Armand Maurer BEING AND KNOWING
Studies in Thomas Aquinas and Later Medieval Philosophers The studies in this volume concern philosophical ideas of men who lived in Western Europe and England between roughly 1250 and 1350 — a period that began with Thomas Aquinas and ended with William of Ockham. These hundred years were marked by intense philosophical speculation and controversy; they saw the rise of philosophical and theological giants such as Albert the Great, Aquinas, Bonaventure, Scotus and Ockham, as well as a host of lesser lights without whom the intellectual history of the time would be incomplete. Besides studies in Thomas Aquinas and Ockham, the volume includes essays on Siger of Brabant, Henry of Harclay, Dietrich of Freiberg, John of Jandun and Francis of Meyronnes. The Epilogue contains two essays of a general character: one on some aspects of fourteenth-century philosophy, the other on the divergent views of several eminent historians of medieval philosophy on the nature of philosophy in the Middle Ages. All the essays in the volume were previously printed in various journals and books. They are here reprinted substantially as they first appeared, but with corrections and revisions. As the title Being and Knowing indicates, the topics of the studies fall within the scope of metaphysics and what is known today as epistemology.
PAPERS IN MEDIAEVAL STUDIES 10
Being and Knowing Studies in Thomas Aquinas and Later Medieval Philosophers Armand Maurer
Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies
CANADIAN CATALOGUING IN PUBLICATION DATA
Maurer, Armand A. (Armand Augustine), 1915Being and knowing (Papers in mediaeval studies, ISSN 0228-8605 ; 10) Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-88844-810-4 1. Philosophy, Medieval. 2. Tho is, Aquinas, Saint, 12257-1274. tifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies. II. Title. III. Series. B721.M38 1990
189
© 1990 by Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies 59 Queen's Park Crescent East Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5S 2C4 PRINTED BY UNIVERSA, WETTEREN, BELGIUM
I. Pon-
C89-094308-7
Contents Introduction Acknowledgments
vn ix THOMAS AQUINAS
1. Form and Essence in the Philosophy of St. Thomas 2. St. Thomas and the Analogy of Genus 3. A Neglected Thomistic Text on the Foundation of Mathematics 4. St. Thomas and Eternal Truths 5. St. Thomas on the Sacred Name 'Tetragrammaton' 6. The Unity of a Science: St. Thomas and the Nominalists 7. St. Thomas and Historicity
3 19 33 43 59 71 95
SIGER OF BRABANT
8. Esse and Essentia in the Metaphysics of Siger of Brabant 119 9. Between Reason and Faith: Siger of Brabant and Pomponazzi on the Magic Arts 137 10. Siger of Brabant on Fables and Falsehoods in Religion 163 DIETRICH OF FREIBERG
11. The De Quiditatibus Entium of Dietrich of Freiberg and its Criticism of Thomistic Metaphysics 177 HENRY OF HARCLAY
12. Henry of Harclay's Question on the Univocity of Being 13. Henry of Harclay's Questions on Immortality JOHN OF JANDUN
14. John of Jandun and the Divine Causality
FRANCIS OF MEYRONNES
15. Francis of Meyronnes' Defense of Epistemological Realism 16. The Role of Infinity in the Thought of Francis of Meyronnes
203 229 275 311 333
VI
CONTENTS WILLIAM OF OCKHAM
17. The Role of Divine Ideas in the Theology of William of Ockham 18. Ockham on the Possibility of a Better World 19. Method in Ockham's Nominalism 20. William of Ockham on Language and Reality 21. Ockham's Razor and Chatton's Anti-Razor
363 383 403 423 431
EPILOGUE
22. Some Aspects of Fourteenth-Century Philosophy 23. Medieval Philosophy and its Historians
447 461
Recent Editions of Works of Authors Cited Index of Authors Subject Index
481 483 491
Introduction It is with some misgiving that I am reprinting the essays in this volume. Written over a period of forty years and appearing in various journals and other publications, they reflect the state of research in the philosophy of the Middle Ages at the time of their composition. The study of medieval philosophy has taken such giant strides in recent years, especially through the editing of the works of the philosophers, that it would be a monumental — and indeed impractical — task to bring the essays completely up to date. All I could do was to revise and correct them when I thought this necessary and to refer to a limited number of recent works on the topics of the essays. The essay on Siger's metaphysics has been completely rewritten. It is to be hoped that thus refurbished and brought together in a volume, they will prove to be of value to students of medieval philosophy. A few of the articles in their original publication contain the editions of brief texts of medieval philosophers. Some of these editions have been made obsolete by the appearance of more recent and critical texts. In these cases I have not reprinted my own editions but make reference in the notes to the newer texts. As a general rule I have retained references in the notes to standard editions available at the time the articles were written. A list of more recent editions of works cited in the articles has been appended at the end of the volume. While calling these papers studies in medieval philosophers, I am aware that, with the exception of Siger of Brabant and John of Jandun, they were not primarily philosophers but theologians who philosophized for the purpose of their theology. The final paper on "Medieval Philosophy and its Historians," suggests the historical circumstances that gave rise to this way of doing philosophy, which has been aptly called "Christian Philosophy." Although this style of philosophizing is no longer in vogue, it can hardly be denied that, as it was practiced in the Middle Ages, it was productive of rational, philosophical ideas that have profoundly influenced Western thought. The subjects of all the papers fall within the period of 1250 and 1350, from Thomas Aquinas to William of Ockham. Several extend to the following centuries, called the Renaissance, but this illustrates the bond between it and
VIII
INTRODUCTION
the Middle Ages. The topics of the papers come within the area of metaphysics or are closely related to it. In thus limiting the scope of the papers I am not implying that other periods and other topics in medieval philosophy are unimportant and uninteresting. I am only showing a personal preference and drawing upon forty years of research and teaching. I wish to express my gratitude to my Basilian confreres at the Pontifical Institute for making this reprint possible. Armand Maurer Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies
Acknowledgments The studies published in this volume are listed below with the place of their original publication. 1. "Form and Essence in the Philosophy of St. Thomas," in Mediaeval Studies 13 (1951), 165-176. 2. "St. Thomas and the Analogy of Genus," in The New Scholasticism 29 (1955), 127-144. 3. "A Neglected Thomistic Text on the Foundation of Mathematics," in Mediaeval Studies 21 (1959), 185-192. 4. "St. Thomas on Eternal Truths," in Mediaeval Studies 32 (1970), 91-107. 5. "St. Thomas on the Sacred Name 'Tetragrammaton'," in Mediaeval Studies 34 (1972), 275-286. 6. "The Unity of a Science: St. Thomas and the Nominalists," in St. Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974. Commemorative Studies, ed. A. Maurer (Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974), 2, 269-291. 7. St. Thomas and Historicity (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1979). Given as the Aquinas Lecture, 1979. 8. "Esse and Essentia in the Metaphysics of Siger ofBrabant," in Mediaeval Studies 8 (1946), 68-86. 9. "Between Reason and Faith: Siger of Brabant and Pomponazzi on the Magic Arts," in Mediaeval Studies 18 (1956), 1-18. 10. "Siger ofBrabant on Fables and Falsehoods in Religion," in Mediaeval Studies 43 (1981), 515-530. 11. "The De Quiditatibus Entium of Dietrich of Freiberg and its Criticism of Thomistic Metaphysics," in Mediaeval Studies 18 (1956), 173-203. 12. "Henry of Harclay's Question on the Univocity of Being," in Mediaeval Studies 16 (1954), 1-18. 13. "Henry of Harclay's Questions on Immortality,'' in Mediaeval Studies 19 (1957), 79-107. 14. "John of Jandun and the Divine Causality," in Mediaeval Studies 17 (1955), 185-207. 15. "Francis of Meyronnes' Defense of Epistemological Realism," in Studia Mediaevalia et Mariologica in Honour of P. Carolo Balic (Rome: Pontificium Athenaeum 'Antonianum', 1971), 203-225.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
16. "The Role of Infinity in the Thought of Francis of Meyronnes," in Mediaeval Studies 33 (1971), 201-227. 17. "Ockham on the Possibility of a Better World," in Mediaeval Studies 38 (1976), 291-312. 18. "The Role of Divine Ideas in the Theology of William of Ockham," in Studies Honoring Ignatius Charles Brady, Friar Minor, ed. R. S. Almagno, C. L. Harkins (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1976), 357-377. 19. "Method in Ockham's Nominalism," in The Monist 61 (1978), 426-443. 20. "William of Ockham on Language and Reality," in Miscellanea Mediaevalia 13/2. Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter, ed. W. Kluxen et al. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1981), 795-802. A lecture delivered to the Societe internationale pour l'etude de la philosophic medievale, Bonn, West Germany, Aug. 29-Sept. 3, 1977. 21. "Ockham's Razor and Chatton's Anti-Razor," in Mediaeval Studies 46 (1984), 463-475. 22. "Some Aspects of Fourteenth-Century Philosophy," Mediaevalia et Humanistica, New Series 7 (1976), 175-188. A lecture given to The Medieval Academy of America, Harvard University, April 18, 1975. 23. "Medieval Philosophy and its Historians," in Essays on the Reconstruction of Medieval History, ed. V. Mudroch & G. S. Couse (Montreal and London: McGill-Queens University Press, 1974), 69-84. A lecture delivered in 1964 at Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, in a series entitled "The Medieval World."
St. Thomas Aquinas was born at Roccasecca, near Monte Cassino, Italy, c. 1225. After studying at the University of Naples he joined the Dominican Order in 1244. He was a pupil of St. Albert the Great, probably in Paris, certainly in Cologne. Returning to Paris in 1252 he lectured on the Sentences and became master of theology in 1257. He taught in Paris from 1256 to 1259, then in Italy until 1269. He taught again in Paris from 1269 to 1272. From 1272 to 1273 he was regent master of studies at Naples. He died at Fossanuova on March 7, 1274.
1
Form and Essence in the Philosophy of St. Thomas The pages that follow make no pretension to treat of St. Thomas' notions of form and essence in all their aspects. A large volume would be required for that. Their aim is simply to study several paragraphs in the Angelic Doctor's Commentary on the Metaphysics which raise a specific problem concerning the essence of material substances: Is their essence identical with their form? What is the status of matter with regard to the essence? Is it included in it as an integral part, or is it in some way extrinsicaily related to it? St. Thomas recognizes that philosophers have given different answers to these questions, and in the section of his Commentary under consideration he outlines them briefly, giving at the same time his own views. We shall follow him in his exposition of the opinions of his predecessors, commenting on its historical accuracy; finally we shall see his own solution to the problem and its doctrinal significance. 1
I. AVERROES AND ARISTOTLE
The first opinion regarding the essence of material substances St. Thomas attributes to the Muslim philosopher Averroes and to some of his followers. In brief, it claims that the essences of such substances are identical with their forms to the exclusion of matter. The whole essence of the species is the form; for example, the whole essence of man consists in his soul. The soul is called the "form of the part" {forma partis) inasmuch as it perfects matter and brings it into actuality. Humanity is called the "form of the whole" (forma totius) inasmuch as through it the whole composite is determined and fixed in the species. Matter and the material parts of the composite are not 1
In VII Metaph, 9; ed. Cathala-Spiazzi (Rome, 1950), 1467-1469.
4
THOMAS AQUINAS
included in the essence nor are they included in the definition signifying the species, but only the formal principles of the species. If we turn to Averroes' Commentary on the Metaphysics we see that this is indeed the sense of his doctrine, although some of the terms used by St. Thomas to express it are not to be found there. In particular, it does not seem that Averroes used the expressions forma partis and forma totius. The Muslim philosopher follows Aristotle closely in distinguishing three meanings of the term "substance." It signifies first of all, he says, the matter of the composite of matter and form. Secondly, it means the form. Thirdly, it designates the composite itself of form and matter. However, even though all these three can be called substance, only the form can be called the essence or quiddity. Form is the substance of the thing in the sense that it indicates its essence. Matter is a part of the composite but it does not belong to the essence. It is simply the subject underlying and receiving the form. Hence it includes form in its definition, but the definition of the form as the very essence of the thing does not include matter. From his examples it is clear that matter in this context is not simply individual matter but matter in general, for example, in the case of man, flesh and bones. Borrowing an example from Aristotle, Averroes says that the form "concavity" does not include matter in its definition. "Snubness" however does, because it is concavity in the nose or in the flesh of the nose. The nose, then, is part of the substance signified by snubness, but it is not part of the definition of the form of concavity. It is simply the subject of this form. 2
3
"... sciendum est quod circa definitiones rerum, et earum essentias, duplex est opinio. Quidam enim dicunt quod tota essentia speciei est ipsa forma, sicut quod tota essentia hominis est anima. Et propter hoc dicunt quod eadem secundum rem est forma totius, quae significatur nomine humanitatis, et forma partis, quae significatur nomine animae, sed differunt solum secundum rationem: nam forma partis dicitur secundum quod perficit maleriam, et facit earn esse in actu: forma autem totius, secundum quod totum compositum per earn in specie collocatur. Et ex hoc volunt quod nullae partes materiae ponantur in definitione indicante speciem, sed solum principia formalia speciei. Et haec opinio videtur Averrois et quorumdam sequentium eum." Ibid., 1467. See St. Thomas, In IV Sent., d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 2, ad 2; Opera omnia 11 (Paris, 1874), p. 298. (Included in the Supplement to the Summa TheoL, q. 79, a. 2, ad 2). Summa contra Gentiles IV, 81, Dehumanitate. On the followers of Averroes see infra, p. 7. In his De Ente et Essentia Thomas attributes this doctrine to some unnamed masters (quidam) but not to Averroes, whom he cites as holding the opposite position: "natura quam habent species in rebus generabilibus est aliquid medium, id est compositum ex materia et forma." Le 'De Ente et Essentia' de s. Thomas d'Aquin; ed. M.-D. Roland-Gosselin (Paris, 1948), 2, pp. 9-10. See Averroes, In VII Metaph., c. 27, Opera omnia 8 (Venice, 1574), fol. 177 C. But here Averroes is not concerned with an essence or quiddity but the nature of something that comes into existence from matter and hence includes both matter and form. "[S]i igitur hoc nomen substantia dicitur simpliciter de materia substantiae compositae ex materia et forma, et de forma ejus, et de composite), tunc forma substantiae dicetur esse substantia rei, cum ipsa declaret essentiam illius; materia vero dicitur secundum considera2
3
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FORM AND ESSENCE
The case of man is similar to this. Man is a substance in the sense of a composite of form and matter. Soul is his form and body his matter. The very essence of man, however, lies in his form, namely his soul, and not in his matter. Matter is simply the subject receiving the form which is his quiddity. Consequently we cannot say without qualification that the quiddity of man is identical with man. In one sense it is and in another it is not. The quiddity of man is the form of man and his very being {esse). It is not the man composed of matter and form: "... quidditas hominis est homo uno modo, et non est homo alio modo; et est forma hominis, et non est homo qui est congregate ex materia et forma." According to St. Thomas, however, this is contrary to Aristotle's intention: Sed videtur esse contra intentionem Aristotelis. It should be noticed that he does not here assert that it is contrary to his very words, but contrary to his intention. In interpreting Aristotle, St. Thomas will say that a conclusion is according to his intention if he thinks it can be deduced from his principles, even though it is not to be found in so many words in his writings. For example, he knew perfectly well that Aristotle never explicitly taught the doctrine of creation. Yet he asserts that Averroes was wrong in thinking that Aristotle proved creation to be impossible. It is not according to Aristotle's intention that something must always come from something and not from nothing, for creation follows necessarily from his own principles. So too in the question of the essence of material substances, St. Thomas thinks that Averroes' interpretation is not in accord with Aristotle's intention, for there is a principle in his Metaphysics leading to the opposite view. The Stagirite says in Book VI that natural things differ from mathematicals precisely in that the former have sensible matter in their definition while the latter do not. Now, St. Thomas argues, if sensible matter is included in their 4
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tionem ad substantiam compositam ex materia et forma esse pars substantiae, secundum considerationem vero ad substantiam declarantem essentiam rei non dicitur esse pars substantiae, sed esse deferens formam in suam definitionem, verbi gratia, simitas, cujus definitio est concavitas in naso, aut in carne nasi; nasus enim est pars substantiae ejus quod signiflcat hoc nomen simitas, quod est congregatio nasi et simitatis, et non est pars definitionis concavitatis, sed est subjectum ei... forma praedicatur per se de habente formam, secundum quod declarat quiditatem ejus substantialem; materia vero non praedicetur de habente formam vera praedicatione, ne dum ut praedicetur per se; idolum enim non dicitur esse cuprum, nec homo caro, nec simus nasus." Averroes, In VII Metaph., c. 34; Opera omnia 8 (Venice, 1574), fol. 184DG. Averroes, ibid., c. 21, fol. 1711. See c. 35, fol. 186 IK. St. Thomas, In VII Metaph., 9, 1468. St. Thomas, Summa Theol, I, 44, 2. See A. C. Pegis, "A Note on St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, I, 44, 1-2," Mediaeval Studies 8 (1946), 159-168. St. Thomas, In VIII Phys., 2, n. 4; ed. Leonine 2 (Rome, 1884), p. 367. Aristotle, Metaph., VI, 1, 1025b28 ff. See St. Thomas, In VI Metaph., 1, 1155-1161. 4 5 6
7
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definition, it must be included in their essence, for the definition signifies the essence. Sensible matter cannot enter into the definition of a material substance by way of addition, as something outside its essence, for only accidents, not substances, are defined in this way. So it follows that sensible matter is a part of the essence of natural substances, not only as to individuals but also as to their species. Of course Averroes knew as well as St. Thomas the Aristotelian distinction between the manner in which the natural philosopher and the mathematician define their objects. He realized that the mathematician does not include sensible matter in his definitions while the natural philosopher does. Still, he did not draw the conclusion of St. Thomas, namely that sensible matter must be contained in the quiddity of a material thing. He always asserted that although such matter is a part of the composite substance and is necessarily included in the natural philosopher's definition of it, it is not contained in the quiddity of that substance. The quiddity is the form alone without matter. It is not difficult to see why Averroes never drew the conclusion of St. Thomas. His aim in commenting on Aristotle was the restoration of the pure doctrine of the Stagirite, and Aristotle himself never seems to have drawn the conclusion. On this point Averroes appears to have simply stated in his own terms the thought of Aristotle. According to Aristotle, matter, form and the composite of matter and form are each in their own way ovaia. Ovaia, then, in his terminology corresponds to substantia in the Latin version of Averroes' Commentary. The Aristotelian term TO rt fjv slvai corresponds to Averroes' quidditas. It designates, Aristotle says, ovaia without matter. It is primary substance (Ttpwrrj ovaia) and is identical to form {el5oq). A recent historian has described the Aristotelian phrase TO tt fjv elvai in this way: 9
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u
"Dicit enim superius in sexto quod res naturales habent in sui deflnitioni materiam sensibilem, et in hoc different a mathematicis. Non autem potest did quod substantiae naturales deftniantur per id quod non sit de essentia earum. Substantiae enim non habent definitionem ex additione, sed sola accidentia, ut supra est habitum. Unde relinquitur quod materia sensibilis sit pars essentiae substantiarum naturalium, non solum quantum ad individuam, sed etiam quantum ad species ipsas. Definitiones enim non dantur de individuis, sed de speciebus." St. Thomas, In VII Metapk, 9, 1468. "Definitio vero significat quid est res." Ibid., 11, 1528. See Averroes, In VI Metapk, c. 2, fol. 146 A-F. St. Thomas had a twofold preoccupation in his commentaries: to read Aristotle correctly and to reach beyond him to philosophic truth. See M.-D. Chenu, Introduction a I'etude de saint Thomas d'Aquin (Montreal, Paris, 1950), p. 27. See J. Owens, "Aquinas as Aristotelian Commentator," St. Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974. Commemorative Studies, ed. A. Maurer (Toronto, 1974), 1, pp. 213-238. Aristotle, Metapk, VII, 10, 1035al. Ibid., 7, 1032bl4. Ibid., 1032bl-2. 9
10 11
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FORM AND ESSENCE
... the phrase presents the notion of a cause opposed to the unintelligible matter (which is the principle of contingency and change), and so expresses the formal, intelligible perfection of a thing. It implies that the form is the fundamental Being of the thing, and that whatever else may be in the thing derives its Being from the form. The form is designated by the peculiarly Aristotelian expression as the element in the thing which is that thing's necessary and unchangeable Being, in contrast in the physical order to the matter and the composite (both of which are changeable), and in the logical order to the generic characteristics (which are not necessarily restricted to the species in question). A thing is its generic nature, its matter and the composite. They are what it is. But what it necessarily and unchangeably and definitely is, is its form. The genera, the matter, or the composite may be the what-is of the thing. But only its form can be its what-IS-being (to ri fjv slvai). If this is true, it seems that Averroes' identification of form with quiddity or essence is authentically Aristotelian. In making it, moreover, he was simply following in the steps of the classical Greek commentators on Aristotle, who recognized that for the Stagirite to ri fjv slvai or essence is form as distinct from matter. Indeed even in the Middle Ages there were some who agreed with Averroes' interpretation of Aristotle on this point. Perhaps they are the followers of Averroes mentioned above by St. Thomas. Among their number St. Albert is the most important - at least the young St. Albert writing his Commentary on the Sentences. Adam of Buckfield's unedited Commentary on the Metaphysics also shows the influence of Averroes on this as on other points of doctrine. Even more striking, however, is the evidence of Averroes' interpretation in the Sapientiale of Thomas of York, which cites the Arabian philosopher at great length on the identity of form and quiddity. 15
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J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, 3rd ed. (Toronto, 1978), pp. 185-187. See W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics 1 (Oxford, 1924), pp. cvi, 127. See Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Aristotelis Metaphysica Commentaria, ed. M. Hayduck (Berlin, 1891), p. 490.27-29; Asclepius, In Metaphysicorum libros A-Z Commentaria, ed. M. Hayduck (Berlin, 1888), pp. 398.37-399.1-2; Themistius, In Libros Aristotelis DeAnima Paraphrasis, ed. R. Heinze (Berlin, 1890), p. 22.4-6. See supra, p. 3. Siger of Brabant does not follow Averroes on this point. See his Questions sur la Metaphysique VII, 14; ed. C. Graiff (Louvain, 1948), p. 376. The 14th century Averroist, John of Jandun, does. See his Questions on the Metaphysics, VII, 12 (Venice, 1505), fol. 96. See infra, p. 10. Adam quotes some of the characteristic statements of Averroes such as: "... forma praedicatur per se de habenti formam et declarat quidditatem ejus substantialem; materia autem non praedicatur de habenti formam [vera] praedicatione." Adam of Bucklield, Sententia super Metaph., VII; MS. Balliol 241, fol. 40rb. See supra, n. 3. "Amplius ipse Aristoteles in VII Metaph., cap. 14a (1035al-9), secundum expositionem Averrois, manifeste vult quod forma dicatur substantia rei, cum ipsa declarat essentiam illius. Materia autem est pars integritatis, non essentiam rei; forma vero est essentia. Unde et materia 15
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If this interpretation of Aristotle is correct, certain statements in the Metaphysics, which at first sight are difficult to understand, become quite clear. For example, he says in one place that the definition of man does not include bones, sinew and flesh; only the parts of the form are parts of the definition. Again, the definition of man is the definition of the soul. When he writes in this way, Aristotle is by no means denying what he said in Book VI of the Metaphysics about sensible matter appearing in the natural philosopher's definition of a natural substance. He is simply pointing out that such a definition is of a composite substance (crvvokoq ovala) and not a definition of a substance in terms of its TO TI QV elvaiP In the latter sort of definition matter will not be present, for it is not part of the essence. The natural philosopher, however, is concerned with matter as well as with form. In his definitions, then, matter will be added to form. His objects of study are things constituted by addition (Ta ex npoirdecrewg). The objects of mathematics are different from those of the natural philosopher, for they are constituted by abstraction; that is to say, sensible matter is deliberately left out of consideration. For Aristotle, then, there is a sense in which a composite substance has a definition including matter and form, and it is precisely this sort of definition that the natural philosopher formulates. What is significant from our point of view, however, is that such a definition is not one of the very essence of the thing. The essence is the form alone. The natural philosopher, unlike the mathematician, defines his objects in terms of matter because the forms he studies are not independent of matter; they imply a relation to it. Nevertheless, the essence of what he defines is form alone. It thus appears that an act of addition is required for the natural philosopher to grasp his object, as an act of abstraction is needed for the mathematician to grasp his. Such a distinction, however, has no place in 21
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dicitur uno modo pars rei et alio modo non, secundum ipsum Averroem. Secundum vero considerationem ad substantiam compositam ex materia e forma, est materia pars substantiae. Secundum vero considerationem ad substantiam declarantem essentiam rei, non dicitur esse pars substantiae, sed comparens et definiens formam et suam definitionem." Thomas of York, Sapientiale 3, 4, MS. Florence, cod. Conv. sopp. A. 6.437, fol. 96v. Aristotle, Metaph,VII, 10, 1035al7-33. Ibid., 11, 1037a24-29. Elsewhere he says that the definition of the sunolon or composite will not refer to matter, for that is indefinite. See ibid., 11, 1037a27. On this subject, see infra, p. 12. Aristotle, De Caelo III, 1, 299al6-17. See M.-D. Philippe, "Abstraction, addition, separation dans la philosophie d'Aristote," Revue Thomiste 48 (1948), 468; J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being, pp. 382-383. For the definition of composite substances see O. Hamelin, Le systeme d'Aristote (Paris, 1920), pp. 119 ff. See M.-D. Philippe, ibid., 466-469; J. Owens, ibid., pp. 382-384. 21
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St. Thomas' philosophy, in which, as we shall see, the essence of a material thing includes both form and matter. It is significant that when St. Thomas comments on Aristotle he mentions the role of addition in natural philosophy, but it plays no part in his own philosophy, where there seems to be no place for it. 27
II. AVICENNA AND ST. THOMAS
A second opinion concerning the essence of material substances is attributed by St. Thomas to Avicenna. According to this view the essence of such substances is composed of matter and form; it does not consist in form alone. Sensible matter enters into the essence of the species, so that form is but a part of the quiddity, not the whole. Of course it is not a question of the essence being composed of this particular form and this particular matter, for the individual, such as Socrates and Callias, is composed of these; but rather of form and matter in general, as soul and body make up the essence of the species man. According to this opinion, St. Thomas says, the "form of the whole" {forma totius), which is the quiddity itself of the species, differs from the "form of the part" (forma partis) as whole from part. On several other occasions St. Thomas attributes the same doctrine to Avicenna. However, the expressions forma partis and forma totius do not seem to appear in the Latin translation of Avicenna's works. In his Metaphysics the form is always said to be a part of the quiddity ("forma enim semper est pars quidditatis in compositis"), while the quiddity is said to be the composition itself of form and matter. 28
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St. Thomas, In III De Caelo et Mundo, 3, 4-5; ed. Leonine 3 (Rome, 1886), p. 236. In his commentary on the Metaphysics St. Thomas says that definition by addition is not definition of a composite but of a form with its proper matter: "Et propter hoc, sicuti accidentia definiuntur ex additione subjectorum, ita et forma ex additione propriae materiae. Cum igitur in definitione formae ponitur materia, est deiinitio ex additione; non autem cum poniturin definitione compositi." In VII Metapk, 9, 1477. "Unde est alia opinio, quam sequitur Avicenna; et secundum hanc forma totius, quae est ipsa quidditas speciei, differt a forma partis, sicut totum a parte: nam quidditas speciei est composita ex materia et forma, non tamen ex hac forma et ex hac materia individua. Ex his enim componitur individuum, ut Socrates et Callias." In VII Metapk, 9, 1469. See infra, n. 31. In I Sent., d. 8, q. 5, a. 2, ed. Mandonnet 1 (Paris, 1929), p. 229; In IV Sent., d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 2, ad 2, ed. Vives 11 (Paris, 1874), p. 298. Roland-Gosselin writes that he has not found the term forma totius in the translation of the works of Avicenna. Le 'De Ente et Essentia' de s. Thomas d'Aquin (Paris, 1948), p. 22, n. 1.1 have found neither it nor the term forma partis. "Definitio enim compositorum non est ex sola forma. Definitio enim rei significat omne id ex quo constitute ejus essentia. Unde contingit ut contineat materiam aliquo modo. Et per hoc cognoscitur differentia inter quidditatem et formam; forma enim semper est pars 27
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St. Thomas adopted this Avicennian doctrine in his early work, the De ente et essentia, and maintained it to the end of his career. In one place in his Commentary on the Sentences he contrasts it with Averroes' and calls it the "truer" doctrine. Perhaps this qualification is a reflection of the noncommittal attitude of St. Thomas' teacher, St. Albert, towards the two views in the same place in his Commentary on the Sentences. There St. Albert simply mentions the teachings of Avicenna and Averroes without showing any preference; or if any is shown, it is to Averroes', which he mentions last and which, significantly, he takes as the authentic interpretation of Aristotle: "Si autem cum Averroe et Aristotele sentiamus quod forma totius est forma materiae, ratione tamen differens, sicut videtur velle in septimo primae Philosophiae ..." In his own Commentary on the Metaphysics, however, St. Albert's interpretation seems to have undergone a change. There he distinguishes between the two meanings of form as quiddity, and as distinct from matter and part of the composite. Certain persons, he says, call the second form the quiddity, for instance the soul of man is his quiddity, but this is an improper way of speaking. In his later writings St. Thomas does not qualify his acceptance of Avicenna's position. In his Summa contra gentiles, in the parallel place to the Commentary on the Sentences mentioned above, he drops the "truer" and simply makes the Avicennian doctrine his own. He does the same in his Commentary on the Metaphysics, where he also presents it as the teaching of Aristotle in Chapter 10 of Book VII of the Metaphysics-. "Et haec est sententia Aristotelis in hoc capitulo." 32
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quidditatis in compositis; omnis vero simplicis forma est ipsum simplex, quoniam non est ibi complexio. Compositorum vero forma non est ipsa composita, nec est eorum quidditas. Ipsa composita non est forma, ideo quia constat quod pars est eorum; quidditas vero est id quod est, quicquid est forma existente conjuncta materiae, quod quidem amplius est quam intentio formae .... Ergo forma est unum eorum quae conveniunt in hac compositione; quidditas vero est ipsa compositio complectens formam et materiam." Avicenna, Metaph., 5, 5 (Venice, 1508), fol. 90raF. De Ente et Essentia 2, pp. 21-22. See Compendium Theologiae 154; Opuscula omnia 2, ed. Mandonnet (Paris, 1927), p. 106. See In IV Sent, d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, sol, ad 2; ed. Vives 11 (Paris, 1874), p. 298. St. Albert, In IV Sent., d. 44, a. 11; ed. Boignet 30 (Paris, 1894), p. 561. St. Albert, In VII Metaph., 1, 1; ed. Borgnet 6 (Paris, 1890), pp. 401-402. See In II Phys., 2, 2; ed. Borgnet 3 (Paris, 1890), p. 123. Summa contra Gentiles IV, 81, De humanitate. In VII Metaph., 9, 1469. 32
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If we examine St. Thomas' commentary on this Book, we see how consistently he maintains this interpretation. However, it sometimes entails forcing the meaning of Aristotle's text. For example, in Chapter 10 the Stagirite determines what parts are to be included in a definition. He distinguishes between parts of the form (efdog) and parts of the composite of form and matter (crbvoXov). He concludes that parts of the form alone are parts of the definition, and he explicitly adds that by the form he means the quiddity (TO ri fjv elvai). Here the identification of quiddity and form as distinct from matter is expressly stated. The Moerbeke translation of this passage used by St. Thomas is as follows: Pars igitur quidem est et speciei (speciem autem dico quod quid erat esse) et simul totius ejus quod ex specie et materia ipsa. Moerbeke used species to translate the Greek eldog, which is said to be identical with quod quid erat esse, the literal rendering of to ri fjv elvai. This together with matter is said to constitute the whole or composite. Commenting on this text, St. Thomas says that species includes matter, at least universal matter, and it is distinguished from form alone. When Aristotle asserts that the composite whole is composed of form (eldog, species) and matter, St. Thomas interprets this matter to be individual matter. To say that the composite is constituted ex specie et materia means for him that the nature of the species is in this determinate matter. Sic igitur patet quod materia est pars speciei. Speciem autem hie intelligimus non formam tantum, sed quod quid erat esse. Et patet etiam quod materia est pars ejus totius, quod "est ex specie et materia," idest singularis, quod significat naturam speciei in hac materia determinata. St. Thomas' distinction, however, between species and forma is not found in Aristotle's text. There species is form (eldog), because it must be added to matter to form the composite whole; it does not itself include matter. Clearly St. Thomas must force Aristotle's text to have it say that matter is included in the species. In the same Chapter Aristotle explicitly identifies the soul of animals with their form (eldog) and quiddity (TO ri fjv elvai). Moerbeke's translation of this passage of the Metaphysics runs as follows: 39
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Aristotle, Metaph., VII, 10, 1035b31-33. I am indebted to James P. Reilly, editor of the Leonine edition of St. Thomas' Commentary on the Metaphysics, for Moerbeke's text. In VII Metaph., 10, 1491. Aristotle, Metaph., VII, 10, 1035 14-16. 39 40
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Quoniam vero animalium anima (haec enim substantia est animati), quae secundum rationem substantia <est> et species et quod quid erat esse tali corpori ,.. We find here the same identification of form and quiddity. Aristotle expressly tells us that the soul, which is the form of the animal, is its quiddity. St. Thomas does not deny it in his commentary on the text, but interprets it to mean that the soul is the quiddity of an animal because the organic body can only be defined through the soul: Corpus enim organicum non potest definiri nisi per animam. Et secundum hoc anima dicitur quod quid erat esse tali corpori. Once more the Angelic Doctor is obliged to interpret Aristotle's text in a forced way in order to bring it into line with his own thought. Again, Aristotle says, "When I speak of substance {ovma) without matter, I mean the quiddity (TO ri fjv elvai)." Although the statement seems to apply generally to all quiddity, St. Thomas interprets it to mean the quiddity of an artificial thing in the mind of the producer: "Et ista species sive substantia sine materia est quam dixit supra quod quid erat esse rei artificiatae." One more example may be cited. In Chapter 11 of Book VII Aristotle says that in a sense there is a definition of a composite substance (crbvoXov) and in another sense there is not. There is no definition of it with its matter for that is indefinite; but there is a definition of it with reference to its primary substance (npwrr] ovma), for instance, in the case of man the definition of the soul. For, he adds, the substance (ov
autem est aliqualiter ratio et non est. Nam cum materia non est (indeterminatum enim), secundum autem primam substantiam est, ut hominis quae animae ratio. Substantia namque est species quae inest, ex qua et materia tota dicitur substantia. What is the "matter" which does not enter into the definition of a composite substance because it is indeterminate? It would seem to be that 43
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See supra, n. 40. St. Thomas, In VII Metaph., 10, 1484. Aristotle, Metaph., VII, 7, 1032bl4. St. Thomas, ibid., 6, 1407. Averroes, however, interprets this statement of the Metaphysics to mean that form without matter is form in the soul, and form in matter is form outside the soul. Still, form is here understood as quiddity. See Averroes, In VII Metaph., c. 23, fol. 174 B. Aristotle, Metaph., VII, 11, 1037a26-30. See supra, n. 40. 43
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which unites with form (for instance, the soul) to constitute the composite whole. Now this is prime matter, which, since it has no determinate characteristics, cannot enter into the definition. Such an interpretation, however, is impossible for St. Thomas, for it implies that the species or form to which the definition corresponds does not itself include matter. It implies that this form is the quiddity, which Aristotle constantly identifies with the form (sldoq) or primary substance of a thing. But then the quiddity does not contain matter. According to St. Thomas' interpretation the quiddity or species of a material thing does include universal matter, but not individual matter. So he understands Aristotle to mean that the matter which is indeterminate, and hence not included in a definition, is individual matter.Cujus quidem compositi aliquo modo est definitio, aliquo modo non est. Quia si accipiatur "cum materia," scilicet individual, non est ejus definitio, quia singularia non definiuntur, ut supra est habitum. Cujus ratio est, quia talis materia individualis est quid infinitum et indeterminatum. Materia enim non finitur nisi per formam. Sed compositum acceptum "secundum primam substantiam," idest secundum formam, habet definitionem. Definitur enim compositum acceptum in specie, non secundum individuum. These are illustrations of the difficulty one has in trying to interpret the Aristotelian text as St. Thomas does. The text is indeed obscure, especially in its Latin translation, but it does not lend itself easily to the view that matter, even in the sense of universal matter, is included in the veiy quiddity of a material thing. A reasonably coherent view of being emerges from the Aristotelian Metaphysics, and in it the notion of TO Tt fjv elvai plays a central role. It is the formal, intelligible perfection of a thing; the element which is its necessary and unchangeable being. As such, it is the thing's form. In the physical order it is contrasted with the matter and with the composite of matter and form. In the logical order it is the specific difference, contrasted with the generic determination. The Aristotelian concept of what the thing is (TO n eortv) is not identical with the concept of TO Ti fjv slvai, for the latter is what the thing is necessarily and immutably and as intelligible to the intellect. The thing is its matter as well as its form. They are included in what it is (TO Ti eortv), but because matter is unintelligible in itself and the root of change, it does not enter into the thing's veiy quiddity or TO n fjv elvai. 49
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See W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics 2 (Oxford, 1924), p. 205. St. Thomas, In VII Metapk, 11, 1530. See J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics. Ibid., p. 180. See L. Robin, Aristote (Paris, 1944), p. 88.
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From the very beginning of his career St. Thomas adopted a different position. The notion of quiddity which we find in his De Ente et Essentia differs significantly from that of Aristotle, even though he presents them to us as identical. The name quiddity, he tells us in that work, is derived from what the definition signifies: "... quiditatis vero nomen sumitur ex hoc quod per diffinitionem significat." Essence sometimes has the same meaning. Hence whatever is included in the definition of a thing is included in its quiddity or essence. Starting with this notion of quiddity it is not difficult for the Angelic Doctor to prove that matter must be contained in the essence of material substances. For the definition of these substances not only contains form but also matter; otherwise there would be no difference between definitions in natural philosophy and in mathematics. Is it possible that matter be included in the definition of material substances and still not contained in their essence? That is the crucial point. Can matter be present in the definition as added to the essence or as a being outside the thing's essence? As we have seen, the Aristotelian view seems to be that in the natural philosopher's definition of a material substance matter is added to the quiddity, which is the form alone. St. Thomas rejects this, however, for according to him it entails a confusion of the way in which accidents and substances are defined. The mode of definition by addition implies that matter is contained in the definition simply as the subject of the essence, and that the essence, being incapable of separate definition, is imperfect. But this is the way accidents, not substances, are defined. Hence St. Thomas concludes that the essence of natural substances cannot be form alone but the composite of form and matter. He looks for confirmation of this in Boethius. According to a dictum often quoted in the thirteenth century, Boethius maintained that ovoia signifies the 53
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"... nomen essentiae a philosophis in nomen quiditatis mutatur; et hoc est quod Philosophus frequenter nominat quod quid erat esse, id est hoc per quod aliquid habet esse quid." St. Thomas, De Ente et Essentia 1, ed. Roland-Gosselin, p. 3.20-22. Ibid., p. 4.13-15. Ibid., 2, p. 7.8. "Neque eciam forma tantum essentia substantie composite did potest, quamuis hoc quidam asserere conentur. Ex hiis enim quae dicta sunt patet quod essentia est id quod per diffinitionem rei significatur. Diffinitio autem substantiarum naturalium non tantum formam continet sed eciam materiam; aliter enim diffinitiones naturales et mathematicae non differrent." Ibid., p. 7.5-11. St. Thomas adds that the essence is not the relation between form and matter or something added to them — a sort of tertium quid resulting from their union. See ibid., pp. 7.11-8.12. See Summa contra Gentiles, IV, 81, De humanitate. 53
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composite of matter and form, and ovaia, he tells us on the authority of Cicero, is the same in Greek as essentia in Latin. But as Roland-Gosselin remarks, the famous dictum of Boethius cannot be found in the work to which it is attributed, his Commentary on the Categories. Instead we read there that matter, species and the composite of the two are all called substance. As we have already observed, this is good Aristotelian doctrine, if substance is understood as ovaia. Ovma is a broad term designating not only the composite but also matter and form. St. Thomas' notion of essence, therefore, is not equivalent to the Aristotelian concept of ovaia. Still another consideration leads St. Thomas in the De Ente et Essentia to the conclusion that the essence of a natural substance embraces both form and matter. Although essence has the meaning of quiddity, or that which the definition signifies, it is also, and more particularly, defined in reference to existence. It is that through which and in which a being has esse: "essentia dicitur secundum quod per earn et in ea ens habet esse." Again, essence is that according to which a thing is said to be: "Essentia autem est secundum quam res esse dicitur." Now the esse of a composite substance does not belong only to the form or to the matter but to the composite: "... esse substantiae compositae non est tantum esse formae nec tantum esse materiae sed ipsius compositi." Hence the composite of form and matter, and not the form alone, is the complete principle through which the thing exists. Moreover, if the essence is that according to which a thing is said to be and to be a being, it cannot be form or matter alone, for whatever is composed of several principles is 58
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De Ente et Essentia 2, p. 8.14-18. ' Ibid. See Boethius, De Duabus Naturis 3; PL 64, 1344 CD. For the derivation of the word essentia, see E. Gilson, "Notes sur le vocabulaire de I'etre," Mediaeval Studies 8 (1946), 152-155; M.-D. Roland-Gosselin, Le 'De Ente et Essentia', p. 8, n. 2. M.-D. Roland-Gosselin, ibid., p. 8, n. 1. "Cum autem tres substantiae sint, materia, species, et quae ex utrisque conficitur undique composita et compacta substantia." Boethius, In Cat. I, de Substantia-, PL 64, 184 A. De Ente et Essentia 1, p. 4.15-16. Ibid., 2, p. 10.4-5. Ibid., p. 10.2-4. "Esse autem non convenit formae tantum nec materiae tantum, sed composito: materia enim non est nisi in potentia; forma vero est qua aliquid est, est enim actus. Unde restat quod compositum proprie sit." Summa contra Gentiles II, 43. Adhuc. Omne. The essence conceived as quo « m u s t be distinguished from the essence conceived as quod est or the subject of existence, e.g. humanity from man. Humanity is conceived by precision as the formal principle of man, and it is related to man as part to whole. In both senses, however, essence includes both form and matter. For this distinction see De Ente et Essentia 3, pp. 22.18-23.7. See also In I Sent, d. 23, q. 1, a. 1, pp. 555-556; In VII Metaph., 5, 1378-1379; Quodlibet 2, 4; Summa Theol., 1, q. 3, a. 3. In the latter two texts St. Thomas distinguishes humanity from man as essence from supposit. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the thorny problem of this distinction. 58 5
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given its name not from one of them but from the composite. It follows from this that the composite alone is the essence. St. Thomas adds that form alone is in its own way the cause of the esse of the composite, but this does not entitle it to the name of essence. He seems to have in mind here a doctrine similar to that of Thomas of York, who says that form alone must be the essence because it gives esse to the substance. Thomas writes in his Sapientiale-. Forma enim est pars quae cum fuerit, est res; id est, ad cujus esse sequitur esse rei. Ex quibus manifestum est quod forma dat esse rei. Constat autem quod illud quod esse dat alicui essentia ejus et quidditas est. Quare essentia et quidditas substantiae singularis est forma. According to St. Thomas, however, even though the form alone causes the esse of the substance, it is still only a part or principle of the composite, and so it is not the complete principle through which and in which the being has esse. Only the composite fits this description. It alone then is the essence. The concept of essence at which we have now arrived with St. Thomas is quite different from that of Aristotle and Averroes. Essence or quiddity is viewed in relation to the act of existing (me), of which it is the formal determination and specification. Essence is nothing in itself without esse, except in the mind conceiving it. Esse is the act of the form and of the composite substance. Hence form or quiddity is no longer, as it is for Aristotle, the supreme act and the ultimate principle of being and intelligibility. Being and intelligibility no longer ultimately derive from form to 65
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"Vnde oportet ut essentia qua res denominator ens non tantum sit forma nec tantum materia sed utrumque, quamuis huius<modi> esse suo modo <sola> forma sit causa. Sic enim in aliis invenimus que ex pluribus principiis constituuntur, quia res non denominator ab altera illorum principiorum tantum, set ab eo quod utrumque complectitur." De Ente et Essentia 2, p. 10.5-10. See supra, n. 65. Both form and essence are in their own ways principles of esse. They are principles quo est. Only the form, however, is the cause of the esse, for it gives esse to matter as a formal cause. "Potest enim dici 'quo est' ipsa forma partis, quae dat esse materiae .... Potest etiam dici 'quo est' ipsa natara quae relinquitur ex conjunctione formae cum materia, ut humanitas." fn I Sent., d. 8, q. 5, a. 2, p. 229. Sapientiale 3, 4; MS. Florence, cod. Conv. sopp. A. 6, 437, fol. 96v. The Sapientiale and De Ente et Essentia were both written about 1255. Thomas of York died about 1260. See E. Longpre, "Fr. Thomas d'York," Arch. Franc. Hist., 19 (1926), 881. De Potentia 3, 5, ad 2. See L.-M. Regis, L'Odyssee de la Metaphysique (Montreal, 1949), p. 35. "Ad ipsam etiam formam comparator ipsum esse ut actus. Per hoc enim in compositis ex materia et forma dicitur forma esse principium essendi, quia est complementam substantiae, cujus actus est ipsum esse." Summa contra Gentiles II, 54, Deinde. See E. Gilson, Le Thomisme, 6th ed. (Paris, 1967), pp. 174-175. See J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being, pp. 185-187, 347-365. 65
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matter and to the composite, but rather from esse. For esse is the actuality of all acts and the perfection of all perfections. It is also the root of all intelligibility, for anything is knowable in the measure in which it has esse. Indeed, how could it be otherwise in a philosophy like St. Thomas', in which God, who is at the peak of actuality and intelligibility, is Ipsum esse subsistens ? Once this viewpoint is adopted, not only are the notions of being and essence radically transformed, but the situation of matter relative to the essence undergoes a change. As long as essence is regarded from the standpoint of intelligibility, as what a thing is necessarily and immutably, it will tend to be focused in the form to the exclusion of matter, for matter is in itself unknowable and the root of change. On the other hand, as soon as it is regarded existentially, in relation to existence, matter will be seen as not foreign to essence, for what the thing is, is not form, but a composite of form and matter. What is more, it now becomes possible to see that matter enters into the essence even regarded from the viewpoint of intelligibility. The existence of each being is a gift of God, created out of nothing according to an intelligible pattern which is a divine idea. In the case of a material being, matter forms a part of that intelligible pattern, so that even though strictly speaking there is no divine idea of prime matter, for in itself it neither exists nor is knowable, still there is a divine idea of the composite, which includes prime matter. Although unintelligible in itself, prime matter is thus essential to the fall intelligibility of the composite and enters in fall right into the essence of a material being. It appears that Aristotle was prevented from seeing this, at least in clear fashion, just because he was not aware that the material world is brought into existence from nothing, and that the existence thus conferred on it is its supreme actuality of being and the source of its intelligibility. Like his master Plato he considered matter eternal, and form the ultimate perfection of being and knowability. However much he may have differed from Plato in his conception of matter and form, he shared with him these fundamental views, which dominate his notion of quiddity as form. However, even though Aristotle identified quiddity with form, we find tendencies and suggestions in his philosophy which point to the integration 71
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St. Thomas, De Potentia, 7, 2, ad 9. "Unumquodque, quantum habet de esse, tantum habet de cognoscibilitate." Summa contra Gentiles I, 71, Nec etiam. St. Thomas, De Veritate, 3, 5; Summa Theol., 1, 15, 3, ad 3. For Aristotle's doctrine of form, see J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being, pp. 347-365. 71
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of matter in quiddity. It is these which St. Thomas seizes upon and develops, leading the Stagirite into avenues unknown to himself. Aristotle tells us that definition manifests what-is and substance (ri eon xai ovaia). Commenting on this, St. Thomas says: "... definitio est manifestativa eius quod quid est et substantiae, idest essentiae cuiuslibet rei." For him, the what is and substance manifested by the definition can only be the essence. And since what is manifested by the definition of a material substance is a composite of matter and form, both must be embraced in that essence. Thus the connection of matter with form in the definition leads St. Thomas to the conclusion of their integration in the essence. The reference to matter in the definition was seen by Aristotle. W. D. Ross notes that he originally describes essence as substance without matter and constantly identifies it with form as opposed to matter. Still, he goes on to point out, the Stagirite was aware of the need of defining the essence of a "materiate universal" in reference to the kind of matter in which alone that essence can be embodied, for example man in reference to his dominant parts, such as heart or brain. This "unsuspected implication of matter in essence," which Aristotle never seems to have clearly seen, is precisely what St. Thomas brings into the light. His achievement in this regard rests upon an Aristotelian principle, but its full accomplishment remains his own. We can say of it, as Gilson says of his doctrine of creation: On ne saurait depasser plus clairement les conclusions d'Aristote au nom d'un principe aristotelicien. 15
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Posterior Analytics II, 3, 90b4, 91al. By translating Aristotle's what-is in this context by "essential nature" the Oxford translation gives a scholastic turn to Aristotle's statements. In II Post. Anal., 2, n. 10; ed. Leonine 1 (Rome, 1882), p. 334. See In VIIMetaph., 12, 1537. W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics I, pp. cix, cvi. See Aristotle, Metaph., VII, 10, 1035b25-26. W. D. Ross, ibid., p. cv. E. Gilson, L'Esprit de la philosophie medievale (Paris, 1932), p. 243, n. 15. 75
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St. Thomas and the Analogy of Genus So much has been written recently about St. Thomas' doctrine of analogy that it may seem superfluous to add another article to the abundant literature on the subject. My reason for doing so is the following. The current literature on St. Thomas' notion of analogy shows a renewed interest in the analogy of genus or inequality. It had been customary to dispose of this kind of analogy in a few short paragraphs or not to mention it at all. Of late, however, its importance has been more widely recognized, and a more serious effort has been made to appreciate its nature. The consensus of opinion, however, is that the analogy of genus is not in the long run a true metaphysical analogy. Rather, it is a pseudo-analogy which fails to measure up to St. Thomas' notion of analogy in the proper sense of the term. If we examine St. Thomas' own writings, however, we find that he nowhere denies that the analogy under discussion is a true type of analogy. Not only does he call it a distinct mode of analogical predication, but he intimates that it is of particular interest to the philosopher of nature and the metaphysician because it has to do with things as they exist. It would seem, then, to have a true metaphysical value in St. Thomas' own eyes. Hence we are led to ask these questions. What did St. Thomas actually teach concerning this type of analogy? Is it a true metaphysical analogy in any sense of the term? Lastly, why is it rejected so generally today as a true analogy? It is with 1
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The following support this view either explicitly or by implication: J. Ramirez, "De Analogia secundum doctrinam aristotelicam-thomisticam," in La Ciencia Tomista XLVI (1921), 201, note 4. J. LeRohellec, "De Fuudamento Metaphysico Analogiae," in Divus Thomas, Piacenza XXVIII (1926), 672 ff. M. T.-L. Penido, Le role de I'analogie en theologie dogmatique (Paris, 1931), p. 55. J. Maritain, Les degres du savoir (Paris, 1932), Annexe II, p. 822. R. Garrigou-Lagrange, God, His Existence and His Nature (St. Louis, 1936), II, 210, note 10. G. B. Phelan, St. Thomas and Analogy (Milwaukee, 1941), pp. 27-28, 34. J. Anderson, The Bond of Being, an Essay on Analogy and Existence (St. Louis, 1949), pp. 59-60. H. Schwartz, "Analogy in St. Thomas and Cajetan," in The New Scholasticism XXVIII (1954), 127-144. The last work calls the analogy of genus "logical analogy." See infra, note 3. 1
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these questions in mind that we wish to make a fresh examination of St. Thomas' texts on the subject. I St. Thomas did not write much about the analogy known today as the analogy of genus or inequality. He refers to it only a few times, and his descriptions of it are all too short and concise. Perhaps his clearest account is to be found in his Commentary on the Sentences. There he describes it as a mode of analogical predication in which something is predicated analogically secundum esse et non secundum intentionem, that is, according to esse, and not according to conception. This occurs, St. Thomas explains, when several things equally receive the attribution of some common concept, but in reality the perfection designated by the concept does not possess an esse of the same character in all of them: illud commune non habet esse unius rationis in omnibus. He illustrates this with an example taken from the physics of his own day. All bodies, he says, equally share in the notion of corporeity or "bodiness." This is true of both terrestrial and celestial bodies, even though, according to ancient physics, they have a different kind of matter. Terrestrial bodies are composed of the four elements and are subject to generation and corruption. Celestial bodies, on the other hand, are formed of a fifth nature, which is subject only to change of place. Thus, if we consider terrestrial and celestial bodies as they exist, "body" does not have precisely the same meaning when predicated of them. Now the philosopher of nature and the metaphysician consider things in their actual existence. As a consequence, they will not predicate the name "body" or any other name univocally of what is corruptible and what is incorruptible. The logician, on the other hand, considers conceptions or intentions alone; he does not regard things in their actual existence. Hence he predicates "body" univocally of all bodies. Accordingly, there is a univocal "body" which is predicated equally of everything corporeal, but "bodiness" does not exist equally in all bodies. In the heavenly bodies it exists more perfectly than in earthly bodies. For the 3
"... aliquid dicitur secundum analogiam ... secundum esse et non secundum intentionem; et hoc contingit quando plura parificantur in intentione alicujus communis, sed illud commune non habet esse unius rationis in omnibus, sicut omnia corpora parificantur in intentione corporeitatis. Unde Logicus, qui considerat intentiones tantum, dicit hoc nomen corpus de omnibus corporibus univoce praedicari; sed esse hujus naturae non est ejusdem rationis in corporibus corruptibilibus et incorruptibilibus. Unde quantum ad metaphysicum et naturalem, qui considerant res secundum suum esse, nec hoc nomen corpus, nec aliquid aliud dicitur univoce de corruptibilibus et incorruptibilibus." In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1. For St. Thomas' conception of the physical world, see J. de Tonquedec, Questions de cosmologie et de physique chez Aristote et saint Thomas (Paris, 1950), pp. 7-71. 3
THE ANALOGY OF GENUS
21
philosopher of nature, then, who considers bodies as they actually exist, "body" is predicated analogically, not "according to conception" but "according to esse." The same is true of "substance" predicated of material and immaterial substances. From a logical point of view they all belong to the one univocal genus; the genus "substance" is predicated of all univocally with respect to the ratio or definition of substance. But in reality immaterial substances have greater perfection as substances than those that are material. Hence even though the logician places all created substances in the genus "substance," the metaphysician or philosopher of nature will not do so, because they consider things as they actually exist. All created substances are in the same logical genus, but they are not all in the same natural genus, for the latter takes into account things as they actually exist, not as logically considered. So too it can be said that all angels are in the same genus of substance, for substance is predicated of all equally and univocally, at least with respect to the meaning of the term: quantum ad intentionem. But it is not predicated equally of them with respect to existence (quantum ad esse), for in reality one is prior to another in perfection. They resemble numbers, one of which is in reality prior to another although they are all in the same genus of number. St. Thomas uses the same principles in answering the question: Are all sins equal? He maintains, of course, that they are not; some are worse than others. But one objector, who knows his logic better than his ethics, says that all sins are equal. Is not a genus equally participated by its species ? Now "sin" is the genus of all sins. It follows, then, that all sins are equal and all sinners sin equally. St. Thomas replies: All animals are equally animals, but they are not equal animals, for one animal is greater and more perfect than another. Similarly, it is not necessary on this account that all sins be equal. 4
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"Dicendum quod substantiae immateriales creatae in genere quidem naturali non conveniunt cum substantiis materialibus, quia non est in eis eadem ratio potentiae et materiae; conveniunt tamen cum eis in genere logico, quia etiam substantiae immateriales sunt in praedicamento substantiae, cum earam quidditas non sit earum esse." Summa Theol., I, 88, 2, ad 4. See ibid., I, 66, 2, ad 2. See In II Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 5, obj. 3 and reply. "Genus aequaliter participator a suis speciebus. Sed peccatum est genus omnium peccatorum. Ergo omnia peccata sunt aequalia, et aequaliter peccat quicumque peccat." De maloll, 9, obj. 16. "Dicendum quod omnia animalia sunt aequaliter animalia, non tamen sunt aequalia animalia, sed unum animal est altera majus et perfectius; et similiter non oportet quod omnia peccata propter hoc sint paria." Ibid., ad 16. 4
s
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In this reply the Angelic Doctor distinguishes between the order of logic and that of reality. He is telling us, in effect, that the genus "animal" may be predicated equally and univocally of all animals, and so too the genus "sin" of all sins. But as animals exist, some are more perfect than others, and in reality some sins are worse than others. It is important, therefore, to keep the order of logic distinct from that of reality. This is why St. Thomas distinguishes between two ways of considering a genus. A genus, he tells us, can be considered either logically or naturally (physice). Considered logically, it abstracts from all existential conditions, such as the manner in which the subjects exist in reality, their kinds of matter and potentiality. He calls this sort of abstract notion a logical genus (genus logicum). However, this is not the only way of considering a genus. It can be considered in such a way that it will take into account the diverse types of matter and potencies and the modes of existing of the things in that genus. The genus so considered is then called a natural genus (genus naturale). By this distinction St. Thomas does not mean that there are two kinds of genera really distinct from each other, one logical and the other natural. He is simply describing two ways in which a genus can be considered by the intellect. Moreover, by a natural genus he does not mean a nature or essence which is participated by a multitude of species, as a species is one nature or essence participated by many individuals. There is no one nature signified by a genus. An examination of St. Thomas' doctrine on genus will clarify this point, which is essential to an understanding of the analogy of genus. St. Thomas tells us that a genus is that which is placed first in a definition, being predicated essentially of a subject and having differences which are its qualities. For instance, "animal" is placed first in the definition of man, and it has "biped" or "rational" as its substantial quality. Both the genus and the species signify the whole essence of a thing, although they do so in different ways. The species signifies the whole essence determinately, since it is a name taken from the specific or ultimate form of a thing. The genus, on the other hand, signifies the whole essence indeterminately, being taken from the matter of a thing. St. Thomas illustrates how the genus is taken from matter by the example of the genus "body." "Body" means that which has a perfection such that three dimensions can be indicated in it, and this 8
9
See supra, note 4; also In XMetaphy., 12, ed. Cathala, n. 2142; Depot, 7, 7 ad 1 in contrarium-, In Boeth. de Trin., VI, 3, ed. B. Decker (Leiden, 1955), p. 222, lines 8-18. ' "Genus dicitur quod primo ponitur in definitione et praedicatur in eo quod quid, et differentiae sunt ejus qualitates. Sicut in definitione hominis primo ponitur animal, et bipes sive rationale, quod est quaedam substantial qualitas hominis." In V Metaph., 28, ed. cit., n. 1122. 8
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THE ANALOGY OF GENUS
perfection is related as matter with respect to further perfections. Similarly, something is called "animal" from the fact that it has a sensitive nature, and "rational" from the fact that it has a rational nature, which is related to sensitive nature as form to matter. Since the species is more particularly related to form and the genus to matter, the unity appropriate to the species and the genus will not be the same. The unity of the species is that of a nature or essence, for the species is taken from the ultimate form, which is simply one in reality: species sit una natura. Et hujus ratio est quia species sumitur a forma ultima, quae simpliciter una est in rerum natural So the unity of a species is a unity purely and simply (simpliciter). The unity of a genus, on the other hand, is not that of an essence or nature. St. Thomas writes: Although the genus signifies the whole essence of the species, it is not necessary that different species in the same genus have one essence. For the unity of the genus comesfromits very indetermination or indifference; not in such a way, it is true, that the genus expresses a nature numerically identical in different species, to which might be joined another thing — the difference - determining it as form determines matter which is numerically one. On the contrary, the genus expresses some form - although not in a determinate way this one or that one — which the difference signifies determinately, and which is not other than that which the genus signifies indeterminately. It appears then that the unity of the genus comes from its indetermination, and since this indetermination in turn is a result of the intellect abstracting from specific differences, the unity of the genus is a logical and not a natural unity. Following Aristotle, St. Thomas says that a genus is not one essence. Unlike a species, a genus is not one purely and simply, but it is one in a certain way: genus quodammodo est unum et non simpliciter. That is to say, a genus is one only in thought or definition. 10
12
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See De Ente et Essentia, ch. 2, ed. Roland-Gosselin (Paris, 1948), pp. 14-19; In V Metaph., 28, ed. cit., n. 1123. In VHPhys., 8, n. 8. De Ente et Essentia, ch. 2, ed. cit., pp. 19-20. "Genus autem non sumitur a forma aliqua quae sit una in rerum natura, sed secundum rationem tantum ... in sola consideratione accipitur forma generis, per abstractionem intellectus a differentiis. Sic igitur species est unum quid a forma una in rerum natura existente: genus autem non est unum; quia secundum diversas formas in rerum natura existentes, diversae species generis praedicationem suscipiunt. Et sic genus est unum logice, sed non physice." In VII Phys., 8, n. 8. See ibid. St. Thomas is here commenting on Aristotle's statement: genus non est unum quid (To yevog ovxevn), PhysicsYll, 4, 249a22. Aristotle is making the point that the genus "movement" is not a unity; hence its various kinds are not comparable. He goes on to say that "many similar cases escape notice" (napa rovro XavOavei noXXa). I am here following the translation of W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Physics (Oxford, 1936), p. 427. He paraphrases 10
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If this is true, it is incorrect to speak of a generic essence in the sense in which we can speak of a specific essence. Unlike a species, a genus has a unity only in thought; it does not signify one nature. It signifies a multitude of natures, but it does so indistinctly, in abstraction from the specific differences which are signified determinately by the species. What, then, does St. Thomas mean by a natural genus? It is simply the generic ratio considered in connection with the existential factors from which the logician precisely abstracts when he considers the same generic ratio. Consider, for example, the genus "substance." There is a sense in which it is a natural genus and another in which it is only a logical genus. Those things are in the natural genus of substance which have the same kind of matter and potentiality, that is to say, all corruptible bodies, which are composed of the four elements and which are in potentiality to generation and corruption. The incorruptible bodies of the heavens do not have the same sort of matter as the corruptible bodies of this earth, and they are in potency only to change of place. Angels, on the other hand, have no matter whatsoever in their composition, and they are in potency neither to generation and corruption nor to change of place. If we predicate "substance" of all these, it will be only as a logical genus. If we predicate "body" of corruptible and incorruptible bodies, we will do so univocally, according to a logical conception: secundum intentionem logicam, It is the logician, then, who forms a univocal conception or "intention" of a genus. Not so the philosopher of nature, who considers the genus naturally or physically. He takes into account the kinds of matter and potentiality and the modes of existence of the things he studies, and their diversity prevents the formation of a univocal conception. The conception he forms is not abstract and logical but concrete. St. Thomas contrasts, for example, the concrete ratio (concretam rationem) considered by the philosopher of nature 15
Aristotle's statement thus: "but there are many other undetected cases in which there is a lack of a single genus." (p. 681). The older Oxford translation is: "the genus is not a unity but contains a plurality latent in it." In either case it does not seem correct to say, as Fr. Zammit does, that Aristotle's expressly speaks here of the analogy of genus. (See his edition of Cajetan's De Nominum Analogia [Rome, 1934], p. 5, note 1). Aristotle seems to have had no notion of the analogy of genus, as he had no notion of esse as the act of being, on which that analogy depends. "Corporeitas secundum intentionem logicam univoce in omnibus corporibus invenitur; sed secundum esse considerata, non potest esse unius rationis in re corruptibili et incorruptibili; quia non similiter se habent in potentia essendi, cum unum sit possibile ad esse et ad non esse, et alteram non; et per modum istum dicit Philosophus in X Metaph., [ch. 10, 1058b28-32] quod de corruptibili et incorruptibili nihil commune dicitur, nisi communitate nominis." In II Sent, d. 12, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1. See In Boeth. de Trin., VI, 3, ed. tit., p. 222, lines 8-18; In X Metaph., 12, ed. cit., n. 2142; Summa Theol., I, 66, 2, ad 2; I, 88, 2, ad 4. 15
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and the abstract notion of the logician and mathematician. Thus when the latter consider quantity and unity, they do so in an abstract manner, and their predication of these notions is not equivocal but univocal. However, when they are considered concretely by the philosopher of nature, who deals with them as they are involved in matter, they are in a way predicated equivocally: aequivoce quodammodo dicuntur. How are we to understand this last statement? St. Thomas does not say that the concrete ratio of the philosopher of nature is predicated purely and simply equivocally, but quodammodo equivocally. He sometimes uses expressions such as this to indicate analogical predication. For example, in the treatment of the divine names in the Summa contra Gentiles, non pure aequivoce, non omnino aequivoce mean analogice, And in the Commentary on the Sentences St. Thomas actually calls the predication of a genus by the philosopher of nature and the metaphysician analogical. It seems justified, then, to interpret the expression aequivoce quodammodo as indicating analogical predication. If this is true, it seems that it is the mind of St. Thomas that a genus is predicated analogically when it is considered naturally and concretely, or in other words, as involved in the diverse kinds of matter, potentialities and modes of esse of the subjects in which it is realized. It is predicated univocally only when it is considered logically or mathematically, in abstraction from matter and esse. This is the teaching of St. Thomas in the text from the Commentary on the Sentences with which we began, but perhaps its significance is now clearer. It should be noted that the analogical mode of predication we are considering here is proper to the predication of a genus and not of a species. The reason for this is that individuals participate in the ratio of a species equally: individua unius speciei aequaliter speciei rationem participant. John, u
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"Est autem considerandum quod multa quidem secundum abstractam considerationem vel logici vel mathematici non sunt aequivoca, quae tamen secundum concretam rationem naturalis ad materiam applicantis, aequivoce quodammodo dicuntur, quia non secundum eandam rationem in qualibet materia recipiuntur; sicut quantitatem et unitatem, quae est principium numeri, non secundum eandem rationem contingit invenire in corporibus caelestibus et in igne et in aere et aqua." In VII Phys., 7, n. 9. Sum. cont. Gent. I, 33-34. So also in his In Boeth. de Trin., VI, 3 and A, fere aequivoce, quasi aequivoce seem to mean analogice. See ed. cit., p. 220, line 24, p. 228, line 5; trans. A. Maurer, The Division and Methods of the Sciences (Toronto, 1953), p. 69, n. 16; p. 77, n. 17. See supra, note 3. In de Causis, 4 (Opera omnia, [New York, 1949]), XXI, 725b. On this point, see C. Fabro, La Nozione Metafisica di Partecipazione secondo S. Tommaso d'Aquino, 2nd ed. (Turin, 1950), pp. 164-165. 16
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Peter, and Paul equally participate in the nature of humanity, so that "man" is predicated of them univocally, not only according to conception but also according to esse, for individuals in one species do not differ formally, but only materially, from each other. They have a nature in common, and they differ with respect to their individuating principles and their diverse accidents. They do not differ in their essential perfections. Accordingly, although there is an essential or per se order among the species of one genus, there is only an accidental or per accidens order among the individuals of one species. One is not essentially, but only accidentally, more perfect than another and prior to it. For example, one man is more intelligent or virtuous than another. As a consequence, the species is predicated equally and univocally of the individuals contained in it, not only in regard to the conception, but also in regard to the esse of the specific perfection in the individuals. It would seem, then, that the type of analogical predication we are concerned with here is truly an analogy of genus. For it has to d<) with the predication of a genus of different species and not with the predication of a species of a number of individuals. Because even in existence the specific nature is not found per prius and per posterius in the individuals which participate in it, it is not predicated analogically of them, but solely univocally, both in regard to the conception and in regard to esse. In the case of a generic ratio, however, which is participated unequally by the species, it is predicated of them analogically, at least with respect to esse. And since it is the philosopher of nature and the metaphysician who consider things as they exist, the analogical predication of genera will be their business and not that of the logician and the mathematician, who are not concerned with existence but simply with concepts. The objection may be raised that generic predication is always univocal because the ratio is realized in each of the things of which it is predicated in a formally identical manner. Material conditions may render it more perfectly possessed by one and less perfectly by another, but the ratio remains identical. That is why St. Thomas says that this is not an analogy according to conception (secundum intentionem). Now for predication to be analogical, the ratio predicated must be partly the same and partly diverse. If it is 20
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De Spiritualibus Creaturis, 8; In de Causis, ibid.; In III Metaph., 8, n. 438. See C. Fabro, op. cit., pp. 171-173. "Genus praedicatur aequaliter de speciebus quantum ad intentionem, sed non semper quantum ad esse, sicut infiguraet numero, ut in III Metaph., dicitur [ch. 3, 999al2]. Sed hoc in speciebus non contingit, ut ibidem dicitur." In II Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 5, ad 3. "Sciendum quod aliquid praedicatur de diversis multipliciter: quandoque quidem secundum rationem omnino eandem, et tunc dicitur de eis univoce praedicari, sicut animal de equo 20
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entirely the same, the predication is univocal. So it would seem that there is no analogy in the true sense when a genus is predicated of its subordinate species. The texts of St. Thomas which have been presented in this article reveal the matter in quite a different light. When he says that this type of analogy is not one according to conception, he seems to mean, as he puts it in a parallel text, not according to logical conception or intention (secundum intentionem logicam). A genus is predicated univocally according to the abstract consideration of the logician or mathematician; not so, however, according to the concrete or "natural" consideration of the philosopher of nature or the metaphysician. It is of paramount importance in discussing this question to recognize the distinction St. Thomas makes between a logical and a natural genus. The natural genus, considered according to its concrete ratio, is not the logical genus of the logician or the mathematician. What is the essential difference between them? The natural genus includes the different kinds of matter and potentiality and the diverse modes of esse with which it is realized in the real world, whereas the logical genus abstracts from them. That is why the latter is univocal and the former analogical. Since the concrete ratio which expresses the natural genus includes a reference to diversity of modes of existing, it does not have the absolute unity required for a univocal concept. In our key text on this question, St. Thomas says that the generic perfection does not have an esse of the same character (ratio) or mode in the various things to which it is common. It appears from this that the diversity of the mode of esse introduces into the concrete conception of the natural genus a diversity which excludes univocity. It does not seem true to say, therefore, that there is no diversity in the generic ratio, at least if we refer to the genus considered naturally. Because there is diversity in the mode of esse with which the generic perfection is realized in things, along with sameness in the generic perfection understood formally as such, the concrete conception which includes both, contains at the same time diversity and sameness; in other words, it is analogical. A farther objection can be raised. According to St. Thomas, the unequal participation in one nature does not exclude univocity: magis et minus 23
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et bove. ... Quandoque vero secundum rationes quae partim sunt diversae et partim non diversae: diversae quidem secundum quod diversas habitudines important, unae autem secundum quod ad unum aliquid et idem istae diversae habitudines referuntur; et illud dicitur analogice praedicari." In IV Metaph., 1, ed. cit., n. 535. See supra, note 15. See supra, note 3. St. Thomas uses "modus" instead of "ratio" In Boeth. de Trin., VI, 3, ed. cit., p. 222, line 18. 23 24
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numquam univocationem vel speciei unitatem auferunt. There may be an unequal participation of many things in one nature, but that does not prevent univocity. So the greater or less intensity of a generic note does not introduce analogy into it. It remains univocal. However, if we examine the context of the above statement of St. Thomas, as well as parallel texts, it appears that he is not here referring to the sort of inequality involved in the analogy of genus. The statement means simply that if several things participate unequally in one form, the unity of the species and univocity of predication are not destroyed. For example, what is more white is said to be clearer than what is less white, but this inequality in clarity and whiteness does not prevent univocity and the unity of the species "whiteness." This sort of inequality, however, has nothing to do with the inequality involved in the analogy of genus, for a genus is not one form or nature. St. Thomas clearly distinguishes between the above-mentioned inequality and that found in the hierarchy of diverse forms. There is inequality, he goes on to say, between the clarity of something white and the clarity of something red or green. There is also inequality in the intellectuality of angels and men. This inequality does destroy the unity of the species and, by implication, univocity. It would seem to be this second kind of inequality, not the first, that is found in the unequal participation of a generic ratio by different species. These texts on inequality, therefore, do not prove that generic predication is in every sense univocal. 2S
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II Historically, the notion that the analogy of genus is not a true analogy can be traced back to Cajetan, who says that it is entirely foreign to analogy: alienus ab analogia omnino sit. 27
In I Sent., d. 35, q. 1, a. 4, ad 3. See Summa Theol., 1, 50, 4 ad 2. "Dicendum quod magis et minus dupliciter accipitur. Uno modo secundum diversum modum participationis unius et ejusdem formae, sicut magis album dicitur magis clarum quam minus album; et sic magis et minus non diversificant speciem. Alio modo dicitur magis et minus secundum gradum diversarum formarum, sicut album dicitur magis clarum quam rubeum aut viride; et sic magis et minus diversificant speciem; et hoc modo angeli differunt in donis naturalibus secundum magis et minus." De Spiritualibus Creaturis 8, ad 8. "Dicendum quod magis et minus nunquam univocationem vel speciei unitatem auferunt; sed ea ex quibus magis et minus causantur possunt differentiam speciei facere, et univocationem auferre: et hoc contingit quando magis et minus causantur non ex diversa participatione unius naturae, sed ex gradu diversarum naturarum; sicut angelus homine intellectualior dicitur." In I Sent., d. 35, q. 1, a. 4, ad 3. See Summa Theol., I, 50, 4, ad 2; Depot., 7, 7, ad 3. Cajetan, De Nominum Analogia, ed. P. N. Zammit (Rome, 1934), n. 3, p. 6; trans. E. Bushinski. H. Koren, The Analogy of Names (Pittsburgh, 1953), p. 11. Fr. Zammit remarks that it is clear from the texts of St. Thomas cited in his edition that in one way this analogy is a true analogy and in another way it is not. He goes on to say that 25
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When we read Cajetan's own exposition of the analogy of genus, or, as he preferred to call it, the analogy of inequality, we are struck by a curious fact. Nowhere in his description does he bring out the role of esse in this analogy. It is true that he calls it an analogy secundum esse when quoting St. Thomas. But in the paragraphs of the De Nominum Analogia in which he gives his own account of it, he does not mention esse at all. He tells us that those things are analogous according to inequality which have a name in common, and the ratio indicated by the name is entirely the same but unequally participated. For example, "body" is a common name given to celestial and terrestrial bodies, and the ratio of all bodies, insofar as they are bodies, is the same."body" means a substance subject to three dimensions. But the ratio of "bodiness" is not in celestial and terrestrial bodies with equal perfection. The logician, he concludes, calls such analogous things "univocal," but the philosopher calls them "equivocal," because the former considers the intentions of names while the latter considers natures. If this description is compared with that of St. Thomas, it will be noticed that Cajetan has omitted reference to esse wherever it appears in St. Thomas. Where St. Thomas describes this analogy as one secundum esse, Cajetan says that it consists in the unequal participation in the ratio of a genus. Where St. Thomas says that it concerns the natural philosopher and the metaphysician because they have to do with things as they exist (secundum suum esse), Cajetan says that the philosopher calls it equivocity because he is concerned with natures. Indeed, Cajetan's account of this type of analogy is in the language of essentialism and not in the existential terminology of St. Thomas. It may be that this is only a matter of terminology and not of doctrine. Certainly it appears that Cajetan thought his description simply another way of saying the same thing as St. Thomas. It can be questioned, however, whether the language of Cajetan is adequate to convey St. Thomas' meaning, and even whether he did not in fact misrepresent that meaning 28
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this is Cajetan's view as well, and that Cajetan did not mean to reject it entirely as a true analogy. See ed. tit., p. 9, note 1. This is difficult to reconcile with Cajetan's statement: alienus ab analogia omnino sit. The English translators of the De Nominum Analogia point out that Cajetan does not reject it absolutely, since he calls it an analogy "in a less proper sense." But they imply that he rejects it as a true metaphysical analogy. See p. 13, note 19. Following Cajetan, John of St. Thomas rejected the analogy of inequality as analogy in the proper sense. See John of St. Thomas, Curs. Phil, Ars Log., II, P.Q. XIII, a. 3, ed. B. Reiser (Turin, 1930), I, pp. 482-484. Suarez denied its metaphysical character. See Disputationes Metaphysicae, Disp. 28, 3, n. 20 (Paris, 1877), XXVII, 20; Disp. 32, 2, n. 15, p. 323. Op. cit., n. 6, p. 8; trans, pp. 12-13. Cajetan also uses this expression in his Commentary on the De Ente et Essentia, 2, q. 3, ed. M. H. Laurent (Turin, 1934), n. 18, p. 32. Op. cit., nn. 4-5, p. 6; trans, pp. 11-12. 28
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when he expressed it in his own essentialist terms. It is difficult, in any case, not to feel uneasy when reading Cajetan on this point. The impression is given that he has missed the significance of the meaning of esse in St. Thomas' text, an impression which is confirmed by examining other instances in which Cajetan interprets Aquinas' doctrines involving esse. Cajetan did not investigate the unity, abstraction, and predication proper to the analogy of genus because he considered it really a case of univocity and consequently subject to its laws. But if it is in its own way a true analogy, a further inquiry is needed to determine how the concrete conception in such an analogy is formed and what sort of unity it has. It would carry us beyond the limits of the present paper to enterfiillyinto these difficult problems. One remark, however, might be suggested by way of conclusion. Since a genus, considered naturally, is conceived in reference to the diverse modes of existence in which it is realized, it appears that it is properly conceived in a judgment and not in an act of simple apprehension. The reason for this is that, according to St. Thomas, we properly grasp existence in judgment. It would seem, then, that any analogy which is secundum esse must be grasped in judgment and not in an act of apprehension, which is properly directed to the understanding of essences. It is not generally realized that St. Thomas' doctrine of analogy is above all a doctrine of the judgment of analogy, and not of the analogy of concept — at least if we mean by "concept" the expression of an act of simple apprehension. The analogy of proportionality, for example, is a judgment of the likeness of several proportions. St. Thomas expresses an analogy of this sort when he makes the judgment: "Whatever good we attribute to creatures pre-exists in God, and in a higher way." Or more generally: Sicut (Deus) se habet ad ea quae ei competunt, ita creatura ad sua propria. It is through judgments of analogy of this sort that we form an analogical conception of such perfections as being and goodness, which are applicable both to God and creatures: that is to say, conceptions which are at the same time diverse and proportionately the same in meaning. A generic concept is not like the conception of being, truth, or goodness, for these latter cannot be conceived in a purely univocal way. Since they are 30
31
32
33
34
35
See E. Gilson, "Cajetan et l'existence," in Tijdschrift voor Philosophie XV (1953) 267-286. Op. cit., n. 7, p. 9 trans, p. 14. See In Boeth de Trin., V, 3, ed. cit. p. 182, lines 6-13. In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, sol. See also E. Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers 2nd ed. (Toronto, 1952), p. 203. See the penetrating comparison between St. Thomas' notion of analogy and that of Duns Scotus in E. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot (Paris, 1952), p. 101. Summa Theoi, I, 13, 2. De Ver., XXIII, 7, ad 9. 30
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;
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THE ANALOGY OF GENUS
conceptions either of being or of its transcendental modes, they cannot be abstracted from esse, and hence they are intrinsically analogical both secundum intentionem and secundum esse. On the other hand, genera can be abstracted from existence and its modes by the logician and the mathematician, both of whom are not concerned with existence but only with concepts. These generic concepts, abstracted from all existential conditions through simple apprehension, are purely univocal. But they can become anafogical when they enter into the context of judgement in metaphysics or the philosophy of nature, for they are then conceived in relation to diverse modes of existence, and such diversity is the reason for analogy. How precisely is the analogical conception of a genus formed in a judgment? It would seem that in its own way it too is conceived through a judgment of proportionality. For there is a likeness of proportions between a genus, existentially considered, and one of its species on the one hand, and the same genus, existentially considered, and another species on the other hand. For example, there is a proportionality between esse animate and canis on the one hand, and esse animale and homo on the other hand. For animal, existentially considered, is related to the species "dog" proportionately as animal, existentially considered, is related to the species "man." In other words, dog and man are both animals, but unequally, each proportionate to its nature. This is the reason, incidentally, why any univocal comparison between the behavior of man and other animals is misleading. Although there is a univocal concept of animal, predicable of the various species, in existence animality and its activities are only proportionately or analogically similar in those species. If analogy is considered simply in terms of essences and concepts abstracted through simple apprehension, the analogy of genus is bound to appear as another case of univocity. It is only when, like St. Thomas himself, we view analogy primarily from the point of view of judgment, based upon esse and its modes, that we can understand how the analogy of genus is, in a sense, a true analogy for the philosopher of nature, for the metaphysician and, we may add, for the theologian. 3S
37
36 37
See In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1. I am indebted to Fr. G. B. Phelan for this formulation of the analogy.
3
A Neglected Thomistic Text on the Foundation of Mathematics Ever since the time of Plato philosophers have been concerned with the nature of mathematics and its relation to reality. The discovery in modern times of new types of mathematics, such as the non-Euclidean geometries, has added new difficulties to the problem, while making its solution more urgent. The ancient view of mathematics as the science of quantity, or of space and number, appears to the modern mind as narrow, in the light of such discoveries as projective geometry and group theory. We are told that "Geometry, inasmuch as it is concerned with real space, is no longer considered a part of pure mathematics; like mechanics and physics, it belongs among the applications of mathematics." This is in agreement with the views of Kant, who set the tone for the modern philosophy of mathematics when he declared that mathematical knowledge is that which reason gains not from concepts but from the construction of concepts. No less an authority in mathematical physics than Albert Einstein asserted, in the Kantian spirit, that mathematics is a product of the human mind independent of all experience. Along with this emancipation of mathematics from reality we find the obliteration, in some circles, of the distinction between mathematics and logic, under the influence of the general arithmetic of hypercomplex numbers, axiomatic investigations, set theory and symbolic logic. The observations of St. Thomas on mathematics take us back to an era when mathematical knowledge was still in its infancy. His knowledge of 1
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H. Weyl, Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Science (Princeton, 1949), p. 62. I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. K. Smith (London, 1950), p. 577. Cited by H. Weyl, op. cit., p. 65. A. Einstein, Geometrie und Erfahrung (Berlin, 1921). Cited by P. Hoenen, "De Philosophia Scholastica Cognitionis Geometricae," Gregorianum X K (1938), 505. See H. Weyl, op. cit., p. 62. 1
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mathematics was limited to some Euclidean geometry and arithmetic. An Arabian treatise on algebra was translated into Latin in the twelfth century by Robert of Chester, but St. Thomas shows no knowledge of it. As for his philosophical views on mathematics, his interpreters are far from being in agreement. Frequently his conception of the object of mathematics is understood to be frankly and even naively realistic. For example, J. Gredt tells us that, according to Aristotle and St. Thomas, the object of mathematics is real quantity. The mathematician abstracts the essence of quantity, while leaving out of consideration its relation to the real being of corporeal substance in which it exists. Quantity, thus considered, is not a being of reason (ens rationis), but a real being (ens reale). Of course, this is true only for Euclidean geometry and arithmetic. Modern mathematicians, Gredt continues, extend mathematical speculation to fictitious quantity, which is not a real being but only a being of reason. This is a special, transcendental mathematics, essentially distinct from real mathematics. More recently, V. Smith has stated without qualification that for St. Thomas geometry is "not a study of an ideal order but a science of the real world." Its object is intelligible matter, or in other words substance with unterminated dimensions of quantity, which is something "truly real." He concludes: "Euclidean geometry is the science of what is real but not physical, imaginable but not sensible, truly essential but not natural and mobile." It is accordingly a science in its own right with an object existing in the physical world. Other Thomists, while conceding that mathematical concepts have a real foundation, stress the role played by the intellect in their formation. In his monumental Les degres du savoir J. Maritain agrees with Gredt in characterizing the object of Euclidean geometry and the arithmetic of whole numbers as entia realia, in distinction to the objects of modern types of mathematics, 5
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L. Karpinski, Robert of Chester's Latin Translation of the Algebra ofAl-Khowarizmi (New York, 1915). "Obiectum Matheseos est quantitas realis ita tamen secundum quidditatem suam abstracte et inadaequate considerata, ut non dicat ordinem ad esse reale in substantia corporea seu in ente mobili ... Quantitas ita considerata non est quidem ens rationis, sed ens reale, tamen ita abstracte consideratur, ut abstrahat etiam ab esse reali et esse rationis. Recentes mathematici speculationem mathematicam usque ad quantitatem fictam extendunt, quae non est ens reale, sed rationis tantum, ut est quarta dimensio, quae secundum essentiam suam positive excludit ordinem ad esse reale. Ita constitutor Mathesis quaedam specialis, quae vocatur Mathesis transcendentalis et quae a Mathesi reali essentialiter distinguitur neque ad earn pertinet nisi reductive." J. Gredt, Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae (Freiburg, 1929), vol. I, p. 194. V. Smith, St. Thomas on the Object of Geometry (Milwaukee, 1954), p. 65. V. Smith, op. cit, pp. 84-85. 5
6
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THE FOUNDATION OF MATHEMATICS
35
which are entia rationis. The basis of this distinction is the fact that the former can exist outside the mind in the material world, whereas the latter cannot. Straight lines, circles, and whole numbers are found in sensible things, but not irrational numbers or the constructions of non-Euclidean geometry. Maritain emphasizes, however, that mathematical entities found in the real world acquire an ideal purity in the mind of the mathematician which they do not have in their real existence. Through the abstractive activity of the intellect these entities undergo an ideal purification which affects not only their mode of being but their very definition. There are no points, lines or whole numbers in the real world with the conditions proper to mathematical abstraction: in nature there are no points without lines, lines without thickness, or abstract numbers. According to John of St. Thomas, mathematical quantity must be distinguished both from imaginary quantity, which is an ens rationis, and from real quantity. The quantity considered by the mathematician is not precisely a being of reason nor a real being but is indifferent to both. This accounts for the fact that mathematical demonstrations are equally valid for both real and imaginary quantity. It would be presumptuous in this brief note to pass judgment on the accuracy of these different interpretations of the thought of St. Thomas. Our purpose is simply to call attention to a text of St. Thomas on the foundation of mathematics which, to the present writer's knowledge, has not been taken into account in estimating his views on mathematics. Although brief, the text is significant, for it places mathematical notions on the same level as those of logic as far as their foundation in reality is concerned. The immediate foundation for both is said to be the activity of the intellect; only remotely do they have a basis in reality. The text in question is found in St. Thomas' Scriptum super libros Sententiarum, I, d. 2, q. 1, a. 3. A. Dondaine has shown that this article was a separate Quaestio Disputata composed by St. Thomas at Rome between the years 1265 and 1267, and inserted by the author himself in his commentary 9
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J. Maritain, Distinguer pour unir, ou Les degres du savoir (Paris, 1932), pp. 283-285. J. Maritain, op. cit., pp. 327, 328. " John of St. Thomas, Cursus theologicus, I, disp. 6, a. 2 (Paris, 1931), vol. I, p. 534. For P. Hoenen, the objects of geometry are not a pure creation, but they presuppose a constructive activity of our mind exercised upon a given matter, namely extension. Geometry is a discovery of extension, with its properties, in the physical, concrete object and this physical extension must have geometrical properties. See P. Hoenen, "Pour une philosophie de la connaissance de l'etendu physique," Gregorianum XXX (1949), 195-196. For E. Maziarz, mathematical beings are entia realia and not merely entia rationis (which he identifies with logical beings). They are not purely fictitious, yet they are as such incapable of extra-mental existence. See his The Philosophy of Mathematics (New York, 1950), p. 208, and p. 227, note 125. 9
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THOMAS AQUINAS
on the Sentences. Unlike the rest of the commentary, therefore, this article is not an early writing of St. Thomas but dates from his mature years. The subject of the article is the distinction between the divine attributes and their foundation in God. St. Thomas contends that divine attributes, such as wisdom and goodness, are entirely one in God Himself, but they differ in ratio. By ratio he means "that which the intellect apprehends about the meaning of a name." If the object of the intellect can be defined, its ratio is identical with its definition. St. Thomas warns us that ratio is not to be confused with the concept existing in the intellect; it is rather the "intention" of a concept (sed significat intentionem hujus conceptionis). In short, the ratio is the meaning or significance of a concept. Now is there any sense in which a ratio so understood exists in reality? Yes, St. Thomas replies. Of course the ratio itself has no real existence, any more than the concept does to which the ratio is attached. But a ratio may be said to exist in reality if there is something real which corresponds to the concept, as an object signified corresponds to its sign. In order to clarify this latter point, St. Thomas describes three ways in which concepts are related to reality: (1) Some concepts are likenesses of realities existing outside the soul; for example the concept of man. A concept of this sort has an immediate foundation in reality, so that the truth of the concept is caused by reality itself and the name signifying the concept is properly predicated of reality. (2) Some concepts are not likenesses of realities existing outside the soul, but the intellect comes upon (adinvenit) their intentions as a consequence of the way it understands reality. For example, the concept "genus" is not the likeness of a reality outside the soul; 12
13
A. Dondaine, "Saint Thomas et la dispute des attributs divins {I Sent, d. 2, a. 3) [sic] authenticity et origine," Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum VIII (1938), 253-262. "Quantum ad primum pertinet, sciendum est, quod ratio, prout hie sumitur, nihil aliud est quam id quod apprehendit intellectus de significatione alicujus nominis: et hoc in his quae habent definitionem est ipsa rei definitio, secundum quod philosophus dicit, IV Metaph., text 11: 'Ratio quam significat nomen est definitio'. Sed quaedam dicuntur habere rationem sic dictam, quae non definiuntur, sicut quantitas et qualitas, et hujusmodi, quae non definiuntur, quia sunt genera generalissima. Et tamen ratio qualitatis est id quod significatur nomine qualitatis; et hoc est illud ex quo qualitas habet quod sit qualitas. Unde non refert, utrum ilia quae dicuntur habere rationem, habeant vel non habeant definitionem. Et sic patet quod ratio sapientiae quae de Deo dicitur, est id quod concipitur de significatione hujus nominis, quamvis ipsa sapientia divina definiri non possit. Nec tamen hoc nomen 'ratio' significat ipsam conceptionem, quia hoc significatur per nomen rei; sed significat intentionem hujus conceptionis, sicut et hoc nomen 'definitio', et alia nomina secundae impositionis. "Et ex hoc patet secundum, scilicet qualiter ratio dicatur esse in re. Non enim hoc dicitur, quasi ipsa intentio quam significat nomen rationis, sit in re; aut etiam ipsa conceptio, cui convenit talis intentio, sit in re extra animam, cum sit in anima sicut in subjecto: sed dicitur esse in re, inquantum in re extra animam est aliquid quod respondet conceptioni animae, sicut significatum signo." Sent., I, d. 2, q. 1, a. 3; ed. P. Mandonnet (Paris, 1929), vol. I, pp. 66-67. 12
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THE FOUNDATION OF MATHEMATICS
37
but from the fact that the intellect understands that there are a number of species of animals it attributes to animal the intention of "genus." An intention of this sort has only a remote foundation in the real world; its proximate foundation is in the intellect itself. The same is true, St. Thomas continues, of all other intentions which follow upon our way of understanding, for example the abstraction of mathematics (abstractio mathematicorum), and the like. (3) Some concepts have no foundation in reality, either remote or proximate, as in the case of the concept of a chimera. This is not the concept of a reality, nor does it follow upon the way we understand reality. For this reason St. Thomas calls it a false concept. St. Thomas concludes that, properly speaking, a ratio can be said to exist in reality only in the first case, namely when the concept is a likeness of a reality, for only then does the object signified by the concept exist in reality. We are not here concerned with the relevance of this analysis to the problem of the divine attributes, but rather with the light it throws incidentally upon the foundation of mathematics. St. Thomas classifies mathematical intentions with those of logic as having only a remote foundation in reality; their proximate basis is the intellect itself. The term St. Thomas uses to designate mathematical intentions is abstractio mathematicorum. The term does not refer to the act of abstracting the objects of mathematics but to the intentions themselves devised by the mathematician. St. Thomas uses abstractio mathematicorum simply as an example of an intention which the intellect comes upon following the way it understands reality. This is in accord with Aristotle's use of the term "abstractions" (ra it; acpaipeaewq) to designate 14
"Unde sciendum, quod ipsa conceptio intellectus tripliciter se habet ad rem quae est extra animam. Aliquando enim hoc quod intellectus concipit, est similitudo rei existentis extra animam, sicut hoc quod concipitur de hoc nomine 'homo'; et talis conceptio intellectus habet fundamentum in re immediate, inquantum res ipsa, ex sua conformitate ad intellectum, fecit quod intellectus sit verus, et quod nomen significans ilium intellectum proprie de re dicatur. Aliquando autem hoc quod significat nomen non est similitudo rei existentis extra animam, sed est aliquid quod consequitur ex modo intelligendi rem quae est extra animam; et hujusmodi sunt intentiones quas intellectus noster adinvenit; sicut significatum hujus nominis 'genus' non est similitudo alicujus rei extra animam existentis; sed ex hoc quod intellectus intelligit animal ut in pluribus speciebus, attribuit ei intentionem generis et hujusmodi intentionis licet proximum fundamentum non sit in re, sed in intellectu, tamen remotum fiindamentum est res ipsa. Unde intellectus non est falsus, qui has intentiones adinvenit. Et simile est de omnibus aliis qui consequuntur ex modo intelligendi, sicut est abstractio mathematicorum et hujusmodi. Aliquando vero id quod significatur per nomen, non habet fundamentum in re, neque proximum, neque remotum, sicut conceptio chimerae: quia neque est similitudo alicujus rei extra animam, neque consequitur ex modo intelligendi rem aliquam vere: et ideo ista conceptio est falsa. Unde patet secundum, scilicet quod ratio dicitur esse in re, inquantum significatum nominis, cui accidit esse rationem, est in re: et hoc contingit proprie quando conceptio intellectus est similitudo rei." Ibid., p. 67. 14
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mathematical objects resulting from the abstractive activity of the intellect. As further examples of intentions which the intellect comes upon as a consequence of its way of knowing, St. Thomas mentions privations and negations. Intentions of this kind are secondary objects of the intellect; things themselves are its primary object. The terms used by St. Thomas to describe the intentions of mathematics in the Scriptum text are the same as those with which he describes an ens rationis. In contrast to a being of nature (ens naturae), he tells us, a being of reason (ens rationis) is properly speaking an intention which reason comes upon (adinvenit) in the things it considers, for example the intention of genus, species and the like, which are not found in the nature of things but follow upon the consideration of reason. Ens autem rationis dicitur proprie de illis intentionibus, quas ratio adinvenit in rebus consideratis; sicut intentio generis, speciei et similium, quae quidem non inveniuntur in rerum natura, sed considerationem rationis consequuntur. Similarly, in the Scriptum text St. Thomas describes both the objects of logic and of mathematics as intentions which the intellect hits upon (intellectus ... has intentiones adinvenit). The term adinvenit has no exact equivalent in English. It does not simply mean "discovers," for we are told that these intentions are not found in reality (non inveniuntur in rerum natura). We do not discover them as we do forms existing in the real world. Yet they are not pure creations of the mind independent of experience. Our intellect hits upon them or devises them as a consequence of its knowledge of reality. Hence both reality and the intellect have a role to play in their elaboration. In this sense they can be called elaborations of the intellect, or more simply and accurately beings of reason. Does this mean that mathematics, like logic, has for its object beings of reason? This seems to be the implication of the Scriptum text. Yet 15
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Aristotle, Post Anal, I, 18, 81b3. See M.-D. Philippe, "Abstraction, Addition, Separation dans la philosophie d'Aristote," Revue thomiste XLVIII (1948), 462. "Nam negatio vel privatio non est ens naturae, sed rationis, sicut dictum est." Metaph., IV, led. 1 (Turin, 1935), n. 560. See nn. 540, 541. "Prima enim intellecta sunt res extra animam, in quae primo intellectus intelligenda fertur. Secunda autem intellecta dicuntur intentiones consequentes modum intelligendi: hoc enim secundo intellectus intelligit in quantum reflectitur supra se ipsum, intelligens se intelligere et modum quo intelligit." De Potentia, VII, 9. Metaph., IV, led. 4, n. 574. " St. Thomas also uses the term adinvenit to designate the craftman's "hitting upon" the form of the work he intends to make: "Cum enim intellectus artifids adinvenit aliquam formam artificiati, ipsa natura seu forma artificiati in se considerata, est posterior intellectu artificis." Quodl., VIII, a. 1. 15
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THE FOUNDATION OF MATHEMATICS
St. Thomas tells us in his commentary on the Metaphysics that beings of reason are properly the subject of logic. In contrast to logic, the subject of philosophy (which for St. Thomas includes mathematics), is real being (ens naturae). Again, he makes it clear that logic alone concerns intentions. Mathematics, on the other hand, has to do with quantity and its properties, for example the circle and triangle, which are forms existing in reality. St. Thomas writes: "Just as the form of man exists in that special matter which is the organic body, so the form of circle or triangle exists in that special matter which is the continuum or surface or body." From this it appears that, in St. Thomas' view, the objects of mathematics are real forms. Why then does he classify mathematical intentions with those of logic in his Scriptum ? The answer to this question is apparent if we reflect on the special character of the objects of mathematics. St. Thomas does not deny that lines and circles exist in sensible reality, but he points out that they are not of the same kind as those investigated by the mathematical sciences: in istis sensibilibus non sunt tales lineae et tales circuli, quales scientiae mathematicae quaerunt This is shown by the fact that mathematical entities do not always have the same properties as their real foundation. To consider but one example: mathematical circles and lines have properties which do not belong to sensible circles and lines. Euclid, for example, proves that a straight line 20
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St. Thomas classifies mathematics with metaphysics and the philosophy of nature as one of the "philosophical disciplines," but he does not put it on the same level as these parts of philosophy. Arithmetic and geometry, like logic, are liberal arts, and as such they are merely preparatory to the study of philosophy. Moreover, like the other liberal arts, they involve not only knowledge but certain direct products of reason. Arithmetic, for example, involves numbering and geometry measuring. Mathematics has consequently both a cognitive and a productive side. See Expositio super Librum Boethii De Trinitate, V, 1; ed. Decker (Leiden, 1955), pp. 164-166; ad 3m, pp. 167-168. "Et hujusmodi, scilicet ens rationis, est proprie subjectum logicae. Hujusmodi autem intentiones intelligibiles, entibus naturae aequiparantur, eo quod omnia entia naturae sub consideratione rationis cadunt. Et ideo subjectum logicae ad omnia se extendit, de quibus ens naturae praedicatur. Unde concludit, quod subjectum logicae aequiparatur subjecto philosophiae, quod est ens naturae." Metaph., IV, lect. 4, n. 574. "Sunt autem scientiae de rebus, non autem de speciebus, vel intentionibus intelligibilibus, nisi sola scientia rationalis." DeAnima, III, lect. 8 (Turin, 1936), n. 718. "Et de huiusmodi abstractis est mathematica, quae considerat quantitates et ea quae quantitates consequuntur, ut figuras et huiusmodi." Expositio super Librum Boethii De Trinitate, V, 3; p. 184, lines 20-22. "Sicut enim forma hominis est in tali materia, quae est corpus organicum, ita forma circuli vel trianguli est in hac materia quae est continuum vel superficies vel corpus." Metaph., VII, lea. 10, n. 1496. Metaph., XI, lect. 1, n. 2161. 20
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touches a circle at only one point, but this is not true of circles and straight lines in the real world. From one point of view, therefore, the objects of mathematics are real, but from another, and perhaps more significant point of view they are devised by the intellect. They are real in the sense that they have a remote foundation in the real world. They are not, however, immediately grounded upon reality. As a consequence, the truth of mathematical judgments does not consist in their conformity with reality, nor are mathematical terms properly predicated of reality. The immediate and most significant basis of mathematical concepts is the activity of the intellect itself. If this is true, the objects of mathematics are, for St. Thomas, beings of reason, although of a different type from those of logic. Both are the work of the intellect, but their remote foundations in reality are different. The real foundation of our logical notions is the unity in reality of the various rationes we conceive of it. This is exemplified by the basic logical notion of predicability. "Predication," St. Thomas writes, "is something completed by the intellect in its act of combining and dividing, having for its foundation in reality the unity of those things, one of which is said of the other. Hence the notion of predicability can be included in the notion of the intention 'genus', which is also completed by an act of the intellect." The logical relation of predicability is not found in reality, but it has a remote basis there. The intellect sees that one and the same reality (for example, Socrates) is both man and animal, and consequently it knows that it can predicate animal of man in the judgment "Man is an animal." Following upon this, the intellect hits upon or devises the logical relation of predicability, which is not a real relation but one between concepts, having a remote foundation in reality. The real foundation of mathematical notions, on the other hand, is the physical extended universe. Because the universe is extended in space and is divisible into numerically different parts, the mathematician can devise the notions of straight line, circle, whole numbers and the like. Here, as in the 26
27
"Et ideo in mathematicis oportet cognitionem secundum judicium terminari ad imaginationem, non ad sensum, quia judicium mathematicum superat apprehensionem sensus. Unde non est idem iudicium quandoque de linea mathematica quod est de linea sensibili, sicut in hoc quod recta linea tangit sphaeram solum secundum punctum, quod convenit rectae lineae separatae, non autem rectae lineae in materia, ut dicitur in I De anima." Expositio super Librum Boethii De Trinitate, VI, 2, p. 216, lines 20-26. See Metaph., Ill, led. 7, n. 416; Aristotle, De Anima, I, 1, 403al2-16. "Predicatio enim est quiddam quod complete per actionem intellectus components et diuidentis, habens fundamentum in re ipsa unitatem eorum quorum unum de altera dicitur. Vnde ratio predicabilitatis potest claudi in ratione huiusmodi intentionis que est genus, que similiter per actum intellectus complete" De Ente et Essentia, III; ed. Roland-Gosselin (Paris, 1948), p. 29, lines 13-18. 26
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case of logic, what is given in experience must be "completed" by the activity of the intellect. Consequently, mathematical abstractions are not totally independent of experience, nor are they found ready made, so to speak, in reality. The importance of the Scriptum text lies in the fact that it shows St. Thomas's awareness of the central role in mathematics of the creative work of the intellect, by locating the immediate foundation of mathematics not in reality but in the activity of the intellect.
4
St. Thomas and Eternal Truths One of the most important legacies of medieval theology to modern philosophy is the notion of eternal truths. The notion appears in various guises in the systems of Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza, and Leibniz, and through them it became a commonplace in modern thought. Although extensive research has been done on the meaning of the notion in the seventeenthcentury classical philosophers, the late medieval background of the doctrine still remains largely unexplored. Indeed, the history of the notion of truth in the Middle Ages still remains to be written. In this complex and intricate history the divergent conceptions of the eternity of truth would occupy a prominent place. Up to the present, historians have examined late medieval doctrines of the eternity of truth mainly in connection with the philosophy of Descartes. It is well known that he identified the eternal truths with the essences of creatures and made them totally dependent on the divine will. According to Descartes, eternal truths, as taught for example by metaphysics and mathematics, have been freely established by God; they could have been created otherwise had he so wished. He was free, for example, to make it untrue that the three angles of a triangle be equal to two right angles. In fact, he willed this mathematical truth to be necessarily true; but he did not necessarily will it to be true. And because his will is immutable, truths of this sort are also 1
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For a bibliography of the literature on Descartes' notion of eternal truths and its relation to his predecessors and successors, see G. Sebba, Bibliographia Cartesiana, a Critical Guide to the Descartes Literature, 1800-1960 (The Hague, 1964), p. 454. Though somewhat out of date the following works can be usefully consulted: E. Boutroux, Les Verites Etemelles chez Descartes (Paris, 1927), E. Gilson, La Liberie chez Descartes et la Theologie (Paris, 1913), pp. 34-75. SeeH. Gouhier, La Pensee Metaphysique de Descartes (Paris, 1962), pp. 285-291. See E. Gilson, op. cit.; P. Garin, Theses Cartesiennes et Theses Thomistes (Paris, 1931); T. Cronin, Objective Being in Descartes and in Suarez (Rome, 1966). Descartes, Lettre a Mersenne; ed. Adam-Tannery (Paris, 1897), I, pp. 151-152. 1
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immutable. They are eternal because eternally established by God as by the supreme legislator. Descartes criticized as blasphemous the thesis that eternal truths are independent of the divine intellect and will, so that even if God did not exist these truths would still be true. The thesis was also rejected by Leibniz, who attributed it to some Scotists. According to him, it is the divine understanding that gives reality to the eternal verities, without the divine will having anything to do with them. For many years historians searched without success in the works of Duns Scotus and other late medieval writers for the thesis that even if God did not exist mathematical truths would still be true, until Etienne Gilson found the equivalent in the Reportata Parisiensia of Duns Scotus. Further research in late scholasticism might unearth other schoolmen who held similar doctrines. It has been found, for instance, that according to Herveus Natalis, even if rocks at the bottom of the sea were unknown to any mind, they would still be basically and materially true because they have an essence independent of any intellect. It is not certain whether Descartes read these fourteenth-century theologians, but he did know Suarez' Disputationes Metaphysicae, which contends that the eternal truths do not come from God, for if they did they would be products of his will and hence they would proceed from him freely and not necessarily. In fact, according to Suarez, God is a mere spectator, not a producer of these truths. He knows them speculatively, and the speculative intellect presupposes the truths of its objects and does not make them. 4
5
6
7
8
Lettre a Mesland, IV, pp. 118-119; Reponses aux 6" Objections, VII, p. 436; IX, p. 236. "Si Deus non esset, nihilominus istae veritates essent verae." Descartes, Lettre a Mersenne; ed. Adam-Tannery, I, p. 150. Leibniz, Theodicy, n. 184; trans. E. M. Huggard (London, 1951), p. 243. "... si poneretur, per impossibile, quod Deus non esset, et quod triangulus esset, adhuc habere tres angulos resolveretur ut in naturam trianguli." Scotus, Rep. Paris., Prol., Ill, quaestiuncula 4 (Paris, 1894), 22, p. 53. On this point see E. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot (Paris, 1952), p. 185, n. 2. Referring to his La Liberte chez Descartes et la Theologie (Paris, 1913), pp. 35 ff. Gilson remarks: "II faudrait entierement reecrire ces pages en fonction de ce fait nouveau." Ibid. "Dico quod si a nullo intellectu intelligerentur, essent veri lapides veritate materiali et fundamentals Sed eis non competeret Veritas formalis excluso omni intellectu." Herveus Natalis, Quodl., Ill, q. 1 (Venice, 1513), fol. 70ra. See the unpublished doctoral thesis of Timothy Fallon, The Notion of Truth in Herveus Natalis (University of Toronto, 1966), pp. 17-18. See also G. Vasquez-. "Quare licet nullus intellectus esset ab aeterno, si tamen esset futurus in aliquo tempore, et potuisset esse antea, et antea in infinitum, haec enunciatio, Antichristus erit, vel Homo est animal, diceretur aeternae veritatis, quia ex se ab aeterno non repugnat vere intelligi, vel in tempore, non determinato principio. Eodem quoque modo etiam si Deus esset aeternus, sed in tempore inciperet intelligere; nihilominus per locum intrinsecum non sequeretur veritatem rerum non esse aeternam." Comm. in primam partem Summae Theologiae, disp. 78, c. 2 (Venice, 1600), I, p. 482b. 4
5
6 1
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ST. THOMAS AND ETERNAL TRUTHS
45
Propositions involving eternal truths are not true because they are known by God, but rather they are known by him because they are true — a thesis, incidentally, rejected by Descartes. Suarez concludes that the eternal truths have a certain independence of the divine intellect and will: propositions expressing them, he insists, have eternal truth not only as they exist in the divine intellect but also in themselves, prescinding from that intellect: habent perpetuam veritatem, non solum ut sunt in divino intellectu, sed etiam secundum se, ac praescindendo ab illo. More precisely, propositions are eternally true in the conditional form (for example, "If man exists, he is an animal"), for as such they have no efficient cause, being the truth of possible and not of actual or real essences. As possible essences, these truths by their nature are not subject to creation. Drawing upon his wide acquaintance with the works of his scholastic predecessors, Suarez reviews their opinions about eternal truths before giving his own. Among those in favor of eternally true propositions, he cites Albert the Great with the ancient Arabians, St. Thomas, Capreolus, Soncinas, Henry of Ghent, Herveus, Scotus, Cajetan, and Silvester of Ferrara. Theirs is the commonly received opinion, he says, but this does not exempt them from his critical appraisal; and in this connection his comments on St. Thomas' doctrine of the eternity of truth are of direct interest to the present paper. Suarez realizes that his own position on eternal truths is not exactly the same as that of the Angelic Doctor. He finds wanting in St. Thomas an awareness of the eternity of truth that belongs to necessary propositions in themselves and not only in the divine mind. St. Thomas, he complains, refers the whole eternity of truth to the divine intellect: totam hanc perpetuitatem referat (scil. S. Thomas) ad intellectum divinum. This makes it impossible for St. Thomas adequately to meet the objection of certain "modern theologians" who claim that propositions concerning creatures are not eternally true but begin to be true when things come to be and lose their truth when things perish. It is hardly adequate to reply with St. Thomas (Suarez protests) that when creatures cease to exist these propositions are true, not in themselves, but in the divine mind; for in this sense even contingent truths exist eternally in the mind of God. How can St. Thomas distinguish between the truth of necessary and contingent propositions if necessary truths are not eternal in themselves but only in the mind of God? It is to assure this 9
w
11
n
13
9 10 11 12 13
Descartes, Lettre a Mersenne; ed. Adam-Tannery, I, p. 149. Suarez, Disputationes Metaphysicae, disp. 31, sect. 12, n. 40 (Paris, 1877), 26, p. 295. Ibid., n. 45, p. 297. Ibid., n. 41, p. 295. Ibid., n. 40, p. 294.
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distinction that Suarez himself insists that eternally true propositions have eternal truth not only in the divine mind but also in themselves. So we are led to ask what exactly St. Thomas taught regarding the eternity of truth. Did he in feet restrict it to the divine mind and agree with "modern theologians" on the evanescence of created truth? *
*
*
When St. Thomas takes up the problem of truth for the first time, in his commentary on the Sentences, he begins by asking whether truth is identical with the essence of a thing. This is a surprising question for a thirteenthcentury theologian to raise. Did not St. Augustine, the father of medieval theology, insist that truth is not only an essence but the essence of essences? Following in the Augustinian tradition, St. Bonaventure takes it as axiomatic that truth is a "property of essence." This "essentialist" view of truth continued to prevail throughout the late Middle Ages and it was still alive in the minds of Suarez and Descartes. St. Thomas' calling it into question and his offering a new perspective on truth are a good example of his propensity — referred to by his biographer William of Tocco — of raising new problems and discovering new ways of solving them. Truth, St. Thomas contends, is one of those notions that have a foundation in reality but receive their formal character and completion from an act of the intellect. Time and universals are other examples of this type of notion. They do not exist as such outside the mind, though they have some basis in reality. The activity of the mind that constitutes the formal completion of the notion of truth is the apprehension of things such as they are. More precisely, truth is not found in the simple apprehension of an essence, which is expressed in a definition, but in a judgment, which is signified by a proposition. And since judgment is directed to the being ( esse) of things, whereas apprehension is directed to their essence, St. Thomas concludes that truth is based upon being rather than upon essence or quiddity: Veritas fundatur in esse rei magis quam in quidditate. 14
15
16
17
n
St. Thomas, In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1; ed. Mandonnet (Paris, 1929), I, p. 484. Augustine, De Immortalttate Animae, 12, 19 (PL 32, 1031). See E. Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, trans. L. E. M. Lynch (New York, 1960), p. 54. St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 8, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1 (Quaracchi, 1882), I, p. 152. William of Tocco, Vita S. Thomae Aquinatis, 1 (Fontes Vitae S. Thomae Aquinatis, ed. D. Prummer, M.-H. Laurent, Revue Thomiste, 1911-1937, II, p. 81). In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, p. 486. See the penetrating study of this doctrine by G. B. Phelan "Verum Sequitur Esse Rerum," Mediaeval Studies, 1 (1939), 11-22. Reprinted in G. B. Phelan: Selected Papers (Toronto, 1967), pp. 133-154. 14 15
16
17
18
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The word "truth" accordingly applies primarily to the intellect judging something to be what it is and to the proposition that expresses this judgment. Secondarily it applies to being itself as the cause of the truth of judgment; for it is the being of a thing that is the cause of truth: ipsum esse rei est causa veritatis. The first principle or original source of truth is esse, so that anything is related to truth as it is related to esse: unumquodque enim ita se habet ad veritatem sicut ad esse} The reader of St. Thomas' Sentences cannot fail to be struck by the constant reference to esse in his resolution of the question Utrum Veritas sit essentia rei. The term esse plays the key role here. And lest there be any doubt about its meaning, St. Thomas explains that he is using it in the sense of the being that is signified by the copula in the judgment, not in the sense of essence, as it was sometimes used by himself and his contemporaries. In short, esse as understood by St. Thomas is other than essence; it is the act of existing (actus essendi). Clearly St. Thomas shifts the discussion of truth from essence to existence — a good example of the reformation he brought about in metaphysics when he "began to translate all the problems concerning being from the language of essences into that of existences." The consequences of this "existential" perspective on truth for the problem of its eternity are startling. St. Thomas has delineated two factors entering into the notion of truth: the esse of a thing and the perception (apprehensio) of the knowing faculty proportioned to this esse. Both must be taken into consideration in resolving the question whether there is any eternal truth, and if so whether there are many such truths. Now, St. Thomas has already shown in his Sentences that the divine being alone is eternal (Bk. I, d. 8, q. 2, a. 2). And since there is only one eternal being, there is only one eternal truth, namely the divine. The same conclusion follows for the immutability of truth. In previous articles St. Thomas showed that the divine being alone is absolutely immutable (Bk. I, d. 8, q. 3, a. 2-3). If follows that there is only one absolutely immutable truth, namely the divine. The esse of other things is changeable. Material things have an esse that is variable and contingent; the esse of spiritual beings is mutable only in the sense that it is subject to annihilation: if left to themselves, without the divine help, they would lapse into nothingness. In both cases, then, the truth of these beings is changeable: it is variable and contingent in material things, and in spiritual beings it at least has a tendency to lapse into nothingness. From the perspective of the 9
20
21
In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, p. 487. Ibid., ad lm, p. 488. See, for example, William of Auvergne, De Trinitate, 2-, ed. B. Switalski (Toronto, 1976), pp. 20.48-21.55. E. Gilson, God and Philosophy (New Haven, 1941), p. 67. 19
20
21
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being of things, then, it is clear that there is no necessary truth in creatures: nulla Veritas est necessaria in creaturis. St. Thomas reaches the same conclusion when he views truth from the perspective of the intellect. Only the divine intellect is by nature eternal and unchangeable. Hence there are not many eternal truths: only the one truth that is in God, and that is identical with him, is eternal and immutable. Although he states his position on the eternity of truth in different ways in later writings, St. Thomas' views on the subject show no essential change. His doctrine throughout his life is constant and unequivocal: properly speaking there is no eternal truth except that of God himself. In the De Veritate St. Thomas approaches the subject of the eternity of truth from the viewpoint of truth as a measure or conformity. Something is called true, he says, because it is measured or conformed. Now this measure may be either intrinsic or extrinsic, as a body may be measured intrinsically by its surface or line, or extrinsically by its time or place. If we take truth to be the inherent measure of true things (the truth we find in things and in created intellects and their propositions), then truth is not eternal, for neither the things themselves nor the intellects in which truth inheres exist for all eternity. On the other hand, if we take truth to mean the extrinsic measure of things, intellects and their propositions, then truth is eternal. But this eternal truth which is the extrinsic measure of all other truths is the divine truth. All things and intellects are true through this primary, eternal truth, as St. Anselm wrote in his own De Veritate. And the eternal truth of God is one, for he knows all things by knowing himself, and he is one. Hence there are not many eternal truths but one alone. St. Thomas' final discussion of the question whether there are many eternal truths is in his Summa Theologiae, I, 16, 7. His treatment of the subject in this work is brief, as befits a compendium for beginners of theology. After explaining that truth is found properly speaking in the propositions of the intellect, and that other things are called true from this truth of the intellect, he argues that since there is only one eternal intellect, namely the divine, eternity of truth is found in it alone. Nothing else is eternal except God. One of the objections to this position is taken from St. Augustine's dictum that there is nothing more eternal than the definition of a circle, or that two and three are five. Since these are created truths, it would seem that created truth can be eternal. To this St. Thomas replies simply that the definition of a circle 22
23
In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 3, p. 496. For the variability of temporal existence, see J. Owens, "Aquinas — Existential Permanence and Flux," Mediaeval Studies, 31 (1969), pp. 71-92. De Veritate, I, 5. 22
23
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and the proposition that two and three are five are eternal in the divine mind. When St. Thomas attributes eternity to the divine truth alone, he is using the word "eternity" in its most perfect sense, as designating the highest mode of being: aeternitas dicit esse secundum altissimum modum. This is the meaning of eternity as formulated by Boethius in his classic definition: interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio. Understood in this sense, eternity has three characteristics, according to St. Thomas. First, it is interminable, lacking a beginning and an end. Second, it is without succession; in other words, what is eternal exists all together at the same time (totum simul). Eternity is accordingly timeless and changeless. This excludes all temporal, material things, but not spiritual creatures like angels, whose mode of duration is not time but eviternity. Their being (esse) is outside time and is thus totum simul, but it is not eternal in the perfect meaning of the term. The eviternity of angels is only a participation in eternity. As a mode of duration, eviternity falls short of eternity because it contains a fundamental termination or limitation: the being of angels is delimited by their essence, and hence their being cannot be said to be absolutely unterminated. Add to this the fact that, along with their eviternity of being, angels change in their thoughts, affections, and places. These areas of mutability bring a sort of priority and posteriority into the angelic life, though this is not strictly speaking lived in time. Only the being of God is interminable and changeless in every sense of the term, and consequently he alone lives in eternity. When the term "eternal" is used in this most perfect sense, it clearly applies to God and to his truth alone. But is there not a less perfect meaning of the term that is applicable to creatures? St. Thomas points out that Scripture speaks of the "eternal" mountains and the "eternal" fire of hell. The term does not have its strict meaning in these cases; it simply means that hell fire is endless and that the mountains seem to last forever. In English we use "eternal" in this broad sense, as the Latins used aeternum. St. Thomas sometimes prefers the word perpetuum to describe something that is lasting 24
25
26
27
28
Summa Theol., I, 16, 7, ad lm. See St. Augustine, De Libera Arbitrio, II, 8, n. 20-21 (PL 32, 1251); Soliloguia, II, 19, n. 33 (PL 32, 901). In De Veritate, I, 5, ad 8m, replying to the same objection, St. Thomas suggests that perhaps Augustine meant that this truth is perpetual (perpetuum), not eternal in the strict sense in which he himself uses the term. In I Sent., d. 8, q. 2, a. 2, ad lm; ed. Mandonnet, I, p. 205. Boethius, De Consolatione Philosophiae, V, prosa 6 (PL 63, 858). See Plotinus, Enneads, III, 7, 3. In I Sent, ibid. For the difference between eternity and time, see Summa Theol., I, 10, 5. In I Sent., ibid., ad 3m, ad 4m. 24
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28
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or abiding but not eternal in the proper sense. He finds a justification for the metaphorical or analogous use of the term aeternum in the fact that creatures may participate in some aspect of the divine eternity. For example, he grants that God could have created a universe without a beginning or end in time, and that such a world could be called eternal because in a sense it would be interminable. But he insists that this universe would not be coeternal with God, for it would not have the divine mode of duration or interminability. In the analogous meaning of the term St. Thomas twice, to my knowledge, calls truths eternal: in the commentary on the Sentences and again in the Summa contra Gentiles. In both cases the context is similar: St. Thomas is discussing the possibility of proving the immortality or eternity of the soul from the fact that it knows the truth. The Augustinian background of the discussion is evident at once, and it helps to explain St. Thomas' language. It is indeed exceptional for him to speak of eternal truths; his constant and formal language is that there is only one eternal truth, namely divine truth. An examination of these two unusual passages will throw light on his conception of the eternity of truth. The occasion for St. Thomas' calling truths eternal in the commentary on the Sentences is an objection to his stand that there are not many eternal created truths. The objection appeals to St. Augustine's proof for the immortality of the soul based on the fact that truth, which is eternal, resides in it. Since the truth in our intellect is not essentially the divine truth — so the argument runs — it follows that there are many eternal truths. As for the eternity of truth, this can be shown by the fact that the very denial of the existence of truth implies its affirmation. For if truth does not exist, it is false that truth exists. But if the affirmation is false, the negation is true, and consequently there is some truth. Hence truth exists and is eternal. St. Thomas begins his reply to this objection by pointing out that if there were no created intellect or soul there would be no created truth, insofar as truth is an activity of the intellect. Only the basis of truth would remain in reality. Of course, in this case truth would also remain in God's mind. But the human soul or mind is not eternal, and hence there was no created truth before it existed. Consequently there is no eternal created truth. As for the argument that if truth does not exist, it is false to say that it does, and since this negation is true there is always some truth, St. Thomas replies that this does not follow; for when there is no truth neither is there any 29
30
Thus St. Thomas writes: "Et quamvis omnis forma intendat perpetuum esse quantum potest, nulla tamen forma rei corruptibilis potest assequi perpetuitatem sui, praeter animam rationalem." Summa Theol., I-II, 85, 6. See Summa Theol., I, 46, 1. 29
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falsehood. Unless there exists a created intellect there can be neither true nor false judgment, and since the created intellect is not eternal there can be no eternal created truth or falsehood. At this point in his reply St. Thomas introduces an important distinction between the meaning (intentio) of a truth or falsehood and its existence in a mind — a distinction that he likens to that between a universal and its existence in a subject. Both a universal, such as man or color, and a truth or falsehood can be understood in two ways, says St. Thomas: either in themselves, with their own meanings (intentiones), or as existing in something. Considered in themselves they are not subject to change or destruction, and hence they can be called incorruptible and eternal. They are destructible only per accidens through losing their existence in a subject. This is the basis of Augustine's proof for the immortality of the soul, continues St. Thomas. The human intellect can grasp the meaning (intentio) of such universal natures as man and color, unlike the bodily senses which can only perceive particular men and colors. It can also grasp the meaning of its truth, which is something the senses cannot do. They can have true perceptions, but they cannot understand the meaning of their truth. The feet that the intellect can grasp the meaning of universals and of its truths, which are in themselves indestructible and eternal, is proof that the intellect is not tied down to a body or dependent on one. Hence it is incorruptible and immortal. This is not the place to comment on the Aristotelian turn St. Thomas gives to the Augustinian proof for the immortality of the soul based on truth. More significant for our present purpose is his distinction between the meaning of a truth considered in itself and its existence in a mind, which is parallel to the distinction between a nature or form and its existence in a subject. It was Avicenna who taught St. Thomas to differentiate between these two ways of regarding a nature or essence. According to Avicenna, an essence can be considered either absolutely in itself or as it exists in reality or in the mind. In the first way it is abstracted from actual existence and retains only what belongs to it in virtue of its definition. In the second way the essence is regarded as existing, either with individuality in the particulars of the real world or with universality in the mind. As early as his De Ente 31
32
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In I Sent, d. 19, q. 5, a. 3, ad 3m, pp. 496-497. For St. Augustine's proof see E. Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, trans. L. E. M. Lynch (New York, 1960), pp. 51-55. His proof is based on the Plotinian notion of truth as divine and eternal. What is lacking in his thought, and is clearly present in St. Thomas', is the distinction between uncreated and created truth. The Thomistic intellect "can produce truth," the Augustinian mind "is limited to receiving it." E. Gilson, ibid., p. 110. Avicenna, Metapk, V, 1-2 (Venice, 1508), fols. 86v-87v Logica, I, fol. 2b; De Anima, II, 2, fol. 6v. 31
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;
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et Essentia St. Thomas adopted this twofold consideration of an essence, though his interpretation of it was somewhat different from that of Avicenna. St. Thomas agrees with him that an essence can be considered just in itself, or absolutely, abstracting from being and all modes of being; but unlike the Muslim philosopher he does not ascribe to the essence absolutely considered a being of its own, an esse proprium . St. Thomas speaks of an absolute consideration of an essence, not of a proper being of an essence, as though an essence possessed a being of its own, an essential being, distinct from its existential being. Similarly, St. Thomas contends that we can think about a truth or falsehood just in itself, considering its meaning in abstraction from whether or not it is entertained by anyone. In his language, truths or falsehoods are then considered secundum intentiones suas. But he does not mean that when they are thus considered they have a kind of being in themselves, any more than essences do when thought of just in themselves. The only being or existence truth or falsity has is in a mind: either the divine mind or a created mind. Thus, when he calls truths incorruptible and eternal he does not intend to ascribe eternal or incorruptible being to them. There is only one eternal and completely immutable being, and that is God. Truths are properly eternal, in the sense of having eternal being, only in the divine mind, where they are one with each other and with the divine mind itself. Clearly, St. Thomas is using the term "eternal" in a different sense from this when he says in his commentary on the Sentences that truths, like universals, are eternal considered secundum intentiones suas. A passage from his Summa Theologiae will perhaps enable us to understand the meaning of the term in this context. In the question "Whether Created Truth is Eternal?" one of the arguments for the positive side runs as follows-. "That which is always, is eternal. But universals are always and everywhere; therefore they are eternal. So therefore is truth, which is the most universal." St. Thomas' reply deserves to be quoted in full: That something is always and everywhere can be understood in two ways. In one way, as having in itself the power to extend to all time and to all places, as it belongs to God to be everywhere and always. In the other way, as not having in itself determination to any place or time; as primary matter is said to be one, not because it has one form, as man is one by the unity of one form, 34
35
De Ente et Essentia, 3; ed. Roland-Gosselin (Paris, 1948), pp. 24-26. See Quodl. 8, 1. Avicenna, Metaph., I, 6, fol. 72vC. Later scholastics called the being proper to essence esse essentiae in distinction to the being of existence (esse existentiae). See, for example, Henry of Ghent, Quodl., I, 9 (Paris, 1578), fol. 7r. For this notion, see E. Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers (Toronto, 1952), p. 76; J. Owens, An Elementary Christian Metaphysics (Milwaukee, 1963), p. 105, n. 12. 34
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but by the absence of all distinguishing forms. In this manner, all universals are said to be everywhere and always, insofar as universals abstractfromplace and time. It does not, however, followfromthis that they are eternal, except in an intellect, if one exists that is eternal. It will be noticed that here in the Summa, unlike the commentary on the Sentences, St. Thomas does not use the term "eternal" of universals and general truths. Neither, incidentally, does he use the term when replying to the same argument in his De Veritate-, there the term used is perpetuum . In the Summa he reserves the term "eternal" for its most proper meaning, which applies to God alone. He does concede, however, that universals may be said to be "always and everywhere" because they abstract from all particular times and places. Later Scholastics, like John of St. Thomas, will call this abstractness of universals and necessary truths "negative eternity" in contrast to the "positive eternity" of God. This is not the language of St. Thomas, but perhaps it expresses well enough what he had in mind. Universals and abstract truths, considered in themselves, may be said to be "always and everywhere" in the purely negative sense of not being determined to place or time. This is because they abstract from being and every mode of being, including spatial and temporal being. But in its most perfect sense eternity is not a negative notion, nor does it abstract from being. As we have seen, it is the highest mode of being (esse secundum altissimum modum), which belongs to God alone. 36
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"Dicendum quod aliquid esse semper et ubique, potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, quia habet in se unde se extendat ad omne tempus et ad omnem locum, sicut Deo competit esse ubique et semper. Alio modo, quia non habet in se quo determinetur ad aliquem locum vel tempus; sicut materia prima dicitur esse una, non quia habet unam formam, sicut homo est unus ab imitate unius formae, sed per remotionem omnium formarum distinguentium. Et per hunc modum, quodlibet universale dicitur esse ubique et semper, inquantum universalia abstrahuntur ab hie et nunc. Sed ex hoc non sequitur ea esse aeterna, nisi in intellectu, si quis sit aeternus." Summa Theol., I, 16, 7, ad 2m. "To be always and everywhere" is not a positive characteristic of a universal, such as man; otherwise all individual men would exist always and everywhere, because the nature of man is found in each of them. Rather, the phrase is to be taken per modum negationis seu abstractions, i.e. in the negative sense that the universal nature abstracts from every determinate time and place. See In I Post. Anal., lect. 42, n. 6; ed. Leonine (Rome, 1882), I, p. 311. "Dicendum, quod hoc quod dicitur, universale perpetuum esse et incorruptibile, Avicenna dupliciter exponit: uno modo ut dicatur esse perpetuum et incorruptibile, ratione particularium, quae nunquam inceperunt nec deficient secundum tenentes aeternitatem mundi; generatio enim ad hoc est, secundum Philosophum, ut salvetur perpetuum esse in specie, quod in individuo salvari non potest. Alio modo ut dicatur esse perpetuum, quia non corrumpitur per se, sed per accidens ad corruptionem individui." De Veritate, I, 5, ad 14m. This negative notion of the perpetuity of universal natures is traceable to Avicenna, Sufficientia, 1, 3 (Venice, 1508), fol. 15vb. John of St. Thomas, Cursus Theologicus, comm. in primam partem, disp. 22, a. 4 (Paris, 1934), II, n. 19, p. 637; disp. 9, a. 3, n. 40, p. 78. ' See above, note 25. 36
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In likening the "eternity" of truths to that of universals in his commentary on the Sentences, St. Thomas does not mean to imply that truths, like universals, are essences or forms. We have already seen him deny that truth is an essence. Still, he says in his De Veritate that a truth is expressed as a form (per modum formae). When a universal truth is thought of just in itself, no account is taken whether or not it is entertained by a mind; its intelligible content is understood simply in itself, abstracting from the subject in which it may exist. Formal expression is then given to the truth in a proposition. It is said to be incorruptible or immutable in the sense in which an essence or form can be said to be indestructible or immutable. The subject in which it inheres may change through receiving or losing it, but it itself is not the subject of change. In itself it abstracts from change, as it also abstracts from time and place. Hence its incorruptibility and immutability, like its "eternity," result from its abstractness. It is not immutable in the sense that it has immutable being, any more than it is eternal because it possesses eternal being. Incidentally, the reader will notice that St. Thomas calls falsehoods as well as truths incorruptible and eternal. This is because they too have a formal intelligible content or meaning that can be understood just in itself, abstracting from whether or not they are entertained by a mind. As such, they share with truths an abstractness that removes them from the conditions of change and temporal or spatial determination. Hence, like truths, they are immutable and "eternal." The distinction between the objective and subjective consideration of truths (i.e. between the consideration of them in themselves and as they exist in a mind) is also made by St. Thomas in his Summa contra Gentiles when treating of the possibility of proving the eternity of the soul from the fact that it knows the truth. At first sight it might seem that the soul's eternity can be proved on this basis. Is not the truth of intelligible matters both imperishable and eternal in itself? For such truths are necessary, and what is necessary cannot be otherwise, and hence it is eternal. It would seem, then, that the soul's knowledge of these truths can be the basis of demonstrating not only its immortality but also its eternity. St. Thomas does not find this line of argument convincing. He points out that the eternity of truth can refer either to the thing understood (i.e. the object) or to that by which it is understood (i.e. the subject). If the truth is 40
41
42
43
40 41 42 43
See above, note 18. De Veritate, I, 6. See above, note 31. Summa contra Gentiles, II, 83, n. 2.
ST. THOMAS AND ETERNAL TRUTHS
55
eternal in the first way, we can argue to the eternity of the thing understood but not to the one who understands it. But if the truth is eternal in the second way — with respect to the means by which it is understood or the subject who understands it - then it follows that the soul is eternal. Now the means by which we know the truth are not eternal: these means are the intelligible species that begin to exist in us through the activity of the agent intellect upon phantasms. So we cannot conclude that the soul is eternal, but we can infer that the truths we understand are grounded in something eternal, namely in the primary truth which is the universal cause containing all truth. This eternal truth is the goal our intellect seeks; and since it is ordained to an eternal end it must have the capacity of enduring forever. Thus the eternity of intelligible truth is a ground on which we can prove the immortality of the soul but not its eternity. We could not wish for a more felicitious expression of St. Thomas' conception of the eternity of truth. As in his commentary on the Sentences, he grants that intelligible truths can be called eternal because they have an objective basis in something eternal. This basis is the eternal truth of God, which is the primary truth and the universal cause containing all truth. Thus all talk about eternal truth is meaningful only in reference to him. 44
*
At the beginning of this paper we saw Suarez make certain reservations about the adequacy of St. Thomas' doctrine on the eternity of truth. We are now in a position to evaluate his criticism and to understand why his own views on the subject were somewhat different from those of the Angelic Doctor. The main burden of Suarez' criticism is that St. Thomas refers the whole eternity of truth to the divine mind, thus failing to account for the eternal truth necessary truths have in themselves, prescinding from the divine mind. As we have seen, St. Thomas does in fact teach that there is only one eternal truth, whether this is the truth of being or of intellect. This one eternal truth is identical with God. All other truths have eternal truth only in the divine mind, where they are identical with each other and with the divine mind. The reason for this limitation of eternal truths to the mind of God is easy to see. Since there is no other eternal being or intellect except his, and since truth is either the truth of being or of intellect, there can be no other eternal truth besides his. Created truth, whether of being or of intellect, is neither eternal nor entirely unchangeable. 44
Ibid., II, 84, n. 4.
