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Beings and Their Attributes : The Teaching of the Basrian School of the Mutazila in the Classical Period Studies in Islamic Philosophy and Science Frank, Richard M. State University of New York Press 9780873953788 9780585077703 English Motazilites, Islam--Doctrines--History, Ontology. 1978 BP195.M6F73eb 181/.07 Motazilites, Islam--Doctrines--History, Ontology.
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Studies in Islamic Philosophy and Science Published under the auspices of the Society for the Study of Islamic Philosophy and Science Editorial Board George F. Hourani, State University of New York at Buffalo Muhsin Mahdi, Harvard University Parviz Morewedge, Baruch Cortege of City University of New York Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Ehsan Yar-Shater, Columbia University
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Beings and Their Attributes The Teaching of the Basrian School of the Mu`tazila in the Classical Period Richard MacDonough Frank State University of New York Press Albany, 1978
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Published by State University of New York Press Albany, New York 12246 Translation © 1978 State University of New York All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Frank, Richard M Beings and their attributes. (Studies in Islamic philosophy and science) Includes indexes. 1. Motazilites. 2. Islamic TheologyHistory. 3. Ontology. I. Title. II. Series. BP195.M6F73 181'.07 78-6957 ISBN o-87595-378-9
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To Jane
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Contents Acknowledgments
xi
Introduction
1
1. The Background and Evolution of the Concept of the Attributes
8
2. The Ontological Structure of the Living Composite: Some General Notions
39
3. The Attribute of the Essence
53
4. The Essential Attributes
58
Essential Attributes and Characteristics .
58
Similarity and Difference .
64
The Modes of the Actuality of Attributes .
66
Attributes Ascribed to the Gins * and to the Naw'
72
5. Attributes Grounded in the Presence of an Accident a) The 'akwaân b) Accidents that do not effect a state either of the substrate or of the totality
93 95 104
c) Accidents that effect a state of the composite whole as a totality but 106 have no determinant effect on the substrate as substrate . d) Accidents that necessitate a state of the total composite and also have 107 a determinant effect on the substrate as such Change 6. Attributes Determined by the Agent Who Causes the Existence of the Thing (bil-fâ `il) "Derived Predicates" (as-sifat* al-mutaqqa)
109 124 135
7. Attributes and Characteristics that are Grounded Neither in the "Essence," Nor in an Entitative Accident
148
Abbreviations
175
Index of Proper Names
179
Index of Technical Terms
181
Index of Citations of Kalâm Works
201
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Acknowledgments This little book was long a making. It had its beginning in an attempt to write a short exposition of what at the time I thought was a simple aspect of kalâm wherein certain basic differences between the Mu`tazila and the As `arites could be easily illustrated. The need to explain the contexts of a progression of different theses and their formulations, however, became ever more apparent as did, with it, the inadequacies of my own understanding of many of them. Further reading and reflection, the preparation of several brief papers and much talk gave sharper focus to my grasp of various elements of the system and its vocabulary; and after winters' dormancies renewed writing brought further revisions as the scope of the study changed and grew. The work is, I think, come now at length to such shape that those who wish to understand something of the Mu`tazilite kalâm may find it genuinely useful. I wish here to express my gratitude to those who contributed to the completion of the work: to the Catholic University of America, grants from whose Research Fund allowed me to take two summers off to devote to study and writing, to Dr. Leslie MacCoull, Mrs. C. Pace, and Mrs. M. Mirabelli who helped with the preparation of the manuscript and with the proofs and to my daughter who assisted in the preparation of the indices and, finally to all those too of my colleagues and kin who willy-nilly had often to listen as over and again I tried to work my talk about kalâm to some reasonable degree of clarity; "And bot thai wist what it mente Ellis me thoght it were alle schente."
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Introduction By way of introduction I wish to indicate briefly something of the scope and aim of this study and to make a few remarks on the perspective from which it was conceived. The work is offered as a kind of introduction to the kalâm, at least to one aspect of the kalâm, to the Mu'tazila of Basra in the classical period of its development and to its teaching concerning the "attributes" of beings: the essential and the accidental properties, characteristics, and qualities of entities and their being in general. The appreciations and judgments of the thought of the early and classical kalâm 1of its quality and historical significance as a speculative reflection, a formally theoretical discussion2 about the central problems of metaphysics and theology as these were construed and constructed by Muslim religious thinkers through the fifth century A.H. (the eleventh A.D.)have been as diverse as the sundry historical and theoretical points of departure, the preoccupations and the prejudices that have served to furnish their frameworks and to give them focus. The early rnutakallimûn, especially those of the Mu`tazila, have frequently been congratulated for introducing into Islam a certain number of "Greek ideas" and "Greek methods of reasoning and argumentation"; just as often their successors of the classical period have been chided for neglecting to pursue the acquisition of classical learning with the result, it is suggested, that the kalâm reached such perfection as it was to achieve only in the later period with the formal adoption of "Greek" logic and the systematic adaptation of certain other elements of ancient philosophy, mostly taken over from the falsafa. There can be no doubt concerning the validity, not to say the necessity, of reading the kalâm within and against the background of classical (and Patristic) thought. In a real and basic sense the fundamental questions are Greek, for the tradition of their explicit conception and formulation as theoretical questions is Greek in origin and the investigation and discussion of them cannot be utterly detached from their origin. The significance of the intellectual achievement of the kalâm as a theoretical science is to be assessed in terms of its insight into a number of questions that had previously been defined and elaborated in the Greek tradition,
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pagan and Christian. This tradition, moreover, variously represented in a number of diverse cultural, intellectual, and religious milieux, furnished significant elements in several layers of the kalâm's background and contributed to its formation, accordingly, on several levels. This fact, however, does not entail the conclusion, often drawn either explicitly or implicitly, that the more its vocabulary and formulation expressly subordinate themselves to and approximate those of the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic traditions, the greater must be its sophistication and maturity, as if the kalâm were no more than a kind of bastard half-brother to the falsafa. It does not, certainly, warrant the thesis that historically "the stammerings of the mutakallimîn" represented at best the beginnings of an intellectual development that would attain its adult perfection in the falsafa. Nor does it permit us to conclude that the kalâm of the early and classical periods was, so to speak, a sort of theological ugly toad that, by the kiss of a philosophical princess of unquestionably hellenistic lineage, was transformed into a more or less handsome prince, though one who remained always defensively apologetic because of his earlier condition. The reasons for the "hellenization" of the A`arite and Maturidite kalâm in the late period and for the ultimate demise of the Mu`tazilite school in Sunni Islam are extremely complex and involve the whole web of Islam's religious and intellectual development in that and in the preceding period. The assumptionto put it in its most extreme formthat the "Aristotelianized" kalâm of al-Gazzali * (d. 505/1111), aahrastâanî (d. 548/1153), Fakhr ad-Dîn ar-Râzî (d. 606/1210), and al-Gurgani* (d. 816/1413) followed through a kind of mutation as the natural intellectual maturity and perfection of that of the earlier period, while the kalâm of al-A`arî (d. 324/935) and al-Bâqillânî (d. 403/1013), abû Haim (d. 321/933), and `Abd al-Gabbar* (d. 415/1025) formed an intermediate stage of the processa sort of holding operationbetween the intellectual ferment of the early period and the introduction of the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic elements into the kalâm at the beginning of the twelfth century, must give rise to a number of serious questions. It is plain that the doctrines of Ibn Kullâb (d. ca. 240/854) and abû l-Hudhayl (d. ca 226/ 840), as represented in the schools that trace their origins to them, achieve a kind of maturity and perfection in the work of al-A`ari and abû Hâim respectively, for their successors over the next two centuries did little more than work out in various detail the implications of their thought.3 As the discourse on "the fundamental theses of religion," the kalâm addressed itself principally towas developed, studied, and transmitted withinthe same intellectual and religious circles as were grammar and law, exegesis and hadit*. Indeed, one of the most conspicuous aspects of the classical kalâm is its close relation to these sciences, especially grammar,
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philology, and law. The assumption (or conclusion) that the kalâm, as an Islamic religious science, was to emerge from its chrysalis into its mature perfectioninto a form, that is, in which it was to achieve an essentially more profound grasp of those basic issues with which it had been concerned from the outsetonly in the sixth/twelfth century requires that one believe that in the period of its greatest creativity Islam failed to generate a reflective discourse or speculative science commensurate with the other "Islamic sciences" and adequate to express fully the Sunni community's sense of its belief and to handle the philosophical and theological problems that such formulation engendered. This is not immediately plausible. From a purely methodological point of view we must begin with the assumptionperhaps subsequently to be modified or abandonedthat whatever their idiosyncrasies, the systems of kalâm that were predominant in the tenth and eleventh centuries were, in dealing with the problems with which they were primarily concerned, at least no less sophisticated than were those other characteristically Islamic disciplines to which they were most allied. Even though no little progress has been made in understanding the kalâm and its historymost particularly in recent years as more texts have come to light and been publishedone has yet, whenever he tries to articulate the sense and meaning of the texts, the continuing sensation of discomfiture, an awareness of having failed to penetrate the texts and to understand fully what they are saying: what they mean and how their statement, explanation, and argumentation of this meaning coherently articulate it and manifest its underlying foundation. This is not merely that we have not yet succeeded in elucidating all the various theses set forth and debated by the mutakallimîn together with their presuppositions, premises, and principles; the simple fact is that we have not yet managed to gain a satisfactory understanding of the language of the kalâm of the early and classical periods. Even for some of the most common and important terms, we lack a reasonably exact and nuanced comprehension of the formal meaning of its technical vocabulary. Too often, indeed, the language of the kalâm has been taken to lack the refinement and nuance of a serious philosophical discipline and its vocabulary has been treated as if it were or should have been, by design or by nature or both, imitative of the Greek philosophical vocabulary. The facts, however, are quite other. Albeit in a general way aware of the problems surrounding the formation of the formal languages of the several traditions of speculative science in Islam, of their diversity and their evolution, students of the kalâm (the present writer among them) have not always been duly sensitive to their implications. The Muslim scholar of the first four centuries of the hegira who wished
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to study falsafa had to learn a vocabulary whose specialized meanings and implicit sense and reflection of the way things are, originating in a differently articulated historical experience of life and the world, not only did not arise congenially out of native Arabic usage but were in many instances dissonant with it and awkwardly superimposed upon it. In time, with the full naturalization of the falsafa and the consequent spread of its vocabulary, this original awkwardness and dissonance came to be forgot. Such was far from the case, however, in the ninth and tenth centuries. By contrast, the language and conceptual structure of the kalâm, most particularly in the Basrian schools, is basically and essentially Arabic: the natural, unaffected, and integral product of Islam's original flowering. Unlike the falsafa, whose expression was for some time constricted and restrained by its dependence upon the translations and so, directly and indirectly, upon a language whose semantics and syntax were known only imperfectly if at all to the falâsifa, the kalâm formed itself from the beginning in the spontaneous exploitation of the inherent richness and flexibility of its native idiom. For this reason the vocabulary of the kalâm of the tenth and eleventh centuries is in many respects richer and more nuanced than is that of the falsafa. We now try to hear and understand the sense and meaning of these texts across a considerable chasm of time and through all the distortion and transformation that its long lapse and the complex evolution of scholarship entail in the contexts of understanding and their availability. Looking backwards to reconstruct these texts, we tend to get some elements turned around, since the natural and inalienable context of our activity is cast in its own structures and impregnated by the habits of schooling in other recovered contexts. Thus it is that the modern reader often tends to feel more at home and in easier converse with the frequently obscure and sometimes clumsy Arabic of al-Kindî than with the plain succinct speech of the earlier mutakallimin * and may, in fact, find the latter somewhat outlandish, while failing altogether to perceive the foreign tone of al-Fârâbî's usage. How often has the famous dialogue concerning ''logic" (al-mantiq*) between abu Bir Mattà ibn Yûnus, the translator of the organon, and abû Sa`îd as-Sîrâfî which took place in 320/ 932 been read without the reader's ever hearing the word mantiq* at all in its first and primary sense of "speaking aloud and dearly"?4 (Ibn Sikkît's Islah* al-mantiq*, after all, is a work not on logic but on the correct and proper usage of Arabic: "The Rectification of Speaking.") The source of our difficulty in trying to understand the kalâm texts of the early and classical Periods is, in brief, that in both language and conception they are essentially Muslim and Arabic. To understand the writings of the falâsifa of this period one must refer to another language
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and another intellectual tradition, some knowledge of which must, if not already possessed, be acquired; it is for this reason that one finds lists of terms and their definitions from the time of al-Kindî. In order to understand the kalâm, on the contrary, one needs only the native language and tradition of Arab Islam. For this very reason, however, the modern reader can find no key or clue to their vocabulary and conception outside the texts themselves and those other Muslim writings that belong to and form an integral part of their original context. There are no lists of definitions, nor do any of the terms have strict equivalents in the philosophical vocabulary of classical antiquity or in the theological vocabulary of the Greek Fathers. To seek to make such equivalences is not merely hazardous but, as has become plain enough, most often conducive to confusion. This is not to say that the kalâm contains no parallels with and no clear dependences upon the pagan and Christian traditions that preceded it, but rather that these dependences are chiefly to be sought on a deeper level. Most of the basic issues, though in a real sense (and for us unavoidably) "Greek," are nevertheless framed and conceived in an Islamic mode and must be so read. Finally, one cannot turn to the lexicon of law or of grammarnor, a fortiori, to that of literary Arabicin the expectation of finding the specialized and nuanced meanings of the terms as they occur in the separate schools of kalâm and, for each, in the different periods of its development. In the present study, then, the effort has been to recover, set forth, and explain some part of the basic sense and structure of the thought and expression of the kalâm out of the available texts and certain elements of their original context. I have chosen the teaching of abû Hâim and his followers because, with the publication since 1959 of a considerable body of the work of the Qadi * `Abd al-Gabbar* it is their teaching for which we have the most thorough documentation and so the best control. Their understanding and analysis of "the attributes of things and their characteristics" (sifatu* l-'ayâ'i wa-'ahkamuha*) was chosen for the obvious reason that this area of their thought forms at once the core and framework of the system; it constitutes, in the strict sense of the term, the metaphysics of the system and accordingly embodies and manifests most of the underlying principles and assumptions that give meaning, order, and coherence to the whole and to its various parts. The theological doctrine of the school I have not attempted to treat as such, though a number of theses concerning the being and attributes of God are perforce discussed. Because of the nature of the sources there is here some amount of reconstruction and a little new construction too. The texts consist largely of theological compendia, shorter and longer, complete and incomplete, and so do not systematically set out for its own sake the philosophical
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substructure of their various theses and arguments. 5 This must be recovered from the diverse evidences that are presented, sometimes plainly and directly but at others only by allusion, at greater length and less, in many disparate contexts. To understand the sense and order of this framework or substructure, to appropriate it to our own grasp, we must in some cases view the problems of the texts from a perspective that is not theirs and ask of them questions they do not explicitly formulate and may never have envisioned specifically. In all this, however, the texts themselves always act as a control; if our interpretation of any given element is really erroneous, the error will become apparent as we seek to apply it in interpretation of new contexts. In order to minimize distortions of the sense of the thought and reasoning of the texts I have sought, insofar as I have been able, to follow in the exposition the language and reasoning of the sources themselves. This has also been done in the hope that this study may serve as an introduction to the reading of the texts, to their language, style, and vocabulary. To this end, as well as to ground the validity of the analysis itself, it seemed appropriate to quote, translate, and cite many more passages than would be required were the study of the kahâm more advanced and to discuss some matters which might well be superfluous were its background and vocabulary more certainly known. The scope of the work is narrowly restricted to the teaching of abû Hâim and his followers in the Mu`tazilite school of Basra. Chapters 1 and 2 examine certain elements of the work of abû Hâim's direct predecessors in the Basrian school, but almost entirely as they form the background for the thought of abû Hâim. No attempt has been made to treat the earlier Mu`tazila as such and of itself and even less to deal with the teaching of al-A'ari and his background. These matters I hope to present in a subsequent study. Again, though I have tried to treat the school's conception of the "attributes" with reasonable thoroughness, setting forth all the principal theses in their various elements and parts as they are conceived, analysed, and discussed in the sources, a number of problems are alluded to only in passing or are avoided outright. Under each topic or heading, that is to say, I have on the whole discussed those questions which appeared most essential or which were unavoidable, employing and setting forth, where there were several, those examples that are treated most extensively and clearly in the texts themselves. The analysis of some individual problems are thus omitted as, in one respect or another redundant, of others for lack of sufficient material or because I simply did not understand them. In many points, no doubt, the present effort will have to be refined, revised, and corrected; of some of these I am aware even at this writing. Other things surely have slipped my notice. Restricted in scope as it is and incomplete though it be, the work
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will nevertheless, I hope, serve to put the study of the kalâm on a somewhat firmer foundation. Notes to the Introduction 1. The history of the kalâm may be divided into three rather clearly defined periods: 1) the early period, running from the beginning to about the end of the ninth Christian century; 2) the classical period, initiated in the work of al-A'ari, abû Hâim, al-Ka'bi, and al-Mâturîdî and ending towards the close of the eleventh century; and 3) the late period, characterised by the introduction of Greek logic and the assimilation of the vocabulary of the kalâm largely to that of the falsafa, begun in the work of al-Gazzali *. I have in what follows preferred on the whole to maintain the Arabic terms kalâm and falsafa rather than to "translate" them as "theology" and "philosophy" respectively, since the Arabic terms at least quite unambiguously denote clearly identified historical traditions in Islam, while the latter terms, being pregnant with connotations and overtones that flow from their historical origins in the classical and Christian traditions, inevitably give rise to ambivalences and questions when applied to the Islamic tradition. 2. Concerning the beginnings of the kalâm and the origin of its being termed "discourse" or, better, "discussion," see J. van Ess, "The Beginnings of Islamic Theology," in The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning edited by J. Murdoch and E. D. Sylla (Cambridge, 1975), PP. 87 ff. 3. The place of al-A'ari within the tradition that bears his name and most particularly the relationship of his teaching to that of his successors in the classical period are rather complex and, in the present state of kalâm studies, less clear to see than are those of abû Hâim to his successors within the Mu`tazilite tradition. The thought of al-A'arî was much less highly elaborated than was that of abû Hâim, and his foremost followers (al-Bâqillânî, Ibn Fûrak, and abû Ishaq* al-Isfarâ'înî) were consequently more divided in their interpretation and treatment of his doctrine than were those of abû Hâim in dealing with his. There is, it should be noted, a sense in which the later kalâm of al-Gazzali* and his successors plainly represents the final maturing of the kalâm. This is particularly true if one takes into account the question of the integration of the theology of the kalâm and of the "Islamic sciences" generally with the ancient sciences. This matter, however, lies outside the purview of the present study; it involves the convergent influence, within the religious and intellectual life of the Muslim community, of a complex set of historical factors, some of which were absent and others of which were of only marginal significance in the development of the classical kalâm. 4. On this dialogue generally, see M. Mahdi, "Language and Logic in Classical Islam" in Logic in Classical Islamic Culture, edited by G. yon Grünebaum, (Wiesbaden, 1970), pp. 51 ff. and the references there cited. 5. Of the principal texts here employed only the Tadkira* of Ibn Mattawayh and, though somewhat less systematically, the Masâ'il of abû Raîd set forth and treat the "philosophical" questions in their own order and for their own sake. All the others are theological compendia, preserved either in whole or in part. Of these, unfortunately, the first three parts of the Mugni* of `Abd al-Gabbar*, containing the Kitâb as-sifat*, where one might expect to find a number of important questions treated in goodly detail (it is explicitly referred to in later portions of the work) are not available. Some of this detail is to be found in the fragment of abu Raîd's Ziyâdât as-sarh* published by abu Rida but only in part and in a restricted number of problems.
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Chapter 1 The Background And Evolution Of The Concept Of The Attributes The predominant theological traditions of Sunnî Islam formulate and elaborate the primary issues and questions that concern the nature of God and of beings in general as problems concerning descriptive predicates and attributes: sifat *. Indeed the term sifa* or "attribute," as it is normally and often quite exactly rendered, is of so common occurrence in the sources and is so manifestly natural an expression to most contexts in which it occurs that the peculiarly Islamic character of the term and the concept may easily escape notice as one's attention is more forcibly drawn to other idiosyncrasies of the texts. One tends to forget that Greek and Latin have no equivalent term that holds a corresponding position of central importance and prominence in the Patristic and Scholastic traditions. The present study intends to examine the essential elements of the philosophy of the attributes as these were conceived and discussed by the leading thinkers of the Basrian School of the Mu`tazila in the classical period of its development. It is necessary, however, by way of introduction, to sketch briefly the development of the concept, i.e., how the "attributes" were formally conceived and understood. The perspective I shall here take is somewhat narrowlymyopically perhapsfocused on the role and function of certain grammatical concepts as these contributed to and, in significant measure, determined the way in which the masters of the Basrian Mu`tazila viewed and considered the attributes. Restricted as it is and though neglecting, for the moment, the matter and substance of most of the major questions that were treated under the rubric of the attributes, this perspective will, I hope, serve to elucidate, if not in part to explain, not only one of the main lines of the evolution of the Mu`tazilite tradition but also one central aspect of the progressive divergence between the teaching of the Mu`tazila and the A`arites. The beginnings of formal theology of Islam are obscure to say the
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least. The theological teachings of Gaylan * ad-Dimaqî (d. before 125/743) and those of Wasil* ibn `Ata* (d. 131/748) and `Amr ibn `Ubayd (d. 144/ 761)if, indeed, any theological doctrine in the formal sense can be ascribed to the latter twoare scarcely known at all. Gahm* ibn Safwan* (d. 128/745) seems to have tended towards some form of Neoplatonic or Neoplatonising doctrine, but from the present data one can tell little more. In the later part of the second/eighth century, however, theological thought in Islam enters upon a period of rapid growth as it gains greater sophistication as a theoretical discipline and begins to take shape as a distinct and separate science, until by the middle of the third/ninth century a number of more or less comprehensive and coherent "systems" have been formulated. It is in this period that the principal traditions of later Sunni theology are founded in the work of Bir ibn al-Mu`tamir (d. 210/825), abû l-Hudhayl al-`Allâf (d. ca. 226/841 in extreme old age), `Abdallâh ibn Sa`îd, known as Ibn Kullâb (d. 245/859), and the jurist theologian, Ahmad* ibn Hanbal* (d. 241/855). Their theological thought is somewhat rough and rudimentary, as it were, but the basic outlines of the future systems are nonetheless clearly established. Several factors concerning the background and general character of the theological schools that trace themselves to these men (and most particularly for the present study, the Basrian Mu`tazilite tradition that derives from abû l-Hudhayl and the A`arite tradition that descends from Ibn Kullâb) have particular significance not merely for the formulation and elaboration of the questions concerning the attributes but also for the historical predominance of these two schools during the classical period of Muslim speculative theology. It is almost impossible to exaggerate the importance of the Arabic language and of the Koran within Islamic culture and especially in its earlier periods. In no culture, perhaps, has speech and the eloquent use of language been so praised and admired or the language itself more cherished and studied. An eminent scholar has suggested that "Islam itself was a part of that miraculous linguistic process by which the Arab nation came into being."1 It is within this context that one should view the Koran as the revelation to the Arabs. It is the revelation of the divineGod's revelation of Himselfthrough language: "the discourse of God" (kalâm Allâh). Several hadiths* are reported to the effect that "the superiority of God's discourse over all other discourse is like God's own superiority over His creatures."2 Common Islamic dogma, founded in the Koran itself, has it that while the miracle of Mosesthe signs and wonders worked through him by God to confirm his missionhad the form and character of magic and that of Jesus the form and character of medicine and healing, that of Muhammad* was of language. The primal
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and essential signs and wonders (`âyât) through which God revealed Himself to the Arabian Prophet were not actions and deeds but are, for the Muslim, articulate discourse (kalâm): the verses (`âyât) of the Koran, revealed in "clear Arabic speech" (lisânun `arabîyun mubîn: 16.103, 26.195, 46.12) as a scripture for recitation in Arabic (qur'ânun `arabîyun: 12.2, 20.112, 39.28, 41.3, 42.7, 43.3). The science of grammar developed, thus, in response to a complex of preoccupations (and not, I think, so predominantly that of scriptural exegesis as some would appear to suggest) that, if not altogether unique to Islam, held, at any rate, a conspicuous and singularly significant position in the development and structure of Islamic culture. Fittingly, for it joins central elements of the ancient Arab culture with Islampoetry and the Korangrammar is the first science to reach maturity in Islam before the end of the second/eighth centuryand it does so, almost completely apart from earlier and alien traditions, as a peculiarly Islamic science. 3 This attention to language, most particularly to the language of the Koran and to the grammatical and lexical structures and the characteristics of literary Arabic, had a profound influence on the formation and development of the kalâm, most especially in the principal Mu`tazilite tradition of Basra and in that of the A`arites, not simply in their terminology but also in the manner in which many fundamental problems of ontology and ethicsconcerning, thus, God's Unity and His Justice (at-tawhid* wal-`adl)were conceived, formulated, and analysed. At exactly what point questions bearing specifically on the nature of God as such (as opposed to theological issues having a more "practical" i.e., legal or politicalsignificance, such as the nature of faith, who is a Muslim, predestination, etc.) began to be of central concern to Muslim theological speculation is somewhat uncertain. They are scarcely alluded to in al-Fiqh al-`akbar I, a short profession of faith (`aqîda) written by the jurist abû Hanifa* (d. 150/767) or in his little "catechism," the Kitâb al-`âlim wal-muta`allim. It is clear, anyhow, from the controversies involving the teaching of Dirar* ibn `Amr (ca. 110/728-200/815) that late in the century, in close conjunction with the debates over the nature of the Koran as the speech of God (and especially over the createdness of "the speech of God"), they had taken a position of major importance.4 The scripture and its exegesis were from the very beginning of central concern to Muslim theology. Questions relating to the nature of God were, for most of the principal authorities, commonly stated in terms of the "names" ('asmâ') and the "attributes" (sifat*) "by which He has described Himself" (wasafa* bihâ nafsahû), i.e., the nouns ('asmâ') and the adjectives (sifat*) that are used of God in the Koran. In the teaching of abû l-Hudhayl and in that of Ibn Kullâb the discussion and investigation
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of the attributes is, to some extent, carried on in the form of an analysis and interpretation of the predications made in such statements as `God is living' (Allâhu hayyun *), `God is knowing' (Allâhu `âlimun), 'God is creating (Greator)' (Allâhu haliqun*), and so forth. Though the whole panoply of terms that occur in the Koran was discussed, the reports make it plain that the central focus of the theologians clearly concentrated on several principal attributes: His being all-powerful (qâdir), knowing (`âlim) hearing and seeing (samî`un basir*), speaking (mutakallim), an entity (say'*'>), existent (mawgud*) and eternal (qadîm). (It should be noted that the last two do not occur in the Koran.) One reads, thus, from Ibn Kullâb: "The meaning of the statement 'God is knowing' is that an act of knowing belongs to him" or from abû lHudhayl: "When one states that the Creator is knowing, he has asserted the reality of an act of knowing that is God and has denied ignorance in God and has indicated [that there is] some object known [to Him] that has been or will be."5 This is not to imply that they were by any means simply concerned with semantics and exegesis. Their doctrines, as revealed in the sources, embrace closely related and rather elaborate, even if yet not fully refined, systems of physics and metaphysics on the basis of which their theologies of God's attributes and the attributes of beings in general are supported and to be understood. They begin the study of the attributes of thingsof God and His creationnevertheless with a conspicuously linguistic bias. Such a bias is peculiarly congenial to the cultural milieu. The science elaborated, to the extent that it is Islamic and theological, begins as also it must end by constructing, on whatever principles and with whatever presuppositions, an exegesis of God's statements about Himself and creation. To be sure, all speculative inquiry that means to account for the nature of things must begin in some kind of exegesis, in that understanding must be formulated in order to be critically examined. Aristotle asks what do we mean when we say of something that it an entity ( ) or when we say that something has come about "through nature" ( ); but in the kalâm (and the term itself is resonant in the context), the origin of the questioning which is at the root of the science itself is perforce more self-consciously and more explicitly exegetical because of its explicit relationship to a revelation whose linguistic nature is not merely a fact among facts, something given and to be taken for granted, but an overarching fact, the awareness which must influence the view and conception of all facts. For the dominant Basrian mutakallimîn the point of departure in the study of the attributes of things is what is said about things: how the nature of the being of things is presented and revealed in articulate language, both in the Arabic of the Koran and as the mind knows and
Page 12
formulates them in Arabic words and sentences. One seeks to explicate the assertion (al-'itbat *)what being is asserted implicitly or explicitly to have reality in beingthrough an analysis of the predicate, and the predicate terms (as-sifat*), therefore, are classified according to what is asserted to be (al-mutbat*) For abû l-Hudhayl and Ibn Kullâb, thus, the principal categories appear to be three as the proposition asserts the reality l) only of the thing itself (its "self": nafsuhû), 2) a cause (`illa) or determinant (ma`nà),6, or 3) an action (fi'l) performed by the subject. A rather rigid adherence to a form of analysis that was coordinated with and, in some significant degree, dependent upon, concepts and terminology developed by the grammarians produced several serious problems and difficulties for the mutakallimîn who were developing their doctrines along these lines. Statements, as they understand it, are statements about things ('ayâ') and the analysis of their meaning is accomplished through other statements, themselves statements about things. The tendency, therefore, since the significant meaning (fâ'ida) and the assertion ('itbat*) of a proposition is conveyed in the predicate, was to paraphrase the adjectives found in the predicates (and so to analyse the sense and meaning of the predicate terms: what is asserted to have reality: al-mutbat*) through nominal propositions whose subject terms are held to refer to entities of some kind. Ibn Kullab says that "the meaning of the statement `God is knowing' is that an act of knowing belongs to Him" (lahû `ilmun); that is to say, there is subsistent in Him (qâ'imun bihî)7 an act of knowing by virtue of which He is said to be knowing. Taking a doctrinally contrary position, abû l-Hudhayl, who would allow the validity of Ibn Kullâb's paraphrase in the case of a created knower, says that the sense of this proposition is that "there is an act of knowing that is God" and "there is an objecti.e., an entitythat He knows." Their use and understanding of this form of analysis had far-reaching effects on the philosophy of the schools that developed from their teaching. Among others it produced a tendency (later reduced and systematized) to proliferate a host of entitative "accidents" as different grounds (ma`ânî) were conceived to be asserted as constituting the ontological basis for each one of many predicates, negative as well as positive, that are predicated about various kinds of beings. This had originated, no doubt, in a simple process of reifying the qualities of things as they are indicated by the adjectives that are predicated of them. Just as one says that the statement "he is knowing" (`âlim) indicates the presence of an act of knowing (`ilm) that "he is living" (hayy*) indicates the presence in him of life (hayat*), that "a body is present'' (kâ'in) in a particular position in space indicates that it has spatial presence (kawn) in that location or position, or that "it is in motion" (mutaharrik*) indicates that it has move-
Page 13
ment (haraka *), so each such predicateeach such adjective or verbmay be paraphrased in terms of a noun which is taken to denote the reality of somethinga kind of entitative realitythat belongs to or inheres in the being of which the adjective or verb is predicated.8 This process is fixed already as a formalized principle in the teaching of abû l-Hudhayl and Ibn Kullâb and in their different conceptions of the kind of being denoted by these nouns is laid the foundations of the differences in the conception of the attributes that characterizes the doctrines of their respective followers. During the middle and later decades of the third/ninth century a number of abû l-Hudhayl's disciples, among them Hiâm al-Fuwati* and abû Ya`qûb as-Sahham*, the master of al-Gubba'i*, continued to pursue their investigations along much the same lines as had abû l-Hudhayl, with some revisions, innovations, and modifications of various degree and significance. With the work of abû `Alî Muhammad* ibn `Abd alWahhâb al-Gubba'i* (235/849-303/915), however, the first of "the Two Masters" of the Basrian Mu`tazila, the early period of the school's teaching reaches its climax. Al-Gubba'i* while following the basic tradition of the school as it had developed, introduced significant revisions and refinements into all the major areas of the theological system. Two correlated aspects of his teaching are most important for the subsequent development of the school's understanding of the attributes and for its continuing divergence from the tradition represented by Ibn Kullâb and later by the A`arites and many of the 'ahl al-hadith* who followed the tradition of Ibn Hanbal*. As opposed to the idea that the nature of language and the relationship of words to reality is in some way absolutewhether by nature or by God's having instituted human language so (tawqîfan)and that, therefore, in the givenness of language one is, as it were, given an absolute, articulate, and intelligible paradigm of all beingof creation in human speech and of the transcendent in the revelation, al-Gubba'i* insisted that words express simply what the mind grasps ('aqala) and that understanding (`aql) determines the use of words and judges its correctness and incorrectness. He is quoted as saying: When understanding indicates that the Creator is knowing, then we must call Him `knowing' (`âlim), even if He has not called Himself by this, since understanding indicates this meaning; and such is the case with all other names. The names of the Creator may not be applied to Him arbitrarily and apart from their established semantics (`alà t-talqîb)9
Accordingly, `Abd al-Qâhir al-Bagdadi* states, with a trifle of polemic, that "the Basrian Qadarîyaviz., al-Gubba'i* and his followerssay that the names of God (The Exalted) are taken from specialized, technical use
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and reasoning (al-istilahu * wal-qiyâs), not from God's revelation of language and the Koran."10 Al-Gubba'i's* doctrine here may do no more than make fully explicit a basic attitude and tendency already at work in the teaching of his predecessors in the Basrian Mu`tazila in the drift of their difference from the followers of Ibn Kullâb and Ibn Hanbal*. That it is thematically stated, however, is of great importance, because it is thereby raised to the level of a formal principle in accordance with which the doctrine of the school is to be explicitly guided and developed. The tendency to view the problem of the attributes in linguistic terms, however, is in no way diminished or abandoned; quite to the contrary, al-Gubba'i* is, if anything, even more consistentnot to say rigidin the way he employs the linguistic framework used by his predecessors. His principles, to judge from the available evidence, may be briefly stated as follows:11 for al-Gubba'i*, as for all the Basrians, knowing is not an intuition of simple essences or "forms" but is to know something about something; the act of knowing is, in his formulation, "the conviction that the thing is as it really is."12 To know something, then, is to recognize it or understand it as having certain attributes, certain essential or accidental qualities or characteristics, which it does in fact have. Language expresses (`abbara) and reflects what the mind knows, understands, or intends, and statements (i.e., formal statements) are statements about things (`ayâ), composed of a noun (ism, sc., a name) that signifies the thing that is known and a predicate (habar*) that indicates what is known about it.13 What is known, properly speaking, is a being: an entity ( in the Aristotelian sense); an entity (ay'), that is, is what is, in the truest sense, the object of our knowing (al-ma`lûm) and, therefore, that which may be referred to (madkur*) and of which something may be predicated (al-muhbaru* `anhû),14 It is that of which something is said but which is not itself said of something else. What is said about somethingwhat is known to be true of itis expressed in the descriptive term (as-sifa*) that is predicated of it.15 What is known about an entity (its being thus and so, its being such that...) is not itself an entity (ay'); it may, however, involve one or more entities. The systematic explanation of the ontological implications of the affirmation of the sifa* as it expresses a judgment of what is true concerning the subject is one of the central preoccupations of the Basrian kalâm. For al-Gubba'i*, then, the formal examination of the attributes is carried out, within the framework of the system's philosophical assumptions and judgments, in the analysis of the propositions in which the descriptive term (sifa*) is affirmed of the thing. Specifically the predicate (sifa*, wasf*) is paraphrased into a separate proposition so as to bring to explicit formula-
Page 15
tion what being (or beings) is (or are) asserted to have entitative reality, what is affirmed concerning it and how, and, finally, in what way the predicate with its paraphrased subject is related to the first and primary subject. The basic form of this paraphrasing follows, as we shall see, certain basic syntactical structures of the language as they are analysed by the grammarians. Al-Gubba'i *, however, employs this framework not in order to study the nature and structure of the Arabic language but of things and reality; accordingly, the principles on which his analysis is founded derive from his metaphysical preconceptions and his paraphrase and interpretation do not correspond in all ways to what one would find in the works of the grammarians.16 He says thus: The meaning of one's describing God as knowing (ma`nà l-wasfi* lil-lâhi bi-'annahû `âlimun) is a) the assertion of His reality ('itbatuhu*); b) that He is contrary to whatever cannot know; c) that he who says that He is ignorant states a false proposition; and d) an indication that there are things that He knows.
or, in another passage, "When we say `God is knowing,' we convey to you a knowledge of Him (`ilmun bihî) and that He is contrary to whatever cannot know...."17 Now in a further analysis, the predicate may be cast or paraphrased as a separate proposition having its own subject. Here again the grammatical patterns are clear. According to Sîbawayh (d. 177/793) the predicate of a nominal proposition must be something identical with the subject: ay'un huwa huwa.18 AI Mubarrad (d. 285/898) emends this (and also extends the formula to cover complex nominal sentences) to say that The predicate of a nominal subject must be something that is the subject in meaning (al-mubtada'u fî l-ma`nà), as for example, `Zayd is your brother' (Zaydun 'ahuka*) or `Zayd is standing' (Zaydun qâ'imun). The predicate, then, is the subject in meaning or else the predicate is other than the first term, in which case it contains an explicit reference to it. If it occurs in neither of these two modes, there is no sentence.19
The forms here parallel al-Gubba'i's* analysis of the propositions Allâhu `âlimun God is knowing) and Zaydun `âlimun (Zayd is knowing). In the initial positioning (ibtidâ') of Allâhu (nominative) as the subject for predication there is an implicit assertion ('itbat*) of His being as something known to the hearer, while the predicate `âlimun (knowing) expresses the "information conveyed" (al-fâ'ida, literally, "the benefit") or report (habar* or hadit*) concerning him20 and this al-Gubba'i* analyzes as "con-
Page 16
trary to whatever cannot know," etc. The predicate `âlimun, since God's knowing is an essential attribute, he takes to be equivalent to the subject; only the being denoted by the subject is asserted to have entitative reality and accordingly he will paraphrase the predicate only to the extent of making explicit the pronoun that the grammarians hold to be implicit (mudamman *, mudmar*) in the verbal adjective so used: Allâhu huwa `âlimun (God, He is knowing). It is thus that the predicate implicitly contains and so conveys "an assertion of His reality" (and thus "a knowledge of Him" in one sense); what is further conveyed, viz., the fâ'ida or "meaning" ("a knowledge of Him" in a second sense), then, al-Gubba'i* specifies through a semantic analysis: knowing is contrary to not-knowing and to ignorance and, since the proposition is true, the contrary proposition is false and also, since it is true, there must be at least one object that He knows. To know the truth of the proposition, then, is to know God (that He is: He could not be knowing if He were nonexistent) and to know something about Him. Now since the corporeal knower, according to al-Gubba'i* and the rest of the Basrians, knows by virtue of an entitative act of knowing (bi`ilmin), his analysis and paraphrase of the proposition Zaydun `âlimun (Zayd is knowing) differs from that of Allahu `âlimun. He does not, in this instance, paraphrase the predicate as the simple equivalent of the subject but rather through a complex form in which the predicate becomes, in al-Mubarrad's terms, something other than the subject, sc., a sentence having another entity as its subject and containing a reference to the first subject: Zaydun lahû `ilmun (Zayd, an act of knowing belongs to him). What is primarily asserted in the predicate in this case is not the reality of the being of the knower but that of the entitative act of knowing.21 To understand the meaning of the statement `Zayd is knowing' is, thus, not primarily to know the being of Zayd but rather to know that of the entitative act of knowing that belongs to him. It is on this basis, i.e., on the basis of a rigid interpretation of the principles and presuppositions underlying these analyses, that al-Gubba'i* rejects abû l-Hudhayl's formulation and paraphrase of the proposition `Allâhu `âlimun' which was cited earlier. To analyze the predicate `âlimun, when used of God, as lahû `ilmun (an act of knowing belongs to Him) is, if taken strictly, to assert that there is an entitative act of knowing belonging to God that can be known as such and distinguished from His essence. To qualify the paraphrase, as abû l-Hudhayl does, by adding that this act of knowing "is God" does not, from al-Gubba'i's* standpoint, solve the problem but only adds to the difficulty, since if one pursues the analysis consistently in treating the other essential predicates, he will have to say not merely that God is an act of knowing (something that abu l-Hudhayl, in fact, denied)
Page 17
but also that He is life (al-hayah *), and is the power of autonomous action (al-qudra), etc., and so that life, knowing, the power of autonomous action, etc., are identical in their identity with God. To do this, however, one will, within the principles of the system and the analysis, have to affirm that the entities denoted by these nouns are everywhere identical. Otherwise one will have to allow that what is really understood concerning God's being knowing and what one means, therefore, to say is not expressed strictly (fî l-haqiqa*) in this formulation. If, however, the expression is fundamentally metaphorical (magaz*), then it can be reduced to a strict, nonmetaphorical expression (haqiqa*). The reduction to a strict form is, indeed, necessary if we are to have a fully intelligible statement of what it is we understand concerning God's being and if what is understood and expressed in the formulation is to be examined and judged critically. It is as such a formally strict formulation that al-Gubba'i* sets his own paraphrase and analysis of Allâhu `âlimun in opposition to that of abû lHudhayl.22 In the example, al-Gubba'i's* question is basically what does it mean to say that God is knowing and what does it mean to say that Zayd is knowing and his reply is that for God to be knowing is that He be Himself-that the divine essence be itselfand that for Zayd to be knowing is that there exist in him a contingent act of knowing that is an entity other than and separable from him. Though explicating what being is asserted in each case implicitly or explicitly to have entitative reality, this method of analysis gives only a partial and inadequate answer to the question precisely because al-Gubba'i* remains always consistent with his principles. What we know can be formulated in a proposition of which the nominal subject refers to the entity that is the object of our knowing (al-ma`lûm), but since what is not an entity cannot be made the subject of a proposition, the attribute remains largely opaque, either kept at one remove in the predicate or paraphrased out altogether. Having taken a radical stance against the reification of attributes or qualities, he must return always and in every case to talking about essences and entities. In the case of God's being knowing, the predicate, in al-Gubba'i's* analysis, is taken to assert only the reality of the subject in its simple identity with itself. Al-Gubba'i* is unable to discuss ontologically the difference between being knowing and being as such and how, in the otherness that is indicated in the statements, they are one in God. In the case of the created (i.e., corporeal) knower, on the other hand, one has the contrary problem: Zayd is entitatively other than his act of knowing and the analysis tends to absolutize the dichotomy of being Zayd and being knowing and so affords no way of understanding how it is that it is Zayd who is knowing and how his being, as expressed in the proposition Zaydun `âlimun, is a
Page 18
being knowing. There is, in short, no way to talk about the attributes as such, i.e., as real qualifications of the being that one knows as being so qualified. Al-Gubba'i *> attempted to avoid this problem through explicating the fâ'ida (the meaning of ``âlim' etc.), but the kalâm and his own analysis focussed principally on the 'itbat*the referential assertion of being implicit in the predicate (wasf*, sifa*)and herein lay the difficulty. Since attributes cannot, within the conceptual framework of the system, be made the subject of a proposition, one is reduced to treating them simply as predications. That is to say, if an attribute is not an entity of which something can be said and therefore cannot be formally treated and discussed as somehow beingas having itself some kind of being and realityit can be validly reified as a linguistic entity. Quite simply put, ``âlimun' as sifa* ('knowing' as verbal adjective or qualifier) can become the subject of a proposition when taken as a linguistic entity; the attribute becomes a reality and is an entity in the strict sense as understood within the terms of the system, as it is objectified in the expression that signifies it in the verbal formulation of the mind's understanding of the thing in its being so qualified and distinguished. As a linguistic entity it can be formally discussed and analysed in terms of its semantic content, i.e., of the fâ'ida as opposed to the 'itbat*. Though the descriptive predicate (sifa*) thus understood does not refer to any entity strictly speaking, it does, nevertheless, as a word within the convention of the language and within the particular context of its use, reflect the mind's grasp of the thing (as mawsuf*) and so has a significance and meaning that is understood and can be critically examined.23 It is in this context that one can see why so great a part of al-Gubba'i's* teaching took the form of lexical and semantic analyses and that his work in this area became definitive for the later school. Of his works, in fact, it is the Kitâb al-'asmâ' was-sifat* (On the Names and Descriptive Predicates [that are said of God]) that the later masters of the school cite most frequently by title.24 How strictly he insisted on speaking not of attributes but only of predications is witnessed in the report of his pupil al-A'arî: [Al-Gubba'i*] held that the act of attributing is the attribute (al-wasfu* huwa s-sifa*) and that the naming is the name, i.e., the statement `God is knowing and endowed with autonomous power'. When one would say to him, "You say that knowing (al-'ilm) is an attribute," he would reply, "We do not [in speaking of God] affirm a knowing in the strict sense so as to be able to say that it is an attribute or not, nor do we affirm a knowing in the strict sense so as to be able to say that it is eternal or temporal or that it is God or is other than He." When one would say, "'the Eternal' is an attribute," he would say, "That is
Page 19 wrong, for the Eternal is the thing described (al-mawsuf *), while the attribute (sifa*) is our saying 'God' and our saying 'the Eternal'."25
Al-Gubba'i*, it is plain, was quite aware of the implications of the system's conceptual framework and exploited its possibilities with considerable insight. It had, however, certain serious limitations which were, within the overall context, particularly conspicuous. One paramount aim of the kalâm was to elaborate a speculative understanding of God's attributes and this, as well as other central concerns of the science, required a systematic theory and understanding of the attributes of being in general. The principles of the system, however, had been so structured and construed that one was virtually forced to treat the attributes formally as linguistic phenomena and no more. Further, al-Gubba'i's* notion of the nature of language and its relationship to human understanding excluded any retreat into a position where, mystifying language itself (and that of the Koran most especially), one might view the revelation as somehow the direct, and, even if only partial, undiluted embodiment and expression of the being of the divine speaker and creator articulating Himself in Arabic words and phrases and in meaning that is somehow prior to creation and to the human understanding of being and the use of language in human discourse so that God's being were preeminently manifested and revealed in language and His attributes as nouns and qualifiers ('âsmâ'un wa-sifat*) syntactically ordered in the divinely instituted reality of speech and the revelation. The aim of the Basrian masters of the Mu`tazila was, in short, to elaborate a rationally critical ontology and the evident need was to formulate a conception of the attributes as having some form and mode of being. Though recognizing that beings have reality and intelligibility only as qualified and distinguished by their attributes, al-Gubba'i* had, nevertheless, systematically backed himself into an ontological corner in which being was to be taken in only one sense, viz., that of the reality of essential entities as such. What was required, thus, was somehow from within the system itself to extend its conceptual base; one had formally to conceptualise the reality of the attributes as such and to distinguish the various ways of a being's being: its being itself (sc., its being the essential entity that it is in itself), its being existent, its being living, its being knowing, its being in motion, its being good, etc. It was to accomplish this that al-Gubba'i's* son, abû Hâim 'Abd as-Salâm ibn Muhammad* al-Gubba'i* (277/890-321/933) reformulated his conception of the attributes as conditions or states ('ahwal*, sg., hal*) of the being of the entity of which they are attributes. In order to do this he turned to the grammarians and grammatical theory. That the concept of
Page 20
the hal * and the term were introduced into the Basrian kalâm from grammar has long been recognized.26 The grammarians' understanding of the hal*, however, has not been examined specifically in terms of abû Hâim's formulation of it as an ontological concept and since this is clearly pertinent to the understanding of his adaptation of the notion and to the relation of the kalâm to the linguistic sciences, it will be useful to outline the matter here. The term hal* (situation, circumstance, state, moment) in grammar is used chiefly to denote the function of several nominal forms that occur in the accusative in a variety of situations only one of which need concern us here, viz., that involving a verb, expressed or implied, and an indefinite verbal adjective or participle. Such an adjective is taken to be governed by the verb and to specify or explicate the situation or state of the subject or object of the verb at the moment of the occurrence of the event signified by the verb. Thus, for example, alMubarrad says: When you say `ga'ani* Zaydun mâiyan (Zayd came to me walking), you do not intend that it be primarily understood that he was walking, but rather you state the proposition that his coming took place in this situation (hal*) and your statement does not indicate what was his situation (mâ huwa fîhî) before or after this moment (hal*). The hal*, thus, is that wherein the act is performed (al-maf'ûlu fîhî). You state simply that his coming occurred in the situation (hal*) of walking. It is the same with 'I passed Zayd laughing' and 'I met your brother riding'.27
The same phenomenon occurs not uncommonly with the verb kâna, yakûnu (to become, to come to be, to be, to exist), particularly when it is taken as having a predicate distinct from the hal* adjective, as for example in the sentence (Koran 19.29), "How shall we speak to one who is in the cradle, a child."28 In none of these cases, however, does one have to do with what is grammatically in any sense a simple predicate. Now abû Hâim and his followers consistently paraphrase the hal* (i.e., the attribute conceived as a "state"), when it must be formulated nominally, as the subject's being so; i.e., they take the predicate of the proposition 'Zaydun `âlimun', for example, to assert ('atbata*) and referentially to indicate (dalla 'alà) his being knowing (kawnuhû `âliman). We need, therefore, to examine how grammarians analyze the use of the verb kâna, yakûnu with a following accusative. According to the Kufan analysis, the verb kâna cannot be grammatically transitive; nor can the following accusative, therefore, be taken as its object, since in contrast to verbs that are truly transitive, the word in the accusative that follows kâna and "its sisters" as a predicate is re-
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stricted to the number and gender of the subject. Consequently they say that the accusative predicate following kâna must be an accusative of circumstance (hal *).29 The grammatical form of the sentence kâna Zaydun `âliman (Zayd was knowing) will, then, be "Zayd was, knowing." The notion conveyed in this analysis represents, essentially, abû Hâim's point of departure. The Kufan position, however, is unqualifiedthey will follow the same analysis when the predicate is definiteand the more commonly accepted Basrian account, which is somewhat more nuanced, would seem to shed more light on the background of abû Hâim's formulation of the hal* as an ontological concept. The verb kâna, yakûnu, according to the grammarians of the Basrian tradition, has a number of distinct uses, two of which are significant here. In the one it is said to be a "complete verb" (fi`lun tâamm) having the meaning "to come to be," or "to be," or "to exist." In this use, 'kâna Zaydun' is a complete sentence: Zayd was, i.e., he came to be or existed. In the other use it is said to be incomplete (naqisa*), i.e., it requires a compliment, viz., a predicate, in order that the sentence be complete and meaningful (mufîd). In this use, they say, it is grammatically transitive, governing the predicate as an accusative object. According to this view, the verb kâna, though effecting the grammatical form and structure of the sentence when thus introduced into a simple predicative proposition, does not alter or introduce anything new into the intentional relationship between the subject and the predicate as such. In the common doctrine of the Basrians, indeed, the kâna in such cases implies in and of itself no notion of "action'' or of "occurrence" (nor, though we translate it so, of "being"), but only of time, wherefore a few authorities would class it, when so used, not as a verb (fi'l) properly speaking, but as a particle (harfu* ma`nan).30 There are some instances, however, in which an apparent predicate must be interpreted as a hal* qualifier following "the complete kâna." To take a standard example, in the sentence ''Abdullâhi, 'ahsanu* mâ yakûnu qâiman' (literally: 'Abdâllah, the best he is [is] standing) the term qâ'iman (standing) is a quasi predicate but must strictly be understood as hal*. The Basrian grammarians state the implied form of the sentence as 'ahsanu* mâ yakûnu 'ida* kâna qâ'iman ("the best he is [is] when he is standing"); that is, the understood predicate of 'ahsanu* mâ yakûnu ("the best he is") is the temporal clause "when he is standing" and the accusative qâ'iman follows the implicit kâna. Sîbawayh further analyzes this saying that the implied sentence is 'ahsanu* 'ahwalihi* 'idâ kâna qâ'irnan ("The best of his states is when he is standing") and insists that the term 'standing' (qâ'iman) cannot be taken as a predicate to kâna but must be understood as hal* and the kâna, therefore, as "complete." The sense of
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the analysis and paraphrase, thus, must be rendered as "the best of his states is when he exists, standing," for, as abû Sa`îd as-Sîrâfî puts it in his commentary on the passage, "his states are not he." 31 The 'standing,' that is to say, is not simply the equivalent of the subject and so cannot be made definite as would be the case if it were a simple predication. One can, for example, alter Zaydun qâ'imun to Zayduni lqâ'imu ("Zayd is standing" to "Zayd is the one who is standing'') or kâna Zaydun qâ'iman to kâna Zayduni l-qâ'ima ("Zayd was standing" to "Zayd was the one who was standing") and also invert the order to give al-qâ'imu Zaydun ("the one who is standing is Zayd"), etc. As hal*, in short, it expresses the circumstance or situation of the occurrence that is expressed in the verb, in this instance, the state or situation of the is or was of Zayd or, if you will, the state or situation of Zayd in the is that is asserted in this proposition. In this way the otherness of the subject from the predicate and its sameness with it may be construed grammatically and so may be conceived and understood ontologically. One might be tempted to suggest that what abû Hâim did, in effect, was simply to insert an is into the Arabic form of simple predication. The situation is somewhat more subtle than this, however. Although not expressed in Arabic, the simple notion of "copula" ( or if you wish) is inherent and implied in the "nominal sentence." This is universally recognized by the grammarians; it is plain in the terminology: "the constructed" (al-mabnî, i.e., the predicate) and "that on which something is constructed" (al-mabnî 'alayhî, i.e., the subject), "the attributed" [or "the rested"] (al-musnad) and "that to which something is attributed" [or "that upon which something is rested"] (al-musnadu 'ilayhi), and it is more or less explicitly treated in the analysis of the governance of the inflections of the subject and the predicate terms.32 The problem of what is implied when one predicates something of something is, that is to say, equally present and pressing whether the language one employs has a copulative verb (or particle) or does not. What abû Hâim did was to consider and, against his father's analysis, to reexamine the sense of the assertion ('itbdt*) that is made in simple predications and to reinterpret some instances (not all) as conveying the sense ('afâda) of a state or qualification of the being of the subject, a state that may be expressed through a paraphrase that employs the verb kâna, yakûnu and grammatically understands the predicate, not as the simple equivalent of the subject but as hal*.33 Existence (wugud*), though secondarily implied in such cases (see later), is not directly expressed or primarily implied, since a thing's being existent (kawnuhû mawgudan*) is itself a state of being which is indicated in the proposition Zaydun mawgudun*. The later masters of the Basrian Mu`tazila continue to cite the gram-
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marians and lexicographers to the effect that the term sifa *, like wasf*, is properly and strictly used only to denote our utterance (qawlunâ), i.e., our describing (wasfuna*) a thing by descriptive term and 'Abd al-Gabbar*, for example, thus cites the grammarians to say that the sifa* is an adjectival expression used to qualify a noun.34 He notes, however, that despite this, i.e., despite what is most correct according to the 'ahl al-luga*, the mutakallimîn nonetheless commonly employ the word to designate "the states by which the object described is specifically qualified in its being, so that one says 'it is 'alà sifatin*, meaning that by virtue of which it is distinguished from something else."35 The thing (ay') or the "essence"/ thing-itself (dat*) of which the attribute is said to be an attribute is, as we have seen, most often defined as that which may be known (i.e., a true object of our knowing) and of which something may be predicated: al-ma'lûmu l-muhbaru* `anhû. This definition is essentially that of the grammarians and lexicographers, however, and the connotation of the term "as it is taken by the mutakallimîn is `that which is capable of being specifically qualified in its being by attributes (sifat*) by which it is distinguished from something else.'"36 That is to say, the contextual sense of the word as used in the kalâm, as opposed to its contextual sense in the linguistic sciences, involves the ontological implications of what it means to be ma'lûm, muhbar* 'anhû. The term sifa*, thus, is employed in the writings of the Basrian Mu`tazila in several distinct senses. They sometimes use it, as the grammarians do, simply to denote a qualification or predicate and so, in a broad sense, of whatever is said of something, whether merely as the verbal expression that one utters (al-'ibâra) or the meaning of the term (al-ma`nà). Used in this general sense, the sifa* may be any kind of predicate, including those that are not, strictly speaking, descriptive of the object but indicate, rather, relations or other states of affairs involving it, as for example, when one says of a thing that it is known (ma'lûm) or of an act that it is commanded (ma'mûr). Abû Hâim and his followers, however, use the term sifa*, as a formal, technical expression, most often and most strictly as the equivalent of hal* to denote the real ontological property or attribute of the being of a thing.37 In reinterpreting the attribute (sifa*) as a state (hal*), then, what abû Hâim understands is this: the statement 'Zaydun 'âlimun' asserts that Zayd is (thus an 'itbat*assertion of reality as in the citation of al-Gubba'i* earlier) and that his is, insofar as is stated in this proposition, is a being knowing. That he have an attribute (lahû sifatun*) is that he be qualified in his being by an attribute (that he be 'alà sifatin*), i.e., that he be in some state ('alà halin*). In opposition, then, to the position of al-Gubba'i*, according to which what is known and affirmed in the statement 'Zaydun '`àlimun' is the reality of the act of
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knowing that is the ground of his being knowing, the position of abû Hâim and his followers is that since it is true that he has a state (hal *) in his being knowing, the knowledge that he is knowing is a knowledge of the thing itself [i.e., the subject as] in this state rather than a knowledge of the act of knowing or of the thing-itself as abû 'Alî [al-Gubba'i*] says (i.e., that the knowledge of it is a knowledge of that by virtue of which the knower is knowing), for the latter is not correct in our view.38
Similarly, in dealing with the act of willing (al-'irâda), Ibn Mattawayh reports that abû Hâim refutes the position he cites from abû 'Alî, for since he [i.e., al-Gubba'i*] will not allow one to speak of states ('ahwal*) in any context, he makes the correlate of our knowing the act of willing. We have shown, however, that he has in his being willing (li-kawnihî murîdan) a state and the correlate is simply the thingitself as qualified by it (ad-datu* 'alayhâ) and not the act of willing itself.39
That is to say, the attribute and its ontological ground are here distinguished and the simple proposition "he is knowing" or "he is living" is taken to assert only the attribute, not the ground; we can recognize that the knower is knowing without knowing the ground of his being knowing and it is this simple and primary fact that is recognized and grasped ('uqila) prior to any question of how the knower's being knowing is related to his being as he is in himself that is stated in the proposition "he is knowing." Taken in this way, the statement "he is knowing" may be understood univocally of all knowers.40 Insofar as the ground of the knower's being knowing differs in the eternal and in the created knower, the attributes may be divided and categorized according to the ontological structure of the being of the knower in his being knowing, but our inquiry and understanding concerning these differences remain, nevertheless, posterior to and derivative of our grasp and understanding of the attribute as such, sc., of our knowledge that he is knowing.41 From the outline here sketched it becomes apparent that as the conception of the attribute underwent modification from abû l-Hudhayl to abû Hâim, so also the conception of the "accidents"the formal role of the "accident" and its position in the teaching of the schoolmanifested a parallel, though less radical, evolution as the overall conceptual framework of the system was altered and refined. As was noted on pp. 12 f. the accidents were originally taken to be "things," most probably through a simple reification of certain attributes, i.e., of the qualities attributed to things. Influential, if not primarily determinant, in reinforcing and sys-
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tematizing this conception was the influence of certain notions borrowed and adapted from the science of grammar, chiefly a) the idea of the primacy of the noun and that verbs and verbal adjectives (one should keep in mind that Arab grammarians conceived the verbal adjective more broadly than did Western tradition)sifat * in the broadest senseare derived from and rooted in the corresponding verbal nouns, and b) the identification of "thing" (entity) with whatever is "an object of knowing of which something can be predicated" (alma`lûmu l-muhbaru* `anhû). Though still somewhat unrefined and in certain respects awkwardly handled, the concept is firmly and formally established already in the teaching of abû 1-Hudhayl as also in that of Ibn Kullâb. In the following generation, as abû 1-Hudhayl's disciples and others in the Basrian Mu`tazila endeavored to perfect this metaphysics of atoms and accidents in discussing and elaborating the nature of the various "accidents" and their properties and characteristics, the conception of the accident as an entity and the distinction between the entitative character of the accident and the nonentitative character of the attribute became more sharply defined. Al-Gubba'i's* treatment of the accidents in the early stage of his career appears, in the few reports we have of it, to follow the pattern of abû l-Hudhayl's teaching rather closely. Subsequently, however, in conjunction with his elaboration of the principles we have outlined he began to introduce a more systematic order into the school's understanding of the "accidents." As he drew a radical distinction between entity and what is not, taking being in a narrow and univocal sense, the accidents fell definitively and unequivocally into the category of the former, while the attributes were formally conceived to have beingi.e., to become objects validly regarded as "things''only as linguistic entities. The accidents, that is, are strictly conceived as beings ('ayâ) whose properties are given, directly or indirectly, to the mind's understanding and may be critically examined in the analysis of the linguistic expressions that objectify this understanding. Again, as we have seen, al-Gubba'i* took the position that language does not, in and of itself, simply and immediately furnish a precise and unambiguous paradigm of reality, but only as it expresses the reflected judgment of understanding; and since beings are understood and distinguished only in their attributes, semantics becomes of paramount importance in the system. What the mind knows and recognizes in the examination of its object, it names and describes by appropriate terms, formally defined. No longer, then, is each of the sifatu* l-ma'ânî (i.e., each of the descriptive expressions which, according to the theoretical system, is understood to imply the reality of an entitative accident) taken to indicate the reality of a distinct and separate accident. The complex multitude of accidents recognised in the teaching of abû 1-Hudhayl and in that
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of al-Gubba'i * himself in an earlier period comes thus to be systematically reduced. For example, knowing (al-'ilm) is recognized as a form of conviction (i`tiqâd) and separation (al-iftirâq) and motion (al-haraka*) as forms of presence in space (al-kawn). When finally, with abû Hâim, the attribute comes to be conceived as an ontologically real perfection or attribute of the being that is qualified by it (al-mawsûf)note the shift in the sense of the passive) the primary focus of the system falls explicitly on the attributes as suchon being as given in its attributesand their grounds. The accidents, then, are viewed as the cause of the actuality of certain attributes, i.e., of those attributes that are classed as sifatu* l-ma`ânî (taking sifa* in abû Hâim's sense). As entities, however, the accidents have their own attributes and characteristics and these are identified, examined, and discussed both in themselves and in terms of the various attributes and characteristics which they effect (attara*) in their subjects. As the understanding of the attributes is progressively refined, the treatment of the accidents, grouped under four main types according to certain generic characteristics of their effects, is further systematised; a number of accidents coalesce, while others, as the attributes formerly associated with them are reclassified, are simply eliminated altogether. Some examples of this process we shall have occasion to examine in concrete detail in the following chapters. The strict dichotomy of entity and attribute is reflected in the basic technical vocabulary of the system. As the atoms and the separate accidents are considered true entities ('ayâ') or "essences"/things-themselves (dawat*), they may properly be said to be existent (mawguda*) or nonexistent (ma`dûma),42 but the attributes and states, in that they are not true entities but rather attributes and characteristics of entities, cannot be said to exist. One says of the existent rather that it is qualified by an attribute (is 'alà sifatin*) or by being in a state ('alà halin*) or has an attribute or state (lahû sifatun*, halun*) by which it is specifically qualified (muhtass*) and described (mawsuf*). Accordingly one may not use of the attributes, states, or characteristics any of the terms that refer to or imply existence; one does not say of them that they exist (wugida*) or that they come to be (hadata*), for the latter signifies "the becoming of existence" (tagaddudu* l-wugud*),43 nor that they endure (baqiya), since this signifies "the continuance of existence" (istimrâru lwugud*).44 Rather, one says of them that they have or come to have actuality (hasala*)45 or that they arise or ''become" (tagaddada*)46 and that they continue (istarnarra).47 Again, since it is the thing (ay') or "essence"/thing-itself (dat*) that strictly speaking is the object of our knowing and the subject of our predications, abû Hâim and his followers insist that the state is not itself known (ma`lûm), i.e., it is not properly speaking the object of our know-
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ing; "they are not, in our opinion, known separately and in themselves but it is the thing-itself rather that is known as being-so, the one being thus distinguished from the other." 48 If, however, the attribute or state is not, within the distinctions of the terminology, strictly speaking "known" (ma`luma), i.e., is not the object of our knowing, it is nevertheless intelligible and grasped by the mind (ma`qûla) in its distinguishing characteristics (ahkam*), for the thing (ay') or "essence" (dat*) which is the object of our knowing "is intelligible only through its attributes and characteristics."49 In sum, to know something, for the masters of the Basrian Mu`tazila, is to know something about it. Knowing is not the simple intuition of forms or essences but is an analytic knowing that is (may be) formulated in propositions. The thing or ''essence"/thing-itself is given to our knowing as being in some state (`alà halin*, sifatin*) by which it is known and distinguished through particular characteristics (ahkam*), and our descriptions of the object known by the given attribute expresses and conveys the state (yufîdu l-hal*) or characteristic,50 as our predication reflects the known (ma`lûm) as it is grasped by the mind (ma`qûl). The "essence"/thing-itself, as the object of our knowing, is known as having a certain attribute by which it is qualified (mawsuf*, thus, in two senses), and the attribute (sifa* and wasf*) is that which is known about itthat as being which it is known or as specifically qualified by which it is known to beand predicated of it. These attributes which are predicated of things as ontologically real attributes of their being are divided by abû Hâim and his followers in the Basrian school51 into several categories according to the source or ground that is to be assigned to the actuality of the particular attribute. The basic categories are five:52 1. The attribute of the Essence (sifatu* d-dat*), 2. The essential attributes, i.e., those attributes that a thing has by virtue of the way it is in itself (li-mâ huwa `alayhî fî datihi*) when it exists, 3. Those attributes that belong to it through the determinant effect of an entitative accident (li-ma`nà), 4. Those attributes that belong to it through the action of an agent (bil-fâ'il), and 5. Those attributes that belong to it neither by virtue of its essence as such nor by virtue of an entitative accident (lâ lid-dati* wa-lâ li-ma`nà).
Before systematically examining the several categories of attributes, however, it will be well to look briefly at the background of abû Hâim's thought from another perspective in order to locate in a general way
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several of the system's principal concepts and structures; this should help to establish the overall context for the problems treated under the separate categories of attributes. Notes to Chapter 1 1. S. D. Goiten, Studies in Islamic History and Institutions (Leiden, 1966), p. 7, q.v. 2. Fad1u * kalâmi liâhi 'alà sâ'iri l.kalâmi ka-fad1i* llâhi 'alâ halqihi*; reported in ad-Dârimî (d. 282/895), ar-Radd `alâ l-gahmiya*, edited by G. Vitestam (Lurid/Leiden, 1960), 74, 4 ff.; cf. also Concordances VI, 62. 3. Cf. H. Fleisch, "Esquisse d'un historique de la grammaire arabe," Arabica 4 (1957): 4 ff., where he notes (p. 6): "munis de ces concepts initiaux aristotéliciens, que la simple ambience a pu leur fournir, les grammariens arabes ont travail1é avec leur mentalité arabe; l'agencement en un système est arabe, si bien que l'on peut dire que, de toutes les sciences islamiques, la grammaire est peut-être celle qui a le moins subi d'influences extérieurs et eat restée la plus purement arabe.... La connaissance de sa méthode reste un des moyens les plus importants pour pénétrer et connaître la structure spirituelle de l'Islam." 4. Cf. J. van Ess, "Dirar* b. `Amr und die 'Cahmîya," der Islam 43 (1967): 241 ff. and 44 (1968): 1 ff., esp. §§ 4 ff. 5. Cf., e.g., for Ibn Kullâb, Maq, 169 and 546 and for abû l-Hudhayl, ibid., 165, 177, 188, and 484; see also J. van Ess, "Ibn Kullab* und die Mihna*," Oriens 18-19 (1967): 109 ff. and my "The Divine Attributes according to abû l-Hudhayl al-`Allâf," le Muséon 82 (1969): 451 ff. 6. When the matter is phrased in this way, the close parallelism in the use of these two terms in the early kalâm and in law becomes more apparent: one has to do with the explanation or "cause" (`illa) or "reason" (ma`nà) for the hukm*, i.e., for the judgment that the thing is so: the juridical qualification (law) or the "characteristic" or attribute (kalâm); concerning the sense and use of these words as technical terms in the kalâm, see Ch. 5, n. 3. I do not here, in listing these categories, mean to imply that these were the sole categories recognized for the attributes. 7. Cf., e.g., Maq, 169, 13 and 546, 9. Ibn Kullâb's explanation and qualification of these formulae we need not deal with here. Note, however, that in the case of the predicates ay' (entity) and mawgud* (existent) he says "He is existent not through an existing and is an entity not by virtue of a causal ground through which He is an entity" (Maq, 170, 1: 'innahû mawgudun* lâ bi-wugudin* wa-ay'un lâ bima`nan huwa lahû kâna ay'an); concerning the argument for this thesis, of. al-Mutahhar* al-Maqdisî, al-Bad' wat-ta'rih*, vol, 1, edited by M. Huart (Paris, 1899), 102 f. 8. The notion that the verbal forms ('amtila*) and (verbal) adjectives (sifat*) are derived from the noun for the event or act (ismu lhadat*, ismu l-fi'l) probably contributed to this. The concept that the conjugated forms of the verb and the verbal adjectives are derived from the nomina actionis, it should be noted however, is purely a grammatical concept and the Basrian grammarians, to whose doctrine this thesis belongs, were extremely meticulous in maintaining the grammatical integrity of their thought; their consideration of grammatical phenomena is almost nowhere contaminated or clouded by a confusion of the linguistic reality of nouns and verbs with the concrete reality of things and events. If there is any confusion or contamination, that is to say, it is on the part of the theologians. Explicit discussion of the difference of object and method
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in the kalâm and in grammar is not, at least insofar as I am aware, reported for the Mu'tazila prior to al'Gubba'i *, though the matter must have been discussed quite early. For the grammarians' distinctions between the nature of "rules" and "causes" ('ilal) in grammar and kalâm, cf. e.g., as-Zaggagi* (d. 337/948), al-'idah* 64-66 and particularly Ibn Ginnî (d. 392/1002), al-Hasd'is* (Cairo, 1347/1955) 1, 48 ff. and cp. Sarh* al-Kitâb 1, fol. 2rº, 3 ff.; note also as-Zaggagi's* discussion of the appropriateness of calling nouns "names" ('asmâ') and verbs "acts" ('af``âl), al-Idah*, 42-44. 9. Maq, 525, 4-6; cf. also M 5, 180, 6 ff. (which cannot be a verbatim citation because of the occurrence of the expression 'ahwal*; cf., e.g., the text cited n. 39); 1, 17, 6-12 (where read wagid* for wahid* in line 9 and yagidu* for yhd* in line 10). Note that the sense of the expression "the meaning" (al-ma'naà) in the passage cited by al-A`arî refers to what is meant (the mind's articulate grasp of the thing's being so) as opposed to the word or expression (al-'ibâra) (cf. Ch. 4, n. 5 and Ch. 7, n. 7). On the laqab, sc., the expression that has no semantic connection within the convention of the language to that of which it is used (e.g., most personal names), see Ch. 4, nn. 101 f., Ch. 6, n. 34, and Ch. 7, n. 20; and that one should not use alqâb of God, cf., e.g., M 5, 186 ff. and 198 ff. and Tad 67rº f. On the name Allâh, see Ch. 3, n. 2. 10. Usul* ad-dîn (Istanbul, 1346/1928), 115 f. Note also that although al-Bagdadi* does introduce the issue in this citation, al-Gubba'i's* position on the application of names to God is not intrinsically related to, and is, in fact, fully independent of, the thesis that the origin of language lies in humanly established convention (muwada'a*). This thesis seems first to have been introduced into Islam by Ibn ar-Râwandî (whose death is reported variously as having occurred in 245/859, 258/864, and 298/910; G. Vajda suggests that the earlier dates are more plausible, cf. his article in EI2, s.v.); (cf. P. Kraus in RSO 14 (1933), 127). Though Ibn ar-Râwandî is commonly reckoned as a Mu'tazilite, his teaching is in almost every aspect in violent opposition to that of the more prevalent authorities of the Mu'tazila. The position concerning the origin and nature of language held by abû l-Hudhayl and those of the Basrian School who generally follow his teaching up to the time of al-Gubba'i* is not reported directly in the sources I have examined. There is only the report that 'Abbâd b. Sulaymân (d. ca. 250/864), a disciple of Hiâm al-Fuwati*, held that the relation between nouns and the things they signify is absolute so that "to change the name would entail the change of the thing named into something else" (qalbu l-ismi yaqtadi* qalba l-musammà: Mas, 75rº; cf also as-Suyuti*, alMuzhir fî `ulûm al-luga* wa-'anwâ'ihâ, edited by M. Jad al-Mawla (Cairo, n.d.), 1, 17. These reports are fully consistent with the statement attributed to him in Tad, 68rº, 17 ff., but his rigidity in this question did not, evidently, restrain him from a rather blithesome attitude towards grammatical forms; cf. the report in M 7, 210). It is doubtful that anybody followed him in this rather preposterous notion and, for the Mu'tazila at least, abû Raî (Mss, 75rº) says without qualification that "our masters consider him an ignoramus for holding this." Concerning al-Gubba'i's* position Ibn Mattawayh reports that "he allowed (gawwaza*) that its origin may be by human convention (muwada'a*) or may be through divine guidance (tawqîfan), though what he says in his Tafsîr is that it is by divine guidance" (Tad, 71vº 10 f.). 'Abd al-Gabbar* states simply that he held the origin of language ('aslu* l-luga*) to be tawqîf (M 15, 105). This latter is the position of Ibn Kullâb and the A`arites as well as of abû l-Qâsim al-Ka'bî of the Bagdad* Mu'tazila, who holds that a word may not be altered from its established use and meaning save by revelation (ld yaguzu* l-'asmâ'i 'illâ bi-wahy*: Mas, 75rº; cf. also Tad, 71vº). The thesis that language must originate in human convention, though 'Abd al-Gabbar*, during a rather lengthy discussion of the question (M 5, 160 ff.), cites none of his predecessors,
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was clearly introduced into the common teaching of the Basrian Mu'tazila by abû Hâasim, as this proposition is attributed to him by abû Raîd (Mas, 73rº; cf. also as-Suyuti *. al-Muzhir 1, 17) and 'Abd al-Gabbar* reports his reasoning against the validity of the thesis of the tawqîf (M 15, 106, 1 ff.). The concerns that led abû Hâim adopt this position were, however, originally theological, arising from his conception of the requirements and prerequisites of the taklîf (moral or religious obligation involving punishment and reward). Since the doctrine of the human origin of language gained general acceptance in a significant element of the intellectual community thus only at a relatively late date and on the basis of theological rather than linguistic considerations, it becomes clear why the discussion of the problem occurs earlier in the theological texts than in the writings of the grammarians and philologians (cf. H. Loucel, "l'Origine du langage d'après les grammariens arabes,"Arabica 10 (1968): 188 ff.). The thesis of al-Gubba'i* with which we are here concerned requires ('Abbâd's position aside) in this regard no more than the assumption of the presence of commonly established usage. For a general discussion of the question of the origin of language, cf. M 5, 160 ff., Tad, 66vº ff.; Mas, 73rº ff.; Ibn Ginni*, al-Hasa'is*, 1, 40 ff. and esp. 44 ff.; as-Suyuti*, al-Muzhir l, 17 and M. Mahdi, "Language and Logic in Classical Islam" in Logic in Classical Islamic Culture, pp. 50-58 and the references there cited. 11. The following outline is based in some part on inference, since the sources are in-adequate to show the detail of al-Gubba'i's* thought. In that the primary aim of the present study is to investigate not the doctrine of al-Gubba'i* but that of his successors in the Basrian School, I shall not here argue the detail of this sketch of al-Gubba'i's* analysis; its conformity to the evidence of the sources and its general validity should, in any event, be reasonably evident to those who have a fair acquaintance with the texts and the problem. It should be remarked also that al-Gubba'i's* thought, as is plain from a number of reports, some of which will be cited in the chapters that follow, underwent considerable modification during the course of his career as he refined his teaching both in its general conception and in particular questions. The outline here offered does not attempt to sort out the chronology of his thought, however, but merely seeks to set out certain fundamental elements of his understanding of the attributes as these formed the point of departure for the innovations of abû Hâim. 12. l'tiqâdu -ay'i 'alà mâ huwa bihî; cf., e.g., Maq, 523, 14; M 12, 13, 17 f.; al-Bagdadi*, Usul* ad-Dîn, 4; âamil (ms), 237rº 4. 13. With this one may compare the statement of az-Zaggagi* (al-idah*, p. 42) that "We know that God (the Mighty, the Glorious) made speech in order that humans might express (yu'abbir) the thoughts that occur in their souls. People address one another concerning what is in their minds (dama'ir*) which cannot be made clear by pointing or by gesturing or by moving the eyebrows or by any device (hila*). Since this is obvious and unchallengeable, it is plain that the person addressed and the one who speaks and that about which something is said and that by means of which it is said are bodies and accidents whose names stand for them in the verbal expression concerning them (fî l-'ibârati 'anhâ What is said about a thing (al-habar*) is other than the statement made and other than that about which it is made (the latter two falling under the category of the noun)...."The notion that oral speech is one of several means of expressing the mind's thought and intention is common and held by the Basrian Mu'tazila (to some of whose teachings az-Zaggagi* adhered); cf., e.g., SU5 529, 17 ff. (and with the citation of abû Hâsim there given cp. Tad, 65vº 22 f.) and M 17, 12 (spoken language is "one of the means by which we can come to know another's intention": qasd*). Al-Gahiz* (d. 255/869) lists speech as one of the five means
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of expressing intention (al-Bayân wat-tabyîn, edited by A.M. Harun [Cairo 1367/1948], I, 76, 9 ff.); of the five, two are linguistic, viz., oral speech and writing, and three are nonverbal, viz., al-isara * (pointing or gesticulating, or the like), al-'aqd (reckoning and indicating sums with the fingers), and an-nusba* (setting up "an indicative situation": halun* dâ (Note that although the notion of God's erecting signsnasbu* l-'adillathat point to Him is frequent and common in the kalâm and is used by al-Gahiz* here [p. 81] as the example of an-nusba*, the concept of the "indicative situation" is much broader and is commonly employed by the grammarians to explain particularly instances of radical ellipsis where one of the major elements of a sentence is omitted, as, e.g., "if [the thing or event] has not been previously mentioned and there is no indicative situation, then the explicit expression ('izhar*) is altogether necessary": alMuqtadab* 3, 267.) The list of the five means of communicating meaning and intention probably originated amongst the grammarians and philologians by whom it continues to be used in later periods (cf., e.g., Ibn Fâris, as-Sahibi* fî fiqh al-luga*, edited by M. Chouémi (Beirut, 1383/1964), 190 and Ibn Ya'î 1, 19, 4 f.) but occurs also in other contexts where exegesis is involved (cf., e.g., al-Gassas*, Usul* al-fiqh, cited by N. Chehaby in The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning, edited by J. Murdoch and E. Sylla (Cambridge, 1975), 61. 14. Thus al-Gubba'i*: mâ summiya bihi -ay'u li-'annahû yurnkinu 'an yudkara* wa-yuhbara* 'anhû, fa-huwa musamman bi-dalika* qabla kawnihî, kal-qawli "ay'un", fa-'inna 'ahla l-lugati* sammaw bil-qawli "ay'un" kulla mâ 'amkanahum 'an yadkuruhu* wa-yuhbiru* 'anhû: Maq, 161, 8-11, following Sîbawayh (l, 7, 4: 'inna -aya yaqi'u 'alà kulli mâ 'uhbira* 'anhû). The term ay, thus, is most commonly defined as alma'lûmu l-muhbaru* 'anhû; cf., e.g., Maq, 519, 6f. (citing al-Gubba'i*); M 5, 251, 3 f.; Mas (B), 19, 12 f.; Tad, 11rº 3 f. and al-Bad' wat-ta'rih* 1, 37. Thus also az-Zaggag*, Mâ yansarif* wa-mâ lâ yansarif* (Cairo, 1971), 3: wa-yaqûlu fî kulli ma'lûrnin huwa ay'un (cp. also al-Gubba'i* in Maq, 522 f.); for citations of later grammarians, cf. N. Rescher, Studies in Arabic Philosophy (Pittsburgh, 1967), 70, n. 1. For the qualification of this definition by the later masters of the Basrian Mu'tazila, see pp. 23 f. and on the connotations of the term, n.b. Ch. 4, nn. 102 ff. 15. The word sifa* in this sense is plainly adapted from its use by the grammarians as M. Allard has suggested (le Problème des attributs divins dans la doctrine d'al-A'ari et ses premiers grands disciples [Beirut, 1965], 2 f.). It is the expression (al-qawl) employed in describing (wasafa*) something, i.e., in formulating the sentence in which the particular word is predicated of a subject noun which is taken to denote some concrete entity (ay'). Sometimes, however, it refers to the meaning of the descriptive term (al-rna'nà, thus, as opposed to the word or material utterance: al-'ibâra, al-lafz*) and so as signified by any of several expressions ('awsaf*, 'asmâ') that are held to be synonymous as said of a particular entity (e.g., 'qâdir'='qawî'="azîz' as said of God) (cf, e.g., Muh*,172, 3-12). For the relevant use of the term by the grammarians, cf., for example, Ibn Ya'î (l, 24) who says that predication (al-'isnâd; on the term see n. 32) is a wasf* and azZaggagi* (Idah*, 42, 11 ff.), in a discussion of the primacy of the noun, classes the verb as a qualifier (sifa*), i.e., as something that is said of a noun. Concerning the question of the primacy of the noun, cf. also ibid., 100 f., Sîibawayh 1, 6; Sarh* al-Kitâ l, 2rº f. and 67rº and Ibn Ya'î, 1.24. 16. Thus, for example, "in making a statement about the predicate" the grammarians will simply insert a particle and invert the proposition so that "God is knowing" or "Zayd is knowing" becomes "the one who is knowing/knows is God/Zayd" (al-`âlimu/al-ladi* ya'lamu Allâhu/Zaydun) (cf., e.g., al-Muqtadab* 3, 89 f.), whereas al-Gubba'is* procedure, since he wants to explicate the 'itbat* of the predicate as such,
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is to leave the first subject and paraphrase the predicate as predicate into a sentence. He cannot make the predicate definite or use it as the subject of a proposition because the sifa * would thus become mawsuf* the qualifier, that is, would become the qualified. That the predicate cannot be taken as the simple equivalent of the subject may be seen, from one perspective, as conducive to abû Hâim's interpretation of it as hal*; see pp. 21 f. 17. Maq, 524 and 167; n.b. also M 5, 205, cited n. 21 and see Ch. 4, n. 2. Al-Gubba'i's*, formulation here is to be compared with that of abû l-Hudhayl cited earlier. 18. Al-Kitâb 1, 287; "they are one thing": ibid., 22, 5. 19. Al-Muqtadab* 4, 127 f. In the present discussion we are not concerned with simple propositions in which the predicate is taken as a pure noun (ismun mahd*), i.e., with such forms as Zaydun 'ahuka*. It is worth noting that some authorities, viz., the Kufans and, of the Basrians, 'Alî b. Ïsà ar-Rummânî, who recorded the famous debate between abû Sa'îd as-Sîrâfî and abû Bir b. Yûnus concerning the value and validity of the Aristotelian logic as translated and taught, take 'ahuka* in the sentence Zaydun 'ahuka* not as a pure noun but as an adjectival expression indicating kinship (qirâba); cf., e.g., al-Insaf* § 7 (PP. 55 ff.) and Ibn Ya'î 1, 88. The Basrian grammarians on the whole, however, allow that it can be used as an adjectival qualifier denoting kinship (cf., e.g., Sîbawayh 1, 223) but insist that it is not to be taken so in the example cited. 20. Cf. generally Sîbawayh 1, 278 and 22; al-Muqtadab* 4, 126 ff.; al-Gumal*, 48 f.; Ibn Kaysân, al-Kitâb al-Muwaffaqî fî n-nahw*, edited by A. al-Fathi and H. T. Shalash in at-Mawrid 4/2, (1975), l08 f. and 113b; al-Insaf*, §5 (pp. 44 ff.); and Ibn Ya'î 1, 83 ff. That the fâ'ida in such propositions is identified with the predicate, cf., e.g., al-Muqtadab* 4, 126, 6 f. and 88, 4 f., and Ibn Ya'â 1, 87, 13-21. AlGubba'i* distinguishes the fâ'ida from the 'itbat*, the former being the meaning conveyed by the word and the latter the reference, i.e., the implicit or explicit reference of the predicate (sifa*) as such to some entity which is asserted to exist. 21. It is thus that al-Gubba'i* says that there is no implication of similarity (tabîh) between God and creatures in such predications "simply because what is asserted to have entitative reality (al-mutbat*) in our describing God as having the power of autonomous action ('annahû qâdirun) is His essence (datuhu*) whereas what is asserted in our describing Zayd as having the power of autonomous action is the qudra; since what is asserted differs in the two predications, no assertion of similarity is implied": M 5, 205, 11 ff. On this question, see also Ch. 4, n. 35 and also the citations of Ibn Mattawayh in nn. 38 ff. 22. Al-A'arî says that abû 1-Hudhayl took from Aristotle the thesis that God's act of knowing is He (Maq, 485, 7-10). Whether or not abû l-Hudhayl's doctrinehis formulation and his understanding of its meaninghas any genuine relationship to the source al-A`arî cites must remain a matter of speculation (see le Musèon 82/1969/454 ff.). One thing that is clear, however, is that al-A`arî senses that abû lHudhayl's formulation, if not his meaning (for 'Abd al-Gabbar* says that he and al-Gubba'i* were in essential agreement on what they meant to say) was incompatible with and alien in spirit to the more Islamic form and conception found in the teaching of his successors in the Basrian School. Leaving aside the nebulous question of abû l'Hudhayl's sources, one sees rather clearly in the evolution of the school's treatment of this issue from abû l'Hudhayl to al-Gubba'i* a development from a beginning in which the Basrian Mu'tazila were yet seeking to adapt some general concepts and formulae originating in older, non-Islamic intellectual milieux to the emergent patterns of Islamic thinking until a point at which all elements were fully assimilated into a consistent and integrated Muslim form.
