BEYOND A ONE-DIMENSIONAL STATE: AN EMERGING RIGHT TO AUTONOMY?
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BEYOND A ONE-DIMENSIONAL STATE: AN EMERGING RIGHT TO AUTONOMY?
THE RAOUL WALLENBERG INSTITUTE HUMAN RIGHTS LIBRARY VOLUME 19
BEYOND A ONE-DIMENSIONAL STATE: AN EMERGING RIGHT TO AUTONOMY?
Edited by ZELIM A. SKURBATY
Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law and The Danish INSTITUTE for Human Rights
MARTINUS NIJHOFF PUBLISHERS LEIDEN/BOSTON 2005
A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
Printed on acid-free paper.
ISBN 90-04-14204-5 © Copyright 2005 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill Academic Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. Brill Academic Publishers incorporates the imprint Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. http://www.brill.nl All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Brill Academic Publishers provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change.
Printed and bound in The Netherlands
TO ALL THOSE WHOSE LIFE IS A STATEMENT OF THE FACT THAT AUTONOMY MATTERS
IF YOU TAKE GOOD THINGS FOR GRANTED YOU MIGHT BE LOOSING THEM AGAIN FOR EVERY RIGHT THAT YOU CHERISH YOU HAVE A DUTY, WHICH YOU MUST FULFIL FOR EVERY HOPE YOU ENTERTAIN YOU HAVE A TASK YOU MUST PERFORM FOR EVERY PRIVILEGE YOU WOULD PRESERVE YOU MUST SACRIFICE A COMFORT FREEDOM WILL ALWAYS CARRY A PRICE OF RESPONSIBILITY AND THE JUST REWARDS OF YOUR OWN CHOICES
Denis Waitley. The Empires of the Mind. The inscription on the Statue of Responsibility (suggested by Denis Waitley), which is supposed to be erected on the American West Coast (San Francisco), as a ‘Responsibility’ counterpart to the ‘Freedom’, personified by the Statue of Liberty on the East Coast (New York).
TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgements .......................................................................................... Biographical Notes.......................................................................................... Prolegomenon: Prefatory Words by Max van der Stoel, Gudmundur Alfredsson and Morten Kjærum ......................................................... Abbreviations .................................................................................................. Introduction by Zelim A. Skurbaty ...............................................................
xi xiii xix xxvii xxxi
PART I GENERAL ISSUES: CROSS-DISCIPLINARY APPRAISAL OF AUTONOMY Autonomy as a Participatory Right in the Modern Democratic State Public Participation, Autonomy and Minorities Yash Ghai .............................................................................................. Legal Appraisal of Autonomy Territorial Autonomy and International Stability: Pros and Cons from the Viewpoint of International Law Hans-Joachim Heintze ....................................................................... Collective & Individual set Back to Back: Autonomy and the Interplay of Individual and Collective Dimensions in Article 27 of the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Zelim A. Skurbaty ................................................................................. Problems Related to the Economic Viability of Autonomous Arrangements Centralism and Fiscal Federalism Gisela Färber ...................................................................................... Social Structure, Social Capital and Institutional Agreement: The TrentinoAlto Adige Model Antonio M. Chiesi ............................................................................... Local Economic and Community Development as an Aspect of the Reconstruction of South-East Europe: Bringing the Local State Back In Milford Bateman ................................................................................
3
47
63
83
103
113
PART II THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS Conceptual Issues Pertaining to Autonomy Territorial Autonomy: Permanent Solution or Step toward Secession? Hurst Hannum ...................................................................................... The Role of Autonomy in State-Nation Dialectic Johan Galtung ........................................................................................ Ambiguities in and Clarifications of the Concept of Autonomy Matti Wiberg .......................................................................................... Meta-Legal and Philosophical Dimensions of Autonomy Paradoxes of Autonomy: Tensions, Traps and Possibilities Thomas W. Simon ..................................................................................
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153 161 177
191
TABLE OF CONTENTS Autonomy and Cultural Rights The Argument of Cultural Disadvantage Juha Räikkä ........................................................................................... The Right of a People to Exercise their Culture – A Scandinavian Model Isi Foighel ...............................................................................................
211 231
PART III CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION, INTERNATIONAL MONITORING AND IMPLEMENTATION International Guarantees of Autonomy Autonomy (International Guarantees of Autonomy) Yoram Dinstein ...................................................................................... International Criminal Law: Protection of Minority Rights Lyal S. Sunga ......................................................................................... Autonomy: The Problem of Irredentism and Cross-Border Cooperation Cross-Border Cooperation as an Indicator for Institutional Evolution of Autonomy: The Case of Trentino-South Tyrol Francesco Palermo and Jens Woelk ....................................................
243 255
277
Autonomy, Participation and Minority Rights Participation and the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) Alan Phillips ........................................................................................... Autonomy and the Effective Participation of Minorities in Public Life: Developments in the OSCE John Packer .........................................................................................
305
Autonomy and Indigenous People Indigenous Rights and the Promise of a Limited Autonomy Model Darren Hawkins ..................................................................................... The Question of Indigenous Autonomy in Latin America José Bengoa ............................................................................................
337
321
351
PART IV NATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES Autonomy, Minorities and Self-Determination The Protection of the Rights of Minorities by Means of Autonomy: The Cases of the Åland and Kosovo Markku Suksi .........................................................................................
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Failed Experiences with Autonomy The Autonomy of Eritrea (1952-62): Learning from the Failed Experience Eyassu Gayim ......................................................................................... Autonomy in the Countries of Transition A Combined Approach to Autonomy: Estonian Experience Aleksei Semjonov ................................................................................... Autonomy of Gagauzia: A Post-Soviet Experience Priit Järve ............................................................................................... Autonomy and Conflict Resolution Autonomy: The Danish-German Border Region Sten Harck .............................................................................................. Continued Challenges, Post-Settlement, to the Cyprus Conundrum Tim Potier ............................................................................................... Strategies of Ethnic Conflict Resolution: The Trentino-South Tyrol Case and the Balkans Paolo Foradori and Riccardo Scartezzini ............................................ National and Regional Experiments with Autonomous Arrangements Experiments with Autonomy in the United Kingdom since 1998 Patricia Leopold ..................................................................................... The Status of Autonomous Territories in International Organizations: Experiences in Nordic and Continental European Co-operation Elisabeth Nauclér ................................................................................... Minority Rights and Forms of Autonomy in South Asia Ranabir Samaddar ................................................................................
401
421 429
457 473
489
503
525 541
Summary Conclusions Is There an Emerging Right to Autonomy? Summary Reflections, Conclusions and Recommendations Zelim A. Skurbaty .................................................................................
565
Index ...............................................................................................................
569
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The attitude of gratitude is a prevailing sentiment at this stage of sending the volume to the Publisher and I owe it to the people and organizations whose help proved to be invaluable in making this publication project a reality. First, I want to express my gratitude to my assistant Frederik Rosen, who has been involved in the project from day one and had been doing all kinds of work within and beyond the call of duty, including editing some texts. It is no small feat given the fact that he had many other commitments and never got any remuneration for his work. Special mention should be made of two Directors of the Scandinavian human rights institutions that played pivotal role in shepherding this volume to its publication phase – Gudmundur Alfredsson, the Director of the Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (Lund Sweden) and Morten Kjaerum, the Director of the (then) Danish Center for Human Rights (Copenhagen). Gudmundur Alfredsson has been instrumental at all stages of the preparation of the volume: giving advice on all kinds of matters, discussing the content of submissions, etc., and, in addition, he took it upon himself to take care of all logistics concerning negotiations with the Publisher. Morten Kaerum has also been supportive all along by providing the venue for the joint autonomy seminar with the United Nations Working Group on Minorities and making contributions of substance during its course. Given the difficulties the Danish Center for Human Rights had been undergoing at the time, this support and contribution acquire special meaning and significance. My heartfelt thanks go to both of them. Asbjørn Eide, the Chairman of the UN Working on Minorities, not only participated in and contributed to the Seminar, but gave the publishing project unreserved support and helped to conceptualize the book’s approach resonating with the credo of the Working Group, namely: ‘the examination of possible solutions to problems involving minorities, including the promotion of mutual understanding between and among minorities and governments’. Professor Tom Hadden from the Centre for International and Comparative Human Rights Law, the Queen’s University of Belfast should be credited for the preparation of the report from the Copenhagen Seminar. The report was put on the agenda of the 8th Annual Session of the UN Working Group on Minorities, widely discussed and thus - set the stage for the preparation of the present publication. Many thanks to Jens Woelk, a researcher from the University of Trento, who brought to the publication scene a number of relevant contributions from the International Conference ‘Organising Cohabitation’ (Trento, January 2001). The authorities of the Autonomous Region of Trentino-South Tyrol, that sponsored the conference, were also very cooperative and helpful in giving the green light for the inclusion of these contributions to this volume. John Packer, Director of the Office of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, also took interest in the publication project and provided useful insights, suggestions and assistance. And one can't but be grateful to the former xi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS High Commissioner on National Minorities, the distinguished Max van der Stoel, who honoured this publication with his words of wisdom and endorsement in the Prolegomenon. My thanks also go to Lindy Melman (Brill Academic Publishers, the Netherlands), Carin Laurin (Publications Officer, Raoul Wallenberg Institute), Christopher Cassetta and Miles Hogan for all kinds of editorial and practical help related to putting the publication through. As already mentioned, publication of this book had been strongly supported by the Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Lund, Sweden, which is only fitting given the prominent role the Institute plays in the promotion of international human and minority rights. And it is no coincidence that one of the most frequently referred documents in the field of autonomy and minority rights – the 1999 Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life – was partly prepared and given life in this institution.1 And – true to form – many colleagues from the Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law has lent a helping hand during preparation of this book, and I can’t but be grateful for that. Finally, I would like to mention a fact whose significance exceeds any passing considerations. This book on autonomy bears on its cover the portrait of Raoul Wallenberg. I consider this rather symbolic in that the person who saved so many lives at the price of his own, has expanded ad infinitum – even if unwittingly – the limits of personal and group autonomy. His tragic fate, sealed in the chambers of the KGB in the late 1940s, set in motion the processes that have changed the intellectual milieu of our epoch forever: it is now accepted, as an immutable imperative, that trespassing personal and group autonomy – defined in human rights terms – is an outrage, something that the international community will not put up with under any conditions or pretexts: it paid too high a price for that. We should send our belated thanks to the person who paid in full for this tidal shift in our perception of what the deep meaning of personal and group autonomy is.
1
As Max Van der Stoel mentions in the Prolegomenon, the origins of Lund Recommendations go back to the inter-governmental conference ‘Governance and Participation: Integrating Diversity’ held in Locarno in October 1988 under the auspices of OSCE. This conference gave rise to a process of consultations with a number of independent experts, which eventually resulted in the ‘Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life’ (September 1999).
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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES Milford Bateman Milford Bateman works at Directorate for Fiscal, Financial and Enterprise Affairs, OECD, Paris José Bengoa José Bengoa is Professor of International Law, University of Santiago, Chile; also a Member of the UN Working Group on Minorities Antonio M. Chiesi Antonio M. Chiesi is Professor of Methodology of the Social Sciences and Director of the Department of Sociology and Social Research at the University of Trento. His recent publications include: Il bilancio sociale, (with A Martinelli and M. Pellegatta, Il sole 24 ore Editore, 2000); L’analisi dei reticoli, (F.Angeli, Milano, 1999); Recent Social Trends in Italy, 1960-1995, (with A. Martinelli and S. Stefanizzi, McGill Queen’s, Montreal 1999); Lavori e professioni (La Nuova Italia Scientifica, 1997). Yoram Dinstein Yoram Dinstein is Professor of International Law, Tel Aviv University (Israel); Humboldt Fellow, Max Planck Institute, Heidelberg (Germany); Member, Institut de Droit International. Paolo Foradori Paolo Foradori is a researcher at University of Bologna, Department of Social Sciences Gisela Färber Deutsche Hochschule für Verwaltungswissenschaften, Speyer Isi Foighel Isi Foighel is Dr. juris Professor emeritus, University of Copenhagen (1964–97), Chairman of the Home Rule Commission for Greenland (1975–1978). Judge at the European Court of Human Rights (1988–98). Senior-researcher at the Danish Center of Human Rights (1998–) Johan Galtung Johan Galtung is dr hc mult, Professor of Peace Studies, American, Ritsumeikan, Troms, Witten/Herdecke and European Peace Universities; Director, TRANSCEND: A Peace and Development Network. He is a founder of International Peace Research Institute (1959). Eyassu Gayim Eyassu Gayim is a Senior Researcher, The Eric Castrén Institute of International Law and Human Rights, University of Helsinki.
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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES Yash Ghai Yash Ghai is the Sir Y.K.Rao Professor of Public Law at the University of Hong kong. His most recent books are Hong Kong’s New Constitutional Order (1998) and Hong Kong’s Constitutional Debate (2000). He has also been a constitutional and legal adviser to several governments, political parties international organisations and non-governmental organisations. Hurst Hannum Hurst Hannum is Professor of International Law and Co-Director, Center for Human Rights & Conflict Resolution, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. He is author of the book Autonomy, Sovereignty, and SelfDetermination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. Sten Harck Dr. Sten Harck is a practising lawyer at the law firm LSH in Copenhagen, where he is working in the areas of public law and EU-law. Before joining the law firm he was a research scholar and assistant professor in EU-law, Public International Law and International Human Rights at the Faculty of Law, University of Copenhagen. He obtained his Ph.D. on a thesis analysing the European Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities. Currently, he is finishing a master thesis at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität in Munich, Germany, concerning the interaction between patent law and human rights. Darren Hawkins Darren Hawkins is an asistant professor of political science at Brigham Young University. He has just published his book, International Human Rights and Authoritarian Rule in Chile. Recent articles have appeared in Comparative Politics and Political Science Quarterly, and he has a forthcoming article in Global Governance. He is currently at work on the political history of international human rights norms and their evolution from statements of principle to laws that can be internationally enforced. Hans-Joachim Heintze Hans-Joachim Heintze is an Associate Professor of International Law at the Institute of International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict, University of the Ruhr, Bochum (Germany). President of the International Association for the Study of the World Refugee Problem (AWR). Research topics: Human Rights Law, Minority Law, Refugee Law, International Humanitarian Law. Co-author of the leading German Textbook Voelkerrecht by Knut Ipsen; Co-author of the Lund Recommendations of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities and of Markku Suksi’s Autonomy: Applications and Implications, Kluwer 1998. Participant of the International Workshop on Regional Autonomy of Ethnic Minorities, Beijing 2001.
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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES Priit Järve Priit Järve, PhD., is senior research associate at the European Centre for Minority Issues, Flensburg, Germany, since 1997. He graduated from Tartu University, Estonia. Before joining the ECMI, he worked in the Estonian Academy of Sciences and acted also as the Plenipotentiary of the President of Estonia to the Estonian Roundtable on National Minorities. He is working in the field of political science and has published on democratisation of transitional societies, multiculturalism, and interethnic relations in the post-soviet area. Patricia Leopold Patricia Leopold, Senior Lecturer in Law, The School of Law, The University of Reading, England. Patricia Leopold is co-author of the 8th edition of O Hood Phillips Constitutional and Administrative Law. She has written on a variety of constitutional matters and is currently researching and writing on the regulation of standards of conduct of members of the devolved institutions in Scotland Wales and Northern Ireland for a book of essays, which she is co-editing. Joseph Marko Joseph Marko is Professor of International Law, University of Graz, Judge at the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina Elisabeth Nauclér Elisabeth Nauclér is Head of Administration at the Government of the Åland Islands since 1999. Ms. Nauclér has a long career Government of Åland, the Parliament of Åland and the Åland Delegation to the Nordic Council. In the last-mentioned institution Ms. Nauclér specialised in questions relating to national minorities and autonomy arrangements. She has also served as Civil Affairs Officer in United Nations in former Yugoslavia in 1993-1996. John Packer John Packer is Director in the Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). He was previously a Human Rights Officer at the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva where he held responsibilities for the Commission on Human Rights investigative mandates. Mr. Packer was a also a consultant for the International Labour Organization and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, a Visiting Research Fellow at the Lauterpacht Research Centre for International Law at Cambridge University, and has lectured at a number of universities and professional institutions around the world. Both in professional and personal capacities, he has contributed to several conferences and publications, has been since 1991 Associate Editor of the Human Rights Law Journal and is a member of the Editorial Boards of the International Journal on Minority and Group Rights and the ECMI Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority
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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES Issues in Europe as well as the International Advisory Board of The Global Review of EthnoPolitics. Francesco Palermo Francesco Palermo holds PhD in comparative constitutional law from the University of Innsbruck, he is also a lecturer of comparative constitutional law in the Universities of Verona and Trento and a senior researcher at the European Academy of Bolzano/Bozen. He conducts research mainly in comparative regional studies, minority issues and constitutional law of the EU. Alan Phillips Alan Phillips was the UK Independent expert to the Council of Europe Advisory Committee on the FCNM and elected as its first Vice President 1998 to 2002. Between 1989 and 2000 he was Director of Minority Rights Group International, while today he is an independent adviser on human rights and minority rights issues, working primarily in the Balkans. A range of his articles has been published and he co-edited Universal Minority Rights with Allan Rosas. Tim Potier Tim Potier is an Assistant Professor, Department of Law, International College of Cyprus (Intercollege), Nicosia. Juha Räikkä Juha Räikkä teaches philosophy at the University of Turku, Finland. After his studies at the University Turku and the University of Miami, Florida, he earned his Ph.D. in 1992 with his dissertation titled An Essay on International Justice. He visited to the Southwest Texas State University in 1994 and European University Institute in Florence in 1999 and 2001. His research interests focus on issues in political theory, philosophy of law and metaethics. He is the editor of Do We Need Minority Rights? – Conceptual Issues (Kluwer 1996). Ranabir Samaddar Ranabir Samaddar, is the Director of the Peace Studies Programme at the South Asia Forum for Human Rights, Kathmandu. He has worked extensively on issues of justice and rights in the context of conflicts in South Asia. His particular researches have been on migration and refugee studies, the theory and practices of dialogue, nationalism and post-colonial statehood in South Asia, and technological restructuring and new labour regimes. Riccardo Scartezzini Riccardo Scartezzini is a researcher at University of Trento, Faculty of Social Sciences
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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
Aleksei Semjonov Aleksei Semjonov’s areas of interest include minority rights, nation building, intergroup and inter-ethic relations; attitudes and values; capacity building of Human Rights NGOs. His main regional focus is the Baltic states and Russia. He is a member of the Presidential Roundtable on Minorities, Estonia, and also of the St. Petersburg Union of Sociologists, Russia. Thomas W. Simon Thomas W. Simon teaches philosophy at Illinois State University and practices law. His books include Democracy and Social Injustice (1995, Rowman & Littlefield); Law & Philosophy (2001, McGraw Hill); and Justice andGenocide (2003, Praeger/Greenwood). He has served as an invited academic consutant for the UN Working Group on Minorities since 1998. Consutantation for an American Bar Association committee on constitutionalism included helping with drafts of Albania’s constitution. Currently, he holds an endowed chair of interdisciplinary studies at the University of Northern Colorado. Zelim A. Skurbaty Zelim A. Skurbaty, Ph.D. (Social Anthropology), Ph.D. (International Human Rigths) had been a Senior Research Fellow at the Danish Center for Human Rights and worked also for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. His publications include ”As if Peoples Mattered. A Critical Appraisal of the Peoples and Minorities from the Internaitonal Human Rights Perspective and Beyond” (2000); “Bibliographical Overview of the Literature in Human Rights Training” (2000); (ed.) “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the two 1966 International Human Rights Covenants and their Domestic Implementation in Vietnam” (2002). Markku Suksi Markku Suksi, Professor of International Law, Director of the Institute of Human Rights, Åbo Akademy University, Finland Lyal S. Sunga Dr. Lyal S. Sunga, BA, LLB, LLM, PhD, is Associate Professor, Director of the Master of Laws Programme in Human Rights and Deputy Director, Centre for Comparative and Public Law at the University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law as well as Visiting Professor at the University of Geneva Faculty of Law’s Centre for International Humanitarian Law. He is the author of two books: The Emerging System of International Criminal Law: Developments in Codification and Implementation (1997) and Individual Responsibility in International Law for Serious Human Rights Violations (1992) as well as a numerous articles in scholarly legal journals.
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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
Matti Wiberg Matti Wiberg is a professor of political science at the university of Turku, Finland. He defended his dissertation (Between Apathy and Revolution: Explications of the Conditions for Political Legitimacy) in 1988 and has published five other monographs, edited 13 anthologies (xxx) and published more than 150 scientific articles. Jens Woelk Jens Woelk, Lecturer and researcher in Comparative Constitutional Law at the University of Trento, Law Faculty. Graduation in Law and PhD in Comparative Constitutional Law (thesis on constitutional principles of co-operation in federal and regional systems) at the University of Regensburg, Bavaria. From 1994 to 2000 Senior Researcher at the European Academy Bolzano (Dept. ‘Minorities and Autonomies’). His main fields of interest are comparative constitutional law, esp. federalism/regionalism, minority-issues and South-Eastern Europe.
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PROLEGOMENON MAX VAN DER STOEL1: ‘. . . AUTONOMY HOLDS TREMENDOUS PROMISE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLITICAL ORGANISATION AND STRUCTURE, ESPECIALLY IN MULTI-ETHNIC STATES . . .’ Autonomy is among the least well-understood concepts in politics. Perhaps for this reason, it does not appear sufficiently well employed if one is to compare the number of situations where forms of autonomy might be usefully considered with the number of situations in which autonomy in fact exists. In my view, well-chosen and designed autonomy arrangements, woven into the structure of the State, have an integrationist potential which can contribute stability to situations where the population comprises significant social or regional diversity. This is because forms of autonomy allow the accommodation of diverse needs, interests and aspirations, and so can create interests and stakes for various groups within the same State, thereby inspiring common loyalty and investment. At the same time, such regimes of autonomy can reduce the appeal of extremist demands and solutions. No matter whether applied to the individual, or seized as a political concept, autonomy is a short-hand notion for a broader idea. In life, neither the individual nor groups are literally free to act as they please; we are all subject to various constraints, including that of law. Autonomy, therefore, implies some degree of independence, but not independence itself. There are a variety of forms and ways this can be manifested. Most often, politicians think of autonomy in territorial terms (within which political power is commonly distributed), but the non-territorial or personal forms are equally important. Indeed, the non-territorial forms are perhaps the more interesting insofar as they offer many more alternatives for accommodation of diversity along the lines of issues (e.g. education) which transcend and do not require territorial divisions. Aside from the division in forms of autonomy, there also exists a division in its basic types whether including legislative, executive, or administrative powers, or all three. In addition to varying forms and types of autonomy, their application can be quite flexible, whether symmetrical or asymmetrical. This flexibility is important in every State since each has its own unique mix of people and territory. Moreover, autonomy can be applied symmetrically across territory and people through simple processes of decentralisation. In my experience, both governmental authorities and the representatives of minority and other communities would do well to become better informed about the idea of autonomy and its potential instrumental value. With this in mind, I instigated 1
Minister of State in The Netherlands; Special Representative of the OSCE Chairman-inOffice for Macedonia; former OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (1993−2001); former Minister for Foreign Affairs of The Netherlands (1973−1977 and 1981−1982) and Permanent Representative of The Netherlands to the United Nations (1983−1986).
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PROLEGONEMON an OSCE wide inter-governmental conference held in Locarno, Switzerland, in October 1998, under the title ‘Governance and Participation: Integrating Diversity’. This conference gave rise to a process of consultations with a number of independent experts who adopted in September 1999 a set of general recommendations entitled the ‘Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life’. While neither the Locarno conference nor the Lund Recommendations were organised around or employ expressly the notion or term ‘autonomy’, they were largely influenced by it. The success of the conference and recommendations also demonstrate the interest States and the wider international community have in the subject. In my view, autonomy holds tremendous promise as an instrument of political organisation and structure, especially in multi-ethnic States and, more generally, in States composed of a diversity of populations and regions − as are most States. Indeed, in order to build an integrated and stable, yet open and dynamic, State it is imperative to maximise the utility offered by forms and types of autonomy appropriately applied. This seems increasingly a global challenge. This compilation brings together leading scholars sharing a variety of perspectives from different intellectual disciplines and regions of the world. It is an important contribution to the surprisingly modest literature, and should be read widely by policy and law-makers, public administrators and scholars.
The Hague, July 2003 GUDMUNDUR ALFREDSSON2: ‘THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO PROTECT GROUP DIGNITY . . . IS TO ALLOW THEM TO CONTROL LOCAL AFFAIRS . . .’ In recent years, with the spread of violent national, ethnic and religious conflicts, minority issues have become regular features on human rights and peace agendas of international and regional organizations. Patterns of political as well as social and economic discrimination, combined with indignities and threats to identities and cultures, continue to cause such conflicts. With better knowledge of their human rights and standing under international law and before international organizations, minorities are increasingly presenting claims to and expecting action from governments and the international community. Much of the new attention to minority rights is security oriented, not least because internal conflicts often spill across borders. Respect for human rights is one method of conflict prevention, and preventive action is certainly less costly than reaction after the eruption of violence. Democracy is good for human rights, but 2
Cand. jur. (University of Iceland 1975), M.C.J. (New York University 1976), S.J.D. (Harvard Law School 1982). He is a Professor at the Law Faculty of Lund University in Sweden and Director of the Raoul Wallenberg Institute for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law.
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PROLEGOMENON minority rights must be enshrined in constitutional and legislative guarantees with available and accessible remedies, consistent with international standards, because majority rule is not necessarily friendly to or understanding of the needs of a minority. In May 1999, a series of expert meetings concluded in Lund with the adoption of the Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life.3 The meetings were convened by the Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations in The Hague and the Raoul Wallenberg Institute for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in Lund, under the auspices of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities.4 The Recommendations deal with the political rights of minorities at both national and local levels. One of the focal areas has to do with the administrative arrangements and the functions of non-territorial and territorial selfgovernments.5 As a matter of international human rights law, persons belonging to minorities are entitled to the equal enjoyment of all human rights, as well as non-discrimination in that enjoyment. In response to the wisdom pronounced by the General Assembly in its resolution on the fate of minorities,6 minority-specific provisions in a number of subsequent human rights instruments provide for special measures or preferential treatment with the aim of achieving equal rights for all, both in law and in fact.7 Thus, States are obliged to ensure the equal enjoyment of all human rights by minorities living within their borders, and they must prohibit and eliminate discrimination against them. The minority-specific standards in international and regional instruments and the corresponding monitoring methods are not perfect. With increased awareness of 3
The Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations published the Lund Recommendations with informative Explanatory Notes in summer 1999. The text is also available on the websites of the OSCE and the Raoul Wallenberg Institute at <www.osce.org> and <www.rwi.lu.se>, respectively. 4 For an historical account, see John Packer, ‘The Origin and Nature of the Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life’, 11:4 Helsinki Monitor. Quarterly on Security and Cooperation in Europe 2000, pp. 29-61. 5 For academic comments on the Lund Recommendations, see Hans-Joachim Heintze, ‘New Direction in the Approach of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities: General Recommendations on Participation of Minorities’, 19:1 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 2001, pp. 101–112; Ñand Kristian Myntti, A Commentary to the Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life (Turku: Institute for Human Rights, Aabo Akademi University, 2001) 75 pages. 6 In 1948 the General Assembly decided that the United Nations could not remain indifferent to the ‘fate of minorities’. This was the title of part C of General Assembly resolution 217 (III) of 10 December 1948. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the same resolution, in part A. 7 For a collection of dozens of human rights instruments with minority-specific standards, see Gudmundur Alfredsson and Göran Melander, A Compilation of Minority Rights Standards. A Selection of Texts from International and Regional Human Rights Instruments and Other Documents, Lund: Raoul Wallenberg Institute Report No. 24, 1997.
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PROLEGONEMON the deficiencies, important initiatives have emerged. A strong emphasis on autonomy, as a special measure for the realization of the equal enjoyment of political rights, is one important part of these new developments, which are reflected not only in the Lund Recommendations but also increasingly in the practice of many States. This book, and the conference at the then Danish Centre for Human Rights (now the Danish Institute for Human Rights) which preceded it, are part of the evidence. In the face of historical and continued discrimination against minority groups, the rules in the international human rights instruments about equal enjoyment and non-discrimination have been complemented by what the UN instruments usually call special measures, as autonomy is referred to above. Special measures are needed to realize the equal enjoyment of human rights and to place the groups, as well as their members, in a position comparable with the majority population. The special measures do not constitute privileges. Like non-discrimination, these measures are rooted in the rule of equal rights. Respect for political rights is an essential aspect of minority rights, and with widespread discrimination there is an obvious need for special measures. A group and its members cannot be really equal to the majority population unless and until equal conditions prevail; even then the group may continue to be disadvantaged because of the majority’s dominance in national life. States have a choice between a variety of measures, but the aim and result must be equal enjoyment of political rights. The measures may include the granting of power to groups and their members, which is disproportionate to their size, in order to ensure fair influence and consultation on political issues. Such special measures should include the establishment of self-governments, but the measures can also involve the requirement that governments obtain consent from or engage in meaningful consultations with groups about matters affecting them; constitutional or legislative recognition of minority laws and customs and their application by the group; and the appointment of officials chosen by the group to either specific positions or to a fixed percentage of general posts at the national level. The Lund Recommendations draw on paragraph 35 of Part IV of the Document from the 1990 Copenhagen Meeting of the OSCE Conference on the Human Dimension. In paragraph 35, it says that the participating States must give persons belonging to minorities sufficient opportunity to participate in public affairs and to protect and promote their identity. Furthermore, in the same paragraph, States ‘note the efforts undertaken to protect and create conditions for the promotion of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of certain national minorities by establishing, as one of the possible means to achieve these aims, appropriate local or autonomous administrations corresponding to the specific historical and territorial circumstances of such minorities in accordance with the policies of the State concerned.’
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PROLEGOMENON Self-government or autonomy8 can come under different names, but the label does not matter as long as the central government agrees to share power and leave local matters in the hands of group representatives. The most effective way to protect group dignity, identity and diverse customs and thus to place groups on an equal footing with other parts of society is to allow them to control local affairs. Autonomy should be seen as one of the best guarantees minorities can wish for and it has been successfully implemented in many countries, although other governments have resisted the trend. Autonomy can be both territorial and personal. With concentration in one area, a group administration can be territorial. If the group’s members, however, are spread over a larger area and/or intermixed with other population groups as is often the case, personal autonomy, meaning membership of and participation in the group’s activities regardless of residence, is a legitimate and workable solution. Personal or non-territorial autonomy also does not result in the drawing of internal borders, undoubtedly an advantage in the eyes of many governments. Autonomy is by its very nature a group right, while the members of the group are the ultimate beneficiaries. The collective entity claims the right, enjoys it and through its membership determines the form and structures of administration. In exercising its powers, the group regime must respect democratic principles and other universally recognized human rights. For example, the group must protect the rights of its own members as well as individuals of other population groups, and it must guarantee representative leadership and equality of the sexes. Group rights must also be exercised in a manner consistent with other principles of international law relating to, for example, the sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of States and the maintenance of international peace and security. This indication of issues associated with minority autonomies only begins to list the many difficult and complex questions, which have arisen and will come up in the drafting of legislation and in the practical application of such laws. This book, with theoretical presentations as well as thoughtful examples from real-life situations, is therefore a welcome addition to the growing literature on the subject.
Lund, June 2003
8
For literature, see for example Louis B. Sohn, ‘The Concept of Autonomy in International Law and the Practice of the United Nations’, 15 Israel Law Review 1980, pp. 180–190; and Markku Suksi (editor), Autonomy: Applications and Implications (Kluwer Law, The Hague International, 1998).
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PROLEGONEMON MORTEN KJÆRUM9: ‘THE ESSENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IS NOTHING BUT THE SAFEGUARD OF INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP AUTONOMY AGAINST THE ARBITRARY USE OF STATE POWER . . .’. The editor of this volume, Zelim Skurbaty, approached me to write a preface. Initially I had two reservations about doing it. First, I held an introductory speech at the opening of the joint UN Working Group on Minorities – the Danish Center for Human Rights10 conference, the offshoot of which is this book, and I felt somewhat awkward to quote myself to the audience, which had heard it viva voce. Second, among the authors of this Prolegomenon, prominent figures such as Max van der Stoel, former OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities and Gudmundur Alfredsson, the director of the Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, have been featured − both are well-known specialists in the specific field of minority rights and autonomy. After some considerations, however, I decided to do some homework on autonomy and, by reworking my speech, to present something fitting to the present academic work. Thus, I hope these few notes will convey the feeling of importance that we at the Danish Institute for Human Rights attach to the issue of autonomy. This is both in terms of the research work conducted on issues related to this topic, and attending to practical aspects of autonomy, such as writing notes to the Government, teaching minority and indigenous rights, conducting seminars and workshops on the topic. By way of generalization, it can be said that autonomy is at the very heart of the human rights discourse, because the essence of human rights is nothing but the safeguard of individual and group autonomy against the arbitrary use of State power. When governments crack down on the rights of refugees and immigrants, close down the educational establishments of minorities, deny – either overtly or covertly – representation and power sharing at the local and federal levels, it is not only a refugee or a minority problem per se, but a problem closely related to autonomy in general, personal autonomy in particular. Supporting autonomy under such conditions amounts to the support of human rights of individuals and groups, and we should always keep in mind this vital linkage between the two. The Danish Center for Human Rights hosted the International Seminar on Autonomist and Integrationist Approaches to Minority Protection in April 2002. It was organized in cooperation with the United Nations Working Group on Minorities and brought together, under the roof of our Center, some leading professionals in the field of autonomy arrangements and minority rights, representing different schools of thought. They had a chance to discuss various aspects of the problems surrounding autonomy − an issue that makes headlines on a daily basis. There is a compelling reason behind the overwhelming interest of this issue by academics, politicians and media. Across the globe − from Spain and Denmark to Sri Lanka, 9
Cand. Jur. (University of Aarhus, 1984). Director of The Danish Institute for Human Rights since 1991. Member of UN Committee on The Elimination of Racial Discrimination. 10 From 1 January 2003 The Danish Centre for Human Rights has been renamed The Danish Institute for Human Rights.
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PROLEGOMENON Northern Ireland to Northern Iraq, Chechnya to Bosnia − minority groups are asserting their distinctive ethnic, religious, or national identity and demanding greater control over the expression of that identity, not only in cultural and social matters but in political and economic areas as well. Here are some snapshots that caught my eye during a casual perusal of recent press: ‘The European Court of Human Rights talks of a “democratic restructuring” without destroying the territorial integrity of Turkey with respect to Kurdish population’; “How will the Faeroes plan of a referendum on independence from Denmark fare in 2014?’; ‘Establishing Nunavut but refusing Quebec secession in Canada?’; ‘France has set in motion a process that can accord Corsica limited autonomous powers’; ‘Palestinian Autonomy or Palestinian State: That’s the Question’, etc., etc. While much of that assertion is based on the right to self-determination of peoples, what is less heard and often neglected is a plea for accommodation and self-restraint. The reason for this is that such pleas for self-restraint come typically from governments trying to support their embattled status and aiming – often - to repress dissent. This one-sided commentary to the autonomy issue is rarely productive, because disdain for give-and-take and accommodation can spawn intergroup antagonism and lead to inter-group strife and even bloodshed. This could be one of the reasons why international law, while according a right to selfdetermination to people, does not promulgate any express right to autonomy within States. Even the word ‘minority’ in legal texts is supplanted by a non-committal term, ‘persons belonging to minorities’, with an apparent implication that States owe a much weaker obligation towards them, namely – the right to enjoy their culture in community with other members of the group. Seen from the big picture of the world politics of the last century, the concept of autonomy harbours a two-pronged hazard. On the one hand, those minorities that show no flexibility and insist upon seceding from the States within which they find themselves, almost always fail in their ambitions, unable either to overcome the opposition of the State or to sustain themselves as an independent entity. On the other hand, those States that dismiss the notion of compromise must usually reckon with prolonged and violent opposition from the disaffected minority. And it is the concept of autonomy that can go beyond the erroneous equation of the right to selfdetermination and the right of secession and serve to promote the process of accommodation between States and minority groups. Autonomy, from this perspective, is a mode – and a creative mode at that − of integration, which should be distinguished from assimilation. While assimilation is aiming, one way or another, at elimination of identity and cultural distinctiveness, integration involves recognition of the identity and culture of the minority communities as well as their effective participation in all aspects of the political, economic and cultural structures of the country in which they live. This is the reason why the International Seminar on Autonomist and Integrationist Approaches to Minority Protection, which our Center hosted, dealt with the questions of the interplay between these two notions, emphasizing flexible, integrationist solutions to State-sub-State modus vivendi. Autonomy should be xxv
PROLEGONEMON considered as a tool, and like any tool, it must be used in accordance with the special circumstances of each case. Autonomy cannot create the wish for compromise between States and minority groups, but if the parties are earnestly looking for one, autonomy can provide a viable framework for flexible and creative solutions to virtually any problem arising from attempts to achieve homogeneity by imposing assimilation. In essence, and this notion is repeatedly stressed in the introduction to the present volume, autonomy is nothing but ongoing and sustained efforts of the State or international community to accommodate heterogeneity by the diffusion of powers. By virtue of history and the fact that Denmark has two home-rule regimes, one in Greenland and one in Faeroe Islands, we are all too aware of the importance of accommodation of diversity, of compromise, of showing restraint in the wellfounded hope that the other side – whichever that might be − will also reciprocate in the same spirit. In our dealings with the local governments in Greenland and the Faeroe Islands we should proceed from the flexible notion of ‘autonomy’ whose details must be ironed out in the negotiating process; and as Isi Foighel underlines in his article on Greenland Home Rule, more emphasis could focus on better accommodation and integration of the home rule regime into the overall State framework, on the optimization and streamlining of the processes of the diffusion of powers and allocation of competences between the central and local authorities. The articles that constitute the present volume, deal with a rich assortment of issues undergirding the concept of autonomy: from economic sustainability of autonomy arrangements to conceptual and philosophical aspects of autonomy, to autonomy as a participatory right, to autonomy and conflict resolution, to autonomy in the countries in transition, to legal safeguards of autonomy, etc., etc. The geographical span of the countries and groups under academic scrutiny is also impressive, stretching from India to Canada, Europe to Africa, Asia and America. The reader will surely be impressed by the scope and ambition of this publication, and also – will get new insights and perspectives that will enable him or her to turn ‘autonomy’ into a tool and concept that will be part of the solution, not part of the problem, to ethnically-based conflicts − the root of the political malaise of the 21 century.
