Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Volume 32, Issue 5, October 2009

An International journal of current research and theory with open peer commentary Volume 32 | Issue 5 | October 2009 | ISSN: 0140-525X

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Editorial Board Atypical Neurodevelopment Simon Baron-Cohen/Cambridge U. Behavioral Neurogenetics Wim E. Crusio/CNRS UMR Cognition and Artificial Intelligence Zenon Pylyshyn/Rutgers U. Cognitive and Decision Sciences Nick Chater/University College London Cognitive Development Annette Karmiloff-Smith/Birbeck College Cognitive Neuroscience Moshe Bar/Harvard Medical School Computational Neuroscience Nestor A. Schmajuk/Duke U. Evolution of Brain and Cognition Dean Falk/Florida State U. Evolution of Cognition Celia Heyes/Oxford U. Experimental Analysis of Behavior A. Charles Catania/U. Maryland, Baltimore County Language and Language Disorders Max Coltheart/Macquarie U. Linguistics Robert A. Freidin/Princeton U. Perception Bruce Bridgeman/U. of California, Santa Cruz Philosophy of Science Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini/U. of Arizona Primate Cognition Laurie R. Santos/Yale U. Social Cognition Mahzarin R. Banaji/Harvard U. Social Cognitive Neuroscience Rebecca Saxe/MIT Vision, Language and Computation Shimon Edelman/Cornell U.

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Contents

Volume 32:5

October 2009

Vigil, J. M. A socio-relational framework of sex differences in the expression of emotion Open Peer Commentary Basso, F. & Oullier, O. When organization meets emotions, does the socio-relational framework fail? Buss, D. M. The role of emotions in adaptations for exploitation Ferber, S. G. Biofeedback mechanisms between shapeable endogen structures and contingent social complexes: The nature of determination for developmental paths Fischer, A. H. Beyond our origin: Adding social context to an explanation of sex differences in emotion expression Fugate, J. M. B., Gouzoules, H. & Barrett, L. F. Separating production from perception: Perceiver-based explanations for sex differences in emotion Izard, C. E., Finlon, K. J. & Grossman, S. R. Sex differences in emotion expression: Developmental, epigenetic, and cultural factors Li, N. P. & Balliet, D. Emotional expression of capacity and trustworthiness in humor and in social dilemmas LoBue, V. & DeLoache, J. S. On the detection of emotional facial expressions: Are girls really better than boys? Lozano, G. A. The other side of the coin: Intersexual selection and the expression of emotions to signal youth or maturity

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Lyons, M. Cry baby cry, make your mother buy? Evolution of tears, smiles, and reciprocity potential Madison, G. Human female exogamy is supported by cross-species comparisons: Cause to recognise sex differences in societal policy? Provine, R. R. Reciprocity of laughing, humor, and tickling, but not tearing and crying, in the sexual marketplace Swain, J. E. Brain-based sex differences in parenting propagate emotion expression Todorov, A. On the richness and limitations of dimensional models of social perception Vazire, S., Naumann, L. P., Rentfrow, P. J. & Gosling, S. D. Smiling reflects different emotions in men and women Vermeulen, N. On the systematic social role of expressed emotions: An embodied perspective Wiefel, A. & Schepker, R. Expressed emotions, early caregiver –child interaction, and disorders Zayas, V., Tabak, J. A., Gu¨naydy´n, G. & Robertson, J. M. A social-cognitive model of human behavior offers a more parsimonious account of emotional expressivity Author’s Response Vigil, J. M. The socio-relational framework of expressive behaviors as an integrative psychological paradigm

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Evans, N. & Levinson, S. C. The myth of language universals: Language diversity and its importance for cognitive science Open Peer Commentary Baker, M. C. Language universals: Abstract but not mythological Bavin, E. L. Widening the field: The process of language acquisition Berent, I. Unveiling phonological universals: A linguist who asks “why” is (inter alia) an experimental psychologist Catania, A. C. Language evolution: Two tracks are not enough Christiansen, M. H. & Chater, N. The myth of language universals and the myth of universal grammar Croft, W. Syntax is more diverse, and evolutionary linguistics is already here Freidin, R. A note on methodology in linguistics Goldberg, A. E. Essentialism gives way to motivation Harbour, D. The universal basis of local linguistic exceptionality Haspelmath, M. The best-supported language universals refer to scalar patterns deriving from processing cost Margoliash, D. & Nusbaum, H. C. Animal comparative studies should be part of linguistics McMurray, B. & Wasserman, E. Variability in languages, variability in learning? Merker, B. Returning language to culture by way of biology

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Nevins, A. On formal universals in phonology Penn, D. C., Holyoak, K. J. & Povinelli, D. J. Universal grammar and mental continuity: Two modern myths Pesetsky, D. Against taking linguistic diversity at “face value” Pinker, S. & Jackendoff, R. The reality of a universal language faculty Pullum, G. K. & Scholz, B. C. For universals (but not finite-state learning) visit the zoo Rizzi, L. The discovery of language invariance and variation, and its relevance for the cognitive sciences Smolensky, P. & Dupoux, E. Universals in cognitive theories of language Tallerman, M. If language is a jungle, why are we all cultivating the same plot? Tomasello, M. Universal grammar is dead Waterfall, H. & Edelman, S. The neglected universals: Learnability constraints and discourse cues Authors’ Response Evans, N. & Levinson, S. C. With diversity in mind: Freeing the language sciences from Universal Grammar

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BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32, 375 –428 doi:10.1017/S0140525X09991075

A socio-relational framework of sex differences in the expression of emotion Jacob Miguel Vigil Department of Psychology, Center for Applied Research in Child and Adolescent Development, University of North Florida, Jacksonville, FL 32224-2673 [email protected] http://www.unf.edu/~j.vigil/

Abstract: Despite a staggering body of research demonstrating sex differences in expressed emotion, very few theoretical models (evolutionary or non-evolutionary) offer a critical examination of the adaptive nature of such differences. From the perspective of a socio-relational framework, emotive behaviors evolved to promote the attraction and aversion of different types of relationships by advertising the two most parsimonious properties of reciprocity potential, or perceived attractiveness as a prospective social partner. These are the individual’s (a) perceived capacity or ability to provide expedient resources, or to inflict immediate harm onto others, and their (b) perceived trustworthiness or probability of actually reciprocating altruism (Vigil 2007). Depending on the unique social demands and relational constraints that each sex evolved, individuals should be sensitive to advertise “capacity” and “trustworthiness” cues through selective displays of dominant versus submissive and masculine versus feminine emotive behaviors, respectively. In this article, I introduce the basic theoretical assumptions and hypotheses of the framework, and show how the models provide a solid scaffold with which to begin to interpret common sex differences in the emotional development literature. I conclude by describing how the framework can be used to predict condition-based and situation-based variation in affect and other forms of expressive behaviors. Keywords: emotion; evolutionary psychology; femininity; masculinity; affect; motivation; nonverbal behaviors; sex differences; social behaviors; social cognition

1. Introduction In The Expression of Emotion in Man and Animals, Charles Darwin (1872) made multiple observations of similarities and differences in emotional behaviors of humans and other animals, and stylistic differences in emotional expression between men and women that have yet to be fully understood in an evolutionary context. Integrating such between-species and withinspecies variations in emotional expression into a single framework of expressive behaviors remains a challenge for scientists today. From a clinical standpoint, pathologies that tend to affect one sex more than the other, such as low mood in adolescent girls and women, and conduct and autistic spectrum disorders among males, require a better understanding of the causes of normal sex differences in emotional development and emotional expression (e.g., Baron-Cohen et al. 2005; Garber 2000; Rutter et al. 2003). Although males and females may experience these conditions similarly (e.g., felt sadness), they express themselves differently (Bogner & Gallo 2004). Boys are often described as producing more externalizing behaviors that act on the external environment (e.g., physical aggression, psychomotor agitation, risk-taking), whereas girls are described as producing more internalizing behaviors that are focused on the individual (e.g., worrying, sadness, self-blame [Crick & Zahn-Waxler 2003; # Cambridge University Press, 2009

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Khan et al. 2002; Salokangas et al. 2002]). These patterns beget the questions of whether or not common distress behaviors are associated with adaptive cost-benefit tradeoffs, and how and why these trade-offs may differ by sex. In the first section of the article, I introduce a theoretical framework for understanding phenotypic variation in expressed emotion, which I refer to as a socio-relational framework of expressive behaviors (SRFB). The framework integrates and extends traditional non-evolutionary (e.g., Lazarus 1991; Leary 1957) and evolutionary (e.g., Cosmides & Tooby 2000; Nesse 1990) discussions of emotionality by describing the social constraints that JACOB M. VIGIL is an assistant professor in the Psychology Department and co-founder of the Center for Applied Research in Child and Adolescent Development at the University of North Florida. He received his Ph.D. in 2007 from the University of Missouri – Columbia, and has published more than eighteen scientific articles across various areas of social, developmental, and evolutionary psychology. His research in social neuroscience has also been featured in popular media such as Scientific American. Dr. Vigil is currently focused on understanding how the mind adjusts the perception of pain according to social factors, including stochastic life experiences and situational audience effects.

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Vigil: Sex differences in the expression of emotion were likely essential to the evolution of human social and expressive behavioral systems. I reason that sex-typical emotive behaviors would have coevolved with these constraints in order to regulate interpersonal dynamics to enhance social fitness. The framework also attempts to integrate earlier models of emotionality that highlight subjective dimensions of emotional experiences (e.g., valence and arousal; Barrett 1998) with the natural diversity of expressed emotion. In the second section, I discuss new work in the evolution and development of sex-typical social dynamics, relationship demands, and social styles, including the perception and expression of masculine versus feminine behaviors. I go on to review common sex differences in the emotional development literature and show how the vast majority of findings can be integrated into the broader socio-relational framework. In the third and final section, I outline how this framework regularizes our understanding of gender variation, relationship variation, and conditional variation in expressive behaviors across the life span. I describe how the quality and quantity of one’s relationships can be related to cost-benefit fitness trade-offs, and how distinctive patterns of expression may be functional for the formation and maintenance of specific types of relationships. 2. The evolution of emotional expressivity The SRFB rests on the assumptions that the adaptive significance of affective responses (e.g., emotions, dispositions, moods) lies in their expression and that affect behaviors function to systematically motivate other people to respond to the signaler in ways that enhance the signaler’s fitness (e.g., Darwin 1872; Dunn 2003; McGuire 1993; Snowdon 2003; see also Panksepp 2000; 2003; Patterson 2003). Neither physiological arousal, nor feelings occurring within a person can enhance fitness unless there are actions associated with these internal states (James 1884). I thus operationally define emotions as expressive behaviors that are often associated with the conscious awareness of intense, appealing and aversive sensations. Likewise, I define a social expression as any behavior that is both observable and can be exaggerated or attenuated by the individual’s audience or other social context. Several lines of research support this description. Developmental studies, for example, show that human infants produce their very first emotive gestures, such as smiling, subsequent to a social interaction that includes face-to-face contact, and that these behaviors tend to cease immediately following the termination of a mutual gaze (Yale et al. 2003). Similarly, people become more expressive (e.g., smile) when they know that others are observing them; when observers have similar descriptive characteristics to the participant; when fellow audience members are perceived to be interacting, such as engaging in mutual eye contact; and even when audience members are not physically present, but are only perceived to be, such as when children are told that another child is viewing the same film in another room (Chapman 1973; 1975; Fridlund 1991; Jakobs et al. 1996; Kraut & Johnston 1979; LaFrance et al. 2003). Fridlund summarized this research by suggesting that emotional expressivity is not only moderated by, but is perhaps mediated by, the 376

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imaginary presence of others, and that the expressive components of emotionality should not be assumed to represent felt experiences (see Fridlund et al. 1990). I use these examples not to debate whether the expressive component of emotion is more biologically primary than the cognitive and experiential components (e.g., see Haidt 2001), but simply to justify the relevance of focusing on the types of social properties or socially relevant information that may underlie variation in the expression of emotive gestures. 2.1. Basic dimensions of emotive behaviors

The SRFB subsumes many traditional models of emotive behaviors, especially models that highlight the significance of trust and dominant/submissive patterns of interaction behaviors (e.g., Carson 1969; Darwin 1872). For example, Leary (1957) proposed that personality behaviors (e.g., acting nice, weak, aggressive, and confident) can be conceptualized as representing two dimensions: dominance versus submissiveness and love versus hate. He described these behaviors in the context of the reciprocated reactions (e.g., kindness, sympathy, fright, and respect) that they evoke from others. The SRFB extends Leary’s and similar models by explicating potential fitness advantages of the motivations to both signal and respond to these traits, as well as by describing how and why these interaction patterns covary with experiential successes versus failures and situational circumstances, such as interpersonal relationship dynamics and audience characteristics. 2.1.1 Approach and withdrawal behaviors. Central to the SRFB is the premise that the most basic dimension of expressed emotion is the universal motivation to respond to external stimuli, and especially to other social agents, with either approach or withdrawal behaviors (Buck 1999; Davidson 1993; Davidson et al. 2000; see also Cacioppo et al. 1993; Camras et al. 1993; Gray 2002). Approach behaviors are actions designed to exploit the environment such as food and mates, whereas withdrawal behaviors are actions designed to avert environmental threats such as toxins and predators. In humans, this system may be especially sensitive to evaluate potential benefits and dangers of interacting with other people and engaging in different types of relationships. Interactions that have the potential to provide reciprocated investment should stimulate affiliative behaviors, whereas interactions that are non-reciprocal in nature, and thus potentially exploitive, should stimulate avoidant behaviors. When considered from an evolutionary perspective, the basic motivation to respond to other social agents through either affiliative or avoidant behaviors should occur reflexively and heuristically and thus be responsive to ecologically relevant stimuli, and develop and manifest as prototypical facial and bodily gestures in the absence of extensive social modeling (Darwin 1859; ¨ hman see also Cosmides & Tooby 2000; LeDoux 1996; O & Wiens 2003). From this perspective, the types of experiences (e.g., social losses) that elicit a behavioral response (e.g., sadness behaviors) are directly associated with the form and functionality of the behaviors themselves. Research on facial expression processing shows that the human amygdala is sensitive to process threatening faces

Vigil: Sex differences in the expression of emotion (e.g., expressions of anger and fear) more quickly and accurately than other stimuli, and especially when the signaler is a male (e.g., Fox et al. 2000; Goos & Silverman 2002; Mogg ¨ hman (2002) summarized this research & Bradley 1999). O by suggesting that hypersensitivity to fearful and angry faces does not reflect an emotion-processing system that is specialized to process the physical characteristics of the human face, per se, but rather an evolved cognitive bias to discriminate threatening from non-threatening individuals. This interpretation is supported by research showing parallel sensitivities for processing nonsocial dangers (e.g., ¨ hman et al. 2001]). snakes and spiders [O A related prediction is that attentive and perceptual biases to detect threatening and non-threatening individuals should have coevolved with expressive behaviors designed to promote affiliative and aversive responses from others. In theory, these behaviors should operate by signaling the opportunity to form reciprocal relationships (e.g., displayed kindness) or the ability to protect oneself (e.g., displayed meanness), depending on the likelihood of receiving reciprocal investment from others (see also Hamm et al. 2003). In this sense, all expressive gestures, including affect behaviors, should be identifiable along an affiliative/ avoidant dimension of behavioral response, depending on whether the behavior typically results in social bonding or in social distancing, across individual relationships. The basic questions that follow are: “What types of social properties should individuals be sensitive to attend to in other people?” and, correspondingly, “What characteristics should individuals express or advertise to others?” 2.1.1.1. Reciprocity potential. The SRFB is based on the

thesis that the social properties that influence the motivation to either be attracted to or to avoid other people may be framed in terms of the construct “reciprocity potential” (Vigil 2007). According to this framework, organisms should be sensitive to display or advertise their reciprocity potential, or perceived attractiveness as a social partner (e.g., mate, friend, community member), by displaying the types of characteristics that are preferred among conspecifics. In the broadest sense, reciprocity potential represents the individual’s cache of resources that are extractable by others through a single or series of social interactions. More specifically, I have previously hypothesized that this potential is contingent on two essential social properties: perceived capacity and trustworthiness cues. Capacity cues demonstrate the individual’s ability to provide some sort of resource (genetic material, food, protection, socio-political opportunities, etc.) or to inflict immediate harm on others. In contrast, trustworthiness cues demonstrate the individual’s intentions, desires, or otherwise probability of actually reciprocating altruism and hence investing into a relationship (Vigil 2007; for a similar discussion, see Newcomb 1990). These two elementary concepts (capacity and trustworthiness) may be the most parsimonious properties of reciprocity potential, because insufficient levels of either of these constructs, such as having a lot to offer but being unwilling to do so, or being willing but having nothing to offer, result in little impact on others. 2.1.2. Capacity and trustworthiness behaviors. 2.1.2.1. Capacity cues. Empirical studies show that humans, as do

other highly affiliative species, respond to social challenges

with either “dominant” or “submissive” behavioral strategies (e.g., happiness vs. sadness, aggression vs. appeasement, disdain vs. shame, confidence vs. worry [Aureli 1997; Bugental & Lewis 1998; Sapolsky 2004; see also Darwin 1872]). These patterns may reflect behavioral advertisements of one’s abilities (cues of capacity) and intentions (cues of trustworthiness), respectively. For example, capacity cues may be perceived through personal characteristics, such as physical stature, personal competencies, material resources, and perceived dominance that signal the individual’s ability to physically invest in or to otherwise affect the welfare of others, either positively or negatively. Traits that distinguish the individual’s personal competencies and healthiness (e.g., physical attractiveness; Scheib et al. 1999) are fundamental components of implicit personality theories (Schneider 1973) and appear to be unrelated to perceptions of integrity and concern for others (Eagly et al. 1991). Likewise, behavioral studies of humans and other socially embedded species (e.g., monkeys and hyenas) show that individuals implicitly attend to, stare at, and mimic peers whom they perceive to be more powerful, dominant, and higher-status, rather than behaving in this manner towards subordinates (Fiske 1993a; Holekamp 2006). These studies suggest that cognitive biases to attend to cues of dominance (e.g., larger size, erect posture, threat stares, assertive speech, expressed confidence) may be corollary features of social processing in primates, in general, and almost certainly in humans (Mazur 1985; Mignault & Chaudhuri 2003; Moors & De Houwer 2005; see also Tiedens & Fragale 2003). The current suggestion is that these perceptual biases may represent a modularized detection system that is primed to evaluate traits and behaviors that signal others’ capacity to reciprocate social favors or capacity to inflict physical harm onto the individual. 2.1.2.2. Trustworthiness cues. In contrast to signals of

capacity, trustworthiness cues are perceived through interpersonal characteristics such as kindness, sympathy, and integrity in humans, and through submissive behaviors in less social species. The basic reasoning is that explicit demonstrations of prosocial behaviors (e.g., expressed compassion) and displays of vulnerability (e.g., head bow, gaze aversion, slow movement patterns, crying and worrying behaviors, self-degradation) may be adaptive by reducing the perception of threat and thus disarming the threat interpretation by others. Through exaggerated displays of benevolence, individuals may be signaling their motivations and intentions, and hence their trustworthiness or probability of reciprocating altruism. Of course, the phenotypic manifestation of submissive behaviors (e.g., crying) may also reflect the individual’s actual vulnerability and inability to reciprocate resources. However, the current reasoning is that these handicaps would not be displayed so explicitly or in such an exaggerated form unless there was a specific fitness advantage to doing so. Likewise, several studies have identified a specialized neural circuitry (involving the right superior temporal sulcus) that may be responsible for the detection of trustworthiness in other people (Winston et al. 2002; see also Adolphs et al. 1998). Todorov and colleagues, for instance, showed that people are particularly sensitive to process BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5

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Vigil: Sex differences in the expression of emotion cues of competency and trustworthiness in human faces, and that these evaluations are both automatic and integral to social trait impressions (Todorov 2008; Todorov et al. 2005; Willis & Todorov 2006). More specific analyses show that amygdala activity is positively correlated with perceptions of distrust and with facial expressions (e.g., anger and fear) that signal threat (Engell et al. 2007; Todorov 2008; Zald 2003). Other research shows that people elicit specific endocrine responses, involving the release of oxytocin and vasopressin, when they experience increased trustworthiness and bonding toward others (e.g., Bartels & Zeki 2004; Zak et al. 2004). Behavioral studies have similarly uncovered numerous factors (e.g., repeatedly interacting with others; Ben-Ner et al. 2004; Buckingham et al. 2006) and interpersonal behaviors that humans may use to induce perceptions of trustworthiness and compliance, including eye contact, self-disclosure, physical touch, smiling, and simple mimicry (Bayliss & Tipper 2006; Collins & Miller 1994; Crusco & Wetzel 1984; Kurzban 2001; Lakin & Chartrand 2003; van Baaren et al. 2004; Webbink 1986; Willis & Hamm 1980). At least one other study has shown that participants who were administered oxytocin in turn expressed higher levels of eye contact than did controls (Guastella et al. 2008). From a socio-relational perspective, these perceptual, neuroendocrine, and expressive biases may have coevolved to process the trustworthiness component of other peoples’ reciprocity potential, as well as the motivation to advertise these cues to others selectively (see also Boone & Buck 2003). 2.2. Unique features of capacity and trustworthiness cues

Collectively, these studies suggest that humans are sensitive to categorizing others according to dominance status and traits that signal altruistic tendencies and vulnerability (e.g., babyish features; Fiske 1993b). From a socio-relational perspective, these sensitivities reflect the basic motivation to process the abilities and intentions and hence reciprocity potential of other people. Related research on social preferences suggests that people may evaluate capacity and trustworthiness attributes in others somewhat differently. People tend to evaluate capacity traits (e.g., physical attractiveness, intelligence, material resources) in others relative to self-evaluations (Lazarsfeld & Merton 1954; see also Kenrick et al. 2003) and prefer peers that have similar, yet slightly higher, levels of these traits over peers with significantly lower or significantly higher capacity attributes than themselves (Vigil 2007). In contrast, people tend to appreciate trustworthiness traits (e.g., kindness, responsibility) in others in a more linear fashion such that the highest levels are most preferred, and preferences are independent of self-evaluations (Li et al. 2002; Vigil 2007). These findings are important, because they suggest that perceptions of trustworthiness are obligatory for the formation of most reciprocal relationships, whereas the selective increase or decrease of capacity displays may be needed to strengthen individual relationships between people that differ in social status. The importance of trustworthiness for human sociality may be why people tend to report and presumably believe that they are “kinder than the average person” and why people inflate their self-described kindness more so than other attributes (Vigil 2007). Increased 378

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sensitivity to appreciate kindness in others and to exaggerate expressions of, and perhaps (falsely) believe in, the unique virtue of one’s own kindness may ultimately result in stabilizing human relationships at the dyadic, group, and perhaps species levels of sociality. Other research suggests that humans may be motivated to adjust preference for capacity and trustworthiness traits in others in relation to the expected extent of the relationship. For example, research on human mate preferences shows that both men and women place greater emphasis on preference for high capacity traits (e.g., physical attractiveness, material resources) rather than high trustworthiness traits when seeking short-term relationships. In contrast, people place a greater emphasis on high trustworthiness traits (e.g., kindness, responsibility) when seeking long-term, more committed, or more exclusive relationships (Cottrell et al. 2007; Geary et al. 2004; Li et al. 2002; Vigil et al. 2006). From a socio-relational perspective, capacity cues may be sought and preferred in short-term relationships, because these types of characteristics do not require repeated interactions to be accurately assessed; they are immediately and more generally observable in other people. In contrast, the veracity of trustworthiness cues may be less discernable through limited exposure, and instead requires repeated interactions to be evaluated accurately. A complementary hypothesis is that people perceive capacity and trustworthiness cues as signaling the potential to interchange different types of resources with others. Capacity cues may signal one’s expedient or immediate resource potential, such as genetic resources in the case of mate preferences. In contrast, trustworthiness cues may signal one’s willingness to provide more continuous provisioning, such as extensive and reliable social support. In this sense, the selective advantage in evaluating and potentially interchanging capacity and trustworthiness cues with other people may pivot on the cost-benefit trade-offs that may be associated with investing in different types of relationships (e.g., Vigil & Geary 2007). In any case, sensitivity to subtleties in capacity and trustworthiness cues in others, and the tendency to increase preference for higher levels of these cues in short-term and long-term relationships (respectively), suggest that detection and expression of these attributes may be integral to relationship formation. Finally, it is important to note that not all capacity and trustworthiness attributes are intuitively associated with the perception of dominance and submissiveness, respectively. Consider the case of a diseased person who has the capacity to infect others but who is perceived as vulnerable, or a person who is perceived to be trustworthy because of a highstatus job. These cases show that dominance and submissiveness trait impressions, while typically associated with high-capacity and high-trustworthiness attributes, are merely examples of cues that humans may use to interchange reciprocity potential. 2.3. Variation in discrete emotive behaviors

From the perspective of the SRFB, discrete emotive gestures (e.g., facial expressions, body-movement patterns, sustained mood behaviors) are examples of social expressions that have evolved to display capacity and trustworthiness cues in order to promote interpersonal affiliation or distancing from other people. In this sense, the

Vigil: Sex differences in the expression of emotion following models incorporate both dimensional and discrete aspects of emotionality. According to the SRFB, discrete emotive behaviors (e.g., sadness vs. joy), while specialized in form and function, may also be conceptualized along broad patterns or dimensions of functionality. This is not to say that discrete emotive behaviors are always manifested within an immediate social context, they are always associated with either the motivation to promote affiliation or avoidance, they never overlap, or that they are only targeted at single individuals or types of audiences. On the contrary, just like other forms of communication such as speech, emotions can manifest in the absence of physical audiences. Likewise, many emotive gestures such as sadness and aggressive responses are pleiotropic, emerge in coordination with other emotions (e.g., simultaneous displays of joy and aggression; Hubbard et al. 2002), and can be functional for both social consolidation and social distancing (discussed in more detail in section 3, “Implications for variation in expressive behaviors”). The current suggestion is that discrete emotive behaviors, while variable in context, may operate through systematic processes, each in terms of the types of events that precipitate their expression, the expressive characteristics of the gestures themselves, and the social outcomes or responses they elicit from others. 2.3.1. Responses to events. One prediction from the

SRFB is that discrete emotive behaviors covary with conditions that affect the opportunity to advertise the capacity and trustworthiness components of reciprocity potential. A conceptual illustration of how salient life conditions and evaluations of other people may affect the expression of so-described “basic” emotions (see Ortony & Turner 1990) is presented in Figure 1. For convenience, I have separated the emotions into two categories: responses to events (Fig. 1a) and responses to other people (Fig. 1b). Figure 1a shows examples of emotions that people express in response to events and circumstances that affect their own perceived reciprocity potential; I refer to these emotions as intra-appraisal emotions. “High” and “Low” levels of capacity and trustworthiness traits represent the individual’s state in relation to the event or circumstance, and in relation to one’s immediate peers. The corresponding emotions should then be inferred as behavioral responses to the event that operate in part to selectively promote affiliation or avoidance, and as advertising either capacity or trustworthiness cues to others (Fig. 1a). For example, Figure 1a shows how behavioral expressions of joy and anger may be conceptualized as distinct forms of high-capacity displays that, under certain conditions, are functional for either attracting or averting interactions with other people. Facial expressions of joy and anger are both associated with the perception of dominance from others, though they differ in that joy is associated with the attendant perception of high affiliation, whereas anger is associated with the perception of low affiliation (e.g., Izard 1993; Marsh et al. 2005; Montepare & Dobish 2003). According to the SRFB, people are predicted to express these emotions when they either increase or retain high levels of capacity attributes (e.g., health, material resources, physical prowess, social status), but express these emotions differently according to whether

Figure 1. (a) Intra-appraisal emotions are responses to the impact of an event or set of circumstances on the individual’s own reciprocity potential. Events that decrease the individual’s capacity resources (see the y-axis) elicit low-capacity emotions (e.g., sadness and fear), whereas events that retain or enhance these attributes elicit high-capacity emotions (e.g., anger and joy). Depending on the individual’s perceived trustworthiness status (see the x-axis), he or she should express emotions that either avert social interactions (e.g., anger and fear) when he or she is not trusted or cannot trust others, or solicit affiliation (e.g., joy and sadness) under more secure social conditions. (b) In contrast, extra-appraisal emotions are responses to the evaluation of other people’s reciprocity potential. Individuals should respond to other people who are perceived as “low” in trustworthiness (x-axis) with avoidant emotions (e.g., disgust and fear), and respond to other people who are perceived as “high” in trustworthiness with affiliative emotions (e.g., love and sympathy). Depending on the simultaneous perception of the other person’s capacity attributes (y-axis), individuals should produce emotions that advertise their own cues of highcapacity (e.g., love and disgust) or high-trustworthiness (e.g., sympathy and fear) to the person being evaluated.

the individual also perceives their immediate relationships to be trustworthy or untrustworthy. Thus, expressions of joy and pride may be conceptualized as affiliative responses that signal successful experiences and available resources and hence capacity to reciprocate with others under trustworthy social conditions. Instead, expressions of anger and hostility may be primarily avoidant responses that are used to signal the ability to protect oneself under conditions in which the perception of trust has been breached. People who endure repeated experiences of distrust (e.g., peer rejection, child abuse, adult assault) in their lives show greater sensitivities to recognize and display felt anger and aggression (Hubbard 2001; Pollak & Sinha 2002; Vigil et al., submitted). When individuals experience these feelings, they prefer to avoid other people (Vigil, 2008); when individuals encounter angry peers, they similarly inhibit affiliative gestures (e.g., expressed sympathy; Strayer & Roberts 2004). In contrast, under conditions in which people experience decreased capacity resources, such as financial and social losses (Brown 2000; Salvador 2005), they may instead exaggerate displays of vulnerability and harmlessness in order to signal their intentions and thus the trustworthiness component of reciprocity potential through emotions such as sadness and fear. However, as shown BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5

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Vigil: Sex differences in the expression of emotion in Figure 1a, the expression of these emotions may differ according to the level of social support available to the individual. People are predicted to express sadness under conditions in which the individual can rely on the trustworthiness of others, and instead express fear when in untrustworthy, less secure social contexts. Sadness behaviors such as crying and blushing are highly associated with the perception of trust and with expressed sympathy by others (e.g., de Jong 1999; Van Tilburg et al. 2002; Williams 1982; Zeifman 2001; see also Boone & Buck 2003). From the current perspective, sadness behaviors have evolved to signal trustworthiness cues to others at times when the ability to display high capacity is diminished and in ways that solicit reciprocal advertisements of trustworthiness displays from others, such as increased attention, expressed sympathy, and behavioral and material investment. In contrast, fear behaviors (e.g., high-pitched whimpering and alarm screams, worrying, incontinence) may be better suited for exaggerating the display of submissiveness and vulnerability in ways that avert interactions with dangerous people. These behaviors may ultimately operate to subjugate the display of capacity, diffuse the threat interpretation of others, stigmatize the status reward of a confrontational victory by others, and ultimately motivate potential assailants to leave the debilitated individual alone. 2.3.2. Responses to other people. Figure 1b shows that

the types of emotions that people express in response to the evaluation of others, referred to as extra-appraisal emotions, may also be understood in terms of reciprocity potential and the motivation to affiliate or avert interactions with others. For these emotions, “High” and “Low” trait levels represent perceptions of another person’s reciprocity potential relative to self-evaluations. The corresponding emotions should again be inferred as behavioral responses to the evaluations of another person, and as reciprocating displays of capacity or trustworthiness cues in order to promote affiliation or avoidance with the other person. For example, individuals may respond to other people who are perceived as “high” in trustworthiness but having “low” capacity attributes with affiliative responses designed to reciprocate the display of one’s own trustworthiness, such as through expressed compassion and sympathy (see also Miller 2004; Rudolph et al. 2004). Likewise, individuals may respond, when perceiving the other person as both highly trustworthy and highly competent, with behaviors that signal one’s own capacity and desire to invest in a reciprocal relationship, through expressions such as admiration and love. Other people who are perceived as untrustworthy should instead increase one’s threat interpretation and should thus stimulate avoidant responses designed to protect the individual. Depending on whether the other person is also perceived as possessing high or low capacity to inflict harm, individuals may express emotions designed to reciprocate the display of vulnerability (e.g., expressed fear) or capacity (e.g., expressed disgust), respectively (see Fig. 1b). Humans and other primates express fear and other submissive displays (e.g., apologizing behaviors, allogrooming, lip smacking) for mitigating conflict with more dominant individuals (Aureli 1997; McCullough et al. 1998). In contrast, people may respond to others 380

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who are perceived as both untrustworthy and incapable with dominant emotions such as disgust and hatred in order to intimidate, stigmatize, or otherwise avert future interactions with such persons (see also Kurzban & Leary 2001; Nesse 2005). Thus, while both fear and disgust responses promote social avoidance, they are predicted to manifest differently depending on the costs and benefits of displaying either lower or higher capacity cues to potential adversaries. The preceding examples pertain only to a handful of common emotions. However, the overarching thesis – that discrete emotive behaviors are functional for promoting affiliation and avoidance and for selectively advertising capacity and trustworthiness cues to others – may be helpful for understanding more complex emotional experiences. For example, discrete emotions can sometimes occur in the absence of an apparent social context, such as feelings of joy in achieving an insight, anger over a failed hard-drive, fear of incarceration, and sadness over losing a treasured object. These phenomena may be due to the way that the situations simulate experiences that actually influence reciprocity potential, including the loss or gain of capacity resources, and the dependability and threat of relied-upon relationships. Other emotions may similarly be understood in terms of reciprocity potential, such as the relative dissonance between self-perceived and other-perceived reciprocity potential (e.g., guilt, embarrassment, pride, honor), the perceived integrity of other people’s reciprocity potential relative to oneself (e.g., disdain, respect), expectations of social affiliations (e.g., feelings of entitlement, remorse, sorrow, jealousy), and lack of control over changes in reciprocity potential (e.g., anxiety). In theory, each of these reactions is systematic in form and function, and is therefore predicted to be associated with the perception of competencies (e.g., dominance) and/or trustworthiness (e.g., submissiveness) and to manifest in ways that either strengthen or diminish relationship formation. 2.4. Summary

The current framework suggests that many, if not all, forms of expressive behaviors, including the momentary and sustained expression of emotion, may be functional for regulating interpersonal relationships. In this sense, even some seemingly problematic behaviors, such as the awareness and self-report of feelings of despair, selfdegradation, and somatic disturbances (e.g., loss of appetite and irregular sleep) that constitute depression, may be interpretable from a socio-relational perspective. For example, several theorists have suggested that extreme sadness behaviors may be adaptive in several ways that help offset the fitness costs of reduced social standing and risk of being exploited that are associated with negative life-experiences. Such benefits of depressive behaviors may be lowering risk-taking behaviors and reducing conflict with more dominant individuals, sometimes described as an “involuntary defeat strategy” (Allen & Badcock 2003; Fournier et al. 2002; Keller & Nesse 2005; Sloman & Gilbert 2000). The current suggestion, however, is that that these behaviors operate primarily as expressive mechanisms that function to explicate demonstrations of vulnerability and incapacity in order to reduce the perception of

Vigil: Sex differences in the expression of emotion threat to others. By responding to social adversity through submissiveness behaviors (e.g., Vigil et al., in press), individuals may be advertising the single most important criterion for the ability to solicit high levels of reliable social support in times of stress; that is, trustworthiness cues in the form of displayed vulnerability (see also Hagen 2003). 3. The evolution of sex differences in the expression of emotion Ironically, even Darwin struggled to understand sex differences in emotionality from the principles of sexual selection – selection forces that act on one sex and not the other – that he first described and which presently underlie our understanding of all sexual dimorphisms in nature (e.g., Geary 2009). For instance, in his 1872 monograph on the expression of emotion, Darwin concluded that the prototypical absence of weeping in males “may be accounted for by its being thought weak and unmanly by men, both of civilized and barbarous races, to exhibit bodily pain by any outward sign” (Darwin 1872, p. 153). From a contemporary scientific perspective, this explanation is of course insufficient, because it provides no biological rationale for why emotive behaviors such as weeping are associated with specific social properties (e.g., perceptions of submissiveness), why children implicitly model same-sex behaviors (e.g., Bandura et al. 1961), and why the fitness advantage of displaying these behaviors and associated social properties may differ for human males as compared to females. Despite the universality of observable sex differences in emotion styles (reviewed in detail in section 3.2), some researchers believe that these distinctions are nonexistent or unimportant (e.g., Wester et al. 2002). Such conclusions are usually drawn from research indicating statistically small effect sizes for some elements of emotionality (e.g., sex differences in empathetic behaviors) compared to other elements (e.g., sex differences in self-reported empathy; see Eisenberg & Lennon 1983). In these studies, researchers find as much intra-group variability as is found between the sexes. However, even behaviors such as depressive symptoms with statistically modest effect sizes (e.g., d ¼ .36) can result in a multifold risk of suffering from clinically profound distress in one sex (e.g., in this case, females) over the other (e.g., Vigil et al., in press). Findings like these suggest that developing a better understanding of sex differences in emotionality is not only worthy of consideration, but that this focus may be essential for understanding the behavior syndromes themselves. From the perspective of the SRFB, phenotypic variation in the expression of capacity (e.g., externalizing) and trustworthiness (e.g., internalizing) behaviors is predicted to covary with fundamental characteristics of the individual’s relationships, such as the perceived trustworthiness and perhaps the expected extent of interpersonal investment (e.g., short-term vs. long-term) across different types of relationships. A large body of research in the social developmental literature describes related distinctions in the prototypical social networks and relational styles of human males and females. These studies show that girls and women spontaneously form and report a preference

for fewer, but more intimate, relationships with their same-sex peers. Boys and men evidence the opposite pattern, forming and reporting a preference for larger, but less intimate, social networks, on average (Geary et al. 2003; Lever 1978; Maccoby 2002; Rose & Rudolph 2006; Vigil 2007). In other words, the corollary distinctions between males’ and females’ social styles pivot on the quality and quantity of individual relationships that children are sensitive to form and that children and adults engage in their daily lives. In order to ascertain how and why these relationship strategies are manifested psychologically and behaviorally, we must therefore examine the types of social constraints that may have been unique to ancestral males as compared to females (Baumeister & Sommer 1997). 3.1. Male-biased philopatry and male-male coalitional competition

Within the last decade, several theorists have integrated a model that provides a potential evolutionary explanation for sex differences in social styles. Collectively, this model can be framed in terms of a human evolutionary history characterized by male-biased philopatry and male-male coalitional competition. In this type of social system, males remain in closer proximity to their male kin, thus allowing them to form strong, kin-based coalitions, whereas females tend to emigrate into the social networks of their husbands upon marriage (see Geary 2002; 2009; Geary & Flinn 2002; Geary et al. 2003; Wrangham & Peterson 1996). This system describes the migratory patterns of traditional societies (Murdock 1981; Pasternak et al. 1997) and is consistent with population-genetics studies on extant (Seielstad 2000; Seielstad et al. 1998; Wells et al. 2001; Wilson et al. 2001) and historical societies (Hammer et al. 2001; Semino et al. 2000), which show that males are more likely to remain in closer proximity to their genetic relatives than are females. Still, while predominant throughout human societies, the extent of male-biased philopatry does vary according to a number of contextual and ecological factors (see Geary 2009). For example, in foraging societies with bride service, the prospective husband is expected to reside with his bride’s family to provide service to them before the marriage and often for some time afterwards (Marlowe 2004). As would be expected, these patterns are related to the nature of inter-group hostilities (Pasternak et al. 1997), with male philopatry being more common during times of, and among societies that engage in, frequent between-group conflict. Nevertheless, these consistent patterns of social migration and cohesion are important, because they would have resulted in unique sub-ecologies in the day-to-day interactions of males and females throughout human evolutionary history. Within systems of male-biased philopatry, males would have been exposed to and reliant upon more daily interactions with kin, on average. In contrast, females would have been dependent upon more daily interactions with non-kin or distantly related kin (de Waal 1993; Geary 2002; Geary et al. 2003). According to inclusive fitness theory (Hamilton 1964; Trivers 1971) and based on behavioral research (Daly & Wilson 1988; de Waal 1993; 2000; West et al. 2002), relationships between non-kin require BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5

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Vigil: Sex differences in the expression of emotion more initial investment and maintenance behaviors and are generally more fragile than relationships among genetic relatives. This is because relationships between kin are maintained by inclusive fitness (the sharing of genes; Hamilton 1964), whereas relationships between non-kin are maintained by reciprocal altruism (the sharing of investment behaviors; Trivers 1971). In the context of the SRFB, the tendency for women to solicit more committed and secure relationships among non-kin would have created a heavy reliance on behaviors designed to advertise their trustworthiness through higher levels of submissive displays such as crying behaviors, intimate selfdisclosure, self-depreciation, and displayed compassion. At the same time, females may have facilitated reciprocal exchanges of trust cues by forming smaller social networks; fewer daily interactions enable greater allocation of intimate, time-consuming investment behaviors in individual relationships (Geary & Flinn 2001; 2002; Geary et al. 2003; Vigil 2007). In contrast, as a result of an evolutionary history of male-male, kin-based, coalitional competition, there is predicted to be an overall relaxation of the selection pressures for males to exaggerate the expression of vulnerability (e.g., expressed pain) and intimacy behaviors (e.g., selfdisclosure, expressed sympathy). In theory, this would have enabled men to form a greater number of total relationships, and thus larger and more functional coalitions. At the same time, men may have evolved a sensitivity to rely more heavily on the advertisement of externalizing behaviors (e.g., physical aggression), displays of dominance (e.g., inflated self-evaluations), and thus capacity cues in order to attract and maintain more numerous, but less intimate and less exclusive, relationships. According to this reasoning, intra-sexual selection forces were predominantly responsible for driving the evolution of sex differences in social styles. This general thesis is consistent with studies showing that children are better able to process same-sex, rather than opposite-sex, faces (Goos & Silverman 2002), and report more comfort observing same-sex speech styles and body language (Underwood et al. 2001). This thesis is also consistent with stressresponse studies showing that men produce greater hypothalamic pituitary adrenal (HPA) activity from between-group competition than from within-group competition (Wagner et al. 2002), and that these responses are associated with pre-competition preparation and focus. Instead, pre-competition HPA activity in women is less associated with inter-group competition and more associated with interest in bonding and affiliation with fellow team-members (Kivlighan et al. 2005). Other research suggests that men produce greater stress responses in anticipation of events that compare capacity attributes (e.g., public demonstrations of intelligence), whereas women’s stress systems are more sensitive to social exclusion (Stroud et al. 2002; Uhart et al. 2006). Despite this support, some scientists contend that malebiased philopatry is an artifact of modern culture, that these patterns are driven by economic rather than instinctual advantages, and that ancestral males were unlikely to have formed dominance hierarchies and to have engaged in systematic violence (Knauft 1991; Wood & Eagly 2002). Some of these researchers have, in turn, suggested that sex differences in social behaviors may arise from asexual cognitive processes, such as the motivation to 382

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conform and to form norms, and that these behaviors are neither functional nor particularly expressive (e.g., Wood & Eagly 2002). This position is counterbalanced by cross-cultural and developmental research (described in the following section) that shows consistent sex differences in emotional development, and by research supporting a major thesis of the SRFB – that sex differences in emotionality are specific and functional. In the following sections, I review the literature on sex differences in emotional development, and allow readers to judge for themselves the utility of a socio-relational approach for interpreting this body of work. 3.2. Empirical support from the emotional development literature 3.2.1. Sex differences in nonverbal expressions. 3.2.1.1. Facial expressions. The central hypotheses from the SRFB

are that males have evolved increased sensitivities to process and exaggerate expressions of capacity cues, relative to females, and that females have evolved increased sensitivities to process and exaggerate expressions of trustworthiness cues, relative to males (Vigil 2007). On average, women are more skilled at decoding the emotional disposition of both sexes (Belle 1987; Neff & Karney 2005; Rosip & Hall 2004; see also Hojjat 2000; Kiecolt-Glaser & Newton 2001). Electroencephalographic studies and emotion-discrimination tasks using filtering and merging techniques, for example, show that females are able to process discrete facial expressions (e.g., sadness vs. fear) faster and more accurately than males (Campanella et al. 2004; Cellerino et al. 2004; Hall & Matsumoto 2004; Larkin et al. 2002; see also Hall 1984). This effect size is largest during infancy and smaller, but still constant, as children mature (McClure 2000). The only type of facial expression that boys and men may be more accurate at detecting is anger, and especially when the poser is another male (Goos & Silverman 2002). Other research suggests that males and females may be biased to process facial expressions differently, depending on the sex of the poser. For example, several studies have found that boys and men demonstrate higher accuracy rates and shorter detection times in categorizing neutral or ambiguous facial expressions of male posers as anger and disgust. In contrast, girls and women are more apt to categorize ambiguities in female faces as fear and sadness (Goos & Silverman 2002; Larkin et al. 2002; Mignault & Chaudhuri 2003; Widen & Russell 2002). According to the SRFB, because anger/disgust and fear/ sadness expressions are associated with the perception of dominance and submissiveness, respectively (e.g., Marsh et al. 2005; Montepare & Dobish 2003), these biases may reflect a differential sensitivity in processing the capacity and trustworthiness components of reciprocity potential in males and females. In general, however, both sexes are better able to process the facial expressions of female posers (Dimitrovsky et al. 2000; Ramsey et al. 2005), probably because females tend to produce more exaggerated facial expressions than males. Regardless of whether expressions were assessed via electromyography, facialaction coding, or cross-context observational techniques, women produced more exaggerated facial expressions, even when both sexes reported similar levels of felt

Vigil: Sex differences in the expression of emotion emotion (Eisenberg et al. 1996; Grossman & Wood 1993; Kring & Gordon 1998; LaFrance et al. 2003; Thunberg & Dimberg 2000). Other studies have found greater facial expressivity in female infants (e.g., 28– 42 weeks old; Guinsberg et al. 2000) and more rapid development and overall motor movement of the mouths of female fetuses, compared to males (Hepper et al. 1997; Miller et al. 2006). The prenatal differences were found despite no sex differences in overall physical growth. Collectively, these findings suggest that females may develop affective processing and expressive systems, effectively characterizing “women’s intuition,” that are more specialized for moderating intimate relationships than are developed by males. 3.2.1.2. Vocal expressions. Research on emotional prosody

(see Scherer et al. 2003) has yielded similar findings in terms of an overall female advantage in decoding and propensity to express emotion sounds. Women appear to be more accurate at discerning the emotional prosody of others (Besson et al. 2002; see also Sternglanz & DePaulo 2004), although these differences are not always detected (e.g., Morton & Trehub 2001; Wells et al. 2004). Other research on preschoolers’ conversation styles shows that girls tend to be more talkative and recite more collaborative, informing, and obliging sentences, and interject their partner’s speech with more ‘positive’ interruption behaviors by using more sympathetic and encouraging utterances and nodding. In contrast, boys tend to produce more controlling and assertive sentences, and provide more ‘negative’ interruption feedback (e.g., contradictory, analytical) to their partners, especially during unstructured activities with same-sex peers (Anderson & Leaper 1998; Dindia 1987; Leaper & Smith 2004; Leaper et al. 1999; Leman et al. 2005). Although these behaviors are sometimes described as “behavioral misconduct,” recent evidence suggests that assertive speech styles may be particularly functional for group-level problem-solving tasks. Boys who used more assertive and controlling, but less obliging, speech styles tended to do better at group-level competitive tasks than did girls and other boys who used more collaborative conversation tactics (Leman et al. 2005; see also Wood 1987). In contrast, girls are more efficient at sharing tasks, but experience greater conflict than males when they engage in unstructured activities (McElwain & Volling 2002). These conversation styles suggest that boys are more sensitive to accentuate their confidence and dominance, and engage in more instrumental cooperation to achieve goals that involve an extrinsic task. In contrast, girls appear to be more sensitive to accentuate prosocial intentions and other trustworthiness cues (e.g., using inquisitive sentences) and to engage in more affiliative cooperation related to the strength of the relationship rather than to the outcome of an event. 3.2.1.3. Crying and laughing behaviors. Perhaps the best

example of a female propensity to advertise trustworthiness cues is females’ greater frequency and intensity of crying behaviors as compared to males’ (De Fruyt 1997; Lombardo et al. 2001; Van Tilburg et al. 2002; Vingerhoets & Scheirs 2000; Williams 1982; Williams & Morris 1996). In a meta-analysis of crying behaviors across thirty countries and six continents, Becht and Vingerhoets

(2002) found that women reported crying an average of 212 times more often than men. This ratio is also found when researchers experimentally induce crying behaviors, such as when researchers measure tear production in response to emotional films (Martin 1998; Rottenberg et al. 2002). Other studies suggest that women cry in response to a wider array of experiences compared to men, for instance, following the loss or deterioration of a relationship (e.g., criticism from a coworker or family member), as well as situations involving less conspicuous social relevance (e.g., exhaustion from lack of sleep, personal religious experience; Williams & Morris 1996). Likewise, girls and women report crying and desiring consolation in response to a wider variety of emotions than do males, including experiences of intense anger (Jones et al. 1992) and feelings of frustration, embarrassment, anxiety, fear, and distress. In contrast, men report a greater propensity to respond to these feelings with more aggressive behaviors (e.g., hitting or banging a nearby object) and the desire to avoid peers (Vigil 2008). Research on laughing behaviors shows women laugh more than men, whereas men are more likely to make other people laugh (Provine 1993). Women are more attracted to men who make them laugh (Grammer & Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1990), and some laughing sounds (e.g., involving clearly voiced phonemes such as “ha”) are more attractive than others (e.g., muffled grunts). Overall, however, both sexes rate female-laughter as more “friendly” than male-laughter (Bachorowski & Owren 2001). When people laugh, they raise the pitch of their voice, and some studies have found that higher-pitched and lower-pitched vocal sounds are associated with the perception of submissiveness and dominance, respectively (Puts et al. 2007; see also Cosmides 1983). These findings suggest that laughter and related phenomena, including humor, tickling, and the inhibition of motor activity that occurs during laughter, may be dynamic affiliative gestures (see Provine 2004). Specifically, the comedian may be displaying capacity cues by conveying wit and/or projecting interpersonal derogation (Bonanno & Keltner 2004), whereas the person laughing may be displaying trustworthiness cues by demonstrating appeasement, freezing, and allowing access to vulnerable areas of the body for tickling. 3.2.1.4. Body movement, eye gaze, and touch behaviors.

Research on body movement shows sex differences present at birth in the form of increased psychomotor activity in male infants compared to females (e.g., Campbell & Eaton 1999; Eaton & Enns 1986). As boys develop, they tend to adopt more open body postures when sitting or standing and produce greater overall body movements than girls. These movements tend to last longer and consist of more complex behaviors, for instance, involving multiple pivots and greater coordination (Bente et al. 1998; Cashdan 1998; Hall 1984; see also Costa et al. 2001). In addition, as early as infancy, males tend to adopt wider interpersonal distance stances (see Hall 1984) and use their body language to assert dominance differently than females. Males convey dominance through personal space, open and animated body postures, forward-leaning posture, and rapid rate of approach. In contrast, women convey their dominance through downward head tilts and by using “appropriate” approach BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5

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Vigil: Sex differences in the expression of emotion patterns such as interjecting eye contact and smiling behaviors in concordance with their partners’ responses (Cashdan 1998; Mast & Hall 2004; Webbink 1986). Women are also more likely to bow their heads and gaze downward in response to feelings of both sadness and joy, whereas these behaviors are rarely used to convey happiness in men (Mignault & Chaudhuri 2003). In terms of absolute gaze rate, infant girls tend to gaze at human figures for longer durations and more frequently than do infant boys, a trend that remains stable throughout childhood and adulthood (see Hall 1984). Other research has found that women are more likely to gaze at others’ faces for longer durations and to punctuate their glances with submissive behaviors such as downward-gaze patterns. In contrast, men tend to engage in more direct, but less frequent, eye contact; for instance, shifting their gaze to and from a target’s face more often and terminating a mutual gaze more quickly than do women (Bente et al. 1998). Similar trends are observed in the absolute rate of nonaggressive touching behaviors, such that young girls (e.g., toddlers) and women tend to engage in more comforting and affiliative touch behaviors than males (e.g., Hall 1984; Kneidinger et al. 2001). Interestingly, similar patterns of earlier onset and more complex patterns of interpersonal touch behaviors have been observed among prenatal female twins (around 100 days post-menstruation), compared to prenatal males and mixed-sex twins (Arabin et al. 1996). Because physical proximity, sustained gaze, and gentle touching have been found to induce interpersonal bonding in humans (e.g., Kurzban 2001; Webbink 1986; Willis & Hamm 1980), it is reasonable to hypothesize that these are examples of trustworthiness cues that females have evolved a sensitivity to display more frequently and overtly than males. These cues may ultimately function to increase perceptions of trustworthiness in order to consolidate the reliability and security of women’s relationships. 3.2.2. Sex differences in verbal expressions. 3.2.2.1. Momentary expressions. In addition to nonverbal behaviors,

humans express their emotions through self-report; that is, through the momentary use of emotion terms and descriptions of felt experiences (Brody & Hall 2000). Studies in both natural and artificial settings show that girls and women use emotion terms to describe themselves and others at rates of nearly three times the frequency of boys and men (Goldshmidt & Weller 2000; see also Burke et al. 1976; Girdle et al. 1990). At the same time, females report more exaggerated experiences of felt emotion than males, such as when viewing slides of facial expressions (Grossman & Wood 1993), and especially submissive emotions such as fear, sadness, and embarrassment (Costa et al. 2001; Lewis & Ramsay 2002; Waters et al. 2005). Greater expression of felt vulnerability is also apparent in the perception and expression of pain. Female infants (e.g., 2 – 12 months old) have been found to produce more overall and higher-pitched crying in response to acute and established pain, compared to male infants, despite no evidence of sex differences in the actual threshold for pain (Fuller 2002). As they grow older, girls report more frequent and intense experiences of pain and are more likely to attribute ailments to non-physical causes such as interpersonal arguments, weather conditions, family relations, and various felt emotions 384

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(e.g., anger; Myers et al. 2003; Ramı´rez-Maestre et al. 2004; Roth-Isigkeit et al. 2005). Related studies show that adolescent girls and women are more likely than same-age males to report having experienced (e.g., during the previous week) and having anticipated experiences of other types of submissive emotions, including feelings of shyness, surprise, shame, guilt, sadness, and self-hostility (Stapley & Haviland 1989; Timmers et al. 1998). In contrast, boys and men tend to deny experiencing these emotions in favor of more feelings of dominant emotions such as contempt. Other studies show that girls report a greater propensity to experience surprise and sadness in the company of female peers than when alone, whereas boys report a greater likelihood of experiencing these types of emotions when alone than among male peers (Stapley & Haviland 1989). 3.2.2.2. Self-presentations. The hypothesis that females

are more prone to advertise their trustworthiness via displayed vulnerability is also consistent with the breadth of research demonstrating sex differences in self-reported depressive and anxiety symptoms. Compared to males, girls and women report higher levels of negative life experiences (Davis et al. 1999; Pinquart & So¨rensen 2006), lower self-esteem, and exaggerated symptoms of depression following a traumatic experience (e.g., Kling et al. 1999; Marttunen et al. 1995; Parslow et al. 2006; Solomon et al. 2005; Twenge & Nolen-Hoeksema 2002). Other research suggests that activation of the sympathetic nervous system is associated with increased depressive symptoms in traumatized females and with decreased symptoms (e.g., greater confidence) among traumatized males (Vigil et al., in press). Sex differences in depressive symptoms and self-reported distress become pronounced upon puberty, due to rapid increases in symptoms among adolescent girls compared to the relatively constant rates among adolescent boys. These differences peak in early adulthood and then decline slowly but continue to exist throughout middle and late adulthood (e.g., Davis et al. 1999; Ge et al. 2001; 2003; Russac et al. 2007; see also Twenge & Nolen-Hoeksema 2002). Although males are far more likely to experience traumatic events in their lifetime, including accidents, physical assault, illness, and witnessing death (the notable exception being sexual assault), females are twice as likely to report symptoms of PTSD following these experiences (Tolin & Foa 2006). For example, boys who experience physical trauma (e.g., community violence) are no more likely to report these experiences than girls who experience nonphysical trauma (e.g., relational harassment; Ireland 1999; McCart et al. 2005; Nishina & Juvonen 2005; Seals & Young 2003; see also Sourander et al. 2004). Related research shows that self-reported “machismo” ideology, the desire to appear tough, is associated with acute anxiety over expressing submissive, but not dominant, emotions in males (Gold et al. 1992; Jakupcak et al. 2003; see also Updegraff et al. 2000). Women, in contrast, are more likely to exaggerate and perhaps precipitate experienced distress, by using more emotion-focused coping strategies that employ higher rates of self-blame and corumination (rehashing personal problems with peers; Rose 2002), and through higher rates of felt guilt and shame (Benetti-McQuoid & Bursik 2005). Men, alternatively, use more “problem-focused” and “positive-thinking” coping strategies to deal with

Vigil: Sex differences in the expression of emotion misfortune (Vingerhoets & Van Heck 1990). Girls and women are also more likely than males to underrate their self-described capacity attributes such as athleticism, talent, intellectual abilities, and physical attractiveness (Cole et al. 1999; DuBois et al. 1996; Patterson et al. 2001; Stetsenko et al. 2000). Among males, the reverse pattern is often found in the form of exaggerated pride (Tracy & Robins 2007) and over-rated self-descriptions of capacity characteristics in comparison to ratings by others and in comparison to females (Feingold & Mazzella 1998; see also Cole et al. 1999; Patterson et al. 2001). Finally, males and females present different types of social personas, such that girls and women express higher levels of sympathy for others than do same-age males (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright 2004; Sy et al. 2003; Warden & MacKinnon 2003). Females are also more willing to disclose their personal feelings (Dindia & Allen 1992) and to invest in and demand greater displays of intimacy across their peer and romantic relationships (Agrawal et al. 2002; Benenson & Christakos 2003; Hartup 1996; see also Rose & Asher 2004; Shackelford et al. 2002; Terwogt 2002). Sex differences in expressed compassion, again, peak around puberty, whereby girls exaggerate their self-ratings more than do boys (Fabes & Eisenberg 1998; see also Fabes et al. 1999). Other studies show that, even as early as toddlerhood, girls engage in more comforting behaviors (Zimmermann & Stansbury 2003), and prefer more egalitarian outcomes and attainment status (e.g., homework scores) with their friends (Benenson 1993; Benenson & Schinazi 2004; see also Sprecher 2001). As they grow older, girls report a greater dissonance, such as feelings of guilt, from exclusionary behaviors as compared to boys (e.g., Horn 2003). Compared to females, males form stricter dominancehierarchies (Geary et al. 2003); are more competitive (Sidanius et al. 1994; 2000), more violent (Holinger 1980; Wrangham & Peterson 1996), less willing to provide comforting behaviors to friends they perceive to be fearful (Terwogt 2002); and report a normative preference for more aggressive peers (e.g., Chang 2004; Farmer et al. 2003; Xu & Zhang 2007). Boys and men are likewise more sensitive to respond to aversive stimuli with automatic and reflexive displays of observable aggression (e.g., Archer 2004; Gold et al. 1992; Knight et al. 2002; Vigil 2008). Aggressive behaviors cause other people to distance themselves from the male, which may deny the comforting behaviors of others and demonstrate the capacity to protect oneself in times of stress (Vigil 2008). Other studies suggest that behavioral displays of toughness enhance boys’ popularity, whereas submissive behaviors appear to reduce this popularity (Cashdan 1998, p. 217; see also Lobel et al. 2001). Male popularity is especially enhanced and given “leadership status” when aggressive boys are also perceived as possessing honest or verifiable signals of capacity (e.g., superior athleticism; Farmer et al. 2003; see also Rodkin et al. 2000) and when boys complement their assertiveness with more selective displays of prosocialism (Arsenio et al. 2000; Farmer et al. 2003). 3.3. Summary

From a socio-relational perspective, sex differences in the propensity to express higher levels of capacity displays (e.g., risk-taking, inflated self-evaluations, aggressive

behaviors) in males and trustworthiness displays (e.g., expressed compassion, modest self-descriptions, sadness behaviors) in females may reflect asymmetries in the social ecologies and relationship demands in which males and females evolved (Geary & Flinn 2002; Geary et al. 2003; Vigil 2007). If males’ evolutionary ecologies consisted of larger social networks among closely related kin, then they may have evolved a sensitivity to relax the display of trustworthiness cues in favor of interchanging more capacity cues for attracting and maintaining a greater number of daily relationships. Likewise, if females’ evolutionary ecologies consisted of more frequent interactions with more distantly related kin and non-kin, then they may have evolved a sensitivity to inhibit the display of capacity behaviors in favor of cues that reduce the perception of threat and demonstrate their overall trustworthiness. Formation of smaller social networks among women may have facilitated a feminine social style that promotes the interchange of higher levels of displayed vulnerability and investment behaviors across fewer, more intimate, more secure, yet time-consuming relationships. From this perspective, higher rates of depressive behaviors in girls and women may stem from an adaptive behavioral strategy that facilitates the advertisement of trustworthiness cues. These behaviors may be particularly functional under conditions when the individual experiences diminished capacity resources, and in ways that ultimately strengthen the intimacy and hence security of one’s relationships. The emergence of increased sadness behaviors in females, but not in males, occurs at the time of reproductive debut, when females are hypothesized to have been exposed to, and dependent upon, relationships with distantly related peers for their own and their offspring’s well-being. This interpretation is consistent with research showing a significant relation between stress reactivity and quality of intimate relationships of adolescent girls, but not girls in middle childhood or boys of either age (Booth et al. 2008). Evolved sensitivities to exaggerate displays of vulnerability (e.g., sadness) and appeasement (e.g., expressed compassion) during this stage of development may have ultimately facilitated the maintenance of more secure and dependable relationships among fewer, more exclusive, and more reliable social affiliates, compared to the social demands faced by women at other stages in their lives, and compared to the relational demands faced by males in general. 4. Theoretical implications for variation in expressive behaviors At the base of the current framework is the assumption that different types of relationships have varying effects on the individual’s fitness (Bronfenbrenner 1979). Some types of social interactions are potentially beneficial, for instance, for reciprocating expedient and/or continuous interpersonal investment, whereas other types of social encounters are non-reciprocal and thus potentially harmful. This combination of factors is hypothesized to represent the ecological constraints and opportunities in which ancestral humans evolved, and thus the social contexts in which children currently develop. One possibility is that these ecological conditions would have coevolved BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5

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Vigil: Sex differences in the expression of emotion with relationship-formation systems that are capable of regulating different types of relationships, simultaneously, in dynamic ways that enhance personal fitness. Again, from the current perspective, such modification may be possible through the selective advertisement of reciprocity potential and adjustment of expressed capacity and trustworthiness cues, as well as through ways described in the following sections. 4.1. Social spheres model

In order to understand how and why humans may be equipped with the ability to modify multiple relationships in systematic, fitness-enhancing ways, it may be best to conceptualize the composite of all the people with whom individuals interact as representing a tangible quotient or ratio of cost-benefit trade-offs. For the sake of illustration I will refer to this quotient as the individual’s social sphere. This construct is extremely important because it represents the aggregation of all the possible social interactions, and hence the socio-relational risks and opportunities, to which individuals are exposed at any given point in their lifetime. In more concrete terms, and similar to Newcomb (e.g., Newcomb & Chou 1989), I am hypothesizing that the quantity and quality of individuals’ relationships qualify these relational possibilities. Specifically, social spheres may be understood in terms of the absolute number of cooperators and competitors with whom individuals may interact, thereby representing the size of the social sphere, as well as the perceived trustworthiness and hence reliability of these relationships, hereafter referred to as the relational proximity between the individual and each sphere-member. Because individuals’ reciprocity potential is finite in terms of time and physical resources, the number of possible relationships that people can maintain at any given time is inversely associated to the relational proximity of their relationships. Again, this is because having a larger social sphere necessarily reduces the amount of investment that individuals can devote to each of their relationships, whereas having a smaller social sphere increases the ability to invest in each relationship (Geary et al. 2003; Vigil 2007). Larger and smaller social spheres should therefore be associated with increased and decreased risks of social defection, respectively, and hence with varying safety levels, as well as with unique opportunities to solicit investment from different types of relationships. Research on social interaction patterns shows that the likelihood of receiving social support from family is inversely associated with the amount of support received from peers (Newcomb & Bentler 1986). These constraints are important because they create a series of adaptive costbenefit trade-offs between having a larger pool of potential reciprocators with a reduced likelihood that each affiliate will actually reciprocate and hence an increased risk of harm, and having a greater likelihood of receiving extensive investment, but from a smaller pool of potential reciprocators (e.g., family members). According to the model of sex differences in social styles discussed earlier, abbreviated displays of capacity cues are theorized to help maintain larger social spheres (boys’ social networks), while advertisements of trustworthiness cues are predicted to be better for maintaining smaller, more intimate social spheres (girls’ social networks). 386

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In other words, there should be an adaptive benefit to advertising higher levels of capacity and trustworthiness cues across larger and smaller social contexts, respectively. A direct investigation of these relations was conducted by Benenson et al. (2002), in which boys and girls were exposed to stress and placed into either groups or dyads. Both boys and girls who were placed into the larger groups responded with increased externalizing behaviors such as assertiveness, anger, and general meanness to others. In contrast, the children that were placed into smaller groups displayed more internalizing behaviors, including self-depreciation, sadness, and expressed empathy for the feelings of others (Benenson et al. 2002; see also LaFrance et al. 2003; Leaper & Smith 2004; Vingerhoets et al. 2000). Though tentative, these findings suggest that the relative size of the social context in which individuals are embedded may be a proximate factor that stimulates the expression of capacity and trustworthiness displays. Finally, different types of relationships (e.g., family vs. friends) should present different opportunities for the types of resources that can be interchanged. Relationships characterized by a history of cooperation, such as between family and close friendships, are the most reliable relationships and should therefore be targeted to interchange the trustworthiness component of reciprocity potential. Again, these expressions may be manifested as intimacy behaviors such as the discussion of personal problems and providing compassionate support. In contrast, other types of relationships, such as between acquaintances and strangers, are not based on a history of investment and are therefore more risky relationships. These types of relationships are supported less by the exchange of trustworthiness cues, and perhaps more by the exchange of expedient and/or discontinued capacity resources, such as material gifts and socio-political opportunities. Research on cultural attainment shows that both reliable and risky relationships are crucial for contemporary success (e.g., occupational status; Blau & Duncan 1967; Breiger 1995), and are therefore presumed to have played a similarly imperative role throughout human evolutionary history. 4.1.1. Conditional variation in expressive behaviors.