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23. Cf. the statement of az-Zaggagi * translated in n. 13. 24. The work is cited a number of times in 'Abd al-Gabbar*, e.g., M 4, 166; 5, 233; 6/2, 61 and 81; 12, 138 and 512; 14, 42. The number of citations is significant in that the writings of al-Gubba'i* are seldom cited by title; only a few titles are recorded in the sources that I have examined and save for this one work none of them more than once or twice. For other examples of his concern with semantics, cf., e.g., Maq, 167 f., 522 ff., and 526 ff.; M 5, 179 ff.,188 f., and 204 ff. passim; 6/1, 33 and 40; 6/2, 56, 59, 318 ff. and 397 f.; 8, 232; et alibi passim. The strong linguistic bias of his thought is plain to see in many contexts that do not have directly to do with the interpretation of particular "names" and expressions that are applied to God but also in contexts involving a wide variety of questions. 25. Maq, 529 f; cf. also ibid., 357, 6-11. (Note that one has to do in this passage with two distinct senses of the word and sifa2*,=ma'nà as defined in Ch. 5, n. 3; the second is never employed by the Mu'tazila.) That the term al-qadîm (the eternal) is taken to denote God's essence as such, see Ch. 3, n. 2 and Ch. 4, n. 57 and for al-Gubba'i's* classification of the kinds of predications cf. Maq, 161 f. and 522 f. 26. Cf., e.g., L. Massignon, la Passion d'al-Hallaj* (Paris, 1922) 555 and L. Gardet, art. Hal* in El2. 27. Al-Muqtadab 4, 300; cf. also ibid., 166 f., 174, and 299 ff. and also 3, 261 and Sîbawayh 1, 241. It would seem clear that for the grammariansespecially those of the later periodthe term hal* has primarily the connotation of "moment" or "instant" (sc., of the occurrence of the event) rather than of "state" or "situation." Thus, for example, as-Strâfî, who also emphasizes that the hal* expression qualifies the subject or object, says (sarh* al-Kitâb 1, 131 vº f.): "The hal* is simply one of the qualifications ('awsaf*) of the agent
at the moment (waqt) of the occurrence of the action as in the statement 'Zayd stood up laughing', [i.e.,] his act occurred in the moment (hal*) in which he is qualified as laughing, and 'Zayd struck Hind standing', i.e., the act of striking occurred in the moment in which she is qualified as standing.'' Cf. also Ibn Ya'î 2, 55. 28. Cited by al-Anbârî, Asrâr al-'arabîya, edited by G. F. Saybold (Leiden, 1886), 55; cf. also Ibn Kathîr, Tafsîr, ad loc. and Ibn alGawzi*, Zâd al-Masîr 5 (Cairo, 1385/1965), 227. Al-Mubarrad (al-Muqtadab* 4, 117) and al-Baydawi* (Tafsîr, ad loc.) take the k
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31. Cf. Sîbawayh 1, 199 f. and as-Sîrîfî in the margins ibid., p. 200; al-Muqtadab * 3, 251 ff.; and Ibn Ya'â 1, 97. That the hal* term must be indefinite (nakira) and can not be definite, cf. also ibid. 2, 55 and 60. 32. See the references cited in n. 20 and, on the terminology, cf. M. Carter, "An Arab Grammarian of the Eighth Century," JAOS 93 (1973): 146 ff. Though the matter is clearest in the discussions of the governance of the inflections of the subject and predicate cited n. 20, as-Sîrâî's discussion of the terms al-musnad and al-musnad 'ilayhî is interesting and, since it is not available in print, is worth citing in part. He explains the sense of the technical expressions in terms of the meaning of the words as they occur in ordinary literary usage thus: "As for [Sîbawayh's] expression [in the chapter heading] 'the attributed and that to which something is attributed', this may be taken in four ways, the most fruitful and satisfying of which is this: the sense of 'the attributed' is the report and the account (al-haditu* wal-habaru*) and 'that to which something is attributed' is that concerning which something is reported. This may be in two ways, 1) a verb and its agent-subject, as when you say 'qâma Zaydun' (Zayd stood up) and 'yantaliqu* Zaydun' (Zayd will go away) and 2) noun and its predicate, as when you say 'Zaydun qâ'imun' (Zayd [is] standing) and `irma `Amran muntaliqun*' ('Amr [is] going away). The verb is a report concerning the agent-subject (fâ`il) and the predicate (habar*) is a report concerning the noun; 'the attributed' is the verb and is the predicate of the noun, while 'that to which something is attributed' is the agent-subject and is the noun of which the predication is made. 'The attributed' is simply the report and 'that to which something is attributed' is that of which something is reported, just as we say of the report in which something is reported of the Prophet (God's Prayer and Peace be upon him), 'this is a report attributed to the Apostle of God', the report being 'that which is attributed' and the Apostle of God being 'the one to whom something is attributed'. The second way: what is implied here is 'This is the chapter on What leans upon the thing (al-musnadu 'ilà -ay'i) and That upon which this thing leans' (al-musnadu dalika* -ay'u 'ilayhî) < being omitted from the first expression since it is sufficiently clear in the second. That is, in the case both of the noun and its predicate and of the verb and its agent-subject, each of them requires the other since it needs the other so as to be completed by it, just as when you say to one whom you address, 'My affair rests upon you ('amrî musnadun 'ilayka) alone', i.e., you are needed in it and it is you who will complete it. The third way: 'that which leans' is in all cases the second term in the order of presentation and 'that upon which something leans' is the first, so that when it is a case of a verb and an agent-subject, 'that which leans' is the agent-subject and 'that upon which something leans' is the verb and if it is a case of an initial noun (mubtada') and a predicate (habar*), 'that which leans' is the predicate and 'that upon which something leans' is the initial noun; the latter is analogous to 'that on which something is built', the 'built' being the second term, whether it be an agent-subject [reading fî'ilan for fi'lan] or a predicate. 'That on which something is built' since you presented it and made it a base ('asl*) for what follows without having mentioned anything previously. Then you present what follows and the latter requires what precedes it and so becomes a derivative of it (far'un 'alayhî) wherefore the second term is called 'the built' since it is the derivative and the first is called 'that on which something is built' since it is the base, just as derivative elements are built upon the foundations;" Sarh* al-Kitâb 1, 74rº ad Sîbawayh 1, 7. (Note that in citing "a report attributed to the Apostle of God" as-Sîrâfî does not mean to suggest that in the grammatical context he conceives the predicate to be made of the entity named by the "initial noun" but is giving only the semantic basis of the terminology as understood
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in the first sense, just as he takes the semantic origin of the terms musnad and musnad 'ilayhî in the second and third ways to be 'ashads in the sense of "to rest upon".) 33. That is to say, if the verb kîna, yakûnu is expressed in whatever form its sense must be interpreted, for it does not of itself indicate "being" or that the predicate is to be understood as a "state" of the being of the subject. In the technical language of the Basrian Mu'tazila one speaks commonly of a thing's "being nonexistent" (kawnuhû ma'dûman), for example, where no state or attribute of the being of the thing is understood, and abû Raîd will say that "the atom is an atom in the situation of its nonexistence" (al-gawharu * yakûnu gawharan* fî hali* 'adamihî: i.e., as a possible), inserting the yakûnu simply for emphasis (probably against the A'arites or Ibn 'Ayyâ; see later). It may be noted that except for the nominal form of expression, "a thing's being so and so'' (kawnuhþ . . . ), i.e., when a nominal form of expression is required or desired, the kâna is almost never expressed in the discussion of the attributes save where the presence of a verb is grammatically demanded in certain subordinate clauses. It is clear from the evidence that the concept of the hal* is not derived from Stoic as has been suggested by van der Bergh (Averroës' Tahafut al-Tahafut [Oxford, 1954], 2, 4 and 99). That al-Gugubbai* might not have so narrowly restricted the sense of being had the language had a copulative verb that were commonly used must remain a matter of speculation. 34. Cf., e.g., M 7, 117 and also Muh*, 173, 3 ff. and, for the position of al-Gubba'i*, Maq, 529 f., cited earlier. It is thus that 'Abd alGabbar* says that "one ought not to follow the philologians ('ahl al-luga*) in their usages of words before knowing what they mean in their usage" (M 5, 187). 35. M 7, 117, 18 f.: huwa mimmâ yuhtassu* bihi l-mawsufu* mina l-'ahwali* fa-yuqâlu 'innahâ 'alà wa-yurâdu bihî mî yufâriqu gayrahu* fîhî. Thus also Ibn Mattawayh (Tad, 69vº 21 f.) says that "included in what has the sense of 'predicate' are the expressions 'wasf*' and 'sifa*',' for they are predicates that refer to the object described's being as qualified by an attribute or characteristic (kawnu lmawsufi* 'alà sifatin* 'aw-hukmin*." Cf. also, e.g., the discussion in M 8, 74 f. I have rendered the term yuhtass* here and in the following note as "qualified in its being" in order to distinguish the sense from that of mawsuf*. 36. M 5, 252, ult. f.: dalika* bi-ta'ârufi l-mutakallimîna 'annahû mimmâ yasihhu* 'an yuhtassa* bi-sifatin*bihâ yabînu min gayrihi* (reading yabînu for tbyn); cf. also ibid., 205, 13-15, cited nn. 39 and 41. Note that precisely what is indicated here by the term ta'âruf is the contextual use of the kalâm (for the explanation of the meaning of the term, cf. M 15, 197). One distinguishes, thus, the notion of "thing" as entity (ay') from that of "thing" as anything whatsoever that may be signified by a noun; since the term ay' is taken thus quite strictly as a "being" (i.e. "entity"), the kalâm regularly employs the word 'amr to mean "thing" in the broadest sense, i.e., of whatever thing, construct, situation, or state of affairs may be indicated or referred to by a noun; cf., e.g., Muh*, 184, cited Ch. 4, n. 106; Mss, 165vº, cited Ch. 4, n. 91; Tad, 103rº, cited Ch. 4, n. 28; and ZS, 382, cited Ch. 7, n. 9, and M 6/1, 54, 17 f. The grammarians, in contrast to their general agreement concerning the verb, differ and dispute over the definition of the noun. Later writers, e.g., as-Sîrâfî (e.g., 1, 2vº 17 ff., cited in al-idah*, 49) and Ibn Ya'î (1, 22) employ the Aristotelian definition. The earlier grammarians, however, who are more contemporary with abû Hâim and his predecessors, view the question from a more formally grammatical perspective. As of interest to the context of the present discussion we may note that al-Ahfas* (Sa'îd b. Mas'ada, d. before 211/835) defines the noun, in effect, as anything that may be used as the agent subject of a verb (cf. al-Idah*, 49), while Lagda* (d. 311/923) defines it as
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anything that may be used as the agent-subject or as the object of a verb (cf. his K. an-Nahw * in al-Mawrid 3/3 [1974], 2222) as do az-Zaggagi* (al-idah*, 48; cf. ibid., 109) and Ibn Kaysân (al-Muwaffaqî, 106a); cf. also Ibn Fîris, 82 f. 37. The distinctions in the various senses of the word are generally clear enough in the individual contexts of their occurrence. Concerning the attribute as hal*, however, Gimaret (JA, 1970, 51 f.), though plainly aware of the problem, is misled by the polemical assertion of his A'arite sources and so concludes (following Allard) that "pour les Mu'tazilites, leur position de principe les amè à refuser toute réalité objective aux attributs." This may, in some sense, be true of al-Gubba'i* in the final period of his teaching. but is certainly false for abû Hâim and the later masters of the school. Concerning the most general sense of the term it may be noted that the expression wasf* is sometimes used in law to denote the circumstances of an action; cf. J. Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford, 1964), p. 121. Concerning the use of the terms, one should also note that "whatever conveys concerning the thing named the sense of what it is or of one of its attributes (mâ yufîdu fî l-musammà ginsan* 'aw-sifatan* min sifatihi*, this our Masters name 'sifa*.' They do not distinguish noun and qualifier as do the grammarians": M 5, 198, 6-8 (reading sifâtihî in line 6 for sifatin*). On the other hand, while they consider words that indicate what a thing is essentially, i.e., its gins* (e.g., black or atom: as-sawâd or al-gawhar*) to be descriptive of the thing and so to denote attributes, those which denote the more general class or domain (haw' or qabîl) to which the thing may be assigned (e.g., color, accident, entity) they understand as mere names ('alqâb), since the latter do not name the particular essence as such and do not signify an attribute by which the thing is specifically distinguished; on this and the terms gins*, naw', etc., See Ch. 4 and Ch. 7. 38. Tad, 186rº 14-16. 39. Ibid., 171rº 11-13; cf. also M 5, 205, 11-16, cited in note 21 and n. 50 and Ch. 6, nn. 55 and 56. 40. According to the Basrians the basic meaning of words must be univocal whenever they are used, whether of phenomenal (i.e., created) being or of the transcendent; these meaningsour understanding and use of thembelong to and are rooted in the experience of the world. To the basic meaning of a term, however, additional qualifying notes may be (must be) added in explicating what is meant and understood in a particular case; cf., e.g., M 4, 242 f., 5, 186, and the text cited Ch. 4, n. 33; see also Ch. 4, n. 5 concerning the haqd'iq*. 41. Cf., e.g., Muh* 188, 23 ff. (translated in Ch. 4, n. 5) and 193, 1 ff.; M 5, 205; SU5, 536 f. (cited Ch. 6, n. 56); et alibi. 42. Nonexistence (al-'adam) is strictly correlated to existence (al-wugud*), in that the nonexistent is simply the possible that is-not existent (laysa bi-mawgud*); cf., e.g., M 8, 74, 17 f. and on these terms generally my "al-Mawgud* wal-Ma'dûm" in Revue Philosophique forthcoming. 43. Cf, e.g., SU5, 110, 10. 44. Cf, e.g., Mas (B), 59, 5 and Mas, 86vº f. 45. Cf., e.g., M 4, 255 f. and 258, 11; 6/1, 9, 5 f. and 8, 76, 4 f.; ZS, 403 f.; Mss (B), 21, 3 f.; and infra passim, and cp. Muh*, 352, 24 f., where one speaks of husulu* l-hudut*. 46. Cf., e.g., M 6/1, 6, 9 (reading tagaddud* for thdd*); 4, 330 f.; 12, 77 f.; SU5, 110, 8 ff. and generally Actas do IV Congresso de Estudos Arabes e Islamicos (Leiden, 1971), 93 f. Hasala* and tagaddada* are nearly impossible to render into English without employing some expression that implies being and existence. That some objectively real attributes (sifat*) (i.e., objectively real as opposed to the "derived attributes" of action, which are mere denominations) are not said to be mutagaddida* but rather one says
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simply that the thing in its actuality is (or comes to be) qualified by them (hasala * 'alayhâ), see Ch. 6, nn. 1 and 38. 47. Cf., e.g., Muh* 187, 17 f.; SU5, 343, 11 f. (where read al-'adam for al-qidam); Mas (B), 61, 4 ff. and 65, 10 f. Note that the same terms may also be used of nonexistence (al-'adam) (e.g., M 11, 19, 2; SU5, 343; Mas, 52vº 5 ff. and, for the A'arite usage, e.g., Sarh* alIrâd, 130vº 9 ff) even though nonexistence, unlike existence, is not a state. Of the nonreality or absence of states and of their ceasing to be actual one uses generally intifâ' or zawâl (cf. my "al-Mawgud* wal-Ma 'dûm.") 48. SU5, 184, 10 ff.: 'innahd 'indand gayru* ma'lûmatin bi-nfirâdihâ wa-'innamâ d-datu* 'alayhâ tu'lamu fa-fâraqa 'ahaduhuma* Cf. also ibid., 366, 8 ff. (translated in the following note), where abû Hâim is cited and also a-ahrastânî, K. al-Milal wan-nihal*, edited by M. Badran (Cairo, 1910/1327-1955/1375) 1, 122 and nn. 38 f. as well as later. 49. M 7, 110, 2 f.: 'innamâ yu'qalu -ay'u bi-sifatihi* wa-'ahkamihi*; n.b. also SU5, 108, 9 ff. For examples of the description of the attributes, states, and characteristics as ma'qûla, cf., e.g., M 4, 253, 9 ff.; 8, 20, 13 ('inna 'ahwala* l-gumlati* ma'qûla) ZS, 407, 16 (cited in Ch. 4, n. 66) and various texts cited later. The state may be grasped in immediate intuition; Ibn Mattawayh says it is clear that one is who is desiring (al-muûtahû) has in his being desiring a state, for this is recognised "through the distinction that one of us experiences (yagidu*) between his perceiving something when he desires it and his perceiving it when he does not desire it or when he shrinks from it; what is involved here can only be a state" (Tad, 134rº 3-5). This is not to say that abû Hâim and his followers held that the attribute or state can be grasped by itself and in isolation (bi-mugarradihd*, bi-nfirîdihâ), for "he did not affirm that the state is grasped by the mind separately, in isolation; he held simply that the thing-itself as qualified by the state (ad-datu* 'alà l-hal*) is grasped by the mind. Indeed, there is no speaker of any language who does not employ in normal use a name for the thing qualified (al-mawsuf*) and a name for the attribute (assifa*) and distinguish between the two in linguistic expression" (SU5, 366, 9 if.; cf. also ibid., 184, cited in n. 48). 50. Cf., e.g., M 5, 205, 13-15 (the citation of al-Gubba'i* ends at line 13) and also the citation of al-Gubba'i*, ibid., 180, 6 f. 51. These are chiefly, for the purposes of the present study, 'Abd al-Gabbar* and his disciples abû Raûîd and Ibn Mattawayh. Since there is no statement to the contrary in the sources that I have examined (including the Ziyâdât a-arh. of abû Raîd and that of abû Talib* anNatiq* bil-Haqq*) it would appear most likely that abû 'All Ibn Hallad* followed the doctrine of abû Hâim, if not in its every detail, at least in its principal features. It is clear that abû 'Abdallâh and abû Ishaq* b. 'Ayyâ, on the other hand, though allowing the basic thesis of the attributes and states and while following abû Hâim generally, attempted to modify his teaching in several significant respects (see later); their specific departures from the doctrines of abû Hâim, however, though some were adopted by 'Abd al-Gabbar* and his disciples, were in large part rejected by the later authorities of the school. 52. On the various expressions used to denote the several categories see later. Because of the specific requirements and perspectives of individual contexts, complete listings of the five (e.g., in Mas (B), 4, 7 ff.) are not common in the texts; more or less complete lists, however, are of fairly frequent occurrence: e.g., M 4, 250, 14-16; ZS, 489, 12-15 (where read tabita* for taniya* in line 12; cp. p. 492, 1); Tad, 79vº 10 ff.; Muh*, 107, 23 if. and 172, 2 ff (lacking no. 4: bil-fâ'il); SU5, 107, 11 f. (lacking nos. 2 and 5); the first and second are not distinguished in Muh*, 189, 6 ff. but the distinction is made abundantly clear in a number of passages, e.g., SU5, 93, 6; Muh*, 206 f.;
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ZS, 410, 18 f. and 413, 9; Tad, 50rº 8 ff. and the references below; ZS, 371, 12 ff. lacks nos. 1 and 5. In a few passages, again, involving at-taqsîm was-sabr (on which see J. van Ess, die Erkenntnislehre des `Adudaddin * al-îcî [Wiesbaden, 1966], index and "The Logical Structure of Islamic Theology" in Logic in Classical Islamic Culture, pp. 40 f. and L. Gardet and G. Anawati, Introduction à la théologie musulmane [Paris, 1948], 365) more elaborate lists are suggested (e.g., ZS, 65 ff. and Mas (B), 13, 2 ff., where read li'adami rna'nan for li-'adamihî 'alà wagh*; cp. ibid., line 15 and ZS, 65, lo), but the alternatives given in such passages are reducible to the five here given as the only plausible grounds for the actuality of an attribute. Al-Guwayni* gives a list (a-âmil, 309 f.) attributed to "the foremost authorities of the Mu'tazila", according to which the sifat* fall into four basic categories: 1) as-sifatu* l-lâzirnatu lin-nafs; 2) sifatu* l-ma'nà; 3). sifatun* tatbutu* bil-fâ'il; and 4) as-sifatu* t-tâbi'atu lilhudut* though he notes elsewhere (ibid., 292, 14) that al-Gubba'i* recognized a category ld lin-nafs wa-ld li-ma'nà. Al-Guwayni's* listing and his description of the attributes that fall under the several categories he gives reflect his own preoccupations, however, and only in a most ambiguous way correspond to what is found in the Mu'tazilite texts.
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Chapter 2 The Ontological Structure Of The Living Composite: Some General Notions Several sources 1 would seem to suggest that abû Hâim formulated the conception of attributes as states chiefly, if not exclusively, in terms of, or in order to deal with, the problems involved in the apparent unity of living beings and of the predicates we make of them as wholes or totalities (gumal*). This is not true, even though the situation of the living composite may at times be used as an argument for the validity of the concept.2 Nonetheless it will be convenient to begin by giving a superficial outline of a part of the question as it involves corporeal living beings and man in particular, in that a concrete example may serve to bring out several of the main concepts, issues, and problems in the evolution of the school's understanding of the attributes. Following this we shall proceed to a more systematic examination of the five principal categories of attributes and their situation within the overall system. Within what one may term the primary Basrian tradition, i.e., that common ground from which derive the shared elements both of the Mu`tazilite tradition that follows from "the Two Masters", abû `Alî al-Gubbai* and abû Hâim, and of the A`arite tradition, all that exists, that has being or existence (wugud* as an entity or thing-itself (dat*, ay') other than God is created and corporeal. Created being is divided into two fundamental categories: the atoms (gawahir*) and the accidents ('a`rad*) that inhere in them.3 These two, distinguished ontologically by the mode of their existence (al-kayfîyatu fî l-wugud*), viz., that the former occpuies space (tahayyaza*) and that the latter does not,4 are the primary entities ( ), in the proper Aristotelian sense of the term. It is they that in the strictest sense are said to exist and to have being and it is they which are most truly said to be "essences"/things-themselves (dawat*, 'ayâa'): things
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that are the subject of predications (muhbarun * `anhâ) but are not themselves said of anything else. Bodies ontologically are composites made up of the atoms that form their ultimate indivisible parts ('agza*') and which individually and separately form the substrates (mahall*) of the inherent accidents. Though in the continuous contiguity (ittisal*) its parts and the absence of separation or discontinuity (faqdu lfasl*) a material body may be said to have a quasi unity, i.e., it has in some sense the character of a single thing (is fî hukmi* -ay'i lwahid*)5 and as such may be the subject of predications, it remains essentially a conglomerate. Animate beings, however, i.e., those that are living and sentient, and most especially humans, though clearly composite in several respects, nevertheless present themselves in some peculiar and characteristic way as single and unitary beings. We speak of them as wholes or totalities (gumal*) when we say that this man is knowing (`âlim) or acts (is fâ'il), not as one predicates motion of an inanimate body (gamad*, mayyit), whose parts move simultaneously in an accidental integration of the continuity of its parts with one another, but as a single being.6 The earlier forerunners of what was to become the classical tradition of the Basrian Mu`tazila could not adequately describe or account for this apparent oneness of the living being that is given to our immediate grasp. How can one say that the one who is knowing is thereby distinguished (fâraqa, iftaraqa, bâna, tamayyaza) from one who is not knowing, when the corporeal individual (sahs*) consists simply of an accidental conglomeration of parts (agza*' = atoms) in only some of which (viz., a single organ: the heart or, indeed, in only one or a few of its constituent atoms) inheres the entitative accident of the act of knowing ('ilm)? Insofar as the composite substrate that forms the whole (sc., that forms the body: gism* or sahs*) remains in reality a composite of ontologically discrete elements and the act of knowing is a distinct entity belonging only to those parts or atoms in which it inheres (halla*) as its substrate of inherence (mahall*), they alone should properly be described as knowing or, more strictly, as "having an act of knowing." From the beginning the Basrian tradition of the Mu`tazila did, in fact, affirm that the human person is a kind of unity. We are told that abû 1-Hudhayl asserted that "one does not say that the several parts of the body act (are fâ'il) individually and separately, nor that the individual part acts together with the others, but rather that the agent is these parts," i.e., all the parts that make up the corporeal person.7 Such a unity, however, is tenuous, for though the assertion recognizes the experienced unity of the human agent as such, the analysis in terms of atoms and entitative accidents as carried out within the conceptual framework described in the
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previous chapter does not account for this unity but, on the contrary, tends to deny it. One aspect of the school's evolution towards the classical solution to this problem in the teaching of abû Hâim may be traced in terms of the definition of man and the role assigned to the accident of life (al-hayat *). In defining "man" (al-'insan*) the Basrian School tend in most instances to follow the model of the lexicographers ('ahl al-luga*) whose aim is to define the precise sense (fâ'ida) and use of the expression in ordinary classical Arabic (al-luga*), i.e., formally to delimit and specify that to which we refer when we use the word.8 Thus abû 1-Hudhayl is reported to have defined man as "this manifest and visible corporeal being that has hands and feet"9 and also, by one account, "that eats and drinks.'' 10 Essentially the same definition continues in use as the masters of the school say that 'man' is defined as "this corporeal being that is structured according to a particular structure by which it is distinguished from all other animals and to which are directed praise and blame."11 Exactly what parts or elements of the body enter into the definition and are essential to the constitution of a living body and its specific identity as a man were long debated,12 but the basic formulation remains the same. The school's understanding of the nature of man, i.e., of what it is to be human, is not given in this definition, however, for it is simply a lexical definition. Thus Ibn Mattawayh says: In the expression 'man' we refer to this composite whole that is structured according to a particular structure. There is, however, some disagreement concerning its being called 'man,' i.e., as to whether this is simply because of the fact of the structure (binya) or whether it is so called, given its being specifically characterized by this structure, only when there are present flesh, dampness, and life. It has been stated by abû 'Alî [al-Gubba'i*] that it is called by this name by virtue of the particular structure alone, but abû Hâim says that it is not named in virtue of the structure except when it is characterised by these other things and this is also the position of abu 'Alî in the Kitâb al-Insîn. The first [position] is reported of him by abû Hâim, but the latter is better since, of an inanimate body, when it has the shape of a man, one says that it has this shape, not that it is a man in the strict sense.... This is a discussion not of meaning but of a name and expression and, since this is so, what we have to say concerning man is that it is this immediately experienced composite whole that one points to and which is structured according to this particular structure. In its
Page 42 definition we refer to nothing more than the designation of the object ('iâra: i.e., to point to it) since this is clearer than the expression ('ibâra). 13
Having, then, isolated and indicated the object referred to, one must go on to an analysis that will reveal the object's specific nature and characteristics. Central among these is life: the living's being living, i.e., what is meant by the expression 'to be living' and what it is we call 'life.' Abû l-Hudhayl is uncertain as to whether life is an accident or a body,14 i.e., as to whether what is referred to when one speaks of "life" (al-hayat*) is an entitative accident ('arad*, ma`nà) or some material, or ganic component of the living body: some set of parts or atoms in which inhere a particular accident or a set of accidents having which they play a particular role in the living body and are accordingly called "life." However he understood it (the data available are insufficient to show how he treated the question), it is clear enough that the system does not furnish an adequate conceptual basis by which to describe the ontological unity of the living being as such. With al-Gubba'i*, however, we see a position that explicitly associates life with the unity of the living as such. Life, held to be an accident,15 he apparently takes as a principle or ground that gives wholeness or oneness to the living body. He continues to define man as the body that has a certain configuration but insists that only the living parts are essential to the identity of the human person,16 and explicitly notes that this is an addition to the definition given by the lexicographers, who are not concerned with certain factors considered important in kalâm, such as the close identification of what is included and what excluded from the term.17 So strongly does al-Gubba'i* adhere to the notion of the unity of the living that he will say that "the meaning of the statement '[God] is living' is to assert that He is one."18 Attributes, thus, that are predicated as affirming the existence in the subject of those accidents such as knowing, willing, etc., which require the presence of life in the substrate, because they require it, he will attribute to the living whole and not simply to the part. The unity of the living body, however, remains a problem, for although the predicate 'living' (hayy*) may be made of the body as a wholeand even if, as is probable, he interpreted it as meaning that the living body is in some sense a unitythe predication, nevertheless, primarily asserts, in alGubba'i's* analysis, only the presence of the accident of life, i.e., the existence of the plurality of its units, inherent in each of the separate entitative parts that together constitute the whole. Similarly the predicate 'knowing' ('âlim), though said of the whole, asserts primarily no more than the presence of the accident of knowing ('ilm) in some part of the whole.
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The problem, as we have seen, was chiefly one of expanding the conceptual framework of the analysis of the attributes and this abû Hâim achieved by introducing the notion of the "state" (hal *). In interpreting the attributes as states, what he understands is that the adjective which is predicated of a thing designates (in some cases, at least) an ontologically real qualification, a perfection, state, condition, or attribute of its being. The sense, thus, of our saying that a thing is living is not that there is in it the accident of life but that it is characterised or qualified in its being by being living. The sense, then, of our saying that a corporeal individual (sahs* = gism*) is living is that the composite body is specifically characterised (muhtass*) in its being, as a unity and whole, by its being alive (kawnuhû hayyan*). Accordingly, it is in a different sense that abû Hâim says of the living composite that "even though its parts are many, it has the character of a single being,"19 for in abû Hâim's perspective the predicate 'living' does not here indicate and assert the existence of the inherent accident of life but the state of being-living which belongs not to the parts (which are the substrates of the units of the accident of life) as such but is a quality of the being of the whole (al-gumla*) in its unity as a whole or totality. Inhering separately in the individual atoms, the separate units or quanta ('agza*') of life function as a single accident in a single substrate so that the living person "must Perforce be a whole that, by virtue of life in each single one of its parts, comes to have the character of a single being."20 ''There is realised in the multiple parts a single attribute so that it is like a single being (ay') insofar as it is specifically characterised by this attribute."21 The living, composite whole or totality is, thus, in some way the equivalent of a single "essence" or thing-itself (dat*).22 It is one of the essential characteristics of the accident of life (min 'ahassi* 'ahkamiha*) that it produce or effect this unity of the body in whose parts it inheres. The character of oneness which the living body has is ontologically different from that which belongs to an inanimate body through the contiguity of its parts and their composition one with another, for the latter is not a unitary whole (gumla*).23 The living body is specifically characterised and distinguished by sentience and perception ('idrâk). Life (the accident of life), in fact, entails the possibility of perception as one of its distinguishing characteristics ('ahassu* 'ahkamiha*)24 Accordingly, the living being is specifically characterised by perception25 and is identified and distinguished as the sentient and perceptive.26 For the earlier masters of the school, abû l-Hudhayl and al-Gubba'i* for example, perception was taken to be a entitative accident (ma`nà) distinct from life; for abet Hâim, however, it is rather a function of life in the living organism: of its being living.27 The details of his un-
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derstanding of this question we shall take up later. As life characteristically produces an ontological oneness and sensibility in the body in which it inheres, so also in that it effects the body's being living it is that which fulfills the condition of the actuality (al-musahhih *) of those other perfections and acts that are associated with the living, such as thought, knowledge, will, etc.28 Although these, as accidents, inhere in substrates (mahall*) that are the constitutive atoms of a single organ,29 their effects belong not to the substrate or to the organ of which the specific atoms of their inherence are a part, but to the living body as such, i.e., as a whole. In that the condition of their actuality is not the situation of the substrate as such, i.e., not the simple actuality and presence of the accident of life in the substrate, but that the being of the body as such be qualified by the attribute of being living (kawnuhâ hayyan*) and in that the body, insofar as it is living, is a single whole or totality (gumla*), these accidents effect attributes that qualify and distinguish and so are predicated, not of their specific substrates of inherence, but of the living totality in its wholeness. Thus where man (al-'insân) is formally defined as a body (gism*, sahs*) having a particular configuration of parts, etc., "the evidence has shown that the living being, capable of autonomous action is the whole man not a part of the heart."30 Against the lexical definition that specifies mainly to what concrete object we refer in using the expression 'insân, what is given here is the formulation of what is the nature of the being referred to: al-hayyu* l-qâdir (the living being that is capable of autonomous action).31 The focus of attention has moved from simple entities and their relationships of inherence and substrate to the attributes of being and their ontological function. Although the substrate (sc., the individual atom or atoms that are the mahall*) or the organs in which inhere these accidents that we have mentioned, viz., the power of autonomous action and causation (al-qudra: ), or those that constitute the interior acts ('af`âalu l-qulâb: the acts of knowing, thinking, willing, intending, etc.) do have in the inherence of these accidents a kind of particular qualification (mazîya) that is not shared by the other material components of the body,32 nevertheless these accidents effect attributes that specifically qualify (ihtassa*) not their immediate substrate of inherence but the being of the living composite as a whole (al-gumlatu* l-hayya*), "for the attribute that is properly ascribed to the whole (gumla*) cannot entail a qualification of the specific substrate of its inherence, since the substrate is related to it as something altogether distinct and it cannot qualify another."33 That is, insofar as the attribute (sifa*) which is necessitated by the inherent accident belongs to, and is properly predicated of, the whole as a single totality, it cannot properly be said to belong to the material part as part; "one cannot say of each
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individual part (guz' *) that it acts [is fâ'il]; quite to the contrary, each of its individual atoms, in that it has [i.e., in itself and as such] no share whatsoever in what specifically qualifies the total composite, is analogous to parts that are fully distinct and separate from it."34 These accidents, in short, effect an attribute (sifa*), a state (hal*) that belongs to and is predicated of the whole. The act of knowing ('ilm) exists and has its being in a specific organ in whose material part(s) it concretely inheres, but it is the living totality, not the organ, whose being is qualified by being knowing (kawnuhû 'âliman) and which, therefore, is said to be knowing.35 Thus similarly "the qâdir ( ) is the living whole, albeit the existent [i.e., that which most strictly is and has existence] is each individual part of it, so that the existent, properly speaking, is not the qâdir, nor is the qâdir, strictly speaking, the existent."36 The living whole, because its parts are joined together and life inheres in its parts, comes to have the character of a single entity, so that the power of autonomous action (al-qudra) existing in a single part of it necessitates the whole's being qâdir ... and the whole becomes, in relation to this power of autonomous action, like the single material substrate of inherence of a motion that inheres in it.37
Thus too the act of willing inheres in the atoms of the heart, but "it belongs to the one who wills to be living, and since it is the whole, not the atoms of the heart, that is the living being, it must be that it, not its material parts, is that which is willing."38 Sight39 and hunger and satiety40 and unawareness (as-sahw)41 also are predicated of the whole, not of the material parts in which the function is concretely localised. The same is true of intent (al-qasd*) and motivation42 (forms of knowing); action (fi`l) is thus predicated of the whole43 and accordingly command and prohibition, blame and praise are directed not at the constituent parts or at some portion of them but at the living totality which is the person.44 In this way the oneness and unity of the living body differs ontologically from that of a nonliving composite, for whatever unity the nonliving has by virtue of the accident of composition (ta'lîf) in its parts and their spatial continuity (ittisal*) with one another, the attributes that are predicated of it are properly predicated only of the parts as parts and of the whole not as a single unitary being but only as the sum of its parts, each of which is singly qualified by the separate attributes and characteristics that belong to it. Abû Hâîim said that if the knower in his being knowing were not specifically characterised by a state but rather the reference were to the mere existence of the act of knowing, it would be possible that
Page 46 a single unit (guz' *) of the knowing of a thing exist in a part of his heart and that the act of being ignorant of the self same thing exist in another part, just as it is possible that black exist in a single substrate and white in another substrate [of the same body]; since we know that it is impossible that these two accidents (ma`nayân) be conjoined [i.e., at the same time in the same person], then it cannot be but that they necessitate attributes that are ascribed to the whole (algumla*).... He said also that if he were not specifically characterised in his being knowing by a state (hal*), it would not be possible that he write with his hand by virtue of the act of knowing that is in his heart without its being possible on the part of another by virtue of the same act of knowing, since the situation in regard to the act of knowing that exists in his heart in relation to his hand would be the same as its situation in regard to the hand of another, because his heart has the status (hukm*) of being other than his hand just as it is other than the hand of another and its [sc., the act of knowing] existence in his heart rather than in the heart of another does not become a basis for the further qualification (mazâya) unless it causes him to have a state by which he and not another is specifically qualified.45
To summarize, the only beings that are properly and strictly said to be essential entities (dawat*, 'ayâ') are the single atoms (gawahir*) that are the material substrate (mahall*) (and whose composition in a specific configuration forms the body as body) and the several accidents ('a'rad*, ma'ânî) that separately and discretely inhere in them. An account of the living composite that restricts itself rigidly and exclusively to the essential actuality of these two constituents, however, is inadequate to render and express the reality of the being that is given to our experience in that the living composite whole, with its constituent accidents, manifests itself and is recognised ('aqala) and known ('alima) as characterised or qualified (muhtass*) by certain characteristics in which it is distinguished and differentiated as a unitary whole or totality from other living wholes, as one who is knowing is distinguished and differentiated (fâraqa) from one who is not knowing or who is ignorant. The attribute of being-knowing, being-willing, or the like, is not a constituent, entitative element of the composite as the material atoms and parts of the substrate or the determinant accidents of knowing, willing, etc.; rather, to be knowing or to be willing is ontologically "the way the thing is" (mâ huwa 'alayhî), that is to say, a state (hal*) that qualifies the being of the composite and characterises it in its wholeness as a unity or totality. It is a state that is necessitated (mugaba*) or caused (ma`lûla) by the existence (wugud*) of the accident
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('arad *) as a determinant cause (ma`nà) inherent (hâll) and subsistent (qâ'im) in a particular substrate that forms an integral and organic part of the living whole. Having set out these few basic elements of the system, we may proceed to a systematic examination of the five categories of attributes. Notes to Chapter 2 1. E.g., a-ahrastânî, Nihâyat al-'iqdâm fî 'ilm al-kalâm, edited by A. Guillaume (Oxford, 1934), 132 and Sarh* al-Irâd, 35vº f. (and regarding the inconsistencies of abû Hâim's position concerning the nonliving mentioned in the latter passage, see n. 23). 2. E.g., SU5, 208 f. 3. Cf. the references in my "Kalâm and Philosophy, a Perspective from one Problem" in Islamic Philosophical Theology, edited by P. Morewedge (Albany, forth-coming), n. 28 and Tad, 1vº 12f., cited in the following note, and for the A'arites, cf., e.g., a-âmil, 639, 8. Frequently the dichotomy is given as between "bodies" ('agsam*, 'agram*, 'ashas*) and accidents in that bodies are, in our common experience, the basic unit of extended materiality and corporeality and exist as quasi things-themselves (dawat*); see later. Concerning the kalâm use of the term gawhar*, we need not discuss here its relation to Greek ; the understanding of the word in the Islamic tradition, however,i.e., in those sciences that are not dependent upon the translation literatureis of some pertinence to the present inquiry. Regarding the use of gawhar* as "atom,'' Ibn Mattawayh notes that although this is a specialised use (istilah*), it has nonetheless some basis in the ordinary language, "but, for the philologians [adding 'ahl before al-luga*], al-gawhar* is used for the basic material ('asl*) [of which something is composed], as they say 'the gawhar* of this garment is excellent or poor,' i.e., its basic material, and the gawahir* are the basic elements of things ('usulu* l-'ayâa')": Tad, 10vº 18f; cp. also M 11, 377, 1 f. This sense (viz., what a thing fundamentally is) occurs in the grammarians (cf., e.g., Sîbawayh 1, 274, 17 and al-Muqtadab* 3, 373, 11-18) and it is this sense that underlies its use in al-Mâturîdî. The lexicographers recognise two basic senses of the word: "the gawhar* is any stone from which is educed something useful and the gawhar* of anything is whatever natural constitution having which it was created" (mâ wudi'at/huliqat* 'alayhî gibillatuhu*): Ibn Sîda, alMuhkam* wal-muhit* al-a'zam* 4 (Cairo, 1388/1968), 117 and Lisân al-'Arab*, s.v. Al-Farabi* in his semantic account of the uses of the word begins from the meaning "jewel" or "stone": K. al-huruf*, edited by M. Mahdi (Beirut, 1969), §§ 72 f. That the accidents are considered, like the atoms, to exist as indivisible units, cf., e.g., Maq, 319, 15 f. and M 4, 242 f. and 5, 244, 3-8 (cited Ch. 7, n. 50). The distinction of God's immaterial act of willing as an "accident" we shall take up later. 4. Cf., e.g., Muh*, 204 f. Thus Ibn Mattawayh says "the temporally existent (al-muhdat*) ... is divided into that which occupies space when it exists and that which does not occupy space when it exists; the former is the atom and the latter is the accident" (Tad, 1vº 12 f.; for the sense of the term al-muhdat*, see Ch. 7, n. 25). The atom is commonly defined as that which occupies space (e.g., M 5, 219, 17 f.; aâmil, 235, 17 f.); concerning the atom and its essential attribute and the notion of the mode (kayfya) of existence, see later. It may be noted that while the expression
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qâ'im bin-nafs ("in se subsistens") is taken by the Mu`tazilite followers of abû Hûim to mean "not requiring a substrate" and so to be appropriately employed to describe the atom and bodies (cf., e.g., M 4, 179 f. and 5, 259, 17 f.; and on the semantics of qâma, yaqûmu, SU5, 555, 1 ff., where read bi-dati * for bi-datihi* in line 1), it is used rarely, if at all, in their discussions of the atom and its characteristics. The A'arites, on the other hand, often use the expression to describe the atom (e.g., Tam, 75, 10 f.; a-âmil, 575, 3 ff. and 678 f., where read al-`âlim for al-'ilm at 678, ult.; and Sarh* al-Irsad*, 62rº l.), even though some authorities formally reject the notion as properly applicable to any being other than God (cf. a-amil, 423), and al-A'ari is reported to have held that it is not properly used of anything whatsoever (ibid., 423 and 574), though he does employ qâ'im bin-nafs, opposing it to qâ'im bi-gayrihi* in his own writing (e.g., al-Luma', § 45). It is important to note, at any rate, that in neither system is the notion of what is truly an entity or thingitself linked to the expression qâ'im bin-nafs. It may also be noted that the grammarians sometimes use qâ'im bin-nafs to describe a grammatical element that can "stand alone'' as a single word or an expression that is meaningful by itself, "standing alone". 5. Cf., e.g., ZS, 432, 4 ff. and 440, 3-7. For the expression fî hukmi* -ay'i l-wahid*, see my "Al-Ma'dûm wal-Mawgud*," and later, and on the way in which a composite whole is said to be one, see Ch. 7. 6. Concerning inanimate bodies, cf., e.g., M 16, 52, 5 ff.; 8, 229, 6 f. and 239, 1 ff.; Farq, 130, 12; and n. 26. The sense of abû lHudhayl's assertion that a body only a part of which is in motion may be said to move as a whole (Farq, 130, lines 10 f.) is difficult to interpret in the absence of any larger context unless he refers to the living body (cf., e.g., Maq, 321 f.), for he is reported to have held that "the motion of a body is divided according to the number of its parts [sc., atoms]"; Maq, 319, 10 f. 7. Maq, 330, 1 f.; cp. the formulation of 'Abd al-Gabbar* (M 11, 357) cited n. 19. 8. On the philologians (the lexicographers and the grammarians) cf., e.g., M 11, 358, 12 ff. and esp. 359, 3 ff.; see also Ch. 6, n. 64. This tendency of the Basrians to follow the lexical definitions is noted by G. Hourani in regard to the ethical terms; he remarks that `Abd alGabbar's* method is apparently one "of testing ordinary language to find the definition which corresponds most closely to the way we speak" ("The Rationalist Ethics of 'Abd al-Gabbar*" in Islamic Philosophy and the Classical Tradition, Essays presented ... to Richard Walzer [Columbia, S.C., 1972], p. 109; cf. also his Islamic Rationalism [Oxford, 1971], p. 27). According to the Masters of the Basrian School of the Mu`tazila the specifically distinctive states and characteristics of things are recognized and grasped by the mind (ma'qûla>) and the definition, whose character it is "to express ('afâda) that whereby the defined is distinguished from what is other" (cf., e.g., M 12, 13, 8 f. and the discussion ibid., pp. 13 ff.; M 7, 6, 4 ff. and generally ibid., pp. 7 ff.; and 11, 362, 7 ff.) is essentially a thematic explanation (tafsîr) of our knowledge of the thing (cf., e.g., M 14, 185, 14 ff.). Though as in all other questions the matter is subject to analysis and considerable debate, the philologians and lexicographers are not necessarily taken as authorities (cf., e.g., M 5, 187 cited Ch. 1, n. 34), for the usage of the kalam* (ta'ârufu l-mutakallimân) in recognised as distinct and as based on criteria and a perspective not those of the 'ahl al-luga*. The sense of words, according to the Basrian School, "derives from the conviction of those on whose convention the language is founded and of those who speak the language" (tatba`u 'tiqâda l-mutawadi`ina* 'alà l-lugati* wa-'ahli l-lisân: Tad, 73rº 3 f.) and as even the strict and fundamental meanings of words (al-haqa'iq*) may change in time with constant use, the substitution of one sense for another is considered proper and valid (cf. ibid., 68rº f.).
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9. Maq, 329, 9 f.; cf. also Ibn Hazm *, al-Fisal* (Cairo, 1321) 5, 65. 10. M 11, 310, 5 f. 11. Cf., e.g., M 11, 311, 12 ff. et alibi. 12. Cf. Maq, 329, M 11, 311 ff., and Tad, 130rº f.; for the detail, n.b. M 11, 325, 334 ff., 353 f., and esp. 357 ff. and 363 ff. The question is frequently posed in terms of the problem of what is essential to the resurrection of the individual in his identity with his former self; cf., e.g., M 11, 473-76. 13. Tad, 122vº 19-29; cf. also M 11, 363, 4 ff. Note also that the distinction Ibn Mattawayh makes in the passage cited between al-`ibâra and al-`iâra follows that made by the grammarians between 'iâratu l-qalb and 'iâratu l-`ayn, sc., the indication of a thing by verbally appealing to understanding and imagination and indicting it by pointing to it (cf., e.g., Sîbawayh 1, 221 and al-Insaf*, § 101, p. 708). This and the definitions of man discussed later stand in notable contest with those of other early schools and authorities; cf., e.g., Maq, 329 ff.; al-Maqdisi, al-Bad' wat-ta'rih* 2, edited by M. Huart (Paris, 1901), 125 and M 11, 310 ff. and, for al-Mâturîdî, al-Tawhid*, 43, where following the "philosophers" as it were, he gives the definition as al-hayy* an-natiq*, al-mayyit (the living, speaking, mortal) and pp. 10 f. where he says that "he is constituted of his nature (tabi`a*) and mind" (cf. also ibid., pp. 100 f., 223, 10 ff. and my "Notes and Remarks" in Mélanges d'Islamologie ... å la Mémoire d'Armand Abel [Leiden, 1974], 143, n. 31). On the definition of man as "living, speaking, mortal,'' see M 11, 361 ff. and Ibn Mattawayh's rejection of this on several grounds in Tad, 123rº 1 ff. It should be noted that in this as in other cases, the occurrence of an "Aristotelian" definition is no indication either of any direct "Greek" influence on the authors in whose works they are found or that one may assume that such formulae were understood as in their original contexts. Abû Sa'îd as-Sîrâfî, for example, also defines man as "living, speaking, mortal" but plainly takes it as a lexical definition: "... if one says What is a man?, the reply is That which is living, speaking, and mortal, and if one says What is a horse?, the reply is That which is living, quadrupedal, neighing, and the other qualifications that delimit the thing named" (wa-gayruha* mina l-'awsafi* l-latî tahsuru* l-musammà): Sarh* al-Kitâb 1, 1vº. 14. Cf. M 11, 310, 6 f., 335, 11 f., and 338, 5 f. Al-Pazdawî, Usul* ad-dîn, edited by P. Linss (Cairo, 1383/1963), 224, 2 f., states that abû 1-Hudhayl was uncertain as m whether "spirit" (ruh*) is life, an accident, or a distinct corporeal entity (gism*), but tiffs is directly contrary to the report of al-A'arî (Maq, 337, 4 ff. and 402, 12 f.), who says that he held spirit to be distinct from life and gives his argument to support this assertion. Al-Pazdawî's report would appear confused or extrapolated from the fact that abû l-Hudhayl held that "spirit" is essential to the maintenance of life in the body (Maq, 337); note that some identified life and spirit (cf., e.g., M 11, 335, 10 f.). The later school holds that spirit is a distinct corporeal clement or organ, distinct from "life" (e.g., al-Gubba'i*, cited in Maq, 334, 10), viz., an-nafasu l-mutaraddidu (M 11, 336, 6 and 338, 8 f.; cf. generally pp. 331 ff.) which, though inanimate or nonliving (gayru* hayya*, gamad*: M 11, 155) is essential to the continuance of life in the body, the exact physiology being uncertain (cf., e.g., M 16, 379, 15 ff. and 392 f.). This is the position of abû Hâim; al-Gubba'i* is reported to have held that life does not require spirit (Tad, 126vº f), but in what sense and how one is to understand "does not require" is uncertain. The Mu'tazila of the Basrian School, unlike the falâsifa, do not hesitate to acknowledge their ignorance of physiology. 15. Maq, 334, 10. 16. There arise, thus, some problems as to what parts or elements must be included in the living whole (al-gumlatu* l-hayya*); al-Gubba'i* is reared to have said that
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while spit, sweat, and the contents of the stomach and guts are not part of the living whole, whatever is connected to the body and grows with its growth is a part of the whole (cf. M 11, 364, 3 ff.), so that the hair and nails will be so reckoned (Tad, 128rº 26-29); on the other hand he is reported by abû Hâm also to have said that the hair and nails are not a part of the living totality, since there is no sensation of pain when they are cut (M 11, 311, 16 f.). On the identification of sensation with life, see nn. 25 f. et alibi. 17. Cf. M 11, 364, 7 as well as 361, 3 ff., 358, 12 ff. and 359, 3 ff. The "philological" definition continues to be used in many contexts (e.g., M 7, 13, 8) where the specific issue of the role of life is not in question or where it is needful to insist that the living being or the human individual is the material composite and not "spirit," ''soul," or the like. 18. Maq, 524, 13. 19. M 5, 29, 18: wa-'in kânat katirata * l-'agzd'i* fa-hiya fî hukmi* -say'i l-wahid*. On predications made of the totality as such, that one says, e.g., "of the many parts that they are an agent ('annahâ fâ`ilun) not that they are acting (pl.: `annahâ fâ'ilatun)," n.b. M 11, 357. 20. Mas (B), 46, 18-20; cf. also Mas, 50rº 15 ff.: `inna 'agza'a* l-gumlati* tatanazzalu manzilata -ay'i l-wahidi* wa-qad `alimnâ 'annahû tugadu* fîhî 'agza'un* katiratun* mina l-hayati* wa-hiya bi-manzilati l-mawgudi* fî mahallin* wahid*; cf. also ibid., 92rº f. et alibi. Thus abû Hâim says that when a human being is said to be one (wahid*), the use of the word is strict (haqiqa*), i.e., as being a human individual the composite is truly one insofar as it is a being and whole; cf. M 5, 244, 15-17 and Ch. 7, nn. 51 f. and 58. 21. M 11, 328, 13 f.: tahsulu* lil-'agza'i* l-katirati* sifatun* wâhidatun fa-takûnu bi-manzilati -ay'i l-wahidi* min haytu* htussat* bitilka s-sifa*; cf, also ibid., 358, 2 f.: ga`alna* l-gumlata* li-ttisali* ba`dihâ bi-ba`din* ka-ay'i l-wahidi* rain haytu* kâna mâ halla* fî ba`diha* ka-annahû hallun* fî sâ'irihâ fî 'igabi* l-hukmi* l-wahid*. Cf. also M 6/2. 153 ff. and ZS, 554, 11 f. 22. Cf. the expression "a single essential entity or a whole that has the character of a single essential entity": datun* wâhidatun 'awgumlatun* fî l-hukmi* kad-ati* l-wahidi*; M 4, 312, 19. 23. Muh*, 198, 13: min 'ahassi* 'ahkamiha* 'an tasira* bihâ l-'agza'u* fî hukmi* -ay'i l-wahid*; Mas, 123vº 5 f.: 'inna l-hayata* li'amrin yargi'u* 'ilà ginsiha* tusayyiru* l-'agza'a* fî hukmi* -ay'i l-wahid*; (concerning the "most specific characteristics" and the sifatu* l-gins*, see Ch. 4. It is by being living that the whole becomes a whole: kawnuhû hayyan* al-ladi* bihî tasîru l-gumlatu* gumlatan*, ZS, 541, 10. The quality of being inanimate or nonliving (al-mawt) implies the ontological discreteness of the parts of a body; cf. M 11, 354, 2 f., 355, 9-12; 6/2, 153 f.; and Mas, 123vº 2 ff. Al-Gubba'i* held al-mawt to be an entitative accident (ma`nà) and the contrary of life (Tad, 132vº 13), but according to abû Hâim and his followers it is not the contrary (didd*) of life (cf. M 11, 355; Muh*, 134, 3 f., where read la-kâna hukman* in line 4) which properly speaking has, they say, no contrary (cf., e.g., M 11, 434, 10 f., Muh*, 134, et alibi). Its exact status, however, is disputed; abû Hâim at one point held that it is an entitative accident (cf., e.g., M 11, 335 f. and Mas, 123vº 20 f.) but seems subsequently to have changed his mind (cf. Tad, 132vº 13 f.), while 'Abd al-Gabbar* (cf., e.g., M 9, 99, 13 ff. and 109, 18; Muh*, 134, 4), Ibn Mattawayh (Tad, 133rº f.), and abû Raîd (Mas, 123rº 2 ff.; on the question generally, see ibid., foll. 123rº ff.) hold that it is not an accident but rather that to be inanimate is simply the absence of life and of the unity of being that life entails. The shift of abû Hâim's position regarding
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al-mawt and the teaching of `Abd al-Gabbar * and the later school parallel their treatment of al-`agz* and as-sahw, on which see Ch. 7, nn. 70 ff. 24. Cf., e.g., M 16, 43, 1 ff.; 4. 334 f.; 11, 467, 12f.; 13, 240, 2 f; Muh, 198, 14; and ZS, 472 f. Mâ hiarna* 'anna rain hukmi* l-hayyi* 'an yakûna mudrikan faqat*; wa-bi-hada* tutbatu* t-tafriqatu bayna l-hayyi* wal-mayyit: Tad, 127vº 25. See also Ch. 7. 25. M 13, 239, 19: 'inna l-ladi* yu`lamu bi-dtirarin* huwa mâ bihiî yanfasilu* l-hayyu* rain gayrihi*, wa-huwa l-'idrâk; n.b. also M 11, 335, 15 ff. and cp. ibid., 309, 15 f.; 313, 6; et alibi, particularly Muh*, 136, 3-18. 26. "We have shown that there must be life in every substrate (mahall*) in which we perceive heat and cold and pain and we have shown that every part (guz*') in which there is life must belong to the totality (gumla*). We have made it clear that the living [sc., human being] is the sentient being having the autonomous power of action (al-qâdiru l-hayyu*) and that even though its parts are many it has the character of a single living being and a single qâir" (M 11, 334, 7-10, reading hayatun* for hayatuhu* in line 8; cf. generally M 9, 144, 12 ff. and 164 f.; M 11, 324 f. and 344 f.; Mas, 117rº f. and ZS, 470, 7 ff.). The identification of life and the living with sensation and perception seems to be early and would appear Stoic in origin; cp. the Stoics' identification of , anima and so with animals ( ) alone as having sense perception: SVF II, 149 (§ 458), 205 (§§ 715 and 718), 225, 23 f. (§ 812), and 229, 20 (§ 845). 27. Cf., e.g., M 4, 55, 15 ff. and cp. M 9, 12, 12 ff.; Sarh* al-Irâd, 150vº f. For the position of abû Hâim and the later school, see generally ZS, 524 ff. and Ch. 7 28. Cf., e.g., M 7, 8, 10; 11, 309, 14-16 and 313, 6 f.; 12, 14, 5 f. and Ch. 5. 29. From al-Gubba'i* on, the (organic) structure (binya = ) is a condition of life. i.e., a condition of the presence of the accident of life, and so of the unity of being that it entails (cf., e.g., M 7, 33 f. and 9, 101, 3 f.); thus similarly, as the organic structure and the health of the organ of sense (al-hassa*) is the condition of its sensation (cf., e.g., M 4, 52, 2 f. and 55, 19 f.; and Ch. 7), so also the specific structure of the heart is the condition, given the presence of life, of thought, knowing, and the other "acts of the heart" ('af'âlu l-qulûb) (cf., e.g., M 9, 105 8 f.; 12, 12, 13 and 102, 10 f.; cf. generally Mss, 70rº a ff.). (For the other conditions, e.g., dampness, etc., cf., e.g., M 11, 365 f.) Life, however, is musahhih* (the primary and intrinsic ground of the actuality of their possibility), while the physical or organic structure, etc., form the sart*, i.e., the secondary and extrinsic condition. 30. M 9, 23, 18 f.; for the detailed exposition of this statement and the argument, cf. M 11, 313, 6 ff. and 331, 1 ff., as well as Muh*, 188, 23 ff. 31. That al-hayy* al-qâdir is taken as a formulation of the essential nature of man (al-mukallaf) is clear from a number of texts; cf., e.g., M 11, 311, 12 ff.: "our masters have shown in regard to this issue that the living being that is capable of autonomous action is the corporeal individual that has the particular organic structure (binya) by which it is distinguished from all other animals . . . "; cf. also ibid., 334, cited above in n. 29 and Studia Islamica 33 (1971): 11, n. 1 and the references there cited. The formula is not, however, applicable exclusively to man in that God also may be so characterized as well as the angels, jinn, and some animals (for reference to animals cf., e.g., Tad, 161rº 25 ff.). 32. Cf. M 6/2, 163, 16 ff. and Muh*, 207, 14. 33. M 4, 177, 14-16: 'inna s-sifata* r-ragi'ata* 'ilâ l-gumlati* lâ yaguzu* 'an taqtadiya* sifatan* yuhtassu* bihâ l-mahallu*, li'anna lmahalla* fî hukmi* l-gayri* lahâ wa-lâ yasihhu* 'an taqtadiya* sifatan* li-mawsufin* 'ahar* (reading tqtdy* for tqdy* in line 14 and lahâ for lahû in line 16).
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34. M 8, 155, 4-6: fa-lâ yasihhu * 'an yuqâla fî kulli guz'in* 'innahû fâ`ilun, bal kullu guz'in* minhû fî 'annahû lâ hazza* lahû fîmâ yahtassu* l-gumlata* bi-manzilati l-'agza'i* l-bâ'inati lahû (reading al-bâ'ina for 'lb'nyh in line 6). 35. Cf. ZS, 550. 36. Muh*, 139, 18 ff.: 'inna l-qâdira huwa 1-gumlatu* 1-hayyatu* wal-mawgudu* huwa kullu ba'din* minhû, fa-laysa l-mawgudu*, fî lhaqiqati*, huwa l-qâdiru wa-lâ l-qâdiru, fî l-haqiqati*, huwa l-mawgud*. 37. M 11, 352: 'inna l-gumlata* l-hayyata* qad sarat* li-ndimami* ba`diha* 'ilà ba'din* wa-hululi* l-hayati* fî 'agza'iha* bi-manzilati -ay'i l-wahid*; fal-qudratu, 'ida* wugidat* fî ba'diha*, 'awgabat* li-hadihi* l-gumlati* kawnahâ qâdiratan ...; hadihi* 1-gumlatu* qad sarat* li-hadihi* l-qudrati kal-mahalli* lil-harakati* l-hallati* fîhî. Cf. generally ibid., 352-354; cf. also M 11, 313, 6 ff. and 334, 9 ff. (cited earlier, n. 26) as well as 328, 18. 38. M 6/2 22 f.: min haqqi* l-murîdi 'an yakâna hayyan*, fa-'ida* kânati l-gumlatu* hiya l-hayyatu* dûna 'agza'i* l-qalbi, fa-yagibu* 'an yakûna hiya l-murîdatu dûna 'agza'ihi*. Cf. also M 11, 329, 5 ff. and generally 329 ff. et alibi. Note that abû Hâim in an earlier period held that the act of willing (al-'irâda) does not necessitate a state of the whole, since he took 'irâda as an act (fi'l) and an agent (fâ`il) is not qualified by a state or an attribute insofar as he is fâ`il (e.g., M 7, 44, 17 f. and 45 f.; see pp. 135 f.). 39. Cf., e.g., M 5, 177, 12 ff. 40. Cf., e.g., M 6/1, 182, 12-14. 41. Abû Hâim took as-sahw to be an entitative accident or, in some of his writings, to be a "defect" or misfunctioning in the heart (fasâdun fî l-qalb). On his position and that of the later school who take as-sahw as a mere negation, see Ch. 7, nn. 70-72. 42. M 8, 19, 10 f.: 'inna d-dawâ't wal-qasda* yargi`ani* `ilà 1-gumlati* dûna l-mahall*; cf. also M 9, 31, 15 ff. and generally the contexts of both passages. 43. Cf., e.g., M 8, 155, 4-6 (cited earlier n. 34) and also ibid., 20 f., 148, 7 ff., and the references cited in n. 38. On how action is predicated, see Ch. 6. 44. Cf. M 8, 91, 13 f. and n. 11. 45. Tad, 185vº 19 ff. On the nature of ignorance (al-gahl*) as an accident see Ch. 6, n. 47.
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Chapter 3 The Attribute Of The Essence An "essence"/thing-itself (dat *) is that of which predication is made; it is not said of anything else. Of itself and in itself as a thing-itself it can be predicated only of itself, and it is this identity of itself in being itself that abû Hâim and his followers term the Attribute of the Essence.1 It is expressed in our saying, for example, that the atom is an atom (al-gawharu* gawharun*) or when we speak of (the accident of) black's being black (kawnu s-sawâdi sawâdan) or of God's being eternal, since the term 'eternal' (qadîm) denotes God's essence.2 It is the essential attribute par excellence, the attribute which is essential in the strictest and most literal sense (lid-dati* `alà l-haqiqa*).3 The essence of a thing, what it is in itself, is precisely "the way it is in itself" (mâ huwa 'alayhî fî datihi*) in being itself, so that our statement of the Attribute of the Essence is the statement of the thing's being indentical with itself in being "the way it is in itself." As the thing's total identity with itself as it is predicated of itself without any implication of duality, the Attribute of the Essence is "restricted to the 'essence'/thing-itself" (maqsuratun* `alà d-dat*).4 Its being as it is in itself is absolute; it cannot be derived from anything else but is irreducible. One cannot ask why it is what essentially it is; its being itself is not subject to explanation.5 The atom cannot be an atom by virtue of the way it is in itself, for there is here no other attribute to which one can point and say that by virtue of it the atom is an atom, since by the atom's being an atom we mean the ground ('asl*) of its attributes and this attribute must be of the essence (lid-dat*)."6
The Attribute of the Essence is "unconditioned by anything else" (gayru* masrutatin* bi-'amrin siwâhâ), for there is no conceivable condition that could be the ground for this attribute . . . and it is not possible that a thing be conditional upon itself."7 It is thus altogether impossible to assign a ground for the Attribute of the Essence since to say that a thing is its own ground (ta'lîlu -ay'i bi-nafsihî) is to say that there is none.8
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The thing-itself, as the object of our knowing, "must perforce be specifically characterised by some attribute by which it is distinguished" 9 and it is this attribute, sc., the Attribute of the Essence, that is the ultimate ground of its intelligibility. In the words of abû Raîd, if the thing in its identity with itself, which is the basis of its being in itself distinguished (tamayyaza) from what is not itself, were not the correlate of our knowing (i.e., our knowing it as being itself what it is), "there would be no object correlated to any knowing."10 Though it is true that the thing-itself is given to usis presented to our knowingas it is manifest (yazhar*) through its essential attributes in the actuality of its existence, it is the thing itself that is the object that we know as it is in itself distinguished in being itself from what is other. Whereas all other attributes that a thing may have are conditional upon the actuality of the existence of the thing-itself (dat*) of whose being they are states or characteristics, the Attribute of the Essence, since it is unconditioned (gayru* masruta*) is prior to existence. The atom is an atom even when it is nonexistent.11 The Attribute of the Essence is truly said to belong to the thing-itself (dat*) when it is nonexistent as also when it is actually existent,12 so that abû Raîd speaks of "the actuality of the attribute" (husuluha*) even when the thing-itself is nonexistent.13 The statement that the thing-itself in being what it is (mâ huwa 'alayhî fî datihi*) is itself even when it is nonexistent does not imply that as nonexistent it is as such really and in fact in some state of being. The nonexistent (al-ma'dûm), according to abû Hâim and his followers, has no state (hal*) in its being nonexistent,14 for its reality in being nonexistent is simply the reality of its possibility (tubutu* l-gawaz*).15 What is meant, rather, is that the thing-itself, in its being possible is truly and in fact an object of knowing (i.e., God's). It is known and affirmed to be the possible that it is and as such is recognised and distinguished from what is other, as for example God knows as such and in itself the individual thing that he will or can create.16 This is not, as Ibn 'Ayyâ holds, a knowledge of an anticipated attribute (sifatun* muntazara*), i.e., a knowledge of the thing and of its difference from what is other that is a knowledge only of the characteristic attributes that it must have when it comes to exist, so that it has, in effect, no proper attribute when it is nonexistent and thus cannot properly be said to be itself when it is nonexistent.17 Rather abû Hâim and those who follow his doctrine in this matter insist that every thing-itself of necessity differs really and in fact from what is different [even] when it is nonexistent; difference does not occur by its being simply a thingitself (dat*), for this is common to every thing-itself; it must, then, occur because of an attribute and it is to
Page 55 this attribute that one refers [for example] by [the atom's] being an atom. 18
In short, "the atom is distinguished (yatamayyazu) from what is not an atom simply by its being at atom."19 That it be nonexistent is simply that it is-not existent (laysa bi-mawgud*),20 but its being an atom is other than its being existent, and since there is no determinant relationship between the two attributes, it may be termed an atom even when it is nonexistent.21 It could cease to have the Attribute of the Essence, i.e., to be itself in its identity with itself, only by ceasing to be a thing-itself, and this is impossible since it would then cease utterly to have any being whatsoever; it would neither be known, nor could it be spoken of.22 Notes to Chapter 3 1. That the concept of the Attribute of the Essence is an innovation of abû Hâim is clear from the reference to it as "the attribute which abû Hâim affirms" in Muh*, 127, 4 (cf. also ibid., 107, 25 and 159, 10 f.). The nature of the thing-itself (dat*, ay') as a thing-itself and of the Attribute of the Essence is discussed from another perspective in my "al-Mawgud* wal-Ma'dûm," the detail of which will not be repeated here. The expressions used to designate what I have here consistently rendered as the Attribute of the Essence (in order clearly to distinguish it from the essential attributes, which will be taken up in the next chapter) show considerable variation. It is frequently said simply to be lid-dat* (e.g., M 4, 250, 14-16 and 270, 18-20; Muh*, 107, 23 and 172, 4, where abû Hâim is cited; Mss (B), 13, 2-5; ZS, 410, 18 f. and 413, 9) and is, thus, quite commonly referred to as sifatu* d-dat* (e.g., M 4, 270, ult.f.; Mas (B), 4, 10; ZS, 71 f. and 489, 13) or as as-sifatu* d-datiya* (e.g., Muh*, 206, 20 and 107, 25; Mas (B), 4, 9; ZS, 459, 15 f.). Likewise one finds it termed lin-nafs (e.g., M 4, 250, 4 and 7, 84, 15; SU5, 107, 7 ff,; Muh*, 61, 8) and thus sometimes, though not commonly, as as-sifatu* n-nafsîya (e.g., M 7, 62, 12 f.), even though these expressions are sometimes used for the essential attribute (see Ch. 4, n. l). It is also referred to as "the attribute that is restricted to the `essence'/thing-itself" (as-sifatu* l-maqsuratu* `alà d-dat*; see n. 4) or as "the attribute that is ascribed to the 'essence'/thing-itself" (as-sifatu* r-ragi`atu* 'ilà d-dat*; e.g., Tad, 10rº 3). 2. Cf. Ch. 4, n. 57. The name Allâh is not understood by the Basrian Mu'tazila to be a proper name (`alam) strictly speaking, nor to designate God's essence. They hold, rather, that Allâh is taken from 'ilâh, with the meaning of "one who deserves to be worshipped" (cf., e.g., Maq, 529, 1-4; M 5, 201, 16 ff. and 210 ff.; 11, 418 f.; et alibi), wherefore it is applicable only to God. This interpretation of the word is not original with the Mu'tazila, nor is it peculiar to them; it is proposed by a number of early exegetes, among them al-Mugahid* (d. 104/722) and ad-Dahhak* (d. 105/723) (cf. at-Tabari*, Tafsîr, Bulaq, 1321, l, 40 f., who states his own preference for this interpretation; note the parallelism in the analysis given in at-Tabari* with that in 'Abd al-Gabbar*, locc. citt.) and is accepted as well by al-Mâturîdî (Tafsîr 1 [Cairo, 1391/1971], p. 96). This is the sense of the word according to the lexicographer Ibn Sîda (al-Muhkam* 4, 258 f.). Others, however, take it as a singular term, viz., a proper name; ibn al-Gawzi* reports (ZÖd al-masîr 2 [Damascus, 1384/1964], 8 f.) that al-Halil* (d. 175/
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791) offered both interpretations, but the citation of al-Halil * given by al-Qâlî (d. 356/967) in al-Bâri` fî l-luga* (facsimile of British Museum ms. Or. 9811, edited by A. S. Fulton [London, 1933], 8) and in Lisân al-'Arab (s.v.) would seem to imply that he preferred the latter, saying that the definite article cannot be removed and that it is not a noun from which one may derive a verb as one can with rahman* and rahím (cf. also Fahr* ad-din ar-Râzî, Tafsîr 1 [Cairo, 1352/1933], P. 96, who attributes this view to Sîbawayh as well as to al-Halil*). An analogous position is taken by al-Mubarrad (al-Muqtadab* 2, 323, 7 f.) who says, in explicit contrast to the position of al-Gubba'i* and his successors in the Basrian Mu'tazila, that Allâh "is the name used of the essence (ad-dat*), while all the rest of God's names are employed adjectivally." 3. Muh*, 172, 4. 4. Cf, e.g., Muh* 61, 9 and 197, 3; Mas (B), 19, 5-9; and ZS, 192, 4; et alibi. 5. Wa-nahnu* naqûlu 'inna mâ huwa `alayhi -ay'u fî datihi* yagibu* lâ li-waghin*, bal bi-'ayyi ay'in `ullila fasad: ZS, 287, 11 f. It is lâ 'an ay'in (ZS, 489, 12 f.): cf. generally ZS 192 f. and 483 ff. 6. Mss (B), 18, 19 ff. That is, the way it is in itself (mâ huwa `alayhî fî datihi*) cannot be grounded in the way it is in itself; see n. 8. 7. Muh, 61, 9 ff.; cf. also ZS, 192, 11 ff. and 287, 11 f., et alibi. 8. Lâ yumkinu ta'lîlu sifati* d-dati* bid-dati* 'aslan: ZS, 192, 11, q.v. et sqq.; see also Mas. 174rº 5. Thus abû Raîd says (ZS, 287, 1315) "When we say that the Attribute of the Essence would not have any reality were it impossible for it to be qualified by the characteristic that is entailed [sc., the essential attribute, on which see the following chapter] or by the characteristic on which the latter is conditioned, viz., existence, we do not mean by this to assign a ground, but rather we mean simply to give a reasoned explanation" [of why and how it is that the impossible, as opposed to that whose existence is possible, has no being and no reality at all]. Concerning "the assigning of grounds" (at-ta'lîl), see Ch. 7. 9. Mss, 174vº 17 f.: 'inns d-data* lâ budda min 'an tuhtassa* bi-sifatin-ma* bihd yatamayyazu; cf. also Ch. 4, n. 3 for the full citation of this passage. 10. Mas (B), 19, 17-19; n.b. also SU5, 108, 9-14. 11. Mas (B) 12, 6 f.: al- awharu* yakûnu gawharan* fî hali* 'adamihî: thus also Tad, 10rº 3: naqûu 'innahû gawharun* fî l-'adami wahakada* l-halu* fî sifati* l-'agnasi* r-ragi`ati* 'ilà dawatiha*; concerning the sifatu* l-'agnas*. see the following chapter, and on the nonexistent (al-ma`dûm), see "al-Mawgud* wal-Ma'dûm." 12. Tatbutu* lahâ fî halatayi* l-'adami wal-wugud*: ZS, 191, ult.f. (reading ttbt* for ytbt): so also Ibn Mattawavh says 'inna l-gawhara* yastahiqqu* hadihi* s-sifata* fî hálatayi l-'adami wal-wugud*: Tad. 10vº 10. 13. Cf., e.g., ZS, 192, 4 ff. and Mss (B), 19, 2 ff. 14. Cf., e.g., ZS, 276, 12 ff. and, for abû Raîd's argument, also Mss (B), 71, 6 ff. (which is translated and discussed in my "Al-Mawgud* wal-ma'dûm," n. 97.); Tad, 8rº f. and M 6/1, 54, 12 f. It is sometimes asserted that abû 'Abdallâh held that the nonexistent (i.e., the possible) does have a state in its being nonexistent (cf., e.g., ZS, 245. 1 f. and 276, 144 f.); the information given concerning his position, however, is insufficient for a clear understanding of how this formula is to be understood. Both abû Raîd and Ibn Mattawayh express some uncertainty regarding the precise sense of his teaching, saying that he appears to have affirmed that the atom has, in some sense, ubication (at-tahayyuz*) even when it is nonexistent (cf. Mas (B), 12, 7 ff. and Tad, 6vº 23 ff.), though he said that the characteristic is not manifest save through the atom's capability of serving as a substrate for accidents and in its being perceived when it actually exists (wa-yaqûlu 'inna hukmahu* lâ yazharu* 'illâ bil-wugudi*
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bi-hassatayn *: Tad, 6vº 24 f.). Ubication is a state for abû Hâim and his followersan essential attribute (see Ch. 4 and 5)and though abû Raîd and Ibn Mattawayh interpret the reported doctrine of abû 'Abdallâh as implying that the atom has a state bi-kawnihî ma'dûman, it is hardly certain that he would have allowed the formulation. He denied that the nonexistent could be said in fact to be ('inna l-ma`dûma l-muntafiyu l-ladi* laysa bi-kâ'inin [wa-]lâ tabit*: SU5, 176, 11 f.). It is likely that he meant no more than that the atom is intelligible only as being mutahayyiz*. 15. Cf. my "Al-Mawgud* wal-Ma`dûm," n. 100 and concerning the thing-itself in the Attribute of the Essence as the possible, ibid. The possibility of the possible (gawazu* wugudihi*) is grounded ultimately in God's having the power to cause it to exist. 16. Cf., e.g., Mas (B), 21, 9-14 and 21, 21 ff. 17. Cf., for Ibn 'Ayyâ's position, Mas (B), 12, 12 f. and Tad, 6vº 26-28; 'ammâ s-sayhu* 'abû 'Ishaqa*, fa-'innahû mâ 'atbata* kawnahû gawharan* fî l-'adami; wa-qála 'inna l-muhalafata* l-hasilata* fî l-'adami yutbatu* bi-sifatin* muntazaratin* lâ bi-sifatin* hasilatin*, wa-huwa t-tahayyuzu*, fa-lá yutbitu* gayra* t-tahayyuzi* wal-wugudi* wa-kawnihî fî gihatin*; cf. also Fahr* ad-Dîn ar-Râzî, alMuhassal* (Cairo, 1323), 37. In effect Ibn `Ayyâ denies against abû Hâim the Attribute of the Essence as a true attribute and so restricts the number of attributes that the atom must inevitably have when it exists to three; for abû Hâim's position and his followers' arguments against Ibn `Ayyâ, cf., e.g., ZS, 191 f.; Mas (B), 21, 1 ff. and also SU5, 554 f.; and see Ch. 5, n. 5. 18. Tad, 10rº 4-6: gami'u* d-dawati* lá budda min 'an yutbata* rnuhalifan* li-má yuhalifuhu* fî l-'adami, wal-muhalafatu* lá taqi`u bikawnihî datan*, fa'inna .d-dawati* mutarikatun fî dalika*, fa-yagibu* wuqû`uhá bi-sifatin* wa-tilka s-sifatu* hiya l-latî yu'abbaru `anhâ bi-kawnihî gawharan*; wa-'innamâ 'atbatna* l-muhalafata* fî l-ma`dûmâti li-'annahá ma'lûmatun. That a thing has no attribute in its being an entity (ay') or thing-itself (dat*), see Ch. 4. 19. Cf. Mas (B), 8, 14 ff. 20. Cf. my "Al-Mawgud* wal-Ma'dûm," n. 8 et alibi. 21. 'Inna halatahu* bi-kawnihî gawharan* gayru* halatihi* bi-kawnihî mawgudan*; fa-'ida* lam yakun bayna s-sifatayni* ta`alluqun, lam yamtani` 'igra'u* hada* l-wasfi* 'alà mâ laysa bi-mawgud*: Tad, 10vº 23 f., q.v. et sqq. 22. Cf., e.g., Tad, 10vº 6 f.: ad-datu* lâ yahrugu* 'an kawnihâ datan* li-anna ma`nâhû sihhatu* l-'ilmi bihî wal-habari* 'anhû, wahuwa fî kulli halin* bi-hadihi* l-mataba*.