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But does not St. Thomas grant that necessary truths have an eternity in themselves, if not in the strict sense of the term, at least in the negative or analogous sense of abstracting from time and place? We should recall that it is only incidentally, in reply to objections to his doctrine, that he uses the term "eternal" of abstract necessary truths. Moreover, he does so only in the commentary on the Sentences and the Contra Gentiles. In the later Summa Theologiae he seems deliberately to avoid the term. Eternity, for St. Thomas is properly a mode of duration of being, and as such it belongs to God alone. In an analogous or negative sense truths, like universals, maybe called eternal because they abstract from place and time; but even this use of the term is connected with its proper use, for all truths are true because they are grounded in the eternal divine truth, which is the universal cause containing all truth. Suarez' critical reaction to St. Thomas' doctrine is understandable because Suarez himself ascribed more than a negative sense to the eternity of necessary truths taken in themselves. Eternal truths, for him, eternally possess in the divine mind a possible being that is not the being of God himself. Though they actually exist for all eternity only in the divine mind, in themselves they have eternal possible being, for it is a fact from all eternity that the essential predicates of an essence can be truly predicated of it, and every truth is based upon a certain being. The kind of being upon which the eternal truths are grounded, according to Suarez, is the essential being (esse essentiae) that belongs to an essence just in itself. This is a type of real being, in the sense of being non-fictitious, unlike the being of a chimera, though it is not real in the full sense of being an actual existent. From all eternity essences have this type of possible being in themselves, independent of any extrinsic efficient causality. In other words, essences are not created by God in their mere possibility but only in their actual existence. And neither are the possible truths involved in these essences created by God: he 45
46
47
For the dating of these works, see I. T. Eschmann, "A Catalogue of St. Thomas's Works," in E. Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas, trans. L. K. Shook (New York, 1956), pp. 384-387. Suarez, Disputationes Metaphysicae, disp. 31, sect. 2, n. 8; 26, p. 231. Ibid., n. 10, p. 232. Suarez distinguishes between two meanings of esse essentiae. The first is merely possible being, which is found only in knowledge and not in reality; the second is actual essence, which belongs to an actually existing creature. Essential being in the first sense does not need an efficient cause but only in the second sense. Ibid., n. 11, p. 232. For the Suarezian notion of essence, see E. Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers (Toronto, 1952), pp. 96-107. For its distinction from existence, see J. Owens, "The Number of Terms in the Suarezian Discussion of Essence and Being," The Modem Schoolman, 34 (1957), pp. 147-191. Before Suarez, Capreolus also maintained that the essence of creatures is uncreated. See N. J. Wells, "Capreolus on Essence and Existence," The Modern Schoolman, 38 (1960), pp. 1-24. 45
46 47
57
ST. THOMAS AND ETERNAL TRUTHS
is not their producer but a mere spectator of them. If he did produce them, they would issue from his will and consequently they would not be necessary but contingent truths. It is because of this, as we have seen, that Suarez claims that necessary truths are eternally true, not only as existing in the divine mind, but also in themselves and abstracting from that mind. It is precisely on this point that Suarez parts company with St. Thomas. We have already remarked that the latter does not ascribe an essential being to essences taken just in themselves. Though he grants that essences may be considered in themselves, he does not believe they have a being or entity in themselves. The only being they have is that of the subject in which they exist; in themselves they are simply nothing. Similarly, truths can be thought of in themselves, but the only being or entity they have is that of the mind which thinks about them. If that mind is God's they have eternal being; if the mind is human they have temporal being. As a result of this, there is no room in St. Thomas' thought for created eternal truths, for this would imply that God could give truths eternal being, which is reserved for him alone. Neither is there a place in his teaching for "neutral" eternal truths, which would have an eternal possible being in themselves, independent of God and human minds. Only on the supposition that eternal truths have a kind of entity in themselves does the late medieval and early modem philosophical discussion concerning their possible creation or non-creation, and their possible independence of the divine mind and will make sense. These questions are eliminated from the outset once St. Thomas' existential notion of truth is adopted. But at the same time does this not eliminate the distinction between necessary and contingent truths? If essences perish with the existences of things — if they have no essential being of their own distinct from their existential being — so too do necessary propositions, in which essential predicates are attributed to a subject. These propositions, then, are not eternal or necessary but contingent truths. This conclusion, which Suarez finds so unpalatable, St. Thomas has no hesitation in accepting. "There is," he says, "no necessary truth in creatures." This is because nothing created exists eternally or immutably — not 48
49
50
See above, notes 10-13. "Ex hoc ipso quod quidditati esse tribute, non solum esse, sed ipsa quidditas creari dicitur; quia antequam esse habeat, nihil est, nisi forte in intellectu creantis, ubi non est creatura, sed creatrix essentia." De Potentia, 3, 5, ad 2m. Suarez agrees that the essence of a creature cannot be an actual reality without being freely created by God, but this does not prevent it from being a possible essence independent of God's creative act. See Suarez, Disp. Metaph., disp. 31, sect. 2, n. 3 26, p. 230. See above, note 22. For Aquinas' views on the historicity of truth, along with its stability in creatures, see J. Owens, "Aquinas — Existential Permanence and Flux," Mediaeval Studies, 31 (1969), 88-90 ; A. Maurer, St. Thomas and Historicity, reprinted below, pp. 95-116. 48
49
;
10
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THOMAS AQUINAS
even truths in human minds. They are contingent on the existence of these minds and subject to their temporal vicissitudes. The discovery itself of truth has a temporal and historical dimension, as is seen in the fact that the ancient philosophers gradually and as it were step by step (paulatim et quasi pedetentim) progressed in the knowledge of the origin of things. And sometimes we must be content with hypotheses which are not necessarily true, though they "save the appearances." Thus the Ptolemaic system of astronomy, according to St. Thomas, "saves the appearances," but the celestial phenomena might conceivably be "saved" in still another way not yet known to man. If all created minds ceased to exist, so too would the truths residing in them. They would then exist only in the mind of God, where they would be identical with him and his eternity. Accordingly, when created truths are considered from the perspective of their being or existence, they cannot be said to exist necessarily. But these truths can be considered just in themselves, abstracting from their being or existence. They can then be distinguished into necessary and contingent truths, depending on whether or not they can be otherwise. A necessary truth is one that cannot be otherwise; for example, a truth of mathematics or a principle such as "Every whole is greater than its part." A contingent truth can be otherwise; for example, "Socrates is sitting." Nor is this distinction destroyed by the fact that God eternally knows all truths, for he knows necessary truths to be necessary and contingent truths to be contingent. Thus the difficulties raised by Suarez regarding the stability of necessary truths and their distinction from contingent truths can be adequately met on Thomistic grounds. These grounds, however, are quite different from those upon which Suarez himself, along with other late scholastics, based their doctrine of eternal truths. The originality of St. Thomas' own views on the subject are traceable to the novelty of his notion of esse and its relation to truth. But it was the Suarezian metaphysics of essences rather than the Thomistic doctrine of esse that influenced the early modern discussion of the nature of eternal truths. 51
52
53
54
55
Summa Theol., I, 44, 2. See De Potentia, 3, 5. In II De Caelo et Mundo, lect. 17, n. 2; ed. Leonine (Rome, 1886), 3, pp. 186-187; Summa Theol., I, 32, 1, ad 2m. For the distinction between necessary and contingent truths, see In I Post. Anal., lect. 43, n. 3; ed. Leonine (Rome, 1882), I, p. 319. See Summa Theol, I, 14, 13. On the influence of Suarez on modern metaphysics, see E. Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers (Toronto, 1952), pp. 105 ff. 51 52
53
54
55
5
St. Thomas on the Sacred Name 'Tetragrammaton' From the beginning of his career St. Thomas was concerned with the problem of identifying the most appropriate name of God. His first theological work, the Scriptum on the Sentences, discusses the subject at some length and concludes without qualification that among all the divine names the most suitable is 'He who is': 'qui est' est maxime proprium nomen Dei inter alia nomina. There was nothing original in this choice of the most fitting divine name; St. Thomas was simply following a long tradition in the Church, based on the revelation of this name in Exodus 3:14, and formulated by the Latin and Greek Fathers. Peter Lombard in his Sentences, and St. Thomas' master St. Albert in his commentary on the Lombard, passed on this tradition to the young St. Thomas. He found in their writings the scriptural and patristic citations he used to show the appropriateness of this name. He also found in St. Albert's commentary the appeal to Jewish tradition, in the person of Moses Maimonides, that 'being' or 'I am who am' is the proper name of God. Throughout the discussion of the most suitable name of God in his Scriptum on the Sentences St. Thomas, like St. Albert, gives no indication that there may be a more fitting divine name than 'He who is'. He adds argument to argument to prove the suitability of this name in comparison with all others. One of these arguments is based on St. Jerome's description of the perfection of the divine being. As St. Jerome says, the being of God has no past or future but is totally possessed in the present. Hence it is 1
2
3
St. Thomas, In I Sent, d. 8, q. 1, a. 1; ed. P. Mandonnet (Paris, 1929), 1, pp. 194-195. This is also the primary name of God; see ibid., a. 3, pp. 199-210. See Peter Lombard, Libri IV Sententiarum, I, d. 8, c. 1 (Quaracchi, 1916), p. 57; St. Albert, In I Sent., d. 2 D, a. 14 (Paris, 1893), 25, pp. 70-71. See St. Albert, ibid., p. 71; St. Thomas, ibid., p. 194. See Maimonides, Dux seu Director Dubitantium aut Perplexorum I, 62 (Paris, 1520: Minerva, 1964), fol. 25v. 1
2
3
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perfect, for what is perfect has nothing outside of itself. Our being, on the contrary, is imperfect: we lack in the present the part of ourselves that has gone into the past and the part that will come in the future. So the name 'He who is' is more suitable to God than to his creatures. The indetermination of the name is another reason for its fittingness. When we name God 'He who is' we do not presume to say what God is; we only express being in an indeterminate fashion. As Damascene says, we do not in fact know the essence of God except negatively. Consequently we name God most properly as 'He who is'. Another argument, drawn from Dionysius, urges that being is the primal perfection given to creatures by God. Hence the divine name expressing being is most appropriate to him. Lastly, St. Thomas finds in the metaphysics of Avicenna a reason for the suitability of this divine name. We name things from their essences, as we call a person a man from his essence, which is humanity. Now creatures are not properly named from being, because their essence is not being; in them being differs from essence. But in God being is identical with his essence. So 'He who is' properly names him. Suitable as this name is, St. Thomas is well aware of its shortcoming in expressing the mystery of God. It cannot perfectly signify God, he explains, because it involves the synthesis or putting together of terms, which befits a composite or 'concreted' being but hardly the absolutely simple being of God. As the being of creatures imperfectly represents the divine being, so the name 'He who is' imperfectly expresses it. But it is more appropriate than other names of God, for these involve, besides the composition expressed by the name 'He who is', further additions. Thus, if we say 'God is wise', not only is there the imperfection implied by the composition of the subject 'God' and the verb 'is', but there is the added notion of wisdom. So there is a greater imperfection in the other names of God than in the name 'He who is'. In the final analysis all our knowledge and names of God fall short of their object. As we approach God we must remove from our knowledge of him all positive perfections, and then we are left in the darkness of ignorance. But God dwells precisely in this obscurity, and it is there that we are most united to him while pilgrims on earth. At this supreme moment of our ascent to God we are joined to him through our very ignorance, and we stand before him as before the absolutely ineffable. 4
5
6
7
8
St. Thomas, ibid., p. 195. See St. Jerome, Epistola 15, Ad Damasum-, PL 22, 358. St. Thomas, ibid. See St. John Damascene, De Fide Orthodoxa, I, 9 (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1955), pp. 48-49; also I, 4, p. 19. Ibid. See Dionysius, De Divinis Nominibus, I, 5 PG 3, 839 BC. Ibid. See Avicenna, Metaphysica, I, 6 (Venice, 1508), fol. 72va. ' Ibid., ad 3m, p. 196. 4 5
6 7
;
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'TETRAGRAMMATON'
The Summa contra Gentiles does not treat explicitly of the appropriate name of God, but at the end of the chapter in which St. Thomas proves the identity of essence and being in God (I, 22), he exclaims that this is the sublime truth taught to Moses by God when he declared 'I am who am'. This shows, St. Thomas says, that 'He who is' is God's appropriate name. He does not say that this is the most appropriate divine name, but no other name is suggested as more suitable. When commenting on the Divine Names of Dionysius, St. Thomas points out that, in giving the name of being to God, Dionysius does not intend to express the ineffable essence of God as it is in itself, but to manifest the procession of being from God to creatures. Because creatures participate in being as the primary gift of God, he is named and praised suitably and principally by the name of being before all other names (prae omnibus aliis nominibus). He is praised primarily as existing, for existence is the most valuable gift he makes to his creatures. This is clear from Exodus 3:14, where it is said, "He who is sent me to you." But this name does not express the ineffable mystery of God in himself, any more than the other divine names do. It praises God insofar as creatures are related to him by participating his gifts. Our most perfect knowledge of God is by negation, when we know him through realizing our own ignorance about him, and by that ignorance being united to him above our mind. Leaving behind all creatures — even the mind itself — the mind is then joined to the superbrilliant rays of the divinity in the realization that God transcends everything it can comprehend. The same sensitivity to the mystery of God is found in St. Thomas' Disputed Questions on the Power of God. There he explains that names such as 'wise', 'good', and 'being' signify the divine substance, but not perfectly or comprehensively, as it is in itself. They express it only insofar as it is known to us. The name 'He who is' is for this reason most suitable to God because it signifies being in an indeterminate way, without limiting God to any one particular form. Nevertheless the divine substance remains unknown to us. Our mind does not measure up to it, and hence it transcends our knowledge. So we know God best in this life by knowing that we do not know him, aware that his nature transcends everything we can know about him. 9
10
11
12
13
Summa contra Gentiles, I, 22, # 10. In Divinis Nominibus, V, 1, n. 618 (Rome, 1950), p. 233. Ibid., n. 635, p. 236. Ibid., VII, 4, n. 732, p. 275. De Potentia Dei, 7, 5. "... illud est ultimum cognitionis humanae de Deo quod sciat se Deum nescire, in quantum cognoscit illud quod Deus est, omne ipsum quod de eo intelligimus excedere." ad 14m. 9
10
11
12 13
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In all these writings St. Thomas is concerned to show that we can know something truly about God from creatures and name him suitably from the names we give to them. They are in agreement that the most appropriate name we can give to him is 'He who is', a name derived from the being imparted to creatures by God as their primal participation in him. At the same time St. Thomas never loses sight of the fact that God's nature in itself remains unknown to us and consequently that as such it is ineffable. So inscrutable and mysterious is God that his essence is wholly unknown to us. But no name is suggested whereby we can express this unknown essence and mystery of God. The Summa Theologiae is the only work of St. Thomas, to my knowledge, that recognizes a divine name that is in a sense more suitable than 'He who is' because it expresses the ineffable and incommunicable divine substance. This is 'Tetragrammaton' — so called because it is known only by the four Hebrew consonants Jod, He, Vau, He. It was revealed to Moses in Exodus 3:15. The Summa does not deny anything said in the earlier writings about the appropriateness of the name 'He who is', but it adds a significant item to the doctrine of the divine names, while developing this doctrine in a remarkable way. St. Thomas in the Summa distinguishes between two ways in which names may be suitable to things: from the perspective of that from which the name is derived, and from the perspective of that which the name is designed to signify. This grammatical distinction goes back at least as far as Varro's De Lingua Latina and it was well known in the middle ages. Following Varro, St. Thomas connects this distinction with the difference between the etymology of a word and its meaning. The etymology of a word has to do with that from which the word is derived for the purpose of signification, while its meaning regards that which the word is designed to signify. These are 14
15
16
17
Summa contra Gentiles, III, 49, # 9. See A. C. Pegis, "Penitus manet ignotum," Mediaeval Studies 27 (1965), 212-226. Summa Theologiae, I, 13, 11, ad lm. See Exodus 3:15. On the sacred name of Tetragrammaton, see W. F. Albright, From the Stone Age to Christianity, 2nd ed. (New York, 1957), pp. 257-272. G. Lambert, "Que signifie le nom divin de YHWH?" Nouvelle Revue Theologique, 74 (1952), 897-915. M. M. Bourke, "Yahweh, the Divine Name," The Bridge, 3 (1958), 271-287. A. M. Dubaile, "La signification dunom de Yahweh," Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques, 35 (1951), 5-21. "Dicendum quod non est semper idem id a quo imponitur nomen ad significandum, et id ad quod significandum nomen imponitur." Summa Theol, I, 13, 8. "Cum uniuscuiusque verbi naturae sint duae, a qua re et in qua re vocabulum sit impositum ... priorem illam partem, ubi cur et unde sint verba scrutantur, Graeci vocant hvfioXoyiav-, illam alteram nepi atifiaivo/ievuiv." Varro, De Lingua Latina, V, 2 (London, Cambridge, Mass., 1951), pp. 2-4. St. Albert uses this distinction, In I Sent, d. 2 D, a. 11 (Paris, 1893), 25, p. 66. 14
15
16
17
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'TETRAGRAMMATON'
sometimes different. For instance, the etymology of the word lapis is said to be laedere pedem (to hurt the foot), though the word does not signify this. If it did, iron would be a stone, for iron hurts the foot. So too, the word superstitio is derived from superstes (surviving), though the word signifies a vice opposed to religion. Applying this distinction to the names of God, St. Thomas explains that from the viewpoint of the origin of the name, 'He who is' is most appropriate to him. For this name is derived from being (esse), which is, according to St. Thomas, the most perfect of all actualities. Clearly, in our effort tcyrname God, being will serve as the best source of the name. The very generality of 'He who is', which at first sight may seem to militate against its suitability as a divine name, is in its favour. If, as Damascene says, God is infinite and unlimited in his being, no name signifying a determinate mode of being would be suitable to him. So the mode of signification of 'He who is' makes it a fitting name of God. Still another reason for its appropriateness is its manner of consignifying. Like all verbs, 'is' signifies an act (the act of existing) and it consignifies the action as taking place in a certain time, namely in the present. This is most suitable to God, whose being knows no past or future but only the present. Turning to the appropriateness of the divine name from the perspective of the object which the name is designed to signify, St. Thomas finds the name 'God' (Deus) more appropriate. With St. Ambrose he considers this name to be the name of a nature: it has been imposed to designate the nature of God. Its etymology is another matter. Following St. John Damascene he derives the name (in its Greek form deoq) from the providential action of God. Damascene considers three possible derivations of deog. It may come from dssTv, which means to take care of or to cherish; or from aideiv, which means to burn (God is a consuming fire); or from deaadai, which means to consider or think about. No matter which of these etymologies is correct, the name is taken from an action of God, more likely from his providential care of all things. But even though the name is taken from this action, it is imposed to signify the divine nature. Of course, we do not know this nature in itself but only through its effects, by way of eminence, causality, and negation. Nevertheless, those who invented the name did so to signify a reality that is the transcendent source of all things. 18
19
20
21
22
Summa Theol., II-II, 92, 1, ad 2m. " Ibid., I, 13, 11. Ibid., ad lm. Ibid., I, 13, 8. See Ambrose, De Fide, I, 1; PL 16, 553. Ibid. See Damascene, De Fide Orthodoxa, I, 9, n. 3 (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1955), p. 49. 18
20 21
22
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If this is true, the name 'God' is reserved for the divine nature and it is incommunicable to anything else. There is only one God and one divine nature, so the name belongs to him alone. Other names of natures are different in that they are properly communicable to many individuals. For example, the name 'lion' designates a certain nature, and it applies in its proper sense to many individuals, to all that share in the nature of the species. Even some things that do not have the lull nature of lion, but share in some of its properties, can be given the name. We may call someone a lion because of his boldness or strength. This is a metaphorical use of the term. Although the name 'God' is properly applicable only to the one God, it is not, in St. Thomas' view, a personal name, like 'Achilles'. This is the proper name of a person. A name such as this is incommunicable both in reality and in thought. Given to designate the one individual person, it refers to him and to him alone. It can be applied to others only by way of metaphor. Someone may be called 'Achilles' because he is like the original, say, in his courage. Because the name 'God' designates a nature and not a person, it is communicable to others, not in reality, to be sure, but in the thought or opinion of some men. Some think there are many gods, all sharing in the nature of divinity. In this regard 'God' is like the word 'sun'. 'Sun' is the name of a nature, but in reality this nature is found in only one individual according to the Ptolemaic astronomy. However, in the opinion of some there are many suns; so at least in thought or opinion the word is applicable to many individual heavenly bodies. It should be noticed that St. Thomas is here comparing the words 'God' and 'sun', not their natures. The divine nature, in his view, cannot be participated by many individual substances, whereas the nature of the sun is such that it might be shared by many, though in fact, according to ancient astronomy it is not. But the words 'God' and 'sun' are alike in that they are not proper but 'appellative' names, for they signify a nature as existing in some individual. They are not personal names of individuals. Not only is the name 'God' communicable in thought to many individual substances; it can also be applied in an improper and metaphorical sense to others besides the one divine substance. Thus we read in Scripture "I have said, you are gods" (Psalms 81:6). Here some men are called gods metaphorically, because they have some godlike characteristic, and not the 23
24
Summa Theol., I, 13, 9. Ibid., ad 2m. For mediaeval logicians appellatio is the present applicability of a term to something; it is the calling of a present individual by a general term. See W. and M. Kneale, The Development of Logic (Oxford, 1962), p. 248. 23
24
'TETRAGRAMMATON'
65
full divine nature. The name 'God' applies to them, not in its full meaning, but in some aspect of it. When it is applied in this way, the word 'God' is used analogously and not univocally. When the pagans speak of many gods, and Scripture gives the name to some godlike men, the term is used by way of analogy. It is similar to 'healthy' applied to an animal and also to urine and medicine. The word 'healthy' has a proper meaning applicable to a living organism; it can be extended to other things because of some relation they have to the health of a living body. A similar analogous use can be made of the name 'God'. Is there a divine name that is absolutely incommunicable, that applies to God and to him alone? 'He who is' and God do not seem to answer this description. If there were such a radically incommunicable name it would not signify the divine nature, but the divine person or supposit. It would be a personal, proper name of God, like 'Achilles', or the name of the sun designating it not in its nature but as an individual substance. St. Thomas suggests that perhaps the Hebrew name 'Tetragrammaton' fits this description. Like the name 'God' it has been given to signify the reality of God, but it is even more appropriate than this name because it does not signify his nature but the incommunicable and (if one can use the expression) the singular substance itself of God. Thus, among the three names of God: 'He who is', 'God', and 'Tetragrammaton', the first is most appropriate from the point of view of the origin of the name, the second is more suitable from the perspective of that which the name has been given to signify, and from this same viewpoint the third is even more fitting. This treatment of the problem of the appropriate name of God in the Summa Theologiae is an important advance over St. Thomas' early handling of the subject. The Scriptum on the Sentences considers the suitability of the divine name only from the point of view of the derivation of the name, not from the perspective of the reality the name is intended to signify. Hence its conclusion that among all the names of God 'He who is' is the most fitting. But when the latter viewpoint is adopted the Summa finds the name 'God' more suitable and 'Tetragrammaton' even more appropriate. Where did St. Thomas obtain his knowledge about the sacred Hebrew name 'Tetragrammaton'? Some information about it was available through 25
26
27
Summa Theol., I, 13, 9. Ibid., I, 13, 10. "Et adhuc magis proprium nomen est Tetragrammaton, quod est impositum ad significandum ipsam Dei substantiam incommunicabilem, et, ut sic liceat loqui, singularem." Ibid., I, 13, 11, ad lm. 25
26 27
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St. Jerome. In his Letter to Marcella on the ten names of God St. Jerome explains that this is the ineffable divine name composed of the four Hebrew letters Jod, He, Vau, He. He distinguishes it from the name 'He who is' (Esher ehjeh). In his commentary on Ezechiel he says that it is equivalent to Dominus in the Septuagint and that it applies properly to God. Alcuin in his Disputatio Puerorum repeats the information given by Jerome in his Letter to Marcella? The Venerable Bede also passed on to the later middle ages the feet that the Jews used 'Tetragrammaton' as the ineffable, wonderful name of God, adding that it was inscribed on the forehead of the priests. Although these Christian writers were available to St. Thomas, they were not his main source of information about the sacred name; rather it was the medieval Jewish theologian Moses Maimonides. The development in Thomas' doctrine of the divine names which we have noted was due to his careful reading of Maimonides' Guide of the Perplexed and his greater assimilation of its thought in the Summa. In the Scriptum on the Sentences he cites Maimonides as an authority for the statement that 'He who is' is the ineffable and most worthy name of God, but he does not mention the Jewish theologian's long discussion of the sacred name 'Tetragrammaton'. Like his master St. Albert, he ignored this name when commenting on the Sentences. Only in the Summa does this name feature in his doctrine of the divine names. Maimonides clearly distinguishes between the divine names 'Tetragrammaton' and 'I am who am', devoting two chapters to the former and a separate one to the latter. The chapters on 'Tetragrammaton' stress its uniqueness as a divine name. All the other names of God are said to be derived from the works or actions of God, with the one exception of this name. It signifies the creator's substance purely, for nothing else shares it with him. 'Tetragrammaton' is the peculiar name of God; it is a 'separated' name (nomen separatum). Even the divine name 'Adonai', which means Lord (and which n
29
0
31
32
St. Jerome, Ad Marcellam. De decern nominibus Del-, PL 22, 429. St. Jerome, Commentaria in Ezechielem, 9, 28, n. 327; PL 25, 266. The Greek Fathers were also acquainted with the sacred Tetragrammaton as the ineffable and mystical personal name of God. See, for example, Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, V, 6, 34; PG 9, 60. Also Origen, Selecta in Psalmos, II; PG 12, 1104. Alcuin, Disputatio Puerorum-, PL 101, 1108 D, 1109 D. Bede, ExplanatioApocalypsis, I, 7; PL 93,150 A. See Dungal, Liber adversus Claudium-, PL 105, 489 C. See also Petrus Alphonsus, Dial., 6; PL 157, 611, and Garnerius of Rochefort, Contra Amaurianos, 10; ed. C. Baeumker (Miinster, 1926), pp. 34-39. Maimonides, Dux seu Director Dubitantium aut Perplexorum, I, 60-62 (Paris, 1520; Minerva, 1964), fol. 24r-26v. The Latin version of this work was made about 1240 from the Hebrew translation of the Arabic original. See E. Synan, "Maimonides," New Catholic Encyclopedia (New York, St. Louis, 1967), 9, pp. 79-81. 28
29
30
31
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'TETRAGRAMMATON'
67
was used in place of the sacred name 'Tetragrammaton'), is shared by others. Abraham, for example, called an angel 'Adonai' or 'my lord'. Names like 'judge', 'just', 'gracious', 'merciful', and 'Elohim' are derived from creatures and are applied generally both to God and creatures. But 'Tetragrammaton' is the proper name of God; having no known etymology, it is shared with none of his creatures. This name, Maimonides continues, is written but not pronounced. Because of its sacredness it was uttered only in the sanctuary by the holy priests when giving their blessing and by the high priest on the Day of Atonement. Not all Jews knew how to pronounce it. Once a week wise men taught their children and suitable disciples its pronunciation and meaning. Thus it remained a 'spiritual secret'. Another secret name of God, composed of twelve letters, was used as a substitute for it, but this was not a name peculiar to God. Because of the corruption of the people even this name was concealed from them. It was taught only to good priests so that they could use it in blessing the people. The use of the sacred name 'Tetragrammaton' was prohibited at this time and no longer used in the sanctuary. The meaning of the four letters that compose it was lost; indeed the language in which it is written is but poorly known today. Maimonides suggests that it means 'necessary existence' (necesse esse). What he is certain is that it designates the very reality of God in such a way that nothing else is signified by it. Reading this account of the sacred name, St. Thomas must have indeed been puzzled. What is this name, so sacred to the Jews, that they hardly dared to pronounce it? The Latin text available to him contains its four Hebrew letters (Yod, He, Vau, He), but this throws no light on the mystery of the name. For him, as for the Jews, it remained a 'spiritual secret' (secretum spirituale). It is of so little use to a theologian who wishes to illumine the contents of faith that it is no wonder that it finds small place in St. Thomas' writings. It occurs exactly where it is needed, at the point where he is looking for a personal name of God that is shared by no one else, that has no known etymology, and that is not derived from creatures. Maimonides' description of 'Tetragrammaton' answers this description perfectly. St. Thomas takes the name as thus described, without mentioning Maimonides' conjecture that it means 'necessary existence'. It must have occurred to him that if this is its meaning it cannot be said to be underived, as Maimonides himself claims. It would have its origin in existence, which, as the Jewish theologian himself says, is the derivation of the divine name 'I am who am'. 33
34
33 34
Ibid., 60, fol. 24rv. Ibid., 61, fol. 24v-25v. The reference to necesse esse is ch. 60, fol. 24v.
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At the end of the chapters on 'Tetragrammaton' Maimonides declares that he will now consider in a separate chapter the divine name 'I am who am', which was revealed to Moses by God himself. This clearly shows that he regarded these names as distinct, as did Philo many years before him. Not only does Maimonides devote separate chapters to these names but he considers the Tetragrammaton to be underived, having no known origin, whereas 'I am who am' is derived from the verb 'to be'. At the same time he seems to think they are closely related, since he associates both with the notion of necessary existence. The two names indeed appear in the same context in chapter three of Exodus: 'Tetragrammaton' in verse 15 (Yod, He, Vau, He, translated in the Septuagint Kvpiog, and in the Vulgate Dominus), and 'I am who am' in verse 14 (translated in the Septuagint Eyw eifit o wv, and in the Vulgate Ego sum qui sum). Maimonides' explanation of this latter name struck St. Thomas as being of the greatest significance. According to the Jewish theologian the majority of the people in Moses' day, exiled in Egypt, were idolators and ignorant of the existence of the creator. God's revelation of his name to Moses was meant to assure them of his existence and his ability to lead them out of captivity. The name 'I am who am' gave to the Jewish people a true notion of his existence. It is derived from the verb 'to be' {hayah), which means existence. In Hebrew, Maimonides says, there is no difference between saying 'He was' and 'He existed'. The whole secret and meaning of the name lies in the fact that it does not ascribe an attribute to God. Other positive names do. Thus if we call God good we name him through an attribute distinct from himself; but this is improper since God has no attributes differing from himself. He is absolutely one and simple. However, when we name God through existence, as 'I am who am', the subject is identical with the predicate. This makes it clear that God does not exist through existence, as an attribute distinct from himself. Rather, he exists through himself; he is sufficient to himself for his existence. This makes us aware of the existence of a necessary being that never was or will be non-existent. Throughout this chapter Maimonides reveals himself as both a biblical exegete and a metaphysician reflecting on the philosophical import of the 35
36
Ibid., 61, fol. 25v. In his translation of Maimonides' Guide of the Perplexed, S. Munk comments that, like other theologians, Maimonides thought he should separate the name Tetragrammaton' from all other divine names and regard it as a proper name, without known etymology, though it is clear that the name contains the meaning of being. See S. Munk, Le Guide des Egares (Paris, 1856), p. 269, n. 2. According to H. A. Wolfson, Philo always distinguishes between the divine name 'Tetragrammaton' and 'He that is'. See his Philo (Cambridge, Mass., 1947), 2, pp. 121-122, n. 60. Ibid., 62, fol. 25v-26r. 35
36
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'TETRAGRAMMATON'
revelation of the divine name. It has already been pointed out how significant these pages of the Guide of the Perplexed were for St. Thomas' own metaphysics. What is less known is their influence on the development of his doctrine of the most appropriate divine name, and in particular on his distinction between 'Tetragrammaton' and 'I am who am' or 'He who is'. He may have known the Guide when he wrote his Scriptum on the Sentences, but in those early days he did not mention the name 'Tetragrammaton'. His whole attention was given to 'He who is' as the most proper name of God, derived from the being of creatures and imperfectly signifying the being of God. At this stage, under the influence of his teacher St. Albert, he seems to have ignored the underived, personal name 'Tetragrammaton'. Yet he was as fully aware then as he was in later years of the sublime mystery of the divine reality and the impossibility of knowing what it is or giving it a completely adequate name. As a boy in the Benedictine monastery of Montecassino he often asked the monks "What is God?" In later life, after mature reflection and conscious of his solidarity with a long Jewish and Christian tradition, he concluded that in this world we cannot strictly answer this question; that the essence of God remains wholly unknown to us. He would not agree with Maimonides that (with the exception of'Tetragrammaton') we cannot apply positive names to God in their proper sense; that only negative names are properly meaningful of him. But he was fully in accord with him that at the end of our search for God we are left with a mystery that the human mind cannot penetrate; and he was indebted to him for pointing out the sacred name that designates God in these mysterious depths: 'Tetragrammaton'. 37
38
39
40
41
See E. Gilson, "Maimonide et la Philosophie de l'Exode," Mediaeval Studies, 13 (1951), 223-225. E. Gilson draws attention to this influence in the following note:"... the very indetermination of HE IS prevents it from naming any nature. Consequently, as a name of nature, God is more appropriate. But there is a still more appropriate one: 'the name Tetragrammaton [ Yahweh] imposed to signify the substance itself of God, incommunicable and, if one may so speak, singular' (ST, I, q. 13, a 11, ad 1). Cf. Maimonides, Guide, I, 61, where it is shown that, appropriately enough, we do not know how to pronounce this name of God's individual nature." Elements of Christian Philosophy (New York, 1960), p. 309, n. 13. See P. Calo, Vila S. Thomae Aquinatis (Fontes Vitae S. Thomae Aquinatis, ed. D. Priimmer, Toulouse, s.d.), p. 19; V. J. Bourke, Aquinas' Search for Wisdom (Milwaukee, 1965), p. 13. See above, note 14. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., I, 13, 2. 31
38
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40
41
5
The Unity of a Science: St. Thomas and the Nominalists It is a commonplace to speak of science as a body or system of knowledge. Contemporary philosophers of conflicting and even contradictory persuasions are alike in using this language. That science is a body of knowledge flows as easily from the pen of a Thomist as from that of a logical positivist, however different their understanding of the words may be. There is general agreement that science is composed of many items, whether they be thought of as propositions, truths, phenomena, or simply data, and that these items are unified in a science so as to constitute a whole. So common is this notion that it has been enshrined in our dictionaries. The Oxford Dictionary calls science an "organized body of the knowledge that has been accumulated on a subject," and Webster's Dictionary gives as one meaning of science "any department of systematized knowledge." It is not difficult to trace the notion of science as a unified body of knowledge to the dawn of modern philosophy. In various guises it is found in the works of Francis Bacon, Descartes, Leibniz, Condillac, Auguste Comte, the French encyclopedists Diderot and d'Alembert, and Kant. It was Kant who gave this notion its classic expression. Science, in his view, is not just any doctrine, but one that forms a system, by which he means "a totality of knowledge arranged according to principles." Kant writes: "... systematic unity is what first raises ordinary knowledge to the rank of science, that is, makes a system out of a mere aggregate of knowledge." Science is no mere 1
2
3
4
5
The Concise Oxford Dictionary, 3rd ed. (Oxford, 1934), p. 1065. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (Toronto, 1961), p. 757. See R. McRae, The Problem of the Unity of the Sciences: Bacon to Kant (Toronto, 1961). "Eine jede Lehre, wenn si ein System, d.i. ein nach Prinzipien geordnetes Ganze der Erkenntnis, sein soli, heisst Wissenschaft..." Kant, Metaphysische Anfangsgriinde der Naturwissenschaft, Vorrede, Samtliche Werke (Leipzig, 1921), IV, p. 547. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. K. Smith (London, 1950), A 832, B 860. 1
2 3
4
5
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aggregate (coacervatio) but an organized unity (articulatio). Each science is an organic unity built around an a priori idea, that is to say one that is not derived from experience but is furnished by reason itself. In order to illustrate the organic character of the unity of a science Kant compares a science to an animal body: like a living body it is a self-sufficient whole that grows from within and not by the addition of external parts. Leibniz was just as certain as Kant that a science is a logically ordered system of truths, though he conceived its unity in a different manner. In his view, an individual science is not a self-sufficient whole with an organic unity but an arbitrary and conventional combination or synthesis of all truths. Leibniz granted some value to the ancient division of science into physics, ethics, and logic, but he thought that ultimately the division broke down because each of these sciences could contain the others. Physics, for example, can embrace all the truths of logic and ethics; for physics treats of beings endowed with intelligence and will, and a complete explanation of intelligence requires the whole of logic, and a full account of the will embraces the whole of ethics. Leibniz remarks that the encyclopedists have encountered this difficulty in arranging their dictionaries of science and philosophy. "It is usually found," he says, "that one and the same truth may be put in different places according to the terms it contains, and also according to the mediate terms or causes upon which it depends, and according to the inferences and results it may have." In this connection he praises the nominalists, who (he writes) "believed that there were as many particular sciences as truths, which they composed after the manner of wholes, according as they arranged them." Who were these nominalists who shattered science into myriad fragments and then arranged them in arbitrary combinations? Unfortunately Leibniz does not name them; but he gives us a clue to their background, and possible identity, when, in a treatise on the contemporary nominalist Mario Nizolius, he gives a brief account of the rise of nominalism in the Middle Ages. The nominalists, Leibniz writes, were the most profound scholastic sect and the one most in harmony with the spirit of modern philosophy. Almost all the modern reformers of philosophy, he goes on to say, are nominalists, maintaining that individuals alone are real and rejecting the reality of universals, which they consider to be simply names (nomina). The sect of the nominalists is said to have begun with Roscelin, and after suffering eclipse 6
7
8
Ibid., A 833, B 861. For Kant's conception of science, seeR. McRae, ibid., pp. 123-143. Leibniz, New Essays concerning Human Understanding, IV, xxi, 4; trans. A. G. Langley (La Salle, 1949), p. 623. Leibniz, ibid. See R. McRae, ibid., pp. 7-8. 6
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8
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for many years it was suddenly revived by William Ockham, a man of the highest genius and of outstanding erudition for his time. In agreement with him were Gregory of Rimini, Gabriel Biel, and the majority of the Augustinian Order. Thus it is that the early writings of Martin Luther reveal an affection for nominalism; and with the passage of time it began to influence all the monks. Thus Leibniz leads us to medieval nominalism for the origin of the notion of science as a unified body of knowledge. In this paper I should like to suggest that this notion of science indeed began with the nominalist and conceptualist theologians of the late 13th and early 14th centuries, and that its chief theoretician and popularizer was William of Ockham. I am not arguing that the medieval nominalists were Leibnizians or Kantians, but only that in the late Middle Ages there grew up a common notion of science as a collection of truths or propositions unified by principles, and that this notion was passed on by them to early modern philosophers, each of whom interpreted it in his own way. I should also like to suggest that this notion of science was conceived in opposition to St. Thomas' doctrine of science, according to which an individual science is not in essence or primarily a system or body of knowledge but a single and simple habitus of the intellect. The story of the development of the notion of science as a body of knowledge is another chapter in the eclipse (and sometimes misunderstanding) of Thomism during the late Middle Ages. 9
*
*
*
St. Thomas inherited from Aristotle the notion of science as a stable disposition or habitus (e&Q) of the intellect. As such it is an intellectual virtue, a perfection of the mind acquired by repeated acts enabling its possessor to demonstrate truths through their causes or principles. In this view, each of the sciences is a distinct mental facility of demonstration and insight. Ontologically, St. Thomas regards a scientific habitus as a simple form or quality.- one habitus is not composed of many habitus (habitus est qualitas simplex non constituta expluribus habitibus). He grants that it involves a multiplicity, in the sense that it extends to many objects. Materially considered, its objects are many, but the scientific habitus regards 10
u
Leibniz, Dissertatio de Stilo Philosophico Nizolii, 28. Opera Philosophica, ed. J. E. Erdmann (Berlin, 1840), pp. 68-69. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VI, 3, 1139b 14-35. St. Thomas, In VI Ethicorum, lect. 3 (Rome, 1969), 47, pp. 340-341. " Summa Theol. I-II, 54, 4. On the notion of a habit as a quality disposing one to act well or badly, see ibid. I-II, 49, 1. 9
10
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all of them from one formal perspective (ratio). In other words, each science has its own formal object, whose unity gives unity to the science. For instance, the unity of the science of theology is based on the unity of its formal object, which is divine revelation. The theologian considers many truths, but all insofar as they have been divinely revealed, or at least insofar as they are related to divine revelation. Similarly, the science of arithmetic treats of all its objects from the formal perspective of continuous quantity. Each science has thus a formal unity owing to the formal unity of its object, and in virtue of this unity it is formally distinct from the other sciences. As the habit of an intellect, it also enjoys numerical unity: it is an individual ability or facility of insight and demonstration perfecting the individual intellect of its possessor. St. Thomas was aware of the serious objection his opponents raised against this conception of the unity of a scientific habit. Following Aristotle, he defines science as the knowledge of conclusions: it is the mental habit that enables us to demonstrate conclusions in the light of their principles. Now there are many conclusions in a whole science such as geometry or arithmetic, and we can have scientific knowledge, both actual and habitual, about any one of them independent of the others. So it would seem that a science is not one single habit but a complex of many. In replying to this difficulty St. Thomas in no way compromises the unity of a scientific habit. Suppose, he says, that we acquire the knowledge of one conclusion in a science by learning its appropriate demonstration. We then possess the habit of the science, though imperfectly. If we go on to master the knowledge of another conclusion in the science, we do not gain an additional habit; our previous habit simply becomes more perfect by extending to more demonstrations and conclusions, all of which are mutually related and ordered. So there is no need to think that a scientific habit is a complex of many partial habits: it is a single quality or form, capable of indefinite increase in perfection by extending to a greater number of objects. 12
13
14
15
16
12
54, 2.
For the distinction of cognitive habits according to their formal objects, see ibid. ITI,
Ibid. I, 1, 3. In VIEth. lect. 3, p. 341, lines 101-116. See Aristotle, Nic. EthicsVI, 3, 1139 b 14-35; 6, 1140b 31-33. Summa Theol. I-II, 54, 4, obj. 3. "Dicendum quod ille qui in aliqua scientia acquirit per demonstrationem scientiam conclusionis unius, habet quidem habitum, sed imperfecte. Cum vero acquirit per aliquam demonstrationem scientiam conclusionis alterius, non aggeneratur in eo alius habitus; sed habitus qui prius inerat fit perfectior, utpote ad plura se extendens, eo quod conclusiones et demonstrationes unius scientiae ordinatae sunt, et una derivator ex alia." Summa Theol. MI, 54, 4, ad 3. 13 14
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It will be noticed that while St. Thomas is making his main point concerning the unity of a scientific habit, he adds another: that this habit is related to a multitude of mutually related demonstrations and conclusions. From the latter point of view a science appears as having a complex structure. "The conclusions and demonstrations of one science," he writes, "have an order, and one flows from another." Adopting this perspective, a science is seen to have a systematic structure that can be studied for its own sake, for example by the logician. From this point of view St. Thomas analyzes science in his commentary on the Posterior Analytics, showing that a science has its own subject and principles, from which it draws its conclusions. In a sense, then, a science is a systematic whole according to St. Thomas. Its demonstrations and conclusions are mutually related and form an ordered whole. But the unity of the system is based on the unity of the single mental habit which is the principle of the whole science. The habit is the principle by which (principium quo) the scientist demonstrates all his conclusions and establishes an order among them. Without this one habitus there would be no systematic unity in the activities and conclusions of the scientist. As we shall see, many scholastics of the later Middle Ages lost sight of the unity of the mental habit that essentially constitutes a science. They describe a science simply as an orderly collection of many mental habits or concepts or propositions. In their view, the unity of a science is that of an ordered or systematic whole, and not that of a single mental habit. Even some Thomists, in their concern to be "modern," interpreted their master in this sense. Cajetan, writing shortly after 1500, refers to certain Thomists who thought St. Thomas vacillated between the opinions that a science is one habitus of the intellect and that it is an orderly collection of intelligible species in the mind. They believed that he inclined to the second view. They based this interpretation on statements of St. Thomas describing science as a totality and ordered aggregate. For example, in the Summa contra Gentiles he speaks of the habitus of knowledge in two senses: (1) as an ability (habilitatio) of the intellect to receive intelligible species by which it becomes actually understanding, and (2) as "the ordered aggregate of the species themselves existing in the intellect, not in complete actuality but in a way between potency and act." From this and similar texts, these 17
18
19
20
Ibid. In I Post. Anal. lect. 17 (Rome, 1882), I, pp. 204-207; lect. 41, p. 305, n. 7. " Cajetan, Comm. in Summa Theol. I-II, 54, 4 (Rome, 1891), VI, p. 345, n. 2-5. "Omnis autem intellectus in habitu per aliquas species intelligit: nam habitus vel est habilitatio quaedam intellectus ad recipiendum species intelligibiles quibus actu flat intelligens; vel est ordinata aggregatio ipsarum specierum existentium in intellectu non secundum 17
18
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Thomists concluded that a scientific habit is composed of intelligible species and hence that it is an ordered whole or totality. But as Cajetan rightly remarks, these Thomists (one of whom was Capreolus) misinterpret their master. St. Thomas' constant teaching is that a science is essentially a simple quality or habitus of the mind. This habitus is produced by repeated acts and by intelligible species, but neither the acts nor the species constitute the habitus itself. A text from St. Thomas' De Veritate clearly states the relation of intelligible species to a scientific habitus-. "... an ordering of [intelligible] species produces a habitus." Cajetan comments that St. Thomas does not say that the species are the habitus, but that they produce it. He also points out that, according to St. Thomas, we use an orderly group of intelligible species when we think scientifically by means of the habitus. Why, then, does St. Thomas sometimes call an ordered aggregate of intelligible species a scientific habit? The answer would seem to be that he applies the term habitus to these species because of their special relation to it. They are the habit in the sense that the habit derives from them and in turn uses them; but properly speaking they do not constitute it. Hence, only in a derived and secondary sense can they be called the habit. St. Thomas often uses terms in primary and secondary senses in order to express the nuances of his thought. He does not always speak formalissime. His use of the term habitus seems to be a case in point. Another instance is his extension of the term to the propositions that are held to be true by means of the habit. In his Summa Theologiae he distinguishes between two meanings of the term habitus? Essentially and properly it means the habitual 11
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completum actum, sed medio modo inter potentiam et actum." Summa contra Gentiles I, 56, § 6.
St. Thomas holds, contrary to Avicenna, that intelligible species remain in the intellect in a state of incomplete actuality even when they are not actually being employed by the intellect. Ibid. II, 74. Hence their orderly arrangement in the intellect constitutes a kind of habitual body of knowledge. De Veritate 24, 4, ad 9. Cajetan, ibid., p. 347, n. 12. According to Cajetan, the species are the beginnings of the habit and its potential parts. Ibid. Likely he has Capreolus in mind as one of the Thomists who misinterpreted St. Thomas on this point. See Capreolus, Defensiones Theologiae Divi Thomae Aquinatis, Prol. q. 3, a. 1, concl. 1 (Turin, 1900), I, p. 34. Soncinas (d. 1494) also held that a science is not a simple quality but a related grouping of intelligible species: "... tamen magis videtur quod scientia sit aggregatio specierum, vel ut melius dicam quod sit ipsae species aggregatae; et consequenter quod una totalis scientia sit constituta ex multis notitiis partialibus, ita quod per quamlibet demonstrationem acquiratur nova notitia." Soncinas, Quaestiones Metaphysicales VI, q. 9 (Venice, 1505), fol. 59v. "Dicendum quod aliquid potest did esse habitus dupliciter. Uno modo, proprie et essentialiter; et sic lex naturalis non est habitus. Dictum est enim supra quod lex naturalis est aliquid per rationem constitutum, sicut etiam propositio est quoddam opus rationis. Non est 21
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inclination or disposition to act in a certain way; but in a secondary and derived sense it means that which is produced or held by the habit. In this latter sense the term can be extended to mean the propositions held to be true by means of the habit. St. Thomas illustrates this distinction by the habit of faith. In the proper sense, faith is the habit by which we believe certain truths; in a derived sense, however, we can speak of "the faith" as that which we hold on faith. In this extended and analogous use of the term it is legitimate to speak of science objectively as a synthesis or system of truths or propositions; but for St. Thomas this is not the primary or proper meaning of the term. Properly, a science is a habit of the intellect, and this habit is radically one and simple. In later scholasticism the secondary and extended senses of the term "science" gradually came to the fore, supplanting its primary and essential meaning. A science was then conceived as an orderly arrangement of many partial habits of the intellect, or of terms and propositions. *
*
This shift in the meaning of a science was not long in coming. Shortly after the death of St. Thomas a lively debate began whether a science is properly speaking a simple habit of the mind or a synthesis of many habits or acts or propositions. Henry of Ghent was no Thomist, but on this question he held firmly to the Thomistic view of the unity of a scientific habit. In the proper sense, he says, scientia has three meanings: (1) the intellectual habit hidden in the intellectual memory, (2) the concept elicited from this habit, (3) the act of understanding by which the concept is conceived. The scientific habit contains within its power (virtualiter) the whole science, with all its concepts, principles, and conclusions; and it is not really composed of parts, but is a simple form or quality acquired by repeated acts, like the moral virtue of temperance. The habit is not a synthesis (collatio) of many propositions — principles and conclusions — but the intellectual facility inclining one to elicit all the acts proper to the science. 24
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autem idem quod quis agit, et quo quis agit; aliquis enim per habitum grammaticae agit orationem congruam. Cum igitur habitus sit quo quis agit, non potest esse quod lex aliqua sit habitus proprie et essentialiter. Alio modo potest dici habitus id quod habitu tenetur, sicut dicitur fides id quod fide tenetur." Summa Theol. I-II, 94, 1. "... sunt alii tres modi notitiae quae proprie dicenda est scientia. Unus enim modus notitiae quae est scientia, est habitus intellectualis latens in memoria intellectuali. Alio modo verbum conceptum ex illo in intelligentia. Et tertio modo ipse actus intelligendi quo concipitur, qui non potest dici verbum nisi ea ratione qua verbo conceptus mformatur, ut iam amplius dicetur." Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet IV, q. 8 (Paris, 1518), fol. 98r. Ibid. 24
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For Heniy of Ghent, if the word "science" is taken not in a generic but a most specific sense (for example, if it means a specific science like metaphysics), it is not really composed of many items, but it is as simple and incomplex as a moral virtue or the quality of whiteness. Like them, it is a form, simple in itself, but capable of greater or less perfection. The whole reality of the habit is present through the first act that generates it, as the whole reality of whiteness exists as a result of the first act that produces it. At first it exists most imperfectly, but it can increase later to its perfect degree. A Dominican by the name of Bernard of Auvergne (also called Bernard of Gannat from his birthplace), who lectured at Paris between 1294 and 1297, wrote a long defense of St. Thomas against Henry of Ghent, but ironically he adopted a stand on the unity of a science opposed to his master. On this point Henry was closer to St. Thomas than Bernard. Bernard was not at all pleased with Henry of Ghent's likening the simplicity of a scientific habit to that of a moral virtue. To Henry's conclusion that "science is not a composite," he retorted that if we speak of science as an intellectual habit it is indeed something composite, for it is a suitable arrangement of intelligible species in the intellect (debita ordinatio specierum intelligibilium). The habit of science, which enables us to understand promptly and at will, is comprised of many such species, and hence it is really composed of parts. Bernard was clearly replying on St. Thomas' statements about science and intelligible species which were quoted above; but, as Cajetan has pointed out, these statements cannot be used to deny the simplicity of a scientific habit. On this question, Bernard, whom B. Haureau called "one of the most intelligent 26
27
"Et est dicendum quod quaelibet scientia quae est habitus in specialissimo scientiae consistens, unicus est et simplex in re, carens omni compositione reali ex diversis secundum rem ut partibus existentibus et manentibus in ipso, et hoc aequali simplicitate ill! quam habet quilibet habitus affectivus, et universaliter quaelibet forma una recipiens intensionem et remissionem, et hoc secundum modum iam supra tactum. Unde non est minor simplicitas in habitu scientiae Metaphysicae in quocumque gradu habeat earn aliquis quam in habitu temperantiae et quam in albedine. Ita quod per primum actum generativum habitus habetur tota realitas habitus, quemadmodum ex primo actu generativo albedinis habetur tota realitas albedinis, licet in gradu imperfectissimo, a quo habet procedere per intensionis motum ad gradum perfectum." Henry of Ghent, QuodlibetlX, q. 4, fol. 355rv. ' "Ergo habitus scientiae non est habilitas intellectus ad intelligendum sicut sunt habitus qui sunt in viribus appetitivis, sed est ordinatio specierum secundum quam intellectus prompte intelligit cum voluit. Ergo cum ad habitum scientiae requirantur species multae, ex quibus iste habitus integratur, videtur quod scientia habet talem materiam ex qua fit et per consequens quod sit composita. Bernard of Auvergne, Contra Dicta Henrici de Gandava quibus Impugnat Thomam, Quodlibet IX, q. 4, Ms Troyes 662, fol. 123rab. "Praeterea, scientia ut est habitus non est nisi debita ordinatio specierum intelligibilium." Ibid. fol. 123ra. On Bernard of Auvergne, see F. J. Roensch, Early Thomistic School (Dubuque Iowa, 1964), pp. 104-106. 26
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students of St. Thomas and one of the most zealous defenders of his master," proves to be less Thomistic than Henry of Ghent. Few scholastics in the years that followed failed to take up the problem of the unity of a science, generally (because they were theologians) in connection with the science of theology. It would be impossible here to do justice to this debate, which is of considerable importance for the development of the notion of science as a body of knowledge. All that can be done is to touch upon some of its most salient moments. The Franciscan Peter Auriol, commenting on the Sentences between 1316 and 1318, devoted considerable attention to the present problem. He dismisses the opinion of Bernard of Auvergne, that a scientific habit is an orderly collection of intelligible species, and also that of St. Thomas and Henry of Ghent, that a science is a simple and indivisible form or quality of the intellect. After a lengthy discussion of the subject, in which he weighs the opinions of many of his predecessors and contemporaries, he concludes that a science is not one simple individual habit of the mind but a composite of many incomplete and imperfect habits, united to form one whole. What decides the issue for him is the fact that we can acquire the mental facility of demonstrating one conclusion in a science without the facilities of demonstrating others. To him, this proves conclusively that these facilities or habits are really distinct, and that many of them go to make up a total science. As for the kind of unity these habits have within a science, Auriol denies that they are a mere aggregate (acervus), like many stones in a heap. Neither are they linked together like potential parts of a continuous whole, as one whiteness has potentially many parts. Rather, they are parts of one totality, having an inner structure or form. A science has the same kind of unity as a house, which is one because of the unity of its form, or as a geometrical figure, which is one because of the total form resulting from its lines. 28
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B. Haureau, Histoire de la philosophic scolastique (Paris, 1872-1880), II, p. 206. For Auriol's criticism of Bernard of Auvergne, see his Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, prooemium, sect. 4, n. 34-39 (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1952), I, pp. 260-261. For his criticism of Henry of Ghent, see ibid., n. 25-28, pp. 256-258; for his criticism of St. Thomas, see ibid., n. 58-62, pp. 270-271. For a more complete account of Auriol's doctrine of the unity of a science, see P. Spade, "The Unity of a Science according to Peter Auriol," Franciscan Studies 32 (1972), 203-217. See ibid., n. 26-28, pp. 257-258. For Auriol's notion of a scientific habit, see ibid., pp. 262-267. Ibid., n. 54, p. 267. "Haec autem scientia unitatem habet, non simplicitatis et indivisibilitatis omnimodae, sed cuiusdam totalitatis et unius formae. Est autem ilia forma connexio omnium partialium habituum, vel secundum longum, vel secundum [latum]; sicut enim dicit Philosophus I Posteriorum, demonstrationes densantur dupliciter, uno modo in post assumendo, ut cum ex una conclusione infertur alia demonstrative; et istarum conclusionum 28
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Auriol contends that a formal unity of this sort suffices for a scientific habit and is consistent with the way we ordinarily talk about a science. We say that one acquires a science little by little; that one is in error regarding the twentieth conclusion of a science while knowing the first; that there are not as many natural sciences as there are conclusions in the science, and so on. Clearly there is formal unity in a specific science along with a multiplicity of acts and mental habits disposing towards them. As for the ground of this formal unity, Auriol refuses to place it in the formal object of the science. If a science were one because it had one formal object, he contends, this formal object would have the unity of an inflma species, a subalternate genus, or a most general genus. In thefirstcase, there would be as many sciences as there are infimae species; in the second, sciences would be multiplied according to subalternate genera; in the third, there would be only ten sciences corresponding to the ten categories. If being were the formal object of science, there would be only one science, especially if there were only one concept of being. Consequently, the formal unity of a science cannot be based on the unity of its formal object. The unity of a science comes from its unique mode of knowing, of understanding its premises and deducing its conclusions, of abstracting its objects and relating them to the senses, imagination, and the external world. In short, each science has its own logic which distinguishes it from every other science and confers on it its formal unity. Auriol's commentary on the Sentences had been published only a few years when Ockham made his own commentary on Peter Lombard. Ockham acknowledges reading Auriol's work, but for no longer than twenty-four hours. Certainly some of this time was spent on Auriol's Prologue, which contains its lengthy treatment of the unity of a science. 32
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connexio est secundum longum; quae quidem connexio locum habet in passionibus ordinatis, secundum mediationem et immediationem ad primum subiectum. Alio modo densantur secundum latum, ut cum ex eodem medio plures passiones concluduntur de subiecto, non ad invicem ordinatae." Ibid., n. 56, p. 268. "Quod autem haec unitas sufficiat pro habitu scientiali, patet ex duobus. Primo quidem quia est unitas formalis; sicut enim ratione unionis maioris extremitatis et minoris in medio, syllogismus est unus unitate formali, sic, ratione istius ordinis perfectivi et unionis cognoscitivae, scientia una erit unitate formali. Secundo vero, quia tali posita unitate, salvantur omnia quae de scientia dicuntur ..." Ibid., n. 57, p. 269. "... unaquaeque scientia habet propriam logicam et proprium modum sciendi ... Ex quibus colligitur evidenter quod scientiae habent unitatem specificam ex modo sciendi eiusdem rationis; qui quidem consistit in uniformi acceptione principiorum, et uniformi modo demonstrandi, et deducendi conclusiones ex ipsis, et uniformem modum se habendi intellectus penes abstractionem et extensionem ad extra; et quod omnis res, quae exigit ista propria et distincta, habet propriam scientiam." Ibid., n. 87, p. 279. See n. 101, p. 282. "... quia tamen pauca vidi de dictis illius doctoris, si enim omnes vices quibus respexi dicta sua simul congregarentur, non complerent spatium unius diei naturalis." Ockham, In I Sent., d. 27, q. 3 H (Lyons, 1495). See P. Vignaux, "Occam," Dictionnaire de theologie catholique XI, 886. 32
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Like Auriol, Ockham refuses all attempts to place the unity of a whole science, such as physics or metaphysics, in one simple habit of the intellect. Each of these sciences, he maintains, is made up of many intellectual habits or propositions arranged in a definite order. If one wishes, he can call a science a single habit or quality, but then he is talking about the facility of demonstrating only one conclusion in a whole science. As the term is generally used, it denotes a collection of many items belonging to the knowledge of one or many objects having a definite order. In this sense, science contains both the incomplex knowledge of terms and the knowledge of propositions, both principles and conclusions. It also comprises the refutations of errors and the solutions of sophisms. It also frequently contains necessary divisions and definitions ... Science in this meaning of the term is taken as the compilations and treatises of authors and philosophers ... This is the meaning of science when the book of [Aristotle's] Metaphysics or Physics is said to be one science. Science in this sense is not one in number but contains many habits distinct not only in species butfrequentlyalso in genus. But they are mutually ordered, and owing to this special order, which other objects of science or knowledge do not have, they can be called, and are called, in common usage, one science. Ockham appeals to experience to show that science is a stable disposition or habit of the mind. We are aware, he says, that as a result of repeatedly knowing some object we are more ready and able to know it than before. Repeated acts of knowing produce in us a new promptness or facility of knowing called scientia. The habit may be simply one of apprehending a term or proposition, or it may be one of demonstrating a conclusion from principles. In the latter case it is science in the strict sense. It is also a matter of experience that distinct acts of demonstrating conclusions engender in us 35
"Ad primum istorum dico quod scientia, ad praesens, dupliciter accipitur. Uno modo pro collectione multorum pertinentium ad notitiam unius vel multorum determinatum ordinem habentium. Et scientia isto modo dicta continet tam notitiam incomplexam terminorum quam notitiam complexorum, et hoc principiorum et conclusionum; continet etiam reprobationes errorum et solutiones falsorum argumentorum; continet etiam divisiones necessarias et definitiones, ut frequenter... Et isto modo accipitur scientia pro compilationibus et tractatibus auctorum et philosophorum ... Sic etiam accipitur scientia quando dicitur liber Metaphysicae vel liber Physicorum esse una scientia. Et scientia ista non est una numero, sed continet multos habitus non tantum specie sed etiam frequenter genere distinctos, ordinem tamen aliquem inter se habentes, propter quem ordinem specialem, qualem non habent aliqua alia scibilia vel cognoscibilia, possunt dici et dicuntur, secundum usum loquentium, una scientia." Ockham, In I Sent., Prol., q. 1 (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1967), I, pp. 8-9. See A. Maurer, "Ockham's Conception of the Unity of Science," Mediaeval Studies 20 (1958), 98-112. 35
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distinct habits of knowing, or sciences. There are, in other words, as many scientific habits in us as there are distinct acts of demonstrating conclusions. Both St. Thomas and Henry of Ghent come under Ockham's criticism for making a whole science consist of one indivisible intellectual habit. Their position rests on the presupposition that every scientific habit has one formal object (as St. Thomas claims) or one formal mode of knowing (as Henry of Ghent says). Just as a power of the soul has one formal object (as color, for example, is the formal object of sight), which gives unity to the power and distinguishes it from every other power, so a science has a formal object which gives unity to the science and differentiates it from all others. But Ockham contends that the unity of neither a power nor a habit can be established on the basis of the unity of its formal object; nor can the distinction of powers or habits be based on the distinction of their formal objects. He strikes at the foundation of St. Thomas' doctrine of the unity and distinction of habits and powers by denying the distinction between a material and formal object, for reasons that take us to the heart of his nominalism. If St. Thomas is correct, Ockham argues, many materially different items share in a common nature (ratio). For example, a man and a stone would have in common the nature of being colored. Accordingly, they would fall under the sense of sight, whose formal object is color. Similarly, the objects studied in theology, according to St. Thomas, share in the common ratio of being revealed, and so they can be considered by the one science of theology, whose formal object is "the divinely revealable." But in the perspective of Ockham's nominalism, no two items have anything in common. In his view, it is absurd to speak of a number of things presenting to the mind a common intelligible or formal object. Every reality or thing is individual and one in number and it shares nothing in common with anything else. Only terms or concepts are common or universal, in the sense that they are predicable of many things. But things themselves are not common or universal. St. Thomas' doctrine of the unity and distinction of sciences based on their formal objects contradicts this basic tenet of Ockham's nominalism. It also compromises the unity of an individual thing as conceived by Ockham. St. Thomas imagines that within one reality there are many distinct rationes, which can be the formal objects of distinct powers and habits. But if this were so, Ockham argues, these rationes would be distinct realities, and the unity of the original reality would be destroyed. Thus, in Ockham's view the 36
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Ockham, Expositio super libros Physicorum, Prol.; ed. P. Boehner, Ockham: Philosophical Writings (Edinburgh, London, 1957), 4-7. (Henceforth referred to as Physics). Ockham, In I Sent. Prol. q. 8, pp. 208-217. 36
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Thomistic distinction between the material and formal objects of sciences breaks down, and along with it the notion that faculties and sciences are distinguished by formal objects. Ockham's conception of reality as radically individual led to a new interpretation of the object of science. With Aristotle he held that science concerns universals and not individuals as such. But where is the universal to be found? It was generally agreed by his scholastic predecessors that individuals in some way contain natures or essences which are the foundations of our universal concepts and which serve as the objects of science. Ockham was uncompromisingly opposed to this view. It was axiomatic for him that reality is individual and in no way common or universal. He was aware that he was going further than any of his predecessors in adopting an absolute position on this point. He writes: All those whom I have seen agree that there is really in the individual a nature that is in some way universal, at least potentially and incompletely; though some say that [this nature] is really distinct [from the individual], some that it is only formally distinct, some that the distinction is in no sense real but only conceptual and a result of the consideration of the intellect. Having proved to his own satisfaction that universality is a property of terms (whether spoken, written or mental), which are found in propositions, he drew the inevitable conclusion: Propositions alone are the objects of science. "Every science," he writes, "whether real or rational, is concerned only with propositions as with objects known, for only propositions are known." In saying this he does not mean that science in no way concerns reality. The terms of the propositions in some sciences stand for real things; for example those of natural science and metaphysics. Ockham calls these "real sciences" or sciences of reality. The terms of the propositions of logic, on the contrary, stand for concepts in the mind; so logic is called "rational science." The terms of the propositions of grammar stand for written or spoken words. Thus science does treat of individuals, but only in an improper 38
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Ibid., pp. 208-211. For Ockham's doctrine of universals, see In I Sent., d. 2, q. 8 (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1970), II, pp. 266-292. Ockham, Physics, Prol., p. 11. See Aristotle, Metaph. XI, 1, 1059 b 26. "In conclusione istius quaestionis omnes quos vidi concordant, dicentes quod natura, quae est aliquo modo universalis, saltern in potentia et incomplete, est realiter in individuo, quamvis aliqui dicant quod distinguitur realiter, aliqui quod tantum formaliter, aliqui quod nullo modo ex natura rei sed secundum rationem tantum vel per considerationem intellectus." Ockham, In I Sent, d. 2, q. 7; II, pp. 225-226. "... et sciendum quod scientia quaelibet sive sit realis sive rationalis est tantum de propositionibus tamquam de illis quae sciuntur, quia solae propositiones sciuntur." Ockham, In I Sent., d. 2, q. 4; II, p. 134. See Physics, Prol., p. 11. 38
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sense, inasmuch as the terms of its propositions stand for them. Properly speaking, science deals with universals, which are terms of propositions. As for the subject of a science, it is simply the subject term in the proposition which is the object of the science. For example, when we know that every man is capable of learning, the object of this knowledge is the whole proposition: "Every man is capable of learning"; the subject is the term "man." In a total science whose unity is that of a collection or group there need not be one object or subject. The science derives its unity from the arrangement of its parts and not from the unity of its object or subject. Ockham criticizes Duns Scotus for failing to see this point. According to Scotus, a science has a primary subject which gives unity to the science because it virtually contains all the truths belonging to the science. For example, theology is one science because its primary subject is God, who virtually contains all theological truths. Ockham opposes the Scotistic explanation of the unity of a science for several reasons. To begin with, he does not think it true that a science has only one subject. He insists that a science has different parts, each of which, being a proposition, has its own subject. So it is meaningless to ask what is the subject of logic, physics, metaphysics, or mathematics. There is no one subject of the entire science; its different parts have different subjects. To ask what is the subject of these sciences is like asking who is the king of the world. There is no one man who is king of the world; one person is king of one part and another of another part. It is the same with the subjects of the various parts of a science. Each part has its own subject. Ockham's comparison of a science to the world is an accurate analogy for both have a unity of order. He writes.Hence we have to say that metaphysics is not a piece of knowledge that is numerically one. The same is true of the philosophy of nature, which is a collection of many habits ... It is one in the same sense that a city or a nation, or an army, which includes men and horses and other necessary things, or a kingdom, or a university, or the world, is said to be one. 42
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Ockham, In I Sent., ibid., pp. 134-138; Physics, p. 12. Ockham, Physics, p. 9. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, Prol. 3, q. 1-3 (Vatican, 1950), I, p. 102, n. 151; Reportata Paris., Prol. 3, q. 2, n. 12 (Paris, 1894), 22, p. 51. Ockham, Physics, pp. 9-10. "Ideo dicendum est, quod metaphysica non est una scientia numero, nec similiter philosophia naturalis. Sed philosophia naturalis est collectio multorum habituum, sicut dictum est. Nec est aliter una nisi sicut civitas dicitur una vel populus dicitur unus vel exercitus comprehendens homines et equos et caetera necessaria dicitur unus, vel sicut regnum dicitur unum, vel sicut universitas dicitur una, vel sicut mundus dicitur unus." Ockham, Physics, p. 7. 42 43
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Secondly, Ockham denies — again in opposition to Scotus — that a science has one primary subject. He insists that absolutely speaking there is no primary subject of a whole science. From one point of view one subject may be primary and from another point of view another may be primary. Thus, being is the primary subject of metaphysics in the order of predication, for the metaphysician primarily draws conclusions about being. But in the order of perfection God is the primary subject of metaphysics, for he is the most perfect being known in it. Natural substance is the primary subject of the philosophy of nature as regards priority of predication, but as regards priority of perfection its first subject is man or the heavenly bodies. Thus the attempt to establish the unity of a science on the unity of a formal object or primary subject fails. Ockham's problem is to find a principle of unity for science, conceived not as a single habit of the mind but as a collection of many items of knowledge: habits of the mind primarily, but secondarily propositions (mental, spoken, and written) which are the objects of these habits. These "partial sciences" do not by their nature belong to the whole science. An item of knowledge may be integrated into a whole science, but it does not by nature belong to that science to the exclusion of another science. For example, Ockham says that the truth that God is one, or the habit of demonstrating it, is neither theological nor metaphysical in itself. It does not in itself belong to theology or metaphysics, any more than a man by himself is part of a nation or an army. Just as he can be included in either or both, so a truth can be integrated into one science or many. Ockham is not saying that every truth will fit into every science. He points out that theology considers many subjects and attributes of subjects that are not the concern of metaphysics or any other natural science. Sciences are distinguished by both their subjects and the attributes demonstrated of them. But what determines the exact range of subjects to be treated by any one science? What marks off one body of knowledge from another as a distinct 47
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Ibid., pp. 9-10. See Scotus, Ordinatio, Prol. 3, q. 3; pp. 94 ff. "Si dicatur quod tunc idem habitus numero esset metaphysicus et theologicus, dico, secundum praedicta, quod accipiendo habitum metaphysicum et theologicum sicut communiter accipitur et quomodo loquimur modo, neuter est unus numero sed continet multos, numero, specie et genere distinctos. Et ideo habitus ille quo cognoscitur ista Veritas 'Deus est unus', qui pertinet ad metaphysicam et ad theologiam, nec est habitus metaphysicus nec theologicus, sicut nec est metaphysica nec theologia. Unde sicut non est concedendum quod homo est populus vel exercitus, nec domus est civitas vel villa, ita habitus ille nec est metaphysica nec theologia. Si tamen per habitum esse metaphysicum vel theologicum intelligatur istum habitum pertinere ad metaphysicam vel theologiam, sic potest concedi quod idem habitus est metaphysicus et theologicus. Concedo tamen quod idem habitus numero est pars habitus metaphysici et etiam theologici, sicut idem homo est pars populi vel exercitus." Ockham, In I Sent, Prol., q. 1, pp. 13-14. 47 4!
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science? What is the "special relation" between the parts of a science that unifies it and makes it one science? We have seen Peter Auriol place the unity of a science in the form of the science. He conceives a science on the analogy of a house or geometrical figure, whose parts are unified by their supervening form. But this solution of the problem is not acceptable to Ockham, for he does not think the notions of matter and form apply in this case. A science, he says, has no formal cause but only efficient and final causes. Since he believes that theology is a practical science, leading to eternal beatitude, he can appeal to its end as the source of its unity: all truths necessary for salvation are theological and can be integrated into the science of theology. But what is the source of unity of a speculative science like metaphysics? This science, he maintains, has only the unity of an aggregate. At best it has the unity of order, like an army or city. It is made up of many partial sciences (scientiae partiales), some of which are still to be discovered. What gives the science its unifying order which distinguishes it from, say, mathematics? Ockham suggests three possibilities: the order may be found in the predicates of the science, or in its subjects, or in both. In the first case, the science may demonstrate of the same subject many attributes which are logically related as superior and inferior (that is, of greater and less extension). Ockham's example is taken from geometry. This science demonstrates of the subject "figure" the attributes of magnitude, and also its own proper attributes and those of its logical inferiors (for instance, circle and triangle). Secondly, the order that unifies a science may be found in the subjects of the science, as when general attributes are demonstrated of their primary subjects and also of their logical inferiors. Thus in the science of animals the attributes of animal in general are demonstrated not only of animal but also of the various genera and species of animals. Thirdly, the unifying order of a science may reside in both its subjects and predicates, as, for example, the attributes of animal are predicated of animal, and the attributes of the various species of animal contained under the genus are predicated of these species. Because the terms of a science have a logical relation of this sort, or some similar logical order, it is called one science. Ockham assures us that this is the sense 49
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"Ideo dicendum est quod, loquendo de virtute sermonis, nulla scientia habet nisi tantum duas causas essentiales, scilicet efficientem et finalem." Ockham, Physics, p. 7. Ockham, In I Sent., Prol. q. 1; I, p. 7. For the practical nature of theology, see ibid., q. 12, pp. 324-370. "Et ita accipiendo unitatem aggregationis pro omni unitate quae non est alicuius unius numero, concedo quod talis scientia (scil. metaphysica) est una unitate aggregationis." Ockham, ibid., p. 224. 49
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in which Aristotle and the other philosophers and masters understand the unity of a science. Ockham knew well enough that Aristotle locates the unity of a science in the unity of its generic subject. "A single science is one whose domain is a single genus," writes the Philosopher in his Posterior Analytics. This Aristotelian dictum is quoted in one of the objections to Ockham's position. In reply, he does not deny it, but qualifies it in such a way that it no longer applies to a whole science. One science, he says, has one generic subject, but only if the attribute predicated of it is one; otherwise the science will have a unity of order. But Ockham has already said that in a total science, like metaphysics, many attributes are predicated of many subjects. Hence, a whole science can only have a unity of order. Ockham's nominalism prevents him from accepting in its full meaning the Aristotelian doctrine of the unity of a science based on the unity of its generic subject. Closer to Aristotle in this respect was Gregory of Rimini, a master of theology at Paris and General of the Augustinian Order, who died shortly after Ockham in 1358. We have seen Leibniz list him among the leading nominalists; and indeed according to a tradition going back to about 1500 he was the standard bearer of the nominalists (Antesignanus nominalistarum). This does not mean that he was always in agreement with Ockham, as is clear from his notion of the unity of a science. Like Auriol and Ockham, he denies that its unity consists of a single intellectual habit. If such were the case, he argues, we would know all the principles and conclusions of a science through the one habit. Knowing one conclusion of geometry, we would know all the conclusions of the science, which is contrary to experience. 52
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Ockham, ibid., pp. 219-220. See ibid., q. 1, p. 14. Natural philosophy is distinguished from the other sciences either by its subjects or predicates; but this does not prevent one and the same truth from belonging to it and to other sciences. Ockham says that he intends to explain how sciences are distinguished by their subjects and predicates in his commentary on the Metaphysics, which he does not seem to have written. See Physics, p. 15. " Aristotle, Post. Anal., I, 28, 87 a 38-39. "Ad secundum patet, quod unius generis subiecti est una scientia si passio sit una, vel erit una unitate ordinis." Ockham, In I Sent., Prol., q. 8, p. 225. "Ad tertium etiam patet, quod metaphysica, prout dicit totum librum Metaphysicae, non est una nisi tali unitate ordinis." Ockham, ibid. This title was given to him by Aventinus (1477-1517), according to D. Trapp. See G. Leff, Gregory of Rimini: Tradition and Innovation in Fourteenth Century Thought (Manchester, 1961), p. 1. "Prima [conclusio] est quod non omnium conclusionum talium est habitus unus numero. Secunda est nec unius conclusionis et suorum principiorum est habitus unus numero. Tertia est nec ipsorum principiorum est habitus unus numero." Gregory of Rimini, Sent, Prol., q. 3, a. 1 (Venice, 1522), fol. 11Q-12A. 52
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For this and other reasons Gregory rejects the view that there is one all-embracing habit for one science. What, then, is the source of its identity? Gregory concludes with Aristotle that a science like geometry or medicine has its own generic subject and premises which give unity to the whole science. For example, the subject of geometry is magnitude. Because all the conclusions of the science concern this subject, they form a unity. The conclusions belong to the same science, as do the habits by which they are demonstrated. Gregory specifies that the common genus constituting the subject of a science cannot be one of the widest genera, like "quality" (that is, it is not one of Aristotle's ten categories). Gregory considers this far too universal to unify a science. Neither is the subject of a science a particular species like "man"; this would be too restrictive a subject for one science. At best this could only be the subject of a "partial" or "special" science included within a total science. The subject of a whole science has the unity of a subalternate genus; that is to say, a genus subalternated to one of the widest genera. The example Gregory gives is "magnitude," which is a genus subalternated to the more general genus "quantity." Magnitude is the generic subject of geometry, giving unity to that science. Gregory adds — again following Aristotle — that a science is said to have one subject genus not only if the items known in it are conceived univocally with one common ratio or notion, but also if they are conceived analogically, or having a common focus of reference. Gregory makes this qualification in order to include metaphysics among the sciences, for its subject "being" is not a genus. More is required to unify a science than a common subject according to Gregory of Rimini. If this were sufficient, how would geometry differ from physics, since both concern magnitude? Besides a subject, a science has common premises or principles, and it regards its objectsfroma formal point of view different from that of the other sciences. For example, both physics and mathematics draw conclusions regarding magnitude, but mathematics has to do with magnitude as such, while physics regards magnitude in the external world. Each of these sciences, accordingly, has not only its generic subject but also its own principles and formal perspective, all of which give the science its identity and distinguish it from the other sciences. Gregory of Rimini's doctrine of science deserves more detailed attention than can be given here. What has been said makes it clear that his conception of the unity of a science, while in some respects similar to Ockham's, differs significantlyfromhis. In appealing to a common generic subject and a unique formal perspective for each science as the ground of its unity, Gregory parts company with his nominalist contemporary. This is but one indication that 58
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Ibid., a. 2, fol. 14L-0.
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what goes by the name of fourteenth-century nominalism was really a complex of many doctrines which, though they have common features, were really quite different. Ockham's theology and philosophy were widely disseminated in the universities of the later Middle Ages, especially through the works of his commentator Gabriel Biel, who died in 1495. Among the many Ockhamist doctrines taught by Biel was that a science is not a single habit of the intellect but a unified collection of habits. The word "science," he says, is as it were a collective name: quasi nomen collectivum. 59
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If one wishes to appreciate how widely the unity of a science was discussed by the late scholastics and how diverse their views on this subject were, he has only to read Suarez' popular Disputationes Metaphysicae, published in 1597. In his usual thorough manner, Suarez recounts the views of many of his predecessors and contemporaries before giving his own. He cannot agree that a science is a simple and indivisible quality of the mind, as Henry of Ghent, St. Thomas, and many Thomists hold. Neither is it an ordered collection of intelligible species, as Soncinas thought. Suarez is also opposed to the nominalist view that a science is not a habit with an essential unity, but only a collection or coordination of many qualities: the opinion, he says, held by Auriol, Scotus, Gregory of Rimini, Ockham, and Biel. He opts for what he calls a "middle way" between the Thomistic and nominalist opinions, maintaining that a science is a collection or coordination of many qualities, but that these qualities comprise one scientific habit with an essential unity owing to the unity of the formal object of the science. Suarez likens the unity of a science to that of a quality of the body, like health or beauty. We speak of health or beauty as though it were one quality, but in fact it is the result of the relation of many bodily qualities. The same is true of a quality of the mind such as a scientific habit. It is the product of the coordination of many simple mental qualities. Every time we learn a new demonstration or principle in a science the mind acquires a real perfection which is not simply an increase in intensity of a previous quality but a new quality of the mind. Each of these simple qualities is a "partial habit" which 60
G. Biel, In I Sent., Prol., q. 1, E (Tubingen, 1501). Suarez, Disputationes Metaphysicae, 44, sect. 11 (Paris, 1877), 26, pp. 697-700, n. 12-19. Suarez here presents the four opinions concerning the unity of a science and adopts the fourth or middle way. On p. 711, n. 55 he asserts that a science is a collection of many simple mental qualities. For the nature of the connection between them, see p. 713, n. 62-63. 59 60
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is integrated into the total habit of the science. Suarez does not favor the nominalist way of speaking, that there are as many sciences as there are simple habits of the mind. Even nominalists like Ockham and Gregory of Rimini, he says, agree that a science such as geometry or theology is one science. Suarez wants to keep the usual language when speaking of the sciences, and above all to avoid extreme positions on this subject. Both the Thomists and the nominalists err in this regard: the Thomists because they fail to see that a science is comprised of many mental qualities, the nominalists because they do not realize that these qualities are so closely coordinated that they compose an essential unity. Suarez goes to great lengths to justify his assertion, against the nominalists, that a science has not simply an artificial or accidental unity but constitutes something essentially one. The partial habits that comprise a science, he contends, are linked together by an "effective subordination," because they dispose the mind to demonstrate conclusions one of which is derived from the other. The scientific habits also refer to one total object or essence, such as man, from a knowledge of which many conclusions can be drawn. In the final analysis, then, it is the unity of the formal object of the science, based on the essence of things, that accounts for the unity of the science. 61
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When non-scholastic philosophers took up the question of the unity of a science in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries they were continuing a discussion that already had a long history, conveniently summarized for them in Suarez' Disputationes Metaphysicae. Nor were they ignorant of Suarez' work. Descartes had firsthand knowledge of it, and Leibniz boasted that he could read it as easily as most people read novels. To many, the Disputationes were, in Schopenhauer's words, "an authentic compendium of the whole scholastic wisdom." Christian Wolff, professor of mathematics and physics at Halle and Marburg from 1706 to 1754, read Suarez with admiration and praised him as the Jesuit "who among scholastics pondered metaphysical realities with particular penetration." After imbibing scholasticism at the font of Suarez, 63
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Ibid., p. 713, n. 60. Ibid., p. 713, n. 63. The mind, however, also has a role in the unity of a science, so that its unity is not exact or perfect but, in a way, artificial. Ibid., p. 715, n. 69. Vita Leibnitii a Seipso, in Foucher de Careil, Nouvelles Lettres et Opuscules Inedits de Leibniz (Palis, 1857), p. 382. Fragmente zur Geschichte der Philosophie, § 6 (Berlin, 1847), 6, p. 57. "Sane Franciscus Suarez e Societate Jesu, quem inter Scholasticos res metaphysicas profiindius meditatum esse constat ..." C. Wolff, Philosophia Prima sive Ontologia, I, 2, 3 (Hildesheim, 1962), p. 138. 61
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Wolff could hardly fail to describe a science as a unified whole. Indeed, in his view a science constitutes a system, comparable to an organized animal body. While treating of natural laws in his Philosophia Practica Universalis Wolff says that they constitute a system, by which he means "the close union (compactio) by which all of them are interconnected." In general, he defines a system of doctrines as "a close union of mutually connected truths or universal propositions." This is the sense, he adds, in which he often called the first part of his Theologia Naturalis a system, even putting in the title of this work that it embraces a whole system, for the truths that it demonstrates about the nature of God are interconnected. In the widest possible sense a system is the close union of interconnected realities. As an example of this use of the word "system" Wolff points out that medical men speak of the nerves, arteries, and veins in the human body as a system when they describe them as diflused throughout the whole body and connected to each other so that they compose as it were one entity. Similarly, there is a system of natural laws if all the laws of nature are interconnected. On this model, too, there can be a system of doctrines, but only if the demonstrative method is used, for only then will all its propositions be mutually connected, one term being contained in the definition of another, and one proposition being the premise from which another is deduced. Wolff was not the first to use the word "body" (corpus) of a doctrinal system. Traditionally, the word was applied to a complete collection of 66
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"Per systema legum naturalium intelligo earn ipsarum compactionem, qua omnes inter se connectuntur. In genere nimirum systema doctrinarum est compactio veritatum seu propositionum universalium inter se connexarum. Immo generalissime systema appellari suevit compactio rerum inter se connexarum. Monuimus enim veritates universales, seu propositiones universales inter se connexas systema doctrinarum constituere ... Et in hoc etiam sensu partem primam Theologiae naturalis in parte altera saepius diximus systema et in ipso titulo illius posuimus, quod integrum systema complectatur, quia scilicet veritates de Dei natura notae inter se connectuntur. In sensu generalissimo Medici systema nervorum, arteriarum, venarum vocant, si nervos, arterias, venas eo ordine describunt, quo per totum humanum corpus diffusi diffusaeque inter se connectuntur, ut unum quoddam quasi ens constituant nervi inter se juncti, unum ab eo diversum arteriae, et diversum ab utroque venae. Quamobrem systema legum naturalium habebis, si leges naturae omnes inter se connectantur." C. Wolff, Philosophia Practica Universalis, Methodo Scientifica Pertractata, II, c. 1 (Frankfurt, Leipzig, 1789), 2, pp. 65-66, n. 81. "Systema doctrinarum condi nequit nisi methodo demonstrativa. Etenim in systemate veritates universales, quae dogmatum seu doctrinarum nomine veniunt, inter se connectuntur. Enimvero veritates inter se connectuntur, si definitum unum ingreditur definitionem alterius, et propositio una demonstrationem alterius tanquam praemissa." Ibid., p. 66, n. 82. Wolff also describes a science in the scholastic manner as a mental habitus of demonstrating truths: "Per scientiam hie intelligo habitum asserta demonstrandi, hoc est ex principiis certis et immotis per legitimam consequentiam inferendi." C. Wolff, Philosophia Rationalis sive Logica, discursus praelim. c. 2, n. 30 (Verona, 1735), p. 9. M
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writings on a subject arranged systematically. Thus the Justinian Code of law was called the Corpus Juris. The works of Homer were referred to as the Corpus Homeri. Cicero and Seneca speak of the book of an author as a corpus. In the fourteenth century the bibliophile Richard of Bury reflects this usage when he writes of "the mighty bodies of the sciences." In his Logic, Isaac Watts (1725) writes that "The word science is usually applied to the whole body of regular or methodical observations or propositions ... concerning any subject of speculation." What appears to be new in Wolff is the analogy between a system of doctrines or laws and a living human body. He sees a science as having a unity on the model of that of a living organism — an appropriate paradigm indeed for a rationalist like Wolff who attempted "to build up a philosophy in which all terms would be unequivocally defined and disposed according to an order as strict as that of mathematical demonstrations." The analogy of science to a living body was no less appealing to Kant. Wolff appeared to him as the living embodiment of metaphysics. Kant rejected that metaphysics and along with it the Wolffian notion of a scientific system; but he was too strongly influenced by Wolff to deny that science is an organic system of doctrines. As we have seen, Kant makes systematic unity the essential note of scientific knowledge. But for him a scientific system is no mere concatenation and interlinking of terms and propositions in the Wolffian manner. "By a system," he writes, "I understand the unity of the manifold modes of knowledge under one idea." Every scientific system for Kant is regulated and constituted by an a priori idea, furnished by reason itself. Empirical knowledge by itself is not scientific unless it is regulated and systematized by a priori principles of reason. With Kant we come full circle and return to the point where we began this inquiry into the history of the notion of the unity of a science. Standing between Kant and his predecessors is his Copernican Revolution in philosophy, which assumes that instead of our knowledge conforming to objects, objects must conform to our knowledge. Thomas Aquinas lived in an age 68
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See references under "corpus" in A. Forcellini, Totius Latinitatis Lexicon (Prati, 1839), I, p. 778b. "Sed per plurimorum investigationes sollicitas, quasi datis symbolis singillatim, scientiarum ingentia corpora ad immensas, quas cernimus, quantitates successivis augmentationibus succreverunt." Richard of Bury, Philobiblion, 10 (Oxford, 1960), p. 108. Isaac Watts, Logic II, 2, n. 9; cited by The Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford, 1933), 9, p. 221. E. Gilson, T. Langan, Modern Philosophy: Descartes to Kant (New York, 1963), p. 178. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A 832, B 860, trans. N. K. Smith (London, 1950), p. 653. Ibid. Preface to second edition, B xvi, p. 22. 68
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that believed that through sense experience the mind can gain an insight — however superficial and precarious — into the nature of reality and achieve truth by conforming to it. Being a realist, he was also convinced that the individuals encountered in sense experience are bearers of intelligible characters or natures which, when conceived, are the contents of our general notions. His solution to the problem of the unity of a science depends upon this metaphysical view of reality and human knowledge. For him, each of the speculative sciences has its own generic subject, or formal object, conceived through its unique mode of abstraction. Each science also has its own principles and mode of procedure, which produce in the intellect a habitus distinct from that of every other science. Once the nominalists eliminated intelligible natures or essences from reality a new explanation of the unity of a science had to be found. For Ockham, the object of science is no longer the real world but the propositions we form about it. Corresponding to each demonstrated proposition there is a scientific habit in the intellect. These are "partial sciences" which can be integrated into a "total science," such as physics or metaphysics, by the logical interconnection of the terms of the scientific propositions. The mediaeval nominalists set the stage for the new notions of the unity of a science in early modern philosophy. Like them, Leibniz locates the unity of a science in the logical synthesis of the truths contained in the science. Not content with this rather loose unity, Kant bases the unity of a science on an a priori idea in the understanding. Between Aquinas and Kant, accordingly, stand the mediaeval nominalists. 74
For St. Thomas' doctrine of the subject of science and its modes of abstraction, see Expositio super Librum Boethii de Trinitate Q. V-VI (Leiden, 1955), pp. 161-218; trans. A. Maurer, The Division and Methods of the Sciences, 4th ed. (Toronto, 1986). 74
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St. Thomas and Historicity I am pleased and honored to be invited to give the Marquette Aquinas Lecture of 1979. For many years I have watched the series of small red volumes of Aquinas Lectures grow on my bookshelf. Little did I think that one day I would be asked to add to their number. As the volumes appeared year after year I read them with interest and profit, but there was one that especially set me thinking. I am referring to Emil Fackenheim's Lecture of 1961 on "Metaphysics and Historicity." Some of you no doubt heard the Lecture and many of you, like myself, have read it in its printed form; and I think you will agree with me that it was memorable for its profound assessment of the predicament in which metaphysics finds itself today. As Fackenheim sees it, this predicament can be summarized as follows. Since the middle of the nineteenth century metaphysicians have questioned the capacity of the human mind to reach truths transcending time and history. They have denied that the philosopher can rise above history and grasp timeless truths. Plato and Aristotle, Aquinas and Avicenna, Descartes, Kant and Hegel certainly disagreed in what the truths of metaphysics are, but they shared the conviction that metaphysical truths are valid for all men for all time. Nietzsche opened the way to a revolution of metaphysics by asserting the death of God and at the same stroke historicizing metaphysical truth. Truth, for Nietzsche, is the will-to-power, and since this will changes from age to age and culture to culture, it no longer transcends history but is essentially tied to it. In the wake of Nietzsche a long line of philosophers have historicized metaphysical truths, among them Collingwood, Dilthey, Croce, Dewey and Heidegger. Closely linked with this revolutionary view of metaphysical truth is a new conception of man. His very being, like his truth, is now viewed as completely 1
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Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1961.
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historical. Contrary to the older view of man as possessing a permanent nature underlying his historical and cultural changes, the more recent philosophy of man refuses him a fixed and abiding nature. Nothing essential or substantial to man remains throughout his history. The being itself of man is inseparable from his history, just like the grasp of his metaphysical truth. As metaphysical truth differs from one period of history to another, so too does the being of man. Again, just as metaphysical truth is a product of man's self-willing and self-making, so too man's being is a self-making or selfconstituting process. In this perspective, Fackenheim writes, "Man is not endowed with a permanent nature capable of acting. His 'nature' is itself the product of his acting, and hence not a proper nature at all. In acting, man makes or constitutes himself." So metaphysics and human nature are in the same situation: both are forms of self-making. Radically historical and temporal, they admit of no transhistorical or timeless features. This in a nutshell is Emil Fackenheim's description of the situation of metaphysics today as a consequence of the doctrine of historicity. Why is he so concerned about it? What predicament does it lead to? Why does it bother him as a metaphysician? The reason is this: If metaphysics does not rise above history and reach transhistorical and stable truths, then all metaphysics is reduced to a sequence of historically relative world views (Weltanschauungen). Metaphysics in principle is superseded by history. There is a history of metaphysics, but beyond this history there is no room for an independent inquiry into metaphysical truth. In short, historicity of metaphysics leads to historicism; and historicism is vitiated by an intrinsic contradiction. For, while insisting on the changing and relative character of all metaphysical truths, it wishes to exempt at least one of them from this condition, namely the thesis on which historicism is based: that the mind changes through history because it is its own self-constituting activity. All acts of human self-making are historically situated, with the one exception of the act by which self-making recognizes itself as self-making and as historically situated. Thus historicism finds itself in the self-contradictory situation of denying that there are any transhistorical truths, and affirming a transhistorical truth as the basis of the doctrine. 2
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Ibid., p. 26 (author's emphasis). Ibid., p. 63. In a later paper Fackenheim considers his "formal-dialectical refutation" of historicism inadequate, pointing out that Heidegger himself (whose historicism Fackenheim is chiefly concerned with) already anticipated it. See E. Fackenheim, "The Historicity and Transcendence of Philosophic Truth," Proceedings of the Seventh Inter-American Congress of Philosophy (Quebec: Les Presses de l'Universite Laval, 1967), I, p. 79. It is not enough to dispose of historicism by charging it with self contradiction, but it must be inquired whether, and if so how, the world of experience, which is historical, can provide a ground for universal and transcendent truth (p. 86). My concern in the present lecture is not whether Heidegger 2 3
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In his Aquinas Lecture Fackenheim does not presume to solve the problem raised for the contemporary metaphysician by the doctrine of historicity. His main concern is to state the problem, and this he does clearly and profoundly. At the end of the lecture he wonders whether we should not abandon the whole doctrine of human self-making and return to what he calls "the classical doctrine of a human nature" in order to escape the inconsistency of historicism. And he invites those who hold for a human nature to dialogue with him on the subject. Since he was giving an Aquinas lecture no doubt he was addressing his invitation above all to Thomists. He asks whether the classical doctrine of a human nature has the resources to meet the contemporary existentialist objections against it. Can this doctrine assimilate the insights into selfhood and self-making achieved from Kant to Heidegger without collapsing in the process? These questions, he assures us, "invite what might well become the most profound metaphysical dialogue in our time." A few years after giving his lecture I met Emil Fackenheim on the Toronto campus and he expressed his disappointment with the small reaction it had provoked. Since then, the theme of historicity and metaphysics has been taken up on various occasions, for example at the meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association in 1969 and again in 1974. But without denying the value of these discussions, I think there is still a place for a dialogue with Professor Fackenheim, and I would like to use this occasion to begin it. In the first part of this lecture I would suggest that the historicity of man and human self-making are compatible with a notion of human 4
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was successful in surmounting his historicism, but how St. Thomas Aquinas accounts for universal and necessary philosophic truths drawn from a changing world by temporally situated humans. Of course a philosopher can escape the self-contradiction described by Fackenheim by claiming that all knowledge is historically and culturally conditioned, even the doctrine of historicity. But then he must abandon every claim to grasp universal and permanent truths. He must be content to speak to his own time and culture and have nothing to say to mankind. Few, if any, great philosophers, novelists, dramatists or poets would so limit themselves. As Fackenheim says of the arts: "any single work of genius is a living witness testifying that the total historization of the arts is absurd." Metaphysics and Historicity, p. 66. Ibid., p. 99. Truth and the Historicity of Man, Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 43 (1969). The Presidential Address was given by W. Norris Clarke, "On Facing up to the Truth about Human Truth." The Presidential Address in 1974 was given by Thomas D. Langan on "Historicity and Metaphysics." See Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 48 (1974), pp. 1-13. See also L. B. Geiger, "Metaphysique et Relativite Historique," Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale, 60 (1952), pp. 381-414; A. Dondeyne, "L'Historicite dans la Philosophie Contemporaine," Revue Philosophique de Louvain, 54 (1956), pp. 5-25; 456-477. Same author, Foi Chretienne et Pensee Contemporaine (Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1952), pp. 11-52. 4 5
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nature, though not with every notion of human nature, and certainly not with the one we have inherited from the rationalism of the nineteenth century. In the second part I would propose that historicity is consistent with the transcendence of truth, though not with every notion of truth, and clearly not with the notion of eternal truths that has come down to us from late scholasticism and early modern philosophy. To be more specific, I would contend that the Thomistic doctrines of man and truth are capable of admitting the positive values of the philosophies of historicity while avoiding their inconsistency. I. HUMAN NATURE AND SELF-MAKING
Let us begin the dialogue by considering the notion of human nature. Fackenheim wonders if "the classical doctrine of human nature" is incompatible with the historicity of man and self-making. But is there one classical notion of human nature? Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Kant — these among other philosophers professed doctrines of human nature, but no two are identical. If any two might be thought to share a common notion of man they would be Aristotle and St. Thomas. Are they not responsible for what is generally known as the scholastic notion of man as a rational animal, endowed with a permanent substantial essence, which is capable of accidental modifications but of no essential change or development? And was it not exactly this concept of human nature as "a reality ready-made prior to the self s own acting, and yet fully human" that Fichte and others have rejected as both metaphysically and morally intolerable? And yet, historians have shown beyond all doubt that Aristotle and Aquinas did not share a common doctrine of human nature, that even their notions of nature were profoundly different. Aristotle conceived nature (physis) as an inner principle of physical bodies determining them to act in definite, specific ways towards determinate ends. Because of its nature earth moves to the center of the world; plants and animals grow and develop with an inner necessity of nature to be specifically different living things. Though Aristotle sometimes used the term "nature" more broadly to designate any kind of being, he preferred to limit it to physical bodies, for they alone exhibit 6
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Metaphysics and Historicity, p. 98. Ibid., p. 95. For Aristotle's notion of nature, see A. Mansion, Introduction a la Physique Aristotelienne, 2nd ed. (Louvain-Paris: Editions de l'lnstitut Superieur de Philosophie, 1946), pp. 80-105. J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, 3d ed. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1978), p. 190. 6
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growth and change, which are implied in one of the basic meanings of the word physis? The Aristotelian notion of nature was appropriated by Aquinas, but he broadened and deepened it to become a properly analogous concept expressing the intelligible essence of a being — a concept that is realized in essentially different ways in physical bodies, plants, animals, men, angels and God. In St. Thomas' vocabulary there is not only corporeal nature, but also sentient nature, rational nature, intellectual nature, even divine nature. Aristotelian nature, as form or actual entity, tended to be fixed and determined in itself and in its causality. Thomist nature, on the level of spiritual creatures, is a principle both of specification and of freedom and transcendence, even of openness to a supernatural perfection and destiny. St. Thomas' Christian conception of nature is closely linked to his new notion of being (esse) as the act of existing. For Aristotle, nature in the sense of form was the highest actuality. In the new metaphysics of St. Thomas the act of existing is the supreme actuality and perfection. Nature, in the created order, is only a possibility of existing; to exist, it has to be actualized by existence. In this new perspective human nature is an openness to existence and to all the nature's existential possibilities. This transformation of the notion of nature, prepared no doubt by Christian, Jewish and Muslim philosophers of the Middle Ages, but accomplished by St. Thomas, would have been impossible without the revealed doctrine of creation. As the handiwork of God, nature is open to his 10
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See Aristotle, Metaph., V, 3, 1014bl6-1015al9. "Aristotle himself lists meanings of 'nature' signifying a permanent principle, and acknowledges that by extension it may designate any kind of being; but in his own usage he prefers to restrict it to the sensible order." J. Owens, A History ofAncient Western Philosophy (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1959), p. 309. "... 'nature' (physis) means for Aristotle the powers and functions of natural bodies." J. H. Randall, Aristotle (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), p. 173. According to Aristotle, mind "can have no nature of its own, other than that of having a certain capacity [to become all things]." De Anima, III, 4, 429a22. See De Partibus Animalium, I, 1, 641b9. For St. Thomas' notion of nature, see Summa Theologiae, III, q. 2,a. 1. The Aristotelian notion of nature is here developed in the context of Christology. See J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, pp. 185, 458. "The distinctive character of a truly Aristotelian metaphysics of being ... lies in the fact that it knows of no act superior to the form, not even existence." E. Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1952), p. 47. "... hoc quod dico esse est inter omnia perfectissimum .... Quaelibet autem forma signata non intelligitur in actu nisi per hoc quod esse ponitur. Nam humanitas vel igneitas potest considerari ut in potentia materiae existens, vel ut in virtute agentis, aut etiam ut in intellectu: sed hoc quod habet esse, efficitur actu existens. Unde patet quod hoc quod dico esse est actualitas omnium actuum, et propter hoc est perfectio omnium perfectionum." De Potentia Dei, q. 7, a. 2, ad 9m (Rome: Marietti, 1942). See Summa Theol., I, q. 4, a. 1, ad 3m. 9
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influence. Man is a special case of nature for he has been created in the image of God, and this image is found in his intellectual nature. And as the image of God he is by his nature drawn to his creator: fertur, vel nata est ferri in Deum. He is not by nature closed in upon himself; he is open to the infinite riches of God. As Karl Jaspers says, man is not "simply one living species among others; he discovers himself as something unique, embracing everything, open to everything." Karl Rahner expresses the same view when he writes that of its very nature spirit possesses a limitless transcendence, which gives the human horizon an infinite character. In this connection Rahner criticizes what he calls the "scholastic concept" of nature as applied to man. He asks whether this concept is not too closely modelled upon nature that is less than human: What is signified by the 'definition' and hence the circumscription of man's 'nature', if he is the essence of transcendence, and hence of the surpassing of limitation? Is it meaningful at all in such a perspective simply to assign to this 'nature' an end perfectly defined materially? Not as though the remotest doubt were being thrown here on the fact that man has a nature and that this in itself has an end assigned to it. But these must not and cannot be conceived in such simple terms as the mutual order of a pot and its lid or of a biological organism and itsfixedenvironment. One has only to ask why a supernatural end can be set for man without annulling his nature, and why God cannot do this with the nature of something below man. Rahner concludes that only in a highly analogous way can the notions of nature and end be extended to the various grades of being, and especially to man. Henri de Lubac agrees with Rahner on this point, though he thinks the scholastic concept of human nature criticized by Rahner, "which borrows too 13
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See St. Thomas, Summa Theol., I, q. 93, a. 4, 6. See L. B. Geiger, "L'homme, Image de Dieu. A propos de 'Summa Theologiae' I, 93, 4," Rivista di Filosofla Neo-Scholastica, 46, (1974), pp. 511-532. "Et sic imago attenditur in anima secundum quod fertur, vel nata est ferri in Deum." Summa Theol., I, q. 93, a. 8. K. Jaspers, Bilans et Perspectives (Paris, 1945), p. 159. Cited by H. de Lubac, The Mystery of the Supernatural, trans. R. Sheed (New York: Herder & Herder, 1967), p. 138. See K. Rahner, Mission and Grace, trans. C. Hastings (London: Sheed & Ward, 1963), I, p. 127. The infinity of the human spirit, for St. Thomas, is not absolute but relative (secundum quid), i.e. with respect to knowledge. Absolutely speaking the mind is finite ("intellectus noster simpliciter finitus est," Summa contra Gentiles, I, 69, n. 14). See J. H. Robb, Man as Infinite Spirit (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1974). For Hegel, man has both finite and infinite aspects, but his finitude is sublated in the infinity of Spirit. See E. Fackenheim, Historicity and Metaphysics, p. 69. See the remarks of J. Maritain, Moral Philosophy (New York: Scribner's, 1964), p. 149. K. Rahner, Theological Investigations, trans. C. Ernst (Baltimore: Helican Press, 1961), I, p. 317. Cited by H. de Lubac, ibid., p. 139. 13
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much from the sub-human," is not that of Thomas Aquinas but of modern scholasticism. De Lubac points out that Aquinas habitually distinguishes between natural things (res naturales, naturalia) and human things and human nature (res humanae, natura humana). A natural thing is limited and contained in being, whereas human nature has greater fullness and breadth (habet maiorem amplitudinem et extensionem). A first indication of this is the mind's capacity to become other things by receiving their forms in knowledge. These forms enrich and develop the being of the knower beyond his limited natural being, to the point that the perfection of the whole universe can exist in him. He can also open himself to others, drawn to them by love. A spirit incarnate in a body, he is not just an individual, separated from other individuals; he is a person, destined to fulfill himself by communion with other persons of his own time and of the past. Thus his spiritual nature is the ground of his sociability and also of his historicity. His full destiny, however, does not he in these natural modes of enrichment and communion, but in the face to face vision of God, which he can achieve not by his own natural resources but by grace. In the perspective of St. Thomas, man's openness to the full range of being, and even to infinity, through his reason is the ground of his freedom. Man, in short, is free precisely because he has a rational nature. We should notice that for Aquinas freedom is not opposed to nature, as it is in the philosophy of Kant. Kant conceived nature as a closed system, utterly determined by law. It makes no sense in his view to speak of man as free n
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St. Thomas, Summa Theol., I, q. 14, a. 1. " "... et ideo in III De Anima dicitur 'animam esse quodam modo omnia' quia nata est omnia cognoscere; et secundum hunc modum possibile est ut in una re totius universi perfectio existat." De Veritate, q. 2, a. 2; ed. Leonine (Rome, 1970), 22, p. 44. "Parce qu'il n'est pas un pur esprit, mais un esprit qui s'anime dans la matiere, l'homme n'est present a lui-meme qu'en sortant de soi. II ne se voit dans sa realite interieure qu'en se tournant vers le monde des objets et des hommes. II n'est personne que lorsqu'il est avec une autre personne; la conscience de soi est la conscience d'un soi-dans-le-monde, une conscience d'etre avec les autres hommes. Ainsi la structure metaphysique de l'homme comporte une ouverture radicale a l'histoire et une dependence de l'histoire." M. D. Chenu, "Creation et Histoire," St. Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974. Commemorative Studies (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974), II, p. 394. "Unde haec est ultima perfectio ad quam anima potest pervenire secundum philosophos ut in ea describatur totus ordo universi, et causarum eius, in quo etiam finem uitimum hominis posuerunt, qui secundum nos erit in visione Dei,..." De Veritate, q. 2, a. 2; ed. Leonine, p. 44. Expositio super Librum Boethii de Trinitate, q. 6, a. 4, ad 5m; ed. B. Decker (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1955), p. 229. "... radix libertatis est voluntas sicut subiectum; sed sicut causa, est ratio ..." Summa Theol., I-II, q. 17, a. 1, ad 2m. See ibid., I, q. 83, a. 1. "By nature, in the empirical sense, we understand the connection of appearances as regards their existence according to necessary rules, that is, according to laws." Kant, Critique 18
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by nature, but it does make good sense to Thomas Aquinas. It is understandable that philosophers who inherited the Kantian notion of nature should have rejected a human nature as incompatible with human freedom. For them, the exaltation of human freedom must result in the denial of a human nature. Free self-determining and self-making cannot be grounded in human nature, as they are in the thought of Thomas Aquinas. Nothing could point up more forcefully the gulf between the Thomistic notion of nature and that of Kant and the post-Kantians. Etienne Gilson once wrote that Thomistic nature is not Aristotelian nature. We might add, neither is it Kantian nature. Because man is free, he is able to choose this or that, make up his mind, select his own course of action. And his choice bears not only upon his will and deeds, but more importantly upon himself. By making up his mind, in a true sense he makes himself. Freedom means nothing if not .^^determination and se/f-making. Karol Cardinal Wojtyla (the future Pope John Paul II) put this well in his address to the Thomistic Congress of 1974 in Rome and Naples: ... self-determination is the manifestation of the fact that not only the active directing of the subject towards a value takes place in the act of the will. There is more in it: there is man, who in this act turns towards a definite value and thus decides not only about this move, but by making it he also decides about himself. The concept of self-determination contains more than the concept of agency: man not only performs his actions, but by his actions he becomes, in one way or another, his own 'maker'. One way in which he does not make himself is to give himself his substantial essence or nature. The Cardinal went on to say that from the very beginning a person is "somebody" in the metaphysical sense. But he insisted that a man by his free decisions throughout life becomes more and more "somebody" 24
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of Pure Reason, trans. N. K. Smith (London: Macmillan, 1950), A 216, B 263; p. 237. "This independence of the mechanism of nature is 'freedom in the strictest sense' or transcendental freedom." L. W. Beck, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 179. E. Gilson, Le Philosophe et la Theologie (Paris: Fayard, 1960), p. 60. "An Aristotelian nature is fixed, determined and self-enclosed in itsfinality.How can a free spirit, called by God to receive the gift of Himself, be explained as an Aristotelian nature?" A. C. Pegis, "Man as Nature and Spirit," Doctor Communis, 4 (1951), p. 61. K. Wojtyla, "The Structure of Self-Determination as the Core of the Theory of the Person," Atti del Congresso Internazionale. Tommaso d'Aquino nel suo Settimo Centenario, 7 (Naples: Edizioni Domenicane Italiane, 1978), pp. 40-41. Kierkegaard wrote: "Therefore, while nature is created out of nothing, while I myself as immediate personality am created out of nothing, as a free spirit I am born out of the principle of contradiction, or born by the fact that I choose myself." Either/Or, trans. Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), II, p. 179. Cited by E. Fackenheim, ibid., p. 85, note. 24
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in the personal and moral sense. By acquiring moral, intellectual and artistic qualities he makes himself more fully a person and a more perfect human being. Because he has a mind, the human person not only "makes" himself in these and other ways, but he also creates his own social, technological and cultural worlds. In this he differs from all other animals. Thomas Aquinas observes that nature is not lacking in providing the necessities of life. To subhuman animals nature provides suitable weapons and covering: teeth, claws, nails, fur, shell, etc. But nature acts differently in the case of man: it gives him reason and hands by which he can provide these things for himself. He is left free to arm and clothe himself as he wishes. Thus reason is at once the ground of man's freedom and the source of his self-enrichment not only through knowledge and love, but also through art and technology. There is then a wide gulf between the world of physical nature or things and the human person. As Anton Pegis liked to remind us, man is a spirit incarnated in a body. Because the human spirit is by nature the form of the body, it is engaged in time and history, and this precisely in order to become fully human and thus achieve its destiny. Pegis wrote: The human soul, which is a spiritual substance as the form of matter, is an intellectual creature destined by nature for a historical existence, for an incarnate and therefore temporal duration, in order to express and to realize the intellectuality proper to it. 26
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"Man not only decides about his actions, but he also decides about himself in terms of his most essential quality. Self-determination thus has as its corresponding counterpart the becoming of man as such (the consequence of this is that he becomes more and more 'somebody' in the personal and ethical sense, though in the metaphysical sense he has from the beginning been somebody ...)." K. Wojtyla, ibid., p. 41. This human development takes place by acquiring intellectual and moral virtues, which in St. Thomas' language, are "accidents" of the human substance. These "accidents," however, are not superficial or unimportant additions to the substance; on the contrary, they profoundly affect the human being. One has only to remember that, for St. Thomas, supernatural grace is an "accident" to realize how deeply an "accident" can transform the human person. In an ethical context St. Thomas does not hesitate to say that human nature is changeable: "Natura autem hominis est mutabilis." Summa Theol., II-II, q. 57, a. 2, ad 1. See St. Thomas, Summa Theol., I-II, q. 5, a. 5, ad lm. A. C. Pegis, At the Origins of the Thomistic Notion of Man (New York: MacMillan, 1963), p. 52. "What is man? A free projection in history, much like a comet burning its way across the heavens? Assuredly he is, and he has exercised the genius of many artists who have sought to capture him, if not in his essence, at least in his passage. With St. Thomas we are aware, in a way that is unique to him, that if man is a historical sort of being, indeed the only being in the universe that is historical by nature, this trait belongs to the soul before it belongs to man. History is the signature of the soul's intellectuality, for the human soul is an intelligence living by motion at the level of the intelligibility found in matter. That is why it is a man, a temporal spirit, engaged in an incarnated intellectual life." Ibid., pp. 46-47. 26
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But what is human nature if it can transcend itself in this way? What is this mysterious center within us that gives us the capacity of free self-determination and self-development? St. Thomas never doubted that we have a permanent nature or essence that specifies us as human beings, but he was equally convinced that we do not know this nature in itself. The essences of things are unknown to us (rerum essentiae sunt nobis ignotae), and St. Thomas makes no exception of the human essence. We define man as a rational animal, and this definition satisfies the demands of logic, that a definition should give the proximate genus and specific difference of what is defined. But this definition hides, as much as it reveals, the real essence of man. We say the specific difference of man is rationality, but this is a property of his nature and not his substantial difference. In place of man's essential difference from other animals, St. Thomas says, we use his power of reasoning or his having a mind. Because this power flows from his essence, it can designate it and in a way disclose it, as an effect can make known its cause. If this is true, we have no a priori knowledge or direct intuition of human nature that would tell us what it means to be fully human. We come to know human potentialities by observing the works of the human mind: language, science, art, religion, history, myth. These Ernst Cassirer calls "the defining and determining circle of humanity"; but it is not a closed circle. We are 29
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"Quia vero rerum essentiae sunt nobis ignotae, virtutes autem earum innotescunt nobis per actus, utimur frequenter nominibus virtutum vel potentiarum ad essentias designandas." St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. 10, a. 1, pp. 296-297. See ibid., q. 4, a. 1, ad 8m, p. 121; In VII Metapk, lect. 12 (Rome: Marietti, 1950), n. 1552. In some cases the properties and accidents of a thing observed by the senses sufficiently disclose its nature: sufflcienter exprtmunt naturam rei. See In De Trinitate Boethii, q. 6, a. 2; ed. B. Decker (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1955), p. 216, lin. 2. In the context, St. Thomas means that the observable data sometimes are adequate to constitute a science of nature. On this point see J. Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, trans. G. B. Phelan (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1959), pp. 176-177, 204-207. "... quia substantiates rerum differentiae sunt nobis ignotae, loco earum interdum diffinientes accidentalibus utuntur secundum quod ipsa accidentia designant vel notificant essentiam ut proprii effectus notificant causam; unde sensibile, secundum quod est differentia constitutiva animalis, non sumitur a sensu prout nominat potentiam sed prout nominat ipsam animae essentiam a qua talis potentia fluit; et similiter est de rationali vel de eo quod est habens mentem." St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. 10, a. 1, ad 6m, p. 299. Cassirer, in the wake of Kant, rejects a definition of man in terms of an "inherent principle which constitutes his metaphysical essence," or "any inborn faculty or instinct that may be ascertained by empirical observation." He allows only a functional, not a substantial definition of man's nature. See E. Cassirer, An Essay on Man (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1944), pp. 67-68. For the Thomist, the functional unity Cassirer finds in the activities and works of man are grounded in his substantial unity, more precisely in the unity of his being (esse). 29
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constantly in amazement of what man can achieve, for good or for ill, and as we observe his achievements, we grow in our understanding of his nature. Of course, no one would deny that man has limitations. Even the devotees of historicity grant that man always acts within a given situation, either natural, historical or human, and that this situation imposes limits upon him. The notion of man as a self-constituting process must be compatible with the fact that I cannot make myself to be a lion, or live in the year 700 A.D., or lift three tons by my own strength. So we need not deny man a human nature on the ground that it would impose limitations on him. We should only refuse him a nature if it were inconsistent with his capacity for self-making and self-transcendence. It is clear that a material nature, like a stone or even a subhuman animal, would be incapable of the sort of self-making we observe in man. But because man is rational, there is no incompatibility between his having a nature and his transcending his being. For man's rationality and freedom are not something fixed and closed, given to him ready-made at the beginning of his life. He is always in the process of developing them, as he is forever building his world. Let me hasten to add that the notion of self-making is not found in the works of St. Thomas. Like the concept of historicity, it has emerged in our own time, which is more historically-minded and self-reflective than his. But far from opposing the notion, his philosophy seems to invite it, and it finds its place in a living Thomism. 32
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So far we have been considering the possibility of reconciling man's selfmaking with his possessing a human nature. I have tried to show that there is no contradiction between them in the Thomist perspective. It is time to Dilthey's assertion, quoted by E. Fackenheim, Metaphysics and Historicity, p. 13, n. 9: "only history brings to light the potentiality of human being (Dasein)" is an overstatement; other disciplines besides history can reveal the powers of man. Have man's essential potentialities long been disclosed? (see ibid., p. 14). They would be M y disclosed only if we had an exhaustive knowledge of man's essence, which, according to St. Thomas, is beyond us. In fact, we have only a general knowledge of human potentialities, as we have of his nature. One can agree that "If there is a human nature, then the historical changes of human self-understanding are as irrelevant to that nature as are the changes in the physical sciences to physical nature." But this does not mean that human being is not historically situated or that human understanding (including self-understanding) does not affect human being. Human nature or essence, for the Thomist, is not equivalent to human being. The Thomist does not reduce being to essence. The impulse or tendency towards self-transcendence is already found in nature below man in its evolution towards higher forms. See J. Maritain, "Vers une Idee Thomiste de l'Evolution," Approches sans Entraves (Paris: Fayard, 1973), pp. 105-162. 32
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turn to our second problem and ask: Is the doctrine of historicity compatible with the transcendence of truth, or does it inevitably involve historicism? Once again Emil Fackenheim can help us to see the problem clearly. Six years after his Aquinas Lecture, in 1967, he addressed the seventh InterAmerican Congress of Philosophy on the subject "The Historicity and Transcendence of Philosophic Truth." This paper is a further development of one aspect of his earlier Aquinas Lecture. That lecture centered around the theme of self-making and human nature; the subsequent lecture turns more directly to the question of historicity and philosophic truth. Fackenheim is not concerned with a truth such as "I am speaking these words now," which will not be true in a moment, but with philosophical truths. Are they also so bound up with specific historical situations that they can claim no transcendence or universality? If they can make no such claim, all philosophy would be historical and there could be no rational argument between philosophers of different ages or cultures. We have already seen Fackenheim refuse this historicism, and his refusal is well founded. In the very act of historicizing their truth, philosophers engage in rational argument with thinkers of the past and of different cultures. It appears that philosophy cannot do without transcendent and universal truths. But does this mean that we have to revert to the notion of eternal truths enshrined in the philosophia perennis ? In Fackenheim's words (which have a clear echo of Plato), must we escape "from the cave of history into a realm of eternity" ? And if we take refuge in the timeless, eternal truths of perennial philosophy, do we not have to abandon the historicity of philosophic truth? Clearly Fackenheim is unhappy about eternal truths in philosophy. Like Heidegger, he is not comfortable with them; but once they have been eliminated, does not historicity permeate philosophic truth so thoroughly as to destroy every vestige of transcendence, with disastrous consequences for philosophy? As an alternative to the historicism of the later Heidegger and to the timeless eternal truths of perennial philosophy, Fackenheim wonders if there may not be universal, transcendent philosophic truths which are grounded 34
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See above, note 3. "The Historicity and Transcendence of Philosophic Truth," p. 77. Ibid., pp. 79-80. "Both the contention that there are 'eternal truths' and the jumbling together of Dasein's phenomenally grounded 'ideality' with an idealized absolute subject, belong to those residues of Christian theology within philosophical problematics which have not as yet been radically extruded." Heidegger, Being and Time, I, 6, 229; trans. J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson (New York & Evanston: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 272. 34 35
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in history and arise from history. Such truths would have the mark of history upon them, but they would still be universal and transcendent. It is possible, he suggests, that the "loss of an eternal realm of truth may not necessarily mean the loss of all universal truth." And this leads him to formulate his central problem: "How can philosophic thought be rooted in history, and emerge from history, and yet reach a truth which is transcendent?" He feels that if an answer to this question can be found we shall have saved both the historicity of philosophic truth and its universality and transcendence. At the same time we shall have avoided the notion of eternal truths, free of all historical taint and independent of the world of experience, proposed by the philosophia perennis. At this point let us begin our dialogue with Fackenheim again and ask: What is the philosophia perennis of which he speaks — the tradition which claims to reach timeless, eternal truths uncontaminated by the world of experience and history? Is Thomism a part of this tradition? The doctrine of eternal truths was a commonplace among the late scholastics and early modern rationalists. Scotus, Vasquez and Suarez vigorously defended the eternal verities, and they occupy an important place in the systems of Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza and Leibniz. The relation of these truths to the divine mind was warmly debated. Descartes contended that they were eternally established by God as the supreme legislator. Since they depend on the divine will, God could have created mathematical and metaphysical truths otherwise than he did. For example, he could have made it untrue that the three angles of a triangle be equal to two right angles. Leibniz disagreed: in his view the divine understanding gives reality to the eternal truths without the intervention of the divine will, and so they are not changeable. Neither Descartes nor Leibniz went as far as some Scotists, 3S
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E. Fackenheim, ibid., p. 82 (author's emphasis). The notion of perennial philosophy goes back to the Renaissance, when Augustinus Steuchus used the term to mean a consensus of religious piety among all philosophers, culminating in the Christian religion. See his De Perenni Philosophia (Basel, 1542), X, 1, p. 649. Leibniz revived the term to mean a continuous philosophic tradition going back to antiquity. See Leibniz, Lettre III a Remond; Opera Omnia, ed. J. E. Erdmann, I, 704a. But, as J. Owens observes, once the real differences of the philosophies have been removed, little if any philosophical consistence seems to remain. See his address, "Scholasticism — Then and Now," Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 40 (1966), p. 3, note. See also J. Collins, "The Problem of a Philosophia Perennis," Thought, 28 (1953), pp. 571-597; C. B. Schmitt, "Perennial Philosophy: from Agostino Steuco to Leibniz," Journal of the History of Ideas, 27 (1966), pp. 505-532. Descartes, Lettre a Mersenne; ed. Adam-Tannery (Paris, 1897), I, pp. 151-152; Lettre a Mesland, IV, pp. 118-119; Reponses awe 6" Objections, VII, p. 436; IX, p. 236. See Leibniz, Theodicy, n. 184; trans. E. M. Huggard (London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1952), p. 243. 38
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who boldly claimed that even if God did not exist, the eternal truths would still be true. Throughout this debate the eternal truths were given a status of their own. Pure and uncontaminated by time, they hovered between the human mind and God — ghosts as it were of the Platonic Ideas. Duns Scotus played a large role in shaping this notion of the eternal truths, for he assigned to them a "diminished" being and eternity, formally distinct from the divine mind. Under the influence of Scotus, Suarez described the eternal truths as a grand spectacle, distinct from God and contemplated and enjoyed by him. Propositions expressing them, he says, "have eternal truth not only as they exist in the divine mind, but also in themselves, abstracting from that mind." He realized that on this point he was deviating from St. Thomas, for he knew that St. Thomas "refers the whole eternity of truth to the divine mind." But if Aquinas is correct, he asks, how can the eternal truth of necessary propositions be safeguarded? How can we meet the objection of "modern theologians" who claim that propositions about creatures are not eternally true, but begin to be true when things come to be and lose their truth when things perish? It is hardly enough to reply with St. Thomas that when creatures cease to exist these propositions are true, not in themselves, but in the mind of God, for in this sense even contingent truths exist eternally in the divine mind. Necessary truths, like those of mathematics and meta42
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See Leibniz, ibid.; Descartes, Lettre a Mersenne, I, p. 150. See Duns Scotus: "... si ponere per impossible, quod Deus non esset, et quod triangulus esset, adhuc habere tres angulos resolveretur ut in naturam trianguli." Rep. Paris., Prol. Ill, quaestiuncula 4; Opera Omnia (Paris, 1894), 22, p. 53. See E. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot (Paris: J. Vrin, 1952), p. 185, n. 2. I am borrowing this phrase from Gilson, who uses it to describe Avicenna's essences. See E. Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1952), p. 76. The phrase is not inappropriate because Avicenna's notion of essence betrays the same essentialism underlying this doctrine of eternal truths. See Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 4; Opera Omnia (Vatican, 1954), III, p. 160, n. 262. The eternal truths are seen by the human mind in the eternal ideas as in a proximate object. Ibid., p. 160, n. 261. See E. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot, pp. 567-569. "... igitur huiusmodi enuntiationes, quae dicuntur esse in primo, imo etiam quae sunt in secundo modo dicendi per se, habent perpetuam veritatem, non solum ut sunt in divino intellectu, sed etiam secundum se, ac praescindendo ab illo." Suarez, Disputationes Metaphysicae, d. 31, s. 12, n. 40 (Paris, 1877), 26, p. 295. "Est igitur valde communis ac recepta sententia, has propositiones esse perpetuae veritatis ... et earn sequi videtur D. Thomas, citatis locis, quamvis totam hanc perpetuitatem referat ad intellectum divinum." Suarez, ibid., n. 41. Ibid., n. 39, p. 294. For the difference between the Thomist and Suarezian notions of eternal truths, see P. Garin, Theses Cartesiennes et Theses Thomistes (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1931), p. 131. Speaking of Suarez' doctrine, he says: "... s'il y a encore un lien entre la pensee divine et les verites eternelles, c'est a condition que ce lien laisse subsister une certaine independence de fond et une certaine autonomie de ces dernieres." 42
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physics, must accordingly have an eternity of their own, prescinding from the mind of God. If we turn to the works of St. Thomas, we see that Suarez' world of eternal truths is conspicuously absent. St. Thomas' constant teaching is that there are not many eternal truths; there is only one, and that is the truth of the divine mind. This follows from the fact that truth is being, and the conformity of mind to being. Hence anything is related to truth as it is related to being: unumquodque... ita se habet ad veritatem sicut ad me. Now only the divine being and mind are eternal. The conclusion is inevitable: only the divine truth is eternal; and since there is only one divine mind, there is only one eternal truth. The truth of the human mind, on the contrary, is not eternal but temporal. St. Thomas leaves us in no doubt on the matter: "Because our mind is not eternal, neither is the truth of propositions which are formed by us eternal, but it had a beginning in time." Do we not experience the birth of truth in us when we learn or discover it? We make up our mind, form a true judgment, and thereby we make its truth, and we do this in time. St. Thomas never loses sight of the fact that the human mind in itself, as a spiritual substance, transcends time, but he insists that because it is incarnated in a body it is subject to time and change. Our thoughts and affections succeed one another in time. We know one thing before and another after. 48
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In I Sent, d. 19, q. 5, a. 1; ed. Mandonnet (Paris, 1929), I, p. 487. See In I Sent, d. 19, q. 5, a. 3, p. 495; De Veritate, q. 1, a. 5, p. 15; Summa Theol., I, q. 16, a. 7. See A. Maurer, "St. Thomas and Eternal Truths," Mediaeval Studies, 32 (1970), pp. 91-107; reprinted above, pp. 43-58. The eternity of truth has a different meaning for Heidegger. It will not be adequately proved that there are eternal truths, he writes, until someone has succeeded in demonstrating that Dasein has been and will be for all eternity. See Being and Time, I, 6, 227, p. 269. But for St. Thomas, even if human being (Dasein) had no beginning or end, it would still not be eternal in the proper sense. Its being would still be temporal and historical and so too its truth. "... quia intellectus noster non est aeternus, nec Veritas enuntiabilium quae a nobis formantur, est aeterna, sed quandoque incoepit." Summa Theol., I, q. 16, a. 7, ad 4m. St. Thomas here replies to the objection that the truth of propositions is eternal, for granted that their truth had a beginning, it must eternally be true that truth did not exist before. St. Thomas retorts: "Before such truth existed, it was not true to say that such a truth did exist, except by reason of the divine intellect, wherein alone truth is eternal." "... the truth of our intellect is a real truth, and one that is truly ours since we make it." E. Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, trans. A. H. C. Downes (New York; Scribner's, 1940), p. 267. "He (St. Thomas) is saying that we make the truth of our knowledge, not in the sense that what we make we can also unmake, e.g. make the true (six is six) false (six is not six) or vice versa, but in the sense that unless we make it the knowledge will not be made, i.e. we shall not have true knowledge." G. Smith, Natural Theology. Metaphysics II (New York: Macmillan, 1951), p. 44. See Summa Theol., I, q. 85, a. 4, ad lm. The spiritual operations of the soul have temporal succession but, unlike bodily 48
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We remember the past, see the present and anticipate the future. God's knowledge, on the contrary, is free from change and temporal succession. In him there is no past or future: everything is eternally present to his sight. Human truth, then, is not eternal, and neither is it unchangeable. Once again St. Thomas is explicit: "The truth of the divine mind is unchangeable, but the truth of our mind is changeable." He does not mean that a truth, say of metaphysics or mathematics, is subject to change, but that the truth of our intellect is. Our mind, in short, is not unchangeably true. For truth exists in a mind: it is the known conformity of mind to being, and this conformity, like any relation, varies with the change in the terms of the relation. If the object of our mind does not change, but our judgment about it does, our judgment becomes false. If we assert that Socrates sits while he sits, our assertion is true. But if we change our judgment to "Socrates stands" while he still sits, our judgment becomes false. If Socrates should stand and we continue to judge that he sits, our judgment becomes false. In order to remain true, we must change our judgment to "Socrates rises." Thus the truth of our judgment can become false, or change to another truth, with the change of our judgment or its object. In some cases our judgment cannot change and remain true as long as its object exists. This is always so when it is a question of the essential properties of things. As long as men exist, it is true that they are rational, for rationality is of the essence of man. But if all men ceased to exist, we would say men were rational. Now that dinosaurs no longer inhabit the earth, we say they were animals. Thus our understanding of things changes with the change of time: secundum variationem temporis sunt diversi intellectus. 54
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movements, they do not have continuity. Some operations of the soul (e.g. imagination) have continuity per accidens owing to their relation to the body. See In I Sent, d. 8, q. 3, a. 3, ad 4m, p. 216. "Quia enim homo subiacet mutationi et tempori, in quo prius et posterius locum habent, successive cognoscit res, quaedam prius et quaedam posterius; et inde est quod praeterita memoramur, videmus praesentia et praenosticamur futura. Sed Deus, sicut liber est ab omni motu ... ita omnem temporis successionem excedit, nec in eo invenitur praeteritum nec futurum, sed praesentialiter omnia futura et praeterita ei adsunt; sicut ipse Moysi famulo suo dicit 'Ego sum qui sum'." A. Dondaine, "La Lettre de saint Thomas a l'Abbe du Montcassin," St. Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974. Commemorative Studies (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974), I, p. 108. "Unde Veritas divini intellectus est immutabilis. Veritas autem intellectus nostri mutabilis est." Summa Theol., I, q. 16, a. 8. See A. Maurer, "St. Thomas and Changing Truths," Atti del Congresso Internazionale. Tommaso dAquino nel suo Settimo Centenario, 6 (Naples: Edizioni Domenicane Italiane, 1977), pp. 267-275. See De Veritate, q. 1, a. 6, p. 24. Ibid., ad 4m. Ibid., ad 6m, p. 25. Time plays a role in a proposition because it includes a verb, which signifies temporally. See In I Periherm., lect. 4, n. 7; ed. Leonine (Rome, 1882), I, p. 20. See also In I Sent., d. 8, q. 2, a. 3, p. 207. 54
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The truth of the human mind, then, is not completely unchangeable, and neither is it necessary. "In creatures," St. Thomas says, "there is no necessary truth." At first sight this is a surprising statement, for are there not in the mind of the mathematician and metaphysician necessary truths, i.e. truths that cannot be otherwise? St. Thomas does not deny this, or that (as we shall see) the mind can think about these truths just in themselves, quite apart from their existence in any mind. What he is denying is that any truth exists necessarily in a created mind. There is no necessity that our mind be conformed to being, or that once it has achieved this conformity it maintain it. Nothing shows better than this St. Thomas' existential view of truth. Truth is completed, he says, by an act of the mind, and it has for its foundation the being (esse) of things. So we must judge of truth as we judge of the mind and being. Now there is only one mind and being that is eternal, completely immutable and necessary, namely the divine. Hence St. Thomas' conclusion: truth in the human mind is not eternal, completely immutable or necessary. The obvious objection, which St. Thomas does not fail to raise, is that truths like "Every whole is greater than its part" seem to be immutable and necessary. In reply, he concedes that there are necessary propositions, but he insists that they are not necessarily true in our mind. The truth of these propositions per accidens can lose its existence in the human mind and in things, if they should cease to exist. In this case, these truths would remain only in God, in whom they would be one and the same truth. The same existential approach to truth inspires St. Thomas' answer to the objection that there is an eternal created truth, for according to St. Augustine there is nothing more eternal than the nature of a circle, and that two and three are five. Surely these are created truths and nevertheless eternal! 59
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"Unde patet quod nulla Veritas est necessaria in creaturis." In I Sent, d. 19, q. 5, a. 3, p. 496. Ibid., ad 4m, p. 497. See G. B. Phelan, "Verum sequitur esse rerum," Mediaeval Studies, I (1939), pp. 11-22; reprinted in G. B. Phelan, Selected Papers (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1967), pp. 133-154. "Now, our known conformity with the things understood, our truth, is not eternal; it began and ceases with our thought. It is not immutable, not that truth itself is subject to change, but our truth is subject to change; sometimes we are right, sometimes we are wrong. Nor is our truth necessary: it need not have been at all, much less need it have been necessarily. All these characteristics — eternity, necessity, immutability — are characteristics of the Truth which is God." G. Smith, Natural Theology. Metaphysics //(New York: Macmillan, 1951), p. 46, note. "... Veritas propositiorum necessariorum potest deficere per accidens quantum ad esse quod habet in anima vel in rebus si res illae deficerent: tunc enim non remanerent istae veritates nisi in Deo, in quo sunt una et eadem Veritas." In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 3, ad 7m, p. 498. 59
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St. Thomas' reply is curt: "The nature of a circle, and the fact that two and three make five, have eternity in the mind of God." Human truth, then, is not to be confused with divine truth. Like human being itself, human truth is at once temporal and historical. Aquinas has often been criticized for presenting a static and anti-historical system of theology and philosophy. The German historian Alois Dempf claims that history meant nothing to Aquinas, nor had he any need of it. Moving in a supratemporal sphere, he saw only the supra-temporal side of truth and recognized no need of progress in the sciences. These harsh judgments of Thomism echo the statement of Nietzsche, that Aquinas and his work are situated outside of history, so to speak "six thousand feet beyond men and time," and Hegel's opinion that in the Middle Ages truth "remains a heavenly truth alone, a Beyond." I trust by now these illusions have been dispelled. St. Thomas in fact was well aware of the role of history in human thought. With Aristotle, he recognized time as a kind of discoverer or good partner in the progress of truth. Not that time itself contributes anything, St. Thomas hastens to add, but help comes with time. An inquirer into truth will understand later what he did not see before, and learning of his predecessors' discoveries he will be able to go beyond them. The arts grow in a similar way. Someone will make a small discovery, and this will gradually lead to great ones. St. Thomas' own practice reveals his sense of history and of his indebtedness to it. He not infrequently marks out the stages in the discovery of a truth, as when he traces the progress of philosophers in understanding the nature of being. These men, he comments, "little by little, and as it were step 62
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"Dicendum quod ratio circuli, et duo et tria esse quinque, habent aeternitatem in mente divina." Summa Theol., I, q. 16, a. 7, ad lm. See A. Dempf, Sacrum Imperium. Geschichts- und Staatsphilosophie des Mittelalters und der politischen Renaissance (Darmstadt, 1954), pp. 367, 381, 397; Christliche Philosophie (Bonn, 1952), p. 134. Quoted by M. Seckler, Le Salut et I'Histoire. La Pensee de saint Thomas d'Aquin sur la Theologie de I'Histoire (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1967), p. 20. This remarkable book is a study of St. Thomas' conception of time and history in relation to the problem of salvation. It is a translation of Das Heil in der Geschichte. Geschichtstheologisches Denken bei Thomas von Aquin (Munich: Kosel, 1964). Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, trans. E. S. Haldane and F. H. Simson (London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1898), III, p. 52. See the work of Seckler, above, note 64. Also J. Langois, "Premiers Jalons d'une Philosophie Thomiste de I'Histoire," Revue des Sciences Ecclesiastiques, 14 (1962), pp. 264-291; M. D. Chenu, "Situation Humaine: Corporalite et Temporalite," 2nd ed. in L'Evangile dans le Temps (Paris, 1962), pp. 411-436. In I Ethic., lect. II; ed. Leonine, I (Rome, 1969), p. 39. See Aristotle, Nic. Ethics, I, 7, 1098a23. 62
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by step, advanced in the knowledge of the truth." Everything of value that he found in these philosophers he appropriated in his own doctrine, and then he advanced beyond them with his original insights. As a theologian he followed the same practice of making his own the tradition of the Fathers and medieval masters, then adding his own contribution to the understanding of the faith. For Aquinas, then, truth does not descend from the blue; it is achieved in time and through history. It always has the mark of history upon it, for it lives and develops in a mind that is historically situated. Moreover, in its linguistic expression it always carries the signature of a special language, different from other idioms in which it may be formulated. This satisfies one of Fackenheim's requirements, that philosophic truths be rooted in the temporal world and emerge from history. What can be said about his other stipulation, that the truths of philosophy be universal and transcendent? This is also met, for although the mind is incarnated in the body, unlike material forms it is not wholly immersed in matter. As a spiritual substance it keeps its transcendence over matter and time. The best proof of this is its ability to abstract natures from spatial and temporal conditions. We can form universal concepts and make universal judgments about the things we experience which are true always and everywhere. Such, for example, is the judgment that men are rational. We can then give formal expression to these universal truths in propositions and think about them just in themselves, or absolutely, abstracting from the existence they have in a 68
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"Dicendum quod antiqui philosophi paulatim et quasi pedetentim intraverunt in cognitionem veritatis." Summa Theol., I, q. 44, a. 2. See De Potentia Dei, q. 3, a. 5; q. 3, a. 17; De Spiritualibus Creaturis, a. 5; De Substantiis Separatis, 1-10, ed. F. J. Lescoe (West Hartford, Connecticut, 1962), pp. 35-98. In the sphere of practical knowledge St. Thomas recognized not only primary moral principles common to all men and true for all, but also secondary principles and laws which change with time and the developing perfection and needs of man. See Summa Theol., I-II, q. 94, a. 4-5; q. 95, a. 1-2. St. Thomas also recognized the temporal character of scientific hypotheses. He considered the Ptolemaic system of astronomy to be an account of the celestial phenomena observed in his own day, but he envisaged a day when the phenomena might be "saved" in another way. See In II De Caelo et Mundo, lect. 17, n. 2; ed. Leonine (Rome, 1899), III, pp. 186-187; Summa Theol., I, q. 32, a. 1, ad 2m. He tells us of a man who spent thirty years investigating the nature of the bee without knowing it perfectly. In Symbolum Apostolorum, a. 1; Opera Omnia (New York: Musurgia Press, 1950), 16, p. 135. This is implied by St. Thomas in statements such as the following: "... multa quae bene sonant in lingua graeca, in latina fortassis bene non sonant, propter quod eandem fidei veritatem aliis verbis Latini confitentur et Graeci... Unde ad officium boni translatoris pertinet ut ea quae sunt catholicae fidei transferens servet sententiam, mutet autem modum loquendi secundum proprietatem linguae in quam transfer!" Contra Errores Graecorum, Prol. (Rome, 1967), 40, p. All. De Ente el Essentia, 4; ed. Leonine (Rome, 1976), 43, pp. 375-376. 68
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mind. We can focus our attention on them, without considering whether they exist temporally in us or eternally in God. We can do the same thing with a nature or essence when we think of it just in itself, or absolutely, without considering whether it exists as a universal in the mind or as an individual in reality. When philosophic truths are considered in this way they are necessary and indestructible, as an essence absolutely considered is necessary and immutable. The mind in which they exist changes by learning or forgetting them, but in themselves they are not subject to change. Truths considered absolutely can even be called "eternal," not in the positive sense that they enjoy an eternal being, but in the negative sense that they abstract from change and time. Because truths can be considered absolutely or in themselves, it is tempting to think that they have a kind of entity in themselves, distinct from the being of the mind in which they exist. A similar illusion is at the basis of the notion that an essence in itself has its own essential being (esse essentiae) quite apart from the existence (esse existentiae) it has in the real world. There were Platonizing philosophers in the Middle Ages, like Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus, who fell prey to this illusion. When they turned their attention to necessary truths, they also endowed them with an intelligible or "diminished" being and eternity, distinct from the full being and eternity of God. Thus was born the scholastic notion of eternal truths that was to bedevil modern rationalism. Heidegger recognized them for what they are: "residues of Christian theology within philosophical problematics," and he called for their complete elimination. But the theology from which they came was not that of Thomas Aquinas. If there is a perennial tradition of eternal truths, Thomism is not part of it. Aquinas never doubted the existence of an eternal truth which is at once the origin and goal of human truth, but this eternal truth is the divine Truth, and it is one, as God himself is one. But does the loss of eternal truths compel us to abandon the transcendence of philosophic truth? Must we remain in the cave of history until the day we enjoy the vision of eternal Truth? Not at all. For the human mind, a spirit in its own right, can reach universal truths that transcend the limits of time and matter, while falling short of eternity. If this is so, we are not left with the two horns of Fackenheim's dilemma: either historicism or eternal truths 71
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Considered absolutely, in abstraction from every mode of being (esse), rationality is predicable of man even though no man exists. See QuodlibetWIII, a. 1, ad lm. See Summa Theol., I, q. 16, a. 7, ad 2m; In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 3, ad 3m, p. 496; De Veritate, q. 1, a. 5, ad 14m, pp. 20-21. See A. Maurer, "St. Thomas and Eternal Truths," pp. 100-102. Reprinted above, pp. 43-58. See E. Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, pp. 76-88. See above, note 37. 11
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in philosophy. There is a way out, and he himself has shown it to us in words that, I believe, Thomas Aquinas would accept: "... philosophic thought seeks radical universality, and the truths to which it lays claim transcend history even if they encompass, not eternity but merely all time or all history." 75
CONCLUSION
At the beginning of this lecture I raised two related questions: Is human nature compatible with self-making? and: Is transcendence of truth reconciliable with its historicity? I have tried to show that both questions can be answered in the affirmative with the philosophy of St. Thomas, provided that it is understood authentically and not confused with later scholasticism. It is vital in this connection to see the difference between St. Thomas' existentialist approach to man and truth and the essentialist views of the later scholastics, who were the vehicles by which scholasticism came to be known by modern philosophers. I hope I have convinced you — provided of course you really needed convincing! — that Thomism is not part of a classical or perennial tradition defined in terms of this later scholasticism. Perhaps I have also persuaded you — provided you needed to be persuaded! — that St. Thomas' views on man and truth leave Thomism open to all that is valuable in the new approaches to self-making and historicity, while giving them a solid metaphysical foundation. I am under no illusion, however, that even if St. Thomas' philosophy were recognized for what it is, it would be readily accepted by our contemporaries. For is not its starting point the very one explicitly rejected by most modern philosophers, that is to say the reality of the external world? In cognition, St. Thomas gives the primacy to the external; only secondarily, by way of reflection, does thinking take cognizance of itself and become its own object. With Descartes, modern philosophy took a new subjective turn, shifting primacy in knowledge from things to consciousness or thinking. The "Copernican revolution" was already begun, and the whole of Western civilization was henceforth to bear its imprint. But this revolutionary turn in philosophy was to bring with it new problems, at least as serious as those it was designed to avoid. For if the philosopher must begin philosophizing with consciousness or thought, how can he ever reach anything transcending it? Is he not forever enclosed within thought, as the idealists contend? The problem of the openness of thinking 76
E. Fackenheim, "The Historicity and Transcendence of Philosophic Truth," p. 80. See J. Owens, "The Primacy of the External in Thomistic Noetics," Egltse et Theologie, 5 (1974), pp. 189-205. 75
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to what is other than thinking becomes acute indeed. Along with this problem of transcendence goes the problem of universality. For where can I begin philosophizing about thought and its ideas except with my own; and from there how can I reach a thought that is common to myself and others, especially those of different times, cultures and languages? In Hegelian terms, how can my finite thought overcome its limitations and be sublated in a transcendent, universal thought? These problems, which are endemic to transcendental philosophy from Fichte, through Hegel, to the contemporary phenomenologists, do not arise for St. Thomas, because in his view cognition from the outset opens upon a meaningful world beyond cognition. The objectivity of perception and thought at once transcends knowledge and contacts a world that is not simply my world, made meaningful to me, but one whose intelligibility reveals itself to the mind and which we can share with others. Indeed, the intellect by its very nature is pointed to the universal: our first conception is being, which is the most universal of all notions. It is true that being as initially conceived is the being of sensible things, but it contains an intelligible light that allows the mind to mount to a Being that is subsistent and eternal. Does not the crisis of metaphysics and historicity described so well by Fackenheim result from the transcendental turn taken by philosophy since Descartes? If so, there is no easy solution to the crisis. It calls for a radical counter-Copernican revolution in which it will no longer be assumed that objects must conform to our knowledge, but that knowledge must conform to things. 77
For Kant's Copernican revolution, see his Critique of Pure Reason, Preface to Second Edition, Bxvi, trans. N. K. Smith (London: MacMillan, 1950), p. 22. 77
Siger of Brabant
Siger of Brabant was born c. 1240 in the duchy of Brabant (now part of Belgium). He was a secular cleric, Canon of St. Paul in Liege. After studying at the University of Paris he became master of arts and taught philosophy in the arts faculty. In 1270 Stephen Tempier, bishop of Paris, condemned the heterodox teachings of Siger and his colleague, Boethius of Denmark. In 1276 Siger was summoned before the inquisitor of France, Simon du Val. According to legend Siger fled to the papal curia at Orvieto, where he died before 1284, stabbed to death by his demented secretary. Some of his doctrines are among the 219 condemned by Tempier in 1277. Pietro Pomponazzi was born in Mantua, Italy, in 1462. He studied at the University of Padua, receiving a degree in medicine in 1487. After teaching at the University from 1488 to 1509, he moved to Ferrara for a year, then to the University of Bologna, where he taught until his death in 1525.