Copenhagen, June 2003
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ABBREVIATIONS A/ A/C.3/ ADB Add. A.J.I.L. ANC ASSR CAHMIN CAP CBC CCPR CEFTA CERD CHT CCI CIS CLP CoE CSCE DCHR DR E/. . . E/CN.4/. . . E/CN.4/AC.1/ E/CN.4/AC.2/. E/CN.4/Sub.2/. . EC ECHR ECOSOC ECOSOCOR EJIL FCNM
Document of the General Assembly of the United Nations Document of the Third (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) Committee of the General Assembly Asian Development Bank Addendum American Journal of International Law African National Congress Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic Committee for the Protection of National Minorities Common Agricultural Policy Cross-Border Cooperation International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Central European Free Trade Area International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination Chittagen Regulation Act Council of Common Interests Commonwealth of Independent States Current Legal Problems Council of Europe Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Danish Centre for Human Rights (Now: DIHR Danish Institute for Human Rights) Decisions and Reports of the European Commission on Human Rights Document of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations Document of the Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations Document of the Drafting Committee on the International Bill of Human Rights Document of the Working Group on the Declaration of Human Rights Document of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities European Community European Convention on Human Rights Economic and Social Council of the United Nations UN Economic and Social Council Official Records European Journal of International Law Framework Convention for the protection of National Minorities xxvii
ABBREVIATIONS EOKA E.T.S. FTA G. A. G. A. Res. G.A.O.R. GDR HM HRC HCNM HRLJ IACHR ICC ICCPR ICERD ICESCR ICJ I.C.J. Rep. ICLQ ICTY ILC ILM. ILO I.L.R. IMF INTERREG L. L.Q.R. L.N.Off. J. L.N.T.S. MLR MNRGT MRG NFC NIHRC NQHR OAS OAU OED OPEC xxviii
Ethniki Organosis Kipriakov Agonos (in Greek) European Treaty Series Free Trade Agreements General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly Resolution (UN) General Assembly Official Records German Democratic Republic Helsinki Monitor Human Rights Committee OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Human Rights Law Journal Inter-American Commission for Human Rights International Criminal Court International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights International Court of Justice International Court of Justice, Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders International and Comparative Law Quarterly International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia International Law Commission International Legal Materials International Labour Organization International Law Reports International Monetary Fund Cross-border program for enterprise cooperation in the ‘Alpenrhein-Bodensee-Hochrein’-area. Limited distribution Law Quarterly Review League of Nations Official Journal League of Nations Treaty Series Modern Law Review Martens Nouveau Recueil Général de Traités Minority Rights Group National Finance Commission Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights Organization of American States Organization of African Unity Oxford English Dictionary (Vol. NN 1−20) Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
ABBREVIATIONS O.R. OSCE P.C.I.J. P.C.I.J. Rep. Procs. A.S.I.L. PFM PCIJ PMR Rev ICJ Res. Rev. RDH RPF SAARC S.C.O.R. S.C. Res. SR. SSR TNC TRANSCEND UDHR U. N. UNAMIR UNCIO Doc. UNESCO UN G. A. U.N.T.S. VAT WGIP WGM WTO Yale L.J. YBECHR YBILC YBUN
Official Records Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Permanent Court of International Justice Permanent Court of International Justice Proceedings of the American Society of International Law Popular Front of Molova Permanent Court of International Justice Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic (in Rus.: “Pridneprovskay Moldavskaya Respublika”) The Review of the International Commission of Jurists Resolution Revision Revue des Droits de l’Homme Rwandan Patriotic Front South Asia Association for Regional Coorporation (UN) Security Council Official Records (UN) Security Council Resolution Summary Records Soviet Socialist Republic Transnational Corporations A Network for Peace and Development United Declarations for Human Rights United Nations Organization United Nation Assistance Mission in Rwanda Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization United Nations General Assembly United Nations Treaty Series Value Added Tax UN Working Group on Indigenous Peoples Working Group on Minorities World Trade Organisation Yale Law Journal Year Book of the European Convention on Human Rights Year Book of the International Law Commission Year Book of the United Nations
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INTRODUCTION ‘The life of every society contains an unending contest between the forces of stability and change. To change too little may lead to stagnation and death; to change too much may lead to disaster and collapse. Yet the thrust of revolution is upon our generation. Some of the thrust must be resisted if we are to live according to the lights history has given us. Yet we must know that even then we must have to accept and make possible great changes in our society. The law is utterly caught up in the immense crisis of our generation. Upon those who practice the law rests a great share of the delicate responsibility of deciding what must be preserved and what must be changed, what we shall protect and what we shall abandon.’ 1
James Hopkins
‘When autonomy is respected, the two-year-old does not carry this unfinished task into later stages of growth. In adolescence, the youngster will again concentrate on independence, but he won’t have to blast the roof off the second time around if it is already well established.’ 2
Dorothy Corkville Briggs
This book is an outgrowth of the presentations and discussions of an International Seminar on Autonomist and Integrationist Approaches to Minority Protection, held at the Danish Centre for Human Rights in Copenhagen on 3−4 April 2002 in accordance with the conclusions of the 7th Session of the United Nations Working Group on Minorities (UN WGM). The event has proved to be such a success that the recommendations of the Seminar have been put on the Agenda of the 8th Session of the UN WGM (May 2002) and, moreover, a multitude of minority NGOs, Government and academia representatives have motioned a proposal to publish the proceedings of the Seminar in order to make available its findings to a broad audience. The proposal had a snowballing effect as even authors who had not participated in the Seminar expressed their desire to contribute to the publishing project. While we respectfully declined the majority of these off-schedule contributions, some of them proved to be not only interesting, but also fit perfectly with the concept of the project. We have also found the process of considering, for publication, the contributions of people (like NGO activists or local government representatives) who, although having intimate knowledge of the problems surrounding autonomy, did not belong to the category designated by stylistic convention as ‘academics’. 1
See Hopkins, James D., (Assoc. Justice, App. Div. 2d Dept.), ‘Precedent and Change: What Are the Reasons?’ NYLJ, 12-1-64, 4:3. 2 Dorothy Corkville Briggs (20th century), U.S. parent educator. Your Child’s Self-Esteem, ch. 15 (1975).
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ZELIM A. SKURBATY There are two distinctive features, which – taken together – set this volume apart from recent analogous publications and add to its value-added benefit for both laymen and professionals. The first of them is its multidisciplinary character, seen from the fact that the authors, attacking the autonomy problematique, are coming from such diverse fields as law, economy, philosophy, political science, peace studies, etc. This pronounced multidisciplinary character of the book, being one of its strengths, could also be a source of confusion of such terms as ‘autonomy’, ‘people’, ‘minorities’, ‘self-determination’, etc. Although every author gives a particular twist to those terms, their basic meanings will readily be understood by an attentive reader: the seeming ‘semantic jungle’ is nothing but the phenomenon of semantic indeterminacy endemic to international human rights.3 The encouraging fact is that apart from academic connotations, these terms have ‘common sense’ or ‘reality-based’ under- and overtones − so much so that both professionals and laymen will easily separate the ‘chaff from wheat’ and see through them.4 Thus, instead of viewing the assemblage of authors coming from radically differing perspectives and using the basic operative terms idiosyncratically, as a semantic Babel of sorts, we decided to consider the very fact a challenge, which, if properly met, could enrich measurably the autonomy discourse. Another distinguishing feature of the present volume is its comparative thrust, whereby parallels and distinctions are constantly drawn between different autonomous arrangements in order to single out the patterns that prove to be effective in the crucible of the real-life situations. Although the authors are usually very cautious in suggesting any mechanical transference of one particular autonomy model to situations radically differing from those that gave rise to it, they always express hope that some elements of such models can still be used with due regard to the local conditions. Convinced that autonomy has the potential to bring peaceful resolution of ethnic conflicts, the authors examine a considerable number of case studies, illustrating many relevant situations in which autonomy might be contemplated: from a minimum of competence to a great number of powers just short of full independence. These case studies show that minority groups seeking greater 3
Cf. Koskenniemmi’s notion of ‘semantic indeterminacy’, to the effect that: ‘The openness of legal language causes contradiction in argument. One man’s ‘aggression’ is another’s ‘selfdefense’. It is pointed out that although most countries use the available legal vocabulary, the meanings they attach to central expressions such as ‘equality’, ‘humane treatment’ or even ‘state’ vary to a great extent. It has even been argued that the sense of words such as ‘law’ and ‘state’ in European, African, Arabic, Chinese and Indian cultures differs to the extent that even the possibility of mutual understanding seems excluded.’ See Koskenniemi, M., From Apology to Utopia. The Structure of International Legal Argument (Helsinki: Lakimuesliiton Kustannus, 1989), p. 43 4 Cf. the now famous statement of Max van der Stoel, the then High Commissioner for National Minoroties: ‘I know a minority when I see one.’ see Max van der Stoel, Keynote Address to the OSCE Human Dimension Seminar on Case Studies on National Minority Issues: Positive Results (24 May 1993).
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INTRODUCTION political identification, should also be realistic in acknowledging their limitations, and that only under this condition can they achieve concrete gains: by exercising control over their own affairs in some areas while remaining subject to the authority of the state in other areas. Consequently, from the perspective of the international community the granting of autonomy should be conceived of as the most workable and peaceable solution to the disgruntled minorities whose aspirations for cultural or ethnic respect and even self-government cannot be silenced or satisfied within the existing system of governance. By providing ample theoretical and practical backup to this thesis, the present compendium could be of immense service to international stability and respect for law. Thus, the authors of the present book share the common belief that autonomy, if properly understood and applied, holds considerable potential for ensuring an effective and harmonious co-existence of diverse groups within the modern state. Autonomy, from this perspective, can be considered as a common denominator of all success stories of peaceful coexistence in societies that are ethnically, culturally and linguistically complex, a ‘great leveler’ of sorts for all seemingly unreconcilable intra- and inter-group interests. To illustrate this overriding point, the authors spell out a host of outstanding issues to be considered when establishing autonomous regimes and identify those dynamics that may increase the chances for their success. And because the authors are both ‘philosophical’ and ‘down to earth’ in terms of their knowledge of the realities on the ground, their recommendations are likely to prove invaluable in stimulating the inventiveness of negotiators on ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ sides of the table, let alone the policymakers from interested third parties. This ability of the authors of the present volume to address the concerns of academics and analysts in the field of human rights on the one hand, and policymakers and practitioners on the other, is very much in keeping with the Scandinavian human rights institutions’ interest in bridging the gap between the policymaking and scholarly communities, between theoretical constructs about autonomy and human rights and practical solutions designed to harmonize the – often − complicated relations between minorities and majorities, state and sub-state entities. In the introduction that follows, I will start with a short overview of the concept of autonomy in modern political and international legal discourse (Part I) and conclude with the brief overview of the contributions submitted to this book (Part II). I. IS THERE AN EMERGING RIGHT TO AUTONOMY? 1.1. The Meaning of Autonomy The World is Diverse. This is a profound truth comparable only to the first of the ‘Four Noble Truths’ of Buddha, which states: ‘Life is Suffering’.5 It is profound 5
or ‘Difficult’ depending on the interpretation of the meaning of the word.
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ZELIM A. SKURBATY because if we truly accept it, we will stop fighting the diversity of peoples inhabiting the world and start, instead, thinking about the ways and means of accommodating this diversity.6 Autonomy from this perspective is both a manifestation, and an instrument for the accommodation of diversity. The contributions to this book bear testimony to the fact that the imposition of assimilation – in whatever form – does not produce harmonious homogeneity, and that the solutions to the inter-group conundrums should be sought in the accommodation of heterogeneity by politics of comprehensive inclusion of the disenfranchised groups and a diffusion of powers – all of which could be summed up by the notion of autonomy. Autonomy from this perspective is antithetical to assimilation which involves the elimination of separate identities7 constituting diversity, and congenial to integration which presupposes the recognition of distinctive identities and cultures and participation of the members of distinctive groups in political, economic and cultural structures of the state. To be autonomous is to be a law to oneself; autonomous entities are selfgoverning entities. Such entities want to be autonomous because they want to be responsible and accountable for what they do, and because it seems that if they are not the ones calling the shots, then they cannot be either responsible or accountable. More specifically, when people constituting a certain group declare that they have the right to live autonomously, what they say is that they ought to be allowed to govern themselves. In making this claim, they are, in essence, rejecting the political and legal authority over a circumscribed or ‘autonomous’ domain, emanating from the sources outside their group. What is at stake here is the legitimacy of any power 6
Cf. ‘The belief that every State is a nation, or that all sovereign States are national States, has done much to obfuscate human understanding of political realities. A State is a legal and political organization, with the power to require obedience and loyalty from its citizens. A nation is a community of people, whose members are bounded together in a sense of solidarity, common culture, a national consciousness. Yet in the common usage of English and other modern languages these two distinct relationships are frequently confused.’ See Seton-Watson, Nations and States: an Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism, 1977, at p.1. The sentiment is echoed by Kymlicka who notes that: ‘[the] implication is that the State should not be conceived as a monolithic unity but as an agency for recognizing groups, determining what legal status and rights they shall have, supervising and co-ordinating their interrelationships, and itself conducting certain kinds of functions in which all have a common interest.’− see Kymlicka, W., The Rights of Minority Cultures (Oxford: OUP, 1995), p.52. 7 This voluntaristic or fiat approach to group diversity is well illustrated by the Bolshevik nationalist policy during the heyday of Stalinism. In 1936 Stalin ‘determined’, that ‘The Soviet Union comprises . . . about 60 nations, national groups and nationalities’(see Stalin, Sochinenija, T. 5. p.113), although it was a well-known fact, that according to the population census of 1926, there existed minimum 185 (!) nationalities (see Vsesojuznaja perepis' naselenija 1926 g. M., 1929, T.17, pp. 26-32). This hatred of diversity is understandable in the light of the programme, envisaged by Lenin and the Bolsheviks, according to which national minorities were only a crude material for the processes of ‘sblizhenie’ (‘coming together’) and eventual ‘sliyanie’ (‘merger’) until they would turn into a super- cosmopolitan society, where the 'proletarian solidarity' would take over the national sentiments.
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INTRODUCTION exercised by the outsiders over matters affecting the group’s identity, culture and welfare. Thus, in order to be autonomous, it is the group members, and they alone, who should have the authority to determine and enforce the rules and policies that govern their lives. By analogy, an individual claiming a certain sphere of her life to be autonomous, denies that anyone else has the authority to control her activities within this sphere; and here too, the essence of her claim is that any exercise of power over these activities is illegitimate unless she authorizes it herself. These considerations allow us to immediately put forward a thesis according to which the meaning of ‘autonomy’ is either self-imposed by the state, or imposed by the international community upon a state, of specific legal obligations designed to accord a sub-state group (and individuals within that group) some degree of self-rule (or self-determination) and, thus, facilitate the preservation and promotion of those differentiating features on which that group places high premium. Additionally, because the mixed-up framework of the modern world carries the seeds of international conflicts, especially when states try to assert uniformity and assimilation by forcible means, the aim of autonomy can also be defined as a means of averting the brewing conflicts while mitigating the transnational effects of those in full swing. As is convincingly shown by the authors of the articles to this book, such a conflation of pragmatic and humanitarian considerations is a hallmark of the whole system of autonomous arrangements. 1.2. Approaches of the International Community Generally speaking, the approach of the international community to the state/substate groups’ modus vivendi can either be territorial or juridical.8 A territorial approach, which finds its international law equivalent in the groups’ claims to internal9 and external self-determination, can – potentially – ensue the revision of international and internal borders, the transfer of populations, the establishment of ‘new’ ethnic homogeneities within states as well as the proliferation of new sovereign states.10 There is no tried and tested alternatives to the territorial approach, 8 By ‘groups’ we mean problematic groups, i.e. those of them that claim, one way or another, autonomy rights. More specifically, and as is often the case, prominent political leaders usually voice claims on their behalf in terms of either internal (personal and territorial autonomy, 'minority rights', power-sharing schemes) or external self-determination (secession and creation of an independent State). 9 By sticking to more conventional understanding of internal self-determination, which is usually framed in terms of autonomous arrangements, I do not exclude the notion that internal forms of self-determination can also include the expansion of participatory rights or ‘more democracy’. 10 International legal rationalization of the self-determination options are captured in the following statement: ‘The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an independent State or the emergence into any political status freely determined by a people constitutes modes of implementing the right of selfdetermination by that people.’ See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
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ZELIM A. SKURBATY the best one being the one of a juridical character and embracing the international protection of human rights and the creation of special minority rights regimes. An important qualification to the juridical approach, which necessitates complex and sophisticated legal solutions to the minorities problem, is the proviso of the minimum level of democracy and the rule of law, without which the juridical measures (and territorial for that matter) can turn out to be nothing more than a smoke screen concealing ruthless oppression of ‘peoples’ and ‘minorities’. Autonomy, from this perspective, can be regarded as a mixtum compositum of territorial and juridical approaches, the ingredients of which should be specified on an ad hoc and context-dependent basis.11 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, ‘autonomy’ refers to several interrelated concepts, the closest of which to our present concern is ‘the right of selfgovernment, of making its own laws and administering its own affairs’.12 There are three types of autonomy regimes reflecting different levels of legal authorization, i.e. the interplay of the governmental and minority subsystems within the constitutional, statutory and customary laws of a given state. The first one is the outgrowth of the (mentioned immediately above) territorial approach, and refers to an autonomy regime with a specific territorial organization. Such organization presupposes the existence of a territorially concentrated minority population. The forms of self-government in territorial autonomy can vary considerably, but usually include the regionally based elective government with the powers to exercise control over the tax and regional education systems as well as the regulation of natural resources. The constitutional forms of territorial autonomy can again vary, from being either part of a federal system or forming a regional government with powers devolved from the central government. To illustrate the multiplicity of options and forms of the territorial regimes: the German constitution allows the subjects of the federation a limited treaty-making power (and the Russian Constitution in respect to Tatarstan) while limiting the nation’s military capacity (along with the constitution of Japan). Moreover, territorial autonomy could be the result of the voluntary union, technically called ‘associated status’, as in the case of the Cook Islands and New Zealand; ‘home-rule’ accommodation of the decolonization process, like in the case of Greenland; or a post World War I United Nations. G. A. Res. 2625 GAOR, 25 Sess., Supp. No. 28; at 121, UN Doc. A/8028 (1971), reprinted in 9 ILM 1292. (emphasis added). 11 Which should not lead to the wholesale exclusion of principle- or legal-centeredness of the apporach at the expense of case-by-case improvisations of international lawyers. 12 Autonomy – 1. Of a state, institution, etc.: The right of self-government, of making its own laws and administering its own affairs. (Sometimes limited by the adjs. local, administrative, when the self-government is only partial; thus English boroughs have a local autonomy, the former British colonies had an administrative autonomy; ‘political autonomy’ is national independence.) b. Liberty to follow one’s will, personal freedom. c. Metaph. Freedom (of the will); the Kantian doctrine of the Will giving itself its own law, apart from any object willed; opposed to heteronomy. 2. Biol. Autonomous condition: a. The condition of being controlled only by its own laws, and not subject to any higher one. b. Organic independence. 3. A selfgoverning community (cf. a monarchy).
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INTRODUCTION bilateral agreement, as in the case of the regional autonomy of the Italian (Austrian?) South Tyrol. The second type of autonomy is a personal autonomy regime with the hallmark feature of a personal law, existing parallel with the nation-wide secular law, and regulating such matters as marriage, divorce, inheritance, adoption, etc. Such a law may or may not be optional depending on the state. Personal autonomy does not require, by definition, any compact settlement of a religious or ethnic minority group, and the members of such a group can enjoy the rights enunciated in personal laws irrespective of the number or place of their settlement. The laws regulating the situation of Muslims and Christians in Israel, and Hindus and Muslims in India illustrate this type of autonomy. The third type is a power-sharing autonomy regime, which provides for a particular form of participation in the decision-making process of the government, especially in the matters touching upon the interests and well being of a specific group.13 A power-sharing regime resembles the personal one in that it does not require the group to be concentrated in one specific region. It can assume the forms of special quotas in the representation of the group in state and regional legislatures, or the procedural provisos, whereby the approval of the majority of the minority representation in the legislature is required in order for laws affecting the minority to be passed. 1.3. Is there the Right to Autonomy in International Law? Although the majority of autonomy definitions are phrased in the ‘rights’ language, there is no explicit right to autonomy in international law. Even in the travaux préparatoires of the UN Charter, the drafters were careful enough to distinguish between the status of trusteeship territories, referred to as ‘self-government’, meaning their autonomy within the terms of reference of the trusteeship arrangement, and their alleged right to self-determination and independent statehood.14 Only in a few documents, belonging to the ‘soft law’ category, can we find rather explicit, though very tentative, references to ‘autonomy’. The most prominent among them is the OSCE (former CSCE) Copenhagen Document of June 1990, in which autonomy is mentioned as a means to preserve and promote the identity of minorities: ‘The participating States note the efforts undertaken to protect and create conditions for the promotion of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of certain national minorities by establishing, as one of the possible means to achieve these aims, appropriate local or autonomous administrations corresponding to the specific historical and territorial
13
See the article of Yash Ghai on public participation of minorities with a good exposition of the major modalities of this form of autonomy. 14 UNCIO, Vol. 6, UN Information Organization New York 1945, p. 278.
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ZELIM A. SKURBATY circumstances of such minorities and in accordance with the policies of the State concerned.’15
In 1993, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe drafted a proposed Protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms on the rights of national minorities16, where Article 11 provided that: ‘In the regions where they are in a majority the persons belonging to a national minority shall have the right to have at their disposal appropriate local or autonomous authorities or to have a special status matching the specific historical and territorial situation and in accordance with the domestic legislation of the State.’
Although the provision is made contingent on specific limiting factors (specific historical and territorial situation, etc.), if it had been adopted it would have provided a justiciable right for minority groups to seek autonomous government before the Council of Europe organs of the ECHR. However, the Vienna Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe (October 1993) rejected the Assembly’s draft Protocol and called only for a protocol in the cultural field to guarantee rights to individual members of minorities.17 As can readily be seen, both paragraph 35 of the Copenhagen Document and Article 11 of Recommendation 1201 expressly refer to local or autonomous administrations or authorities, which are limited to the control of the group’s own affairs. These administrations, however, should have been geared to specific historical or territorial circumstances and provide, ideally, a local or autonomous authority over that territory – the fact exemplifying the concept of autonomy qua form of internal self-determination. These documents show also that autonomy is not a static, uniform concept, but can vary in content to meet the circumstances of the group. The right to autonomy qua the specific right to self-determination is featured in the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Article 31 of which provides that, ‘Indigenous peoples, as a specific form of exercising their right to selfdetermination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, including culture, religion, education, information, media, health, housing, employment, social welfare, economic activities, land and resources management, environment and entry 15
See CSCE, Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension in 11 HRLJ (1990), p. 232, para. 35. (emphasis added). 16 Recommendation 1201 (1993). 17 Recommendation 1255 (1995), para.3. The cultural protocol has also proved to be stillborn as the Parliamentary Assembly insisted on the need for a protocol to the ECHR motioned in 2001 – see Press Release, Council of Europe Press Service 24 January 2001.
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INTRODUCTION by non-members, as well as ways and means for financing these autonomous functions.’18
The 1992 United Nations General Assembly Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities19 mentions no autonomous self-government for minorities, but does provide20 minorities with participatory rights in Article 2.3: ‘Persons belonging to minorities have the right to participate effectively in decisions on the national and, where appropriate, regional level concerning the minority to which they belong or the regions in which they live, in a manner not incompatible with national legislation.’21
After the above-mentioned minority rights protocol to the ECHR was rejected22, the Council of Europe promulgated the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in 1995.23 It contains no provision on autonomous government. As a predominantly aspirational document, the Convention operates by imposing an obligation on States to implement the various provisions within their own constitutional and legal systems. Article 15 in particular provides that, ‘The Parties shall create the conditions necessary for the effective participation of persons belonging to national minorities in cultural, social and economic life and in public affairs, in particular those affecting them.’
In terms of the latest developments in the ‘juridical approach’ to autonomy,24 one could also mention the work of the Badinter Arbitration Committee, created by ‘the 18
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add.1 (1994), emphasis added. GA Res.47/135, Annex, 47 UNGAOR Supp.(No.49) at 210, UN Doc.A/47/49 (1993); and comments thereon, E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/1999/WP.1. 20 Speaking about ‘providing’ the right, we should mind, of course, that the 1992 Declaration is a soft law document by definition. 21 The territorial dimension of autonomy is mentioned only in the context of the preservation of the ‘territorial integrity’ of the State in the Article 8.4: ‘Nothing in the present Declaration may be construed as permitting any activity contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, including sovereign equality, territorial integrity and political independence of States.’ 22 See footnote 16, supra. 23 34 ILM 351 (1995). See also, Klebes, The Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 16 HRLJ 92 (1995). 24 See a comprehensive taxonomy of autonomous arrangements in the article of Yoram Dinstein ‘Autonomy’, where he distinguishes between autonomies by multilateral treaty, bilateral agreement, local legislation, local legislation based on both bilateral and multilateral treaties, by local legislation based on General Assembly Resolution, by local legislation based on bilateral treaty as well as a resolution of the Security Council, and by decree of the Security Council. Another, very interesting taxonomy of autonomies can be found in the article of Thomas W. Simon ‘Paradoxes of Autonomy: Tensions, Traps and Possibilities’, where the author classifies them as Legal (De Jure) Autonomy, Reciprocal Autonomy, 19
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ZELIM A. SKURBATY European Community and its Member States’ on 27 August 1991 in order to address (in the forms of ‘opinions or recommendations’) the clashing claims of the former Yugoslavian Republics to self-determination.25 Having started in Opinion 2 (out of 7 Opinions produced) with the statement that Article 1 of the two 1966 International Covenants on human rights establishes that the principle of the right to self-determination serves to safeguard the choice ‘to belong to whatever ethnic, religious or language community he or she wishes’.26 In keeping with this conclusion, the ‘opinion’ had gone on to say that the members of the Serbian population in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia could be ‘recognized under agreements between the Republics as having the nationality of their choice, with all the rights and obligations which entails with respect to the states concerned’.27 Thus – and this might well be considered as a ground-breaking aspect of the deliberations of the Committee – the previous implication of homogeneity within an englobing State in the notion of ‘peoples’ is expressly replaced with the wider concept of a State, housing various ethnic, religious and linguistic communities (groups), all of which can insist on the right to be recognized as an entity with an identity of its own choice. Opinion 2 of the Badinter Committee, however, begs some pragmaticallycoloured questions: if Serbians, as a case in point, are accorded Serbian nationality in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, and they still remain loyal citizens of these states, what is the difference between ‘nationality’ and ‘citizenship’ in the European context? The statement of A. Pellet vis-à-vis the implications of the Opinion 2 is rather characteristic: ‘The States are thus informed: these are “imperative norms” binding all subjects of international law, and, which could one day be applied to protect, for example, the rights of Gagauz or Chechens without entailing the break-up
Variegated Autonomy, Deliberative (De Facto) Autonomy and Humanitarian Autonomy, and gives recommendations to all stakeholders on the ways of optimization of every particular arrangement. One could probably give alternative sets of classifications (see for example an extremely interesting classification provided by Johan Galtung in his article ‘The Role of Autonomy in State/Nation Dialectic’), but the ones presented by Yoram Dinstein and Thomas Simon can serve as useful guides for orientation in the legal (and non-legal) maze surrounding autonomy arrangements. I do not repeat these classifications and I see my task in giving the bird’s eye view of the autonomy and delineating the major trends pointing to the possible ‘emergence’ of the ‘right to autonomy’. 25 See Pellet, A., The Opinion of the Badinter Arbitration Committee: a Second Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples, in: European Journal of International Law, Vol. 3, 1992, No. 1, p. 182. 26 ibid. 27 Op. cit., No. 1, p. 179.
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INTRODUCTION of Moldavia or Russia. One dare not even consider Corsicans or even Basques . . .’28
This sort of recognition of diversity – that within one State, various ethnic, religious or linguistic communities are entitled to their own nationality irrespective of the existence of state borders – might, perhaps, seem superfluous and far from opinio juris, but it opens new avenues of legal thinking, leading to juridical consolidation of the major distinction put forward in the Treaty on European Union signed in Maastricht, that is, between ‘nationality’ and ‘citizenship’. This line of thought represents the long-awaited nexus between autonomy and ‘peoples’ and ‘minorities’ rights. It also serves to secure such a human right as the right to belong to one’s homeland (which can be a kith and kin ethnic or religious unity bonding groups beyond or across national frontiers) irrespective of the formal citizenship and the right to vote in local elections there without prejudice to the integrity of the states involved. These projective loose entities – national-home regimes (patries, heimats) or ‘overlays’ over existing or future states – might or might not correspond to (sovereign) state boundaries and serve as the prototypes of new multi-purpose subjects of new international law. The realities on the ground, however, dictate more state-centric solutions to minority-based problems, especially in post-conflict situations. The precedent of Dayton Agreement of 1995 is exemplary in that it reasserted the sovereign status of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Article 1 of the General Framework Agreement for Peace, and at the same time, created two autonomous entities: the Muslim-Croatian federation (approximately 51 per cent of the territory, including the whole of Sarajevo) and the Serb Republic (Republika Srpska) with about 49 per cent. The agreement provided for the presence of 60,000 NATO troops (including 20,000 from the United States) for one year to supervise the implementation of the agreement. NATO, whose forces were deployed immediately after the signing of the Dayton agreements on 14 December, took over officially from the UN in Bosnia on 20 December. The Constitution of Bosnia Herzegovina, set out in Annex 4 of the Agreement, reiterated the standard commitments to the Charter of the United Nations and to a variety of human rights instruments and provided, specifically, in Article I.3 that this sovereign Republic shall consist of the two Autonomous Entities. The Dayton Agreement has demonstrated that solutions to minority-based problems in modern times can require the intervention of the international community (even in the form of a transitional de-facto protectorate regime) and the imposition of autonomous regimes. The same can be said about the non-starter Rambouillet Accord and the final Kosovo peace 28
Ibid., p. 179. One could only add that before ‘daring’ to protect Corsicans or Basques qua minority groups they have to be recognized as such by a State, which in case of France could have been problematic, as the statement of its representative before the Human Rights Committee clearly shows: ‘France cannot recognize the existence of ethnic groups, whether minorities or not’, and as a logical consequence: ‘Article 27 is not applicable so far as the Republic is concerned’, see: UN Doc.. E/CN.4/Sub. 2/384/Rev.1 (1979), para. 67.
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ZELIM A. SKURBATY agreement in line with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244: both were predicated on the principle of territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the creation of the autonomy within the federation as a means of guaranteeing the rights of the Kosovar Albanians. 1.4. The Pros and Cons of Autonomy29 Nature abhors a straight line: if we find one, a human made it. Nowhere this is truer than in the discourse on autonomy: the forms it acquires are numerous, and the ambivalence towards it is rampant among both politicians and lawyers. This ambivalence is easily explainable if we take into account the role ‘autonomy’ plays in the age-old debate about relative values of change and stability, individual and group rights, the ‘primordial’ diversity of groups and homogenization accompanying modern development and technology, the inclusive ideals of human rights, openness to inquiry and challenge and fossilization of static (and statist for that matter) traditions. Depending on the political and legal vectors of the moment, autonomy can promote constructive change, can avert brewing inter-group conflicts and preserve diversity, but also – can dramatize grotesquely groups’ particular characteristics, foment intergroup dissent and can be used as a guardian of narrowly-understood ‘stability’.30 The pros and cons of the hypothetical right of indigenous peoples to extended forms of autonomy and even external self-determination graphically illustrate the overall complexity of the problem: Pros: • • • •
29
the indigenous peoples have their own clear-cut identity: cultural, linguistic, religious, etc.; they have lived on their territories since time immemorial; they have established their own political institutions, most effectively geared to their traditional way of life; they exercise both internal and external control over their respective populations and territories until a very distinct, historical watershed
I deliberately omit certain lines of argumentation in order to avoid an overlap with some of the authors of the present book. See e.g. the programmatic article by Hurst Hannum in Part II of the book, where many of the issues I raise are put to detailed scrutiny. Of special interest is the exposition of the ‘pros’- and ‘cons’ of autonomy and delineation of the ‘proper’ role autonomy. 30 Cf. the statement of Henry Steiner: ‘To the extent that autonomy regimes protect historical differences but inhibit the creation, as it were, of fresh differences, they would convert the human rights movement’ framework of protection of open inquiry and advocacy into the protection of static traditions. A state composed of segregated autonomy regimes would resemble more a museum of social and cultural antiquities than any human rights ideal’, see H. Steiner, 66 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1539 (1991), at 1547.
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INTRODUCTION
•
of the external enforcement of an indigenous group into colonial dependency occurred; indigenous peoples were formally recognized as equals when they entered into treaties of peace and friendship, which were of an international character and – as a rule – were broken by the colonizing powers unilaterally, without indigenous consent;
Cons: • •
• •
the notions of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘territorial integrity’ are the foundations of international law and cannot be removed without fatally damaging the whole construction; presumably, there would be no limit to fragmentation if every ethnic, religious or linguistic group claimed the right of selfdetermination in the form of secession and the creation of a separate state;31 the prospect of achieving peace and stability in the atomized world of thousands of sovereign states and autonomy regimes seems even more bleak.32 Notwithstanding the semantic and juridical subtleties involved in these kinds of exercises, we should always keep in mind the importance of the will to interpret the notion and pragmatic content of autonomy in one way or another.33
To sum up these introductory notes on autonomy: 1. The meaning of autonomy is either self-imposed by the state, or an imposition by the international community upon a state, of specific legal obligations designed to accord a sub-state group some degree of self-rule and, thus, to facilitate the preservation and promotion of those differentiating features on which that group places high premium. Autonomy can also be regarded as a means to avert or mitigate inter-group conflicts. 2. There are three major forms of autonomous regimes: territorial, personal and power-sharing. 3. There is no explicit right to autonomy in international law, and any concrete autonomous regime stems, as a rule, from the negotiation between the central 31 For the most vivid enunciation of the threat perceived, see the report of the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, – UN Doc. A/47/277 – S/24111, 17 June 1992, para 17. 32 See, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/37, para. 157. 33 The will or intention behind a particular interpretation of autonomy can be likened to the role of an observer in the uncertainty principle in quantum mechanics (or theory). The principle (called often Heisenberg uncertainty principle) stipulates that increasing the accuracy of measurement of one observable quantity increases the uncertainty with which another conjugate quantity may be known. Which might mean – analogously − that the way we observe or interpret the phenomenon of autonomy affects its very nature, its mode of existence, and ultimately − the mode of its manifestation or implementation.
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ZELIM A. SKURBATY government and the minority group, while the resulting accommodation is ratified in law. 4. There can be both advantages and disadvantages emanating from the imposition of an autonomous regime depending on various political and legal variables. Of special concern to the international community is the prospect of conservation of historical differences of the group and inhibition of the creation of new differentiating features, reflecting the processes of change in modern societies. 5. Given that rigorous standards of free and voluntary choice are met, and the concept of equal protection/non-discrimination is taken into account by all the stakeholders during negotiations leading to an autonomy arrangement, the advantages of autonomy clearly outweigh the disadvantages. Autonomy can effectively be used as a means to preserve and promote the identities of the groups, to foster economic development and to either prevent or mitigate the state-group or inter-group conflicts. 6. Taking account of the fact that there are some 6,000 to 9,000 internationally unrecognized but culturally persistent peoples or nations, and the mixed-up framework of the majority of modern states, the creation of autonomous regimes should be considered as a viable alternative to the ‘atomization’ of the international community into thousands of sovereign states.34 In fact, we are entering − at the dawn of the 21st century − the Age of Autonomy, the hallmark of which is the growing demand of the multitudes of sub-state groups for more inclusion and more self-rule – all of which can, eventually, result in the emerging right to autonomy. The articles composing this book present ample evidence that this is no longer an idle speculation, but a clear trend in modern political and legal discourse. II. AN INTRODUCTORY OVERVIEW OF THE CONTRIBUTIONS As the articles in this book are no more uniform in form and conceptualization than the actual phenomenon of autonomy on the ground, the need to reflect this diversity was more than obvious. The contributions are thus categorized under the following rubrics: General Issues: Cross-Disciplinary Appraisal of Autonomy; Theoretical Justifications; Cross-Border Cooperation, International Monitoring and Implementation; and National and Comparative Case Studies. These sections form also the four constitutive parts of the book (Parts I−IV), each of which is, in turn, 34
Subsumed in some studies under the categorical term of Fourth World nations, see for example a very interesting work by Griggs, A. R., The Role of Fourth World Nations and Synchronous Geopolitical Factors in the Breakdown of States (Berkeley: University of California at Berkeley, 1993). (Doctoral Dissertation), see also: ‘Economic Development by Invasion of Indigenous Nations’, Cultural Survival Quarterly 10(2): 2-11, 1986; ‘Central America Becomes Central Nations Reemerging Under Fire’, Fourth World Journal 1(4):227256, 1986; Nietschmann, Bernard; ‘The Third World War’, Cultural Survival Quarterly 11 (3): 1-16, 1987; and ‘The Miskito Nation and the Geopolitics of Self-Determination’, Journal of Political Science 19: 1840.’ We should, of course, regard these ‘peoples’ or ‘nations’ as territorial ethnic or cultural groups stripped of any legal connotations.