Collectively, these dynamics lend to the hypothesis that humans may possess the inherent motivation to adjust the relative size and relational proximity of their social spheres in coordination with life experiences and situational circumstances that enhance the ability to advertise reciprocity potential, as well as the associated risks of not being able to do so. Examples of these hypothesized relations are presented in Figure 2. According to Figure 2, when individuals experience conditions that increase their social status or resource accrual, they should be motivated to increase the advertisement of capacity cues such as through displays of joy, pride, and confidence. These displays may be effective for attracting less familiar and hence riskier relationships and, ultimately, increasing the size of the social sphere. By increasing the proportion of risky people to reliable people with whom individuals interact on a daily basis (see Fig. 2), they are able to increase their overall opportunity to solicit reciprocation at the cost of having less secure

Vigil: Sex differences in the expression of emotion

Figure 2. Relational proximity represents the probability of receiving reliable social support. The social spheres model predicts that individuals should respond to positive and negative life experiences by either increasing or decreasing the size of their social sphere. These modifications may be facilitated through the selective advertisement of the capacity and trustworthiness components of reciprocity potential, respectively (labeled “Dominant” and “Submissive” conditions). In response to positive life events, individuals increase the ratio of risky to reliable affiliates with whom they may interact in order to enhance the opportunity to reciprocate with more people. In response to negative life events, individuals increase the ratio of reliable to risky affiliates in order to enhance the probability of reciprocating with more reliable affiliates.

relationships and hence a lowered probability of actually receiving social support. This trade-off is optimal under conditions in which the individual can endure the added risk of less reliable social support, again, following positive life events when the individual has experienced increased capacity attributes. Likewise, felt happiness in children and adults is associated with the perception of dominance (Montepare & Dobish 2003), broadcast sociability and willingness to help strangers (Eisenberg et al. 2003; Terwogt 2002), creativity and remote memory retrieval (e.g., in judgment tasks; Bolte et al. 2003; Isen 2000), calculated risk (see Fredrickson & Joiner 2002), and the motivation to explore novel relationships (Diener & Seligman 2002; Izard 1993). Felt happiness is also rated among the most preferred characteristics in a potential new friend (e.g., Vigil 2007). Collectively, these findings suggest positive life experiences and corresponding emotive responses may have been selected to facilitate the motivation to form potentially risky relationships, as well as the demonstrated ability to attract these types of social opportunities. In contrast, the social spheres model predicts that when individuals experience events that decrease their social status, reduce their resource accrual, or otherwise inhibit their capacity, they should instead be motivated to rely more heavily on the behavioral advertisement of trustworthiness cues, such as through sadness, worrying, and sympathetic behaviors. Under these conditions, individuals may be additionally motivated to decrease the size of their social sphere in order to more efficiently advertise these cues and to reduce the likelihood of interacting with (e.g., attracting) less familiar and hence potentially risky

affiliates (see Fig. 2). Events that decrease capacity attributes, such as experienced poverty and conditional vulnerability (e.g., during postpartum), are associated with sadness behaviors (e.g., Jackson & Warren 2000; Sutter et al. 1997), as well as with a greater overall threat interpretation of ambiguous stimuli (Chen et al. 2004), perceptions of subdominance, reticence, and reluctance (Montepare & Dobish 2003), self-perceived inferiority and feeling less influential (Zuroff et al. 2007), reduced aggression (Vigil et al., in press), and actual disengagement from less familiar and hence risky relationships (Caldwell et al. 2004; Keller & Nesse 2005). Sadness behaviors increase the likelihood of receiving extensive social support from intimate affiliates such as family and close friends (e.g., Kaniasty & Norris 1995; Terwogt 2002). By consolidating their social spheres, individuals may be better able to allocate high levels of intimate investment behaviors into fewer, yet more secure, relationships. Strengthening the intimacy of these relationships may in turn increase the reliability of receiving high levels of investment from others under conditions when dependable social support is needed most (for related discussions, see Aureli 1997; Geary & Flinn 2002; Hagen 2003; Izard 1993; Taylor et al. 2000). Collectively, these affiliative and avoidant response patterns suggest that individuals may be equipped with domainbased algorithms that motivate them to either pursue or avoid specific types of relationships, depending on the costs and benefits of engagement (see also Andersen & Chen 2002; Bugental 2000; Kenny et al. 2001; Rudolph et al. 2005; see also Nail et al. 2000). From a sociorelational perspective, emotive behaviors evolved to mechanize these motivations, regulate the individual’s relationships, and optimize the advertisement of capacity and trustworthiness cues in coordination with stochastic life experiences that affect the ability to advertise these cues. 4.1.2. Situational variation in expressive behaviors. A

related prediction is that individuals will adjust the relative expressiveness of capacity and trustworthiness displays in the presence of different sphere members. This hypothesis is illustrated in Figure 3, which shows that individuals should be motivated to increase the expressiveness of capacity displays among larger group settings and less familiar affiliates, and instead produce more neutral capacity displays among smaller social settings and more reliable affiliates. Capacity displays (e.g., bragging, flashy body movements, raised voice volume) may be more observable than displays of trustworthiness (e.g., self-depreciation, modest body movements, lower voice volume), and thus more efficient for maintaining a greater number of expedient and discontinuous relationships (i.e., among acquaintances and strangers). This interpretation may help explain why people feel more compelled to display “positive” affect and to mask their sadness in the presence of strangers than when among close friends or alone, even though they feel greater genuine happiness among close affiliates (Jakobs et al. 1996; Lee & Wagner, 2002; Zaalberg et al. 2004). People also smile more in large than in small group settings, and this pattern is especially pronounced in females (see LaFrance & Hecht 2000). In contrast, males tend to increase assertive speech and overall body movements among strangers than among BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5

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Vigil: Sex differences in the expression of emotion states of vulnerability (Webbink 1986). Collectively, these findings suggest that people may increase the expressiveness of submissive behaviors among trusted social partners and the types of interactions (i.e., long-term and committed relationships) that place the highest premium on these displays. At the same time, by maintaining more neutral submissiveness displays among larger group settings and less familiar people, individuals are able to conceal states of vulnerability from risky affiliates (see also the “save face” effect; Sabini et al. 2001). 4.1.3. Additional correlates of variation in expressive behaviors. 4.1.3.1. Personality correlates. The current fraFigure 3. Relational proximity represents the probability of receiving reliable social support. The Social Spheres Model predicts that individuals selectively express varying intensities of capacity and trustworthiness cues, depending on the relational proximity of the audience. Individuals should increase the expressiveness of capacity displays in the presence of less reliable and hence riskier affiliates, and instead increase the expressiveness of trustworthiness displays in the presence of more reliable affiliates.

close affiliates, and more so than do females (Bente et al. 1998; Leaper & Smith 2004). Similar studies show that physical aggression and other displays of hegemonic (exaggerated) masculinity are associated with more broadcast, rather than intimate, popularity among males (Cillessen & Mayeux 2004; Levy 2005; Rodkin et al. 2000). Figure 3 also predicts that people should demonstrate the reverse pattern for trustworthiness displays, such that individuals should increase the expressiveness of these behaviors among smaller groups (e.g., dyads) and more reliable affiliates, and much less so among risky affiliates. Likewise, people report a much greater willingness to express sadness behaviors, such as crying, when alone or in the company of a close friend than when in the presence of a stranger (Lombardo et al. 2001; Williams & Morris 1996; Vingerhoets et al. 2000). In one example, Buss and Kiel (2004) found that 2-year-old toddlers were more likely to selectively adjust the display of sadness expressions from other types of emotive behaviors (e.g., fearful and angry facial expressions) when they were engaged in mutual eye contact with their mothers, than when not. Once mutual gaze was broken, the children tended to revert back to their previous expressions (Buss & Kiel 2004; see also Shipman et al. 2003). Similar research has found that intimate affiliates such as parents and children discuss submissive emotions (e.g., sadness and fear) more extensively than dominant emotions (e.g., happiness; Lagattuta & Wellman 2002). People also use more affiliative speech in smaller, rather than larger group settings, especially among females (Leaper & Smith 2004). In contrast, people are more likely to inhibit and conceal sadness and embarrassment behaviors (e.g., lip biting) in the presence of strangers than when alone (Costa et al. 2001; Jakobs et al. 1996). When people experience submissive emotions, they often try to avoid unfamiliar affiliations such as going out in public, and, when these encounters cannot be avoided, they tend to avert direct eye contact in ways that disallow strangers from detecting 388

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mework is based on the thesis that individual differences in observable characteristics are intricately associated with the motivation and opportunity to exchange the capacity and trustworthiness components of reciprocity potential across different types of relationships. Because personality styles are both observable and are usually modified in different social settings to some extent (Matthews & Deary 1998), these characteristics should, in theory, covary with systematic differences in the types of relationships (e.g., short term vs. long term) that individuals may seek to form and maintain. Early support for this hypothesis may be found in the literature on romantic relationships, which shows that individuals who self-report high ratings of sensationseeking personality traits, such as disinhibition (Zuckerman et al. 1976) and extraversion (Eysenck 1976), report a greater number of sexual partners (see Simpson & Gangestad 1991). Other research suggests that high selfmonitoring, the tendency to regulate one’s self-presentation across different social contexts, is also associated with a greater number of lifetime sexual partners and with more serial relationships characterized by discontinued sexual experiences (Snyder et al. 1986). In other words, individuals who rate high on sensationseeking and self-monitoring personality traits may engage in a greater number of social interactions and thus maintain larger social spheres than do individuals who rate low on these traits. From the present perspective, the ease with which individuals are able to maintain larger social spheres may turn on the ability to advertise capacity cues, for instance, vis-a`-vis personas that demonstrate one’s willingness to engage in risky relationships (e.g., disinhibition) and ability to exchange resources across various types of relationships (e.g., high self-monitoring). Related predictions are that individuals who rate high on these personality traits should also report a higher number of non-reproductive peer relationships and rate themselves high on other types of capacity cues such as higher mood, self-confidence, assertiveness, and friendliness, among many others (e.g., see recent findings on traithappiness; Weiss et al. 2008). 4.1.3.2. Peer relations. A similar prediction is that people

will adjust self-presentations in conjunction with the relative size and intimacy levels of their social sphere. Specifically, individuals with fewer yet more intimate daily interactions should be more likely to express submissive behaviors, for instance, in the form of lower mood, higher felt pain, worrying behaviors, and expressed sympathy for others. In contrast, individuals with larger and more fluid social networks should be more likely to express dominant behaviors, such as greater joy,

Vigil: Sex differences in the expression of emotion confidence, felt strength, and other capacity cues. Although several studies have found a relation between increased sadness and lack of adequate social support and desire for greater support (e.g., Brugha et al. 1990; Cramer et al. 1997), no study to my knowledge has examined the relation between frequency and overall number of daily interactions and variation in expressed mood. 4.1.3.3. Developmental variation. In theory, these relation-

ships should exist for both sexes and covary with developmental changes in capacity attributes across the life span. For example, one possibility is that increased fertility (among the most fundamental capacity attributes) upon adolescence may covary with heightened sensitivity to exaggerate the expression of other types of capacity cues during this stage of development. This hypothesis is consistent with patterns of greater risk-taking behaviors, teasing behaviors, felt anger and hostility, and propensity to express physical aggression during adolescence and young adulthood, as compared to other points across the life span (Archer 2004; Birditt & Fingerman 2003; Holinger 1980; Keltner et al. 2001). Adolescents (both boys and girls) show less discriminate activation of the amygdala than other age groups, and hence more similar patterns of threat processing to adult males than to adult females (McClure et al. 2004). Similarly, decreases in capacity attributes (e.g., fertility and physical abilities) that accompany the later stages of life may help explain why people report dramatic reductions in felt anger and aggression as they progress into older adulthood, with men experiencing sharper declines in these types of feelings than women (Mroczek & Kolarz 1998). By increasing the display of submissive behaviors in older adulthood, individuals may be optimizing the ability to advertise their reciprocity potential to others. Related predictions are that people should be motivated to form larger social spheres during adolescence and young adulthood, and to form smaller and more intimate social networks during older adulthood. In theory, many correspondences between capacity development and expressive behaviors should exist throughout the human life span. 4.1.3.4. Cultural variation. Another area in which the

present framework may be applied is the study of cultural variability in expressive behaviors and the ability to detect expressed emotions. For example, several studies have found that participants from more individualistic cultures (e.g., European-Americans, African-Americans) tend to be more accurate at recognizing emotions, rate more intense reactions to emotions, and express more dominant emotions (e.g., anger and joy), compared to people from more collectivistic cultures (e.g., Asian-Americans [Bond 1993; Matsumoto 1993; Matsumoto & Ekman 1989; McLaughlin et al. 2007; Schimmack 1996; see also Elfenbein & Ambady 2003; Marsh et al. 2003]). Other research has found that Latin-Americans, a relatively collectivistic cultural group (Oyserman et al. 2002), in contrast report more sadness behaviors than other groups (Twenge & Nolen-Hoeksema 2002). According to the present framework, these findings may result from variation in basic social dynamics, such as the relative size and relational proximity of the social spheres of people from individualistic versus collectivistic cultures. People from collectivistic cultures report stronger kinship

ties and dependency (e.g., for decision making; Kim et al. 1994), effectively demonstrating relatively smaller and more intimate social spheres than people from other cultures. In theory, these social dynamics should covary with the associated biases to produce and recognize trustworthiness cues (e.g., sadness facial expressions, felt pain, surprise intonations in voice quality, conscientiousness), compared to people from more individualistic cultures. People from individualistic cultures are instead predicted to be more sensitive to producing and recognizing capacity cues (e.g., anger and joy facial expressions, felt pride, assertive intonations in voice quality, impulsivity). This prediction is consistent with findings that people from individualistic cultures report a greater tendency to respond to conflict with higher levels of assertion and confidence, compared to people from more collectivistic cultures (Brew et al. 2001; Mann et al. 1998; Ohbuchi et al. 1999). From the present perspective, cultural variation in expressive behaviors (e.g., mood, expressed confidence, body language, vocal intonations) may best approximate structural and relational distinctions in the social dynamics of individuals from different cultural backgrounds. 4.1.3.5. Climatic and geographical variation. From a socio-

relational perspective, climatic and geographical variation in expressed mood may also be interpreted from the impact of these factors on the relative size and relational proximity of the individual’s social sphere. For example, numerous cross-cultural studies have highlighted an association between living in northern latitudes and colder climates and greater reported sadness and worrying behaviors (Agumadu et al. 2004; de Graaf et al. 2005; Kovalenko et al. 2000; Okawa et al. 1996). Other research suggests that geographic isolation may also be associated with increased prevalence of mood disorders, with large nationally representative samples showing higher prevalence rates of depression among individuals living in rural versus urban neighborhoods (Probst et al. 2006; Wainwright & Surtees 2004). These differences are not always found, however, and may be associated with factors such as population density (Walters et al. 2004; Weich et al. 2003). Other research suggests that sex differences in mood and anxiety disorders tend to vary by city size, and are due to higher prevalence rates of depressive symptoms among rural men, compared to urban men (Diala & Muntaner 2003). From the current perspective, rural dwellers and individuals living in colder climates may report higher levels of sadness behaviors because these factors create physical barriers to the ability to interact with multiple people, essentially resulting in smaller social spheres for people living under these conditions. In contrast, warmer climates and higher levels of urbanization provide greater opportunities to interact with more people, which may thereby create a bias to express higher levels of capacity displays. Higher temperature levels are generally related to greater societal aggression (e.g., violent acts; Bushman et al. 2005) and self-reported happiness (de Vliert et al. 2004; Rehdanz & Maddison 2005). According to the SRFB, contemporary sensitivities to climatic and geographic conditions may have evolved to optimize the ability to exchange capacity and trustworthiness cues with local community members, in association with the BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5

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Vigil: Sex differences in the expression of emotion physical contingencies and social opportunities that diverse ecological conditions create. 4.1.3.6. Implications for the study of disease. Finally, the

current framework may offer new and intriguing directions for our understanding of normative, yet seemingly paradoxical, health processes. One such process is the pattern for humans to respond to traumatic experiences with stress reactions that are broadly associated with significant health consequences and, in certain circumstances, may actually cause illness. Repeated activation of the Hypothalamic-Pituitary-Adrenal (HPA) system and the sympathetic nervous system (SNS) is associated with lower immune functioning, increased susceptibility to viral infection, and onset of disease-causing factors (e.g., pulmonary constriction [Cohen et al. 1998; Flinn & England 2003; Kunz-Ebrecht et al. 2003; Rotton & Dubitsky 2002; Segerstrom & Miller 2004; Uchino et al. 1996]). Findings like these have understandably caused many researchers to interpret stress responses from a pleiotropic, disease-centered model. From this perspective, short-term stress responses are believed to be adaptive for sensitizing the organism to prepare for action, whereas repeated stress exposure or allostatic load is thought to result in unintended and hence maladaptive mental and physical health consequences in humans and related species (McEwen & Seeman 1999; Sapolsky 1994). Longer-termed psychobiological and behavioral symptoms of chronic stress exposure (e.g., blunted HPA activity, low mood, fatigue, stress-related illness) are therefore believed to be the outcome of dysfunctional psychological and/or neuroendocrine regulation (Southwick et al. 2005). An alternative approach to the disease-centered perspective of stress-induced morbidity is provided by models that highlight adaptive trade-offs of phenotypes that affect natural selection and senescence (Williams 1957), such as disease behaviors. For example, it is possible, though counterintuitive and certainly speculative at this time, that increased morbidity and susceptibility to illness caused by trauma exposure may be partly functional for regulating fundamental social dynamics, such as the size and relational proximity of the social sphere. If one considers physical health consequences and associated vulnerability in terms of expressive displays, then increased morbidity may reflect a broader behavioral strategy designed to advertise trustworthiness cues in times of adversity. From this perspective, certain illness-related outcomes of behavioral distress (e.g., felt pain suffering) may operate effectively as self-harming mechanisms designed to provide an honest advertisement of disability, reduced threat, and hence trustworthiness to others. In this sense, some physical illnesses may be associated with adaptive cost-benefit trade-offs in and of themselves, for example, manifesting when the social benefits of these conditions may outweigh the physical detriment that they cause. 4.2. Conclusion

Our current understanding of the natural history and present impact of variation in nonverbal behaviors is rapidly evolving. This research has drawn most heavily from the solid scaffolding provided by Charles Darwin’s “Sexual Selection Theory” (1882) and, one hundred 390

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years later, by Robert Trivers’s “Reciprocal Altruism Theory” (1971), as well as more recent contributions from countless researchers and theorists. My goal was to address variation in expressed emotion at the individual, situational, and group levels of analysis. My framework is similar to earlier treatments that suggest that emotions may function to modify the outcomes of social interactions (e.g., Frijda 1993; Tronick 1989), but extends these earlier models by proposing several overlapping dimensions, as well as essential cost-benefit trade-offs that are predicted to underlie specific patterns of variation. The phenotypic expression of emotion is predicted to promote affiliative and avoidant reactions from others, in part, by advertisement of cues that signal the individual’s abilities and intentions. If so, then theoretically similar emotions such as anger and joy should share a number of trait impressions (e.g., perceptions of dominance vs. submissiveness) and overlapping characteristics, including distinct neurological pathways (for support of this hypothesis, see Murphy et al. 2003; see also Adolphs & Tranel 2004). These trait impressions should covary with many forms of expressive behaviors, including variation in speech content, declarative versus inquisitive sentence usage, vocal intonations (e.g., lowpitched vs. high-pitched sounds), facial expressions (e.g., teeth-baring vs. closed-mouth expressions), eyegaze patterns (e.g., narrow threat-stare vs. wide-eyed tear production), body-movement speed and positioning (e.g., basic hand gestures), social dispositions (e.g., independent vs. dependent personas), public policy displays (e.g., pragmatic vs. compassionate political ideologies), displays of rebellion and faith (e.g., religiosity), and so forth. The second aim of the article was to provide an evolutionary explanation of sex differences in emotionality and to describe the social underpinnings of human masculinity and femininity. From a socio-relational perspective, these sex differences are specializations needed to communicate reciprocity potential with same-sex affiliates, and in specific social ecologies. In addition to the expression of emotion, sex differences have been found in many types of social behaviors, including morality and helping behaviors (see Eagly & Crowley 1986; Jaffee & Hyde 2000; Thoma 1986), implicit attitudes and judgments (e.g., Rudman 2004; see also Forgas 2003), intra-group biases and prejudice (Ekehammar et al. 2003), temperament and personality characteristics (e.g., Cohn 1991; Else-Quest et al. 2006; Feingold 1994), and public policy behaviors (e.g., opinions on judicial philosophy; Gault & Sabini 2000). Though many of these constructs have not been traditionally viewed in terms of expressive behaviors or advertisements in and of themselves, they can be viewed as simulations of preferred social characteristics. In this sense, a socio-relational perspective may eventually integrate emotional expression with a full range of social communication. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I thank David Geary, Norm Li, Carroll Izard, Shaun Brophy, Adam Carle, Randy Russac, and four anonymous reviewers for comments on an earlier draft. I also thank my wife, Patricia, and my parents, Jake and Annabell Vigil, for their emotional support.

Commentary/Vigil: Sex differences in the expression of emotion

Open Peer Commentary When organization meets emotions, does the socio-relational framework fail? doi:10.1017/S0140525X09990227 Fre´de´ric Bassoa and Olivier Oullierb a Center for Research in Economics and Management (UMR 6211), University of Rennes 1, Rennes, France; Graduate School of Business Administration (Institut de Gestion de Rennes – Institut d’Administration des Entreprises), 35708 Rennes Cedex 7, France; bUniversite´ de Provence, Aix-Marseille University & CNRS, 13331 Marseille cedex 03, France; Human Brain and Behavior Laboratory, Center for Complex Systems and Brain Sciences, Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton, FL 33431. [email protected] [email protected] http://www.oullier.fr/ http://www.neuroeconomie.fr/

Abstract: We suggest that the framework proposed by Vigil is useful in laboratory contexts but might come up short for in vivo social interactions. Emotions result from cost-benefits trade-offs but are not solely generated at the individual level to establish emotional social spheres. In organizational contexts, emotion expression can be a constitutive part of a professional activity, and observed sex differences might vanish.

We wish to discuss Vigil’s views regarding emotions in light of data collected either in a “neutral” context (i.e., lab experiments) or in a more social one (i.e., field research). From his target article we gathered that the exhibition (or perception) of capacity displays is associated with risk-taking tendencies (see sect. 3.3), whereas trustworthiness displays give rise to altruism (sect. 2.1.1.1). In addition, the author claims that capacity cues are more specific to male than to female behavior as opposed to trustworthiness ones (sect. 3.2.1.1). Nevertheless, both compose the cost-benefits trade-offs that constitute the core of the social sphere. To apprehend individual emotive behavior from a functional and conscious perspective, we have decided to consider results from experimental economic games. In general, these protocols not only pay little attention to, but do their best to elude the role played by facial expressions and gesture in social interactions (but see Oullier & Basso 2010, for novel perspectives). In spite of this obvious reductionism, these games offer original insights on risk-taking and altruistic behaviors, therefore allowing the implementation of contexts in which interactions favor the analysis of trade-offs occurring in these social spheres. Here, we focus on two settings from experimental economics: The Dictator Game (DG) and Ultimatum Games (UG). In both, a first player A offers a share of the amount of money he owns to a second player B. The DG is a true unilateral division of A’s initial capital since what B decides regarding the money sent to him has no effect on what A can keep (Forsythe et al. 1994). The UG extends the DG to a situation where B can refuse A’s offer. If he does so, both players lose their respective share (Guth et al. 1982). Player A is somewhat forced to anticipate B’s emotions if he does not want to be punished. In the DG, the average share offered to B is 20% of A’s capital, whereas another 20% is added in the UG (Elster 2009). The UG is therefore a true revelator of the functional role of emotions. Interestingly, a meta-analysis of results collected in both games does not permit one to conclude that women exhibit more trustworthiness or less capacity than men (Croson & Gneezy 2009). However, men appear to have more capacity since they are less risk-averse than women. As such, empirical evidence seems to favor Vigil’s views: “Recent findings suggest that women are more reluctant than men to engage in competitive interactions like tournaments, bargaining and auctions” (Croson & Gneezy 2009, p. 464). It is noteworthy that this claim is not verified for a certain category of women: namely, managers and entrepreneurs.

For instance, it has been reported that such women’s aversion to risk is of the same order as that found with men (Masters & Meier 1988). They are therefore less risk-averse than other women. Two hypotheses can be made to interpret these observations. First, low risk aversion could be considered to be one of these women’s intrinsic features that perhaps led them to become managers or entrepreneurs – a kind of autoselection. Second, it is possible that the particular training they underwent to prepare for these specific careers modified their aversion to risk (Johnson & Powell 1994). A recent study shows that differences could also emerge between managers and entrepreneurs in their attitude towards risk. Nevertheless, training as well as social and cultural norms are to be considered key factors that can minimize risk aversion (Lawrence et al. 2008). This second interpretation has major consequences for Vigil, for, as Croson and Gneezy (2009, p. 454) observe: “This result [i.e., modified risk-aversion] could also be an adaptive behavior to the requirements of the job.” The importance of one’s professional activity in his or her relation to risk entices us into considering the role of organizations in our emotions. Thus, it appears difficult not to include organizations in the socio-relational framework. Economically, they account for 80% of America’s economic activity (Simon 1996). Socially, they are the product of social interactions that are shaped by multiple kinds of emotions (Simon 1967). As suggested by the aforementioned study, emotions are not only to be considered at the level of our social individual sphere but also as a by-product of the organization, therefore leading to the concept of emotional work (Hochschild 1979). Emotions in the emotional work exist, as pointed by Vigil, at the social and behavioral levels ( face-to-face or voice-to-voice) and preserve their conscious and functional features. However, in that context, they somewhat lose their purely individual dimension. The cost-benefit trade-off is implemented to extend the social sphere of the organization while being put in emotional conformity with its expectations (Hochschild 1983; Rafaeli & Sutton 1987) or to influence of the emotions of others (Sutton & Rafaeli 1988) as suggested in quadrant II (controlled and emotional processes) of the typology provided by Camerer et al. (2005). In summary, the organizational context brings the behavior and the individuals that constitute the organization much closer. Indeed, as we saw that women’s professional activity can make them exhibit risk aversion similar to men’s, it should also be noted that men, as members of an organization, can be constrained to adopt altruistic behaviors to the level generally exhibited by women (Simon 1996). All in all, Vigil’s conclusions on social status (sect. 4.1.1) might need to be put in perspective by stressing that “the imaginary presence of organization” (a kind of panopticon) influences the emotions of its members, although there exists a debate as to whether these prescribed emotions would not be basically inspired (or prescribed) by men (Mumby & Putnam 1992).

The role of emotions in adaptations for exploitation doi:10.1017/S0140525X09991087 David M. Buss Department of Psychology, University of Texas, Austin, TX 78712. [email protected] www.davidbuss.com http://homepage.psy.utexas.edu/homepage/Group/BussLAB/

Abstract: Emotion expression serves functions in exploitative resourceacquisition strategies that may not include relationship reciprocity. These include rendering victims more exploitable and signaling one’s status as non-exploitable. A comprehensive theory of emotion expressions must explain their role in adaptations for exploitation, as well as evolved defenses against those pursuing a strategy of exploitation. BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5

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Commentary/Vigil: Sex differences in the expression of emotion Emotion expression surely must be central to regulating social relationships, as Vigil contends. For internal psychological functions such as ratcheting up attention to strategic interference (Buss 1989) or recalibrating internal mechanisms (Tooby & Cosmides 2008), overt expression of internal emotional states would be superfluous, although of course these ultimately often contribute to the solution of social adaptive problems. Vigil also makes a compelling case for the role of emotions in signaling reciprocity potential. I propose that emotion expressions serve other functions as well, and I highlight one suite that has been relatively neglected by emotion theorists – their role in adaptations for exploitation. Buss and Duntley (2008) argue that humans have evolved three fundamental strategies for acquiring reproductively relevant resources: (1) individual resource acquisition strategies (e.g., solo hunting or gathering), (2) cooperative resource-acquisition strategies (e.g., forming reciprocal and coalitional alliances), and (3) exploitative resource-acquisition strategies (e.g., expropriating the resources of others through deception, theft, coercion, terror, force, or murder). Although cooperative strategies have enjoyed a large volume of theoretical and research attention, exploitative strategies have been relatively ignored, with some notable exceptions (e.g., Buss & Duntley 2008; Jones 2007; Zuk & Kolluru 1998). Without diminishing the role of emotion expression in strategies of reciprocity, I suggest that emotion expressions play a key role in strategies of exploitation and anti-exploitation defenses. Ominous expressions of anger, for example, could signal a perceived violation of reciprocity in one context, but signal a threat to a victim to cede resources immediately and non-reciprocally as a strategy of exploitation. Women may express an emotion of sexual desire to deepen a committed relationship in one context, or to expropriate a man’s resources non-reciprocally through a “bait-and-switch” strategy in another context (Buss 2003). Emotion expressions also function as anti-exploitability defenses. Displays of anger or masculine prowess may signal reciprocal resource capacity, but may also convey to would-be exploiters that one is a poor choice as a potential victim of exploitation. Expressions of jealousy, to take another example, may signal to romantic partners a lack of exploitability as a potential cuckold. The intentional suppression of emotion expression, too, may figure centrally in anti-exploitability defenses. The suppression of subjectively experienced jealousy to one’s intimate partner, for example, may function to conceal an exploitable mate-value discrepancy that otherwise might be perceived by a romantic partner (Buss 2000). The suppression of fear in the presence of coalitional partners may function not merely to signal reciprocity capacity, but also to activate exploitability adaptations in coalition partners in order to better expropriate out-group resources. Even displays of kindness and sympathy, rather than signaling reciprocity capacity, may function in some circumstances to deactivate the evolved anti-exploitability defenses in others. A comprehensive theory of emotion expressions must explain their role in the successful enactment of adaptations for exploitation, as well as their functions in signaling non-vulnerability to those pursuing exploitative resource acquisition strategies.

Biofeedback mechanisms between shapeable endogen structures and contingent social complexes: The nature of determination for developmental paths doi:10.1017/S0140525X09990197 Sari Goldstein Ferber Department of Developmental Neuroscience, New York Psychiatric Institute, New York, NY 10032; Department of Psychiatry, Columbia Medical School, New York, NY 10032; and Department of Neonatology, Wolfson Medical Center, Sackler School of Medicine, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel. [email protected]

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Abstract: Biofeedback mechanisms (a) between individuals, (b) between the individual and the society structures which shape individual cognitions, and (c) within the individual genetic biochemical circulation, may explain the diversity of trustworthiness potential and the option of mutual trust for every individual in any given society.

Causal models predict different human inferences than taxonomic models do (Shafto et al. 2008); biofeedback perspectives, therefore, may correct the discrepancy between these cognitive capacities. Studies with humans on neuropeptides such as vasopressin and oxytocine suggest that variation in the genes encoding their receptors may contribute to variation in human social behavior by altering brain function (Donaldson & Young 2008). Likewise, the shapeable human social cognitions and the contingent social structures may imply a complex regulatory system of power; for example, submissive female sexuality can lead to dominance in gene reproductivity. Regulatory theories (Als 1999; Hofer 1994; Mareschal et al. 2007) in turn may suggest the need to measure the level of power within a given relationship in order to judge dominance and submissiveness and the complex interrelations between the two constructs. Vigil claims that submissive behaviors express trustworthiness. This creates a one-way hierarchy of trust, in which the dominant can trust the submissive. As challenge and competition are considered part of give-and-take relationship, submissiveness may end in raising power challenges in the other and result in difficulties for trusting the submissive. Regulatory theories consider the concept of mutual trust and individual preferences. Vigil refers to submissiveness in the adversity of the social framework through submissiveness as trustworthiness. The vulnerable may not receive social support in all human cultures or in other species. The assumption of welfare and charity found in Western society is problematic and may be replaced by the question whether the expression of vulnerability as well as the benefits of vulnerability, are instinctual. The examination of natural expressions of vulnerability compared with the cultural expression of it may suggest a complex of species-attributed behaviors interacting with socially and/or culturally attributed effects. Sometimes individuals choose losing strategies or perpetuate their own victim state. Following this rationale, we would have to interpret (1) the attraction to abusive relationships as rewarding at some other levels; (2) the ability to discriminate what behavior is rewarding; and (3) what is the level of the observed reward. Alternatively, we can claim that attachment is a reward and that love has complex facets of frustration and reward. The examination of biofeedback mechanisms of alleles, genes, individuals, societies, or ecosystems, as suggested by theories of co-regulation, may show the complex of gender differences and that men with the similar biofeedback mechanisms may have feminine attributes, and vice versa. We ought to be cautious when we refer to individuals as entities that cannot be divided or summed, without considering biofeedback mechanisms of the vital human brain (Ferber 2008; 2009; Ferber & Makhoul 2004; 2008). Critical ages (Duffy et al. 2003) during early development and through the entire life span provide the window of opportunities and the possibility for determining which developmental paths may be considered along the course of life until a critical age for a certain capacity ends. Vigil assumes a coherent and discrete self versus other, which are often hard to delineate – for example, in the case of pregnancy. There are also other states in early infancy without distinct discrimination between the self and other, along with the complex emergence of relationships and interactive behaviors between the infant and his/her family members (Ferber et al. 2007). Vigil assumes that there are only two vectors when facing the other – toward and away – and neglects the possibility of exploratory and curious observation and learning even in relation to a threat, or the cycle of retreating, reinforcing, and returning to marked experiences (Als 1999). The adoption of abusive behaviors that prove unprofitable even to the abuser, such as abusive parenting, is a situation where desire and abjection are more than normative regulations, and become a personality.

Commentary/Vigil: Sex differences in the expression of emotion Vigil mentions that there are neural-endocrinal correlates to trust. Oxytocin is the prime inducer of bonding between mother and infant; this means that we can understand such hormones and trusting behavior as organically linked, that is, as being the cause and effect of each other. Thus, it cannot be said that trustworthiness is merely an observed feature. It is an acquired relationship. The more trustworthy we are, the more trusting the other becomes toward us. Oxytocin causes mothers to bond with their child and not other people’s children, and also explains the preference of monogamous species for one mating partner over multiple mating partners. This suggests that oxytocin-enhanced individuals will not only be more prone to bonding, but also more prone to reject those who are not bonded with. A mother’s bond with her child means she will defend him or her against any threat or aggressor, making trusting and bonding behaviors trusted and bonded, but threatening and defensive against all others. Therefore, the coregulation between vasopressin and oxytocin seems more adequate for explaining trustworthiness. Vigil describes the current state of affairs in a patriarchal society and grounds it as historically consistent. Still, Vigil provides us with the possibility of an alternative: “In foraging societies with bride service, the prospective husband is expected to reside with his bride’s family to provide service to them before the marriage and often for some time afterwards” (sect. 3.1, para. 2, emphasis in target article). In this idea, Vigil pays attention to the contingent structure of society as a primary regulator of personality creation. Vigil describes the correlation of hypothalamic pituitary adrenal (HPA) axis activation and the theory of sexually dimorphic competition domains. It could be argued that the activation of the HPA axis is not proof enough of a natural tendency of the two sexes to compete within or between groups, and that social construction leads to cognitive schemes that define stressful contexts and these activate the HPA axis accordingly. The neural-endocrinal correlates are not proof of universality or biological origin, since they may be mediated by modular, shapeable cognitions as stated above. Therefore, contingency between shapeable cognitive structures and contingent social complex structures may need to be considered as interacting with genetic, environmental, and reciprocal complexes. The concept of female submissiveness versus male aggressiveness opens a window of opportunities for understanding developmental trajectories which one of them is the development of mutual trust.

Beyond our origin: Adding social context to an explanation of sex differences in emotion expression doi:10.1017/S0140525X09990215 Agneta H. Fischer Department of Social Psychology, University of Amsterdam, 1018 WB Amsterdam, The Netherlands. [email protected] http://home.medewerker.uva.nl/a.h.fischer/

Abstract: Vigil’s socio-relational framework of sex differences in emotional expressiveness emphasizes general sex differences in emotional responding, but largely ignores the social context in which emotions are expressed. There is much empirical evidence showing that sex differences in emotion displays are flexible and a function of specific social roles and demands, rather than a reflection of evolutionary-based social adjustments.

The socio-relational framework presented by Vigil is a new challenge in understanding sex differences in emotion expression. Vigil’s model accounts for the fact that there are general sex

differences in specific emotional expressiveness: women cry more, laugh more, or show more depressive symptoms, whereas men display more contempt or antagonistic anger. These sex differences would reflect the extent to which men and women aim to maintain different social spheres and are motivated to display different social cues. Although I appreciate the argument that social sphere plays an important role in this explanatory framework, the model lacks flexibility and sensitivity to the immediate social context (see also Deaux & Major 1987; Eagly & Wood 1999). Men and women may indeed differ in the ways in which they emotionally adapt in order to enhance their social fitness. However, social fitness should not be exclusively described in evolutionary terms, but should be defined as being able to adjust to one’s current social environment, and to form and maintain social relationships in order to achieve one’s life goals. These goals may be different for men and women, partly because of their different biological heritage, but also because of their current social roles (e.g., Diekman & Eagly 2008; Eagly 1997; Eagly & Wood 1999). In many societies, these social roles still co-occur with the different biological capacities of men and women; however, it is also clear that in an increasing number of societies men and women have more egalitarian social roles, and therefore meet similar social demands and social restraints. Social demands and restraints that individuals are facing can be described in terms of both long-term and short-term socialrelational goals in a specific situation. These can be roughly distinguished along similar lines as in Vigil’s model; namely, approach and avoidance, or to promote relationships (either intimate or more formal) or to exclude oneself from relationships (running away, avoiding, excluding others). We have suggested that emotions have social functions (Fischer & Manstead 2008) that are derived from these social-relational goals. In other words, discrete emotions may serve either affiliation or distancing goals. A goal can be reached through different emotion expressions, however, depending on the social context and one’s relational history with a specific person. For example, in a dispute with one’s partner about a broken promise, the most important goal is to change the other’s behavior. This goal can be reached via submissive behavior (disappointment, crying), but also via antagonistic behavior (direct anger, contempt). On the basis of Vigil’s framework, we would predict that in an intimate context, women show submissiveness in order to maintain their intimate social sphere, whereas men would be aggressive in order to secure a larger social network. There is evidence, however, that sex differences in emotional expressions diverge from this general pattern, depending on specific social contexts. First of all, results from meta-analyses have demonstrated that women show more aggressive behavior in intimate relations than do men (e.g., Archer 2004), but more importantly for the present argument, the type of anger expression varies with the type of social role. Women in egalitarian relations report more direct, or antagonistic anger compared to women in traditional relations (Fischer & Evers, under review); moreover, it was shown that women in traditional societies report less antagonistic anger in intimate settings than do women in societies with more egalitarian roles (Fischer et al. 2004). In other words, women’s anger expressions seem to depend on the direct social demands that they are facing. This is supported by experimental evidence suggesting that women’s anger can be predicted by the expected negative consequences of their overt anger (Evers et al. 2005). Another example of the context specificity of sex differences in emotion expressions is the case of smiling. It is true that women generally tend to smile more than men, but results from a metaanalysis suggest that they do so especially in situations where they are expected to smile more; for example, in situations in which they are observed or evaluated (LaFrance & Hecht 2000; LaFrance et al. 2003). Sex differences in smiling therefore seem partly based on gender-specific display rules (see also Stoppard BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5

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Commentary/Vigil: Sex differences in the expression of emotion & Gruchy 1993). This is also evident from the fact that in social contexts with an explicit affiliation goal – for example, in caretaker roles – the sex difference in smiling decreases. This supports the general argument that social goals and one’s social role in an interaction determine which emotional behaviors are functional to meet social demands. A second critical issue with respect to Vigil’s explanatory framework relates to the suggestion that making dispositional inferences in terms of capacity and trustworthiness cues is merely based on the characteristics of the display. It is likely, however, that such inferences are also context dependent. Smiling, for example, can be seen as signal of affiliation, appeasement, dominance, or negative self-conscious emotions, depending on the context (e.g., LaFrance & Hecht 2000; Shields 2002). The same applies to other – less ambiguous – emotional displays, such as crying. Crying can be interpreted as a sign of dispositional powerlessness (someone who is emotional), but also as a sign of temporary powerlessness (someone who is very sad), which may lead to quite different reactions. Perceivers may thus interpret emotional displays in different ways, not only depending on the actual dynamics of the display, but also on the construal of the perceiver, who may take into account the social role and identity of the displayer, and the social context. We may thus wonder what we actually infer from emotional displays and why. There is as much evidence that we infer individual dispositions, such as capacity and trustworthiness, as social motives (Fridlund 1994), status characteristics (Tiedens 2001), or emotivational states (Roseman et al. 1994). Moreover, why would those inferences be context independent? Given that emotions are elicited in order to help an individual cope with problems in his or her environment, expressive displays are directly intended to change our social relations. This implies that we would infer information not only about the other person, but also about our relationship with this other person. In other words, we do not only infer from an angry face that someone has resources, but also that this person is more powerful and ready to retaliate.

Separating production from perception: Perceiver-based explanations for sex differences in emotion doi:10.1017/S0140525X09990203 Jennifer M. B. Fugate,a Harold Gouzoules,b and Lisa Feldman Barrett a,c a

Department of Psychology, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467; Department of Psychology, Emory University, Atlanta, GA 3032; c Massachusetts General Hospital – East, Charlestown, MA 02129. [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] http://www2.bc.edu/~barretli/ http://www.psychology.emory.edu/nab/gouzoules/index.html b

Abstract: In this commentary, we review evidence that production-based (perceiver-independent) measures reveal few consistent sex differences in emotion. Further, sex differences in perceiver-based measures can be attributed to retrospective or dispositional biases. We end by discussing an alternative view that women might appear to be more emotional because they are more facile with emotion language.

In his target article, Vigil suggests that sex differences in emotion are an adaptation to a presumed social structure exhibited by early hominoids, in which females migrated from their natal group and males tended to stay in their natal groups. As evidence for extant sex differences, Vigil reviews literature showing that women are superior to men at perceiving emotion in others, and then uses such evidence as the basis for inferring that women also produce more emotion than do men. In this commentary, we first discuss

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evidence that production-based (perceiver-independent) measures of emotion reveal few consistent sex differences. Next, we review evidence that perceiver-based measures, which do suggest women are more emotional, evoke retrospective biases that highlight gender stereotypes, or dispositional biases that attribute emotional responses to a women’s nature. We end by discussing an alternative view that women might appear to be more emotional because they are more facile with emotion language. Perceiver-independent measurements provide very little consistent evidence that women are “more emotional” than men (with the exception that women do cry more often). For example, some facial electromyographic (EMG) studies show sex differences in facial muscle activity in response to emotional stimuli (reviewed in the target article), but many do not (Lundqvist 1995, experiment 2; Lundqvist & Dimberg 1995; Kelley et al. 2005; Sloan et al. 2002). Even among papers that report sex differences, explanations based on orienting responses (Lang et al. 1993) or facial imitation (Dimberg & Lundquist 1990) cannot be ruled out. There is also inconsistent evidence for sex differences in smiling: some studies show that women smile more than men (LaFrance et al. 2003), but in others women smile less (Ansfield 2007). Similarly, there is no evidence for sex differences in psychophysiological responding to emotional stimuli (Kelley et al. 2005), nor in the acoustics of emotional vocalizations (Viscovich et al. 2003). Likewise, a recent meta-analysis of imagining studies found no major sex differences in how the brain responds to emotional stimuli (although males tend to exhibit more lateralized activation compared to females) (Wager et al. 2003). Results from perceiver-based measurements of emotion generally tell a different story. Women, compared to men, report that they are more emotionally expressive (Barrett et al. 1998; Kring & Gordon 1998). Women also report experiencing more intense emotions than do men (Allen & Haccoun 1976; Allen & Hamsher 1974; Balswick & Avertt 1977; Larsen & Diener 1987), and perceivers typically agree (Kring & Gordon 1998). However, these sex differences are observed primarily when self-report measures draw upon memory for prior emotional experiences (Barrett et al. 1998; Robinson & Clore 2002b; Robinson et al. 1998). When men and women report their momentary emotional experiences in everyday life using experience-sampling procedures, they appear equally emotional (Barrett et al. 1998). Thus, one reason for perceiver-based sex differences is that women are simply better at recalling the information needed on global or dispositional self-report measures of emotional experience. Consistent with this suggestion, women also have more sophisticated emotion concepts that can serve as retrieval cues (Barrett et al. 2000; Seidlitz & Diener 1998). In addition, women recall emotional memories more quickly and frequently (Davis 1999), intensely (Seidlitz & Diener 1998), and ruminate more on negative events compared to men (Nolen-Hoeksema et al. 1994; Wood et al. 1990). A second reason that women appear more emotional in perceiver-based measurements is that memory for emotional events is infused with gender stereotypes (Grossman & Wood 1993; Robinson & Clore 2002b; Robinson et al. 1998). Specifically, Robinson et al. (1998) showed that gender stereotypes are employed as a heuristic when people lack easy access to the target and situation-specific information (such as perceiving emotion in another person). Robinson and Clore (2002a, Study 3) showed that women reported more intense emotion, and men less intense emotion, when participants were not concurrently experiencing emotion but gender-based beliefs about emotion were primed. Thus, people might believe women are the more emotional sex because they are engaging in retrospective biases that highlight gender stereotypes. Recent work within our laboratory highlights a third reason that perceivers experience women as more emotional: sex differences in emotionality might stem not from what men and women actually do, but from the explanations that perceivers give for those behaviors. Specially, Barrett and Bliss-Moreau (under review) found evidence that people are more likely to assign a dispositional

Commentary/Vigil: Sex differences in the expression of emotion cause to female displays of emotion, whereas a situational cause is more frequently assigned to male displays of emotion. Thus, people might believe women are the more emotional sex because they treat women’s emotional behavior as evidence that women have an emotional nature, whereas men’s emotional behavior is interpreted as evidence that the situation warrants such behavior. Lastly, women, compared to men, might also report more emotion because they are more likely to conceptualize basic affective changes as emotional. This might be the result of women having a broader and more facile emotion vocabulary than do men. Consistent with this suggestion, parents tend to discuss emotions differently with their daughters and sons. Mothers elaborate about emotion more with their daughters than with their sons, and place emotions in a more interpersonal context with their daughters (Fivush et al. 2003). Mothers also use more emotion labels during conversations with their preschooler-aged daughters than with sons. Women consistently use more emotion words when describing their own and others’ reactions to interpersonal conflicts (Barrett et al. 2000). Simply stated, then, more facile emotion language to which females are exposed might provide an internal context that shapes emotion perception. In fact, a recent review (Barrett et al. 2007) summarized a number of different lines of evidence that support the idea that language is a key component in the conceptualization of emotion. Language might not only help determine the emotion categories people acquire but also how variable instances of core affect become conceptualized as a discrete emotion. More precisely, conceptual knowledge that is supported by language might explain why emotions are perceived as discrete entities even when the majority of production-based measures (including peripheral nervous systems responses, facial EMG, and neuroimaging) do not robustly and unambiguously differentiate among emotions (for a review, see Barrett 2006b; Barrett et al. 2007; Wager et al. 2008). As a result, we suggest that conceptual knowledge is a powerful tool that not only might explain sex differences in emotion, but also might shed light on the very nature of emotion (for further discussion, see Barrett 2006a; 2006b). ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Preparation of this commentary was supported by the National Institutes of Health Director’s Pioneer Award (DP1OD003312), by grants from the National Institute of Aging (AG030311) and the National Science Foundation (BCS 0721260; BCS 0527440), and by a contract with the Army Research Institute (W91WAW) to the third author, Lisa Feldman Barrett.

Sex differences in emotion expression: Developmental, epigenetic, and cultural factors doi:10.1017/S0140525X09990185

We found much to admire in Vigil’s target article. The novel constructs that he introduced to explain sex differences in emotion expression seem likely to become topics for further research, particularly among social psychologists. We also found some points that seemed underdeveloped or misleading. 1. Functions of emotion expression. In considering the functions of emotion-expressive behavior, Vigil focused on a rather narrow, though significant, area. He proposed that emotion expressions evolved to promote attraction and aversion in different types of relationships. He then operationally defined emotions as expressive behaviors – a highly restrictive view of emotions and their various properties. Though we see expression as an important aspect of emotion, it is but one of its components. Furthermore, expressions can and do occur without a matching experiential or feeling component, and the latter is widely considered as the motivational aspect of emotion (LeDoux, in press). In responding to a survey on the definition, functions, activation, and regulation of emotion, 35 distinguished emotion scientists identified social communication as one of six functions of emotion (Izard 2008). 2. First-order or second-order emotions. Vigil’s allusion to socio-relational expressive behavior as reflecting basic or firstorder emotions could prove misleading. The expressions that he describes as conveying reciprocity potential and trustworthiness are clearly higher-order emotions or emotion schemas that include complex cognitive content (Izard 2009). The latter undoubtedly reflects the cultural context of the individuals engaged in exchanging expressive-behavior signals. In the target article, Vigil shows little concern for the roles of cultural and epigenetic factors in shaping emotion-expressive behavior. 3. Epigenetic, cultural, and personality factors influence emotion expression. Memes are one of several epigenetic mech-

anisms that may influence the development and transmission of expressive behavior. Natural selection can act on “replicant” units (memes) that consist of cognition and action patterns. Experts on evolution hypothesize that memes emerged to serve unique adaptive functions in social interactions that are transmitted through imitative learning (Dawkins 1976/1989). Even newborns can imitate simple facial behavior (Meltzoff & Moore 1994), and they display identifiable discrete emotion expressions later in infancy (Izard et al. 1995). In the preschool years, makebelieve play further enhances children’s imitative skills. Clearly, both ontogenetic development and the evolutionary processes in phylogeny play significant roles in emotion expressive behavior (Izard 2009; Noble 2006). People express emotions for reasons other than promoting interpersonal attraction and aversion, and emotion responding is always influenced by temperament/personality. One can express interest and engagement in a wide variety of nonsocial events or situations (Izard 2007; Silvia 2006). A person may become frustrated or angry when her computer malfunctions, frightened by a strange noise after a storm causes a power failure, and disgusted by foul tastes or odors. The same is true for experiencing and expressing other emotions (Izard 1991). 4. Sex differences in emotion experiences and expressions.

Carroll E. Izard, Kristy J. Finlon, and Stacy R. Grossman Psychology Department, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716. [email protected] [email protected] sgrossman@psych. udel.edu http://www.psych.udel.edu/people/faculty/izard.asp http://www.psych.udel.edu/people/StacyGrossman.asp

Abstract: Vigil’s socio-relational framework of sex differences in emotion-expressive behavior has a number of interesting aspects, especially the principal concepts of reciprocity potential and perceived attractiveness and trustworthiness. These are attractive and potentially heuristic ideas. However, some of his arguments and claims are not well grounded in research on early development. Three- to five-yearold children did not show the sex differences in emotion-expressive behavior discussed in the target article. Our data suggest that Vigil may have underestimated the roles of epigenetic and cultural factors in shaping emotion-expressive behavior.

Vigil maintains that females are better at detecting and identifying emotions in the expressions of others. Though research results on this issue consistently favor females, the size of the difference is typically quite small (McClure 2000). Moreover, Vigil claims that females are more expressive than males. There is little, if any, evidence to show that these differences are determined more by evolution than by culture and socialization. On the contrary, findings based on large data-sets relating to 3- to 5-year-old children typically show age differences but not sex differences in emotion knowledge – the understanding of the expressions, feelings, and functions of emotions (Finlon et al. 2009). We have found no evidence that girls are more expressive than boys. Our data show no consistent sex differences in emotion expressions during unstructured playtime (as indexed by independent observers’ coding of facial cues, vocal cues, and body posture with our Emotion Behavior Coding System). BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5

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Commentary/Vigil: Sex differences in the expression of emotion In the one data set where we found sex differences, boys showed more expressiveness than girls, especially more happy expressions, but this difference was not consistent across cohorts. Our data do support Vigil’s claim that anger and joy should share trait impressions and overlapping characteristics. In 3- to 5-year-old children, during unstructured playtime, we found both increased anger and increased joy expression related to more positive interactions with peers and teachers and less solitary behaviors. We also found that increased sadness and increased anger were related to more negative interactions with peers and teachers. Contrary to Vigil’s claims, there were no sex differences in these emotion expression-behavior relations. The findings from our data sets are from low-socioeconomic status (SES), urban, minority populations. We suspect that most of the data reviewed in the target article came from middle-class Caucasian participants. Our data from children in low-income families help account for some significant differences related to ethnicity (Krauthamer-Ewing 2009), but not those determined primarily by evolutionary processes. Vigil noted that Latino Americans, as a collectivistic culture, report more sadness-related behaviors than those from individualistic cultures. This finding is also contrary to what we have observed. In 3- to 5-year-old Hispanic and African American children, we found no differences in sadness expressions in the classroom, and African American mothers in our samples scored higher than Hispanic mothers on a depression inventory (although this finding was likely influenced by other demographic factors; Krauthamer-Ewing 2009). 5. Conclusion. In sum, we think that our finding of no consistent emotion-expression sex differences in several cohorts of Black and Hispanic 3- to 5-year-old children raises serious questions relating to Vigil’s theory. In particular, our data suggest that Vigil may have gone too far in discounting familial (e.g., parental socialization of emotions), other social, and cultural factors in making an unjustifiably strong claim that evolution is the primary determinant of sex differences in the expression of emotions. Though we disagree with Vigil on this particular issue, we have long supported theories that view evolutionary processes as critical to understanding emotions and emotion processes (Izard 2009). ACKNOWLEDGMENT This work was supported by grant R01MH080909 from the National Institute of Mental Health. The content is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily represent the official views of the National Institute of Mental Health or the National Institutes of Health.

Emotional expression of capacity and trustworthiness in humor and in social dilemmas doi:10.1017/S0140525X09990173 Norman P. Lia,b and Daniel Ballieta a School of Social Sciences, Singapore Management University, Singapore 178904, Singapore; bDepartment of Psychology, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX 78712. [email protected] [email protected] http://www.normli.com http://www.socsc.smu.edu.sg/faculty/social_sciences/dballiet.asp

Abstract: Humor and social dilemmas are two disparate areas that have been linked to emotions. However, they tend to have been studied apart from considerations of emotion and emotional expression. We provide an overview of how such areas might be illuminated by Vigil’s sociorelational framework, and how capacity and trustworthiness are communicated in humor and social dilemmas.

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Vigil’s socio-relational framework broadly unifies research on emotion, proposing that emotional expression serves the function of communicating reciprocity potential along the dimensions of capacity and trustworthiness. We briefly consider how two disparate areas are tied into emotional expression and can be fruitfully viewed under the socio-relational framework. Although not traditionally considered as a primary emotion or emotional display, per se, humor nevertheless has been associated with emotional intelligence (e.g., Yip & Martin 2006) and relationship formation and regulation (e.g., Shiota et al. 2004). Recently, Li et al. (2009) found experimental evidence that people initiate humor to indicate interest in romantic relationships with desirable others to whom they are attracted. Indeed, when people initiate humor as opposed to non-humorous conversation, their audience is more likely to perceive that the initiators are interested in a potential relationship, and the audience laughs and responds more positively if they reciprocate the positive evaluation and interest. In such social interactions, humor may be a process through which high self-capacity and high self-trustworthiness emotions are communicated and confirmation emotions are elicited. When individuals assess themselves and each other to be high in both capacity and trustworthiness, reciprocity potential is particularly strong; hence, the individuals may be especially motivated to form relationships with each other. However, an important aspect of Vigil’s model is that it highlights that people also need to communicate intra- and extra-appraisals where capacity and trustworthiness are not high. In this regard, specific types of humor may serve as effective mediums through which specific emotions are conveyed and feedback emotions are solicited. For instance, self-deprecating humor may be initiated to convey a state of high trustworthiness but low self-capacity, whereas aggressive put-down humor may convey high capacity but low trustworthiness. Similarly, perverse or sarcastic humor may suggest low self-capacity and low selftrustworthiness. In each case, to the extent that an audience agrees with the implied self-appraisal, they should react positively to the humor to indicate their agreement. Humor may be an especially useful communication platform because it allows individuals to incrementally indicate their interest toward potential and existing relationships (Li et al., 2009). Similarly, humor may allow for less committed self- and otherappraisals of reciprocity potential. For example, when situations are new and somewhat ambiguous, one’s own capacity and trustworthiness, as well as those of others, may not be clear. By using humor, individuals may be able to indicate the general direction of their appraisals and seek verification before committing to stronger appraisals. Thus, under the socio-relational framework, individuals who are adept at using and recognizing humor may be emotionally intelligent in that they are more effective at communicating and eliciting the appropriate emotional signals to form and regulate social interactions to their advantage. There are, of course, plenty of situations where there is nothing to laugh about, including when relationships are in conflict. While traditionally considered to be in the domain of judgment and decision-making, social dilemmas may be intimately connected to dynamics of emotion. For instance, research on communication in social dilemmas has found that nonverbal communication between participants, including touch, oblique eye gaze, sight of the other, and just the sound of one’s voice, can increase cooperation in social dilemmas (Balliet, in press; Kurzban 2001). However, no research has explicitly addressed how emotions may underlie the coordination of behaviors in social dilemmas. By looking to the socio-relational framework, it becomes clearer that emotions may be an integral part of communication in social dilemmas. To illustrate, the framework predicts that individuals will respond to signals of high capacity and low trustworthiness with terror, fear, and/or aversion. Consistent with this, recent research on social dilemmas has found that people are less likely to contribute to a public good and more inclined to exit

Commentary/Vigil: Sex differences in the expression of emotion the social dilemma when an individual with a relatively higher endowment, and therefore, capacity to contribute to a public good, expresses anger (Wubben et al. 2008). Furthermore, people report lower expectations of contributions from an angry group member, compared to a guilty group member, thereby supporting the idea that angry individuals are perceived as less trustworthy in social dilemmas. These findings, which represent one of the few published studies on communicated emotions in social dilemmas, appear to fit well in a sociorelational framework and demonstrate that emotional expression can directly impact the outcomes of social dilemmas. The socio-relational model can also generate hypotheses to guide social dilemma research on the role of emotional expression. For example, although individuals often possess cooperative intentions, certain circumstances (termed negative noise) may block individuals from acting on these intentions (e.g., a computer fails, thereby preventing one of the coauthors of this article from finishing his part of the collaboration). The individual still self-perceives trustworthiness, but would display sadness, grief, or shame in response to his or her own defection if the negative noise reduces his or her self-perceived state of capacity. In fact, negative noise in dilemmas tends to result in lower cooperation, unless an individual is given an opportunity to communicate (and presumably express appropriate emotions), in which case subsequent cooperation prevails (Tazelaar et al. 2004). The socio-relational framework predicts that by expressing sadness or grief, a defector can mitigate the defection’s negative effect on the defector’s trustworthiness as perceived by the partner. Consequently, if the defector’s partner perceives greater trust, this could result in feelings and displays of sympathy toward the defector, which in turn are related to forgiveness and the ability to sustain a cooperative relationship. Therefore, the socio-relational model can be applied to predict how emotional expression coordinates cooperation between partners in social dilemmas. We have briefly identified two disparate research domains that may both be intimately connected to emotion displays, and therefore, could benefit from an organized study of emotion expression and the communication of capacity and trustworthiness. Although we did not consider sex differences in this commentary, sex differences tend to be ubiquitous in these and other areas, and their consideration can only increase the utility of the socio-relational framework.

On the detection of emotional facial expressions: Are girls really better than boys? doi:10.1017/S0140525X09990161 Vanessa LoBue and Judy S. DeLoache Department of Psychology, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22904. [email protected] [email protected]

Abstract: One facet of Vigil’s socio-relational framework of expressive behaviors (SRFB) suggests that females are more sensitive to facial expressions than are males, and should detect facial expressions more quickly. A re-examination of recent research with children demonstrates that girls do detect various facial expressions more quickly than do boys. Although this provides support for SRFB, further examination of SRFB in children would lend important support this evolutionary-based theory.

In his socio-relational framework of sex differences in the expression of emotion (i.e., the socio-relational framework of expressive behaviors [SRFB]), Vigil proposes that there should be gender differences in the processing of affective facial expressions, and he cites several specific examples of the ways in which males and females should differ in this domain. Here we focus on one in particular – sex differences in the detection

of affective facial expressions and, in particular, whether there is evidence of such differences over the course of development. Based on SRFB, Vigil claims that, because of their sensitivity to trustworthiness cues, females should detect affective facial expressions more quickly than males. The only exception might be in the detection of anger: since males should be particularly sensitive to dominance cues, they should detect angry facial expressions more quickly than females. The question of whether adults detect certain kinds of facial expressions more quickly than others has been of substantial interest to many researchers, making Vigil’s claims easy to evaluate based on the existing literature. Using a standard visual search paradigm, many researchers have examined the detection of threatening facial expressions, such as anger. However, with the exception of the few studies cited by Vigil, few report any gender differences. Most of these studies find that participants of both sexes are faster at identifying angry faces than happy faces overall (Calvo et al. 2006; Esteves 1999; Fox et al. 2000; Gilboa-Schechtman et al. 1999; Horstmann ¨ hman 2005; Mather & Knight & Bauland 2006; Lundqvist & O ¨ hman et al. 2001; Schubo et al. 2006). 2006; O Although this research with adults offers no support for Vigil’s theory, research with children might be particularly relevant to evaluating SRFB. Vigil’s theory suggests an evolved or biological basis for gender differences in face detection, so it is possible that such differences would be apparent in childhood and even infancy. Recently, LoBue (2009) examined the visual detection of several affective facial expressions (e.g., happy, sad, angry, fearful) in both preschool children and adults. Participants in a series of studies were asked to find the single instance of a given category in a 3 x 3 matrix of color photographs. For example, they might be asked to identify the single angry face among eight happy ones (or vice versa). Consistent with the adult literature, both preschool children and adults were faster to detect facial expressions that depicted threat-relevant expressions (anger, fear) than non– threatrelevant expressions (happiness, sadness). In another series of studies, LoBue and DeLoache (2008) reported that preschool children and adults were also faster at detecting pictures of threat-relevant animals (snakes) than non– threat-relevant ones (frogs or caterpillars). However, no gender differences were found in any of the experiments. Despite the lack of significant sex differences, a slight advantage was apparent for female preschoolers in some of the studies. It is possible that the sample size in each study was too small (24 children in each study, 12 in each condition) for detecting subtle gender differences. Accordingly, we combined the data from all our visual search experiments to examine whether there was an overall advantage for females (data from LoBue 2009). There was in fact a significant effect of gender, indicating that girls detected the target faces more quickly than did boys. The advantage for females was stable across studies, and did not differ based on whether the target was threatening or nonthreatening. Importantly, this advantage was significant only for the detection of affective facial expressions: When reanalyzing the data for the detection of snakes (data from LoBue & DeLoache 2008), there was no such advantage for girls. These results indicate an advantage for young girls in the detection of affective facial expressions. Further, this advantage cannot be attributed to simple differences in motivation or compliance, since it was not found for the detection of non-facial stimuli. These results provide support for Vigil’s claim that females should have an advantage over males in the detection of emotional facial expressions. However, Vigil’s assertion that males should be particularly sensitive to threatening facial expressions was not supported – girls showed an advantage over boys across studies, regardless of whether or not the targets were threat-relevant. While these findings provide some support for SRFB, whether there is a biological basis for these gender differences is still unclear. It is certainly possible that by preschool, children have BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5

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Commentary/Vigil: Sex differences in the expression of emotion developed gender differences in face processing based on experience. This question makes research with infants, who have less experience interacting with the relevant stimuli, critical for testing Vigil’s hypothesis. Recently, LoBue and DeLoache (in press) did examine the detection of affective facial expressions in 8- to 14-month-olds, but found no gender differences. Further research in this area is needed in order to examine Vigil’s claims more thoroughly. Future research in other areas of development might also be informative for the SRFB. For example, Vigil suggests that females are better at posing affective facial expressions than are males. If so, this should also be true for children. Further, gender differences in infants’ preferences for different kinds of faces might be an important consideration for future research. For example, Lutchmaya and Baron-Cohen (2002) reported an important gender differences in 12-month-old infants’ looking preferences. They found that when infants were presented with videos of moving cars or moving faces in a looking-preference experiment, infant boys preferred to look at the cars over faces, while infant girls preferred to look at faces over cars. This result supports Vigil’s claims and may warrant further investigation. In conclusion, developmental findings on gender differences in the detection of affective facial expressions provide partial support for Vigil’s view that females should detect affective facial expressions more quickly than do males. Research with infants and young children could provide further information relevant to assessing the SRFB.

The other side of the coin: Intersexual selection and the expression of emotions to signal youth or maturity doi:10.1017/S0140525X0999015X George A. Lozano Department of Zoology, Institute of Ecology and Earth Sciences, Tartu University, 51014 Tartu, Estonia. [email protected] www.georgealozano.com

Abstract: Vigil summarizes sex-related differences in emotivity, and presents a psychological model based on the restrictive assumption that responses to stimuli are dichotomous. The model uses for support the concept of intrasexual selection, but ignores intersexual selection. An alternative hypothesis might be that emotivity signals age: maturity in men and youth in women. Integration requires considering all evolutionary biology, not just agreeable concepts.

Vigil is to be applauded for tackling such a large and complex topic as the differences in emotivity between the sexes and for attempting to produce a model that reconciles psychological and evolutionary approaches. Vigil’s summary of these differences (target article, sect. 3.2) is written crisply and directly, and will be a useful reference for anyone working in this area. With some adjustments and additions, his model or a derivative of it might successfully merge evolutionary and psychological approaches. The model assumes that “approach” and “avoid” are the only possible responses to external stimuli. However, animals often respond to stimuli by taking a “wait and see” strategy to obtain more information. Second, to use Vigil’s examples, food may be laden with toxins, and mates may sometimes become predators, so organisms seldom face a dichotomous choice, but rather must monitor many requirements and make the appropriate trade-offs. Third, even when it might be ultimately desirable to avoid a stimulus – for instance, a predator – there might be several viable short-term responses. The potential prey might freeze to avoid detection. If it is already being stalked, it might

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simply inform the predator that it has been seen so the latter can no longer mount a surprise attack. If the predator does attack, the best response might be to stand and fight. It is even more complex when, instead of responding to predators, animals must respond to highly social conspecifics with common and conflicting interests. Hence, the model would be stronger if it recognized that most responses to social stimuli probably fall within a large grey area between “avoid” and “approach.” Vigil then applies the model to sex-related differences in emotivity, using for support the concepts of intrasexual competition (Darwin 1871) and reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971). The model would be stronger if it also considered related concepts, such as intersexual selection (Darwin 1871) and the ensuing sexual conflict (Trivers 1972). Vigil points out that most social interactions are with members of our own sex, and women have more intimate relationships and with fewer individuals than men do, and he attributes these patterns to sex-related differences in philopatry. It might be worth also considering that variance in reproductive success is higher for males than for females, so competition among males is stronger than among women, not just different in its style and in its setting. Second, one must also wonder why displaying emotions might be more useful in more intimate situations. The opposite could be argued. Powerful leaders throughout history, who happen to have been mostly male, demonstrate that displaying emotions can be a powerful means of controlling and motivating the masses. Third, as a sexually reproducing species, there is only one way for our genes to make it to the next generation – by interacting with the opposite sex. Maybe the model could incorporate intersexual selection (a.k.a. epigamic selection or mate choice) instead of focusing solely on intrasexual competition. Finally, sexual relationships are a constant struggle between common and conflicting interests. Within every sexual relationship, there is the potential for cooperation but also for deceit, manipulation, and exploitation. An enormous body of work over the past 40 years has been based on that premise (Andersson 1994; Arnqvist & Rowe 2005; Low 2001; Majerus 2003; Trivers 1972). It is peculiar that a treatise on the differences in emotivity between the sexes would not consider the one emotion that for millennia has provided a livelihood for thespians, singers, poets, and playwrights; humanity’s greatest and most wonderfully labile and complex emotion and obsession: romantic love. When mating, men have been selected to be relatively more concerned with quantity and women with quality (Betzig 1986; 1993; Buss 2003; Helle et al. 2008; Murstein 1986). Men compete for resources mostly with other men, but they also compete for the attention of women by displaying, emphasizing, and exaggerating their strength, status, and wealth. In contrast, women compete for high-quality males by displaying, emphasizing, and exaggerating their potential fecundity, beauty, and/or youth, all of which are highly positively correlated. Emotional displays are signals, and as such, their purpose is to persuade, cajole, and manipulate the intended receivers (Maynard-Smith & Harper 2003; Searcy & Nowicki 2005). There is nothing more potentially deceptive than a simple smile. A new hypothesis suggests itself: emotivity, or lack thereof, might be yet another way to attract the opposite sex. Given that children are more emotive than adults, men might conceal their emotions as a way to display their strength and maturity. In contrast, women might express more and more variable emotions in order to display their youth. In any case, consideration of intersexual selection offers a different and more complete perspective. Vigil’s social framework of emotions consists of a two-dimensional construct with “trustworthiness” on one axis and “capacity”, or, perhaps more aptly, “ability”, on the other axis. This conceptualization is similar to Leary’s (1957) model, which had “love” and “dominance” as the two axes. Just like Leary’s model, Vigil’s is reasonable, interesting, and compelling, and it could have been derived without any knowledge of evolutionary biology. In

Commentary/Vigil: Sex differences in the expression of emotion applying the model to sex-related differences in emotions, evolutionary concepts are used only for support, not for illumination. Unfortunately, integration must encompass all evolutionary biology, not just selected concepts that agree with the model. If anything, the model highlights the fact that some areas of psychology and evolutionary biology, despite over 50 years of progress and a mutually acknowledged desire for integration, might be getting closer but are still entrenched in their own ways of thinking. Following Darwin’s (1872) pragmatism, Vigil addresses the expression of emotions, not emotions per se, as the latter are more difficult to observe, quantify, and classify (e.g., Nesse & Ellsworth 2009), and anyway, can only affect fitness when they alter behaviour. This important distinction might help us merge evolutionary and psychological approaches by allowing us to abandon arbitrary conceptualizations of what is inside a mind – the sensation of emotions – and instead lead us to focus on their ecology and functions. It is ironic that, evolutionarily, it only matters what emotions do, not how they feel.