5 Esse and Essentia
in the Metaphysics of Siger of Brabant I. STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION
Siger of Brabant addressed the topic of the relation between essence and existence while lecturing as a master in the faculty of arts at Paris around 1272-1274. One of the seven questions that form an introduction to his Quaestiones in Metaphysicam asks, "Does being or existence {ens vel esse) in caused beings belong to the essence of the caused beings, or is it something added to their essence?" The question is formulated differently in another manuscript, but with the same meaning: "Is existence, from which the notion of being is derived, in the essence of caused beings, or is it only an accident of their essence?" This is said to be the same question as "Is a thing (res) a being (ens) through its essence or through something added to the essence?" The popularity of Siger's question is attested by the fact that it is extant in four different student reportationes, and that later two anonymous 1
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For the life, works and philosophy of Siger, see F. Van Steenberghen, Maitre Siger de Brabant (Louvain, Paris, 1977). For his doctrine of essence and existence, see pp. 280-292. See also E. Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 2nd ed. (Toronto, 1952), pp. 61 -70; L etre et I'.essence, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1962), pp. 74-80. For a recent reevalualion of Siger, see R.-A. Gauthier, "Notes sur Siger de Brabant," Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques 67 (1983), 201-232 and 68 (1984), 3-49. "[UJtrum ens vel esse in rebus causatis pertineat ad essentiam causatorum, vel sit aliquid additum essentiae illorum." Siger de Brabant, Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, Introductio, q. 7; ed. W. Dunphy (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1981), p. 41.9-11. "[U]trum esse a quo sumitur ratio entis sit in essentia entium causatorum vel solum sit aliquod accidens essentiae ipsorum; et idem est quaerere utrum res sit ens per essentiam suam vel per aliquid additum essentiae." Siger de Brabant, Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, Introductio, q. 7 ed. A. Maurer (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1983), p. 29.22-25. The question is found in ms Munich, Staatsbibliotek, Clm 9559, ed. W. Dunphy (see above, n. 2). It was previously edited by C. A. Graiff, Siger de Brabant, Questions sur la Metaphysique (Louvain, 1948). Ms Cambridge, Peterhouse 152 and Paris, Bibliotheque 1
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writers incorporated it into their own commentaries on Aristotle's Metaphysics. The question of the relation of essence and existence was in the air in the second half of the thirteenth century. All the masters, including Albert the Great, Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas, expressed their views on the subject; but to the best of my knowledge no one of them formulated the general question of the relation between essence and existence in creatures. Siger seems to have been thefirstto do so, and after him the question became standard in the schools. Siger's wording of the question is carefully designed to elicit two possible answers: In things that have a cause (i.e. in everything except God) being or existence (ens vel esse) either belongs to its essence or it is an accidental condition (dispositio) added to its essence. Siger assumes that these are the only reasonable stands to take on the relation of existence to essence. Historians of philosophy will recognize them as respectively the positions of the Muslim philosophers Averroes and Avicenna. As Avicenna was understood in Latin translation, only the First Being or God exists by essence. The existence of all other things is a condition (dispositio) that happens (accidit) to their essence and is added to it by its cause. As a consequence, a caused thing (res) is not a being (ens) through its essence but by something added to that essence. So the notions of thing (res) and being (ens) do not have the same meaning; they are two different concepts (intentiones)} Averroes 5
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Nationale, lat. 16297, ed. A. Maurer (see above, n. 3). The Paris ms. was previously edited by C. A. Graiff, ibid. Ms Paris Bibl. Nat. lat. 16133, ed. J. Vennebusch, Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie, B. 48, H. 2 (Berlin, 1966), pp. 175-183. These mss will be cited respectively as M, C, P, PI. References to the question will usually be to the Munich ms for it is most available in both the Graiff and Dunphy editions. The other mss will be cited when they contain significant variant readings or additions. Anonymous, Quaestiones supra librum Metaphysicae, ms Cambrai 486. The question on essence and existence has been edited by A. Maurer, "Ms Cambrai 486: Another Redaction of the Metaphysics of Siger of Brabant?" Mediaeval Studies 11 (1949), 224-232. I am now of the opinion that this commentary is the work of a follower of Siger. Anonymous, Quaestiones in Metaphysicam I-IX, Cambridge, Peterhouse 152, IV, q. 3; A. Zimmermann, "Die Quaestio iiber Wesen und Sein aus einem anonymen Metaphysik-Kommentar des spaten 13. Jahrhunderts," Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum 16 (1971), 3-23. Thomas Aquinas treats of the subject in various contexts, especially when dealing with composition in the angels. See Sum. theol. I, 50, 2; Contra gentiles II, 52-53; in II, 54 he considers the problem more generally. See also Bonaventure, Sent., II, d. 3, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1; ed. Quaracchi, II, pp. 89-91. ' Siger's disciple, Godfrey of Fontaines, raised the question of essence and existence in general terms, as did Henry of Ghent and Giles of Rome. See J. F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines (Washington, D.C., 1981), pp. 39-99. "Dicemus ergo quod naturae hominis, ex hoc quod est homo, accidit ut habeat esse ..." Avicenna, Avicenna latinus. Liber de philosophia prima sive divina scientia, V, 2; ed. S. Van 5
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mounted a vigorous attack against this way of conceiving the relation of existence to essence. For him, existence is not an accidental condition added to essence; rather, existence belongs to it by right of the essence. As Aristotle says, there is no difference between 'man' and 'existing man'. Thus Siger's way of raising the question offers his readers either the Avicennian or Averroistic solution of the problem of essence and existence. As we shall see, he is aware that Thomas Aquinas' views on this topic do not fit into the conceptual framework he has set up. So it is understandable that he finds the Thomist doctrine unintelligible. Before analyzing in detail Siger's question, it is well to examine his language of being, for it implicitly contains his resolution of the question. 9
II. SIGER'S LANGUAGE OF BEING
We have seen that in formulating his question Siger uses 'being' (ens) and 'to be' (es.se) as equivalent terms: his question concerns the relation of ens vel esse to essentia. The terms ens and esse differ grammatically, for the former is a noun or participle and the latter is an infinitive. As the infinitive is the more basic form, he says that the term 'being' (ens) is derived from 'to be' (esse): esse a quo sumitur ratio entis. Both ens and esse, in turn, are said to be given their names from the act of existing: esse et ens, quae imponuntur ab actu essendi. Thus both ens and esse express being in its actual existence (esse actuale). Esse is the actuality of existing (actualitas essendi), or "that which pertains to the actuation of a thing's essence" (illud quodpertinet ad actuationem essentiae ejus)} Accordingly in his statement 10
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Riet (Louvain, Leiden, 1980), II, p. 239.68-69. "Dico ergo quod intentio entis et intentio rei imaginantur in animabus duae intentiones." Ibid. I, 5; ed. Van Riet, I (1977), p. 34.50-51. A.-M. Goichon remarks that accidit mistranslates Avicenna's text. She writes: "Nous n'avons pas rencontre une seule fois le sens d'accidere chez Ibn Sina." She prefers sequitur to accidit. See A.-M. Goichon, La distinction de I'essence et de I'existence d'apres Ibn Sina (Paris, 1937), p. 90. Goichon also writes: "Imaginantur traduit a tort le latin pour mutasawwarani, qui indique une operation intellectuelle et non pas imaginative." Ibid., p. 136, n. 4. The Latin intentio was the medieval translation of the Arabic ma 'no, a word meaning 'idea' or 'notion'. See A.-M. Goichon, Lexique de la langue philosophique d'Ibn Sina (Paris, 1938), pp. 253255, n. 469. See F. Rahman, "Essence and Existence in Avicenna," Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies 4 (1958), 1-16. Averroes, Metaph., IV, com. 3 (Venice, 1574), fol. 66 M; 67 B-H. See Aristotle, Metaph., IV, 2, 1003b27. Q. in Metaph.-, ed. Maurer, p. 29.23. Q. Metaph. tres; ed. Vennebusch, p. 175.3. Quaestio utrum haec sit vera: homo est animal, nullo homine existente. Siger de Brabant. Ecrits de logique, de morale et de physique; ed. B. Bazan (Louvain, Paris), p. 54.59, 61-62. 9
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of the question, esse and ens are used in the sense of actual existence, as expressed by the verb 'is' in a proposition such as 'Man exists' (Homo est). Sometimes, however, Siger uses the term m e in the more traditional sense of a thing's essence or form, as expressed by its definition. Thus he writes, "The definition of a thing reveals its esse (Definitio autem indicat esse)." This non-existential use of the term goes back at least as far as Boethius, and it has its roots in Aristotle's metaphysics. In this meaning of the term, esse is equivalent to esse essentiale and esse essentiae — terms that will have a long history in scholastic philosophy. Siger describes the esse essentiae of man as "everything that belongs to his entity, whether it be potency or act, expressed by (his) definition." Another term Siger uses for the essence or quiddity of a thing is res. How does the meaning of this term differ from that of ens, since, as equivalent to esse, ens can also designate the essence of a thing? Siger raises this problem when he asks whether the terms res and ens are synonyms, or whether ens adds something to the meaning of res. Indeed, he takes this to be the same question whether being or 'to be' belongs to the essence of a thing or is something added to it. In other words, Siger identifies the problem of the relation between essence and existence with that of the relation between the transcendental concepts ens and res. The consequence of this identification will be clear from our analysis of the question. Before resolving the question of the relation of existence to essence, Siger criticizes the doctrines of Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas — the two contemporaries whom he rated as "outstanding in philosophy." By confronting their views on the subject, his own stands out with greater clarity and precision. 13
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Q. tn Metaph.-, ed. Dunphy, p. 71.51-52. See Boethius, In Isag. Porphr., IV, 14, ed. secunda; ed. Brandt CSEL 48, p. 273.13. For the Aristotelian background, see J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, 3rd ed. (Toronto, 1978), p. 225. Quaestio utrum haec sit vera, p. 54.62-63. Q. in Metaph.-, ed. Dunphy, p. 45.23. Q. Metaph. tres-, ed. Vennebusch, p. 175.3-8. For Thomas, the distinction between esse and essence is not the same as that between ens and res. The transcendental notions res, ens and unum signify entirely the same thing but through different notions (rationes). See Thomas, Metaph., IV, 2; ed. Cathala-Spiazzi (Turin, 1964), n. 553. "... praecipui viri in philosophia Albertus et Thomas." Siger of Brabant, De anima intellectiva, III; ed. B. Bazan, Siger de Brabant. Quaestiones in tertium de anima, De anima intellectiva, De aeternitate mundi (Louvain, Paris, 1972), p. 81.79-80. 13
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III. CRITICISM OF ALBERT THE GREAT
Siger takes Albert's doctrine of essence and existence from his commentary on the Liber de causis. The choice of this commentary from among Albert's numerous works was not by chance. Its doctrine (which Albert reports and does not necessarily accept as his own) fits in perfectly with the structure of Siger's question. Moreover, Siger had a special interest in the commentary, for in one of the manuscripts of his question he claims to have heard Albert of Cologne teach its doctrine: "... et hoc eum dicentem viva voce audivi." When and where Siger may have met or studied under Albert is still a mystery. One of the most important propositions of the Liber de causis is that the First Being gives being to all its effects. Albert interprets this laconic statement through the metaphysics of Avicenna. The Muslim philosopher held that only the First Being, or God, necessarily exists with an underived existence. All beings below the First of themselves are only possible; if they exist, they owe their existence to a cause other than themselves, and ultimately to the First Being. Hence there is a distinction in everything below the First Being between its possible being, which is that which it is or its essence, and its actual existence. In illustrating this distinction, Albert argues that a man is a man of himself and not from something else, for he is equally what he is whether he actually 19
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" Albert the Great, De causis et processu universitatis, I, c. 8, ed. Borgnet X (1891), pp. 376-379. Albert explains that he is writing as a commentator and not giving his own doctrine. Ibid., II, 5, 24, p. 619. In his early writings (Summa de creaturis and commentary on the Sentences) Albert often uses esse as synonymous with existere and existentia as designating the emergence of an effect from a cause (sistere ex). See L. Ducharme, "'Esse' chez saint Albert le Grand. Introduction a la metaphysique de ses premiers ecrits," Revue de I'Universite d'Ottawa, oct. dec. (1957), 1-44. Q. Meta. tres; ed. Vennebusch, p. 179.110-111. In the 16th century Augustino Nifo called Siger a disciple of Albert. Nifo, De intellectu, I, tr. 3, c. 26 (Venice, 1503), fol. 35vb. Cited by J. Vennebusch, ibid., p. 168, n. 17. Vennebusch concludes that owing to the discrepancy of their dates the meeting between Siger and Albert must have been quite accidental. Siger could not have been a student of Albert for long. See B. Nardi, Sigieri di Brabante nel pensiero del Rinascimento italiano (Rome, 1945), p. 20. "... ens primum dat causatis suis omnibus ens." Liber de causis, xvii (xviii); ed. A. Pattin, Tijdschrift voor fllosofle 28 (1966), p. 173, n. 144. "Eius autem quod est possibile esse, iam manifesta est ex hoc proprietas, scilicet quia ipsum necessario eget alio quod faciat illud esse in effectu; quicquid enim est possibile esse, respectu sui, semper est possibile esse, sed fortassis accidet ei necessario esse per aliud a se.... Quod enim habet respectu sui ipsius aliud est ab eo quod habet ab alio a se, et ex his duobus acquiritur ei esse id quod est, et ideo nihil est quod omnino sit expoliatum ab omni eo quod est in potentia et possibilitate respectu sui ipsius, nisi necesse esse." Avicenna, Liber de prima philosophia, I, 7; I, pp. 54.44-47, 55.51-55. 20
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exists or not. But he does not exist of himself; otherwise he would not need a cause of his existence. He owes his existence to the Primary Existent from which all existence flows. Thus existence comes to him from without and indeed "happens" to him (accidit ei). Siger does not find this reasoning conclusive. It assumes that there is something in the effect of the First Being that does not come from it, namely its possibility of being or essence. But Siger contends that there is nothing in the effect that does not derive from its first cause. Hence you cannot distinguish the essence of man from his existence on the ground that one derives from the first cause and the other does not. The mistake would not have been made, Siger continues, if Avicenna and Albert had been more attentive to their language. They equivocate in their use of the terms 'from' and 'through' (ex, per). These terms always indicate a cause, but one must distinguish, as Aristotle does, between a formal and an efficient cause. When it is said that a thing is from or through itself, or from or through something else, 'from' or 'through' may mean formally or efficiently. Thus man is man through himself (per se) if 'through' indicates a formal cause. But a man is also a man through another (per aliud) if 'through' indicates an efficient cause. So there is no contradiction in saying that something caused is through itself (per se) formally, and is through another (per aliud) efficiently. This undercuts the position of Avicenna and Albert. To say that a thing is what it is through itself and exists through another does not prove a real distinction between what a thing is (its essence) and its existence. Rather, it shows a distinction between two causalities that converge in the thing: the formal cause by reason of which the thing is what it is through its essence, and the efficient cause by reason of which the thing exists through something other than itself. 2A
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"Aliqui dicunt quod res est per dispositionem additam essentiae suae, ita quod secundum ipsos res et ens non sunt eiusdem intentiorris, ita quod esse est aliquid additum essentiae. Haec est opinio Alberti Commentatoris. Ratio sua est ista Libro de causis, quia res habet esse ex suo Primo Principio; ipsum autem Primum est illud quod et seipso est, et illud quod ex seipso est habens esse, et est illud quod est ex se; etiam essentia rei est ex se quare res distinguitur ab esse." Q. in Metaph.-, ed. Dunphy, p. 43.81-87. See Albert, De causis, I, 1, 8; ed. Borgnet X, p. 377. "Sed contra: quidquid est universaliter in re est effectus Primi Principii, et nihil est eorum quae pertinent ad rem in re ipsa neque essentialiter neque accidentaliter, quin reducatur in Primum Principium; ergo haec distinctio nulla est, scilicet inter essentiam rei et esse per hoc quod unum sit effectus Primi Principii et aliud non." Q. in Metaph., ibid. 44.88-92. Ibid., p. 44.96-6. v
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ESSE AND ESSENTIA IV. CRITICISM OF THOMAS AQUINAS
Now that Siger has disposed of Avicenna's distinction between essence and existence, as interpreted by Albert the Great, he turns his critical attention to that of Thomas Aquinas. He sees Thomas as attempting to mediate between the metaphysics of Avicenna and Aristotle. According to Avicenna, existence is not of the essence of a creature but is added to it as a sort of accident, with the result that the concept (intentio) of thing (res) differs from the concept of being (ens). But this is contradictory to Aristotle, Siger says, for according to the Stagirite being is nothing apart from substance, quality, quantity and the other accidents. Siger is happy to see Thomas agree that existence cannot be an accidental condition (dispositio) of essence, but he is puzzled to find Thomas saying that existence, after all, is other than essence and added to it, "constituted as it were through the essence or from the principles of the essence." Siger is quoting from Thomas' commentary on the Metaphysics-. For although the existence (esse) of a thing is other than its essence, we should not understand that it is something added in the manner of an accident, but it is as it were constituted through the principles of the essence. Thomas' statement is no doubt enigmatic and invites misunderstanding. Esse is said to be 'something' (aliquid), though for Aquinas it is not an essence or quid. Esse is also said to be constituted through the principles of 27
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"Alia est hie opinio, et fuit Thomae de Aquino." Q. in Metaph., ed. Maurer, p. 32.87. Siger's use of the past tense would indicate that Thomas was dead. He died in 1274. Siger uses the present tense when speaking of Albert, who died in 1280. See above, n. 24. In ms M Siger appears to place another opinion between Albert's and Thomas'. See ed. Dunphy, p. 44.7-9. The other mss make it clear that these lines are intended as the beginning of Thomas' doctrine. "Ponunt autem quidam, modo medio, quod esse est aliquid additum essentiae rei, non pertinens ad essentiam rei, nec ponunt quod sit accidens, sed est aliquid additum quasi per essentiam constitutum sive ex principiis essentiae." Ibid., p. 44.1 -13. Siger refers to Aristotle's Metaphysics X, 2, 1054al7-19: "... being is nothing apart from substance or quality or quantity ..." For Thomas, esse is not properly speaking an accident of essence, but he sometimes calls it an accident in the sense that it is not part of the essence. See Quodl. XII, 5. On this point see J. Owens, "The Accidental and Essential Character of Being in the Doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas," Mediaeval Studies 20 (1958), 19-23; reprinted in St. Thomas on the Existence of God. Collected Papers of Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R.-, ed. J. R. Catan (Albany, 1980), pp. 63-73. "Esse enim rei quamvis sit aliud ab ejus essentia, non tamen est intelligendum quod sit aliquod superadditum ad modum accidentis, sed quasi constituitur per principia essentiae." St. Thomas, Metaph., IV, 2, n. 558. "Et hoc quidem esse in re est, et est actus entis resultans ex principiis rei, sicut lucere est actus lucentis." Sent., Ill, d. 6, q. 2, a. 2; Resp.; ed. Moos (Paris, 1933), III, p. 238. 27
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the essence, but the meaning of 'constituted' is not clear. Esse cannot be constituted by the essence or its principles as by an efficient cause, for an efficient cause must exist in order to exercise its causality, and without esse it does not exist. The word constituere can also have the meaning of determining or fixing. It is in this sense that essence as it were constitutes the esse of a thing. Through the essential principles of matter and form (and especially through form) the esse they receive is determined or fixed in its proper species. Thus the essence of man determines his existence to be human. In other words, the essence with its form is the formal cause of the thing's esse. Siger's reaction to Thomas' statement is expressed differently in the four manuscripts of his Metaphysics. According to M, Siger remarked, "Although the conclusion is true, I do not understand the way it is stated." C reads: "Whatever may be said of the conclusion, it is not properly expressed." PI has Siger saying: "Perhaps I do not understand this, but it seems to be unreasonable." P is more forthright, claiming that Thomas has flatly contradicted himself. To Siger, Thomas' statement is contradictory because it asserts that esse is other than the substantial essence of a thing and yet it is not an accident, which alone fulfills this condition. Thomas' conclusion is true when correctly interpreted, according to Siger, for existence or being does result from the union of form with matter, which are the essential principles of a thing. Thomas' mistake was to claim that esse is over and above the three known constituents of reality: the matter and form of substance and its accidents. In effect this is to posit a fourth nature in things: ponere quartam naturam in entibus. We would not want a clearer proof that Siger lives in the philosophical world of Aristotle, where there is no room for a metaphysical principle that it not in the order of nature or essence. For Thomas, esse is not at all in that order. It is the actuality of form or essence, by which an essence exists and 30
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"Non autem potest esse quod ipsum esse sit causatum ab ipsa forma vel quiditate rei, causatum dico sicut a causa efficiente." De ente et essentia, IV; ed. Roland-Gosselin (Paris, 1948), p. 35.6-8. "Esse autem in quibusdam rebus habet aliquid quasi principium: forma enim dicitur esse principium essendi." Contra gentiles, I, 26, n. 4. See De veritate, 27, 1, ad 3. "Etsi conclusio vera sit, modum ponendi non intelligo." Q. in Metaph.; ed. Dunphy, p. 45.14. "Sed quidquid sit de conclusione, modus ponendi non est conveniens." Ed. Maurer, p. 32.91. "Sed hoc dicere, quia [quod] forsan non intelligo, videtur esse irrationabile." Ed. Vennebusch, p. 180.144-145. "Dicere quod esse non est essentia rei, sed aliquid constitutum per essentiae principia, est idem affirmare et negare, cum constitutum per essentiae principia nihil aliud sit quam ipsa res ex illis constituta." Ed. Maurer, p. 398.15-17. Q. in Metaph.-, ed. Dunphy, p. 45.20. 30
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is called a being. With his existential understanding of esse he added a new dimension to metaphysics that was difficult for a mind like Siger's to fathom, steeped as he was in the philosophy of Aristotle as interpreted by Averroes. Along with Thomas' notion of esse, Siger finds the Thomist notion of a real composition of esse and essence in all creatures foreign to Aristotle. The Stagirite taught a composition of form and matter in sensible substances, but he says nothing about a composition in the substance of the celestial Intelligences. Thomas argues that since the Intelligences (or angels) are not composed of matter and form, they must be composed of m e and essence. He bases this on the "famous proposition" that eveiy substance below the First M s short of its simplicity by being composed. Siger grants some probability to the proposition but he sees no basis for it in the philosophy of Aristotle. He wonders where the proposition was taken from. If it is true, he adds, beings may fall short of the simplicity of the First Being and be diversified in other ways than Thomas proposes. They may, for instance, have a greater or lesser degree of potentiality, or participate to a greater or lesser extent in the pure actuality of the First Being. Like numbers, which are diversified in species by their distance from unity, substances have different natures and are more or less perfect according as they approach the First Being. If one still insists on composition in the Intelligences, Siger points out that only the Primary Being knows without intelligible species; all other cognitive beings know their objects through species, which are different from the substances of those beings. Thomas reaches the peak of his inquiry into God when he proves that God, and he alone, is esse per se subsistens. By this he means that God is the only subsistent act of existing. All other beings have esse (habens esse); he alone is the pure act of existing. It is his veiy nature 'to be'. Other beings are not the pure act of existing but receive a measure of existence in proportion to their natures. Thus the act of existing is multiplied and diversified in them, whereas there is no plurality or diversity in the divine act of existing. Moreover, as participants in esse, their essences or natures differ from their received acts of existing. 33
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"Dicendum quod ipsum esse est perfectissimum omnium; comparatur enim ad omnia ut actus. Nihil enim habet actualitatem, nisi inquantum est; unde ipsum esse est actualitas omnium rerum, et etiam ipsarum formarum." Sum. theol., I, 4, 1, ad 3. See E. Gilson, Le thomisme, 6th ed. (Paris, 1965), pp. 169-189; The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. L. K. Shook (New York, 1956), pp. 29-35. Sum. theol., I, 50, 2; Contra gentiles II, 52-54. "Respondeo dicendum quod omne quod procedit a Deo in diversitate essentiae, deficit a simplicitate ejus." Sent., I, d. 8, q. 5, a. 1, sol; ed. Mandonnet (Paris, 1925), I, p. 226. Q. in Metaph., ad 7; ed. Dunphy, pp. 35.83-36.6; ed. Maurer, pp. 47.5-48.30. Sum. theol. I, 3, 4; I, 4, 1-2. 33
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After accurately summarizing this Thomistic doctrine, Siger asks, "If I denied that there is only one esse per se subsistens how would you prove it?" And indeed no proof is possible, given Siger's notion of esse as equivalent to ens. In his language, an esse per se subsistens would be an ens subsistens or substance, and how could you prove that there is only one substance? Thomas' proof of the oneness of esse per se subsistens is valid only if you grant him his notion of esse. Since the notion is unintelligible to Siger, so too is Thomas' proof. Neither can Siger make any sense of Thomas' distinction between a recipient of esse and the received esse, or the diversification of esse by the diversity of its recipients. If being were a genus, Siger remarks, it could be diversified by the addition of differences, but Aristotle has shown that being cannot be a genus. So being cannot be diversified in this way but by the variety of its natures (rationes). It can be substance or quality or quantity or one of the other categories described by Aristotle. In any case, Siger concludes, nothing can be added to the nature of being, for every nature is a nature of being: ratio essendi non potest esse ratio addita, quia omnis ratio est essendi ratio? In the third book of his Metaphysics, when discussing participation, Siger returns to the question of the relation of existence (esse) to essence. He asks whether a participating essence differs from its participated esse. Thomas contends that they do differ, but Siger replies to him by distinguishing between univocal participation and participation by imitation. The former is the sharing of a recipient in a univocal perfection such as whiteness. In this case there is a composition of the thing that is white with its whiteness. The latter — participation by imitation — is the sharing of a recipient in a non-univocal or analogous perfection such as being, and this mode of participation demands no composition of recipient and perfection received. All beings in some way can imitate the First Being without being composed of esse and a nature participating esse. In this perspective the First Being alone is being by essence; all other beings exist by participating in the First 38
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"Item, esse secundum quod esse non potest esse diversum; si igitur debeat diversificari, oportet quod sit ex aliquo sibi addito; sed esse per se subsistens non habet aliquod sibi additum per quod diversificetur; ergo esse per se subsistens est unum tantum. Et si hoc, tunc oportet quod in omnibus aliis sit aliquid unitum ipsi esse aut non esset solum unum esse per se subsistens, ita quod differunt natura esse participans et esse." Q. in Metaph.-, ed. Dunphy, arg. 10, p. 43.59-64. To this argument of St. Thomas Siger replies: "Ad aliud: non potest esse per se subsistens nisi unum tantum. Si negavero tibi illud, quomodo probares?" Ibid., p. 48.36-37. See St. Thomas, Contra gentiles II, 52, n. 2. Q. in Metaph.-, ed. Dunphy, pp. 48.36-49.49; ed. Maurer, pp. 36.21-37.34. See Aristotle, Metaph. Ill, 3, 998b21. Q. in Metaph. Ill, q. 21; ed. Dunphy, p. 149. Sum. theol. I, 75, 5, ad 4. 38
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Being: "Dicimus enim tantum Ens primum esse ens per essentiam, et omnia alia entia esse participatione Primi Entis." Siger here opens his metaphysics to the influence of Neoplatonism, but it must be admitted that it sits uneasily with his Aristotelianism, according to which every thing is a being by essence. 42
V. SIGER'S SOLUTION OF THE QUESTION
All the main elements of Siger's solution of his original question are now at hand. He asked whether being or existence in caused beings belongs to their essence or is something added to it. His criticisms of Albert and Thomas make it clear that, in his view, existence belongs to the essence of all caused beings and is not something added to it. Existence, moreover, "belongs" to essence in the sense that it is really identical with it. In Siger's words, there is no "compositio realis esse et essentiae." Is there a conceptual distinction between esse and essentia, and if so, how is it to be understood? Notice that it would be the same as the distinction between ens and res, for as we have seen, in Siger's language ens is equivalent to esse and res to essentia. Now he distinguishes between three kinds of terms that are interchangeable as predicates of a subject. 1) Two terms may signify the same essence and in the same way. These are synonyms, like two names of the same person. Ens and res are not synonyms, for if they were one would add no meaning to the other; but ens does add the intelligible note of actuality to res. 2) Two terms may differ in that one signifies an essence and the other does not, but it adds something to the essence without limiting the extension of the original term. An example is 'man' and 'capable of laughter'. These terms are predicable of the same subjects as signiying two different formal concepts (intellectus formales diversi). 3) Two terms may signify the same essence and be predicable of the same subjects, but they denote two different ways the mind conceives the essence: in the manner of an act or in the manner of a state (unum per modum actus, aliud per modum habitus). Examples are 'to run' and 'a running', and 'to live' and 'animated'. This is the way the terms ens and res are distinguished: Now I say that res and ens signify the same essence, but they are not synonyms, nor do they signify two concepts (intentiones) like 'man' and 'capable of laughter'. Rather, they signify the same concept, one in the manner of an act (this is what I call ens), the other in the manner of a state (this is what I call res). 43
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Q. in Metaph., Ill, q. 20, ed. Maurer, p. 122.11-12; III, q. 21, ed. Dunphy, p. 149. Q. in Metaph., Intro, q. 2 (ms P); ed. Maurer, p. 399.57. This is opposed to Thomas, De veritate, 27, 1, ad 8m. "Modo dico quod res et ens significant eandem essentiam, non tamen sunt nomina 42 43
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In manuscript C the wording is slightly different: Now res and ens are convertible terms of the third kind, for they signify the same essence but in different ways. Ens denotes the substance of anything in the manner of an act, because the notion (ratio) of being is taken from the act of being. Res, however, denotes the substance of anything in the manner of a potency. In Siger's view, then, 'being' is not a different formal concept from 'thing', for if it were it would designate a really different essence. The two terms signify the same concept or essence but in different ways, 'being' denoting in a dynamic way what 'thing' denotes in a static way. The distinction between them is accordingly in the conceptual order, for the two terms correspond to two different ways the mind conceives the same thing. Hence existence and essence differ in their meaning (ratio). The distinction, however, is not conceptual if by this is meant that the terms correspond to two different formal concepts. The notion of two modes of signification, per modum actus and per modum habitus, was not original with Siger. He owes it to contemporary logicians, probably to Peter of Spain, who preceded him as a master of arts at Paris and died c. 1277 as Pope John xxi. Nor was Siger the last to make use of Peter's doctrine of modes of signification in solving the problem of the relation between essence and existence. Shortly afterward Dietrich of Freiberg will resort to it in almost the same terms as Siger when resolving the same problem. 45
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synonyma nec significant duas intentiones sicut homo et risibile, sed significant eandem intentionem: unum tamen ut est per modum actus, ut hoc quod dico ens, aliud per modum habitus, ut res." Q. in Metaph.-, ed. Dunphy, p. 45.45-48. "Nunc autem res et ens convertuntur in suppositis isto tertio modo, quia significant essentiam eandem, modis tamen diversis. Ens enim significat substantiam uniuscuiusque per modum actus, quia ratio entis ab actu essendi sumitur. Res autem significat substantiam uniuscuiusque per modum potentiae magis." Q. in Metaph.-, ed. Maurer, pp. 33.26-34.30. It is difficult to see why the different modes of signification do not give rise to different concepts. According to Siger, "Aliquid enim vel ratio aliqua alia constituitur in audiente quando dicitur 'res ens', quam quando dicitur 'res per se'." Q. in Metaph.-, ed. Dunphy, p. 48.33-34. Ratio should here be understood as 'sense' or 'meaning' in contradistinction to an Avicennian intentio or Sigerian intellectus formalis. Siger claims that ens and res are different rationes for Avicenna but this is clearly to be taken in the sense of intentiones. Q. in Metaph., Intro.-, ed. Dunphy, p. 35.16. Using a modern distinction, perhaps we can say that for Siger 'being' and 'thing' have the same reference but different senses. Peter of Spain, Summule logicales, VII, 86; ed. L. M. De Rijk (Assen, 1972), p. 133. See A. Maurer, "The De Quiditatibus Entium of Dietrich of Freiberg and its Criticism ofThomistic Metaphysics." Mediaeval Studies 18 (1956), 173-174; reprinted below, pp. 177199. 45
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Siger's greatest debt, however, was not to the medieval modistae but to Averroes commenting on Aristotle's Metaphysics. He learned from Averroes that Avicenna made two mistakes in his belief that existence is something added to essence. First, he failed to distinguish between terms signifying different concepts and those signifying the same concept but in different ways. Confusing logic with metaphysics, he believed that there is a different essence corresponding to a different mode of signification, and since the mode of signification of existence differs from that of essence, he concluded that existence denotes something added to essence. Avicenna's second mistake was to confuse conditions (dispositions) added to a thing's essence, like the accidents white or black, with conditions that belong to the essence. As a result he misplaced existence among the accidental conditions of essence. He should have realized that if existence is an accident added to essence, another existence would have to be added to the first existence to account for its existence, and so on to infinity. If we are to avoid this absurdity, we have to acknowledge that a substance exists and is a being through itself and not through something added to it. Averroes, commenting on Aristotle, also taught Siger to distinguish between two kinds of problems: one regarding a genus (problema de genere), the other regarding an accident (problema de accidente). The former is a problem whose answer is in terms of the genus of a thing, whereas the answer to the latter kind of problem is in terms of something belonging accidentally to a thing. If it be asked 'What is the object before you?' and the object is a man, an appropriate answer is , 'He is an animal'. The predicate 'animal' is in the category of essence, indicating the genus of the subject. But if it be asked 'Is the man sitting?' the reply, 'The man is sitting' is not in terms of the essence or genus of the man but of something that may either belong or not belong to him. With this distinction in mind, Siger sees two possible answers to the problem, 'Does man exist?' or 'Is man a being?' If this is a problema de genere, the answer 'Man exists' or 'Man is a being' predicates being generically or essentially of him. But if it be taken as a problema de accidente, being is not predicated essentially of the subject but only accidentally. This is the case when the being predicated is the being the mind gives to a thing by knowing it. This is 'being in the mind', which Averroes called 'diminished being' (ens diminutum) in contrast to the full and perfect being a thing has 49
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in reality. Since it is not essential but accidental to a thing that it be known, 'being in the mind' belongs to a thing accidentally and not essentially. Siger can now be more precise in answering his original question: "Does the being of caused things belong to their essence?" The being intended is not 'being in the mind' but real or extramental being in one of the ten categories, for example substance, quality or quantity. Consequently being as here understood is not an accidental but an essential predicate. How did so many illustrious men come to believe that 'is' belongs to the essence of only the First Being or God? Siger finds some truth in what they say, for "existence (esse) signifies essence in the manner of the greatest actuality," and the Primary Being is most actual, with no admixture of potentiality. All other beings are partly actual and partly potential. Accordingly existence is more properly the effect of the Primary Being, and it belongs to his essence more truly than to other beings: ad essentiam Primi magis pertinet esse. It is with this ontology, though couched in somewhat different language, that Siger resolves the question "Is this true: a man is an animal if no man exists?" Some authors are of the opinion, he reports, that if no man actually exists, man would still remain with the being of an essence (esse essentiae), and so it would be true to say that man is an animal, but it would be false to add that he exists, because 'exists' as a predicate means actual existence (esse actuale). The argument is invalid, in Siger's view, because it presupposes that man can have essential being without actual existence, whereas actual existence 51
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"Averroes V Metaphysicae dicit sic: dictio 'homo est' uno modo est problema de genere, alio modo de accidente. Secundum quod praedicatur esse diminutum vel esse in intellectu (ms effectu), sic est problema de accidente. Sed sic dictum 'homo est', secundum quod praedicatur esse non diminutum, sed qualitativum vel quantitativum, sic <est> problema de genere. Sed in problemate tali est praedicatio essentialis." Q. in Metaph., ed. Dunphy, p. 43.65-70. For the notion of ens diminutum see A. Maurer, "Ens diminutum: a Note on its Origin and Meaning," Mediaeval Studies 12 (1950), 216-222. "Verum est quod Boethius et alii magni dixerunt quod res est id quod est ex seipsa, esse autem habet ex Primo Principio; et in solo Primo Principio posuerunt multi 'est' esse pertinens ad essentiam. Illud aliquid veritatis habet, quia esse signiflcat essentiam per modum actus maximi; sed convenit substantiae rei habere naturam et modum actus secundum quod effectus Primi Principii; ideo potest dici quod esse est ex Primo Principio magis proprie et de aliis minus proprie. Item, esse videtur actum primum significare; sed nulla est natura in rebus quin ad naturam potentiae accedat ex aliquo principio; ideo ad essentiam Primi magis pertinet esse." Q. in Metaph.; ed. Dunphy, p. 46.65-74. See Boethius, De hebdomadibus; PL 64, 1311 BC. Quaestio utrum haec sit vera: homo est animal, nullo homine existente-, ed. B. Bazan, pp. 53-66. The question is dated after 1268, before 1270. See ibid., p. 25. In his Q. in Metaph. IV, q. 21, Siger debates the question "Utrum nomen idem significet et univoce re existente et non existente"; ed. Dunphy, pp. 201-203. 51
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belongs to his essential being. Actual existence is "the actualizing of essence," and this is implied by a thing's essential being. This is a different language from the one Siger uses in his Metaphysics but his meaning is the same: being or existence is part and parcel of a thing's essence. Any doubt we may have is quickly dispelled by his assertion that being purely and simply (ens simpliciter) belongs to the very nature of man, whereas being for a limited time belongs to individuals like Socrates and Plato. This implies the eternity and necessity of the human species. Individuals live only for a while, but Siger affirms that it is contradictory to say that man himself can die by the death of all individual humans, for non-being is opposed to his genus or generic nature (oppositum generis seu generalis). Siger qualifies his claim that being is a genus, for as a good Aristotelian he knows that it is not; but it functions in his philosophy similarly to true genera like 'substance' and 'animal'. Though being is predicated analogously (that is, per prius and per posterius) of substance and accidents, and generally of caused beings, like a genus it signifies the essence of the subject. The publication in 1972 of Siger's Quaestiones super Librum de causis adds a new chapter to his teaching on essence and existence. The commentary, dated between 1274 and 1276, is almost certainly Siger's last known work. As the editor, A. Marlasca shows, it betrays the pervasive influence of Thomas Aquinas, including his notion of a distinction between the nature and esse of the Intelligences or angels. The editor cautions the reader, however, that Siger's doctrine in the commentary is not veiy clear on this point. In his commentary on the Metaphysics Siger acknowledges his inability to understand Thomas' teaching on essence and existence. Later, through his reading of Thomas' Summa theologiae he appears to have gained a considerable knowledge of it and, what is more, to have accepted it as his own. 54
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Quaestio utrum haec sit vera, p. 54.52-66. Ibid., p. 57.31-32. See Siger of Brabant, De aeternitate mundi; ed. B. Bazan, pp. 113-136. Q. in Metaph., Ill, com. 3; ed. Maurer, p. 115.38-40. " Quaestio utrum haec sit vera, p. 57.38-40. Q. in Metaph., Ill, com.; ed. Dunphy, pp. 121-123; III, 12, ed. Maurer, pp. 101-102. Being is not predicated of caused beings purely equivocally or univocally but analogously. See Q. in Metaph., Ill, 8; ed. Dunphy, p. 103.83-87. In msM Siger says: "... ratio entis praedicatur de omnibus rationibus essendi univoce." Q. in Metaph., Introd., q. 7, ed. Dunphy, p. 49.48-49. But this is not found in the other mss. Les Quaestiones super librum de causis de Siger de Brabant-, ed. A. Marlasca (Louvain, Paris, 1972). Ibid., q. 22. See Introduction, p. 21. The editor has conveniently gathered the main texts of the Quaestiones on the distinction between essence and existence, p. 21, n. 20. 54
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If this is true, his notion of being changed radically in the few years between his commentaries on the Metaphysics and the De causis, but this would not be an isolated case of a profound development in doctrine. It has been shown that his conception of the human intellect also underwent a considerable evolution under the influence of Thomas Aquinas. The influence of Thomas is readily apparent in Siger's treatment of the question whether an Intelligence is composed of matter and form. In writing it he certainly had before him Thomas' corresponding question on composition in the angels in the Summa theologiae. Following Thomas, Siger affirms that, although an Intelligence is not composed of matter and form, it does have some composition and potentiality. "For, since an Intelligence," Siger writes, "is not being in the primary sense, it is a being such that it has existence (esse habet), and the nature of the Intelligence is related to existence (esse) as potency to act." This recalls Thomas' statement that "the nature itself (of an angel) is related to esse as potency to act." Again, Siger writes that, "although existence (esse) in the Intelligences is not limited and determined by matter, it is nevertheless "contracted" to the nature receiving existence (esse), which in them is related to their existence (esse) as potency to act. The First Cause, however, is pure existence subsisting of itself (esse purum per se subsistens) without matter or a nature receiving that existence." These statements can hardly be interpreted in the sense of a conceptual distinction between existence and essence. The esse of an Intelligence is said to be received and limited by its essence as the form of a material thing is determined by matter. In the former case, as in the latter, a real distinction seems to be intended. In his De causis Siger also accepts Thomas' doctrine of a distinction between the essence of an Intelligence (or angel) and its power of understanding. According to Siger, 62
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See F. Van Steenberghen, Maitre Siger, pp. 338-383. E. P. Mahoney, "Saint Thomas and Siger of Brabant Revisited," The Review of Metaphysics 27 (1974), 531-553. Les Quaestiones super librurn de causis, q. 22, pp. 91-94. See St. Thomas, Sum. theol. I, 50, 2. "Intelligentia enim cum non sit primo ens, sic est ens quod esse habet et quod natura intelligentiae comparatur ad esse eius sicut potentia ad actum." Ibid., p. 93.64-66. "Unde ipsa natura (scil. angeli) comparatur ad suum esse sicut potentia ad actum." St. Thomas, Sum. theol. I, 50, 2, ad 3m. In q. 37, Contra of his Quaestiones super librum de causis, Siger writes, "In primis substantiis est hoc verum-. habent enim potentiam ad suum esse, cum non sint suum esse." But already in his Metaphysics he held that an Intelligence is not its esse but is potential to it. See Q. in Metaph., Ill, 8, ed. Dunphy, p. 105.33-34. "... licet in intelligentiis esse non sit finitum et terminatum ad materiam, est tamen contractum ad naturam esse recipientem, quae in eis se habet ad esse earum sicut potentia ad actum. Causa autem prima est esse purum per se subsistens sine materia vel natura recipiente illud esse." Les Quaestiones super librum de causis, q. 53, p. 184.35-39. Siger seems to be following the Summa theologiae, ibid., ad 4m. 62
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If the esse of an Intelligence, which is the act of essence (actus essentiae), is distinctfromits act of understanding, which is the act of the intellective power, then the essence of an Intelligence, whose act is esse, is also distinctfromthe intellective power, whose act is understanding. This is a concise summary of Thomas' argument that the essence of an angel is distinct from its power of understanding: Since every power is related to an act, the diversity of powers must be according to the diversity of acts; and on this account it is said that each proper act corresponds to its proper power. But in every creature the essence differs from the being (esse), and is compared to it as potentiality is to act.... Now the act to which the operative power is compared is operation. But in the angel to understand is not the same as to be (esse), nor is any operation in him, nor in any other created thing, the same as his being. Hence the angel's essence is not his power of understanding, nor is the essence of any creature its power of operation. As we have seen, in his Metaphysics Siger granted some probability to Thomas' claim that everything except the First Being or God falls short of his simplicity by being composed. Siger did not absolutely reject the principle, but he did not favor it because it was not in the works of Aristotle. He suggested that perhaps beings recede from the First Being not by composition but by an increasing degree of potentiality. In his De causis he appears to have changed his mind. Though he does not explicitly say that existence and essence in caused beings are really distinct or form a real composition, he implies these Thomistic doctrines; and if this is so, he rallies to Thomas' account of participation by the composition of essence and esse. Siger's approach to Thomas' metaphysics of esse as really distinct from essence does not prove that he became a Thomist. Although Thomas' influence on Siger's De causis was, according to its editor, "preponderante et decisive," on occasion Siger criticizes the positions of Thomas. But the De causis suggests that at the close of his career Siger moved a considerable distance from a metaphysics of substance and essence inspired by Aristotle and Averroes toward the metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas. 67
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"Si igitur esse intelligentiae, quod est actus essentiae, distinctum est ab intelligere, quod est actus potentiae intellectivae, tunc et essentia intelligentiae, cuius actus est esse, distinguetur a potentia intellectiva, cuius actus est intelligere." De causis, q. 38, p. 146.16-20. St. Thomas, Sum. theol., I, 54, 3 (Pegis translation). Q. in Metaph.-, ed. Dunphy, pp. 47.8-48.13. See F. Van Steenberghen, Maitre Siger, p. 292. See Les Quaestiones, Introduction, p. 30. For the evidence for the authenticity of this work, see ibid., pp. 15-25. 67
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10 Between Reason and Faith: Siger of Brabant and Pomponazzi on the Magic Arts * Henri Busson's inquiry into the sources of rationalism in the French literature of the Renaissance led him to conclude that modern rationalism stems principally from Italy and, in particular, from the University of Padua. He concluded further that the rationalism of this school was in continuity with the Averroism of the Middle Ages, having received from the Averroists of the thirteenth century the fundamental principle of rationalism: the opposition of faith and reason. Indeed, he asserted that the rebirth of rationalism in the sixteenth century was above all the rebirth of Averroism. For it was this movement, as transformed at Padua, which determined the precise point of attack of free-thought. From this point of view, European rationalism can be said to date from the thirteenth centuiy. In coming to this conclusion, 1
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* This article represents a section of work done as a Fellow of the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation. "La source principale du rationalisme moderne, c'est ritalie, et dans lTtalie, l'ecole de Padoue. Elle avait re?u, en effet, des averroi'stes du xm siecle le principe fondamental du rationalisme: l'opposition de la foi et de la raison; elle l'applique comme Averroes aux dogmes de la Creation, de la Providence, de l'lmmortalite." H. Busson, Les Sources et le developpement du rationalisme dans la litterature franfaise de la Renaissance (1533-1601) (Paris, 1922), pp. xn-xm. On Paduan Averroism, see E. Troilo, Averroismo e aristotelismo padovano (Padua, 1939); same author, Per I'averroismo padovano e veneto (Venice, 1940). For the introduction of Averroism into Italy, cf. P. Renucci, LAventure de Vhumanisme europeen au moyen-age (Paris, 1953), pp. 151-158. Anneliese Maier olfers evidence that Bologna, not Padua, was the cradle of Italian Averroism. See her articles: "Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des italienischen Averroismus," Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken, XXXIII (1944), 136-157; "Die Bologneser Philosophen des 14. Jahrhunderts," Studi e Memorie per la storia dell'Universita di Bologna, Nuova serie 1 (1955), 297-310. For the latest account of Renaissance Averroism and rationalism see The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy ed. C. B. Schmitt et al. (Cambridge, 1988). "On pourrait dire que la renaissance du rationalisme au xvi' siecle fiit surtout la renaissance de 1'averrolsme. C'est lui qui, transforme par le centre d'etudes de Padoue, fixa les points d'attaque precis de la libre-pensfee. En tant que le rationalisme europeen en est issu, il date du xm* siecle." H. Busson, op. cit., p. 29. 1
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Busson was essentially in agreement with J. Charbonnel who had pointed out, in his study of Italian free-thought in the sixteenth century, the impact of heterodox Averroist ideas on the European mind through Italian writers of the Renaissance. Busson singled out Pietro Pomponazzi as the central figure in the rationalist circle of Padua in the sixteenth century. He did not claim him to be the father of Paduan rationalism, but the man who took up its ideas, developed and systematized them, and through his writings and immediate disciples left an indelible stamp upon both Italian and French libertinism. In particular, he made a study of Pomponazzi's treatise on the magic arts, the De Incantationibus, and showed the influence of its naturalist approach to problems of the marvellous and miraculous upon such men as Cardan, Campanella, Cesalpini, Vanini, Wier and Montaigne. The main source of information for medieval and renaissance Averroism used by J. Charbonnel and H. Busson was Ernest Renan's Averroes et iAverroisme, the first edition of which appeared at Paris in 1852. Subsequent historians of medieval philosophy have found much to modify and correct in this work, but they have confirmed its main thesis of the existence of a medieval Aristotelianism influenced by Averroes and lasting into the Renaissance. We now know much more of the origins of this movement in the thirteenth century and of Siger of Brabant who was its leader at that period. So too, precious light has been thrown on the influence of Siger in succeeding centuries and on his connection with the Renaissance. The pages which follow aim at making a small contribution to the latter aspect of Siger's thought. In his commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics he expresses his views on the origin of the marvels attributed to the magic arts, and his handling of the problem reveals striking similarities to that of 3
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J. R. Charbonnel, La Pensee italienne au xvf siecle et le courant libertin (Paris, 1919), pp. 713-714. See H. Busson, op. cit., p. 30. See the introduction to his French translation of this work under the title Les Causes des merveilles de la nature ou les enchantements (Paris, 1930); same author, "L'Influence du De Incantationibus de P. Pomponazzi sur la pensee frangaise 1560-1650," Revue de litterature comparee, IX (1929), 305-347; La Pensee franfaise de Charron a Pascal (Paris, 1933), pp. 316-378. See F. Van Steenberghen, Maitre Siger de firaZ>am(Louvain-Paris, 1977); Aristotle in the West (Louvain, 1955), pp. 198-229; "Siger of Brabant," The Modern Schoolman, XXIX (1951), 11 -27; "Nouvelles recherches sur Siger de Brabant et son ecole," Revue philosophique de Louvain, LIV (1956), 130-147. (F. Van Steenberghen dates the beginning of Latin Averroism from the fourteenth century). E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York, 1955), pp. 387-402. See B. Nardi, Sigieri di Brabante nel pensiero del rinascimento italiano (Rome, 1945). 3
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Pomponazzi in his De Incantationibus. There is a similar opposition of the religious and rational approaches to the marvellous and occult, and a similar effort to find a naturalistic explanation of them. They also share a similar philosophical view of the universe and of the causal relationship between the spiritual and material worlds, largely inspired by Aristotle and his commentator Averroes. No evidence is available that Pomponazzi read Siger's Metaphysics or that Siger exercised a direct influence upon him. Some of Siger's writings, it is true, were read in Pomponazzi's circle, and a direct influence is not impossible. More likely, however, the similarities in their thought are due to the use of common sources and to the persistence in the sixteenth century of the Averroist tradition which Siger did so much to establish in the thirteenth. 8
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Siger of Brabant takes up the problem of the origin of magical phenomena quite incidentally in his lectures on Aristotle's Metaphysics. While treating of the notion of power in Book V, he abruptly raises the question of the power responsible for the wonders accomplished through the magic arts. This offers him an opportunity to give his opinion on a subject much debated among the philosophers and theologians of his day, and also to voice his disapproval of St. Thomas Aquinas' treatment of the magic arts in the latter's Disputed Questions De Potentia Dei. As we shall see, he was conversant with St. Thomas' views on the subject, and he took exception to them not only on the grounds of their being philosophically dubious, but also because he considered them an infelicitous mingling of rational and religious notions, which he himself always strove to keep separate. Like all men of his century, Siger of Brabant was convinced that the magic arts could bring about wonderful effects, such as the foretelling of future events, the manifestation of secrets, and the finding of treasures and thefts. The question remains as to the power lying behind these marvels. Siger 9
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See B. Nardi, op. cit. Siger's Question on the magic arts is contained in a brief redaction in the Paris manuscript of his commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics, edited by C. GraifF, Siger de Brabant Questions sur la Metaphysique (Louvain, 1948), pp. 362-363.(51 >-(93); reedited and corrected by A. Maurer, Siger de Brabant. Quaestiones in Metaphysicam V, 10 (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1983), pp. 445.1-446.38. It is contained in a more complete form in the Cambridge manuscript, Peterhouse 152, edited A. Maurer, ibid., V, 41, pp. 278-287. All references are to this edition unless otherwise noted. Siger's Question on magic is not contained in the Munich and Vienna manuscripts, edited by W. Dunphy, Siger de Brabant. Quaestiones in Metaphysicam (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1981). See St. Thomas, Quaestiones disputatae De Potentia Dei VI, 10 (Rome, 1942). 8 9
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observes that we judge of any power by its operation, and marvellous operations, such as those of the magic arts, reveal a superior and marvellous power. As to the identity of this power, he thinks two opinions worthy of consideration: the effects of the magic arts are brought about either by separated (i.e. immaterial) intelligences or by the heavenly bodies. In support of the former view Siger cites Hermes Trismegistus (whom he calls an expert in magic), and also the Arabian philosopher Avicenna. Avicenna, he says, considered bodies subject to the separated substances and no less obedient to them than to corporeal agents. These substances can directly cause rainfall and similar natural phenomena. In proof of this, Avicenna pointed out that the human soul can bring about changes in its own body simply through its ideas. For example, a terrified man grows cold and a passionate man hot. From this he argued that a soul liberated for the most part from emotions can bring under subjection not only its own body but other bodies as well. It can cure others by its will alone, or give them the evil eye even at a distance. And if our soul can do these things, much more so can higher powers produce marvellous and superior effects in matter. Siger is here referring to a passage in Avicenna's De Anima in which the Arabian philosopher describes the power of the human soul over matter. In accord with his Platonic conception of the soul, he does not think that it is immersed in the body, but is rather its guardian. Matter is accordingly under its sway, and through its intellectual power it can produce miraculous effects in the inanimate as well as the animate world. The conclusion that the 11
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"Consequenter, quia virtus attenditur ex operatione, et operationes mirabiles repraesentant virtutem excellentem et mirabilem, cum appareant quaedam operationes factae secundum artes magicas, ut enuntiationes futurorum et manifestationes occultorum, ut inventio thesauri vel furti vel ceterae huiusmodi operationes mirabiles, quaeritur utrum istae operationes sunt a virtute corporum vel a substantia aliqua intellectual) separata, secundum quod quidam crediderunt." Siger de Brabant, Metaph., V, 41; pp. 278.5-279.11. On Hermes and magic, see A. Festugiere, La revelation d'Hermes Trismegiste I (Paris, 1944), pp. 283-308. "Item, ad idem videtur opinio Avicennae. Vult enim quod materia corporalis obedit conceptioni substantiae separatae non minus quam corporeis agentibus. Unde et dixit a substantia separata immediate casum quandoque pluviae fieri et alia huiusmodi. Probat autem hoc per signum, quia corpus nostrum manifeste transmutatur ad solam conceptionem animae nostrae, ut apparet in timentibus et frigefactis et in concupiscentibus calefactis. Et ex hoc progreditur, dicens quod cuius anima liberata est multum a passionibus sensibilibus, tali animae habet obedire non tantum corpus proprium sed etiam alienum. Et ideo ponit ex sola voluntate earundem corpora aliorum sanata esse. Ex hoc etiam ponunt fascinationis causam. Cum enim anima talis vehementer esset affecta in malivolentiam alicuius, et maxime pueri, eo quod tenerae complexionis, contingit ipsum ex hoc transmutari, etsi distans sit. Quod si intellectus noster talia potest, quanta magis virtutes superiores a materia penitus liberatae possunt materiam ad effectus mirabiles et excellentiores transmutare." Siger de Brabant, Metaph., p. 280.38-53. Avicenna, De Anima IV, 4 (Venice, 1508), fol. 20 D. 11
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separated substances in general have this power is not found in the passage Siger refers to, but he probably felt justified in drawing it in view of Avicenna's conception of the relationship between the spiritual and material worlds. As he points out later when criticizing Avicenna, the Arabian philosopher thought that all material forms were produced by the separated substances. The role of efficient causes in this world is simply to dispose matter to receive these forms. The separated substances are in effect creators or "givers of forms." In this view, the material world is directly under the control not only of human souls, but especially of the celestial Intelligences, who can directly bring about effects in it. The second theory mentioned by Siger differs from Avicenna's in that it ascribes the extraordinary effects of the magic arts not to special immaterial causes, but to the movement of the heavenly bodies: the general material causes which, according to Aristotle, produce all events in this world. Siger attributes this view to the Arabian philosopher Alkindi who, in his Theory of the Magic Art, explained the works of magic by the harmony of the celestial spheres. Aristotle, says Siger, is in agreement with this, at least in his intention or philosophical outlook. To these two opinions Siger adds another which, like the first, ascribes magical phenomena to immaterial Intelligences, but it describes these Intelligences as evil beings or demons, because it looks upon most magic as evil and as having an evil purpose. Three indications are given as proof that the results of magic are due to intelligent beings and not to the heavenly bodies. Magicians use definite prayers to produce definite effects. These words do not have their efficacy from the speaker, but from the intellectual substances to which they are addressed. Hence some superior intelligence is the cause of the wonders produced by magic. The same conclusion follows from the fact that magicians employ sensible figures and symbols, which have no active power to dispose matter to receive impressions from the heavenly bodies. 15
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Siger de Brabant, Metaph., p. 286.51-57. "In oppositum est Alkindus in tractatu suo De theoria rationis magicae. Vult enim expresse quod harmonia caelestis causa est openim factorum per artes illas." Ibid., p. 280.54-56. For Alkindi's ideas on magic, see L. Thorndyke, A History of Magic and Experimental Science I (New York, 1929), pp. 643-647. " "Item, huius opinionis videtur esse Aristoteles, ut apparet in intentione eius XII' huius et VIII' Phys. Ex quibus autem dictis eius hoc apparet, videbitur in dissolutione quaestionis." Siger de Brabant, Metaph., p. 280.61-63. See Aristotle, Metaph., XII, 8, 1073al3 ff. Phys., VIII, 8, 9. " "Quidam enim volunt quod opera ista causata sunt a virtute substantiae intellectualis separatae et substantiae malae quam demonem appellant, quia plura operum talium mala sunt et fiunt ad finem malum." Siger de Brabant, Metaph., p. 281.73-75. 15
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Finally, magicians use sacrifices and offerings which appear to have as their purpose homage to intelligent beings. All these are signs that the magic arts accomplish their wonders not through the heavenly bodies, but through intelligent beings called demons. Siger does not identify the upholders of this opinion, but it is not difficult to recognize them as Christian theologians such as St. Augustine and, in particular, St. Thomas Aquinas. In his De Civitate Dei St. Augustine has much to say about the role of demons in human affairs and magic. He pictures theurgists and sorcerers as entangled in the deceitful rites of demons who masquerade under the name of angels. The origin and success of magic are attributed to demons, who, he claims, are enticed by men to work marvels by the use of symbols, such as stones, plants, animals, incantations and ceremonies. St. Thomas takes up these notions in his De Potentia Dei when treating of miracles and the magic arts. He describes the two rival opinions of the philosophers regarding miracles — the Avicennian and Aristotelian — in much the same terms as Siger, which suggests the possibility that Siger used St. Thomas' treatise in preparing his own. To these opinions of the philosophers St. Thomas opposes the teaching of the Faith: sententia jidei. The Faith agrees with Avicenna that spiritual creatures can move bodies in place, but not that they can control matter at will. As Augustine says, matter is not subservient to the bidding of the wicked angels, but rather to the will of God, who alone grants this power. Consequently, Aquinas rejects the Avicennian notion that spiritual creatures can directly impress forms on matter. This, he asserts, is a prerogative of God, who alone has unlimited power over matter. As for the Aristotelian view, St. Thomas says that the Faith agrees that the separated substances cause the local movement of the heavenly bodies, but it maintains, contrary to Aristotelianism, that these creatures can, with the divine permission, move other bodies as well. 19
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Ibid., pp. 281.75-282.27. See St. Augustine, De Civitate DeiX, 9; CSEL 40, p. 460. For Augustine's teaching on demons, with its Platonic and Scriptural background, see R. H. Barrow, Introduction to St. Augustine. The City of God (London, 1950), pp. 208-218. See St. Augustine, ibid., XXI, 6; CSEL 40, p. 525. See St. Thomas, De Potentia Dei, VI, 3. See St. Thomas, ibid.; Summa Theol., I, 110, 2. St. Augustine, De Trinitate III, 8; PL 42, 875: "Non est putandum istis transgressoribus angelis ad nutum servire hanc visibilium rerum materiam, sed soli Deo." In his De Malo, XVI, 9 St. Thomas denies that demons or other spiritual substances can by their own power formally change bodies in the lower world, except by using material forces proportionate to the effects. See St. Thomas, De Potentia Dei, VI, 3. 19
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Neither Avicenna nor the Aristotelians, then, can furnish St. Thomas the theologian with an adequate answer to the question of the origin of the miraculous or marvellous. When he turns to discuss the magic arts, he is willing to concede to the Aristotelians that some magical phenomena, for example certain transmutations in matter, can be explained by the heavenly bodies working through powers and energies in our world. But by and large this explanation is inadequate, for there are certain results of magic that are altogether beyond the scope of material forces. For instance, through the magic arts spoken answers are caused to be heard; and it is plain that speech can come only from an intelligence. Hence these words must come from an intelligence, especially since the answers sometimes convey information about hidden matters beyond the reach of man's reason. Nor can it be said that this is done simply by tricking the imagination. In that case these voices would not be heard by all the bystanders. It follows that these answers proceed from an intelligence, and one beyond that of the magician himself. They must come from either good or bad spirits. Not from good spirits, because they would not associate with evil men, as most magicians are; nor would they cooperate in the evil-doing characterizing most magic. The only solution left is that the replies elicited by magicians come from evil spirits or demons. It is in order to carry out more easily their evil designs that demons allow themselves to be enticed by the magicians' art with its ritual of observing the stars, using material signs, and offering sacrifices, prayers and prostrations. In his De Operationibus occultis naturae St. Thomas makes the same point, using another of the proofs for the existence of demons cited above by Siger. Magicians, he says, use figures and images to produce their prodigies. But since these consist simply in artificial configurations and dispositions of matter, they have no active power to cause them, unless they serve as instruments for the demons. These, in brief, were the opinions on the magic arts current in the thirteenth century when Siger of Brabant took up the subject in his lectures in philosophy at the University of Paris. The Avicennian position held that spiritual substances, like the human soul and celestial Intelligences, directly cause magical phenomena. The Aristotelian position maintained that they were due to the forces of nature working through the power of the heavenly bodies. Finally, the Augustinian position, inspired both by Scripture and Platonism, held that demons were at work in the magic arts. 25
26
Ibid., VI, 10. St. Thomas, De operationibus occultis naturae, 3, 10, 11; Opuscula Omnia I (Paris, 1949), pp. 204, 209-210. 25 26
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Faced with these conflicting opinions, Siger confesses his lack of competence to settle the matter once and for all. It is difficult, he avows, to determine the power causing magical phenomena unless you are very skilled in the arts of magic. As a good Aristotelian, he knows that it belongs to those with experience to judge principles in the natural order. As for himself, he modestly disclaims any skill in these matters; but he will set out to resolve the problem as best he can by means of reason. Siger begins in his usual manner by distinguishing between what he knows and what he believes. "I know one thing," he says, "but I believe another"; unum scio, aliud autem credo. We can recognize in this terse formula his customary method of separating his rational, scientific knowledge from his religious beliefs. As far as Siger's scientific knowledge of the matter is concerned, he draws it as usual from Aristotle. I know, he continues, that it is Aristotle's intention that the works of the magicians are not accomplished by a separated intellectual nature whom we call a demon, but by the power of the heavenly bodies. As Aristotle shows, the metaphysician is not ignorant of the existence of separated substances. He has some knowledge of their nature, for he can prove that they are immaterial, immobile, eternal, actually understanding, and the like. As for their number, he reckons it according to the number of the movements of the heavenly bodies, which he proceeds to establish. He also shows that these celestial Intelligences can bring about new effects in the sublunary world only insofar as they are the final and efficient causes of the movement of the heavenly bodies. If we consider the direction of Aristotle's thought, then, two conclusions are evident. First, there are no separated substances of the sort we call demons, for they are not included among the efficient and final causes of the celestial movements. Secondly, separated intellectual substances have no 27
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"Qui non multum expertus est in talibus operationibus artium magicarum, difficile est eum diiudicare quae est virtus quae est principium talium operationum. Sensibilia enim principia sunt expertorum. Ideo ego, non expertus in talibus, secundum quod ratione ad hoc duci possum, a qua virtute procedant talia opera, intendo ostendere." Siger de Brabant, Metaph., p. 281.68-72. Ibid., p. 282.28. On Siger's attitude towards faith and reason, see E. Gilson, "La doctrine de la double verite," Etudes de philosophie medievale (Strasbourg, 1921), 51-69; same author, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York, 1955), pp. 398-399. F. Van Steenberghen, Maitre Siger de Brabant (Louvain-Paris, 1977), pp. 222-257. "Scio enim quod de intentione Aristotelis est quod opera facta per magos non sunt facta a nature intellectuali separata, quam daemonem dicimus, sed a virtute corporum caelestium," Siger de Brabant, Metaph., p. 282.28-31. Ibid., pp. 282.31-283.38. Siger refers to Aristotle's Metaph., XII, 7, 1072al8 ff. 21
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direct influence upon the sublunary world, but only through the intermediary of the heavenly bodies. In proof of this, Siger points to the eighth book of Aristotle's Physics, in which it is shown that any new event, whether proceeding from a voluntary or non-voluntary agent, can be attributed to an eternal, immobile cause only through the mediation of the heavenly bodies. This was a point Siger had already dealt with in commenting on the Metaphysics. In the third book he showed that if a new effect is produced, something new must have occurred in its cause. For every diversity in an effect happens because of a diversity in its cause: Omnis diversitas in effectu contingit ex diversitate in causa. Now, when something comes to be which before was not, a diversity is present, and so there must be some diversity in its cause. But absolutely no diversity is possible in the First Principle and the other eternal, immobile substances. Therefore they can bring no new effect into existence except by means of a cause which is subject to change. Now, the works accomplished through the magic arts are new, since they did not exist before. Hence, according to Aristotle, they cannot immediately proceed from the power of a separated intellectual substance. This is the conclusion at which human reason arrives when following the principles of Aristotle. Is it, however, a necessary conclusion of reason? Siger does not think so. The proposition that any new effect must proceed immediately from a cause in which something new occurs (hence not from an eternally unchangeable cause), depends upon the prior proposition that if a cause possesses everything whereby it is the cause of a given effect, the effect necessarily exists. If this latter proposition is true, an eternal, unchangeable cause could produce directly only an eternal and necessary effect, for it eternally and unchangeably is disposed to be its cause. So it could not immediately produce an effect which began in time. But Siger is convinced that the proposition in question is not necessary, but only probable. For it is a universal proposition drawn from individual cases of causality in the world about us, and it is then extended to all instances of causality. Such an inductive law, according to Siger, has only probable value: 32
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"Ex quo apparet de intentione Aristotelis esse duo, scilicet quod non sunt tales substantiae separatae quas daemones dicimus, cum non ponantur causae effectivae et finales motuum superiorum; quod etiam ab aliqua substantia intellectuali separata non possunt aliqui effectus novi in his inferioribus immediate causari, sed tantum mediantibus corporibus supracaelestibus. Ibid., p. 283.38-43. Ibid., p. 283.44-47. Ibid., Ill, 16, pp. 111-115. "Patet igitur de intentione Aristotelis esse quod talia opera facta per magicas artes, cum nova sint, non possunt immediate procedere a virtute alicuius substantiae intellectualis separatae." Ibid., V, 3, p. 283.54-57. 32
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Quando enim accipitur ex multis singularibus aliqua propositio universalis, et ex hoc quod ita est in multis, creditur esse ita in omnibus, accipitur propositio probabilis tantum. We know nothing of the way the First Cause acts except from our knowledge of causes in this world. We are certain, however, that its action is proportionate to its being, and that the being of the First Agent, as well as its mode of activity, far exceeds that of agents in our world. No wonder, then, that we cannot completely grasp the First Cause's mode of acting, and that we can fall into error in ascribing to it conditions applying to causes in the world about us. We can prove even by reason that a cause can be possessed of everything whereby it is the cause of a given effect, without that effect existing. For an effect is more dependent on a cause than vice versa. Now, effects remain in existence without their causes, as in the case of projectiles which continue to move even when their original movers are no longer in contact with them but only the adjacent parts of air or water. A fortiori, then, a cause can exist, in possession of everything whereby it is a cause, without its effect existing. This would indeed be astonishing, but not impossible. So even though it would be surprising if the First Agent existed eternally, while its effect did not, this would not be impossible. Siger in this way leaves open the possibility of accepting on faith God's creation of the world in time and the direct intervention in the material world of spiritual beings like demons. It is not absurd to believe this, even though human reason leads us to the opposite conclusion. Indeed, he remarks, there are some tenets of faith whose opposite seems to be more firmly supported by reason than the opposite of this one. Siger insists, however, that it does not come within the province of rational, scientific knowledge to assert the existence of demons. On that level he follows the direction of Aristotle's philosophy in denying their existence and in explaining the extraordinary effects ascribed to them by the action of the heavenly bodies. Strictly speaking, that is what he knows-, unum scio. Yet his faith leads him to believe something quite different: aliud autem credo. He writes that he does not intend to deny the existence of intellectual substances called demons, nor that some new effect can be directly produced by a separated intellectual substance. He believes, however, that many works of 36
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Ibid., Ill, 16, p. 113.93-96. Ibid., pp. 113.96-114.3. See Siger de Brabant, Quaesttones in Metaphysicam III, 19, ed. Dunphy, pp. 144.21-145.34. Metapk, III, 16; p. 114.5-18. Ibid., p. 114.19-24. 36 37
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the magic arts are not brought about directly by the power of such an intelligence, but by the power of the heavenly bodies. In explanation of this position, he points out that it is the very nature of science to be concerned with what happens always or in the majority of cases. The incidental does not fall within its compass. Now no universal truths can be laid down as to what prayers, sacrifices or signs are to be used so that a demon will produce a given effect at a given time. This depends on the demon himself, who can act only with God's permission. It follows that the works of demons do not fall within the scope of science. On the other hand, magic is both an art and a science, and as such it yields scientific knowledge. For instance, it tells us what forces produce magical effects, as well as the time when these effects should be produced. Since it does involve knowledge of this sort, the prodigies it accomplishes are not from the power of a demon or a separated intellectual substance. Rather, they come from the power of the heavenly bodies. A man who knows the positions of the stars, the powers of herbs, times and places, and other factors which dispose matter to receive many effects from the heavenly bodies, can by his art produce many excellent and marvellous works. As a result people marvel, and it is noised abroad that these works were produced by invoking the demons or by the power of some very exalted beings. The objection might be raised that in bringing about their prodigies magicians actually use prayers, sacrifices, and images, the purpose of which does not seem to be disposing matter but doing homage to intellectual beings. Siger replies that if magicians use prayers, sacrifices and rites, it is because they enjoy being admired by the people. They employ these signs as if they helped to produce magical effects, making it appear that they can call 40
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"Aliud autem credo. Non enim intendo negare tales substantias intellectuales quas daemones dicimus, nec quod a substantia aliqua intellectuali separata possit procedere immediate aliquid novum. Credo tamen quod opera talia, facta per artes magicas, non sunt facta immediate a virtute talis substantiae intellectualis, sed a virtute corporum caelestium." Metaph., V, 41, p. 283.58-62. Consequently Siger's refusal to deny the existence of demons or the creation of the world in time is owing to his faith and not to his rational knowledge. Ibid., pp. 283.63-284.99. "Item, si per artes magicas aliqui effectus mirabiles producantur, non fiunt a virtute talis substantiae intellectualis quam daemonem dicimus. Sed si per artem magicam aliqua talia fiant, ita ut eorum possit haberi ars et scientia, quando et ex quibus contingit ea produci, de necessitate fiunt a virtute corporum caelestium. Qui enim sciret determinates situs stellarum et virtutes herbarum, et loca et tempora, et alia quibus contingeret disponi materiam ad inductionem multorum effectuum a corporibus caelestibus, artificiose posset multos effectus nobiles et mirabiles producere. Et si qui tales effectus sic producantur, admiratio eorum est in causa eius quod vulgatum est talia opera fieri per invocationes daemonum, vel in virtute aliquarum causarum valde nobilium." Ibid., p. 285.7-18. 40
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to their aid demons and the power of superior beings. It may even be that some magicians are deceived in thinking that demonology is an art and science and consequently employ these prayers and images. But when they do so, they are not acting according to the art of magic. It might also be objected that many of the prodigies of the magic arts could not come about through the influence of the spheres or the heavenly bodies; for instance the moving of statues from place to place, their speaking by themselves and giving replies about the future; also the revelation of hidden things, like thefts, treasures and the like. In reply to this, Siger insists that even on the supposition that these things occur through the power of demons and not through the heavenly bodies, they cannot be the work of the art or science of magic, for, as he has shown, there is no universal truth concerning such matters. Nor does it prove anything to say that it is the common opinion that these things occur by the power of demons. With the savant's typical disdain for the opinion of the crowd, he says that many falsehoods are current among the people. In matters where the truth is extremely hidden, the common people are not to be believed: 43
[I]n his in quibus Veritas valde occulta est, non est vulgo credendum ... Et si
dicas quod vulgatum est, hoc non probat; multa enim falsa vulgata sunt. After replying in this fashion to the arguments in favour of the thesis that demons account for at least some magical phenomena (the first two of which we recognize as St. Thomas'), Siger turns to the Avicennian explanation of magic. We have already seen that, according to the Arabian philosopher, matter in the sublunary world is subject to the influence of the ideas of separated Intelligences even more than to causes acting from within that world. A separated Intelligence by its will alone can cure the sick, cause rain to fall, and bring about other wonderful effects. Indeed, Avicenna thought that all material forms are placed in matter by the separated Intelligences; agents in the lower world simply dispose matter to receive them. 44
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"Ad ilia quae arguuntur in oppositum ex signis, dicendum quod, si magici utantur talibus orationibus, figuris et sacrifices, non tamen utuntur eis ad operandum artificiose. Et dico 'ad operandum' quia, si talibus utantur, huius causa est quia artifices gaudent cum reputantur mirabiles. Ut igitur tales videantur quod daemones possent invocare et in virtute causarum valde nobilium tales effectus producere, utuntur talibus quasi conferant ad effectus producendos. Dico autem 'artificiose' quia bene potest esse quod aliqui decepti, credentes quod talium factorum a daemonibus contingat esse artem et scientiam, utuntur talibus in operando; sed isti artificiose non operantur." Ibid., p. 285.19-28. Ibid., pp. 285.33-286.46. "Ad illud Avicennae dicendum est quod ipse opinatus est quod materia hie inferior obedit conceptioni substantiae separatae magis quam agentibus contrariis, ita ut sola voluntate 43
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No doubt Siger was acquainted with Avicenna's teaching on this point from his own works. He also knew Averroes' account of it in his commentary on the Metaphysics, and he wholeheartedly agreed with the Averroistic criticism. If Avicenna were correct, forms would be created in matter by the separated Intelligences. Now this is contrary to Aristotle — so runs the criticism of Averroes — for the Stagirite teaches that a form is not per se in potency to exist or to be generated, but rather the composite of form and matter. Forms are generated from matter, being drawn from the potentiality of matter by a body which moves it by its active qualities. Hence there is no creator of forms as Avicenna thought; corporeal agents move matter and bring into act forms potentially present in it. As Siger puts it, summing up the doctrine of Averroes: there cannot be another type of agent giving a form and changing matter: non potest esse aliud agens dans formam et transmutans 46 materiam. Consonant with his criticism of Avicenna's notion of causality, Siger rejects the Arabian philosopher's explanation of fascinatio, or casting of spells. According to Avicenna, a soul, once it is freed from passion, can directly affect the body of another person even at a distance. Not so for Siger, who seeks an explanation of this phenomenon in harmony with the views of Aristotle and Averroes. Aristotle knew that the conceptions of our soul give rise to movements of the sense appetite, like fear and desire. From them, in turn, there follows a definite change in the body, and this bodily alteration affects other bodies. In this way the soul can cause changes in the body of another person, but it cannot do it directly. It can affect another body only through the intermediary of its own body. Thus an old woman of very hard complexion can be violently aroused to work evil on a child, and through the movement of her heart her body will be violently changed. This bodily change, radiating outward, can affect the medium and finally the child. In confirmation of this, Siger refers to the phenomenon, recounted by Aristotle, talis substantiae contingat quandoque infirmos sanari et casum pluviae fieri, et alia huiusmodi opera mirabilia. Immo plus dixit quod omnis forma materialis inducitur a substantiis separatis; agentia autem hie solum sunt disponentia materiam, ut recitat Commentator super VII" huius." Ibid., p. 286.51-57. See supra, note 13. Averroes, In VII Metaph., c. 31 (Venice, 1574), 181 AB. "Aristoteles et etiam Commentator istud improbant VII" huius. Probant enim quod solum compositum est quod per se generatur. Si enim forma per se generaretur, ipsa per se esset in potentia ad esse. Ipsa enim generaretur ex aliquo quod est pars sui in fine generationis. Quod si haec sunt impossibilia, cum hoc quod materia est ingenita, relinquitur solum compositum esse quod generans per se generat. Ex quo sequitur quod non potest esse aliud agens dans formam et transmutans materiam." Ibid., p. 286.57-64. See Aristotle, Metaph., VII, 9, 1034a33-bl9; Averroes, ibid., c. 31, 181 D-K,- c. 32, 182 B-D. 44
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of a woman during her menstrual period altering the appearance of a mirror simply by looking at it. With this, Siger closes his account of the cause of magic. The most striking feature in it is the separation, and even opposition, of his belief and his knowledge. He does not doubt the teaching of his Christian faith regarding the existence of evil spirits or demons who can interfere in the affairs of our world. Neither does he doubt that God can directly produce effects in matter. But his reason tells him the opposite. As is usually the case for Siger, the voice of reason is Aristotle as interpreted by Averroes. And it tells him that no spiritual, incorruptible being can bring about an effect in the world of corruptible matter except through the movement of the spheres and heavenly bodies. On the level of rational, scientific knowledge, then, we are led to conclude that all events in our world, both ordinary and extraordinary, are caused by the heavenly bodies. If there are exceptions to this law, they are extra-scientific and fall within the domain of faith. Reason by itself would lead us to deny such exceptions; but reason is fallible, especially when confronted with God and the spiritual world. What is more, our knowledge of the way spiritual beings operate is only probable, since it is based on our experience of causality in the sensible world and extended to the immaterial. So we should not be surprised that reason leads us into error in this matter. This is just another instance of a general rule in which Siger summarizes his experience in matters touching upon faith and reason: human reason leads to conclusions which, in the light of faith, must be denied: ratio humana ducit in hoc quod debet negari. Can we say, then, that Siger adopted a personal position on the subject of magic and demons contrary to Aristotle? Yes, if by this we mean that, as a believing Christian, he held as true, doctrines contrary to those of the Stagirite. But this is only half the story, and not the most significant part from 47
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"Quod autem Avicenna probat per signum, dicendum quod impossible <est>, quantumcumque anima alicuius hominis liberata sit a passionibus, transmutet corpus alienum; nec per illam viam fit fascinatio, sed per aliam. Sicut enim vult Aristoteles libro De causa motus animalium (8, 701b33-702a7), ad animae nostrae conceptionem insurgunt appetitus sensitivi, ut timor, concupiscentia et huiusmodi, ex quibus sequitur alteratio corporis determinata secundum calidum vel frigidum. Et sic anima potest esse causa alterations corporis alieni. Sed hoc non est ex anima immediate, sed ex motu cordis tali vel tali. Cum enim contingit aliquam vetulam multum durae complexionis vehementer affici in malitiam alicuius pueri, contingit mediante motu cordis corpus eius vehementer alterari; et alteratione redeunte ad exteriora, contingit infici medium, et ex hoc ulterius contingit infici puerum. Unde secundum eundem modum oculus menstruatae inficit speculum, ut docet Aristoteles in De somno et vigilia (De somniis 2, 459b29-32)." Ibid., p. 287.65-80. St. Thomas criticizes Avicenna's doctrine of fascinatio in the same way in his De Malo XVI, 9, ad 13m. Metaph., Ill, 19; ed. Dunphy, p. 144.19-20. 47
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the point of view of the history of ideas. We must add that he did not oppose Aristotle's heterodox teachings as a philosopher and on the level of rational thought. True, he is insistent on pointing out the limitations under which the philosopher works, and he even gives a reason in favour of the doctrine of faith as opposed to Aristotle; but the main direction of reason, in his view, is that taken by Aristotle and his commentator Averroes. The result is an opposition between Christian belief and rational knowledge in sharp contrast to the intimate reconciliation between them in the mind of a Christian theologian like St. Thomas Aquinas. From the point of view of reason Siger considers magic an art and a science. As such, its aim is to bring about dispositions in matter so that extraordinary effects will appear through the power of the heavenly bodies, which govern all growth and decline in our world. A magician accomplishes this through a universal, scientific knowledge, and not through prayers and sacrifices to demons. In all this we see Siger intent on finding a naturalistic explanation of magical phenomena: one separate from, and even contradictory to religious and popular notions, and in harmony with the laws governing all nature. These are themes we shall meet again, although more boldly and sharply delineated, if we turn the pages of history to the sixteenth century and read Pomponazzi's De Incantationibus. II. PlETRO POMPONAZZI
Pomponazzi dedicated his De Naturalium effectuum admirandorum causis, sive De incantationibus to a doctor of his native city of Mantua, who had written to him requesting his views on the causes of certain seemingly preternatural events. Among other marvels the doctor, probably Ludovico Panizza, told of several boys under his care who were cured by a man using only words and songs. The doctor begged Pomponazzi to give his opinion about the wonderful results of the magic arts and, in particular, to explain how the Aristotelians give a probable account of them. The doctor further inquired if Pomponazzi agreed with the three religions - Christian, Jewish, and Mohammedan — which explain preternatural events 49
The work was written in 1520 and published posthumously at Bale in 1556. Citations are to the Bale edition of 1567. For its doctrine, see F. Fiorentino, Pietro Pomponazzi (Florence, 1868); A. Douglas, The Philosophy and Psychology of Pietro Pomponazzi (Cambridge, 1910), pp. 270-303; H. Busson, Pietro Pomponazzi, Les causes des merveilles de la nature ou les enchantements, French trans., introduction and notes (Paris, 1930); E. Cassirer, Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance (Leipzig, 1927), pp. 108-115; L. Thorndike, A History of Magic and Experimental ScienceV (New York, 1941), pp. 94-110. 49
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by demons. Still another solution known to the doctor is that of Avicenna, who claimed that an intellect well disposed and elevated above matter has all material things under its control. For example, the human soul can cause rainfall, hail, and the like. Both these solutions, the doctor went on to point out, are clearly contrary to Aristotle. He did not admit the existence of demons, the solution advanced by religion, nor did he think that any agent can act without contact with its effect, which seems to followfromAvicenna's position. The doctor had once heard Pietro Trapolino, who had been his teacher at Padua as well as Pomponazzi's, give another answer to the problem. He had maintained that the words and signs used in magic are the instruments of the heavenly bodies. It is not impossible, then, that they can produce extraordinary effects through the power of those bodies. The doctor himself was not satisfied with his former teacher's solution, and in his perplexity he wrote to Pomponazzi for his views on the matter, and especially for an account of Aristotle's teaching. All this Pomponazzi recounts in his dedicatory letter to the doctor of Mantua which serves as a preface to the De Incantationibus. The letter sets the problem of the treatise and in the same terms as Siger raised it in the thirteenth century. The same possible explanations of magical phenomena are suggested: the invocation of demons, the human soul or intelligence, the power of the heavenly bodies. The same text of Avicenna's DeAnima is cited in favour of the second hypothesis. It is recognized that neither the first nor second explanation is in accord with Aristotle's philosophy. The fundamental issue of causality is also raised, and the basic difference between the Avicennian and Aristotelian notions erf a cause is brought to the fore. The status quaestionis is thus the same for Siger and the Italian philosopher, and, as we shall see, their resolution of it is also basically the same. Like Siger of Brabant, Pomponazzi begins his treatise by proclaiming his Christian faith. He assures the doctor that he believes whatever the Church teaches about the marvellous events observed in the world and recorded in history. All the three religions — Christian, Jewish, and Mohammedan — agree that there are such beings as demons, and that they can produce preternatural effects in this world. This, Pomponazzi asserts, is the safer answer to the doctor's difficulty, especially that given by the Christian religion. Indeed, he adds, we must maintain the existence of demons not only because the Church says so, but also to explain many experiences. 50
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Pomponazzi, De Incantationibus, pp. 1-5. Op. cit., 1, p. 6.
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At the veiy outset, then, Pomponazzi is careful to state his belief in the Church's teaching regarding the existence of angels and demons who can intervene in extraordinary ways in mundane affairs. Not only does he begin his treatise on this note, but he concludes it in the same way. In the final chapter, which serves as a retraction of the ideas set forth in the main portion of the treatise, he assures the doctor that Christ is the pure truth, and that He does not permit His holy Church to err in essential matters: Christus, qui est pura Veritas ... et non permittat ecclesiam sanctam errare in essentialibus. The Aristotelian explanation of the miraculous and marvellous is said to be false: dogma Aristotelis estfalsum, Christi doctrina verissima est. Nor should we be surprised that Aristotle failed to understand the cause of the marvellous events under discussion, for human reason is in error in the majority of cases. After all, we know that Aristotle and Plato were mortal men and ignorant sinners. Would it not be foolish to put faith in them, especially when they are opposed to the Catholic religion? We may not be able to reply perfectly to their arguments against religion. But one reply suffices: they are in contradiction to the Faith; therefore they are in error. So much for Pomponazzi the believer. There remains to be considered Pomponazzi the philosopher and Aristotelian. For, if he is careful to state that he is a Christian and that truth is on the side of faith, he also shows a great love for philosophy and especially for Aristotle, even when he contradicts the truth. The philosophers alone, he says, are the gods of this earth: soli sunt dii terrestres. * Indeed, anyone who does not have a share in philosophy is a beast: qui de philosophia non participat, bestia est. As for Aristotle, Pomponazzi avows that he has loved him from his youth. So he will undertake to defend him, while, at the same time, dissociating himself at least verbally from his ideas. It is puzzling to many, Pomponazzi remarks, that Aristotle denied the existence of demons, although Plato and Socrates admitted their reality. It would seem that he was quite inexcusable for falling into this error. Pomponazzi assures us, however, that Aristotle's attitude towards demons was strictly in accord with his method. He based his philosophy upon the sensible 51
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Op. cit., 13, p. 316. "Aristotelem autem et Platonem scimus fuisse homines mortales, ignorantes, et peccatores, veluti ipsi de seipsis dicunt. Quare, fatuum est in omnibus fidem eis adhibere, et praecipue in his in quibus Christianae religioni adversantur. Et quamvis eorum rationes adversus religionem videantur nobis apparentes, et fortassis nescimus perfectam earum solutionem, unica solutio est, quoniam fidei adversatur, ergo quod dicitur ab eis falsum est." Op. cit., 13, pp. 320-321. Op. cit., 4, p. 53. Op. cit., 12, p. 251. Op. cit., 10, p. 110. 52
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world, as the only starting point from which to rise to the world beyond our senses. Now spiritual beings like demons cannot be proved to exist from sensible data. In fact, they are clearly in contradiction to natural principles. No wonder, then, that Aristotle boldly denied their existence. At first sight it might seem that Aristotle needed demons to explain the movement of the heavenly bodies; but the celestial Intelligences suffice for that. Natural reason cannot prove that God is assisted by an innumerable host of spiritual beings. They are said to exist in order to explain numerous effects observed in this world, such as oracles, divinations, omens, auguries, and the like, but this explanation is unreasonable, worthless and entirely unnecessary. Those who proffer it speak of the spiritual substances they call demons or angels as though they can hear our prayers, see our actions, and rejoice and sorrow with us. In short, they speak as though they were human like ourselves: an anthropomorphism foreign to philosophy. How, then, do the Aristotelians explain the extraordinary phenomena usually attributed to angels and demons? Many deny the phenomena outright and say that they are stories like Aesop's Fables, told to instruct the people, or snares laid by the priests to obtain money or honour. Pomponazzi himself does not entirely agree with this explanation, which he brands as both unsafe and shameless. After all, we have the testimony of many eminent men to the feet that such phenomena occur. He does assert, however, that according to Aristotle many of these extraordinary phenomena are deceptions of men and priests, as Albert the Great himself often warns us. Pomponazzi adds that this is known to be true in some cases in his own day. 57
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" "... cum Aristoteles ex sensibilibus in insensibilia processerit, videritque ex sensibilibus haec insensata probari non posse, et haec principiis naturalibus aperte adversari, ideo audacter hos daemones negavit. Ibid., p. 111. "Ponuntur (scil. daemones) autem propter quosdam efFectus quos vident in isto mundo inferiori qui numerati sunt, utpote pro oraculis, divinationibus, ominibus, auguriis, et denique pro caeteris hujusmodi generis, veluti et ponentes confitentur. Verum hie modus sive necessitas ponendi videtur esse satis irrationabilis, vana, et nullius prorsus momenti; quoniam ita loquuntur de istis substantiis et immaterialibus, ac si essent homines: quod remotissimum est a philosophia, ut manifestum est. Nam homines sunt mortales, mente et corpore mutabiles, existentes quasi secundum utramque partem in continua transmutatione: quorum nullum de substantis immaterialibus dicere possumus, veluti ex VIII Physicorum et II De Caelo demonstratum est. Quomodo enim immaterialia et aeterna de novo possunt intelligere et desiderare? Quomodo a rebus moveri possunt? Quomodo gaudere et tristari? Et sic de reliquis, quae omnia passionem et corruptibilitatem argumentantur. Quomodo etiam possunt nos alloqui, nostras audire voces, nostra videre opera, et reliqua huiusmodi, quae deliramenta esse videntur." Ibid., pp. 111-113. "Mihi autem non videtur tutum neque sine verecundia dictum, quod a plerisque dici solet haec experimenta negantibus, haec scilicet esse ab hominibus conficta, velut Aesopi apologi, ad plebis instructionem, vel quod sunt sacerdotum aucupia ad subripiendas pecunias, et ut in honorem habeantur .... Ego inquam hanc sententiam non approbo, quandoquidem viri 58
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Pomponazzi admits, however, that there are undoubted marvellous events attested by trustworthy witnesses. But these, he says, the Aristotelians explain by natural causes without any recourse to demons. Nature is replete with hidden powers capable of extraordinary effects. Herbs, stones, minerals, and animal extracts change bodies not only through evident properties, but also through vapours and invisible qualities. Daily experience teaches us of the invisible power of the magnet to attract iron, of rhubarb to purge cholera, and the like. Man too possesses hidden and extraordinary powers, situated as he is between the eternal and changeable worlds and sharing in both. Cures worked through relics of the saints can be explained by these hidden powers in nature, and also by the faith and imagination of the one healed. Pomponazzi sees no necessity to maintain that these cures are caused by spiritual beings acting as God's ministers. On this point he is critical of St. Thomas' De Operationibus occultis naturae. The Angelic Doctor teaches in this work that the invisible, superior powers of natural things follow upon their specific forms; for instance the power of the magnet to attract iron. Hence they belong to all the members of a species, although they can be weaker or stronger in different individuals owing to the disposition of matter and the position of the heavenly bodies. If an individual in a species causes a superior effect of which the other members are not capable, this is a sign that the effect comes not from an inherent power in the individual, but from the action of some higher agent. Thus tides result from the action of the moon and not from any permanent power in water, since water does not ordinarily behave in this way. So, too, the relics of a saint can effect a cure 60
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gravissimi, doctrina eminentissimi, et novi et veteres, tam Graeci quam Latini, ac Barbari moribus, haec verissima esse affirmant." Ibid., pp. 113-114. "Quantum vero ad illud, quod statuae sudaverint, lacrimas emiserint, guttas sanguinis emanaverint, versae fiierint secundum situm, et sic de reliquis: secundum ipsos satis patet quid dicendum sit. Facta enim haec omnia sunt procuratione spirituum. Verum secundum Aristotelem puto sic esse dicendum, quamquam haec multotiens sint hominum et sacerdotum deceptiones, veluti Albertus in secundo suorum Mineralium saepe commemorat et admonet, et nos vere scimus temporibus nostris haec aliquando contigisse, fidem tamen praestantes gravissimis auctoribus, dicimus iuxta responsiones priores, haec fieri ab ipsis intelligentiis mediantibus corporibus coelestibus." Ibid., p. 146. St. Albert refers to some wonderworkers lying and deceiving, without specifying who they are. See Liber Mineralium II, 1, 3; Opera Omnia V (Paris, 1890), pp. 27 b, 31 a. "... per causas naturales nos possumus hujusmodi experimenta salvare, neque est aliqua ratio cogens haec per daemones operari. Ergo in vanum daemones ponuntur. Ridiculum enim et omnino fatuum est relinquere manifesto et quae natural! ratione probari possunt, et quaerere immanifesta quae nulla verisimilitudine persuaderi possunt." Op. cit., 1, pp. 19-20. Op. cit., 3, pp. 21-22. Ibid., p. 25. See St. Thomas, De Operationibus occultis naturae, 10, p. 209. 60
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only through the power of God and not through any power of their own, since not all bones heal the sick. With all due respect for St. Thomas, Pomponazzi says, this position carries no weight. For it is well known from physicians and philosophers that occult properties follow upon matter and not upon form, and hence they do not belong to a whole species. Applying this principle to relics, Pomponazzi sees no reason why the cures they effect cannot be explained by inherent natural powers. All relics need not cure equally. Furthermore, he suggests that such cures can be the result of faith and imagination, for it is well known how efficacious these are in causing health and sickness. Lastly, Aquinas' account of tides he finds completely unintelligible. It assumes the action of the moon upon the water, even though there are no apparent intermediaries by which it would contact it. So amazed is Pomponazzi at this thesis that he doubts (probably with his tongue in his cheek) if St. Thomas really wrote the work. Pomponazzi holds that man's ideas have an influence not only upon his own body and feelings, but also, by their means, upon exterior things. On this point his position is much like Siger's; in support of it he even quotes the same passage from Aristotle's De Motibus animalium. Through the power of his imagination and desire, he says, a man can bring about changes in his blood and spirits, and through these he can affect external objects. This is how old women bewitch children, whose bodies resist their influence less than those of older people. If a man's imagination and cogitative powers are strongly fixed on something, he can bring into reality what he imagines. The soul has thus wonderful control over its own body and exterior things. Like Siger of Brabant, however, Pomponazzi does not think Avicenna correct in supposing that the soul can produce these effects simply by its knowledge and command, without using sensible means. He agrees that the soul can do these things only by changing exterior matter and by transmitting vapours affected by the soul's power and malice. 64
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Op. cit., 4, p. 205. Pomponazzi, op. cit., 12, pp. 231-234, Pomponazzi also criticizes St. Thomas' doctrine of the magic arts contained in De Potentia VI, 10, in his De Immortalitate animae, 14 (Bologna, 1954), p. 216. Pomponazzi, De Incant., 3, pp. 28-36. Op. cit., 4, pp. 48-51. "Ut enim Avicennae ascribitur, anima sola cognitione et imperio tales producit effectus non sensibiliter neque insensibiliter alterando, sed solum ex obedientia materialium quae sunt nata parere nutui eius animae. Secundum vero nos, anima talia non operatur nisi alterando, et per vapores transmissos ab ea qui sunt affecti tali virtute vel malitia." Op. cit., 4, p. 52. While rejecting Avicenna's position, Pomponazzi is not certain that it is contrary to the opinion of Aristotle. See op. cit., 2, pp. 20, 21. 64 65
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These hidden powers of nature alone, however, would not explain the extraordinary effects they produce. Above them the Aristotelians place the heavenly Intelligences and bodies, which by their circular movements cause all events in the sublunary world. As for God's role in the production of these effects, Pomponazzi says that according to Aristotle He causes all things, both material and immaterial, as their final, efficient and exemplar cause, the latter generally being reduced to a formal cause. He refuses here to discuss the question, widely debated in his day, whether Aristotle thought God to be the true efficient cause of the universe or only its conserving cause, although elsewhere he seems to adopt the former view. All that he wishes to make clear for the moment is that the Stagirite did not think that God produces sublunary effects immediately, but rather through the instrumentality of the heavenly bodies and their Intelligences. The reason for this is easy to see. If God were the immediate cause of a new event, something new would happen to him. For in order to produce anything new, a new change must take place in its cause. Now God is unchangeable. It follows that he cannot be the immediate cause of any new happening in this world; he is only the general cause of all that happens here below. The fact that a particular event occurs is owing to the determinate position of the heavenly bodies and the particular time in which it happens. All events in this world are thus the direct effects of the heavenly bodies. As for angels and demons, there is no need, according to Aristotle, to maintain their existence as the causes of the marvels observed in nature and 69
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Op. tit., 10, pp. 120, 122, 123. "Primo itaque supponamus Deum esse causam universalem omnium materialium et immaterialium, et sic vim gerere causarum finalis, efficients, et exemplaris, quae ad causam formalem reduci solet.... Numquid autem, cum secundum Aristotelem mundus sit aeternus, veram habeat causam efficientem, an potius conservantem, alienum est huic nostra proposito." Op. tit., 10, pp. 115-116. In his commentary on Averroes' De Substantia orbis, Pomponazzi holds that, according to Aristotle, the world and the Intelligences depend on God as on an efficient cause. Efficient causality in this sense is to be understood as a "simple emanation," not as a transmutation of matter. See Ms Bibl. Vat. Reg. Lat. 1279, fols. 29v-30v. This also seems to be Siger's position. See Metaph. II, 8; ed. C. Graiff, pp. 46-51; Physics II, 20; ed. A. Zimmermann, Die Quaestionen des Siger von Brabant zur Physik des Aristoteles (Cologne, 1956), pp. 68-70. The distinction between these two kinds of efficient cause: one which changes matter, the other which gives being simply, is from Avicenna, Metaph. VI, 1, fol. 91 A. For Avicenna's doctrine and Averroes' criticism of it, see E. Gilson, History of Christian Phil, in the Middle Ages, pp. 210-211; 643, note 20. For the debate on this point in Pomponazzi's day, see A. Maurer, "John of Jandun and the Divine Causality," Mediaeval Studies, XVII (1955), 195-197; reprinted below, pp. 275-308. Siger and Pomponazzi thus appear to adopt Avicenna's cosmogony, with its eternal production of the Intelligences and matter, while rejecting with Averroes his doctrine of a creation of new forms in matter by the Intelligence or Dator Formarum. See ibid., pp. 133-134; 12, pp. 221-223, 243-244. 69
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recounted in history. The common people see these wonders and, being ignorant of their true cause which is invisible, believe they are done by God, or angels, or demons, and that the men who work them are familiar with these spirits. But such explanations are not only superfluous; they are contrary to the principles of philosophy. Why then did some philosophers, like Plato, teach the existence of angels and demons? Pomponazzi replies that they did this not because they believed such beings really exist, but for pedagogical reasons. Demons and angels are poetic fictions useful for leading the uneducated crowd to do good and avoid evil, as children are stimulated and restrained by hope of reward and fear of punishment. They really have no place in philosophy, although they are suitable for the teaching of religion, which, as Averroes says in his commentary on Aristotle's Poetics, is similar to poetry. Aristotle himself, Pomponazzi observes, condemned the use of metaphors and myths in philosophy, unlike Plato who made constant use of them. This is probably the reason why Aristotle was never popular, and why the common people and priests rejected him and praised Plato. Since the Faith and Aristotle are incompatible with each other, it is inevitable that conflicts like the present one should arise between the 72
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"Supponitur tertio quod aliquando aliqui habentes cognitionem istorum sic operantium secundum tertium modum (i.e. by means of occult and invisible changes), inducunt aliquos effectus, quos vulgares videntes et nescientes reducere in causam, (quoniam insensibiliter operetur huiusmodi causa) credunt talia fieri aut a Deo, aut ab angelis, aut a daemonibus, et existimant homines ipsos talia operantes habere familiaritatem cum angelis vel cum daemonibus." De Incant., 3, p. 23. See 4, p. 43. "Quare a me alienum non est, nec a veritate remotum, Platonem revera angelos et daemones introduxisse, non quia hoc esse crediderit, sed quoniam suum faerit propositum homines rudes instruere." Op. cit., 10, p. 202. ' "Sermo enim legum, ut inquit Averrois in sua poesi, est similis sermoni poetarum. Nam quamquam poetae fingunt fabulas quae, ut verba sonant, non sunt possibiles, intus tamen veritatem continent, ut multotiens Plato et Aristoteles referunt. Nam ilia fingunt, ut in veritatem veniamus, et rude vulgus instruamus, quod inducere oportet ad bonum, et a malo retrahere, ut pueri inducuntur et retrahuntur, scilicet spe praemii et timori poenae." Ibid., p. 201. On the pedagogical value of myth in Plato, see Republic II, 17, 376e-378; in Aristotle, see Metaph. XII, 8, 1074b2-8. Pomponazzi seems to have this passage of Averroes in mind: "Primum {scil. peccatum) est quod imitetur (scil. poema) id quod est impossible, quoniam imitatio debet esse de re quae est, vel existimatur esse, ut confingere malos per daemones, vel per id quod est possibile ut in pluribus, vel in paucioribus, vel ad utrumlibet indifferenter. Hoc enim genus rerum magis congruit rhetoricae quam poeticae facultati." Averroes, Paraphrasis in librum Poeticae Aristotelis VII (Venice, 1574), 228D. "Ex quibus patere potest causa cur Aristoteles aperte locutus non faerit. Genus namque philosophandi per aenigmata, metaphoras et fictiones maxime a Platone usitatum damnavit Aristoteles et ex toto a se reiecit. Quare nil mirum si Plato a vulgaribus et saceidotibus faerit exaltatus, Aristoteles autem repulsus et depressus." Ibid., p. 205. See Aristotle, Metaph. Ill, 4, 1000al8. 72
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devotees of religion and the philosophers. Indeed, men of religion have always held philosophers in suspicion and have hated and derided them. What is to be done in order to avoid such conflicts? Pomponazzi's advice is reminiscent of Averroes' to the philosophers of Islam: philosophy should be kept from the common people. It should not be taught to them for they are incapable of learning it. Believing only what they see, they are unable to appreciate the hidden powers of nature and they ascribe their marvellous effects to supernatural beings. Pomponazzi also warns philosophers to beware of talking with inexperienced priests, who often wield power in the republic. As Plato says, nothing makes philosophy so ridiculous as to try to persuade rustic and common folk of its divine teachings. They are either unaccustomed to hear them, or else they are too weak of mind to grasp them. The result is that they transfer their own fault to philosophers and to philosophy itself. What is worse, they exile philosophers from their cities, kill them, and utterly exterminate them. Although Pomponazzi protests that truth is on the side of faith and not of philosophy, these remarks would seem to indicate clearly enough where his heart really lies. Like the Latin Averroists of the Middle Ages, he always verbally aligns himself with the Christian faith and professes that it alone teaches the truth when contradicted by philosophy. But there is evidence that in fact he espoused the Averroist supremacy of reason over faith and the relegation of religion to the uneducated crowd. Indeed, he explains religion itself by the same natural forces controlling all events in the world. Like every 76
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Ibid., pp. 203-204. "Verum haec non sunt communicanda vulgaribus, quoniam horum arcanorum non sunt capaces, et non credunt nisi quod vident, vel quae sunt videre assueti. Cavendum est etiam cum imperitis sacerdotibus de his habere sermonem. Causa autem patens est, quia multotiens philosophi fuerunt ex urbibus expulsi, aut incarcerati, aut lapidibus et ultimo supplicio affecti." Op. cit., 12, p. 243. "Immo, teste Platone Epistola per nos citata ad Dionysium, nihil est quod magis philosophiam ridiculam faciat quam tam divina agrestibus et prophanis viris velle persuadere; neque hoc irrationabiliter contingit. Cum enim turn ex disuetudine audiendi, turn ob ingenii hebetudinem haec minime capere possint, in philosophos et in philosophiam culpam transferunt. Quo fit, ut convitiis et irrisionibus eos prosequantur; immo quod deterius est, ex urbibus expellant, trudicent, et prorsus exterminent." Ibid., pp. 219-220. See Plato, Epistle II, 314A. For the relation between faith and reason in Averroes, see L. Gauthier, La Theorie d'Ibn Rochd (Averroes) sur les rapports de la religion et de la philosophie (Paris, 1909). See W. Betzendorfer, Die Lehre von der zweifachen Wahrheit bei Petrus Pomponatius (Tubingen, 1919). M. de Andrea maintains that Pomponazzi, while separating faith and philosophy, always subordinated the latter to the former. M. de Andrea, "Fede e ragione nel pensiero del Pomponazzi," Rivista di Jilosofla neo-scolastica, 38 (1946), 278-297. This is indeed what is to be gathered from his formal statements on the subject; but it does not take into account certain disquieting texts which incline one to think Pomponazzi was in fact a rationalist. 76
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happening in the sublunary world, religions, according to the philosophers, arise and decay under the influence of the heavenly bodies. Their rise and fall may not be perceptible, but that is owing to their long duration, which gives them an appearance of eternity. In fact, the present religions all existed an infinite number of times in the past, and they will reappear an infinity of times in the future. Pomponazzi explicitly applies this to Christianity, whose decline he thinks he can detect in his own day: "In our faith," he writes, "everything is growing cold, miracles are ceasing, except fictitious ones; for the end seems to be near: propinquus videtur esse finis. When Pomponazzi writes in this manner he reveals a spirit foreign to Siger of Brabant. We find nothing in the latter's works comparable to the Italian Averroist's anti-clerical and anti-religious sentiments. Like him, Siger teaches the eternity of the world and the cyclical return of all events, including opinions and religions, adding, like Pomponazzi, that these cycles escape human memory because of their antiquity. But Siger professes this solely as the opinion of Aristotle and not as the truth, and he gives no hint that he is insincere in this statement. Pomponazzi is writing in a different century than Siger; one in which the rift between reason and faith has widened, and minds inclined to rationalism express themselves more freely and boldly. He is also writing in a different milieu: that of Padua and Bologna, where the declining years of the Middle Ages saw the growth of a lay and anti-clerical spirit. It was there in the fourteenth century that Marsilius of Padua drew up the program of the lay state to which the Church was subordinate, and John of Jandun philosophized as the self-styled "ape" of Averroes with an independent and apparently mocking attitude towards the faith. Pompo79
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" Op. cit., 12, p. 285. "Unde ritus qui nunc sunt, infinities fuerunt secundum speciem, et infinities erunt, nihilque est quod simile non fuerit, et consimile non erit, nihil erit quod non fuit, nihil fuit quod non erit." Ibid., p. 290. "Quare et nunc in fide nostra omnia frigescunt, miracula desinunt, nisi conficta et simulata, nam propinquus videtur esse finis." Ibid., p. 286. "Ex hoc autem quod semper est movens et sic agens, sequitur quod nulla species entis ad actum procedit, quin prius processerit, ita quod eadem specie quae fuerunt circulariter redeunt, et opiniones, et leges, et religiones et alia ut circulent inferiora ex superiorum circulatione, quamvis circulationis quorumdam, propter antiquitatem non maneat memoria. Haec autem dicimus secundum opinionem Philosophi, non ea asserendo tamquam vera." L'Opuscule de Siger de Brabant "De aeternitate mundi", ed. W. J. Dwyer (Louvain, 1937), p. 42. See Aristotle, Metaph. XII, 6, 1071b3-1072al8, 1074bl2. See G. de Lagarde, La Naissance de I'esprit laique au declin du moyen age II (Paris, 1934), pp. 95-104. See A. Gewirth, Marsilius of Padua. The Defender of Peace I: Marsilius of Padua and Medieval Political Philosophy (New York, 1951). See E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York, 1955), pp. 522-524. 80
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nazzi simply carries on and intensifies the rationalist movement of these naturalists. But however different their personal attitudes towards religion may have been, Siger of Brabant and Pomponazzi reveal many similarities in their philosophical conception of the universe, owing to their common allegiance to Aristotle and frequent borrowings from Averroes. As Aristotelians, both realize that demons have no place in their philosophical view of the universe. They observe, as does St. Thomas, that Aristotle makes no mention of demons, and this for a good reason, since his philosophy rests upon sensible data and it admits no spiritual substances except those necessary to account for observable movements in the heavens. St. Thomas sums up well Aristotle's empiricism apropos of this question: non multum recedit ab his quae sunt manifesto secundum sensum, Aristotle needs the separated substances to explain the movement of the heavenly bodies, but he sees no necessity for another grade of spirits between them and the inferior world. Siger and Pomponazzi also realize that the Aristotelian notion of causality precludes the role of demons in human affairs. According to that notion, the introduction of any new determination or form into matter requires a change on the part of the cause, and Aristotle considers the separated substances eternal and unchangeable. So the production of new effects can be due only to causes which are themselves subject to change, that is, to material things. Ultimately, all events — even the extraordinary ones resulting from magic — must be traced back to the movements of the heavenly bodies. Under these circumstances it is understandable that our two philosophers should reject the Avicennian conception of a "giver of forms": a spiritual being who can directly introduce new forms into matter. Averroes was bound to appear to them as an authentic interpreter of Aristotle when he maintained, against Avicenna, that new determinations can arise in matter only through the agency of material forces. The spiritual world cannot have a direct efficacy on events in the universe; it can at best exercise a remote and mediate influence upon them. 86
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On the subject of the intellectual soul Pomponazzi was a critic of Averroes. See his De Immortalitate animae, 4 (Bologna, 1954), pp. 48-69. "Aristoteles non posuit aliquas animas medias inter coelorum animas et animas hominum, sicut posuit Plato; unde de daemonibus nullam invenitur nec ipse nec ejus sequaces fecisse mentionem." St. Thomas, De Substantiis separatis, 3, 18; Opuscula Omnia I (Paris, 1949), pp. 13 5-136. In fact, there are a few incidental references to demons in the Aristotelian treatises. See H. Bonitz, Index Arislotelicus (Graz, 1955), p. 164. St. Thomas, op. cit., 2, 11, p. 130. 86
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It is hardly surprising to find both Siger and Pomponazzi also critical of St. Thomas' treatment of the marvellous and miraculous. His very manner of approaching the subject was differentfromtheirs and little congenial to them. His method was that of a theologian who seeks to understand better what he believes. He was assured by faith of the existence of spiritual beings like angels and demons, and of their ability, with the divine permission, of acting upon our world. He was also convinced by faith of the immediate influence of God upon every event in the universe. As for the Aristotelian philosophy, he was well aware of its deficiencies, especially on these points. On the subject of demons, for instance, he shows an independent and critical attitude towards Aristotle and prefers the position of Plato which, he says, is more adequate. St. Thomas never considered the philosophy of Aristotle to be the voice of reason itself, nor did he adopt it uncritically as his guide in his work as a theologian. While remaining deeply indebted to Aristotle, as well as to other philosophers, the philosophical speculation he brought to bear upon his faith is fundamentally his own. In contrast to St. Thomas, Siger and Pomponazzi were not theologians but philosophers attempting to resolve the problem before them within the limits of nature (infra limites naturales), with Aristotle as their principal guide. They both accept — at least verbally — the truth of the Christian faith, but faith is kept within its own sphere, which is separated from that of reason. Without vital contact with each other, reason and faith thus go their own ways and sometimes in opposite directions. The separation of faith and reason was a legacy of Averroes to his medieval followers and one of their most significant contributions to the Renaissance. 89
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"Haec autem Aristotelis positio certior quidem videtur esse eo quod non multum recedit ab his quae sunt manifesta secundum sensum; tamen minus sufficiens videtur quam Platonis positio. St. Thomas, ibid. See E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, pp. 361-383; The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (New York, 1956). See Pomponazzi, De Immortalitate animae, 14; p. 212. 89
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10 Siger of Brabant on Fables and Falsehoods in Religion While Siger of Brabant was teaching philosophy at the University of Paris in the early 1270's, it was obligatory for him to lecture on the Metaphysics of Aristotle. Reading and commenting on book 2, he had to deal with a subject warmly debated since antiquity by both pagan and Christian writers — the role of fables or myths in religion and philosophy. His comments on this topic are of interest not only for the general interpretation of his views on the relation between philosophy and religion, but also as a possible background for several propositions condemned by the bishop of Paris in 1277 as attacking the Christian religion and theology on the ground that they contain fables and falsehoods. In a wider context, Siger's remarks on the value of fabulae in philosophy and religion are an important contribution to the history of this topic in the Middle Ages. The first part of this paper deals with Siger's commentary on fabulae, the second with the possible link between his commentary and the condemnation of 1277. 1
I The general theme of book 2 of Aristotle's Metaphysics is the difficulty of arriving at the truth and the hindrances that stand in the way of its achievement. The book opens with the observation that the investigation of truth is in one way hard and in another easy. "An indication of this," For the history of the place and value of fables in the early Middle Ages, see H. de Lubac, Exegese medievale. Les quatre sens de lecriture, 4 vols. (Paris, 1959-64); B. Stock, Myth and Science in the Twelfth Century. A Study of Bernard Silvester (Princeton, 1972); P. Demats, Fabula. Trois etudes de mythographie antique et medievale (Geneva, 1973); P. Dronke, Fabula. Explorations into the Uses of Myth in Medieval Platonism (Leiden-Cologne, 1974); J. Pepin, Mythe et allegorie. Les origines grecques et les contestations judeo-chretiennes, 2nd edition (Paris, 1976); M.-D. Chenu, "'Involucrum': le mythe selon les theologiens medievaux," Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen age 23 (1955) 75-79; E. Jeauneau, 'Lectio philosophorum'. Recherches sur I'Ecole de Chartres (Amsterdam, 1973), pp. 127-192. In the Middle Ages fabula was used to translate the Greek fivBo<;•, see Augustine, De civitate dei, 6. 5 (CCL 47. 170-171; Tumhout, 1955). Fabula meant not only myth but also fable or any fictitious story; see Dronke, p. 5. 1
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Aristotle writes, "is found in the fact that no one is able to attain the truth adequately, while, on the other hand, we do not collectively fail, but every one says something true about the nature of things, and while individually we contribute little or nothing to the truth, by the union of all a considerable amount is amassed." Among the difficulties blocking the inquiry into truth is the custom of hearing statements repeated and the consequent formation of the habit of believing them to be true. What we are accustomed to hear is intelligible to us; the unfamiliar, even if it be true, is foreign and unintelligible. Thus the force of custom and habit can stand in the way of the scientific knowledge of truth. Aristotle illustrates these general remarks through the popular belief in the mythical and childish elements of the laws (01 vo/ioi), by which he means the traditional customs, regulations and religious ideas of the community. In his view the traditional lore contains a great deal of wisdom and truth, besides being extremely useful in giving order and cohesion to the state, but its legendary and puerile elements must be weeded out in order to find its solid core of wisdom. Writing specifically of the religious content of the laws in book 12, Aristotle says: Our forefathers in the most remote ages have handed down to their posterity a tradition, in the form of a myth, that [the celestial] bodies are gods and that the divine encloses the whole of nature. The rest of the tradition has been added later in mythical form with a view to the persuasion of the multitude and to its legal and utilitarian expediency; they say these gods are in the form of men or like some of the other animals, and they say other things consequent on and similar to these which we have mentioned. But if one were to separate the first point from these additions and take it alone — that they thought the first substances to be gods, one must regard this as an inspired utterance. Clearly Aristotle did not intend to abandon the religion of his people; indeed he regarded it in a way as divinely revealed. His will shows his piety towards the gods. But as a philosopher he wanted to separate the legendary and crude form in which his religion was handed down by the poets, who appealed to the popular imagination, from the rationally demonstrated truth 2
3
4
5
6
Aristotle, Metaph., 2.1 (993a31-b4) Oxford translation, ed. W. D. Ross, 2nd edition (Oxford, 1928), cited here and elsewhere. Ibid., 2.3 (994b32-995a3). Ibid., (995a3-6). For the Greek notion of law, see W. Jaeger, Paideiw The Ideals of Greek Culture 1 (New York, 1939), pp. 106-107. Aristotle, Metaph., 12.8 (1074a38-bl0). In his will Aristotle directed that life-size statues of Zeus and Athena be erected. See W. Jaeger, Aristotle. Fundamentals of the History of His Development, trans. R. Robinson, 2nd edition (Oxford, 1948), p. 323. 2
3 4
5 6
;
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that there are primary substances which are the first causes of terrestrial events. Though Aristotle carefully separated philosophy from poetry and its myths, he saw a close connection between them. The lover of myths, he says, is in a sense a lover of wisdom, i.e., a philosopher, for a myth is composed of wonders, and wonder is the origin of all philosophy. In fact, he himself confessed to be a lover of myths. But, like Plato, he did not expect pure truth from the myths of poetry; this is the province and goal of philosophy. Such is the Aristotelian background against which we should read Siger's comments on the place of fabulae in philosophy and religion. These comments are preserved in two manuscripts: Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek Clm 9559, edited by C. Graiff and reedited by W. Dunphy, and Cambridge, Peterhouse 152, edited by the present writer. Since these two versions of Siger's commentary are somewhat different, it will be well to consider them separately. The Munich manuscript contains a literal commentary on Aristotle's statement that custom can impede the inquiry into truth, followed by a formally organized quaestio: "Utrum consuetudo audiendi falsa faciat ea credere esse vera." The literal commentary is more significant for our topic because here Siger raises the subject of religion. Aristotle's purpose at the beginning of book 2, Siger explains, is to show the right way to reach the truth and to eliminate false methods and other impediments to learning. The first of these impediments is to take as true what we are accustomed to hear. This is wrong, because slavish reliance on what we are used to hearing leads us to believe it to be true and its opposite to be false. Aristotle finds proof of this — continues Siger — in human laws (in legibus humanis). It is a fact that the law (lex), taken as a practical guide of action, contains many erroneous notions. For example, the religion of Pythagoras (lex Pythagorae) claimed that the soul of a man would enter the body of a beast unless it behaved well in the human body. Similarly the 7
8
9
10
In fragment 668 Aristotle says, "The more solitary and isolated I am, the more I have come to love myths." See Jaeger, ibid., p. 321, n. 1. There is a close connection between myth and philosophy: "And a man who is puzzled and wonders thinks himself ignorant (whence even the lover of myth is in a sense a lover of Wisdom, for the myth is composed of wonders) ..." (Aristotle, Metaph., 1.2 [982M7-19]). "... poetry being such as we have described is not to be regarded seriously as attaining to the truth" (Plato, Republic, 10, 608 A; trans. B. Jowett [New York, 1937]). Siger de Brabant, Questions sur la Metaphysique, Commentum and q. 17, ed. C. Graiff (Louvain, 1948), pp. 73-76. Siger de Brabant, Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, ed. Dunphy (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1981), pp. 80-83. Siger de Brabant, Quaestiones in Metaphysicam II, q. 23, ed. Maurer (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1983), pp. 71-73. 7
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ancient poets amuse us with many fabulous tales (fabulosis) about the punishment of souls after death. Men come to believe these stories because they are used to hearing them, and they are more familiar with crude ideas than with the opposite. The term lex in this passage translates the Greek vo/iog in Aristotle's text. From Siger's use of the word it is clear that, like vo/wg, it is meant to include the rules, customs, and religious teachings devised to promote the common good of society. By qualifying these laws as human (leges humanae), he implies their distinction from divine laws (leges divinae), the former having their origin in men and the latter originating in divine revelation. When St. Thomas commented on Aristotle's Metaphysics at this point, he made a clear distinction between the two laws. Siger does not, but at least he implies the distinction. We shall have to return to this later for its possible significance. Why does the law contain erroneous ideas? Siger finds the explanation in the passage of Aristotle's Metaphysics, book 12, quoted above. The purpose of law (lex) is to make men good. So the laws of the legislator do not express what he really believes about the primary causes, but what he takes to be more advantageous in leading men to virtue. And does not Aristotle remind us in book 10 of the Ethics that, although some men are good by nature and others by instruction, still others become virtuous only by childish tales and punishments? Men fear punishment and pain and seek pleasure. By punishing their bad conduct men gradually become good. If we keep in mind the practical purpose of law, we will not be surprised that it expresses childish and even erroneous ideas. This is proof from experience that it is a mistake to believe what we are accustomed to hear. Siger makes the same point in the quaestio that follows the literal commentary on Aristotle's text, though here religion is not mentioned. The argument centers around the possibility of denying self-evidentfirstprinciples as a result of hearing them frequently and authoritatively contradicted. Siger contends that this is possible, for if something is said, especially by someone famous and in authority, an opinion of its truth is created in the listener. The statement acquires a certain probability in his mind, and, if it is repeated many times, the opinion is strengthened to the point that he might believe it to be true even though it is false. The first principles are no exception to the rule, for even though they are known naturally and with self-evidence, 11
12
13
Siger de Brabant, ed. Dunphy, p. 80.17-27. St. Thomas, Sententia super Metaphysicam, 2.5 (995a4) 333, ed. Cathala-Spiazzi (Rome, 1971). Siger de Brabant, ed. Dunphy, pp. 80-81.27-38. See Aristotle, Nic. Eth., 10.9 (1179b20-1080a4). 11
12
13
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they can be believed to be false. This happens, because, as Aristotle explains, custom has the force of nature, and a false habit, produced in the mind by custom, becomes as it were second nature to us. So the false habit, acting as a kind of second nature in the mind, can make us deny first principles, as the nature of the mind itself inclines it to affirm their truth. The same ideas appear in the Cambridge version of Siger's Metaphysics, though arranged and expressed somewhat differently. The literal commentary on Aristotle's text is eliminated and the role of myths and errors in the law and religion is placed at the beginning of the solution of the quaestio: "Utrum consuetudo audiendi falsa faciat credere ea." This rearrangement and tightening up of the text may have been done by Siger himself in a later lecture course on the Metaphysics, though it is conceivably the work of a student recording his lectures. However this may be, the result is to give greater prominence in the Cambridge commentary to the treatment of fables and errors in the law and religion. More significant still, the words fabulosa et falsa occur three times in the Cambridge text, recalling the phrase fabulae et falsa in the proposition condemned in 1277: "Quod fabulae et falsa sunt in lege Christiana, sicut in aliis." Is this a mere coincidence or does it indicate some relation of Siger's text to the condemned proposition? We shall return to the question in the second part of this paper. Siger takes up the role of fables in philosophy and religion again when commenting on book 3 of the Metaphysics. Aristotle here shows impatience with mythologists like Hesiod who speak of the gods in metaphorical terms, for example as tasting nectar and ambrosia for their pleasure. He dismisses such language with the comment "... into the subleties of the mythologists it is not worth our while to inquire seriously." But this does not deter Siger from commenting briefly on the value of metaphorical and mythical language about the deity. In the Munich manuscript this is part of the literal commentary on Aristotle's text; in the Cambridge manuscript it occupies a formal quaestio-. "Utrum philosophantibus competat loqui de divinis fabulose." He begins with a critique of mythical and metaphorical language about God but ends on the positive note of its limited value for conveying the truth. The language of myth and metaphor, Siger explains, is sometimes used of God because the speaker cannot raise his mind to a purely intelligible reality, 14
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Siger de Brabant, ed. Dunphy, pp. 81-83. Siger de Brabant, ed. Maurer, p. 71.19, 20-21,23. For the condemned proposition, see below, n. 19. Aristotle, Metaph., 3.4 (1000al8-19). " Siger de Brabant, ed. Dunphy, pp. 137-138.10-57. Siger de Brabant, ed. Maurer, 3, q. 17, pp. 116-117. 14 15
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but uses his imagination to depict it. This is how the gods came to be pictured as animals in mythical stories. Others use such language, not because of their mental inability, but in order to conceal the truth. Plato, for one, may have been guilty of this. But the philosopher should avoid myths and metaphors for three reasons. First, they are the meanest and least persuasive ways of teaching truth, being appropriate to poets but hardly to philosophers. Their persuasive power is even less than that of dialectic, which produces an opinion of the truth. At best myths and metaphors give but a slight suspicion of it. The best method is that of philosophy. The second reason for avoiding myths and metaphors is that the truth is hidden in them, whereas it is the business of the philosopher to reveal and not to conceal the truth. Third, teaching the truth in metaphors and myths can sometimes lead students into error, making them believe that divine and intelligible realities are in fact such as they are mythically described. Despite the caveats, Siger concludes that for two reasons it is permissible to teach the truth in myths and metaphors (sub fabulis et metaphoris). Some intelligible realities so transcend our mind that we cannot fully grasp them. This is the case with the Primary Cause, which, as the Liber de causis says, is beyond all language and must be explained by its effects which are most similar to it. Another reason for resorting to myths and metaphors is that sometimes the audience is mentally incapable of grasping the literal truth, though it is perfectly known to the teacher. He can then legitimately propose it in metaphorical language. II In 1277 Stephen Tempier, the bishop of Paris, was directed by Pope John XXI to send him information about certain errors allegedly being taught by masters of arts and theologians at Paris. The bishop responded with the condemnation of 219 propositions, among which were several attacking the Christian religion and theology on the grounds that they contain myths and falsehoods and hence are a hindrance to learning. These propositions are: that there are fables and errors in the Christian religion just as there are in other religions ("Quod fabulae et falsa sunt in lege Christiana, sicut in aiiis"), that the Christian religion is an impediment to learning ("Quod lex Christiana impedit addiscere"), that the statements of the theologian are based on fables ("Quod sermones theologi fiindati sunt in fabulis"), and that one does not know more for knowing theology ("Quod nihil plus scitur propter scire theologiam"). 19
For the text of the condemnation, see Chartularium universitatis Parisiensis, ed. H. Denifle and E. Chatelain, 1 (Paris, 1889), pp. 543-555. The four propositions are 19
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Up to the present the source or sources of these bold assertions have not been identified. In his recent study of the condemnation of 1277, Roland Hissette, following Gilson, sees them as expressing a kind of naturalism and rationalism that were creeping into Christian circles through the newly translated works of Aristotle and Averroes, but he throws no further light on their origin. Regarding the proposition that there are fables and falsehoods in the Christian religion just as there are in other religions, it should be pointed out that the idea of fables in Christianity, as in other religions, was not new in the thirteenth century. Twelfth-century writers, like William of Conches, thought there were fables in scripture which express the truth by way of fictional devices, e.g., the creation of the body of Eve from Adam's rib. Stories such as this, he believed, should not be taken literally but interpreted in order to reach the truth they contain. They were seen as ways of both concealing and asserting the truth with beauty and dignity. The involvement of truth in fables or myths was expressed by the notion of integumentum, literally a 'covering', that must be unveiled in order to reach its underlying truth. Taken literally, it presents a false appearance to the reader, but it has an inner truth. The notion of involucrum, or 'wrapping', was often used as almost synonymous with integumentum. St. Augustine gave positive value to these concepts as early as the fourth century, and they were adopted and elaborated by later Christian writers. As for the linking of falsehood with fables, this goes back to antiquity. Cicero thought that fables contain what is neither true nor probable. 20
21
22
23
24
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26
numbered respectively 174, 175, 152, 153. Mandonnet rearranged and renumbered them in logical order. In his new listing of the propositions the four are numbered respectively 181, 180, 183, 182. See P. Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant et I'averroisme latin au xm" siecle 2 (Louvain, 1908), p. 189. For the history of the condemnation, see E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York, 1955), pp. 405-408; F. Van Steenberghen, La philosophic au XIII' siecle (Louvain-Paris, 1966), pp. 483-488 and Maitre Siger de Brabant (Louvain-Paris, 1977), pp. 139-158; J. F. Wippel, "The Condemnations of 1270 and 1277 at Paris," The Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies 7 (1977) 169-201. R. Hissette, Enquete sur les 219 articles condamnes a Paris le 7 mars 1277 (LouvainParis, 1977), pp. 274-275. See Gilson, ibid., p. 406. See Dronke, Fabula, p. 19. Ibid., p. 55. For the notion of integumentum, see Stock, Myth and Science, pp. 49-62; Dronke, ibid., pp. 25-32; Jeauneau, "Lectio Philosophorum," pp. 127-192. See Stock, ibid.; Dronke, ibid., pp. 56-57, 61-64; Chenu, "'Involucrum'," 75-79. See Dronke, ibid., p. 4. "Fabula est, in qua nec verae nec veri similes res continentur" (Cicero, De inventione 1.19.27, ed. J. G. Baiter-C. L. Kayser [Leipzig, I860]). Cicero thought that fables about the gods were foolish and absurd, yet he claimed it was the duty of a Roman to revere and worship 20
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24 25 26
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Macrobius, commenting on Cicero in the fifth century, connected fables with falsity in his classic statement: "Fables — the name itself proclaims their falsity — are invented either for delight alone, to please the ear, or also to encourage men to moral worth." The association of fables and falsehood is echoed in the condemned proposition we have been considering and also in Siger of Brabant's triple use of the expression fabulosa et falsa in his treatment of fables in religion. It is possible, therefore, that the condemned proposition was expressed either orally or in writing by some masters of arts at Paris commenting on a classical text dealing with fables. There seems to be no precedent, however, for saying that theology is based on fables or that theology is worthless and the Christian religion impedes learning. These statements reveal a definite naturalist and rationalist spirit that was new in medieval intellectual circles. The obvious place to look for their source is the faculty of arts at Paris in the 1270's in the circle of Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia. Many of the condemned propositions derived from their teaching, or they were suspected to derive from it. Hissette has been able to trace thirty of the condemned propositions directly to Siger, fourteen probably to him, andfifty-sixplausibly to him. Boethius of Dacia is credited with thirteen, probably with three, and plausibly with twenty-six. Several manuscripts of the condemnation name these men as the principal proponents of the propositions. The propositions may not have been written down but asserted orally. St. Thomas implies that some Parisian 27
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30
them; see Cicero, De natura deorum, 2.28.70, ed. A. S. Pease (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), 2. 734-737. "Fabulae, quarum nomen indicat falsi professionem, aut tantum conciliandae auribus voluptatis, aut adhortationis quoque in bonam frugem gratia repertae sunt ..." (Macrobius, Commentarii in somnium Scipionis, 1.2.7, ed. J. Willis [Leipzig, 1963], p. 5). See Pepin, Mythe et allegorie, pp. 210-214; Dronke, Fabula, p. 16. Macrobius, however, thought that a fictitious narrative (narratio fabulosa) could express the truth though hidden and covered by the story (see ibid.). Macrobius' distinction between fabula and narratio fabulosa was disregarded in the twelfth century when the cognitive function and value of fables were emphasized. On narratio fabulosa, see Stock, Myth and Science, chap. 2. See above, n. 15. See Hissette, Enquete, pp. 314-315. Little is know about this associate of Siger. For the latest information about his life and works, see Van Steenberghen, La philosophie au XIII' siecle, pp. 402-412. There is solid evidence that he was born in Denmark, not in Sweden, as previously thought: see S. Skovgaard Jensen, "On the National Origin of the Philosopher Boetiusde Dacia," Classica et mediaevalia 24 (1963) 232-241. Unfortunately his commentary on the Metaphysics has not been found. The commentary would be of great interest for the subject of this paper. See J. J. Duin, "A la recherche du commentaire de Boece de Dacie sur la Metaphysique d'Aristote" in Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter (Miscellanea mediaevalia 2; Berlin, 1963), pp. 446-453. See Hissette, ibid., pp. 11-12; Van Steenberghen, Maitre Siger de Brabant, p. 155 and La philosophie au xm" siecle, p. 485. 27
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masters were teaching clandestinely heterodox doctrines that they feared to teach openly. In his De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas, written against Siger and his followers, he accuses a certain unnamed master or masters of teaching boys in corners, and he challenges them to write openly so that their errors can be refuted. Mandonnet suggests that the propositions may reflect student discussions, but it does not seem likely that the authorities would take the remarks of students so seriously. Mandonnet's other suggestion is more plausible, that the propositions against the Christian religion and theology were never taught literally but were "inductions made by the judges of 1277." It is possible that the censors thought they could find in Siger's Metaphysics, especially as it is preserved in the Cambridge manuscript, at least the proposition that there are fables and falsehoods in the Christian religion as there are in other religions. Implied in this statement are the other propositions: that the Christian religion is an impediment to learning, that theology is based on fables, and that one does not know more for knowing theology. It should be emphasized that none of these statements can be found in the extant works of Siger, indeed that his views on Christian faith and theology, as expressed in his works, are incompatible with them. He never taught that there are fables and errors in the Christian faith or that it is a hindrance to learning. Quite the opposite. In cases of conflict between faith and reason he always placed truth on the side of faith. As for theology, far from reducing it to a legendary or mythical account of the truth, he expressly praises it as a higher kind of wisdom than metaphysics. Like St. Thomas, he claimed that the theology based on sacred scripture is more certain than metaphysics because it is grounded in divine revelation which, unlike human reason, cannot err. It is also a superior kind of wisdom because it leads to a knowledge of God and creatures inaccessible to human reason left to itself. 31
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"Si quis autem gloriabundus de falsi nominis scientia, velit contra haec quae scripsimus aliquid dicere, non loquatur in angulis nec coram pueris qui nesciunt de tam arduis judicare; sed contra hoc scriptum rescribat, si audet" (St. Thomas, De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas, ed. L. W. Keeler [Rome, 1936], p. 80). See Van Steenberghen, Maitre Siger de Brabant, pp. 58-59. P. Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant et I'averroisme latin au xm' siecle 1 (Louvain, 1911), p. 193. Ibid. See Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy, pp. 398-399; Van Steenberghen, Maitre Siger de Brabant, pp. 242-243. B. Bazan, "La reconciliation de la foi et la raison etait-elle possible pour les aristoteliciens radicaux?", Dialogue 19 (1980) 235-254. See Siger de Brabant, ed. Dunphy, 6, com. 1, pp. 359-361; ed. Maurer, pp. 303304.70-79. A. Maurer, "Siger of Brabant and Theology," Mediaeval Studies 50 (1988) 257-278. 31
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As they stand, therefore, the four condemned propositions we have been considering do not express the mind of Siger. It is possible, however, that at least the proposition that there are fables and falsehoods in the Christian religion just as there are in other religions was formulated with Siger in mind. It is well known that the theologians who drew up the 219 propositions condemned by the bishop of Parisj worked hastily and not always with great insight into the meaning of the works they read. Hissette calculates that sixteen times they misunderstood the text they censored, nine times they hardened the author's thought, ten times they isolated a phrase from its context and stretched its meaning, and sixty-four times they ascribed to an author doctrines taught only from a limited point of view, for example that of the philosopher of nature, or proposed secundum intentionem philosophorum and subsequently rejected by the author. Examples of the latter doctrines are the eternity of the world and the myth of the eternal recurrence of historical events. These can be found in the writings of Siger and Boethius of Dacia, presented not as true but only as conclusions of the philosophy of nature or as the teaching of Aristotle. In his De aeternitate mundi Siger argues for the eternity of the world in opposition to "theologians and poets" who teach that the universe came into existence from nothing. He also contends that world history is cyclical, with the same events recurring eternally, including ideas, laws and religions (leges et religiones). He is careful to add that he is teaching this, not as true, but as the doctrine of Aristotle. But this disclaimer did not prevent the theologians from censoring his work. May not these theologians have acted in the same way when they read Siger's discussion of fables and falsehoods in religion? He makes it clear that, as a philosopher and commentator on Aristotle, he is concerned only with human laws (leges humanae), which are the product of human reason; he does not mention the Christian religion or the divine law (lex divina). The human laws and religion Siger has in mind are within the sphere of human reason and nature; they do not include divine laws or a divinely revealed religion. Writing as a philosopher, not as a theologian, he does not go out of his way to discuss the law or religion whose origin is above nature and human reason. But this may be exactly why the theologians were disquieted by his commentary on Aristotle. He does not explicitly exempt the Christian 36
37
38
See Hissette, Enquete, pp. 316-317. Propositions 83-92 in the numbering of Mandonnet; see Hissette, ibid., pp. 147-160. Siger of Brabant, De aeternitate mundi, ed. B. Bazan, Siger de Brabant, Quaestiones in tertium De anima, De anima intellectiva, De aeternitate mundi (Louvain-Paris, 1972), pp. 131-132. 36
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religion from contamination by childish tales and errors. St. Thomas was more cautious in his own commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics. Though he was writing a philosophical work, he thought it prudent when addressing a Christian audience to point out the difference between the laws Aristotle knew and the divinely revealed religion of Christianity. Aristotle, St. Thomas remarks, ... is speaking here of the laws devised by men, which have as their ultimate end the preservation of the political community. Therefore the men who established these laws have handed down in them, in keeping with the diversity of peoples and nations, certain directives by which human souls might be drawn away from evil and persuaded to do good, although many of them, which men have heard from childhood and of which they approved more readily than of what they knew to be true, were empty and foolish. But the law given by God directs men to that true happiness to which everything false is opposed. Therefore there is nothing false in the divine law. The absence of a similar cautionary statement by Siger might have led his critics to believe that his treatment of this subject was suspect; that he really thought, or could at least make his audience believe, that there are errors and childish tales in the Christian religion as there are in others, even though he did not expressly say this. This suspicion might have been strengthened by Siger's proof that the habit of hearing falsehoods makes a person believe them to be true. When we hear a statement — so the argument runs — especially by someone famous or in authority, it is a reason for thinking it is probably true. Authority is a locus dialecticus, that is to say, a ground for forming a probable opinion. When the statement is repeated, a habit of believing it to be true is formed, and this is strengthened and multiplied with the repetition of the statement. In this way it comes to be believed, even though it may be false. Children are especially prone to believe falsehoods they hear repeated because of their mental incapacity to judge the truth. 39
40
"Loquitur autem hie Philosophus de legibus ab hominibus adinventis, quae ad eonservationem civilem sicut ad ultimum finem ordinantur; et ideo quicumque invenerunt eas, aliqua quibus hominum animi retraherentur a malis et provocarentur ad bona secundum diversitatem gentium et nationum in suis legibus tradiderunt, quamvis multa eorum essent vana et frivola, quae homines a pueritia audientes magis approbabant quam veritatis cognitionem. Sed lex divinitus data ordinat hominem ad veram felicitatem cui omnis falsitas repugnat. Unde in lege Dei nulla felsitas continetur" (St. Thomas, Sent, super Metaph., 2.5 (995a4) 333, ed. Cathala-Spiazzi [Rome, 1971]). See ST, 1-2.99.3 Resp. Siger de Brabant, ed. Dunphy, pp. 81-82.21-26; ed. Maurer, p. 72.31-51. For authority as the primus locus of probable arguments, see Cicero, De inventione 1.53.101. See also Aristotle, Rhetoric, 2.25 (1402b9) and Topics, 1.10 (104a3-37). 39
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This is sound Aristotelian doctrine and quite unobjectionable in its philosophical context. But we must remember that Siger was lecturing in the University of Paris at a time when the ecclesiastical authorities and the theologians were combating the rise of naturalism and rationalism. They were bound to be disturbed by the unqualified statement that authority is a locus dialecticus, inducing opinions which may be false. Is this true if the person 'famous and in authority' mentioned by Siger is Christ or one of his earthly representatives, like the bishop of Paris? In Christian circles must one not distinguish between human and divine authority, as well as between human and divine law? Siger would no doubt reply that he was only doing the work of a philosopher, which is to pursue natural truths by natural means; what transcends reason and nature is not within the scope of philosophy but of faith and theology. This is true, and no less a theologian than St. Albert the Great said the same thing in almost the same words as Siger. But in the troubled atmosphere of the 1270's in Paris the separation (and not only the distinction) of reason and faith practiced by Siger and his circle made them an object of suspicion to the ecclesiastical authorities and open to misunderstanding and misrepresentation. 41
42
** *
Whoever the author or authors of the four propositions we have been considering might have been, it is practically certain that they are connected with book 2 of Aristotle's Metaphysics. As we have seen, Aristotle at this point discusses wrong approaches to scientific knowledge and other hindrances to learning. Among them is reliance on customary and familiar sayings, such as the legendary tales of popular religion. This would be the natural place for a master of arts at Paris, lecturing on the Metaphysics and reflecting on his own Christian religion, to have made these statements. If their authorship is ever discovered, it will no doubt be among the commentators on book 2 of the Metaphysics. The evidence presented in this paper does not lead with certainty to their author. It only allows the conjecture that the condemnation of the proposition that there are fables and falsehoods in the Christian religion, just as there are in other religions, was directed, however erroneously, against Siger of Brabant. "Sed nihil ad nos nunc de Dei miraculis, cum de naturalibus naturaliter disseramus" (Siger of Brabant, De anima intellectiva 3, ed. Bazan, Siger de Brabant, p. 84,11. 47-48). For Siger's ideal as a philosopher, see Van Steenberghen, Maitre Siger de Brabant, pp. 222-257. "... dico quod nihil ad me de Dei miraculis, cum ego de naturalibus disseram" (St. Albert, De generatione et corruptione 1.1.22, ed. Borgnet [Paris, 1890], 4.363). 41
42
Dietrich of Freiberg
Dietrich of Freiberg (Theodoricus de Vriberg), a Dominican friar, was born c. 1250. he studied and taught at the Dominican studium at Freiberg in Saxony. Continuing his studies at Paris c. 1275-1277, he became a master of theology, probably at Paris, and taught there from 1290 to 1293. He contributed to many areas of philosophy and to science, especially through his study of the rainbow. He died shortly after 1310.
10 The De Quiditatibus Entium
of Dietrich of Freiberg and its Criticism of Thomistic Metaphysics Recent research has shown that St. Thomas' innovations in metaphysics met widespread criticism from his contemporaries and immediate successors. Much still remains to be done before an adequate picture can be drawn of the impact of his novel notion of being upon the philosophy of the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Everything leads us to believe, however, that his metaphysics was widely misunderstood and criticized, even by his alleged followers. Older metaphysical views, stemming on the one hand from Neoplatonists like St. Augustine, Boethius, and the author of the Liber de causis, and on the other from Aristotle and Averroes, seem to have been too deeply rooted in the schools to be displaced by the daring novelties of the Angelic Doctor. Among the most clear-sighted and resolute critics of St. Thomas at the end of the thirteenth century was the German Dominican Dietrich of Freiberg. He was born c. 1250 and studied and taught at the Dominican convent at Freiberg in Saxony. From there he went to Paris in 1276 to complete his education. He was too late to study under his compatriot and confrere, 1
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For the "correctives" of St. Thomas in the generation after his death, see E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York, 1955), pp. 410-427, 730-750. For the life, works and thought of Dietrich of Freiberg, see E. Krebs, "Meister Dietrich (Theodoricus Teutonicus de Vriberg). Sein Leben, seine Werke, seine Wissenschaft," Beitrage zur Geschichte der Phil, des Mittelalters V, 5-6 (Miinster, 1906); same author, "Dietrich (Theodoricus) v. Freiberg," Lexikon fur Theologie undKirche 3 (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1931), 318. E. Gilson, ibid., pp. 433-437, Bibliography, p. 753, n. 9. W. A. Wallace, The Scientific Methodology of Theodoric of Freiberg (Fribourg, Switzerland, 1959). B. Mojsisch, Die Theorie des Intellekts bei Dietrich von Freiberg (Hamburg, 1977). Von Meister Dietrich zu Meister Eckhart, ed. K. Flasch (Hamburg, 1984). L. Sturlese, Dokumente und Forschungen zu Leben und Werk Dietrichs von Freiberg (Hamburg, 1984). Dietrich's works are published in four volumes: Opera omnia, ed. K. Flash et al. (Hamburg, 1977-1985). 1
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St. Albert, but like Master Eckhart he came under the influence of St. Albert's thought and the Neoplatonism he had popularized in German Dominican circles. Combining that Neoplatonism with certain congenial elements in Aristotelianism, he turned it against the philosophy of St. Thomas. He died shortly after 1310. Dietrich of Freiberg wrote extensively on theology, philosophy and science. Two of his metaphysical treatises, De ente et essentia and De quiditatibus entium, together deal with all the main topics of St. Thomas' De ente et essentia and take issue with his treatment of them. They are important, therefore, not only for an understanding of Dietrich's metaphysics, but also for the light they throw upon the reaction to Thomism in the last quarter of the thirteenth century. The main concern of Dietrich's De ente et essentia is to clarify the language of metaphysics and to establish, against St. Thomas, the identity of existence (esse) and essence both in reality and in meaning (ratio). The theme running through it like a constant refrain is that essence does not differ from existence; rather, existence signifies the whole essence of any thing. The only distinction between them is their manner of signifying being: esse signifies being in the manner of an act, whereas "essence," like the term "entity," signifies the same being in the manner of a state or disposition. Thus esse signifies in a dynamic way exactly the same reality that essence signifies in a static way. This manner of distinguishing between existence and essence had already been proposed during the lifetime of St. Thomas by Siger of Brabant, who drew his inspiration for it from Averroes. Dietrich is likely following an established school tradition of opposing the Thomistic distinc3
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The De ente et essentia was first published by E. Krebs, "Le Traite 'De Esse et Essentia' de Thierry de Fribourg," Revue neoscolastique de philosophie 18 (1911), 516-536; definitive ed. R. Imbach, Opera omnia 2, pp. 17-42. The De quiditatibus entium was first published as an appendix to the present article; the definitive edition was made by R. Imbach and J.-D. Cavigioli, ibid., 3, pp. 91-118. References are to this edition. "Nunc de essentia et esse considerandum, et circa ea notandum, quod idem important in sua significatione et idem significant, quod ens et entitas, videlicet totam rei essentiam sive in substantiis sive in accidentibus, sicut dictum est supra de entitate et ente, quamvis different in modis significandi, ut videlicet esse significet per modum actus, idem autem significant ens et entitas per modum habitus et quietis. Et sic etiam different essentia et esse." Dietrich, De ente et essentia I, 5, 1, p. 31. For the distinction between these modes of signifying, see Peter of Spain, Summule logicales, VII, 86; ed. L. M. De Rijk (Assen, 1972), p. 133. Peter gives as an example "sight," which can mean either the act of seeing (signifying secundum actum) or the ability to see, as in one asleep (signifying secundum habitum). See Siger of Brabant, Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, Intro., q. 7; ed. W. Dunphy, (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1981), pp. 41-49; ed. A. Maurer, (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1983), pp. 30-37. A. Maurer, " f e e and Essentia in the Metaphysics of Siger of Brabant," Mediaeval Studies 8 (1946), 68-86 (reprinted above, pp. 119-135). 3
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tion of esse and essence with a conception of being stemming from Aristotle by way of his commentator Averroes. There is no doubt that Dietrich meant to criticize St. Thomas himself on this point. He cites and criticizes several arguments of St. Thomas establishing a real composition of esse and essence in creatures. Among them is the argument in the De ente et essentia, in which St. Thomas reasons to the distinction of esse and essence from the fact that we can understand what a man or phoenix is without knowing whether they exist in reality. Since existence is not included in the understanding of their essence or quiddity — so runs the argument of St. Thomas — it must come from without and form a composition with the essence. This argument, according to Dietrich, is fundamentally erroneous, for it assumes that an essence can be understood without knowing anything of its actual existence. An analysis of the terms will reveal that this is false. As St. Augustine points out, the term essentia (essence) comes from the verb esse (to exist), as the term sapientia (wisdom) comes from the verb sapere (to be wise). Augustine was correct, then, in saying that an essence is an essence only because it exists. It follows that we cannot understand an essence like man unless we understand him as actually existing. Actual existence belongs to the essential being of man — a point Siger of Brabant had already made against St. Thomas. The fact that we can understand man without knowing whether he exists in reality does not militate against this. For we can know man through a simple concept without judging whether he exists or not. This shows that there are two ways of knowing man, not that there is in man a real composition of essence and existence. 6
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See St. Thomas, De ente et essentia 4; ed. M.-D. Roland-Gosselin (Paris, 1948), p. 34. Dietrich, De ente et essentia II, 1, 2, p. 38. "Sed ista ratio deficit in suo fundamento, quod assumit, scilicet quod 'omnis essentia potest intelligi sine hoc, quod intelligatur aliquid de suo esse actuali. Possum enim intelligere, quid est homo' et cetera. Istud assumptum est causa deceptionis in dicta ratione. Si enim loquamur de significatione essentiae quantum ad rem significatam, falsum est, quod assumitur, scilicet quod 'omnis essentia potest intelligi' et cetera. Quando enim intelligo hominem, intelligo hominem secundum actum suum essendi in rerum natura, secundum quod supra dictum est de sententia Augustini, scilicet quod 'omnis essentia non ob aliud essentia est, nisi quia est'. Secundum hoc ergo non possum intelligere essentiam hominis, nisi intelligam esse actuate eius." Dietrich, De ente et essentia II, 1, 3-4, p. 38. See St. Augustine, De immortalitate animae XII, 19; PL 32, 1031. "... ad esse essentiale hominis pertinet actualitas essendi." Siger of Brabant, Quaestio utrum haec sit vera: homo est animal nullo homine existente; ed. B. Bazan, Siger de Brabant. Merits de logique, de morale et de physique (Louvain-Paris, 1974), pp. 54.58-59. "Sed quod coassumitur, quod ignore, utrum homo sit in rerum natura, hoc non est inconveniens, quia intelligendo essentiam hominis intelligo tamquam quoddam incomplexum, in quo nec est Veritas nec falsitas. Intelligendo autem ipsum hominem esse iam intelligo illud idem, sed per modum complexi, in quo attenditur Veritas vel falsitas." Dietrich, De ente et essentia II, 1, 5, pp. 38-39. 6
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Not only does Dietrich oppose St. Thomas' distinction between essence and esse-, he also criticizes the nobility and excellence the Angelic Doctor attributed to esse in comparison with essence. Dietrich shows a deep appreciation of St. Thomas' position on this point, which has been so seldom understood even by Thomists. He realizes that for the Angelic Doctor esse is a more noble and profound principle in being than essence, which is subject to esse and receptive of its influx. Dietrich's own view of being, however, runs counter to this. Using an argument of St. Thomas (itself inspired by the Liber de causis), but drawing from it exactly the opposite conclusion, he asserts that the nobility of the created effect must be judged by the nobility of the action causing it. Now creation, which is the most excellent action of God, terminates at essence. Hence essence must be the most excellent of all effects. Indeed, nothing is more intimate to anything than its essence. The student of St. Thomas will realize from these statements that Dietrich attributes to essence the primacy and nobility St. Thomas expressly reserved for esse. Nothing could show more conclusively his opposition to the Thomistic revolution in metaphysics which ascribes to esse, as distinct from essence, the actuality of all acts and the perfection of all perfections. Dietrich could not differfromSt. Thomas on the relation of esse to essence without diverging from him on the meaning of all metaphysical terms. That is already apparent in Dietrich's De ente et essentia in which he defines, 10
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"Dicendum quod ipsum esse est perfectissimum omnium; comparatur enim ad omnia ut actus. Nihil enim habet actualitatem, nisi inquantum est; unde ipsum esse est actualitas omnium rerum, et etiam ipsarum formarum. Unde non comparatur ad alia sicut recipiens ad receptum, sed magis sicut receptum ad recipiens. Cum enim dico esse hominis, vel equi, vel cuiuscumque alterius, ipsum esse consideratur ut formale et receptum, non autem ut illud cui competit esse." St. Thomas, Summa theol. I, 4, 1, ad 3m. The witness of Banez in the sixteenth century should be noted: "Et hoc est quod saepissime D. Thomas clamat, et Thomistae nolunt audire: quod esse est actualitas omnis formae vel naturae. Comm. in /, q. 3, q. 4; ed. (Madrid, 1934), p. 141. "Nihil enim est intimius essentiae rei quam ipsum esse. Sed inter omnia, quae sunt aliquid essentiae, nihil tam intimum sicut ipsa essentia sibi ipsi est. Ergo esse est idem, quod essentia rei. Nec potest dici, quod essentia est aliquid in se, cui influitur ipsum esse et intimatur ei... Unde et eius nobilissimae actionis, quae est creatio, nobilissimus et primus est effectus, ut dicitur 4 propositione Libri de causis: 'Prima rerum creatarum est esse'. Et alibi in eodem in commento, quod soli Deo competit creare. Sed nobilissima actio inquantum huiusmodi terminatur ad nobilissimum effectum. Nihil autem pertinens ad rei essentiam est nobilius ipsa essentia neque aeque nobile. Ergo actio Dei nobilissima, quae est creatio, non terminatur nisi ad essentiam. Sed terminatur ad esse. Ergo esse est idem, quod essentia." Dietrich, De ente et essentia I, 6, 3-5, pp. 32-33. See St. Thomas, Summa theol., I, 8, 1; Liber de causis, ed. O. Bardenhewer (Freiburg, 1882), 3, 4, p. 166. "Unde patet quod hoc quod dico esse est actualitas omnium actuum, et propter hoc est perfectio omnium perfectionum." St. Thomas, De potentia DeiYll, 2, ad 9m. 10
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besides essence and esse, such notions as "quiddity," "what is," and "form." But the significance of his opposition to St. Thomas on the meaning of these terms becomes clearer when we read the companion treatise De quiditatibus entium. I. PLAN OF THE TREATISE
The central object of this little work is to set forth the precise meaning of the term "quiddity" and to show how quiddity is found in the various orders of being. Dietrich's conception of quiddity is expressed in the De ente et essentia, but here it is made the dominant theme and it receives a much fuller treatment and development. Dietrich was obviously inspired by St. Thomas' De ente et essentia in the plan of the work. In his first chapter, St. Thomas explains the general meaning of the terms "being" and "essence." In the succeeding chapters he shows the meaning of essence in the various orders of being: in substances composed of matter and form (chapter 2); in logical intentions, such as genus, species and difference (chapter 3); in immaterial substances (chapter 4); and in accidents (chapter 6). Following a similar order, Dietrich begins in chapter one by giving his own descriptions of being and essence. Quiddity in the proper sense is then defined in distinction to essence, and the succeeding chapters make this key notion progressively more precise. He shows in what sense quiddity is found in general in all things (chapter 2); then how it is found in composite substances (chapters 3, 7, 8); in immaterial substances (chapters 3, 4, 7); in logical intentions (chapters 4-6); and in accidents (chapters 9-13). It will be noticed that whereas St. Thomas' treatise is chiefly concerned with essence and its relation to the various orders of being, Dietrich's takes up the same problems in terms of quiddity. This difference of terminology is not accidental. It points to the profound divergence between Dietrich's notions of essence and quiddity and those of St. Thomas. This will become clear if we examine the meaning of these terms in Dietrich's treatise. II. THE MEANING OF BEING, ESSENCE AND QUIDDITY
According to Dietrich, being (ens) is the first and most simple of all formal notions. It is that by which a thing primarily, through its essence, is outside nothingness. This does not mean that essence is really distinct from being. It is the very "beingness" or entity of the thing, or that in virtue of which the
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thing stands outside nothingness. In his De ente et essentia St. Thomas describes essence as "that through which and in which a thing has esse: (essentia dicitur secundum quod per earn et in ea res habet esse)." This quasi-definition of essence is entirely different in meaning from that of Dietrich. For St. Thomas, essence is a principle in created being other than esse and receptive of it. As potential to, and receptive of esse, essence is thus a principle through which and in which a thing exists. Not so for Dietrich. Essence, in his view, is not subject to an influx of esse. It is the very beingness of the thing, and hence that through which it may be said to be outside of nothingness. Dietrich resorts to this description of being because he recognizes no terms simpler than being with which to describe it. This is not so for St. Thomas, who opens his De ente et essentia by telling us that the meaning of essence is simpler than that of being, which indeed is a composite notion. Being means that which in a way has esse: ens dicitur quasi habens esse. This Thomistic quasi-definition of being is in terms simpler than being itself, namely essence and esse, but it is valid only in a metaphysics which sees in created being a real composition of essence and esse. It was bound to be rejected by Dietrich along with his rejection of the real composition. In Dietrich's view, the terms "being," "entity," "essence," and "to be" are all existential, in that they express the fact that things exist. They are alike in that they reply to the question whether a thing exists. They must be carefully distinguished from another group of terms which answer the question what a thing is. These are quidditative terms: "what" and "whatness" or "quiddity." These latter terms signify more than the former, existential terms. A thing is said to be a being because it exists or stands outside nothingness. There can be no concept simpler than the one expressing this fact. After this, if we say that a being is a man or a horse, we add to what the concept of being expresses by itself. We signify a certain determination or specification of being which adds something to being, at least according to our way of understanding. These concepts express the "what" or "quiddity" of a thing, in the sense that they designate over and above being a certain determination 14
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De guiditatibus, I, 3, p. 99. Ens, entitas and esse are terms expressing this primary concept: "... ens et entitas significant res sub prima omnium intentione, qua res primo distat a nihilo." Dietrich, De ente et essentia I, 4, 2, p. 31; see 6, 2, p. 32. St. Thomas, De ente et essentia 1; ed. M.-D. Roland-Gosselin, p. 4. St. Thomas, De potentia Dei VII, 2, ad 9m Summa theol., I, 3, 4. "Quia vero ex compositis simplicium cognitionem accipere debemus et ex posterioribus in priora devenire ... ideo ex significatione entis ad significationem essentiae procedendum est." St. Thomas, De ente et essentia 1, p. 2. St. Thomas, In XII Metaph., 1; ed. Cathala-Spiazzi (Turin, 1964), n. 2419. 14
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not expressed by being itself. It should be noted, however, that such quidditative terms imply being or the fact of standing outside nothingness. That is why Dietrich denies that a quiddity has any meaning apart from existence. Man is not man if he does not exist. These preliminary remarks clear the way for a precise definition of quiddity. A quiddity, Dietrich says, is the determination of a being which gives it its special character as a being and as an object of knowledge. Since it is an intrinsic determination or principle, it is not the efficient or final cause of a being, both of which are extrinsic to their effect. Neither is it the matter from which a thing is generated, for matter is a potential principle, whereas quiddity is an actual determination. Matter does not "quiddify" or make known the essence of a thing. Hence it is excluded from a thing's quiddity. In brief, quiddity is something formal and intrinsic to a thing, pertaining to its actuality: Quiditas igitur est aliquid formale intrinsecum rei quantum ad actum rei. In a wide sense anything actual may be said to have a quiddity; for example, simple beings, like the Intelligences. For we distinguish the essence of an Intelligence, by which it is a being, from the act by which it is formally such and such a determined being. True, this distinction is not a real one; it is made by the mind. But it warrants our attributing a quiddity in some sense of the term to the Intelligences. So too, accidents may be said to have a quiddity in this wide sense, for in their own way (to be specified later) they are something actual. Even potential being, like matter, may be said to have a quiddity in proportion to the mode of its essence, for possible being is by its nature possible being: that is what it is. Hence it has a quiddity and is a "what" in the mode of possibility. In short, anything which is in any way whatsoever has a quiddity in the wide sense, and this quiddity is proportionate to its being. But everything does not have a quiddity in the proper and true meaning of the term. In the strict sense only beings really composed of matter and substantial form have a quiddity, and this is precisely their substantial form. Why do composite beings alone possess a quiddity in the proper sense? The reason is that, as Aristotle says, quiddity answers the question "why" or "for what reason." We ask, for example, why stones and walls are a house. The answer, as Aristotle tells us, is that it has the form of a house. The form, 19
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De quiditatibus 1, 2-4, p. 99. For the meaning of these terms, see Dietrich, De ente et essentia I, 2, 1-4, pp. 28-29. Dietrich, De ente et essentia II, 1, 3, p. 38. De quiditatibus 2, 4, p. 100. Ibid., 2, 6, p. 101. Ibid., 2, 7, p. 101. 15
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then, is the quiddity of the house. In everything possessing a quiddity, then, there must be a distinction between the quiddity and that which has the quiddity. The "what" or "that which" is not the quiddity; it is that which possesses it as its formal act, making it to be what it is. To use another example: a white thing is white by reason of whiteness. The white thing is what is white: whiteness is its quiddity. Whiteness itself — the quiddity — is not white, that is, it is not what is white. So quiddity is not itself a "what is," but a quality by which something is a "what." It is clear from this that the quiddity is not the whole thing signified by the terms "what is" or "essence." Rather, it is the form of the thing: quiditas non est ipsum quid, quia forma non est tota essentia rei. 24
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It follows that a simple being, like an Intelligence, does not have a quiddity in the proper sense of the term, just as it cannot properly be defined. A quiddity, like a definition, implies a multiplicity in a being and a distinction between the quiddity itself and that which possesses it. Now a simple being lacks real multiplicity. It is only in accommodation to our way of thinking that we distinguish between the essence of a simple thing, by which it is a being, and the act by which it is formally such and such a determined being. Consequently, it cannot truly and properly have a quiddity. This is basically the same argument Avicenna used to prove that God has no quiddity or definition. The Prime Being, he reasoned, must be one and simple, containing no multiplicity. If we speak of its having a quiddity, what we mean is precisely its unity or necessary being. There can be no quiddity in it over and above its necessary being for this would destroy its unity: necessitas essendi non habet quiditatem sibi adiunctam nisi ipsam necessitatem essendi? In anything having a quiddity, like water, air or fire, there is a difference between the quiddity which happens to be and to be one, and the unity and being themselves. These are creatures, that is, beings which are possible in themselves, and which happen to exist because they have been caused. The First Being, who is necessary and uncaused, has no quiddity: Primus enim non habet quiditatem, 26
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The Jewish theologian, Maimonides, was obviously inspired by Avicenna in similarly denying quiddity of God. Explaining in the Avicennian manner that God is necessary being to whom nothing is accidental, he asserts that God exists but not "in essence," for there is no multiplicity in his being. For Maimonides, as for Avicenna, the absolute simplicity of God precludes his having a quiddity. Anything with a quiddity is necessarily a finite being. This limitation of the notion of essence or quiddity found an early echo in Scholastic thought. In the first half of the thirteenth century William of Auvergne, who was deeply influenced by Avicenna's conception of being, agreed with him that owing to God's simplicity he has neither quiddity nor definition. St. Thomas knew of this doctrine and referred to it several times in his writings. In his commentary on the Sentences he refers to some philosophers who say that God is a "being not in essence" — an obvious allusion to Maimonides. In his De ente et essentia he likewise reports that some philosophers hold that God has no quiddity or essence because his essence is not other than his existence. Here he seems to have Avicenna in mind. As for St. Thomas himself, he never expressly rejected or criticized the Avicennian doctrine, but he never adopted it as his own. When writing in his own name, he preferred to say, not that God has no essence or quiddity, but rather that his essence is his act of being (esse). At first sight this may seem a trifling difference, and yet it is not without significance. It indicates that St. Thomas conceived essence as a perfection which can be predicated of God in proportion to his being. It is not a term 29
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"Nec est (scil. Deus) substantia cui acciderit esse, quia tunc sua inventio esset res addita super illam essentiam. Sed est necesse esse semper cui nihil accidit, et idcirco est non in essentia, et vivus non in vita, et potens non in potentia, et sapiens non in sapientia. Et haec omnia in idem redundant, quia non est in eo multitudo, sicut explanabitur." Maimonides, Dux seu Director dubitantium aut perplexorum I, 56 (Paris, 1520), fol. 21 v. "Creator necesse est esse, in quo non est compositio, sicut probabimus, et non apprehendimus nisi essentiam eius, non quidditatem ipsius. Et idcirco non convenit ei agnominatio attributiva, quia non habet essentiam quae exigat terminum quidditatis, nisi agnominatio significat illam." Ibid., I, 57, fol. 22r. "Item non habet (scil. Deus) quidditatem nec definitionem; omne namque definibile, et quocumque modo explicable aliquo modo resolubile est, et vestitum." William of Auvergne, De Trinitate 4 (Paris, 1674), fol. 6. "Et ideo cum omnium quae dicuntur de Deo natura vel forma sit ipsum esse, quia suum esse est sua natura, propter quod dicitur a quibusdam philosophis quod est ens non in essentia, et sciens non per scientiam, et sic de aliis, ut intelligatur essentia non esse aliud ab esse, et sic de aliis; ideo nihil de Deo et creaturis univoce dici potest." St. Thomas, In I Sent., 35,1,4; ed. P. Mandonnet I (Paris, 1929), pp. 819-820. "Aliquis enim est sicut Deus cuius essentia est ipsummet esse suum; et ideo inveniuntur aliqui philosophi dicentes quod Deus non habet quiditatem vel essentiam quia essentia sua non est aliud quam esse suum." St. Thomas, De ente et essentia 5, p. 37. See In I Sent., 8, 4, 2, p. 222; Summa theol, I, 3, 4; Summa contra gentiles I, 22. 29
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intrinsically involving an imperfection and consequently attributable in the strict sense only to creatures. The notion of quiddity bequeathed by Avicenna to the Latin writers of the Middle Ages restricts it to composite being contained within the categories and hence definable in terms of genus and specific difference. Under these conditions essence and quiddity are bound to be refused to God. The denial of essence to him, like the denial of all limitation and imperfection, becomes a means of expressing his transcendence over creatures. Although Dietrich of Freiberg's notion of being has little in common with Avicenna's, he shares with him this restricted and limited notion of quiddity. He agrees with him that a simple being cannot have a quiddity, while parting company on what beings are truly simple. Avicenna conceived all beings except God as really composed of essence and existence. Besides this, material things are composed of matter and form. Having denied the real composition of essence and existence in creatures, the only real composition Dietrich recognizes is that of matter and form. Now the Intelligences do not contain the latter composition; hence they are really simple beings. As a consequence Dietrich extends the Avicennian denial of quiddity to God to the Intelligences or angels as well. Material substances alone have a quiddity in the proper sense of the term. The full significance of this limitation will become apparent if we turn to his doctrine of the quiddity of material things. 35
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We have seen that quiddity is not identical with "what is": it is only a part of the existing composite, namely the formal principle on which the composite depends for its being and its intelligibility. Now in a material substance this is the substantial form of the composite. Only material substances, then, have a quiddity in the proper sense, and this quiddity is their substantial form. Dietrich is convinced of this from his reading of Book VII of 38
For the analogous character of essence according to St. Thomas, see J. Maritain, "Sur la doctrine de l'aseite divine," Mediaeval Studies 5 (1943), 39-50. See A. M. Goichon, La distinction de I'essence et de I'existence d'apres Ibn Sina (Avicenne) (Paris, 1937). De quiditatibus 3, 2, pp. 102-103. "Constat autem, quod hoc principium intrinsecum secundum actum cum iam dictis condicionibus non est nisi forma substantialis. Igitur quiditas, quae vere et simpliciter quiditas est, non est nisi in substantiis compositis et est forma substantialis, non ea, quam dicunt formam totius, quae complectitur totam rei substantiam quantum ad omnia principia sua essentialia, ut aiunt de humanitate, sed forma, quae est altera pars compositi ut anima in animatis, quae est quiditas animati, non totum animatum." Ibid., 8, 3, p. 111. See St. Thomas, In VII Metaph., 9, n. 1469; De ente et essentia 2, pp. 21-23. See also A. Maurer, "Form and 35
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Aristotle's Metaphysics and Averroes' commentary on it. He is convinced, too, that this is the only view which makes it possible to distinguish between simple and composite beings. He knows that there are some philosophers who include the whole composite of matter and form in the quiddity of a material thing. But this, he says, is contrary to Aristotle and the truth. Even when the quiddity is signified in the abstract, for example by the concept "humanity," it signifies the form alone, not the composite of form and matter. Otherwise it would be indistinguishable from the quiddity of a simple immaterial being, and the whole difference between such beings and composite ones would be destroyed. In thus restricting the quiddity of a material substance to form, to the exclusion of matter, Dietrich is once again taking issue with St. Thomas. In his De ente et essentia the Angelic Doctor sets out to disprove this thesis, which he recognizes as that of Averroes and some of his followers. The essence of a material composite, he reasons, cannot be its form alone, for the essence of a thing is what is signified by its definition. Now, unlike the definition of mathematical entities, that of natural substances contains not only form but matter. So it is clear that the essence embraces both matter and form. Dietrich agrees with St. Thomas that what is defined by a definition of a material substance is the whole composite. He parts from him, however, in insisting that the form alone is signified by the definition. This, he assures us, is the teaching of Aristotle in Book VII of the Metaphysics and of Averroes' commentary. It is a fact that both Aristotle and his great commentator exclude matter from the quiddity of a material thing, which they understand to be form alone. Dietrich has tried to recapture the true meaning of the Aristotelian to ti fjv elvai in his conception of quiddity. According to 39
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Essence in the Philosophy of St. Thomas," Mediaeval Studies 13 (1951), 165-176; reprinted above, pp. 3-18. De quiditatibus 3, 1-2, pp. 101-103. See Aristotle, Metaph., VII, 1, 1037a25-32; Averroes, In VII Metaph., c. 34, fol. 184DF. "Ex dictis etiam manifestum est, quod hi, qui dicunt quiditatem comprehendere totum compositum in rebus compositis ex materia et forma, quod etiam in abstracto significatur ut humanitas, ut dicunt, hi, inquam, sentiunt contra Philosophum et contra veritatem." De quiditatibus 3, 3, p. 103. See above, n. 38. "Neque etiam forma tantum essentia substantiae compositae dici potest, quamvis hoc quidam asserere conentur. Ex hiis enim quae dicta sunt patet quod essentia est id quod per diffinitionem rei significatur. DifBnitio autem substantiarum naturalium non tantum formam continet sed etiam materiam; aliter enim diffinitiones naturales et mathematicae non different." St. Thomas, De ente et essentia 2, p. 7. De quiditatibus 8, 4, p. 112. See Aristotle, Metaph., VII, 10, 1035al7-23; 11, 1037a25-32. Averroes, In VII Metaph., c. 34, fol. 184 DF. 39
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Aristotle, this is the form alone without matter. So that we will not be mistaken about the meaning of form in this context, he illustrates his thought by telling us that the souls of animals are the form and to ri ijv slvai of animal bodies. Dietrich uses the same example in explaining the restriction of quiddity to form. Quiddity, he says — alluding to St. Thomas — is not what some call the form of the whole {forma totius), embracing the whole substance in all its essential principles (e.g. humanity). For example, the quiddity of living things is the soul, not the whole animal. Dietrich is here carefully distinguishing between the essence and quiddity of a material substance. Its essence is its very being, including both form and matter as its essential principles. Its quiddity is its formal actuality which gives it its special character as a being and object of knowledge. But this formal actuality is the substantial form of the thing. Quiddity is thus identical with substantial form, which is only one part of the whole being or essence of a material substance. It should now be clear that Dietrich distinguishes between essence and quiddity in a way foreign to St. Thomas. In the first chapter of his De ente et essentia the Angelic Doctor presents "essence" and "quiddity" as two names which designate the same thing. Essence is defined as that which constitutes a thing in its proper genus and species; again, as that through which and in which a thing has the act of being. But this is precisely the object of a definition expressing what a thing is. In short, it is the thing's quiddity. This is why, St. Thomas explains, philosophers changed the name "essence" to "quiddity." Dietrich of Freiberg's notion of quiddity does not permit him to make this identification. Patterned after the Aristotelian to ri fjv slvai as seen through the eyes of Averroes, quiddity appears to him as the act and form of being, and hence exclusive of matter which is the potential and unintelligible element in reality. In his own interpretation of Aristotle, St. Thomas, following Avicenna, integrates matter in the quiddity of material substance. It would be beyond our present scope to inquire fully into the significance and explanation of this difference in doctrine. It appears, however, that the real composition of essence and esse in created being is a decisive factor in the Avicennian-Thomistic interpretation of Aristotle on this point. St. Thomas himself furnishes us with a clue to this in his De ente et essentia. As 44
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47
See Aristotle, Metaph., VII, 1035bl5. See J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, 3rd ed. (Toronto, 1978), pp. 186-187. De quiditatibus 8, 3, p. 111. St. Thomas, De ente et essentia 1, p. 3. See St. Thomas, In VII Metaph., 9, n. 1469; Avicenna, Metaph., V, 5, fol. 90 F. 44
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Dietrich well understood, St. Thomas envisages essence as a principle in created being really distinct from the act of being (esse ) to which it is subject. Now what is subject to and receives the influx of esse is not the form or the matter alone but the composite of form and matter. Existence belongs to the composite, not to the form or matter taken by itself. The complete principle, then, according to which a thing exists and is called a being is not form or matter but the composite of the two. Now essence is precisely that according to which a thing is said to exist. Hence it necessarily embraces both form and matter in any material substance. This makes it clear that St. Thomas' notion of essence is thoroughly tied up with his conception of esse as the act of being. If he includes matter in the essence of a material thing, it is because of his notion of esse and the special relation of essence to esse. Having rejected the Thomistic doctrine of esse, Dietrich is logically bound to reject at the same time the Thomistic notion of essence or quiddity. His own follows the tradition of Greek and mediaeval formalism, rather than the newer existentialism of St. Thomas, which views being primarily not in terms of form but of existence. 48
V. QUIDDITY IN THE ORDER OF LOGIC AND GRAMMAR
According to Dietrich, St. Thomas' error regarding the quiddity of material things comes from a confusion of first and second intentions. This becomes clear from the chapters he devotes to quiddity and its relation to second intentions. In taking up this problem Dietrich is following the example of St. Thomas, who reserved chapter three of his De ente et essentia to discussing the relation of essence to the logical notions of genus, species and difference. Like him, Dietrich realizes that an adequate explanation of quiddity must take into account not only its meaning in the real order of things, but also in the logical order of second intentions. Only then is the risk avoided of confusing quiddity as it is found in these two orders. The primary division of being, according to Dietrich, is into real being and being of reason, or, to use another terminology, into being of first intention and being of second intention. Being of first intention, or real being, is divided in turn into the ten categories. Being of second intention, or being of reason, includes logical entities like the syllogism, definition, major and "Huic etiam concordat ratio, quia esse substantiae compositae non est tantum esse formae nec tantum esse materiae sed ipsius compositi; essentia autem est secundum quam res esse dicitur. Unde oportet ut essentia qua res denominator ens non tantum sit forma nec tantum materia sed utrumque, quamvis huius esse suo modo forma sit causa." St. Thomas, De ente et essentia 2, p. 10. 48
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minor terms, genus, species and difference. It also includes the objects of grammar, like parts of speech and modes of signification. In the order of second intentions — logical and grammatical entities — there are found the basic divisions of being into one and many, potency and act, as well as the subsequent divisions into matter and form, quiddity and "what is," although within this order the divisions have a meaning only proportionately similar to that which they have in the order of reality. Consider, for example, the division into form and matter. When a genus or species is predicated of a subject, it implies two things. First and directly it implies a quality after the manner of a form — the proper form of the genus or species taken precisely as such. Secondly, it implies an underlying subject or matter. In the case of a genus the underlying subject is a species; in the case of a species it is an individual. For instance, "white thing" signifies the species or form of whiteness, and it also implies in its notion a particular subject. A species, then, as a term of second intention, signifies a composite or aggregate of the species itself, understood as a form, and an individual whose species it is, understood as an underlying matter or subject. Similarly, a genus signifies a composite of the form of the genus and its underlying species. Difference, as a logical term, signifies a form alone in an absolute way. As a being of reason it is outside the substance of the genus, and hence the genus cannot be predicated of the difference. We cannot say, for example, that rational is animal. In beings of second intention, then, as well as in beings of first intention, there is a composition of form and matter, but the meaning of the composition is not the same. Form and matter in the logical or grammatical order are not the same as in the real order; they are proportionate to their own orders. In the logical order the species, taken in abstraction from the individual of which it is predicated, is a form; e.g. humanity. This form expresses the whole nature of the species, and it is the quiddity of the composite of species and individual. So too the genus "animality" is a form in abstraction from the species of which it is predicated. It is the quiddity of the composite of genus and species, expressing the whole nature of the genus. It would be a mistake, however, to think that an abstract form like humanity, which signifies the whole nature of the species "man," is the quiddity of man understood as a being in reality or in the order of first intention. It is the quiddity of man simply in the logical order of second intention. In the real order, as we have seen, man's quiddity is his substantial form or soul. 49
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49 so 51
De quiditatibus 4, 3, p. 104. Ibid., 5, 3-4, pp. 104-105. Ibid., 6, 1-4, pp. 106-107.