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INTRODUCTION subdivided into thematic sub-sections for easier reference. Although these subsections sometimes overlap, we have found them useful for better orientation in the wealth of diverse material compiled in this volume. 2.1. Part I General Issues: Cross-Disciplinary Appraisal of Autonomy The contributions in Part I focus on general issues and emphasize the importance of a degree of flexibility and inventiveness in defining and applying concepts in the area of autonomy. Needless to say, these articles overlap various disciplines and are eclectic so far as the methodologies applied are concerned. 2.1.1. Autonomy as a Participatory Right in the Modern Democratic State The first two articles of Part I reflect conceptualizations of the two major approaches of international community toward inter-group accommodation mentioned above: juridical and territorial. The article by Yash Ghai, Public Participation, Autonomy and Minorities, represents the power-sharing facet of the juridical approach to autonomy. The author shows, on the one hand, the high price society pays when minorities and indigenous peoples are excluded from political, social and economic decisions that have major repercussions on their lives, and on the other – a wide range of approaches that can offer possibilities for enhancing the level of participation of the disenfranchised groups. He does it through a theoretical analysis of major schools of thought on the topic (such as consociationalism and integrationist approaches, which should be distinguished from the assimilationist one) and a legal analysis of major instruments on participation of minority groups (like the 1992 UN Declaration on Minorities, the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, as well as the 1998, Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life, published by the OSCE’s High Commissioner for National Minorities in 1999). The author comes up with an assortment of principles that can widen the scope of the autonomy for minorities in the wider societies. Specifically, he singles out such factors as a) citizenship as the key to political participation; b) regional bodies that should work together to develop regional systems and provide for minority and indigenous participation in response to local realities; c) electoral laws promoting inclusion in the political process; d) special legislative procedures for situations where law-making has a major bearing on minority and indigenous communities. Overall, the author emphasizes the key role of participatory rights qua power sharing which can take the form of a specific autonomous arrangement − if desired and appropriate − in the modern democratic state. Equally important, according to the author, are adequate provision for the rights of minorities-within-minorities, such as women and other vulnerable groups.
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ZELIM A. SKURBATY 2.1.2. Legal Appraisal of Autonomy The second article by Hans-Joachim Heintze, Territorial Autonomy and International Stability: On Pros and Cons from the Viewpoint of International Law presents the advantages both for minorities and for the international community of a flexible concept of autonomy in the absence of any clear legal definition. This was evidenced by the fact that only one out of forty-four OSCE participating states had opposed the adoption of the Lund Recommendations. The author rightly notes that autonomy has more often than not been considered as a conflict-resolution device, as a means to ease tensions resulting from heterogeneity, which clearly has the advantage of according the same level of protection to both minorities and majorities. There is, however, a tendency to link territorial autonomy, which accompanies a number of regional autonomous arrangements, to ethnicity, which can, in turn, evoke the notions of ethnic mobilization and secessionism. Such an association can hinder interethnic cooperation, and the solution, according to the author, is a comprehensive set of regulations for any particular instance of selfgovernment, which should be effected in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity and the provision of full-scale political and socio-economic rights for all citizens. Perhaps, no other problem is so controversial in the international human rights discourse as the problem of the relative importance of the individual and collective dimensions. This problem is quite prominent in the autonomy discourse – the reason I35 put it under the magnifying glass of analysis in the article: Collective & Individual set Back to Back: Autonomy and the Interplay of Individual and Collective Dimensions in Article 27 of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. I made an attempt to give a detailed analysis of the travaux préparatoires of the Article 27 of the UN ICCPR and came to the conclusion that states deliberately wished to adopt rules and procedures that would maximize the chances of survival of the political status-quo. Moreover, it was shown that the assumption that if individual rights were honoured, ‘minorities’ would have no legitimate or defensible claims to further, has been proved wrong. However, the debate over the content and context of Article 27 has paved the way for the realization that the state-minority stand-off, at a fundamental level, can be resolved only in the form of an effective international legal arrangement which takes into account the collective – along with the individual − dimensions of a minority. The alleged form of such an arrangement could, ideally, be a legally recognized right to autonomy. As the questions related to the economic sustainability of the autonomous arrangements, including centre-autonomy fiscal modus operandi, are important determinants in the viability of autonomies, and have acquired – due to rapid decentralization tendencies – special significance during past few years, the next three articles of the Part I are devoted to these issues.
35
i.e. Zelim A. Skurbaty, the editor of this book.
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INTRODUCTION 2.1.3. Problems Related to the Economic Viability of Autonomous Arrangements In the article Centralism and Fiscal Federalism, Gisela Färber differentiates between a ‘centralist’ state where the central government decides about all public goods and has to guarantee their effective and equal provision across the whole territory, and a federal state where the legislative responsibility is divided among the governmental tiers and each jurisdiction decides the structure and the volume of ‘its’ public goods. The author tries to fashion answers to questions underlining ‘financial constitutions’: tax autonomy, competition for a better allocation of resources and full employment, future functions of fiscal equalisation and its construction, horizontal elements of redistribution, etc. Of crucial importance to autonomies, as the author rightly notes, is the mode of handling the fiscal revenue collected on a territory: whether it is left to that territory to be directly managed by local authorities or if it is first ‘centralised’ or brought to the centre and only afterwards redistributed or invested locally. This question comes out time and again as an apple of discord in the tug-of-war between autonomies and central authorities, and the article reviews the possible solutions to this problem – solutions lying on the continuum between centralism and fiscal federalism. Antonio M. Chiesi explores, in the article Social Structure, Social Capital And Institutional Agreement: The Trentino-Alto Adige Model, the role of ‘social capital’ in the development of Trentino-South Tyrol and the management of political and administrative autonomy. Since the very concept of ‘social capital’ is imbued with different under and overtones, resulting from the various meanings invested into it by different scholars, the author is careful to present a brief summary of the theoretical debate on its semantic boundaries and its relations with other kinds of ‘capital’. He attributes the relative success of the Trentino-South Tyrol autonomous arrangement to two important historical factors: the specific social structure that progressively reduced economic inequalities between the centre and periphery during the post war period through the institution of a welfare system at local level, and – the crux of his argumentation – the role played by social capital (community rules and culture, networks of interpersonal relations in private and economic spheres, etc.) in granting an overall trust at the macro level and co-operation incentives at the micro level. The author has succeeded in the demonstration of the transferability of his findings by showing how the application of the concept of social capital vis-à-vis Trentino-South Tyrol region, could also be profitably used for the projective analysis of the Balkan area. The last chapter of the Part I contains the article by Milford Bateman, Local Economic and Community Development as an Aspect of the Reconstruction of South-East Europe: Bringing the Local State Back In, in which the author describes a ‘local developmental state’ model, based on the potential role of regional, local and village government administrations in economic development. The author argues that the transposition of the neo-liberal approach to Central and Eastern Europe was the reason the processes of social and economic reconstruction in the Yugoslav successor states were ineffective. Inability to apply this approach mutatis xlvii
ZELIM A. SKURBATY mudantis to actual circumstances, has resulted, according to the author, in the enforced inactivity of one of the key institutional vehicles for the desired change – the local state. Specifically, the post-war reconstruction period in the area had seen the decline of many local and rural communities because of the absence of vigorous local institutional structures capable of orchestrating and promoting sustainable community policies. Instead of viewing themselves as subjects and beneficiaries of the structural changes, these communities regarded themselves as casualties of the transition period. The author comes up with specific suggestions having the potential to optimize the economic performance of the Yugoslav successor states, like local policy interventions, institution and capacity building as well as the effective allocation of financial resources for small enterprise development. 2.2. Part II Theoretical Justifications 2.2.1. Conceptual Issues Pertaining to Autonomy Part II begins with three chapters clarifying some conceptual issues pertaining to autonomy. As Hurst Hannum argues in his programmatic article, Territorial Autonomy: Permanent Solution or Step toward Secession?, autonomy may be a useful tool with which to resolve disputes involving minority rights or self-determination, but it should not be seen as a magic bullet that can resolve all conflicts, prevent violence, or guarantee political and economic development. In much the same way as it was shown in the introduction to this volume, the author argues that there are pros and cons to ‘autonomy’. Such ‘pros’ include the flexibility inherent in the concept, its compatibility with territorial integrity, and its value as a means of devolving power to smaller political entities. The ‘cons’ are exemplified by an inherent vagueness that may make meaningful dialogue about the real issues at stake in a conflict more difficult, a tendency to reinforce artificially the norm of territorial integrity, and the possibly of unwarranted expansion of traditional minority rights into the realm of political and economic power. The author takes an instrumental view of ‘autonomy’, saying that autonomy is a means to an end, not an end in itself: at the end of the day, the proper concern should be rights, not policy, and fixating on autonomy as a onesize-fits-all compromise solution is unlikely to respond to the needs either of the concerned parties or the international community. Johan Galtung explores in the article The role of Autonomy in the State/Nation Dialectic the universal quest for ‘autonomy’ based on the dictum of ‘being ruled by one’s own kind’. It is this primordial dynamic that lurks, according to the author, behind the actual or brewing conflicts between (roughly) 200 nation states in the world, run usually by one dominant (or titular) nation, and the (roughly) 2000 substate nations. The latter nations can be subdivided into three categories: those divided between two or more states, those finding themselves in states inhabited by two or more nations, or those in two or more states inhabited by two or more nations. The author goes beyond academic rationalizations by presenting some pertinent case studies, demonstrating that what we have at stake is not only the right xlviii
INTRODUCTION to self-determination, however important, but also our duty to channel the potentially discordant forces into conflict transformation. In the article Ambiguities In And Clarifications Of The Concept Of Autonomy Matti Wiberg parses the concept of autonomy from a variety of perspectives, including the viewpoint of formal logics. He shows the concept’s utter dependence on the ideological whims of different authors as well as the political vectors of power, and he gives a prescription of sorts, admonishing writers on the subject to ‘define what (he), strictly speaking, means when he uses the notion, and he should then stick to this meaning in a consistent manner’. Vagueness of the concept, the author contends, is by itself a strategic device permitting governing elites to wield power and impose their agendas. To substantiate the point he gives the examples of the Camp David Agreement, and – a more recent and dramatic example – the arrangement fashioned by the Russian Government with the Chechen rebels. 2.2.2. Meta-Legal and Philosophical Dimensions of Autonomy In the article Paradoxes of Autonomy: Tensions, Traps And Possibilities Thomas Simon undertakes the task of clarifying the conceptual tensions underlining the problem of collective autonomy as applied to minorities. Regarding international legal context as a fitting instrument for bettering our understanding of these tensions, the author comes up with a taxonomy of situations where collective, as opposed to individual, autonomy, seems more appropriate. He lists four basic options: de jure, reciprocal, variegated, de facto, and humanitarian. More specifically, types of autonomy could include: legal autonomy based on clear legal or constitutional principles; deliberative autonomy granted on a temporary basis pending a final settlement in an area of conflict; variegated autonomy involving a dynamic approach to the development of new forms of self-government; reciprocal autonomy which would allow negotiated settlements with other states; selfdeterminative autonomy which might develop into secession and independence; and humanitarian autonomy arising from international intervention to prevent or control human rights violations. 2.2.3. Autonomy and Cultural Rights The following two chapters of the Part II are devoted to the interrelationship between autonomy and cultural rights. In the article An Argument from Cultural Disadvantage Juha Raikka argues that group-differentiated legal rights of minority cultures (and of the members of such groups) can be defended by referring to the moral value of cultural equality. He goes on to say that since cultural disadvantage is a morally relevant factor, it should be taken into account when formulating the laws and public policies of multicultural liberal democracies. Thus cultural disadvantage can be taken in a variety of ways: as a sufficient condition, a necessary condition, a sufficient and necessary condition, or merely a relevant factor in the justification of group-differentiated legal rights. The author concludes that the relevant factor approach is the most satisfactory, but xlix
ZELIM A. SKURBATY leaves open the possibility that group differentiated rights might also be justified without any form of cultural disadvantage. In his article The Right of a People to Exercise their Culture: A Scandinavian Model, the former Chairman of the Home Rule Commission for Greenland, Isi Foighel, gives an interesting, first-hand account on the modalities of the Greenland Home Rule Act of 1978. The basic philosophy of the Danish-Greenlandic modus vivendi could be expressed – in the words of the author – ‘in the terms, that the population of Greenland did not wish national independence but improved possibilities of strengthening and expanding the identity of Greenland through an increased independent responsibility’. The cultural dimension of such an ‘expansion of identity’ is of vital importance, according to the author. The Home Rule Act was not, from this perspective, an expression of the par in parem (agreement between juridically equal partners) principle, but of the fact that the relationships between population groups living under conditions so much at variance should be based upon the principle of more broadly-understood equal rights, which includes responsibility for catering to the special needs of the respective partner. For all the potential the Home Rule Act holds for the Centre-Autonomy partners, the implementation process should proceed, according to the author, incrementally and ‘on the basis of a carefully worked out schedule’. 2.3. Part III Implementation
Cross-Border
Cooperation,
International
Monitoring
and
Part III of the book is devoted to the cross-border cooperation, indigenous people and international monitoring and implementation. 2.3.1. International Guarantees of Autonomy The first chapter, Autonomy (International Guarantees of Autonomy) by Yoram Dinstein, deals with international guarantees of autonomy. The author confines the broad concept of self-government to those systems that are granted to particular regions within a certain country. In contrast to federalism, which requires a general sharing of (equal) powers among all regions of a state, an autonomous regime can be seen as an exception, since self-government is granted only to chosen areas, considered on the basis of a preferential treatment by the central state; and only a national group territorially concentrated in a specific geographic area may opt both for internal and for external self-determination, i.e. to choose to stay within the borders of a multinational state or to set up a new sovereign state. The author determines the requisite factors enabling the group to claim an autonomous regime and puts to scrutiny the particular circumstances required by customary international law to effect such a decision. He gives examples of different possibilities of autonomy reflecting different historical antecedents: a multilateral treaty (e.g. Memel, 1924); a multilateral agreement (e.g. Palestinian Autonomy, 1994); local legislation (e.g. Greenland, 1979); local legislation based on both, bilateral and multilateral treaties (e.g. South Tyrol); local legislation based on a General l
INTRODUCTION Assembly resolution (e.g. Eritrea, 1962); local legislation based on a bilateral treaty as well as on a resolution of the Council of the League of Nations (e.g. Åland Islands); decision of the Security Council (e.g. Kosovo, 1999). The conclusion drawn from the comparison of these examples is that the most significant guarantee to an autonomous regime, in terms of its political and international legal underpinnings, is a decision by the UN Security Council. Only this body is able to adopt binding decisions on matters affecting international peace and security, and authorize enforcement action against a state. The problem is, of course, that the Security Council is a predominantly political – not a judicial – body, and all too often submits to the pressures of the powers of the moment. In the article International Criminal Law: Protection of Minority Rights Lyal. S. Sunga explores the strengths and limitations of international criminal law protection of minority rights, arguing that while the international community continues to treat minority rights with considerable ambivalence, it nevertheless has been forced to react to severe violations of minority rights with international criminal prosecutions, and increasingly, to develop prospective deterrence of minority rights abuse. In this connection, the article contends that until now international criminal justice has been either non-existent or ‘too little too late’ for minorities, but that the new International Criminal Court represents the international community’s first real step towards prospective deterrence of severe minority rights criminal violations when domestic avenues are blocked. In light of the rapidity of the processes shaping the system of holding violators of human rights accountable before international community, one could only expect the expansion of the autonomous powers exercised by international tribunals. 2.3.2. Autonomy: The Problem of Irredentism and Cross-Border Cooperation In the article devoted to the problems surrounding cross-border cooperation within autonomous arrangements, Cross-Border Cooperation as an Indicator for Institutional Evolution of Autonomy: the Case of Trentino-South Tyrol, Francesco Palermo and Jens Woelk convincingly show that the increasing cooperation and integration between states has, as a consequence, the dilution of national sovereignty and can lead to the transformation of border areas from mere peripheries to integrated and more efficient contact-areas. As the authors argue, internal decentralization of the states is actively complemented by the processes of crossborder cooperation (CBC), which becomes a powerful and flexible horizontal link in the autonomous setup. They proceed to analyze the international legal and political umbrella for CBC provided by the Council of Europe, like the 1980 Madrid Outline Convention on cross-border cooperation between territorial communities. The authors note that, although EC-law does not directly seize of CBC, it still plays an important role in stimulating states to improve the competence of their regions in this field. They underline the ongoing, procedural nature of CBC and the utter necessity of closer cooperation in the harmonization of domestic legal policies on the matter. The recent increase in the scope of cross-border cooperation in areas li
ZELIM A. SKURBATY inhabited by kith-and-kin groups, distributed unevenly between the host- and mother states, has drawn considerable attention from the political quarters: the fear of irredentism is still afresh due to historical legacies. This makes the authors conclude that only mature autonomies can establish modern forms of CBC, because only stable systems which are able to cooperate smoothly with the central authorities can also cooperate effectively with the neighbouring regions. 2.3.3. Autonomy, Participation and Minority Rights In the article titled Participation and the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities Alan Phillips outlines the initial disappointment among many human rights activists at the relatively weak provisions and monitoring system, which had been adopted in the Convention. However, his experience as a member of the Advisory Committee in reviewing state reports on the implementation of the Convention leads him towards a more positive assessment. The Advisory Committee has been able to develop a more active role in monitoring state performance through visits and discussions with those affected than had been expressly provided in the Convention and its recommendations have generally been accepted without amendment by the Council of Ministers. He concludes that system weaknesses and deficiencies notwithstanding, the flexibility in the provisions of the Convention and the inventiveness of the members of the Advisory Committee coupled with the support of the Council of Ministers in engaging with civil society, have resulted in general strengthening of standards and practice at a national level. The way the OSCE deals with the questions of autonomy and the political participation of minorities is reflected in the article Autonomy and Effective Participation in Public Life: Developments in the OSCE by John Packer, Director of the Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM). He convincingly shows that despite the fact that the term ‘autonomy’ does not appear in OSCE documents in any essential form36, the commitment of participating states to democratic governance with respect for minorities and their rights has led to the consideration of forms of autonomy. This has taken place both expressly and implicitly in the evolving practice and ‘soft law’ (yet ground-breaking) standards relating to the effective participation of national minorities in public affairs. Seemingly modest, this approach has significant implications both in terms of prospects for substantial autonomies within the state and for the often politically linked issue of self-determination and its various (mis)understandings. In his contribution, John Packer summarizes the developments within the OSCE and shows how, to which extent and within which limits the notion of autonomy so far fits within the practice of the OSCE.
36
See references on the OSCE and autonomy in the first part of this Introduction, in the Prolegomenon and a number of articles in this volume.
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INTRODUCTION 2.3.4. Autonomy and Indigenous People The last two articles of Part III are devoted to problems concerning autonomy and indigenous peoples. As Darren Hawkins notes in the article Indigenous Rights and the Promise of a Limited Autonomy Model despite states’ reluctance to create international agreements that endorse autonomy for minority groups, recent progress has been made in the Organization of American States with respect to indigenous rights. States appear to be compromising on a ‘limited autonomy’ model that allows indigenous groups substantial autonomy on internal matters that affect their own people while simultaneously guaranteeing the territorial integrity and political unity of the state. The author argues that this emerging compromise is the result of a dialetical historical process in which repression of indigenous people gave rise to a transnational movement calling for extensive indigenous autonomy. He singles out three political conditions that have facilitated this tentative compromise: the dominance of democratic governments free from security threats in the Americas, prevalent historical myths linking autonomy with indigenous peoples, and a relatively strong association between indigenous peoples and particular geographical areas. In the process, states and indigenous peoples are redefining the notion of selfdetermination to make the concept dependent on the context of the people seeking that status. The conclusion of the author is that while the limited autonomy model offers an appealing political compromise to states, it also faces substantial difficulties before its final adoption and may not be easily transferrable to other regions of the world or to other kinds of minority peoples. Another chapter on the same topic by José Bengoa, The Question of Indigenous Autonomy in Latin America, deals with the particular modalities of autonomous arrangements for indigenous populations in Panamá, Colombia and the Atlantic Coast in Nicaragua, existing in the region since the 1980s. The second part of the chapter is devoted to the analysis of the new autonomous arrangements in the area and the negotiations between the governments and indigenous representatives on the setup of different forms of cultural, territorial and educational autonomous structures. In conclusion, the author puts the indigenous problematique in perspective by giving a cogent analysis of the current debate on the issue in Latin America. 2.4. Part IV National and Comparative Case Studies Part IV of the book is devoted to national and comparative case studies, which, in a way, bring the problem down from the rarefied atmosphere of theoretical discussions to the realities on the ground. The facets of autonomy these cases illustrate are many and varied: from autonomy and self-determination to failed experience with autonomy to autonomy and conflict resolution, etc. Read and appreciated in juxtaposition, the chapters can convey lessons from successful and unsuccessful autonomy experiments more powerfully and effectively.
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ZELIM A. SKURBATY 2.4.1. Autonomy, Minorities and Self-Determination The first article is titled The Protection Of Minorities Between Autonomy And SelfDetermination: The Cases Of The Åland Islands And Kosovo and written by Markku Suksi. The author does not limit himself to a legal analysis of the international legal framework vis-à-vis these troubled regions, but shows the key leverage points of commonality and divergence that permitted a peaceful solution in the first case and lead to a dramatic outcome in the latter. The conclusion of the author is that although no right to autonomy can be found within the framework of the (external) right to self-determination, autonomy can still be exercised within the framework of internal self-determination, keeping in mind that the concept of autonomy is – in the first place – a matter of participation. In that sense, the decision concerning the Åland Islands in 1921 by the League of Nations may serve as an important point of reference for present and future debates on autonomy. 2.4.2. Failed Experiences with Autonomy While the Åland Islands exemplifies the success of autonomy and the politics of constructive compromise, the downside of the efforts in this field are epitomized by the case of the failed autonomy in Eritrea, which is analyzed by Eyassu Gayim in The Autonomy of Eritrea (1952-62): Learning from Failed Experience. Despite the fact that Eritrea had been featured as an ‘an autonomous unit’ in the federal state of Ethiopia from 1952 to 1962 on the basis of UN General Assembly resolution 390(V), the arrangement was seriously flawed at its outset because there were no guarantees for its practical survival. Nor was there any effective international guarantee to prevent the Ethiopian Emperor from undermining the proposed autonomy of Eritrea by asserting overall federal control over all economic and legislative policies. The Eritrean reaction to the Ethiopian intervention and domination was to wage a protracted liberation struggle for self-determination leading eventually to independence. The result was an increasing demand for independence and a lengthy internal conflict leading eventually to secession. He concludes that the failed experience of Eritrean autonomy in the 1950s showed that an autonomous arrangement that disregards the wishes and welfare of the local people concerned, which is not accompanied by effective guarantees, can hardly be satisfactory or practical. 2.4.3. Autonomy in the Countries of Transition From the failed experiment with autonomy we turn to autonomies in countries in transition. In his article A Combined Approach to Autonomy: Estonian Experience, Aleksei Semjonov outlines some formal and practical aspects of the protection of minorities’ cultural and educational rights in Estonia based on the Law on Cultural Autonomy of National Minority of 1993. Though the law made extensive general provision for cultural autonomy, the very demanding conditions for the establishment of an autonomous agency or council, including a formal demand from liv
INTRODUCTION more than 3,000 registered citizens and the organisation of a nation-wide election involving all members of the relevant minority, had made it impractical for any minority community to take advantage of the law. Despite the fact that the Estonian government has relied extensively on the existence on the law in its dealing with the international community, no autonomous cultural agencies or councils had in fact been established. However, this did not prevent members of national minorities from relying on more general long established legal rights in respect of Russian language schools and state financing for minority cultural bodies. He concludes that general laws on individual rights proved more effective than any special provisions for minority communities. The autonomous arrangement in Gagauzia, one of the troublesome regions of the former USSR republic Moldova, is examined by Priit Järve in Autonomy of Gagauzia: a Post-Soviet Experience. He analyses this situation in two interrelated contexts: the broad legal and political context common to most of the regions of the former USSR after its dissolution, and the specific context of the armed conflict between the central government of Moldova and its breakaway region of Transdniestria, which gave an incentive to the first to look for more constructive approaches to the amicable accommodation of this minority group. The author scrutinizes in detail – both the positive features and deficiencies – the ‘Law on the special legal status of Gagauzia (Gagauz Yeri)’, which is based on Article 111 of the Constitution of Moldova and recognizes the possibility of the existence of territories with a special status in the country. The author makes an attempt to draw some lessons from the seven plus years of the Gagauzia autonomous arrangement in Moldova: a strong state is necessary for the creation of a strong and well-functioning autonomy; the interaction between the Central Government and the Gagauzia autonomous territory should be put in the broader context of the relationships between all the potential stakeholders including Transdniestria. He concludes that two factors – shortcomings in the power sharing agreement and imperfect administrative (and political) culture – can be held responsible for the uneasy development of power sharing between Moldova and its autonomous region of Gagauzia. One step further from situations of instability in countries in transition with autonomous arrangements, are those that have come into open conflict after the inability of all the stakeholders to come to some working agreement on power sharing and delimitation of competencies. As the chapters that follow show, despite all its actual and potential deficiencies, autonomy has always been regarded as one of the instruments capable of preventing and mitigating ongoing conflict situations between state and sub-state actors. 2.4.4. Autonomy and Conflict Resolution In the article Autonomy: The Danish-German Border Region Sten Harck navigates in the well-chartered territory of the Danish-German autonomous arrangement. He analyses the legal aspects of the peaceful minority solutions in the Danish-German lv
ZELIM A. SKURBATY Border Region, which is often considered a model solution for other minoritymajority conflicts. After an introduction to the historical and social background of the problematic region, namely, the Copenhagen-Bonn Declarations of 1955, he gives a detailed account of the so called ‘Bill of Rights’ concerning the Danish and German minorities in the respective countries. The Bonn declarations, as the author contends, were not only the key factors for the peaceful co-existence of these two nations but turned also into international customary law. According to Sten Harck, the Danish-German Border Region has a remarkable level of legal protection, which should, even in the future, enable the minorities living there to protect and develop their own cultures. The willingness of the two kin states to provide their respective minorities with the necessary financial means – the part and parcel of the so called ‘European model’ – is of crucial importance, concludes the author. In the contribution that follows, Continued Challenges, Post-Settlement, to the Cyprus Conundrum, Tim Potier argues that since international law has been dominated the last 57 years by the pre-eminence of the nation state concept, the question of autonomy is invoked only in those places where the nation state itself has, at least in some way, failed. He adds that much of the debate has focussed upon the establishment of a ‘federation’ while little attention has been paid towards its essence. In reality, as the author contends, any ‘federation’ created – as the case in point – in Cyprus, would be extremely ‘loose’ and confer almost complete autonomy upon the two ‘federated’ states. He gives a detailed ‘projective’ account of the possible future condition of a Cyprus ‘federation’ and the issues that will remain outstanding even after a framework agreement or a more substantive agreement is concluded. Another article that explores the potential of autonomy in conflict resolution, especially in terms of transposition of the positive precedents, is Strategies of Ethnic Conflict Resolution: The Trentino-South Tyrol Case and the Balkans by Paolo Foradori and Riccardo Scartezzini. It explores the possibilities and limits of exporting the Trentino-South Tyrol model of ethnic pacification by assessing the topic from both a sociological and political perspective. The crux of the problem, as the authors see it, is the classic dilemma between what may be considered the most suitable and legitimate solution from a normative point of view and what, on the other hand, is the most feasible and workable solution in a given specific and concrete context. Starting from the definition of ethnic conflict and which remote and proximate factors can cause it to manifest violently, the authors give a number of evident reasons of the many constraints to any attempt of exportation. The authors stress the role of domestic elites as a catalytic factor in triggering ethnic conflicts as well as the democratic deficit in the Balkans as a whole exacerbated by unfavourable economic conditions. Their conclusion is that the role of the international community in the stabilization of the Balkans is fundamental, especially its efforts to promote and support political and economic democratization of the region.
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INTRODUCTION 2.4.5. National and Regional Experiments with Autonomous Arrangements The overarching theme of the three contributions that follow is national and regional experiments with autonomous arrangements, introduced by the article Patricia Leopold Experiments with autonomy in the United Kingdom since 1998. As she admits at the outset of her deliberations, autonomy is a new concept in the British Constitution which has been provided for in a limited sense since 1998 in the provision of devolved self-government for three of the countries making up the United Kingdom: Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The author first outlines the background to the changes introduced in 1998, and explains briefly the three different types of autonomy provided in the UK: representation of minority groups and power sharing; equality of opportunity and human rights; and cultural protection. She gives analysis of the legal and constitutional provisions that have brought about changes in the forms of self-governance in these regions, with special reference to the position in Northern Ireland. The latter is chosen because the devolution arrangements for Northern Ireland have particular provisions for the protection of minority rights and for the creation of a consociational government not found in the other devolution arrangements. The contribution that follows is titled The Status of Autonomous Territories in International Organizations, Experiences in Nordic and Continental European Cooperation, and is written by Elisabeth Nauclér, who is the Head of Administration of the Government of the Åland Islands. She puts under scrutiny – with emphasis on the Åland autonomy – three Nordic autonomous territories within the framework of the Nordic and European cooperation schemes. While all three autonomous territories have the same representation in the Nordic co-operation, they have different statuses and cooperation modalities within the European Union. The author gives a detailed comparative analysis of these autonomies and draws a number of lessons, potentially usable for other regions and situations. And the last contribution crowning the present volume is the article-essay by Ranabir Samaddar, Minority Rights and Forms of Autonomy in South Asia, in which he parses the various forms of autonomy in countries of South Asia in the context of the debates on minority rights and the right to self-determination. In reflecting on the practices of protection of minorities and other vulnerable groups – like constitutional arrangements of autonomy aimed at giving a measure of satisfaction to the right to self-determination – the essay takes a brief view of the existing debates on the relevant issues, and tries to figure out the ways in which the political experience of South Asia, as a decolonised region, can enrich the discourse of rights and justice. The essay addresses principally four issues on the basis of the empirical study: (a) the debate on self-determination and the accompanying questions of rights and justice; (b) the thin line between ‘minorities’ and ‘people’ – the two poles on which two sets of rights are perched, namely rights of the minorities and the right to selfdetermination (c) globalisation and the international character of the conundrum; (d) and, the imperatives for a move from rights based argument to justice and reconciliation based argument and thought. lvii
ZELIM A. SKURBATY The summary conclusions distilled from the contributions of the authors, as well as recommendations to the professionals (and laymen for that matter) working on the modalities of the prospective ‘right to autonomy’ can be found in the article of the editor of this volume, titled Is There an Emerging Right to Autonomy? Summary Reflections, Conclusions and Recommendations.
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PART I GENERAL ISSUES: CROSS-DISCIPLINARY APPRAISAL OF AUTONOMY
AUTONOMY AS A PARTICIPATORY RIGHT IN THE MODERN DEMOCRATIC STATE PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, AUTONOMY AND MINORITIES Yash Ghai 1. INTRODUCTION In the last two decades there has been a marked shift from the limited protection against discrimination that characterized the original efforts of the United Nations (UN) regarding minorities, towards a more active engagement of the state in facilitating the development of minority cultures and promoting a political role for minorities.1 Notions of identity, emphasizing states’ responsibility to promote minorities’ culture, language and religion, and the rights of minorities to public participation, are central to the new understanding of the protection of minorities. Issues of minority rights have been subsumed under ethnic relations to a significant extent, focusing on the relations of minorities with other communities. New norms and institutions have been developed in the context of intense ethnic or religious conflicts, and as part of efforts to restructure states, encourage the coexistence of different ethnic groups, and provide security to cultural and national minorities. The emphasis on identity and public participation has led, in various ways, to the political recognition of minority or ethnic groups and their collective cultural and political rights. Contemporary efforts at minority protection are also influenced by the adoption of democracy in regions and states which had hitherto had military or one-party regimes. Democracy is understood as encapsulating various values – tolerance, pluralism, freedom of expression, participation and accountability. As the foundations of democracy in human rights are explored, the salience of minority rights as an essential component of a democratic society is acknowledged. Increasingly, the framework of rights is used to assess social and political progress, including the situation of minorities. 1 Throughout this text, the term ‘minority’ is used broadly to include indigenous peoples where applicable. However, the author and MRG recognize that some indigenous peoples reject the designation ‘minority’.
3
YASH GHAI However, there is no universal formula for minority participation. In the past there was an excessive tendency to look at minority rights from the perspectives of the majority and of ‘nation building’, requiring common and exclusionary loyalties and the homogenization of public and private space. Now, it is arguable that the present approach is marked by the concern for finding a distinctive political and social role for minorities. Supporters of minority rights, focusing on devices to protect the identity of minorities, have perhaps paid insufficient attention to another aspect of minority protection, that is, its effect on wider societal and inter-group relations. Effective protection of minorities depends also on minority–majority relations, the integration of communities, and the development of common values and loyalties to sustain the wider political community. Currently (at least in Western scholarship) two competing views dominate regarding the protection of minorities2. The more fashionable among key policy makers in Europe is connected with Lijphart’s concept of consociationalism, which despairs of peaceful coexistence of ethnic groups unless special constitutional provisions are put in place to recognize their corporate entity and to confer on them the right to separate representation and participation in public bodies. Its typical features are segmental autonomy for ethnic groups (if possible through territorial arrangements, otherwise through forms of group or cultural autonomy), proportional and frequently separate representation, proportional participation in institutions and services, and group veto. The other approach is integrationist, to be distinguished from assimilation, for integrationists value minority cultures and identities, but seek to establish a political system in which all citizens participate equally. It aims to provide constitutional and political incentives for people of different groups to cooperate, either through coalition of ethnic parties or, hopefully, the establishment of multi-ethnic parties, generally relying on electoral laws which encourage inter-ethnic cooperation.3 It relies on a clearer distinction than consociationalism between the common public space, with state neutrality, and the private where each group is free to pursue its linguistic, religious and cultural predilections. It emphasizes individual rights, claimed and exercised in the name of citizenship, unlike consociationalism which places considerable emphasis on group rights. In practice a state may be able to incorporate elements of both approaches. South Africa and Fiji, both discussed later, provide instructive examples. 2. DEFINITION OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION Although a number of international and regional instruments require states to promote the right of minorities to participation, few define participation. However, a 2 For a useful summary see T.D. Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts (US Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, 1996). 3 See D. Horowitz, ‘Encouraging Electoral Accommodation in Divided Societies’, in B. Lal and P. Larmour (eds), Electoral Systems in Divided Societies: The Fiji Constitution Review (Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, ANU, Canberra, 1997).
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PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, AUTONOMY AND MINORITIES notion of participation may be gleaned from these instruments. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) protect the right to take part in government or in the conduct of public affairs. The UN Committee on Human Rights has elaborated this provision by stating that the: ‘conduct of public affairs . . . is a broad concept which relates to the exercise of political power, in particular the exercise of legislative, executive and administrative powers . . . [covering] all aspects of public administration, and the formulation and implementation of policy at international, national, regional and local levels.’ (General Comment 25, 1996)
These instruments protect the right to vote (the UDHR more emphatically when it states that the ‘will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government’) and of equal access to the public service. The freedoms of expression, procession, association and conscience imply, and facilitate, participation in politics and public policies. Overarching these specific instances is the general right of selfdetermination, proclaimed in the UN Charter, the ICCPR and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), as belonging to ‘all peoples’. Although the right is collective, every person is deemed under it to have certain political rights, particularly participation rights expressly granted in the ICCPR. But the reference to the pursuit of economic, social and cultural development indicates that participation rights are not restricted to politics or administration. The UDHR protects the right: ‘freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in the scientific advancement and its benefits’. (Article 27)
The ICESCR guarantees other forms of participation, in the economy, trade unions, culture and arts, scientific research and literary activities. In more recent years, the emphasis on ethnic identity has produced a particular concern with participation rights of minorities. It is through participation that a person expresses and protects his or her identity, and the survival and dignity of the group is ensured. Participation in cultural, educational, linguistic and religious affairs is given special attention, for these matters are closely connected to a group’s identity. Under the UDHR and the Covenants, members of minorities are as much entitled to these rights as members of the majority group. However, so far as the exercise of political influence and participation is concerned, the general principle of non-discrimination is not sufficient. As a minority, a group’s interests may well be different from those of the majority; and its culture is likely to be marginalized by that of the majority. Its population may be dispersed through the country, and it will not, as a general rule, have adequate numbers of legislators etc. to influence the formation of government or its policies. Therefore, in order to ensure effective participation, it is necessary that special procedures, institutions and arrangements be established through which members of 5
YASH GHAI minorities are able to make decisions, exercise legislative and administrative powers, and develop their culture. Conceived in this broad way, participation covers many areas of life, both state and private sector organization, and involves a number of activities. These include taking part in national politics through participation in political parties, standing for elections and voting in them. Participation covers forms of enacting legislation, and may include vetoes by a group on specified matters. It encompasses other forms of influencing policies, through the media, lobbying, etc. It can cover mechanisms for consultation and negotiations. Thus participation may signify the ability of minorities or their members to bring relevant facts to decision-makers, argue their position before decision-makers, propose reform, be co-decision-makers, veto legislative or administrative proposals, and establish and manage their own institutions in specified areas. 3. THE IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION RIGHTS Many of the general justifications for minority protection apply equally, or even more forcibly, to participation rights. A major justification is the inherent fairness of minority protection. Members of minorities are entitled, like any other person, to human rights and freedoms, of which participation is an essential aspect. Minorities have the right to influence the formulation and implementation of public policy, and to be represented by people belonging to the same social, cultural and economic context as themselves. For a political system to be truly democratic, it has to allow minorities a voice of their own, to articulate their distinct concerns and seek redress, and lay the basis of deliberative democracy. The rationale for special measures is not to create a privileged position for minorities but to place them effectively in the same position as members of the majority. Paradoxically, special measures can help towards the integration of minorities, for the prospects of integration are better if minorities become involved in national political and social processes. They acquire a stake in the system, and are able to contribute to policy making and play a part in administration. All too often minorities become alienated from mainstream national processes because they see no role for themselves in these processes or believe that they cannot influence outcomes. Others then claim to speak for them – and claim to know better what is good for them than the minority itself. This encourages prejudices against and the stereotyping of minorities. Participation also develops and utilizes the talents of minorities for the national good. States which welcome participation and integration of minorities tend not only to be more stable, but also more prosperous. The availability of human rights to members of majority communities themselves may depend on the enjoyment of rights by members of minorities. The whole concept of universal and human rights suffers when some individuals or groups are denied rights on the grounds of their religion, language or colour. In some multi-ethnic states, for example Malaysia and Fiji, it has been very difficult to develop a popular understanding or appreciation of human rights, because human 6
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, AUTONOMY AND MINORITIES rights are often seen as protecting minorities against the special status and authority of the majority. But if minorities are denied rights, there is the danger of general intolerance and authoritarianism. The denial of rights to minorities also leads to their denial to all in other ways. Fair treatment of minorities is essential to social peace and stability. Social, often violent, conflict that results from the oppression of minorities creates conditions in which there is a massive internal and external displacement of persons, and the movement of people to some parts of the country or even within particular cities, becomes impossible. The government is unable to ensure people’s physical or psychological security. The state itself becomes a major violator of rights. Oppression of minorities has led to inter-state wars. It has been easy to find in a country’s ill treatment of another state’s ‘kin people’ an excuse for territorial aggression. Special measures can also be justified as providing cultural diversity within, and thus enriching, the wider society. Such diversity challenges the dominant ideas and values of society. It promotes comparisons and debates, keeps society open to new ideas and protects it from narrow orthodoxies. Participation by minorities helps to put old policies in new contexts, often highlighting their weaknesses or ethnic bias, and drawing attention to the need for new policies and approaches. Public participation promotes inter-ethnic dialogues, and averts ethnic conflicts borne out of misunderstanding or ignorance. This recognition of diversity is particularly pertinent now, when few states are mono-ethnic. States and individuals are engaged in multiple relations with other political and cultural systems, and need the background and skills to negotiate numerous contexts where different cultures meet and interact. This article proceeds on the assumption that minorities welcome opportunities for participation in public affairs and in other national or communal matters. But it is possible to conceive of minorities who would regard participation – on the terms of the state and in its institutions – as compromising their fundamental claims or wishes. This is most evident with a number of indigenous peoples, who, perhaps reflecting their unhappy experience with national institutions, see their goal as selfdetermination, meaning either independence or a high degree of autonomy. The Draft UN Declaration on Indigenous Peoples makes the exercise of rights by them optional (‘if they so choose’, Articles 19 and 20). But some minorities may wish to integrate politically (such as Hindus and Christians who resisted the imposition of communal representation in Pakistan). Some groups might feel a threat to their identity in involvement with national politics and institutions, where their own influence may be marginal. Individual members of minorities may desire nothing more than to be left alone by their own and other communities. However, there are many forms of participation, not all involving the surrender to a state’s claims or assimilation, and sometimes participation rights are optional and facilitative, both for communities and individuals.