Cry baby cry, make your mother buy? Evolution of tears, smiles, and reciprocity potential doi:10.1017/S0140525X09990148 Minna Lyons Liverpool Hope University and British Academy Centenary Research Project, Liverpool L16 9JD, United Kingdom. [email protected] http://hopelive.hope.ac.uk/psychology/evolutiongroup

Abstract: In this commentary, the idea of reciprocity potential indicators is tied in with ultimate accounts on sex differences in social sensitivity. It is proposed that, rather than crying, smiling is a more likely cooperative signal. The possibility of coevolution and polymorphism in perceptual and signalling systems are also discussed briefly, with a reference to Theory of Mind and Machiavellianism.

Although Vigil provides a very plausible ultimate account on the evolution of sex differences in emotionality based on male philopatry and female dispersal, some of the premises of the socio-relational framework of expressive behaviours (SRFB) remain less convincing. The two main aspects of the model circle around advertising capacity (relating to masculine dominance behaviours) and trustworthiness (relating to feminine emotional expressions), which Vigil ties in with numerous examples from diverse literature. While dominance cues might provide the observer with information about the importance of the actor as a social partner, the idea that emotive signals such as crying have evolved as a display of trustworthiness is less compelling. The purpose of adult crying is still very much disputed. Crying is a communicative signal (Zeifman 2001) functioning differently in multiple contexts (Peter et al. 2001). However, it is debatable whether adult tears represent an honest signal of cooperative intentions, and whether crying is perceived as such by receivers of the signal. Although some forms of crying do signify vulnerability and a need of help (Frijda 1997), it is more likely to induce others to help without the expectation of reciprocity. In fact, research suggests that, although crying amplifies the perceived sadness in the face (Provine et al. 2009) and elicits emotional support from others, crying individuals are sometimes perceived negatively (Hendriks et al. 2008), and even labelled as being manipulative (Buss 1992; Frijda 1997). Moreover, empirical, cross-cultural evidence on sex differences in crying is sparse, and the relative importance of socialisation and culture versus biological processes is not clear. Rosenblatt et al. (1976), for

example, analysed sex differences in crying in 60 societies and found that in over half of the cultures, women did not cry more than men did. Ross and Mirowsky (1984) suggested that, rather than an evolved signal, crying in adults is socially conditioned behaviour, dependent on factors such as socio-economic status and sex-role identity of the individual. It is possible that crying in adults is an extension of attachment-related behaviour (Nelson 2005), but does not function as a signal signifying reciprocity potential. Rather than crying, smiling is a more likely signal of reciprocity potential. Research has found that smiling is related to altruistic dispositions (Brown & Moore 2000; Brown et al. 2003) and is used in cooperative context (Mehu et al. 2007). Moreover, unlike crying, smiling induces trust and positive evaluations by the receivers of the signal (Mehu et al. 2008; Scharlemann et al. 2003). Sex differences in smiling and decoding of smiles could relate, ultimately, to the need to form reciprocal relationships with unrelated individuals. Females, both children and adults, are more expressive than males are (LaFrance et al. 2003; Provine 2000), and perform better in decoding emotional facial expressions (Hall et al. 2000; Rotter & Rotter 1988; Thayer & Johnsen 2000). Overall, females are better in processing and sending out signals that facilitate social interactions. At a neural level, a recent study found that when processing social information, females recruit areas containing mirror neurons more than males do (Schulte-Ru¨ther et al. 2007), which could provide a possible proximate mechanism facilitating sex differences in social cognition. Ultimately, the superiority of women in reading and sending out nonverbal messages is probably a result of evolutionary pressures for heightened social sensitivity needed for competing and forming alliances in non-kin– based social networks. The female advantage in sending and receiving social signals fits well with Vigil’s idea of coevolution between perceptual systems aiding in identifying cooperators, and honest expressive behaviours in advertising trustworthiness. Ultimately, the coevolution could explain the problem of cooperation via the Green Beard effect, which postulates that altruists possess a conspicuous phenotypic behavioural of physical trait, which can easily be identified by others with the same characteristic (Dawkins 1976/1989). Although there is some evidence that people can recognise potential cooperators (Frank et al. 1993; Lyons & Aitken 2008; Pradel et al. 2008), not much is known about individual differences that might account for this ability. Moreover, it is possible that altruistic individuals are equipped with superior social intelligence, helping them in identifying the altruistic dispositions in others. There is some evidence that social intelligence in the form of Theory of Mind is related to self-rated cooperativeness (Paal & Bereczkei 2007), but it is unclear whether social intelligence is used when assessing the honesty of another person. It is equally possible that evolution has produced polymorphism in perceptual and signalling systems, resulting in the existence of mixed strategies. Experimental work suggests that human populations consist of different cooperative types, which are under substantial genetic influence (Cesarini et al. 2008; Kurzban & Hauser 2005). Further research is needed in order to demonstrate how these types relate to individual differences in accuracy in assessing altruistic dispositions in others. Some individuals might be good in detecting trustworthiness, but not actually be trustworthy – a good candidate would be Machiavellian individuals (for the Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis, see McIlwain 2003; cf. Byrne & Whiten 1997). Others might, in turn, be trustworthy, but not competent in recognising the same trait in others (e.g., people with William’s syndrome). It remains to be demonstrated how individual differences in social perceptiveness (e.g., Theory of Mind) and trustworthiness (e.g., Machiavellianism) relate to individual and sex differences in sending and receiving social cues. BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5

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Commentary/Vigil: Sex differences in the expression of emotion

Human female exogamy is supported by cross-species comparisons: Cause to recognise sex differences in societal policy? doi:10.1017/S0140525X09990136 Guy Madison Department of Psychology, Umea˚ University, 901 87 Umea˚, Sweden. [email protected] http://www.psy.umu.se/staff/guy_madison_eng.html

Abstract: A sex difference in the tendency to outbreed (female exogamy) is a premise for the target article’s proposed framework, which receives some support by being shared with chimpanzees but not with more distantly related primates. Further empirical support is provided, and it is suggested that recognition of sex differences might improve effective fairness, taking sexual assault as a case in point.

In the target article, Vigil argues compellingly for a socio-relational framework of expressive behaviours (SRFB) that integrates a vast array of reported sex differences. The main selection pressure proposed to underlie these sex differences is female exogamy and its social consequences. Female exogamy refers to a drive to outbreed, effectively analogous to male philopatry: the tendency to remain at or return to the natal territory. The former drive is presumably based on natural selection benefits in terms of decreasing the effects of defective genes and increasing genetic variation. This may have been very important during phases of evolution when small groups were geographically isolated, and to leave a group posed a considerable effort as well as a considerable risk. It is conceivable that the selection pressure for exogamy must for such periods have been very strong and must also have required very strong motivational mechanisms to overcome the individual’s natural tendency to remain in the familiar environment. In species with sexual reproduction, it is of course sufficient that one sex outbreeds. Since it would probably inflict adaptive costs if both sexes outbred, the optimal solution is a sex-specific one, in which the non-migrating sex can develop adaptive benefits related to philopatry. It is conceivable that a sufficiently effective and sex-specific motivational mechanism is quite a difficult device to develop by means of natural selection, and that a selection pressure to reverse its sex-specificity is unlikely to emerge once its development has commenced. It is therefore notable that, although female exogamy is a rare behavioural characteristic in the animal kingdom, it is nevertheless shared by humans and chimpanzees (Ember 1978; Pusey 1979). It is estimated that around the time of sexual maturity, roughly one of every two female chimpanzees migrates to other territories (Pusey et al. 1997). Female exogamy is consistent with the group sociality centred on male rather than female kinship observed among chimpanzees (Mitani & Watts 2005; Williams et al. 2004; Wilson & Wrangham 2003), whereas other primates such as macaques and baboons exhibit a female-based social system. Chimpanzee sociality features male kin forming territorial groups that typically engage in competition with other groups, a pattern with some parallels in human behaviour (Alexander 1990; Wrangham & Wilson 2004). These observations are consistent with the notion that female exogamy is a genetic behavioural trait in humans, because chimpanzees are considerably closer in the human lineage than are primates with female-centred sociality. For comparison, the current estimate of the human-chimpanzee split is some 5 million years old, whereas the split between Hominidae and Old World monkeys (Cercopithecoidea) such as baboons and macaques is on the order of 25 million years (see, e.g., Boyd & Silk 2006). Any evolutionary scenario can be questioned on the causality of its relationships, because its hypotheses can rarely be subject to experimental tests. This is particularly true in the case of humans, who, among other complicating factors, suffer from a long life cycle and an extremely elaborate set of cultures that

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may propagate non-adaptive action and experience tendencies. Main approaches for assessing the validity of theories such as SRFB are therefore analyses of cross-cultural commonality, correlational studies, and observations unlikely to have been affected by culture, such as infant behaviour. In addition to the many empirical data reviewed in the target article concerning emotional expression per se, such as crying (DeFruyt 1997; Kraemer & Hastrup 1986), large sex differences have been reported for other behaviours that would also seem to be brought to bear on SRFB, such as sexual arousal (Chivers & Bailey 2005; Chivers et al. 2004; 2007) and the prevalence of sexual assault (Elliott et al. 2004). Moderate sex differences are also found for emotional reactions to music both in humans (McCown et al. 1997; Nater et al. 2006) and in chimpanzees (Videan et al. 2007). Female neonates display more interest for faces than for mechanical objects, whereas male neonates exhibit the opposite pattern (Connellan et al. 2001). Several studies have also reported on dose-response relationships between androgens and sex-typical behaviours of children, such as foetal testosterone in one-year-olds (Lutchmaya et al. 2002) and the severity of congenital adrenal hyperplasia (Nordenstro¨m et al. 2002; Servin et al. 2003). Finally, I note that the SRFB may have implications for societal policies, in particular those pertaining to equality and fairness between the sexes. Given that, according to the SRFB, females on average have a stronger tendency for submissive displays (ultimately intended to advertise trustworthiness) and males have a stronger tendency for aggression and dominance displays (ultimately intended to advertise capacity), these two tendencies would seem likely to conspire in between-sex interactions. A conflict of interest would in such interactions be likely to exaggerate the male dominance display, being his default approach strategy, which would in turn exaggerate the female submissive display, being her default withdrawal strategy, and so forth in a vicious cycle. In a situation where the male desires sexual activity and the female does not, it is conceivable that the proposed sex-specific display strategies might increase the risk for sexual coercion and rape as compared to sexneutral displays (cf. McKibbin et al. 2008; Thornhill & Palmer 2000). Another aspect of this scenario is that sex-specific displays effectively may make men and women unequal in the eyes of the law. Indeed, it is common that rapists fail to be convicted because of insufficient evidence of violence. It is conceivable that the level of physical resistance and ensuing violence expected by the legal court as a display of refusal might be set by male standards, thereby seriously compromising the woman. Sexual assault is but one example of instances where the recognition of sex differences might facilitate effective equality and fairness, in contrast to the typical denial from gender studies that biological sex differences exist. An important question, therefore, is: What empirical evidence and theoretical ground, such as the SRFB, might be required for recognising sex differences in societal policy?

Reciprocity of laughing, humor, and tickling, but not tearing and crying, in the sexual marketplace doi:10.1017/S0140525X09991002 Robert R. Provine Department of Psychology, University of Maryland, Baltimore, MD 21250. [email protected]

Abstract: Laughing, humor, and tickling, but not tearing and crying, involve the give-and-take that provides value and a basis for exchange in the psychosexual marketplace.

Commentary/Vigil: Sex differences in the expression of emotion Laughter and humor are highly valued in the sexual marketplace. In a study of 3,745 personal ads published by heterosexual men and women in eight U.S. national newspapers on Sunday, April 28, 1996, men offered “sense of humor” or its equivalent (“humorous”), and women requested it (Provine 2000). Women, however, couldn’t care less whether their ideal male partner laughs or not – they want a man who makes them laugh. Women sought laughter over twice as often as they offered it. The behavioral economics of such bids and offers is consistent with the finding that men are attracted to women who laugh in their presence (Grammer & Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1990). Without such a balance between the value of bids and offers, there would be no market for laughter and humor, and the currency of these behaviors would decline. It is significant that this orderly laughter scenario occurs at a low level of conscious awareness – laughter is not a matter of deciding to speak “ha-ha.” Most people have difficulty laughing convincingly on command; it happens spontaneously in the appropriate social context. Laughter, like crying, is an honest signal that is hard to fake. Although laughter is under low voluntary control, its stimuli are not, and show strong sexual dimorphism. Men are the most effective laugh getters (Provine 1993; 2000). Both men and women laugh more at male than female speakers, a likely reason why there are more male than female comedians. This trend starts early in life; most class clowns are boys. The essential stimulus of laughter is another person, male or female, not humor. Laughter is 30 times more frequent in social than solitary situations, and, when laughter occurs, only 10 to 15 percent follows comments that are jokes or other formal attempts at humor. Contagious laughter – laughing in response to perceived laughter – may be the ultimate example of the reciprocity of emotional expression. Contagious yawning may be another. Tickle, the primordial laugh stimulus, joins humor as another laugh stimulus under voluntary control. The sexual component of tickle is suggested by its strongly heterosexual character (Provine 2000; 2004). Aside from physical play with children, adult males tend to tickle females, and vice versa. The ticklee of choice is not random. We tickle and are tickled by friends, family, and lovers. When was the last time you were tickled by a stranger? The reasons given most often for tickling are to “show affection” and to “get attention,” not to antagonize. Even confirmed tickle haters may reconsider their position when they realize that the give-and-take of tickle battles is central to sexual foreplay and intercourse. If you still doubt the sociality of tickle, consider that you can’t tickle yourself (Provine 2000; 2004). It takes two to tickle. In contrast, you can tap your own patellar tendon and evoke a perfectly normal knee jerk. The sociality and reciprocity of tickle are neurologically programmed. Ticklees struggle, fend-off the tickling hand, laugh, and retaliate. Retaliation is the basis of the giveand-take of tickle battles, and what binds us together during the rough-and-tumble play of childhood and the sex play of adulthood. Bad tickle experiences are associated with the absence of reciprocity, such as when a person is held down and tickled. Nonconsensual tickle, like nonconsensual sex, is unwelcome and unpleasant. Vigil’s emphasis on the reciprocity of emotional relationships is well placed. Vocal crying and tearing are emotional signals that provide informative contrasts with laughing, humor, and tickling. The first study of tearing as a visual signal of sadness found that faces with tears appeared sadder than identical faces with tears removed by digital image processing (Provine et al. 2009). Tear removal produced faces that were not only less sad but of ambiguous emotional state. Thus, emotional tearing provides a significant visual cue of sadness, complementing the neuromuscular instrument of facial behavior that may not quite be up to the task. Emotional tearing, unique to humans, is a significant advance in Homo sapiens as a social species. The study detected

no difference in the perceived sadness of teary and tear-free faces as judged by male and female subjects. However, as noted by Vigil, females cry much more than males, which provides females with more potential vocal and visual stimuli of the emotional state. Tearing and vocal crying, solicitations of caregiving and expressions of neediness, may be exceptions to emotional reciprocity of the sort considered for laughing, humor, and tickling. Caregiving, although adaptive within the framework of reciprocal altruism, is unattractive and costly for the provider, a fact revealed in the psychosexual marketplace of personal ads. You are unlikely to find people advertising their neediness or seeking it in others.

Brain-based sex differences in parenting propagate emotion expression doi:10.1017/S0140525X09990124 James E. Swain Child Study Center, Yale University School of Medicine, New Haven, CT 06520. [email protected] http://myprofile.cos.com/jameseswain

Abstract: Parent-infant emotional expressions vary according to parent and infant gender. Such parent-infant interactions critically affect infant development. Neuroimaging research is exploring emotionrelated brain function that varies according to gender, and regulates parenting thoughts and behaviors in the early postpartum. Through specific brain functions, parenting serves to program the infant brain for the next generation of sex-specific emotional expression.

In addition to interpersonal social ecologies important for understanding sex differences in emotional expression, as discussed by Vigil in the target article, parent-infant interactions are a specific, measurable, and evolutionarily significant arena (Feldman 2007). Indeed, by the third month postpartum, face-to-face, synchronous parent-infant interactions teach infants about a range of emotional social interactions (Feldman et al. 1999; Tronick 1989). These early-life interactions consist of brief behavioral units in dyad-specific patterns. One of very few studies that have considered such parent-infant interaction as a function of parental gender (Dickson et al. 1997) examined the co-occurrences of infant smile type and play type during interactions with each parent. During father-child interactions, objectoriented play was more frequent and tended to co-occur with basic smiles, whereas mother-child play included more vocalizations. In another study, time-series analysis of 100 first-time mothers and fathers interacting with their 5-month-old firstborn, coded with 1 second resolution, showed that during play with mother, infants cycled between states of low and medium arousal, often with one peak of high positive emotionality during the engagement episode (Feldman 2003). In this study, mother-child play focused on face-to-face exchange and included patterns of mutual gazing, covocalization, and affectionate touch integrated into timed configurations. In contrast, during play with fathers, the time-line of arousal contained several quick peaks of high positive emotionality, including joint laughter and open exuberance, and individual linear regressions showed that these peaks became more frequent as play proceeded. Furthermore, father-child interactions centered on physical games, or games with an object focus, rather than on attention to microlevel face-to-face signals. This latter finding is consistent with previous research (Lamb 1977; Yogman 1981). However, despite parent-gender differences in content, no differences were detected in temporal parameters, suggesting that father-infant play may be as synchronous as mother-infant play. Father-son and mother-daughter dyads showed the BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5

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Commentary/Vigil: Sex differences in the expression of emotion highest levels of synchrony, with respect to coherence, more mutuality in the lead-lag structure, and shorter time lags to synchrony. It has been suggested that synchrony builds on the infant’s biological rhythms and extends it to social relatedness (Lester et al. 1985; Wolff 1967). Perhaps female newborns’ higher social orientations, increased periods of eye contact, smiles, and rhythmical mouthing contrast with male newborns’ frequent peaks of excitement, quicker rapidity of buildup, and higher reflex startling (Korner 1969; Osofsky 1976) to more easily match and build on similar parent interactions that tend to build on these innate dispositions. Thus, mothers and fathers provide infants two modes of coregulation. As infants interact with mother and father, they learn that interpersonal intimacy may come in different forms; some relationships focus on subtle shifts in facial signals, whereas others are directed to exploring of the outside world; some are moderate in intensity, whereas others may be more arousing and exciting. Also, some are consistent with the individual’s biological tendencies, while others may require some adjustment. As one might expect, it has been shown that mother-son dyads take longer to repair from mismatched to matched states (Weinberg et al. 1999), which may be explained by gender mismatching of dyadic interactions between mother and son. Such experiments explain the well-established link between early father absence and the development of externalizing disorders (Cabrera et al. 2000). Since synchrony is central for the development of selfregulation, father absence and lack of sufficient and naturally more synchronous same-gender early interactions may disrupt the acquisition of self-regulatory skills and lead to conduct disorders in boys. This may also point to possible protective therapeutic interventions to maximize opposite-gender parent-infant interactions. These findings fit with psychoanalytic notions that early relational patterns construct person-specific internalized models (Stern 1985), perhaps through the development of specific emotion-regulation brain circuits (Leppanen & Nelson 2009), to serve as templates for intimate emotional interactions throughout life (Cassidy & Shaver 2008). Unique contributions from mother-child interaction (Moran et al. 2008) and fatherchild interaction (Boyce et al. 2006; Grossmann et al. 2002) to evolutionarily favorable sex-specific emotional expressions of the developing child may significantly constitute the mechanism through which sex differences cross generations. These sex differences in emotional expression, manifested and perhaps transmitted through parent-infant interactions, are presumably based on sexual differences in parental brain structure and function across species (Bridges 2008) and in humans in particular (Swain & Lorberbaum 2008; Swain et al. 2007). Such studies also lie within the larger and growing field addressing sex differences in brain structure, function, and chemistry (Cosgrove et al. 2007). For example, neurochemical modulators such as oxytocin and vasopressin (Donaldson & Young 2008) are likely to be important determinants of emotion expression, as well as contribute to psychopathology risk. Furthermore, brain networks that differ according to sex likely also vary according to the type of emotional stimuli (Hamann et al. 2004; Proverbio et al. 2009; Schirmer et al. 2004; Wager & Ochsner 2005), including the involvement of empathys (Schulte-Ru¨ther et al. 2008). For example, considering parentrelated stimuli, infant laughing, and crying stimuli versus a control sound, the amygdala and anterior cingulate of nonparent women were more active than those of men (Sander et al. 2007). Perhaps these gender-dependent correlates of neural activity reflect neural predispositions in mothers for responses to preverbal infant vocalizations. Direct contrast of men versus women in the first weeks postpartum indicated increased activity in mothers compared with fathers in response to baby cry (Swain et al. 2004) and picture (Swain et al. 2006) in limbic brain regions. This fits with findings that fathers experience more anxious emotional thoughts and engage in more

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compulsion-like behaviors to reduce their worry (Kim et al., submitted; Leckman et al. 1999; 2004; Swain et al. 2005). Taken together, this research suggests that networks of highly conserved hypothalamic-midbrain-limbic-paralimbic-cortical circuits act in concert to support aspects of parent response to infants, including the emotion-regulation circuits that vary according to gender. An integrated understanding of the brain basis of parenting according to gender has implications for long-term parent and infant emotional expression and mental health. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS James E. Swain is supported by a grant from the National Alliance for Research on Schizophrenia and Depression, and the Klingenstein Third Generation Foundation.

On the richness and limitations of dimensional models of social perception doi:10.1017/S0140525X09991014 Alexander Todorov Department of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08540. [email protected] http://www.princeton.edu/~atodorov/

Abstract: The two-dimensional model of social relations outlined in the target article has striking convergence with empirically derived dimensional models of interpersonal perception, inter-group perception, and face evaluation. All these models posit two-dimensional structures related to perceptions of valence/affiliation and power/status. Although these models are parsimonious, they may be insufficient to account for behaviors in specific contexts.

In an ambitious treatment of gender differences in expressive behaviors, Vigil’s target article outlines a two-dimensional model of social relationships according to which people evaluate their relationships on two fundamental dimensions: trustworthiness and capacity. These dimensions are related to inferring the intentions (e.g., potential harm) and the ability of the relationship partner to implement these intentions (e.g., means to inflict harm). This model converges with a number of dimensional models that have been empirically derived from the study of specific domains of social perception. These include Wiggins’s model of interpersonal perception (Wiggins 1979; Wiggins et al. 1989), Fiske’s model of inter-group perception (Fiske et al. 2007), and Todorov’s model of evaluation of faces on social dimensions (Oosterhof & Todorov 2008; Todorov et al. 2008). All these models use a similar data-driven approach. Groups, people, or faces are initially characterized on a number of specific attributes (e.g., trustworthiness, competence, aggressiveness), and then the judgments on these attributes are submitted to statistical analyses that identify and model the common variance among these judgments. The final objective is to identify a simple model that accounts for most of the variance in these judgments and, ultimately, provide an explanatory framework for the domain of study. Using this approach, Fiske et al. (2007) have argued that the primary dimensions of perceiving social groups are warmth and competence and that these dimensions are related to competition and status. Wiggins et al. (1989) have argued that the primary dimensions of perceiving other people are affiliation and dominance. Todorov et al. (2008) have argued that the primary dimensions of evaluating faces are valence/trustworthiness and power/dominance. I use our own approach to illustrate the data-driven character of these methods. To outline the structure of perception of faces on social dimensions (Oosterhof & Todorov 2008; Todorov et al. 2008), we first identified trait attributes that are spontaneously

Commentary/Vigil: Sex differences in the expression of emotion used to characterize unfamiliar faces. Then, we asked participants to rate faces on these attributes. Not surprisingly, judgments of these attributes were highly correlated with each other. In fact, it is almost impossible to find a social judgment that is uncorrelated with judgments of trustworthiness. A Principal Component Analysis of the trait judgments identified a simple two-dimensional solution that accounted for more than 80% of the variance of these judgments. The first dimension was interpreted as valence evaluation of faces and the second dimension as dominance evaluation. Trustworthiness judgments were the best approximation of valence evaluation, and dominance judgments were the best approximation of power evaluation. Computer modeling of judgments of trustworthiness and dominance showed that whereas cues signaling correspondent approach/avoidance behaviors were important for the valence/ trustworthiness dimension, cues signaling physical strength were important for the power/dominance evaluation. As shown in Figure 1, whereas faces on the extreme positive end of the trustworthiness dimension were perceived as happy and slightly surprised, faces on the extreme negative end were perceived as angry. Whereas extremely dominant faces were perceived as extremely masculine and mature faced, extremely submissive faces were perceived as extremely feminine and baby-faced (Fig. 1). These findings converge nicely with the model proposed by Vigil: that relationship partners are evaluated on trustworthiness and capacity; that is, intentions and the ability to implement these intentions. Moreover, given the commonalities between these dimensions and the dimensions in the models of Fiske et al. (2007) and Wiggins et al. (1989), models that were empirically derived in different domains of social perception, it may be argued that these dimensions are universal dimensions of social perception (Fiske et al. 2007). Yet, although these models can provide a powerful explanatory framework for a set of phenomena, their parsimony can come with a price. Specifically, these models may be insufficient to explain and predict social behaviors in specific contexts. In the data-driven methods, the general approach is to model

common variance and discard variance that is unique to the specific input variables (e.g., non-error variance that is specific for trustworthiness per se and is not shared with general valence evaluation of faces). While this approach is justified to the extent that the objective is to arrive at a general framework that can account for a variety of specific effects, it may miss important effects that are not easily attributable to common variance. For example, perceptions of trustworthiness and dominance are sufficient to account for perceptions of threat (Oosterhof & Todorov 2008) but not perceptions of competence. In decision contexts (e.g., voting) where competence is the primary dimension of evaluation, cues specific to competence, and not trustworthiness or dominance, predict social decisions (Olivola & Todorov, in press; Todorov et al. 2005). The weight of attributes or importance of dimensions can also change as a function of the specific context. Whereas masculine-looking leaders, with the associated perceptions of leadership and dominance, are preferred in wartime, feminine-looking leaders, with the associated perceptions of trustworthiness and likeability, are preferred in peacetime (Little et al. 2007). To what extent the socio-relational framework of expressive behaviors (SRFB) model would sacrifice specificity of prediction is an empirical question. As a general descriptive framework, this model is certainly supported by independent evidence from other dimensional approaches to social perception. Moreover, as outlined by Vigil, the descriptive framework of the model can be best understood in the context of social interaction. That is, displays of social cues are in the service of social interaction.

Smiling reflects different emotions in men and women doi:10.1017/S0140525X09991026 Simine Vazire,a Laura P. Naumann,b Peter J. Rentfrow,c and Samuel D. Goslingd a

Department of Psychology, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, MO 63130; bInstitute of Personality and Social Research, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720-5050; cDepartment of Social and Developmental Psychology, Faculty of Politics, Psychology, and Sociology, The University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 3RQ, United Kingdom; d Department of Psychology, University of Texas at Austin, A8000 Austin, TX 78712-0187. [email protected] www.simine.com [email protected] http://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/~johnlab/naumann.htm [email protected] http://www.ppsis.cam.ac.uk/psy/staff/jrentfrow.html [email protected] www.samgosling.com

Abstract: We present evidence that smiling is positively associated with positive affect in women and negatively associated with negative affect in men. In line with Vigil’s model, we propose that, in women, smiling signals warmth (trustworthiness cues), which attracts fewer and more intimate relationships, whereas in men, smiling signals confidence and lack of self-doubt (capacity cues), which attracts numerous, less-intimate relationships.

Figure 1 (Todorov). A data-driven computer model of variation of faces on the dimensions of valence/trustworthiness depicted on the x-axis and power/dominance depicted on y-axis. The variation of faces is in standard deviation units. The details of the modeling are described in Oosterhof and Todorov (2008).

Vigil proposes that “gender-specific emotive behaviors would have coevolved with these [social] constraints in order to regulate interpersonal dynamics to enhance social fitness” (target article, sect. 1, para. 3). Vigil’s framework can be used to make sense of apparently contradictory findings in the literature regarding the relationship between smiling and affect; moreover, the framework is useful for understanding our own recent empirical findings concerning gender differences in emotional expression. Previous empirical evidence regarding the relationship between smiling and positive affect is equivocal, with some BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5

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Commentary/Vigil: Sex differences in the expression of emotion studies finding such a relationship (Brown & Schwartz 1980; Ekman et al. 1980; Friedman & Miller-Herringer 1991; Hall & Horgan 2003; Hecht & LaFrance 1998; Schwartz et al. 1980) but several others failing to find one (Gehricke & Fridlund 2002; Jakobs et al. 2001; Kraut & Johnston 1979; Ruiz-Belda et al. 2003). Consistent with Vigil’s socio-relational framework of expressive behaviors (SRFB), we propose that sex is an important moderator of the relationship between smiling and affect. The view that sex differences can help explain the contradictory findings regarding the relationship between smiling and affect is supported by several pieces of evidence. First, most of the studies supporting a positive affect – smiling link used predominantly or exclusively female samples (e.g., Ekman et al. 1980; 1990; Friedman & Miller-Herringer 1991; Hess et al. 1995; Larsen et al. 2003), whereas studies finding no such link tended to rely on male samples (e.g., Gehricke & Fridlund 2002). This suggests that, as Vigil argues, the links between affect and facial behavior could be different for women and men. Second, evidence suggests that positive and negative affect may have different biological markers in men than in women. One study found that salivary cortisol was associated with state positive affect only in women (Polk et al. 2005). Once again this finding supports Vigil’s model by demonstrating that biological affective processes may differ for men and women. We propose that these differences could result in different facial displays of affect, specifically smiling, for men and women. In line with Vigil’s model, we predicted that, among women, smiling may be a signal of trustworthiness, associated with feelings of warmth, and thus should correlate positively with positive affect. Among men, smiling may be a signal of capacity, associated with feelings of confidence and lack of distress, and thus should correlate negatively with negative affect. We tested this hypothesis by examining whether positive affect and negative affect predicted smiling in men and women. Seventy male and 87 female undergraduates (mean age, 18.7 years; SD ¼ 2.0; 58% White, 24% Asian, 12% Latino, and 6% other ethnicity) completed a battery of questionnaires including the Positive And Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al. 1988). The instructions for the PANAS were to “indicate to what extent you have felt this way today” using a 1 to 7 Likert-type rating scale. Immediately after, participants were photographed by an experimenter who was blind to the purpose of the study. To capture naturally occurring smiling behavior, experimenters gave participants no instructions about what to do in the photograph except where to stand. Six coders viewed the photographs in different randomized orders and, on a forced-choice item, coded whether or not participants were smiling. The reliability of the codings was very high (ICC or intraclass correlation coefficient [2, k] ¼ .95; ICC [2,1] ¼ .76). Consistent with the existing literature (e.g., LaFrance & Hecht 2000), there was a main effect for sex in the overall prevalence of smiling: 76% of women were smiling compared to only 41% of men (x 2 [1, 157] ¼ 19.26, p , .01). Men and women did not differ significantly in their levels of positive affect (Mwomen ¼ 4.46, SDwomen ¼ 1.04; Mmen ¼ 4.46, SDmen ¼ 1.10; t[155] ¼ .01; NS) or negative affect (Mwomen ¼ 2.43, SDwomen ¼ 1.21, Mmen ¼ 2.28, SDmen ¼ 0.95; t[155] ¼ .89, n.s.). Consistent with our hypothesis, smiling was correlated with positive affect in women (point-biserial r ¼ .41; p , .01) but not in men (r ¼ .01, n.s.). Conversely, smiling was negatively correlated with negative affect in men (r ¼ 2.51; p , .01) but not in women (r ¼ 2.05, n.s.). A binary logistic regression revealed that the interaction of sex and positive affect was a significant predictor of smiling (x2 ¼ 8.58 [1, 157]; p , .01; see Fig. 1). A separate binary logistic regression revealed that the interaction of sex and negative affect was also a significant predictor of smiling (x2 [1, 157] ¼ 15.44; p , .01; see Fig. 2). In short, positive affect is a strong positive predictor of smiling for women but not for men, and negative affect is a strong negative predictor of smiling for men but not for women.

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Figure 1 (Vazire et al.). Men’s and women’s probability of smiling as a function of positive affect. This plot is based on the results of two separate binary logistic regressions (one for men and one for women) predicting smiling from positive affect. The x-axis represents the possible range of positive affect scores, and the y-axis represents probability of smiling based on the results of the regressions. The individual dots represent data from individual men (circles) and women (squares) who did and did not smile. Smiling was coded as a binary variable, so the dots appear on the y ¼ 0 and y ¼ 1 lines.

These results support our hypothesis that smiling reflects different affective experiences for men and women. In line with Vigil’s socio-relational framework, we propose that the sex

Figure 2 (Vazire et al.). Men’s and women’s probability of smiling as a function of negative affect. This plot is based on the results of two separate binary logistic regressions (one for men and one for women) predicting smiling from negative affect. The x-axis represents the possible range of negative affect scores, and the y-axis represents probability of smiling based on the results of the regressions. The individual dots represent data from individual men (circles) and women (squares) who did and did not smile. Smiling was coded as a binary variable so the dots appear on the y ¼ 0 and y ¼ 1 lines.

Commentary/Vigil: Sex differences in the expression of emotion difference observed here may reflect different strategies for enhancing fitness. Specifically, Vigil argues that the unique social constraints faced by women in a male-biased philopatry would create in women “a heavy reliance on behaviors designed to advertise their trustworthiness through higher levels of submissive displays” (sect. 3.1, para. 3). The strong relationship between smiling and positive affect in women suggests that, in women, smiling serves as a cue to trustworthiness by signaling warmth and enthusiasm (dimensions of positive affect), which serve to communicate a willingness to form intimate relationships. Why might smiling be associated with lack of negative affect in men? According to Vigil, the evolutionary pressures faced by men may have led men to evolve a tendency to rely more heavily on capacity cues. Hence we propose that, in men, smiling may have evolved to signal confidence and calmness (i.e., lack of negative affect or self-doubt), which serve to attract numerous less-intimate relationships. In summary, the framework proposed by Vigil is corroborated by our findings that smiling reflects different affective states in men and women, and the framework also helps makes sense of the seemingly inconsistent findings in the literature on smiling and affect.

On the systematic social role of expressed emotions: An embodied perspective doi:10.1017/S0140525X09990112 Nicolas Vermeulen Universite´ catholique de Louvain (UCL), 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium; and National Fund for Scientific Research (FRS-FNRS), Belgium. [email protected] http://www.ecsa.ucl.ac.be/personnel/vermeulen/

Abstract: Vigil suggests that expressed emotions are inherently learned and triggered in social contexts. A strict reading of this account is not consistent with the findings that individuals, even those who are congenitally blind, do express emotions in the absence of an audience. Rather, grounded cognition suggests that facial expressions might also be an embodied support used to represent emotional information.

The socio-relational framework of expressive behaviors (SRFB) proposes that expressed emotions are socially learned responses to external stimuli, especially to other social agents. In such a view, the central function of expressed emotions is to motivate other individuals to respond to the expresser. For instance, SRFB assumes that a smile systematically aims to motivate reactions in perceivers that will in turn enhance the smiler’s fitness. Although this is undoubtedly one key function of facial expression, I am not comfortable with the strict view that expressive behaviors (among which are expressed emotions) are purely social in nature. There exist two important lines of research showing (1) that individuals (even congenitally blind people) express emotion even in the absence of an audience and (2) that facial expressions can also play another role in emotional life, which is to serve as the grounding for the processing of emotional information (Barsalou 1999). When taken together, I propose that such findings suggest that facial expressions also constitute a cognitive support used to reflect on or to access the affective meaning of a given emotional situation or emotion concept. As a first body of evidence, the social psychology literature shows that individuals express emotion even when other individuals are not present to perceive it. In other words, people express emotion for themselves. Consistent with this notion, Matsumoto and Willingham (2006) found that 72% of the coded expressions of judo athletes occurred when the athletes were not directly

facing anyone (facing towards the Tatami), as soon as 2.5 seconds after match completion. Of importance, too, Matsumoto and Willingham (2006) found no cultural (i.e., social) differences in the first expressions at match completion, which support the universality of these expressions, and it was instead on the podium (during medal ceremony) that cultural differences in expression were observed. Crucially, there were also no differences between congenitally blind and sighted athletes in spontaneous expression (Matsumoto & Willingham 2009). Collectively, these findings demonstrated that spontaneous expressions of emotion are not only dependent on observational (social) learning. Matsumoto and Willingham (2006) conclude that the initial expressions were probably not displayed because of the social nature of the event but were, rather, reflections of the athletes’ emotional responses to the outcome of the match. This is fully in line with a second body of evidence coming from the embodied cognition literature. In the growing embodied or grounded cognition literature (e.g., Barsalou 1999; 2008), research has demonstrated that individuals use simulations to represent knowledge. The simulations can occur in different sensory modalities (e.g., van Dantzig et al. 2008; Vermeulen et al. 2008) and in affective systems (Niedenthal 2007; Niedenthal et al. in press; Vermeulen et al. 2007). Thus, expressed emotion (such as facial expression) might also have the function of providing a grounded support of emotional knowledge (for a review, see Niedenthal 2007). Such a view is consistent with the observation that people automatically mimic a perceived facial expression (Dimberg 1982; 1990). The embodied cognition view suggests that mimicry constitutes part of the simulation (emotional mirroring) of perceived emotion to facilitate its comprehension. Such an interpretation can account for the fact that covert experimental manipulation of facial expressions (facial feedback hypothesis) influences emotional judgments. For instance, Strack et al. (1988) instructed their participants to place a pen in their mouth (as if they would write with it) either between the teeth (to produce a smiling face) or between the lips (to produce a sad face) while they assessed cartoons. The findings showed that smile induction increased positive ratings of the cartoons, compared to conditions where the smile was hampered (for further demonstrations, see also Niedenthal et al. 2001). In addition, the results of a study using electromyography (EMG) clearly confirm that the moderating impact of the facial manipulation was related to the muscular activity (Oberman et al. 2007). Interestingly, recent studies show that the necessity to access the emotional meanings of words triggers discrete muscular activity in the face (Niedenthal et al., in press). Specifically, Niedenthal and colleagues found that their experimental participants expressed emotion when trying to represent discrete emotional content such as that related to disgust. For instance, when participants had to indicate whether the words slug or vomit were related to an emotion, they expressed disgust on their faces, as measured by the contraction of the levator labialis (used to wrinkle one’s nose). Importantly, a follow-up experiment showed further that the blocking of facial activation (e.g., using a manipulation that requires holding a pen laterally between one’s lips and teeth; Niedenthal et al. 2001) disrupted the emotional judgment. This latter finding suggests a causal role (rather than simply a correlational role) of facial activation observed in emotion word processing (Niedenthal et al., in press). Collectively, the aforementioned literature provides good evidence that perceiving and thinking about emotionally significant information involves the re-experience (i.e., embodiment) of this emotion. And this re-experience often involves the display of a facial expression of emotion. The SRFB relies in part on the findings that females and males do not express emotions the same way. However, gender differences in expressed emotions might also be a demonstration of gender differences in the conceptual organization of emotions. These may be related to previously demonstrated innate BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5

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Commentary/Vigil: Sex differences in the expression of emotion structural gender differences in brain activation during emotional situations (e.g., Aleman & Swart 2008; Gur et al. 2002). Furthermore, individual and cultural differences in emotional expression (e.g., Elfenbein & Ambady 2002) can be comfortably accounted for in theories of embodied cognition (e.g., Niedenthal & Maringer 2009). In sum, while the specifics of the appearance and timing of facial expressions are unquestionably influenced by social learning (and context), the precise developmental and functional proposals of the SRFB do not appear to me to account for all of the findings in the vast literature on the facial expression of emotion.

Expressed emotions, early caregiver–child interaction, and disorders doi:10.1017/S0140525X09990100 Andreas Wiefela and Renate Schepkerb a Charite´-Universitaetsmedizin Berlin, D 13353 Berlin, Germany; bZentrum fu¨r Psychiatrie Su¨dwu¨rttemberg, D 88214 Ravensburg, Germany. [email protected] [email protected] http://kjp.charite.de/patienten/baby_und_kleinkindsprechstunde http://www.zfp-web.de/K2/index.php3

Abstract: In addition to the socio-relational framework of expressive behaviors (SRFB), we recommend integrating theoretical and empirical findings based on attachment theory. We advocate a dynamic interpretation of early caregiver–child interaction. The consequences of models from developmental psychology for the occurrence of psychopathology are demonstrated from a clinical perspective.

Vigil’s interpretation is a major step in summarizing recent knowledge about emotional behavior guided by Darwin’s concept of the variation of expression of emotion. We would like to add that human behavior in general necessarily has its roots in the earliest caregiver – child interaction. In humans, any kind of behavior occurs in a context of extra-uterine social prematurity; that is to say, in a psychophysical state when terms such as “capacity” or “dominance” cannot easily be applied. To understand human emotional development, we must go beyond the concepts of “fitness,” “cost-benefit,” and so on, because human babies are “unfit” and depend so much on the caregiving function. Hamlin et al. (2007) conducted an amazing social-task experiment with 6- to 10-month-old healthy infants and found that “The capacity to evaluate other people is essential for navigating the social world” (p. 557). A baby’s crying, for example, may not necessarily be a gesture of submission, but instead can be an act of dominance, inducing the appearance of a caregiver (and, of course, then constitutes a fitness advantage). If this fails to happen too often, helplessness and depression follow, and crying loses its meaning as a specific social signal and only expresses despair in lieu of other outlets. Vigil’s capacity and trustworthiness components represent “within” cues, whereas interaction competencies as “between” cues might be additionally meaningful in a broader sense of early mental development. Attachment theory (Ainsworth & Bowlby 1991), as a key feature in understanding human socioemotional development in early infancy, could be an expansion of Vigil’s theoretical framework. Bowlby’s main construct is the infant’s dependence on the presence of a sensitive caregiver responsible for providing a “secure base” in an asymmetrical relationship. Thus arise the “inner working models” in the infant that are supposed to influence developing personality traits. Continuing the concept of “emotional availability,” Emde (1980) points out the dyadic and dynamic aspects of emotional development in the first year of life. As an ethological model, attachment behavior shares the central topic of the socio-relational framework of expressive

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behaviors (SRFB) – that is, with either proximity-seeking (affiliative) behavior or withdrawn (avoidance) behavior – but in a reflexive and intuitive manner. Patterns of infants’ behavior such as displays of vulnerability (e.g., bowed head, gaze aversion, slow movement patterns, crying, and worrying behavior) are usually reactions to over-stimulation and tiredness, indicating the need for a break; whereas ongoing avoidance may emerge after experiences of neglect or maltreatment. Corresponding to Vigil’s social sphere model, empirical findings based on the emotional availability concept show the great predictive power of alternatively auto-regulative or interpersonal affect-regulation styles in mother– child interaction when the child is at the age of 4 months (Kogan & Carter 1996). In this light, Vigil’s model for correlating individuals’ social spheres and phenotypic expression could be augmented by such a “mothering” link. Beside a large body of pediatric literature, this can be supported by our own data concerning breastfeeding and bonding (Bo¨ge et al., in preparation). In comparing a clinical sample with a non-clinical one, we have found that breast-feeding is associated with a reduced incidence of developmental problems and psychopathology in children later in life – irrespective of socioeconomic status, prematurity, and other risk factors. Oxytocin-inducing “good mothering” behavior and affiliative and/or trustworthy behavior, such as more intense eye contact and proximity among females than among males, might thus also be specific to females on account of heightened receptor sensitivity, ensuring the healthy upbringing of the species. But phenotypic behavior does not automatically represent internal states. For example, misunderstanding, apparent sensitive behavior, as well as any other double-bind communication, cannot be explained by the mechanisms of SRFB as a monadic model. The findings of changes in temporal lobe and amygdala, as well as increasing oxytocin and vasopressin levels in conflicting communication, might be indicative of an early “flight-or-fight” decision. Either on the basis of intuitive attachment, or dominance versus submissive behavior, those findings have been largely confirmed – also by our own data of elevated levels of cortisol in 4-month-old infants of mothers with postpartum depression (Bartling et al. 2006). Thus, it would be worth widening the focus on conflicting states and clinical disorders, to disorders other than only stress-induced ones. As the expression of emotion relies heavily on mother – child contact and the child’s potential for developing a theory of mind, autistic spectrum disorders, as well as depressive disorders, are the most interesting ones for investigation. Video interaction analyses in a clinical sample showed specific patterns in correlation with diagnostic clusters, not gender (Wiefel et al. 2005). We especially like Vigil’s notion, towards the end of the target article, that certain behaviors which were previously thought to be maladaptive (signs of weakness or submissiveness), might in fact be functional in humans. However, alternatively, those involuntary defeat strategies could be understood as a compromise between genetic drift and the result of attachment experiences from the first year of life, and, therefore, could be proof of a cost-benefit advantage; for example, the concept of learned helplessness in common depression. We even dare to pose the hypothesis that most of the gender differences found in childhood between girls and boys (more intense expression of emotion, more submissiveness, more group adherence) might be protective factors for children’s mental health that wear off in later life, as girls are epidemiologically less prone to behavioral symptoms at a young age than are boys. From our clinical viewpoint, beneath the well-known gender differences in the incidence of several disorders we actually observed an even more rapid shift of this phenomenon over the early age span in infant psychiatry (Wiefel et al. 2009). Certainly we found diminished gender effects in our clinical sample when psycho-social circumstances (but not the caregiver’s sensitivity as a central cue in the field) were integrated (Witte 2006).

Commentary/Vigil: Sex differences in the expression of emotion

A social-cognitive model of human behavior offers a more parsimonious account of emotional expressivity doi:10.1017/S0140525X09990094 a

b

a

Vivian Zayas, Joshua A. Tabak, Gu¨l Gu¨naydy´n, and Jeanne M. Robertsonc a

Department of Psychology, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853-7601; Department of Psychology, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195; c Department of Biological Sciences, University of Idaho, Moscow, Moscow, Idaho, 83844-3051. [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] http://people.psych.cornell.edu/~pac_lab/ b

Abstract: According to socio-relational theory, men and women encountered different ecologies in their evolutionary past, and, as a result of different ancestral selection pressures, they developed different patterns of emotional expressivity that have persisted across cultures and large human evolutionary time scales. We question these assumptions, and propose that social-cognitive models of individual differences more parsimoniously account for sex differences in emotional expressivity.

Imagine a hunter-gatherer society in which men hunt, facing dramatic surprises and life-threatening situations regularly. Men with facility in emotion regulation would be better hunters, promoting higher overall fitness; in contrast, women would face weaker selection pressure for emotion-regulation abilities. Such an evolutionary construction could predict why a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study of cognitive reappraisal found neurophysiological evidence that men were more effective than women at down-regulating emotional responses to negative stimuli (McRae et al. 2008). This evolutionary explanation is plausible. But, so is the following cultural explanation: Western societal norms and gender stereotypes differentially encourage men to down-regulate emotional responses to negative events (Brody 1997). Thus, adherence to societal norms of expressivity, which pervade everyday life (e.g., Simpson & Stroh 2004), rather than prolonged evolution favoring sensitivities, could also easily account for the fMRI findings. Evolutionary accounts do provide a provocative lens through which to view modern human behavior. However, as the foregoing vignette illustrates, a concern with most evolutionary psychological theories, such as Vigil’s socio-relational framework for expressive behaviors (SRFB), is that their hypotheses rely on a number of assumptions that are difficult, if not impossible, to examine empirically in human populations. We question the validity of basic assumptions of the SRFB, specifically (1) evidence of patrilocality in the ancestral populations that gave rise to contemporary humans, (2) the extent to which patrilocality led to purported differences in emotional expressivity in ancestral populations, and (3) the likelihood that the selection pressures mediating these hypothesized sex differences have persisted across large human evolutionary time scales to result in modern sex differences. In light of these concerns, we question the SRFB’s utility as an integrative framework for understanding emotion and sex differences. We propose that current social-cognitive models of human behaviors provide a more parsimonious explanation of emotional expressivity and any purported sex differences. 1. How prevalent is patrilocality across cultures? The SRFB’s explanation of sex differences in emotional expressivity rests on the assumption that women and men faced different social ecologies, which imposed different evolutionary constraints. However, in nearly one-fourth of human societies included in Murdock’s (1967) ethnographic database, which includes data from a myriad of societies, including preindustrial ones, the residence pattern in which men stay with kin and women move with non-kin (patrilocal residence) is not observed. Thus, these find-

ings cast doubt upon the SRFB’s assumed universality of patrilocality and patrilocality-induced sex differences in emotional expression. 2. Did patrilocality lead to adaptive sex differences in emotional expressivity in ancestral populations? Even assuming that

the majority of ancestral human populations exhibited patrilocal residence patterns, the adaptive value of Vigil’s purported sex differences in emotional expressiveness is unsubstantiated. According to the SRFB, women had to advertise trustworthiness to non-kin through submissive emotions. However, other evolutionary arguments (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000) suggest that such displays might have also been associated with costs. As a result, the cost of expressing emotions in distant (non-kin) relationships might have been relatively more costly than expressing emotions in close (kin) relationships; in the latter, costs arising from emotional expressions might have been offset because of incurred inclusive (shared) fitness benefits. Thus, based on this account, it is unclear why women, who were moving into distant relationships, did not limit their emotional expressiveness, and why men, who remained near kin, did not exhibit greater emotional expression with kin and limit expression of vulnerabilities to competitors. 3. Is there evidence that directional selection favoring sex differences in ancestral populations persisted throughout modern human evolution? The SRFB rests on the assumption

that men experienced prolonged selection pressures that favored less expressiveness, and that women experienced prolonged (and opposing) directional selection favoring more expressiveness. Prolonged directional selection is unlikely, because the environment for which this trait has evolved has changed over the long course of human evolution. However, neither hypothesis can be directly tested in extinct populations. Moreover, prolonged directional selection would have resulted in relatively large sex differences in emotional expressivity (Grant & Grant 1992; Kocher 2004). This is clearly not the case. The empirical reality is that substantial sex differences in emotional expressivity are not observed; One comprehensive review of research on emotion as expressed through behavior, selfreport, or physiology, unequivocally concluded that “sex differences in emotionality are small, inconsistent, or limited to the influence of specific situational demands. . . . Reviews do not support belief in sex-based affective differences” (Wester et al. 2002, p. 639, emphasis in original). Furthermore, because sex differences in emotion facilities, when they appear, tend to be small (e.g., Montagne et al. 2005; see also Brody 1997; Wester et al. 2002), between-sex variability in emotion expressivity is actually smaller than within-sex variability. Indeed, men’s and women’s distributions of scores on a measure of emotional expressivity, assuming a small effect size of r ¼ .1, overlap by 84.3%. Applied to the SRFB, this suggests that a substantial proportion of women display “masculine” patterns of capacity and trustworthiness cues, and a substantial portion of men display cues in “feminine” patterns. The high variance of this behavioral trait does not fit with expectations of prolonged, directional selection favoring sex-specific patterns of expressivity, as proposed by the SRFB. 4. Social-cognitive models of human behavior: A parsimonious account of emotional expressivity and sex differences in emotional expressivity. Key assumptions of the SRFB remain

speculative. Specifically, the adaptive significance of sex differences in expressivity in ancestral human populations and the conservation of such purported differences both across cultures and throughout modern human evolution cannot be validated. Moreover, extant research suggests women and men are much more alike than different in their emotional expression. The large within-sex individual differences, relative to small between-sex differences, suggest that emotional displays are strongly influenced by contemporary context (e.g., Ambady & Hall 2002; Callahan et al. 2005) rather than ancestral sex differences in sensitivities (see Brody 1997). BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5

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Response/Vigil: Sex differences in the expression of emotion A more parsimonious account of emotional expressivity, as well as any possible sex differences in emotional expressivity, is offered by current social-cognitive models of individual differences and human behavior (e.g., Zayas et al. 2002; see Mischel & Shoda 1995; Shoda & Mischel 1998). Such models highlight the adaptive value of flexible emotional expressivity for both women and men, and the importance of culture and contemporaneous situational influences in guiding appropriate emotional displays and behaviors. By accounting for evolutionary constraints and empirical and theoretical contributions from broad areas of psychology and neuroscience, such social-cognitive models construe a person’s behavior as a function of his or her processing system (e.g., sensitivity to displays) and the particular contingencies present in the situation. This position is in stark contrast to Vigil’s current assumptions that sex differences in emotional expressivity reflect differences in ancestral selection pressures for men and women. Additionally, because social-cognitive models allow the generation of falsifiable hypotheses, they have broader potential for empirical scrutiny. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We gratefully acknowledge Emre Selcuk for his assistance and Cindy Hazan for her helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this commentary.

Author’s Response doi:10.1017/S0140525X09990999

The socio-relational framework of expressive behaviors as an integrative psychological paradigm Jacob Miguel Vigil Department of Psychology, Center for Applied Research in Child and Adolescent Development, University of North Florida, Jacksonville, FL 322242673. [email protected] http://www.unf.edu/~j.vigil/

Abstract: This response shows how the socio-relational framework of expressive behaviors may be used to understand and predict social psychological processes, beyond sex differences in the expression of emotion. I use this opportunity to elaborate on several key concepts on the epigenesis of evolved social behaviors that were not fully addressed in the target article. These are: evidence of a natural history of masculine and feminine specialization (sect. R1); phenotypic plasticity and range of reactivity of social behaviors (sect. R2); exploitive and protective functions of social behaviors (sect. R3); and the role of cognition in some affective responses (sect. R4). I conclude by highlighting (in sect. R5) future directions for psychological research from a socio-relational basis.

I am pleased that my target article is largely viewed as controversial yet useful for understanding sex differences and broader organization of social behaviors in humans. My goal was to present an integrative theoretical framework of key social selection pressures that may have been involved in the evolution and contemporary development of cognitive and behavioral mechanisms for regulating interpersonal relationships. I specifically focused on sex 408

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differences in masculine and feminine behaviors as an example of the many areas that the socio-relational framework of expressive behaviors (SRFB) may be applied. In the target article, I conceptualize just some of the costbenefit fitness trade-offs that may have supported situation-based and condition-based variation in emotional expressivity. I use the current opportunity to comment on several key concepts that are fundamental to the commentary responses, but were necessarily truncated in the target article. I hope that by integrating these precepts into the existing framework, the reader is left with a broader conceptual basis with which to better understand and examine the human organism. This response is divided into five sections to reflect the major themes of the commentaries. In the first section (R1), I discuss the commentators’ concerns with some empirical and theoretical inferences from the target article. I then show how an evolutionary approach to studying sex differences may integrate many of the “alternative” models the commentators presented, while addressing corollary hypotheses that are difficult to explain from the discrete models themselves. In the second section (R2), I use the example of sex differences to describe how personal experiences operate within evolved ranges of reactivity to produce both evolved dispositions (e.g., overall group differences) and individual differences (e.g., within sex variability). In the third section (R3), I describe how social psychological mechanisms operate to exploit the reciprocity potential of others, while protecting the self from being exploited. In the fourth section (R4), I discuss the potential roles of some cognitive processes (e.g., emotional awareness, visceral sensations) for regulating affect. In the final section (R5), I describe how the SRFB may be useful for guiding some of the future research the commentators highlighted. R1. Natural history of masculine and feminine behaviors R1.1. Empirical issues related to the biology of sex differences

Of all the major findings that I described in the target article, a few empirical inferences were parsed by the commentaries. The first finding is greater facial expression – processing abilities in females, with the exception of anger, of which males are predicted to be more sensitive. Consistent with the SRFB, commentators LoBue & DeLoache show that females are better at detecting social, but not nonsocial, stimuli as compared with males. However, LoBue & DeLoache also present some data that suggest that both males and females detect threatening emotions (e.g., anger and fear) more efficiently than non-threatening emotions (e.g., happiness and sadness), leading the researchers to suggest that males and females may not differ in the ability to detect threat. I recently conducted a preliminary analysis that may shed light on the commentators’ findings. Using a large, representative sample of young adults (n ¼ 808), I found that women were just as likely as men to perceive threatening (i.e., anger, fear, disgust) versus non-threatening (i.e., joy, sadness, surprise) emotions from ambiguous facial stimuli. However,

Response/Vigil: Sex differences in the expression of emotion when the emotional interpretations were re-coded as either signaling dominance (i.e., joy, anger, disgust) or submissiveness (i.e., sadness, fear, surprise), males were more likely to perceive the former (Vigil, submitted a). These findings suggest that males and females differ in how they interpret dominant and submissive cues in others. The SRFB explains these phenomena as reflecting a natural history characterized by the interchange of higher levels of capacity cues among males and trustworthiness cues among females. Likewise, the SRFB predicts that most sex differences in (social) perceptual and expressive biases should become exaggerated upon adolescence (not at the ages of children that LoBue & DeLoache investigated, for example). Historically, adolescence is when males and females may have required, and thus developed, specialized social skills for regulating different types of relationships. This age-dependent constraint may also explain why Izard, Finlon, & Grossman (Izard et al.) did not find sex differences in emotional expression in their samples of preschoolers (though see the comments further regarding racial differences in emotional expressivity). Clearly, we need more research to examine the universality of age and sex differences in the expression of emotion across people from varying cultural backgrounds. Other empirical concerns were for the predictions that males are more sensitive to take risks (displays of capacity) and that females are more sensitive to display altruism (e.g., kindness). To address these hypotheses, Basso & Oullier highlight findings from two experimental tasks (the “Dictator Game” and the “Ultimatum Game”) which involve the exchange of economic credits. The researchers found support for the prediction that males are less risk averse than females, but contend that females show no greater willingness to engage in true altruism (costly actions) than do males. The latter findings can be understood with a clearer description of what the SRFB actually predicts. First, unconditional self-sacrifices are rarely adaptive in most contexts. It would therefore make no sense for either sex to endure an actual cost to personal fitness, without the possibility of a reciprocated reward. Rather, the SRFB predicts that females are only more sensitive to demonstrate the appearance of, or willingness to engage in, altruism, not the actual and unconditional provisioning of resources, as the experimental tasks demanded. I would therefore predict that, while not actually engaging in costly actions (e.g., expending one’s credits), females will report greater compassion and felt guilt for their actions (e.g., not giving more credits to their experimental partners). Males, in contrast are predicted to demonstrate higher levels of capacity cues such as felt pride for successfully “cheating” their partners. Further, the experimental tasks that Basso & Oullier describe are not as analogous to the functional display of emotions (especially trust cues) and for the overall negotiation of relationships as the commentators imply. This is because actual relationships are formed and maintained over time. In the experimental situations, participants are constrained by a limited number of options, aware of the eventual termination of the task, and not dependent on their experimental partners in any meaningful way (e.g., for sustained self-enhancement or protection). Another drawback of using economic games to simulate social

interactions is that the games rely on the exchange of arbitrary (e.g., unearned) credits, again limiting the inherent interest of the tasks themselves. An extremely high level of creativity will surely be needed to design experimental protocols that can even remotely simulate the actual importance of non-kin relationships, as well as the scope of dynamic behaviors that humans use to regulate their relationships.

R1.2. Theoretical issues related to the biology of sex differences

The two major contentions that some commentators have with my theoretical models concern the utility of using an evolutionary approach to understanding human sex differences, as well as the specific types of sexual selection principles that would have favored their expression. The first set of issues is whether contemporary sex differences in social psychology even exist at all, and if so, whether they are solely the result of evolutionary forces. Alternative models to the evolutionary approach often highlight the importance of culture, proximate learning mechanisms, and motivational forces such as “norm formation” and “gender stereotyping.” Several of the commentators (e.g., Fugate, Gouzoules, & Barrett [Fugate et al.]; Vermeulen) took this approach, and Zayas, Tabak, Gu¨naydy´n, & Robertson [Zayas et al.] described several reasons why sex-typical emotionality can be better explained by models that emphasize individual learning processes rather than naturally selected behaviors. Specifically, Zayas et al. contend that: (a) patrilocality is not favored across all human cultures, (b) patrilocality does not result in unique social selection constraints for males compared with females, and (c) human males and females do not express emotionality differently and, if they do, that the differences are not the result of biological dispositions. The authors conclude by describing a social modeling/ learning explanation of gender development which appears to be more complementary than contradictory to the SRFB and the overall thesis that sex differences in social behaviors are rooted in evolutionary design. First, human patrilocality is an example of a plastic or facultative phenotype. Phenotypic plasticity, or variability in the expression of traits, is an essential characteristic of ontogeny because it enables the individual to develop phenotypes that are specialized for different types of ecological conditions. As I described in the target article, patrilocality is the predominant social migratory system in traditional societies; however, as evidenced through anthropological records, this pattern does vary somewhat according to local, ecological conditions. These conditions appear to encompass historical ties between environment factors (e.g., regions where resources are scarce and groom labor is used as a bride service) and social customs (e.g., historically low levels of inter-group hostility). Under these special conditions, humans may benefit from alternative locality customs. Under more typical conditions (i.e., involving inter-group hostility), male-biased philopatry is associated with numerous biological incentives (see Geary 2009), as elaborated by Madison and as I describe in further detail below (see sect. R1.3). BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5

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Response/Vigil: Sex differences in the expression of emotion Second, Zayas et al. suggest that because certain types of social ecologies (e.g., consisting of acquaintances) are associated with fitness-reducing costs, nature would not have favored women to expose themselves to these conditions. However, according to evolutionary reasoning, it is because interacting with different types of affiliates is associated with both fitness benefits (e.g., genetic outbreeding) as well as costs (e.g., risk of rejection), that these behaviors have been designed by evolutionary trial and error to evidence plasticity. The existence of costbenefit fitness trade-offs is a necessary condition for the evolution of phenotypic flexibility, and as such, the facultative expression of social philopatry, differential motivations to form distinct types of relationships, and the development of expressive behaviors that facilitate these goals. The importance of these processes is what motivated me to focus on how variability in social behaviors can be understood as a function of certain fitness-related costbenefit trade-offs that covary with specific conditional factors (e.g., sex, age, personal experiences, social network dynamics, ecological factors such as climate) and situational stimuli (e.g., the presence of different audiences). Third, Zayas et al. question the evidence that human males and females have evolved the proclivity to develop specialized social behaviors, based on the modest effect sizes that are sometimes found in this type of research. They support this concern by stating that “prolonged directional selection would have resulted in relatively large sex differences in emotional expressivity” and “this is clearly not the case.” However, it is unclear how the commentators estimate what should be the appropriate effect size for psychological processes. From my perspective, nature selects biological designs to be highly specialized for their own set of environmental contingencies, and because such specialization often involves phenotypic plasticity, it is implausible to assume a degree of evolutionary design from the weight of a statistical effect size. In terms of sex differences, as long as a mean sex difference in psycho-biological processes exists, even at a proximate level of causation (e.g., memory retrieval, as suggested by Fugate et al.), the presumption should be that some degree of psychobiological specialization has taken place. Finally, Zayas et al. suggest that sex differences in emotionality are driven by contemporary, individualistic factors (e.g., personal development of social norms) rather than evolutionary pressures. I don’t agree with this dichotomy and instead believe that societal experiences (e.g., exposure to gender norms) and the psychological (e.g., learning) mechanisms that process these experiences are ultimately constrained by, and thus a reflection of, biological structures and sensitivities. As a result, models that rely exclusively on social learning/modeling explanations of sex differences, in the absence of evolutionary specialization, are not able to account for (a) why males and females usually identify with, and model, same-sex individuals; (b) why mothers and fathers interact with their children differently (e.g., talking vs. doing activities) across generations; (c) why males and females form distinct peer networks; (d) developmental and even prenatal sex differences in the rudiments of social behaviors (e.g., eye-contact and 410

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touching); and (e) cross-cultural universality of masculine (e.g., physical violence) and feminine (e.g., crying) behaviors. R1.3. Theoretical issues related to the sexual selection of sex differences

Within the evolutionary school of thought, Lozano makes a number of excellent points regarding the utility of examining both intra-sexual and inter-sexual selection forces to account for human sex differences. Lozano highlights several biological scenarios that may be related to sextypical behavior patterns, including the possibility that masculine and feminine dispositions are the products of inter-sexual selection pressures (e.g., similar to face and body shape) rather than skills that are needed to manipulate same-sex relationships. Of course, intra-sexual selection pressures often operate in parallel with mate preferences, resulting in behaviors with pleiotropic functions. According to the SRFB, for instance, traits that signal capacity (e.g., physical attractiveness) and trust (e.g., kindness) are essential for attracting all types of (non-kin) relationships. These traits should thus be advantageous for regulating interactions with romantic and non-romantic peers. However, let me directly address the crux of Lozano’s hypothesis: that dominance may signal maturation and submissiveness may signal youth, and thus human mate preferences drove the evolution of masculinity and femininity. The reasons why sex differences in emotionality were probably not selected by mate preferences, irrespective of within-sex competition pressures, is because mate preferences cannot account for (a) implicit preferences for same-sex friendships, (b) social motivations to construct unique peer networks, and (c) sexually dimorphic social styles in early development (i.e., prior to puberty). Moreover, (d) sex-typical emotive gestures such as crying in females and aggression/threat promotion in males are not directly preferred in prospective mates, at least not to the same extent of well-established mating characteristics such as age, beauty, and resource acquisition. Finally, males’ and females’ social styles could not have been selected from mate choices, because (e) these are the very distinctions that often result in “miscommunication” between the sexes, a phenomenon that is more likely to deteriorate, rather than strengthen, pair bonding. Lozano is therefore correct in stating that intra-sexually selected traits can also affect mate choices; it is evident (and predicted) that they sometimes do. However, I strongly believe that the majority of the dimorphisms (e.g., social motivations, emotional expressivity, and speech styles) that I reviewed in the target article are probably the result of intra-sexual selection pressures. In support of this hypothesis, I recently found that the previously mentioned pattern of males and females to perceive differential cues of dominance or submissiveness in facial stimuli is moderated by sex-typical relationship dynamics (Vigil, submitted a). Males with larger social spheres (i.e., numbers of friendships) were more likely to perceive dominant emotions (e.g., joy and anger) than males with smaller social spheres, and as compared to females in general. Regarding Lozano’s related comment on the evolution of romantic love, it is unclear whether this sensation is expressed differently by males and

Response/Vigil: Sex differences in the expression of emotion females, and, if it is, whether such differences were selected by mate preferences and thus used to facilitate mating and/or parenting strategies. I nonetheless agree with Lozano that the SRFB can only be enhanced with the integration of models that can incorporate the simultaneous operation of additional forms of selection pressures that are known to drive sex differences in social behaviors (e.g., differential parental investment). In this sense, I see male-biased philopatry as a supplementary adaptation to the basic human mating strategy of resource acquisition in males. If males can enhance mate value through resource inheritance and if patrilocality can enhance resource inheritance, then this form of philopatry may directly result from human mating constraints. Thus, we may be able to organize a tentative chain of selection pressures (e.g., parental investment ! mate preferences ! male-biased philopatry ! sex-typed social styles) that can more fully account for the evolution of human sex differences in emotionality. R2. Range of reactivity of phenotypic expression R2.1. Ultimate versus proximate levels of analyses

It is important for social scientists to remember that psychological phenomena can be adequately explained through both proximate and ultimate levels of analyses (Tinbergen 1963). Proximate explanations incorporate physiological, situational, and experiential mechanisms and are able to answer what-type questions (e.g., what learning experiences contribute to sex differences). This level of analysis is essential for measuring individual differences in phenotypic expression. Ultimate explanations instead incorporate micro- and macro-evolutionary forces and are able to answer why-type questions (e.g., why are human males different or similar to human females). This level of analysis is essential for measuring the functionality (and thus often assumed existence) of the psychological phenomena. Sound ultimate levels of explanation operate in parallel with sound proximate levels of explanation, and to view them as contradictory is erroneous. At the same time, both proximate and ultimate levels of analyses are required to model the form and function of psychological adaptations. I attempted to do this in the target article by describing how some social, psychological processes in humans can be understood in the context of evolutionary cost-benefit fitness trade-offs that cause individuals to respond to personal life experiences and situational factors (e.g., audience characteristics) through sex-typical and sex-general behavior patterns. In the following subsections, I describe how two proximate sources of causation – individual life experiences and accompanying learning mechanisms – fit into the broader socio-relational framework.

the concept of range of reactivity. Ranges of reactivity simply refer to the continua of possibilities (and constraints) that any given phenotype can be expressed. Some types of phenotypes such as eye color are not as plastic and thus have very narrow ranges of reactivity; these phenotypes do not benefit from conditional modifications and are thus designed to be less influenced by environmental or experiential factors. Other types of phenotypes such as social behaviors are highly plastic and are more modifiable by life experiences. These phenotypes have wider ranges of reactivity that support the ontogeny of ecological specialization. As I mentioned earlier, phenotypic plasticity is driven by cost-benefit fitness trade-offs and operates to modify developmental trajectories in ways that optimize personal attributes, within the constraints and opportunities of the local environment. An example of this concept for understanding sex differences in social behaviors is illustrated in Figure R1. Males and females have evolved different ranges of reactivity or proclivities to develop masculine and feminine behaviors. The specific points along the continuum at which people express their unique combinations of masculine/feminine traits are influenced by individual (e.g., genetic) and experiential factors and by the proximate learning mechanisms that process life experiences. Figure R1 shows that males and females both have wide ranges of reactivity to develop prototypically masculine/feminine behaviors, and more narrow ranges of possibility to develop atypical behaviors. Although there is a great deal of variance within each sex, males and females are sensitive to develop specialized expressive styles for regulating different types of social ecologies. This concept of range of reactivity thus makes it possible to integrate most of the “alternative,” mostly proximate learning-based models that the commentaries have highlighted.