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Chapter 4 The Essential Attributes Essential Attributes and Characteristics The essential attributes are distinguished as those that belong to a thing "by virtue of the way it is in itself;" 1 they are not themselves "the way the thing is in itself" but manifest the "essence"/thing-itself as it is in itself. The Attribute of the Essence is the being of the thing-itself in the total identity of its self with itself and so, when formulated, is predicated of the thing in such a way that no duality is stated or implied. The essential attributes, however, are entailed by the essence (muqtadatun* `anhâ); they are states or characteristics of the thing-itself that are distinctive and characteristic of it as it is manifest, recognised, and known. Their formulation, accordingly, does not express the absoluteness of the thing's being in the sheer compactness of its being itself but incompletely and partially and in a duality in which it is known (even as the definition must in some way dissolve the sameness of the subject into some form of otherness in which the predicate is not simply identical with the subject and so does not express the absolute fullness of the being of the thing as it is in itself). The attribute (sifa* in both senses) is not identical with its subject, as when one says that the atom is "that which occupies space'' (al-mutahayyiz*), for the single attribute is characteristic of the essence itself as it is in itself, but the manifestation is other than that of which it is the manifestation and so too is less than the fullness of the being of the thing-itself. Similarly our statement that God is knowing ('âlim) or is possessed of the power of autonomous action (qâdir) or is existent (mawgud*) does not express the fullness of His being as He is in Himself, but a manifest characteristic of His being that, nonetheless, since it is directly entailed by His being as He is in Himself (muqtadan* `ammâ huwa `alayhî fî nafsihî), reveals His being as it is distinctive in itself.2 The essential attribute is, thus, ontologically distinguished from the Attribute of the Essence;
Page 59 The "essence"/thing-itself (dat *) must of necessity be specifically characterized by some attribute [sc., the Attribute of the Essence] by which it is distinguished (yatarnayyazu) from what is other, and this attribute must of necessity have some characteristic [sc., the essential attribute] by which it becomes manifest. This characteristic is, so to speak, what it really is (al-haqiqa*) and it must be conditional upon the existence [of the thing-itself].3
Since it is normally what is manifest, one can say generally that "the entailed is, so to speak, the reality (haqiqa*) of that which entails;"4 because it is what is manifest and so can be grasped by the mind (`uqila), it is the thing as we know it and is, therefore, "so to speak" what we really mean and understand when we name the thing and speak of it: kalhaqiqa*.5 The term is qualified by "so to speak" (ka-, literally "like"), since properly and strictly speaking (fî l-haqiqa*) what we mean and refer to is that which is the true object of our knowing (alma`lûm), i.e., the thing-itself as it is in itself in the Attribute of the Essence, and not the manifest attribute or characteristic that is entailed by it. Although the thing-itself can be said to be itself in the Attribute of the Essence whether it exists or not, existence (sc., the state of being existent) is the condition (sart*) and a ground ('asl*) of the actuality (husul*) of the essential attributes.6 Existence ''is the attribute through which the characteristics of the various kinds of things-themselves are manifest"; "alongside existence there can be no other condition for the actuality of the entailed" [sc., of the essential attribute].7 Existence, thus, is the condition and ground of the manifestation (zuhur*) of the essential attributes and so, for us, of the thing-itself insofar as it is capable of being manifest in itself and known and distinguished by the mind. "It belongs to every thing-itself that when it exists it is distinguished (yatarnayyazu) by something ('amr) which becomes a means of access to it."8 "There is no kind of being (gins*), save that when it exists it has some attribute by which it is manifestly distinguished (yabînu) from what is other."9 It is because this attribute manifests the thing-itself as it is in itself and constitutes, thus, its accessibility to our knowledge of it as it is in itself that it must, according to abû Hâim and his followers, be grounded directly in the Attribute of the Essence. For example, "the atom is, when it is nonexistent, specifically characterized by an attribute but is not manifest (lâ yazharu*) except through its occupying space, wherefore this [sc., its occupying space] must be entailed by the Attribute of the Essence."10 'Abd al-Gabbar* describes the relationship of the essential attribute to the Attribute of the Essence and that of existence in the following terms:
Page 60 The characteristic of the attribute of existence is that the Attribute of the Essence is actually made manifest through it so that the former [sc., existence] is that which fulfills the condition of the actuality of the latter [sc., the manifestation]. We know that the former is undifferentiated in things-themselves. It is because of its existence that the attribute which is entailed by the Attribute of the Essence becomes manifest and through its existence we come to know how it is in itself. Thus this attribute [sc., existence] must be one and undifferentiated.... Now that whose effect is greater and stronger than the effect of conditions (surut *) and factors that fulfill the condition of actuality ('umûrun tusahhihu*), viz., that which effects the attribute by way of necessity, is differentiated here. The atom, because of the way it is in itself, effects its occupying space when it exists and so also with black. That which is entailed [sc., the essential attribute] differs by virtue of this, not because of any difference in existence itself.11
The atom, since it has some surface area, cannot exist without occupying space12 and so also black cannot exist without there being some specific disposition (hay'a) of the substrate.13 Thus also, all other accidents, since they are things. themselves, having their Attributes of the Essence,14 manifest their essential attributes "that give notice of how the thing-itself is in itself" (tunbi'u `ammâ `alayhi d-datu* fî nafsihâ), as, for example, life in effecting sentience and the unity of the living composite15 or "pressure" (i'timâd) by the directionality of its effect.16 It is these characteristics ('ahkam*) that distinguish and manifest the "essence"/ thing-itself and so may, in most instances, serve as the basis of the definition of the thing. Similarly God's being knowing, living, and endowed with autonomous power are in some sense conditional upon His being existent, but since these attributes, including existence, are essential attributes, they are entailed by His Attribute of the Essence (by His being as He is in Himself) and manifest to us His essence as it is in itself.17 We have at this point to distinguish between the "characteristic" (al-liukm*) and the attribute (as-sifa*) and the state (al-hal*), for though in a number of contexts the former may be used as a quasi synonym for the latter terms, it is formally distinguished as the characteristic, not of the "essence"/thing-itself, but of its attributes or states. That is, whereas entities, things-themselves, have attributes which are ontologically states of their being that are predicated of them, the attributes (sifat*) have manifest characteristics ('ahkam*) whereby they are grasped by the mind ('uqila), recognised, and distinguished from one another.18 In many cases we know the nature of the attribute and its actuality only by inference
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(istidlâl) from the manifestation of its characteristics, "for when the attribute is not directly perceptible or is not given immediate intuition, it is presented to us only through its characteristics." 19 In this way one speaks of the characteristic of the attribute (sc., state) of existence in the text cited earlier (n. 11) or of the "characteristic of the essential attribute"20 or even of the essential attribute as a characteristic of the Attribute of the Essence, as in the passage from abû Raîd translated P. 59. Accordingly, also, one not infrequently speaks of the characteristics of the accidents, meaning the characteristics that are manifest in the effects that, flowing from them as causes ('ilal), manifest their essential attributes through some state (hal*), either of the substrate or of the living body as a whole or totality. The causes ('ilal, sc., the ma'ânî) and the characteristics that flow directly from them are distinct, for the characteristics of the cause are, so to speak, the manifest reality (haqiqa*) of the cause, so that the actuality (husul*) of the former is impossible apart from the latter.21
It is the characteristic of the state that evidences the presence and nature of the accident. More properly, however, one speaks of the characteristics of states. Thus, for example, one speaks of "the characteristic of the atom's occupying space" or of "the characteristic of His being endowed with autonomous power," or of the specific characteristics of His being-living.22 The attribute is manifested in the characteristics that its actuality (husul*) entails. Thus where to be qâdir is an attribute (sc., a state), "the possibility of acting is a characteristic not an attribute. The characteristic is always derivative of the attribute, for it is, so to speak, the reality of it and is what reveals it" (kal-haqiqati* fîhâ wal-munbi'u `anhâ),23 even though in some cases this might be quite indirect. Thus, for example, in the case of a thing's being joined or bound to another (kawnuhû mu'allafan bi-gayrihi*) through the accident of composition (ta'lîf), "the characteristic that reveals it (yunbi'u `anhû), viz., the difficulty of separating [its components], belongs to the autonomous agent [i.e., in the effort required on his part to achieve the separation], not to the characteristic of the substrate; and its being wet or dry belongs to the characteristics and not to the states,"24 for "the way by which [the accident of] wetness is affirmed is through inference based on the characteristic of its substrate, since the wet has no state in its being wet; this characteristic is the wet's necessarily receding from the hand of the one who would lay hold of it."25 The attributes and states, thus, are specifically described or defined by
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their characteristics and the separate accidents, in turn, as the determinant causes of the particular characteristics in which the effected attribute or state is manifest and understood. Save in the limited number of beings that in one or another of their attributes are immediately accessible to sense or intuition, the reality and nature of things-themselves, of their being and their attributes, are known and understood only in our grasp and reflection on the characteristics that more or less directly manifest their presence and nature. Abû Hâim remarks that In many cases when we wish to define something we can find no succinct locution to convey the meaning and so have to have recourse to mentioning its related characteristics and the states that belong to it. 26
In the case of existence (i.e., the state of being existent), for example, The characteristic of a thing's being existent is that the characteristics of the thing-itself be manifest, for this depends upon existence and so long as it is not existent, one finds neither the entailed attributes (as-sifatu* l-muqtadatu*), nor the characteristics that are directly ascribed to them (al-'ahkamu* r-râgi`atu 'ilayhâ).27
Again, the accident of pressure or momentum (al-i'timâd) is defined in terms of directionality (giha*) and "pushing away" (al-mudâfa`a) and the basis on which one must affirm this proposition concerning pressure is that one must affirm that every thing-itself has, when it exists, that which becomes a cause of its being distinguished (sababun li-tamayyuzihî) from everything else and in the case of pressures one can point to nothing more specifically characteristic ('amrun 'ahassu*).28
So also "life must be specifically characterized (tuhtass*) by some characteristic by which it is distinct from other accidents," sc., the actuality of the possibility of perception (sihhatu* l-'idrâk) or of knowing or of autonomous action or its producing the unity of the corporeal body, and it is these characteristics that are, "so to speak, its haqiqa*;" i.e., it is they, so to speak, that we most strictly mean and refer to when we speak of life and being alive.29 Thus in defining the attribute of the living we say: 'That which is not incapable of being knowing or of being qâdir', since we can find no one word of established usage (lafzatun* mawdu`a*) which expresses what is meant better than 'living,' and we make plain the sense of what is intended by 'living' by mentioning the characteris-
Page 63 tics that are actually possible in the living and not in anything else. 30
Likewise the state or attribute of being knowing may be described or defined as constituting the actual possibility of the realization of a wellwrought act (sihhatu* wuqû`i l-fi`li l-muhkam*) on the part of one who is knowing, since by this characteristic it may be recognized as a distinct attribute in another;31 and the attribute of having the power of autonomous action (sc., being qâdir) is described or defined as constituting the actual possibility of the realization of an act (sihhatu* l-fi`l, sihhatu* 'igadi* l-fi`l), for "this attribute is revealed (yankasifu*) through this characteristic which is, thus, its haqiqa*."32 Several distinctions, however, are to be made. As was noted earlier, what is first and primarily understood by a given attribute or state is one and the same for all beings whose being is qualified as having the particular state and the attribute. For this reason it may be predicated univocally of all beings that are so qualified. In that the ground of the actuality of the state in one being may, however, be different from its ground in another, some characteristics of the attribute may also be seen to differ when one goes beyond those first and primary characteristics that are manifest in all subjects of which it may be predicated. For example, although the possibility of the realization of an act is the essential characteristic of the attribute of being qâdir and so is true of any being of which the attribute may be predicated, the characteristics that belong to qâdir's being qâdir may be divided as 1) it may be simply his being qâdir alone, which is the possibility of action, or 2) it may be his being qâdir through [the accident of] qudra, which is that the act is possible on his part only in the substrate of the qudra or ... that its object is restricted in kind and number, or 3) that it may be because of something that is ascribed to his being essentially qâdir (qâdirun lin-nafs) as his having the power to realize acts unlimited either in kind or in number, etc.33
In the latter instance the characteristic belongs to an essential attribute of God and so, even if only in part, reveals His being as He is in Himself. In the former instance, the characteristics derive from the essential attribute of the entitative accident that is inherent in the material substrate; its correlation [to its object] is by virtue of the attribute that is entailed by the Attribute of the Essence and follows consequent upon existence ...; we insist that the correlation [to its object] must belong to the characteristic of this attribute because through it this attribute is revealed, just as it is revealed* by its [sc., the accident's]
Page 64 necessitating the attribute for the one who is qâdir and thus it becomes, so to speak, its haqiqa *.34
Finally, a given attribute may have but a single characteristic in terms of which it is known and may be defined, while another may, as in the case of life, cited earlier, have a number of specific characteristics. Speaking again of the power of autonomous action, Ibn Mattawayh remarks that it is necessary that his being qâdir be correlated only to the act's being caused to exist and that this be, as it were, the reality (haqiqa*) which reveals his being qâdir. This is made clear in that, since we know his being qâdir through the act's being caused to exist, it is necessary that this attribute effect only this characteristic, for when the attribute is known only through a single particular characteristic, it must, in its effect, not go beyond it, like the atom's being an atom and its occupying space. In this way [the qâdir's being qâdir] or the atom's occupying space differ from the living's being living and this attribute's being known through several different characteristics, because something the means of knowing which is not restricted to a single thing need not be restricted in what it effects to a single manner but rather it may effect a number of characteristics.35
The particular attribute or state, thus, may be manifest and known in one or more characteristics, just as a single essence or thing-itself may have one or more essential attributes. Similarity and Difference Strictly speaking, sameness (at-tamatul*) and difference (al-ihtilaf*) are predicated only of things-themselves and not of attributes.36 The things-themselves, however, are intelligible only through their characteristics and attributes.37 Two passages should be cited in this context: Know that "essences"/things-themselves (dawat*) are distinguished (tatamayyazu) from one another by their attributes. It makes no difference whether the particular thing-itself be recognised in immediate intuition ('urifa daruratan*)38 or through inference from evidence (bid-dalâla), for if it is perceived directly, it must be perceived as having some attribute ('alà sifatin*), and if it is known through inference from evidence, then it must perforce be distinguished from something else through its being specifically charac-
Page 65 terised (ihtisasuha *) by an attribute that does not belong to that which differs from it. Just as this is the case with things-themselves, so attributes are distinguished through their characteristics, so that the detailed knowledge of the attribute and the distinction between it and another is not achieved (hasala*), save when one knows its characteristics. This is universally so except in the case of an attribute that is known necessarily or that we experience directly in our persons.39 That whereby one knows that the attributes belonging to things-themselves differ (ihtalafat*), when this knowledge is not given necessarily, is that their characteristics differ (ihtalafa*), so that through the difference of their characteristics we arrive at their being different in themselves, just as the way to the recognition that things-them-selves are different is their being different in those characteristics that are actually possible (tasihhu*) or are necessary or are impossible, so that what is meant by things-themselves' being different is that they do not correspond one to another in their necessary, possible, and impossible characteristics, and what is meant by their being similar (tamâtuluhâ) is that the), correspond in the characteristics that actually belong (tatbutu*) to them, so that when they are not distinguished (lam taftariq) in these characteristics, we recognise that they are similar, and if they are distinguished, we recognise that they are different.40
Things, then, are distinguished as different from one another or are the same as one another and similar in terms of the attributes and characteristics we have been discussing; i.e., similarity and dissimilarity, sameness and difference, are determined through the Attribute of the Essence or through the essential attributes that flow directly from it.41 One of the characteristics of being different (al-muhalafa*) is that it specifically characterizes singulars. Being different, thus, and being the same are derivative of the Attribute of the Essence or of that which is entailed by it.... As for contrariety (at-tadadd*), on the other hand, what is most likely is that it has its reality (tubut*) only through the attribute that is entailed by the Attribute of the Essence and not by virtue of the essence itself. Otherwise a thing would have to be a contrary of another when it was nonexistent, but it is in this that the situation of contrariety differs from that of being-different, for the latter is a fact in nonexistence.42
That is, there is no real contrariety (at-tadaddu* fî l-haqiqa*) apart from the existent, for the contrariety of one thing with another is real and a fact (tabit*) only as the coming to be of the one excludes the being of the
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other and causes it to cease to exist. 43 The nonexistent (al-ma'dûm), however, as that whose existence was or is possible (or what once existed and is no more) is real in its possibility; each possibleeach nonexistentis distinguished in itself as being itself and as other than what is other and also different from what is different and similar to what is similar.44 For our understanding, however, since we have no direct knowledge of the nonexistent, the essential attribute is the ground of the sameness and difference of things-themselves insofar as "to be the same occurs only through that the knowledge of which is a basis of the knowledge of the [thing's] being the same."45 To know the attribute of a thing is to know the thing as qualified by the particular attribute, i.e., to know its being as its being is to be according to a particular state or to manifest a certain characteristic.46 If the essential attributes or characteristics that manifest the essential reality of the thing-itself were under any conceivable circumstances to cease to be characteristic of the thing-itself as it is in itself and to manifest its essential reality, then the thing-itself would cease thereby to be knowable and accordingly, by definition, cease to be "something" (ay')to be anything at all.47 Thus "that two things share in an attribute that is necessitated by the Attribute of the Essence is similar to their sharing in the Attribute of the Essence in the necessity of their being similar,"48 "for it is impossible that two things share in one of their essential attributes and not in the rest of their essential attributes,"49 "since if two things-themselves share in one of their essential attributes, one knows that to the 'essence' (dat*) of the one must belong all that belongs to the other, because that which necessitates its belonging to the one necessitates its belonging to the other.'' 50 Conversely, to differ in one of the essential attributes is to differ in all, "since through that attribute by which a thing-itself is distinguished from that which differs from it, it conforms to that with which it shares it."51 It is, thus, that some of these attributes are frequently referred to as the most characteristic or most specific attributes or characteristics ('ahassu* l-'awsâaf, 'ahassu* l-'ahkam*: ),52 since it is through them that we know the essential being of things and through no other attributes.53 The Modes of the Actuality of Attributes What is given forpresent toour knowledge and understanding is given and available only through the characteristics of its presentation.
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The Attribute of the Essence remains opaque in itself, just as the statement of it (e.g., 'the atom is an atom') indicates only its identity with itself and presents no duality that allows of analysis. An essential attribute, however, reveals the thing-itself as it is in itself (mâ huwa 'alarm fî datihi *). We cannot know, thus, the atom as it is in itself in the absoluteness of its being itself, but when, for example, we know its occupying space, even if we know no other attribute that belongs to it, we know that it is distinct in itself from what is different from it, so that its being distinct in itself must be realized (hasala*) through its occupying space and what entails it, for if it were to be distinct in itself through some other attribute, then we, not knowing this latter attribute, would not know that it is different [from another being] even though we do know that it occupies space, because the knowledge of its being different is derivative of the knowledge of that which effects its being different, as has been shown in the works [of the masters of the School].54
Thus also God's being, as He is in Himself, is revealed through His essential attributes: His being existent, being living, being qâdir, and being knowing. Our understanding of His being, however, is not given simply in our grasp of the attributes as such, but in our knowledge that they are essential attributes, i.e., in our knowing also the way in which it belongs to Him to have these attributes (waghu* stihqaqihi* lahâ). 'Abd al-Gabbar* remarks that Essential attributes may be divided. There are some in which the distinctiveness ('ibâna) [i.e., of the thing from what is essentially other] occurs through the attribute itself, so that whatever it belongs to to have it must necessarily be different (though it must permanently belong to it to have it); when, however, the distinctiveness occurs through the way in which it belongs to the qualified to have it [i.e., the attribute] and not merely through the attribute itself, one must consider the manner in which it belongs to the thing to have it and not the attribute. We know that the Eternal does not differ from all else by being existent, since others share this with Him, but differs from all else in that it belongs to Him to have this [attribute] in a way that is ascribed to His essence.55
Similarly, whereas it belongs to us to be knowing through the inherence of an accident (li-ma`nà), sc., the act of knowing, the Eternal is distinguished (yabînu) from other things-themselves by His being knowing in a way in which it does not belong to others,
Page 68 so that His situation in this regard is analogous to that of knowing's being knowing. 56
That is, as in the case of the entitative accident of knowing, the Attribute of the Essence (viz., knowing's being knowing) effects, because of the way it is in itself, the actuality of its essential attribute, viz., the causing of the one in whom it inheres to be knowing of that which he knows in the particular act of knowing, so with God, the Attribute of the Essence grounds in Him, because of the way He is in Himself, the actuality of his being knowing of all that is knowable. As was mentioned before, God's Attribute of the Essence is most commonly taken as His being eternal (kawnuhû qadîman). This is interpreted in terms of the necessity of His attributes57 and most specifically of the necessity of His being existent: That by which the Eternal differs from what is other is His being eternal, because this entails (yaqtadi*) in Him the actuality of existence by virtue of the way He is in Himself, neither by a cause ('illa, sc., an "accident"), nor through the action of an agent.58
"Existence is necessary for the Eternal simply because of His being specifically characterized by a state in which He is distinguished from all other existents."59 "That which entails existence in Him is His essence."60 The descriptive predicates, as we have noted, are fundamentally univocal; the primary characteristics by which a given attribute is distinguished and defined do not vary. What it is to be knowing, for examplei.e., what is given to our understanding of this attribute through its manifest characteristicsis fundamentally one and the same for all knowing beings. So too with the attribute of being existent; we know it in all beings as the ground and condition of the actuality and manifestation of their essential attributes and recognise its actuality through the apprehension of these attributes. To be temporally contingent (al-hudut*) and to be eternal (al-qidam) are not attributes (sifat*), nor are they characteristics of an attribute. Existencewhat is conveyed when we say of a being that it is existent: the ground of the actuality of its essential attributes is not more in one being and less in another; it is not subject to augmentation or diminution, nor can one existent be said to be more existent than another.61 The contingency or necessity of an attribute is, rather, a mode (kayfîya) of its actuality. The mode of the attribute, however, is not a qualification that distinguishes the attribute by modifying its proper characteristics or by adding in one case or in another taking away any specific characteristic, nor is it ontologically distinct from the
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attribute itself. Our understanding of the mode of an attribute is an understanding first of the attribute itself, and it is in the grasp of the mode that we know the reality of that which is revealed through the attribute's characteristics and, insofar as its being is revealed through the attribute, the nature of the being of which the attribute is an attribute. `Abd al-Gabbar * asks How is it possible that one deny the temporal contingency of a thing and affirm its eternity without having grasped (`aqala) its existence, given that contingency and eternity are derivative of (yatba`âni) existence, and how is it possible that one grasp (yu`qalu) the existence of the thing without grasping the characteristics by which it is specifically characterised, given that the means to the understanding of the existence of the thing is the recognition (ma`rifa) of its characteristics that are related to its existence?62
The state of being existent, thus, is not distinguished and different as such in diverse beings. "That God's being be necessary is not an attribute over and above His being existent, but is simply a mode (kayfîya) of the attribute of existence."63 In knowing the necessity of God's existence, therefore, we do not know Him as qualified by any attribute in addition to the state of being existent, even though apart from knowing the mode of His existence we cannot know the nature of His being as He is in Himself.64 The same is true of our understanding of His other attributes: the necessity of His being living, knowing, etc., or the contingency of His being willing. Similarly, apart from the knowledge of the contingency of the attribute of existence in the creature we do not know the nature of its being as existent, and apart from that of the contingency of its attributes of knowing, etc., we do not know the nature of its being as qualified by these attributes, nor that of the entitative accidents whose existence is revealed in the actuality of their characteristics, which are manifest in the being in which the accidents inhere. Again, one may say that "to inhere in a substrate (al-hulul*) is one of the characteristics of accidents"65 but to inhere is "to exist in the locus of another (bi-haytu* l-gayr*), the other occupying space,"66 so that in speaking of an accident's inherence in a substrate strictly "what one refers to is its mode of existing."67 "In its being inherent in its substrate the accident does not have any attribute over and above its existence,"68 and "thus when one asks concerning the inherence of one of two things-themselves in the substrate and the impossibility of the inherence of the other in it, this is neither an attribute (sifa*), nor a characteristic (hukm*) in addition to its existence.'' 69 That is, when we say that a being is inherent (hall*) (sc., in a substrate) and that another is not inherent (gayru*
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ha11 *), what we have said is simply that they exist: that each one is existent and, in the actuality of its existence, manifests its essential attributes. Each exists according to its own proper mode and our grasp of the nature of its being, if it is to be complete, must include therefore the mode of its existence. Most accidents can exist only as inherent in a substrate, so that abû Raîd remarks in one passage that "the basic principle of accidents is that they exist in substrates."70 This is not, however, a kind of generic characteristic that they have because they are accidents, for the accident has no attribute or characteristic as such (i.e., by virtue of its being an accident); rather some must inhere in their substrates for one or another characteristic reason because of their type or kind (lil-gins* or lin-naw`i wal-qàbîl) and others for less intrinsic reasons. The accident of "conviction" (al-i`tiqâd, which includes conjecture and credence as well as knowing) requires for its existence the organically structured substrate of the heart (binyatu l-qalb).71 Speech, on the other hand, is a kind of sound and so, like all other directly perceptible accidents, cannot exist save in a substrate because it cannot manifest its essential characteristics except through the substrate.72 Again the entitative accident of qudra (the power of autonomous action) cannot function except through the corporeal agent's employing its substrate, so that it too can exist and manifest its essential characteristic only in a substrate.73 The need (ihtiyag*, iftiqâr) that such accidents have for a substrate is, thus, attributable in one way or another to the specific nature of the accident. In addition, all accidents whose existence effects some state or attribute of the being of a corporeal entitywhich function, thus, as causes ('ilal) of the attribute that is manifest in a corporeal beingmust inhere in the substrate of that entity if the attribute is specifically to characterize it. Thus the accidents of willing and knowing require a substrate because they are entitative causes (`illatân) and so must necessarily be particularly associated with one of us, since it belongs to an entitative cause that it must be specifically associated with the effect with the utmost specificity and for one of us [i.e., for a material individual] this can only be by way of inherence.74
In some instances this need for a substrate for the sake of particular association or specific qualification (ihtisas*) may be considered as derivative (tâbi`) of the specific nature of the accident;75 but this is not universally so since some entitative accidents, sc., God's acts of willing, do not require a substrate at all. Consequently in regard to the need of speech (kalâm) for a substrate
Page 71 the situation differs from that of the act of willing ('irâda) since the act of willing, when it requires a substrate, does not require it because of anything ascribable to the kind and type of thing it is (ginsuha * wa-qabîluhâ) but because it is a material cause (`illa and it does not necessitate the characteristic of the caused save when it is specifically associated with it with the utmost specificity....76
This is more fully explained by Ibn Mattawayh who says, concerning the fact that God's act of willing is not in a substrate (lâ fî mshall*) while ours is, that in this case there is no distinction (iftirâq) that is based on a characteristic ascribable to the essences [of the acts as things-themselves], but the inherence in a substrate in the case of our act of willing is conditioned simply by the necessity of specific association (ihtisas*), since one of us has not the power to effect it save in this way [i.e., save through employing the qudar inherent in the substrate of the heart]. How can it be ascribed to their essences when it is a mode of existence?77
That is to say, the accident's inherence in its substrate is simply the mode of its existence as it is caused to exist; the particular accident of willing exists so because the corporeal agent cannot initiate the being of an act save in the substrate of the accident of his power of efficient causality (qudra) and because the attribute that arises from the actuality of the accident as cause can specifically qualify and characterize his being only when it inheres in a substrate that is an intergral part of the living totality (gumla*) that is he. Within the specialized terminology of the school's analysis of the ontology of the attributes, the mode (kayfîya) of existence is, thus, neither an attribute (sifa*), nor the characteristic (hukm*) of a being or attribute and accordingly one cannot assign to it any of the ontological grounds that are given as those of the attributes and in terms of which the categories of attributes are formally distinguished; it has no separately identifiable ground of its own apart from that of the attribute of which it is the mode. The accident's inherence in its substrate, for example, cannot be taken as an attribute or characteristic of the thing-itself (i.e., as an essential attribute of the particular accident), since, as abû Hâim puts it, if it were so then all accidents that shared in it would have to be similar (tamatala*). Nor, though the mode of the attribute of existence, can it be grounded in its existence (bil-wugudi* wal-huduti*)i.e., on-tologically derived from its existence as suchsince, if this were so, whatever shared in this attribute would have to inhere in the same sub-
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strate. 78 The mode of existence is not, strictly speaking, a basis of a thing's being similar (tamatala*) or dissimilar (halafa*, ihtalafa*), nor of one thing's being distinguished (tamayyaza, bâna, fâraqa) from another, nor of one attribute's being distinguished from another, for things-themselves (dawat*) are distinguished by their attributes and the attributes by their characteristics. Apart from the mode of the attribute, however, one cannot fully grasp the nature of the thing whose being is revealed in the attribute. As the term hal* does not occur with great frequency in the texts, sifa* being by far the more common term employed to designate the attributes that are predicated of things as states of their being (so much so, indeed, as to lead one scholar to suggest that the notion of the hal* was not adopted by abû Hâim's successors in the Basrian School), so also kayfîya, used of the mode of the attributes, is not found with any notable frequency in the sources, nor is it often discussed for its own sake. Even so the concept, which originates at the latest in the doctrine of abû Hâim, is central to the school's understanding of the nature of the attributes.79 Attributes Ascribed to the Gins* and to the Naw`, The essential attributes are not infrequently referred to as sifat* al-gins*, i.e., those attributes that belong to a thing by virtue of its being the particular "kind" of thing that it is: li-ginsihi*. Though these "specific attributes" (if the expression may be so rendered) may be fully and adequately defined as essential attributes, it will be well nevertheless to examine briefly the use of the expression, since this will serve further to elucidate the conception of the essential attributes as it is treated and employed in the texts. Also the terminology may itself give rise to some ambiguity or confusion because the Basrian Mu`tazila employ the terms gins* and naw` differently than does al-Mâturîdî, for example, or than do the translation literature and the Islamic traditions that follow it or are influenced by it. The term gins*, as used in the writings of the Basrian Mu`tazila, does not mean "genus" in the Aristotelian sense. Rather they employ the term gins* most commonly to indicate "kind," ''type," or "class" of a being and as suchi.e., as a common term taken from ordinary literary Arabicit is used often to refer to more or less broadly defined categories. For example, one says that speech (kalâm) or will ('irâda) belongs to the category of action (ginsu* l-fi'l) or to the general
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category of accidents (ginsu * l-'a`rad*). In the context with which we are here concerned, however, sc., what is meant by saying that a thing has a given attribute or characteristic by virtue of its gins*, the expression is taken in a narrower sense more akin to the Aristotelian category of species. That is, it designates the thing's being what it is in itself. The attributes, therefore, which are "ascribed to its gins*" (arrâ`atu 'ilà l-gins)that it has "by virtue of its gins*" (lil-gins*)are those which it has by virtue of its being specifically what it is and which, because it is what it is, must inevitably belong to it when it exists. In speaking of "what a thing entails by its gins*" (mâ yaqtadi* -ay'u liginsihi* one says, for example, that the accident of qudra ''by its gins*"i.e., by being what it isentails the possibility of the act on the part of the one in whom the accident inheres; that the accident of willing's "necessitating the being willing of the one who wills is necessary by its being what it is" (li-ginsiha*); or that life "through a property ascribed to its gins* causes the parts (al-'agza'*, i.e., of the body) to come to have the character of a single being."80 That is to say, given the actuality of their existence, these accidents effect these characteristics or attributes in the subject of their inherence. In the strictest sense, however, the concept of the gins* as the thing's being what it is is understood more narrowly than in these examples. Most strictly speaking things are said to be of one and the same gins* which share in their essential attributes and are altogether alike (mutamatila*), such as the individual atoms (gawahir*) or the individual units of black ('agza'u* s-sawâd), which are indistinguishable one from another and cannot differ.81 Thus too, the units of life (hayat*) are identical with one another and form a single gins*.82 The individual units of qudra (al-qudar), however, or of acts of willing (al-'irâdât) differ and are dissimilar (muhtalifa*) if they are correlated to different objects and in this way may be considered as not of the same gins*. To illustrate more clearly and precisely the use of the term and what is meant by an attribute's being lil-gins* it will be convenient to cite a passage from `Abd al-Gabbar's* Mugni* and to give a brief analysis of it. In treating the question (already alluded to earlier in the slightly different context) of why the act of willing (al-'irâda), unlike other accidents (ma'ânî), need not inhere in a substrate in order to exist among other remarks he makes the following: It is not excluded that [the individuals of] a single gins* be distinguished (iftaraqa) by a characteristic that is not ascribed to the gins* as such. This is excluded only in the necessary characteristics that it has by its essence (li-nafsihî) or by virtue of the way it is in
Page 74 itself (li-mâ huwa `alayhî fî datihi *). The others [i.e., other characteristics] result from the act of willing. Thus it is possible in two units of black (sawâdân) that one of them belong specifically (ihtassa*) to a substrate other than that of the other and that one of two spatial presences (kawnân) belong specifically to a position other than that to which the other specifically belongs and that what may be true of conviction (i'tiqâd) when it is knowing (`ilm) may not be true of it when it is mere acceptance of authority (taqlîd), even though the two are of one and the same gins*. Now since this is so and since it is not necessary that the act of willing that specifically characterizes one of us exist in a substrate by virtue of its gins* or for any equivalent reason, it is not excluded that an act of the same gins* exist not in a substrate, just as it is not excluded that the like of Zayd's act of willing exist in the heart of `Amr.83
The Qadi* here quite expressly identifies the sifat* al-gins* with the Attribute of the Essence and the essential attributes, i.e., with those that are necessary given the actuality of existence, as opposed to those attributes and characteristics that, in one way or another, are determinable by the act of the agent who causes the thing to exist or through his act of willing (that are mawqûfatun `alà l-'irâda, as it is put in the present passage). By this latter he means those attributes that a thing may have "by virtue of the way it occurs or comes to be" (liwaghi* wuqû`ihî or hudutihi*). These we shall take up subsequently under the generic category of attributes that are determined by the agent (bil-fa`îl). It is sufficient in the present context to note that apart from the Attribute of the Essence and the essential attributes, it is these alone that the accident may have as distinguishing characteristics or attributes (taking sifat* and 'ahkam* in the strict sense).84 When, however, he says that "it is not excluded that an act of the same gins* (mâ huwa min ginsiha*) exist not in a substrate," he does not, as is clear from the example, refer simply to any act of willing but rather to an act of willing that has the selfsame object, "for its correlation to the object to which it must be correlated is ascribed to its gins*."85 By its gins*by virtue of its being specifically that which it isa concrete act of willing can have but a single, specific object and its correlation to this object is an essential attribute that it has ''by virtue of the way it is in itself."86 The attribute, therefore, that it has by being specifically what it is it has essentially in the concrete actuality of its being and this entails its specific correlation to its particular object. From this perspective, then, acts of willing belong to the same gins* and are said to be similar not simply as being acts of willing, but as having the same object; they are similar in their essential attribute
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and share in that which is entailed by the way they are in themselves, sc., their correlation to the same object. That the one, in `Abd alGabbar's * example, inhere in a substrate and the other does not, like the inherence of one in a substrate other than that in which the other inheres, involves only the mode (kayfîya) of their existence and existence is an attribute that they have through the action of the agent that caused them to exist and cannot, in the case of the act of willing, be required either "by virtue of its gins* or for any equivalent reason" (liginsiha* 'aw-li-mâ yagri* hada* l-magra*), i.e., neither by its being what it is in itself (sc., an act of willing correlated to a particular object), nor by its being simply an act of willing (sc., by its naw'; see later). Two acts of willing, thus, may be essentially identical (mutamatila*), though the one exist in a substrate and the other not, but if they are correlated to different objects, they are dissimilar (muhtalifa*) and distinguished (mufâraqa, muftariqa) in their essential attributes and so are said to differ in specific kind (gins*), even though they are both acts of willing. To confirm his thesis concerning the act of willing in terms of the specific attributes of accidents, `Abd al-Gabbar* gives three examples, which, as we shall see in the next chapter, embrace three of the four classes of accidents classified according to the nature of the characteristics and states that they effect in their subjects of inherence. In the first, the example of the forms of conviction, the author, following abû Hâim, takes the act of knowing (`ilm) to be a modality or form of conviction (i`tiqâd), differentiated only by a secondary or accidental quality. What our masters say concerning knowing (`ilm) is that it is of the gins* of conviction; when it is related to the thing as it really is (`alà mâ huwa bihî) and occurs (waqa`a) in a way that entails authentic confidence (sukûnu n-nafs), it is knowing; when it is related to a thing as the thing is not, it is ignorance; when it is related to it as it really is but does not entail authentic confidence, it is neither knowing nor ignorance [but is simply conviction].87
Like willing, it has, because of the type of thing it is, a single object or content which it focuses on in a specific way;88 as also in the case of the act of willing, therefore, in any given form of conviction its specific content (i.e., its relation to its object: ta`alluquhû bi-mâ yata`allaqu bihî) involves the essential attribute of the act in its being what it is, while any additional or secondary attribute or characteristic by which it may be distinguished from another is, so to speak, accidental (though the Basrian kalâm of the Period has no expression for "accidental" in this sense). The act of knowing (`ilm) is recognised, thus, and distinguished from belief based solely on the uncritical acceptance of authority (taqlîd)
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as, through the characteristics ('ahkam*) manifested in the one in whom the accident inheres, one recognises "that the state (hal *) of one who uncritically accepts on the authority of another that Zayd is in his house is distinguished (fâraqa) from the state of one who is convinced (ya`taqidu) of his being in his house having seen him."89 This distinction between the two, however, involves the quality of the conviction that is due to the manner of its occurrence (waghu* wuqû`ihî), not its essential character in its being what it is, "since they share in a single characteristic that reveals how they are in themselves, viz., their absolutely specific correlation to the particular correlate."90 Thus abû Raîd says, in terms quite parallel to those of the passage of the Mugni* that we are considering, that we know that this characteristic which we grasp as "authentic confidence" (sukûnu n-nafs) belongs to the act of knowing insofar as it is an act of knowing (`ilm), not insofar as it is an act of being convinced (i`tiqâd) and not by virtue of anything ascribable to its gins* (lâ li-'amrin yargi`u* `ilà ginsihi*), for belief based on the uncritical acceptance of authority (taqlîd), as we have shown, does not entail this, albeit it is of the same gins*. Authentic confidence must, thus, be as it were the reality (haqiqa*) of knowing.91
They are, to follow the strict use of the terminology we have been discussing, distinguished by a secondary characteristic (hukm*) manifest in the actuality of the state (hal*) or attribute (sifa*) of the subject in which they inhere. In speaking, therefore, of what is true of one and not of the other, the Qadi* refers to the authentic confidence of the knower in his knowing what he knows and what this confidence may involve in terms of theory or action. In a similar way, ignorance (gahl*) is taken to be of the same gins* as knowing, since the erroneous act of conviction may, though not simultaneously, have precisely the same content as one based on the necessary knowledge of direct perception and so differ not essentially and in gins* but only accidentally.92 The other two examples cited, viz., those of black (sawâd) and the "spatial presence" (kawn), may be treated quite briefly here, since the characteristics of these accidents will be taken up in detail in the ensuing chapter. What `Abd al-Gabbar* alludes to is that one unit of black (like all primary entities, the accident of black exists in discrete units: 'agza'*) is essentially similar to any other unit of black; they are all alike (mutamatila*) and indistinguishable as such and so, like the units of the other basic colors, constitute a single gins*.93 Two units of black may exist in one and the same or in two different substrates (sc., atoms), but
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their being distinguished as in separate substrates involves not their essential attribute, which is known immediately in perception, but only their existence and its mode, i.e., an attribute that is determined by the agent who caused them to exist. The example of the two kawns is analogous; `Abd al-Gabbar * views them simply as the determinants of being in specific location and herein one kawn is similar in its essential attribute to another, even if the two different positions or locations are involved. In this example, however, the author's perspective differs somewhat, for he has taken the act of "spatial presence" (kawn), not with a view to the individual's essential relation to the single, specific position the atom's presence in which it determines, but rather more generally; that is, as he will say that the act of willing, by its beings what it is (by its being an act of willing), entails that the one in whom it inheres be willing, or that knowing (in general) is of the same gins* as conviction, taqlîd, etc., so here he has taken kawn simply as that which, by virtue of what it is, determines the presence of the atom in some specific location in space without regard to the particular position. The detail of the question of the akwân will be taken up in the next chapter. Most important to the present context is that the attributes said to be grounded in the thing's being what it is (lil-gins*) are the essential attributes it has "by virtue of the way it is in itself." Those things, then, are said to belong to the same gins* which are alike or identical to one another (mutamatila*), i.e., which share in their essential and "most characteristic attributes" ('ahassu* sifatiha*). The notion of things' being similar and of the same "kind" (gins*), nonetheless, as is clear from the texts we have discussed, may be taken in either a broader or a narrower conception. One may say that "since it is necessary that the act of willing because of its being what it is (li-ginsiha*) cannot be correlated to two objects or to a single object in two respects, this must be true of every act of willing," or that two acts of willing are said to be alike and of the same "kind" (gins*) only when they have the same or similar objects.94 In some contexts, however, when it is required or desired to distinguish between the broader and narrower conception of the ''kind of thing" a thing-itself (dat*) is, the masters of the Basrian Mu`tazila employ the term gins* to designate the latter and naw` (or qabil*) to designate the former. The terms `color' (lawn) and `flavor' (ta`m*), for example, indicate the naw,95 while the primary colors, black, white, etc., and the particular flavors constitute the `agnas*.96 "Pressure" or momentum (i`timâd) is a naw` whose units are alike and of the same gins* when they have one and the same direction.97 Similarly the expression qudra (the entitative power of autonomous action), 'irâda (will), and 'ilm (knowing) denote anwâ,98
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since the individuals that are specifically and strictly alike (mutamatila *) are, in each naw, those that are correlated to the same or similar objects. What belongs to a thing and is properly ascribed to its naw` is not an essential attribute or characteristic that reveals it as it is in itself (yunbi'u `ammâ huwa `alayhî fî datihi*). Those that reveal it as it is in itself are, rather, "the most characteristic" (ahass*) attributes that are ascribed to its being what and as it is in itself, viz., the gins*. The visibility of black, for example, is said to be grounded not in its being a color (its naw` or qabîl), which is not an attribute or state, but in "the attribute that is entailed by the Attribute of its Essence," sc., its being black, for it is as this and this alone that it is perceived.99 The mutakallimûn of the Basrian School divide nouns and adjectives into two major classes: those that convey specific meaning (that are mufîd, i.e., yufîdu t-ta`rîf) and those that do not. The former are those which designate the gins* of a thing or some nonessential distinguishing attribute or characteristic that it may have. They signify the attributes by which a thing-itself is distinguished from others as being that which it is in itself or in some particular state or characteristic that may distinguish the individual, differentiating it from another of the same gins*. `Abd al-Gabbar* notes, accordingly, that his predecessors and masters in the Basrian School call all such terms sifat*, without distinguishing nouns and adjectives as do the grammarians (ahlu l-`arabîya).100 The latter class., sc., those that do not convey specific meaning concerning the thing described, they divide into two types. The one consists of words that are "pure denominations" ('alqâbun mahda* or halisa*), such as personal names, i.e., terms that are "the equivalent of pointing ('iarâ) to the thing named" in that they refer to a single individual but semantically convey no information concerning it. The second type includes, among others, terms that "signify the distinction of one naw` from another'' (yufîdu 'ibanâta naw'in min naw`in).101 Terms that denote the naw`, unlike the pure denominations, whose reference is altogether arbitrary and unique to the individual, whatever kind of thing it may be (e.g., to a man, woman, horse, or camel), do have some semantic content and so "cannot be arbitrarily changed given the state of the language"; that is, they convey some meaning concerning the thing named (al-musammà) but denote neither a particular (nonessential) attribute by which the thing is distinguished, nor any of the properly essential or "most characteristic'" attributes that belong to it in its being specifically that which it is in itself or, therefore, the gins*. To the extent that a term which denotes the naw`, e.g., `color' (al-lawn), indicates a domain or class, broadly defined, it conveys some meaning (is mufîd) concerning the thing named, but in that it neither names the gins*, nor denotes a specific, distinguishing attri-
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bute and thereby is equivalent to a mere denomination, a laqab or name by which the thing is called but which does not convey a specifically distinguishing attribute, it does not convey "definite meaning" (lâ tufîdu t-ta'rîf). It has, thus, "two aspects" (ganbatan *) and herein is like the word "thing'' or "being" (ay'),102 i.e., it is used of a diversity of beings. For example, when the term irâda denotes the concrete individual, it indicates the gins* and the essential attribute(s) that it has "by virtue of the way it is in itself," but when it refers to "the act of willing" in general and as a class of beings, it indicates the naw`. Ibn Mattawayh remarks concerning black that its being a color is not an essential attribute as its being black is an essential attribute (linafsihî), "for it has no attribute in it being color, much less an essential attribute, and if it had in fact an attribute in its being color, this could not belong to it essentially, otherwise contraries would have to be alike (mutamatila*)."103 Nevertheless, though a thing has, properly speaking, no distinctive or characteristic attributes by virtue of its naw`, some characteristics are "ascribed to the naw`" (ragi`atun* 'ilà nnaw`) and are accounted for as grounded in the naw` (mu`allalatun bin-naw`). For example, that a unit or quantum of color "perdures" (yabqà), i.e., continues to exist so long as its substrate exists and its contrary does not supplant it in the substrate, is a characteristic that is said to be grounded in the naw`, for it is characteristic of all colors. "Pressure" that is intrinsic (al-i`timàdu l-làzim), e.g., the weight of a body that has weight, also perdures, but, by contrast with the case of color, its perdurance cannot be ascribed to the naw` of "pressure," since that pressure or momentum which is induced (al-i'timâdu l-mugtalab*), e.g., that which is generated (wullida) in a heavy object when it is thrown, does not perdure.104 In any event, a thing's being such that its perdurance is possible or its being such that its perdurance is impossible cannot be grounded in its gins*; similarity is not entailed by things' sharing in these characteristics, since they do not reveal the being of the thing as it is in itself.105 Again that an act of knowing, like the act of willing, can have but a single object may be ascribed to its naw106 and that units of qudra can function (i.e., that the realization of the action that is the specific object of any single quantum of qudra is possible) only by its employing its substrate ('inda sti`mâli l-mahall*) is a characteristic that is explained as grounded in "the naw` and qabîl of the qudar, in that what is referred to by the 'possibility' [of action, in this context] is general and common (alâ sabîli l-gumlati* wa-siyâa`) and thus the possibility to which we have referred of acting by employing the substrate is a characteristic common to all (yoî`u lgami`*) and so must be explained as grounded in something that is common to all."107
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Notes to Chapter 4 1. Here too, as with the Attribute of the Essence (cf. Ch. 3, n. 1), the expressions used to denote the essential attributes vary considerably. It is commonly said to be lin-nafs (e.g., M 7, 62 ff. passim, Muh *, 107, 25 and 144, 24, in both of which abû Hâim is cited) and so is commonly termed sifatu* n-nafs (e.g., M 7, 63 ff. and 11, 323, 15 ff.) and is said, formally to distinguish it from the Attribute of the Essence, to belong to the thing li-mâ huwa `alayhî fî nafsihî (e.g., Muh*, 107, 27 and 172, 5 f., citing abû Hâim); this would seem to have been the terminology of abû Hâim. The essential attribute is also, however, frequently said to be lid-dat* (e.g., M 5, 253, 3 and Muh*, 189, 7) and so is occasionally termed as-sifatu* d-datiya* (e.g., M 7, 83, 2 and Muh*, 107, 25). Commonly it is said to be that which belongs to a thing li-mâ huwa `alayhî fî datihi* (e.g., M 4, 250, 14-16 and 271, 3; SU5, 182 ult., citing abû Hâim; Mas (B), 13, 4 and 18, 19; ZS 410, 18 f. and 413, 9); thus also it is said to be muqtadatun* `an sifati* d-dat* (entailed by the Attribute of the Essence) or simply ani d-dat* (e.g., SU5, 107, 19 f. and 199, 2 ff.; Muh*, 206, 20 ff., 140, 4, and 142, 14; ZS, 71, 11 ff. and 382, 14f.; Mas (B), 4, 10; et alibi passim) and sometimes simply as "the entailed": al-muqtada* (e.g., ZS, 489, 14; Tad, 5010 13; et alibi) (for the specific sense of al-iqtida'* in this use, cf. ZS, 537, 1 ff. and 547, 6 ff.); it is thus also said to be "necessitated by the Attribute of the Essence": sifatun* mugabatun* an sifati* d-dat* (e.g., M 4, 270, ult.) and as "that which is ascribed to the essence" (mâ yargi'u* 'ilà nafsihî: e.g., M 12, 56, 2; mâ yargi`u* 'ilà datihi*: M 12, 61, 12, where read ka-tahayyuz* for ka-tahayyur*; 9, 91, 8 f.; Muh*, 182, 5). 2. This is the basis of the difference between abû Hâim's description of these attributes as li-mâ huwa `alayhî fî datihi* or as entailed by the Attribute of the Essence and al-Gubba'i's* affirming that they are simply li-datihi* (cf., e.g., SU5, 129, 12 ff., 182, 13-15 and 199, 1 f.; Muh*, 107, 24 and 192, 11 ff.; and ZS, 246, 14 f.), for where al-Gubba'i* held that when one speaks of God's being all-powerful (qâdir), the assertion concerns simply "His essence" (e.g., M 5, 205, 11-13) or that our knowledge that He is so simply a knowledge of Him (e.g., Maq, 167 f., 176, 6 ff. and 524, 8 ff., cited Ch. 1, n. 17), abû Hâim insists that this statement or this knowledge concerns God's essence but expresses it or grasps it only in part, not absolutely and totally as it is in itself. Both of the Two Masters agree that for God to be knowing is that He be Himself, but al-Gubba'i*, as we noted in Ch. 1, did not distinguish God's being knowing ontologically from His being Himself. 3. Mas, 174vº 17-19: 'inna d-data* lâ budda min 'an tuhtassa* bi-sifatin-ma* tatamayyazu bihâ 'an gayriha* wa-lâ budda min 'an yakûna li-tilka s-sifati* hukmun* bihî yazharu*; wa-dalika* l-hukmu* kal-haqiqati* lahâ wa-yagibu* 'an yakûna masrutan* bil-wugud*. 4. ZS, 536, 13: 'inna l-muqtada* kal-haqiqati* fî l-muqtadi* wa-hukmun* lahû. 5. Though we cannot enter here into any fulsome treatment of the Basrians' discussion of the relationships between words and their signification and being and the understanding of being, it is necessary to note briefly the use and senses of the term haqiqa* (pl. haqa'iq*), since it is an important term that recurs frequently in the discussion of the attributes. Al-haqiqa*, like so many kalâm expressions, has a rather broad spectrum of meanings and like the other principal terms that have to do with the attributes of beings (sc., sifa*, hukm*, et al.) is used to refer both to the objective reality of things and their attributes and to our understanding of them and our talking about them. Haqiqa* is commonly used in the sense of "the strict and most proper meaning of a word," as this is opposed to its metaphorical (magdz*) or extended
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(tawassu) use (cf., e.g., M 5, 234 and 244 f.; 7, 209; 8, 304; 16, 200 f.; Tad, 67vº f.; Muh *, 190, 20; et alibi and for the understanding of the term thus used generally, see Ibn Fâris. 196 ff. and al-Mu`tamad 1, 17). For the writers with whom we are here concerned, though a term may be defined and understood according to the ordinary literary usage (al-luga*), the hiqiqa* is taken, whenever they differ, as the strict sense that the word has contextually in the usage of the kalâm (fî ta'ârufi l-mutakallimîn). It may be a purely adapted, technical use, arbitrarily established by the mutakallimîn (istilah*) which is not directly reflected in the normal lexical meaning (cf., e.g., M 11, 387, 2 ff.). Primarily the haqiqa* is what we are really talking about when we use a word: the reality that being understood is or may be referred to or the meaning that it most strictly conveys when its use and sense are carefully analysed. Thus "their allegation that the haqiqa* of 'the knower' (al-`âlim) is 'he who has an act of knowing' is patently erroneous, since he who knows the knower [i.e., recognizes him to be knowing] would have then to know the act of knowing, since this is the case with one's knowing haqa'iq*. It is common knowledge that one of us may recognise that the knower is knowing without knowing the act of knowing [i.e., without knowing that the entitative accident, `ilm, is the ground of his being knowing] ...; on the other hand, he who does not know black (as-sawâd) either in a general way or analytically does not know that the black is black (aswad) and so too with 'acting' (fâ'il) and other names of haqa'iq*" (Muh*, 188 f.; cf. also SU5, 205, 10-12; cp. also for the sense of this, Ch. 1, n. 38, Ch. 5, n. 59, and Ch. 6, n. 56); "the occurrence of the act through the agency of the qâdir is, so to speak, the haqiqa* of his being acting (fâ'il) (SU5, 205, 15 f., reading al-fi`l for al-haqiqa* in line 15; for the significance of this argument concerning "the predicates of action" see Ch. 6). Thus 'Abd al-Gabbar* says that 'kasb' as the A'arites understand the sense of the term "has no haqiqa*" (M 8, 182, 1) because the term, as they explain it, has no intelligible content, i.e., represents, according to the analysis of the Mu`tazila, no reality that is grasped by the mind (cf., e.g., M 8, 69 f., 83 ff.; SU5, 343, ult. and 352, 1; et alibi). By contrast, "the qâdir's being qâdir or the living's being living is a haqiqa* by which it is distinguished from what is other'' (M 11, 324, 15 f.; cf. also M 6/1, 56, ult; note that one could in both places substitute either sifa* or hukm* for haqiqa*; the latter passage is cited by Hourani, Rationalism, p. 63, n. 36, where he renders "reality"). As the reality that the mind grasps, the haqa'iq* are not altered by names and our description of them, for the distinctions that the mind understands in its grasp of being are not supplied by words and expressions (cf., e.g., M 8, 86, 1 ff. and Muh*, 306, 14 ff.) and against al-Gubba'i*, abû Hâim and the later school hold that the haqiqa* of a given predicate term does not differ in the created and the uncreated (cf., e.g., M 5, 205, 14 f.; 6/1, 41, 4 ff., where abû Hâim is cited; 7, 53, 14 ff.; and 14, 13, 3 f.). That is, what is first and primarily understood when one recognizes, e.g., that the knower is knowing and what, therefore, is primarily and fundamentally expressed in the word `âlim (knowing) is the same for all knowers, the eternal and the created. As the reality that the mind grasps and understands ('aqala), it is impossible that the haqiqa* change (tagayyara*) (e.g., M 9, 89, 8) or that it become something else (inqalaba); the accident cannot change "from the way it is ('ammâ huwa 'alayhî) into the haqiqa* of the atom" (Cf. M 4, 186, 12 ff. and also, e.g., M 6/2, 253, 4 ff. and 8, 246, 16-18 as well as the references cited in Ch. 1, n. 40; see also the passages on the impossibility of qalbu l-'agnas*). 6. Cf., e.g., ZS, 46, 1: 'inna l-wuguda* aslun* fî kulli datin* fî sâ'iri s-sifat*; thus, as-sifatu* l-muqtadatu* 'an sifati* d-dati*, hiya masrutatun* bil-wugud*: SU5, 107, 19 f. Cf. also Muh*, 163, 1 ff., cited n. 27.
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7. Tad, 9vº 18 f.: 'innahâ s-sifatu * l-latî tazharu* bihâ 'ahkamu* 'agnasi* d-dawat*; cf. also ibid., 49vº 18 f.: lâ yaguzu* ma'a lwugudi* 'an yaqifa husulu* l-muqtada* 'alà sartin* 'ahar*. 8. Tad, 132vº 29 f.: min haqqi* kulli datin* 'an yatamayyaza inda wugudihi* bi-'amrin yasiru* tariqan* 'ilayhî. Cf. also n. 3. 9. M 8, 72, 17: lâ ginsa* 'illâ wa-yahsulu* lahû 'inda l-wugudi*, sifatun* yabînu bihâ min gayrihi*. On the role of existence generally, cf. my "Al-Mawgud* wal-Ma'dum*," and that we have no direct knowledge of the nonexistent, see ibid., n. 84 and the references there cited. 10. Tad, 12vº 15 f.; cf. also ibid., 14rº 19 f., where he notes that sifatu* t-tahayyuzi* ... lâ budda min kawnihâ muqtadatan* 'anhâ [sc., the Attribute of the Essence] li-yasira* tariqan* 'ilayhâ. 11. Muh*, 142, 12-20; thus more succinctly in Tad, 12rº 12 ff.: "The effect of existence on this attribute is the effect of a condition; that which effects it, strictly speaking, is the way it is in itself but this latter has its effect only on the condition of the foyer" (cf. also Muh*, 206, 6 ff. and the passage from British Museum ms. Or. 8613 translated in n. 17). This differs notably from the position of abû Ishaq* anNasibini* (a disciple of abû 'Abdallâh; cf. Tabaqât, 114) who holds that "the attribute of existence in the atom is its occupying space, without distinguishing existence taken by itself (al-wugudu* bi-mugarradihi*) as an attribute over and above occupying space" (Tad, 7rº 12 f.). 12. Cf., e.g., ZS, 66, 3-13; Mas (B), 21 f. and the commonly cited formula of abû Hâim in ZS, 76, 1-3 (see also Ch. 5, n. 5 for further references and a discussion of the matter). Thus the atom may be defined as al-qabîlu l-ladi* yatahayyazu* fî l-wugud* (the sort of thing that occupies space when it exists) (M 5, 219, 17 f.; cf. also Ch. 2, n. 4). On the atom's having some surface area (qistun* mina lmasaha*) and shape, see Ch. 5, n. 17. 13. Cf. M 12, 61, 13 (where read kat-tahayyuz* for kat-tahayyur* in line 12) and Ch. 5, n. 56. 14. Cf., e.g., Muh*, 181, 6: al-qudratu qudratun li-nafsihâ wa-kadalika* l-hayatu*; that he means here the concrete individual, not the class, see later. 15. Cf., e.g., M 11, 335, 15 ff.; ZS, 525 f. (where read bi-`aynihî for y'ynh at 525, 24); and Ch. 2, nn. 21 ff. Thus generally kâna l-'igabu* fihâ mawqûfan 'alà mâ 'alayhi l-'illatu fî datiha*: Tad, 49vº 6 (on the use of the term 'illa for the accident or ma`nà, see Ch. 5, n. 3). 16. Cf., e.g., ZS, 399, 6 ff. and on the directionality of i'timâd, see Ch. 5, nn. 16 f. and 35. 17. Cf., e.g., M 4, 270, 18 f. (where read hayyan* for qadîman in line 19); 5, 233 f.; SU5, 182, 13-15; Muh*, 172; et alibi pass. and concerning existence specifically, cf. also M 11, 432, 14 f. and 433, 5 ff. I do not here want to get into the theology of the divine attributes. For the relation between God's existence and His essence, which is to exist necessarily, see n. 57; in terms of the present discussion, cf. also the statement in British Museum ms. Or. 8613, 107vº: "Question: How can one validly say that His being existent effects (yu'attiru* fî) His being all-powerful when, according to your doctrine, that which effects (al-mu'attir*) His being all-powerful is the Attribute of the Essence, viz., how He is in Himself (mâ huwa 'alayhî fî datihi* min sifati* n-nafs)? This attribute is the one that effects His being all-powerful and just as it effects His being all-powerful so also it effects His being existent. Thus one cannot say that what effects His being all-powerful is simply His being existent. If this must be the case, it will be a condition (sart*) and that which effects [the actuality of the attribute] will be the
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way He is in Himself, just as you hold that what effects the atom's being mutahayyiz * is the way it is in itself, existence being a condition. Response: This is exactly what we hold, sc., that it is the Attribute of the Essence (sifatu* d-dat*) alone that effects both His being all-powerful and His being existent, save that the latter attribute, viz., His being existent, since it is necessitated (muwaggaba* [sic]) by the former [viz., by the Attribute of the Essence], reveals it (kanat* tariqan* 'ilayhâ), wherefore it is classified among the essential attributes." On this whole question, n. b. Muh*, 166 f. 18. Thus in identical formulations we find 'ahkam* in the one case and ahwal* in the other (e.g., M 6/2, 162 = 9, 87, cited Ch. 5, n. 13 and Mas, 82rº f. = 116vº 3 f.). In these and other cases one alludes to the state through the term hukm*, for the latter denotes the former as it is manifest and accessible to understanding, i.e., as the characteristic is, so to speak, the haqiqa* of the state (see later). Thus abû Raîd speaks at one point of "the characteristic which is the attribute" (ZS, 539, 2 f.). The terms arc nonetheless always to be distinguished; "the characteristic always derives from the attribute, not the attribute from it, and so the usage of the two is clearly distinguished" (al-hukmu* 'abadan tatba'u s-sifata* was-sifatu* lâ tatba`uhû, fa-bâna l-farqu bayna l-mawdi'ayn*: ZS, 228, 9; reading fa-bâna for fa-bi-'an). In an earlier work I suggested on the basis of the parallel formulae mentioned earlier that hukm* was used for hal* (Actas do IF Congresso de Estudos Arabes e Islamicos [Leiden, 1971] p. 89, n. 9) and similarly Gimaret (JA, 1970, p. 81) asserts that abû Hâim did not distinguish hukm* and sifa*. 19. ZS, 287, 16 f.: 'innâ nastadillu bi-hukmi* s-sifati* 'alà s-sifati* li-'anna s-sifata*, 'ida* lam takun mudrakatan wa-lâ mawgudatan* mina n-nafsi, fa-'innahû natawassalu* 'ilayhâ bi-hukmiha*; cf. also Tad, 26rº 14 f., where he says: at-turuqu* l-latî bihâ na'rifu s-sifati* 'immâ l-'idrâku 'awil-wigdanu* mina n-nafsi awi-htilafi* l-'ahkam*. I. e., for example, the atom is perceived directly in its being mutahayyiz* (occupying space) and we have immediate intuition of our own interior states, our being desiring or knowing, etc., but our knowledge of the actuality of another's being living or qâdir, etc., we know only by inference from their manifest characteristics. 20. Hukmu* s-sifati* d-datiya* (Muh*, 206, 22). Thus Ibn Mattawayh says, making this distinction, fa'ammâ ta'alluqu l-qudrati, fa-lâ yakûnu li-datiha*, wa-'illâ lazima tubutuhu* wa-'in 'udimat, wa-`alà anna dalika* hukmun*, fa-kayfa yargiu* 'ilà d-dati*; bal yagibu* stinâduhû 'ilà s-sifati* l-muqtadati* 'an sifati* d-dati*, fa'inna l-'ahkama* min haqqiha* 'an takûna mustanadatan 'ilà sifati* d-ddti* 'awil-muqtada* anhâ fa'ammâ stihqaquha* li-mugarradi* d-dati*, fa-gayru* sahih*: Tad, 146vº 26 ff. 21. Cf. Muh*, 81, 14 f. Thus one may speak of "the attributes of bodies" (sifatu* l-'agsam*) as opposed to "the characteristics of accidents" (ahkamu* l-'a'rad*) (e.g., Muh*, 226, 21 f.) as also of "the attribute of the living [corporeal body]'' (sifatu* l-hayy*; e.g., M 5, 26, 3 f.) but of "the characteristic" of [the accident of] life (e.g., M 11, 335, 15 f.). 22. E.g., Mas (B), 7, 4 ff.; Muh*, 136, 12 ff. and 160, 12 f. 23. Cf. ZS, 489, 1 ff.; cf. also ibid., 539, 6 f.: inna sihhata* an ya'lama wa-yaqdura hukmun* fa-lâ budda min sifatin* taqtadihi* li'anna l-'ahkama* lá tastaqillu bi-nafsihá. It is thus that the hukm* is the means of access to the attribute (at-tariqu* 'ilayhá) apart from which it cannot be known and affirmed (Muh*, 207, 9 and n. 19; see also the references cited in n. 32). 24. Tad, 8vº 17-19. 25. At-tariqu* 'ilà 'itbati* r-ratubati* huwa l-istidlálu bi-hukmi* mahalliha*, 'id* lá hala* lir-ratibi* bi-kawnihî ratiban; wa-dalika*; lhukmu* huwa wugubu* ndifá'i r-ratibi* min yadi l-gamizi* alayhî: Tad, 119rº 9 f., q.v. et sqq. for other examples. Hot and cold are perceived directly but not wet and dry (see Ch. 6, nn. 54 f.).
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26. M 12, 14, 16-18; cf. also M 12, 20f.; 5, 219 f. (cited in n. 30); et alibi. 27. Muh *, 163, 1 ff. (reading ad-dat* for ad-dawat* in the first line). It is thus that from knowing the characteristics as they are manifest we know that a thing is existent (cf., e.g., M 7, 153, cited in note 62). That the mind grasps existence as a distinct and separate attribute (state), cf., e.g., ZS, 192 ff. Existencethat a thing-itself be existent: kawnuhû mawgudan*is a state of the being of the thing-itself. The nonexistent has no state as nonexistent (ma'dûm), as we noted; it does, however, have a characteristic, viz., the fact of the possibility of its existence (tubutu* gawazihi*), whereby it is posited and is distinguished from that whose existence is impossible (lâ yasihhu* 'an yakûna lahû bi-kawnihî ma'dûman halun* wa-qad yakûnu lahû bi-kawnihî ma`dûrnan hukmun* li'annahû 'inda l-'adami yasihhu* mina l-qâdiri 'alayhî 'igaduhu*, fal-farqu baynahû wa-bayna mâ lâ yasihhu* igaduhu* yargi`'u* 'ilà l-hukm*: Tad, 8rº 11 ff.). 28. Tad, 103rº 19 ff., q.v. for other examples of the ahkam*; cf. also ibid., 106rº 10 ff. 29. Cf., e.g., M 11, 335, 15 ff.: inna l-hayata* ... lâ budda rain 'an tuhtassa* li-ginsiha* bi-hukmin* tabînu rain gayriha* mina l'a`rad*; cf. also M 13, 239 f. and the references cited Ch. 1, nn. 19 ff. 30. M 5, 219, 18 ff.: wa-kadalika* qawlunâ fî haddi* wasfi* l-hayyi* 'l-ladi* lâ yata`addaru* kawnuhû `âliman qâdiran' li'annâ lam nagid* lafzatan* 'aksafa* min qawlinâ `hayyun* mawdu`atan* wa-nabbahnâ bi-dikri* l-'ahkami* l-latî tasihhu* fî l-hayyi* dûna gayrihi* `alà ma'nà i-muràdi bi-qawlinâ 'hayyun*; cf. also M 12, 14, 5 ff. and Muh*, 198, 12 ff. 31. Cf. e.g., M 12, 14 and 2l; 16, 264; and 5, 219. 32. Muh*, 160, 13 ff.; cf. also M 13, 267, 15 and, for this definition of qudra, cf. also, e.g., M 4, 306, 15 ff., 331, 3-5; 9, 134, 23 f.; ZS, 469, 3 ff.; et alibi; and n.b. Tad, 141vº 9-12, cited in Ch. 7, n. 7. 33. Tad, 142rº 15 ff. 34. Tad, 167rº 8-11; (concerning the expression tâbi'atun lil-wugud*, see Ch. 6); cf. also Tad, 146vº f. 35. Tad, 147rº f. 36. Cf., e.g., ZS, 523, 8. 37. Cf., e.g., M 7, 110, 2 f., cited in Ch. 1, n. 49. 38. "Necessary knowledge," though here he means that gained in direct sense perception ('idrâk), includes all knowledge, whether gained through experience, study, practice, perception, or whatever, that, since it is not based on inference and reasoning, cannot be challenged or called into question on theoretical grounds. 39. Muh*, 160, 3-9. There follow here a number of distinctions regarding how an attribute may be known. 40. Muh*, 142, 5-11; the passage continues with a discussion of the undifferentiated character of the attribute of being existent, cited n. 11. On the difference of the sifat* generally, cf. also ZS, 518 ff. and Tad, 26rº f. 41. Thus Mas (B), 11, 10f.: 'inna l-ladi* yu'attiru* fî t-tamatuli* huwa s-sifatu* d-datiya* 'awil-muqtadatu* 'an sifati* d-dat*. Cf. also Tad, 146vº, cited n. so; Mas (B), 8, 14 f. and M 4, 270 f., cited n. 48. On this question generally, see Muh*, 155 ff. and 181 ff. 42. Tad, 26rº 7-10; min hukmi* l-muhalafati* 'an tahassa* l-'ahada* fa-tabata* anna l-muhalafata* wat-tamatula* tdbi`ani* li-sifati* ddati* 'aw-lil-muqtada* `anhâ ... fa'ammâ t-tadaddatu* fal-'aqrabu 'an hi tatbuta* 'illâ li-'agli* s-sifati* l-muqtadati* `an sifati* d-dati* dûna nafsi d-dati*, wa-'illâ, wagaba* 'an yutbata* -ay'u diddan* li-gayrihi* fî l-`adami; wa-bi-hada* tuhalifu* halu* l-mudaddati* hala* l-muhalafati* fa'innahâ qad tabatat* fî l-`adam. 43. On the distinction between "contrariety strictly speaking" (at-tadaddu* fî l-haqiqa*)
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and "contrariety in kind" (at-tadaddu * fî l-gins*), which is only ideal or hypothetical, cf., e.g., Muh*, 59, 16 ff.; Tad, 47rº 17 ff. and 86rº 23 ff.; and cp. M 5, 32, 7 ff. 44. See Ch. 3 on the actuality (husul* of the Attribute of the Essence when the thing-itself is nonexistent. Thus Ibn Mattawayh says 'in gu`ila* l-muhalafatu* wâqi'atan bi-sifatin* muntazaratin* lam yasihha*, li'anna l-hilafa*, 'ida* kâna hukman* tabitan*, lam yasihha* fîmâ yu'attiru* fîhî 'an tataraha*, bal yagibu* tubutuhuma* ma`an*: Tad, 10rº 10-12 (against the position of Ibn 'Ayyâ cited Ch. 3, n. 17). 45. Mas (B), 11, 16 f.: 'inna t-tamatula* 'innama* yaqi`u bimâ yakûnu l-'ilmu bihî 'aslan lil-'ilmi bit-tamatul*; cf. also ibid., 8 f., cited n. 54. Similarly in ZS, 72, 1 f.: mimmâ yadullu 'aid 'anna t-tahayyuza* muqtadan* 'an hadihi* s-sifati* 'anna bit-tahayyuzi* yazharu* mâ huwa 'alayhî fî datihi* (reading 'an for 'alà); cf. also the references in nn. 10 and 23. 46. E.g., lâ yaguzu* 'an yakûna 'âliman bi-sifatihi* l-latî yuhtassu* bihâ wa-lâ ya'lamu data* l-mawsuf*: M 11, 468, q.v.; so also M 11, 470, 1 f.: ... li'anna l-'lima yata`allaqu bil-mawsufi* dunaha*. Cf. also Mas (B), 8 f., cited n. 54. 47. Thus 'Abd al-Gabbar* says: wa'ammâ l-ladi* yadullu 'alà 'anna l-mawsufa* bi-sifatin* min sifati* d-dati* lâ yaguzu* huruguhu* 'anha bi-halin* mina l-'ahwali*, fa-huwa 'anna d-data* 'innamâ yadhulu* fî kawnihî datan* ma`lûmatan li-htisasiha* bi-sifati* d-dati*, fa-law haragat* 'an hadihi* s-sifati* la-haragat* 'an 'an takûna .datan* ma'lûmatan 'aslan*: SU5, 108, 9-12; see also the following note. 48. M 4, 270 f.: 'inna tirâka -ay'ayni fî s-sifati* l-mugabati* 'an sifati* d-dati* ka-stirakihima* fî sifati* d-dati* It wugubi* t-tamatul* (where the example is the ubication of the atom); for other examples cf., e.g., M 4, 273, 5-7; Muh*, 199, 8 f.; et alibi; cf. also Ch. 3, n. 22. 49. M. 11, 323, 16 f.: li'annahû lâ yaguzu* fî -ay'ayni 'an yatarikâ fî sifatin* min sifati* n-nafsi dûna sâ'iri sifati* n-nafs; cf. generally M. 4, 252 f. 50. Li'anna d-datayni* 'ida* tarakâ fî sifatin* min sifati* d-dati* fa-qad `ulima 'anna data* 'ihdahuma* yagibu* an tastahiqqa* sâira mâ tastahiqqu* l-uhra*, lianna mâ awgaba* stihqaqahu* li-ihdahuma* yugibu* stihqaqahu* lil-uhra* (reading lil-uhra* for lil-ahar* in line 10): M 4, 242, 8-10, q.v. et sqq. Thus also in SU5, 199, 3-5 we read: madhabu* abî Hâimin fas-sifatu* l-muqtadatu* an sifati* ddati* ka-sifati* d-dati*, fainnahû bihâ yaqi`u l-hilafu* wal-wifâqu wa-inna bil-istiraki fîhâ yagibu* l-itiraku fî sâiri sifati* tilka d-dat*. Cf. Also regarding Gods attributes M 11, 123, 8 ff. and 323, 5 ff.; and 7, 86, 12 ff. 51. Mas (B), 8, 18 ff.: lianna s-sifata* l-latî bihâ yatamayyazu d-datu* `an muhalifiha* bihâ tawâfiqu mâ yuârikuhâ fîhâ. 52. Thus "to occupy space" (at-tahayyuz*) is said to be 'ahassu* s-sifat* of the atom (e.g. Muh*, 199, 8) or to effect the unitary wholeness of the body or the actual possibility of sensation is 'ahassu* 'ahkami* l-hayati* (e.g., ibid., 198, 15 f.; see Ch. a, n. 23). The expression is used also, however, of the Attribute of the Essence (e.g., Mas (B), 3, 5 et alibi). According to al-Ansari*, abû Hâim used this expression only in the latter sense (cf., e.g., Sarh* al-Irâd, 45rº 4); his contention subsequently (ibid., 164rº 10 f.) that according to abû Haâim "the ahass* is a state that cannot be described or named since the 'ahass* is asserted as real (yuhaqqaq*) both in the existence and in the nonexistence" of the thing-itself, though a reasonable statement concerning the Attribute of the Essence, is not terminologically correct for the Mu`tazilite masters, for the ahass* includes also the essential attributes. The A`arite use of the expression, it should be noted, does not conform to that of the Mu`tazila. 53. Thus "things must be said to be similar only when they share in any one of their essential attributes. They must not be said to be similar either on the basis of
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two essential attributes that differ or through two like [attributes] that are grounded in an accident or that [belong to the thing] neither by virtue of an accident nor by its essence": M 5, 205, 7-10 (omitting aw-lin-nafs in line 9). What he does here is, in effect, to eliminate our categories three and five from any role in determining the similarity and dissimilarity of beings as things-themselves; the Attribute of the Essence is not in question and the fourth category is eliminated, since, as we shall see below, a thing cannot be what it is bil-fâ'il. 54. Mas (B), 8 f.: innâ matà arafnâ tahayyuzahu *, wa-in lam na`rif lahû sifatan* uhra*mitlan*, `alimnâ tamayyuzahû `ammâ halafahu*, fa-yagibu* `an yakûna t-tamayyuzu yahsulu* bi-tahayyuzihi* wa-bimâ yaqtadihi*, liannahû, law kâna yatamayyazu bi-sifatin* uhra*, la-kunnâ, matà lam na`rif tilka s-sifata*, lam nalam muhalafatahu*, wa-in `alimnâ t-tahayyuza* lianna l-`ilma bil-muhalafati* farun alà l-ilmi bimâ yuattiru* fî l-muhalafati*, bimâ qad buyyina fî l-kutub. 55. M 11, 433, 2-6: inna s-sifati* n-nafsîyata tanqasimu, fa-fîhâ mâ taqiu l-ibânatu bihâ nafsihâ, fa-kullu mâ stahaqqaha* fa-lâ budda min an yuhalifa* gayrahu*, wa-in kâna lâ budda min an yastamirra stihqaquhu* lahâ; faammâ ida* waqaati l-ibânatu li-waghi* stihqaqi* l-mawsufi* lahâ, lâ bihâ nafsihâ, fa-wagaba* `tibâru gihati* l-istihqaqi* dûnahâ. Wa-qad `alimnâ anna l-qadîma (subhanahu*) lâ yuhalifu* gayrahu* bil-wugudi* lianna gayrahu* qad ârakahû fîhî, wa-innamâ halafa* gayrahu* bi-stihqaqihi* dalika* `alà waghin* yargiu* ilà datihi* (reading ida*waqaati l-ibânatu for ida* qtadati* l-ibânatu though perhaps one should read ida* qtadati* l-ibânata with as-sifa* as the subject.). 56. Muh*, 174, 13-15; cf. also ibid., 188 5 ff. and for the parallel example of life, see M 11, 322 ff.; cp. the division of the attribute of being qâdir cited n. 33. 57. For the association of the Eternal and the necessary, see my "Kalâm and Philosophy" and for "being eternal" as the primal attribute of God, cf., e.g., ZS, 459, 15 ff.; Muh*, 61, 8 ff., 217, 21 ff. and esp. 163, 6 ff.; M 4, 250 f.; 7, 84, 5 ff. (where read fa-mâ for mimmâ in line 15); et alibi. This notion, i.e., that qadîm is the fundamental attribute, stems, it would seem, from the doctrine of al-Gubba'i* for whom al-qadîm signifies God's essence as such and so that of which the other attributes are predicated (cf., Maq, 529 f., translated in Ch. 1, n. 25; a-âmil, 252, 6 ff.; and a-âahrastânî, Milal, 120). For the background of the doctrine concerning the four primary essential attributes (wugud*, hayat*, qudra, and ilm) cf., e.g., SU5, 182, 12-15; ZS, 195, 9 ff.; et alibi. For the ordering of the attributes of God, cf., e.g., Muh*, 166 f., ZS, 459f. and the text translated in n. 17, and for the order of our knowing them, ZS, 457 ff.; note, however, that as necessitated by God's essence, these attributes are, strictly speaking, unconditioned (gayru* masruta* and are ordered only quoad nos (cf. Muh*, 166 f., ZS, 460, 17 ff. and my "Al-Mawgud* wal-Ma'dûm''. 58. M 11, 432, 13-15: inna l-ladi* bihî halafa* l-qadîmu (taâlà) gayrahu* kawnuhû qadîman, lianna dalika* yaqtadi* fîhî anna lwuguda* hasala* lahû li-mâ huwa alayhî fî datihi*, lâ li-`illatin wa-lâ `an fâ`ilin; cf. also Muh*, 182, 12: al-ladi* bihî taqiu muhalafatuhu* li-gayrihi* kawnuhû qadîman. N.b. generally Muh*, 156 f. 59. M 6/1, 54, 15 f.: al-qadîmu innamâ wagaba* lahû l-wugudu* li-htisasihi* bi-halin* yabînu lahà min sâiri l-mawgudat*. 60. Tad, 28rº 24 f.: inna l-ladi* yaqtadi* fîhî l-wuguda* huwa datuhu*. 61. Lâ yasihhu* fîhî tazâyud: M 9, 116, 1 f.; cf. generally Tad, 9rº ff. 62. M 7, 153, 3-6. Thus also Ibn Mattawayh: The difference cannot be made ascribable to the mode of an attribute, viz., of existence, since the mode of the attribute is derived from it" (lâ yumkinu an tug`ala* t-tafriqatu ragiatan* ilà kayfîyati sifatin* hiya l-wugudu*, lianna kayfîyata s-sifati* tatbauhâ: Tad, 8rº 6 f.).