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YASH GHAI 4. LEGAL FOUNDATIONS FOR PUBLIC PARTICIPATION RIGHTS OF MINORITIES The juridical case for minority participation rests on three principal sources, apart from the general norms of human rights: minority rights, indigenous peoples’ rights and, more controversially, the right to self-determination. Minority rights may also be protected in bilateral treaties, especially in Europe, dealing with national minorities and the employment of foreigners. 5. MINORITIES When the UN began work on an international regime of rights, it emphasized individual rights and carefully avoided giving rights, particularly political rights, to groups. Article 27 of the ICCPR, until recently the principal UN provision on minorities, was drafted in narrow terms. It reads: ‘In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language.’
Although this may suggest that it is up to the state to determine whether it has minorities, the UN Human Rights Committee has stated that the question is a factual one to be decided through objective tests. Under the Articles, rights belong not to minorities as groups, but to individual members, although these rights can only be exercised in association with other members of the community, thus giving them a ‘collective’ dimension. Rights given to members of minorities are negative, prohibiting the state from suppressing their culture or language. But it could be argued that this negative prohibition may be transformed into a positive right, that is, the state is under an obligation to intervene proactively, by implementing legislation or programmes, to ensure that Article 27 is not violated, rather than simply refraining from certain actions. Thus despite the parsimonious language of the Article, it has the potential to develop into the framework a broader entitlement, including a measure of autonomy – and the UN Human Rights Committee has tried to do this in recent years. In a series of decisions, the Committee has interpreted the Article as a basis for collective minority rights (Kitok v. Sweden, 1988), as a basis for the preservation of the culture and way of life of a minority group (Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, 1990) and as a basis for protecting and developing the traditional way of life of minorities (Linsman v. Finland, 1995). The Committee recognized that in some situations, Article 27 rights may be connected to a territory, for example when cultural rights consist of a way of life which is closely associated with territory and use of its resources. The Committee has given a broad meaning to ‘culture’, noting that culture manifests itself in many forms, including a particular way of life 8
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, AUTONOMY AND MINORITIES associated with the use of land resources and traditional occupations, especially in the case of indigenous peoples (General Comment 23, 1994). The Committee has also interpreted the Article to include elements of group rights, since the prescribed rights ‘depend in turn on the ability of the minority group to maintain its culture, language or religion’. Nor are rights merely passive, since ‘positive steps may also be necessary to protect the identity of a minority and the rights of its members to enjoy and develop their culture and language and to practice their religion, in community with the other members of the group’. (para. 6.2)
From the nexus between culture and territory, the Committee draws the right of minorities to participation, observing that the enjoyment of cultural and other rights imply the ‘effective participation of members of minority communities in decisions which affect them’ (para. 7). This broader approach is reflected in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities adopted by the General Assembly in 1992. Although it also recognizes only the rights of individuals, it places positive obligations on the state to protect the identity of minorities and encourage ‘conditions for the promotion of that identity’ (Article 1). The Declaration places particular emphasis upon the right of minorities ‘to participate effectively in cultural, religious, social, economic and public life’ (Article 2.2). They also have the right to participate in decisions on national and regional levels concerning the minority to which they belong or where they live (Article 2.3). Three further specific participation rights are guaranteed – the right to maintain their own associations (Article 2.4), to maintain contacts with members of other minorities and citizens of other states to whom they are related by national or ethnic, religious or linguistic ties (Article 2.5), and the right to participate fully in economic progress and development (Article 4.5). A case for minorities’ rights to participation can also be made on the basis of Article 25 of the ICCPR, which gives every citizen the right and the opportunity: ‘to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections on universal franchise … and to have access, on general terms of equality, to public services’.
Although the Article does not mention minorities, it has been argued that where a minority is unrepresented or under-represented in national political processes, either because of their small numbers or because of systematic exclusion, special processes and structures for political participation must be developed to respond to the spirit of Article 25(a).4 Such an argument was advanced to the UN Committee on Human 4
See M.E. Turpel, ‘Rights of Political Participation and Self-determination in Canada’, in H. Reynolds and R. Nile (eds), Indigenous Rights in the Pacific and North America: Race and
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YASH GHAI Rights by the Mikmaq Tribal Society in support of its claim to be represented at the Canada constitutional conferences (separately from the participation by the Canadian First Nations Council).5 The UN Committee on Human Rights concluded that the article did not require that any affected group, however large or small, be able to send a representative, but did not rule out special representation in suitable cases. Several initiatives have been taken in Europe, through the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe and the European Union (EU) to promote the concept of participation and autonomy. This is manifested in both formal declarations and interventions to solve ethnic conflicts in Europe (such as the Rambouillet proposals for Kosovo/a). In Article 35 of the Copenhagen Document on the Human Dimension (1990) of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, the predecessor of the OSCE), member states have undertaken to respect the rights of members of national minorities to: ‘effective participation in public affairs, including participation in the affairs relating to the protection and promotion of the identity of such minorities.’
The Document takes particular note of provisions for certain minorities: ‘by establishing . . . appropriate local or autonomous administrations corresponding to the specific historical and territorial circumstances of such minorities.’
The principal instrument of the Council of Europe is the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1995) which protects various rights of minorities, obliges the state to facilitate the enjoyment of these rights, and recognizes many rights of ‘identity’. It obliges state parties to: ‘create the conditions necessary for the effective participation of persons belonging to national minorities in cultural, social and economic life and in public affairs, in particular those affecting them.’ (Article 15)
The exercise of some of these rights implies a measure of autonomy, and the prohibition against altering the proportion of a minority in areas inhabited by them (Article 16) will have the effect of enhancing prospects of local autonomy. The Copenhagen Document and statements of principle by the Council of Europe, although not strictly binding, have been used by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities and other mediating bodies as a basis for compromise between contending forces, and have thus influenced practice, in which participation rights, including autonomy, have been a key constituent.6 Nation in the Late Twentieth Century (University of London and Sir Robert Menzies Centre for Australian Studies, London, 1992) pp. 104–5. 5 Ibid., p. 106. 6 See A. Bloed, ‘The OSCE and the Issue of National Minorities’, in A. Phillips and A. Rosas (eds), Universal Minority Rights (Åbo Akademi University Press, Åbo, 1995); OSCE High
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PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, AUTONOMY AND MINORITIES The then European Community (now European Union) has also used conformity with the Copenhagen Document as a precondition for the recognition of new states in Europe. The ability of existing states (which is relatively unregulated by international law) to confer recognition on entities, especially breakaway states, can be a powerful weapon to influence their constitutional structure. When various republics within the former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union were breaking away, the European Community issued a Declaration on the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union (16 December 1991). Among the conditions a candidate had to satisfy before it would be recognized was that its constitution contained: ‘guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities in accordance with the commitments subscribed to in the framework of the CSCE’.
Similar principles have been used for admission to the Council of Europe and the EU. 6. INDIGENOUS PEOPLES The International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention on Indigenous Peoples (No. 169), adopted in 1989, and representing a reversal of the paternalistic and assimilationist approach followed in the 1957 Convention, recognized the: ‘aspirations of these peoples to exercise control over their own institutions, ways of life and economic development and to maintain and develop their identities, languages and religions, within the framework of the States in which they live’.
Their cultural and religious values, institutions and forms of traditional social control are to be preserved (Article 4). The system of land ownership and the rules for the transmission of land rights are to be protected (Articles 14 and 17). States are required, in applying the Convention, to: ‘consult the peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures and in particular through their representative institutions, whenever consideration is being given to legislative or administrative measures which may affect them directly’.
And the consultation shall be in: Commissioner, Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life, 1999; J. Packer, ‘Autonomy within the OSCE: the Case of Crimea’, in M. Suksi (ed.), Autonomy: Applications and Implications (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1998); R.S. Ratner, ‘Does International Law Matter in Preventing Ethnic Conflict?’, 32:3 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics (2000), pp. 591–698; P. Thornberry, ‘Images of Autonomy and Individual and Collective Rights in International Instruments on the Rights of Minorities’, in Suksi (ed.), op. cit.
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YASH GHAI ‘good faith and in a form appropriate to the circumstances, with the objective of achieving agreement or consent to the proposed measures’. (Article 6)
A more broad ranging provision provides (Article 7): ‘The peoples concerned shall have the right to decide their own priorities for the process of development as it affects their lives, beliefs, institutions and spiritual well-being and the lands they occupy or otherwise use, and to exercise control, to the extent possible, over their own economic, social and cultural development. In addition they shall participate in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of plans and programs for national and regional development which may affect them directly.’
Although an advance on the 1957 Convention, it has been criticized for being ‘paternalistic’, and its negotiations involved a limited participation by indigenous peoples.7 These deficiencies were meant to be addressed in another exercise of standard-setting, the Draft UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (1992). It proclaims their right to self-determination, under which they may ‘freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’ (Article 3). The principle of self-determination gives them the ‘right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs’, which include social, cultural and economic activities, and the right to control the entry of non-members (Article 31). It recognizes their ‘collective rights’ (Article 7) and the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, economic, social and cultural characteristics (Article 4). These ideas have already formed the basis of negotiations between indigenous peoples and the states in which they live, giving recognition not only to their land rights (as in Australia and New Zealand) but also to forms of autonomy (as in Canada). Indigenous peoples, particularly in North America and New Zealand, have other legal bases for their claims as well: (a) their ‘inherent sovereignty’ which pre-dates colonization and (b) treaties with incoming powers.8 The former is more important in the USA and Canada than in Australia or New Zealand. The US Supreme Court has recognized the ‘sovereignty’ of Indian tribes and, more narrowly, the rights of Alaskan tribes. With this ‘sovereignty’ come various rights of participation, particularly of self-government. Canada is only now coming to terms with First Nations’ sovereignty, granting autonomy and land rights to First Nations, and with it significant participation in boards, committees and other parts of the administrative machinery. As in the USA, the federal legislature can derogate from the ‘sovereignty’, although aboriginal and treaty rights have been entrenched in the Constitution and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In New Zealand progress has been achieved through resuscitation of the Waitangi Treaty, signed in 1840 between 7
G. Nettheim, ‘International Law and Indigenous Political Rights’, in Reynolds and Nile (eds), supra note 4, p. 25. 8 For what has been called ‘treaty federalism’, see J.Y. Henderson, ‘Empowering Treaty Federalism’, 58 Saskatchewan Law Review (1986), pp. 241–329.
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PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, AUTONOMY AND MINORITIES Maori Chiefs and representatives of the British Crown, which was judicially pronounced ‘a simple nullity’ in 1877. In recent years courts have drawn various implications from its general provisions for the partnership between the Maori and the government. The two parties should behave reasonably and in good faith to each other and negotiate to solve disputes that arise out of treaty provisions. A similar principle of good faith negotiations has been enunciated by the Canadian courts.9 Both in New Zealand and Canada this approach has given indigenous peoples significant participation in law, in regulations and contracts over natural resources and in the development of traditional lands. Another basis for participation of indigenous peoples has been their increasing control over their traditional lands, and the resources that have been transferred to them in settlement of previous acquisitions of land. In Australia there have also been some moves towards selfgovernment, the most obvious example being the Aboriginal and Torres Straits Islands Commission. 7. SELF-DETERMINATION The broadest source of autonomy as a form of participation is self-determination, increasingly analysed in terms of the internal, democratic organization of a state rather than in terms of secession or independence. The UN General Assembly resolved many years ago that autonomy is a manifestation of self-determination. The greater involvement of the UN or consortia of states in the settlement of internal conflicts has also helped to develop the concept of self-determination as implying autonomy in appropriate circumstances.10 However, the birth of new states following the collapse of the communist order in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and the Balkans, has removed the taboo against secession, and the international community seems to be inching towards some consensus that extreme oppression of a group may justify secession. This position has served to strengthen the internal aspect of self-determination, for a state can defeat the claim of separation if it can demonstrate that it respects political and cultural rights of minorities. A further, and far-reaching, gloss has been placed on this doctrine by the Canadian Supreme Court which decided in 1999 that, while Quebec has no right under either the Canadian Constitution or international law to unilateral secession, if Quebec were to decide on secession through a referendum, Ottawa and provinces would have to negotiate with Quebec on future constitutional arrangements. Such a view of self-determination has some support in certain national constitutions. Often constitutional provisions for autonomy are adopted during periods of social and political transformation, when an autocratic regime is 9
See S. Lawrence and P. Macklen, ‘From Consultation to Reconciliation: Aboriginal rights and the Crown’s duty to Consult’, 79 The Canadian Bar Review, 2000, pp. 252–91. 10 See T.M. Franck, ‘Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession’, in C. Broleman et al. (eds), Peoples and Minorities in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1993); and A. Rosas, ‘Internal Self-government’, in C. Tomuschat (ed.), Modern Law of Selfdetermination (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1993).
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YASH GHAI overthrown, a crisis is reached in minority–majority conflicts, or there is intense international pressure. Propelled by these factors, a number of constitutions now recognize some entitlement to self-government, such as Fiji (for indigenous peoples), Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Spain and Ethiopia which gives its ‘nations, nationalities, and peoples’ the right to seek wide-ranging powers as states within a federation and even guarantees the right to secession. The Russian Constitution of 1993, in the wake of the break-up of the Soviet Union, provides for extensive autonomy to its constituent parts, whether republics or autonomous areas.11 The Chinese Constitution entrenches the rights of ethnic minorities to substantial self-government, although both there and in Ethiopia the dominance of one party denies the substance of autonomy.12 8. PRECONDITIONS FOR PUBLIC PARTICIPATION Rights of participation cannot be enjoyed unless certain conditions exist. These include physical and emotional security, financial resources and minimum levels of education for the minorities. There has to be a toleration of opposing, particularly minority, views, and a general condemnation of discriminatory practices. States must ensure the promotion of minority cultures, intercultural exchanges and education in schools, the teaching and development of minority languages, and the protection of religious beliefs and practices. 9. CITIZENSHIP AND OTHER BASES OF ENTITLEMENT TO RIGHTS Traditionally, rights were regarded as the entitlement of citizens only. Such a restriction is not consistent with international instruments, nor indeed with most national constitutions. In this era of mass migrations and globalization, such a restriction would deny many people what have come to be accepted as basic human rights. Rights have been extended to non-citizen residents in several countries in recent decades, reflecting both the general importance of rights and the fact of migration. It is not possible in this Article to discuss all the restrictions on the economic, social, cultural and political rights of non-citizens. However, some examples, dealing with the principal participation rights examined here, will illustrate the denial of participation rights of non-citizens who are in a state for
11
See J. Agnew, ‘Postscript: federalism in the post-Cold War era’, in G. Smith (ed.), Federalism: The Multiethnic Challenge (Longman, London, 1995); N.A. Lynn, and A.V. Novikov, ‘Refederalizing Russia: Debates on the Idea of Federalism in Russia’, 27:2 Publius (1997), pp. 187–203; and G. Smith, ‘Russia, Ethnoregionalism and the Politics of Federation’, 19:2 Ethnic and Racial Studies (1996), pp. 391–410. 12 See Y. Ghai, ‘Chinese Minorities: Autonomy with Chinese Characteristics’, in Y. Ghai (ed.), Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Claims in Multi-Ethnic States (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000); and Paul, J., ‘Ethnicity and the new Constitutional Orders of Ethiopia and Eritrea’, in ibid.
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PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, AUTONOMY AND MINORITIES legitimate purposes, such as employment with the expectation of settlement.13 The provision in the ILO Convention (No. 143 of 1975) requiring the abolition of restrictions on migrant workers on access to employment after two years’ residence is widely ignored, even in states which have in the past actively sought labour from outside. In Germany non-citizens do not enjoy the same right to form political parties as citizens; leaders and majority members of a party must be German nationals. Portugal prohibits non-nationals from political activities except with the permission of the government (Article 15 of the Constitution). The law in Switzerland is even worse; non-nationals must secure permission from the cantonal authorities to speak on a political issue at an open or closed private meeting of an association. In principle, non-nationals cannot anywhere stand as a candidate or vote in state or local government elections. Sweden now permits them to vote in local government elections (provided that they have been residents for three years); its lead has been followed by Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Norway. The German Constitutional Court has declared that the granting of franchise to nonnationals is unconstitutional, since the Constitution states that ‘all state authority emanates from the people’, the concept of people not including foreigners. That decision has been overruled by a constitutional amendment. In Australia, indigenous peoples (Aborigines) were not declared full citizens until 1962, when for the first time they got the franchise, and in Canada it was not until the 1970s that indigenous peoples were enfranchised. On the other hand, Britain has traditionally permitted citizens of the Commonwealth and the Irish Republic both to contest, and to vote in, national and local elections. The position under international instruments is also far from satisfactory. The ICCPR talks of minorities, but states have often claimed that only nationals are entitled to such rights. However, the UN Human Rights Committee has stated that Article 27 is applicable to non-citizens resident in the state. Whether a group is a minority depends upon objective criteria, and not upon a decision of the state. The UDHR and the ICCPR restrict political rights of franchise, representation and access to public service to citizens, for they belong to a person in respect of ‘his [sic] country’ (Articles 21 and 25 respectively). The UN Declaration on . . . Minorities mentions both national and ethnic minorities, which would cover migrant communities. The tone of European regional instruments was set by the Helsinki Declaration of the CSCE (1975) which refers to the rights only of ‘national minorities’ (s. VII). The Charter of Paris for a New Europe is likewise restricted and the influential Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1995) also restricts rights under it to ‘national minorities’. None of these instruments defines ‘national minorities’. Two well-known definitions of ‘minorities’ offered by Capotorti and Deschenes in the course of their work for the
13
See generally R. Cholewinski, Migrant Workers in International Human Rights Law: Their Protection in Countries of Employment (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997).
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YASH GHAI UN restrict it to citizens.14 A fortiori, ‘national minorities’ may be interpreted as referring to citizens. However, Professor Asbjørn Eide, in his article as Special Rapporteur on Minorities, expressed the view that ‘national minorities’ does not refer to ‘citizenship’, but to ‘ethnicity’, although a number of states, particularly Germany, have contested his interpretation.15 Another interpretation of ‘national minorities’ in the European context is that it refers to long-settled minorities, with another European state as the kin state, and is designed to exclude the newer immigrants. Anomalies and injustices arise from the fact, that in this globalized world, large numbers of people live in states of which they are not nationals, but where they expect to live most of their lives. Yet they have no automatic right to the citizenship of these states. Regulations for naturalization as a citizen vary from state to state; and the period of lawful residence before an application can be made varies from five to ten years. In an increasing number of states, citizenship rules are based on the principle of jus sanguinis, that is, the nationality of parents, so that members of a migrant community may remain ‘foreigners’ for generations. The Committee of the Council of Europe recommended to its members in September 2000 to take measures to enhance the security of long-term immigrants, including giving them the possibility of acquiring the state’s nationality. Reviews by the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the UN of citizenship laws enacted by the Czech Republic, Estonia and Latvia after their re-emergence as independent states, which resulted effectively in the loss of citizenship of people who did not belong to the dominant ethnic community, despite long residence, have suggested the limits of the discretion of states to determine citizenship laws. First, the UDHR and the ICCPR give everyone the right to a nationality, and although no specific obligation is placed on a state, this right can be realized only through regulation of state discretion. Second, such restrictive laws may offend the cardinal principle of non-discrimination which lies at the heart of human rights. Third, states in which a substantial number of people are not citizens and are thus not eligible for political rights, are unlikely to satisfy Article 25 of the ICCPR and similar or stronger provisions in other instruments requiring a democratic order.16
14
F. Capotorti, Study on the Rights of Persons belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, UN doc. E/CN.4/SUB.2/1985/31; Deschesnes, J., UN doc. E/CN.4/SUB.2/1985/31. 15 For references and a fuller discussion see Thornberry, P., ‘The UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities: background, analysis, observations, and an update’, in Phillips and Rosas (eds), supra note 6, pp. 29–36. 16 D.F. Orentlicher, ‘Citizenship and national identity’, in D. Wippman (ed.), International Law and Ethnic Conflict (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY,)
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PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, AUTONOMY AND MINORITIES 10. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS The right to participation is meaningless unless a group has the ability and the resources to exercise it. In many countries minorities have been economically or socially disadvantaged. Unless special programmes, such as educational facilities, access to the public service, or sometimes special financial loans, are established to enable them to catch up with other communities, the disparities between them and others increase. Participation assumes security and self-confidence. The importance of minimum levels of education and other social and economic facilities to the exercise of the right to participate is increasingly recognized in studies on poverty and social development (see the Copenhagen Social Development Declaration, 1995). It is at the national level that some progress has been made, although here too the constraints that globalization places on welfare have restricted progress. The constitutions of several countries now require or urge the state to provide economic and social rights, although for the most part they are mandatory only for disadvantaged groups, not necessarily numerical minorities (as in Fiji and Malaysia, where the main beneficiaries are members of numerical majority communities). India and South Africa are two outstanding examples, where the obligations on the state are based on the moral and political recognition of past injustices to particular ethnic or social groups. The recent Fiji Constitution (1997) imposes a legal obligation on the government to institute schemes for preferential policies for poorer communities and groups.17 Hungary has set up a Foundation for Hungarian Gypsies (Roma) and a Coordination Council for Gypsy Affairs to examine social and political problems confronting the Roma. A government decree (1995) obliges ministries to develop Roma programmes in housing, education, employment, agriculture and animal husbandry. Some other countries also practise preferential policies (similar institutions for the Roma have also been set up in the Czech Republic, Romania and Slovakia). 11. FORMS AND MECHANISMS OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION The most important form of participation is one in which the minority takes part in decision-making, whether legislative, executive or judicial. But participation can also include representations to decision-makers, or consultation before a decision is confirmed. Participation is also important in the implementation of legislative and administrative decisions and policies, as it is in procedures for monitoring and assessing the implementation. A particularly valued form of participation is selfgovernment, where specific matters of special concern to a minority are delegated for policy-making or administration to the minority. Participation can take place at different levels, national, regional and local. 17 The 1997 Fiji Constitution was abrogated by the army following the coup in May 2000. The High Court said this abrogation was illegal and the Constitution is still in force. The army’s appeal against this decision has not yet been heard as this Article goes to press.
17
YASH GHAI There are different modalities to ensure participation. Much of the emphasis is on decision-making bodies, but the role of consultative bodies should not be ignored. In Fiji all legislation relating to matters that might affect the interests of indigenous peoples is referred for comment to a representative body of Fijians. In Finland, Norway and Sweden, there are parliaments for the Sami, which governments have to consult on specified matters, and which may make representations on legislative and policy proposals to the national governments. National Councils for Minorities in Hungary are consulted on bills affecting them, and enjoy a limited veto on legislative proposals. In New Caledonia, the Customary Senate has to be consulted on ‘subjects relating to Kanak identity’. Many governments have set up anti-discriminatory bodies, ombudspersons for minorities, language commissions and equal opportunities institutions to analyse difficulties faced by minorities, to lobby for legislative or administrative reforms, and to empower minorities. People from minority communities are frequently members of such bodies. This gives them valuable access to information, public opinion and policy makers. Participation can also take the form of negotiations over differences between the minority and the state (or other groups). For example in New Zealand, differences over the meaning or implementation of the Waitangi Treaty, which governs the relations between indigenous peoples and the government, are negotiated with the mediation of the Waitangi Tribunal. The Tribunal has played a valuable role in establishing the framework and parameters within which the parties have negotiated. This has been an effective way of empowering Maori communities. Much of the discussion on participation focuses on official bodies. But unofficial bodies can provide a useful forum for consultation with and influence on decision-making bodies. In Croatia the Council of National Minorities, a nongovernmental association, which consists of one member of each of the 14 minorities in the country, complements the work of the parliamentary representatives of minorities. It facilitates dialogue between the government and minorities, examines and gives its opinion on draft laws and other legal acts which concern minorities, and monitors the implementation of provisions for minority protection. This article does not look at all the forms and mechanisms of participation (the Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life sets out a wide variety of them). The focus here is on representation, power sharing, and autonomy or self-government. However, before turning to them, it is necessary to refer to another important basis of participation – the right of access to the public service, which includes the right to employment in state services, recognized by the ICCPR, in Article 25 (c). The importance of equitable ethnic representation in the public service is now well recognized. A great deal of state policy and regulations are made by public servants, and it is appropriate that officials of minorities should be able to participate in these processes. Decisions on policy and implementation are better informed and improve through the input of minorities. The access of minorities to the public service and their relations with 18
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, AUTONOMY AND MINORITIES state services are greatly facilitated and improved if they can deal with officials from their own community. 12. RIGHT TO LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATION 12.1. Uses of Minority Representation Representation is a key instrument for participation, enabling voices of the minority to be heard in official bodies. The process of electing representatives acts to mobilize the minority and, depending on the method of election, to reinforce its corporate character, frequently through a political party. At the same time it also strengthens its articulation with the national political system. Representation is an emphatic recognition of a positive right of the minority – to take part in state political processes and to influence state policies. Because, in most democratic systems, governments are formed on the basis of representation, the minority will frequently be able to influence the formation of the executive and indeed to secure membership in it. Even if its representatives do not become part of the government, they are able to play an important role in the political process as part of the opposition. Additionally, they add to the efficiency and effectiveness of the legislature by bringing to the attention of the majority perspectives they would otherwise miss. In general if a minority is small, and represented proportionately, it may not have much influence on politics. In most countries, minorities are under-represented; in the USA African-Americans constitute approximately 12.4 per cent of the population but hold only 1.4 per cent of elected offices; Latino Americans fare worse: although eight per cent of the population, they hold only 0.8 per cent of elected offices, and in Canada indigenous peoples hold only one per cent of elected offices, although they are 3.5 per cent of the population.18 However, the value of representation to a minority also depends on factors other than numbers. Armed with votes or seats, a minority may be able to extract concessions or promises from larger political groups, or even enter into strategic alliances. If there are a number of ethnic groups, a small minority may hold the balance between the larger groups, as in Fiji where the small electorate of Europeans, Chinese and people of mixed race (‘Others’) has wielded disproportionate influence and participation in government for this reason. Even if there is a dominant community, the minority may be able to influence politics, if the dominant community is split into two or more parties, as the Sinhala have been in Sri Lanka. The Swedish People’s Party in Finland has helped to maintain the political influence of the Swedish-speaking minority; its members have been in most governments since 1945 in larger numbers than its population would justify. But it is noticeable that Swedish-speakers have influenced national politics also by joining
18
W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995) p. 132.
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YASH GHAI national political parties in which they have held senior positions. Here much may depend on the electoral system. Separate representation may enhance minority influence, as in Fiji, but minorities as part of the general electorate can also influence the outcome of national elections, as the Muslims in India are able to (it is estimated that the Muslim vote is decisive in nearly 100 parliamentary constituencies, forcing even the right-wing Hindu Bharattiya Janata Party to woo them). Forms of proportional representation may also enable minorities to influence the outcome of elections (the Tamil influence in Sri Lanka has increased with the shift to proportional representation, particularly in the presidential elections). Parliamentary systems are more prone to minority influences given the system of responsibility, although presidential elections can also empower minorities (as in the 1988 Nigerian elections).19 In bicameral legislatures, representation in the lower house may be more important – contrary to the convention of special representation in the upper house. A number of devices can be used to enhance the value of minority representation. In some circumstances it may be more effective to have representation for purposes of bringing the interests and concerns of minorities to the attention of the legislature. A novel form of representation has been proposed by the Mikmaq Grand Council for the band in the Nova Scotia legislature. It is proposed that a member would be elected or nominated by the Council, to be known as the Treaty Deputy, whose function would be to ensure that the provisions of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed in 1752 between Mikmaq and the Crown would not be abrogated. The Deputy would also be able to address general political questions of consequence to the Mikmaq people.20 In order not to affect the democratic process, the Deputy would not have a vote in matters not affected by the Treaty. The inspiration for this proposal may have come from the State of Maine in the USA, which has traditionally allowed two representatives of indigenous groups, elected on a special ballot, in its legislature in order to protect their treaty rights. The provision in the Indian Constitution for nomination of Anglo-Indians to the Upper House was intended to perform a similar function. Representatives of minorities or minority regions can be given a special role in the legislative process. Members from Scotland in the British Parliament have traditionally formed the Grand Scottish Committee to review legislative bills of special relevance to Scotland, and it has been possible even to take one or more readings of the bill in that committee. In Fiji, representatives of indigenous Fijians sit with senior Fijian civil servants in the Fijian Affairs Committee to review legislative proposals of special concern to them before the proposals can be enacted by the Parliament (this provision dates from the time when indigenous Fijians were considered a vulnerable group). Some constitutions go even further and give communal representatives the right to block legislative proposals or to subject them to a special procedure. In Belgium, where members are divided into linguistic 19 See also D. Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1991) pp. 184–6. 20 See Turpel, supra note 4, pp. 107–8, on which this account is based.
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PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, AUTONOMY AND MINORITIES groups, the enactment of certain laws requires the votes of two-thirds of each linguistic group, provided that each group has a majority of its members in the legislature at the time of the vote. Another procedure is designed to help the Frenchspeaking minority: when the French linguistic group considers that a bill is likely to impair relations between the French and Flemish communities, three-quarters of its members may raise an objection, whereupon the matter is referred to the Council of Ministers, consisting of an equal number of French and Flemish and operating by consensus. The Council presents a reasoned response to the legislature, either to defend or modify the bill. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the legislative quorum in the House of Peoples in the Parliamentary Assembly requires three representatives each of Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs. In the second chamber of the Parliamentary Assembly, the House of Representatives, a majority of all members comprises a quorum. Any community can declare that a proposed decision affects its vital interests, which then calls for special procedures for mediation and reconciliation of differences. If the political process fails to resolve differences, the matter is referred to the Constitutional Court. The focus of this section of the Article is on representation in national institutions. However, representation can be secured indirectly, through elections to councils of minorities which have a consultative status with the legislature or the government (as in Croatia, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia). This form of representation can be especially useful when members of minorities, being nonnationals, lack the franchise to vote in national elections. The EU states are encouraged to set up these councils when minorities are otherwise disenfranchised. Second, representation at the local government level to facilitate minority participation is receiving increased attention. In several countries, non-nationals are allowed to participate in local government elections and institutions, and several instruments have drawn attention to the potential of local-level politics for the participation and welfare of minorities. In other instances, national minorities are given rights of self-government if they constitute a majority in a district (as in Croatia and Hungary), and the draft Sri Lankan Constitution (February 2000) not only provides for power sharing at the provincial level but also for cultural councils at the district level. 12.2. Securing Minority Representation: the Electoral System It is only in recent years that consideration has been given to the adaptation of electoral systems to minority representation.21 Two widely different approaches have been advanced on their representation. The first focuses on ensuring representation for minorities by members of the minority, hopefully proportional to their size of the population, either through a national electoral system which will 21
See K.M. de Silva, ‘Electoral systems’, in C. Young (ed.), Ethnic Diversity and Public Policy: A Comparative Policy, (Macmillan, London, 1998); and B. Reilly, and A. Reynolds, Electoral Systems and Conflict in Divided Societies (National Academy Press, Washington, DC, 1999).
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YASH GHAI facilitate this, or, if necessary, by a system of separate representation. The other approach is less concerned with direct minority representation than with their political integration. The distinction is sometimes blurred, for some methods for direct minority representation are compatible with their integration, such as proportional representation (PR). In practice the distinction between systems which do and do not provide for separate minority representation is greater. Of the electoral systems which are not explicitly based on ethnic representation, the most common are the plurality–majoritarian systems and the proportional representation system. The plurality, or first-past-the-post, system, typically used in Britain, the USA and many other countries which have been associated with them historically, is the least favourable for the election of minority representation – unless the minority is sufficiently concentrated in a locality to constitute a dominant group. In Britain, for example, there are relatively few parliamentarians from minority communities, and those usually represent constituencies with significant minority populations.22 Sometimes the first-past-the-post system can yield minority representation if constituency boundaries are changed; such changes have been judicially approved in the USA to allow representation of black people in the Southern states. If minorities are politically well integrated with the majority, their members may well be elected in such a system, as with the Jewish community in Britain. The majoritarian systems are even less favourable to minorities, for a candidate needs to secure at least 51 per cent of the votes to win. The best-known example of a majoritarian system is what is called the ‘two-round system’, under which, if no candidate wins a majority in the first round, a second poll is taken in which voters choose between the two top candidates (as in France and its former colonies, and parts of Europe and Latin America). A variation of majoritarianism is the ‘alternative vote’ (AV), in which electors mark their preference among candidates and if, on the first count, no candidate gets the majority of the first preferences, the candidate with the fewest votes is eliminated and electors’ second preferences are distributed among remaining candidates until a majority winner emerges. There are also several types of PR which aim at relating the number of representatives to the votes cast for particular candidates or parties. The best-known of these systems is the List PR system, under which political parties contesting the elections present a list of their candidates to the voters. The constituency is either the whole state (as in Israel, Moldova, Namibia and Slovakia) or, more commonly, a series of multi-member constituencies. Large constituencies are better for minority representation. The voting is for a party and not a candidate; a party is entitled to the number of seats which corresponds to its share of the vote, so that if it wins 30 per cent of the votes, it gets 30 per cent of the seats, which go to the requisite number of candidates at the top of its list. However, a party has to secure a minimum percentage of votes before it can get any seats; this is known as the ‘threshold’, although a number of countries have no threshold at all – Belgium, Bosnia22
S. Saggar, Race and British Electoral Politics (UCL Press, London and Bristol, PA, 1998).
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PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, AUTONOMY AND MINORITIES Herzegovina, Spain and Switzerland, or none for parties of minority groups, as in Poland and Germany. In some systems, voters are not bound by the ranking of a party’s candidates and may declare their own preference (‘open list’). Experience suggests that a closed list, in which the party leadership determines the order of priority, can be more effective for securing representation of minorities and women. It is also possible to require political parties to nominate a minimum number of members of minority communities (this device has been useful in securing the representation of women as in Nepal). In the PR system, unless the threshold for securing seats is high, a minority can secure representation through its own political party. Thus, as between majoritarian and PR systems, the latter is more likely to result in minority representation and to provide incentives for formation of ethnic parties. In the former system, a member of a minority keen on a political career is more likely to join a ‘mainstream’ party, for the prospects of a minority ethnic party are poor, except in areas, if any, where they are in a majority. The second approach favours designing electoral systems to integrate different communities by creating incentives for political parties to broaden their appeal to attract votes from all communities. The aim therefore is not so much to ensure direct minority representation, as those who are elected are likely to enjoy the support of minorities and thus be moderate in their policies. The rules for the election of the Nigerian President, but not of other officials, under the 1982 Constitution were based on this approach (and has recently been used in Kenyan presidential elections). An electoral system to encourage communal integration was adopted in the 1997 Fiji Constitution, although it retained elements of separate representation. Singapore provides an example of a system which both secures minority representation and attempts to integrate communities. A number of constituencies, called the Group Representative Constituency (GRC), return either three or four members. A political party which wants to contest in these constituencies has to present a slate of three or four candidates, of which at least one must be from a minority. Electors vote for the slate rather than individual candidates. The justification advanced for this system is that it secures the election of some minority candidates, although its critics saw it as an attempt by the government to stifle opposition parties which would have difficulty in securing enough qualified candidates given the constraints under which opposition parties operate. It is certainly the case that so far all GRC seats have been won by the ruling party.23 In its electoral reforms of 1993, New Zealand altered its system of representation for Maori by giving them the option to vote on a separate electorate or common roll – as more Maoris opted for the common roll, there was a corresponding reduction in separate representation, a provision designed to encourage integration. With this common roll Maoris secured higher representation than in the past, thanks to the PR system that was adopted at the same time. 23 Thio Li-am, ‘The elected president and the legal control of government’, in K. Tan and Lam Peng Er (eds), Managing Political Change in Singapore (Routledge, London, 1997) pp. 107–8.