R2.2. Range of reactivity

Some of the commentators contended that evolutionary approaches to understanding sex differences are too constrained, that they don’t incorporate learning experiences, and that, because sex differences are sometimes not found, their existence should be denied all together. These contentions can be resolved through a brief description of

Figure R1. Epigenesis of evolved proclivities within a range of reaction. Males and females are sensitive to develop unique behaviors styles. Individual differences (e.g., genetics [not shown]) and learning experiences moderate the degree to which the behaviors are expressed. BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5

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Response/Vigil: Sex differences in the expression of emotion R2.3. Proximate learning mechanisms

For example, Swain describes interesting research showing that same-sex parent-infant dyads evidence more behavioral and arousal synchrony in their daily interactions as compared to opposite-sex dyads. These findings again highlight the utility of using intra-sexual models for understanding social behaviors, but also show how proximate learning experiences, such as classical conditioning, can strengthen sex-typical behavior patterns. As mentioned earlier (see Fugate et al., Zayas et al.), parents also reinforce sex-typicality through social modeling (observation and mimicking) mechanisms. Likewise, Basso & Oullier show how group demands (expected rules in organizational settings) can lead to acceptance and rejection, and thus how operant conditioning can alter sex differences in social behaviors. Similar arguments are made by Fischer and Wiefel & Schepker, who contend that different types of relational demands, such as history of trust, play a pivotal role in the expression of emotion. The SRFB hypothesizes that sex differences in emotionality are largely based on the differential sensitivity to advertise trust cues. As noted by Wiefel & Schepker, the emphasis on trust links the SRFB to other models of social psychology such as “Attachment Theory” (Bowlby 1969). I believe the SRFB extends traditional applications of attachment models by showing why early childhood experiences (i.e., behavioral responses of others) are associated with the development of specialized and functional interaction styles. Infant-caregiver experiences probably form the basis of self-conceptualizations of reciprocity potential, as well as the basis for social expectations. For example, individuals who experience distrustful relationships in their life develop increased perceptual and expressive proclivities to detect and express anger (Vigil et al., submitted). Anger behaviors are in turn effective at provoking distancing responses from peers (e.g., Vigil 2008). Thus, this research shows that the types of learning that occur within relationships can and do alter the development of expressive styles (e.g., hostility) that primarily operate to regulate individuals’ unique social conditions. In an interesting caveat to the literature, Izard et al. found that minority children showed reduced sex differences in the expression of emotion. This finding is analogous to similar findings in adults showing reduced sex differences among African Americans as compared to European Americans (Vrana & Rollock 2002) and Asian Americans (Vigil, in preparation). The ethnic discrepancies are probably the result of variation in social, structural (e.g., in terms of social spheres), and relational demands (e.g., relative earning capacity and perceptions of peer trust) among males compared with females, for people from different cultural backgrounds. In a related commentary, Fischer describes how females express more antagonistic aggression in intimate situations with less traditional and more egalitarian relationship partners. I agree with Fischer that the findings can be explained according to the expected outcomes of the anger behaviors. Specifically, the SRFB predicts that individuals should express more risky forms of aggression, such as antagonistic anger, when their relational partners are perceived to have lower capacity (to retaliate) 412

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than themselves (target article, Fig. 1). Lastly, I would like to clarify Fischer’s insinuation that females express higher levels of aggression than males. These findings are typical for research relying on self-report measures, which usually include a multitude of non-risky behaviors (e.g., arguing with peers). In ethnographic studies that measure acts of violence that involve a greater risk of death (e.g., homicide), males are far more likely to express these behaviors than are females (e.g., Archer 2009). R3. Social behaviors as exploitive and protective mechanisms R3.1. Human psychology as an exploitive system

It is interesting that some of the commentators, such as Goldstein Ferber, tend to view my models as too individualistic and not focusing on mutual goal attainment, whereas other commentators, such as Buss, instead imply that I could have emphasized individual fitness gains even more strongly. Buss distinguishes three types of resource acquisition strategies (i.e., personal efforts, cooperative efforts, and exploitive efforts), whereas I consider all three strategies as operating off the same exploitive, and hence personal-fitness-enhancing, motivations. I agree with Buss that anger and related capacity displays (e.g., signals of prowess) operate to exploit the reciprocity potential (e.g., material resources, fertility) of others. However, I also believe that trustworthiness displays (e.g., expressed kindness and vulnerability) are equally exploitive. By advertising trustworthiness cues (e.g., via crying) to other people, individuals are able to exploit the motivation of others to advertise their own reciprocity potential such as via sympathetic responses. Relationship formation may thus ultimately function as the context within which individuals can readily interchange reciprocal displays of capacity and trustworthiness with others in the form of expedient and continuous investment cues, respectively. R3.2. Fundamental mechanisms of exploitation

One of the most important commentaries is from Todorov, who has been constructing a neurocognitive model of affective processing that is remarkably similar to my own. What is impressive about this convergence is that Todorov and I derived our conclusions from two very different analytical strategies. Todorov derived his models from a bottom-up approach, using empirical findings to build a conceptual model, whereas my models were constructed from a purely top-down or theorydriven analysis. As predicted from my models, and as was found by Todorov, people evaluate others along two dimensions, what Todorov refers to as valence/trustworthiness and dominance/power impressions. The SRFB extends Todorov’s findings in several ways that include: (a) conceptualizing the natural essence of these social properties as fundamental components of reciprocity potential; (b) extending the utility of the dimensional models to explain variation in expressive behaviors including displayed affect; and (c) describing some costbenefit fitness trade-offs that support situation-based and condition-based variation in expressive behaviors. Todorov

Response/Vigil: Sex differences in the expression of emotion and I agree that social, perceptual processing of capacity and trust cues in others precipitates affective responses in the individual, and that affective responses ultimately function to induce affiliation versus avoidance from others. I simply extend this argument to model the fundamental dimensions of expressive behaviors as behavioral advertisements of these same social properties. According to the SRFB, all forms of expressive behaviors (i.e., behaviors that are both observable and modified by the social context) are dynamic advertisements of capacity and/ or trustworthiness cues, which ultimately function to control how other people respond to the individual. I recently found support for this hypothesis as it relates to affective processing by examining how perceptions of other people’s capacity and trustworthiness trait levels are associated with interpersonal dispositions and discrete emotive reactions toward the people (Vigil, submitted b). Specifically, I showed that trustworthiness impressions are parsimonious predictors of the motivational desire either to affiliate with (i.e., “form a friendship”) or to avoid (i.e., “stay away from”) social objects. However, simultaneous impressions of capacity trait levels are necessary (and sufficient) for predicting discrete affiliative (e.g., sympathy vs. admiration) and avoidant (e.g., fear vs. disgust) emotions, as predicted in the target article’s Figure 1. The types of emotional reactions that individuals express in turn affect whether other people respond to the individual with either affiliative or avoidant dispositions of their own (see Vigil 2008). Collectively, these findings suggest that both the perceptual processing and expression of human affect can be understood along several broad dimensions of social relevance. Affect behaviors operate by advertising the essential properties of reciprocity potential (i.e., capacity and trustworthiness cues) in order to regulate social fitness by selectively promoting affiliation versus avoidance across the individual’s relationships. In this regard, I disagree with Todorov’s suggestion that broad conceptual dimensions of affective processing are insufficient for predicting specific emotional reactions in vivo. In fact, in the target article, I attempted to outline several overlapping dimensions that can be simultaneously applied for just this purpose. Again, some of these dimensions can be conceptualized as (a) the perception and (b) the expression of capacity/trustworthiness cues, (c) the motivation to promote affiliation versus avoidance (target article, Fig. 1), (d) the signaler’s sex (Fig. R1), (e) recent life experiences (target article, Fig. 2), and (f) characteristics of the signaler’s audience (target article, Fig. 3), among several other probable dimensions (e.g., climatic ecology and health status). The predictive validity of these hypotheses will ultimately rest on the universality of what I presented as basic behavioral responses. For example, Goldstein Ferber questions whether people from different cultures (and whether different species) respond to expressions of vulnerability in trusted affiliates with increased social support. I believe that this, as with most of the broad response patterns that I described in the target article (e.g., distancing reactions toward angry peers), are universal to humans. I would also suggest that submissive displays (i.e., trustworthiness cues) are far rarer in nature than is the demonstration of dominant displays (i.e., capacity cues). Specifically, submissive behaviors should

covary with the social complexity of each species. Species that form continuous relationships (e.g., certain primates, wolves, dolphins, elephants, and lions) should be most likely to signal trustworthiness gestures (e.g., pain behaviors, high-pitched utterances, non-threatening eye contact), as these mechanisms are predicted to be functional for regulating longer-term relationships. R3.3. Variation in affective responses

Several of the commentators are concerned with the ability to predict certain social reactions (e.g., indecisiveness about others) and emotive gestures (e.g., different types of laughing and crying behaviors) that were not fully addressed in the target article. Lozano and Goldstein Ferber, for example, find my approach/withdrawal heuristic to be too constrained to integrate what were described as more dynamic social reactionary strategies, including wait and see, freezing, and simply revealing oneself (e.g., to potential predators). They also contend that individuals must monitor and implicitly process multiple cost-benefit fitness trade-offs that are involved with interacting with different people. I agree that interacting with any sort of environmental stimuli, and especially other people, which are the least predictable stimuli humans can encounter, present multiple and simultaneous costs and benefits, as described earlier. However, I suggest that a dichotomous (affiliative/avoidant) heuristic can sufficiently account for variant response behaviors as well as simultaneous appraisal processes. This is possible as long as humans have the heuristical algorithms for processing the net outcome of either affiliating with, or avoiding, others. From my perspective, wait-and-see strategies, such as experiences of curiosity, may operate as low-intensity or low-valence approach dispositions; for instance, motivating the future appraisal of others. Freezing behaviors, in contrast, are obviously more beneficial for evading dangerous stimuli, by using a behavioral strategy that is specialized differently than other forms of avoidant reactions (e.g., displays of fear or violence). According to the SRFB, discrete affective sensations (e.g., feelings of sadness) should covary with, and could thus be predicted by, discrete expressive displays (e.g., sadness behaviors) and the systematic reaction of others (e.g., approach from intimate affiliates and avoidance from unfamiliar affiliates). This thesis could be applied to the study of variant forms of expressive behaviors throughout the life span, including crying behaviors in infancy and adulthood. I agree with Wiefel & Schepker that babies utilize crying as a powerful tool for manipulating others, and that caregivers play a key role in shaping the development of affective processes in children, such as through the proximate learning mechanisms I have mentioned. Wiefel & Schepker also describe how infants use crying to solicit attention, and that the attention can be needed for various reasons, including hunger, fatigue, and overstimulation. It makes sense that infants primarily rely on trustworthiness rather than capacity cues to manipulate others, as submissive gestures can best accentuate an infant’s actual vulnerability and because these behaviors are most effective for regulating intimate, co-dependent relationships. Lyons also does an excellent job of outlining the many possible functions (exploitive benefits) of crying behaviors, BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5

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Response/Vigil: Sex differences in the expression of emotion but misinterprets an associated premise from the SRFB. Lyons implies that I suggest that vulnerability displays (e.g., crying) are only functional by displaying one’s actual willingness to reciprocate with others. Rather, vulnerability displays such as crying, worrying, and perhaps pain sensations are also adaptive by signaling reduced threat, which may simply be effective at signaling a safe context within which other people can advertise their own reciprocity potential (e.g., via sympathizing behaviors). I believe that humans are systemically motivated to advertise capacity and trust cues continuously to other people, given every available opportunity, including conditional and situational openings. This would create an inherent fitness incentive for providing other people with the opportunity to demonstrate their own reciprocity potential. It is therefore possible that humans produce certain behaviors, such as playful aggression and crying, to disarm the threat interpretations of others and to signal the opportunity to reciprocate social demonstrations of reciprocity with others, in a safe relational context, irrespective of more specialized relationship behaviors. On a related note, Lyons mentions that crying isn’t always perceived as attractive, a fact that is predicted by the SRFB. According to the target article’s Figure 3, for instance, crying and other displays of vulnerability should be expressed and most positively received by proximate affiliates (e.g., family and close friends). Instead, these behaviors should be attenuated and aversively responded to by distal affiliates (e.g., acquaintances). Again, these are the types of cost-benefit fitness tradeoffs that would have selected for the facultative adjustment of behaviors such as crying that are effective at soliciting social support from certain types of affiliates, while simultaneously averting interactions with other affiliates. These trade-offs are part of the foundation of my social spheres hypothesis (target article, Fig. 2). I agree with Lyons that smiling is also an affiliative gesture, and hypothesize that these behaviors should be especially attractive (e.g., in terms of increasing “positive” trait impressions) among more distal affiliates, rather than intimate relationship partners. Unlike crying, which serves as more of a relationship maintenance behavior, smiling and laughing are largely used to solicit potential relationship partners. Still, Fischer describes several forms and functioning of smiling behaviors, including serving as a signal of affiliation (Duchenne smile), appeasement (closedmouth smile), dominance (pride smile), or experiencing negative self-conscious emotions (e.g., embarrassed smile). Some of these smiles signal capacity, namely the types of smiles that display the teeth; these smiles should covary with dominant emotions (e.g., joy and anger). Other smiles, especially those that conceal the teeth, should instead covary with submissive emotions (e.g., sympathy and shame). Thus, it would appear as though humans use the teeth (e.g., canines) to signal capacity, perhaps through demonstrations of bilateral symmetry and overall healthiness. By concealing the teeth, humans may instead produce heuristical demonstrations of modesty, which may ultimately reduce threat perceptions in others. Again, the SRFB predicts that submissive (i.e., trust) cues are just as powerful at exploiting the reciprocity potential of others as are displays of dominance (i.e., capacity). The function of smiles differs somewhat by sex. This is supported by the work of Vazire, Naumann, Rentfrow, & Gosling (Vazire et al.), which shows that males and 414

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females evidence unique associations between smiling behaviors and felt emotional sensations. In females, smiling covaries with affiliative moods, such as pride, enthusiasm, and inspiration (referred to by the commentators as positive emotions). In males, however, smiling is more strongly and negatively associated with avoidant emotions, such as anger, fear, and shame (referred to as negative emotions). Because males have evolved the proclivity to advertise their capacity (e.g., prowess) and to conceal their vulnerability (e.g., shame, pain, crying, frustration, worry), it makes sense that they should advertise various forms of dominance behaviors (e.g., teeth-baring, threat stare, erect posture, lowering voice-pitch) in coordination with submissive emotional states, relative to females. Of course the opposite pattern – for females to display submissive cues (e.g., concealing teeth, head lowering, raising voice-pitch) when experiencing dominant emotional states – is predicted as well. In any event, Vazire et al.’s research shows how biological sex is an important dimension of affective processing in humans. Along similar lines, Provine accurately describes the effectiveness and sexual dimorphism of other types of affiliative gestures such as laughing. According to Provine, laughter is an honest signal of reciprocation because it occurs implicitly, often without conscious awareness, and because it is hard to voluntarily produce and give the impression of sincerity. I agree with Provine that laughing is a behavioral mechanism that is used to show appeasement and hence trust cues (e.g., via high-pitched vocal utterances) to others. Indeed, people selectively laugh for (certain) other people and not about the humorous content itself. Li & Balliet provide support for this hypothesis by describing how people initiate humor to indicate affiliative intentions, and humor is in turn associated with, and effective at demonstrating, affiliative dispositions to other people. I agree with Li and Balliet that smiling, laughing, and humor operate by adjusting the display of both capacity and trustworthiness in ways that induce affiliation from others. I also agree that different types of humor may operate to serve specialized functions (e.g., maintenance of existing relationships vs. solicitation of novel relationships), which should covary with the structural properties of the humorous content itself (e.g., self-degradation vs. degradation of others). Tickling and tear production are also elaborate affiliative gestures that are used to strengthen bonding with proximate (e.g., intimate) affiliates via the behavioral display of vulnerability. In the case of tickling, vulnerability is exaggerated by providing access to sensitive areas of the body (e.g., neck, abdomen) and becoming catatonic during intense laughter. In the case of tear production, vulnerability is exaggerated by occluding visual acuity with a bodily fluid. Here again, we see the natural organization of phenotypic forms, functions, and the reactions of other people. Given the power of these basic behavioral mechanisms for regulating social fitness, it is surprising that they are given much less scientific attention than more “cognitive” social, psychological processes. R3.4. Social behaviors as exploitive defenses

Buss highlighted an interesting concept: behaviors that protect the self from being exploited by other people.

Response/Vigil: Sex differences in the expression of emotion From my perspective, this concept is captured by the entire set of responses that I referred to as avoidant behaviors. Individuals should produce these responses when they perceive a risk of being exploited by other people, either through direct interactions with a dangerous person or via indirect fitness-losses (e.g., reputational consequences and comparisons with higher-status people). I agree with Buss that defensive heuristics are sometimes manifested as hegemonic masculinity (e.g., physical prowess and less risk aversion) such as through exaggerated aggression by males. However, it should also be recognized that defensive mechanisms can also operate through trust cues, such as appeasement and vulnerability displays. Submissive gestures such as self-reported shame, guilt, and subservience (e.g., asking questions) may be effective for protecting oneself by lowering threat interpretations and inviting reciprocal displays of kindness or mercy from others, as described earlier. R4. The role of social cognition in the SRFB R4.1. The hierarchical organization of social psychology

The psychological sciences are currently hindered by the lack of unity on the organizational primacy and supporting roles of human thoughts versus feelings versus behaviors. Do thoughts and feelings ultimately support the adaptive qualities of expressive behaviors, or do behaviors ultimately facilitate the fitness objectives of thoughts? Alternatively, both thoughts and behaviors may be codependent, evolving in parallel and reliant upon support from the other for fitness enhancement. The answers to these hypotheses are imperative for understanding the form and function of human emotionality. I ascribe to the general view that only behaviors can impact personal fitness. This is because a thought or feeling in and of itself cannot result in self-sustainment (e.g., survival) or self-enhancement (e.g., reproduction) without an associated modification in one’s own behavior or in the behavioral reactions of other people (James 1884). It therefore makes sense that, across all animals, including humans, basic learning mechanisms and associated cognitive processes (e.g., attention, perception, sensational awareness, information processing, and rationalization) can affect fitness only by altering actual behaviors. From the basis of this perspective, emotions primarily serve social expressive functions. This position is further supported by studies that show that: (a) blind and perhaps cognitively impaired people are emotionally expressive; (b) children (e.g., infants) are sensitive to mimic and express emotions at earlier ages than they are generally believed to engage in operational learning; (c) normative emotional development unfolds through social interactions; and (d) emotive gestures (e.g., teeth or weapon baring) are more universal in nature than the sensations that we often refer to as “feelings.” As Lozano aptly states, “evolutionarily, it only matters what emotions do, not how they feel.” Still, many of the commentaries took the contrary approach, instead emphasizing intra-individual cognitive processes (e.g., self-reflection, rationalization, and cultural norm appraisal) over the primacy of social expressive mechanisms. According to Izard et al., these cognitivebased approaches represent the focus of the majority of emotion researchers. The commentators justified this

position by citing the fact that affect is sometimes experienced in the absence of an apparent social situation. Vermeulen elaborates on this theme by describing how congenitally blind children express smiles similar to sighted individuals, the implication being that emotions are not always socially relevant and may therefore serve intrapersonal functions (e.g., self-reflection). As I suggested in the target article, this inference is analogous to the reasoning that: because people sometimes talk to themselves, and because deaf children can learn to speak, human language evolved to communicate to the self. In the following section I describe some potential reasons why emotions may consume the human consciousness and feel like important, self-reflective processes. R4.2. The form and function of emotional experiences

The feelings or experience component of affective responses is usually the first concept that people think of when asked to define an emotion. However, according to the reasoning mentioned above, felt experiences are limited to a supplementary or facultative role in the evolution of emotionality; that is, they are only capable of enhancing fitness vis-a`-vis modifications to specific behaviors. In the target article, I provided no justification for the inclusion of emotional experiences and may have implicitly de-emphasized the importance of felt sensations for daily functioning. If, as I proposed, the selective interchange of heuristical expressive cues is effective for regulating individual relationships (i.e., promoting attraction vs. aversion) and hence overall social fitness, then why do humans (need to) feel emotional experiences at all? This question can be further parsed by asking: Why are humans cognizant of emotional experiences; why are emotional experiences valence-based (e.g., felt along pleasant and aversive dimensions); and how does feeling an emotion enhance personal fitness? The first question is difficult to analyze, but can be viewed along two opposing hypotheses. One hypothesis is that emotional awareness is simply a by-product of a broader adaptation to be consciously aware. Another hypothesis is that emotional awareness is instead specific and functional and hence an evolved adaptation in and of itself. I tend to lean towards the latter hypothesis for several reasons. First, humans are not aware of all bodily sensations (e.g., what it feels like to store iron in the liver), but only certain ones, suggesting a special design for the ability to acknowledge emotional sensations. Second, emotional experiences are not just consciously observed, but are also felt in seemingly important ways. Third, several cognitive psychologists have suggested that many of humans’ comparatively unique mental faculties, such as intelligence, consciousness, and voluntary thought processing, were the products of, and ultimately serve, social manipulatory functions (e.g., Dunbar 1998; Geary 2005; Humphrey 1976). If these complex cognitive abilities evolved to regulate social relationships, then it is certainly possible that the awareness and experience of felt emotions may be designed for related purposes. An associated hypothesis is that visceral experiences of pleasantness and aversion may have evolved to calibrate or otherwise differentiate the impact of significant life events in ways that enhance the efficacy of interpersonal interactions. By experiencing varying degrees of felt BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5

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Response/Vigil: Sex differences in the expression of emotion sensations (e.g., feeling slightly down vs. extremely down) in coordination with different types of life experiences, individuals may be better able to solicit sufficient degrees of responses (e.g., provisioning) from others. Likewise, inter-subjectivity (dual awareness) of the feelings of others (e.g., knowing what is feels like to experience mild vs. severe pain) may enable individuals to better qualify their own responses toward others without overextending personal resources such as time. From this perspective, humans are not just aware of arbitrary cognitive sensations, but rather, that these sensations exist and become accessible for fitness-enhancing purposes, by facilitating the selective interchange of reciprocity potential with other people. Finally, I propose the thesis that humans may experience the biological affects (e.g., emotions, moods, anxiety, pain) for the sole purpose of showing or talking about them to other people. For example, one hypothesis is that emotional experiences may operate to sustain the behavioral advertisement of the felt emotions; this would be functional for prolonging the ability to solicit beneficial behavioral responses from others. A complimentary hypothesis is that humans may experience emotions (e.g., pride and guilt) in order to better convince others that one’s behavioral advertisements are genuine. That is, by feeling emotions (or contextualizing emotions, as Fugate et al. suggest), individuals may be more effective at communicating the sincerity of one’s relative state of capacity and trustworthiness attributes to others. From this perspective, it therefore makes sense that emotions feel important; they may be designed to do just that. By convincing oneself of the relevance of an emotional representation, humans may be better able to demonstrate to others that one’s abilities and intentions are sincere. Empirically, it is very difficult to separate cognitive processes (e.g., rationalization) that may be involved in emotion processes from the expressive properties of a self-report. Taken further, this confound opens up the possibility that many forms of self-reported information, such as self-descriptions (e.g., self-esteem) and social opinions (e.g., political ideologies), could largely operate to convey specific social impressions (e.g., demonstrations of dominance or submissiveness) to others (e.g., Vigil, submitted c). It is therefore likely that many types of selfreported information may be more closely associated with behaviorism rather than outcomes of cognitive reasoning processes. At the very least, the fact that the content of some self-reported information cannot be easily separated from the social impressions that the information communicates should give researchers caution to consider the possibility that they may be measuring behavioral expressions in addition to, or rather than products of complex computations. For these purposes, my definition of a social expression – a behavior that is both observable and moderated by the social context – should be especially useful for distinguishing communicative versus non-communicative mental processes. R5. Future directions for the psychological sciences Finally, I will briefly highlight some broad directions for future research that can be drawn from the target article 416

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and commentaries. One area is emotional heterochrony, or the timing of expression of emotional development. From a life-history perspective, the timing of any form of developmental process is an evolved adaptation in and of itself, and thus subject to the same principles of expression (e.g., plasticity within a range of reactivity) as other phenotypes. In this sense, the timing of expression of emotional development (e.g., emergence of discrete emotions throughout childhood) should reflect specificity (e.g., consistency in temporal development) and functionality (e.g., for regulating relationships) in ways that are not currently being investigated. Another area for future research is how people regulate their relationships in coordination with stochastic life events (e.g., everyday ups and downs) and significant personal experiences (e.g., a history of child maltreatment). Interpersonal victimization and situational hardships are associated with differential mood adjustments (e.g., increased vs. decreased aggression, respectively [Vigil et al., in press; submitted]). According to the SRFB, variable mood states should be adaptive for regulating different types of social interactions in accordance with both historical and recent social experiences and a dynamic interaction of the two. Along these lines, several of the commentators (e.g., Wiefel & Schepker; Swain) presented novel hypotheses on potential physiological substrates that may help link early relationship experiences (e.g., attachment styles) and subsequent psychological functioning. Neuroendocrine chemicals that regulate social bonding, such as oxytocin, will prove invaluable for future research in the social neurosciences. A complimentary line of research is in the field of evolutionary medicine as it pertains to the socio-relational precipitates and consequences of disease, including proximate and ultimate factors that link psychological processes to physical health. Physical illness has relevance for social fitness, and social fitness has implications for physical health, probably via mechanisms that are not always obvious. I firmly believe that many physical health – related systems (e.g., immune functioning, pain perception, endocrine stress responses) have been evolutionarily co-opted, and are thus moderated (i.e., attenuated and exaggerated) by affective processes in ways that result in social benefits (e.g., compromising physical health to solicit social support). I have recently been examining these hypotheses in relation to pain perception, based on my intuition that pain experiences and displays are moderated by social information (e.g., life experiences and situational factors), similar to other affect behaviors (see also Craig 2009). By investigating how social stimuli modulate pain perception, we should be able to develop innovative therapy techniques and technological devices that can either simulate pain-reducing social stimuli or otherwise modulate how people process this information. Finally, Madison took the unique approach of discussing potential societal implications of the predictions from the SRFB, including the evolution of sex differences in emotionality. For example, Madison suggested that the SRFB may be useful for understanding the perpetual cycle of male-on-female exploitation, such as domestic violence and raping behaviors in which the male default display (i.e., dominance) reinforces the female default display (submissiveness), and vice versa. Of course, females evolved counter defensive mechanisms for

References/Vigil: Sex differences in the expression of emotion protecting themselves from such exploitation, as well as powerful exploitive mechanisms (e.g., crying behaviors) of their own. Moreover, it would appear as if sex differences in psychological functioning pervade many aspects of our lives, from beliefs about social policies to the differential interpretation of empirical data among male and female scientists. Males and females undoubtedly have different styles of communicating, with males expecting and appreciating capacity (e.g., dominance) displays from others, and with females expecting and appreciating cues of trustworthiness (e.g., submissiveness). With respect to such specialization, miscommunication between the sexes would seem to be inevitable.

R6. Conclusion My objective in formulating the SRFB was to construct a top-down analysis of how and why humans evaluate, attract, and protect themselves from each other, and form and maintain different types of relationships for personal fitness gains. While I hope that I was effective at presenting some broad predictions of the SRFB, the models are still in their infancy and will require continuous scrutiny, refinement, and innovations to reach their full potential for hypothesis generation. I am therefore extremely grateful to all of my distinguished colleagues that have already, and may continue to contribute towards this goal.

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The myth of language universals: Language diversity and its importance for cognitive science Nicholas Evans Department of Linguistics, Research School of Asian and Pacific Studies, Australian National University, ACT 0200, Australia [email protected] http://rspas.anu.edu.au/people/personal/evann_ling.php

Stephen C. Levinson Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, Wundtlaan 1, NL-6525 XD Nijmegen, The Netherlands; and Radboud University, Department of Linguistics, Nijmegen, The Netherlands [email protected] http://www.mpi.nl/Members/StephenLevinson

Abstract: Talk of linguistic universals has given cognitive scientists the impression that languages are all built to a common pattern. In fact, there are vanishingly few universals of language in the direct sense that all languages exhibit them. Instead, diversity can be found at almost every level of linguistic organization. This fundamentally changes the object of enquiry from a cognitive science perspective. This target article summarizes decades of cross-linguistic work by typologists and descriptive linguists, showing just how few and unprofound the universal characteristics of language are, once we honestly confront the diversity offered to us by the world’s 6,000 to 8,000 languages. After surveying the various uses of “universal,” we illustrate the ways languages vary radically in sound, meaning, and syntactic organization, and then we examine in more detail the core grammatical machinery of recursion, constituency, and grammatical relations. Although there are significant recurrent patterns in organization, these are better explained as stable engineering solutions satisfying multiple design constraints, reflecting both cultural-historical factors and the constraints of human cognition. Linguistic diversity then becomes the crucial datum for cognitive science: we are the only species with a communication system that is fundamentally variable at all levels. Recognizing the true extent of structural diversity in human language opens up exciting new research directions for cognitive scientists, offering thousands of different natural experiments given by different languages, with new opportunities for dialogue with biological paradigms concerned with change and diversity, and confronting us with the extraordinary plasticity of the highest human skills. Keywords: Chomsky; coevolution; constituency; culture; dependency; evolutionary theory; Greenberg; linguistic diversity; linguistic typology; recursion; universal grammar

1. Introduction According to Chomsky, a visiting Martian scientist would surely conclude that aside from their mutually unintelligible vocabularies, Earthlings speak a single language. — Steven Pinker (1994, p. 232)

Languages are much more diverse in structure than cognitive scientists generally appreciate. A widespread assumption among cognitive scientists, growing out of the generative tradition in linguistics, is that all languages are English-like but with different sound systems and vocabularies. The true picture is very different: languages differ so fundamentally from one another at every level of description (sound, grammar, lexicon, meaning) that it is very hard to find any single structural property they share. The claims of Universal Grammar, we argue here, are either empirically false, unfalsifiable, or misleading in that they refer to tendencies rather than strict # Cambridge University Press, 2009

0140-525X/09 $40.00

universals. Structural differences should instead be accepted for what they are, and integrated into a new approach to language and cognition that places diversity at centre stage. The misconception that the differences between languages are merely superficial, and that they can be resolved by postulating a more abstract formal level at which individual language differences disappear, is serious: it now pervades a great deal of work done in psycholinguistics, in theories of language evolution, language acquisition, neurocognition, parsing and speech recognition, and just about every branch of the cognitive sciences. Even scholars like Christiansen and Chater (2008), concerned to demonstrate the evolutionary impossibility of pre-evolved constraints, employ the term Universal Grammar as if it were an empirically verified construct. A great deal of theoretical work within the cognitive sciences thus risks being vitiated, at least if it purports to be investigating a fixed human language processing capacity, rather 429

Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals than just the particular form this takes in some well-known languages like English and Japanese. How did this widespread misconception of language uniformity come about? In part, this can be attributed simply to ethnocentrism – most cognitive scientists, linguists included, speak only the familiar European languages, all close cousins in structure. But in part it can be attributed to misleading advertizing copy issued by linguists themselves. Unfortunate sociological splits in the field have left generative and typological linguists with completely different views of what is proven science, without shared rules of argumentation that would allow them to resolve the issue – and in dialogue with cognitive scientists it has been the generativists who have been taken as representing the dominant view. As a result, Chomsky’s notion of Universal Grammar (UG) has been mistaken, not for what it is – namely, the programmatic label for whatever it turns out to be that all children bring to learning a language – but for a set of substantial research findings about what all languages have in common. For the substantial findings about universals across languages one must turn to the field of linguistic typology, which has laid bare a bewildering range of diverse languages, where the generalizations are really quite hard to extract. Chomsky’s views, filtered through various commentators, have been hugely influential in the cognitive sciences, because they combine philosophically sophisticated ideas and mathematical approaches to structure with claims about the innate endowment for language that are immediately relevant to learning theorists, cognitive psychologists, and brain scientists. Even though

NICHOLAS EVANS is Professor of Linguistics at the Australian National University. His more than 120 linguistic publications include grammars of Kayardild and Bininj Gun-wok; dictionaries of Kayardild and Dalabon; edited books on polysynthesis, linguistic prehistory, and grammar-writing; and the recent Dying Words: Endangered Languages and What They Have To Tell Us (Wiley Blackwell, 2009). He has carried out intensive fieldwork on a number of languages of Australia and Papua New Guinea. Current research projects focus on the encoding of psychosocial cognition in grammar, song language traditions of Arnhem Land, and languages of South Coast New Guinea. Evans is a fellow of the Australian Academy of the Humanities. STEPHEN C. LEVINSON is co-director of the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, and Professor of Comparative Linguistics at Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands. He is the author of more than 150 publications on language and cognition, including the books Pragmatics (Cambridge University Press [CUP], 1983), Politeness (CUP, 1987), Presumptive Meanings (MIT, 2000), Space in Language and Cognition (CUP, 2003). In addition, he has co-edited the following collections: Language Acquisition and Conceptual Development (CUP, 2001) with M. Bowerman; Grammars of Space (CUP, 2006) with D. Wilkins; Evolution and Culture (MIT, 2006) with P. Jaisson; and Roots of Sociality (Berg, 2006) with N. Enfield. Levinson has done extensive fieldwork on languages in India, Australia, Mexico, and Papua New Guinea, and coordinated research on the typology of languages in New Guinea and Australia. He is a fellow of the British Academy and the Academia Europaea.

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psychologists learned from the linguistic wars of the 1970s (Newmeyer 1986) to steer clear from too close an association with any specific linguistic theory, the underlying idea that all languages share the same structure at some abstract level has remained pervasive, tying in nicely to the modularity arguments of recent decades (Fodor 1983). It will take a historian of science to unravel the causes of this ongoing presumption of underlying language uniformity. But a major reason is simply that there is a lack of communication between theorists in the cognitive sciences and those linguists most in the know about linguistic diversity. This is partly because of the reluctance by most descriptive and typological linguists to look up from their fascinating particularistic worlds and engage with the larger theoretical issues in the cognitive sciences. Outsiders have instead taken the articulate envoys from the universalizing generativist camp to represent the consensus view within linguistics. But there are other reasons as well: the relevant literature is forbiddingly opaque to outsiders, bristling with arcane phonetic symbols and esoteric terminologies. Our first goal (sect. 2) in this article, then, is to survey some of the linguistic diversity that has been largely ignored in the cognitive sciences, which shows how differently languages can be structured at every level: phonetic, phonological, morphological, syntactic, and semantic. We critically evaluate (sect. 3) the kind of descriptive generalizations (again, misleadingly called “universals”) that have emerged from careful cross-linguistic comparisons, and we survey the treacherously different senses of “universal” that have allowed the term to survive a massive accumulation of counterevidence. We then turn to three syntactic features that have recently figured large in debates about the origin of language: grammatical relations (sect. 4), constituency (sect. 5), and recursion (sect. 6). How universal are these features? We conclude that there are plenty of languages that do not exhibit them in their syntax. What does it mean for an alleged universal to not apply in a given case? We will consider the idea of “parameters” and the idea of UG as a “toolkit” (Jackendoff 2002). We then turn (sect. 7) to the question of how all this diversity is to be accounted for. We suggest, first, that linguistic diversity patterns just like biological diversity and should be understood in the same sorts of ways, with functional pressures and systems constraints engineering constant small changes. Finally (sect. 8), we advance seven theses about the nature of language as a recently evolved bio-cultural hybrid. We suggest that refocusing on a unique property of our communication system, namely its diversity, is essential to understanding its role in human cognition. 2. Language diversity A review of leading publications suggests that cognitive scientists are not aware of the real range of linguistic diversity. In Box 1, for example, is a list of features, taken from a BBS publication on the evolution of language, that all languages are supposed to have – “uncontroversial facts about substantive universals” (Pinker & Bloom 1990; a similar list is found in Pinker 1994). But none of these “uncontroversial facts” are true of all languages, as noted in the box.

Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals Box 1. “Every language has X, doesn’t it?”: Proposed substantive universals (from Pinker & Bloom 1990) supposedly common to all languages 1. “Major lexical categories (noun, verb, adjective, preposition)” (! sect. 2.2.4) 2. “Major phrasal categories (noun phrase, verb phrase, etc.)” (! sect. 5) 3. “Phrase structure rules (e.g., “X-bar theory” or “immediate dominance rules”)” (! sect. 5) 4. “Rules of linear order” to distinguish, for example, subject from object, or “case affixes” which “can take over these functions” (! sect. 5) 5. “Verb affixes” signaling “aspect” and “tense” (including pluperfects) (! sect. 2.2.3) 6. “Auxiliaries” 7. “Anaphoric elements” including pronouns and reflexives 8. “Wh-movement” There are clear counterexamples to each of these claims. Problems with the first three are discussed in section 2.2.4 and section 5; here are counterexamples to the others: (4) Some languages (e.g., Riau Indonesian) exhibit neither fixed word-order nor case-marking (Gil 2001). (5) Many languages (e.g., Chinese, Malay) do not mark tense (Comrie 1985, pp. 50– 55; Norman 1988, p. 163), and many (e.g., spoken German) lack aspect (Comrie 1976, p. 8). (6) Many languages lack auxiliaries (e.g., Kayardild, Bininj Gun-wok). (7) Many languages (e.g. Mwotlap; Franc¸ois 2005, p. 119) lack dedicated reflexive or reciprocal constructions altogether, so that “they hit them dead” can mean “they killed them,” “they killed themselves,” or “they killed each other” (Levinson 2000, p. 334 ff.). Some Southeast Asian languages lack clear personal pronouns, using titles (of the kind “honorable sir”) instead, and many languages lack third-person pronouns (Cysouw 2001). Sign languages like ASL (American Sign Language) also lack pronouns, using pointing instead. (8) Not all languages (e.g., Chinese, Japanese, Lakhota) move their wh-forms, saying, in effect, “You came to see who?” instead of “Who did you come to see _” (Van Valin & LaPolla 1997, pp. 424 – 25). Some further universalizing claims with counterevidence: (9) Verbs for “give” always have three arguments (Gleitman 1990); Saliba is a counterexample (Margetts 2007). (10) No recursion of case (Pinker & Bloom 1990). Kayardild has up to four layers (Evans 1995a; 1995c). (11) No languages have nominal tense (Pinker & Bloom 1990) – Nordlinger and Sadler (2004) give numerous counterexamples, such as Guarani “my house-FUTURE-FUTURE” “it will be my future house.” (12) All languages have numerals (Greenberg 1978b – Konstanz #527). See Everett (2005; Gordon 2004) for counterexample. (13) All languages have syntactic constituents, specifically NPs, whose semantic function is to express generalized quantifiers over the domain of discourse (Barwise & Cooper 1981 – Konstanz #1203); see Partee (1995) and sect. 5. See also collection of “rara” at: http://typo.uni-konstanz.de/rara/intro/index.php

The crucial fact for understanding the place of language in human cognition is its diversity. For example, languages may have less than a dozen distinctive sounds, or they may have 12 dozen, and sign languages do not use sounds at all. Languages may or may not have derivational morphology (to make words from other words, e.g., run . runner), or inflectional morphology for an obligatory set of syntactically consequential choices (e.g., plural the girls are vs. singular the girl is). They may or may not have constituent structure (building blocks of words that form phrases), may or may not have fixed orders of elements, and their semantic systems may carve the world at quite different joints. We detail all these dimensions of variation later, but the point here is this: We are the only known species whose communication system varies fundamentally in both form and content. Speculations about the evolution of language that do not take this properly into account thus overlook the criterial feature distinctive of the species. The diversity of language points to the general importance of cultural and technological adaptation in our species: language is a bio-cultural hybrid, a product of intensive gene:culture coevolution over perhaps the last 200,000 to 400,000 years (Boyd & Richerson 1985;

Enfield & Levinson 2006; Laland et al. 2000; Levinson & Jaisson 2006). Why should the cognitive sciences care about language diversity, apart from their stake in evolutionary questions? First, a proper appreciation of the diversity completely alters the psycholinguistic picture: What kind of language processing machine can handle all this variation? Not the conventional one, built to handle the parsing of European sound systems and the limited morphological and syntactic structures of familiar languages. Imagine a language where instead of saying, “This woman caught that huge butterfly,” one says, something like: “Thatobject thissubject hugeobject caught womansubject butterflyobject”; such languages exist (sect. 4). The parsing system for English cannot be remotely like the one for such a language: What then is constant about the neural implementation of language processing across speakers of two such different languages? Second, how do children learn languages of such different structure, indeed languages that vary in every possible dimension? Can there really be a fixed “language acquisition device”? These are the classic questions about how language capacities are implemented in the mind and in the brain, and the ballgame is BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5

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Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals fundamentally changed when the full range of language diversity is appreciated. The cognitive sciences have been partially immunized against the proper consideration of language diversity by two tenets of Chomskyan origin. The first is that the differences are somehow superficial, and that expert linguistic eyes can spot the underlying common constructional bedrock. This, at first a working hypothesis, became a dogma, and it is wrong, in the straightforward sense that the experts either cannot formulate it clearly, or do not agree that it is true. The second was an interesting intellectual program that proceeded on the hypothesis that linguistic variation is “parametric”; that is, that there are a restricted number of binary switches, which in different states project out the full set of possible combinations, explaining observed linguistic diversity (Chomsky 1981; see also Baker 2001). This hypothesis is now known to be false as well: its predictions about language acquisition, language change, and the implicational relations between linguistic variables simply fail (Newmeyer 2004; 2005). The conclusion is that the variation has to be taken at face value – there are fundamental differences in how languages work, with long historico-cultural roots that explain the many divergences. Once linguistic diversity is accepted for what it is, it can be seen to offer a fundamental opportunity for cognitive science. It provides a natural laboratory of variation in a fundamental skill – 7,000 natural experiments in evolving communicative systems, and as many populations of experts with exotic expertise. We can ask questions like: How much longer does it take a child to master 144 distinctive sounds versus 11? How do listeners actually parse a free word order language? How do speakers plan the encoding of visual stimuli if the semantic resources of the language make quite different distinctions? How do listeners break up the giant inflected words of a polysynthetic language? In Bininj Gun-wok (Evans 2003a), for instance, the single word abanyawoihwarrgahmarneganjginjeng can represent what, in English, would constitute an entire sentence: “I cooked the wrong meat for them again.” These resources offered by diversity have scarcely been exploited in systematic ways by the scientific community: We have a comparative psychology across species, but not a proper comparative psychology inside our own species in the central questions that drive cognitive science. 2.1. The current representation of languages in the world

Somewhere between 5,000 and 8,000 distinct languages are spoken today. How come we cannot be more precise? In part because there are definitional problems: When does a dialect difference become a language difference (the “languages” Czech and Slovak are far closer in structure and mutual intelligibility than so-called dialects of Chinese like Mandarin and Cantonese)? But mostly it is because academic linguists, especially those concerned with primary language description, form a tiny community, far outnumbered by the languages they should be studying, each of which takes the best part of a lifetime to master. Less than 10% of these languages have decent descriptions (full grammars and dictionaries). Consequently, nearly all generalizations about what is possible 432

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in human languages are based on a maximal 500 languages sample (in practice, usually much smaller – Greenberg’s famous universals of language were based on 30), and almost every new language description still guarantees substantial surprises. Ethnologue, the most dependable worldwide source (http://www.ethnologue.com/), reckons that 82% of the world’s 6,912 languages are spoken by populations under 100,000, 39% by populations under 10,000. These small speaker numbers indicate that much of this diversity is endangered. Ethnologue lists 8% as nearly extinct, and a language dies every two weeks. This loss of diversity, as with biological species, drastically narrows our scientific understanding of what makes a possible human language. Equally important as the brute numbers are the facts of relatedness. The number of language families is crucial to the search for universals, because typologists want to test hypotheses against a sample of independent languages. The more closely two languages are related, the less independent they are as samplings of the design space. The question of how many distinct phylogenetic groupings are found across the world’s languages is highly controversial, although Nichols’ (1992) estimate of 300 “stocks” is reasonable, and each stock itself can have levels of divergence that make deep-time relationship hard to detect (English and Bengali within Indo-European; Hausa and Hebrew within Afroa-Asiatic). In addition, there are more than 100 isolates, languages with no proven affiliation whatsoever. A major problem for the field is that we currently have no way of demonstrating higher-level phylogenetic groupings that would give us a more principled way of selecting a maximally independent sample for a set smaller than these 300 to 400 groups. This may become more tractable with the application of modern cladistic techniques (Dunn et al. 2005; Gray & Atkinson 2003; McMahon & McMahon 2006), but such methods have yet to be fully adopted by the linguistic community. Suppose then that we think of current linguistic diversity as represented by 7,000 languages falling into 300 or 400 groups. Five hundred years ago, before the expansion of Western colonization, there were probably twice as many. Because most surviving languages are spoken by small ethnic groups, language death continues apace. If we project back through time, there have probably been at least half a million human languages (Pagel 2000), so what we now have is a non-random sample of less than 2% of the full range of human linguistic diversity. It would be nice to at least be in the position to exploit that sample, but in fact, as mentioned, we have good information for only 10% of that. The fact is that at this stage of linguistic inquiry, almost every new language that comes under the microscope reveals unanticipated new features. 2.2. Some dimensions of diversity

In this section we illustrate some of the surprising dimensions of diversity in the world’s languages. We show how languages may or may not be in the articulatory-auditory channel, and if they are how their inventories of contrastive sounds vary dramatically, how they may or may not have morphologies (processes of word derivation or inflection), how varied they can be in syntactic structure or their inventory of word classes, and how varied are the semantic distinctions which they encode. We can do no more here

Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals than lightly sample the range of diversity, drawing attention to a few representative cases. 2.2.1. Sound inventories. We start by noting that some

natural human languages do not have sound systems at all. These are the sign languages of the deaf. Just like spoken languages, many of these have developed independently around the world, wherever a sufficient intercommunicating population of deaf people has arisen, usually as a result of a heritable condition. (Ethnologue, an online inventory of languages, lists 121 documented sign languages, but there are certainly many more.) These groups can constitute both significant proportions of local populations and substantial populations in absolute terms: in India there are around 1.5 million signers. They present interesting, well-circumscribed models of gene-culture coevolution (Aoki & Feldman 1994; Durham 1991): Without the strain of hereditary deafness, the cultural adaptation would not exist, whereas the cultural adaptation allows signers to lead normal lives, productive and reproductive, thus maintaining the genetic basis for the adaptation. The whole evolutionary background to sign languages remains fascinating but obscure – were humans endowed, as Hauser (1997, p. 245) suggests, with a capability unique in the animal world to switch their entire communication system between just two modalities, or (as the existence of touch languages of the blind-deaf suggest) is the language capacity modality-neutral? There have been two hundred years of speculation that sign languages may be the evolutionary precursors to human speech, a view recently revived by the discovery of mirror-neurons (Arbib 2005). An alternative view is that language evolved from a modality-hybrid communication system in which hand and mouth both participated, as they do today in both spoken and signed languages (cf. Sandler 2009). Whichever evolutionary scenario you favor, the critical point here is that sign languages are an existence proof of the modality-plastic nature of our language capacity. At a stroke, therefore, they invalidate such generalizations as “all natural languages have oral vowels,” although at some deeper level there may well be analogies to be drawn: signs have a basic temporal organization of “move and hold” which parallels the rhythmic alternation of vowels and consonants. Returning to spoken languages, the vocal tract itself is the clearest evidence for the biological basis for language – the lowering of the larynx and the right-angle in the windpipe have been optimized for speaking at the expense of running and with some concomitant danger of choking (Lenneberg 1967). Similar specializations exist in the auditory system, with acuity tuned just to the speech range, and, more controversially, specialized neural pathways for speech analysis. These adaptations of the peripheral input/output systems for spoken language have, for some unaccountable reason, been minimized in much of the discussion of language origins, in favor of an emphasis on syntax (see, for example, Hauser et al. 2002). The vocal tract and the auditory system put strong constraints on what an articulatorily possible and perceptually distinguishable speech sound is. Nevertheless, the extreme range of phonemic (distinctive sound) inventories, from 11 to 144, is already a telling fact about

linguistic diversity (Maddieson 1984). Jakobson’s distinctive features – binary values on a limited set of (largely) acoustic parameters – were meant to capture the full set of possible speech sounds. They were the inspiration for the Chomskyan model of substantive universals, a constrained set of alternates from which any particular language will select just a few. But as we get better information from more languages, sounds that we had thought were impossible to produce or impractical to distinguish keep turning up. Take the case of double-articulations, where a consonantal closure is made in more than one place. On the basis of evidence then available, Maddieson (1983) concluded that contrastive labial-alveolar consonants (making a sound like “b” at the same time as a sound like “d”) were not a possible segment in natural language on auditory grounds. But it was then discovered that the Papuan language Ye´lıˆ Dnye makes a direct contrast between a coarticulated “tp,” and a “tp” where the t ˙ is further back towards the palate (Ladefoged & Maddie-˙ son 1996, pp. 344 –45; Maddieson & Levinson, in preparation). As more such rarities accrue, experts on sound systems are abandoning the Jakobsonian idea of a fixed set of parameters from which languages draw their phonological inventories, in favor of a model where languages can recruit their own sound systems from fine phonetic details that vary in almost unlimited ways (see also Mielke 2007; Pierrehumbert et al. 2000): Do phoneticians generally agree with phonologists that we will eventually arrive at a fixed inventory of possible human speech sounds? The answer is no. (Port & Leary 2005, p. 927)

And, Languages can differ systematically in arbitrarily fine phonetic detail. This means we do not want to think about universal phonetic categories, but rather about universal phonetic resources, which are organized and harnessed by the cognitive system . . . . The vowel space – a continuous physical space rendered useful by the connection it establishes between articulation and perception – is also a physical resource. Cultures differ in the way they divide up and use this physical resource. (Pierrehumbert 2000, p. 12)

2.2.2. Syllables and the “CV” universal. The default expectation of languages is that they organize their sounds into an alternating string of more versus less sonorant segments, creating a basic rhythmic alternation of sonorous vowels (V) and less sonorous consonants (C). But beyond this, a further constraint was long believed to be universal: that there was a universal preference for CV syllables (like law /l :/ or gnaw /n :/) over VC syllables (like awl / :l/ or awn / :n/). The many ways in which languages organize their syllable structures allows the setting up of implicational (if/then) statements which effectively find order in the exuberant variation: No language will allow VC if it does not also allow CV, or allow V if it does not also allow CV: CV . V . VC

This long-proclaimed conditional universal (Jakobson & Halle 1956; cf. Clements & Keyser 1983; Jakobson 1962) has as corollary the maximal onset principle (Blevins 1995, p. 230): a /. . ..VCV. . ../ string will universally be syllabified as /. . .V-CV. . ./. An obvious advantage such a BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5

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Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals universal principle would give the child is that it can go right in and parse strings into syllables from first exposure. But in 1999, Breen and Pensalfini published a clear demonstration that Arrernte organizes its syllables around a VC(C) structure and does not permit consonantal onsets (Breen & Pensalfini 1999). With the addition of this one language to our sample, the CV syllable gets downgraded from absolute universal to a strong tendency, and the status of the CV assumption in any model of UG must be revised. If CV syllables really were inviolable rules of UG, Arrernte would then be unlearnable, yet children learn Arrernte without difficulty. At best, then, the child may start with the initial hypothesis of CVs, and learn to modify it when faced with Arrernte or other such languages. But in that case we are talking about initial heuristics, not about constraints on possible human languages. The example also shows, as is familiar from the history of mathematical induction (as with the Gauss-Riemann hypothesis regarding prime number densities), that an initially plausible pattern turns out not to be universal after all, once the range of induction is sufficiently extended. 2.2.3. Morphology. Morphological differences are among

the most obvious divergences between languages, and linguistic science has been aware of them since the Spanish encountered Aztec and other polysynthetic languages in sixteenth-century Mexico, while half a world away the Portuguese were engaging with isolating languages in Vietnam and China. Isolating languages, of course, lack all the inflectional affixes of person, number, tense, and aspect, as well as systematic word derivation processes. They even lack the rather rudimentary morphology of English words like boy-s or kiss-ed, using just the root and getting plural and past-tense meanings either from context or from other independent words. Polysynthetic languages go overboard in the other direction, packing whole English sentences into a single word, as in Cayuga E˛skakheh na’ta´ye˛thwahs “I will plant potatoes for them again” (Evans & Sasse 2002). Clearly, children learning such languages face massive challenges in picking out what the “words” are that they must learn. They must also learn a huge set of rules for morphological composition, since the number of forms that can be built from a small set of lexical stems may run into the millions (Hankamer 1989). But if these very long words function as sentences, perhaps there’s no essential difference: perhaps, for example, the Cayuga morpheme -h na- for “potatoes” in the word above is just a word-internal direct object as Baker (1993; 1996) has claimed. However, the parallels turn out to be at best approximate. For example, the pronominal affixes and incorporated nouns do not need to be referential. The prefix ban- in Bininj Gun-wok ka-bandung [she-them-scolds] is only superficially like its English free-pronoun counterpart, since kabandung can mean both “she scolds them” and “she scolds people in general” (Evans 2002). It seems more likely, then, that much of the obvious typological difference between polysynthetic languages and more moderately synthetic languages like English or Russian needs to be taken at face value: the vast difference in morphological complexity 434

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is mirrored by differences in grammatical organization right through to the deepest levels of how meaning is organized. 2.2.4. Syntax and word-classes. Purported syntactic uni-

versals lie at the heart of most claims regarding UG, and we hold off discussing these in detail until sections 4 through 6. As a warm-up, though, we look at one fundamental issue: word-classes, otherwise known as parts of speech. These are fundamental to grammar, because the application of grammatical rules is made general by formulating them over word-classes. If we say that in English adjectives precede but cannot follow the nouns they modify (the rich man but not  the man rich), we get a generalization that holds over an indefinitely large set of phrases, because both adjectives and nouns are “open classes” that in principle are always extendable by new members. But to stop it generating  the nerd zappy we need to know that nerd is a noun, not an adjective, and that zappy is an adjective, not a noun. To do this we need to find a clearly delimited set of distinct behaviors, in their morphology and their syntax, that allows us to distinguish noun and adjective classes, and to determine which words belong to which class. Now it has often been assumed that, across all languages, the major classes – those that are essentially unlimited in their membership – will always be the same “big four”: nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs. But we now know that this is untenable when we consider the cross-linguistic evidence. Many languages lack an open adverb class (Hengeveld 1992), making do with other forms of modification. There are also languages like Lao with no adjective class, encoding property concepts as a sub-sub-type of verbs (Enfield 2004). If a language jettisons adjectives and adverbs, the last stockade of word-class difference is that between nouns and verbs. Could a language abolish this and just have a single word-class of predicates (like predicate calculus)? Here controversy still rages among linguists as the bar for evidence of single-class languages keeps getting raised, with some purported cases (e.g., Mundari) falling by the wayside (Evans & Osada 2005). For many languages of the Philippines and the Pacific Northwest Coast, the argument has run back and forth for nearly a century, with the relevant evidence becoming ever more subtle, but still no definitive consensus has been reached. A feeling for what a language without a noun-verb distinction is like comes from Straits Salish. Here, on the analysis by Jelinek (1995), all major-class lexical items simply function as predicates, of the type “run,” “be_big,” or “be_a_man.” They then slot into various clausal roles, such as argument (“the one such that he runs”), predicate (“run[s]”), and modifier (“the running [one]”), according to the syntactic slots they are placed in. The single open syntactic class of predicate includes words for events, entities, and qualities. When used directly as predicates, all appear in clause-initial position, followed by subject and/or object clitics. When used as arguments, all lexical stems are effectively converted into relative clauses through the use of a determiner, which must be employed whether the predicate-word refers to an event (“the [ones who] sing”), an entity (“the [one which is a] fish”), or even a proper name (“the [one which] is Eloise”). The square-bracketed material shows what we

Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals need to add to the English translation to convert the reading in the way the Straits Salish structure lays out. There are thus languages without adverbs, languages without adjectives, and perhaps even languages without a basic noun-verb distinction. In the other direction, we now know that there are other types of major word-class – e.g., ideophones, positionals, and coverbs – that are unfamiliar to Indo-European languages. Ideophones typically encode cross-modal perceptual properties – they holophrastically depict the sight, sound, smell, or feeling of situations in which the event and its participants are all rolled together into an undissected gestalt. They are usually only loosely integrated syntactically, being added into narratives as independent units to spice up the color. Examples from Mundari (Osada 1992) are ribuy-tibuy, “sound, sight, or motion of a fat person’s buttocks rubbing together as they walk,” and rawa-dawa, “the sensation of suddenly realizing you can do something reprehensible, and no-one is there to witness it.” Often ideophones have special phonological characteristics, such as vowel changes to mark changes in size or intensity, special reduplication patterns, and unusual phonemes or tonal patterns. (Note that English words like willy-nilly or heeby-jeebies may seem analogous, but they differ from ideophones in all being assimilated to other pre-existing word classes, here adverb and noun.) Positionals describe the position and form of persons and objects (Ameka & Levinson 2007). These are widespread in Mayan languages (Bohnemeyer & Brown 2007; Brown 1994; England 2001; 2004). Examples from Tzeltal include latz’al, “of flat items, arranged in vertical stack”; chepel, “be located in bulging bag,” and so on. Positionals typically have special morphological and syntactic properties. Coverbs are a further open class outside the “big four.” Such languages as Kalam (PNG; Pawley 1993) or the Australian language Jaminjung (Schultze-Berndt 2000) have only around 20 to 30 inflecting verbs, but they form detailed event-descriptors by combining inflecting verbs with an open class of coverbs. Unlike positionals or ideophones, coverbs are syntactically integrated with inflecting verbs, with which they cross-combine in ways that largely need to be learned individually. In Jaminjung, for example, the coverb dibird, “wound around” can combine with yu, “be,” to mean “be wound around,” and with angu, “get/handle,” to mean “tangle up.” (English “light verbs,” as in take a train or do lunch, give a feel for the phenomenon, but of course train and lunch are just regular nouns.) Classifiers are yet another word class unforeseen by the categories of traditional grammar – whether “numeral classifiers” in East Asian and Mesoamerican languages that classify counted objects according to shape, or the hand-shape classifiers in sign languages that represent the involved entity through a schematized representation of its shape. And further unfamiliar word classes are continuously being unearthed that respect only the internal structural logic of previously undescribed languages. Even when typologists talk of “ideophones,” “classifiers,” and so forth, these are not identical in nature across the languages that exhibit them – rather we are dealing with family-resemblance phenomena: no two languages have any word classes that are exactly alike in morphosyntactic properties or range of meanings (Haspelmath 2007).

Once again, then, the great variability in how languages organize their word-classes dilutes the plausibility of the innatist UG position. Just which word classes are supposed to be there in the learning child’s mind? We would need to postulate a start-up state with an ever-longer list of initial categories (adding ideophones, positionals, coverbs, classifiers, etc.), many of which will never be needed. And, because syntactic rules work by combining these wordclass categories – “projecting” word-class syntax onto the larger syntactic assemblages that they head – each wordclass we add to the purported universal inventory would then need its own accompanying set of syntactic constraints. 2.2.5. Semantics. There is a persistent strand of thought,

articulated most forcefully by Fodor (1975), that languages directly encode the categories we think in, and moreover that these constitute an innate, universal “language of thought” or “mentalese.” As Pinker (1994, p. 82) put it, “Knowing a language, then, is knowing how to translate mentalese into strings of words and vice versa. People without a language would still have mentalese, and babies and many nonhuman animals presumably have simpler dialects.” Learning a language, then, is simply a matter of finding out what the local clothing is for universal concepts we already have (Li & Gleitman 2002). The problem with this view is that languages differ enormously in the concepts that they provide ready-coded in grammar and lexicon. Languages may lack words or constructions corresponding to the logical connectives “if” (Guugu Yimithirr) or “or” (Tzeltal), or “blue” or “green” or “hand” or “leg” (Ye´lıˆ Dnye). There are languages without tense, without aspect, without numerals, or without third-person pronouns (or even without pronouns at all, in the case of most sign languages). Some languages have thousands of verbs; others only have thirty (Schultze-Berndt 2000). Lack of vocabulary may sometimes merely make expression more cumbersome, but sometimes it effectively limits expressibility, as in the case of languages without numerals (Gordon 2004). In the other direction, many languages make semantic distinctions we certainly would never think of making. So Kiowa, instead of a plural marker on nouns, has a marker that means roughly “of unexpected number”: on an animate noun like “man” it means “two or more,” on a word like “leg,” it means “one or more than two,” and on “stone,” it means “just two” (Mithun 1999, p. 81). In many languages, all statements must be coded (e.g., in verbal affixes) for the sources of evidence; for example, in Central Pomo, whether I saw it, perceived it in another modality (tactile, auditory), was told about it, inferred it, or know that it is an established fact (Mithun 1999, p. 181). Kwakwala insists on referents being coded as visible or not (Anderson & Keenan 1985). Athabaskan languages are renowned for their classificatory verbs, forcing a speaker to decide between a dozen categories of objects (e.g., liquids, rope-like objects, containers, flexible sheets) before picking one of a set of alternate verbs of location, giving, handling, and so on (Mithun 1999, p. 106 ff.). Australian languages force their speakers to pay attention to intricate kinship relations between participants in the discourse – in many to use a pronoun you must first work out whether the referents are in even- or BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5

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Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals odd-numbered generations with respect to one another, or related by direct links through the male line. On top of this, many have special kin terms that triangulate the relation between speaker, hearer, and referent, with meanings like “the one who is my mother and your daughter, you being my maternal grandmother” (Evans 2003b). Spatial concepts are an interesting domain to compare languages in, because spatial cognition is fundamental to any animal – and if Fodor is right anywhere, it should be here. But, in fact, we find fundamental differences in the semantic parameters languages use to code space. For example, there are numerous languages without notions of “left of,” “right of,” “back of,” “front of ” – words meaning “right hand” or “left hand” are normally present, but don’t generalize to spatial description. How then does one express, for example, that the book you are looking for is on the table left of the window? In most of these languages by saying that it lies on the table north of the window – that is, by using geographic rather than egocentric coordinates. Research shows that speakers remember the location in terms of the coordinate system used in their language, not in terms of some fixed, innate mentalese (see Levinson 2003; Majid et al. 2004). Linguists often distinguish between closed-class or function words (like the, of, in, which play a grammatical role) and open-class items or general vocabulary which can be easily augmented by new coinages or borrowing. Some researchers claim that closed-class items reveal a recurrent set of semantic distinctions, whereas the open-class items may be more culture-specific (Talmy 2000). Others claim effectively just the reverse, that relational vocabulary (as in prepositions) is much more abstract, and thus prone to cultural patterning, whereas the open-class items (like nouns) are grounded in concrete reality, and thus less cross-linguistically variable (Gentner & Boroditsky 2001). In fact, neither of these views seems correct, for both ends of the spectrum are cross-linguistically variable. Consider, for example, the difference between nouns and spatial prepositions. Landau and Jackendoff (1993) claimed that this difference corresponds to the nature of the so-called what versus where systems in neurocognition: nouns are “whaty” in that their meanings code detailed features of objects, while prepositions are “wherey” in that they encode abstract, geometric properties of spatial relations. These researchers thus felt able to confidently predict that there would be no preposition or spatial relator encoding featural properties of objects, for example, none meaning “through a cigarshaped object” (Landau & Jackendoff 1993, p. 226). But the Californian language Karuk has precisely such a spatial verbal prefix, meaning “in through a tubular space” (Mithun 1999, p. 142)! More systematic examination of the inventories of spatial pre- and post-positions shows that there is no simple universal inventory, and the meanings can be very specific; for example, “in a liquid,” “astraddle,” “fixed by spiking” (Levinson & Meira 2003) – or distinguish “to (a location below)” versus “to (a location above)” versus “to (a location on a level with the speaker).” Nor do nouns always have the concrete sort of reference we expect – for example, in many languages nouns tend to have a mass or “stuff”-like reference (meaning, e.g., any stuff composed of banana genotype, or anything made of wax), and do not inherently refer to bounded entities. In such languages, it takes a noun and a classifier (Lucy 1992), or a noun and a classificatory verb (Brown 1994), 436

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to construct a meaning recognizable to us as “banana” or “candle.” In the light of examples like these, the view that “linguistic categories and structures are more or less straightforward mappings from a pre-existing conceptual space programmed into our biological nature” (Li & Gleitman 2002, p. 266) looks quite implausible. Instead, languages reflect cultural preoccupations and ecological interests that are a direct and important part of the adaptive character of language and culture.

