BEYOND A ONE-DIMENSIONAL STATE: AN EMERGING RIGHT TO AUTONOMY?
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BEYOND A ONE-DIMENSIONAL STATE: AN EMERGING RIGHT TO AUTONOMY?
THE RAOUL WALLENBERG INSTITUTE HUMAN RIGHTS LIBRARY VOLUME 19
BEYOND A ONE-DIMENSIONAL STATE: AN EMERGING RIGHT TO AUTONOMY?
Edited by ZELIM A. SKURBATY
Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law and The Danish INSTITUTE for Human Rights
MARTINUS NIJHOFF PUBLISHERS LEIDEN/BOSTON 2005
A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
Printed on acid-free paper.
ISBN 90-04-14204-5 © Copyright 2005 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill Academic Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. Brill Academic Publishers incorporates the imprint Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. http://www.brill.nl All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Brill Academic Publishers provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change.
Printed and bound in The Netherlands
TO ALL THOSE WHOSE LIFE IS A STATEMENT OF THE FACT THAT AUTONOMY MATTERS
IF YOU TAKE GOOD THINGS FOR GRANTED YOU MIGHT BE LOOSING THEM AGAIN FOR EVERY RIGHT THAT YOU CHERISH YOU HAVE A DUTY, WHICH YOU MUST FULFIL FOR EVERY HOPE YOU ENTERTAIN YOU HAVE A TASK YOU MUST PERFORM FOR EVERY PRIVILEGE YOU WOULD PRESERVE YOU MUST SACRIFICE A COMFORT FREEDOM WILL ALWAYS CARRY A PRICE OF RESPONSIBILITY AND THE JUST REWARDS OF YOUR OWN CHOICES
Denis Waitley. The Empires of the Mind. The inscription on the Statue of Responsibility (suggested by Denis Waitley), which is supposed to be erected on the American West Coast (San Francisco), as a ‘Responsibility’ counterpart to the ‘Freedom’, personified by the Statue of Liberty on the East Coast (New York).
TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgements .......................................................................................... Biographical Notes.......................................................................................... Prolegomenon: Prefatory Words by Max van der Stoel, Gudmundur Alfredsson and Morten Kjærum ......................................................... Abbreviations .................................................................................................. Introduction by Zelim A. Skurbaty ...............................................................
xi xiii xix xxvii xxxi
PART I GENERAL ISSUES: CROSS-DISCIPLINARY APPRAISAL OF AUTONOMY Autonomy as a Participatory Right in the Modern Democratic State Public Participation, Autonomy and Minorities Yash Ghai .............................................................................................. Legal Appraisal of Autonomy Territorial Autonomy and International Stability: Pros and Cons from the Viewpoint of International Law Hans-Joachim Heintze ....................................................................... Collective & Individual set Back to Back: Autonomy and the Interplay of Individual and Collective Dimensions in Article 27 of the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Zelim A. Skurbaty ................................................................................. Problems Related to the Economic Viability of Autonomous Arrangements Centralism and Fiscal Federalism Gisela Färber ...................................................................................... Social Structure, Social Capital and Institutional Agreement: The TrentinoAlto Adige Model Antonio M. Chiesi ............................................................................... Local Economic and Community Development as an Aspect of the Reconstruction of South-East Europe: Bringing the Local State Back In Milford Bateman ................................................................................
3
47
63
83
103
113
PART II THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS Conceptual Issues Pertaining to Autonomy Territorial Autonomy: Permanent Solution or Step toward Secession? Hurst Hannum ...................................................................................... The Role of Autonomy in State-Nation Dialectic Johan Galtung ........................................................................................ Ambiguities in and Clarifications of the Concept of Autonomy Matti Wiberg .......................................................................................... Meta-Legal and Philosophical Dimensions of Autonomy Paradoxes of Autonomy: Tensions, Traps and Possibilities Thomas W. Simon ..................................................................................
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153 161 177
191
TABLE OF CONTENTS Autonomy and Cultural Rights The Argument of Cultural Disadvantage Juha Räikkä ........................................................................................... The Right of a People to Exercise their Culture – A Scandinavian Model Isi Foighel ...............................................................................................
211 231
PART III CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION, INTERNATIONAL MONITORING AND IMPLEMENTATION International Guarantees of Autonomy Autonomy (International Guarantees of Autonomy) Yoram Dinstein ...................................................................................... International Criminal Law: Protection of Minority Rights Lyal S. Sunga ......................................................................................... Autonomy: The Problem of Irredentism and Cross-Border Cooperation Cross-Border Cooperation as an Indicator for Institutional Evolution of Autonomy: The Case of Trentino-South Tyrol Francesco Palermo and Jens Woelk ....................................................
243 255
277
Autonomy, Participation and Minority Rights Participation and the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) Alan Phillips ........................................................................................... Autonomy and the Effective Participation of Minorities in Public Life: Developments in the OSCE John Packer .........................................................................................
305
Autonomy and Indigenous People Indigenous Rights and the Promise of a Limited Autonomy Model Darren Hawkins ..................................................................................... The Question of Indigenous Autonomy in Latin America José Bengoa ............................................................................................
337
321
351
PART IV NATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES Autonomy, Minorities and Self-Determination The Protection of the Rights of Minorities by Means of Autonomy: The Cases of the Åland and Kosovo Markku Suksi .........................................................................................
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Failed Experiences with Autonomy The Autonomy of Eritrea (1952-62): Learning from the Failed Experience Eyassu Gayim ......................................................................................... Autonomy in the Countries of Transition A Combined Approach to Autonomy: Estonian Experience Aleksei Semjonov ................................................................................... Autonomy of Gagauzia: A Post-Soviet Experience Priit Järve ............................................................................................... Autonomy and Conflict Resolution Autonomy: The Danish-German Border Region Sten Harck .............................................................................................. Continued Challenges, Post-Settlement, to the Cyprus Conundrum Tim Potier ............................................................................................... Strategies of Ethnic Conflict Resolution: The Trentino-South Tyrol Case and the Balkans Paolo Foradori and Riccardo Scartezzini ............................................ National and Regional Experiments with Autonomous Arrangements Experiments with Autonomy in the United Kingdom since 1998 Patricia Leopold ..................................................................................... The Status of Autonomous Territories in International Organizations: Experiences in Nordic and Continental European Co-operation Elisabeth Nauclér ................................................................................... Minority Rights and Forms of Autonomy in South Asia Ranabir Samaddar ................................................................................
401
421 429
457 473
489
503
525 541
Summary Conclusions Is There an Emerging Right to Autonomy? Summary Reflections, Conclusions and Recommendations Zelim A. Skurbaty .................................................................................
565
Index ...............................................................................................................
569
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The attitude of gratitude is a prevailing sentiment at this stage of sending the volume to the Publisher and I owe it to the people and organizations whose help proved to be invaluable in making this publication project a reality. First, I want to express my gratitude to my assistant Frederik Rosen, who has been involved in the project from day one and had been doing all kinds of work within and beyond the call of duty, including editing some texts. It is no small feat given the fact that he had many other commitments and never got any remuneration for his work. Special mention should be made of two Directors of the Scandinavian human rights institutions that played pivotal role in shepherding this volume to its publication phase – Gudmundur Alfredsson, the Director of the Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (Lund Sweden) and Morten Kjaerum, the Director of the (then) Danish Center for Human Rights (Copenhagen). Gudmundur Alfredsson has been instrumental at all stages of the preparation of the volume: giving advice on all kinds of matters, discussing the content of submissions, etc., and, in addition, he took it upon himself to take care of all logistics concerning negotiations with the Publisher. Morten Kaerum has also been supportive all along by providing the venue for the joint autonomy seminar with the United Nations Working Group on Minorities and making contributions of substance during its course. Given the difficulties the Danish Center for Human Rights had been undergoing at the time, this support and contribution acquire special meaning and significance. My heartfelt thanks go to both of them. Asbjørn Eide, the Chairman of the UN Working on Minorities, not only participated in and contributed to the Seminar, but gave the publishing project unreserved support and helped to conceptualize the book’s approach resonating with the credo of the Working Group, namely: ‘the examination of possible solutions to problems involving minorities, including the promotion of mutual understanding between and among minorities and governments’. Professor Tom Hadden from the Centre for International and Comparative Human Rights Law, the Queen’s University of Belfast should be credited for the preparation of the report from the Copenhagen Seminar. The report was put on the agenda of the 8th Annual Session of the UN Working Group on Minorities, widely discussed and thus - set the stage for the preparation of the present publication. Many thanks to Jens Woelk, a researcher from the University of Trento, who brought to the publication scene a number of relevant contributions from the International Conference ‘Organising Cohabitation’ (Trento, January 2001). The authorities of the Autonomous Region of Trentino-South Tyrol, that sponsored the conference, were also very cooperative and helpful in giving the green light for the inclusion of these contributions to this volume. John Packer, Director of the Office of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, also took interest in the publication project and provided useful insights, suggestions and assistance. And one can't but be grateful to the former xi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS High Commissioner on National Minorities, the distinguished Max van der Stoel, who honoured this publication with his words of wisdom and endorsement in the Prolegomenon. My thanks also go to Lindy Melman (Brill Academic Publishers, the Netherlands), Carin Laurin (Publications Officer, Raoul Wallenberg Institute), Christopher Cassetta and Miles Hogan for all kinds of editorial and practical help related to putting the publication through. As already mentioned, publication of this book had been strongly supported by the Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Lund, Sweden, which is only fitting given the prominent role the Institute plays in the promotion of international human and minority rights. And it is no coincidence that one of the most frequently referred documents in the field of autonomy and minority rights – the 1999 Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life – was partly prepared and given life in this institution.1 And – true to form – many colleagues from the Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law has lent a helping hand during preparation of this book, and I can’t but be grateful for that. Finally, I would like to mention a fact whose significance exceeds any passing considerations. This book on autonomy bears on its cover the portrait of Raoul Wallenberg. I consider this rather symbolic in that the person who saved so many lives at the price of his own, has expanded ad infinitum – even if unwittingly – the limits of personal and group autonomy. His tragic fate, sealed in the chambers of the KGB in the late 1940s, set in motion the processes that have changed the intellectual milieu of our epoch forever: it is now accepted, as an immutable imperative, that trespassing personal and group autonomy – defined in human rights terms – is an outrage, something that the international community will not put up with under any conditions or pretexts: it paid too high a price for that. We should send our belated thanks to the person who paid in full for this tidal shift in our perception of what the deep meaning of personal and group autonomy is.
1
As Max Van der Stoel mentions in the Prolegomenon, the origins of Lund Recommendations go back to the inter-governmental conference ‘Governance and Participation: Integrating Diversity’ held in Locarno in October 1988 under the auspices of OSCE. This conference gave rise to a process of consultations with a number of independent experts, which eventually resulted in the ‘Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life’ (September 1999).
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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES Milford Bateman Milford Bateman works at Directorate for Fiscal, Financial and Enterprise Affairs, OECD, Paris José Bengoa José Bengoa is Professor of International Law, University of Santiago, Chile; also a Member of the UN Working Group on Minorities Antonio M. Chiesi Antonio M. Chiesi is Professor of Methodology of the Social Sciences and Director of the Department of Sociology and Social Research at the University of Trento. His recent publications include: Il bilancio sociale, (with A Martinelli and M. Pellegatta, Il sole 24 ore Editore, 2000); L’analisi dei reticoli, (F.Angeli, Milano, 1999); Recent Social Trends in Italy, 1960-1995, (with A. Martinelli and S. Stefanizzi, McGill Queen’s, Montreal 1999); Lavori e professioni (La Nuova Italia Scientifica, 1997). Yoram Dinstein Yoram Dinstein is Professor of International Law, Tel Aviv University (Israel); Humboldt Fellow, Max Planck Institute, Heidelberg (Germany); Member, Institut de Droit International. Paolo Foradori Paolo Foradori is a researcher at University of Bologna, Department of Social Sciences Gisela Färber Deutsche Hochschule für Verwaltungswissenschaften, Speyer Isi Foighel Isi Foighel is Dr. juris Professor emeritus, University of Copenhagen (1964–97), Chairman of the Home Rule Commission for Greenland (1975–1978). Judge at the European Court of Human Rights (1988–98). Senior-researcher at the Danish Center of Human Rights (1998–) Johan Galtung Johan Galtung is dr hc mult, Professor of Peace Studies, American, Ritsumeikan, Troms, Witten/Herdecke and European Peace Universities; Director, TRANSCEND: A Peace and Development Network. He is a founder of International Peace Research Institute (1959). Eyassu Gayim Eyassu Gayim is a Senior Researcher, The Eric Castrén Institute of International Law and Human Rights, University of Helsinki.
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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES Yash Ghai Yash Ghai is the Sir Y.K.Rao Professor of Public Law at the University of Hong kong. His most recent books are Hong Kong’s New Constitutional Order (1998) and Hong Kong’s Constitutional Debate (2000). He has also been a constitutional and legal adviser to several governments, political parties international organisations and non-governmental organisations. Hurst Hannum Hurst Hannum is Professor of International Law and Co-Director, Center for Human Rights & Conflict Resolution, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. He is author of the book Autonomy, Sovereignty, and SelfDetermination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. Sten Harck Dr. Sten Harck is a practising lawyer at the law firm LSH in Copenhagen, where he is working in the areas of public law and EU-law. Before joining the law firm he was a research scholar and assistant professor in EU-law, Public International Law and International Human Rights at the Faculty of Law, University of Copenhagen. He obtained his Ph.D. on a thesis analysing the European Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities. Currently, he is finishing a master thesis at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität in Munich, Germany, concerning the interaction between patent law and human rights. Darren Hawkins Darren Hawkins is an asistant professor of political science at Brigham Young University. He has just published his book, International Human Rights and Authoritarian Rule in Chile. Recent articles have appeared in Comparative Politics and Political Science Quarterly, and he has a forthcoming article in Global Governance. He is currently at work on the political history of international human rights norms and their evolution from statements of principle to laws that can be internationally enforced. Hans-Joachim Heintze Hans-Joachim Heintze is an Associate Professor of International Law at the Institute of International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict, University of the Ruhr, Bochum (Germany). President of the International Association for the Study of the World Refugee Problem (AWR). Research topics: Human Rights Law, Minority Law, Refugee Law, International Humanitarian Law. Co-author of the leading German Textbook Voelkerrecht by Knut Ipsen; Co-author of the Lund Recommendations of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities and of Markku Suksi’s Autonomy: Applications and Implications, Kluwer 1998. Participant of the International Workshop on Regional Autonomy of Ethnic Minorities, Beijing 2001.
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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES Priit Järve Priit Järve, PhD., is senior research associate at the European Centre for Minority Issues, Flensburg, Germany, since 1997. He graduated from Tartu University, Estonia. Before joining the ECMI, he worked in the Estonian Academy of Sciences and acted also as the Plenipotentiary of the President of Estonia to the Estonian Roundtable on National Minorities. He is working in the field of political science and has published on democratisation of transitional societies, multiculturalism, and interethnic relations in the post-soviet area. Patricia Leopold Patricia Leopold, Senior Lecturer in Law, The School of Law, The University of Reading, England. Patricia Leopold is co-author of the 8th edition of O Hood Phillips Constitutional and Administrative Law. She has written on a variety of constitutional matters and is currently researching and writing on the regulation of standards of conduct of members of the devolved institutions in Scotland Wales and Northern Ireland for a book of essays, which she is co-editing. Joseph Marko Joseph Marko is Professor of International Law, University of Graz, Judge at the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina Elisabeth Nauclér Elisabeth Nauclér is Head of Administration at the Government of the Åland Islands since 1999. Ms. Nauclér has a long career Government of Åland, the Parliament of Åland and the Åland Delegation to the Nordic Council. In the last-mentioned institution Ms. Nauclér specialised in questions relating to national minorities and autonomy arrangements. She has also served as Civil Affairs Officer in United Nations in former Yugoslavia in 1993-1996. John Packer John Packer is Director in the Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). He was previously a Human Rights Officer at the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva where he held responsibilities for the Commission on Human Rights investigative mandates. Mr. Packer was a also a consultant for the International Labour Organization and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, a Visiting Research Fellow at the Lauterpacht Research Centre for International Law at Cambridge University, and has lectured at a number of universities and professional institutions around the world. Both in professional and personal capacities, he has contributed to several conferences and publications, has been since 1991 Associate Editor of the Human Rights Law Journal and is a member of the Editorial Boards of the International Journal on Minority and Group Rights and the ECMI Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority
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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES Issues in Europe as well as the International Advisory Board of The Global Review of EthnoPolitics. Francesco Palermo Francesco Palermo holds PhD in comparative constitutional law from the University of Innsbruck, he is also a lecturer of comparative constitutional law in the Universities of Verona and Trento and a senior researcher at the European Academy of Bolzano/Bozen. He conducts research mainly in comparative regional studies, minority issues and constitutional law of the EU. Alan Phillips Alan Phillips was the UK Independent expert to the Council of Europe Advisory Committee on the FCNM and elected as its first Vice President 1998 to 2002. Between 1989 and 2000 he was Director of Minority Rights Group International, while today he is an independent adviser on human rights and minority rights issues, working primarily in the Balkans. A range of his articles has been published and he co-edited Universal Minority Rights with Allan Rosas. Tim Potier Tim Potier is an Assistant Professor, Department of Law, International College of Cyprus (Intercollege), Nicosia. Juha Räikkä Juha Räikkä teaches philosophy at the University of Turku, Finland. After his studies at the University Turku and the University of Miami, Florida, he earned his Ph.D. in 1992 with his dissertation titled An Essay on International Justice. He visited to the Southwest Texas State University in 1994 and European University Institute in Florence in 1999 and 2001. His research interests focus on issues in political theory, philosophy of law and metaethics. He is the editor of Do We Need Minority Rights? – Conceptual Issues (Kluwer 1996). Ranabir Samaddar Ranabir Samaddar, is the Director of the Peace Studies Programme at the South Asia Forum for Human Rights, Kathmandu. He has worked extensively on issues of justice and rights in the context of conflicts in South Asia. His particular researches have been on migration and refugee studies, the theory and practices of dialogue, nationalism and post-colonial statehood in South Asia, and technological restructuring and new labour regimes. Riccardo Scartezzini Riccardo Scartezzini is a researcher at University of Trento, Faculty of Social Sciences
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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
Aleksei Semjonov Aleksei Semjonov’s areas of interest include minority rights, nation building, intergroup and inter-ethic relations; attitudes and values; capacity building of Human Rights NGOs. His main regional focus is the Baltic states and Russia. He is a member of the Presidential Roundtable on Minorities, Estonia, and also of the St. Petersburg Union of Sociologists, Russia. Thomas W. Simon Thomas W. Simon teaches philosophy at Illinois State University and practices law. His books include Democracy and Social Injustice (1995, Rowman & Littlefield); Law & Philosophy (2001, McGraw Hill); and Justice andGenocide (2003, Praeger/Greenwood). He has served as an invited academic consutant for the UN Working Group on Minorities since 1998. Consutantation for an American Bar Association committee on constitutionalism included helping with drafts of Albania’s constitution. Currently, he holds an endowed chair of interdisciplinary studies at the University of Northern Colorado. Zelim A. Skurbaty Zelim A. Skurbaty, Ph.D. (Social Anthropology), Ph.D. (International Human Rigths) had been a Senior Research Fellow at the Danish Center for Human Rights and worked also for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. His publications include ”As if Peoples Mattered. A Critical Appraisal of the Peoples and Minorities from the Internaitonal Human Rights Perspective and Beyond” (2000); “Bibliographical Overview of the Literature in Human Rights Training” (2000); (ed.) “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the two 1966 International Human Rights Covenants and their Domestic Implementation in Vietnam” (2002). Markku Suksi Markku Suksi, Professor of International Law, Director of the Institute of Human Rights, Åbo Akademy University, Finland Lyal S. Sunga Dr. Lyal S. Sunga, BA, LLB, LLM, PhD, is Associate Professor, Director of the Master of Laws Programme in Human Rights and Deputy Director, Centre for Comparative and Public Law at the University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law as well as Visiting Professor at the University of Geneva Faculty of Law’s Centre for International Humanitarian Law. He is the author of two books: The Emerging System of International Criminal Law: Developments in Codification and Implementation (1997) and Individual Responsibility in International Law for Serious Human Rights Violations (1992) as well as a numerous articles in scholarly legal journals.
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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
Matti Wiberg Matti Wiberg is a professor of political science at the university of Turku, Finland. He defended his dissertation (Between Apathy and Revolution: Explications of the Conditions for Political Legitimacy) in 1988 and has published five other monographs, edited 13 anthologies (xxx) and published more than 150 scientific articles. Jens Woelk Jens Woelk, Lecturer and researcher in Comparative Constitutional Law at the University of Trento, Law Faculty. Graduation in Law and PhD in Comparative Constitutional Law (thesis on constitutional principles of co-operation in federal and regional systems) at the University of Regensburg, Bavaria. From 1994 to 2000 Senior Researcher at the European Academy Bolzano (Dept. ‘Minorities and Autonomies’). His main fields of interest are comparative constitutional law, esp. federalism/regionalism, minority-issues and South-Eastern Europe.
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PROLEGOMENON MAX VAN DER STOEL1: ‘. . . AUTONOMY HOLDS TREMENDOUS PROMISE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLITICAL ORGANISATION AND STRUCTURE, ESPECIALLY IN MULTI-ETHNIC STATES . . .’ Autonomy is among the least well-understood concepts in politics. Perhaps for this reason, it does not appear sufficiently well employed if one is to compare the number of situations where forms of autonomy might be usefully considered with the number of situations in which autonomy in fact exists. In my view, well-chosen and designed autonomy arrangements, woven into the structure of the State, have an integrationist potential which can contribute stability to situations where the population comprises significant social or regional diversity. This is because forms of autonomy allow the accommodation of diverse needs, interests and aspirations, and so can create interests and stakes for various groups within the same State, thereby inspiring common loyalty and investment. At the same time, such regimes of autonomy can reduce the appeal of extremist demands and solutions. No matter whether applied to the individual, or seized as a political concept, autonomy is a short-hand notion for a broader idea. In life, neither the individual nor groups are literally free to act as they please; we are all subject to various constraints, including that of law. Autonomy, therefore, implies some degree of independence, but not independence itself. There are a variety of forms and ways this can be manifested. Most often, politicians think of autonomy in territorial terms (within which political power is commonly distributed), but the non-territorial or personal forms are equally important. Indeed, the non-territorial forms are perhaps the more interesting insofar as they offer many more alternatives for accommodation of diversity along the lines of issues (e.g. education) which transcend and do not require territorial divisions. Aside from the division in forms of autonomy, there also exists a division in its basic types whether including legislative, executive, or administrative powers, or all three. In addition to varying forms and types of autonomy, their application can be quite flexible, whether symmetrical or asymmetrical. This flexibility is important in every State since each has its own unique mix of people and territory. Moreover, autonomy can be applied symmetrically across territory and people through simple processes of decentralisation. In my experience, both governmental authorities and the representatives of minority and other communities would do well to become better informed about the idea of autonomy and its potential instrumental value. With this in mind, I instigated 1
Minister of State in The Netherlands; Special Representative of the OSCE Chairman-inOffice for Macedonia; former OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (1993−2001); former Minister for Foreign Affairs of The Netherlands (1973−1977 and 1981−1982) and Permanent Representative of The Netherlands to the United Nations (1983−1986).
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PROLEGONEMON an OSCE wide inter-governmental conference held in Locarno, Switzerland, in October 1998, under the title ‘Governance and Participation: Integrating Diversity’. This conference gave rise to a process of consultations with a number of independent experts who adopted in September 1999 a set of general recommendations entitled the ‘Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life’. While neither the Locarno conference nor the Lund Recommendations were organised around or employ expressly the notion or term ‘autonomy’, they were largely influenced by it. The success of the conference and recommendations also demonstrate the interest States and the wider international community have in the subject. In my view, autonomy holds tremendous promise as an instrument of political organisation and structure, especially in multi-ethnic States and, more generally, in States composed of a diversity of populations and regions − as are most States. Indeed, in order to build an integrated and stable, yet open and dynamic, State it is imperative to maximise the utility offered by forms and types of autonomy appropriately applied. This seems increasingly a global challenge. This compilation brings together leading scholars sharing a variety of perspectives from different intellectual disciplines and regions of the world. It is an important contribution to the surprisingly modest literature, and should be read widely by policy and law-makers, public administrators and scholars.
The Hague, July 2003 GUDMUNDUR ALFREDSSON2: ‘THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO PROTECT GROUP DIGNITY . . . IS TO ALLOW THEM TO CONTROL LOCAL AFFAIRS . . .’ In recent years, with the spread of violent national, ethnic and religious conflicts, minority issues have become regular features on human rights and peace agendas of international and regional organizations. Patterns of political as well as social and economic discrimination, combined with indignities and threats to identities and cultures, continue to cause such conflicts. With better knowledge of their human rights and standing under international law and before international organizations, minorities are increasingly presenting claims to and expecting action from governments and the international community. Much of the new attention to minority rights is security oriented, not least because internal conflicts often spill across borders. Respect for human rights is one method of conflict prevention, and preventive action is certainly less costly than reaction after the eruption of violence. Democracy is good for human rights, but 2
Cand. jur. (University of Iceland 1975), M.C.J. (New York University 1976), S.J.D. (Harvard Law School 1982). He is a Professor at the Law Faculty of Lund University in Sweden and Director of the Raoul Wallenberg Institute for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law.
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PROLEGOMENON minority rights must be enshrined in constitutional and legislative guarantees with available and accessible remedies, consistent with international standards, because majority rule is not necessarily friendly to or understanding of the needs of a minority. In May 1999, a series of expert meetings concluded in Lund with the adoption of the Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life.3 The meetings were convened by the Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations in The Hague and the Raoul Wallenberg Institute for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in Lund, under the auspices of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities.4 The Recommendations deal with the political rights of minorities at both national and local levels. One of the focal areas has to do with the administrative arrangements and the functions of non-territorial and territorial selfgovernments.5 As a matter of international human rights law, persons belonging to minorities are entitled to the equal enjoyment of all human rights, as well as non-discrimination in that enjoyment. In response to the wisdom pronounced by the General Assembly in its resolution on the fate of minorities,6 minority-specific provisions in a number of subsequent human rights instruments provide for special measures or preferential treatment with the aim of achieving equal rights for all, both in law and in fact.7 Thus, States are obliged to ensure the equal enjoyment of all human rights by minorities living within their borders, and they must prohibit and eliminate discrimination against them. The minority-specific standards in international and regional instruments and the corresponding monitoring methods are not perfect. With increased awareness of 3
The Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations published the Lund Recommendations with informative Explanatory Notes in summer 1999. The text is also available on the websites of the OSCE and the Raoul Wallenberg Institute at <www.osce.org> and <www.rwi.lu.se>, respectively. 4 For an historical account, see John Packer, ‘The Origin and Nature of the Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life’, 11:4 Helsinki Monitor. Quarterly on Security and Cooperation in Europe 2000, pp. 29-61. 5 For academic comments on the Lund Recommendations, see Hans-Joachim Heintze, ‘New Direction in the Approach of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities: General Recommendations on Participation of Minorities’, 19:1 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 2001, pp. 101–112; Ñand Kristian Myntti, A Commentary to the Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life (Turku: Institute for Human Rights, Aabo Akademi University, 2001) 75 pages. 6 In 1948 the General Assembly decided that the United Nations could not remain indifferent to the ‘fate of minorities’. This was the title of part C of General Assembly resolution 217 (III) of 10 December 1948. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the same resolution, in part A. 7 For a collection of dozens of human rights instruments with minority-specific standards, see Gudmundur Alfredsson and Göran Melander, A Compilation of Minority Rights Standards. A Selection of Texts from International and Regional Human Rights Instruments and Other Documents, Lund: Raoul Wallenberg Institute Report No. 24, 1997.