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YASH GHAI The integrationist approach favours electoral systems which create incentives for political parties to woo support among all communities. This is expected to result in both multi-ethnic and moderate parties. Such systems work best when the votes of the minority can have a decisive influence on the outcome of the elections. This is indeed its drawback, for while preferential voting systems like the alternative vote or the single transferable vote (STV) can give the minority a decisive say, they can do so only if certain population configurations are present. Essentially, not only must the constituency be ethnically heterogeneous, but the majority community in it must be split into at least two political parties of roughly equal strength – as has often happened with the Sinhala parties in presidential elections in Sri Lanka. Unless these conditions exist naturally, they will need to be created through constituency boundary changes to establish balanced heterogeneity, as in Fiji. This raises its own difficulties and is open to political manipulation. If an election system does not work as projected by its proponents, the logic of majoritarianism, on which the system is based, is likely to result in an under-representation of minorities. 12.3. Communal Representation The preoccupation with minority representation in recent years, particularly as part of complex constitutional schemes for the governance of multi-ethnic territories, has led to provisions for separate representation for ethnic groups, particularly for minorities (called here ‘communal representation’), as in Croatia, Finland, Hungary, Romania and Slovenia. Communal representation was the cornerstone of the British colonial system, but at independence most former colonies abolished this system of separate representation, the outstanding exceptions being Cyprus and Fiji. This system is also to be found in China (where minorities are deliberately overrepresented), New Zealand and Samoa. The revival of communal representation in the face of considerable criticism calls for an assessment, which I do by examining a number of examples of its adoption. 12.3.1. Cyprus From the very start of representative politics in Cyprus, Britain introduced communal representation. Such was the bitterness between the dominant Greek community and the minority Turkish community (fuelled no doubt by their ‘kin states’) that independence could only be secured through an intricate Constitution built around far-reaching consociational principles. The Greek (including the Maronite community) and the Turkish communities were treated as separate entities, and the entire system of representation, government, administration and social services was based on proportionality, with Greeks counting for 70 per cent and Turks 30 per cent of the population. This was based on a slight over-representation of Turks. The House of Representatives consisted of 50 members, of whom 35 were Greek and 15 Turkish, elected on a communal basis. The President of the House had to be a Greek, the Vice-President a Turk. In addition to the full House, there were also communal chambers of Greek and Turkish members respectively, which had 24
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, AUTONOMY AND MINORITIES wide law-making powers in educational, religious and personal affairs, and other matters delegated to them by the House. The President of Cyprus had to be Greek, elected by Greek voters and the Vice-President a Turk who was elected by the Turks, each with their own special powers. Ministerial posts were also divided among the two communities; Greek ministers were appointed (and removed) by the President; the Vice-President performed similar functions in relation to Turkish ministers. The system produced extreme rigidity; the Greeks resented it for giving disproportionate powers to Turks, and Turks resented the permanent dominant position of the Greeks. The first wanted to change the Constitution; the second boycotted arrangements agreed at independence (in which, it should be stated, the decisive influence was of metropolitan powers). Cypriot politics were also complicated by political and military interventions of Greece and Turkey, which eventually spelled the end of the Republic as described above. 12.3.2. India The Indian National Congress which led India to independence was opposed to ethnic electoral rolls and representation which the British had introduced in 1909. It would have been willing to contemplate them if Pakistan had not been carved out of the subcontinent as the homeland for Muslims; separate rolls having been devised primarily for Muslims. Austin says that the: ‘members of the Constituent Assembly had one predominant aim when framing the legislative provisions of the Constitution: to create a basis for the social and political unity of the country’.24
He summarizes the situation at independence as follows: ‘not only did the provinces lack even a semblance of popular government . . . but the small electorate that existed was itself thoroughly fragmented . . . split into no less than thirteen communal and functional compartments for whose representatives seats were reserved in the various parliamentary bodies’.
Similar distinctions were applied in the indirectly elected central legislature. The Constituent Assembly did agree to one form of special representation, for scheduled castes and tribes, as part of the package of affirmative policies for these communities. The Constitution expressly provides for reserved seats for each of these communities in proportion to their share of the population in both the lower house at the national level and in the states (Articles 330 and 332 respectively; arguably seats can be reserved for them in other political bodies under Article 15 of the Constitution).25 In India’s parliamentary systems, lower houses are the more 24
G. Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation (Oxford University Press, Bombay, 1972) p. 144. 25 M. Galanter, Competing Equalities (Oxford University Press, Delhi) p. 45, n. 15. The following account draws heavily on Galanter.
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YASH GHAI important component of the legislature, as it is there that governments are formed and removed. This provision was originally to last for ten years, but it has been renewed ever since. The scheduled castes constitute about 15 per cent of the population, and the scheduled tribes seven per cent, so that they enjoy significant guaranteed representation. The law also provides that scheduled castes and scheduled tribes candidates are required to make smaller deposits. Separate electorates are prohibited for the national and state legislatures and the Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution to prohibit separate electoral rolls at local levels.26 All registered voters may vote in constituencies in which seats are reserved for scheduled castes or scheduled tribes. The Delimitation Commission, an independent body, determines in which constituencies seats will be reserved. There is a single criterion for the selection of constituencies for scheduled tribes – the concentration of its population. Since the scheduled tribes still live in particular areas, these constituencies contain a high proportion of their population, more than 50 per cent in more than half the constituencies so reserved, so that the bulk of scheduled tribes (about 70 per cent) would live in such constituencies. As for scheduled castes, who are more dispersed, reservations have to be spread throughout the country, and to be located, in so far as possible, in constituencies in which the proportion of their population to the total is comparatively large. Thus constituencies with reserved seats for scheduled castes contain proportionately fewer of them than is the case with scheduled tribes. The largest contain about 30 per cent. There is considerable opposition from other communities to the designation of the constituencies in which they live as reserved constituencies, as it deprives their members of the right to the seat. Galanter says that on the whole, constituencies reserved for the scheduled castes ‘tend to be political backwaters – slightly less urban, with less newspaper circulation and a slightly greater percentage of agricultural labourers’.27 Scheduled tribe constituencies tend to be more isolated and less urban than general constituencies. The effect of the reservations is to ensure the representation of these two communities, who are otherwise politically and economically marginalized. This is particularly important for the scheduled castes who do not form a majority anywhere. As over 20 per cent of seats are held by the members of these communities, all major parties have an interest in promoting candidates from them. The candidates likewise have an incentive to cast their appeal beyond their own communities, particularly in the scheduled caste constituencies. This has helped to integrate scheduled caste and scheduled tribe members into the constitutional and political system, but this result has perhaps been achieved at the expense of abandoning particular advocacy of the claims of their own communities. Nevertheless, there are parties which are based predominantly on their support, particularly at the state level, where their members have achieved high office.28 It is 26
Nain Sukh Das v. State of UP, AIR 1953 SC 384. Galanter, supra note 25, p. 48. 28 O. Mendelsohn, and M. Vicziany, ‘The Untouchables’, in O. Mendlesohn and U. Baxi (eds), The Rights of Subordinated Peoples (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1994). 27
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PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, AUTONOMY AND MINORITIES fair to say that the reservations have given the two communities considerable political clout. It has facilitated their entry into the government and their lobbying has been crucial for the maintenance and improvement of other affirmative action policies, which for the most part are authorized but not mandatory. 12.3.3. Bosnia and Herzegovina The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, officially named Bosnia and Hercegovina, is composed of two Entities, 1) the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 2) the Republika Srpska. Many important powers are vested in the Entities, whilst the government at the level of the state has powers which are necessary to constitute and exercise external aspects of state sovereignty and is responsible for key issues, such as human rights protection. The Constitution is built around the concept of ethnic communities and includes both individual rights of citizens and very strong provisions for collective rights of the three main ethnic groups, called constituent peoples. Arrangements for representation and power sharing take the three main ethnic communities as building blocks, carrying forward the proposition stated in the Preamble that Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs are ‘constituent peoples’ of Bosnia and Herzegovina. ‘Others’, and ‘citizens’ are mentioned only in passing. Professor Pajic implies, critically, that this makes these three communities, rather than the people as a whole, the source and bearers of sovereignty.29 The Parliamentary Assembly has two chambers, House of Peoples and House of Representatives. The House of Peoples has 15 Delegates; these are five Bosniacs and five Croats from the Federation of Bosnia and Hercegovina (selected, respectively, by the Bosniac and Croat Delegates to the House of Peoples of the Federation) and five Serbs from the Republika Srpska (selected by the National Asembly of Republika Srpska). (Article IV). This means that Serbs in the Federation, Bosniaks and Croats in Republika Srpska and minorities across the whole of Bosnia and Hercegovina are excluded from standing for office for the House of Peoples. Nine members of the House of Peoples constitute the quorum, so long as there are at least three from each constituent people. The House of Representatives has two thirds of its members elected from the Federation of Bosnia and Hercegovina and one third from Republika Srpska; a majority of all members constitutes a quorum. The result of these arrangements is that politics is entirely communal, and almost perforce political parties are ethnically based. Parties get together in Parliament or government only after the elections. The system creates incentives for parties and their leaders to intensify appeals to narrow ethnic interests, which in some cases is linked to their kinsfolk in other states, which does little for the unity of the country. In the 1996 elections, the most extreme ethnic party in each community won the elections, leaving their leaders the impossible task of finding a 29 Z. Pajic, ‘A Critical Appraisal of the Dayton Accord Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, in W. Bendek (ed.), Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina after Dayton: From Theory to Practice (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1996).
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YASH GHAI common purpose.30 The relevance of this form of representation for public participation will become clear when power sharing in Bosnia and Hercegovina is discussed later in this Article. 12.3.4. Fiji In Fiji one of the most difficult questions that the leaders of the different ethnic communities had to resolve at independence was the electoral system. Fiji has now experienced three different electoral systems, and is about to design a fourth. The 1970 (independence) Constitution was dominated by communal seats and communal voting. Although there was provision for national seats, their structure was still based on an ethnic allocation of seats, while the logic of communal seats prevailed over the logic of national seats which was intended to provide a basis for non-racial politics. There were 52 members: 27 were elected on communal franchise (12 by indigenous Fijians, two by Indo-Fijians and three by general electors, principally Europeans and their part descendants and Chinese); 25 (‘national seats’) were allocated communally (10 each to indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians and five to the general electors) but all the voters in the community voted for them – hence the system came to be known as ‘cross-voting’. Each voter had three votes in the contests for national seats, each to be cast for members of different ethnic groups. The rationale of national seats was to integrate ethnic groups politically, promote inter-ethnic parties and prepare for the transition to a complete common roll. However, the logic of the system was dictated by the communal rather than the national seats. Politically, parties were organized essentially on ethnic lines, in order to compete for communal seats. There was one dominant party for each of the communities. While the need to contest national seats compelled each of the major parties to extend its appeal beyond the community they principally represented, for the most part this was not successful, and few attracted votes from other communities. National seats were decided principally by communal votes; thus, indigenous Fijian candidates sponsored by the dominantly Indo-Fijian National Federation Party were successful as a result of Indo-Fijian votes, and so on. This was possible because of the concentration of the two major communities in different constituencies. In this way cross-voting seats became an extension of communal seats. The Alliance Party (the dominant party of indigenous Fijians) was a partial exception to this trend. It attracted a significant percentage of Indo-Fijian votes, especially for the cross-voting seats, in which it often achieved over 20 per cent of the vote. By contrast the National Federation Party commonly gained less than five per cent of indigenous Fijian votes. However, the Alliance Party had to maintain its support among indigenous Fijians if it was to remain a serious political contender, especially as militant indigenous Fijian parties were bidding for the support of its 30
Supra note 2.
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PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, AUTONOMY AND MINORITIES principal electorate. The logic of the system compelled the Alliance Party progressively to champion exclusively indigenous Fijian interests. The 1990 Constitution, adopted by the military government following the 1987 coups, abolished national seats. It not only removed any vestiges of cross-voting, completing the separation of ethnic groups (and making politics almost totally ethnically based), but also aimed to ensure the permanent and undisputed rule of indigenous Fijians. It gave a disproportionately large representation to them in both houses of Parliament (in the House of Representatives 37 out of 70 seats being reserved for them). In addition it provided that a Prime Minister had always to be an indigenous Fijian. It also dispensed with the rather awkward, residual agenda of the 1970 Constitution that the ultimate aim was the development of a multi-ethnic Fiji. The sidelining in this way of the Indo-Fijians had the predictable effect of releasing factionalism within the Fijian community that had been largely contained under the more balanced allocation of communal seats in the 1970 Constitution. The 1997 Constitution (overthrown in May 2000) largely abandoned that approach, but it continued with significant reliance on communal representation. It provided for 25 open seats in the House of Representatives (out of a total of 71) which were open to candidates of any ethnic group and for which all voters resident in the constituency could vote, and 46 communal seats (to be voted communally) divided between the ethnic communities. The voting for these, as for communal seats, was by the alternative vote system. While in communal seats this method of voting served principally the purpose of ensuring that the winning candidate enjoyed clear majority support, its purpose in open seats was to provide incentives for political parties to cooperate across ethnic frontiers. Under the AV system, a voter has to declare his or her preference among all the candidates. Since a winning candidate has to have an absolute majority, the second and subsequent preferences of a voter can be crucial in determining the result. This method thus opens up possibilities of arrangements between political parties for the trade-off of the second and subsequent preferences of their supporters. The logic of the system might well have led to multi-ethnic parties (as was the expectation of the Reeves Commission which recommended it). Additionally, it was expected that candidates with moderate views would have an advantage over those espousing extreme views, as they would have a chance of capturing more second preferences.31 The results of the first general election seemed to have vindicated some of the assumptions of the Reeves Commission. Two broad coalitions of communal parties were formed and contested the elections. However, it was not only moderate parties with conciliatory policies that tended to trade preferences. In fact the more ethnically conciliatory coalition lost the election, negating the assumption that, even if an extremist party may get a significant proportion of first preferences, the more moderate parties would get the second and subsequent preferences. As an observer of the results has commented: 31
Fiji Constitution Review Commission (the Reeves Commission) 9.150–152 and 10.31– 10.109; see also Horowitz, supra note 3.
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YASH GHAI ‘Where racial polarisation is particularly sharp, it is easy to envisage a situation where a majority of an ethnic group’s first preferences are picked up by the militant flank party, which also attracts, at the second, third or subsequent count, the preference votes from eliminated more moderate parties representing the same ethnic group. Here the AV system could serve, not as a vehicle for inter-ethnic compromise, but as a means of cohering a 32 politically fragmented ethnic group around an extremist position.’
A major party with predominant Indo-Fijian support failed to secure a single seat, although its share of the communal vote was over 32 per cent. It does not seem therefore that the electoral system led to cross-ethnic voting on any scale, nor to any proportionality, but the logic of open seats on the AV system did lead to multiethnic coalitions.33 Unfortunately it is not possible to make a reliable assessment of this interesting system, for it was tried only once. But the experience may reflect limits of electoral designs and the ability of voters to handle elaborate voting systems. 12.4. Discussion Where both the majority and minorities are agreed that minorities should be represented separately, there may be no objection to communal electorates. But the case studies examined in this Article raise doubts as to whether separate representation in general is desirable. A particularly acute observer of constitutional politics, Stanley de Smith concluded that communal seats tend: ‘to magnify existing communal differences, in as much as communities are stirred to fuller self-consciousness and electoral campaigns are dominated by appeals to communal prejudices; and new communities discover themselves as further claims to separate representation are lodged’.34
It is exceedingly hard to establish national parties, necessary for political integration, when voting is communal. Communal forms of representation often irritate and provoke majority groups, although this is not in itself a reason for not adopting them. Members of minorities have fewer prospects of high office if they rely on their own separate parties and representation than if they were members of national parties (unless there are provisions for power sharing). Communal representation also tends to obscure social and economic interests that sections of different communities have in common. Moreover, leaders and parties of the majority party have little incentive to woo minorities or design policies to suit them. A better approach would be to consider devices whereby, within an integrated electoral 32
J. Fraenkel, ‘The triumph of the non-idealist intellectuals? An investigation of Fiji’s 1999 election results’ (unpublished, 2000). 33 S. Prasad, ‘Fiji 1999 general elections: outcome and prospects’, in A. Haoon Akram-Lodhi (ed.), Confronting Fiji Futures (Asia Pacific Press, Canberra, 2000). 34 S. De Smith, The New Commonwealth and Its Constitutions (Stevens, London, 1964) p. 118.
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PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, AUTONOMY AND MINORITIES system, there are legal requirements or political incentives to secure representation of minorities, through the list system in PR or mandatory nomination of a minimum number of minority candidates. 13. POWER SHARING It is increasingly realized that, although an important basis for participation, representation by itself does not allow a minority to participate significantly in public affairs. Whatever the electoral system, its members would be too insignificant to influence policy, much less stake a claim to membership of the government or other key institutions, unless the minority held the balance between the major parties contending to form a government, as has often happened in Israel, for example. Ways must therefore be found for the minority to share in government and administration, through membership of the cabinet and other policy making bodies, and in the public service, including the judiciary. Power sharing refers to a system in which all major ethnic or political groups are entitled to participate in government and to a proportion of positions in the public service. It also tends to establish harmony and stability, through a partnership of ethnic groups. The best-known example of power sharing is consociationalism, whereby ethnic groups are recognized as political entities, and as such are entitled to a large measure of self-government in matters deemed to be internal to them, and to a share in power when matters of common interest are being resolved, at the national level. However, consociationalism, which has many critics, is not the only method of power sharing. It is possible to base power sharing not explicitly on ethnicity but on political parties, as in the transitional arrangements in South Africa and under the 1997 Fiji Constitution, for these arrangements also tend to encourage political integration of ethnic groups. Power sharing in consociationalism relies on a number of other devices as a package, but simpler forms of power sharing can be established, geared principally to giving minorities a share in power at the national and local levels. Arrangements for power sharing can be stipulated in the constitution, as they would under consociationalism, or be left to political understandings or conventions, as in India where it is normal to include at least a member of scheduled communities in the cabinet, and in the US Supreme Court where at least one Jewish and one black judge would normally be expected to hold office. But the important point in such systems is not so much a convention to ensure participation of minorities as that minorities are involved, and integrated, in mainstream politics through parties and other mechanisms. While in the West, to a considerable extent, minorities have had access to power through a non-ethnic political process, in many parts of Asia and Africa minorities have been denied such a role. Hence the current interest in consociationalism. In general, there is considerable agreement that power sharing is desirable, particularly as minorities would otherwise remain marginalized. However, some criticism is made of arrangements which seek to be inclusive, where all key groups are in government, on the grounds that the government is not subject to sufficient 31
YASH GHAI scrutiny and is less accountable. It is also said that coalition governments, which is what power sharing entails, are weak and inefficient as it is difficult to agree on policies and their implementation. Compulsory quotas in the public service, another consequence of power sharing, may arguably lead to the appointment and promotion of incompetent candidates. But even among those who support power sharing, there is considerable disagreement on principles and modalities. Some of these principles and modalities, such as federalism or other forms of autonomy, are discussed below. There are few studies that focus on different methods of power sharing and their relative worth.35 A review of some experiences of power sharing may help us to assess the value of this way of empowering minorities. 13.1. Cyprus Power sharing was instituted principally by vesting specified powers respectively in the President and Vice-President of the Republic, the former of which must be Greek and the latter Turkish, elected by their own communities. The President appointed (and could remove) seven Greek ministers; the Vice-President three Turkish ministers. The President and the Vice-President had to make some decisions jointly, but decisions on the most important matters, which applied on a communal basis, were made by them separately. This meant that on many matters there were different regimes for the communities, and that these matters were under the jurisdiction of each community. The President and the Vice-President each had a veto over specified legislation, primarily on matters of common interest to the communities. This ensured that no legislation in these areas could be passed over the opposition of either community. Similar vetoes operated also in the Council of Ministers. Such a system of power sharing placed more importance on differences rather than commonality of interests. It was likely to produce conflict and deadlock, and that is precisely what it did. The President acted, or perhaps more charitably, was compelled to act several times in contravention of the Constitution. There were frequent disputes about the allocation or exercise of powers. The constitutional arrangements collapsed under their own weight, assisted by outside intervention. The collapse led to communal violence and transfers of population, so that Cyprus is now divided between a northern Turkish area and a southern Greek area, and the search, under the auspices of the UN, has been under way for years for a federal solution to the division of territory and the antagonism between the communities. 13.2. Northern Ireland Power sharing has been a recurrent theme in Northern Ireland. In 1973 the British Parliament, in a shift from majority rule, provided that autonomy for Northern Ireland would depend on the formation of a broadly based executive, accepted by 35
But see Sisk, supra note 2.
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PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, AUTONOMY AND MINORITIES the population, based on representation of both communities (the Northern Ireland Constitution Act). However, the government (and the system of autonomy) was short-lived as it was opposed by the Ulster Unionists who won 11 out of 12 seats in the election to Westminster and thus discredited the power-sharing arrangements (the opposition being not so much to power sharing as to a subsequent agreement between the UK, Irish and Northern Irish political parties to the ‘Irish Dimension’ through the Council of Ireland). In 1982 another attempt was made to move towards autonomy. At first the functions of the Northern Ireland Assembly were consultation, scrutiny and deliberation, particularly in relation to legislation proposed by the British government in Parliament. However devolution would take place if 70 per cent of the Assembly members supported it or if both communities supported it; full devolution would require an executive acceptable to both communities, implying some form of power sharing. This system was stillborn since the ‘nationalists’ (those supportive of closer a connection with the Irish Republic), opposed it, as it did not provide for something like the Council of Ireland. The next move towards power sharing was the Belfast Agreement (the Good Friday Agreement) in 1998, which has the support of the governments of the Irish Republic, the UK and the USA. At the first meeting of the Assembly all members are to register their identity in one of three categories – nationalist, unionist or ‘other’. The election of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister is through cross-voting, in which there are three separate forms of voting – by all the members, by the unionists and by the nationalists. Candidates have to secure the support of the majority of all three groups, thus placing a premium upon moderate candidates. Other ministers take office in proportion to the size of their parties’ representation in the Assembly. The First and the First Deputy Ministers form a diarchy, so that if one resigns, the other also loses office. They cannot be removed by the Assembly. The principle of power sharing is carried into the Assembly where, for key issues, decisions are made not by simple majority voting but by majority of both nationalists and unionists, or, if agreed, by a majority of the votes of members, provided that it includes 40 per cent of each of the members of the these communities. While the antecedents of this system are understandable, it may tend to entrench religious/political differences, at a time when a substantial proportion of the people of Northern Ireland are willing to drop communal differences. It would give power to those who are adept at manipulating religious differences and nationalist politics. This system unfortunately downgrades the votes of ‘others’, and thus is less favourable to those who work across communities. 13.3. South Africa There were spurious efforts at ‘power sharing’ in apartheid South Africa. ‘Bantustans’ were created, ostensibly to empower black Africans in their ‘homelands’, and the 1982 Constitution established different legislative chambers 33
YASH GHAI for whites, Indians and Coloureds, and the concept of ‘own’ and ‘common’ affairs, whereby each chamber had jurisdiction over communal affairs, and jointly over common affairs. The whole system, a disguise for white domination, worked under the hegemony of the white chamber. During the discussions on, and negotiations for, future constitutional dispensation after the collapse of apartheid, demands for power sharing were made by sections of the white, particularly Afrikaner, community and the Zulu-based Inkatha Party. Although contrary to its non-racial policy, the African National Congress (ANC) was prepared to accept it to ensure democratization. These concessions for the government of national unity were included in the powersharing provisions of the 1993 (transitional) Constitution. Certain executive powers were vested in the President, elected at a joint sitting of Parliament, to be exercised at his or her discretion; others had to be exercised after consultations with the cabinet (sec. 82). Each party which had at least 20 seats in the National Assembly was entitled to seats in the cabinet proportionate to its seats in the Assembly. In addition, each party which had at least 80 members was entitled to nominate an Executive Deputy President. The role of Deputy Presidents was central to the scheme of power sharing. The President had to consult with them on a number of matters, including the development and execution of government policies, the management of cabinet business, appointment of ambassadors and negotiations of treaties, appointment of commissions of enquiry, holding referenda and pardon or reprieve of prisoners (sec. 82(2)). Powers for the allocation and appointment of ministries were to be exercised ‘in the spirit underlying the concept of a government of national unity’ and through consensus, but in the event consensus could not be achieved, the decisive say rested with the President on the allocation of ministries and with party leaders on appointment of ministers from their parties (sec. 88(5)). The Constitution stated that the cabinet: ‘shall function in a manner which gives consideration to the consensus seeking spirit underlying the concept of a government of national unity as well as the need for effective government’. (sec. 89(2))
The Constitution also provided for the collective responsibility of the cabinet, especially necessary in case of forced, multi-party government. If a minister failed to act in accordance with presidential instructions, the minister could be removed by the President, after discussions with his or her party leader (sec. 92(2)). The provisions for power sharing enabled a measure of bipartisanship in the transition from apartheid towards a non-racial, democratic South Africa. It should be noted that the criterion for power sharing was not ethnic, but it was clearly assumed that it would facilitate the inclusion in government of all ethnic groups (as it did). But it should also be noted that members of all ethnic groups would have been represented even if only the ANC, the party with a substantial majority, had formed government, such were its multi-racial credentials. The provisions did not lead to the accentuation of the ethnic base of parties; all major parties attempted to broaden the ethnic base of their support. It is also worth noting that there were no vetoes for 34
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, AUTONOMY AND MINORITIES participating parties or mechanisms to block decisions (as is the current preoccupation of European schemes of power sharing). The Constitution specifically mentioned the need for efficiency. The experience of power sharing did indeed show a concern with efficiency and the need to maintain consensus through what was a difficult and testing time for South Africa‘s transition. The cabinet was able to maintain a remarkable, and surprising, degree of cohesion. Nevertheless, party leaders in government had difficulties in dealing with their own backbenchers, particularly when trying to sell them compromises reached in the cabinet. This was a problem for all parties, but especially for the ANC, which had enough numbers to have constituted a government on its own in a straightforward majoritarian system. It was this restlessness that persuaded its leadership not to support the continuation of power sharing arrangements when the final Constitution was negotiated. 13.4. Fiji One of the major political problems that Fiji has faced since independence is that its first two constitutions (1970 and 1990) included communal representation in the legislature but provided for government by the majority party. This produced a government composed predominantly of indigenous Fijians and deprived IndoFijians of many rights of political participation – producing acute political tensions. After the failure of the racist Constitution of 1990, there developed wide consensus among leaders of major political parties that all communities should share in the powers and functions of the executive, reflected in the 1997 Constitution. The President appoints as Prime Minister the member of the House of Representatives who in his/her view commands the confidence of the House (sec. 98). The Constitution entitles any political party which wins ten per cent of the seats to join the cabinet (sec. 99(5) and (7)). If the Prime Minister needs the support of other parties to form a government, these parties would be in a strong position to negotiate policies that would bind the government. If the Prime Minister’s party has a majority or substantial numbers, it may exercise a hegemonic role, and other parties may be compelled to comply with its priorities. Smaller parties (those with fewer than eight members) would be less favourably placed than before, for previously they might have held the balance of power. However, the Constitution permits the Prime Minister to appoint as minister a member of such a party, but only by sacrificing a ministerial post from his or her party’s quota (sec. 99(6)). The Prime Minister appoints ministers (sec. 99(1)), although when appointing people from a participating party, he or she has to consult with its leader. The Prime Minister alone decides on the allocation of portfolios (sec. 103) and the dismissal of ministers (sec. 99(1)). He or she would effectively have to consult the leader of the minister’s party in the case of dismissal, for in replacing the minister, the Prime Minister would have to consult that leader. In most Westminster-type systems, the Prime Minister is no longer, as in constitutional theory, primus inter pares (first among equals), but is effectively the government. This may not create a major 35
YASH GHAI constitutional problem if the government consists of one party (whatever the strains within the party), but could become problematic in the case of coalitions. In the case of Fiji under the new Constitution, the problems and difficulties may be even greater: for one, the purpose of multi-party government is power sharing – a purpose which could be negated if the Prime Minister were not to consult other partner parties and, second, multi-party government is mandated by the Constitution, and is not a voluntary arrangement. A ‘forced marriage’ of this kind requires the utmost sensitivity, consultation and compromise, and therefore effectively changes the nature of the office of the Prime Minister. The provisions for power sharing came into effect only after the general elections in May 1999. A coalition of ethnic parties under the leadership of the Fiji Labour Party, the most multi-ethnic party, formed the government. There is evidence that the cabinet was better placed than any previous one to appreciate the concerns of all communities and to reconcile their claims. The government brought together a wide variety of interests and, on delicate and difficult questions like land, the presence in significant numbers of representatives of all major groups ensured the avoidance of narrow ethnic approaches. Unexpectedly, one party, the Labour Party, won enough votes to form a government of its own in a normal parliamentary system, adversely affecting the balance of power conducive to power sharing. The largest party of indigenous Fijians, Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT), was not in the government – for a variety of confusing reasons. The absence of the largest party of indigenous Fijians was unfortunate, given the aims of the Constitution, as it is also the party of the previous government, associated with the coup. Its entry into the cabinet could have helped to consolidate the improvement in ethnic relations, while in opposition it saw its role as to challenge the government constantly, often on ethnic points, and indeed to destabilize it, as its leaders successfully did when they joined the forces for the coup in May 2000. 13.5. Bosnia and Herzegovina The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Annex 4, Dayton Peace Agreement) provides for extensive power sharing. The Presidency, in which executive power is vested, consists of three people, elected directly by each of the three main ethnic communities, or constituent peoples. Decisions are by consensus, giving each community a veto. Similar provisions apply for appointments to other public bodies, including the Constitutional Court and the Board of the Central Bank. The chair of each legislative chamber rotates among the representatives of the three constituent peoples. Voting rules ensure that each of the three main ethnic communities are involved in all decisions. Any of the three sets of constituent peoples can declare that a proposed decision affects vital national interests, triggering special procedures for mediation and reconciliation of differences. If that fails, the matter is referred to the Constitutional Court. Commenting on the centrality of ethnicity to these arrangements, Pajic observes that preoccupation: ‘with the rights of ethnic groups reflects the transition from 36
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, AUTONOMY AND MINORITIES communist to nationalist collectivism, where the nepotism of the “one and only” ruling party is replaced by the despotism of presupposed groups’ ethnic interests’.36 Both parliaments and Entity governments are required to have a proportional ethnic balance, and distribution of key political functions is along ethnic lines. Ironically, in this preoccupation, the rights of national minorities are seriously downgraded or ignored (as for example, in the restriction of the office of the Presidency, or legislative or executive vetoes to Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs). Rights of individual citizens, as citizens rather than as members of a particular ethnic group, are also limited. Given this complex process of decision-making, it is not surprising that numerous deadlocks have occurred. The state level government is seriously handicapped in its capacity to make or execute policy. The Constitution provides for a key role for foreigners. Three judges of the Constitutional Court are foreigners, selected by the President of the European Court of Human Rights; and eight out of 14 members of the Human Rights Chambers are also foreigners. The first Governor of the Central Bank also had to be a foreigner, appointed by the International Monetary Fund. The highest executive power and key policy powers are vested in the Office of the High Representative, appointed in accordance with UN Security Council’s resolutions; his mandate covers monitoring the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement and in particular the civilian aspects (Annex 10). Due to differences within the collective Presidency and the unwillingness of each of them to take decisions that might be resented by his or her community, many matters end up on the desk of the High Representative. 13.6. Discussion Most of these case studies suggest various difficulties about power sharing. The majority group may be reluctant to share power if it considers that it can or should form government on its own. At best it is prepared to accept other groups in a subordinate position, and members of these groups may come to be looked upon as stooges of the majority community. Decision-making can be hard, especially if each ethnic group is vested with vetoes. The accountability of the executive suffers as most important groups are in government. Cyprus, Fiji and Northern Ireland show that either the conflict is introduced into the government itself or that those outside it are frequently able to mobilize ethnic unrest. Power sharing is difficult when there are only two major communities, or where there are no traditions of democracy or tolerance. The typical form of power sharing, consociationalism, suffers from particular difficulties: it assumes that groups are driven by primordial sentiments and have an unchanging identity, that communal interests prevail over economic and professional interests, and that within each group there is political consensus on policies and ethnic relations. It tends to rely too much on cooperation among elite groups, and thus to be unstable. On the other hand, there is considerable evidence 36
Pajic, supra note 29, p. 39.
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YASH GHAI that a government based on power sharing principles is able to handle ethnic conflicts better than a more exclusive government. Power sharing has also played a useful role in transition to democracy in ethnically divided or war-torn societies. 14. AUTONOMY Autonomy is a device to allow minorities claiming a distinct identity to exercise direct control over affairs of special concern to them while allowing the larger entity to exercise those powers which cover common interests. There are two basic types of autonomy: territorial or group. Territorial autonomy can take the form of federation (such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Canada, India, Nigeria, Switzerland) or autonomy for one or two regions only (as in Åland, Chittagong Hill Tracts, Greenland, Kashmir, Mindanao, New Caledonia, Scotland, South Tyrol). Territorial autonomy for a minority is possible when the minority is concentrated in one region of the country and constitutes a majority within that region. A particular advantage of territorial autonomy, being based on the spatial principle, is that it enables ethnic problems to be solved without ‘entrenching’ ethnicity. However, some forms of autonomy may indeed entrench ethnicity, as with reservations or tribal areas, or the communist ‘republics’, under the dominance of titular minorities, as in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, where the cultural and political hegemony of the group may serve to sharpen boundaries against outsiders. When a minority is not geographically concentrated, it is possible to grant group autonomy to it over specified matters such as culture, language, religion and personal law (Muslims in India; linguistic groups in Belgium; national minorities in Estonia, Latvia, and Hungary; Arabs in Israel). Members of the group, or, where self-identification is permitted, registered members of the group, wherever they may be living in the state, are bound by regulations made by, normally, a council of the group in respect of matters delegated to it. Both territorial and group autonomies give the minority or the territorial community the right to legislate on and administer certain matters, usually to the exclusion of the national authorities. Group autonomy normally encompasses limited, specific matters, unlike territorial autonomy where transferred powers may be extensive. The territory or the group may also have the power to raise revenue through taxation or other measures binding its members, and will frequently also receive financial transfers from the central authorities. Regional institutions are established for the exercise of territorial autonomy, covering legislative and executive functions, and sometimes also judicial and public service functions. In this way the minority and other residents are able to exercise a wide range of participatory rights in the region. Group autonomy may be exercised through a representative council, and through it and other mechanisms, its members will be able to participate in affairs which are vested in the community. Sometimes, as most extensively in Belgium, it may be possible to combine territorial and group autonomies.
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PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, AUTONOMY AND MINORITIES 14.1. Territorial Autonomy Autonomy enables fair representation of minorities in the regional legislature and the executive. Autonomy arrangements would probably also provide for the minority’s language to be the official regional language. Primary and sometimes secondary education is also likely to be the responsibility of the regional government, facilitating the preservation and development of minority culture. Most autonomy arrangements provide financial and administrative resources for the local government to carry out its functions – crucial to effective participation. Autonomy arrangements, especially in the federal form, provide for regional representation at the centre, and thus institutionalizes regional influence at the centre. This, rather than significant provincial powers, is in essence the South African strategy, for through the second chamber, provinces are represented at the centre and determine national policy. Sometimes representation at the centre is not considered important, especially if the region is small and its primary concerns are local (as in Åland or Puerto Rico, or for the Sami in Scandinavian countries). Autonomy can comprise a wide variety of arrangements regarding structure and powers. The flexibility of the federal device in terms of the division of powers and the structure of institutions enables various kinds of accommodations to be made, as it is more hospitable to compromises than other kinds of minority protection. It can also allow for a gradually increasing transfer of powers. It ensures better prospects for preserving minorities’ culture (language, religion, etc.) and resisting state homogenizing policies and practices. It is a device to control local physical and natural resources, although the problem of natural and other resources is not easily resolved. However, state control over national revenue enables other regions to be compensated in other ways to maintain a measure of equity necessary for national unity. Autonomy has the potential to accommodate the demands of linguistic or cultural minorities. The first important example of the use of federalism to give a minority significant participation rights was the division of Canada into two provinces of the largely anglophone Ontario and the francophone Quebec in 1867.37 Several provinces have been established under the Indian Federation to provide autonomy for linguistic minorities, particularly in the North-East. In Nigeria the federal device, as reorganized after the Biafran war, helped to provide security and participation to its minorities, and maintained the unity of the state. A striking example of the successful use of a federal type autonomy is Spain after Franco’s death in the 1978 Constitution. Various cultural and linguistic minorities or nations, prominently the Catalans and the Basques, resisting the centralization of the state in the nineteenth century, had been seeking separation by the use of violence. The outstanding example of the successful use of regional autonomy is Åland, where a predominantly Swedish-speaking population under Finnish sovereignty has enjoyed a large measure of cultural and political autonomy since 1921. Åland was 37
R.L. Watts, ‘Federalism and diversity in Canada’, in Ghai, supra note 12.
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YASH GHAI administered by Sweden as part of its dependency of Finland; when Russia obtained Finland as the price for its military victory in the nineteenth century, Åland went with it. On the granting of independence to Finland in 1917, Ålanders demanded reunification with Sweden. The League of Nations, asked to deal with the matter, recommended that Åland should remain with Finland but should enjoy a high degree of autonomy, under international guarantee, designed to protect Ålanders’ political, linguistic and property rights. Åland has its own legislative and executive bodies, which hold a wide array of powers of self-government. Ålanders also have representation in the national Parliament, and the Åland legislature is able to introduce bills in the national Parliament on subjects which fall under the authority of the national government. The national government can, and has, delegated executive authority over some national matters to Åland. There is strong institutional protection for the autonomy, provisions for which cannot be altered without the consent of both the national and Åland legislatures. Over time, Åland has come to value its links with Finland.38 Åland’s experience has served as a model of regional autonomy, and has been followed in Greenland and the Faroes, which are under Danish sovereignty. Other examples of regional autonomy include the Italian South Tyrol, for the protection of its substantial German-speaking minority, the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua for the protection of its indigenous peoples, and Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh. In the UK participation rights of the Scottish and the Welsh have been considerably strengthened by devolution of power; it is too early to make an assessment, as it is of the Muslims’ autonomy in the Philippines’ province of Minadanao, where it has certainly abated ethnic violence. 14.2. Discussion The record of the success of autonomy to resolve or manage ethnic conflicts is mixed. There are many instances when its use has defused tensions, reorganized the state and provided the basis for the existence of ethnic groups. There are also numerous occasions when autonomy has been unacceptable either to the central government or the ethnic group. There are many examples of the abrupt withdrawal of autonomy because the central government rejects pluralism or considers that its continued operation is a threat to state integrity through secession (as in Southern Sudan and Kosovo/a). In recent years some federations have dissolved into a multiplicity of states: Bangladesh has seceded from Pakistan, Czechoslovakia has broken up, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia have collapsed. But such break-ups are not the result of autonomy, but of the denial of meaningful autonomy. Many federations or autonomous systems have suffered acute tensions or crises (Canada, Nigeria, Pakistan), but it is probable that without federation, they would be worse off. Agreement on autonomy is, moreover, exceedingly hard to negotiate. It has
38
L. Hannikainen, ‘The International Legal Basis of the Autonomy and Swedish character of the Åland Islands’, in L. Hannikainen and F. Horn, Autonomy and Demilitarisation in International Law: The Åland Islands in a Changing Europe (Kluwer, The Hague, 1997).