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63. Muh *, 163, 4-7: al-wugudu*, wa-lâ farqa fî hada* bayna sáiri l-mawgudati* , fa-ammâ kawnuhû qadîman fa-laysa bi-sifatin* zâidatin `alà kawnihî mawgudan*, wa-innmâ huwa kayfîyatun fî sifati* l-wugud*; cf. also ibid., 205, ult.: inna hukma* s-sifati* lâ yahtalifu* bi-kayfîyati stihqaqiha*. Similarly the continuance of existence (al-baqâ = istimrâru l-wugud*) is also a kayfîya (e.g., ZS, 280, 5 f.). That the mind grasps (`aqala) existence together with its kayfîya, cf., e.g., ZS, 293 ff. (concerning hudut* response to an objection posed on p. 286, 11 ff.). 64. Cf., e.g., ZS, 461, 16-18: "the necessity of the attribute is a mode of the attribute and so is ordered (murattabai.e., logically posterior) to the attribute itself; thus when one does not know the mode of the attribute insofar as it is ordered to the attribute, it is impossible that he know how the Eternal is in Himself (mâ 'alayhî l-qadîmu fî datihi*)." 65. Muh*, 226, 21 f. 66. SU5, 107, 1 = ZS, 453, 7 f. and 478, 6 (reading hayt* for gnb* in SU5); cf. also ZS, 407, 16: 'inna l-ma'qûla mina l-hululi* huwa lhusulu* bi-haytu* l-gayru* wal-gayru* mutahayyiz*. 67. ZS, 384, 14 f.: 'inna l-margi`a* bihî kayfîyatuhû fî l-wugud*. 68. M 6/1, 54, 7 f.: 'inna l-'arada laysa lahû bi-hululihi* fî l-mahalli* sifatun* zâ'idatun 'alà wugudihi* (note that one should read albinya for at-tanabbuh in line to following this). On the question generally, cf. Muh*, 204 ff. 69. Tad, 141vº 25 f.: fa-ida* suilnâ an hululi* ihda* d-datayni* mahallan* wa-stihalati* hululi* gayrihi* fîhî, fa-laysa hada* bi-sifatin* wa-lâ hukmin* azyada min wugudihi*, fa-li-hada* lam yagib* taliluhu* (reading hulul* for hlw* in line 25); cf. also ZS, 478, 3-5. Concerning the talâl see Ch. 7. That the atoms being existent without being inherent (wugudu* l-gawhari* gayra* hallin*) is likewise a mode of its existence, cf. Muh*, 204, ult. f. 70. Al-'aslu fî l-'a`radi* 'an takuna* mawgudatan* fî l-rnahall*: British Museum ms. Or. 8613, 133vº 4 f. This statement can be taken univocally if one recognizes that in the normal use of the terminology al-`arad* (unlike al-ma'nà) is not used of God's act of willing. That al-`arad* is not so used is probably because of the word's connotations in ordinary literary Arabic where it has the meaning of what befalls (`arada*) a person or happens to him (e.g., an illness) (cf., e.g., Ibn Sikkît, Islah* al-mantiq*3, edited by A. Shakir and A.M. Harun [Cairo, 1970], p. 72 and cp. M 6/2, 166, 1, SU5, 230 f. and Maq, 369 f.). That the term basically is an equivalent of ma`nà and may be used even for God's act of willing is plainly recognized in M 6/2, 164, 3 f., where he says "we are speaking here only of those accidents ('a`rad*) that do not exist except in a substrate." On the terminology, see Ch. 5, n. 3. 71. Cf. M 12, 12, 13 (where he notes that the exact reason for this is not known); cf. also M 9, 105, 4 ff. and Mas, 70rº 2 ff. 72. Cf. generally M 7, 26 ff. and Tad, 61rº ff. The mode of its existence (kayfîyatu wugudihi*) in its generation (tawlîd) involves "pressure" (i'timâd) and the movement of bodies (cf. M 9, 33, 20 f., where this is given as an example of a mode of existence). For the definition of speech as a kind of sound, cf., e.g., M 7, 16; SU5, 529, et alibi; and on the perceptible accidents, see Ch. 5. 73. Cf., e.g., ZS, 451, 14 ff. and generally pp. 449 ff. and Ch. 5, n. 80 and Ch. 7, n. 8. The focus of the present discussion is on the attributes and characteristics of the accidents as "essences"/things-themselves; for the attributes that arise in another by virtue of the actuality of the existence of the accident, see Ch. 5. 74. ZS, 451: al-irâdatu wal-`ilmu yahtagani* ilà l-mahalli* liannahumâ `illatâni, fa-lâ budda mini htisasihima* bil-wahidi* minnâ lianna min haqqi* l-`illati an tahtassa* bil-malûli gayata* l-ihtisasi*, wa-gayatu* l-ihtisasi* fî l-wahidi* minnâ lâ takûnu illâ
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bi-tariqi * l-hulul*. That it be "particularly associated with the effect," i.e., with the resulting attribute and its characteristics and therefore with the corporeal entity whose being is qualified by the actuality of the attribute, see also n. 76. 75. E.g., ZS, 451: inna hada* l-hukma*, wa-huwa an lâ yumkina l-filu bihâ illâ ma`a sti`mâli mahalliha*, mu`allalun wal-`illatu laysa illâ kawnahâ qudaran . wa-inna l-ihtiyaga* l-ladi* huwa li-agli* l-ihtisasi* tâbi`un li-dalika*. That this talil is not strictly a statement of grounds but only an explanation (kafun wa-bayân), see Ch. 7. 76. British Museum ms. Or. 8613, 133vº: wa-fâraqa l-halu* fî dalika* hala* l-irâdati, lianna l-irâdata ida* ftaqarat ilà l-mhahalli* lam taftaqir li-amrin yargi`u* ilà ginisiha* wa-qabîlihâ, lâkinnahâ illatun fa-lâ tugibu* l-hukma* lil-ma`lûli illâ ida* htussat* bihî gayata* l-ihtisasi* wa-gayatu* l-ihtisasi* yakûnu fînâ bi-tariqati* l-hulul*. (The use of al-malûl for al-ma`lûlu fîhî I have noted only in this passage and in that of ZS cited in n. 74; in a parallel context of 'Abd al-Gabbar* one finds al-mu`allal: M 6/2, 165 f., cited in the following note. It should be noted that ZS and the work represented in British Museum ms. Or. 8613 are most probably one and the same, the latter being a later portion of the Ziyâdât as-Sarh* in another recension.) Cf. also M 6/2, 167 and that God's act of willing is in no substrate, cf. generally M 6/2, 149 ff. and, regarding the context of the present discussion, esp. 162 ff. and Muh*, 50, 8 ff. 77. Tad, 148rº 12-15: wa-laysa ta`taridu* hadihi* l-gumlatu* mâ naqûlu fî l-irâdati wa-wugudiha* lâ fî mahallin*, wa-in istihala* dalika* fî irâdatinâ, li-anna hunâ laysa bi-ftirâqin fî hukmin* ragi`in* ilà dawatina*, wa-innamâ yustaratu* fî irâdatinâ l-hululu* liwugubi* l-ihtisasi* áwa-ñ lianna ahadana* lâ yaqduru an yafalahâ illâ kadalika*; wa-kayfa yakûnu li-mâ yargiu ilà dawatihâ wa-huwa kayfîyatun fî l-wugudi*: cf. also ZS, 451 f. Thus `Abd al-Gabbar* notes that the specific association of accidents (ihtisasu* l-'ilal) with something may vary; there is that which has specific association simply by inherence (hulul*) and there is that which is specifically associated with that which is qualified by its effect (al-mu`allal, perhaps to be read al-malûl) by its existence in a part of it and not by inhering in it [simply]..., as for example the act of knowing, etc., and there is that which is specifically associated with the living by its existence in no substrate [e.g., God's act of willing], and each of these ways, though it differs from the others, nevertheless remains similar to the others in that it is specifically associated with that which is qualified by its effect through some kind of specific association;" M 6/2, 165 f. 78. Cf. Tad, 48rº 20 ff. Note that implicit in this is that the essential attributes are those of the individual act, not simply the "class", cf. the text cited in n. 42 and later concerning gins* and naw`. 79. If the citation of al-Gubba'i* at M 11, 460, 5 ff. accurately reflects his terminology and if it continues into line 8, then the notion dates at least from him. How he might have treated it, however, is uncertain. 80. E.g., al-qudratu li-ginsiha* taqtadi* sihhata* l-fi`l: M 8, 54, 7 f. = M 4, 26, 11 f.; [al-irâdatu] igabuha* kawna l-murîdi murîdan huwa wagibun* li-ginsiha*: M 6/2, 164, 11; cf. also ibid., 49, 11 f. Concerning the accident of life, cf., e.g., Mas, 123vº, cited in Ch. 2, n. 23 and M 13, 240: inna l-hayata* taqtadi* li-ginsiha* l-idraka*. 81. On the atoms as identical and forming a single gins*, cf., e.g., Muh*, 199, 7 ff. and Mas (B), 2; and on black (as-sawâd), cf., e.g., Mas, 47rº f. and Tad, 46rº f. 82. Cf., e.g., Tad, 128vº f. 83. M 6/2, 169, 14 ff. (a response to a question posed pp. 160 ff.), here reading al-giha* for al-qudra at 169, 18 and wa- for aw- in line 19 and yagri* for tagri* at 170, 2.
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84. That the sifat * al-'agnas* cannot be bil-fâ'il, cf., e.g., ZS, 213, 6 ff. and M 8, 68, 10 ff. 85. M 6/2, 45, 11: ... li-'anna ta'alluqahâ bimâ yagibu* 'an tata'allaqa bihî yargi'u* 'ilâ ginsiha*. 86. Cf., e.g., M 6/2, 311, 7 ff.: al-'irâdatu, 'ida* wagaba* fîhâ li-ginsiha* 'an yastahila* ta'alluquhâ bi-murâdayni 'aw-bi-murâdin wahidin* 'alâ waghayni*, fa-yagibu* dalika* fî kulli 'irâdatin; ZS, 398, 10 f.: dalika* li'anna l-'irâdata tata'allaqu bimâ tata'allaqu limâ hiya 'alayhî fî datiha*, wa-mâ hiya 'alayhî fî datiha* taqiadi* t-ta'alluqa bi-hada* l-murâdi dûna gayrihi* mina l-murâdât. Cf. also ZS, 374, 19 f.: "We say that two acts of willing differ (ihtalafa*) when they are correlated to two different (tagayara*) objects because the one is specifically characterized by an attribute by virtue of which it is correlated to this object and not to the other, while the second is correlated to that and not this object." Cf. also ibid., 379 f. 'Abd al-Gabbar* notes (e.g., M 6/2, 45, 11 ff.) the contrast in this regard between 'irâda and qudra, which may be correlated to an indefinite number of similar objects; cf. also M 4, 271 f. regarding the qudar and for a general discussion of this difference between 'irâda on the one hand and qudra and "desire" (ahwa) on the other hand, both of which, though differently, are correlated to an indefinite number of objects of like gins*, cf., e.g., Tad, 137vº. 87. M 12, 25, 17-20 (reading huwa bihi for yqwyh in line 20); cf. generally ibid., pp. 24 ff. et alibi. Cf. also the citation from 'Abd alGabbar's* kitâb al-'Amd given in SU5, 42, 1 f.: "knowing is the conviction through which the knower is fully confident (taskunu bihi nnafs) that the object of his conviction is really as he is convinced it is, for knowing is distinguished [reading yabinu with the A text against the editor's yatabayyanu] from everything else simply by this which we have mentioned" (the first part of this formulation is given without attribution by abû l-Husayn* in al-Mu'tamad 1, 10, 5 f.). The notion of sukûn an-nafs (which should not be taken in a simplistic sense) we need not take up here, since the present discussion is not concerned with the Basrians' epistemology. On the notion of ignorance, see Ch. 6, n. 47. 88. Cf. Muh*, 184, 9-11, cited n. 106. 89. Mas, 165rº 19 f. 90. Mas, 165vº f.: li'annahurmâ qad itarakâ fî hukmin* wahidin* yunbi'u 'ammâ humâ 'alayhî fî 'anfusihimâ wa-huwa t-ta'alluqu bidalika* l-muta'allaqi 'alà 'ahassi* mâ yumkinu (reading humâ for huwa at 166rº 1). 91. Mas, 165vº 5-8. Thus also, having the same object, the knowing that is immediate and unquestionable (daruri*) is of the same gins* as that which is based on a process of reasoning or inference and therefore can be called into question by questioning the premises, etc., even though they differ in quality because of the manner of their occurrence; wa-bi-mitli* hada* yu'lamu 'anna l-'ilma d-daruriya* min ginsi* l-'ilmi l-muktasabi 'ida* kâna l-muta'allaqu wahidan* 'alà 'ahassi* mâ yumkinu: Mas, 166rº 4 f. That 'aql also is classed as i'tiqâd (is min ginsi* l-i'tiqâdât) cf. SU5, 90, 18. 92. Cf., e.g., Mas, 166rº (citing abû Hâsim); M 6/1, 171 f.; 12, 214 f. and also 213, 15 ff. 93. Cf. Tad, 46rº f. and Mas, 47rº f. See also nn. 96 and 99 and, on the accident of color generally, Ch. 5. 94. Cf. the texts cited in n. 86 and see also M 6/2, 45, 11. Thus also, for example, one may view the accident of composition (ta'lif, on which see Ch. 5, nn. 45 ff.) as constituting a single gins* (cf., e,g., M 4, 337, 14 f.; 9, 129, 12 f.; ZS, 126, 6 ff.), while, from another perspective, since one atom may be conjoined to another from six positions according to the common doctrine of the school, Ibn Mattawayh will say that "since the most particular characteristic ('ahassu* l-'ahkam*) of ta'lîf is that it requires two juxtaposed substrates when it exists and because of its being specifically charac-
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terized by this characteristic ... its 'agnas * are limited to the number of the six directions and its situation differs from that of the 'akwân whose 'agnas* are unlimited" (cf. Tad, 103rº 22 ff.), since there are an infinite number of "positions" in which an atom may exist, either absolutely or in relation to one another. (Or the 'akwân see Ch. 5.) In either case, however, one has to do with an attribute or characteristic that is "most particular" in that it reveals the thing in its being what it is in itself. 95. Cf., e.g., ZS, 381, 6. Thus one says that the perceptible accidents are of seven 'anwâ', viz., colors, flavors, odors, heat, cold, pains, and sounds (SU5, 92, 9; see Ch. 5). Again, at-tu'umu* lahâ 'agnasun* mahsusa*: Tad, 52vº 26 f.. The term qabil seems to be a synonym for naw' with which it is commonly paired; see the texts cited later. 96. Cf. Tad, 45vº 9. Again it should be noted that, like gins*, the terms naw' and qabîl are not infrequently used loosely as terms for "kind," "type," etc., so that though speaking strictly the 'agnas* of colors, where they are formally listed (ibid.), in other contexts Ibn Mattawayh uses the other terms (e.g., ibid., 47rº 18: kullu naw'in mina l-'alwâni, or 46rº 20: kullu qabílin mina l-'alwâni) where the distinction is not in question. The apparent fluctuation in the use of these terms as they are technically and formally distinguished (gins* denoting the narrower and naw' and qabîl the broader category) or as they are used simply as expressions for "class", "kind" or "sort'' is a trifle disconcerting at first glance. The problem would seem, in part at any rate, to have its source more in us than in the texts as conceived and understood by their authors. For the authors and their contemporaries the terms are given as common and ordinary words in normal literary Arabic, words which, where required or desired, may be employed in narrow and formal senses in which they are distinguished, the distinctions being altogether familiar and "natural" as part of the school tradition within which they arose. The contemporary scholar and reader, on the other hand, has not this familiarity with their use but rather knows the words as common, general terms for "class," "kind," "type," etc., and, approaching the texts cold, is prone to compound his confusion by attempting to read their specialized and technical senses out of or along with authors who do not formally distinguish them as do the Basrians of the classical period, e.g., an-Nazzam* or alMâturîdî or, more likely, out of the translation literature and the Islamic writings that depend upon its usage, where gins* renders "genus" and naw' "species" as these are taken in the Aristotelian tradition. One's insensitivity to their use may also be aggravated by the habit, most conspicuous perhaps in English, of living with technical vocabularies that are built not spontaneously out of the common idiom but are inherited, borrowed, or concocted out of Latin and Greek and whose terms, therefore, may exist more or less, depending on the particular word, as exclusively or primarily technical expressions in relative autonomy and isolation from the lexicon of common speech. 97. Cf., e.g., Mas, 501rº and n. 104 and on i'timâd generally, see Ch. 5. 98. Cf., e.g., M 5, 198, 9 f. and 6/1, 172, 4-9; ZS, 381, 5 f.; Tad, 167vº 16 f.; note also the phrase li-ginsiha* 'aw-li-mâ yagri* hada* 1magra* in M 6/2, 169 cited in n. 83. Thus also one says that the i'tiqâdât (the forms of conviction) constitute a single qabîl (Mss, 183vº 12 f.) and that knowing ('ilm) is of the qabîl of conviction (Tad, 187rº 11, in the chapter heading; for the same formula, cf. SU5, 188 f. and on 'ilm as a modality of i'tiqâd see nn. 87 ff.); so also opinion (zann*), according to abû Hâim, is of the qabîl of conviction (Tad, 205rº 3); and Ibn Mattawayh remarks that" a thing is not confusable with what is not of its naw', e.g., will and conviction" (Tad, 187rº 26 ff.). The occurrence of al-hayat* in the list of M 5, 198 is curious in that all individual units of life are identical (mutamatila*) and so form a single gins* (cf. Tad, 128vº f., cited n. 82).
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99. Cf., e.g., ZS, 382, 14-17: 'inna s-sawâda lâ yurà li-kawnihî min qabíli l-'alwâni, wa-'innamâ yurà li-mâ huwa 'alayhî fî datihi *, wahuwa s-sifatu* l-muqtadatu* 'an sifati* d-dati*; fa'ida* lam yakuni l-'idrâku muta'alliqan bin-naw'i wal-qabili, fa-lâ yaguzu* t-ta'lîlu lil-'idrâki bihî, bal yu'allalu bi-mâ huwa yata'allaqu bihî, wa-huwa l-muqtada* 'an sifati* d-dat*; cf. generally ibid., 381 f. and Tad, 52vº 18-25, cited nn. 102 f. and concerning ta'lil, see Ch. 7. Ibn Mattawayh says, thus, that it is not true that color is perceptible "by virtue of its belonging to this naw' and by virtue of its being as it is in itself, li'anna l-'idrâka yata'allaqu bi-ay'i 'alà 'ahassi* 'awsafihi* faqat*, wa-lâ yu'lamu bil-'idrâk: 'annahû min hada* l-qabîl" (Tad, 148rº 5-7). That the perceptible is perceived in its essential attributes, cf. also, e.g., M 13, 254 f.; 7, 24, 4 and 194, 9; Mas (B), 2. ff. passim.; Tad, 206vº 13 and 222rº 5. 100. M 5, 198, 7-9 (where read min sifatihi* for min sifatin* in line 8), 249, 12 (where read 'ibânata ginsin* for ginsan*), and Tad, 52vº 20 f., cited in n. 102. 101. Cf. M 5, 198, 4-13 (where read naw'in for al-'anwâ' in line 9); Tad, 52vº 19 f. (cited in the following note) and 167vº 17 ff.; ZS, 381, 5-10 (where read mahd* for mahsus* in line 9). 'Abd al-Gabbar* in the passage cited is concerned not simply with terms that indicate the naw' (or qabîl) alone but with the whole category of the non-mufîd (mâ lâ yufîdu t-ta'rîf) including also those terms that "convey the distinction of one composite whole (gumla*) [from another] or of one kind of act from another, such as ... the words 'man' or 'riding animal' or the words 'darb*' ("beating"but perhaps "type,'' "kind") or 'number.'" The category of terms that "do not convey specific meaning" includes, thus, many of What the grammarians and lexicographers term 'asmâ'u l-gins* (names of classes). (For this and the use of the terms gins*, qabîl, and haw' by the grammarians, cf., e.g., al-Hasa'is* l, 26 f. and 34, where the former two denote the broader category and the latter the narrower.) The difference of the distinctions made by the mutakallimin from those of the grammarians is clear enough. Cf. also the division made by abû l-Husayn* in al-Mu'tamad 1, 15, 17 ff. (keeping in mind that the Basrian mutakallimîn consider terms denoting gins* in the grammarians' sense to be sifat*). Concerning "pure denominations" (al-'alqâbu l-mahda*), cf. M 5, 198 ff., 249 f. and 178; Tad, 67rº f. and 52vº 18 ff. and also as-Sîrâfî in the margins of Sîbawayh 1, 223; al-Muqtadab* 4, 16 f.; and Ibn Ya'î 1, 27. As a "pure denomination," i.e., a purely arbitrary name for a particular individual, a word has no strict lexical meaning (haqiqa*) and cannot, therefore, have a metaphorical meaning cf., e.g., al-Mu'tamad 1, 34, 12 ff.). See also Ch. 1, n. 9, and Ch. 6, n. 34. 102. "The word 'color' is not a pure denomination (laqab halis*) since it cannot be altered given the state of the language and so differs from the pure 'alqâb such as 'Zayd' and "Amr,' the meaning it signifies being the distinction of this naw' from any other. In this way, then, it comes to be included among term, that convey meaning, but insofar as it does not, concerning the thing named by it, convey the meaning of an attribute by which it is distinguished from something else (sifatun* yabînu bihâ min gayrihi*), it resembles the word 'thing' (ay') and so is considered to have two sides" (Tad, 52vº 18-21, reading fî l-musammà for fal-musammà in line 20). Similarly 'Abd al-Gabbar* says that "though such expressions belong under the heading of 'alqâb, insofar as they are equivalent to terms that convey meaning (halls* mahalla* l-mufîd) they have the same status in their use," i.e., they are not used arbitrarily and without established semantic content (M 5, 198, 11 f; that they are equivalent to 'alqâb in some respects, cf. also ZS, 381, 5 f.); cf. generally, Tad, 67rº f. and M 5, 249 f. With this one may contrast the philological discussion of 'alqâb in Ibn Fâris, 93 f. The Basrians take 'ay'' (thing, being, entity) as "the most nonspecific and universal of nouns" ('abhamu l-'asmâ'i wa-'ammuhâ: Tad, 67vº 9 f., reading al-'asmâ' for
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al-'ayâ'; cf. also al-Muqtadab * 4, 280 and 3, 186, where it is said to be "the most undefined of nouns": 'ankaru l-'asmâ'). Thus "it is used of whatever can be known and of which a predication can be made, but it does not signify this concerning it; it is not excluded that a noun be used only of what is specifically characterized by an attribute even though its normal use does not signify this, for the word 'body' is used only of the atoms though it does not convey this meaning about them and the word 'Zayd' is used only of an existent being though it does not signify this": M 5, 250, 4 ff.; see generally Tad, 67vº and Ch. 1, n. 14. 103. Tad, 52vº 21-23. He goes on to say that "the Shaikh abû 'Alî [al-Gubba'i*], since he considered as an essential predicate whatever is always predicable of a thing (mâ lâ yazûlu 'ani l-mawsuf*) both when it is nonexistent and when it exists, said that color is color by its essence (li-nafsihi), but later he retracted this in favor of the valid position," i.e., one that distinguishes terms that denote the essential and "most characteristic" attributes of a thing and its gins* from those that do not, even though they may be validly predicated of the possible and the nonexistent; for al-Gubba'i's* position, cf. also Maq, 161, 8 ff. and generally pp. 161 ff., 352, 13-15 and 522, 8 ff. Here too Ibn Mattawayh notes that a thing "has no attribute in its being a thing (bi-kawnihî ay'an) ...; abû 'Alî did take the position that it is a thing by its essence ('annahû ay'un li-nafsihî), but he subsequently retracted this, though the followers of Ibn al-Ihsid* continue to maintain the thesis": Tad, 11rº 16 ff. That a being has no state (hal*), i.e., as a distinguishing attribute, in its being an entity (ay') or an accident ('arad*), cf. also SU5, 374, 9-11 and Ch. 7. The question of what expressions do not imply existence and so may be used of the Possible and nonexistent is discussed by Ibn Mattawayh in a number of places, e.g., Tad, 52rº f., 83rº, 103vº, 139vº f., and 167vº. 104. Cf. Tad, 52vº 11 ff. On the perdurance of color generally, cf. ibid. and ZS, 395, 9 ff., and on that of i'timâd (which has no contrary: e.g., M 11, 434, 10 f.; 14, 198, 2 f.; and generally Tad, 108rº f.) see Tad, 106vº f. and Mas, 50rº; that the possibility of perdurance (sihhatu* l-baqâ') cannot be grounded in the gins* and does not imply similarity "since it does not reveal the thing as it is in itself," cf. Tad, 141vº 26-28, cited in n. 105. The one who throws an object into the air, for example, generates (wallada) through the i'timâdât of his arm a given number of i'timâdât in the object; as they cease to exist, they are reduced first to the same quantity as the intrinsic i'timâd of the object at which point the object stops rising, and then, as they diminish further, it falls of its own weight (cf., e.g., M 9, 58, 6 ff. and 148, 3 ff.; Mas, 103rº f.; and Tad, 116vº 23 ff.); on al-i'timâd generally, see Mas, 118rº ff. and Tad, 102rº ff. as well as Ch. 5, nn. 16 f. and 35. On the notion of al-baqâ' cf., e.g., M 5, 237; Mas, 86vº f.; and Mas (B) 59, 4 ff. 105. Tad, 141vº 26-28: 'ammâ sihhatu* l-baqâ'i wa-stihalatuhu*, fa-lâ yasihhu* ta'lîluhû bil-ginsi* wa-lâ bil-itirâki fîhî t-tamatulu* limâ lam yakun munbi'an 'ammâ 'alayhî -ay'u fî datihi*. 106. Muh*, 184, 9-11: 'inna l-'ilma li-'amrin yargi'u* 'ilà naw'ihî lâ yaguzu* ta'alluquhû 'illâ bi-muta'allaqin wahidin* mufassalan* wayuâbihu fî dalika* l-'irâdata wa-yuhalifu* l-qudrata wa-ahwata wa-gayrahuma*. 107. Cf. ZS, 450 ff. (where read al-qadîm for al-'arad* at 452, 8), Muh*, 183, 9 ff. and M 9, 18 ff. Concerning the question of taganusu* maqdûrâti l-qudar which is raised in ZS, 450 ff. and 381 ff. and its being likewise grounded in the naw' of the qudar, see Ch. 7, n. 8.
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Chapter 5 Attributes Grounded In The Presence Of An Accident The attributes that a being has through the inherence of an entitative accident ('arad *) or determinant (ma'nà) are, in relation to the being they qualify, simply possible (ga'iza*). They are attributes that a being has with the simultaneous possibility of its not being so qualified or of its being qualified by a contrary or different attribute under the same conditions, all other states remaining unchanged and regardless of external circumstances and conditions.1 Their absence or actuality cannot be grounded either in some essential attribute or in some extrinsic factor or in the manner of the thing's coming to be (waghu* hudutihi*), or the like, but can be ascribed only to the presence of a determinant cause (ma'nà) which is the immediate ground of their actuality; in its coming to be (hudut*) it is the ground of their coming to actuality (tagaddud*, husul*). That is, it is the accident that specifically determines (hassasa*) the realization of the particular qualification out of the indifferent possibility of the thing's being so qualified or not.2 Given the presence of the accident or determinant, the attribute is necessary (wagiba*, mugaba*) and accordingly the accident, as determinant (ma'nà), is commonly termed the cause ('illa) and the attribute, state, or characteristic, the effect (ma'lûl).3 That the attribute is simply contingent (sc., possible: ga'iza*) in regard to the thing is true even when the actuality of the specific type of attribute may be required by the essential attribute of the being it qualifies. Thus, for example, the essential attribute of the atom, its occupying space, entails (taqtadi*) its being in some location or position4 and the specific determinant (al-muhassis*) of this is an accident, namely, the kawn. In the formulation of abû Hâim, "the atom cannot exist unless it occupies space and it cannot occupy space unless it is spatially present (kâ'in) and it cannot be spatially present in a position save by virtue of a kawn."5 The existence of the kawn, then, is "directly entailed (mudamman*) in that the existence for the atom] is impossible save that
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it be in a state that it cannot have except by virtue of the kawn." 6 God, therefore, cannot create an atom unless he also creates a kawn.7 Though its being in some location or position is necessary, its being in any given position is not specifically and particularly necessitated; i.e. though it cannot exist without being present in some location, "it does not require the [particular] kawn for its existence but only in order to be present in a given location,"8 and that it be present in one location rather than another is purely contingent (ga'iz*). The atom may, in brief, remaining in one and the same (essential) state, sc., its occupying space, and given one and the same condition, sc., its existence, be qualified by being in any given position indifferently.9 It should be noted here that al-Gubba'i* and the earlier Basrian School (as well as al-Ka'bi and al-A'arî and their followers) held that the substrate (mahall*) must perforce have any accident that it is capable of having (ihtamala*). That is to say, for any accident the conditions of the existence of which are actually present (yasihhu* wuguduhu*), the subject must have, existent in it, either the accident or its contrary (didd*) or one of its contraries, if there is more than one.10 Under this conception virtually all types or classes of accidents would have to exist; given the existence of the atom it would have to have some color and be either heavy or light, etc., and given any living body it would have to be either qâdir or 'âgiz, etc. This position, however, is rejected by abû Hâim and the later school, who assert that there is no conceivable intrinsic ground that would preclude the existence of the being to which the accident would belong simply because of the nonexistence of the particular accident or its contrary.11 Their thesis is that the presence of the accident or its contrary is not entailed (mudamman*) by the actuality of the conditions of its presence and that the substrate may, accordingly, lack both; if, however, the accident or its contrary (given that they are such as to continue in existence: baqiya = istamarra l-wugud*) once exists in the substrate, the latter may not thereafter lack the one or the other, since the nonpresence of the oneits annihilation and consequent nonexistenceonce given its actuality, comes about only through the supervention (turuww*) of the contrary.12 As we have seen, the accidents are beings: entities that are "things-themselves" (dawat*), having their own essential attributes and characteristics that are manifest in one way or another when they exist. An entity, however, i.e., an "essence"/thing-itself (ay', dat*) is not predicated of something else; one entity is not said of another. It was in part to describe how one being is qualified by another, i.e., how one entity, viz., a composite body, whether animate or inanimate, may have some distinguishing qualification or attribute by virtue of the presence of an-
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other, viz., the accident (ma'nà), that abu Hâim formulated his concept of the state (hal *). Certain aspects of this question regarding the attributes specifically associated with the living composite whole or totality (gumla*) we have outlined and discussed in several places already. What is required now is to examine more closely the various classes of accidents and the specific effects that they produce in the subject to which they belong and that, as distinctive qualifications, states, characteristics, dispositions or modalities of the subject, whether in whole or in part, are predicated of it so that it is said to be thus specifically qualified (muhtass*) and thereby distinguished (mufâriq, bâ'in) from that which lacks the specific state, etc., or has a contrary one. On the basis of the kinds of qualification they effect, 'Abd al-Gabbar* divides the accidents or ma'ânî into four basic categories:13 a) Those that specifically qualify the substrate and necessitate a state in it, as for example the 'akwân; b) Those that specifically qualify the substrate but do not necessitate a state of it, as for example colors; c) Those that specifically qualify the total composite (gumla*) as such but have no determinant effect on the substrate, as for example the acts of willing or conviction; and d) Those that necessitate a state of the total composite and also have a determinant effect on the substrate as such, as for example, the power of autonomous action (al-qudra) or life.
A. The 'Akwân In order to explain the first category of "accidental attributes" (sifatu* l-ma'ânî) it will be necessary to examine the notion of the kawn in some detail, for though frequently discussed in the texts it is somewhat troublesome and has been treated with greater and less misunderstanding by more than one writer, the present one included. As is clear enough from the discussion and the texts cited earlier, the verb kâna, yakûnu is commonly associated with the concept of the state (hal*), as one speaks of a thing's being existent (kawnuhû mawgudan*), an atom's being occupying-space (kawnuhû mutahayyizan*), or a person's being knowing (kawnuhû 'âliman). In this, it expresses the predicated attribute (sifa*) as the way the thing is (mâ huwa 'alayhî): what is (kâna) and is in fact (tabata*) true of it (min 'amrihî, to borrow the expression of
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the grammarians). The background of this concept in the writings of the grammarians has already been outlined. What concerns the present context is, rather, the semantics of the verb when it is used without any predicate, as when one speaks of a thing's "being kâ'in" (kawnuhû kâ'inan). Used thus, kâna, yakûnu, though it may sometimes be employed by the Basrian Mu'tazila in the sense simply of being or becoming actual or existent, 14 is more commonly employed in a technical sense that is, in some respects, associated with the word rnakân (place). 'Abd al-Gabbar*, in discussing the semantics of the word, distinguishes the two meanings in the following manner: God is also described as "being" (kâ'in) in the sense that He is existent (mawgud*), since it belongs to every existent to be so described. One cannot, however, describe Him as "being" (kâ'in) in the manner in which an atom is described by this expression, viz., in that it is specifically qualified as being in one location (muhadat*) rather than in another.15
In the formal, technical sense, then, kâna is "to be spatially present" in a particular position (fî gihatin*) location (muhadatin*), or place (makânin),16 and it is this that concerns us here. The atom is the ultimate, indivisible unit of corporeality. Though indivisible it has, according to abû Hâim and those who follow his doctrine, some surface area (masaha*) by virtue of which there is an increase in magnitude (ta'azum*) as an increasing number of atoms are assembled together.17 As we have already noted, the essential characteristic of the atomits essential attributeis that it occupy space (hayyiz*) and to occupy space entails being in one particular position or location and not in another. Like all other reality, positions are considered by the Basrians to be discrete. As formally distinguished from place (makân), the position (giha*) or location (muhadat*) of a body or at atom is no larger than that which occupies it, and consequently the ultimate and indivisible unit of spatial location, the position (giha*), is equivalent in size to the atom. It is that area into which, when it is occupied by one atom, another cannot intrude, being the locus or the where (hayt*) of the first. For this reason, since the isolated atom is too small to be perceptible to normal human sense, the movement or transference of a body from one position to the one next adjacent (intiqâlu l-gismi* min gihatin* 'ilà 'aqrabi l-muhadayati* 'ilayhî is imperceptible.18 Position is not necessarily defined or determined by its being occupied. It is the area of space that is or may be occupied by an individual atom and that as such is spatially related to an indefinite number of other
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positions that are or may be occupied. It is not, however, considered to be a concrete entity (ay'un tabit *). In speaking of a moving body's vacating that from which it moves and occupying that to which it moves, abû Raîd says: In saying 'vacates' (mufrig*) and 'occupies' (sagil*) we refer to its vacating one position and occupying another and by 'position' we mean that if another atom were present (hasala*) it would not be present where this one is (bi-haytu* huwa).19
Concretely, then, position is defined by the presence of the single atom so that abû Hâim affirms that "the atom has position even if no other touches it, since the attribute that we mentioned [sc., occupying space: at-tahayyuz*] is inevitably realised when it exists."20 When it exists in actuality, the atom must necessarily be spatially present (kâ'in) in a position; the sense of this is that it has its actuality in such a way that if there were there another then it would be either near it or remote from it or would exist to the right or to the left or in one of the six directions, but not where it is.21
Directionality and distance can be conceived in terms of a single given position apart from any reference to the actual presence of any surrounding and intervening bodies, so that one can speak of motion without reference to place (makân), i.e., of movement in no place (lâ lî makân) by a kind of hypothesis ('alà darbin* mina t-taqdîr), viz., that if there were places ('amâkin) and bodies between them, the distance that one body would require to traverse it would be greater than that required by another. Likewise ... if God were to create a body and then, after that one, another and after that another, the discontinuity (at-tarahi*) between the first and the third would be greater than that between the first and the second.22
Position, even apart from the reality of place and the presence of surrounding bodies, implies and defines the six directions (al-gihatu* ssitt) of up and down, left and right, etc., and thus abû Raîd says in the Kitâb al-Masâ'il that if God were to create a heavy body, having created nothing else, it would be necessary that that body fall, since, given the actuality of the cause (sabab; i.e., the weight) and a substrate capable of receiving it and the absence of any impediment, the actuality of the effect (al-musabbab) is necessary.23
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Though the atom, by virtue of the way it is in itself, must at any given instant occupy some specific position in space, that it occupy one particular position rather than another is not determined by its essence or by its essential attribute. That is, if one considers the atom simply as it is specifically characterized by its being in a particular position or location and as, by virtue of its being in that position or location, it is distinguished from every other atom, the intrinsic determinant or ground of the actuality of this attribute can be neither the Attribute of the Essence, nor an essential attribute, nor can it be grounded immediately in the action of an agent or any extrinsic cause. Its occupying the particular position is, thus, effected and necessitated by the existence and inherence (huhul *) of a determinant accident (ma'nà) that, for want of a better word, is called the kawn. It is thus that the kawn is defined, namely, as that which necessitates the atom's being in a particular position.24 That is, as understanding posits the existence of the accident (ma'nà) of life as the ontological ground of a body's being living (or, in al-Gubba'i's* analysis, as that whose reality in being is the basis of the truth of the proposition 'he is living'), so also understanding posits the kawn as an ontologically real entity which is the intrinsic ground of the actuality of the attribute by which the being of a corporeal entity is specifically qualified in its being kâ'in in a given position. The forms of the kawnthe 'akwânare distinguished by the kinds of relationships that bodies have to positions in space and to one another in their being located in space. The majority of the masters of the Basrian School of the Mu'tazila from abû l-Hudhayl on distinguish basically five 'akwan: contiguity (igtima'*, mugawara*, mumâssa, muqâraba), separation (iftirâq, mufâraqa, mubâ'ada), motion (haraka*), rest (sukûn), and "the initial kawn" (al-kawn al-mubtada'), sc., the kawn that an atom has at the instant of its creation, when one cannot properly speak of the others because of their relational implications.25 Although one distinguishes in common speech five 'akwân, the attribute of being in a specific position or location is, strictly speaking, in the doctrine of abû Hâim and his followers, a single attribute, the distinctions being essentially verbal. The matter is summarized in the Muhit* bit-Taklîf in the following way: Now that which expresses (yunbi'u 'an) the attributes of the type of this accident whose reality we wish to affirm is the word 'kawn'; the meaning of the word is 'that whereby the atom comes to be (yasiru*) in one position and not in another.' The names used for it differ but in sense all refer to this same class. At one time, thus, we call it simply 'kawn', [viz.] when it exists initially, not following another; this is used only of the one which exists at the moment of the atom's
Page 99 coming into existence. Again, we may call it 'rest' when it continues; we call this kawn 'rest' at one time, viz., when it comes to exist following its like or when the atom, because of it, continues in one single position for two instants or more. At another time we call it 'motion,' [viz.] when it comes to exist following its contrary or when it necessitates the body's being kâ'in in one place immediately after its having been in another. At another time we call an instance of it 'contiguity' (mugawara *) or 'proximity' (muqâraba) or 'nearness' (qurb), when the atom is near another in such a way that there is contact (mumâssa) between them. At another time we call it 'separation' (mufâraqa) or 'remoteness' (mubâ'ada) or 'separateness' (iftirâq), when another atom exists at a distance from it. These are names we apply to this type of thing.26
What the author is saying is this: to be "spatially present" (to be kâ'in) in a specific position or location is a single and simple attribute of that which occupies space and is, in and of itself, distinguished only as one may distinguish one position from another. In talking about this attribute, however,i.e., in talking about bodies in their occupying places and positions in space and of the accident that is the ground of the actuality of this attribute or statewe normally employ a vocabulary that refers not simply and solely to the single body's occupying its unique position at a given instant, but one that considers this and views it as it is related to other positions, either to those occupied by other bodies at the same instant or those which the particular body itself occupied in previous instants. The relational connotations of the names, however, do not bear on the nature of the accident that exists and belongs to the single atom, nor, consequently, on the attribute or state of being of the single atom that is realized by virtue of the existence of the accident. This, basically, is the substance of their conception of the 'akwân. For the sake of clarity, however, it is advisable to examine briefly something of this accident, as one treats the correlative pairs of terms, separation and contiguity and motion and rest. Concerning the former Ibn Mattawayh has this to say: `Separation' (iftirâq), we hold, is a term used to refer to the two kawns through which two bodies have their being (hasala*) in two places remote from one another, just as proximity (mugawara*) is the two kawns in nearness (`ala waghi* l-qurb).27
That is to say, when two atoms or bodies are separated by an interval and distance (bawnun wa-masâfa), there inheres in each its own accident
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or kawn that determines its being kâ'in (spatially present) in that specific location, though we speak of the two, alluding to their spatial relationship, as separated (muftariqân), just as we refer to them as next to one another in speaking of their individually being in positions of proximate contiguity to one another. 28 Separation or being remote is, thus, a real (positive) attribute (sifatun* tabita*) and is not the mere absence of contiguity, conjunction, or composition. The attribute, however, strictly speaking, is that of the single atom in its being kâ'in in the position in which it exists. The being of each of the atoms to which one refers in speaking of separation is qualified and distinguished by its being in a specific location, and it is to the being of each as it is individually so qualified and distinguished that we refer in saying that they are separated (muftariqân) or are remote from one another (mutabâ`idân). To be separated or remote, then, is not an attribute but simply a way of talking (`ibâra) of the attributes or states of two beings that occupy positions in space. The reality is that of the being of each and the attribute (sifa*) or state (hal*) denoted by the expression is that by which the being of each is separately qualified and distinguished by its being individually kâ'in (kawnuhû kâ'inan) in its own position. The spatial relationship referred to in the expressions iftirâq, tabâ'ud, etc., does not, in sum, constitute the sifa* or hal* of the individual atoms, nor the two taken together, but is purely extrinsic. The same is true of proximity or contiguity (igtima`*, magawara*, etc.). Al-Gubba'i*, in an early period of his teaching, distinguished motion (haraka*) and rest (sukûn) as essentially different accidents. Motion, according to this position, constitutes a uniqe type of accident, a class unto itself (ginsun* bi-ra'sihî).29 The two are presented as essentially different in our perception of them. Rest, unlike motion, can "remain" (baqiya), i.e., continue in existence over a number of instants and can generate (wallada) no effect either in its own or in another substrate. Motion, on the other hand, is an alteration of position (zawâl: departure); it has direction and cannot perdure (baqiya), i.e., cannot continue in existence in the same position for more than one instant. It can, however, generate an effect, e.g., rest, further motion, or sound.30 One notes here that in the thesis that movement is incapable of perdurance (baqâ') al-Gubba'i* implies that motion is divided according to position and instant; what cannot perdure is the single unit or movement, for if the body were to remain so that the being in position (al-kawnu fî giha*) were one and the same for consecutive instants, the body would be said not to be moving but to be at rest. Abû Hâim, then, completes the systematization of the concept in working out the implications of his father's teaching and refining the
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notion of what it is to be kâ'in in a position with greater consistency. It is important to keep in mind the precise focus and perspective of the question to which abû Hâim addressed himself. His chief focus is not on the process of transference (intiqâl); it is not, that is, on the going from here to there as a going. His focus is, rather, consistently with that of the overall conception of the attributes that we have been examining, to describe and to give an account of what is implied concerning the being of a body when we say of it that it is moving or has moved (that it is mutaharrik *) at the instant at which this statement is taken to be true. Viewing the issue from this perspective, then, he will say that a body is said to be moving or to have moved when ''it has its actuality (hasala*) in one position immediately after having been in another one,"31 and rest is that a body have remained in one and the same position for two or more instants. Motion and rest, in this way, are identified as relative expressions for being kâ'in in a position that differ from separation and contiguity. Whereas the latter have reference to the simultaneous positions of several different bodies or atoms, the former, motion and rest, refer to the actuality of a single atom's being kâ'in in the position in which it is at a particular instant (waqt) as this is viewed in relation to the position it occupied in the immediately preceding instant. Insofar as one speaks of the attribute of the thingof the state of its being as it exists and is distinguished by the particular attribute at a given instant of its existenceit is simply kâ'in in the given position. Shorn of the allusion to what is not the present and actual (hasil*) state of the being of the body or atom that is so described, motion and rest are essentially one and the same; the actuality of the atom's being kâ'in in the given position is indistinguishable apart from the consideration of the no longer actual state that it was in in the preceding instant. In the words of Ibn Mattawayh: If theymotion and restwere different (muhtalifa*), they would be distinguished (iftaraqat) in some way that would necessitate the difference, but one can point to nothing beyond the names that are employed (at-tasmiya) as one says of the one that it is `motion' (haraka*) and of the other that it is 'rest' (sukân). The difference of the names one employs, however, does not entail a true difference in the things-themselves (dawat*).32
Thus according to abû Hâim and the later school, we perceive and distinguish bodies, and in perceiving a multitude of bodies note their various positions in relation to one another and the differences of their relative positions in successive instants. We know them as being in their various positions and so as qualified by this attribute, sc., their being
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kâ'ina, each in its particular position. If one comes to be in a position different from that which it occupied in a previous instant, we recognize the change of position relative to the other bodies (e.g., in relation to the surface on which it has moved: al-makân) and so know it as being spatially present (kâ'in) first in one and now in another position, and because of the otherness of the latter position from that which the body occupied in the immediately preceding instant, we refer to its presence in the latter position as `motion' (haraka *). What is perceived, however, is not the kawn but simply the body as it exists and has its being in the particular position; and its being in this position immediately following its presence in an adjacent position does not in itself differ fundamentally from its being in this position over several successive instants. In contrast to this, al-Gubba'i* (for whom, it will be recalled, the object of our knowing that the body has moved is the accident itself) had held that as an alteration of position (zawâl), motion (haraka*, i.e., the accident which is determinant of the body's being in the next adjacent position) is itself perceived and so is recognized as in itself essentially different from rest. Ibn Mattawayh, accordingly, remarks that where al-Gubba'i* had insisted that if motion in a particular position and rest in it were alike (mitlan*), it would be necessary that they could be conjoined, our position that of abû Hâim and his followersis that it is possible that they coincide but that when they coincide motion ceases to be so named in that to use this name implies its being spatially transferred to another place. We have shown, however, that the very thing which is a motion (nafsu mâ huwa haraka*) may become rest by perduring (bilbaqâ') and the very thing which is an act of being at rest might have existed as motion, i.e., hypothetically, since it is impossible for that rest which actually exists subsequently to become motion, since this would entail a contradiction in the terms.33
That is to say, the accident that actually exists at the given instant, viz., the kawn which is the determinant of the body's being in the particular position can, at least hypothetically, exist in such a way as to be called either motion or rest. Motion, therefore, for abû Hâim, since it is simply the determinant accident that necessitates the atom's being kâ'in in a particular position,34 has no direction or directionality.35 Again, one speaks of greater and less in reference to motion and rest, saying that one body has greater rest, i.e., more stability in its position in that it is more difficult to move36 or that a body has greater movement, i.e., moves more rapidly. In both cases, however, one has to do not with motion and rest strictly under-
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stood as kawn (sc., al-kawnu fî giha *) but with weight (taql*) and force or pressure (i'timad), as, for example, the greater rate of fall over a similar distance is properly attributed to the greater weight of the body and not to the number of movements, i.e., the number of positions successively occupied in the course of the fall in a given period.37 So likewise, where abû l-Hudhayl and, for a time, al-Gubba'i* had insisted that the "initial kawn," that which is present in the atom at the first moment of its creation, must be neither motion nor rest,38 abû Hâim and the later school hold that "it is simply kawn and is not specifically different from motion and rest; rather, the meaning is the same but one does not call it that."39 In summary, then, Ibn Mattawayh says: The names alter simply because of their [sc., the 'akwâns'] occurrence in various ways. This is shown by the fact that that which is in motion and that which is at rest have no state over and above their being kâ'in in the place in which they are, just as that which perdures (al-bâqî) has, in being perduring, no state over and above the continuance of existence. That which necessitates this state, then, must be of one and the same gins*, whether it is called motion or rest or simply kawn, for the sameness of the caused (al-mugab*) implies the sameness of the cause (al-mugib*).40
There is, nonetheless, difference and sameness and contrariety in the 'akwân according to abû Hâim and his successors; and their conception of this differs from that of the school's earlier masters systematically with the difference of their understanding of the nature of the accident itself. Whereas abû l-Hudhayl and al-Gubba'i* and others had held that, for example, motion and rest were contraries in themselves and in reference to the single substrate regardless of its position,41 abû Hâim's teaching is that every kawn that is specifically characterised by one particular location is similar (tamatala*), whether it be motion or rest and whether the substrate be one and the same or different ones; nor, furthermore, does it have any determinant effect on its similarity that it be at one time movement to the right and at another movement to the left.... When the 'akwân, however, cease to be specifically characterized by a particular position, their otherness [sc., that of the positions] indicates that the 'akwân are dissimilar or, rather, that they are contraries.42
Similarity and dissimilarity of being in a position are related simply to the sameness and difference of the position that is occupied. "Whatever [sc., whatever kawn] exists in one and the same location shares in neces-
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sitating a single attribute, namely, the atom's being kâ'in in that place." 43 Contrariety (at-tadadd*) for the 'akwân consists in being in a different location or position, since the actuality of being kâ'in in one entails the nonexistence (intifâ', 'adam) of the kawn that determines the thing's presence in the other.44 Like the kawn, the accident of composition (ta'lîf) is an accident whose effect is restricted to the substrate of its inherence and which requires for its existence only the actuality of its substrate.45 It is distinct from proximity, i.e., from mere contiguity (mugawara*, mumâssa)46 in that, whereas this latter is, in reality two accidents inhering separately in each of the two adjacent substrates or atoms, composition (ta'lîf) is a single accident whose substrate of inherence is the two adjacent atoms by its inherence in which it causes to be conjoined (mu'allafân), i.e., bonded together.47 It is by its requiring two contiguous substrates (ma-hallani* mutagawiran*), when it exists, that it is distinguished as a unique type (gins*) of accident48 that gives the two the character of being a single thing (manzilatu -ay'i lwahid*).49 Like the kawn, composition is spoken of in a number of ways. It is composition that is referred to when one speaks of length and breadth and depth,50 as also it is to various forms or modalities of composition that one refers in speaking of a thing's being hard or soft and rough or smooth, etc., or of its being more or less solid or compact or more or less firm in cleaving together.51 These, however, are simply modes of its occurrence and are correlated to the physical conditions that give rise to the actuality of the accident. The accident itself, however, forms a single gins* as that which determines that the pair of atoms are conjoined in composition (mu'allafân) and not merely contiguous or adjacent (mutagawiran*, etc.).52 That is to say, in speaking of the accident of composition and the characteristic that it effects in its substrate (mahallan*), one speaks not of the physical conditions that effect it or give it the particular character of being hard or smooth or simply to their cleaving together (iltizâq), but to their being conjoined so as to have quasi unity that may be the condition of further accidents. B. Accidents That Do Not Effect a State Either of the Substrate or of the Totality Though `Abd al-Gabbar*, in the passage cited in note 13, mentions only color as an example of this category of accidents, it includes all the
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classes ('anwâ`) of accidents that are directly perceived by the senses, viz., colors, tastes, odors, heat, cold, pains, and sounds. 58 The single example, however, is sufficient to the present inquiry. The basic colors are accidents that have as the necessary mode (kayfîya) of their existence that they inhere in the single atoms as a substrate,54 requiring no more than the single atom as the condition of their existence, without, however, effecting a state or attribute either of the substrate (mahall*) as such or of the corporeal composite as a whole (al-gumla*), if the subject of their inherence be a living body.55 Inhering in the substrate, rather, they constitute a disposition (hay'a) as having which the substrate is perceived.56 According to the Basrians, "the perception of a thing presents it as it is in itself" (`alà mâ huwa `alayhi li-nafsihî). That is, what is directly perceptible (sc., the atom and the seven categories of accidents listed earlier) is perceived and so known immediately in its essential attribute.57 In the case of color, then, what is Perceived is the accident itself in its essential attribute that it has "by virtue of the way it is in itself."58 Since it is the color itself in its essential attribute that is thus Perceived, the particular color is the haqiqa* of what is colored insofar as it is so; it is what we are referring to when we say that the thing is colored. 'Abd al-Gabbar* says: The haqiqa* of the black (at-'aswad) is that there is black (sawâd) in it, so that . . . the haqiqa* of the term is the cause ('illa, sc., the accident itself); ... That which is black (al-'aswad) has, in its being black, no state (hal*) that belongs to its through [the accident of] black (as-sawâd), but rather what is referred to in 'its being black' (kawnuhâ 'aswada) is no more than that there is black in it. How then could one consider this the cause ('illa) of its being black save as considering it the basis ('illa) of the name, so that its being called 'black' ('aswad) is the name for the black that is in it.59
In contrast to the nonperceptible attributes whose characteristics and haqa'iq* were discussed earlier, to be colored, e.g., to be black, is thus not an attribute or state of the substrate as having which it is recognized as distinguished in its being from another, nor is it the ground or condition of any other qualification or attribute that it may have, but simply a per-ceivable disposition (hay'a).60 It is not, in short, a real ontological attribute or qualification of the being of the thing, but simply the present accident in its presence and inherence in the material substrate: a physical disposition of the substrate.
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C. Accidents That Effect a State of the Composite Whole as a Totality but Have no Determinant Effect on the Substrate as Substrate The basic elements of the Basrian School's understanding of the states and characteristics that qualify the being of the living whole or totality (gumla *) and their ground in inherent entitative accidents have, in some part, already been outlined in Chapter 2. Here we need but note those specific characteristics of these attributes on the basis of which 'Abd al-Gabbar* divides them and so the accidents that are their causes ('ilal) into two fundamental classes.61 The distinction is of considerable significance for the school's understanding of the ontology of the living composite whole in that it involves the ground, the order (tartîb), and the interrelationships of the attributes that qualify the being of the composite whole in itself as an ontologically unitary being and in the activity and function of its parts as integral parts of the whole. The accidents of conviction (i'tiqâd)62 and willing ('irâda), as we have already seen, effect states of the composite that are real ontological states of its being insofar as, in its being a whole and totality, it has the character of a single entity. That is, in contrast to the black's being black but analogously to the atom's being kâ'in in a specific location, when we know that a person is knowing or is willing and when we speak of his being knowing or being willing, the characteristic that the mind grasps (`aqala) and that, therefore, is primarily spoken of in our saying "being willing" and "being knowing" is not the inherent accident that is the ground and cause of the actuality of the attribute, but the being of the composite as it is really and in fact knowing or willing. These accidents have, however, no direct effect on the substrate as such; i.e., the actuality of their presence in the substrate (mahall*) and of the totality's being qualified by the attribute which flows from them by virtue of the way they are in themselves has no determinant effect (ta'tir*) on the functioning of the substrate, nor in effecting the realization of any state that can properly be predicated of it.63 Though knowing (al-'ilm) in some cases64 and willing (al-'irâda) in all65 are produced by the autonomous action of the one who knows or wills in the heart as the instrument or organ of their production and the locus of their existence (so that the act of knowing or willing is effected through the qudar that inhere in the heart as substrate), and although they may have transitive effects on further action of the composite whole in that the knower's being knowing may be the basis of the wellwrought act (al-fi'lu l-muhkam*)66 and his being willing is determinant of the way the action takes place (waghu*
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wuqâ`ihî), 67 and so of the character of the act insofar as this is determined (muqtadan*) by or ascribable to (râgi'un 'ilà) the manner of its occurrence, they produce or effect no specific qualification (ihtisas*) or state (hal* or sifa*) of the substrate or organ, but only of the living composite as a whole and totality that is thereby willing or knowing.68 D. Accidents That Necessitate a State of the Total Composite and also Have a Determinant Effect on the Substrate as Such In contrast to the accidents of conviction and will, those of life (al-hayat*) and the power of autonomous action (al-qudra) have a direct effect upon the substrate of the composite as such, and the states and attributes that belong to the being of the composite as a whole or totality by virtue of their presence are, in consequence, of greater ontological significance. Primary here is the accident of life, for, as has already been made clear in several places, it is the basis and cause that effects the oneness of the body as a living totality; it is by virtue of the accident of life in each part (guz*' = atom) of the living that the whole becomes ontologically a single being. Life is, thus, the primary ground and condition of whatsoever attributes the living composite can have insofar as it is a whole and totality, i.e., insofar as its being is the being of a whole that has the character of a single entity. To be living forms a unique and, in a certain respect, primary mode of being, for the living composite whole or totality in the unity of its being is, in some respects, analogous to the atom as an ultimate ontological principle or element. Just as the essential attribute of the atom, viz., its occupying space (tahayyuzuhu* = kawnuhû mutahayyizan*), is the primary ground ('asl*) of the actual possibility (sihha*) of its serving as the substrate of whatever accidents it may have and of the succession of different and contrary accidents over time (and so of all corporeal existence as such), likewise the living's being living (kawnuhû hayyan*) is the primary ground of the actual possibility of its being characterized by whatsoever attributes may qualify its being as a living totality.69 Again since the living composite as a material composite must inevitably have needs (hagat*) and is subject to excess and deficiency (az-ziyâdatu wan-nuqsan*), its being living entails (dammana*) its having desires (kawnuhû mutahiyan nâfiran).70 Besides these, the accident of life has other concomitant effects (for they are not separable from the whole's being one and living) on the
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parts ('agza *' = atoms) of the whole in their function as substrate (mahall*), viz., in their function as integral parts of the living whole. It is through the accident of life, inherent in each part of the living being, that each part becomes sentient, for primary sensation or perception belongs to the living substrate as such.71 Every part (guz'*, mahall*) as living is sensitive at least to heat and cold,72 and by virtue of their specific organic structure (binya mahsusa*) the separate organs of sense (al-hawass*, 'âlâtu l-hawass*), since life inheres in them, are also sensitive to their specific objects (light rays, sound, etc.). Again it is by virtue of the presence of life (of the "units of life": 'agza'u* lhayati*) that the substrate of various parts and organs of the composite totality are capable of serving as the substrate of other accidents that are associated With life. For example, the parts of the heart may serve as the substrate of the acts of knowing, willing, or intending, or the heart and the various members (al-gawarih*) may be the substrate of the power of autonomous action (al-qudra), sc., of its individual units: al-qudar. The case of qudra is more or less analogous to that of life. Its presence in whatever part or organ constitutes the living totality (al-gumla*) as capable of autonomous action (qâdira), for it is the living whole or totality that is capable of acting and is the agent (al-fâ'il), not a limb or organ of the body.73 In the corporeal agent, however, units of the power of efficient causality or autonomous action (al-qudar) are diverse (muhtalifa*).74 As an entitative accident, al-qudra inheres in the atoms of the several organs ('âlât) in discrete units or quanta (agza*),75 the nature of the action that is their correlative object (al-maqdûr) being determined by the structure and nature of the organ. Through the qudar of the heart the agent may make an act of the will76 or an act of reasoning that leads to conviction or knowing (or ignorance).77 Similarly there are qudar in the limbs (al-gawarih*) through which they move, as for example in the hand or forearm.78 These organs, in their material parts (their constituent atoms with their specific structure and composition: their compliment of accidents) constitute the "substrate of the power of autonomous action" (mahallu* l-qudar),79 and the specific qudra belongs to its own substrate and cannot function apart from it.80 Just as life has a determinant effect on its substrate in that it renders it living and sentient and capable of serving as the substrate of certain other accidents, the condition of whose actuality in them is the whole's being living (kawnuhâ hayyatan*), so the power of autonomous action and causation, in addition to rendering the total composite capable of acting, renders the substrate functional as a material instrument ('âla), i.e., as the locus of the realization of the act or of the initiation (ibtidâ') of the act, if its effect goes beyond the locus of its initiation into another.
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Change No existent being can, under any circumstances whatsoever, be divested of its essential attributes, 81 for the being of the essence itself is, so to speak, the "cause" of their actuality.82 Accordingly, against the strident opposition of the A`arites,83 abû Hâim and his followers hold that no necessary attribute, i.e., no attribute that is necessary simply upon the existence of the "essence"/thing-itself, can properly be considered as ''grounded in a cause" (li-'illa, li-ma'nà), for the accident (i.e., the ma'nà) that is the cause ('illa) and the attribute whose actuality its existence necessitates are by definition purely contingent (ga'iza*) in relation to the being of the thing-itself. The attribute whose actuality is necessary given the existence of the "essence"/thing-itself "by its very necessity needs no entitative determinant" (ma'nà)84 Since they are altogether contingent and "accidental" in relation to the essential attributes, the "accidental attributes" (sifatu* l-ma`ânî) cannot be the basis of the specifically distinguishing characteristics of a thing in its being what it is.85 There can be no change in the essential attributes of a thing; so long as it continues to exist, what it is in the content of its being cannot be subject to alteration. "The essential attribute cannot change by the acquisition of anything that did not previously belong to it."86 According to abû Hâsim and his followers, primary entities"essences"/things-themselves (ad-dawat*) cannot be said to change (tagayyara*), for change involves the coming to actuality (tagaddud*, husul*) and the cessation of the actuality (zawâl, intifâ') of attributes and the primary entities, the atoms and the accidents, cannot vary in their essential attributes. Change, therefore, must consist essentially in the alteration of "accidental attributes" (sifatun* ma'nawîya, sifatu* l-ma`ânî)and so is properly predicated of composites, referring to the alteration of the composite, i.e., to its becoming a different composite through the coming to be and passing away of certain of the entitative accidents that constitute a part of it. In the terms of abû Hâim a single thing [i.e., a single atom as such or a single accident] cannot change just as it cannot become other than itself.87 We say that 'change' (at-tagayyur*) and 'becoming other '(at-tagayur* have one and the same sense and that they are not used in reference to a single thing but to a plurality of things, so that one says of a body, when some of the accidents (ma`ânî) that are in it cease to be and other accidents come to be, that "it has changed or has be. come other"....88
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Change, in brief, is predicated only of the composite in its becoming another composite, i.e., in reference to its coming to be made up of other entitative constituents or components (viz., the specific accidents that are themselves things-themselves: (dawat *) and thereby, through having other determinants (ma'ânî, 'ilal), coming to have other characteristics ('ahkam*) and attributes (sifat*) that are predicated of it. It should be noted, however, that though grounded in a determinant accident, the attribute of a body's being living (kawnuhû hayyan*) is, for the material composite that is living, a state that is unique in several significant respects, so that the coming to be or ceasing to be of the accident of life in the composite represents a change of a quite different order from that which occurs in terms of other accidents. The presence of life alters, so to speak, the nature of the composite as a composite, in that with the coming to be of the accident of life and its inherence in its parts, the composite ceases to be a mere conglomerate of discrete entitative constituents (sc., atoms, each with its separate complement of accidents) and takes on the character of a single essential entity or thing itself (datun* wahida*, ay'un wahid*). The attribute or state of being living stands, in relation to the living composite whole or totality (al-hayy*), as a sort of essential attribute that may belong to the living as such, just as to occupy space is the ground of the possibility of the atom's having all the other accidents that may inhere in it. That is, the atom's capability of being a substrate of entitative accidents (ihtimaluhu* lil-'a`rad*) is grounded not directly and immediately in the essence or the Attribute of the Essence, but in its characteristic, essential attribute, viz., its occupying space,89 and likewise the possibility (sihha*) of the living's having, for example, the attributes of desire (ahwa), knowing ('ilm), and the power of efficient causality (qudra), etc., is grounded not immediately in the corporality and ubication of the substrate (mahall*) or their composition (ta'lîf) into a body (gism*) or, indeed, in the presence of the accident of life as such, but in its being living that is the characteristic state of the unified living whole or totality.90 It should be noted finally that it is only the "accidental attributes" (sifatu* l-ma`ânî), those, namely, that are grounded in the existence of an entitative cause (sifatun* li-'illatin, li-ma'nan), that qualify and are predicated of the material composite as a whole or totality, for the other attributes, e.g., essential attributes or existence properly speaking, belong to the ultimate unitary entities ('ahadu* l-'aya'), sc., the true "essences"/ things-themselves (dawat*). The living composite comes to be living and is constituted as a living whole or totality through the inherence of the accident of life, and whatever attributes or characteristics it may have as
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a whole are grounded in the presence (wugud *) of this or another entitative accident.91 We can here see how the Basrians' definition of man that was outlined at the beginning is to be understood within the context of the system, i.e., in what sense the human being (al-'abd, al-mukallaf) has ontologically the character of a single entity (dat*, ) but is, at the same time, essentially a composite and so how, against those who hold that man is, in one sense or another, the spirit or soul or life, the Basrian Mu'tazila say that the living being that is capable of autonomous action (al-hayyu* l-qâdir) is this corporeal individual which is structured as a particular organic structure by which it is differentiated from all other animals and is that to which command and prohibition, blame and praise are directed, even though it is not living and capable of autonomous action save through entitative determinants (ma`ânî) that are in it (though this does not belong to the definition.)92
The living has, so to speak, its essential attribute, its grounding principle ('as1*), viz., that it be living (kawnuhû hayyan*), but that whose state of being is that of being living (i.e., of which 'being living' is predicated) is the corporeal individual, the composite insofar as it has the character of a thing-itself (fî hukmi* -ay'i l-wahid*). Thus abû Hâim says that "the mutakallimûm call the living being that is capable of autonomous action by the name 'man';" the living being, however, is the corporeal individual (sahs*), "so that man is the organically structured parts, not the structure (binya) or the form (sura* = shape)." 93 Notes to Chapter 5 1. Cf., e.g., M 6/2, 24, 3 ff. and 350, 17 ff.; Muh*, 41, 15 ff., 45, 5 ff.; and 98, 9 f.; SU5, 98, cited in the following note. 2. 'Inna l-gisma* 'ida* gazat* `alayhî sifatani*, tummma* haragat* 'ihdahuma* mina l-gawazi* 'ilà l-wugubi* wal-'uhra* mina lgawazi* 'ilà l-istihalati*, fa-lâ budda min 'amrin muhassisin* in lahû..., wa-laysa dalika* l-'amru 'illâ wuguda* ma'nan: SU5, 98, 4 ff. (omitting wa- before muhassis* in line 5 and wa-li-makânihî . . . al-istihala* in ll. 5 f.); for the use of the term hassasa*, see my "Kalam and Philosophy" Islamic Philosophical Theology, edited by P. Morewedge (Albany, 1977). 3. The vocabulary here requires some comment. The terms gawhar* and 'arad* are basically categorial terms for the atom and for the "accident" as that which inheres in the atom. The terms mahall* and ma'nà are commonly employed as synonyms for gawhar* and 'arad* respectively, but whereas the latter arc fundamentally categorial, the former connote the function of the beings designated, i.e., the atom as substrate
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(mahall *) and the "accident" as the ground or cause (ma`nà, 'illa) of a contingent attribute or characteristic. As was noted, not all entitative accidents inhere in a substrate; God's act of willing is a temporally generated (muhdat*) accident that exists immaterially, in no substrate (lâ fî mahall*). While the term ma`nà is used of all entitative "accidents"both those that inhere in a material substrate and that which does notthe term 'arad* is not used of the latter, most probably because of the semantic overtones of the word (cf. Ch. 4, n. 70). Thus mahall* (as substrate, whether the single atom or a composite plurality of atoms) and ma`nà are the more general terms and occur much more commonly in the texts than do gawhar* and 'arad*. (That 'arad* is a secondary and perhaps later expression would seem indicated in Maq, 369 f.; this is significant for the understanding of the background of the Basrian kalâm and its relation to the translation vocabulary.) Ma`nà in this use means basically "cause", i.e., the "reason" (semantically cp. Greek and ) for the actuality of the attribute or characteristic and so ''in the usage of the kalâa" (ta`âruf al-mutakallimîn) is an equivalent of 'illa (M 5, 253, 9-11). The earlier kalâm use of these terms and its origin are to be found in the juridical texts, where both terms, 'ilia and ma'nà, are commonly associated with the expression 'hukm*' as one speaks of the "basis" or "cause" of the "judgment" (that the thing is thus or so). 'Arad*, indeed, is used in correlation to hukm* only where one wants to emphasize that it is a materially inherent "accident" that is in question (e.g., M 6/2, 150, 2-6 and 9, 87, 11). Ma`nà and 'illa are used for the "accident" (whether materially inherent or not) as the ground or cause of the attribute that "arises from it" (sadara* `anhâ; for the expression, cf., e.g., Muh*, 72, 19; ZS, 489, 16 f., 520, 15 and 536, 14) and accordingly this attribute or characteristic is commonly referred to as the "result" or "effect": al-ma'lûl. (Note that 'ilia is frequently used of the ma'nà that is "not in a substrate" despite the apparent implication of the text cited in Ch. 4, nn. 74 and 76.) As a distinct form of causation in that the cause "necessitates" ('awgaba*) its effect (mugab*)so that these terms too are commonly associated with the ma'nà and its resulting attribute or characteristicthe causality of the 'illa and ma'lûl (sc., of the ma`nà and its necessitated hukm or sifa*) is distinguished from that of the sabab and musabbab, the latter terms being used of sequential causes and effects (generally physical) of one thing on another. The 'ilia with its ma'lûl are thus taken as the type of necessary and immediate causation (cf., e.g., the argument in ZS, 469, 15-17). (On the forms of causality recognized in the kalâm, see my "Kalam and Philosophy," and on the term 'ilia generally, see Ch. 7, n. 1.) For convenience I have, in the present study, used the term 'accident' generally for the ma'nài.e., the broader termnoting the distinction between this and 'arad* only where required by the context. Gimaret's rendering JA, 1970, 49 ff. of ma'nà as "entité" ('Abd al-Gabbar's* third meaning for the term, which he says is magaz*: M 5, 253, 12 ff.), like H. Davidson's "something" ("Arguments from the Concept of Particularisation in Arabic Philosophy," Philosophy East and West 18 [1968] 303) ignores the technical sense that is clear from the texts, A'arite as well as Mu'tazilite, and that is given in explicit definition by the Qadi*. 4. Cf., e.g., M 9, 53, 5 f. and the references cited in the following notes. Concerning "being in a location or position" (al-kawnu fî giha*), also see later. 5. ZS, 76, 1-3 (citing abû Hâim): 'inna l-gawhara* lâ yugadu* 'illâ wa-huwa mutahayyizun* wa-lâ yakûnu mutahayyizan* 'illâ wa-huwa kâ'in, tumma* lâ yakûnu kâ'inan fî gihatin* 'illâ bi-kawnin; this formula is cited without attribution ibid., 236, 12 ff. and 362, 15 ff.; SU5, 112, 7 f. and 538, 5 ff. (cp. also M 11, 376, 15 ff.); M 13, 246, 15 f.; Muh*, 198, 20 ff.; Tad, 15rº 5 ff., 23rº 21 f., and 30vº 22; Mas (B), 40, 18 ff.; cp.
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also the somewhat analogous statement of Avicenna (al-Mabahit *, § 325) in Aristu* 'inda l-'Arab, edited by A. Badawl (Cairo, 1947), 189. 6. M 9, 100, 2 ff.: yagibu* wugudu* l-kawni 'inda wugudihi* li'anna wugudahu* mudmmanun* min haytu* yastahilu* wuguduhu* 'illâ 'alà halin* lâ yahsulu* `alayhâ `illâ bi-kawnin. Cf. also ibid., lines 13 ff. and p. 43, 16 and, for this argument generally, ZS, 362 f. and the references in the preceding note. Entailment (tadmin*) here is not iqtida*'; the former is defined by abû Raîd in the following terms: "Tadmin* is validly affirmed only when that whose existence is asserted to entail (mudammin*) the existence of another by virtue of the way it is in itself does not have actuality of being save that it be in some manner by virtue of its being in which manner there must exist that whose existence is said to be entailed (mudamman*) by it, as is affirmed to be the case with the atom and the kawn" (Mas, 148vº: 'inna ttadmina* 'innamâ yasihhu* 'ida* kâna mâ yuqâlu fîhî bi'anna wugudahu* mudamminun* bi-wugudi* gayrihi* limâ huwa 'alayhî fî datihi* lâ wa-yakûnu `alà waghin* li-kawnihî `alà dalika* l-waghi* yagibu* 'an yugada* mâ yuqâlu 'inna wugudahu* mudammanun* bihî kamâ, tubbita* fî l-gawhari* wal-kawn); cf. also the shorter explanation given in M 11, 376, 15 ff., using the same example. Similarly life (the living's being living) "entails" the presence of desire (ahwa) (cf. the references cited in n. 70). 7. Cf., e.g., M 6/1, 165, 12 f.; 8, 222 f.; 9. 43, 15 f. and 89, 17 f.; 13, 246, 1 ff. Thus "the attributes of the atom are four: its being an atom, its being mutahayyiz*, its being existent, and its being kâ'in in a position. Its being an atom is by its essence, its occupying space is entailed (muqtadan*) by its essence, its existence is through coming to exist through the agency of the agent who is essentially qâdir, and its being kâ'in is through an accident (ma`nà). It belongs to the individual atoms [insofar as they are atoms] to have only these attributes" (Tad, 6vº 16-18): cf. also Mas (B), 8, 7 ff. and ZS, 153, 4 f. and also Mas (B), 3, 13 ff., where the first attribute is omitted because of the context. 8. M 8, 78, 14 f. (where, note, the numeral 15 is misplaced in the margin). This whole conception is important to the school's opposition to the contention of the falâsifa that the motion of the celestial bodies is eternal (sc., necessary). 9. Cf., e.g., ZS, 408 f.; SU5, 96, 15 ff. (and 97, 16 ff.); Muh*, 41, 15 ff., et alibi. 10. Cf., e.g., M 6/1, 175, l2 ff.; 9, l2, 17-19; Mas (B), 43 f.; Mas, 149vº 12 f.; and Tad, 23rº 22 f. (where insert lâ before yahlu* in line 22). The logic of this thesis for al-Gubba'i* is to be understood within the context of his treatment of the sifat*, i.e., of his tendency to understand them in a formally linguistic framework; if the denial of a predicate implies the affirmation of the contrary. then it implies, in the case of predicates that are grounded in entitative accidents. the existence of the contrary accident. Involved also, however, in the differences of the doctrines of abû Hâim and of the later school from that of al-Gubba'i* in this matter is the shift in the conception and treatment of the "negative attributes," on which see Ch. 7. 11. Cf., e.g., Mas, l75rº 3 ff. 12. Cf. generally Mas (B), 43 ff. and Tad, 23rº ff. (that the atom can exist having no accident save the kawn) and contrast the arguments in Muh*, 334, 15-24 and SU5, 555 ff. with those of al-A'arî's K. al-Luma`, §§ 34 and 45. Concerning the atom, cf. also, e.g., M 11, 432 ff., Mas (B), 69 ff. and Tad, 38rº ff. 13. M 6/2, 162, 2-7: 'inna i-'a'rada* 'alà durubin*: minhâ mâ yahtassu* l-mahalla* wa-yugibu* lahû halan* kal-'akwâni, wa-minhâ mâ yahtassu* l-mahalla* wa-lâ yugibu* lahû halan* kal-'alwâni, wa-minhâ mâ yahtassu* l-gumlata* wa-yugibu* lahâ hâlan wa-lâ ta'tira* lahû fî l-mahalli* l-battata, kal-'irâdati, wa-minhâ mâ yugibu* lil-mahalli* hâlan wa-lahû
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ta'tirun * fî l-mahalli* kal-qudrati wal-hayati*; cf. also M 9, 87, 18-21, where the last category, however, is omitted (and read lilmahall* for al-mahall* and kal-lawn for kal-kawn in line 19), and Tad, 1vº f. Cf. also Ch. 4, n. 18. 14. Cf., e.g., M 8, 148, 9 f. Thus also al-Gubba'i*, cited in Maq, 520 ult., 529, 6 f. and 531, 7 (cp. M 5, 237, 10 ff.) and generally 161 and 522 f., where it may be taken either as to come to exist or simply to exist; cp. also, e.g., Muslim, as-Sahih* (Cairo, 1334) 4, 158. This sense of the term is common in the grammatical literature (cf., e.g., al-'Idah*, 115: al-hawaditu* l-kâ'ina; cf. also Ibn Fâris, 160 f.), where wugida*, mawgud*, etc., are not used in the earlier period, since the sense of "existence" in this term is basically and originally a technical usage (istilah*) belonging to the kalâm and the translation literature (though as-Sîrâfî, whose language and thought are somewhat influenced by the translations, employs wugida*, yugadu*, e.g., in Sarh* al-Kitâb I, 2rº f.). In this sense kâna is viewed as an equivalent of tahara* (cf., e.g., Maq, 523, 1l-13; Muh*, 190 f. and SU5, 176 f.; note that abû `Abdallâh's definition of the mawgud* that `Abd alGabbar* here rejects he employs in his muhtasar* al-Husna*, published in Rasâ'il ahl al-`adl wat-tawhid*, edited by M. Ammara, vol. 1 [Cairo, 1971], 183, 13; concerning the title of the work cf. SU5, 122, 15). It should be noted, however, that kâna and tabata* alike, though denoting reality or actuality, are not used as strict equivalents of wugida* and, thus, both occur of the attributes and characteristics as well as of the nonexistent in the actuality of its possibility and the Attribute of the Essence. 15. M 5, 232, 10-12; cf. also SU5, 175 f. where, against abû `Abdallâh, he argues that the term kâ'in should be used only of the gawahir*. Thus according to `Abd al-Gabbar* one does not say that the accident is kâ'in in the substrate (mahall*) (cf. M 8, 148, 9 f.). There seems to have been a feeling amongst some that this specialized sense of the word does not conform altogether comfortably with its common meaning; see the following note. 16. Cf., e.g., M 8, 112, 16f.; 15, 157, 6 ff.; Muh*, 198, 22 f.; Mas (B), 3, 14 and 8, 8f.; and the later references. In connection with the kawn, i.e., in the sense of the space or locus which an atom or body occupies, the expressions giha*, muhadat*, and makân are commonly used almost interchangeably (cf., e.g., Muh*, 41, 2 and 45, 9 f.; ZS, 429, 13 f. and 439, 8f.; 437, 17 and 439, 18; Mas (B), 41, 11; Tad, 81vº 23 ff., 83rº 5-8, 85rº 2 ff., et alibi passim), though in some instances the relational overtones of muhadat* may determine its use rather than that of one of the other terms (e.g., ZS 429 f. and Tad, 88vº 3 f.: 'aqrabu l-muhadayat*; on the etymology of the word cf. ibid., 7vº 18) as the common use of giha* as "direction" underlies its use as a position to the right or the left (e.g., Tad, 34vº 30 f.) or of the effective direction or locus of "pressure" (gihatu* l-i`timâd: e.g., ZS, 429> ff.). In this latter case, indeed, the sense of the term is direction and not position. This distinction must be kept carefully in mind if one is not to read the sense of the texts amiss. When abû Raîd says al-harakatani* 'ida* kânatâ fî gihatin* wahidatin* kânatâ mitlayni*, wa-'in kânat> 'ihdahuma* .hasanatan* wal-'uhra* qabihatan* (Mas, 107vº 6f.), he does not mean "when two motions are in the same direction they are likes,..." but rather "when they are in one and the same position...;" on the sense of this, see later. Again, although makân (place) is often used as an equivalent of giha* or muhadat* insofar as it is regarded as the space into which another body cannot intrude so long as the first remains there (cf. Mas, 94vº 14 ff. and M 8, 146, 1 f.), it is formally distinguished as being not the position or location that an atom occupies (sagala*; for the use of the term cf., e.g., Tad, 85vº 27 ff.) but as that upon which a body rests, being defined, thus, as "that which receives a heavy [object] and prevents its weight from
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generating a downward motion" (Tad, 7vº 17 f.; cf. also Mas, 92vº) or as "that which prevents the descent of the heavy through its weight given the [downward] pressure of the weight upon it" (Tad, 91rº 19 f.; cf. also ibid., 34rº 13 ff.: makân is, in one sense, constituted by the i`timâd that effects its support of that which rests upon it); makân as thus defined is itself a body and so is not ontologically associated with a body's kawn (cf. Tad, 91rº 11 ff. and 6rº 4 ff.; on the conception of makân as a "body," cf. also Sîbawnyh 1, 16, 9 f., Sarh * al-Kitâb 1, fol. 122rº 19 f. and al-Muqtadab* 2, 275). The sense of giha* is rendered by H. Davidson (Philosophy East and West 18 [1968] 304) as "specific spot"; I should suggest here, for the convenience of distinguishing the precise usage of the texts, to render giha* by 'position,' muhadat* by 'location,' and makân by 'place.' Though I have used several times the formula "to be spatially present," I can think of no simple English expression that may conveniently be used to render the specialized sense of kâna or that of al-kawn as the accident that is determinant of the atom's being kâ'in without ambiguity or awkwardness of one kind or another and so propose to maintain the Arabic expressions in most places in the discussion that follows. As was Pointed out by J. van Ess (Bibliotheca Orientalis 25 [1968] 259), my rendering of kawn by "becoming" (The Metaphysics of Created Being according to abû l-Hudayl al-`Allâf, 16 ff.) is scarcely justifiable; this was based on an uncritical adoption of the sense of the word as used in al-Kindî and the early translation literature. O. Pretzl's rendering as "Seinsweise" (die frühislamische Attributenlehre, SBAW, 1940, 4, P. 47) is somewhat better (i.e., for the earlier school, though it is not at all correct for the classical period that concerns the present study), while van Ess' suggestion (Bibliotheca Orientalis 25 [1968] 259) that when used of the atom the sense of the term is "Existenz" is hardly satisfactory, as least apart from some explicit distinction between existence (kawn) and existence (wugud*). Gimaret translates kawn by ''position" (JA 1970, 65) and once renders 'akwân as "faits d'être" (ibid., 59). It may be noted here also that there seems to have been some criticism of abû Hâim's having chosen the term kawn for this use. He chose it, it is reported, "because it is the most universal and all-embracing expression for the state of a body" ('a`ammu wa-li-halati* lgismi* 'amalu: cf. Tad, 83rº 9 ff.); cf. also M 8, 146, cited in n. 24. N. b. also the statement that kawn can be termed 'kawn' even when it is nonexistent, since this merely names the thing (and so refers properly only to the Attribute of the Essence), while 'igtima`*' ('contiguity,' on which see p. 100.), for example, since it implies the circumstance of the kawn's actuality, implies existence and so cannot be used of the nonexistent: Tad, 83rº 12 ff. 17. Cf., e.g., Mas (B), 39, 11 ff. and generally ibid., 38 ff. and Tad, 34rº 21 ff. Ibn Mattawayh (ibid.) reports that al-Gubba'i* denied that the atom had surface (masaha*), saying that it achieved masaha*, like length, through being joined with another, but suggests that the difference of opinion between abû Hâim and al-Gubba'i* is, at least in part, only one of formulation and terminology. According to abû Hâim the atom "resembles a square more than anything else" (cf. Tad, 32vº 1 ff.), since this figure and some surface area are required for the school's thesis that six atoms may be contiguous with a single atom (cf. generally Tad, 32rº ff.). Al-Gubba'i*, however, like `Abbâd b. Sulaymân (cf. Tad, 103vº 27 ff.), had insisted that the atom has intrinsic weight as one of its essential attributes (at-taqlu* yargi`u* 'ilà nafsi l-gawhari*: Mas, 121rº 11; cf. also Tad, 103vº and 34vº 8 and 94vº 7 ff.; and M 9, 96, 7 f., where read at-taql* for at-taqil* in line 8 and hawiyyahû for huwiyyatan in line 11 as well as at p. 95, lines no and 23); for him, thus, "weight is merely the entity that is heavy" (at-taqlu* huwa t-taqil*) and weight is increased only by the increase of a thing's parts (cf. Maq, 420 f.).