3. Linguistic universals The prior sections have illustrated the surprising range of cross-linguistic variability at every level of language, from sound to meaning. The more we discover about languages, the more diversity we find. Clearly, this ups the ante in the search for universals. There have been two main approaches to linguistic universals. The first, already mentioned, is the Chomskyan approach, where UG denotes structural principles which are complex and implicit enough to be unlearnable from finite exposure. Chomsky thus famously once held that language universals could be extracted from the study of a single language: I have not hesitated to propose a general principle of linguistic structure on the basis of observation of a single language. The inference is legitimate, on the assumption that humans are not specifically adapted to learn one rather than another human language. . . . Assuming that the genetically determined language faculty is a common human possession, we may conclude that a principle of language is universal if we are led to postulate it as a “precondition” for the acquisition of a single language. (Chomsky 1980, p. 48)1

Chomsky (1965, pp. 27– 30) influentially distinguished between substantive and formal universals. Substantive universals are drawn from a fixed class of items (e.g., distinctive phonological features, or word classes like noun, verb, adjective, and adverb). No particular language is required to exhibit any specific member of a class. Consequently, the claim that property X is a substantive universal cannot be falsified by finding a language without it, because the property is not required in all of them. Conversely, suppose we find a new language with property Y, hitherto unexpected: we can simply add it to the inventory of substantive universals. Jackendoff (2002, p. 263) nevertheless holds “the view of Universal Grammar as a “toolkit” . . . : beyond the absolute universal bare minimum of concatenated words . . . languages can pick and choose which tools they use, and how extensively.” But without limits on the toolkit, UG is unfalsifiable. Formal universals specify abstract constraints on the grammar of languages (e.g., that they have specific rule types or cannot have rules that perform specific operations). To give a sense of the kind of abstract constraints in UG, consider the proposed constraint called Subjacency (see Newmeyer 2004, p. 537 ff.). This is an abstract principle meant to explain the difference between the grammaticality of the sentence (6) and (7), below, versus the ungrammaticality (marked by an asterisk) of sentence (8): (6) Where did John say that we had to get off the bus? (7) Did John say whether we had to get off the bus? (8)  Where did John say whether we had to get off the bus?

Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals The child somehow has to extrapolate that (6) and (7) are okay, but (8) is not, without ever being explicitly told that (8) is ungrammatical. This induction is argued to be impossible, necessitating an underlying and innate principle that forbids the formation of wh-questions if a whphrase intervenes between the “filler” (initial wh-word) and the “gap” (the underlying slot for the wh-word). This presumes a movement rule pulling a wh-phrase out of its underlying position and putting it at the front of the sentence as shown in (9): (9)  Where did John say whether we had to get off the bus ____? However, it turns out that this constraint does not work in Italian or Russian in the same way, and theorists have had to assume that children can learn the specifics of the constraint after all, although we do not know how (Newmeyer 2004; Van Valin & LaPolla 1997, p. 615 ff.). This shows the danger of extrapolations from a single language to unlearnable constraints. Each constraint in UG needs to be taken as no more than a working hypothesis, hopefully sufficiently clearly articulated that it could be falsified by cross-linguistic data. But what counts as falsification of these often abstract principles? Consider the so-called Binding Conditions, proposed as elements of Universal Grammar in the 1980s (see Koster & May 1982). One element (condition A) specifies that anaphors (reflexives and reciprocals) must be bound in their governing category, whereas a second (condition B) states that (normal nonreflexive) pronouns must be free in their governing category. These conditions were proposed to account for the English data in (10a – c) and comparable data in many other languages (the subscripts keep track of what each term refers to). The abstract notion of “bound” is tied to a particular type of constituent-based syntactic representation where the subject “commands” the object (owing to its position in a syntactic tree) rather than the other way round, and reflexives are sensitive to this command. Normal pronouns pick up their reference from elsewhere and so cannot be used in a “bound” position. (10a) Johnx saw himy. (disjoint reference) (10b) Johnx saw himselfx (conjoint reference) (10c)  Himselfx saw Johnx/himx. This works well for English and hundreds, perhaps thousands, of other languages, but it does not generalize to languages where you get examples as in (11a, b) (to represent their structures in a pseudo-English style). (11a) Hex saw himx,y (11b) Theyx,y saw thema,b/x,y/y,x. Many languages (even Old English; see Levinson 2000) allow sentences like (11a) and (11b): the same pronouns can either have disjoint reference (shown as “a,b”), conjoint reference (“x,y”) or commuted conjoint reference (“y,x,” corresponding to “each other” in English). Does this falsify the Binding Principles? Not necessarily, would be a typical response in the generativist position – it may be that there are really two distinct pronouns (a normal pronoun and a reflexive, say) which just happen to have the same form, but can arguably be teased apart in other ways (see, e.g., Chung [1989] on Chamorro). But it is all too easy for such an abstract analysis to presuppose precisely what is being tested, dismissing seeming counterexamples and rendering the claims unfalsifiable. The lack of shared rules of argumentation means that

the field as a whole has not kept a generally accepted running score of which putative universals are left standing. In short, it has proven extremely hard to come up with even quite abstract generalizations that don’t run afoul of the cross-linguistic facts. This doesn’t mean that such generalizations won’t ultimately be found, nor that there are no genetic underpinnings for language – there certainly are.2 But, to date, strikingly little progress has been made. We turn now to the other approach to universals, stemming from the work of Greenberg (1963a; 1963b), which directly attempts to test linguistic universals against the diversity of the world’s languages. Greenberg’s methods crystallized the field of linguistic typology, and his empirical generalizations are sometimes called Greenbergian universals. First, importantly, Greenberg discounted features of language that are universal by definition – that is, we would not call the object in question a language if it lacked these properties (Greenberg et al. 1963, p. 73). Thus, many of what Hockett (1963) called the “design features” of language are excluded – for example, discreteness, arbitrariness, productivity, and the duality of patterning achieved by combining meaningless elements at one level (phonology) to construct meaningful elements (morphemes or words) at another.3 We can add other functional features that all languages need in order to be adequately expressive instruments (e.g., the ability to indicate negative or prior states of affairs, to question, to distinguish new from old information, etc.). Second, Greenberg (1960, see also Comrie 1989: 17–23) distinguished the different types of universal statement laid out in Table 1 (the terminology may differ slightly across sources): Although all of these types are universals in the sense that they employ universal quantification over languages, their relations to notions of “universal grammar” differ profoundly. Type 1 statements are true of all languages, though not tautological by being definitional of languagehood. This is the category which cognitive scientists often imagine is filled by rich empirical findings from a hundred years of scientific linguistics – indeed Greenberg (1986, p. 14) recollects how Osgood challenged him to produce such universals, saying that these would be of fundamental interest to psychologists. This started Greenberg Table 1. Logical types of universal statement (following Greenberg) Absolute (exceptionless)

Statistical (tendencies)

Unconditional Type 1. “Unrestricted (unrestricted) absolute universals” All languages have property X

Type 2. “Unrestricted tendencies” Most languages have property X

Conditional (restricted)

Type 4. “Statistical implicational universals” If a language has property X, it will tend to have property Y

Type 3. “Exceptionless implicational universals” If a language has property X, it also has property Y

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Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals Box 2. The challenge of sign languages Many proposed universals of language ignore the existence of sign languages – the languages of the deaf, now recognized to be full-blown languages of independent origin (Klima & Bellugi 1979). Studies of, for example, American Sign Language, British Sign Language, and Indo-Pakistani Sign Language (Zeshan 2002) show that these are unrelated, complex systems of their own. They can even be said to have “phonologies” – patterns of hand shape, facial expression, and so on, which, although individually meaningless, can be combined to make morphemes or words (Padden & Perlmutter 1987). The typology of sign languages is in its infancy (see, e.g., Perniss et al. 2008; Perniss & Zeshan 2008; Schwager & Zeshan 2008; Zeshan 2006a; 2006b). The Ethnologue lists 121 sign languages, but there are certainly many not yet listed. The major sign languages show some typological similarities, but the smaller ones, only now coming under scrutiny, are typologically diverse (see, e.g., Meir et al., in press). Sign languages offer a model “organism” for understanding the relation between biological and cultural aspects of language (Aoki & Feldman 1994). They also offer unique opportunities to study the emergence of new languages under different conditions: (a) where home-signers (Goldin-Meadow 2003) are congregated and a sign language emerges among themselves, as in Nicaragua (Senghas et al. 2004); and (b) where a localized hereditary deaf population lives among hearers who also sign, as in Bali (Marsaja 2008) or in a Bedouin group in Israel (Sandler et al. 2005). These studies show that although word order constraints may show early, it may take three generations or more to evolve syntactic embedding and morphology. When due allowance is made for the manual-visual interface, sign languages seem to be handled by the same specialized brain structures as spoken ones, with parallel aphasias, similar developmental trajectories (e.g., infants “babble” in sign), and similar processing strategies as spoken languages (see Emmorey 2002). The neurocognition of sign does not look, for example, like the neurocognition of gesture, but instead recruits, for example, auditory cortex (MacSweeney et al. 2002; Nishimura et al. 1999). These results show that our biological endowment for language is by no means restricted to the input/output systems of a particular modality.

on a search that ended elsewhere, and he rapidly came to realize “the meagreness and relative triteness of statements that were simply true of all languages” (Greenberg 1986, p. 15): Assuming that it was important to discover generalizations which were valid for all languages, would not such statements be few in number and on the whole quite banal? Examples would be that languages had nouns and verbs (although some linguists denied even that) or that all languages had sound systems and distinguished between phonetic vowels and consonants. (Greenberg 1986, p. 14)

To this day, the reader will find no agreed list of Type 1 universals (see Box 1). This more or less empty box is why the emperor of Universal Grammar has no clothes. Textbooks such as those by Comrie (1989), Whaley (1997), and Croft (2003) are almost mum on the subject, and what they do provide is more or less the same two or three examples. For the longest available list of hypotheses, see the online resources at the Konstanz Universals Archive (http://ling.uni-konstanz.de:591/Universals). The most often cited absolute unrestricted universals are that all languages distinguish nouns and verbs (discussed earlier) and that all languages have vowels. The problem with the notion “all languages have vowels” is that it does not extend to sign languages (see Box 2), as already mentioned. A second problem is that, for spoken languages, if the statement is taken at a phonetic level, it is true, but for trivial reasons: they would otherwise scarcely be audible. A third problem is that, if taken as a phonological claim that all languages have distinctive vowel segments, it is in fact contested: There are some languages, notably of the Northwestern Caucasus, where the quality of the vowel segments was long maintained by many linguists to be entirely predictable from the consonantal context (see Colarusso 1982; 438

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Halle 1970; Kuipers 1960), and although most scholars have now swung round to recognizing two contrasting vowels, the evidence for this hangs on the thread of a few minimal pairs, mostly loanwords from Turkish or Arabic. This example illustrates the problems with making simple, interesting statements that are true of all languages. Most straightforward claims are simply false – see Box 1. The fact is that it is a jungle out there: languages differ in fundamental ways – in their sound systems (even whether they have one), in their grammar, and in their semantics. Hence, the very type of universal that seems most interesting to psychologists was rapidly rejected as the focus of research by Greenberg. Linguistic typologists make a virtue out of the necessity to consider other kinds of universals. Conditional or implicational universals of Types 3 and 4 (i.e., of the kind “If a language has property X, it has [or tends to have] property Y”) allow us to make claims about the interrelation of two, logically independent parameters. Statements of this kind, therefore, greatly restrict the space of possible languages: interpreted as logical (material) conditionals, they predict that there are no languages with X that lack Y, where X and Y may not be obviously related at all. Here again, however, exceptionless or absolute versions are usually somewhat trite. For example, the following seem plausible: (12a) IF a language has nasal vowels, THEN it has oral vowels. (12b) IF a language has a trial number, THEN there is also a dual. IF there is a dual, THEN there is also a plural. Statement (12a) essentially expresses the markedness (or recessive character) of nasal vowels. However, most markedness universals are statistical, not absolute. Statement (12b) is really only about one parameter, namely

Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals number, and it is not really surprising that a language that morphologically marks pairs of things would want to be able to distinguish singular from plural or trial (i.e., more than two). Nevertheless, there is at least one language that counter-exemplifies: Basic verbs stems in Nen are dual, with non-duals indicated by a suffix meaning “either singular or three-or-more,” the singular and the plural sharing an inflection! But the main problem with absolute conditional universals is that, again and again (as just exemplified), they too have been shown to be false. In this sense conditional universals follow the same trajectory as unconditional ones, in that hypothesized absolute universals tend to become statistical ones as we sample languages more widely. For example, it was hypothesized as an unconditional universal (Greenberg 1966, p. 50) that all languages mark the negative by adding some morpheme to a sentence, but then we find that classical Tamil marks the negative by deleting the tense morphemes present in the positive (Master 1946; Pederson 1993). We can expect the same general story for conditional universals, except that, given the conditional restriction, it will take a larger overall database to falsify them. Again making a virtue out of a necessity, Dryer (1998) convincingly argues that statistical universals or strong tendencies are more interesting anyway. Although at first sight it seems that absolute implications are more easily falsifiable, the relevant test set is after all not the 7,000 odd languages we happen to have now, but the half million or so that have existed, not to mention those yet to come – because we never have all the data in hand, the one counterexample might never show up. In fact, Dryer points out, because linguistic types always empirically show a clustering with outliers, the chances of catching all the outliers are vanishingly small. The classical Tamil counterexample to negative marking strategies is a case in point: it is a real counterexample, but extremely rare. Given this distribution of phenomena, the methods have to be statistical. And as a matter of fact, nearly all work done in linguistic typology concerns Type 4 Universals (i.e., conditional tendencies). Where these tendencies are weak, they may reveal only bias in the current languages we have, or in the sampling methods employed. But where they are strong, they suggest that there is indeed a cognitive, communicative, or system-internal bias towards particular solutions evolving. With absolute universals, sampling is not an issue: just a single counterexample is needed, and linguists should follow whatever leads they need to find them. For this reason, and because many of the claimed universals we are targeting are absolute, we have not shied away in this article from hand-picking the clearest examples that illustrate our point. But with statistical universals, having the right sampling methods is crucial (Widmann & Bakker 2006), and many factors need to be controlled for. Language family (coinherited traits are not independent), language area (convergent traits are not independent), key organizational features (dominant phrase orders have knock-on effects elsewhere), other cultural aspects (speaker population size, whether there is a written language), modality (spoken vs. signed language), and quality of available descriptions all impact on the choice. Employing geographically separate areas is crucial to minimize the risk of convergent mutual influence, but even this

is contingent on our current very limited understanding of the higher-level phylogenetic relationships of the world’s languages: if languages in two distinct regions (say, inland Canada and Central Siberia) are found to be related, we can no longer assume these two areas supply independent samples. The long-term and not unachievable goal must be to have data on all existing languages, which should be the target for the language sciences. Where do linguistic universals, of whatever type, come from? We return to this issue in section 6, but here it is vital to point out that a property common to languages need not have its origins in a “language faculty,” or innate specialization for language. First, such a property could be due to properties of other mental capacities – memory, action control, sensory integration, and so on. Second, it could be due to overall design requirements of communication systems. For example, most languages seem to distinguish closed-class functional elements (cf. English the, some, should) from open-class vocabulary (cf. eat, dog, big), just as logics distinguish operators from other terms, allowing constancies in composition with open-ended vocabularies and facilitating parsing. Universals can also arise from so-called functional factors, that is to say, the machining of structure to fit the uses to which it would be put. For example, we can ask: Why are negatives usually marked in languages with a positive “not” morpheme rather than by a gap as in classical Tamil? Because (a) we make more positive than negative assertions, so it is more efficient to mark the less common negatives, and (b) it is crucial to distinguish what is said from its contrary, and a non-zero morpheme is less likely to escape notice than a gap. In addition, given human motivations, interests and sensory perception together with the shared world we live in, we can expect all sorts of convergences in, for example, vocabulary items – most if not all languages have kin terms, body part terms, words for celestial bodies. The appeal to innate concepts and structure should be a last resort (Tomasello 1995). Finally, a word needs to be said about the metalanguage in which typological (statistical) universals are couched. The terms employed are notions like subject, adjective, inflection, syllable, pronoun, noun phrase, and so on – more or less the vocabulary of “traditional grammar.” As we have seen, these are not absolute universals of Type 1. Rather, they are descriptive labels, emerging from structural facts of particular languages, which work well in some languages but may be problematic or absent in others (cf. Croft 2001). Consequently, for the most part they do not have precise definitions shared by all researchers, or equally applicable to all languages (Haspelmath 2007). Does this vitiate such research? Not necessarily: the descriptive botanist also uses many terms (“pinnate,” “thorn,” etc.) that have no precise definition. Likewise, linguists use notions like “subject” (sect. 4) in a prototype way: a prototypical subject has a large range of features (argument of the predication, controller of verb agreement, topic, etc.) which may not all be present in any particular case. The “family resemblance” character of the basic metalanguage is what underlies the essential nature of typological generalizations, namely that of soft regularities of association of traits. BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5

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Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals 4. How multiple constraints drive multiple solutions: Grammatical subject as a great (but not universal) idea We can use the notion of grammatical subject to illustrate the multi-constraint engineering problems languages face, the numerous independent but convergent solutions that cluster similar properties, and at the same time the occurrence of alternative solutions in a minority of other languages that weight competing design motivations differently. The “grammatical relations” of subject and object apply unproblematically to enough unrelated languages that Baker (2003) regards them as part of the invariant machinery of universal grammar. Indeed, many languages around the world have grammatical relations that map straightforwardly onto the clusterings of properties familiar from English “subject” and “object.” But linguists have also known for some time that the notion “subject” is far from universal, and other languages have come up with strikingly different solutions. The device of subject, whether in English, Warlpiri, or Malagasy, is a way of streamlining grammars to take advantage of the fact that three logically distinct tasks correlate statistically. In a sentence like “Mary is trying to finish her book,” the subject “Mary” is: (a) a topic – what the sentence is about; (b) an agent – the semantic role of the instigator of an action; (c) the “pivot” – the syntactic broker around which many grammatical properties coalesce Having a subject relation is an efficient way to organize a language’s grammar because it bundles up different subtasks that most often need to be done together. But languages also need ways to indicate when the properties do not coalesce. For example, when the subject is not an agent, this can be marked by the passive: John was kissed by Mary. “Subject” is thus a fundamentally useful notion for the analysis of many, probably most, languages. But when we look further we find many languages where the properties just described do not line up, and the notion “subject” can only be applied by so weakening the definition that it is near vacuous. For example, the semantic dimension of case role (agent, patient, recipient, etc.) and the discourse dimension of topic can be dissociated, with different grammatical mechanisms assigned to deal with each in a dedicated way: this is essentially how Tagalog works (Schachter 1976). Or a language may use its case system to reflect semantic roles more transparently, so that basic clause types have a plethora of different case arrays, rather than funnelling most event types down to a single transitive type, as in the Caucasian language Lezgian (Haspelmath 1993). Alternatively, a language may split the notion subject by funnelling all semantic roles into two main “macro-roles” – “actor” (a wider range of semantic roles than agent) and “undergoer” (corresponding to, e.g., the subject of English, John underwent heart surgery). The syntactic privileges we normally associate with subjects then get divided between these two distinct categories (as in Acehnese; Durie 1985). Finally, a language may plump for the advantages of rolling a wide range of syntactic properties together into a single syntactic broker or “pivot,” but go the opposite 440

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way to English, privileging the patient over the agent as the semantic role that gets the syntactic privileges of the pivot slot. Dyirbal (Dixon 1972; 1977) is famous for such “syntactic ergativity.” The whole of Dyirbal’s grammatical organization then revolves around this absolutive pivot – case marking, coordination, complex clause constructions. To illustrate with coordination, take the English sentence “The woman slapped the man and ø laughed.” The “gap” (represented here by a zero) is interpreted by linking it to the preceding subject, forcing the reading “and she laughed.” But in the Dyirbal equivalent, yibinggu yara bunjun ø miyandanyu, the gap is linked to the preceding absolutive pivot yara (corresponding to the English object, the man), and gets interpreted as “and he laughed.” Dyirbal, then, is like English in having a single syntactic “pivot” around which a whole range of constructions are organized. But it is unlike it in linking this pivot to the patient rather than the agent. Because this system probably strikes the reader as perverse, it is worth noting that a natural source is the fact that crosslinguistically most new referents are introduced in “absolutive” (S or O) roles (Dubois 1987), making this a natural attractor for unmarked case and thus a candidate for syntactic “pivot” status (see also Levinson, under review). Given languages like Dyirbal, Acehnese, or Tagalog, where the concepts of “subject” and “object” are dismembered in language-specific ways, it is clear that a child preequipped by UG to expect its language to have a “subject” could be sorely led astray. 5. The claimed universality of constituency In nearly all recent discussions of syntax for a general cognitive science audience, it is simply presumed that the syntax of natural languages can basically be expressed in terms of constituent structure, and thus the familiar tree diagrams for sentence structure (Hauser et al. 2002; Jackendoff 2002; 2003a; Pinker 1994, p. 97 ff.). In the recent debates following Hauser et al. (2002), there is sometimes a conflation between constituent structure and recursion (see, e.g., Pinker & Jackendoff 2005, p. 215), but they are potentially orthogonal properties of languages. There can be constituent structure without recursion, but there can also be hierarchical relations and recursion without constituency. We return to the issue of recursion in the next section, but here we focus on constituency. Constituency is the bracketing of elements (typically words) into higher-order elements (as in [[[[the][tall [man]]] [came]] where [[[the][tall [man]]] is a Noun Phrase, substitutable by a single element (he, or John). Many discussions presume that constituency is an absolute universal, exhibited by all languages. But in fact constituency is just one method, used by a subset of languages, to express constructions which in other languages may be coded as dependencies of other kinds (Matthews 1981; 2007). The need for this alternative perspective is that many languages show few traces of constituent structure, because they scramble the words, as in the following Latin line from Virgil (Matthews 1981, p. 255):

Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals

Here the lines link the parts of two noun phrases, and it makes no sense to produce a bracketing of the normal sort: a tree diagram of the normal kind would have crossing lines. A better representation is in terms of dependency – which parts depend on which other parts, as in the following diagram where the arrowhead points to the dependent item:

Classical Latin is a representative of a large class of languages, which exhibit free word order (not just free phrase order, which is much commoner still). The Australian languages are also renowned for these properties. In Jiwarli and Thalanyji, for example, all linked nominals (part of a noun phrase if there was such a thing) are marked with case and can be separated from each other; there is no evidence for a verb phrase, and there are no major constraints on ordering (see Austin & Bresnan 1996). Example (15) illustrates a discontinuous sequence of words in Thalanyji, which would correspond to a constituent in most European languages; “the woman’s dog” is grouped as a single semantic unit by sharing the accusative case. ð15Þ Kupuju-lu kaparla-nha yanga-lkin wartirra-ku-nha child-ERG dog-ACC chase-PRES woman-DAT-ACC ‘‘The child chases the woman’s dog.’’ (Austin 1995, p. 372)

Note how possessive modifiers – coded by a special use of the dative case – additionally pick up the case of the noun they modify, as with the accusative –nha on “dog” and “woman-Dat” in (15). In this way multiple case marking (Dench & Evans 1988) allows the grouping of elements from distinct levels of structure, such as embedded possessive phrases, even when they are not contiguous. It is this case-tagging, rather than grouping of words into constituents, which forms the basic organizational principle in many Australian languages (see Nordlinger 1998 for a formalization). It is even possible in Jiwarli to intermingle words that in English would belong to two distinct clauses, since the case suffixes function to match up the appropriate elements. These are tagged, as it were, with instructions like “I am object of the subordinate clause verb,” or “I am a possessive modifier of an object of a main clause verb.” By fishing out these distinct cases, a hearer can discern the structure of a two-clause sentence like “the child (ERG) is chasing the dog (ACC) of the woman (DAT-ACC) who is sitting down cooking meat (DAT)” without needing to attend to the order in which words

occur (Austin & Bresnan 1996). The syntactic structure here is most elegantly represented via a dependency formalism (supplemented with appropriate morphological features) rather than a constituency one. Although languages like Jiwarli have been increasingly well documented over the last forty years, syntactic theories developed in the English-speaking world have primarily focussed on constituency, no doubt because English fits this bill. In the Slavic world, by contrast, where languages like Russian have a structure much more like Jiwarli or Latin, models of syntactic relations have been largely based on dependency relations (Melcˇuk 1988). The most realistic view of the world’s languages is that some yield completely to one representational system, some to the other, most to a mix. Some outgrowths of generative theory, such as Lexical-Functional Grammar (LFG), effectively incorporate analogues of dependency representations alongside constituency-based ones, in the form of f-structures besides c-structures, with an interface system linking the two structures (see Bresnan 2001; Hudson 1993, p. 329). It is also worth emphasizing, at this point, that dependencybased representations are just as capable of expressing recursive structure as constituency-based ones are. A way of saving the claimed primacy of word order and constituency would be to impose an English-like structure on a sentence like the Latin one given earlier (reordered, say, as [ [ [[ultima][aetas]] [[carminis][Cumae]] ] [[iam] [venit]]] ) and then to scramble the words with a secondary operation (see Matthews 2007, for critical review). A more sophisticated variant is to separate out the hierarchical from the ordering information and specify them separately in a differently construed version of a Phrase Structure Grammar (PSG) (Gazdar & Pullum 1982). But the point is that order and constituency are playing no signalling role for the hearer – they cannot therefore play a role in the parsing of such a sentence. In all the recent applications in the cognitive sciences mentioned earlier, where recursion has played such an important theoretical role, the experimental evidence was from a comprehension or parsing perspective where the universality of constituency was assumed (Fitch & Hauser 2004; Friederici 2004). A further point is that there is not the slightest evidence for the psychological reality of any such imposed constituent structure in a language like Jiwarli. (Researchers on Australian languages have repeatedly reported the inability of speakers to repeat a sentence with the same word order: for Warlpiri “sentences containing the same content words in different linear arrangements count as repetitions of one another” [Hale 1983, p. 5] and “[w]hen asked to repeat an utterance, speakers depart from the ordering of the original more often than not” [Hale et al. 1995, p. 1431].) Syntactic constituency, then, is not a universal feature of languages.4 Just like dependency relations, it is simply one possible way to mark relationships between the parts of a sentence. Just like the grammatical relation of subject (sect. 5), employing constituency as a coding device is a common and workable solution that many languages have evolved, but it is totally absent in others, while in others again it is in the process of evolving without having yet quite crystallized (Himmelmann 1997). It follows that any suggestion about UG that presumes the universality of constituent structure will be false. Models of the evolution of language (e.g., Bickerton BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5

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Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals 1981) that presume the operation of phrase-structure grammar (PSG) generating sentences with surface constituency (Hauser et al., p. 1577) are also therefore aimed at a particular kind of (English-like) language as the target of evolutionary development. But it is clear that the child must be able to learn (at least) both types of system, constituency or dependency. It will not always be the case that the child needs to use constituency-detecting abilities in constructing its grammar, because constituency relations are, as shown, not universal. 6. Recursion in syntax as a non-universal We turn now to recursion, the feature which is at the heart of recent heated discussions: Indeed, Hauser et al. (p. 1569) hypothesize that recursion is “the only uniquely human component of the faculty of language.”5 Recent findings are said to show that “animals lack the capacity to create open-ended generative systems,” whereas human “languages go beyond purely local structure by including a capacity for recursive embedding of phrases within phrases” (Hauser et al. 2002, p. 1577). Recursion, in syntax, is commonly defined as the looping back into a set of rules of its own output, so as to produce a potentially infinite set of outputs. It is sometimes assumed in the debate that recursion is defined over constituent structure, in that recursion “consists of embedding a constituent in a constituent of the same type” (Pinker & Jackendoff 2005, p. 211). However, because dependency structures are also generated by rule, it is equally possible to have recursive structures that employ dependency relations rather than constituency structures (Levelt 2008, Vol 2, pp. 134 ff.). The terms of the debate were set fifty years ago by Chomsky (1955; 1957) when he introduced the hierarchy of formal languages, using methods from logic and mathematics, and applied them to constituent structure. He showed that English constituent structure could not be generated by a grammar limited to state transitions (a finite state grammar, or FSG). Rather, the indefinitely embedded structures of English required at least a phrase-structure grammar, or PSG, as in “If A, then B,” where A itself could be of the form “X and Y,” and “X” of the form “W or Z.” Taken as a whole, this generates structures like If John comes or Mary comes and Bill agrees, let’s go to the movies. Chomsky has consistently held that this recursion in constituent structure is the magic ingredient in language, which gives it its expressive power. Since then, a vast amount of work in theoretical linguistics has elaborated on the mathematical properties of abstract grammars (Gazdar et al. 1985; Partee et al. 1990), while many non-Chomskyan linguistic theories have moved beyond this syntactic focus, developing models of language that reapportion generativity to other components of grammar (see, e.g., Bresnan 2001; Jackendoff 2003a; 2003b). But recently this classic “syntactocentricism” (as Jackendoff [2003b] has called it), never relinquished by Chomsky, has re-emerged centrally in interdisciplinary discussions about the evolution of language, re-enlivened by Hauser et al.’s (2002) proposal that the property of recursion over constituent structures represents the only key design feature of language that is unique to humans: sound systems and conceptual systems (which provide the semantics) are found in 442

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other species. Fitch and Hauser (2004) have gone on to show that despite impressive learning powers over FSGs, tamarin monkeys don’t appear to be able to grasp the patterning in PSG-generated sequences, while O’Donnell et al. (2005) argue that comparative psychology should focus on these formal features of language. Meanwhile Friederici (2004), on the basis of these developments, suggests different neural systems for processing FSG versus PSGs, which she takes to be the critical juncture in the evolution of human language. In this context where recursion has been suggested to be the criterial feature of the human language capacity, it is important for cognitive scientists to know that many languages show distinct limits on recursion in this sense, or even lack it altogether. First, many languages are structured to minimize embedding. For example, polysynthetic languages – which typically have extreme levels of morphological complexity in their verb, but little in the way of syntactic organization at the clause level or beyond – show scant evidence for embedding. In Bininj Gun-wok, for example (Evans 2003a, p. 633), the doubly-embedded English sentence “[They stood [watching us [fight]]]” is expressed, without any embedding, as “they_stood / they_were_watching_us / we_were_fighting_each_other,” where underscores link morphemes within a word. In fact, the clearest cases of embedding are morphological (within the word) rather than syntactic: to a limited degree one verb can be incorporated within another, for example: barri-kanj-ngu-nihmi-re [they-meat-eat-ing-go], “they go along eating meat.” But this construction has a maximum of one level of embedding – so that even if it were claimed that polysynthetic languages simply shift the recursive apparatus out of the syntax into the morphology (Baker 1988), the limit to one degree of embedding means it can be generated by a finite state grammar in Bininj Gun-wok. Mithun (1984) counted the percentage of subordinate clauses (embedded or otherwise) in a body of texts for three polysynthetic languages and found very low levels in all three: 7% for oral Mohawk texts, 6% in Gunwinggu (a dialect of Bininj Gun-wok), and just 2% in Kathlamet. Examples like this show how easily a language can dispense with subordination (and hence with the primary type of recursion), by adopting strategies that present a number of syntactically independent propositions whose relations are worked out pragmatically. Kayardild is another interesting case of a language whose grammar allows recursion, but caps it at one level of nesting (see Evans 1995a; 1995c). Kayardild forms subordinate clauses in two ways: either it can nominalize the subordinate verb (something like English -ing), or it can use a finite clause for the subordinate clause. Either way, it makes special use of a case marking – the oblique (OBL) – which can go on all or most clausal constituents. This oblique case marker then stacks up outside any other case markers that may already be there independently. We shall illustrate with the nominalized variant, but identical arguments carry through for the finite version. For example, to say, “I will watch the man spearing the turtle,” you say, ð16Þ ngada kurri-ju dangka-wu raa-n-ku banga-wuu-nth I watch-FUT man-OBJ spear-NOMZR-OBJ turtle-OBJ-OBL

The object marker on “man” is required because it is the object of “watch,” and the object marker on “turtle” because it is the object of “spear.” Of particular relevance

Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals here is that “turtle” is marked with the object case plus the oblique case because the verb “spear” of which it is the object has been nominalized. Now the interesting thing is that, even though in general Kayardild (highly unusually) allows cases to be stacked up to several levels, the oblique case has the particular limitation (found only with this one case) that it cannot be followed by any other case. This morphological restriction, combined with the fact that subordinate clauses require their objects and other non-subject NPs to be marked with an oblique for the sentence to be grammatical, means that the morphology places a cap on the syntax: at most, one level of embedding. In discussions of the infinitude of language, it is normally assumed that once the possibility of embedding to one level has been demonstrated, iterated recursion can then go on to generate an infinite number of levels, subject only to memory limitations. And it was arguments from the need to generate an indefinite number of embeddings that were crucial in demonstrating the inadequacy of finitestate grammars. But, as Kayardild shows, the step from one-level recursion to unbounded recursion cannot be assumed, and once recursion is quarantined to one level of nesting it is always possible to use a more limited type of grammar, such as a finite state grammar, to generate it. The most radical case would be of a language that simply disallows recursion altogether, and an example of this has recently been given for the Amazonian language Piraha˜ by Everett (2005), which lacks not only subordination but even indefinitely expandable possessives like “Ko’oi’s son’s daughter.” This has been widely discussed, and we refer the reader to Everett’s paper for the details. Village-level sign languages of three generations’ depth or more also systematically show an absence of embedding (Meir et al., in press), suggesting that recursion in language is an evolved socio-cultural achievement rather than an automatic reflex of a cognitive specialism. The languages we have reviewed, then, show that languages can employ a range of alternative strategies to render, without embedding, meanings whose English renditions normally use embedded structures. In some cases the languages do, indeed, permit embedding, but it is rare, as with Bininj Gun-wok or Kathlamet. In other cases, like Kayardild nominalized clauses, embedding is allowed, but to a maximum of one iteration. Moreover, since this is governed by clear grammatical constraints, it is not simply a matter of performance or frequency. Finally, there is at least one language, Piraha˜, where embedding is impossible, both syntactically and morphologically. The clear conclusion that these languages point to is that recursion is not a necessary or defining feature of every language. It is a well-developed feature of some languages, like English or Japanese, rare but allowed in others (like Bininj Gun-wok), capped at a single level of nesting in others (Kayardild), and in others, like Piraha˜, it is completely absent. Recursion, then, is a capacity languages may exhibit, not a universally present feature. The example of Piraha˜ has already been raised in debate with Chomsky, Hauser, and Fitch, by Pinker and Jackendoff (2005). Fitch et al. (2005) replied that “the putative absence of obvious recursion in one of these languages is no more relevant to the human ability to master recursion than the existence of three vowel languages calls into doubt the human ability to master a five- or ten-vowel

language” (p. 203). That is, despite the fact that recursion is the “only uniquely human component of the language faculty,” recursion is not an absolute universal, but just one of the design features provided by UG from which languages may draw: “as Jackendoff (2002) correctly notes, our language faculty provides us with a toolkit for building languages, but not all languages use all the tools” (2002, p. 204). But we have already noted that the argument from capacity is weak. By parity of argument, every feature of every language that has ever been spoken must then be part of the language faculty or UG. This seems no more plausible than claiming that, because we can learn to ride a bicycle or read music, these abilities are part of our innate endowment. Rather, it is the ability to learn bicycle riding by putting together other, more basic abilities which has to be within our capacities, not the trick itself. Besides, if syntactic recursion is the single core feature of language, one would surely expect it to have the strong form of a “formal universal,” a positive constraint on possible rule systems, not just an optional part of the toolkit, in the style of one of Chomsky’s “substantive universals.” No one doubts that humans have the ability to create utterances of indefinite complexity, but there can be serious doubt about where exactly this recursive property resides, in the syntax or elsewhere. Consider that instead of saying, “If the dog barks, the postman may run away,” we could say: “The dog might bark. The postman might run away.” In the former case we have syntactic embedding. In the latter the same message is conveyed, but the “embedding” is in the discourse understanding – the semantics and the pragmatics, not the syntax. It is because pragmatic inference can deliver embedded understandings of non-embedded clauses that languages often differ in what syntactic embeddings they allow. For example, in Guugu Yimithirr there is no overt conditional – and conditionals are expressed in the way just outlined (Haviland 1979). In these cases, the expressive power of language lies outside syntax. It is a property of conceptual structure, that is, of the semantics and pragmatics of language. This is a central problem for the “syntactocentric” models associated with Chomsky and his followers, but less so of course for the kind of view championed by Jackendoff in these pages (see Jackendoff 2003a), where semantics or conceptual structure is also argued to have generative capacity. More specifically, the generative power would seem to lie in the semantics/pragmatics or the conceptual structure in all languages, but only in some is it also a property of the syntax. To recapitulate: 1. Many languages do not have syntactic constituent structure. As such, they cannot have embedded structures of the kind indicated by a labelled bracketing like [A[A]]. Most of the suggestions for rule constraints (like Subjacency) in UG falsely presume the universality of constituency. The Chomsky, Hauser, and Fitch versus Pinker and Jackendoff controversy simply ignores the existence of this wide class of languages. 2. Many languages have no, or very circumscribed recursion in their syntax. That is, they do not allow embedding of indefinite complexity, and in some languages there is no syntactic embedding at all. Fitch et al’s (2005) response that this is of no relevance to their selection of BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5

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Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals syntactic recursion as the single unique design feature of human language reveals their choice to be empirically arbitrary. 3. The cross-linguistic evidence shows that although recursion may not be found in the syntax of languages, it is always found in the conceptual structure, that is, the semantics or pragmatics – in the sense that it is always possible in any language to express complex propositions. This argues against the syntacticocentrism of the Chomskyan paradigm. It also points to a different kind of possible evidence for the evolutionary background to language, namely, the investigation of embedded reasoning across our nearest phylogenetic cousins, as is required, for example, in theory of mind tasks, or spatial perspective taking. Even simple tool making can require recursive action patterning (Greenfield 1991).

7. The new synthesis: Evolutionary approaches to language A linguist who asks “Why?” must be a historian. —Martin Haspelmath (1999, p. 205)

Our message has been that the languages of the world offer a real challenge to current theory and analysis about the place of language in human cognition. From the perspective of some approaches, the message of diversity may suggest that there is no clear way forward. In fact, however, there is a growing body of work that shows exactly where the language sciences are headed, which is to tame the diversity with theories and methods that stem ultimately from the biological sciences. Evolutionary approaches, in the broadest sense, are transforming the theoretical terrain. This work is of different kinds. In the first instance, there is a great deal of speculation, elegant theory, and mathematical modelling aimed at the problem of language origins (Christiansen & Kirby 2003). Some of this is devoted to the preconditions – for example, the origin of human cooperation (Boyd & Richerson 2005; Tomasello 2000, 2008), or the properties of human interaction or theory of mind (Enfield & Levinson 2006). Other work is centrally concerned with the coevolution of cognition and culture generally, arguing for a twin-track model in which biological and cultural evolution run partially independently, but with reciprocal interaction (Durham 1991; Levinson & Jaisson 2006). This provides a mechanism for the biological evolution of traits adaptive to cultural environments, for which the neuroanatomical foundations for language must be a prime example.6 Language diversity can best be understood in terms of such a twin-track model, with the diversity largely accounted for in terms of diversification in the cultural track, in which traits evolve under similar processes to those in population genetics, by drift, lineal inheritance, recombination, and hybridization. These create the population conditions in which new variants arise in separate social groups. A range of selectors – characteristics of the brain and vocal tract, constraints on the communicative channel, internal constraints within the system, and transition constraints on what can turn into what – then shape the chances of different variants catching on. 444

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Historical linguistics is the oldest branch of scientific linguistics, with long-standing interests in lineal inheritance versus horizontal transfer through contact and borrowing. Its greatest achievement was the development of rigorous methods for the tracking of vocabulary through descendant languages. But brand new is the application of bioinformatic techniques to linguistic material, allowing the quantification of inheritance versus borrowing in vocabulary (McMahon & McMahon 2006); see also Pagel et al. (2007) and Atkinson et al. (2008) for further examples of statistical phylogenetic approaches to understanding language evolution. Application of cladistics and Bayesian phylogenetics to vocabulary allow much firmer inferences about the date of divergences between languages (Atkinson & Gray 2005; Gray & Atkinson 2003). These methods can also be applied to the structural (phonological and grammatical) features of language, and this can be shown to replicate the findings based on traditional vocabulary methods (Dunn et al. 2005; Dunn et al. 2008), while potentially reaching much further back in time. These explicit methods allow the comparison between, for example, linguistic phylogeny, human genetics, and the diversification of cultural traits in some area of the world. A stunning result is that, in at least some parts of the world, linguistic traits are the most tree-like, least hybridized properties of any human population (Hunley et al. 2007), with stable linguistic groupings solidly maintained across thousands of years despite enormous flows of genes and cultural exchange across groups. These bioinformatic methods throw new light on the nature of Greenbergian universals (Dunn et al. 2008). Using Bayesian phylogenetics, we can reconstruct family trees with the structural properties at each node, right back to the ancestral proto-language of a family. We can then ask how much these structural features are, over millennia, codependent (i.e., changing together, or instead evolving independently). First impressions from these new methods show that the great majority of structural features are relatively independent; only a few resemble the Greenbergian word-order conditional universals, with closely correlated state-transitions. The emerging picture, then, confirms the view that most linguistic diversity is the product of historical cultural evolution operating on relatively independent traits. On the other hand, some derived states are inherently instable and unleash chains of changes till a more stable overall state is reached. As Greenberg once put it, “a speaker is like a lousy auto mechanic: every time he fixes something in the language, he screws up something else” (quoted in Croft 2002, p. 5). In short, there are evolutionarily stable strategies, local minima as it were, that are recurrent solutions across time and space, such as the tendency to distinguish noun and verb roots, to have a subject role, or mutually consistent approaches to the ordering of head and modifier, which underlie the Greenbergian statistical universals linking different features. These tendencies cannot plausibly be attributed to UG, since changes from one stable strategy to another take generations (sometimes millennia) to work through. Instead, they result from myriad interactions between communicative, cognitive, and processing constraints which reshape existing structures through use. A major achievement of functionalist linguistics has been to map out, under the rubric of grammaticalization, the complex temporal sub-processes by which grammar

Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals emerges as frequently used patterns sediment into conventionalized patterns (Bybee 2000; Givo´n 2008). Cultural preoccupations may push some of these changes in particular directions, such as the evolution of kinship-specific pronouns in Australia (Evans 2003b). And social factors, most importantly the urge to identify with some groups by speaking like them, and to maximize distance from others by speaking differently (studied in fine-grained detail by Labov 1980), act as an amplifier on minor changes that have arisen in the reshaping process (Nettle 1999). Gaps in the theoretically possible design space can be explained partly by the nature of the sample (we have 7,000 survivors from an estimated half-million historical languages), partly by chance, partly because the biased state changes above make arriving at, or staying in, some states rather unlikely (Dunn et al. 2008; Evans 1995c). An advantage to this evolutionary and population biology perspective is that it more readily accounts for the clusterand-outlier pattern found with so many phenomena when a broad sample of the world’s languages is plumbed. We know that “rara” are not cognitively impossible, because there are speech communities that learn them, but it may be that the immediately preceding springboard state requires such specific and improbable collocations of rare features that there is a low statistical likelihood of such systems arising (Harris 2008). It also accounts for common but not universal clusterings, such as grammatical subject, through the convergent functional economies outlined in section 4, making an all-purpose syntactic pivot an efficient means of dealing with the statistically correlated roles of agent and discourse topic in one fell swoop. And it explains why conditional universals, as well, almost always turn out to be mere tendencies rather than absolute universals: Greenberg’s word-order correlations – for example, prepositions where verb precedes object, postpositions where verb follows object – are functionally economical. They allow the language user to consistently stick to just one parsing strategy, right- or left-branching as appropriate, and channel state transitions in particular directions that tend to maintain the integrity of the system. For example, where adpositions derive from verbs, if the verb follows its object it only has to stay where it is to become a post- rather than a pre-position. The fertile research program, briefly summarized in the preceding paragraphs, allows us to move our explanations for the recurrent regularities in language out of the prewired mind and into the processes that shape languages into intricate social artefacts. Cognitive constraints and abilities now play a different role to what they did in the generative program (cf. Christiansen & Chater 2008): their primary role is now as stochastical selective agents that drive along the emergence and constant resculpting of language structure. We emphasize that this view does not, of itself, provide a solution to the other great Chomskyan question: What cognitive tools must children bring to the task of language learning? If anything, this question has become more challenging in two vital respects, and here we part company with Christiansen and Chater (2008), who assume a much narrower spectrum of structural possibilities in language than we do: First, because the extraordinary structural variation sketched in this article presents a far greater range of problems for the child to solve than we were aware of fifty years ago; and second, because the child can bring

practically no specific hypotheses, of the UG variety, to the task. But, however great it is, this learning challenge is not peculiar to language – it was set up as the crucial human cognitive property when we moved into a coevolutionary mode, using culture as our main means of adaptation to environmental challenges, well over a million years ago. 8. Conclusion: Seven theses about the nature of language and mind The new and more complex emerging picture that we have sketched here, however uncomfortable it may be for models of learning that minimize the challenge by postulating some form of universal grammar, in fact promises us a much better understanding of the nature of language and the cognition that makes it possible. On the one hand, there are thousands of diverse languages, with the organizing principles that sort them being largely similar to the radiation and diversification of species. In other words, language diversification and hybridization works just like the evolution of biological species – it is a historical process, following the laws of population biology. Consider the fact that linguistic diversity patterns just like biological diversity generally, so that the density of languages closely matches the density of biological species across the globe, correlating with rainfall and latitude (Collard & Foley 2002; Mace & Pagel 1995; Nettle 1999; Pagel 2000). Minor genetic differences between human populations may act as “attractors” for certain linguistic properties which are then easier to acquire and propagate (Dediu & Ladd 2007). On the other hand, the human cognition and physiology that has produced and maintained this diversity is a single system, late evolved and shared across all members of the species. It is a system that is designed to deal with the following shared Hockettian design features of spoken languages: the use of the auditory-vocal channel with its specialized (neuro)anatomy, fast transmission with output-input asymmetries (with a production-comprehension rate in the proportion 1 : 4, see Levinson 2000, p. 28), multiple levels of structure (phonological, morphosyntactic, semantic) bridging sound to meaning, linearity combined with nonlinear structure (constituency and dependency), and massive reliance on inference. The learning system has to be able to cope with an amazing diversity of linguistic structures, as detailed in this article. Despite this, the hemispherical lateralization and neurocognitive pathways are largely shared across speakers of even the most different languages, to judge from comparative studies of European spoken and signed languages (Emmorey 2002). Yet there is increasing evidence that few areas of the brain are specialized just for language processing (see, e.g., recent work on Broca’s area in Fink et al. 2005 and Hagoort 2005). How are we to reconcile diverse linguistic systems as the product of one cognitive system? Once the full diversity is taken into account, the UG approach becomes quite implausible – we would need to stuff the child’s mind with principles appropriate to thousands of languages working on distinct structural principles. That leaves just two possible models of the cognitive system. Either the innate cognitive system has a narrow core, which is then BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5

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Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals augmented by general cognition and general learning principles to accommodate the additional structures of a specific language (as in, e.g., Elman et al. 1996), or it is actually a “machine tool,” prebuilt to specialize and construct a machine appropriate to indefinitely variable local conditions – much the picture assumed in cross-linguistic psycholinguistics of sound systems (Kuhl 1991). Either way, when we look at adult language processing, we find a hybrid: a biological system tuned to a specific linguistic system, itself a cultural historical product. The fact that language is a bio-cultural hybrid is its most important property, and a key to understanding our own place in nature. For human success in colonizing virtually every ecological niche on the planet is due to adaptation through culture and technology, made possible by brains gradually evolved specifically to do that. The rapidly expanding theory of coevolution explores the twin-track descent mechanisms of culture and biology, and the feedback loops between them (Boyd & Richerson 2005; Durham 1991; Laland et al. 2000; Odling-Smee et al. 2003). Language is one of the best exemplars of such coevolution, with evolved biological underpinnings for culturally variable practices, where the biology constrains and canalizes but does not dictate linguistic structures. We may summarize this emerging general picture in the following seven theses, each linked to a specifically implicated research initiative. Some of these initiatives are already under way across a range of subliteratures (linguistic typology, cognitivist and functionalist treatments, optimality theory), others not. But in either case the initiatives need to be linked across schools into an integrated general theory with hypothesis-testing procedures accepted by the whole field. 1. The diversity of language is, from a biological point of view, its most remarkable property – there is no other animal whose communication system varies both in form and content. It presupposes an extraordinary plasticity and powerful learning abilities able to cope with variation at every level of the language system. This has to be the central explicandum for a theory of human communication. (It seems inevitable that part of the explicans will be that language has coevolved with culture, which itself evolved to give rapid adaptation to fast-changing environments and migration across niches; see thesis 5.) Research initiative: a principled and exhaustive global mapping of the world’s linguistic diversity. 2. Linguistic diversity is structured very largely in phylogenetic (cultural-historical) and geographical patterns. Understanding these patterns basically involves the methods of population biology and cladistics, together with the principles that generate change and diversity. To the extent that there are striking similarities across languages, they have their origin in two sources: historical common origin or mutual influence, on the one hand, and on the other, from convergent selective pressures on what systems can evolve. The relevant selectors are the brain and speech apparatus, functional and cognitive constraints on communication systems, including conceptual constraints on the semantics, and internal organizational properties of viable semiotic systems. Research initiatives: First, a global assessment of structural variability comparable to that geneticists have produced for human populations, assembled in accessible synthesis like the World Atlas of Language Structures (WALS) (http://WALS.info/) and the structural phylogenetics database (Reesink et al. 446

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under review). Second, we need a full and integrated account of how selectors generate structures. 3. Language diversity is characterized not by sharp boundaries between possible and impossible languages, between sharply parameterized variables, or by selection from a finite set of types. Instead, it is characterized by clusters around alternative architectural solutions, by prototypes (like “subject”) with unexpected outliers, and by family-resemblance relations between structures (“words,” “noun phrases”) and inventories (“adjectives”). Hypothesis: There are cross-linguistically robust systempreferences and functions, with recurrent solutions (e.g., subject) satisfying several highly ranked preferences, and outliers either satisfying only one preference, or having low-probability evolutionary steps leading to their states. 4. This kind of statistical distribution of typological variation suggests an evolutionary model with attractors (e.g., the CV syllable, a color term “red,” a word for “arm”), “canals,” and numerous local peaks or troughs in an adaptive landscape. Some of the attractors are cognitive, some functional (communicational), some cultural-historical in nature. Some of the canalization is due to systems-biases, as when one sound change sparks off a chain of further changes to maintain signalling discreteness. Research initiative: Each preference of this kind calls for its own focussed research in terms of which selectors are at work, along with a modelling of system interactions – for example, computational simulations of the importance of these distinct factors along the lines reported by Steels and Belpaeme (2005). 5. The dual role of biological and cultural-historical attractors underlines the need for a coevolutionary model of human language, where there is interaction between entities of completely different orders – biological constraints and cultural-historical traditions. A coevolutionary model explains how complex socially shared structures emerge from the crucible of biological and cognitive constraints, functional constraints, and historically inherited material. Such a model unburdens the neonate mind, reapportioning a great deal of the patterning to culture, which itself has evolved to be learnt. Initiative: Coevolutionary models need to work for two distinct phases: one for the intensely coevolutionary period leading to modern humans, where innovations in hardware (human physiology) and software (language as cultural institution) egged each other on, and a second phase where the full variety of modern languages mutate regularly between radically different variants against a relatively constant biophysical backdrop, although population genetics may nevertheless predispose to specific linguistic variants (Dediu & Ladd 2007). 6. The biological underpinnings for language are so recently evolved that they cannot be remotely compared, for example, to echolocation in bats (pace Jackendoff 2002, p. 79). Echolocation is an ancient adaptation shared by 17 families (the Microchiroptera) with nearly 1,000 species and over 50 million years of evolution (Teeling et al. 2005), whereas language is an ability very recently acquired along with spiralling culture in perhaps the last 200,000 to 300,000 years by a single species.7 Language therefore must exploit pre-existing brain machinery, which continues to do other things to this day. Language processing relies crucially on plasticity, as evidenced by the modality switch in sign languages. The major biological adaptation may prove to be the obvious anatomical one, the

Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals vocal tract itself. The null hypothesis here is that all needed brain mechanisms, outside the vocal-tract adaptation for speech, were co-opted from pre-existing adaptations not specific to language (though perhaps specific to communication and sociality in a more general sense). 7. The two central challenges that language diversity poses are, first, to show how the full range of attested language systems can evolve and diversify as sociocultural products constrained by cognitive constraints on learning, and second, to show how the child’s mind can learn and the adult’s mind can use, with approximately equal ease, any one of this vast range of alternative systems. The first of these challenges returns language histories to centre stage in the research program: “Why state X?” is recast as “How does state X arise?”. The second calls for a diversified and strategic harnessing of linguistic diversity as the independent variable in studying language acquisition and language processing (Box 3): Can different systems be acquired by the same learning strategies, are learning rates really equivalent, and are some types of structure in fact easier to use?

This picture may seem to contrast starkly with the assumption that was the starting point for classic cognitive science, namely, the presumption of an invariant mental machinery, both in terms of its psychological architecture and neurocognitive underpinnings, underlying the common cognitive capacities of the species as a whole. Two points need to be made here. First, there is no logical incompatibility with the classic assumption, it is simply a matter of the level at which relative cognitive uniformity is to be sought. On this new view, cognition is less like the proverbial toolbox of ready-made tools than a machine tool, capable of manufacturing special tools for special jobs. The wider the variety of tools that can be made, the more powerful the underlying mechanisms have to be. Culture provides the impetus for new tools of many different kinds – whether calculating, playing the piano, reading right to left, or speaking Arabic. Second, the classic picture is anyway in flux, under pressure from increasing evidence of individual differences. Old ideas about expertise effects are now complemented with startling evidence for plasticity in

Box 3. Using linguistic diversity as a “natural laboratory” in cognitive science Instead of yearning for simple language universals, cognitive scientists should embrace the diversity and use it for what it is good for: supplying rich independent variables for experimental purposes. Listed here are some of the existing outstanding uses of this natural laboratory of variation in the communication system of our species (see also Bates et al. 2001; Guo et al. 2008; Li et al. 2006; Nakayama et al. 2006; Slobin 1997a). Modality: Sign versus Speech The modality transfer in sign versus spoken language can be exploited to explore the nature of language processing when the input/output systems are switched, thus allowing glimpses into language-specific cognition beyond the vocal-auditory specializations (Emmorey 2002; MacSweeney et al. 2002). Sound Systems and How We Process Them Kuhl (1991; 2004) and Werker and Tees (2005) have exploited cross-linguistic differences in sound systems, showing that infants from 6 months of age are already “tuning” their acoustic space to the sound system of the language they are learning. Cutler et al. (1983) have shown that parsing the sound stream for word recognition crucially involves the rhythmic structure of the language, which can be of at least three distinct kinds: based on syllable timing (e.g., Spanish), stress timing (e.g., English) and on the mora (e.g., Japanese). Even the best bilinguals tend to use only one system (Cutler et al. 1989). Morphology Psycholinguists have exploited structural differences between languages to explore, for example, the cognitive effects of gender systems (Boroditsky et al. 2003) or the effects on processing (Vigliocco et al. 2005). Syntax The full variety of syntax types has hardly begun to be exploited by psycholinguists (but see MacWhinney & Bates 1989). For some first psycholinguistic investigations of a free word order language (Odawa), see Christianson and Ferreira (2005). Semantics and Conceptual Structure Differences in the linguistic coding of, for example, space can be shown to correlate with differences in the non-linguistic conceptual coding (Levinson 2003; Levinson & Wilkins 2006; Majid et al. 2004), suggesting that linguistic distinctions affect how we think (see also Boroditsky 2001; Lucy 1992; Lucy & Gaskins 2001). Lexicon Lexical gaps can impact perception (e.g., of color: Davidoff et al. 1999; Kay & Kempton 1984) and cognition (e.g., of number: Gordon 2004). Meaning diversity has obvious implications for language acquisition: do we name pre-existing concepts or construct the concepts during learning (Bowerman & Levinson 2001)? Acquisition of Morphosyntax The diversity of the child’s target has been the focus of a great deal of acquisition research (see, e.g., Slobin 1997a). Controlled comparison across languages can be very revealing of children’s learning strategies (Pye et al. 2007).

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Commentary/Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals the brain – behavioral adaptation is reflected directly in the underlying wetware (as when taxi drivers’ spatial expertise is correlated with growth in the hippocampal area; Maguire et al. 2000). Conversely, studies of individual variance show that uniform behavior in language and elsewhere can be generated using distinct underlying neural machinery, as shown for example in the differing degrees of lateralization of language in individuals (see, e.g., Baynes & Gazzaniga 2005; Knecht et al. 2000). Thus, the cognitive sciences are faced with a double challenge: culturally variable behavior running on what are, at a “zoomed-out” level of granularity, closely related biological machines, and intra-cultural uniformity of behavior running on what are, from a zoomed-in perspective, individually variable, distinct machines. But that is the human cognitive specialty that makes language and culture possible – to produce diversity out of biological similarity, and uniformity out of biological diversity. Embedding cognitive science into what is, in a broad sense including cultural and behavioral variation, a population biology perspective, is going to be the key to understanding these central puzzles.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This work was partially supported by the Australian Research Council (Social Cognition and Language Grant DP878126) to Nicholas Evans, and by the Max Planck Society to Stephen Levinson. Author order is alphabetical. We thank Jos van Berkum, Lera Boroditsky, Morten Christiansen, Peter Hagoort, Martin Haspelmath, Wolfgang Klein, Asifa Majid, Fritz Newmeyer, and Karl-Magnus Petersson for helpful comments; Barbara Finlay, Adele Goldberg, Russell Gray, Shimon Edelman, Mark Pagel, and two further anonymous BBS referees for their suggestions on improvement; and Edith Sjoerdsma for her work on the manuscript.

NOTES 1. See also Postal (1970, p. 130), responding to a challenge: “I would be willing to postulate universals on the basis of an even weaker study, namely of one language.” 2. There will certainly prove to be a genetic basis for the input/output mechanisms for language, and very probably for vocal learning. The FOXP2 story points in these directions (Fisher & Marcus 2006, Vernes et al. 2008). Whether the higher, more abstract aspects of language reside in languagespecific abilities, however, remains quite unclear (but see Box 2). 3. Such “design features” may, it is thought, offer us at least a bedrock of exceptionless universals. Even here, though, exceptions are reported: for example, not all sign languages appear to show duality of patterning (Aronoff et al. 2008). 4. For example, Hornstein et al. (2005, p. 7) describe constituent structure as one of the uncontentious “big facts” about language. See Matthews (2007) for a careful demolition of this position. 5. There is some lack of clarity over what is meant here by recursion: In the Chomsky hierarchy, all formal languages are recursively enumerable, but only some are recursive in the sense of decidable (Levelt 2008, vol. 1, p. 113). As far as structures are concerned, tail (or peripheral) recursion (sometimes hard to distinguish from mere iteration) is usefully differentiated from nested recursion or centre-embedding, which requires push-down stack memory (see Parker 2006; Pinker & Jackendoff 2005, p. 203).

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6. For examples of ongoing coevolution in the language domain, see Dediu and Ladd (2007) and Aoki and Feldman (1989). 7. Any date for the origin of a graduated capacity will be arbitrary, but consider, for example, the breathing control necessary for extended speech (MacLarnon & Hewitt 2004): the relevant thoracic vertebral enervation dates after Homo erectus and before the split between modern humans and Neanderthals at perhaps 325,000 years ago (Wall & Kim 2007).

Open Peer Commentary Language universals: Abstract but not mythological doi:10.1017/S0140525X09990604 Mark C. Baker Department of Linguistics, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08901. [email protected] http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~mabaker/

Abstract: I present the so-called Verb-Object Constraint as a serious proposal for a true linguistic universal. It provides an example of the kind of abstraction in linguistic analysis that seems warranted, of how different languages can confirm such a universal in different ways, and why approaches that avoid all abstractness miss important linguistic generalizations.

I agree with Evans & Levinson (E&L) that natural languages display an amazing diversity, and that this has great significance for cognitive science. Like them, I have devoted myself to studying this diversity. But I do not agree that the descriptive data becoming available refute the Chomskian notion of a rich Universal Grammar (UG). On the contrary, each new language I have studied presents both fascinating new examples of diversity and important new evidence that human languages are all variations on the same theme. E&L are looking at only one side of this paradox. The root of the paradox is that – according to generative linguistics – natural languages are properly described at several distinct levels of analysis (Chomsky 1957; 1965). Given this, it is perfectly possible for new languages to demonstrate diversity at one level and uniformity at another. It is easy to imagine how “comparative architecture” might find that the fac¸ade designs of buildings vary much more than expected, whereas fundamental structural support systems vary very little. This is parallel to what I believe comparative linguistics shows us about language. As an example (synopsized from Baker 2001; Baker, in press), consider (1) as a possible linguistic universal: (1) The Verb-Object Constraint (VOC): A nominal that expresses the theme/patient of an event combines with the event-denoting verb before a nominal that expresses the agent/ cause does. One obvious reflection of the VOC in English is that (normally) objects immediately follow the verb, the two forming a verb phrase, whereas subjects do not. Comparison with other languages shows that many (35%; Dryer 2005) are like English in this respect – but also that many have a different word order, or no fixed order at all. At this level of description, there is substantial diversity. Nevertheless, we find other reflections of the VOC in language after language. For example, some

Commentary/Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals 40% of languages (Turkish, Japanese, etc.) have Subject-ObjectVerb order, with the object left-adjacent to the verb rather than right-adjacent to it. This is different from English but equally consistent with the VOC. Languages with Verb-Subject-Object order (7%) look like violations of (1), but careful research has shown that many of them (at least) are not. For example, Irish clearly has a (Subject þ [Verb þ Object]) structure when there is no tense marking; Verb-Subject-Object order arises only when the verb needs to combine with tense (McCloskey 1991); see also Chung 1998 on Chamorro. These languages thus support the VOC, understood as holding at an abstract level. Mohawk is a language in which word order gives no evidence of constituency. But Mohawk also has noun incorporation, where an argument can combine with the verb to form a compound. Crucially, the theme-object of the verb can incorporate into the verb, but the agent-subject argument cannot: Mohawk (and Bininj Gun-wok) allows “The baby meat-ate” but not “ Babyate the meat.” This is another manifestation of the VOC, the compositional asymmetry showing up at the level of compounding rather than phrase formation (Baker 1988; 1996). Unusual features of newly described languages can reveal universal properties in new ways. Kayardild has the very rare property of copying tense marking onto every constituent related to the verb phrase (Evans 1995a, pp. 399– 401). Strikingly, this marking shows up on the theme-object but not on the agentsubject (see E&L’s example [16]) – which is new support for the VOC. Including minor types (like Verb-Object-Subject languages), we now have solid leads that the VOC is valid for well over 90% of the known linguistic diversity. And I know of no counterexamples that have been investigated directly by mutually correcting research communities that include some researchers open to using abstractness. The descriptive and typological research that E&L draw on summarily rejects most abstractness in linguistic analysis. E&L say it is a misconception that the differences among languages can be resolved by postulating a more abstract formal level, declaring this to be a false dogma. But the only support they give for this declaration is saying that “the experts either cannot formulate it clearly or do not agree that it is true” (target article, sect. 2). There is a real issue underlying this: It is a serious intellectual challenge to find exactly the right formulations of principles like the VOC (or Subjacency, or the Binding Principles). Generativists thus offer different formulations, and they do not claim to have found the definitive ones yet. But these formulations share a common core. Saying that UG is false on these grounds is thus like saying (as some do) that evolution is false because experts disagree about the details. The challenge and opportunity of finding the right statement of universals can be seen in the putative contrast between “dependency” languages and “constituency” languages, which E&L emphasize. I find it striking that the dependency relations they identify for Latin in their example (14) are exactly the same as the dominance relations in the phrase structure of the English equivalent in example (13). We can thus isolate something substantive that these allegedly different language types have in common by finding a neutral mode of representation that expresses this important topological equivalence. E&L also voice the widespread concern that abstractness allows generative theories to immunize themselves from counterexamples. No doubt this happens. But the VOC is not an unfalsifiable dogma for generativists. On the contrary, they have seriously considered alternative possibilities. For example, Marantz (1984) proposed that the VOC is a feature of language that varies parametrically, to account for “deep ergative” languages like Dyirbal. This hypothesis was investigated, but the preponderance of evidence showed it to be false, as more data came in from languages like Inuit (Bok-Bennema 1991). That the VOC is universal is simply the hypothesis that has fared better empirically than any well-articulated alternative.

Note that if the VOC is universal, this is certainly of great interest to cognitive science. Why should verbs combine with their theme arguments before their agent arguments? It is easy to write formal languages that do it the other way around. Presumably this tells us something contingent and potentially profound about how humans mentally represent events. Linguistic universals are thus not myths, but hypotheses – hypotheses that gain new support from much of the same research that E&L cite. This research shows that we cannot be superficial in our approach to language, not that we cannot be universalist.

Widening the field: The process of language acquisition doi:10.1017/S0140525X09990616 Edith L. Bavin School of Psychological Science, La Trobe University, Bundoora, Victoria 3083, Australia. [email protected] http://www.latrobe.edu.au/psy/staff/bavine.html

Abstract: Evans & Levinson (E&L) argue against Universal Grammar on the basis of language diversity. A related and fundamental issue is whether the language input provides sufficient information for a child to acquire it. I briefly discuss the more integrated approaches to language acquisition which focus on the mechanisms, and research showing that input cues provide valuable information for the language learner.