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PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, AUTONOMY AND MINORITIES proved impossible to muster enough political support for significant autonomy in Sri Lanka despite years of negotiations and waves of violence. An important objection to territorially based solutions is that a complete identity of ethnicity and territory is impossible without an infinite fragmentation of the state. Ethnically based autonomy will create new minorities; the position of these minorities may be worse than in a non-ethnic state, since they may be subjected to discrimination or have to acknowledge the symbols and cultures of the regional majority. The partition of Ireland in 1921 produced minorities on both sides of the border; the substantial Catholic minority in Northern Ireland was then subjected to institutionalized discrimination. The demand for new provinces in India has come from minorities in linguistically based provinces, where there was considerable discrimination against them. However, it is possible to make arrangements which would protect the interests of ‘minorities within minorities’, through power sharing, cultural autonomy and devolution to local authorities where these minorities constitute a significant number (in Sri Lanka, where this has been a major obstacle to autonomy, these devices are included in the draft Constitution). It is argued that if autonomy can be justified on ethnic grounds, the rules justifying the grant of autonomy (identity, a sense of discrimination/injustice) may encourage the mobilization of other minorities to manufacture ‘ethnic communities’. There is also the fear that autonomy may lead in time to secession, although there is little evidence of it. 15. GROUP OR CULTURAL AUTONOMY Many of these objections do not apply to group autonomy. There are different forms and uses of cultural autonomy. Rights or entitlements protected under such autonomy can be personal, cultural or political. They can be entrenched or subject to the overriding authority of the government. They normally consist of positive and substantive rights and entitlements, but they can be negative, such as a veto. They form the basis of the communal organization of politics and policies, and of the collective protection of their rights. At one end is corporate autonomy or, more accurately, corporate identity, as the basis of wide-ranging rights, as exemplified by the independence Constitution of Cyprus (1970). Contemporary examples include the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which combines more traditional federalism with corporate shares in power and communal vetoes. These forms of autonomy were significant features of old and modern empires. Modern examples include provisions in the Constitutions or laws of Estonia, Hungary, the Russian Federation and Slovenia. These countries provide for the establishment of councils for national minorities which assume responsibility for the education and cultural affairs of the minorities.39 In principle a council can be set up if a majority of the community desire it, as expressed in votes. Once established, its decisions bind members of the community throughout the state, except that a member can opt in or out of membership – the important principle of self39
A. Eide, ‘Cultural Autonomy: Concept and Contents’, in Suksi supra note 6, pp. 256–9.
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YASH GHAI identification is maintained. Within the areas in which powers are vested in it, the council’s regulations prevail over those of the state. The council has the power to levy a tax on its members; and also receive subsidies from the state. It has authority over language, education and culture of the minority. The principal objective of the system is the maintenance or strengthening of the identity of the minority, based on language and culture. The aim is to take culture out of ‘politics’, and leave other matters to the national political process, in which minorities may or may not have a special status through representation. It is too early to evaluate the experience as the few councils established so far, often under external pressure, have existed only for a short period. However, it would seem that the distinction between culture and politics may be too simplistic, especially today when the survival of culture is closely connected to the availability of resources and to national policy in several areas. Another use of group autonomy is the application to the members of a community of its personal or religious laws (covering marriage and family, and occasionally land, particularly for tribal communities).40 The application of personal laws, and thus the preservation of customary law or practices, is considered important for maintaining the identity of the community. When India tried, during the drafting of its Constitution, to mandate a common civil code for all of the country, some Muslim leaders objected. The supporters of a common code argued that common laws were essential for national unity. The opponents argued that it amounted to the oppression of minorities and the loss of their communal identity. The result was that the Constitution merely set a common code as an objective of state policy, and it is now a well established convention that the sharia will continue to apply to Muslims so long as they desire it. The scope of the application of personal laws, quite extensive during the colonial period in Africa and Asia, is now diminishing under the pressure of modernization (although it is being reinforced in some countries committed to a more fundamentalist view of religion). However, one place where regimes of personal laws still apply with full vigour is Israel, where all of the major religions have their own laws on personal matters.4141 For the Jews, most matters of personal law fall exclusively within the Rabbinical courts, while Muslims are subject to the jurisdiction of Sharia courts applying the Sharia. Although linked to and supported by the state, these courts are administered independently of the state. For the Muslims, the presence of Sharia courts has reinforced their sense of community and the values they want to live by, and helped in the social reproduction of the community (an important factor for a minority, and one whose substantial numbers live under foreign occupation). For the Jews, however, the Rabbinical courts have been deeply divisive, symbolizing the fundamental schism between the Orthodox and secular Jews. In both instances the courts give the clergy, committed to the 40
Y. Ghai, ‘Decentralisation and the Accommodation of ethnic diversity’, in C. Young, supra note 21, pp. 52–9; for a historical account of its use in Europe, see Eide, ibid. 41 See M. Edelman, Courts, Politics and Culture in Israel (University of Virginia Press, Charlottesville, 1994) on which the following account is principally based.
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PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, AUTONOMY AND MINORITIES preservation of orthodoxy, a specially privileged position. The law is slow to change in these circumstances. Personal regimes of laws have also sharpened the distinction among Israel’s communities, and formed a barrier to social relations among them. Such laws would prove an obstacle if state policy were to change in favour of greater integration of communities. One of the major problems with cultural/religious/legal autonomy of this kind is that it puts certain sections of the relevant community at a disadvantage. Edelman shows how both Jewish and Muslim women come off worse in their respective autonomous courts. In India, Muslim women are unable to benefit from the more liberal legal regime that applies to other Indian women after the reforms of the 1960s. One aspect of their disadvantage was illustrated in the famous Shah Banu case ((1985) 2 Sup. Ct Case 556). In this case, although the Supreme Court held that the maintenance a Muslim divorced woman could claim from her former husband was that under the general national law, which provided a higher amount than she would get under the Sharia, the government gave way to pressure from the Muslim clergy and other sections of the Muslim community and legislatively over-ruled the decision.42 In Canada the application of the customary law of Indian bands has also disadvantaged women (the UN Human Rights Committee has held invalid the law which deprived an Indian woman of her land and other community rights if she married an outsider; men who marry outside the community do not incur a similar liability). In South Africa claims of traditional leaders for the continuation of customary laws were resisted by African women because of the discriminations against them, such as in relation to custody and inheritance. The South African solution was to provide for the application of customary law but subject to the Bill of Rights. The Canadian government is negotiating a similar solution for the band laws. 16. CONCLUSIONS Participation in public affairs by minorities is central to their sense of identity. It is crucial to their feeling a part of the state and the wider community. It is essential to the protection of their interests. It helps to inform decision-makers of the concerns of minorities, and leads to better decision-making and implementation. There is less agreement on how participation by minorities should be facilitated and structured. One point of view is that separate provisions should be established for minority participation, as in legislative representation and executive power, and that there should be as much self-government by minorities as possible. The other view is that the modalities of participation should be designed to encourage the political integration of minorities. Even if it were agreed that one or the other was the preferred approach, it might still be hard to generalize on the usefulness of particular modalities. The choice between these options may depend, in many situations, less on their inherent merits than on circumstances and constraints. The objective circumstances as well as the aspirations of minorities vary from place to 42
S. Kazi, Muslim Women in India (MRG, London, 1999).
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YASH GHAI place, and from time to time. For example, the size of the minority is a material factor: a substantial and economically well-off minority might not require special rules for legislative representation, but a small minority might. Moreover, in the former case, special rules might be resented or mistrusted by the majority, but not necessarily in the latter case. This Article has attempted to set out a menu of approaches and modalities. The choice of approach and modalities would depend on the ultimate goals that the state and minorities have set themselves. The problem arises when there is no consensus either between the majority and the minority, or within each group. A section of a minority may want to preserve its social structure and culture at all costs; another may wish to escape the constraints or even the oppression of the community and seek their identity in a cosmopolitan culture. The choice would also depend on the balance between individual and communal rights. Furthermore, particular solutions may not be valid for all times; they may need to be reviewed as the socio-economic and demographic situations change. It is, however, worthwhile to caution against reifying temporary or fluid identities, which are so much a mark of contemporary times. Separate representation and institutions tend to lead to ethnic manipulation or extremism. Many recommendations which have been made in recent years are untried and, even though different ways of furthering minorities’ participation have been tried, it is too early to assess their success. Many of them are concerned excessively with conflict management, and perhaps have been insufficiently focused on long-term objectives. RECOMMENDATIONS 1. All states and regional intergovernmental organizations should provide for and facilitate the effective participation rights of minorities and indigenous peoples in keeping with international norms. Additionally, regional systems for the protection of minorities and indigenous peoples should be established where they do not currently exist. Such regional systems should respond to local realities and facilitate the settlement of disputes that might lead to the oppression of minorities or ethnic conflict. 2. Because citizenship is generally the key to participation rights, those states that have restrictive laws on the acquisition of citizenship should review their laws to enable people who move from one state to another for settlement purposes to acquire citizenship. States that prohibit dual nationality should repeal this restriction, since many people today identify with more than one country. 3. States should guarantee to immigrants key participation rights at the national and local levels after, at most, five years of residence. 4. States should devise electoral laws to encourage political parties to broaden their appeal to members of minorities and indigenous peoples, and require or encourage 44
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, AUTONOMY AND MINORITIES political parties to nominate a minimum specified proportion of candidates from minorities and indigenous peoples. States that have elections by proportional representation should abolish the threshold for representation as regards parties of minorities and indigenous peoples. 5. States should set up systems of government and administration that allow minorities and indigenous peoples to participate in decision-making and implementation. Legislative procedures should allow representatives of minorities and indigenous peoples, and minority-representative institutions, a special role – such as initiation, prior consultation and special voting rights – regarding any bill with a major bearing on minority rights. 6. States engaged in post-conflict transition should adopt systems of power sharing, at least for a limited period, and such power sharing should be based wherever possible on parties rather than on ethnicity. 7. Where a minority or indigenous people is geographically concentrated, states should establish territorial autonomy to provide for self-government. Group or cultural autonomy should be provided when the minority or indigenous people desires it. Group autonomy should be based on self-identification, allowing individual members of minorities and indigenous peoples to opt out of that autonomy. Within territorial or group autonomy arrangements, there should be provisions to protect the rights and legitimate interests of women and of groups that become minorities as a result of the autonomy. 8. States should support and encourage organizations that promote minority and indigenous cultures and languages and should promote cultural exchanges, understandings and reconciliation between different communities. 9. States should set up institutions, such as minorities ombudspersons, to ensure fair treatment of minorities and indigenous peoples, and the promotion of minority and indigenous participation in public and economic life.
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LEGAL APPRAISAL OF AUTONOMY TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY: PROS AND CONS FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW Hans-Joachim Heintze The concept of autonomy – or self-government – has been, at least for half a century, under discussion at a global level. It is noteworthy that the travaux préparatoires of the UN Charter concerning the trusteeship territories already clearly referred to ‘self-government’.1 It was conceived as denoting autonomy, but not as independent statehood. This position was underlined in respect of the trusteeship system, in which ‘self-government’ is not to be confused with ‘selfdetermination’.2 Before this historical background, as one of the sources of the modern understanding, ‘internal self-determination’ or autonomy is to be seen. However, most of the trusteeship territories are now finally independent States. Though the concept of autonomy is therefore even in the system of the UN not a new idea the organisation was not able to overcome the legal grey areas, which are connected with that idea. Alone the example of the establishment of statehood in former trusteeship territories shows to a large degree confusion about the term autonomy (or self-government) and the content of self-determination, minority rights and autonomy. Under these circumstances one cannot be surprised that many States have a still a hostile attitude towards any autonomy regulations due to fears of weakening the existence of the State by secessionist demands of minority groups. Ethnic conflict has become a source of international concern. Those conflicts culminated after the Cold War with the eruptions in Former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union – proving that they are not a vestige of the ‘primitive’ past − as well as those in Africa. This ‘ethnic mobilisation’ among minorities in multiethnic States has often led to demands for self-rule or secession.3 Under those circumstances where practically nearly all armed conflicts are related to non-international conflicts between States and ethnic groups it is worth while to examine autonomy as a possible solution for those minority issues. Autonomy is an indefinite and general legal term that has to be given a concrete content in every special case.4 Organisational as well as substantive rules for 1
UNCIO, Vol. 6, UN Information Organization New York 1945, p. 278. K. Doehring, ‘self-Determination’ in B. Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations, A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 1994) p. 60. 3 S. E. Cornell, Autonomy and Conflict (Uppsala Universitet, 2001) p. 5. 4 H.-J. Heintze, ‘On the legal understanding of Autonomy’ in M. Suksi (ed.), Autonomy: Applications and Implications (Kluwer, The Hague, 1998) p. 13. 2
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HANS-JOACHIM HEINTZE autonomous entities do not follow a given and uniform pattern. The particular form depends on the specific group, on the preparedness of the majority to grant autonomous rights and on the influence of other States and the international community.5 The essential element of autonomy is the granting of certain rights to a specific part of the State population, in view of its characteristics, which differ from the majority of the population. Linguistic, cultural and ethnic minorities are the prototypes of groups who need protection. They are interested in excluding State and majority interference as far as their specific background, tradition and way of life are concerned. Because a certain group is, and feels, different from the majority of the population, it longs for different rights. The aim of any autonomy regime should always be the better implementation of human and minority rights and therefore to avoid conflicts within States and between States. However, autonomy regulations are necessarily always a case-to-case solution and there is no obligation under international law to grant autonomy to any group, perhaps with exception of indigenous peoples.6 One can imagine circumstances in which autonomy regulations cannot contribute to the settlement of conflicts but create new problems and confrontations among minorities or between the majority and the minority. Autonomy is always a result of careful negotiations between States and minorities or peoples about the content, aims and mechanisms of that kind of self-government. However, the State is under no international obligation either to introduce or to maintain a regime of autonomy within its own territory. So far, no document of general international law contains a right to receive – or an obligation to bestow – autonomy.7 Therefore, one cannot support the idea that autonomy is a principle of international law and at least territorial minorities have rights of autonomy within the existing structures of States.8 Nevertheless, the parties to possible autonomy regimes have to take into consideration the advantages and disadvantages of that concept. 1. PROS OF AUTONOMY International law affirms the value of cultural diversity and of individual choice and cultures as context of choice. It is in favour for the continuance of cultures and the nexus between individual and collective identity.9 Autonomy regulations are a possible way for the realization of those aims of international law. 5
R. Bernhardt, ‘Federalism and Autonomy’ in Y. Dinstein (ed.), Models of Autonomy (Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1981) p. 27. 6 H.-J. Heintze, ‘The Protection of Indigenous Peoples under the ILO Convention 169’ in M. Bothe et al. (eds.), Amazonia and Siberia (Graham & Trotman, London, 1993) p. 323. 7 R. Lapidoth, Autonomy – Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts (United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., 1996) p. 175. 8 D. Sanders, ‘Is Autonomy a Principle of International Law?’, 55 Nordic Journal of Int'l. Law (1986), p. 17. 9 P. Thornberry, ‘Introduction: In the Strongroom of Vocabulary’ in P. Culper and S. Wheatley (eds.), Minority Rights in the ‘New’ Europe (Nijhoff, The Hague, 1999) p. 5.
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TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY 1.1. For the International Community Due to the lack of a generally accepted definition of the terms ‘peoples’ and ‘minorities’ in international law there is a certain overlap in the scopes of the norms of minority protection and self-determination of peoples. Doehring argues in the well-known commentary of the UN Charter that the first holders of the classic right of self-determination are ethnic minorities living in an ethnically different State.10 This description contributes doubtlessly to the confusion around the norm of selfdetermination and explains that one has to see minority rights always in connection with the rights of peoples. As the right of peoples to self-determination in principle includes the right to an independent State, it raises the discomforting question of what is going to happen if the world’s 3500 ethnic groups demanded their own State.11 The planet is too small to provide each of them with full sovereignty over a piece of land. Disintegration into hundreds of States is neither realistic nor desirable.12 Even for Buchanan who views the modern State with deep ambivalence, the prospect of uncontrolled secession is, because of the human and economic costs, a cause for considerable apprehension.13 Therefore one has to argue for the need of an international response to secession demands. The most important element of such an international strategy is to distinguish between demands for secession and less extreme forms of self-determination. Autonomy regulations are doubtlessly in the interest of the international community, which is in favour of keeping the number of States on earth as low as possible. Henrard recommends an enhanced awareness of the relationship between the right to self-determination and a high degree of intrastate stability, which would probably help to counter the typical escalation fear of States regarding the grant of special rights to minorities.14 This means, compromises must be found to satisfy the aspirations of minorities and other groups. Many scholars argue, like Eide, that the right to secession prevails over territorial integrity only in cases of severe deprivation of a group’s human rights, especially the rights of a minority.15 Judge Wildhaber identified in Loizdou v. Turkey 1996 before the European Court of Human Rights an emerging consensus that the right to self-determination should be interpreted as remedial for consistent and flagrant human rights violations.16 But even in such cases of massive human rights violations, like in Kosovo, the Security Council, the community of States (and legal 10
Doehring, supra note 2, p. 60. T.R. Gurr and J.R. Scaritt, ‘Minorities Rights at Risk: A Global Survey’, 11 Human Rights Quarterly (1989) p. 375. 12 An Agenda for peace, UN Doc. A/47/277, para. 17. 13 A. Buchanan, ‘Federalism, Secession, and the Morality of Inclusion’, 37 Arizona Law Review (1995) p. 53. 14 K. Henrard, Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection (Nijhoff, The Hague, 2000) p. 312. 15 A. Eide, ‘In Search of Constructive Alternatives to Secession’ in C. Tomuschat (ed.), Modern Law of Self-Determination (Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1993) p. 139 et seq. 16 Cf. 18 Human Rights Law Journal (1997), p. 59. 11
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HANS-JOACHIM HEINTZE scholars) have not been in favour of the establishment of statehood of the Kosovars. Practice shows that the international community is not prepared to recognize ethnic groups living within the boundaries of sovereign States as peoples enjoying selfdetermination. The extending of the right to self-determination might foster internal disputes and even armed conflicts.17 Since secession involves major structural and institutional change to a State and the international community of States, one can observe that the costs of transition and the potentially lasting effects on individuals and groups within the original and the breakaway States be created only if no less drastic means are available.18 This explains the new interest in solutions within the borders of existing States. In the past the UN has not been interested in questions like local self-governance and autonomy as such issues belong to internal affairs of every State. By the principle of sovereignty States themselves decide freely about those questions. This attitude has begun to change after the end of the cold war. In 1995 the Security Council explicitly welcomed the consultations regarding a new constitution based on federal principles between Georgia and Abkhasia.19 With this resolution the Council has recognized that federalism might be a possible way for solving of a minority conflict. 1.2. For the People Kirgis argues that the international community may recognize even a seriously destabilizing right of self-determination claim as legitimate if a government does not represent the people.20 This means on the other hand that the international community would not support a secession claim if the responding government represents the people belonging to the territory. But what happens if there exists a minority and the government represents primarily the majority? In such a case an autonomy regulation may be the answer. 1.2.1. Implementation of Minority Rights Especially in the past the autonomy status has often be seen as a consequence of practical considerations. It has been argued that autonomy regulations are only acceptable in cases in which the population is small ‘or the territory cannot
17 The perspective of Gerd Seidel (G. Seidel, ‘A New Dimension of the Right to SelfDetermination in Kosovo’ in C. Tomuschat (ed.), Kosovo and the International Community (Kluwer, The Hague, 2002 p. 203), who demanded statehood for the Kosovars has not been shared by most of the participants of a German-French international lawyers conference. See supra, p. 335. 18 K. Knop, Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law (Cambridge, University Press, 2002) p. 82. 19 UN Doc. S/Res. 993 (1995). 20 F. L. Kirgis, ‘The Degrees of Self-determination in the United Nations Era’, 88 American Journal of Int’l Law (1994), p. 310.
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TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY conceivably fulfil the requirements of a sovereign state’.21 Other reasons, which led to autonomy, were geographical remoteness of a region, the special relationship of the local population to their land and its resources, the region’s particular historical or cultural development or the existence of indigenous peoples who survived colonization. However, in all cases did the desirable high level of self-government not abrogate the duty of loyalty encompassed by nationality? This is also true in ‘modern’ models of autonomy regulations. The most important precondition for the necessary loyalty of minorities is the respect of the human rights of the persons belonging to minorities. If their life and security are not threatened by the majority, if their culture and religion can be exercised and if they can speak their language then there is no apparent reason for conflict and resistance.22 But very often the traditional concepts of human rights protection with their individualistic approach are not enough. They fail to respond to the specific needs of minorities. Human rights bind by national legislation all inhabitants, including the persons belonging to minorities. These laws may not respond to their specific needs. Especially in the field of civil and political rights the effect is very often limited to the State’s duty to remain passive and to refrain from interference in the individual rights.23 This approach may not ensure effective participation of the minorities in governmental affairs and in the access to political power. To overcome these shortcomings many experts recommend some affirmative action measures. One of latest attempts in that direction are the ‘Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation in Public Life’.24 Those recommendations were elaborated at the request of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM). As an instrument of conflict prevention acting at the earliest possible stage the HCNM addresses the root causes of conflicts. Autonomy can be such a measure. Therefore, one can find in the Lund Recommendations a whole section dealing with ‘self-government’, which could also be paraphrased as autonomy. The experts recommend on the one hand that functions, which are generally exercised by central authorities like defence, foreign affairs, immigration and customs, macroeconomic policies and monetary affairs should stay with the State to prevent separatist movements. On the other hand they plead that education, culture, language, environment, local planning, natural resources, economic development, local policing functions, housing, health and social services should be applied in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity which permits adaptation to the concrete circumstances by transferring
21
B. Broms, ‘Autonomous territories’ in Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol. 1, North Holland: Amsterdam 1992, p. 311. 22 W. Kälin, ‘Federalism and the Resolution of Minority Conflicts’ in G. Bächler (ed.), Federalism against Ethnicity (Rüegger, Chur, 1997) p. 172. 23 W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995) p. 35. 24 See the text of the Recommendations and the article by J. Packer, ‘The origin and nature of the Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life’, 11 Helsinki Monitor (2000) 4, p. 29.
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HANS-JOACHIM HEINTZE responsibility to the autonomous entity.25 This entity has to make sure that minority rights do more than just safeguard the political human rights of the persons belonging to minorities, because they must also contribute to the preservation of the identity of the minority. 1.2.2. Autonomy and Democracy Political participation of minorities is an expression of and a necessity for democracy. However, democracy is often characterized as majority rule. Democracy rests on the assumption that majorities can change and that power is limited in time. According to the will of the voters the political majority of today become the political minority of tomorrow. The power of the majority is not limited in scope because they do not have to share their power. This means that such a system is not necessarily willing to respect the interests of ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities. Such minorities – some authors call them ‘structural’ minorities − cannot give up their specifics (e.g. race, history) or they have to pay the price of losing their identity (e.g. culture or language).26 Those minorities may suffer even under democratic conditions. If the predominant cultural majority is large enough, it will not have to take into account the minority. Under a winner-takes-all rule the majority may even increase the advantages to its own cultural group while discriminating against the minority, because this group is not in a position to challenge the power of the political majority.27 This explains why one can find minority conflicts in States with democratically elected governments, which respect internationally codified human rights in principle. The ultimate objective of free elections and political participation must under those circumstances be ‘not “democracy” but a “democratic society”, the majority has regard the interests of all groups and peoples in the State, not merely those of its supporters’.28 Therefore one has look for concepts of so-called participatory democracy, which postulates open public debates in search of consensus and access for individuals and groups to all levels of public institutions. This has to be combined with the rule of law. Although it is a source of legitimacy, the rule of law is not sufficient without institutions of governance that are direct expression of democratic self-determination.29 Lijphart’s theory of consociational democracy offers solutions for this contradiction between the Westminster style-democracy and an effective participation of minorities in public affairs. His model of consociational democracy 25
H.-J. Heintze, ‘New Direction in the Approach of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities’, 19 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights (2001) 1, p. 110. 26 Kälin, supra note 22, p. 173 27 W. Linder, Swiss Democracy, Possible solutions to Conflict in Multicultural Societies (New York, 1994) p. 170. 28 This is the wording of the findings of the European Commission on Human Rights in the Greek case (12 YB 1, p. 179). 29 E. Stein, ‘International Integration and Democracy’, 95 American Journal of Int’l Law (2001), p. 492.
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TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY has four main characteristics, namely coalition government, the proportionality principle, the minority veto and segmental autonomy.30 The model makes the political participation of minorities in national policy decisions as optimal as possible, because it allows them to protect and to promote their own characteristics by the minority veto. It ostensibly amounts to a form of internal self-determination for minority groups and is, therefore, in general appropriate and desirable for deeply divided societies.31 Even Wheatley, who considers the approach of consociational democracy only ‘superficially attractive’ accepts that for regional government, appropriate autonomy and subsidiaritiy is to be commended. However, this should in his opinion not be confused with a constitutional recording intended to reflect ethnic differences within the State.32 1.2.3. Autonomy as Means of Conflict Resolution The confrontation between the reassertion of rights by minorities and the resistance of States to accept meaningful pluralism has resulted in many cases in the demand for broader political and economic power of minority groups.33 Autonomy has the capability to satisfy the aspirations of an ethnic minority to a degree of political power while preserving the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the State. Therefore it is often seen – although it was used rarely by the States – as an instrument of conflict resolution between the demands of a group for more independence and the rights of the State to territorial integrity.34 The main advantage of autonomy follows from the fact that the suppression of groups and minorities calls forth their resistance, thus disturbing public order. This opposition could also impede the exchange and communication between different groups of the population. The principle of subsidiarity, on the other hand, could promote a productive participation of minorities in the State. This underlines ‘The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities in Europe’ of the Council of Europe in its Recommendation 43 (1998): ‘Convinced that the application of the principle of subsidiarity, whereby decisions are taken at the level closest to citizens, can contribute positively to resolving the problem of protecting national minorities’. Political and cultural pluralism will have positive effects on the society as a whole, as tolerance facilitates voluntary assimilation of a minority. People can express their distinct identity and run its own affairs in certain spheres. Autonomy follows from a 30 A. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1977) p. 36. 31 Henrard, supra note 14, p. 314. 32 S. Wheatley, ‘Minority Rights, Power Sharing and the Modern Democratic State’ in supra note 9, p. 201. 33 H. Hannum, ‘The Limits of Sovereignty and Majority Rule: Minorities, Indigenous Peoples, and the Right to Autonomy’ in E. L. Lutz et al. (eds.), New Directions in Human Rights (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania, 1989) p. 14. 34 T. D. Musgrave, Self-determination and National Minorities (Claredon, Oxford, 1997) p. 208.
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HANS-JOACHIM HEINTZE special political status of a region, which is based on its population differing ethnically or culturally from the majority. Autonomy requires the recognition of the particular group features. Due to the territorial focus of many current internal conflicts autonomy has the capability of being a conflict-solving mechanism. Practice indicates, that the higher the degree of militarization of a conflict preceding the establishment of autonomy legislation, the less likelihood there is of high autonomy durability. Strong international involvement in the elaboration and implementation of the autonomy regulation, however, has a positive effect on the durability.35 This experience underlines that in principle autonomy has an international aspect due to its influence on regional stability. 1.3. Expression of a Modern Understanding of Sovereignty The expansion and enhancement of economic and political activity as well as the increasing acceptance of human rights have placed in question the allocation of authority dictated by the Westphalian order. Social changes have driven a paradigm shift from a world of States to a world of diminished State sovereignty. This process is according to Elazar accompanied by the legitimization of ethnic identity and national self-determination, which is associated with the ‘postmodernist’ preference for local knowledge over global norms.36 However, usually the government of a State wishes to prevent the autonomous regional entity from acquiring sovereignty due to fears of secession. The autonomous entity on the other hand is very much interested to get as many elements of sovereignty as possible. Broms argues that even existing autonomous territories are – as a rule – interested in becoming independent.37 To solve this contradiction means to question the modern understanding of sovereignty. Many scholars have growing doubts concerning the extent and usefulness of the concept of sovereignty in our days and speak about a relative notion, variable in the course of time.38 Practice has proven, however, that the classical meaning of sovereignty as total and indivisible State power has been eroded by the development of the modern world. State borders are no longer dividing lines between States and societies. Economies are interdependent and the norms of international law – especially human rights – undermined the idea of total sovereignty. Therefore Reisman refers to the need of ‘contemporatization’ of the notion of sovereignty.39 The concept of autonomy fulfils such a demand. Lapidoth 35
K.-Å. Nordquist, ‘Autonomy as a Conflict-Solving Mechanism – An Overview’ in M. Suksi (ed.), Autonomy: Applications and Implications (Kluwer, The Hague, 1998) p. 73. 36 D. J. Elazar, Constitutionalizing Globalization: The Postmodern Revival of Conferal Arragements (Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 1998) p. 19. 37 Broms, supra note 21, p. 311. 38 L. Wildhaber, ‘sovereignty and International Law’ in R. St. Macdonald and D. M. Johnston (eds.), The Structure and Process of International Law, p. 440. 39 W.M. Reisman, ‘sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary international law’, 84 American Journal of Int’l Law (1990), p. 873.
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TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY argues that autonomy and sovereignty are not mutually exclusive under a modern understanding of those concepts.40 Autonomy as we understand it today is partly a consequence of this modern development of international law. The general acceptance of the right of peoples to self-determination has encouraged groups to claim more participation in their government instead of simply accepting majority rule. However, if peoples fight for secession and the establishment of a new State they behave in very conservatively because they are promoting the multiplication of States. Therefore it is an attempt to create more States, not to change the character of State sovereignty. To establish a new State means to replicate sovereignty without questioning it. It does not call into question the dominant conception of the State and the existing international order. Autonomy on the other hand may lead to a more critical attitude toward the nature and structure of State authority. It is ‘in the strict sense’ a rejection of the idea of State sovereignty ‘in its purest form – the claim that there is only one legitimate legislative authority, the State itself’.41 This is the reason that autonomy regulations are more fundamental challenges to the conception of the State authority than the demand of secession. The changing character of sovereignty is reflected – beside ethnic questions – worldwide in the appearance of ‘sub-State entities’, i.e. internal institutions and confederate structures playing an increasing role and taking on functions previously within the competence of States. 1.4 Flexibility of the Concept of Autonomy It is impossible to achieve a perfect solution regulating the relationship between the majorities and minorities. Territorial autonomy always involves a compromise because perfectly ethnic homogenous territories can – and should – never be established.42 The flexibility of the autonomy concept allows balancing of the concrete negative and positive effects of autonomy in each case; the legal basis is the minimum standard of minority rights. As a rule the regulations are not rigid, they allow the introduction of changes. It is sometimes deliberately designed to be established by a gradual process. This gives the parties an opportunity to adapt slowly to the new regime and to collect experiences. In this way the parties can build confidence. According to the principles of the rule of law autonomy should by established by law and the enactments which regulate the regime should be amended only by a procedure that is more stringent than the one used for the amendment of regular laws. However, in State practice one can find other approaches. Taking the Faeroese 40 R. Lapidoth, ‘Autonomy and Sovereignty – Are They Mutually Exclusive?’ in A. Shapira and M. Tabory (eds.), New Political Entities in Public and Private International Law (The Hague, Kluwer, 1999) p. 14. 41 Buchanan, supra note 13, p. 54. 42 A. Lijphard, ‘self-Determination versus Pre-Determination of Ethnic Minorities in Powersharing Systems’ in W. Kymlinka (ed.), The Rights of Minority Cultures (Oxford, University Press, 1995) p. 275.
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HANS-JOACHIM HEINTZE Home Rule as an example, it is obvious that it is a typical political construction and not a stringent legal construction.43 This may explain some shortcomings of the Faeroese model.44 The forms of implementation of minority and peoples’ rights are diverse. Minority cultural rights allow peoples and other groups to wear their distinctive cultural dress, to be called by their own names and to practice their own cultural and religious rituals as well as to learn and to speak their own language. Selfgovernment primarily concerns political rights, but besides the administration it includes, inter alia, the regulation of the use of land and the exploitation of natural resources, property and tax rights. Such rights belong to the so-called internal rights of self-determination because they can be exercised short of secession within the State. Such a solution expands the set of constructive alternatives immeasurably. States are under those circumstances free to acknowledge that a group has legitimate interests in self-determination.45 Autonomy regulations are very flexible because the details of the autonomy are open to negotiation between the representatives of the central State and those of the autonomous regime. In any case the basic idea of any regulation is the principle of subsidiarity. It is a political and social rule for organising State and society. Subsidiarity is based on the idea that there are elements between the State and the individual enabling the individual to preserve his identity. As a legal principle, subsidiarity has a positive and a negative content: as a negative obligation, it restrains the higher-up community level if a solution can be achieved on the lower community level. This is complemented by the positive duty to assist the smaller community if necessary. The principle of subsidiarity is thus based on spreading public affairs among different communities in order to avoid centralisation. The ‘recognition and institution of territorial autonomy, which may consist in local or regional self-government’ is according to the Council of Europe a concrete form of the application of the principle of subsidiarity.46 Subsidiarity has to be adapted to the circumstances of the case and cannot be defined abstractly.47 It always raises the practical question of what forms of selfgovernance would be necessary to guarantee comprehensive participation of minorities in public life. Due to its flexibility it is increasingly adopted in national and international affairs and serves as the basis of assigning tasks, which are performed by the world community on the planetary level, some by regional communities, others by nation-States, and finally some on the local level, through formalized structures. 43
A. Olafsson, ‘Relationship between Political and Economic Self-Determination. The Faeroese Case’, 64 Nordic Journal of International Law (1995) p. 479. 44 Cf. L. Lyck, ‘The Faeroese Home Rule Act as a Framework for the Faeroese Economy’ in L. Lyck (ed.), Constitutional and Economic Space of the Small Nordic Jurisdictions (Stockholm, 1997) p. 137. 45 Buchanan, supra note 13, p. 54. 46 Recommendation No. 43 (1998), adopted on 27 May 1998. 47 Elazar, supra note 36, p. 60.
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TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY Autonomy can contribute to solving minority conflicts on the local level by flexible means. Despite the widely accepted positive effects of autonomy on the protection of minorities, State practice has shown no willingness to regard it as a general model for the resolution of minority conflicts. There is no right to autonomy to be found in treaties. Even in the area of soft law, States consciously avoid any apparent acceptance of autonomy. But the mere fact that the possibility of autonomy is mentioned in some OSCE documents has to be emphasised, as it proves that autonomy is of increasing importance in enforcing minorities’ and groups’ right to identity. The concept of autonomy and its status as a principle of international law also gains new impulse by the debate in the UN on the rights of indigenous peoples. This is the first time a group is expressly given the right to autonomy by a draft of an UN Declaration. Although the unique character of these claims has to be kept in mind, the debate on indigenous peoples indicates the increasing acceptance of autonomy. One has also to take into consideration that the community of States hesitates to accept the draft of the declaration on indigenous rights due to the articles on self-determination and autonomy. Another example of those reservations on the part of the States is the good neighbourhood agreement between Slovakia and Hungary. The mentioning of the Council of Europe Parliamentarian Assembly’s Recommendation 1201, which refers to the right to autonomy, led to the provisional failure of the negotiations on that bilateral treaty. This example shows that the sensitivity with regard to autonomy on whatever form is still very strong even in some member States of the Council of Europe.48 1.5 Content of Autonomy The term autonomy is used today in three different branches of science. In philosophy autonomy is the power of the human being to determine by himself on the basis of its rationale will. In natural sciences the concept means organic independence. In law and politics autonomy has many meanings. Lapidoth identifies four conceptions of autonomy in the law: (a) as a right to act upon one’s own discretion in certain matters, (b) as a synonym of independence, (c) as synonym with decentralisation and (d) as exclusive powers of legislation, administration and adjudication in specific areas of an autonomous entity. In principle, autonomy is regarded as granting internal self-government to a region or group of persons, and thus partial independence from the influence of the national or central government.49 The term autonomy appears in various legal contexts and is used differently, because it is not a well-fitted legal concept. In fact, this concept was originally derived from sociology. The frequent appearance of territorial autonomy has led many to restrict the term ‘autonomy’ to this type, although it is only one among many. It means that 48
H. Klebes, ‘The Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities’, 16 Human Rights Law Journal (1995) p. 92. 49 R. Lapidoth, ‘Autonomy: potential and limitations’, 1 Int’l Journal of Group Rights (1994) p. 277
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HANS-JOACHIM HEINTZE under the principle of territorial sovereignty, one region is given a special status. The latter possesses the competence of self-government organs to regulate certain matters, i.e. subject of autonomy is territorial self-government. These competencies go beyond local and regional self-government and include specific problems of the minority or group. Territorial autonomy as a form of group protection can only be implemented if the group in question lives in a defined area, i.e. in a geographically distinct territory, and constitutes the majority there. As a consequence of a region being autonomous, all people living in it are subject to this status, not only the members of certain groups. On the other hand, those members of a minority living outside the autonomous area do not enjoy this status. When integrating a group that lives in one region only and has a historically developed group consciousness, taking into account local circumstances is unlikely to permit any other solution than regionalisation and decentralisation of the institutional State structure. In order to minimise the misuse of autonomy, there should be clear and precise agreements between the sides concerned. The following points are essential: A precondition of autonomy is the willingness of the organ of self-government to comply with human rights and minority rights standards. Other crucial prerequisites include ensuring the safety of its citizens and the creation of representative and elected bodies necessary for democratic legitimisation. Funding territorial autonomy will necessitate further rights and could even include the competence of taxation. Mechanisms are needed for the resolution of conflicts between the State and the organs of the autonomous region. In most cases, preparatory and transitional rules and agreements will be necessary too. 2. CONS OF AUTONOMY? Wippman rightly argues that it depends on different aspects whether a proposal for autonomy will be productive or counterproductive. He mentions the goals of the relevant actors, the size and political strength of the minority population vis-à-vis the majority and vis-à-vis other minority groups in the society, the territorial concentration of the relevant groups, the timing of the proposal, the history of the majority-minority relations in that society, the goals and involvement of kin-States and other interested outside actors, and a host of other variables.50 The territorial autonomy that may work for the Åland-Islands or the Trentino-Alto Adige region may be totally impractical or unnecessary for minorities in other States.51
50
D. Wippman, ‘The Evolution and Implementation of Minority Rights’, 66 Fordham Law Review (1997), p. 624. 51 G. Malinverni, ‘Local Self-Government, Territorial Integrity and Protection of Minorities’ in European Commission for Democracy Through Law (ed.), Sciences and technique of Democracy, Vol. 16 (Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 1996) p. 314 et seq.