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PROLEGONEMON the deficiencies, important initiatives have emerged. A strong emphasis on autonomy, as a special measure for the realization of the equal enjoyment of political rights, is one important part of these new developments, which are reflected not only in the Lund Recommendations but also increasingly in the practice of many States. This book, and the conference at the then Danish Centre for Human Rights (now the Danish Institute for Human Rights) which preceded it, are part of the evidence. In the face of historical and continued discrimination against minority groups, the rules in the international human rights instruments about equal enjoyment and non-discrimination have been complemented by what the UN instruments usually call special measures, as autonomy is referred to above. Special measures are needed to realize the equal enjoyment of human rights and to place the groups, as well as their members, in a position comparable with the majority population. The special measures do not constitute privileges. Like non-discrimination, these measures are rooted in the rule of equal rights. Respect for political rights is an essential aspect of minority rights, and with widespread discrimination there is an obvious need for special measures. A group and its members cannot be really equal to the majority population unless and until equal conditions prevail; even then the group may continue to be disadvantaged because of the majority’s dominance in national life. States have a choice between a variety of measures, but the aim and result must be equal enjoyment of political rights. The measures may include the granting of power to groups and their members, which is disproportionate to their size, in order to ensure fair influence and consultation on political issues. Such special measures should include the establishment of self-governments, but the measures can also involve the requirement that governments obtain consent from or engage in meaningful consultations with groups about matters affecting them; constitutional or legislative recognition of minority laws and customs and their application by the group; and the appointment of officials chosen by the group to either specific positions or to a fixed percentage of general posts at the national level. The Lund Recommendations draw on paragraph 35 of Part IV of the Document from the 1990 Copenhagen Meeting of the OSCE Conference on the Human Dimension. In paragraph 35, it says that the participating States must give persons belonging to minorities sufficient opportunity to participate in public affairs and to protect and promote their identity. Furthermore, in the same paragraph, States ‘note the efforts undertaken to protect and create conditions for the promotion of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of certain national minorities by establishing, as one of the possible means to achieve these aims, appropriate local or autonomous administrations corresponding to the specific historical and territorial circumstances of such minorities in accordance with the policies of the State concerned.’
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PROLEGOMENON Self-government or autonomy8 can come under different names, but the label does not matter as long as the central government agrees to share power and leave local matters in the hands of group representatives. The most effective way to protect group dignity, identity and diverse customs and thus to place groups on an equal footing with other parts of society is to allow them to control local affairs. Autonomy should be seen as one of the best guarantees minorities can wish for and it has been successfully implemented in many countries, although other governments have resisted the trend. Autonomy can be both territorial and personal. With concentration in one area, a group administration can be territorial. If the group’s members, however, are spread over a larger area and/or intermixed with other population groups as is often the case, personal autonomy, meaning membership of and participation in the group’s activities regardless of residence, is a legitimate and workable solution. Personal or non-territorial autonomy also does not result in the drawing of internal borders, undoubtedly an advantage in the eyes of many governments. Autonomy is by its very nature a group right, while the members of the group are the ultimate beneficiaries. The collective entity claims the right, enjoys it and through its membership determines the form and structures of administration. In exercising its powers, the group regime must respect democratic principles and other universally recognized human rights. For example, the group must protect the rights of its own members as well as individuals of other population groups, and it must guarantee representative leadership and equality of the sexes. Group rights must also be exercised in a manner consistent with other principles of international law relating to, for example, the sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of States and the maintenance of international peace and security. This indication of issues associated with minority autonomies only begins to list the many difficult and complex questions, which have arisen and will come up in the drafting of legislation and in the practical application of such laws. This book, with theoretical presentations as well as thoughtful examples from real-life situations, is therefore a welcome addition to the growing literature on the subject.
Lund, June 2003
8
For literature, see for example Louis B. Sohn, ‘The Concept of Autonomy in International Law and the Practice of the United Nations’, 15 Israel Law Review 1980, pp. 180–190; and Markku Suksi (editor), Autonomy: Applications and Implications (Kluwer Law, The Hague International, 1998).
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PROLEGONEMON MORTEN KJÆRUM9: ‘THE ESSENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IS NOTHING BUT THE SAFEGUARD OF INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP AUTONOMY AGAINST THE ARBITRARY USE OF STATE POWER . . .’. The editor of this volume, Zelim Skurbaty, approached me to write a preface. Initially I had two reservations about doing it. First, I held an introductory speech at the opening of the joint UN Working Group on Minorities – the Danish Center for Human Rights10 conference, the offshoot of which is this book, and I felt somewhat awkward to quote myself to the audience, which had heard it viva voce. Second, among the authors of this Prolegomenon, prominent figures such as Max van der Stoel, former OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities and Gudmundur Alfredsson, the director of the Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, have been featured − both are well-known specialists in the specific field of minority rights and autonomy. After some considerations, however, I decided to do some homework on autonomy and, by reworking my speech, to present something fitting to the present academic work. Thus, I hope these few notes will convey the feeling of importance that we at the Danish Institute for Human Rights attach to the issue of autonomy. This is both in terms of the research work conducted on issues related to this topic, and attending to practical aspects of autonomy, such as writing notes to the Government, teaching minority and indigenous rights, conducting seminars and workshops on the topic. By way of generalization, it can be said that autonomy is at the very heart of the human rights discourse, because the essence of human rights is nothing but the safeguard of individual and group autonomy against the arbitrary use of State power. When governments crack down on the rights of refugees and immigrants, close down the educational establishments of minorities, deny – either overtly or covertly – representation and power sharing at the local and federal levels, it is not only a refugee or a minority problem per se, but a problem closely related to autonomy in general, personal autonomy in particular. Supporting autonomy under such conditions amounts to the support of human rights of individuals and groups, and we should always keep in mind this vital linkage between the two. The Danish Center for Human Rights hosted the International Seminar on Autonomist and Integrationist Approaches to Minority Protection in April 2002. It was organized in cooperation with the United Nations Working Group on Minorities and brought together, under the roof of our Center, some leading professionals in the field of autonomy arrangements and minority rights, representing different schools of thought. They had a chance to discuss various aspects of the problems surrounding autonomy − an issue that makes headlines on a daily basis. There is a compelling reason behind the overwhelming interest of this issue by academics, politicians and media. Across the globe − from Spain and Denmark to Sri Lanka, 9
Cand. Jur. (University of Aarhus, 1984). Director of The Danish Institute for Human Rights since 1991. Member of UN Committee on The Elimination of Racial Discrimination. 10 From 1 January 2003 The Danish Centre for Human Rights has been renamed The Danish Institute for Human Rights.
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PROLEGOMENON Northern Ireland to Northern Iraq, Chechnya to Bosnia − minority groups are asserting their distinctive ethnic, religious, or national identity and demanding greater control over the expression of that identity, not only in cultural and social matters but in political and economic areas as well. Here are some snapshots that caught my eye during a casual perusal of recent press: ‘The European Court of Human Rights talks of a “democratic restructuring” without destroying the territorial integrity of Turkey with respect to Kurdish population’; “How will the Faeroes plan of a referendum on independence from Denmark fare in 2014?’; ‘Establishing Nunavut but refusing Quebec secession in Canada?’; ‘France has set in motion a process that can accord Corsica limited autonomous powers’; ‘Palestinian Autonomy or Palestinian State: That’s the Question’, etc., etc. While much of that assertion is based on the right to self-determination of peoples, what is less heard and often neglected is a plea for accommodation and self-restraint. The reason for this is that such pleas for self-restraint come typically from governments trying to support their embattled status and aiming – often - to repress dissent. This one-sided commentary to the autonomy issue is rarely productive, because disdain for give-and-take and accommodation can spawn intergroup antagonism and lead to inter-group strife and even bloodshed. This could be one of the reasons why international law, while according a right to selfdetermination to people, does not promulgate any express right to autonomy within States. Even the word ‘minority’ in legal texts is supplanted by a non-committal term, ‘persons belonging to minorities’, with an apparent implication that States owe a much weaker obligation towards them, namely – the right to enjoy their culture in community with other members of the group. Seen from the big picture of the world politics of the last century, the concept of autonomy harbours a two-pronged hazard. On the one hand, those minorities that show no flexibility and insist upon seceding from the States within which they find themselves, almost always fail in their ambitions, unable either to overcome the opposition of the State or to sustain themselves as an independent entity. On the other hand, those States that dismiss the notion of compromise must usually reckon with prolonged and violent opposition from the disaffected minority. And it is the concept of autonomy that can go beyond the erroneous equation of the right to selfdetermination and the right of secession and serve to promote the process of accommodation between States and minority groups. Autonomy, from this perspective, is a mode – and a creative mode at that − of integration, which should be distinguished from assimilation. While assimilation is aiming, one way or another, at elimination of identity and cultural distinctiveness, integration involves recognition of the identity and culture of the minority communities as well as their effective participation in all aspects of the political, economic and cultural structures of the country in which they live. This is the reason why the International Seminar on Autonomist and Integrationist Approaches to Minority Protection, which our Center hosted, dealt with the questions of the interplay between these two notions, emphasizing flexible, integrationist solutions to State-sub-State modus vivendi. Autonomy should be xxv
PROLEGONEMON considered as a tool, and like any tool, it must be used in accordance with the special circumstances of each case. Autonomy cannot create the wish for compromise between States and minority groups, but if the parties are earnestly looking for one, autonomy can provide a viable framework for flexible and creative solutions to virtually any problem arising from attempts to achieve homogeneity by imposing assimilation. In essence, and this notion is repeatedly stressed in the introduction to the present volume, autonomy is nothing but ongoing and sustained efforts of the State or international community to accommodate heterogeneity by the diffusion of powers. By virtue of history and the fact that Denmark has two home-rule regimes, one in Greenland and one in Faeroe Islands, we are all too aware of the importance of accommodation of diversity, of compromise, of showing restraint in the wellfounded hope that the other side – whichever that might be − will also reciprocate in the same spirit. In our dealings with the local governments in Greenland and the Faeroe Islands we should proceed from the flexible notion of ‘autonomy’ whose details must be ironed out in the negotiating process; and as Isi Foighel underlines in his article on Greenland Home Rule, more emphasis could focus on better accommodation and integration of the home rule regime into the overall State framework, on the optimization and streamlining of the processes of the diffusion of powers and allocation of competences between the central and local authorities. The articles that constitute the present volume, deal with a rich assortment of issues undergirding the concept of autonomy: from economic sustainability of autonomy arrangements to conceptual and philosophical aspects of autonomy, to autonomy as a participatory right, to autonomy and conflict resolution, to autonomy in the countries in transition, to legal safeguards of autonomy, etc., etc. The geographical span of the countries and groups under academic scrutiny is also impressive, stretching from India to Canada, Europe to Africa, Asia and America. The reader will surely be impressed by the scope and ambition of this publication, and also – will get new insights and perspectives that will enable him or her to turn ‘autonomy’ into a tool and concept that will be part of the solution, not part of the problem, to ethnically-based conflicts − the root of the political malaise of the 21 century.
Copenhagen, June 2003
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ABBREVIATIONS A/ A/C.3/ ADB Add. A.J.I.L. ANC ASSR CAHMIN CAP CBC CCPR CEFTA CERD CHT CCI CIS CLP CoE CSCE DCHR DR E/. . . E/CN.4/. . . E/CN.4/AC.1/ E/CN.4/AC.2/. E/CN.4/Sub.2/. . EC ECHR ECOSOC ECOSOCOR EJIL FCNM
Document of the General Assembly of the United Nations Document of the Third (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) Committee of the General Assembly Asian Development Bank Addendum American Journal of International Law African National Congress Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic Committee for the Protection of National Minorities Common Agricultural Policy Cross-Border Cooperation International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Central European Free Trade Area International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination Chittagen Regulation Act Council of Common Interests Commonwealth of Independent States Current Legal Problems Council of Europe Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Danish Centre for Human Rights (Now: DIHR Danish Institute for Human Rights) Decisions and Reports of the European Commission on Human Rights Document of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations Document of the Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations Document of the Drafting Committee on the International Bill of Human Rights Document of the Working Group on the Declaration of Human Rights Document of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities European Community European Convention on Human Rights Economic and Social Council of the United Nations UN Economic and Social Council Official Records European Journal of International Law Framework Convention for the protection of National Minorities xxvii
ABBREVIATIONS EOKA E.T.S. FTA G. A. G. A. Res. G.A.O.R. GDR HM HRC HCNM HRLJ IACHR ICC ICCPR ICERD ICESCR ICJ I.C.J. Rep. ICLQ ICTY ILC ILM. ILO I.L.R. IMF INTERREG L. L.Q.R. L.N.Off. J. L.N.T.S. MLR MNRGT MRG NFC NIHRC NQHR OAS OAU OED OPEC xxviii
Ethniki Organosis Kipriakov Agonos (in Greek) European Treaty Series Free Trade Agreements General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly Resolution (UN) General Assembly Official Records German Democratic Republic Helsinki Monitor Human Rights Committee OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Human Rights Law Journal Inter-American Commission for Human Rights International Criminal Court International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights International Court of Justice International Court of Justice, Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders International and Comparative Law Quarterly International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia International Law Commission International Legal Materials International Labour Organization International Law Reports International Monetary Fund Cross-border program for enterprise cooperation in the ‘Alpenrhein-Bodensee-Hochrein’-area. Limited distribution Law Quarterly Review League of Nations Official Journal League of Nations Treaty Series Modern Law Review Martens Nouveau Recueil Général de Traités Minority Rights Group National Finance Commission Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights Organization of American States Organization of African Unity Oxford English Dictionary (Vol. NN 1−20) Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
ABBREVIATIONS O.R. OSCE P.C.I.J. P.C.I.J. Rep. Procs. A.S.I.L. PFM PCIJ PMR Rev ICJ Res. Rev. RDH RPF SAARC S.C.O.R. S.C. Res. SR. SSR TNC TRANSCEND UDHR U. N. UNAMIR UNCIO Doc. UNESCO UN G. A. U.N.T.S. VAT WGIP WGM WTO Yale L.J. YBECHR YBILC YBUN
Official Records Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Permanent Court of International Justice Permanent Court of International Justice Proceedings of the American Society of International Law Popular Front of Molova Permanent Court of International Justice Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic (in Rus.: “Pridneprovskay Moldavskaya Respublika”) The Review of the International Commission of Jurists Resolution Revision Revue des Droits de l’Homme Rwandan Patriotic Front South Asia Association for Regional Coorporation (UN) Security Council Official Records (UN) Security Council Resolution Summary Records Soviet Socialist Republic Transnational Corporations A Network for Peace and Development United Declarations for Human Rights United Nations Organization United Nation Assistance Mission in Rwanda Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization United Nations General Assembly United Nations Treaty Series Value Added Tax UN Working Group on Indigenous Peoples Working Group on Minorities World Trade Organisation Yale Law Journal Year Book of the European Convention on Human Rights Year Book of the International Law Commission Year Book of the United Nations
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INTRODUCTION ‘The life of every society contains an unending contest between the forces of stability and change. To change too little may lead to stagnation and death; to change too much may lead to disaster and collapse. Yet the thrust of revolution is upon our generation. Some of the thrust must be resisted if we are to live according to the lights history has given us. Yet we must know that even then we must have to accept and make possible great changes in our society. The law is utterly caught up in the immense crisis of our generation. Upon those who practice the law rests a great share of the delicate responsibility of deciding what must be preserved and what must be changed, what we shall protect and what we shall abandon.’ 1
James Hopkins
‘When autonomy is respected, the two-year-old does not carry this unfinished task into later stages of growth. In adolescence, the youngster will again concentrate on independence, but he won’t have to blast the roof off the second time around if it is already well established.’ 2
Dorothy Corkville Briggs
This book is an outgrowth of the presentations and discussions of an International Seminar on Autonomist and Integrationist Approaches to Minority Protection, held at the Danish Centre for Human Rights in Copenhagen on 3−4 April 2002 in accordance with the conclusions of the 7th Session of the United Nations Working Group on Minorities (UN WGM). The event has proved to be such a success that the recommendations of the Seminar have been put on the Agenda of the 8th Session of the UN WGM (May 2002) and, moreover, a multitude of minority NGOs, Government and academia representatives have motioned a proposal to publish the proceedings of the Seminar in order to make available its findings to a broad audience. The proposal had a snowballing effect as even authors who had not participated in the Seminar expressed their desire to contribute to the publishing project. While we respectfully declined the majority of these off-schedule contributions, some of them proved to be not only interesting, but also fit perfectly with the concept of the project. We have also found the process of considering, for publication, the contributions of people (like NGO activists or local government representatives) who, although having intimate knowledge of the problems surrounding autonomy, did not belong to the category designated by stylistic convention as ‘academics’. 1
See Hopkins, James D., (Assoc. Justice, App. Div. 2d Dept.), ‘Precedent and Change: What Are the Reasons?’ NYLJ, 12-1-64, 4:3. 2 Dorothy Corkville Briggs (20th century), U.S. parent educator. Your Child’s Self-Esteem, ch. 15 (1975).
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ZELIM A. SKURBATY There are two distinctive features, which – taken together – set this volume apart from recent analogous publications and add to its value-added benefit for both laymen and professionals. The first of them is its multidisciplinary character, seen from the fact that the authors, attacking the autonomy problematique, are coming from such diverse fields as law, economy, philosophy, political science, peace studies, etc. This pronounced multidisciplinary character of the book, being one of its strengths, could also be a source of confusion of such terms as ‘autonomy’, ‘people’, ‘minorities’, ‘self-determination’, etc. Although every author gives a particular twist to those terms, their basic meanings will readily be understood by an attentive reader: the seeming ‘semantic jungle’ is nothing but the phenomenon of semantic indeterminacy endemic to international human rights.3 The encouraging fact is that apart from academic connotations, these terms have ‘common sense’ or ‘reality-based’ under- and overtones − so much so that both professionals and laymen will easily separate the ‘chaff from wheat’ and see through them.4 Thus, instead of viewing the assemblage of authors coming from radically differing perspectives and using the basic operative terms idiosyncratically, as a semantic Babel of sorts, we decided to consider the very fact a challenge, which, if properly met, could enrich measurably the autonomy discourse. Another distinguishing feature of the present volume is its comparative thrust, whereby parallels and distinctions are constantly drawn between different autonomous arrangements in order to single out the patterns that prove to be effective in the crucible of the real-life situations. Although the authors are usually very cautious in suggesting any mechanical transference of one particular autonomy model to situations radically differing from those that gave rise to it, they always express hope that some elements of such models can still be used with due regard to the local conditions. Convinced that autonomy has the potential to bring peaceful resolution of ethnic conflicts, the authors examine a considerable number of case studies, illustrating many relevant situations in which autonomy might be contemplated: from a minimum of competence to a great number of powers just short of full independence. These case studies show that minority groups seeking greater 3
Cf. Koskenniemmi’s notion of ‘semantic indeterminacy’, to the effect that: ‘The openness of legal language causes contradiction in argument. One man’s ‘aggression’ is another’s ‘selfdefense’. It is pointed out that although most countries use the available legal vocabulary, the meanings they attach to central expressions such as ‘equality’, ‘humane treatment’ or even ‘state’ vary to a great extent. It has even been argued that the sense of words such as ‘law’ and ‘state’ in European, African, Arabic, Chinese and Indian cultures differs to the extent that even the possibility of mutual understanding seems excluded.’ See Koskenniemi, M., From Apology to Utopia. The Structure of International Legal Argument (Helsinki: Lakimuesliiton Kustannus, 1989), p. 43 4 Cf. the now famous statement of Max van der Stoel, the then High Commissioner for National Minoroties: ‘I know a minority when I see one.’ see Max van der Stoel, Keynote Address to the OSCE Human Dimension Seminar on Case Studies on National Minority Issues: Positive Results (24 May 1993).
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INTRODUCTION political identification, should also be realistic in acknowledging their limitations, and that only under this condition can they achieve concrete gains: by exercising control over their own affairs in some areas while remaining subject to the authority of the state in other areas. Consequently, from the perspective of the international community the granting of autonomy should be conceived of as the most workable and peaceable solution to the disgruntled minorities whose aspirations for cultural or ethnic respect and even self-government cannot be silenced or satisfied within the existing system of governance. By providing ample theoretical and practical backup to this thesis, the present compendium could be of immense service to international stability and respect for law. Thus, the authors of the present book share the common belief that autonomy, if properly understood and applied, holds considerable potential for ensuring an effective and harmonious co-existence of diverse groups within the modern state. Autonomy, from this perspective, can be considered as a common denominator of all success stories of peaceful coexistence in societies that are ethnically, culturally and linguistically complex, a ‘great leveler’ of sorts for all seemingly unreconcilable intra- and inter-group interests. To illustrate this overriding point, the authors spell out a host of outstanding issues to be considered when establishing autonomous regimes and identify those dynamics that may increase the chances for their success. And because the authors are both ‘philosophical’ and ‘down to earth’ in terms of their knowledge of the realities on the ground, their recommendations are likely to prove invaluable in stimulating the inventiveness of negotiators on ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ sides of the table, let alone the policymakers from interested third parties. This ability of the authors of the present volume to address the concerns of academics and analysts in the field of human rights on the one hand, and policymakers and practitioners on the other, is very much in keeping with the Scandinavian human rights institutions’ interest in bridging the gap between the policymaking and scholarly communities, between theoretical constructs about autonomy and human rights and practical solutions designed to harmonize the – often − complicated relations between minorities and majorities, state and sub-state entities. In the introduction that follows, I will start with a short overview of the concept of autonomy in modern political and international legal discourse (Part I) and conclude with the brief overview of the contributions submitted to this book (Part II). I. IS THERE AN EMERGING RIGHT TO AUTONOMY? 1.1. The Meaning of Autonomy The World is Diverse. This is a profound truth comparable only to the first of the ‘Four Noble Truths’ of Buddha, which states: ‘Life is Suffering’.5 It is profound 5
or ‘Difficult’ depending on the interpretation of the meaning of the word.
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ZELIM A. SKURBATY because if we truly accept it, we will stop fighting the diversity of peoples inhabiting the world and start, instead, thinking about the ways and means of accommodating this diversity.6 Autonomy from this perspective is both a manifestation, and an instrument for the accommodation of diversity. The contributions to this book bear testimony to the fact that the imposition of assimilation – in whatever form – does not produce harmonious homogeneity, and that the solutions to the inter-group conundrums should be sought in the accommodation of heterogeneity by politics of comprehensive inclusion of the disenfranchised groups and a diffusion of powers – all of which could be summed up by the notion of autonomy. Autonomy from this perspective is antithetical to assimilation which involves the elimination of separate identities7 constituting diversity, and congenial to integration which presupposes the recognition of distinctive identities and cultures and participation of the members of distinctive groups in political, economic and cultural structures of the state. To be autonomous is to be a law to oneself; autonomous entities are selfgoverning entities. Such entities want to be autonomous because they want to be responsible and accountable for what they do, and because it seems that if they are not the ones calling the shots, then they cannot be either responsible or accountable. More specifically, when people constituting a certain group declare that they have the right to live autonomously, what they say is that they ought to be allowed to govern themselves. In making this claim, they are, in essence, rejecting the political and legal authority over a circumscribed or ‘autonomous’ domain, emanating from the sources outside their group. What is at stake here is the legitimacy of any power 6
Cf. ‘The belief that every State is a nation, or that all sovereign States are national States, has done much to obfuscate human understanding of political realities. A State is a legal and political organization, with the power to require obedience and loyalty from its citizens. A nation is a community of people, whose members are bounded together in a sense of solidarity, common culture, a national consciousness. Yet in the common usage of English and other modern languages these two distinct relationships are frequently confused.’ See Seton-Watson, Nations and States: an Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism, 1977, at p.1. The sentiment is echoed by Kymlicka who notes that: ‘[the] implication is that the State should not be conceived as a monolithic unity but as an agency for recognizing groups, determining what legal status and rights they shall have, supervising and co-ordinating their interrelationships, and itself conducting certain kinds of functions in which all have a common interest.’− see Kymlicka, W., The Rights of Minority Cultures (Oxford: OUP, 1995), p.52. 7 This voluntaristic or fiat approach to group diversity is well illustrated by the Bolshevik nationalist policy during the heyday of Stalinism. In 1936 Stalin ‘determined’, that ‘The Soviet Union comprises . . . about 60 nations, national groups and nationalities’(see Stalin, Sochinenija, T. 5. p.113), although it was a well-known fact, that according to the population census of 1926, there existed minimum 185 (!) nationalities (see Vsesojuznaja perepis' naselenija 1926 g. M., 1929, T.17, pp. 26-32). This hatred of diversity is understandable in the light of the programme, envisaged by Lenin and the Bolsheviks, according to which national minorities were only a crude material for the processes of ‘sblizhenie’ (‘coming together’) and eventual ‘sliyanie’ (‘merger’) until they would turn into a super- cosmopolitan society, where the 'proletarian solidarity' would take over the national sentiments.
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INTRODUCTION exercised by the outsiders over matters affecting the group’s identity, culture and welfare. Thus, in order to be autonomous, it is the group members, and they alone, who should have the authority to determine and enforce the rules and policies that govern their lives. By analogy, an individual claiming a certain sphere of her life to be autonomous, denies that anyone else has the authority to control her activities within this sphere; and here too, the essence of her claim is that any exercise of power over these activities is illegitimate unless she authorizes it herself. These considerations allow us to immediately put forward a thesis according to which the meaning of ‘autonomy’ is either self-imposed by the state, or imposed by the international community upon a state, of specific legal obligations designed to accord a sub-state group (and individuals within that group) some degree of self-rule (or self-determination) and, thus, facilitate the preservation and promotion of those differentiating features on which that group places high premium. Additionally, because the mixed-up framework of the modern world carries the seeds of international conflicts, especially when states try to assert uniformity and assimilation by forcible means, the aim of autonomy can also be defined as a means of averting the brewing conflicts while mitigating the transnational effects of those in full swing. As is convincingly shown by the authors of the articles to this book, such a conflation of pragmatic and humanitarian considerations is a hallmark of the whole system of autonomous arrangements. 1.2. Approaches of the International Community Generally speaking, the approach of the international community to the state/substate groups’ modus vivendi can either be territorial or juridical.8 A territorial approach, which finds its international law equivalent in the groups’ claims to internal9 and external self-determination, can – potentially – ensue the revision of international and internal borders, the transfer of populations, the establishment of ‘new’ ethnic homogeneities within states as well as the proliferation of new sovereign states.10 There is no tried and tested alternatives to the territorial approach, 8 By ‘groups’ we mean problematic groups, i.e. those of them that claim, one way or another, autonomy rights. More specifically, and as is often the case, prominent political leaders usually voice claims on their behalf in terms of either internal (personal and territorial autonomy, 'minority rights', power-sharing schemes) or external self-determination (secession and creation of an independent State). 9 By sticking to more conventional understanding of internal self-determination, which is usually framed in terms of autonomous arrangements, I do not exclude the notion that internal forms of self-determination can also include the expansion of participatory rights or ‘more democracy’. 10 International legal rationalization of the self-determination options are captured in the following statement: ‘The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an independent State or the emergence into any political status freely determined by a people constitutes modes of implementing the right of selfdetermination by that people.’ See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
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ZELIM A. SKURBATY the best one being the one of a juridical character and embracing the international protection of human rights and the creation of special minority rights regimes. An important qualification to the juridical approach, which necessitates complex and sophisticated legal solutions to the minorities problem, is the proviso of the minimum level of democracy and the rule of law, without which the juridical measures (and territorial for that matter) can turn out to be nothing more than a smoke screen concealing ruthless oppression of ‘peoples’ and ‘minorities’. Autonomy, from this perspective, can be regarded as a mixtum compositum of territorial and juridical approaches, the ingredients of which should be specified on an ad hoc and context-dependent basis.11 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, ‘autonomy’ refers to several interrelated concepts, the closest of which to our present concern is ‘the right of selfgovernment, of making its own laws and administering its own affairs’.12 There are three types of autonomy regimes reflecting different levels of legal authorization, i.e. the interplay of the governmental and minority subsystems within the constitutional, statutory and customary laws of a given state. The first one is the outgrowth of the (mentioned immediately above) territorial approach, and refers to an autonomy regime with a specific territorial organization. Such organization presupposes the existence of a territorially concentrated minority population. The forms of self-government in territorial autonomy can vary considerably, but usually include the regionally based elective government with the powers to exercise control over the tax and regional education systems as well as the regulation of natural resources. The constitutional forms of territorial autonomy can again vary, from being either part of a federal system or forming a regional government with powers devolved from the central government. To illustrate the multiplicity of options and forms of the territorial regimes: the German constitution allows the subjects of the federation a limited treaty-making power (and the Russian Constitution in respect to Tatarstan) while limiting the nation’s military capacity (along with the constitution of Japan). Moreover, territorial autonomy could be the result of the voluntary union, technically called ‘associated status’, as in the case of the Cook Islands and New Zealand; ‘home-rule’ accommodation of the decolonization process, like in the case of Greenland; or a post World War I United Nations. G. A. Res. 2625 GAOR, 25 Sess., Supp. No. 28; at 121, UN Doc. A/8028 (1971), reprinted in 9 ILM 1292. (emphasis added). 11 Which should not lead to the wholesale exclusion of principle- or legal-centeredness of the apporach at the expense of case-by-case improvisations of international lawyers. 12 Autonomy – 1. Of a state, institution, etc.: The right of self-government, of making its own laws and administering its own affairs. (Sometimes limited by the adjs. local, administrative, when the self-government is only partial; thus English boroughs have a local autonomy, the former British colonies had an administrative autonomy; ‘political autonomy’ is national independence.) b. Liberty to follow one’s will, personal freedom. c. Metaph. Freedom (of the will); the Kantian doctrine of the Will giving itself its own law, apart from any object willed; opposed to heteronomy. 2. Biol. Autonomous condition: a. The condition of being controlled only by its own laws, and not subject to any higher one. b. Organic independence. 3. A selfgoverning community (cf. a monarchy).