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Dietrich ascribes this confusion of first and second intentions to certain persons whom he leaves unnamed. These persons, he says, intend to treat of the quiddities of natural things, which are beings of first intention, but they make the mistake of speaking of them as though they were dealing with second intentions. They call humanity, which in the abstract signifies the whole nature of the species, the quiddity of man as a natural being and a being of first intention, whereas in fact it is a logical notion and term of second intention. There is little doubt but that this is a criticism of St. Thomas' treatment of the terms "man" and "humanity" in his De ente et essentia. Both terms, according to this work, signify the essence of man although in different ways. Humanity signifies all the essential parts of man: i.e. form and matter. It does this, moreover, as a form — a "form of the whole" {forma totius), prescinding from all the individual characteristics of men. In this it differs from the term "man," which, although abstracting from these individual characteristics, does not, like "humanity," positively exclude them, but contains them implicitly and indistinctly. That is why we can predicate "man" of any individual man but not "humanity." We can say "Socrates is a man," but not "Socrates is humanity," for humanity signifies only that whereby man is a man, and hence positively excludes from its meaning all individual conditions of the human essence. If this is true, "humanity" is not a logical concept nor a term of second intention. Like the concept "man" it signifies the essence of man absolutely, in abstraction from the particular conditions under which it exists in the real world and in the intellect. "Man" is a species, or concept of second intention, only when it includes the note of predicability of many individuals, and this condition attaches to man's essence only as it exists in the intellect. "Humanity" is not predicable of many individuals, and so it is not a species. An essence has the nature of a species or genus only when it is signified in the manner of a whole, like "man" or "animal," not when it is signified in the manner of a part, like "humanity" or "animality." Dietrich cannot agree with St. Thomas' explanation of these terms because he has refused to accept the notion of being on which it depends. Because in St. Thomas' view created being is really composed of essence and esse, an essence can be considered precisely as such, abstracting from the existential conditions it has either in reality or in the intellect. That is what in its own 52
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52 53 54
Ibid., 6, 3, p. 107. See St. Thomas, De ente et essentia 2, pp. 21-23. Ibid., 3, p. 23.
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way "humanity" does. Despite its abstract character, then, it is not a logical notion, unless it is conceived as related by the mind to other notions. This is completely foreign to Dietrich's metaphysics, in which one and the same quiddity does not admit of diverse modes of existence. From a metaphysical point of view, the quiddity of a material thing is its intrinsic formal principle or substantial form. In man, it is his soul. An abstract notion like "humanity" signifies all the essential elements of man's being, that is, both soul and body; but it does so as a logical concept and not as a concept of first intention. It is simply the species "humanity." The decisive factor in Dietrich's criticism of St. Thomas on this point is his rejection of the Thomistic notion of being with its real composition of essence and esse. We will find this also true of his criticism of St. Thomas' notion of an accident. VI. QUIDDITY IN ACCIDENTS
Thefinalproblem taken up by Dietrich is the one with which St. Thomas also concludes his De ente et essentia: In what sense can we say accidents have a quiddity? The importance of the problem for Dietrich is indicated by the fact that he devotes five chapters of the present work to it (9-13), besides having written a special treatise De accidentibus, mentioned at the end of Chapter 13. We know already from the previous chapters that in the proper sense only substances composed of matter and form have a quiddity, and their quiddity is precisely their substantial form. Can accidents also be said to have a quiddity in the proper sense? Dietrich tells us that according to some, accidents have in themselves their own quiddity and essence, so that in their quiddity and essence they are unrelated to substance. They consider the definition of accidents to be formed from the intrinsic principles of their essence. For example, the definition of whiteness comprises its proper genus, colour, and some difference differentiating it from other colours within the genus, in much the same way that the definition of man is formed from the genus "animal" and the difference "rational." Several conclusions follow from this conception of accidents. Possessed of their own quiddities, it is not essential but accidental for them to exist in a substance as in a subject. It is also accidental for substance to enter into their definition. Finally, it is possible at least for a supernatural power to separate an accident from its subject so that it can remain in existence without that subject. 55
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De quiditatibus 9, 2, p. 112. Ibid.
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In the present work Dietrich gives no hint as to the identity of the persons teaching this doctrine of accident. From his De accidentibus, however, it appears that this is his interpretation of St. Thomas'. In that treatise he presents the same conception of accident and then recounts three arguments used by its proponents to prove that an accident, possessing its own essence, can by God's power exist without substance. The first of these arguments is that, according to the Liber de causis, a primary cause exercises a greater influence on the effect of a secondary cause than the secondary cause itself. Consequently, when the secondary cause removes its influencefromits effect, that of the primary cause still remains. Now God is the primary cause of accidents; their secondary cause is their subject. When their subject is removed, therefore, God can still hold accidents in existence. The second proof is the statement in St. Luke (1:37): "No word is impossible with God." The third is that God can do more than we can understand. Now some philosophers thought that the dimensions of bodies exist separately. Hence it is possible for God to make them exist separately. All three of these arguments are to be found in St. Thomas' article on the separability of accidents in the Eucharist in his commentary on the Sentences. The second, which Dietrich calls an argument in contrarium, is indeed the first of the two arguments sed contra of St. Thomas. It is likely, then, that Dietrich has this article in mind when he wrote the De accidentibus, and that it is its doctrine of accident which he criticizes there and in his De quiditatibus entium. It is not surprising that once Dietrich refused to accept St. Thomas' doctrine of the real composition of essence and esse in created being, he would also reject his notions of substance and accident, which are in terms of that distinction. The definition, or quasi-definition, of substance, St. Thomas says, is "a thing having a quiddity which receives, or to which is due, being ( m e ) not in something else." An accident is defined as "a thing to which is due being (esse) in something else." In defining substance and accident in this way St. Thomas is criticizing St. Bonaventure who, in the parallel place in his commentary on the Sentences, defines them respectively 57
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De accidentibus 23, 1-11; Opera omnia 3, pp. 85-87. St. Thomas, In IV Sent., 12, 1, 1, sed contra; ed. M. Moos (Paris, 1947), p. 496, n. 14; responsio ad lm quaes., pp. 498-499, n. 22-23. "Sed definitio vel quasi definitio substantias est res habens quidditatem, cui acquiritur esse vel debetur non in alio. Et similiter esse in subjecto non est definitio accidentis, sed e contrario res cui debetur esse in alio." Ibid., p. 499, n. 25. See E. Gilson, "Quasi Definitio Substantias," St. Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974. Commemorative Studies (Toronto, 1974), 1, pp. 111-129. 57
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as "a per se existing thing," and "a being existing in something else." St. Thomas saw clearly that he could not accept these definitions of substance and accident. The definition of substance, he says, cannot be "being per se," for this is to consider being as a genus and as the very essence of substance. But the essence of no creature is its very esse. St. Thomas insists that a definition must point out the quiddity of the thing defined, not its being, which is distinct from that quiddity. This is precisely what his own definitions of substance and accident do. Each is defined as a certain "thing" or "quiddity" to which being is due, but in different ways. To substance it is due not to exist in something else; to accident it is due to exist in something else as in a subject. St. Thomas adds, in his charity, that when authors (cf. St. Bonaventure) sometimes define substance and accident improperly, it is for the sake of brevity. In point of fact, a crucial philosophical issue is at stake, and St. Thomas shows his awareness of the fact by his careful reformulation of the current definitions of substance and accident. Once St. Thomas has defined accident in this way, it is not difficult for him to show that an accident can exist supernaturally without a substance. By reason of its quiddity it belongs to an accident to exist in a substance, but it is possible for God to sustain it in existence without a substance. What belongs to something by reason of its quiddity may not belong to it by reason of the power of God. The objection may be raised that this is contrary to the very definition of an accident. But this is not the case. An accident is a "thing" to which it is due to exist in something else, and this remains true even when, by the divine power, it is conserved without a substance, as in the case of the accidents of bread and wine in the Eucharist. The objection may also be raised that a substance or subject enters into the very definition of an accident. Consequently, substance is of the very essence or quiddity of an accident. According to St. Thomas, however, substance does not enter into the definition of an accident as part of its very essence. It is added because of the natural dependence of the accident upon the 60
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"Substantia dicitur res per se existens, ita quod nata est per se existere et nullo modo in alio." An accident is "ens in alio." St. Bonaventure, In IV Sent, 12, 1, 1, 1; Opera omnia 4 (Quaracchi, 1939), p. 271, n. 4-5. "Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut probat Avicenna in sua Meta., per se existere non est definitio substantiae; quia per hoc non demonstrator quidditas eius, sed esse eius. Et sua quidditas non est suum esse; alias non posset esse genus, quia esse non potest esse commune per modum generis, cum singula contenta in genere different secundum esse." St. Thomas, In IV Sent., 12, 1, 1, p. 499, n. 25. See Summa contra gentiles I, 25; Summa theol., Ill, 77, 1, ad 2m. Avicenna, Metaph., II, 2, fol. 75rC-76r. See St. Thomas, In IV Sent., ibid., n. 26. Ibid., n. 27. 60
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substance. Strictly speaking, substance is outside of the essence of the defined accident. It is not impossible under these conditions for accidents to exist separately from substance through the power of God, although this would be impossible in virtue of their own nature. Moreover, when they are conserved by God without substance, as in the Eucharist, they have their own esse and their own essence, and their essence is not their esse. So they are composed of esse and essence just as the angels are. Ordinarily, however, accidents do not have their own esse, nor are they really composed of esse and essence. If it is indeed St. Thomas' doctrine of accident which is the object of Dietrich's criticism, his interpretation of it can hardly be said to be exact. St. Thomas himself never attributed to accidents their own essence or esse, except in the case of the Eucharist. Accidents have no existence of their own; only substances exist. The esse of accidents is inesse, for their being is to exist in a substance. What is more, because they do not have a being of their own, they lack a complete and absolute essence. Their essence is relative to the subject of which they are but the complementary determinations. Reading St. Thomas' tract on the Eucharist in his commentary on the Sentences, Dietrich seems to consider only one interpretation of its doctrine of accident possible. Accidents have a quiddity of their own or an absolute essence, in which they are unrelated to substance. This crude and intolerable error, he says, leads to the conclusions that substance is outside of their essence and definition, and that the divine power can conserve them in existence without substance. 64
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Ibid., ad 3m quaes., ad 6m, p. 504, n. 53. See Quodl. 9, 5, ad lm. "Dicendum quod cum ista accidentia habeant esse et essentias proprias, et eorum essentia non sit eorum esse, constat quod aliud est in eis esse et quod est. Et ita habent compositionem illam quae in angelis invenitur." St. Thomas, In IV Sent., 12, 1, 1, ad 3m quaes., ad 5m, p. 503, n. 52. The metaphysical status of accidents in the Eucharist is an exception. Elsewhere St. Thomas holds that accidents do not have their own esse nor do they have a real composition of essence and esse. See De veritate 27, 1, ad 8m. See St. Thomas, De ente et essentia 6, pp. 43-44; Summa theol., I, 28, 2. For St. Thomas' notion of accidents, see E. Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. L. K. Shook (New York, 1956), p. 31. "Ceterum, qualiter sit quiditas in accidentibus, sic videndum. Circa quod sunt, qui dicunt, quod accidentia quiditatem propriam habent secundum se secundum rationem suae essentiae absolute, id est non concernendo nec in sua quiditate nec in sua essentia substantiam. Secundum hoc et ipsorum accidentium definitio secundum eos ex propriis sui generis seu suae essentiae intrinsecis principiis constat. Definio enim albedinem ex suo proprio genere, quod est color, aggregando tali generi aliquam propriam differentiam, qua species albedinis sub tali genere constitute, sicut definio hominem ex animali et rationali. Secundum hoc ergo non est essentiale, sed accidit accidenti inesse subiecto, quod est substantia, et accidit in definiendo accidens, ut substantia ingrediatur definitionem accidentis. Secundum hoc etiam possibile est virtute saltern supernaturali accidens separari a subiecto et in se sic separatum permanere absque subiecto." De quiditatibus 9, 9, 1-2, p. 112. 64 65
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In Dietrich's opinion all these are errors stemming from the failure to distinguish correctly between substance and accident. The nature of a substance is to be per se and secundum se, or in other words to have an essence per se and secundum se: an essence so absolute that it is in itself unrelated to any extraneous thing. But if an accident is likewise defined as having an essence in itself, unrelated to substance, it becomes indistinguishable from substance. It too has an absolute essence, unrelated in itself to anything extrinsic. It is not enough to point out that it is proper to substance to exist in itself and not in something else, whereas it belongs to an accident to exist in something else. These are properties or accidental modes of substance and accident; they do not constitute their very essences. Hence they do not enable us to distinguish between them essentially. To Dietrich's mind, the root of the difficulty is not so much to understand the nature of substance as it is to know that of an accident. The characteristic mark of substance is per se and essential being and unity, excluding all accidentality resulting from an essential relation to some other thing. There is an essential unity in its quiddity, between the quiddity and the substance possessing it, and in the total essence of the substance. The case is just the opposite with accidents. Essentially they are dispositions of substance, as we learn from the commentator on Aristotle, Averroes. Hence they bear an essential relation to substance, and they are called beings only by reference to substance. Consequently, accidents are not per se beings, nor do they have an essential unity in themselves. As essentiality is the hallmark of substance, so accidentality is the hallmark of accidents. It should thus be clear that accidents do not have an absolute quiddity or essence; indeed, as Aristotle says, properly speaking they have no quiddity at all, nor can they be truly and properly defined. A true definition is formed from the intrinsic principles of a thing, without any extrinsic nature entering into the definition; for instance the definition of man, which is "rational animal." But definitions of accidents do include something else, for they are defined in reference to substance; for instance the definition of snub-nose, which is "curvature of the nose." At best, we can say that accidents have definitions in the broad sense of the term. When accidents are defined in the above way, in relation to substance, they are considered as they are in reality, or as beings of first intention; for in reality and in their essence they are dispositions of substance. But it is also 68
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Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., Ibid.,
10, 10, 10, 10,
1-2, p. 113. 3, p. 113. 4-6, pp. 113-114. 7, p. 114.
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possible to consider accidents logically, as beings of second intention, that is to say as genera, species, and the like. Then they can be defined autonomously and in themselves, without substance entering into their definitions. Dietrich gives examples of these two ways of defining accidents in his De accidentibus. If the question is asked: What is whiteness? the reply can be given: Whiteness is a colour which expands sight. This definition locates the object defined in its proper genus and assigns to it a specific difference as if it were a quiddity in itself like substance. But this is not a definition of whiteness as a reality, or as a being of first intention. It is a logical or dialectical definition, and as such it is "empty." Accidents, however, can also be given real definitions. If it is asked: What is colour? the reply can be given: Colour is the limit of the translucent in a determinately bounded body. This defines colour as it is in reality: a disposition of substance, and not as a quiddity in itself, in terms of its own genus and difference. We have already seen Dietrich accuse St. Thomas of confusing first and second intentions. Had St. Thomas distinguished properly between them, he would never have called an abstract logical notion like "humanity" the quiddity of man. It now appears that Dietrich considers the same confusion responsible for St. Thomas' doctrine of accidents. We can ask the question "What is it?" of an accident as well as of a substance, and a reply can be given stating the "whatness" of the accident. But it will signify the real quiddity only if it defines the accident as it is in reality, that is, as a disposition of substance. If it defines the accident like a substance, in terms of a genus and specific difference, the definition will be only dialectical. It will not point out what the accident is in reality. That is why Dietrich considers St. Thomas' definition of whiteness as "a colour which expands sight" purely logical. Such a definition gives the illusion that an accident has its own quiddity. It also leads one to imagine that an accident can be made to exist without a substance, if not by a natural power, at least by a supernatural one. In fact, the quiddity of an accident is to be a disposition of a substance. Existence in a substance is thus a necessary property of an accident, as equality or 72
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Ibid., 12, 2-3, p. 117. Ibid., 12, 3, p. 117. "Et secundum hoc potest did, quod aliquo modo (accidentia) habent quiditatem, sed non simpliciter, 'sed ut quidam dixerunt modo logico'; modo, inquit, logico, inquantum videlicet logice inquirendo per logicas seu dialecticas definitiones et interrogationem et responsionem per quid est inquiritur de ipsis." De accidentibus 12, 5, p. 69. See Aristotle, Metaph., VII, 4, 1030a25-26. 72
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inequality is a necessary property of a number. Hence it is impossible for any power, natural or supernatural, to separate an accident from its substance. We now know that the quiddity of an accident is to be the disposition of substance; but it is possible to be even more precise. Dietrich has told us that, in general, quiddity is the formal principle of a thing, giving it its special character as a being and as an object of knowledge. In composite substances the substantial form answers this description, and so it is their quiddity. In accidents the most formal principle of their being and intelligibility is substance. This is clear from the fact that substance is placed in the definition of accidents as their formal difference. For instance, when we define snubness, we say it is curvature of the nose. Substance is thus the formal, specifying principle in the definition of accidents and plays the role of their quiddity, as substantial form does in substances. This conclusion of the final chapter of the De quiditatibus entium completes Dietrich's description of quiddity and at the same time demonstrates its thorough consistency. Quiddity in general is the intrinsic formal principle of a being, specifying it as a being and as an object of knowledge. In this general sense, quiddity is to be found in every order of being. Every being, besides standing outside of nothingness, has a determinate or specified character and offers itself to the intellect as a determinate object of knowledge. In this broad sense everything can be said to have a "whatness" or quiddity. Even possible being is precisely "possible" being. In most orders of being, however, there is no real distinction between being and the quiddity which determines it to be such and such a being. We think of simple beings, like God and the Intelligences, as though they were distinct in their being and quiddity, but we know that their very simplicity precludes this. In the logical and grammatical orders (the order of second intention), there is indeed a distinction between an underlying subject and determining quiddity. In these orders quiddity is found in the special sense of a principle distinct from the being which it determines and specifies to be of such and such a kind. But these beings are products of the mind, and consequently the distinction between their being and quiddity is not real. As for accidents, they do not have a being or quiddity of their own. As dispositions of substance, they are called beings only in reference to substance. Substance indeed is their very quiddity, for it is that which most formally determines and specifies them. 75
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De quiditatibus 12, 4, pp. 117-118. See De accidentibus 19, 1, p. 80. See St. Thomas, De ente et essentia 6, p. 47; In XMetaph., 9, nn. 2106, 2107. In the latter place St. Thomas explains, however, that he does not consider the difference "expansive of sight" a true constitutive difference of whiteness but rather its effect. De quiditatibus 13, 2-3, p. 118. 75
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Only in material substances, which are really composed of matter and form, do wefindall the conditions required for quiddity in the full and proper sense. Possessed of their own essence and being, they contain within themselves a real multiplicity of underlying subject and determining form. In this order of being alone, "what is" is really distinct from the intrinsic principle by which it is what it is, namely substantial form. Substantial form, then, is quiddity in the perfect and proper sense of the term. Formal principles in other orders of being may be proportionately called quiddities, but on the analogy of substantial form, which alone is quiddity in the proper sense. Dietrich is fully aware of the gulf between this notion of quiddity and that of St. Thomas. He is also conscious that his divergence from St. Thomas on this point stems from a more fundamental opposition on the meaning of being itself. Two metaphysical views of reality are here at stake: one which sees reality primarily as existential act, and the other which sees it primarily as essence and quiddity. Dietrich recognizes the new direction of St. Thomas' metaphysics and its un-Aristotelian character. But he himself prefers the second type of metaphysics, which he found in Aristotle's Metaphysics as interpreted by Averroes. Dietrich's merit as a metaphysician lies in the fact that, having made this choice, he consistently drew from it its manifold implications.
Henry of Harclay
Henry of Harclay was born c. 1270. By 1296 he was a master of arts at Oxford. He was ordained a priest in 1297. Before 1310 he was master of theology. From 1312 to 1317 he was chancellor of the University of Oxford. His commentary on the Sentences shows the influence of Scotus, but his later writings reveal a more independent spirit. He died at Avignon in 1317.
12 Henry of Harclay's Question on the Univocity of Being From the very beginning, medieval speculation was concerned with the problem of how we know God and how we are able to give names to him. St. Augustine and Dionysius the pseudo-Areopagite, in this as in so many other ways, stirred the intellectual curiosity of the Middle Ages and set it along paths it was never wholly to abandon. The solutions of St. Thomas and Duns Scotus to these problems have been the object of many studies. What is not so well known is the history of the controversy which arose immediately after Duns Scotus on the univocity of being and its transcendental properties when attributed to God and creatures. By the keenness and originality of his insight Scotus gave to the fourteenth century a new outlook on the problem of the divine names and set the stage for a long debate, whose literature is for the most part still unedited and unstudied. The present article is a small contribution to the history of this controversy. Henry of Harclay, Master of Theology and Chancellor of Oxford, who died in 1317, nine years after Duns Scotus, was an outstanding theologian and philosopher in his day. His contemporaries spoke of him with respect and admiration and Ockham thought him sufficiently important to single out for special attention. While studying at Paris about 1300, Harclay wrote a commentary on the Sentences which shows the influence of Duns Scotus. Later he disputed a number of questions in a more independent spirit. J. Kraus has made an important contribution to our knowledge of Harclay's philosophy by his long study of his Question on universals. As a result of 1
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Cf. infra, note 73. For Harclay's life, works and much valuable information about his philosophy, cf. F. Pelster, "Heinrich von Harclay, Kanzler von Oxford, und seine Quastionen," Miscellanea Ehrle I (Rome, 1924), 307-356. J. Kraus, "Die Universalienlehre des Oxforder Kanzlers Heinrich von Harclay in ihrer Mittelstellung zwischen skotistischem Realismus und ockhamistischem Nominalismus," Divus 1
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his research, Harclay appears as an anti-Scotist who is on his way to Ockhamism, although he has not completely arrived there. He serves as an important link between Scotus and Ockham, the two main thinkers of the fourteenth century. The present article is a study of another Question of Harclay — that on the univocity of the concept of being. Since this is a question dealt with at length by both Scotus and Ockham, it will afford a good opportunity to compare his teaching with theirs. We shall first analyze Harclay's Question; then, in the second part of the paper, we shall indicate its relations to Scotism and Ockhamism. 4
I. THE UNIVOCITY OF BEING REGARDING GOD AND CREATURES
Harclay's Question on univocity is divided into two parts. In the first, which is by far the longer of the two, he asks whether anything is univocally common to God and creatures; in the second, the same question is raised regarding substance and accident. His reply to both queries is in the affirmative. The reasons Harclay gives in support of this position recall those Duns Scotus already gave in favor of it. He argues that every cognitive power has only one primary and adequate object. Indeed, according to Aristotle, it is this very object that distinguishes it from other powers. Now the intellect is one power; hence its primary object is one; and this, as Avicenna says, is being. Being, then, as the primary and adequate object of our intellect, is one. Furthermore, the primary object of our intellect, or being, extends to both uncreated and created being. Let us suppose for a moment that it did not. 5
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Thomas (Freiburg), X (1932), 36-58, 475-508; XI (1933), 76-96, 288-314. Harclay's Question on universals has been edited by G. Gal, "Henricus de Harclay: Quaestio de Significato Conceptus Universalis," Franciscan Studies 31 (1971), 173-234. For the doctrine of univocity in William of Alnwick, another early follower of Scotus, see S. D. Dumont, "The Univocity of the Concept of Being in the Fourteenth Century: John Duns Scotus and William of Alnwick," Mediaeval Studies 49 (1987), 1-75. The Question is contained in Ms. Bibl. Vat. Lat. Borgh. 171, fols. l-3v. All references are to this manuscript unless otherwise indicated. "Ad quaestionem primo dicendum quod Deo et creaturis aliquid est commune univocum. Secundo dicendum est quod substantiae et accidenti aliquid est commune et univocum." Fol. Ira. "Unius potentiae cognoscitivae est tantum unum objectum primum et adaequatum. Ista patet ex II De Anima (4, 415al8), ubi dicitur quod potentiae distinguuntur per actus et actus [et] per objecta-, et hoc est verum maxime de objectis primariis. Sed intellectus noster est potentia cognoscitiva una. Ergo et (Ms. est) primum objectum erit unum. Haec autem est ens, quia ens occurrit primo nostro intellectui per Avicennam I Metaph, c. 5. Ergo ens est unum." Fol. Ira. Cf. Avicenna, Metaph. I, 6 (Venice, 1508), fol. 72rA. 4
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Nothing could make it possible for our intellect to know uncreated being, for no power of knowing can extend beyond its primary and adequate object. For example, nothing could render it possible for sight to know what is not color or light, nor for hearing to know anything but sound. So the very fact that we can know uncreated being proves that it falls under the primary object of the intellect, which is being. The conclusion is inevitable: being is univocally common to created and uncreated being. The Scotist inspiration of this position is evident. Duns Scotus taught that being, as the proper and adequate object of human knowledge, is indifferent to created and uncreated being. Moreover, following Avicenna, he maintained that in this sense being has one meaning {una ratio), and so it is univocal to God and creatures. In support of this, Scotus appealed to the fact that we know the being or existence of God. Harclay follows him on this point. The philosophers, he says, demonstrate that God exists. Now what does "exist" signify in this proposition? A concept common to God and creatures? In that case, his position is established. If it does not signify a univocal concept, it signifies precisely either the being of creatures or the being of God. It cannot signify the being of creatures because this does not belong to God. Neither can it signify the divine being, because then a proof of God's existence would be simply a proof that God is God, which indeed is true but needs no proof. 7
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"Tunc quaero utrum illud ens unum quod est objectum primum nostri intellectus extendat se ad ens incausatum et ad causatum. Quod si sic, habetur propositurn, quod enti causato et incausato aliquid est commune univocum. Si dicat quod non se extendat ad ens incausatum, ergo sequitur quod intellectus noster nulla virtute potest cognoscere (Ms. ignorare) ens incausatum. Consequens falsum. Probo consequens. Potentia cognoscitiva quaecumque nulla virtute potest cognoscere illud ad quod non se extendit suum primum objectum et adaequatum et illud quod non continetur sub suo primo objecto adaequato, sicut visus nulla virtute potest cognoscere illud quod non est color vel lumen, nec auditus illud quod non continetur sub sono." Ibid. Cf. Scotus, Quodl. XIV, n. 11, 12, 13; Opera Omnia (Paris, 1891-1895), XXVI, pp. 40, 46, 47. In Metaph. II, 3, n. 22; VII, p. 112; In Metaph. IV, 1, n. 5; p. 147. Cf. E. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot (Paris, 1952), pp. 31, 32, 91-93. (Texts of Avicenna, p. 93, note 4). For Scotus' doctrine of univocity, cf. C. Shircel, The Univocity of the Concept of Being in the Philosophy of John Duns Scotus (Washington D.C., 1942); T. Barth, "Zum Problem der Eindeutigkeit. Ein Beitrag zum Verstandnis ihrer Entwicklung von Aristoteles fiber Porphyria, Boethius, Thomas von Aquin nach Duns Skotus," Philosophisches Jahrbuch, LV (1942), 300-321. "Prima ratio est ista. De Deo demonstratur esse per philosophos, nam haec propositio 'Deus est' est conclusio demonstrationis, saltim factae a posteriori. Tunc quaero utrum esse quod demonstratur de Deo significet conceptum communem Deo et creaturis. Si sic, habetur propositum. Si non, tunc significat practise esse creaturae; quod est impossible, quia tale esse non convenit Deo; aut practise significat esse divinum, et tunc probare Deum esse nihil aliud est probare nisi Deus est Deus, quia esse praecise Dei non ditit aliud, nec rem nec conceptum, nisi esse Dei. Consequens est falsum, quia illud non est probabile sed per suppositum et per 7
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The objection may be raised that we do not demonstrate absolutely that God exists, but that he superexists; in short, that he is above being, as Dionysius says. But this is the common notion that everyone has of God. Everyone presupposes that he is superior to everything. What must be proved is that there is in reality a being corresponding to this concept. In brief, we must demonstrate that God is, and this necessarily requires a univocal concept common to God and creatures. Once more Harclay is following Scotus. The Subtle Doctor argued against St. Thomas that when we prove that God is, "is" does not simply signify the truth of the proposition, but the very being of God. So we must know the being of God in itself and have a concept of being which is univocally common to God and creatures, from which we obtain the concept. Indeed, every investigation of God supposes that our intellect has a univocal concept taken from creatures: Ergo omnis inquisitio de Deo supponit intellectum habere conceptum eumdem univocum, quern accipit ex creaturis. This is the general principle underlying most of Harclay's demonstrations for the univocity of the concept of being. We can rightly argue that it is better for creatures to be wise than not to be wise, or to be intelligent than not to be intelligent; therefore God is wise and intelligent. Now when it is said that it is better to be wise than not to be wise, what does "wise" mean? Simply created wisdom? But then the conclusion does not follow, for it is not necessary that created wisdom is better than uncreated wisdom or the absence of created wisdom, for God is not wise in this sense. In order for the conclusion to follow, the phrase "not to be wise" must deny wisdom for both created and uncreated wisdom. But this entails that there is something common to created and uncreated wisdom which renders the negation possible. 10
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se notum, Deus est Deus." Ibid. Note Harclay's opposition to St. Bonaventure's reformulation of the Anselmian argument: "Si Deus est Deus, Deus est." Cf. E. Gilson, La philosophie de S. Bonaventure (Paris, 1943), p. 109. "Dicit forte quod de Deo probata non absolute esse sed superesse, modo loquendi Dionysii in libro De Divinis Nominibus (5, 8; PG 3, 824B): Deus est supersubstantia et superens, hoc est, est ens modo excellentiori quam alia entia, et ideo non univoce. Contra. Acceptum est falsum, nam Deum esse super entem non est probatum sed praesuppositum, nam omnes concipiunt Deum ut quod Deus excedit omnia, sicut dicit Augustinus primo De Doctrina Christiana (7; PL 34, 22): 'Hoc Deum esse ens concipiunt quod ceteris rebus anteponunt.' Sed utrum illi conceptui subsit aliquid in rerum natura vel tantum in imaginatione, hoc non fiut omnibus notum. Ideo hoc via demonstrationis est probatum ex creaturis. Ergo necessario esse erit commune univocum Deo et creaturis." Ibid. Scotus, Opus Oxon. I, 3, 2, n. 2 IX (Paris, 1893), p. 10. Cf. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1, 3, 4, ad 2m. Scotus, loc. cit., n. 10; p. 21. "Haec consequentia est bona: Sapiens in creaturis est melius non sapiente, vel intelligens 10
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So the proper attribution of names to God requires univocal concepts common to God and creatures. We can say that God is wise or is light in a proper and not simply in a metaphorical sense, as we say he is a stone. This means that in the formal concept of wisdom or light there is included no imperfection, or limited perfection; neither is there included the highest perfection proper to God. In other words, it abstracts from God and creatures as animal does from man and ass. It follows that there is something univocally common to God and creatures. Harclay uses still another argument of Scotus to prove his point. A concept such as "wisdom" is predicated formally of God and creatures, and it is not predicated equivocally. We can be sure of this because it is possible to compare the wisdom of God and creatures; we can say God is more wise than creatures. Now Aristotle lays it down in his Topics that if several things are comparable — if they are similar, or if one has more of a perfection and the other less — then they are not equivocal. For example, it is impossible to compare the "clearness" of a voice with the "clearness" of a color. This shows that they are "clear" in an equivocal sense. But this is not the case with concepts predicated formally of God and creatures. Here a comparison with something common is possible: illud quod convenit Deo formaliter et creaturis non dicitur aequivoce, quia comparatio potest esse secundum idem commune. Now if these concepts are not predicated equivocally, they must be predicated univocally, for according to Aristotle, whatever is comparable is univocal. 14
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melius non intelligente. Ergo Deus est intelligens ... Tunc arguo.- Quaero de antecedente, cum dicitur sapiens est melior non sapiente, aut negatio cum dicitur 'non sapiens' negat sapiens pro sapiente causato et incausato. Quod si sic, habetur propositum, quod sapienti causato et incausato est aliquid commune, quia ilia pro quibus sit negatio necessario conveniunt in aliquo communi quod primo negatur, sicut et ilia pro quibus fit distributio conveniunt in aliquo communi necessario quod distribuitur primo pro omnibus. Si autem dicas quod negatio negat sapiens tantum pro sapiente causato, tunc antecedens est falsum, quia non est necesse quod sapiens causatum est melius sapiente non creato vel non sapiente causato, nam Deus est non sapiens hoc modo, quia non est sapiens causatum, sicut Socrates in rei veritate esset non homo si homo tantum negaretur pro Platone." Ibid. "Sapientia dicta de creatura non pro alio repugnaret Deo nisi quia sapientia dicta de creatura in suo formali intellectu includeret aliquam imperfectionem Deo repugnantem. Sed hoc est falsum, ut probabo ... Si ergo lux proprie dicatur et non lapis, oportet quod lux in suo formali intellectu non includat imperfectionem, nec similiter perfectionem summam, sicut nec animal includit hominem nec asinum." Fol. lrb. "Sapientia dicitur formaliter de Deo et de creatura et non aequivoce, ergo univoce. Probatio antecedentis. Primo Aristoteles I Topicorum (15, 107bl3-19) dat unam considerationem ad sciendum utrum aliqua dicantur aequivoce, sicut utrum album univoce dicatur vel aequivoce de sono et de veste. Et dicit quod considerandum est si sint ad invicem comparabilia, similiter vel secundum magis, tunc sunt non aequivoca. Si vero non sint comparabilia, tunc sunt aequivoca; sicut album (Ms. argumentum) in voce comparator ad album (Ms. 14
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The obvious rejoinder is that Aristotle says nothing about analogy; he writes as though terms are either equivocal or univocal without mentioning analogy as an alternative. Harclay replies that Aristotle is silent about analogy, but he himself sees no contradiction in extending univocity to analogy and calling an analogous concept univocal: Si diceretur quod extendit univocum ad analogum, concedo. Si tu vocas analogum univocum, non est contradictio; de univoco loquitur Aristoteles, de analogo non. Harclay's notion of analogy, then, does not oppose it to univocity; rather he conceives it as a special kind of univocity. He thought that the whole controversy between the supporters of univocity and analogy is simply one of words: Dico ergo quod non est nisi controversia in verbis} The supporters of analogy argue that concepts predicated formally of God and creatures cannot be univocal because they belong to them unequally; to God first and then to creatures. They think that what is univocally predicated of several things belongs to them equally and not per prius et posterius. In reply Harclay shows that a relationship of priority and posteriority does not prevent univocity: Contra ostendo quod ordo per prius et posterius non impedit univocationem. For a genus is predicated univocally of its species, but it is attributed to one per prius and to another per posterius. So it is clear that a relation of priority and posteriority is not incompatible with univocity. 16
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argumentum) in colore; et ideo dicuntur aequivoce alba. Sed Deus et creatura comparantur secundum sapientiam, nam Deus est magis sapiens quam creatura, nam quidquid convenit causae aequivocae formaliter et effectui formaliter, per prius et posterius convenit causae quam effectui." Ibid. Cf. Scotus, Opus Oxon. 1, 8, 3, n. 12; pp. 590-591. In Metaph. IV, 1, n. 2; (Paris, 1893), VII, p. 146. Fol. lva. Fol. lvb. Thomas of Sutton criticizes Scotus for abusing the term "univocal" by extending it to what others call analogy. For him too, the dispute is chiefly one of words. "Quarto ponit (scil. Scotus) ens esse univocum, vocans univocum quod alii vocant analogum. Hoc patet, quia iste concedit quod ens dicitur de substantia et accidente secundum prius et posterius, et de uno in attributione ad alterum, quod alii ponunt analogum. Unde quia in hoc abutitur significatione vocabuli, ideo licet minus bene dicat, non potest argui contra eum nisi ex usu loquentium." Ms. Florence, Bibl. Naz. Conv. soppr. C.3, 46, fol. 39rb. Quoted by F. Pdster, "Thomas von Sutton O. Pr., ein Oxforder Verteidiger der thomistischen Lehre," Zeitschrift fur kath. Theol., XLVI (1922), 395, n. 2. "Dicetur forte huic: Concedo quod necesse est esse unum conceptual tertium respectu cujus comparatio, tamen ille non dicitur univoce de Deo et aliis pro eo quod per prius convenit uni quam alteri. Illud autem quod univoce convenit aliquibus aequaliter convenit et non per prius et posterius." Fol. lva. "Contra ostendo quod ordo per prius et posterius non impedit univocationem. Primo quia tunc calidum non conveniret univoce igni et ligno, quia prius convenit uni quam alteri, quod est contra Aristotelem II Metaph. (1, 993b25) ut dictum est. Item et hoc est contra Aristotelem I Topicorum (15, 107bl3), ut dictum est. Dicit enim ibi quod omne univocum est comparabile similiter et secundum magis. Ergo non repugnat univoco comparatio secundum prius et posterius. Item et genus non dicitur univoce de suis speciebus, quod non est 16 17
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In this question everything depends on how the term "univocal" is used. If we follow Aristotle and Averroes, it will be understood in a broad sense so as to include what is usually called analogy. Do they not speak of the heat of the sun and of its effects as univocal, and do they not also call univocal the truth of the first principles, which are most true, and the other lesser truths which depend on them? Algazel, for his part, requires three conditions for univocity: no relationship of priority and posteriority, no degrees of perfection, and no mediation of one thing by another. It is understandable, then, that he should call being analogous and not univocal, for it belongs by prior right and more perfectly to substance than to accidents, and it is possessed by accidents through substance. It should be clear from this that the philosophers use the term "univocal" in two different senses. It has a broad meaning, accepted by such great authorities as Aristotle and Averroes, which is not opposed to analogy; and it has a strict and popular meaning (Jamosam significationem) adopted by Algazel. For Harclay, then, as for William of Ockham, there is no basic opposition between analogy and univocity. Univocity admits of degrees, and analogy is simply one of its weaker or lesser types; but it is nonetheless fundamentally univocity. It is in this looser sense of the term that we must say that being and all other concepts predicated formally of God and creatures are univocal. Harclay has now stated in brief the position he wishes to uphold. It remains for him to meet more specifically the objections of those who deny the univocity of being. By answering these objections he reinforces the validity of his own doctrine and incidentally clears up some of the obscurities which still remain in it. 20
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verum. Probatio consequentiae, quia genus per prius convenit uni speciei quam alteri." Fol. lva-lvb. This extension of the notion of univocity was opposed by Peter of Sutton: "Ratio univocorum, quantum est ex se, aequaliter convenit illis, quibus est nomen commune non secundum prius et posterius." Cf. M. Schmaus, "Die Quaestio des Petrus Sutton, O.F.M., fiber die Univokation des Seins," Collectanea Franciscana, III (1933), 17. "Tres conditiones requiruntur ad univocationem secundum eum (scil. Algazelem): quod non prius et posterius, quod non magis aut minus, quod non uni mediante altera." Fol. lvb. Cf. Algazel, Metaphysics I, 1,4; ed. J. T. Muckle (Toronto, 1933), p. 26. "Ergo ut concordent auctoritates, necesse est quod univocatio habeat gradus, et Algazel accipit earn secundum suam famosam significationem; sed alii auctoritates majores, puta Aristoteles, accipit univocationem alio modo magis large." Ibid. Ockham describes several degrees of similarity of the things of which the univocal term is predicated. Cf. Sent. I, 2, 9 (Lyons, 1495) N; III, 9 Q. Cf. M. Menges, The Concept of Univocity regarding the Predication of God and Creature according to William Ockham (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1952), pp. 72-82. Analogy is not a distinct mode of predication for Ockham; it is always reduced either to univocity or equivocity. Cf. Quodl. IV, 16 (Strasbourg, 1491). Cf. Menges, op. cit., pp. 122-136. 20
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HENRY OF HARCLAY II. CRITICISM OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS
The first position Harclay criticizes is that of St. Thomas in his Contra Gentiles, which he cites by name. He chooses five of the Angelic Doctor's arguments in Book I, chapter 32, against the univocity of the divine names, states them briefly but accurately, and then criticizes them. St. Thomas' first argument runs as follows: When an effect does not receive a form similar in species to the form through which the agent acts, no name taken from the form can belong univocally to the cause and effect. He shows this with an example taken from ancient physics. Fire generated by the sun does not receive a form similar in species to the form through which the sun acts. So "heat" is not predicated univocally of the sun andfire.Now it is clear that God's creatures do not have a form similar in species to that through which God acts. So no name taken from the form can belong univocally to God and creatures. Harclay does not think St. Thomas' major proposition is true. A frog, he says, generated by the sun does not receive a form similar to the form of the sun in species, but it does in remote genus, for both are substances and bodies which are predicated univocally of the sun and the frog. So it is sufficient for univocity that the effect be similar to the cause in the widest genus. The genus "substance," for instance, is predicated univocally of all like things existing in that genus. Harclay goes even further: it is sufficient that they have in common a concept more universal than the widest of all genera: Et ego dico quod sufficit quod conveniant in intentione communiore quam sit genus generalissimum. He is here referring to such concepts as being and the transcendentals, which, while not being genera, are, according to him, univocally predicable of God and creatures. Turning to St. Thomas' example, he points out that simply because the sun and fire do not agree univocally in heat, it does not follow that they agree univocally in nothing else. The reason why they are not univocally "hot" is that the sun is not formally, or simply speaking, hot: it is called hot only because it causes heat, as it can be called liquid because it causes ice to melt. Both the sun and its effects, however, are formally substances and, since they both formally agree in this perfection, it is predicated univocally of them. The 23
"Propositio major est falsa. Non habet apparentiam, nam rana causata a sole non accipit formam similem in specie formae solis, sed tantum in genere remoto, puta substantiae vel corporis; et tamen substantia vel corpus dicitur univoce de sole et rana. Unde sufficit ad univocationem quod effectus sit similis causae in genere generalissimo. Nam substantia, quae genus est, univoce dicitur de omnibus similibus in genere existentibus. Et ego dico quod sufficit quod conveniant in intentione communiore quam sit genus generalissimus." Ibid. 13
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conclusion follows: since God and creatures are formally and properly being and substance, these terms are predicated of them univocally. It is significant that St. Thomas agrees with Harclay that a generic concept, such as "body" or "substance," is univocally predicable of the heavenly bodies and their sublunar effects, but according to him it is univocal only from the point of view of the logician and not from that of the philosopher of nature and the metaphysician. Because the latter consider things as they actually exist, with their different kinds of matter, potentiality and modes of existence, generic concepts are not univocal for them but analogous. Harclay has no notion of St. Thomas' distinction between the "physical" and "logical" consideration of a genus. From the point of view of the Angelic Doctor, Harclay's notion of a concept remains on the level of logic and does not rise to that of the philosophy of nature or metaphysics. The second argument of St. Thomas given by Harclay is the following: Nothing can belong univocally to a cause and its effect unless it belongs to them according to the same mode of being. This is why "house" is not predicated univocally of the house existing in the mind, that is to say, the idea of a house, and the house in reality, which is the effect of the idea of house, for each has its own distinctive mode of being. Now the same is true of God's effects, e.g. wisdom: they do not have the same mode of being in themselves, i.e. in creatures, and in God. It follows that nothing is predicated univocally of the two. Harclay replies that not every diversity of mode of being causes equivocity. For instance, spiritual and corporeal qualities do not have the same mode of being, and yet "quality" is predicated univocally of them, for both are species of quality. In the example used by St. Thomas the mode of being is such that it "diminishes" the thing to which it belongs, for the being which house has in the soul is "diminished being." This is why Aristotle says in the De Anima that the idea of a stone is not a stone. Any mode of being which diminishes or destroys the thing to which it belongs will cause equivocity. But this has nothing to do with the present case, because both God and creatures are 24
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"Ad probationem suam dico quod exemplum non valet. Fallacia consequentis. Non sequitur: Sol et ignis non conveniunt univoce in calido, ergo in nullo alio. Immo ego dico quod substantia ignis est causata a sole sicut caiiditas sua, et tamen sunt univoce substantia. Causa autem quare non sunt univoce calida est quia sol non est formaliter calidus sicut est formaliter substantia.... Quod autem sol simpliciter non sit calidus patet, quia non est calidus (Ms. alius) nisi quia effectivus caliditatis in alio a se. Sed sic eadem ratione diceretur liquidus quia efficit liquiditatem in glacie." Fols. lvb-2ra. Cf. St. Thomas, In I Sent., 19, 5, 2, ad lm Summa Theol. I, 66, 2, ad 2m I, 88, 2, ad 4m; In X Metaph., 12, n. 2142. See A. Maurer, "St. Thomas and the Analogy of Genus," The New Scholasticism 29 (1955), 127-144; reprinted above, pp. 19-31. 24
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formally wise; hence the mode of being wise in creatures does not "diminish" or "destroy" the notion of wisdom. . Medieval logicians developed the notions of a determinatio diminuens and distrahens. According to them, qualifying determinations can be added to words which "diminish" their sense. For example, if to the proposition "The Ethiopian is white" there is added the qualification "as to his teeth," the meaning of white is limited or "diminished." If "dead" is added to "man," the qualification "destroys" the meaning of man. Harclay's point is that St. Thomas bases his position on an example of such a "diminishing" determination, which has nothing to do with the case at hand. St. Thomas' third argument is that if anything is common to God and creatures, it must be one of the five universal predicables: genus, species, difference, property or accident. But none of these apply to God. Harclay agrees that there are onlyfiveuniversals if we restrict ourselves to the direct predicamental order; but, like Scotus, he points out that there are others not reducible to this order. For example, "not man" is said univocally of everything not a man, and yet it is not a genus, species, etc. Moreover, there is the universality of the transcendentals, such as being and unity, which are not limited to any determined genus. The fourth argument of St. Thomas is that whatever is predicated of several things by the intellect is simpler than they are. Hence there would be something simpler than God is there were a univocal concept predicable of 26
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"Responsio. Non omnis varius modus essendi facitv aequivocationem. Nam qualitates spirituales, sciicet virtutes, et hujusmodi, non habent eundem modum essendi qm habent qualitates corporales, quia subjecta eorum sunt alterius rationis; et tamen qualitas univoce dicitur de illis, quia species qualitatis sunt. Si autem modus essendi sit talis quod sit diminuens vel distrahens a re cujus est, non est mirum si causat aequivocationem. Et ita est in exemplo adjuncto, quia esse domus in anima est esse diminutum. Unde lapis in anima non est lapis, secundum Aristotelem III De Anima (8, 431b29).... Sed tunc nihil ad propositum, nam Deus vere et formaliter est sapiens et non secundum quid, et creatura similiter." Fol. 2ra. For the logical notion of determinatio diminuens, cf. Peter of Spain, Summulae Logicales, ed. I. Bochenski (Rome, 1947), VII, pp. 83, 84; XI, pp. 104, 105, Siger of Courtrai, Fallaciae•, ed. G. Wallerand, Les Oeuves de Siger de Courtrai, (Les Philosophes Beiges VIII, Louvain, 1913), pp. 82, 83. C. Prantl, Geschichte er Logik in Abendlande IV (Leipzig, 1927), pp. 51, 124. For the meaning and origin of ens diminutum, A. Maurer, "Ens Diminuum: a Notes on its Origin and Meaning," Mediaeval Studies, XII (1950), 216-222. "Dico quod universalia secundum quod subserviunt rebus ordinabilibus in recta linea praedicamentali sufficienter distinguuntur per quinque, et sic sufficit ad intentionem Porphyrii, cujus liber, scilicet Isagoge, subservit libra Praedicamentorum. Tamen nihil prohibet alia esse communia et indifferenter quae nullum istorum sunt directe sed reducibile ad aliquod istorum ... Et tunc dico quod communitas eorum quae sunt transcendentia, scilicet entis et unius, est communitas non determinata ad aliquam unam determinatam communitatem, sicut nec ilia transcendentia sunt limitata ad determinatum genus." Ibid. Cf. Scotus, Report. Paris. 1, 8, 5; XXII, p. 171. 26
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God and creatures. To this Harclay retorts that nothing prevents there being a more simple concept than that which we have of God. He leaves for later the explanation of how this is possible. Lastly St. Thomas argues that what belongs to one thing per prius and to another per posterius does not belong to them univocally. There is no need to repeat Harclay's position on this point. As we have seen, he does not think the unequal degrees of a perfection hinder univocity. 29
III. CRITICISM OF HENRY OF GHENT
After replying to St. Thomas' arguments against the univocity of the divine names, Harclay turns his attention to another group of objections to his position. He leaves their authors anonymous, simply calling them alii. It is possible that he refers to some of his contemporaries, perhaps to Peter of Sutton, who, like St. Thomas, but for other reasons, opposed the univocity of being. The objections, however, can be traced back to Henry of Ghent. Duns Scotus already disputed against Henry on the univocity of being; Harclay now takes up the dispute on the side of the Subtle Doctor, but in terms of his own philosophy. Harclay says that some argue as follows: A univocal concept is based upon some thing, otherwise it is empty. So a universal reality (rem communem) corresponds to every universal concept. Now there is no reality common to God and creatures. It follows that neither is there any concept common to them. Henry of Ghent opposed the univocity of being precisely on this ground. He pointed out that, since there is no one meaning or "intention" common to substance and accident, there can be no real community of being between them. Now the creator and his creatures share in one reality even less than a substance and an accident. So it is impossible that being is something real, common to God and creatures: nullo modo ens potest esse aliquid commune reale Deo et creaturae. Henry of Ghent concluded that, since there is no real 30
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"Dico ad illud quod nihil prohibet aliquem conceptum esse simpliciorem conceptu quem nos habemus de Deo, sicut dicetur infra." Ibid. Cf. infra, note 36. "Praeterea contra istam opinionem arguunt alii primo sic: Communis conceptus fundatur super aliquam rem; alioquin esset conceptus vanus. Ergo si sit dare conceptum communem, est dare rem communem. Cum ergo nulla res sit communis Deo et creaturis, (Ms. add. nullus) sequitur etiam quod nullus (Ms. nulla) conceptus erit communis." Ibid. "Circa secundum, quod Deus in esse communicet cum creaturis, idest, quod esse sit aliquid commune Deo et creaturis, aiguitur ... tertio sic: Dictum de pluribus quod habet per se intellectum propter intellectus illorum, est aliquid reale commune ad illos, quia omnis conceptus fundatur in re aliqua; ens est hujusmodi, quia secundum Avicennam ens imprimitur 29
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community between God and creatures or between a substance and an accident, being cannot be predicated of them univocally but only analogically. Duns Scotus was willing to agree with Henry of Ghent that God and creatures have no thing or reality in common: in reality they are fundamentally diverse (primo diversa); that is to say, they differ by their whole selves and share in nothing common. But this does not prevent their having a concept in common: Ad secundum (leg. tertium) patebit in secundo articulo quod Deus et creatura non sunt primo diversa in conceptibus, tamen sunt primo diversa in realitate, quia in nulla realitate conveniunt; et quomodo esse possit conceptus communis sine convenientia in re vel in realitate in sequenti dicetur. In this way Scotus dissociated a univocal concept from the real sharing of several things in a common reality. He was opposed on this point by Peter 33
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impressione prima etiam antequam in ipsa imprimitur intellectus aut creaturae aut Dei. Ergo, etc. Dicendum ad hoc: Cum ens, ut infra dicetur, non signiiicat aliquam unam intentionem communem substantiae et accidenti, sed signiiicat significatione prima unumquodque decern praedicamentorum, nulla communitate reali ipsum ens potest esse commune substantiae et accidenti. Quare cum multo minus in aliquo uno reali conveniunt creator et creatura quam duae creaturae, substantia scilicet et accidens, immo multo plus distat ratio essendi creatoris a ratione essendi creaturae quam differat ratio essendi unius creaturae a ratione essendi alterius, nullo modo ens potest esse aliquid commune reale Deo et creaturae." Henry of Ghent, Summa I, 21, 2 (Paris, 1520), fol. 123EF. "Et ideo absolute dicendum quod esse non est aliquid commune reale in quo Deus communicet cum creaturis-, et ita si ens aut esse praedicatur de Deo et creaturis, hoc est sola nominis communitate, nulla rei. Et ita non univoce per definitionem univocorum, nec tamen pure aequivoce, secundum definitionem aequivocorum casu, sed medio modo, ut analogice." Loc. cit., fol. 123F. Primo diversa is Scotus' technical expression to signify that several things are distinguished by their whole selves: "quae se totis distinguuntur sunt primo diversa." Opus Oxort. I, 26, n. 2; X, p. 293. Scotus also holds that the Persons of the Trinity are primo diversa in reality but not in concept: "Dico igitur quod paternitas et filiatio non sunt duo primo diversa quantum ad intellectum, quin possit intellectus abstrahere ab eis aliquam conceptum realem communem, sed sunt primo diversa quantum ad realitatem et realitatem, ita quod nullum unum gradum realitatis includunt, qui sit quasi potentialis et determinabilis per proprias differentias vel quasi per proprias." Op. cit., I, 26, n. 48; p. 341. According to the Vatican edition, vol. 6, p. 52, this is a textus interpolatus. Scotus, Opus Oxon. I, 8, 3, n. 11; p. 590, cf. nn. 27-29; pp. 626-629. "Nulla realitas est communis Deo et creaturae, nec tamen intellectus est falsus qui habet univocum conceptum de eis." Collatio 24, ed. C. Balic, "De Collationibus J. D. Scoti," Bogoslovni Vestnik IX (1923), 215. Also in C. Harris, Duns Scotus II (Oxford, 1927), p. 374. There is no reality common to God and creatures because of the modalities of infinity andfinitudeproper to each in actual existence. On the other hand, there can be concepts common to God and creatures without any real community between them because the concepts of God's essential attributes are not genera but transcendentals. Cf. Opus Oxon. I, 8, 3, nn. 16-18, pp. 595-598; E. Gilson, op. cit., pp. 236-239; T. Barth, art. cit., 318. 33
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of Sutton, a contemporary of Harclay's. Using the same argument as Henry of Ghent, Peter denied that two things can be primo diversa in reality but not in the conception we form of them. For something in reality must correspond to that concept; otherwise it is empty. A univocal concept of God and creatures, therefore, demands some real community between them, which he has proved to be false. Harclay follows Scotus on this point, opposing both Henry of Ghent and Peter of Sutton. Indeed, as we shall see, like William of Ockham he goes beyond the Subtle Doctor in completely dissociating the univocity of concepts from common natures or realities, for he maintains that there are univocal concepts while denying that any two things have a reality in common. Scotus did not go as far as that, for, according to him, at least finite beings in a species share in a common nature, which has a real being outside the intellect. In his Question on universals Harclay criticizes this view, maintaining that only individual things are real and denying the reality of common natures. In the Question on univocity he denies that there must be a community in reality corresponding to the community of the concept: Dico ad illud, quod communitati conceptus non necessario correspondet communitas in re. A concept is based upon a thing in the sense that it is taken or formed from the thing, or is a concept of the thing; but fundamentally it is in the intellect which conceives it. So it is not necessary that whenever there are distinct concepts there are distinct things corresponding to them. Reality is an equivocal cause of the concepts in our intellect, and it is a general rule that we cannot argue from a distinction in the effect to one in its equivocal cause, nor from a distinction in something posterior (e.g., concepts) to one in something prior (e.g., reality). Harclay has a simpler explanation of the origin of universal concepts. From one individual we can form both confused and general concepts and others that are distinct and more particular. The fact that the mind can form confused, common concepts of things does not warrant our affirming a reality common to them. Hence 36
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"Item ista quae sunt primo diversa nihil possunt habere commune. Si enim haberent aliquid commune, non essent primo diversa, sed per diflerentias primo diversas differrent ab invicem. Sed Deus et creatura sunt primo diversa Super decern praedicamenta. Igitur, etc. Dicitur quod sunt primo diversa in re, non in conceptu. Contra: Aut illi conceptui aliquid correspondet aut nihil. Si nihil, cassus est. Ergo habent commune aliquid in re, quod improbatum est." Cf. M. Schmaus, art. cit,, 20. The reference to the commentary on the Categories has not been identified. Cf. Opus Oxon., loc. cit., nn. 16, 17; pp. 595-597; II, 3, 1, n. 7; 12, pp. 48-49. Cf. E. Gilson, op. cit., pp. 110, 451. Cf. J. Kraus, art. cit., X (1932), 49-58. "Dico ad illud quod communitati conceptus non necessario correspondet communitas in re, sed ab eadem re simplici omnino accipitur conceptus communis et confusus vel non 36
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there can be concepts univocal to God and creatures without their sharing a common reality. Harclay gives another argument against the univocity of being which has its basis in Henry of Ghent — an argument which he finds the most difficult of all to answer. The burden of the argument is as follows: If there is something univocally common to God and creatures, they must agree in that which they have in common and differ in something else. But this implies that there is some composition in God, for no simple being can be understood to agree with, and be distinguished from the same thing, for agreement and distinction are contrary relative properties. Now, as contraries, they cannot be simultaneously present in the same thing, just as two absolute contrary forms, like whiteness and blackness, cannot be together in the same thing. If God, then, agrees with a creature in something and at the same time differs from it in something else, he must agree and differ by distinct forms, and this is contrary to the divine simplicity. We must conclude, then, that nothing is univocally common to God and creatures. Faced with this difficulty, Henry of Ghent concluded that God and creatures have nothing in common, neither a reality nor a concept. If being or esse is predicated of both God and creatures, it is only the name which they have in common. The concept of being is predicated of them analogically, not univocally. Since being does not signify a reality common to both, God does not agree with creatures insofar as he is a being by any other reality or concept than that by which he differs from them insofar as he is God: 40
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differens, et conceptus distinctivus et magis particularis. Et cum dicit conceptus fundatur super rem, dico quod hoc est sic intelligendum, quod conceptus accipitur vel formatur a re vel est conceptus rei; tamen fundamentaliter est in intellectu concipiente. Et tunc nego consequentiam, quia non sequitur quod distinctis conceptibus distinctae res correspondeant, quia distinctio in posteriori non arguit distinctionem in priori, nec distinctio in effectu arguit distinctionem in causa aequivoca. Ideo non sequitur quod aliqua sit communis res." Fol. 2ra. "Praeterea arguitur contra istam opinionem; et est responsio difficilis inter omnia. Arguit sic: Impossibile est quod ab eodem simplici accipiatur convenientia et distinctio respectu ejusdem. Ita est quasi primum principium: sicut duae formae absolutae contrariae, puta albedo et nigredo non possunt inesse eidem simili (Ms. similis), nec simpliciter nec respective, nam idem non potest esse album et nigrum, nec etiam respectu diversorum, nec etiam respectu ejusdem, ita duae formae respectivae contrariae sunt impossibiles in eodem respectu ejusdem. Unde impossibile est esse idem simile et dissimile alicui secundum idem. Sed convenientia et distinctio sunt formae respectivae contrariae. Ergo, etc. Major ergo vera. Ergo si Deus convenit cum creatura in aliquo et distinguitur ab ilia, non potest eodem (Ms. eidem) convenire et distingui. Ergo alio et alio convenit et distinguitur. Hoc autem repugnat simplicitati divinae. Ergo, etc." Fols. 2ra-2rb. Cf. supra, note 33. The difficulty is stated in Henry of Ghent, Summa 1,21,2, fol. 123E; also in I, 21, 3, fol. 125A. 40
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Cum nihil sit commune reale in ente significatum ad creatorem et creaturam, ut supra dictum est, non oportet quod aliquo alio vel re vel intentione conveniat Deus cum creatura inquantum ens, et alio differat inquantum est Deus. To this, Duns Scotus replied in the same way as he did to the previous objection to the univocity of the concept of being. Granted that God and creatures share in no common reality, and that they do not agree and differ by distinct realities, this does not prevent their sharing in a common concept. Henry of Harclay's answer is basically the same. "I agree," he says, "that it is by something different that God and creatures are alike and differ, but by different concepts and not by different things." It is possible to have distinct concepts of the same simple thing. By one of these concepts it can agree with another thing if that concept is indifferent and does not distinguish between them. By still another concept of the same thing the intellect can distinguish between them. It is true, then, that one thing agrees with, and is distinguished from, another thing by the same reality. However, since the relation of agreement formally speaking belongs to a concept and not to a thing, we must deny that one thing formally agrees with, or is distinguished from another by the same reality, but rather by different concepts. This presupposes that the intellect can form distinct concepts of one absolutely simple being, such as God. How indeed is this possible? We form concepts of God from his creatures, in which the perfections united in God are distinct from each other. One divine perfection shines forth more in one person than in another. For instance, in one person we find more wisdom than goodness, and vice versa. So the intellect can consider these different perfections in creatures and form distinct concepts of them, and then attribute them to God. So even though God himself is absolutely one, we can form distinct concepts of him. 42
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Henry of Ghent, Summa I, 21, 3, fol. 1261. Cf. Scotus, Opus Oxort. 1, 8, 3, n. 11, p. 590. He is here answering an objection based on Henry of Ghent's doctrine, stated loc. cit., n. 2, p; 581. Cf. E. Gilson, op. cit., pp. 236, 237. "Concedo quod alio et alio conveniunt et distinguuntur Deus et creatura, sed alio et alio conceptu, non alia et alia re. Nam ab eadem re simplici possunt haberi distincti conceptus, quorum uno potest convenire cum alia re quia ille conceptus indififerens est et non distinctivus unius rei ab alia, et alio conceptu formato ab eadem re potest intellectus distinguere rem unam ab alia. Et tunc ad formam dico quod eodem a parte rei convenit et distinguitur sed quia re non convenit formaliter sed in conceptu formato a re, ideo non eodem formaliter convenit et distinguitur." Fol. 2rb. "Modo primo probo illud, quod ab una re simplici, in fine simplicitatis (Ms. simpliciter) potest intellectus formare tales distinctos conceptus. ... Nam quia intellectus noster concipit Deum ex creaturis, et perfectiones quae sunt unitae in Deo distinctae apparent in effectu, nam 42
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Moreover, it is evident that our intellect need not conceive an object in the most perfect manner possible. It can know something first confusedly and then distinctly, without any distinction on the part of the object: sub eadem ratione a parte objecti. Now a confused concept is not the same as a distinct one. So it is certain that there can be different concepts of something which itself is without distinction in object and ratio. If something is conceived more distinctly than it was before, the same thing is conceived and not several things, but it is conceived in a more perfect way. Suppose some simple degree of whiteness is seen by an eagle and an owl; the eagle will know it more perfectly than the owl, not because it sees more things in the object or more formal rationes, for we have supposed the object is simple, but because it sees the same thing more perfectly. The same is evident in the Beatific Vision, for one person does not see more than another from the point of view of the divine reality or its mode, but because he has a more perfect knowledge of it. The reason for this is that a concept depends on two causes: the object and the intellect. Now whenever an effect essentially depends on two causes, if one varies, the effect varies, even though the other cause does not. So even though the object is in no way altered, it will cause a different concept because of a different disposition in the intellect. It is evident, then, that one 46
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una perfectio Dei magis relucet et apparet in uno effectu quam in alio, puta sapientia magis quam bonitas, et bonitas magis apparet in alio effectu quam sapientia; et ideo intellectus deveniens in cognitionem Dei per efFectus, potest Deum concipere sub ratione unius perfectionis quae magis relucet in effectu, et ideo concipere eum sub ratione alterius perfectionis, et iterum convertendo se ad alium effectum, alium conceptum alterius perfectionis potest formare. Et ita stante omnimoda simplicitate divina in re intellecta, puta in Deo, potest intellectus habere distinctos conceptus. ... Ecce ex diversis effectibus habentur distincti conceptus distinctarum perfectionum, quae tamen sunt una simplex perfectio in Deo." Ibid. "Non est necesse quod intellectus noster, concipiens aliquod objectum sub aliqua ratione objecti, concipiat ipsum sub ipsa ratione primo intuitu perfectissimo modo quo possibile est intellectum concipere illud. Nam intellectus noster respectu cujuscumque intelligibilis et sub quacumque ratione natus est procedere a confusa cognitione ad distinctam. Primo ergo potest habere confusam cognitionem et postea distinctam (Ms. distincti) ejusdem objecti et sub eadem ratione a parte objecti. Sed conceptus confusus et distinctus non sunt idem. Certum est ergo, stante unitate objecti, et rationis cujuscumque a parte objecti, potest esse diversi conceptus de eo." Ibid. "Confirmatur hoc argumentum, nam distinctius concipere quam prius non est plura concipere quam prius, sed idem, tamen modo perfection cognoscendi. Verbi gratia, si esset unus gradus albedinis indivisibilis et simplex, ille gradus perfectius videretur ab aquila et distinctius quam a vespertilione, ita quod aquila perfectius cognosceret illud objectum quam noctua, non quia plura cognosceret in objecto, nec formales rationes plures, quia objectum simplicem est suppono, sed quia idem perfectius. Exemplum etiam patet in visione beata, nam non videt plus unus quam alius, nec rem nec modum rei; tamen perfectiorem cognitionem habet unus quam alius." Ibid. 46
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and the same object can cause distinct acts and concepts because of different dispositions on the part of the knower; we need not suppose any distinction on the part of the object. Because of the difference in the concepts we form of God, the names which signify these concepts are not synonyms. The concepts of "God," "being," "wisdom" are not the same. So even though in God all these are one, still they are not so in our manner of conceiving him. Harclay has said that nothing real outside thought is common to God and creatures; they have in common only the concepts formed by the intellect. It would seem to follow that if no intellect considers or conceives God and creatures they have nothing whatsoever in common and there is no similarity between them. But Harclay contends that even if no mind thinks about them they have still something in common, for God and creatures are really so similar (tantum conveniunt) that any mind can form one concept of them, for their relation and conformity to each other always remains on their side. So there is always community and likeness between them: Ad secundum dico quod si nullus intellectus consideraret aliquid, adhuc diceretur esse commune Deo et creaturis pro quanta Deus et creatura tantum conveniunt ex natura rei quod intellectus quicumque considerans posset formare unum conceptum de illis, nam habitudo eorum et conformitas ad invicem ex parte illorum semper manet. Ideo ex parte illorum semper est communitas et convenientia. In the same way, even though truth exists only in the intellect, the necessary proposition, "Man is an animal" is always true even if no intellect thinks about it. The reason for this is that every truth in the intellect depends on reality as on its cause, and the conformity of reality to the intellect exists on the side of reality. So it is clear that Harclay does not absolutely deny that there is a real community between God and creatures, even though that community is not a thing or a reality. There is a real likeness between them which serves as the foundation for our univocal concepts of them. 48
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"Quando aliquis effectus essentialiter dependet ex duabus causis, facta variatione in altera illarum causarum, etiam alia non variata, sequetur tamen variatio effectus. Sed conceptus noster dependet ab objecto similiter et ab intellectu... Ergo altera causa, puta objecto, omnino non variato, propter variam dispositionem in intellectu cognoscente, erit conceptus alius causatus." Ibid. Fol. 2va. Ibid. The manuscript omits part of the objection, but the reply indicates this is the sense. Ibid. Fols. 2va-2vb. 48
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What precisely is this relation of likeness? First of all, we must realize that it is in no sense a kind of unity, or founded on a kind of unity. Because there is a real likeness between God and creatures it might be thought that there is some real unity between them which serves as the basis for the unity of our univocal concepts. Not at all. Likeness and unity are absolutely different: convenientia et unitas sunt primo diversa. This is obvious, for likeness always implies diversity and distinction, since only different things can be alike. Unity, on the other hand, is the contrary of distinction. So there can be degrees of likeness but not degrees of unity. One thing can be more like another than it is like a third thing, and different concepts can be formed on the basis of these likenesses. But unity admits of no degrees. It is not true that the more alike two things are the more one they are. Likeness can be increased to infinity and unity will not be reached, for distinction still remains, and consequently lack of unity, in the things that are alike. Two things are not more one than a thousand things. Harclay is here opposing Duns Scotus' doctrine of degrees of real unity, as Ockham will also do later on. Scotus distinguished between a greater and lesser real unity, corresponding to his distinction between individual things and the natures they have in common. According to him, an individual, like Peter, is numerically one, while the specific nature it possesses in common with other individuals, like humanity, has in itself a real unity less than the numerical unity of the individual. In his Question on universals Harclay opposes the Scotist distinction between the individual thing and its common nature; for him, as for Ockham, there are no real natures shared in common by several individuals. It is only to be expected, then, that Harclay will refuse to accept degrees of real unity. The only real unity he recognizes is that of the individual thing, which indeed alone is real. Harclay's dissociation of likeness and unity enables him to assert a real likeness between God and creatures without any real unity: concedo quod inter Deum et creaturam ex natura rei est similitudo et tamen nulla unitas. On 53
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"Ad tertium dico quod necesse est quod sit convenientia ex natura rei inter ilia a quibus formatur unus conceptus, sed non est necesse quod sint magis unum ex natura rei quam alia; immo nec aliquo modo unum nec minus nec magis. Ratio istius est, nam convenientia et unitas sunt primo diversa; ideo major convenientia numquam facit majorem unitatem, etiam si convenientia cresceret in infinitum, nam semper convenientia supponit distinctionem, sed unitas contrariatur distinctioni." Fol. 2vb. Cf. Ockham, Sent. I, 2, 6 X. Henry of Ghent admitted a minimal unity of analogy between God and creatures: "Habent igitur creator et creatura aliquam identitatem et unitatem, sed ilia non est alicujus communis participatione, sed analogia imitationis, ut dictum est, et haec est unitas minima." Summa I, 26, 2, fol. 159V. Cf. J. Kraus, art. cit., especially X ( 1932), 49-58. For Scotus' doctrine of real unity, cf. Opus Oxon. II, 3, 1, n. 7; pp. 48-49. 53
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what, then, is this real likeness grounded? Harclay replies that it is based, not on one foundation, nor on the real unity of the foundation, but on distinct foundations: Et tu dicis, super quid fundatur ista similitudo ex natura rei? Dico quod super fundamenta distincta et non super unumfiindamentum,nec super unitatem fundamenti realem. This is perfectly in accord with his doctrine of relation. He holds that there are real relations, but he contends that they are based on distinct foundations in the things related and not on the real unity of the foundation. So God and creatures can be really related without the relation being grounded on one reality common to both. There is no need, then, to affirm the reality of something common corresponding to the universality of our concepts. The objection may be raised that a person who conceives God under the aspect of being conceives a reality outside thought. And if he does not know that reality precisely as God when he knows it as being, he knows a reality other than the deity. Hence being in God is a reality distinct from deity: Ergo entitas in Deo est alia realitas quam deitas. It would seem to follow that there is a real community of being corresponding to our concept of it. Harclay replies that in conceiving God as being, the intellect conceives the reality of the deity, although it is not aware of it. If we have a concept of being, predicated of God, we have a concept of the deity, but we do not know that we have that concept. 56
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Ibid. "Nam ideo dicunt quod relationes communes in diversis, ut similitudo et aequalitas, non sunt reales, quia necesse est fundamentum numerare in extremis. Nam, ut dicunt, ipsamet fundamenta similitudinis et aequalitatis sunt similia et aequalia. Et ideo cum aequalitas et similitudo includant distinctionem extremorum, necesse est fundamenta numerari. Illud tamen non teneo, sed concedo quod similitudo et convenientia stant cum distinctione." Ibid. Other texts on relation will be found in F. Pelster, art cit., 339. In his Question on relations Harclay argues against the strong realist position of Scotus on relation, which Harclay defended in his Sentence commentary. In his later Question he presents a minimal realist view of real relations, holding that they are "things" (res) in a broad sense of the word, but insisting that the only being they have is the simultaneity and association of the things related. See M. G. Henninger, "Henry of Harclay's Question on Relations," Mediaeval Studies 49 (1987), 76-112. "Probo quod communitati conceptus correspondeat necessario communitas in re. Nam qui concipit Deum sub ratione entis vere concipit aliquid reale extra animam; et si non cognoscat Deum, cognoscit ergo aliquam veram rem extra animam, et non cognoscit et deitatem. Ergo entitas in Deo est alia realitas quam deitas." Fol. 2va. "Ad quintum respondemus uno modo sic, quod intellectus concipiens de Deo quod est ens concipit realitatem deitatis, sed non percipit se hoc concipere; eodem modo si habet unum conceptum entis dicti de Deo, habet conceptum deitatis, sed non percipit se habere ilium conceptum." Fol. 2vb. 56
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When we conceive being, then, we conceive a reality; but what exactly does "reality" mean in this case? "Reality" is a term which does not stand for any one definite thing; rather, it has a confused supposition and stands indeterminately for any thing. The feet that, in conceiving being, we conceive a reality does not prove that outside the intellect there is some definite thing common to several things, corresponding to our concept. At the present moment, Harclay says, I know that some degree (gradus) of the zodiac is rising in the east, for the heavens are continually in motion. But I do not know what degree it is, whether it is the Lamb or the Bull. This does not mean that there is in reality one "degree" common to all the degrees of the heavens. The universality involved in conceiving a "degree" is only in the mind, just as "man" is common to all men only in thought. 60
IV. THE UNTVOCITY OF BEING REGARDING SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT
It is owing to its indetermination, then, that the concept of being is predicated univocally. We have seen this to be true with regard to God and creatures. In the second part of his Question Harclay shows that it is equally the case with regard to substance and accidents. His treatment of this topic helps to confirm the notion of being we have met in discussing the predication of being of God and creatures. Henry of Ghent held that being is not a concept common to substance and accidents but primarily signifies substance or one of the nine accidents. Following Duns Scotus, Harclay opposes Henry of Ghent on this point. Being does not primarily signify one of the ten categories, but something common to both substance and accidents — at least, Harclay adds, a concept: Ens non signiflcat sua prima significatione substantiam nec accidens, sed aliquid commune, puta conceptum saltim . His arguments in defense of this recall those of Duns Scotus. We can know that something is a being without knowing whether it is a substance or accident; for example, the powers of the soul. Further, as Algazel says, we can know that something is a being without knowing whether it is active or 61
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"Ideo dico aliter quod cum dicitur intellectus concipiens ens concipit rem, quod res ibi habet suppositionem confiisam tantum, non supponit pro hac re nec pro ilia, sed confuse. Nec sequitur propter hoc quod in re sit aliqua res signata communis uni et alteri rei. Ergo ego scio modo quod aliquis gradus firmamenti ascendit in oriente, quia coelum continue movetur; tamen nescio quis sit, utrum arietis vel tauri. Et ex hoc non sequitur quod sit unus gradus communis omnibus gradibus in re; immo suppositum gradus est commune secundum considerationem ad hoc et illud suppositum, sicut homo est communis." Ibid. Henry of Ghent, Summa I, 21, 2, fol. 124F. Fol. 3ra. Cf. Scotus, In Metaph. IV, 1, n. 6; VII, p. 148. 60
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passive; for instance, the will. For everyone knows that the will is a being, but, Harclay adds, in these days they question whether it is active or passive. The concept of being, then, is quite distinct from that of substance and accident: it is predicated commonly of both without primarily signifying one or the other. Again, if being were not a univocal concept, it would be equivocal, and if that were so, the verbal copula "is" would also be equivocal, for tot modi dicitur esse, quot modi dicitur ens. So every proposition having the copula "is" would have a multitude of meanings. This would be especially true of the principle of non-contradiction; but this is impossible, for as the first of all principles it is the measure and standard of all truth, and the standard in any genus must be most simple and uniform. It must be conceded, then, that being is a univocal concept with only one meaning. In a concluding argument for his position Harclay points out that names can be classified according to their greater or lesser generality. There are some which signify individual things and are proper to them; for example, "Socrates." These individual names are equivocal in the highest degree and are never used univocally; if several men are called Socrates, this is the height of equivocity and entirely by chance. But these same men, equivocally called Socrates, are univocally called men. Again, certain things are equivocally given the name of a species, as the dog-fish and the animal dog are equivocally called dog, but they are univocally called animals. So we can see that the more universal a name is the more univocal it is. Individual names are always equivocal. At the opposite pole is the most universal name "being," which accordingly must be absolutely univocal. In between are names which are univocal with respect to some things and equivocal with respect to others. Being, as the most universal of all names, is most univocal, for it is univocal with respect to everything and equivocal with respect to none. 63
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"Nam si conceptus entis dicti de substantia et conceptus substantiae non essent distincti, impossibile esset intellectum cognoscere quod sit ens et non cognoscere quod sit substantia. Consequens falsum. Probatio consequentiae. Item conceptus non potest esse eidem intellectui notus et ignotus, vel distincte notus vel non distincte, vel perceptus vel non perceptus." Ibid. Cf. Algazel, Metaph. I, 1, 4; ed. J. T. Muckle (Toronto, 1933), p. 25. Cf. Scotus, In Metaph. IV, l,n. 6 p. 148. "Si ens esset aequivocum, eigo et esse, quia tot modi dicitur esse, quot modi dicitur ens, V Metaph. (7, 1017a24). Ergo omnis propositio esset multiplex in qua poneretur esse copula verbalis. Et per consequens primum principium esset maxime aequivocum, cum dicitur de quolibet esse vel non esse. Consequens falsum. Necesse est enim metrum in omni genere esse maxime simplex et non multiplex, et maxime uniforme. Sed primum principium est metrum omnis veritatis. Eigo, etc. Ista ratio non est nova, sed est Algazelis, ubi supra." Fol. 3rb. Cf. supra, note 63; Scotus, In Metaph. IV, 1, n. 2; p. 146. "Dico quod impossibile est quod ens dicatur de aliquibus aequivoce, immo de omnibus 63
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HENRY OF HARCLAY V. HARCLAY'S LOCATION IN MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY
In the light of the foregoing analysis several conclusions can be drawn concerning the thought of Henry of Harclay and its location in medieval philosophy. Harclay's criticism of Thomas Aquinas' doctrine of analogy does not come to grips with it in its metaphysical foundation. The analogy of being is inevitable in a metaphysics of essence and esse like that of St. Thomas, in which being belongs intrinsically to each and every thing in proportion to its essence. In Thomism, every being is at once diverse from, and proportionately the same as, every other being. Hence there cannot be a metaphysical concept of being predicable of everything in exactly the same sense. Harclay's thinking is on a quite different level from that of Thomas Aquinas. He philosophizes not so much as a metaphysician as an empiricist describing the formation of distinct and confused concepts on the basis of our more or less distinct awareness of things. The metaphysical structure of being seems to present no problem to him, as it will present no problem to Ockham. For Harclay, as for Ockham, every reality is a thing (res) conceived as a unity or block which is individual of itself and which the mind can conceptualize more or less vaguely on the basis of its degree of similarity to other things. To think of something as a being is to conceive it as vaguely and indistinctly as possible. Under this condition the concept of being is predicable of everything with exactly the same meaning; in short, it is univocal. This conceptualist tendency in Harclay's thought foreshadows Ockhamism and later English empiricism. Harclay's relation to Duns Scotus with respect to the concept of being is complex and difficult to define. One reason for this is the obscurity of the 66
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univoce, quia nomen maxime commune de nullo dicitur aequivoce, et nomen maxime singularis de nullo univoce. Et sic ascendendo a nomine significante singulare semper minuitur aequivocatio usque ad supremum, quod nullo modo est aequivocum et aliud esse nomen nullo modo univocum. Media autem istorum quodammodo univoca, quodammodo aequivoca, quia respectu aliorum univoca, respectu aliorum aequivoca. Verbi gratia, Socrates, quia significat individuum signatum, quod nulli est commune. Ideo Socrates et nomen individui est maxime aequivocum et totaliter a casu ... sed ilia quae aequivocantur in nomine individui, univocari possunt in nomine speciei. Unde plures Socrates sunt homo univoce. Item ilia quae aequivocantur in nomine speciei univocari in nomine generis, sicut marinus piscis et latrabile animal, quae aequivocantur in nomine speciei, scilicet canis, univocantur in nomine animalis; sunt enim animal univoce." Fol. 3vb. For St. Thomas' notion of being, cf. E. Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 2nd ed. (Toronto, 1952), pp. 154-189. For his doctrine of analogy, cf. G. B. Phelan, St. Thomas and Analogy (Milwaukee, 1941). Cf. J. Kraus, art. cit. (1933), 82. For Ockham's notion of an individual cf. A. C. Pegis, "The Dilemma of Being and Unity," Essays in Thomism (New York, 1942), 151-183. 66
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225
Subtle Doctor's notion of univocity, which has received different interpretations. We have seen, however, that Harclay agrees at least verbally with Scotus on the univocity of being and the transcendentals, and that he makes use of some of his arguments in support of this position. He continues Scotus' opposition on this point to St. Thomas and Henry of Ghent. At first sight it may be surprising to find Harclay agreeing with Scotus on the univocity of the concept of being, for his philosophy, as presented in his Quaestiones, appears to have little in common with Scotism. He takes issue with Scotus on the reality of common natures, holding that nothing is real save individual things, which have no essences or natures in common, requiring individuation by an added haecceity. In this regard Harclay anticipates William of Ockham. Our analysis of Harclay's Question on univocity reveals that he also anticipated other Ockhamist doctrines. Not only did he assert the univocity of the concept of being in a universe of radically distinct individuals, but his use of confused supposition to justify it prefigures the role of this logical doctrine in Ockham's philosophy. Harclay is also a pre-Ockhamist in his denial of any real unity except the unity of number. From this it is clear that the "mental universe" of Harclay is significantly differentfromthat of Scotus. His notion of being is not that of Scotus' entitas, which, taken in its ultimate abstraction, is univocal even to God and creatures, but which is analogical in its various modes of existence. Harclay's rejection of the Scotist formal distinction can be seen in his refusal to distinguish a parte rei between entity and deity in God. As we have seen, Harclay holds that it is impossible to conceive the being of God without conceiving the deity: the concept of the former is the unperceived concept of the latter. Even in his Sentence commentary he does not admit a distinction a parte rei between God and the divine attributes. Like Thomas Aquinas, he holds that God is really identical with his attributes (vere Deus est omnia ista realiter); their plurality resides on the side of God only in the sense that the fullness of the divine being makes it necessary for our weak intellect, accustomed to knowing creatures, to think of him through distinct concepts. This is entirely in agreement with Harclay's remarks about the divine attributes in the present Question. 68
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Cf. the works cited supra, note 8. Cf. J. Kraus, art. cit. (1932), 49-58. For an example of Ockham's use of the doctrine of supposition, cf. Sent. I, 2,6 KK, LL. Cf. E. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot, pp. 84-115. "Et ideo dicitur et bene quod causa multitudinis nominum (divinorum) dependet ex tribus: ex plenitudine Dei excedentis, ex infirmitate nostri intellectus deficientis, et ex parte 68
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The publication of all Harclay's Quaestiones will undoubtedly throw further light on his relation to Scotus. Even from the data at hand, however, it appears that his notion of being differs basically from that of Scotus. Both speak of the univocity of the concept of being, but we are warned in advance that the meaning they give to the concept is radically different. If we wish to find a philosophy with more affinity to that of Harclay, we should look to Ockham's conceptualism or nominalism. But even here we must make serious reservations. Ockham criticized Harclay's doctrine of universals for conceding at least a minimal reality to universals. Harclay contends that an individual is universal as it is conceived indistinctly. Socrates is Socrates, and he is also a man, an animal, and a body. All of these, in Harclay's view, are really one (omnia ista in re sunt unum); they differ only as more or less universal concepts of the same individual. This is contrary to Ockham, for whom an individual can never be said to be universal, even as it is indistinctly conceived. To say otherwise is to admit that even in this tenuous way universality can be found on the side of reality, which Ockham will not accept. Consistent with this is Ockham's denial of any real community between God and creatures. In this matter too we have seen Harclay refuse to go as far as Ockham. Harclay wanted to retain some vestige of real community between the two as a basis for the univocal concepts we form of them. We have seen him assert that even if no intellect thought of God and creatures, there would still be a conformity and relation between them: Ideo ex parte illorum semper est communitas et convenientia. This places Harclay outside the strict limits of Ockham's nominalism. There is a further difference between the two philosophies. According to Harclay the concept of being is always predicated univocally and never equivocally, for the concept is so general that it cannot distinctly signify one thing rather than another. Ockham agrees that being is predicated univocally, though he adds that properly speaking it is not the concept but the word "being" that is univocal. Only in an improper sense can the concept of being be called univocal. Unlike Harclay, therefore, Ockham locates 73
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modi cognoscendi intellectus assuescentis, quia per creaturas assuescit Deum apprehendere." Ms. Troyes 501, fol. 19rb. Cf. St. Thomas, In I Sent, 2, 1, 3; ed. Mandonnet (Paris, 1929), I, pp. 69-70. For the text of Harclay, cf. G. Gal, "Henricus de Harclay," 216-217, n. 79; 218, n. 83. Ockham quotes Harclay and criticizes his doctrine of universals in his Sentences, 1, 2, 7 E flf. Cf. Ockham, Sent., 1, 2, 9 GG; III, 9 X. Cf. supra, p. 219. Cf. supra, p. 223. Cf. Ockham, Summa Logicael, 13; p. 41.6-9. 73
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univocity in the strict sense on the level of words rather than concepts. As a consequence, Ockham thought that being is sometimes predicated equivocally. Though there is a univocal concept of being predicable alike of everything, when the term "being" is predicated of the various categories and they are taken in their function as signs, it stands not for one concept but for different concepts, and hence it is predicated equivocally. Ockham's point is that when the categories are taken as signs of things, some signify them one by one (divisim) and some signify things in conjunction with each other (coniunctim). For example, the category of substance or quality signifies individual things taken individually, whereas a category like relation signifies things taken together. So the word "being," predicated of these categories, understood as signs of things, stands for different concepts, and hence it is equivocal. There are significant differences, then, between the philosophies of Harclay and Ockham; the former is not just an undeveloped and incomplete version of the latter. While Harclay's philosophy anticipated some doctrines of the Venerable Inceptor and perhaps influenced them, it appears to have an inner consistency that marks it off from the nominalism or conceptualism of Ockham. It would be rash, however, to make definitive judgments in this matter until all the works of Harclay are published. 78
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Ibid. I, 38; p. 99.35-39; Quodl. V, 14. Cf. Ockham, Expositio Aurea. Liber Praedicabilium, cap. de specie (Bologna, 1496), fol. 17. Cf. M. Menges, op. cit., pp. 168-170. For the equivocal predication of being of the categories, cf. Aristotle, Metaph. VI, 2, 1026a32-bl. 7!
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13 Henry of Harclay's Questions on Immortality Both of the Questions of Henry of Harclay edited in the appendix of this article concern the problem of immortality. The first considers the problem in its broadest aspect, inquiring whether any creature necessarily exists and is by nature indestructible. It lays down the principles determining Harclay's conclusions in the second Question, which asks more specifically whether the human soul is immortal. The two Questions are also linked together by their opposition to the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. He is the main subject of criticism in both. Harclay's chief concern is to uphold orthodoxy and the traditional views of the Church regarding the freedom and omnipotence of God and the basic nothingness of creatures. He sees in St. Thomas a theologian who has betrayed these Christian truths and fallen into heresy through his love of Greek philosophy and his attempt to reconcile Aristotle with the Christian faith. Harclay's preoccupation in these Questions is thus allied to that of his fellow Oxonians and contemporaries, Duns Scotus and William of Ockham, both of whom were intent on safeguarding the faith against Greek and Arabian necessitarianism. This concern was not new to Oxford in the 1
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Cf. infra, Appendix I, 12; II, 41-44. Unless otherwise indicated, references to Harclay are to the Questions edited in the Appendix. I, 12 refers to Question I, paragraph 12. St. Thomas is also Harclay's principal subject of criticism in his Question on the univocity of being. Cf. A. Maurer, "Heniy of Harclay's Question on the Univocity of Being," Mediaeval Studies XVI (1954), 1-18. Reprinted above, pp. 203-227. For Scotus' relations to the philosophers, cf. E. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot (Paris, 1952), especially pp. 641-653. For Ockham, cf. L. Baudry, Le Tractatus de Principiis Theologiae attribue a G. d'Occam (Paris, 1936), pp. 42, 43: "En resume, la philosophie de Guillaume d'Occam se presente comme un effort de la pensee chretienne pour se liberer des entraves de I'aristotelisme." Cf. E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York, 1955), p. 498. 1
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fourteenth century. As early as the first half of the thirteenth century, Robert Grosseteste criticized certain "moderns" who tried to make Aristotle a Catholic and ended by making themselves heretics. In levelling the same charge against St. Thomas, Harclay follows the tradition begun by Grosseteste of guarding the Christian faith against the contamination of pagan Aristotelianism. 3
I. THE CONTINGENCY OF CREATED BEING
The main point at issue in Henry of Harclay's present polemic against St. Thomas is the contingency of creatures. Harclay insists that it is possible for every creature not to exist. God alone is a necessary being. If anything else exists, it is because it has been created by God, and once created God can annihilate it if he chooses. Why should God not be able to annihilate one of his creatures? The basic reason why anything is impossible is not that God cannot do it but that the thing itself is impossible to do. If God, then, could not annihilate a creature, it would be because the creature of its nature could not be annihilated. But of itself every creature, including spiritual beings like angels, can be annihilated. Hence no creature of itself or by its very nature is a necessary being; of itself it is possible for it not to exist (I, 21, 22). Harclay's second point is that this is equally true of every creature. There are no degrees of necessity or contingency. An angel is no more necessary in its being than a frog, nor is a frog any more contingent than an angel, for the Christian faith teaches that God conserves both of them in existence. His will is no more necessitated to hold one thing in existence than another (I, 23). On both these points Harclay sets himself in opposition to St. Thomas. Citing the Summa contra Gentiles, he shows that according to St. Thomas not all created beings are contingent; some are necessary, and what is more, absolutely necessary. An example of an absolutely necessary creature is a per se subsisting form, like an angel, which contains no matter or passive potency subject to privation. A creature of this sort has no potentiality to nonexistence. Only material creatures whose matter is receptive of other forms have potentiality to non-existence. In short, only beings which are changeable and corruptible can cease to exist (I, 3). Moreover, in his Summa "Non igitur se decipiant et frustra desudent ut Aristotelem faciant Catholicum, ne inutiliter tempus suum et vires ingenii sui consumant et Aristotelem Catholicum constituendo seipsos hereticos faciendo." Robert Grosseteste, Hexaemeron, Ms. Oxford Queens College 312, fol. 40va. Quoted in A. C. Pegis, Saint Thomas and the Greeks (Milwaukee, 1939), p. 89. 1
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Theologiae St. Thomas asserts that a form subsisting per se cannot lose its being, for being follows inseparably upon form: esse consequitur formam inseparabiliter. It could lose its being only if it could lose its form. But this is obviously impossible in a creature which is a form alone (I, 6). To Harclay, this is a scandalous doctrine in the writings of a Catholic theologian. St. Thomas, for his part, sees nothing offensive in it. Indeed, he looks upon it as entirely normal, for it is eminently fitting for a perfect agent like God to produce beings similar to himself to the extent that this is possible. Now it is not impossible for a creature to be a necessary being. The only reason that could be urged against it is that the creature depends upon God for its existence. But dependence on a cause does not militate against necessity in the effect. A conclusion, for instance, depends upon its principle and yet it is as necessary as the principle itself. It is to be expected, therefore, that the beings closest to God and most like him, namely the separated substances, are farthest removed from potentiality to non-existence (I, 4, 5). But surely, it might be argued, God could take his causal influence away from creatures and then they would cease to exist. This shows that no creature is necessary. To St. Thomas, however, the supposition that God might remove his influencefromhis creatures is impossible, because if he did so the divine will would change, and we know that this will is immutable (I, 7). It might also be advanced that creatures have been made from nothing and consequently tend to return to nothing. From this it would seem that in themselves they have potentiality to non-being. St. Thomas replies with a distinction. Creatures may be said to tend to nothing in two senses: first, because it is in God's power to give them existence or not; second, because the creatures themselves have potentiality to non-being. In the first sense creatures do tend to nothing, but not in the second. God has the power to give them existence or not, but this does not entail a potentiality in creatures themselves to non-being (I, 8). As Harclay is well aware, this distinction is crucial for the Angelic Doctor's position. St. Thomas invites us to look at creatures in two ways: from the point of view of their dependence on God, and from the point of view of their own natures and their proximate principles. From the first standpoint creatures have only a hypothetical necessity: they exist only on the supposition that God wills to create them. From the second standpoint, however, creatures involve absolute necessity. For example, it was not necessary for animals to be created, but once created it is absolutely necessary for them to be mortal because they are composed of contraries. Consequently, owing to the very nature of a creature and its proximate principles
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it contains absolute necessity, even though this necessity, like the creature itself, depends entirely upon God. St. Thomas proceeds to show that there is absolute necessity in creatures owing to both matter and form, which are their essential principles. Matter in itself is potential. Hence anything material can either be or not be; in a word it is corruptible. Form, on the other hand, is act, and through it things actually exist. Through form, then, certain creatures necessarily exist. These are of two types: first, separated substances which, because they are immaterial, have no potentiality to non-being; second, heavenly bodies, whose forms completely actualize their matter, with the result that their matter retains no potency to further form and hence no potency to non-being. Other bodies composed of the four elements, and the elements themselves, have forms which do not completely actualize the potentiality of their matter. Since their matter remains in potency to receive other forms, they are corruptible; consequently they do not exist necessarily. But this does not entail any tendency in them to nothingness. A thing can cease to exist through the loss of its form, but matter itself remains and a new form becomes actual in it when the previous form is removed. So in the whole created universe there is no potentiality by which things can tend to nothingness. The point of disagreement between St. Thomas and Harclay is now fairly evident. They agree on the absolute dependence of creatures upon God, as well as on the freedom of God in creating and on his power to annihilate his creatures. The precise moment of disagreement is reached when St. Thomas invites us to consider creatures in their own natures and proximate principles. St. Thomas takes these natures seriously, as Aristotle taught him to do. He sees them as involving absolute necessities, which indeed have their origin in God but which God will not violate. This is the case with the relation of 4
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"Sciendum est itaque quod, si rerum creatarum universitas consideretur prout sunt a primo principio, inveniuntur dependere ex voluntate, non ex necessitate principii, nisi necessitate suppositionis, sicut dictum est. Si vero comparentur ad principia proxima, inveniuntur necessitatem habere absolutam. Nihil enim prohibet aliqua principia non ex necessitate produci, quibus tamen positis, de necessitate sequitur talis effectus: sicut mors animalis huius absolutam necessitatem habet propter hoc quod iam ex contrariis est compositum, quamvis ipsum ex contrariis componi non fuisset necessarium absolute. Similiter autem quod tales rerum naturae a Deo producerentur, voluntarium fuit: quod autem eis sic statutis, aliquid proveniat vel existat, absolutam necessitatem habet." Contra Gentiles II, 30. Cf. De Potentia V, 3; Summa Theologiae I, 9, 2. Cf. Contra Gentiles, ibid. Diversimode. "In illis etiam rebus in quibus est possibilitas ad non esse, materia permanet; formae vero sicut ex potentia materiae educuntur in actum in rerum generatione, ita in corruptione de actu reducuntur in hoc quod sint in potentia. Unde relinquitur quod in tota natura creata non est aliqua potentia per quam sit aliquid possibile tendere in nihilum." De Potentia V, 3. 4
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spiritual substances to existence. Pure forms, they lack matter which is the root of potentiality. Hence they are not strictly speaking contingent; they have within themselves no potentiality to non-being. They are subsistent forms; and since being necessarily follows upon form (esse per se consequitur adformam), they possess their being by right of their nature, and necessarily. They cannot lose their being as a material thing does when it loses its form. Of course, they are not identical with their being; in God alone nature and being are identical. They are endowed with being as a gift from God, who has the power to take it away if he wishes. But we are sure that he will not exercise that power, for he has willed the necessary existence of the separated substances and his will is immutable. In criticizing St. Thomas, Harclay strikes at what he considers the central error in his position, namely the claim that an immaterial substance has no potentiality to non-existence. Harclay sees two possible meanings of this statement. It means either that the immaterial substance cannot annihilate or destroy itself, or that non-being is formally opposed to the notion of such a creature. The first must be rejected, for no creature can annihilate or destroy itself. If this were the meaning of the statement, every creature would be necessary and have no potentiality to non-being. The second meaning of the statement is also unacceptable. If non-being were formally opposed to the notion of an immaterial substance, it would be impossible for it not to exist, and God could not annihilate it (I, 9). Moreover, when an immaterial substance is said to have no potentiality to non-being, what is meant by "potentiality" ? Potentiality is either subjective or objective. In the case of subjective potentiality, a passive subject remains the same from one terminus of a change to another; for example wood, which can be changed from white to black. In this sense of the term no creature is potential to non-being, for no subject remains identical while changing from being to non-being. The other kind of potentiality, called objective, obtains when two terms do not contradict each other. In this sense an angel does have potentiality to non-being, for non-being is not contradictory to it; otherwise God could not annihilate it. Hence in no distinctive or significant sense can an immaterial substance be said to lack potentiality to non-being (I, 10).
In justice to St. Thomas it must be said that this criticism does not come to grips with his doctrine of the necessary being of spiritual creatures. As is usual in controversy, Harclay has couched the problem in his own terms which make his conclusion inevitable. St. Thomas' own position is not set within the limits laid down by Harclay but is a consequence of his own conception of created being and its metaphysical structure.
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The only subject of change, according to St. Thomas, is a material substance, which is potential or contingent through its matter. It is precisely because an angel lacks matter that it has no internal potentiality to non-being. There is no other passive subject of change (such as a real essence), which might remain identical whether it exists or not. In this, St. Thomas agrees with Harclay. He also agrees that non-being is not formally contradictory to the notion of an angel or of any creature. It does not imply a contradiction for a creature absolutely not to exist; if it did, creatures would be eternal. The reason why no contradiction is involved in a creature's non-existence is that it is not identical with its being (esse), nor is being included in its definition. Hence it is possible for God to take away a creature's being and so annihilate it. In what sense, then, does St. Thomas teach that it is impossible for an angel not to exist? The being of any creature is other than its essence or form, but it necessarily follows upon the form: esse per se consequitur ad formam So once being is given to a pure form, like an angel, it necessarily belongs to it. There is a necessary connection between the form and the being by which it exists. Being is not essential or necessary to a creature because it enters into its very definition, but because it is a necessary consequent of form. Hence an immaterial form, once endowed with being, will necessarily exist; it will have no potentiality to non-existence. In this way St. Thomas is able to maintain the necessary being of spiritual creatures while at the same time denying any contradiction in their nonexistence. This is bound to appear absurd to Henry of Harclay who does not accept the Thomistic notion of being upon which the conclusion depends. 7
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"Quia in omni mutabili est invenire aliquid quod substernitur ei quod per mutationem amovetur, et de hoc dicitur quod potest mutari. Sed si accipiamus totum esse creaturae quod dependet a Deo, non inveniemus aliquid substratum de quo possit dici quod potest mutari." Sent. I, d. 8, q. 3, a. 2; ed. Mandonnet (Paris, 1929), I, p. 214. "Creaturas autem simpliciter non esse, non est in se impossibile quasi contradictionem implicans (alias ab aeterno fuissent. Et hoc ideo est, quia non sunt suum esse): ut sic cum dicitur, Creatura non est omnino, oppositum praedicati includatur in definitione, ut si dicatur, Homo non est animal rationale.- hujusmodi enim contradictionem implicant, et sunt secundum se impossibilia." De Potentia V, 3. "Quod per se alicui competit, de necessitate et semper et inseparabiliter ei inest; sicut rotundum per se quidem inest circulo, per accidens autem aeri; unde aes quidem fieri non rotundum est possibile, circulum autem non esse rotundum est impossibile. Esse autem per se consequitur ad formam: per se enim dicimus secundum quod ipsum (I Poster., IV, 9; 73b); unumquodque autem habet esse secundum quod habet formam. Substantiae igitur quae non sunt ipsae formae, possunt privari esse, secundum quod amittunt formam: sicut aes privatur rotunditate secundum quod desinit esse circulare. Substantiae vero quae sunt ipsae formae, nunquam possunt privari esse: sicut, si aliqua substantia esset circulus, nunquam posset fieri non rotunda. Ostensum est autem supra quod substantiae intellectuales sunt ipsae formae subsistentes. Impossibile est igitur quod esse desinant." Contra Gentiles II, 55. 7
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He is one of the many post-Thomistic thinkers who deny the real composition of essence and being (esse) in created being. For him, if esse were something added to essence, it would be a form or habitus. In fact, he says, existence adds nothing to form or substance except a relation — presumably a relation of substance to its cause. This implies a rejection of St. Thomas' doctrine of esse as the act of form or essence in creatures, and the reduction of existence to a relation between creatures and God. Under these circumstances we can understand why Harclay claims that all creatures are equally contingent in their being. Since all creatures are equally related to God in being freely created by him, they depend upon him equally and are equally contingent upon his creative act. For St. Thomas, on the other hand, being is proportionate to the essence or form of which it is the act. The mode of being of any creature will therefore be proportionate to the essence of the creature. The mode of being of material, corruptible things is contingency; the mode of being of spiritual, incorruptible things is necessity. St. Thomas owes to Aristotle and his Arabian commentators his recognition of the dimension of nature and the necessities inherent in it. His own doctrine of necessity and contingency, however, is not identical with theirs but conforms to his original notion of being. Avicenna taught him the existence of two kinds of necessary being (necesse esse): one which is necessary through itself, namely God, and another which receives its necessity from God, such as the being of the separate substances or angels. Avicenna locates the necessity of these creatures in their relation to their cause: they must exist because they emanate necessarily from God. However, they are possible in themselves, since they are not identical with their existence but receive it from God. St. Thomas significantly reverses the 10
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For the history of this problem, cf. E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York, 1955), pp. 420-427. II, 28. If this is indeed Henry of Harclay's meaning, he agrees with Vital du Four and Henry of Ghent that existence is the relation of a thing to its efficient cause. Cf. E. Gilson, op. cit., p. 424. "Sed considerandum est quod ea quae a primo ente esse participant non participant esse secundum universalem modum essendi, secundum quod est in primo principio, sed particulariter secundum quemdam essendi modum determinatum qui convenit vel generi huic vel huic speciei. Unaquaeque autem res adaptatur ad unum determinatum modum essendi secundum modum suaesubstantiae." DeSubstantiis SeparatisVl, n. 44; Opuscula Omnial (Paris, 1949), p. 151. For St. Thomas' doctrine of contingency and necessity, cf. C. Fabro, "Intorno alia nozione 'Tomista' di contingenza," Rivista difilosofia neo-scolastica XXX (1938), 132-149; T. Wright, "Necessary and Contingent Being in St. Thomas," The New Scholasticism XXV (1951), 439-466. "Dein necesse-esse potest esse necesse-esse per se, et potest esse necesse esse non per se. Quod autem est necesse-esse per seipsum est illud quo non esse posito, sequitur repu10
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position of Avicenna. The potentiality of creatures to non-existence, which Avicenna attributes to creatures in themselves, St. Thomas locates in God. The bond between them and their cause is not one of necessary emanation but of free creation and conservation in existence. The absolute necessity of certain creatures does not reside in their relationship to God but in themselves through their inner structure and principles. From this point of view St. Thomas finds Averroes' doctrine more reasonable than Avicenna's: potentiality to non-existence is to be found only in material, corruptible beings, not in subsistent forms lacking matter. In this strikingly original manner St. Thomas synthesizes the Christian doctrine of the omnipotence and freedom of God, and the Aristotelian and Averroist teaching of the absolute necessity of certain beings in the universe and of the universe as a whole. Henry of Harclay looks at the universe with eyes different from those of St. Thomas. His view of nature — at least on the present subject — is quite innocent of the speculation of Aristotle and the Arabians, but reflects rather the pre-scholastic outlook of the Fathers of the Church. He cites St. Augustine (in reality Vigilius of Tapsus), St. Gregory the Great, and St. John Damascene as witnesses that creatures are not immortal or imperishable by 15
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gnantia-, non quidem propter aliquid aliud a se, quodlibet illud aliud sit, sed propter suammet essentiam. Necesse-esse vero non per se, est illud quod, posito aliquo alio, quod non sit ipsum, ipsum fit necesse-esse." N. Carame, Avicennae Metaphysices Compendium (Rome, 1926), p. 68. Cf. Avicenna, Metaphysics I, 7 (Venice, 1508), 73r VIII, 4, 99r. "Si ergo loquamur de possibilitate ad non esse ex parte rerum factarum, dupliciter circa hoc aliqui opinati sunt. Avicenna namque posuit (lib. VIII Metaph., cap. 6), quod quaelibet res praeter Deum habebat in se possibilitatem ad esse et non esse. Cum enim esse sit praeter essentiam cujuslibet rei creatae, ipsa natura rei creatae per se considerata, possibilis est ad esse; necessitatem vero essendi non habet nisi ab alio, cujus natura est suum esse, et per consequens est per se necesse esse, et hoc Deus est. Commentator vero (in XI [XII] Metaph., text 41. et in libra De Substantia Orbis [c. 7]) contrarium ponit, scilicet quod quaedam res creatae sunt, in quarum natura non est possibilitas ad non esse; quia quod in sua natura habet possibilitatem ad non esse, non potest ab extrinseco acquirere sempiternitatem, ut scilicit sit per naturam suam sempiternum. Et haec quidem positio videtur rationabilior. Potentia enim ad esse et non esse non convenit alicui nisi ratione materiae, quae est pura potentia." De Potentia V, 3. In his Commentary on the Sentences St. Thomas cites with approval Avicenna's statement that all creatures are possible in themselves. This possibility, he says, is simply their dependence on God. In his later writings he abandons this terminology with its Avicennian overtone. Cf. Sent., I, d. 8, q. 3, a. 2; p. 213. It has been suggested that Avicenna in his own way attempted to harmonize the necessity of the universe, as taught by Aristotle and the Neoplatonists, with the Moslem theology of creation and the freedom of God. He does this, however, not like St. Thomas, but by asserting the possibility of all creatures in themselves and their necessity in relation to their cause. Cf. E. Fackenheim, "The Possibility of the Universe in Al-Farabi, Ibn Sina and Maimonides," Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research XVI (1947), 43. ;
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nature but only by divine grace. These theologians assure us that anything created from nothing tends by its nature or essence to relapse into nothing unless it is upheld by God (I, 18-20). Damascene contends that anything with a beginning naturally has an end. Consequently, an angel is immortal not by nature but by grace (I, 19). Does not St. Paul say that God alone has immortality? By immortality, Harclay explains, the Apostle does not mean simply the absence of death, for many creatures have everlasting life. Rather, he means that to God alone absolute non-existence is contradictoiy; or to put it another way: God alone exists necessarily (I, 11). This view was shared by many of the early Christian writers. For example, St. Justin Martyr in his Dialogue with Trypho opposes the natural immortality of the soul on the grounds that if it were immortal by nature it would be uncreated. The lot of anything begotten is death unless it is preserved in existence by God's will. This was also the opinion of Clement of Alexandria and Lactantius. It survived in the Middle Ages in the minds of theologians anxious to uphold the tradition of the Fathers of the Church in the face of what they considered the paganizing influence of the philosophers, especially Aristotle. Thus in the thirteenth century St. Bonaventure, following Damascene, attributed to every creature a natural vertibilitas, or tendency to lapse into nothing. God alone is by nature invertibilis; creatures possess this characteristic only as a grace from God. This view of the universe as ontologically "empty" and in constant danger of lapsing into nothing is in marked contrast with that of St. Thomas who upheld the natural indestructibility of angels, human souls, and the material universe as a whole. Closer to Henry of Harclay, and his more immediate sources, are Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus, both of whom deny that any creature exists 17
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" Cf. St. Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho 5; PG 6, 488. " For the views of these theologians, with texts, cf. H. Karpp, Probleme altchristlicher Anthropologic (Gutersloh, 1950), pp. 102-103, 140. Cf. also W. Gotzmann, Die Unsterblichkeitsbeweise in der Vaterzeit und Scholastik bis zum Ende des 13. Jahrhunderts (Karlsruhe, 1927). " "Omnia quae sunt, aut creabilia sunt, aut increabilia. Si igitur creabilia quidem sunt, omnino sunt et vertibilia. Quorum enim esse a versione incepit, haec versioni subicientur, vel corrupta, vel secundum electionem alterata." St. John Damascene, De Fide Orthodoxa 3, n. 2 (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1955), pp. 16-17. "Si vero tertio modo dicatur immutabilitas (scil. secundum totam rei substantiam), sic omnibus creaturis mest per gratiam, nulli autem per naturam nisi soli Deo. Invertibile enim per naturam est, quod ex se ipso habet, ut possit stare; hoc autem est, in quo nulla est vanitas et in quo omnino nulla essentiae mutatio nec ad esse, nec ad non esse; et hoc est solum aeternum. Ideo haec invertibilitas est in solo Deo et est proprie proprium eius. Invertibilitas autem per gratiam inest omnibus vel pluribus creaturis, quia Deus sua gratuita bonitate cetera continet, ne in nihil cedant." St. Bonaventure, Sent. I, d. 8, p. 1, a. 2, q. 2 (Quaracchi, 1882), I, p. 160. 20
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necessarily. According to Henry of Ghent, there is a conflict between the philosophers and Catholic doctrine on this point. Aristotle considered many creatures to be formally necessary of themselves. Avicenna came closer to the truth, for he realized that every creature is in itself only a possible existent. But he erred in thinking some creatures must exist because they are necessarily produced by God. Catholic truth assures us that only God is a necessary being; no creature is or can be formally necessary either in itself or through its cause. Duns Scotus also recognizes the controversy between theologians and philosophers on this question.- in hac quaestione est controversia inter theologos et philosophos. Aristotle, he says, held that everything except God is produced by him as by an efficient cause, and in itself is formally necessary. Scotus on the contrary, maintains that everything has been contingently created by God, so that nothing except God is formally necessary; every creature is a possible being and prone to lapse into nothing: nihil aliud ab ipso (scil. Deo) est formaliter necessarium, sed possibile, et in nihil vertibile. After Henry of Harclay, William of Ockham continues this traditional doctrine of the theologians, denying necessary existence to everything except God. He alone is immutable in the sense that he is free from the radical possibility of non-being which Damascene called versio. Ockham adds that this is known to us only by faith; it cannot be proved by natural reason. This seems to have been the common teaching of the theologians in the circle in which Harclay moved. He conformed to it without adding anything strikingly new or original. His conservatism and traditionalism, however, only throw into stronger relief the novelty and daring of the Thomistic doctrine of contingency and necessity. 21
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"Et sic appellando creaturam quicquid est aliud a Deo, philosophus posuit plurimas creaturas esse ex se formaliter necesse esse; quod omnino falsum est; immo omnis creatura et omne aliud a Deo, ex se est possibile esse et non esse, ut posuit Avicenna, cuius opinio in hoc multo verior fuit et propinquior veritati catholicae: quod, scilicet secundum sextum modum essendi supra positum, omnis creatura ex se est possibile esse, ita quod praeter primum nullum aliorum sit necesse esse." Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet VIII,, 9 (Paris, 1518), fol. 316r. Cf. Summa 30, 2 (Paris, 1520), fol. 179 D-E. Duns Scotus, Rep. Paris., I, d. 8, q. 3, n. 4; Opera Omnia XXII (Paris, 1894), p. 154. Ibid., n. 23, p. 163. Cf. Opus Oxon. I, d. 8, q. 5, n. 22; IX, p. 761. Cf. E. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot (Paris, 1952), pp. 254-278. "Nihil aliud a Deo est immutabile primo modo [i.e. without that change called by Damascene versio], quamvis hoc non possit ratione naturali probari." Ockham, Sent. I, d. 8, q. 7 (Lyons, 1495) D. 21
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II. THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
Harclay himself applies the conclusions of the Question just analyzed to the problem of the immortality of the human soul. He has established that no creature is imperishable by nature; of itself everything created tends to revert to nothing. This holds good for human souls as well as for angels. Yet, as a matter of fact the human soul will live forever. Nothing except God can destroy it, and he has willed to preserve it in existence forever. Corruptible by nature, the soul is incorruptible and immortal by the will and grace of God (II, 3). If immortality is not a natural property of the soul, we should not expect human reason to be able to prove it; nor should we be surprised if a philosopher without revelation, like Aristotle, had no clear and unequivocal knowledge of it. One of the main lessons Harclay wishes to teach in his Question on the immortality of the soul is that in the last resort it is not philosophy but faith which gives us a true conception of the soul. Not all medieval thinkers agreed with him on this point. Many tried to establish the immortality of the soul with arguments taken from Aristotle, as well as with proofs of their own. Harclay assembles the main Aristotelian texts used by men like St. Albert and St. Thomas for this purpose (II, 5-15). He then presents other proofs for immortality, beginning with that of St. Thomas in his Commentary on the Sentences, which establishes the incorruptibility of the intellectual soul from the fact that the intellect does not use a corporeal organ. This in turn rests upon the capacity of the intellect to know all corporeal forms, universals, and itself (II, 16). Harclay does not mention St. Thomas' metaphysical proof for immortality in the Summa Theologiae, which depends upon his doctrine that being necessarily belongs to form. Since the human soul is a subsistent form, it cannot lose its being. No doubt Harclay considers this line of reasoning adequately refuted in his previous Question. After St. Thomas' proof for immortality, Harclay presents those of James of Viterbo, which are based upon the dignity, mode of operation, and simplicity of the soul (II, 17-20). Finally, he gives the Augustinian proof that the soul must be immortal since truth, which is immortal, resides in it (II, 21). Unfortunately, he does not examine these proofs or subject them to 25
"Manifestum est enim quod id quod secundum se convenit alicui, est inseparable ab ipso. Esse autem per se convenit formae, quae est actus. Unde materia secundum hoc acquirit esse in actu, quod acquirit formam; secundum hoc autem accidit in ea corruptio, quod separator forma ab ea. Impossible est autem quod forma separetur a seipsa. Unde impossible est quod forma subsistens desinat esse." St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, 75, 6. 25
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criticism. But he obviously does not think them convincing, for he considers the immortality of the soul an object of faith and not of demonstration by human reason (II, 3, 22). Harclay's attitude towards Aristotle on this subject is difficult to assess. It is as ambiguous as the Stagirite's own statements. Harclay loyally bows to the decision of Robert Kilwardby, Archbishop of Canterbury, who in 1277 condemned the proposition that Aristotle did not hold the intellectual soul to be immortal (II, 4). At the same time, he shows at great length by citations from Aristotle that the soul is the substantial form of the body and as such it is not separable from the body. However, this does not seem to embarrass Harclay, who calmly states that it is compatible with the condemned proposition (II, 23). Unfortunately, he does not tell us how these two statements can be reconciled. We can surmise, however, that he believed Kilwardby's position justified by the Aristotelian description of the intellect as a kind of soul which is divine, incorruptible, separated from matter, and eternal (II, 5-11). This ill accords, however, with the many statements of Aristotle leading us to believe that the soul is the substantial form of the body. If the intellectual soul is indeed separable from the body and not educed from the potentiality of matter, it is not the substantial form of man (II, 27). The reader receives the impression that Harclay does not take very seriously the apparent conflict in Aristotle's statements regarding the soul. He is critical of those who, like St. Thomas, try to reconcile them with each other and with the Catholic faith, calling the soul both an immortal substance and the substantial form of the body. He himself favors Averroes' interpretation of Aristotle. I believe (he writes) that the Commentator expresses Aristotle's mind in the third book of the DeAnima, since the intellect, like God, receives nothing new, for contradictories exist simultaneously in the soul just as they do in God ... So a new concept in us is only a new phantasm joined to the separated intellect. And there is no argument proving the opposite. So I hold only by faith that the intellectual soul is the form of man. It is to be noted that, like the Latin Averroists, Harclay finds no rational argument to disprove Averroes' doctrine but turns to faith, which teaches the contrary. 26
II, 61. At the Council of Vienne (1311 • 1312) the proposition was condemned that the rational or intellectual soul is not the form of the body per se and essentialiter. Cf. H. Denzinger, Enchiridion Symbolorum (Rome, 1957), n. 481, p. 223. This Council was contemporary with Harclay's teaching career as a master of theology at Oxford, which began about 1310. He became Chancellor of Oxford in 1312. Cf. F. Pelster, "Heinrich von Harclay," Lexikon fur Theologie und Kirche IV, 923. He himself taught that the soul is not the form of the body essentially but accidentally. Cf. II. 36. 26
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From Harclay's Question on the Immortality of the soul, as well as from his Question on the plurality of substantial forms, we can gather the main lines of his own conception of the human soul. He gives both theological and philosophical reasons for a plurality of substantial forms in man. He concludes that man has three distinct souls — vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual — each of which is a substantial form. He criticizes St. Thomas for assuming that a substantial form gives being purely and simply, so that a substance that is simply one, like a man, can have only one substantial form. For Harclay, each substantial form in man gives him an added substantial perfection; no one of them gives him his total substantial being. Intellectual souls, moreover, owe neither their being nor their individuality to the bodies they inform. Indeed, there is no reason why God cannot create them prior to their entrance into bodies, as St. Augustine and Origen taught, although as a matter of fact they are created at the moment they inform bodies (II, 46-49). They have an absolute nature in which they are unrelated to matter; their function as corporeal forms is not essential but accidental to that nature (II, 36). Aristotle popularized the notion that numerical distinction is due to a distinction of matter, so that two beings can differ in number only if they are material. According to Harclay this accounts for his doctrine that the intellectual soul, which is immaterial, is one in number and not multiplied according to the multiplication of human bodies (II, 34). St. Thomas — Harclay continues — tried to reconcile Aristotle with the Catholic faith by maintaining both the multiplicity of human souls and their individuation by matter. Thus in his Commentary on the Sentences he attributes the formal distinction between two souls to matter. This is how he pictures the individuation of a soul: God creates a soul and at the same moment places it in matter, from which it receives a distinctive mark or character (signatio) which individuates it and makes it numerically distinct from every other soul. Without this individuation through matter it could not be distinguished numerically from another soul. Moreover, once the soul is individuated through matter, it remains individuated forever, even when separated from the body. Similarly, when a seal imprints a figure on wax, the printing of the figure depends on the seal, but the existence of the figure remains even when 27
Cf. Heniy of Harclay, Quaestio utrum in homine sit aliqua forma substantialis praeter intellectivam; ed. A. Maurer, "Henry of Harclay's Disputed Question on the Plurality of Forms," Essays in Honour ofAnton Charles Pegis, ed. J. R. O'Donnell (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974), 115-159. For St. Thomas' doctrine of the unity of substantial form, cf. Contra Gentiles II, 58. On this problem, cf. E. Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. L. K. Shook (New York, 1956), pp. 193-196. 27
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the seal is removed. The same is true of the soul with respect to the body. Its individuation depends on the body, but not the very existence of the individuated soul (II, 40). Harclay is aroused to sharp words against St. Thomas for this doctrine, which he brands as bold and contrary to the Catholic faith. It ought to be eliminated as plain heresy: Unde et in opinione, ut videtur mihi, est truculentia. Abradi debet sicut haeresis plana. For one thing, it denies God's freedom, for St. Thomas openly proclaims that God cannot produce the soul before the body, because it can be individuated only through the body. Furthermore, St. Thomas' crude metaphor of the seal and the wax is out of place. It conveys the impression that the body in some way acts upon the soul, stamping it with an individual mark. Now this individual mark must be something substantial like the soul itself. If it is identical with the soul, the body would cause the soul itself, which is heretical. If it is something different from the soul, what causes the soul to acquire it? The soul must already be individual in order to receive it as its own. In short, the soul must be individual in its own right, apart from the individuality it acquires from the body (II, 41). For these and similar reasons Harclay finds it impossible to accept St. Thomas' doctrine of the individuation of the human soul through matter. Nor is this surprising in view of his rejection of the Thomistic notion of being upon which it rests. St. Thomas would agree that the illustration of the seal and the wax is only a metaphor; it does not perfectlyfitthe situation of soul and body. The seal and the wax are two distinct substances; the body and soul are not. So the body cannot individuate the soul as one substance acting upon another. Indeed, there is no body apart from the soul, for it is the soul that gives the body existence and life. But because the soul is the form of the body it is received by the body according to the latter's capacity and measure. So the soul will have a being (me) limited to the body's capacity. But this limited being, acquired by the soul in the body, is not from the body nor dependent upon it. The being of the soul is from God, and the soul possesses it in its own right (per se). Far from receiving it from the body, 28
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Cf. St. Thomas, Quaestiones Disputatae De Anima 9. "Sed quamvis individuatio animarum dependeat a corpore quantum ad sui principium, non tamen quantum ad sui finem, ita scilicet quod cessantibus corporibus, cesset (ed. esset) individuatio animarum. Cujus ratio est, quod cum omnis perfectio infiindatur materiae secundum capacitatem suam, natura animae ita infundetur diversis corporibus, non secundum eamdem nobilitatem et puritatem: unde in unoquoque corpore habebit esse terminatum secundum mensuram corporis. Hoc autem esse terminatum, quamvis acquiratur animae in corpore, non tamen ex corpore, nec per dependentiam ad corpus." St. Thomas, Sent. I, d. 8, q. 5, a. 2, ad 6m; p. 231. "Sic igitur esse animae est a Deo sicut a principio activo, et in corpore sicut in materia, 28
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the soul communicates its being to the body by informing it, so that soul and body share one and the same being. For St. Thomas then, matter is indeed the soul's passive principle of individuation: it makes possible a multiplicity of souls each numerically distinct from the other. It is not, however, the active principle of individuation. According to St. Thomas, everything has its being and individuation from the same source: unumquodque secundum idem habet esse et individuationem , It is through itself as a form, and ultimately from God, that the soul possesses its being and individuation. The natural immortality of the human soul follows as a matter of course. Possessed of its own being and individuality, it cannot lose them through the destruction of the body. In adopting this stand, St. Thomas did not for a minute think that he was substracting anything from God, for he acknowledged that the whole being of the soul is due to God, including its necessary existence. He was simply giving to nature its due, which after all is to glorify the God who created it. In making his decision against St. Thomas, Henry of Harclay leaves us in no doubt as to his own position. Firmly entrenched in a patristic tradition, he spurns as hostile to the faith the novel metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas. 31
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APPENDIX Each of the two Questions here edited is extant in only one manuscript: I. Utrum aliud a Deo sit simpliciter necesse esse. Cod. Vat. Borghes. 171, fols. 2 lv-22r. II. Utrum anima intellectiva sit immortalis. Cod. Worcester F. 3, fols. 21 lr-214v. These manuscripts are described by F. Pelster, "Heinrich von Harclay, Kanzler von Oxford, und seine Quastionen," Miscellanea Francesco Ehrle (Rome, 1924), 323, 324. Since editing these Questions another manuscript has come to my attention, in cod. Assisi, Bibl. Comm. 172 fols. 128v-129v. In reediting the Question I have used some of its readings. The Worcester manuscript has several lacunae and omissions, as well as scribal errors. There are marginal corrections by the original scribe and by a later hand. Where I could suggest a plausible emendation, I have done so. Diamond brackets < > indicate an insertion not found in the manuscript. nec tamen esse animae perit pereunte corpore; ita et individuatio animae, etsi aliquam relationem habeat ad corpus, non tamen perit corpore pereunte." St. Thomas, De Anima 1, ad 2m. "... illud idem esse quod est animae, communicat corpori, ut sit unum esse totius compositi." Ibid., ad lm. Ibid., ad 2m. 31
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HENRY OF HARCLAY I. U T R U M A L I U D A D E O SIT SIMPLICITER N E C E S S E ESSE 33
< 1 > Quod sic. Aristoteles VII Metaph. : Materia est qua res potest esse et non esse. Sed multae creatae sunt sine materia. Ergo multae sunt quae non sunt indifferenter ad esse et non esse. Ergo sunt necesse esse vel impossibiles non esse. 34
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<2> Oppositum. Si sic, maxime esset verum de angelo. Sed ille non. Ergo, etc. Quod non ille, patet per Damascenum, libro II, capitulo 2: "Angelus non natura, sed gratia, est immortalitatem accipiens." 37
< OPINIO S. THOMAE >
<3> Ad istam quaestionem respondet Frater Thomas multis locis. Tenet pro conclusione quod formae per se subsistentes sunt absolute et simpliciter necesse esse. Unde et recte haec verba dicit II libro Contra Gentiles, capitulo 29. Prima ratio sua ibi, quia tales formae non habent materiam nec potentiam pas(21vb)sivam subjectam privationi. Verba ejus sunt. <4> Praeterea, secunda ratio sua ibidem: Divina perfectio exigit quod producatur sibi simile quantum non repugnat. Sed in hoc quod creatura est necesse esse assimilatur Deo; et necesse esse non repugnat creaturae. Ergo divina perfectio exigit quod talis creatura producatur. Quod autem hoc non repugnat creaturae probo. Quia si repugnaret, hoc solum esset quia esset ab alio. Sed esse ab alio non repugnat 38
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Ms aliquid. Ch. 7, 1032a21. Ms aliquid. Ms compossibiles. "Angelus igitur est substantia intellectualis, semper nobilis, arbitrio libera, incorporea, Deo ministrans, secundum gratiam, non natura, immortalitatem suscipiens." St. John Damascene, De Fide Orthodoxa 17 (II, 3), (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1955), p. 69, n. 2. Contra Gentiles II, 30. "Illas enim res simpliciter et absolute necesse est esse in quibus non est possibilitas ad non esse. Quaedam autem res sic sunt a Deo in esse productae ut in earum natura sit potentia ad non esse. Quod quidem contingit ex hoc quod materia in eis est in potentia ad aliam formam. Illae igitur res in quibus vel non est materia, vel, si est, non est possibilis ad aliam formam, non habent potentiam ad non esse. Eas igitur absolute et simpliciter necesse est esse." Ibid. "Ad divinam perfectionem pertinet quod rebus creatis suam similitudinem indiderit, nisi quantum ad ilia quae repugnant ei quod est esse creatum: agentis enim perfecti est producere sibi simile quantum possibile est. Esse autem necesse simpliciter non repugnat ad rationem esse creati: nihil enim prohibet aliquid esse necesse quod tamen suae necessitatis causam habet, sicut conclusiones demonstrationum. Nihil igitur prohibet quasdam res sic esse productas a Deo ut tamen eas esse sit necesse simpliciter. Immo hoc divinae perfectioni attestatur." Ibid. 33
34 33
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necessitati, nam conclusio est a principio, et tamen conclusio est necessaria sicut principium. <5> Item, tertio ibidem. Quae magis appropinquant Deo, magis recedunt a non esse et recedunt a potentia non essendi, secundum quam contingit res non esse. Ergo quae sunt Deo propinquissima, cujusmodi sunt substantiae separatae, maxime recedunt a potentia non essendi. <6> Praeterea, idem prima parte Summae, quaestione 9, articulo 2, ponit rationem, et dicit haec verba.- Ipsae formae sunt per se subsistentes. Sed esse consequitur formam inseparabiliter; et nihil corrumpitur nisi per hoc quod amittit formam. Unde in ipsa forma non est potentia ad non esse. Haec sunt verba. <7> Praeterea, in Scripto super primum, distinctio 8, facit tale argumentum. Nam dicit sic: Si illae substantiae possent non esse, hoc maxime esset quia Deus eis subtraheret suam influentiam. Sed hoc est impossible; ergo antecedens. Quod hoc sit impossible, probat sic. Illud non est contingens cujus contrarium est impossible vel quod non potest poni in esse sine positione impossibilis. Sed illud est hujusmodi. Nam si subtraheret eis suam influentiam, tunc mutaretur sua voluntas; quod est impossible. <8> Ipse arguit contra seipsum in libro Contra Gentiles sic: Ilia quae sunt ex nihilo quantum in se est, in nihilum intendunt. Ergo habent potentiam non essendi. Respondet negando consequentiam. Quia res creatae eo modo dicuntur in nihilum tendere quo modo sunt ex nihilo. Hoc non est nisi secundum potentiam agentis. Nam non fiiit in eis potentia creata praecedens earum esse, quae fiiit respectu eorum 41
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Ms corrupt. "Quanto aliquid magis distat ab eo quod per seipsum est ens, scilicet Deo, tanto magis propinquum est ad non esse. Quanto igitur aliquid est propinquius Deo, tanto magis recedit a non esse. Quae autem iam sunt, propinqua sunt ad non esse per hoc quod habent potentiam ad non esse. Ilia igitur quae sunt Deo propinquissima, et per hoc a non esse remotissima, talia esse oportet, ad hoc quod sit rerum ordo completus, ut in eis non sit potentia ad non esse. Talia autem sunt necessaria absolute. — Sic igitur aliqua creata de necessitate habent esse." Ibid. "Substantiae vero incorporeae, quia sunt ipsae formae subsistentes, quae tamen se habent ad esse ipsarum sicut potentia ad actum, non compatiuntur secum privationem huius actus; quia esse consequitur formam; et nihil corrumpitur nisi per hoc quod amittit formam. Unde in ipsa forma non est potentia ad non esse, et ideo huiusmodi substantiae sunt immutabiles et invariabiles secundum esse." Summa Theologiae I, 9, 2. "Alia ratio est, quia nihil dicitur possibile cujus contrarium est necessarium, vel quod non potest esse, nisi impossibili posito. Esse autem creaturae omnino deficere non potest, nisi retrahatur inde fluxus divinae bonitatis in creaturis, et hoc est impossibile ex immutabilitate divinae voluntatis, et contrarium necessarium." Sent. I, d. 8, q. 3, a. 2 (Paris, 1929), I, p. 214. Ms principium. "Si autem dicatur quod ea quae sunt ex nihilo, quantum est de se, in nihilum tendunt; et sic omnibus creaturis inest potentia ad non esse: — manifestum est hoc non sequi. Dicuntur enim res creatae eo modo in nihilum tendere quo sunt ex nihilo. Quod quidem non est nisi secundum potentiam agentis. Sic igitur et rebus creatis non inest potentia ad non esse: sed Creatori inest potentia ut eis det esse vel eis desinat esse influere; cum non ex necessitate naturae agat ad rerum productionem, sed ex voluntate, ut ostensum est." Contra Gentiles II, 30, Si autem. 41
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esse. Ita dico nunc quod in potestate Dei est dare eis esse et non esse, verum ipsae non habent potentiam non essendi. < CONTRA OPINIONEM S. THOMAE>
<9> Contra istam opinionem. Aut tu intelligis quod creatura immaterialis non potest non esse quia non potest causare effective suum non esse, hoc est, non potest seipsam adnihilare vel corrumpere; aut tu intelligis quod non potest non esse quia sibi formaliter repugnat non esse. Si primo modo, tunc omnis creatura et omnis res non posset non esse et per consequens esset necesse esse, quia nulla res potest seipsam adnihilare vel corrumpere. Si intelligas secundo modo, quod ideo non potest non esse quia sibi formaliter repugnat non esse, tunc non posset Deus earn facere non esse. Consequens falsum. Consequentiae probatio: Quia illud quod repugnat alicui, illud cum eo includit contradictionem, et tale non potestfieria Deo. Ergo, etc. <10> Praeterea, quaero quid intelligis quando dicis quia non habent potentiam non essendi? Aut intelligis tu per illam potentiam aliquod subjectum possibile reale extra animam quod vel cui repugnat non esse quia non est ilia potentia transmutabilis de esse ad non esse, sicut lignum est transmutabile de albo in nigrum et materia de habitu in privationem. Quod si sic intelligis, nulla res non potest non esse, nedum angelus sed nec rana nec alia creatura, quia in nulla creatura est dare aliquod subjectum quod manet idem sub utroque terminorum, scilicet esse et non esse. Unde rana non habet in se potentiam aliquam realem quae potest concipere non esse ranae sicut materia recipit privationem formae. Si autem alio modo intelligis quod potentia ad non essendum non sit potentia realis passiva, sed potentia quae est non repugnantia terminorum, quam alii vocant potentiam objectivam, certum est quod angelus isto modo habet potentiam non essendi. Aliter Deus non posset facere eum non esse. Si esset repugnantia terminorum, tunc arguo: Illud quod isto modo potest non esse non est simpliciter necesse esse. Nam tunc anima Antichristi esset impossibile esse, et anima Sortis esset necesse esse. Probatio: Nam anima Antichristi non habet potentiam essendi modo nisi non repugnantiam terminorum. Nam habet necessario potentiam passivam realem respectu esse nec in se nec in materia. Praeterea, anima Sortis, quae modo est, esset necesse esse, quia non habet aliquam potentiam realem, nec in se nec in materia, quae potest esse subjecta non esse. Ergo quacumque via data, angelus non est simpliciter necesse esse. < 11 > Praeterea, ut videtur, ista opinio est contra auctoritatem sacrae scripturae. 47
48
49
Nam I Ad Timotheum VI dicit Apostolus de Deo-, qui solus habet immortalitatem. 50
Quaero quid intelligis per immortalitatem? Si intelligat privationem mortis proprie dictae, id est separationem animae a corpore vel formae a materia — quod si sic, non
Cf. Henry of Ghent, Summa 59, 2 (Paris, 1520), fols. 138r-139v Duns Scotus, Opus Oxon. II, d. 12, q. 1, n. 10; XII (Paris, 1893), p. 556. Ms add. a. Ms add. ut videtur. St. Paul, 1 Ad Tim. vi, 16. 47
48 45
50
;
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solus Deus est immortalis sed multi alii, puta angeli. Unde Dionysius quarto capitulo De Divinis Nominibus: "Omnes substantiae intellectuales vivunt et vitam habent indeficientem, mundae existentes ab universa morte et materia et generatione." Ergo secundum hoc falsum diceret Apostolus quod solus Deus habet immortalitatem. Praeterea, et accidentia sunt immutabilia, quia Porphyrius dicit quod perimi possunt, alterari nequaquam. Ergo non solus Deus est immortalis, quia nec solus ille est immutabilis mutatione proprie dicta, nec solus Deus est incorruptibilis. Ergo si Apostolus dicit verum, oportet quod immortalitas in Deo signified repugnantiam ad non essendum simpliciter. Ergo illud convenit solum Deo. Ergo necesse esse convenit soli Deo. sl
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<12> Ad primum argumentum pro sua positione, quando dicit quod ideo sunt necesse esse quia non habent materiam subjectam privationi, dico quod consequentia non valet. Omnis Catholicus debet earn negare. Praeterea, Philosophus earn negaret. Nam lumen in medio et accidentia non habent materiam partem sui, et tamen non sunt necesse esse, sed possunt desinire quantum est a parte sui. Si autem tu intelligis quod forma quae non habet materiam partem sui nec est perfectio materiae, quod ilia est simpliciter necesse esse, verum est quod ista fiiit opinio Philosophi, quia tales formae nec possunt non esse, nec a se nec a Deo effective; sed illud est contra fidem. <13> Ad secundum argumentum dico quod divina perfectio non solum non exigit quod aliquid sit simpliciter necesse esse ut sibi assimiletur, sicut ipse accipit; immo divina perfectio exigit quod nullum tale sit, quia (22ra) divina perfectio < exigit > quod non sit nisi unus Deus, et alia omnia sunt producta de nihilo ab eo et quod possunt redigi in nihilum per eum. Sed si essent necesse esse simpliciter, hoc repugnaret eis. <14> Ad probationem, quando arguitur: Non esset alia causa quia non esset necesse esse nisi quia sunt ab alio; sed illud non obstat, quia conclusio est a principio et tamen est necesse esse — Respondeo ad illud quod causa quare non sunt necesse esse <est> quia sunt ab alio contingenter. Unde Deus libere et nulla necessitate produxit eas in esse, et libere manu tenet eas in esse; non sic de principio et conclusione. Nam conclusio non dependet nec sequitur a principio contingenter, sed simpliciter necessario, ita quod contradictio est ponere principium nisi sequatur conclusio; quod non est verum de Deo et creatura. <15> Ad aliud argumentum, cum dicitur: Quae magis appropinquant Deo, etc., ego dico, sicut patebit in positione, quod, quae magis appropinquant Deo, non magis 54
55
Dionysius, De Divinis Nominibus IV, 1; PG 3, 693; Dionysiaca I (Paris, 1937), pp. 147-148. St. Paul, ibid. I have not found this in Porphyry's Isagoge. Cf. Metaphysics XII, 7, 1073a 3-40. Ms lacuna. 51
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recedunt a potentia non essendi; immo sunt simpliciter loquendo aequaliter contingentes. Nec approximate ad Deum, stando infra limites creaturae, est propter necessitatem essendi majorem, quia quaelibet creatura aequaliter et aeque contingenter dependet a Deo. Sed major appropinquatio ad Deum est secundum gradus perfectionis et nobilitatis; et hoc accidit potentiae non essendi vel essendi. Unde Philosophus I Ethicorum dicit quod album unius anni non est perfectius quam album unius diei. < 16> Ad illud argumentum, cum dicitur quod sunt formae subsistentes, et esse consequitur formam inseparabiliter, et nihil potest corrumpi nisi propter hoc quod amittit formam - Respondeo: Ista ratio probat, si aliquid valeat, Deus non potest angelos adnihilare quia non potest ab eis formam separare, quia non potest separare ipsos a seipsis. Et propter hoc dico quod non oportet quod omnis destructio vel adnihilatio sit per separationem et remotionem partis a parte, sed sufficit non repugnantia illius ad non esse. < 17> Ad aliud, cum arguitur quod non posset non esse nisi Deus subtraheret ab eis suam influentiam, etc., ista ratio probat quod Deus non potest modo angelum corrumpere vel adnihilare quia sua voluntas mutaretur. Praeterea, breviter omnia venirent ex necessitate quaecumque Deus voluit et praevidet evenire, quia aliter mutaretur sua voluntas, et sanctus quicumque in via esset necessario sanctus, quia dicitur praeelegit eos ante mundi constitutionem ut essent sancti et immaculati. Ad Ephesios I. Cum igitur sua voluntas sit immutabilis, et per te ideo res est simpliciter necesse esse quia voluntas Dei, qua vult rem esse, est immutabilis, sequitur quod quicumque sanctus esset simpliciter necessario sanctus; et per consequens non mereretur in aliquo, quia in necessariis non est meritum neque demeritum. < 18 > Ad ultimum, cum dicitur quod non sequitur: res quantum est de se tendunt in nihilum, ergo habent potentiam non essendi, ipse negat consequentiam. Quia non, sicut dicit, res tendunt in nihilum quo modo sunt de nihilo, sed sunt de nihilo per potentiam Dei et non per potentiam suam. Et confirmatur sua responsio per Anselmum 12 capitulo De Casu Diaboli, qui dicit quod potentia qua res potest esse simpliciter non est aliquid in re sed in agente, sicut ponit exemplum: "liber potest scribi, et homo potest vinci, etc." Istud non valet, ut videtur, quia etsi in re non 56
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Ms est. Ms potentia. Nicomachean Ethics I, 6, 1096b23. Ms quod. Ms mutatur. Ms quaecumque. St. Paul, Ad Ephisios i, 4. Msmutabilis. "Ut si dico: liber potest scribi a me: utique liber nihil potest, sed ego possum scribere librum. Et cum dicimus, iste non potest vinci ab illo, non aliud intelligimus quam: ille non potest vincere istum." St. Anselm, De Casu Diaboli 12; Opera Omnia I (Seckau, 1938), p. 253. 56 57 58 35 60
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sit potentia realis quae potest esse subjecta privationi esse, tamen res quantum est ex parte sui desinit esse, et ideo simpliciter potest non esse. Et hoc est quod dicunt auctoritates sanctorum. Augustinus I Contra Felicianum, responsione XVF: "Creatura ex nihilo prolata est. Et propter hoc quantum ad se attinet ex eo quod est in id quod non est, id est in nihilum, nisi perpetua gratia fecerit, naturae suae qualitate vertenda est." Ecce, quod dicit creaturam non natura immortalem, sed gratia tantum. < 19> Item, idem dicit Damascenus libro 2, capitulo 2: "Angelus est immortalis non natura sed gratia." Probat hoc: "Omne enim quod incipit, etfinitursecundum naturam." Ecce quod angelus non habet immortalitatem ex natura sed ex gratia. <20> Praeterea, Gregorius XVI libro Moralium dicit sic: "Cuncta quae ex nihilo sunt, eorum essentia rursum ad nihilum tenderent, nisi earn auctor regiminis manu teneret." Ecce quod dicit eas, quantum in se est et de natura sua, tendere in nihilum. Quod iste doctor arguit, quod per potentiam Dei sunt de nihilo et tendunt in nihilum, hoc est verum quantum ad potentiam activam, quia non per alium creantur nec adnihilantur, tamen in eis est potentia ad non essendum, id est non repugnantia ad non essendum. Et de potentia activa intelligit Damascenus in loco praeallegato. 65
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<21> Dico tunc breviter ad quaestionem quod omnis creatura potest non esse, et nulla, quantum est ex parte sui, est necesse esse nec determinat sibi esse. Dico ulterius quod omnis creatura aequaliter et aeque contingenter potest non esse, ita angelus sicut rana. <22> Primum probo per unam rationem. Haec est simpliciter vera: Deus potest facere angelum non esse; et haec est impossibilis: Deus non potest facere angelum non esse. Tunc arguo: praecisa causa cujuslibet impossibilis, quare est impossibilis, est non quia Deus non potest facere hoc, sed quia res in se non est factibilis. Ergo causa quare haec est impossibilis: Deus non potest angelum adnihilare, est quia angelus non est adnihilabilis de se. Ergo ista est primo et per se impossibilis: Angelus non est adnihilabilis. Ergo ejus opposita est primo et per se vera: Angelus, quantum est ex parte sui, est adnihilabilis. Ergo quantum est a parte sui non est necesse esse. 72
73
Ms add non. St. Augustine, Contra Felicianum 7; PL 42, 1162. This is not a work of Augustine but of Vigilius ofTapsus. Cf. O. Bardenhewer, Patrology (St. Louis, 1908), p. 616. St. John Damascene, De Fide Orthodoxa 17 (II, 3), p. 70, n. 5. Ibid. St. Gregory, Moralium Libri XVI, 37, n. 45; PL 75, 1143. See St. Thomas, supra, note 46. St. John Damascene, ibid. Ms corrupt. Ms passio. 65
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<23> Secundum probo, videlicet quod angelus, quantum est a parte sui, non magis est necesse esse quam rana. Et arguo sic: Si consequentia sunt aeque contingentia, antecedentia sunt aequaliter contingentia. Ista propositio probatur quia ex necessario non sequitur contingens. Eadem ratione ex magis necessario non sequitur aequalius contingens. Modo ista consequentia est bona: Angelus est; ergo Deus conservat vel manu tenet angelum in esse; et consequentia simpliciter necessaria. Item, ista consequentia est necessaria: Rana est; ergo Deus conservat ranam in esse. Modo ista duo.- Deus conservat ranam in esse, est ita contingens sicut ista: Deus conservat angelum in esse. Nam utrumque est contingens ad utrumlibet, quia non magis necessitatur voluntas divina ad conservandum angelum quam ad conservandum (22rb) ranam. Ergo antecedentia sunt aeque contingentia. Ergo aeque contingens est ista: Angelus est, sicut ista: Rana est. Et ista credo quod necesse est dicere secundum fidem Christianam. 74
<24> Ad argumentum principale in oppositum, dico quod intentio Philosophi fuit quod separata a materia intantum erant necesse esse quod nec poterant non esse, nec a se nec a Deo. Unde etsi posuisset ea creata effective a Deo, non tamen contingenter diceret ea creari a Deo; sed eadem necessitate qua Deus est Deus, eadem necessitate poneret quod Deus produceret ea in esse. Et hoc est contra nostramfidem,et ideo non est tenendum. II. UTRUM ANIMA INTELLECTIVA SIT IMMORTALIS < ARGUMENTUM PRINCIPALE >
< 1 > Quod non. Nulla substantia immortalis potest esse actus et forma alicujus corruptibilis. Sed anima intellectiva est forma rei corruptibilis, id est hominis. Ergo non est incorruptibilis. Major probatur, quia corruptibile et incorruptibile difFerunt secundum genus, X Metaphysicae. Ergo non est inter ilia proportio. Formae autem ad subjectum necessarium est proportio. 75
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<2> Oppositum. Aristoteles II De Anima dicit quod intellectiva separatur a corpore sicut perpetuum a corruptibili. 11
74 75 76 77
Ms ista. Ms corruptibilis. Ch. 10, 1058b28. Ch. 2, 413b27.