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TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY 2.1. Division of the Population into Groups It is possible to argue that autonomy does not make sense if human rights are respected and the society is organized in a democratic way.52 There is no doubt that the implementation of the whole body of human rights law, including effective remedy mechanisms, is the fundament of minority protection. If the inhabitants of a State are free of fear and discrimination resulting from minority status then there is no reason for engaging in a conflict with the majority. Under those conditions the demand for autonomy as an instrument of minority protection, has been criticised. Its opponents claim that assimilation has advantages over autonomy because any different treatment of people due to their belonging to a group calls forth the opposition of other groups, which eventually leads to ethnic conflicts.53 Autonomy regimes rest on the assumption that differences enrich more the endanger the society. Cultural survival is defended by counteracting the (Western) homogenisation. This means according to Steiner ‘a state composed of segregated autonomy regimes would resemble more a museum of social and cultural antiquities than any human rights ideals’.54 Moreover, a system, which recognises minorities, is regarded as economically and politically inefficient: The free market is impeded because minority members are less inclined to leave the group’s territory. Politically, the division of society made it more difficult to reach consensus. Autonomy might also isolate the minority and alienate different groups, which could eventually lead to segregation. The dialogue between groups, essential for a multi-ethnic State, could cease. There is, in the opinion of some authors, considerable reason to argue that the institution of territorial autonomy may foster ethnic mobilisation, increased secessionism and even armed conflict.55 Therefore, those structures may be counterproductive under certain circumstances.56 A further negative consequence of autonomy legislation may be that the government feels less responsible for the political stability, development and prosperity of the autonomous region.57 2.2. Autonomy, Human Rights and Discrimination It has been criticised that autonomy promotes the separate ethnic identity of a group and the responding minority is singled out as being different. The very existence of such a special status would discourage the development of overlapping and inclusive identities. Cornell points out that the concept of all citizens being equal and 52
See Kälin, supra note 22, p. 172. D. Steiner, ‘Collective Rights’, 13 Human Rights Quarterly (1991) p. 368. 54 H. J. Steiner, ‘Ideals and Counter-Ideals in the Struggle Over Autonomy Regimes for Minorities’, 66 Notre Dame L. Rev. (1991) p. 1552 55 M. Brems, Die politische Integration ethnischer Minderheiten (Frankfurt/M., 1995) p. 142. 56 See Cornell, supra note 3, p. 7 57 L. Lyck, ‘Lessons to be learned on autonomy from the Faeroese situation since 1992’, 64 Nordic Journal of Int’l law (1995) p. 481. 53
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HANS-JOACHIM HEINTZE members of a civic nation would be hardly compatible with the singling out of specific groups on the basis of their ethnicity.58 Wheatley warns that the ethnic ‘cantonisation’ of a multi ethnic State or ‘consociational democracy’ (regardless of its form) are in the long term unhelpful, because they explicitly discriminate between groups on grounds like religion, language, race or national origin. His criticism is a consequence of that fact that power-sharing schemes are concerned with the rights of the group and not with the rights of the individuals.59 Indeed, this danger is inherent to the concept of autonomy because the holder of territorial autonomy is always a group. Hence the prerequisites of autonomy are recognition as a minority or group on the one hand and the acceptance of collective rights on the other. Another condition for self-government is the existence of a representative organ recognised by the State granting autonomy as well as by the group. This may lead to power struggles within the minority. The advantage of minority protection systems under international law – to transform minority rights into human rights and to make the individual the holder of those rights – is questioned by such an approach. Rights held by a group are by nature dissimilar to those held by individuals. According to some theories about the character of collective rights this might create problems. Granting autonomy to a territory may be perceived as a disadvantage and an act of discrimination against other groups who live in that area. Therefore, the autonomy legislation has to safeguard the rights of other groups rather than just the holders of territorial autonomy. The power relationship in an autonomous territory is reversed. The group, previously in the minority, takes power and the relationship between majority and minority is for practical purposes inverted. Therefore, there is always a danger of acts of revenge and one has to emphasise that the authorities of an autonomous region must respect and ensure the human rights in particular of the ‘new minority’. This must be seen as a basic rule of any autonomy legislation whatever its nature and an important challenge to the new administration. For example, in the case of Kosovo, the UN General Assembly60 and other human rights institutions became after 1999 – i.e. after the NATO intervention – increasingly concerned about the frequent instances of harassment, periodic kidnapping and murder of ethnic Serbian, Roma and other minorities by ethnic Albanian extremists.61 2.3. Autonomy and Secession The question arises whether autonomy relates only to a purely domestic and mainly constitutional dimension or whether there are international underpinnings to that concept. Especially the uncertainness of the norm of self-determination opens a wide 58
Cornell, supra note 3, p. 228. Wheatley, supra note 9, p. 201. 60 UN-Doc. 54/183 (29 February 2000). 61 J. Kokott, ‘Human Rights Situation in Kosovo 1989−1999’ in Tomuschat, supra note 17, p. 26. 59
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TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY field of problems. Under which circumstances self-determination may create an entitlement to autonomy is thus doubtful.62 The criticism by many States of the proposal of Liechtenstein in the General Assembly in 1991, according to which communities having a distinctive social and territorial identity should be able to enjoy autonomy to realize their right to self-determination over their affairs, reflect the unclear legal situation. Under those circumstances it is not surprising that there has been a need for pressure on both the Albanians and the Serbs in Kosovo by the UN to come to an agreement on autonomous regulations.63 But other States are also extremely reluctant to grant any form of self-government to groups and consider decentralization as a step in the direction of ‘Balkanization’.64 Delegating State competencies to autonomous institutions is often suspected of being a step towards secession. Cornell even argues that secessionism is likely to be significantly higher for minorities equipped with an autonomous region compared with non-autonomous minorities and mentions the post-Soviet experience as evidence.65 Due to the fact that autonomy can create institutions with some legitimacy can create a widespread fear of the spiral from cultural autonomy and administrative autonomy to secession. This explains, in a large measure, the reticence of States to accept any kind of legal instrument containing an obligation to grant persons belonging to a national minority the right to have at their disposal appropriate local or autonomous authorities. Autonomy doubtlessly increases the group cohesion and the incentives of the group to act; its political institutions also increase their capacity to act. Gurr underlines that capacity for collective action is relative high among those groups that control an autonomous government.66 The possession of State-like institutions has very often the effect of ethnic mobilisation that can challenge the central State’s integrity. The local bodies and the parliaments can be used, inter alia, to pass language laws or to refuse to accept legislation from the central government. In situations when the leadership of the autonomous structure is nationalistic the whole bureaucracy is in danger of adopting a more nationalistic profile.67 It may increase the risk of politicians resorting to ethnic mobilisation for career purposes. Elite power may be positively correlated to the level of autonomy, which means at the end of the day that the elite has an interest to keeping nationalist emotions alive. Due to financial autonomy, which is very often part of the autonomy arrangements, the leaderships dependence from the central government is lesser. Last but not least, it is more likely that an autonomous entity – especially if there is a kin State – gets more international support than a minority without that special status. Autonomy may be a 62
G. Welhenga, ‘The Legitimacy of Minorities’ Claim for Autonomy through the Right to Self-Determination’, 68 Nordic Journal of Int’l law (1999) p. 420 et seq. 63 Kokott, supra note 17, p. 8 64 L. C. Bucheit, Secession (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1978) p. 104. 65 Cornell, supra note 3, p. 19 66 T. R. Gurr, Peoples versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century (Washington D.C., United States Institute for Peace Press, 2000) p. 19. 67 Cornell, supra note 3, p. 18.
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HANS-JOACHIM HEINTZE possible way to regulate the ethnic affinity of a minority with the kin State but this can also increase tensions between States. This explains why autonomy cannot be seen to be isolated from the case-to-case circumstances. 3. CONCLUSION Autonomy is not a well-defined concept in international law, there are no commonly accepted models of autonomy which can be used, and minority groups or peoples do not have any legal right to it, however, its efficacy as a means of settling ethnic tensions, preventing existing States from falling apart and of implementing internationally recognised human and minority rights is becoming more and more apparent. Evaluating the current debate on autonomy one can say that the advantages – safeguarding international stability and protecting the identity of minority groups – supersede the possible drawbacks. However, autonomy is not automatically a recipe for success. It is only one part of conflict resolution and has to be combined with other measures according to the circumstances of the case. It must be backed by the political will of the partners to make autonomy a success. The case of Palestinian autonomy is overshadowed by a lack of such a will. Therefore, one has to take those voices into consideration, which argue that the existence of territorial autonomies can increase the risk of conflict.68 It must also be taken into consideration that international law must not lead to the destabilisation and disintegration of States. That means therefore that one has to see autonomy within the framework of human rights, minority rights, self-determination and the sovereignty of States. Any isolated overestimation of one aspect of international law would lead to instability and is not in accordance with modern international law.
68
Cornell, supra note 3, p. 14.
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COLLECTIVE & INDIVIDUAL SET BACK TO BACK: AUTONOMY AND THE INTERPLAY OF INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE DIMENSIONS IN ARTICLE 27 OF THE UN INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS Zelim A. Skurbaty 1
1. PRO PATRIA MORI: THE WHYS AND WHEREFORES What always seemed prima facie strange is that mysterious sense of self-conscious identification of individual actors with a community as well as the subjective feeling of compulsion to adjust their conduct and expectations in relation to that selfimposed identity. So far no “objective” categorizations could explain it. No matter how strongly this sense of attachment is politically promoted by e.g., group leaders, the fact remains that there always exists a sustained, structured interaction between members of a group, giving them a sense of being part of a “bounded whole”, which, over time, can turn into a willingness to sacrifice oneself completely for the survival of the group as a whole. There are different degrees of such mutual concern and involvement, which – in the context of the group being at war – may become a legal obligation, supported by the group’s custom or the state’s coercive power, endorsing fight, punishing flight.’ In the specific context of the present article we could proceed from the following question: can autonomy be conceived of as a group right per se or as a right of an individual to share and express her most intimate needs in community – and in the community2 − with other members of the group? To answer this question, we should give a brief analysis of the standing collective (or group) and individual rights enjoy in the international minority and human rights discourse. The best way to do that would be to demonstrate how these rights or dimensions interact in one specific human rights provision – Article 27 of the ICCPR, as the most widely used venue of complaint for individuals belonging to different types of minority groups, including indigenous populations. The dynamics revealed from such analysis would be indicative of the attitudes of the international community toward group rights in general and autonomy in particular. As is now well-known in both academic and non-academic circles, the reason why the very term ‘group rights’ has constantly been avoided after World War II was the pragmatic consideration not to provoke the resentment of member States – especially of newly independent States emerging after de-colonization – sensitive to 1
‘To die for one’s fatherland’, the shortened form of Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori. Meaning by ‘community’ any form of ‘autonomous’ entity or arrangement, both personal and territorial. 2
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ZELIM A. SKURBATY any attempts of limiting the exclusive prerogatives of their recently acquired statehood. These sovereign fledglings were suspect of any legally binding propositions designed to protect whatever groups within their boundaries, be they ethnic, religious, racial, linguistic or otherwise. Groups rights phobia developed as an overreaction to the perceived threat of an attack on the ‘sovereignty’ and of ‘interference in the internal affairs’, and was symbolic of repressed anxiety. The understanding of society as a set of independent individual wills is based on a belief in the priority of individual over cooperative values and goes back to Leibnitz (Baron von Gottfried Wilhelm, 1646–1716), who was the first to state in his major work ‘New Essays on Human Understanding, a treatise on John Locke’s Essay concerning Human Understanding’ (1704), that the physical world (and by extension, humankind) is composed of irreducible self-contained elements – monads – that are infinite in number, hierarchically arranged, nonmaterial, and in constant motion. The individualistic – monadic assumption lying at the heart of the West’s super-indulgence in individual rights was afterwards transferred matter-of-factly to the field of protection of human rights. Accordingly, the dominant ideology has taken comfort in the following clichés: collective rights are not human rights per se, because only the rights of individuals, e.g., the right to freedoms of expression, press, assembly, etc., really and truly matter in democratic societies. The latter (i.e., the individuals) can pursue their specific interests ‘in community’ with other members of kin social groups; but when the prospect of the individual-collectivity clash emerges, the individual human rights should – under all circumstances – get the upper hand over collective ones, lest the latter be used as pretexts for violating the former. Thus, the exercise of individual rights would automatically supersede collective rights, eliminate ipso facto any non-recognition or non-application of the rights pertaining to a group’s (or community’s) existence, and as a sequitur, obliterate any need for the latter. If it were so, it would be logical to suppose that from time immemorial, individuals in different societies should have been preoccupied with questions pertaining to their basic individual rights, while the questions of ethnicity and collectivity should have had a tangential, peripheral role. Even the pursuit of autonomy would be considered as something having nothing to do with the real needs of either individuals or groups. However, history proves otherwise. One of the central features of the great revolution of our times which has brought the modern world into being, writes R. Emerson, is that ‘the peoples of mankind in successive stages have been swept into a vivid and sometimes all-consuming sense of their existence as nations – or at least of their desire to create nations where none existed before’.3 If ‘group rights’ were merely varieties of the rights of individuals to associate in pursuit of particular interests, then collective rights could have been viewed in the light of Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which stipulates that, 3
See R. Emerson, From Empire to Nation: the Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples (Beacon Press, Boston, 1960), p. 89.
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AUTONOMY AND THE INTERPLAY OF INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE DIMENSIONS ‘(1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible. (2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.’4
The essence of the problem, however, boils down to whether we can afford to ignore the intimately individual human experience referred to under the rubric of ‘ethnicity’, which manifests itself in the constant search of ethnic markers in order to belong and share – the more so, if it is an experience with the potential ‘to be transformed into “aggressive nationalism” snapping back with fury like a bent twig when it is forced down’.5 We can no longer afford to be ‘blind to the fact that many demands for self-determination have been made and will continue to be made outside the colonial context’6 and should accept nolens volens that ‘[c]ultural minorities are a fact of life. Political stability requires that minority rights be acknowledged and accommodated.’7 Running ahead of our argumentation, a radical view of the whole subject can be propounded, to the effect that the entire controversy is unreal, artificial and strictly beside the point, because it assumes something that has to exist for there to be any controversy at all. It is a delusion created by uncritically assumed assumptions or presuppositions. There is simply no need to shuttle between the cracks of conceptual fragmentations (either individual or collective) and simplistic holisms (‘individual’, ‘collectivity’): the one is an equal ingredient as well as a complementary facet of the other; both represent fundamental constituents of the same universe. The question then is not what to give prevalence to – to individual or collective rights – but how to forge their modus vivendi in such a way that they establish a harmonic, complementary relationship while retaining their specific contributive value and distinctiveness. We can (and should) separate them for analytical reasons, but in existential terms they are inseparable to the extent that an individual might feel threatened, ‘desperate’, ready to ‘snap back with fury’. This is because a (ethnically-based) ‘nation’ is nothing but a community of people, ‘who feel that they belong together in the double sense that they share deeply significant features of a common heritage and that they have a common destiny for the future. In the contemporary world the nation is for great portions of mankind the community with which men most 4
GA Res. 217 A(III) 10 December 1948. See ‘Two Concepts of Nationalism: An Interview with Isaiah Berlin’, by Nathan Gardels, The New York Review of Books, 21 November 1991, p. 19. 6 See M. Sornarajah, ‘Internal Colonialism and Humanitarian Intervention’, 11 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law (1981), p. 846. 7 See D. Sanders, ‘Collective Rights’, 13 Human Rights Quarterly (1991), pp. 369–370. 5
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ZELIM A. SKURBATY intensely and most unconditionally identify themselves, even to the point of being prepared to lay down their lives for it, however deeply they may 8 disagree among themselves on other issues.’
This double entendre nature of the individual-collective discourse is all too obvious and there is no reason why the second meaning should any longer be passed for a risqué. It is hoped also, that by now some common though erroneous interpretations (amounting to caricature) have been exposed and bypassed. To sum up: Far from being Leibnitzean atomized entities, individuals are intimately integrated into specific groups engaged in collective symbolic interaction and sharing inter alia common value-systems and assumed beliefs about orderings of the world. In the broadest possible sense then, we can assert that the group (or kith-and-kin community) dimension is embedded in the consciousness of individuals, or is constitutive of individual beings, their collective unconscious and bio-social makeup. It inevitably flows from this that group rights should be accepted as a sui generis category of the national and international legal regimes. Such a recognition (of group or collective rights) should not prima facie be associated with sidelining and the violation of individual rights. In fact, the contrary can be true for the following reasons: a) individual rights of persons – voicing claims on behalf of groups and being persecuted by governments – can more effectively be vindicated and protected; b) legally authorized weighing and mediating of possible recognition (or rejections) of claims to ethnic self-determination, especially at an early stage of tension, would become more feasible with the effect of stabilizing inter-ethnic relations by subjecting them to the rules of international law.9
8
See Emerson, supra note 3., pp. 89−95 (emphasis added). Peter Juviler, reflecting on the recent developments in the former USSR, argues that collective rights to self-determination may be recognized in the form of internal autonomy, or even full secession, providing the following conditions are met: (1) ethnic groups are recognized as subjects of international law; (2) the inviolability of States territorial integrity should be conditional on State’s living up to their commitments as regards persons belonging to ethnic minorities; (3) collective self-determination should aim at autonomy, rather than secession; (4) valid grounds for secession might include discriminatory retribution, and violations of minority rights; (5) international recognition for such a new State should depend on ‘internationally monitored and credibly guaranteed undertakings to respect the rights of members of majority and minority ethnic groups in a mutt-ethnic community of equals’; (6) the international community must develop proactive rather than reactive means of resolving conflict; and (7) in such cases CSCE and UN mechanisms should be applied with vigor. See Juviler, pp. 281−282.
9
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AUTONOMY AND THE INTERPLAY OF INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE DIMENSIONS 2. ARTICLE 27 OF THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: JANUS10 EX (LEGAL) MACHINA11 HAMLET: Do you see yonder cloud that’s almost in the shape of a camel? POLONIUS: By the mass, and ‘tis like a camel, indeed. HAMLET: Methinks it is like a weasel. POLONIUS: It is backed like a weasel. HAMLET: Or like a whale? POLONIUS: Very like a whale. Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act III, Scene 2 2.1. Taking Individual Rights Seriously In contradistinction to the ambiguity of the status of collective rights (and I put as charitable a light on the matter as possible), individual rights have already achieved a position of status in international law. Although the rights and immunities of sovereign States still occupy commanding heights in current juridical consideration, recent developments point to the fact that the new definition of the law of nations goes beyond its traditional definition as a system composed of rules governing the relations between States exclusively. The concern of the international community extends now to certain rights and duties of individuals and non-State entities. Of special importance is the exponential growth of international human rights law, manifested inter alia in the adoption of new rules by which certain acts were declared to be international crimes, namely, crimes against humanity and peace and conspiracy to commit such crimes (e.g., the judgments of the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg in 1946, of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in 1948, or The International Tribunal on War Crimes in former Yugoslavia12). Whether such rules comprise international treaties or international customs, they have a tendency to assume the force of law in the international community, and thus to become – by virtue of the fact that contemporary international law is applicable to all States – universal. Both justice and peace are gradually promoted by transferring legal cases, especially those concerning the gross violation of human rights, from the diplomatic to the international judicial forum. Since the question is important qua
10
Janus (Mythology) 1. The god of gates and doorways, depicted with two faces looking in opposite directions. Janus-faced: Hypocritical. See The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language. 11 Deus ex machina [New Latin deus ex machinâ : deus, god + ex, from + machina, machine (translation of Greek theos apo mêkhanês)]. 1. In Greek and Roman drama, a god lowered by stage machinery to resolve a plot or extricate the protagonist from a difficult situation. See The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language. 12 The entry into force of the Rome Statute (Rome Statute of 1998) of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is the most recent example of this trend. The entry into force means that the ICC will be able to investigate and prosecute people accused of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed from this time onwards.
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ZELIM A. SKURBATY one of the horns of the individual/collective dilemma, I should, perhaps, further document this aspect of the contemporary international juridical scene. In 1981 the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities appointed (by decision 1981/142) one of its members, Mrs. Erica-Irene A. Daes (Greece), as a special Rapporteur to undertake a study on the status of the individual and contemporary international law. The final report on the study,13 presented to the sub-commission at its 1989 session, was based on the information received in response to a questionnaire from a number of States, specialized agencies, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and some other international agencies and organizations. Having reviewed developments relating to the subjectivity of the individual in international law, the special Rapporteur came to the conclusion that the individual is indeed a bearer of international rights and responsibilities and that she has a restricted procedural capacity directly under international law and, as a sequitur, should be considered, at least alongside the State, as a subject of contemporary international law.14 More specifically, her final conclusions can be presented as follows: (1) the individual is a subject of rights under a great number of rules of international law, is the beneficiary of international law and, in certain cases, bears the liabilities and disabilities which it imposes; the right to the protection of law, the right to own property, the right to education, the right to work, freedom of thought and assembly and the freedom of movement, residence and correspondence are examples of the rights and freedoms enjoyed by the individual irrespective of her origin, nationality, religion or language. Moreover, contemporary international law provides additional and specific protection to certain individuals: e.g., by international organizations, and in some instances against international organizations; 15 (2) of special importance is the individual complaint procedure established under the Optional Protocol – the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which came into force in 1976, and the procedure for human rights complaints established under Economic and Social Council resolution 1503; both of them represent important steps in the direction of the forthcoming (to be overly optimistic) world tribunal from which an individual will be able to seek redress and which will be capable to enforce its decisions; 13
See E.-I. A. Daes, Status of the Individual and Contemporary International Law: Promotion, Protection and Restoration of Human Rights at National, Regional and International Levels (United Nations, New York, 1992). UN Doc. E/ CN.4/Sub.2/1989/40. 14 ‘The elaboration of the present study demonstrates from theoretical and practical points of view, among others, that the individual is a bearer of international rights and responsibilities, his position in international law is constantly being strengthened. He has a restricted procedural capacity directly under international law and should be considered, at least alongside the State, as a subject of contemporary international law.’ See E.-I. A. Daes, op.cit., p. 56 (emphasis added). 15 Ibid. See also in this respect C. Parry ‘some Considerations upon the Protection of Individuals in International Law’, II Recueil des Cours, (1956) pp. 713−723.
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AUTONOMY AND THE INTERPLAY OF INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE DIMENSIONS 3) although the place of the sovereign State in international law remains to a degree sacrosant, it is difficult to overemphasize the notion that the State exists not as an end in itself, but as the means to welfare and prosperity of individuals (and we would add – groups) residing within its borders; its raison d'être is to be an effective means for the attainment of the individual and community values, and is thus, of a purely functional, pragmatic nature; 4) the relationship between the individual and contemporary international law is becoming more intimate as the international community becomes increasingly aware of the fundamental human values which underpin the law of nations. The concept of the international personality of the individual in international law holds encouraging prospects for the future. The full recognition of the individual as a subject of contemporary international law would be useful and important for the improvement of the enjoyment and the effective protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms at the national, regional and international level; 5) as Article 1, common to both Covenants, provides expressis verbis: ‘All peoples have the right of self-determination . . .’, it constitutes one of the cornerstones on which the legal basis of the struggle of national liberation movements and of their protection is based. The recognition of the observer status of the Palestine Liberation Organization and certain African liberation movements by the United Nations and other international organizations, clearly shows that the role of the liberation movements is on the increase and has a significant impact on international relations and the evolution of international law. The development is also indicative of the fact that the growing and ever-changing needs and the interdependence of communities and the real interest of modern society requires the existence of various subjects of international law. The study undertaken by the Special Rapporteur shows that, although it is a long way to the full recognition of the individual as a subject of contemporary international law, its legal standing as one of the prime beneficiaries of international law (especially what concerns the protection of individual human rights) is nonetheless firm and stable. Since individuals are not atomized entities (and we have already tried to refute this notion), and are, moreover, partly defined by the mode of their integration into specific groups, both national and international legal orders should have responded to the challenge of groups rights. The biggest challenge they were presented with was the question of balance between individual and group ‘ingredients’ in the relevant legal provisions. How the issue was handled in the legal domain and at the international level is our next and immediate concern. 2.2. Travaux Préparatoires: Orwellian Language vs. True Acceptance of Contradictions ‘Doublethink’ is the power of holding two contradictory beliefs in one’s mind simultaneously, and accepting both of them
G. Orwell 69
ZELIM A. SKURBATY In the recent legislative history on minority-related issues there is nothing that might suggest that the preservation of cultural diversity is an accepted, matter-of-fact idea or virtuality. Far from it, despite the fact that the opposite – the idea of (forceful) assimilation – openly clashes with the beau ideals of Western individualism, democracy, and freedom. It is the hidden imperative of a State and Sovereignty, which has prompted the States – both socialist and capitalist – to nip in the bud the initial proposal to include an Article on minorities in the Universal Declaration. ‘Communist’ China, ‘non-aligned’ India and the ‘capitalist’ United Kingdom have united in the belief that the entire Article should be deleted.16 As stated in the introduction to the present book, the meaning of international legal norms vis-à-vis minority groups (including the nascent provisions on autonomy) is an imposition of specific obligations upon States designed to facilitate the preservation of those differentiating features on which those groups place a high premium. The obligations can be pressed up to a point after which any sub-State entity should be given an opportunity to find other forms of interdependence, i.e., to exercise any appropriate (e.g., the so called internal or external forms) form of the right to self-determination. On the less dramatic side, the States might assume obligations both within the domain of their internal (municipal) law and pursuant to the 1966 International Conventions and bilateral treaties (where there are specific provisions concerning minorities), which they signed (or acceded to). The specific measures the States pledge to undertake can be subdivided in legal jargon into two major categories: those designed to prevent the discrimination of the members of minority groups (non-discriminatory legal provisions and practices), and those aimed at helping the minorities to catch up with and to be on par (in terms of socio-economic and cultural opportunities) with the dominant group (preferential treatment or affirmative action programmes). What follows is an account of the discussion, dissent and debate of the relevant – and uniquely legal – provision of an important international instrument, a provision, containing the essence of the international institutionalized response from the international community. Reliving the debate, however, is a rewarding experience because it gives a firsthand account of the vectors of power that have contributed to the particular 16
See UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR. 73, at 5 (1948). In supporting this proposal, Eleanor Roosevelt, a U.S. delegate to the UN and a chairman of the Commission for Human Rights, took a diplomatic tact when she pointed out that, ‘the aim of States was to assimilate and absorb large foreign groups, and to make them part of the nation. Unless all the citizens of a given country could speak the same language, there was the danger that public order might be disrupted by persons who might not understand their duties as citizens of the country in which they were a minority. It was not a question of teaching children in a language different from that of the majority, but of adult persons who would be unable to assume their duties as citizens of the larger country’, see UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR. 73,, p. 7. In a more open fashion, Wilson (United Kingdom), stated that ‘the principle of diversity in some States, far from raising cultural levels, might create minority problems’. Op. cit., p.12. The Article on minorities was deleted by ten votes to six. UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.74, at 5 (1948).
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AUTONOMY AND THE INTERPLAY OF INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE DIMENSIONS configuration of the clause. The problems which concerned the drafters of Article 27 are still at the sharp end of human rights law in general, and minority and groups rights in particular, without any one of them being crystallized into any final or even workable form. Thus, the reasons why we have chosen to parse this Article in the context of autonomy and minority rights are the following: a) it is the most important legally binding provision in the whole discourse of international human rights law; b) as a corollary, it provides the most widely used (and abused) avenue of complaint or redress for persons belonging to specific groups; c) it embodies the compromise between seemingly mutually-cancelling dimensions, such as those for individual and collectives; d) it is an outcome of a fierce debate, ‘where hundreds of schools of thought’ were ‘contending’ and representing the full palette of the then existing powers, systems and opinions; e) it reflects an institutional response from the international community, not a regional organization. We can credit this Article for both successes and failures of the minority system, autonomous arrangements included, as it stands today without mulling over similar less legally important and meaningful provisions in other relevant instruments. With this in mind, we shall try to proceed in a manner, which might avoid any suspicion of arbitrary or subconscious selectiveness. 2.2.1. Numerical Factor, Positive/Permissive Formulation The Drafting Committee, on its 1st Session (1947) considered the following proposal ‘In States inhabited by a substantial number of persons of a race, language or religion other than those of the majority of the population, persons belonging to such ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities shall have the right to establish and maintain, out of an equitable proportion of any public funds available for the purpose, their schools and cultural and religious institutions and to use their own language before the courts and other authorities and organs of the State and in the press and in public assembly.’17
We see here the emphasis on the numerical factor, albeit without qualification (what is ‘substantial’?), and a positive formulation of the right formulation withheld later on at the 9th Session (1953) of the Commission on Human Rights:18 ‘There was also some discussion on the extent of the obligations of States towards minorities. A proposal that “the State shall ensure to national minorities the right” was rejected.’19 The proposal that was rejected20 by eight votes to four, with four abstentions was formulated as follows: ‘The State shall ensure to national minorities the right to use 17
The proposal E/CN.4/21, annex A (Secretariat) Article 46 [27] (hereinafter, if not otherwise stated, the emphasis is that of the author’s) 18 A/2929, Chapt. VI, §18. 19 E/CN.4/5R.369, p. 4 (PL) 20 the proposal E/CN.4/L.222 (SU)
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ZELIM A. SKURBATY their native tongue and to possess their national schools, libraries museums and other cultural and educational institutions’.21 On second thought, though, the proposals of a more specific character, ‘to possess their national schools, libraries, museums and other cultural and educational institutions’, were not accepted.22 It was argued further that, ‘under such a text which imposed a positive obligation on States, minority consciousness could be artificially awakened or stimulated’.23 The formula ‘“the persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right”, which was adopted, seemed to imply that the obligations of States would be limited to permitting the free exercise of the rights of minorities’.24 The foregoing qualification of a minority qua group had popped up almost à la Freudian slip,25 because already in 1951, at the 5th (1950) and 6th (1951) Sessions of the Third Committee [A/5000, §119], ‘[t]here was general agreement on the basic provision that persons belonging to a minority should not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language’. The text elaborated by the Commission on Human Rights was widely regarded as satisfactory.26 2.2.2. ‘Persons Belonging to’ vs. ‘Minorities’ Why was the question of protection of minorities qua groups, especially concerning their equal status with the majorities, considered so vital? Because, ‘It was agreed that, while Article 2, paragraph 1, and Article 24 [26] of the draft Covenant on Civil and Political Rights contained a general prohibition of discrimination, differential treatment might be granted to minorities in order to ensure them real equality of status with the other elements of the population. It was felt that an Article on this question 27 should be included in the draft Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.’
But what meaning should be invested in the notion of ‘minorities’? The ensuing discussion on the meaning of the word ‘minorities’ at the 6th Session (1950), 8th Session (1952), 9th Session (1953) of the Commission on Human Rights [A/2929, Chapt. VI, §184], resulted in an agreement that ‘the Article should cover only separate or distinct groups, well-defined and long-established on the territory of a
21
E/CN.4/SR.371, p.6. E/CN.4/SR.257, p.5 (PL); E/CN.4/SR. 368, p. 4 (SU), p.8 (RCH), p. 14 (SU), p. 16 (F); 23 E/CN.4/5R.368, p. 9 (RCH); E/CN.4/SR.369, p.5 (GB) 24 E/CN.4/SR.368, p. 12 (YU); E/CN.4/5R.369, p. 12 (USA). 25 A verbal mistake that is thought to reveal an unconscious belief, thought, or emotion. See The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language. 26 A/17C.3/SR.289, §34 (SU); A/C.3/SR.290, §4 (PL); A/C.3/SR.291, §21 (YU); A/C.3/SR.366, §29 (LIB), §53 (EC); A/C.3/SR.401, §2 (BSSR) 27 Commission on Human Rights, 5th Session (1949), A/2929, Chapt. VI, §183 22
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AUTONOMY AND THE INTERPLAY OF INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE DIMENSIONS State’.28 This appeared to be the meaning of the opening clause, ‘[i]n those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist’.29 According to one opinion, the draft Covenant should deal with ‘national minorities’30; according to another opinion, ‘ethnic or linguistic groups’31; according to a third suggestion, ‘national, ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities’.32 The expression, ‘ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities’, was adopted.33 The hybrid Article under the heading of ‘amendment’34 had taken the following shape: ‘In those States in which stable and well defined ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities have long been established, persons belonging to such minorities should not be denied the right, in community with the 35 other members of their group to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion or to use their own language.’
It was proposed to modify the text of the amendment36 by deleting the phrase ‘stable and well defined’ and by replacing the words ‘have long be established’ by the word ‘exist’. The first clause should then read: ‘In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist’. The proposal, as modified orally, was adopted by five votes to one, with ten abstentions.37 It was thought that disruptive tendencies might result if ‘every person’ were to claim the benefit of the rights of minorities. For this reason, it was decided to qualify the exercise of minorities’ rights with the clause ‘in 28 E/CN.4/SR.256, p.5 (IND); E/CN.4/SR.257, p.3 (RCH); E/CN.4/SR.368, p.9 & p.14 (RCH), p. 17 (F); 29 E/CN.4/SR.369, p. 8, (U), p. 15 (RCH), p. 16 (SU); E/CN.4/SR.370, p. 11 (AUS). 30 E/CN.4/SR.369, p.6 (PAK), p. 9 (UkSSR), p.10 (AUS), p.13 (SU), p. 14 (GB); E/CN.4/SR.370, p.8 (PI), p. 11 (AuS) 31 E/CN.4/SR.369, p.7 (IND) 32 E/CN.4/ SR.369, p.9 (ET), p. 15 (RCH)] 33 ibid. 34 Amendment E/CN.4/L.261 (RCH) to E/2556 (Sub-Commission) 35 The analogous phrase ‘in community with others’ can also be found in Article 18(3) of the CCPR, concerning freedom of religion: ‘1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching’. It is noteworthy that no limitations of Article 18 – ‘necessary to protect public safety, etc.,’ − are permitted in Article 27. It compares also favourably with the next paragraph of the same Article which stipulates that ‘3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others’, and the 1947 draft by the Sub-Commission of a minority provision to be inserted in the Declaration of Human Rights, which stated that persons belonging to minority groups shall have institutional and linguistic rights ‘as far as is compatible with public order and security’. UN Doc. E/CN.4./52 at 9 (1947). 36 E/CN.6/L.261. 37 E/CN.4/SR.371, p .6.
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ZELIM A. SKURBATY community with the other members of their group’.38 As the Commission’s report shows, the mode of naming of a minority group was considered to be a factor having a direct influence on the nature of their claims: ‘Those who were in favour of the expression ‘ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities” were of the opinion that persons belonging to such minorities should have the right, in community with the other members of the group, ‘to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their religion or to use their own language. Those who were in favour of the expression ‘national minorities’ emphasized the right of such minorities ‘to use their native tongue and to possess their national schools, libraries, museums and other cultural and education institutions.’39
2.2.3. ‘Sheer Romanticism’ or the Roots of ‘Group-Protection’ Phobia Factions that clashed on a mode of minority protection shared one overriding fear: that any protection of a group might give an incentive to invoke the principle of selfdetermination with the concomitant secessionist claims. On the one hand, as one proposal held it: ‘Every people and every nation shall have the right to national selfdetermination’;40 on the other – a kind of a consensus of opinion was established among the State Parties, that the provisions concerning rights of minorities, ‘should not be applied in such a manner as to encourage the creation of new minorities or to obstruct the process of assimilation’.41 It was widely felt that ‘such tendencies could be dangerous for the unity of the State’.42 No minority, it was argued, ‘had the right to subversive action, and the Article [on self-determination] would not give it that right’.43 The long and ominous shadow cast by Article 1 was unsettling, especially: ‘the dangers of mistaken or over-simplified theories regarding the exercise of that right, which might lead to confusion and disorder; if selfdetermination was misused and considered as an absolute right, nothing but anarchy could result. The right could be exercised only within the limits of national sovereignty. It must not be used to undermine a sovereign Power’s rights over its territory and national resources; to use the right of self determination in order to incite dissident minorities to rise 38
E/CN.4/5R.369, p. 6 (GB). See UN Doc. E/2447, supra note 16, para. 53. See also the statements by India, UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.369 at 7 (1953); the Soviet Union, UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.368 at 14 (1953); the Philippines, UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.370 at 8−9 (1953). 40 Commission on Human Rights, 5th Session (1949), the proposal E/CN.4/237 (SU). 41 A/2929, Chapt. VI, §186 E/CN.4/5R.368, p.10 (RCH); E/CN.4/SR.371, p. 5. 42 Ibid. 43 Statement by Saudi Arabia during the debate on Article l, 10 GAOR, C.3 (648th mtg.), UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.648 at 121 (1955). It is interesting to note how quick some States were to equate Article 1 and Article 27 of the CCPR despite the fact that the drafters did their utmost to separate them both linguistically and semantically and to infuse them with different meanings. It shows, moreover, that self-determination was perceived as a loaded field common to both articles despite the intentions of the drafters. 39
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AUTONOMY AND THE INTERPLAY OF INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE DIMENSIONS against the State and imperil its stability would be as contrary to the true spirit of self-determination as aggression or subversion itself. And yet, as history went to show, groups with subversive and aggressive aims had been used by foreign Powers to overturn the governments of countries whose territory they wish to seize. Many independent countries had been the victims of irresponsible groups which had been encouraged to destroy the national unity of their own country. Furthermore, the right of selfdetermination must never be confused with the right of secession. Secession was the outcome not of respect for the right of selfdetermination but of disregard for fundamental human rights and the absence of the free consent of peoples to the exercise of the right of selfdetermination . . . [No] country represented on the Committee would be in existence if every national, religious or linguistic group had an absolute and unrestricted right to self-determination.’44
Also rejected was a proposal that ‘[e]very person shall have the right to show freely his membership of an ethnic or linguistic group, to use without hindrance the name of his group, to learn the language of this group and to use it in public or private life, to be taught in his language as well as the right to cultural development together with other members of this group’.45 In the light of time’s perspective, it is clear that the way the Commission has handled the problem of a ‘national’ or ‘ethnic homeland’, addressed later by the Badinter Commission, illustrates a lack of foresight (to put it mildly). During the 16th Session (1961) of the Third Committee46 some States were especially apprehensive of the prospect of ‘minoritization’ of the immigrant groups, which might gradually extend their claims to extreme forms of self-determination: ‘Many delegations representing countries of immigration stressed . . . that persons of similar background who entered their territories voluntarily, through a gradual process of immigration, could not be regarded as minorities, as this would endanger the national integrity of the receiving 47 States ; while the newcomers were free to use their own language and follow their own religion, they were expected to become part of the national fabric. It was emphasized that the provisions of Article 25 [27] should not be invoked to justify attempts which might undermine the 48 national unity of any State.’