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INTRODUCTION bilateral agreement, as in the case of the regional autonomy of the Italian (Austrian?) South Tyrol. The second type of autonomy is a personal autonomy regime with the hallmark feature of a personal law, existing parallel with the nation-wide secular law, and regulating such matters as marriage, divorce, inheritance, adoption, etc. Such a law may or may not be optional depending on the state. Personal autonomy does not require, by definition, any compact settlement of a religious or ethnic minority group, and the members of such a group can enjoy the rights enunciated in personal laws irrespective of the number or place of their settlement. The laws regulating the situation of Muslims and Christians in Israel, and Hindus and Muslims in India illustrate this type of autonomy. The third type is a power-sharing autonomy regime, which provides for a particular form of participation in the decision-making process of the government, especially in the matters touching upon the interests and well being of a specific group.13 A power-sharing regime resembles the personal one in that it does not require the group to be concentrated in one specific region. It can assume the forms of special quotas in the representation of the group in state and regional legislatures, or the procedural provisos, whereby the approval of the majority of the minority representation in the legislature is required in order for laws affecting the minority to be passed. 1.3. Is there the Right to Autonomy in International Law? Although the majority of autonomy definitions are phrased in the ‘rights’ language, there is no explicit right to autonomy in international law. Even in the travaux préparatoires of the UN Charter, the drafters were careful enough to distinguish between the status of trusteeship territories, referred to as ‘self-government’, meaning their autonomy within the terms of reference of the trusteeship arrangement, and their alleged right to self-determination and independent statehood.14 Only in a few documents, belonging to the ‘soft law’ category, can we find rather explicit, though very tentative, references to ‘autonomy’. The most prominent among them is the OSCE (former CSCE) Copenhagen Document of June 1990, in which autonomy is mentioned as a means to preserve and promote the identity of minorities: ‘The participating States note the efforts undertaken to protect and create conditions for the promotion of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of certain national minorities by establishing, as one of the possible means to achieve these aims, appropriate local or autonomous administrations corresponding to the specific historical and territorial
13
See the article of Yash Ghai on public participation of minorities with a good exposition of the major modalities of this form of autonomy. 14 UNCIO, Vol. 6, UN Information Organization New York 1945, p. 278.
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ZELIM A. SKURBATY circumstances of such minorities and in accordance with the policies of the State concerned.’15
In 1993, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe drafted a proposed Protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms on the rights of national minorities16, where Article 11 provided that: ‘In the regions where they are in a majority the persons belonging to a national minority shall have the right to have at their disposal appropriate local or autonomous authorities or to have a special status matching the specific historical and territorial situation and in accordance with the domestic legislation of the State.’
Although the provision is made contingent on specific limiting factors (specific historical and territorial situation, etc.), if it had been adopted it would have provided a justiciable right for minority groups to seek autonomous government before the Council of Europe organs of the ECHR. However, the Vienna Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe (October 1993) rejected the Assembly’s draft Protocol and called only for a protocol in the cultural field to guarantee rights to individual members of minorities.17 As can readily be seen, both paragraph 35 of the Copenhagen Document and Article 11 of Recommendation 1201 expressly refer to local or autonomous administrations or authorities, which are limited to the control of the group’s own affairs. These administrations, however, should have been geared to specific historical or territorial circumstances and provide, ideally, a local or autonomous authority over that territory – the fact exemplifying the concept of autonomy qua form of internal self-determination. These documents show also that autonomy is not a static, uniform concept, but can vary in content to meet the circumstances of the group. The right to autonomy qua the specific right to self-determination is featured in the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Article 31 of which provides that, ‘Indigenous peoples, as a specific form of exercising their right to selfdetermination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, including culture, religion, education, information, media, health, housing, employment, social welfare, economic activities, land and resources management, environment and entry 15
See CSCE, Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension in 11 HRLJ (1990), p. 232, para. 35. (emphasis added). 16 Recommendation 1201 (1993). 17 Recommendation 1255 (1995), para.3. The cultural protocol has also proved to be stillborn as the Parliamentary Assembly insisted on the need for a protocol to the ECHR motioned in 2001 – see Press Release, Council of Europe Press Service 24 January 2001.
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INTRODUCTION by non-members, as well as ways and means for financing these autonomous functions.’18
The 1992 United Nations General Assembly Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities19 mentions no autonomous self-government for minorities, but does provide20 minorities with participatory rights in Article 2.3: ‘Persons belonging to minorities have the right to participate effectively in decisions on the national and, where appropriate, regional level concerning the minority to which they belong or the regions in which they live, in a manner not incompatible with national legislation.’21
After the above-mentioned minority rights protocol to the ECHR was rejected22, the Council of Europe promulgated the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in 1995.23 It contains no provision on autonomous government. As a predominantly aspirational document, the Convention operates by imposing an obligation on States to implement the various provisions within their own constitutional and legal systems. Article 15 in particular provides that, ‘The Parties shall create the conditions necessary for the effective participation of persons belonging to national minorities in cultural, social and economic life and in public affairs, in particular those affecting them.’
In terms of the latest developments in the ‘juridical approach’ to autonomy,24 one could also mention the work of the Badinter Arbitration Committee, created by ‘the 18
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add.1 (1994), emphasis added. GA Res.47/135, Annex, 47 UNGAOR Supp.(No.49) at 210, UN Doc.A/47/49 (1993); and comments thereon, E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/1999/WP.1. 20 Speaking about ‘providing’ the right, we should mind, of course, that the 1992 Declaration is a soft law document by definition. 21 The territorial dimension of autonomy is mentioned only in the context of the preservation of the ‘territorial integrity’ of the State in the Article 8.4: ‘Nothing in the present Declaration may be construed as permitting any activity contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, including sovereign equality, territorial integrity and political independence of States.’ 22 See footnote 16, supra. 23 34 ILM 351 (1995). See also, Klebes, The Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 16 HRLJ 92 (1995). 24 See a comprehensive taxonomy of autonomous arrangements in the article of Yoram Dinstein ‘Autonomy’, where he distinguishes between autonomies by multilateral treaty, bilateral agreement, local legislation, local legislation based on both bilateral and multilateral treaties, by local legislation based on General Assembly Resolution, by local legislation based on bilateral treaty as well as a resolution of the Security Council, and by decree of the Security Council. Another, very interesting taxonomy of autonomies can be found in the article of Thomas W. Simon ‘Paradoxes of Autonomy: Tensions, Traps and Possibilities’, where the author classifies them as Legal (De Jure) Autonomy, Reciprocal Autonomy, 19
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ZELIM A. SKURBATY European Community and its Member States’ on 27 August 1991 in order to address (in the forms of ‘opinions or recommendations’) the clashing claims of the former Yugoslavian Republics to self-determination.25 Having started in Opinion 2 (out of 7 Opinions produced) with the statement that Article 1 of the two 1966 International Covenants on human rights establishes that the principle of the right to self-determination serves to safeguard the choice ‘to belong to whatever ethnic, religious or language community he or she wishes’.26 In keeping with this conclusion, the ‘opinion’ had gone on to say that the members of the Serbian population in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia could be ‘recognized under agreements between the Republics as having the nationality of their choice, with all the rights and obligations which entails with respect to the states concerned’.27 Thus – and this might well be considered as a ground-breaking aspect of the deliberations of the Committee – the previous implication of homogeneity within an englobing State in the notion of ‘peoples’ is expressly replaced with the wider concept of a State, housing various ethnic, religious and linguistic communities (groups), all of which can insist on the right to be recognized as an entity with an identity of its own choice. Opinion 2 of the Badinter Committee, however, begs some pragmaticallycoloured questions: if Serbians, as a case in point, are accorded Serbian nationality in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, and they still remain loyal citizens of these states, what is the difference between ‘nationality’ and ‘citizenship’ in the European context? The statement of A. Pellet vis-à-vis the implications of the Opinion 2 is rather characteristic: ‘The States are thus informed: these are “imperative norms” binding all subjects of international law, and, which could one day be applied to protect, for example, the rights of Gagauz or Chechens without entailing the break-up
Variegated Autonomy, Deliberative (De Facto) Autonomy and Humanitarian Autonomy, and gives recommendations to all stakeholders on the ways of optimization of every particular arrangement. One could probably give alternative sets of classifications (see for example an extremely interesting classification provided by Johan Galtung in his article ‘The Role of Autonomy in State/Nation Dialectic’), but the ones presented by Yoram Dinstein and Thomas Simon can serve as useful guides for orientation in the legal (and non-legal) maze surrounding autonomy arrangements. I do not repeat these classifications and I see my task in giving the bird’s eye view of the autonomy and delineating the major trends pointing to the possible ‘emergence’ of the ‘right to autonomy’. 25 See Pellet, A., The Opinion of the Badinter Arbitration Committee: a Second Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples, in: European Journal of International Law, Vol. 3, 1992, No. 1, p. 182. 26 ibid. 27 Op. cit., No. 1, p. 179.
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INTRODUCTION of Moldavia or Russia. One dare not even consider Corsicans or even Basques . . .’28
This sort of recognition of diversity – that within one State, various ethnic, religious or linguistic communities are entitled to their own nationality irrespective of the existence of state borders – might, perhaps, seem superfluous and far from opinio juris, but it opens new avenues of legal thinking, leading to juridical consolidation of the major distinction put forward in the Treaty on European Union signed in Maastricht, that is, between ‘nationality’ and ‘citizenship’. This line of thought represents the long-awaited nexus between autonomy and ‘peoples’ and ‘minorities’ rights. It also serves to secure such a human right as the right to belong to one’s homeland (which can be a kith and kin ethnic or religious unity bonding groups beyond or across national frontiers) irrespective of the formal citizenship and the right to vote in local elections there without prejudice to the integrity of the states involved. These projective loose entities – national-home regimes (patries, heimats) or ‘overlays’ over existing or future states – might or might not correspond to (sovereign) state boundaries and serve as the prototypes of new multi-purpose subjects of new international law. The realities on the ground, however, dictate more state-centric solutions to minority-based problems, especially in post-conflict situations. The precedent of Dayton Agreement of 1995 is exemplary in that it reasserted the sovereign status of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Article 1 of the General Framework Agreement for Peace, and at the same time, created two autonomous entities: the Muslim-Croatian federation (approximately 51 per cent of the territory, including the whole of Sarajevo) and the Serb Republic (Republika Srpska) with about 49 per cent. The agreement provided for the presence of 60,000 NATO troops (including 20,000 from the United States) for one year to supervise the implementation of the agreement. NATO, whose forces were deployed immediately after the signing of the Dayton agreements on 14 December, took over officially from the UN in Bosnia on 20 December. The Constitution of Bosnia Herzegovina, set out in Annex 4 of the Agreement, reiterated the standard commitments to the Charter of the United Nations and to a variety of human rights instruments and provided, specifically, in Article I.3 that this sovereign Republic shall consist of the two Autonomous Entities. The Dayton Agreement has demonstrated that solutions to minority-based problems in modern times can require the intervention of the international community (even in the form of a transitional de-facto protectorate regime) and the imposition of autonomous regimes. The same can be said about the non-starter Rambouillet Accord and the final Kosovo peace 28
Ibid., p. 179. One could only add that before ‘daring’ to protect Corsicans or Basques qua minority groups they have to be recognized as such by a State, which in case of France could have been problematic, as the statement of its representative before the Human Rights Committee clearly shows: ‘France cannot recognize the existence of ethnic groups, whether minorities or not’, and as a logical consequence: ‘Article 27 is not applicable so far as the Republic is concerned’, see: UN Doc.. E/CN.4/Sub. 2/384/Rev.1 (1979), para. 67.
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ZELIM A. SKURBATY agreement in line with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244: both were predicated on the principle of territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the creation of the autonomy within the federation as a means of guaranteeing the rights of the Kosovar Albanians. 1.4. The Pros and Cons of Autonomy29 Nature abhors a straight line: if we find one, a human made it. Nowhere this is truer than in the discourse on autonomy: the forms it acquires are numerous, and the ambivalence towards it is rampant among both politicians and lawyers. This ambivalence is easily explainable if we take into account the role ‘autonomy’ plays in the age-old debate about relative values of change and stability, individual and group rights, the ‘primordial’ diversity of groups and homogenization accompanying modern development and technology, the inclusive ideals of human rights, openness to inquiry and challenge and fossilization of static (and statist for that matter) traditions. Depending on the political and legal vectors of the moment, autonomy can promote constructive change, can avert brewing inter-group conflicts and preserve diversity, but also – can dramatize grotesquely groups’ particular characteristics, foment intergroup dissent and can be used as a guardian of narrowly-understood ‘stability’.30 The pros and cons of the hypothetical right of indigenous peoples to extended forms of autonomy and even external self-determination graphically illustrate the overall complexity of the problem: Pros: • • • •
29
the indigenous peoples have their own clear-cut identity: cultural, linguistic, religious, etc.; they have lived on their territories since time immemorial; they have established their own political institutions, most effectively geared to their traditional way of life; they exercise both internal and external control over their respective populations and territories until a very distinct, historical watershed
I deliberately omit certain lines of argumentation in order to avoid an overlap with some of the authors of the present book. See e.g. the programmatic article by Hurst Hannum in Part II of the book, where many of the issues I raise are put to detailed scrutiny. Of special interest is the exposition of the ‘pros’- and ‘cons’ of autonomy and delineation of the ‘proper’ role autonomy. 30 Cf. the statement of Henry Steiner: ‘To the extent that autonomy regimes protect historical differences but inhibit the creation, as it were, of fresh differences, they would convert the human rights movement’ framework of protection of open inquiry and advocacy into the protection of static traditions. A state composed of segregated autonomy regimes would resemble more a museum of social and cultural antiquities than any human rights ideal’, see H. Steiner, 66 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1539 (1991), at 1547.
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INTRODUCTION
•
of the external enforcement of an indigenous group into colonial dependency occurred; indigenous peoples were formally recognized as equals when they entered into treaties of peace and friendship, which were of an international character and – as a rule – were broken by the colonizing powers unilaterally, without indigenous consent;
Cons: • •
• •
the notions of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘territorial integrity’ are the foundations of international law and cannot be removed without fatally damaging the whole construction; presumably, there would be no limit to fragmentation if every ethnic, religious or linguistic group claimed the right of selfdetermination in the form of secession and the creation of a separate state;31 the prospect of achieving peace and stability in the atomized world of thousands of sovereign states and autonomy regimes seems even more bleak.32 Notwithstanding the semantic and juridical subtleties involved in these kinds of exercises, we should always keep in mind the importance of the will to interpret the notion and pragmatic content of autonomy in one way or another.33
To sum up these introductory notes on autonomy: 1. The meaning of autonomy is either self-imposed by the state, or an imposition by the international community upon a state, of specific legal obligations designed to accord a sub-state group some degree of self-rule and, thus, to facilitate the preservation and promotion of those differentiating features on which that group places high premium. Autonomy can also be regarded as a means to avert or mitigate inter-group conflicts. 2. There are three major forms of autonomous regimes: territorial, personal and power-sharing. 3. There is no explicit right to autonomy in international law, and any concrete autonomous regime stems, as a rule, from the negotiation between the central 31 For the most vivid enunciation of the threat perceived, see the report of the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, – UN Doc. A/47/277 – S/24111, 17 June 1992, para 17. 32 See, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/37, para. 157. 33 The will or intention behind a particular interpretation of autonomy can be likened to the role of an observer in the uncertainty principle in quantum mechanics (or theory). The principle (called often Heisenberg uncertainty principle) stipulates that increasing the accuracy of measurement of one observable quantity increases the uncertainty with which another conjugate quantity may be known. Which might mean – analogously − that the way we observe or interpret the phenomenon of autonomy affects its very nature, its mode of existence, and ultimately − the mode of its manifestation or implementation.
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ZELIM A. SKURBATY government and the minority group, while the resulting accommodation is ratified in law. 4. There can be both advantages and disadvantages emanating from the imposition of an autonomous regime depending on various political and legal variables. Of special concern to the international community is the prospect of conservation of historical differences of the group and inhibition of the creation of new differentiating features, reflecting the processes of change in modern societies. 5. Given that rigorous standards of free and voluntary choice are met, and the concept of equal protection/non-discrimination is taken into account by all the stakeholders during negotiations leading to an autonomy arrangement, the advantages of autonomy clearly outweigh the disadvantages. Autonomy can effectively be used as a means to preserve and promote the identities of the groups, to foster economic development and to either prevent or mitigate the state-group or inter-group conflicts. 6. Taking account of the fact that there are some 6,000 to 9,000 internationally unrecognized but culturally persistent peoples or nations, and the mixed-up framework of the majority of modern states, the creation of autonomous regimes should be considered as a viable alternative to the ‘atomization’ of the international community into thousands of sovereign states.34 In fact, we are entering − at the dawn of the 21st century − the Age of Autonomy, the hallmark of which is the growing demand of the multitudes of sub-state groups for more inclusion and more self-rule – all of which can, eventually, result in the emerging right to autonomy. The articles composing this book present ample evidence that this is no longer an idle speculation, but a clear trend in modern political and legal discourse. II. AN INTRODUCTORY OVERVIEW OF THE CONTRIBUTIONS As the articles in this book are no more uniform in form and conceptualization than the actual phenomenon of autonomy on the ground, the need to reflect this diversity was more than obvious. The contributions are thus categorized under the following rubrics: General Issues: Cross-Disciplinary Appraisal of Autonomy; Theoretical Justifications; Cross-Border Cooperation, International Monitoring and Implementation; and National and Comparative Case Studies. These sections form also the four constitutive parts of the book (Parts I−IV), each of which is, in turn, 34
Subsumed in some studies under the categorical term of Fourth World nations, see for example a very interesting work by Griggs, A. R., The Role of Fourth World Nations and Synchronous Geopolitical Factors in the Breakdown of States (Berkeley: University of California at Berkeley, 1993). (Doctoral Dissertation), see also: ‘Economic Development by Invasion of Indigenous Nations’, Cultural Survival Quarterly 10(2): 2-11, 1986; ‘Central America Becomes Central Nations Reemerging Under Fire’, Fourth World Journal 1(4):227256, 1986; Nietschmann, Bernard; ‘The Third World War’, Cultural Survival Quarterly 11 (3): 1-16, 1987; and ‘The Miskito Nation and the Geopolitics of Self-Determination’, Journal of Political Science 19: 1840.’ We should, of course, regard these ‘peoples’ or ‘nations’ as territorial ethnic or cultural groups stripped of any legal connotations.
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INTRODUCTION subdivided into thematic sub-sections for easier reference. Although these subsections sometimes overlap, we have found them useful for better orientation in the wealth of diverse material compiled in this volume. 2.1. Part I General Issues: Cross-Disciplinary Appraisal of Autonomy The contributions in Part I focus on general issues and emphasize the importance of a degree of flexibility and inventiveness in defining and applying concepts in the area of autonomy. Needless to say, these articles overlap various disciplines and are eclectic so far as the methodologies applied are concerned. 2.1.1. Autonomy as a Participatory Right in the Modern Democratic State The first two articles of Part I reflect conceptualizations of the two major approaches of international community toward inter-group accommodation mentioned above: juridical and territorial. The article by Yash Ghai, Public Participation, Autonomy and Minorities, represents the power-sharing facet of the juridical approach to autonomy. The author shows, on the one hand, the high price society pays when minorities and indigenous peoples are excluded from political, social and economic decisions that have major repercussions on their lives, and on the other – a wide range of approaches that can offer possibilities for enhancing the level of participation of the disenfranchised groups. He does it through a theoretical analysis of major schools of thought on the topic (such as consociationalism and integrationist approaches, which should be distinguished from the assimilationist one) and a legal analysis of major instruments on participation of minority groups (like the 1992 UN Declaration on Minorities, the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, as well as the 1998, Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life, published by the OSCE’s High Commissioner for National Minorities in 1999). The author comes up with an assortment of principles that can widen the scope of the autonomy for minorities in the wider societies. Specifically, he singles out such factors as a) citizenship as the key to political participation; b) regional bodies that should work together to develop regional systems and provide for minority and indigenous participation in response to local realities; c) electoral laws promoting inclusion in the political process; d) special legislative procedures for situations where law-making has a major bearing on minority and indigenous communities. Overall, the author emphasizes the key role of participatory rights qua power sharing which can take the form of a specific autonomous arrangement − if desired and appropriate − in the modern democratic state. Equally important, according to the author, are adequate provision for the rights of minorities-within-minorities, such as women and other vulnerable groups.
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ZELIM A. SKURBATY 2.1.2. Legal Appraisal of Autonomy The second article by Hans-Joachim Heintze, Territorial Autonomy and International Stability: On Pros and Cons from the Viewpoint of International Law presents the advantages both for minorities and for the international community of a flexible concept of autonomy in the absence of any clear legal definition. This was evidenced by the fact that only one out of forty-four OSCE participating states had opposed the adoption of the Lund Recommendations. The author rightly notes that autonomy has more often than not been considered as a conflict-resolution device, as a means to ease tensions resulting from heterogeneity, which clearly has the advantage of according the same level of protection to both minorities and majorities. There is, however, a tendency to link territorial autonomy, which accompanies a number of regional autonomous arrangements, to ethnicity, which can, in turn, evoke the notions of ethnic mobilization and secessionism. Such an association can hinder interethnic cooperation, and the solution, according to the author, is a comprehensive set of regulations for any particular instance of selfgovernment, which should be effected in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity and the provision of full-scale political and socio-economic rights for all citizens. Perhaps, no other problem is so controversial in the international human rights discourse as the problem of the relative importance of the individual and collective dimensions. This problem is quite prominent in the autonomy discourse – the reason I35 put it under the magnifying glass of analysis in the article: Collective & Individual set Back to Back: Autonomy and the Interplay of Individual and Collective Dimensions in Article 27 of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. I made an attempt to give a detailed analysis of the travaux préparatoires of the Article 27 of the UN ICCPR and came to the conclusion that states deliberately wished to adopt rules and procedures that would maximize the chances of survival of the political status-quo. Moreover, it was shown that the assumption that if individual rights were honoured, ‘minorities’ would have no legitimate or defensible claims to further, has been proved wrong. However, the debate over the content and context of Article 27 has paved the way for the realization that the state-minority stand-off, at a fundamental level, can be resolved only in the form of an effective international legal arrangement which takes into account the collective – along with the individual − dimensions of a minority. The alleged form of such an arrangement could, ideally, be a legally recognized right to autonomy. As the questions related to the economic sustainability of the autonomous arrangements, including centre-autonomy fiscal modus operandi, are important determinants in the viability of autonomies, and have acquired – due to rapid decentralization tendencies – special significance during past few years, the next three articles of the Part I are devoted to these issues.
35
i.e. Zelim A. Skurbaty, the editor of this book.