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Consistently with his systematization of the metaphysics of atoms and accidents, abû Hâim denies this (M 9, 96; Mas, 121rº, Tad, 34rº ff., 32rº ff., 103vº, 34vº 8, 94vº 7 ff., and 93rº 6 ff. and generally 90rº ff.), saying that weight is grounded in a separate entitative accident (ma'nà), viz., momentum or pressure in a downward direction (i'timâdun fî gihati * s-sufl: Mas, 50rº 9): an intrinsic or inherent downward momentum (i'timddun lâzimun suflan cf., e.g., M 9, 52, 11 ff. and 58, 5 ff.; 6/1, 10, 1 f.; ZS, 442 f.; and generally Mas, 64vº ff.; the intrinsic i'timâd is opposed to that which is induced tawlîdan, viz., al-i'timâdu l-mugtalab*). The atom is sometimes defined by the A'arites in terms of surface (masaha*) or volume (hagm*), e.g., by al-Bâqillânî as mâ lahû hazzun* mina l-masaha* (cited in a-âmil, 142, 18 f.; cf. also ibid., 156) or ma'nâ qawlinâ 'innahû gawharun* 'annahû hagmun* wagirm* (Sarh* al-Irâd, 47vº 18 f.) and 'innahû hagmun* qâ'imun bi-nafsihî (ibid., 62rº 1, q.v. et sqq. and also Irâd, 17), which is followed by a-ahrastânî when he defines it as mutabayyizun* du* masahatin* wa-hagmin* (Nihâya, 291, 14 f.), although al-Guwayni* denies that it "has exterior or interior" (zahir* wa-batin*: a-âmil, 190). On the area and volume, cf. also van den Bergh, Tahafut 2, 191, ad 337, 3. 18. Cf. Tad, 88vº 3-6. According to abû Hâim, place, strictly defined (see n. 16) is larger than that which is "in place" in or on it (almutamakkin); cf. Mas, 92vº f. That this transference to the next adjacent giha* is imperceptible does not concern the non-perceptibility of the 'akwân in general, on which see the references in n. 32. 19. Mas, 94vº (reading lâ before hunâka; the context demands the negative; cf. also Tad, 78vº 21 ff). 20. Tad, 35rº 5 f.: ·· huwa qawlu 'abî Hâimin, wa'alà hada* l-qawli yatbutu* lil-gawhari* l-gihatu* wa-'in lam yulâqihîgayruhu*, la'anna s-sifata* l-latî dakarnaha* tabitatun* 'inda wugudihi* lâ mahala*. Cf. generally ibid., 35rº 1 ff. 21. Tad, 7vº 14-17. So also he reports that abû Hâim's position was this: 'innahû yasihhu* 'an yalqà sittata 'amtalihi* wa-'inna lahû gihatan* huwa htisasuhu* bi-halin* li-kawnihî 'alayhâ yasihhu* fî sittati 'amtalihi* 'an tandamma* 'ilayhî min hadihi* l-gihati* s-sitti, wa-tilka l-halu* hiya t-tahayyuz*: Tad, 35rº 1-3. 22. Mas, 95rº 1 ff.; cf. generally ibid., 94rº ff. and Tad, 91rº 4 ff. That what is involved here is not simply relation ('idafa*), see, e.g., Tad, 78vº 20 ff. 23. Mas, 94rº 17-29; cf. also Tad 91rº 11 ff. and concerning weight, see n. 17. 24. Tad, 78vº 4: al-kawnu mâ yugibu* kawna l-gawhari* fî gihatin*; Muh*, 41, 5 f.; fâ'idatuhû mâ bihî yasiru* l-gawharu* fî gihatin* dûna gihatin*. Thus it must be inherent: 'inna l-kawna wa-sâ'ira l-ma'ânî l-latî tugibu* l-'ahkama* lil-mahalli* lâ tugibu* `illâ ba`da lhululi* fîhâ fa-yakûnu htussa* bihâ nihâyata l-ihtisas* (Tad, 84vº 2-4; cp. Ch. 4, nn. 74 if.); cf. also Muh*, 198, 23 and, for the arguments that it must be an entitative accident that determines this state, cf. generally ibid., 41 ff.; SU5, 101 ff.; ZS, 119 ff.; and Tad, 79vº ff. That the atom's being in a particular location (kawnuhû kû'inan fîgihatin*) cannot be a "mode" of existence (kayfîyatun fî lwugud*), cf. Muh*, 205, 3 ff. (where read bi-tagayyurihi* for bi-gayrihi* in line 4 and tagaddud* for ygdd* in line 5). From a common. sense perspective it would seem that the atom occupies a given position through the agent (bil-fâ'il), i.e., by the action of one who put it there or created it there. The thesis of the Basrians, however, is that directly and immediately to effect the actuality of an attribute of a being implies that the agent is capable of effecting the existence of the being itself, for the attributes of a being that are determined by the agent immediately and directly through his deliberate action are existence and certain attributes and characteristics that derive from the manner of a thing's coming to be (see Ch. 6); a body's being in a specific location in space does not, however derive from its coming to be as such. What the agent does, rather, is to effect the existence of
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the kawn which effects, as its essential characteristic, the atom's being in the particular position; cf., e.g., Muh *, 46 f. and 353 (which is cited in Ch. 6, n. 6); and SU5, 100 f. For the A'arire definitions of the kawn, cf., e.g., al-Bâqillânî cited in a-âmil, 198, 9 and alGuwayni*, ibid., 428, 2 f. ('awgaba* tahsisa* l-gawhari* bi-makânin 'aw-taqdîri makânin; for the taqdîr here mentioned, cp. the references to abû Raîid given in n. 22), as well as a-âmil, 430, 6 ff., 453, 2; Irâd, 17, 10 f. and Sarh* al-Irâd, 5rº 9 ff.' Abû Hâim suggests that the expression "being in a place" or location is, from one standpoint, really more fittingly used of the accident, which has its being in a substrate as the locus of its inherence, the use of the expression for the atom being really by analogy (M 8, 146, 7-19). 25. Cf., e.g., SU5, 96. 13 and 111, 7 f., Muh*, 41, 5-14, translated later; ZS, 61 2 ff.; and Tad, 78vº ff., passim, and the references nn. 3840. For the A`arites, cf., eg., a-âmil, 198, 16 f. and al-Irâd, 17, 10 f. Note that where igtima*' occurs most frequently in the lists of the 'akwân, the term al-mugawara* is more common in the passages where the accident is discussed and distinguished from composition (ta'lîf), e.g., M 8, 75, 2 ff.; Muh*, 45, 12; Tad, 78vº ff. and later. The term igtima*` was evidently used occasionally for ta'lîf; cf. the citation of Ibn Hallad's* speaking of al-Gubba'i* and abû Hâim in ZS, 80, 2. Concerning the terms themselves, the Zaydi imam, an-Natiq* bil-Haqq*, says in his Ziyâdât as-Sarh* (Leiden University ms. Or. 2949, fol. 18rº): al-igtima'u* l-ladi* dakarna* . . . al-mugawaratu* fa-hasbu*, wa-haqiqatu* l-igtima'i* huwa t-ta'lîfu watasmiyatuhu l-mugawarata* magadzun*, wat-ta'lîfu ma`nan zâ'idun 'alà lmugawara*. It should be noted that although abû l-Hudhayl associated motion, rest, etc., with the 'akwân, he nevertheless held them to be distinct accidents, distinct from each other and from the 'akwân; see n. 33. 26. Muh*, 41, 5-14 (reading nusammt for tsmy and sukûnan for tkwn' in line 9); cf. also Tad, 78vº 4-8 (where read 'aqîba mitlihi* for `aqîba diddihi* in line 7), which contains the same general statement in somewhat abridged form. Note that where Ibn Mattawayh, in both places, uses the broader terms naw` and qabîl, he elsewhere refers to the 'akwân as a single gins* (cf., e.g., Tad, 82vº cited in n. 49). Note also that the double formulation given with motion and rest represents alternative definitions. 27. Tad, 83vº 9 f.; cf. also ibid., lines 14-16. 28. Cf., ZS, 63, 8 f (where read muftariqân for mugtami'an* in line 9; cp. the identical formulation in SU5, 113) and pp. 8 ff. Proximity (al-mugawara*) is thus defined (Tad, 111vº 30 f.) as husulu* l-guz'ayni* fî haddin* lâ yabqà makânun talitun* baynahumâ. This is in contrast to the position of abû l-Hudhayl and the earlier opinion of al-Gubba'i* according to which separation, analogous to composition (ta'lîf), is a distinct accident inhering in the two separated substrates as a single accident; cf. Tad, 83vº 7 ff. and ZS, 119, where alGubba'i's* Masâ'il 'alà abî l-Hudayl is cited as containing the latter position, sc., that of abû Hâim. 29. Cf., e.g., ZS, 231 f. Later he included it amongst the 'akwân (cf., e.g., Maq, 355, 12 f.) but continued nevertheless to consider it to have unique essential properties and so as essentially different from rest. 30. Cf., e.g., Tad, 85rº f. and 90rº ult. ff.; ZS 131 f.; M 9, 139 f.; and later. Concerning a1-Gubba'i's* definition of motion as "departure" (zawâl) rather than as "transference" (intiqâl), cf. Maq, 355 f. and see also an-Nâîi', K. al-Awsat* (in J. van Ess, Frühe mu`tazilitische Häresiographie [Beirut, 1971]), § 146 (translated and discussed ibid., 135 f.). An-Nâi' does not here name his opponent (and nowhere in the work, in fact, mentions any of his contemporaries by name), but from his assertion that the unnamed sahib* al-a`rad* who defines motion as zawâl also holds that fire generates combustion (tuwallidu l-ihtiraq*) and that motion may generate pain, it would appear that
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he must have had al-Gubba'i * in mind. Zawâl is used also by al-A'ari and at least some of his followers to denote a kind of motion; thus al-Aarî says (Risâla 'ilâ ahl at-tagr* in llahiyat Fakültesi Mecmuasi 8[1928]97, 4 ff.), speaking of God, that "His coming is neither a motion nor a departure (laysa ... harakatan* wa-lâ zawâlan); coming is a motion and departure only when that which comes is a body or an atom." Concerning the distinction between haraka* and zawâl here made, cf. Sarh* al-Irâd, fol. 1vº 1 ff., where abû Ishaq* alIsfarâ'înî is cited. Van Ess' translation of the term zawâl as 'Vergehen' and his association of this use of zawâl with Greek are incorrect. Zawâl, it may be further noted, is also used of motion by al-Kindî; cf. al-Falsafa al-ûlà in Rasâ'il al-Kindî I, edited by M. abu Rida (Cairo, 1369/1959), 106, 9 and 113, 11. 31. M 8, 239, 1 f.: ... li-annahû hasala* fî muhadatin* ba`da 'an kâna fî gayriha* bi-lâ faslin* (cf. also Muh*, 41, 10-12, cited earlier). Ibn Mattawayh explains (Tad, 83rº 21-26) that the introduction of the term "immediately" into this formula was based on a "disputed question," viz., that if an atom were to be annihilated when in one position and then created again ('u`îda) in another, the kawn determining its being in the latter position would not be called motion but would be the initial kawn because of the intervening period of nonexistence. He goes on to note that abû Hâim's position is that ''rest may be a kawn that continues to exist (kawnun bâqin) or may be one that comes to be following its like (haditun* ba`da mitlihi*)" (cf. also Muh*, 41, cited n. 26), whereas al-Gubba'i* held that only that which continues to exist is termed sukûn. 32. Tad, 85rº 7-10: law kânat muhtalifatan* la-ftaraqat fî waghin* yugibu* l-ihtilafa*, wa-lâ yumkinu l-'iâratu 'ilà 'amrin siwà ttasmiyati fa-yuqâla fî ba'dihi* 'innahû harakatun* wa-yuqâla fî ba`dihi* 'innahû sukûnun; wa-htilafu*; l-`ibârati lâ yaqtadi* l-hilafa* 'alà l-haqiqati* bayna d-dawati*. For the essential identity of motion and rest, see generally Mas, 83rº ff.: mas'alatun fî 'anna l-harakata* min ginsi* s-sukûn. Al-Gubba'i* , like abû l-Hudhayl before him, held that all the 'akwân are directly perceptible (by two senses, sight and touch) and, therefore. that rest and motion are recognized immediately as different (muhtalifa*) (Tad, 85rº 23 and 88rº 4 f. and cp. ibid., 99rº, 2 ff.; cf. also Maq, 352 f. and ZS, 132). Abû Hâim in an early stage of his career held that "though they are not directly perceived, the 'akwân are known necessarily (daruratan*) in that the knowledge of the moved is a knowledge of its movement" (Tad, 88rº 6 f.). This position must antedate his formulation of the concept of the state (hal*) in that it corresponds to al-Gubba'i's* understanding of the sense and reference of the term (viz., that it involves as such the knowledge of the substrate and the accident rather than a knowledge of the substrate and its state) and further implies, following the teaching of his father, that motion is different (muhtalifa*) in its gins*. His later positionthat of his major worksis that motion and rest are not perceptible as such but are known only indirectly. The thesis (cited from his 'Askarîyât in Tad, 88vº f. and Mas, 109vº f.) that motion and rest are distinguished as one recognizes the otherness or sameness of an object's position as it is perceived together with and in relation to a background of other bodies conforms to his conception of the essential sameness of the 'akwân. For the various arguments on this matter and for abû Hâim's several theses concerning how motion is recognized, see Tad, 88rº ff. and Mas, 108vº-112rº (Question 64) and cp. M 15, 350. 33. Tad, 85vº 8-13. Regarding the hypothetical situation mentioned (which involves an act of creation on God's part), cf. ibid., 85rº 11 ff. Some of the salient aspects of the development of the Basrians' thought are vividly illustrated in the evolution of the concept of motion and the 'akwân. With abû l-Hudhayl the tendency is to assert
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for every predicate that would be classed as sifatu * ma`nan (a descriptive term that refers to the presence of an accident) the presence of a distinct entitative accident (cf. Ch. 1, p. 12); separation, for example, since it is predicated of two atoms, he says is a single accident that inheres in both substrates and so is distinct from the two kawns that ground their individual presences in space (cf. n. 28 and cp. the discussion of ta'lif pp. 104 f.). Likewise contiguity, rest, and motion he see as accidents distinct from the 'akwân (cf., e.g., Maq, 237, 1 ff., 351, 1 ff., and 355, 3 ff.; note also that my analysis of abû l-Hudhayl's conception of the 'akwân cited in n. 16 is not exact and requires revision); when a thing moves, two accidents are involved: a movement (haraka*) which is its transference from the first to the second position and a kawn which is its presence in the second position. Al-Gubba'i*, then, taking account of the implications of the thesis that accidents are entities and assuming a more critical attitude in his analysis of the semantics of the terms, focuses on the common association of motion, rest, etc., with the 'akwân and interprets contiguity, separation, rest, and, later, motion as 'akwân, i.e., as expressions for the single atom's presence in space (cf. nn. 28 and 32). Nevertheless, though classing motion and rest among the 'akwân (cf. also Maq, 355, 12 ff.), he continues to hold that they are essentially different from one another. Abû Hâim finally brings the focus of the question narrowly onto the concept of a thing's being kâ'in and, consistently and systematically following the general direction laid down in his father's thought, carries the reduction one step further to complete the conceptual unification of the 'akwân. 34. Cf. Tad, 87vº 24: qâla 'abû Hâimin fi l-Gami'i* . . . al-harakatu* tugibu* kawna l-gawhari* kâ'inan fî gihatin* mahsusatin*. 35. Cf., e.g., M 9, 149, 9; ZS, 396, 12 ff.; Mas, 103rº 8: wa-qad tubbita* 'anna l-harakata* lâ gihata* lahâ; and on the distinction of the senses of giha*, see n. 16. This is integral to the thesis of the unity of the 'akwân. For abû Hâim and his followers only i`timâd has direction (cf., e.g., ZS, 396, 13). Motion, thus, may be initiated by i`timâd through the directionality of its force (cf., e.g., M 9, 138-150 and ZS, 427 ff. and generally the references given in Ch. 4, nn. 16 and 28), but the motion which is the atom's being kâ'in in one particular position has no direction strictly speaking. Abû Hâim and the later school do allow that motion may generate "composition" (ta'lîf, on which see later) and pain (e.g., Tad, 89rº ff.), for these arise from "being present in a position"; more strictly speaking, however, the kawn is the condition (sart*) and not the muwallid; e.g., motion as a being kâ'in in a position of one atom can constitute proximate contiguity (almugawara*) in relation to another and this, given certain other physical conditions in the two atoms, gives rise to ta'lîf; cf., e.g., M 6/1, 167 f.; 7, 171, 14 f.; and particularly 9, 155 f. and ZS, 80 ff., et alibi; Mas (B), 43, 7 ff.; 48, 5 ff.; and Mas, 114vº ff., as well as Tad, 89rº ff. and a-amil, 466 and 473 ff. 36. Cf., e.g., Tad, 81rº 1-3. 37. Cf., e.g., Tad, 87rº 8 ff., 88vº 10 f., 90vº 9 ff.; and Mas, 103rº and 104rº f. 38. For the position of abû l-Hudhayl and al-Gubba'i* in an early period (al-Ka`bî is reported to have held a similar position), cf. generally Tad, 82vº 9 ff. and 83vº 7 ff. and also ZS, 131 ff.; al-Gubba'i's* later teaching was that the initial kawn is the same as rest (sukûn); cf. Maq, 325, 11 f.; Tad, 82vº 11 ff. and ZS, 131 f. 39. Tad, 82vº 5 ff., q.v. generally. 40. Tad, 82vº 13-16: 'innamâ tagyiru* l-'asmâ'i li-wuqû'ihâ `alà wuguhin*; yadwllu `allà dalika* 'annahû lâ hala* lis-sâkini wa-lâ lilmutaharriki* 'azyada min kawnihimâ kâ'inayni fî l-makâni l-ladi* humâ fîhî bi-mitli* mâ tubbita* 'anna l-bâaqiya lâ hala* lahû bikawnihî bâqiyan 'azyada min al-wugudi* l-mustamirri, fa-yagibu* fîmâ yugibu* hadihi* l-halata* 'an yakûna ginsan* wahidan* siwà yusammà harakatan* 'aw-sukûnan 'aw-kawnan,
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fa'inna tamatula * l-mugabi* yaqtadi* tamatula* l-mugib* (reading yadullu for tadullu in line 13); cf. also M 9, 151, 5 ff (where read 'aktar* for 'akbar in line 7). N.b. the association of necessitating causality with the "accidents": al-`ilalu l-mugiba*; this statement, viz., that the similarity of the necessitated result implies the similarity of the necessitating cause would not be used of the other forms of causality, i.e., of that of the 'asbâb and the autonomous agent. 41. Cf., e.g., Tad, 84vº 25-27: 'inna 'abà `Alîyin qad gawwaza* fî l-mawgudi* fî gihatin* wahidatin* 'an yatamila 'alà l-mutamatili* wal-mutadaddi*; lammâ 'tabara bi-kawnihimâ harakatan* 'aw-sukûnan, fa-'atbata* t-tadadda* fîhimâ 'alà kulli halin*; for his position generally, cf. ZS, 132 ff. and Tad, 84vº ff. Al-Gubba'i's* position here regarding the contrariety of the 'akwân is consistent with the school's general conception of contraries as regards corporeally inherent accidents, sc., that contrariety basically involves their inherence in one and the same substrate: at-tadaddu* bi-'an yatarika fî l-hulûli fî mahallin* wahid* (M 11, 447, 3 f.; cf. also M 6/2, 161 f. and 163, 11 ff. and, concerning the distinction of contrariety fî l-gins* as opposed to contrariety fî l-haqiqa*, see Ch. 4, n. 43). 42. Tad, 84vº 18-24; concerning their similarity (tamatul*), n.b., ibid., 86rº 11 ff. and on their contrariety ibid., lines 23 ff. 43. Tad, 85rº 2 f. Cf. also Mas, 100rº 13 f.: 'inna l-kawnayni fî muhadatin* wahidatin* yagibu* 'an yakûnâ min ginsin* wahid*. 44. Cf. Tad, 85vº 17 ff. and 86rº 9-11 and 87vº f. That there is any contrariety in the 'akwân was denied by abû Ya`qûb al-Bustânî (a contemporary of 'Abd al-Gabbar*; cf. Tabaqat*, 114); cf. Tad, 85rº 1 ff. 45. Thus, e.g., Tad, 97rº 26 f.: fa-hukmu* t-ta'lîfi maqsurun* 'alà mahallihi* fa-lâ yahtagu* 'ilà 'azyada minhû, fa-qad batala* hagatu* t-ta'lîfi 'ilà 'azyada mina l-mahalli*. Regarding the kawn in this regard, i.e., that it needs only its mahall*, cf., e.g., M 9, 145, 2 ff. (where read maqdûrayhî for maqdûr bihî in line 16); 11, 442, 4 ff.; et alibi. 46. Cf., e.g., M 8, 75, a ff.; Muh*, 45, 12; and Tad, 85vº f. 47. Cf., e.g., M 9, 129, 12 f.; 4, 325, 11 f.; 8, 129, 4 f.; and a-amil, 476 f. On ta'lîf generally, see especially Mas, 112rº ff. (Question 65: fî 'anna t-ta'lîfa ma'nan siwà l-kawnayni 'alà sabîli l-qurbi wa-'annahû yugadu* fî mahallayn*); ZS, 80 ff. (which is cited in Mas, 112vº 8) and Tad, 96rº ff. That this conception of ta'lîf originates with abû l-Hudhayl, cf. ZS, 101 and Tad, 96rº 10 ff. Concerning the word ta'lîf, see also n. 25. 48. Cf., e.g., Tad, 99rº 24 f. and generally Mas, 112rº ff. and 49vº 3 ff. That its in-herence in two substrates is its essential characteristic see ch. 4, n. 94. 49. Cf., e.g., M 9, 101, 2 ff. and 13, 237 f. "The two substrates arc, for the ta'lîf, like the single substrate for black (sawâd), since it exists in both of them": Tad, 150vº 9 f. 50. Cf. Tad, 97vº f.: "length, breadth, and depth arc names that refer to ta'lîfs which go in those directions"; "length is a particular [form of] composition" (ta'lîfun mahsusun*): ibid., 34vº 5. 51. Cf., e.g., M 9, 51, 17 ff.; Tad, 97rº 28 ff. and 97vº f. Thus for a surface to be smooth or shiny is "composition that occurs in a fiat plane" (as-saqalatu* huwa t-ta'lîfu l-wâqi'u 'alà sabîli l-istiqâmati): Tad, 225rº 30 f. 52. Cf. M 9, 51. On the physical conditions and the requirement for dampness and dryness in given proportions in the substrate in order that the parts stick together or adhere (iltazaqa), cf. Tad, 97rº f., 24rº 6 ff., and 4vº 2 f. and the references given in n. 35. 53. SU5, 92, 9 f.; cf. also Tad, 8vº 12 f. 54. For the Basrian School the basic colors are black, white, yellow, red, and green;
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cf. Mas, 57rº 2 f. and generally foll. 56vº ff. and Tad, 45vº f. and 47rº 17 ff. We need not, for the purposes of the present discussion, dwell at length on the various problems that have to do with the nature of the colors, their variations, combinations, and mixtures. Like other accidents, color occurs in discrete units or quanta ('agza' *) (cf., e.g., M 11, 445, 15 f.) and like most other accidents that qualify the substrate (though not the 'akwân for obvious reasons; cf., e.g., Tad, 86rº 11 ff.), more than one unit of a like color can inhere in a single atom (cf., e.g.. ibid. and Mas, 57rº 3 f. and generally ibid., 48rº ff., Question 22: 'anna s-sawâdayni yaguzu* gtima`uhuma* fî mahallin* wahid*; and Tad, 46vº) giving rise to the intensity of the single color. That, e.g., life occurs in distinct units, cf., e.g., Tad, 128vº 3 ff. and that more than one unit of life can exist in a single substrate, cf. ibid., 129rº f.: Faslun*: 'inna wuguda* l-'agza'i* kkatirati* minhâ fî mahallin* wahidin* sahih*. 55. Besides the texts cited in n. 17, cf. also, e.g., M 9, 86, 19; 13, 253, 11 f.; Muh*, 188, 13 ff. (translated later); SU5, 206, 11 f.. and concerning wet and dry, that they are not directly perceptible, cf. the texts cited in Ch. 4, nn. 24 f. That no perceptible accident effects a state either of the substrate (mahall*) or of the totality (gumla*), cf. M 7, 26, 4 f. 56. Cf. generally Tad, 88vº 12 ff. (where the author notes that this is true of all perceptible accidents). Color is, thus, described as "the disposition having which a body is perceived" (al-hay'atu l-latî yudraku `alayhâ l-gism*: Tad, 44vº 15). It is a disposition of the substrate (hay'atun lil-mahall*: M 7, 97, 6 f.) such that "when one of us perceives that a thing is colored, he knows that it is specifically characterized by one disposition (hay'a) rather than another": M 11, 314, 4 f.; cf. also Mas, 47vº 20, 50rº f., et alibi and regarding the term hay'a in this use, cf. also ibid., 110vº 15 ff.; on the exclusion of there being two dispositions of the same class in the same substrate, cf. M 7, 27, 16-19 and Tad, 47rº 26 ff. Although the term hay'a is used of all perceptible accidents (on heat and coldal-harura* wal-barûdaas hay'â, cf., e g., Tad, 99rº 2 ff.), 'Abd al-Gabbar* says that it is most properly and strictly used of color (M 14, 294, 10 f.). For the similar use of the term by the A'arites, cf., e.g., Tam, 235, 11; a-amil*, 542. 1 (citing abû Ishaq* al-Isfarâ'înî); Sarh* al-Irâd, 4vº and 56rº; and cp. also the use in Sîbawayh 1, 232, 15. The term hay'a here would seem perhaps to be an equivalent of Greek following Stoic usage; cf. SVF 1, 26, 1-3, cited by van den Bergh, Tahafut 2, 180. ad 321, 2. 57. Cf., e.g.. M 7, 194, 2 ff. and the references cited in Ch. 4, n. 99. For the parallel doctrines of the A`arites cf., e.g., a-amil, 484 and 643 f. 58. Cf. ZS, 382, 14-17 and see also Tad, 52vº, cited in Ch. 4, n. 102. An-Nâai' seems to take a contrary position concerning the "genus" (naw'); cf., e.g., K. al-Awsat*, § 49 in J. van Ess, Fruhe* mu'tazilitische Häresiographie (Beirut, 1971). 59. Muh*, 188, 13-17 (reading bis-sawâd for as-sawâd in line 15). N.b. also ibid., lines 23 ff., translated in Ch. 4, n. 5 in connection with the notion of the haqiqa*; and concerning that of ta'lîl, see Ch. 7. 60. As, e.g., the substrate's being in some specific Position (kawnuhû kì'inan fî giha*) is the condition of the presence of the accident of color (cf., e.g., SU5, 111, 12-14, where read al-ma`âni for 'im`yny), the presence of color is the condition of no function or state of the substrate whatsoever; cf., e.g., Mas (B), 47 ff., esp. 51 ff. 61. The division of the attributes that qualify the whole or totality made here by 'Abd al-Gabbar* is more fundamental than that made by abû Rad in ZS, 555, where he divides them into those that the totality almost always has (e.g., its being knowing and qâdira) and those that it frequently may lack (e.g., its being willing and nilling:
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murîda wa-kâriha etc.); in abû Raîd's division life is not mentioned at all, since this accident lacking, the whole would cease to be a whole (gumla *). 62. The accident of conviction (i`tiqâd) includes knowing, as we have noted in the discussion of the sifat* al-'agnas*. For abû Hâim and his followers knowing is a modality of conviction, distinguished by "its taking place in a particular manner" (wuqû'uhû 'alà waghin*); cf. generally M 12, 30 ff. and 34 ff.; SU5 188 ff. and Mas, 155vº ff., Question 93 (note that the numbering of the questions in the margins of the ms. is not strictly correct, since several of them are not numbered though the sequence is uninterrupted). 63. Cf., e.g., M 11, 330, 7 ff. and M 6/2, 162 cited in n.13. 64. Sc., "acquired knowing" (`ilm al-iktisâb): that which is achieved through a process of reflection and reasoning (nazar*), i.e., by inference, as opposed to "necessary knowing" (`ilm al-idtirar*) on which see Ch. 4, n. 38. 65. See the references in n. 76. 66. Cf., e.g., M 12, 14, 7 ff. and 16, 264 and Ch. 6, nn. 19-21. 67. Cf., e.g., Muh*, 165, 9 ff. and ZS, 450, 9 ff. and Ch. 6, nn. 40 ff. 68. See the references given in Ch. 2, nn. 3 ff. Note the argument, e.g., of abû Raîd, that though a specific piece of knowing (sc., an act of knowing that is the knowing of a particular fact) inheres in a part of the heart, ignorance of the same thing cannot inhere simultaneously in another part, not because the act of knowing effects a state of and in the organ but rather "because it necessitates a qualification of the living composite in its totality (`awgabat* lil-gumlati* sifatan) just as if it were inherent in every part (guz'*) of it," ignorance being thereby excluded from every part of the totality as the contrary that cannot coexist in the same substrate with its contrary: Mas, 113rº 1 ff.; cf. also SU5, 208, ult. ff. 69. Al-'aslu* fî l-hayyi* kawnuhû hayyan* kamâ 'anna l-'asla fî l-mahalli* t-tahayyuz*; cf. Muh*, 133, 19 ff.; cf. also ibid., 127, 21-24. 70. Cf., e.g., Muh*, 200, 5 ff.; MQ 1, 30, 17; Tad, 127vº 13 ff.; and ZS, 561, 3 ff. On sahwa* generally as an accident (ma`nà) that produces a state of the totality (gumla*), cf. Tad, 134rº ff. 71. Cf., e.g., M 9, 144, 12 f. and Ch. 2, nn. 24 ff. 72. Cf., e.g., M 11, 334 ff. and cp. ZS, 563 f. 73. Cf., e.g., M 8, 155; 9, 23, 18 ff. and 92, 5 ff.; 11, 352, 5 ff.; and see Ch. 2, nn. 36 f. 74. Cf., e.g., M 4, 333, 9 ff. and generally ZS, 373 ff. and 383, 1 ff. (where read al-'igad* for al-'igab* in line 6 and 'illâ for fa'innahû in line 14) and Mas, 128rº ff. 75. Cf., e.g., M 8, 160 f.; Muh*, 200, 1 ff. and the references later. 76. Cf., e.g., M 6/2, 26 ff.; 8, 43 f.; 9, 15; 12, 6; and 14, 222, 12 ff. 77. Cf., e.g., ibid. Abû Hâim holds that inquiry or reflective thought (an-nazar*) does not produce a state of the agent, since it is an act and, thus, like speaking, is attributed to him only as action (`alà tariqati* l-fi`lîya, on which see the following chapter, n. 55); 'Abd alGabbar*, on the contrary, insists that it does produce a state; cf., e.g., M 7, 45. 78. Cf., e.g., M 9, 18, 19 ff.; 4, 333, 18 ff.; 9, 143, 6 ff. 79. Cf., e.g., generally M 9, 142 ff. Thus within the system the measure of the act that can be produced is proportional to the number and quantity of the qudar present in the substrate (cf., e.g., M 9, 18, 19 ff); e.g., it requires a greater number of qudar to move a heavy object than a lighter one (cf., e.g., M 9, 40, 3 ff. and Mas, 144rº f.). 80. Cf., e.g., M 11, 351, 13 ff. and 4, 333 f.; 6/2, 167, 16 f. and Ch. 4, n. 73. 81. Cf., e.g., SU5, 160, 10 f. (note that lâ should be omitted before yastahiqqu* in line 9) as well as 108, 9 ff., cited Ch. 4, n. 47.
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82. Cf. e.g., SU5 108 12-14: "the essential attribute in relation to the essence is analogous to the attribute that is grounded in a 'cause' (sifatu * l-`illa = sifatu l-ma'nà) in its relation to its cause, and just as the attribute that is grounded in a cause is necessary so long as the cause continues to exist, so the essential attribute is necessary so long as the "essence"/thing-itself continues to exist." Cf. also Mas (B), 19, 1 ff.; ZS, 192, 3 ff.; et alibi. 83. Cf, e.g., a-amil, 701 ff. and ms. fol. 219rº 11 ff. 84. M 7, 62, 12 f.; Muh*, 173, 23 q.v. et sqq. Thus also as-sifatu* matâ wagabat* istagna* 'ani l-`illati: SU5, 199, 7, q.v. et sqq. (where add istagnat* following wagabat* in line 9 and read al-`illa for Allâh at p. 200, 3) and also Mas (B), 40, 5-7. This is not, however, to say that the essential attributes are not mu`allala; concerning ta`lîl see Ch. 7. 85. Cf., e.g., Muh*, 182, 19. 86. M 6/2. 204, 9: sifatu* n-nafsi lâ yaguzu* 'an tatagayyara* fa-yadhula* fîhâ mâ lam yakun dahilan*. 87. M 6/2, 107, 7-10; cf. also the more fulsome paraphrase of this citation ibid., 199, 10-16 (where read at-tagayyur* for at-tagyir* in lines 6 and 9). See also J van Ess in der Islam 43, 254 f. and the references that follow. Herein abû Hâim and his followers reject the primary A'arite definition of change (tagayyur*) sc., haqiqatu* t-tagayyuri* hurugu* -ay'i 'ilà gayri* mâ kâna 'alayhî mina l-wasfi*: Sarh* al-Irâd, 6rº 11; this definition is paraphrased in M 6/2, 198, 20 (tagayyara* haluhu* 'ammâ kâna `alayhî) and is explicitly rejected by abû Hâim and the later school, who note that although the concept is valid enough, it is not what is denoted by the expression `tagayyur*' (cf. M 6/2, 107, 11-16; Muh*, 152, 1 ff.; and ZS, 567, 7 ff.; cf. also SU5, 172, 13 ff.). Contrariwise, the Mu`tazilite definition, cited as butlanu* ma`nan wa-hudutu* gayrihi* is allowed as a valid sense of `tagayyur*' but not as the primary or proper one in Sarh* alIrâd, 6rº 13 f. 88. ZS, 567, 7 ff.; n.b, also Muh*, 151 f.; M 6/2, 107, 7 ff. and 199. 4 ff. (where read the correction noted in the preceding note); and 11m 472 f. On this question, see my "Al-mawgud* wal-Ma'dûm". 'Abd al-Gabbar* reports, however, that abû Hâim said: 'innahû qad yuqâlu fi -ay'i 'idâ wugida* 'an 'adamin 'innahû tagayyara* min haytu* halla* mahalla* tagayyuri* lawni -ay'i `alà l-manzari* . . . (M 6/2, 199 f.). 89. Cf., e.g., M 12, 33, 3 f.: 'inna htimala* l-gawhari* lil-'a`radi* yargi'u* 'ilà tahayyuzihi*, lâ 'anna d-data* taqtadi* l-'amrayn; cf. also ibid., lines 21-23 (reading tahayyuzihi* for thyrh* in line 4 and mutahayyizan* for mthyr'* in line 21) and Muh*, 133, 19 ff., cited in n. 69; cf. also Mas (B), 7, 4 ff. and a-amil, 715 f. Thus "the atom's capability of being a substrate for the accident is, so to speak, the haqlqa* of its occupying space"; Mas (B), 51 f. 90. Cf., e.g., M 9, 100, 14 f.; 15, 155, ult. f.; 5, 229, 3 ff. and generally ZS, 524 ff. and the references earlier. That the haqiqa* of life is its being the ground of the possibility of knowing, etc., see Ch. 4, nn. 29 f. 91. Cf. M 11, 340, 17 ff. and in connection with this question, see also ibid., 469, 8 ff. 92. M 11, 311, 12-14. 93. M 11, 312, 4 ff. The use of the term sura* here may well be directed against the falâsifa.
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Chapter 6 Attributes Determined By The Agent Who Causes The Existence Of The Thing (bil-fâ`il) The attributes and characteristics of a thing that are properly said to be grounded in the action of an agent (bil-fâ`il) are those the thing's being qualified by which (husuluhu * `alayhâ) or not being qualified by which is directly ascribed to the autonomous action of an agent and its having which or not having which may be directly correlated to his intention and motive (bi-hasbi* qasdihi* wa-dawâ`îhî). The attributes of the act that are correlated to the agent are its coming to be and those which are derivative of this qualified by which it comes to actuality (yahsulu* `alayhâ) through his intention and knowledgenot the attributes which are ascribed to its class (gins*)whether they are such as to have their own actuality or not (sawâ'un kânat mutagaddidatan* 'aw-gayra* mutagaddidatin*). We have shown that any attribute whose actuality is necessary under whatever circumstances given the existence of the act, cannot be due to the action of the agent.1
They are those attributes, states, or characteristics that are effectively determined by the states ('ahwal*) of the being of the agent,2 as the accomplishment of the act may be freely chosen and qualified by virtue of his having these states. The attributes that belong to the thing or act through the action of the agent who causes it to be may be divided and categorized, therefore, as they are severally correlated to one or another of the states of the agent as the determinant ground of their actuality or, to put it more strictly, as one or another of the states ('ahwal*) of the being of the agent is effectively determinant (mu'attir*) of the being of the act as it comes to actuality qualified by the particular attribute or char-
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acteristic (yahsulu * `alayhâ). These states are most commonly listed as the agent's being capable of efficient causation (kawnuhû qâdiran), his being knowing (kawnuhû `âliman), and his being willing (kawnuhû murîdan), though the list may be extended to include related attributes.3 Of these the primary state is that of the agent's being qâdir, for it is this that constitutes the actuality of the possibility of his realizing the act (sihhatu* l-fi`l) and which, therefore, is the ground of the realization of its existence: its coming to be (al-hudut* = tagaddudu* l-wugud*) at all. From one standpoint the attribute that is realized in accord with his intention and motivation is its coming to be and none other . . . and thus the attribute which is fully distinct from its coming to be (as-sifatu* l-mufâriqatu lil-hudut*) must not belong to the thing through the agent.4
The notion of what is properly speaking determined by and so to be ascribed to the action of the agent, i.e., that on whose actuality he has a determinant effect (ta'tir*) as agent (fâ`il), is, in this way, closely defined. Although the thing's existence is purely possible (ga'iz*) as such and so fully contingent upon the autonomous action of the agent in that its coming to exist at all depends upon his action, a number of attributes are necessary given the existence of the "essence"/thing-itself or upon some other ground and are therefore not, as such, subject to the agent's free choice. Accordingly, the ways in which an act occurs are divided into a) those its coming to actuality qualified by which (al-latî yahsulu* 'alayhâ) is effected by the agent and b) what is not due to the agent but rather to the way the thing is in itself. This is simply because the state of the agent has a determinant effect (tu'attiru*) only on that whose non-actuality is possible (yaguzu*) given the existence of the act. The state of the agent, however, has no determinant effect on that whose actuality is necessary under whatever circumstances
given the existence of the thing.5 That is to say, those attributes and characteristics that are reckoned as necessary (wagibat*), such as the Attribute of the Essence and those attributes that are entailed by it or those attributes that are derivative of entitative causes [`ilal, sc., the accidents] can never be attributed to the agent.6
The case of the Attribute of the Essence and of the essential attributes is clear enough from what has been said earlier. The case of the "accidental attributes" (sifatu* l-ma`ânî) is analogous in that, while the agent
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can, through his free act, produce the existence of a determinant accident (ma`nà) that is the cause (`illa) of the state or attribute of the thing in which the accident inheres, the state or attribute arises immediately through the inherent accident as one of its essential characteristics. The act of the agent, thus, is not the immediate ground of a body's being moved (kawnuhû mutaharrikan *) but rather of the existence of the accident (sc., the kawn) which is the immediate ontological ground of the actuality of the attribute. The act, i.e., the thing-itself whose being the agent produces through his power of efficient causality, is, however, qualified by attributes which, though inseparable (not munfasila*, munfakka) from its existence (wugud*) and coming into existence (hudut*), are nonetheless plainly recognized and distinguished by the mind (`uqila) as characteristics over and above its simple existence as such (zâ'idatun `alà mugarradi* l-wugud*).7 Inseparably conjoined (muqârina) to the coming to be of the thing, these attributes are said to be consequent upon it or derivative of it (tâbi`atun lil-hudut*); they reveal the being of the thing or the act as its being is qualified and distinguished by the mode or manner of its coming to be.8 The attribute is "derivative" of the manner of the thing's coming to be, not as one says that an attribute "arises from" (sadara* 'an) or is derivative of an accident (tatba`u l-ma`nà),9 but as one says that "the characteristic is derivative of the attribute.'' 10 Thus a thing's being morally wrong or bad (qubhuhu*) "is derivative of its being an untrue statement or an unjust act" (yatba`u kawnahû kadiban* 'awzulman*).11 No characteristic (hukm*) that is derivative (yatba`u) of an attribute can be actual (yahsulu*) prior to the actuality of the attribute. This is shown by the fact that an act cannot take place through the agency of a being (dat*) unless the being is qâdir, since the actuality of the possibility of the realization of the act consists exclusively in (maqsuratun* `alà) its being qâdir."12 As in the case of all attributes that are derivative of the agent's action (tatba`u l-fi`lîya), His being qâdir `alayhâ [i.e., being capable of effecting their actuality and existence through a free and autonomous act] is the sufficient ground of the actuality of their possibility.13
In terms of the present discussion this is to say that while the agent's power of efficient causality (specifically kawnuhû qâdiran) alone effects the realization of the existence of the act, his knowledge and will may effect the object of his power of efficient causality in a secondary or derivative way (`alà sabîli t-taba`);14 and as the determinant effect of the will upon the act depends upon the realization of the existence of the
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act it is said to be correlated to the thing "in a way that is derivative of its coming to be" (`ala waghin * yatba`u l-hudut*).15 Whereas the essential attributes arise with the existence of the thing are mutagaddidatun* `inda l-wugud*16but are grounded in the Attribute of the Essence, those which are derived from its coming to be "are attributed (tudafu*) to the agent as their ground, since they are derivative of an attribute [sc., of existence and the becoming of existence: tagaddudu* l-wugud*] that is effected by the autonomous agent (al-qâdir) and his states."17 In that they are characteristics that are distinguishable from the mere existence of the thing, they are specifically correlated to attributes other than his being qâdir, viz., to his being knowing or his being willing.18 That an act is well or skillfully wrought (muhkam*, muttasiq) is a characteristic that arises with or derives from its coming to bethat is actualized in and through its coming to bebut is distinct as over and above its coming to be.19 The well-wrought act is that which is sequentially ordered in its coming to be (murattabun fî hudutihi*) according to knowledge and skill and so can be intentionally realized only by one who knows the character of the thing, how it should be (al-`âlimu bi-kayfîyatihî).20. The agent's being knowing determines not its existence or its being what it is but the characteristic of its being that is derived from the manner or character of its coming to be (waghu* hudutihi*). The agent's knowing determines, thus, the ordering of the elements in a complex event; i.e., it effects the ordering of several distinct acts. The (whole) act's being well wrought or skillfully accomplished is, in this way, correlated to and dependent upon Iris being knowing, but the effect of his being knowing is mediated through the ordered sequence as a series of distinct and separate acts. The role of the attribute, therefore, may be viewed more as that of a condition (sart*) than as that of a necessitating cause (mugib*). Abû Raîd remarks that the actuality of the possibility of the well-wrought act lies not in [the agent's] knowing but in the power of efficient causality. Indeed, it is nothing more than to cause one thing to exist after another or one thing to exist simultaneously with another and this [viz., causation of existence] can only be through his being qâdir. His being knowing, however, is a condition (sart*).21
That a verbal utterance be a simple report or statement (habar*) or a command ('amr) or any other of the divisions of speech ('aqsâmu lkalâm)22 depends upon the will of the agent who makes the utterance, for
Page 128 that selfsame thing which is a predicative statement can exist without its being a predicative statement. It is a simple statement only because the agent wills thereby to make a simple statement and a command is a command only through the agent's willing the thing commanded. 23
That is, every other attribute that is evident in its being may be present without its being a simple statement so long as the will and intention of the agent are absent. Thus, one cannot say that it comes to be a simple statement simply through the [agent's] being qâdir, since its relation to his being qâ when it is not a simple statement is the same as its relation to it when it is a simple statement.24
In contrast to the case of the well-wrought act, the actuality of the attribute here may be said to be necessitated (mugaba*) by the act of the will and the agent's being qâdir may be considered, in relation to the attribute, not as the necessitating ground but rather as a condition (sart*).25 Similarly, an act of prostration becomes an act of worship (`ihâda) only through the determinant effect of the agent's will; likewise acts of reward (tawab*) or of punishment (`iqâab) are specifically qualified as being reward or punishment only through the will of the agent.26 The act of the will that determines the specific characteristic of the act in its coming to be is not, however, directed to the characteristic as such but to the aim of the agent in performing the act. Thus 'Abd al-Gabbar* says that In the case of every act that comes to be, qualified by a particular state (sara* `alà halin* mahsusa*) through the will [of the agent], this act of willing is not specifically correlated to the given state but rather is specifically correlated [to the act] in another manner and [the act] then comes to have a state. For example, the act of willing on account of which the simple statement comes to be a simple statement is the act of willing to make a statement about that concerning which it is a simple statement; it is not that [the agent] wills that it be a simple statement. So also he wills in the act of punitive retribution (`iqâb) to cause it [sc., the act itself] to be in the manner deserved by the one to be punished; it is not that he wills that it be an act of punitive retribution. Likewise he wills that the thing commanded be brought to be by the person to whom the command is given; it is not that he wills that [the utterance] be a command.27
The act of the will is specifically correlated (ta`allaqa) to its object (al-murâd = the thing willed) and through this relationship determines
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the mode of the act's occurrence (waghu * wuqû'i l-fi'i). By its correlation, again, it necessitates the mode of the occurrence of the act, though it cannot be said to necessitate its object.28 To take the case of a simple, predicative statement (habar*), since the act of the will is required for the utterance to be a simple statement. . ., that which effects its being a simple statement is the act of willing to make a predicative statement to someone about Zayd and not about 'Amr. This act of the will is sufficient, according to abû Hâim, since the intention in this instance is to cause the utterance to exist as a predicative statement about Zayd and not about 'Amr. Abû 'Alî [al-Gubba'i>*], however, held that there must also be the act of willing to cause it to exist and so, as it were, held that there must exist two acts of willing.29
The position of al-Gubba'i* reported here is rather difficult to determine with clarity because the data concerning the detail of his doctrine on this matter are few and inadequate. That is, there is some question in determining the precise referent of the pronoun in the expression 'ihdatihi*: "to cause it to exist." Al-Gubba'i* held that speech or verbal utterance (kalâm) is not the sounds ('aswat*) as such but the "letters," the consonants (huruf*), whether spoken or written or held in the mind and memory.30 Consequently when he speaks of causing it to exist, it is unclear, in the present state of the evidence, whether by it one refers here merely to the material disposition (hay'a) of the substrate, i.e., to the simple material act (the sound or the marks on the paper) or whether he includes with this their being articulated letters, i.e., sounds, etc., as words. One cannot, therefore, affirm with certainty whether he distinguishes the separate intention to make a statement about Zayd from that to make speech (kalâm), disjoining thus the intention of the words' reference from the simple being of the words as words, or whether he means to tie the referential intention to that of making speech (i.e., the articulated elements of speech in whatever form) and to distinguish this from the intention to make the motions, etc., that give rise to rite disposition of the substrate as sound, etc., that constitutes the act in its simple materiality.31 Here again, as in several other elements of the school's teaching which we have examined, abû Hâim's refinement and revision of his father's doctrine simplifies the problem to a notable extent. The words (speech) are the sounds, for "the ordered letters" (al-hurufu* lmanzuma*) that make up the words of the utterance are nothing other than interrupted sounds ('aswatun* muqatta`a*).32 The meaning of the utterance, i.e., its being, in the example we have been considering, a predicative statement
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(habar *) which, as such, conveys some information (fâ'ida) about something (e.g., a particular individual named Zayd) is not separable from the intention of the speaker to say something (to someone) about something, but is, quite to the contrary, primarily grounded in this and in this alone. The grammatical form of the statement, the forms and the order of the words (sigatu* l-qawli wa-nizamihi* within the established convention of the language (al-muwada'atu* l-mutaqaddimatu), are required and prerequisite but are not sufficient to cause it to be a predicative statement, for it is only through the agent's will and intention that it convey some information that it becomes a predicative statement.33 Following the terms of the Muslim grammarians' analysis of the simplest form of a declarative proposition, we should say that in making a predicative statement the speaker begins by setting forth as subject for predication (ibtidât') a defined noun (ma'rifa) or its grammatical equivalent, i.e., an expression the specific or particular referent of which is presumed to be known and recognized by the person addressed, and then, concerning this thing that they both then have in mind, proceeds to state something which, in its being syntactically "constructed upon" (mabnîyun 'alà) the grammatical subject, conveys to the hearer something about the subject that he is presumed not to know.34 If the speaker does not, in uttering the words, will or intend, then, to predicate something of something, the utterance cannot be a predicative statement because there is no ibtidâ'. That is to say, no subject is posited for predication; there is grammatically no subject (mubtada': musnad 'ilayhî, mabnî 'alayhî) and therefore can be no predicate (habar*: mabnî, musnad). The parts cannot be so related, for their occurrence (and their inflection too) as subject and predicate (musnad 'ilayhî and musnad) depends upon the ibtidâ'.35 The material act (the words) exists, but there is, strictly speaking, no sentence, no statement. The notion of the utterance's dependence upon the will of the speaker is more nuanced than this, however. If there is no intention whatsoever to say somethingas in the case of one who is asleep (an-nâ'im) or who is unconscious or unaware of his act (as-sâhî)then the act will be mere sound that has the formal appearance of words and of being a statement. It is possible, however, that the strictly (merely) grammatical intention may be present without the utterance's being intended as the assertion of any fact or to communicate any meaning at all, as in the case of one who consciously utters a statement but with no purpose or intention of saying anything about anything or of communicating any meaning, as in the case of one who talks aimlessly, just to utter sounds and words (kalâmu l-'âbit).36 Here the grammatical intention may be present so that the utterance has, in fact, the form of a predicative proposition, but
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since there is no will and intention ('irâda, qasd *) to communicate or to state any particular meaningto say one thing and not anotherthe utterance can have none; it cannot be validly interpreted as meaning this rather than that. Again, that which has grammatically the form of a predicative statement may, through the intention of the speaker, be not a simple statement about something but rather a request or command (e.g., 'I want you to do so and so') or a warning (e.g., 'there is a dog in the house'), and similarly that which has the grammatical form of an imperative and so of command ('amr) may in fact be a request (talab*) or a threat (tahdîd), or that which has grammatically the form of a question (istifhâm) may be a rebuke or reproof (tawbih*) or expression of disapproval ('inkâr) (e.g., 'are you sitting on your arse when there's work to be done?').37 These attributes are plainly recognized as characteristics that a thing may have through the free determination of the agent. They derive, as we have noted, from the coming to be of a thing (hudutuhu*) but qualify and distinguish its being as characteristics that it has over and above its mere existence as what it is in itself and its essential attributes. Its being qualified by them (husuluhu* `alayhâ) derives, thus, not from its coming to be as the mere becoming of existence (tagaddudu* l-wugud*), but from its coming to be in some specific "manner": hudutuhu* `ala waghin*from the manner of its coming to be or of its occurrence: waghu* hudutihi>*, waghu* wuqû`ihî. The wagh* may be described as the character of the coming to be or occurrence of the act as this may be distinguished as over and above the simple becoming of existence and as, therein, the coming to be of one act is distinguished (fâraqa) from that of another that may be materially identical. 'Abd al-Gabbar* says, thus, that the wagh* is analogous in the coming to be of the act to the state (hal*) in the being of a corporeal entity (sahs*); that is, as the corporeal entity or thing-itself has states of its being and characteristics by which it is specifically qualified (muhtassun* bihâ) and distinguished (fâraqa) from others that do not have them or which have different or contrary attributes, so the occurrence of the act, i.e., its coming to be, may be specifically qualified and distinguished by a "manner" (wagh*). The distinction is made in the terminology (al-lafz*, al-'ibâra), he says, even though the concepts are basically the same, because whereas corporeal entities are concrete (qâ'ima, tabita*) and that whereby they are specifically qualified has the character of something that comes to actuality in them (hukmu* l-mutagaddidi* fîhâ), acts are transitory (hadita*, tari'a*) and the distinctiveness (al-mufâraqa) that specifically qualifies them does not have the charac-
Page 132 ter of that which comes to actuality in something concrete (laysa fî hukmi * l-mutagaddidi* fî tabitin*) .38
As the wash belongs to the coming to be of the act and, in its coming to be, is the immediate ground of the specific attribute or characteristic, so the characteristic and the wash are given simultaneously and, as in the case of the 'illa and its ma'lûl, the one implies the other.39 It is the nature of the will ('irada) that it determine the manner or character (wagh*) of the occurrence of the act. This is not to say that the manner of coming to be is for all acts in all their aspects subject to modification and qualification by the free choice of the agent who causes their coming to be, but only that in those cases where it is so, the act of willing is that which determines it.40 That is, while the will is correlated to its object (al-murâd) strictly in terms of its coming to be,41 it is, nonetheless, directed to it as that which is aimed at (almaqsud* 'ilayhî) or that which one is motivated to (al-mad'ûw 'ilayhî) and not simply as a thing-itself or act. The will may more specifically, then, be said "to be correlated to it in a manner that derives from its coming to be."42 This is taken as characteristic of the act of willing, i.e., of the willing that is said to be effective (al-'irâdatu l-mu'attira*), viz., that has a determinant effect on its object, so that 'Abd al-Gabbar* says that "to describe one who wills as willing denotes his being specifically characterized by a state by virtue of his being qualified by which acts occur through his agency in one manner (wagh*) and not in another."43 As is the case of a verbal utterance's being a predicative statement or a command or a threat or the like, so also the moral qualification of an act is an objectively real characteristic that is distinct from whatever other attributes or characteristics it may have and is, in most cases, a characteristic by which a particular act may or may not be qualified.44 That an act be ethically good (hasan*) or bad (qabîh) is an objectively real characteristic (hukm*)45 whose immediate ground is often the manner of its occurrence (waghu* wuqû`ihî) or of its coming to be (hudutihi*). We know that the bad act is bad because of its occurrence in some manner such as its being a false statement (kadib*) or oppression (zulm*) . . . and this entails (iqtada*)its being specifically characterized by a characteristic over and above its existence. The same is true of the good act, for it is good only by virtue of some intelligibly discernable manner (waghun* ma'qûl) qualified by which it comes to actuality (yahsul* 'alayhî) when the manners [that could entail its being] bad (wuguhu* l-qubh*) are absent46
The "manner," thus, as an ontologically real and distinct quality of the coming to be and the existence of the act, belongs to the act anti not to
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the intention or motive of the agent (though the act of intending or willing, as an act, may itself be ethically bad). The moral or ethical characteristic, that is, since it is grounded immediately in the being of the act, is ontologically a characteristic of the act itself, and the agent is judged to be deserving of praise or blame as the one who caused the act to exist qualified by this characteristic. In terms of their ethical characteristics, then, acts may be divided into two categories: those which are intrinsically bad and those which, remaining materially and essentially the same, may occur either as good or as bad according to the free determination of the agent. It is the latter category which is of primary concern to the present chapter. This 'Abd al-Gabbar * divides into two classes according to the ontological relationship of the "manner" that is the ground of the ethical qualification to the state of the agent who causes the act to exist: those the manner (wagh*) of whose being bad is immediately grounded in (determined by) the state of the agent and those the manner of whose being bad is secondary or derivative of some characteristic of the act which characteristic is itself immediately grounded in the state of the agent. Of the first type he cites the utterly pointless act (al-'abat*), in which the immediate, determinant ground of the manner of its being bad (waghu* qubhihi>*) is the agent's state of mind, so that he could perform the selfsame act at the same time in a way that would entail its being good simply through his will or intention. For the second he cites the example of the false statement whose being false and therefore bad derives immediately from its being a predicative statement having a particular content, while this characteristic, in turn, is immediately grounded in the determinant effect of the agent's act of willing or intention.47 In the pointless act (al-'abat*), the "manner of its being bad" is, assuming that all other "manners" or conditions of the act's being bad are absent (intafat), simply that it is utterly pointless and vain; the agent, though he knows or is aware of what he is doing, has no purpose (garad*) in performing it and so no intention (qasd*) that would cause it to occur in some manner, i.e., in some manner that would be the basis of its being good (hasan*) or of its being bad on grounds other than its being pointless. Since he is simultaneously capable of deliberately causing the act to occur qualified by some manner, this absence of any manner grounded in the intention and will of the agent constitutes itself a manner of its occurrence. That is, in that the agent knows or is aware of what he is doing and has no purpose in the act, it occurs "in a manner [i.e., with a qualification] over and above its mere existence that is not possible in the act of one who is totally unaware of what he does and whose act, therefore, cannot be bad."48 The manner (wagh*) which is the
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ground of the moral qualification of the pointless act (assuming always that there is no other ground that would entail its being bad) is not, thus, in any way grounded in an attribute or characteristic of the act itself but is effectively determined, wholly and immediately, by the state of the agent. 49 In the case of a false statement (kadib*), the agent is responsible for the ethical characteristic of the act, but his state (sc., his being willing: kawnuhû murîdan) is not the immediate ground of "the manner of its being bad." The determinant effect (ta'tir*) of the agent's will and intention is on its being a predicative statement (habar*), which, as such, because it has a given content of meaning, may be true or false, e.g., in that it affirms that "Zayd was in the house" and refers to a particular individual (Zayd ibn Khâlid, not Zayd ibn 'Amr) and to a particular house, at a particular time, etc. That the utterance is a predicative statement that can correctly be interpreted as affirming (or denying) something about a particular individual derives, as we have seen, immediately from the intention of the agent; given its being so determined, however, its being true or false is then a fact that is not subject to determination by the agent's free choice or intention. If it is false, it is bad as such; it is ethically bad, that is, simply because the real state of affairs is not as stated in the proposition (muhbaruhu* 'alà mâ lâ tanâwalahu l-habar*). Strictly speaking, therefore, the will and intention have no determining effect (ta'tir*), no direct role (hazz*), in determining the manner of the statement's being bad, for its being a false statement is derivative (yatba'u) of its being a predicative statement that has a particular referent and content. The intention of the agent is, therefore, directly correlated (muta'alliq) to a characteristic that is the immediate ground of the ethical characteristic. The agent could cause the selfsame statement to exist as true, not by willing it to be true but, in the example, by intending to refer to a different individual (Zayd ibn 'Amr) or to a different house or a different time, etc.50 Like the manners of an act's being ethically bad, so also the manners of its being ethically good (wuguhu* l-husn*) may be grounded in the action of the agent (bil-fâ'il), i.e., in a characteristic that is determined by his will and intention, as a statement may be true or a command a command to do what is right according to the intention of the agent to make a particular statement about a particular thing or situation or to command a particular individual to perform a given act. The ethical characteristic in the case of a thing's being good, however, does not, like that of its being bad, arise simply from the manner of its being good. That is to say, where the manner of its being bad directly and of itself entails (yaqtadi*) its being bad, the manner of its being good (e.g., the statement's
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being true) effects its being good only on the condition of the absence of any manner of its being ethically bad (e.g., its causing some undeserved harm), for in the view of the masters of the Basrian Mu'tazila, there is no manner of an act's being good but that it can be found in an act that is, for one reason or another, bad. 51 Thus one says that an act is good "only by virtue of some intelligibly discernable manner qualified by which it comes to actuality, when the manners of being bad are absent."52 'Abd al-Gabbar>* says, therefore, that since given some manner of being bad (ma'a tubuti* waghi* l-qubh*) an act cannot be good, "the manner of the act's being bad is, as it were, the 'cause' ('ilia) of an act's being bad, while the manner of its being good is, as it were, that which fulfills the condition of the possibility of its being good" (kal-musahhihi* li-husnihi*.53 The "Derived Predicates": as-sifat* al-mustaqqa* Based on the attributes and characteristics that are grounded in the action of the agent, i.e, the acts in their existence and whatever other qualities or characteristics belong to them by virtue of the agent, are the predicates that are attributed to the agent "by way of action" ('alà tariqati* l-fi`lîya): those predicates by which the agent is described as having performed or produced the act or the specific characteristic of it. The basis and validity of the attribution rests in the fact that the one so described has in fact performed or produced the act through his autonomous power of efficient causality and by virtue of one or another of the states of his being that may causally determine some additional quality of it. The attribution does not, however, indicate an ontologically real attribute or state o£ the being of the agent. In referring to the agent as acting or having acted (jâ'il) or as the one who caused the act to exist (mugid*, muhdit*) or, for example, as striking (darib*), speaking (mutakallim), commanding ('âmir), or doing something good (muhsin*), one does not refer to a state or characteristic of the being of the agent but does really no more than to assert the reality or occurrence of the act and attribute it as such or in some particular aspect or quality to the agent as the one who caused it to exist or to be so qualified.54 If the agent had a state in his being agent, it is argued, then the presence and actuality of this state would be apparent to the mind (ma'qûl) as such;55 that is to say, one would know and recognise the agent directly and in a primary way as being in such a state, just as one recognizes and dis-
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tinguishes his being living or knowing as attributes of his being. The attribution to the agent, however, is secondary and derivative. If the speaker had a state (hal *) in his being speaking, the knowledge of this state would have to precede the knowledge of his speech, as is the case in his being knowing, for as he has a state in his being knowing, the knowledge of his being knowing precedes the knowledge of what necessitates it, sc., [the accident] of the act of knowing; and the same is true of what is in motion (al-mutaharrik*). . . .56
By contrast, the way that one knows that a thing is attributed to the living [i.e., to the living composite as a whole or totality: gumla*] by way of action is this: when one knows that it occurred through his agency in direct accord with his intention and motive, he is described by it. It is in this way that one knows whatever is ascribed to him by way of action, such as striking or moving or staying.57
Similarly, that one is said to be ''causing benefit" (nâfi') does not imply a state contrary to his being "causing harm" (darr*), but is ascribed or attributed to him only as action (fi'lîya).58 The reference to the state of the agent is, in effect, to the act's occurrence through his autonomous power of efficient causality and so to his having been qâdir,59 but the primary basis of the attribution remains the reality of the act whose being and reality are fully distinct and separate from that of the agent. "The command is the letters and the sounds and it is not possible that it necessitate an attribute for the living being, but the one who is willing has a state in his being willing."60 Thus 'Abd alGabbar* says that the basis on which He [God] is affirmed to be 'speaking' (mutakallim) is nothing other than that one knows that speech exists through His agency, just as is the case with His being 'doing what is good' (muhsin*), 'giving sustenance' (râziq), 'causing to die' (murnît), and similar predicates that are derived (mutaqqa) from [that which describes] the act. This is so simply because to affirm the act as the act of the agent on the basis of his being in fact capable of performing it is not valid. This one must, in asserting that He is 'acting' (fâ'il) avert to the knowledge that the act exists through His agency.61
It is thus that these predicates are most frequently referred to in the writings of the Basrian Mu'tazila as the "derived attributes" or, more exactly, "derived predicates" (al-'awsafu/as-sifatu* l-mutaqqa.62 They are derived in that we know first the act as such or as having some specific characteristic through its occurring in a particular manner (wagh*) and
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then know and describe the agent, naming him as the one who is responsible for the act or for the particular characteristic of it. The attribution, the adjective or name, is "derived" (mutaqq), that is, from the name of the act or from the noun or adjective that designates some specific and particular characteristic of it (min 'ahassi * mâ yakûnu l-fi'lu 'alayhî).63 To use the example cited earlier, the state of the agent that determines that his utterance be a command is that of his being willing (kawnuhû murîdan) that the thing commanded be done by the one to whom the command is addressed. The act, then, is objectively characterized by its being a command ('amr) and thus one may describe the agent as commanding ('âmir). The state of the agent is the particular being willing and being qâdir; his being described as 'âmir, therefore, derives entirely from the character of the act: the utterance that is a command. Accordingly, the name (ism), i.e., the adjective (sifa*) by which the agent is described, is derived (mutaqq) from the name of the act. The expression "derivation" (itiqaq), in fact, is taken from the philological sciences, for the specific attribution (wasf*) or (verbal) adjective (sifa*) is derived from the name of the act (fi'l) as the agent is described as having done the act or as being responsible for the named characteristic. The concept, however, is explicitly distinguished from that of linguistic derivation,64 for the concern of the mutakallimîn, unlike that of the grammarians, is not the grammatical and lexical derivation of words, how they are taken (ma'huda*) one from another and what form is primary, but the ontological order of what is: what is primary in the order of the attributes of being as it is given to understanding. Thus, the knower's being described as 'knowing' is not derived (mutaqq) from the act of knowing ('ilm) at all but indicates merely his being specifically characterized by a state (hâl*) whereby he is distinguished from another composite whole.65
That is, our primary and original knowledge in this case is of the knower as knowing. We know the being (dat*) that is the knower as being in a particular state ('alà halin*); his being is given as qualified by being in this state and it is only beginning from the recognition and understanding that the being is qualified by the state of being knowing that one may then enquire as to the ground of the state, whether it is an essential attribute or is the effect (ma'lûl) of an entitative accident. Thus it is that it is solely because we recognize that the knower is knowing that we call him knowing; as we have seen, the reference to the act of knowing (sc., the inherent accident) is not directly implied.66 By contrast, the term 'striking' (darib*) is derived from the name for the act of striking (viz., 'ad-darb*>); the knowledge of the act necessarily precedes and is the basis
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of the specific attribution, so that "as long as we do not know that the act of striking has occurred on the part of the agent, we do not know him to have struck/be striking," for "the knowledge of that from which something is derived must precede that of what is derived." 67 Similarly reckoned as "derived predicates" are passive predicates which have reference to the act of another or his state, as when one says of a thing that it is 'known' or 'mentioned' or when one says, e.g., of God that he is 'worshipped.' Here also, as in the case of the derived predicates of action that we have examined, the predicate denotes no real ontological state or qualification of the being of which it is predicated; it is, rather, based upon the knowledge of the action or the state of another and affirms merely an extrinsic state of affairs relative to the being of which the attribute is predicated.68 Notes to Chapter 6 1. M 8, 159, 12-17; cf. also ibid., pp. 22 f. and 270, 2-6, translated p. 125; on the distinction between the mutagaddid* and the non-mutagaddid* see n. 38. The act (fi'l) here is the thing done; that whose existence (wugud*) is brought to actuality through the activity of the agent. Any act involves the causation of existence ('ihdat*, 'igad*) as through his being qâdir one produces, e.g., an act of speculative inquiry (nazar*) in the heart or physical pressure (i'timâd) in the muscles which then may be transmitted so as to effect (wallada) movement or rest or the like in another body, or, as in God's case, the act may be the creation of the atom. 2. Cf., e.g., Muh*, 352, 21-23: kullu sifatin* 'aw-hukmin* yudafu* 'ilà l-fâ'ili, fa-huwa yakûnu li-'ahwalihi>* fîhî ta'tirun*, lâ budda min 'an yakûna min sarti* dalika* l-gawazu*, wa-'in lam yug'al* hada* haddan* lahû; cf. also the texts cited in nn. 17 f., 43, et alibi. The expression bi-hasbi* 'ahwali* l-fî`il, used in relation to the occurrence of the act, refers to those states that effectively determine (tu'attiru*) some attribute of the act (its existence or one of the other attributes and characteristics that are bil-fâ'il) as these are subject to his free choice. Thus one says that our knowledge of what we perceive occurs "in accord with the actuality of the possibility of our seeing" (bi-hasbi* sihhati* basarina*) and not "in accord with our states" (bi-hasbi* 'ahwalina*) since, although it does occur in accord with our being living, it is not an act that may be freely chosen or rejected (cf. M 9, 38 f. and also ibid., p. 21, 12 ff.). 3. Thus, e.g., Tad, 14rº 12-14: . . . sifatu* l-fâ'ili l-mu'attiratu*, wa-hiya kawnuhâ qâdiran wa-`âliman wa-murâdan wa-kârihan wamutafakkiran, fa-'ammâ kawnuhû qâdiran, fa-lâ yata'addà tariqata* l-ihdati* wa-kawnuhû `âliman yu'attiru*. . .; for the divisions, see later. 4. M 8, 65, 11-15: 'alimnâ 'anna l-ladi* yahsulu* min 'awsafih>* bi-hasbi* qasdihi* wa-dawâ'îthî huwa hudutuhu* lâ gayr*. . . fakadalika* s-sifatu* l-mufâriqatu lil-huduti* yagibu* 'an yakûna 'alayhâ bihî (adding lâ before yakâna in line 15); cf. also Tad, 80vº 25 ff. That which is fully distinct from its coming to be is strictly that which is neither the existence of the thing, nor directly derivative from its coming to be (tâbi'un> lil-hudut*).
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5. M 8, 270, 2-6 (reading tu'attiru * for yu'attiru* in lines 5 and 6 and al-fâ`il for al-fi`l in line 6); cf. also, e.g., ibid., 281, 7-14 and later. 6. Muh*, 353, 4 f.: mâ kâna mina s-sifati* wal-'ahkami* mimmd yu'addu fî l-wagibati*, ka-nahwi* sifati* d-dawati* wal-muqtada* 'anhâ, wa-mâ kâna mina s-sifati* t-tâbi`ati lil-`ilali, fa-lan tasihha* 'idafatuha* 'ilà l-fâ`il. That it is not existence (sc., the existence of the thing-itself) that effectively determines the actuality of the essential attributes but rather the Attribute of the Essence, cf. Muh*, 142, translated p. 60. For the arguments (against the A`arites) that the essential attributes cannot be determined by the agent, cf., e.g., M 8, 64 ff. (esp. 68 ff.); 15, 152 f.; Tad, 13rº ff.; et alibi. Ibn Ginni* (al-Hasa'is* 1, 174, 5-7) takes the Mu`tazilite position as the position of the 'ahl an-nazar*. 7. Hasala* lahû halun* zâ'idatun `alà mugarradi* l-wugudi* l-ladî bihî yahrugu* main `an yakûna fî hukmi* l-ma`dûm: M 6/1, 59, 1-4 (reading bibâ for bihâ in line 4); cf. also M 14, 242, 16-18. Thus "one says that the act has actuality in being qualified by characteristics (yahsulu* `alayhâ) through the action of the agent only when it is confirmed as really belonging to the act and the act's being qualified by it is plainly apparent to the mind (`uqila kawnuhû `alayhâ), for to ascribe the ground of an attribute to the agent (ta`lilu s-sifati* bil-fâ`il) and to assert its dependence upon him is like ascribing the ground of an attribute to a determinant accident (ma`nà) and cause (`illa) in that the ascription is based on its [i.e., the attribute's] being plainly recognized and distinguished by the mind" (far`un `alà kawnihâ ma`qûlatan): M 8, 74, 4-6. That it is plainly recognized as a distinct and positive attribute that is not a mere negation, cf. e.g., M 5, 230, 11-14; 6/1, 9 f. (where read bi-'an lâ yakûna for wa-'in lain yakun in 9 ult. and taqûlûna, etc. for yaqûlûna, etc., ibid. ff.); concerning negative attributes, see Ch. 7. 8. Cf., e.g., ZS, 404, 9-11: dalika* l-hukmu* huwa t-tâbi`u lil-huduti* wa-kat-tariqati* fîhî wal-kayfîyati 'id* laysa yanfasilu* 'ani lhuduti*, fa-kâna yagibu* 'an yakûna rnuta`alliqan bi-fâ`ili l-hudut*; see also the references later. 9. E.g., Muh*, 182, 19; cf. also at-tâbi`atu lil-'ilal, ibid., 353 5; for the expression sadara* `an ma`nan, cf. Ch. 5, n. 3. The expression is used in a number of contexts; one says, e.g., that the attributes or acts of "looking," "smelling," "tasting," etc., are "derivative of the senses'' (tatba`u l-hawass*) in that they are grounded in the functioning of the organs of sense (e.g., Muh*, 215 f., on which see Ch. 7) and that the act of willing is "derivative of conviction or belief" (tatba`u l-i`tiqâd; e.g., M 6/2, 73, 9) in that it is realized on the basis of conviction (not necessarily correct) that the realization of the action is possible. By contrast, one says that the atom's occupying space is not derivative of something else (is not `alà sabîli t-tab`i li-gayrihi*: ZS, 408, 12 f.). 10. ZS, 228, 9; see Ch. 4, nn. 18 f. 11. M 8, 198, 10. 12. Mas (B), 21, 5 ff.; cf. also SU5, 314. l3. Muh*, 315, 15 f.: sâ'iru l-awsafi* l-latî tatba`u l-fi`lîyata yakfî fî sihhatiha* kawnuhû ta`âlà qâdiran `alayhâ; (cp, e.g., M 7, 45, 5 fand SU5, 310). The expression fi`lîya refers to a thing insofar as it is an action or act dependent upon and correlated to the will and intention of the agent; al-fi`lîya, thus, "lâ tu`qalu 'illâ `alà l-ginsi* l-ladi* nadkuruhu* min wugubi* wuqû`i l-fi`li bi-hasbi* qasdihi* wadawâ`ihî wa-wugubi* ntifâ'ihî bi-hasbi* kirâhatihî wa-sarifihi*: Mas, 58rº 7 ff. 14. M 8, 109, 12 f.: qad yu'attiru* l-'ilmu wal-'irâdatu fî maqdûrihî `alà sabîli t-taba`. 15. M 6/2, 76, 16. Concerning the concept wagh* in this context, see pp. 131 f. 16. Cf., e.g., Muh*, 157 f. 17. Min haytu* yatba`u sifata* yu'attiru* fîhâ l-qâdiru wa-mâ huwa `alayhî mina l-'ahwali*, qad yudafu* 'ilà l-fâ`il: Muh*, 354, 4-6, q.v. et sqq.
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18. Thus, lâ yahtagu * 'ilà halin* zâ'idatin 'alà kawni fâ``ilihî qâdiran 'illâ fî sifatin* zâ'idatin `alà wugudihi*: M 8, 277, 18 ff., q.v. (where read al-habari* habaran* for al-hayri* hayran* in line 19); cf. also ibid., 70, 1-3 (where read habaran* for gabran* in line 3) and 71, 4 ff. Note also M 8, 65 f. (where read wa-habaran* for wa-gabran* at 66, 1), esp. 66, 1-3: 'inna dalika* 'agma`a* yatba`u l-huduta* fa-yakûnu l-fi`lu `alayhâ bil-fâ'ili, wa-'in lam yakun min haytu* kâna qâdiran, bal li-sifâtin zâ'idatin `alà kawnihî qâdiran, li-'anna gihati* li-fi'li 'innamâ yahsulu* `alayhâ li-sifati* 1-qâdir . . . ; n.b. also M 15, 154, 8 ff.; 4, 259 f. (where read al-habari* habaran* for al-hayri* hayran* in line 14 and habaran* for hayran* in line 15) especially p. 259; 16, 54 f.; SU5, 72, 14 ff. and ZS, 79, 8 ff.; see also Tad, 80vº 25-27 and 81rº 3. Thus it is that the only act that has no characteristic over and above its existence and those attributes that are necessary given its existence is that which is produced by an agent who is unaware or unconscious (sâhî) of what he is doing, sc., where knowledge, will, etc., are excluded; cf., e.g., M 6/1, 7, 3-6. This is the position of most authorities; abû `Abdallâh and `Abd al-Gabbar*. however, hold that some acts are intrinsically bad and so have ethical qualification even when performed by one who is totally unaware of what he is doing; cf., e.g., M 6/l, 11 f. and 32 f. and n. 47. 19. Cf., e.g., ZS, 507 f. (where add bihî following huwa at 507, 17.). 20. Cf. M 11, 372, 10 ff.; ZS, 493 f. and 506 ff.; as well as M 16, 191 and 207; and Muh, 352, 24 ff. Note that kayfîya in this context means no more than the way one goes about doing the thing or making it. It is thus knowing (`ilm) may be defined as the basis of the wellwrought or skillful act, since to perform such an act is distinctive of one who is knowing; see the references Ch. 4, n. 32. 21. Mas, 141rº. 22. On the 'aqsâmu l-kalâm, see the references given in Bibliotheca Orientalis 29 (1972) 356; to be included among those there mentioned is also that an utterance be a reproof or casting of blame (damm) (cf. M 6/2, 73 f.), a threat, request, etc. (see later). The 'aqsâm al-kalâm listed by the grammarians generally differ from those given by the mutakallimîn; cf., e.g., Ibn Fâris. 179 ff. 23. Mas, 203rº 2-5; cf. also ibid., 77rº f., where the same formula is given and the contrary position of al-Ka`bî (on which see M 6/2, 12, 1 ff. and Tad, 70rº) is also discussed. Cf. generally also M 15, 323 ff. and Tad, 69rº ff. Concerning command (al-'amr) cf., e.g., alMu`tamad 1. 58. 6 ff. According to abû Hasim* in his Masâ'il it is only through the will and intention of the speaker that the utterance is addressed to some one and so becomes hitab* (M 6/2, 49). 24. M 6/2, 18, q.v. For this question generally, cf. M 6/2, 10 ff. 18, 3 ff., 49 f., 91 ff. and 94 ff.; Tad, 68vº ff. and especially 70rº ff.: et alibi. 25. Cf. Tad, 142vº 5 f.: wa-qad nafsilu bayna l-'irâdati wal-`ilmi min haytu* kâna ta'tîru l-'irâdati 'alà haddi* l-'igabi* dûna l-`ilmi fayuaâlu 'inna t-ta'tira* fî kawni l-kalâmi habaran* huwa l-'irâdaîu wa-kawnuhû qâdiran sartun*. 26. Cf., e.g., M 6/2, 94 f. 27. M 6/2, 96, 3-9 (reading fa-yasiru* for fa-tasîru in line 5); cf. generally ibid., pp. 95 ff. and also M 13, 538 f., Mas, 202rº ff., et alibi. 28. Cf. M 6/2, 84-88 and Mas, 199vº ff. (Question 138) and cf., e.g., also ZS, 474, 2 ff. That is the will may have as its object something whose existence the one who wills is incapable of effecting; if. however, the act is accomplished by the one who wills, the will necessitates its coming to be qualified by the particular characteristic that is "derivative of the way it comes to be." 29. Tad, 177vº 3 ff.; for al-Gubba'i's* position, cf. also M 6/2, 97, 12 f. and 214, 12 ff.
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Ibn Mattawayh, following the passage translated, discusses "command" ('amr) in a like manner; concerning this, see the detailed discussion in al-Mu`tamad 1, 50 ff. 30. Cf., e.g., M 7, 7, 15 ff.; Muh *, 307, 1 ff. and 327, 14 ff.; Tad, 64rº 20 ff. The identification of the words with the consonants (huruf*) follows the analysis of the grammarians. 31. The former alternative would appear the more plausible and consistent. This would be corroborated if abû Raîd's assertion that the thesis set out at n. 23 is that "of our masters" may be taken as validly including al-Gubba'i*. M 11, 305 f. may also be pertinent. Most reports concerning al-Gubba'i's* teaching regarding the nature of speech (e.g., M 7, 187 and 191, 11 ff.; 16, 54, 1 ff. [where read wabefore ga`ala* in line 3]; Muh*, 327, 14 ff.; and Maq, 192, 1 ff. and 598 f.) are of little aid elucidating the present problem. 32. Cf. generally M 7, 6 ff.; Muh*, 306 ff.; SU5, 528 ff. (where read `addûhû for `arrawhû at 529, 18); and Tad, 65vº ff. Contrary to the position taken by abû Hâim in his Bagdadiyat* (cited in Tad, 65vº 20 ff.), his successors held that included in speech are articulations that are not employed normally in the given language (al-muhmal as opposed to al-musta`mal), whether sounds or words, i.e., "those that arc not established in conventional usage although it is possible that they be so" (Tad, 67rº 19 f.), as well as those articulations that do not in fact convey any meaning; cf. Tad, 65vº 16 ff.; SU5, 529, 17 ff.; and Muh*, 307, 20 ff.; Mas, 73rº 1 ff. and al-Mu`tamad 1, 16, 7 f. Cp. Ibn Fâris, 82, 1 ff. and Ibn Ya`î 1, 18. 33. Cf., e.g., M 15, 323, 3 ff.; 6/2, 95, 1 ff. (and cp. ibid., p. 18, 3 ff); M 17, 14 f.; 13, 538 f.; and al-Mu`tamad 1, 49 ff. On the requirement that there be an established convention of usage, cf. generally M 5, 160 ff.; Tad, 66vº ff. and 71vº f.; and Mas, 73rº and see also Ch. 1, n. 10. 34. Cf., e.g., al-Muqtadab* 4, 126 ff. The speaker "wills to inform Zayd of what is in the predicate" (al-Mu`tamad 1, 52, 16 f.). The defined noun (al-ma`rifa) is, by definition, that noun the particular referent of which is taken to be known to the hearer. Thus in the discussion of the degrees of definition in nouns (marâtibu 1-ma`ârif) the question is one of which are more and which less clearly and immediately recognized and known to the person addressed as designating their individual and particular referents; cf., e.g., al-Insaf*, § 101 (2, 707 ff.), al-Muqtadab* 4, 276 ff. and esp. 280 ff., al-Gumal*, 191 f., and Sîbawayh 1, 219 f. Some words, however, that in this context are among the most defined ('a`raf), e.g., the demonstrative pronouns and personal names ('alqâb) which "distinguish the individual from the whole class" (besides the foregoing references, cf. also al-Muqtadab* 4, 17), are, from another standpoint, fully nonspecific (mubham) and are said to convey no meaning (lâ tufîd) in that some specific designation or ostension ('iâra) or qualification is required for them to have specific meaning (fâ'ida). Those that do not have specific meaning are divided into two classes, viz., those whose references is altogether arbitrary within the convention of the language (al-'alqâbu l-mahda*), such as personal names, and those that are simply nonspecific (mubham), e.g., ay' and the demonstrative pronouns (al-'asmâ'u l-mubhama); cf. Tad, 67rº 19 ff. (where read al-'asmâ' for al'ayâ' at 67vº 9: qad ga`alu* qawlahum ay'un min 'abhami l-'asmâ'i wa-'a`ammihâ) and see the references cited in Ch. 4, n. 101. 35. See the discussion in Sîbawayh 1, 278, al-Muqtadab* 4, 126 ff., al-Insaf* § 5 (1, 44, ff.), and Ibn Ya`î 1, 83 ff., cited Ch. 1, n. 20. That there can be a predicate when the subject is understood as intended but not expressed, cf., e.g., Sîbawayh 1, 279 and Ibn Ya`î 1. 94 f. A word has no reference apart from the intention of the speaker (M 5, 160, 5 ff.).