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< 3 > Dicendum quodfirmafidetenendum quod anima intellectiva immortalis est, id est incorruptibilis ab aliqua potentia nisi a Deo solo qui creavit earn. Et tunc tenendum non est de facto anima habuit initium suae durationis. Nam Deus creat quod et de facto omnis anima creata a Deo (21 lv) manebit in perpetuum, Deo volente et conservante. Nam ipsa de se tenderet in nihilum cum sit de nihilo. Unde sicut in alia dictum est, non est necesse esse de se, nec alia creatura, sed contingens tantum, sicut rana vel aliud corruptibile, licet non potest corrumpi nisi a Deo tantum. 78
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<4> Sed hujus quaestionis difficultas est ex hoc: utrum ratione naturali et per rationem Aristotelis posset probari quod anima intellectiva est incorruptibilis. Utrum autem fiiisset hoc de intentione Aristotelis quod ftusset immortalis, de hoc jam expediti sumus per articulum Oxoniensem. Damnatus est enim articulus qui dicit: non habetur ab Aristotele quod intellectiva maneat post separationem. 81
COPINIONES PRO PARTE AFHRMATWA RATIONES MULTORUM EX ARISTOTELE SUMPTAE>
<5> Item, multi doctores hanc partem tenentes probant per rationes Aristotelis et per alias quod anima intellectiva est incorruptibilis, adducendo primo auctoritatem Aristotelis, secundo per rationes ostendendo idem. Primo una auctoritate I De Anima, c. 1, Rationabilius dubitabit. Dicit Aristoteles sic: "Intellectus autem videtur substantia quaedam existens et non corrumpi." Et probat quod non corrumpitur, quia tunc per senium corrumperetur, quod falsum est. Probat quod est falsum; nam si senex acciperet oculumjuvenis, ita videret sicut juvenis. Ergo anima non senescit, licet organum debilitetur. <6> Praeterea, infra eodem capitulo dicit sic.- "Intellectus autem fortassis divinius aliquid et impassibile est" quam corpus. Ergo est incorruptibilis. 82
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Ms mortalis, corrected in margin to "incorruptibile." Ms ipse. Cf. supra, Appendix I, 21. One of the thirty propositions condemned in 1277 by Robert Kilwardby, Archbishop of Canterbury: "Item quod non est inventum ab Aristotele, quod intellectiva manet post separationem." Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensisl (Paris, 1899), p. 559. Cf. St. Albert, Summa de Creaturis II, 61, 2; XXXV (Paris, 1896), pp. 521-531; St. Thomas, De Unitate Intellectus I, 16-22; Opuscula Omnia I (Paris, 1949), pp. 84-90. 408b 18. 408b29. Ms Item. Ms dicimus. Ms ens. 78 79
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83 84 85 86 87
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<7> Praeterea, II De Animal "De intellectu et perspectiva potentia nihil adhuc manifestum est, sed videtur genus alteram animae esse, et hoc solum contingit separari sicut perpetuum a corruptibili." 89
<8> Praeterea, III De Anima, c. De parte autem animae, dicit quod non est 90
similis possibilitas in sensu et intellectu. Nam sensus in cognoscendo excellentiora sensibilia minus cognoscit inferiora, ut visus cum videt lumen internum minus cognoscit aliquid visibile, ut album vel nigrum. Intellectus autem, secundum Aristotelem, in cognoscendo excellens intelligibile non minus cognoscit minus intelligibile, immo magis secundum Philosophum. Hoc non esset nisi esset incorruptibilis. Nam si esset corruptibilis, ut sensus, corrumperetur ab excellentia intelligibili sicut sensus corrumpitur ab excellentia sensibili. <9> Praeterea, Aristoteles eodem III De Anima, eodem capitulo, dicit de intellectu agente, "Hie intellectus est separabilis et impassibilis et immixtus, substantia actu ens." Et infra param, "Separatus est autem solum, et hoc solum immortale et perpetuum est." <10> Praeterea, XII Metaphysicae, c. 3, quaerit Aristoteles quae causae de genere causaram sunt simul cum suo effectu. Et dicit quod causa efficiens non est necessario simul cum suo effectu. Causa formalis est simul cum suo effectu ut in pluribus. Excipit tamen animam intellectivam, quae manet corrupto composito. Unde dicit Aristoteles sic: "Moventes quidem causae velut prius autem existentes. Quae autem ut ratio simul. Si autem posterius aliquid manet, perscrutandum. In quodam enim nihil prohibet, ut si est anima tale, <non omnis> sed intellectus. Omne nam impossibile forsitan." <11> Praeterea, Aristoteles II De Generatione Animalium, c. 6: "Relinquitur autem intellectum solum de foris advenire et divinum esse solum. Nihil enim ipsius communicat corporalis operatio." Ex isto fit duplex argumentum. Primum ex primo dicto. Si enim de foris est, non educitur. Sed nulla forma corrumpitur nisi ilia educitur de potentia materiae. Et secundo praedicto, cum dicitur quod nihil ipsius communicat corporalis operatio, arguitur quod est semper. Ita enim arguit Aristoteles I De Anima} Si, inquit, haberet forma spiritualem operationem et distinctam, 91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
02
88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102
Ch. 2, 413b24-27. Ms contingere. Ch. 4, 429a29-b5. Aristotle's text in Latin reads "impassibilitas." Ms aliud. Ms add. tunc. Ch. 5, 430al7. Ms corrupt. 430a22. 1070a21. Ms moventur. aliquid manet: ms corrupt. Ms esse. Ch. 3, 736b27. Ch. 1, 403al 1.
253
QUESTIONS ON IMMORTALITY
esset separabilis. Sed ex dicto ejus in libro De Animalibus patet quod habet talem operationem. Ergo est separabilis. < 12> Praeterea, Aristoteles IV libro De Partibus Animalium' dicit quod homo inter cetera animalia solum est recti corporis propter hoc quod naturam et substantiam habet divinam. Sed corruptibilis substantia non est divina, id est non est similis Deo. Ergo oportet quod sit incorruptibile aliquid in homine. Ergo, etc. <13> Praeterea, ex libro Ethicorum ostenditur idem. Nam fortis, secundum Aristotelem III Ethicorum, exponere se debet morti propter bonum commune. Sed hoc non faceret nisi aliam vitam speraret. <14> Praeterea, X Ethicorum dicit Aristoteles quod felicitas speculativa permanentior est quam felicitas activa. Sed activa felicitas permanet usque ad finem vitae. Ergo et speculativa permanet ulterius, et non nisi in anima. Ergo anima immortalis. < 15 > Praeterea, Aristoteles eodem X dicit quod sapiens secundum intellectum operans et hunc curans est Deo amantissimus; ergo Deo gratissimus. Ergo necessario habebit mercedem majorem a Deo quam alius non secundum intellectum operans. Sed ilia merces non expectata in vita ista. Ergo manifesta probatio quod non incidat. Nam istud Aristoteles in libro De Bona Fortuna dicit, quod secundum intellectum operantem non sunt fortunati; immo universaliter bene fortunati non sunt sapientes, sed impelluntur a quodam principio superiori quam sit intellectus. Unde secundum ipsum bona fortuna est sine ratione. Natura ergo secundum intellectum operans in hac vita non sentit amorem Dei tantum sicut ille qui non operatur secundum intellectum. m
04
105
106
107
108
m
<16> Secundo ostenditur hoc per rationes unus doctor Thomas. In Scripto II, d. 19, facit hanc rationem: Omnis potentia cognitiva quae in operando non utitur organo corporali est incorruptibilis. Intellectus est hujusmodi. Consequentiam supponit. Antecedens probat tripliciter. Primo, ilia operatio quae se extendit ad omnes formas corporales caret omni forma corporali. Ideo, secundum Aristotelem, oculus non est color ut omnium colorum sit receptivus. Sed ratio intelligendi extendit se ad omnes formas corporales. Ergo non utitur aliquo organo 110
111
112
Cf. supra, note 101. Bk. II, ch. 10, 656a7-13. Ch. 9, 1117b7-19. Ms separaret. Ch. 7, 1177a22. Ch. 9, 1179a22. "Et propter hoc, quod olim dicebatur, bene fortunati vocantur qui si impetum faciant dirigunt sine ratione existentis. Et consiliari non expedit ipsis: habent enim principium tale quod melius intellectu et consilio." Cf. Th. Deman, "Le 'Liber de bona fortuna' dans la theologie de S. Thomas d'Aquin," Revue des sciences phil. et theol., XVII (1928), 40. Excerpted from Ethica EudemiaYll, 14, 1248a29-32. St. Thomas, Sent. II, d. 19, q. 1, a. 1 (Paris, 1929), II, pp. 481-482. De Anima III, 4, 429al9-23. Ms sunt. 103
104 105 106
107 m
109
110 111
112
254
HENRY OF HARCLAY
corporali. Secundo, quia intelligere est universalium, et universalia non recipiuntur in organo corporali, sed tantum intentiones individuatae. Tertio, quia intellectus cognoscit seipsum. Nulla autem potentia organica redit supra seipsam, quia in omni potentia organica organum est medium inter potentiam cognoscentem et omne cognitum. Sed inter idem et seipsum non cadit medium. Ergo, etc. 113
U3a
<17> Praeterea, alius doctor, Jacobus Augustiniensis, in ilia quaestione: Utrum anima esset capax scientiae si non esset immortalis," arguit sic, ex parte dignitatis, ex parte modi operationis, tertio ex parte simplicitatis. Ex parte dignitatis dupliciter. Primo sic: Nam propter dignitatem debet esse Deo propinquissima, nam ad imaginem Dei est. Ergo nulla creatura inter ipsam et Deum. Ista consequentia probatur per Augustinum XI De Trinitate, c. 5." Dicit enim sic: (212r) "Non sane omne quod est in creaturis aliquo modo est simile cum Deo quasi ejus imago. Dicendum quod ilia sola qua superior est ipse solus est. Ea quippe prorsus de illo exprimitur inter quam et ipsum nulla est inteijecta." Ergo ratione imaginis debet esse Deo propinquissima. Sed apud Deum non est transmutatio nec vicissitudinis obumbratio." Ergo tantum anima elongatur a transmutatione creatura potest elongari. Ergo immortalis. < 18> Praeterea, adhuc ex dignitate imaginis arguitur. Nam anima, eo quod est ad imaginem Dei, capax Dei est et particeps ejus potest esse, secundum Augustinum XIV De Trinitate, c. 8. Sed esse particeps Dei est esse capax beatitudinis. Sed beati non" ... ibidem XII, c. 3, XIII libro, c. 8: Vera enim beatitudo non est nisi aeterna. Ergo anima est capax naturaliter aeternitatis. <19> Secundo, probatur hoc ex ratione modi operationis vel cognitionis. Nam Augustinus dicit XII libro De Trinitate, c. 12: Intellectus vero transmutabilia intransmutabiliter cognoscit secundum intransmutabiles rationes. Sed intransmutabilis cognitio arguit esse intransmutabile. 4
115
6
117
118
9
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
sed ... individuatae: ms non tantum intellectus? indistinctae. St. Thomas' text reads: "Secundo, quia intelligere est universalium, in organo autem corporali recipi non possunt nisi intentiones individuatae." Op. cit., p. 481. Ms modo. James ofViterbo, Quodlibet I, q. 11; Ms Troyes 269, fol. 99r. PL 42, 991. St. James i, 17. PL 42, 1044. Ms corrupt. Ms lacuna of about seven letters. This sentence does not appear in the text of James ofViterbo. PL 42, 1022. Ms ut. naturaliter: ms lacuna. Ch. 2; PL 42, 999. Ms non? Ms transmutabiles. Ms transmutabile. 113
1131
114 115
116
117
118 119
120 121
122 123 124 125 126
255
QUESTIONS ON IMMORTALITY
<20> Tertio, ostendit animam esse incomiptibilem ex ejus simplicitate. Nam si simplex, non potest corrumpi.
<21 > Augustinus in libro De Immortalitate Animae nititur ostendere quod anima sit immortalis. Et vis totius deductionis consistit in hoc quodratioet scientia vel Veritas est immortalis; ergo anima. Consequentia probatur diffuse. Vel enim veritas est in anima ut in subjecto, et tunc est propositio plana cum sunt conjuncta sicut duae substantiae. Et tunc probat quod non potest separari diffuse, sicut patet. Dimitto quia longum est et multum praeter propositum. 121
< CONTRA PARTEM AFFIRMATIVAM>
<22> Contra istam opinionem probatio. Videtur quod non possit probari ratione naturali. Nam Augustinus XIII De Trinitate, c. 9, dicit sic: "Humanis cogitationibus hoc invenire conantes, vix pauci magno praediti ingenio abundantes otio, doctrinisque subtilissimis eruditi, ad indagandam solius animae immortalitatem pervenire potuerunt": et forte non invenitur tam ingeniosus. 128
129
130
< OPINIO AUCTORIS QUINQUEPARTITA PARS I: ANIMA INTELLECTIVA NON EST INCORRUPTIBILIS
PER iNTENnONEM ARISTOTELIS>
<23> Adhuc volo salvare articulum, quod invenitur ab Aristotele quod anima est immortalis. Item, dico quod oppositum sequitur ex dictis Aristotelis, et hoc non repugnat articulo. Videtur ergo mihi quod non potest stare cum dictis Aristotelis quod anima intellectiva sit immortalis, supposito quod sit forma substantialis hominis. Sed quod sit forma corporis videtur esse expressum ab Aristotele in multis locis.' <24> Praeterea, II De Anima definit animam, quod est "actus corporis physici organici, vitam habentis in potentia." Et ne dicatur quod non vult extendere suam definitionem ad animam intellectivam. — Contra, quia infra dicit sic: "anima qua vivimus, sentimus et intelligimus." Et de anima loquens dicit sic: "non est enim 131
32
133
134
135
136
127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 133 136
Chs. 4-6; PL 32, 1023-1027. Ch. 9; PL 42, 1023. The concluding words of the paragraph are not in the edition. Ms conatis. Ms corrupt. Cf. supra, note 81. Cf. De Anima II, 1, 412a29; 414al2-27; III, 4, 429a24-28. Ch. 1, 412a27. Ms ostendere. 414al2. 414al8.
256
HENRY OF HARCLAY
corpus actus animae, sed ipsa corporis cujusdam." Ergo anima intellectiva est actus corporis. Sed XII Metaphysicae supra allegatum est; intendit ostendere quod aliqua causa formalis potest manere, corrupto illo cujus est forma. Nam dicit quod moventes causae priores sunt efFectu. Causa ut ratio, id est forma, sit cum effectu. "In quodam tamen nihil prohibet, ut si est tale, non omnis, sed intellectus." Ergo intellectus est causa formalis hominis. Modo probo ex hoc quod nullo modo est incorruptibilis per intentionem Aristotelis. Nam Aristoteles VIII Metaphysicae in fine, redarguit opiniones aliquorum dicentium materiam et formam esse unum, ergo colligationem tantum. Et ipse vult ostendere causam quare ex materia et forma fit unum. Et dicit ' quod causa praecisa non est quia haec materia et haec forma, sed quia haec potentia, hie actus, et quia illud quod est in potentia est diversum ab alio quod est in actu. Nam idem quod est in potentia primo posteafitin actu. Et ideo dicit Philosophus haec verba: "Est autem, ut dictum est, ultima materia et forma idem, haec potentia, hie actu." Et subdit: "Quare causa nulla alia nisi ut quod illud movens ex potentia ad actum." Non ergo quaerenda est alia causa quarefitunum ex his nisi quia idem sunt, hie in actu et haec in potentia; et hoc non indiget nisi motore extrinseco educente actum de potentia. Ergo nulla potentia facit unum cum altera actu, sed cum illo actu qui educitur de potentia ilia. Cum ergo omnis talis forma quae educitur de potentia subjecti est corruptibilis, vel anima intellectiva est corruptibilis necessario si sit forma substantialis hominis, faciens unum per se cum materia vel corpore, vel ratio Philosophi nihil in mundo valebit. <25> Et istud confirmatur per Commentatorem. Dicit enim in commento ultimo, non est differentia inter compositionem aeris et trium angulorum, et compositionem animae et corporis. Unde idem est dicere cuprum habet tres angulos et dicere corpus esse animatum. Anima enim ita se habet ad corpus sicut figura ad cuprum. Et subdit Commentator causam deceptionis antiquorum. Dicit quod causa deceptionis antiquorum est quia ponunt quod illud quod est in potentia et illud quod est in actu esse diversum, et in rei veritate est unum. Illud enim quod fuit in potentia est in actu, et non sunt diversa. Ergo ad hoc quod ex materia et forma fiat unum, manifestum est quod materia ilia habeat in se potentiam ante actum formae, qua potentia possit reduci ad actum per agens extrahens, ut subdit Commentator: 137
138
139
140
14
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149
Ms corrupt. Cf. supra, II, 10. Ch. 6, 1045bl0-12. Ms operationes. 1045M6-21. Ms contingit. 1045bl7-19. 1045b21-22. sed: ms non. Ms et. Averroes, In VIII Metaph., t.c. 16 (Venice, 1576), 225D. Ibid., 225E. Ibid., 225F.
257
QUESTIONS ON IMMORTALITY
exitus illius de potentia in actum non habet causam nisi motorem extrinsecum, extrahentem ipsum de potentia in actum. Ergo forma quae non potest extrahi de potentia materiae nullo modo facit unum cum materia. <26> Praeterea, Commentator supra, commento penultimo: "Translatio enim alicujus de potentia in actum non largitur ei multitudinem sed perfectionem." Et dat causam: "quia non est aliud causatum ab agente ab eo in quod agens agit, sed illud idem quod sit sphaera in potentia fit sphaera in actu." Sed nullum corpus, nulla natura est intellectiva in potentia, nec homo in potentia. Ergo vel ex materia et forma non potestfieriunum per se, puta intellectiva, vel intellectiva educitur de potentia materiae. Est autem intelligendum quod Aristoteles non intendit quod materia fiat forma, sed quodfiatformata, ut patet per verba. Unde compositumfit,et materia est in potentia compositum. Unde non differt a composito nisi sicut illud quod est in potentia ab eodem cum est in actu. Si ergo aliquis videt quod dicit Aristoteles, oportet quod omnis forma quae facit per se unum cum materia quod habeat potentiam in materia quae possit reduci in actum per agens. 150
151
152
153
<27 > Praeterea, probo quod intellectiva non est forma substantialis hominis, dato quod sit separabilis et non educta de potentia materiae. Ilia forma non substantialis alicujus, cui in subjecto non opponitur aliqua privatio. Ista propositio est plana. Nam tria sunt principia naturae.- materia, forma, privatio; inter quae duo sunt contraria, et privatio, secundum Aristotelem I Physicorum} Ergo cuilibet formae substantiali quae est ,.. enim c. 5, correspondet non in materia sibi contraria. Sed intellectivae <non> correspondet privatio aliqua in subjecto naturali. Ergo non est forma substantialis. Probatio (212v) minoris. Nam privatio in subjecto non est negatio formae intellectivae. Ergo, etc. Privatio ilia non negat intellectivam absolute, nam simul stant, quia intellectiva potest esse et non in materia. Ergo ilia negatio tantum erit non formae, sed negatio existentiae formae in subjecto tantum. Ergo non privatio formae. Ergo, etc. 54
155
<28> Tu dices hoc sufficit ad privationem, quod sit negatio formae non absolute, sed existentiae ejus in subjecto. Contra, probo quod hoc est impossibile. Forma et existentia formae in subjecto sunt duo per te, quia possunt in esse separari ab invicem. Tunc sic illud quo tollitur a subjecto, illud est formaliter habitus. Nam 156
150 151 152 153 154 155 156
Op. cit., t.c. 15, 224AB. Ms sed. 1045bl7-23. in actum per agens: ms per actum in agens. Physics 7, 190b28-191a22. Omission in ms. Ms fere.
258
HENRY OF HARCLAY
privationi formaliter non contrariatur nisi habitus et forma. Sed privatio tollitur a subjecto per te per solam existentiam formae in subjecto, non per formam absolute. Ergo existentia ilia, ut distinguitur a natura absoluta formae, est forma et habitus qui est alteram principiorum naturae. Cum ergo ilia existentia non est nisi quaedam relatio (non enim addit supra formam nec substantiam ut aliquid aliud nisi respectum), ergo solus respectus est principium, nec substantiate. Consequens falsum. Multa sequuntur absurda. Nam transmutatio subjecti privatione, quae est unum principiorum naturae, in habitum sibi contrarium, est transmutatio essentialis per quam transitur de non esse simpliciter ad esse simpliciter. Ergo terminus formalis est aliqua substantia necessario. Sed propter solam relationem novam non consurgit novum ens simpliciter; et ilia transitio subjecti de privatione in habitum non terminatur nisi ad novum respectum. <29> Item, impossible est eandem formam numero esse terminum formale duarum mutationum vel productionum totalium; quae productiones differunt numero, immo specie et genere. Ista propositio videtur plana. Si enim totaliter producitur per unam mutationem et unam productionem, alia et producit de ilia, licet intellectiva tota producitur et per creationem; unde est terminus creationis. Sed creatio omnino alia mutatio est, extendendo nomen mutationis ab ilia mutatione cujus terminus a quo est privatio in subjecto apto nato, et alterius rationis est. Ergo intellectiva nec minus potest esse terminus illius mutationis quo subjectum mutatur de privatione in habitum. Ergo non erit forma substantial nec principium naturae. 157
158
157
157
<30> Praeterea, tertio ad principale, quod intellectiva sit educata de potentia materiae si <sit> sola forma substantialis hominis secundum intentionem Aristotelis: ista propositio est nota apud Aristotelem, quod homo generat hominem sicut asinus asinum. Unde frequenter dicit illam propositionem II Physicorum: "Homo generat hominem ex materia et sol." Nota "ex materia." Similiter VII Metaphysicae, primo capitulo: "Eorum autem quae fiunt, haec quidem naturafiunt,haec autem ab arte." Ostendit quod omne illud quod fit a natura habet aliquid a natura a quo fit sicut materia; habet aliquid quod fit in natura sicut compositum ex forma et materia, vel per illud quod sic intendit formalem terminum generationis. Nam per terminos formales, non materiales, distinguuntur species motus et mutationis. Habetur tertio secundum Aristotelem: in natura quo fit, idem est habens principium naturale. 159
160
161
162
157 158 159 160 161 162
Ms habitu. Ms non. Ch. 2, 194bl3; "ex materia" has no equivalent in the Greek. Ch. 7, 1032al2. Ms sunt. Ch. 7, 1032a24.
259
QUESTIONS ON IMMORTALITY
Ponit exemplum: "Homo namque hominem generat." Ista propositio nunquam est vera secundum Aristotelem nisi forma ilia substantialis, a quo homo est homo, formaliter produceretur in esse per agens naturae ex materia; alioquin non generat hominem. Unde concludunt theologi quod homo magis proprie causatur quam generatur. 163
164
<31 > Si dicas quod Aristoteles intendit quod homo generat hominem, quod generat dispositionem propinquam ad receptionem intellectivae — Contra: Illud non potest stare. Aristoteles in capitulo praedicto dividit inter ea quae fiunt a natura et ilia quae fiunt ab arte quantum ad principium activum, quia principium activum eorum quaefiunta natura est forma naturalis extra, sed principium eorum quae fiunt ab arte est ars in mente. Et illud habetur VI Metaphysicae. Ideo semper dicit Philosophus quod ilia quaefiunta natura non fiunt ab arte, nec e converso. <32> Sed ego probo secundum istam responsionem, quod scilicet ,..' nam cultellusfita natura et similiter ab arte. Quod ab arte, manifestum est. Quod a natura, nam natura facit causam et dispositionem propinquam ad formam rei artificiatae cultelli, nam causat ferrum et ferri mollitiem per calorem, sicut homo causat dispositionem propinquam intellectivae. Eodem modo ergo et aequali ratione possum dicere quod ilia facit rem artificiatam, sicut possum dicere quod homo generat hominem per naturam; et plane est contra Aristotelem. 165
166
67
<(PARS 4: NON STANT SIMUL QUOD ANIMA INTELLECTIVA SIT INCORRUPTIBILIS ET QUOD SIT FORMA HOMINIS>
<33> Praeterea, quarto probo quod non stant simul quod anima intellectiva sit incorruptibilis et tamen quod sit forma hominis. Nam tunc multiplicarentur secundum numerum ad multitudinem hominum. Sed anima non potest multiplicari secundum numerum. Ergo, etc. Probatio minoris: Forma subsistens a materia est tantum una in una specie. Ejus probatio secundum Aristotelem, quia multitudo individuorum in eadem specie est per materiam, sicut in multis locis dicit V Metaphysicae, capitulo de uno: Nunc sunt unum quorum materia una. Praeterea, idem dicit eodem quinto capitulo quod ista sunt unum numero quorum materia una. Praeterea, VII Metaphysicae: "Callias vero et Socrates diversa quidem propter materiam (diversa namque); idem vero specie, nam individua species." 168
169
170
171
1032a25. Non inveni. Ch. 7, 1032al5-29. Ch. 1, 1025bl9-25. Omission in ms. Ch. 6, 1016a28. ' 1016b33. Ch. 8, I034a7. Ms naturam. Ms necessaria.
163
164 165
166
167
168 ,6
171 172
172
260
HENRY OF HARCLAY
<34> Praeterea, XII Metaphysicae probat caelum esse unum numero; et si essent plures caeli, essent plures motores secundum numerum. "Sed quaecumque sunt numero multa, materiam habent. Quod autem quid erat esse non habet materiam; endelechia <enim>." Concludit igitur Aristoteles sic: "Unum et ratione et numero primum movens." Cum igitur intellectiva non habet materiam, sequitur quod est una numero tantum. m
174
17S
< 35 > Huic argumento multipliciter respondetur. Uno modo sic, quod aliqua est forma separata a materia quae nata est per se existere et non perficere materiam, et ilia est tantum in una numero et in una specie. Alia est forma quae, licet separata sit aliquando a materia, tamen apta nata est esse perfectio materiae. Hujusmodi est intellectiva. Ilia enim est in confinio inter substantias corporales et substantias mere spirituales. Et hujusmodi forma, licet separata a materia, potest tamen multiplicari ad multiplicationem partium materiae. <36> Si arguatur duae animae separatae a materia numero distinguuntur et non sunt forma materiae, respondetur quod adhuc manet aptitudo ad materiam, secundum quas aptitudines distinguuntur. Contra illud: ilia aptitudo non <est> respectus realis qui manet sine termino. Ergo vel est respectus rationis tantum vel ipsa substantia animae absoluta. Si respectus rationis, certum est non distinguit realiter. Ergo si per aptitudinem dicuntur distingui, non est aliud nisi quod per naturas proprias absolutas distinguuntur. Et tunc probo quod distinctio eorum non est per materiam; immo magis eorum distinctio corporum causatur ad distinctionem illarum formarum. Probatio: Distinctio in priori est (213r) causa distinctionis in posteriori magis quam e converso. Sed anima, quantum ad naturam suam absolutam, prior est natura quam sit forma corporalis, quia esse forma corporis accidit et contingit suae naturae. Ergo prius secundum naturam distinguuntur duae animae quam uniantur corporibus. Ergo non distinguuntur per materiam, sed magis e converso materia per ipsas. 176
177
178
<37> Tu dicis: Anima non est prior secundum naturam aptitudine superficiendi. Illud non valet. Nam patet quod aptitudo non significat nisi substantiam animae absolutam. <38> Praeterea, eodem modo possem dicere quod est rationalis per aptitudinem ad materiam; quod ita est quod non esset rationalis nisi esset apta nata perficere 1,5 176 177 178
Ch. 8, 1074a34-36. 1074a37. Ms sibi. Cf. Liber de Causis 2; ed. O. Bardenhewer (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1882), p. 165. Ms prima. Ms add. corpora.
261
QUESTIONS ON IMMORTALITY
materiam. Si ergo verum est quod dicit Aristoteles, quod distinctio numeralis non est nisi per materiam, impossibile est duas animas separatas esse numero distinctas. <39> Praeterea, eodem modo dicerem tibi quod definitio specifica et formalis hominis et asini est per accidentia: per ridere et rudere. Probatio: Nam per aptitudines distinguuntur certum est, vocando aptitudines naturas substantiates quae sunt aptae natae: natura hominis apta nata est ridere et asini rudere. Ergo distinctio formarum numeralis non est magis per materiam quam distinctio substantiarum per accidentia contingentia et separabilia. Et tunc nihil valet dictum Aristotelis, quod distinguuntur per materiam. < OPINIO S. THOMAE>
<40> Alio modo respondet Thomas in Scripto suo, d. 8, primi libri. Ipse vult concordare philosophiam Aristotelis cumfideCatholica cum illis qui volunt servare legem cum Evangelio. Et dicit sic, quod in rei veritate distinctio formalis duarum animarum est per materiam formaliter. Imaginatur enim hoc modo quod anima, creata a Deo, in eodem esse infunditur materiae et contrahit a materia quandam caracterizationem et quandam signationem, per quam anima est individuata et ab alia anima numero distincta. Et nisi ilia caracterizaretur per materiam, non posset distingui numero ab alia anima. Et ista signatio semel facta in anima per materiam, manet in aeternum in anima separata et conjuncta. Unde anima infiendodependet hoc modo a materia, etsi non in durando. Ponit exemplum: sigillum imprimit figuram. Unde figura in cera dependet a sigillo quantum ad fieri illius, non tamen quantum ad esse, quia remoto sigillo manetfigura.Sic de anima intellectiva respectu corporis. Ita dicit; et dicit quod est intentio Avicennae. 179
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< CONTRA OPINIONEM S. THOMAE>
<41> Contra: Cujuscumque fuerit dictum, sive Avicennae sive suum, porro Catholicaefideiest contrarium. Unde et in opinione, ut videtur mihi, est truculentia. Abradi debet sicut haeresis plana. Asserit enim manifeste quod Deus non posset facere animam ante corpus per aliquod ens, quia non possit esse signata nec singulare nisi per corpus. Probatur sic: Ilia signatio quam dicis esse creatam a corpore non est sicut figura cerae in metaphora rudi quam facis, sed oportet quod 183
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179 180 181 182 183 184 185
185
St. Thomas, Sent I, d. 8, q. 5, a. 2, ad 6m pp. 231, 232. See the remark of Robert Grosseteste cited supra, note 3. Ms durandi. Cf. Avicenna, DeAnimaV, 3 (Venice, 1508), 24rb. Ms truculenta. Ms corrupt. Ms probat. ;
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sit aliquod substantiate praeter animam. Probatio istius: Aut ilia signatio data est aliquid aut nihil. Si nihil, nihil sit ,.. Si aliquid, aut igitur idem aliquid quod natura animae creata a Deo, aut aliud aliquid. Si idem, ergo tota substantia animae causatur a corpore, quod est haereticum. Si ilia signatio facta a corpore sit aliud aliquid a substantia animae, volo ergo loqui de substantia animae, comparando earn ad istam signationem a qua distinguitur realiter. Haec substantia appropriet sibi istam signationem factam ab hoc corpore, quia aliter esset haec natura animae indifferens ad hoc corpus sicut ad aliud corpus, quod non est verum. Quaero ergo per quam rationem appropriat sibi talem signationem: aut per rationem generalem animae communem Sorti et Platoni. Et hoc non potest esse, quia illud quod convenit animae secundum rationem communem animae Sortis et Platonis non magis convenit Sorti quam Platoni. Ergo oportet quod haec substantia animae appropriet sibi hanc signationem per aliquam rationem magis contractam et limitatam quam sit natura speciei in communi. Et talis est necessaria conditio singularitatis. Ergo anima in se est singularis praeter illam signationem. Ergo frustra ponitur ilia signatio pro individuatione animae. <42> Praeterea, cum signatio, ut argutum est, sit aliud necessario a substantia animae et causatur a corpore, nescio videre quin per virtutem corporalem posset corrumpi. Quidquid enim potest causari ab aliqua virtute corporali potest corrumpi ab aliqua virtute creata. Certum est ergo ilia signatio posset per aliquam virtutem creatam deleri. Sed ilia deleta, jam non manet anima quae prius, quia non eadem numero nec distincta ab alia. Ergo aliqua virtus creata posset delere animam, quod est contrafidemEvangelii. Nolite, inquit, timere eos qui occidunt corpus. ° Ergo, etc. <43> Praeterea, anima reunietur corpori in resurrectione et applicabitur sicut forma materiae suae, certum est secundumfidem.Ergo et tunc contrahet anima per eandem rationem unam novam signationem sicut in principio, et nova signatio facit novam animam secundum numerum; ergo alia anima. Consequens falsum. 186
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<44> Tu dicis quod in hoc casu non creabitur alia signatio a corpore, quia primo fuit causata suffitienter et adhuc manet. Contra: Quod non est idem homo qui prius compositum, qui non habet easdem partes essentiales quas prius, non est idem compositum quod prius, praecipue de parte essentiali formali. Sed sic est in proposito. Probatio: Primus homo in nativitate habuit partes essentiales corpus et animam absolute dictam. Sed iste resurgens habebit partem formalem animam signatam, et anima signata et anima non sunt idem sed aliud, sicut totum integrate et pars, ut dictum est. Ergo impossibile est quod idem homo resultet ex eis. Consequens est haereticum. 186 187 188 189 190
Ms naturalis. The rest of the sentence is corrupt: quia et ista ea ut. Ms indivisus? Ms aliquid. St. Matt, x, 28.
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<45> Praeterea, quod allegatur esse intentio Avicennae, etsi esset, contemnenda esset; tamen Avicenna dicit oppositum directe alicubi VI Naturalium, parte 5, versus finem. Dicit enim sic: "Anima non est una sed multae numero, et ejus species una est, sed sine dubio aliquid est propter quod anima est singularis effecta. Illud autem non est impressio animae in materia. Jam enim destruximus hoc; immo est aliqua de affectionibus, et aliqua de virtutibus, et aliquod de accidentibus spiritualibus, aut compositum ex illis, propter quod singularis est anima, licet nesciamus illud:" expresse. <46> Praeterea, quod dicit animam non posse causari ante corpus videtur esse contra Augustinum. Ipse enim reputat opinionem principalem; immo certe tenet quod anima in principio fuit creata ante corpus et postea sexto die fuit unita corpori. Dicit enim VII Super Genesim, c. 7: "Credatur ergo, si nulla Scripturarum auctoritas seu veritatis ratio contradicit, hominem ita factum sexto ut corporis quidem humani ratio causalis in elementis mundi; anima vero jam (213v) ipsa crearetur sicut primitus conditus est dies, et creatura lateret in operibus Dei donee earn suo tempore insufflando, hoc est inspirando, formato ex humo corpori insereret." Si sua opinio esset impossibilis, nunquam hoc dixisset. <47> Praeterea, Augustinus infra videtur innuere quod necesse est hoc dicere 191
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propter Scripturam. Dicitur enim Genesis I: Creavit Deus hominem ad imagi200
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nem suam; et postea secundo capitulo legitur quod formavit Deus hominem de 202
limo terrae et inspiravit in faciem ejus spiraculum vitae. Tunc arguit Augustinus:
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Anima ista, quam Deus inspiravit corpori, aut <de aliquo> fuit facta, quod non est verum, aut facta de nihilo. Et tunc quaeret: aut tunc facta, aut prius. Si prius, habetur propositum, quod ante corpus. Si tunc, arguit Augustinus: Ergo Deus non complevit omne opus quod patrat in ratione: haec de quo dicitur quod sexto die fecit Deus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem suam, quod non nisi secundum animam intelligi potest. Unde videtur Augustinus dicere quod corpus hominis creavit prius illos sex dies, quia corpus idem in causali ratione fuit primo causatum in elementis. Non ergo fuit impossibile hoc esse, licet nonfiieritista. 204
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Cf. supra, paragraph 40. De Anima V, 3; 24v. Ms si. Ms add vel. Ms aliquid de effectibus. De Genesi ad litteramVII, 24; PL 34, 368. Ms amittitur. Ms talis. Ms quod? Ms naturam. Genesis i, 27. Genesis ii, 7. Op. cit., VII, 28, n. 40; PL 34, 370. Ibid. Cf. n. 22; PL 34, 366. Ms tertio.
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<48 > Praeterea, opinio Origenis fait, licet falsa, quod Adam et Eva in paradiso corpora non habuerunt, sed postquam ejecti fuerunt extra paradisum. Et ita exponit illud quod habetur Genesis 3 : Fecit quoque Deus Adae et uxori <ejus> tunicas pelliceas, id est corpora secundum Origenem. Non enim est credendum ipsum fuisse pellitum per eum aut sutorem, sicut dicit Origenus. Et ita omnia habentur in epistola Hieronymi ad Epiphanium. Sed <si> fuisset Deo impossibile hoc facere, certum est quod non dixisset ita. Unde nullus sanctorum redarguit eum de impossibilitate dicti, sed de falsitate tantum. Sic ergo patet quod non est impossibile animam causari ante corpus; immo certe Augustinus credidit hoc, quod ita fuit. 206
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<49> Sed tu dicis quod communiter allegatur: Augustinus dicit alibi quod in corporibus creantur, in libro De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus, Et Magister allegat libro II, d. 18, ubi dicit sic: "Animas hominum <non> esse ab initio inter ceteras intellectuales naturas, sicut Origenes fingit, dicimus, sed formato jam corpore animam creari et infundi." Dicendum quod potest esse ita quodfait;tamen alio modo potuit fuisse secundum Augustinum. Praeterea, auctoritas allegata non est Augustini sed Gennadii, presbyteri Massiliensis. Ille, non Augustinus, fecit ilium librum De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus } 211
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< P A R S 5 : A N I M A NON EST IMMORTALIS SECUNDUM ARISTOTELEM >
<50> Praeterea, quinto, quod anima non sit immortalis probatio secundum Aristotelem. Certum est quod opinio Aristotelis fuit quod mundus fuit ab aeterno secundum omnes species. Hoc dico pro tanto quidam vane fingunt mundum faisse ab aeterno et hominem incepisse in tempore. Illud multipliciter nihil valet, quia contra Aristotelis intentionem. Nam tunc mundus tempore infinito faisset imperfectus, carens optima sua species, quae est homo. 215
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Genesis iii, 21. Ms Adam. Cf. Ex Origene selecta in Genesim-, PG 12, 102A. Ms pelle. Cf. Epistola 51: S. Epiphanii ad Joannem Episcopum Jerosolymorum, a Hieronymo Latine reddita; PL 22, 520-527. Ch. 18; PL 42, 1216. Peter Lombard, Sent. II, d. 18, 7; I (Quaracchi, 1916), p. 392. intellectuales naturas: ms noctellea? malos natura. For Gennadius of Marseilles as the author of this work, cf. O. Bardenhewer, Patrology (St. Louis, 1908), p. 609. Cf. De Generatione Animalium II, 1, 732al. St. Thomas raises this possibility in Summa Theologiae I, 46, 2, ad 8m; De Aeternitate Mundi 12; Opuscula Omnia I (Paris, 1949), p. 60. Ms corrupt. 206
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<51 > Praeterea, "Omne illud propter quod, eidem magis," I Posteriorum. Sed omnia alia propter hominem. Ergo homo magis est factus. Minor probata, quia "Omnia creata sunt propter hominem" non est tantum propositio scripturae sacrae, immo Aristotelis in pluribus locis. II Physicorum dicit sic: "Utimur tamquam propter nos omnibus quae sunt; sumus etenim et nos quodammodo finis omnium." Praeterea, I Politicorum, c. 5: "Aestimandum est plantas genitas esse animalium gratia, et alia animalia hominum gratia. Si ergo natura nihil imperfectum neque frustra facit, necessarium est hominum gratia omnia fecisse naturam." Plane ergo fuisset natura frustra nisi essent homines ab aeterno sicut alia animalia. <52> Praeterea, expressae sunt auctoritates Aristotelis de hominibus aeternis, sicut de aliis animalibus, primo libro De Caelo etMundo 3, et I Meteorum, c. 8: "Non enim semel aut bis, sed infinities debet putare easdem advenisse opiniones ad nos." Ergo homines fiiisse per infinitum. Praeterea, in libro De Plantis, libro primo, c. 2, dicit Aristoteles: "Mundus demonstratus est perpetuus, sempiternus; nec cessavit unquam generare animalia, plantas, et omnes suas species." Ergo homines. Et si dicas quod liber iste non est Aristotelis, ecce auctoritatem de libro De Animalibus, libro secundo De Generatione Animalium: "Semper est genus hominum et animalium et plantarum. Horum autem principium masculinus et femina." Ergo secundum Aristotelem homines fiierint ab aeterno. Et magis habetur de hoc in alia quaestione De Aeternitate Mundi. Modo ex isto sic necessario animam intellectivam corruptibilem secundum eum, vel infinitae animae fuerunt, certum est; et si sic immortalis, certum est modo sunt; ergo infinitum in actu, quod Aristoteles nitita improbare III Physicorum , tam in continuis quam in numeris. <53> Huic argumento nunquam data alia responsio salvans mentem Aristotelis. Non potest responded tenendo quod omnis homo habuit animam rationalem sicut formam suam substantialem nisi petendo fiiisse ab aeterno tantum determinatas m
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Aristotle, Post. Anal. I, 2, 72a29. Cf. Genesis i, 28-30. Ch. 2, 194a34. Ch. 8, 1256bl6-22. Ms add et. Ms habet. Ms hominis. Ch. 3, 270bl9. Ch. 3, 339b29. Ms corrupt. Ms lacuna. 817b3 8. Aristotle's text in Latin reads "totalis." The author of this work was probably Nicholas of Damas. Cf. P. Moiaux, Les listes anciennes des ouvrages dAristote (Louvain, 1951), p. 109. Ch. 1, 732al. Ergo secundum: ms corrupt. Cf. Ms. Vat. Borghes. 171, fols. 22v-24v. Ch. 7, 207a33-208a4. 218
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animas, puta, gratia exempli, quatuor, et illae sufficiunt et suffecerunt pro infinitis corporibus successive, visitando corpora, vadendo de corpore in corpus. Sed illud omnino contradicit Aristoteli. Nam aut redirent in eadem corpora, secundum opinionem Platonis, quam recitat Augustinus XII libro De Civitate Dei, dicentis quod post numerates annos, id est multos, ipse redditurus erat ad vitam et legeret in scola Academica eisdem scolaribus numero quibus tunc legebat. Et certum est quod illud repugnat Aristoteli II De Generatione in fine: Quorum substantia deperdit, ipsa non redeunt eadem numero, sed specie. <54> Item, in praedictis a privatione ad habitum impossibilis est regressio; aut intelligis quod animae illae redirent in alia corpora quam prius; et illudfiiitabsurdum apud Aristotelem, nam anima habet proprium corpus sicut propriam speciem. Unde ipse redarguit istam opinionem I DeAnima; dicit enim istam Pythagoricam. Dicit enim sic: "Non est < in Conveniens, secundum Pythagoricas fabulas, quamlibet animam quodlibet corpus ingredi. Simile itaque aliquid dicunt, quod si aliquis dicat tectonicam infistulasingredi. Oportet quidem artem uti organis, animam autem corpore. Videtur enim unumquodque propriam habere speciem et formam." Haec Aristoteles. Ergo omnino sequitur quod anima est corruptibilis vel erunt modo infinitae in actu, quod non concedet Aristoteles. <55> Praeterea, sexto, potest argui sic contra illud: quod Aristoteles in I Caeli et Mundi asserit quod non est possibile quod aliquid sit corruptibile et aeternum a parte post, et tamen quod habuit motum a parte ante. Si ergo ponat animam fuisse incorruptibilem, necessarium habet ponere earn esse ab aeterno ante consequenter; et tunc sequitur omnia (214r) absurda quae prius sunt tacta de reversione animarum ad corpora. Quaelibet sint vera; tamen apud Aristotelem sunt absurda. Et si illud non sequatur, sequitur statim quod infinitae animae fuerunt ab aeterno et infinito tempore, sive caret anima sua perfectione naturali, quae est perficere corpus. Hoc dico si fuisset earn esse perfectioni corporis. m
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<56> Ad hoc argumentum respondet quidam doctor Thomas, dicens non plus intelligit Aristoteles nisi quod illud habet in se potentiam manendi in perpetuum. Unde anima per potentiam quam habet potest fuisse ab aeterno; et non plus intelligit Aristoteles. 243
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236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244
Ch. 14; CSEL 40, pp. 588, 589. Ch. 11, 338bl7. Ch. 3, 407b22-26. Ms add. in. Ms Vide. Ch. 10, 279bl8; ch. 12, 282al. Ms est. Cf. St. Thomas, Sent. II, d. 19, q. 1, a. 1, ad 5m II, p. 484. Ms add quod. ;
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<57> Iste videtur ludere, quia nihil valet totum. Nam si anima haberet esse prius duratione, anima est generabilis. Illud fuit principium apud eum, et omne generabile est corruptibile et omne tale necessario corrumpetur secundum eum. 245
< 58 > Tu dicis: anima non est proprie generabilis <et> non corrumpitur quia non componitur ex contrariis. Illud non valet, quia vel sic accipit ille novam generationem vel novam acceptionem esse. Unde probat quod mundus non potest generari, id est non potest habere esse novum, quia tunc non posset, et per consequens aliquando non erit. Unde si anima aliquando non fuit, ipsa non determinat sibi esse ex natura sua, sicut determinat sibi rationalitatem. Tunc enim semper fuit impossibile: anima non est, sicut anima non est rationalis. Ergo ex parte sui potest non esse, id est non repugnat sibi non esse. Sed secundum Aristotelem omni potentiae <passivae> in natura correspondet activa, quae reducit illud aliquando in 246
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actum. Unde in XII Metaphysicae, id est capitulo: Sed quoniam tres erant substan-
tiae, ubi vult ostendere quod necesse est aliquam esse substantiam immobilem et sempiternam, probat earn non esse generabilem nec corruptibilem. Ergo idem est apud eum accipere esse de novo et generari. Ergo, etc. < 59> Praeterea, septimo sic Anima intellectiva, si sit separata forma et incorruptibilis, ipsa est actus purus, ita quod ejus " operatio et actus et substantia idem. Sed nullum tale potest esse forma perficiens materiam. Ergo, etc. Minor est plana. Probatio majoris secundum Aristotelem eodem modo quod ipse probat XII Metaphysicae Primum esse actum purum. Ipse enim probat Primum Movens esse actum purum ex perpetuitate motus facti ab eo. Arguit enim sic: "Adhuc autem substantia ejus non eget potentia, quia tunc non erit motus aeternus. Contingit enim quod potentia est, non esse. Oportet ergo esse principium tale cujus substantia actus." Haec sunt verba Aristotelis. <60> Eodem modo et immediatius potest argui aeternitas Primi Motoris ex perpetuitate esse ejus. Nam ex perpetuitate motus non <potest> argui ejus substantiam esse actum purum nisi quia perpetuitas motus arguit perpetuam exisU9
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;
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2538
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Cf. supra, paragraph 55. Ms impossibihs. ' Cf. De Anima III, 5, 430al0. Ms potentiam. Ch. 6, 107 lb3. Ms illud. Ms ex. Ms sufficiens. Ch. 6, 1071bl8-20. potentia: ms primum. Ms auctoritas. Ms add. contra.
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HENRY OF HARCLAY
tentiam motus. Tunc arguo tibi de anima eodem modo: ejus substantia non indigeret potentia, quia tunc posset <esse> an non esse; contingit enim quod potest <esse> an non esse. Sed hoc est falsum, quia anima incorruptibilis. Ergo non potest non esse. <61> Unde credo Commentatorem habere intentionem Aristotelis III De Anima™ quia intellectus nihil de novo recipit sicut nec Deus, quia contradictoria sunt simul in anima eodem modo sicut ad Deum, apud quem non est transmutatio nec vicissitudinis obumbratio, Unde nova intentio in nobis non est nisi nova phantasma copulata cum intellectu separato. Et nulla ratio probat oppositum. Unde solum propter fidem teneo quod intellectiva est forma hominis. <62> Praeterea, octavo sic: Anima, si sit forma substantial corporis, ergo ex natura sua et non per aliquid additum natum est facere unum cum corpore. Ergo quando non est aptum natum facere idem cum corpore ut esset forma corporis, tunc desinit esse anima. Unde non valet quod aliqui magistri dixerunt, quod anima nata est perficere corpus semel tantum et non amplius. Illud potest improbari ratione naturali. Nam illud quod inest ratione substantiae et naturae specificae, illud non potest amitti natura manente, sicut risibilitas. Ergo cum aptitudo perficiendi materiam conveniat formae substantiali per naturam suam, non potest amitti manente forma vel substantia formae. Sed anima post separationem non est nata perficere materiam secundum Aristotelem. Ergo vel maxima fUit forma vel desinit esse anima. Probatio istius assumpti, quia impossibile est quod aptitudo naturalis sit ad impossibile simpliciter. Illud est necessarium apud Aristotelem et apud theologum. Sed secundum Aristotelem impossibile est simpliciter quod anima separata iterum perficiat aliud corpus, quia impossibile est simpliciter quod idem corpus redeat, ut probatum est per duplicem auctoritatem Aristotelis supra in libro ... argumento, ut patet, anima redire ad aliud corpus, sicut est probatum ibidem per Aristotelem. 256
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<63> Tu dicis quod ista ratio probat quod non est apta nata redire ad corpus quia, licet Deus potest resuscitare idem corpus numero, tamen naturaliter est hoc Ms ex. Cf. Averroes, In III De Anima, t.c. 5; ed. F. Crawford (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), pp. 404, 405. St. James i, 17. Ms fantasi °. Ms objectum. Ms nono. Ms vel. Non inveni. Ms formam. Cf. supra, paragraph 54. The sense of the argument would seem to require "nunquam." Cf. Aristotle, De Anima III, 12, 434a31; St. Thomas, Summa Theologiael, 75, 6. Cf. supra, paragraphs 53-55. There appears to be an omission here. 256
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impossibile. Sed aptitudo naturalis non est ad illud quod est impossibile in natura. Ergo, etc. Dico quod argumentum est bonum secundum viam Aristotelis ponentis quod idem corpus numero nulla ratione resurget, quia tunc nulla aptitudo naturalis ordinatur ad illud. Sed secundum viam Catholicam nihil valet. Nos enim credimus firmiter quod multae sunt aptitudines et potentiae naturales passivae quae non possunt reduci ad actum nisi per agens supernaturale, id est per Deum. Et hoc est verum tam de aptitudine alicujus per formam substantialem, sicut est aptitudo materiae ad formam substantialem, tam de aptitudine accidentali qua subjectum natum est recipere formam accidentalem, sicut anima nata est suscipere beatitudinem. Eo enim quod ad imaginem Dei est, capax est beatitudinis; et natura istarum potentiarum est reducibilis ad actum ut per agens supernaturale, scilicet Deum. <64> Praeterea, si anima esset apta nata perficere corpus post separationem, certe posset ratione naturali, secundum viam Aristotelis, probari resurrectio per propositionem quam frequentissime accipit Aristoteles: "Deus et natura nihil faciunt frustra." Ista propositio habetur I Caeli et Mundi, III De Anima? versus finem: "Nihil frustra facit natura." Item omnino dicit Aristoteles in libro De Progressu Animalium? * in principio libri De Partibus Animalium in XXIII libro DeAnimalibus, in principio: "Natura nihil facitfrustraneque superfluum." Ergo aliquando esset resurrectio per rationem naturalem probatur, quod nunquam concederet Aristoteles; immo pro inconvenienti habet quod resurgat aliquod animatum. Unde I De Anima arguit sic: Arguit contra istos qui dicunt animam movere seipsam motu locali, sicut corpus movetur motu locali. Dicit Aristoteles: "Si autem hoc contingeret, et exeuntem iterum ingredi. Ab hoc alio sequetur resurgere mortua animalium." (214v) Hoc ergo habet Aristoteles pro inconvenienti. <65> Praeterea, Avicenna dicit IX Metaphysicae, c. 7, quod anima habebit felicitatem vel miseriam. Hoc probari potest ratione demonstrativa; sed quod anima habebit corpus in resurrectione, hoc non probat ratione demonstrativa, sed tantum testimonio prophetae Mathumeth. <66> Praeterea, nono, potest argui per auctoritatem libri De Anima, de quo libro sumuntur auctoritates ad partem oppositam. Aristoteles I De Anima, versus princi269
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Ms videmus. Ms potentias? Ms aliud. Ch. 4, 271a35. Ch. 12, 434a31. Cf. De Incessu Animalium 8, 708al0. Cf. De Partibus Animalium III, 1, 661b25; IV, 11, 691b5; 13, 695bl8. Ms probat. Ch. 3, 406b3. Ms add. sicut corpus movetur. Ibid. Ms haec. Fol. 106v. Ms scilicet.
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pium, movet istam dubitationem, utrum anima habeat aliquas proprias passiones an omnes sunt conjunct!. Et dicit quod hoc scire non leve, scilicet quibus passionibus videtur certum, sicut irasci, confidere et desiderare et hujusmodi, et omnino sentire. Sed de intelligere dubitat aliquis utrum sit proprium animae an sit conjuncti. Et solvit sic: "Si autem et hoc," scilicet intelligere, "phantasia quaedam est, aut non sine phantasia, non contingit utique, neque hoc sine corpore esse." Ergo cum intellectus sit phantasia, vel non sine phantasia, non est separabilis a corpore. <67> Praeterea, arguit Aristoteles per modum dubitationis: Si anima habet operationem propriam, ergo contingit ipsam aliquando separari; si non habet, non est separabilis. Et sicut mihi videtur, solvit illud argumentum, quod non arguitur: etsi habeat operationem propriam in corpore, et propter hoc habeat earn separatam. Nam rectum habet propriam passionem in corpore, puta "tangere sphaeram in puncto, non tamen tanget separatum rectum; inseparable <enim>, siquidem semper cum quodam corpore est." Ergo ista videtur esse de anima, et semper cum quodam corpore est. 283
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<68> Tu dicis ad primum argumentum quod intelligere animae conjunctae non est sine phantasmate, non tamen separatae. Illud non solvit. Nam Aristoteles vult per hoc quod intelligere non est sine phantasmate probare quod non est separabilis secundum operationem, multo minus secundum esse, etsi intelligeret quod intelligere conjungitur. <69> Praeterea, infra eodem libro dicit quod "Dicere animam irasci, simile est ac si dicat earn texere vel aedificare." Et si forte tu dicas: Verum, quia hujusmodi, sicut irasci, sunt passiones conjuncti, quod ergo mirum quia non insunt animae. Sed non solvit, quia idem dicit de intelligere. Unde consequenter immediate dicit, "Melius autem fortassis est non dicere animam misereri aut addiscere aut intelligere, sed hominem." 291
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283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293
Ch. 1, 403a3. Ms personas. 403a8. Ms quae. Ms et. Ms sit. Cf. De Animal, 1, 403al0. Ibid., 403al3. Cf. St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, 75, 6, ad 3m. De Animal, 4, 408bl2. Ibid., 408bl3.
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<70> Primum argumentum (illud quod assumitur I De Anima * aperte de sene accipiente oculum juvenis), ita bene probat quod sensitiva, utpote visiva, est incorruptibilis sicut de intellectiva. Nam ille senex videret sicut juvenis, nedum intelligeret. Ideo statim qualiter intelligere corrumpitur quodam interiori corrupto, et non alio modo corrumpitur sensitiva nisi corrupto organo. Unde sequitur continue littera expressa, quod anima non est separabilis. Dicit enim continue: "Hoc autem corrupto," scilicet illo interiori, "impossibile est intelligere aut amare et odire." Et concludit: "Non sunt ergo illius," scilicet animae, "passiones, sed hujus habentis ilium, secundum quod ilium habet. Quare et hoc corrupto, neque memoratur neque amat. Non enim <erant> illius, sed communis quidem, quod destructum est." expresse quod destructio contingit, non habet aliquas passiones et operationes. 19
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Cf. supra, paragraph 5. Ibid., 408b27. Ibid., 408b28. Ms qualiter.
John of Jandun
John of Jandun was born in Jandun in the Ardennes, France, c. 1275. He studied and taught in the faculty of arts at Paris. He was the leading exponent of Averroism in his day. He collaborated with Marsilius of Padua in writing the Defensor pads. In 1324 he was forced to leave Paris with Marsilius after John xxii's condemnation of that work. In 1326 he, like Ockham, sought the protection of Louis of Bavaria. He died in Todi c. 1328.
14 John of Jandun and the Divine Causality* Among the various currents of philosophy in the fourteenth century, Latin Averroism was one of the least forward-looking and progressive. Closely allied to the tradition of Averroes, it moved for the most part in a closed circle, impermeable to new ideas and ways of thought. Its conservatism becomes quite clear when its most representative figure, John of Jandun, is compared with his contemporary, William of Ockham. While Jandun was looking back to the tradition of Aristotle as interpreted by Averroes, and expending his talents in attempting to understand it correctly, Ockham was trying new experiments in philosophy and laying the basis of modern ways of thought. It is nonetheless true that the Averroist movement, initiated at Paris in the second half of the thirteenth century, exercised considerable influence throughout the later Middle Ages and the Renaissance, especially in the schools of northern Italy. Its characteristic themes in psychology, natural philosophy, and metaphysics were continually debated and widely upheld. More generally, its sharp opposition of faith and reason and its rationalist approach to problems of philosophy permeated the intellectual atmosphere of the time and even influenced thinkers like Pomponazzi who, strictly 1
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* This article represents a section of work done as a Fellow of the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation. Cf. E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York, 1955), p. 522. Cf. E. Renan, Averroes et I'averroisme (Paris, 1852; 4th ed. 1925); J. R. Charbonnel, La Pensee italienne au xvi' siecle et le courant libertin (Paris, 1919), pp. 160-170, 220-388; H. Busson, Les Sources et le developpement du rationalisme dans la litterature franpaise de la renaissance (1539-1601) (Paris, 1922); B. Nardi, Sigieri di Brabante nei pensiero del Rinascimento italiano (Rome, 1945); The Renaissance Philosophy of Man, ed. E. Cassirer, P. O. Kristeller, J. Randall Jr. (Chicago, 1948), pp. 8-20; P. Renucci, L'Aventure de Vhumanisme europeen au moyen-dge (ir-xir siecle) (Paris, 1953), pp. 151-158. For the thought of John of Jandun, see S. MacClintock, Perversity and Error. Studies on the "Averroist" John of Jandun (Blommington, Ind. 1956). 1
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speaking, did not belong to the Averroist school. Indeed, this general influence of Averroism extends to our own day. John of Jandun's Disputed Question on the divine causality, edited in the appendix to the present article, illustrates well the Averroist approach to a metaphysical problem. It exhibits the concern of the Averroists to interpret thefrequentlyambiguous texts of Aristotle in the light of Averroes' commentaries, and to understand correctly the often obscure statements of Averroes himself. It also reveals their concern to set aside revelation in discussing a philosophical problem and to appeal to the philosophers alone for a solution, which they generally interpret to be in opposition to the teaching of faith. Jandun's Disputed Question is also significant in the history of the notion of efficient causality. Descartes was to pass on to modern philosophy the notion of an efficient cause with a "positive influence" upon its effect. To be more precise, he distinguished between two types of efficient causes. The first simply brings about a change in its effect, in such a way that the effect can remain even when the cause is no longer present. In this way the architect is the cause of a house and the father the cause of his son. These are causes, Descartes says, only secundum fieri and not secundum esse, because they make the effect come to be without precisely giving it its being. The second type of efficient cause produces the very being of its effect, so that if the cause is removed the effect itself ceases to be. In this way the sun causes light and God causes all created things. These are causes secundum esse. And because God stands in this relation to his creatures, his continual influence is needed in order that they be conserved in being; a fact, Descartes adds, of which the unlettered are often ignorant, but which is evident to all metaphysicians. Descartes' conception of efficient causality and of God's causal relation to the universe, like so much of his metaphysics, if not his method, had its source in medieval philosophy, more exactly in St. Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, who in turn inherited it from Avicenna. Not all medieval 3
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Pomponazzi is often called an Averroist, although he himself was a bitter opponent of Averroes. Cf. his De Immortalitate animae, 4 (Tubingen, 1791), pp. 7-21. For his opposition of faith and reason, cf. W. Betzendorfer, Die Lehre von der zweifachen Wahrheit bei Petrus Pomponatius (Tubingen, 1919); A. Maurer, "Between Reason and Faith: Siger of Brabant and Pomponazzi on the Magic Arts," Mediaeval Studies 18 (1956), 1-18. Reprinted supra, pp. 137-162. Cf. R Descartes, Correspondance 233, ed. Adam-Tannery, CEuvres de Descartes III (Paris, 1899), p. 336. Cf. R Descartes, Responsio ad Quintas Objectiones, ed. cit., VII, p. 369; N. K. Smith, New Studies in the Philosophy of Descartes (London, 1952), p. 204. For further references to Descartes' conception of efficient causality, cf. E. Gilson, Index Scolastico-Cartesien (Paris, 1912), pp. 39-40. There are, however, important differences in their notions of causality. On the subject of Descartes and the scholastics, cf. E. Gilson, Etudes sur le role de la pensee medievale dans la 3
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philosophers, however, would have agreed with Descartes that this notion of divine causality is an evident metaphysical truth. There were some, like Averroes and John of Jandun, who rejected it as stemming from revelation, and so outside the domain of rational thought. In proof of this they pointed to the fact that Aristotle, the Philosopher par excellence, always described an efficient cause as simply the starting-point of motion: he knew nothing of an efficient cause which imparts being to its effect, or of such a causal relation of God to the universe. The history of this conflict of views in the Middle Ages on the nature of efficient causality has not yet been fully written, although it is important for an understanding of the modern controversy over efficient causality and of the impact of revelation on the development of modern philosophical ideas. Indeed, this history cannot be fully written until all the pertinent documents are made available. It is with the hope of making a slight contribution to the subject that Jandun's treatise on the divine causality is here edited. The treatise is a Quaestio Disputata-. "Is it contradictory for eternal beings to have an efficient cause?" Jandun treated of similar and related problems in several of his commentaries on Aristotle. The present Question, although it does not always have the orderly presentation of ideas of the commentaries, is quite unique in its presentation and handling of the problem. It bears the mark of the classroom dispute of which it is the written record; but just for this reason it is important for showing us the various sides of the controversy in his day and the position which he himself adopted. The background of the dispute contained in Jandun's treatise is the conflict between the conceptions of efficient causality of Avicenna and Averroes. A 7
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formation du systeme cartesien (Paris, 1930), pp. 226-227. For texts of St. Thomas on efficient causality, cf. L. Schutz, Thomas-Lexikon (Paderborn, 1895), pp. 103-109; F. Meehan, Efficient Causality in Aristotle and St. Thomas (Washington, 1940), pp. 152-398. For Duns Scotus, cf. M. Garcia, Lexicon-Scholasticum Philosophico — Theologicum (Quaracchi, 1910), pp. 125-129. For Avicenna, cf. infra, pp. 277-279. Cf. infra, pp. 280-282. See the penetrating study on this subject in E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy..., pp. 210-211, 643-644. Cf. infra, Appendix, p. 294. In II Metaph., 5 (Venice, 1505), fols. 28v-30r.- Utrum substantiae aeternae aliae a prima dependeant a prima tanquam ab aliquo agente et efficiente; In VIII Phys., 5 (Venice, 1586), pp. 197-199: An motus aetemus dependeat a motore aliquo effective; In I De Caelo etMundo, 15 (Venice, 1552), fols. 11 r-12r: An caelum ab aliquo dependeat tanquam ab agente et efficiente proprio; In De Substantia Orbis 14 (Venice, 1552), fol. 60r: An intelligentiae dependeant a primo principio in ratione efficientis vel finis: ibid., 10, fols. 56v-57r: An caeli motor sit idem secundum agens et secundum finem, vel utrum in separatis a materia, efficiens et finis different vel sint idem. 7
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word must be said on this subject before introducing Jandun's own treatment of the question." Avicenna conceived an efficient cause as that which gives being to something distinct from itself: Agens vero est causa quae acquirit rei esse discretum a seipso, More briefly, it is that from which being comes: id a quo provenit esse. In the medieval Latin translation of his works the Arabic word for this cause ('Ilia fa 'ila) is rendered either causa agens or causa efficiens. Although according to Avicenna all efficient causes give being, not all of them are true causes of being. A natural efficient cause gives being to something only in the sense that it moves or changes it; it is simply a source of motion: principium motionis tantum } This is the type of efficient cause studied by the philosopher of nature, who deals with the moving and changing universe. Besides this type of efficient cause there is another, studied by the metaphysician, which is the source or giver of being: principium essendi et datorem ejus. This manner of giving being is called creation — a mode of communication proper not only to God, who according to Avicenna immediately creates only one being (the first celestial Intelligence), but also to all the subsequent Intelligences. Each of these creates in turn the Intelligence immediately inferior to it, along with the animated celestial sphere with which it is intimately connected. The last of these Intelligences, which is the Agent Intellect, creates or gives being to the sublunary world and individual souls. Every true and essential cause, precisely because its effect depends on it for its very existence, must be simultaneous with its effect. It is a rule for Avicenna that every cause, in the true sense of the word, must co-exist with its effect and not precede it, as do the causes of motion: unaquaeque igitur causa est simul cum suo causato. Only non-essential and remote causes 12
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Cf. E. Gilson, ibid. Avicenna, Metaph. VI, 1 (Venice, 1508), fol. 91rb. Avicennae Metaphysices Compendium, ed. N. Carame (Rome, 1926), p. 34, n. 2. Cf. A. M. Goichon, Lexique de la langue philosophique d'Ibn Sina (Avicenne) (Paris, 1938), p. 238, n. 448, 3. Avicenna, Metaph. VI, 1, fol. 91rb. Ibid. Peter of Auvergne, a disciple of St. Thomas, expressed this type of efficient cause with the striking formula: unde principium esse, obviously paralleling the Aristotelian formula for a moving cause: unde principium motus. Cf. W. Dunphy, "Peter of Auvergne and the Twofold Efficient Cause," Mediaeval Studies 28 (1966), 1-21. For Avicenna's doctrine of creation, cf. A. M. Goichon, La Distinction de I'essence et de lexistence d'apres Ibn Sina (Avicenne) (Paris, 1937), pp. 201-334; L. Gardet, La pensee religieuse dAvicenne (Ibn Sina) (Paris, 1951), pp. 62-68. 11
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precede their effects in existence, in such a way that those effects can remain when the causes are removed. Thus Avicenna distinguished between two radically different types of efficient causes: one necessarily connected with change and motion, the other transcending motion and connected simply with being. The first is "natural," the second "metaphysical" causality. Algazel, in his summary of Avicenna's philosophy, described these types of causes in succinct terms for future philosophers. Avicenna's notion of efficient causality found a resolute critic in Averroes. He objected basically to Avicenna's mixing religion and revelation with philosophy, and he made a deliberate effort to purify it of whatever doctrines derived from these sources. One such doctrine was creation ex nihilo, and with it the Avicennian conception of an efficient cause which does not give motion or change but being. He saw clearly that this notion could not be found in Aristotle's philosophy, to which he was consciously trying to return. Averroes distinguished between two types of active causes-, a mover (movens) and an agent (agens). A moving cause properly produces only local motion. An agent, on the other hand, produces qualitative changes or alterations. The term "moving cause" is wider than "agent." All agents are movers, but not all movers are agents. Only those are agents which, besides moving bodies locally, reduce matter from potency to act and thus produce a composite of form and matter. Averroes wished to avoid what he considered to be two extreme positions on this question. One was that of Empedocles, who conceived agent causes simply as movers, whose function it is to separate what is united in nature and thus reveal forms hidden within it. At the other extreme Averroes saw the upholders of creation, who imagine that an agent can create a whole being from nothing. In this theory a creator 18
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Avicenna, Metaph. VI, 2, fol. 91vb. "Verae causae simul sunt cum suis causatis. Sed praecedentes sunt causae vel per accidens vel adiutrices." " Algazel, Metaph. I, 8; ed. J. T. Muckle (Toronto, 1933), pp. 47-51. It is interesting to note that Descartes illustrates these causes with the same examples that Algazel used five centuries before. (Cf. supra, p. 276). Cf. Avicenna, ibid. On the relation between faith and reason in Averroes, cf. Averroes on the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy, transl. G. F. Hourani (London, 1961); L. Gauthier, La Theorie d'Ibn Rochd (Averroes) sur les rapports de la religion et de la philosophie (Paris, 1909); same author, Ibn Rochd (Averroes) (Paris, 1948), pp. 41-42; E. Gilson, op. cit., pp. 218-220. "Agens enim est movens et faciens passiones .... Movens autem proprie nullam facit passionem; quapropter omne agens est movens, sed non omne movens est agens." Averroes, In XIIMetaph., t.c. 23; Opera Omnia VIII (Venice, 1574), 308K. Unless otherwise indicated all references to Averroes are to this edition. Cf. In I De Generatione et Corruptione, t.c. 45, V; 361G; In III Phys., t.c. 3, IV, 86K; Epitomes in Metaph. 1, VIII, 356K. For an excellent study of Averroes on causality, see B. S. Kogan, Averroes and the Metaphysics of Causation (Albany, New York, 1985). 18
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is a being which does not need matter on which to operate; the whole possibility of the effect resides on the part of the agent, without any potential subject which is reduced from possibility to act. As examples of the creationists Averroes gives the Mutakallimun (Moslem theologians), Christians such as Philoponus, and Avicenna, according to whom forms are not educed from the potency of matter, but created and placed in matter by a "giver of forms" (dator formarum). To these two positions on the role of an agent Averroes opposed what he considered the opinion of Aristotle, which he adopted as his own. According to this view, an agent produces only a composite of matter and form, and it does this by moving and changing matter until the form potentially present becomes actual. Averroes does not seem to have conceived a true agent as a giver of being or form, but simply as a source of motion or change. He thus eliminated from his philosophy the "metaphysical" efficient cause of Avicenna, which is not a principle of change but a source of existence itself. It is true, however, that at times he uses the term "agent" in another sense, extending it to include an immaterial being like God as the cause of the very form or essence of its effect. In this higher sense of the term, he says, the agent cause is studied in metaphysics, not in the philosophy of nature. We shall have to return later to the meaning of "agent" in this sense, and to the controversy it provoked among the interpreters and followers of Averroes. It is against the background of this dispute over the meaning of an efficient cause that we must read John of Jandun's treatise on the possibility of something eternal having an efficient cause. The question is well designed to bring out a philosopher's conception of efficient causality. If an efficient cause is nothing else than the source of motion or change, how can it cause something eternal? Must it not be prior in time to that which it changes and reduces from potency to act? And if that is true, how can its effect have always existed? On the other hand, if an efficient cause can simply give being, 22
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p. 64.
Cf. Averroes, In XII Metaph., t.c. 18, 304E-I. On this point, cf. L. Gardet, op. cit.,
"Tertia autem est opinio Aristotelis. Et est quod agens non facit nisi compositum ex materia et forma, et hoc fit movendo materiam et transmutando earn donee exeat de ea illud quod est de potentia in ea ad illam formam in actu ... agens apud Aristotelem non est congregans inter duo in rei veritate, sed extrahens illud quod est in potentia ad actum." Averroes, ibid., 356H-L. "Hinc est quod haec scientia (sciL metaphysica) non praestat de causis nisi formam et finem, et aliquo modo agens: videlicet non eo modo quo dicitur agens in rebus transmutabilibus, quia conditio agentis in hoc loco non est quod praecedat passum praecessione temporali, sicutfitin rebus naturalibus." Averroes, Epitomes in Metaph. 1; VIII, 3561; cf. 4, 388M-389A. Cf. infra, pp. 287-293. 23
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without motion or change, its relationship to its effect transcends time, and there seems to be no contradiction in its effect being eternal. Jandun himself reports three opinions on this question. The first is the view of Avicenna and Algazel, that all eternal beings other than God have an efficient cause. The second view maintains that nothing eternal has such a cause. The third, which we shall see is Jandun's own, holds a position midway between these two extremes. Avicenna's position, Jandun says, is that God exists eternally as the most self-sufficient and adequate cause. No defect is to be found in him, and there is no impediment to stand in the way of his realizing his effects. Granted that he exists eternally, then, it follows that his effects also exist eternally; and so there are eternal beings which have an efficient cause. In his reply Jandun comes immediately to the crucial point. There are, he says, only two ways in which eternal beings could have an efficient cause: through motion and change, or through simple emanation or creation. Now it is impossible that they be caused in the first way, because this manner of efficiency requires matter as the subject of change, and the Intelligences, which Avicenna supposes are eternally created, are immaterial. Moreover, an efficient cause which produces its effect through motion and change must precede it in time, and consequently the effect cannot be eternal. So these eternal beings cannot be brought into existence through any kind of motion or change. The other possibility is that they are simply created by God out of nothing. But this is contrary to Aristotle, who made it clear that something cannot be made from nothing. In neither of these two ways, then, can eternal beings have an efficient cause. In the present treatise Jandun does not explain further his opposition to creation as a mode of efficient causation. Elsewhere, however, he adds that reason and faith are opposed on this point. Reason takes its origin in the objects of sense, and consequently it cannot demonstrate what is above the sensible and natural order. Now creation, or the simple emanation of being, is a supernatural mode of production, and it can never be known by reasoning from the order of nature. Jandun stoutly maintains his belief in the veracity of the Scriptural account of God's creating all things in the beginning of time, and hence in a mode of efficient causality beyond that known to the philosopher. But he would have us notice two things: First, according to Scripture God's creation is not eternal; it had a temporal beginning. Thus 26
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Cf. infra, Appendix, pp. 299-300. Ibid. On the necessity of creation according to Avicenna, cf. L. Gardet, op. cit., p. 42; E. Gilson, op. cit., p. 213. Cf. infra, Appendix, p. 299. Cf. Aristotle, Physics I, 4, 187a29. 26
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even according to revelation God is not the efficient cause of eternal beings. Second, creation is called a "production" in a sense equivocal to causation through motion and change. It is not the type exercised by a natural agent, which is alone known to the philosopher, whose method of inquiry is purely natural. To be convinced of the fact, we have only to read Aristotle, who, Jandun says, always speaks of a true efficient cause as a principle of motion. Indeed, the very definition of an agent is "the source of motion and change." So whatever does not come into being by motion cannot have a true efficient cause. If anyone denies this, Jandun refuses to dispute with him, although he does try to justify his own position by means of inductive reasoning. Consequently he agrees with Averroes that the modern way of explaining the production of beings, as an immediate creation by God as by a true efficient cause, is simply not true: Modus modernorum in producendo entia non est verus? The opposition between the teaching of faith and the philosophers is thus complete. 29
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"Hoc modo dicendum est ad quaestionem secundum intentionem Aristotelis et Commentatoris ponentium citra primum aliquas substantias aeternas; et si hoc esset verum, non dependerent a vero agente per motum. Sed tamen dicendum secundum fidem et veritatem quod nihil citra primum est aeternum, sed omnia inceperunt de novo esse. Et per consequens producta fuerunt a primo principio tanquam ab agente per creationem ex nihilo, saltern substantiae abstractae. Et ilia creatio non est motus nec generatio univoce dictus cum motu inferiorum, sed alia productio supernaturalis quae non potest convinci ex sensatis et ex naturalibus, ex quibus procedunt philosophi naturaliter loquentes. Sed tantum finniter hoc credo et scio, non de ratione orta ex sensatis, et hoc firmiter fecit scripturae doctoribus reverenter assentire. Unde ex hoc quod nescio demonstrare ex sensatis, nec potest, quia est super sensibilia et naturam, tunc simpliciter credendo et fideliter habeo meritum, et in hoc etiam probatur creationis et salvationis excellentia vigoris super agens quodlibet naturale." Jandun, In II Metaph. 5, fols. 29vb-30ra. Texts on creation from Jandun's Commentary on the Physics will be found in E. Gilson, "La doctrine de la double verite," Etudes de philosophie medievale (Strasbourg, 1921), 74-75. On Jandun's mocking attitude towards the faith, cf. p. 67; same author, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages {New York, 1955), pp. 523-524. Cf. Aristotle, Metaph.V, 2, 1013a29 Physics II, 3, 194b29-31. For Aristotle's doctrine of efficient causality, cf. A. Mansion, Introduction a la physique aristotelicienne (Louvain, 1946), pp. 226-239; E. Gilson, L'Etre et I'essence (Paris, 1948), pp. 59-62. It should be noticed that what Aristotle describes is a moving cause; the distinction between such a cause and an "efficient" cause is due to Avicenna. Cf. E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy..., pp. 210-211; 643, note 20. On Aristotle's lack of treatment of efficient causality from the point of view of existential act, cf. J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, 3rd ed. (Toronto, 1978), p. 359. "Omne agens simpliciter est principium motus et mutationis; et illud intelligitur per quid nominis hujus quod est causa agens. Et qui negaret hoc, non esset disputandum cum eo. Et tamen potest declarari inductione .... Ubicumque Aristoteles loquitur de efficiente vero, dicit ipsum unde principium motus; quicquid ergo non fit per motum, non habet efficiens verum." Jandun, In II Metaph. 5, fols. 28vb, 29rb. Ibid., fol. 29rb. Cf. Averroes, In XII Metaph., t.c. 44, 328D. 29
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Jandun's quarrel with the "moderns," such as Avicenna, goes even deeper. Not only did he, like Averroes, think that Avicenna was appealing to an extra-philosophical notion when he introduced the concept of creation into metaphysics, but he considered erroneous the whole metaphysics of being connected with it. Why, indeed, would a being which always existed need an efficient cause? To this question Avicenna replied that only God is a necessary being in the absolute sense of the word. Everything else is, in itself, or from the point of view of its essence, only possible. It is necessary only in relation to the cause which gives it actual existence. God is the only case of a being which exists in virtue of its very nature; in all other beings essence is really distinct from existence, and it is not their very nature to exist. In virtue of their natures they can exist, but an efficient cause is required to give them their existence. This is true even for eternal beings like the heavenly Intelligences. In themselves they are only possible beings; if they are to exist, they must eternally be given existence by their efficient causes. Like his master Averroes, Jandun could not accept the notion of being presupposed by this argument. Suppose Avicenna were correct in thinking it possible for an eternal being not to exist. Since nothing impossible follows from what is possible, it could be posited that, at a certain moment, the eternal being might not exist. But at that moment it would exist, since in fact it is eternal. Therefore, at one and the same time, the thing would both exist and not exist, which is contradictory. Consider, too, that any moment might be chosen for this hypothetical experiment. It then becomes evident that on the strength of Avicenna's argument we can say that for all eternity a certain being both exists and does not exist — which plainly violates the law of non-contradiction. The very notions of being and possibility are here at stake. For Jandun, as for Averroes, an eternal substance is formally, by its very nature, a necessary being. It cannot be a possible being by virtue of its nature, as Avicenna imagined, for then it would acquire eternity and necessity when brought into existence by its cause, with the result that a possible nature would be changed 33
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For Avicenna's notion of necessary and possible being, cf. Metaph. I, 7-8, fols. 73ra74ra VIII, 4, fols. 98vb-99rb. Cf. also A. M. Goichon, op. cit., pp. 156-200; L. Gardet, op. cit., pp. 45-61; E. Gilson, op. cit., pp. 207-208; 212-213. Cf. infra, Appendix, pp. 299-300. For Averroes' criticism of Avicenna's notion of being, cf. In IVMetaph., t.c. 3, 67B-H; In XIIMetaph., t.c. 41, 324K. Avicenna's logic is not at fault; nor would it lead him to this conclusion. For him, it is not contradictory for something to be eternally possible in virtue of its essence and eternally necessary in virtue of the cause which makes it exist, for created essence is really distinct from existence. Having denied, with Averroes, Avicenna's distinction of essence and existence, Jandun cannot admit his distinction between possibility and necessity within created being. Cf. Jandun, In De Sub. Orbis 14, fol. 60ra. Cf. Averroes, De Sub. Orbis 3, 9DE. 33
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into a necessary nature. This seems to be the reason, incidentally, why Averroes and Jandun did not admit, with Avicenna, that the heavenly bodies are really composed of matter and form, like sublunary bodies. If matter were an integral part of their natures, they would contain a root of possibility, since whatever is material is potential. They considered the heavenly bodies "material" only in an equivocal sense, since their "matter" is of a different sort from that of sublunary bodies; and they thought these bodies were composed, not of matter and form, but of a mover and a subject which is moved. Nothing could show more clearly the gulf between the Avicennian and Averroist notions of being and possibility. For Avicenna, the essence of a created being is not its existence, and so he would not agree that a nature or essence which is possible in itself is changed into a necessary one by receiving necessary existence from its efficient cause. The nature always remains possible in itself; the necessity of an eternal being resides solely on the side of the existence given to it by its cause. On the contrary, for Averroes, whom Jandun follows, there is no real distinction between essence and existence. A possible being which becomes necessary through the agency of a cause would thus be fundamentally altered in essence. Must it be said, then, that nothing eternal has an efficient cause? Jandun will not go as far as this, although he reports it to be the opinion of some philosophers. Does not Aristotle prove that motion is eternal, and is it not clear to the senses that motion has an efficient cause? It would seem, then, that at least eternal motion is efficiently produced. Jandun points out, however, that motion is not a substance but the accident of a substance. So, even though eternal motion has an efficient cause, it still remains true that no eternal substance has a cause of this sort. Notice, too, that motion is not a permanent but a successive accident. A permanent accident is one whose being requires the simultaneous actual existence of all its parts, like the quantity of the heavens and the nature of light. A successive accident is one which need not have all its parts present at once; some exist only in potency 36
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Cf. Jandun, ibid.; infra, Appendix, p. 304. Cf. Averroes, In XII Metaph., t.c. 41, 423K; H. A. Wolfson, "Averroes' Lost Treatise on the Prime Mover," The Hebrew Union College Annual XXIII, 1 (1950-51), 700-702. "Ideo videtur dicendum secundum Aristotelem et Commentatorem quod caelum ... non componitur ex materia et forma, sed est corpus simplex actu existens subjectum suo motori vel motoribus, ita quod non est potentia ad esse, nec habet esse formaliter a motore vel ab alia forma, sed solum est in eo potentia ad ubi." Jandun, op. cit., 1, fol. 51vb. Cf. In I De Caelo etMundo, 23, fols. 14v-16v. Cf. Avicenna, Metaph. IX, 4, fols. 104vb-105ra. I have not been able to identify these philosophers. The position Jandun reports them as holding was adopted by Gregory of Rimini, who died thirty years after Jandun, in 1358. Cf. infra, p. 303. Cf. infra, Appendix, ibid. Cf. Aristotle, Physics VIII, 1, 250bll-251b27. 36
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so that they are in a constant process of becoming. Now it is impossible for eternally permanent accidents to have an efficient cause, for the same reason that it is impossible for an eternal substance to have one. But successive accidents, like motion, do have an efficient cause, even though they are eternal. What is the efficient cause or mover of the never-ending successive phases of the movement of the heavens? Jandun thinks that it is not God, but the Intelligence presiding over the first sphere. This Intelligence, in its eternal knowledge and love of God and its desire to conserve its likeness to him, efficiently moves the first mobile sphere. According to Jandun, God is thus the first cause of motion only as a final cause and not as an efficient cause. The efficient mover of the celestial sphere is the Intelligence presiding over it. Jandun presents this as his interpretation of Aristotle's and Averroes' conception of the divine causality. As he himself indicates, the correct understanding of their position was a matter of dispute at the time. Indeed, shortly afterwards Gregory of Rimini attacked Jandun's interpretation on two scores. His first disagreement may seem at first sight a mere dispute over words, but it is important as reflecting Gregory's allegiance to Ockham in refusing to attribute any reality to universals. The question Jandun has raised was: Has anything eternal an efficient cause? He had replied that no eternal substance has such a cause, but motion has, and motion is something eternal: motus est aliquid aeternum. So in a sense it can be said that something eternal has an efficient cause. Gregory of Rimini protests that to conceive motion as "something eternal" is to imagine motion as a kind of entity, shared in by all individual moving things. Many have imagined this, he adds, but in fact nothing exists in reality 40
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Cf. infra, Appendix, pp. 304-305. "Secundo dico quod primum movens, quod est movens mediate, movet in ratione finis tantum, et non in ratione efficientis, ut patet per Philosophum et Commentatorem II Caelo. Quod enim est nobile et perfectum simpliciter non eget actione extrinseca in acquisitione nobilitatis, quia non eget assimilari alicui, ex quo est simpliciter primum, et a se est omnis nobilitas et omnis perfectio ... intelligentia quae movet primum orbem aliud est a primo principio. ... Ergo apparet primum mobile moveri effective ab intelligentia desiderante et intelligente primum ... praeter primum sit alius motor conjunctus, qui movet effective." Jandun, In De Sub. Orbis 10, fol. 56vb. Cf. Aristotle, De Caelo II, 12, 292a21-292b6; Averroes, In IIDe Caelo, t.c. 63, 14IKL; 64, 142H-I. For Gregory's relations to Ockham, cf. E. Gilson, op. cit., pp. 502-503. With regard to the point at issue, Ockham had argued that motion is not a real entity, really different from that which is moved. Cf. Ockham, In II Sent. 9 (Lyons, 1495). Ockham differed from Gregory, however, in maintaining that, according to Aristotle, God is the efficient cause of all things. Cf. Ockham, loc. cit., 6, B. Cf. infra, Appendix, p. 303. 40
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except individual things and their individual movements and changes. It is true that, according to Aristotle and Averroes, movements have been succeeding each other for all eternity, just as individual men have been eternally generated one after the other. We can say, then, according to these philosophers, that there always has been motion; but strictly speaking we cannot say that motion is eternal, just as we cannot say that man is eternal. To say this implies that motion and humanity have some real status apart from the individual things in motion and individual men, which is not the case. Consequently Gregory of Rimini claims that strictly speaking, according to Aristotle and Averroes, nothing eternal has an efficient cause. Jandun, however, was not to go undefended. In the sixteenth century the Averroist, Zimara, took up the debate on the side of Jandun against Gregory of Rimini. According to him, the whole eternal motion of the universe makes up a numerical unity, and this motion is efficiently produced by the celestial Intelligence charged with this function. Since this Intelligence per se intends the whole movement and only incidentally its parts, we can say that something eternal has a true efficient cause. The second point on which Gregory of Rimini disagrees with Jandun's interpretation of Aristotle and his commentator regards the type of causality exercised by God on the first heavenly sphere. Jandun claimed that God transcends all the spheres, and that the immediate efficient mover of the primum mobile is not God, but an Intelligence inferior to him. Gregory thinks that Aristotle and Averroes meant that God is the immediate active power of the primum mobile. In defense of this interpretation, Gregory reminds us that Aristotle reckoned the number of separate immobile substances according to the number of simple movements of the heavens. Averroes expressly says that the primary separate substance, or God, produces the first movement. Gregory argues that he cannot mean that God moves the first 44
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"Ad hoc dicendum quod utique generatio habet causam agentem secundum Philosophum si recte hoc intelligatur secundum eum; tamen nulla generatio est aeterna aut fuit ab aeterno, sicut nullum genitum fuit ab aeterno sive fuit aut est aeternum. Unde secundum ipsum ista de virtute sermonis est falsa: generatio est aeterna, quia quaelibet ejus singularis est falsa, ut de se patet... non est considerandum quod aliqua entitas motus sit aeterna, nec quod entitas aliqua facta in mobili a motore sit aeterna, cum quaelibet singularis sit falsa." Gregory of Rimini, In II Sent., 1, 1 (Venice, 1522), fol. 2ra (Reprinted, St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1955). "Secundum Peripateticos, intelligentia quae est causa efficiens motus caeli per se intendit totum motum, ut est unus numero, et non intendit partes motus nisi per accidens .... Ergo intelligentia per se est causa effectiva totius motus. Sed totus motus est aeternus in verissima unitate numerali; ergo aliquod aeternum habet causam vere effectivam." Zimara, Annotationes in Joannem Gandavensem super Quaest. Metaph. (Venice, 1505), fol. 174ra. Gregory is referred to on fol. 173vb. Zimara, however, did not think Jandun correct in saying that, according to the philosophers, God does not move the heavens immediately as its efficient cause. Cf. ibid., fol. 178rb. 44
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sphere only as a final cause, because in this sense he is the cause of all motion. The fact that Averroes says this movement is especially caused by God indicates that he is the efficient cause of the movement of the first sphere and not simply its final cause. John of Jandun was well aware that certain statements of Averroes, and even of Aristotle, would lead one at first sight to think they conceived God as a true efficient cause. Does not Aristotle refer to God, and to eternal beings in general, as causes and principles? Averroes in his turn explicitly , calls God a final, efficient, and formal cause. Since he expressly distinguishes between God as afinaland as an efficient cause, it would seem that he means to attribute true efficient causality to him. What is more, Averroes states that God is not only the cause of the continuity of motion but also of the very substance of what he moves. This hardly seems consistent with his being solely the final cause of the motion of the heavens. Again, he asserts that the celestial bodies need not only a power giving them motion but also the eternity of their substance. So it would seem that, according to Averroes, God moves the heavens not only as a final cause — as an object of love and desire — but also as an efficient cause, giving them their very substance. However convincing these statements may seem, Jandun thinks that to interpret them in the sense that God is a true efficient cause of an eternal substance runs counter to the philosophers' notion of efficient causality, for they always conceived this type of causality simply as a principle of motion and change. It follows that what is not subject to change, for instance the immaterial Intelligences, which are purely actual, cannot have an efficient cause. Moreover, they conceived an efficient cause as necessarily prior in time to its effect, which therefore cannot be eternal. How are we to understand, then, Averroes' statement that God is an efficient cause? Jandun appeals to Averroes' own explanation in his Com46
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"Philosophus et Commentator opinati sunt Deum esse motorem appropriatum primo mobili, et illud immediate active moventem." Gregory of Rimini, loc. cit., fol. 3vb. As the marginal note of the editor indicates, Gregory is here directly criticizing Peter of Auriol, In I Sent. 42, 1, 1, prop. 3 (Rome, 1596), p. 958. The reference to Aristotle is: Metaph. XII, 8, 1073a21-38; to Averroes: In XII Metaph., t.c. 43, 326L-327A. Cf. infra, Appendix, notes 117-119. On the sense in which the separate substances are movers for Aristotle, cf. J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, 3rd ed. (Toronto, 1978), pp. 441-443, 452-453. A useful bibliography for the controversy on the subject: J. Owens, "The Reality of the Aristotelian Separate Movers," Review of Metaphysics, 3 (1950), 322, note 14. Cf. infra, Appendix, note 125. Cf. infra, Appendix, note 135. Cf. infra, Appendix, note 136. Cf. infra, Appendix, p. 300. 46
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mentary on the De Caelo, where he explicitly says that the celestial Intelligences do not exercise efficient causality in the proper sense of the term but only formal and final causality. They can be called efficient causes only in a metaphorical sense. Jandun concludes from this that Averroes uses the term "efficient cause" in two ways: first, in its proper sense, simply as the source of motion or change; second, in a metaphorical sense, as equivalent to a formal or final cause. He points out that Aristotle calls health an efficient cause in this latter way: health may be said to make a person healthy, although strictly speaking health is a formal and final cause, not an efficient cause. If we call God the efficient cause of the universe of nature, it is only in this metaphorical sense. Properly he is its final cause, since he is the good to which the whole of nature tends as to its end. A formidable difficulty, however, still remains. Granted that God is the final cause of the universe, in the sense that he is the end for whose sake it functions, how can he be said to give it not only its motion but also its very being and substance? In the world about us we are acquainted with the fact of finality. We desire something and that object is capable of moving us to action. In this case the object of desire is a cause of motion. But we have no experience of a final cause which is capable of giving to another thing its very existence. Jandun was aware of this difficulty, but he seems not to have given any solution of it. He simply states that, unlike final causes in this world, a final cause in the celestial world is not only the source of operation but also gives and conserves being. We are left in the dark as to how this is accomplished. Averroes himself seems to have considered the being of the world as consisting in its unity, order and motion. As the final cause of its order and movement, then, God gives the universe its very being. Jandun does not offer this explanation, but leaves us with the mystery of an Averroist God who, as the final cause of the world, not only moves it but gives it its existence and substance. 52
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It would be beyond the limits of our present inquiry to deal adequately with the interpretation of Averroes' notion of the divine causality after John of Jandun. It might be useful, however, to add a few words on this subject, at least in so far as it is related to Jandun. Cf. ibid. Cf. ibid. "Unde finis in superioribus non solum est principium operationis, sed etiam dat esse et conservat esse, licet hoc non sit in inferioribus." Jandun, In II Metaph. 5, fol. 29va. This is the interpretation of H. A. Wolfson, art. cit., 704. Cf. Averroes, De Substantia Orbis 4, 101. 52
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John Baconthorpe gives an excellent presentation of the various opinions of his immediate predecessors. He names Harvey of Nedellec as holding that, according to Aristotle and Averroes, everything depends on God as on an efficient cause. On this point Harvey was largely inspired by St. Thomas Aquinas. A certain Gerard (of Bologna?) is cited, along with others, as holding the contrary view. The Averroist, Thomas of Wilton, is said to maintain an intermediate position, teaching that, although the Intelligences do not depend on God as an efficient cause, the corporeal universe does. In Baconthorpe's own view, Aristotle and Averroes were of the opinion that both the Intelligences and the heavenly bodies have God for their final, and not for their efficient cause. Arguing against Wilton, he makes the same distinction as Jandun between a proper and a broad use of the term "agent" in Averroes' writings. In the proper sense, Averroes does not mean God to be the efficient cause of eternal things but only their final cause. Baconthorpe's explanation of how God, as a final cause, can give eternal beings their very existence, is interesting. He says that they come into existence through the very fact that God knows he stands in different ways to them as their end. Because God exists and is their end, they too spring into existence by a sort of concomitance, as a relation comes to be along with its foundation. 56
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Cf. Baconthorpe, In II Sent., 1, 1, 1 (Cremona, 1618), pp. 421 ff. Cf. op. cit., p. 421. Cf. Harvey of Nedellec, Quodlibet I, 8 (Venice, 1513), fols. 15r-18v. Harvey follows St. Thomas in granting that Aristotle knew God to be the efficient cause of the very substance of things. Cf. Summa Theol. I, 44, 1-2. For St. Thomas' attitude on this point, cf. E. Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy (London, 1936), pp. 68-69, 438, note 4; A. Pegis, "A Note on St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 1, 44 1-2," Mediaeval Studies, VIII (1946), 159-168. Duns Scotus, interpreting Aristotle through Avicenna, attributes to him the notion of an eternal efficient causality: "Dico quod Philosophus posuit omnia alia a Deo ex se necessaria formaliter, esse effective ab eo, non tamen noviter accipiendo esse post non esse duratione, sed natura." Scotus, Rep. Paris. I, 8, 3; Opera OmniaXXlI (Paris, 1894), p. 161. Cf. Scotus, Opus Oxon., 2, 1, 2; II (Quaracchi, 1914), p. 25. Ibid. Cf. Gerard of Bologna, Quodlibet I, 9 Ms. Vat. Iat. 932, fol. 98r-100r. Op. cit., p. 422. Cf. Thomas of Wilton, Ms. Vat. Iat. Borgh. 36, fols. 50v-55r. Cf. A. Maier, "Wilhelm von Alnwicks Bologneser Quaestionen gegen den Averroismus (1323)," Gregorianum, XXX (1949), 295-296. "Videtur mihi quod tam Intelligentiae quam corpora caelestia sunt a Deo secundum opinionem Philosophi et Commentatoris non sicut a causa efficiente, sed solum sicut a fine." Baconthorpe, In II Sent., 1, 1, 2, n. 1, p. 424bC. Cf. op. cit., 1, 1, 3, n. 2, p. 427bE-428aA. "Ideo imaginatur Commentator quod secundum quod primum intelligit se esse diversimode finem eorem, quod ilia aeterna statim sunt entia quaedam per solam dependentiam ad ipsum, sicut ad causam finalem, ita quod distinguuntur in diversa gradus essendi, solum per hoc, quod diversimode ordinantur ad diversa officia in ordine ad primum finem." Loc. cit. a. 2, n. 1, p. 425aC. "Deus largiatur rebus esse secundum quod dependent in genere causae finalis; per hoc enim quod ipse est, qui est finis eorum, et ipsae sunt per quandam concomitantiam et resultationem, sicut relatio per esse fundamenti." Loc. cit., a. 3, n. 3, p. 428bD. 56
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The correct interpretation of Aristotle and Averroes on this subject continued to be debated throughout the later Middle Ages and the Renaissance. At the beginning of the sixteenth century the Averroist, Achillini, defended essentially the same view as John of Jandun. He too distinguished between Averroes' proper use of the term "agent," according to which an agent is always a source of motion, drawing its effect from potency to act, and a metaphorical use of the term which extends to a formal and final cause. Pomponazzi, who was Achillini's opponent at the University of Padua, took the opposite side of the debate, directing his arguments chiefly against Gregory of Rimini. The renowned Averroist, Marcantonio Zimara, played an important role in the debate. In his Annotations on Jandun's Metaphysics he criticized, among other things, his fellow-Averroist's interpretation on this point. It was his opinion that both Aristotle and Averroes had taught that, besides an efficient cause originating movement and change, there is another giving being by simple emanation, without the instrumentality of motion. It is in this latter way, according to them, that God eternally produces the eternal, immaterial Intelligences, and the Intelligences themselves can immediately bring into existence in time generable and corruptible things. Zimara tells us in his Tables on the terminology of Aristotle and Averroes that he wrote a special treatise in his youth against Gregory of Rimini and John Baconthorpe, entitled De Triplici causalitate intelligentiae. In this work, which he says was not published, he criticized these theologians for asserting that, according to Averroes, the movement of the heavenly bodies is eternally caused but not their substance. He pointed out that Averroes clearly states in his De Substantia orbis that the heavens have not only a moving cause but 63
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Cf. Achillini, Liber de Intelligentiis, Quodlibetum II (Venice, 1545), fol. 8rb. Cf. P. Pomponazzi, In De Substantia Orbis, Ms Vat. Reg. lat. 1279, fols. 29v-30v. Although the text of Pomponazzi is defective in places, this seems to be the position he adopts. Cf. "Unde ilia videtur esse sententia Aristotelis, quod, scilicet mundus et aliae intelligentiae effective dependeant a Deo." Fol. 30v. Bruno Nardi, on the other hand, thinks Pomponazzi is in agreement with Achillini on this point; "II suo aristotelismo et il suo averroismo insomma non hanno la rigidita intransigente del pensiero deH'Achillini, con quale il mantovano era in sostanza d'accordo anche nel dubitare della dipendenza delle intelligenze a dei corpi celesti dalla causalita efficiente del primo motore." B. Nardi, "Appunti suU'averroista bolognese Alessandro Achillini," Giornale critico della fllosofla italiana, Fas. I (1954), 90. "In aeternis et universaliter in omnibus abstractis a materia est dare unum efiiciens producens ab aeterno sine vero motu et transmutatione, sed per simplicem emanationem." Annotationes ... (Venice, 1505), fol. 176rb. Zimara also criticizes Jandun for holding that, according to the philosophers (i.e. Aristotle and Averroes), God is not the immediate efficient mover of the heavens (cf. supra, p. 285). Op. cit., fol. 178rb. 63
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also an agent cause, which gives them their very substance. In his Tables he goes on to admit the difficulty of interpreting Averroes on this point, exclaiming: Deus sit dator auxilii in tanta perplexitate et varietate doctorum I As far as Aristotle's own doctrine is concerned, Zimara shows some hesitation, pointing out that his classical Greek interpreters are not in agreement. But he is not doubtful at all that Averroes thought eternal beings are caused formally, finally and efficiently. Some of the most persuasive texts brought forth by Zimara to prove that Averroes thought eternal beings have a true efficient cause come from the Arabian philosopher's Epitome of Metaphysics, which was not translated into Latin until the sixteenth century, and hence was unknown to Jandun. In one of these texts Averroes asserts that the metaphysician and the philosopher of nature consider causes in different ways. The metaphysician studies only formal and final causes and, in a certain way, agent causes. The latter type of cause does not mean the same to him as it does to the philosopher of nature; for in natural science an agent cause is a mover, preceding its effect in time and imparting to it nothing but movement, while in metaphysics the agent has no temporal priority over its effect, to which it gives its very form. Zimara points to this as a clear indication that Averroes distinguished between a natural and a metaphysical efficient cause, and that for him the eternal universe depends on God, not only as its form and end, but also as its true efficient cause. He cites to the same purpose still another text of the Epitome in which Averroes asserts that the movers of the celestial bodies do
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"Et hoc manifestat verum fuisse nostrum judicium in iuventute nostra, ubi disputavimus in special! quaestione de triplici causalitate intelligentiae, contra Gregorium Ariminensem et Joannem de Baccone, asseverantes in via Averrois corpora sempiterna non esse causata ab aeterno quo ad substandard, sed quo ad motum tantum ab ipsa intelligentia. Et tunc iam non erat impressus tractatus iste, licet manifests etiam pateat hoc idem ex 2 capitulo De Substantia Orbis (6M-7A), ubi Commentator expresse dicit se fecisse illam digressionem propter amorern veritatis, quia multi etiam suo tempore asserebant caelum non habere nisi causam moventem et non agentem ... et Deus sit dator auxilii in tanta perpexitate et varietate doctorum. Zimara, Tabula ... in Dictis Aristotelis et Averrois (Venice, 1576), fol. 14ra. Cf. fol. 2ra. Cf. Zimara, op. cit., fol. 2rab. It was translated from the Hebrew by Jacob Mantinus. Cf. S. Van den Bergh, Die Epitome der Metaphysik des Averroes (Leiden, 1924), Vorwort. "Hinc est quod haec scientia (scil. metaphysica) non praestat de causis, nisi formam et finem, et aliquo modo agens: videlicet non eo modo quo dicitur agens in rebus transmutabilibus, quia conditio agentis in hoc loco non est quod praecedat passum praecessione temporali, sicut fit in rebus naturalibus ... Nam arbitrari potest esse differentiam inter agens et movens, quia movens praestat mobili motum tantum, agens vero formam propter quam fit motus." Averroes, Epitomes in libros Metaph. 1, 356 I-K, S. Van den Bergh points out the unaristotelian character of this distinction, op. cit., pp. 149-150. Cf. Zimara, Tabula, fol. 13vab. 66
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not simply move them but give them the forms by which they are what they are. On the strength of these and similar texts Zimara opposes the interpretation of Jandun, Gregory of Rimini and Baconthorpe, that according to Averroes eternal beings cannot have a true efficient cause. In his marginal notes to Harvey of Nedellec's Quodlibetal Questions, he agrees with Harvey's opinion that Averroes thought eternal beings have an agent cause as well as a final cause. If we had his unedited treatise De triplici causalitate intelligentiae, we could perhaps understand better in what sense Zimara understood Averroes' notion of a metaphysical agent cause. It appears from his extant writings, however, that he understood it in the sense of a true creator or giver of being, in the Avicennian sense of the term. It is precisely on this point that he parts company with Jandun, Gregory of Rimini and Baconthorpe. They understood well enough that Averroes spoke of an agent cause outside the order of time and movement, and that he admitted that eternal beings have, in a sense, an efficient cause. But they recognized that he always maintained that, in this sense, the term "agent" or "efficient cause" is used only metaphorically and not properly. It is really identical with a formal or final cause. Zimara does not point out that in his Epitome Averroes calls the movers of the celestial bodies "agents" only in a certain sense (quoquo modo), and that the meaning of "agent" in this context becomes apparent when he declares that the form and end are sometimes called agents by a kind of similitude. On this point, there is complete agreement between Averroes' Epitome and his other writings. It seems justifiable to conclude that, on the subject of the divine causality, Jandun was a more faithful interpreter of Averroes than Zimara. Unlike 71
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" "Ex quo etiam ostenditur quod non sunt tantum motores corporum coelestium, immo dant eis formas suas, quibus sunt id quod sunt." Averroes, op. cit., 4, 388 M. Cf. Zimara, op. cit., fol. 13vb. For instance: "Nam agens est duplex. Aliquid enim est a quo provenit actum, in quo pendet operatio ejus hora, qua reperitur; et hoc, cum perficitur esse ejus, non indiget agente, ut esse domus ab aedificatore. Et aliquid est ex quo provenit actio tantum, quae pendet in acto; et non est esse huic acto nisi cum pendentia agentis in eo." Averroes, Destructio Destructionum 4; IX, 69C. Trans, by S. Van den Bergh, Averroes' Tahafut al-Tahafut \ (London, 1954), p. 156. Cf. Zimara, op. cit., fol. 13va. "Et ideo erubescant tenentes in via Aristotelis et Commentatoris entia aeterna habere causam finalem et non causam agentem, sicut nos late probavimus in quaestione nostra De Triplice causalitate intelligentiae." Zimara, Marginal Note to Harvey of Nedellec, Quodl. I, 8, fol. 18va. Cf. supra, p. 288. Cf. Averroes, Epitomes 4, 393D. Loc. cit., 388M-389A. 72
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Jandun, Zimara failed to recognize the revolutionary character of Avicenna's notion of true efficient causality as a source of being transcending time and movement, and the determined effort of Averroes to oppose this notion and to return to the doctrine of Aristotle. Gregory of Rimini, following Jandun, proved himself an excellent historian of philosophy when he summed up the situation, saying that the distinction between two kinds of production, one through motion and the other through the simple emanation of being, does not stem from Aristotle or Averroes, but from Avicenna, who in this matter greatly differed from them. 77
"Distinctio quoque quam dant de duplici factione, ut supra ostensum est, non est secundum doctrinam Philosophi aut Commentatoris, sed secundum Avicennam, qui ab eis in hoc plurimum discordat." Gregory of Rimini, loc. cit., fol. 4rb. It is beyond our scope here to attempt to define Siger of Brabant's views on the divine causality. E. Gilson has pointed out the difficulty of this problem in his History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York, 1955), pp. 391-392, 395. It is helpful, however, to compare John of Jandun's Question on this subject with Siger's: Utrum existentia semper possint habere causam efficientem et principium, loquendo secundum intentionem philosophorum. Questions sur la Metaphysiquell, 8, ed. C. Graiff (Louvain, 1948), p. 47. Siger first gives arguments proving that eternal beings cannot have an efficient cause. We have already met them in John of Jandun's treatise. (1) It is the very nature of an agent or efficient principle to be the source of motion and of the effect. This implies, according to Aristotle, that there was a time prior to which the effect did not exist. Hence something eternal cannot be efficiently produced (lines 11-14). (2) Whatever has an agent or efficient cause can either be or not be. Now an eternal being does not have matter, which alone would make this possible. Hence an eternal being cannot either be or not be, and so it cannot have an agent cause (lines 15-31). (3) If the existence of anything has been caused, that thing will cease to exist if the extrinsic cause on which it depends is taken away. This is clear, for if the efficient cause of something's coming into being is removed, the coming into being also ceases, as light goes out when the sun ceases to cause it. And the same is true of the causes of the very being of things. Now eternal beings are such that they cannot cease to be, for of their very nature they lack potency to non-being. So they cannot have an efficient cause (lines 32-39). These will be recognized as arguments used by Jandun to prove that, with the exception of motion, what is eternal cannot have a true efficient cause. But they are not convincing to Siger. Like Avicenna, he does not think the notion of efficient cause should be limited to one which gives being through motion or change. Besides this type of efficient cause he recognizes another which gives being or becoming without change. And in this latter sense eternal beings can have an efficient cause: "Sed advertendum est quod aliquid habere causam efficientem possumus intelligere dupliciter. Uno modo quod habeat causam efficientem per transmutationem ad esse, et tale non est sempiternum. Quod enim invenitur in fine transmutationis, non autem in principio, ipsum non fuit prius. Alio modo potest intelligi aliquid habere causam efficientem per hoc quod sit causa suae naturae et sui esse dans sibi esse, sic, quod non est causa esse vel fieri per transmutationem; et tale non tollit rationem effectus. Et sic possunt sempiterna habere causam sui esse" (pp. 48-49, lines 51-61). Unlike Avicenna, however, Siger does not believe that whatever has an efficient cause can either be or not be. Whatever has a cause has being from its cause, but considered in itself that being is necessary (p. 50, lines 93-97). Siger here opposes Avicenna's conception of an eternal being as possible in itself and necessary by reason of its cause; and this is hardly to be wondered at, for he rejects the Avicennian metaphysics of being on which it is based. On the relation of God to the world, cf. F. Van Steenberghen, Maitre Siger de Brabant (LouvainParis, 1977), pp. 303-318. 77
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APPENDIX For the edition of the Quaestio Disputata of John of Jandun the following manuscripts have been used. F, Ms Florence, Bibl. Nazionale Conv. Soppr. I, III, 6, fols. 122r-123r; K Ms Vat. lat. 6768, fols. 230v-232r O, Ms. Vat. Ottob. lat. 318, fols. 24r-26v. Fhas been used as the base, and the variant readings of V have been given. O is either a different reportatio of the same Disputed Question, or an abbreviation made at a later date. The variants of this manuscript have not been given. Its readings have been used only a few times, when those of F and V are obviously incorrect. Both F and V seem to be in fourteenth-century Italian hands. According to the explicit, 0 was written by Raymond of Saleta November 28, 1493. Its margins contain the gloss of Anselm of Como, who taught at Bologna about 1335. The gloss contains useful references to Aristotle and Averroes as well as summaries of the arguments in the Question. ;
78
QUAERITUR UTRUM AETERNIS REPUGNET HABERE CAUSAM EFFICIENTEM < RATIONES PRINCIPALES>
< 1 > Et primo arguitur quod aeterna non possunt habere causam efficientem. Et ratio potest esse ilia: Illud quod non potest non esse non habet causam efficientem. Sed aeterna non possunt non esse. Ergo, etc. A patet per Avicennam in VIII suae Metaphysicae. B est nota in I Caeli, ubi dicit quod illud quod est aeternum, semper est. Modo quod semper est, non potest non esse. <2> Praeterea, illud quod, quolibet alio circumscripta, non potest corrumpi, non habet causam efficientem. Sed aeterna sunt hujusmodi. Quare, etc. A patet, nam si haberent causam efficientem, ipsa circumscripta, possent corrumpi; da enim quod remaneret, essetfrustrapostquam non haberet aliquam operationem. B patet, nam quolibet circumscripta, aeterna non possunt corrumpi. Nam sicut dicit Commentator, decisio materiae ab aliqua re est causa perpetuitatis illius rei. Modo si aeterna non haberent aliquam materiam, non possunt corrumpi, cum materia sit principium corruptionis. < 3 > Praeterea, illud quod non est factum non habet causam efficientem. Aeterna non sunt facta. Quare, etc. A patet, nam de ratione effectus respectu suae causae efficientis est quod habeat esse factum. B patet, nam omne quod est factum habet esse novum; sed nullum aeternum est novum, quia semper fuit. 19
i0
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On Anselm of Como, cf. A. Maier, An der Grenze von Scholastik und Naturwissenschaft (Essen, 1943), p. 139, note; Die Vorlaufer Galileis im 14. Jahrhundert (Rome, 1949), pp. 261-262. Avicenna, Metaph. VIII, 3, fol. 98vb; 4, fols. 98vb-99rb; cf. I, 7-8, fols. 73r-74r. Aristotle, De Caelol, 12, 282a22-32. Averroes, In II De Caelo, t.c. 38, 122K. 78
79 80 81
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DIVINE CAUSALITY
<4> Praeterea, illud non habet causam efficientem quod non potest educi de potentia materiae. Aeterna non possunt duci de potentia materiae. Quare, etc. A patet, nam sicut dicit Philosophus in XII Metaph., verum agens non distinguit inter diversa, sed quod est in potentia reducit ad actum; ita quod illud quod habet causam efficientem debet reduci de potentia ad actum. B patet, nam si aeterna reducerentur de potentia ad actum, tunc dabitur tempus in quo aeternum non erit, et sic aeternum non esset, nam in aeternis non differt esse et posse. Et hoc est quia ibi primo non est potentia. Si sic, non possunt duci de potentia ad actum. < 5 > Praeterea, illud quod non habet materiam non habet causam efficientem. Sed aetema sunt hujusmodi. Quare, etc. A patet, quia materia est potentia passiva; sed causa efficiens est sicut causa activa. Modo ubicumque est potentia activa, est passiva, cum referantur adinvicem, et si una non est, neque alia. B patet, nam si haberent materiam, possent corrumpi. Nam I Caeli et Mundi dicitur quod sicut acumen est passio cutelli, ita generatio et corruptio est (122rb) passio materiae. 82
83
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IN CONTRARIUM videtur
esse Aristoteles in II Metaph. , ubi dicit quod oportet principia esse verissima, non quae quandoque sunt et quandoque non, sed semper sunt; et non habent causam ut sint, sed ipsa aliis sunt causa. Super quo verbo videtur Commentator asserere quod Deus sit causa esse omnium a se. Hoc idem ponit Philosophus in VI et in prooemio libri Metaph. , ubi dicit quod Deus tribuit esse omnibus entibus. Hoc etiam videtur esse de mente Philosophi 1 Caeli, ubi dicit quod a primo principio omnibus communicatum est esse et vivere; his quidem clarius, his vero obscurius. Hoc idem potest argui ratione. Quia motus corporis supercaelestis est aeternus. Sed motus corporis supercaelestis habet causam efficientem. Ergo aeterna possunt habere causam efficientem. B patet in VIII Physicorum et in XII Metaph. Quod autem ipse habeat causam efficientem patet, nam dependet ex duobus: ex uno sicut 88
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91
92
93
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82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97
Aeternae F. Om. F. Averroes, In XII Metaph., t.c. 18, 3041. potentia V. neque alia: nec aliqua V. Averroes, In I De Caelo, t.c. 20, 15D. Aristotle, Metaph. II, 1, 993b28-31. Om. Metaph. V. quandocumque F. Averroes, In II Metaph., t.c. 4, 30C. Aristotle, Metaph. VI, 1, 1026al7. Op. cit., I, 2, 983a8. Add. in V. Aristotle, De Caelo I, 9, 279a30. Aristotle, Physics VIII, 6, 258blO-259a8. Aristotle, Metaph. XII, 7, 1072a21-25. habet V.
94
96
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JOHN OF JANDUN
ex causa materiali, ut ex corpore ipso mobili; ex motore autem sicut ex causa efficient!. Praeterea, omne quod habet materiam partem sui, quae est in potentia ad esse simpliciter, habet causam efficientem. Sed aeteraa, vel aliquod aeteraum, est hujusmodi. Quare, etc. A patet, nam materia, quae est in potentia ad esse simpliciter, est pars substantiae et eget agente reducente ipsam ad actum. B patet; Commentator enim in III DeAnima dicit quod anima intellectiva est quaedam substantia aeteraa; tamen habet intellectum possibilem aliquam partem sui, cum ita sit quod intellectus possibilis sit pura potentia in genere intelligibilium, sicut materia prima est pura potentia in genere sensibilium. Praeterea, omne quod habet aliquam passionem qua potest carere, habet causam efficientem. Sed aliquod aeteraum est hujusmodi. Quare, etc. A patet, nam si non haberet causam efficientem, posset corrumpi. Da enim quod remaneat, erit frustra, quia non habebit passionem. B patet, nam corpus supercaeleste habet illam passionem, scilicet motum. Modo motus potest corrumpi, quia per se habet contrarium, ut quietem. Praeterea, omne habens propriam passionem quae habet causam efficientem, et ipsum habet causam efficientem. Sed aliquod aeteraum est hujusmodi. Quare, etc. A patet in quarto Caeli: dans formam, dat omnia consequentia ad formam. B patet, nam motus habet causam efficientem. Unde dicit Philosophus in VIII Physicorum quod nihil prohibet quorundam aeteraorum esse causam efficientem. Et super isto verbo dicit Commentator quod si pes fuisset ab aeterao, cum etiam fixio pedis in pulvere fuisset ab aeterno, et tamen fixio pedis procedit a pede tamquam a causa efficiente, videtur igitur quod aeteraa habeant causam efficientem. 98
99
m
101
102
m
104
105
His visis, respondendum est ad quaestionem. Ad cujus evidentiam est sciendum quod de ilia quaestione fuerunt tres opiniones. Prima fuit opinio Avicennae et Algazelis, dicentis omnium aeteraorum a primo esse causam efficientem. Secunda fuit opinio alia, tenens ipsorum ex toto non esse causam efficientem. Sed tertia opinio est tenens viam mediam. 106
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agere F. Om. V. Averroes, In III De Anima, t.c. 4-5, 137v-139v. Add. igitur V. octavo V. Cf. Averroes, In III De Caelo, t.c. 28, 198E. Aristotle, Physics VIII, 6, 259a7-8; 260al. Cf. Averroes, In VIII Phys., t.c. 48, 389A-C. motus FV. Non inveni. Cf. St. Augustine, De Civitate DeiX, 31; PL 41, 311. Avicenna, Metaph. I, 7-8, fols. 73r-74r XI, 1, fols. 101v-102r. Sufficientia I, 2, fol. 14va. Algazel, Metaph. I, 2, 12; ed. J. T. Muckle (Toronto, 1933), pp. 58-61; I, 1, 8, p. 47. mixto FV. modo V. 98 99
100 101
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104 105 106
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;
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DIVINE CAUSALITY < OPINIO AVICENNAE ET ALGAZELIS>
< 1 > Ad primam opinionem sic arguitur de mente Avicennae. Omnis ilia causa quae habet esse causa sufficiens, ipsa posita ab aeterao non impedita, et suus effectus ponetur ab aeterno. Sed Deus est hujusmodi. Quare, etc. A patet; da enim quod non poneretur effectus, non esset causa sufficiens. B patet. Primo enim Deus est causa sufficiens, immo sufficientissima, quia nullus defectus in ipso reperitur, et non habet impedimentum, et etiam ponitur ab aeterno, ut notum est. Ergo relinquitur quod suus effectus ponatur ab aeterno, et sic videtur quod aeterna habeant causam efficientem. <2> Item, in omni genere est devenire ad unum primum, ut patet in VII Metaph. } Modo si aeternorum non esset causa efficiens, tunc in motoribus non deveniremus ad unum primum. Ergo, etc. A videtur esse nota, sed B probatur. Nam da quod aeterna non habeant causam efficientem, illud primum ad quod deveniretur maxime erunt corpora supercaelestia. Sed talia non possunt esse, quia illud quod est primum in aliquo genere debet esse simplex; sed talia sunt composita. Quare, etc. A patet. B probatur, quia secundum sententiam theologorum " componuntur ex materia et forma; secundum autem sententiam philosophorum," componuntur ex subject» et accidente, et motore et mobili. Modo cum ibi sint duo, sunt multi; et per consequens adhuc ilia multa oportet quod reducantur ad aliquod principium," ita quod in eis non erit status; et per consequens deveniretur ad primum principium tamquam ad causam primam in genere causae efficientis. Ergo videtur quod aeterna habeant causam efficientem. < 3 > Praeterea, quae dependent in esse ab aliquo, habent causam efficientem. Sed aeterna alia a Deo sunt hujusmodi. Quare, etc. A patet, nam sicut primum dependere est a causa efficiente, sic primum dependere afineest dependere in agere. B patet in III Metaph. , ubi dicitur quod Deus est propter quem omnia sunt et fiunt. <4> Praeterea, in aeternis idem est efficiens et finis. Sed Deus est causa finalis omnium a se; ergo etiam erit efficiens. <5> Praeterea, si hoc non esset, sequitur quod in aliqua multitudine non daretur unum primum; et deducatur sicut prius, quia parum ilia ratio differt ab ilia. <6> Praeterea, arguitur ratione quam tenentes istam partem reputant demonstrationem et achillem. Et est ilia: Omne quod per se habet causam finalem, oportet quod habeat aliquam causam efficientem. Sed omnia a Deo sunt hujusmodi. Quare, etc. A patet, nam omne quod reductum in se, in nihil revertitur, oportet quod 109
w
1
2
3
114
115
116
Avicenna, Metaph. IX, 4, fol. 104v. Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. II, 2, 994al-19. Om. Metaph. V. Cf. St. Thomas, In I De Caelo et Mundo 6; ed. Leon. Ill (Rome, 1886), p. 24, n. 6. Cf. Averroes, De Substantia Orbis, 2, 6H-I; 6, 11E-13G; In I De Caelo, t.c. 20, 15CD; In VIII Metaph., t.c. 12, 220GH. primum V. Om. V. Aristotle, Metaph. Ill, 2, 996a22-29. revertitur V. 109
110 111
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113 114
1,5
116
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JOHN OF JANDUN
habeat aliquam causam efficientem deducentem de non esse ad esse. Sed omne quod per se dependet in aliquo genere causae, in se reducitur vel revertitur, et absolutum ab ilia causa a qua per se dependet, et revertitur in nihil, ut notum est; ut si omnia aeterna absolverentur a Deo tamquam a fine, in se reducta, reverterentur in nihil. Quare, etc. < OPINIO ARISTOTEUS ET AVERROIS>
Hoc etiam ipsi nituntur probare de ratione de mente Commentatoris et Philosophi. Et primo auctoritate Philosophi in prooemio Metaph. , ubi dicitur quod Deus solus est sicut causa; et in II, oportet principia semper esse verissima, quae non aliquando sunt et aliquando non sunt, sed semper; quae non habent causam, sed aliis sunt causa. Hoc idem patet per Philosophum in VI, ubi dicit quod causae superiores sunt aeternae. Et Commentator dicit quod causa prima magis est digna did aeterna quam aliqua alia causa quia est causa aliis ut sint. Hoc idem videtur esse de mente Commentatoris in XII, ubi dicit contra Avicennam quod causa propter quam Aristoteles fuit motus ad ponendum etiam immaterialia fuit factio intelligibilium; quasi velit dicere quod, sicut ad factionem materialium requiruntur entia materialia, eodem modo ad factionem entium immaterialium oportet quod requirantur entia immaterialia. Hoc idem dicit in eodem XII,' ubi Commentator dicit quod Deus est causa in triplici genere causae, finalis, efficientis, et formalis. Hoc dicit in VII contra Avicennam, qui ponebat quod Deus solum comparatur utfinisad substantiam primam sensibilem. Sed dicit Commentator quod etiam comparatur ut agens. Et constat quod Commentator non intellexit per finem et agens idem; sic enim committet nugationem, et etiam sua (122va) improbatio nihil valet. Hoc etiam patet per Commentatorem in XII, ubi dicit quod factio illorum 117
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25
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Op. cit., I, 2, 983a8. Om. Metaph. V. Aristotle here says that God is thought to be among the causes of all things. Op. cit., II, 1, 993b28-31. Op. cit., VI, 1, 1026al7. Averroes, In VI Metaph., t.c. 2, 146G. digna dici: dignus de V. sunt F. Averroes, In VII Metaph., t.c. 31, 181K. dicitur V. Op. cit., XII, t.c. 38, 321FG. materialis FV. Op. cit., VII, t.c. 31, 181I-K, Avicenna, Metaph. IX, 4, fol. 104vab. solus V. Averroes, In XII Metaph., t.c. 38, 321FG. committetur FV. Hoc etiam: Item hoc V. Averroes, In XII Metaph., t.c. 44, 328D. 117
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DIVINE CAUSALITY
inferiorum est factio superficialis; sed factio superiorum est vera; et per consequens ibi est verum agens. Hoc etiam videtur esse de mente Commentatoris in suo tractatu De Substantia orbis, ubi Commentator dicit quod non solum prima causa est causa continuitatis motus, sed est etiam causa substantiae motae. Hoc etiam dicit Commentator, quod non solum corpora supercaelestia egent aliqua virtute largiente eis motum, sed etiam egent aliqua virtute largiente eis perpetuitatem substantiae. Hoc etiam ipse dicit ulterius, ubi dicit quod prima causa non solum est causa efficiens aliorum, sed etiam agens. Et sic ipse subdit quamdam distinctionem cum dicit quod aliquod dicitur prius altera dupliciter: uno modo secundum tempus, alio modo secundum naturam. Modo ipsa causa prima est prior aliis aeternis secundum naturam, sed non secundum tempus. Et propter ignorantiam istius distinctionis aliqui ignoraverunt ipsum universum habere causam efficientem, nam habet. Sic ergo patet quod aeterna habent causam efficientem, ut satis visum fuit, et patuit ex praedictis Commentatoris et Philosophi. 134
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< OPINIO AUCTORIS>
Sed videte, ilia opinio non est vera, scilicet quod aeterna universaliter habent causam efficientem. Et ratio hujus est, quia si aeterna universaliter haberent causam efficientem, aut hoc esset per motum et transmutationem, aut per simplicem emanationem sive creationem. Non primo modo, quia in tali productione oportet quod supponatur materia. Sed intelligentiae, quae sunt puri actus, nullam habent materiam. Nec per simplicem creationem, quia in simplici creatione nihil supponitur, ita, scilicet, quod ex nihilo possit aliquid fieri. Sed hoc est contra intentionem Philosophi. Item, illud quod non potest non esse, non habet aliquam causam efficientem. Sed aeterna, saltern aliqua, non possunt non esse. Ergo non habent causam efficientem. A patet per Avicennam, qui ponit quod habens causam efficientem, habet potentiam ad esse et non esse. B patet, quia da quod possunt"" non esse, ponentur in esse, nam possibili posito in esse, nullum sequitur impossibile. Sit ergo b illud tempus in 142
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134 135 136 137 138 138 140 141 142 143 144 145
unum FV. Averroes, De Sub. Orbis 4, 101; cf. 2, 61. Op. cit., 2, fol. 61. Om. V. Ibid., 6L. Ibid., 6M-7A. Add. hora V. Cf. supra, note 103. sed FV. Aristotle, Physics I, 4, 187a29. Cf. supra, note 76. possint V.
300
JOHN OF JANDUN
quo ponuntur non esse; sed cum ex alia parte ipsa aeteraa semper sunt, ergo implicabuntur contradictoria, quia semper erunt et non semper erunt. Item, hoc est contra intentionem Philosophi VIII Metaph., qui ponens differentiam inter causam formalem et efficientem, dicit quod causa efficiens est causa infieriet transmutari, sed forma est causa in esse tantum. Tunc arguitun Illud non habet causam efficientem quod non subjicitur motui et transmutationi. Sed ipsa aeterna, saltern aliqua, non possunt subjici motui nec' transmutationi. Ergo non habent causam efficientem. A patet per Philosophum. B etiam patet, nam puri actus non possunt subjici motui nec transmutationi, sicut intelligentiae; sic enim participarent materia; quod est falsum. Item, hoc est contra intentionem Philosophi in eodem libro Metaph., ubi ponens differentiam inter causam formalem et efficientem, dicit quod causa efficiens est prior suo effectu, sed causa formalis simul est cum suo effectu. Modo manifestum est quod ipse non loquitur de prioritate naturae, quia causa formalis est prior prioritate naturae, sed loquitur de prioritate temporis. Ergo si aeterna haberent causam efficientem, jam causa ilia tempore praecessisset et in aliquo tempore aeteraa non fuissent; quod est falsum ex eo quod semper sunt. Hoc etiam videtur esse contra intentionem Commentatoris in XII, qui ponit quod in superioribus non est aliquis proventus neque aliqua actio; et sic ibi non est agens. Hoc etiam videtur esse contra intentionem Commentatoris IV Caeli circa principium, ubi Commentator dicit quod in superioribus, scilicet intelligentiis, non reperitur nisi causa formalis et finalis; sed efficiens proprie non reperitur nisi secundum similitudinem. Advertendum tamen quod causa efficiens est duplex, scilicet proprie dicta; et ista solum reperitur in istis. Sed alia est causa efficiens improprie dicta; et ista talis causa poterit appellari causa finalis et formalis. Quod est de mente Philosophi in I De Generatione, qui ponit quod sanitas est causa efficiens secundum metaphoram tantum, et tamen est causa finalis sive formalis. Et illo modo Deus erit causa finalis, nam Deus est totius naturae bonum; bonum autem proprie reperitur in causa finali. 146
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48
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153
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Add. in V. Aristotle, Metaph. VIII, 3, 1043a29-1043bl4; 4, 1044a33-1044b20; 6, 1045a20-33. « et V. Aristotle, Physics II, 3, I94b29-31; 195a5-8, 22; De Gen. et Corr. I, 7, 324bl4; Metaph. V, 2, 1013a29-33. Cf. supra, note 147; also Aristotle, Metaph. XII, 3, 1070a22. Add. Philosophus V. Add in FV. Averroes, In XII Metaph., t.c. 44, 3271. punctus FOV. Averroes, In IV De Caelo, t.c. 1, 234A. Aristotle, De Gen. et Corr. I, 8, 324M4-18. 146
147 14
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150 151
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154 155
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DIVINE CAUSALITY ET TUNC AD RATIONES
Ad primam, cum dicitur, "Ilia causa quae est sufficiens, ipsa posita ab aeterno, et effectus ponitur ab aeterao," aliqui concedunt istam. Et cum dicitur in B, "Deus est talis," negatur, nam Deus per se non est suppositus, sed oportet quod supponitur materia. Sed ista solutio non videtur ex toto sufficiens, cum ita sit quod in Deo nullum malum et nulla privatio reperiatur. Et ideo solvo aliter, concedendo majorem. Et cum dicitur in minori quod Deus est causa omnium, etc., dico quod est causa finalis, sed non est causa efficiens nisi improprie et secundum quamdam similitudinem. Ad aliam, cum dicitur, "Si Deus non esset causa efficiens, tunc in motoribus non deveniretur ad primum," dico quod non sequitur. Et cum probatur, quia si aeteraa non haberent causam efficientem, tunc illud ad quod devenitur erit corpus supercaeleste, conceditur. Et cum dicitur non, quia omne habens rationem primi debet esse simplex, dico quod erit devenire ad ipsam intelligentiam quae est causa efficiens motus caeli, quae secundum se est simplex, et maxime erit devenire ad ultimam intelligentiam moventem ultimum orbem; et talis non habet aliquam compositionem. Ad aliam, cum dicitur, "Ilia quae dependent ab alio in esse habent causam efficientem," dico quod ilia propositio est falsa. Nam non solum efficiens est causa alicujus in esse, sed materia et finis. Et sic Deus, inquantum habet rationem causae finalis, erit causa in esse. Unde Philosophus in III Metaph., definiens causamfinalem,dicit quod finis est ille propter quem omnia sunt et fiunt. < Ad 4> Ad aliam, cum dicitur, "In aeterais idem est efficiens etfinis,"dico quod in aeternis illud quod est efficiens alicujus estfinisillius, sicut intelligentia est causa caeli mod; eo quod movet, est causa efficiens. Modo ipsa intelligentia estfinis,nam sicut dicit Commentator, intelligentia movet per se. < Ad 5 > Ad aliam, cum dicitur, "Tunc non esset devenire ad unum primum," dico quod immo. Et cum postea dicitur, etc., dico quod non concludit ratio quod deveniatur ad unum tamquam ad primum in ratione causae efficientis, sed bene devenitur ad ipsum tamquam ad primum in ratione causae finalis. Ad aliam, cum dicitur, "Ilia quae per se habent causamfinalemoportet quod habeant causam efficientem," dico quod ilia propositio est falsa. Et cum dicitur quia quod est tale, reductum in se, reducitur in nihil; sed omne tale quod convertitur in nihil oportet quod habeat aliquam causam efficientem deducentem ipsum de potentia ad actum, dico quod "aliquid converti in nihil, in se reductum," potest intelligi duobus modis: uno modo quod, quia suum esse sit ad aliud ordinatum; quo proposito, ipsum ponitur, et quo remoto, ipsum removetur. Et tale 157
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supponatur V. Add. nisi improprie et secundum quamdam similitudinem V. Aristotle, Metaph. Ill, 2, 996a22-26 cf. II, 2, 994b9. Averroes, In XII Metaph., t.c. 52, 337H-338B. habent V. Om. FV. ;
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quod in se convertitur in nihil non habet causam efficientem, vel non est necessarium quod habeat. Alio modo quia convertitur in non ens, quia sit non in actu ens, tamen in potentia. Et illo modo bene oportet quod habeat causam efficientem, nam cuicumque potentiae passivae oportet quod correspondeat potentia activa. Et hoc est quod Commentator dicebat, quod verum agens non congregat inter diversa, sed quod est in potentia reducit ad actum. 163
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Primo Philosophi: Ubi Philosophus loquitur de causa simplici, vel intellexit de (122vb) causa finali, vel de causa efficienti improprie vel per similitudinem, quae eadem est quod causafinalis.Et hoc quando loquitur de Deo. Tunc ad auctoritates Commentatoris. Ad primam, quando dicitur quod Commentator, loquens contra Avicennam, dicit quod illud quod movit Philosophum ad ponendum substantias immateriales fiiit factio intelligibilium, dicendum quod Commentator intellexit per hunc modum. Ad cujus evidentiam est sciendum quod Avicenna in sua Metaphysica posuit quamdam decimam intelligentiam quae habet introducere formas sensibiles et materiam sensibilem, et formas intelligibiles et intellectum ipsum. Sed primo Commentator respondit aliquod. Et dicit Commentator quod hoc non est possibile, nam quod aliquod habeat introducere in materiam sensibilem oportet quod transmutet materiam. Sed omne transmutans materiam est agens corporale. Sed ilia ultima intelligentia non est agens corporale. Ergo non habet introducere formas sensibiles in materiam. Et postea subdit Commentator, loquens de formis intelligibilibus, idest de speciebus rerum intelligibilium, dicit quod illud quod movit Aristotelem ad ponendum aliquam substantiam immaterialem, quia intellectum agentem, fiiit factio rerum intelligibilium. Ad aliam auctoritatem, quae dicit quod in aeternis non est aliquis proventus nec aliqua, etc., sicut in istis quae actiones sunt superlicietenus et non vere agentium. Et aliqui sic exponunt quod in superioribus non est proventus nec actio, sed in istis sic, quia actiones istae sunt actiones superlicietenus, idest, sunt actiones factae per qualitates superlicietenus quia sunt in superlicie, ex eo quod non sunt qualitates sive actiones agentium vere, quia verum agens reperitur in superioribus. Sed istum intellectum Commentator non habuit; immo intellexit sic, quod actiones aliquae in istis inferioribus non vere sunt agentium superficietenus; actiones illae quae fiunt non propter formam substantialem introducendam in materiam, sed magis sunt alterationes quaedam, non verae actiones; non proprie ilia vocatur actio quae fit propter formam substantialem introduci in materiam. Et tales actiones, quae vocantur 165
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quod V. Op. cit., XII, t.c. 18, 3041. Op. cit., VII, t.c. 31, 18IK. Avicenna, Metaph. IX, 3, fol. 104rb. Om. V. Averroes, In VII Metaph., t.c. 31, 181K. aliquod: cum Deo F. Ibid.
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alterationes, sunt actiones agentium superficietenus; non sunt introducentes nisi quasdam dispositiones. Ad aliam, cum dicit Commentator quod non solum caelum requirit aliquid quod sit causa motus, sed aliquid perpetuitatis caeli in esse, voluit sic intelligere quod non solum corpus supercaeleste requirit intelligentiam, quae est causa effectiva sui motus, sed Deus, licet sit causa continuationis per comparationem quam habet intelligentia ad eum tamquam ad finem, sed etiam requirit aliquid ad quod suum esse sit ordinativum, quo perpetuato, et ipsum perpetuetur. Non propterea volebat se referre ad causam efficientem veram; sed volebat se referre ad causam finalem, quod idem est quod causa efficiens secundum metaphoram. Et ideo dicit quod causa est duplex: quaedam est quae est prior secundum tempus, sicut vera causa transmutans; et quaedam est causa quae est prior secundum naturam, sicut causa efficiens improprie, quae idem est quod causa finalis. Et ideo dicit quod ignorantes talem distinctionem ignoraverunt universum habere talem causam, nam universus habet illo modo causam efficientem improprie, quia causam finalem, sicut primum principium. 170
< OPINIO ALIORUM>
His visis, recitanda est opinio aliorum. Et sunt quidam dicentes, credentes loqui secundum sententiam Commentatoris, quod breviter nullum aeternum habet causam efficientem. Et ratio hujus est quia omne habens causam efficientem est in potentia. Sed omne ens in potentia materiam habet. Sed aeterna non habent materiam. Ergo non habent causam efficientem, quia non sunt in potentia. A patet de se. 5 etiam patet, quia secundum Commentatorem in III Caeli, abscisio materiae a rebus est causa perpetuitatis illarum. m
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< CONTRA ISTAM OPINIONEM>
Sed ilia positio non valet. Primo quidem de mente Commentatoris in XII Metaph. , ubi Philosophus dicit quod prima causa comparatur ad substantiam motam in triplici genere causae: efficiens, formalis, et finalis. Et hoc patet ad sensum, scilicet, quod motus habet causam efficientem; et tamen motus est aliquid aeternum. Et hoc videtur esse de mente Commentatoris in tractatu De Substantia orbis, ubi ponit quod intelligentia est causa substantiae primae sensibilis utfiniset ut motor. Sed constat quod per motorem non intellexitfinem;sic enim ibi est inutilis repetitio verborum. Ergo per motorem Commentator intellexit causam efficientem. 173
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Om. V. Minor V. Cf. Averroes, In II De Caelo, t.c. 38, 122K. Averroes, In XII Metaph., t.c. 36, 318F-K, 321FG. Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. XII, 7, 1072b8-14. Averroes, De Sub. Orbis, 2, 6M. Add. Commentator V. 170
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Propter quod sunt alii aliter dicentes; et dicunt quod aeteraa sunt duplicia: quaedam sunt quae sunt de genere substantiae, et quaedam quae sunt de genere accidentis. Modo dicunt quod aeteraa de genere substantiae non habent causam efficientem. Et ratio est, nam illud non habet causam efficientem quod non potest non esse. Sed talia sunt hujusmodi. Quare, etc. A patet per Avicennam. B etiam, quod potuit non esse, ponatur in esse. Possibili enim posito in esse, nullum sequitur impossibile. Et tunc ratio deducatur sicut prius. Item, illud quod non habet materiam non potest habere causam efficientem. Sed aeteraa sunt hujusmodi. Quare, etc., scilicet substantiae. A patet, quia causa efficiens est causa infieriet transmutari. Sed illud transmutari recipitur in aliquo; sed in nullo recipitur nisi mediante materia. B patet de se. Si enim haberent materiam, essent jam corporalia. Constat autem quod non sunt corporalia. Item, si aeteraa haberent causam efficientem, tunc sequitur quod natura possibilis converteretur in naturam aeternam; hoc autem est falsum. Consequentia statim patet, nam manifestum est quod si habent materiam, ipsa sunt possibilia. Sed si sunt possibilia, cum ex alia parte dicas ipsa esse aeterna, ergo natura possibilis transiret in naturam aeternam; hoc autem falsum est. Neque valet si dicatur quod ratio non concludit, nam dato quod ipsa aeterna habeant causam efficientem, tamen seipsis habent esse formaliter, sicut albedo existens in corpore seipsa habet esse formaliter, et tamen habet causam efficientem. Nec ratio valet aliquid, quia illam rationem Commentator facit contra Avicennam, qui ponebat quod corpora supercaelestia habebant materiam; sed ego ponam quod talia non habeant materiam. 176
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< CONTRA ISTAM OPINIONEM>
Ista solutio adhuc stare non potest. Primo quidem quia omne quod habet causam efficientem totum suum esse habet ab ilia causa. Si ergo totum suum esse habet a causa ilia, ergo prius fuit in potentia quam in actu esset. Da enim quod ipsa semper in actu essent, non esset necessarium quod ipsa haberent causam efficientem. Modo talia per te habent causam efficientem. Ergo primo fuerunt in potentia quam in actu. Si ergo primo fuerunt in potentia quam in actu, ergo fuit dare aliquod tempus in quo ipsa non fuerunt; et sic non erunt aeterna, cum aeterna semper sunt. Sed etiam isti possunt reprehendi de insufficientia, quemadmodum et ipsi reprehendunt alios. Nam non credo quod quaecumque accidentia habent causam efficientem, nam accidentia sunt duplicia, scilicet permanentia, sicut quantitas caeli, et etiam sua lux; et talia non habent causam efficientem. Et substantia (123ra) caeli non habet causam efficientem. Et non intelligo per ipsam lucem illuminationem factam in aere 180
176 177 1,8 179 180
Avicenna, Metaph. VIII, 3, fol. 98vb; 4, fols. 98vb-99rb. Add quod V. Averroes, In VIII Phys., t.c. 79, 426K-427A; cf. In XII Metaph., t.c. 10, 297A. Avicenna, Metaph. IX, 4, fols. 104r-105r. alia V.