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INTRODUCTION 2.1.3. Problems Related to the Economic Viability of Autonomous Arrangements In the article Centralism and Fiscal Federalism, Gisela Färber differentiates between a ‘centralist’ state where the central government decides about all public goods and has to guarantee their effective and equal provision across the whole territory, and a federal state where the legislative responsibility is divided among the governmental tiers and each jurisdiction decides the structure and the volume of ‘its’ public goods. The author tries to fashion answers to questions underlining ‘financial constitutions’: tax autonomy, competition for a better allocation of resources and full employment, future functions of fiscal equalisation and its construction, horizontal elements of redistribution, etc. Of crucial importance to autonomies, as the author rightly notes, is the mode of handling the fiscal revenue collected on a territory: whether it is left to that territory to be directly managed by local authorities or if it is first ‘centralised’ or brought to the centre and only afterwards redistributed or invested locally. This question comes out time and again as an apple of discord in the tug-of-war between autonomies and central authorities, and the article reviews the possible solutions to this problem – solutions lying on the continuum between centralism and fiscal federalism. Antonio M. Chiesi explores, in the article Social Structure, Social Capital And Institutional Agreement: The Trentino-Alto Adige Model, the role of ‘social capital’ in the development of Trentino-South Tyrol and the management of political and administrative autonomy. Since the very concept of ‘social capital’ is imbued with different under and overtones, resulting from the various meanings invested into it by different scholars, the author is careful to present a brief summary of the theoretical debate on its semantic boundaries and its relations with other kinds of ‘capital’. He attributes the relative success of the Trentino-South Tyrol autonomous arrangement to two important historical factors: the specific social structure that progressively reduced economic inequalities between the centre and periphery during the post war period through the institution of a welfare system at local level, and – the crux of his argumentation – the role played by social capital (community rules and culture, networks of interpersonal relations in private and economic spheres, etc.) in granting an overall trust at the macro level and co-operation incentives at the micro level. The author has succeeded in the demonstration of the transferability of his findings by showing how the application of the concept of social capital vis-à-vis Trentino-South Tyrol region, could also be profitably used for the projective analysis of the Balkan area. The last chapter of the Part I contains the article by Milford Bateman, Local Economic and Community Development as an Aspect of the Reconstruction of South-East Europe: Bringing the Local State Back In, in which the author describes a ‘local developmental state’ model, based on the potential role of regional, local and village government administrations in economic development. The author argues that the transposition of the neo-liberal approach to Central and Eastern Europe was the reason the processes of social and economic reconstruction in the Yugoslav successor states were ineffective. Inability to apply this approach mutatis xlvii
ZELIM A. SKURBATY mudantis to actual circumstances, has resulted, according to the author, in the enforced inactivity of one of the key institutional vehicles for the desired change – the local state. Specifically, the post-war reconstruction period in the area had seen the decline of many local and rural communities because of the absence of vigorous local institutional structures capable of orchestrating and promoting sustainable community policies. Instead of viewing themselves as subjects and beneficiaries of the structural changes, these communities regarded themselves as casualties of the transition period. The author comes up with specific suggestions having the potential to optimize the economic performance of the Yugoslav successor states, like local policy interventions, institution and capacity building as well as the effective allocation of financial resources for small enterprise development. 2.2. Part II Theoretical Justifications 2.2.1. Conceptual Issues Pertaining to Autonomy Part II begins with three chapters clarifying some conceptual issues pertaining to autonomy. As Hurst Hannum argues in his programmatic article, Territorial Autonomy: Permanent Solution or Step toward Secession?, autonomy may be a useful tool with which to resolve disputes involving minority rights or self-determination, but it should not be seen as a magic bullet that can resolve all conflicts, prevent violence, or guarantee political and economic development. In much the same way as it was shown in the introduction to this volume, the author argues that there are pros and cons to ‘autonomy’. Such ‘pros’ include the flexibility inherent in the concept, its compatibility with territorial integrity, and its value as a means of devolving power to smaller political entities. The ‘cons’ are exemplified by an inherent vagueness that may make meaningful dialogue about the real issues at stake in a conflict more difficult, a tendency to reinforce artificially the norm of territorial integrity, and the possibly of unwarranted expansion of traditional minority rights into the realm of political and economic power. The author takes an instrumental view of ‘autonomy’, saying that autonomy is a means to an end, not an end in itself: at the end of the day, the proper concern should be rights, not policy, and fixating on autonomy as a onesize-fits-all compromise solution is unlikely to respond to the needs either of the concerned parties or the international community. Johan Galtung explores in the article The role of Autonomy in the State/Nation Dialectic the universal quest for ‘autonomy’ based on the dictum of ‘being ruled by one’s own kind’. It is this primordial dynamic that lurks, according to the author, behind the actual or brewing conflicts between (roughly) 200 nation states in the world, run usually by one dominant (or titular) nation, and the (roughly) 2000 substate nations. The latter nations can be subdivided into three categories: those divided between two or more states, those finding themselves in states inhabited by two or more nations, or those in two or more states inhabited by two or more nations. The author goes beyond academic rationalizations by presenting some pertinent case studies, demonstrating that what we have at stake is not only the right xlviii
INTRODUCTION to self-determination, however important, but also our duty to channel the potentially discordant forces into conflict transformation. In the article Ambiguities In And Clarifications Of The Concept Of Autonomy Matti Wiberg parses the concept of autonomy from a variety of perspectives, including the viewpoint of formal logics. He shows the concept’s utter dependence on the ideological whims of different authors as well as the political vectors of power, and he gives a prescription of sorts, admonishing writers on the subject to ‘define what (he), strictly speaking, means when he uses the notion, and he should then stick to this meaning in a consistent manner’. Vagueness of the concept, the author contends, is by itself a strategic device permitting governing elites to wield power and impose their agendas. To substantiate the point he gives the examples of the Camp David Agreement, and – a more recent and dramatic example – the arrangement fashioned by the Russian Government with the Chechen rebels. 2.2.2. Meta-Legal and Philosophical Dimensions of Autonomy In the article Paradoxes of Autonomy: Tensions, Traps And Possibilities Thomas Simon undertakes the task of clarifying the conceptual tensions underlining the problem of collective autonomy as applied to minorities. Regarding international legal context as a fitting instrument for bettering our understanding of these tensions, the author comes up with a taxonomy of situations where collective, as opposed to individual, autonomy, seems more appropriate. He lists four basic options: de jure, reciprocal, variegated, de facto, and humanitarian. More specifically, types of autonomy could include: legal autonomy based on clear legal or constitutional principles; deliberative autonomy granted on a temporary basis pending a final settlement in an area of conflict; variegated autonomy involving a dynamic approach to the development of new forms of self-government; reciprocal autonomy which would allow negotiated settlements with other states; selfdeterminative autonomy which might develop into secession and independence; and humanitarian autonomy arising from international intervention to prevent or control human rights violations. 2.2.3. Autonomy and Cultural Rights The following two chapters of the Part II are devoted to the interrelationship between autonomy and cultural rights. In the article An Argument from Cultural Disadvantage Juha Raikka argues that group-differentiated legal rights of minority cultures (and of the members of such groups) can be defended by referring to the moral value of cultural equality. He goes on to say that since cultural disadvantage is a morally relevant factor, it should be taken into account when formulating the laws and public policies of multicultural liberal democracies. Thus cultural disadvantage can be taken in a variety of ways: as a sufficient condition, a necessary condition, a sufficient and necessary condition, or merely a relevant factor in the justification of group-differentiated legal rights. The author concludes that the relevant factor approach is the most satisfactory, but xlix
ZELIM A. SKURBATY leaves open the possibility that group differentiated rights might also be justified without any form of cultural disadvantage. In his article The Right of a People to Exercise their Culture: A Scandinavian Model, the former Chairman of the Home Rule Commission for Greenland, Isi Foighel, gives an interesting, first-hand account on the modalities of the Greenland Home Rule Act of 1978. The basic philosophy of the Danish-Greenlandic modus vivendi could be expressed – in the words of the author – ‘in the terms, that the population of Greenland did not wish national independence but improved possibilities of strengthening and expanding the identity of Greenland through an increased independent responsibility’. The cultural dimension of such an ‘expansion of identity’ is of vital importance, according to the author. The Home Rule Act was not, from this perspective, an expression of the par in parem (agreement between juridically equal partners) principle, but of the fact that the relationships between population groups living under conditions so much at variance should be based upon the principle of more broadly-understood equal rights, which includes responsibility for catering to the special needs of the respective partner. For all the potential the Home Rule Act holds for the Centre-Autonomy partners, the implementation process should proceed, according to the author, incrementally and ‘on the basis of a carefully worked out schedule’. 2.3. Part III Implementation
Cross-Border
Cooperation,
International
Monitoring
and
Part III of the book is devoted to the cross-border cooperation, indigenous people and international monitoring and implementation. 2.3.1. International Guarantees of Autonomy The first chapter, Autonomy (International Guarantees of Autonomy) by Yoram Dinstein, deals with international guarantees of autonomy. The author confines the broad concept of self-government to those systems that are granted to particular regions within a certain country. In contrast to federalism, which requires a general sharing of (equal) powers among all regions of a state, an autonomous regime can be seen as an exception, since self-government is granted only to chosen areas, considered on the basis of a preferential treatment by the central state; and only a national group territorially concentrated in a specific geographic area may opt both for internal and for external self-determination, i.e. to choose to stay within the borders of a multinational state or to set up a new sovereign state. The author determines the requisite factors enabling the group to claim an autonomous regime and puts to scrutiny the particular circumstances required by customary international law to effect such a decision. He gives examples of different possibilities of autonomy reflecting different historical antecedents: a multilateral treaty (e.g. Memel, 1924); a multilateral agreement (e.g. Palestinian Autonomy, 1994); local legislation (e.g. Greenland, 1979); local legislation based on both, bilateral and multilateral treaties (e.g. South Tyrol); local legislation based on a General l
INTRODUCTION Assembly resolution (e.g. Eritrea, 1962); local legislation based on a bilateral treaty as well as on a resolution of the Council of the League of Nations (e.g. Åland Islands); decision of the Security Council (e.g. Kosovo, 1999). The conclusion drawn from the comparison of these examples is that the most significant guarantee to an autonomous regime, in terms of its political and international legal underpinnings, is a decision by the UN Security Council. Only this body is able to adopt binding decisions on matters affecting international peace and security, and authorize enforcement action against a state. The problem is, of course, that the Security Council is a predominantly political – not a judicial – body, and all too often submits to the pressures of the powers of the moment. In the article International Criminal Law: Protection of Minority Rights Lyal. S. Sunga explores the strengths and limitations of international criminal law protection of minority rights, arguing that while the international community continues to treat minority rights with considerable ambivalence, it nevertheless has been forced to react to severe violations of minority rights with international criminal prosecutions, and increasingly, to develop prospective deterrence of minority rights abuse. In this connection, the article contends that until now international criminal justice has been either non-existent or ‘too little too late’ for minorities, but that the new International Criminal Court represents the international community’s first real step towards prospective deterrence of severe minority rights criminal violations when domestic avenues are blocked. In light of the rapidity of the processes shaping the system of holding violators of human rights accountable before international community, one could only expect the expansion of the autonomous powers exercised by international tribunals. 2.3.2. Autonomy: The Problem of Irredentism and Cross-Border Cooperation In the article devoted to the problems surrounding cross-border cooperation within autonomous arrangements, Cross-Border Cooperation as an Indicator for Institutional Evolution of Autonomy: the Case of Trentino-South Tyrol, Francesco Palermo and Jens Woelk convincingly show that the increasing cooperation and integration between states has, as a consequence, the dilution of national sovereignty and can lead to the transformation of border areas from mere peripheries to integrated and more efficient contact-areas. As the authors argue, internal decentralization of the states is actively complemented by the processes of crossborder cooperation (CBC), which becomes a powerful and flexible horizontal link in the autonomous setup. They proceed to analyze the international legal and political umbrella for CBC provided by the Council of Europe, like the 1980 Madrid Outline Convention on cross-border cooperation between territorial communities. The authors note that, although EC-law does not directly seize of CBC, it still plays an important role in stimulating states to improve the competence of their regions in this field. They underline the ongoing, procedural nature of CBC and the utter necessity of closer cooperation in the harmonization of domestic legal policies on the matter. The recent increase in the scope of cross-border cooperation in areas li
ZELIM A. SKURBATY inhabited by kith-and-kin groups, distributed unevenly between the host- and mother states, has drawn considerable attention from the political quarters: the fear of irredentism is still afresh due to historical legacies. This makes the authors conclude that only mature autonomies can establish modern forms of CBC, because only stable systems which are able to cooperate smoothly with the central authorities can also cooperate effectively with the neighbouring regions. 2.3.3. Autonomy, Participation and Minority Rights In the article titled Participation and the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities Alan Phillips outlines the initial disappointment among many human rights activists at the relatively weak provisions and monitoring system, which had been adopted in the Convention. However, his experience as a member of the Advisory Committee in reviewing state reports on the implementation of the Convention leads him towards a more positive assessment. The Advisory Committee has been able to develop a more active role in monitoring state performance through visits and discussions with those affected than had been expressly provided in the Convention and its recommendations have generally been accepted without amendment by the Council of Ministers. He concludes that system weaknesses and deficiencies notwithstanding, the flexibility in the provisions of the Convention and the inventiveness of the members of the Advisory Committee coupled with the support of the Council of Ministers in engaging with civil society, have resulted in general strengthening of standards and practice at a national level. The way the OSCE deals with the questions of autonomy and the political participation of minorities is reflected in the article Autonomy and Effective Participation in Public Life: Developments in the OSCE by John Packer, Director of the Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM). He convincingly shows that despite the fact that the term ‘autonomy’ does not appear in OSCE documents in any essential form36, the commitment of participating states to democratic governance with respect for minorities and their rights has led to the consideration of forms of autonomy. This has taken place both expressly and implicitly in the evolving practice and ‘soft law’ (yet ground-breaking) standards relating to the effective participation of national minorities in public affairs. Seemingly modest, this approach has significant implications both in terms of prospects for substantial autonomies within the state and for the often politically linked issue of self-determination and its various (mis)understandings. In his contribution, John Packer summarizes the developments within the OSCE and shows how, to which extent and within which limits the notion of autonomy so far fits within the practice of the OSCE.
36
See references on the OSCE and autonomy in the first part of this Introduction, in the Prolegomenon and a number of articles in this volume.
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INTRODUCTION 2.3.4. Autonomy and Indigenous People The last two articles of Part III are devoted to problems concerning autonomy and indigenous peoples. As Darren Hawkins notes in the article Indigenous Rights and the Promise of a Limited Autonomy Model despite states’ reluctance to create international agreements that endorse autonomy for minority groups, recent progress has been made in the Organization of American States with respect to indigenous rights. States appear to be compromising on a ‘limited autonomy’ model that allows indigenous groups substantial autonomy on internal matters that affect their own people while simultaneously guaranteeing the territorial integrity and political unity of the state. The author argues that this emerging compromise is the result of a dialetical historical process in which repression of indigenous people gave rise to a transnational movement calling for extensive indigenous autonomy. He singles out three political conditions that have facilitated this tentative compromise: the dominance of democratic governments free from security threats in the Americas, prevalent historical myths linking autonomy with indigenous peoples, and a relatively strong association between indigenous peoples and particular geographical areas. In the process, states and indigenous peoples are redefining the notion of selfdetermination to make the concept dependent on the context of the people seeking that status. The conclusion of the author is that while the limited autonomy model offers an appealing political compromise to states, it also faces substantial difficulties before its final adoption and may not be easily transferrable to other regions of the world or to other kinds of minority peoples. Another chapter on the same topic by José Bengoa, The Question of Indigenous Autonomy in Latin America, deals with the particular modalities of autonomous arrangements for indigenous populations in Panamá, Colombia and the Atlantic Coast in Nicaragua, existing in the region since the 1980s. The second part of the chapter is devoted to the analysis of the new autonomous arrangements in the area and the negotiations between the governments and indigenous representatives on the setup of different forms of cultural, territorial and educational autonomous structures. In conclusion, the author puts the indigenous problematique in perspective by giving a cogent analysis of the current debate on the issue in Latin America. 2.4. Part IV National and Comparative Case Studies Part IV of the book is devoted to national and comparative case studies, which, in a way, bring the problem down from the rarefied atmosphere of theoretical discussions to the realities on the ground. The facets of autonomy these cases illustrate are many and varied: from autonomy and self-determination to failed experience with autonomy to autonomy and conflict resolution, etc. Read and appreciated in juxtaposition, the chapters can convey lessons from successful and unsuccessful autonomy experiments more powerfully and effectively.
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ZELIM A. SKURBATY 2.4.1. Autonomy, Minorities and Self-Determination The first article is titled The Protection Of Minorities Between Autonomy And SelfDetermination: The Cases Of The Åland Islands And Kosovo and written by Markku Suksi. The author does not limit himself to a legal analysis of the international legal framework vis-à-vis these troubled regions, but shows the key leverage points of commonality and divergence that permitted a peaceful solution in the first case and lead to a dramatic outcome in the latter. The conclusion of the author is that although no right to autonomy can be found within the framework of the (external) right to self-determination, autonomy can still be exercised within the framework of internal self-determination, keeping in mind that the concept of autonomy is – in the first place – a matter of participation. In that sense, the decision concerning the Åland Islands in 1921 by the League of Nations may serve as an important point of reference for present and future debates on autonomy. 2.4.2. Failed Experiences with Autonomy While the Åland Islands exemplifies the success of autonomy and the politics of constructive compromise, the downside of the efforts in this field are epitomized by the case of the failed autonomy in Eritrea, which is analyzed by Eyassu Gayim in The Autonomy of Eritrea (1952-62): Learning from Failed Experience. Despite the fact that Eritrea had been featured as an ‘an autonomous unit’ in the federal state of Ethiopia from 1952 to 1962 on the basis of UN General Assembly resolution 390(V), the arrangement was seriously flawed at its outset because there were no guarantees for its practical survival. Nor was there any effective international guarantee to prevent the Ethiopian Emperor from undermining the proposed autonomy of Eritrea by asserting overall federal control over all economic and legislative policies. The Eritrean reaction to the Ethiopian intervention and domination was to wage a protracted liberation struggle for self-determination leading eventually to independence. The result was an increasing demand for independence and a lengthy internal conflict leading eventually to secession. He concludes that the failed experience of Eritrean autonomy in the 1950s showed that an autonomous arrangement that disregards the wishes and welfare of the local people concerned, which is not accompanied by effective guarantees, can hardly be satisfactory or practical. 2.4.3. Autonomy in the Countries of Transition From the failed experiment with autonomy we turn to autonomies in countries in transition. In his article A Combined Approach to Autonomy: Estonian Experience, Aleksei Semjonov outlines some formal and practical aspects of the protection of minorities’ cultural and educational rights in Estonia based on the Law on Cultural Autonomy of National Minority of 1993. Though the law made extensive general provision for cultural autonomy, the very demanding conditions for the establishment of an autonomous agency or council, including a formal demand from liv
INTRODUCTION more than 3,000 registered citizens and the organisation of a nation-wide election involving all members of the relevant minority, had made it impractical for any minority community to take advantage of the law. Despite the fact that the Estonian government has relied extensively on the existence on the law in its dealing with the international community, no autonomous cultural agencies or councils had in fact been established. However, this did not prevent members of national minorities from relying on more general long established legal rights in respect of Russian language schools and state financing for minority cultural bodies. He concludes that general laws on individual rights proved more effective than any special provisions for minority communities. The autonomous arrangement in Gagauzia, one of the troublesome regions of the former USSR republic Moldova, is examined by Priit Järve in Autonomy of Gagauzia: a Post-Soviet Experience. He analyses this situation in two interrelated contexts: the broad legal and political context common to most of the regions of the former USSR after its dissolution, and the specific context of the armed conflict between the central government of Moldova and its breakaway region of Transdniestria, which gave an incentive to the first to look for more constructive approaches to the amicable accommodation of this minority group. The author scrutinizes in detail – both the positive features and deficiencies – the ‘Law on the special legal status of Gagauzia (Gagauz Yeri)’, which is based on Article 111 of the Constitution of Moldova and recognizes the possibility of the existence of territories with a special status in the country. The author makes an attempt to draw some lessons from the seven plus years of the Gagauzia autonomous arrangement in Moldova: a strong state is necessary for the creation of a strong and well-functioning autonomy; the interaction between the Central Government and the Gagauzia autonomous territory should be put in the broader context of the relationships between all the potential stakeholders including Transdniestria. He concludes that two factors – shortcomings in the power sharing agreement and imperfect administrative (and political) culture – can be held responsible for the uneasy development of power sharing between Moldova and its autonomous region of Gagauzia. One step further from situations of instability in countries in transition with autonomous arrangements, are those that have come into open conflict after the inability of all the stakeholders to come to some working agreement on power sharing and delimitation of competencies. As the chapters that follow show, despite all its actual and potential deficiencies, autonomy has always been regarded as one of the instruments capable of preventing and mitigating ongoing conflict situations between state and sub-state actors. 2.4.4. Autonomy and Conflict Resolution In the article Autonomy: The Danish-German Border Region Sten Harck navigates in the well-chartered territory of the Danish-German autonomous arrangement. He analyses the legal aspects of the peaceful minority solutions in the Danish-German lv
ZELIM A. SKURBATY Border Region, which is often considered a model solution for other minoritymajority conflicts. After an introduction to the historical and social background of the problematic region, namely, the Copenhagen-Bonn Declarations of 1955, he gives a detailed account of the so called ‘Bill of Rights’ concerning the Danish and German minorities in the respective countries. The Bonn declarations, as the author contends, were not only the key factors for the peaceful co-existence of these two nations but turned also into international customary law. According to Sten Harck, the Danish-German Border Region has a remarkable level of legal protection, which should, even in the future, enable the minorities living there to protect and develop their own cultures. The willingness of the two kin states to provide their respective minorities with the necessary financial means – the part and parcel of the so called ‘European model’ – is of crucial importance, concludes the author. In the contribution that follows, Continued Challenges, Post-Settlement, to the Cyprus Conundrum, Tim Potier argues that since international law has been dominated the last 57 years by the pre-eminence of the nation state concept, the question of autonomy is invoked only in those places where the nation state itself has, at least in some way, failed. He adds that much of the debate has focussed upon the establishment of a ‘federation’ while little attention has been paid towards its essence. In reality, as the author contends, any ‘federation’ created – as the case in point – in Cyprus, would be extremely ‘loose’ and confer almost complete autonomy upon the two ‘federated’ states. He gives a detailed ‘projective’ account of the possible future condition of a Cyprus ‘federation’ and the issues that will remain outstanding even after a framework agreement or a more substantive agreement is concluded. Another article that explores the potential of autonomy in conflict resolution, especially in terms of transposition of the positive precedents, is Strategies of Ethnic Conflict Resolution: The Trentino-South Tyrol Case and the Balkans by Paolo Foradori and Riccardo Scartezzini. It explores the possibilities and limits of exporting the Trentino-South Tyrol model of ethnic pacification by assessing the topic from both a sociological and political perspective. The crux of the problem, as the authors see it, is the classic dilemma between what may be considered the most suitable and legitimate solution from a normative point of view and what, on the other hand, is the most feasible and workable solution in a given specific and concrete context. Starting from the definition of ethnic conflict and which remote and proximate factors can cause it to manifest violently, the authors give a number of evident reasons of the many constraints to any attempt of exportation. The authors stress the role of domestic elites as a catalytic factor in triggering ethnic conflicts as well as the democratic deficit in the Balkans as a whole exacerbated by unfavourable economic conditions. Their conclusion is that the role of the international community in the stabilization of the Balkans is fundamental, especially its efforts to promote and support political and economic democratization of the region.
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INTRODUCTION 2.4.5. National and Regional Experiments with Autonomous Arrangements The overarching theme of the three contributions that follow is national and regional experiments with autonomous arrangements, introduced by the article Patricia Leopold Experiments with autonomy in the United Kingdom since 1998. As she admits at the outset of her deliberations, autonomy is a new concept in the British Constitution which has been provided for in a limited sense since 1998 in the provision of devolved self-government for three of the countries making up the United Kingdom: Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The author first outlines the background to the changes introduced in 1998, and explains briefly the three different types of autonomy provided in the UK: representation of minority groups and power sharing; equality of opportunity and human rights; and cultural protection. She gives analysis of the legal and constitutional provisions that have brought about changes in the forms of self-governance in these regions, with special reference to the position in Northern Ireland. The latter is chosen because the devolution arrangements for Northern Ireland have particular provisions for the protection of minority rights and for the creation of a consociational government not found in the other devolution arrangements. The contribution that follows is titled The Status of Autonomous Territories in International Organizations, Experiences in Nordic and Continental European Cooperation, and is written by Elisabeth Nauclér, who is the Head of Administration of the Government of the Åland Islands. She puts under scrutiny – with emphasis on the Åland autonomy – three Nordic autonomous territories within the framework of the Nordic and European cooperation schemes. While all three autonomous territories have the same representation in the Nordic co-operation, they have different statuses and cooperation modalities within the European Union. The author gives a detailed comparative analysis of these autonomies and draws a number of lessons, potentially usable for other regions and situations. And the last contribution crowning the present volume is the article-essay by Ranabir Samaddar, Minority Rights and Forms of Autonomy in South Asia, in which he parses the various forms of autonomy in countries of South Asia in the context of the debates on minority rights and the right to self-determination. In reflecting on the practices of protection of minorities and other vulnerable groups – like constitutional arrangements of autonomy aimed at giving a measure of satisfaction to the right to self-determination – the essay takes a brief view of the existing debates on the relevant issues, and tries to figure out the ways in which the political experience of South Asia, as a decolonised region, can enrich the discourse of rights and justice. The essay addresses principally four issues on the basis of the empirical study: (a) the debate on self-determination and the accompanying questions of rights and justice; (b) the thin line between ‘minorities’ and ‘people’ – the two poles on which two sets of rights are perched, namely rights of the minorities and the right to selfdetermination (c) globalisation and the international character of the conundrum; (d) and, the imperatives for a move from rights based argument to justice and reconciliation based argument and thought. lvii
ZELIM A. SKURBATY The summary conclusions distilled from the contributions of the authors, as well as recommendations to the professionals (and laymen for that matter) working on the modalities of the prospective ‘right to autonomy’ can be found in the article of the editor of this volume, titled Is There an Emerging Right to Autonomy? Summary Reflections, Conclusions and Recommendations.
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PART I GENERAL ISSUES: CROSS-DISCIPLINARY APPRAISAL OF AUTONOMY
AUTONOMY AS A PARTICIPATORY RIGHT IN THE MODERN DEMOCRATIC STATE PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, AUTONOMY AND MINORITIES Yash Ghai 1. INTRODUCTION In the last two decades there has been a marked shift from the limited protection against discrimination that characterized the original efforts of the United Nations (UN) regarding minorities, towards a more active engagement of the state in facilitating the development of minority cultures and promoting a political role for minorities.1 Notions of identity, emphasizing states’ responsibility to promote minorities’ culture, language and religion, and the rights of minorities to public participation, are central to the new understanding of the protection of minorities. Issues of minority rights have been subsumed under ethnic relations to a significant extent, focusing on the relations of minorities with other communities. New norms and institutions have been developed in the context of intense ethnic or religious conflicts, and as part of efforts to restructure states, encourage the coexistence of different ethnic groups, and provide security to cultural and national minorities. The emphasis on identity and public participation has led, in various ways, to the political recognition of minority or ethnic groups and their collective cultural and political rights. Contemporary efforts at minority protection are also influenced by the adoption of democracy in regions and states which had hitherto had military or one-party regimes. Democracy is understood as encapsulating various values – tolerance, pluralism, freedom of expression, participation and accountability. As the foundations of democracy in human rights are explored, the salience of minority rights as an essential component of a democratic society is acknowledged. Increasingly, the framework of rights is used to assess social and political progress, including the situation of minorities. 1 Throughout this text, the term ‘minority’ is used broadly to include indigenous peoples where applicable. However, the author and MRG recognize that some indigenous peoples reject the designation ‘minority’.
3
YASH GHAI However, there is no universal formula for minority participation. In the past there was an excessive tendency to look at minority rights from the perspectives of the majority and of ‘nation building’, requiring common and exclusionary loyalties and the homogenization of public and private space. Now, it is arguable that the present approach is marked by the concern for finding a distinctive political and social role for minorities. Supporters of minority rights, focusing on devices to protect the identity of minorities, have perhaps paid insufficient attention to another aspect of minority protection, that is, its effect on wider societal and inter-group relations. Effective protection of minorities depends also on minority–majority relations, the integration of communities, and the development of common values and loyalties to sustain the wider political community. Currently (at least in Western scholarship) two competing views dominate regarding the protection of minorities2. The more fashionable among key policy makers in Europe is connected with Lijphart’s concept of consociationalism, which despairs of peaceful coexistence of ethnic groups unless special constitutional provisions are put in place to recognize their corporate entity and to confer on them the right to separate representation and participation in public bodies. Its typical features are segmental autonomy for ethnic groups (if possible through territorial arrangements, otherwise through forms of group or cultural autonomy), proportional and frequently separate representation, proportional participation in institutions and services, and group veto. The other approach is integrationist, to be distinguished from assimilation, for integrationists value minority cultures and identities, but seek to establish a political system in which all citizens participate equally. It aims to provide constitutional and political incentives for people of different groups to cooperate, either through coalition of ethnic parties or, hopefully, the establishment of multi-ethnic parties, generally relying on electoral laws which encourage inter-ethnic cooperation.3 It relies on a clearer distinction than consociationalism between the common public space, with state neutrality, and the private where each group is free to pursue its linguistic, religious and cultural predilections. It emphasizes individual rights, claimed and exercised in the name of citizenship, unlike consociationalism which places considerable emphasis on group rights. In practice a state may be able to incorporate elements of both approaches. South Africa and Fiji, both discussed later, provide instructive examples. 2. DEFINITION OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION Although a number of international and regional instruments require states to promote the right of minorities to participation, few define participation. However, a 2 For a useful summary see T.D. Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts (US Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, 1996). 3 See D. Horowitz, ‘Encouraging Electoral Accommodation in Divided Societies’, in B. Lal and P. Larmour (eds), Electoral Systems in Divided Societies: The Fiji Constitution Review (Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, ANU, Canberra, 1997).
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PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, AUTONOMY AND MINORITIES notion of participation may be gleaned from these instruments. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) protect the right to take part in government or in the conduct of public affairs. The UN Committee on Human Rights has elaborated this provision by stating that the: ‘conduct of public affairs . . . is a broad concept which relates to the exercise of political power, in particular the exercise of legislative, executive and administrative powers . . . [covering] all aspects of public administration, and the formulation and implementation of policy at international, national, regional and local levels.’ (General Comment 25, 1996)
These instruments protect the right to vote (the UDHR more emphatically when it states that the ‘will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government’) and of equal access to the public service. The freedoms of expression, procession, association and conscience imply, and facilitate, participation in politics and public policies. Overarching these specific instances is the general right of selfdetermination, proclaimed in the UN Charter, the ICCPR and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), as belonging to ‘all peoples’. Although the right is collective, every person is deemed under it to have certain political rights, particularly participation rights expressly granted in the ICCPR. But the reference to the pursuit of economic, social and cultural development indicates that participation rights are not restricted to politics or administration. The UDHR protects the right: ‘freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in the scientific advancement and its benefits’. (Article 27)
The ICESCR guarantees other forms of participation, in the economy, trade unions, culture and arts, scientific research and literary activities. In more recent years, the emphasis on ethnic identity has produced a particular concern with participation rights of minorities. It is through participation that a person expresses and protects his or her identity, and the survival and dignity of the group is ensured. Participation in cultural, educational, linguistic and religious affairs is given special attention, for these matters are closely connected to a group’s identity. Under the UDHR and the Covenants, members of minorities are as much entitled to these rights as members of the majority group. However, so far as the exercise of political influence and participation is concerned, the general principle of non-discrimination is not sufficient. As a minority, a group’s interests may well be different from those of the majority; and its culture is likely to be marginalized by that of the majority. Its population may be dispersed through the country, and it will not, as a general rule, have adequate numbers of legislators etc. to influence the formation of government or its policies. Therefore, in order to ensure effective participation, it is necessary that special procedures, institutions and arrangements be established through which members of 5
YASH GHAI minorities are able to make decisions, exercise legislative and administrative powers, and develop their culture. Conceived in this broad way, participation covers many areas of life, both state and private sector organization, and involves a number of activities. These include taking part in national politics through participation in political parties, standing for elections and voting in them. Participation covers forms of enacting legislation, and may include vetoes by a group on specified matters. It encompasses other forms of influencing policies, through the media, lobbying, etc. It can cover mechanisms for consultation and negotiations. Thus participation may signify the ability of minorities or their members to bring relevant facts to decision-makers, argue their position before decision-makers, propose reform, be co-decision-makers, veto legislative or administrative proposals, and establish and manage their own institutions in specified areas. 3. THE IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION RIGHTS Many of the general justifications for minority protection apply equally, or even more forcibly, to participation rights. A major justification is the inherent fairness of minority protection. Members of minorities are entitled, like any other person, to human rights and freedoms, of which participation is an essential aspect. Minorities have the right to influence the formulation and implementation of public policy, and to be represented by people belonging to the same social, cultural and economic context as themselves. For a political system to be truly democratic, it has to allow minorities a voice of their own, to articulate their distinct concerns and seek redress, and lay the basis of deliberative democracy. The rationale for special measures is not to create a privileged position for minorities but to place them effectively in the same position as members of the majority. Paradoxically, special measures can help towards the integration of minorities, for the prospects of integration are better if minorities become involved in national political and social processes. They acquire a stake in the system, and are able to contribute to policy making and play a part in administration. All too often minorities become alienated from mainstream national processes because they see no role for themselves in these processes or believe that they cannot influence outcomes. Others then claim to speak for them – and claim to know better what is good for them than the minority itself. This encourages prejudices against and the stereotyping of minorities. Participation also develops and utilizes the talents of minorities for the national good. States which welcome participation and integration of minorities tend not only to be more stable, but also more prosperous. The availability of human rights to members of majority communities themselves may depend on the enjoyment of rights by members of minorities. The whole concept of universal and human rights suffers when some individuals or groups are denied rights on the grounds of their religion, language or colour. In some multi-ethnic states, for example Malaysia and Fiji, it has been very difficult to develop a popular understanding or appreciation of human rights, because human 6
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, AUTONOMY AND MINORITIES rights are often seen as protecting minorities against the special status and authority of the majority. But if minorities are denied rights, there is the danger of general intolerance and authoritarianism. The denial of rights to minorities also leads to their denial to all in other ways. Fair treatment of minorities is essential to social peace and stability. Social, often violent, conflict that results from the oppression of minorities creates conditions in which there is a massive internal and external displacement of persons, and the movement of people to some parts of the country or even within particular cities, becomes impossible. The government is unable to ensure people’s physical or psychological security. The state itself becomes a major violator of rights. Oppression of minorities has led to inter-state wars. It has been easy to find in a country’s ill treatment of another state’s ‘kin people’ an excuse for territorial aggression. Special measures can also be justified as providing cultural diversity within, and thus enriching, the wider society. Such diversity challenges the dominant ideas and values of society. It promotes comparisons and debates, keeps society open to new ideas and protects it from narrow orthodoxies. Participation by minorities helps to put old policies in new contexts, often highlighting their weaknesses or ethnic bias, and drawing attention to the need for new policies and approaches. Public participation promotes inter-ethnic dialogues, and averts ethnic conflicts borne out of misunderstanding or ignorance. This recognition of diversity is particularly pertinent now, when few states are mono-ethnic. States and individuals are engaged in multiple relations with other political and cultural systems, and need the background and skills to negotiate numerous contexts where different cultures meet and interact. This article proceeds on the assumption that minorities welcome opportunities for participation in public affairs and in other national or communal matters. But it is possible to conceive of minorities who would regard participation – on the terms of the state and in its institutions – as compromising their fundamental claims or wishes. This is most evident with a number of indigenous peoples, who, perhaps reflecting their unhappy experience with national institutions, see their goal as selfdetermination, meaning either independence or a high degree of autonomy. The Draft UN Declaration on Indigenous Peoples makes the exercise of rights by them optional (‘if they so choose’, Articles 19 and 20). But some minorities may wish to integrate politically (such as Hindus and Christians who resisted the imposition of communal representation in Pakistan). Some groups might feel a threat to their identity in involvement with national politics and institutions, where their own influence may be marginal. Individual members of minorities may desire nothing more than to be left alone by their own and other communities. However, there are many forms of participation, not all involving the surrender to a state’s claims or assimilation, and sometimes participation rights are optional and facilitative, both for communities and individuals.