Evans & Levinson (E&L) argue against the notion of Universal Grammar (UG), illustrating the huge diversity in human language – a diversity that exists at all levels. A justification for UG was the assumption that language is too complex for a child to acquire and that the input does not contain sufficient evidence for the child to learn the system; prior knowledge of language was therefore assumed. Hence, information about the process of language acquisition is fundamental in any discussion of UG and the domain specificity of language, something that E&L do not elaborate on. Acquisition data are available from a range of languages, including those represented in the cross-linguistic studies pioneered by Dan Slobin (1985a; 1985b; 1992; 1997a; 1997b) and from more recent publications. The data indicate that young children quickly attune to the input language at all levels. Young children are adept at identifying the recurrent patterns of organisation within the input language, whether these are related to case systems, tense and aspect systems, word order, syntactic alternations, complex sentences, pronominal systems, the encoding of spatial relations, or other features. Based on the findings, the proposed UG principles and parameters are not adequate to explain the acquisition process. Nor do they convince all researchers that the language input lacks sufficient evidence for acquisition without prior knowledge of language structures, or that children from different language environments follow the same path in acquisition. The crucial question is: What does the child bring to the task? A related question is: What factors influence language development? In the UG approach, the focus is on the end state, the mature grammar. Abstract linguistic concepts are available to the child, and language forms in the input are mapped onto these concepts. Both absolute and relative universals have been proposed, candidates for possible innate syntactic content (Valian 2009, p. 18). The relative universals allow for variation across languages including syntactic features and categories from which languages are built and from which they can select, as well as proposed binary parameters of syntactic variation BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5

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Commentary/Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals (Valian 2009, p. 19). Given the diversity of syntactic features and categories in languages discussed by E&L, there would need to be numerous relative universals to accommodate them. However, the child will need to process the input to determine which were relevant to the target language. Many researchers in the field reject the formal UG approach; they do not assume domain (language)-specific constraints to facilitate language acquisition. Rather domain-specific knowledge emerges as a product of development. Their concern is with the mechanisms, processes, and strategies involved in acquiring a language or languages. The assumption is that language development cannot be isolated from the child’s brain development or social and cognitive development. In the emergentist approaches, language structures are not innate; they emerge from known processes linking “a growing understanding of the brain with new theories of cognition” (MacWhinney 1999, p. xvii). The child uses the cues available in the input to identify the language specific patterns (Bates & MacWhinney 1987), with some cues more reliable than others. In constructivist usagebased approaches, children are assumed to build up syntactic categories and structures of their language gradually, using cues such as frequency and regularity of specific constructions (e.g., Lieven et al. 2003; Tomasello 2003a; 2009). Instead of assuming that the input lacks sufficient cues for the child to acquire the language, the research focuses on which cues it does provide and the cognitive and perceptual tools brought by the child to the task of acquisition. A large proportion of the research designed to test proposed UG principles has focused on complex syntax. However, by the time children are processing complex structures, they have vast experience with their language and the contexts of use. In developing a language, new knowledge is built on existing knowledge. In the initial stages, perceptual biases, attentional mechanisms, and cognitive abilities are involved in processing the rich information provided in the input language. Rhythmic and distributional information provide cues to segmentation (Jusczyk 1997; Werker & Curtin 2005; Werker & Tees 1984). Research on statistical learning (e.g., Saffran et al. 1996) shows that young infants are sensitive to language-specific transitional probabilities, correlational probabilities, and distributional features of the input (Ho¨hle et al. 2004; Mintz 2006; Thiessen 2009). The developing sensitivities allow for segmentation of syllables, words, and other grammatical units of the input language, segmentation that is an essential precursor to acquiring the system. As shown by Kuhl (2004), as infants become attuned to the sound contrasts of their environmental language, reorganisation of their perceptual abilities takes place; similarly, infants’ developing statistical knowledge influences what they later perceive from the input. Thus, knowledge is advanced as they map sound sequences to meaning and retain these mappings in memory (e.g., Hollich et al. 2000) and as they identify category membership, for example, by linking the language context to properties of referents in particular domains (Smith 1999). Similarly, in the later stages of acquisition, knowledge of language structures gained facilitates the acquisition of new knowledge. Phonological memory is important in forming mental representations of new words (Gathercole & Baddeley 1989), and vocabulary development is a precursor of vocabulary development (Bates & Goodman 1999). By assuming that language acquisition is guided by universal principles specific to the language domain, as in the UG approach, the role of cognitive skills and the influence of individual cognitive abilities on language development are not adequately considered. However, the link is clear from typical language development as well as atypical, an example of which is specific language impairment (SLI). It was first proposed that SLI supports separation of language from other cognitive domains, and explanations for language problems in SLI were related to principles of UG (e.g., Rice & Wexler 1996). Although children identified as having SLI are judged to have nonverbal abilities in the normal

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range, a significant body of research has revealed memory and information processing deficits (e.g., Archibald & Gathercole 2007; Bavin et al. 2005; Montgomery et al. 2009). In addition, significantly lower scores on standardised cognitive assessments are typically reported for SLI groups compared to age-matched, nonimpaired children. Thus, an alternative explanation is that cognitive deficits lead to difficulty in processing information from the input, information required in acquiring the language (Leonard et al. 2007). Theorists need to understand more about the diversity of languages, such as discussed by E&L, and the impact that such typological features have on the acquisition process; and, in addition, develop a greater understanding of language in atypical situations. Such understanding can only advance discussion about constraints on human language.

Unveiling phonological universals: A linguist who asks “why” is (inter alia) an experimental psychologist doi:10.1017/S0140525X09990628 Iris Berent Department of Psychology, Northeastern University, Boston, MA 02115-5000. [email protected] http://www.psych.neu.edu/people/faculty/berent.html

Abstract: Evans & Levinson (E&L) are right to hold theories of language accountable for language diversity, but typological data alone cannot determine the structure of mental phonological grammars. Grammatical universals are nonetheless testable by formal and experimental methods, and the growing research in experimental phonology demonstrates the viability of a comparative experimental evaluation of the Universal Grammar (UG) hypothesis.

There is little doubt that the twin challenges of language universals and language diversity are critical for understanding the architecture of the language faculty, its domain-specificity and evolutionary origins. Despite their crucial import, these questions remain unaddressed in most existing psycholinguistic research. Evans & Levinson (E&L) should be commended for reminding the cognitive science community of its outstanding intellectual debt in this area. Nonetheless, E&L’s own conclusion – that the hypothesis of universal grammar is false – does not follow from the evidence they present. Here, I specifically consider E&L’s analysis of phonological universals – the role of syntactic and semantic universals falls beyond the scope of this commentary. In its bare minimum, the hypothesis of Universal Grammar (UG) states that the brains of all speakers represent a shared set of grammatical constraints. Although this hypothesis is often associated with the claims that UG constraints are innate, and domain- and species-specific, these additional claims are not logically linked to the basic hypothesis of grammatical universals. E&L appear to reject all four claims on the grounds that language typology exhibits no absolute, exceptionless regularities. Typological universals, however, are distinct from grammatical universals, and the link between them is complex. Grammatical universals – the object of cognitive inquiry – are mental representations (I-language), whereas typological universals are statistical generalizations concerning external linguistic outputs (E-language). Such outputs are shaped by multiple factors, of which putative grammatical universals are only one force – the restrictions on perception, motor control, conceptual structure and memory, coupled with cultural and social factors, are equally strong determinants. Consider, for example, the typological prevalence of CV syllables (discussed by E&L). One theory of UG, Optimality Theory

Commentary/Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals (Prince & Smolensky 1993/2004), attributes this fact to a universal, but violable, well-formedness constraint that requires all syllables to begin with an onset. Such a constraint, however, does not guarantee that CV syllables are most frequent typologically (typological frequency is also determined by extra-grammatical factors); nor does it preclude the existence of onsetless syllables (e.g., V – such syllables can be protected by other constraints enforcing faithfulness to grammatical inputs). Instead, the Onset constraint predicts that no grammatical process will actively transform syllables with an onset to onsetless ones (de Lacy, 2008). Whether the case of Arrernte (cited by E&L) counters this prediction is debatable (Berry 1998; Smith 2005), but typological frequency alone clearly cannot decide this matter. Although this conclusion calls for a more careful interpretation of the typological diversity, it does not render the UG hypothesis unfalsifiable: optimality theory asserts that universal well-formedness constraints are active in the grammars of all speakers, irrespective of whether the relevant structures are present or absent in their linguistic experience. This strong hypothesis has sparked a productive research program that uses experimental tools to test the role of grammatical language universals – an enterprise that has unfortunately gone unnoticed by E&L. The available findings suggest that speakers are sensitive to putatively UG restrictions unattested in their language while ignoring other regularities that are equally motivated on statistical and phonetic grounds (Becker et al., submitted; Davidson 2006; Hayes et al., submitted; Moreton 2008; Wilson 2006). Consider, for example, the restrictions on onset clusters (e.g., bl in blocks). It is well known that onsets such as bl are typologically more frequent than lb, and languages that tolerate syllables like lba tend to allow bla. This fact is attributed to sonority – a scalar property that correlates with the intensity of consonants: least sonorous (softest) on the scale are stops (e.g., b,d), followed by nasals (e.g., n) and liquids (e.g., l). Accordingly, bla rises in sonority, whereas lba manifests a sonority fall. The typological preference for onsets like bl is captured by a scalar UG constraint that favors onsets with large sonority distances (e.g., bl.bn. bd.lb, where.indicates preference; Clements 1990; Smolensky 2006). Although sonority restrictions are widely documented, the typological evidence reflects only implicational tendencies, and many languages manifest outright reversals (e.g., Russian allows sonority falls, e.g., lb). Such observations might lead E&L to conclude that sonority restrictions are not grammatical universals, but rather, artifacts of modality-specific acoustic and articulatory preferences. However, sonority-based restrictions have been documented in sign languages (Corina 1990; Sandler & Lillo-Martin 2006), and recent experimental work suggests that they are active in the brains of individual speakers even when the relevant structures are absent in their language. English speakers, for example, favor syllables that rise in sonority (e.g., bnif) compared to sonority plateaus (e.g., bdif), which, in turn, are preferred to sonority falls (e.g., lbif), and this preference shapes the perception of these syllables (Berent 2008; Berent et al. 2007): the worst-formed onsets of falling sonority (e.g., lbif) are more likely to be misperceived (as lebif) compared to sonority plateaus (e.g., bdif), which, in turn, are misperceived relative to sonority rises (e.g., bnif). The misperception of illformed onsets is not due to an inability to extract their surface form from the acoustic input (e.g., it obtains with printed materials; Berent et al. 2009); nor is it explained by the statistical properties of English – similar results have been reported among speakers of Korean, a language that arguably lacks onset clusters altogether (Berent et al. 2008). Instead, these systematic misperceptions imply broad grammatical knowledge that triggers the active recoding of ill-formed structures. The convergence of sonority preferences across phonological systems, both spoken and signed (Sandler 1993), is consistent with a domain-specific phonological mechanism. Nonetheless, the present results cannot determine whether phonology preferences are, in fact, universal or innate.

Markedness (i.e., well-formedness) hierarchies, such as sonority, could vary in detail due to both predictable grammatical processes (e.g., conflation; de Lacy 2006) and variation in finegrained phonetic properties that could inform their inference (Hayes & Steriade 2004). Whether phonological markedness hierarchies are experience-independent or learned is unknown, and there is vanishingly little information on their domain- and species-specificity. Far from being untestable, however, these questions call for a comparative cross-linguistic research program that combines typological, formal, and experimental methods. The emerging field of experimental phonology demonstrates the viability of this approach in evaluating the UG hypothesis. ACKNOWLEDGMENT This research was supported by NIDCD grant DC003277.

Language evolution: Two tracks are not enough doi:10.1017/S0140525X0999063X A. Charles Catania Department of Psychology, University of Maryland, Baltimore County (UMBC), Baltimore, MD 21250. [email protected] http://www.umbc.edu/psyc/personal/catania/catanias.html

Abstract: This commentary argues that Evans & Levinson (E&L) should expand their two-track model to a three-track model in which biological and cultural evolution interact with the evolution of an individual’s language repertories in ontogeny. It also comments on the relevance of the argument from the poverty of the stimulus and offers a caveat, based on analogous issues in biology, on the metaphor of language as a container, whether of meanings or of other content.

I welcome the arguments of Evans & Levinson (E&L) and offer only some supplementary remarks perhaps relevant to the future elaboration of their case. I strongly agree that, given the shared properties of the world we live in, our appeals to innate concepts and structures should be a last resort. My primary recommendation is that they expand their model from two tracks to three, so that they can deal with the ways in which biological and cultural evolution must necessarily interact with the evolution of an individual’s language repertories in ontogeny. I also comment on the relevance of the argument from the poverty of the stimulus, and I offer a caveat, based on analogous issues in biology, on the metaphor of language as a container of meanings or other content. I have elsewhere addressed related issues, including the primacy of behavior in shaping brain structure (Catania 2008), the interpretation of learning in terms of selection rather than in terms of associations (Catania 1995; 2003; Catania & Shimoff 1998), and the distinction between language structure and function and its implications (Catania 1973; 1990; 2001; 2004; Catania & Cerutti 1986). E&L make a persuasive case for the interaction of biological and cultural evolution. But languages can survive only if acquired and maintained by individuals who then pass them on. This acquisition and maintenance involves a third variety of selection operating on individual behavior, at every level: from the shaping of complex vocalizations as the child masters phonetic structures, through the semantic and syntactic details of those languages, to the sophisticated social interactions of mature speakers. Without selection at the level of individual language repertories, those linguistic and social practices cannot last long enough to be transmitted across successive generations. For this to work, by the way, ontogenetic and cultural selection must operate upon similar kinds of linguistic units; what is acquired in learning must share dimensions with what is culturally transmitted. BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5

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Commentary/Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals Adequate scenarios for language evolution must take into account these three varieties of selection. Each requires variations among the units upon which it operates; each entails different mechanisms by which environments select surviving variants. Biological contingencies must select requisite physiological attributes (e.g., vocal tract structure, neural organization). Ontogenetic contingencies must maintain the features of languages acquired by individuals. Cultural selection must perpetuate language practices across generations. E&L’s discussion of language diversity nicely accommodates these processes, because it allows for substantial ranges of variation while still showing how languages can be maintained within and across generations. These different varieties of selection often complement one another, but selection at one level may oppose selection at another. For example, behavior selected through ontogenetic processes during an individual’s lifetime may reduce the individual’s reproductive fitness at the phylogenetic level (consider substance abuse or sexual behavior involving partners at risk for AIDS). Although they do so sparingly, and typically only implicitly, E&L sometimes discuss language as a container of meanings or of other content expressed in words and sentences. The conduit metaphor of language is pervasive but too often misleading (Reddy 1979). Assuming that language expresses or contains something transmitted from one individual to another raises some of the same difficulties as the assumption that genetic materials transmit information. Dawkins (1982) made that point when distinguishing between blueprints and recipes in characterizing genetic materials, which do not contain body plans or other information about the organism that will be their product. Rather than blueprints, they are recipes for development; the relevant information is not about past selective environments or about the way mature organisms will interact with their environments. A parallel distinction is relevant to language and has implications for language evolution. Words are not carriers of meanings or schemas or other information relevant to the selective environments that engendered them; we should look at words not in terms of what they contain but rather in terms of what they do (Catania 1987). Of all that they can do, one irreducible function of language is providing a mechanism by which one individual can change the behavior of others. This alone may be a sufficient basis for the origins of language. Other functions of language (e.g., communication, calculation, narrative, truth) may then be its derivatives. I was surprised that E&L did not mention Chomsky’s argument from the poverty of the stimulus (Chomsky 1965), because claims that the relevant structures cannot be found in the environmental contingencies justify the reification and internalization of language universals. The argument that children learn grammatical structures even in the absence of examples of negative instances seems to assume that learning any distinction requires exposure to all possible negative exemplars. But, for example, a bird raised in monochromatic light does not discriminate among wavelengths. Yet after learning to discriminate between the original wavelength and just a single new one not seen before, the bird responds in an orderly way to wavelengths across the entire visual spectrum (Terrace 1975). Similarly, any verbal environment including contrasts between several grammatical structures provides the differences on which learning can be based: for example, both active and passive voice are grammatical but provide a contrast that may enable later discrimination of grammatical versus ungrammatical. Of course, these outcomes tell us about the structure of the underlying continua (the orderliness of the color continuum could be described as its universal grammar). But with regard to grammatical dimensions, those structures are so highly variable across languages, as E&L so aptly argue, that it would be as reasonable to assume that they are driven by language cultures

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within lifetimes in social environments as that they are driven by brain structures evolved over biological time (Catania 2008; Moerk 1992). This is consistent with evidence that rich verbal environments in which parents spend lots of time interacting verbally with their children make vast and lasting differences in their verbal competence, as measured by vocabulary growth rate, school performance, and IQ scores (Hart & Risley 1995). Verbal environments matter.

The myth of language universals and the myth of universal grammar doi:10.1017/S0140525X09990641 Morten H. Christiansena and Nick Chaterb a Department of Psychology, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853, and Santa Fe Institute, Santa Fe, NM 87501; bDivision of Psychology and Language Sciences, University College London, London, WC1E 6BT, United Kingdom. [email protected] http://www.psych.cornell.edu/people/Faculty/mhc27.htm [email protected] http://www.psychol.ucl.ac.uk/people/profiles/chater_nick.htm

Abstract: Evans & Levinson (E&L) argue that language universals are a myth. Christiansen and Chater (2008) have recently suggested that innate universal grammar is also a myth. This commentary explores the connection between these two theses, and draws wider implications for the cognitive science of language.

It has been widely argued that an innate Universal Grammar (UG) must be postulated to explain two key observations: first, that languages share putatively “universal” patterns, which appear arbitrary from a functional, communicative point of view; and second, that children acquire language so readily from an apparently impoverished linguistic input (the “poverty of the stimulus” argument). The second point has been the subject of considerable recent interest, with many theorists arguing that linguistic input is richer than has previously been suspected (e.g., Pullum & Scholz 2002; Reali & Christiansen 2005) or that modern learning methods are richer than is often presumed (e.g., Chater & Vita´nyi 2007; Harman & Kulkarni 2007). The first argument, based on language universals, has gone relatively unchallenged in the cognitive science literature – but no longer. Evans & Levinson (E&L) provide powerful evidence that language universals are myth rather than reality, and hence, that this line of defense of UG is swept aside. It remains to be explained, though, how languages came to display such stunning diversity, and this is where research on language evolution may offer some insight. We have recently argued (Christiansen & Chater 2008) that an innate UG is not merely poorly evidenced, but indefensible on evolutionary grounds. Specifically, we argue that the cultural variability of language provides a “moving target,” which changes too rapidly to support the biological adaptation that would be required to lead to an innate UG (Chater et al. 2009). Thus, language is best viewed as the product of cultural evolution, not biological evolution (Christiansen et al., in press). The cultural evolution of language does not, of course, take place in a biological or social vacuum, but rather, is shaped by multiple constraints. One type of constraint derives from the nature of the thoughts that language expresses. For example, whatever the nature of our mental representations, they apparently afford an infinite range of different thoughts, promoting the likely emergence of compositionality in language (Kirby 2007). Linguistic structure is also shaped by socio-pragmatic principles relating to the communicative function of language;

Commentary/Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals for example, as embodied by Gricean implicatures (Grice 1967). A further source of constraints on language evolution derives from the operation of our perceptuo-motor apparatus, which, for example, enforces substantial seriality in both spoken and signed languages. Similarly, cognitive limitations on learning, processing, and memory also provide strong constraints on linguistic structure; for example, our limited working memory promotes a general tendency to resolve ambiguities as quickly as possible in both linguistic (Clark 1975) and perceptual input (Pomerantz & Kubovy 1986). Individual languages are seen as evolving under the pressures from these constraints, as well as cultural-historical factors (including language contact and sociolinguistic influences), resulting over time in the kind of linguistic diversity described by E&L. Cross-linguistically recurring patterns do emerge due to similarity in constraints and culture/history, but such patterns should be expected to be probabilistic tendencies, not the rigid properties of UG (Christiansen & Chater 2008). Thus, we construe recurring patterns of language along the lines of Wittgenstein’s (1953) notion of “family resemblance”: although there may be similarities between pairs of individual languages, there is no single set of features common to all languages. This perspective on language evolution and universals has important implications for language acquisition and processing. The ready learnability of language is explicable not because language fits an innate UG within each child; but rather, because language itself embodies patterns that are most naturally acquired from past generations of learners. We have argued, more generally, that learning cultural forms (C-induction) is very much easier than learning aspects of the natural world (N-induction) – because learning merely requires that each new generations agrees with the previous generation. For example, the number sequence 1, 2, 3. . . could be continued in any numbers of ways using repetition (1, 2, 3, 1, 2, 3, 1. . .), oscillation (1, 2, 3, 2, 1, 2. . .), as a Fibonacci sequence (1, 2, 3, 5, 8. . .), or some entirely irregular pattern (1, 2, 3, 73, 0, 18. . .). In the context of N-induction, the learner faces real difficulties: In encountering the sequence in some aspect of the natural world (e.g., the number of planets observed on successive nights), it is very difficult to know how the sequence will continue. However, Cinduction is much more reliable and straightforward. The vast majority of people would find it most natural to continue the sequence with “. . .4, 5, 6. . . .” Thus, predicting how other people will continue the sequence is relatively easy, at least if people have the same inductive biases. Similarly, children must extrapolate a language from the sample of language they encounter; but such extrapolation is likely to be correct, given that it is the result of prior extrapolations by previous generations of learners. Again, the learning problem is dramatically easier if the objective is to mirror a cultural form that has been learned by others. Indeed, through prior generations of cultural selection, the form itself will have been optimized to embody whatever inductive biases the learner may have (Chater & Christiansen, in press). Our emphasis on C-induction in language acquisition dovetails with a usage-based approach to language processing. Connectionist cognitive science has for some time explored the computational implications of a usage-based approach to language in which constituency and recursion are not built into the architecture of the language system but rather emerge through learning as probabilistic generalizations (Christiansen & Chater 2003). Importantly, we have developed usage-based models of recursive sentence processing that are capable of constituent-like generalization and have quasi-recursive abilities comparable to human performance on a variety of complex recursive constructions (Christiansen & Chater 1999; Christiansen & MacDonald, in press). Thus, at least some aspects of cognitive science do fit with the picture of language outlined by E&L, in which recursion and constituency are not innately defined universals.

E&L’s important paper will substantially shift the debate in the cognitive science of language. Cognitive scientists have often taken rigid language universals as a “given,” to be explained by theories of language acquisition and processing (e.g., by the postulation of an innate UG). E&L make clear that this is a mistake – and that a much more nuanced view of the patterns in the world’s languages is required. We argue that this perspective is consistent with the view that an innate UG is as much a myth as language universals; and that language should be viewed as primarily a product of cultural, rather than biological, evolution.

Syntax is more diverse, and evolutionary linguistics is already here doi:10.1017/S0140525X09990653 William Croft Department of Linguistics, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM 87131-0001. [email protected] http://www.unm.edu/~wcroft

Abstract: Evans & Levinson (E&L) perform a major service for cognitive science. The assumption of Chomskyan generative linguistics – that there are absolute unrestricted universals of grammatical structure – is empirically untenable. However, E&L are too reluctant to abandon word classes and grammatical relations in syntax. Also, a cognitive scientist can already draw on a substantial linguistics literature on variationist, evolutionary models of language.

Evans & Levinson (E&L) make an important point to cognitive scientists about language universals. The nature of language is seriously misrepresented by Chomskyan generative linguistics, which is all too often taken as the standard theory of language that must be accommodated by any interdisciplinary research in cognitive science. In particular, the Chomskyan emphasis on absolute unrestricted universals of grammatical structure flies in the face of overwhelming empirical evidence of the structural diversity of languages. This structural diversity has to be the starting point for any theory that attempts to come up with universals of language. I have only two additions to make to E&L’s argument: First, their critique of syntax, the heartland of Chomskyan linguistics, is too timid; and second, the dynamic evolutionary approach to language that E&L advocate already has a lengthy pedigree in linguistics. E&L’s approach to syntax contrasts with their assertions about sound structure. E&L state that phonologists are abandoning the idea of a fixed inventory of possible human speech sounds in favor of a model where languages construct sound systems from fine phonetic details that vary substantially. But in syntax, they assume that word classes of the traditional sort (noun, verb, adjective, etc.) exist, and they respond to diversity by arguing that some languages do not take advantage of some of these classes or add others. This is very much like Jackendoff’s notion of a syntactic toolkit, which the authors otherwise reject. In fact, E&L should abandon the assumption that nouns, verbs, and so on, have theoretical, cross-linguistic validity as part of a fixed inventory of word classes, just as they have abandoned the parallel assumption for sound inventories. Linguists identify word classes by using syntactic criteria or tests. These criteria are the possible occurrence of words of a particular class in a set of grammatical constructions (including morphological inflectional contexts), and their inability to occur in other constructions. This is called the distribution of the words, or word class. But the fact of all languages, including English, is that the distribution of words is highly variable, so that there BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5

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Commentary/Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals are no large coherent word classes in any language (see Gross 1979). Thus, it makes no sense to say (as E&L do) that English words like willy-nilly and heeby-jeebies differ from ideophones in other languages in kind rather than degree, or that lunch and train in do lunch or take a train are just regular nouns; they are not (Wierzbicka 1982). Instead, the only cross-linguistically valid – and language-internally valid – conclusion is that each construction defines its own word classes; words do not enter into a small number of large classes; and noun, verb, and so on, should be abandoned as word classes (Croft 1991; 2001; 2007; 2009). This is not to deny that there are language universals constraining syntax, just as one cannot deny universals governing sound inventories; but they are not in the form of universal word classes found in traditional grammar and generative grammar. Instead, there are typological prototypes for parts of speech reflecting the preference of particular propositional acts (reference, predication, modification) for particular semantic classes; these are basically the same as E&L’s clusters or attractors. A similar argument applies to E&L’s analysis of so-called subjects. A division of functions into topic, agent, and pivot is insufficient to reflect the diversity of encoding participants in clauses and the categorization of participant roles across constructions with different functions. Unlike word classes and propositional acts, there is no simple typological prototype to account for the diversity of participant encoding in clauses. Yet there are universal patterns that constrain the types of grammatical relations used for different construction types (Croft 2001; Kazenin 1994) and that constrain grammatical relations relative to each other in a clause (Croft 1991). The chief sense in which the dynamic, complex adaptive systems approach to language that E&L advocate is now emerging (as they put it) is that it is finally emerging from under the shadow of generative linguistics. Cognitive science must embrace language diversity and the consequences it entails for our understanding of the nature of language. But cognitive scientists need not wait for linguists to draw those consequences; there is much existing research to guide a nonlinguist cognitive scientist interested in the approach to language presented by E&L. A few examples are given here, linked to E&L’s seven theses in their conclusion. Linguistic diversity (thesis 1) is the basic starting point of typological analysis. An important omission in an article asserting the centrality of linguistic diversity is the existence of diversity (variation) within speech communities, not just across speech communities (see Labov 1994; 2001; Milroy 1992). Numerous databases and inventories of typological diversity (thesis 2) already exist. Although there are clusters (thesis 3) or attractors (thesis 4) governing the distribution of some linguistic diversity (typological prototypes), these are only some of the patterns of typological distribution that have been observed, as mentioned earlier. Greenberg (1969; 1978a; 1979) presents a model of language that shifts away from synchronic language states to language history (thesis 7). A detailed evolutionary theory of language (theses 2 and 5) which integrates variation across languages, within speech communities, and in language use is presented in Croft (2000a) and in Mufwene (2001; 2008). Although this work is not coevolutionary, it balances the extensive recent work on the biological evolutionary origins of the language capacity by providing a cultural evolutionary framework for understanding language. Cognitive and functional constraints have been investigated in cognitive linguistics for a quarter of a century (theses 2 and 6; see Croft & Cruse [2004] and Langacker [2008] for recent overviews, and Tomasello [1998; 2003b] for an introduction oriented to cognitive scientists). Much of course remains to be done in evolutionary linguistics. Cognitive science can draw on these strands of linguistic theory and empirical discovery, and evolutionary linguistics can draw on the rest of cognitive science for a better understanding of the factors that motivate speakers’ creation and use of the

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linguistic structures that are found in the world’s languages – before they disappear.

A note on methodology in linguistics Robert Freidin doi:10.1017/S0140525X09990665 Program in Linguistics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544-5264. [email protected]

Abstract: Evans & Levinson’s (E&L’s) critique of Universal Grammar fails because their methodology is flawed, as illustrated in their discussion of the Subjacency Condition. The lack of explicit analysis leads the authors to a false conclusion that is refuted by work published in this journal twenty years ago. They miss the point that unanalyzed data cannot disprove grammatical hypotheses.

From the outset, modern generative grammar has been concerned with the construction of precise models for linguistic structure. As Chomsky noted in the preface to Syntactic Structures, such models can play an important role, both negative and positive, in the process of discovery itself. By pushing a precise but inadequate formulation to an unacceptable conclusion, we can often expose the exact source of this inadequacy and, consequently, gain a deeper a deeper understanding of the linguistic data. More positively, a formalized theory may automatically provide solutions for many problems other than those for which it was explicitly designed. Obscure and intuition-bound notions can neither lead to absurd conclusions nor provide new and correct ones, and hence they fail to be useful in two important respects. (Chomsky 1957, p. 5)

One can evaluate competing proposals in linguistics to the extent that they are formulated precisely. In the case of the target article, this is not possible because there are no such proposals. In general, the target article eschews precise analysis and offers instead a number of general descriptive statements about a range of languages that are taken to be refutations of proposed universals. Often these are offered without citation of data or, more importantly, the explicit analysis that would support the claims. Such refutations are based on unstated and unverified assumptions about grammatical analysis. In general, such discussion is not useful. Consider the discussion of the Subjacency Condition in section 3, one of only two UG principles in generative grammar discussed.1 Evans & Levinson (E&L) give no formulation of this condition; nor do they give explicit syntactic analyses of the examples cited in (6– 8). Example (6) is actually ambiguous (i.e., ‘where-said’ versus ‘where-got off’) and Example (8), which is marked deviant, is grammatical under the interpretation of ‘where-said’. The inadequate analysis of (8) offered in Example (9) does not distinguish between the possible and impossible interpretations because a place adverbial modifying the main clause VP occurs in the same linear position as one modifying the subordinate clause VP. Only the analysis of hierarchical structure disambiguates the two interpretations. Either where starts out as a constituent of the subordinate clause (the impossible interpretation) or of only the main clause (the possible interpretation). Moreover, if whether is analyzed as a complementizer on a par with that in Example (6) rather than a wh-phrase, then the Subjacency Condition does not account for the deviance of (8) on the ‘where-get off’ interpretation. To understand E&L’s criticism, one needs to know that the Subjacency Condition is a locality constraint that restricts the scope of syntactic movement, thereby contributing to an account of so-called island phenomena in natural language, a

Commentary/Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals central topic with an extensive literature.2 E&L attempt to dismiss the Subjacency proposal on the grounds that it “does not work in Italian or Russian in the same way, and theorists have had to assume that children learn the specifics of the constraint after all” (sect. 3, para. 6). This is simply wrong, as illustrated for Italian in Rizzi’s famous 1978 paper, which demonstrates that Subjacency holds in Italian but is parameterized in terms of which clause boundary type counts as a bounding domain for the constraint (CP for Italian, but TP for English)3 (Rizzi 1978). The parametric analysis (including Russian, which apparently has no interclausal wh-movement) has been spelled out in detail in this journal; see Freidin and Quicoli (1989), which analyzes the poverty of stimulus issues for parameters, arguing that the choice of parameter settings for Subjacency cannot be made solely from presentation of data.4 Thus, some parameters that account for variation across languages are also part of UG. E&L conclude their discussion of Subjacency by saying, “Each constraint in UG needs to be taken as no more than a working hypothesis, hopefully sufficiently clearly articulated that it could be falsified by cross-linguistic data” (sect. 3, para. 6). The first part is a truism. However, the assumption in the second part that data alone can falsify any working hypothesis (especially one that works for a significant range of data) is clearly false. As Chomsky noted about Subjacency more than thirty years ago, It is easy enough to find phenomena that appear to violate the subjacency condition. Consider, e.g., the sentences (9), (10), where there is a relation between the phrase in bold face and the position marked by t, “violating” subjacency under the assumption that the rule in question is a movement rule: (9) John seems [S0 to be certain [S0 t to win] ] (10) who did Mary hope [S0 that Tom would tell Bill [S0 that he should visit t] ] Putting the matter more carefully, a proposed condition on rules, such as subjacency, cannot be confirmed or refuted directly by phenomena of this (or any other) sort. A condition on rules can be confirmed or refuted only by rules, which observe or violate it, respectively. If the rule of NP movement that yields (9) applies successive cyclically, as often assumed, then the rule will observe subjacency. If, as I have argued in the references cited, the rule of wh-movement applies successive cyclically, then it too will observe subjacency, giving (10). To find evidence to support or to refute a proposed condition on rules, it does not suffice to list unexplained phenomena; rather, it is necessary to present rules, i.e., to present a fragment of a grammar. The confirmation or refutation will be as convincing as the fragment of grammar presented. This is a simple point of logic, occasionally overlooked in the literature. The status of conditions on rules is empirical, but evidence can only be indirect and the argument, one way or another, is necessarily rather abstract and “theory bound.” (Chomsky 1977, p. 74)

Data alone cannot speak to the validity of explicit proposals about the content of UG. What is required is an explicit analysis of data that follows from a precisely formulated fragment of a grammar. This is a comment about methodology, independent of any particular linguistic theory. In science there is no alternative to providing explicit analysis of data. The discussion of UG in this article misses the mark entirely.

NOTES 1. The other is Principle B of binding theory, although not identified as such nor explicitly formulated. 2. This is well understood within generative linguistics but possibly not to the wider readership of Brain and Behavioral Sciences. For recent accounts, see Chomsky (2008) and Boeckx and Hornstein (2008). The original work goes back to Chomsky (1964) and Ross (1967). See Chomsky (1973; 1977) for the original Subjacency proposal and subsequent modifications. Note that Newmeyer (2004), which is the only citation E&L give, also provides no explicit formulation for Subjacency. 3. The core principle is the same for all languages that manifest syntactic movement. Subjacency can be formulated as in (i):

(i) No movement rule can extract a constituent out of more than one bounding domain per movement operation. NP and the clausal constituents CP and TP have been proposed as binding domains. See Note 2 for references. 4. For a similar parametric analysis of binding conditions, see Freidin (1992, Chs. 7 and 8), and the works cited there.

Essentialism gives way to motivation doi:10.1017/S0140525X09990677 Adele E. Goldberg Department of Linguistics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08540. [email protected] http://www.princeton.edu/~adele

Abstract: The recognition that contentful universals are rare and often “banal” does not undermine the fact that most non-universal but recurring patterns of language are amenable to explanation. These patterns are sensical or motivated solutions to interacting and often conflicting factors. As implied by the Evans & Levinson’s (E&L’s) article, linguistics would be well served to move beyond the essentialist bias that seeks universal, innate, unchanging categories with rigid boundaries.

The Evans & Levinson (E&L) target article is a welcome concise summary of the problems and confusions created by facile claims of universality (see also Croft 2001). Given the authors’ own extensive fieldwork on understudied languages, they clearly know the typological terrain. The article provides another reminder that the 50-year-old promise of a contentful “Universal Grammar” has gone unfulfilled. And yet, many sympathetic linguists may be concerned that the picture portrayed appears a bit nihilistic. Surely the regularities of languages that have caught smart linguists’ attention cannot be pure chance or complete accidents of language contact. In fact, as E&L note, recurrent patterns are solutions that satisfy “multiple design constraints, reflecting both cultural-historical factors and the constraints of human cognition” (target article, Abstract). This point is clearly central to the alternative approaches the authors and others espouse, and it is worth emphasizing. A key idea is that most patterns of language are neither strictly predictable nor arbitrary: they are sensical or motivated solutions to interacting and often conflicting demands (cf. Lakoff 1987). We cannot predict that every language should have a given option, and we should not assume that because one language has the option, all languages do so “underlyingly.” But neither are all the logical combinations of options attested, as we might expect if the options were arbitrary and simply learned from whatever unsystematic input a child might be exposed to. Importantly, we should not require that all languages show the same recurrent pattern in order to recognize the pattern as being motivated. Haiman (1985) wrote that polysemy (one word form with more than one related meaning) can be defined as recurrent homonymy: that is, if the same two meanings are named by one label in unrelated languages, then it is reasonable to conclude that there is a motivated relationship between the two meanings. We do not require that the same polysemy exists in every language in order to understand that it is motivated by semantic and pragmatic factors. The recognition of multiple motivating factors should make languages more, not less interesting to cognitive scientists. Instead of decreeing that a certain recurrent pattern exists just because it exists – because it is part of a “Universal Grammar” – we ask, how does the recurrent pattern develop and what independently needed factors conspire to motivate it? Explanation often comes from an understanding of historical processes, processing and developmental constraints, and a clear understanding of the functions of the constructions involved. BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5

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Commentary/Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals Recognition of conflicting motivations can reveal explanations as to why exceptions, as well as the generalizations themselves, exist. For example, regular morphological forms are compositional, but at times they license violations of general phonotactic constraints. For example, the consonant cluster /-lkd/ does not occur in root English words, and yet we tolerate it in walked and talked. Compositional morphology is motivated because it allows interpretations to be transparent, and it allows us to use old words in new ways. Irregular forms often satisfy one or more other demands, while violating compositionality. Irregular made allows for phonotactic regularity and reduction that would have been lacking if we used the word maked (Burzio 2002). Unfortunately, providing “motivation” may fail to satisfy the way that prediction does. A normal reaction could be: “Surely necessary and sufficient criteria and simple predictive causes exist, even if we have not managed to discover them yet!” An understanding of this reaction may ultimately lead to a better understanding of why Universal Grammar has held such great appeal to so many for so long. People, even young children, prefer explanations that appeal to essentialist categories (e.g., Gelman 2003). An essentialist category, C, combines several key ideas: (1) Though surface reality may differ, there exists an underlying invariant essence that defines C; (2) C has clear boundaries: one can determine categorically whether an entity is or is not a member of C; (3) the essence of C does not change over time; and (4) if C is construed as a biological category, the essence of C is assumed to be innately determined. Essentialist explanations were sought throughout the biological and social sciences, perhaps on the model of mathematics or physics where such programs are often successful (but see Anderson 1972). And yet, most biological and social sciences have moved beyond the essentialist perspective. For example, evolutionary biologists in the nineteenth century thought of species as having an “essence” characterized by certain necessary, abstract features; but by the middle of the twentieth century, essentialism was replaced by “population thinking” (Mayr 1975) in which species were conceptualized as populations of individuals related to one another closely but in myriad complex ways. Similarly, within genetics, researchers had sought single genes that might be responsible for all kinds of syndromes and phenotypes, but more recently this view has given way to systems biology that rests on the recognition that most phenotypes are influenced by multiple interacting factors that include subtle environmental effects (Karmiloff-Smith 2006; Lander 1994). Much of linguistics has remained in a stranglehold of the essentialist mindset, although important work in laboratory phonology and computational, experimental, and corpus linguistics has successfully moved beyond it. From definitions of word meanings to feature assignments for grammatical categories or constructions, the quest for simple, universal, unchanging, necessary, and sufficient conditions continues. Yet such essentialist conditions are hard to come by, even for categories within a single language. For example, we like to think English adjectives form a clear-cut set. Definitions might appeal to their semantic property of noun modification, their prenominal attributive distribution, or their appearance after copular verbs such as seem. And yet there are exceptions to each of these criteria. For instance, a subclass of adjectives beginning with an unstressed schwa resists prenominal position (??the asleep/alive boy), the adjective use of quantifiers like occasional do not semantically modify the following noun (as in, the occasional cigarette), and adjectives do not all readily appear after seem (?The idiot seems blithering). Motivations for these exceptions exist (see e.g., Coppock 2008; Goldberg & Boyd 2009), but the fact remains that the category of English adjectives requires a more nuanced, multifaceted characterization. E&L wonder aloud why the notion of a Universal Grammar has remained such a compelling notion within our field, despite the lack of consensus about what exactly it is. The lure

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of essentialism may provide a part of the explanation: “Universal Grammar” (UG) provides an essentialist answer to the question, What is human language? As with all essentialist explanations: (a) UG is assumed to offer an underlying invariant essence of language, although surface realities are recognized to differ; (b) UG is assumed to have clear boundaries: all human languages, and no other communication systems, are assumed to share UG; (c) UG is viewed as unchanging over time; and (d) UG is assumed to be innately determined. Each of these assumptions is controversial at best and nonsensical at worst (e.g., Christiansen & Chater 2008; Goldberg 2006; Tomasello 2004). Emergent phenomena, widespread statistical generalizations, and multi-source interacting causes undermine the essentialists’ program, as does the sort of widespread variation documented in the E&L article. It is time we let go of the essentialist mindset and embraced motivation as linguistic explanation.

The universal basis of local linguistic exceptionality doi:10.1017/S0140525X09991130 Daniel Harbour Department of Linguistics, Queen Mary University of London, London, E1 4NS, United Kingdom. [email protected] http://webspace.qmul.ac.uk/dharbour

Abstract: Evans & Levinson (E&L) claim Kiowa number as a prime example of the semantically unexpected, threatening both Universal Grammar and Linguistic Universals. This commentary, besides correcting factual errors, shows that the primitives required for Kiowa also explain two unrelated semantically unexpected patterns and derive two robust Linguistic Universals. Consequently, such apparent exceptionality argues strongly for Universal Grammar and against E&L.

According to Evans & Levinson (E&L), the search for semantic universals is misguided because “many languages make semantic distinctions we . . . would never think of” (sect. 2.2.5, para. 3): no theory of universals can capture local linguistic exceptionality. This commentary shows that the exact opposite is true: apparent exceptionality provides highly robust evidence for Universal Grammar (UG). Here I summarize E&L’s semantic argument, expose its fundamental flaw, then empirically refute their claim: two primitives are proposed that explain not only their primary example of “semantic distinctions we . . . would never think of,” but derive two Universals and two further semantic Surprises. Consider E&L’s argument from semantics. For limited counting, languages may use noun/verb marking instead of numerals: for example, English king~king-s; Sanskrit ra¯jan~ra¯jan-au~ra¯jan-as “one~two~many kings.” Faced with singular~plural versus singular~dual~plural, accounting for number variation hardly appears challenging. However, Kiowa, say E&L (mis-citing Mithun), possesses “a marker that means roughly ‘of unexpected number’: on . . . ‘man’ it means ‘two or more,’ on . . . ‘leg’ . . . ‘one or more than two, . . . on ‘stone’ . . . ‘just two’” (sect. 2.2.5, para. 3). Thus, number systems present semantic distinctions too diverse for any universals to subsume. So, number variation refutes UG. To reveal the flaw, consider chemistry. Common oxygencarbon compounds (CO, CO2) are odorless, colorless gases; but C3O2 is a colorless, odorous gas and C12O9, a white solid. Does such diversity mean these are not all constructed from the same two basic building blocks? No. Chemists simply recognize that atoms combined in surprising ways yield surprising properties. Analogously, linguists seek universal primitives and aim to explain cross-linguistic differences through the different ways these may combine. For Kiowa to refute UG, one must (a) look beyond surface appearances, (b) discover, by analysis, the

Commentary/Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals building blocks it uses, and (c) show that these are irreconcilable with any universal (non-Kiowa-specific) set of primitives. E&L do none of these: Like early chemists, their interest lies only in listing differences between substances, not in discovering how their components explain those properties. Such criticism is more than methodological. It empirically undermines E&L’s position. To explain Kiowa requires just two primitives (rooted in Thomas 1955), and these same primitives derive two robust Universals (U1/2) and two semantic Surprises (S1/2) from unrelated languages. Thus, local linguistic exceptionality, properly analyzed, argues strongly for UG. UG number theory is basic set theory, so the two primitives concern sets. The first asserts ([þatomic]) or denies ([2atomic]) that a set is a singleton. The second asserts ([þ augmented]) or denies ([2augmented]) that some given property of the whole set also holds of a subset.1 English uses just [+atomic]: king is [þatomic], kings [2atomic]. Sanskrit uses both (momentarily ignore typefaces): singular ¼ [þatomic 2augmented] dual plural

— singletons without singleton subsets ¼ [2atomic 2augmented] — nonsingletons without nonsingleton subsets ¼ [2atomic þaugmented] — nonsingletons with nonsingleton subsets

For example, fHenry, Richardg is [2atomic] (nonsingleton) and [2augmented] (lacking [2atomic] subsets). UG aims to explain constraints on cross-linguistic variation. The primitives just cited do precisely this, deriving robust two universals concerning the expression of number in natural languages. In broad outline: (U1) Three is the highest number expressible grammatically in any language, without specialized numeral vocabulary (contra quadrals, see Corbett 2000). Derivation: three kings (e.g., fAlfred, Henry, Richardg) is a collection (hence [2atomic]); it has nonatomic subsets (fAlfred, Henryg) (hence [2atomic þ augmented]); but no such subset itself has nonatomic subsets (hence [2atomic þaugmented 2augmented]). Therefore, [2augmented þaugmented 2atomic] ¼ 3. Moreover, by basic set theory, addition of extra primitives is either contradictory or redundant.2 So, trial (3) is the highest the number primitives of UG can reach. (U2) Languages with dual invariably have singular/plural (Corbett 2000), because the primitives required for dual ([+atomic], [+augmented]) also generate singular/plural (see Sanskrit above).3 Likewise, languages with trial invariably have singular/dual/plural because the resources for trial ([+atomic], [+augmented], opposing þ/2 specifications) include [+atomic]/[+augmented], which generate dual, and so on.4 (Harbour, in press, derives further analogous results.) Important as such Universals are, the true test of these primitives, and UG, is whether they capture systems “we . . . would never think of.” In fact, these capture two semantic surprises E&L do not discuss, in addition to Kiowa. (S1) Although 2 = 1 þ 3, languages may create dual from singular þ plural. Consider Hopi “this (one) ran/these (ones) ran” (Hale 1997). Plural puma, “these,” and singular wari, “ran,” combine to create dual puma wari, “these two ran,” as follows: singular Dual Plural

¼ pam ¼ puma ¼ puma

wari wari yu`utu

The semantic surprise that 1 þ 3 ¼ 2 follows from the primitives. The boldfacing in both tables is identical: dual/plural share [2atomic]/puma; singular/dual share [2augmented]/wari. (S2) Although “we” is plural, some languages treat the meaning {me, you} as singular. Winnebago -wı˜ pluralizes both sh-’u˜, “you do,” and hı˜-’u˜, “you and I do,” giving sh-’u˜-wı˜, “you and other(s)

do,” and hı˜-’u˜-wı˜, “you, I and other(s) do” (Lipkind 1945). Anomalously, singular “we” arises because Winnebago uses only [+augmented] (Noyer 1992). Consequently, “we” ¼ fme, you, other(s)g is [þaugmented] relative to “contains me, you”: it and its subset fme, youg both contain me, you. However, “we” ¼ fme, youg is [2augmented]: it contains me, you but has no proper subset that does. Thus, [+augmented] explains the semantically surprising singularity of some senses of “we.” Finally, Kiowa. First, correcting E&L’s errors, unsuffixed, “man”/”leg” mean “one or two”; “stick,” “more than one”; “hair,” “just two”; “stone,” “any number.” Suffixation yields “more than two men/legs,” “one stick,” “one, or three or more, hair(s)” (e.g., aa, “sticks,” aa-dau, “one stick”; aul, “two hairs,” au-dau, “one, or three or more, hair[s]”). Nobody thinks groups of men odd, but pairs of hairs and solo legs normal. So, -dau does not mean “unexpected number of.” Actually, Kiowa is like French, with two minor differences. Both languages organize their nouns into classes, but, where French uses a property of animates [+feminine], Kiowa uses number primitives: for example, the “gender” of stick is [2atomic]. This cleverly avoids the French problem of giving sticks anatomical gender. However, it encounters a different difficulty: talking about “one stick” (where “one” is [þatomic] but “stick” is [2atomic]). All -dau does is register when such þ/2 conflicts occur (French faces similar mismatches – when [þ feminine] la sentinelle references a [2feminine] guard – but lacks an analogous suffix). Nothing more exotic need be said (see Harbour 2006 for Jemez and full details in Harbour 2007). E&L claim that there are no Universals and that semantic Surprises vitiate attempts to discover UG. Both claims have been refuted here: two primitives suffice to derive two Universals, E&L’s prime example of something “we . . . would never think of,” and two further Surprises besides. Linguists, like chemists, must look beyond surface appearances to discover universal building blocks and their properties. E&L’s critique of this program succeeds only in highlighting some of its compelling results. NOTES 1. Semi-formally: S satisfies [þatomic] iff jSj ¼ 1; S satisfies [þaugmented], relative to predicate P, iff S, and S 0 , S, satisfy P. 2. [þatomic 2atomic] means 1 = jSj ¼ 1. [þaugmented 2augmented þaugmented . . .] ¼ [þaugmented 2augmented . . .] by Axiom: fa, ag ¼ fag. 3. Arbitrarily narrow focus misleads: Kiowa ‘hair’ (below) contrasts just dual/nondual, but Kiowa globally does not (cf. Nen, E&L’s purported, unreferenced counterexample). 4. Occurrence of opposing þ/2 specifications varies cross-linguistically: Sanskrit does not permit them, Kiowa (below) does but not for counting. Both consequently lack trial.

The best-supported language universals refer to scalar patterns deriving from processing cost doi:10.1017/S0140525X09990689 Martin Haspelmath Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, 04103 Leipzig, Germany. [email protected] http://www.eva.mpg.de/lingua/staff/haspelmath/home.php

Abstract: Conditional universals have always interested linguists more than unrestricted universals, which are often impossible to demonstrate empirically because categories cannot be defined in a crosslinguistically meaningful way. But deep dependencies have not been confirmed by more recent empirical research, and those universals with

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Commentary/Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals solid empirical support mostly relate to scalar patterns that can plausibly be related to processing cost.

For a long time, linguists have been more interested in general dependencies between different aspects of language structure than in categories shared by all languages, or, in other words, they have found conditional universals (“if a language has X, it also has Y”) more interesting than unrestricted universals (“all languages have X”) (cf. Table 1 in Evans & Levinson’s [E&L’s] target article). Although there are obvious similarities between the kinds of categories languages have, and linguists have found it possible to carry over category labels from one language to another ever since Greek grammatical terminology was adopted for Latin, there is something unsatisfactory about claiming, for instance, that “all languages have nouns and verbs.” Clearly, all languages allow their speakers to talk about people, things, and events (nobody disputes this), and all languages have specialized words for meanings such as “mother,” “tree,” “sleep,” and “hit.” But how do we know whether the “tree” word in a language is a noun? The basic problem is that there is no way of defining structural categories such as noun, article, dative case, or future tense in such a way that the definition applies to different languages, other than via meanings that they share – but that these meanings are cross-linguistically comparable is not at issue. Thus, whether the Straits Salish words for “run” and “(be a) man” are verbs and nouns, or whether they are merely subclasses of a more general word-class “major word,” is not decidable (Croft 2000b). There are no agreed upon criteria for nounhood, which makes debates about this rather pointless; and the same applies to all kinds of other structural categories (even word; cf. Haspelmath 2009). Not all comparative linguists share this view, and E&L (sect. 2.2.4) seem to regard it as an empirical question whether the noun-verb distinction will be found to be universal; but in any event the literature has put much more emphasis on dependencies (or correlations) between structural patterns. Since the eighteenth century (cf. Plank 2001), linguists have often felt that given a certain property X, a language simply had to have property Y as well. Language structures were often seen as coherent systems in which a change in one place would necessarily entail changes elsewhere, perhaps multiple changes throughout the system. This view is particularly associated with the structuralist movement of circa 1920 to 1970, and a famous dictum is A. Meillet’s “une langue est un syste`me ou` tout se tient” (‘a language is a system where everything hangs together’). Although Noam A. Chomsky’s original interest in universals came from the claim that languages are unlearnable without rich innate structures, and he dissociated himself from structuralism, the 1980s and 1990s saw a strong movement of generative research into deep dependencies between different structures, due to a few “macroparameters,” whose setting during language acquisition fixes a whole range of patterns (Baker 2001). In Pinker’s (1994) words, children “are not acquiring dozens or hundreds of rules; they are just setting a few mental switches” (p. 112). However, this work on macroparameters has not been a success, and it has largely been abandoned by mainstream generative linguists (cf. Haspelmath 2008b). Similarly, a large number of the proposals for deep connections between different parts of grammar that were made outside of the generative paradigm have not been confirmed by subsequent research. What has happened again and again is that a particular proposal for a correlation was based on a few languages (e.g., “languages with vowel harmony tend to have object-verb order,” based on Turkish and Hungarian), but subsequent research on more languages showed that the generalization was too rash. Languages were found to cohere less than the intuitions of linguists indicated. This does not mean, however, that universal dependencies (“conditional universals”) are not more than a “myth.” Although

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the structuralist and macroparametric hope that languages have an overall coherence across the entire system has not been confirmed, there are many generalizations with narrower domains that hold true, and for which there is massive empirical support. Consider the examples (1) to (6) (see Haspelmath 2008b for more discussion). 1. If a language has an [ø] sound (front rounded mid vowel), it also has an [e] sound (front unrounded mid vowel). 2. If a language has a [u] sound (interdental fricative), it also has an [s] sound. 3. If a language allows two consonants at the end of a syllable, it also allows one or zero consonants at the end of a syllable. 4. If a language requires accusative marking on a patient object of some type, it also requires marking on patients of all types to the left on the following scale: speaker/hearer . 3rdperson pronoun . definite NP . indefinite specific NP . nonspecific NP. 5. If a language can form a relative clause on some clause position, it allows relativization on all other positions to the left on the following scale (Hawkins 2004): subject . object . oblique . possessor. 6. If a language uses a special reflexive pronoun for an adnominal possessor (e.g., Latin suum), then it also uses a special reflexive pronoun for the patient object (e.g., Latin se) (see Haspelmath 2008a). All these universals, and quite a few more of a similar kind, refer to scales (or “hierarchies”; cf. Croft’s [2003, p. 122] notion of “implicational hierarchies”). These scales can generally be interpreted in terms of processing cost. For example, the [u] sound requires more articulatory effort than the [s] sound; the [ø] sound is less easy to distinguish from other vowels than the [e] sound; accusative marking is less redundant on patient objects that are pronouns or definite than on indefinite and nonspecific NPs; and reflexive use is more remarkable (and hence better coded) in patient object position than in adnominal possessive position (cf. He1 criticized himself1 versus He1 criticized his1 colleague). E&L primarily attack the Chomskyan rhetoric of “Universal Grammar” (UG) for understandable reasons, given the widespread acceptance of his approach outside of linguistics. But the cross-linguistic research of the last few decades has put to rest quite a few earlier hunches and claims by linguists about deep dependencies. What remains, however, is no less interesting from a cognitive science perspective than Chomsky’s innate UG: Language structures can be shown to follow scalar patterns that in most cases have fairly straightforward explanations in terms of processing cost.

Animal comparative studies should be part of linguistics doi:10.1017/S0140525X09990690 Daniel Margoliasha and Howard C. Nusbaumb a Departments of Organismal Biology and Anatomy, and Psychology, The University of Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637; bDepartment of Psychology, The University of Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637. [email protected] http://margoliashlab.uchicago.edu [email protected] http://psychology.uchicago.edu/people/faculty/hnusbaum.shtml

Abstract: Universal Grammar promotes the study of an idealization of language behavior and language learning. In examining the diversity of actual behavioral strategies used to achieve linguistic goals, Evans & Levinson (E&L) move towards studying language as a behavior. This approach can benefit from studying communicative and cognitive capacities more broadly – across species. We exhort like-minded

Commentary/Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals linguists to cast off the remaining intellectual shackles of linguistic speciesism.

The fundamental premise for generativist linguists is that the diversity of languages springs from a common cognitive structure, latent in all humans, called Universal Grammar (UG). The assumption of this core cognitive construct, from which language emerges and by which language structures are constrained, is closely tied to assumptions that the structural framework of language is innate and unlearnable, that the processing capacities necessary for language are unique to humans, and that language is inherently a cognitively isolated module and therefore a computationally unique aspect of human cognition. This black box approach to a fundamental question in cognitive science ignores the potential of an evolutionary approach to cognitive processing, including such an approach to language. It also trains linguists to avoid consideration of evolutionary biology, and animal research in general. Evans & Levinson (E&L) address the first limitation head on but fall prey to the second. The good news is that it is a modest and easy extension of their work to complete the revolution. By shifting the terms of scientific discourse from the unsupported and untestable assumption of a common core set of linguistic universals, a sort of mystical construction, to the actual distinctive behaviors of language populations, E&L move the study of language in the direction of the research methods of the experimental sciences and away from enclosed personal belief systems. The idea of studying real behavior as opposed to a platonic idealization also brings with it the obligation to consider real mechanisms that can explain that behavior. This calls into question the longstanding barrier of the competence/performance distinction to empirical study of language use and processing. This also brings with it a different standard for language research and what should count as evidence in understanding language processes. This is particularly important in considering the issue of the human uniqueness of language. Hauser et al. (2002) have claimed that the single property of recursion as applied to vocalizations is the uniquely human computational capacity of the faculty of language. To address this point, E&L discuss the definition of recursion at length, from recursively enumerable patterns to nested recursion of patterns, and they allude to the computational differences among these. However, it is important to have clarity regarding what capacity is being described. If recursive syntactic processing in humans is a concept tractable to experimental science, then recursion refers not to the concept of putatively infinite (or, in any case, exceedingly long) patterns that no human produces or ever produced, as best as we know, but to an aspect of the computational complexity of pattern processes in actual human vocalizations. The real functional limits on what humans do produce and can perceive matter, and these should not be disregarded under the rubric of performance limitations independent of linguistic competence. Research with animals is irrefutably essential to address any claims of human uniqueness. In psychology and biology a single counterexample may not destroy a theory as it does in physics, but a whole class or classes of counterexamples can do so. E&L refer to a study by Fitch and Hauser (2004) that reports the “impressive learning powers over FSGs [finite state grammars]” displayed by cotton-top tamarins, in spite of their failure to “grasp the patterning in PSG-generated sequences” (i.e., phrase-structure grammar generated sequences) (see target article, sect. 6, para. 3). Here E&L fall prey to becoming the “outsiders . . . [heeding] . . . the articulate envoys from the universalising generativist” (sect. 1, para. 4). E&L accept a null (PSG) result reported in tamarin study with species-irrelevant signals (human speech syllables), no clear learning procedure (mere exposure to stimuli), and with possible biases by additional cues (male/ female voicing distinctions available for the FSG stimuli). Indeed, it might not have even been clear to the tamarins that

there was a task since they were not behaviorally shaped to make a particular response. The experimental paradigm that Fitch and Hauser (2004) used to distinguish tamarin failure of perception at the PSG level became broadly controversial only after it was used to demonstrate that operantly trained European starlings are able to learn both the FSG and PSG sequences (Gentner et al. 2006). Claims and counterclaims surrounding these results have appeared elsewhere and need not be repeated here. Nevertheless, one clear distinction of the starling results stands out in comparison to the tamarin studies. Whether one accepts or rejects the claims regarding recursive processing in assessing the learning of the PSG sequences, the starlings displayed far more complex vocal processing behavior than was displayed by tamarins. Our point is that animals that engage in vocal sensorimotor learning (starlings are songbirds and are excellent mimics) also demonstrate heightened vocal perceptual skills. Understanding the functional relationship between perceptual and motor skills, and the functional utility of such abilities in the daily life and social needs of an organism – including humans – is critical to assessing biological and computational capacities. This fact alone importantly informs the program of E&L, but about it they are mute. E&L appropriately reach towards cladistic methods developed by evolutionary biologists to help sort out relations among human languages. They do not reach far enough. There are also examples of rapid changes in learned vocal patterns within nonhuman species based on cultural transmission of vocal patterns – famously studied in the songbirds (e.g., Marler & Tamura 1964). These studies have stimulated assessment of different learning models and extensive analysis of learning mechanisms. Applying this knowledge must be part of E&L’s program, but they failed to recognize it as such. As long as linguistics will be tied up in generativist nativism, animal studies won’t matter and will contribute little. If linguistics truly becomes an experimental science, then animal studies are informative, and a synthesis of animal and human work becomes a useful goal to try to conceive. E&L have staked out an important position: that there is an ethology of language, that it is available for study, and that it is essential that models of language use and mechanisms of language be inexorably related to actual language usage across humans. We agree, and maintain that this program is fundamentally rooted in experimental science and evolutionary biology. As such, it can be deeply informed by biological work on animal communication systems. Linguistics, and psychology, are subsets of organismal biology.

Variability in languages, variability in learning? doi:10.1017/S0140525X09990926 Bob McMurray and Edward Wasserman Department of Psychology and Delta Center, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52240. [email protected] www.psychology.uiowa.edu/faculty/mcmurray [email protected] www.psychology.uiowa.edu/Faculty/Wasserman/

Abstract: In documenting the dizzying diversity of human languages, Evans & Levinson (E&L) highlight the lack of universals. This suggests the need for complex learning. Yet, just as there is no universal structure, there may be no universal learning mechanism responsible for language. Language is a behavior assembled by many processes, an assembly guided by the language being learned.

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Commentary/Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals A rough heuristic can be deployed in comparative approaches to learning: If a behavior is fixed, it derives from the organism (e.g., early genetic or epigenetic processes); if it is moderately variable, it is learned, although possibly with constraints; if it is highly flexible, it is acquired by highly context-sensitive learning processes. Language may be the quintessentially flexible behavior. So, why have classical approaches focused so heavily on what might lie within the organism? Evans & Levinson (E&L) offer a remarkable gift to cognitive science. In their sweeping synthesis of typological linguistics and their daring criticism of prevailing orthodoxy, they push us to focus on the flexibility and prowess of the language capacity, if there even is such a thing anymore. Chomsky proposed Universal Grammar (UG) to ease the learning of language; yet, thanks to E&L, we see that in many cases even basic assumptions like syllabification or word order might set children learning certain languages down the wrong path. Although it is possible to soften UG by positing limits on the form of languages (as opposed to features that languages must have), even this maneuver may fail. Swedish, for example, violates the hallowed “size principle” in phonology: using two features to represent a binary contrast for which one would suffice (Helgason & Ringen 2008). Given the linguistic data described by E&L, we suspect that a UG based on limits will fare no better than one based on necessary features. E&L, by questioning whether anything about language is universal (and therefore could be properly deemed innate), compel us to consider a flexible learning process that is capable of giving rise to a great deal of emergent complexity. So, a language learner may rely on a rich, redundant set of cues, using seemingly irrelevant speaker information to acquire phonology (Rost & McMurray 2009) and seemingly irrelevant phonological detail to acquire syntax (Christiansen et al. 2009), all in the context of a reinforcement environment that surpasses that of all other species in complexity. Therefore, why do only humans acquire language? Hold-outs might argue that disparities in basic learning processes among species (Newport et al. 2004) are responsible. And, indeed, there is longstanding and compelling evidence that animals differ in basic, although perhaps parametric ways (Bitterman 1975). Yet, other than Skinner (1957), no other learning theorist has attempted to apply basic learning processes to language acquisition as a whole (although connectionist approaches have begun to address this piecemeal; e.g., Christiansen & Chater 2001). One might also observe that basic cognitive capacities like categorization (Lazareva & Wasserman 2008), same-different discrimination (Cook & Wasserman 2006), sequence learning (Gentner et al. 2006), and expectation generation and evaluation (Keller & Hahnloser 2009) can be seen in various forms among diverse species. Yet, exhibiting many of these complex forms of cognition, all necessary for language, may be insufficient to move animals to a level of communication performance comparable to humans. So where does that leave us? When confronted with such diversity of possible language inputs, one might first look for even more powerful learning mechanisms. But, perhaps language is not the product of a single mechanism. There is tremendous diversity of learning and cognition among animals (Wasserman & Zentall 2006). Finding one simple mechanism across many different species is highly improbable (Bitterman 1975). Given the diversity of human language so richly detailed by E&L, perhaps the parallel holds across humans. This possibility would seem at first blush to undermine the view of humans sharing fundamental cognitive capacities. Yet, perhaps that is not so. Language may not be a monolithic structure to be internalized. Rather, language may be an ensemble of skilled behaviors that are shaped by a variety of forces and are sensitive to any available source of information. In this light, humans (much like evolution) assemble language with a variety of learning mechanisms and sources of information, this

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assembly being guided by the particularities of the language they are learning. Learning even something as restricted as the phonology of English may demand mechanisms as diverse as unsupervised clustering (McMurray et al. 2009), dimensional weighting or cue neutralization (Rost & McMurray 2009), anticipatory learning of transitions (Elman 1990; Saffran et al. 1996), top-down feedback from the lexicon (Thiessen 2007), and nonspecific social contingencies (Goldstein et al. 2003). Perhaps none of them is necessary for mastery of all languages; but most of them are necessary for any given language. Still, none of these learning mechanisms could operate without a rich information source consisting of overlapping categories, information buried in the relative variation in particular cues, sequential relationships between sounds, and vertical relationships between sound and meaning. These relationships are provided by the language and the culture. Although this may appear circular, as is so often the case in evolution, it is merely evidence of coevolving systems. Language is not a structure to be internalized; rather, it is an extremely complex assembly of behaviors to be developed. Is language a thing? Or is it a skill? If it is a skill, we should not be studying “structure” at all, but rather, studying moment-bymoment behaviors. Evolution does not select for genes, it selects for phenotypes, or rather, for the developmental processes that give rise to them (Lickliter & Honeycutt 2003). Similarly, in language, the fundamental unit is not a piece of structure – it is an ongoing behavior, the learning processes that give rise to it, and the cultural factors that make it useful. So what is language? It is a behavior . . . that develops . . . in a culture . . . that develops . . . The evidence and argument of E&L have freed developmental theorists from having to explain the abstract and arcane of narrow linguistic theories; language can be virtually anything. The authors have moved us to a more productive consideration of what is central to language: how language is used and acquired, and what flexible and emergent mechanisms are needed to accomplish this remarkable behavior.

Returning language to culture by way of biology doi:10.1017/S0140525X09990707 Bjorn Merker Gamla Kyrkv. 44, SE-14171 Segeltorp, Sweden. [email protected]

Abstract: Conflation of our unique human endowment for language with innate, so-called universal, grammar has banished language from its biological home. The facts reviewed by Evans & Levinson (E&L) fit the biology of cultural transmission. My commentary highlights our dedicated learning capacity for vocal production learning as the form of our language endowment compatible with those facts.

The synoptic sketch of language diversity presented by Evans & Levinson (E&L) suggests that the scope and depth of this diversity itself is a pivotal fact of language. The sheer variety in patterns of usage by which different languages map between linguistic form and meaning points to cultural transmission as the biological model of choice for human language. Handed down the generations in a family setting, languages not only provide a good match to the details of human population structure worldwide (Cavalli-Sforza 1997), but each one of them, linguistic isolates included, is in a state of perpetual change. Grammars (as the rest of language) undergo constant transformations in historical time, exhibiting shared modes of change driven by language use, modes that may in fact harbor the true laws of language (Bybee 2006; Greenberg 1969; Lehmann 1995).

Commentary/Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals Add the fact that any human being, placed in any one of these language communities at birth, will acquire full competence in the local language, and the cultural model equates to two null hypotheses: Every extant and past mapping between linguistic form and meaning is learnable under the circumstances in which humans typically encounter them, and we come into the world equipped with the capacity to acquire, and eventually to transmit, such mappings across generations by cultural learning. The impression that language requires constraints on its forms (such as its grammar) other than those imposed by the logic of cultural transmission itself stems from a half-century old strategic confound introduced into linguistics by Noam Chomsky (1959). One argument Chomsky opposed to behaviorist claims regarding language acquisition was a formal one: The sophisticated Suppes-Estes formalization of behaviorist learning theory lacks the power to acquire a grammar of human caliber (Chomsky 1975, in Piattelli-Palmarini 1980, p. 111). Although the logical possibility remained that behaviorist learning theory is inadequate as learning theory, Chomsky took the unlearnability of human grammar by its means to support the proposition that grammar is innate. Through his persistent efforts, the fact that humans have a unique biological endowment for language has come to be identified with a presumptive innate grammar to which learning contributes but “minor modifications that give one language or another, depending on experience” (Chomsky, in Harnad 1976), as if this were the only way to have an endowment for language. There is neither need nor justification for biologically oriented work on human language to continue to accommodate this strategic confound. Cultural transmission delivers the restricted search space needed to enable language learning, not by constraining the form language takes on an innate basis, but by ensuring that the form in which language is presented to the learner is learnable (Zuidema 2003). The target of the new generation’s learning process is itself the outcome of a learning process (previous generation). Gold’s 1967 theorem – cited as recently as 2002 by Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch (see Hauser et al. 2002) – accordingly cannot decide between learned and innate grammar (Zuidema 2003; see also Clark 2001; Horning 1969; Johnson 2004; Lappin & Shieber 2007). Moreover, across generations of learning agents, cultural transmission has the power to transform a state of arbitrary strings randomly paired with meanings into a shared and efficient grammar without intervention of natural selection or differential reinforcement of outcomes (Kirby 2002). This apparent magic results from competition among strings for access to subsequent generations via the “learner bottleneck,” a central aspect of the “poverty of the stimulus” argument. In this competition more efficient and general forms tend to outlast others over generations. What remains is to complete the cultural model with a way to sustain the chain of transmission of initial nonsense (unsemanticized, ungrammaticized strings) over the many generations required for convergence on a shared grammar. The ideal prior state for this can be found among the cultural traditions of complex learned song of many songbirds and a few mammals. Some of these are not confined to cultural variations on an innate pattern, the “species-specific song” recently invoked by Fitch (2008), but are emancipated from innate constraint on the form song takes (calls and songs of 76 species of birds from two continents have been identified in the repertoire of the marsh warbler: Baylis 1982; Dowsett-Lemaire 1979). Under circumstances explored in Merker and Okanoya (2007), a prelinguistic human adaptation for emancipated song would provide the mechanism to sustain string transmission for however long convergence might take, because it would be driven by the need to impress by elaborate vocal display rather than to communicate meaning. But “Something about the faculty of language must be unique in order to explain the differences between humans and other animals” (Fitch et al. 2005, p. 182, emphasis in original). Indeed, this is a condition met by the very adaptation needed

for song learning to be possible, as first proposed by Darwin (1871). It is a dedicated learning capacity missing in all other primates – our ape relatives included – but essential for every word and sentence we know how to pronounce, namely the capacity to learn to reproduce, by voice, patterns of sound originally received by ear, technically known as vocal production learning (Janik & Slater 1997). We share this capacity with some of the singers and all mimics among the birds, and with a few mammals, yet we alone, of all species, have evolved vocal learning in the setting of a primate brain. Supported by a conformal motive (Merker 2005) and de novo evolution of a direct projection from primary motor cortex to the respiratory and phonatory motor nuclei of the lower brainstem (Brown et al. 2008; Okanoya & Merker 2007), vocal learning turns the cerebral territories centered on Wernicke’s and Broca’s areas from their non-language uses in other primates to the service of human language by recruiting them to the generative production and intergenerational transmission of culturally learned vocal lore. To it we owe not only our developmental trajectory for language learning, infant babbling included, but our propensity for imitation and ritual culture more generally (Merker 2005), along with a robust selection pressure for encephalization (Merker, in press; Merker & Okanoya 2007). As repeatedly urged by students of birdsong (Doupe´ & Kuhl 1999; Marler 1970; Nottebohm 1975), this distinctive capacity of ours for vocal learning holds the biological key to the singularity of human language. Through it, and unconstrained by innate so-called universal grammar, the historical filter of cultural transmission – which passes only the possible – continually adapts the actual forms of languages to multiple interacting constraints such as use, utility, learnability, and neural resources (Christiansen & Chater 2008), as well as cultural norms (Everett 2005), with diversity in train. ACKNOWLEDGMENT The author is indebted to Shimon Edelman for helpful comments on an earlier version of this commentary.