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et in terra, quia talis bene est corporalis et generabilis, nam lux habet causari per radios lineae directae. Ergo si habet causari per radios lineae directae, cum caelum continue revolvatur, ergo istae lineae facientes punctum continue corrumpentur et generabuntur. Sed intelligo per lucem ipsam substantiam lucis. Sed aliqua sunt accidentia successiva, sicut motus, et hujusmodi talia; et ista bene habent causam efficientem.
His visis, restat movere dubitationes quasdam. Et quia dicta sunt duo in quaestione, ideo contra haec duo arguam. < 1 > Et primo contra primum, ubi dicebatur quod substantia aeterna non habet causam efficientem: contra, quia aut hoc repugnaret sibi ex parte substantiae in eo quod substantiae, aut ex parte aeternitatis; neque sic, neque sic. Ergo nullo modo. A patet per sufficientem divisionem. B patet primo: Non potest repugnare ex parte substantiae in eo quod substantiae, quia tunc repugnaret omni substantiae; quod est falsum; neque ex parte aeternitatis, quia tunc repugnaret omni enti aeterno; quod est falsum. Ergo relinquitur quod substantia habeat causam efficientem; et dato quod sit aeterna. <2> Secundo, quia dicebatur quod aliqua accidentia aeterna habebant causam efficientem, arguitur contra; et facio illasmet rationes quas faciebas de substantia. Et hoc sic: Omne habens causam efficientem potest non esse. Sed nullum aeternum potest non esse. Ergo nullum aeternum habet causam efficientem. A patet, et concessa est; et B etiam, nam da quod possunt non esse, ponatur in esse; quia possibili posito in esse, nullum sequitur impossibile. Et sic etiam sequitur sicut deductum fuit prius, quia causabitur tempus quo aliquod aeternum non erit; quod est falsum. <3> Item, omne quod habet causam efficientem, habet esse post non esse, tamenque aeterna non habent esse post non esse. Ergo non habent causam efficientem. A patet de se; B etiam. Si enim haberent esse post non esse, jam esset dare tempus in quo non essent; quod est falsum. 181
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Ad primam, cum dicitur, "aut hoc repugnaret, etc.," dico quod non repugnat ex parte substantiae tantum, neque ex parte aeternitatis, sed ex parte substantiae aeternae. Sed tu dices: Illud nihil est, quia quod inest alicui ratione ambarum partium inest sibi ratione totius. Si igitur non repugnat substantiae aeternae habere causam efficientem ratione utriusque partis, nec etiam repugnabit sibi ex parte 181 182 183 184
Om. F. possint V. sequetur V. Om. tamenque ... esse F.
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totius. Dico quod ista ratio imaginatur quod substantia aeterna sit quoddam compositum ex aeternitate et substantia tamquam ex duabus naturis per se distinctis; sed hoc est falsum. Aeternum enim et substantia unam praecise dicunt essentiam; quia secundum quod dicit Commentator in X, si necessarium, possibile et contingens sunt de substantia rerum in quibus sunt, et si necessarium est de substantia rerum, eodem modo et aeternum, cum aeternum sit necessarium. Ad aliam, cum dicitur, "Quod habet causam efficientem potest non esse," verum est in accidente. Et cum dicitur quod accidentia talia habent causam efficientem, conceditur. Ergo bene potuerunt non esse quaedam ex parte eorum; sed si non possunt non esse, hoc est quia de se proprie non habent esse, sed esse quod habent, habent ex substantia. Et quia substantia talis est impossibilis non esse, ideo et etiam accidentia. Et propterea dicit Commentator in XII Metaph. , in ilia digressione Johannes autem Grammaticus, quod in hoc differt substantia ab accidente; nam substantia est potens esse per aliquod quod est pars sui, sed accidentia non habent aliquid quod sit pars sui per quod sunt possibilia esse. Et ideo si non sunt possibilia esse per aliquid suum, sed in virtute substantiae, hinc est quod, dato quod accidentia, quantum est ex parte ipsorum, possunt non esse, tamen non possunt non esse propter substantiam in qua sunt. Postea dicebatur: "Ponatur in esse," dicitur quod proprie non debent poni in esse; nam sicut dictum est, accidentia habent esse ex substantia et sequuntur substantiam. Et ideo non possunt proprie poni in esse. Et propterea ilia regula: Possibili posito in esse, nullum sequitur impossibile, habet veritatem de proprio possibili. Et ideo bene volo quod motus, quantum est de se, possit corrumpi quia habet contrarium, scilicet quietem, ex eo quod sunt opposita privative. Sed tu dices-. Illud non valet, quia si motus et quies sunt privative opposita, jam caelum quiescit, quia cum opposita privative habeantfiericirca idem, ergo caelum erit in potentia ad suscipiendum utrumque oppositoram. Da enim quod non esset dare aliquam potentiam quae non reduceretur ad actum, et per consequens esset frustra. Dicendum quod potentia est duplex, quia quaedam est potentia quae respicit actum positivum, sicut potentia materiae respicit formam quae debet introduci, et non potest introduci nisi per corruptionem alicujus formae praecedentis. Talis potentia frustra esset nisi reduceretur ad actum. Sed alia est potentia quae non respicit aliquid nisi privative, sicut nos dicimus modo quod caelum est in potentia ad quietem privative, ex eo quod nunquam quiescet, quia ab aeterno fuit motus et nunquam quiescet, sed aeternaliter movebitur. Ad aliam, cum dicitur, "Habens causam efficientem habet esse post non esse," conceditur. Et cum dicitur, "Accidentia talia sunt hujusmodi," dico quod 185
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Om. F.
Averroes, In X Metaph., t.c. 26, 276LM. Averroes, In XII Metaph., t.c. 41, 324B-M. sint V. Om. FV.
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accidentia sunt duplicia, scilicet permanentia et successiva. Et ista duo differunt, quia accidentia permanentia ad eorum esse requirunt omnes partes suas simul et in actu. Sed accidentia successiva non requirunt omnes partes in actu, sed aliquas in actu et aliquas in potentia, ita quod sint in continuo fieri. Et tunc immediate patet solutio. Nam accidentia ilia successiva habent esse post non esse quoad partem ipsorum, non autem quoad totum. Sed tu dices: Nonne ilia secundum se tota habent causam efficientem? Dico quod illo modo secundum se tota habent causam, quia non est aliqua pars in toto motu quae non possit habere causam efficientem. Sed non debet intelligi quod totus habeat causam, quia totum secundum se producatur; et illo modo non est verum. Sic enim esset dare tempus in quo non fuit tempus; quod est falsum. ET TUNC AD RATIONES PRINCIPALES
Ad primam, cum dicitur, "Omne quod habet causam efficientem potest non esse," verum est de accidente. Et tunc ulterius solvas sicut prius. Ad aliam, "Omne quod potest corrumpi, quolibet alio etiam circumscripto, non habet causam efficientem," conceditur. Et cum dicitur in minori, "Aeterna sunt hujusmodi," falsum est; nam circumscripto primo motore et intelligentia, nihil movebit. Ad aliam, "Quod non habet causam materialem, etc.," concedo. Et cum dicitur in B, "Accidentia talia sunt aeterna," dico quod habent materiam ad ubi, et hoc sufficit eis. Ad aliam, cum dicitur, "Illud quod habet materiam ad esse parte sui habet causam efficientem," concedo. Et cum dicitur quod ipsa sunt talia, dico quod materia ad esse sive potentia potest esse duplex. Quaedam est potentia ad esse quia ad formam. Et quia talis forma non acquiritur nisi mediante motu et transmutatione, et motus et transmutatio necessario habent causam efficientem, hinc est quod habens talem materiam habet causam efficientem. Sed alia est potentia ad esse, quia est quaedam natura possibilis quae habet esse, et non habet eum motu et transmutatione; et pro tanto non debet habere causam efficientem. Ad aliam, cum dicitur, "Omne habens aliquam (123rb) passionem qua potest carere habet causam efficientem," conceditur. Et cum dicitur, "Aeterna sunt talia," dico quod falsum est. Et cum probatur de mente Commentatoris in XII, qui dicit quod caelum potest moveri et non moveri, dico quod Commentator non vult dicere quod caelum possit simpliciter moveri et non moveri, sed hoc quia caelum de se non habet sufficientia omnia principia requisita ad motum, quia requiritur motor, a quo habet quod aeternaliter moveatur. 190
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Om. V. manebit V. partem F. Om. V. Averroes, In XII Metaph., t.c. 41, 324I-325A. Om. V.
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Sed tu dices: Illud nihil est, quia Commentator in eodem XII dicit quod motor potest movere et non movere. Dico quod Commentator dicit quod motor potest movere et non movere si in ipso possetfierialiqua transmutatio. Et quia interimendo consequens: impossibile est in eo fieri aliquam transmutationem, ideo concludes quod impossibile est ipsum moved et non moveri. Auctoritates autem sunt solutae; et sic de isto. Explicit quaestio Johannis de G. 196
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Loc. cit., t.c. 30, 314K. Om. V. movere V. Johannis de Ganduno: etc. V.
Francis of Meyronnes
Francis of Meyronnes, a Franciscan, was born c. 1285 in Meyronnes in southern France. He made his studies at Paris, becoming a master of theology in 1323. He was one of the main disciples of Scotus, while developing Scotism in an original way. He died in Piacenza, Italy, after 1328.
15 Francis of Meyronnes' Defense of Epistemological Realism The schoolmen of the fourteenth century often discussed problems relating to human knowledge, such as its nature, kinds, objects, and validity, when treating of the question whether there can be intuitive cognition of something that does not exist. The primary interest of these schoolmen was not philosophical but theological: they were concerned with the omnipotence of God and the range of his possible actions, given his infinite power. With this in view they debated such abstruse questions as whether God can give the human mind in this life an evident knowledge of theological truths, and whether he can communicate to a man in the present life an abstractive knowledge of the divine essence without its existence. Against the same background they frequently debated the equally subtle question whether it is possible for God to give us an intuition of a non-existing object. These theological problems scarcely interest theologians today, but the epistemological reflections they occasioned bear upon issues of perennial importance for philosophers. This can be illustrated by the two Questions in Francis of Meyronnes' Commentary on the Sentences on the possibility of intuitive cognition of something that does not exist. In these Questions he presents a remarkable defense of the reality of the object of sense perception and the intellectual intuition following upon perception. Against the phenomenalism of Peter Auriol and the skeptical tendencies of William of Ockham he upholds the veracity of intuitive cognition by firmly grounding its object in the reality of the external world. Before analyzing these Questions, 1
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W. of Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum. Ordinatio, prol. q. 1, ed. G. Gal (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1967), 3-75. Francis of Meyronnes, Quodlibeta, q. 4 (ed. Venice, 1520; reprinted Frankiurt-Main, 1966), 233r-234r. Francis of Meyronnes, Sent., prol. q. 18-19 (ed. Venice, 1520), f. lOv-llv. See K. H. Tachau, Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham (Leiden, New York, 1988), pp. 327-332. 1
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however, it will be well to say a word about the background of the dispute about intuitive knowledge in the fourteenth century. The terms "intuitive" and "abstractive" knowledge seem to have originated with Duns Scotus at the beginning of the fourteenth century. Robert Holcot, writing about the middle of the century, remarks that these expressions were not used by the saints or philosophers but appear to have been invented by Scotus, adding that for this reason one is free either to use them or not. In fact, they became part of the common vocabulary of the schoolmen of the late Middle Ages, whether they were Scotists, Ockhamists, or Thomists. One of the principal commentators on Scotus, Mastrius de Meldula, calls the distinction between intuitive and abstractive knowledge the best known and most frequently used of all divisions of knowledge. As the initiator of the distinction, Scotus was never far from the minds of those who later used his terms, even when they interpreted them in ways he would never have accepted. He describes intuitive knowledge as the cognition of something existing and present to the knower, in opposition to abstractive knowledge which abstracts from the existence of its object. According to Scotus the whole difference between these two kinds of cognition lies in the way the object is present to the knower. In intuitive knowledge the object is present in itself, in its actual existence; in abstractive knowledge the object is present in an image or likeness, which can represent either an existing or a non-existing thing. The likeness by itself is not sufficient to cause intuitive knowledge; for this kind of knowledge the object must actually exist and be present to the knower. Hence for Scotus, the intuition of a non-existing object is a contradiction in terms. 4
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Robert Holcot, "Utrum theologia sit scientia," ed. J. T. Muckle, in Mediaeval Studies 20 (1958), 130. Mastrius de Meldula, Cursus philosophicus, In De anima, d. 6, q. 11 (ed. Venice, 1708), III, 204a-. "De cognitione intuitiva et abstractiva ... inter alias cognitionis nostrae divisiones haec est fomosior et frequentissima." Duns Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 3, q. 9, n. 6 (ed. Vives, XII, 212a-213a): "Potest enim aliqua esse cognitio obiecti, secundum quod abstrahit ab omni existentia actuali, et potest esse aliqua eius, secundum quod existens et secundum quod praesens in aliqua existentia actuali... Primam voco abstractivam, quae est ipsius quiditatis secundum quod abstrahitur ab existentia actuali et non-existentia. Secundam, scilicet quae est quiditatis rei secundum eius existentiam actualem, vel quae est praesentis secundum talem existentiam, voco cognitionem intuitivam, non prout intuitiva distinguitur contra discursivam, quia sic aliqua abstractiva esset intuitiva, sed simpliciter intuitiva, eo modo quo dicimur intueri rem, sicut est in se." For Scotus' doctrine of intuitive knowledge, see E. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot (Paris, 1952), 544-555; S. J. Day, Intuitive Cognition: a Key to the Significance of the Later Scholastics (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1947), 39-139. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio IV, d. 10, q. 8, n. 5 (ed. Vives, XVII, 285b): "Videre autem importat intellectionem intuitivam, ut distinguitur contra intellectionem abstractivam; et quidem ... intellect» intuitiva est cognitio rei ut in se est praesens; abstractiva potest esse eius 4
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Only a few years after Scotus' death his views on intuitive knowledge were challenged by Peter Auriol (d. 1322). Auriol offers arguments based both on experience and reason that we can have intuitive cognition of nonexistents. Do we not perceive with our senses objects that do not really exist, as in dreams and illusions? Many experiences show that sense perception is possible without the real presence of its object. A fortiori intellectual intuition does not require the real existence of its object. Moreover, God can do anything that does not imply a contradiction. Now there is no contradiction in God's conserving one term of a relation without the other; e.g. Socrates without his son. So too, God can conserve the absolute reality which is intuitive knowledge without the real existence of its object. Again, God, as the first efficient cause, can conserve something by himself while suppressing the activity of the creature that normally produces that thing. Now intuitive knowledge, as a quality of the mind, is an absolute entity that depends on its object, but only as on an efficient cause. Consequently, God can preserve the intuition without the causality of the real object. This leads Auriol to a new, phenomenological description of intuitive knowledge, not in terms of the real existence and presence of its object, but as a mode of knowing that directly and immediately intends its object, whether that object really exists or not. William of Ockham, writing shortly after Auriol, agrees with him that intuitive cognition is an absolute reality, and that as such it can be conserved supernaturally by God without the real existence of its object; but he does not believe that this can happen naturally. Only by the absolute power of God (de potentia absoluta) can we see a star, for example, even though the star does not exist. According to the ordinary laws of nature established by God (depotentia ordinata) this is impossible. Since intuitive knowledge does not 9
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secundum quod relucet in aliqua similitudine, quae potest esse existentis, et etiam nonexistentis, sive praesentis sive non." Duns Scotus, Rep. Paris. Ill, d. 14, q. 3 (ed. Vives, XXIII, 359): "Contradictio est igitur quod sit cognitio intuitiva in genere proprio, et quod res non sit, quia species non potest sufficere ad cognitionem intuitivam sine praesentia rei, quia species aequaliter potest repraesentare obiectum re existente et non existente; igitur non sufficienter causat cognitionem intuitivam existentiae rei." Scotus qualifies this by granting that the object need not be present with its own presence. Thus the vision of creatures in the divine essence does not require the creatures' own presence; the divine essence is the sufficient cause of this intuition. See Duns Scotus, Ordinatio IV, d. 10, q. 8 (ed. Vives, XVII, 287a). Following his master, Meyronnes also says that there can be intuitive knowledge "per repraesentationem" under these circumstances. See Francis of Meyronnes, Quodlibeta, q. 5, f. 234 G. Peter Auriol, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, prol. sect. 2 (ed. St. Bonaventure, New York, 1952), 1,196-203. See Ph. Boehner, "Notitia Intuitiva of Non-Existents according to Peter Aureoli," in Franciscan Studies 8 (1948), 388-416. Ockham, Sent., prol. q. I (ed. cit., 38-39); Quodl. V, q. 5; VI, q. 6 (Strasbourg, 1491). 8
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absolutely speaking require a real object, Ockham does not distinguish it from abstractive knowledge on the basis of its object. Like Auriol, he defines it as a mode of knowing distinct from abstractive knowledge in itself and not with respect to its object or cause." It is the knowledge by which we can judge with evidence that something exists or does not exist in contrast to abstractive knowledge, which does not permit us to make such a judgment. The followers of Duns Scotus immediately pointed out the serious consequences of the doctrines of both Auriol and Ockham for the validity of human knowledge. Walter of Chatton, for example, a Franciscan who lectured on the Sentences at London and Oxford between 1320 and 1330, criticized both because of the skeptical consequences of their doctrines. Against Auriol he argues that we cannot naturally perceive something in the absence of that thing: 12
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"... otherwise all our certitude would vanish, for we have our greatest certitude about sensible thingsfromthe fact that we experience our sensations, through which sensible things appear to be present to us. Hence, if sensation can be naturally produced in the absence of the thing, and even preserved for a long time without it, this way [of knowing] is not certain." 14
Sensitive to Ockham's position, he grants that our certitude is not so great as to preclude the possibility of God's causing the perception without the
See Ph. Boehner, "The Notitia Intuitiva of Non-Existents according to William Ockham," in Traditio I (1943) 223-275 (reprinted in Ph. Boehner, Collected Articles on Ockham [ St. Bonaventure, New York, 1958], 268-200). See also A. C. Pegis, "Concerning William of Ockham," in Traditio 2 (1944) 465-480; Ph. Boehner, "In propria causa," in Franciscan Studies 5 (1945) 37-54 {CollectedArticles, 300-319). " Ockham, Sent., prol. q. I (ed. cit., 38). Ibid., 31-32: "Notitia intuitiva rei est talis notitia virtute cuius potest sciri utrum res sit vel non, ita quod si res sit, statim intellectus iudicat earn esse et evidenter cognoscit earn esse, nisi forte impediatur propter imperfectionem illius notitiae ... Notitia autem abstractive est ilia virtute cuius de re contingente non potest sciri evidenter utrum sit vel non sit." J. O'Callaghan, "The Second Question of the Prologue to Walter Catton's Commentary on the Sentences on Intuitive and Abstractive Knowledge," in Nine Mediaeval Thinkers (Toronto, 1955), 233-269. See L. Baudry, "Gauthier de Chatton et son Commentaire des Sentences," in Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen age 18 (1943) 337-369; C. Berube, La connaissance de I'individuel au moyen-age (Montreal-Paris, 1964), 252-257. For Chatton's relation to Meyronnes see L. Cova, "Francesco di Meyronnes e Walter Catton nella controversia scolastica sulla 'notitia intuitiva de non existente'," Medioevo. Rivista di storia delta JilosoJia medievale 2 (1976), 227-251. Walter of Chatton, ed. cit., 242: "Probo quod visio rei non potest naturaliter causari re absente, nec etiam naturaliter diu conservari ipsa recedente. Probo: primo, quia aliter periret omnis nostra certitudo, quia maxima certitudo nostra de sensibilibus convenit nobis per hoc quod experimur nostras sensationes per quas sensibilia nobis apparent praesentia. Si ergo sensatio causatur naturaliter re absente, et etiam diu conservetur sine ea, ergo ilia via non est certa." 12
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presence of the real object. Nevertheless he is sure that we could not be placed in invincible error through natural causes. Could God himself deceive us by giving us an intuition of a non-existing thing? Ockham did not impute such mendacity to God. According to him, if God caused perfect intuitive knowledge in us without the existence of its object, we would evidently judge the thing not to exist. But Chatton thinks this evasion pointless, for if the knowledge is truly intuitive it would represent the thing as existing, and hence we would judge that it exists. It is abstractive knowledge that does not present an object as existing. In trying to evade skepticism Ockham would have us believe that the same knowledge can be both intuitive and abstractive. In order to insure the certitude of our knowledge Chatton firmly aligns himself with Scotus: 15
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"They speak the truth," he writes, "who say that God cannot cause intuitive cognition without the presence of the thing." 18
Thus in the early years of the fourteenth century the lines were clearly drawn in the debate on intuitive knowledge. One of the earliest disciples of Scotus and defenders of his doctrine was Francis of Meyronnes, a Franciscan who commented on the Sentences at Paris in 1320-21 and died after 1328. Like Chatton he devotes several articles in his commentary to the question of intuitive knowledge. The first, entitled "Through the divine power can there be intuitive knowledge of something non-existent?," is directed against Ockhamism; the second, "Is it possible naturally for either the sense or intellectual power to know something non-existent?," is directed against Peter Auriol. Meyronnes' preoccupation in these articles is to defend the views of his master, Duns Scotus, on the certitude of our knowledge of the external world. In his opinion both Ockham and Auriol undermine this certitude by admitting the possibility of intuitive cognition of things that do 19
20
Ibid., 243-244. Ockham, Sent., prol. (ed. cit., 31): "Et eodem modo si esset perfecta talis notitia [scil. intuitiva] per potentiam divinam conservata de re non exsistente, virtute illius notitiae incomplexae evidenter cognosceret illam rem non esse." However, Ockham sometimes says that if God caused intuitive knowledge of something not present to sight we would be able to judge that it exists "in the same way as if that intuitive knowledge were obtained naturally," Sent. II, q. 15E (ed. Ph. Boehner, in Traditio I [1943] 249). On the difficulty of reconciling Ockham's statements on this point, see Pegis, "Concerning William of Ockham," in Traditio 2 (1944), 473-479. Walter of Chatton, ibid., 246. Ibid., 248. See B. Roth, Franz von Mayronis OFM, sein Leben, seine Werke, seine Lehre vom Formalunterschied in Gott (Werl in Westfalen, 1936), 34, 49. See above, note 3. Meyronnes also treats of intuitive knowledge in Sent., prol. q. 20 (f. llv-12r), and Quodl., q. 4-5 (f. 233r-235r). 15
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18
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not exist. Both of these articles are worthy of detailed analysis for their contribution to the fourteenth-century debate on intuitive knowledge. *
*
*
There are two contradictory opinions, Meyronnes says, about the possibility of an intuitive cognition of a non-existent object through the divine intervention. The first affirms and the second denies this possibility. Meyronnes' editor in marginal notes correctly ascribes the first position to Ockham and the second to Scotus and his followers. Four arguments are given by Meyronnes for the Ockhamist doctrine. (1) Whatever God can do by means of a secondary cause he can do by himself. Now he can cause intuitive knowledge by means of an object as a secondary cause. Therefore he can cause such knowledge without the object. (2) According to those who adopt this view, intuitive and abstractive knowledge have the same object as the terminus of the knowledge but they differ in their moving or efficient causes. Now it is clear from the first argument that God can supply the whole efficient cause of the knowledge without the object. Hence intuitive knowledge of a non-existent object is possible by divine means. (3) God can separate all absolute, distinct things. But the act of knowing is something absolute, distinct from its object. Hence God can separate the act from its object. (4) God can separate from a substance an accident really distinct from it. Hence he can separate the act of intuition from the intellect. But this real act has more relations, and more intimate ones, to the intellect than it has to the object, for it is an effect depending on the intellect as on its cause, and it also inheres in the intellect as in a subject. Consequently God can separate intuitive knowledge from its object. Meyronnes undoubtedly has Ockham in mind as the author of this position. The first three arguments are taken from Ockham's Sentences, and the fourth is based on one of his principles. But he also seems to know certain followers of Ockham who interpreted his doctrine in different ways. He distinguishes between four different interpretations of the Ockhamist 21
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Meyronnes, Sent., prol. q. 18 (lOvN, Q). The editor is less correct in also attributing the first opinion to St. Thomas: "Quaere Ockham, Quodlibeto 6, q. 6, et Thomam et alios." Ibid. (lOvN). The first three arguments are in Ockham, Sent., prol. q. I (ed. cit., 35-39). For the notion that God can separate from a substance an accident really distinct from it, see Ockham, Summa Logicae, I, c. 25 (ed. St. Bonaventure, New York, 1951), I, 74-76. 21
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21
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position. (His division of these into four has no special significance: it was Meyronnes' peculiarity always to make fourfold divisions, a custom that prompted the caustic remark of a later Scotist, William of Vaurouillon, that a good threefold division is better than a bad fourfold one). There are some, says Meyronnes, who hold that God can cause intuitive knowledge in the absence of its object without this knowledge's losing any of its characteristics of intuitive cognition. But this seems highly unlikely to Meyronnes; he protests that at least the intuitive knowledge would not be related to an object if it had none. God can certainly produce any absolute reality by itself, but with the condition that it be without a relation. Others claim that through the divine power the act of knowing can remain as a quality of the mind but its relation to the object would then disappear. To this, Meyronnes replies that the act of knowing and knowledge (notitia) are two different things. The act of knowing is a mental quality but it is not a perfection absolutely speaking. Knowledge is a perfection in the full sense of the term, and knowledge always implies a relation to an object. Hence, if the act of knowing remained without an object it would not be called the absolute perfection that is knowledge, nor would anything be known by this act. Still others hold that, given the divine power, the absolute reality of knowledge would remain, but it would not be intuitive knowledge because of the absence of an object. Neither would it be abstractive knowledge because it would not be mediated by an image or likeness. To this, Meyronnes objects that something does not vary precisely because of a change in its relations. Hence, if the relation is removed from knowledge, the knowledge itself would not vary. A fourth opinion maintains that the knowledge divinely conserved without an object would be abstractive and not intuitive, because it would be caused by God and not by an existing object. This is Ockham's view in his Quodlibet V, q. 5. But Meyronnes sees a logical fallacy in it. Consider the maxim that whatever God can do through a secondary cause he can do by himself. On this basis it is argued that, because God can cause intuitive knowledge by means of an object, he can likewise cause it by himself. But if the "it" in the conclusion is abstractive and not intuitive knowledge, the syllogism is invalid because it has four terms. In other words, the minor premise cannot be about 24
25
* William of Vaurouillon, Sent. IV, d. 14-16 (ed. Basel, 1510), 371C: "... melius est habere bonum ternarium quam malum quaternarium." Ockham here says that this would be an act of belief and abstractive rather than intuitive knowledge, — Quodl. V, q. 5, ad 1: "Et dico quod ilia notitia creditiva erit abstractiva, non intuitiva." But in Quodl. VI, q. 6 he calls it intuitive knowledge. 2
2S
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intuitive knowledge and the conclusion about abstractive knowledge without vitiating the argument. For these reasons Meyronnes rejects all four of the Ockhamist positions on intuitive knowledge. Moreover, none of the four main arguments of the Ockhamists, given above, seems convincing to him. Consider the first, that God can cause intuitive knowledge by himself just as easily as he can cause it by an object. Meyronnes grants that God can do this without the object acting as an efficient cause but not without the object as a terminus of the knowledge. He clarifies his point by the example of a sunbeam, which is normally produced by the sun. God could produce the sunbeam by himself, but then it could not be said to be produced by the sun. The sun would not be a terminus of the relation of the sunbeam. Similarly, if God produced the act of knowing without an object, the act would not terminate in an object. Meyronnes' point is that, in this case, it would be an act of knowing nothing, and this would not be knowledge. Regarding the second main argument of the Ockhamists, he does not agree with them that intuitive and abstractive knowledge have the same object and differ only in their productive causes. They do differ, he insists, in the object in which they terminate: intuitive knowledge terminating in existence, and abstractive knowledge terminating in a quiddity in abstraction from existence. As for the third argument, that God can produce separately absolute realities, Meyronnes counters that although God can separate one absolute reality from another, this has nothing to do with the present case, because the act of knowing is not something separate from its object. As we shall shortly see, Meyronnes, following Scotus, believes that the act is essentially relative to an object. Meyronnes makes the same point in replying to the fourth argument. True, knowledge has two relations: one to its subject in which it resides as an accident, the other to its object. But the second relation belongs to knowledge as such, and hence it is more essential to it than the other relation to its subject. Hence even if God produced knowledge without a mind, it would not lack an object. All of these are weighty reasons for Meyronnes to reject the Ockhamist stand on intuitive knowledge and to adopt the Scotist, that intuitive cognition is impossible without the real presence of an object. How indeed can someone see, and yet see nothing? If he sees, he must see something; and 26
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26 27 28
Meyronnes, Sent., prol. q. 18 (ed. cit., lOvO-P). See below, note 58. Meyronnes, ibid. (P-Q).
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it is unintelligible to Meyronnes, as it is to his fellow Scotists, to call this "something" "nothing." Ockham was well aware of this telling objection to his doctrine. It appears as the principal argument against it in his QuodlibetW, q. 6: 29
"It is argued that there cannot be [intuitive knowledge of a non-existent object] because it is a contradiction that there be sight and nothing be seen. Therefore it is a contradiction for there to be sight and for the object seen not to be."
This is true, Ockham replies, but the object need not be something actually existing; it can be simply a possible object, or something that actually existed in the past. Did not God see all possible creatures for all eternity and yet none actually existed eternally? Hence intuitive knowledge does not necessarily require an actually existing object; a merely possible object suffices. Meyronnes finds a ready rejoinder to Ockham in the latter's own doctrine. Intuitive cognition, according to Ockham, has to do with the contingent and accidental features of a thing. It is the kind of knowledge, for instance, that allows us to judge that Socrates is white. But what is accidental to something — so Meyronnes argues — does not belong to it insofar as it is potential but insofar as it actually exists. Things are necessary in their possible being; nothing accidental or contingent accrues to them insofar as they are merely possible. This is clear from the fact that what is accidental to something comes to it not from itself but from another source. Now a thing does not possess its possibility from something else — not even from God. He does not make things possible; they are possible of themselves. Consequently possible being cannot be afittingbasis for their objectivity in intuitive cognition; their actual existence is required. Furthermore, actual existence is essentially prior to all the accidental features of a thing: unless something first of all exists it cannot possess any 30
31
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Ibid. (10vQ): "Alia autem opinio contraria dicit quod non potest fieri notitia intuitiva sine reali praesentia obiecti. Non enim possunt intelligere isti [scil. Scotistae] quod aliquis aliquid videat et nihil videatur." — Ockham uses the term 'nihil' to designate the object of intuitive knowledge supernaturally caused or conserved. See his Quodl. VI, q. 6; Sent. II, q. 15 E (ed. Boehner, in Traditio I [1943] 250). For the medieval background of the notion of non-being as an object of knowledge, see A. C. Pegis, "Matthew of Aquasparta and the Cognition of Non-Being," in Scholastica, ratione historico-critica instauranda (Rome, 1951), 463-480. Ockham, Quodl VI, q. 6. Ockham, Sent, prol. q. 1 (ed. cit., 31-32). Meyronnes, ibid. (1 IrA): "Impossibile est quod alicui exsistenti in potentia conveniat illud quod convenit sibi per accidens; sed intuitive cognoscuntur ilia quae insunt per accidens rei in se; ergo etc. Maior probata, quia quando res est in potentia, res in isto esse est necessaria; nec Deus facit quod res sint possibiles, quia eorum esse possibile est necessarium; et ideo nihil per accidens convenit ei in isto esse. Minor patet, quia quod convenit alicui per accidens, ab alio sibi convenit; illud autem esse in potentia non habet res aliunde." 29
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accidents. But potential being as such does not possess actual existence. Consequently as a merely possible being something cannot possess any accidental features. Again, let us suppose that intuitive cognition has some individual as its object. The terminus of this cognition is an object in its ultimate actuality, namely individuality. But the object receives its ultimate actuality only if it actually exists. Hence intuitive cognition bears upon the object not as a possible but as an actually existing entity. In concluding his article against Ockhamism, Meyronnes further clarifies several points he has made. The first is that the relation of knowledge to its object is essential to knowledge and hence inseparable from it even by the power of God. What precisely is the distinction between knowledge and its relation to an object? According to Meyronnes they are really identical, though he grants they may be distinct "in some way." Later in his commentary he makes it clear that there is a formal distinction between the terms of a relation and the relation itself. The second point clarified by Meyronnes is the sense in which the act of knowing is said to depend on its object. Pressed to state precisely the kind of causality implied by this dependence, he refuses to specify any particular kind. Dependence, he explains, can mean simply a "prerequisite" (praeexi• gere), and this is not necessarily reducible to any kind of cause. Thus action presupposes that the agent draw near the patient, but this "drawing near" is not a cause. Some hold that the act of the will presupposes the act of the intellect but not as its cause. In the present case, the act of knowing presupposes the existence of its object, though the latter is not the cause of the act in any usual sense of the term "cause". In the sense defined, intuitive cognition depends on a really existing object and terminates in it so that not even God can dispense with it. 33
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Ibid. Ibid. (lOvQ-1 IrA): "Supposito quod notitia intuitiva sit alicuius singularis, quandocumque aliqua notitia terminatur ad aliud obiectum actuatum ultimata actualitate, necessario fertur in ipsum ut in aliquid exsistens; sed notitia intuitiva terminatur vel fertur in rem singularem, singularitas autem est actualitas ultimata; ergo necessario terminatur ad exsistens: non enim videtur ultimate actuatum nisi sit exsistens." Ibid. (1 lrC): "Ad primum, quando sunt aliqua duo quae separari non possunt, ista sunt idem realiter. Et tunc dico quod notitia et sui relatio ad obiectum sunt idem realiter, licet aliquo modo distinguantur." Sent. I, d. 29, q. 2 (89vQ): "Dico quod universaliter omnis relatio formaliter differt a suo fiindamento." However, an actual relation in the category of relation is a true reality [vera res] really distinct from its foundation. See ibid. (89vL). For Scotus, intuitive knowledge has a real, actual relation to its object, whereas abstractive knowledge has only a potential relation. See Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 13, n. 11-13 (ed. Vives, XII, 311, 320). Ockham disagreed with Scotus on this point: see his Sent., prol. q. 1 (ed. cit., 34, lines 13-18). Meyronnes, ibid. (llrC): "Ad secundum dico quod dependentia, si dicat praeexigere, 33
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Meyronnes next turns his attention to the position of Peter Auriol, that intuitive cognition of non-existents is possible not only by the divine power but also naturally. To Meyronnes, this doubly undermines the certitude of our knowledge by proposing that not only God but also nature itself can make us perceive what does not exist. That this is impossible Meyronnes shows first of intellectual intuitive cognition and second of sense intuitive cognition. If our intellectual intuitive cognition can deceive us, says Meyronnes, no other truth is possible, because all our certitude depends on intuitive cognition. A prime example of such intellectual intuitive cognition is the intuition we have of our own act of knowing. To Meyronnes, it is beyond question that we enjoy an intuition of our mental activities, but he does not think this intuition extends beyond these acts to our powers, habits, or to the soul itself. These are known to us by reasoning from our intuition of our interior acts. But we are in no doubt about our inner powers, habits, or soul, and hence the intuitive cognition which leads us to know them must itself be certain. Meyronnes also holds that we know intuitively the acts of our other powers, for example our power of sense. His reason for this assertion is that without intuitive knowledge of our sensations we would not know with certainty contingent truths about the external world, such as the movement of the sun. We know that the heavens move because we enjoy intuitive knowledge of the act of our sense power which terminates at this truth. 37
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sic non reducitur ad aliquod genus causae necessario, nam actio praesupponit approximationem agentis ad passum, et tamen ilia approximatio non est causa. Similiter, secundum aliquos, actus voluntatis praesupponit actum intellectus, non tamen ut causam. Ita in proposito de actu et obiecto." For Auriol's doctrine of intuitive knowledge, see above, note 9. Meyronnes, ibid. (llrD): "Ilia notitia non potest esse falsa a qua dependet certitudo omnis notitiae nostrae...; sed a notitia intuitiva dependet omnis certitudo nostrae cognitionis; ergo etc." Ibid. (1 lrD): "Secundo sic: ilia notitia non potest esse dubia ex qua arguitur illud quod nulli est dubium sed omnino certum,- sed per actum intelligendi cognitum intuitive arguitur illud in nobis quod nulli est dubium et scimus nos esse certos; ergo cognitio intuitiva intellectiva non potest esse dubia." Ibid., q. 20 (12rAB): "Hoc viso, dico quattuor conclusiones. Prima est quod cognoscimus intuitive actum intelligendi in via. Hoc probo primo sic: omnis notitia experimentalis est intuitiva, nam per abstractivam nihil experimur de singularibus; sed notitia actus intelligendi est experimentalis; experimur enim nos intelligere; ergo ipse cognoscitur intuitive ... Secunda conclusio est quod in anima nihil cognoscitur intuitive nisi actus. Quod probo de essentia animae, quia arguimus animam esse per actus. Eodem modo arguimus potentias esse per actus. Eodem modo de habitibus ...." Ibid. (12rC): "Secunda difficultas: Utrum actus aliarum potentiarum cognoscantur intuitive? Dico quod sic, quia non possum videre quod, si non videntur intuitive, quod de aliqua veritate contingente de his quae extra nos sunt, puta de motu solis et de multis aliis, 37
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Thus, intellectual intuitive knowledge is the source of all our certitude, and as such its veracity cannot be called in question. Sense intuitive cognition must also be veridical, for if our senses could deceive us we could not be certain of the first principles from which we deduce all conclusions. These principles are self-evident in virtue of their terms, and we know the terms through sense intuitive cognition. Hence this cognition must also be self-evident, and indeed more certain than our knowledge of principles. Without the certain knowledge of these terms and principles we could have no valid scientific knowledge. For metaphysics rests upon the knowledge of terms obtained through the senses and upon the principles known through these terms. Natural philosophy also depends upon the senses for its certitude, for it uses them to demonstrate its conclusions. Sciences like astronomy also reach truths demonstrated through the senses. Because the senses lurnish us with the terms in scientific demonstrations, our sense knowledge of them must be certain and selfevident. The point to all these arguments is the same, Meyronnes concludes: the certain does not depend on the uncertain. Since all our certain knowledge rests upon sense knowledge, it cannot be uncertain. Meyronnes is well aware of the many experiences that seem to indicate that we often perceive things that do not exist. Auriol appeals to some of them to prove his own doctrine, but Meyronnes considerably extends the list by drawing upon ancient and medieval sources. These experiences concern each of thefivesenses. We seem to hear sounds at their point of origin, but they reach our ears by a movement in the medium, and hence when heard they no longer exist where they are heard. Since the same odor is perceived as pleasant by one person and as unpleasant by another, one of them smells something that does not exist. The same is true of taste and touch. What is sweet to one taste is bitter to another; a warm object is judged warmer by one person and less warm by another. So too, if a body is moved between two fingers it feels differently than it actually is. 41
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certam notitiam possemus habere. Ex hoc enim cognosco certitudinaliter caelum moveri quia cognosco intuitive actum potentiae sensitivae ad hanc veritatem terminatum." (I have corrected the text with ms. Paris, Bibl. Nat., Latin 15871, 1 lva). This shows that according to Meyronnes we have intellectual cognition of the external world through the intellect's intuition of the acts of our senses. This appears to have been the view of Scotus himself. See Gilson, Jean Duns Scot, 549. Berube thinks otherwise in his La connaissance de I'individuel au moyen age, 201. Meyronnes, ibid., q. 19 (llrF): "Omnes istae rationes habent istam vim: certum non praesupponit incertum; sed omnis certa cognitio scientis praesupponit notitiam sensitivam; ergo etc." Ibid. (llrF-G). 41
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323
The sense of sight is particularly prone to deception. After gazing intently at a bright object and then turning away its colors continue to appear to us. When we look at the neck of a dove we see various colors which are not there. We can have a similar experience looking at certain cloths which appear to be colored differently at different times. Certain paintings give the illusion of real objects in relief. In dreams, too, we see things that do not exist. Looking in a mirror the eye sees itself, and yet it is not in the mirror. We also see colors in the rainbow which are not there. A rotated fan appears to be circular; and a stick plunged in water appears to be broken. To one sitting in a boat moving on a river the trees and banks seem to move. The moon seems to be moving through fast-moving clouds. We perceive motion itself, and yet no part of the motion actually exists. Since the act of seeing lasts only for an instant, in perceiving motion we seem to see something that does not exist. Before considering each of these cases of seeming deception on the part of the senses, Meyronnes makes some general remarks about the causes of deception and clarifies four points that must be kept in mind in solving the proposed difficulties. There are, he says, two ways in which we can fall into error, as St. Augustine pointed out in his famous chapter on sense perception in De Trinitate I, 2. The first is that when two things are very similar we can easily mistake one for the other. The second is that when two things are joined together we are often unable to distinguish between them. Thus imagining and understanding are so closely linked in us that we can fail to discriminate between them and give them properties that they do not possess. These obvious remarks are important in the present case because, as Meyronnes will presently show, the so-called deceptions of the senses are really errors of judgment on the part of the sensus communis, which is so similar to the particular senses and so closely linked with them in their activities that we can fail to distinguish between them. Besides this, Meyronnes asks us to keep four points in mind: (1) The object moves the cognitive faculty in two ways: really and intentionally. For instance, the sun brings about a real change in the sense of sight which lasts for a period of time; but it also changes sight intentionally and this occurs in an instant. 43
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43 44 45 46
Meyronnes refers to St. Augustine, De Trinitate XI, c. 2, n. 4 (PL 42, 987). Ibid. (Ilvl-N). St. Augustine, ibid., n. 3-5 (PL 42, 986-988). Meyronnes, ibid. (llrG).
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(2) The objects of the particular senses must be distinguished from those of the sensus communis. The particular senses can also perceive the "per se" objects of the sensus communis, such as movement and distance, but these are not their primary objects. (3) The imagination judges an object that is present and affecting the particular sense differently from when that object is absent. In the first case the imagination is conformed to the object and judges it to be as it is. Meyronnes implies that in the absence of the object this may not be the case. (4) A cognitive power becomes accustomed to judge in one way so that in a changed situation it tends to make the same judgment unless it is aware of the change in situation. Thus a person accustomed to getting out of bed on the east side will continue to think he is arising as before, even though his bed has been turned around. Having made these clarifications, Meyronnes proceeds to show that none of the experiences described by his opponents proves that sense perception occurs in the absence of a real object. In most cases, he contends, the deceptions can be explained as errors of judgment on the part of the sensus communis and not of the particular senses. For example, it is the sensus communis that judges the distance of a sound and reports that the sound we hear is where it originates. In fact, what we hear is the sound close to the ear and not the sound at a distance or in the ear. The sound at its point of origin may have ceased, but the sensus communis judges that it is still there as the origin of the sound we hear. This is understandable because the sound itself and the intentional change it causes in the sense of hearing take place in an instant. Similarly, it is the sensus communis that judges an odor to be pleasant or unpleasant; the sense of smell itself "perceives that which is precisely there and nothing else." As for the bitterness we taste, it is a real bitterness produced by a real mixture of a "bitter humor." The particular sense of touch perceives a hot object; it is the sensus communis that estimates and compares degrees of heat. The sensus communis is likewise the judge of motion; hence errors regarding motion are to be laid to this sense and not to the particular senses. According to Meyronnes, the sensus communis and imagination are responsible for the so-called illusions of sight; the perceptions of sight itself are veridical. In accounting for the perception of after-images, he reminds us that the object of sight has both a real and intentional effect on the perceiver. 47
48
47 48
Ibid. (llrG-H). Ibid. (1 lrH-1 lvl).
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The intentional effect takes place instantaneously and then passes away. At the same time a real change takes place in the "spirits" in the nerves which carry the images (species) of color from place to place. The "spirits" receive true colors, and it is these which are seen after the primary object of sight has been removed. How are we to explain the appearance of various colors in the neck of a dove and in certain kinds of clothing? Meyronnes does not accept the theory that different parts of these objects have different colors, for this does not account for the fact that there is a variation of color in the same spot when the source of light is varied. The phenomenon can be more adequately accounted for, he believes, by Avicenna's theory of color. The Muslim philosopher thought that objects are not actually colored without light. Colors are caused and made actual by a ray of light streaming from a luminous source. Diversity of color is caused by the variation in the position of the luminous body and its distance from the illuminated object. The light ray first falling on the object causes red (the primary color), then subsequent rays produce in turn green, blue, and black, the latter resulting from the fact that the light ray illuminates the object least of all. This theory, which Meyronnes considers defensible, can account for the above mentioned phenomenon without prejudice to the veracity of the sense of sight. As for deceptive paintings that make objects appear to stand out and to be real, Meyronnes maintains that it is the sensus communis and not the sense of sight that is in error. This is clear from the fact that it is the less experienced who make mistakes in these matters. The objection that in our sleep we see things that do not exist does not detain Meyronnes for long. This, he explains, is the work of the imagination, whose knowledge is abstractive and not intuitive. He grants the possibility, however, that some of the external senses may not be obstructed in sleep and hence capable of true perception. This seems to be the case with those who dispute coherently in their sleep and act as though they were awake. Meyronnes concedes that illusions can be produced by the devil's art. If they occur in the external world they appear equally to all present; but if they are caused in the organ the external senses are obstructed and the imagination is stirred to make judgments about them. Meyronnes believes there is no deception on the part of the sense of sight when we look into a mirror and see ourselves: the eye really sees itself and 49
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According to Avicenna, whom Meyronnes seems to be following here, there is a "subtle body" called "spiritus" in the nerves which is the means by which we see. See Avicenna, De anima III, c. 7 (ed. Venice, 1508), 13va. See Avicenna, ibid., c. 3 (10ra): "Color enim in effectu non accidit nisi ex causa luminis." I have not found all the details of this theory of color in this chapter on sight. 49
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not an image of itself. Sight judges only about colors, which are its proper objects; it is the business of the sensus communis to judge place and distance. Because we are accustomed to see things in a straight line and not reflexively, as in the case of seeing in a mirror, the sensus communis may falsely judge that the eye is in the mirror; but this mistake should not be attributed to sight itself. As for the rainbow, Meyronnes affirms that there are real colors in it; sight is not deceived in seeing them there. Many of the objections to the veracity of sense perception involve motion; for example, the motion of a fan which makes it appear circular, the appearance of the motion of the moon in fast-moving clouds, the motion of the banks of a river to one sitting in a moving boat. Since motion is properly an object of the sensus communis and not of the particular senses, errors in judgment concerning it are attributable to it and not to the external senses. Similarly, it is this internal sense that erroneously judges a stick plunged in water to be broken, and a single object to be double when viewed in a broken mirror or with a compressed eyeball. In all these instances Meyronnes does not disagree with Peter Auriol regarding the data of the deceptions and illusions of the senses. What he does dispute is Auriol's interpretation of the facts, with its implication that perception of the external senses does not require the real existence of an object. According to Auriol, all that is necessary is an object with "apparent being" (esse apparens). When something real is seen or known, Auriol contends, it acquires this sort of being in the sense or intellect. Sometimes, however, perception occurs in the absence of a real object and then nothing is perceived except an appearance. Auriol insists that in this case true perception (visio) takes place, for the absence of a real object does not change the specific nature of perception. The reality of the perception is the same, whether its object is real or only phenomenal. Anticipating Meyronnes' appeal to the sensus communis as the faculty that erroneously judges a mere appearance to be real, Auriol protests that the judgment of the sensus communis presupposes a perception on the part of the external senses. Thus there must be an appearance of something in the eye in order that the sensus communis judge that there is a perception. Now this appearance of the thing existing in the sense of sight is sight itself (ipsa visio). Hence there can be perception or vision without the real presence of an object; all that is required is an object with "apparent being." 51
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Meyronnes, ibid. (1 lvI-N). Peter Auriol, Sent, prol. sect. 2, n. 92 (ed. cit. 201). "Apparent being" or simply "appearance" (apparentia) is not a real but intentional being. It is not in reality but in the 51
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Meyronnes strikes at the heart of Auriol's interpretation of sense perception — as Ockham already did — by contesting the validity of his notion of esse apparens. He agrees that an object seen or known acquires a certain cognitional being in the perceiver or knower, but he insists that this being necessarily presupposes another kind of being, namely existential being, in the object. In short, there is no "being seen" (esse visum) without some existing thing that is seen. "Being seen" expresses a relation to one who sees; but before being seen, an object must exist in itself. This follows from the general rule that prior to anything's being related to something else it exists in itself. Hence "being seen" presupposes some other being in the object. This other being, moreover, is an absolute being (esse simpliciter) which serves as the basis for the relational being (esse secundum quid) expressed by the phrase "being seen." What is this absolute being presupposed in the object prior to its relational being toward a knower or perceiver? The Scotists recognized two types of absolute being: the being of essence (esse essentiae) and the being of existence (esse existentiae). In the case of intuitive cognition the absolute being of the object cannot be simply the being of essence, for this is the object of abstractive knowledge. Intuitive cognition is directed toward existential being. Consequently, before being related to a perceiver or knower, the object of intuitive cognition must actually exist in itself. In other words, there is no "being seen" or appearing without some existing thing that is seen or appears. 53
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mind. According to Auriol, both the senses and intellect produce their objects in "objective, apparent being." When knowledge is veridical we reach the real being of a thing in its coincidence with its apparent being. For the latest account of Auriol's doctrine, correcting some previous misconceptions of it, see K. H. Tachau, ibid., pp. 85-112. Good bibliography, p. 85, n. 2. Ockham criticized Auriol's notion of esse apparens in his Sent. I, d. 27, q. 3. J. Weinberg has presented the objection of Ockham and John of Mirecourt to Auriol's notion of "apparent being" as standing between the knower and the object, preventing its being known; also their criticism of Auriol's interpretation of the so-called deceptions of the senses. See his article "The Problem of Sensory Cognition," in Knowledge and Methodology (Milwaukee, 1965), 28-40. See also K. H. Tachau, ibid., pp. 135-148. See Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 36, n. 33-36 (ed. Vaticana, VI, 284-285). Meyronnes, ibid. (1 lvN-P): "Nunc videndum esset de modo ponendi istorum quibus istae instantiae concludunt. Dicunt enim quod obiectum in esse apparenti producitur in esse viso et in esse cognito (quaere Petrum Aureolum). Sed licet ego concedam quod obiectum in quolibet actu apprehensivo producatur in aliquo esse, tamen productio illius esse in quo producitur per actum visionis illud esse productum, necessario praesupponit aliud esse in obiecto. Et probo hoc multipliciter ... Secundo sic: omne quod est ad aliud, prius est ad se; sed esse visum est ad aliud, quia respectu videntis; ergo prius est ad se. Ergo esse visum praesupponit aliquid aliud esse in obiecto ... Quarto sic: omne esse secundum quid fundatur in esse simpliciter; sed illud esse, scilicet esse visum, est esse secundum quid, et fundatur in obiecto; ergo in obiecto est aliquod esse simpliciter, in quo illud esse secundum quid, scilicet 53
54 55
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Thus, in opposition to both Auriol and Ockham, Meyronnes contends that intuitive cognition necessarily requires an actually existing object. The object cannot have simply "apparent being" as Auriol believed, nor merely possible being as Ockham maintained. Neither mere appearance nor mere possibility can account for perception or intellectual intuition: actual existence is always required on the part of the object. On the side of intuitive cognition itself, Meyronnes criticizes both Auriol and Ockham for conceiving it as an absolute reality, essentially unrelated to a really existing object. As we have seen, this was one of the grounds on which both Auriol and Ockham argued that God can produce an intuition of something that does not exist. For Ockham, knowledge is a reality (res) in the category of quality, and as such it is an absolute entity, separable (at least by the divine power) from its object. Auriol likewise describes intuitive knowledge as an absolute reality, formally independent of everything outside itself. The absolute reality that is intuitive knowledge depends on its object and on God only as efficient causes, not as formal causes. Hence intuition does not formally and essentially depend on its object as the terminus of knowledge. Auriol thought that if it did, one would have to deny that it is an absolute reality in the category of quality. The only qualification Auriol makes is that intuitive knowledge necessarily implies a relation to an object with cognitional being (esse cognitum). As he puts it, "It is not true that intuitive knowledge is described relationally except to an object as it is intuited." In short, the object is necessary only in "intuited being" (esse intuitum). Auriol seems to think that because this is not a real but cognitional being it is not really distinct from the act of knowing and hence does not destroy the absolute character of that act. We are here at the heart of the disagreement between Francis of Meyronnes on the one side and Auriol and Ockham on the other concerning intuitive cognition. Knowledge, for Meyronnes, is not an absolute reality but essentially relative to an object, and intuitive knowledge is essentially relative to a really existing and present object. When discussing the question "Whether God can take the place of any secondary cause by totally causing an effect," he agrees with the common principle of the theologians that whatever 56
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esse visum, fundatur. Dico ergo quod oportet quod obiectum habeat aliud esse; non esse essentiae, quia tunc cognosceretur abstractive tantum, sed esse exsistentiae actualis." Ockham, Sent, prol. q. 1 (ed. cit., p. 39, lines 2-3): "Sed visio intuitiva, tam sensitiva quam intellectiva, est res absoluta, distincta loco et subiecto ab obiecto." In Quodl. VI, q. 6 Ockham calls vision a qualitas absoluta. Peter Auriol, ibid., n. 96 (202): "Non est verum quod notitia intuitiva dicatur relative nisi ad obiectum ut est intuitum." Ibid., n. 98 (202): "Non est verum quod intuitiva notitia exigat obiectum in esse reali, sed sufficit quod sit in esse intuito, ut infra apparebit." 56
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God can do by means of a secondary efficient cause he can do by himself; but he insists that this applies only to absolute entities and not to relative ones. Now the act of knowing, like the act of loving and the mental concept itself, is something relative. As for intuitive knowledge, it "includes in some way [i.e. intrinsically] a relation to an object as existing." Consequently not even God can cause intuitive knowledge without the concurrence of a really existing object. 58
** *
Like all living things, ideas grow and develop. Once conceived, their consequences and implications will almost inevitably be drawn out, if not by the thinkers in whose minds they originated, at least by their successors. So it was with the notion that intuitive cognition or perception can be separated from its really existing object, either supernaturally by the divine intervention or in the natural course of events. Neither Auriol nor Ockham doubted that intuitive knowledge normally puts us in contact with the really existing world and gives us certain knowledge of it; but as their ideas spread in the fourteenth century the phenomenalistic and skeptical consequences of their doctrines began to be evident. Nicholas of Autrecourt, who lectured at Paris between 1327 and 1340, clearly saw the logical consequence of the doctrine that intuitive knowledge does not necessarily require an existing object. In a letter to the Franciscan Bernard of Arezzo, who held this doctrine, he insisted that if it were true we could have almost no certitude about things through their natural appearances. Our knowledge would be limited to the appearances of reality, all of Meyronnes, Sent. I, d. 43-44, q. 8 (ed. cit., 127vL): "Intuitiva notitia includit aliquo modo habitudinem ad obiectum ut exsistens est... His tamen non obstantibus, dico et credo quod ilia regula quae est communiter a theologis concessa [scil. quod quidquid potest Deus facere mediante causa secunda in genere causae efficientis, potest immediate per se, quia est causa prima et perfectissima] est vera in absolutis, et tamen non in relativis." The principle holds good in regard to things only extrinsically related to other things. Ibid. (K): "Ideo regula ista universaliter solum est ponenda in absolutis et in relativis extrinsecis." If God created an act of intuitive knowledge without an object, it would be an absolute quality but not intuitive or abstractive knowledge; in fact it would not merit the name of knowledge at all, because relation to an object is of the nature of knowledge: "quia de ratione notitiae est respectus ad obiectum." — Quodl., q. 5 (ed. cit., 234vM). — Scotus himself seems to have conceived of intuitive knowledge as an absolute quality. In a remarkable text he calls it a forma absoluta and grants that God could produce it without the relation of presence to an object. See Ordinatio IV, d. 10, q. 9, n. 5 (ed. Vives, XVII, 303): "Dico quod Deus de potentia absoluta posset causare in oculo glorioso vel non glorioso visionem istius corporis [scil. Christi], licet istud corpus nusquam esset nisi in Eucharistia. Hoc probatur, quia visio est forma absoluta, ex primo libro, d. 3; ergo sine contradictione potest fieri sine respectu praesentialitatis ad obiectum, vel quocumque tali respectu." 58
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which could be false. We could not be certain of the existence of the objects of the five senses or even of our own acts. Nor did Nicholas grant that we can infer the existence of the object from the fact of perception when the cause of the perception is natural but not when it is caused supernaturally, because we have no way of distinguishing between these two cases with any certainty. John of Rodington (c. 1340) drew the inevitable conclusion that, if God can make something appear to be different from what it really is, we cannot be certain of anything by our natural faculties. Everything the intellect knows can be doubted. And why cannot God make things appear otherwise than they are? The devil and magicians can do this, and surely God is not less powerful than they. To the objection that God would then deceive us, Rodington replies that such playfulness on God's part would not be a deception, for this would imply a bad will, which cannot be imputed to him. Rodington's doubt went even further than Descartes'; he thought that we cannot be absolutely certain that we doubt. We can doubt, he says, even that we doubt, because it is not absolutely certain that we do not doubt. In the end he appeals to a special divine illumination to save us from this extreme condition of doubting; but without this illumination he despaired of our doing anything perfectly or knowing anything with certitude. Richard FitzRalph, another fourteenth-century theologian, did not hesitate to ascribe to God the power to deceive us and to make us err. This he deduced from the principle that God can always do something by himself that he can do by a secondary cause. Since error and deception are "something" that occur naturally, they clearly come within his power. This fourteenth-century movement toward skepticism and phenomenalism, which became so pervasive in modern philosophy, would have been 59
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G. Lappe, "Nicolaus von Autrecourt," in Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, VI (Miinster, 1908), 2*-6*. For the philosophy of Nicholas of Autrecourt, see J. Weinberg, Nicolaus ofAutrecourt, a Study in 14th Century Thought (Princeton, 1948); J. R. O'Donnell, "The Philosophy of Nicolas of Autrecourt," in Mediaeval Studies 4 (1942) 97-125. Nicholas maintained that all knowledge has an existing thing as its object; the only difference between abstractive and intuitive knowledge is that the latter is clearer than the former. This led him to hold as probable the Protagorean thesis that everything that appears to exist exists, and what appears to be true is true. See his Satis exigit ordo (ed. J. R. O'Donnell, in Mediaeval Studies I [1939] 228-238). See text of Rodington edited by Nardi, Soggetto et oggetto del conoscere nella fllosofla antica e medievale (Rome, 1952), 80-81. See also ibid., 62-64. John Rodington, "... simpliciter loquendo potest dubitare se dubitare, quia non simpliciter certus quod non dubitet" (Nardi, ibid., 85). Nardi, ibid., 62. 59
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averted if philosophers had attended to the lesson of Francis of Meyronnes. This lesson can be summed up in two points. The first is a clear and persuasive affirmation of the essential and intrinsic relation of intuitive cognition, such as sense perception, to the reality of the world. For Meyronnes, such knowledge does not, and cannot, have for its object a mere appearance or possibility, but rather a really and actually existing thing. In this regard it differs from all types of abstractive cognition. Thus, in his view there is no possible disjunction or gap between knowledge in its intuitive form and the reality of the world. Such knowledge opens upon reality itself. Its immediate object is not a psychic impression, idea, or sense datum, on the basis of which we would have to infer the existence of a real world. Many modern philosophers, from Descartes to the present, have tried to bridge the gap between ideas or sense data as the primary objects of experience and reality itself; or they have declared the attempt impossible and adopted some form of idealism or phenomenalism. But for Francis of Meyronnes the world of experience is identical with the real world, and so there is no gap between them to be bridged. Meyronnes' second point is that not only do our cognitive faculties open us to a really existing world, but they do so with absolute certitude. Not even the omnipotence of God can cast into doubt the reality of the object of our intuitive cognitions. If our knowledge is truly intuitive, we are assured of the existence and actuality of its object. In his article against Auriol he argues convincingly for the certitude of intuitive cognition as the basis of all our certainty. In his view, Auriol casts doubt upon all our knowledge by undermining the basic certitude of intuitive cognition. By implication Ockham also comes under his criticism in this regard for admitting the possibility of an intuition of non-existents through the divine intervention. Unfortunately Meyronnes does not discuss Ockham's theory from the viewpoint of the certitude of our knowledge. Unlike his confrere Walter of Chatton he does not comment on Ockham's attempt to save the certitude of our judgments about reality despite the possibility of a supernaturally caused intuition of non-existents. We can only surmise that he would have agreed with Chatton that the attempt was a failure. What is clear is that Meyronnes does not accept the possibility of an intuition of non-existents, whether it is brought about supernaturally by God or by natural causes.
16 The Role of Infinity in the Thought of Francis of Meyronnes The notion of infinity plays a central role in the thought of Francis of Meyronnes. This is hardly surprising in a disciple of Duns Scotus, who gave the concept of infinite being a dominant position in his theology. It was largely owing to him that the topic of infinity assumed such importance not only among his followers but also in other schools of late medieval and early modern thought. Scotus elevated infinity to the position of the most perfect concept we can have of God. In his view, the concept of infinite being is the object itself of theology, and the ascent of the mind to God culminates in the proof of his infinity. Though generally loyal to the principles of his master, Francis of Meyronnes has been found to differ from him in certain important respects, some of which concern infinity. Thus Scotus taught that existence belongs to the concept of the divine essence, whereas Meyronnes considered it to be 1
2
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4
This article wasfirstpublished with myself and my late Basilian confrere, Alfred P. Caird, as co-authors. I am responsible for writing the article; Fr. Caird graciously allowed me to use his unpublished doctoral thesis, The Doctrine of Quiddities and Modes in Francis of Meyronnes, 2 vols., University of Toronto, 1948. For Meyronnes' life and thought, see B. Roth, Franz von Mayronis, O.F.M., sein Leben, seine Werke, seine Lehre vom Formalunterschied in Gott (Werl in Westfalen, 1936). See Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 2, p. 1, q. 2 (Vatican, 1950) 2, p. 215, n. 147. See Meyronnes: "Ille conceptus est perfectissimus de Deo per quem omnes rationes divinae alia excedunt; sed hujusmodi est infinitas." In Libros Sententiarum I, d. 2, q. 6 (Venice, 1520; reprint, Minerva, 1966), fol. 19 C. For Scotus' doctrine of infinity, see E. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot (Paris, 1952), especially pp. 52, 149-215. Meyronnes differs from Scotus in denying that the divine ideas are not formally identical and absolutely co-eternal with God, and in attributing to these ideas a 'being of essence' ( esse essentiae) with more reality than a simple object of knowledge (esse cognitum). See B. Roth, op. cit, pp. 563-565; E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York, 1955), p. 467. 1
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an intrinsic mode outside the concept of the essence of God. Among the divine modes of being Meyronnes places infinity prior in nature to existence. This entails the surprising consequence that existence attaches to the divine essence through the modality of infinity. Existence is posterior in nature to the divine essence and even to the modes of infinity and haecceity or 'thisness'. Infinity appears to be a divine mode of being standing between the divine essence and existence and mediating between them. What is the rationale behind this remarkable metaphysical analysis of God? We may expect to find the answer in Francis of Meyronnes' concept of infinity and its relation to the divine essence on the one hand, and to the rest of the divine modes on the other. With this in view, we shall examine the meaning of infinity in his doctrine and its proper place among our notions of God. This will lead to his proof of the existence of God and the role played in it by the notion of infinity. It is hoped that this inquiry will provide information useful for the history of the notion of infinity in the Middle Ages and modern thought. Only in recent years have historians turned their attention to the gradual emergence in the Christian era of the notion of God as infinite being. It was normal for the ancient Greeks to think of the infinite as imperfect; in their view perfect being was limited and finite. Hence it was quite foreign to them to regard the First Principle of the universe or God as infinite in its substance. It was owing to the religious influence of Judaism and Christianity that infinity came to be considered one of the primary characteristics of God. Theologians of the Middle Ages went beyond Greek metaphysics by affirming the perfection of infinite being and ascribing infinity to God; but they, by no means, agreed on the meaning of infinity as a divine attribute. Many regarded it as a negative divine attribute. Only towards the end of the thirteenth century, seemingly through the initiative of Henry of Ghent, was infinity conceived as a positive perfection of God. The notion of positive infinity was adopted by Scotus and 5
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"In divinis autem existentia est de conceptu essentiae, et praedicatur in primo modo dicendi per se ..." Scotus, Quodl. I, q. 1, n. 4, additio (Paris, 1895) 25, p. 10. Gilson comments: "Ce texte est une addition, qui peut n'etre pas de la main de Duns Scot lui-meme, mais elle rend fidelement sa pensee." Jean Duns Scot, p. 149, n. 2. For the difference between Scotus and Meyronnes on this point, see E. Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 2nd ed. (Toronto, 1952), pp. 92-95. See J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, 2nd ed. (Toronto, 1963), p. 39, note; J. Chevalier, La Notion du Necessaire chez Aristote (Paris, 1915), pp. 187-188; A. E. Armstrong, "Plotinus' Doctrine of the Infinite and Christian Thought," Downside Review 73 (1954-55), 47. See E. Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy (New York, 1940), pp. 55-58. For the role of Philo in the history of divine infinity, see H. Guyot, L 'infinite divine depuis Philon le Juifjusqu'a Plotin (Paris, 1906). See below, note 24. 5
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his followers, paving the way for later medieval and modern speculation about the infinity of God by men such as Nicholas of Cusa, Giordano Bruno, Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza. We hope to show in the present article that Francis of Meyronnes, writing in the fourteenth century as a disciple of Duns Scotus, had a modest, though significant, role to play in this history. I. THE MEANING OF INFINITY
Given his penchant for making fourfold divisions, it comes as no surprise that Francis of Meyronnes distinguishes between four opinions about infinity. The first identifies the concept of infinity with that of the divine essence or deity. Those who hold this view, he says, appeal to St. Anselm's notion of God as that than which a greater cannot be thought. This description of God would not be true if he were not infinite. Hence the deity and infinity must be the same. To Meyronnes, this appears to be a too facile identification of the divine essence and infinity. Do we not have a definite notion of what we mean by God and yet find it possible to doubt whether he is infinite? If something is formally the same, surely we cannot both be certain and doubtful about it. Moreover, according to Meyronnes we can know the infinity of God by our natural powers but not the proper nature of God. Hence, he concludes, infinity cannot be identical with God's essence. According to a second opinion, infinity is an attribute of God, like eternity. As eternity is the 'extensive quantity' of God's duration, so infinity is his 'intensive quantity'. But in Meyronnes' view the divine essence can be known as infinite, abstracting from all its attributes. Prior to knowing that essence in any of its attributes we can know it most perfectly as infinite, that is to say with its 'quantity of perfection' (secundum quantitatem virtutis). So infinity cannot be a divine attribute. 9
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Meyronnes' habit of always making fourfold divisions was criticized by the 15th century Scotist William of Vaurouillon: "... melius est habere bonum ternarium quam malum quaternarium." Sent., 4, d. 14-16 (Basel, 1510) 371C. See B. Roth, op. cit., p. 90. "... sciendum quod sunt quatuor modi dicendi de infinito. Aliqui enim dicunt quod infinitas idem est quod deitas, et idem est conceptus utriusque. Et hoc probant quia Anselmus dicit quod Deus est quo majus cogitari non potest. Hoc autem sibi non competit nisi ratione infinitatis. Ergo etc." Meyronnes, Sent. I, d. 3, q. 5, 18 E. " Ibid., F. "Alii dicunt quod est < scilicet infinitas> quoddam attributum. Sicut enim aeternitas dicit quandam quantitatem extensivam durationis, ita infinitas intensivam; et ideo sicut aeternitas est attributum ita et infinitas ... Contra secundum arguo quod non sit attributum. Illud quod intelligitur in essentia, ut abstrahit ab omnibus attributis, non est attributum; sed infinitas est hujusmodi. Ergo etc. Probatio minoris; quia in illo priori in quo intelligitur essentia prior 9
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The third and fourth views of infinity are alike in that they consider infinity to be a negative or privative concept. But this is only partly true according to Meyronnes because it fails to tell the whole story about infinity. Infinity is a negative or privative notion if we take it in the formal sense of 'lacking an end'; but its meaning is positive if understood in its basic and primary sense of indicating the 'quantity of perfection' (quantitas virtutis) of the divine essence. If we are to appreciate this all-important point in Meyronnes' conception of infinity, we have to distinguish with him between two different kinds of negative terms. Some express the lack of a perfection, as ignorance for example indicates the lack of knowledge. Other negative terms express the privation of some imperfection, as incorruptible indicates the absence of corruptibility. Both of these terms are negative in form and express a lack of something, but the second is basically positive, for through its negative form it denotes a positive perfection. This is also true of the term 'infinite'. At first sight it appears to be entirely negative and indicates a lack of limitation. But on closer examination it is seen to express a positive perfection, namely the 'quantity of perfection' of the divine essence. We can compare it to the term 'incorporeal', which is negative in form but indicates the positive perfection of spirituality both in God and creatures. In God infinity is an unqualified perfection (perfectio 13
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attributis, intelligitur Deus perfectissime. Sed hoc non est nisi secundum quantitatem virtutis. Ergo etc." Ibid. E-G. Sometimes Meyronnes calls infinity a divine attribute because it is predicated of the subject 'God' as a necessary passio; but more properly an attribute is a perfection found in both God and creatures. See Sent. I, d. 8, q. 7, 52 Q, 53 A. Eternity is usually listed among the intrinsic modes as the 'quantity of duration' of the divine being. See Sent I, d. 9, q. 1, 53 IK. "Alii dicunt quod est ratio privativa. Et ratio est quia de quocumque ente affirmatio vel negatio per primum principium. Sed affirmatio finitatis non dicitur de Deo. Ergo negatio finitatis dicitur de Deo. Praeterea, carentia finis dicit aliquid privativum; sed infinitum dicit carentiam finis. Ergo etc... Contra tertium non arguo, quia in parte dicit verum, licet non in toto... Infinitum tamen posset accipi dupliciter: uno modo fundamentaliter et primarie, alio modo formaliter et ultimate. Exemplum primi: duo alba dicuntur similia fundamentaliter et primarie albedine; sed formaliter et ultimate dicuntur similia similitudinibus. Sic dico de infinitate quod primarie et fundamentaliter dicit quantitatem virtutis; formaliter autem et ultimate dicit carentiam finis." Sent I, d. 3, q. 5, 18 FH. "... sciendum quod privationes distinguuntur secundum distinctionem positivorum quibus opponuntur. Quaedam enim privationes sunt quae privant perfectiones, sicut ignorantia et nescientia, et ista dicunt imperfectionem... Aliae autem sunt quae privant imperfectionem, sicut incorruptibilitas, quae corruptionem privat; et istae dicunt perfectionem et ponuntur in Deo, eo quod dicitur immortalis et similia." Sent. I, d. 28, q. 1, 86 AB. "Si dicas: tu supponis quod infinitas dicit negationem, et tamen dicit modum intrinsecum, similiter incorporeum, quod est differentia de genere substantiae; dico quod tam infinitas quam incorporeum quantum ad rationes formales eorum dicunt privationes quae vere sunt in Deo suo modo essendi, et dicuntur de Deo. Sed tamen per istas negationes vel privationes bene 13
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simpliciter), not a negation or privation. Meyronnes does not suggest that we have an explicit knowledge of the positive foundation of infinity in God, any more than we have such knowledge of the positive basis of negative terms such as 'incorruptible' and 'immaterial'. The positive foundation of the divine infinity remains unknown to us in this life, and this is why the term is formally negative or privative; but this should not blind us to the fact that, fundamentally, it denotes the positive perfection of the quantitas virtualis of the divine essence. The extension of the term 'quantity' from bodies to the spiritual realm was long in honor among the scholastics. St. Thomas, for example, speaks of quantitas virtualis or quantitas virtutis by analogy with quantitas corporea or quantitas molis. Scripture suggests such an analogy when it speaks of the depth, height, and length of God, though he is not properly a body; he may be said, however, to have 'virtual quantity' (quantitas virtualis). For St. Thomas, this is a spiritual 'greatness', a kind of 'quantity' of perfection, which is identical with a certain form or nature or with some effect of a form, such as being (me) or operation. God's quantitas virtutis is his subsistent being (esse subsistens), his possession of esse according to the whole power of being (secundum totam virtutem essendi). It is precisely because God possesses being without restriction that St. Thomas conceives of him as infinite. The notion of infinity, for him, is negative, indicating that the divine being is not limited by being received in a subject. In this respect it is unlike the being of a creature, which is finite because limited by the essence in which it is received. Since the divine being is not received in a subject, but is subsistent, it is unlimited and therefore infinite. Thus there is no positive perfection corresponding to the Thomistic notion of infinity. To say that God is infinite adds nothing positive to the notion of God; it merely indicates that God's being is without limits. The whole positive content of the Thomistic notion of God is ipsum esse. 15
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tircumloquimur aliqua positiva, utpote per infinitatem quantitatem virtutis, per incorporeum differentiam spiritualitatis quae est positiva in Deo et creatura." Ibid., 86 KL. See Sent I, d. 34-35, a. 8, 107 DF. On the fifth level of absolute perfections Meyronnes places the essence of God and its necessary passiones, such as infinity, eternity, and necessity. See Sent. I, d. 34-35, a. 4, 105 PQ. See Sent. I, d. 3, q. 5, 18 H. St. Thomas, Summa TheoL I, 3, 1, ad lm I, 42, 1, ad lm. See Job., 11, 8-9. St. Thomas, In de Divinis Nominibus c. V, lect. 1, n. 629 (Rome, 19 50). For the notion of virtus essendi in St. Thomas, see E. Gilson, "Virtus Essendi," Mediaeval Studies 26 (1964), 1-10. St. Thomas, Summa Theol. I, 7, 1. 15
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It is otherwise in the thought of Duns Scotus. He, too, uses the term quantitas virtutis to denote the spiritual greatness of the divine being, but he conceives this greatness as the positive mode of infinity of the divine essence. The primary division of quantity, according to Scotus, is into discrete and continuous, continuous quantity being subdivided into permanent and successive. There is no discrete quantity, or number, in God, but there is something in him corresponding to the successive and permanent quantity found in corporeal things. Corresponding to their successive quantity there is in God quantity of duration, properly called eternity. Corresponding to the permanent quantity of bodies (quantitas molis) there is in God his magnitudo virtutis or quantitas virtutis, and this precisely is his infinity. Thus the greatness characteristic of the divine essence is its infinity: infinitas autem essentiae [divinae] dicitur magnitudo ejus propria? For Scotus, then, infinity is the positive intrinsic mode of the divine being, and as such it makes God the unique being that he is. Like the esse of St. Thomas, the Scotist infinity "tends to devour the divine essence; it is so co-essential and uniquely proper to him that to name the one is practically the same as naming the other." According to Scotus, infinity can be understood in God both as 'extensive infinity', as denoting an infinite multitude of perfections, or as 'intensive infinity', as indicating an unlimited amount of any divine perfection. The divine essence as such has not only formal, intensive infinity, like all the divine attributes, but also fundamental intensive infinity, as the root of the infinity of these attributes. The intensive infinity of the divine essence indicates the highest perfection or magnitude of perfection. 20
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"C'est meme pourquoi, chez Duns Scot, la notion d'infini acquiert une valeur nouvelle et joue un role beaucoup plus important que chez Thomas d'Aquin. Dans les deux doctrines, nous n'avons de l'infini qu'un concept negatif, qui est celui de non-fini, ou de ce dont l'essence exclut la limite, mais, chez Duns Scot, l'infinite elle-meme est posee comme une modalite intensive ou, si l'on prefere, comme une intensite de l'etre meme. La definition negative qu'il en donne designe une realite positive: la modalite en vertu de laquelle l'Etre depasse tout etre au dela de toute quantite ou proportion donnee. Le role que joue cette notion dans la theologie de Duns Scot est aussi nouveau que son contenu. Dans le thomisme, l'infinite n'ajoute rien a la notion de Dieu coniju comme l'acte pur d' Esse." E. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot (Paris, 1952), p. 208. Scotus, Quodl. q. 6, n. 3-6 (Paris, 1895) 25, pp. 240-243. Opus Oxon. TV, d. 13, q. 1, n. 31 (Paris, 1894) 17, p. 688. "Comme Y esse chez Thomas d'Aquin, 1' infinitas tend chez Duns Scot a devorer l'essence divine; elle lui est si coessentielle et singulierement propre que nommer 1'une est pratiquement nommer l'autre." E. Gilson, op. cit., pp. 238-239. Scotus, Quodl. 6, n. 6, p. 243. 20
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It is not our present purpose to enter into the question of the historical origins of the notion of infinity as a positive perfection. Suffice it to say that recent research has shown that it was likely Henry of Ghent who first conceived infinity in this way. While granting the negative form of the term, he insists that it indicates something positive in God, namely something whose on-going process never comes to an end or indeed can come to an end. Scotus inherited this positive view of infinity from Henry of Ghent, interpreting it in the light of his own metaphysics, in which infinity is conceived as one of the intrinsic modes of the divine being. Francis of Meyronnes is directly indebted to his master Scotus for this doctrine. For him, as for Scotus, there is an 'intensive quantity' distinct from the 'extensive quantity' of the dimensions of bodies. This is a quantity of 'virtual intension', and it is related to its possessor as its intrinsic mode. In the case of creatures this virtual quantity is finiteness, in the case of God it is infinity. In the next section we shall examine the relation of the intrinsic mode of infinity to the divine essence and its attributes. After that we shall be in a position to understand the relation of infinity to the other divine modes of individuality and existence. 24
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"... dicitur infinitum cujus processus semper protenditur, et non habet finem in quo deficit, nec natum est finiri. Et juxta hunc modum (ut credimus) Deus did debet infinitus. Et est infinitum secundum istum modum vere positivum alicujus in re." Henry of Ghent, Summae Quaestionum Ordinariarum, a. 44, q. 2 (Paris, 1920) 2, fol. 14r. See E. Gilson, "Theology and the Unity of Knowledge," The Unity of Knowledge, ed. L. Leary (New York, 1955), pp. 41-42; History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York, 1955), p. 449. D. E. Dubrule, Divine Infinity in the Writings of Henry of Ghent, unpublished doctoral dissertation, the University of Toronto, 1968. For the important role of Richard Fishacre in the history of divine infinity, see L. Sweeney and C. Ermatinger, "Divine Infinity according to Richard Fishacre," The Modern Schoolman, 35 (1958), 191-235. See also L. Sweeney, "Divine Infinity: 1150-1250," The Modem Schoolman, 35 (1957), 38-51. However, there was not just one "medieval Christian conception of divine infinity" as the latter article suggests, p. 39. For St. Augustine's notion of divine infinity, see E. Gilson, "L'infinite divine chez saint Augustin," Augustinus Magister 1 (Paris, 1954), 569-574. See also L. Sweeney, "Some Mediaeval Opponents of Divine Infinity," Mediaeval Studies 19 (1957), 233-245. Scotus calls infinity a positive intrinsic mode in the De cognitione Dei published by C. R. S. Harris, Duns Scotus 2 (Oxford, 1927), pp. 381-382. The authenticity of this work is uncertain. It is either from Scotus or from his school. See L. Honnefelder, Ens inquantum ens. Der Begriff des Seienden als solchen als Gegenstand der Metaphysik nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus. Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 16 (Munster, 1979), 125-126. Meyronnes, Sent. 4, d. 12, q. 8, 197 EF. 24
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FRANCIS OF MEYRONNES I I . INFINITY A N D THE D I V I N E E S S E N C E
The relationship of infinity to the divine essence must be seen in the light of Meyronnes' general doctrine of essences and intrinsic modes. Meyronnes' world, like that of Scotus, is composed of essences or quiddities and their complements, the intrinsic modes. Everything not contained in the quidditative order finds its place in the modal order. In Meyronnes' words, "Besides quiddity, there is nothing but a mode." The realm of essences contains formal natures (rationes), each of which can be abstracted from eveiy other by the mind, but at a deeper level they are already abstract or distinct in themselves. The quidditative world is peopled by essences, formally distinct from each other, prior (in nature) to the consideration of the mind. In this formal or quidditative realm the addition of one formal item will vary the nature of the thing thus constituted. For example, a difference added to a genus (e.g. 'rational' added to 'animal') does not vary the formal nature of the genus, but it does formally affect the nature constituted from the genus and difference, namely rational animal. So too, if a surface is colored white, the coming of whiteness does not formally vary the formal nature of the surface, but what is constituted from the union of whiteness and surface is a formal nature or ratio distinct from the mere ratio of surface. But if the whiteness is merely varied in intensity, a change would take place in the whiteness, though not in the essential order. The whiteness would remain whiteness; only its intensity or modality would be different. In short, addition of modes does not affect essences in themselves. Thus man remains essentially the same whether he is actual or only potential; whether he exists in reality or only in the mind. Only his mode of being is different. Hence Francis of Meyronnes' general definition of a mode.- "That is an intrinsic mode which, on coming to something or departing from it, does not vary its formal ratio." 27
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"... nihil autem aliud est a quidditate nisi modus." Sent. I, d. 42, q. 4, 121 K. "Sed dico quod ens extra animam dividitur in quidditatem et modum quidditatis." Sent. I, d. 8, q. 5, 50 B. Sent. I, d. 47, q. 3, 134 CD. Meyronnes praises Avicenna for realizing that the abstraction or precision of one quiddity from another is not only the work of the mind but more basically it is already present in the object of knowledge. "Et ideo dicunt alii magis sequentes Avicennam quod ilia praecisio non solum est ex parte intellectus, sed ex parte objecti... Unde licet accidentals abstractio sit per intellectum, abstrahibilitas tamen inest sibi ante omnem abstractionem intellectus et praecisio quidditativa." Ibid., D. Because Aristotle did not understand this, he was ignorant about abstraction and as a result constructed the worst metaphysics. "Aliter dicitur quod Aristoteles fuit optimus physicus, sed pessimus metaphysicus, quia nescivit abstrahere, et ideo pessimam metaphysicam fecit." Ibid. F. "Ideo dico quod modus intrinsecus est qui adveniens alicui non variat rationem 27
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THE ROLE OF INFINITY
Lying outside the quidditative or essential order, modes themselves do not have an essence or quiddity (modus non dicit aliquam rationem formalem). It is true that modes can be the object of the intellect and can be conceived, but this does not mean that they have a quiddity. What has a quiddity can be conceived by itself (per se); modes can only be conceived along with the formal natures whose modes they are. In short, a mode is intelligible, though not in abstraction from the formal ratio of which it is the mode. Why are modes called intrinsic if they do not enter into the quiddity or formal nature of things? Meyronnes replies that this is because they are not totally outside the formal ratio of that of which they are modes. If they were completely outside the formal ratio they would be different formal rationes, but in fact they do not add a new formal ratio to a quiddity. To call them intrinsic simply means "that they are not outside the ratio in such a way as to indicate a formal ratio distinct from that of which they are the modes." Since modes in a sense are not contained within quiddities, they can be said to be accidental to them. 'Accidental' in this context does not necessarily mean 'contingent', though, as we shall see, some modes of creatures are contingent. A mode is 'accidental' to a quiddity in the sense that its addition to the quiddity does not affect that quiddity as such; the formal ratio of the quiddity remains the same whether or not the mode is added to it. For example, whether man exists or not, whether he is 'this' man or 'that' man, does not alter the nature of man qua man. Hence the divine modes of being can be called 'accidental' to the divine essence in the sense explained above. This does not mean that they belong to the divine essence contingently; in fact, they are necessary to that essence. Creatures, for their part, have only one necessary mode, namely finiteness; all their other modes are contingent. The first and most basic division of intrinsic modes, according to Meyronnes, is into infinity and finiteness, the second into contingency and necessity, the third into act and potency, and the fourth into real being and 30
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formalem ejus, vel recedens ab eo non variatur ratio, sicut patet de albedine et ejus gradibus." Sent I, d. 8, q. 5, 49 E. Sent. I, d. 42, q. 4, 120 P. Ibid., Q. "... et ideo quando arguitur de istis modis intrinsecis, dico quod non sunt extra rationem sic, quia non dicunt aliquam rationem formalem aliam ab ilia cujus sunt modi." Sent I, d. 5, q. 1, 341. "Secundum dubium est: ex quo non sunt de ratione formali quidditatis, quare dicuntur modi intrinseci? Dico quod quia non intrant quidditatem aliquam, nec differunt ab ilia saltern formaliter sive quidditative. Ideo dicuntur modi intrinseci et non extrinseci." Sent. I, d. 42, q. 4, 120 Q. For the meaning of'accidental' in this context, see Sent. I, d. 18, q. 1, 72 C; d. 33, q. 3, 101 L. 30
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being of reason (ens rationis). Besides these modes he mentions others; for example, existence, eternity, and individuality or haecceity. Existence can be reduced to actuality, so that Meyronnes does not always distinguish between these modes. The eternity of God is reducible to this infinity, as the duration proper to creatures can be reduced to their finiteness. Individuality or haecceity, however, is an intrinsic mode irreducible to any of the others. It constitutes an individual as such within a specific ratio without varying the formal ratio. Thus Meyronnes' enumeration of the intrinsic modes includes: infinity and its duration, eternity; finiteness and its duration and degree of intensity; contingency; necessity; actuality and existence; potentiality; reality; ens rationis; and individuality or haecceity. After these preliminary remarks about intrinsic modes and their relation to essences, we come to the specific problem of the relation of infinity to the divine essence. Is the intrinsic mode of infinity included in the formal nature of the deity? This is impossible according to Francis of Meyronnes. Infinity belongs to the modal order, the formal nature of the deity to the quidditative order. Distinct as quiddity and mode, neither is included in the other. Meyronnes advances several arguments to prove this point. An intrinsic mode is always posterior (in nature) to the quiddity of which it is the mode, and so it cannot be predicated quidditatively of it. It does not form part of the formal ratio of the quiddity, nor does it enter into its definition. As a mode of the divine essence, infinity is subject to these conditions; it cannot enter into the formal ratio of the deity. Does infinity belong to the formal ratio of the divine attributes, such as knowledge? This is just as impossible as that it enter into the formal nature of the deity. As an intrinsic mode, infinity is outside the formal order and hence it cannot be predicated quidditatively of anything. Infinity does not enter into the formal structure of either the divine essence or any of the divine perfections. Suppose that infinity were predicable formally of the divine intellect. It would follow that it would also be formally predicable of the 34
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Sent. I, d. 42, q. 4, 121 A. Ibid., BC. He distinguishes between existence and actuality in Quodl. 3, a. 4: "... in Deo modus intrinsecus actualitatis differt a modo intrinseco existentiae, quia existentia communicatur creaturis et non actualitas, ut est in divinus, scilicet pura." Ms. Troyes 995, fol. 160va. ' Actuality and existence differ from haecceity because in God there is one existence and actuality but several haecceities belonging to the Persons of the Trinity. For the same reason reality differs from existence; there are three realities in the Trinity but one existence. Ibid. Reality is a mode distinct from existence both in God and creatures: "... quia in Deo realitas triplicate, non existentia; ergo multo magis in creatura, licet non sit ita manifestum sicut est in Deo." Sent. I, d. 42, q. 4, 121 DE. Sent. I, d. 2, q. 7, 19 HI. 34
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human intellect, for these two intellects have the same formal nature. For Meyronnes, perfections common to God and creatures are predicated of them univocally. In both they have the same formal constitution, so that whatever belongs essentially to the divine intellect belongs essentially to the human intellect as well. Hence, if infinity were a formal constituent of the divine perfections or attributes, such as wisdom or will, it would also enter formally into the essential nature of our intellect, wisdom, will, and so on. Since this is clearly false, it follows that neither can infinity enter the formal quiddity of the deity. Another argument in support of the same point runs as follows: If infinity were part and parcel of the formal nature of the divine attributes, there would be as many infinities as there are divine attributes since the attributes are formally distinct. There would be an infinite wisdom, infinite will, and so on. Meyronnes argues that this is a useless multiplication of infinities. Just as all the attributes of God are divine through their union with the deity, so they can all be infinite through the one infinity of the divine essence. This reinforces the main conclusion of Meyronnes: infinity does not belong to the formal order, and hence it is not part of the formal nature of God or any of the divine attributes. If infinity does not enter into the formal nature of the deity, it is not predicated of it per se in the first mode of essential predication. In this mode we predicate of a subject only what belongs to its essence; e.g. rational of man. This does not mean that infinity is predicated of God accidentally (per accidens). As we shall presently see, it can be demonstrated that God is necessarily infinite, just as it can be demonstrated that creatures are necessarily finite. Infinity, then, must belong to the deity necessarily, as finiteness necessarily belongs to creatures. Finiteness indeed is a necessary and proper passio of creatures, being found wherever they are found and being predicated of them in the second mode of essential predication. In this mode the subject is necessarily present in the predicate; e.g. we predicate 'capability of laughter' of man in this way, so that 'that which is capable of laughter' necessarily implies man. Thus finiteness is predicated of creatures, 'the finite' necessarily implying a creature. In the same way infinity is predicated of God. When we say 'God is infinite', the subject 'God' is necessarily included in the predicate 'infinite'. 39
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Ibid. "Quarto, quia viderenturfrustraponi ibi tot infinitates quot sunt ibi infinita attributa, cum totum possit salvari per unam. Si autem essent idem formaliter, multiplicatis perfectionibus, multiplicaretur infinitas. Ideo dico quod non est nisi una infinitas sicut nec una deitas." Ibid., I. Ibid., IK. 39
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FRANCIS OF MEYRONNES I I I . T H E RELATION OF INFINITY TO THE O T H E R DIVINE M O D E S
The presence of many modes of being in God introduces no confusion in him; order reigns in the deity as it does throughout the universe of Francis of Meyronnes. All the modes are posterior by nature to the divine essence and anterior to the divine attributes. Among the modes, as among the attributes, Francis of Meyronnes finds a natural order, though he does not always describe that order in the same way. In his Commentary on the Sentences, Book I, Distinction 42, Question 4, he arranges the order of the modes as follows: infinity, existence, necessity, and haecceity; then, taking into account an objection to this order, he immediately rearranges it to: existence, necessity, infinity, and haecceity. In Distinction 33, Question 3 we find this order: haecceity, infinity, existence, and reality. In Distinction 13, Question 1 he places infinity ahead of existence and necessity, as he also does in Distinction 4, Question 1. In the Troyes manuscript of the Quodlibets he presents the following order of the divine modes: infinity, haecceity, existence and actuality, necessity and reality. Is it possible to reconcile these different orderings of the divine modes, or must we conclude that Meyronnes has no firm doctrine on the matter? If we examine them carefully, taking into account his metaphysical principles, we can see that only one of these orders of modes is essential, namely infinity, haecceity, existence and actuality. This places infinity as the mode most closely associated with the divine essence. It alone attaches to the deity without any intermediary; in Meyronnes' words immediate inest deitati.* All the other modes, including existence, attach to the deity through the mode of infinity. In Distinction 42, Question 4, Meyronnes compares the intrinsic modes of God and creatures, using as his criterion of comparison the sharing of modes between them. In creatures, he says, the first mode is the one that belongs to them essentially (per se) and is not found in God, namely finiteness. After finiteness come the modes attaching to creatures accidentally (per accidens), but which are also found in God, namely existence and reality. Then come the modes belonging to creatures per accidens but not found in God, such as contingency. Finally there are the modes belonging to creatures per accidens as individuals, i.e. 'thisness' (haecceitas). This yields the following order of creaturely modes: finiteness, existence, reality, contin2
Sent. I, d. 2, q. 6, 19 B. Here Meyronnes argues that the concept of infinite being is our most perfect concept because it is most intimate to the most perfect concept, which is that of the deity. The concept of the essence of God is the most perfect, but in our present state we cannot have this concept. 42
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gency, and haecceity. The corresponding divine modes are said to be infinity, existence, necessity, and haecceity. At this point in his Commentary on the Sentences Meyronnes does not propose a metaphysical order of the divine modes, considering solely their relationship to the divine essence and to each other. Rather, he organizes the modes of created being taking into account whether they belong to creatures per se or per accidens, and whether or not they are shared by God and creatures. Hence the order of the divine modes corresponding to those of creatures (i.e. infinity, existence, necessity, and haecceity) need not be an essential one. It is controlled by factors other than the abstract consideration of the divine essence and its modes. If the Persons of the Trinity are taken into account, still another order of the divine modes is possible. According to Meyronnes, the Persons, unlike the divine essence, are not formally infinite, though they are formally existent and necessary. Hence, if we set up the divine modes on the basis of their commonness with creatures, and taking the Trinity into account, infinity will no longer be the first of the divine modes but rather existence. The order of the divine modes will then be: existence, necessity, infinity, and haecceity. It should be clear, however, that this modal order, like the preceding, need not be the proper and essential one, based as it is on factors extrinsic to the divine essence and its modes. In any case, Meyronnes dismisses this modal order as unimportant. In Distinction 33, Question 3, once again the order of the divine modes is considered in the context of the Trinity. According to Meyronnes, haecceity is more intrinsic to the Persons of the Trinity than infinity; consequently it should precede infinity. So the modal order here proposed is: haecceity, infinity, existence, and reality. Once again we are presented with an order of divine modes directly related to the Trinity of Persons and not the divine essence. In Distinction 13, Question 1, Meyronnes places infinity before existence and necessity as modes of the divine essence. His reason is that even if per impossibile the divine essence did not exist, it would still be possible to demonstrate its infinity from the nature of that essence, just as the finitude of a creature can be demonstrated through its formal nature even if the creature did not exist. This is a clear indication that in the essential order 43
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Sent. I, d. 42, q. 4, 121 EF. Ibid., G. Sent. I, d. 33, q. 3, 1011. Adopting the perspective of the relations of the Trinity and not the divine essence, haecceity is more intrinsic to the deity and infinity more extrinsic:"... haecceitas est magis intrinseca, infinitas est extrinseca magis, et per consequens posterior." Sent. I, d. 13, q. 1, 65 CD. 43
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of the modes infinity is to be placed ahead of existence and necessity. The essential priority of infinity to existence is again affirmed in Distinction 14, Question l. In Quodlibet 3, a. 7, contained in the unpublished Troyes manuscript (995), Meyronnes draws four conclusions regarding the order of the divine modes. (1) the infinity of God precedes his existence and actuality, (2) the divine infinity precedes haecceity, (3) the divine singularity and haecceity precede his existence and actuality, (4) the divine necessity is posterior to all these. Posterior to all these modes, which attach to the one divine essence, is the mode of reality, which belongs to the Persons of the Trinity. This text yields the following modal order: infinity, haecceity, existence and actuality, necessity, and reality. The following table shows the variation in Meyronnes' listing of the divine modes in the above passages. D. 42, q. 4: infinity, existence, necessity, haecceity. D. 42, q. 4: existence, necessity, infinity, haecceity. D. 33, q. 3: haecceity, infinity, existence, reality. D. 13, q. 1: infinity, existence, necessity. Quodl. 3, a. 7: infinity, haecceity, existence, necessity, reality. There appears to be no internal contradiction between these different orders of the divine modes of being. Each is in function of a different perspective of God and his modalities, and it is intelligible in its context. There is good reason to believe that the essential order of the modes is best represented by Quodlibet 3, a. 7. There infinity is placed first among the modes as closest to the divine essence. This agrees with Meyronnes' state47
48
"Et dico quod ordines quatuor essentiales sunt in divinis ... Quartus inter modos intrinsecos sicut inter infinitatem et existentiam, sicut dictum est generaliter de ordine naturae." Sent. I, d. 14-16, q. 1, 66 O. See also Sent. I, d. 2, q. 7, 19 G. "Septimus articulus est de istorum modorum ordine in divinis. Ubi ponuntur quatuor conclusiones. Prima est quod infinitas Dei praecedit ejus existentiam et actualitatem, quia qualem ordinem habent aliqua quando distinguuntur secundum rem, talem servant quando distinguuntur secundum rationem. Et ideo cum in creatis quantitas virtutis praeveniat existentiam, ita erit in divinis, ubi sunt minus distincta. Secunda conclusio, quod infinitas divina praevenit ejus haecceitatem, quia unaquaeque natura prius intelligitur in certo gradu entium collata per suam naturam specificam, quam intelligatur individuata. Tertia conclusio, quod divina singularitas et haecceitas praevenit ejus existentiam et actualitatem, quia unaquaeque ratio formalis, ut praescindit ab alia, habet suam haecceitatem intrinsece antequam intelliguntur actualiter existens, sicut fiiit deductum in creatis. Quarta conclusio, quod divina necessitas est posterior omnibus istis, quia esse necessarium praesupponit esse, et esse est cum actu, quae sunt posteriora infinitate. Et confirmatur, quia opposita opponuntur in eodem ordine; contingentia autem in creatis est istis posterior, ut patuit... realitas est posterior istis omnibus." Quodl. 3, a. 7, Ms. Troyes 995, fol. 16Ira. 47
48
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ment, which is perfectly Scotistic, that infinity is immediate to the deity: immediate inest deitati, This is justified by the correspondence between reality and thought. The order among things distinguished by thought, he contends, corresponds to their order in reality. Following this principle he asserts that the finiteness, or 'quantity of perfection', of creatures precedes their existence, and consequently the same will be true in God, in whom there is less distinction between the mode and its subject. The divine haecceity comes after infinity, because every nature is understood to be placed at a definite level of being through its specific essence prior to its being individualized. Hence in God the mode of infinity is prior to the mode of haecceity. After these two modes come the divine existence and actuality, because a nature is understood to be intrinsically characterized by 'thisness' before it is understood to be actually existing. This is so in the case of creatures and it is no less true in the divinity. Necessity is posterior to all these modes because it presupposes existence. In the last place is the mode of reality, for all the other modes attach to the one divine essence, whereas reality belongs to the three Persons of the Trinity, which constitute three realities in the one essence. The placing of haecceity after infinity, and both of these modes before existence, was already suggested by Duns Scotus. According to the Subtle Doctor, the divine essence is first in the order of essence. After it in the natural order comes infinity, and then 'thisness' or individuality. Scotus even gives Meyronnes his reason for locating infinity before haecceity: it is, Scotus says, as though infinity has to be understood as a mode of the divine entity before we can understand that entity as 'this' or individual. In short, it is a requirement of thought that compels us to assert the primacy of infinity over haecceity. This same requirement is at the basis of Meyronnes' order of the modes. The order of the three modes: infinity, haecceity, and existence, is confirmed by the proofs of the existence and oneness of God which we shall 49
50
51
See above, note 42. Quodl. 3, a. 7, ibid. "Respondeo, quia quando aliquid est de se esse et non tantum capax ipsius esse, de se est habens quamlibet condicionem necessario requisitam ad esse; ens autem ut convenit Deo — scilicet ens per essentiam — est ipsum esse infinitum et non aliquid cui tantum convenit ipsum esse (ex se est 'hoc' et ex se 'infinitum'), ut quasi per prius intelligitur, aliquo modo, infinitas esse modus entis per essentiam quam ipsum intelligatur esse 'hoc'; et ideo non oportet quaerere quare 'hoc' ens sit infinitum, quasi prius conveniat sibi singularitas quam infinitas." Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 8, p. 1, q. 3 (Vatican, 1956) 4, p. 227, n. 149. See E. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot (Paris, 1952), p. 241, note 1; Being and Some Philosophers, 2nd ed. (Toronto, 1952), p. 94. 49 50
51
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consider in the next section. Each of these modes is demonstrated of God through the medium of infinity. Infinity, therefore, must precede these modes in relation to the divine essence. In demonstrating these modes of God he arranges his proofs in the following order: the existence of God, the oneness or individuality of God, and the infinity of God. Since, according to Meyronnes, we acquire knowledge by going from the less perfect to the more perfect, and from what is posterior in nature to what is prior, the essential order of divine modes should be: infinity, haecceity, and existence. We shall now turn to Meyronnes' demonstrations of these three modes of the divine essence. I V . P R O O F OF THE EXISTENCE OF A N INFINITE B E I N G
The first point to be noted in considering the existence of God, according to Meyronnes, is that his existence is not self-evident but must be proved. He is aware that St. Anselm has been interpreted to affirm the self-evidence of God's existence. At first sight, the Anselmian notion of God as that than which none greater can be conceived seems to justify this interpretation; for if God's existence were not self-evident we could conceive of a being better known than him, whose existence would be self-evident. But this is not the point to St. Anselm's famous description of God according to Meyronnes. St. Anselm, he remarks perceptively, was trying to prove the existence of God, and what is thought to be provable is not self-evident. Furthermore, what is self-evident cannot be denied, whereas many do deny the existence of God. So his existence must be proved; and if this is true of his existence it is no less true of his infinity. Of course, to minds in other states than ours the existence of God would be self-evident. If we had intuitive knowledge of his essence, we would see his existence and no proof of it would be needed; but in the present life we are denied intuitive knowledge of God. Even if we had abstractive knowledge of the divine essence through a likeness (species) distinctly representing the divine essence, its existence would not be self-evident. No quiddity, not even the divine, includes existence in its formal ratio. So the divine essence could be known abstractively without knowing the divine existence. Some kind of proof of God's existence would be necessary for an intellect capable of such knowledge, but it would be different from the proofs we have in our present condition. In this state we lack abstractive knowledge of God's essence under 52
Sent. I, d. 2, q. 1, 16 G-1. Anselm indeed speaks of'proving' (probare) the existence of God. See his Proslogion, prooemium 1 (Seckau, 1938), p. 93. 52
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his proper formal ratio-, all our knowledge of him is from the formal perspective of being. What kind of proof of the existence of God is possible for us? Of the two types of demonstration, propter quid and quia, Meyronnes dismisses the first as inapplicable in the present case. In a demonstration propter quid a definition serves as a middle term; e.g. Man is a rational animal; every rational animal is capable of laughter; therefore ... But God is absolutely simple and hence incapable of being defined. There can be no definition of him serving as a middle term through which his existence can be demonstrated. Even if we had abstractive knowledge of the divine essence under its proper formal ratio we could not prove the existence of God by a demonstration propter quid, for existence is not included in the divine essence. As we have seen, no mode is contained in an abstract essence, not even that of God. So we could not deduce the existence of God from an abstractive knowledge of his essence. Having eliminated a demonstration propter quid of the existence of God, there remains the possibility of a demonstration quia. This would proceed through an inquiry into his existence through his effects, i.e. through creatures. Now two modes of inquiring into God's existence from his effects are possible, the physical and the metaphysical (modo physico et modo metaphysico). Using the physical mode we can investigate the existence of God through motion. If something is moved, it is moved by another. This either continues on to infinity (which Meyronnes takes to be impossible), or it ends with the existence of a first mover. This way can be made more evident, he says, if 'created' is substituted for 'moved'. For if something is created, it must be created by another, and this process cannot go on to infinity. Proceeding metaphysically we can inquire into God's existence by way of eminence. Even if nothing is moved or created, we find an order among beings of different natures, and from this it can be shown that there is a first and highest being. These two ways of investigating the existence of God give us two concepts of him as 'primary cause' and 'primary being', and once we are in possession of these concepts, Meyronnes assures us, we can demonstrate his existence. This statement of Meyronnes comes as a surprise. Has he not already demonstrated the existence of God from creatures? In fact, in his own view he has only presented two traditional 'ways of inquiring' into the existence of God. These ways are essential to the demonstration of God's existence 53
54
55
53 54 55
Ibid., 15Q-16C. Sent. I, d. 2, q. 2, 16 1-17 H. Sent. I, d. 2, q. 3, 17 I.
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because without them we would not have the concepts needed for that demonstration, but they are not the demonstration itself. The 'ways of inquiring' into the existence of God involve creatures: they are methods by which the mind rises from creatures to God. But, according to Meyronnes, a creature cannot enter into the demonstration itself of God's existence. Nothing created can be the middle term in this demonstration. The middle term whereby we prove the existence of God must be something in God and really the same as him; nothing really distinct from him can serve to prove anything about him-, nihil quod est in creatura est medium ad demonstrandum aliquid de Deo. We must demonstrate predicates or properties (passiones) of God through other divine properties. Hence no effect of God, or creature, can be the means of demonstrating his existence. If this is true, we cannot demonstrate God's existence through his effects; but we can use as a means of demonstration his relation to his effects — not his actual relation to them, for this is contingent on his will to create, but rather his possible relation to them (habitudo aptitudinalis), for this is necessary. Whether or not God actually creates, he must have the power to relate himself to creatures, A necessary property (passio) of God such as this can be the middle term in demonstrating God's existence. According to Meyronnes, a demonstratio quia has for its middle term a property (passio) of the subject, and through this property a second property is demonstrated of the subject. If the property used as a middle term is prior to the property demonstrated, then it is a demonstratio quia a priori-, if it is a property that is posterior, it is a demonstratio quia a posteriori. Meyronnes gives the following demonstration quia a posteriori of the existence of God: "Every first cause exists; God is the first cause; therefore he exists." Since causality is a property posterior to the mode of existence, when causality is used as a middle term the demonstration proceeds through a posterior property to one that is prior; hence the demonstration is a posteriori. The following is a demonstration quia a priori of God's existence: "Every infinite being actually exists; God is an infinite being; therefore God actually exists." As a mode prior to existence, infinity serves as the middle term to demonstrate the existence of God; hence the demonstration is a priori. 56
51
Ibid., 17 K. "Sed est intelligendum quod duplex est demonstratio quia: una a priori et alia a posteriori. Hoc enim est communis omni demonstrationi quia, quod fiat per passionem acceptam pro medio; contingit autem hoc dupliciter. Aliquando enim contingit quod passio posterior est conclusa a priori sicut per medium, et sic est demonstratio quia a priori. Exemplum-. Omne ens infinitum existit actualiter; Deus est ens infinitum; ergo etc. Hie enim posterior passio demonstratur per priorem passionem tamquam per medium; infinitas autem 56 57
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The strength of these proofs, in Meyronnes' view, lies in the fact that they begin with properties that belong to God and are really the same as God; they do not begin with creatures, which are really distinct from him and contingent on his will to create them. Their starting points are the notions of infinite being and first cause, and through these concepts the existence of God is demonstrated. It is true that we arrive at these concepts through creatures, but the proofs do not include the means whereby we arrive at the notions that provide the terms of the proofs. Once we possess these notions their actual basis in creatures no longer enters into the picture. Indeed, it makes no difference to the proofs whether creatures actually exist or not; all that is needed for the proofs is the notion of infinite being and first cause. In both of these proofs infinity plays a central role. This is clear enough in the second proof, which states that God exists because he is infinite. For Meyronnes, infinity in some way must involve existence. If a being is infinite it must also exist. The role of infinity is not so clear in the first proof, which states that God exists because he is the first cause. The notion of a first cause necessarily involves existence. But there is a hidden link in this argument. Causality is an attribute of God, a formal ratio, not an intrinsic mode. The union between the divine essence and a divine attribute can be only through the mode of infinity. In other words, God is infinitely wise, good, or the first cause only because his essence is infinite. Hence he can be the first cause only because he is infinite. This, of course, has still to be proved. Thus the proof proceeds from a posterior attribute or passio, namely from causality to infinity, and then to existence. It is thus imperative for Meyronnes to demonstrate the infinity of God. Before doing so, however, he devotes some attention to the problem of the oneness of God. Can there be several gods, or is there only one? This problem, like that of the existence of God, is directly related to his infinity. If God is infinite, Meyronnes argues, there cannot be several gods, for there cannot be several infinities. There can be only one infinite being. 58
59
est passio prior existentia, sicut patebit 8 dist. Aliquando autem accidit quod passio posterior est medium ad concludendum priorem, et tunc demonstratio quia est a posteriori. Exemplum: Omnis prima causa existit; Deus est hujusmodi; ergo existit. Existentia enim Dei prior est quam causalitas quaecumque. Ideo dicitur demonstratio quia a posteriori." Sent. I, d. 3, q. 4, 17I-K. "Dico quod nulla est ibi (scilicet, in divinis perfectionibus) diversitas simpliciter, cum sint unum identice propter infinitatem, secundum quam haec formalitas est alia." Sent. I, d. 8, q. 5, SO N. "... unitas identica convenit attributis solum per infinitatem, quae est modus intrinsecus." Sent I, d. 33, q. 3, 101 M. Sent I, d. 3, q. 4, 17 L. 58
59
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Several arguments based on St. Anselm's notion of God as that than which none greater can be thought are given to support this, but Meyronnes rejects them as faulty. The first argument contends that if there were several individual gods sharing the same divine nature, a greater than any one of them could be conceived, for we can think of one God who would exhaust the whole perfection of that nature. Since the infinite is that than which none greater can be thought, no one of them would be infinite or God. We must conclude, therefore, that there is one divine individual adequate to the whole specific nature of the divinity, and so there is only one God. The second argument varies this reasoning a little but the result is the same. Whenever individuals are multiplied within the same specific nature, there is a greater perfection in several of them than in any one. For example, two men possess a greater perfection than just one. Thus two gods would possess a greater perfection than merely one. Consequently if there were several gods having the same nature, no one of them would be that than which none greater can be thought, and hence no one of them would be God. So there is only one God. The fallacy in these arguments, in Meyronnes' view, is to apply the notions of greater and less, of equal and unequal, to infinite being, when in fact they are valid only forfinitebeings. We cannot compare the infinite with the finite as though the former were 'greater' than, or 'unequal' to, the latter. The importance of the point Meyronnes is making should not be overlooked. He is saying that the infinite is not the greatest being in a hierarchy, or the first in a great chain of being. Rather, it is an absolutely unique being, incomparable and out of all proportion to finite being. The absolute transcendence of the infinite makes it impossible to describe it accurately as that than which none greater can be thought. Meyronnes' own arguments for the oneness of God do not prejudice his absolute uniqueness and transcendence but rather enforce them. They establish that he is not only an individual but most individual or singular (singularissimus). How could God possibly lack individuality, since this is an absolute perfection and his nature is most perfect? Being most actual and perfect, he must have 'thisness' or haecceity. In creatures haecceity is their ultimate difference, the last positive actuality added to them and constituting them as individuals. Formal differences can be added to natures, as the specific difference 'rational' joined to the genus 'animal' constitutes the nature 'rational animal'. A non-formal difference, 'thisness', added to the specific nature of man renders it 'this' individual man. 60
60
Ibid., 17M-P.
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Many individual men are possible because human nature is not of itself one individual but is potential to an infinite number of individuals. The 'thisness' or individuality of the divine essence must be different from that of creatures. Being most actual and infinite, this essence has an infinite individuality and haecceity. It is not potential to the reception of many individualities but constitutes of itself one individual. It alone is individual of itself (de se haec)-, and the reason for this is the divine infinity. Suppose there were many gods. Each of their individualities would be most noble and infinite, with the result that the individuality of one would be present in every other. In short, there would be only one individual God. Ultimately, then, God is one because he is infinite. But how can it be proved that God is infinite? The answer to this question is all-important, for on it hang the answers to the questions whether God exists and is one. As we have seen, his existence and oneness can be proved if his infinity can be demonstrated. This is the vital link in the inquiry into God that must now be supplied. Meyronnes finds no text in Scripture that says in so many words that God is infinite. The best he can do is to quote from the Psalms: "Great is the Lord, and exceedingly to be praised ..." (48, l). And indeed, it appears to be true that, although Scripture speaks of God's wisdom as unlimited and his days as without number, it does not contain the simple statement: "God is infinite." Can the infinity of God be demonstrated by natural reason? Meyronnes believes that it can, but he does not accept uncritically all the reasons that can be advanced in its favor. According to Dionysius, there are four ways of coming to a knowledge of God: the way of efficient causality, final causality, eminence, and negation. Meyronnes examines each of these in turn to see if it may offer an adequate proof of the divine infinity. 61
62
63
64
Ibid., 17 Q-18 B. For the proof that there can be only one infinity, see q. 7, 19 I. Sent. I, d. 2, q. 8, 19 I. " See E. Gilson, "Theology and the Unity of Knowledge," p. 39. "... intelligendum est quod Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, et Angelica hierarchia, et in pluribus aliis locis ostendit quatuor modos deveniendi in cognitionem divinorum, scilicet per viam causalitatis effectivae, procedendo in inquisitione causarum donee veniamus ad primum efficiens; secundo per viam causalitatis finalis, eodem modo procedendo; tertio per viam eminentiae; quarto per viam remotionis, quando ab ente perfectissimo removentur omnes imperfectiones." Sent. I, d. 2, q. 8, 19 K. Meyronnes reads Dionysius as a scholastic, using the language of the scholastics and not that of Dionysius himself. Compare Scotus' four ways of proving the infinity of God by efficient causality, intellectuality, final causality, and eminence; Ordinatio I, d. 2, p. 1, q. 2 (Vatican, 1950), 2, p. 189, n. 111. 61 62
64
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Following the way of efficient causality some use four arguments to demonstrate the infinity of God. (1) A finite power cannot move other things over an infinite period of time; but God can do this. (2) Only an infinite cause can produce an infinite number of effects; but this is within God's power. (3) One who knows more is more perfect than one who knows less; but God can know an infinity of things, showing that he is infinitely perfect. (4) If a cause contains simultaneously an infinite number of effects, it must itself be infinite. This is true of God, though owing to their nature these effects cannot be produced simultaneously. Thefirsttwo arguments, which have a distinctly Aristotelian background, are rejected by Meyronnes out of hand. They would lead to the unacceptable conclusion that an intelligence moving the heavens for an infinite time is itself infinite, and that if the sun and other heavenly bodies lasted forever they would be infinite because they could produce an infinite number of effects. The next two arguments, which come from Scotus himself, cause Meyronnes some concern. He does not see any possibility of denying their probative value, though he does not seem very happy about them. He offers an objection to them but admits that it carries little weight. Proofs of the infinity of God based on final causality are unacceptable to Meyronnes. Some argue that the human will has an infinite capacity and is unsatisfied with anything finite. If a finite good is presented to it, the intellect can always propose a greater good which the will then seeks. The will is ordained to an infinite end and it will rest onfy in the infinite. Again, everything in the universe is ordered to an ultimate end, and since the end is always more perfect than the means, the ultimate end of the whole universe must be more perfect than the universe. The infinite number of things which are ordainable to the end prove that the end itself is infinite. Neither of these proofs is convincing to Meyronnes. The mere fact that we desire something does not mean that it is to be found in the real world. We often desire impossible things. Similarly the fact that all things are directed to one ultimate end does not prove that the end is infinite. Man is the end 65
66
67
Aristotle shows that the prime unmoved mover has infinite power of moving because it causes eternal movement for an infinite time; see his Physics VIII, 10; Metaphysics XII, 7. Duns Scotus uses Aristotle's proof of the infinity of the prime mover to show the infinity of God, but he modifies it profoundly; by itself he does not think it proves the existence of the infinite creator of the world. See Scotus, ibid., pp. 189-201, n. 111-124. Scotus, ibid., pp. 201-205, n. 125-129; pp. 192-197, n. 117-120. "Non apparet via fugiendi istas instantias, nisi forte opinio ilia poneretur quam ponit Augustinus in uno loco, quod scilicet in omni instanti res accipiat novam virtutem producendi a Deo. Et tunc leviter possunt solvi instantiae, scilicet quod causae non continent infinita virtualiter, quia novum effectum continet nova virtus." Sent. I, d. 2, q. 8, 19 O. 65
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of all corporeal nature and to some degree transcends it. The universe, man included, may be directed to a goal that would transcend it but that goal need not be infinite. So the direction of all things to God does not justify the assertion that he is infinite. The way of eminence is just as impotent to lead us to an infinite God. Four arguments are given to show that this way leads to the infinite, but Meyronnes rejects them all. The first is based on the disposition of the universe. It is certain to natural reason that the universe is disposed in the best possible way. Now it is better disposed if there is an infinite being than if there is not; hence there must be one. The second argument is based on the nature of infinity as an unqualified perfection. Every absolute perfection is compatible with another absolute perfection. Now infinity is an absolute perfection; hence it is compatible with the divine nature. But whatever infinity is compatible with must itself be infinite. Therefore the deity is infinite. The third argument continues in the same vein. Finiteness implies limitation and hence imperfection. It cannot, therefore, be included in the deity, for an unqualified perfection admits of no imperfection. The final argument may be summed up as follows-. A being whose nature is impossible cannot be more perfect than one whose nature is not. Now if there were an infinite being it would be more perfect than a finite one. Consequently it is not impossible for there to be an infinite being. Some of these arguments may seem persuasive, but when they are presented in the context of the way of eminence they do not necessarily lead to infinite being. This way involves comparison of greater and less perfection, excess and defect; and, as we have seen, Meyronnes does not grant that this leads to a being that is absolutely transcendent and unique. Even though these arguments lead to a supreme being, it would nevertheless be a finite, and not an infinite, being. The second and third arguments contain statements that are true in themselves. The third argument is almost identical with his own demonstration of the divine infinity. It is not with the statements that he is quarreling but with the context in which they are placed. By way of eminence we can arrive at a supreme being in any genus, but this would be something finite. We may even come to something more perfect than all existing things, but it would still be finite. Only the way of negation remains to be explored as an avenue to the infinite. This way alone meets with Meyronnes' full approval. Following this 68
69
Ibid., 19 OP. For Scotus' use of the prooffromfinality, see Ordinatio, ibid. pp. 205-206, n. 130. " Ibid., 19 PQ. For Scotus' use of the proof from eminence, see ibid., pp. 206-211, n. 131-139. 68
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method we deny of God anything imperfect or unworthy of him, for surely no imperfection can be found in him. Now finiteness is an imperfection, and so we must deny it of him. But to say that God is not finite is equivalent to affirming that he is infinite. Asked to defend his assumption that God cannot be imperfect, Meyronnes replies that this is something we naturally know. If God were imperfect in some respect, this would violate the perfect order among beings. Much more important to him is the demonstration that finiteness involves imperfection. This he believes he can prove in four ways: (1) The more finite something is, the more limited and imperfect it is. (2) The closer something is to non-being, the more imperfect it is. Now the more limited it is, the closer it is to non-being. Thus limitation or finiteness involves imperfection. (3) The closer natures are to matter, the more imperfect they are. A sign of this is the feet that material forms closer to matter are more imperfect among material things. Thus, if the primary being, or God, were finite, it would have a definite distance from, and relationship to, matter. Consequently it will be imperfect, and this for the sole reason that it is finite. (4) Every lack of perfection means imperfection. But every finiteness means a lack of further perfection in the genus to which it is added. Hence finiteness means imperfection. Among the four ways to God, therefore, only the negative way successfully leads to the divine infinity. This does not mean that the other ways of efficient and final causality and eminence are of no value in our ascent to God. Even though they do not by themselves yield a knowledge of his infinity, they are the necessary starting-points of that knowledge. At first sight they appear to be independent approaches to God, but Meyronnes sees them as an interconnected series of arguments, one starting where the other leaves off. The way of efficient causality comes first; seeing something moved or caused, we reason to a first efficient cause. The way of final causality is based on that of efficiency, for we recognize ends only through the effects of efficient causes. Following this way we come to the existence of a final end. Efficiency and finality in turn serve as the foundation for the way of eminence. Since the end is more noble than the means to the end, we can reason to a most noble being. The negative way carries on from this point. The most noble being must be most eminent, and hence it can admit of no imperfection. Accordingly we must remove from it all imperfection and arrive at the primum eminens, the infinite being. 70
71
Ibid., 20 AB. " "Sed quis istorum modorum Dionysii est prior simpliciter? Dicit doctor quod via efficientiae, quia enim videmus aliquid moveri et causari arguimus primum, et in isto fundatur via finis; nunquam enim finis cognosceretur nisi per effectum efficientis. Et in istis fundatur 70
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Unequal in their capacity to lead us to a knowledge of God as infinite being, these four ways also differ in the type of discursive reasoning they employ. Meyronnes distinguishes between two kinds of discursive knowledge, intuitive and abstractive. The former begins with something known intuitively and ends with something whose existence is not intuited. This is the way we reason to the existence of the power of knowing and of the soul itself from the intuitive knowledge of the act of knowing. Abstractive discursive knowledge, as the term indicates, begins with an object known abstractively, that is to say grasped in its nature, abstracting from existence. In this way we reason to the nature of accidents from the notion of substance. In general, abstractive discursive knowledge starts with an object known abstractively or quidditatively and concludes with the essential properties of that object. Having no direct intuition of the existence of God, and being unable to know him abstractively through a likeness representing his essence, all our knowledge of him comes through a process of reasoning and falls under one of the types of discursive knowledge. The first two ways to God, through efficient and final causality, are instances of intuitive discursive knowledge. They begin with the existence of motion and causes and conclude with the existence of the first mover and final cause. The ways of eminence and negation follow the pattern of abstractive discursive knowledge. Their starting-points are the quiddities or 'sensible species' of corporeal substances, and from them we ascend to spiritual substances andfinallyto the highest or first cause. 72
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via eminentiae, quia finis necessario nobilior est his quae sunt ad finem, et sic arguimus ipsum esse nobilissimum. Et exinde amovemus ab eo omnem imperfectionem." Sent. I, d. 3, q. 1, 23 O. See Scotus, Ordinatio, ibid., p. 189, n. 111. "Circa primum est sciendum quod quadruplex est notitia. Prima est intuitiva, quae scilicet est de re per seipsam. Secunda est abstractiva, quae est per aliquod representativum. Tertia est illativa notitia, quae est de relationibus quae infertur ex cognitione terminorum. Quarta est discursiva vel arguitiva; et haec est duplex: una quae incipit ab intuitiva et terminatur ad aliquid quod non videtur intuitive, sicut patet de cognitione intelligentiae, quae conditio incipit a motu, qui intuitive cognoscitur et deinde arguitive intelligent cognoscitur, quae intuitive a nobis minime cognoscitur. Alia est notitia discursiva abstractiva, quae incipit ab abstractiva et terminatur ad aliquid quod non cognoscitur abstractive, sicut patet de cognitione substantiae et accidentis, quia accidentia nullo modo cognoscuntur abstractive. Notitia discursiva per intuitivam.- quae scilicet incipit ab intuitiva et terminatur ad aliquid quod non videtur intuitive. Abstractiva discursiva: quae incipit ab abstractiva et terminatur ad ilia quae insunt sibi per se." Sent., Prolog, q. 20, 11 Q-12 A. "Primo modo a nobis Deus pro statu isto non cognoscitur, quia ista, ut supra patuit, est notitia intuitiva. Nec secundo modo de communi lege, quia speciem nullam habemus naturaliter nisi a sensibus causatam. A sensibus autem non imprimitur nobis aliqua species quae sic posset Deum representare. Sed tertio modo, quia per actum cognoscendi arguimus potentiam, et per potentiam arguimus essentiam, et per istam cognoscimus 72
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Thus we reach our most perfect knowledge of God as infinite being, and prove that existence is an essential (per se) property of the divine essence — in short, that infinite being exists — through abstractive discursive reasoning. This clearly falls within the competence of metaphysics and not the philosophy of nature. The latter, according to Meyronnes, reaches the existence of God as prime mover, but because its starting-point is not a necessary truth but the contingent fact that there is motion in the world, it does not carry us as far as metaphysics in our investigation of God. In his view, the proof of the existence of a prime mover, as found in Aristotle's eighth book of the Physics, is solid enough, but its method is dialectical rather than demonstrative. It is metaphysics that inquires into God as the highest and most noble being. Using its method, rather than that of physics, we can demonstrate the existence of God as infinite being. 74
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With the demonstration of the divine infinity we return to the point where we started: the notion of infinity as a positive divine perfection. This notion is at the basis of the demonstration. Having shown that God is the most eminent and perfect being, it is a simple step for Meyronnes to conclude that he is infinite, given his concept of infinity as a positive mode of the divine being. The 'amount of perfection' (quantitas virtutis) of the most perfect being is bound to be unlimited. Once this has been shown, it is easy for him to demonstrate the existence and individuality of the infinite being, for these are also positive perfections that must be included in it. They are proved to be necessary properties (passiones) of the divine essence, belonging to it in the second mode of per se predication. The reader of Francis of Meyronnes cannot fail to be struck by his orderly and systematic thinking. Deeply imbued with Scotus' fundamental ideas, this 'Prince of the Scotists' wants to put all of them in their proper places and delineate clearly their interconnection. Scotus himself was not always as tidy veram existentiam. Et isto modo incipit et procedit ilia via, tam efficientis quam finis secundum Dionysium. Quarto modo etiam cognoscimus, quia per quidditates vel species sensibiles cognoscimus substantiam corporalem et per istam spiritualem; et sic summam vel primam causam. Tenent ergo viae Dionysii per istos duos ultimos modos, quia quando aliquod causatum cognoscimus, quaerimus de causa efficiente et finali usque ad primam in utroque genere. Similiter per viam eminentiae, quia videmus has res deficientes, ideo arguimus aliquod indeficiens. Ex ista sequitur via remotionis, quia primum efficiens et ultimus finis eminens est, ideo ab eo removemus omnes imperfectiones." Sent. I, d. 3, q. 1, 23 NO. Sent., Prol. q. 16, 10 C. Ibid., q. 14, 8 P. 74
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as this; there are ambiguities and uncertainties in his thought which gave his disciples ample room to interpret him in different and even conflicting ways, and thus display their own originality. So it is with the relation of infinity to the divine essence, and the relation of infinity to the other divine modes. Some Scotists, like Claudius Frassen, refuse to see in infinity simply a mode of the divine essence. While granting that Scotus used the language of infinity, Frassen interprets him to mean that infinity is the formal constituent of the divine essence, distinguishing it fundamentally from all creatures. Meyronnes is no less certain of the central role of infinity in the deity, but in his view it has this role as an intrinsic mode, not as a formal or essential factor in God. A mode simply does not function in the way Frassen describes infinity; being outside the formal or quidditative order, it cannot be the formal constituent of the divine essence. As an intrinsic mode it is not included in that essence. And if this is true of infinity, it must also be true of existence, which is not as directly or closely related to the divine essence as infinity. The notion of existence is not contained in that of the divine essence. In saying this, Meyronnes is faithful to his Scotist principles, but he draws a conclusion from them that Scotus himself would not accept. Meyronnes displays even more originality in his proofs of the existence and infinity of God. Like Scotus, he looks for demonstrations on the level of metaphysics rather than the philosophy of nature: at best the 'physical method' of Aristotle plays a secondary and ancillary role in them. There are clear echoes of Scotus in his proofs, but at the crucial moment of demonstrating God's infinity he does not turn to his master's proof based on the possibility of infinite being and concluding with its actual existence. His own proof depends upon the notion of infinity as an unqualified perfection and the necessity of attributing all such perfections to God. Following the way of negation, all imperfections must be denied of God, including finiteness. Here, as elsewhere in his metaphysics, Meyronnes is both a Scotist and an original thinker. 76
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See C. Frassen, Scotus Academicus 1 (Rome, 1900), p. 171. On this point, see E. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot (Paris, 1952), p. 212, n. 1. Scotus, ibid., pp. 206-210, n. 131-138. 76
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William of Ockham
William of Ockham, a Franciscan, was born in Ockham in the county of Surrey, England, c. 1285. He studied theology at Oxford, commenting on the Sentences from 1317 to 1319. Though he completed the requirements for the mastership in theology and problably gave his inaugural lecture or inceptio (hence his title of Venerable Inceptor), he did not become a regent master at Oxford but taught at the Franciscan studium in London. He was called to Avignon in 1324 by John XXII to stand trial for heresy. In 1328, before a verdict was give, he escaped from the city and took refuge with Louis of Bavaria in Munich. He was promptly excommunicated. According to his epitaph, he died in Munich on April 10, 1347. Walter of Chatton was born c. 1290 in the village of Catton in northern England. He joined the Franciscans at an early age and was ordained subdeacon in 1307. From 1321 to 1323 he lectured on the Sentences at a Franciscan convent, probably in London. In 1329 he was at the Franciscan convent in Oxford, presumably as regent master. At Oxford he commented again on the Sentences. He was in Avignon by 1333 and lived there until his death in 1343 or early 1344. He was influenced by Scotus and was one of the first opponents of Ockham.
17 The Role of Divine Ideas in the Theology of William of Ockham In an article on Franciscan philosophy published in 1927, Etienne Gilson made this remarkable statement about William of Ockham: After having given to scholastic philosophy the systems of St. Bonaventure, Roger Bacon, Raymond Lull, and Duns Scotus, not to mention all those who prepare the way for them, accompany them, and comment on them, Franciscan thought could with good reason be considered exhausted. It was nothing of the sort. It had still to be enriched with the work of William of Ockham. These were extraordinary words in 1927. Historians usually took a different attitude towards William of Ockham. They saw him as a revolutionary in medieval philosophy, the initiator of the via moderna, a rebel in his own Order, an individualist whose intention was to destroy rather than to create. Gilson was suggesting that, however true these labels may be, Ockham must also be understood as a Franciscan, working within the tradition of his Order, and more generally within the stream of medieval theology. The problems he grappled with, many of the notions he used to solve them, were shaped at least in part by the Franciscan tradition. Gilson asked if Ockham was not in his own way a reactionary and traditionalist. 1
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"Apres avoir donne a la philosophie scolastique les systemes de saint Bonaventure, de Roger Bacon, de Raymond Lulle et de Duns Scot, sans compter ceux tous qui les preparent, les accompagnent ou les commentent, la pensee franciscaine pouvait a bon droit etre consideree comme epuisee. II n'en etait rien cependant, et elle devait s'enrichir encore de l'oeuvre de Guillaume d'Occam." E. Gilson, "La Philosophie Franciscaine," Saint Francois d'Assise: son Oeuvre, son Influence, 1226-1926 (Paris, 1927), p. 171. In his positive assessment of Ockhamism H. A. Oberman speaks of the "Franciscan school of interpretation" which "is apt to stress the orthodoxy and theological contribution of 'new' Franciscans such as Scotus and Occam." But this "is a relatively young, and, until recent years, a decidedly less vocal school of interpretation." The Honest ofMedieval Theology (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), p. 2. 1
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Does not the old Franciscan idea of a plurality of forms recur in his doctrine? Does he not show a feeling for experience and scientific demonstration as did Roger Bacon? Is not the skeptical tendency in his philosophy a reflection of the Franciscan tradition that always mistrusted reason alone and called for a divine illumination of the intellect for a knowledge of the truth? Is not his desire to uphold at all costs the truths of faith against the pretensions of the philosophers typically Franciscan? In raising these questions Gilson was inviting us to see Ockham as a man of his own time, the heir of a rich and varied tradition that he did not wish to abandon but improve and develop. Gilson did not say that Ockham was successful in his intention, that his philosophy and theology are a "true enrichment" of the Franciscan tradition. His main point was that Ockhamism grew out of that tradition, and that it was an effort to make a positive contribution to it. As a consequence Ockhamism is not fully intelligible in isolation from its Franciscan antecedents. In this paper I should like to confirm these general remarks by examining Ockham's doctrine of the divine ideas and their role in his theology. Ockham did not wish to flout the combined authority of the "saints and philosophers," who held that it is God's nature to know and understand. He warns his reader, however, that he should not think that the divine knowledge is the same as our own. The univocal term "knowledge" may be applied to both created and uncreated cognition, but they do not have the same definition. Strictly speaking, knowledge (scientia) in us is the result of a reasoning process called demonstration and it is possessed as a habitus of the intellect. Not so the divine knowledge. In God, knowledge and essence are one in every respect. They are distinct neither conceptually, as the Thomists claim, nor formally, as the Scotists maintain. Here as elsewhere, Ockham sees language leading us astray. We say "God is intellectual" or "God is an intellectual substance," the form of our language making it appear that "intellectual" is a specific difference predicated of God. In fact, the intent of the first proposition is that God is an intellect, and of the second proposition that God is a substance that is an intellect. In other 3
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E. Gilson, ibid., p. 174. In later writings Gilson stresses the skeptical tendencies in Ockhamism. See The Unity of Philosophical Experience (New York, 1937), pp. 61-91. In the History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York, 1955), p. 499, he speaks of Ockham's "dissolving influence" in medieval theology. Ockham, In I Sent., d. 35, q. I, C (Lyons, 1495). For Ockham's doctrine of the divine knowledge and ideas one can profitably consult G. Leff, William of Ockham: The Metamorphosis of Scholastic Discourse (Manchester, 1975), pp. 436-437 and M. M. Adams, William Ockham (Notre Dame, Indiana, 1987) 2, pp. 1011-1083. Ibid., E. 3
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words, these are essential or in quid, not in quale, predications. So it is with all statements about God, such as "God is a living, wise, knowing, willing substance." The meaning is that he is a substance that is intellect, life, wisdom, knowledge, will. Too much weight should not be given to grammatical constructions. These are usually based on some convenience or necessity; but no other reason can be given why one is allowed and another forbidden except the will of those using them (nec est hie aliqua causa quaerenda nisi voluntas utentium). Can it be demonstrated that God possesses knowledge? At the outset Ockham takes exception to Thomas Aquinas' manner of distinguishing between a knower and a non-knower and his demonstration of God's knowledge. A knower is different from a non-knower, according to St. Thomas, because a non-knower has only its own form, whereas a knower can have the form of other things by becoming assimilated to them through their species. Thus a non-knower is by nature more limited and restricted than a knower. Now limitation comes to a form through matter. Hence the reason why someone is a knower is his immateriality. But God is supremely immaterial. Consequently he possesses knowledge in the highest possible manner. Though Ockham agrees with this conclusion when it is rightly understood, he finds the argumentation behind it weak. A non-knower is receptive of the forms of other things as much as a knower. Does not Aquinas himself hold that the medium between the knower and its object receives the species of things? Of course Aquinas would reply that the medium receives species materially, not immaterially, as does a knower. This is in accord with his principle that what is received is received according to the mode of the recipient. But then he should have argued from the immateriality of the knower to the immaterial mode of its reception of species, rather than from the reception of species to the immateriality of the knower. In any case, Ockham undercuts this line of reasoning by denying, later in his commentary on the Sentences, that species are necessary to explain our knowledge of things. Ockham finds other difficulties with the Thomist proof of God's knowledge. God is the supreme knower and yet he is not receptive of the forms of other things nor are their species in him. Moreover, it is false that immateriality is the reason why someone is a knower: many accidents are immaterial and nevertheless they are not cognitive. Ockham sees no 6
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Ibid., F. St. Thomas, Summa Theoiogiael, 14, 1. Ockham, In II Sent., q. 14-15, ST.
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contradiction in God's creating an immaterial substance, such as the form of the heavens, as described by Averroes, which is not cognitive or receptive of other forms. Accordingly, Ockham finds no other reason why a being has knowledge except that it is its nature to be a knower. It is simply by nature (ex natura rei) that one being is cognitive and another is not. What kind of proof can be given that God knows or understands? None is possible according to Ockham that would assign a reason or cause for his understanding, for he has no cause. In the broad sense, Ockham says, an a priori argument can be given based upon the fact that God is the highest being. God is the supreme being — so the argument runs — and consequently he is intelligent, knowing, and cognitive. The proposition on which this conclusion rests is absolutely necessary, and so too is the conclusion. Although Ockham calls this a "demonstration," it does not appear to be a strict demonstration but rather a "persuasive" argument, for he does not think it possible to demonstrate the existence of one supreme being or God. Granted that God is a knower, and indeed the supreme knower, the next question Ockham takes up is the object of God's knowledge. What is the primary object of this knowledge, and to what does his knowledge extend? Duns Scotus was of the opinion that the divine essence is the primary and adequate object of the divine intellect - primary both in the order of origin and perfection. Developing a theme he found in Avicenna, Scotus conceived of "moments" in the divine knowledge — moments not in the temporal order, for God does not dwell in time, but stages in the order of nature. In this order God first knows his own essence absolutely. In the second "moment" he produces all possible creatures in his intellect in intelligible being and knows them. In the third "moment" the divine intellect relates its understanding to these intelligible objects and causes a relation of reason between them. In the fourth "moment" the divine intellect reflects on this relation and knows it. Hence all God's knowledge is virtually contained in his knowledge of his essence. 9
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' Ockham, In / Sent, d. 35, q. 1, C. Ibid., D. Ibid., d. 2, q. 10; Quodl., I, q. 1, (ed. Strasbourg, 1491). See L. Baudry, "Guillaume d'Occam, critique des preuves scotistes de l'unicite de Dieu." Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Litteraire du Moyen Age, 20 (1953), 99-112. Moreover, in Ockham's view only a persuasive argument can be given that God is the efficient cause of some effects; hence it is only probable that he knows them. See Quodl., II, q. 1. Ockham, In I Sent, d. 35, q. 3. Ibid., B. See Duns Scotus, Opus Oxon., I, d. 35, qu. unica, n. 10 (Paris, 1893), 10, pp. 548-549. See E. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot (Paris, 1952), pp. 281-282. See Avicenna, Metaph., VIII, 7 (Venice, 1508), fol. 100v-101v. 10 11
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There are many aspects of this Scotist doctrine that Ockham finds unintelligible. He is willing to grant that the first object of God's knowledge is his own self. Since nothing is more perfect than God, he is his own primary object, using "primary" in the sense of primacy of perfection. He is not primary, however, with a primacy of origin. Ockham does not agree that there are moments in the divine knowledge, so that in some sense he first knows himself and afterwards creatures. God understands everything in one unique and indistinct act. When several things are understood in the same act of knowing, one is not known before the others. Now God knows himself and creatures by one and the same act of knowing. Accordingly, God's knowledge of himself is not prior in origin to his knowledge of creatures. It is simply not true that the divine essence is known first, and in virtue of this knowledge creatures are subsequently known. Ockham also takes exception to Scotus' description of the divine essence as the primary adequate object of the divine knowledge. His description is correct, Ockham says, if adequate means "perfect," but not if it has the logical meaning of the prior object of which essential attributes are demonstrated. In the latter sense a triangle is a primary object with respect to its having three angles, as Aristotle explains in his Posterior Analytics. In this logical meaning of primacy of adequation, God himself is not the primary object of the divine knowledge, but rather the univocal notion of being, which is common to both him and creatures. Does God's knowledge extend to all his creatures? Does he know distinctly all things other than himself? Averroes thought he could demonstrate that God knows only himself. His most persuasive argument, in Ockham's view, is that a knowledge of lowly creatures is beneath God's dignity. As the most excellent and noble of all beings, it would lessen his perfection to know things other than himself. But Ockham does not find this convincing. It is not the nature of knowledge to be more or less perfect or equal to its object. Perfection of understanding is compatible with the lowliness or baseness of its object. Neither is dependence on an object of the essence of knowledge. It cannot be proved that the knowledge of the intelligence moving the heavens depends on the heavens. Moreover, knowledge in us is not always caused by an object; sometimes it is and sometimes it is not. It is entirely accidental to the object of a cognitive power that it move the power to act. God can give the sight of an object without the real object moving the power of sight, and then the sight is not caused by the object but directly by God. 15
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Ockham, In I Sent., d. 35, q. 4, D. In I Sent., d. 35, q. 3, R. See Aristotle, Post. Anal., I, 4, 73b32-74a3. " In I Sent., d. 35, q. 2, M. For the possibility of an intuitive knowledge of a non-existent 15 16
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Ockham also criticizes Averroes' description of the known object as the "perfection" of the knower. When we know a stone, the stone is not our perfection. Neither can God be called the perfection of himself when he knows himself, for this implies that he is not in every way the same as himself. When knowledge is caused by an object, the object is not formally and properly the perfection of the knower; it is only the efficient cause of his knowledge. When knowledge is uncaused, as in God's case, the object known is either identical with his knowledge, as when he knows himself, or the object is something he can create. Another objection to God's having a distinct knowledge of all possible creatures is their infinity. Ockham contends that this raises no serious problem, for it is not unreasonable that God, an infinite being, comprehend an infinity of things. Thus all attempts to demonstrate that God knows only himself and that he lacks a distinct knowledge of creatures fail. Equally indemonstrable, however, is the opposite thesis, that God knows everything: this is held with certainty only on faith. It is clear from Scripture that God knows all the details of the universe, but this is beyond the power of human reason to prove. If it could be shown that the divine knowledge extends to everything, this would be because God is the cause of everything besides himself; but the universal causality of God is not a matter of philosophical demonstration. Even if it could be adequately proved that he is the cause of everything, it would not be certain that he knows everything, for it cannot be proved from the nature of causality that a cause knows any of its immediate effects. Ockham grants, however, that a probable argument can be given that God's knowledge extends beyond himself. It is probable that God is the immediate cause of some effect, for if he produced nothing in the world his existence would be superfluous. On this ground it is also probable that he knows his immediate effects; but this argument is not conclusive nor sufficient to silence a stubborn adversary. Granted that God has a distinct knowledge of creatures, does this entail his having their ideas in his intellect? This is the next question Ockham raises. It was the common teaching of the medieval theologians that God does have the ideas of creatures in his mind, though they were far from 18
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object, see In I Sent., Prol., q. I Opera Theologica (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1967), I, pp. 38-39; Quodl. V, q. 5, VI, q. 6. The reference to Averroes is In XIIMetaph., c. 51 (Venice, 1574), 8, fol. 336rA. Ibid., E. Ibid., D. In Quodl. II, 2 Ockham contends that it can be reasonably held, but not adequately proven, that God knows or wills something besides himself. 18
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agreeing on the exact status of these ideas or their relation to the divine mind. Most of them, Ockham reports, claimed that the divine ideas are really identical with the divine essence and differ from it only through a distinction made by the mind (distinctio rationis). This was the teaching of most thirteenth-century masters of theology, including St. Albert, St. Bonaventure, and St. Thomas Aquinas. As a representative of this opinion Ockham chooses Henry of Ghent — a theologian closer to his own time. According to Henry of Ghent, Ockham says, God knows creatures both as really identical with himself and as distinct from himself. The first and essential object of God's knowledge is his own essence. This most perfect object alone befits the divine knowledge. In this first act of knowing God knows his essence in itself or absolutely. In a second act, by knowing his essence he knows all possible creatures, for he sees that his essence can be imitated in many different ways. Thus the divine essence is the means whereby God knows things other than himself. His essence is the means of knowing (ratio cognoscendi) creatures, and as such it is the divine idea of creatures. The divine idea is not the divine essence understood just in itself or absolutely, but as having a relation of imitability to other things. More precisely, the divine ideas are the relations of imitability of the divine essence to possible creatures. They are really identical with that essence and differ from it only as distinct ways the divine intellect conceives itself. This is as far as Ockham goes in reproducing Henry of Ghent's doctrine of the divine ideas. He does not tell his reader - perhaps because it did not suit his purpose — that Henry of Ghent, under the influence of Avicenna, conceived the divine ideas in still another way. The Arabian philosopher taught Henry of Ghent to think of these ideas as so many possible essences produced in the divine mind by God's knowledge of himself as imitable by creatures. In this view the divine ideas are not precisely the divine essence 20
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Ockham, In I Sent, d. 35, q. 5, B. See St. Albert, In I Sent., d. 35, E, 7; ed. A. Borgnet (Paris, 1893), 26, pp. 189-192; 9, pp. 192-195. St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 35, q. 1, 3 (Quaracchi, 1882), I, p. 608. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., I, 15, 2. Henry of Harclay also says that the "more common" opinion is that a divine idea is the divine essence with a relation of imitability. See A. Maurer, "Henry of Harclay's Questions on the Divine Ideas," Mediaeval Studies, 23 (1961), 178. For St. Thomas' doctrine of the divine ideas, see L. B. Geiger, "Les Idees Divines dans l'Oeuvre de S. Thomas," St. Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974. Commemorative Studies, ed. A. Maurer (Toronto, 1974), 2, pp. 175-209. For St. Bonaventure, see J. F. Quinn, The Historical Constitution of St. Bonaventure's Philosophy (Toronto, 1973), pp. 492-497, 506-509. Ockham, ibid. See Henry of Ghent, Quodl., IX, q. 2 (Paris, 1518), fol. 344v. For Henry of Ghent's doctrine of the divine ideas, see J. Paulus, Henri de Gand Essai sur les tendances de sa Metaphysique (Paris, 1938), pp. 87-103. "Modus tamen theologorum magis consuetus est appellare ideas ipsas rationes imitabili20 21
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or relations of instability of that essence, but rather a world of possible essences constituted by God's knowledge of himself. This was a departure from the usual thirteenth-century conception of the divine ideas and one that was to influence Duns Scotus and Ockham himself. Henry of Ghent was turning speculation about the divine ideas in the direction of creatures rather than the divine essence. He was proposing that the divine ideas are objects of the divine knowledge and that these objects constitute a world of possible creatures: an infinite pool of possibles from which God chooses some to be actually created. As we shall see, it was along these lines, though with profound differences, that both Scotus and Ockham solved the problem of the divine ideas. The basic mistake of the common theology of the divine ideas, in Ockham's view, is to identify them with the divine essence. Every attempt to explain them in these terms runs into insuperable difficulties. If they are really the divine essence, they are either precisely that essence, or relations of imitability of that essence, or a combination of the two. No theologian claims that they are the divine essence considered just in itself, for then there would be only one divine idea as there is only one divine essence. All agree that there are many divine ideas, and it was to explain their plurality that the masters of theology introduced the notion of relations of imitability into the theology of the divine ideas. Though the divine essence is one, it can be imitated or participated in many different ways by creatures, and these constitute the multiplicity of divine ideas. Ockham turns the full force of his dialectic against this notion of the divine ideas. What, he asks, is the nature of these relations of imitability? They cannot be real relations, for the theologians agree that the only real relations in God are the divine Persons. There is also consensus that God is not really related to creatures, though creatures are really related to God. Consequently we must suppose that the divine ideas are relations of reason (relationes rationis). But this is also untenable because a relation of this sort is an ens rationis, and this cannot be identical with an ens reale such as the divine essence. The remaining alternative is that the divine idea is a composite of tatis ... Sed positionem idearum secundum quod essentiae rerum appellantur ideae quoad naturas essentiarum secundum quod essentiae sunt optime exponit Avicenna in sua Metaphysica." Henry of Ghent, ibid. See Avicenna, Metaph. VIII, 7 (Venice, 1508), fol. lOOv10 lv. As A. C. Pegis has remarked, the reason why Henry turned to Avicenna to complete his doctrine of the divine ideas is that "the traditional Christian doctrine of the divine ideas is insufficient, in his eyes, to express the objective and distinct character of the essences which are the objects of the divine knowledge." A. C. Pegis, "The Dilemma of Being and Unity," Essays in Thomism, ed. R. E. Brennan (New York, 1942), 175.