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YASH GHAI 4. LEGAL FOUNDATIONS FOR PUBLIC PARTICIPATION RIGHTS OF MINORITIES The juridical case for minority participation rests on three principal sources, apart from the general norms of human rights: minority rights, indigenous peoples’ rights and, more controversially, the right to self-determination. Minority rights may also be protected in bilateral treaties, especially in Europe, dealing with national minorities and the employment of foreigners. 5. MINORITIES When the UN began work on an international regime of rights, it emphasized individual rights and carefully avoided giving rights, particularly political rights, to groups. Article 27 of the ICCPR, until recently the principal UN provision on minorities, was drafted in narrow terms. It reads: ‘In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language.’
Although this may suggest that it is up to the state to determine whether it has minorities, the UN Human Rights Committee has stated that the question is a factual one to be decided through objective tests. Under the Articles, rights belong not to minorities as groups, but to individual members, although these rights can only be exercised in association with other members of the community, thus giving them a ‘collective’ dimension. Rights given to members of minorities are negative, prohibiting the state from suppressing their culture or language. But it could be argued that this negative prohibition may be transformed into a positive right, that is, the state is under an obligation to intervene proactively, by implementing legislation or programmes, to ensure that Article 27 is not violated, rather than simply refraining from certain actions. Thus despite the parsimonious language of the Article, it has the potential to develop into the framework a broader entitlement, including a measure of autonomy – and the UN Human Rights Committee has tried to do this in recent years. In a series of decisions, the Committee has interpreted the Article as a basis for collective minority rights (Kitok v. Sweden, 1988), as a basis for the preservation of the culture and way of life of a minority group (Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, 1990) and as a basis for protecting and developing the traditional way of life of minorities (Linsman v. Finland, 1995). The Committee recognized that in some situations, Article 27 rights may be connected to a territory, for example when cultural rights consist of a way of life which is closely associated with territory and use of its resources. The Committee has given a broad meaning to ‘culture’, noting that culture manifests itself in many forms, including a particular way of life 8
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, AUTONOMY AND MINORITIES associated with the use of land resources and traditional occupations, especially in the case of indigenous peoples (General Comment 23, 1994). The Committee has also interpreted the Article to include elements of group rights, since the prescribed rights ‘depend in turn on the ability of the minority group to maintain its culture, language or religion’. Nor are rights merely passive, since ‘positive steps may also be necessary to protect the identity of a minority and the rights of its members to enjoy and develop their culture and language and to practice their religion, in community with the other members of the group’. (para. 6.2)
From the nexus between culture and territory, the Committee draws the right of minorities to participation, observing that the enjoyment of cultural and other rights imply the ‘effective participation of members of minority communities in decisions which affect them’ (para. 7). This broader approach is reflected in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities adopted by the General Assembly in 1992. Although it also recognizes only the rights of individuals, it places positive obligations on the state to protect the identity of minorities and encourage ‘conditions for the promotion of that identity’ (Article 1). The Declaration places particular emphasis upon the right of minorities ‘to participate effectively in cultural, religious, social, economic and public life’ (Article 2.2). They also have the right to participate in decisions on national and regional levels concerning the minority to which they belong or where they live (Article 2.3). Three further specific participation rights are guaranteed – the right to maintain their own associations (Article 2.4), to maintain contacts with members of other minorities and citizens of other states to whom they are related by national or ethnic, religious or linguistic ties (Article 2.5), and the right to participate fully in economic progress and development (Article 4.5). A case for minorities’ rights to participation can also be made on the basis of Article 25 of the ICCPR, which gives every citizen the right and the opportunity: ‘to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections on universal franchise … and to have access, on general terms of equality, to public services’.
Although the Article does not mention minorities, it has been argued that where a minority is unrepresented or under-represented in national political processes, either because of their small numbers or because of systematic exclusion, special processes and structures for political participation must be developed to respond to the spirit of Article 25(a).4 Such an argument was advanced to the UN Committee on Human 4
See M.E. Turpel, ‘Rights of Political Participation and Self-determination in Canada’, in H. Reynolds and R. Nile (eds), Indigenous Rights in the Pacific and North America: Race and
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YASH GHAI Rights by the Mikmaq Tribal Society in support of its claim to be represented at the Canada constitutional conferences (separately from the participation by the Canadian First Nations Council).5 The UN Committee on Human Rights concluded that the article did not require that any affected group, however large or small, be able to send a representative, but did not rule out special representation in suitable cases. Several initiatives have been taken in Europe, through the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe and the European Union (EU) to promote the concept of participation and autonomy. This is manifested in both formal declarations and interventions to solve ethnic conflicts in Europe (such as the Rambouillet proposals for Kosovo/a). In Article 35 of the Copenhagen Document on the Human Dimension (1990) of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, the predecessor of the OSCE), member states have undertaken to respect the rights of members of national minorities to: ‘effective participation in public affairs, including participation in the affairs relating to the protection and promotion of the identity of such minorities.’
The Document takes particular note of provisions for certain minorities: ‘by establishing . . . appropriate local or autonomous administrations corresponding to the specific historical and territorial circumstances of such minorities.’
The principal instrument of the Council of Europe is the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1995) which protects various rights of minorities, obliges the state to facilitate the enjoyment of these rights, and recognizes many rights of ‘identity’. It obliges state parties to: ‘create the conditions necessary for the effective participation of persons belonging to national minorities in cultural, social and economic life and in public affairs, in particular those affecting them.’ (Article 15)
The exercise of some of these rights implies a measure of autonomy, and the prohibition against altering the proportion of a minority in areas inhabited by them (Article 16) will have the effect of enhancing prospects of local autonomy. The Copenhagen Document and statements of principle by the Council of Europe, although not strictly binding, have been used by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities and other mediating bodies as a basis for compromise between contending forces, and have thus influenced practice, in which participation rights, including autonomy, have been a key constituent.6 Nation in the Late Twentieth Century (University of London and Sir Robert Menzies Centre for Australian Studies, London, 1992) pp. 104–5. 5 Ibid., p. 106. 6 See A. Bloed, ‘The OSCE and the Issue of National Minorities’, in A. Phillips and A. Rosas (eds), Universal Minority Rights (Åbo Akademi University Press, Åbo, 1995); OSCE High
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PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, AUTONOMY AND MINORITIES The then European Community (now European Union) has also used conformity with the Copenhagen Document as a precondition for the recognition of new states in Europe. The ability of existing states (which is relatively unregulated by international law) to confer recognition on entities, especially breakaway states, can be a powerful weapon to influence their constitutional structure. When various republics within the former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union were breaking away, the European Community issued a Declaration on the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union (16 December 1991). Among the conditions a candidate had to satisfy before it would be recognized was that its constitution contained: ‘guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities in accordance with the commitments subscribed to in the framework of the CSCE’.
Similar principles have been used for admission to the Council of Europe and the EU. 6. INDIGENOUS PEOPLES The International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention on Indigenous Peoples (No. 169), adopted in 1989, and representing a reversal of the paternalistic and assimilationist approach followed in the 1957 Convention, recognized the: ‘aspirations of these peoples to exercise control over their own institutions, ways of life and economic development and to maintain and develop their identities, languages and religions, within the framework of the States in which they live’.
Their cultural and religious values, institutions and forms of traditional social control are to be preserved (Article 4). The system of land ownership and the rules for the transmission of land rights are to be protected (Articles 14 and 17). States are required, in applying the Convention, to: ‘consult the peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures and in particular through their representative institutions, whenever consideration is being given to legislative or administrative measures which may affect them directly’.
And the consultation shall be in: Commissioner, Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life, 1999; J. Packer, ‘Autonomy within the OSCE: the Case of Crimea’, in M. Suksi (ed.), Autonomy: Applications and Implications (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1998); R.S. Ratner, ‘Does International Law Matter in Preventing Ethnic Conflict?’, 32:3 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics (2000), pp. 591–698; P. Thornberry, ‘Images of Autonomy and Individual and Collective Rights in International Instruments on the Rights of Minorities’, in Suksi (ed.), op. cit.
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YASH GHAI ‘good faith and in a form appropriate to the circumstances, with the objective of achieving agreement or consent to the proposed measures’. (Article 6)
A more broad ranging provision provides (Article 7): ‘The peoples concerned shall have the right to decide their own priorities for the process of development as it affects their lives, beliefs, institutions and spiritual well-being and the lands they occupy or otherwise use, and to exercise control, to the extent possible, over their own economic, social and cultural development. In addition they shall participate in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of plans and programs for national and regional development which may affect them directly.’
Although an advance on the 1957 Convention, it has been criticized for being ‘paternalistic’, and its negotiations involved a limited participation by indigenous peoples.7 These deficiencies were meant to be addressed in another exercise of standard-setting, the Draft UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (1992). It proclaims their right to self-determination, under which they may ‘freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’ (Article 3). The principle of self-determination gives them the ‘right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs’, which include social, cultural and economic activities, and the right to control the entry of non-members (Article 31). It recognizes their ‘collective rights’ (Article 7) and the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, economic, social and cultural characteristics (Article 4). These ideas have already formed the basis of negotiations between indigenous peoples and the states in which they live, giving recognition not only to their land rights (as in Australia and New Zealand) but also to forms of autonomy (as in Canada). Indigenous peoples, particularly in North America and New Zealand, have other legal bases for their claims as well: (a) their ‘inherent sovereignty’ which pre-dates colonization and (b) treaties with incoming powers.8 The former is more important in the USA and Canada than in Australia or New Zealand. The US Supreme Court has recognized the ‘sovereignty’ of Indian tribes and, more narrowly, the rights of Alaskan tribes. With this ‘sovereignty’ come various rights of participation, particularly of self-government. Canada is only now coming to terms with First Nations’ sovereignty, granting autonomy and land rights to First Nations, and with it significant participation in boards, committees and other parts of the administrative machinery. As in the USA, the federal legislature can derogate from the ‘sovereignty’, although aboriginal and treaty rights have been entrenched in the Constitution and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In New Zealand progress has been achieved through resuscitation of the Waitangi Treaty, signed in 1840 between 7
G. Nettheim, ‘International Law and Indigenous Political Rights’, in Reynolds and Nile (eds), supra note 4, p. 25. 8 For what has been called ‘treaty federalism’, see J.Y. Henderson, ‘Empowering Treaty Federalism’, 58 Saskatchewan Law Review (1986), pp. 241–329.
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PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, AUTONOMY AND MINORITIES Maori Chiefs and representatives of the British Crown, which was judicially pronounced ‘a simple nullity’ in 1877. In recent years courts have drawn various implications from its general provisions for the partnership between the Maori and the government. The two parties should behave reasonably and in good faith to each other and negotiate to solve disputes that arise out of treaty provisions. A similar principle of good faith negotiations has been enunciated by the Canadian courts.9 Both in New Zealand and Canada this approach has given indigenous peoples significant participation in law, in regulations and contracts over natural resources and in the development of traditional lands. Another basis for participation of indigenous peoples has been their increasing control over their traditional lands, and the resources that have been transferred to them in settlement of previous acquisitions of land. In Australia there have also been some moves towards selfgovernment, the most obvious example being the Aboriginal and Torres Straits Islands Commission. 7. SELF-DETERMINATION The broadest source of autonomy as a form of participation is self-determination, increasingly analysed in terms of the internal, democratic organization of a state rather than in terms of secession or independence. The UN General Assembly resolved many years ago that autonomy is a manifestation of self-determination. The greater involvement of the UN or consortia of states in the settlement of internal conflicts has also helped to develop the concept of self-determination as implying autonomy in appropriate circumstances.10 However, the birth of new states following the collapse of the communist order in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and the Balkans, has removed the taboo against secession, and the international community seems to be inching towards some consensus that extreme oppression of a group may justify secession. This position has served to strengthen the internal aspect of self-determination, for a state can defeat the claim of separation if it can demonstrate that it respects political and cultural rights of minorities. A further, and far-reaching, gloss has been placed on this doctrine by the Canadian Supreme Court which decided in 1999 that, while Quebec has no right under either the Canadian Constitution or international law to unilateral secession, if Quebec were to decide on secession through a referendum, Ottawa and provinces would have to negotiate with Quebec on future constitutional arrangements. Such a view of self-determination has some support in certain national constitutions. Often constitutional provisions for autonomy are adopted during periods of social and political transformation, when an autocratic regime is 9
See S. Lawrence and P. Macklen, ‘From Consultation to Reconciliation: Aboriginal rights and the Crown’s duty to Consult’, 79 The Canadian Bar Review, 2000, pp. 252–91. 10 See T.M. Franck, ‘Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession’, in C. Broleman et al. (eds), Peoples and Minorities in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1993); and A. Rosas, ‘Internal Self-government’, in C. Tomuschat (ed.), Modern Law of Selfdetermination (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1993).
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YASH GHAI overthrown, a crisis is reached in minority–majority conflicts, or there is intense international pressure. Propelled by these factors, a number of constitutions now recognize some entitlement to self-government, such as Fiji (for indigenous peoples), Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Spain and Ethiopia which gives its ‘nations, nationalities, and peoples’ the right to seek wide-ranging powers as states within a federation and even guarantees the right to secession. The Russian Constitution of 1993, in the wake of the break-up of the Soviet Union, provides for extensive autonomy to its constituent parts, whether republics or autonomous areas.11 The Chinese Constitution entrenches the rights of ethnic minorities to substantial self-government, although both there and in Ethiopia the dominance of one party denies the substance of autonomy.12 8. PRECONDITIONS FOR PUBLIC PARTICIPATION Rights of participation cannot be enjoyed unless certain conditions exist. These include physical and emotional security, financial resources and minimum levels of education for the minorities. There has to be a toleration of opposing, particularly minority, views, and a general condemnation of discriminatory practices. States must ensure the promotion of minority cultures, intercultural exchanges and education in schools, the teaching and development of minority languages, and the protection of religious beliefs and practices. 9. CITIZENSHIP AND OTHER BASES OF ENTITLEMENT TO RIGHTS Traditionally, rights were regarded as the entitlement of citizens only. Such a restriction is not consistent with international instruments, nor indeed with most national constitutions. In this era of mass migrations and globalization, such a restriction would deny many people what have come to be accepted as basic human rights. Rights have been extended to non-citizen residents in several countries in recent decades, reflecting both the general importance of rights and the fact of migration. It is not possible in this Article to discuss all the restrictions on the economic, social, cultural and political rights of non-citizens. However, some examples, dealing with the principal participation rights examined here, will illustrate the denial of participation rights of non-citizens who are in a state for
11
See J. Agnew, ‘Postscript: federalism in the post-Cold War era’, in G. Smith (ed.), Federalism: The Multiethnic Challenge (Longman, London, 1995); N.A. Lynn, and A.V. Novikov, ‘Refederalizing Russia: Debates on the Idea of Federalism in Russia’, 27:2 Publius (1997), pp. 187–203; and G. Smith, ‘Russia, Ethnoregionalism and the Politics of Federation’, 19:2 Ethnic and Racial Studies (1996), pp. 391–410. 12 See Y. Ghai, ‘Chinese Minorities: Autonomy with Chinese Characteristics’, in Y. Ghai (ed.), Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Claims in Multi-Ethnic States (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000); and Paul, J., ‘Ethnicity and the new Constitutional Orders of Ethiopia and Eritrea’, in ibid.
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PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, AUTONOMY AND MINORITIES legitimate purposes, such as employment with the expectation of settlement.13 The provision in the ILO Convention (No. 143 of 1975) requiring the abolition of restrictions on migrant workers on access to employment after two years’ residence is widely ignored, even in states which have in the past actively sought labour from outside. In Germany non-citizens do not enjoy the same right to form political parties as citizens; leaders and majority members of a party must be German nationals. Portugal prohibits non-nationals from political activities except with the permission of the government (Article 15 of the Constitution). The law in Switzerland is even worse; non-nationals must secure permission from the cantonal authorities to speak on a political issue at an open or closed private meeting of an association. In principle, non-nationals cannot anywhere stand as a candidate or vote in state or local government elections. Sweden now permits them to vote in local government elections (provided that they have been residents for three years); its lead has been followed by Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Norway. The German Constitutional Court has declared that the granting of franchise to nonnationals is unconstitutional, since the Constitution states that ‘all state authority emanates from the people’, the concept of people not including foreigners. That decision has been overruled by a constitutional amendment. In Australia, indigenous peoples (Aborigines) were not declared full citizens until 1962, when for the first time they got the franchise, and in Canada it was not until the 1970s that indigenous peoples were enfranchised. On the other hand, Britain has traditionally permitted citizens of the Commonwealth and the Irish Republic both to contest, and to vote in, national and local elections. The position under international instruments is also far from satisfactory. The ICCPR talks of minorities, but states have often claimed that only nationals are entitled to such rights. However, the UN Human Rights Committee has stated that Article 27 is applicable to non-citizens resident in the state. Whether a group is a minority depends upon objective criteria, and not upon a decision of the state. The UDHR and the ICCPR restrict political rights of franchise, representation and access to public service to citizens, for they belong to a person in respect of ‘his [sic] country’ (Articles 21 and 25 respectively). The UN Declaration on . . . Minorities mentions both national and ethnic minorities, which would cover migrant communities. The tone of European regional instruments was set by the Helsinki Declaration of the CSCE (1975) which refers to the rights only of ‘national minorities’ (s. VII). The Charter of Paris for a New Europe is likewise restricted and the influential Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1995) also restricts rights under it to ‘national minorities’. None of these instruments defines ‘national minorities’. Two well-known definitions of ‘minorities’ offered by Capotorti and Deschenes in the course of their work for the
13
See generally R. Cholewinski, Migrant Workers in International Human Rights Law: Their Protection in Countries of Employment (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997).
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YASH GHAI UN restrict it to citizens.14 A fortiori, ‘national minorities’ may be interpreted as referring to citizens. However, Professor Asbjørn Eide, in his article as Special Rapporteur on Minorities, expressed the view that ‘national minorities’ does not refer to ‘citizenship’, but to ‘ethnicity’, although a number of states, particularly Germany, have contested his interpretation.15 Another interpretation of ‘national minorities’ in the European context is that it refers to long-settled minorities, with another European state as the kin state, and is designed to exclude the newer immigrants. Anomalies and injustices arise from the fact, that in this globalized world, large numbers of people live in states of which they are not nationals, but where they expect to live most of their lives. Yet they have no automatic right to the citizenship of these states. Regulations for naturalization as a citizen vary from state to state; and the period of lawful residence before an application can be made varies from five to ten years. In an increasing number of states, citizenship rules are based on the principle of jus sanguinis, that is, the nationality of parents, so that members of a migrant community may remain ‘foreigners’ for generations. The Committee of the Council of Europe recommended to its members in September 2000 to take measures to enhance the security of long-term immigrants, including giving them the possibility of acquiring the state’s nationality. Reviews by the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the UN of citizenship laws enacted by the Czech Republic, Estonia and Latvia after their re-emergence as independent states, which resulted effectively in the loss of citizenship of people who did not belong to the dominant ethnic community, despite long residence, have suggested the limits of the discretion of states to determine citizenship laws. First, the UDHR and the ICCPR give everyone the right to a nationality, and although no specific obligation is placed on a state, this right can be realized only through regulation of state discretion. Second, such restrictive laws may offend the cardinal principle of non-discrimination which lies at the heart of human rights. Third, states in which a substantial number of people are not citizens and are thus not eligible for political rights, are unlikely to satisfy Article 25 of the ICCPR and similar or stronger provisions in other instruments requiring a democratic order.16
14
F. Capotorti, Study on the Rights of Persons belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, UN doc. E/CN.4/SUB.2/1985/31; Deschesnes, J., UN doc. E/CN.4/SUB.2/1985/31. 15 For references and a fuller discussion see Thornberry, P., ‘The UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities: background, analysis, observations, and an update’, in Phillips and Rosas (eds), supra note 6, pp. 29–36. 16 D.F. Orentlicher, ‘Citizenship and national identity’, in D. Wippman (ed.), International Law and Ethnic Conflict (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY,)
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PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, AUTONOMY AND MINORITIES 10. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS The right to participation is meaningless unless a group has the ability and the resources to exercise it. In many countries minorities have been economically or socially disadvantaged. Unless special programmes, such as educational facilities, access to the public service, or sometimes special financial loans, are established to enable them to catch up with other communities, the disparities between them and others increase. Participation assumes security and self-confidence. The importance of minimum levels of education and other social and economic facilities to the exercise of the right to participate is increasingly recognized in studies on poverty and social development (see the Copenhagen Social Development Declaration, 1995). It is at the national level that some progress has been made, although here too the constraints that globalization places on welfare have restricted progress. The constitutions of several countries now require or urge the state to provide economic and social rights, although for the most part they are mandatory only for disadvantaged groups, not necessarily numerical minorities (as in Fiji and Malaysia, where the main beneficiaries are members of numerical majority communities). India and South Africa are two outstanding examples, where the obligations on the state are based on the moral and political recognition of past injustices to particular ethnic or social groups. The recent Fiji Constitution (1997) imposes a legal obligation on the government to institute schemes for preferential policies for poorer communities and groups.17 Hungary has set up a Foundation for Hungarian Gypsies (Roma) and a Coordination Council for Gypsy Affairs to examine social and political problems confronting the Roma. A government decree (1995) obliges ministries to develop Roma programmes in housing, education, employment, agriculture and animal husbandry. Some other countries also practise preferential policies (similar institutions for the Roma have also been set up in the Czech Republic, Romania and Slovakia). 11. FORMS AND MECHANISMS OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION The most important form of participation is one in which the minority takes part in decision-making, whether legislative, executive or judicial. But participation can also include representations to decision-makers, or consultation before a decision is confirmed. Participation is also important in the implementation of legislative and administrative decisions and policies, as it is in procedures for monitoring and assessing the implementation. A particularly valued form of participation is selfgovernment, where specific matters of special concern to a minority are delegated for policy-making or administration to the minority. Participation can take place at different levels, national, regional and local. 17 The 1997 Fiji Constitution was abrogated by the army following the coup in May 2000. The High Court said this abrogation was illegal and the Constitution is still in force. The army’s appeal against this decision has not yet been heard as this Article goes to press.
17
YASH GHAI There are different modalities to ensure participation. Much of the emphasis is on decision-making bodies, but the role of consultative bodies should not be ignored. In Fiji all legislation relating to matters that might affect the interests of indigenous peoples is referred for comment to a representative body of Fijians. In Finland, Norway and Sweden, there are parliaments for the Sami, which governments have to consult on specified matters, and which may make representations on legislative and policy proposals to the national governments. National Councils for Minorities in Hungary are consulted on bills affecting them, and enjoy a limited veto on legislative proposals. In New Caledonia, the Customary Senate has to be consulted on ‘subjects relating to Kanak identity’. Many governments have set up anti-discriminatory bodies, ombudspersons for minorities, language commissions and equal opportunities institutions to analyse difficulties faced by minorities, to lobby for legislative or administrative reforms, and to empower minorities. People from minority communities are frequently members of such bodies. This gives them valuable access to information, public opinion and policy makers. Participation can also take the form of negotiations over differences between the minority and the state (or other groups). For example in New Zealand, differences over the meaning or implementation of the Waitangi Treaty, which governs the relations between indigenous peoples and the government, are negotiated with the mediation of the Waitangi Tribunal. The Tribunal has played a valuable role in establishing the framework and parameters within which the parties have negotiated. This has been an effective way of empowering Maori communities. Much of the discussion on participation focuses on official bodies. But unofficial bodies can provide a useful forum for consultation with and influence on decision-making bodies. In Croatia the Council of National Minorities, a nongovernmental association, which consists of one member of each of the 14 minorities in the country, complements the work of the parliamentary representatives of minorities. It facilitates dialogue between the government and minorities, examines and gives its opinion on draft laws and other legal acts which concern minorities, and monitors the implementation of provisions for minority protection. This article does not look at all the forms and mechanisms of participation (the Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life sets out a wide variety of them). The focus here is on representation, power sharing, and autonomy or self-government. However, before turning to them, it is necessary to refer to another important basis of participation – the right of access to the public service, which includes the right to employment in state services, recognized by the ICCPR, in Article 25 (c). The importance of equitable ethnic representation in the public service is now well recognized. A great deal of state policy and regulations are made by public servants, and it is appropriate that officials of minorities should be able to participate in these processes. Decisions on policy and implementation are better informed and improve through the input of minorities. The access of minorities to the public service and their relations with 18
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, AUTONOMY AND MINORITIES state services are greatly facilitated and improved if they can deal with officials from their own community. 12. RIGHT TO LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATION 12.1. Uses of Minority Representation Representation is a key instrument for participation, enabling voices of the minority to be heard in official bodies. The process of electing representatives acts to mobilize the minority and, depending on the method of election, to reinforce its corporate character, frequently through a political party. At the same time it also strengthens its articulation with the national political system. Representation is an emphatic recognition of a positive right of the minority – to take part in state political processes and to influence state policies. Because, in most democratic systems, governments are formed on the basis of representation, the minority will frequently be able to influence the formation of the executive and indeed to secure membership in it. Even if its representatives do not become part of the government, they are able to play an important role in the political process as part of the opposition. Additionally, they add to the efficiency and effectiveness of the legislature by bringing to the attention of the majority perspectives they would otherwise miss. In general if a minority is small, and represented proportionately, it may not have much influence on politics. In most countries, minorities are under-represented; in the USA African-Americans constitute approximately 12.4 per cent of the population but hold only 1.4 per cent of elected offices; Latino Americans fare worse: although eight per cent of the population, they hold only 0.8 per cent of elected offices, and in Canada indigenous peoples hold only one per cent of elected offices, although they are 3.5 per cent of the population.18 However, the value of representation to a minority also depends on factors other than numbers. Armed with votes or seats, a minority may be able to extract concessions or promises from larger political groups, or even enter into strategic alliances. If there are a number of ethnic groups, a small minority may hold the balance between the larger groups, as in Fiji where the small electorate of Europeans, Chinese and people of mixed race (‘Others’) has wielded disproportionate influence and participation in government for this reason. Even if there is a dominant community, the minority may be able to influence politics, if the dominant community is split into two or more parties, as the Sinhala have been in Sri Lanka. The Swedish People’s Party in Finland has helped to maintain the political influence of the Swedish-speaking minority; its members have been in most governments since 1945 in larger numbers than its population would justify. But it is noticeable that Swedish-speakers have influenced national politics also by joining
18
W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995) p. 132.