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36. Cf. M 17, 38; see also M 11, 191, 3 ff., where the utterly pointless act (al-`abat *) is described as "any act in which the agent intends no intelligible manner (waghun* ma`qûl), so that it is like the idle nonsense that we sometimes utter and anything else in which the agent has no purpose though he knows and expressly intends [the act]." (On what he means by "intelligible manner," see n. 38 and concerning the idle or pointless act, see the references in n. 48.) Similarily the utterance that has the grammatical form of a command cannot be a command or request or whatever when it is kalâmu s-sâhî wal-`abit*; cf. al-Mu`tamad 1, 52, 2-4. 37. Concerning the predicative statement, see generally M 15, 323 ff. and concerning commands, see al-Mu`tamad 1, 43 ff., where the general issue of will and intention is discussed in detail, as well as M 6/2, 73 f. where reproof (ad-damm*) is also discussed. These distinctions are also recognized by the grammarians; cf., e.g., concerning a reproof that has the grammatical form of a question, alMuqtadab* 3, 228 f. and 264. 38. M 14, 22, 3-10 (on the same page read al-`aql for al-fi`l in line 9); cf. also M 11, 529 f. (where read as-sifat* for the editor's al'innîyât at 529, 13; al-'innîya not only would make no sense in the context but is originally a translation term that, to my knowledge, never occurs in the writings of the Basrian Mu`tazila of the classical period). Thus one speaks of waghun* mahsus* as belonging to the act (e.g., M 11, 191, 7) just as of sifatun* mahsusa* or halun* mahsusa* as belonging to the thing-itself or corporeal whole (gumla*). In the strict use of the terminology, then, one does not speak of the tagaddud* or husul* of the wash or of the attribute that may be derived from it but speaks rather of the act's occurrence in a manner (wuqû`uhû `alà waghin*) and of the thing's coming to actuality or having actuality as qualified by the particular attribute (husuluhu* 'alayhâ); cf., e.g., the passages cited in nn. 1 and 5 and cp. those cited in Ch. 1, nn. 44 f. and M 8, 65, 15 ff. (where add lâ before yagib* in line 15). The term wagh* may also be used to denote the circumstance of an action as this may be chosen by the agent and so involve the ethical qualification of the act; cf., e.g., SU5, 313, 1-6 and 314, 10-12 and cp. the juridical use of wasf* for circumstances (cited in Ch. 1, n. 37). 39. Cr., e.g., M 11, 196, 18-20, 267, 13-15, and 529 (cited in the following note) and 8, 74, 3-6. The ethical qualification of an act is most commonly referred to as a "characteristic" (hukm*). Though this use corresponds to and may probably be based on the juridical use of the words, it nonetheless accords with the formal conception of the attributes and their 'ahkam* in that the ethical characteristic is grounded in another attribute, viz., the thing's existence in the manner of its coming to exist. Though it is not, thus, a hal* (cf., e.g., SU5, 374, 9 f.) the term hal* is used of the ethical qualification in a loose sense in some passages (cf., e.g., M 6/1, 52, 10 f. and 59, 1 ff., where insert al-ladi* after al-wugud* in line 3). 40. That not all wuguhu* l-wuqû` are subject to determination by the will of the human agent, cf., e.g., M 8, 270, 2 ff. (cited in n. 5). Thus, e.g., knowing (al-`ilm) is distinguished from simple conviction (al-i`tiqâd) or from taqlîd or tabhit*, not by its gins* but by being "a conviction that occurs in a particular way" (wâqi`un `alà waghin* mahsus*; cf., e.g., M 12, 213, 15 f.; Tad, 187rº ult.; and generally SU5, 188 ff.; Mas, 155vº., where, note, there is at least one leaf missing between foll. 156 and 157; Tad, 189rº ff.) such that it causes authentic confidence on the part of the knower that the thing really is as he is convinced it is (see Ch. 4, nn. 87 ff.). That conviction occur as an act of knowing is not, however, subject to the free determination of the agent in the way that, for example, a particular utterance may, through an act of willing, occur as a command or a threat, etc.; cf., e.g., SU5, 191; Mas, 156rº f. and 174rº 11-14; and Tad, 189vº 13 ff. To explain fully the argument set forth in these texts would require too detailed an examination of the Basrians' epistemology.
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41. Cf., e.g., M 6/2, 70 f.; al-'irâdatu 'innamâ tata`allaqu bil-murâdi `alà gihati * l-hudut*; cf. generally M 6/2, 68-77 and M 8, 22 f. and the references in the following notes. 42. Qad tata`allaqu bi-ay'i `alà waghin* yatba`u l-hudut*; cf., M 6/2, 76 f. 43. M 6/2, 294 f.: wasfu* l-murîdi bi-'annahû murîdun yufîdu htisasahu* bi-halin* li-kawnihî `alayhâ taqi`u l-'af`âlu minhû `alà waghin* mina l-wuguhi* dûna waghin*; cf. also M l1, 131, 12 f.; Muh*, 165, 9 ff.; and ZS, 450, 9 ff.; and Mas, 202vº f. (Question 141: 'inna l'irâdata tu'attiru* fî wuqû'i l-fi`li `alà waghin*). (The concept of the will and its role in action is, in this way, altogther different in the doctrine of the Basrian Mu`tazila from that found in the schools of al-A`ari and al-Mâturîdî.) That the agent is, thus, responsible for the thing's realization or actuality in being qualified by this specific character (husuluhu* `alà l-wagh*), cf., e.g., ZS, 403, 12-15 and that the agent's being knowing may also effect the wuguh*, as in the well-wrought act, cf. ZS, 507 f., cited n.19; n.b. also Muh*, 155, 1 ff. and generally ibid., 153-155. Abû Raîd says (Mas, 202rº f.) that there arc two kinds (darbân) of will, viz., that which has a determinant effect on its object in terms of its occurrence with one wash rather than another and that which does not. The former, he notes, cannot precede the act or the first part or element (guz'*) of the act (cf. also M 13, 72, 7: lâ yaguzu* fî l-'irâdati l-mu'attirati* 'an tataqad-dama l-fi'l and for the expression `al-'irâdatu l-mu'attira'*, cf. also Tad, 14rº 12, cited in n. 3) while the latter may. This second kind, however, is of no concern to the present context. 44. This is the position of the Basrian Mu`tazila against that of al-Ka`bî and the Baghdad School, who, just as they hold that what exists as a command is a command per se (li-`aynihî) and cannot exist save as a command (cf., e.g., al-Mu`tamad 1, 50, 4 ff. and Mas, 77rº and n. 23), insist also that the act that is bad is bad per se (e.g., SU5, 309 f.) and cannot exist as good, so that a given motion (haraka*) that is morally bad (qabiha*) cannot exist and be good; cf. Mas, 198rº f., 107vº ff. and 126rº f. Cf. also G. Hourani, Rationalism, 64 f. 45. Cf., e.g., M 6/1, 52 f., where he says that the immediate ground of a thing's being bad cannot be ascribed to something else, for whatever is described by a predicate the immediate basis of which is ascribed to another (e.g., a thing's being known or mentioned) has, as such, no ontologically real characteristic, "whereas we know that the bad action has characteristics by which it is specifically qualified, wherefore that which entails these characteristics must perforce be the way the thing is" (lâ budda rain 'an yakûna l-muqtadi* li-tilka l'ahkami* mâ huwa `'alayhî). 46. M 6/1, l0 f. (note that the presence of gahl* in this list is inconsistent with the distinction made in M 8, 171 f.; see n. 48); cf. generally M 6/1, 9 ff. (for which note the emendations suggested in n. 7 and that there seems to be something missing on p. 9, possibly following qabîh in line 13); M 6/1, 54 f.; 11, 528 f.; SU5, 309 ff. (where read lin-nahy for lir-ra'y at 310, 2 and `illa for `lyt at 311, ult.) and the references earlier. Several remarks concerning the terminology may conveniently be made here. Al-kadib* should not be rendered in these texts as "lie," since "lie" implies the speaker's knowingly and willingly making a false statement; kadib*, on the contrary, in the technical usage of the kalâm, is used of any statement that affirms what is not factually no or denies what is factually so, whether uttered knowingly or unwittingly (see later). The use of the wordi.e., without any connotation of speaker's knowing the statement to be untrueis common in literary Arabic; cf., e.g., abû l-Farag* al-Isfahânî, K. al-Agani* (Bulaq, 1285) 5, 42, 12 ff.; cf. also the citation of al-Gubba'i* in Ch. 1, n. 17. I have preferred to render qabih* as `bad' (sometimes `wrong') rather than `evil,' since the latter would seem to have too heavy a connotation for some contexts
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(e.g., that a false statement is "bad" even when made unintentionally); on the term qabih *, see Hourani, Rationalism, § 16, p. 49. Finally, concerning the notion that the ethical qualities of acts are objectively present in the acts, see ibid., pp. 52 ff. et alibi and also later. Since the sole aim of the present inquiry is to show how in some (most) instances the ethical characteristic (hukm*) that belongs objectively to the act is said to be grounded in the agent (bil-fâ'il)i.e., grounded in his actionthere is no need to enter here into a discussion of ethical values as such or of the source and nature of moral valuation and how our knowledge of ethical principles in general or how the valuation of the individual act is had; all this has been treated by Hourani. 47. M 8, 171 f.; cf. also M 6/2, 78 f. and 6/1, 83 f. and the references nn. 22 ff. In the same passage (M 8, 172, 5 ff., where omit wabefore bi-htiyarihi* in line 7 and read muta'alliq for m'lq in line 9) the author distinguishes those acts whose moral qualification does not belong to them through the state or action of the agent but rather belongs to them necessarily when they exist, e.g., ignorance (al-gahl*); cf. also M 8, 66, 16 ff. (where read wa-habaran* for wa-gabran* in lines 1 and 13) and 324, 5 ff. (where there is evidently something missing following 'alà waghin* in line 6); for the same distinction, see also M 6/1, 83, 8 ff.; 6/2, 94 ff.; Muh*, 354, 4 ff.; and, in regard to the present context, see also M 12, 213, 16 f. Ignorance may be regarded as the conviction (i'tiqâd) that affirms an untrue proposition or denies a true proposition (cf. Muh*, 196 15 f.) and that the autonomous agent (al-qâdir) may produce on the basis of erroneous or misleading evidence or reasoning (ubha) that he ought to doubt (cf., e.g., M 11, 168, 15 f. and 16, 290, 16 f.). The act is bad in itself; it is bad, that is to say, in its being the particular act of conviction with its specific content. Its being bad, therefore, involves its essential attribute and is not subject to determination through the will and intention of the agent but on the contrary is necessary given its existence. The agent's moral responsibility, sc., that he rightly deserves blame for having produced the act, lies simply in the fact that he need not (and should not) have performed that act at all (cf. M 8, 172 and also 12, 280). So also the act of willing what is bad (al-'irâdatu lil-qabih*) is essentially bad (cf., e.g., M 6/1, 85, 11); it is bad by its essential correlation to its specific object and so cannot become good. 'Abd alGabbar*, following abû 'Abdallûh against al-Gubba'i* and abû Hâîim, classes "oppression" or "injustice" (zulm*, on which see Hourani, Rationalism, index s. wrongdoing) as intrinsically bad (cf., e.g., M 6/1, 83, 11 and also ibid. pp. 11 f., 71 f. et alibi).Zulm* is quite too complex a concept to deal with here. What is most important to note is that in the doctrine of 'Abd al-Gabbar* and abû, 'Abdallâh acts which are thus essentially bad cannot under any circumstances occur as neutral; i.e., because they are essentially bad, the manners of their being bad are present even when the agent is totally unaware of what he is doing. 48. 'Inna l-'abata* huwa l-fi'lu l-wâqi'u mina l-'âlimi bi-halihi* 'aw-fî hukmi* 1-'`âlimi bihî 'ida* lam yaqsud* bihî waghan* ma`a sihhati* dalika* fîhî ; wa-mâ hadihi* haluhu* qad hasala* lahû hukmun* zâ'idun 'alà wugudihi*, wa-dalika* lâ yata'attâ fî fi'li s-sâhî wan--nâ'imi fa-lâ yasihha* kawnuhû qabihan*: M 6/1, 11 (where read 'abatan* for gny'* in line 5; lil-'abat* for llgyb* in line 6; and al'abat* for 'lgyb* in line 8); n. b. also M 11, 101, 3 ff. and cf. also ibid., 64, 7 f. and 13, 126, 3 ff. 49. The nature of the act, in brief (all other things being equal), is indifferent to the moral qualification of the act in this instance; the basis of the act's being bad is simple, that is, and the qualification, consequently, grounded immediately in the state (hal*) of the agent. 'Abd alGabbar* offers a number of examples, several of which may be mentioned: e.g., (M 11, 191), that of altogether aimless or idle talk (alhadayan*). The same act (utterance) which is bad because of its being utterly pointless could be-
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come good though the action and intention of the same agent. In is important, in terms of the present context, however, to note that whereas the basis of the act's being bad because it is pointless is altogether simple, that of its being good, like that of its becoming bad on other grounds (see later) is not simple in its relation to the states of the agent. To take the example of an utterance that in grammatical form is a predicative statement, the agent's intention to convey some however useful or beneficial information concerning the subject of the proposition would make it an authentic predicative statement (habar *) (and so interpretable as true or false) and, given this qualification (hukm*) of the act as a thing-itself and the presence of some "manner" of its being good, e.g., its conveying some benefit on the one to whom it is addressed (on the wuguhu* l-husn*, see later) and the absence of any "manner" or circumstance that would entail its being bad (e.g., its being false) it will be good. Similarly in the case of a pointless command (e.g., "a command the fulfillment of which is beyond the capacity of the one commanded, even though [the one who commands] has the ability to empower him to carry it out, so that it would then cease to be bad'': M 8, 171, cited earlier) the example is essentially simple. The qualifier ('ida* 'amkanahû 'an yumakkinahû minhû) means only to indicate that the same agent could have performed the selfsame act in a manner (under circumstances) occurring in which it would be good. Though again the elements required for the act to be good or to be bad on other grounds are complex, its being bad because of its being pointless derives from a "manner" that has nothing to do with the nature of the act but is correlated simply to the state of the agent in his knowingly performing it as a pointless act. Hourani (Rationalism, § 24, pp. 75 f.) wants to find some further and ultimate ground for such an act's being bad, but it is dear from the texts that no other is to be sought. The "manners" that would allow its being qualified as good are plainly absent, but the manner that entails (iqtada*) its being bad is grounded in the absence of aim or purpose, as is explicitly stated in M 6/1, 11, cited in the previous note. Thus the Basrian Mu'tazila hold that God's creation of a universe in which there were no living (sc., perceiving) creature would be pointless and so morally bad; cf. M 11, 69 ff. 50. Cf. M 6/1, 83 f. (where read mâ lâ for lâ mâ at 83, ult.), 6/2, 78 f., 8, 171 f.: and Mas, 174rº. That to utter false statement is morally bad regardless of the circumstances, cf. M 11, 206, 10 ff,; 13, 351 and 353 f.; 14, 241, 4 ff.; thus abû Raîâ says (Mas, 173rº) that abû Hâim and the rest of the masters of the Basrian School hold that "one knows by an immediate intuition that to utter a false statement which in no way involves the attainment of benefit or the avoidance of harm is bad; that uttering a false statement through which one obtains some benefit or avoids some harm is bad is known. however, through reasoning; they have made the ways of reasoning [to this conclusion] clear." On the "manner of being ethically bad" in general, cf. M 6/1, 52-69 et alibi. 51. Cf., e.g., M 6/1, 70 ff. and 59, 1 ff. (where read al-ladi* yahrugu* bihî for yahrugu* hihâ in lines 3f.); 11, 84 f. (where read alqabih* for al-qubh* at 84, 10); and 13, 316 f. See also Hourani, Rationalism, 103 f. 52. M 6/1, 11, 1 f.: 'innahû 'innamâ yahsunu* li-waghin* ma`qûlin yahsulu* `alayhî, matà ntafat wuguhu* l-qubhi 'anhû: cf. also the formulation of abû Hâim and the citation of abû 'Abdaliâh al-Basri*, ibid., 71, 11 ff. 53. M 11, 84, q.v. Thus it is that the Qadi* says (M 13, 316, 13 f.) that the sense conveyed (al-fâ'ida) in one's saying that an act is good contains an implicit negation (tatadammanu* n-nafy), viz., of the manners of being ethically bad, while that of one's saying that it is bad contains only an affirmation, in that in the former case one must
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enquire concerning the validity of the implied negation. Its being good, however, is not strictly speaking a negative attribute, for though its condition is the absence of the wuguhu * l-qubh*, it is grounded in a positive wagh*. 54. Thus, for example, 'irma l-fâ`ila laysa lahû bi-kawnihî fâ'ilan halun*, wa-'innarnâ yulâdu bi-dalika* 'annahû 'ahdata* l-fi`'la wa'awgadahu*: M 8, 157, 4 f.; cf. also M 7, 82, 3 f. and the references later. 55. Cf. M 6/2, 47, 5 f.: 'inna l-fâ'ila laysa lahû bi-kawnihî fâ`'ilan halun* li'annahû law kâna lahû halun* bi-kawnihî fâ`ilan la-wagaba* kawnuhû ma'qûlan; cf. also Muh*, 310, 3 ff. (where note that the expression tugadu* in line 3 and mawguda* in line 5 refer not to the state as existenta notion that is excluded from the conceptbut to its being grasped in immediate experience: wigdan*). Connected with this is the argument over whether the act of reflective thinking (an-nazar*) is atributed to the one who is reflecting (an-nazir*) simply as an action or whether to be reflecting is a state (hal*). The former position is taken by abû Hâim in his Bagdadiyat* and by Ibn 'Ayyâ, while the latter is given by abû Hâim in his Naqd* al-ma'rifa and is adopted by 'Abd al-Gabbar* (cf. M 12, 6 and 7, 45, 5 f.). Thus it is argued in a number of places (e.g., M 6/2, 49 f. that though the act of willing is an act produced by the agent through his autonomous power of efficient causality, it does not effect the state of his being willing (kawnuhû rnurîdan) as an action but as an essential characteristic of its own being as an accident (ma'nà); cf. also Ch. 2, n. 38. It is also argued (e.g., M 6/2, 47 ff.) that an act does not entail a state on the part of the agent, since such a state, in that it would qualify the agent as a whole and totality, would thus exclude the possibility of the simultaneous realization of a contrary act. 56. SU5, 536 f.; cf. also ibid., 205, 13 ff.; 207, 16 ff. (cited n. 67) and generally in regard to speaking as an "attribute" of action, see M 7, 48 ff.; Muh*, 309 ff.; and Tad, 72vº ff. Concerning the argument of the passage here translated, we may note again that it is thus that in the case of all accidents which are not directly perceptible, one recognizes first the attribute or characteristic of which the accident is the cause and then knows the accident as its cause only through inference and reasoning. 57. M 7, 48, 3-6. For the sense of al-fi'lîya, see n. 13. 58. Muh*, 194, 24-27. 59. Thus, lâ hala* lil-fâ'lili bi-fi'lihî wa-'innamâ yudafu* 'ilayhî min haytu* kâna qâdiran 'alayhî: M 14, 293, 19; cf. also Tad, 161vº 19: 'al-fâ'ilu,' ma'nâhû man qad wugida* rnâ kâna qâdiran ' `alayhî. 60. Tad, 171vº 15 f. 61. M 7, 58, 3-7. For the background in al-Gubba'l*, cf., e.g., Maq, 528, 8 ff. and 551, 7 ff. 62. Cf., e.g., the passages cited in the preceding note and M 8, 238, 20-22: 'inna z-zalima* 'innamâ yusafu* bi'annahtû zalimun* min haytu* fa'ala z-zulma*, 'alà mâ qad-damnâhû, fa-yagibu* wasfuhu* (ta'ûlà) bi-dalika* law kâna fâ`ilan liz-zulmi* ; wa-kadalika* fî sâ'iri l-'awsafi* l-mutaqqati; cf also, e.g., M 1l, 125, 19f.; SU5, 370, 11-16 and 349 f.; and the references in the following notes. Note, however, that the expression sifatun* mutaqqa is not restricted simply to predicates "derived" from and referring to actions performed by the one of whom they are predicated; cf. n. 68. The expression sifatu* l-fi'l (sifatu* l-'af'âl)common in the A'arite textsis found only infrequently in the Mu'tazilite texts (e.g., M 6/2, 147, 7). 63. Cf. Tad, 74rº 1. 64. Cf., e.g., M 7, 48, 7 ff. and 157 f.; 8, 35, 10 ff. and 233, 9-21; SUS, 349 ff.; Muh*, 190 1 ff.; and Tad, 66rº ff. as well as the references in the following notes. For the general question, n.b. Tad, 73vº-78vº, where the opinions of a number of authorities in the
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school from al-Gubba'i on are discussed as well as the philologians' notion of derivation (itiqâq). For the grammarians' derivation of verbal nouns and adjectives, cf., e.g., al-Muqtadab * 3, 185, 4, 299 and 335 ff. and Sîbawayh 1, 15. The restriction of the philologianas' concern to the derivation of words as words is made particularly clear in az-Zaggagi* al-idah*, 57 f. According to some classifications of nouns (viz., of nominal forms: 'agnas* al-'asmâ), however, the philologians do distinguish a class of "derived nouns" ('asmâ' mutaqqa, i.e., derived from verbs) that corresponds in some respects to that of the "derived predicates" we are here considering; cf., e.g., Ibn Fâris, 86 ff. 65.M 7, 157, 15 f.: 'inna wasfa* l-'âlimi bi-'annahû 'âlimun laysa bi-mutaqqin mina l-'ilmi l-battata; wa-'innama yufîdu htisasahu* bihalin* yufâriqu bihâ gayrahu* mina l-gumal* n.b. also Muh*, 190 1 ff. (where read 'âlim for 'lmm in line 3 and tariquhu* for tariqah* in line 5). 66. Regarding the ontological status of the state, it should be kept in mind that, in the case of the corporeal knower, it is the state as an ontologically real qualification of the being of the composite totality (gumla*) which is knowing, not the accident inherent in a part of it, that is the effective ground (al-mu'attir*) of his act's being well wrought, as also it is his being qâdir, not the separate inherent qudar, that is the effective ground of the existence of the act. 67. Cf. SU5, 207, 16-19: law kâna 'l-'âlimu' mutaqqan mina l-'ilmi la-wagaba* 'an yasbiqa i-'ilmu bil-mutaqqi minhû 'alà i-'ilmi bilmutaqqi, kamâ fâ d-daribi*, fa'innahú li-mâ kâna mutaqqan mina d-darbi*, yasbiqu l-'ilmu bil-mutaqqi minhû 'alà l-'ilmi bil-mutaqqi, hatta* lam na'lam wuqû'a (d-darbi* min qibalihî, lam na'lamhû dariban*. Cf. also M 7, 157 f.; 14, 47 f.; and Muh*, 337, 1 ff., 306, 14 ff., and 188 f. (where there is apparently something missing between al-'a'rad* and kawnuhû in 188, ult.); and n.b. Tad, 168rº 10-13. Regarding the question of the validity of the application of the name to one who will perform the act and of the relation of time generally in the application of the "name," since the Arabic participle does not express time relationship, see Tad, 74rº 9 ff. 68. Cf., e.g., M 5, 211, 9 f.; 11, 177 (cited Ch. 7, n. 25); and 6/1, 52, 15-17 (cited in 45).>
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Chapter 7 Attributes And Characteristics That Are Grounded Neither In The "Essence," Nor In An Entitative Accident We have thus far examined four categories of attributes: the Attribute of the Essence, which is absolute in its givenness as the thing's being its self in the fullness of its identity with itself, and three categories of attributes and characteristics whose actuality and predicability of the thing whose being they qualify and distinguish are contingent and which, accordingly, are divided in terms of the grounds to which their actuality is to be ascribed: to the essence of the thing-itself (given its existence), to the existence of an entitative accident, or to the action or will of the agent who caused the thing-itself to exist. The question of ascribing or assigning grounds (at-ta'lîl) has come up in several contexts as it has occurred in a number of the texts that we have cited or discussed and it will be convenient here, before examining this last category of attributes and predications, to clarify what the masters of the Basrian Mu'tazila mean by "assigning grounds" or "stating the cause" (ta'lîl) and how the term 'illa is understood in this context. Here again, as with so many of the specialized terms and expressions, the usage of the Mu'tazilite writers does not coincide with that of the A'arites. The term 'illa, so far as concerns our present inquiry, means fundamentally and originally "reason": the reason for some particular state of affairs, the motive for which one acts, or the "cause" of an event or situation. 1 Thus the term is used by the authors with whom we are presently concerned sometimes loosely to mean simply the reason or explanation that may be given for something.2 Most strictly, however, it is used only of attributes and characteristics to denote the cause or ground of their
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actuality. 3 Properly speaking, then, "the 'illa is no more than that given which the characteristic is given and in the absence of which the characteristic is also absent."4 The use of the term 'illa, sc., 'al-'illatu l-mugiba'*, to designate an entitative cause (i.e., the accident) originally as the "reason" for the validity of the predication and thereafter as the ground or determinant of the actuality of the state or characteristic that arises from it (sadara* 'anhâ), we have noted already in a number of places. This is far and away the most frequent use of the term. The expression 'ta'lîl' "to state the 'illa": the reason or cause of the actuality of an attribute or characteristicis, however, commonly used in a broader sense, one, that is to say, which is not chiefly restricted to attributes and characteristics that arise from the existence of accidents (i.e., that are li-'illatin or li-ma'nan as it is most often put). One speaks of giving the "essence" as the ground of the [essential] attribute (ta'lîlu s-sifati* bin-nafs)5 or of 'assigning the ground' of an act's being morally bad.6 Thus too one may give an attribute as the ground of a characteristic (yu'allalu l-hukmu* bi-sifatin*), as the essential attribute is grounded in the Attribute of the Essence, or as, for example, the actual possibility of the realization of an autonomous act on the part of one individual and not on the part of another is grounded in the one's being qâdir and the other's not, because "the occurrence of the difference between the two must be by virtue of an attribute [that qualifies the being of the one and not the other], the expression (al-'ibâra) for which is 'his being qâdir'.'' 7 Again, as we have seen, the haw' of a thing rather than its gins* is in some instances to be taken as the basis of certain of its characteristics, so that we may speak of at-ta'lîlu bin-naw'i wal-qabîl, when they are common to the various 'agnas* that belong to the haw', as, for example, the perdurance of colors (sihhatu* l-baqâ'i 'alayhâ) or, in the case of qudra, that it can function only by employing its substrate and that all qudar, though they differ from one another (ihtalafat*), are equivalent in the range of objects whose being may be effected by them.8 One may also speak of "giving the cause" or reason (ta'lîl), not in the strict sense of identifying a single "cause" ('illa) that, of itself, necessitates (tugib*) the actuality of a given attribute or characteristic, but simply "by way of explanation" ('alô waghi* l-kafi wal-bayân). Thus one may know and explain that God will not do what is morally bad (al-qabih*) on the grounds that He knows it to be bad and because He is totally self-sufficient (gani* = ) and so can neither gain by doing any act nor suffer diminution by its omission. Here one cannot give a single cause by virtue of which this characteristic is necessary ('alà waghi* l-'igab*), but rather he understands and explains the fact or characteristic in terms of two factors (bi-'amrayn).9 Again one can know and explain our act's need
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for and dependence upon us (ihtiyagu * tasarrufina* 'ilaynâ) in terms of its coming to be (hudutuhu*), but, strictly speaking, its coming to be and existence is not a cause or ground of this need.10 A number of characteristics and attributes, on the other hand, allow of no ta'lil in the strict sense. As we have seen, it is impossible to indicate any ground for the Attribute of the Essence.11 An accident's being inherent in its substrate is, according to abû Hâim and his followers, not subject to ta'lîl, because it is not, properly speaking, an attribute at all, but rather a mode (kayfîya) of an attribute (sc., existence) and has no ground distinct from that of the attribute of which it is the mode.12 Ibn Mattawayh notes: It is stated in several places in the work of abû Hâim that [the accident] inheres in its substrate because of its coming to be, but he does not intend thereby to assign a cause in the strict sense but means only that in its coming to be it has in fact this characteristic.13
Again, that an accident cannot inhere in a substrate other than that in which it does inhere is a fact or characteristic for which no strict "cause" can be assigned; it is, in fact, an essentially negative characteristic and, as such, cannot be subject to ta'lîl.14 The category of attributes with which we are presently concerned, viz., those attributes that are ascribed "neither to the 'essence' of the thing, nor to an entitative accident" presents a number of difficulties not encountered in the four classes of attributes we have treated thus far. The Mu'tazilite sources mention explicitly only an exiguous number of predicates or attributes as belonging to this category and those that are mentioned explicitly represent predicates of quite disparate kinds, not all of which are fully explained in terms of their being so categorized. Consequently one cannot, for the present, at least, be sure of the criteria for an attribute's being included hereat least not for the doctrine of abû Hâtim and his followersand cannot tell what other attributes, not specifically designated as such, are to be included. Again, the A'arite reports, which are often incomplete and not always exact or consistent, are at variance with the evidence given by the Mu'tazilite texts. Further, the lists of attributes to be included here that one may compile from the two sources do not coincide and may not be fully coherent with one another. Some large part of the problem would appear to arise because the A'arite sources report chiefly the teaching of al-Gubba'i*, while the Mu'tazilite sources deal only with the conception of the category by abû Hâim and his successors. Because of the paucity of evidence, then, and the difficulty of its interpretation, it is advisable to begin with an examination of al-Gubba'i's* conception of the category as it is presented in the A'arite
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reports, especially as this may shed some light on the origins of the category as such. That al-Gubba'i * recognized a category of terms that are predicated of a thing neither as of its "essence," nor of an entitative accident (or cause) is clear enough, though it is not certain whether it was he who first introduced it into the teaching of the Basrian Mu'tazila. As alGubba'i's* understanding and analysis of the predicates (sifat*) differs from that of abû Hâim, so also his classification of them is differently conceived from that of the later school. For al-Gubba'i*, as we have seen, the predications we make of beings are classed or categorized in terms of their implicit reference, i.e., of the entity whose reality in being is asserted (mutbat*) in the descriptive term (wasf*, sifa*) and whose actuality in being is the basis for the truth of the proposition when the words are used in their strict sense (fî l-haqiqa*). To say, then, that a predicate (sifa*) is lâ lin-nafsi wa-lâ li-'illa is to say that the term neither names nor describes the thing itself in its own proper essence, nor refers to another entity ('illa)15 whose specific relationship to the being that is referred to in the subject of the proposition (the "first subject") is asserted as the basis of the predication (wasf*, sifa*). According to al-Guwayni* and al-Ansari*, al-Gubba'i* held that a thing's being one (wahid*) is an attribute that is predicated of it neither by virtue of its essence (dat*), nor by virtue of an entitative accident.16 Al-Guwayni* explains that al-Gubba'i* took this position because according to his teaching things that share an essential attribute must be similar (mutamatila*) and consequently if two beings, e.g., God and the atom, have both the attribute of being one (i.e., of being indivisible and without parts) as an essential attribute, they must be similar in essence.17 On this basis, then, the category will, in the system of al-Gubba'i* anyhow, include all predicates which, as predicated of a thing, refer somehow to the thing itself but do not name or describe the particular "self" or "essence"' (nafs) as such, since they are similarly predicated of a plurality of essentially diverse beings. The terms 'knowing,' 'living,' etc., thus, though they indicate essential attributes in God and are predicated also of various creatures, will not be included, since, while as predicated of God, according to al-Gubba'i's* analysis, they refer simply to His "essence," as predicated of creatures they refer to an inherent, entitative accident.18 Such a principle, at any rate, seems to be consistent with and applicable to the other predicates that al-Gubba'i* is reported to have included in this category. AlGuwayni* says, for example, that Al-Gubba'i* held that likes (mitlan*) are those things that are equivalent (yastawiyân) in their essential attribute. This is based on a principle of his concerning attributes, viz., his assertion that attributes
Page 152 which are not affirmed on the basis of entitative accidents (ma'ânî) are divided into the attribute which is said to be the essential attribute (sifatu * n-nafs) and the attribute which is said to be affirmed neither by virtue of the 'essence,' nor by virtue of the entitative accident. The essential attribute of black is its being black (kawnuhû sawâdan), but its being a color or an accident ('arad*) or a thing (ay') < among the attributes that are present lâ lin-nafsi wa-lâ lilma'nà.19
Here again, though the kind of attribution that is made in predicating these nouns is quite different from that which is made in saying that a thing is one, we have to do with predicates that indicate the thing itself but do not name or describe its "essence" as such and so are used of different beings.20 A1-A'arî tells us that al-Gubba'i* held that motion belongs to the body in which it inheres "neither by virtue of its essence, nor by virtue of an entitative accident."21 The criteria for this attribute's being so classed can be taken to be the same as in the preceding cases: if an accident's inherence in its substrate were an essential attribute, then all accidents that inhere in the same substrate would be similar; motion would be identical with rest, etc. One notes that the reasoning here cannot involve dissimilar and contrary motions, since, in al-Gubbâ'î's teaching, the accident of motion is an essential entity and all motion is essentially similar. Dissimilar and contrary motions, thus, cannot differ by their essences (li-'anfusihâ), according to his analysis, but rather must differ "neither by their essences, nor by an entitative cause other than they,"22 for if they differed essentially, they would not all be motions. Thus the criterion for an attribute's inclusion in the present category remains constant. Another report, however, has it that, for al-Gubba'i*, an accident inhere in its substrate "by virtue of its existence" (li-wutgudihi*).23 That is to say, the affirmation of the predicate "inhering" (hall*) is, in his analysis, an assertion ('itbat*) of the existence of a particular accident and its existence is, in some sense, the ground of its being inherent in the particular substrate. This report of Ibn Mattawayh does notneed notexclude the attribute's being classed as lâ lin-nafsi wa-lâ li 'illa; it does not, that is to say, necessarily indicate another category of attributes and that al-Gubba'i* at one time or another expressed differing views concerning the classification of this attribute, but is, rather, likely an explanation of the particular predicate, like the analysis of the sense of wahid* and of the terms that denote general domains and classes of beings (ay', 'arad*, etc.), which we have already seen. Again, that a thing be contingent and temporal in its being (muhdat*) is
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also taken to be an attribute that belongs to it neither by its "essence," nor by virtue of an entitative accident. 24 and one may apply the same criterion for its being so classed as in the other cases. Analogously to an accident's being inherent in its substrate, he says, furthermore, that a thing is contingent (muhdat*) "because of its coming to be" (li-hudutihi*) and "because its 'self' (or 'essence') has a temporal beginning of its existence" (li'annahû haditu* nafsihî).25 The predicate 'muhdat*,' therefore, refers properly not to the essence of the thing as such and in itself, but to its having come to be. It would seem, thus, that al-Gubba'i* grouped under the heading lâ lin-nafsi wa-lâ li-'illa a number of disparate "attributes" or, more properly, predicates (sifat*, taking the word in its original sense). All, however, in some way refer to the thing itself of which they are predicated and are predicated similarly of a plurality of disparate entities. Some denote some quality of a thing's being, such as its contingency, its unity, its inherence in a substrate, and refer properly to some other attribute (coming to be, existence, indivisibility), while the rest are predicated as denoting some more or less broadly defined domain of beings to which it may be considered as belonging and which we distinguish and name by the particular expression. None are such as al-Gubba'i's* successors in the later period would consider true attributes or, more properly speaking, states ('ahwal*) and none would allow of ta'lâlof being assigned a groundin the strict sense noted earlier. The situation in regard to the attributes that abû Hâûim and his followers class under this heading is somewhat more complex and, despite the far greater abundance of information concerning their thought generally, the list of attributes which are explicitly mentioned as lâ linnafsi wa-lâ li-'illa is more restricted than it is for al-Gubba'i*. What one sees, in effect, is that the name of the category is retained from alGubba'i*, but its meaning undergoes a modification in accordance with abû Hâim's revision of the system as a whole. The most commonly cited example of this category of attributes is that of the perceptive's being perceiving (kawnu l-mudriki mudrikan).27 Following al-Gubba'i* abû Hâim and his successors in the school of Basra distinguish two senses of a thing's being "perceiving" (kawnuhû mudrikan), viz., its being actually capable of perception (sihhatu* l-'idrâk) and its being actually perceiving the perceptible.27 Where, however, al-Gubba'i* had taught that to be actually Perceiving is an essential attribute (lin-nafs) in God28 and that in the corporeal being it is an attribute that arises from the presence of an entitative accident (li-ma'nà), viz., the act of Perceiving (al-'idrâk),29 abû Hâûim and his followers hold, on the contrary, that in the one case as in the other it is a state or attribute whose
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actuality is grounded in the being's being alive (kawnuhû hayyan *) on the condition of the existence of the perceptible (bi-sarti* wugudi* lmudrak)30 and so is neither li-'illa (lil-ma`nà) nor lin-nafs. The account of perception found in the texts is rendered somewhat complicated by the authors' desire to maintain the univocity of the expression 'to be perceiving' while explaining, at the same time, how the corporeal being and how God, the incorporeal, can be said truly and strictly to perceive the perceptible, e.g., to be hearing and seeing. It will be appropriate, therefore, to offer here a brief outline of the analysis found in the texts, one that will at least set out the basic terms and elements and show how the attribute falls under this fifth category of attribute. According to abû Hâim and his followers, perception (al-'idrâk) is the direct apprehension (tanàwul: "receiving, taking possession") of the perceptible (al-mudrak, viz., of the atom or of one of the seven types of perceptible accidents) as such.31 To be perceiving is not a form of knowing but is, rather, a distinct attribute or state whose peculiarity and distinctiveness is given to intuition in the immediate experience of one's own states.32 It is a means or way of achieving knowing (tariqun* lil-`ilm) and as such is distinct from knowing,33 as also it is distinguished from knowing in that while the latter is related to all beings whatsoever in all the various aspects of their being ('alà sâ'iri lwuguhi* l-latî tahsulu* `alayhâ), perception grasps only what may be perceived and in a particular aspect (`alà waghin* mahsus*).34 As we have noted in several places, to be perceptive, i.e., actually capable of perception and sensation, is one of the distinguishing characteristics of the living (min 'ahassi* 'ahkami* l-hayati*); the actual possibility of perception belongs to the living as such.35 In the case of the corporeal perceiver, since it is living by virtue of the inherence of the accident of life in each of the atoms of which the living totality is composed, perception is associated with sensation (al-'ihsas*), which belongs to the living substrate (mahallu* l-hayâti) that is its locus. Because of the differences of the natures of the various perceptibles, some of them are perceived only through an organ ('âla)i.e., [the organ of] sense (al-hassa*)especially adapted by its structure (binya) to receive the specific perceptible.36 Sensation, thus, is identified with the functioning of the particular sense: the role or operation of the specific, living substrate in its being the locus of the particular sensation. That the living be perceiving (kawnuhû mudrikan), however, is not simply identified with the physical functioning of the organ or substrate, i.e., with sensation, since the latter belongs to the substrate as such and the attribute of being perceiving is a state that qualifies the living totality (al-gumla*) as such.37 Sensation, rather, may be considered as "a means to perception" (tariqun* lil-'idrâk) in that
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the senses (al-hawass *) are, as it were, "(physical) causes and precursors" ('asbâbun wa-muqaddimâtun) of perception.38 The one who is sensing, thus, is defined as 'he who is perceiving through a sense' ('al-muhissu* = 'al-mudriku bi-hassa*').39 Thus the Basrians distinguish expressions that strictly denote the physical operation of the substrate as a "means to perception"e.g., lams (touching, feeling), amm (smelling, i.e., the contact of the sensible with the cartilage of the nose), nazar* (looking), and the likefrom those that denote perception properly speaking, as when one says of a being that it is seeing (râ'î, mubsir*) or hearing (sâmi`).40 The living as such and by definition is capable of perception and the living substrate of functioning as the locus of sensation; although for this reason the living may, insofar as it is living, be termed `hearing' (samî') i.e., capable of perceiving the audibleor `seeing' (basir*)i.e., capable of perceiving the visibleit has nevertheless, in its being living, no attribute over and above its being living (sifatun zâ'idatun 'alà kawnihî hayyan*),41 for the attribute of life, the state of being living, is not, as such and in itself, correlated to anything. That is, it is not an attribute whose nature is to be correlated to some object, as are knowing, willing, and the like.42 Now perception, according to abû Hâim and his followers, cannot be an entitative accident, because if it were, its presence would, alone and of itself, be the sufficient ground for the actuality of one's being perceiving apart from any extrinsic condition; given the existence of the accident, that is, one could truly Perceive something even though it were not present or, indeed, did not exist, just as one may know what is absent or nonexistent. In fact, however, our experience indicates that the act of perception is strictly correlated to and associated with the immediate presence of the Perceptible object, and it is this form of apprehension, not some merely interior act, that is denoted by the expression 'idrâk.43 Life, therefore, does not constitute the actuality of the possibility of Perception in the same way that it does that of knowing, for example, i.e., the possibility of the inherence of an entitative accident. To be living, rather, is itself the immediate possibility of perceiving, and it is the state of being living that is the effective ground (al-mu'attir*) which entails (iqtada*) the actuality of the living's being perceiving given the fulfillment of the requisite conditions, viz., the existence of the perceptible and, in the case of the corporeal perceiver, the soundness of the sense organ (sihhatu* l-hassa*) and the absence of any impediment.44 That is to say, the direct apprehension of the perceptible requires the physically mediated presence of the perceptible in the case of the corporeal perceiver, because perception is mediated by sensation. In the case of the incorporeal (sc., of God), however, it requires only the existence of the perceptible, since the condition of the perceptible's perceptibility is, on its part, no more than its
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existence in that it is perceived as such in its essential attribute and existence is the sole condition for the actuality (husul *) and the manifestation (zuhur*) of a being's essential attributes. The existence of the perceptible and its presence to sense cannot, however, be the effective ground of the perceiver's perceiving. This is true whether one has to do with God, whose being living is an essential attribute, or with the corporeal, whose being living is grounded in the presence of an entitative accident, for in both instances the perceptible that is perceived is a being which, in its existence as in its other various attributes and characteristics (including that wherein it is perceived) is altogether separate and extrinsic to the perceiver as such.45 Nor, again, can the sense organ and its soundness and functioning be the effective ground of the actuality of the corporeal perceiver's being perceiving in that the soundness of the organ is a characteristic of the substrate and not of the composite totality.46 In the case of a thing's being perceiving we have to do with an attribute that is, in the strictest sense, a positive state (hal*) of the being that is so qualified and one for which a specific ground can be assigned (which is, properly speaking, mu`allala) in that its actuality is entailed (iqtada*) by the attribute of being living, given the requisite conditions. Of the other attributes that are explicitly mentioned as being predicated of a thing lâ lin-nafsi wa-lâ li-`illa, however, none represents a state properly speaking,47 and none, accordingly, is subject to ta`lil in the strict sense, even though one can, in each case, give an account of how it belongs to a thing to be described by the particular "attribute" or predicate. Thus, for example, `Abd al-Gabbar* says that an existent's being temporal (muhdat*) is an attribute that belongs to it neither essentially, nor by virtue of an entitative accident.48 In this instance, we have to do not with an attribute or state properly speaking but rather with the mode of an attribute (kayfîyatun fî sifa*), sc., the mode of the thing's being existent, for which, therefore, no distinct ground can be assigned. Of the attributes explicitly designated in the Mu`tazilite sources as belonging to this category, I have found only these two, i.e., perception and the temporality of the being of the contingent existent, are reckoned as positive attributes, all others being understood simply as negative predications. A thing is properly and strictly (fî l-haqiqa*) said to be one (wahid*) according to abû Hâim and his followers, in two senses: 1) that it is or is considered to be a single, undivided unit, and 2) that it is unique in some respect.49 The first, then, is said of two kinds of things, viz., those which are in fact individuals and without parts, such as the single atom or a single unit of an accident (guz'un* mina l-gawhari* 'awil`arad*) or as God is one and indivisible,50 and, according to abû Hâim, those composite wholes that, as such in the predicates that are said of them as
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wholes, are unitary wholes which, considered in terms of these attributes, are without parts, as for example, a composite number or a living individual. According to some authorities, however, the use of the expression 'wahid *' in the latter sense is only an extended use of the term (tawassu`an). Abû Hâim, however, is cited as saying that the use is strict (haqiqa*), for even though a human individual is a composite totality (gumla*), he is necessarily undivided and without parts insofar as he is a man; the name is not used of the parts.51 This he explains by saying that what is meant by the expression (sc., 'wahid*') is the same in both cases [viz., when used of the atom or of a single unit of an accident and when used of a man]; that is, the thing is one in the attribute by which it is described and is not divisible (lâ yanqasim) in this attribute, even though it may be divisible in another.52
Though the expression 'wahid*' is verbally positive (lafzu* 'itbat*), abû Hâim and his successors consider it to be, in this use, viz., as when we say that a thing is numerically one ('annahû wahidun* fî bâbi l-`adad), conceptually negative (yufîdu n-nafy), since semantically what is indicated is that the thing "is undivided and without parts" (lâ yatagazza'u* wa-lâ yataba"adu*). Abû Hâim says, again, that it belongs to God to be described as one, là lin-nafsi wa-lâ li-`illa. It is clear from 'Abd al-Gabbar's* reports, however, that abû Hâim did not explicitly join these two theses.53 The Qadi*, by contrast, holds that a thing is said to be one lâ lin-nafsi wa-lâ li-`illa because the term is negative, for in his view all predications that imply a negation are, as such, predicated of a thing "neither essentially, nor by virtue of an entitative accident," and no cause or ground, in the strict sense, can be assigned for any negative predication. As negative, thus, the predicate `wahid*' cannot signify His being specifically characterized by an attribute or a characteristic such that an ontological ground can be validly assigned for it, but rather it is, in its sense, analogous to the other negations for which we hold that grounds cannot be assigned, as for example in the statements that a motion cannot exist in other than its own substrate, that a thing is other than another, that an act cannot be realized through a unit of qudra at the first instant of its existence, and the like.54
The second strict use (haqiqa*) of the term 'wahid*' recognized by the masters of the Basrian Mu`tazila is that of "unique," i.e., that an individual, for example, is said to be "one" "when he is unique in certain attributes (infarada bi-sifatin*) that belong to him but not to others." Thus one says of a man that he "is unique in his epoch or unique in his
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time" and of God that "He is unique in being eternal (al-qidam) or in His deserving worship (al-'ilâhîya), 55 and in all of His essential attributes" in that they are essential attributes in no other being.56 That God is one in this sense, to the extent that the predication has reference to His essential attributes, may be considered as an essential attribute, even though, insofar as one understands that no other being shares these as essential attributes, there is an implicit negation which cannot be predicated of Him essentially.57 In contrast to abû Hâim, `Abd al-Gabbar* understands the sense of `one' as predicated of a composite whole to be in this latter sense rather than in the sense of what is one as being undivided and without parts. We describe a man as being one individual, he says, "because the composite whole, not the parts, is specifically characterized in being a man."58 According to this analysis, the reality of the parts is implicit in the use of the term that denotes the whole,59 e.g., in the word `man' (defined, as we have seen, as a corporeal body having a particular structure and configuration), and when the individual, then, is said to be `one,' the reference is to those attributes "in which no part shares or in which he has no parts at all."60 Like the predication `one,' the term gani* (self-sufficient: Basrians
), too, is positive in the form of expression but, in the analysis of the
its strict sense is the denial of need (haga*) on the part of one who is specifically characterized by a state [viz., life] having which need and self-sufficiency are actually possible. It indicates the negation of that whose affirmation is implied by `need.'61
Since the analysis, thus, of what is meant when we say that God is gani* shows that the concept is negative, it cannot be an essential attribute (for it is not, strictly speaking, an attribute at all)62 and must be lâ lin-nafsi wa-lâ li-`illa. The other attributes that the sources class in this category are more plainly negative. `Abd al-Gabbar* says: Our saying of a thing that it is other (gayr*) than another is, strictly understood, founded in a negation and predicates that are implicitly negative belong to a thing neither by virtue of an entitative accident, nor essentially, but rather denote only particular characteristics and no more.63
The statement here that negative predications "signify only particular characteristics and no more" ('innamâ yufîdu 'ahkaman* mahsusatan* fa-qat*) appears to be contrary to what he had to say in another context (al-Mugni* 4, 246) that was cited earlier, viz., that negative predicates such
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as 'one,' 'other,' and the like, do not denote a state or characteristic (hal * or hukm*). It may be that he views gayr*, like wahid* (in the sense of 'unique'), from two perspectives (his analysis of the two is somewhat parallel), but it is most likely that here he does not take hukm* strictly as the manifest characteristic of an attribute but uses it rather, as is frequently the case with hukm* and with sifa/wasf*, simply as ''predication" or what is said of something, a semantically meaningful predicate which, however, does not denote a state of the being of that of which it is predicated, nor the mode or characteristic of a true state or attribute.64 In discussing the notion of otherness (al-gayriya*)65 the Qadi* in several places employs simply the common lexical definition of the term: "For any two objects mentioned, the one of which is distinguished from the other by an expression that refers to it in particular, each must be other than the other." 66 This definition, however, does no more than describe how the word is employed in common usage and is used by 'Abd al-Gabbar* only when he wishes to distinguish 'part' (ba'd*) from 'other' (gayr*), to insist that the part, as included in and belonging to the whole, is not strictly said to be other than the whole, since "whatever is not implicitly included in the thing referred to [i.e., as designated by the particular expression] is other than it and what is implicitly included in it is a part of it."67 It does not, that is to say, give a philosophical description or definition of the concept. This he formulates in the following manner: Whatever object (mawsuf*) is known to be specifically qualified (yuhtass*) by any characteristic or attribute by which the other is not specifically qualified, or if it is possible that this be true of them, then each of the two is other than the other.68
Conceived thus, however, no attribute is designated by the predicate 'other' but only the negation: 'this is not that.' Though not explicitly so designated in the Mu'tazilite texts, the attribute or predicate of "difference" or dissimilarity (al-ihtilaf*) must also be classed as lâ lin-nafsi wa-lâ li-'illa, for two things are said to be different and unlike that do not share the same essential attribute, so that, in the formulation of abû Hâim, "otherness is implicit in difference" (tahta* l-ihtilafi* l-gayriyatu*).69 Similarly, where al-Gubba'i*, abû Hâim, and abû 'Abdallâh held that unawareness (as-sahw) is an entitative accident and a contrary of knowing and conviction (i'tiqâd), etc.,70 Ibn 'Ayyâ and the later masters of the school, 'Abd al-Gabbar*, abû Raîd, and Ibn Mattawayh, hold that it is simply a negative predicate; that is, it is no more than the absence (zawâl) of awareness and knowing (or of conviction, opinion, or doubt)
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concerning something that normally one would be aware of and know. 71 It is not, therefore, a true attribute or state but the term 'being unawares' (kawnuhû sâhiyan) refers, rather, to no more than the absence of the recollection of something. That is to say, whereas in the case of knowing, of perceiving, or of willing, one has the immediate experience of being in a distinct state, one's being sâhî is known, experienced, and recognized in one's self only in the failure to recollect an event.72 That the living being be 'agiz*, i.e., that it lack the autonomous power to realize some act and so be unable to perform it (as opposed to its being prevented: mamnuû`), is an attribute whose treatment by the masters of the Basrian Mu'tazila develops along lines analogous to that of the conception of sahw. Al-'agz* is considered to be an entitative accident by al-Gubba'i* abû 'Abdallâh, although abû Hâim, in his later period, in his Naqd* al-'abwâb, came to express uncertainty as to its nature. Abû 'Abdallâh, however, insisted that a person's being 'agiz* is a true state (hal*) that qualifies his being and on this basis argued that the ground must be a distinct accident.73 'Abd al-Gabbar*, however, followed by abû Raîd and Ibn Mattawayh, holds that no proper state is denoted or understood by our saying of a person that he is 'agiz*, but rather only that he has ceased to be qualified by the state of being qâdir (huruguhu* 'ammâkâna 'alayhî 'inda kawnihî qâdiran), wherefore there can be no ground of the thing's being so, neither an entitative accident, nor the essence of the thing-itself.74 In the evolution of the school's understanding of these predicates, one sees another example of the tendency, evident already in the work of al-Gubba'i*, systematically to reduce the number of attributes that are recognized as real and distinct states or characteristics of beings and, more especially, to reduce the number of entitative accidents that are assigned as the ground and basis of predicates that are said of things. With 'Abd al-Gabbar* and the later authorities it becomes a principle that whenever a given predicate can be understood in terms of the nonactuality of some particular attribute, one should not affirm it as asserting the presence of a distinct and separate state or characteristic, having its own ground, nor should an accident be affirmed when a given characteristic can be understood in terms of the nonpresence of some particular accident.75 In the discussion of the attributes and predicates that are classed within this category one notes again, most conspicuously perhaps in the case of wahid* or gani*, the tendency to rely on an explicit semantic analysis of the terms. In this respect as in all others, the conception and classification of these attributes follow integrally the basic principles and methodology that guided the teaching of the school and typified it from the beginning. One examines, within and against the general framework of the
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metaphysical assumptions of what are entitative beings and what their natures and relationships, the sense of the predications we make of them: what meaning is indicated and conveyed ('afâda) by the words, what the mind really grasps ('aqala) of the thing and expresses in the particular predication. The fundamental concepts signified by the terms are given or are derived from an examination of and reflection on the beings that make up the phenomenal, material world and are so more or less directly available to our understanding (a-âhid) and the validity and significance of their predicability of the transcendent that is not directly available to examination (al-ga'ib *) is then judged in a further inquiry. The paramount role of semantics and grammar in al-Gubba'i's* discussion and classification of the attributes is fully evident, as we have seen in several places. Having no adequate way, within the conceptual structure of his system, to treat the attributes as such, i.e., to understand them and to talk about them formally within the structure of the system as ontologically real properties and qualities of entities and as having their own distinguishing characteristics, he examines them almost exclusively as predicates in terms of what they refer to, i.e., of what being is, explicitly or implicitly, denoted or referred to in the predicate when a given noun or adjective is predicated as a description (sifa*) of a subject (mawsuf*). It is thus that he can take negative predications as being said of the thing essentially; that whose reality is asserted in the predicate is simply the thing-itself which is indicated in the subject, but since the predicate is negative and so some attribute denied, explicitly or implicitly, rather than affirmed, likeness or similarity is not implied when the predication is made univocally of different and disparate beings. For him, then, the category of attributes that belong to the thing lâ lin-nafsi wa-lâ li-`illa is simply that of those which, as predicated of the thing, refer to and assert neither the thing as such (i.e., in its essential reality as viewed in terms of the peculiar characteristics or properties that belong to it and distinguish it specifically as such), nor any other essential entity whose existence can be understood as the ground or cause of the validity of the predication. They refer, rather, to some attribute of the thing (e.g., hudut*, wugud*, or hulul*) or to some property of its being (e.g., indivisibility), or designate a class of beings to which the thing may be assigned along with other, essentially different beings (e.g., lawn, 'arad*, ay'). For abû Hâim and the masters of the classical Period, the perspective alters in some significant respects as, while the basic double sense of the term 'sifa*' remains, the primary focus shifts definitively and towards an ontological conception. Amongst the many attributes that are predicated of beings, one distinguishes, among others, those that have reality and actuality as states ('ahwal*) of a thing's being, along with their modes and
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their characteristics, as well as those which, though not the characteristics of states, strictly and properly speaking, are nonetheless distinguishable characteristics or qualities as having which the thing comes to be and exists. All these are distinguished from those predications that signify, properly speaking, no attribute or characteristic of the thing of which they are predicated, since they are "derived" (mutaqqa) merely from the name for some act, or state of another, or are pure or quasi denominations ('alqâb), or are conceptually negative. Since within this framework one can and must deal with the states and characteristics as such and since the attribute's being predicated of the thing is viewed as asserting only the actuality of the state or that the thing in the actuality of its being is qualified or distinguished by the state or characteristic, the categories of the attributes are viewed chiefly in terms of the ontological grounds of the states and their actuality and of the various characteristics rather than in terms of what entity is understood to be asserted in a more narrowly grammatical and linguistic analysis of the predicate of the proposition in which the thing-itself is described by the predicate. The proposition, that is, in which the attribute is said of the thing is viewed as asserting only that the being of the thing is specifically qualified by the attribute or characteristic (or that it has the particular property), since what is grasped initially and primarily by the mind (save in the case of the perceptible accidents) and is then expressed in the predication, is the being of the thing-itself as qualified by the particular state or as manifesting the particular characteristic. The ground of the attribute (or its lack of one in the formal sense) is not viewed as directly asserted in the predication but as something that must be determined in a separate inquiry. Accordingly, the classification of the attributes can no longer be viewed as primarily given simply in the analysis and paraphrase of the propositions and their predicatesand so as primarily a classification of kinds of predicationsbut must be understood in terms of the ta'lîl that is or is not possible in the particular instance. This shift of perspective necesarily has an effect also on the category of those attributes that belong to a thing lâ lin-nafsi wa-lâ li-illa, even though it remains, as it was for al-Gubba'i *, a kind of general category for a variety of attributes and predicates that do not fall under the other categories. A thing's being perceiving (kawnûl-hayyi* mudrikan), which is a state in the strict sense, is included, since when the ground of its actuality is determined, it proves to be that of another state (viz., the thing's being living); it is, thus, grounded "neither in its essence, nor in an entitative accident" (nor can it be ascribed to the act of an agent). As for the other attributes that are classed under this category, none, as understood within conceptual framework of the system, is a state or the characteristic of a state or a characteristic qualified by which the thing
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comes to actuality (hasala * 'alayhî), and none, therefore, can be ascribed to a ground in the strict sense. Accordingly, then, if one excludes the single exception of perception, the category is that of attributes or predicates that are not subject to ta'lîl in the formal sense.76 In the case of "the existent's being temporal in its being" one has to do with what is more strictly classified as the mode of an attribute and so is most properly examined and explained in terms of the state (sc., of existence, for which a strict ground can be assigned), though as a distinct predicate it must be classed here as was done by al-Gubba'i*. All the other predicates that the texts explicitly mention as to be included in this category are, whether or not in the explicit form of expression, negative and so do not denote attributes or characteristics at all. In that no ground can be assigned, they too belong within this category. The analysis of the "attribute," then, becomes an analysis of what is denied and how and so of what is affirmed, what fact or state of affairs concerning the being of which it is said is denoted or implied by the particular term. If some ta'lîl is required for a full and adequate understanding of the states and characteristics for which ontological grounds can be formally assigned within the terms of the system, Ibn Mattawayh suggests, then similarly in the case of negative predications and those which denote attributes for which no strict ta'lîl can be given, one must nevertheless give some account and explanation: some ta'lîlun 'alà waghi* l-kafi wad-dalâla, for the sense and validity of the predicate. It is because of this that the category is infrequently mentioned; it contains a diversity of attributes and in no case does an attribute's inclusion in this category in itself tell us anything much about its nature. Its nature may be discussed fully and at length without the classification's being mentioned at all and, indeed, may most appropriately be discussed in the context of another attribute, as in the case of the modes (kayfîyât) of states. In most cases, therefore, the classification of these attributes is rarely mentioned and in some, no doubt, not at all. Thus, although the inclusion of the "derived predicates" (as-sifatu* l-mutaqqa), discussed in the preceding chapter, in the class of attributes that belong to a thing "neither essentially, nor by virtue of an entitative accident" would be altogether consistent and plausible, in no place that I have noted are they said to be so classed. Notes to Chapter 7 1. On the terms generally, cf. J. van Ess, "The Logical Structure of Islamic Theology" in Logic in Classical Islamic Culture, pp. 35 ff. Thus the 'ilal in grammar are the rules and are the reasons that may be given to explain them and those that may be used to
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argue for the validity of the explanation; cf. al-idah *, 64 f. and see Dozy, Supplement* aux Dictionaires arabes, s.v. Cp. also Ibn `Aqîl, Kitâb al-Gadal* edited by G. Makdisi, BEO 30 (1967), §§50 f., 92, et alibi and on the general difference of the conception of the `ilal in law, grammar, and kalâm, cf. Ibn Ginni*, al-Hasa'is* 1, 144 ff. 2. Cf., e.g., M 6/2, 73, 11; 7, 123, 15; 11, 382, 2; 17, 15, 9; and ZS, 536, 2 f.; and for al-Gubba'i*, cf. Maq, 523, 4 ff. 3. Cf. Tad, 141vº 25 (cited in Ch. 4, n. 69) and ZS, 384, l1-15; cp. also ibid., 477, 9 f. 4. Cf. SU5, 303, 8 f.: ... li'anna l-'illata laysat bi-'aktara* min 'an yatbuta* l-hukmu* bi-tabatiha* wa-yazûla bi-zawâlihâ; in this passage read halahu* for halat-* at 302, 13 and ta`lîl for ta`lîq and bihî (with ms. S*) for `alayhî at 303, 9. The rendering here of `Abd alGabbar's* statement I have paraphrased slightly in order to avoid having to lay out the full context in which it occurs. The `illa here, in fact, involves two elements. On this, see n. 9. 5. Cf., e.g., M 4, 253, 11. 6. Cf., e.g., M 6/1, 54, 7-9. 7. Tad, 141vº 6 ff. (where insert yadullu before `alà in line 10); cf. also ZS, 481 ff. 8. Cf. Ch. 4, nn. 104-107 and 75 and concerning the question of taganusu* maqdûrâti l-qudar, cf. ZS, 373 ff., especially 380 ff. (where read al-qâdir [with the ms.] for al-qudar at 375, 2; fî [with the ms.] for min at 376, 7; omit fîhî at 380, 11; read mahd* for mahsus* at 381, 9; 'igad* for 'igab* at 383, 7; al-qudar for at-qudra at 383, 13; and 'illâ for fa'innahû at 383, 14); Mas, 129rº ff.; and Tad, 147vº ff (where read al-`ilal for 'lhll* at 148rº and insert wa- before li'anna in 148rº 14 [cf. Ch. 4, n. 77]). The thesis of the taganusu* maqdûrâti l-qudar requires no discussion here; it should be noted simply that the expression does not mean that all the objects of the accident of qudra (and thus the range of the autonomous causality of the created agent) are of one gins* but rather that any given unit of qudra, inherent in whatever part of the body, could by its nature be correlated to any of the classes ('agnas*) of objects to which another is correlated even though, in the concrete, their objects are restricted according to the several substrates of their inherence (the heart, forearm, etc.) and each, in fact, differs (tahtalif*) from every other; concerning the expression, thus, Ibn Mattawayh remarks that ma`nà hada* 'annahû lâ qudrata 'illâ wa-yasihhu* 'an yuf`ala bihâ mina l-'agnasi* mitlu* mâ sahha* bi-gayriha* (Tad, 147vº 16 f.). The thesis is several times referred to in the published writings of `Abd al-Gabbar* but nowhere discussed in detail (cf., e.g., Muh*, 183 f.; M 4, 333, 9 ff., where read yagib* for yahsib* in line 10; and 12, 119). 9. Cf., e.g., ZS, 382, 6-10 and SU5, 304 f.; that there can be no true ta`lil where two grounds are conjoined (since the mugib* must be one) cf. also Tad, 148rº 2-5 and ZS, 452, 5-7. Cf. also n. 4, and note the statement of Ibn Mattawayh, 'inna t-ta`lîlu wagibun* li-yahsula* l-`ilmu bil-hukmi* `alà tamâmin wa-kamâl ... wa-kullu mâ yamtani`u mina t-ta`lîli kanahwi* hululi* -ay'i fî mahallin* 'ilà gayri* dalika*, fa-''inna `adama t-ta`lîla lâ yu'attiru* fî l-`ilm (Tad, 141rº 6 ff.). 10. ZS 350, 12-17; cf. also ibid., 480 ff. On at-ta`lîlu `alà tariqati* l-istidlîli wal-kafi, cf. also ZS, 287, 13-15, translated in Ch. 3, n. 8. 11. Cf. Tad, 48vº 3-5 and the texts cited in Ch. 3, nn. 5, 7 and 8. 12. Cf. ZS, 478, 3-5, 384, 11-17, and Tad, 141vº 25 (cited Ch. 4, n. 69). 13. Tad, 48rº 24 f.: rubbamâ gara* fî kalâmihî 'annahû yahullu* hada* l-ma.halla* li-hudutihi*, wa-laysa ya`nî bihí t-ta`lîla fî lhaqiqati*, wa-'innamâ yurîdu 'an `inda hudutihi* yatbutu* lahû hada* l-hukmu. Al-Gubba'i* is reported to have held that the accident inheres in its substrate "because of its existence" (li-wugudihi*) (Tad, 48rº 28). Al-Gubba'i* classified predicates primarily in terms of their reference, implicit and explicit; the basic sense of the formula, thus, is that the predicate `hall*' refers to and
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asserts the fact of the accident's existence. (On al-hulul * as the accident's "mode" of existence, see Ch. 3.) The sense* in which a term can be taken, within the context of al-Gubba'l's* thought, to refer to existence is a problem which we cannot broach here. 14. Cf. Tad, 48rº 20 ff. and M 6/1, 54 8 f. Again here al-Gubba'i's* position differs from that of abû Hâim. Al-Gubba'i* held that the impossibility of the accident's in-hering in a substrate other than that in which it does inhere is lin-nafs, but Ibn Mattawayh adds that "this does not entail similarity" (at-tamatul*) in beings which share this attribute, since, according to him, similarity of gins* is entailed only when the attribute is positive (Tad, 48rº 28 f.). The full sense of his position requires elaboration in the context of a systematic study of his conception of the essential attributes. That negative attributes are not subject to ta`lîl, cf. also M 6/2, 18, 4 f. and 4, 245 f., and for a listing of other examples of attributes for which no strict "cause" can be given (e.g., that qudra precedes the act and that what concretely perdures perdures and that what does not does not), cf. ibid. and Tad, 157rº 14-19. 15. This broader use of `illa by al-Gubba'i*, common to the earlier kalâm, is largely abandoned by the later masters of the school. AlA`ar and his followers consistently prefer, in this usage, the synonym ma`nà, which, because of the way they classify the predicates (al-'asmâ'u was-sifat*), continues to serve also in this broader sense even into the twelfth century. 16. A-Sâmil, 349, 15-17 and Sarh* al-Irâd, 18vº ult. f. Note that al-Guwayni's* report (a-âmil, 349, lines 10 f.) of abû Hâim's position is essentially incomplete. 17. The A`arite sources do not explicate al-Gubba'i's* understanding of the sense of our saying of something that it is one. His analysis of how `one' is predicated of God `Abd al-Gabbar* cites in the following form: "Our master abû `Alî said: 'The Eternal is described as being one in three ways: 1) in the sense that He is indivisible and without parts (lâ yatagazza'u* wa-lâ yataba"adu); this is what is meant when one says of the atom that it is one. this way [of His being described as one] is not praise because all other entities ('asyâ') share this with Him. 2) In the sense that He is unique (mutafarrid) in being eternal, there being no second such being. 3) That He is unique in the attributes that belong to Him essentially, viz., His being essentially qâdir, His beign essentially knowing, and His being essentially living. . . In these latter two ways He is praised by our describing HIm as being one, since He is specifically so characterized and others are not';" (M 4, 241, 4-9; cf. also M 5, 245, 11f. and cp. Maq, 528, 14ff.). The present discussion concerns only the first sense. Concerning God's being praised only for the last two ways, cp. Muh*, 217, 3-8 and SU5, 277, 10-15 (where the three are reduced to two in accord with the analysis of abû Hâim) and cf. also the citation of `Abbâd b. Sulaymân (M 4, 241, 16ff. and Muh*, 217, 7), who holds that God cannot validly be described as one in the first sense. It should be noted that the Mu`tazilite sourcesat least as far as I have discovereddo not mention that al-Gubba'i* classed God's unity as an attribute that is lâ lin-nafsi wa-lâ li-ma`nà; they do not, in fact, mention his use of the category at all! Concerning, however, his teaching in regard to essential attributes and the similarity of beings that share them, cf. Tad, 48rº, cited in n. 14. Al-Gubba'i* classed the sifat* under a number of categories; since his thought changed rather considerably over the course of his career, the evidence of the sources is too complex to try to sort out here. 18. Al-Ansari* reports (Sarh* al-Irâd, 60rº 9-11,) that one of the disciples of al-Gubba'i* held that in God the predicates `living,' `qâdir,' and `knowing' belong to him lâ lin-nafsi wa-lâ li-ma`nà. Who it is, however, and on what basis he formulated this thesis, is not indicated, nor is any such position reported in the Mu'tazilite sources that I have examined.
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19. A-âmil, 292, 1l-16 (cf. also ibid., 310, 14 ff.). Lines 14 f. of the published text of the âmil (p. 292) are corrupt (the edition of H. Klopfer [Cairo, 1383/1963], p. 170, 1-5 follows the same text), though the sense is clear, and I have therefore, in rendering the passage, followed the wording of the Tehran University Central Library ms. no. 350 (fol. 74rº): ... yaz'amu 'anna s-sifati * l-latî lâ tutbatu* `ani la'ânî tanqasimu 'ilà sifatin* yuqâlu 'innahâ sifatu* n-nafsi wa-'ilà sifatin* yuqâlu 'innahâ tutbatu* lâ lin-nafsi wa-lâ lil-ma`nà [sic]; wasifatu* nafsi s-sawâdi kawnuhû sawâdan, fa'ammâ kawnuhû lawnan wa-`aradan* wa-ay'an áfa-ñmina s-sifati* l-latî tahaqqaqat* lâ linnafsi wa-lâ lil-ma`nà [sic]. This manuscript, though incomplete also, contains a goodly amount of material additional to those which served as the basis for al-Nashar's edition and that of Klopfer, including the first pages, some eight leaves, in which it is indicated that the work is a tahrir* on al-Bâqillânî's commentary (sarh*) on the K. al-Luma` of al-A`ari. The text, however, that underlies al-Guwayni's* work seems to represent a recension of the Luma` different from that published by Fr. McCarthy. I hope shortly to publish the additional material of the Tehran ms. along with a list of the significant variants between it and the published edition of the work and a brief introduction. The "opponent" in an argument set forth in Tam (§ 351, p. 207, 7 ff.) raises the question of attributes that are lâ lin-nafsi wa-lâ li-`illa and, among others, the predicates `color,' `accident,' and `thing' (entity) are also listed and the thesis that they belong to this category of predicates is supported by reasoning analogous to that suggested by al-Guwayni* (cited earlier) in regard to the attribute of unity (also listed in al-Bâqillânî's argument). Note, however, that al-Bâqillânî also lists a thing's being other (gayr*), an attribute that is not included in this category by al-Gubba'i*, though it is by abû Hâim and the later masters of the school; on this, see pp. 158 ff. 20. Al-Gubba'i* discusses (Maq, 161 f. and 522 ff.) a number of expressions that may and may not be predicated of the possible (i.e., the nonexistent possible); among them he says that those that are predicated of it "by its essence" (e.g., black or atom) must be said of it prior to its existence (161, 5 f. and 523, 1-3); certain others, such as those we are here considering, are predicated of the possible, he says, in the same way but by implication not necessarily. Terms such as `color' and the like, he says, are used to distinguish classes of entities (161, 10 f.) and so may predicated of the nonexistent Possible, while `ay'' (thing, being, entity) is predicated of something simply by virute of the fact that "it can be referred to and a predication made of it" (161, 10 f.), wherefore it too is predicable of the Possible. Such expressions do not, however, describe the thing as it is essentially, i.e., in that respect sharing which another will be essentially similar to it. As we have already seen (Ch. 4, n. 102), the later masters of the school considered such expressions as quasi 'alqâb and it is evident that al-Gubba'i* took a similar position (cf. Ch. 3, n. 103). Ibn Mattawayh reports (Tad, 67vº 11-14) that ''abû `Abdallâh said: `Were it not for revealed authority in this matter I should, on the basis of the normal usage of the expression and on theoretical grounds, refuse to call [God] ay', for it is a semantically empty term (laqab).' There is evidence in the work of abû `Alî [al-Gubba'i*] to indicate that he also held this position." As for God's being termed ay', however, al-Gubba'i* concluded, evidently, that there were greater problems in denying the applicability of the term than in affirming it (cf. M 5, 250 f.). With al-Gubba'i's* thesis concerning "color" as an attribute, cp. the statement of Ibn Mattawayh cited Ch. 4, n. 103. 21. Maq, 373, 11: 'innahu* harakatun* lahû lâ li-nafsihâ wa-lâ li-ma`nà. 22. Cf. Maq, 352, 1-7. Al-Bâqillâanî (Tam, 207, 12 f., cited in n. 19) would seem to imply that difference and dissimilarity (ihtilaf*) generally were taken by the Basrian Mu`tazila to be lâ lin-nafsi wa-lâ li-ma`nà, as he cited the example of black and white
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(as-sawâd wal-bayad *, while al-Guwayni*, on the other hand, says that according to al-Gubba'i* it is predicated essentially (cf. a-âmil, 308, 21 f.). More likely, however, and more in accord with al-Gubba'i's* general method would seem to be al-A`arî's report (Maq, 352) that some accidents direr essentially (e.g., black or white) and some M li-nafsihâ wa-lâ li-`illatin hiya gayruha*. (The editor's suggested addition to line 4 of this passage is to be omitted as out of place in the context.) The statement of al-Bâqillânî regarding ihtilaf* is most likely a reflection of the teaching of the later Basrian School (his contemporaries), while that of al-Guwayni* is, as so often, incomplete. 23. Tad, 48rº, cited n. 13. This is somewhat analogous to the formula of the later masters of the school, that inherence is a "mode" (kayfiya) of existence (cf. Ch. 4). According to the later authorities, however, there is no ta`lîl for the modes of an attribute (see n. 12), while the expression li-wugudihi* would appear to indicate that al-Gubba'i* held existence to be in some sense the ground of inherence. How al-Gubba'i* treated terms signifying existence (wugud*, mawgud*; for his semantic analysis of the verb, see Maq, 520, 13 ff.; M 5, 222 f., and 12, 17, where read wagid* for wahid* in line 9 and yagid* for yhd* in line 10) is not reported (cf. however, Maq, 523, 11-13). On the basis of the present data it would not seem inconsistent that he clawed it as lâ lin-nafsi wa-lâ li-ma`nà, but its absence from the lists is highly conspicuous. 24. Cf. Maq, 357, 13 f.; muhdat* is also so categorized in the argument set forth in Tam, § 351. 25. Ct. Maq, 162, 2 f. and 523, 8 f. (the nafsihî of 523, 8 f., which is questioned by the editor is plainly correct). Though juxtaposed in both passages to maf`ûlun (predicated of a thing "by virtue of its being an act") it is, nevertheless, clear that the expression muhdat* is not to be taken in a passive sense, for had al-Gubba'i* meant it to be so understood, he would have said li-'ihdatihi* rather than li-hudutihi* (162, 2) and would not have used hadit*. The word hadit* is not common in the kalâm literature but is found as an equivalent of hadit* and opposed to qadîm (cf. e.g., al-A`ari, al-Luma`, § 45, p. 22, 6 and a-âmil, 518, 4-9). Muhdat*, indeed, is normally taken in this sense (sc., hadit*); `Abd al-Gabbar* says, for example, that "the knowledge that a thing is muhdat* is a knowledge of its being qualified by a temporal beginning of its existence (`ilmun bi-mâ huwa `alayhî min tagaddudi* wugudihi*) and does not connote its being related to another" (M 6/1, 6, 8 f., reading tagaddud* for thdd* in line 9; cf. also M 8, 33 f.) and elsewhere insists that despite common literary usage and grammar (al-luga*), in the formal usage of the kalâm (al-istilah*) "'muhdat*' is not a derived expression (mutaqq), even though it is equivalent in form to mukram (honored) and similar derived nouns'' (M 11, 177, 5-13); i.e., it is not conceptually derived from and does not refer to the action of an agent which is expressed in the verbal form 'ahdata*. On derivation (itiqâq) as understood by the Basrians, see Ch. 6, nn. 62-65. 26. Ct., e.g., Muh*, 172, 6 f. (where add lâ before lin-nafs in line 6; the reference to "the dispute previously mentioned" is to the discussion of 107, 26 ff., mentioned later); Mas (B), 4, 18 f.; and M 6/2, 134, 15-17. 27. One distinguishes thus as-sâmi` from as-sami`, al-mubsir* from al-basir*, etc.; cf., e.g., SU5, 167, 15 ff., 168 f., and 174, 3 ff. (where omit 'ilà after laysa in line 4); Muh*, 136, 5 ff.; M 5, 241, 3 ff.; and, for al-Gubba'i's* position, e.g., Maq, 175 f. and 526 f. 28. Cf., e.g., Muh*, 107, 26 f. (where abû `Abdallâh is cited as holding the same position) and Maq, 527, 2 ff. One may note again, however, that in interpreting the reports of al-Gubba'i's* teaching it should be kept in mind that his conception of the essential attributes is different from that of abû Hâim and the principal authorities of the later school. 29. Cf., e.g., Maq, 340, 7-10. In that he considers 'idrâk to be an entitative accident
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(`arad *, ma`nà), al-Gubba'i's* position is analogous to that of abû l-Hudhayl and abû l-Husayn as-Salihi*. Their conceptions of the nature of perception, however, differ significantly; for abû l-Hudhayl perception is a form of knowing and inheres in the heart rather than in the organ of sense. Consequently it is possible, according to his doctrine, that God create, for example, the knowledge and perception of color in the heart of one who has been blind from birth or that He refrain from creating sight in one whose eye is sound, even when the visible object is immediately present. For al-Gubba'i*, on the other hand, the locus of the accident is the organ of sense. Blindness, thus, he held to be a contrary (didd*) of sight (though not an accident and so not a strict contrary but rather a defectnaqs*in the eye), so that God cannot, as he understands it, create sight in one who is blind, since contraries cannot be combined in the same substrate. Similarily he held that given the immediate presence of the visible, Cod cannot refrain from creating the accident of sight in one who is not blind, since the substrate must have one of the pair of contraries (cf. Ch. 5, n. 10); cf. Maq, 569 f.; M 4, 51, a ff., 54, 711, and 55, 17 ff. (where read al-`amà for al-ma`nà in line 18); M 9, 12, 12 ff.; and Tad, 219rº 1-7. 30. Cf., e.g., Tad, 219rº 9-11; SU5, 129, 9 f. = 170, 5; Muh*, 107, 27 and 137, 24; M 8, 73, 1 f.; and 5, 241, 3 f. See generally SU5 167 ff., Muh*, 135 ff., ZS, 562 ff., and Tad, 218rº ff. 31. Cf., e.g., M 7, 194, 2 ff.; 13, 229, 19 ff.; 12, 61, 10 ff. (where read at-tahayyuz* for at-tahayyur* in line 12); 4, 83, 16-20. That the perceptible is perceived in its essential attribute, cf. also the references cited in Ch. 4, n. 99. Thus concerning the atom abû Raîd says: 'innamâ na`lamu 'annahû kâ'inun fî gihatin-ma* li'anna dalika* min 'ahkami* s-sifati* l-latî yatanâwaluhâ l-'idrâk: Mas, 112rº 13 f. 32. Cf. Tad, 218rº; ZS, 557; SU5, 168, 12-14; and generally M 4, 33 ff. That the expression kawnuhû mudrikan is used properly to denote this state alone, cf. M 4, 41 f. The distinctive nature of perception as distinguished from knowing, `Abd al-Gabbar* says, is too self-evident to require verbal definition (tahdidun* bi-'ibârât): M 4, 81, 6-9. 33. Cf., e.g., Tad, 221rº f.; ZS, 457, 10 ff.; and that ultimately all knowing, for us, originates in perception, cf., e.g., M 12, 58 ff., 156 f., and 161 ff. One does not always and inevitably, however, know what he perceives; cf., e.g., SU5, 169, 7 ff. and Tad, 221rº f. 34. Cf., e.g., M 4, 82, 6 ff. 35. Cf., e.g., Muh*, 136, 14 ff. and the references cited in Ch. 2, n. 24. 36. The hassa* (sense or sense organ) is thus defined as "a body having a particular structure" (M 11, 378, 7 f. and Tad, 222rº 23). The sense organs, according to abû Hâim, are four, viz., the eye, the ear canal, the cartilage of the nose, and the uvula. `Abbâd added to these the heart and the sexual organs and also termed touch (al-lams) a hassa* (cf. Tad, 222rº 25 ff. and Maq, 339, 3-5). On the various organs and their functioning, see generally Tad, 22rº ff. `Abd al-Gabbar* suggests (M 12, 62, 6-18) that in the corporeal being there is a distinct attribute in its being perceiving according to each of the five senses. Note that here he does not list "touch" (al-lams), since the term denotes, strictly speaking, only physical contact, but rather, in the fifth place, mentions the sensation of heat and cold and of pain, since there is, he notes, no single, proper expression (`ibâra) for the perception of heat and cold, nor for that of pain. The sensation of these three is, as it were, the primitive sense in corporeal beings, for while perception of the other perceptibles requires specially structured organs, the sole condition for the perception of heat and cold or of pain is that the substrate be living (cf., e.g., M 11, 335 f.; Tad, 57vº 15 f.; and generally Tad, 53vº 6 ff., where the term
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lams is used and Ch. 2, n. 26 and Ch. 5, n. 72). For abû Hâm's account of the perception of the distinction between the smooth and the rough, cf. Mas, 117vº 16 ff. 37. Cf., e.g., Tad, 218vº 24 f. (cited n. 46); ZS, 563, 13 ff.; and M 4, 41, 14-17 (where read al-gali * for 'lhlw* in line 9 and al-`âlim for al-`ilm in line 17). 38. Cf, e.g., Tad, 222vº 9 ff. and 2rº 2 ff.; and ZS, 565 f. Strictly speaking, however, the sense cannot be said to be a "means to perception" in the way that one says that perception is a means to knowing (cf. n. 33), since in this sense perception has no tariq* (cf. Tad, 221vº 14 ff. and M 4, 41, 9 ff.). 39. Cf. abû Hâim, cited in M 5, 224, 18-20. Abû Hâim is reported to have used the terms hassa* and hiss* alike to denote "sensing" and perception through sense (Tad, 222vº 4 f.), while al-Gubba'i*, because of the common use of the verb 'ahassa*, allowed that hiss* may mean "the initial knowing of the perceptible" ('awwalu l-'ilmi bilmudrak) (M 5, 224, 15-18, Tad, 222vº 5 f., and ZS, 564, 7 ff.). In neither case can one use 'muhiss'*' as a predicate of God. 40. Cf., e.g., ZS, 565 f. and SU5, 173 f. (where read al-lâmis for al-mulâmis at 173, 16 and hayatihi* for hynt* in line 17): and cp. M 4, 39, 3 ff. 41. Cf., e.g., M 5, 241, 3-5 and ZS, 569 f, Abû Raîd says (ZS, 569, 10 ff.) that abû Hâim seems to suggest in some passages that samî` and basir* indicate an attribute over and above being alive but elsewhere seems to deny this, as do the later masters of the school. 42. Cf., e.g., SU5 168, 17 f.; Muh*., 135, 17 ff. (where read muta`allaqihî for mu'lqt in line 21) and 136, 3 ff. Thus though the living is, as such, capable of perception (mudrik), it cannot be termed darrâk or hassas* (M 3, 231). 43. Cf. generally M 4, 50 ff.; SU5, 170 ff.: Muh, 135 ff.; Tad, 218rº ff.: and ZS, 562 ff. 44. 'Inna hadihi* s-sifata* lâ yastahiqquha* l-mawsufu* bihâ 'illâ li-kawnihî gami`a* s-sara'iti* l-latî nadkuruha* ba`du, dûna 'an yakûna hunâka ms`nan yu'attiru* fîhâ ...: Tad, 218rº f. Thus Ibn Mattawayh reports: wa-qad nafà abû Hâimin 'an yakûna l-'idrâku ma`nan, wa-ga`ala* 'ahadanâ mudrikan li-kawnihî hayyan* wa-sihhati* l-hawassi* wa-zawâli l-mawâni'i fa-yakânu t-ta'tiru* li-kawnihî hayyan* wa-hadihi* l'umûru surutun* fî qtida'i* kawnihî hayyan* kawnahû mudrikan: Tad, 219rº 9-12. See generally the references in the preceding note and for the use of the term iqtadà in this context, see also Muh*, 137, 23 f., M 6/2, 135, 9 ff., and ZS, 48, 1 f. and 459 f. The attribute of a thing's being mudrik is thus murattabun `alà kawnihî hayyan* (Muh*, 166, 13 f. and ZS, 459, ult. f.), i.e., when we know that a being is living, we know that it is capable of perception given the conditions of the actuality of the attribute. Similarly also, it is for this reason that even though it is not grounded in the presence of an entitative accident, the attribute of being perceiving nonetheless qualifies the corporeal being as a whole or totality (cf., e.g., M 11, 340 f. and Ch. 2, n. 39). Note that the relation of the conditions of the actuality of the attribute to the being of which it is an attribute is not the same in the case of perception as it is in the case of the essential attributes whose actuality is entailed by the Attribute of the Essence on the condition of the existence of the thing. itself (bi-sarti* wugudi* d-dat*), for in the latter case the condition is fully intrinsic to the being whose being is qualified by the attribute. 45. Cf., e.g., M 7, 83, 3-8 (in which passage read yufâriqu bihâ gayrahu* for tufâriqu bihâ gayraha* at 82, 12, datihi* for adâtihî at 83, 1; omit lâ before yata`allaqu and hal* following wugudi* at 83, 6 and add 'aqsâm following bi-sâ'iri at 83, 9). Thus, speaking of the corporeal perceiver, Ibn Mattawayh says: lâ yasihhu* 'an yug`ala* wugudu* l-mudraki `illatan, bal huwa sartun*; yubayyinu dalika* 'annahû yudriku l-mudraka bi-'umûrin munfasilatin* `anhû, wa-mâ yûgadu* lâ yuksibuhû halan* (Tad, 218vº 15 f.) and
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in another place: 'inna l-mudrakâti `alà htilafiha * lâ yasihhu* 'an takûna mugibata* sifatin* râgi`atin 'ilà l-gumlati*, bal 'ahkamuha* maqsuratun* 'alà mahalliha*; wa-ba`du, fa-kâna yanbagi* 'an na`rifahâ ba`da 'idrâki mahalliha* (Tad, 144rº 22 f.). 46. Thus, e.g., Tad, 218vº 24 f.: lâ yaguzu* an takûna l-hassatu* wa-sihhatuha* mu'attiratan* fî dalika* ta'tira* l-`ilali, li'anna lhassata* hukmuha* râgi`un 'ilà l-ba`di* wal-mudriku nagidu* kawnahû mudrikan râgi'an 'ilà l-gumlati*. Cf. also ZS, 563, 13 ff. and M 4, 41, 14-17. 47. `Abd al-Gabbar* states in one passage (M 7, 82, 11-13) that "the predicate that may belong to a thing not by virtue of an entitative accident must denote the described's being specifically characterized by a state (hal*) by virtue of which it is distinguished from another, so that we may, then, say that it belongs to it to have it not by virtue of an entitative accident." It is clear, however, that he cannot here (he cites no example) refer to the predicates that are là lin-nafsi wa-lâ li-`illa as a whole, since of the predicates mentioned as falling under this category only perceiving indicates a true state or characteristic according to the Basrians of the classical period. 48. M 6/2, 134, 15-17: inna s-sifata* l-latî tustahaqqu* lâ lin-nafsâ wa-lâ li-`illatin lâ budda 'an yakûna lahà waghun* tustahaqqu* minhû, kamâ naqûluhû fî kawni l-mawgudi* muhdatan* wal-hayyi* mudrikan. That a thing's being muhdat* is a mode of its being existent, see Ch. 4, and for the sense of the term `muhdat*', see n. 25. As we have seen in Ch. 4. for abû Hâim and his successors in the Basrian School, as for al-Gubba'i*, that an attribute be "essential" entails the similarity of those things that share it. 49. Cf., e.g., M 4, 241, 10-12 (citing abû Hâim); SU5, 277, 10-12; and Muh*, 217, 3-7. 50. Cf. M 4, 242, 18 ff. and 5, 244, 3-8; and SU5, 277, 10-12. 51. M 5, 244 f. (where omit ta`âlà at 245, 2). 52. M 4, 244, 5-7 (reading gayriha* for gayrihi* in line 7; read also 'annahû 'insânun for 'annahû laysa bi-'insânin in line 8; cp. M 5, 244, ult. f.). `Abd al-Gabbar*, however, objects to this interpretation of `wahid*' in the case of its predication of a living composite whole; see n. 60. He also cites abû Hâîim as saying. concerning the use of the term wahid*' as predicated of a composite whole, that "by this one means that it is a single whole (gumlatun* wahida*), so as to distinguish it from all other wholes, just as one says `a single thing-itself' (datun* wahida*)" (M 5, 244, 3-5). Concerning nouns that denote composite unities ('asmâ'u l-gumal*), see also M 7, 120, 18-21 (where read al-gumal* for 'lhml* in line 21). 53. Cf. M 4, 245 f. (translated n. 76) and 5, 244, 10-12; the author's uncertainty expressed in the latter passage is only to be explained in terms of the first, where it is clear that the two statements are not conceptually joined by abû Hâim. Note that al-Gubba'i* considered negative predicates of this kind to be predicated as indicating essential attributes; cf. M 5, 254, 5 f. and n. 14. 54. M 4, 246, 1-4: lâ yumkinu 'an yuqâla fîhî 'innahû yufîdu htisasahu* bi-halin* 'aw-hukmin* fa-yasihha* ma`nà t-ta'lîli fîhî, fa-huwa fî bâbhiî bi-manzilati sâ'iri mâ lâ nugizu* ta'lîlahû mina n-nafy ...; cf. also M 5, 244, 9 f. On the use here of the term hukm*, however, see also p. 159. 55. For the semantics of the term 'ilâh, see Ch. 3, n. 2 and on the abstract, 'ilâhiya, see n. 65. 56. Cf. M 5, 245, 2-10; 4, 241, 12 (citing abû Hâim in both places); SU5, 277, 12-15; and Muh*, 217, 3-6. Thus al-Gubba'i* and abû Hâim held that the knowledge that God is one, in the sense that there is no other such being, "is a knowledge that has no object and they frequently formulated this as `that has no object that can be indicated (yuâru 'ilayhî) either as being existent or nonexistent';" cf., M 4, 247 ff. and also ibid., pp. 243, 4 ff. and 244, 13 ff. That is to say, since the implicit negation of wahid*' used in
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this sense is to be formulated as "there is no entity [ay' includes both the real (al-mawgud *) and the possible (al-ma'dûm: the nonexistent)] such that it is other than God and is essentially similar to Him," the knowledge of the truth of the proposition is an act that affirms a (negative) proposition whose subject refers to no object. 57. Cf. M 5, 245 and 4, 245, 17 f. 58. M 4, 245, 15 f. 59. On the inclusion of the parts and their being implied in the expression that denotes the whole, see nn. 66 and 67. 60. It is thus that the Qadi* objects to abû Hasim's* interpretation of the sense of our saying that a man is one (M 4, 244, 5-7, cited above in n. 52, where note the emendation), saying that "one should not take this statement literally, since it is universally known that the part of a man is not a man and so, insofar as he is a man, he is as if without parts and therefore the term [sc., `wahid'*] is used of him properly and strictly. In my opinion what he [abû Hâim] means to say in describing this way [of predicating 'wahid'*] is that our describing the one as one indicates a meaning by way of restriction to a part of his attributes (yufîdu 'alà sabîli t-taqyîdi bi-ba`di* sifatihi*), the meaning being that he is one in some particular respect (fî 'amrin-mâ), so that for every attribute by which he is specifically qualified and in which no part shares or in which he has no parts at all, the use of the word to described him is strict and proper (`alà l-haqiqa*)" (M 4, 244, 7-12). Concerning the attributes that the parts do not share with the whole, cf., e.g., the texts cited Ch. 2, nn. 33 and 45. 61 Haqiqatu* hadihi* s-sifati* nafyu l-hagati* `amman ihtussa* bi-halin* ma`ahâ yasihhu* l-gina* wal-hagatu*, ... yufîdu nafya mâ yaqtadî l-hagata* itabatuhu*: M 5, 247; cf. generally ibid. f.; M 4, 8 f.; Muh*, 213 f. Al-Gubba'i* is quoted in Maq, 533 f. as saying, "God's being described as gani* is that He is untouched by benefits or harms, that pleasures joys, pains, and worries are impossible for Him and that He has no need of another." As a negative, however, al-Gubba'i* would hold it to be an essential predicate. 62. Cf. Muh*, 213, 20 ff.: "this is not an attribute in the strict sense but only a negation of need on His part.... That He is gani* is not, strictly speaking, an essential attribute (lid-dat*), for one can say of that which may be classed as an essential attribute in the strict sense that it is `due to the essence,' but a negative does not belong to the thing by its essence." Note that in contrast to these genuinely negative attributes, an act's being (ethically) good, albeit implying the absence of any manner of its being bad, is not properly speaking a negative attribute, since, as was noted earlier (Ch. 6, n. 53). it does have a positive ground. 63. M 7, 128, 2-4 (on the same page insert lâ before taqûm in line 12). On the senses of gayr* generally, see M 7, 119-129. 64. It should also be noted that the author observes at the end of the work (M 20/2, 257) that he spent some twenty years in composing the Mugni* and that there well may be some inconsistencies in it. 65. One may note here that althought it is true, as we have already remarked, that abstract nouns are rarely used in the Mu`tazilite kalam*, the expression al-gayriya* (otherness) is common. This is probably because the expression kawnu -ay'i gayran* (li-gayrihî) is awkward at best, while there is no convenient noun available, i.e., no masdar* corresponding to gayr* (though mugayara* might suggest itself). The same is true in the case of the word 'ilâhîya. That these expressions are taken not as true abstracts but as verbal nouns (masadir*), cf. Idah*, 58 f. 66. M 7, 119, 19 f.; cf. also M 5, 254, 1-4 and 11, 358, 10 ff., where the formula is given in a somewhat shorter form.