On formal universals in phonology doi:10.1017/S0140525X09990537 Andrew Nevins Department of Linguistics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02139. [email protected] www.fas.harvard.edu/~nevins

Abstract: Understanding the universal aspects of human language structure requires comparison at multiple levels of analysis. While Evans & Levinson (E&L) focus mostly on substantive variation in language, equally revealing insights can come from studying formal universals. I first discuss how Artificial Grammar Experiments can test universal preferences for certain types of abstract phonological generalizations over others. I then discuss moraic onsets in the language Arrernte, and how its apparent substantive variation ultimately rests on a formal universal regarding syllable-weight sensitivity.

The target article by Evans & Levinson (E&L), questioning not only the existence of universals but the methodology of pursuing them, raises many issues for discussion. In this commentary, I limit my remarks to the importance of formal (as opposed to substantive) universals – a distinction E&L do not draw with sufficient clarity. Formal universals in phonology are constituted by the analytic elements that human minds employ in constructing representations of sound structure. Put simply, formal universals refer to the set of available data structures (e.g., binary features, metrical grids, autosegmental tiers) and the possible operations on them that can be used in constructing a grammar of a language. Phonotactic dependencies of the form Given segments A, B in the same word, if A has feature F, then B must have feature G are BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5

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Commentary/Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals constrained by analytic restrictions on what can be referred to. These analytic restrictions are, by hypothesis, formal universals that are independent of the historical contingencies or cultural practices of any given language community. One of the best ways of studying formal universals of this kind is by constructing Artificial Grammar Learning experiments, using the methodology of cognitive science. In one such recent study, Moreton (2008) conducted an experiment in which participants were taught a miniature artificial language containing phonotactic dependencies of the form outlined above. There were three conditions: in one, F and G were both vowel height; in a second, F and G were both obstruent voicing; and in a third, F was vowel height and G was obstruent voicing. Importantly, the rules of English phonotactics do not contain any of these three dependencies. The results, however, showed that the height-voice dependency was not learned by participants. Moreton’s conclusion was that an analytic bias favors learning certain phonotactic dependencies over others; the resulting formal phonological universal is in (1): (1) Learning phonotactic dependencies of the form Given segments A, B in the same word, if A has feature F, then B must have feature G is universally easier when F and G are the same feature than when F and G are different features. Formal universals like (1) lend themselves to eminently more possibilities for integration with the cognitive sciences than E&L’s proposed research program based on “the dual role of biological and cultural-historical attractors” (target article, sect. 8, para. 6, E&L’s thesis 5). Formal universals allow for experimental testing in laboratory conditions under which the historicalcultural factors are completely controlled for, and hence irrelevant to the outcomes. It is worth considering how apparent exceptions to universals are analyzed in other fields. As an example, consider the case of the Jacana bird, one of nature’s species exhibiting a “sex-role reversal,” whereby it is the females that engage in polyandry and cuckolding of the males. At the right level of analysis, the sex-role reversal in these shorebirds is entirely unsurprising, because it is the males that perform the raising of the chicks. The correct asymmetry between sexes is not that males have multiple mates while females do not, but rather, that the sex that commits to what biologists call “parental investment” is the one who is stuck in the harem. When the universal is correctly formulated, the Jacana bird is actually an exception that proves the rule. I argue that E&L err in concluding that there are no universals within human phonology based on apparent substantive exceptions: But in 1999, Breen and Pensalfini published a clear demonstration that Arrernte organizes its syllables around a VC(C) structure and does not permit consonantal onsets(Breen & Pensalfini 1999). With the addition of this one language to our sample, the CV syllable gets downgraded from absolute universal to a strong tendency, and the status of the CV assumption in any model of UG must be revised. (target article, sect. 2.2.2, para. 2)

Arrernte is not, as E&L would have it, but one language that recently “ruined the entire sample,” so to speak. The question of VC syllabification in Australian languages was raised by Sommer (1970; 1981) on the language Oykangand, later insightfully analyzed in terms of onset-maximization by McCarthy and Prince (1986). There was, historically, a widespread loss of initial consonants throughout Australian languages, which Hale (1964) and Blevins (2001) attributed to stress shift and lenition processes. Although Arrernte was apparently no exception to this sweeping change, nonetheless, “25% of Arrernte words are pronounced in isolation with an initial consonant” (Breen & Pensalfini 1999, p. 2). To account for words such as mpwar and ta˛k, Breen and Pensalfini (1999) have to propose that these words have an underlying hidden initial vowel, a red-flag for any “clear demonstration” that the language disallows consonantal onsets. In general, the deduction of which syllabification pattern a word contains depends on particular phonological processes

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that refer to syllabic divisions. In this light, consider the following formal universal: (2) Stress assignment, weight-sensitive allomorphy, compensatory lengthening and prosodic morphology, when sensitive to distinctions among syllable types, refer exclusively to the representational unit of weight called the mora. The phonological universal in (2), developed by Hyman (1985), McCarthy and Prince (1986), and Hayes (1989), is formal, not substantive in nature: it restricts the data structures that can be referred to by morphophonological processes, and is not about the substantive question of which segments can bear moras. In fact, Topintzi (2009) has gathered evidence from a wide range of languages demonstrating the ability of onset consonants to be moraic. The existence of metrical processes referring to onsets has been a topic of research for many years; see Davis (1988), Downing (1998), Goedemans (1998), and Gordon (2005), who discuss onset-sensitivity of stress in languages ranging from English and Italian to Piraha˜ and Iowa-Oto. If vowels and onset consonants, but not coda consonants, are moraic in Arrernte, the statement of stress assignment and weight-sensitive allomorphy become quite straightforward in the light of (2). In Arrernte, stress is assigned within a word to the first vowel preceded by a consonant: mpwa´.rem, “is making,” versus i.kwe´nt, “policeman.” Since onset consonants are moraic, the stress rule is simple: the left-most bimoraic syllable receives stress. Similarly, the statement of plural allomorphy in Arrernte is simple: bimoraic-or-greater forms like i.˛el and ta˛k take the suffix -ewar, while monomoraic forms like ar and a˛k take the suffix -erir. The reduplication patterns can receive a similar treatment in terms of moraic targets, within the prosodic morphology framework: for example, the copying of VC strings to a reduplicant is driven by the demand to fill a bimoraic template. Like the Jacana bird’s sex-role reversal, which has a mechanistic and principled explanation at a different level of primitives (partner with greater parental investment, instead of male and female), the patterning of weight-sensitive process in Arrernte exhibits a principled conformity to a formal universal at the level of which consonants are moraic, instead of in terms of syllabification. Rather than positing a silent initial vowel for 25% of Arrernte words, attention to the statement of formal universals enables a consistent representational property for syllables throughout the language. The universal in this case pertains to the set of data structures that learners use to encode sound patterns: moras, and only moras, are the formal unit that can be referred to by weight-sensitive properties. E&L trumpet the slogan “A linguist who asks ‘Why?’ must be a historian” (sect. 7, epigram, quoting Haspelmath 1999, p. 205). Integration with the cognitive sciences, however, will come from mechanistic explanations, not from hand-waving at diachronic contingencies. Formal universals are restrictions on representational vocabulary, and they rear their heads even when history deals them an odd shuffle or, as in the case of artificial grammar experiments, no historical shuffle at all.

Universal grammar and mental continuity: Two modern myths doi:10.1017/S0140525X09990719 Derek C. Penn,a Keith J. Holyoak,b and Daniel J. Povinellia a Cognitive Evolution Group, University of Louisiana at Lafayette, New Iberia, LA, 70560; bDepartment of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90095. [email protected] http://www.cognitiveevolutiongroup.org/ [email protected] http://reasoninglab.psych.ucla.edu/ [email protected] http://www.cognitiveevolutiongroup.org/

Abstract: In our opinion, the discontinuity between extant human and nonhuman minds is much broader and deeper than most researchers

Commentary/Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals admit. We are happy to report that Evans & Levinson’s (E&L’s) target article strongly corroborates our unpopular hypothesis, and that the comparative evidence, in turn, bolsters E&L’s provocative argument. Both a Universal Grammar and the “mental continuity” between human and nonhuman minds turn out to be modern myths.

If Evans & Levinson (E&L) are right (and we believe they are), the dominant consensus among comparative psychologists is as specious as the Universal Grammar (UG) hypothesis in linguistics. At present, most comparative psychologists believe that the difference between human and other animal minds is “one of degree and not of kind” (Darwin 1871; for recent examples of this pervasive consensus, see commentaries on Penn et al. [2008] in BBS, Vol. 31, No. 2). Among researchers willing to admit that the human mind might be qualitatively different, most argue that our species’ cognitive uniqueness is limited to certain domain-specific faculties, such as language and/or social-communicative intelligence. We believe this view of the human mind is profoundly mistaken. In our opinion, the discontinuity between extant human and nonhuman minds is much broader and deeper than most researchers admit. We are happy to report that E&L’s target article strongly corroborates our unpopular hypothesis; conversely, the comparative evidence bolsters E&L’s provocative argument. The case for a domain-general discontinuity. Linguists can (and should) argue about which human languages employ constituency and which do not. Or about which employ syntactic recursion and which do not. But from a comparative psychologist’s perspective, the spectacular fact of the matter is that any normal human child can learn any human language, and no human language is learnable by any other extant species. Why? Why are human languages so easy for us to learn and so unthinkable for everyone else? The standard explanation is that only humans have a “language instinct” (Pinker 1994), which fits nicely with the presumption that the rest of the human mind is more or less like that of any other ape (e.g., Hauser et al. 2002). But as E&L point out, the diversity of human languages suggests that our faculty for language relies largely on domain-general cognitive systems that originally evolved for other purposes and still perform these non-linguistic functions to this day. If E&L are right, there should be significant differences between human and nonhuman minds outside of language. Conversely, E&L’s case would be in bad shape if the nonverbal cognitive abilities of nonhuman apes turned out to be highly similar to those of humans. We recently reviewed the available comparative evidence across a number of domains – from “same-different” reasoning and Theory of Mind (ToM) to tool-use and spatial cognition (Penn et al. 2008). Across all these disparate domains, a consistent pattern emerges: Although there is a profound similarity between the ability of human and nonhuman animals to learn about perceptually grounded relations, only humans reason in terms of higher-order structural relations. Nonhuman animals, for example, are capable of generalizing abstract rules about “same” and “different” relations in terms of the perceptual variability between stimuli. But unlike human children (Holyoak et al. 1984), they appear incapable of making analogical inferences based on structural, logical, or functional relationships. Nonhuman animals are able to predict the actions of others on the basis of the past and occurrent behavior of these others. But they are incapable of forming higher-order representations of others’ mental states or of understanding others’ subjective experience by analogy to their own (Penn & Povinelli 2007b; in press; Povinelli & Vonk 2003). Nonhuman animals can infer the first-order causal relation between observable contingencies and reason in a means-end fashion. But they show no evidence of being able to cognize the analogy between perceptually disparate causal relationships or to reason in terms of unobservable causal

mechanisms (Penn & Povinelli 2007a; Povinelli 2000). And although nonhuman animals can learn the first-order relationship between symbols and objects in the world, they are incapable of cognizing combinatorial hierarchical schemas in any domain – causal, social, spatial, or symbolic. So here is the central explanadum that most comparative psychologists and linguists seem to be avoiding: Why is it that the discontinuity between human and nonhuman forms of communication appears at the same degree of relational complexity as does the discontinuity between human and nonhuman cognition in every other domain? The hypothesis that human and nonhuman minds differ only in their social-communicative intelligence (cf. Tomasello 2008) does not explain why the discontinuities between human and nonhuman minds in non-communicative tasks (e.g., causal reasoning) are just as profound as those between human and nonhuman forms of communication; nor does it explain why the human learning system is the only one that can cope with the relational complexity of human language. Furthermore, the evidence from high-functioning autistic populations demonstrates that normal relational intelligence can be preserved in the absence of normal social-communicative intelligence, whereas the converse is not the case (see Morsanyi & Holyoak [in press] and references therein). This suggests that our unique social-communicative skills rely on our unique relational intelligence – not the other way around. The hypothesis that the communicative and cognitive functions of language played an important role in rewiring the human brain makes good sense to us (Bermudez 2005; Bickerton 2009). And it is clear that language still enables, extends, and shapes human cognition in many profound ways (Clark 2006; Loewenstein & Gentner 2005; Majid et al. 2004). But the evidence from comparative psychology points to the same conclusion as does that from comparative linguistics: It is not language alone that made or makes humans so smart (see our discussion in Penn et al. 2008). Rather, the diversity of human languages seems to have been shaped by the capabilities and limitations of the human mind (Christiansen & Chater 2008). And our species’ unique relational abilities seem to be a necessary precursor for the advent of even the most rudimentary human language. As Darwin himself put it: “The mental powers of some early progenitor of man must have been more highly developed than in any existing ape, before even the most imperfect form of speech could have come into use” (Darwin 1871, p. 57). The model of a physical symbol system (PSS; Newell 1980) provides a useful heuristic framework for understanding what happened to the human mind. According to our hypothesis (Penn et al. 2008), animals of many taxa evolved the ability to represent first-order symbolic relations; but only humans evolved the ability to approximate the higher-order capabilities of a PSS. As a result, only humans can make the kind of analogical, modality-independent, role-governed inferences necessary to master the spectacular complexity of human language (Holyoak & Hummel 2000). This capability is not specific to language, nor did it originally evolve for language. Rather, our domaingeneral ability to reason about higher-order relations coevolved with and continues to subserve all our uniquely human abilities. An object lesson for comparative research. We cannot help but notice an unfortunate parallel between the current state of comparative psychology and generative linguistics: in both cases, researchers have gone to elaborate lengths to minimize any possible differences from English-speaking humans. To our mind, this is a gross travesty of Darwin’s legacy. Wasn’t the entire point of Darwin’s (1859) magnum opus to show that the natural processes of variation and selection combined with “Extinction of less-improved forms” could create enormous differences between extant organisms, some so great as to constitute different species altogether? Human minds and human BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5

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Commentary/Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals languages may both be bio-cultural hybrids. But, in our view, the principles of evolution that apply to bodies apply, mutatis mutandis, to minds and languages.

Against taking linguistic diversity at “face value” doi:10.1017/S0140525X09990562 David Pesetsky Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139. [email protected] http://web.mit.edu/linguistics/people/faculty/pesetsky/index.html

Abstract: Evans & Levinson (E&L) advocate taking linguistic diversity at “face value.” Their argument consists of a list of diverse phenomena and the assertion that no non-vacuous theory could possibly uncover a meaningful unity underlying them. I argue, with evidence from Tlingit and Warlpiri, that E&L’s list itself should not be taken at face value – and that the actual research record already demonstrates unity amidst diversity.

From a distance, the structures of the world’s languages do look gloriously diverse and endlessly varied. But since when is it sound strategy to take diversity at “face value”? All other sciences have progressed precisely by taking nothing at face value – diversity included. Evans & Levinson (E&L) claim, in effect, that linguistics is different from all other fields. If they are right, the search for deeper laws behind linguistic structure is a fool’s errand, and languages are just as inexplicably diverse as they seem at first glance. It is thus surprising that E&L’s article contains no discussion of the actual research to which they supposedly object. Instead, their article offers only (1) a parade of capsule descriptions of phenomena from the world’s languages, coupled with (2) blanket assertions that each phenomenon falls outside the scope of all (non-vacuous) general theories of linguistic structure. The argument must therefore rest on two premises: (1) that the capsule descriptions of phenomena are correct, and (2) that these phenomena fall so obviously beyond the pale of research on Universal Grammar (UG) that no argument is necessary. I believe there are reasons for caution about the first supposition and that the second is simply wrong. Confidence in the accuracy of E&L’s examples is undermined at the outset by a comparison of E&L’s claims with their sources. For example, as a demonstration that “semantic systems may carve the world at quite different joints” (sect. 2, para. 2), E&L cite Mithun (1999, p. 81) for an “unexpected number” marker (sect. 2.2.5, para. 3) in Jemez (misidentified by E&L as Kiowa). It is supposedly because “two” is an expected number of legs but not stones that the marker means “any quantity but two” when added to “leg” but “exactly two” when added to “stone.” According to Mithun, however, the actual determinant is the Noun-Class to which the noun belongs, a partly arbitrary classification (like Indo-European gender). In Jemez, “nose” belongs to the same class as “leg,” and “arm” belongs to the same class as “stone.” Consequently, if the number marker truly indicates how Jemez speakers “carve the world,” “one” must be an unexpected quantity of noses, but an expected quantity for arms (cf. Harbour 2006). Similarly, although E&L use Mundari ideophones to exemplify a “major word class” whose very existence “dilutes the plausibility of the innatist UG position” (sect. 2.2.4, para. 10), their source, Osada (1992, pp. 140– 44), actually does not discuss ideophone syntax at all. Mayan positionals are mentioned for the same reason – but although they do constitute a distinct category of root (used to derive words belonging to standard classes), they do not appear to constitute a syntactically distinguishable word class – at least not in Mam (England 1983,

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p. 78), Tzotzil (Haviland 1994, p. 700), Chol (Coon & Preminger 2009), or Tzeltal (Brown 1994, p. 754; cited by E&L). But even if E&L’s sources had been quoted perfectly, there is a deeper danger in arguments founded on capsule descriptions. Because linguistic puzzles are complex, even the best descriptions are incomplete. Fundamental generalizations often remain undiscovered for years, until a creative researcher suddenly asks a question whose answer unlocks one of the language’s secrets. And how does one find such questions? As it happens, among the most productive question-generating devices is the very idea that E&L deride: that languages share structural properties, often masked by one of their differences. Again and again, investigations guided by this possibility have altered our basic picture of the world’s languages. Compare E&L’s assertion that “syntactic constituency . . . is not a universal feature of languages” (sect. 5, para. 8), supposedly supported by the existence of languages with “free word order,” with the alternative – that such languages do not fundamentally differ from others in basic constituent structure, but merely allow these constituents to be reordered more freely. Although E&L attribute the appeal of this alternative to mere anglophone prejudice, its actual appeal rests on a body of hard-won results, achieved by researchers pursuing lines of inquiry that no one previously thought to pursue. One recent example is Cable’s (2007; 2008) investigation of wh-questions in Tlingit, a language of Alaska with considerable word order freedom. In languages with more rigid word order, there is a well-known split in how they form wh-questions. In languages like English and Italian, interrogative wh-phrases move to a dedicated position near the left periphery of the clause, precedable only by discourse topics (cf. This book, who would read it?; Rizzi 1997). In languages like Chinese and Korean, by contrast, there is no dedicated position for whphrases. Instead, they appear wherever their noninterrogative counterparts would: (1) (a)

English Who did John see?

(b) Chinese (Huang 1982) Zhangsan kajian-le shei Zhangsan see-asp who At first glance, Tlingit appears to pattern with Chinese rather than English in lacking a dedicated wh-position, as expected if free word order entails absence of constituent structure: (2)

Tlingit (Cable 2007; 2008) a. Ya´ x’u´x’ aado´och sa´ kwgwato´ow? this book who-erg Q he.will.read.it “Who will read this book?” b. Aado´och who-erg (¼ a)

sa´ ya´ x’u´x’ kwgwato´ow? Q this book he.will.read.it

c. Ke´et daa sa´ axa´? killer.whale what Q he.eats.it “What do killer whales eat?” On the basis of his fieldwork and analysis of Tlingit texts, Cable showed that, contrary to appearances, Tlingit wh-phrases do occupy a dedicated wh-position – in fact, a position syntactically and semantically identical to its counterpart in languages like English. Specifically, Cable discovered that phrases to the left of an interrogative wh-phrase – “this book” in (2a) and “killer whale” in (2c) – are always discourse topics, and if a wh-phrase appears to the right of the verb, the result is not interpretable as a wh-question. These findings are explained if the interrogative phrase in both Tlingit and English must occupy the same

Commentary/Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals position at the left periphery, precedable only by a discourse topic – that is, if this aspect of Tlingit clause structure resembles English, despite first impressions. Cable’s findings constitute a discovery, not anglophone prejudice. Earlier work on Tlingit, though excellent, had failed to spot the evidence for a wh-position. Cable’s discoveries were made precisely because his investigation was informed by what linguists had learned about whquestions in other languages. Remarkably, the same type of discovery has been reported by Legate (2001; 2002, building on Laughren 2002) for Warlpiri, the free word order language par excellence. Legate not only found the same dedicated wh-position in Warlpiri (precedable by topics) but also showed that the full array of standard tests for phrase structure in languages like English yield the same results for Warlpiri – important findings directly attributable to the very research program that E&L consider bankrupt. Questions like those addressed by Legate and Cable must be asked for every item in E&L’s linguistic Wunderkammer. Are they truly as “different” as they seem? Sometimes, of course, the answer might be “yes.” But how will we ever distinguish real differences from those that merely reflect our ignorance if we grant – even for an instant – E&L’s dictum that apparent structural differences must just “be accepted for what they are” (sect. 1, para. 1)? ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I wish to thank Tom Bever, Seth Cable, Guglielmo Cinque, Jessica Coon, Daniel Harbour, and Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini for useful comments on an earlier draft.

The reality of a universal language faculty doi:10.1017/S0140525X09990720 Steven Pinkera and Ray Jackendoffb,c a

Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138; Center for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University, Medford, MA 02155; and c Santa Fe Institute, Santa Fe, NM 87501. [email protected] http://pinker.wjh.harvard.edu [email protected] http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/incbios/RayJackendoff/index.htm b

Abstract: While endorsing Evans & Levinson’s (E&L’s) call for rigorous documentation of variation, we defend the idea of Universal Grammar as a toolkit of language acquisition mechanisms. The authors exaggerate diversity by ignoring the space of conceivable but nonexistent languages, trivializing major design universals, conflating quantitative with qualitative variation, and assuming that the utility of a linguistic feature suffices to explain how children acquire it.

Though Evans & Levinson (E&L) cite us as foils, we agree with many of their points: that the documentation of linguistic diversity is important for cognitive science; that linguists have been too casual in assuming universals and formulating a defensible theory of universal grammar; that the language faculty is a product of gene-culture coevolution; that languages are historical compromises among competing desiderata; and that cross-linguistic generalizations are unlikely to be exceptionless. We do, however, endorse a version of the Universal Grammar (UG) hypothesis: that the human brain is equipped with circuitry, partly specific to language, that makes language acquisition possible and that constrains human languages to a characteristic design. E&L do not make it easy to evaluate their position. Their claim that linguistic variation is “extraordinary,” “fundamental,” “amazing,” and “remarkable” is not just unfalsifiably vague but also myopic, focusing on differences while taking commonalities for granted. Any survey that fails to consider the larger design

space for conceivable languages is simply unequipped to specify how “remarkable” the actual diversity of languages is. Consider these hypothetical languages: Abba specifies grammatical relations not in terms of agent, patient, theme, location, goal, and so on, but in terms of evolutionarily significant relationships: predator-prey, eater-food, enemy-ally, permissible-impermissible sexual partners, and so on. All other semantic relations are metaphorical extensions of these. Bacca resembles the two-word stage in children’s language development. Speakers productively combine words to express basic semantic relations like recurrence, absence, and agentpatient, but no utterance contains more than two morphemes. Listeners use the context to disambiguate them. The speakers of Cadda have no productive capacity: they draw on a huge lexicon of one-word holophrases and memorized formulas and idioms. New combinations are occasionally coined by a shaman or borrowed from neighboring groups. The grammar of Daffa corresponds to quantificational logic, distinguishing only predicates and arguments, and using morphological markers for quantifiers, parentheses, and variables. Fagga is a “rational” language spoken in a utopian commune. It lacks arbitrary signs larger than a phoneme, allowing the meaning of any word to be deduced from its phonology. Gahha is a musical language, which uses melodic motifs for words, major and minor keys for polarity, patterns of tension and relaxation for modalities, and so on. These and countless other conceivable languages are not obviously incompatible with cognitive limitations or communicative limitations (unless stipulated post hoc), and fall well outside the envelope reviewed by E&L. Indeed, E&L concede an enormous stratum of universals in endorsing an innate core of Hockett-syle “design features”: discreteness, arbitrariness, productivity, duality of patterning, auditoryvocal specialization, multiple levels of structure between sound and meaning (including morphosyntax and semantics), and linearity combined with nonlinear structure (constituency and dependency). But if this set of universal mechanisms were laid out explicitly, as computational machinery consistent with the details of actual languages, we doubt that it would differ “starkly” from the kind of Universal Grammar that the two of us have posited (Jackendoff 1997; 2002; Pinker & Jackendoff 2005; Culicover & Jackendoff 2005). E&L’s focus on differences of detail, moreover, leads them to exaggerate differences in underlying design. Whether a language’s inventory of phonemes or verbs is large or small, whether grammatical agreement plays a role that is indispensable or vestigial, whether a noun-verb difference is obvious to a linguist in every language or subtle in a few, whether grammatical combination is florid inside phrases but rudimentary inside words, or vice versa, whether embeddings are found in a high or a low percentage of phrases – none of these pertains to underlying computational systems, just the extent to which different parts of it are deployed (which we agree depends on the vagaries of history). The force of many of E&L’s examples depends more on having a splitter’s (rather than a lumper’s) temperament than on the existence of “extraordinary” variation. English, for example, has phenomena similar to Chinese classifiers (e.g., a piece of paper, a stick of wood), Athabaskan verb distinctions (among locative verbs; Levin 1993; Pinker 1989; 2007), ideophones (response cries such as yum, splat, hubba-hubba, pow!; Goffman 1978), and geocentric spatial terms (e.g., north, upstream, crosstown; Li & Gleitman 2002). There are differences, to be sure, but it is unparsimonious to insist that they lack any common psycholinguistic mechanisms. E&L try to minimize their own commitment to Universal Grammar in two ways. First, they try to trivialize it as “true by definition,” claiming that any system lacking these features BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5

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Commentary/Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals would not be called a “language.” But that is both factually false (the word “language” is commonly applied to bee dance, ape signing, computer programming protocols, etc.) and theoretically misleading. The proposition that all human societies have “language” according to that definition is neither circular nor trivial. Second, the authors note that these features are functional, as if that suffices to explain how children acquire them. But functionally useful structures do not materialize by magic. Even after they have developed historically as part of a tacit convention within a community of speakers, a child still has to acquire them, including the myriad grammatical details which do not perceptibly contribute to that child’s ability to communicate but are simply part of the target language (semi-regular inflectional paradigms, arbitrary grammatical categories, complex co-occurrence restrictions, etc.). This requires sufficiently powerful learning abilities, which have evolved as the “gene” side of the “geneculture coevolution” we all embrace. The construct “Universal Grammar” (UG), as we have invoked it, refers to these learning abilities. UG is emphatically not a compendium of language universals (though it has often been taken to be such). UG, in our conception, is a toolkit. This implies that it does not, as E&L claim, contain all possibilities for all languages: one builds structures with tools, not from tools. We have suggested that UG may be a set of “attractors” for grammars (Culicover 1999; Culicover & Jackendoff 2005; Jackendoff 2002) – strong biases on the child’s learning that produce statistical tendencies in grammars, but that can be overcome by exceptional input, a possibility that E&L endorse. These learning mechanisms are a black box for E&L, who suggest that they can be borrowed off the shelf from other domains of cognition. But they do not cite any analysis showing that some independently motivated set of cognitive processes actually suffices to acquire the detailed and complex structures mastered by children. In practice, attempts to model specific phenomena of language development using generic information-processing machinery (notably, connectionist networks) habitually smuggle innate linguistic structure in the back door in the form of unheralded design features and kluges (Marcus 2001; Pinker & Ullman 2002a; 2002b; 2003). For all these disagreements, we applaud E&L’s call for a more rigorous study of linguistic variation and universals. When combined with rigorous specification of the psychological mechanisms that make language acquisition and use possible, we predict that the resulting psycholinguistic universals that give rise to the diversity of human language will be far from “unprofound.”

For universals (but not finite-state learning) visit the zoo doi:10.1017/S0140525X09990732 Geoffrey K. Pullum and Barbara C. Scholz School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, EH8 9AD, Scotland, United Kingdom. [email protected] http://ling.ed.ac.uk/~gpullum [email protected] http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/people/honorary-fellows/barbarascholz.html

Abstract: Evans & Levinson’s (E&L’s) major point is that human languages are intriguingly diverse rather than (like animal communication systems) uniform within the species. This does not establish a “myth” about language universals, or advance the ill-framed pseudo-debate over universal grammar. The target article does,

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however, repeat a troublesome myth about Fitch and Hauser’s (2004) work on pattern learning in cotton-top tamarins.

The take-home message from the target article by Evans & Levinson (E&L) is not in their title but in their subtitle. They don’t show that language universals are a myth; their point is that what makes human languages really interesting for cognitive science is their diversity, not their uniformity. Boas would have endorsed this view, but it seems fresh and novel in the current context. You want species-wide universal grammar? Visit the zoo. Study puttynose monkeys (Arnold & Zuberbu¨hler 2006), or your cat. What human beings bring to animal communication is not rigid universals but a flexible ability to employ any of a gigantic range of strikingly varied systems. That seems to be what E&L are saying. Regrettably, though, the authors repeat a wildly false claim about results on syntactic learning in nonhuman primates. E&L were apparently misled by a statement in the literature they critique: they cite Fitch and Hauser (2004) as having demonstrated that cotton-top tamarins have “impressive learning powers over FSGs [finite state grammars]” (sect. 6, para. 3). This meme is spreading, alarmingly: E&L even cite a paper by a brain researcher (Friederici 2004) who is looking for distinct neural systems for processing FSGs on the one hand and PSGs (phrase-structure grammar) on the other. The truth is that no one has shown monkeys to have any general ability to learn finite-state (FS) languages. It is extremely unlikely that anyone ever will. FS parsing is powerful; it would suffice for pretty much all the linguistic processing that humans ever do. Reflect for a moment on the likelihood that tamarins could be habituated to strings matching this regular expression: a (c d c d c ) a þ b (c d c d c ) b

All such strings begin with either a or b; the middle is an indefinitely long stretch of c and d in random order, but always containing an even number of d; and strings end with whatever they began with (notice, an unbounded dependency!). This language has a very simple FSG, but passively learning it from being exposed to examples (acca, accdcccddcccccda; bdccccdb; acdccddcccddda . . .) is surely not plausible. Figuring out the grammar would surely be way beyond the abilities of any mammal other than a skilled human puzzle-solver with pencil and paper. People have unfortunately been confusing FS languages with a vastly smaller proper subset known as the strictly local (SL) languages (Pullum & Rogers 2006; Pullum & Scholz 2007; Rogers & Pullum 2007). Fitch and Hauser unwittingly encouraged the error by remarking that FSGs “can be fully specified by transition probabilities between a finite number of ‘states’ (e.g., corresponding to words or calls)” (Fitch & Hauser 2004, p. 377). The equation of states with words here is an error. States in FSGs are much more abstract. Languages that can be described purely in terms of transitions between particular terminal symbols (words or calls or whatever) are SL languages. (It is not clear why Fitch and Hauser mentioned the orthogonal issue of transition probability.) The SL class is the infinite union of a hierarchy of SLk languages (k . 1), the k setting the maximal distance over which dependencies can be stated. The most basic SL languages are the SL2 languages, describable by finite sets of bigrams. The SL2 class is right at the bottom of several infinite hierarchies within the FS languages (see Pullum & Rogers [2006] or Rogers & Pullum [2007] for the mathematics). Fitch and Hauser found that cotton-top tamarins could be habituated to an SL2 pattern, namely the one denoted by (ab) . They remark that perhaps tamarins fail to learn non-FS PSG languages “because their ability to differentiate successive items is limited to runs of two” (Fitch & Hauser 2004, p. 379), conceding the point

Commentary/Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals that a limitation to recognizing bigrams might well be involved. Their results do not in any way imply that monkeys can acquire arbitrary FS languages from exposure to primary data. They may not be much better at pattern learning than your cat. E&L have unfortunately contributed to the spread of a myth. As for the supposed myth of E&L’s title, that of language universals, we see little prospect of sensible debate at this stage. People trying to set one up usually depict a clash between Chomsky, who has purportedly “shown that there is really only one human language” (Smith 1999 p. 1), and Joos, who is alleged to have claimed that languages may “differ from each other without limit and in unpredictable ways” (e.g., Smith 1999, p. 105). But Chomsky (in Kasher 1991, p. 26) says merely that if all parameters of syntactic variation are “reducible to lexical properties” and if we ignore all parameters that are so reducible (hence we ignore all parameters), there is no syntactic variation at all, so the number of distinct syntactic systems is 1. This is not an empirical claim about human languages; it is a tautology. And Joos (1966, p. 96), while setting a phonology paper in historical context, merely alluded to an “American (Boas) tradition” that valued cataloguing language features over explanatory speculation. The passage quoted does not endorse that tradition or extend it to syntax. It should be obvious that we must assume languages may differ in unpredictable ways: we do not know the limits of variation, so fieldwork often brings surprises. That was Boas’s point. But equally obviously, not all conceivable differences between languages will be attested. Logically there could be dekatransitive verbs (taking ten obligatory object NPs), but there are not, because using them would outstrip our cognitive resources. In that sense there will be all sorts of limits. This does not look like the seeds of an interesting debate, so it is just as well that E&L do not really try to pursue one. Their conclusions are not about universally quantified linguistic generalizations being mythical, but about how “the diversity of language is, from a biological point of view, its most remarkable property” (sect. 8, para. 6, their thesis 1). That is an interesting thought, and it deserves extended consideration by linguistic and cognitive scientists. ACKNOWLEDGMENT We thank Rob Truswell for helpful critical comments on an earlier draft. He bears no responsibility for the opinions expressed in this one, or for any errors.

The discovery of language invariance and variation, and its relevance for the cognitive sciences doi:10.1017/S0140525X09990574 Luigi Rizzi CISCL (Interdepartmental Centre for Cognitive Studies on Language), University of Siena, 53100 Siena, Italy. rizzil unisi.it

Abstract: Modern linguistics has highlighted the fundamental invariance of human language: A rich invariant structure has emerged from comparative studies nourished by sophisticated formal models; languages also differ along important dimensions, but variation is constrained in severe and systematic ways. I illustrate this research direction in the domains of island constraints, word order restrictions, and the expression of referential dependencies. Both language invariance and language variability within systematic limits are highly relevant for the cognitive sciences.

Evans & Levinson (E&L) claim that diversity, rather than uniformity, is the fundamental fact of language relevant for cognitive scientists. This is not the conclusion that modern linguistics arrived at over the last half century: careful testing of specific

universalist hypotheses permitted in many cases the discovery of precise and stable patterns of invariance. First, consider locality. In the late 1970s, the observation that wh-phrases can be extracted from indirect questions in Italian led to abandoning the hypothesis of a universal Wh Island Constraint (WhIC), and to the formulation of a parametrized version of the relevant Universal Grammar (UG) principle, Subjacency (Rizzi 1978). The attempt to systematically check the empirical validity of the model led to the discovery of argument/adjunct asymmetries. Wh-adjuncts (why, how, . . .) are strictly nonextractable even in languages which are permissive with argument extraction: (1) a. b.

Quale problema non sai come risolvere? “Which problem don’t you know how to solve?” 

Come non sai quale problema risolvere? “How don’t you know which problem to solve?”

The critical cross-linguistic observation came from the study of wh-in-situ languages (with wh-elements remaining in clauseinternal position). Huang(1982) discovered that in Chinese, the argument-adjunct asymmetry (1) holds at the interpretive level. Sentence (2) can mean (3)a, with interpretive extraction of the argument, but not (3)b, with interpretive extraction of the adjunct: (2)

Akiu xiang.zhidao [women weishenme jiegu-le shei] ne? Akiu want.know [we why fire-Prf who] Qwh

(3)

a. “Who is the person x such that Akiu wonders [why we fired person x]?” b.

“ What is the reason x such that Akiu wonders [whom we fired for reason x]?”

Huang’s conclusion was that in wh-in-situ languages the whelements move abstractly to the front, and the abstract movement in (2) is sensitive to the same fundamental locality constraint as the overt movement in (1) (see also, Tsai 1994). A huge literature was then devoted to understanding the nature of the asymmetry in (1) to (3) (see Cinque 1990; Pesetsky 2000; Starke 2001, among others), the generality of adjunct nonextractability (Lasnik & Saito 1992), and the parametrization involved in argument extraction. So, the refutation of an unqualified WhIC gave rise to a deeper cross-linguistic generalization, which was soon extended to a much larger class of Weak Islands (Szabolcsi 2006), and deeply influenced the development of the theory of locality (Chomsky 1995, 2000; Rizzi 1990). Here and elsewhere, variation is not haphazard but gives rise to precise cross-linguistic patterns, with some logical possibilities systematically unattested: we don’t find the “mirror image” of Italian or Chinese, that is, of a language allowing (overt or covert) extraction of adjuncts and barring extraction of arguments. If the non-universality of the WhIC had been interpreted as showing that anything goes in extraction across languages, linguists would have continued to collect catalogues of extraction facts for individual languages, with little hope of ever uncovering systematic generalizations in the patterns of variation. In this case, the discovery of invariance required considerable abstractness and theoretical sophistication. Much of the typological tradition discussed by E&L has chosen to stick to an extremely impoverished, non-abstract descriptive apparatus, a legitimate methodological decision, but one which severely restricts the possibility of capturing forms of invariance. In spite of these limitations, it is far from true that the typological literature globally supports an “anything goes” position. In fact, the typological findings can be an important source of inspiration for more structured and abstract approaches. Consider Cinque’s (2005) discussion of Greenberg’s (1963a) Universal 20, a generalization essentially confirmed by 40 years of typological BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5

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Commentary/Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals investigations: in languages in which N appears at the end of the NP, the order of certain modifiers is rigid (Demonstrative – Numeral – Adjective – Noun); in languages in which N is initial, significant ordering variation is observed. Cinque offers an explanation of this pattern through the assumption that N movement is the fundamental engine determining reordering. If N moves, it can determine different orders on the basis of familiar parameters on movement. If N remains in the final position, the order is invariably the basic one, plausibly determined by compositional semantics. Again, only a small subset of the logical possibilities is attested, and precise patterns of variation hold, which are amenable to plausible computational principles. Finally, consider the theory of binding, constraining referential dependencies (E&L, sect. 3, para. 8). There is some limited variation in the locality conditions for the principles holding for anaphors and pronominals, expressible through restrictive and highly falsifiable parametric models (Manzini & Wexler 1986). Clearly, we are very far from a picture of indefinite variability. Moreover, there is no variation at all in non-coreference effects: no language seems to allow coreference between a pronoun and a NP when the pronoun c-commands the NP ( Hei said that Johni was sick: Lasnik 1989), a property which children are sensitive to as early as testing is feasible (Crain 1991). Furthermore, referential dependencies are systematically regulated by the hierarchical relation c-command (Reinhart 1976), not by other imaginable relations. In sum, we find highly restricted variation, or strict uniformity. The same kinds of considerations would apply to many other domains discussed by E&L (constituent structure, the status of subjects, etc.). I certainly agree that language variation is of great interest for the cognitive sciences. Much promising research already focuses on that. Brain-imaging studies try to determine how the brain learns formal rules falling within or outside the range of attested cross-linguistic variation (Moro 2008; Tettamanti et al. 2002); acquisition studies uncover systematic “errors” in language development which correspond to structures possible in other adult languages, thus suggesting that children explore UG-constrained grammatical options which are not supported by experience (Rizzi 2006; Thornton 2008); and so on. The cognitive sciences should not overlook the results of half a century of linguistic research which has seriously attempted to identify the limits of variation: it is simply not true that languages can vary indefinitely. This fundamental fact is of critical importance for addressing central questions of acquisition and processing, questions on the expression of the linguistic capacities in the brain, and on the domain specificity or generality of the relevant cognitive constraints. The astounding observational diversity of living organisms has not deflected biologists from the search for the fundamental common features of life. There is no reason why linguists and cognitive scientists should give up the theory-guided search for deep invariants and the ultimate factors of linguistic variation.

Abstract: Generative linguistics’ search for linguistic universals (1) is not comparable to the vague explanatory suggestions of the article; (2) clearly merits a more central place than linguistic typology in cognitive science; (3) is fundamentally untouched by the article’s empirical arguments; (4) best explains the important facts of linguistic diversity; and (5) illuminates the dominant component of language’s “biocultural” nature: biology. 1. A science of cognition needs falsifiable theories. Although the target article’s final seven theses (sect. 8) include suggestions we find promising, they are presented as vague speculation, rather than as a formal theory that makes falsifiable predictions. It is thus nonsensical to construe them as superior to a falsifiable theory on the grounds that that theory has been falsified. Every theory is certain to make some predictions that are empirically inadequate, but the appropriate response within a science of cognition is to improve the theory and not to take refuge in the safety of unfalsifiable speculation. Insightful speculation is vital – not because speculation can replace formal theorizing, but because speculation can be sharpened to become formal theory. Theory and speculation are simply not empirically comparable. 2. In a theory of cognition, a universal principle is a property true of all human minds – a cog-universal – not a superficial descriptive property true of the expressions of all languages – a des-universal. This is why generative grammar, with its explicit

goal of seeking cog-universals, has always been more central to cognitive science than linguistic typology, which only speaks to des-universals. Unlike descriptive linguistic typology, generative grammar merits a central place in cognitive science because its topic is cognition and its method is science – falsifiable theory formulation. 3a. Counterexamples to des-universals are not counterexamples to cog-universals. The des-universals of Evans & Levinson’s

(E&L’s) Box 1 must not be confused with the cog-universals sought by generative grammar. This general point applies to all cases addressed in their article, but we only illustrate with one example. That Chinese questions do not locate wh-expressions in a different superficial position than the corresponding declarative sentence (Box 1) is a counterexample to a wh-movement des-universal but, famously, generative syntax has revealed that Chinese behaves like English with respect to syntactically determined restrictions on possible interpretations of questions; this follows if questions in both languages involve the same dependency between the same two syntactic positions, one of them “fronted.” In English, the fronted position is occupied by the wh-phrase and the other is empty, whereas in Chinese the reverse holds (Huang 1982/1998; Legendre et al. 1998). It is the syntactic relation between these positions, not the superficial location of the wh-phrase, that restricts possible interpretations. Such a hypothesized cog-universal can only be falsified by engaging the full apparatus of the formal theory – it establishes nothing to point to the superficial fact that wh-expressions in Chinese are not fronted. 3b. There are two types of cog-universals: Architectural and specific universals. The former specify the computational archi-

Universals in cognitive theories of language doi:10.1017/S0140525X09990586 Paul Smolenskya and Emmanuel Dupouxb a Department of Cognitive Science, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD 21218-2685; bLaboratoire de Sciences Cognitives et Psycholinguistique, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, De´partement d’Etudes Cognitives, Ecole Normale Supe´rieure, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 75005 Paris, France. [email protected] http://www.cogsci.jhu.edu/faculty/smolensky.html [email protected] http://www.lscp.net/persons/dupoux.html

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tecture of language: levels of representation (phonological, syntactic, semantic, etc.) data structures (features, hierarchical trees, indexes, etc.), operations (rule application, constraint satisfaction, etc.). The authors correctly recognize these as “design features” of human languages, but erroneously exclude them from the set of relevant universals. These architectural universals do not yield falsifiable predictions regarding typology, but they yield falsifiable predictions regarding language learnability. For instance, Peperkamp et al (2006) showed that without architectural universals regarding phonological rules, general-purpose unsupervised learning algorithms simply fail to acquire the phonemes of a language. The latter, specific universals, are tied to particular formal theories specifying in detail the architecture’s levels, structures, and operations, thus yielding falsifiable predictions regarding language typology.

Commentary/Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals 4a. Optimality Theory (OT), mentioned in the target article as a promising direction, contains the strongest architectural and specific universals currently available within generative grammar. According to OT’s architectural universals (Prince &

Smolensky 1993/2004; 1997), grammatical computation is optimization over a set of ranked constraints. This strong hypothesis (more than the hypothesis of “parameters”) has contributed insight into all levels of grammatical structure from phonology to pragmatics, and has addressed acquisition, processing, and probabilistic variation (the website http://roa.rutgers.edu hosts more than 1,000 OT papers). In a particular OT theory, specific universals take the form of a set of constraints (e.g., C1 ¼ “a sentence requires a subject”; C2 ¼ “each word must have an interpretation,” etc.) A grammar for a particular language is then a priority ranking of these constraints. For instance, C1 is ranked higher than C2 in the English grammar, so we say “it is raining,” although expletive “it” contributes nothing to the meaning; in Italian, the reverse priority relation holds, making the subjectless sentence “piove” optimal – grammatical (Grimshaw & SamekLodovici 1998). 4b. OT’s cog-universals yield theories of cross-linguistic typology that generally predict the absence of desuniversals. Each ranking of a constraint set mechanically pre-

dicts the possible existence of a human language. OT therefore provides theories of linguistic typology that aim, as rightly urged by the target article, to grapple with the full spectrum of cross-linguistic variation. OT makes use of a large set of specific universals (i.e., constraints), but because of the resolution of constraint conflict through optimization, these do not translate into des-universals: In the preceding example, C1 is violated in Italian, and C2 in English. Some des-universals can, however, emerge as general properties of the entire typology, and can be falsified by the data (as, perhaps, the existence of onsetless languages). This does not entail abandoning the Generative Linguistics program, nor the OT framework, but rather, revising the theory with an improved set of specific universals.

and verbs are probably universal. Non-local dependencies are a general property of languages, not merely non-configurational languages. Even the latter class exhibits constituency.

Languages exhibit hugely more diverse phenomena than are displayed in well-studied European families. However, citing a collection of exotica does not prove Evans & Levinson’s (E&L’s) claim that “it’s a jungle out there” (sect. 3, para. 17). Examining languages more closely, or at a higher level of abstraction, often reveals critical similarities which superficial descriptions can obscure. Moreover, languages frequently employ distinct grammatical strategies to achieve parallel outcomes; thus, the universal is the end result, not the means of achieving it. Finally, unrelated languages often “choose” the same strategy, despite the lack of a single universal solution, suggesting that homogeneity is widespread. Lexical category distinctions (sect. 2.2.4). Certainly, there is no invariant set of lexical or functional categories. But it remains to be demonstrated that a language may lack any distinctions between lexical categories, or, more specifically, may lack a noun/verb distinction. E&L note that languages of the Pacific Northwest Coast are frequently claimed to have no noun/verb distinction, illustrating with Straits Salish. Similar claims have been made for a nearby, unrelated family, Southern Wakashan (e.g., Makah, Nuuchahnulth). Here, nouns can function as predicates (i.e., not only arguments) and bear predicative inflections, including tense, aspectual, and person/number marking, and verbs can function as arguments (i.e., not only predicates) and bear nominal inflections, including determiners; (1) and (2) give Nuuchahnulth examples from Swadesh (1939): 1.

mamuuk-maa quu as- i work-3s:INDIC man-the “The man is working.”

2.

quu as-maa mamuuk- i man-3s:INDIC work-the “The working one is a man.”

5. Language is more a biological trait than a cultural construct. The authors do not provide criteria to determine

where language is located on the continuum of bio-cultural hybrids. Lenneberg, quoted in the target article, presented four criteria for distinguishing biological traits from cultural phenomena (universality across the species, across time, absence of learning of the trait, rigid developmental schedule) and concluded that oral (but not written) language is a biological trait (Lenneberg 1964). The validity of this argument is ignored by the authors. Ironically, OT is more readily connected to biology than to culture: the archictural-universals of OT are emergent symbolic-level effects of subsymbolic optimization over “soft” constraints in neural networks (Smolensky & Legendre 2006); and Soderstrom et al. (2006) have derived an explicit abstract genome that encodes the growth of neural networks containing connections implementing universal constraints.

Thus, nominal and verbal roots cannot be identified either by distribution or morphology. Additionally, essentially any lexical root in Nuuchahnulth, including (the equivalents of) nouns, adjectives, and quantifiers, can take verbal inflectional morphology, superficially suggesting that all words are predicative, and thus that there is no noun/verb distinction. Immediate evidence against this (Braithwaite 2008) is that verbs only function as arguments when a determiner is present, whereas nouns function as arguments even without a determiner. Close inspection reveals further behavioral differences between noun and verb roots (Braithwaite 2008). For instance, proper names can take nominal inflections, such as the definite - i, shown on noun and verb stems in (1) and (2), but cannot take the third singular indicative verbal inflection -maa: 3.

If language is a jungle, why are we all cultivating the same plot? doi:10.1017/S0140525X09990598 Maggie Tallerman Centre for Research in Linguistics and Language Sciences (CRiLLS), Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 7RU, United Kingdom. [email protected] http://www.ncl.ac.uk/elll/staff/profile/maggie.tallerman

Abstract: Evans & Levinson (E&L) focus on differences between languages at a superficial level, rather than examining common processes. Their emphasis on trivial details conceals uniform design features and universally shared strategies. Lexical category distinctions between nouns



Jack-maa Jack-3s:INDIC (“He is Jack.”)

Names, a subclass of nouns, therefore cannot be predicates, clearly distinguishing them from verb roots. Moreover, although both nominal and verbal predicates can bear possessive markers, nominal predicates with possessive morphemes display a systematic ambiguity in terms of which argument an accompanying person marker is understood to refer to, whereas verbal predicates display no such ambiguity. A similar ambiguity arises in tense marking. Verbal predicates in Nuuchahnulth display a past tense suffix: -(m)it: 4.

mamuuk-(m)it -(m)a work-PAST -1s.INDIC “I was working.” BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5

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Commentary/Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals This suffix also appears on nouns. Even nonpredicative nouns, including names, can bear tense morphology, apparently supporting the lack of a noun/verb distinction: 5.

a aa a qasˇi – ’a mista-(m)it and.then die-EVENTIVE Mista-PAST “Then (the late) Mista died.”

The past-tense marker -(m)it on the name conveys the specific meaning “former”; since names cannot be predicative in Nuuchahnulth, as (3) shows, this is evidently not a nominal predicate. However, past-tense markers also attach to nominal predicates, which are then interpreted in one of two ways: (6) shows a past-tense nominal predicate, exactly parallel to (4), except with a noun root; (7) displays a predicate nominal in which -(m)it bears the alternative “former” meaning: 6.

quu as-(m)it-(m)a person-PAST -1s.INDIC “I was a man.”

7.

uunuu ani uumiik-(m)it-qa because that whaler-PAST -SUBORDINATE “because he was a former whaler”

Critically, -(m)it on a verbal predicate never exhibits the “former” meaning but is always interpreted simply as past tense. In sum, careful investigation such as that of Braithwaite provides ample evidence for a noun/verb distinction in Wakashan languages, despite superficial appearances. Constituent structure (sect. 5). As E&L note, “non-configurational” languages display free word order and discontinuous constituents: in (8), from the Australian language Kalkatungu, the underscore shows the components of the ergative subject, and italics show the (nominative) object:

8.

Tjipa-yi

tjaa

kunka-(ng)ku

pukutjurrka

lhayi

nguyi-nyin-tu.

this-ERG this branch-ERG mouse kill fall-PARTICIPLE-ERG “The falling branch hit the mouse.” (Blake 2001, p. 419)

E&L state that “the parsing system for English cannot be remotely like the one for such a language” (sect. 2, para. 3), because case-tagging indicates relationships between words, rather than constituency and fixed word order. But, in fact, the parsing system for English is well used to non-local dependencies – that is, to relating items not contiguous in the string. Note the discontinuous constituents in the following examples, and that the dependency even occurs across a clause boundary in the second instance: A student sauntered in wearing a large fedora; Which girl did you say he gave the books to __?. Parsing in Kalkatungu (or Latin) therefore utilizes a strategy also found in languages which do have clear constituents. Moreover, completely unrelated non-configurational languages like Kalkatungu and Latin share the same method of signaling relationships between words (case-marking). All this is hardly indicative of the jungle E&L assume; rather, it is evidence that very few solutions are available, and that languages make differential use of options from a small pool of possibilities. Furthermore, certain non-configurational Australian languages (e.g., Wambaya; Nordlinger 2006) actually have one strict word order requirement, namely that the auxiliary is in second position, thus either second word, (9), or second constituent, (10) (Hale 1973 outlines the parallel requirement in Warlpiri): 9.

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Nganki ngiy-a lurrgbanyi wardangarringa-ni alaji this.ERG 3SF -PAST grab moon-ERG boy “The moon grabbed (her) child.” BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5

10.

Naniyawulu nagawulu baraj-bulu that.DUAL.NOM female.DUAL.NOM old.person-DUAL.(NOM) “Those two old women are getting up.”

wurlu-n 3.DUAL-PROG

duwa. get.up

Crucially, the auxiliary cannot appear as, say, third word within a four-word noun phrase. Contra E&L, this demonstrates the psychological reality of word order and of constituent structure in such languages. Moreover, while by no means universal, second-position phenomena occur widely (e.g., Sanskrit, Celtic, Germanic), demonstrating remarkable formal homogeneity cross-linguistically. Finally, E&L claim linguistic diversity is not characterized by “selection from a finite set of types” (sect. 8, para 9, their thesis 3). Case-encoding systems are few indeed, and familiar strategies (such as ergativity) even occur in language isolates such as Basque.

Universal grammar is dead doi:10.1017/S0140525X09990744 Michael Tomasello Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, D-04103 Leipzig, Germany. [email protected]

Abstract: The idea of a biologically evolved, universal grammar with linguistic content is a myth, perpetuated by three spurious explanatory strategies of generative linguists. To make progress in understanding human linguistic competence, cognitive scientists must abandon the idea of an innate universal grammar and instead try to build theories that explain both linguistic universals and diversity and how they emerge.

Universal grammar is, and has been for some time, a completely empty concept. Ask yourself: what exactly is in universal grammar? Oh, you don’t know – but you are sure that the experts (generative linguists) do. Wrong; they don’t. And not only that, they have no method for finding out. If there is a method, it would be looking carefully at all the world’s thousands of languages to discern universals. But that is what linguistic typologists have been doing for the past several decades, and, as Evans & Levinson (E&L) report, they find no universal grammar. I am told that a number of supporters of universal grammar will be writing commentaries on this article. Though I have not seen them, here is what is certain. You will not be seeing arguments of the following type: I have systematically looked at a well-chosen sample of the world’s languages, and I have discerned the following universals . . . And you will not even be seeing specific hypotheses about what we might find in universal grammar if we followed such a procedure. What you will be seeing are in-principle arguments about why there have to be constraints, how there is a poverty of the stimulus, and other arguments that are basically continuations of Chomsky’s original attack on behaviorism; to wit, that the mind is not a blank slate and language learning is not rat-like conditioning. Granted, behaviorism cannot account for language. But modern cognitive scientists do not assume that the mind is a blank slate, and they work with much more powerful, cognitively based forms of learning such as categorization, analogy, statistical learning, and intention-reading. The in-principle arguments against the sufficiency of “learning” to account for language acquisition (without a universal grammar) assume a long-gone theoretical adversary. Given all of the data that E&L cite, how could anyone maintain the notion of a universal grammar with linguistic content? Traditionally, there have been three basic strategies. First, just as we may force English grammar into the Procrustean bed of Latin grammar – that is how I was taught the structure of English in grade school – the grammars of the world’s so-called exotic

Commentary/Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals languages may be forced into an abstract scheme based mainly on European languages. For example, one can say that all the world’s languages have “subject.” But actually there are about 30 different grammatical features that have been used with this concept, and any one language has only a subset – often with almost non-overlapping subsets between languages. Or take noun phrase. Yes, all languages may be used to make reference to things in the world. But some languages have a large repertoire of specially dedicated words (nouns) that play the central role in this function, whereas others do not: they mostly have a stock of all-purpose words which can be used for this, as well as other, functions. So are subjects and noun phrases universal? As you please. Second, from the beginning a central role in universal grammar has been played by the notion of transformations, or “movement.” A paradigm phenomenon in English and many European languages is so-called wh- movement, in which the wh- word in questions always comes at the beginning no matter which element is being questioned. Thus, we ask, “What did John eat?”, which “moves” the thing eaten to the beginning of the sentence (from the end of the sentence in the statement “John ate X”). But in many of the world’s languages, questions are formed by substituting the wh- word for the element being questioned in situ, with no “movement” at all, as in “John ate what?”. In classic generative grammar analyses, it is posited that all languages have wh- movement, it is just that one cannot always see it on the surface – there is underlying movement. But the evidence for this is, to say the least, indirect. The third, more recent, strategy has been to say that not all languages must have all features of universal grammar. Thus, E&L note that some languages do not seem to have any recursive structures, and recursion has also been posited as a central aspect of universal grammar (in a very different way than such notions as noun phrase). The response has been that, first of all, these languages do have recursive structures, it is just that one cannot see them on the surface. But even if they do not have such structures, that is fine because the components of universal grammar do not all apply universally. This strategy is the most effective because it basically immunizes the Universal Grammar (UG) hypothesis from falsification. For sure, all of the world’s languages have things in common, and E&L document a number of them. But these commonalities come not from any universal grammar, but rather from universal aspects of human cognition, social interaction, and information processing – most of which were in existence in humans before anything like modern languages arose. Thus, in one account (Tomasello 2003a; 2008), human linguistic universals derive from the fact that all humans everywhere: (1) conceive nonlinguistically of agents of actions, patients of actions, possessors, locations, and so forth; (2) read the intentions of others, including communicative intentions; (3) follow into, direct, and share attention with others; (4) imitatively learn things from others, using categorization, analogy, and statistical learning to extract hierarchically structured patterns of language use; and (5) process vocal-auditory information in specific ways. The evolution of human capacities for linguistic communication draw on what was already there cognitively and socially ahead of time, and this is what provides the many and varied “constraints” on human languages; that is, this is what constrains the way speech communities grammaticalize linguistic constructions historically (what E&L call “stable engineering solutions satisfying multiple design constraints”; target article, Abstract, para. 2). Why don’t we just call this universal grammar? The reason is because historically, universal grammar referred to specific linguistic content, not general cognitive principles, and so it would be a misuse of the term. It is not the idea of universals of language that is dead, but rather, it is the idea that there is a biological adaptation with specific linguistic content that is dead.

The neglected universals: Learnability constraints and discourse cues doi:10.1017/S0140525X09990756 Heidi Waterfalla and Shimon Edelmanb a

Department of Psychology, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853, and Department of Psychology, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637; b Department of Psychology, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853, and Department of Brain and Cognitive Engineering, Korea University, Seoul 136-713, South Korea. [email protected] http://kybele.psych.cornell.edu/~heidi [email protected] http://kybele.psych.cornell.edu/~edelman

Abstract: Converging findings from English, Mandarin, and other languages suggest that observed “universals” may be algorithmic. First, computational principles behind recently developed algorithms that acquire productive constructions from raw texts or transcribed childdirected speech impose family resemblance on learnable languages. Second, child-directed speech is particularly rich in statistical (and social) cues that facilitate learning of certain types of structures.

Having surveyed a wide range of posited universals and found them wanting, Evans & Levinson (E&L) propose instead that the “common patterns” observed in the organization of human languages are due to cognitive constraints and cultural factors. We offer empirical evidence in support of both these ideas. (See Fig. 1.) One kind of common pattern is readily apparent in the six examples of child-directed speech in Figure 1, in each of which partial matches between successive utterances serve to highlight the structural regularities of the underlying language. Two universal principles facilitating the identification of such regularities can be traced to the work of Zellig Harris (1946; 1991). First, the discovery of language structure, from morphemes to phrases, can proceed by cross-utterance alignment and comparison (Edelman & Waterfall 2007; Harris 1946). Second, the fundamental task in describing a language is to state the departures from equiprobability in its sound- and word-sequences (Harris 1991, p. 32; cf. Goldsmith 2007). These principles are precisely those used by the only two unsupervised algorithms currently capable of learning productive construction grammars from large-scale raw corpus data, ADIOS (Solan et al. 2005) and ConText (Waterfall et al., under review). Both algorithms bootstrap from completely unsegmented text to words and to phrase structure by recursively identifying candidate constructions in patterns of partial alignment between utterances in the training corpus. Furthermore, in both algorithms, candidate structures must pass a statistical significance test before they join the growing grammar and the learning resumes (the algorithms differ in the way they represent corpus data and in the kinds of significance tests they impose). These algorithms exhibited hitherto unrivaled – albeit still very far from perfect – capacity for language learning, as measured by (1) precision, or acceptability of novel generated utterances, (2) recall, or coverage of withheld test corpus, (3) perplexity, or average uncertainty about the next lexical element in test utterances, and (4) performance in certain comprehension-related tasks (Edelman & Solan, under review; Edelman et al. 2005; 2004; Solan et al. 2005). They have been tested, to varying extents, in English, French, Hebrew, Mandarin, Spanish, and a few other languages. The learning algorithms proved particularly effective when applied to raw, transcribed, child-directed speech (MacWhinney 2000), achieving precision of 54% and 63% in Mandarin and English, respectively, and recall of about 30% in both languages (Brodsky et al. 2007; Solan et al. 2003). To the extent that human learners rely on the same principles of aligning and comparing potentially relatable utterances, one may put these principles forward as the source of part of BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5

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Response/Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals same observation, as well as to their production of verbs, pronouns, and subcategorization frames four months later (HoffGinsberg, 1990; Waterfall 2006; under review). Moreover, experiments involving artificial language learning highlighted the causal role of variation sets: adults exposed to input which contained variation sets performed better in word segmentation and phrase boundary judgment tasks than a control group that heard the same utterances in a scrambled order, which had no variation sets (Onnis et al. 2008). The convergence of the three lines of evidence mentioned – the ubiquity of variation sets in child-directed speech in widely different languages, their proven effectiveness in facilitating acquisition, and the algorithmic revival of the principles of acquisition intuited by Harris – supports E&L’s proposal of the origin of observed universals. More research is needed to integrate the computational framework outlined here with models of social interaction during acquisition and with neurobiological constraints on learning that undoubtedly contribute to the emergence of cognitive/cultural language universals. NOTES 1. Language may also be expected to evolve in the direction of a better fit between its structure and the learners’ abilities (Christiansen & Chater 2008). 2. Social cues complement and reinforce structural ones in this context (Goldstein & Schwade 2008).

Authors’ Response Figure 1 (Waterfall & Edelman). Examples of child-directed speech in six languages. It is not necessary to be able to read, let alone understand, any of these languages to identify the most prominent structural characteristics common to these examples (see text for a hint). These characteristics should, therefore, be readily apparent to a prelinguistic infant, which is indeed the case, as the evidence we mention suggests. All the examples are from CHILDES corpora (MacWhinney 2000). speech, phrase structure, and other structural “universals.” In other words, certain forms may be common across languages because they are easier to learn, given the algorithmic constraints on the learner.1 Language acquisition becomes easier not only when linguistic forms match the algorithmic capabilities of the learner, but also when the learner’s social environment is structured in various helpful ways. One possibility here is for mature speakers to embed structural cues in child-directed speech (CDS). Indeed, a growing body of evidence suggests that language acquisition is made easier than it would have been otherwise because of the way CDS is shaped by caregivers during their interaction with children.2 One seemingly universal property of CDS is the prevalence of variation sets (Hoff-Ginsberg 1990; Ku¨ntay & Slobin 1996; Waterfall 2006; under review) – partial alignment among phrases uttered in temporal proximity, of the kind illustrated in Figure 1. The proportion of CDS utterances contained in variation sets is surprisingly constant across languages: 22% in Mandarin, 20% in Turkish, and 25% in English (when variation sets are defined by requiring consecutive caregiver utterances to have in common at least two lexical items in the same order; cf. Ku¨ntay & Slobin 1996; this proportion grows to about 50% if a gap of two utterances is allowed between the partially matching ones). Furthermore, the lexical items (types) on which CDS utterances are aligned constitute a significant proportion of the corpus vocabulary, ranging from 9% in Mandarin to 32% in English. Crucially, the nouns and verbs in variation sets in CDS were shown to be related to children’s verb and noun use at the

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With diversity in mind: Freeing the language sciences from Universal Grammar doi:10.1017/S0140525X09990525 Nicholas Evansa and Stephen C. Levinsonb a Department of Linguistics, Research School of Asian and Pacific Studies, Australian National University, ACT 0200, Australia; bMax Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, Wundtlaan 1, NL-6525 XD Nijmegen, The Netherlands; and Radboud University, The Netherlands. [email protected] http://rspas.anu.edu.au/people/personal/evann_ling.php [email protected] http://www.mpi.nl/Members/StephenLevinson

Abstract: Our response takes advantage of the wide-ranging commentary to clarify some aspects of our original proposal and augment others. We argue against the generative critics of our coevolutionary program for the language sciences, defend the use of close-to-surface models as minimizing crosslinguistic data distortion, and stress the growing role of stochastic simulations in making generalized historical accounts testable. These methods lead the search for general principles away from idealized representations and towards selective processes. Putting cultural evolution central in understanding language diversity makes learning fundamental in the cognition of language: increasingly powerful models of general learning, paired with channelled caregiver input, seem set to manage language acquisition without recourse to any innate “universal grammar.” Understanding why human language has no clear parallels in the animal world requires a cross-species perspective: crucial ingredients are vocal learning (for which there are clear non-primate parallels) and an intentionattributing cognitive infrastructure that provides a universal base for language evolution. We conclude by situating linguistic diversity within a broader trend towards understanding human

Response/Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals cognition through the study of variation in, for example, human genetics, neurocognition, and psycholinguistic processing.