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YASH GHAI national political parties in which they have held senior positions. Here much may depend on the electoral system. Separate representation may enhance minority influence, as in Fiji, but minorities as part of the general electorate can also influence the outcome of national elections, as the Muslims in India are able to (it is estimated that the Muslim vote is decisive in nearly 100 parliamentary constituencies, forcing even the right-wing Hindu Bharattiya Janata Party to woo them). Forms of proportional representation may also enable minorities to influence the outcome of elections (the Tamil influence in Sri Lanka has increased with the shift to proportional representation, particularly in the presidential elections). Parliamentary systems are more prone to minority influences given the system of responsibility, although presidential elections can also empower minorities (as in the 1988 Nigerian elections).19 In bicameral legislatures, representation in the lower house may be more important – contrary to the convention of special representation in the upper house. A number of devices can be used to enhance the value of minority representation. In some circumstances it may be more effective to have representation for purposes of bringing the interests and concerns of minorities to the attention of the legislature. A novel form of representation has been proposed by the Mikmaq Grand Council for the band in the Nova Scotia legislature. It is proposed that a member would be elected or nominated by the Council, to be known as the Treaty Deputy, whose function would be to ensure that the provisions of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed in 1752 between Mikmaq and the Crown would not be abrogated. The Deputy would also be able to address general political questions of consequence to the Mikmaq people.20 In order not to affect the democratic process, the Deputy would not have a vote in matters not affected by the Treaty. The inspiration for this proposal may have come from the State of Maine in the USA, which has traditionally allowed two representatives of indigenous groups, elected on a special ballot, in its legislature in order to protect their treaty rights. The provision in the Indian Constitution for nomination of Anglo-Indians to the Upper House was intended to perform a similar function. Representatives of minorities or minority regions can be given a special role in the legislative process. Members from Scotland in the British Parliament have traditionally formed the Grand Scottish Committee to review legislative bills of special relevance to Scotland, and it has been possible even to take one or more readings of the bill in that committee. In Fiji, representatives of indigenous Fijians sit with senior Fijian civil servants in the Fijian Affairs Committee to review legislative proposals of special concern to them before the proposals can be enacted by the Parliament (this provision dates from the time when indigenous Fijians were considered a vulnerable group). Some constitutions go even further and give communal representatives the right to block legislative proposals or to subject them to a special procedure. In Belgium, where members are divided into linguistic 19 See also D. Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1991) pp. 184–6. 20 See Turpel, supra note 4, pp. 107–8, on which this account is based.
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PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, AUTONOMY AND MINORITIES groups, the enactment of certain laws requires the votes of two-thirds of each linguistic group, provided that each group has a majority of its members in the legislature at the time of the vote. Another procedure is designed to help the Frenchspeaking minority: when the French linguistic group considers that a bill is likely to impair relations between the French and Flemish communities, three-quarters of its members may raise an objection, whereupon the matter is referred to the Council of Ministers, consisting of an equal number of French and Flemish and operating by consensus. The Council presents a reasoned response to the legislature, either to defend or modify the bill. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the legislative quorum in the House of Peoples in the Parliamentary Assembly requires three representatives each of Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs. In the second chamber of the Parliamentary Assembly, the House of Representatives, a majority of all members comprises a quorum. Any community can declare that a proposed decision affects its vital interests, which then calls for special procedures for mediation and reconciliation of differences. If the political process fails to resolve differences, the matter is referred to the Constitutional Court. The focus of this section of the Article is on representation in national institutions. However, representation can be secured indirectly, through elections to councils of minorities which have a consultative status with the legislature or the government (as in Croatia, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia). This form of representation can be especially useful when members of minorities, being nonnationals, lack the franchise to vote in national elections. The EU states are encouraged to set up these councils when minorities are otherwise disenfranchised. Second, representation at the local government level to facilitate minority participation is receiving increased attention. In several countries, non-nationals are allowed to participate in local government elections and institutions, and several instruments have drawn attention to the potential of local-level politics for the participation and welfare of minorities. In other instances, national minorities are given rights of self-government if they constitute a majority in a district (as in Croatia and Hungary), and the draft Sri Lankan Constitution (February 2000) not only provides for power sharing at the provincial level but also for cultural councils at the district level. 12.2. Securing Minority Representation: the Electoral System It is only in recent years that consideration has been given to the adaptation of electoral systems to minority representation.21 Two widely different approaches have been advanced on their representation. The first focuses on ensuring representation for minorities by members of the minority, hopefully proportional to their size of the population, either through a national electoral system which will 21
See K.M. de Silva, ‘Electoral systems’, in C. Young (ed.), Ethnic Diversity and Public Policy: A Comparative Policy, (Macmillan, London, 1998); and B. Reilly, and A. Reynolds, Electoral Systems and Conflict in Divided Societies (National Academy Press, Washington, DC, 1999).
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YASH GHAI facilitate this, or, if necessary, by a system of separate representation. The other approach is less concerned with direct minority representation than with their political integration. The distinction is sometimes blurred, for some methods for direct minority representation are compatible with their integration, such as proportional representation (PR). In practice the distinction between systems which do and do not provide for separate minority representation is greater. Of the electoral systems which are not explicitly based on ethnic representation, the most common are the plurality–majoritarian systems and the proportional representation system. The plurality, or first-past-the-post, system, typically used in Britain, the USA and many other countries which have been associated with them historically, is the least favourable for the election of minority representation – unless the minority is sufficiently concentrated in a locality to constitute a dominant group. In Britain, for example, there are relatively few parliamentarians from minority communities, and those usually represent constituencies with significant minority populations.22 Sometimes the first-past-the-post system can yield minority representation if constituency boundaries are changed; such changes have been judicially approved in the USA to allow representation of black people in the Southern states. If minorities are politically well integrated with the majority, their members may well be elected in such a system, as with the Jewish community in Britain. The majoritarian systems are even less favourable to minorities, for a candidate needs to secure at least 51 per cent of the votes to win. The best-known example of a majoritarian system is what is called the ‘two-round system’, under which, if no candidate wins a majority in the first round, a second poll is taken in which voters choose between the two top candidates (as in France and its former colonies, and parts of Europe and Latin America). A variation of majoritarianism is the ‘alternative vote’ (AV), in which electors mark their preference among candidates and if, on the first count, no candidate gets the majority of the first preferences, the candidate with the fewest votes is eliminated and electors’ second preferences are distributed among remaining candidates until a majority winner emerges. There are also several types of PR which aim at relating the number of representatives to the votes cast for particular candidates or parties. The best-known of these systems is the List PR system, under which political parties contesting the elections present a list of their candidates to the voters. The constituency is either the whole state (as in Israel, Moldova, Namibia and Slovakia) or, more commonly, a series of multi-member constituencies. Large constituencies are better for minority representation. The voting is for a party and not a candidate; a party is entitled to the number of seats which corresponds to its share of the vote, so that if it wins 30 per cent of the votes, it gets 30 per cent of the seats, which go to the requisite number of candidates at the top of its list. However, a party has to secure a minimum percentage of votes before it can get any seats; this is known as the ‘threshold’, although a number of countries have no threshold at all – Belgium, Bosnia22
S. Saggar, Race and British Electoral Politics (UCL Press, London and Bristol, PA, 1998).
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PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, AUTONOMY AND MINORITIES Herzegovina, Spain and Switzerland, or none for parties of minority groups, as in Poland and Germany. In some systems, voters are not bound by the ranking of a party’s candidates and may declare their own preference (‘open list’). Experience suggests that a closed list, in which the party leadership determines the order of priority, can be more effective for securing representation of minorities and women. It is also possible to require political parties to nominate a minimum number of members of minority communities (this device has been useful in securing the representation of women as in Nepal). In the PR system, unless the threshold for securing seats is high, a minority can secure representation through its own political party. Thus, as between majoritarian and PR systems, the latter is more likely to result in minority representation and to provide incentives for formation of ethnic parties. In the former system, a member of a minority keen on a political career is more likely to join a ‘mainstream’ party, for the prospects of a minority ethnic party are poor, except in areas, if any, where they are in a majority. The second approach favours designing electoral systems to integrate different communities by creating incentives for political parties to broaden their appeal to attract votes from all communities. The aim therefore is not so much to ensure direct minority representation, as those who are elected are likely to enjoy the support of minorities and thus be moderate in their policies. The rules for the election of the Nigerian President, but not of other officials, under the 1982 Constitution were based on this approach (and has recently been used in Kenyan presidential elections). An electoral system to encourage communal integration was adopted in the 1997 Fiji Constitution, although it retained elements of separate representation. Singapore provides an example of a system which both secures minority representation and attempts to integrate communities. A number of constituencies, called the Group Representative Constituency (GRC), return either three or four members. A political party which wants to contest in these constituencies has to present a slate of three or four candidates, of which at least one must be from a minority. Electors vote for the slate rather than individual candidates. The justification advanced for this system is that it secures the election of some minority candidates, although its critics saw it as an attempt by the government to stifle opposition parties which would have difficulty in securing enough qualified candidates given the constraints under which opposition parties operate. It is certainly the case that so far all GRC seats have been won by the ruling party.23 In its electoral reforms of 1993, New Zealand altered its system of representation for Maori by giving them the option to vote on a separate electorate or common roll – as more Maoris opted for the common roll, there was a corresponding reduction in separate representation, a provision designed to encourage integration. With this common roll Maoris secured higher representation than in the past, thanks to the PR system that was adopted at the same time. 23 Thio Li-am, ‘The elected president and the legal control of government’, in K. Tan and Lam Peng Er (eds), Managing Political Change in Singapore (Routledge, London, 1997) pp. 107–8.
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YASH GHAI The integrationist approach favours electoral systems which create incentives for political parties to woo support among all communities. This is expected to result in both multi-ethnic and moderate parties. Such systems work best when the votes of the minority can have a decisive influence on the outcome of the elections. This is indeed its drawback, for while preferential voting systems like the alternative vote or the single transferable vote (STV) can give the minority a decisive say, they can do so only if certain population configurations are present. Essentially, not only must the constituency be ethnically heterogeneous, but the majority community in it must be split into at least two political parties of roughly equal strength – as has often happened with the Sinhala parties in presidential elections in Sri Lanka. Unless these conditions exist naturally, they will need to be created through constituency boundary changes to establish balanced heterogeneity, as in Fiji. This raises its own difficulties and is open to political manipulation. If an election system does not work as projected by its proponents, the logic of majoritarianism, on which the system is based, is likely to result in an under-representation of minorities. 12.3. Communal Representation The preoccupation with minority representation in recent years, particularly as part of complex constitutional schemes for the governance of multi-ethnic territories, has led to provisions for separate representation for ethnic groups, particularly for minorities (called here ‘communal representation’), as in Croatia, Finland, Hungary, Romania and Slovenia. Communal representation was the cornerstone of the British colonial system, but at independence most former colonies abolished this system of separate representation, the outstanding exceptions being Cyprus and Fiji. This system is also to be found in China (where minorities are deliberately overrepresented), New Zealand and Samoa. The revival of communal representation in the face of considerable criticism calls for an assessment, which I do by examining a number of examples of its adoption. 12.3.1. Cyprus From the very start of representative politics in Cyprus, Britain introduced communal representation. Such was the bitterness between the dominant Greek community and the minority Turkish community (fuelled no doubt by their ‘kin states’) that independence could only be secured through an intricate Constitution built around far-reaching consociational principles. The Greek (including the Maronite community) and the Turkish communities were treated as separate entities, and the entire system of representation, government, administration and social services was based on proportionality, with Greeks counting for 70 per cent and Turks 30 per cent of the population. This was based on a slight over-representation of Turks. The House of Representatives consisted of 50 members, of whom 35 were Greek and 15 Turkish, elected on a communal basis. The President of the House had to be a Greek, the Vice-President a Turk. In addition to the full House, there were also communal chambers of Greek and Turkish members respectively, which had 24
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, AUTONOMY AND MINORITIES wide law-making powers in educational, religious and personal affairs, and other matters delegated to them by the House. The President of Cyprus had to be Greek, elected by Greek voters and the Vice-President a Turk who was elected by the Turks, each with their own special powers. Ministerial posts were also divided among the two communities; Greek ministers were appointed (and removed) by the President; the Vice-President performed similar functions in relation to Turkish ministers. The system produced extreme rigidity; the Greeks resented it for giving disproportionate powers to Turks, and Turks resented the permanent dominant position of the Greeks. The first wanted to change the Constitution; the second boycotted arrangements agreed at independence (in which, it should be stated, the decisive influence was of metropolitan powers). Cypriot politics were also complicated by political and military interventions of Greece and Turkey, which eventually spelled the end of the Republic as described above. 12.3.2. India The Indian National Congress which led India to independence was opposed to ethnic electoral rolls and representation which the British had introduced in 1909. It would have been willing to contemplate them if Pakistan had not been carved out of the subcontinent as the homeland for Muslims; separate rolls having been devised primarily for Muslims. Austin says that the: ‘members of the Constituent Assembly had one predominant aim when framing the legislative provisions of the Constitution: to create a basis for the social and political unity of the country’.24
He summarizes the situation at independence as follows: ‘not only did the provinces lack even a semblance of popular government . . . but the small electorate that existed was itself thoroughly fragmented . . . split into no less than thirteen communal and functional compartments for whose representatives seats were reserved in the various parliamentary bodies’.
Similar distinctions were applied in the indirectly elected central legislature. The Constituent Assembly did agree to one form of special representation, for scheduled castes and tribes, as part of the package of affirmative policies for these communities. The Constitution expressly provides for reserved seats for each of these communities in proportion to their share of the population in both the lower house at the national level and in the states (Articles 330 and 332 respectively; arguably seats can be reserved for them in other political bodies under Article 15 of the Constitution).25 In India’s parliamentary systems, lower houses are the more 24
G. Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation (Oxford University Press, Bombay, 1972) p. 144. 25 M. Galanter, Competing Equalities (Oxford University Press, Delhi) p. 45, n. 15. The following account draws heavily on Galanter.
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YASH GHAI important component of the legislature, as it is there that governments are formed and removed. This provision was originally to last for ten years, but it has been renewed ever since. The scheduled castes constitute about 15 per cent of the population, and the scheduled tribes seven per cent, so that they enjoy significant guaranteed representation. The law also provides that scheduled castes and scheduled tribes candidates are required to make smaller deposits. Separate electorates are prohibited for the national and state legislatures and the Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution to prohibit separate electoral rolls at local levels.26 All registered voters may vote in constituencies in which seats are reserved for scheduled castes or scheduled tribes. The Delimitation Commission, an independent body, determines in which constituencies seats will be reserved. There is a single criterion for the selection of constituencies for scheduled tribes – the concentration of its population. Since the scheduled tribes still live in particular areas, these constituencies contain a high proportion of their population, more than 50 per cent in more than half the constituencies so reserved, so that the bulk of scheduled tribes (about 70 per cent) would live in such constituencies. As for scheduled castes, who are more dispersed, reservations have to be spread throughout the country, and to be located, in so far as possible, in constituencies in which the proportion of their population to the total is comparatively large. Thus constituencies with reserved seats for scheduled castes contain proportionately fewer of them than is the case with scheduled tribes. The largest contain about 30 per cent. There is considerable opposition from other communities to the designation of the constituencies in which they live as reserved constituencies, as it deprives their members of the right to the seat. Galanter says that on the whole, constituencies reserved for the scheduled castes ‘tend to be political backwaters – slightly less urban, with less newspaper circulation and a slightly greater percentage of agricultural labourers’.27 Scheduled tribe constituencies tend to be more isolated and less urban than general constituencies. The effect of the reservations is to ensure the representation of these two communities, who are otherwise politically and economically marginalized. This is particularly important for the scheduled castes who do not form a majority anywhere. As over 20 per cent of seats are held by the members of these communities, all major parties have an interest in promoting candidates from them. The candidates likewise have an incentive to cast their appeal beyond their own communities, particularly in the scheduled caste constituencies. This has helped to integrate scheduled caste and scheduled tribe members into the constitutional and political system, but this result has perhaps been achieved at the expense of abandoning particular advocacy of the claims of their own communities. Nevertheless, there are parties which are based predominantly on their support, particularly at the state level, where their members have achieved high office.28 It is 26
Nain Sukh Das v. State of UP, AIR 1953 SC 384. Galanter, supra note 25, p. 48. 28 O. Mendelsohn, and M. Vicziany, ‘The Untouchables’, in O. Mendlesohn and U. Baxi (eds), The Rights of Subordinated Peoples (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1994). 27
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PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, AUTONOMY AND MINORITIES fair to say that the reservations have given the two communities considerable political clout. It has facilitated their entry into the government and their lobbying has been crucial for the maintenance and improvement of other affirmative action policies, which for the most part are authorized but not mandatory. 12.3.3. Bosnia and Herzegovina The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, officially named Bosnia and Hercegovina, is composed of two Entities, 1) the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 2) the Republika Srpska. Many important powers are vested in the Entities, whilst the government at the level of the state has powers which are necessary to constitute and exercise external aspects of state sovereignty and is responsible for key issues, such as human rights protection. The Constitution is built around the concept of ethnic communities and includes both individual rights of citizens and very strong provisions for collective rights of the three main ethnic groups, called constituent peoples. Arrangements for representation and power sharing take the three main ethnic communities as building blocks, carrying forward the proposition stated in the Preamble that Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs are ‘constituent peoples’ of Bosnia and Herzegovina. ‘Others’, and ‘citizens’ are mentioned only in passing. Professor Pajic implies, critically, that this makes these three communities, rather than the people as a whole, the source and bearers of sovereignty.29 The Parliamentary Assembly has two chambers, House of Peoples and House of Representatives. The House of Peoples has 15 Delegates; these are five Bosniacs and five Croats from the Federation of Bosnia and Hercegovina (selected, respectively, by the Bosniac and Croat Delegates to the House of Peoples of the Federation) and five Serbs from the Republika Srpska (selected by the National Asembly of Republika Srpska). (Article IV). This means that Serbs in the Federation, Bosniaks and Croats in Republika Srpska and minorities across the whole of Bosnia and Hercegovina are excluded from standing for office for the House of Peoples. Nine members of the House of Peoples constitute the quorum, so long as there are at least three from each constituent people. The House of Representatives has two thirds of its members elected from the Federation of Bosnia and Hercegovina and one third from Republika Srpska; a majority of all members constitutes a quorum. The result of these arrangements is that politics is entirely communal, and almost perforce political parties are ethnically based. Parties get together in Parliament or government only after the elections. The system creates incentives for parties and their leaders to intensify appeals to narrow ethnic interests, which in some cases is linked to their kinsfolk in other states, which does little for the unity of the country. In the 1996 elections, the most extreme ethnic party in each community won the elections, leaving their leaders the impossible task of finding a 29 Z. Pajic, ‘A Critical Appraisal of the Dayton Accord Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, in W. Bendek (ed.), Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina after Dayton: From Theory to Practice (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1996).
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YASH GHAI common purpose.30 The relevance of this form of representation for public participation will become clear when power sharing in Bosnia and Hercegovina is discussed later in this Article. 12.3.4. Fiji In Fiji one of the most difficult questions that the leaders of the different ethnic communities had to resolve at independence was the electoral system. Fiji has now experienced three different electoral systems, and is about to design a fourth. The 1970 (independence) Constitution was dominated by communal seats and communal voting. Although there was provision for national seats, their structure was still based on an ethnic allocation of seats, while the logic of communal seats prevailed over the logic of national seats which was intended to provide a basis for non-racial politics. There were 52 members: 27 were elected on communal franchise (12 by indigenous Fijians, two by Indo-Fijians and three by general electors, principally Europeans and their part descendants and Chinese); 25 (‘national seats’) were allocated communally (10 each to indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians and five to the general electors) but all the voters in the community voted for them – hence the system came to be known as ‘cross-voting’. Each voter had three votes in the contests for national seats, each to be cast for members of different ethnic groups. The rationale of national seats was to integrate ethnic groups politically, promote inter-ethnic parties and prepare for the transition to a complete common roll. However, the logic of the system was dictated by the communal rather than the national seats. Politically, parties were organized essentially on ethnic lines, in order to compete for communal seats. There was one dominant party for each of the communities. While the need to contest national seats compelled each of the major parties to extend its appeal beyond the community they principally represented, for the most part this was not successful, and few attracted votes from other communities. National seats were decided principally by communal votes; thus, indigenous Fijian candidates sponsored by the dominantly Indo-Fijian National Federation Party were successful as a result of Indo-Fijian votes, and so on. This was possible because of the concentration of the two major communities in different constituencies. In this way cross-voting seats became an extension of communal seats. The Alliance Party (the dominant party of indigenous Fijians) was a partial exception to this trend. It attracted a significant percentage of Indo-Fijian votes, especially for the cross-voting seats, in which it often achieved over 20 per cent of the vote. By contrast the National Federation Party commonly gained less than five per cent of indigenous Fijian votes. However, the Alliance Party had to maintain its support among indigenous Fijians if it was to remain a serious political contender, especially as militant indigenous Fijian parties were bidding for the support of its 30
Supra note 2.
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PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, AUTONOMY AND MINORITIES principal electorate. The logic of the system compelled the Alliance Party progressively to champion exclusively indigenous Fijian interests. The 1990 Constitution, adopted by the military government following the 1987 coups, abolished national seats. It not only removed any vestiges of cross-voting, completing the separation of ethnic groups (and making politics almost totally ethnically based), but also aimed to ensure the permanent and undisputed rule of indigenous Fijians. It gave a disproportionately large representation to them in both houses of Parliament (in the House of Representatives 37 out of 70 seats being reserved for them). In addition it provided that a Prime Minister had always to be an indigenous Fijian. It also dispensed with the rather awkward, residual agenda of the 1970 Constitution that the ultimate aim was the development of a multi-ethnic Fiji. The sidelining in this way of the Indo-Fijians had the predictable effect of releasing factionalism within the Fijian community that had been largely contained under the more balanced allocation of communal seats in the 1970 Constitution. The 1997 Constitution (overthrown in May 2000) largely abandoned that approach, but it continued with significant reliance on communal representation. It provided for 25 open seats in the House of Representatives (out of a total of 71) which were open to candidates of any ethnic group and for which all voters resident in the constituency could vote, and 46 communal seats (to be voted communally) divided between the ethnic communities. The voting for these, as for communal seats, was by the alternative vote system. While in communal seats this method of voting served principally the purpose of ensuring that the winning candidate enjoyed clear majority support, its purpose in open seats was to provide incentives for political parties to cooperate across ethnic frontiers. Under the AV system, a voter has to declare his or her preference among all the candidates. Since a winning candidate has to have an absolute majority, the second and subsequent preferences of a voter can be crucial in determining the result. This method thus opens up possibilities of arrangements between political parties for the trade-off of the second and subsequent preferences of their supporters. The logic of the system might well have led to multi-ethnic parties (as was the expectation of the Reeves Commission which recommended it). Additionally, it was expected that candidates with moderate views would have an advantage over those espousing extreme views, as they would have a chance of capturing more second preferences.31 The results of the first general election seemed to have vindicated some of the assumptions of the Reeves Commission. Two broad coalitions of communal parties were formed and contested the elections. However, it was not only moderate parties with conciliatory policies that tended to trade preferences. In fact the more ethnically conciliatory coalition lost the election, negating the assumption that, even if an extremist party may get a significant proportion of first preferences, the more moderate parties would get the second and subsequent preferences. As an observer of the results has commented: 31
Fiji Constitution Review Commission (the Reeves Commission) 9.150–152 and 10.31– 10.109; see also Horowitz, supra note 3.
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YASH GHAI ‘Where racial polarisation is particularly sharp, it is easy to envisage a situation where a majority of an ethnic group’s first preferences are picked up by the militant flank party, which also attracts, at the second, third or subsequent count, the preference votes from eliminated more moderate parties representing the same ethnic group. Here the AV system could serve, not as a vehicle for inter-ethnic compromise, but as a means of cohering a 32 politically fragmented ethnic group around an extremist position.’
A major party with predominant Indo-Fijian support failed to secure a single seat, although its share of the communal vote was over 32 per cent. It does not seem therefore that the electoral system led to cross-ethnic voting on any scale, nor to any proportionality, but the logic of open seats on the AV system did lead to multiethnic coalitions.33 Unfortunately it is not possible to make a reliable assessment of this interesting system, for it was tried only once. But the experience may reflect limits of electoral designs and the ability of voters to handle elaborate voting systems. 12.4. Discussion Where both the majority and minorities are agreed that minorities should be represented separately, there may be no objection to communal electorates. But the case studies examined in this Article raise doubts as to whether separate representation in general is desirable. A particularly acute observer of constitutional politics, Stanley de Smith concluded that communal seats tend: ‘to magnify existing communal differences, in as much as communities are stirred to fuller self-consciousness and electoral campaigns are dominated by appeals to communal prejudices; and new communities discover themselves as further claims to separate representation are lodged’.34
It is exceedingly hard to establish national parties, necessary for political integration, when voting is communal. Communal forms of representation often irritate and provoke majority groups, although this is not in itself a reason for not adopting them. Members of minorities have fewer prospects of high office if they rely on their own separate parties and representation than if they were members of national parties (unless there are provisions for power sharing). Communal representation also tends to obscure social and economic interests that sections of different communities have in common. Moreover, leaders and parties of the majority party have little incentive to woo minorities or design policies to suit them. A better approach would be to consider devices whereby, within an integrated electoral 32
J. Fraenkel, ‘The triumph of the non-idealist intellectuals? An investigation of Fiji’s 1999 election results’ (unpublished, 2000). 33 S. Prasad, ‘Fiji 1999 general elections: outcome and prospects’, in A. Haoon Akram-Lodhi (ed.), Confronting Fiji Futures (Asia Pacific Press, Canberra, 2000). 34 S. De Smith, The New Commonwealth and Its Constitutions (Stevens, London, 1964) p. 118.
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PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, AUTONOMY AND MINORITIES system, there are legal requirements or political incentives to secure representation of minorities, through the list system in PR or mandatory nomination of a minimum number of minority candidates. 13. POWER SHARING It is increasingly realized that, although an important basis for participation, representation by itself does not allow a minority to participate significantly in public affairs. Whatever the electoral system, its members would be too insignificant to influence policy, much less stake a claim to membership of the government or other key institutions, unless the minority held the balance between the major parties contending to form a government, as has often happened in Israel, for example. Ways must therefore be found for the minority to share in government and administration, through membership of the cabinet and other policy making bodies, and in the public service, including the judiciary. Power sharing refers to a system in which all major ethnic or political groups are entitled to participate in government and to a proportion of positions in the public service. It also tends to establish harmony and stability, through a partnership of ethnic groups. The best-known example of power sharing is consociationalism, whereby ethnic groups are recognized as political entities, and as such are entitled to a large measure of self-government in matters deemed to be internal to them, and to a share in power when matters of common interest are being resolved, at the national level. However, consociationalism, which has many critics, is not the only method of power sharing. It is possible to base power sharing not explicitly on ethnicity but on political parties, as in the transitional arrangements in South Africa and under the 1997 Fiji Constitution, for these arrangements also tend to encourage political integration of ethnic groups. Power sharing in consociationalism relies on a number of other devices as a package, but simpler forms of power sharing can be established, geared principally to giving minorities a share in power at the national and local levels. Arrangements for power sharing can be stipulated in the constitution, as they would under consociationalism, or be left to political understandings or conventions, as in India where it is normal to include at least a member of scheduled communities in the cabinet, and in the US Supreme Court where at least one Jewish and one black judge would normally be expected to hold office. But the important point in such systems is not so much a convention to ensure participation of minorities as that minorities are involved, and integrated, in mainstream politics through parties and other mechanisms. While in the West, to a considerable extent, minorities have had access to power through a non-ethnic political process, in many parts of Asia and Africa minorities have been denied such a role. Hence the current interest in consociationalism. In general, there is considerable agreement that power sharing is desirable, particularly as minorities would otherwise remain marginalized. However, some criticism is made of arrangements which seek to be inclusive, where all key groups are in government, on the grounds that the government is not subject to sufficient 31
YASH GHAI scrutiny and is less accountable. It is also said that coalition governments, which is what power sharing entails, are weak and inefficient as it is difficult to agree on policies and their implementation. Compulsory quotas in the public service, another consequence of power sharing, may arguably lead to the appointment and promotion of incompetent candidates. But even among those who support power sharing, there is considerable disagreement on principles and modalities. Some of these principles and modalities, such as federalism or other forms of autonomy, are discussed below. There are few studies that focus on different methods of power sharing and their relative worth.35 A review of some experiences of power sharing may help us to assess the value of this way of empowering minorities. 13.1. Cyprus Power sharing was instituted principally by vesting specified powers respectively in the President and Vice-President of the Republic, the former of which must be Greek and the latter Turkish, elected by their own communities. The President appointed (and could remove) seven Greek ministers; the Vice-President three Turkish ministers. The President and the Vice-President had to make some decisions jointly, but decisions on the most important matters, which applied on a communal basis, were made by them separately. This meant that on many matters there were different regimes for the communities, and that these matters were under the jurisdiction of each community. The President and the Vice-President each had a veto over specified legislation, primarily on matters of common interest to the communities. This ensured that no legislation in these areas could be passed over the opposition of either community. Similar vetoes operated also in the Council of Ministers. Such a system of power sharing placed more importance on differences rather than commonality of interests. It was likely to produce conflict and deadlock, and that is precisely what it did. The President acted, or perhaps more charitably, was compelled to act several times in contravention of the Constitution. There were frequent disputes about the allocation or exercise of powers. The constitutional arrangements collapsed under their own weight, assisted by outside intervention. The collapse led to communal violence and transfers of population, so that Cyprus is now divided between a northern Turkish area and a southern Greek area, and the search, under the auspices of the UN, has been under way for years for a federal solution to the division of territory and the antagonism between the communities. 13.2. Northern Ireland Power sharing has been a recurrent theme in Northern Ireland. In 1973 the British Parliament, in a shift from majority rule, provided that autonomy for Northern Ireland would depend on the formation of a broadly based executive, accepted by 35
But see Sisk, supra note 2.