In view of the clarification given on those points, it was thought unnecessary to specify in Article 27 that ‘such rights may not be interpreted as entitling any group settled in the territory of a State, particularly under the terms of its immigration laws, to form within that State separate communities which might impair its national 44
13 GAOR C.3 (888th mtg.), UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.888 at 257 (1958). The proposal E/CN.4/L.225 (YU), E/CN.4/5R.368, pp. 5-7 (YU), E/CN.6/SR.370, p.6. 46 A/5000, §120. 47 A/C.3/SR.1103, §50 (LIB). 48 A/C.3/SR. 305, §78 (U); A/C.3/SR. 1104, §21 (RMM). 45
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ZELIM A. SKURBATY unity or security’.49 Latin America formed the leading edge of the restriction tide50: ‘It was further stressed that the autochthonous population in Latin American countries could not be regarded as a minority. It should be treated as a vital part of the nation and should be assisted in attaining the same levels of development as the remainder of the population.’51 Although the Commission on Human Rights has acknowledged that the proposed amendment52 was supported by the majority of the Commission’s members, it had to reject it.53 However, after a second thought, the Commission decided that the limited rights guaranteed by the Article to the individual members of immigrant groups, were not likely to affect ‘national unity’ of States, be it by specific political activities, by using cultural institutions, or by spreading ‘political theories’.54 The prevailing sentiment during the debate55 was that minorities, or, to be in keeping with the accepted jargon, persons belonging to minorities, should be allowed to be assimilated if they (presumably) wished so: ‘A certain amount of discussion took place on the general questions of integration of minorities and protection of minorities. The question was raised whether protection should be accorded to individual members of a minority group or to the group as such’.56 It was emphasized in this connection that ‘any assimilation which might take place must be clearly voluntary’57, and that ‘members of minority groups should not be deprived of the rights enjoyed by other citizens of the same State, so as to enable them to integrate should they so desire’.58 Several delegations stated that ‘existing minorities were groups which had succeeded in maintaining their separate identities and that Article 25 [27] should not be used to encourage the emergence of new minorities’ and ‘pointed out that the protection of minorities was not meant to derogate from the principle of majority rule; there were regions, such as certain parts of Africa which were dominated by privileged minorities and Article 25 [27] was not intended to protect such domination’.59 But subject to this point, it would be fair to suppose that the majority rule might suppress the subjective willingness of the minority to maintain its special 49
E/CN.4/5R.368, p.10 (RCH); p. 16 (F). A/5000, §121. 51 A/C.3/SR.1103, §§ 20-21 (RCH), §43 (EC). 52 Providing that minority rights should not be interpreted as entitling immigrant groups settled in the territory of a State ‘to form within that State separate communities which might impair its national unity or its security’ – see UN Doc. E/2447, at 75. 53 Ibid. 54 UN Docs. E/CN.4/SR.370, at 4, 7, 9−10. 55 A/5000, §122. 56 A/C.3/SR.1103, §39 (IND); A/C.3/SR.1104, §18 (BR). 57 A/C.3/SR.1103, §30−31 (K); A/C.3/SR.1104, §11 (SU). 58 A/C.3/SR.1103, §54 (YU); A/C.3/SR.1104, §3 (MEX), §13-14 (YU), §23−25 (RCH), §32 (SA). 59 A/5000, §124. 50
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AUTONOMY AND THE INTERPLAY OF INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE DIMENSIONS characteristics. The challenge seemed far from being academic posturing. There is a rich irony in the fact that it was the government of Yugoslavia that took a firm stand on the issue vindicating the ‘subjective element’: ‘The Yugoslav Government wishes to underscore its conviction that the so-called “subjective factor” is in many respects dependent on the political atmosphere, and the cultural and social circumstances prevailing in the individual social communities in which the members of minorities live and work. Historical experiences have shown that the “indifference” of the members of minorities towards their national origin, position and rights [is], as a rule, the consequence of the social and other circumstances in which they live. In societies with a prevailing negative attitude of the “majority” towards the “minority” the members of the minorities are fearful that any declaration of one’s national, ethnic, cultural and other characteristics might be interpreted as a so-called “civil disloyalty” on his part as citizen of the country concerned. Therefore, it would be inappropriate to ascribe too much importance to the need of a “declaration of desire” by the members of any minority in order to preserve their own national, ethnic, cultural and other features and to manifest their awareness of their affiliation to a particular minority, especially in the case of a minority which has for decades been subjected 60 to the pressures of systematic assimilation and denationalization.’
Some States, especially Latin American ones, were even less willing to accord the status of minorities to indigenous populations. The unwillingness to recognize a group as a collective entity, with prospects of acquiring an international juridical personality, was covered up by false concerns of the State of its economic wellbeing. The position of Mexico in the debate has become paradigmatic in that it faked caring to avoid a status problem. Its government pointed out that Mexico, ‘was at present earnestly pursuing the incorporation within its national community of large indigenous groups which had hitherto led, so to speak, a marginal existence owing to lack of communications and the rudimentary level of economic development attained in the areas in which they lived. Those groups had remained untouched by the benefits of modern civilization, and had their own modes of thought and their own languages, but it would be sheer romanticism to make them into minorities.’61
60
See F. Capotorti, Study on the Rights of Persons belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (United Nations, New York, 1991), pp. 8−9. Also in: (UN docs E/CN4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1, Sales No. E78XIV1), ibid. 61 See UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.368 at 10 (1953).
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ZELIM A. SKURBATY If we assume some sort of conceptual succession between the reasoning above and their modern interpretations, then the ‘General Comment’ of the Human Rights Committee (1994) on Article 27 would represent a typical example of what I call below a ‘post hoc legal rationalization’. It is an attempt to infuse the rather ostensible message – easily inferred from the above-cited travaux préparatoires – with some profitable motives, existent, in all probability, only in the heads of the interpreters: ‘The terms used in Article 27 indicate that the persons designed to be protected are those who belong to a group and who share in common a culture, a religion and/or a language. Those terms also indicate that the individuals designed to be protected need not be citizens of the State party. In this regard, the obligations deriving from Article 2(1) are also relevant, since a State party is required under that Article to ensure that the rights protected under the Covenant are available to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction, except rights which are expressly made to apply to citizens, for example, political rights under Article 25. A State party may not, therefore, restrict the rights under Article 27 to its citizens alone.’62
And further: ‘Article 27 confers rights on persons belonging to minorities which “exist” in a State party. Given the nature and scope of the rights envisaged under that article, it is not relevant to determine the degree of permanence that the term “exist” connotes. Those rights simply are that individuals belonging to those minorities should not be denied the right, in community with members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to practice their religion and speak their language. Just as they need not be nationals or citizens, they need not be permanent residents. Thus, migrant workers or even visitors in a State party constituting such minorities are entitled not to be denied the exercise of those rights. As any other individual in the territory of the State party, they would, also for this purpose, have the general rights for example, to freedom of association, of assembly, and of expression. The existence of an ethnic, religious or linguistic minority in a given State party does not depend upon a decision by that State party but requires to be established by objective criteria.’63
Although the very fact of the more ‘profitable’ interpretations of the existing provisions should be viewed favourably (their non-binding character notwithstanding), the real meaning of such efforts will be more understandable if we take into account the notion of the progressive realization of the basic, core concepts concerning ‘minorities’, ‘self-determination’, etc. 62
See Report of the Human Rights Committee, Vol. I, GAOR, Forty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 40 (A/49/40), pp. 108−109. 63 Ibid.
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AUTONOMY AND THE INTERPLAY OF INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE DIMENSIONS 2.2.4. Finalized Version of Article 27: the Transpired Rationale and the Caveat The foregoing discussions suggest a simple conclusion for which no originality can be claimed at this stage of our discourse: the recognition of the collective or group dimension does not mean an advocacy of its supremacy over individual rights; even less the impairment of the responsibility of individual citizens for their individual decisions and actions; and even less – the imposition of collective guardianship over individual’s morals or self-consciousness. It is the hope of the author that he made this thesis clear, because to expand on this point in detail would be a resumption of the line of argumentation taken up above. This having been said, let us revenons à nos moutons.64 What the laborious debate amounted to was the following version of Article 27 of the Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, which was destined to become the only legally binding provision concerning ‘minorities’ in the whole discourse of international law of human rights65: ‘In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.’66
In the light of the considerations set out above, it becomes obvious that the particular wording and message of the Article are not random creatures and cannot be viewed just as an accident of drafting, but represent a deliberate decision, having a loosely concealed background determinant. The travaux préparatoires of Article 27 as well as their wording indicate the reluctance of the drafters to accept any reference to minority or group rights per se. The overriding interest, propelling the States to come to this particular decision was to avoid conferring an international legal personality on groups (or collectivities). I consider this as the single most important distinction and could theoretically leave out everything else as having no added (explanatory) value. But the rationalization of this avoidance does add value to the rationale of the overall States-Minority problematique. First, by denying the victimized groups an international legal personality States deny a ‘minority’ or a ‘people’ the capacity to vindicate their rights before a competent international institution, such as the
64
French., literally. ‘let us return to our sheep’, with allusion to the confused court scene in the old French Farce de Maistre Pierre Pathelin (c. 1470). ‘Let us return to the subject’: an exhortation to cease digressing. See Oxford English Dictionary 65 The Council of Europe Framework Convention on Minorities is of a programmatic nature and does not provide any venue for individual complaints. 66 In International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976, G.A. Res. 220A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 UNTS 171, reprinted in 6 ILM 368 (1967).
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ZELIM A. SKURBATY Committee on Human Rights established by the Covenant.67 How? Because the Optional Protocol to the Covenant gives the right to file communications to the Committee only to individual members of groups, not groups as such, which means that such communications stand every chance of being rejected at the level of admissibility criteria. Although the Human Rights Committee in its ‘General Comment’ (23 (fiftieth session, 1994) states that this Article establishes and recognizes a right which is ‘distinct from, and additional to, all the other rights which, as individuals in common with everyone else, they are already entitled to enjoy under the Covenant’, a clear-cut distinction is drawn between ‘the right to self-determination and the rights protected under Article 27’, because ‘the former is expressed to be a right belonging to peoples and is dealt with in a separate part (Part I) of the Covenant’; self-determination ‘is not a right cognizable under the Optional Protocol’, while Article 27 ‘relates to rights conferred on individuals as such and is included, like the articles relating to other personal rights conferred on individuals, in Part III of the Covenant’ and – thus pigeonholed – ‘is cognizable under the Optional Protocol’.68 The fact the latter is the saving clause is apparent by the reference that ‘the enjoyment of the rights to which Article 27 relates does not prejudice the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a State party’.69 Second, the opening words, ‘[i]n those States in which . . .’, are a clear indication of the resistance to accept the broader concept of minority rights. From the purely legal standpoint, there is confusion here between the rights protected under Article 27 and the guarantees under Articles 2(1) (i.e., to enjoy the rights under the Covenant without discrimination as applied to all individuals within a State’s territory irrespective of their group affiliation), and Article 26 (equality before the law and non-discrimination in respect of rights granted by the States) – a fact profitably exploited by certain States (e.g., France,70 Turkey, India, to name 67
10 GAOR C.3 (642d mtg.), UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.642 at 90 (1955). See Report of the Human Rights Committee, Vol. I, GAOR, Forty-ninth Session, Supplement, No. 40 (A/49/40), pp. 107−108. 69 Op. cit., p. 108 70 The example of France, so far as the recognition of minorities is concerned, is most telling. Numerous cases submitted by French citizens of non-French ethnic origin (e.g., Bretons or Corsicans) to the Committee under Article 27, were uniformly dismissed by the Government of France under the pretext that ‘in the light of Article 2 of the “Constitution of the French Republic . . . Article 27 of the Covenant is not applicable so far as the ‘Republic’ is concerned”. Article 2 of the French Constitution stresses the famous (and very much − historically − French) egalitarian principle, which ‘shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race or religion’. When the Human Rights Committee requested France to submit the periodic report under Article 40 of the Covenant, it expanded on the egalitarian rationale for denial the minority rights: ‘since the basic principles of public law prohibit distinctions between citizens on grounds of origin, race or religion, France is a country in which there are no minorities and, as stated in the declaration made by France, Article 27 is not applicable as far as the Republic is concerned’. See 27 Documents CCPR/C/22/Add.2 and CCPR/C/46/Add.2. There was nothing left for the Human Rights Committee but to recognize its ‘incompetence’ − in the cases of 68
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AUTONOMY AND THE INTERPLAY OF INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE DIMENSIONS only a very few) when they deny both the minority rights and the existence of minorities as such. The fact has been heeded by the Human Rights Committee: ‘Some States parties who claim that they do not discriminate on grounds of ethnicity, language or religion, wrongly contend, on that basis alone, that they have no minorities’.71 The stance of the government of India is representative of the position taken by a number of States. The reference to ethnic minority (in Article 27) ‘does not apply to Indian society’, reads the country Report submitted to the UN Special Rapporteur A. Eide (as a reply to the questionnaire he sent out beforehand). Why? Because Article 18 of the CCPR, which ‘deals with the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion’, is of greater ‘importance to India, which comprises people belonging to different religions, faiths and beliefs’.72 The said aspects of ethnic identity are addressed by Article 29 of the Indian Constitution which reads: ‘Any section of the citizens residing in the territory of India having a distinct language, script or culture of its own shall have the right to conserve the same. No citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds of religion, race, caste or language. The Indian Constitution provides suitable protection to linguistic minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.’73
Third, no matter how liberally we interpret the text of the Article (and thus follow the advice of Francesco Capotorty), the words ‘shall not be denied the right’ – in contrast to the turned down ‘shall enjoy’ – are indicative of tolerance and concession, not of positive affirmation or even of a recognition of rights. The provision, as a safeguard for particular minorities, has a distinct negative purport because it gives a place of pride to an interdiction of interference with certain collective human activities, not to their positive protection. Again, it is difficult to e.g., T.K. v. France and M.K. v. France − ‘to consider complaints directed against France concerning alleged violations of Article 27’. Moreover, in S.G. v. France, G.B. v. France, R.L.M. v. France, and C.L.D. v. France (Communication No. 439/1990) the Committee observed that France’s declaration ‘is tantamount to a reservation and therefore precludes the Committee from considering complaints against France alleging violations of Article 27’. Only Committee member Rosalyn Higgins, in an individual dissenting opinion, argued that the French declaration need not be equated with a reservation, and that the Committee was competent to examine the Article 27 claim. 71 ibid. 72 See India, CCPR/C/37/Add.13, cited in A. Eide, Possible Ways and Means of Facilitating the Peaceful and Constructive Solution of Problems Involving Minorities. E/CN4/Sub.2/1993/34 10 August 1993 pp. 45−46. 73 Ibid.
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ZELIM A. SKURBATY reconcile an assertion that ‘Article 27 is expressed in negative terms’ with “the existence of a right’” which ‘requires that it shall not be denied’.74 It is rather evident from the above that the cited Commentary as a whole, is nothing but a string of post hoc legal rationalizations; and, although it sounds anecdotal to repeat endlessly the claims of groups in the context of an overriding, State-sided running commentary, it is exactly what the background debate – the travaux préparatoires of Article 27 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – offers. The short lesson that comes out of this experience is something like this: all the motive power in all of the movements of the States Parties during the drafting of Article 27 was the instinct of State – and status-quo – preservation. States deliberately wished to adopt rules and procedures that would maximize the chances of survival of the political status-quo (or preservation). All the obstructions came from attempting to rely on something else than status quo. All the attempts at bridging the differences of opinions and claims proved to be half-hearted and ineffective. The provision (Article 27) has not provided either enforcement with temper, or conciliation with dignity. It could not strengthen the hand of a ‘minority’ representative in advancing claims for the minority but only – for the protection of the ‘minority’ members by a State. The background assumption that if individual rights were honoured, ‘minorities’ would have no legitimate or defensible claims to further – not to mention special – protection under international law, proved – as History and modern developments testify − wrong. Given the above mentioned political constraints on the drafting of Article 27, it went as far in this direction as it could possibly go. The debate over the content and context of Article 27, however, has paved the way for the realization that the State-Minority stand-off can be resolved, at the fundamental level, only in the form of an effective international legal arrangement which takes into account the collective – along with an individual − dimension of a ‘minority’. Knowing what we know now, one could put forward a well-founded assumption that the alleged form of such an arrangement could, ideally, be a legally recognized right (at both national and international levels) to autonomy.75
74
Ibid. It goes without saying that the semantic scope of ‘autonomy’ exceeds in our deliberations the notion of a ‘territorial autonomy’, pure and simple. 75
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PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE ECONOMIC VIABILITY OF AUTONOMOUS ARRANGEMENTS CENTRALISM AND FISCAL FEDERALISM Gisela Färber 1. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FINANCIAL CONSTITUTION FOR AN EFFICIENT PUBLIC SECTOR Intergovernmental financial relations are crucial for the balance of power either in a centralist state or in a federal state. It has recently become also an important concern for supra-national organisations like the EU, EMU and other international relations e.g. the international climate negotiations. Independence, interdependence and general rules about intergovernmental tax and non-tax ‘prices’ build the frame in which governments ‘communicate’ with their voters as well as with regional and foreign tax payers and consumers of public goods. Centralist and federal systems differ strongly concerning intergovernmental financial relations. This paper shows the fundamental concepts of both presenting the respective approaches of the theory of public choice and of fiscal federalism. It starts with the contrast of the two opposing concepts concerning the division of public responsibilities among administrative units and independent jurisdictions on different federal tiers. To be able to determine in a nearly optimal way the volume and structure of the central, regional and local public goods, all jurisdictions need certain rights concerning taxation and public expenditures. Particularly regional spill-overs, and other imperfections in the intergovernmental relations, but also arguments in favour of an interregional solidarity cause the need for a system of fiscal equalization. There are different construction principles of fiscal equalization including horizontal intergovernmental transfer payments among different jurisdictions at the same governmental tier and – more often – vertical transfers from central government to state governments, from state to local governments, as well as directly from central to local governments. Financial equalization payments do not only exist in federal states, but also in centralist countries between central and local governments which have a certain autonomy to regulate local concerns. In part two, the paper is concerned with the fiscal constitutions of ‘real’ systems of centralist and federalist countries. Most centralist countries have started to implement federal elements like regional parliaments including certain autonomous 83
GISELA FÄRBER competences into their governmental and administrative structure. All federally constituted countries suffer under long established poorly constructed and unbalanced taxing and spending powers which actually provide increasing problems for the respective international competitiveness of the national economies. Against this background questions arise as to what are the future functions of fiscal equalization. How is it to be constructed? How much redistribution among jurisdictions is required? Should more horizontal elements of redistribution be implemented? Or should the central government take over more responsibilities of redistribution of tax revenues, and a more ‘centrally’ directed financial constitution be established? 2. ALLOCATION INSTRUMENTS IN CENTRALIST AND FEDERAL STATES 2.1. Principles of Political Decision Making and Supply of Public Goods in Centralist and in Federal States One of the most difficult questions in market economies is which public goods and how much of them are needed. The decisions about an optimal size and structure of private goods are coordinated by the market mechanism. But there are certain cases of so-called market failures in which the government sector has to guarantee or regulate a provision of goods or even to produce it by its own public administration or public enterprises because a private market supply will not be sufficient. In theoretical models, all information is available to determine the optimal quantity of public goods including an optimal taxation. In reality however, there is no wise dictator. Instead democratic elections are used to make the citizens’ preferences visible. That means that people vote for a certain bundle of public goods, for a certain political program according to their preferences. Politicians who want to be elected or re-elected offer those programs with which they hope to win the elections. Therefore, politicians are, in basic public choice model, mediators of citizens’ preferences for public goods. Centrally and federally constituted countries differ strongly in regards to the mechanisms of allocation decisions of public goods. In a centralist state, the central government decides about all public goods and has to guarantee the provision and administration of the public good equally across the whole territory. That means that only one government is elected and has the right to determine the size and the structure of public goods. Conflicts among diverging preferences are solved by majority decision for a certain program. Preferences of public goods, which are not offered by the winning party, are not satisfied. In federal states, the legislative responsibility is divided among several government tiers: Each of the many jurisdictions decides about the structure and volume of ‘their’ public goods and has to get the approval of their voters. That way, federal states have the ability to provide different bundles of public goods at state and local levels according to the diverging regional preferences of the respective regional and local voters. Also, the problems of ethnic minorities – which are always 84
CENTRALISM AND FISCAL FEDERALISM also connected with different preferences for public goods – can be solved by establishing a federal structure. The overwhelming advantage of a federal structure against a centralist state is the ability to cover diverging preferences for public goods. Therefore the number of ‘losers’, of unsatisfied preferences is much lower in federal states. Usually this advantage of benefits should exceed the additional costs of the higher number of governments and the higher costs of information necessary for political decision-making and for the voters. By a federal governmental constitution, the number of federal tiers and the number of jurisdictions on the different levels of governments is determined. This structure is not to remain unchanged for eternity. Rather changes concerning significant changes of preferences e.g. of ethnic groups can lead to separations or unifications of jurisdictions or even to moving frontiers of jurisdictions. Examples are the establishment of a new Canadian Province, Nunavut, located in the North and containing only 25,000 inhabitants, or the new determination of the frontiers of the Swiss Canton Jura according to the linguistic affiliation of the people. The developments of the last ten years in the territory of the former Yugoslavia show another more tragic example of the living structure of a multi-ethnic state. Economists tend to reduce economic transactions to the goal of efficiency. Since Musgrave published his ‘Theory of Public Finance’ two other fundamental goals of government activities, distribution and stabilisation, have been accepted.1 Efficiency however is the dominant decision criterion and is used to construct rules how to distribute the potential public goods among the government tiers in a federal state. According to the subsidiarity principle, the responsibility to decide about the structure and the amount of public goods should be as decentralized as possible, particularly if • • •
people in different regions show diverging preferences for public goods, diseconomics of scale exist. Additionally, the costs for innovation are lower at the decentralized levels, because only a limited number of citizens are forced to suffer under ‘administrative experiments’. In the positive case there are also strong incentives of imitation of the new procedures so that in general federal systems tend to be more innovative than centralist ones.
A centralization of responsibilities increases the efficiency of public good production in the cases of • •
economics of scale and regional spill-overs.
Since the discussions of public choice arguments we additionally know that the necessary political control is more effective at decentralized government levels. It 1
See R. A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance (New York, 1959).
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GISELA FÄRBER also increases in the cases when direct democratic instruments are provided, and is weaker the less people can influence politicians and the political decision making processes. Concluding all arguments for a federal structure of responsibilities for public goods, there are as many optimal government tiers as public goods2 because only occasionally two public goods are covered by identical areas of homogeneous preferences. But special service jurisdictions only exist exceptionally. Normal jurisdictions usually bundle those regional and local public goods with a comparable spatial homogeneity. The efficiency losses due to an imprecise optimal cut of the jurisdiction according to the preferences mostly are more than compensated by the efficiency gains resulting from the fact that a lower number of administrative bodies has to be established and that capacities for public services which necessarily have to be offered are better occupied. 2.2. Division of Responsibilities: Two Types of Federalism Federal states have been established for various reasons. The Swiss federation was set up as a union against a suppressor. Belgium and the former Yugoslavia took it as a way to solve their multi-ethnic problems. Many of the former British colonies3 – the USA, Canada, Australia, but also India and Nigeria – chose federal structures for their independent life in the frame of the Commonwealth. Germany established the Second German Empire under the hegemony of Prussia, which was clever enough not to continue its military strategy to unify the independent German states but to establish a supra-state common government level. Austria’s federal system has existed since 1922 when after the break down of the Imperial and Royal Monarchy a democratic government system was set up. Nobody would expect all these federal systems to be constructed identically. But two basic types of federalism, which dominate all variations, can be distinguished: • •
federal systems where the tiers are in principle independent from each other, and the so-called systems of administrative federalism with interconnected responsibilities.
The second type is realised in Germany and in Austria and in principle also in the European Union. Here governmental responsibilities as concerned with legislation 2
From this theoretical point of view, the approach of FOCJ (Functional, Overlapping, and Competing Jurisdictions) has been developed by Bruno S. Frey and Reiner Eichenberger (see their contribution: ‘Jenseits des Gebietsmonopols des Staates’ in Gerken, Lüder; Schick, Gerhard (eds.) Grüne Ordnungsökonomik: Eine Option moderner Wirtschaftspolitik, (Marburg, 2000) p. 331. 3 Astonishingly, the former French colonies did not set up federal, but only unitarian or centralist government structures.
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CENTRALISM AND FISCAL FEDERALISM and with administration are not at the same federal tier: e.g. in Germany, the Länder are according to Article 84 GG responsible for the execution of federal laws. The Federal Parliament therefore passes in many fields federal laws which are then executed by state or even local administrations in their proper responsibility. If a federal law regulates details of state administration the approval of the Bundesrat is required. From this point of view it is quite logical that members of the Bundesrat are representatives of state governments and not of state parliaments or otherwise directly elected representatives as it is regulated by the Senate model which is common for the type of federalism with independent responsibilities. Which of the two basic types of federalism provides a more efficient public sector is not clear ex ante. Both systems offer certain advantages and suffer from other disadvantages: •
•
•
•
Federal tiers which are widely independent from each other can better follow different regional preferences while administrative federalism tends towards a high degree of centralization of legislation and highly regulated administrative procedures. From the ideal perspective however, the freedom to decide how to execute a federal law, how to produce or guarantee a public service which is regulated by federal law in general terms should be broad enough to find different regional administrative solutions according to regional preferences. Administrative federalism is easily open for changes of public good responsibilities, particularly for centralization if changes in the tier of responsibility are required according to the above-mentioned criteria. Economic and technical development demands a fundamental revision of federal responsibilities every 30 years. During that period, other more marginal changes may be required. In the federal systems, which are not interconnected, changes of responsibilities from state to federal government level are difficult to negotiate and tend to be extremely expensive for the central government. The large part of federally uniform law in administrative federalism additionally provides advantages concerned with information costs for those citizens who are highly mobile in their economic or private activities. The larger a country is and the less people cross state frontiers the less this perspective becomes important. In small countries a certain harmonization among state regulation is necessary particularly in those cases in which citizens tend to optimize their economic sphere in a way, which reduces the same rights of people in other parts of the country. Interpersonal (re)distribution is easier in those federal systems which have a high degree of central legislation. In highly decentralised federal countries redistribution of the government sector is limited to the degree which is accepted within a jurisdiction. Therefore, a country-wide uniform redistribution is lower in the independent federal constitutions,
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GISELA FÄRBER while it is higher in the types of administrative federalism and – certainly – in centrally constituted countries. What kind of federal system should be established is before this background depends on the size of a country, the interregional mobility particularly of the labour force and the consumers, the homogeneity of citizens’ preferences and their preference for a high degree of interpersonal redistribution. 2.3. Structure of Financial Constitutions in Federal States The structure of financial constitutions has to be discussed in three parts, firstly the budgetary spending competences, secondly the taxation competences, thirdly the construction of fiscal equalization. To enable the jurisdictions of a federal system to fulfil their responsibilities it is necessary to equip them with certain rights and securities. The leading model was established by Samuelson4 and Lindahl who asked in the 1950s which would be the optimal size of the government sector – in centralist states.5 According to the ideas of public finance welfare economics the two economists stated that citizens would have additional benefits from the provision of public goods and would suffer from a respective withdrawal of benefits by the taxes, which they had to pay for the provision. Because of different marginal benefits of public goods and tax payments dependent on the size of the public budget – the first marginal benefits of public goods are high while the first units of taxes only have small losses of benefits – the optimal size of government budgets is at the point where the marginal gains of benefits from public goods and the marginal losses of benefits resulting from tax payments are equal. Although nobody has the exact information at which point the optimal budget is reached, democratic elections expose the voters’ preferences in a nearly optimal way. This idea can be enlarged to the construction principles of federal financial constitutions. To be able to determine in a nearly optimal way the volume and structure of the central, regional and local public goods, all federal jurisdictions need the rights • •
to spend their taxpayers’ money independently and to levy taxes autonomously at least at the margin.
The power to determine both sides of the public budgets is essential for the democratic allocation mechanism in the public sector. For the empirical construction of fiscal constitutions the details of both rights are very important. But because of the fact that the first three different stages of a fiscal constitution – the distribution of responsibilities for public goods, the spending competences and the rights of 4 See P. A. Samuelson, ‘Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditures’ in Review of Economics and Statistics (1955), p. 350. 5 See E. Lindahl, Die Gerechtigkeit der Besteuerung, (Lund, 1919), p. 85.
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CENTRALISM AND FISCAL FEDERALISM taxation –- never will work perfectly, a fiscal equalization is necessary at the last fourth stage for compensation of the inbuilt deficits. 2.3.1. Budgetary Spending Competences Spending competences are narrowly connected with the right to decide about the amount, the method, and the quality of public service production. It is obviously rational that the federal tier, which is responsible for the determination of a public good, should also be responsible to pay for the provision. In all unconnected federal systems spending rules are constructed according to that principle: All jurisdictions pay for those public goods for which they have taken legislative decisions. Although there are almost always direct and indirect effects of the public goods provision of a jurisdiction to the economy, the production functions of ‘foreign’ public services and the taxation base of other jurisdictions they only scarcely reach a level of importance that the burdened jurisdictions complain about. Exceptions are sometimes concerned with vertical financial relations particularly when the higher tier affects the budgets of the lower ones by its legislation. The debate about the ‘unfunded mandates’ in the USA is a good example and led to a reform of the 6 respective intergovernmental relations in the mid-1990s. In general, in federal systems the principle that the responsible legislating jurisdiction has to pay for the production or provision of public goods is fulfilled and is a certain guarantee for the efficient provision of public goods. Otherwise the burden of taxation, which is a direct result of public spending, becomes too high and th government will not be re-elected. It is obvious that the rules of public borrowing are very important for the taxation-spending mechanism. If governments are not able to shift financial burdens to other generations of taxpayers the mechanism is workable. In the systems of administrative federalism, the spending rights are constructed differently: They are not tied to the legislation right, but to the administration competence. In Germany as well as in Austria and in the European Union, the executing federal tiers have to respect expenditures, which are ‘ordered’ by the central legislation. Exceptions are valid for certain direct transfer payments. Article 104a(3) of the German Grundgesetz indicates e.g. so-called ‘Geldleistungsgesetze’ which regulate certain social transfer payments of which federal and state governments share the financial burdens. Among this type of public expenditure include location aids, students’ transfers and loans, and young parents aids. Additionally, public expenditures in the context of the European agricultural market are financed, precisely: refunded from the European budget while the member states have to bear the costs for the administration. But in general, state and local governments have to cover the costs for those public goods which are regulated – partly in a very detailed way – by federal laws out of their budgets, out of the tax 6
C. R. Wise and T. L. Brown, When Governments disagree: A Comparative Analysis of Conflict Resolution Mechanisms in Intergovernmental Relations in Three Nations, <www.napawash.org/fsp.nsf/83…2a339852568da0014693e?OpenDocument>, S. 10
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GISELA FÄRBER revenues they impose on their regional or local taxpayers. It is also obvious that the principle of congruency of legal responsibility and of cost carrying is not fulfilled. From an isolated perspective it can be expected that huge distortions − an inefficient and too high supply of public services under federal regulation and too few regional and local autonomous public goods − will result from that construction mistake. Before that background the question should be kept in mind what are the resulting compensating constructions on the two following stages of the fiscal constitution concerning taxation and fiscal equalization. 2.3.2. Taxation Competences If the ideals of optimal taxation could be implemented in reality there would be no problems concerning the distribution of taxation principles. In a centralist state, a lump sum tax would be levied which for its part would not cause any welfare distortion, and the taxation-spending mechanism could work. The sum of welfare distortions might be marginal in the case where all federal tiers have the right to levy a lump sum tax which is constructed solely to finance public expenditures. For many economists, it is a sad reality that a lump sum tax is neither accepted as fair nor is executable. The last example was realized by Margaret Thatcher after the implementation of the poll tax which directly lead to her losing the elections. Using practicable types of taxes many problems arise. Beside those problems which are common for all practiced tax systems, including centralist countries with only one deciding institution, there are special taxation problems in federal systems in which all jurisdictions should have tax sources of their own. Principally, the rights of taxing certain typical tax sources are divided among the federal tiers. But the right of taxation is not a uniform one and can be distinguished into the right of legislation and the right of revenue of the whole tax amount or part of it. Further, the rights of tax administration can differ from those of legislation and those of revenues. Additionally, some economists and many politicians want to use taxes as instruments to influence private behaviour and economic activities. Income taxes therefore give after several years of validation the picture of a Swiss cheese with many, many loopholes, decreasing revenue capacities and increasing individual tax burdens.7 But before regarding the problems it is necessary to have an insight into the goals, which a division of taxing powers should follow in a federal system: 1.
7
Taxation revenues should be the most important instruments to finance public spending. They therefore have to create revenue capacitie, which
This fact is often overlooked because of the progressive income tax rates, which lead to an automatic increase of income tax revenues exceeding the growth rate of economic activity. The marginal income tax gains are therefore often used by politicians to offer new tax exemptions without being forced to discuss the use of taxpayers money for certain purposes. In truth, the tax burden of the average taxpayer increases and increases until the latter is no longer willing to pay and starts diving into the shadow economy.
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CENTRALISM AND FISCAL FEDERALISM
2.
3.
4.
follow the burdens of spending themselves resulting from the division of responsibilities of public services. They should be sensitive to the variation of tax rates in those cases that the jurisdictions of a certain federal tier follow diverging citizens’ preferences for public services. If an equal level of regional and local services is desired by the voters then taxes should also spread very evenly. They should also have c.p. an equal or better: a rather even revenue capacity if the production costs for public services are similar across the whole country. They should in contrast differ with respect to production cost differences. It has to be guaranteed that the taxation powers are able to fulfil the functions of ‘regional tax prices’. That means that from an ideal point of view taxes should be paid to those jurisdictions where a taxpayer – a private person as a consumer or a member of labour force or an enterprise – uses regionally and locally immobile public infrastructure capital for his or her benefit. According to an international tradition (and for good economic reasons) taxation is tied to the residence of a natural person or the location of an enterprise. But a person can work and consume in other jurisdictions than in his or her residence jurisdiction, and enterprises can produce at several locations. From this perspective it becomes clear that the procedures of corporate income tax cutting according to the amount of wages or value added at the different locations is not an act of arbitrariness rather than of a fair sharing of tax revenues among the jurisdictions which offered infrastructure capital necessary to make the enterprise profit. If the production factors labour and capital were not mobile, there would be no need of a competition among the jurisdictions of the same tier. This assumption has to be left more and more, as the discussion about the models of competing federalism shows. From the functions of ‘tax prices’ and of a fair tax competition can also be concluded that the different economic tax bases are not equally useful for all federal tiers. The lower the federal level the more functional are taxes on immobile factors, starting with land taxes. Meantime, the high international mobility of capital even sets limits for an independent national taxation of capital incomes. Many other taxes are in principle due to be used as tax sources at many federal tiers, but certain construction principles have then to be regarded. For a fair competition among jurisdictions the tax sources should be distributed in a way that the tax capacities do not spread too strongly. If a fiscally strong jurisdiction disposes e.g. about twice the tax base of a fiscally poor one, the first could c.p. easily change the ratio of public services and the necessary spending level on the one hand and/or the tax rate on the other hand to its favour because it needs a lower tax rate to have the same amount of tax revenues. High divergences in tax capacities without compensations by fiscal equalization measures would 91
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5.
6.
7.
8.
lead to an unfair tax competition and a high degree of migration which is inefficient if it is only caused by those differences of the taxation base. Furthermore it has to be guaranteed that all jurisdictions only can tax activities and assets which are in their own area. Unfair tax competition also takes place if some jurisdictions can appropriate parts of the tax base of other jurisdictions. All jurisdictions need at least two broad tax bases to be able for a fair tax competition. If the tax bases are too small the change of tax rate can again lead to inefficient migration of the mobile production factors. With regard to the absolute and relative importance of the personal income tax all over the world it should seriously be reflected if the participation in the personal income tax base – however it is constructed - should not become some sort of ‘basic right’ of all jurisdictions in federal systems. For local governments should additionally be required that aside of an access to a personal income tax base they should also have the right to levy a tax on the economic activity of local enterprises. From the point of view of a rational tax system the number of taxes should be limited. Many small taxes prevent citizens from feeling the burden of taxation and mostly increase the share of administration costs of the tax system. If tax exemptions lead to remarkable losses of tax revenue of other jurisdictions of other federal tiers they have to be avoided, at least to be refunded. This principle becomes more important if the tax exemptions of a jurisdiction at a higher federal level does not lead to even revenue losses, but concerns certain regions more than others.
Many of these principles are realised in many federal fiscal constitutions. There are typical patterns of distribution of tax sources: taxes on land and immovable property are local taxes in most federal states. Progressive income taxes sometimes are centralised to the federal tiers, in other countries several tiers participate in that important tax base. Turnover taxes with deduction of pre-taxes are located at the central government level while state governments often have the right to levy a sales tax. Special excise taxes are located at the federal or at the state level. A central taxation minimizes the administration costs because excises can easily be taxed at the producers. If the taxation technique offers reasonable possibilities to levy the taxes at the wholesale or even retail trade turnover then the taxes are suitable as tax sources of state governments. Motor vehicle taxes and taxes on land acquisition often are state taxes, inheritance taxes at the state level have started to disappear because they – as you can see in Australia and also in the relation between Austria and Germany – are sensitive for a down sizing competition. A sacrifice of tax competition has become the local trade tax, which was very common across whole Europe until about 20-25 years ago. The European employment crisis then lead to a distortion to that traditional and a bit old-fashioned tax. The poor remains of that tax on enterprise gains – instead of their value added – are now ready for a German 92
CENTRALISM AND FISCAL FEDERALISM museum after they can be deducted by 100% from the corporate and the personal income tax. If these facts did not lead to sufficient confusion the above-mentioned differences concerning legislation, revenue and administration competences would shortly have to be discussed. In central systems they necessarily fall in one hand, in not interconnected federal systems they generally do. Each jurisdiction decides about the legal tax base, the tax rate and the details of tax administration, which is executed by a tax office of the same jurisdiction. In Canada e.g., federal government has offered agreements to provincial governments to levy their income taxes in the case that they chose the same tax base as federal government. With that instrument federal government offered an incentive for a common tax base all over Canada. Most of the Province