R1. Introduction The purpose of our target article was to draw attention to linguistic diversity and its implications for theories of human cognition: Structural diversity at every level is not consonant with a theory of fixed innate language structure, but instead suggests remarkable cognitive plasticity and powerful learning mechanisms. We pointed out that human communication is the only animal communication system that varies in myriad ways in both form and meaning across the species, and this must be a central fact that should never be lost sight of. The responses in the commentaries show that opinion in the language sciences, and especially in linguistics, is still sharply divided on “the myth of language universals,” or at least our telling of it. The comments of the typological and functional linguists (Croft, Goldberg, Haspelmath) show that much of our argument is already widely accepted there: “evolutionary linguistics is already here” (Croft). Positive responses from many commentators in experimental and cross-species comparative psychology suggest that researchers in experimental psychology and cross-species studies of communication are ready for the kind of coevolutionary, variability-centred approach we outlined (Bavin, Catania, McMurray & Wasserman, Merker, Tomasello, and Waterfall & Edelman). Generative linguists, by contrast, disagreed sharply with our presentation, laying bare some fundamental differences in how linguistics is conceived as a science.1 We have organized the response as follows. Section R2 responds to the critical comments from the generative camp, suggesting that the assumptions behind many of these responses are misplaced. Section R3 looks at the question of whether we have overstated the range of diversity by ignoring unpopulated regions of the design space. Section R4 takes the commentaries from the non-generative linguists and the psychological, animal behavior, and computational learning research communities, which were overwhelmingly positive, and indicates how these might be used to round out, or in places correct, our position. Section R5 sketches where we think these new developments are heading, and their relationship to what else is happening in the cognitive sciences. We set aside the specific data questions till an appendix at the end, where we concede two factual mistakes, clarify disputed facts and generalizations, and examine more specific linguistic points that would bog down the main argument – on nearly all of them, we think the criticisms from our generativist colleagues do not stand up to scrutiny.

R2. Incompatible evaluation metrics reflect different paradigms It was never our intention to engage in mud-slinging with our generative colleagues, but as Tomasello has predicted there was a certain inevitability that familiar sibling quarrels would be rerun. Most of the criticisms from the generative camp reflect deep differences between generative

and typological/functionalist approaches in their overall assumptions about many issues. Where do we locate causal explanations? Where do we seek the general unifying laws behind surface diversity – in structure or in process? Do we use only discrete mathematical models (favoring regularized representations), or do we bring in continuous and stochastic models as well (favoring representations sticking closer to surface variety)? Should generalizations purport to directly represent mental reality, or are they modelling the summed information of thousands of different coevolutionary products shaped by multiple selective factors? Should we adopt essentializing categorizations (as “formal universals”), or abandon these as misleading and adopt a strategy that measures surface diversity directly so as not to lose data that is useful for evaluating the fit of models? Generative and typological/functionalist accounts will give different answers to each of these questions, and it is this difference in overall scientific paradigm that accounts for the seemingly irreconcilable conflict between generativist commentators like Freidin and Pesetsky, who see our proposals as so imprecise as to be unfalsifiable, and psychologists like Tomasello and Margoliash & Nusbaum, for whom it is the generative approach that has moved away from falsifiability. To clarify these differences, we try here to give a brief and constructive account of where the real differences lie (as Pullum & Scholz opine, more could be fruitless). The generativist critique includes the following interlinked charges: 1. Lack of theory, precise representation, or falsifiability (Smolensky & Dupoux, Freidin) 2. Mistaken ontology, mistaking behavior for cognition and (a point we hold off till sect. R4.1) history for science (Smolensky & Dupoux) 3. Lack of abstractness – that we are misled by surface variation into ignoring underlying structural regularities (Baker, Harbour) 4. That taking surface diversity at face value leads away from the quest for general principles (Smolensky & Dupoux, Nevins) 5. That we have neglected the presence of “formal universals” (Nevins) 6. That the typologists’ preference for using a nonabstract descriptive apparatus is the wrong methodological choice (Rizzi) 7. That we have merely presented an under-analyzed Wunderkammer of variation that can be shown to reduce to well-known phenomena (Pesetsky). We now take up these issues one at a time. A further criticism, that we may have overstated the range of diversity by ignoring the fact that languages all lie within a bounded corner of the possibility space (Pinker & Jackendoff, Tallerman) is dealt with separately in section R3. R.2.1. What kind of theory?

Smolensky & Dupoux and Freidin complain that we did not offer a fully articulated theory with precise predictions about sentential structure. But that was not what we set out to do. Our goal was to survey our current understanding of language variation, explain its import for the cognitive sciences, and outline a fertile area for future research. We sketched the kind of biological models into which this BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5

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Response/Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals variation neatly seems to fit and the ones that invite future development in a number of directions. A lot of these materials and ideas have not been sufficiently taken into account, we felt, by researchers in the cognitive sciences. We were gently suggesting that the time has come for a paradigm change, and at the end of this response we will say a little more. Nevertheless, at the end of the target article we did sketch directions for future research (see also sect. R5 in this response). Commentators outside the generative camp (e.g., Waterfall & Edelman, Christiansen & Chater) in many cases saw no difficulty in deriving a range of predictions or consequences, and indeed saw the target article as “mov[ing] the study of language in the direction of the research methods of the experimental sciences and away from enclosed personal belief systems” (Margoliash & Nusbaum). The radically different assessments of empirical grounding here reflect (we think) a narrow view of theory and evidence on the part of some of our critics. Within the language sciences there is a wide variety of theory – theories about language change (historical linguistics), language usage (pragmatics), microvariation within individual languages (sociolinguistics), language production, acquisition and comprehension (psycholinguistics), language variation (typology), and language structure (the traditional heart of linguistics), to name just a few. Generative theory is just one version of a theory of linguistic structure and representation, and it is marked by a lack of external explanatory variables, making no reference to function, use, or psychological or neural implementation. It has delivered important insights into linguistic complexity, but has now run into severely diminishing returns. It is time to look at the larger context and develop theories that are more responsive to “external” constraints, be they anatomical and neural, cognitive, functional, cultural, or historical. Here we think an evolutionary framework has a great deal to offer in the multiple directions we sketched. We pointed out the central fact that the human communication system is characterized by a diversity in form and meaning that has no parallel in the animal kingdom. Generative theory has never come fully to terms with this, and a theory of universal grammar that isn’t answerable to linguistic variation consequently has distinctly limited appeal. R.2.2. Cognition, behavior, and representation

Various Chomskyan dichotomies (competence vs. performance, i-language vs. e-language, Smolensky & Dupoux’s cog-universals vs. des-universals) have been used to drive a wedge between cognition and behavior. There are distinct dangers in this. First, most cognitive scientists will agree that cognition exists to service perception and behavior. Second, the evidence for cognition remains behavioral and perceptual (even when we can look at the functioning brain in vivo, we look at its response to an event), and most cognitive scientists will want all theories measured ultimately in terms of predictions over brain events and behavior or response (as the very title of this journal suggests; cf. Margoliash & Nusbaum). Third, many cognitive scientists view favorably the new “embodiment” perspectives which blur the line between representation and process. 474

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Chomsky, in his initial work on formal grammars, suggested that the descriptive apparatus chosen to model language should be just sufficient and not more powerful than is required – in that way, some match to cognition may be achieved. From then on, in the generative tradition there has been a systematic conflation between the language of description and what is attributed to the language learner and user: “the brains of all speakers represent a shared set of grammatical categories” (Berent), and “formal universals in phonology are constituted by the analytic elements that human minds employ in constructing representations of sound structure” (Nevins). Many generativist approaches – particularly parametric formulations – consequently attribute cognitive reality to conditionals of the form “if structural decision X, then also structural decision Y” or “learning X is universally easier than learning Y” (essentially Nevins’ Example [1]). No language typologist would maintain that conditional regularities of this type would be found in speakers’ heads. Yet this is precisely what is advocated in the OT (Optimality Theory) framework advocated by Smolensky & Dupoux: OT . . . is inherently typological: the grammar of one language inevitably incorporates claims about the grammars of all languages. This joining of the individual and the universal, which OT accomplishes through ranking permutation, is probably the most important insight of the theory. (McCarthy 2002, p. 1)

To make this work, an infinite set of possible sentences are first generated then filtered by (among other things) comparisons of this type. Instead of putting the filtering where it belongs, in cultural system evolution across generations, OT effectively burdens each individual mind with a pre´cis of the functional history of all known human languages, and loads the entire optimization process onto on-line grammatical computation. This is not just cognitively unrealistic – it is computationally intractable (Idsardi 2006). This conflation of the metalanguage with the object of description is a peculiar trick of the generative tradition. By going down this path, it has opened up a huge gap between theory and the behavioral data that would verify it. The complex representational structures look undermotivated, and covert processes proliferate where alternative models deftly avoid them (see the discussion of Subjacency and covert movement in sect. R6.8). A biologist does not assume that a snail maintains an internalized representation of the mathematical equations that describe the helical growth of its shell. Even for the internal characterization of a mental faculty, the strategy is odd: computer scientists interested in characterizing the properties of programming languages use a more general auxiliary language to describe them, as in ScottStrachey denotational semantics. Once explanatory theories hook external factors (e.g., psycholinguistic or evolutionary factors) into the account, this conflation of cognition and metalanguage must be dropped. Smolensky & Dupoux’s aphorism “Generative grammar merits a central place in cognitive science because its topic is cognition and its method is science,” then, will not find universal approval: other branches of linguistics are much more in tune with psychological reality as reflected in language acquisition, production, and comprehension. Nor has generative grammar of the

Response/Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals Chomskyan variety been particularly successful as an explicit theory of linguistic representation. Many other representational formats, such as HPSG and LFG, have had greater uptake in computational circles (see, e.g., Butt et al. 2006, Reuer 2004). LFG, for example, adopts a parallel constraint-based architecture that includes dependency as well as constituency relations. This allows for the direct representation of crucial types of variability discussed in sect. 5 of our target article, while avoiding the need for movement rules or large numbers of empty nodes (see sect. R6.8 for further discussion of how this works for subjacency). These formats, which represent different outgrowths from the same generative roots, show that precise, testable, computationally tractable models of language can be developed that reflect cross-linguistic diversity much more directly in their architecture. R2.3. Abstractness and universal generalizations

A number of commentators (Baker, Harbour, Nevins, Pesetsky) felt that we were unwilling to entertain the sorts of abstract analyses which allow us to find unity in diversity. But we are simply pointing out that the proposals on the table haven’t worked. Abstractness has a cost: the more unverifiable unobservables, the greater the explanatory payoff we expect. Judging the point where explanatory superstructure becomes epicyclic and unproductive may be tough, and generative and non-generative camps clearly have different thresholds here. But the increasingly abstruse theoretical apparatus is like a spiralling loan that risks never being paid by the theory’s meagre empirical income (cf. Edelman & Christiansen 2003). Even attempts to deal with the growing evidence of variability through the theory of parameters – projecting out diversity by a limited number of “switches” pre-provided in Universal Grammar (UG) – has empirically collapsed (Newmeyer 2004, p. 545), a point largely undisputed by our commentators (although Rizzi continues to use the notion – see the discussion of Subjacency in sect. R6.8). All sciences search for underlying regularities – that’s the game, and there is no branch of linguistics (least of all historical linguistics, with its laws of sound change) that is not a player. For this reason Harbour’s commentary misses the target – of course some middle level generalizations about the semantics of grammatical number are valid in any framework (although his account of the plural seems to not generalize beyond three participants, and there are additional problems that we discuss in sect. R6.4). The art is to find the highest level generalization that still has empirical “bite.” R2.4. Recognizing structural diversity is not incompatible with seeking general laws

The criticisms by Nevins, Pesetsky, and Smolensky & Dupoux – that we are not interested in seeking deeper laws behind the surface variation in linguistic structure – reveal a failure to understand the typological/functional approach. In a coevolutionary model the underlying regularities in the cross-linguistic landscape are sought in the vocal-auditory, cognitive, sociolinguistic, functional, and acquisitional selectors which favor the development of some structures over others. The goal is to seek a constrained set of motivated selectors (each testable) that

filter what structures can be learned, processed, and transmitted. The stochastic nature of the selection process, and the interaction and competition between multiple selectors, accounts for the characteristic balance we find, of recurrent but not universal patterns with marked diversity in the outliers. Phonological structures, for example, will be favored to the extent that they can be easily said, easily heard, and easily learned.2 But these targets regularly conflict, as when streamlined articulation weakens perceptual contrasts or creates formal alternations that are harder to learn. In fact it has been a key insight of optimality theory (OT) that many competing factors need to be juggled, but that not all are equally potent and most can be “non-fatally violated.” The different weightings of these “constraints” generate a kaleidoscope of languagespecific configurations, and modelling their interaction has been a strong appeal of the OT program. But the constraints identified by OT are more fruitfully treated as the sorts of scalar processing effects sketched in Haspelmath’s commentary. The typological sweep, like OT phonology, aims at a comprehensive documentation of all such constraints and their interactions, finding languages in which individual effects can best be isolated or recombined, with laboratory phonology studying why each effect occurs. The line of attack that “languages share structural similarities often masked by one of their differences” (Pesetsky) thus misses the point of why it is useful to confront diversity head on. Like generative theory, the program we have outlined seeks to discover the general behind the particular. But it differs in where we seek the general laws. For our generativist critics, generality is to be found at the level of structural representation; for us, at the level of process. Our claim, in Darwinian mode, is that the unity of evolutionary mechanisms can best be discerned by reckoning with the full diversity of evolutionary products and processes. R2.5. Non-abstract representations preserve information

Rizzi suggests that the typologist’s strategy of using an “extremely impoverished, non-abstract descriptive apparatus” that takes diversity at face value in representing phenomena will have less success than the generative program in establishing universal patterns. Yet, as the burden of explanation for cross-linguistic patterning is moved out of the prewired mind and into the evolution of individual language systems under selection from the sorts of factors outlined earlier, the most appropriate mathematical models employ stochastical and continuous methods rather than the discrete methods that have characterized the generative tradition (Pierrehumbert et al. 2000). And once we employ these methods, there are positive benefits in “directly measuring the variation, instead of reducing it” (Bickel 2009): any other strategy risks degrading the information on which the methods are based. Take the question of how perceptual discriminability and articulatory ease interact in the domain of vowel dispersion over the formant space to favor the emergence of some vowel systems over others. The classic study by Liljencrants and Lindblom (1972) simulated the evolution BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5

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Response/Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals of vowel systems over time under these twin selectional pressures and compared the results to the distribution of attested vowel inventories. The insights yielded by their model would not have been possible if the descriptions of vowel systems had been in terms of discrete binary features such as [front] and [round] rather than in terms of position in a continuous three-dimensional space based on formant frequencies. Staying close to the surface thus avoids the essentializing fallacy critiqued by Goldberg and Croft, while retaining the maximum information for matching against stochastic models of how general evolutionary processes interact to produce a scatter of different structural outcomes across the language sample. R2.6. Neglect of “formal universals”

We are criticized by Nevins for neglecting “formal universals” – “the analytic elements that human minds employ in constructing representations of sound structure . . . the available data structures (e.g., binary features, metrical grids, autosegmental tiers) and the possible operations on them that can be used in constructing a grammar of a language.” (See also our discussion in sect. R6.8 of Subjacency, as raised by Smolensky & Dupoux, Freidin, and Rizzi.) Data structures like these have undoubted value in constructing formal representations of phonological phenomena. But, first, it does not follow that they are the actual representations that humans learn and use. As Tomasello and Bavin argue, increasingly powerful general pattern learning mechanisms suggest that many of the relevant phenomena can be managed without needing the representations that Nevins advocates. Second, even if such structures prove to have psychological reality, it does not follow that we are natively endowed with them. Take the general issue of discrete combinatoriality – the fact that languages recombine discrete units like consonants and vowels – which is relevant both to binary features (like + consonantal) and, in many models, the separation of consonantal and vocalic elements onto distinct autosegmental tiers.3 Zuidema and De Boer (2009) have used evolutionary game theory simulations to investigate the hypothesis that combinatorial phonology results from optimizing signal systems for perceptual distinctiveness. Selection for acoustic distinctiveness, defined in terms of the probability of confusion, leads along a path of increasing fitness from unstructured, holistic signals to structured signals that can be analyzed as combinatorial. Some very general assumptions – temporal structuring of signals and selection for acoustic distinctiveness – lead over time to the emergence of combinatorial signals from holistic origins. Should linguists use binary features and autosegmental tiers in the grammars and phonological descriptions they write? Sure, whenever they are useful and elegant. Do we need them to draw on a single, universal feature set to account for the mental representations that speakers have? Probably not, judging by the direction in which the psycholinguistic learning literature is headed. Do we need them to account for why languages all exhibit discrete combinatoriality? No – this can emerge through the sorts of processes that Zuidema and De Boer have modelled. Intriguingly, an empirical parallel has been 476

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identified in one new sign language: Meir et al. (in press) and Sandler et al. (2009) show that duality of patterning has only been gradually emerging over three generations of one Bedouin sign language variety. R2.7. An underanalyzed Wunderkammer of variation

A number of commentators charge us with producing a Wunderkammer of exotica (Pesetsky), intended more to dazzle rather than illuminate. Pesetsky and Tallerman suggest that if properly analyzed these exotica will turn out just to be ordinary, universal-conforming languages. Both take up the issue of constituency, and argue that recent research finds it subtly present in languages previously claimed to lack it. A clarification is in order. There are two potential issues: a. Is constituency universal in the sense that all languages exhibit it somewhere in their systems, if even marginally? b. Is constituency universal in the sense that all languages use it as the main organizational principle of sentence structure and the main way of signalling grammatical relations? Our target was (b) – different languages use different mixes, as has been well-modelled by approaches like LFG; but our commentators tend to target (a). Pesetsky points out that Tlingit may after all have an initial slot into which constituents can be systematically shifted (we would need to know actually what can go there, and if that is actually predicted by a constituency analysis). But he is wrong in presenting Warlpiri as the “free word order language par excellence.” It is well known that Warlpiri places its auxiliary after the first constituent, and that when words are grouped together into a contiguous NP only the last word needs to carry case, instead of the usual patterning of inflecting every word. Neither of these properties, however, are found in Jiwarli (Austin & Bresnan 1996), which is why we chose it as our example. The point about free word order languages, whether or not they have small islands of constituency, is that they cannot be parsed by a constituency-based algorithm as in most NLP (natural language programming) today, because they do not use constituency as the systematic organizing principle of sentence structure. If constituency is not the universal architecture for sentence structure, then the entire generative apparatus of c-command, bounding nodes, subjacency, and so forth collapses, since all are defined in terms of constituency. In this way Tallerman is wrong in thinking that parsing free word order is just like parsing English discontinuous constructions – the latter are allowed by rule, which sets up precise expectations of what comes next in what order. Incidentally, the reader should note the argumentation of these rejoinders: that we, Evans & Levinson (E&L), have cherry-picked exotic facts about language A, but look, language B yields to the normal universal analysis, so there’s no reason to take A seriously. Since absolute universals can be falsified by a single counterexample, it is a logical fallacy to defend a universal by adducing facts from some other language which happens not to violate it. The seven general charges we have discussed capture, we think, most of the sources of disagreement. Freidin’s commentary in particular indicates the deep rift in

Response/Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals contemporary linguistics between Chomskyans and the rest, which ultimately rests on different judgements about the interlocking of theory and evidence. This is regrettable, as generative grammar has served to open up the “deep unconscious” of language as it were, showing how languages are organized with far greater complexity than had hitherto been imagined. While Chomskyans have presumed that these complexities must be innate, we have argued that there are two blind watchmakers: cultural evolution acting over deep time, and genetic infrastructure, which for the most part, of course, will not be specific to language. Finally, let us note that Chomsky’s own position makes it clear that the generative enterprise simply has a different target than the program we are trying to promote, namely, (in our case) working out the implications of language diversity for theories of cognition and human evolution. The following recent quote makes this clear: Complexity, variety, effects of historical accident, and so on, are overwhelmingly restricted to morphology and phonology, the mapping to the sensorimotor interface. That’s why these are virtually the only topics investigated in traditional linguistics, or that enter into language teaching. They are idiosyncrasies, so are noticed, and have to be learned. If so, then it appears that language evolved, and is designed, primarily as an instrument of thought. Emergence of unbounded Merge in human evolutionary history provides what has been called a “language of thought,” an internal generative system that constructs thoughts of arbitrary richness and complexity, exploiting conceptual resources that are already available or may develop with the availability of structured expressions. (Chomsky 2007, p. 22; our emphasis)

On this view, UG primarily constrains the “language of thought,” not the details of its external expression. The same conclusion was stoically reached by Newmeyer (2004, p. 545): “Typological generalizations are therefore phenomena whose explanation is not the task of grammatical theory. If such a conclusion is correct, then the explanatory domain of Universal Grammar is considerably smaller than has been assumed in much work in the Principles-and-Parameters approach” and Chomsky (2007, p. 18) seems in part to concur: “Diversity of language provides an upper bound on what may be attributed to UG.” These then are simply different enterprises – Chomsky is concerned with the nature of recursive thought capacities, whereas linguistic typology and the non-generative linguists are concerned with what external language behavior indicates about the nature of cognition and its evolution. We have argued that the latter program has more to offer cognitive science at this juncture in intellectual history. Perhaps a mark of this is that our crosslinguistic enterprise is actually close to Chomsky’s new position in some respects, locating recursion not as a universal property of (linguistic) syntax, but as a universal property of language use (pragmatics, or mind) – a fact, though, that emerges from empirical cross-linguistic work. R3. How much of the design space is populated? Pinker & Jackendoff point out no doubt correctly that the possible design space for human languages is much greater than the space actually explored by existing languages. Two basic questions arise: (1) What exactly

are the dimensions of the possible design space, of which just one corner is actually occupied? (2) What exactly does this sequestration in a small corner imply? Before we get too excited by (1), we should consider (2). Pinker & Jackendoff imply that languages are locked into the corner by intrinsic, innate constraints, and that’s why we don’t find languages with really outlandish properties. But there is a fundamental fact they have overlooked. The earliest modern human remains date back to about 200,000 BP, and outside Africa date from only 100,000 years or so ago. If that is the date of the great diaspora, there has been relatively little time for diversification. Let us explain. We have to presume that most likely all the languages we have now are descended by cultural evolution from a single ancestral tongue (it would take an event of total spoken language loss to be otherwise – not impossible, but requiring a highly unlikely scenario, such as an isolated lineage descended from a deaf couple). Now consider the following surprising fact. The structural properties of language change on a near-glacial time scale. In an ongoing study using Bayesian phylogenetics, Dunn et al. (in preparation) have found that taken individually, a structural feature within a single large language-family like Austronesian changes on average just once about every 50,000 years.4 What that implies is that all the languages we now sample from are within structural spitting distance of the ancestral tongue! It is quite surprising in this light that typologists have been able to catalogue so much linguistic variation. Once again, a coevolutionary perspective is an essential corrective to the enterprise. So whether we need a lot of further explanation for the fact that languages seem to be cultivating the same garden (Tallerman), to the degree that this can be shown, depends crucially on the extent to which you think the languages of the world are independent experiments. Francis Galton, who stressed the need for genealogical independence in statistical sampling, would urge caution! Let us turn now to the properties of the design space. Pinker & Jackendoff point out that we set aside a rich set of functional universals on the grounds that they are definitional of language (a move we borrowed directly from Greenberg). Of course it is not trivial that these seem shared by all human groups (although very little empirical work has actually been done to establish this – but see, e.g., Stivers et al. 2009). We think that there is a clear biological infrastructure for language, which is distinct from the structural properties of language. This consists of two key elements: the vocal apparatus and the capacity for vocal learning, on the one hand (both biological properties unique in our immediate biological family, the Hominidae), and a rich set of pragmatic universals (communicative intention recognition prime among them), on the other. This is the platform from which languages arise by cultural evolution, and yes, it limits the design space, like our general cognitive and learning capacities (Christiansen & Chater). We emphasized that those interested in the evolution of the biological preconditions for language have been looking in the wrong place: Instead of looking at the input-output system (as Philip Lieberman has been urging for years; see, e.g., Lieberman 2006), or the pragmatics of communicative exchange, they’ve been focussed on the syntax and combinatorics, the least determined part of the system, as demonstrated by linguistic typology. BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5

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Response/Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals A functional perspective has been a long running undercurrent in typological and descriptive linguistics, as Croft and Goldberg remind us. Goldberg suggests that the design space is highly constrained by systems motivations; for example, pressures to keep forms distinct while staying within the normal sound patterns of a language. These pressures provide explanations for the internal coherence of language structure, a perspective that is indeed necessary to explain how languages are not for the most part a heap of flotsam and jetsam accumulated during cultural evolution, but rather, beautifully machined systems, with innovations constantly being adjusted to their functions. Returning to the question of how saturated or otherwise the design space is, Pinker & Jackendoff maintain it is easy to think of highly improbable but possible language types, and they suggest a few. Quite a few of these simply fail on the functional front – they are unproductive like their Cadda, or limited in expressiveness like their Bacca, and groups confined to speaking such languages would rapidly lose out to groups with more expressive systems. Daffa, the quantificational-logic language, lacks any form of deictics like “I,” “‘you,” “this,” “now,” or “here”: The presence of some deictics is certainly a functional universal of human language and follows from the emergence of human language from interactional, socially situated transactions. Interestingly, though, some natural languages do have properties that partake of Pinker & Jackendoff’s thought experiments. For example, their imaginary Cadda, a language of one word holophrases, lacks double articulation. The three-generation sign language of Al Sayyid is also said to lack double articulation (Meir et al., in press; Sandler et al. 2009), showing that this has to arise by cultural evolution: it is not given by instinct. The musical language Gahha, likewise, isn’t too far off attested reality. The West Papuan language Iau (Bateman 1986a; 1986b; 1990a; 1990b) has eight phonemic tones (including melodic contours), close to the number of phonemic segments, and uses them both for lexical distinctions and for grammatical distinctions including aspect, mood, and speech-act distinctions; other tone languages use pitch to indicate modality or case (e.g., Maasai). Nor is the “rational” Fagga too far “outside the envelope.” Sure, it would require a level of semantic factorization down to a number of combinable semantic components not larger than the number of phonemes, but some semantic theories posit a few score “semantic primitives” in terms of which all meanings can be stated (e.g., Goddard & Wierzbicka 2002), and Demiin, the Lardil initiation language, maps the entire lexicon down to around 150 elements (Hale 1982). Combine Demiin semantics with !Xo´o˜ phonology (159 consonant phonemes on some analyses), pair one semantic element to each phoneme, and Fagga might just squeak in.5 Whether or not it then actually existed would depend on whether a possibly evolutionary route past the “historical filters” could be found – in other words whether an evolutionary pathway could exist to reach this highly economical mapping of meaning elements onto phonological segments. Finally, it is salutary to recollect that it is only relatively recently that we have come to recognize sign languages as fully developed languages with equal expressive power to spoken languages. These languages with their easy access to iconicity and analog spatial coding break out of the design space restricted by the strictly linear coding of the 478

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vocal-auditory channel. The typology of these languages is still in development, and there are plenty of surprises yet to come (see Meir et al., in press; Zeshan 2006a; 2006b). R4. Language variation and the future directions of cognitive science R4.1. Is history bunk? Linguistics as a science of change History is more or less bunk. It’s tradition. We don’t want tradition. We want to live in the present and the only history that is worth a tinker’s dam is the history we make today. — Henry Ford (Interview in Chicago Tribune, May 25, 1916)

Nevins’ dismissal of the coevolutionary approach we are advocating as “hand-waving at diachronic contingencies” hints at another kind of dissatisfaction with the general program we outlined in the target article: the suspicion that we advocate an old-fashioned historical and cultural approach, which will return linguistics wholly to the humanities. The antipathy to history is based on the view that (a) it is the study of particularities, whereas we should be in the business of generalizing, (b) it cannot be predictive, while any empirical science should make falsifiable predictions. But the study of evolution is centrally about history, the study of the match between organisms and environment over time, and few would doubt its scientific credentials. And modern linguistics began as a historical discipline, that rapidly felt able to announce laws of historical change, while recent sociolinguistics has been able to catch language change in the making. A fundamental shift is that modern computational methods have revolutionized the possibility of studying change in systems using more and more complex and realistic simulations. Within the study of evolution, computational cladistics exploits this to the full, using, for example, Bayesian inference to run millions of simulations and Monte Carlo Markov chains to search for the optimum model that predicts back the data with the greatest likelihood. We can make history today, as Henry Ford thought we should. In the coda of the target article (sect. 8) we sketched a set of future directions for the language sciences based on evolutionary ideas, and these new methods put those directions within our grasp right now. Take the idea stated in thesis (3), that recurrent clustering of solutions will occur in grammars of non-closely related languages – such a claim can be tested by simulations. Equally tractable is the idea that changes cascade (thesis [4]), so that a few crucial ones may land a language in a gully of future developments. Thesis (5) about coevolution between brain, vocal organs, and language has already begun being intensively explored by simulation (Christiansen & Chater 2008; Christian et al. 2009). Thesis (7) suggests that we should investigate how the full range of attested language systems could have arisen – pie in the sky without computational simulation, but now thinkable. For example, we could follow Bickerton (1981) and start with a simple Creolelike language, described by a set of formal features or characters, and use the rates and parameters of character change derived from recent work on the Bayesian

Response/Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals phylogenetics of language families to simulate cultural evolution over more than 100,000 years. Do we derive patterns of diversity like we now see, or would we need to model special historical circumstances such as massive hybridization? Smolensky & Dupoux ignore the recent synthesis of biological and cultural evolution. Thus they assert “language is more a biological than a cultural construct.” We would go further: “language is one hundred percent a biological phenomenon.” It is absurd to imagine that humans by means of culture have escaped the biosphere – we are just a species with a very highly developed “extended phenotype” or “niche construction” (Laland et al. 1999), using culture to create conditions favorable to our survival. The twin-track approach to human evolution that we sketched (derivatively from, e.g., Boyd & Richerson 1985; Durham 1991) tries to explicate this, unifying perspectives on history and phylogeny as the science of likely state changes in a population. There is immense room for future theoretical and modelling work here: without it we are not going to understand how we as a species evolved with the particular cognitive capacities we have. R4.2. Learning and development

A number of commentators stress how two further avenues of research will help to situate our understanding of human cognition in a biological context: human development, and comparative psychology across species. For reasons of space, and reflecting the limits of our own expertise, we underplayed the crucial role of learning and cognitive development that is presupposed by the linguistic variation we outlined. These commentators offer a valuable corrective, summarizing the human and cross-species literature. They show how much more powerful are the learning mechanisms we can now draw on than the basic associationist models available in the 1950s when Chomsky argued that their lack of power forced us to postulate rich innate endowments for language learning. Indeed, the combined arguments put forth by the commentators go some way towards providing a solution to a problem we left unanswered at the end of section 7 of the target article: accounting for how language learning is possible in the face of the levels of diversity we describe. Bavin does a good job of reminding readers what the basic issues are here, and especially the central debate over the domain-specificity of language learning. Tomasello observes that the Chomskyan argument about the unlearnability of language structure crucially relies on the assumption of a simple association learning: once we take into account the rich context of communication, with shared attention and intention interpretation, not to mention capacities for analogy and statistical learning, the argument fails. Catania also refers to work on other species showing that category discrimination can be triggered right across the board by a single new stimulus. Catania, Christiansen & Chater, and Merker all stress the funnelling effects of the learner bottleneck via “C-induction”: In Merker’s words. “cultural transmission delivers the restricted search space needed to enable language learning, not by constraining the form language takes on an innate basis, but by ensuring that the form

in which language is presented to the learner is learnable.” Catania suggests we explicitly incorporate a “third track” – acquisition – into our coevolutionary model, but we would prefer to maintain it as one (albeit powerful) set of selectors on linguistic structure alongside the others we outline in our article. A number of commentators dwelt on Chomsky’s “poverty of the stimulus” argument for rich innate language capacities. Bavin points out that the complex sentential syntax that motivates the argument is learnt so late that the child has wide experience of language on which to build. Perhaps the neatest refutation is provided by Waterfall & Edelman, who note a crucial property of the linguistic input to children: namely, repetition with minor variation, which draws attention to the structural properties of strings, exhibiting for the infant the “transformations” of Zellig Harris. They show how learning algorithms can effectively use this information to bootstrap from unsegmented text to grammatical analysis. McMurray & Wasserman correctly point out that our position radically moves the goal posts for language learning, suggesting that not only are a slew of specialized learning strategies employed to learn a language (and these commentators provide very useful bibliographic leads here), but which of these strategies is deployed may depend on the language being learnt. We don’t necessarily learn Ye´lıˆ Dnye with its 90 phonemes, flexible phrase order, and widespread verb suppletion using the same strategies we use for English: As McMurray & Wasserman write, “humans . . . assemble language with a variety of learning mechanisms and sources of information, this assembly being guided by the particularities of the language they are learning.” Instead of talking about the passive acquisition of language, we should be talking about the active construction of many different skills. This perspective buries the idea of a single language acquisition device (LAD). Christiansen & Chater, as well as Catania, emphasize that learning in development is the crucial filter through which languages have to pass. Languages have to be good to think with (to modify an adage of Levi-Strauss), otherwise they won’t make it. Christiansen & Chater have described (both in their 2008 BBS article [see BBS 31(5)] and in Christiansen et al. 2009) interesting modelling that shows that the learning filter must be largely language-independent, and thus that properties of learning are unlikely to have evolved specifically for language. This is a new kind of evidence against the position taken by Pinker & Jackendoff that language-specific learning principles must be involved in the acquisition of language. Finally, we would like to draw attention to one other crucial aspect of development, namely, the way in which the environment is known to modulate developmental timing in the underlying biology of organisms, so that phenotypic variation can be achieved from the same genotype (“phenotypic plasticity”), and conversely, phenotypic identity can be obtained from variant genotypes (“developmental buffering”). In the conclusion to our target article we drew attention to the extraordinary achievement that is culture – generating phenotypic difference where there is no genetic difference, and phenotypic identity where there is genetic difference. These issues have been much explored in the biological literature on epigenesis and BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5

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Response/Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals development (see West-Eberhard [2003] for a fascinating overview). R4.3. The comparative perspective across species

Our other major omission, as some commentators noticed, is the lack of reference to the comparative psychology of other species. Margoliash & Nusbaum appeal to linguists and others interested in the evolution of language to “cast off the remaining intellectual shackles of linguistic speciesism” and take the findings of animal research more into account. They usefully remind us of the importance of the relationship between perceptual and motor skills. Merker notes how findings about complex learned birdsong can explain how a prelinguistic human adaptation for emancipated song could provide a mechanism for sustaining and elaborating string transmission, even if this was timed before the full emergence of social cognition: it can be driven by the need to impress by elaborate vocal display even when not yet used to communicate meaning. Darwin (1871) had, of course, imagined that language evolved from song (see Fisher & Scharff 2009; Fitch 2006, for an update). Penn, Holyoak, & Povinelli (Penn et al.) point out that our demonstration of the variability in language, and the implication that there is no simple innate basis for it, has interesting implications for a central issue in comparative psychology: what exactly is the Rubicon which divides us from apes? If the crucial ingredient was a chance language gene or the genetic substrate for UG, it might be possible to argue that language alone is responsible for the sea-change in our cognition. But if there is no such magic bullet, then languages must be learnt by principles of general cognition, and the Rubicon must be constituted by more fundamental and more general differences in cognition. Penn et al. err, though, when they try to extend the argument to downplay Tomasello’s (2008) thesis that the crucial divide is the special assemblage of abilities that make up the pragmatic infrastructure for human language. Tomasello’s assemblage of specialized social cognition is precisely what we need to explain the genesis of language diversity – it provides a general platform both for language learning and for the elaboration of distinct systems. Still, bringing their point together with those by Margoliash & Nusbaum and Merker is a useful reminder that we need to account both for the emergence of patterned form (where cross-species studies of sophisticated vocalizers must take on greater importance) and of productive meaning (where social cognition is likely to remain the main driver). Penn et al. see in our display of language variation more evidence for their identification of a major discontinuity between apes and humans in the capacity for relational thought. If this capacity is not introduced by a single new evolved trait, human language, then the gulf is a feature of general cognition. But we note two caveats here: First, in our very nearest cousins (chimps and bonobos), there are pale shadows of relational thinking (Haun & Call 2009). Second, no one doubts the importance of language in delivering ready-made relational concepts (Gentner 2003). Beyond that, we probably agree about the facts, but might value them differently: Is 10% continuity with chimps a telling bit of continuity, or is 90% discontinuity a hopeless Rubicon? 480

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R5. Situating language and cognition in the biology of variation Science moves in new directions blown by winds of different kinds – Kuhnian collapses, new technologies, new integrative insights, newly developing fields, funding biases, even boredom with old paradigms. We think it is pretty clear that for a mix of these reasons, the cognitive sciences are about to undergo a major upheaval. Classical cognitive science was based on a mechanistic analogy with a serial computational device, where serial algebraic algorithms could represent models of the mind. A simplifying assumption was made at the outset: we need only characterize one invariant system. That is, the human mind is essentially an invariant processing device, processing different content to be sure, but running the same basic algorithms regardless of its instantiations in different individuals with different experiences, different environments, and different languages (cf. Smolensky & Dupoux’s “a universal principle is a property true of all minds”). This view has taken a number of knocks in the last twenty years; for example, from the success of parallel computational models and the rise of the brain sciences. The brain sciences were at first harnessed to the classical enterprise, with invariance sought beneath individual variation in brain structure and function through selecting only right-handed or male subjects, pooling data, and normalizing brains. But cognitive neuroscience has increasingly broken free, and now the range of individual biological variation is a subject of interest in its own right. Pushing this development is genetics. It is now feasible to correlate brain structure and function with scans across half a million single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) or genetic markers. We already know detailed facts about, for example, the alleles that favor better long-term memory (Papassotiropoulos et al. 2006), and we are well on the way to knowing something about the genetic bases of language (Fisher & Marcus 2006, Vernes et al. 2008). On the processing side, we know that about 8% of individuals have rightlateralized language, that individuals differ markedly in the degree of language lateralization, and that on specific tasks about 10% of individuals may not show activation of the classic language areas at all (Mu¨ller 2009). (True, most individuals will have circuitry special to language, as Pinker & Jackendoff remark, but that may be only because using language bundles specific mental tasks, and because adults have built the circuitry in extended development.) We even have preliminary evidence that gene pools with certain biases in allele distribution are more likely to harbour languages of specific sorts (Dediu & Ladd 2007). We are not dealing, then, with an invariant machine at all, but with a biological system whose evolution has relied on keeping variance in the gene pool. This research is going to revolutionize what we know about the mind and brain and how it works. By putting variation central, as the fuel of evolution, it will recast the language sciences. Some aspects of the language sciences are pre-adapted to the sea-change –sociolinguistics, dialectology, historical linguistics, and typology – provided they can take the new mathematical methods on board. But we can look forward to the new psycholinguistics, centrally concerned with variation in human performance in the language domain both within and across language groups, and the new neurocognition of language which will

Response/Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals explore both the varying demands that different languages put on the neural circuitry and the way in which superficial phenotypic standardization is achieved by distinct underlying processing strategies in different individuals. In this context, renewed interest in the variation in human experience and expertise, in the cultural contexts of learning, and the diversity in our highest learned skill – language – is inevitable. For the cognitive and language sciences to engage with these developments, a first step is to take on board the lessons of those linguistic approaches that place variation and process at centre stage. Then the very diversity of languages becomes no longer an embarrassment but a serious scientific resource. That is the message we have been trying to convey. R6. Appendix: Disputed data and generalizations R6.1. Kayardild nominal tense

The occurrence of tense on Kayardild nominals was cited by us as a counterexample to Pinker and Bloom’s (1990) claim that languages will not code tense on nominals. Baker’s commentary does not dispute this, but then tries to use it to establish an orthogonal issue, namely, his verb-object constraint (see sect. R.6.10). While it is true that in Kayardild, tense appears on objects rather than subjects, it is not hard to find other languages, such as Pitta-Pitta (Blake 1979), where it is the subject rather than the object that codes for tense – so the general phenomenon gives no succor to Baker’s hoped-for universal. Needless to say, all this only reinforces the fact that tense can occur on nominals. R6.2. Positionals and ideophones

We noted in the target article that not only are the “big four” word classes (noun, verb, adjective, adverb) not wholly universal, but there were plenty of other word classes out there, including positionals and ideophones. We used the example of Mayan positionals. Pesetsky is right that Mayan positionals are classically defined as a root class, not a stem class, but the facts are actually more complex (see, e.g., Haviland 1994). Positionals have their own unique distribution at the stem level too, occurring, for example, in a special class of mensural classifiers (de Le´on 1988), body-part constructions (Haviland 1988, p. 92) and color-plus-position constructions (Haviland, submitted). In any case, many languages from around the world (such as Ye´lıˆ Dnye; Levinson 2000) have positionals as a special word class with their own distinctive distributions. (See Ameka and Levinson [2007] for detailed examples and a typology.) Pesetsky similarly tries to undermine the status of ideophones/expressives as a word class (the terms are more or less synonymous, but come from different linguistic descriptive traditions). He correctly notes that Osada (1992) does not discuss their syntax in Mundari, and this reflects a general neglect of their syntactic characteristics in linguistic descriptions, apart from simplistic characterizations of them as “syntactically unintegrated.” However, a careful discussion of the syntax of the functionally similar class of expressives in another Austroasiatic language, Semelai, can be found in Kruspe (2004): their syntactic distribution closely parallels that of direct speech

complements. Likewise in Southern Sotho (Molotsi 1993), ideophones pattern like complements of “say,” with the further property that they can be passivized, so that “John snatched the woman’s purse” is literally “John said snatch woman’s purse,” which can be passivized as “snatch was said woman’s purse.” In short, ideophones and expressives have a syntax, if sometimes limited. R6.3. Straits Salish noun versus verb distinction

We pointed out that it was still unclear whether in fact there is a universal noun/verb distinction. We mentioned the Wakashan language Straits Salish as an example of a language plausibly claimed to lack a noun/verb distinction. Instead of presenting counteranalyses of the Straits Salish data, Tallerman cites data from Nuuchahnulth (Nootka), from another language family, with no demonstration that the arguments can be transferred to Straits Salish. A crucial difference between the languages is that names can be predicative in Straits Salish but not in Nootka. Tallerman’s major arguments for the existence of a noun/verb distinction in Nuuchahnulth were already given in Jacobsen (1979) and Schachter (1985), and Jelinek (1995) takes care to show that they don’t apply to Straits Salish, which is why we used Salish rather than Nootka as an example. We agree with her, though, that further investigation of the Salish case is needed (a point also articulated in Evans & Osada 2005); hence our statement that no definitive consensus has been reached. R6.4. Jemez/Kiowa number

Harbour reproaches us for attributing the “unexpected number” facts to Jemez rather than Kiowa; in fact, the languages are related and both exhibit similar phenomena (Mithun 1999, p. 81, and personal communication). We thank Harbour for picking up the factual errors he points out, but for our part would like to correct his mischaracterization of this case as our “prime example” of “something we would never think of” – it was one of many, and the rest still stand. More importantly, further cross-linguistic data disputes his claim that “singular ‘we’ arises because Winnebago uses only [+ augmented].” The use of “because” here illustrates the fallacy of inferring cause from single cases. Harbour’s formulation predicts that if a language uses a more elaborated grammatical number system than just [+ augmented] it should not treat “1 þ 2” as singular. Yet there are many languages which have a three-way number system and which nonetheless treat 1þ2 in the same series as the singulars, like Bininj Gun-wok (Evans 2003a). R6.5. Arrernte syllable structure

Nevins, and (briefly) Berent, take issue with our citing Arrernte as an example of a language that defies the “Universal CV preference” by taking VC as the underlying syllable type. To contextualize their riposte, it is worth quoting Hyman (2008, p. 13): In each of the above cases, there is no “knock-out argument.” Anyone determined to maintain [these] universals can continue to do so, the worst consequence being an indeterminate or more awkward analysis. . . . Architectural universals have BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5

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Response/Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals this property: it all depends on your model and on what complications you are willing to live with.

Nevins’ purported counter-analysis is of this type. To make it work is not just a matter of allowing onset-sensitive morae, not a problem in itself, but also of leaving the coda out of weight considerations, which is more problematic. Moreover, he only considers some of the phenomena that Breen and Pensalfini (1999) cite – such as the fact that the language game known as “Rabbit Talk” picks out exactly the VC syllable to move to the end of the word – and ignores the arguments they give for postulating an initial vowel in words which start with a C when pronounced in isolation; namely, that this vowel appears when the word is not pronounced breath-group initially, and that postulating it simplifies other morphonological processes. A further argument in favor of the VC analysis (see Evans 1995b) is that although there is considerable variation in how words are pronounced in isolation (e.g., “sits” can be pronounced [an m ], [an m], [n m ], or [n m]), the number of syllables remains constant under the VC syllable analysis (at 2 in this instance), whereas the number of syllables under other analyses remains inconstant, even with the moraic adjustments that Nevins proposes. In short, proposing VC syllables lines up beautifully with a whole range of rules, whereas adopting the alternative, while workable, is crabbed by inelegancies. A deeper problem than mere inelegance in forcing a language like Arrernte into a procrustean CV bed is that it draws attention away from explaining what forces have shaped the unusual Arrernte structure. There is growing evidence from phonetic work by Butcher (2006) that the Arrernte VC syllable represents the phonologization of a whole syndrome of phonetic and phonological effects at work in Australian languages, linking a number of phenomena like: (a) the unusual proliferation of distinctive heterorganic clusters intervocalically (e.g., nk vs. ˛k vs. k vs. k); (b) the large set of place contrasts for oral and nasal stops, including contrasts like alveolar versus postalveolar, that are most effectively cued by the leading rather than following vowel; (c) the neutralization of the apicoalveolar versus apico-postalveolar contrast word-initially; and (d) the widespread pre-stopping of intervocalic nasals and laterals. The joint effect of all these features is to concentrate the maximum amount of contrasting information in intervocalic position, and make the leading vowel crucial for signalling the place of following consonants through F2 and F3 formant transitions. In other words, it is VC rather than CV units (or, more accurately, the continuous phonetic signals that correspond to them) which are the most informative, in terms of cueing the greater number of contrasts. This now allows us to give an insightful account of why VC syllables emerge as phonological units in some Australian languages. We would not be led to this explanation if we use too much abstract representational machinery to conjure away the existence of an aberrant pattern.

R6.6. Finite state grammars and cotton-top tamarins

Pullum & Scholz pull us up for propagating a misinterpretation of the findings in Fitch and Hauser (2004), by stating that cotton-top tamarins have a general ability to 482

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learn finite state languages. We stand corrected, and urge the reader to heed Pullum & Scholz’s clarification that Fitch and Hauser’s findings are restricted to the much smaller subset known as SL (strictly local) languages. The investigation of recursive and augmentative structures in animal cognition is a current minor industry in cognitive science. If this is meant to shed light on the human language capacity, it is arguably quite misguided. Indefinite recursion, or discrete infinity as Chomsky prefers, is not an actual property of human language – no human is capable of indefinite centre-embedding, for example. Only in the light of a radical distinction between competence and performance does this minor industry make any sense at all, and that little sense is undermined by the impossibility of testing animals directly for indefinite recursion. R6.7. Cinque’s generalization about Greenberg’s Universal #20

Specifying strict ordering in noun phrases where the noun comes last, is raised by Rizzi as an example of how implicational universals can be made to follow from parameterized rules. However, Dryer (2009), drawing on a larger cross-linguistic sample, shows that you get better fit with the data if Cinque’s formal categories (like Adjective) are replaced by semantic categories (like “modifier denoting size, color, etc.”). Cinque’s parameterization just gives a discrete and approximate characterization of statistical trends reflecting the interaction of many functional selectors. R6.8. Subjacency and “invisible Wh-movement”

A number of commentators (Smolensky & Dupoux, Freidin, Rizzi) appealed to the Chomskyan notion of “Subjacency” as a convincing example of a highly abstract principle or rule-constraint which is manifested directly in languages like English. The idea in a nutshell is that movement of constituents is constrained so that they may not cross more than one “bounding node” in the syntactic tree (in English, bounding nodes are a NP, i.e., noun phrase, or a complementizer phrase headed by that). Hence you can say “What does John believe that Mary saw __?” but not “ What does John believe the rumor that Mary saw _?”. Now consider Rizzi’s point that many languages, including Chinese, do not move their Wh-words (so called in situ Wh) – they would stay in the corresponding slots indicated in the just provided sentences – but appear to exhibit semantic interpretations that might constitute a parallel phenomenon. The apparent lack of Wh-movement in Chinese, which at first seems an embarrassment to the theory, is claimed however to mask covert movement at an underlying level, close to semantic interpretation: consequently the range of construals of a Chinese Whquestion is argued to be limited by the very same abstract constraint postulated for languages with overt movement (see examples in Rizzi’s commentary). For generativists, this may seem like a double scoop: Not only is the constraint of an abstract enough kind that children would find it hard to learn in English, but it even holds in Chinese where it is, in effect, invisible, so could not possibly be learnt! Moreover, it is a completely arbitrary and

Response/Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals unmotivated constraint, so there is no apparent way for the child to infer its existence. Therefore, it must be part of UG, a quirk of our innate language organ. But this in fact is not at all a convincing example to the other camp. First, to make it work in languages with and without overt “movement,” it has to be so particularized (“parameterized”) for each language so that, as we noted in the target article, the child might as well learn the whole thing (Newmeyer 2005). Second, there are perfectly good alternative models that do not use movement: Whwords are simply generated in the right place from the start, using other methods than movement to get the correct logical interpretations. Within LFG, a combination of the FOCUS discourse function and prosodic structure can get in situ Wh interpretation with no covert movement required (Mycock 2006). Through methods like these, LFG, HPSG, and Role and Reference Grammar have all developed ways of modelling both the English syntactic constraints and the Chinese interpretation constraints without any covert operations or unlearnable constraints. Van Valin (1998) offers one of these rival explanations.6 He notes that for entirely general purposes one needs to have a notion of “focus domain” – roughly the unit that can be focussed on as new information in a sentence. A chunk like Mary did X is such a unit, but the rumor that Mary did X is not, because it marks the information as already presumed. So it makes no sense to question part of it. Focus domains have a precise structural characterization, and the informational structure of this kind explains both the English and the Chinese facts without positing covert entities or unmotivated rule constraints. Van Valin shows that the focus domains are easily learned by children from the range of possible yes/no question elliptical answers. This explanation needs the minimum equipment (a definition of focus domain) and no magic or UG. Take your pick between the two explanations – an unmotivated, unlearnable, hidden constraint implying innate complex architecture, or a general design for communication requiring nothing you wouldn’t need for other explanatory purposes. As C.-R. Huang (1993) notes after discussing the Mandarin data, “there is no concrete evidence for an abstract movement account . . . invoking Ockham’s razor would exclude movements at an abstract level.”

R6.9. C-command

Rizzi claims that “no language allows coreference between a pronoun and a NP when the pronoun c-commands the NP” ( He said that John was sick;  each other saw the men). We pointed out that in languages (like Jiwarli) which lack constituency as the main organizing principle of sentence structure, notions like c-command cannot be defined (c-command is defined in terms of a particular kind of position higher in a syntactic constituency tree). But let us interpret this relation loosely and charitably, in terms of some general notion of domination or control. Then the observation would have very wide validity, but it would still be only a strong tendency. Counterexamples include Abaza reciprocals (Hewitt 1979) where the verbal affix corresponding to “each other” occupies the subject rather than the object slot, and Guugu Yimidhirr pronominalization, where it is possible to have a

pronoun in the higher clause coreferential with a full NP in the lower clause (Levinson 1987). Once again, then, we are dealing with a widespread but not universal pattern. The typological/functional paradigm explains it as emerging from a more general tendency in discourse (not just syntax): reference to entities proceeds with increasing generality, which is why “She came in. Barbara sat down” is not a way of expressing “Barbara came in. She sat down.” (see Levinson [2000] for a detailed Gricean account). Many languages have grammaticalized the results of this more general tendency, producing grammatical rules which can then be described by c-command (if you want to use that formalism) but also by other formalisms. Seeking the most general explanation for cross-linguistic patterning here directs us to more general pragmatic principles (“use the least informative form compatible with ensuring successful reference given the current state of common ground”), rather than in terms of a specific syntactic constraint which only applies in a subset (even if a majority) of the world’s languages. Many strong tendencies across languages appear to have a pragmatic or functional base, undermining a presumption of innate syntax. R6.10. The “Verb-Object Constraint”

Baker offers his “Verb-Object Constraint (VOC)” as a proposal for a “true linguistic universal” of this high level kind – the generalization that the verb “combines” with the theme/patient before a nominal that expresses the agent/cause (“combines” is not defined, so we take it loosely). But this, too, rapidly runs afoul of the cross-linguistic facts. Note that his formulation equivocates between whether the constraint is formulated in terms of semantic roles such as agent and patient, or grammatical relations such as subject and object; some of the problems below pertain to one of these, some to the other, some to both: 1. Many languages don’t have a clear notion of subject and object (see remarks in our target article). If we avoid this problem by stating the universal in terms of thematic roles (theme, patient, agent, experiencer), then we’ll find such anomalies as languages which effectively idiomatize the subject-verb combination, only combining secondarily with the patient, employing idioms like “headache strikes me/the girl” or “fever burns him” (Evans 2004; Pawley et al. 2000). 2. Although polysynthetic languages like Mohawk usually incorporate objects rather than subjects into the verb, there are some that do incorporate transitive subjects/agents (not just objects as Baker’s generalization would predict), most famously the Munda language Sora (Ramamurti 1931; cf. Anderson 2007). 3. There are twice as many VSO languages as VOS languages, 14% versus 7%, respectively, in a worldwide sample by Dryer (2009), but only VOS languages seem likely to facilitate a “combination” of verb and object. 4. Languages with ergative syntax group the object of transitives and the subject of intransitives as one type of entity, around which the syntax is organized (Baker notes this as a potential problem, but doesn’t offer the solution). Taken together, these problems make the VOC just one more observation that is certainly a statistical tendency, but which it is misleading to elevate to “universal” status. BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5

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References/Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We thank the following people for discussion, comments, and ideas in preparing this response: Mary Beckman, Balthasar Bickel, Penelope Brown, Andy Butcher, Grev Corbett, Bill Croft, Nick Enfield, Adele Goldberg, Martin Haspelmath, Yan Huang, Larry Hyman, Rachel Nordlinger, Masha Polinsky, Arie Verhagen, and Robert Van Valin. NOTES 1. We use the term generative linguists to refer to linguists working specifically within frameworks deriving from the various theories of Chomsky. The term also has a wider sense, referring to a larger body of researchers working in fully explicit formal models of language such as LFG, HPSG, and their derivatives. These alternative theoretical developments have been much less wedded to the Chomskyan notion of Universal Grammar. LFG, in particular, has explicitly developed a much more flexible multidimensional architecture allowing for both constituency and dependency relations as well as the direct representation of prosodic units. 2. Of course these need to be relativized to modality: facts about the position of the larynx or the stability of some vowel formants across varying vocal tract configurations are only relevant to sound, whereas constraints on the production of hand or arm gestures are only relevant to manual sign. There will be some parallels, but the degree to which “sonority” is the same phenomenon in both, as Berent suggests, is still controversial (Sandler 2009; Sandler & Lillo-Martin 2006, p. 245). 3. Hockett (1960) correctly identified this as part of the “duality of patterning” (together with combinatorial semantics) necessary if language is to be unlimited in its productivity. 4. Lest this finding invite incredulity, given that the language family is assumed to be less than 6,000 years old, this figure is worked out by summing independent path-lengths in many branches of the family tree and looking for the total numbers of changes from an ancestral language. The number should be taken with a pinch of salt but is probably in the right general ballpark. 5. Abui, on Frantisˇek Kratochvil’s (2007) analysis, comes rather close. 6. For other kinds of explanation in terms of processing costs, see Kluender (1992; 1998), Hawkins (1999), and Sag et al. (2007).

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FOUNDING EDITOR (1978–2001)

Behavioral and Brain Sciences Instructions for Authors and Commentators http://www.editorialmanager.com/bbs/account/BBS_ifc.pdf Behavioral and Brain Sciences (BBS) is a unique scientific communication medium, providing the service of Open Peer Commentary for reports of significant current work in psychology, neuroscience, behavioral biology or cognitive science. If a manuscript is judged by BBS referees and editors to be appropriate for Commentary (see Criteria below), it is circulated electronically to a large number of commentators selected (with the aid of systematic bibliographic searches and e-mail Calls for Commentators) from the BBS Associateship and the worldwide biobehavioral science community, including individuals recommended by the author. If you are not a BBS Associate and wish to enquire about joining, please see the instructions for associate membership at http://www.editorialmanager.com/bbs/account/BBS_ifc.pdf Once the Commentary stage of the process has begun, the author can no longer alter the article, but can respond formally to all commentaries accepted for publication. The target article, commentaries, and authors' responses then co-appear in BBS. (Note: Continuing Commentary submissions are no longer being accepted.) Criteria for acceptance: To be eligible for publication, a paper should not only meet the standards of a journal such as Psychological Review or the International Review of Neurobiology in terms of conceptual rigor, empirical grounding, and clarity of style, but the author should also offer an explicit 500 word rationale for soliciting Commentary, and a list of suggested commentators (complete with e-mail addresses). A BBS target article an be: (i) the report and discussion of empirical research that the author judges to have broader scope and implications than might be more appropriately reported in a specialty journal; (ii) an unusually significant theoretical article that formally models or systematizes a body of research; or (iii) a novel interpretation, synthesis, or critique of existing experimental or theoretical work. Occasionally, articles dealing with social or philosophical aspects of the behavioral and brain sciences will be considered. The service of Open Peer Commentary will be primarily devoted to original unpublished manuscripts written specifically for BBS treatment. However, a recently published book whose contents meet the standards outlined above spontaneously and multiply nominated by the BBS Associateship may also be eligible for Commentary. In such a BBS Multiple Book Review, a comprehensive, article-length précis by the author is published together with the commentaries and the author's response. In special cases, Commentary will also be extended to a position paper or an already published article that deals with particularly influential or controversial research or that has itself proven to be especially important or controversial. In normal cases however, BBS submissions may not be already published (either in part or whole) or be under consideration for publication elsewhere and submission of an article is considered expressly to imply this. Multiple book reviews and previously published articles appear by invitation only. Self-nominations cannot be considered, neither can non-spontaneous (i.e. author elicited) nominations. However, the BBS Associateship and professional readership of BBS are encouraged to nominate current topics, books and authors for Commentary; e-mail [email protected] In all the categories described, the decisive consideration for eligibility will be the desirability of Commentary for the submitted material. Controversiality simpliciter is not a sufficient criterion for soliciting Commentary: a paper may be controversial simply because it is wrong or weak. Nor is the mere presence of interdisciplinary aspects sufficient: general cybernetic and "organismic" disquisitions are not appropriate for BBS. Some appropriate rationales for seeking Open Peer Commentary would be that: (1) the material bears in a significant way on some current controversial issues in behavioral and brain sciences; (2) its findings substantively contradict some well-established aspects of current research and theory; (3) it criticizes the findings, practices, or principles of an accepted or influential line of work; (4) it unifies a substantial amount of disparate research; (5) it has important cross-disciplinary ramifications; (6) it introduces an innovative methodology or formalism for broader consideration; (7) it meaningfully integrates a body of brain and behavioral data; (8) it places a hitherto dissociated area of research into an evolutionary or ecological perspective; etc. In order to assure communication with potential commentators (and readers) from other BBS specialty areas, all technical terminology must be clearly defined or simplified, and specialized concepts must be fully described. In case of doubt of appropriateness for BBS Commentary, authors should submit a detailed target article proposal using the new BBS Editorial Manager site at http://www.editorialmanager.com/bbs/. After evaluating the proposal, the Editors will encourage or discourage formal target article submission. A note on commentaries: The purpose of the Open Peer Commentary service is to provide a concentrated constructive interaction between author and commentators on a topic judged to be of broad significance to the biobehavioral science community. Commentators should provide substantive criticism, interpretation, and elaboration as well as any pertinent complementary or supplementary material, such as illustrations; all original data will be refereed in order to assure the archival validity of BBS commentaries. Commentaries and articles should be free of hyperbole and remarks ad hominem. Please refer to and follow exactly the BBS Instructions for Commentators at http://www.editorialmanager.com/bbs/account/BBS_ifc.pdf before submitting your invited commentary. Style and format for target articles: Target Articles must not exceed 14,000 words (and should ordinarily be considerably shorter); commentaries should not exceed

Stevan Harnad *Modelled on the “CA Comment” service of the journal Current Anthropology.

1,000 words, excluding references. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation should be consistent within each article and commentary and should follow the style recommended in the latest edition of A Manual of Style, The University of Chicago Press. It is advisable to examine a recent issue of BBS as a model. Target articles should be submitted in MSWord format to the new Editorial Manager site at http://www.editorialmanager.com/bbs/. Figures should appear in the body of the text, not at the end of the paper, and should also be supplied as separate TIFF, EPS, JPEG, or GIF files. However, if your article is accepted, TIFF or EPS format will be requested for publication since printing requires resolutions of at least 1100dpi. (Please note that costs for color figure reproduction will be passed along to the author. Color printing is expensive, and authors are encouraged to find alternative methods for presentation of their argument.) Once accepted, a Call for Commentators will be sent to thousands of BBS Associates and readers. The Call letter includes a link to the pre-copyedited final draft archived publicly for potential commentators. The copyedited final draft will only be posted for the invited commentators. Please make sure your target article file has ALL of the following in this order: Four Separate Word Counts (for the abstract, main text, references, and entire text – total + addresses etc.), an Indexable Title, Full Name(s), Institutional Address(es), E-mail Address(es) and Homepage URL(s) for all authors (where available), Short Abstract (100 words), Long Abstract (250 words), 5–10 Keywords (in alphabetical order), approx. 12,000 word Main Text (with paragraphs separated by full blank lines, not tab indents), and Alphabetical Reference List. Target article authors must also provide numbered headings and subheadings to facilitate cross-reference by commentators. Tables and figures (i.e., photographs, graphs, charts, or other artwork) should be numbered consecutively, and should appear in its appropriate location. Every table should have a title; every figure, a caption. Endnotes and appendices should be grouped together at the end of the paper and should ideally be locally linked to in the text to facilitate the reader (and of course the referee’s task). Acknowledgements should be placed at the end of the paper. The short abstract will appear by way of an advertisement, one issue in advance of the publication issue. The long abstract will be circulated to referees and then potential commentators should the paper be accepted, and will appear with the printed article. BBS’s rigorous timetable constraints (requiring the coordination of target articles, commentaries and author’s responses within the publishing queue) make it extremely difficult for us to process follow-up drafts of your submission. Please make sure that the paper you submit is the carefully checked final draft to which you wish the referees to address. Please also ensure that your submission has been proof-read by a native English speaker before submission. This, of course, greatly improves its chances at the refereeing stage. References: Bibliographic citations in the text must include the author’s last name and the date of publication and may include page references. Complete bibliographic information for each citation should be included in the list of references. Please also include and link to the WWW URL for any paper for which it exists. Examples of correct styles are: Brown (1973); (Brown 1973); Brown 1973; 1978); (Brown 1973; Jones 1976); (Brown & Jones 1978); (Brown et al. 1978). References should be in alphabetical order in the style of the following examples. Do not abbreviate journal titles: Freeman, W. J. (1958) Distribution in time and space of prepyriform electrical activity. Journal of Neurophysiology 2:644–66. http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/abs/ neuro/199806009 Dennet, D. C. (1991) Two contrasts: Folk craft versus folk science and belief versus opinion. In: The future of folk psychology: Intentionality and cognitive science, ed. J. D. Greenwood, pp. 26–7. Cambridge University Press. http:// cogprints.soton.ac.uk/abs/phil/199804005 Bateson, P.P.G. & Hinde, R.A., eds. (1978) Growing points in ethology. Cambridge University Press. Editing: The publishers reserve the right to edit and proof all articles and commentaries accepted for publication. Authors of target articles will be given the opportunity o review the copy-edited manuscript and page proofs. Commentators will be asked to review copy-editing only when changes have been substantial; commentators will not see proofs. Both authors and commentators should notify the editorial office of all corrections within 48 hours or approval will be assumed. Author response to commentaries: All invited commentaries received before the deadline are only accessible to the Authors and Editors. Please note that no commentary is officially accepted until the Editor in charge has formally reviewed it and notified both the authors and the Editorial Administrator. Please refer to and follow exactly the BBS Commentary Response Instructions at http://www.editorialmanager.com/ bbs/account/BBS_ifc.pdf before submitting your response. Authors of target articles receive 50 offprints of the entire treatment, and can purchase additional copies. Commentators will also be given an opportunity to purchase offprints of the entire treatment.

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Offprints of the following forthcoming BBS treatments can be purchased for educational purposes if they are ordered well in advance. For ordering information, please write to Journals Department, Cambridge University Press, 32 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10013-2473.

The myth of language universals: Language diversity and its importance for cognitive science Nicholas Evans and Stephen Levinson

A socio-relational framework of sex differences in the expression of emotion Jacob Miguel Vigil

To appear in Volume 32, Number 6 (2009)

Behavioral and Brain Sciences

In this issue

The evolution of misbelief A default presumption is that, whereas true beliefs are biologically adaptive, misbeliefs are maladaptive. How then are we to account for routine instances of misbelief? We endorse a distinction between two general types: those resulting from a breakdown in the normal functioning of the belief formation system and those arising in the normal course of that system’s operations. We argue that a subset of the latter – positive illusions – arise not incidentally but, rather, systematically, because such misbeliefs (the misbeliefs themselves, not just the systems that produce them) are adaptive. We are thus evolutionarily predisposed to form such misbeliefs.

With commentary from JM Ackerman, JR Shapiro & JK Maner; G Ainslie; M Bertamini & R Casati; P Boyer; JD Brown; J Bulbulia & R Sosis; ET Cokely & A Feltz; M Coltheart; D Dunning; CS Dweck; O Flanagan; K Frankish; NL Gjersoe & BM Hood; J Hartung; MG Haselton & DM Buss; DDP Johnson; VJ Konecˇni; DL Krebs & K Denton; J Kruger, S Chan & N Roese; R Langdon; JR Liddle & TK Shackelford; GF Marcus; RG Millikan; AL Mishara & P Corlett; A Norenzayan, AF Shariff & WM Gervais; B Randolph-Seng; JP Schloss & MJ Murray; D Sperber; J Sutton; K Talmont-Kaminski; TJ Wereha & TP Racine; Y Wilks; TW Zawidzki

David A. Coall, University of Western Australia, and Ralph Hertwig, University of Basel What motivates grandparents to their altruism? We review answers from evolutionary theory, sociology, and economics. The answers exist side-by-side, with little theoretical integration. Regardless of their motives, can grandparental acts of altruism enhance kin’s welfare? Evidence from natural-fertility populations suggests that grandmothers especially can improve grandchildren’s survival chances and welfare. The impact of grandparental investment in industrialized societies, however, has received little attention. We found few studies that investigated its impact in low-risk family contexts. Under circumstances of duress, evidence obtained suggests that grandparents could provide support that safeguards their grandchildren. We discuss research and policy implications.

List of commentators is unavailable Among the articles to appear in forthcoming issues of BBS: R. T. McKay & D. C. Dennett, “The Evolution of Misbelief” David A. Coall & R. Hertwig, “Grandparental investment: Past, present, and future” J. Henrich, S. J. Heine & A. Norenzayan, “The Weirdest People In The World?”

Volume 32, Number 5

Grandparental investment: Past, present, and future

October 2009

Ryan T. McKay, University of Zurich, and Daniel C. Dennett, Tufts University

Pages 375–492

Cambridge Journals Online For further information about this journal please go to the journal website at: journals.cambridge.org/bbs

An International journal of current research and theory with open peer commentary Volume 32 | Issue 5 | October 2009 | ISSN: 0140-525X