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PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, AUTONOMY AND MINORITIES the population, based on representation of both communities (the Northern Ireland Constitution Act). However, the government (and the system of autonomy) was short-lived as it was opposed by the Ulster Unionists who won 11 out of 12 seats in the election to Westminster and thus discredited the power-sharing arrangements (the opposition being not so much to power sharing as to a subsequent agreement between the UK, Irish and Northern Irish political parties to the ‘Irish Dimension’ through the Council of Ireland). In 1982 another attempt was made to move towards autonomy. At first the functions of the Northern Ireland Assembly were consultation, scrutiny and deliberation, particularly in relation to legislation proposed by the British government in Parliament. However devolution would take place if 70 per cent of the Assembly members supported it or if both communities supported it; full devolution would require an executive acceptable to both communities, implying some form of power sharing. This system was stillborn since the ‘nationalists’ (those supportive of closer a connection with the Irish Republic), opposed it, as it did not provide for something like the Council of Ireland. The next move towards power sharing was the Belfast Agreement (the Good Friday Agreement) in 1998, which has the support of the governments of the Irish Republic, the UK and the USA. At the first meeting of the Assembly all members are to register their identity in one of three categories – nationalist, unionist or ‘other’. The election of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister is through cross-voting, in which there are three separate forms of voting – by all the members, by the unionists and by the nationalists. Candidates have to secure the support of the majority of all three groups, thus placing a premium upon moderate candidates. Other ministers take office in proportion to the size of their parties’ representation in the Assembly. The First and the First Deputy Ministers form a diarchy, so that if one resigns, the other also loses office. They cannot be removed by the Assembly. The principle of power sharing is carried into the Assembly where, for key issues, decisions are made not by simple majority voting but by majority of both nationalists and unionists, or, if agreed, by a majority of the votes of members, provided that it includes 40 per cent of each of the members of the these communities. While the antecedents of this system are understandable, it may tend to entrench religious/political differences, at a time when a substantial proportion of the people of Northern Ireland are willing to drop communal differences. It would give power to those who are adept at manipulating religious differences and nationalist politics. This system unfortunately downgrades the votes of ‘others’, and thus is less favourable to those who work across communities. 13.3. South Africa There were spurious efforts at ‘power sharing’ in apartheid South Africa. ‘Bantustans’ were created, ostensibly to empower black Africans in their ‘homelands’, and the 1982 Constitution established different legislative chambers 33
YASH GHAI for whites, Indians and Coloureds, and the concept of ‘own’ and ‘common’ affairs, whereby each chamber had jurisdiction over communal affairs, and jointly over common affairs. The whole system, a disguise for white domination, worked under the hegemony of the white chamber. During the discussions on, and negotiations for, future constitutional dispensation after the collapse of apartheid, demands for power sharing were made by sections of the white, particularly Afrikaner, community and the Zulu-based Inkatha Party. Although contrary to its non-racial policy, the African National Congress (ANC) was prepared to accept it to ensure democratization. These concessions for the government of national unity were included in the powersharing provisions of the 1993 (transitional) Constitution. Certain executive powers were vested in the President, elected at a joint sitting of Parliament, to be exercised at his or her discretion; others had to be exercised after consultations with the cabinet (sec. 82). Each party which had at least 20 seats in the National Assembly was entitled to seats in the cabinet proportionate to its seats in the Assembly. In addition, each party which had at least 80 members was entitled to nominate an Executive Deputy President. The role of Deputy Presidents was central to the scheme of power sharing. The President had to consult with them on a number of matters, including the development and execution of government policies, the management of cabinet business, appointment of ambassadors and negotiations of treaties, appointment of commissions of enquiry, holding referenda and pardon or reprieve of prisoners (sec. 82(2)). Powers for the allocation and appointment of ministries were to be exercised ‘in the spirit underlying the concept of a government of national unity’ and through consensus, but in the event consensus could not be achieved, the decisive say rested with the President on the allocation of ministries and with party leaders on appointment of ministers from their parties (sec. 88(5)). The Constitution stated that the cabinet: ‘shall function in a manner which gives consideration to the consensus seeking spirit underlying the concept of a government of national unity as well as the need for effective government’. (sec. 89(2))
The Constitution also provided for the collective responsibility of the cabinet, especially necessary in case of forced, multi-party government. If a minister failed to act in accordance with presidential instructions, the minister could be removed by the President, after discussions with his or her party leader (sec. 92(2)). The provisions for power sharing enabled a measure of bipartisanship in the transition from apartheid towards a non-racial, democratic South Africa. It should be noted that the criterion for power sharing was not ethnic, but it was clearly assumed that it would facilitate the inclusion in government of all ethnic groups (as it did). But it should also be noted that members of all ethnic groups would have been represented even if only the ANC, the party with a substantial majority, had formed government, such were its multi-racial credentials. The provisions did not lead to the accentuation of the ethnic base of parties; all major parties attempted to broaden the ethnic base of their support. It is also worth noting that there were no vetoes for 34
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, AUTONOMY AND MINORITIES participating parties or mechanisms to block decisions (as is the current preoccupation of European schemes of power sharing). The Constitution specifically mentioned the need for efficiency. The experience of power sharing did indeed show a concern with efficiency and the need to maintain consensus through what was a difficult and testing time for South Africa‘s transition. The cabinet was able to maintain a remarkable, and surprising, degree of cohesion. Nevertheless, party leaders in government had difficulties in dealing with their own backbenchers, particularly when trying to sell them compromises reached in the cabinet. This was a problem for all parties, but especially for the ANC, which had enough numbers to have constituted a government on its own in a straightforward majoritarian system. It was this restlessness that persuaded its leadership not to support the continuation of power sharing arrangements when the final Constitution was negotiated. 13.4. Fiji One of the major political problems that Fiji has faced since independence is that its first two constitutions (1970 and 1990) included communal representation in the legislature but provided for government by the majority party. This produced a government composed predominantly of indigenous Fijians and deprived IndoFijians of many rights of political participation – producing acute political tensions. After the failure of the racist Constitution of 1990, there developed wide consensus among leaders of major political parties that all communities should share in the powers and functions of the executive, reflected in the 1997 Constitution. The President appoints as Prime Minister the member of the House of Representatives who in his/her view commands the confidence of the House (sec. 98). The Constitution entitles any political party which wins ten per cent of the seats to join the cabinet (sec. 99(5) and (7)). If the Prime Minister needs the support of other parties to form a government, these parties would be in a strong position to negotiate policies that would bind the government. If the Prime Minister’s party has a majority or substantial numbers, it may exercise a hegemonic role, and other parties may be compelled to comply with its priorities. Smaller parties (those with fewer than eight members) would be less favourably placed than before, for previously they might have held the balance of power. However, the Constitution permits the Prime Minister to appoint as minister a member of such a party, but only by sacrificing a ministerial post from his or her party’s quota (sec. 99(6)). The Prime Minister appoints ministers (sec. 99(1)), although when appointing people from a participating party, he or she has to consult with its leader. The Prime Minister alone decides on the allocation of portfolios (sec. 103) and the dismissal of ministers (sec. 99(1)). He or she would effectively have to consult the leader of the minister’s party in the case of dismissal, for in replacing the minister, the Prime Minister would have to consult that leader. In most Westminster-type systems, the Prime Minister is no longer, as in constitutional theory, primus inter pares (first among equals), but is effectively the government. This may not create a major 35
YASH GHAI constitutional problem if the government consists of one party (whatever the strains within the party), but could become problematic in the case of coalitions. In the case of Fiji under the new Constitution, the problems and difficulties may be even greater: for one, the purpose of multi-party government is power sharing – a purpose which could be negated if the Prime Minister were not to consult other partner parties and, second, multi-party government is mandated by the Constitution, and is not a voluntary arrangement. A ‘forced marriage’ of this kind requires the utmost sensitivity, consultation and compromise, and therefore effectively changes the nature of the office of the Prime Minister. The provisions for power sharing came into effect only after the general elections in May 1999. A coalition of ethnic parties under the leadership of the Fiji Labour Party, the most multi-ethnic party, formed the government. There is evidence that the cabinet was better placed than any previous one to appreciate the concerns of all communities and to reconcile their claims. The government brought together a wide variety of interests and, on delicate and difficult questions like land, the presence in significant numbers of representatives of all major groups ensured the avoidance of narrow ethnic approaches. Unexpectedly, one party, the Labour Party, won enough votes to form a government of its own in a normal parliamentary system, adversely affecting the balance of power conducive to power sharing. The largest party of indigenous Fijians, Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT), was not in the government – for a variety of confusing reasons. The absence of the largest party of indigenous Fijians was unfortunate, given the aims of the Constitution, as it is also the party of the previous government, associated with the coup. Its entry into the cabinet could have helped to consolidate the improvement in ethnic relations, while in opposition it saw its role as to challenge the government constantly, often on ethnic points, and indeed to destabilize it, as its leaders successfully did when they joined the forces for the coup in May 2000. 13.5. Bosnia and Herzegovina The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Annex 4, Dayton Peace Agreement) provides for extensive power sharing. The Presidency, in which executive power is vested, consists of three people, elected directly by each of the three main ethnic communities, or constituent peoples. Decisions are by consensus, giving each community a veto. Similar provisions apply for appointments to other public bodies, including the Constitutional Court and the Board of the Central Bank. The chair of each legislative chamber rotates among the representatives of the three constituent peoples. Voting rules ensure that each of the three main ethnic communities are involved in all decisions. Any of the three sets of constituent peoples can declare that a proposed decision affects vital national interests, triggering special procedures for mediation and reconciliation of differences. If that fails, the matter is referred to the Constitutional Court. Commenting on the centrality of ethnicity to these arrangements, Pajic observes that preoccupation: ‘with the rights of ethnic groups reflects the transition from 36
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, AUTONOMY AND MINORITIES communist to nationalist collectivism, where the nepotism of the “one and only” ruling party is replaced by the despotism of presupposed groups’ ethnic interests’.36 Both parliaments and Entity governments are required to have a proportional ethnic balance, and distribution of key political functions is along ethnic lines. Ironically, in this preoccupation, the rights of national minorities are seriously downgraded or ignored (as for example, in the restriction of the office of the Presidency, or legislative or executive vetoes to Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs). Rights of individual citizens, as citizens rather than as members of a particular ethnic group, are also limited. Given this complex process of decision-making, it is not surprising that numerous deadlocks have occurred. The state level government is seriously handicapped in its capacity to make or execute policy. The Constitution provides for a key role for foreigners. Three judges of the Constitutional Court are foreigners, selected by the President of the European Court of Human Rights; and eight out of 14 members of the Human Rights Chambers are also foreigners. The first Governor of the Central Bank also had to be a foreigner, appointed by the International Monetary Fund. The highest executive power and key policy powers are vested in the Office of the High Representative, appointed in accordance with UN Security Council’s resolutions; his mandate covers monitoring the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement and in particular the civilian aspects (Annex 10). Due to differences within the collective Presidency and the unwillingness of each of them to take decisions that might be resented by his or her community, many matters end up on the desk of the High Representative. 13.6. Discussion Most of these case studies suggest various difficulties about power sharing. The majority group may be reluctant to share power if it considers that it can or should form government on its own. At best it is prepared to accept other groups in a subordinate position, and members of these groups may come to be looked upon as stooges of the majority community. Decision-making can be hard, especially if each ethnic group is vested with vetoes. The accountability of the executive suffers as most important groups are in government. Cyprus, Fiji and Northern Ireland show that either the conflict is introduced into the government itself or that those outside it are frequently able to mobilize ethnic unrest. Power sharing is difficult when there are only two major communities, or where there are no traditions of democracy or tolerance. The typical form of power sharing, consociationalism, suffers from particular difficulties: it assumes that groups are driven by primordial sentiments and have an unchanging identity, that communal interests prevail over economic and professional interests, and that within each group there is political consensus on policies and ethnic relations. It tends to rely too much on cooperation among elite groups, and thus to be unstable. On the other hand, there is considerable evidence 36
Pajic, supra note 29, p. 39.
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YASH GHAI that a government based on power sharing principles is able to handle ethnic conflicts better than a more exclusive government. Power sharing has also played a useful role in transition to democracy in ethnically divided or war-torn societies. 14. AUTONOMY Autonomy is a device to allow minorities claiming a distinct identity to exercise direct control over affairs of special concern to them while allowing the larger entity to exercise those powers which cover common interests. There are two basic types of autonomy: territorial or group. Territorial autonomy can take the form of federation (such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Canada, India, Nigeria, Switzerland) or autonomy for one or two regions only (as in Åland, Chittagong Hill Tracts, Greenland, Kashmir, Mindanao, New Caledonia, Scotland, South Tyrol). Territorial autonomy for a minority is possible when the minority is concentrated in one region of the country and constitutes a majority within that region. A particular advantage of territorial autonomy, being based on the spatial principle, is that it enables ethnic problems to be solved without ‘entrenching’ ethnicity. However, some forms of autonomy may indeed entrench ethnicity, as with reservations or tribal areas, or the communist ‘republics’, under the dominance of titular minorities, as in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, where the cultural and political hegemony of the group may serve to sharpen boundaries against outsiders. When a minority is not geographically concentrated, it is possible to grant group autonomy to it over specified matters such as culture, language, religion and personal law (Muslims in India; linguistic groups in Belgium; national minorities in Estonia, Latvia, and Hungary; Arabs in Israel). Members of the group, or, where self-identification is permitted, registered members of the group, wherever they may be living in the state, are bound by regulations made by, normally, a council of the group in respect of matters delegated to it. Both territorial and group autonomies give the minority or the territorial community the right to legislate on and administer certain matters, usually to the exclusion of the national authorities. Group autonomy normally encompasses limited, specific matters, unlike territorial autonomy where transferred powers may be extensive. The territory or the group may also have the power to raise revenue through taxation or other measures binding its members, and will frequently also receive financial transfers from the central authorities. Regional institutions are established for the exercise of territorial autonomy, covering legislative and executive functions, and sometimes also judicial and public service functions. In this way the minority and other residents are able to exercise a wide range of participatory rights in the region. Group autonomy may be exercised through a representative council, and through it and other mechanisms, its members will be able to participate in affairs which are vested in the community. Sometimes, as most extensively in Belgium, it may be possible to combine territorial and group autonomies.
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PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, AUTONOMY AND MINORITIES 14.1. Territorial Autonomy Autonomy enables fair representation of minorities in the regional legislature and the executive. Autonomy arrangements would probably also provide for the minority’s language to be the official regional language. Primary and sometimes secondary education is also likely to be the responsibility of the regional government, facilitating the preservation and development of minority culture. Most autonomy arrangements provide financial and administrative resources for the local government to carry out its functions – crucial to effective participation. Autonomy arrangements, especially in the federal form, provide for regional representation at the centre, and thus institutionalizes regional influence at the centre. This, rather than significant provincial powers, is in essence the South African strategy, for through the second chamber, provinces are represented at the centre and determine national policy. Sometimes representation at the centre is not considered important, especially if the region is small and its primary concerns are local (as in Åland or Puerto Rico, or for the Sami in Scandinavian countries). Autonomy can comprise a wide variety of arrangements regarding structure and powers. The flexibility of the federal device in terms of the division of powers and the structure of institutions enables various kinds of accommodations to be made, as it is more hospitable to compromises than other kinds of minority protection. It can also allow for a gradually increasing transfer of powers. It ensures better prospects for preserving minorities’ culture (language, religion, etc.) and resisting state homogenizing policies and practices. It is a device to control local physical and natural resources, although the problem of natural and other resources is not easily resolved. However, state control over national revenue enables other regions to be compensated in other ways to maintain a measure of equity necessary for national unity. Autonomy has the potential to accommodate the demands of linguistic or cultural minorities. The first important example of the use of federalism to give a minority significant participation rights was the division of Canada into two provinces of the largely anglophone Ontario and the francophone Quebec in 1867.37 Several provinces have been established under the Indian Federation to provide autonomy for linguistic minorities, particularly in the North-East. In Nigeria the federal device, as reorganized after the Biafran war, helped to provide security and participation to its minorities, and maintained the unity of the state. A striking example of the successful use of a federal type autonomy is Spain after Franco’s death in the 1978 Constitution. Various cultural and linguistic minorities or nations, prominently the Catalans and the Basques, resisting the centralization of the state in the nineteenth century, had been seeking separation by the use of violence. The outstanding example of the successful use of regional autonomy is Åland, where a predominantly Swedish-speaking population under Finnish sovereignty has enjoyed a large measure of cultural and political autonomy since 1921. Åland was 37
R.L. Watts, ‘Federalism and diversity in Canada’, in Ghai, supra note 12.
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YASH GHAI administered by Sweden as part of its dependency of Finland; when Russia obtained Finland as the price for its military victory in the nineteenth century, Åland went with it. On the granting of independence to Finland in 1917, Ålanders demanded reunification with Sweden. The League of Nations, asked to deal with the matter, recommended that Åland should remain with Finland but should enjoy a high degree of autonomy, under international guarantee, designed to protect Ålanders’ political, linguistic and property rights. Åland has its own legislative and executive bodies, which hold a wide array of powers of self-government. Ålanders also have representation in the national Parliament, and the Åland legislature is able to introduce bills in the national Parliament on subjects which fall under the authority of the national government. The national government can, and has, delegated executive authority over some national matters to Åland. There is strong institutional protection for the autonomy, provisions for which cannot be altered without the consent of both the national and Åland legislatures. Over time, Åland has come to value its links with Finland.38 Åland’s experience has served as a model of regional autonomy, and has been followed in Greenland and the Faroes, which are under Danish sovereignty. Other examples of regional autonomy include the Italian South Tyrol, for the protection of its substantial German-speaking minority, the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua for the protection of its indigenous peoples, and Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh. In the UK participation rights of the Scottish and the Welsh have been considerably strengthened by devolution of power; it is too early to make an assessment, as it is of the Muslims’ autonomy in the Philippines’ province of Minadanao, where it has certainly abated ethnic violence. 14.2. Discussion The record of the success of autonomy to resolve or manage ethnic conflicts is mixed. There are many instances when its use has defused tensions, reorganized the state and provided the basis for the existence of ethnic groups. There are also numerous occasions when autonomy has been unacceptable either to the central government or the ethnic group. There are many examples of the abrupt withdrawal of autonomy because the central government rejects pluralism or considers that its continued operation is a threat to state integrity through secession (as in Southern Sudan and Kosovo/a). In recent years some federations have dissolved into a multiplicity of states: Bangladesh has seceded from Pakistan, Czechoslovakia has broken up, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia have collapsed. But such break-ups are not the result of autonomy, but of the denial of meaningful autonomy. Many federations or autonomous systems have suffered acute tensions or crises (Canada, Nigeria, Pakistan), but it is probable that without federation, they would be worse off. Agreement on autonomy is, moreover, exceedingly hard to negotiate. It has
38
L. Hannikainen, ‘The International Legal Basis of the Autonomy and Swedish character of the Åland Islands’, in L. Hannikainen and F. Horn, Autonomy and Demilitarisation in International Law: The Åland Islands in a Changing Europe (Kluwer, The Hague, 1997).
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PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, AUTONOMY AND MINORITIES proved impossible to muster enough political support for significant autonomy in Sri Lanka despite years of negotiations and waves of violence. An important objection to territorially based solutions is that a complete identity of ethnicity and territory is impossible without an infinite fragmentation of the state. Ethnically based autonomy will create new minorities; the position of these minorities may be worse than in a non-ethnic state, since they may be subjected to discrimination or have to acknowledge the symbols and cultures of the regional majority. The partition of Ireland in 1921 produced minorities on both sides of the border; the substantial Catholic minority in Northern Ireland was then subjected to institutionalized discrimination. The demand for new provinces in India has come from minorities in linguistically based provinces, where there was considerable discrimination against them. However, it is possible to make arrangements which would protect the interests of ‘minorities within minorities’, through power sharing, cultural autonomy and devolution to local authorities where these minorities constitute a significant number (in Sri Lanka, where this has been a major obstacle to autonomy, these devices are included in the draft Constitution). It is argued that if autonomy can be justified on ethnic grounds, the rules justifying the grant of autonomy (identity, a sense of discrimination/injustice) may encourage the mobilization of other minorities to manufacture ‘ethnic communities’. There is also the fear that autonomy may lead in time to secession, although there is little evidence of it. 15. GROUP OR CULTURAL AUTONOMY Many of these objections do not apply to group autonomy. There are different forms and uses of cultural autonomy. Rights or entitlements protected under such autonomy can be personal, cultural or political. They can be entrenched or subject to the overriding authority of the government. They normally consist of positive and substantive rights and entitlements, but they can be negative, such as a veto. They form the basis of the communal organization of politics and policies, and of the collective protection of their rights. At one end is corporate autonomy or, more accurately, corporate identity, as the basis of wide-ranging rights, as exemplified by the independence Constitution of Cyprus (1970). Contemporary examples include the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which combines more traditional federalism with corporate shares in power and communal vetoes. These forms of autonomy were significant features of old and modern empires. Modern examples include provisions in the Constitutions or laws of Estonia, Hungary, the Russian Federation and Slovenia. These countries provide for the establishment of councils for national minorities which assume responsibility for the education and cultural affairs of the minorities.39 In principle a council can be set up if a majority of the community desire it, as expressed in votes. Once established, its decisions bind members of the community throughout the state, except that a member can opt in or out of membership – the important principle of self39
A. Eide, ‘Cultural Autonomy: Concept and Contents’, in Suksi supra note 6, pp. 256–9.
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YASH GHAI identification is maintained. Within the areas in which powers are vested in it, the council’s regulations prevail over those of the state. The council has the power to levy a tax on its members; and also receive subsidies from the state. It has authority over language, education and culture of the minority. The principal objective of the system is the maintenance or strengthening of the identity of the minority, based on language and culture. The aim is to take culture out of ‘politics’, and leave other matters to the national political process, in which minorities may or may not have a special status through representation. It is too early to evaluate the experience as the few councils established so far, often under external pressure, have existed only for a short period. However, it would seem that the distinction between culture and politics may be too simplistic, especially today when the survival of culture is closely connected to the availability of resources and to national policy in several areas. Another use of group autonomy is the application to the members of a community of its personal or religious laws (covering marriage and family, and occasionally land, particularly for tribal communities).40 The application of personal laws, and thus the preservation of customary law or practices, is considered important for maintaining the identity of the community. When India tried, during the drafting of its Constitution, to mandate a common civil code for all of the country, some Muslim leaders objected. The supporters of a common code argued that common laws were essential for national unity. The opponents argued that it amounted to the oppression of minorities and the loss of their communal identity. The result was that the Constitution merely set a common code as an objective of state policy, and it is now a well established convention that the sharia will continue to apply to Muslims so long as they desire it. The scope of the application of personal laws, quite extensive during the colonial period in Africa and Asia, is now diminishing under the pressure of modernization (although it is being reinforced in some countries committed to a more fundamentalist view of religion). However, one place where regimes of personal laws still apply with full vigour is Israel, where all of the major religions have their own laws on personal matters.4141 For the Jews, most matters of personal law fall exclusively within the Rabbinical courts, while Muslims are subject to the jurisdiction of Sharia courts applying the Sharia. Although linked to and supported by the state, these courts are administered independently of the state. For the Muslims, the presence of Sharia courts has reinforced their sense of community and the values they want to live by, and helped in the social reproduction of the community (an important factor for a minority, and one whose substantial numbers live under foreign occupation). For the Jews, however, the Rabbinical courts have been deeply divisive, symbolizing the fundamental schism between the Orthodox and secular Jews. In both instances the courts give the clergy, committed to the 40
Y. Ghai, ‘Decentralisation and the Accommodation of ethnic diversity’, in C. Young, supra note 21, pp. 52–9; for a historical account of its use in Europe, see Eide, ibid. 41 See M. Edelman, Courts, Politics and Culture in Israel (University of Virginia Press, Charlottesville, 1994) on which the following account is principally based.
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PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, AUTONOMY AND MINORITIES preservation of orthodoxy, a specially privileged position. The law is slow to change in these circumstances. Personal regimes of laws have also sharpened the distinction among Israel’s communities, and formed a barrier to social relations among them. Such laws would prove an obstacle if state policy were to change in favour of greater integration of communities. One of the major problems with cultural/religious/legal autonomy of this kind is that it puts certain sections of the relevant community at a disadvantage. Edelman shows how both Jewish and Muslim women come off worse in their respective autonomous courts. In India, Muslim women are unable to benefit from the more liberal legal regime that applies to other Indian women after the reforms of the 1960s. One aspect of their disadvantage was illustrated in the famous Shah Banu case ((1985) 2 Sup. Ct Case 556). In this case, although the Supreme Court held that the maintenance a Muslim divorced woman could claim from her former husband was that under the general national law, which provided a higher amount than she would get under the Sharia, the government gave way to pressure from the Muslim clergy and other sections of the Muslim community and legislatively over-ruled the decision.42 In Canada the application of the customary law of Indian bands has also disadvantaged women (the UN Human Rights Committee has held invalid the law which deprived an Indian woman of her land and other community rights if she married an outsider; men who marry outside the community do not incur a similar liability). In South Africa claims of traditional leaders for the continuation of customary laws were resisted by African women because of the discriminations against them, such as in relation to custody and inheritance. The South African solution was to provide for the application of customary law but subject to the Bill of Rights. The Canadian government is negotiating a similar solution for the band laws. 16. CONCLUSIONS Participation in public affairs by minorities is central to their sense of identity. It is crucial to their feeling a part of the state and the wider community. It is essential to the protection of their interests. It helps to inform decision-makers of the concerns of minorities, and leads to better decision-making and implementation. There is less agreement on how participation by minorities should be facilitated and structured. One point of view is that separate provisions should be established for minority participation, as in legislative representation and executive power, and that there should be as much self-government by minorities as possible. The other view is that the modalities of participation should be designed to encourage the political integration of minorities. Even if it were agreed that one or the other was the preferred approach, it might still be hard to generalize on the usefulness of particular modalities. The choice between these options may depend, in many situations, less on their inherent merits than on circumstances and constraints. The objective circumstances as well as the aspirations of minorities vary from place to 42
S. Kazi, Muslim Women in India (MRG, London, 1999).
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YASH GHAI place, and from time to time. For example, the size of the minority is a material factor: a substantial and economically well-off minority might not require special rules for legislative representation, but a small minority might. Moreover, in the former case, special rules might be resented or mistrusted by the majority, but not necessarily in the latter case. This Article has attempted to set out a menu of approaches and modalities. The choice of approach and modalities would depend on the ultimate goals that the state and minorities have set themselves. The problem arises when there is no consensus either between the majority and the minority, or within each group. A section of a minority may want to preserve its social structure and culture at all costs; another may wish to escape the constraints or even the oppression of the community and seek their identity in a cosmopolitan culture. The choice would also depend on the balance between individual and communal rights. Furthermore, particular solutions may not be valid for all times; they may need to be reviewed as the socio-economic and demographic situations change. It is, however, worthwhile to caution against reifying temporary or fluid identities, which are so much a mark of contemporary times. Separate representation and institutions tend to lead to ethnic manipulation or extremism. Many recommendations which have been made in recent years are untried and, even though different ways of furthering minorities’ participation have been tried, it is too early to assess their success. Many of them are concerned excessively with conflict management, and perhaps have been insufficiently focused on long-term objectives. RECOMMENDATIONS 1. All states and regional intergovernmental organizations should provide for and facilitate the effective participation rights of minorities and indigenous peoples in keeping with international norms. Additionally, regional systems for the protection of minorities and indigenous peoples should be established where they do not currently exist. Such regional systems should respond to local realities and facilitate the settlement of disputes that might lead to the oppression of minorities or ethnic conflict. 2. Because citizenship is generally the key to participation rights, those states that have restrictive laws on the acquisition of citizenship should review their laws to enable people who move from one state to another for settlement purposes to acquire citizenship. States that prohibit dual nationality should repeal this restriction, since many people today identify with more than one country. 3. States should guarantee to immigrants key participation rights at the national and local levels after, at most, five years of residence. 4. States should devise electoral laws to encourage political parties to broaden their appeal to members of minorities and indigenous peoples, and require or encourage 44
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, AUTONOMY AND MINORITIES political parties to nominate a minimum specified proportion of candidates from minorities and indigenous peoples. States that have elections by proportional representation should abolish the threshold for representation as regards parties of minorities and indigenous peoples. 5. States should set up systems of government and administration that allow minorities and indigenous peoples to participate in decision-making and implementation. Legislative procedures should allow representatives of minorities and indigenous peoples, and minority-representative institutions, a special role – such as initiation, prior consultation and special voting rights – regarding any bill with a major bearing on minority rights. 6. States engaged in post-conflict transition should adopt systems of power sharing, at least for a limited period, and such power sharing should be based wherever possible on parties rather than on ethnicity. 7. Where a minority or indigenous people is geographically concentrated, states should establish territorial autonomy to provide for self-government. Group or cultural autonomy should be provided when the minority or indigenous people desires it. Group autonomy should be based on self-identification, allowing individual members of minorities and indigenous peoples to opt out of that autonomy. Within territorial or group autonomy arrangements, there should be provisions to protect the rights and legitimate interests of women and of groups that become minorities as a result of the autonomy. 8. States should support and encourage organizations that promote minority and indigenous cultures and languages and should promote cultural exchanges, understandings and reconciliation between different communities. 9. States should set up institutions, such as minorities ombudspersons, to ensure fair treatment of minorities and indigenous peoples, and the promotion of minority and indigenous participation in public and economic life.