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the divine essence and a conceptual relation of imitability. But this is also impossible because, on this supposition, the divine idea could not be described as the divine essence, for a composite is not identical with any of its components. For example, a composite of matter and form is not identical with either the form or the matter. Though Ockham does not explicitly appeal to his so-called razor in this connection, the principle of economy of thought is clearly operative in his rejection of relations of imitability as explanations of the divine knowledge of creatures. They are entirely superfluous. A created artist does not need them in order to produce his works of art; why should the divine artist require them? Ockham also believes it degrading for God to need these relations. Since he is self-sufficient and independent, his own essence should suffice for his knowledge of everything. No other entities or relations should be needed. In any case relations of imitability cannot account for God's knowledge of creatures. They either precede or follow that knowledge. If they precede it, they could not be the result of God's knowledge, as Henry of Ghent claimed; if they follow it, they could not be God's means of knowing creatures. What, then, are the divine ideas? Ockham's reply to this question begins, characteristically, with an analysis of the term "idea." It is a connotative or relative term, for it does not precisely signify one thing but rather one thing along with something else. Like all connotative terms it has only a nominal quiddity {quid nominis), not a real quiddity {quid rei). Hence it can be defined only nominally, as "something known by a productive intellectual principle to which that principle looks and is thereby able to bring something into real being." St. Augustine's description of the divine ideas happily confirms all the elements of this definition. "Where should these ideas be thought to reside," St. Augustine wrote, "except in the mind of the creator? He did not look to anything located outside himself in order to create, in accordance with it, what he created." If this is true, the ideas are objects known by the divine mind, which, as an intellectual, productive principle, gazes upon them in order to give real existence to creatures. St. Augustine also specifies that the ideas are within, not outside, the divine mind. 24
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Ockham, ibid., B. Henry of Harclay refers to some theologians who hold that the divine idea is a composite of the divine essence and a relation of imitability with respect to creatures, the former component being material and the latter formal. I have not identified these theologians. See A. Maurer, art. cit., p. 178. Ockham, ibid., C. Ibid., D. Ibid., E. See St. Augustine, De Diversis Quaestionibus 83, q. 46, 2; PL 40, 30. According to Ockham an idea is not a cause properly speaking but only in an extended sense, as everything presupposed for the production of something can be called a cause. See ibid., N. 24
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To the weight of St. Augustine's authority Ockham adds that of the Roman philosopher Seneca. After enumerating Aristotle's four causes, Seneca described a fifth, which he says was introduced by Plato. This fifth cause, in Seneca's words, is "the pattern which he himself (i.e. Plato) calls the 'idea'; for it is this that the artist gazed upon when he created the work which he had decided to carry out. Now it makes no difference whether he has his pattern outside himself, that he may direct his glance to it, or within himself, conceived and placed there by himself." The main point, Ockham agrees, is that ideas are examplars or patterns which a knower can gaze upon in order to produce something real. These classic descriptions of an idea, Ockham continues, fit neither the divine essence nor relations of imitability, but rather creatures themselves. All theologians agree that there are many divine ideas. To cite but one of them, St. Augustine claims that God created men through one idea and horses through another. But the divine essence is one and incapable of being many. Of course the theologians would concede this, but they would add that the divine essence can be identical with distinct ideas through its different relations to creatures. On this supposition there are many ideas in God, differing not in reality but only conceptually. But Ockham has already dismissed as unintelligible the notion of a divine idea as a conceptual relation that is identical with the reality of God himself. Thus every attempt to identify the divine ideas with the divine essence fails. And if they are not that essence, what else can they be except creatures? In fact, if we examine the above description of an idea we see that it perfectly fits creatures. An idea is something an artist or maker looks at and uses as a model of his work of art. What else but the creature does God know or look upon so that he can create it intelligently? Knowing his own essence is not enough; unless he knows what he is about to create, that is the creature, he works in ignorance and unintelligently, which is but another way of saying that he works without ideas. Ideas are posited in God on the analogy of ideas in an artist. Now, all the artist has to know in order to produce his work of art is something similar to what he intends to make. This is his exemplar or idea. So too, God has foreknowledge of the creatures he can create, and these creatures as preconceived by him are his ideas. Plato may have been wrong in thinking that 28
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Ibid., D. See Seneca, Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, LXV; trans. R. M. Gummere (London, New York, 1925), I, p. 449. Ibid., E. See St. Augustine, ibid. "Ergo cum Deus ipsammet creaturam producibilem praecognoscit, ipsamet vere est idea." Ibid. However, Ockham denies that God knows future contingent truths through ideas; these he knows through his own essence or knowledge. See In I Sent., d. 38, q. I, M. 28
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the ideas are realities, each really distinct from the other, as Aristotle interpreted his doctrine, but Plato was correct in his belief that these exemplars are not God but objects at which he looked when he produced the world. St. Augustine shared the Platonic view that the idea of man is man, man's essence, or universal man. So if the theologian is searching for the most suitable description of the divine ideas, he will say that they are creatures themselves. These observations of Ockham give us a better notion of what he conceived an idea or exemplar to be. It may be something real used as a model for making a similar reality, as a house may be the model for building another house; the architect, knowing the first house uses it as an exemplar for making a similar one. Or the architect may simply draw up the plan of a house and then use it to construct the same house. In this case the house is the idea of itself. As for the term "divine idea," it signifies directly (in recto) the creature itself conceived by God as something creatable, though indirectly (in obliquo) it also signifies the same creature produced in reality and the divine knowledge or knower. So the term can be applied to the creature but not properly to God or to his knowledge, for neither is an idea or exemplar. In Ockham's language the divine ideas are not means by which God knows creatures or likenesses representing creatures to the divine mind; neither are they beings produced by the divine mind (entia rationis). God can be said to know "through" them, but this does not mean that they move the divine mind, or are identical with it, or are objects located between the divine mind and other things known by God. The ideas are simply the things themselves that God knows to be other than himself and creatable by him. He may be said to know "through" them in the sense that they are objects terminating the divine act of knowing. The preposition "through" is used in a similar way when we say that in heaven we shall see God "through" his essence, meaning that we shall see the divine essence itself. If the divine ideas are not identical with the divine essence, why does St. Augustine describe them as eternal, immortal, and unchangeable? Are not these terms applicable to God alone? Ockham does not grant that the divine ideas can properly be called eternal; only God is eternal in the strict sense of a being that truly, really, and actually exists for all eternity. The divine ideas are said to be eternal only in the sense that God eternally and immutably knows them. In Ockham's words, they are not eternal "subjec31
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31 32 33 34
In I Sent., d. 35, q. 5, F. Ibid., H. Ibid., I. See St. Augustine, De Immortalitate Animae, IV, 6; PL 32, 1024. Ibid., K.
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tively," that is, as really existing eternally in God, but only "objectively," that is, as eternal objects of his knowledge. If they existed eternally in the divine mind as in a subject, their multiplicity would compromise the absolute oneness and simplicity of God; their eternal objectivity to the divine mind does not. In the Question devoted to the divine ideas in Ockham's commentary on the Sentences, he does not enlighten his reader further concerning the status of the divine ideas. We are given to understand that, though creatures, they are not "things" or "realities" really existing in God; they are nothing but objects known by him. But what precisely are they if not things? Ockham throws more light on this crucial point a little later, when inquiring if the perfections of creatures are in God. There he explains that the proposition "All things are in God" is equivalent to "All things are known by God," or "All things are creatable by God." To many of his predecessors and contemporaries, such as Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus and Henry of Harclay, the presence of creatures to the divine mind as possible objects of creation entailed their production in that mind in a special mode of being, called esse intelligibile, esse cognitum, or esse diminutum. But Ockham protests that these theologians have let their imagination run wild. Creatures are eternally known by God, but as objects of his knowledge they have no positive entity (entitas positiva). They are not things but no-thing (nihil). Indeed, as possible objects of creation, or "creatables," they are pure nothing (purum nihil)? 35
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Ibid., R. In I Sent., d. 36, q. 1, P. In his Summa Logicae Ockham criticizes those who would place ideas between God and really existing creatures: "... creaturae non sunt sic in Deo nec in cognitione Dei quasi quaedam media inter Deum et cognitionem Dei et illas creaturas extra productas, quasi primo sit Deus vel cognitio Dei, deinde sint quaedam aliquo modo distincta, eadem tamen realiter cum Deo, et postea creaturae distinctae realiter a Deo, sicut multi imaginantur." Summa Logicae, pars III-4, c. 6 (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1974), p. 780, lines 255-259. See Henry of Ghent, Quodl. IX, q. 2, fol. 344; Duns Scotus, Opus Oxon. I, d. 35, q. unica, n. 10 (Paris, 1893), 10, pp. 548-549; Henry of Harclay, in A. Maurer, "Henry of Harclay's Questions on the Divine Ideas," Mediaeval Studies, 23 (1961), 169-171. In a later Question on the divine ideas Harclay adopts the common view that they are the divine essence with relations of imitability respecting creatures. See ibid., 189. For Scotus, the production of the divine ideas is not a creation, for their esse intelligibile is not a real being. Scotus places the being of the divine ideas between real being and a simple being of reason (ens rationis). William of Alnwick, an "independent Scotist," opposed Scotus on this point; he denied that the divine ideas are produced by God in esse intelligible on the ground that this would amount to an eternal creation of the ideas. See William of Alnwick, Quaestiones Disputatae de Esse Intelligibili et de Quodlibet (Quaracchi, 1937), p. 124. See E. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot, p. 284, n. 2. Ockham, like Alnwick, denied the production of the ideas on the same ground. Ibid., R. In IV Sent, q. 7, M. 35 36
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If the divine ideas are not things (res), are they beings with only objective existence (esse obiectivum), like the flcta an artist makes up in his mind as models of what he intends to create? In that case their whole being would be their being known (eorum esse est eorum cognosci). * When Ockham claims in his Sentences that the divine ideas do not exist in the divine mind subjectively (i.e. as realities) but only objectively, as objects known, he seems to imply that they do indeed have objective existence there, but he does not explicitly say so. And in his later works, in which he no longer defends the flctum theory, he denies that the divine ideas have objective existence. In his Quodlibets he contends that if the objects of God's knowledge other than himself were flcta, from all eternity there would be a system of as many flcta as there can be different intelligible beings, endowed with so great a necessity that God could not destroy them, which is clearly false. Again, Ockham dismisses the flctum theory and the notion of objective existence as being superfluous. He sees no need to posit "another world of objective beings," which neither are nor can be real things. In short, what is not a thing (res) is entirely nothing. Ockham is here following his argument to its logical conclusion, paradoxical as it may be. How can a divine idea be nothing and still be an object of the divine mind? An analysis of the term "nothing" will help to clarify this. "Nothing" has two meanings according to Ockham. It can be a syncategorematic term, and then it is a universal negative sign predicable of all its inferiors. Thus we say "Nothing is running," meaning "John is not running," "Paul is not running," etc. "Nothing" can also be used as a categorematic term for something that is said to be "a nothing" (unum nihil). It can then have two meanings: (1) That which does not really exist or have any real being. In this sense an angel from eternity was "a nothing" because he did not really exist for all eternity. (2) That which neither has nor can have real being because it is contradictory for it to exist in reality. In this meaning a chimera is "a nothing," but not a man, for it is contradictory that a chimera really exist but not that a man exist. The being of creatures as an object of the divine mind (their esse cognitum) from eternity was a nothing in the first categorematic sense but not in the second. In other words, creatures did not really exist for all eternity, but it was not contradictory for them, eternally known by God, to exist in reality, provided that God chose to create them. Ockham does not expressly say that a divine idea is "a nothing" (unum nihil), but he implies this by his statement that a creature, known from all 3
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In I Sent, d. 2, q. 8, F. Quodl. TV, q. 19 (q. 35 in ed. J. Wey, St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1980, p. 473.92-96). Ibid., Ill, q. 4 (ed. Wey, pp. 218.97-219.100).
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eternity by the divine mind as something creatable, is unum nihil, for a divine idea is precisely something creatable to which God can give real existence. How God knows these non-existents or "nothings" which are the divine ideas Ockham does not pretend to understand. He is certain, however, that God does know everything, and this simply because he is God. The distinction between several meanings of the word "nothing" is not original with Ockham. Henry of Ghent differentiated between two senses of the term: a pure nothing (purum nihil) which is both impossible and unknowable, and a "nothing" in actuality which is possible and knowable. The Franciscan Matthew of Aquasparta also described two kinds of nonbeing or nothing: one absolute and the other relative. Absolute non-being is nothing in itself or in its cause, in potentiality or in actuality. It was nothing in the past, nor will it be in the future. It is not now, nor can it ever be. According to Matthew of Aquasparta, non-being in this absolute sense cannot be the object of knowledge, for the intellect is naturally directed to knowing being. However, it can know what is non-being in a relative sense (secundum quid), for this is not completely nothing. It is not actually something, but it can be something. It is nothing in itself, but it has being in its efficient or exemplar cause. This kind of non-being, Matthew writes, "is intelligible and it can be an object of the intellect." A prime example of a non-being in Matthew of Aquasparta's relative sense is a pure essence or quiddity, such as man or circle. An essence of this sort is not absolutely nothing; it is a definite something or object of thought. Of itself it does not actually exist, but it is possible for it to exist if God creates it. In short, it is something possible or creatable. As such, it is not something insignificant in Matthew's estimation; it is in fact a necessary, immutable, and eternal truth. Does not St. Augustine say there is nothing so eternal as the essence of a circle? Matthew of Aquasparta's reference to St. Augustine alerts us to the Augustinian Neoplatonism that inspired this notion of eternal essences. According to the Bishop of Hippo the divine ideas are immutable and eternal forms or likenesses (species) contained in the divine mind as archetypes of 41
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In I Sent, d. 36, q. 1, P. Henry of Ghent, Quodl., Ill, q. 9, fol. 61 v. Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones Disputatae Selectae de Cognitione, q. 1 (Quaracchi, 1903), p. 227. See A. C. Pegis, "Matthew of Aquasparta and the Cognition of Non-Being," Scholastica Ratione Historico-Critica Instauranda. Acta Congressus Scholastici Internationalis (Rome, 1951), 464. Matthew of Aquasparta, ibid., p. 232. See St. Augustine, De Immortalitate Animae, IV, 6; PL 32, 1024. 41
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creation. In the thirteenth century this Augustinian doctrine was blended with Avicenna's notion of the divine ideas as possible beings or essences which God actualized in creation. Matthew of Aquasparta was but one of several theologians who shaped this amalgam of St. Augustine and Avicenna; others were Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus. Central to their doctrine was the notion of a creatable essence as an immutable "something" in the order of essence that offered to the mind — both divine and human — a stable and eternal object of thought. Since an essence of this sort does not exist of itself but is only possible, awaiting the creative act of God in order to exist in reality, it can be described as relatively non-being or nothing. There is no place in Ockham's philosophy for the notion of essence as conceived by these theologians. In his view there are no essences, in their sense of the term, in the real world or in the mind, either human or divine. Ockham's criticism of his predecessors' doctrines of essences and universals was bound to have repercussions on his notion of the divine ideas. It is significant that he does not allow, strictly speaking, universal or general ideas in the mind of God. He insists that God has distinct ideas of both actual and possible creatures; but because creatures are individual, his ideas are primarily and precisely individual and not specific or generic. As we have seen, an idea is an exemplar to which God looks in order to create something; but only individuals are creatable. It follows that the divine ideas are precisely ideas of individuals and not of universals. There are distinct ideas of matter and form and all the essential and integral parts of individuals, but not of genera or differentia or other universals, for these cannot exist in reality. Neither are there distinct ideas of negations, privations, evil, sin, or anything else that lacks positive reality. Though God does not primarily or precisely have universal ideas, his knowledge extends to both the individual and the universal. His knowledge is not inferior to that of an artist or craftsman. An architect with a general plan of a house can build a particular house, but God has no need of universal ideas in order to create the world. His knowledge is infinitely greater than 45
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St. Augustine, De Diversis Quaestionibus 83, q. 46, 1-2; PL 40, 29-30. See E. Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, trans. L. E. M. Lynch (New York, 1960), pp. 80, 198-199. For Avicenna's notion of possible being, see G. Smith, "Avicenna and the Possibles," The New Scholasticism, 17 (1943), 340-357. For Ockham's critique of his predecessors' doctrines of universals, see In I Sent, d. 2, qq. 4-7. Guillelmi de Ockham, Opera Theologica, II (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1970), pp. 99-266. Ockham, In I Sent, d. 35, q. 5, M. Ibid., G. Since God can create an infinite number of things, there is an infinity of divine ideas. Ibid. 45
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that of any creature. Through his ideas of individuals he has a distinct and particular knowledge of everything he actually creates or can create, including the universals associated with them, such as their species and genera. He knows perfectly what he intends to create, not only in general but also in particular. A second important consequence of Ockham's critique of essence is his new conception of the divine ideas as nothing {nihil). The nothing described by Henry of Ghent and Matthew of Aquasparta as an object of the intellect is a something in the order of essence; it is a pure essence which of itself is not something actual but only potential with respect to existence. As A. C. Pegis has shown, Ockham revolutionized the notion of nothing by emptying it of the somethingness of essence, leaving nothing but the pure possibility of an individual's existence. The nothing which is the idea of a creature in the divine mind is a pure possibility of being — a possibility which is defined as the absence of contradiction. This nihil of possibility is "a remnant of the metaphysical destruction of pure essences" in the nominalism of William of Ockham. Ockham's reduction of the divine ideas to the status of nothing was even more radical than that of Duns Scotus. Scotus did not agree with Henry of Ghent that creatures, as eternal objects of the divine mind, possess the being of an essence (esse essentiae), for in Scotus' view this is a type of real being. If creatures, prior to creation, had this kind of reality they would not be created from nothing; and as eternal objects of God he would depend upon them for his knowledge. Hence Scotus insisted that a creature known by God for eternity is not something but nothing: lapis ab aeterno intellectus non est aliquid, sed nihil. But he thought this consistent with the creature's possession of a "diminished being" (esse diminutum) or "intelligible being" (esse intelligibile) in the divine mind. As eternally known by God they have objective being (esse objectivum). As we have seen, Ockham denies even this minimal being to the divine ideas. They are objects of the divine mind but their objectivity gives them no positive status as beings. In short, they are pure nothings. 50
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Ibid., R. A. C. Pegis, art. cit., 479-480. Duns Scotus, Reportata Paris., I, d. 36, q. 2, n. 29 (Paris, 1894), 22, p. 443. The point Scotus makes is that there is no dependence of the divine knowledge on the object God knows for eternity to be a possible creature, nor is there any dependence of the object on the divine knowledge: "Nec etiam videtur mihi quod ibi sit relatio aliqua propter aliquam dependentiam intellectionis divinae ad lapidem intellectum, ut patet, quia tunc non esset mensura ejus; nec etiam propter aliquam dependentiam e converso in lapide respectu intellectionis, quia lapis ab aeterno intellectus non est aliquid, sed nihil; igitur ejus nulla est dependentia, ut habet esse objective, et cognitum in Deo." so 51
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This is indeed a bold solution of the age-old problem of the divine ideas, but it is in perfect harmony with the principles and spirit of Ockhamism. No theologian in the Middle Ages was more concerned than Ockham to uphold the autonomy and liberty of God against all philosophical threats to these divine prerogatives. Ockham saw one of these dangers in the Platonic notion of ideas as models of creation that have some kind of being of their own. Whether these ideas are in the divine mind or outside it, God would depend upon them, and he would cease to be the absolutely free creator in whom Christians believe. In fact, according to Ockham God needs nothing but himself in order to know both himself and all possible creatures: It can be said that God himself, or the divine essence, is a single intuitive cognition as much of himself as of all things creatable and uncreatable - (a cognition) so perfect and so clear that it is also evident cognition of all things past, future, and present. Strictly speaking, God does not depend on anything besides himself in order to create. He does not need ideas, but only knowledge of ideas, and this is identical with himself. Ockham writes: In order to act, God has no need whatsoever of anything besides himself. So God does not need ideas in order to act, nor are ideas themselves required, properly speaking, so that God can act. All that is required is knowledge of the ideas themselves, and this is in every way God himself. From the fact that God is God, God knows everything. Ockham is here echoing Duns Scotus' insistence on the divine autonomy: Many things are said about the ideas (Scotus wrote), but even if they were never said, nay, even if the ideas were not mentioned, no less will be known about Thy perfection. This is established, that Thy essence is the perfect reason of knowing (ratio cognoscendi) every knowable whatsoever under every reason of the knowable. Let him who wishes call it an idea. I do not intend here to delay over that Greek and Platonic word. But Ockham had to take the divine ideas more seriously than Scotus, because for Ockham the divine essence is not the exemplar of creatures. They have their own exemplars in the divine mind, and these are nothing but creatures themselves as eternal objects of God's knowledge. 53
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In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, M; translated in M. M. Adams and N. Kretzmann, William Ockham, Predestination, God's Foreknowledge, and Future Contingents (New York, 1969), Appendix I, p. 90. In I Sent, d. 35, q. 5, R. Duns Scotus, De Primo Principio, cap. IV, concl. 10; revised text and translation by E. Roche (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1949), p. 147. God's knowledge of the ideas adds nothing to the knowability of his essence; concl. 9, additio, p. 110. 53
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Ockham's problem was to reconcile the need for divine ideas with the divine autonomy and independence, and he solved this by reducing the ideas to the status of "nothing." Because they are stripped of all positive being, the ideas can still be objects of God's knowledge and yet pose no threat to his self-sufficiency. Even if God were said to depend on them, he would still depend on nothing. The question remains why Ockham felt he had to identify the divine ideas with creatures rather than with the divine essence as the majority of his immediate predecessors had done. The answer brings to light the Platonism of his position and his adherence to an old Christian tradition that the divine ideas in some sense are creatures of God. As we have seen, Ockham did not think that the divine essence, because of its absolute oneness and simplicity, offers to the divine mind the multiplicity of objects needed for the creation of the world. If St. Augustine was right — and what medieval theologian would say he was not? — God created a man through one idea and a horse through another. So there must be a plurality of ideas in the mind of God, and this plurality cannot be identified with the one divine essence. The reason for Ockham's rejection of the Thomist and Scotist doctrines of the ideas is that, in his view, they failed to account for the plurality of the ideas as objects of the divine knowledge. If the ideas are really identical with the divine essence, and this essence is absolutely one, it presents to God but a single object of knowledge. Like all Platonists, Ockham required ideas that are other than the artist who fashioned the world, and which are different from each other. Without this otherness, and consequent plurality, the world would not be intelligible to God. This is not the place to show how St. Thomas was able to reconcile the oneness of the divine essence with the multiplicity of the ideas through his novel conception of God as Ipsum Esse, * or how Duns Scotus was able to do this with his notion of God as Infinite Being. Ockham's metaphysics did not allow him to follow the paths of either of these predecessors. For him, a being is a thing (res), and what is not a being is no-thing (nihil). Since the divine ideas cannot be things, for the reasons that have been given, Ockham 56
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In the 9th centuiy John the Scot, called Eriugena, taught that the divine ideas are creatures because they have been produced and formed by God within his Verbum, though they are not properly created because they are eternal. For Eriugena, the ideas are not nothing but something (aliquid)-, God should be called nihil owing to his transcendence to all creatures. See De Divisione NaturaeV, 16; PL 122, 887D-888A. See E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York, 1955), pp. 117-119. A. C. Pegis has examined Ockham's complex relationship to Platonism in his article, "The Dilemma of Being and Unity," 151-183. See A. C. Pegis, ibid. See E. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot (Paris, 1952), pp. 279-306. 56
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drew the inevitable conclusion that they are absolutely nothing (purum nihil). At the beginning of this paper it was suggested that Ockham was both a traditionalist and an innovator, a reactionary and a revolutionary. This is borne out by his doctrine of the divine ideas. Ockham remained in the Christian Platonic tradition in placing ideas in God's mind to account for his knowledge and creation of the world. His Platonism is particularly evident in his refusal to identify the ideas with God himself and in his description of them as multiple objects of God's knowledge. The newer, thirteenthcentuiy conception of the ideas as really the same as God, and as expressing multiple relations of instability respecting creatures, appeared to him inconsistent with the divine oneness and simplicity. In reaction to this he returned to an older medieval view of the ideas as creatures themselves as eternal objects of the divine knowledge and possible choices of creation. Ockham's novelty appears in his conception of being as radically individual and his denial to reality of all community or universality; in short, in what is traditionally called his nominalism. His elimination of essences from things goes hand in hand with his banishment of them from the divine ideas, with the consequence that the ideas are individual like the creatures of which they are the exemplars. Nowhere was Ockham more revolutionary than in his reduction of the ideas to the status of nothingness, understood as the possibility of existence and pure objectivity to the divine mind. Only when emptied of all positive being and essence are the Platonic ideas free to enter Ockham's Christian theology, for only then do they pose no threat to the absolute freedom and omnipotence of God. 60
In Quodl. VI, q. 6. Ockham likens God's eternal vision of possible creatures as nihil to the intuitive knowledge of non-existents that God is able to produce supernaturally in us. "Unde Deus ab aeterno vidit omnes res factibiles, et tamen tunc nihil fiierunt." 60
18 Ockham on the Possibility of a Better World In his William James lectures, published under the title The Great Chain of Being, Arthur Lovejoy formulated "the Principle of Plenitude" which he found latent in the philosophy of Plato. This Platonic principle asserts that the universe is full of all conceivable kinds of living things; "that no genuine potentiality of being can remain unfulfilled, that the extent and abundance of the creation must be as great as the possibility of existence and commensurate with the productive capacity of a 'perfect' and inexhaustible Source ,.." According to Lovejoy, this principle of plenitude passed through Neoplatonism into the theology and cosmology of medieval Christendom, and from there it had an enormous impact on modern Western thought. It was this principle, for example, that led Leibniz to affirm that this is the best of all possible worlds. For if God, the creative source of the world, is all-good and perfect, he cannot fail to have produced all conceivable forms of being, from the highest to the lowest, and to have fashioned them in the best possible manner. Lovejoy further argued that this principle, introduced into medieval thought especially by St. Augustine and Dionysius, came into conflict with the Christian doctrine of the freedom and omnipotence of the Creator God. The Platonic view of the necessary diflusion of the divine goodness to the full range of its power and the Christian dogma of the freedom of God in creation produced an internal strain in medieval theology. St. Thomas Aquinas was especially criticized by Lovejoy for affirming the principle of plenitude "quite unequivocally and unqualifiedly," while at the same time 1
2
Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being. A Study of the History of an Idea (New York, 1936), p. 52. Ibid., pp. 144-182. For Leibniz' doctrine, see his Theodicy, 194, trans. E. M. Huggard (London, 1951), pp. 248-249; The Monadology, 53-60, trans. R. Latta (Oxford, 1898), pp. 247-250; The Principles of Nature and Grace, in T. V. Smith and M. Greene, From Descartes to Kant (Chicago, 1940), p. 364. 1
2
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holding that "though the divine intellect conceives of an infinity of possible things, the divine will does not choose them all; and the existence of finite things is therefore contingent and the number of their kinds is arbitrary." The only medieval schoolmen, Lovejoy contended, for whom this conflict of ideas did not arise were the "extreme anti-rationalists," particularly the Scotists and William of Ockham. These men "held the arbitrary and inscrutable will of the deity to be the sole ground of all distinctions of value." Consequently they posited no rational basis of the goodness of creatures but solely the will of God. As a consequence of their voluntarism, they maintained that "the world contained whatever it had pleased its Maker to put into it; but what sort of creatures, or how many of them, this might mean, no man had any means of judging, except by experience or revelation." The conflict of ideas that Lovejoy alleged to have occurred in St. Thomas' thought through his acceptance of the principle of plenitude is not our present concern. It has been convincingly shown that this conflict is not really present in Thomism but is of Lovejoy's own making. Unlike the Neoplatonists, St. Thomas did not hold that the world emanated necessarily from its divine source, but rather that it was created by a self-sufficient and autonomous God, who out of his goodness and generosity freely willed to share his perfection with creatures. The only necessary object of God's will is himself; he wills creatures not because of any need on his part but as a free expression of his goodness. Neither do we intend to discuss the supposed anti-rationalism of Duns Scotus and his followers. Recent studies have shown that according to Scotus there is nothing irrational in the works of God; that in fact he assigned a central role to the divine intellect in determining good and evil. This paper focuses rather on the case of William of Ockham. Did he in fact reject the principle of plenitude, and if so, on what grounds: 3
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Lovejoy, ibid., p. 75. Ibid., p. 70. Ibid. See A. C. Pegis' reply to Lovejoy in Saint Thomas and the Greeks (Milwaukee, 1939); also H. Veatch, "A Note on the Metaphysical Grounds for Freedom, with Special Reference to Professor Lovejoy's Thesis in The Great Chain of Being'," Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearch! (1947) 391-412, and A. Lovejoy's reply, pp. 413-438. A. C. Pegis, "Principale Volitum: Some Notes on a Supposed Thomistic Contradiction," ibid., 9 (1948) 51-70; A. Lovejoy, "Necessity and Self-Sufficiency in the Thomistic Theology: A Reply to President Pegis," ibid., 71-88, and A. C. Pegis' reply, ibid., 89-97; A. Lovejoy, "Comment on Mr. Pegis's Rejoinder," ibid., 284-290, and A. C. Pegis' reply, ibid., 291-293. "Ainsi, Duns Scot enseigne simultanement qu'il ne peut y avoir d'arbitraire irrationnel dans les ceuvres de Dieu, mais que le choix (non l'essence) de chaque ordre rationnel depend de sa volonte. C'est en ce sens qu'il fout entendre les declarations relatives au bien et au mal, qui semblent les soumettre a l'arbitraire du vouloir divin" (E. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot [Paris, 1952], p. 611). 3 4 5 6
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philosophical or theological? More particularly, what were his views on the possibility of a better world? Could God create a variety of worlds the same or different from our own, and better than ours? The answers to these questions reveal Ockham as both a theologian and a philosopher, anxious to maintain the Christian truth of the freedom and omnipotence of God, but at the same time carefiil to do justice to the rational claims of the philosophers who uphold the principle of plenitude. I While commenting on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, Ockham reached the point where the Lombard treats of the power and omnipotence of God. The Lombard takes the orthodox Christian stand that God is all-powerful, and in this connection he criticizes theologians such as Abelard, who in his view restricted the power of God by denying that he can create things he has not created or make them better than he has made them. Of course, God could not beget a Son better than the one he did, as St. Augustine correctly points out, but this is because the Son is equal to the Father. But when it is a question of creatures, who are not equal to God or consubstantial with him, he can make others better than those he has created, and he can make those he has created better than they now are. On the occasion of these remarks of Peter Lombard, his medieval commentators were accustomed to discuss at length problems concerning God's power to create, the range of his creative power, his freedom to create or not create, and the possibility of his creating a better world. Ockham follows this tradition with a series of Questions on the divine power, two of which are especially important for his views on the principle of plenitude. They are: Can God make things he has not made nor will make? (1 Sent. 43, 1), and: Can God produce a world better than this world? (1 Sent. 44, 1). In his discussion of the first question, Ockham begins by assuming that God is the efficient cause of things. The assumption is obviously necessary, 8
9
Peter Lombard, Sententiae in IVLibris Distinctae, 1, 1, d. 44, c. 1 (Grottaferrata, 1971), pp. 303-304. The Lombard refers to certain scrutatores who claimed that God cannot make something better than he has made it, for if he could and did not he would be envious and not supremely good (p. 304, lines 1-4). This is a reference to Abelard (p. 303, n.). See Abelard, Theologia Christiana, 5 (PL 178, 1326B-1327B); Theologia 'Scholarium' 3.5 (PL 178, 1093D, 1094C). The reference to Augustine is from Abelard (ibid., 1054A), In libro quaestionum 83, 50 (PL 40, 31-32). St. Thomas also refers to this position of Abelard, whom he calls "magister Petrus Almalareus" (Almarareus), in De potentia Dei, 1.5. "Circa istam quaestionem primo supponendum est quod Deus est causa effectiva rerum"; 1 Sent., 43.IB (Lyons, 1495). 8
9
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for if God were not their efficient cause there would be no point in inquiring whether he can make something he has not made nor will make. Now this assumption is not groundless, in Ockham's view, for it rests not only on the Christian faith but also on the teaching of philosophers such as Aristotle. In his early work, the commentary on the Sentences, Ockham interprets Aristotle as holding that God is the efficient cause of the celestial Intelligences and through them the remote cause of all other things. He rejects the opposing interpretation, that God is not the efficient cause of the world but only its final cause, moving it solely as an object of love. Ockham's reading of Aristotle at this early stage was clearly influenced by Duns Scotus and, before him, by Avicenna. Like Scotus, Ockham thought that according to the mind of Aristotle God is the efficient cause of the total being of the Intelligences, who in turn produced the sublunar world. The obvious objection to this Neoplatonic understanding of Aristotle is that he defines an efficient cause as "the source of the beginning of motion." Since God does not bring the Intelligences into being by moving or changing matter but by producing their total being, they cannot be efficiently produced by God. Ockham meets this difficulty by distinguishing between two Aristotelian uses of the term "efficient cause." In one sense an efficient cause brings about its effect by moving or changing matter; in another sense it is "that at whose existence there follows the existence of something else." In this second meaning of the term God can be the efficient cause of the Intelligences, since they are produced not by motion but by creation. The distinction between two kinds of efficient cause, one of which is a principle of motion or change and the other a principle of being, originated not with Aristotle but with Avicenna. The distinction was well-known among thirteenth-century schoolmen. Ockham inherited it from them, reworded it in terms of his own sequential notion of cause, and used it in his 10
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"Intentio ergo Philosophi est quod Deus ut (leg. est) causa immediata et totalis omnium substantiarum separalarum; sed generabilium et corruptibilium (secundum eum) non est causa immediata nec totalis nec partialis, sed tantummodo mediata"; 2 Sent, 6C. Ibid., A. Scotus, Rep. Paris., 2.1.3, nn. 5-9; 22 (Paris, 1894), pp. 532-536. See E. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot, pp. 331-332. For Avicenna's doctrine of creation, see L. Gardet, La pensee religieuse d'Avicenne (Ibn Sina) (Paris, 1951), pp. 62-68. "... sed Deo non convenit diffinitio causae efficientis, quia quinto Physicorum et alibi frequenter dicit Philosophus quod causa efficiens est unde principium motus ...," Ockham, 2 Sent 6B. See Aristotle, Metaphysics, 5.2 (1013a29) Physics, 2.3 (194b29-31). Ockham, ibid., C. Avicenna, Metaph., 6; 1 (Venice, 1508), fol. 91rb. See E. Gilson, "Notes pour l'histoire de la cause efficiente," Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen age 31 (1962) 7-31; W. Dunphy, "St. Albert and the Five Causes," ibid., 41 (1966) 7-21. 10
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;
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interpretation of the causal power of God when commenting on the Sentences. Later, in his Quodlibets, Ockham abandoned this rendering of Aristotle in favor of the Averroistic view that God is only the final cause of the world. When Ockham wrote this work he no longer believed that according to Aristotle God is the immediate efficient cause of the separated substances, and through them the remote efficient cause of the sublunar world. Rather, it was Aristotle's mind that "the Primary Being is the final, but not the efficient cause of other things, because he [i.e. Aristotle] holds that the heavenly bodies, with other lower causes, produce these inferior beings." The Avicennian interpretation of Aristotle in the commentary on the Sentences has given way, in the Quodlibets, to the Averroistic notion that God causes the world only as an object of desire or love. Both in the commentary on the Sentences and the Quodlibets Ockham strictly limits the power of human reason to prove convincingly anything about God's causal relation with the world. He denies that natural reason can prove that God is the immediate efficient cause of all things; indeed that he is the efficient cause of any effect. No adequate proof can be given that there are other effects than generable and corruptible beings, and their efficient causes are the natural bodies in the sublunar world and the heavenly bodies; and there is no adequate proof that the heavenly bodies, or the separate substances, have an efficient cause. It cannot even be proved that God is the remote or partial cause of any effect. Only persuasive arguments can be offered that God is the efficient cause of some effect. It can be argued, for example, that if God produced nothing his existence would be useless. Accordingly, in the discussion whether God can make things he has not made or will not make, it must be assumed (supponendum est) that God is the efficient cause of things. The arguments of the philosophers, based on natural reason, are no more than persuasions of this truth; it is known with certainty only by faith. Assuming that God is the efficient cause of the world, can natural reason prove that he produced it as a free and contingent cause? On this point 16
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"Ad ultimum dico quod intentio Aristotelis fuit quod primum ens sit causa finalis aliorum sed non efficiens, quia ponit quod corpora caelestia cum aliis causis inferioribus producunt omnia ista inferiora"; Ockham, Quodl., 4.2 (Strasbourg, 1491). For Averroes, the Intelligences exercise final and formal, but not properly efficient causality on the sublunar world. See Averroes, In IV De Caelo, 1; 5 (Venice, 1574), fol. 234A. Ockham, Quodl, 2.1. Neither can an adequate proof be given that God is the final cause of any effect. Quodl., 4.2. In his Commentary on the Sentences Ockham says that Aristotle proved by reason that God is the cause of all things, but not that he caused the world contingently or with a beginning in time. 2 Sent., 6B. 16
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Ockham's interpretation of the philosophers does not waver. It was their mind, he says, that God is not a free or contingent cause of the world, but rather that he produced it naturally. Even though the world issued from God acting through intellect and will, he caused the world by necessity of his nature (per necessitatem naturae). Moreover, Ockham does not think that human reason can conclusively disprove this position of the philosophers. All the arguments of St. Thomas and Duns Scotus to the contrary he rejects as inconclusive. In his De potentia Dei 3.15, St. Thomas gives four reasons for holding "that God brought creatures into being by no natural necessity but by the free choice of his will (ex libero arbitrio suae voluntatis)." The first argument is based on the premise that the universe as a whole is directed towards an end, for otherwise everything in it would happen by chance. Hence God had some end in view in the production of creatures. Could he have produced it acting through his nature and not through his will? No, for a natural agent does not determine the end for which it acts. It must be directed to an end predetermined by an intelligent and voluntary agent, which in the case of the universe can only be God. So God directs the universe to its end through his will, and consequently he produced creatures through his will and not by necessity of nature. The second Thomistic proof also stresses the difference between a natural and voluntary agent. A natural agent is limited to produce one effect equal to itself, unless there is some defect in its active power or in the recipient of the effect. Now farfrombeing defective, the divine power is infinite. Only one "effect" proceeds from it naturally, namely the Son, who is equal to the Father. Hence creatures, which are unequal to the divine power, proceed from the divine will. The third argument of St. Thomas is based on the fact that an effect preexists in its cause according to the mode of being of the cause. Since God is an intellect, creatures must preexist in him as in an intellect. But what exists in an intellect can be produced only by means of the will. Consequently creatures proceed from God by means of his will. The fourth argument also presupposes that God is an intelligent agent. Now his actions must be understood as immanent operations, like understanding and willing, not as transient actions such as heating or moving. The reason for this is the identity of the divine operations and the divine essence, which always remains within God and does not proceed outside of him. Hence everything God creates outside himself is created by the divine knowledge and will. 18
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1 Sent., 43, 1B-L.
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All these arguments lead to the same conclusion, in St. Thomas' view: "Therefore it is necessary to say that every creature proceeded from God through his will and not through necessity of his nature." After faithfully summarizing these Thomistic arguments, Ockham hastens to add that all of them are inconclusive. They prove that God produced creatures by his will, but they do not establish that this operation of willing was free and contingent. God may produce creatures through his will, as a voluntary agent, and yet produce them naturally and necessarily. Does not St. Thomas himself hold that the will acts in two ways, naturally and freely? Thus he says that the will wills the end naturally and the means to the end freely and contingently. Hence, the fact that God acts through his will does not entail that he does not act through necessity of nature. This is confirmed by the fact that philosophers like Aristotle held that the first cause acts through intellect and will, and yet that it acts by necessity of nature. And does not St. Thomas himself maintain that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the divine will and yet naturally and necessarily? There is no contradiction, then, in God's producing creatures through his will and yet through necessity of nature. Ockham's criticism of thefirstThomistic argument pinpoints the weakness he finds in all of them. Even though the divine will directs the universe to its end, it does not follow that it has ordained this end freely and contingently. St. Thomas contends that the will wills what is ordained to the end contingently and freely, even though it wills the end necessarily. While necessarily willing himself as the end, God wills creaturesfreelybecause they are ordained to that end. But Ockham insists that this explanation is insufficient, "because it has not been adequately proved that the divine will wills contingently what is ordained to an end, and yet this is in special need of proof." Accordingly, in Ockham's view St. Thomas has failed to prove the freedom of God as a creator. He has not demonstrated beyond all doubt that God 19
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" St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, 1, 82, 2; 41, 2 ad 3. Ockham, 1 Sent., 43, 1C. Ibid. Elsewhere St. Thomas gave this proof, but unfortunately Ockham does not seem to be aware of this; in any case he does not allude to it in the present context. The Thomistic proof rests upon the feet that only the divine goodness is the natural and principal object (principale volitum) of the divine will. As such, it alone is proportionate to the divine will and is willed necessarily. Similarly the human will necessarily wills its natural and proportionate end, which is happiness; but it wills particular goods freely. Since the good of creatures is not proportionate to the divine will, it does not necessitate that will but is willed freely and contingently. See St. Thomas, ST 1, 19, 3; De potentia, 1, 5; De Veritate, 23, 4; Contra gent., 1, 81. On God's freedom in creation, see A. C. Pegis, "Necessity and Liberty: an Historical Note on St. Thomas Aquinas," The New Scholasticism 15 (1941) 18-45. 20 21
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acted freely and contingently in his production of the universe. For a cause to act freely and contingently, nothing can impede its action, and, after equally regarding several options, it produces one and not the other. But according to an unbeliever such as Aristotle this is not the way God is related to the universe. The unbeliever would say that God immediately and equally regards everything producible, but that he necessarily produces the first Intelligence, and by means of it he produces other things, or that the first Intelligence itself produces them. Only if it could be demonstrated by natural reason that God created the universe with a beginning in time (de novo), freely choosing one creature in preference to another possible one, could one prove contingency in him. But no adequate proof of this is possible. If it is impossible to demonstrate contingency in God in the Thomistic manner, by considering the nature of the divine will, can this be done beginning with contingency in things? This is the method of Duns Scotus. The fact that contingent events occur in nature is proof to him that the first cause acts contingently. If the first cause produced its effect necessarily, this effect, acting as a second cause, would in turn produce a necessary effect, and so on for the whole series of causes. So the whole chain of primary and secondaiy causes would act necessarily, with the result that nothing would happen contingently. Since second causes cause only through the power of the first cause, the fact that they do cause contingently is proof of the contingency of the first cause. The same conclusion can be drawn from the existence of evil in the world. A necessary cause, Scotus argues, produces its effect in the recipient to the greatest possible extent. Now the effect of the first cause is goodness and perfection. Hence, if the first cause acted necessarily, it would produce the greatest possible amount of goodness in things, and there would be no evil in them. Moreover, the existence of second causes itself argues against the necessary causality of the first cause. An agent acting necessarily acts to the limit of its power (causa necessario agens agit secundum ultimum potentiae suae). Consequently, if the first cause acts necessarily, it produces everything it can produce. Now it can produce everything producible. Therefore, in the event that the first cause acted necessarily, there would be no second causes. 22
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"Dupliciter accipitur ... producere aliquid contingenter. Uno modo quod simpliciter potest... producere et non producere. Et isto modo quidquid producit quemcumque effectum, producit contingenter, quia potest Deus facere quod non producat. Alio modo accipitur pro illo quod producit aliquem effectum, et nullo variato ex parte sua nec ex parte cuiuscumque alterius habet in potestate sua ita non producere sicut producere, ita quod ex natura sua ad neutrum determinatur." 1 Sent., 1, 6, 1 (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1967), p. 501, lines 2-11. 2 Sent. 6BC. 1 Sent. 43, IG. These arguments of Scotus are taken from his Opus Oxoniense (Ordinatio), 1, 8, pars 2, q. unica; 4 (Vatican City, 1956), pp. 310-315. See E. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot, pp. 270-278. 22
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In a note appended to these arguments Scotus concedes that they would not convince the philosophers (non valent contra philosophos). Ockham readily agrees that they are inconclusive from the philosophical point of view. It cannot be evidently proved that because something occurs contingently the first cause acts contingently. The philosophers would reply that the contingency of the effect may result from the contingency of the action of some creature, such as the activity of the created will. The will is a contingent cause, according to the philosophers, and however much other causes may act naturally, when it concurs with them the resultant effect is contingent. The feet that the will is moved or conserved by a necessary first cause does not necessitate its action; it may be left free to act or not to act. The concurrence of the will may also account for evil in the world. We need not suppose that the first cause is the immediate and total cause of everything, and hence that evil is to be imputed to it; the created will has a role in many effects, and evil may reside in it, not in the divine will. In general, to prove that secondaiy causes have no part in causation, one would have to demonstrate by natural reason, in opposition to the philosophers, that God, acting by himself, can cause everything producible, or that he immediately concurs in its production. But neither of these is susceptible of proof. By "proof" in this context Ockham means a strict demonstration or "sufficient proof," which would dispell all doubt and settle the matter philosophically. He grants that persuasive arguments can be given that God is the immediate cause of all things, and that he is a free and contingent cause, but these do not amount to demonstrations. Human reason simply cannot disprove the opposite thesis of the philosophers, that God, as the first cause, stands in necessary relation to his effects, and that these effects flow from him in hierarchical order, from the first Intelligence, who proceeds immediately from him, to the lowest material bodies in the sublunar world. From the standpoint of natural reason, this world of the philosophers is entirely plausible. This world constitutes a "great chain of being," to use Lovejoy's phrase, flowing from the first cause as naturally and necessarily as effects from the sun. 25
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Scotus, ibid., p. 313, note a. Ockham, ibid., H. Ibid., K. Ibid., L. "Ideo quod Deus sit causa libera respectu omnium tenendum est tanquam creditum, quia non potest demonstrari per aliquam rationem ad quam non responderet unus infidelis; persuaderi tamen potest sic ...," 2 Sent., 4-5, E. For Ockham's notion of demonstration, see D. Webering, Theory of Demonstration according to William Ockham (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1953). 25 26
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Of course, to Ockham the Christian theologian, this is not the truth of the matter. For this we must turn to the faith, which teaches that God is a cause that acts contingently, and that he can produce the world of generable and corruptible bodies immediately and totally. And because God is a contingent cause, he is not limited to produce creatures as he has in fact done. He can make some that he has not made; for instance, he can produce an infinity of souls, though in fact he will create only afinitenumber. Can he create more worlds than he actually has created, worlds different from, and better than, our own? It is to this question that we now turn. 30
II Before answering the question whether God can create a better world, Ockham clarifies the meaning of the terms "world" and "better." A world can be understood in two senses: (1) as the total aggregate of all creatures, whether substances or accidents, or (2) as a whole composed of a multitude of things contained under one body and the body containing them. In the second sense "world" can be taken precisely for its substantial parts or indifferently for everything contained in it. Ockham specifies that in the present discussion he is using the term "world" to mean "precisely one universe composed as it were of parts that are substances, not as including accidents with substance." The second sense of the term "world" is the one familiar to medieval physics through the works of Aristotle. This cosmos was a vast but finite sphere whose outermost limit was the sphere of the fixed stars; within this sphere were contained the planetary spheres, which in turn enclosed the sublunar world of the four elements, with the spherical earth at the center. Ockham's second description of this world is close of that of Richard of Middleton, which runs as follows: "I call the universe the collection of creatures contained within one surface — which is contained by no other surface within that universe — including also the surface that contains these creatures." Richard of Middleton's specification that the surface of the 31
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1 Sent., 43, IN. "Sed in ista quaestione accipiendus est mundus praecise pro uno universo quasi composito ex partibus quae sunt substantiae, et non secundum quod includit accidentia cum substantia" (1 Sent. 44, IB). This description of the world fits in well with Ockham's doctrine of a collective whole. A world has the same kind of unity as a city, a nation, an army, a kingdom, the church, or a university. They are not one reality but an aggregate of individuals having only the unity of a collection (unitas collectionis). See Quodl., 7.13; In libros Physicomm, Prol., ed. P. Boehner, Ockham, Philosophical Writings (London, 1957), p. 7. "Respondeo, vocando universum universitatem creaturarum infra unam superficiem contentarum, quae a nulla alia superficie continetur infra illam universitatem, comprehen30
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sphere containing the universe is not itself contained within the surface of another sphere rules out the hypothesis that our universe might be encased in another; that beyond the outermost sphere that limits our world there might be another world contained in another sphere far distant from that which encircles our own. This hypothesis of several worlds, one included in another like layers of an onion, was raised and rejected by William of Auvergne on the ground that the outermost sphere of the second world, enveloping and containing the heavens of that world, would also contain the outermost sphere of our world, and thus it would constitute but one world. The supposed two worlds would be contiguous, one enveloped in the other, with no void separating them, for Aristotle proved convincingly that there is no void in nature. Against this background, Ockham's second definition of a world as "a whole composed of a multitude of things contained under one body and the body containing them" becomes clearer. The containing body is the outermost sphere of the universe that envelops and contains the heavens and the earth. Properly speaking, the parts included in the universe are its substances, not its accidental properties. There are qualities in the universe really distinct from substances, but these accidents are not contained in the universe as principal parts but as modifications of substances. What is meant by asking whether God can create a "better" world? One thing can be better than another essentially or accidentally. A universe essentially better than the present one would be different from it in species and not only in number; that is, it would contain individuals of more perfect species than those in our present world. A universe accidentally better would contain individuals of the same species as ours but their goodness would be heightened. Having clarified the terms of the question, Ockham proceeds to answer it. He holds it as possible that God can produce another universe substantially or essentially better than ours. He sees no compelling reason why God cannot create substances more perfect in species than any he has created, and this to infinity. Can he not increase the perfection of a quality, such as grace, without limit? Why can he not increase the goodness of individuals to the point where they constitute a new and better species? Even if one maintains that there is a limit to the perfection of a creature, so that there is a most 33
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dendo etiam superficiem continentem." Richard of Middleton, 1 Sent. 44, 4 (Brescia, 1591; rpt. Frankfurt, 1963), p. 392. William of Auvergne, De universo, primae partis principalis, pars 1, cap. 13; 1 (Paris, 1674), p. 607. Ockham, 1 Sent, 44, IB. 33
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perfect substance possible for God to create, it can still be held as probably true that God can create another world distinct in species from our own, and hence substantially better than ours. For confirmation of this Ockham appeals to both St. Augustine and Peter Lombard. According to St. Augustine, God could have made a man who could neither sin nor will to sin, and if he did there can be no doubt that the man would be better than ourselves. Ockham, for his part, contends that he would not only be better but he would belong to a different and higher species of man. The individuals in our human species are able to sin and will to sin. This he considers to be a defining property of our species, and hence it cannot be formally repugnant to any of the individuals in it. If there are individuals who cannot sin, they must belong to an inflma species of man different from ours. It follows that if God created such individuals, the universe in which they lived would belong to a different and better species than our own. An objection that readily occurs to a Christian is that Christ could not sin, and yet he belonged to the same human inflma species as we who can sin. Ockham replies that Christ's incapacity to sin was due to the fact that he possessed the divine nature. Sin was incompatible with the divine Word; it was not incompatible with the human nature united to the Word. If Christ's human nature were separated from the Word, it could sin. Ockham's hypothesis of a human nature specifically different from our own runs counter to the usual notion that man is an inflma species. How can there be a species of man different from the one we know? Ockham hopes to show the possibility by clarifying the meaning of the term "man." In one sense it means a composite of a body and an intellectual nature. Taken in this broad sense, man does not constitute a species specialissima or inflma species. In this meaning of the term there could be a man who is by nature incapable of sinning, but he would not belong to the same species as the man who can sin. In another sense, "man" means a composite of a body and an intellectual soul such as we have. Thus understood, man is an inflma species, and this human species would not contain the hypothetical man who is incapable of sinning. It is at least probable, therefore, that God could create another world better than the present one and specifically differentfromit. This better world would contain things of different species, and a greater number of species, 35
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Ibid., C. See St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, 11, 7 (CSEL, 28/3.340); Peter Lombard, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae, 1, 1, d. 44, c. 1; p. 304, lines 23-25. Ockham, ibid., D. Ibid. 35
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than our world. God could also create a better world that is only numerically different from ours. Nothing prevents him from creating an infinite number of individuals of the same species and nature as those existing in our world; nor is he restricted to creating them within the confines of our world. He could produce them outside our world and form another world from them, just as he has already formed our world from the things he has created. The hypothesis of a plurality of worlds was not new in Ockham's day; it was debated throughout the thirteenth century in the wake of the translation of Aristotle's works into Latin. The scholastics could then read his arguments that there can be only one world. If there were a number of worlds, Aristotle reasoned, they would contain elements of the same nature as ours; otherwise they would be worlds in name only. They would be equivocally the same as our world. Now, each of the four elements has its proper place. For example, earth is at the center and fire is at the circumference of our world. When they are removed from these places they naturally tend to return to them: earth naturally moves downwards to the center and fire naturally moves upwards to the circumference. On the supposition of a plurality of worlds, the particles of earth in the worlds outside our own would naturally move to our center, and their fire would move to our circumference. If they did not, they would naturally move away from the center and circumference of our world, which is contrary to their nature. Hence there cannot be many worlds. The possibility remains that there are many worlds, each with its own center and circumference. On this hypothesis, earth in each of them would always move to the center and fire to the circumference, but to numerically different centers and circumferences. Individual particles of the same species would then naturally move to the same place in species but not in number. But Aristotle rejected this possibility on the ground that there would then be no reason why in our own universe different particles of earth would move to numerically different centers — which is contrary to the evidence of the senses. So there can be only one center to which all particles of earth, having the same form or nature, naturally move, and one circumference to which all particles of fire naturally move. In short, there can be only one world. Aristotle also reasoned that there cannot be many worlds because the heavens of our own contain all the available material, with none left over for other worlds. Theoretically he saw no reason why the form or nature expressed by the term "world" could not be realized in many particular worlds, as the form of circle can exist in many particular bronze or gold 38
39
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38 35 40
Ibid., E. Ibid. See Aristotle, De caelo, 1, 8 (276al8-b22). Ockham, ibid. See Aristotle, ibid., 277al-13.
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circles. But this possibility is ruled out by the fact that the one instance of world perceptible to us exhausts all the matter, leaving none for other worlds. The case would be the same if one man were created containing all flesh and bones; there would be none left for other men. In the first half of the thirteenth century there were Christian thinkers who did not find these arguments convincing. Better informed than Aristotle through revelation, they believed that God created the world from nothing and that his infinite creative power is not exhausted by the production of a single world. Writing about 1225 or 1230, Michael Scot reported: "There are some who pretend that God, being omnipotent, had the power and is still able to create, over and above this world, another world, or several other worlds, or even an infinity of worlds, composing these worlds either of elements of the same species or nature as those that form this one, or from different elements." Michael Scot himself did not share this view. While acknowledging that God is all-powerful, he was too good an Aristotelian to think that in fact there could be many worlds. "God can do this," he wrote, "but nature cannot bear it, as Aristotle says in De caelo et mundo, book 1, chapter 3. It follows from the very nature of the world, from its proximate and essential causes, that a plurality of worlds is impossible. Nevertheless, God could do this if he wanted to." In other words, there is a distinction between the power of God taken absolutely and his power relative to the subject of his operation. He has the power, absolutely speaking, of doing many things that can never be realized because nature is not capable of receiving these actions of the divine power. This is the case with the creation of a plurality of worlds. Michael Scot's ingenious method of harmonizing Aristotle and the Christian faith was followed by others in the thirteenth century. William of Auvergne never doubted the omnipotence of God and yet, like Aristotle, he 41
42
Aristotle, ibid., 277b26-278b9. "Et dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod Deus potuit et potest ita cum isto mundo alium et alios facere, vel etiam infinitos cum sit omnipotens, et hoc ex elementis eiusdem speciei et naturae, vel etiam diversae. Sed ista positio insufficiens est. Et causa huius est quia, quamvis Deus possit hoc facere, non tamen natura hoc posset pati, ut habetur primo Caeli et Mundi, tertio capitulo. Quia quantum est de natura mundi impossibile est esse plures mundos, et hoc quantum ad eius causas proximas et essentiales, licet hoc Deus posset si vellet. Multa namque Deus de potentia sua apta posset facere quae respectu fieri non possunt. Cuius causa est quia non omnis potentia activa convertitur in passivam nisi solum quando patiens habet proportionatum et possibilitatem ad receptionem illius. Natura vero causata non est talis potentiae receptiva, quantum est de natura sui, scilicet quod sit receptiva plurium mundorum simul." Michael Scot, Super auctore spherae (Venice, 1518), fol. 105b. See P. Duhem, Etudes sur Leonardde Vinci 2 (Paris, 1909), pp. 73-74. For the history of the problem of plural worlds, see ibid., pp. 57-96, 408-423. 41
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could not conceive of a plurality of universes. He pointed out that the word "universe" itself contains the notion of oneness: a universitas is "a multitude gathered into a unity" (in unum versa multitudo). A "universe" of colors is the union of all colors under one genus. Similarly, there is a universe of beings all united by their sharing in the nature of being. Outside this universe there can be nothing. The oneness of the universe is also proved by the oneness of its divine source. In a similar vein, St. Thomas argued that the universe is one by its very nature. It has a unity which consists in the order of all its parts to each other and to its creator. Since the universe has one order, all creatures belong to one universe. The appeal to the omnipotence of God did not shake St. Thomas' conviction of the oneness of the universe, for God did not create the universe with sheer power but with wisdom, and wisdom demands that everything have one order and be directed to one end. St. Thomas was also sympathetic to Aristotle's arguments that the present universe exhausts all the available material, and that the elements, no matter how widely dispersed, naturally tend to one natural place. Of course, God could make the present universe better by creating many other species or by ameliorating all its parts. If the amelioration added to the universe's essential goodness, the result would be a different universe essentially and specifically better than ours; but in any case there would be but one universe. To the Franciscan Richard of Middleton this conceded too much to Aristotelianism and failed to give proper weight to the divine omnipotence. God could have produced another universe besides the present one, and he still has the power to do so if he wished. Nothing prevents this on his part, for he can do everything that does not include a contradiction, and a plurality of worlds is not contradictory. No finite universe exhausts the infinite creative power of God. Neither does anything on the side of the universe stand in the way of a plurality. Matter does not, for it has been created out of nothing; it was not created from a preexistent stuff that would limit the scope of the divine action. Moreover, there is no receptacle, such as space, which receives 43
44
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"Universitas, sicut apparet etiam ex ipsa nominatione, non est nisi in unum versa multitudo; versa autem non intelligitur nisi collectione, vel adunatione in aliquid, vel sub aliquo, quod tota ilia multitudo communicat; quemadmodum dicitur universitas colorum quae colligitur ad genus, et sub genere quod omnes colores communicant." William of Auvergne, De universo, primae partis principalis, pars 1, cap. 11; 1 (Paris, 1674), p. 605 C. St. Thomas, ST I, 47, 3. Ibid., ad 3. See In I De caelo et mundo, 19, 14 2 (Rome, 1886), pp. 78-79. St. Thomas, 1 Sent., 44, 1, 2; ed. Mandonnet, 1 (Paris, 1929), p. 1018. God has the power to create things he has not actually created, De potentia, 1, 5; ST, 1, 25, 5. Any world God created would be the best in relation to his goodness and wisdom; in short, there is no best of all possible worlds, De potentia, ibid., ad 15. 43
44 45 46
;
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the whole universe and makes it one. Neither do the special natures of the four elements prevent a plurality of worlds. God could create other worlds with elements of the same nature as ours. In these worlds earth would naturally move to the center and rest there, just as it does in our world. In the hypothesis of many worlds, each with its own center, earth would naturally tend to be at rest in whichever center it was first located, and it would not naturally tend to move to the center of another world. Richard of Middleton felt he was on sure ground in adopting this position, for in 1277 Stephen Tempier, the Bishop of Paris (and also a master of theology, as Richard pointedly adds), condemned the proposition that God could not produce many worlds. And this is not all that God can do. If God has infinite power, he could give the outermost sphere of the heavens, which according to the Aristotelians has only a circular movement, a lateral movement as well. He could also create a universe which, though not actually infinite or infinitely divided, could be expanded or divided beyond any given limit. Writing in an age in revolt against Greek necessitarianism, this Franciscan theologian was raising the possibility of viewing the universe differently from Aristotle and his commentators. Ockham's speculation about the possibility of other worlds shows the same effort to free Christian thought from the shackles of Aristotelianism. Like Richard of Middleton, he does not consider Aristotle's arguments for the oneness of the world demonstrative. Elements of the same species need not move to numerically the same place; there can be several worlds, each with its own center and circumference, to which the elements would naturally tend if displaced from them. Ockham argues for this possibility not only a priori, like Richard of Middleton, but also from experience. If two fires are lighted in different places on the earth, say in Oxford and Paris, they naturally move upwards to the circumference of the heavens, but not to numerically the same place. Only if the fire at Oxford is placed in the same spot as the fire at Paris will it move to the same place as the fire at Paris. Similarly, if the earth of another world is placed in ours, it will by nature tend to the center of our world; but within the heavens of another world the earth will naturally tend to rest at its center. The reason why particles of earth in the two worlds will move to numerically different centers is not only that these particles are different in number, but also that they are in different situations in their 47
48
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Richard of Middleton, ibid. Tempier condemned the proposition: "Quod prima causa non posset plures mundos facere." Chartularium universitatis Parisiensis; ed. Denifle and Chatelain, 1 (Paris, 1889), p. 543, a. 473. See E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York, 1955), pp. 348-349. 47
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respective heavens. The case is similar to the two fires that move to different places on the circumference of our universe because of their different situations in this universe. It is true that the outermost sphere or circumference of our world is one continuous body and hence one in number; but it does not follow that two fires in different places on earth tend upwards to numerically the same place, for they move to numerically different parts of the circumference. With equal reason different particles of earth within the confines of distinct worlds could move to different centers. But if a particle of earth in another world naturally moves to the center of that world, would it not naturally move away from the center of our world? If if moved to the center of our world, its motion would be violent and not natural — which is clearly false, because in our experience earth moves naturally to the center of our world. Ockham grants that on the hypothesis of another world, earth moving towards its center would naturally move away from the center of our world, but he insists that this behavior of the earth would not be per se but per accidens, owing to the situation of the particle of earth within the boundary of its own world. If placed between the center and circumference of the world,firenaturally tends upwards to the circumference, but it moves away from the opposite side of the circumference. It recedes from the opposite side per accidens, owing to its situation in the world. If the same fire is located between the center and that part of the circumference, it would naturally move upwards to it. Thus not only the nature of the elements but also their situation in a world must be taken into account when explaining their motion. A particle of earth can naturally move downwards to the center of one world and per accidens, owing to its position in that world, move away from the center of another world. Accordingly, the nature of the elements and their natural movements place no barrier to a plurality of worlds. Neither does the limited amount of matter available for their production. Granted that the present world exhausts all the matter God has created, it does not contain all he can create. An omnipotent God is not restricted to produce a certain amount of matter; he can always create more, both celestial and terrestrial, and form from it other worlds like, or better than, our own. Can God create other worlds essentially better than ours without limit, or would he finally reach a best of all possible worlds? Ockham does not 50
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50 51 52 53
Ockham, 1 Sent, 44, IF. Ibid., G. Ibid., H. Ibid., I.
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presume to settle this question but is content to remark that the answer depends on whether or not there is a limit to the degree of perfection God can give to individuals in other species. Those who say there is no limit would conclude that there is no best of possible worlds; those who affirm a limit would conclude the opposite. However this may be, there is no doubt that God can create a world essentially and accidentally more perfect than the present one. 54
Ill Ockham's treatment of the possibility of a better world is a good illustration of his complex relationship to Aristotelianism. He has no quarrel with Aristotle as far as the actual constitution of the world is concerned. He does not suggest that the world is different from Aristotle's, or that in fact there are other worlds besides the one described by him. What interests Ockham is not so much the scientific question of the actual structure of the world as the theological issue of what worlds are possible, given the absolute power of God. Lacking the Christian faith, Aristotle did not believe in the divine freedom and omnipotence. He did not realize that the present world is governed by God's potentia ordinata, but that there are other and better worlds that come under his potentia absoluta. Hence he took the limitations of the present world to be those of all possible worlds. He also failed to see that his arguments for the oneness of the world are not demonstrative but only probable, leaving open the possibility of other worlds better than our own. The question remains why Ockham, unlike other Christian theologians, did not consider the Aristotelian arguments for the oneness of the world to be truly demonstrative. As we have seen, Michael Scot believed as firmly as Ockham that God has the power to create other worlds, but he denied the real possibility of plural worlds because "nature cannot bear it." A plurality of worlds is impossible, in his view, not because of any limitation on the side of God but because of the nature of the world. This suggests that Ockham's conception of nature was not Aristotelian; and this is indeed the case. For Aristotle, each of the four elements has a 55
Ibid., M. For the distinction between these two divine powers, see Quodl, 6, 1: "Haec distinctio est sic intelligenda... quod posse Deum aliquid quandoque accipitur secundum leges ordinatas et institutas a Deo, et ilia dicitur Deus posse facere de potentia ordinata. Aliter accipitur posse pro posse omne illud quod non includit contradictionem fieri, sive Deus ordinavit se hoc facturum sive non, quia multa potest Deus facere quae non vult facere, secundum Magistrum Sententiarum, lib. I, d. 43; et ilia dicitur Deus posse de potentia absoluta." 54 55
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form or nature, in virtue of which it naturally moves to its proper place when removed from it. Having the same nature, particular instances of each element must naturally have the same movement. As Aristotle says, "the particular instances of each form must necessarily have for goal a place numerically one." From this he deduced the oneness of the world. Its oneness follows strictly from the oneness of the forms or natures with which the elements are endowed. For Ockham, on the contrary, bodies share no forms or natures. All particles of earth or fire have been created very similar to each other, and hence their movements are also very similar; but this is not because they have the same form or nature. With the removal of natures or essences from individuals, the force of the Aristotelian argument for the oneness of the universe is lost. There is no longer a strict necessity for bodies to move to one place or that there be but one world. Ockham introduces the notion of the "situation" (conditio) of the elements, thereby profoundly modifying the Aristotelian conception of their natural movement. Because they are differently situated in their respective worlds, heavy and light bodies move naturally up and down, but not to the same center or circumference. Even within the same world a fight body, owing to its different situation, will naturally move upwards to one place in the heavens and away from the opposite side of the heavens. We are here in the presence of a new, non-Aristotelian, conception of nature which is the philosophical basis of Ockham's doctrine of the possibility of a plurality of worlds. If more, and better, worlds are possible for him, it is because the Ockhamist nature, unlike the Aristotelian, can "bear it." From a theological perspective Ockham's guiding principle was the freedom and omnipotence of God. Above all else he wished to vindicate these attributes of the Christian God against the necessitarianism of the Greek and Arabian philosophers. Relying solely on natural reason they concluded that God is not a free but a necessary cause of the world, that his immediate causation does not extend to all its details, and that he is limited to producing the present world. Ockham did not think natural reason can demonstrate these philosophical tenets, but neither did he think it can prove 56
57
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Aristotle, De caelo, 1, 8, 276b32 Nature, for Ockham, is an absolute, positive, extramental reality: "Per naturam intelligo rem absolutam, positivam, natam esse extra animam (3 Sent., 1C). It is also individual ofitself and in no way common or universal. See 1 Sent., 2, 6-7; 2 (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1970), pp. 160-266. Fr. Leon Baudry gives a good defense of Ockhamism as a philosophy of the divine omnipotence. See his Le Tractatus de principiis theologiae attribue a G. D'Occam (Paris, 1936), pp. 37-42. More correctly, it should be called a "theology of the divine omnipotence" since this divine attribute is solely a matter of faith. See also R. Guelluy, Philosophie et theologie chez Guillaume d'Ockham (Louvain-Paris, 1947). 56 57
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their contrary. In his view, philosophy can at best offer persuasive arguments for the freedom of God as a creator. Lacking a truly demonstrative proof of the divine freedom, Ockham's Christian faith alone assured him that God can produce things he has not made and will not make, and that he can create many worlds and better ones than our own. All medieval theologians believed in the divine omnipotence; every time they recited the Creed they professed their faith in "one God, the Father Almighty." In this respect there was nothing to distinguish Ockham from other theologians, such as Abelard, William of Auvergne or Thomas Aquinas. The fact that the God of Ockham has the power to do things that the God of his predecessors could not do clearly indicates that he was giving a new interpretation to the divine omnipotence. A direct consequence of this belief, as he saw it, was the divine freedom regarding the whole order of creation. The God of Ockham is under no obligation to obey physical or moral laws, both of which are determined by his will. He is not constrained by the necessity inherent in general essences serving as a pattern of creation. To Ockham, this conceded too much to the necessitarianism of the philosophers, for it implies a limitation on the divine freedom and power. Ockham insisted that the divine ideas are precisely the individuals producible by God. This ensures his absolute freedom as a creator as well as the complete contingency of his creation. It also guarantees that this is not the only possible world, but that other and better worlds are within the divine power to create. In the words of Lovejoy, "The world contained whatever it had pleased its Maker to put into it, but what sort of creatures, or how many of them, this might mean, no man had any means of judging, except by experience or revelation." 59
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Ockham, 2 Sent., 5H; 4 Sent., 9EF. See G. Leff, William of Ockham (Manchester, 1975), p. 496: "Absolutely then the criterion of good or bad is what God wills or rejects, which is ipso facto always for a good end ... it is true that for Ockham what God decrees is ultimately the measure of all value; F. Copleston, A History of Philosophy, 3.1 (New York, 1963), p. 116: "For Ockham, however, the divine will is the ultimate norm of morality: the moral law is founded on the free divine choice rather than ultimately on the divine essence." Ockham, 1 Sent., 35, 4-5. L. Baudry (Le Tractatus de principiis theologiae attribue a G. d'Occam, p. 39, n. 2) points out the connection between Ockham's defense of the divine freedom and his doctrine of the divine ideas as purum nihil: "C'est done le souci de sauvegarder l'absolue liberie de Dieu qui conduit Guillaume d'Occam a nier que les essences possedent l'etre ab aeterno. Par oil l'on voit une fois de plus que l'idee de la toute-puissance anime toute la doctrine." For Ockham's doctrine of the divine ideas, see A. Maurer, "The Role of Divine Ideas in the Theology of William of Ockham," Studies Honoring Ignatius Charles Brady, Friar Minor Bonaventure, New York, 1976), 357-377; reprinted above, pp. 363381. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, p. 70. 59
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401 Method in Ockham's Nominalism It is generally recognized that the content of a philosophy cannot be adequately understood apart from the form in which it is couched and the style of reasoning with which it is supported. Matter and form go together in a philosophy, as they do in all human creations and everywhere in nature. Thus, Werner Jaeger has shown the importance of form in the development of Aristotle's Metaphysicsand Julius Stenzel has stressed the interrelation of dialectical method and content in the philosophy of Plato. In the study of the philosophies of the Middle Ages the common scholastic method has long been the object of attention; but, with the exception of Thomism, their individual and special modes of procedure and styles of reasoning have largely been neglected. All too often they have been studied with an eye simply to their content, as "static systems of conceptions" (to use Jaeger's phrase), with little if any regard for their living form and method. In this paper I propose to examine some aspects of Ockham's methodology, with a view to determining the role of philosophical form in shaping his nominalism. Space does not permit anything like a thorough study of the topic. All I can do is to choose a few of Ockham's methodological rules and techniques of argumentation and show by examples how he uses them in settling philosophical disputes. 2
3
Werner Jaeger, Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of his Development, 2d ed. trans. R. Richardson (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1948). Julius Stenzel, Plato's Method of Dialectic, trans. D. J. Allan (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1940). On the scholastic method, see M. Grabmann, Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode, 2 vols. (Freiburg, 1909-11); A. Landgraf, "Zum Begriff der Scholastik," Collectanea Franciscana, 11 (1941), 487-490; M. D. Chenu, Toward Understanding St. Thomas, trans. A. M. Landry and D. Hughes (Chicago, Henry Regnery Co., 1964); James Weisheipl, "The Evolution of Scientific Method," The Logic of Science, ed. V. E. Smith (New York, St. John's University Press, 1964), 59-86; same author, "Scholastic Method," New Catholic Encyclopedia (1967), 12, 1145-1146. 1
2
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The Ockhamist principles and methods I have chosen are philosophical, not theological. In making this choice I am not suggesting that one can easily separate philosophy from theology in the works of Ockham. Even his theological principles are of vital importance for his philosophy. Indeed, the use of dogmas of faith and theological principles in answering philosophical questions - sometimes called 'theologism' - is itself characteristic of Ockham's method. For example, he often appeals to the divine omnipotence, in the formula "God can do anything that does not include a clear contradiction," to settle philosophical as well as theological issues. Thus he employs this principle, along with the allied distinction between the absolute and "ordained" power of God, to establish the possibility of an intuition of something that does not exist. Indeed, from the principle of the divine omnipotence the Tractatus de Principiis Theologiae, written by an anonymous Ockhamist about 1350, deduces one hundred and sixty-nine theological and philosophical conclusions. Yet Ockham and his followers considered the divine omnipotence to be a matter of faith and not of philosophical demonstration. Since recent studies have been devoted to this aspect of Ockham's methodology, I shall not be concerned with it here. Less attention, surprisingly, has been given to his use of the principle of parsimony, called Ockham's Razor. The importance of this rule in Ockhamism is attested by 4
5
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Ockham, Sent., prol. q. 1; I, pp. 38-39. QuodlibetVl, 6; IX, pp. 604-607. Unless otherwise indicated, Ockham's works are cited in the Franciscan Institute edition, in the series Opera Theologica. Le Tractatus de Principiis Theologiae attribue a Guillaume d'Occam, ed. L. Baudry (Paris, J. Vrin, 1936). Ockham, Sent., prol. q. 2, I, p. 105; I, d. 42, q. 1, IV, p. 617. Quodl. I, 1, IX, p. 11; III, 1, pp. 199-208. See Heiko A. Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology. Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1963); William J. Courtenay, "Nominalism and Late Medieval Religion," The Pursuit of Holiness in Late Medieval and Renaissance Religion, ed. C. Trinkaus with H. A. Oberman (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1974), 37-43. To my knowledge there is no adequate study of the subject. For the history of the Razor, see C. K. Brampton, "Nominalism and the Law of Parsimony," The Modern Schoolman, 41 (1964), 273-281. Other useful articles on the Razor: W. M. Thornburn, "The Myth of Ockham's Razor," Mind, 27 (1918), 345-352; M. M. Rossi, "Riflessioni sui rasoio di Occam," Logos, 20 (1937), 319-358; C. F. Rogers, "Occam's Razor," Theology, 40 (1940), 340-349; D. P. Henry, "Ockham's Razor and the Unification of Physical Science," British Journal of Philosophical Science, 8 (1957-58), 265-280; G. O'Hara, "Ockham's Razor Today," Philosophical Studies, 12 (1963), 125-139; J. E. Bolzan, "iNavaja de Ockham o navaja de santo Tomas?" Sapientia, 29 (1974), 207-216. Gordon Leff mentions the Razor only in a brief note: William of Ockham. The Metamorphosis of Scholastic Discourse (Manchester, University Press, 1975), p. 35, n. 141. Leff remarks that Ockham made extensive use of the Razor "to excise unnecessary concepts." In fact, he uses it not to eliminate concepts but to reduce supposed entities to the status of terms. 4
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the fact that from it the De Principiis Theologiae draws eighty-one conclusions. I wish to examine the different formulations of this principle in Ockham's writings and his understanding and use of it. The following sections of this paper are concerned with his use of the principle of contradiction and conceptual analysis in arriving at his nominalist conclusions. It is hoped that this brief sampling of his methodology will show the importance of logical procedures in establishing his nominalism and throw fresh light on him as the initiator of the via moderna. I. OCKHAM'S USE OF THE RAZOR
It is well known that the axiom called Ockham's Razor did not originate with him; indeed, it was already in common use among the scholastics in the second half of the 13th century. Around 1250 Odo of Rigaud, a Franciscan master at Paris, formulated the principle as follows: Frustrafitper plura quod potestfieriper unum, which can be roughly translated: "It is useless to explain by several things what can be explained by one." The axiom was gleaned from the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle, which assumes the superiority ceteris paribus of the demonstration which derives from fewer postulates or hypotheses. Commentators on this logical work of Aristotle, such as Robert Grosseteste and St. Thomas Aquinas, gave currency to this methodological principle. In his Physics Aristotle expresses his preference for simple explanations of nature to more complicated ones. Thus he criticizes Anaxagoras for assuming an infinite number of principles when a smaller and finite number suffice. Regarding the number of primary movers Aristotle writes: 9
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We ought, however, to suppose that there is one [first mover] rather than many, and afiniterather than an infinite number. When the consequences of either assumption are the same, we should always assume that things arefiniterather than infinite in number, since in things constituted by nature that which is finite and that which is better ought, if possible, to be present rather than the reverse. 13
This methodological rule fitted in well with the Christian belief that the universe was created by a wise and good God, and it was adopted by the ' Cited by P. Boehner, Ockham: Philosophical Writings (Nelson Philosophical Texts, 1957), p. xx, n. 2. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, c. 25, 86a33. SeeR. Grosseteste, In Post. Anal. I, 17 (Venice, 1514), fol. 21vb; St. Thomas, In I Post. Anal., lect. 39 (Rome, 1882), I, p. 299, n. 2. Aristotle, Physics, I, c. 4, 188al7. Ibid., VIII, c. 6, 259a8. 10 11
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schoolmen as an authoritative axiom in settling theological and philosophical issues. Thus it became an essential element in the scholastic method. One of the most common formulations of the principle was "A plurality should never be posited without necessity" (Pluralitas nunquam ponenda est sine necessitate). The wording "Beings should not be multiplied more than necessary" (Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem) appears to be postmedieval. In 1639 it was cited by the Scotist commentator John Ponce of Cork as an axioma vulgare of the scholastics. Shortly afterward, Leibniz wrote that the nominalists used it on all occasions, believing that it can explain everything in nature. From then on the principle was firmly attached to the nominalists. In 1746 Condillac called it "le rasoir des nominaux," and in 1836-1837 Sir William Hamilton referred to it as "Ockham's Razor." Though Ockham does not appear to have used the axiom in the formula "Beings should not be multiplied more than necessary," he often resorts to it in the form "A plurality should never be posited without necessity" or "It is vain to do with more what can be done with fewer." In the Quodlibets, which he wrote late in his teaching career, he sometimes states it in terms of the verification of a proposition: "When a proposition is verified of things, if two things suffice for its truth, it is superfluous to posit a third." This new formulation was probably due to the intervention of Ockham's contemporary and confrere Walter of Chatton. Irked no doubt by the constant use of the Razor against his own positions by Ockham, he devised his own anti-Razor. "My proposition," he retorted is: "If three things are insufficient to verily [an affirmative proposition] a fourth must be posited, and so on." This counterpart to the law of parsimony did not gain wide acceptance, though interestingly enough it has recently been proposed by Karl Menger as "a Law against Miserliness — stipulating that entities must not be reduced to the point of inadequacy, and, more generally, that it is vain to try to do with fewer what requires more." 14
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Published in Duns Scotus, Opera Omnia XV (Paris, Vives, 1894), p. 483a. Cited by Brampton, 273. Leibniz, De Stylo Philosophico Marti Nizolii; Opera Philosophica; ed. J. E. Erdmann (Berlin, 1840), pp. 68-69. Cited by Brampton, ibid. Condillac, Essai sur I'origine des connaissances humaines (Amsterdam, 1788), I, p. 180, n. I. Cited by Brampton, ibid. Sir William Hamilton, Discussions, 2nd ed. (London, 1853), pp. 616, 629. Cited by Brampton, 274. Ockham, Quodl. IV, 24; IX, p. 413; VI, 9, p. 618; VII, 1, p. 704; VII, 3, p. 710. " Cited by G. Gal in Ockham, Summa Logicae (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., Franciscan Institute, 1974), p. 61*. Henceforth cited SL. The pseudo-Campsall Logica contra Ockham proposes a similar anti-Razor. See ibid. Karl Menger, "A Counterpart of Ockham's Razor in Pure and Applied Mathematics: Ontological Uses," Synthese, 12 (1960), 415. Author's emphasis. 14
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407
At first sight the Razor and anti-Razor appear to be two sides of the same coin, the one expressing negatively what the other expresses positively. Both Ockham and Chatton demand a sufficient number of items to verily a proposition, Ockham stating the sufficiency in a negative form "no more than is necessary," Chatton stating it in a positive form "no fewer than is necessary." But Ockham's vehement reaction to the anti-Razor makes this facile reconciliation dubious. In one place he says that Chatton's rule, as it is generally understood, is false; in another he remarks that the principle is false unless it is better understood. This dispute over the value of the Razor and its counterpart deserves further study; but it appears that Ockham's main objection to Chatton's rule — for all its truth — is that it turns the mind in a direction opposed to the Razor. The Aristotelian principle directs one to look for simple solutions to problems, not to assume more entities than are strictly necessary to verify a proposition. This spirit of economy of thought is missing in the anti-Razor, and no doubt this is why Ockham did not favor it. Chatton's role in this dispute had the happy result of Ockham's formulating the Razor in terms of the verification of propositions. This was a definite improvement over the previous statement of the Razor, simply as a rule not to "posit" more beings than are necessary, or not "to do" with more what can "be done" with fewer. This original form of the axiom Bertrand Russell correctly describes as metaphysical, because "it was a principle of parsimony as regards 'entities'." The new wording of the Razor makes it explicit that it is a rule regarding the truth of a proposition; that for its verification no more items are to be assumed than are absolutely necessary. There is no indication that Ockham saw a real difference between these various formulations of the axiom. Quite the contrary; he sometimes uses the new formula in the Quodlibets in contexts where, in the Sentences, he used the more familiar Pluralitas non est ponenda ... To him these were but different ways of saying the same thing. 21
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Ockham, Quodl. VI, q. 12; IX, pp. 632-633. Ibid., I, 5, p. 32. Bertrand Russell, "My Mental Development," in P. A. Schlipp, ed., The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell (Evanston & Chicago, Northwestern University, 1944), 14. (Now published by Open Court.) For Russell's understanding and use of Ockham's Razor, see G. O'Hara, "Ockham's Razor Today." Wittgenstein interpreted Ockham's Razor in terms of semantics: "If a sign is not necessary then it is meaningless. This is the meaning of Ockham's Razor." Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London, Kegan Paul, 1922), 3.328. See 5.4732. This corresponds to neither the first nor the second version of Ockham's own Razor. Compare Ockham, Sent., 1, d. 31, q. 1; IV, p. 396 and Quodl., VII, 1; DC p. 704. Also Sent., 1, d. 30, q. 2; IV, p. 322 and Quodl., VII, 8, p. 727. 21
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The Razor in all its formulations is so general a rule that by itself it could hardly yield Ockham's personal conclusions; for this he had to interpret it in his own way or accompany it either explicitly or implicitly with other principles. All the schoolmen, realists as well as nominalists, agreed that more entities should not be assumed than are necessary, but they could not see eye to eye on how many are strictly needed to verify a proposition. Duns Scotus used the axiom against St. Thomas when debating the question whether the powers of intellect and will are really distinct from each other and from the essence of the soul. St. Thomas thought they were, but Scotus, arguing that a plurality should not be assumed without a cogent reason, concludes that they are only formally distinct. Ockham, for his part, sees no necessity in assuming even a formal distinction between them. Intellect and will, he contends, are "wholly indistinct." On the ground that we should not posit a plurality without necessity, he also denies a real distinction between agent and possible intellects in man. Clearly, the difference between Scotus and Ockham is not that one uses the Razor and the other does not, but how they both use it. Each interprets it in his own way, in the light of more basic principles, so that one can affirm and the other deny the necessity of positing certain entities. What counts for one as a cogent reason for assuming an item does not count for the other. Ockham leaves us in no doubt about his own criteria for the need of assuming an entity. A plurality is not to be posited, he says, unless we can be convinced of its necessity by reason, experience, or an infallible authority. The authority he has in mind is Christian revelation as expressed in Scripture or the writings of the Church Fathers. As a theologian he sometimes appeals to this authority in conjunction with the Razor, as when he cautions that we should not posit more miracles — which appear to be opposed to natural reason — than the authority of Scripture and the Fathers allow. Again, in discussing the Eucharist he argues that no reason, experience, or revealed statement compels us to posit quantity as a reality distinct from the reality of a material substance or its sensible qualities. When treating of subjects in a philosophical context Ockham normally appeals to reason and experience to justify the assumption of entities. To consider but one example: on these grounds he rules out the necessity of assuming an intentional or spiritual likeness between the knower and thing 25
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25 26 27 28 29
Scotus, Sent., II, d. 16, q. unica; XIII (Paris, Vives, 1893), p. 25, n. 5. Ockham, Sent., II, q. 20; V, pp. 442-443. Ibid., q. 13; V, p. 268. See De Principiis Theologiae, p. 125, with references in n. 3. Ockham, Sent. I, d. 26, q. 1; IV, p. 157. Ockham, De SacramentoAltaris, II, c. 28; ed. T. B. Birch (Burlington, la, 1930), p. 318.
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known in explaining intuitive knowledge. For St. Thomas, knowledge requires the mediation of an intentional or "immaterial" likeness of the object in the medium and in the knower, but Ockham sees no compelling reason to assume there is such an entity. In order to give a rational account of any effect, he argues, nothing should be assumed unless we are convinced of its existence by a definite proof based on self-evident principles or by an unquestionable experience. Now neither of these leads us to affirm the existence of intentional likenesses. We have no experience of them, for no one sees them with his eyes or perceives them with any exterior or interior cognitive power. Neither can we prove from self-evident principles that intentional likenesses are causes of intuitive cognition, because "only by experience can we demonstrate that a creature is certainly an efficient cause; when, namely, at its presence the effect follows and in its absence it does not." Now, at the presence of the object to the mind the act of understanding follows just as surely without an intentional likeness as with one. Hence it is entirely superfluous to assume the existence of these beings. Moreover, there are positive reasons to reject them. If an intentional likeness were a necessary efficient cause of intuitive knowledge, since this likeness can remain in the absence of the object it could naturally cause intuitive knowledge even when the real object is not present, which in Ockham's view is false and contrary to experience. What is more, coming between the knower and the object, it would prevent him from knowing that object. Ockham grants that the likeness of an object can be produced in a medium like air, as when a body sends rays through a red colored glass and causes a red image on the opposite wall. But this likeness is of the same nature as the red color of the glass; it is not an intentional or spiritual entity, except in the metaphorical sense that the image of the color is less perfect than the original. We are sure of the existence of these physical likenesses because they can be experienced, but not of so-called intentional likenesses that escape observation. The only other reason for positing them is that they can be proved to exist, but Ockham rules out this possibility because their very notion implies a contradiction. They would exist outside the mind in the medium (e.g., air), and yet, they would not be real beings in the category of substance or accident. But "every being outside the mind is a true thing (vera res), and it has true real existence." On the principle, then, that a plurality is not to be posited without necessity, we should deny the existence of intentional likenesses. 30
31
32
Ockham, Sent. II, q. 13; V, p. 269. On the question of species in knowledge, see G. Leff, pp. 35-40; K. H. Tachau, Vision and Certitude in The Age of Ockham (Leiden, New York, 1988), pp. 130-148. Ockham, Sent. II, q. 2; VI, pp. 59-60 (ed. Lyons, 1495, d. 18 F-G). 30 31
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All the features of Ockham's philosophical use of the Razor are present here. There is the spirit of economy of thought; the desire to limit as strictly as possible the number of items in the explanation of a natural event. There is also a clear statement of the two criteria for judging which items are necessary, namely reason and experience. Each of these, moreover, is given a distinctive interpretation. As a radical empiricist, Ockham restricts experience to the perception of individuals taken singly or in conjunction. There is no experience of causality as a relation between individuals; there is only the observation that at the presence of one individual another follows, and that in its absence the other individual does not follow. Moreover, individuals are so radically unique that we cannot reason from one to the other as from effect to cause; their conjunction is only a matter of observation. Ockham rejects relations as realities distinct from the things related, with the consequence that the experience of causality or likeness is simply the perception of the things related. What counts as an indisputable reason or proof (ratio certa) is also strictly defined. A proof of this kind is based either on an indubitable experience (experientia certa) or on self-evident principles, the first of which is the principle of contradiction. All sound reasoning is ultimately reducible to something we have experienced in the external world or in the world of the mind, or to the logical principle of contradiction. That is why this principle, along with experience, plays such an important role in Ockham's thought. Ockham's notion of reality as a thing (vera res) is also operative throughout his discussion of intentional likenesses, as it is everywhere in his philosophy. Each thing is conceived as so unique and individual that it has nothing in common with anything else. Community or universality is a property not of reality but solely of names — either mental names (nomina mentalia), i.e. concepts of the mind, or spoken and written words. That is why Ockham has traditionally been called a nominalist. The title as it was used in the Middle Ages and in early modern philosophy (e.g., by Leibniz) did not mean that Ockham limited universal to spoken and written words, but that he made community or universality solely a property of signs, primarily of concepts, secondarily of words. Opposed to the nominalists 33
34
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Ockham defines an efficient cause as follows: "Definitio causae efficientis est esse illud ad cuius esse sive praesentiam sequitur aliud." Quodl. IV, q. 1; DC p. 294. Ockham, Sent. II, d. 13; V, p. 269. For the medieval notion of nominalism, see Paul Vignaux, "Nominalisme," Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique, XI, 718-784; F. Pelster, "Nominales und reales in 13. Jahrhundert," Sophia (1946), 154-161. St. Albert describes the nominales as follows: "Sunt tamen quialiter ea quae dicta sunt, interpretantur dicentes, quod in solis intellectibus sunt ilia [i.e. universalia] quoad nos, quae utrum sint quomodo esse habeant, solus scit intellectus. Et tales esse in 33
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were the realists (reales) who thought that in some way universals exist in reality. For them, universality and community were features of reality and not just of the signs by which we think and speak about it. Ockham's notion of reality, like his conception of experience and proof, is essential to his conclusion that it is superfluous to posit intentional likenesses as media of knowledge. The Razor by itself does not yield this Ockhamist conclusion, but only as it functions along with more basic principles and notions in his philosophy. Hence, if we wish to reach closer to the heart of Ockhamism it is into these that we must inquire. II. OCKHAM'S USE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF CONTRADICTION
Like the Razor, the principle of contradiction, and the allied principle of the excluded middle, came to the medieval schoolmen through Aristotle; with him they considered them to be the first and most indisputable of axioms. Not that they always agreed on their meaning or on the use to which they might be put. Nicholas of Cusa, for one, refused to apply the principle of contradiction in the mystical ascent to the infinite God; and, as we shall see, Ockham also rejected its consequences in his doctrine of the Trinity. But in purely rational matters Ockham held these axioms to be the indispensable bases of all logic and philosophy, serving not as premises of demonstrations but as the necessary prerequisite of all demonstrations and learning. Over and above the role of the principle of contradiction in logic, Ockham thought that it gives one an insight into the nature of reality itself, and he used it as a powerful means to refute his opponents' metaphysics and to establish his own nominalism. 36
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intellects universalia habere dixerunt illi qui vocabantur Nominates, qui communitatem (ad quam particularia universalium, de quibus dicuntur ipsa universalia, referuntur) tantum in intellectu esse dicebant." St. Albert, Liber de Praedicabilibus, tr. II, c. II (Paris, Vives, 1890), I, p. 19. See ibid., tr. IX, c. 3, pp. 146-147. This description fits Ockham perfectly. Some prefer to call Ockham a conceptualist because he did not restrict universals to words, but included concepts among universals. See P. Boehner, "The Realistic Conceptualism of William Ockham," Traditio, 4 (1946), 307-335; reprinted in part in P. Boehner, Collected Articles on Ockham (St. Bonaventure, New York: Franciscan Institute, 1958), pp. 156-174. But the traditional notion of nominalism is not so restrictive. See "Nominalisme," Andre Lalande, Vocabulaire Technique et Critique de la Phibsophie, 5 ed. (Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1947), p. 669. See Aristotle, Metaph. IV, c. 4, 1006a2; 1008a34. Nicholas of Cusa, Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae; ed. R. Klibansky, Opera Omnia, II (Leipzig, F. Meiner, 1932), p. 6. Ockham, SL, III-2, c. 4, p. 510. On Ockham's use of the principle of contradiction, see G. Leff, pp. 405-406. e
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This extraordinary use of the principle of contradiction can best be illustrated by Ockham's criticism of the formal distinction of Duns Scotus. This distinction is a keystone in Scotism, including its solution of the problem of universals, and Ockham's refutation of it is a milestone in reaching his own nominalist position. Indeed, the method itself by which he refutes Scotus leads him inexorably to this position. According to Scotus there are three principal kinds of distinction: real, formal, and conceptual. The real distinction (distinctio realis) in the strong sense of the term is found between two or more individuals, one of which can exist without the other; e.g., between two men. The conceptual distinction (distinctio rationis), unlike the real distinction, is not found in reality but is made by the mind between its different notions, e.g., between the logical notions of genus and species. The formal distinction (distinctio formalis), like the real distinction, is found on the side of reality (a parte rei), but items formally distinct cannot exist apart from each other. They can, however, be conceived apart, so that one does not enter into the formal definition of the other. Thus, the definition of man does not include the individuals who share human nature, so man and the individual man are formally distinct. Scotus insists that formal distinction is compatible with real identity: in Peter human nature and his individual difference or 'thisness' are really the same though formally distinct. Scotus applies the formal distinction in many areas of his philosophy and theology. To cite but one other example; in his view the divine attributes, say of goodness and wisdom, are really identical with each other and with the divine essence, but they are formally distinct because the concept of one does not contain the concept of the other. The basis of the formal distinction is the existence in reality of natures or essences which of themselves have the status of formalities or realities, while falling short of being real individuals. In the realm of creatures these natures are of themselves common to many individuals, in the sense that they can be instantiated in many. They are not, however, fully universal until they have been abstracted from individuals and conceived by the mind. To Ockham this account of distinction and reality is needlessly complicated. All the facts that it was designed to explain can be accounted for more simply without the formal distinction and common natures. He does not explicitly appeal to the Razor to make this point, though it appears to be at the back of his mind. The principle he does use to eliminate these superfluous items is that of contradiction. 39
For Scotus' doctrine of distinction, see Maurice Grajewski, The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus. A Study in Metaphysics (Washington, D.C., Catholic University Press, 1944). 39
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How indeed can one prove that two things are distinct? The best method, Ockham contends, is to show that contradictories are verified of them: contradictio est via potissima ad probandum distinctionem rerum. It is correct to argue: A is, B is not, therefore A is not B. Again, This thing is A, that thing is not A, therefore this thing is not that thing. If one were to deny the validity of these syllogisms and affirm that absolutely one and the same predicate can be truly affirmed and denied of the same thing, it would be impossible to show that there is any distinction between things. Scotus could hardly object to this line of reasoning for he himself already resorted to it. If the contradictories 'to be' and 'not to be' are said of two subjects, he contended, they cannot be the same being; and indeed if this principle is denied "there does not seem to be left any way of proving distinction between beings." From this principle Scotus deduced his criterion to prove a real distinction between things: "Things are really distinct if one of them can remain without the other." Up to this point Ockham has no quarrel with Scotus, but he presses on to show that Scotus' reasoning can be turned against the validity of his formal distinction. All contradictories, Ockham claims, are equally opposed to each other. If there is so great an opposition between being and non-being that when these primary contradictories are predicated of different things they prove a real distinction between them, the same is true of other contradictories. We can correctly argue: This thing is A, that thing is not A, therefore this thing is not that thing. Now Scotus admits that contradictory predicates are asserted of an individual difference and of the nature it 'contracts' to be an individual, for the difference of itself belongs exclusively to the individual whereas the nature of itself does not. Hence if, as Scotus believes, these are distinct in reality, they must be really and not only formally distinct. In short, they must be two things. We can argue validly: 40
41
If every individual difference of itself is proper to an individual; And a nature of itself is not proper to an individual, Therefore that nature is distinctfromthe individual difference, and by 'distinct' is here meant 'really distinct'. 42
But neither Scotus nor Ockham would accept this conclusion, for then a nature and its individual difference would be two separable things. In order to avoid this absurdity Ockham concludes that they are entirely the same in reality, with consequences far-reaching in his philosophy. The real is now 40 41 42
Ockham, Sent. I, d. 2, q. 6; II, p. 174. Scotus, Sent. II, d. 1, q. 4, n. 5 (Paris, Vives, 1893), XI, p. 99. Ockham, ibid.
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identified with the individual; no room is left for a real nature that is common of itself and individuated by a real individual difference or 'haecceity". Rather, every nature is individual by itself or by essence. In this dispute over the nature of the real and the possibility of a formal distinction, the Scotists were not lacking in logical resources to meet Ockham's challenge. Granted that contradiction proves distinction, they retorted, there is a difference between an absolute and a qualified contradiction. Thus if one argues: A is and B is not, or A is A and B is not A, the contradiction is absolute, and if A and B are real one can infer a real distinction between them. But when something is affirmed and denied with a qualification, by adding the syncategorematic mode 'formally', then one can infer only a formal distinction. If A is formally A, and B is not formally A, one should not conclude that they are really but only formally distinct. But this introduces degrees into contradiction, which, as we have seen, is unacceptable to Ockham. In his view all contradictoriness is equal, whether expressed absolutely or with a qualification. It is just as contradictory, he says apropos of the divine attributes, to assert: "Divine wisdom is formally divine wisdom and is not formally divine wisdom" as it is to affirm "Divine wisdom is divine wisdom and is not divine wisdom." The qualification 'formally' does not lessen the contradiction. Thus rigidly understood, the principle of contradiction rules supreme in Ockham's philosophy; but the same cannot be said of his theology. The Trinity, in his view, is not governed by the same rules of logic as our own world. In this unique case the principle of contradiction does not hold, for according to the Christian faith there are three distinct Persons who are identical with the one divine essence. Following the principle of contradiction, we should say: 43
The divine essence is the Son, The Father is not the Son, Therefore the Father is not the divine essence.
Since the contradictories 'to be the Son' and 'not to be the Son' are predicated of the divine essence and the Father, we should, as good Aristotelians, conclude that they are not identical; and yet the faith assures us that they are. But this is a special case that is beyond our comprehension; it should be admitted only because sacred Scripture compels us to. In our world we never find three realities that are one reality. 44
43 44
Ibid., I, d. 2, q. 1; II, pp. 16-17. Ibid., I, d. 2, q. 6, p. 175. See Ibid., I, d. 1, q. 5; I, p. 461.
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To Scotus, the Trinity was not quite so incomprehensible or opposed to the laws of logic, for he introduced the formal distinction between the Persons and the divine essence. Though they are really identical, they are formally non-identical. With the rich resources of his metaphysics he was able to avoid a conflict between faith and reason in his doctrine of the Trinity. The same cannot be said for Ockham. Having eliminated the metaphysical basis for the formal distinction, he was left with the stark opposition of faith and logic in the Trinity. It is true that he verbally agrees with Scotus that the Persons and the divine essence are formally distinct, but he immediately adds that when this is rightly understood it simply means "that the [divine] essence is three Persons and that a Person is not three Persons." In other words, the formal distinction is nothing but a statement of the contradiction Ockham finds in the Trinity. It is a term designating a mystery believed on faith but without logical or philosophical justification. Clearly, there was no meeting of minds in this dispute over what is real and what counts as a distinction in reality. It could go on indefinitely without either disputant convincing the other of his error. The one point on which they agreed was that the principle of contradiction would ultimately solve the problem, but they could not see eye to eye on its meaning or use. In the 12th century Abelard and William of Champeaux debated the question of universals in a similar spirit, Abelard defending nominalism and William realism with the principle of contradiction. Referring to this famous episode, Etienne Gilson wrote: 45
William and Abelard were equally convinced that a purely logical method would ultimately bring forth an adequate answer to the question [of universals]. Now logic, and especially mediaeval logic, is ruled by the principle of contradiction, which always works when it is applied to concepts, but not always when it is applied to things. 46
If this is true, we may well ask whether Ockham and Scotus were not also engaged in a futile attempt to determine the nature of the real by means of
SL, II, c. 2, p. 254. The Trinity affronts the laws of Aristotelian logic. See ibid., II, c. 27, pp. 337-338; III-I, c. 4, pp. 370-371. Ockham places the formal distinction between the real and conceptual distinctions, but he denies its basis in a being located between a real and conceptual being. Sent. I, d. 2, q. 11; II, pp. 370-371. Only through a linguistic "circumlocution" does the formal distinction apply to the Trinity. Ibid., p. 374. It is misleading, therefore, to say that the formal distinction is "a doctrine which he [Ockham] has in common with Scotus." P. Boehner, "The Medieval Crisis of Logic and the Author of the Centiloquium attributed to Ockham," Franciscan Studies, 25 (1944), 165. All they have in common is the term. Etienne Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Experience {New York, Scribner's, 1941), p. 14. The latest account of Abelard's nominalism is by Martin Tweedale, Abailard on Universals (Amsterdam, North-Holland Publishing Co., 1976). 45
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the principle of contradiction. However this may be, the consequences of Ockham's use of the principle are of the utmost importance for his philosophy. It enables him to banish from the real world the common nature of Duns Scotus and to establish the individual as the sole reality. At the same stroke it eliminates from philosophy the formal distinction as a kind of non-identity a parte rei. The only real distinction is that between individual things. Besides this there is a 'distinction of reason' between mental beings and an unnamed distinction between a thing and a mental being. A distinction of reason is verified if contradictories can be predicated of two mental items; e.g., this concept is understood, that concept is not understood. The distinction between a mental being and a thing is verified if it can be said that the former exists only in the mind and the latter exists outside the mind. This is the kind of distinction between a universal like 'man' and an individual man. 'Man' is a mental name or concept, and its universality consists solely in the fact that it is equally the natural sign of all men and hence is predicable of them. Ockham also gives a new meaning to a 'distinction of reason' (distinctio rationis). This he defines as a purely mental or conceptual distinction. A ratio is a being produced by the mind (ens rationis), for example a concept. Hence a distinction between rationes is purely on the side of the mind, in contrast to a real distinction, which is not made by the mind but discovered in reality. Only mental beings can be said to be distinct or identical according to reason (secundum rationem). It makes no sense to Ockham to speak of a reality as distinct from itself or from another reality in this way. This rules out the Thomistic distinction of reason with a foundation in reality. According to St. Thomas, when we form several concepts of the same reality, as when we conceive Socrates as an individual and also as a man, the distinction is made by the mind, but it has a real foundation in the existence in Socrates of human nature, which can be abstracted from him and conceived apart from him as an individual. But in Ockham's view individuals do not possess natures in common that are distinguishable from individuals by reason or through the consideration of the mind (secundum rationem tantum vel per considerationem intellectus). Ockham's nominalism banishes even this last trace of realism in order to reach his pure position on the nature of reality as radically individual and in no sense common or universal. He was fully conscious of the revolutionary step he was taking: 47
All those whom I have seen [he writes] agree ... that there is really in the individual a nature that is in some way universal, at least potentially and
4
' Ockham, Sent. I, d. 2, q. 3 II, pp. 74-99. ;
METHOD IN OCKHAM'S NOMINALISM
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incompletely, though some say that it is really distinguished [from the individual] [the Platonists], some that it is distinguished only formally [the Scotists], some that it is distinguished in no way in reality but only by reason and through the consideration of the mind [the Thomists]. 48
The principle of contradiction, especially in the logical and univocal use to which Ockham puts it, admits of no medium between 'to be' and 'not to be'. In his hands it becomes a powerful weapon to exclude any intermediary between an ens rationis (which is a being in the mind) and a real individual (which is not a being in the mind but outside the mind). There is no place for Scotist common natures or formalitates somewhere between concepts and things; neither is there room for Thomist essences that exist individuated in things. In excising these items from the world of being, Ockham is at least implicitly appealing to the Razor, but its cutting edge has been honed by the principle of contradiction. III. OCKHAM'S USE OF CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS
Besides the Razor and the principle of contradiction, Ockham enforces his nominalism by means of conceptual analysis. By this I mean the analyzing of a term in order to show that when it is correctly understood it is seen to be superfluous to posit a corresponding entity. The realists who assume these entities are shown to misunderstand the logic of their language. Nowhere does Ockham appear more modern than when he engages in this kind of analysis. I am not suggesting that he qualifies as a linguistic analyst in the modern sense; analysis is only one of several supplementary methods he uses. But his proto-analysis of concepts should not be neglected. This 14th century English philosopher was acutely aware of language, both ordinary and technical, and the errors it can induce when incorrectly understood. His thinking is always animated by the spirit of the Razor; but the Razor is insufficient. He needs supplementary methods and techniques to reach his specifically nominalist conclusions. One of these is his personal use of the principle of contradiction; another is the analysis of terms. A prime example of Ockham's use of analysis is his treatment of abstract and concrete terms. The Scotists were convinced that corresponding to abstract terms like 'humanity' and 'horseness' there were specific natures formally distinct from the individuals in which they existed. The abstract term signifies only the specific nature; the concrete term (e.g., 'man', 'horse') adds 49
Ibid., q. 7; II, pp. 225-226. Ockham here opposes the doctrine of universals of both St. Thomas and Henry of Harclay. Ockham, SL, I, c. 5-8. 48
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over and above this the individual difference. Hence, corresponding to the distinction between abstract and concrete terms there is a distinction in things themselves. But Ockham can find no philosophical justification for this conclusion. The Scotists were bewitched by abstract terms, but a simple analysis will dissipate their power to deceive. The only difference between abstract and concrete terms is that they have different endings and usually abstract terms have more syllables. Examples are 'just' and 'justice', 'animal' and 'animality'. When it is a question of absolute terms in the category of substance, the abstract and concrete forms are synonymous. 'Humanity' and 'man' signify the same individual men. This does not mean that they can be used in the same way in sentences. 'Humanity' is the equivalent of the reduplicative phrase 'man insofar as he is man', or 'man qua man'; and hence when it is used in a proposition it is exponible, being equivalent to several different propositions. As a result, 'humanity' cannot be used wherever 'man' is used. We can say 'Socrates is a man' but not 'Socrates is humanity'; this would be to say that he is man qua man. Could the abstract form of the word signify the specific nature of man as formally distinct from the individual? If so, it would be equally reasonable to say that 'Socrates' and 'Socrateity' denote items formally distinct in him, for one of these terms is concrete and the other abstract, just like 'man' and 'humanity'. In this as in similar matters, Ockham observes, the problem is verbal rather than real, and logic offers the solution. "Those ignorant of logic," he complains, "uselessly fill up pages about these subjects, making a problem where there is none, and passing over the problem they should be investigating." Though Ockham admired Scotus for his subtlety and logical skill, he clearly had him in mind when he wrote these lines. What else is Scotus' doctrine of essence but a confusion of logic and metaphysics? Scotus liked to quote Avicenna's dictum that "Horseness is nothing else than horseness; of itself it is neither one nor many, neither existing in the sensible world nor in the mind." Scotus interpreted this to mean that a specific essence has 50
51
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Ibid., I, c. 7, p. 23. Ibid., p. 24. When Ockham analyzes these terms not as an Aristotelian philosopher but as a theologian, the result is different. According to the "truth of the theologians," 'man' and 'humanity' are not synonyms but they are terms standing for distinct things. This is to accommodate propositions regarding the Incarnate Word. Ockham, ibid., p. 31. " Avicenna, Metaph. V, c. 1 (Venice, 1508), f. 86va. See Scotus, Sent. II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1 (Vatican, 1973), VII, pp. 402-404. 50 51
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419
an entity of its own which is indifferent to being in the mind or in reality; in the former it is universal, in the latter it is individual. Of itself, however, it is neither of these but the simple essence that is captured in its definition. Ockham sees this as a rank confusion between two kinds of acts clearly distinguished by the logician. There is an exercised act (actus exercitus) expressed by the verb 'is' or a similar verb. For example, when we say 'Man runs', 'Man disputes', 'Man is an animal', we mean that he is actually exercising an act. There is also a signified act (actus signatus) expressed by verbs like 'to be predicated', 'to be the subject of, 'to be verified'. These verbs do not indicate that something performs an act, but that a predicate is attributed to a subject. Had Scotus kept this distinction in mind he would not have misinterpreted Avicenna. When Avicenna says that horseness is nothing else than horseness, he simply meant that the definition of horse does not include the notions of one or many, existence in reality or in the mind. He did not intend the absurdity that horseness is a reality that is actually neither one nor many, neither existing in nature nor in the mind. "Horseness' is indifferent, then, in the logical sense that the opposed predicates 'universal' and 'individual' are attributable to it. In this case 'horseness' has simple supposition (suppositio), for the term stands for the concept of horseness. If one says "Universal and individual can be predicated of horse," he expresses a signified act: 'horse' is a term functioning as the subject of the predicates 'universal' and 'individual'. Corresponding to this usage of the term, there are two possible propositions expressing an exercised act. We can say "Horseness is universal," where 'horseness' stands for the concept of horse. We can also say "Horseness is individual," in which case 'horseness' has personal supposition, for it stands for the same individual horses that it signifies. In this way Ockham transposes the notion of an 'indifferent nature' from the metaphysical to the logical order. His analysis of the term is intended to show that the indifference Scotus took to be real is in fact linguistic or logical. This reenforces his basic contention that the real is purely individual; there are no real essences that are common or indifferent in that they can be instantiated in many individuals. 54
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Ockham, SL, ibid. See Sent. I, d. 2, q. 6; II, pp. 173, 219. For the doctrine of Scotus, see Etienne Gilson, Jean Duns Scot (Paris, J. Vrin, 1952), pp. 84-115. Scotus was influenced in this doctrine by Henry of Ghent. For the distinction between actus exercitus and actus signatus, see Ockham, SL, I, c. 66, pp. 202-203. Ockham, Sent. I, d. 2, q. 6; II, p. 220; SL, I, c. 8, p. 31. On the supposition of terms, see SL, I, c. 63-77, pp. 193-238. 54
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Another typical instance of Ockham's use of analysis is his treatment of motion. It was the common opinion in his day that motion is a reality over and above a physical body. Some scholastics, like St. Albert, thought that motion has a special kind of being called 'flowing being' (ens fluens) or 'flowing form' (forma fluens). Others, like Peter Olivi, conceived of motion not as a successive but as a 'permanent entity'. This view of motion is plausible when we consider our use of verbs like 'moves', 'changes', 'grows', all of which appear to denote something besides the body that moves, changes or grows. The abstract terms 'motion', 'change', 'growth' would seem to express this added entity. This conception of motion as a kind of accidental form of bodies has the added advantage of allowing a qualitative method of studying motion, in terms of increase and decrease — the kind favored by the Aristotelians. Only in the 14th century, at Oxford, did this method yield to a quantitative investigation of motion. Ockham's analytic approach to the problem of motion is different from both of these. To him, abstract words like 'motion' and 'change' designate nothing real over and above a physical body. They are simply convenient terms to express the fact that a body is not at rest. If motion were a reality distinct from a body, he argues, God could conserve it without the body — which is clearly absurd. The alternative is that motion is simply a word or concept, used as a shorthand expression of a complex situation. Thus the noun 'local motion' is a brief term taking the place of the complex phrase "a body that was in one place, and later will be in another place, in such a way that at no time does it rest in any place." There is both a positive and negative element in this description, the positive element being the individual body that alone is real, the negative being the denial of rest, which is something added by the mind. If space permitted, other examples of Ockham's use of the analytic method could be cited; e.g., his analysis of quantity resulting in the reduction of problems of physical quantity to problems of grammar and logic. His approach to relation and action is similarly analytic. Acutely aware of the difficulties and errors in philosophy engendered by abstract nouns derived from verb, adverbs, conjunctions, prepositions and syncategorematic terms, 51
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See St. Albert, In III Phys., tr. 1, c. 3; III, pp. 183-186. See Peter Olivi, Quaestiones in II Lib. Sent., q. 27; ed. B. Jansen (Quaracchi, St. Bonaventure College, 1926), I, pp. 465-482. Ockham, Sent. II, 7; V, pp. 110-113. Summulae Philosophiae Naturalis III, c. 7; Opera PhilosophicalI, pp. 266-272. Quaestiones in libros Physicorum, q. 13; Opera Philosophical, pp. 425-429. See James Weisheipl, The Development of Physical Theory in the Middle Ages (Ann Arbor Paperbacks, University of Michigan Press, 1971), p. 67. 57
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he aims to remove them by the correct analysis of the terms. The fly is let out of the flybottle. *
*
*
In the 17th century the Jesuit philosopher Honore Fabri observed that the common principle "Beings should not be multiplied without necessity" is ineffective unless you add "without reason or without experience." This is in perfect harmony with Ockham's use of the Razor. He did not believe that it could explain everything in nature, as Leibniz said the nominalists claimed. Ockham realized that by itself the axiom is too broad to support his conclusions, and so he supplemented it with other methods and techniques. Indeed, he was sparing in his explicit use of the Razor; more often it functions implicitly in his thinking, while he formed his views directly by an appeal to experience and reason. But like the Razor, reason and experience are the common coin of philosophers. The search for Ockham's method inevitably leads to his personal understanding of what counts as experience and as a 'good reason'. Bertrand Russell goes too far when he comments that Ockham eliminated with his Razor "the forms, substances and the like, with which traditional metaphysics was concerned." Ockham was too much a medieval, Aristotelian philosopher to deny the existence of form and matter as components of a material substance. He even accepted qualities like whiteness and cognition as distinct realities. The thrust of the Razor was against what he called "those small entities" like essences, relations, motion, and action, which the realists thought necessary to account for the unity, coherence, and communality in the world. Ockham's philosophizing resulted in a fragmented and individualistic picture of the world that agreed all too well with the dissolving socio-political and religious society of the late Middle Ages. 60
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"Non sunt multiplicanda entia sine necessitate, quod certe non valet nisi addes, vel sine ratione, vel sine experientia." Honore Fabri (1606-1688), Tractatus Physicus de Motu Local!, I, axioma iii (Lyons, 1646), col. 6.1 owe this citation to James Weisheipl. Bertrand Russell, Wisdom of the West (London, Rathbone Books Ltd., 1959), p. 162. 60
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20 William of Ockham on Language and Reality
1
In the first chapter of his Summa Logicae, Ockham describes three kinds of language (oratio): written, spoken, and mental. Written language, he says, is composed of words inscribed on some material and visible to the eye. Spoken language is made up of words uttered by the mouth and audible to the ear. Mental language is different from both of these because it has no material or outward expression. Rather, it is composed of mental words which, as St. Augustine says, belong to no tongue, for they remain entirely within the mind and are incapable of external expression. In these brief lines Ockham sketches three systems of communication that make possible an interchange of ideas, feelings, and desires. Each language is a complex set of signs with its own properties and place in human communication. The terms of written and spoken language are conventional signs, varying from people to people, and having no natural likeness to the things they signify. The terms of mental language are signs of an entirely different sort: they are mental names ( nomina mentalia) or thoughts functioning as natural signs of things. Ockham was not disturbed by modern doubts about the possibility of a purely mental language or about our direct awareness of its mental processes. In his view, we enjoy a direct intuition of the operations or concepts that are the components of our mental language. The idea of a mental language 2
3
4
' I wish to express my indebtedness to Prof. Stephen Brown for valuable information on the subject of this paper. The interpretation of the "great dispute" over words, concepts, and things is my own. Ockham, Summa logicae, P. I, c. 1; Opera philosophical (Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure, New York, 1974), p. 7.13-25. For the references to St. Augustine, see p. 7, n. 3. Ockham, ibid. On Ockham's notion of mental language, see John Trentman, "Ockham on Mental," Mind, 79 (1970), 586-590; Joan Gibson, The Role of Mental Language in the Philosophy of William of Ockham (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Toronto, 1976). Ockham, Sent. I, Prol. q. 1; Opera theologica I (Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure, New York, 1967), pp. 39.18-40.6. Quodlibet I, q. 14 (Strasbourg, 1491). See St. Augustine, De Trinitate, XV, c. 12. 2
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would present no difficulty to a theologian like Ockham, who read St. Augustine's De Trinitate and believed with him in the existence of a divine Word that makes possible communication in the Trinity, and that is the model of our own mental and spoken word. Indeed, does not Scripture itself tell us that we 'speak' in our hearts, and what is this interior speech but the mind's thinking within itself? When Ockham describes the world of the angels he appeals to mental speech to explain their communication with each other. Turning to the human world, Ockham finds a purely spiritual mode of communication insufficient. Creatures of body and soul, we need an outwardly expressed system of signs composed of oral or written words. But our material language systems cannot function without the primary system of mental language. Spoken and written words are only secondary signs, subordinate to the mental signs that make up our mental speech. Concepts are the primary and natural signs of things; spoken and written words signify the same things that concepts do, but on a level below that of concepts. Written words in turn are inferior as signs to spoken words. This may seem questionable to us who live in what Marshall McLuhan calls the Gutenberg Era, but it is understandable in an oral culture like that of the Middle Ages. While Ockham subordinates words to concepts in their function as signs, he insists that words are designated primarily to signify the same things that concepts do. Spoken words are not first of all and properly signs of concepts but of the same things that concepts signify. In making this decision, Ockham takes sides in a lively debate in his day over the question whether words first of all signify concepts or things. Roger Bacon, writing in his old age (c. 1292), testifies that the masters were then disputing this question at great length and contradicting each other in their answers to it. Shortly after, Duns Scotus speaks of a "great controversy" (magna altercatio) over the subject. At first sight the question whether words are first of all signs of concepts or things may seem trivial; but the schoolmen realized the important issues at stake. The answer to the question is bound to reveal the philosopher's notion of language, thought, and reality. That the scholastics took the problem seriously is a credit to their philosophical acumen; that they could 5
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Psalm 13:1. Ockham, Sent. II, q. 20 M-O (Lyons, 1495). For the notion of mental speech (loqui mentaliter), see Quodl. I, q. 6. Ockham, Summa logicae, P. 1, c. 1, pp. 7.26-8.45. Ibid. Roger Bacon, Compendium studii theologiae; ed. H. Rashdall and A. G. Little (Aberdeen, 1911), p. 44. Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 27, q. 1-3; Opera Omnia VI (Vatican, 1963), p. 97, n. 83. 5 6
7 8
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not always see eye to eye on the answer is proof of the profound divergence of their philosophies. It is remarkable that a dispute should have arisen over this subject in view of the fact that all the participants claimed to be following Aristotle, and he seems to leave no doubt about his own views on it. In his Perihermenias he clearly asserts that spoken words are first of all symbols of the affections of the soul, and written words are symbols of spoken sounds. This would seem to settle the matter for followers of Aristotle. But there were many kinds of Aristotelians in the Middle Ages, and no one interpretation of his philosophy satisfied all. One was free to interpret his statements as one wished; as Alain of Lille said, authority, like a wax nose, could be turned in any direction. Boethius, the great teacher of logic for the Middle Ages, made no attempt to twist Aristotle's nose. His two commentaries on the Perihermenias do not conceal the ambiguities in the work nor the different interpretations of it, but on the relation between words, concepts, and things, he did not swerve from the text. 11
12
A spoken word (Boethius writes) signifies both the concept of a thing and the thing itself. When I utter the word 'stone', the word designates the concept of a stone and the stone itself; but first of all it signifies the concept, and in the second place it signifies the thing. Thus, not all things that a word signifies are thoughts, but only those that are the first things signified, for a word first signifies concepts and in the second place things. 13
The Boethian rendering of Aristotle's Perihermenias became traditional in the Middle Ages, prevailing well into the 13th century. St. Thomas was clearly under its influence when he wrote his own commentary on the Perihermenias. He was aware that the term passiones animae, which is the Latin equivalent of the Greek ev r f j Yvxfj Ttadtj/iara, has various meanings in the works of Aristotle. Sometimes it means the soul's feelings or emotions or desires. These can be signified by natural signs, as a groan is the natural sign of pain. But in the present context, St. Thomas explains, passiones animae are to be understood as conceptions of the mind; and these, according to Aristotle, are directly signified by nouns, verbs, and sentences. Words cannot immediately signify things, as is clear from their mode of signifying. The word 'man', for example, designates human nature in abstraction from individual men, and so it cannot directly signify individual men. This was the reason why the Platonists held that the word 'man' Aristotle, Perihermenias, 1, 16 a 3-7. Alain of Lille, Deflde catholica, 1, 30; PL 210, 333. Boethius, In Librum De Interpretation, editio prima, 1; PL 64, 298D-299A. See In Librum De Interpretation, editio secunda, 1; PL 64, 409 B. 11
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signifies the separated idea of Man. But Aristotle showed that the abstract man does not exist in reality but only in the mind; and from this he drew the inevitable conclusion that words like 'man' immediately signify concepts, and things only through concepts. Although this conclusion holds most obviously for general words like 'man', whose mode of signifying is abstract, according to St. Thomas it is equally valid for all words. A word (verbum) is not only a sound; it is a meaningful sound. A cough is a sound made by the throat, but it is not a word. In order to turn a sound into a word, it must proceed not only from the throat but also from the soul. In other words, it must be filled with meaning and imagination. The sound then becomes an instrument of the soul, giving outward expression to its feelings and thoughts. Hence the uttered sound is a word only because it is the sign of the inner conception of the mind. While arguing against the notion that words are directly signs of things, St. Thomas does not give the impression that he is opposing a position actually held by any of his contemporaries. The discussion appears to be simply a matter of school debate. A generation later the situation was different. Around the turn of the century, as we have seen, Bacon and Scotus report that a great controversy is taking place over words: Are they signs of things or concepts? And now there are protagonists on both sides, with Scotus, among others, holding that words are not first of all signs of concepts but of things. What prompted Scotus to adopt this position on the role of words as signs, so opposed to the traditional view expressed by Boethius and St. Thomas? The reason becomes clear if we read the long discussion of the "great debate" in Scotus' two commentaries on the Perihermenias. In these works he does not definitely take sides in the dispute, but there we find the arguments that no doubt led him to his final position in the Opus Oxoniense. Scotus' first concern is to clarify the terms of the question. When we ask: Do words signify concepts or things? what words do we have in mind? The 14
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St. Thomas, In I Perhermenias, lect. 2; Opera omnia, I (Rome, 1882), p. 12, n. 5. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, I, 34, 1; In II De Anima, lect. 18; ed. Pirotta (Turin, 1936), p. 163, n. 477. Scotus, Ordinatio, I, d. 27, q. 1-3; VI, p. 97, n. 83. Bacon also held that when a word is imposed to signify something outside the mind it is only a sign of that thing. See Bacon, above, note 9. See also Walter Burley, In I Perihermenias; Super artem veterem (Venice, 1497; Minerva reprint, 1967). "Sunt ergo ea quae sunt in voce ..." According to Siger of Brabant, common names of first imposition do not principally signify concepts but natures outside the mind; they consignify concepts. Siger de Brabant. Ecrits de Logique, de Morale et de Physique-, ed. B. Bazan, "La signification des termes communs et la doctrine de la supposition chez Maitre Siger de Brabant," Revue philosophique de Louvain, 77 (1979), 345-372. 14
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question is not about words like 'concept' or 'genus', for these clearly signify concepts. The question has to do with general or common words like 'man' or 'animal', which are signs, either immediate or mediate, of things. The dispute, moreover, is not over the role of particular names like 'Socrates', or words that denote figments of the imagination like 'chimera'. Rather, the controversy concerns the universal terms used in scientific discourse about the real world. Scotus further clarifies the meaning of 'concept'. It is a passio animae, according to Aristotle; but this can be viewed in two ways: either as an accidental reality existing in the mind or as a likeness representing a thing. It is like the statue of Hercules, which can be considered as a real thing or as a likeness of Hercules. Turning now to the question, Scotus lays down the principle that in his mind governs the whole discussion: We first signify what we first know. This means that words primarily and properly are signs of what we first of all and properly understand. This principle is justified by the observation that "signification follows upon understanding." In short, as we understand, so we signify. There is a strict correlation or proportion between our knowledge and our use of signs to express this knowledge. As a thing is known, so a name is given to it. Now our first knowledge is not of concepts, or passiones animae, but of things. We know concepts only secondarily, by reflection on our knowledge. It follows that what we first signify by words is not a concept but a reality. This conclusion is reinforced by the obvious fact that when we use words, they signify that about which we are speaking. Now when we say 'Man runs', we do not intend to say something about a concept or intention of the mind, but about a reality. What reality is first and properly signified by words like 'man' and 'animal' ? Not the individual reality of this man or this animal, for the first and proper object of the intellect is not the individual but its essence or quiddity. The intellect knows the individual only secondarily, by reflecting on its image in the sense powers. Hence Scotus' conclusion: what is first signified by words is the essence or quod quid est of a thing. If a word is said to signify a concept or passio of the intellect, it is in the sense that it signifies the thing as conceived by the mind. This is how we are to interpret the saying of Aristotle and Boethius, that words are signs of concepts, and concepts are signs of things. 17
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Scotus, In Libros Perihermenias, opus secundum, q. 1; Opera omnia I (Paris, 1891), p. 584, n. 8. Ibid., p. 582, n. 2. Ibid., p. 583, n. 5, 6. In this work, Scotus does not definitely take sides in the debate, 17
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From this it should be clear that Scotus' interpretation of Aristotle is a consequence of his realistic conception of an essence or nature. In his view, a common nature like 'man' is endowed with an essential being or reality formally distinct a parte reifromthe individual differences that narrow down or "contract" the nature in individuals. It has the entity of a nature (entitas naturae), with its appropriate real unity and community. When this nature is conceived by the mind, it takes on a new intelligible being and it exists as a universal concept; but outside the mind the nature has a real essential being. St. Thomas, on the contrary, does not attribute a positive reality to essences in themselves. The only real beings, in his view, are individuals. These share a form or essence, as all men participate in human nature, but this nature has no real being or community distinct from the individuals. As a consequence, a common word cannot directly signify reality but only a nature as abstracted from individuals. The word 'man', for example, designates first of all the nature of man in abstraction from individual men. Hence it is directly the sign of a concept. The abstract mode of signification of the word makes it impossible for it to function as an immediate sign of a reality. Only indirectly, through the concept, does the word signify real men. If this is true, the key to the conflict between the Thomists and Scotists on the meaning of abstract words is their divergent notions of what is real. Scotus can assert that common words are direct signs of reality because, for him, there are real common natures to which these words can refer and for which they can stand when we talk about them. Aquinas denies this because of his refusal to grant a reality to essences or natures in themselves. For both, the value of words as signs of reality depends on what is real. If we return now to Ockham's notion of words as signs of things, we shall see that this is also true in his case. At first sight, Ockham seems to be in agreement with Duns Scotus, for like him he claims that common words like 'man' are not directly signs of concepts but of things. In the "great debate" over words, concepts, and things, he takes the side of Scotus. But on closer inspection it becomes clear 20
21
but he thinks that it is more in accord with Aristotle to say that a name can signify a thing, not absolutely but as it is understood. Ibid., n. 13. "... etiam in re natura secundum illam entitatem habet verum esse reale extra animam ..." Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1; Opera omnia, VII, p. 404, n. 34. See E. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot (Paris, 1952), pp. 110, 451. For the difference between the Thomist and Scotist notions of essence or nature, see J. Owens, "Common Nature: a Point of Comparison between Thomistic and Scotistic Metaphysics," Mediaeval Studies, 19 (1957), 1-14. 20
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that the agreement is only verbal, and that in fact he has given a radically new meaning to language, thought, and reality. Ockham's guiding principle in settling the debate is already found in Duns Scotus. Since words are conventional signs, Ockham argues, they signify primarily what the inventor and user of the words first of all intends them to signify. Now some words were devised to signifyfirstof all things outside the mind; e.g. 'man', 'animal', 'whiteness'. These are called words of "first imposition" and "first intention." Other words were designed to signify first of all concepts of the mind. Examples are 'genus', 'species', and 'universal'. These are words of "first imposition" and "second intention." Still other words were invented to signify meaningful words or their properties and conditions; e.g. 'noun', 'verb', 'participle', 'case'. These are words of "second imposition." Consequently, there is no simple answer to the question: Do words signify things or concepts? It all depends on what word you are talking about. If it is a word of first imposition and intention, like 'man' or 'animal', it refers to things existing outside the mind and not to concepts in the mind. But what is a thing? What is real? Ockham contends that a thing can only be an individual; there are no common or universal 'things' or 'realities'. There are only individuals, and these are so radically individual that they have no essence or nature in common. Ockham criticizes all theories of reality that distinguish in any way between a thing and its nature or essence. There is no essence in things, shared by them and in some way distinct from them. Essences are not formally distinct from things, as Scotus holds, nor are they conceptually distinct from things, as St. Thomas maintains. A thing is identical with its essence; and since all things are individual, so too are essences. Hence, though Scotus was right in saying that the word 'man' is a sign of reality, he was wrong in thinking that it is the sign of a real common nature. In fact, the spoken or written word signifies nothing but individual men. We are here at the heart of Ockham's nominalistic theory of signs. In this theory, signs themselves are individual things, sharing no form or essence with the things of which they are signs. This is true whether they are conventional signs like spoken or written words or natural signs like 22
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Ockham, Expositio in librum Perihermenias, 2; ed. A. Gambatese, S. Brown (Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure, New York, 1978), pp. 347-348. Sent. I, d. 22, qu. unica; ed. G. Etzkorn, F. Kelley (Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure, New York, 1979), pp. 48-49. For the principle in Scotus, see above, n. 18. Ockham, Sent. I, d. 2, q. 4-7; II, pp. 99-266. On the nature of sign, see Ockham, Summa logicae, P. 1, c. 1; p. 8.53-9.65. 22
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concepts. If they are general or universal signs, their universality consists solely in the fact that they signify or stand for many things. Concepts are natural likenesses of the things they signify, but their likeness is not due to their containing the forms or essences of those things. The mark of a sign is simply its capacity to lead to a knowledge of something else and to stand for that thing in our discourse about it. It refers to, or designates that thing. This is so true that, according to Ockham, a sign loses its meaning if the things it signifies cease to exist. Thus the word 'man' was devised primarily as a sign of all men. If all men ceased to exist, the word would lose its present meaning. Like the term 'gold mountain' it would then signify only a figment of the mind or concept. The radical innovation in Ockham's philosophy of language is not the claim that general names can primarily signify realities. This was already the doctrine of Scotus and other masters of the Middle Ages. What is revolutionary is Ockham's contention that general names like 'man' are first of all signs of individual things; in short, that they have no general object whatsoever. They do not have a general object in a nature abstractly conceived by the mind as in Thomism nor in a real common nature as in Scotism. Ockham's greatness as a philosopher lies in the fact that he took a pure metaphysical stance on the nature of reality: that what is real is so radically individual that it shares no form or essence with anything else. In short, a thing is individual by itself and by essence. Ockham's novelties in logic and the philosophy of language follow from this basic metaphysical position. 25
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Ockham, Expositio in librum Perihermenias, ibid.