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67. M 7, 120, 3 f.: 'inns mâ lâ yadhulu * tahta* l-madkuri* kàna gayrahu*, wa-mâ yadhulu* tahtahu* kâna ba`dahu*. "The word 'part' implies that it and another are given by a single term" (taqtadi* 'annahû wa-gayrahu* qad tanâwalahumâ smun wahid*): ibid., lines 1 f., reading tanâwalahumâ for tandwalahû. He notes thus that one may be considered as other than ten, just as it is other than nine or eleven, but when considered as part of ten it is not other, just as the hand is not strictly other than the man. Cf. generally M 7, 120 ff, and 11, 358, cited in the preceding note. 68. M 7, 123, 2-4: kullu mawsufin* `ulima 'annahû yuhtassu* bi-mâ lâ yuhtassu* bihi l-mawsufu* l-'âharu mina l-'ahkami* was-sifati*, 'aw-yaguzu* dalika* fîhimâ, fa-kullu wahidin* minhumâ gayrun* li-sahibihi* fî l-ma`nà. (The expression fâ l-ma`nà is here to distinguish this sense, i.e. the true "meaning," from "the word" (al-`ibâra), i.e., from its ordinary sense as described by the lexicographers.) Cf. also M 5, 253 f. and 16 50, 7 ff. Note that `Abd al-Gabbar* rejects as too narrow al-Ka`bi's definition of other, viz., that "the strict sense of 'others' is that the two exist in two places or at two times or that it is possible that one of them exist in some manner while the other does not": M 4, 318, 5-7; cf. also M 7, 123, 7 ff. 69. Cf. M 7, 122, 5-9; that entities are unlike when they do not share an essential attribute, see, e.g., the text translated in Ch. 4, ad loc. nn. 39 ff. Al-ihtilaf* is indicated as lâ lin-nafsi wa-lâ li-ma`nà in the argument set out in Tam, 207. 70. Cf., e.g., Mas, 190rº 4-6 and Tad, 201vº 28 ff. Abû Hâim also, in several places, took the position that as-sahw is a "defect" in the heart (fasâdun fâ l-qalb); see the preceding references and M 7, 44, 6/2, 63, and 12, 212. His position here would seem to be somewhat analogous to that of his father regarding blindness (on which see n. 29). For abû `Abdallâh and abû Hâim, then (whichever of the latter's accounts of the attribute one chooses to take), one's being unaware will be considered a state. 71. Laysa bi-'aktara* min zawâli 1-`ilmi bil-'umûri 1-latî garati* 1-`adatu 'an tu`lama: Tad, 201vº 26 f.; cp. Mas, 190rº 7-9 and M 6/2, 63 f. The discussion of the nature of sahw and whether or not it is an accident and whether one's being sâh is a true state or not, is rather complex but can be omitted here. On the question generally, see Mas, 190rº ff. and Tad, 201vº ff. as well as M 7, 44, 6 ff. and 12, 212, 6 ff. 72. Lan yagida* 'ahaduna* li-nafsihî halatan* bi-kawnihi* sàhiyan fa-tusatahaqqa* li-ma`nan*, bal mà yagiduhu* huwa margu`un* 'ilà nafyi d-dikri*, wa-lam yutbat* 'anna l-`ilma bâqin fa-yuqâla 'innahû yantafî bis-sahw: Tad, 202rº 2-3; cf. also M 6/2, 63 f. and 7, 44. 73. Cf. Mas, 133vº 4-7 and Tad, 169rº 21-24. 74. Cf., e.g., M 4, 253, 13 ff.; 8, 76, 1-3; and ZS, 455, 4 ff.; and generally Mss, Question 85, foll 133vº f.; Tad, 169rº f.; and M 4, 337 ff. The intelligible content of the expression is simply that the being that is so described is incapable of the act (ta`addara* l-fi'lu 'alayhî); 'agiz* is, however, predicable only of what can be capable of the act (of what can be qâdir) and so cannot be used of the inanimate (cf., e.g., Muh*, 195, 3 ff. and Tad, 169rº 19 ff.). One may, accordingly, say that life constitutes the actuality of the condition of the thing's being 'agiz* (ZS, 561, 10 ff.). Concerning the attribute of being inanimate (al-mawt) and the teachings of the various authorities, see the references Ch. 2, n. 23. 75. Thus for example, Ibn Mattawayh says: 'ida* 'amkana ta`lîqu l-hukmi* bi-zawâli sifatin*, fa-lâ ma`nà li-ta`liqihi bi-sifatin* 'uhra*, wa-li-hada* mana`nâ 'an yakû lil-`agizi* bi-kawnihî `agizan* halun*, li-mâ 'amkana ta`lîqu l-hukmi bi-zawâli sifati l-qâdir; wa-lihada* Iâ yasihhu* 'itbatu* ma`ânin katiratin* bi-ga`li* hukmiha* mâ yasihhu* 'an yargi`a* 'ilà zawâli ma`ànin, fa-'ida* sahhat* hadihi* l-gumlatu* wa-arnkana 'an yu`allaqa l-hukmu* l-ladi* yutbatu* lil-ma'dûmi bi-zawâli sifati* l-wugudi*, fa-lâ wagha* yaqtadi* 'itbata* sifatin* lahû bi-kawnihî ma`dûman: Tad, 8vº 2-6; see generally foll. 8rº f. This same thesis is
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set forth at somewhat greater length in Mas (B), 72, 1 ff.; cf. also M 8, 76, 1-8. A thing's being nonexistent is, like these attributes that we are discussing, nowhere that I have noted specifically designated as lâ lin-nafsi wa-lâ li-`illa, though it is indicated as so classed in the objection set out in M 6/2, 135, 2 f. (where one should probably read taqûlûnahu for yaqûlûnahu in line 3). 76. One may note in this context `Abd al-Gabbar's * statement (M 4, 245, 19 f.) that "abû Hâim says that our describing Him by `one,' in the numerical sense, belongs to Him neither essentially, nor by virtue of an entitative accident, and in a number of places he says that this [predicate] indicates a negation; this cannot be assigned a ground either (f-l-lâ yu`allalu 'aydan*) and is the correct position."
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Abbreviations 'Abd al-Qâhir al-Bagdadi *, al-Farq bayn al-firaq, edited by M. 'Abd al-Hamid Farq (Cairo, n.d.). al-Gumal* az-Zaggagi*, al-Gumal*, edited by M. ben Cheneb (Algiers/Paris, 1927). Ibn Fâris Ibn Fâris, al-Kitâb as-Sahibi* fî fiqh al-luga*, edited by M. el-Chouémi (Beirut, 1383/1964). Ibn Ya'î Ibn Ya'î, garb al-Mufassal*, l0 volumes (Cairo, n.d). al-idah* az-Zaggagi*, al-'idah* fî 'ilal an-nahw*, edited by M. Mubarak (Beirut, 1393/1973). al-Insaf* abû 1-Barakât al-Anbârî, al-`Insaf* fî masâil al-hilaf*, edited by M. M. 'Abd alHamid, a volumes (Cairo, 1380/1961). al-Guwayni*, al-'Irâd, edited by M. Musa and A. 'Abd al-Hamid (Cairo, al-Irâd 1369/1950). 'Abd al-Gabbar* al-Hamadani*, al-Mugni* fî 'abwâb at-tawhid* wal-'adl, 16 M volumes (Gairo, 1959-1965). Maq al-A`arî, Maqâlât al-'Islârn îyîn, edited by H. Ritter (Istanbul, 1929-30). abû Raîd an-Nisâ'il al-hilaf* bayn al-Basriyin* wal-Bagdadiyin*, ms. Berlin 5125 Mas = Glaser 12. Mas (B) the first section of the same work (Berlin: A. Biram, 1902). 'Abd al-Gabbar*, Mutaâbih al-Qur'ân, edited by M. Zarzour, 2 volumes (Cairo, MQ n.d). 'Abd al-Gabbar*, al-Magmu* al-muhit* bit-taklîf, edited by U. Azmi (Cairo, Muh* n.d.). alal-Mubarrad, al-Muqtadab*, edited by M. A. Adima, 4 volumes (Cairo, 1386Muqtadab*1388). alabû 1-Husayn* al-Basri*, al-Mu'tarnad fî 'usul* al-fiqh, edited by M. Hamid Mu'tamad Allah, a volumes (Damascus, 1384/1964-1385/1965). al-Guwayni*, as-âmil fî 'usul* ad-dîn, edited by A. S. al-Nashar (Alexandria, a-âmil 1969); portions of this work not
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found in the printed edition are cited from Tehran University Central Library ms. 350. Sarh * abû 1-Qâsim Sulaymân b. Nasir* al-Ansari*, Sarh* al-Irâd, Princeton University al-Irâd ms. ELS 634. abî Sa'îd as-îâfî, Sarh* Kitâb Sîbawayh;; citations of portions of this work not Sarh* al- found in the margins of the Bulaq edition of Sîbawayh are taken from Selim Agha mss. 1158-1163 = Nahw* 79-84 of the microfilm collection of the League of Arab Kitâb States (cf. F. Sayyid, Fihris al-mahtutat* al-musawwara* 1 [Cairo, 1954], pp. 387 f.) SîbawayhSîbawayh, al-Kitâb (Bulaq, 1316). 'Abd al-Gabbar*, Sarh* al-'Usul* al-hamsa*, edited by A. Uthman (Cairo, SU5 1965/1384). Tabaqat* Ibn al-Murtada*, Tabaqat* al-Mu'tazila, edited by S. Diwald-Wilzer (Wiesbaden, 1961). Ibn Mattawayh, at-Tadkira* fî 'ahkam* al-gawahir* wal-'a'râd, Biblioteca Tad Ambrosiana, ms. C-l04. Tam al-Bâqillânî, at-Tamhîd, edited by R. McCarthy (Beirut, 1957). abû Raîd an-Nîsâbûuî, Zâclât as-sarh*: an extensive fragment of the first part of ZS this work, published by M. abu Rida under the title fî t-Tawhid* (Cairo, 1969).
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Indices
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Proper Names `Abbâd b. Sulaymân, 29f., n. 10; 115, n. 17; 168, n. 36. `Abd al-Gabbar *, 2, 5, 7 n. 5, 23, 30 n. 10, 32 n. 22, 35, n. 34, 48 nn. 7, 8, 50 n. 23, 55 n. 2, 59, 67, 69, 73, 75, 77, 78, 81 n. 5, 85 n. 47, 88 nn. 76, 77, 89 nn. 86, 87, 91, nn. 101, 102, 95, 104-106, 112 n. 3, 114 nn. 14, 15, 120 n. 44, 121 nn. 56, 61, 122 n. 77, 123 n. 88, 128, 131-133, 135, 140 n. 18, 144 nn. 47, 49, 145 n. 53, 146 n. 55, 156-159, 164 nn. 4, 8, 165 nn. 14, 15, 17, 18, 167 n. 25, 168 n. 36, 170 nn. 47, 52, 171 n. 60, 172 n. 68, 173 n. 76. abû `Abdallâh al-Basri*, 37 n. 51, 56f. n. 14, 82 n. 11, 114 nn. 14, 15, 140 n. 18, 144 n. 47, 145 n. 52, 159, 166 n. 20, 167 n. 28, 172 n. 70. abû Bir Mattâ b. Yûnus, 4, 32 n. 19. abû l-Farag* al-Isfahani*, 143 n. 46. abû Hanifa*, 10. abû Hâim, 2, 5, 6, 7 nn. l, 3, 19-27, 30 n. 10, 32 n. 16, 36 n. 37, 37 n. 49, 39, 41, 43, 45, 47 n. 1, 48 n. 4, 49 n. 14, 50 nn. 16, 20, 50 n. 23, 51 n. 27, 52 nn. 38, 41, 53, 54, 55 n. l, 57 nn. 14, 17, 59, 62, 71, 72, 75, 80 nn. l, 2, 81 n. 5, 82 n. 12, 83 n. 18, 85 nn. 50, 52, 89 n. 92, 90 n. 98, 93-98, 100-103, 109, 111, 112 n. 5, 113 n. 10, 115 nn. 16, 17, 116 nn. 20, 21, 117 nn. 24, 25, 28, 118 nn. 31, 32, 119, n. 33, 122 nn. 62, 77, 123 nn. 87, 88, 129, 140 n. 23, 141 n. 32, 144 n. 47, 145 nn. 50, 52, 146 n. 55, 150-161, 165 nn. 14, 16, 167 n. 28, 168f. n. 36, 169 nn. 39, 41, 44, 170, nn. 48, 49, 52, 53, 56, 171 n. 60, 172 n. 70, 173 n. 76. abû l-Hudhayl al-`Allâf, 2, 9, 10-13, 16, 24, 28 n. 5, 29 n. 10, 32 n. 22, 40, 41, 42, 43, 48 n. 6, 49 n. 14, 98, 103, 117 nn. 25, 28, 118 n. 32, 119 nn. 33, 38, 120 n. 47, 168 n. 29. abû l-Husayn* al-Basri*, 89 n. 87, 91 n. 100. abû Ishaq* al-Isfarâ'înî, 7 n. 3, 121 n. 56. abû Ishaq* an-Nasibini* 82 n. 11, 118 n. 30. abû Raîd an-Nîsâbûrî, 7 n. 5, 29 n. 10, 35 n. 33, 37 n. 51, 50f n. 23, 54, 56 nn. 8, 14, 61, 70, 76, 83 n. 18, 97, 113 n. 6, 114 n. 16, 117 n. 24, 122 nn. 61, 68, 127, 141 n. 31, 143 n. 43, 159, 160. abû Ya`qûb al-Bustânî, 120 n. 44. al-Ahfas*, Sa`îd b. Mas`ada, 35 n. 36. Ahmad* b. Hanbal*, 9, 13, 14. Allard, M., 36 n. 37. `Amr b. `Ubayd, 9. Anawati, G., 38. al-Ansari*, abû l-Qâsim Sulaymân b. Nasir*, 85 n. 52, 151, 165 n. 18. Aristotle, 32 n. 22. al-A'arî, abû l-Hasan*, 2, 5, 7 nn. 1, 3, 32, n. 22, 48 n. 4, 49 n. 14, 94, 118 n. 30, 143 n. 43, 152, 165 n. 15, 166 n. 19, 167 n. 22. Avicenna, 113 n. 5. al-Bagdadi*, `Abd al-Qâhir, 13, 29 n. 10. al-Bâqillânî, abû Bakr, 2, 7 n. 3, 116 n. 17, 117 n. 24, 166 nn. 19, 22. Bir b. al-Mu`tamir, 9. Carter, M., 34 n. 32. ad-Dahhak* b. Muzahim*, 55 n. 2. ad-Dârimî, abû Sa`îd 'Utman*, 28. Davidson, H., 112 n. 3, 115 n. 16.
Dirar* b. `Amr, 10. al-Fârâbî, 4, 47 n. 3. al-Farrâ', Yahya* b. Ziyâd, 33 n. 29. Fleisch, H., 28 n. 3. al-Gahiz*, 30f. n. 13. Gahm* b. Safwan*, 9. Gardet, L., 38. Gaylan* ad-Dimaqî, 9. al-Gazzali*, abû Hamid*, 2, 7 n. 1. Gimaret, D., 36 n. 37, 115 n. 16. Goitein, S., 28 n. 1. al-Gubba'i*, 13-19, 23-26, 29 nn. 8, 10, 30 nn. 10, 11, 31, nn. 14-16, 32, nn. 17, 21, 22, 33 nn. 24, 25, 35, nn. 33, 34, 36 n. 37, 37 n. 50, 39, 41-43, 49 nn. 14, 16,
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al-Gubba'i * (continued) 50 n. 23, 51 n. 27, 56 n. 2, 80 n. 2, 81 n. 5, 86 n. 57, 88 n. 79, 92 n. 103, 94, 98, 100, 102, 103, 113 n. 10, 114 n. 14, 117 nn. 24, 25, 28, 30, 118 nn. 30-32, 119 nn. 33, 38, 120 n. 41, 129, 140 n. 29, 141 n. 31, 143 n. 46, 144 n. 47, 146 n. 61, 147 n. 64, 151-153, 159, 161-163, 164 nn. 2, 13, 165 nn. 14, 15, 17, 18, 166 n. 19, 167 nn. 22, 23, 25, 27, 168 n. 29, 169 n. 39, 170 nn. 53, 56, 171 n. 61. al-Gurgani* `Alî b. Muhammad*, 2. al-Guwayni* 38, 116 n. 17, 151, 165 n. 16, 166 n. 19, 167 n. 22. al-Halil* b. Ahmad* 55 n. 2. Hiâ al-Fuwati*, 13, 29 n. 10. Hourani, G., 48 n. 8, 81 n. 5, 143 n. 44, 144 n. 46, 145 nn. 49, 52. Ibn `Aqîl, 164 n. 1. Ibn `Ayyâ, 35 n. 33, 37 n. 51, 54, 57 n. 17, 146 n. 55, 159. Ibn Fâris, 36 n. 36, 114 n. 14, 140 n. 22, 141 n. 32. Ibn Fûrak, 7 n. 3. Ibn Ginni*, 29 n. 8, 30 n. 10, 139 n. 6, 164 n. 1. Ibn al-Gawzi* 55 n. 2. Ibn Hallad*, 117 n. 25. Ibn Hanbal*, see Ahmad* b. Hanbal*. Ibn al-Ihsid*, 92 n. l03. Ibn Kaysân, Muhammad* b. Ahmad* b. Ibrâhîm, 32 n. 20, 36 n. 36. Ibn Kullâb, 2, 9, 10, 14, 28 nn. 5, 6, 29 n. 10. Ibn Mattawayh, 7 n. 5, 24, 32 n. 21, 35 n. 35, 37 nn. 49, 51, 41, 47 n. 4, 49 n. 13, 50 n. 23, 56 n. 12, 56f. n. 14, 64, 71, 79, 83 n. 20, 85 n. 44, 86 n. 62, 89 n. 94, 90 nn. 96, 98, 91 n. 99, 99, 101-103, 115 n. 17, 117 n. 26, 118 n. 31, 141 n. 29, 152, 159, 160, 163, 164 nn. 8, 9, 165 n. 14, 166 n. 20, 169 nn. 44, 45, 172 n. 75. Ibn ar-Râwandî, 29 n. 10. Ibn Sikkît, 4, 87 n. 70. Ibn Sîda, 47 n. 3, 55 n. 2. Ibn Sînâ, see Avicenna. Ibn Ya`ì, 32 n. 20, 35 n. 36, 91 n. 101, 141 nn. 32, 35. al-Ka`bî, abû l-Qâsim, 7 n. 1, 14 n. 23, 29 n. 10, 94, 119 n. 38, 143 n. 44, 172 n. 68. al-Kindî, abû Yûsuf Ya`qûb, 4, 5, 115 n. 16, 118 n. 30. Lagda*, abû `Alî al-Hasan* b. `Abdallâh, 35 n. 36. Loucel, H., 30 n. 10. Mahdi, M., 7, n. 4, 30 n. 10. al-Maqdisî, al-Mutahhar*, 28 n. 7, 49 n. 13. al-Mâturîdî, 7 n. 1, 47 n. 3, 49 n. 13, 55 n. 2, 90 n. 96, 143 n. 43. al-Mubarrad, 15, 16, 20, 56 n. 2. al-Mugahid* b. Gabr*, abû l-Haggag*, 55 n. 2. Muslim b. al-Haggag*, 114 n. 14. an-Nâi' al-Akbar, 117 n. 30, 121 n. 58.
an-Natiq* bil-Haqq*, abû Talib*, 37 n. 51, 117 n. 25. an-Nazzam*, 90 n. 96. al-Pazdawî, 49 n. 14. Pretzl O., 115 n. 16. al-Qâlî, Ismâ`îl b. al-Qâsim, 56 n. 2. ar-Râzî Fahr* ad-Dîn, 2, 56 n. 2, 57 n. 17. ar-Rummânî, abû `Isà, 32 n. 19. as-Sahham*, abû Ya`qûb, 13. a-ahrastânî, a, 47 n. 1, 116 n. 17. as-Salihi*, abû l-Husayn*, 168 n. 29. Schacht, J., 36 n. 37. Sîbawayh, 15, 21, 32 nn. 19, 20, 34 n. 31, 47 n. 3, 49 n. 13, 56 n. 2, 91 n. 101, 121 n. 56, 141 n. 35, 147 n. 64. as-Sîrâfî, abû Sa`îd, 4, 22, 32 n. 19, 33 n. 27, 34 n. 31, 35 n. 36, 49 n. 13, 91 n. 101, 114 n. 14. as-Suyuti* 30 n. 10. at-Tabari*, Muhammad* b. Garir*, 55 n. 2. van den Bergh, S., 35 n. 33, 116 n. 17, 121 n. 56. van Ess, J., 7 n. 2, 28 nn. 4, 5, 38, 115 n. 16, 117 n. 30, 123 n. 87, 163 n. 1. Wasil* b. `Ata*', 9. az-Zaggagi* `Abd ar-Rahman* b. Ishaq*, 29 n. 8, 30 n. 13, 31 nn. 14, 15, 36 n. 36, 147 n. 64. Page 181
Technical Terms English Additional references can be found from the English index by looking in the Arabic section under the equivalents indicated. The Arabic index is arranged according to the order of the Arabic alphabet. The English equivalents given in the Arabic index are not meant to be exhaustive for the kalâm usage but are restricted, unless otherwise indicated, to the senses in which the words are used in the texts and the contexts cited. Places where the particular term is discussed or defined are indicated in the Arabic index by an asterisk (*). A accident (`arad*, ma`nà, 'illa), 12, 24-27, 39, 43, 44, 46, 47, 47 n. 4, 50 n. 23, 60-62, 68, 70, 73, 83 n. 21, 92 n. 103, 93ff., 126, 156; perceptible accidents, 70, 90 n. 95, 104f., 120 n. 54, 121 nn. 55, 56; accidents associated with life, 42. ''acquisition" (al-kasb), 81 n. 5. act (fa`ala, yaf`alu), 45. act (al-fi`i, pl. al-'af`âl), 45, 74, 108, 116 n. 24, 124-135; occurrence of the act (wuqû`uhû, hudutuhu*), see s. occur; skilful, well-wrought act (al-fi`lu l-muhkam*), 106, 127; pointless, purposeless act (al-`abat*), 133f., 142 n. 36, 144 n. 49; ethically bad act (al-fi`lu l-qabih*), 143 nn. 44-46; interior act (fi`lu l-qalb), 44, 51 n. 29; predicates of action (sifatu* l-'af`âl), see s. predicate. action (al-fi`liya), 122 n. 77, 126, 135, 136.
actuality (al-husul*), 36 nn. 45, 46, 59, 67, 124f., 128; to come to actuality (tagaddada*), 109. adjectives (as-sifat*), see s. predicate, descriptive. agent (al-fâ`il), 27, 52 n. 38, 81 n. 5, 108, 113 n. 7, 124ff., 146 nn. 54, 55, 59; the state of the agent (halu* l-fâ`il), 124ff., 133; attributes caused by the action of the agent, see s. attributes bil-fâ'il. Allâh, 55 n. 2. animate (hayy*), see s. living. Arabic (al-`arabîya), see s. language. area (surface: al-masaha*, used of the atom), 96. assertion (al-'itbat*), 12, 15, 22, 23, 151. association (al-ihtisas*), 70f. atom (al-gawhar*, pl. al-gawahir*; al-guz'*, pl. al-'agza'*), 39, 44, 47 n. 3, 54, 55, 56 n. 14, 59, 60, 67, 73, 93f., 96, 98, 105, 113 nn. 7, 12, defined 115f. n. 17; 123 n. 89, 156. attribute (sifa*, hal*), 18, 19, 26, 36 n. 37, 37 n. 49, 43, 44, 83 n. 21, 107, 161; characteristic of an attribute (hukmu* s-sifa*), 60-64; mode of an attribute (al-kayfîya), see s. mode. attribute of the essence (for the Arabic terminology see 55 n. 1), 27, 53-57, 60, 65, 67, 68, 74, 83 n. 17, 98, 125, 127, 150. essential attribute (for the Arabic terminology see 80, n. 1), 16, 27, 58-79, 85 n. 53, 92 n. 103, 97, 105, 109, 123 n. 82, 125-127, 156, 168 n. 31; sharing in an essential attribute, 66; entailed attribute, 62, 63, 65, see also s. al-muqtada*; most characteristic attribute(s), 66, 77, 78, see also s. al-'ahass*; necessary attribute, 125; attributes of the class (sifat* al-gins*), 72-77, 124. attribute grounded in an "accident" (lima`nà, li-`illa), 27, 67, 93-111, 125.
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attribute caused by an agent (bil-fâ`il), 89 n. 84, 124-135. attribute lâ lin-nafsi wa-lâ li-ma`nà, 27, 150-163. causally effective attribute (sifatun * mu'attira*), 138 n. 3. anticipated attribute (sifatun* muntazara*), 54, 57 n. 17. the way it belongs to a being to have an attribute, 67, see also s. istahaqqa*. attribution (description), 135. authority, acceptance of, ace s. at-taqlîd. B bad (qabih*), 132-135. badness (al-qubh*), 126. becoming, coming to be, see s. hadata*, tagaddada*, hasala*, and waqa`a. being (as-say', ad-dat*) see s. entity; created beings, 39. being (al-wugud*) see s. existence. being (at-tubut*), 65; see also s. tabata*, yatbutu*. being..., to be so (kawnuhû...), 20; being desiring (kawnuhû mutahian), 107; being eternal (kawnuhû qadîman), 68; being existent (kawnuhû mawgudan*) 83 n. 17; being spatially located (kawnuhû kâ'inan), 103, 119 n. 40; being knowing (kawnuhû `âliman), 45, 63, 67, 122 n. 69, 124; being living (kawnuhû hayyan*), 42-44, 107, 111, 154-156; being perceiving (kawnuhû mudrikan), 153-156, 162; being qâdir (kawnuhû qâdiran), 63, 64, 124, 126, 128; being willing (kawnuhû murîdan), 106; see also s. kawnuhû. . . . black (as-sawâd; the accident), 46, 60, 73, 74, 76, 105. body (al-gism*), 39, 40, 47 n. 3, 107-109, 131; living body, 42, 44, see also s. composite whole (al-gumla) and individual (as-sahs*); the members of the body (al-gawarih*), 108. breath (an-nafas), 104. C capable of autonomous action, see s. qâdir. cause (`illa), 61, 68, 93, 135, 148-149, see also s. accident and `illa; (al-mugib*), 103, 120 n. 40, 127; (as-sabab), 62, 97, 155. caused (ma`lûl), 46; (mugab*), 103. characteristic (al-hukm*, pl. al-'ahkam*), 27, 46, 59-64, 73, 74, 76, 126, 131; entailed characteristic, 56 n. 8; most particular characteristic ('ahassu* l-'ahkam*), 43, 89 n. 94, see also s. al-'ahass*;
ethical characteristic, 132-135. characterize (ihtassa*), to be characterized or qualified (muhtass*), 23, 35 n. 35, 35 n. 36, 44, 46, 59, 62, 64, 65, 107, 159. change (at-tagayyur*), 109-111; (inqalaba), 81 n. 5. class (al-gins*), 70, 72-77, 90 n. 96, 100, 166 n. 20; (an-naw'), 77-79, 90 n. 96, 105. cold (the sensation of), 51 n. 26. color (al-lawn, pl. al-'alwân), 76.78, 104. 105, 120 n. 54, 121 n. 56, n. 60. come to be (hadata*, yahdutu*), 74; coming to be (al-hudut*, al-wuqû'), 126-127, 131-135, 138 n. 4. command ('amara, ya'muru, al-'amr), 127-137. common (â'i`), 79. composite body, 40; composite (al-mu'allaf), 104; composite (living) whole (al-gumla*, pl. al-gumal* al-gumla* al-hayya*), 39f., 42, 44-46, 60, 71, 106-111, 121 n. 61, 122 n. 68, n. 69, 142 n. 40, 146 n. 55, 154, 157f., 170 n. 52. composition (at-ta'lîf; the accident), 61, 89 n. 94, 104, 117 n. 28, 119 n. 35, 120 nn. 45-52. condition (as-sart*, pl. as-surut*, as-sara'it*), 51 n. 29, 59, 60, 82 n. 11, 121 n. 60, 127f.; condition (sihha*), 94, see also s. sihha*; that which fulfills the condition of the actuality of...(al-musahhih*), 44, 51 n. 29, 60; see also s. sahhaha*. conditional (upon existence), 59. conditionality (al-ihtiyag*, al-iftiqâr), 70. confidence (sukûn an-nafs), 75, 76, see also s. sukûn. consequent (tâbi'), see s. derivative. contiguity (al-mugawara*, al-igtima`*, al-mumâssa; defined, 117 n. 28), 98-100, 119 n. 33, n. 35. contingent (temporal; muhdat*), 47 n. 4, 152, 156; see also s. possible (ga'iz*). continuity (ittisal*), 45.
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contrariety (at-tadadd *), 65, 104. contrary (ad-didd*, pl. al-'addad*), 50 n. 23, 94, 113 n. 10, 168 n. 29. convention (al-muwada`a*), 130, 141 nn. 32, 33. conviction (al-i`tiqâd), 24, 70, 74-76, 90 n. 98, 106, 122 n. 62. correlation (at-ta`alluq), see s. relation. copula, 22. D dampness, 51 n. 29, 120 n. 52. deficiency (an-nuqsan*), 107. definition, 48 n. 8, 49 n. 13, 60, 62, 159. depth, 104. derivative, derived (tâbi`), 69-70, 124, 126, 127, 134; derived predicate (sifa* mutaqqa), see s. predicate. described (mawsuf*) see s. object descriptive predicate (as-sifa*, al-wasf*), 10ff., 78f.; see also s. sifa* and wasf*. designation (al-'iâra), 42. desire (a-ahwa), 89 n. 86, 107. determinant, determinant cause (ma`nà) see s. accident: (muhassis*), 93. determine (hassasa*, yuhassisu*), 93, 111 n. 2, 117 n. 24. difference (al-ihtilaf*, al-muhalafa* see s. dissimilarity. direction (al-giha*, pl. al-gihat*), 62, 97, 119 n. 35. discontinuity (al-fasl*), 40. disposition (al-hay'a, pl. al-hay'ât), 60, 105, 121 n. 56. dissimilarity (al-ihtilaf*, al-muhalafa*), 60, 64-66, 72, 101, 159, 172 n. 69. distinguish: to be distinguished, distinct (fâraqa, iftaraqa, bâna, tamayyaza), 54, 59, 62, 64, 71-73. distinction, distinctiveness (al-'ibâna), 67, 78. dry, 61, 121 n. 55. dryness, 120 n. 52. E effect: to effect, produce the actuality of ('attara*, yu'attiru*), 60, 67, 82 n. 17. effect (at-ta'tir*), 106, 108, 134. effect (result) (al-mugab*), 46, 120 n. 40; (al-ma`lûl), 93; (al-musabbab), 97. endure (baqiya, yabqà), see s. perdure. entail (iqtada*), 73, 132, 155, 156; that which entails (al-muqtadi*), 67;
entailed attribute, see s. attribute; (dammana)*), 107; entailed (mudamman*), 93f. entity (a-ay', pl. al-'ayâ', ad-dat*, pl. ad-dawat*, an-nafs, pl. al-'anfus; defined p. 23), 12, 15, 25f., 35 n. 36, 39, 43, 46, 53-55, 57 n. 22, 59, 64-66, 109. essence (ad-dat*, an-nafs), 16, 53, 59, 71, 109, 123 n. 82, 151; attribute of the essence, see s. attribute. essential (lid-dat*, lin-nafs) see s. ad-dat* and an-nafs; essential attribute, see s. attribute. eternal (qadîm), 33 n. 25, 53; the Eternal (al-qadîm), 86 nn. 57-60, 87 n. 64; see also s. God and al-qadîm. ethical qualification, 132-135, 142 nn. 38, 39, 144 n. 46. evil (qabîh) see s. act and bad; (al-qubh*) see s. badness. existence (al-wugud*), 22, 46, 56 n. 8, 59, 60, 68, 71, 82 n. 17, 84 n. 27, 86 n. 62, 92 n. 103, 94, 103, 113 n. 7, 125-127, 133, 138 n. 1, 140 n. 18, 152, 156, 169 n. 45; necessary existence, 86, nn. 57-60; mode of existence (kayfîyatu l-wugud*), 71, 75, 87 n. 72; see also s. mode. existent (mawgud*), 26, 39, 45. excess (az-ziyâda), 107. exegesis (at-tafsîr), 2f. explanation (at-tafsîr), 48 n. 8; (at-ta`lîl). see s. `allala, yu`allilu and `illa. expression (word, utterance) see s. al-`ibâra, al-qawl, and al-lafz*. F falsafa, 7 n. 1. false statement (al-kadib*), 134, 143 n. 46. fiqh, 3. flavor (at-ta`m*), pl. at-tu`um*), 90 n. 95, 105. form (as-sura*, pl. as-suwar*), 111. function, see s. al-hazz*. G generate (wallada, yuwallidu), 79, 87 n. 72, 92 n. 104. genus, 72, 90 n. 96. God (al-qadîm: that `qadîm' [eternal] describes His essence see p. 86 n. 57; on the terms `Allâh' and `'ilâh' see p. 55 n. 1), 11, 13, 14, 29 n. 10, 32 n. 21, 42, 53, 58, 60, 63, 67f., 70, 71, 80 n. 2, 82
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God (continued) n. 17, 86 nn. 57-60, 96, 97, 136, 145 n. 49, 149, 151, 155-158, 165 n. 17, n. 18, 166 n. 20, 169 n. 39. good (hasan *), 132-135. goodness (al-husn*), 145 n. 49, nn. 52, 53. grammar, the grammarians, 2f., 10, 15ff. 19, 21, 25, 28 n. 8, 31 n. 14, 35 n. 36, 48 n. 8, 78, 91 n. 101, 114 n. 14, 130, 141 n. 34, 142 n. 37, 147 n. 64. Greeks, the Greek tradition, 1f., 4f. ground (of the actuality of an attribute), 24, 59, 63, 107; (al-`asl*), 53, 111; to assign, give the grounds ('allala, yu`allilu, at-ta`lîl), 71, 148-150. H Hadith*, 2f., 9. hearing (sâmi`, samî`), 155. heart (al-qalb), 44, 52 n. 41, 70, 106, 122 n. 68, 172 n. 70. heat (al-harara*), 51 n. 26, 105. I impediment (al-man`, al-mâni`, pl. al-mawâni`), 97. inanimate (mayyit), 40, 45, 50 n. 23. incapable (`agiz*), 160. inference (al-istidlâl), 60f., 64. ignorance (al-gahl*, defined p. 144 n. 47), 46, 75, 76, 122 n. 68. individual (as-sahs*), 40, 43, 111. indivisible (gayr* munqasim, gayr* mutagazzi'*), 165 n. 17. inhere, inherence in a substrate (halla*, yahullu*, al-hulul*), 40, 69-72, 150, 152. injustice (az-zulm*), 132, 144 n. 47, 146 n. 62. initiation (of action: al-ibtidâ'), 108. instant (al-waqt), 99, 101. intelligence (al-`aql) see s. understanding and `aqala, yu`qilu. intelligible (ma`qûl), 132, 135. intelligibility, 64. intention (al-qasd*), 30 n. 13, 45, 124, 125, 131, 133-135, 142 n. 37. interior acts ('af`âlu l-qulûb) see s. act. interval (al-masâfa), 99; (al-fasl*), 118 n. 31. J judgement (al-hukm*), 28 n. 6. K
kalâm, 4f., 7 n. 1, 9, 20, 42. kawn (pl. al-'akwân; defined p. 98), 12, 74, 76, 77, 93-104, 118 n. 32, 119 n. 38, 120 nn. 41, 42, 44. knowing (the act of knowing: al-`ilm), 12, 18, 42, 45, 46, 70, 74-76, 79, 106, 112 n. 62, n. 68, 124, 127, 140 n. 20, 142 n. 40; acquired knowing (al-`ilm al-muktasab), 122 n. 64; "necessary knowing" (al-`ilm ad-daruri*), 84 n. 38, 89 n. 91; knowing that has no real object, 170 n. 56. knowing (knower: `âlim), 45, 81 n. 5, 127. known (an object of knowing: ma`lûm) see s. object. Koran, 9-11. L language, 10, 13, 14, 18, 19, 24, 37 n. 49, 48 n. 8, 81 n. 5, 141 n. 32, 160; Arabic, 9, 15, 41, 72; the origin of language, 29 n. 10. length, 104. letters (al-harf*, pl. al-huruf*), 129f., 136. lie (false statement, al-kadib*), see s. false statement. life (al-hayah*), 41-43, 45, 51 n. 29, 60, 62, 73, 107f., 154-156, 172 n. 74. living (hayy*), 40, 62, 106; living composite (gumla* hayya*) see s. composite whole; the living being that is capable of autonomous action (al-hayy* al-qâdir), 109f. location (al-muhadah*), 96; see also s. al-gi ha*. locus (hayt*), 69, 96. logic, 4. M magnitude (al-`izm*): increase in magnitude (at-ta`azum*), 96. man (al-`insân), 41f., 44, 51 n. 31, 110, 158. manifest (to be or become manifest: zahara*, yazharu*), 54, 59, 60, 156; (to make manifest: anba'a, yunbi'u), 60, 78. manner (al-wagh*, pl. al-wuguh*): of a thing's coming to be (waghu* hudutihi*), of the occurrence of an act (waghu* wuqû`ihî), defined pp. 131f.; 74, 89 n. 9l, 106f., 122 n. 62, 127, 129-135; the manner of an act's being good or bad (waghu* l-husni/l-qubhi*), 132-135.
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meaning, see s. al-haqiqa *, al- ma`nà, and al-fâ'ida. mind (at-`aql) see s. understanding. mode, modality of being (at-kayfîya), 39, 62-72, 86 n. 62, 105, 116 n. 24, 156. motion (al-haraka*), 48 n. 6, 96-98, 100-103, 117 n. 30, 118 n. 32, 119 n. 33, 152; that motion has no directionality, 119 n. 35; motion "in no place" (lâ fî makân), 97. motive (ad-dâ`î, pl. ad-dawâ`î), 124, 125, 132. N nature (at-tabi`a*), 49 n. 13. name (al-ism, pl. at-'asmâ), 10, 29 n. 10, 41, 77f., 101, 103; proper names, 55 n. 2; see also s. noun. negation (an-nafy), 145 n. 53, 157. negative predications, pp. 157-161. necessary, see s. wagaba*, yagibu* and al-qadîm. necessity (al-wugub*), 87 n. 64, 109. need (al-haga*), 107. nonactuality, see s. al-intifâ' and az-zawâl nonexistence (al-`adam, al-intifâ', az-zawâl), 36 n. 42, 56 n. 14, 57 nn. 17-18, 59, 65, 104. nonexistent (ma`dûm), 26, 35 n. 33, 54f., 66, 92 n. 103, 166 n. 20. nonliving, see s. inanimate. noun (al-ism, al-'asmâ'), 25, 32 n. 19, 35 n. 36, 56 n. 2, 78f., 91 nn. 101-102, 92 n. 102, 130, 141 n. 34, 170 n. 52; derived nouns ('asmâ' mutaqqa), 147 n. 64. O object: object of which something is predicated (al-mawsuf*), 35 n. 35, 159, see also s. al-mawsuf*; object named (al-musammâ), 78; object of knowing (alma`lûm), 14, 26f., 54, 59, see also s. al-ma`lûm; object of the will (al-murâd), 128, 132; object of the power of action (al-maqdûr), 108. occupy (a place or position, sagala*, yasgalu*), 97; occupy space (tahayyaza*, yatahayyazu*), 39, 47 n. 4, 67, 97. occur (waqa`a, yaqi`u), 74f.; occurrence, manner of occurrence, see s. manner. odor (ar-ra'iha*, pl. ar-rawa'ih*), 105. one (wahid*), oneness, see s. unity. opinion (az-zann*), 90 n. 98. organ (al-'âla), 108; sense organ (al-hassa*, pl. al-hawass*), 51 n. 29, 108, 154f.
ostension, see s. al-'isara*. other (gayr*), 158f.; to be or become other tagayara*, yatagayaru*, 109. P pain (al-'alam), the sensation of, 50 n. 16, 51 n. 26, 105. part (indivisible part, viz., the atom, al-guz* ', pl. al-'agza*'), 40, 73, 107f., 156; part (of a body, al-ba`d*, pl. al-'ab`ad*), 44f., 157-159. particular: most particular (al-'ahass*) see s. characteristic. participation (al-istirak*) see sharing. perceptible (mudrak), 168 n. 31, 169 nn. 39, 45. perceptibility, 91 n. 99. perception (al-'idrâk), 43-44, 51 n. 26, 62, 91 n. 99, 101, 108, 138 n. 2, 153-156, 167 n. 29, 168 nn. 32, 33, 36. perdure, perdurance (baqiya, yabqà, al-baqâ'), 26, 79, 92 nn. 104, 105, 94, 100, 102, 103. perfection (hal*, sifa*) see s. attribute. philologians ('ahl al-luga*) see s. grammarians. place (al-makân, defined 114 n. 16), 96, 97, 102, 114 n. 16, 116 n. 18; place as the area or volume of space occupied, see s. al-hayyiz* and al-giha*. position (al-giha*), 94, 96-97; see also s. al-muhadah* and al-makân. possible (ga'iz*), 93, 109; (ma`dûm), 54, 66, 84 n. 27, 92 n. l03. possibility (al-gawaz*), 54, 84 n. 27; (as-sihha*
), 61-63, 65, 94, 107, 125, 127, 153.
posterior, see s. derivative (tâbi`) and murattab. power of autonomous action (al-quâra, pl. al-qudar), 44, 70-71, 73, 89 n. 86, 106-108, 122 n. 79, 124, 126, 128; its units ('agza'uha*), 79. predicate (descriptive predicate, al-wasf*, as-sifa*, al-ism), 14ff., 21f., 32 n. 20, 35 n. 35, 42, 68, 137, 151-153, 156f., 161, 165 n. 18, 166 nn. 19, 20, 167 n. 25; essential predicates, 92 n. 103; derived predicates (as-sifat* al- mutaqqa),
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predicate (continued) 135-138, 146 n. 62, 147 nn. 64, 65, 67, 162-163; predicates of action (sifat * al-'af`âl), 12, 135-137; grammatical predicate of a sentence, 31 n. 15, 131; paraphrase of predicates, 13ff.; that of which something is predicated, see s. al-muhbaru* `anhû. predication, 40, 44f., 53, 63, 105; see also s. wasafa*, yasifu* and al-'isnâd. pressure (al-i`timâd), 60, 62, 77, 87 n. 72, 92 n. 104, 103, 114 n. 16, 116 n. 17; its directionality, 119 n. 35; induced pressure (al-i`timâd al-mugtalab*), 79; inherent permanent pressure (al-i`mâd al-lâzirn), 79. principle (al-'asl*), see s. ground. proximity (al-mugawara*, al-igtima*`, al-muqâraba, al-mumâssa), see s. contiguity. purpose (al-garad*), 133. Q qualification (al-mazîya), 44, 46; (ihtisas*), see s. characterize (ihtassa*); (sifa* hal*) see s. attribute; (hukm*) see s. characteristic. quantum (al-guz*', pl. al-'agza*'), see s. unit. R reality (what the thing really is: al-haqiqa*), 59, 61-64; (the way it really is, huwa bihî, etc.) see s. way. reasoning (the activity of, an-nazar*), 122 n. 77, 146 n. 55; erroneous reasoning (aubha), 144 n. 47. reflection (an-nazar*) see s. reasoning. relation (at-ta`alluq) 63, 73-75, 128. remoteness (al-mufâraqa, al-iftirâq, al-mubâ`ada) see s. separation; (at-tarahi*), 97. rest (as-sukûn), 98, 101-103, 118 n. 32. revelation (at-tawqîf), 29 n. 10; cp. also 166 n. 20. S sameness (at-tamatul*), see s. similarity. see (absara*, ra'å, nazara*), 155. self (an-nafs, ad-dat*), see s. an-nafs; "the way it is in itself" (mâ huwa `alayhî fî nafsihi/datihi*) see s. way. self-sufficient (gani*, 149, 158.
sensation, sense (al-'ihsas*, al-hiss*), 154; see also s. al-hassa*. sensibility (al-'idrâk), 44. separation (al-mufâraqa, al- iftirâq, al-mubâ`ada), 98-100, 119 n. 33. share, to share in the same attribute (itiraka fî sifatin*), 66, 71, 85 n. 53. sign (dalîl, dalâla, pl. 'adilla), 31 n. 13. similarity (at-tamatul*), 64-66, 71-74, 85 n. 53, 101, 103, 120 nn. 40-42, 151, 161, 165 n. 14. situation: indicative situation (al-hal* ad-dâlla), 31 n. 13. smell (as-samm*), 155. solid, 104. soul (anima,
), 51 n. 26.
sound (as-sawt*, pl. al-'aswat*), 105, 129f. space (al-hayyiz*), 96f.; to occupy space (tahayyaza*) see s. occupy. spatial presence (al-kawn), see s. kawn in the English and in the Arabic section. speaking (mutakallim), 136. speech (al-kalâm, defined pp. 129f.), 70, 127-132, 136, 142 n. 40, 145 n. 49; God's speech, 9f. species, 73. spirit (ar-ruh*), 49 n. 14. state (al-hal*, pl. al-'ahwal*), 23, 43, 45-46, 54, 124, 128, 135, 137, 153, 156, 158, 170 n. 47; as distinguished from "manner" (al-wagh*), 142 nn. 38, 39; the states of the agent ('ahwalu* l-fâ`il), see s. agent (al-fâ'il); see also s. attribute (as-sifa*). statement (al-habar*, al-hadit*), 127-135. status (al-hukm*) see s. characteristic. structure (al-binya, pl. al-binå), 41, 51 nn. 29, 31, 70, 108. substrate (al-mahall*, pl., al-mahall*), 40, 44, 46, 69-72, 76, 94, 104, 106, 108, 119 n. 33, 121 nn. 54, 60, 150; substrate of the qudar (mahallu* l-qudar, 108; "not in a substrate" (lâ fî mahall*), 70, 71, 74, 88 n. 77. subsist, see s. qâma, yaqûmu; self subsistent (qâ'imun bin-nafs), 48 n. 4. subject (of a sentence: al-mubtada', al-musnad 'ilayhî, 15, 16, 21f., 130. T taste (at-ta`m*, pl. at-tu`um*), 105. temporal contingency (al-hudut*), 68, 69; temporal (muhdat*) see s. contingent.
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thing (as-say *', ad-dat*) see s. entity and essence. thought (an-nazar*), see s. reasoning. totality (al-gumla*) see s. composite whole. touch (al-lams), 155. translation literature, 114 n. 14. U unaware (sâhin), 130, 133f. unawareness (as-sahw), 45, 159. ubication, see s. occupy space and attahayyuz*. unconditioned (gayr* masrut*, 53, 54, 86 n. 57. understanding (`aqala, ya`qilu, al-`aql), 13, 37 n. 49; understood (known, grasped by the mind, ma`qûl), 48 n. 8, 69, 135; accessibility to understanding, see s. 'anba'a yunbi'u, at-tariqu* 'ilå..., zahara*, yazharu*. undivided (gayr* munqasim), 157. unique (mutafarrid, munfarid), 157f., 165 n. 17. unit (al-guz*', pl. al-'agza*), the ultimate, discrete unit of corporeality, see s. atom; the ultimate, discrete unit or quantum of an accident, 43, 47 n. 3, 73, 76, 79, 108, 121 n. 54. unity (one, oneness, wahid*, as-say*' al-wahid*, ad-dat* al-wahida*), 40, 42, 44, 73, 104, 151, 156-159, 170 n. 52, 173 n. 76. universal ('âmm), 91 n. 102, 115 n. 16. univocity, 36 n. 40. usage of words, 48 n. 8. use (to employ) see s. ista`mala, yasta`milu. V vacate ('afraga*, yufrigu*), 96. visibility, 91 n. 99. W way: the way it really is (mâ huwa bihî), 75; the way it is (mâ huwa 'alayhî), 45-47; the way it is in itself (mâ huwa 'alayhî fî datihi/nafsihi*), 53, 56 nn. 5, 6, 58, 73f., 78, 105, 125; the way it occurs/comes to be (waghu* wuqu`ihi/hudutihi*) see s. manner. weight (at-taql*, taqil*), 97, 103, 114 n. 16, 115 n. 17. wet, 61, 121 n. 55. whole (al-gumla*) see s. composite whole; wholeness, see s. unity. will (the act of the will, al-'irâda), 24, 45, 70f., 74, 77, 106, 124, 126, 128-135, 137, 142 n. 40, 143 n. 43; effective, efficatious will (al-'irâda al-mu'attira*), 132; object of the will, see s. object.
word (al-`ibâra), 41f., 172 n. 68; (al-lafz*), 62, 157. Arabic 'tr*: 'attara*, yu'attiru* (to effect, to cause the actuality of), 26, 82 n. 17, 84 n. 41, 124, 138 n. 3, 143 n. 43, 155, 170 n. 46; sifatun* mu'attira* (an attribute that effects the being or actuality of an entity or attribute), 138 n. 3. ta'tir* (effect), 106, 108, 111 n. 13, 134, 138 n. 2, 140 n. 25. 'sl: al-'asl*, pl. al-'usul* (ground, source, principle), 47 n. 3, 53, 59, 81 n. 6, 85 n. 45, 111, 122 n. 69. 'lf: at-ta'lîf (composition), 89 n. 94, 104, 117 n. 25, n. 28, 119 n. 35, 120 nn. 45-52; the conditions that give rise to composition, 120 n. 52. 'lh: Allâh, 'ilâh (God), 55 n. 1*. al-'ilâhîya (divinity, to be divine), 158*. 'mr: 'amara, ya'muru (to command): `ma'mûr [bihî]' (commanded), 23. al-'amr, pl. al-'awâmir (command, a category of sentences), 135f. al-'amr, pl. al-'umûr (thing), 35 n. 36*, 50 n. 23, 53. 'ns: al-'insân (man), 41f., 44. 'wl: al-'âla, pl. al-'âlât (organ), 154. bht*: at-tabhit* (guess, conjecture), 142 n. 40.
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bd': ibtada'a, yabtadi'u (to initiate, effect the first element of an action), 108; to posit a noun in the initial position as subject of a sentence, 15, 130. bsr *: 'absara*, yubsiru* (to see), 155; basir* (capable of visual perception), 155, 167 n. 27. btn*: al-batin* (the interior [of a solid]), 116 n. l7. b'd: al-mubâ'ada (remoteness, separation), 98f. b`d*: taba"ada*, yataba"ada (to be divisible into parts, have parts), 157. al-ba`d*, pl. al-'ab`ad* (part [of any composite, e.g., a body, a number]), 59, nn. 36, 37, 157-159, 172 n. 67. bqy: baqiya, yabqà, baqâ'an (to perdure, continue in being), 26, 79, 87 n. 63, 92 nn. 104, 105, 100, 102-103. bhm: mubham (non-specific: a class of nouns), 91 n. 102. bny: al-binya, pl. al-binå (structure), 41, 51 nn. 29, 31, 108, 111, 154; al-mabnî wal-mabnî 'alayhî (the predicate and subject of a sentence), 22. byn: bâna, yabînu, bâ'in (to be distinct, distinguished, distinguishable), 35 n. 36, 40, 52 n. 34, 82 n. 9. al-ibâna (distinctiveness), 67, 86 n. 55. tb`: taba`a, yatba`u, tâbi` (to follow, be consequent of or upon, to derive from), 69, 83 n. 18, 84 n. 42, 86 n. 62, 88 n. 75, 134, 139 n. 9*, 139 n. 17; `alå sabîli t-taba`, 139 n. 14; tâbi'un lil-hudut*, see s. al-hudut*. tbt*: tabata*, yatbutu*, tabit* (to have reality or actuality, to be, to be actual), 84 n. 42, 114 n. 14, 164 n. 4; tabit* (real, existent), 57 n. 14, 65, 85 n. 44; say'un* tabit* (a real, concrete entity), 97; sifatun* tabita* (a genuine attribute, i.e., one that cannot be conceptually reduced to a negation), 100; qâ'im, tabit* (concretely existent), 131. at-tubut* (reality, actuality), 54, 65, 83 n. 20, 84 n. 27. 'atbata*, yutbitu* (to assert, affirm): al-'itbat* (assertion), 12, 15, 18, 22-23, 31 n. 16, 32 n. 20, 152, 172 n. 75; (affirmation, affirmative), 157; al-mutbat* (that which is asserted to exist), 12, 32 n. 21. tql*: at-taql* (weight, being heavy), 103, 114 n. 16, 115 n. 17. gdd*: tagaddada*, yatagaddadu*, tagaddudan* (to come to be, to come to actuality, to have temporal actuality), 26, 36 n. 46, 109, 124, 142 n. 38; al-mutagaddid*, of attribute, as opposed to gayru* l-mutagaddid*, 124, 131f. grd*: bi-mugarradihi* ("considered alone and in itself", of existence), 82 n. 11; mugarradu* l-wugud*, 138 n. 7. grm*: al-girm*, pl. al-'agram* (body), 47 n. 3, 116 n. 17. gz*': al-guz*', pl. al-'agza* (discrete and indivisible part or element, of a body, of accidents, or of an act; a discrete unit, quantum: of bodies (sc., an atom), 40, 50 nn. 20, 21, 51 n. 26, 52 nn. 34, 37, 73, 156; of accidents, 43, 46, 47 n. 3, 108, 121 n. 54, 156; of an act, 143 n. 43. tagazza'a*, yatagazza'u* (to have or be divisible into discrete parts, 'agza*'), 157.
gsm*: al-gism*, pl. al-'agsam* (body), 40, 43, 47 n. 3, 83 n. 21, 111 n. 2. gml*: al-gumla*, p1. al-gumal* (a composite whole, a living corporeal entity), 7 n. 49, 39f., 43-45, 49 n. 16, 50 nn. 20, 22, 23, 51 nn. 26, 33, 52 nn. 34, 36, 37, 42, 106-111, 113 n. 13, 154, 170 nn. 45, 52. glb*: al-i`timâd al-mugtalab*, see s. al-i'timâd. gmd*: gamad* (inanimate [body]), 40, 49 n. 14. gm*`: al-igtima*` (juxtaposition, contiguity), 98-100, 117 n. 25*. gns*: al-gins*, pl. al-'agnas* (class, category), 36 n. 37, 50 n. 23, 70, 71, 82 n. 9, 88 nn. 76, 80, 81, 89 n. 86, 90 nn.
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94-96, 100, 103, 117 n. 26, 119 n. 40, 120 n. 42, 124; at-tadaddu * fî l-gins*(contrariety of class), 85 n. 43. taganasa*, yataganasu* (to belong to the same class), 164 n. 8. ghl*: al-gahl* (ignorance, the act of affirming an undue proposition), 45, 75, 144 n. 47*. gwr*: al-mugawara* (contiguity, juxtaposition), 98-100, 117 n. 25*, n. 28. gwz*: gaza*, yaguzu* (to be possible, conceivable), 111 n. 2, et alibi pass.; ga'iz* (possible, contingent), 93, 109 al-gawaz* (possibility), 138 n. 2. al-magaz* (metaphore), 80 n. 5. al-gawhar*, pl. al-gawahir* (the atom), 47 n. 3, 56 n. 11, 111 n. 3*, 112 n. 5, 113 n. 6, 115 n. 17*, 116 n. 20, 123 n. 89. hgm*: al-hagm* (bulk, volume), used of the atom, 116 n. 17. hdd*: al-hadd* (definition), 138 n. 2. hdt*: hadata*, yahdutu*, hudutan* (to come to be, begin to exist, be temporal): hadit* (= muhdat*, q.v.), 167 n. 25; haditun* tari* (transitory, opted w qa'imun* tabit*), 131; hadit* (= muhdat*, haddit*), 153, 167 n. 25*; al-hudut* (coming to be, the initiation of existence), 68, 69; 'li-hudutihi* (expression used by al-Gubba'i*), 153; tabi'un* lil-hudut* (consequent upon a thing's coming to be), 126, 138 nn. 4, 8, 140 n. 18, 143 n. 42; waghu* l-hudut*, see s. al-wagh*. al-hadit* (sentence, report, predicate), 15. 'ahdata*, yuhditu* (to cause to come to exist), 129; muhdat* (continent, temporal), 152, 156, 167 n. 25*, 170 n. 48. hdw*: al-muhadah* (location; a synonym of al-giha*1, q.v.), 96, 114 n. 16*. hrf*: al-harf*, pl. al-huruf*: (letter, consonant), l29f.; harfu* ma'nan (particle, in grammar), 21. hrk*: taharraka*, yataharrraku* (to move, be moved, be in motion): 'mutaharrik*' (in motion), 12. al-haraka*, pl. al-harakdt* (motion, movement), 98, 100-103; that it has no direction strictly speaking, 119 n. 35. hss*: 'ahassa*, yuhissu* (to sense, have sensation of), 154f. al-hiss* (sense), 169 n. 39. al-hassa*, pl. al-hawass* (sense, sense organ), 51 n. 29, 154f., 168 n. 36, 169 nn. 39, 44, 170 n. 46. hassas* (actually sensing), 169 n. 42. hsn*: hasana*, yahsunu*, husnan* (to be [ethically] good): al-husn* (goodness, being good), wuguh* al-husn*, 134f. hasan* (ethically good), 133-35, 145 nn. 52, 53. hsl*: hasala*, yahsulu*, husulan* (to have actuality, come to actuality), 36 nn. 45, 46, 57 n. 17, 59, 65, 67, 82 n. 9, 109, 141 n. 38; used of existence, 86 n. 58; hasala* 'alà sifatin*, `alà hukmin* (to come to or to have actuality in being qualified by a particular attribute or characteristic), 37 n.
46, 124, 125, 132; hasala* 'alà waghin* (to come to actuality in a particular manner), 143 n. 43; used of a body or an atom, hasala* fî, bi-(to come to be, to be present in), 97, 101, 118 n. 31. hzz*.: al-hazzu* (role, function), 52 n. 34, 134; (portion), 116 n. 17 (the latter is an A'arite use of the word). hqq*: tahaqqaqa*, yatahaqqaqu* (to have reality, to be real, actual), 166 n. 19 (an A'arite use of the expression). istahaqqa*, yastahiqqu* ("to deserve", i.e., appropriately or necessarily to be such as to have [a given perfection or state of being]), 56 n. 12, 67, 85 n. 50, 86 n. 55, 87 n. 63, 169 n. 44, 170 n. 48. al-haqiqa*1, pl. at-haqd'iq (the strict and proper meaning or use of a word), 48 n. 8, 50 n. 20; al-haqiqa*2, (the reality of an entity, an
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hqq *: al-haqiqa*2 (continued) attribute, or a characteristic as it is known and referred to by a word used in its haqiqa*1), 59, 61-64, 76, 80 n. 5*, 83 n. 18, 123 n. 89. hkm*: al-hukm*1, pl. al-'ahkam* (judgement, either the mind's judgement or the sentence that expresses it), 28 n. 6, 111 n. 3. al-hukm*2 (characteristic), 28 n. 6, 35 n. 35, 58-64*, 73f., 80 n. 3, 83 nn. 18-25, 84 nn. 26-30, 88 n. 76, 116 n. 24, 120 n. 45, 131, 142 n. 39, 158f.; fî hukmi* (to have the character of, to be analogous or equivalent to ...), 40, 46, 50 nn. 19, 23; 'ahassu* l-'ahkam* (particular, most particular characteristics) see s. al-'ahass*. hll*: halla*, yahullu*, hululan* (to inhere, to reside in; used of the presence of the entitative accident in its substrate), 40, 52 n. 37, 69-72, 87 nn. 66, 68, 69, 88 nn. 74, 77, 164 n. 13; al-mahall*, pl. al-mahall* (substrate), 40, 46, 51 nn. 26, 33, 69-72, 87 nn. 74, 75, 88 nn. 76, 77, 89 n. 94, 108, 111 n. 13*, 120 n. 45, 122 n. 69, 170 n. 45; mahallu* l-hayati* (the substrate of the accident of life, i.e., living substrate) see s. al-hayah;* isti'malu* l-mahall* (to employ the substrate), 88 n. 75; mahallu* l-qudari, see s. al-qudra lâ fî mahall* (in no substrate), 71, 88 n. 77, 112 n. 3. hml*: ihtamala*, yahtamilu* (to be apt for, capable of receiving), 94, 123 n. 89. hwg*: ihtaga*, yahtagu*, ihtiyagan* (to need, require; a synonym for iftaqara), 70, 88 n. 75, 120 n. 45, 140 n. 18, 150. hwz*: al-hayyiz*, pl. al-'ahyaz* (space, place), 96f.; tahayyaza*, yatahayyazu*, tahayyuzan* (to occupy space, to have place), 39, 47 n. 4, 56 n. 14, 85 nn. 45, 51, 52, 86 n. 54, 87 n. 66, 97, 112 n. 5, 122 n. 69, 123 n. 89. hwl*: istahala*, yastahilu*, istihala* (to be impossible), 87 n. 69, 88 n. 77, 92 n. l05, 111 n. 2; al-hal*, pl. at-'ahwal*: hal*1 (in grammatical usage: circumstance, a circumstantial expression), 20-23, 32 n. 16, 33 nn. 27, 29, 34 n. 31; al-halu* d-dalla* (the indicative situation), 31 n. 13. hal*2, (abû Hâûim's usage and that of the later Mu'tazila: state, attribute, quality, perfection; a synonym of sifa*3), 19f., 23-27, 35 n. 35, 36 n. 37, 46, 72, 76, 83 n. 18, 142 nn. 38, 39, 170 n. 47; 'ahwalu* l-fâ'il (the states of the agent), 124, 138 n. 2, 144 n. 49; 'alà halin* (qualified by an attribute), 23f., 26, et alibi pass. hyy*: hayy*, pl. 'ahya* (living), 12, 42, 51 nn. 24, 25, 84 n. 30, 122 n. 69, 169 n. 42; al-hayyu* 1-qâdir (the living being that is capable of autonomous action), 44, 51 nn. 26, 31, 109f.; gayru* hayyin* (= gamad*, inanimate), 49 n. 14; kawnuhû hayyan* (being living) see s. kâna, yakûnu. al-hayah* (life, an entitative accident), 43, 49 n. 14, 50 n. 23, 51 n. 26, 84 n. 27, 88 n. 80, 107f, 154-156, 172 n. 74; 'ahassu* 'ahkamiha* (its most particular characteristics), see s. al-'ahass*; mahallu* l-hayati*, 154. hyt*: hayt* (locus), 87 n. 66, 96. hbr*: al-habar*, pl. al-'ahbar* (statement), 127-135, 140 n. 25, 145 n. 49; (predicate), 14f., 30 n. 33; al-muhbaru* 'anhû (that of which a predication is, or can be, made), 23, 40. hss* hassasa*, yuhassisu* (to determine specifically), 93, 117 n. 24; 'amrun muhassis* (a determining factor), 111 n. 2.
ihtassa*, yahtassu* ihtisasan* (active: to qualify, characterise), 113 n. 13; (passive: to be qualified, characterised by), 35 nn. 35, 36, 50 n. 21, 51 n. 33, 5 n. 34, 56 n. 9, 65, 85 n. 48, 107, 116 n. 21, 143 n. 43, 159;
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(to belong particularly to, to be particularly or exclusively associated with), 70f., 74, 87 n. 74, 88 nn. 75-77. al-'ahass * 'ahassu* s-sifat*, 'ahassu* l-'ahkam*, 'ahassu* l-'awsaf* (the most particular attribute(s), characteristic(s)), 43, 50 n. 23, 62, 66, 77-78, 85 n. 52, 89 n. 94, 91 n. 99, 137, 154. htb*: al-hitab* (speech or a sentence that is addressed to another), 140 n. 23. hlf*: halafa*, yuhalifu* (to be dissimilar), 85 n. 51, 86 n. 55; al-muhalafa* (dissimilarity), 57 n. 18, 84 n. 42, 85 n. 44; ihtalafa*, yahtalifu* (to be dissimilar, different, unlike), 89 n. 86, 101; al-ihtilaf* (dissimilarity), 64-66, 83 n. 19, 159. hlw*: al-huluwwa* (a Kufan grammatical term for certain accusative uses), 33 n. 29. dhl* dahala*, yadhulu*, (to be included in), 172 n. 67. drk: 'adraka, yudriku, 'idrâkan (to perceive): mudrik (capable of perception), 43, 51 n. 24; (perceiving) 153-156; darrâk (actually perceiving), 169 n. 42. mudrak (perceptible), 83 n. 19, 167 n. 31; al-'idrâk (perception), 43f., 51 n. 25, 91 n. 99, 153-156*, 167 n. 29, 168 nn. 32, 33, 169 n. 44 d'w: ad-dâ'i, pl. ad-dawâ'î (motive, motivation), 52 n. 42, 138 n. 4. df`: 'al-mudâfa'a (resistance, pressure against), 62. dll: dalla, yadullu 'alà (to indicate, signify), 13; istadalla, yastadillu, istadlâlan bi- 'alà ... (to infer something [`alà] from [bi-], to use something [bi-] in order to infer something ['alà]), 83 nn. 19, 25; ad-dalâla, pl. al-'adilla (evidence that is or can be used to draw a conclusion), 31 n. 13, 64. dkr*dakara*, yadkuru* (to mention, refer to), 14, 31 n. 14; (to remember, recall): ad-dikr* (recollection), 172 n. 72. ad-dat*, pl., ad-dawat* (entity, essence), 37 n. 49, 39, 43, 46, 50 n. 22, 53, 57 n. 22, 82 n. 8, 85 n. 47, et alibi passim; lid-dat* (belonging to ... essentially, essential), 53, 55 n. 1, 80 nn. 1, 2, et alibi pass.; maqsurun* 'alà d-dat* (restricted to, belonging exclusively to the essence) see s. maqsur*; mâ huwa 'alayhî fî datihi* (the way it is in itself) see s. mâ. r'y:ra'à, yarà, ru'yatan (to see), 99 n. 91, 155. rtb:murattab (ordered in relation to, posterior) 87 n. 64, 127, 169 n. 44. rg*,': raga'a*, yargi'u* 'ilà (to be ascribable to, to belong to, be grounded in), 50 n. 23, 51 n. 33, 52 n. 42, 55 n. 1, 62, 73, 76, 79, 80 n. 1 et alibi. rhw*: taraha*, yataraha* (to be remote), 85 n. 44; at-tarahi* (distance, interval), 97. rtb*: ar-rutuba* (dampness, moisture, liquid), 51 n. 29, 83 n. 25. rwh*: ar-ruh* (spirit), 49 n. 14. rwd:'arâda, yurîdu (to will): murîd (willing), 52 n. 38, 143 n. 43*; kawnuhû murîdan (being willing) see s. kâna, yakûnu; al-murâd (the object of the will), 89 n. 86, 128, 132;
al-'irâda (the act of willing), 88 nn. 76, 77, 89 n. 86, 128-135*, 139 nn. 9, 14, 140 nn. 25, 28, 142 n. 40, 146 n. 55; al-'irâdatu l-mu'attira* (efficatious, efficient act of willing), 132*, 143 n. 42; al-'irâdatu lil-qabih* (the act of willing whose object is ethically, bad), 144 n. 47. zwl: zâla, yazûlu, zawâlan (to cease being present, actual, or existent; to be nonexistent, to have no actuality), 109, 164 n. 4, 172 nn. 71, 75; az-zawâl (nonexistence), 37 n. 47; (non-presence, absence), 159; (motion;
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zwl: az-zawâl (continued) used thus by al-Gubba'i * and some of the A'arites), 100, 102, 117 n. 30*. zyd: zâda, yazîd, zâ'id (to be distinct and distinguishable, ''over and above"), 87 n. 63, 87 n. 68, 138 n. 7 az-ziyâda (excess), 107; at-tazâyud (augmentation), 86 n. 61 sbb: as-sabab, pl. al-'asbâb (cause), 97, 112, 155 al-musabbab (effect), 97. sbr: at-taqsîm was-sabr, see s. taqsîm. swf: al-masâfa (interval, distance), 99. skn: sakana, yaskunu (to be at rest, motionless): as-sukûn (rest), 98, 100-103*, 118 n. 32; sukûn an-nafs (confidence, certitude), 75, 89 n. 87, 142 n. 40. sm': samî'un (capable of hearing), 155, 167 n. 27. smw: al-ism, pl., al-'asmâ' (noun), 14, 32 n. 19; (name, descriptive noun), 10, 29 n. 10, 31 n. 15, 32 n. 19, 78f., 91 n. 102, 119 n. 40; 'asmâ' Allâh (predicates of God), 13, 19; 'asmâ'u l-gumal* (nouns that denote composite bodies), 170 n. 52; 'asmâ'u l-'agnas* (nouns that denote members of classes), 99 n. 91. al-musammà (the object named, or described), 78. at-tasmiya (the action of naming or describing), 101. snd: istanada, yastanidu 'ilà (to be ascribed, attributed to), 83 n. 20; al-'isnâd (predication), 31 n. 15; al-musnad wal-musnad 'ilayhî (predicate and subject), 22, 34 n. 32*. shw: sahâ, yashû (to be inattentive, unaware): as-sâhî (the agent who is unaware or unconscious of what he does), 130, 133f., 140 n. 18, 144 n. 48; as-sahw (unawareness, unconsciousness), 45, 51 n. 23, 52 n. 41, 159, 172 nn. 70, 71. swd: as-sawâd (black), 46, 88 n. 81, 91 n. 99, 105. swy:istawà, yastawî (to be equivalent, similar), 151. bh: a-ubha, pl. a-ubah (erroneous reasoning, reasoning based on erroneous evidence), 144 n. 47. abbahs, yuabbihu, tabîhan (to assert that one being is similar to another, that God is like creatures), 32 n. 21. shs*: as-sahs*, pl. al-'ashas* (individual, corporeal individual), 40, 43, 47 n. 3. srt*: masrut* (conditional, conditioned), 80 n. 3, 81 n. 6; gayru* masrut* (unconditioned), 53, 54, 86 n. 57; istarata*, yastaritu* (to be conditional), 88 n. 77 as-sart*. pl. as-sara'it* (condition), 51 n. 29, 82 nn. 7, 11, 127, 138 n. 2, 140 n. 25, 156, 169 nn. 44, 45. rk: âraka, yuâriku (to have [an attribute or characteristic] in common with), 86 n. 55. itaraka, yatariku [fî sifatin*, fî hukmin*] (to share in [an attribute or characteristic]), 57 n. 18, 85 nn. 48-51, 89 n. 90, 92 n. 105.
sgl:* sagala*, yasgalu*, saglan* (to occupy [a place]), 97. qq: itaqqa, yataqqu (to derive), 135-138, 147 nn. 64, 65, 67, 167 n. 25; mutaqq: as-sifat* al-mutaqqa, see s. sifa*. mm: amma, yaummu, amman (to smell), 155. hw: itahà, yatahî (to desire), 37 n. 49; a-ahwa (desire), 89 n. 86, 122 n. 69. wr: aâra, yuîru, 'iâratan (to point to, indicate by pointing), 31 n. 13, 41, 49n. 13, 170 n. 56. y': a-ay', pl. al-'ayâ' (entity, being), 12, 14, 23*, 38 n. 7, 31 n. 14*, 35 n. 36, 46, 91 n. 102, 92 n. 103, 166 n. 20. y': â'a, yaî'u, iyâ'an (to be general, common), 79. shh* sahha*, yasihhu* (to be valid, validly
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asserted), 113 n. 6, 172 n. 75; (to be possible), 51 n. 33. as-sihha * (possibility), 62, 83 n. 23, 88 n. 80, 92 nn. l04, 105, 107, 125, 127, 153; (soundness, health), 155, 169 n. 44, 170 n. 46. al-musahhih* (that which fulfills the conditions of the possibility of), 44, 51 n. 29, 135. sdr*: sadara*, yasduru* 'an (to arise from, flow from), 126. srf*: at-tasarruf* (action, activity), 150. slh*: istalaha*, yastalihu*, istilahan* (to assign a meaning to a word, establish a convention of usage), 14, 47 n. 3, 114 n. 14, 167 n, 25. swr*: as-sura*, pl. as-suwar* (shape, form), 111. syr*: sara*, yasiru* (to come to be, to be), 116 n. 24, 128. ddd*: ad-didd*, pl. al-`addad* (contrary), 50 n. 23, 84 n. 42; at-tadadd* (contrariety), 84 n. 42, 120 n. 41; at-tadaddu* fî l-haqiqa* and at-tadaddu* fî l-gins*, 84 n. 43; al-mutadadd* (that which is contrary to another), 120 n. 41. drr*: daruri* (necessary, inescapable), al-'ilmu d-daruri*, see s. 'ilm. dmm*: 'indamma*, yandammu* 'ilà (to be joined to, contiguous with), 52 n. 37, 116 n. 21. dmr*: mudmar* (implicit; a grammatical term), 16. dmn* dammana*, yudamminu* (to entail), 93f., 107, 113 n. 6*; mudamman* (implicit; a grammatical term), 16. dyf*: 'adafa*, yudifu* (to ascribe to, to attribute to), 127, 158 n. 2, 139 n. 17, 146 n. 49. al-'idafa* (relation), 116 n. 22. tb'*: at-tabia* (nature), 49 n. 13. trq*:at-tariq*: tariqun* 'ilaà (means to or accessibility to understanding), 82 nn. 8, 10, 83 n. 17, 156; tariqun lil-idrak*, 154. trw*: tara*, yatru*, truwwan* (to supplant), 94. t'm*: at-ta'm*, pl. at-tu'um* (flavor, taste), 90 n. 95, 105. zlm*: az-zulm* (act of wrongdoing, injustice), 132, 144 n. 47, 146 n. 62. znn*: az-zann* (opinion: a judgement lacking in certitude, based on insufficient evidence), 90 n. 98. zhr*: zahara*, yazharu*, zuhuran* (to be or to become manifest), 54, 56 n. 14, 59, 80 n. 3, 82 n. 7, 156. az-zahir* (exterior surface), 116 n. 17. 'bt*: al-'abat* (purposeless action), 133f.*, 142 n. 36, 144 nn. 48, 49. 'br: 'abbara, yu'abbiru (to express, speak of, refer to), 30 n. 13. al-'ibara* (expression, word used to name, refer to, or describe something), 23, 29 n. 9, 30 n. 13, 42, 49 n. 13, 100, 168 n. 56, 172 n. 68. 'gz*: 'agiz* (incapable of acting), 172 nn. 74, 75; al-'agz* (incapacity to act), 51 n. 23. 'dm: 'udima, yu'damu, 'adaman to be nonexistent), 83 n. 20. ma'dum* (nonexistent, possible), 54, 57 n. 18, 172 n. 75;
kawnuhû ma'dû-man (being nonexistent), see s. kâna, yakûnu. al-'adam (nonexistence), 36 n. 42, 37 n. 47, 56 nn. 11, 12, 14, 57 n. 17, 84 n. 42, 123 n. 88 'dr*: ta'addara*, yata'a-adddaru* ['alayhî l-fi'l] (to be incapable of), 172 n. 74. 'rb: al-'arabîya: 'ahlu l-`arabîya (the grammarians), 78. 'rd*: al-'arad*, pl. al-'a'rad* (accident), 39, 47 n. 3, 83 n. 21, 87 nn. 68, 70, 111 n. 3*, 113 n. 13. 'rf: 'arafa, ya'rifu (to know, recognise), 64. at-ta'âruf (contextual use or meaning of a word), 35 n. 36, 48 n. 8, 81 n. 5. 'zm*: ta'azama*, yata'azamu*, ta`azuman* (to increase in magnitude), 96.
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`qd: al-i`tiqâd (conviction), 26, 30 n. 12, 48 n. 8, 89 n. 91, 90 n. 98, 144 n. 47. `ql: `aqala, ya`qilu, `aqlan (to understand, grasp with the mind), 13, 24, 37, 49, 59, 89 n. 91, 139 n. 7; waghun * ma`qûl, see s. wagh*. `ll: al-`illa1, pl. al-`ilal (basis, reason, origin, cause), 10, 28 n. 6*, 88 n. 75, 148f.*; (basis of the validity of a predicate), 12, 105; al-`illa2 (synonym of al-rna`nà2: entitative "accident"), 71, 87 n. 74, 88 n. 76, 112 n. 3*, 123 n. 84, 135; lâ li-`illatin wa-lâ lin-nafs, 148-163. al-ma`lûl (effect of an `illa2), 87 n. 74; ma`lûl [fîhî], (that in which the effect is present), 88 n. 76. `allala, yu`allilu, ta`lîlan (to explain, give the cause for or the reasons for), 56 nn. 5, 8, 71, 79, 139 n. 7, 148-150*, 173 n. 76. at-ta`lîl (explanation, assignment of the cause), 58, 87 n. 69, 92 n. 105, 156, 164 nn. 9, 10, 13, 165 n. 14, 170 n. 54. `lq: ta`allaqa, yata`allaqu, ta`alluqan (to be related, correlated), 91 n. 99, 128, 134; at-ta`alluq (relation, correlation), 57 n. 21, 63, 83 n. 20, 89 nn. 85, 86, 90, 92 n. l06. `1m: `alima, ya`lamu, `ilman (to know): al-`ilm (knowing, knowledge in general), 138 n. 2, 156, 168 n. 33, 169 n. 39. al-`ilm (the act of knowing), 18, 75-77, 89 n. 87, 139 n. 14, 122 nn. 62, 68, 140 n. 25; al-`ilmu d-daruri* ("necessary knowing"), 84 n. 38, 89 n. 91; al-`ilmu l-muktasab (knowing based on inference), 89 n. 91, 122 n. 64; `ilmun lâ ma`lûma lahû (an act of knowing that has no real object), 170 n. 56; `âlirn (knowing, knower), 12, 42; ma`lûm (known, an object of knowing), 14, 23, 26f., 59, 170 n. 56; alma`lûmu l-muhbaru* `anhû (a definition for `ay'un'), 57 n. 22. `mm: `âmm (general, universal), 91 n. 102, 115 n. 17. `md: al-i`timâd (pressure, force, momentum), 87 n. 72, 92 n. l04, 103, 116 n. 17, 119 n. 35; al-i`timâdu l-mugtalab* (induced pressure or momentum), 79, 92 n. l04; al-i`timâdu l-lâzim (intrinsic, permanent pressure), 79, 92 n. 104, 116 n. 17. `ml: ista`mala, yasta`milu, isti`mâlan (to employ, use), 71 (of the qudar), 88 n. 75 (of the substrate). `ny: al-ma`nà1, pl. al-ma`ânî (meaning, sense, referent), 15, 28 n. 6, 29 n. 9, 31 n. 15; harfu* ma`nan (particle; a grammatical term), 21. al-ma`nà2 (a synonym of `illa2: the entitative accident [sc., the basis of the truth of the predication and the ground of the actuality of the attribute or characteristic]), 12, 28 n. 6, 50 n. 23, 87 n. 70, 111 n. 3*; sifatu* l-ma`ânî, see s. sifa*. `wd: 'a`âda, yu`îdu (to create anew what has ceased to exist), 118 n. 31. al-`âda (the normal course of events), 172 n. 71. grd*: al-garad*, pl. al-'agrad* (purpose, intent), 133. gny*: gani* (self-sufficient), 149, 158*. gyr*: gayr* (other), 158f., 172 nn. 67, 68.
al-gayriya* (being other, otherness), 159, 171 n. 65*. tagayyara*, yatagayyaru*, tagayyuran* (to change, alter), 109-111, 123 nn. 86-88. tagayara*, yatagayaru*, tagayuran* (to become other), 88 n. 86, 109. frd: mutafarrid (unique), 165 n. 17. infarada, yanfaridu (to be unique), 157. frq: al-farq (difference, distinction), 87 n. 63; at-tafriqa (distinction), 86 n. 62; fâraqa, yufâriqu, mufâraqatan (to be distinct, distinguished, distinguishable), 35 n. 35, 40, 88 n. 76; al-mufâraqa (being distinct), 131. al-mufâraqa (the accident of separation; synonymous with al-mubâ`ada), 98f.
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iftaraqa, yaftariqu, iftirâqan (to be distinct, distinguishable), 40, 73, 101; al-iftirâq (distinction), 26, 71. al-iftirâq (the accident of separation; synonymous with al-mubâ`ada), 98-100. fsd: al-fasâd (defect): fasâddun fî l-qalb, 52 n. 41, 172 n. 70. fsr: at-tafsîr (explanation), 48 n. 8. fsl *: al-fasl* (separation, interval, discontinuity), 40, 118 n. 31. infasala*, yanfasilu* (to be distinct, separate, separable), 51 n. 25, 126, 169 n. 45. f`l: fa`ala, yaf`alu (to act, cause an act to exist), 40. al-fi`l1, pl. al-'af`âl (act) 88 n. 80; fi`lu s-sâhî wan-nâ'im (the act of one who is unaware of what he is doing), 130; 'af`âlu l-qulûb (interior acts), 44, 51 n. 29; sifat* al-'af`âl, see s. sifa*. al-fi'l2 (verb), 21. al-fi`lîya (action), 122 n. 77, 126, 135f., 139 n. 13*. al-fâ`il (agent), 138 n. 2, 140 n. 18; that as agent (acting) the agent has no ontologically real attribute (hal*), 144, nn. 54, 55, 59; the effective attributes of the agent, see s. hal*. fqr: iftaqara, yaftariqu 'ilà (to need, require), 70, 88 n. 75. fkk: infakka, yanfakku (to be separable), 126. al-falsafa (philosophy), 1f., 113 n. 8. fyd: 'afâda, yufîdu, mufîd (to convey meaning, be meaningful, mean), 21f., 27, 48 n. 8, 130, 147 n. 65, 158, 170 n. 52; 'afâda t-ta'rîf (to convey particular meaning about an individual), 78f., 91, 101. al-fâ'ida, pl. al-fawâ'id (meaning, sense [conveyed by a sentence or word]), 12, 15f., 18, 32 n. 20, 41, 130, 145 n. 53. qbh*: al-qubh* (ethical badness), 126, 132-135, 145 n. 52, 146 n. 53; wuguhu* l-qubh*, 132-135. qabih* (ethically bad), 132-135, 144 nn. 48, 49. qbl: al-qabîl (class), 36 n. 37, 71, 82 n. 12, 90 nn. 95, 96, 91 nn. 99, 101. qdr: qadira, yaqdaru (to be capable of autonomous action): al-qâdiru l-hayy*, see s. hayy*; kawnuhû qâdiran, see s. kâna, yakûnu; al-maqdûru `alayhî (the possible whose existence can be brought to actuality by an agent), 108. al-qudra, pl. al-qudar (the power of autonomous action), 44, 77, 84 n. 32, 88 n, 80, 89 n. 86, 106-108; that the act is proportional to the quantity of the qudar, 122 n. 79; isti`mâl al-qudar (the utilization of the qudar), 71; mahallu* l-qudar (the substrate of the qudar), 108; taganusu* maqdûrâti l-qudar, 146 n. 7. qdm: qaduma, yaqdumu, qidaman (to be eternal), 68, 165 n. 17; qadîm (eternal), al-qadîm (God), 33 n. 25, 53, 86 nn. 55, 57-60, 87 n. 64, 167 n. 25.
qrb: al-qurb: a synonym for al-mugawara* (q.v.), 99. al-muqâraba (proximity; synonymous with al-mugawara*, al-igtma`*), 98-100, 104. qsm: at-taqsîmu was-sabr, 38 n. 52. qsd*: al-qasd* (intention, purpose), 52 n. 42, 138 n. 4, 144 n. 48, 145 n. 49. qsr*: maqsur* (restricted to, belonging ex-clusively to), 53, 55 n. 1, 120 n. 45, 170 n. 45. qdy*: iqtada*, yaqtadi*, iqtida'an* (to entail, cause, give rise to), 51 n. 33, 68, 83 n. 23, 86 nn. 54, 58, 60, 88 n. 80, 107, 120 n. 40, 123 n. 89, 132, 155f., 169 n. 44, 172 n. 75; al-muqtadi* (cause), 80 n. 4, 143 n. 45; al-muqtada* (the entailed, used of the essential attribute), 80 nn. 1, 4, 82 n. 7, 83 n. 20, 91 n. 99, 139 n. 6. qlb: inqalaba, yanqalibu (to change, become something else), 81 n. 5; al-qalb, pl. al-qulûb (heart), 44, 52 n. 41, 172 n. 70; 'af`âlu l-qulûb (interior acts) see s. fi`l. qld: at-taqlîd (conviction based solely on authority), 74, 76, 142 n. 40.
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qwl: al-qawl (utterance, word), 23, 31. qwm: qâma, yaqûmu (to subsist, exist): qâma bi- (to subsist in, reside in), 12, 47, 48 n. 4; qâ`im: qâ'imun tabit * (concretely existent), 131; qâ'imun bin-nafs ("self-subsistent"), 48 n. 4*, 116 n. 17. qys: al-qiyâs (reasoning), 14. kdb*, al-kadb*, al-kadib* (false statement), 134, 143 n. 46*. ksb: iktasaba, yaktasibu, iktisâban: `ilmun muktasab, see s. `ilm; al-kasb ("acquisition"; an A`arite term and concept for the human act), 81 n. 5. kf: al-kaf (explanation), 149; inkaafa, yahkaifu, inkiâfan (to explain), 63. klf: at-taklîf (obligation, involving praise and blame, reward and punishment), 30 n. 10. klm: takallama, yatakallamu (to speak): `mutakallim' ('speaking'), 135. al-kalâm1 (speech), 70; kalârnu l-'abit* (purposeless, meaningless speech), 130; kalâm Allâh, 9. al-kalâm2 (sentence): 'aqsâmu l-kalâm (the categories of sentences), 127f., 140 n. 22. kwn: kâna, yakûnu, kawnan (to be, to exist, to be present, to come to be), 20-22, 33 n. 30, 35 n. 33, 95f., 114 nn. 14, 15; kâ'in (existent), 57 n. 14; kawnu -ay' ... (an entity's being ...; used to speak of attributes), 35 n. 33; kawnuhû `alà sifatin* (its being qualified by an attribute), 139 n. 7; kawnuhû mu'allafan, 61; kawnuhû gawharan*, 57 nn. 18, 21; kawnuhû hayyan*, 43f., 50 n. 23, 107, 111, 122 n. 69, 169 n. 44; kawnuhû mudrikan, 153-156, 162; kawnuhû murîdan, 138 n. 3; kawnuhû ay'an, 92 n. 103; kawnuhû ma`dûman, 57 n. 14; kawnuhû `âliman, 45, 63, 138 n. 3; kawnuhû qadîman, 68, 87 n. 63; kawnuhû qâdiran, 61, 63f., 125, 136, 138 n. 3; kawnuhû kâ'inan2, 103, 119 n. 40; kawnuhû mawgudan*, 69, 84, 87 n. 63; kâna2 [fî gihatin*] (to have spatial location, position [in a position]), 96; kâ'in [fî gihatin*] (being in a position, having spatial location), 12, 103, 112 n. 5, 119 n. 40. al-kawn, pl. al-'akwân (the accident, kawn), 12, 26, 74, 93-104, 112 n. 5, 113 n. 6, 114 n. 16, 116 n. 24*, 118 n. 32;
the perceptibility of the 'akwân according to al-Gubba'i*, 118 n. 32; al-kawnu l-mubtada' (the initial kawn), 103, 118 n. 32, 119 n. 38. al-makân, pl. al-'amkina (place): place, generally defined, 96; place, in the formal sense, 102, 114 n. 16*, 116 n. 18; used as a synonym for giha* (position), 114 n. 16*, 117 nn. 24, 28. al-kayfîya1 (modality, mode of actuality or being), 39, 71, 74, 86 n. 62, 87 n. 67, 87 n. 72, 88 n. 77, 105, 116 n. 24; kayfîyatu stihqaqi* s-sifa*, 87 n. 63; al-kayfîya2 (how to perform an act), 140 n. 20. lzq: iltazaqa, yaltaziqu, iltizâqan (to adhere, cleave together), 104, 120 n. 52. lzm: lazima, yalzamu: al-i`timâdu l-lâzim, see s. i`timâd. lsn: al-lisân (language): 'ahlu 1-1isân (the native speakers of a language), 48 n. 8. lgw*: al-luga* (language): on the origin of language see 29 n. 10; 'ahl al-luga* (the lexicographers, philologians), 16, 23, 31 n. 14, 35 n. 34, 41, 47 n. 3, 48 n. 8. lfz*: al-lafz*, pl. al-'alfaz* (word, utterance), 31 n. 15. lqb: al-laqab, pl. al-'alqâb, 13, 36 n. 37, 141 n. 34, 161, 166 n. 20; al-'alqâb al-halisa*, al-mahda*, 78f, 91 nn. 101, 102. laqqaba, yulaqqibu, talqîban (to call something by a laqab), 13.
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lqy: laqiya, yalqà (to touch, be in contact with), 116 n. 21. lâqà, yulâqî (to touch, be in contact with), 116 n. 20. lms: al-lams (touch, feeling, sense of touch). 155, 168 n. 36. lwn: al-lawn, pl. al-'alwân (color), 90 n. 96, 104f. mâ: mâ huwa 'alayhî (the way it is), 46, 160; mâ huwa bihî (the way it is), 75; mâ huwa `alayhî fî datihi/fi * nafsihî (the way it is in itself), 53, 56 nn. 5f. 58, 73f., 78, 82 nn. 11, 15, 17, 85 n. 45, 87 n. 64, 89 nn. 86, 90, 92 n. 105, 105, 125; li-mâ huwa `alayhî fî datihi/fi* nafsihî (by virtue of the way it is in itself), 80 nn. 1f., 81 n. 5, 86 n. 58, 91 n. 99; mâ huwa `alayhî mina l-'ahwal* (the attributes by which its being is qualified), 139 n. 17. mtl*: tamatala*, yatamatalu*, tamatulan* (to be similar to), 64-66, 84 nn. 41f., 85 nn. 45, 48, 92 n. 105, 103, 120 nn. 40-42. al-mitl*, pl. al-'amtal* (that which is alike; a synonym of mutamdtil*), 102, 151. mrr: istamarra, yastamirru, istimrâran (to continue, be constant), 26. mzy: al-mazîya (additional qualification), 44, 46. mss: al-mumâssa (contact, contiguity; a synonym for al-mugawara*, al-igtima`*), 98f., 104. msh*: al-masaha* (surface), 82 n. 12, 96, 115f. n. 17. mkn: al-mutamakkin (that which is in a place, has place), 116 n. 18. mn`: mana`a, yamna`u, man`an (to prevent, preclude), 160; al-mâni`, pl. al-mawâni' (impediment), 169 n. 44. mwt: mayyit (inanimate, non-living), 40, 51 n. 24; al-mawt (inanimateness), 50 n. 23. myz: tamayyaza, yatamayyazu, tamayyuzan (to be distinguished, distinct, distinguishable), 40, 54f., 86 n. 54, et alibi. nb': 'anba'a, yunbi'u `an (to reveal, manifest), 61, 89 n. 90, 92 n. 105. ntq*: al-mantiq*, 4. nzr*: nazara*, yanzuru* `ilà (to look at, cast the eyes on), 155. nazara*, yanzuru* fî (to consider, reflect on, think about): an-nazaru* (the act of reasoning, reflection), 122 n. 77, 138 n. l, 146 n. 55. intazara*, yantaziru*: sifatun* muntazara*, see s. sifa*. nfs: an-nafs1, pl. al-'anfus (self, being, essence; a synonym of dat*); lin-nafs (belonging to the thing itself, essential), 55 n. 1, 73, 79, 82 n. 14, 92 n. 103, 165 n. 14; mâ huwa `alayhî fî nafsihî (the way it is in itself, its essential being) see s. mâ; lâ lin-nafsi wa-lâ li-`illa, 148-163; qâ'imun bin-nafs, see s. qâ'im. an-nafs2, pl. an-nufûs (soul): sukûnu n-nafs, see s. sukûn (note that this is a fixed expression and that `nafs is not formally significant by itself.). an-nafas: an-nafasu l-mutaraddidu (breath), 49 n. 14. nfy: an-nafy (negation), 170 n. 56; sifatu* n-nafy (negative predicate) see s. sifa*. intafà, yantafî, intifâ (to be absent, to lack actuality, to be nonexistent), 37 n. 47, 57 n. 14, 109, 133, 145 n. 53, 172 n. 72. nqs*: an-nuqsan* (deficiency, imperfection), 107.
nkr: an-nakira (indefinite noun), 34 n. 31, 92 n. 102. nw`: an-naw`, pl. al-'anwâ` (class; when correlative to gins*, naw` indicates the broader class), 36 n. 37, 70, 77-79, 90 nn. 95f., 91 nn. 99, 101, 92 n. 106, 117 n. 26. nwl: tanâwala, yatanâwalu (to receive, grasp, apprehend; used of sense and perception), 154, 168 n. 31, 172 n. 67.
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hwy: al-hawiyya (downward motion), 115 n. 17. hy': al-hay'a, pl. al-hay'ât (disposition) 105, 121 n. 56*. wgb *: wagaba*, yagibu*, wuguban* (to be necessary), 86 n. 59, 111 n. 2, 123 n. 84, 139 n. 6; sifatun* wagiba*, see s. sifa*. 'awgaba*, yugibu*, 'igaban* (to necessitate, to cause), 52 n. 37, 82 n. 15, 88 n. 76, 116 n. 24, 140 n. 25. at-mugib* (cause), 103, 127. mugab* (caused, necessitated), 46, 85 n. 48. wgd*: wagada*, yagidu*, wugudan*, wigdanan* (to know, to have immediate experience or intuition of), 37 n. 49, 83 n. 19, 172 n. 72; wugida*, yugadu*, wugudan* (to exist), 52 n. 37, 112 n. 5, 114 n. 14; al-wugud* (existence), 22, 80 n. 3, 81 n. 6, 82 nn. 7-9, 11f., 86 n. 55, 87 nn. 68f., 119 n. 40, 138 n. 7, 140 n. 18; God's existence, 86 nn. 58-60, 62, 87 n. 63; istimrâru l-wugud* (continuance in existence), 26; tagaddudu* l-wugud* (temporal beginning of existence), 26 and see s. tagaddada*; kayfîyatu l-wugud* (mode of existence), 87 nn. 67, 69, 72, 88 n. 77; see also s. kayfîya; `li-wugudihi*' (in al-Gubba'i's* usage), 164 n. 13, 167 n. 23, 169 n. 45; masrutun* bil-wugud* (conditional upon existence), 80 n. 3; mawgud* (existent), 26, 28 n. 7, 39, 114 n. 14; kawnuhû mawgudan* (being existent), see s. kâna, yakûnu; laysa bi-mawgud* (is-not existent), 55. al-mawgud* (entity, that which exists), 45, 52 n. 36. 'awgada*, yugidu*, 'igadan* (to cause to exist), 84 n. 27. wgh*: al-giha*1 pl. al-gihat* (direction), 97, 114 n. 16*, 116 n. 21, 119 n. 35; al-giha*2, pl. al-gihat* (position in space), 96-104, 114 n. 16*, 116 n. 18. al-wagh*1, pl. al-wuguh* ("manner"): waghu* l-hudut*, waghu* l-wuqû` (the manner in which an entity comes to exist, an act occurs), 74, 106, 129-135, 140 n. 28, 142 nn. 38*, 40, 143 nn. 42f., 145 n. 49; hasala* `alà waghin*, waqa`a `alà waghin* (to come to actuality, come to be in a particular manner), 119 n. 40, 122 n. 62, 143 n. 43, 154; waghun* ma`qûl (an intelligible, i.e., discernable and distinguishable, manner [of coming to be]), 132, 135, 142 n. 36, 145 n. 52; waghun* yatba`u l-hudut*, 140 n. 28, 143 n. 42; wuguhu* l-qubh*, 132-135; wuguhu* l-husn*, 134f., 145 n. 49; waghu* l-istihqaq* (the manner in which it belongs to an entity to have a given attribute), 67. al-wagh*2, pl. al-wuguh* (respect, way; e.g., "in a given respect"), 56 n. 5, 89 n. 86. whd*: wahid* (one), 156-159*, 170 n. 52; fî hukmi* -ay'i l-wahid/bi-manzilati* -ay'i l-wahia* (having onto-logically the character of a unitary entity), 40, 50 nn. 19-21, 23, 52 n. 37, 104. ws`: at-tawassu` (extended usage of a word), 157. wsf*: wasafa*, yasifu*, wasfan* (to describe, to predicate something of), 31 n. 15; as-sifa*1, pl. as-sifat*, al-'awsâf (a qualifier, descriptive term, predicate), 10, 12, 14, 18 (where there is a conflict of usage with sifa*4), 23, 31 n. 15, 32 n. 20, 33 n. 25, 35 n. 35, 36 n. 37, 78f.; sifatu* ma`nan (a predicate whose truth rests upon the presence of a ma`nà2/`'illa2), 25f., 119 n. 33;
sifatun* mutaqqa (a derived predicate), 135-138, 146 n. 62, 147 nn. 64f., 67, 162f.; sifatu* fi`lin (predicate of action; a synonym for sifatun* mutaqqa), 12; sifatu* nafy (negative predicate), 157-161. as-sifa*2, pl. as-sifat* (the concept signified by a sifa*1), 31 n. 15. as-sifa*3, pl. as-sifat*, occasionally
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al-'awsaf * (an attribute; synonymous with hal*, q.v.), 22, 26f., 37 n. 49, 44, 72, 83 n. 21, et alibi pass.; 'alà sifatin* (qualified by an attribute), 23, 35 n. 35, 64; sifatun* tabita* (a real attribute, sc., one that is not reducible on analysis to a negation), 100; sifatun* mutagaddida* (an attribute that comes to actuality in the subject), 124; sifatun* zâ'idatun `alà l-wugud* (an attribute distinct from existence), 140 n. 18; sifatun* wagiba* (necessary attribute), 125, 139 n. 6; sifatu* d-dat*, 55 n. 1, 85 nn. 47f., 50, 138 n. 6; as-sifatu* d-datiya*, 55 n. 1, 80 n. 1, 83 n. 20, 84 n. 42; sifatu* n-nafs, 80 n. l, 85 n. 49, 123 n. 86; as-sifatu* n-nafsîya, 55 n. 1, 86 n. 55; sifatun* muqtadah* (`ani d-dat*), 58, 62, 80 n. 1, 81 n. 6, 82 n. 10, 83 n. 20, 84 n. 42, 85 n. 50, 91 n. 90; sifatun* mugabatun* `an sifati* d-dat*, 80 n. 1; sifatun* muntazara*, 54, 85 n. 44; sifatun* ragi'atun* 'lià l-gumla*, 51 n. 33; sifatu* gins* (an attribute belonging to each member of a class, sc., an essential attribute), 56 n. 11, 72-77, 88 n. 80, 89 n. 84, 124; sifatun* mu'attira*, 138 n. 3; as-sifa*1, pl. as-sifat* (an "attribute" in the A`arite use; a synonym of ma`nà2, 'illa2), 18, 33 n. 25; al-wasf*, pl. al-'awsaf* (the act of describing or predicating, a descriptive term or predicate; note that though the plural 'awsaf* is sometimes used by the Mu'tazilites as a plural for sifa*2, the singular, wasf*, is rarely, if ever, used as an equivalent for sifa*2), 14f., 18, 23, 31 n. 15, 33 n. 25, 35 n. 35, 36 n. 37; al-wasf* al-mutaqq (a synonym for as-sifatu* l-mutaqqa), 146 n. 62. mawsuf*1 (qualified, described), 26f., 32 n. 16; al-mawsuf*1 (object of which a predication is made), 18f., 37 n. 49, 51 n. 33; al-mawsuf*2 (that which is qualified by an attribute), 85 nn. 46f., 159, 172 n. 68. wsl*: ittasala*, yattasilu*: al-ittisal* (continuity, contiguity), 40, 45, 50 n. 21. wd*': al-muwada`a* (the human convention that is the basis of language), 29 n. 10; al-mutawadi'un* (those who are party to such a convention, who know the language), 48 n. 8. wfq: wâfaqa, yuwâfiqu, wifâqan (to coincide) 85 nn. 50f. wqt al-waqt, pl. al-'awqât (instant, moment), 99, 101. wq`: waqa`a, yaqi`u, wuqû`an (to occur, come to be, exist), 75, 85 n. 45, 119 n. 40; waghu* l-wuqû`, see s. wagh*. wqf: waqafa, yaqifu, wuqûfan (to be based on, grounded in), 82 n. 7; mawqûfun `alà (passive with the same sense), 74, 82 n. 15. at-tawqîf (God's establishment of the convention of language; opposed to al-muwada'a*), 13, 29f. n. 10. wld: wallada, yuwallidu, tawlîdan (to generate an effect, cause the actuality of a being or event), 79, 87 n. 72, 92 n. 104, 138 n. 1. Page 201
Citations Of Kalâm Works
`Abd al-Gabbar* al-Magmu*` al-muhit* bit-takîf: 41: Ch. V, nn. 1, 9, 16, 24, 25, 26, 31. 41ff.: Ch. V, n. 24. 45: Ch. V, nn. l, 16, 25, 46. 46f: Ch. V, n. 24. 50: Ch. IV, n. 76. 59: Ch. IV, n. 43. 61: Ch. III, nn. 4, 7; Ch. IV, n. 57. 72: Ch. V, n. 3. 81: Ch. IV, n. 21. 98: Ch. V, n. 1. Ch. I, n. 52; Ch. III, n. 1; Ch. IV, nn. 1, 2; Ch. VII, nn. 107: 28, 30. 127: Ch. III, n. l; Ch. V, n. 69. 133: Ch. V, nn. 69, 89. 134: Ch. II, n. 23. 135: Ch. VII, n. 42. 135ff.: Ch. VII, nn. 30, 43. 136: Ch. II, n. 25; Ch. IV, n. 22; Ch. VII, nn. 27, 35, 42. 137: Ch. VII, nn. 30, 44. 139: Ch. II, n. 36. 140: Ch. IV, n. 1. 142: Ch. IV, nn. 1, 11, 40; Ch. VI, n. 6. 144: Ch. IV, n. 1. 151f.: Ch. V, n. 88. 152: Ch. V, n. 87. 153Ch. VI, n. 43. 155: 155: Ch. VI, n. 43. 155ff.: Ch. IV, n. 41. 156f: Ch. IV, n. 58. 157f.: Ch. VI, n. 16. 159: Ch. III, n. 1. 160: Ch. IV, nn. 22, 32, 39. 163: Ch. IV, nn. 6, 27, 57, 63. 165: Ch. V, n. 67; Ch. VI, n. 43. 166: Ch. VII, n. 44. 166f: Ch. IV, nn. 17, 57, 83. Ch. I, nn. 15, 52; Ch. III, nn. 1, 3; Ch. IV, nn. 1, 17; Ch. 172: VII, n. 26. 173: Ch. I, n. 34; Ch. V, n. 84. 174: Ch. IV, n. 56. 181: Ch. IV, n. 14. 181ff.: Ch. IV, n. 41. 182: Ch. IV, nn. 1, 58; Ch. V, n. 85; Ch. VI, n. 9. 183: Ch. IV, n. 107. 183f.: Ch. VII, n. 8. 184: Ch. I, n. 36; Ch. IV, nn. 88, 106. 187: Ch. I, n. 47. 188: Ch. I, n. 41; Ch. II, n. 30; Ch. IV, n. 56; Ch. V, nn. 55, 59. 188f.: Ch. IV, n. 5; Ch. VI, n. 67. 189: Ch. I, n. 52; Ch. IV, n. 1. 190: Ch. IV, n. 5; Ch. VI, nn. 64, 65. 190f.: Ch. V, n. 14. 192: Ch. IV, n. 2. 193: Ch. I, n. 41. 194: Ch. VI, n. 58. 195: Ch. VIII, n. 74. 196: Ch. VI, n. 47. 197: Ch. III, n. 4.
Ch. II, nn. 23, 24; Ch. IV, nn. 30, 52; Ch. V, nn. 5, 16, 24. 206: Ch. IV, nn. 48, 52, 81. 199: Ch. V, nn. 70, 75. 200: Ch. II, n. 4; Ch. IV, n. 69. 204f.: Ch. IV, n. 69. 204ff.: Ch. IV, n. 63; Ch. V, n. 24. 205: Ch. III, n. 1; Ch. IV, nn. 1, 11, 20. 206f.: Ch. I, n. 52. 198:
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Ch. II, n. 32; Ch. IV, n. 23. 207: 213: Ch. VII, nn. 61, 62. 215f.: Ch. VI, n. 9. 217: Ch. IV, n. 57; Ch. VII, nn. 17, 49, 56. 226: Ch. IV, nn. 21, 64, 65. 306: Ch. IV, n. 5; Ch. VI, n. 67. 306ff.: Ch. VI, n. 32. 307: Ch. VI, nn. 30, 32. 309ff.: Ch. VI, n. 56. 310: Ch. VI, n. 55. 315: Ch. VI, n. 13. 327: Ch. VI, nn. 30, 31. 334: Ch. V, n. 12. 337: Ch. VI, n. 67. 352: Ch. I, n. 45; Ch. VI, nn. 2, 20. 353: Ch. V, n. 24; Ch. VI, nn. 6, 9. 354: Ch. VI, nn. 17, 47. al-Mugni * fî 'abwâb at-tawhid* wal-'adl: pt. 4 8f.: Ch. VII, n. 61. 26: Ch. IV, n. 80. 33ff.: Ch. VII, n. 32. 39: Ch. VII, n. 40. 41: Ch. VII, nn. 32, 37, 38, 46. 50ff.: Ch. VII, n. 43. 51: Ch. II, n. 29; Ch. VII, n. 29. 54: Ch. VII, n. 29. 55: Ch. II, nn. 27, 29; Ch. VII, n. 29. 81: Ch. VII, n. 32. 82: Ch. VII, n. 34. 83: Ch. VII, n. 31. 166: Ch. I, n. 24. 177: Ch. II, n. 33. 179f.: Ch. II, n. 4. 186: Ch. IV, n. 5. 241: Ch. VII, nn. 17, 49, 56. 242: Ch. IV, n. 50; Ch. VII, n. 50. 242f.: Ch. I, n. 40; Ch. II, n. 3. 243: Ch. VII, n. 56. 244: Ch. VII, nn. 52, 56, 60. 245: Ch. VII, n. 76. 245f.: Ch. VII, nn. 14, 53, 57, 58. 246: Ch. IV, p. 158; Ch. VII, n. 54. 247ff.: Ch. VII, n. 56. 250: Ch. I, n. 52; Ch. III, n. l; Ch. IV, n. 1. 250f.: Ch. IV, n. 57. 252f.: Ch. IV, n. 49. 253: Ch. VII, nn. 5, 74. 255f.: Ch. I, n. 45. 258: Ch. I, n. 45. 259f.: Ch. VI, n. 18. 270: Ch. III, n. 1; Ch. IV, nn. 1, 17· 270f.: Ch. III, n. 1; Ch. IV, nn. 41, 48· 271: Ch. IV, n. 1. 271ff.: Ch. IV, n. 86. 273: Ch. IV, n. 48. 306: Ch. IV, n. 32. 312: Ch. II, n. 22. 318: Ch. VII, n. 68. 325: Ch. V, n. 47. 330f.: Ch. I, n. 46.
331: 333: 334f.: 337: 337ff.: pt. 5 26: 29: 32: 128: 160: 160ff.: 177: 178: 179ff.: 180: 186: 186ff.: 187: 188f.: 189ff.:
Ch. IV, n. 32. Ch. V, nn. 74, 78, 80; Ch. VII, n. 8. Ch. II, n. 24. Ch. IV, n. 94. Ch. VII, n. 74. Ch. IV, n. 21. Ch. II, n. 19. Ch. IV, n. 43. Ch. I, n. 9. Ch. VI, n. 35. Ch. I, n. 10; Ch. VI, n. 33. Ch. II, n. 39. Ch. IV, n. 101. Ch. I, n. 24. Ch. I, n. 50. Ch. I, n. 40. Ch. I, n. 9. Ch. I, n. 34; Ch. II, n. 8. Ch. I, n. 24. Ch. I, n. 9.
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198: Ch. I, n. 37; Ch. IV, nn. 98, 100, 101, 102. 198ff.:Ch. IV, n. 101. 201: Ch. III, n. 2. 204ff.:Ch. I, n. 24. 205: Ch. I, nn. 17, 21, 39, 41, 50; Ch. IV, nn, 2, 5, 55. 210ff.:Ch. III, n. 2. 211: Ch. VI, n. 68. 219: Ch. II, n. 4; Ch. IV, nn. 12, 30, 31. 219f.: Ch. IV, n. 26. 222f: Ch. VII, n. 23. 224: Ch. VII, n. 39. 229: Ch. V, n. 90. 230: Ch. VI, n. 7. 231: Ch. VII, n. 42. 232: Ch. V, n. 15. 233: Ch. I, n. 24. 233f.: Ch. IV, n. 17. 234: Ch. IV, n. 5. 237: Ch. IV, n. 104; Ch. V, n. 14. 239: Ch. II, n. 4. 241: Ch. VII, nn. 27, 30, 41. 244: Ch. II, n. 3; Ch. VII, nn. 17, 50, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57. 244f.: Ch. IV, n. 5; Ch. VII, nn. 51, 52. 245: Ch. VII, nn. 17, 56, 57. 247: Ch. VII, n. 61. 249: Ch. IV, n. 100. 249f: Ch. IV, nn. 101, 102. 251: Ch. I, n. 14. 252: Ch. I, n. 36. 253: Ch. IV, n. 1; Ch. V, n. 3. 253f.: Ch. VII, n. 68. 254: Ch. VII, nn. 53, 66. pt. 6/1 6: Ch. I, n. 46; Ch. VIII, n. 25. 7: Ch. VI, n. 18. 9: Ch. I, n. 45. 9f.: Ch. VI, n. 7. 10: Ch. V, n. 17. 10f.: Ch. VI, n. 46. 11: Ch. VI, nn. 48, 49, 52. 11f.: Ch. VI, nn. 18, 47. 32f.: Ch. VI, n. 18. 33: Ch. I, n. 24. 40: Ch. I, n. 24. 41: Ch. IV, n. 5. 52: Ch. VI, nn. 39, 68. 52f.: Ch. VI, n. 45. 52-69:Ch. VI, n. 50. 54: Ch. I, n. 36; Ch. III, n. 14; Ch. IV, nn. 59, 68; Ch. VII, nn. 6, 14. 54f: Ch. VI, n. 46. 56: Ch. IV, n. 5. 59: Ch. VI, nn. 7, 51. 70ff.: Ch. VI, n. 51. 71: Ch. VI, n. 52. 83: Ch. VI, n. 47. 83f.: Ch. VI, n. 50. 165: Ch. V, n. 7. 167f.: Ch. V, n. 35. 171f.: Ch. IV, n. 92.
172: Ch. IV, n. 98. 175: Ch. V, n. 10. 182: Ch. II, n. 40. pt. 6/2 10ff.: Ch. VI, n. 24. 12: Ch. VI, n. 23. 18: Ch. VI, nn. 24, 33; Ch. VII, n. 14. 22: Ch. II, n. 38. 24: Ch. V, n. 1. 26ff.: Ch. V, n. 76. 45: Ch. IV, nn. 45, 86, 94. 47ff.: Ch. VI, n. 55. 49: Ch. IV, n. 80; Ch. VI, n. 23. 49f.: Ch. VI, nn. 24, 55. 56: Ch. I, n. 24. 59: Ch. I, n. 24. 61: Ch. I, n. 24. 63: Ch. VII, n. 70. 63f.: Ch. VII, nn. 71, 72. 68-77:Ch. VI, n. 41. 70f.: Ch. VI, n. 41. 73: Ch. VII, n. 2. 73f.: Ch. VI, nn. 9, 22, 37. 76f.: Ch. VI, nn. 15, 42. 78f.: Ch. VI, nn. 47, 50. 81: Ch. I, n. 24. 84-88:Ch. VI, n. 28. 91ff.: Ch. VI, n. 24. 94f.: Ch. VI, n. 26.
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Ch. VI, nn. 24, 47. Ch. VI, n. 33Ch. VI, n. 27. Ch. VI, n, 27. Ch. VI, n, 29. Ch. V, nn. 87, 88. Ch. VII, nn. 26, 48. Ch. VII, nn. 44, 75. Ch. VI, n. 62. Ch. IV, n. 76. Ch. V, n. 3. Ch. II, nn. 21, 23. Ch. V, n. 41. Ch. IV, n. 18; Ch. V, nn. 13, 63. Ch. IV, n. 76. Ch. II, n. 32; Ch. V, n. 41. Ch. IV, nn. 70, 80. Ch. IV, nn. 76, 77. Ch. IV, n. 70. Ch. IV, n. 76; Ch. V, n. 80. Ch. IV, n. 83. Ch. V, n. 87. Ch. V, nn. 87, 88. Ch. V, n. 88. Ch. V, n. 86. Ch. VI, n. 29. Ch. IV, n. 5. Ch. VI, n. 43. Ch. IV, n. 86. Ch. I, n. 24. Ch. I, n. 24. Ch. V, n. 1. Ch. II, n. 8; Ch. VI, n. 32. Ch. VI, n. 32. Ch. II, n. 28. Ch. II, n. 17. Ch. IV, n. 72. Ch. IV, n. 99. Ch. V, n. 55. Ch. IV, n. 72. Ch. V, n. 56. Ch. II, n. 29. Ch. II, n. 38; Ch. VII, nn. 70, 71, 72. Ch. V, n. 77; Ch. VI, n. 13. Ch. II, n. 38. Ch. VI, nn. 57, 64. Ch. VI, n, 56. Ch. IV, n. 5. Ch. VI, n. 61. Ch. III, n. 1; Ch. V, n. 84. Ch. IV, n. 1. Ch. VI, n. 54; Ch. VII, n. 47. Ch. IV, n. 1; Ch. VII, n. 45. Ch. III, n. 1; Ch. IV, n. 57. Ch, VI, n. 50. Ch. V, n. 56. Ch. I, n. 49; Ch. IV, n. 37. Ch. I, nn. 34, 35. Ch. VII, n. 63.
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Ch. VII, n. 66. Ch. VII, n. 52. Ch. VII, n. 67. Ch. VII, n. 69. Ch. VII, nn. 2, 68. Ch. VII, n. 63. Ch. IV, nn. 27, 62. Ch. VI, nn. 64, 65, 67. Ch. V, n. 35. Ch. VI, n. 31. Ch. VI, n. 31. Ch. IV, n. 99; Ch. V, n. 57; Ch. VII, n. 31. Ch. IV, n. 5. Ch. 1, n. 10. Ch. II, n. 42. Ch. VI, nn. 1, 41. Ch. VII, n. 25. Ch. VI, n. 64. Ch. V, n. 76. Ch. IV, n. 80. Ch. VI, n. 6. Ch. VI, nn. 4, 18, 38. Ch. VI, n. 47. Ch. IV, n. 84. Ch. VI, n. 6. Ch. IV, n. 5. Ch. VI, n. 18. Ch. VI, n. 18. Ch. IV, n. 9. Ch. VII, n. 30. Ch, VI, nn. 7, 39. Ch. I, n. 35.
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Ch. V. nn. 25, 46. Ch. I, n. 45; Ch. VII, nn. 74, 75. Ch. V, n. 8. Ch. IV, n. 5. Ch. IV, n. 5. Ch. II, n. 44. Ch. VI, n. 14. Ch. V, n. 16. Ch. V, n. 47. Ch. V, n. 16. Ch. II, n. 43; Ch. V, nn. 14, 15. Ch. II, nn. 34, 43; Ch. V, n. 73. Ch. VI, n. 53. Ch. VI, n. 1. Ch. V, n. 75. Ch. VI, n. 49. Ch. VI, nn. 46, 47, 50. Ch. VI, n. 47. Ch. VI, n. 11. Ch. V, n. 7. Ch. II, n. 6. Ch. I, n. 24. Ch. VI, n. 64. Ch. VI, n. 62. Ch. II, n. 6; Ch. V, n. 31. Ch. II, n. 20. Ch. IV, n. 5. Ch. VI, nn. 1, 5, 40. Ch. VI, n. 18. Ch. VI, n. 5. Ch. IV, n. 5. Ch. VI, n. 47. Ch. II, n. 27; Ch. V, n. 10; Ch. VII, n. 29. Ch. V, n. 76. Ch. V, nn. 78, 79. Ch. IV, n. 107. Ch. VI, n. 2. Ch. II, n. 30; Ch. V, n. 73. Ch. IV, n. 72. Ch. VI, n. 2. Ch. V, n. 79. Ch. V, nn. 6, 7. Ch. V, nn. 51, 52. Ch. V, n. 17. Ch. V, n, 4. Ch. IV, n. 104; Ch. V, n. 17. Ch. V, n. 55. Ch. IV, n. 18; Ch. V, nn. 3, 13. Ch. IV, n. 5; Ch. V, n. 7. Ch. V, n. 73. Ch. V, n. 17. ch. II, n. 23. Ch. V, nn. 6, 90. Ch. II, n. 29; Ch. V, n. 49. Ch. II, n. 29; Ch. IV, n. 71. Ch. IV, n. 61. Ch. IV, n. 94; Ch. V, n. 47. Ch. IV, n. 32. Ch. V, n. 35.
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Ch. V, n. 30. Ch. V, n. 122. Ch. V, n. 78. Ch. II, n. 26; Ch. V, n. 71. Ch. V, n. 45. Ch. IV, n. 104. Ch. V, n. 35. Ch. V, n. 46. Ch. V, n. 35. Ch. I, n. 47. Ch. VI, n. 48. Ch. VI, n. 49. Ch. VI, n. 53. Ch. VI, n. 51. Ch. IV, n. 50. Ch. VI, n. 62. Ch. VI, n. 43. Ch. II, n. 14. Ch. VI, n. 47. Ch. VI, n. 68; Ch. VII, n. 25. Ch. VI, nn. 36, 38, 48, 49. Ch. VI, n. 39. Ch. VI, n. 50. Ch. VI, n. 39. Ch. VI, n. 31. Ch. II, nn. 25, 28. Ch. II, nn. 10, 14. Ch. II, nn. 11, 31; Ch. V, n. 92. Ch. II, n. 12.
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Ch. V, n. 93. 312: 313: Ch. II, nn. 25, 28, 30, 37. 314: Ch. V, n. 56. 322ff.: Ch. IV, n. 56. 323: Ch. IV, nn. 1, 49, 50. 324: Ch. IV, n. 5. 324f.: Ch. II, n. 26. 325: Ch. II, n. 12. 328: Ch. II, nn. 21, 37. 329ff.: Ch. II, n. 38. 330: Ch. V, n. 63. 331: Ch. II, n. 30 334: Ch. II, nn. 26, 31, 37. 334ff.: Ch. V, n. 72. 335: Ch. II, nn. 24, 23, 25; Ch. IV, nn. 15, 21, 29. 335ff.: Ch. VII, n. 36. 336: Ch. II, n. 14. 340: Ch. V, n. 91. 340f.: Ch. VII, n. 44. 344f.: Ch. II, n. 26. 351: Ch. V, n. 80. 352: Ch. II, n. 37; Ch. V, n. 73. 352-354: Ch. II, n. 37. 353f.: Ch. II, n. 12. 354f.: Ch. II, n. 23. 357: Ch. II, n. 7. 357ff.: Ch. II, n. 12. 358: Ch. II, nn. 8, 17; Ch. VII, nn. 66, 67. 359: Ch. II, nn. 8, 17. 361: Ch. II, n. 17. 361ff.: Ch. II, n. 13. 362: Ch. II, n. 8. 363: Ch. II, n. 13. 363ff.: Ch. II, n. 12. 364: Ch. II, nn. 16, 17. 365: Ch. II, n. 29. 372: Ch. VI, n. 20. 376: Ch. V, nn. 5, 6. 377: Ch. II, n. 3. 378: Ch. VII, n. 36. 382: Ch. VII, n. 2. 387: Ch. IV, n. 5. 418f.: Ch. III, n. 2. 432: Ch. IV, nn. 17, 58. 432ff.: Ch. V, n. 12. 433: Ch. IV, nn. 17, 54, 55. 434: Ch. II, n. 23; Ch. IV, n. 104. 442: Ch. V, n. 45. 445: Ch. V, n. 54. 447: Ch. V, n. 41. 460: Ch. IV, n. 79. 467: Ch. II, n. 24. 468: Ch. IV, n. 46. 470: Ch. IV, n. 46. 472f.: Ch. V, n. 88. 473-476: Ch. II, n. 12. 528f.: Ch. VI, n. 46. 529f.: Ch. VI, n. 38. pt. 12 6: Ch. V, n. 76; Ch. VI, n. 55.
12: 13: 13ff.: 14: 16: 17: 20f.: 21: 24ff.: 25: 30ff.: 33: 34ff.: 56: 58ff.: 61: 62: 77f.: 102: 119: 138: 156f.: 161ff.: 212: 213: 213ff.: 280: 512: pt. 13 72: 126: 229: 237f.: 239:
Ch. II, n. 29; Ch. IV, n. 71. Ch. I, n. 12. Ch. II, n. 8. Ch. II, n. 28; Ch. IV, nn. 26, 30, 31; Ch. V, n. 66. Ch. V, n. 66. Ch. I, n. 9; Ch. VII, n. 23. Ch. IV, n. 26. Ch. IV, n. 31. Ch. IV, n. 87. Ch. IV, n. 87. Ch. V, n. 62. Ch. V, n. 89. Ch. V, n. 62. Ch. IV, n. 1. Ch. VII, n. 33. Ch. IV, nn. 2, 13; Ch. VII, n. 31. Ch. VII, n. 36. Ch. I, n. 46. Ch. II, n. 21. Ch. VII, n. 8. Ch. I, n. 24. Ch. VII, n. 33. Ch. VII, n. 33. Ch. VII, nn. 70, 71. Ch. VI, nn. 40, 47. Ch. IV, n. 92. Ch. VI, n. 47. Ch. I, n. 24. Ch. VI, n. 43. Ch. VI, n. 48. Ch. VII, n. 31. Ch. V, n. 49. Ch. II, n. 25.
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239f.: Ch. IV, n. 29. 240: Ch. II, n. 24; Ch. IV, n. 80. 246: Ch. V, nn. 5, 7. 253: Ch. V, n. 55. 254f.: Ch. IV, n. 99. 267: Ch. IV, n. 32. 316: Ch. VI, n. 53. 316f.: Ch. VI, n. 51. 351: Ch. VI, n. 50. 353f.: Ch. VI, n. 50. 538f.: Ch. VI, nn. 27, 33. pt. 14 13: Ch. IV, n. 5. 22: Ch. VI, n. 38. 42: Ch. I, n. 24. 47f.: Ch. VI, n. 67. 185: Ch. II, n. 8. 198: Ch. IV, n. 104. 222: Ch. V, n. 76. 241: Ch. VI, n. 50. 242: Ch. VI, n. 7. 293: Ch. VI, n. 59. 294: Ch. V, n. 56. pt. 15 105: Ch. I, n. 10. 106: Ch. I, n. 10. 152f.: Ch. VI, n. 6. 154: Ch. VI, n. 18. 155f.: Ch. V, n. 90. 157: Ch. V, n. 16. 197: Ch. I, n. 36. 323: Ch. VI, n. 33. 323ff.:Ch. VI, nn. 23, 37. 350: Ch. V, n. 32. pt. 16 43: Ch. II, n. 24. 50: Ch. VII, n. 68. 52: Ch. II, n. 6. 54: Ch. VI, n. 31. 191: Ch. VI, n. 20. 200f.: Ch. IV, n. 5. 207: Ch. VI, n. 20. 264: Ch. IV, n. 31. 290: Ch. VI, n. 47. 379: Ch. II, n. 14. 392f.: Ch. II, n. 14. pt. 17 12: Ch. I, n. 13. 14f.: Ch. VI, n. 33. 15: Ch. VII, n. 2. 38: Ch. VI, n. 36. pt. 18 3ff.: Ch. VI, n. 24. pt. 20/2 257: Ch. VII, n. 64. Muhtasar * al-Husna*: 183: Ch. V, n. 14. Mutaâbih al-Qur'ân: 1,30: Ch. V, n. 70. Sarh* al-Usul* al-hamsa*:
42: Ch. IV, n. 87. 72: Ch. VI, n. 18. 90: Ch. IV, n. 91. 92: Ch. IV, n. 95; Ch. V, n. 53. 93: Ch. I, n. 52. 96: Ch. V, nn, 9, 25. 97: Ch. V, n. 9. 98: Ch. V, nn, 1, 2. 100f.: Ch. V, n. 24. 101ff.:Ch. V, n. 24. 107: Ch. I, n. 52; Ch. IV, nn. 1, 6, 66. 108: Ch. I, n. 49; Ch. III, n. 10; Ch. IV, n. 47; Ch. V, nn. 81, 82. 110: Ch. I, nn. 43, 46.
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111: Ch. V, nn. 25, 60. 112: Ch. V, n. 5. 113: Ch. V, n. 28. 122: Ch. V, n. 14. 129: Ch. IV, n. 2; Ch. VII, n. 30. 160: Ch. V, n. 81. 167: Ch. VII, n. 27. 167ff.: Ch. VII, n. 30. 168: Ch. VII, nn. 32, 42. 168f.: Ch. VII, n. 27. 169: Ch. VII, n. 33. 170: Ch. VII, n. 30. 170ff.: Ch. VII, n. 43. 172: Ch. V, n. 87. 173f: Ch. VII, n. 40. 174: Ch. VII, n. 27. 175f.: Ch. V, n. 15. 176: Ch. III, n. 14. 176f.: Ch. V, n. 14. 182: Ch. IV, nn. 1, 2, 17, 57. 184: Ch. I, nn. 48, 49. 188ff.: Ch. V, n. 62; Ch. VI, n. 40, 98. 191: Ch. VI, n. 40. 199: Ch. IV, nn. 1, 2, 50; Ch. V, n. 84. 205: Ch. IV, n. 5; Ch. VI, n. 56. 206: Ch. V, n, 55. 207: Ch. VI, nn. 56, 67. 208f.: Ch. II, n. 2; Ch. V, n. 68. 230f.: Ch. IV, n. 70. 277: Ch. VII, nn. 17, 49, 50, 56. 303: Ch. VII, n. 4. 304f.: Ch. VII, n. 9. 309f.: Ch. VI, n. 44. 309ff.: Ch. VI, n. 46. 310: Ch. VI, n. 13. 313: Ch. VI, n. 38. 314: Ch. VI, nn. 12, 38. 343: Ch. I, n. 47; Ch. IV, n. 5. 349: Ch. VI, n. 62. 349ff.: Ch. VI, n. 64. 352: Ch. IV, n. 5. 366: Ch. I, nn. 48, 49. 370: Ch. VI, n. 62. 374: Ch. IV, n. 103; Ch. VI, n. 39. 528ff.: Ch. VI, n. 32. 529: Ch. I, n. 13; Ch. IV, n. 72; Ch. VI, n. 32. 535: Ch. II, n. 4. 536f.: Ch. I, n. 41; Ch. VI, n. 56. 538: Ch. V, n. 5. 554: Ch. III, n. 17. 555ff.: Ch. V, n. 12. Abû Raîd an-Nîsâbûrî al-Masâ'il fî l-hilaf * bayn al-Basriyin* wal-Bagdadiyin* (ed. A. Biram, Berlin, 1902 = foll. 1-44vº of the Berlin MS.) 2: Ch. IV, n. 81. 2ff.: Ch. IV, n. 99. 3: Ch. IV, n. 52; Ch. V, nn. 7, 16. 4: Ch. III, n. 1; Ch. IV, n. 1; Ch. VII, n. 26. 7: Ch. IV, n. 22; Ch. V, n. 89. 8: Ch, III, n. 19; Ch. IV, nn. 41, 51; Ch. V, nn. 7, 16.
8f.: 11: 12: 13: 18: 19: 21: 21f.: 38ff.: 40: 41: 43: 43ff.: 44ff.: 46: 48: 51f.: 59: 61:
Ch, IV, nn. 45, 46, 86. Ch, IV, nn. 41, 45. Ch. III, nn. 11, 14, 17. Ch. I, n. 52; Ch. III, n. 1; Ch. IV, n. 1. Ch. III, n. 6; Ch. IV, n. 1. Ch. I, n. 14; Ch. III nn. 4, 10, 13; Ch. V, n. 82. Ch. I, n. 45; Ch. III, nn. 16, 17. Ch. IV, n. 12. Ch. V, n. 17. Ch. V, nn. 5, 84. Ch. V, n. 16. Ch. V, n. 35. Ch. V, nn. 10, 12. Ch. V, n. 60. Ch. II, n. 20. Ch. V, n. 35. Ch. V, nn. 60, 89. Ch. I, n. 44; Ch. IV, n. 104. Ch. I, n. 47.
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Ch. I, n. 47. 65: 69ff.: Ch. V, n. 12. 71: Ch. III, n. 14. 72: Ch. VII, n. 75. (from Berlin MS.) 47rºf.: Ch. IV, n. 81, 93. 47vº: Ch. V, n. 56. 48rºff.: Ch. V, n. 54. 49vº: Ch. V, n. 48. 50rº Ch. II, n. 20; Ch. IV, nn. 97, 104; Ch. V, n. 17. 50rºf.: Ch. V, n. 56. 52vº: Ch. I, n. 47. 56vºff.: Ch. V, n. 54. 57rº: Ch. V, n. 54. 58rº: Ch. VI, n. 13. 64vºff.: Ch. V, n. 17. 70rº: Ch. II, n. 29; Ch. IV, n. 71. 73rº: Ch. VI, nn. 32, 33. 73rºff.: Ch. I, n. 10. 75rº: Ch. I, n. 10. 77rº: Ch. VI, n. 44. 77rºf.: Ch. VI, n. 23. 82rºf.: Ch. IV, n. 18. 83rºff.: Ch. V, n. 32. 86vºf.: Ch. I, n. 44; Ch. IV, n. 104. 92vº: Ch. V, n. 16. 92vºf.: Ch. V, n. 18. 94rº: Ch. V, n. 23. 94rºff.: Ch. V, n. 22. 94vº: Ch. V, nn. 16, 19. 95rº: Ch. V, n. 17. 100rº: Ch. V, n. 43. 103rº: Ch. V, nn. 35, 37. 103rºf.: Ch. IV, n. 104. 107vº: Ch. V, n. 16. 107vºff.: Ch. VI, n. 44. 109vºf.: Ch. V, n. 32. 110vº: Ch. V, n. 56. 112rº: Ch. VII, n. 31. 112rºff.: Ch. V, nn. 47, 48. 112vº: Ch. V, n. 47. 113rº: Ch. V, n. 68. 114vºff.: Ch, V, n. 35. 116vº: Ch. IV, n. 18. 117rºf.: Ch. II, n. 26. 117vº: Ch. VII, n. 36. 118rºff.: Ch. IV, n. 104. 121rº: Ch. V, n. 17. 123rºff.: Ch. II, n. 23. 123vº: Ch. II, n. 23; Ch. IV, n. 80. 126rºf.: Ch. VI, n. 44. 128rºff.: Ch. V, n. 74. 129rºf.: Ch. V, n. 54. 129rºff.: Ch. VII, n. 8. 133vº: Ch. VII, n. 73. 133vºff: Ch. VII, n. 74. 141rº: Ch. VI, n. 21. 144rºf.: Ch. V, n. 79. 148vº: Ch. V, n. 6. 149vº: Ch. V, n. 10.
155vº: Ch. VI, n. 40. 155vºff.: Ch. V, n. 62. 156rºf.: Ch. VI, n. 40. 165rº: Ch. IV, n. 89. 165vº: Ch. I, n. 36. 165vºf.: Ch. IV, nn. 90, 91. 166rº: Ch. IV, n. 92. 173rº: Ch. VI, n. 50. 174rº: Ch. III, n. 8; Ch. VI, nn. 40, 50. 174vº: Ch. III, n. 9; Ch. IV, n, 3. 175rº: Ch. V, n. 11. 183vº: Ch. IV, n. 98. 190rº: Ch. VII, nn. 70, 71. 198rº: Ch. VI, n. 44. 199vºff.: Ch. VI, n. 28. 202rºff.: Ch. VI, nn. 27, 43. 202vº: Ch. VI, n. 43. 203rº: Ch. VI, n. 23. Ziyâdât as-Sarh * 8ff.: Ch. V, n. 28. 46: Ch. IV, n. 6. 48: Ch. VII, n. 44. 61: Ch. V, n. 25. 63: Ch. V, n. 28. 65ff.: Ch. I, n. 52. 66: Ch. IV, n. 12. 71: Ch. IV, n. 1. 71f.: Ch. III, n. 1. 72: Ch. IV, n. 45. 76: Ch. IV, n. 12; Ch. V, n. 5. 79: Ch. VI, n. 18.
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80ff.: Ch. V, nn. 35, 47. 101: Ch. V, n. 47. 119: Ch. V, n. 28. 119ff.:Ch. V, n. 24. 126: Ch. IV, n. 94. 131f.: Ch. V, nn. 29, 30, 38. 132: Ch. V, n. 32. 153: Ch. V, n. 7. 191f.: Ch. III, nn. 12, 17. 192: Ch. III, nn. 4, 7, 8, 13; Ch. V, n. 82. 192f.: Ch. III, n. 5. 192ff.:Ch. IV, n. 27. 195: Ch. IV, n. 57. 213: Ch. IV, n. 84. 228: Ch. IV, n. 18; Ch. VI, n. 10. 236: Ch. V, n. 5. 245: Ch. III, n. 14. 246: Ch. IV, n. 2. 276: Ch. III, n. 14. 280: Ch. IV, n. 63. 286: Ch. IV, n. 63. 287: Ch. III, nn. 5, 7, 8; Ch. IV, n. 19; Ch. VII, n. l0. 293ff.:Ch. IV, n. 63. 350: Ch. VII, n. 10. 362: Ch. V, n. 5. 362f.: Ch. V, n. 6. 371: Ch. I, n. 52. 373ff.:Ch, V, n. 74; Ch. VII, n. 8. 374: Ch. IV, n. 86. 380ff.:Ch. VII, n. 8. 381: Ch. IV, nn. 95, 98, 101, l02. 381f.: Ch. IV, n. 99. 381ff.:Ch. IV, n. 107. 382: Ch. I, n. 36; Ch. IV, nn. 1, 99; Ch. V, n. 58; Ch. VII, n. 9. 383: Ch. V, n. 74. 384: Ch. IV, n. 67; Ch. VII, nn. 3, 12. 395: Ch. IV, n. 104. 396: Ch. V, n. 35. 398: Ch. IV, n. 86. 399: Ch. IV, n. 16. 403: Ch. VI, n. 43. 403f.: Ch. I, n. 45. 404: Ch. VI, n. 8. 407: Ch. I, n. 49; Ch. IV, n. 66. 408: Ch. VI, n. 9. 408f.: Ch. V, n. 9. 410: Ch. I, n. 52; Ch. III, n. 1; Ch. IV, n. 1. 413: Ch. I, n. 52; Ch. III, n. 1; Ch. IV, n. 1. 427ff.:Ch. V, n. 35. 429: Ch. V, n. 16. 429ff.:Ch. V, n. 16. 432: Ch. II, n. 5. 437: Ch. V, n. 16. 439: Ch. V, n. 16. 440: Ch. II, n. 5. 442f.: Ch. V, n. 17. 449ff.:Ch. IV, n. 73. 450: Ch. V, n. 67; Ch. VI, n. 43. 450ff.:Ch. IV, n. 107.
451: Ch. IV, nn. 73, 74, 75. 451f.: Ch. IV, n. 77. 452: Ch. VII, n. 9. 453: Ch. IV, n. 66. 455: Ch. VII, n. 74. 457: Ch. VII, n. 33. 457ff.:Ch. IV, n. 57. 459: Ch. III, n. 1; Ch. IV, n. 57. 459f.: Ch. VII, n. 44. 460: Ch. IV, n. 57. 461: Ch. IV, n. 64. 469: Ch. IV, n. 32; Ch. V, n. 33. 470: Ch. II, n. 26. 472f.: Ch. II, n. 24. 474: Ch. VI, n. 28. 477: Ch. VII, n. 3. 478: Ch. VII, n. 12; Ch. IV, n. 66. 480ff.:Ch. VII, n. 10. 483ff.:Ch. II, n. 5. 487: Ch. IV, n. 69. Ch. I, n. 52; Ch. III, nn. 1, 5; Ch. IV, 1, 23; Ch. V, n. 489: 3. 492: Ch. I, n. 52. 495: Ch. IV, n. 57. 506ff.:Ch. VI, n. 20. 507f.: Ch. VI, nn. 19, 43. 518ff.:Ch. IV, n. 40. 520: Ch. V, n. 3. 523: Ch. IV, n. 36. 524ff.:Ch. V, n. 90. 525: Ch. IV, n. 15. 536: Ch. IV, n. 4; Ch. V, n. 3; Ch. VII, n. 2.
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537: Ch. IV, n. 1. 539: Ch. IV, nn. 18, 23. 541: Ch. II, n. 23. 547: Ch. IV, n. 1. 550: Ch. II, n. 35. 554: Ch. II, n. 21. 555: Ch. V, n. 61. 557: Ch. VII, n. 32. 561: Ch. V, n. 70; Ch. VII, n. 74. 562ff.: Ch. VII, nn. 30, 43. 563: Ch. VII, nn. 37, 46. 563f.: Ch. V, n. 72. 564: Ch. VII, n. 39. 565: Ch. VII, n. 38. 565f.: Ch. VII, n. 40. 567: Ch. V, nn. 87, 88. 569f.: Ch. VII, n. 41. (from British Museum MS. Or. 8613) 107vº: Ch. IV, n. 17. 133vº: Ch. IV, nn. 70, 76. Al-Ansari *, abû l-Qâsim Sulaymân ibn Nasir* Sarh* al-Irâd: 1vº: Ch. V, n. 30. 4vº: Ch. V, n. 56. 5rº: Ch. V, n. 24. 6rº: Ch. V, n. 87. 18vºf.: Ch. VII, n. 16. 35vºf.: Ch. II, n. 1. 45rº: Ch. IV, n. 52. 47vº: Ch. V, n. 17. 56rº: Ch. V, n. 56. 60rº: Ch. VII, n. 18. 62rº: Ch. II, n. 4; Ch. V, n. 17. 130vº: Ch. I, n. 47. 150vº: Ch. II, n. 27. 164rº: Ch. IV, n. 52. Al-A'ari Kitâb al-Luma': §34: Ch. V, n. 12. §45: Ch. II, n. 4; Ch. V, n. 12; Ch. VII, n. 25. Maqâlât al-Islâmîyîn 161: Ch. I, n. 14; Ch. IV, n. 103; Ch. V, n. 14. 161f.: Ch. I, n. 25; Ch. IV, n. 103; Ch. VII, n. 20. 162: Ch. VII, n. 25. 165: Ch. I, n. 5. 167: Ch. I, n. 17. 167f.: Ch. I, n. 24; Ch. IV, n. 2. 169: Ch. I, n. 5. 170: Ch. I, n. 7. 175f.: Ch. VII, n. 27. 176: Ch. IV, n. 2. 177: Ch. I, n. 5. 188: Ch. I, n. 5. 192: Ch. VI, n. 31. 237: Ch. V, n. 33. 319: Ch. II, nn. 3, 6. 321f.: Ch. II, n. 6. 325: Ch. V, n. 38. 329: Ch. II, nn. 9, 12. 329ff.: Ch. II, n. 13.
330: 334: 337: 339: 340: 352: 352f.:
Ch. II, n. 7. Ch. II, nn. 14, 15. Ch. II, n. 14. Ch. VII, n. 36. Ch. VII, n. 29. Ch. VII, n. 22. Ch. V, n. 32.
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355: Ch. V, nn. 29, 33. 355f.: Ch. V, n. 30. 357: Ch. I, n. 25; Ch. VII, n. 24. 369f.: Ch. IV, n. 70; Ch. V, n. 3. 373: Ch. VII, n. 21. 402: Ch. II, n, 14. 420f.: Ch. V, n. 17. 484: Ch. I, n. 5. 485: Ch. I, n. 22. 519: Ch. I, n. 14. 520: Ch. V, n. 14; Ch. VII, n. 23. 522: Ch. IV, n. 103. 522f.: Ch. I, nn. 14, 25; Ch. V, n. 14. 522ff.: Ch. I, n. 24; Ch. VII, n. 20. 523: Ch. I, n. 12; Ch. V, n. 14; Ch. VII, nn. 2, 23. 524: Ch. I, n. 17; Ch. II, n. 18; Ch. IV, n. 2. 525: Ch. I, n. 9. 526f.: Ch. VII, n. 27. 526ff.: Ch. I, n. 24. 527: Ch. VII, n. 28. 528: Ch. VI, n. 61; Ch. VII, n. 17. 529: Ch. I, n. 25; Ch. III, n. 2; Ch. V, n. 14. 529f.: Ch. I, n. 34; Ch. IV, n. 57. 531: Ch. V, n. 14. 533f.: Ch. VII, n. 61. 546: Ch. I, n. 5. 551: Ch. VI, n. 61. 569f.: Ch. VII, n. 29. 598f.: Ch. VI, n. 31. Risâla 'ilà 'ahl at-tagr *: 97: Ch. V, n. 30. A1-Bagdadi*, 'Abd al-Qâhir Usul* ad-dîn: 4: Ch. I, n. 12. 115f.: Ch. I, n. 10. al-Farq bayn al-firaq: 130: Ch. II, n. 6. A1-Bâqillânî At-Tamhîd: 75: Ch. II, n. 4. 207: Ch. VII, nn. 19, 22, 24, 69. 235: Ch. V, n. 56. Al-Guwayni* al-Irâd: 17: Ch. V, nn. 17, 24, 25.
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a-âmil: 142: Ch. V, n. 17. 156: Ch. V, n. 17. 190: Ch. V, n. 17. 198: Ch. V, nn. 24, 25. 233: Ch. II, n. 4. 292: Ch. VII, n. 19. 308: Ch. VII, n. 22. 309f.: Ch. I, n. 52. 349: Ch. VII, n. 16. 423: Ch. II, n. 4. 428: Ch. V, n. 24. 430: Ch. V, n. 24. 453: Ch. V, n. 24. 466: Ch. V, n. 35. 473ff.: Ch. V, n. 35. 476f.: Ch. V, n. 47. 484: Ch. V, n. 57. 518: Ch. VII, n. 25. 542: Ch. V, n. 56. 573: Ch. II, n. 4. 574: Ch. H, n. 4. 639: Ch. II, n. 3. 643f.: Ch. V, n. 57. 678f.: Ch. II, n. 4. 701ff.: Ch. V, n. 83. 715f.: Ch. V, n. 89. (from Tehran University Central Library MS. 350) 219rº: Ch. V, n. 83. 237rº: Ch. I, n. 12. Ibn Mattawayh at-Tadkira * fî 'ahkam* al-gawahir* wal-'a`rad*: 1vº: Ch. II, nn. 3, 4. 1vºf.: Ch. V, n. 13. 2rº: Ch. VII, n. 38. 4vº: Ch. V, n. 52. 6rº: Ch. V, n. 16. 6vº: Ch. III, nn. 14, 17; Ch. V, n. 7. 7vº: Ch. V, n. 16, 21. 8rº: Ch. IV, nn. 27, 62. 8rºf.: Ch. Ill, n. 14. 8vº: Ch. IV, n. 24; Ch. V, n. 53; Ch. VII, n. 75. 9vº: Ch. IV, n. 7. 10rº: Ch. III, nn. 1, 11, 18; Ch. IV, n. 44. 10vº: Ch. II, n. 3; Ch. III, nn. 12, 21, 22. 11rº: Ch. I, n. 14; Ch. IV, n. 103. 12rº: Ch. IV, n. 11. 12vº: Ch. IV, n. 10. 13rºff.: Ch. VI, n. 6. 14rº: Ch. IV, n. 10; Ch. VI, nn. 3, 43. 15rº: Ch. V, n. 5. 22rºff.: Ch. VII, n. 36. 23rº: Ch. V, nn. 5, 10, 12. 24rº: Ch. V, n. 52. 26rº: Ch. IV, nn. 19, 42. 26rºf.: Ch. IV, n. 40. 28rº: Ch. IV, n. 60. 30vº: Ch. V, n. 5. 32rºff.: Ch. V, n. 17. 32vº: Ch. V, n. 17.
34rº: 34rºff.: 34vº: 35rº: 38rºff.: 44vº: 45vºf.: 46rºf.: 46vº: 47rº: 47vº: 48rº: 48vº: 49vº: 50rº:
Ch. V, n. 16. Ch. V, n. 17. Ch. V, nn. 16, 17, 50. Ch. V, nn. 20, 21. Ch. V, n. 12. Ch. V, n. 56. Ch. IV, n. 96; Ch. V, n. 54. Ch. IV, nn. 81, 93. Ch. V, n. 54. Ch. IV, nn. 43, 96; Ch. V, n. 56. Ch. V, n. 54. Ch. IV, n. 78; Ch. VII, nn. 13, 14, 17, 23. Ch. VII, n. 11. Ch. IV, n. 7. Ch. I, n. 52.
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Ch. IV, n. 103. Ch. IV, nn. 95, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104; Ch. V, 52vº: n. 58. 57vº: Ch. VII, n. 36. 61rºff.: Ch. IV, n. 72. 64rº: Ch. VI, n. 30. 65vº: Ch. I, n. 13. 65vºff.: Ch. VI, n. 32. 66rºff.: Ch. VI, n. 64. 66vºff.: Ch. I, n. 10; Ch. VI, n. 33. 67rº: Ch. I, n. 9; Ch. VI, nn. 32, 34. 67rºf.: Ch. IV, nn. 101, 102. 67vº: Ch. IV, n. l02; Ch. VII, n. 20. 67vºf.: Ch. IV, n. 5. 68rº: Ch. I, n. 10. 68rºf: Ch. II, n. 8. 68vºff.: Gh. VI, n. 24. 69vº: Ch. I, n. 35. 70rº: Ch. IV, n. 11; Ch. VI, n. 23. 71vº: Ch. I, n. 10. 71vºf.: Ch. VI, n. 33. 72vºff.: Ch. VI, n. 56. 73rº: Ch. II, n. 8. 73vº-78vº: Ch. VI, n. 64. 74rº: Ch. VI, nn. 63, 67. 78vº: Ch. V, nn. 19, 22, 24, 26. 78vºff.: Ch. V, n. 25. 79vº: Ch. I, n. 52. 79vºff.: Ch. V, n. 24. 80vº: Ch. VI, nn. 4, 18. 81rº: Ch. V, n. 36; Ch. VI, n. 18. 81vº: Ch. V, n. 16. 82vº: Ch. V, nn. 26, 38, 39, 40. 83rº: Ch. IV, n. 103; Ch. V, nn. 16, 31. 83vº: Ch. V, nn. 27, 28, 38. 83vºf.: Ch. V, n. 46. 84vº: Ch. V, nn. 24, 42. 84vºff.: Ch. V, n. 41. 85rº: Ch. V, nn. 16, 32, 33, 43, 44. 85rºf.: Ch. V, n. 30. 85vº: Ch. V, nn. 16, 33, 44. 86rº: Ch. IV, n. 43; Ch. V, nn. 42, 44, 54. 87rº: Ch. V, n. 37. 87vº: Ch. V, n. 34. 87vºf.: Ch. V, n. 44. 88rºff.: Ch. V, n. 32. 88vº: Ch. V, nn. 16, 18, 32, 37, 56. 89rºff,: Ch. V, n. 35. 90rºf.: Ch. V, n. 30. 90rºff.: Ch. V, n. 17. 90vº: Ch. V, n. 37. 91rº: Ch. V, nn. 16, 22, 23. 93rº: Ch. V, n. 17. 94vº: Ch. V, n. 17. 96rºff.: Ch. V, n. 47. 97rº: Ch. V, nn. 45, 51. 97rºf.: Ch. V, n. 52. 97vºf.: Ch. V, nn. 50, 51. 99rº: Ch. V, nn. 32, 48, 56. 102rºff.: Ch. IV, n. 104. 52rºf.:
103rº: 103vº: 104rº: 106rº: 106vºf.: 108rºf.: 108vº112rº: 111vº: 116vº: 119rº: 122vº: 123rº: 126vºf.: 127vº: 128rº: 128vº: 128vºf.: 130rºf.: 132vº 133rºf.: 134rº: 134rºff.: 137vº: 139vº: 141rº: 141vº: 142rº: 142vº: 144rº: 146vº: 146vºf.: 147rºf.:
Ch. I, n. 36; Ch. IV, n. 28, 94. Ch. V, n. 17. Ch. V, n. 37. Ch. IV, n. 28. Ch. IV, n. 104. Ch. IV, n. 104. Ch. V, n. 32. Ch. V, n. 28. Ch. IV, n. 104. Ch. IV, n. 25. Ch. II, n. 13. Ch. II, n. 13. Ch. II, n. 14. Ch. II, n. 24; Ch. V, n. 70. Ch. II, n. 16. Ch. V, n. 54. Ch. IV, nn. 82, 98. Ch. II, n. 12. Ch. II, n. 23; Ch. IV, n. 8. Ch. II, n. 23. Ch. I, n. 49. Ch. V, n. 70. Ch. IV, n. 86. Ch. IV, n. 103. Ch. VII, n. 9. Ch. IV, n. 32, 69, 104, 105; Ch. VII, nn. 3, 7, 12. Ch. IV, n. 33. Ch. VI, n. 25. Ch. VII, n. 45. Ch. IV, nn. 20, 41. Ch. IV, n. 34. Ch. IV, n. 35.
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Ch. VII, n. 8. 147vºff.: 148rº: Ch. IV, nn. 77, 99; Ch. VII, n. 9 150vº: Ch. V, n. 49. 157rº: Ch. VII, n. 14. 161rº: Ch. II, n. 31. 161vº: Ch. VI, n. 59. 167rº: Ch. IV, n. 34. 167vº: Ch. IV, nn. 98, 101, 103. 168rº: Ch. VI, n. 67. 169rº: Ch. VII, n. 73. 169rºf.: Ch. VII, n. 74. 171rº: Ch. I, n. 39. 171vº: Ch. VI, n. 60. 177vº: Ch. VI, n. 29. 185vº: Ch. II, n. 45. 186rº: Ch. I, n. 38. 187rº: Ch. IV, n. 98; Ch. VI, n. 40. 189rºff.: Ch. VI, n. 40. 189vº: Ch. VI, n. 40 201rº: Ch. VII, n. 70. 201vºff.: Ch. VII, n. 71. 202rº: Ch. VII, n. 72. 205rº: Ch. IV, n. 98. 206vº: Ch. IV, n. 99. 218rº: Ch. VII, nn. 32, 44. 218rºff.: Ch. VII, nn. 30, 43. 218vº: Ch. VII, nn. 37, 45, 46. 219rº: Ch, VII, nn. 29, 30, 44. 221rºf.: Ch. VII, n. 33. 221vº: Ch. VII, n. 38. 222rº: Ch. IV, n. 99; Ch. VII, n. 36. 222vº: Ch. VII, nn. 38, 39. 225rº: Ch. V, n. 51. Al-Mâturîdî Kitâb at-Tawhid *: 43: Ch. II, n. 13. 100f.: Ch. II, n. 13. 223: Ch. II, n. 13. An-Nâi' al-Akbar al-Kitâb al-'awsat*: §49: Ch. V, n. 58. §146: Ch. V, n. 30. An-Nâtiq bil-Haqq*, abû Talib* Yahya* ibn al-Husayn* Ziyâdât as-Sarh*: 18rº: Ch. V, n. 25. Al-Pazdawî Usul* ad-dîn: 224: Ch. II, n. 14.