21 Ockham's Razor and Chatton's Anti-Razor After completing his work for the degree of Master of Theology at Oxford about 1320, Ockham likely left Oxford and spent several years teaching in Franciscan convents, until he went to Avignon early in 1324 to answer the charge of heresy. During his Oxford period and later at Franciscan convents, perhaps at London, his path must have crossed that of his Franciscan confrere, Walter of Chatton, who was studying about this time at Oxford and teaching in convents of his Order. Whatever their personal relationship might have been, it is certain that each knew the other's theological and philosophical views intimately and often disagreed with them. In their disputes Chatton frequently took the side of Duns Scotus, who was Ockham's bete noir. Ockham went his own way, initiating a revolution in theology and philosophy whose consequences are felt to the present day. An essential element in this revolution was Ockham's appeal to a favorite axiom "A plurality is not to be posited without necessity" ("Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate"). Sometimes he used an earlier formula: "It is useless to do with more what can be done with fewer" ("Frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora"). The principle was not original with him; it was in 1
2
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For Ockham's life, see L. Baudry, Guillaume d'Occam. Sa vie, ses wuvres, ses idees sociales etpolitiques, vol. 1: L'homme et les wuvres (Paris, 1950); A. B. Emden, A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1957-59), 2.1384-1387; J. A. Weisheipl, "Ockham and Some Mertonians," Mediaeval Studies, 30 (1968), 163-174. For Chatton's life and relations with Ockham, see L. Baudry, "Gauthier de Chatton et son commentaire des Sentences," Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire au moyen age, 14 (1943-45), 337-369; Emden, ibid., 1.395-396; W. J. Courtenay, Adam Wodeham. An Introduction to His Life and Writings (Leiden, 1978), pp. 66-74; G. Gal in the introduction to William of Ockham, Summa logicae (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1974), pp. 54*-55*; J. C. Wey in the introduction to William of Ockham, Quodlibeta septem (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1980), pp. 36*-41*; G. Gal in the introduction to William of Ockham, Ordinatio (Opera theologica 1; St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1967), pp. 26*-31*. About the middle of the thirteenth century the razor was formulated by Odo Rigaldus in the form: "Frustrafitper plura quod potestfieriper unum." This is the oldest known version 1
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frequent use at the time and its foundation can be traced back to Aristotle. Scotus, as well as Ockham, often had recourse to it, but Ockham's use of the axiom was new. It was one of the means by which he eliminated entities dear to Duns Scotus and followers such as Chatton, especially what Ockham calls 'small entities' (res parvae) like relation, motion and action. In defense of the reality of these and other entities, Chatton devised his own counter-principle or anti-razor. "My rule,'' he retorted, is that "if three things are not enough to verily an affirmative proposition about things, a fourth must be added, and so on." Chatton's anti-razor was to have little success in the history of Western thought, while the razor became a keystone in modern science and philosophy. First formulated in the Middle Ages, the razor was accepted by scientists and philosophers such as Galileo, Newton, Leibniz and Bertrand Russell. But the anti-razor did not lack its supporters, 4
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of the axiom: see C. K. Brampton, "Nominalism and the Law of Parsimony," The Modern Schoolman, 41 (1964), 275. Other articles on the razor are: W. M. Thornburn, "The Myth of Ockham's Razor," Mind, 27 (1918) 345-352; M. M. Rossi, "Riflessioni sui rasoio di Occam," Logos, 20 (1937), 319-358; C. F. Rogers, "Ockham's Razor," Theology, 40 (1940), 340-349; D. P. Hemy, "Ockham's Razor and the Unification of Physical Science," British Journal of Philosophical Science, 8 (1957-58), 265-280; G. O'Hara, "Ockham's Razor Today," Philosophical Studies, 12 (1963), 125-139; A. Maurer, "Method in Ockham's Nominalism," The Monist, 61 (1978), 426-443, reprinted above, pp. 405-411. The wording "Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem" appears to be postmedieval. In 1639 it was cited, in slightly different words ("Non sunt multiplicanda entia sine necessitate"), by the Scotist commentator John Ponce of Cork as an axioma vulgare of the scholastics; see Duns Scotus, In 3 Sent., d. 34, q. unica (Opera omnia 15; Paris, 1894), p. 483a. See also Honore Fabri (1606-88), Tractatus physicus de motu locali, lib. 1, axioma iii (Lyons, 1646), col. 6; G. W. Leibniz, De stilo philosophico Nizolii 28 (Opera philosophica, ed. J. E. Erdmann, pars prior [Berlin, 1840], p. 69) and Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Utters, trans. L. E. Loemker, 1 (Chicago, 1956), pp. 198-199. See Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 1.25 (86a33); Physics, 1.4 (188al7), 8.6 (259a8); De caelo, 1.4 (271a33). See e.g., Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 1 (Opera omnia 3; Vatican City, 1954), p. 224, n. 369; De primo principio, c. 2, n. 10 (Opera omnia 4; Paris, 1891), p. 735. Ockham uses the expression res parva of the relations of equality, likeness and causality; see Quodlibeta VI, q. 12 (p. 631.51-52) and q. 26 (p. 683.20). "Arguo sic: propositio affirmativa, quae quando verificatur, solum verificatur pro rebus: si tres res non sufficiunt ad verificandum earn, oportet ponere quartam, et sic deinceps" (Chatton, Reportatio 1, d. 30, q. 1, a. 4; Paris, Bibliotheque Nationale lat. 15887, fol. 63rb). Chatton's Lectura has a more extended and precise formula: "Ubicumque propositio affirmativa nata est verificari pro rebus actualiter existentibus, si duae res qualitercumque praesentes secundum situm et durationem sine alia re non poterunt sufficere, oportet aliam rem ponere; et si tres qualitercumque praesentes secundum situm et durationem sine alia re non poterunt sufficerre, oportet quartam rem ponere, et sic ulterius procedendo" (Lectura I, d. 3, q. 1, a. 1; Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale Conv. soppr. C.5.357, fol. 82ra). I am indebted to Joseph C. Wey for transcriptions of the passages from the works of Chatton. For Galileo see Dialogue concerning the Two Chief World Systems, Ptolemaic & 4
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for it appears in a fourteenth-century anti-Ockhamist logic attributed erroneously to Richard of Campsall. The pseudo-Campsall clearly depends on Chatton when he lays down the rule: "Whenever an affirmative proposition is verified of things, if one thing does not suffice to verify the proposition two things must be posited, and if two things are insufficient then three, and so on to infinity." An anonymous Franciscan treatise on logic entitled Logica 'Ad rudium', dated about 1335, repeats the same axiom: "When a proposition is precisely verified of existing things and its truth does not depend on the future, if two things do not suffice for its truth a third must be posited, and soon." Modern philosophers have also found need of an anti-razor to balance the cutting edge of the razor. Leibniz thought that the nominalists' law of parsimony should be countered with a 'principle of plenitude' (to use the phrase of Arthur Lovejoy), according to which God created the best of possible worlds with the greatest number of possible beings. Leibniz did not think that the razor, when correctly understood, conflicts with the opulence of nature. The law of economy means that God works in simple ways in nature, bringing about the greatest diversity by the easiest and simplest means. God has implanted in the world simple laws which result in the vast variety and diversity we observe in nature. There is simplicity and economy in nature's laws (which are God's means) and plenitude in their effects. Another form of the anti-razor is found in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Kant accepted the razor as formulated in his day: "Beings should not be multiplied beyond what is necessary." He regarded this not as a rule about nature itself, but as a regulative idea of pure reason, its function being "to bring unity into the body of our detailed knowledge." So compelling did he find the idea that he did not think it should be encouraged. Rather, it should be moderated by a counter-principle, which he stated as follows: "The variety 9
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Copemican, trans. S. Drake (Berkeley-Los Angeles, 1962), pp. 396-397; Newton, Philosophies naturalis principia mathematica, 3rd edition by A. Koyre and I. B. Cohen, 2 (Cambridge, Mass., 1972), p. 550; Leibniz, above, n. 3; Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World (London, 1926), p. 112. "... quandocunque aliqua proposicio affirmativa verificatur pro rebus, si vna res non sufficiat ad verificandum talem proposicionem, oportet ponere duas, et si due non sufficiant, tres, et sic in infinitum" (pseudo-Richard of Campsall, Logica Campsale Anglicj, ualde utilis et realis contra Ocham 41.19, ed. E. A. Synan, The Works of Richard of Campsall 2 [Toronto, 1982], p. 237). "Quando propositio precise verificatur pro rebus existentibus et eius Veritas non dependet de fiituro: si ad veritatem eius non sufficiunt due res, oportet tertiam ponere, et sic deinceps" (Anonymi auctoris franciscani Logica Ad rudium'59, ed. L. M. de Rijk [Nijmegen, 1981], p. 38). I am indebted to Paul Vincent Spade for this citation. " A. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (Cambridge, Mass., 1936). See R. McRae, Leibniz: Perception, Apperception, and Thought (Toronto, 1976), p. 112. 9
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of beings should not rashly be diminished" (entium varietates non temere esse minuendas). In our own day the mathematician-philosopher Karl Menger has proposed his own anti-razor. He finds mathematicians too parsimonious in their account of variables, failing to recognize their variety; and so he lays down what he calls "a Law against Miserliness — stipulating that entities must not be reduced to the point of inadequacy, and, more generally, that it is vain to try to do with fewer what requires more." The history of the razor and anti-razor, captivating as it is, is not the subject of the present paper. We are here concerned only with the quarrel between Ockham and Chatton over the values of the axioms, with the hope that an examination of this dispute will throw light on their meaning. Gedeon Gal, one of the editors of the excellent critical edition of Ockham's Sentences, suggests that they are but two sides of the same coin, the razor expressing negatively what the anti-razor expresses positively. Both Ockham and Chatton, he says, require a sufficient number of entities to verify a proposition, Ockham stating the sufficiency in a negative form "no more than is necessary," Chatton stating it in a positive form "no less than is necessary." No doubt there is some truth in this attempt to reconcile the two axioms. Both Ockham and Chatton were reasonable enough to agree that a sufficient number of items should be posited in order to verify a proposition — no more and no less. However, there appears to be more to the razor and anti-razor than this, at least as Ockham and Chatton defended them. Gal's interpretation of the axioms does not explain why Chatton, while occasionally using the razor, preferred the anti-razor, calling it the 'clearer' principle. Neither does it account for the fact that Ockham never made personal use of the anti-razor nor why he objected to the way Chatton used it. In his disputes with Chatton he calls the anti-razor "false unless it is better understood," and again, "false as it is generally understood." What did Ockham find wrong with Chatton's use of the anti-razor? Why was he content with the razor, as though the anti-razor were, if not wrong in itself, at least superfluous? Light will be thrown on these questions if we examine 13
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I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. K. Smith (London, 1950), pp. 538 (A 652, B 680), 541 (A 656, B 684). Karl Menger, "A Counterpart of Ockham's Razor in Pure and Applied Mathematics: Ontological Uses," Synthese, 12 (1960), 415 (Menger's emphasis). Gal in the introduction to Ockham, Summa logicae, p. 61*. Comparing his own anti-razor to the razor Chatton writes: "Ista propositio clarior est quam alia ad oppositum. Et hoc mihi sufficit" (Reportatio I, d. 30, q. 1, a. 4; Paris lat. 15887, fol. 63rb). Ockham, Quodlibeta I, q. 5 (p. 32.72). Ibid., VI, q. 12 (p. 632.100-101). 13
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some of the disputes between the two Franciscans involving the use of the anti-razor. One of the debates is recorded in Ockham's Quodlibet VI, q. 12, which asks whether the relation of efficient causality is a reality distinct from the absolute terms of the relation. Suppose there is an efficient cause A and its effect B: is there a third reality, a real relation of causality set up between A and B? Ockham was convinced that there is not. In his view, the absolute realities of cause and effect are sufficient to account for the fact that they are really related in this way. No additional relational reality is needed. Indeed, in the created world there are no res relativae-, all realities are absolutes. Before presenting his own position on the topic he gives several arguments to the contrary, the second of which is taken from Chatton's Sentences. Chatton, like the majority of his contemporaries, was of the opinion that when things are really related, like an efficient cause and its effect, over and above them there must be a real relation binding them together. Chatton claimed to have many arguments in support of this, but only one he thought really weighty. It is based on the principle that he calls "my rule" (regula mea): "When a proposition is verified of things, if two do not suffice, a third must be posited." Now consider the proposition "A produces B." Are A and B sufficient to verify the proposition? Clearly not, for God can produce A and B by himself, and then the same two absolute realities exist, but they cannot verify the proposition "A produces B," for in this case it is God who produces B. In order for the proposition to be true, a third reality must be added, namely, a real relation of causality between A and B. Chatton gives examples to illustrate his point. Consider the proposition "Heat produces heat." What is needed to verify this proposition? Not the two absolute qualities of heat, for God can produce heat by himself — heat in any 19
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" Ibid., pp. 629-633. "Nec potest per rationem ostendi quin omnis res realiter distincta ab alia ita sit res absoluta sicut alia, quamvis non omnis res sit ita perfecta res absoluta sicut alia" (Ordinatio I, d. 30, q. 1 and IV [p. 307.12-15]). Ockham restricts himself to natural reason in order to leave room for the theological teaching that the Persons of the Trinity are res relativae. Strictly speaking it is not proper to speak of a thing as absolute, since the distinction between relative and absolute is one between terms, not things: "Similiter distinctio entis per absolutum et respectivum non est entis in quantum ens sed terminorum ..." (Ockham, Summa logicae I, c. 51 [p. 167.148-149]). For Ockham's doctrine of relation, see ibid., cc. 49-54 (pp. 153-179); Quodlibeta VI, qq. 22-25 (pp. 666-682). Ockham, Quodlibeta^I, q. 12 (p. 629.8-13). See Chatton, ReportatioI, d. 30, q. 1, a. 4 (Paris lat. 15887, fol. 63rb). Ibid. (Paris lat. 15887, fol. 63ra). See above, n. 7. Chatton calls this "my rule" (ibid., fol. 64ra). This is a generalization of Chatton's arguments (ibid., fol. 63ra-b). Ockham reports one of them in Quodlibeta VI, q. 12 (p. 629.8-13). 20
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number — and then it is not true to say that heat produces heat. A thousand absolute entities might be added but they will not be enough to verify the proposition. For this a real relation of causality is needed. Another of Chatton's examples is the proposition "Visual perception depends on the presence of its object." The perception and the object, being absolutes, cannot verify the proposition, for God, being omnipotent, can conserve in existence the perception and its object. Then the proposition is not true, for the perception depends on God and not on its object. In order for the proposition to be true, a relative reality, or real relation of dependence of perception on its object, is needed. Another difference of opinion between Ockham and Chatton concerns the status of motion. This is recorded in Ockham's Quodlibet I, q. 5. Ockham saw no reason to posit a distinct reality called motion in order to account for the fact that things move in space, any more than that there must be a distinct reality called relation to explain the fact that things are really related to each other. In his view, motion and relation are only terms that we use to describe certain factual situations of things. Relation is a term that we use to designate the fact that things are related to each other, though they are related to each other by themselves and not by an added reality of relation. The word 'motion' is just a shorthand way of describing the fact that something is successively in different places without resting in any of the intermediate places. Though Chatton did not dismiss this view of motion outright, he preferred the traditional explanation of motion as a distinct entity, really different from the permanent things that are set in motion. Motion is not just a term: it is a reality that things acquire when they move. Chatton's difficulty in accepting Ockham's account of motion is easy to see. Ockham asks us to believe that things at rest (res permanentes) can by themselves explain their motion, just as he would have us think that absolute things (res absolutae) can by themselves explain their relatedness to each other. 25
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"Secundum exemplum est: haec est vera 'calor producit calorem'. Quae sunt res, quibus positis haec est vera? Non duo isti calores tantum; nec duo calores et Deus. Argue ut prius, si mille addantur absoluta." (ibid., fol. 63ra). "Quintum exemplum est: visio oculi dependet ex praesentia albedinis, ita quod ad hoc quod visio existat, requirit praesentiam obiecti. Absoluta quaecumque possunt simul poni, et tamen si Deus immediate conservet visionem, haec erit falsa 'visio dependet ab albedine'." (ibid., fol. 63rb). "... dico quod motus localis est coexistentia successiva, sine quiete media, alicuius continue existentis in loco diversis locis." (Ockham, Quodlibeta I, q. 5 [p. 29.10-12]). For Ockham's doctrine of motion, see De successivis, ed. P. Boehner (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1944), pp. 43-44; Reportatio II, q. 7; V (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1981), pp. 99-151. 25
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To Chatton this is too parsimonious an explanation of either relation or motion. Consider the proposition "A mobile thing (A) is moved by a mover (B)." Are things at rest (respermanentes) enough to verify this proposition? Clearly not, for God by himself can set the thing in motion. Then the same moving thing exists, and the negative condition of its movement is satisfied, i.e., it passes from one place to another without resting in the intermediate places. But the proposition is not true: "A mobile thing (A) is moved by a mover (B)," for now it is God and not B who does the moving. In order for the proposition to be true, a third reality called motion must be added to the mobile thing. Chatton describes this reality as the relation of the passive movement of the mobile thing (A) to the mover (B). The weapon Chatton uses against Ockham in these and similar disputes is his anti-razor: "If two things do not suffice to verify a proposition regarding existing things, a third must be posited." Chatton offers several proofs of his law, the first of which is based on the principle of contradiction. (Incidentally Ockham does not appear to have attempted a proof of the razor; perhaps this difference accounts for Chatton's calling his own rule clearer than Ockham's). Chatton's proof goes as follows. It would be contradictory for the same proposition to be both verifiable and not verifiable of the same things existing in the same way in place and time, without the addition of another thing. For instance, the proposition "Fire does not burn wood" is verifiable of fire and wood without the action of burning. It would be contradictory for the same proposition not to be verifiable of them existing in the same way at the same time. In order to verify the proposition "Fire burns wood," something more must be added than what is needed to verify the proposition "Fire does not burn wood." This something more is a reality — the relative reality of the action of burning — over and above the realities of fire and wood. 28
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"Respondeo ergo aliter pro modo quod motus est aliqua res positiva praeter res absolutas permanentes, respectus scilicet motionis passivae mobilis ad motorem, quia ubi propositio verificatur pro rebus simul existentibus, si rebus existentibus simul positis potest esse falsa, oportet ponere aliam. Sed haec est huiusmodi: Hoc movetur ad hoc ab agente. Et ad veritatem huius non sufficiunt omnes res absolutae possibiles nec negationes quomodocumque combinatae absolutorum, quia omnibus aeque praesentibus posset moveri a deo, et tunc esset haec falsa. Ergo alia res requiritur, scilicet motio passiva." (Chatton, Reportatio II, d. 2, q. 1, a. 1; Paris lat. 15887, fol. 90va). "Istam propositionem probo primo sic: de quolibet, affirmatio vel negatio; de nullo, eorum ambo. Igitur impossibile est quod pro eisdem rebus quocumque uno et eodem modo praesentibus secundum situm et durationem sine alia re, eadem propositio nata sit verificari et non sit nata verificari. Sed si non oportet aliam rem ponere ad hoc quod sit vera, tunc pro istis rebus sic praesentibus secundum situm et durationem sine alia re, nata est haec propositio verificari, sicut patet ex opposite». Quia si non sit nata verificari pro eis sic se habentibus, igitur oportet aliquid aliud ponere in re ad hoc quod ipsa sit vera, quia in eo quod res est vel non est, est oratio vera vel falsa. Aut enim requiritur aliquid plus in re ad hoc quod ipsa sit vera, 28
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Ockham's analysis of the notion of action led him to a different conclusion. He saw no need for a distinct reality of action any more than for one of motion. Just as motion is identical with that which moves, so action is really the same as that which acts, or the agent. More precisely, the term 'action' signifies the agent while connoting the effect it produces. Chatton, on the contrary, contended that this is too parsimonious an analysis of action. One may insist on paucity of explanation ("semper est paucitas ponenda"), he says, but this is going too far in the direction of economy. Over and above all absolute realities we must concede action or production as a relative entity. This he shows as follows. When an affirmative proposition is verified of things, if by the power of God it remains that these things exist and nevertheless that the proposition is false, something more is needed for the truth of the proposition. Now consider the proposition "The soul causes love of God." The proposition, if true, is verified of the soul and its actions. But no number of absolute entities suffice to verify it, for all of them (i.e., the soul and love) can exist by the divine power alone, without the soul causing love of God. The conclusion follows: in order that the proposition be true we must posit productive action as a relative reality added to the absolute entities of the soul and love. This is a good example, I believe, of the misuse and misunderstanding of the anti-razor that Ockham deplored. As we have seen, he did not object to the anti-razor itself, but rather to Chatton's simplistic and uncritical use of 30
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vel nihil plus. Si nihil plus, habetur propositum, quia istae sic se habentes sufficiunt sine plure. Si aliquid plus in re praeter praesentiam situs et durationis, illud plus, ex quo est in re, est res aliqua, et per consequens habetur propositum: quod praeter istas sic se habentes requiritur aliqua alia res. Et per consequens ex opposite, si praeter istas sic se habentes non requiritur alia res, tunc haec propositio nata est pro istis sic se habentibus verificari; sed pro istis sic se habentibus sine alia re non est nata verificari, quia per positum istae res sic se habentes sine alia re non possunt sufficere ad hoc quod sit vera; ergo contradictoria simul vera." (Chatton, Lectura I, d. 3, q. 1, a. 1; Florence Conv. soppr. C.5.357, fol. 82ra). The point at issue in this article is: "quod cognitio qua anima vel angelus cognoscit distinguatur ab angelo realiter." For Ockham's doctrine of action, see Summa logicae I, c. 57 (pp. 183-186) and Quodtibeta VII, qq. 3, 4 (pp. 709-714). Chatton, prol. q. 6, a. 3 (Paris, Bibliotheque Nationale lat. 15886, fol. 49rb). "Sed in proposito quae potest esse ars ad ostendendum quod anima est activa respectu dilectionis? Dico, primo praemittendo quod sicut superius probatum est, necesse est ponere praeter omnia absoluta rem relativam, puta actionem, quia ubi propositio affirmativa verificatur pro rebus, si per potentiam Dei stet quod illae res sint et tamen propositio <sit> falsa, plus requiritur ad veritatem illius propositionis quam illae res. Sed ista propositio verificatur pro anima et suis actibus 'anima causat dilectionem Dei,' et verificatur pro rebus si sit vera; et non sufficiunt ad eius veritatem res absolutae quaecumque, quia omnes possunt poni de potentia Dei et poni praesentes absque hoc quod anima causet dilectionem. Ergo necesse est ponere rem relativam ultra absoluta, scilicet actionem productivam." (Chatton, Reportatio I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 1; Paris lat. 15887, fol. 3ra). 30
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it. Chatton assumes that an unverifiable proposition can be made verifiable simply by postulating more and more entities. As a consequence the anti-razor in Chatton's hands becomes a kind of magical formula telling us what entities are truly real, and the thrust of his principle is to multiply these entities needlessly. In reply to Chatton, Ockham argues that one cannot always verify a proposition by adding entities. The verification of propositions is not so simple a matter as this. One must inquire whether the assumption of entities is reasonable, in line with experience, or justified by competent authority. These are the three criteria Ockham himself uses forjudging the necessity of positing items. The razor states that a plurality is not to be assumed without necessity, but in order to know what is necessary Ockham appeals to experience and reason in philosophical and scientific matters and to the authority of Scripture and the Fathers of the Church in theological questions. Ockham sees Chatton further abusing the anti-razor by bringing the divine omnipotence into the argument. Chatton asks us to imagine God miraculously intervening in the course of nature and causing effects that he normally produces by secondary causes. In other words his argument has recourse to the absolute power of God (his potentia absoluta) and not to his ordained power (potentia ordinata). The appeal, however, to the divine omnipotence is out of place here, for rules such as the razor or anti-razor do not apply to the absolute power of God. Given his omnipotence we cannot estimate the number or kinds of things he might create or the means by which he might produce them. Ockham makes this clear when treating of the razor. God, he says, has revealed that we are destined to enjoy eternal life, and for this we are given not only the gift of the Holy Spirit but the Holy Spirit himself. An objector asks why the gift without the Holy Spirit does not suffice. Ockham's reply absolves God from any restriction by the razor: "I say that God does many things by more means which he could do by fewer, nor should we look for any other reason [than the will of God]. And from the fact that he so wills, it is done fittingly and not in vain." 33
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See, for example, Ockham's argument that creation or conservation is not an action or 'passion' really distinct from the absolute entities involved. (Quodlibeta VII, q. 1 [pp. 703-706]). See Ockham, Reportatio II, q. 14, V (p. 319.21-22); Ordinatio I, d. 26, q. 1, IV (p. 157.20-25); De Sacramento altaris 28, ed. T. B. Birch (Burlington, Iowa, 1930), p. 318. "Ad secundum dico quod Deus multa agit per plura quae posset facere per pauciora, nec est alia causa quaerenda. Et ex hoc ipso quod vult, convenienter fit et non frustra. Secus est in causis naturalibus et in causis voluntariis creatis, quae voluntariae causae debent conformare rectae rationi primae, nec aliter faciunt aliquid iuste et recte." (Ordinatio I, d. 14, q. 2, III [p. 432.16-21]). Roger Ariew uses this text to prove that the razor, as used by Ockham, does not have an 33
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Neither does the anti-razor function in conjunction with the divine omnipotence. Chatton uses his principle, along with the notion of the divine omnipotence, to prove the reality of such supposed entities as relation and motion. As we have seen, he argues that in order to verify the proposition "A is moved by B" A and B are not enough: a third reality called motion must be added. For God can miraculously move A by himself, and then the same two things exist as before, but they fail to verify the proposition. For the proposition to be true, the relative reality of movement must be added. Ockham replies that when God miraculously moves A, neither A and B, nor the addition of anything else, suffices to verify the proposition "A is moved by B." Why not? Because the proposition is now false: not B but God moves A. Ockham argues in the same vein against Chatton's use of the anti-razor and divine omnipotence to prove the reality of the causal relation. Consider the proposition "A is the efficient cause of B." Two things are enough, in Ockham's view, to verify the proposition in the natural way that one thing causes another. No additional relative entity is needed. If, however, God works a miracle and causes the effect by himself, Ockham claims that a hundred realities are not enough for the truth of the proposition. Why not? Because the proposition "A is the efficient cause of B" is now clearly false. Not A, but God, is the cause of B. 36
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ontological but only a methodological sense. He writes: "It isn't that we are more likely right if we keep our entities to the minimum for there may exist useless entities by the will of God. God decides how many entities are to be; man decides how many concepts are to be." Thus "Ockham's razor is not Ockham's", ("Did Ockham Use His Razor?," Franciscan Studies, 37 [1977], 15, 17; see also his Ockham's Razor: A Historical and Philosophical Analysis of Ockham's Principle of Parsimony [Diss. Illinois, 1976; University Microfilms International, 1977]). Two remarks are in order. First, if God willed an entity it would not be useless. Second, all laws for Ockham, except the principle of non-contradiction, hold only considering the ordained power of God, not his absolute power. This is the case with the razor. It is a principle valid for the universe as God has willed it and normally governs it. As such, it has an ontological as well as an epistemological bearing. For the distinction between the absolute and ordained power of God, see Ockham, Quodlibeta VI, q. 1 (pp. 585-586). "Ad propositum, dico quod ad veritatem istius 'hoc mobile movetur ab isto movente,' sufficiunt mobile et movens et quod ad praesentiam moventis mobile continue sit in alio et alio loco sine miraculo Dei; et quando non fit miraculum, ista sufficiunt; quando autem fit miraculum, nec ista nec quaecumque alia sufficiunt ad verificandum istam propositionem." (Ockham, Quodlibeta I, q. 5 [pp. 33.107-34.113]). The whole Quodlibet should be read. "Ad aliud dico quod ilia propositio (scil. 'quando propositio verificatur pro rebus, si duae non sufficiunt, oportet ponere tertiam') general iter accepta falsa est, quia aliquando ad veritatem propositionis sufficiunt duae res, aliquando nec duae nec tres sufficiunt. In proposito sufficiunt duae res, quando fiunt sine miraculo et naturaliter. Quando autem intellectus et 36
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441
The debate between Ockham and Chatton over the use of the anti-razor continues in this highly dialectical fashion page after page. It is of small importance in the history of philosophy, but it assumes some significance in the context of fourteenth-century thought, illustrating well certain characteristics of the mental climate of the time. Fourteenth-century disputations often had recourse to the omnipotence of God. A disputant never allowed his opponent to forget the first article of the Creed: I believe in God the Father almighty. The debate often concerned what is possible, given the divine omnipotence. Many instances could be cited from the works of Ockham and his contemporaries. The present dispute is one of them. Another tendency of fourteenth-century thought illustrated by the dispute has been described by David Knowles as "the passion for pursuing an idea to its logical term and indeed beyond it." Knowles gives examples of this inclination to extremism and extravagant theoty in the political and ecclesiastical quarrels of the time. He points to Ockham's use of the razor as another instance of this fourteenth-century mentality. Chatton's defense of the anti-razor perhaps qualifies as another instance of the same tendency. The chief importance, however, of the dispute between the two Franciscans is the light it throws on the meaning of Ockham's razor. It gives us, first of all, a new and better formulation of the razor, probably under the influence of Chatton. Ockham ordinarily used the traditional wordings "A plurality is never to be posited without necessity," and "It is useless to do with more what can be done with fewer." But occasionally in his Quodlibeta (a relatively late work), he puts the razor in terms of the verification of a proposition: "When a proposition is verified of things, if three or two things suffice for its truth it is not necessary to posit a fourth." Chatton put both the razor and 38
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intellectio non fiunt naturaliter sed miraculose, tunc non sufficiunt centum res ad eius veritatem." (ibid., VI, q. 12 [pp. 632.100-33.105]). Ockham sends the reader back to Quodlibet I, q. 5, for a fUller explanation of his argument. See A. Maurer, "Some Aspects of Fourteenth-Century Philosophy," Medievalia et humanistica, N.S. 7 (1976), 178-179, reprinted below, pp. 447-460; W. J. Courtenay, "John of Mirecourt and Gregory of Rimini on Whether God Can Undo the Past," Recherches de theologie ancienne et medievale, 39 (1972), 224-256 and 40 (1973), 147-174. D. Knowles, "A Characteristic of the Mental Climate of the Fourteenth Century" in Melanges offerts a Etienne Gilson (Toronto-Paris, 1959), p. 322. "... quando propositio verificatur pro rebus, si tres res vel duae sufficiunt ad veritatem illius propositionis, quarta res superfluit." (Quodlibeta VII, q. 1 [p. 704.17-19]); "... quando propositio verificatur pro rebus, si tres [res] sufficiunt ad eius veritatem, non oportet ponere quartam." (ibid. VII, q. 3 [p. 710.43-44]); "... quando propositio verificatur pro rebus, si pauciores sufficiunt, plures superfluunt." (ibid., VII, q. 8 [p. 727.23-25]); "... quando propositio verificatur pro rebus, si duae res sufficiunt ad eius veritatem, superfluum est ponere tertiam." (ibid. IV, q. 24 [p. 413.15-17]); "Quando propositio verificatur pro rebus, si duae res sufficiunt ad eius veritatem, non est ponenda tertia." (ibid., VI, q. 9 [p. 618.7-8]). 38
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anti-razor in terms of the verification of a proposition and it is probable that Ockham took this wording from him. Though Ockham uses the new formula of the razor, he does not give it a new meaning. Quite the contrary. He uses the various forms of the axiom indifferently as though their meaning were the same. Indeed he sometimes employs the new formula in the Quodlibeta in contexts where, in the earlier commentary on the Sentences, he used the more familiar forms of the razor. To him these were but different ways of saying the same thing. What is the meaning of the razor as Ockham himself understood it? The new formula makes it explicit that it is a rule regarding human knowledge, more precisely regarding the truth of propositions. The older formulae also contain a reference to knowledge, though not so explicitly. They tell us not to 'do' with more what can be 'done' with fewer, or not 'to posit' more entities than are necessary. The 'doing' or 'positing' in these rules are cognitive acts of asserting, postulating or assuming, but it is not made clear that they are directed to the verification of a proposition. Is the razor only concerned with human knowledge? Is it simply a methodological rule for verifying propositions? As Ockham understood the axiom it clearly has an ontological basis. For him the propositions in question are verified of things ("verificantur pro rebus"), and the maxim warns us not to posit more of them than are needed. Thus the razor has an ontological as well as a methodological bearing. Ockham's frequent use of the razor in eliminating supposed entities supports this interpretation. In Ockham's view the razor tells us something about the reality of the world and not just about how we know it or talk about it. It was left to Kant and modern linguistic philosophers to reduce the razor to a mere rule of thought or language. 41
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Chatton sometimes uses the traditional formula of the razor: "Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate," as in Lectura, prol., q. 2, a. 1, ed. J. O'Callaghan in Nine Mediaeval Thinkers, ed. J. R. O'Donnell (Toronto, 1955), p. 236. At other times he expresses the razor in terms of the verification of a proposition: e.g., "... quando propositio affirmativa verificabilis est tantum pro rebus quae sunt simul, si duo sufficiant, ita quod contradictio sit illas esse et propositionem non esse veram, non debet poni tertia." (Reportatio I, d. 30, q. 1, a. 4; Paris lat. 15887, fol. 63vb). For his statement of the anti-razor, see above, n. 7. See also Lectura, prol., q. 1, a. 1, ed. M. Reina in Rivista critica di storia della filosofla, 25 (1970) 64.448-450; prol., q. 2, a. 1, ed. O'Callaghan, ibid., p. 240; prol., q. 6, a. 3 (Paris lat. 15886, fol. 49ra). Compare Ockham, Ordinatio I, d. 31, q. unica, IV, (pp. 396-397.23-24) with Quodlibeta VII, q. 1 (p. 704.17-18); also Ordinatio I, d. 30, q. 2, IV, (p. 322.9-10) with Quodlibeta VII, q. 8 (p. 727.23-25). Bertrand Russell correctly describes Ockham's razor as originally concerned with things and not just with signs or propositions: "Ockham's razor, in its original form, was metaphysical; it was a principle of parsimony as regards 'entities'." (B. Russell, "My Mental Develop41
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How can the razor be a rule about the world when the world is the creation of an omnipotent God who is not bound by the razor? If, as Ockham holds, God can 'do' with more entities what he could 'do' with fewer, how can the razor apply to the world he created ? Is not the world asfreeof the limitations of the razor as God himself is? Though Ockham believed in the absolute freedom and omnipotence of God he did not conceive of him as a capricious monarch. He isfreeto create any possible world or worlds, but in fact he has created the present one and he has willed it to be orderly and governed by laws he has freely chosen. The razor is a principle that applies to the world as God has created it and as he ordinarily governs it. In other words, it is limited to the display of God's potentia ordinata; it does not extend to the full range of his potentia absoluta. Even miracles come under the razor: Ockham warns us not to multiply them beyond necessity. But once the omnipotence of God enters the picture the razor does not work. There is no telling then how many things are necessary to verify a proposition. Does this leave any room for the anti-razor? Ockham's attitude towards the anti-razor is difficult to define. He does not reject it outright but only as it was understood and used by contemporaries like Chatton. He does not welcome it, however, as a complement to his own principle of the razor, nor does he make personal use of it. Perhaps this can be explained by the anti-razor's tendency to turn the mind in a direction opposed to the razor. The traditional, Aristotelian axiom enjoins one to look for simple solutions to problems and to avoid assuming more entities than are needed to verify a proposition. This spirit of parsimony is lacking in the anti-razor. Everything happens as though for Ockham one principle (the razor) is enough, and there is no necessity to add a second. The anti-razor is but one of the many items that fall victim to the razor. 44
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ment" in P. A. Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell [Evanston, 1946], p. 14). Russell himself gives a logical interpretation to the razor: "Wherever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities." (Mysticism and Logic [London, 1917], p. 155). SeeG. O'Hara, "Ockham's Razor Today," Philosophical Studies, 12 (1963), 125-139. Wittgenstein understood the razor semantically: "If a sign is not necessary then it is meaningless. That is the meaning of Occam's Razor." (Tractatus logico-philosophicus 3.328 [London, 1922]; see 5.47321). See A. Maurer, "Ockham on the Possibility of a Better World," Mediaeval Studies, 38 (1976), 291-312; reprinted above, pp. 383-402. "... frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora, nec ponenda sunt plura miracula quae videntur rationi naturali repugnare, sine auctoritate Scripturae vel Sanctorum." (Ockham, Ordinatio I, d. 26, q. I; IV, p. 157.20-23). The same point was made by Peter Auriol: "... ponenda non sunt plura miracula ad aliquem effectum, qui potest salvari per pauciora." (/« 4 Sent., d. 12, a. 3 [Rome, 1605], p. 120a). 44
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Epilogue
22 Some Aspects of Fourteenth-Century Philosophy In 1926 Etienne Gilson described philosophy in the fourteenth century as a virgin forest. Today, sixty years later, the forest can hardly be called virgin. Especially in the last few decades, historians in ever-increasing numbers have been trampling through it, breaking new paths and removing old ones. As a consequence, the geography of the forest is being charted more accurately, hills and valleys examined more closely, the taller trees identified, and even some of the underbrush cleared away. Despite all this activity, the forest can scarcely be said to be conquered. In comparison with thirteenth-century philosophy, that of the fourteenth is relatively unknown. This is due in large measure to the fact that so many writings of the fourteenth century are still unpublished or available only in early printed editions. Unless one is a paleographer, inured to the reading of medieval manuscripts, or oblivious to the dust of incunabula, one can make little headway in this field. A graduate student doing research in fourteenth-century philosophy with enterprise and paleographic expertise can in a short time confound his professor with facts the professor knows nothing about. This, incidentally, is not the least of the reasons why students in ever-larger numbers are concentrating in this area. More important, they have learned that without a knowledge of the late Middle Ages it is impossible to understand the beginnings of modern thought. As one moves from the relatively well-cultivated field of thirteenth-century philosophy to the forest of the fourteenth, one is conscious of a new mood and atmosphere. He has a sense of the continuity of thought and expression between the two centuries: philosophy is still done in the scholastic manner, in Latin, with much the same vocabulary and citation of ancient and medieval 1
1
See E. Gilson, Revue d'Histoire Franciscaine, 3 (1926), 129.
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authorities. But there is a new temper to the times, a distinctive spirit that distinguishes a fourteenth-century thinker from one of the thirteenth century as surely as a typical fourteenth-century work of art or manuscript is different from one of the previous century. What are some of the most distinctive characteristics of fourteenth-century philosophy? I would suggest the following:
1. relative to the preceding century, a more cautious and critical attitude towards the philosophy of Aristotle, especially at Paris and Oxford; 2. a greater interest in problems concerning what is possible, rather than what is actually the case; 3. more rigorous criteria of demonstration, with a consequent concern for probability and degrees of probability; 4. most important, the rise of nominalism and a greater emphasis on the individual in all areas of thought.
As we proceed, I hope it will become apparent that these four characteristics are not unrelated. Taken together, I believe, they created a climate of opinion in the fourteenth century that distinguishes its philosophy from that of any other period in the Middle Ages. I have said, first of all, that the fourteenth century was marked by a shift in attitude towards Aristotle. Indeed, from the end of the thirteenth century, his influence was on the wane, until it was effectively extinguished in the seventeenth century, when Descartes filled the void with his new philosophy. The change in the status of Aristotelianism was bound to have far-reaching effects, for scholasticism was born with the discovery of Aristotle's works in the West at the end of the twelfth and beginning of the thirteenth century. Regarded with suspicion at first by Church authorities, his philosophy was gradually accepted and assimilated into Christian thought. With Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, Aristotelianism reached its apogee in the Middle Ages. But the rise of Averroism in the 1260's, and the condemnation in 1277 of Aristotelian naturalism at both Paris and Oxford — the intellectual centers of western Christendom — brought about a marked change in the evaluation and use of Aristotle's philosophy. 1 do not mean that Aristotelianism was no longer taught and read in the schools; indeed it was. The masters continued to regard Aristotle as the philosopher and to use his ideas and language. But his heyday was over. The 2
The text of the condemnation is in Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, ed. H. Denifle and E. Chatelain, I (Paris, 1889), pp. 543-558. For the significance of this condemnation, see E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York, 1955), pp. 402-410; F. Van Steenberghen, La philosophie au XIII' siecle (Louvain, Paris, 1966), pp. 483-493. 2
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masters increasingly found his philosophy inadequate to express their Christian thought. They stressed the limitations of his philosophy and sought to find, or to create, new vehicles for their theologies. It must be remembered that most of the philosophers of the fourteenth century, as in the previous century, were primarily theologians. They did not separate philosophy from theology, but philosophized within theology and for theological purposes. Many treatises that appear to be purely philosophical have, in fact, a theological orientation. A notable example is Ockham's great work in logic, the Summa Logicae. In the preface he says that he wrote it to teach theologians logic, because they were falling into error through ignorance of the subject. Throughout the work, Ockham is conscious of this purpose, and, when the occasion demands, he clearly distinguishes between the intentio Aristotelis and the Veritas theologorum. In this respect, fourteenth-century philosophy was in continuity with that of the previous century; it was mainly the work of philosophizing theologians and not of pure philosophers. Averroists like John of Jandun were exceptions, in that they philosophized apart from religion, as Averroes himself and Siger of Brabant did before them. But, just because of this, they were out of tune with their contemporaries, who regarded them with suspicion and sometimes with outright hostility. Because they were also theologians, most fourteenth-century philosophers did not ignore the condemnation of Aristotelian and Muslim naturalism at Paris and Oxford in 1277. That they took the condemnation seriously is clear from their constant citation of the proscribed propositions and from their efforts to disprove them. The condemnation was not entirely new: it crystallized the growing reaction of the theologians against the errores philosophorum — the errors of Aristotle and his Muslim commentators Avicenna and Averroes. After the solemn condemnation, the atmosphere in the universities was not the same: theologians were increasingly on the defensive against the pagan and Muslim philosophers, and they sought new and more adequate bases for their theologies. Above all, the theologians felt the need for a more adequate approach to the existence and nature of God than the Aristotelians offered. To Thomas Aquinas, Aristotle's proof of the existence of God from motion was the most 3
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Ockham, Summa Logicae, ed. P. Boehner et al. (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1974), p. 6, lines 21-28. Ibid. Pars I, c. 7, p. 24, line 55-p. 25, line 56. See Pars III-1, c. 31, p. 442, lines 73-82, Pars III-2, c. 7, p. 516, lines 34-39. In fact, Aristotle has said many false things: "Aristoteles... multa etiam falsa dixit." Ibid., p. 614, lines 112-113. See E. Gilson, The Philosopher and Theology, trans. C. Gilson (New York, 1962); A. C. Pegis, The Middle Ages and Philosophy (Chicago, 1963). 3
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evident of all. We observe motion in the world, and because everything that is moved is moved by something else, and there cannot be an infinite series of movers, there must be a primary mover that is itself immovable, while it moves everything else. This primary mover, Aquinas baldly states, "everyone understands to be God." To this, Scotus adds the pertinent comment: but not properly the Christian God. The God of the Christians is not only the primary mover of the world, he is the primary being. He has not only infinite motive power, as Aristotle held, but he is absolutely infinite. Moreover, there is only one Christian God, but many Aristotelian primary movers. To reach the God of the Christians a physical proof is not sufficient; what is needed is a metaphysical demonstration, which Scotus provides in what is, no doubt, the most perfectly-elaborated proof of God's existence in the Middle Ages. The demonstration culminates in the proof of the existence of an infinite being. Scotus' method is worthy of notice: he first proves the possibility of an infinite being by showing that the notion contains no contradiction. He then demonstrates that an infinite being actually exists as the only reason for its possibility. Scotus was not the only theologian who looked for a more suitable philosophical vehicle of Christian truths than Aristotelianism. The mystic, Master Eckhart, encountered God in a realm beyond being, in a darkness and wilderness that he could best describe as non-being (nihil), or the One. Neoplatonism, in his view, was a more appropriate guide into this lofty region than the more mundane philosophy of Aristotle. Paradox, and even contradiction, are to be expected here: God is not a being, because he transcends everything we call being or reality; but he can also be called a being, because he is its creator. The baneful effects of Aristotelianism was a dominant theme of Nicholas of Autrecourt, master of arts and bachelor of theology at Paris in the 1330s and 1340s. He was astonished to see some Christians studying Aristotle and Averroes for twenty or thirty years, right up to a decrepit old age. So preoccupied were they with Aristotle's logic that they forsook ethical 6
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St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, 2, 3. See Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 2, p. 1, q. 1-2; ed. C. Balic, vol. 2 (Vatican, 1950), pp. 125-221. Another version of the proof is found in his De Primo Principio, ed. E. Roche (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1949). Before Duns Scotus, Henry of Ghent elaborated a metaphysical proof of the existence of God. See A. C. Pegis, "Toward a New Way to God: Henry of Ghent," Mediaeval Studies, 30 (1968), 226-247; "A New Way to God: Henry of Ghent (II)," Mediaeval Studies, 31 (1969), 93-116; "Henry of Ghent and the New Way to God (III)," Mediaeval Studies, 33 (1971), 158-179. Eckhart, Quaestiones Parisienses, ed. A. Dondaine (Leipzig, 1936), pp. 7, 11. See V. Lossky, Theologie Negative et Connaissance de Dieu chez Maitre Eckhart (Paris, 1960). 6
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questions and the care of the common good. Having examined almost a thousand conclusions demonstrated by Aristotle and Averroes, Nicholas concluded that their contraries can be held with just as much probability. The friend of truth (by which he means himself) may rise up and sound a trumpet to rouse these sleepers from their slumber, but this only angers them, and they rush upon him like armed men to deadly combat. And indeed, they made him burn his books publicly at Paris in 1347. In place of Aristotle's physics, Nicholas of Autrecourt proposed to return to the atomism of early Greek philosophy. Atomism, in his view, accords better with Christianity, and it can be held as probable, at least until some other doctrine comes along to make it, in turn, improbable. Other examples of fourteenth-century antipathy to Aristotle could be cited, but perhaps this is enough to show that his influence was in decline. The most active minds were looking for new philosophical paths, whether from the ancients or from their contemporaries, such as William of Ockham, as the Mertonian physicists were trying new methods in science, different from those of Aristotle. The second characteristic of fourteenth-century philosophy I should like to point out is its preoccupation with problems concerning what is possible, rather than what is actually the case. This type of problem was raised occasionally in the previous century, but by no means as often as in the fourteenth. Theologians and philosophers had a predilection for speculating about what is possible, given the absolute power of God. William of Ockham begins his Commentary on the Sentences with the remarkable question: "Is it possible for the intellect of a man in this life to have an evident knowledge of theological truths?" This is an extraordinary introduction to a course in theology. Ockham asks whether God by his absolute power (per potentiam absolutam), could give us the evidence of the mysteries of faith, which, in fact, we now know only in a dark manner. Throughout his Commentary, Ockham raises hypothetical questions of this sort. For example, can God give a person an intuition of a non-existent object? Can he create a better world than the present one? Can he create many worlds, with natural species 9
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Nicholas of Autrecourt, Tractatus Universalis Magistri Nicholai de Ultricuria ad Videndum an Sermones Peripateticorum Fuerint Demonstrativi (Satia Exigit Ordo), ed. J. R. O'Donnell, Mediaeval Studies, I (1939), 181. See J. R. O'Donnell, "The Philosophy of Nicholas of Autrecourt and his Appraisal of Aristotle," Mediaeval Studies, 4 (1942), 97-125. For the Mertonians' new mathematical approach to nature, see M. Clagett, The Science of Mechanics in the Middle Ages (Madison, Wis., 1959); J. Weisheipl, The Development of Physical Theory in the Middle Ages (New York, 1959). Ockham, Scriptum in Librum Primum Sententiarum, Prol. I; ed. G. Gal (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1967), I, p. 3. Sent., ibid., p. 38, line 15-p. 39, line 6. 9
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different from our own, even human beings of another species? Can he justify a person without endowing him with a created quality of grace? Similar problems of what is possible were raised throughout the fourteenth century; for example, can God undo the past, i.e. make what has happened not to have happened? As far as I know, no one in the Middle Ages debated the question of how many angels can dance on the point of a pin; but the form of the question was familiar to the fourteenth century, and perhaps also the subject. A logical treatise of Pseudo-Campsall contains the statement that an infinite number of pure spirits can be present in the same place; for does not Scripture say that a legion of devils inhabited one demoniac? And if a legion, why not an infinity of demons? Why this concern for what can be, for what is possible? I suggest that this is a consequence of the notion of God as omnipotent and creatures as purely contingent. This, in turn, is connected with the anti-Aristotelianism I have just discussed. To Aristotle and Averroes, the world is eternal and necessary, both in its existence and its basic structure. It cannot not exist or be essentially different from what it is. Individuals come and go, and hence they are contingent, but the universe as a whole and its various natural species are eternal and necessary. No doctrine of Aristotle was more vigorously opposed in the fourteenth century. The Scotists and Ockhamists insisted that, unlike the God of Aristotle, the God of the Christians is an omnipotent and free creator. The universe exists only by his fiat; had he decided otherwise, it would not have existed or it would have been created differently. Even now, God could annihilate it if he wished. In short, he alone is a necessary being; contingency rules the whole order of nature and also the order of grace. But if the world is utterly contingent, how is it possible to reach necessary truths about it? Are not all truths about what actually exists contingent, i.e. truths that may be otherwise? Now, the philosopher is not satisfied with contingent truths; he wants to know truths that are universal and necessary. 13
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Sent. I, d. 44, q. unica; d. 42, q. unica; d. 43, q. 2 (ed. Lyons, 1495). Sent. I, d. 17, q. 1. See P. Vignaux, Justification et Predestination au xrv' Siecle (Paris, 1934), pp. 118-127. John of Mirecourt was condemned in 1347 for teaching that God can make a past event not to have happened, but he defended himself against this charge. Gregory of Rimini did uphold this thesis. See W. J. Courtenay, "John of Mirecourt and Gregory of Rimini on Whether God Can Undo the Past," Recherches de Theologie Ancienne et Medievale, 39 (1972), 224-256; 40 (1973), 147-174. "Ista descriptio statim patet, tamen, quia infinita — non quanta — possunt esse in eodem loco, sicut patet quia legio fiiit in uno demoniaco et, qua ratione legio, eodem ratione infinities infinita...." Pseudo-Richard of Campsall, Logica valde utilis et realis contra Ockham, ed. E. A. Synan, The Works of Richard Campsall 11 (Toronto, 1982), 41.05, p. 233. See Mark 5:9, Luke 8:30. 13 14
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In a contingent world he cannot do this by forming propositions about what actually is the case, but he can by framing his assertions in the mode of possibility. The possibile is simply that which is not contradictory. For example, there is nothing contradictory about a plane figure having three sides and three angles; hence, a triangle is possible, even though none may actually exist. It is contingent whether triangles actually exist; it is necessary that they fulfill their definition if they do. Hence the possible, or noncontradictory, offers the mind a necessary object, and necessary propositions can be formed about it. That is why Scotus preferred to base his proof of the existence of God upon the possibility of an infinite being, rather than upon the actual, contingent fact that there are movers and causes in the world. Once he has shown that an infinite being is possible, he felt that he had a more solid, because necessary, basis on which to prove the actual existence of God. Another way fourteenth-century philosophers and theologians formed necessary propositions about the contingent world was to put them in the hypothetical mode, that is, in the form "If... then." To an Aristotelian an assertion of identity, such as "Man is man," is absolutely necessary; but to an Ockhamist this is a contingent proposition, because man's existence itself is contingent. If God had not created man, he would not exist, and even now God could annihilate all men. So man's existence is not necessary, and neither is the proposition "Man is man." However, if it is put in the hypothetical mode: "If man exists, then man is man," it becomes necessary. This philosophical turn from the actual to the possible and the hypothetical cannot be explained solely by the Christian conviction in the absolute power of God. It is also a direct consequence of the conception of the complete contingency of the existing order of things. Thomas Aquinas was as certain of the omnipotence of God as Scotus and Ockham were, yet he believed that once God freely chose to create the world, spiritual beings like angels and human souls, and matter itself, existed with absolute necessity. 17
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See E. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot (Paris, 1952), p. 143, and note 2. L. Baudry, Le Tractatus de Principiis Theologiae attribue a Guillaume d'Occam (Paris, 1936), pp. 28-29, 127-128. See P. Vignaux, Nominalisme au xiv' Siecle (Montreal, Paris, 1948), p. 25. Ockham denied that in the strict sense it is true to say with Aristotle that "Everything that is must be when it is." (Aristotle, Perihermenias 19a23-32). "Sciendum est quod ista propositio: omne quod est quando est necesse est esse, de virtute sermonis est simpliciter falsa." Expositio in Periherm. Arist. I, c. 6, ad textum: Esse igitur quod est, quando est (Bologna, 1496; reprint Gregg Press, 1964). "Unde ista propositio 'Sortes est, dum est' vel 'Sortes movetur, dum currit' non est necessaria, sed poterit esse falsa. Verumtamen per tales temporales intelligunt condicionales, quae condicionales verae sunt." Ockham, Summa Logicae II, c. 35, p. 355, lines 34-36. 17
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This necessity flows from the nature God has given them in creation, which in his wisdom he would not violate. In the view of Thomas Aquinas, accordingly, the world contains both contingent and necessary beings; created existence is not utterly contingent, as both Scotus and Ockham thought it to be. This doctrine of Aquinas profoundly scandalized Henry of Harclay, a Chancellor of Oxford and predecessor of Ockham. In ascribing absolute necessity to certain creatures, Harclay saw Aquinas making undue concessions to the pagan Aristotle, and he branded Aquinas a heretic. As Scotism and Ockhamism gained ground in the late Middle Ages, their notion of the contingency of created existence gradually penetrated the schools, with profound consequences for philosophy for centuries to come. Following Aristotle, Scotus defined the object of metaphysics — philosophy par excellence — as being qua being, but he insisted that the object of metaphysics was not the being of actual existence but the being of essence or quidditative being; in short, possible being. Actual existence was but a property or determination of the being that was the focal point of metaphysics. Under these circumstances, even though actual existence was not disregarded, philosophy could not be fully existential. Its main concern was essences as possible bearers of existence. In his own way, Ockham also contributed to the de-existentiaiizing of late medieval philosophy. The actually-existing world, in his view, is composed of individuals, but these are not the primary concern of the scientist or philosopher. The philosopher's object is the universal, and universality is found only in terms, either conceived in the mind or spoken or written. Terms are the elements of propositions, so that Ockham can conclude that propositions are the object of philosophy. "Every science," Ockham writes, "whether real or rational, is concerned only with propositions as with objects known, for only propositions are known." This does not mean that science or philosophy in no way concerns the individual, or that the individual is unknown, but that scientific knowledge is directed primarily to universal 19
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" St. Thomas, In I Sent., d. 8, q. 3, a. 2; Contra Gentiles II, 30, 55; De Potential, 3; Summa Theologiae I, 9, 2. See A. Maurer, "Henry of Harclay's Questions on Immortality," Mediaeval Studies, 19 (1957), 79-107; reprinted above, pp. 229-271. See E. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot (Paris, 1952), pp. 79-80. "... est sciendum quod scientia quaelibet sive sit realis sive rationalis est tantum de propositionibus tamquam de illis quae sciuntur, quia solae propositiones sciuntur." Ockham, Sent. I, q. 2, a. 4; II, (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1970), p. 134, lines 7-9. Physics and metaphysics are "real sciences" because the terms of their propositions stand for real things; logic is "rational science" because its terms stand for mental concepts. The terms of the science of grammar stand for spoken or written words. See A. Maurer, "Ockham's Conception of the Unity of Science," Mediaeval Studies, 20 (1958), p. 100. 20
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terms and propositions. It treats of the individual only insofar as the terms of propositions stand for and signify them. Thus, philosophy primarily and directly is a study not of the actually existing world, but of mental and verbal assertions. Centuries before the contemporary linguistic movement in philosophy, Ockham, the Oxonian, directed the study of philosophy to language. A third factor shaping the philosophical atmosphere of the fourteenth century was the prevalence of dialectical reasoning, leading to probability, not certitude. Aristotle described this type of argumentation in his Topics, and it was used throughout the thirteenth century. Aquinas resorted to it, especially in matters we would today call scientific, when reasoning led to a conclusion that was probabilis or rationabilis but not demonstrata, In the fourteenth century, many conclusions of natural theology or metaphysics were reduced to this status. Ockham strictly limited the power of the mind to demonstrate truths in these matters. Criticizing the Scotist proof of the existence of God, he concluded that we cannot demonstrate attributes of God held on faith, such as his oneness or his omnipotence. We can establish the existence of a primary conserving cause of the world, but there may be many such causes, and they may be simply the heavenly bodies. We 23
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"Sed scientia isto modo est de rebus singularibus, quia pro ipsis singularibus termini supponunt." Ockham, Sent., ibid., p. 138, lines 3-4. See, for example, St. Thomas, In I De Caelo et Mundo, lect. 22, n. 9 (Rome, 1886), III, p. 91; led. 2, n. 7, p. 7. Ockham, Quodl. I, q. 1 (Strasbourg, 1491); Sent. I, d. 2, q. 10; II, p. 354, line 16-p. 357, line 9. For the meaning of the term probabilis in the Middle Ages see Th. Deman, "Probabilis,"Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques, 22 (1933), 260-290. As the word indicates, a proposition that is "probable" is susceptible of proof, but it is not the conclusion of a demonstrative, but a dialectical, syllogism. Reasoning is dialectical if it proceeds from opinions that are generally accepted, or accepted by the wise. See Aristotle, Topics, I, c. 1, 100a30-b23. Ockham uses the term probabilis in this sense. A "probable" conclusion may be necessary and true, but it is not self-evident or established by principles that are self-evident or evidently known through experience. See Ockham, Summa Logicae, III-I, c. 1, pp. 361-362. In a broader sense, a probable statement may seem to be true to many or the wise but, in fact, it may be false. See L. Baudry, Lexique Philosophique de Guillaume d'Occam (Paris, 1957), pp. 216-217. Ockham, Sent. I, d. 2, q. 10; II, p. 354, line 16-p. 357, line 9; Quaestiones in Lib. I Physicorum, ed. P. Boehner, Ockham: Philosophical Writings (Toronto, etc., 1957), pp. 122-125. See L. Baudry, "Guillaume d'Occam, Critique des Preuves Scotistes de 1'Unicite de Dieu," Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Litteraire du Moyen Age, 20 (1953), 99-112. Ockham, Quodl. II, q. 1; Sent. I, d. 2, q. 10; Quaest. in Lib. Physicorum I, q. 136; Ockham.- Philosophical Writings, pp. 122-125. P. Boehner claims that "what Ockham proves is the existence of the Christian God." "Zu Ockhams Beweis der Existenz Gottes," Franciskanische Studien, 32 (1950), 61; reprinted in P. Boehner, Collected Articles on Ockham (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1958), p. 412. Fr. Boehner qualifies this statement by adding that the concept of the Christian God is not proven, because this includes the oneness of God. It is not clear, then, how Ockham proves the existence of the Christian God. 23
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experience the effect of these bodies, such as the sun and moon, on our world; and it cannot be evidently proved that they have been produced by an efficient cause. Neither can it be demonstrated that God is the final cause of the world, or, indeed, that he has any knowledge of it. Regarding man, he denied that we can demonstrate the existence of an immortal, spiritual soul. These are matters of faith and not of philosophical demonstration. The reason for the cult of probability and degrees of probability, by Ockham and his followers, takes us to the heart of their empiricism and nominalism. For them, the world is made up of individuals, no one of which has anything in common with any other. In this nominalistic world of individuals, the knowledge of one thing cannot lead to a knowledge of another: una res non potest intelligiper aliam? Each thing must be perceived for itself. Hence, the difficulty of proving that one thing is the efficient cause of another. Only experience can assure us of this, "namely, that at its presence the effect follows, and in its absence it does not." We can be sure of the evident intuitions of sense objects and our interior acts and feelings, also of the principle of non-contradiction and whatever can be directly reduced to it; beyond that lies a large area of probable knowledge. From these principles, Nicholas of Autrecourt drew all the possible consequences. Except for the certitude of faith, he admitted nothing certain except the principle of non-contradiction and what is reducible to it; for example, that a thing is identical with itself. Besides this, he allowed as certain what is directly verifiable in experience. This led him to cast doubt on the reality of substance and the faculties of intellect and will. No one could go further than John of Rodington in limiting the scope of pure human reason. Bruno Nardi published a remarkable treatise by this Franciscan, entitled: "Can one have certain knowledge of any truth from natural principles?" Rodington's answer is, no, if by knowledge is meant a rational truth known so clearly that it cannot be doubted. "The intellect," 28
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Ockham, Quodl. IV, q. 2. Ockham, Sent. I, d. 35, q. 2 D. Ockham, Quodl. I, q. 10; II, q. 1. Ockham, Sent. II, d. 15 ZZ. Sent., P. Ockham defines an efficient cause as follows: "Definitio causae efficientis est esse illud ad cujus esse sive praesentiam sequitur aliquid." Quodl. IV, q. 1. "Sed quod aliquid creatum sit causa efficiens non potest demonstrative probari, sed solum per experientiam, per hoc, scilicet, quod ad ejus praesentiam sequitur effectus et ad ejus absentiam non." Sent. II, d. 15 P. See J. R. O'Donnell, "The Philosophy of Nicholas of Autrecourt and his Appraisal of Aristotle," Mediaeval Studies, 4 (1942), 97-125. B. Nardi, Soggetto e Oggetto del Conoscere nella Filosojia Antica e Medievale (Rome, 1952), pp. 74-92. 28
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he writes, "cannot naturally know something without being able to doubt that it knows it." But, if we doubt, are we not certain at least that we doubt? Augustine appealed to this basic certitude in order to escape skepticism, as Descartes did later. Rodington's natural skepticism goes even farther, for he replies: "... absolutely speaking one can doubt that he doubts, because he is not completely certain that he does not doubt." Rodington's skepticism was aimed at philosophers like Aristotle who relied on reason alone. It was they, who, philosophizing without faith in Christ, did not reach the truth. Rodington did not doubt at all the truth of his religious faith. Natural reason alone may yield only probable conclusions, but he who enjoys a special divine illumination reaches a perfect knowledge of things. Rodington's intention thus becomes clear: he downgraded natural reason and philosophy in order to exalt religious faith. An incidental effect of the prevalence of dialectical reasoning was the tendency for disputations in the schools to run on at great length. It is the very nature of this kind of reasoning not to come to a certain conclusion, so there is no reason why it should end. John of Jandun recorded a public disputation he held in 1318 on the subject whether, given an eternal world, all possibilities will eventually be realized. Jandun and his opponent argue pro and con at great length, until one begins to suspect that in this interminable dispute all possible arguments will eventually be voiced. This, at any rate, seems to have been the fear of the students, for suddenly Jandun records that they were making so much noise that the disputation had to be halted. It began again, but, shortly after, Jandun was not able to hear the argument of his opponent "because of the outcry of the students, who were tired from having sat [so long]." In those days, students had less command of university affairs; they were eventually subdued, for the debate continued with arguments that fill two more columns of parchment. The most important development in philosophy in the fourteenth century was the nominalism of Ockham and others who, to a greater or lesser extent, shared his views. His relation to men like Adam Wodeham, Robert Holkot, Gregory of Rimini, and John of Mirecourt is currently being studied more closely, and new facts are coming to light that reveal them as individual thinkers, as well as adherents to common principles. Though they may 35
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Soggetto, p. 80. Soggetto, p. 85. Soggetto, p. 92. John of Jandun, "Utrum omne generabile de necessitate generabitur," Ms Florence, Bibl. Naz. Conv. Soppr. I. Ill, 6, fol. llOr. See, for example, W. J. Courtenay, "Nominalism and Late Medieval Religion," The Pursuit of Holiness in Late Medieval and Renaissance Religion. Papers from the University of 35 36 31
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hardly be called a school in the strict sense, they are at least united by what Wittgenstein would call "family resemblances." As for Ockham, the principal figure in this movement, it is less fashionable than before to call him a nominalist; if the name is admitted, he is sometimes qualified as a "moderate nominalist," or "not a thorough-going nominalist." For myself, I see no compelling reason to give up his traditional title. In the Middle Ages a nominalist was one who taught that universals, like 'man' or 'horse', exist only in the mind. In other words, they are nothing but names (nomina). This is what Ockham taught, and he did so in as thorough-going a manner as possible. Universals, in his view, are either mental names (nomina mentalia), that is, concepts in the mind, or they are spoken or written names. General concepts are natural signs of individuals that more or less resemble each other; spoken and written words are conventional signs of the same individuals. Ockham revolutionized medieval thought by taking an absolute stand on this notion of universals and by drawing all its consequences for both philosophy and theology. It was generally agreed by the schoolmen of the thirteenth century that individual things in some way contain natures or essences which are the bases of our universal concepts. Ockham absolutely disagreed with them. It was axiomatic for him that reality is radically individual and in no sense common or universal. Even words and concepts, insofar as they are realities, are individual; their universality consists solely in the fact that they are signs of many things. Ockham was fully aware of the 40
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Michigan Conference; ed. C. Trinkaus and H. A. Oberman (Leiden, 1974), 26-59; H. A. Oberman, "Some Notes on the Theology of Nominalism with Attention to its Relation to the Renaissance," Harvard Theological Review, 53 (1960), 47-76. See W. J. Courtenay, Nom., pp. 34, 52. See P. Vignaux, "Nominalisme," in Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique, XI, 718-784; F. Pelster, "Nominales und reales in 13. Jahrhundert," Sophia (1946), 154-161. St. Albert's description of the nominales is typical: "Sunt tamen qui aliter ea quae dicta sunt, interpretantur dicentes, quod in solis intellectibus sunt ilia [i.e., universalia] quoad nos, quae utrum sint quomodo esse habeant, solus scit intellectus. Et tale esse in intellectu universalia habere dixerunt illi qui vocabantur Nominales, qui communitatem (ad quam particularia universalium, de quibus dicuntur ipsa universalia, referuntur) tantum in intellectu esse dicebant." St. Albert, Liber de Praedicabilibus, Tract. II, c. II (Paris, 1890), I, p. 19. Fr. Boehner preferred to call Ockham a conceptualise because he did not restrict universals to words, but included concepts among universals. See P. Boehner, "The Realistic Conceptualism of William Ockham," Traditio, 4 (1946), 307-335; reprinted in part in Collected Articles, pp. 156-174. But the medieval notion of nominalism was not so restrictive. For the expression nomina mentalia, see Ockham, Quodl. IV, q. 35; Summa Logicae, I, c. 3; ed. P. Boehner et al. (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1974), p. 11, line 27, p. 14, line 84. Ockham, Sent. I, d. 2; q. 4-7; II, pp. 99-266. "... sed nulla res est realiter communis pluribus; igitur nulla res est universalis quocumque modo." Sent. I, d. 2, q. 6, p. 179, lines 24-26. 40 41
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novelty in his day of completely eliminating natures or essences from individual things. "All those whom I have seen," he writes, "agree ... that there is really in the individual a nature that is in some way universal, at least potentially and incompletely, though some say that it is really distinguished [from the individual], some that it is distinguished only formally, some that the distinction is in no way in reality but only through reason and the consideration of the mind." Contrary to all the schoolmen Ockham had read, he proposed a new notion of reality as purely individual. So unique is each individual in his view that it has nothing in common with any other. Each is different not only in number, but also in essence. It is rare in the history of philosophy to find someone who defines reality or nature in a new way and consistently draws from it all its implications. Ockham was such a philosopher. It seems to me that we are here at the heart of Ockham's philosophy. Heidegger once said, "Each thinker thinks but one single thought." The single philosophical idea that is at the center of Ockhamism is the notion of reality as purely individual. As might be expected, this notion plays a pivotal role in every area of his thought. It underlies his innovations in logic, for example, his theory of signification and supposition of terms. It accounts for his new concepts in physics, such as motion and quantity. It is found even in his political theory. If nothing is real, save the individual, there can be no social or communal reality: a society is nothing but the sum of individuals of which it is composed. This is clearly expressed in Ockham's notion of the Church and of his own Franciscan Order. No society, lay or religious, can be said to be a person — not even a fictitious one, as some canonists claimed. With his new conception of reality or being as radically individual, Ockham worked out a philosophy and theology whose influence was to last for centuries, indeed to our own time. To Leibniz, Ockham was "a man of the highest genius and of outstanding erudition for his time." The nominalist sect, which he revived, was "the one most in harmony with the spirit of 44
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Ockham, Sent. I, d. 2, q. 7, II, p. 225, line 17-p. 226, line 3. This makes it clear that Ockham had not read the twelfth-century nominalists, such as Abelard. "... humanitas quae est in Sorte essentialiter distinguitur ab humanitate quae est in Platone." Ockham, Sent. I, d. 2, q. 6, II, p. 184, lines 20-21. "Jeder Denker denkt nur einen einzigen Gedanken." M. Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking? trans. F. D. Wieck and J. G. Gray (New York, 1968), p. 50. The Franciscan Order, the Church, indeed any society, has no reality except the individuals who compose it. They have no personality, real, imaginary, or fictitious. Ockham, Opus Nonaginta Dierum, c. 62; Opera Politico, ed. R. F. Bennett, H. S. Offler, II (Univ. of Manchester Press, 1940), pp. 568-570. See G. de Lagarde, La Naissance de I'Esprit Laique au Declin du Moyen Age, V (Paris, Louvain, 1963), p. 38. 44
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modern philosophy." Charles Sanders Peirce had little liking for Ockham's nominalism; he preferred the realism of Duns Scotus. But he was fully aware of the historical impact of Ockhamism. "Modern thought," he said, "has been extravagantly Ockhamistic." Thinkers of major stature, like Ockham, can be seen from the viewpoint of their influence on later generations, but they can only be understood in the context of their own time, as growing out of a tradition that they inherit and shape to their own liking. Ockhamism was a novelty in the fourteenth century: it epitomized the via moderna; but it was an answer to a centuries-old problem of how to use Aristotelianism and other non-Christian philosophies for the enrichment, and not the betrayal, of Christianity. It was also a Franciscan answer, the last in a long line that began with Alexander of Hales and Bonaventure and extended to Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. Ockham, like his fellow Franciscans, had no intention of compromising the omnipotence and freedom of God by making undue concessions to the pagan and Muslim philosophers. Above all, he wanted to safeguard the first article of the Creed: I believe in one God, the Father almighty. In his view, Aquinas, and even Duns Scotus, had failed to uphold the complete contingency of creatures and the absolute liberty of God with regard to them. Working creatively within the Franciscan tradition, he devised his nominalist philosophy as his answer to this problem. Other fourteenth-century theologians, too numerous to mention, were engaged in the same enterprise. Among all of them, Scotus and Ockham were most successful in setting the style of thinking for the next few centuries. 48
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Leibniz, Dissertatio de Stilo Philosophico Nizolii, 28; Opera Philosophica, ed. J. E. Erdmann (Berlin, 1840), pp. 68-69. The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1931-35), VI, n. 348. "Apres avoir donne a la philosophie scolastique les systemes de saint Bonaventure, de Roger Bacon, de Raymond Lulle et de Duns Scot, sans compter ceux tous qui les preparent, les accompagnent ou les commentent, la pensee franciscaine pouvait a bon droit etre consideree comme epuisee. II n'en etait rien cependant, et elle devait s'enrichir encore de l'ceuvre de Guillaume d'Occam." E. Gilson, "La Philosophie Franciscaine," Saint Franfois d'Assise: son Oeuvre, son Influence, 1226-1926 (Paris, 1927), p. 171. It is clear from Gilson's later writings that he is among those who do not consider Ockham's work to be what he calls a "true enrichment" of Franciscan thought. See E. Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Experience (New York, 1937), ch. 3, pp. 61-91. 48
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456 Medieval Philosophy and its Historians We are witnessing today a growing interest in the historical study of the Middle Ages. Colleges and universities are opening new courses in the various facets of medieval culture, and in some these courses are being combined to form a medieval centre, where students can specialize in some area of medieval studies and at the same time obtain a well-rounded view of medieval civilization. Examples that readily come to mind are the medieval centres at the University of Western Michigan, the University of California in Los Angeles, and the University of Toronto. As early as the 1920's and 1930's Institutes of Medieval Studies were founded in Toronto and Ottawa (since moved to Montreal). This developing concern for the study of the Middle Ages is due to an increased awareness of the riches of medieval literature, art, institutions, and ideas in the Christian, Islamic and Jewish worlds, and to their importance for an understanding of modern culture and history. An integral aspect of this awakening to the significance of medieval civilization is a greater appreciation of philosophy in the Middle Ages. It is now generally acknowledged that there was a rich and varied philosophical speculation in the medieval period, and that this speculation had an important impact on the beginnings of modern philosophy. Few historians today would agree, without serious reservations, with Octave Hamelin's statement, written in 1905, that in philosophy Descartes came after the ancients almost as though there was nothing but a blank between. Hamelin was expressing the view, widely held in his day, that the Middle Ages were philosophically sterile; that, having begun with the Greeks, philosophy suffered an eclipse during the night of the Middle Ages, only to revive again with Descartes. Through the patient 1
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See L. K. Shook, "University Centers and Institutes of Medieval Studies," Journal of Higher Education, 38 (1967), 484-492. O. Hamelin, Le systeme de Descartes (Paris, 1921), p. 15. 1
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research of many historians in the last hundred andfiftyyears, this view has been shown to be false. Gradually the blank between ancient and modern philosophy has been filled in, so that today it is generally accepted that without a knowledge of medieval philosophy one cannot see the continuity in the growth of philosophical ideas in the Western world. This is not to say that all historians are in agreement as to the nature of philosophy in the Middle Ages. While generally concurring on its cultural importance, they differ widely in their interpretations and evaluations of it. The historians of the nineteenth century were deeply divided on many aspects of medieval philosophy, and especially on the central problem of its status with regard to theology. These differences of opinion have by no means been completely removed today. This is not the place to recount the history of the notion of medieval philosophy in modern times, but I would like to trace some of the important steps in its development in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 3
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The scientific study of the history of medieval philosophy began in the early nineteenth century, when the romantic movement was awakening curiosity in the Gothic culture of the Middle Ages. One of the first historians to give serious attention to medieval thought was Victor Cousin. Besides editing the logical works of Abelard and his correspondence with Heloise, Cousin lectured for many years on medieval philosophy in his Cours de philosophie in the Faculte des Lettres at the University of Paris. Cousin did not recognize the Middle Ages as a distinct period of history. For him there were but two, antiquity and modern times. "The Middle Ages," he wrote, "are nothing more than the painful, slow, and bloody formation of modern civilization." In his view, the Middle Ages were the cradle of modern society, and medieval philosophy the cradle of modern philosophy. Modern philosophy emerged from medieval thought as Greek thought was born from the mythology that preceded it. As Greek thought lay 4
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Examples of recent divergent interpreters of medieval philosophy are A. C. Pegis, The Middle Ages and Philosophy (Chicago, 1963), and F. Van Steenberghen, Histoire de la philosophie: Periode chretienne (Louvain, 1964). The introduction and conclusion of the latter book were published under the title "La philosophie en chretiente," in Revue philosophique de Louvain, 61 (1963), 561-582; same author, La philosophie auxin' siecle (Louvain-Paris, 1966); Introduction a I'etude de la philosophie medievale (Louvain-Paris, 1974). In general, Pegis follows the views of Gilson, Van Steenberghen those of De Wulf. V. Cousin, Cours de philosophie (Paris, 1836), p. 1. V. Cousin, Cours de I'histoire de la philosophie moderne, 2° serie [1828-30] (Paris, 1847), I, 37. 3
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in shadows in the mythology of Orpheus until it came to light with the Greek philosophers, beginning with Thales, so medieval philosophy was born under the aegis of the Church, developed little by little, and wasfinallyemancipated in modern times. Victor Cousin acknowledged the beneficial role played by Christianity in the formation of our culture. For ten centuries, he wrote, Christianity laid a solid foundation for our civilization. It began industry, it formed the state to its own image, it produced art, and also philosophy: "I mean that very famous philosophy, though badly known, that is called scholasticism." But Cousin denied that scholasticism was philosophy in the strict sense of the word. The philosophy of the Middle Ages, he wrote in his Histoire generate de la philosophie, is founded on the Bible, the Fathers of the Church, and the sovereign decisions of the Church. Living under the authority of the Church, it did not enjoy that absolute liberty of thought that characterizes philosophy properly so called. "The Middle Ages," he continued, "are nothing else in the order of the spirit than the absolute reign of the Christian religion and the Church. Philosophy in the Middle Ages could therefore be nothing else than the work of the mind in the service of the ruling faith and under the surveillance of ecclesiastical authority." Far from its being the last word in philosophy, then, Cousin said that scholasticism was not strictly speaking philosophy at all. Its proper name is theology. True philosophy, which to Cousin was purely rational, untainted by religion, could be found among the Greeks and the moderns, but not among the medieval schoolmen. Between antiquity and modern times, the light of Greek genius gradually faded away into the night of the Middle Ages, until it was reborn at the time of Descartes. 6
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The school of medieval historians that grew up under the influence of Victor Cousin advanced the study of philosophy in the medieval world. The most famous of the group was Barthelemy Haureau, archivist at the Bibliotheque Nationale in Paris. Haureau edited medieval texts and published two large studies of medieval philosophy, a two-volume De la philosophie scolastique in 1850 and a three-volume Histoire de la philosophie scolastique from 1872 to 1880. A rationalist and freethinker, Haureau saw in medieval scholasticism V. Cousin, V. Cousin, V. Cousin, ' V. Cousin, 6 7
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Histoire generate de la philosophie, 9th ed. (Paris, 1872), pp. 218-219. Cours de I'histoire de la philosophie moderne, p. 37. Histoire generate de la philosophie, p. 218. Cours de philosophie, p. 2.
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"the passionate work of minds who, too long enslaved to revealed dogma, were trying to merit and gain their emancipation." Was not France the native soil of scholastic philosophy? And is not the French spirit one of bold curiosity and daring to overcome all obstacles in its path? Carried away by his patriotism, Haureau proclaimed that the emancipation that gave birth to medieval philosophy was the French Revolution in preparation; and what is the Revolution but France itself? (Haureau was forgetting that in the heyday of scholasticism at the University of Paris few of the great scholastics were French. Alexander of Hales was English, Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas were Italian, Albertus Magnus was German, Henry of Ghent was Belgian, Duns Scotus was Scottish.) Haureau wanted to dispel the prejudices against scholasticism that dated back to the Renaissance. The most serious of these was that scholasticism was a false philosophy whose sole purpose was to serve papist theology. It was said that the scholastics did not search for truth for its own sake; their only purpose was to expound with a new and refined method the mysteries of the Christian faith. Hence philosophy in the Middle Ages was simply a form of theology — the disputatious form, very different from dogmatic and mystical theology. Haureau was willing to agree that the clerical and monkish philosophers of the Middle Ages had theological preoccupations, but he insisted that their philosophy did not lack independence. More than once theologians tried to put philosophy under their yoke, but the attempt was always in vain. Philosophy reduced to slavery would not merit the name of science nor would it have attracted the noble minds it did in the Middle Ages unless it were free; it would have died of complete abandonment. Thus, contrary to Victor Cousin, Haureau found philosophy worthy of the name in the medieval world, a purely rational speculation separated from theology. The medieval masters, he contended, did not confuse philosophy and theology; they knew well enough how to distinguish between them. Philosophy occupies the separate domain of this universe of ours and everything enclosed by it; theology occupies the separate domain of the Christian mysteries and sacraments. These two separate domains were confused only by those theologians whose names, obscure or famous, do not belong to the history of philosophy. As for the freedom of medieval philosophers, Haureau continued, St. Thomas expressed himself on the nature and operations of the soul as a 10
11
12
10 11 12
B. Haureau, Histoire de la philosophie scolastique (Paris, 1872), 1,121. Ibid., pp. 29-30. Ibid., p. 31.
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philosopher and with complete liberty. Indeed, this liberty went so far that some scrupulous thinkers today, who want to bring religion into everything, openly reject the whole Thomistic psychology in the interests of faith. Moreover, thirteenth-century logicians always began their courses by declaring that they did not occupy a chair of theology; they made no pretension to discuss the mysteries or sacraments, but treated solely of questions within their competence. It is not only the moderns, then, who know how to distinguish between the two domains of philosophy and theology; the Middle Ages knew the distinction, professed it, and practised it more or less scrupulously. Thus Haureau found in the medieval world a philosophy with its own method and genius. What gave this philosophy its particular character was its Aristotelianism. "Whether we call our doctors in the Middle Ages theologians or philosophers," he wrote, "Aristotle was their master." Scholasticism began in the Middle Ages with the discovery of the works of Aristotle, not with the invention of a new philosophical doctrine. The originality of the different scholastic systems produced from the ninth to the fifteenth century consisted in their novel ways of interpreting, adding to, and correcting the text of Aristotle. From another point of view Haureau defined scholasticism as the philosophy taught in the medieval schools from their establishment in the Carolingian period to their decline in the fifteenth century. This teaching, which was entirely oral, fell into decadence at the beginning of the age of printed books. The invention of printing brought philosophy out of the schools and gave it a new spirit of freedom. Then philosophy was no longer under the control of the Sorbonne; it was in the hands of free philosophers, such as Francis Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, and Spinoza. Thus with the passing of the medieval schools scholasticism came to an end; it died with Gothic art, the monastic and feudal institutions, the ancient papacy and royalty. 13
14
15
*
*
*
The Catholic revival of interest in medieval philosophy began in the first half of the nineteenth century. Several Italian theologians, disturbed by the inferior quality of philosophical speculation and text books in Catholic circles, advocated a return to the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. They described his philosophical doctrine as 'Christian philosophy' — a term 13 14 13
Ibid. Ibid., pp. 33-34. Ibid., p. 36.
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indicating the Christian inspiration of his doctrine. The neo-Thomist movement begun by these theologians culminated in the encyclical Aeterni Patris, published by Pope Leo XIII in 1879. The title of this encyclical is "On the Restoration of Christian Philosophy in Catholic Schools." In it the Pope asks his readers to "open the history of philosophy" and to study the works of Christian thinkers from St. Justin Martyr to St. Thomas Aquinas, for it is in history that his readers will find exemplified the notion of Christian philosophy. The Pope praises Thomas Aquinas as the model of the Christian way of philosophizing, but not to the exclusion of the other patristic and medieval theologians, such as Augustine, Anselm, Albert the Great, and Bonaventure. The encyclical gave great impetus in Catholic circles to the historical study of philosophy in the Middle Ages. Of perhaps equal importance for the development of the neo-scholastic movement was the letter sent by Pope Leo XIII to the University of Louvain in 1880, asking that a chair of Thomistic philosophy be established. In the letter the Pope wrote: "We propose to restore the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. We desire that Catholic schools go back to that doctrine, while at the same time proposing that it be brought into harmony with modern developments and discoveries duly and scientifically established." The first occupant of the Thomistic chair at Louvain was a young priest named Desire Merrier, later Cardinal Merrier. Merrier undertook to establish Thomism as a philosophy in the modern world, a philosophy in harmony with Christian faith and open to the discoveries of modern science. Thus modernized, he thought, Thomism could live in the modern world as a philosophy on an equal footing with other philosophies, and it would earn the respect of Catholics and non-Catholics alike. Meanwhile historians continued their researches in the philosophy of the Middle Ages. The second half of the nineteenth century saw the work of many pioneers in this field. Besides Haureau, there were Ehrle, Denifle, Baeumker, Erdmann, Uberweg, Heinze, Picavet, Willmann, Mandonnet, Grabmann, and others. As a result of their discoveries, philosophy in the 16
17
18
See E. Gilson, "What is Christian Philosophy?," in A Gilson Reader, ed. A. C. Pegis (Garden City, 1957), pp. 185-186. For a detailed account of the revival of Thomism in the nineteenth century, see E. Gilson, ed., Recent Philosophy: Hegel to the Present (New York, 1966), pp. 330-354. Aeterni Patris, 10, trans, in The Church Speaks to the Modern World, ed. E. Gilson (Garden City, 1954), p. 39. Papal encyclicals do not have official titles. The Pope gave his encyclical this title in a later document. See Acta sanctae sedis 13 (1879), p. 56. For the authenticity of the title, see G. Van Riet, "Le titre de l'encyclique 'Aeterni Patris'. Note historique," Revue philosophique de Louvain, 80 (1982), 35-63. D. Mercier, "La philosophie neoscolastique," Revue neoscolastique, 1 (1894), 10. 16
17
18
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Middle Ages was seen to be much more complex than earlier historians imagined. At the turn of the century the time was ripe for a new synoptic view and assessment of medieval philosophy. Of the several that were produced, none was more important or influential than that of Maurice De Wulf. De Wulf was one of the first pupils of Mercier at Louvain. One day about 1885, while Mercier was talking to De Wulf about his work, he asked his pupil, "Why not study the philosophy of the Middle Ages from an historical point of view? What hidden riches it must contain! Go and find M. Haureau in Paris, the octogenerian archivist who has examined so many manuscripts at the Bibliotheque Nationale. He will set you on the right path." Thus began the long career of Maurice De Wulf dedicated to the study of medieval philosophy. The main fruit of this career was his Histoire de la philosophie medievale, first published in one volume in 1900, and enlarged to three volumes in the sixth edition, which was completed in 1947, the year of his death. De Wulf has greatly influenced twentieth-century views on philosophy in the Middle Ages through his large history and also through his Introduction to Scholastic Philosophy {_ 1907) and Philosophy and Civilization in the Middle Ages (1922). In 1922 De Wulf lectured at Harvard on Medieval Philosophy Illustratedfrom the System of Thomas Aquinas. He was one of the first lecturers on medieval philosophy at the Institute of Mediaeval Studies in Toronto. I do not know if De Wulf took Mercier's advice and consulted Haureau in Paris, but he did read the French historian's Histoire de la philosophie scolastique, and he found in it a description of scholastic philosophy little to his liking. As we have seen, Haureau described scholasticism as "the philosophy taught in the schools of the Middle Ages." To De Wulf this is a purely verbal definition devoid of meaning. It is like describing Greek philosophy as the philosophy taught at the Greek Agora, Lyceums, Academies, and so on. Such a definition tells us nothing of the content of the philosophy taught at these places. And according to De Wulf scholasticism does have a definable content. It is, he says, a clearly determined body of doctrine, an organism that slowly developed through the centuries. Beginning as a weak and loosely knit structure in the ninth century, it grew in the twelfth and reached the peak of its development in the thirteenth. It declined in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, only to be revived in the sixteenth. Each 19
This is De Wulfs own report of Mercier's words, cited by L. Noel, "L'oeuvre de Monsieur De Wulf," Hommage a Maurice De Wulf: Revue neoscolastique de philosophie, 36 (1934), 11. For De Wulfs work as an historian of medieval philosophy, see ibid., 11-38; F. Van Steenberghen, "Maurice De Wulf, historien de la philosophie medievale," Revue philosophique de Louvain, 46 (1948), 421-447; E. Bertola; Saggi e studi di fllosofla medioevale (Padua, 1951), pp. 70-77. 19
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generation of philosophers added its own new ideas to the common scholastic synthesis, but they differed only in details. Consequently, the scholastics formed a school in the strict sense of the term. As for the doctrinal content of scholasticism, dominant in the Middle Ages, De Wulf, like Haureau, thought it was Aristotelian in origin and vocabulary. Scholasticism is not a monist but a pluralist philosophy. It is not a pantheism but a dualist system of God as pure act and creatures as composites of act and potency, matter and form, essence and existence. It is creationist, its God is a personal being, its interpretation of the material world is evolutionist and finalistic. Its psychology is spiritualistic, experimental, and objective. The formation of the scholastic system, according to De Wulf, began in the early Middle Ages, when the important doctrines were being formulated that would become "the nucleus of the synthesis of the thirteenth century." Hence the early medieval period can be called 'pre-scholastic', or the 'infancy of scholasticism'. In the thirteenth century scholasticism at first was rather loosely organized by the pre-Thomists such as Alexander of Hales and Bonaventure. Their thought was Augustinian and Neoplatonic, harking back to the early Middle Ages. Aristotelianism was superimposed on Augustinism, resulting in an eclecticism in which Aristotelian doctrines were compromised by alien views. In short, none of the pre-Thomists worked out a compact philosophical synthesis. With Aquinas the scholastic synthesis appeared in all its fullness and power. It was he who "set forth [this synthesis] as a grand and enduring system, while he at the same time dismantled many a theory that had previously loomed large in the schools." Thus for De Wulf scholasticism was a truly organic system of doctrines. A product of medieval culture, it shared in that culture's unity. It was not, however, the whole of philosophy in the Middle Ages. There were other philosophical systems which denied one or more of the fundamental theses of scholasticism. These were the work of what De Wulf called 'anti-scholastics', the chief of whom were John Scotus Erigena, the Cathars and Albigensians, pantheists of the twelfth-century school of Chartres, Amaury of Benes and David of Dinant in the thirteenth century, Averroists like Siger 20
21
22
23
M. De Wulf, Histoire de la philosophie scolastique dans les Pays-Bas et la Principauti de Liege (Louvain and Paris, 1895), pp. xi-xii. M. De Wulf, Histoire de la philosophie medievale, 1st ed. (Louvain, 1900), pp. 288-289. M. De Wulf, History of Medieval Philosophy, 1st English ed. [3rd ed. of Histoire de la philosophie medievale], trans. P. Coffey (London, 1909), p. 268. M. De Wulf, An Introduction to Scholastic Philosophy, trans. P. Coffey (New York, 1956), pp. 37-53. 20
21
22
23
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of Brabant, heterodox mystics, Nicholas of Autrecourt, and John of Mirecourt. Other medieval philosophers, while not contradicting the essential doctrines of scholasticism, deviated from its spirit and hence were called 'dissident scholastics'. Among them De Wulf included Roger Bacon, Raymond Lull, John Baconthorpe, Meister Eckhart, and Nicholas of Cusa. The main proponents of the scholastic system, according to De Wulf, were Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, and to a lesser degree Alexander of Hales and Bonaventure. "Their philosophy," he wrote, "is an intellectual monument, and the sense of proportion which it reveals is the same as that of the Gothic cathedral to which it has so often been compared." There were different forms of this common philosophy, just as there were different forms of the Gothic cathedral, but they shared a common spirit and basic store of ideas. "Its leading principles," De Wulf said, "were accepted by all the scholastics.... The forms assumed by scholasticism were numerous and noteworthy, each of the great scholastics realizing in the concrete, according to the bent of his peculiar genius, the one dominant abstract synthesis." De Wulf s notion of a common scholastic philosophy came under severe criticism as early as the first decades of the twentieth century. His critics pointed out that a close examination of the great medieval thinkers does not reveal a unitary philosophical teaching but a number of highly original and fundamentally divergent systems. With progress in the knowledge of medieval thought it was becoming more difficult to maintain that the medieval scholastics taught a common doctrine with only incidental divergences. Taking this criticism into account, De Wulf somewhat modified his views on medieval philosophy after 1925. He dropped the term 'scholastic synthesis' and used the less rigid expression 'common intellectual patrimony' to designate the fund of ideas shared by the medieval philosophers. He also conformed to the more general practice of the time of identifying 'scholastic philosophy" with 'medieval philosophy'. After 1925 he used the term 'scholasticism' to designate any medieval philosophy; at the same time he dropped the terms 'anti-scholastics' and 'dissident scholastics'. These changes in terminology indicate a more flexible and supple notion of 24
25
26
27
M. De Wulf, Philosophy and Civilization in the Middle Ages (Princeton, 1922, reprinted New York, 1953), p. 109. M. De Wulf, Histoire de la philosophie medievale, 2nd ed. (Louvain, 1905), p. 265. De Wulf takes account of these criticisms in "Notion de la scolastique medievale," Revue neoscolastique de philosophie, 18 (1911), 177-196. M. De Wulf, "Y eut-il une philosophie scolastique au moyen age?" Revue neoscolastique de philosophie, 29 (1927), 5-27. For De Wulfs views on medieval philosophy, see F. Van Steenberghen, La philosophie au xm' siecle, pp. 23-24; Introduction a letude de la philosophie medievale, pp. 287-313. 24
25
26
27
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EPILOGUE
medieval philosophy than before, but De Wulf never abandoned his thesis of a common body of philosophical ideas shared by the leading scholastics and expressed most systematically by Thomas Aquinas. The second important thesis defended by De Wulf was the independence of medieval philosophy from medieval theology. He insisted that these two were not to be confused. Theology is based on the revealed word of God and depends on authority; philosophy is based on the light of human reason and it proceeds by scientific proofs. All the scholastics of the thirteenth century knew this distinction and practised it. De Wulf was here taking sides with Haureau against Victor Cousin. As we have seen, Cousin thought that what is generally called medieval philosophy was in reality theology; in the Middle Ages rational thought was trying to emerge from its bondage to religion but never adequately succeeded in doing so. Haureau, on the contrary, insisted that philosophy was not enslaved to religion in the Middle Ages, especially in Thomas Aquinas. In De Wulf s opinion, medieval philosophy had a long struggle to become independent of religion. In the ninth century John Scotus Erigena, faithful to the patristic tradition, made no distinction between revelation and philosophy. Like Augustine, he identified true religion and true philosophy. Gradually, however, philosophy became conscious of itself and its autonomy. The eleventh century broke with the past and achieved a practical distinction between philosophy and theology, and finally in the thirteenth these two sciences were clearly defined as distinct bodies of doctrine and their mutual relations were established. De Wulf did not deny that philosophy in the thirteenth century had close ties with theology. His Princeton lectures on Philosophy and Civilization in the Middle Ages emphasize the religious character of the medieval period and especially of the thirteenth century. Religious inspiration, he told his audience, affected all aspects of thirteenth-century civilization — politics, art, morals, family, work — and it likewise affected philosophy. In this century philosophy "was bathed in a general atmosphere of religion which pervaded everything else." But he argued that this did not enslave philosophy to religion or destroy the autonomy of philosophy. In defining the relation between scholastic philosophy and theology, De Wulf insisted on the subordination of the former to the latter. In the Middle Ages theology was the queen of the sciences, and philosophy was beneath it in dignity. Philosophical studies were rarely pursued for their own sake; for 28
29
30
28 25 30
M. De Wulf, An Introduction to Scholastic Philosophy, pp. 8-10. M. De Wulf, Histoire de la philosophie en Belgique (Brussels, Paris, 1910), pp. 7-8. M. De Wulf, Philosophy and Civilization in the Middle Ages, p. 167.
MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY AND ITS HISTORIANS
471
the most part they were a step to the higher science of theology. Theologians used philosophy in the work of apologetics. Thus we find in the theological summae genuine philosophical treatises; for example, in the Summa of theology of Thomas Aquinas there are integral philosophical treatises in psychology, ethics, and law. The scholastics, De Wulf says, had a passion "for combining (but not confusing) philosophical and theological questions in the same work." Not only did theology benefit from its contact with philosophy; philosophy was also assisted by the higher science of theology. Theology raised many problems for scholastic philosophers, and it gave them a negative guide by which to judge the correctness of their conclusions. They were convinced that the Catholic faith expresses the infallible word of God, and also that the truth cannot contradict itself. Consequently, when their conclusions in philosophy contradicted their faith, they knew these conclusions must be wrong. Thus faith prohibited scholastics from teaching certain doctrines, such as the eternity of the world, but this prohibition was purely negative; faith gave philosophy no positive proof for its own assertions. Philosophy had to furnish its proofs from its own resources. Moreover, the negative control of theology over philosophy applied only to matters which they shared in common. It had no force in many domains of philosophy where faith had no concern, for example in logic. Therefore scholasticism was affected only to a very limited extent by its subordination to theology. In its own domain it remained a distinct and independent science. In brief, this was De Wulf s conception of medieval philosophy. He considered it to be a scholasticism held in common by all the leading medieval minds and expressed most clearly and in the most orderly fashion by Thomas Aquinas. This scholastic philosophy was made fruitful by the Christian religion, but its ties with religion were historical and sociological rather than doctrinal; they in no way deprived scholasticism of its autonomy. As for the location of this scholastic philosophy, it could be found incorporated in the vast theological works of the Middle Ages, such as the summae of theology and the quodlibetal and disputed questions. Was it a mere coincidence that this description of scholastic philosophy fitted so neatly the needs of De Wulf s master, Monsignor Mercier? When Mercier directed De Wulf to the study of medieval philosophy, his interests were not primarily historical; he wanted to revive scholastic philosophy in the modern world. De Wulf found in the Middle Ages a scholasticism worthy of being revived: a common synthesis of ideas that could be disengaged from 31
31
Ibid., p. 170.
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its theological setting and from the outmoded scientific notions of the Middle Ages. Moreover, since this scholastic philosophy was best exemplified by the thought of St. Thomas, Mercier's neoscholasticism could be practically identified with neo-Thomism. But we do not have to surmise that there was a connection between Mercier's project and the findings of his famous pupil, Maurice De Wulf. We have it from no less an authority on the subject than Monsignor Noel, the third president of the Institut Superieur de Philosophie in Louvain. Writing on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of De Wulf s teaching at the Institut, Noel had these illuminating remarks to make concerning the relation of De Wulf to Mercier:
Nevertheless, in the mind of M. De Wulf, the point of his work has never been purely historical. From the very first it seems that the theses he defends are closely connected in his mind with the justification of the movement of the revival of scholasticism, of which his master, Monsignor Mercier, is one of the chief founders. How can scholasticism be revived if it has no systematic unity? How can we pretend to introduce it among contemporary philosophies if it is nothing but a theological doctrine? How can we make it live in the modern world if it is bound up with outmoded notions of pre-Copernican physics and astronomy? To these Questions [De Wulfs] Introduction to Neoscholastic Philosophy, written in 1904, furnishes answers that can be drawn from [his] History of Mediaeval Philosophy. There is a doctrine common to the great scholastic doctors; this doctrine is a philosophy and above all a metaphysics; it is not necessarily tied up with the consequences that have been drawn from it by applying its principles to the data of brief experience or a naive imagination. Moreover, the decline of scholasticism on the eve of the Renaissance was due to accidental circumstances: a barbarous language, the abuse of dialectics, the ignorance of its defenders. It collapsed "notfromlack of ideas but from lack of men." Hence there is nothing to prevent its revival. 32
Let us grant at once that De Wulfs conclusions were well adapted to further Mercier's project of reviving scholasticism. But this is no criterion of their historical accuracy. The question remained whether the portrait of medieval philosophy drawn by De Wulf was true to historical reality. A number of critics in the 1920's thought it was not. Among them was a young man who was appointed Professor of the History of Medieval Philosophy at the Sorbonne in 1921, and who was destined to open a new phase in the understanding of medieval philosophy. His name was Etienne Gilson. *
32
*
*
In Hommage a Maurice De Wulf, pp. 25-26.
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MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY AND ITS HISTORIANS
Gilson came to medieval philosophy by a most unlikely route — Rene Descartes. While studying philosophy at the Sorbonne he sought the advice of Professor Levy-Bruhl in choosing the subject of his doctoral thesis. Levy-Bruhl suggested that he study the vocabulary and ideas borrowed from scholasticism by Descartes. At the time, Gilson says, neither he nor any of his professors knew anything about scholasticism. All the professors at the Sorbonne were convinced that since the time of Descartes scholasticism was "a mere piece of mental archeology." Gilson spent nine years preparing his thesis, which was printed in 1913 under the title: La liberte chez Descartes et la theologie. During these years he learned to read Thomas Aquinas and the other medieval schoolmen, and he also discovered, to his great surprise, that far from being dull and barren they were better metaphysicians than Descartes. "As the work progressed," Gilson wrote in his recent philosophical memoirs, "I experienced a growing feeling of intellectual dismay in seeing what impoverishment metaphysics had suffered at the hands of Descartes. Most of the philosophical positions he had retained had their proper justification, not in his own works, but in those of the scholastics.... From scholasticism to cartesianism the loss in metaphysical substance seemed to me frightening. Looking back across forty-five years I distinctly remember the feeling of fear I experienced on the day when, after holding back my pen for a long time, Ifinallywrote this simple sentence: 'On all these points the thought of Descartes, in comparison with the sources from which it derives, marks much less a gain than a loss'." This simple sentence flatly contradicted the commonly accepted view of the historians of the day. And its consequence was immediately evident to Gilson. "If it is possible to find in the middle ages," he continued, "metaphysical conclusions better worked out technically and more completely justified than they are in Descartes, then it becomes difficult to maintain with Cousin that between the Greeks and Descartes there was nothing but a progressive dimming of the Greek light leading to a sort of intellectual night. If on certain points there is more in Saint Thomas than in Descartes, one can no longer say with Hamelin that 'Descartes appears after the ancients as though there was nothing between the Greeks and himself." The force of this conviction has sustained Gilson throughout his long career as an historian of medieval philosophy. His first work in the medieval field was a study of Thomistic philosophy entitled Le Thomisme, the first 33
34
35
E. Gilson, God and Philosophy (New Haven, 1941), p. xii. E. Gilson, The Philosopher and Theology, trans. Cecile Gilson (New York, 1962), pp. 88-89. Ibid., p. 89. 33
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edition of which appeared in 1919. There followed in 1924 La philosophie de saint Bonaventure. The most remarkable conclusion of this work is that the thought of Bonaventure cannot be described as an inferior form of Thomism, a thomisme manque. Like the philosophy of St. Thomas, that of St. Bonaventure is thoroughly Christian in inspiration and purpose, and yet it is a different philosophy, neither conflicting nor coinciding with Thomism. St. Bonaventure had no intention of imitating or following St. Thomas; he went his own way on the path to Christian wisdom, taking St. Augustine as his principal guide. In 1922 Gilson wrote his first general survey of medieval philosophy, La philosophie au moyen age. This appeared in a second, much expanded edition in 1944. In 1955 he published his monumental History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages. These volumes, summarizing the results of his own research and that of many other historians, while putting the whole history of medieval philosophy in new perspective, made it abundantly clear that there was no common scholastic synthesis in the Middle Ages. During these decades the philosophy of St. Thomas continued to be Gilson's main interest, and his deepening understanding of it, especially in its metaphysical aspect, is recorded in the successive editions of Le Thomisme. The fifth edition, published in 1944, contains a new chapter entitled "Existence et realite," which stresses the originality of St. Thomas' views on being and existence. Far from being a 'baptized Aristotelianism' or simple variant of a common scholasticism, Thomism in this perspective appears as a new metaphysical view of reality. Because it posits the act of existing as the keystone of metaphysics and as the very core of reality, Gilson calls it an, indeed the only, existential philosophy. Besides Thomism, other distinctive forms of medieval philosophy have emerged into clearer light in recent years. As far back as 1852 Ernest Renan did the pioneering work on the influence of the Muslim philosopher Averroes on the Christian West. Since Renan's day more accurate and detailed information has been unearthed concerning the movement called Latin Averroism, or, as some historians prefer to call it, radical Aristotelianism. Siger of Brabant has been identified as its leader in the thirteenth century, and the history of the movement he initiated has been traced into the Renaissance. Siger's name was preserved in Dante's Paradiso, but after the Renaissance his identity and philosophy were lost to history. The discovery of his long lost manuscripts and the reconstruction of his thought and place in history are one of the significant achievements of historians of 36
37
36 37
E. Gilson, Le Thomisme 5th ed. (Paris, 1944), p. 511; 6th ed. (Paris, 1965), p. 448. E. Renan, Averroes et I'averroisme (Paris, 1852).
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medieval philosophy in the past century. More recently still, the works of Boethius of Dacia, an associate of Siger's in the Averroist movement, are beginning to come to light. The historical significance of radical Aristotelianism cannot be measured by its philosophical fecundity. It was singularly unproductive of new philosophical ideas, contenting itself with remaining as close as possible to the philosophy of Aristotle as interpreted by his commentator, Averroes. Radical Aristotelianism is important in the history of philosophy because it introduced into the medieval world the separation of philosophy from faith and theology that became the ideal of modern thought. As Professor Gilson says, Averroes and his followers were "the representatives of philosophy qua pure philosophy in the middle ages, or, at least, of the purely philosophical spirit from the thirteenth century up to the beginning of modern times." Their effort to make philosophy as independent from theology as possible is at the origin of the opposition to the notion of Christian philosophy. It is also the beginning of the elimination from theology of purely rationally demonstrable conclusions and its limitation to the explication of the dogmas of faith. Another discovery of the last fifty years is the influence of the Arabian philosopher Avicenna on the Latin West. We now know that there was a Latin Avicennism in the Middle Ages as well as a Latin Averroism. One of Gilson's noteworthy discoveries is the combination of Augustinian and Avicennian doctrines in certain theologians of the Franciscan school, which he called by the rather cumbersome name of 'Avicennizing Augustinism.' In 1938 Jean Paulus published an outstanding book on Henry of Ghent which showed the strong Avicennian influence on his metaphysics. Gilson's studies on Duns Scotus revealed that on more than one point the philosophy of Avicenna was the foundation of Scotism. More exact research has also clarified the role of Platonism in medieval philosophy. A continuous Platonic tradition has been traced from antiquity 38
39
40
41
42
43
See A. Maurer, "The State of Historical Research in Siger ofBrabant," Speculum, 31 (1956), 49-56; F. Van Steenberghen, Maitre Siger de Brabant (Louvain, Paris, 1977). See G. Sajo, "Boetius de Dacia und seine philosophische Bedeutung," Miscellania mediaevalia, vol. 2: Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter, ed. P. Wilpert (Berlin, 1963), pp. 454-463. Boetius de Dacia, Tractatus de aeternitate mundi, ed. G. Sajo, 2nd ed. (Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie, 4, Berlin, 1964). E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York, 1955), p. 542. See E. Gilson, "Pourquoi saint Thomas a critique saint Augustin," Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen age, 1 (1926), 5-127; "Les sources greco-arabes de l'augustinisme avicennisant," Archives ..., 4 (1929), 5-149. J. Paulus, Henri de Gand: Essai sur les tendances de sa metaphysique (Paris, 1938). See E. Gilson, "Avicenne et le point de depart de Duns Scot," Archives ..., 2 (1927), 89-149; Jean Duns Scot: Introduction a ses positions fondamentales (Paris, 1952). 38
39
40 41
42 43
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to the Renaissance. Even the schoolmen of the later Middle Ages, when Aristotelianism held the dominant position in philosophy, show the influence of Platonism. St. Thomas Aquinas was no exception; his thought, like that of all his contemporaries, bears the impress of the Platonic current of philosophy. Through these and other important discoveries it has become clear how complex and diversified philosophical movements and syntheses were in the Middle Ages. All historians do not interpret them in the same way; but they no longer subscribe to De Wulf s notion of a common scholastic system or patrimony of ideas inspired mainly by Aristotle. As Anton Pegis recently wrote: "Medieval philosophy, as we see it today, is a community of philosophizing theologians rather than a common synthesis." While Gilson and others were laying the ghost of a common medieval scholasticism, they were also putting into better perspective the position of medieval philosophy in relation to Christian faith. As we have seen, De Wulf maintained the independence of medieval philosophy from theology. While recognizing the religious setting of philosophy in the medieval world and its negative subordination to theology, he insisted that as a body of doctrine it was autonomous, having its own formal object and methods of procedure. If this is true, it makes little sense to speak of a Christian philosophy in the Middle Ages, for this implies the direct and positive influence of Christianity on philosophy, and this is what De Wulf and his followers denied. Indeed, they thought that the notion of 'Christian philosophy' is a contradiction in terms. Is not philosophy, in the words of De Wulf, a rational study of the universal order of things by their ultimate causes and principles? How then can it be open to the positive influence of religious faith without ceasing to be philosophy? Gilson's study of the Middle Ages convinced him that it produced, besides a Christian literature and art, a Christian philosophy. This is the theme of his Gilford Lectures, published in 1932 under the title The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy. The reality of a Christian philosophy in the Middle Ages was 44
45
46
47
See R. Klibansky, The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition during the Middle Ages (London, 1939). See R. J. Henle, Saint Thomas and Platonism (The Hague, 1956); C. Fabro, La nozione metaflsica di partecipazione secondo S. Tommaso dAquino, 3rd ed. (Turin, 1963); L. B. Geiger, La participation dans la philosophic de S. Thomas dAquin, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1953); P. O. Kristeller, Le thomisme et la pensee italienne de la Renaissance (Montreal, 1967). A. C. Pegis, The Middle Ages and Philosophy, pp. 50-51. M. De Wulf, An Introduction to Scholastic Philosophy, p. 7; Histoire de la philosophic medievale, 6th ed. (Louvain, 1934), 1, pp. 19, 285. See also F. Van Steenberghen, Histoire de la philosophic: Periode chretienne, p. 174. 44
45
46 47
MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY AND ITS HISTORIANS
477
forced upon Gilson by historical facts. Looking for the sources of philosophy in the Middle Ages, he discovered that there were in the main two: (1) the classical philosophy of the Greeks, and especially Aristotelianism, (2) Christian revelation. Under the influence of Christianity, philosophical ideas unknown to the ancient world were created in the Middle Ages, ideas which have become part and parcel of modern philosophy. Hence Christian revelation played a decisive and positive role in the formation of medieval philosophy, so that it merits the name of Christian. If this is true, there is a kind of unity among the philosophies of the Middle Ages, since most of them were created under the influence of the same Christian revelation. Thus Gilson in effect substituted the notion of Christian philosophy for the outmoded concept of a common scholasticism. But Christian philosophy, in his view, had no doctrinal unity; it embraced a number of diverse and even mutually incompatible philosophical syntheses, the chief of which were Augustinism, Albertism, Bonaventurianism, Thomism, Scotism, and Ockhamism. Furthermore, no one of these is a philosophy independent of theology. They were created not by pure philosophers but by theologians as rational tools for their theologies, and they were in the main expressed in their theological writings. These were Gilson's views on medieval philosophy for many years. He is now in a new phase of his understanding of this philosophy, one that brings him closer to the reality of the medieval world. Like Cousin, Haureau, and De Wulf, he approached medieval thought not as a theologian but as an historian of philosophy and as a philosopher. He found philosophy in the Middle Ages, not only in commentaries on Aristotle, logical treatises, and philosophical opuscula, but above all in theological writings. Paradoxically, he found the most original and important philosophical notions of the schoolmen in their works of theology. From these he extracted rationally demonstrable theses and presented them as the Christian philosophies of the Middle Ages. And he did not hesitate to call their authors philosophers. Did they not philosophize abundantly and wisely? Did they not create new philosophical notions that have entered into the heritage of Western philosophy? With a deeper understanding of medieval theology, Gilson came to see the work of the medieval schoolmen in a different light. He never doubted that schoolmen such as Thomas Aquinas were professionally theologians and that they philosophized within the context of their theologies and for the sake of their theologies. But as he studied more closely the Thomistic notion of theology he came to realize that what he presented as the Christian philosophy of St. Thomas is in reality a part of his theology — the part, namely, which St. Thomas considered to be demonstrable by reason. In
478
EPILOGUE
short, what Gilson called medieval philosophies were in fact "truncated theologies." Thus, unexpectedly, medieval theology turned out to be the key to the understanding of medieval philosophy. Since the time of Descartes it has generally been thought that theology is separate from philosophy; that theologizing is something quite different from, and even incompatible with, philosophizing. This modern notion of theology was shared by the early historians of medieval philosophy and it intruded itself into their interpretation of this philosophy. De Wulf, while disclaiming any competence in the history of medieval theology, ascribed the Cartesian separation of theology from philosophy to the Middle Ages. He wrote that "the distinction between philosophy where one proceeds according to reason and theology where one proceeds according to the data of dogma was already fully established in the time of Descartes. This distinction appeared already at the end of the twelfth century; the thirteenth century exposed it under its methodological form, and Descartes took it up in exactly the same terms that the scholastics had used." Under these conditions there is no room in theology for philosophical truths known by the light of human reason. But this is clearly not the case with the scholastic theology of St. Thomas. His summation of theology in his Summa theologiae is filled with philosophically demonstrated truths. As Gilson delved more deeply into the Thomistic notion of theology, he realized that in the intention of St. Thomas everything in the Summa is theological, even those parts that he had extracted and called Christian philosophy. Thus Gilson proved that Victor Cousin was right: the philosophy of the Middle Ages, in its most eminent representatives, was in fact theology. But he also showed that Barthelemy Haureau was right: schoolmen such as Thomas Aquinas developed strictly rational philosophies worthy of the name. This must be qualified, however, by adding that, unlike modern philosophies, those of the Middle Ages were created within theologies for theological purposes. 48
49
50
51
** *
See E. Gilson, The Philosopher and Theology, p. 94. In his History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, p. 543, Gilson concluded that on historical grounds one is forced to recognize the presence of purely rational speculation in medieval theology. These words were written by M. De Wulf in criticism of Gilson's broad use of the word 'theology' in his thesis La liberte chez Descartes et la theologie. See Bulletin de la societe franfaise de philosophie, 14 (1914), 220-221. For De Wulfs avowal of "incompetence in the domain of the history of dogmatic and mystic theology," see his Introduction to Scholastic Philosophy, p. 10. See E. Gilson, The Philosopher and Theology, p. 95. See E. Gilson, Le thomisme, 6th ed., p. 7. 48
49
50 51
MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY AND ITS HISTORIANS
479
Looking back over the history of medieval philosophy in the last century and a half, we can see that the constant danger besetting historians was the interpretation of the Middle Ages through specifically modern concepts. The medieval world is so distant from our own; its life and spirit were so foreign to ours, that it is only through a persistent effort of intelligence and imagination that we can enter into it and see it as it really was. De Wulf himself was well aware of this. He warned students of the Middle Ages: "To understand the medieval civilization — to penetrate into its very spirit — we must first of all avoid forcing parallels with the mentality and customs of our own age. Many a study has been marred because its author was unable to resist this temptation. Medieval civilization is not the same as that of our own age. Its factors have a different meaning; they were made for men of a different age .... Further, in order to understand the Middle Ages, we must think directly after their manner of thinking.... A right study of the civilization of the Middle Ages must take it in and for itself, in its internal elements and structure; it must be understood from within." If today we are closer than ever before to an understanding of the nature of philosophy in the Middle Ages, it is because historians have taken this lesson to heart. 52
52
M. De Wulf, Philosophy and Civilization in the Middle Ages, pp. 4-5.
Recent Editions of Works of Authors Cited Avicenna Avicenna Latinus, Liber de Anima seu Sextus de Naturalibus, 2 vols., ed. S. Van Riet (Louvain-Leiden, 1972, 1968). Avicenna Latinus, Liber de Philosophia Prima sive Scientia Divina, 2 vols., ed. S. Van Riet (Louvain-Leiden, 1977, 1980). Dietrich of Freiberg Opera Omnia, 3 vols., ed. K. Flasch et al. (Hamburg, 1977) — De Ente et Essentia, ed. R. Imbach, vol. 2. — De Quiditatibus Entium, ed. R. Imbach, J.-D. Cavigioli, vol. 3. — De Accidentibus, ed. M. R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, vol. 3. Duns Scotus Opera Omnia, vols. 1-7, 16-18, ed. C. Balic (Vatican City, 1950-) — Ordinatio (Oxford Commentary on the Sentences), vols. 1-7 (19501973). — Lectura in Librum Primum et Secundum Sententiarum, vols. 16-18 (1960-1982). Henry of Ghent Quodlibeta, ed. R. Macken et al., vols. 1-18 (Leuven University Press, 1979-1985). Henry of Harclay A. Maurer, "Henry of Harclay's Questions on the Divine Ideas," Mediaeval Studies 23 (1961), 163-193. A. Maurer, "Henry of Harclay's Disputed Question on the Plurality of Forms," in Essays in Honour of Anton Charles Pegis, ed. J. R. O'Donnell (Toronto, 1974), pp. 125-259. G. Gal, "Henricus de Harclay: Quaestio de Significato Conceptus Universalis," Franciscan Studies 31 (1971), 178-234. M. G. Henninger, "Henry of Harclay on the Formal Distinction in the Trinity," Franciscan Studies 41 (1981), 250-335. M. G. Henninger, "Henry of Harclay's Question on Relations," Mediaeval Studies 49 (1987), 76-123. R. C. Dales, "Henricus de Harclay. Quaestio 'Utrum Mundus potuit fuisse ab Aeterno'," Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen age 50 (1983), 223-255.
482
RECENT EDITIONS OF WORKS OF AUTHORS CITED
Siger of Brabant Quaestiones in Tertium de Anima, De Anima Intellectiva, De Aeternitate Mundi, ed. B. Bazan (Louvain, 1972). Siger de Brabant. Ecrits de logique, de morale et de physique, ed. B. Bazan (Louvain, 1974). Includes Sophisma: Omnis homo de necessitate est animal. Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, ed. W. Dunphy (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1981). (Edition of Mss Munich and Vienna). Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, ed. A. Maurer (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1983). (Edition of Mss Cambridge and Paris). Thomas Aquinas Opera Omnia. Commissio Leonina (Rome 1882-) — De Veritate, vol. 22 (1970). — DeMalo, yo\. 23 (1982). — De Substantiis Separatis, vol. 40 (1969). — Compendium Theologiae, vol. 42 (1979). — De Ente et Essentia, vol. 43 (1976). — De Unitate Intellectus, vol. 43 (1976). — De Aeternitate Mundi, vol. 43 (1976). — De Operationibus Occultis Naturae, vol. 43 (1976). — Sentencia Libri de Anima, vol. 45.1 (1984). Quaestiones de Anima, ed. J. H. Robb (Toronto, 1968). Walter Chatton Reportatio et Lectura super Sententias: Collatio ad Librum Primum et Prologus, ed. J. C. Wey (Toronto, 1989). William of Ockham Opera Theologica, 10 vols., ed. G. Gal et al. (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1967-1985) — Scriptum in Libros Sententiarum, vols. 1-8 (1967-1984). — Quodlibeta Septem, ed. J. C. Wey, vol. 9 (1980). Opera Philosophica, 6 vols., ed. G. Gal et al. (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1974-1984) — Summa Logicae, vol. 1 (1974). — Expositio in Librum Perihermenias, vol. 2 (1978). — De Praedestinatione et Praescientia Dei Respectu Futurorum Contengentium, vol. 2 (1978). — Expositio in Libros Physicorum, vols. 4-5 (1985). — Summulae Philosophiae Naturalis, vol. 6 (1984). — Quaestiones in Libros Physicorum, vol. 6 (1984).
Index of Authors Authors whose works are cited in the notes but without comment or disccussion are not listed Abelard, see Peter Abelard Achillini, A.: agent cause, two meanings of, 290 Adam of Buckfield: form and quiddity 7 Adam Wodehaxn, 457 Alain of Lille: authority a wax nose 425 Albert the Great: essence and existence 123, 124; meaning of existere 123n; divine ideas 369; form and quiddity 10; He who is, proper name of God 59; motion 420; on nominates 41 On Alcuin-. Tetragrammaton 66 Alexander of Hales 460 Algazel: creation 281; univocity 209 Alkindi: magic arts 141 Ambrose, St.: the name 'God' 63 Anderson, J.-, analogy of genus 19n Anselm, St.: eternal truth 48; proof of God's existence 348 Aquinas, see Thomas Aquinas, St. Anew, R.: Ockham's razor 439n Aristotle: abstraction and addition 8; dialectical reasoning 455; genus 23n; efficient cause as source of beginning of motion 277, 282, 386; form as supreme actuality 16; one world 395, 396, 401; myths 164-167; nature 98, 99; notion of science 73, 74; objects of mathematics 37, 38; Ockham's razor 405, 532; ovaia 6, 12; eldog 6, 11-13; purpose of law 166; quiddity (to rt ijv slvai) identical with form 6-8, 11-13, 187; religion 164; unity of a science 87, 88; words as signs 425; meaning of 'world' 392 Augustine, St.: demons in magic arts 142; divine ideas 371-373, 376, 377, 380, 383; essentia derived from esse 179; eternal truths 48, 111; integumentum, involucrum, 169; mental language 423; proof of immortality of soul 51, 239; truth, the essence of essences 46
Averroes: agent cause, two meanings of 279, 280; commentator on Aristotle 6; critic of Avicenna on essence and existence 131, on efficient causality 279, 280; efficient cause, proper and metaphorical meaning of, 288; ens diminutum 131, 132n; essence and existence 120, 121; form as essence 3-7; God knows only himself 367; influence in Middle Ages and Renaissance 138; philosophy and religion 449; quiddity identical with form 187 Avicenna: being as the primary object of the intellect 204; has one meaning (una ratio) 205; creation 280, 281; divine ideas 377; efficient cause 278, 279; two meanings of 386, essence includes form and matter 9-10; essence and existence 120, 123-125; God has no quiddity 184; possibility and necessity 236n, 283; magic arts 140, 141, 143, 148, 149, 152, 156, 161; two ways of considering a nature or essence 51; two kinds of necessary being 235 Baeumker, C. 466 Baiiez, D.: Thomas' notion of esse 180n Baudry, L. 40In, 402n Bede: Tetragrammaton 66 Bernard of Arezzo: intuitive knowledge 329 Bernard of Auvergne: unity of a science 78, 79 Biel, G.: nominalism 73; unity of a science 89 Boethius: words as signs 425; eternity defined 49 Boethius of Dacia: and Averroism 475; condemnation of 1277 170, 172 Boehner, P.: Ockham on the existence of God 455n; on formal distinction 415n; Ockham as a conceptualist 41 In, 458n
484
INDEX OF AUTHORS
Bonaventure, St.: divine ideas 369; truth as a property of essence 46; substance and accident defined 193; vertibilitas of creatures 237 Bruno, G.: infinity of God 335
Duns Scotus: being as the primary object of the intellect 204, 205; the concept of being is univocal 205-207; common nature 428; concept, nature of 427; contingency of creatures 237, 238; divine ideas 374n, 378, 379; divine idea as nihil 378; divine knowledge, moments of 366; disCaird, A. P. 333n tinction, kinds of 412; Gods acts freely in Cajetan (Thomas de Vio): analogy of genus creation 390, 391; and Greek and Araor inequality 28-30; science and intelligibian necessitarianism 229n; infinity, the ble species 76n; unity of a science 75, 76 most perfect concept of God 333; infinCapreolus: essence of creatures uncreated ity, a positive mode of God's essence and 56n; science and intelligible species 76n; its proper greatness 337, 338, 339n; no unity of a science 76 reality common to God and creatures Cassirer, E.: human nature 104, 105 214; intuitive and abstractive knowledge Cicero: essentia translates ovaia 15; fables 312; intuitive knowledge a forma absoluta 169 329n; omnipotence of God 452, 460; Clement of Alexandria, St.: immortality of proof of God as infinite being 353n, 450; the soul 237; Tetragrammaton 66n quidditative being the object of metaphysCondillac, E.: Ockham's razor 406 ics 454; relation of knowledge to its Cousin, V.: medieval philosophy 462-464, object 320n; Trinity and formal distinc478 tion 415; unity of a science 84, 89; univocal concepts of God and creatures Dempf, A.: Aquinas and history 112 214-217; words as signs 426-428 Denifle, H.: medieval philosophy 466 Descartes, R.: efficient cause, two kinds of, Eckhart: God as non-being (nihil) 450 276; eternal truths 43-45, 107; infinity of Ehrle, F.: medieval philosophy 466 God 335 Einstein, A.: mathematics 33 Dewey, J.: historicism 95 Empedocles: agent cause 279 De Wuif, M.: critic of Christian philosophy Erdmann, J. E.: medieval philosophy 466 476; medieval philosophy 467-472, 476479 Fabri, H.: Ockham's razor 421 Dietrich of Freiberg: being (ens), entity (enti- Fackenheim, E.: historicity of truth and tas), meaning of 181; being of first and metaphysics 95-98, 106-107 second intention 189; critic of Thomistic Francis of Meyronnes: Anselm's proof of metaphysics 177-199, of the Thomistic God's existence 348; Aristotle the best doctrine of the eucharist 195; essence and physicist, worst metaphysician 340n; existence 130; essence more excellent Avicenna on abstraction 340n; certitude than esse-, existence (esse) identical with 321; certitude of intuitive knowledge 331; essence in reality and meaning 178; God critic of Auriol and Ockham on intuitive has no quiddity 184-186; quiddity in knowledge 311, 315-331; divine ideas accidents 192-198, in logic and grammar 333n; eternity an intrinsic mode of God 189-192, in material substance 186-189; 336n; infinity of God 333-359; infinity a quiddity in the proprer sense is form negative notion with positive meaning without matter 183; quiddity as substan336; infinity an absolute perfection of tial form 186-188, 191, 192, 198; subGod 336, 337; infinity not included in stance and accident defined 195-198 divine essence or attributes 335, 342, Dilthey, W.: historicism 95 343; infinity of God prior to his haecceity Dionysius, pseudo Areopagite: ways of knowand existence 346, 347; infinity related to ing God 353; being as the proper name the other divine modes 343-347; intrinsic of God 60 modes 339-347; intuitive knowledge 328, 329; intuitive and abstractive discursive Duhem, P.: history of the problem of plural knowledge 356, 357; physical and metaworlds 396n
485 INDEX OF AUTHORS physical ways to God 349, 357-359; Henry of Ghent: analogy of concept of being proof of God's existence as infinite being 213, 214, 216, 220n; esse essentiae and 348-351; proof of his infinity 353-358; esse existentiae 52n; existence, meaning proof of his oneness 351-353; realism of of 235n; contingency of creatures 237, knowledge 311-331; sensus communis 238; divine ideas 369, 370; infinity a and errors of judgment 323-326; univopositive perfection of God 334, 335, 338, city of concepts of God and creatures 342 339; metaphysical proof of God's exisFrassen, C.: infinity the formal constituent of tence 450n; nihil, two meanings of 376; God's essence 358 science and its unity 77, 78 Henry of Harclay: analogy a kind of univocity 208, 209; calls Aquinas a heretic 242, Gal, G.: Ockham's razor and Chatton's 454; contingency of creatures 230; critic anti-razor 434 of Aquinas on immortality 229-242, on Galileo: Ockham's razor 432 individuation of the soul 241-243, on Garrigou-Lagrange, R.: analogy of genus 19n necessity of creatures 230-235, on univoGerard of Bologna: divine causality 289 city 210-213; essence and existence 234Gilson, E.: Abelard and William of Cham235; immortality 229-271; opposes peaux on universals 415; Aristotle and Henry of Ghent on analogy of divine Aquinas on creation 18; Aquinas and names 213-217; opposes Scotus' notion Scotus on analogy 3 On; Aquinas and of degrees of real unity 220, and common Scotus on the infinity of God 337n; nature 220; plurality of forms in man 240, Aristotle and Aquinas on nature 102; 241; real community between God and Aquinas and Augustine on truth 5 In; creatures 219, 220; relation 221; relation Averroism 475; Avicennian Augustinism to Ockham 224-227; to Scotus 224-226; 475; Christian philosophy 476, 477; soul accidentally the form of the body 14th-century philosophy 447; influence 240n; soul individual in its own right 242; of Suarez' metaphysics 58n-, form as suheld on faith to be substantial form of preme act in Aristotle 99n medieval man 240; universals 203, 215-217; uniphilosophy 472-478; medieval theology vocity of concept of being 203-227 477, 478; Ockham as a Franciscan thinker 363, 364; revival of Thomism 466n; Hermes Trismegistus: magic arts 140 Scotus' notion of infinity 334, 338; Sco- Herveus Natalis: eternal truths 44 tus on eternal truths 44; Tetragranimaton Hissette, R.: condemnation of 1277 169, 69n; Thomism 473, 474; we make the 170n, 172n truth of our knowledge 109n Hoenen, P.: object of mathematics 35n Goichon, A.-M.: Latin translation of Avicenna 121 Jaeger, W.: Aristotle's Metaphysics 403 Grabmann, M.: medieval philosophy 466 James of Viterbo: proofs of immortality of Gredt, J.: object of mathematics 34 human soul 239 Gregory the Great, St.: immortality 236 Jaspers, K.: human nature 100 Gregory of Rimini: eternal beings have no Jerome, St.: He who is, the proper name of efficient cause according to Aristotle 285, God 59; Tetragrammaton 66 286, 293; God can undo the past 452n John Baconthorpe: divine causality 289 nominalism 73; unity of a science 87-90 John Damascene, St.: He who is, the proper name of God 60; etymology of deog 63; immortality of the soul 236; versio, HameKn, O.: Middle Ages and philosophy meaning of 238 461, 473 John of Jandun: attitude toward the Faith Hamilton, W. Ockham's razor 406 160; divine causality 276-308; efficient Harclay, see Henry of Harclay cause for Aristotle is the principle of Haureau, B.: medieval philosophy 463-465, motion 282; essence as form alone 7n; 467, 470, 478 faith and reason opposed on creation Hegel, G. W. F.: Middle Ages and truth 112 281, 282; God is the final cause of Heidegger, M.: eternal truths 106, 109n, motion for Aristotle and Averroes 285; 114; historicism 95, 459 ;
;
:
486
INDEX OF AUTHORS
God is not the true efficient cause of eternal substances for the philosophers 287; Latin Averroism 275; necessary and possible being 283, 284; philosophy and religion 449 John of Mirecourt: God can undo the past 452n John Ponce: Ockham's razor 406, 432n John of Rodington: no certitude in natural knowledge 330, 456, 457 John the Scot (Eriugena): divine ideas are creatures 380 John of St. Thomas: analogy of genus or inequality 29n; mathematics 35; positive and negative eternity of truth 53 Justin Martyr, St.: immortality of the soul 237 Kant., I.: mathematics 33; nature and freedom opposed 101, 102; Ockham's razor and the anti-razor 433, 442; notion of science 71, 72, 92 Knowles, D.: 14th-century thought 441 Lactantius: immortality of the soul 237 LefF, G.: Ockham's razor 404n Ockham's voluntarism 402n Leibniz, G.W.: best of all worlds 383; eternal truths 44, 107; infinity of God 335; nominalists 72, 73; Ockham praised 459, 460; Ockham's razor 406, 421,432; perennial philosophy 107n; principle of plenitude 433; Suarez' Disputationes metaphysicae 90 Leo xiii, Pope: Aeterni Patris 466 LeRohellec, J.: analogy of genus 19n Lovejoy, A.: great chain of being 391; principle of plenitude 383, 384, 433 Lubac, H. de: human nature 100, 101 Luther, M.: nominalism 73 ;
Macrobius: fables linked with falsity 170 Maimonides, Moses: I am who am, the proper name of God 59; God has no quiddity 184; Tetragrammaton 66-69 Malebranche, N.: eternal truths 107 Mandonnet, P.: condemnation of 1277 171; medieval philosophy 466 Maritain, J.: analogy of genus 19n; analogous notion of essence 185n; object of mathematics 34, 35 Marlasca, A.: influence of Aquinas on Siger's De causis 133, 135
Marsilius of Padua: church and state 160 Mastrius de Meldula: intuitive and abstractive knowledge 312 Matthew of Aquasparta: two meanings of 'nothing' (nihil) 376 Maziarz, E.: object of mathematics 35n Menger, K.: antirazor 406, 434 Mercier, D.: Thomism 466, 467 Michael Scot: impossibility of many worlds 396 Moerbeke: translator of Aristotle 11, 12 Munk, S.: Tetragrammaton 68n Mutakallimun: creation 280 Nardi, B.: on John of Rodington 456 Newton, I.: Ockham's razor 432 Nicholas of Autrecourt: anti-Aristotelianism 450, 451; atomism 451; intuitive knowledge 329, 330; skepticism 456 Nicholas of Cusa: infinity of God 334, 335; principle of contradiction 411 Nietzsche, F.: Aquinas and history 112; historicity of truth 95 Nifo, A.; Siger and Albert 123n Nizolius, M.: nominalism 72 Noel, L.: on Mercier and De Wulf 472 Oberman, H. A.: on Franciscan school of interpretation 363n Ockham, see William of Ockham Odo of Rigaud: Ockham's razor 405, 43In Origen: Tetragrammaton 66n Owens, J.-. Aristotle's notion of TO ri ijv slvai, of form 17n, of nature 99n,- perennial philosophy 107n Paul, St.: God alone has immortality 237 Pegis, A. C.: Henry of Ghent on divine ideas 370n; man an incarnate spirit 103; medieval philosophy 462n, 476; non-being as an object of knowledge 318n; Ockham on intuitive knowledge of non-existents 313n, 315n; Ockham and Platonism 382n Peirce, C. S.: on Ockham and Scotus 460 Penido, T.-L.: analogy of genus 19n Peter Abelard: impossibility of a better world 385; universals 415 Peter Auriol: esse apparens 326, 327; intuitive knowledge of non-existents 313; intuitive knowledge an absolute reality 328; Ockham's razor and miracles 443; unity of a science 79, 81, 89
487 INDEX OF AUTHORS Peter Lombard: He who is, the proper name of God 59; possibility of a better world 385 Peter Olivi: motion 420 Peter of Spain: modes of signification 130, 178n Peter of Sutton: analogy and univocity 208n, 213-215 Phelan, G. B.: analogy of genus 19n, 3 In Philo: divine infinity 334n; He who is and Tetragrammaton 68n Philoponus: creation 280 Picavet: F„ medieval philosophy 466 Plato: form, ultimate perfection of being 17; myths 165 Pomponazzi, P.: Averroism 275, 276; critic of Aquinas on magic arts 155,156; divine causality 290; feith and reason 152-158, 160; magic arts 151-162 Pythagoras: religion (lex) 165 Rahner, K.: human nature 100 Ramirez, J.: analogy of genus 19n Randall, J. H. Aristotle's notion of nature 99n Renan, E.: Averroism 138, 474 Richard of Bury: sciences as 'bodies' 92 Richard of Campsall, pseudo: Ockham's razor 406; anti-razor 433; infinity of spirits occupying same place 452 Richard Fishacre: divine infinity 339n Richard FitzRalph: God can deceive us 330 Richard of Middleton: meaning of 'world' 392, 393; possibility of many worlds 397, 398 Robert of Chester: algebra 34 Robert Grosseteste: Aristotle and the Faith 230; Ockham's razor 405 Robert Holcot: intuitive and abstractive knowledge 312 Robert Kilwardby: soul immortal for Aristotle 239, 240 Roger Bacon: words as signs 424, 426n Roscelin: nominalism 72 Ross, W. D.: Aristotle's notion of essence 18 Russell, B.: Ockham's razor 407, 421, 432, 442n ;
Schopenhauer, A.: Suarez' Disputationes metaphysicae 90 Schwartz, H.: analogy of genus 19n Scotus, see Duns Scotus
Sechler, M.: Aquinas and salvation history 112n Seneca: idea, meaning of, 372 Siger of Brabant: critic of Aquinas on essence and existence 125-129; critic of Albert and Avicenna 123, 124; and Dante 474; disciple of Albert 123n; distinction between essence and esse 119-135; between res and ens 122, 129, 130; divine causality 293n; ens, esse derived from the act of existing (actus essendi) 121; esse as essence (esse essentiae) 122, 132; essential being includes actual existence 132, 133; essence of material substances includes form and mater 7n; fables and errors in religion 163-174; faith and reason 144, 150, 151, 171, 174; influence of Aquinas on his De causis 133-135; influence of Neoplatonism 129; magic arts 139-151; myths and metaphors 167,168; participation: univocal and by imitation 128, 129; philosophy and religion 449; words as signs 426n; world history cyclical 172 Smith, G.: we make the truth of our knowledge 109n Smith, V.: mathematics 34 Soncinas, P.: science and intelligible species 76n; unity of a science 89 Spade, P.: Auriol on the unity of a science 79n 433n Spinoza, B.: eternal truths 107; infinity of God 335 Stenzel, J.: Plato's method 403 Stephen Tempier: condemnation of 1277 168, 169; God could make many worlds 398 Steuchus, A.: perennial philosophy 107n Suarez, F.: eternal truths 44-46, 55-58, 107109; creature as a possible being uncreated 56n; unity of a science 89, 90; analogy of genus 29n ;
Tachau, K.: Auriol and esse apparens 326n, 327n Thomas Aquinas, St.: abstraction and precision 191; accidents in the eucharist 193, 194; addition 9; analogy 26, 27, 30, 224; of genus 19-31; meaning of being (ens) 127, 134, 182; distinction between existence (esse) and essence 125-128, 188; distinction between ens and res 122n; divine ideas 369; divine names not univo-
488
INDEX OF AUTHORS
cal 210-213; meaning of esse 125-127; esse as act of form or essence 16, 126, 127, 235; not an accident of essence 125n; essence defined 15, 181; essence formally specifies esse 16, 126; essence and esse in accidents 194, 195; two ways of considering an essence 52; essences unknown 104; eternal truths 46-58; eternity 53; etymology of a word and its meaning 62, 63; form and essence 3-18; freedom of God the creator 384, 388, 389; genus, logical and natural 21-24, 27; God as esse per se subsistens 17, 127; God's essence is his esse 185; God unnameable 60, 61; meaning of the name 'God' 63-65; He who is, the proper name of God 59-69; Tetragrammaton as a divine name 62, 65-69; human freedom 101; immortality of the soul 239; individuation of the soul 241-243; infinity a negative notion 337; laws, human and divine 173; objet of logic 38-40; mathematics 33-41; nature 99-105; necessity and contingency of creatures 230, 231, 454; two kinds of necessary being 235, 236; Ockham's razor 405; no best of all possible worlds 397n; the principle of plenitude 383; probability 455; proof of God by motion 449, 450; purpose as commentator 6n; quiddity 14; saving the phenomena 58, 113n; science and its unity 73-77, 92, 93; sense of history 112, 113; spiritual substances by nature have no potency to non-being 233-236; substance and accident defined 193; meaning of truth 46, 47; truth based on esse 47; contingent and necessary truths 58; two ways of considering a truth 51,54; human truth temporal 109; divine truth alone immutable, eternal and necessary 47, 48; words as signs 425, 426, 428; worlds is one by nature 397 Thomas of Sutton: analogy and univocity 208n Thomas of Wilton: divine causality 289 Thomas of York: essence is form alone 16 Trapolino, P.: magic arts 152
Varro: etymology and meaning of words 62 Vasquez, G.: eternal truths 44n, 107 Vennebusch, J.: Siger and Albert 123n Vigilius of Tapsus (Augustine): immortality 236 Vital du Four: meaning of existence 235n
Walter of Chatton: action 438; anti-razor 406, 407, 432, 443; critic of Auriol and Ockham on intuitive knowledge 314, 315; motion 436, 437; relation 435 Watts, I.: science a body of propositions 92 Weinberg, J.-. Auriol and esse apparens 327n William of Alnwick: univocity of concept of being 204n; divine ideas 374n William of Auvergne: only one possible world 393, 396, 397; God has no quiddity 185 William of Champeaux: universals 415 William of Conches: fables 169 William of Ockham: abstract and concrete terms, 417-419; action 438; Avicenna's notion of essence interpreted 419; analogy and univocity 209; and Aristotelianism 229n, 400, 401; conceptual analysis 417-421; contingency of creatures 238; criteria for use of the razor 408; critic of Scotist formal distinction 412-416; critic of Aquinas on freedom of creation 389; critic of Auriol and Scotus on unity of a science 84-86; distinction of reason (distinctio rationis) 416; divine ideas 368381; primarily of individuals 377; possible objects of creation 374; have no positive entity 374; are not relations of imitability 370, 371; are not ficta 375; eternity of 373, 374; efficient cause 409, 410, defined 410n, 456n; two meanings of, in Aristotle 386; experience 410; freedom and omnipotence of God 401, 402, 404, 452, 460; God can create other and better worlds 393, 394, 398-400,- God as a knower 364-368; idea, meaning of 371, 373; individuals alone real 83; intuitive and abstractive knowledge 314; intuitive knowledge of non-existents 313-320; knowledge an absolute reality (res) 328; language and reality 423-430; mental language 423, 424; method 403-421; Ueberweg, F.: medieval philosophy 466 motion 420, 436; nature, meaning of 400, 401; non-being (nihil) as object of Van Riet, G.: the title of Aeterni Patris 466n knowledge 318n; nominalism 73, 456Van Steenberghen, F.: on De Wulf 467n, 460; a nominalist 410; no species in 469n; medieval philosophy 462n
489 INDEX OF AUTHORS knowledge 408, 409; nothing (nihil), two 402; words of imposition and intention meanings of 375; possibility of a better 429; meaning of general words 428-430; world 385, 392-395; and Platonism 380, meaning of 'world' and 'better world' 381; potentia absoluta and ordinata 313, 392, 393 439, 400, 443, 451; principle of contra- Willmann, O.: medieval philosophy 466 diction 411-417; razor 404-411; and Wittgenstein, L.: Ockham's razor 407n, 442 anti-razor 431-443; reality as purely indi- Wojtyla, K. (Pope John Paul n): person as vidual 416, 417, 419; relation 410, 435; 'self-maker' 102, 103 science, real and rational 83; science and Wolff, C.: on Suarez 90; unity of a science its unity 80-87, 89; subject of science 84, 91, 92 object of science 83, 84, 454, 455; signi- Wolfson, H. A.: He who is and Tetragrammafied and exercised act 419; signs 429, ton 68n 430; thing (res), meaning of 410; Trinity and principle of contradiction 414; uni- Zammit, P. N.: the analogy of genus 24n, versals 83, 410, critic of Harclay on 28n universals 226; verification of proposi- Zimara, M.: divine causality in Aristotle and tions 439; via moderna 460; voluntarism Averroes 290-292
Index of Subjects abstraction: in Meyronnes 340n; and mathematics in Aquinas 37, in Aristotle 37, 38; and precision in Aquinas 191 abstractive knwoledge, see intuitive knowledge accident: defined by Aquinas 193, 194; relation to esse in Aquinas 195; and the eucharist in Aquinas 192-195, in Dietrich 196-198; permanent and successive in Jandun 284-285 action: in Chatton 438, in Ockham 438 actus signatus and exercitus: in Ockham 419 addition: in Aquinas 6, 9, 15, in Aristotle 8, 9 Aetemi Patris, 466 analogy: in Aquinas 224, in Harclay 208, 209, in Ockham 209; of genus or inequality in Aquinas 19-31, in Cajetan 28-30, in John of St. Thomas 29n, in Suarez 29n, in Zammit 24n, 28n; of proportionality in Aquinas 30-31; and esse in Aquinas 20, 21, 27 anti-razor: in Chatton 406, 407, 432-443, in Gal 434, in Kant 433, 434, in Menger 406, 434, in pseudo-Campsall 406n, 433 Aristotelianism: and the Faith, 229, 230; and Ockham 398, 400, 401; in 14th-century philosophy 448-451 atomism: in Nicholas of Autrecourt 451 Averroism: in the Middle Ages and Renaissance 138, 139 Avicennizing Augustinism, 475 being (ens)-, in Aquinas 124, 134, 182; primary gift of God in Aquinas and Dionysius 61-62; in Dietrich 18, 182, 198; univocity of, in Harclay 203-227, in Ockham 226, 227, in Scotus 205-207, 214; see existence, ens, esse, ov
causality: in Aristotle 277, 282, in Averroes 149, in Avicenna 141, 148, 149, 157n, 161, in Chatton 435, 436, in Empedocles 279, in Ockham 410, 435, in Pomponazzi 157, in Siger 145, 146, 149; two kinds of agent or efficient causes in Algazel 279, in Averroes 279, 288, in Avicenna 278, 279, 386, in Jandun 276, 277, 288, in Ockham 386, in Siger 293n of God, in Aristotle 144, 145, 157, 161, in Averroes 287, 288, in Achillini 290, in Baconthorpe 289, in Gerard of Bologna 289, in Gregory of Rimini 285n, 286, 293, in Harvey of Nedellec 289, in Jandun 276-308, in Thomas of Wilton 289, in Ockham 387-391, in Pomponazzi 290, in Zimara 290-292 certitude: of intuitive knowledge, in Chatton 314, 315, in Meyronnes 330, 331, in Nicholas of Autrecourt 329, 330 Christian philosophy, 465, 466, 476-478 common nature: in Scotus 215, 412-414, 417; criticized by Harclay 215, 220, 225, by Ockham 416, 417 concept: as sign, in Aquinas 425, 426, in Ockham 423, 424, 428-430, in Scotus 426-428 concepts: foundation of, in Aquinas 36, 37 conceptual analysis: Ockham's use of, 417421 condemnation of 1277: 167-172, 174, 448, 449 contingency: of created being, in Harclay 230-238; and necessity in Aquinas 454, in Ockham 452-454, in Scotus 452-454 Council of Vienne: intellectual soul per se form of body 240n creation: in Algazel 281, in Aquinas 384, in Avicenna 281, 386n, in Mutakallimun 280, in Philoponus 280 creatures: naturally tend to nothingness, in Bonaventure 237; do not exist necessarily, in Harclay 230-238, in Henry of ;
492
INDEX OF SUBJECTS
Ghent 237, 238, in Ockham 238, in Scotus 237, 238; spiritual creatures by nature exist necessarily in Aquinas 230233, 234; not immortal by nature, in Damascene 236, 237, in Gregory the Great 236, 237, in Harclay 236, 237, in Vigilius of Tapsus 236, 237 demons: in Aquinas 142n, 143, in Aristotle 153,154,162, in Augustine 142, in Plato 153, 162, in Pomponazzi 152-155, 157, 158, 161, in Siger 144, 146-148, 161 demonstratio quia a priori and a posteriori: in Meyronnes 350 demonstration: in Ockham 39In determinatio diminuens and distrahens: in Peter of Spain 212 dialectical reasoning: in 14th-century, 455, 457 diminished being: in Averroes 131, in Harclay211-212, in Siger 131, 132; of divine ideas, in Scotus 378 distinction: kinds, in Ockham 412, 413, in Scotus 412; distinctio rationis in Aquinas 416, in Ockham 416; distinctio formalis in Ockham 412-415, in Scotus 412-415; distinctio realis in Ockham 413, in Scotus 412, 413; distinction of essence and existence, in Aquinas 125-128, 179, in Albert the Great 123, 124, in Averroes 120, 121, in Avicenna 120, 123, 125, in Dietrich 178, 179, in Jandun 284, in Siger 119-135, 178, 179 divine ideas: in Aquinas 369, 380, in Albert 369, in Augustine 371-373, 376, 380, in Avicenna 377, in Bonaventure 369, in Eriugena 380n, in Harclay 369n, 371n, 374, in Henry of Ghent 369, 370, 374, in Meyronnes 333n, in Ockham 368-381, in Scotus 374, 378, 379 eldoQ: in Aristotle 6, 11, 13-15 efficient cause: in Aristotle 386, 387, in Ockham 386, 456; see causality ens-, in Aquinas 122n, 182, in Avicenna 120, 125, in Dietrich 181, in Siger 119-122, 128-131, 133; see being ens diminutum, see diminished being ens rationis: and mathematics, in Aquinas 38 entity: in Dietrich of Freiberg 182 esse: in Aquinas: act of existing 99, act of form or essence 16, 235, and analogy 20, 21, 27, 29-31, most perfect actuality 17,
63, 180, foundation of truth 46, 47, necessarily follows upon form 231, 233, 234, 239, relation to essence 15, 16, two meanings of 47; in Albert the Great 123, 124, in Bafiez 18 On, in Dietrich of Freiberg 178-180, 182, in Siger 119-122, 126-135; see existence, essence esse apparens: in Auriol 326-328 esse essentiae: in Siger 122, 132, in Suarez 52n, 56; distinct from esse existentiae, in Henry of Ghent and Scotus 114 esse existentiae, see esse essentiae essence: in Aquinas 15, 52, 181, 182, 185, 187-189, 428, in Augustine 179, in Avicenna 51, in Capreolus 56n, in Dietrich of Freiberg 178-182, 184, 188, in Maritain 185n, in Scotus 428, in Suarez 57n; relation to form, in Aquinas 3-18, in Aristotle 8, in Averroes 3-7, in Avicenna 9, 10 eternal truths: in Aquinas 43-58, 109-115, in Anselm 48, in Augustine 48, in Descartes 43-45, 107, in Fachenheim 106, 107, in Heidegger 106n, 109n, 114, in Leibniz 44, 107, in Malebranche 107, in Scotus 44, 107, in Spinoza 107, in Suarez 4446, 107-109, in Vasquez 44n, 107; Gilson on Scotus' doctrine of 44 eternity: meaning of, in Aquinas 49, 53; defined by Boethius 49; negative and positive notions in John of St. Thomas 53; of the world, in Siger 160, 172, in Boethius of Dacia 172; an intrinsic mode of God, in Meyronnes 336n eviternity: in Aquinas 49 existence: in Harclay 235, in Meyronnes 333, 334, 342, in Henry of Ghent and Vital du Four 235n; as related to essence, in Aquinas 15, 16, 125-128, 179, in Albert 123, 124, in Averroes 120-121, in Avicenna 120, 123, 125, 284, in Dietrich of Freiberg 178-180, in Jandun 284, in Siger 119-135, 178, 179; see esse experience: in Ockham 410 fables: in Cicero 169, in Macrobius 170, in Siger 163-174, in William of Conches 169; see myths fabula: meaning of, in Middle Ages 163n faith and reason: in Aquinas 151, in Averroes 159, in Jandun 281, 282, in Pomponazzi 152, 158-160, 162; see Latin Averroism flcta: in Ockham 375
493 INDEX OF SUBJECTS form: in relation to essence or quiddity, in human nature: in Aquinas 100-105, in CassiAquinas 3-18, in Averroes 3-7, 187, in rer 104, 105, in de Lubac 100, 101, in Albert 10, in Adam of Buckfield 7, in Jaspers 100, in Kierkegaard 102n, in Aristotle 4, 12, in Dietrich of Freiberg Pegis 103, in Rahner 100 187, in Thomas of York 7, 16 forma partis and totius 3, 4, 9, 187 idea: meaning of, in Ockham 371, in Plato freedom: in Aquinas 101, 102, in Wojtyla 372, 373, in Seneca 372 102, 103 immortality of human soul: proof of, in Aquinas 50, 55, 239, in Augustine 50, 51, 239, in James ofViterbo 239; held on genus: in Aquinas 22-31; unity of, in Aquinas faith alone, in Harclay 240, in Ockham 23, 24, 28; analogy of, in Aquinas 19-31, 456 logical and natural in Aquinas 21-24, 27; individual: in Hsrclsy 220, in Ockhsm 226, in Aristotle 23n 458, 459 God: a deceiver, in FitzRalph 330, in Ro- induction: of, in Siger 146 dington 330; no deceiver, in Ockham infinity of value God: in Aquinas 337, in Bruno, 315; divine knowledge, in Aquinas 365, Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza 335, in Fishin Averroes 367, in Ockham 364-368, in acre 339n, in Frassen 358, in Meyronnes Scotus 366; divine name, in Aquinas 333-359; positive perfection of God, in 63-65, in Ambrose 63; as unnameable, in Henry of Ghent 334, 338, 339, in MeyAquinas 60-62; best known by negation, ronnes 336, 337, 352-358, in Scotus in Aquinas, Damascene and Dionysius, 337-339, 353n, 450; Gilson on divine 60-61; esse per se subsistens, in Aquinas infinity in Scotus 337n, 338n; infinity of 17, 127, 128, in Siger 134; essence is prime mover, in Aristotle 353n; proof of esse, in Aquinas 185; haecceity of, in divine infinity, in Meyronnes 353-358, in Meyronnes 352; has no quiddity, in Scotus 353n; related to other divine Avicenna 184, in Dietrich 184, in Wilmodes, in Meyronnes 343-347 liam of Auvergne 185; only necessary intention (intentio): in Avicenna 120; first being, in Harclay 230, in Ockham 238, in and second, in Dietrich 189-191 Scotus 238; only being immortal by nature, in Harclay 237; non-being, m Eck- intrinsic modes: in Meyronnes 339-347; defined 340; distinguished 341, 342 hart 450; omnipotent, m Aquinas 453, in Peter Lombard 385, in Ockham 401, intuitive knowledge: nature of, in Auriol 328, in Meyronnes 328, in Ockham 328, in 402, 452, 455, in Scotus 452; proof of Scotus 329n; and abstractive, in Holcot existence, in Anselm 348, in Aquinas 312, in Mastrius de Meldula 312, in 449, 450, in Meyronnes 348-358, in Nicholas of Autrecourt 330n, in Ockham Scotus 450; proof of oneness, in Meyron314, 317, in Scotus 312; ofnon-existents, nes 351, 352; ways to God, in Dionysius in Auriol 313, in Chatton 314, 315, in 353, in Meyronnes 357-359; see causalBernard of Arezzo 329, in John of Roity, infinity, He who is, Tetragrammaton dington 330, in Meyronnes 311-315, in great chain of being: in Lovejoy 383, 391 Nicholas of Autrecourt 329, 330, in Ockham 313-320, in Scotus 312 He who is: divine name, in Aquinas 59-63, 65, 69, in Albert 59, in Damascene 60, in knowledge: meaning of, in Aquinas 365, in Ockham 365-368; how related to its Maimonides 59, 66-69, in Peter Lomobject, in Auriol 328, in Meyronnes 318, bard 59 320, 328, in Scotus 318, 320n see intuihistoricity of truth: in Collingwood 95n, in tive knowledge, science Croce 95n, in Dewey 95, in Dilthey 95, in Fackenheim 95-98, 106-107, in Heilanguage: in Augustine 423, 424, in Ockham degger, 95, 112, in Nietzsche 95 423-430 history: importance of, in Aquinas; Aquinas and history, in Dempf 112, in Dilthey, in Latin Averroism: 137-139, 162, 275, 276, 474, 475 Nietzsche 112, in Seckler 112n ;
494
INDEX OF SUBJECTS
Latin Avicennism: 475 laws {leges): in Aquinas 166, 173, in Aristotle 164-166, in Siger 165, 166, 172 logic: object of, in Aquinas 38, 39; and mathematics, in Aquinas 37-39 magic: an art and science, in Siger 147, 151 magic arts: in Alkindi 141, in Aquinas 139, in Augustine 142, in Avicenna 140, 141, 143, 148, 149, 152, 156, in Hermes Trismegistus 140, in Siger 139-151, in Pomponazzi 151-162, in Trapolino 152 man: incarnate spirit, in Pegis 193; selftranscending and self-making 102, 105; two meanings of, in Ockham 394 mathematics: in Aquinas 33-41, in Einstein 33, in Kant 33, in John of St. Thomas 35; object of, in Gredt 34, in Hoenen 35n, in Maritain 34, 35, in Maziarz 35n, in Smith 34 matter: how related to essence or quiddity of sensible substance, in Aquinas 5, 6, 9-18, in Albert 10, in Aristotle 6-8, 11-13, in Averroes 3-7, in Avicenna 9, 10, in Thomas of York 16, in Dietrich 183, 186, 187 medieval philosophy-, in Cousin 462-464, 478, in De Wulf 467-472, 476, 478, in Gilson 472-478, in Haureau 463-465, 468-470, 478, in Pegis 462n, 476, in Van Steenberghen 462n medieval theology: in De Wulf 470, 471, 478, in Gilson 477, 478 metaphors: Aristotle, Plato 158, in Siger 167, 168 metaphysics: and historicity, in Fackenheim 95-98, in Heidegger 96n; objet of, in Scotus 454; see historicity method: in Ockham 403-421; scholastic 403n modes of signification: in Dietrich of Freiberg 130, 178, 189, in Peter of Spain 130, 178n, in Siger 130 motion: nature of, in Albert 420, in Chatton 436, 437, in Gregory of Rimini 285, in Ockham 285n, 420, 436, in Olivi 420; eternal, in Aristotle 284, in Jandun 284, 285 myths: in Aristotle 158, 164, 165, 167, in Averroes 158, in Augustine 169, in Hesiod 167, in Plato 158, 165, in Siger 167, 168, in Pomponazzi 158; see fables
nature: in Aquinas 99-102, in Aristotle 98, 99, in Kant 101, 102, in Gilson 102, in Ockham 400, 401 necessary being: two kinds of, in Aquinas 235, in Avicenna 235; and possible being, in Avicenna 283, 284, in Jandun 283 necessity and contingency of creatures: in Aquinas 230-236 Neoplatonism: in Albert and Dietrich 178; in 14th-century 450 nomina mentalia: in Ockham 410 nominalism: in Abelard 415, in Biel 73, in Gregory of Rimini 73, in Nizolius 72, in Ockham 73, 410, in Roscelin 72; history of, in Leibniz 72-73; in 14th-century, 457-460; nominalists, on unity of a science, see science; Albert on, nominalists 410 non-being: as object of knowledge in Ockham 319, in Matthew of Aquasparta 319n; nothing (nihil), two meanings of, in Henry of Ghent 376, 378, in Matthew of Aquasparta 376, 378, in Ockham 375 Ockham's razor: in Aristotle 405, 432, in Aquinas 405, in Ariew 439n, in Auriol 443n, in Condillac 406, in Fabri 421, in Galileo 432, in Grosseteste 405, in Hamilton 406, in Kant 433, 442, in Leff 404n, in Leibniz 406, 432, in Newton 432, in Ockham 404-411, 404n, 431-443, in Odo of Rigaud 405, 431n, in Ponce 406, 432n, in Russell 407, 421, 432, 442n, in Wittgenstein 407n, 442n; see anti-razor omnipotence of God: in Ockham 401, 402, 452, 455, in Scotus 452; and Ockham's razor, in Ockham 439, 440, 443, in Chatton 440 ovaia: in Aristotle 6, 8, 12, 15, 18, in Boethius 14, 15, in Cicero 15 participation: in Siger 128, 129 philosophia perennis: 106, 107 Platonism: in Middle Ages 475, 476 plural worlds: in Ockham 393-395, 398, 399; impossible, in Aquinas 397, in Aristotle 395, 396, 401, in Michael Scot 396, in William of Auvergne 393, 396, 397; history of, in Duhem 396n; see world plurality of forms in man: in Harclay 241 poetry: in Aristotle 165, in Plato 165
495 INDEX OF SUBJECTS possible being: object of metaphysics, in Scotus 454, in 14th century 451-454 possibility of a better world: in Peter Lombard 385, in Ockham 385, 399 potentia absoluta and ordinata: in Ockham 313, 400, 443, 451; absolute and relative power, in Michael Scot 396 predication: defined, in Aquinas 40 principle of contradiction:' in Nicholas of Cusa 411, in Ockham 411-417, in Scotus 413-415; of plenitude, in Leibniz 443, in Lovejoy 383, 384, 443; and Aquinas 383, 384 probability: in "th-century philosophy 455457 1
quiddity: in Aquinas 14, in Aristotle 187, 188, in Averroes 6, 187, in Avicenna 9, 184, in Dietrich 180-198, in Maimonides 184 ratio: meaning of, in Aquinas 36, 37 rationalism: in Renaissance 137, 138, 160; beginnings in Middle Ages 169, 174 realism: of knowledge, in Meyronnes 311331 realists (reales): opposed to nominalists 411 reality: individual in Aquinas 428, purely individual in Ockham 82, 410, 413, 414, 429, 430, common in Scotus 428; individual of itself, in Harclay 224 reasoning: intuitive and abstractive, in Meyronnes 356, 357 relation: in Chatton 435, in Harclay 221, in Ockham 410, 435 religion: in Aristotle 164, in Pythagoras 165; see laws res: meaning of, in Aquinas 122n, in Avicenna 120, in Harclay 224, in Siger 122, 129, 130 science: body of knowledge, in Bacon 71, in Comte 71, in Condillac 71, in d'Alembert 71, in Descartes 71, in Diderot 71, in Kant 71, 72, in Leibniz 71, 72, in Richard of Bury 92, in Watts 92; unity of a science, in Aquinas 73-77, in Aristotle 87, in Auriol 79-81, 86, 89, in Cajetan 75, 76, in Capreolus 76, in Gregory of Rimini 87-90, in Henry of Ghent 77, 78, in Ockham 80-87, in Scotus 84, 89, in Soncinas 89, in Suarez 89, 90, in WolfT 91-92; an intellectual habitus, in Aristotle
73, 74, in Aquinas 73-77; object of, in Aquinas 93n, in Ockham 83, 84, 87, 454, 455, in Scotus 84; subject of, in Ockham 84-87; real and rational, in Ockham 83; modes of abstraction, in Aquinas 93n scientific hypotheses: and time, in Aquinas 113n sensus communis-, role in errors of judgment, in Meyronnes 323-326 signs: in Aristotle 425, 426, in Aquinas 425, 426, in Ockham 423, 424, 428-430, in Scotus 426-428 skepticism: in John of Rodington 456, 457, in Nicholas of Autrecourt 456 soul (human): immortal by grace, in Clement of Alexandria, Justin Martyr and .Lactantius 237, by grace .and not by nature in Harclay 239; naturally immortal, in Aquinas 243; individuated by master, in Aquinas 241-243, individual in itself, in Harclay 242,243; not essentially the form of the body, in Harclay 240n, 241 species: unity of, in Aquinas 23, 24, 28 species: in knowledge, in Aquinas 408; not needed, in Ockham 408, 409 spiritual creatures: have necessary being, in Aquinas 230-233, 234 substance: in Averroes 4; defined, in Aquinas 193, 194, in Bonaventure 193 terms: concrete and abstract, in Ockham 417-419 Tetragrammaton [YHWH]: in Alcuin 66, in Aquinas 62, 65-69, in Bede 66, in Gilson 69n, in Jerome 66, in Munk 68n, in Maimonides 66-69, in Philo 68n, in Wolfson 68n theology: in Aquinas 82, 478, 479, in Siger 171 Thomistic philosophy: modern revival of, 465, 466; role of Leo xm, Merrier 466, De Wulf 467-472; independent of Christian faith, in De Wulf 471; part of Thomistic theology in Gilson 477, 478; only existential philosophy, in Gilson 473, 373 TO rt fi elvai: meaning of, in Aristotle 6, 7, 11, 12, 187 TO ri eonv: meaning of, in Aristotle 13 Trinity: and formal distinction, in Ockham 414, 415; in Scotus 415 truth: meaning of, in Aquinas 46, 47, in Augustine 46, in Bonaventure 46; based
496
INDEX OF SUBJECTS
on esse, in Aquinas 46, 111; no created eternal truths, in Aquinas 57; contingent and necessary, in Aquinas 57,58; historicity and temporality of human truth, in Aquinas 57n, 112, 113; two ways of considering a truth: in itself and in a mind, in Aquinas 51-55; universal and necessary, in Aquinas 113, 114; Gilson and Smith on the making of truth l09n; see eternal truths unity: degrees of, in Scotus 220; opposed by Harclay 200; see science, unity of a universals: in Aquinas 51-53, in Harclay 215, 220-222, in Ockham 82, 83, 226, 410, 416, 417, 458, 459 univocity: of the concept of being, in Harclay 203-227, in Scotus 205-207, 214,217; of perfections common to God and creatures, in Meyronnes 342; belongs properly to words, not to concepts, in Ockham 226, 227; of divine names, opposed by Aquinas 210-213; of the concept of being, opposed by Henry of Ghent 213-
216, by Peter of Sutton 213-215; meaning of, in Algazel 209, in Aristotle and Averroes 209 verification of propositions: in Ockham 439, 442 versio: in Damascene 237, 238 via moderna: and Ockhamism 460 voluntarism: in Ockham 402n words: as signs, in Aristotle 425, in Aquinas 425, 426, in Boethius 425, in Ockham 423, 429, in Roger Bacon 426, in Scotus 426-428, in Siger 426n; of first and second imposition and first and second intention, in Ockham 429; debate over words as signs, in Roger Bacon 424, in Scotus 424, in Ockham 424 world: meaning of, in Aristotle 392, in Richard of Middleton 397, 398, in William of Auvergne 396, 397; two meanings of, in Ockham 392; has unity of nature in Aquinas 397, collective unity in Ockham 392n; see plural worlds