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LEGAL APPRAISAL OF AUTONOMY TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY: PROS AND CONS FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW Hans-Joachim Heintze The concept of autonomy – or self-government – has been, at least for half a century, under discussion at a global level. It is noteworthy that the travaux préparatoires of the UN Charter concerning the trusteeship territories already clearly referred to ‘self-government’.1 It was conceived as denoting autonomy, but not as independent statehood. This position was underlined in respect of the trusteeship system, in which ‘self-government’ is not to be confused with ‘selfdetermination’.2 Before this historical background, as one of the sources of the modern understanding, ‘internal self-determination’ or autonomy is to be seen. However, most of the trusteeship territories are now finally independent States. Though the concept of autonomy is therefore even in the system of the UN not a new idea the organisation was not able to overcome the legal grey areas, which are connected with that idea. Alone the example of the establishment of statehood in former trusteeship territories shows to a large degree confusion about the term autonomy (or self-government) and the content of self-determination, minority rights and autonomy. Under these circumstances one cannot be surprised that many States have a still a hostile attitude towards any autonomy regulations due to fears of weakening the existence of the State by secessionist demands of minority groups. Ethnic conflict has become a source of international concern. Those conflicts culminated after the Cold War with the eruptions in Former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union – proving that they are not a vestige of the ‘primitive’ past − as well as those in Africa. This ‘ethnic mobilisation’ among minorities in multiethnic States has often led to demands for self-rule or secession.3 Under those circumstances where practically nearly all armed conflicts are related to non-international conflicts between States and ethnic groups it is worth while to examine autonomy as a possible solution for those minority issues. Autonomy is an indefinite and general legal term that has to be given a concrete content in every special case.4 Organisational as well as substantive rules for 1
UNCIO, Vol. 6, UN Information Organization New York 1945, p. 278. K. Doehring, ‘self-Determination’ in B. Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations, A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 1994) p. 60. 3 S. E. Cornell, Autonomy and Conflict (Uppsala Universitet, 2001) p. 5. 4 H.-J. Heintze, ‘On the legal understanding of Autonomy’ in M. Suksi (ed.), Autonomy: Applications and Implications (Kluwer, The Hague, 1998) p. 13. 2
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HANS-JOACHIM HEINTZE autonomous entities do not follow a given and uniform pattern. The particular form depends on the specific group, on the preparedness of the majority to grant autonomous rights and on the influence of other States and the international community.5 The essential element of autonomy is the granting of certain rights to a specific part of the State population, in view of its characteristics, which differ from the majority of the population. Linguistic, cultural and ethnic minorities are the prototypes of groups who need protection. They are interested in excluding State and majority interference as far as their specific background, tradition and way of life are concerned. Because a certain group is, and feels, different from the majority of the population, it longs for different rights. The aim of any autonomy regime should always be the better implementation of human and minority rights and therefore to avoid conflicts within States and between States. However, autonomy regulations are necessarily always a case-to-case solution and there is no obligation under international law to grant autonomy to any group, perhaps with exception of indigenous peoples.6 One can imagine circumstances in which autonomy regulations cannot contribute to the settlement of conflicts but create new problems and confrontations among minorities or between the majority and the minority. Autonomy is always a result of careful negotiations between States and minorities or peoples about the content, aims and mechanisms of that kind of self-government. However, the State is under no international obligation either to introduce or to maintain a regime of autonomy within its own territory. So far, no document of general international law contains a right to receive – or an obligation to bestow – autonomy.7 Therefore, one cannot support the idea that autonomy is a principle of international law and at least territorial minorities have rights of autonomy within the existing structures of States.8 Nevertheless, the parties to possible autonomy regimes have to take into consideration the advantages and disadvantages of that concept. 1. PROS OF AUTONOMY International law affirms the value of cultural diversity and of individual choice and cultures as context of choice. It is in favour for the continuance of cultures and the nexus between individual and collective identity.9 Autonomy regulations are a possible way for the realization of those aims of international law. 5
R. Bernhardt, ‘Federalism and Autonomy’ in Y. Dinstein (ed.), Models of Autonomy (Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1981) p. 27. 6 H.-J. Heintze, ‘The Protection of Indigenous Peoples under the ILO Convention 169’ in M. Bothe et al. (eds.), Amazonia and Siberia (Graham & Trotman, London, 1993) p. 323. 7 R. Lapidoth, Autonomy – Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts (United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., 1996) p. 175. 8 D. Sanders, ‘Is Autonomy a Principle of International Law?’, 55 Nordic Journal of Int'l. Law (1986), p. 17. 9 P. Thornberry, ‘Introduction: In the Strongroom of Vocabulary’ in P. Culper and S. Wheatley (eds.), Minority Rights in the ‘New’ Europe (Nijhoff, The Hague, 1999) p. 5.
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TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY 1.1. For the International Community Due to the lack of a generally accepted definition of the terms ‘peoples’ and ‘minorities’ in international law there is a certain overlap in the scopes of the norms of minority protection and self-determination of peoples. Doehring argues in the well-known commentary of the UN Charter that the first holders of the classic right of self-determination are ethnic minorities living in an ethnically different State.10 This description contributes doubtlessly to the confusion around the norm of selfdetermination and explains that one has to see minority rights always in connection with the rights of peoples. As the right of peoples to self-determination in principle includes the right to an independent State, it raises the discomforting question of what is going to happen if the world’s 3500 ethnic groups demanded their own State.11 The planet is too small to provide each of them with full sovereignty over a piece of land. Disintegration into hundreds of States is neither realistic nor desirable.12 Even for Buchanan who views the modern State with deep ambivalence, the prospect of uncontrolled secession is, because of the human and economic costs, a cause for considerable apprehension.13 Therefore one has to argue for the need of an international response to secession demands. The most important element of such an international strategy is to distinguish between demands for secession and less extreme forms of self-determination. Autonomy regulations are doubtlessly in the interest of the international community, which is in favour of keeping the number of States on earth as low as possible. Henrard recommends an enhanced awareness of the relationship between the right to self-determination and a high degree of intrastate stability, which would probably help to counter the typical escalation fear of States regarding the grant of special rights to minorities.14 This means, compromises must be found to satisfy the aspirations of minorities and other groups. Many scholars argue, like Eide, that the right to secession prevails over territorial integrity only in cases of severe deprivation of a group’s human rights, especially the rights of a minority.15 Judge Wildhaber identified in Loizdou v. Turkey 1996 before the European Court of Human Rights an emerging consensus that the right to self-determination should be interpreted as remedial for consistent and flagrant human rights violations.16 But even in such cases of massive human rights violations, like in Kosovo, the Security Council, the community of States (and legal 10
Doehring, supra note 2, p. 60. T.R. Gurr and J.R. Scaritt, ‘Minorities Rights at Risk: A Global Survey’, 11 Human Rights Quarterly (1989) p. 375. 12 An Agenda for peace, UN Doc. A/47/277, para. 17. 13 A. Buchanan, ‘Federalism, Secession, and the Morality of Inclusion’, 37 Arizona Law Review (1995) p. 53. 14 K. Henrard, Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection (Nijhoff, The Hague, 2000) p. 312. 15 A. Eide, ‘In Search of Constructive Alternatives to Secession’ in C. Tomuschat (ed.), Modern Law of Self-Determination (Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1993) p. 139 et seq. 16 Cf. 18 Human Rights Law Journal (1997), p. 59. 11
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HANS-JOACHIM HEINTZE scholars) have not been in favour of the establishment of statehood of the Kosovars. Practice shows that the international community is not prepared to recognize ethnic groups living within the boundaries of sovereign States as peoples enjoying selfdetermination. The extending of the right to self-determination might foster internal disputes and even armed conflicts.17 Since secession involves major structural and institutional change to a State and the international community of States, one can observe that the costs of transition and the potentially lasting effects on individuals and groups within the original and the breakaway States be created only if no less drastic means are available.18 This explains the new interest in solutions within the borders of existing States. In the past the UN has not been interested in questions like local self-governance and autonomy as such issues belong to internal affairs of every State. By the principle of sovereignty States themselves decide freely about those questions. This attitude has begun to change after the end of the cold war. In 1995 the Security Council explicitly welcomed the consultations regarding a new constitution based on federal principles between Georgia and Abkhasia.19 With this resolution the Council has recognized that federalism might be a possible way for solving of a minority conflict. 1.2. For the People Kirgis argues that the international community may recognize even a seriously destabilizing right of self-determination claim as legitimate if a government does not represent the people.20 This means on the other hand that the international community would not support a secession claim if the responding government represents the people belonging to the territory. But what happens if there exists a minority and the government represents primarily the majority? In such a case an autonomy regulation may be the answer. 1.2.1. Implementation of Minority Rights Especially in the past the autonomy status has often be seen as a consequence of practical considerations. It has been argued that autonomy regulations are only acceptable in cases in which the population is small ‘or the territory cannot
17 The perspective of Gerd Seidel (G. Seidel, ‘A New Dimension of the Right to SelfDetermination in Kosovo’ in C. Tomuschat (ed.), Kosovo and the International Community (Kluwer, The Hague, 2002 p. 203), who demanded statehood for the Kosovars has not been shared by most of the participants of a German-French international lawyers conference. See supra, p. 335. 18 K. Knop, Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law (Cambridge, University Press, 2002) p. 82. 19 UN Doc. S/Res. 993 (1995). 20 F. L. Kirgis, ‘The Degrees of Self-determination in the United Nations Era’, 88 American Journal of Int’l Law (1994), p. 310.
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TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY conceivably fulfil the requirements of a sovereign state’.21 Other reasons, which led to autonomy, were geographical remoteness of a region, the special relationship of the local population to their land and its resources, the region’s particular historical or cultural development or the existence of indigenous peoples who survived colonization. However, in all cases did the desirable high level of self-government not abrogate the duty of loyalty encompassed by nationality? This is also true in ‘modern’ models of autonomy regulations. The most important precondition for the necessary loyalty of minorities is the respect of the human rights of the persons belonging to minorities. If their life and security are not threatened by the majority, if their culture and religion can be exercised and if they can speak their language then there is no apparent reason for conflict and resistance.22 But very often the traditional concepts of human rights protection with their individualistic approach are not enough. They fail to respond to the specific needs of minorities. Human rights bind by national legislation all inhabitants, including the persons belonging to minorities. These laws may not respond to their specific needs. Especially in the field of civil and political rights the effect is very often limited to the State’s duty to remain passive and to refrain from interference in the individual rights.23 This approach may not ensure effective participation of the minorities in governmental affairs and in the access to political power. To overcome these shortcomings many experts recommend some affirmative action measures. One of latest attempts in that direction are the ‘Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation in Public Life’.24 Those recommendations were elaborated at the request of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM). As an instrument of conflict prevention acting at the earliest possible stage the HCNM addresses the root causes of conflicts. Autonomy can be such a measure. Therefore, one can find in the Lund Recommendations a whole section dealing with ‘self-government’, which could also be paraphrased as autonomy. The experts recommend on the one hand that functions, which are generally exercised by central authorities like defence, foreign affairs, immigration and customs, macroeconomic policies and monetary affairs should stay with the State to prevent separatist movements. On the other hand they plead that education, culture, language, environment, local planning, natural resources, economic development, local policing functions, housing, health and social services should be applied in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity which permits adaptation to the concrete circumstances by transferring
21
B. Broms, ‘Autonomous territories’ in Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol. 1, North Holland: Amsterdam 1992, p. 311. 22 W. Kälin, ‘Federalism and the Resolution of Minority Conflicts’ in G. Bächler (ed.), Federalism against Ethnicity (Rüegger, Chur, 1997) p. 172. 23 W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995) p. 35. 24 See the text of the Recommendations and the article by J. Packer, ‘The origin and nature of the Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life’, 11 Helsinki Monitor (2000) 4, p. 29.
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HANS-JOACHIM HEINTZE responsibility to the autonomous entity.25 This entity has to make sure that minority rights do more than just safeguard the political human rights of the persons belonging to minorities, because they must also contribute to the preservation of the identity of the minority. 1.2.2. Autonomy and Democracy Political participation of minorities is an expression of and a necessity for democracy. However, democracy is often characterized as majority rule. Democracy rests on the assumption that majorities can change and that power is limited in time. According to the will of the voters the political majority of today become the political minority of tomorrow. The power of the majority is not limited in scope because they do not have to share their power. This means that such a system is not necessarily willing to respect the interests of ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities. Such minorities – some authors call them ‘structural’ minorities − cannot give up their specifics (e.g. race, history) or they have to pay the price of losing their identity (e.g. culture or language).26 Those minorities may suffer even under democratic conditions. If the predominant cultural majority is large enough, it will not have to take into account the minority. Under a winner-takes-all rule the majority may even increase the advantages to its own cultural group while discriminating against the minority, because this group is not in a position to challenge the power of the political majority.27 This explains why one can find minority conflicts in States with democratically elected governments, which respect internationally codified human rights in principle. The ultimate objective of free elections and political participation must under those circumstances be ‘not “democracy” but a “democratic society”, the majority has regard the interests of all groups and peoples in the State, not merely those of its supporters’.28 Therefore one has look for concepts of so-called participatory democracy, which postulates open public debates in search of consensus and access for individuals and groups to all levels of public institutions. This has to be combined with the rule of law. Although it is a source of legitimacy, the rule of law is not sufficient without institutions of governance that are direct expression of democratic self-determination.29 Lijphart’s theory of consociational democracy offers solutions for this contradiction between the Westminster style-democracy and an effective participation of minorities in public affairs. His model of consociational democracy 25
H.-J. Heintze, ‘New Direction in the Approach of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities’, 19 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights (2001) 1, p. 110. 26 Kälin, supra note 22, p. 173 27 W. Linder, Swiss Democracy, Possible solutions to Conflict in Multicultural Societies (New York, 1994) p. 170. 28 This is the wording of the findings of the European Commission on Human Rights in the Greek case (12 YB 1, p. 179). 29 E. Stein, ‘International Integration and Democracy’, 95 American Journal of Int’l Law (2001), p. 492.
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TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY has four main characteristics, namely coalition government, the proportionality principle, the minority veto and segmental autonomy.30 The model makes the political participation of minorities in national policy decisions as optimal as possible, because it allows them to protect and to promote their own characteristics by the minority veto. It ostensibly amounts to a form of internal self-determination for minority groups and is, therefore, in general appropriate and desirable for deeply divided societies.31 Even Wheatley, who considers the approach of consociational democracy only ‘superficially attractive’ accepts that for regional government, appropriate autonomy and subsidiaritiy is to be commended. However, this should in his opinion not be confused with a constitutional recording intended to reflect ethnic differences within the State.32 1.2.3. Autonomy as Means of Conflict Resolution The confrontation between the reassertion of rights by minorities and the resistance of States to accept meaningful pluralism has resulted in many cases in the demand for broader political and economic power of minority groups.33 Autonomy has the capability to satisfy the aspirations of an ethnic minority to a degree of political power while preserving the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the State. Therefore it is often seen – although it was used rarely by the States – as an instrument of conflict resolution between the demands of a group for more independence and the rights of the State to territorial integrity.34 The main advantage of autonomy follows from the fact that the suppression of groups and minorities calls forth their resistance, thus disturbing public order. This opposition could also impede the exchange and communication between different groups of the population. The principle of subsidiarity, on the other hand, could promote a productive participation of minorities in the State. This underlines ‘The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities in Europe’ of the Council of Europe in its Recommendation 43 (1998): ‘Convinced that the application of the principle of subsidiarity, whereby decisions are taken at the level closest to citizens, can contribute positively to resolving the problem of protecting national minorities’. Political and cultural pluralism will have positive effects on the society as a whole, as tolerance facilitates voluntary assimilation of a minority. People can express their distinct identity and run its own affairs in certain spheres. Autonomy follows from a 30 A. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1977) p. 36. 31 Henrard, supra note 14, p. 314. 32 S. Wheatley, ‘Minority Rights, Power Sharing and the Modern Democratic State’ in supra note 9, p. 201. 33 H. Hannum, ‘The Limits of Sovereignty and Majority Rule: Minorities, Indigenous Peoples, and the Right to Autonomy’ in E. L. Lutz et al. (eds.), New Directions in Human Rights (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania, 1989) p. 14. 34 T. D. Musgrave, Self-determination and National Minorities (Claredon, Oxford, 1997) p. 208.
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HANS-JOACHIM HEINTZE special political status of a region, which is based on its population differing ethnically or culturally from the majority. Autonomy requires the recognition of the particular group features. Due to the territorial focus of many current internal conflicts autonomy has the capability of being a conflict-solving mechanism. Practice indicates, that the higher the degree of militarization of a conflict preceding the establishment of autonomy legislation, the less likelihood there is of high autonomy durability. Strong international involvement in the elaboration and implementation of the autonomy regulation, however, has a positive effect on the durability.35 This experience underlines that in principle autonomy has an international aspect due to its influence on regional stability. 1.3. Expression of a Modern Understanding of Sovereignty The expansion and enhancement of economic and political activity as well as the increasing acceptance of human rights have placed in question the allocation of authority dictated by the Westphalian order. Social changes have driven a paradigm shift from a world of States to a world of diminished State sovereignty. This process is according to Elazar accompanied by the legitimization of ethnic identity and national self-determination, which is associated with the ‘postmodernist’ preference for local knowledge over global norms.36 However, usually the government of a State wishes to prevent the autonomous regional entity from acquiring sovereignty due to fears of secession. The autonomous entity on the other hand is very much interested to get as many elements of sovereignty as possible. Broms argues that even existing autonomous territories are – as a rule – interested in becoming independent.37 To solve this contradiction means to question the modern understanding of sovereignty. Many scholars have growing doubts concerning the extent and usefulness of the concept of sovereignty in our days and speak about a relative notion, variable in the course of time.38 Practice has proven, however, that the classical meaning of sovereignty as total and indivisible State power has been eroded by the development of the modern world. State borders are no longer dividing lines between States and societies. Economies are interdependent and the norms of international law – especially human rights – undermined the idea of total sovereignty. Therefore Reisman refers to the need of ‘contemporatization’ of the notion of sovereignty.39 The concept of autonomy fulfils such a demand. Lapidoth 35
K.-Å. Nordquist, ‘Autonomy as a Conflict-Solving Mechanism – An Overview’ in M. Suksi (ed.), Autonomy: Applications and Implications (Kluwer, The Hague, 1998) p. 73. 36 D. J. Elazar, Constitutionalizing Globalization: The Postmodern Revival of Conferal Arragements (Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 1998) p. 19. 37 Broms, supra note 21, p. 311. 38 L. Wildhaber, ‘sovereignty and International Law’ in R. St. Macdonald and D. M. Johnston (eds.), The Structure and Process of International Law, p. 440. 39 W.M. Reisman, ‘sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary international law’, 84 American Journal of Int’l Law (1990), p. 873.
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TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY argues that autonomy and sovereignty are not mutually exclusive under a modern understanding of those concepts.40 Autonomy as we understand it today is partly a consequence of this modern development of international law. The general acceptance of the right of peoples to self-determination has encouraged groups to claim more participation in their government instead of simply accepting majority rule. However, if peoples fight for secession and the establishment of a new State they behave in very conservatively because they are promoting the multiplication of States. Therefore it is an attempt to create more States, not to change the character of State sovereignty. To establish a new State means to replicate sovereignty without questioning it. It does not call into question the dominant conception of the State and the existing international order. Autonomy on the other hand may lead to a more critical attitude toward the nature and structure of State authority. It is ‘in the strict sense’ a rejection of the idea of State sovereignty ‘in its purest form – the claim that there is only one legitimate legislative authority, the State itself’.41 This is the reason that autonomy regulations are more fundamental challenges to the conception of the State authority than the demand of secession. The changing character of sovereignty is reflected – beside ethnic questions – worldwide in the appearance of ‘sub-State entities’, i.e. internal institutions and confederate structures playing an increasing role and taking on functions previously within the competence of States. 1.4 Flexibility of the Concept of Autonomy It is impossible to achieve a perfect solution regulating the relationship between the majorities and minorities. Territorial autonomy always involves a compromise because perfectly ethnic homogenous territories can – and should – never be established.42 The flexibility of the autonomy concept allows balancing of the concrete negative and positive effects of autonomy in each case; the legal basis is the minimum standard of minority rights. As a rule the regulations are not rigid, they allow the introduction of changes. It is sometimes deliberately designed to be established by a gradual process. This gives the parties an opportunity to adapt slowly to the new regime and to collect experiences. In this way the parties can build confidence. According to the principles of the rule of law autonomy should by established by law and the enactments which regulate the regime should be amended only by a procedure that is more stringent than the one used for the amendment of regular laws. However, in State practice one can find other approaches. Taking the Faeroese 40 R. Lapidoth, ‘Autonomy and Sovereignty – Are They Mutually Exclusive?’ in A. Shapira and M. Tabory (eds.), New Political Entities in Public and Private International Law (The Hague, Kluwer, 1999) p. 14. 41 Buchanan, supra note 13, p. 54. 42 A. Lijphard, ‘self-Determination versus Pre-Determination of Ethnic Minorities in Powersharing Systems’ in W. Kymlinka (ed.), The Rights of Minority Cultures (Oxford, University Press, 1995) p. 275.
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HANS-JOACHIM HEINTZE Home Rule as an example, it is obvious that it is a typical political construction and not a stringent legal construction.43 This may explain some shortcomings of the Faeroese model.44 The forms of implementation of minority and peoples’ rights are diverse. Minority cultural rights allow peoples and other groups to wear their distinctive cultural dress, to be called by their own names and to practice their own cultural and religious rituals as well as to learn and to speak their own language. Selfgovernment primarily concerns political rights, but besides the administration it includes, inter alia, the regulation of the use of land and the exploitation of natural resources, property and tax rights. Such rights belong to the so-called internal rights of self-determination because they can be exercised short of secession within the State. Such a solution expands the set of constructive alternatives immeasurably. States are under those circumstances free to acknowledge that a group has legitimate interests in self-determination.45 Autonomy regulations are very flexible because the details of the autonomy are open to negotiation between the representatives of the central State and those of the autonomous regime. In any case the basic idea of any regulation is the principle of subsidiarity. It is a political and social rule for organising State and society. Subsidiarity is based on the idea that there are elements between the State and the individual enabling the individual to preserve his identity. As a legal principle, subsidiarity has a positive and a negative content: as a negative obligation, it restrains the higher-up community level if a solution can be achieved on the lower community level. This is complemented by the positive duty to assist the smaller community if necessary. The principle of subsidiarity is thus based on spreading public affairs among different communities in order to avoid centralisation. The ‘recognition and institution of territorial autonomy, which may consist in local or regional self-government’ is according to the Council of Europe a concrete form of the application of the principle of subsidiarity.46 Subsidiarity has to be adapted to the circumstances of the case and cannot be defined abstractly.47 It always raises the practical question of what forms of selfgovernance would be necessary to guarantee comprehensive participation of minorities in public life. Due to its flexibility it is increasingly adopted in national and international affairs and serves as the basis of assigning tasks, which are performed by the world community on the planetary level, some by regional communities, others by nation-States, and finally some on the local level, through formalized structures. 43
A. Olafsson, ‘Relationship between Political and Economic Self-Determination. The Faeroese Case’, 64 Nordic Journal of International Law (1995) p. 479. 44 Cf. L. Lyck, ‘The Faeroese Home Rule Act as a Framework for the Faeroese Economy’ in L. Lyck (ed.), Constitutional and Economic Space of the Small Nordic Jurisdictions (Stockholm, 1997) p. 137. 45 Buchanan, supra note 13, p. 54. 46 Recommendation No. 43 (1998), adopted on 27 May 1998. 47 Elazar, supra note 36, p. 60.
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TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY Autonomy can contribute to solving minority conflicts on the local level by flexible means. Despite the widely accepted positive effects of autonomy on the protection of minorities, State practice has shown no willingness to regard it as a general model for the resolution of minority conflicts. There is no right to autonomy to be found in treaties. Even in the area of soft law, States consciously avoid any apparent acceptance of autonomy. But the mere fact that the possibility of autonomy is mentioned in some OSCE documents has to be emphasised, as it proves that autonomy is of increasing importance in enforcing minorities’ and groups’ right to identity. The concept of autonomy and its status as a principle of international law also gains new impulse by the debate in the UN on the rights of indigenous peoples. This is the first time a group is expressly given the right to autonomy by a draft of an UN Declaration. Although the unique character of these claims has to be kept in mind, the debate on indigenous peoples indicates the increasing acceptance of autonomy. One has also to take into consideration that the community of States hesitates to accept the draft of the declaration on indigenous rights due to the articles on self-determination and autonomy. Another example of those reservations on the part of the States is the good neighbourhood agreement between Slovakia and Hungary. The mentioning of the Council of Europe Parliamentarian Assembly’s Recommendation 1201, which refers to the right to autonomy, led to the provisional failure of the negotiations on that bilateral treaty. This example shows that the sensitivity with regard to autonomy on whatever form is still very strong even in some member States of the Council of Europe.48 1.5 Content of Autonomy The term autonomy is used today in three different branches of science. In philosophy autonomy is the power of the human being to determine by himself on the basis of its rationale will. In natural sciences the concept means organic independence. In law and politics autonomy has many meanings. Lapidoth identifies four conceptions of autonomy in the law: (a) as a right to act upon one’s own discretion in certain matters, (b) as a synonym of independence, (c) as synonym with decentralisation and (d) as exclusive powers of legislation, administration and adjudication in specific areas of an autonomous entity. In principle, autonomy is regarded as granting internal self-government to a region or group of persons, and thus partial independence from the influence of the national or central government.49 The term autonomy appears in various legal contexts and is used differently, because it is not a well-fitted legal concept. In fact, this concept was originally derived from sociology. The frequent appearance of territorial autonomy has led many to restrict the term ‘autonomy’ to this type, although it is only one among many. It means that 48
H. Klebes, ‘The Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities’, 16 Human Rights Law Journal (1995) p. 92. 49 R. Lapidoth, ‘Autonomy: potential and limitations’, 1 Int’l Journal of Group Rights (1994) p. 277
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HANS-JOACHIM HEINTZE under the principle of territorial sovereignty, one region is given a special status. The latter possesses the competence of self-government organs to regulate certain matters, i.e. subject of autonomy is territorial self-government. These competencies go beyond local and regional self-government and include specific problems of the minority or group. Territorial autonomy as a form of group protection can only be implemented if the group in question lives in a defined area, i.e. in a geographically distinct territory, and constitutes the majority there. As a consequence of a region being autonomous, all people living in it are subject to this status, not only the members of certain groups. On the other hand, those members of a minority living outside the autonomous area do not enjoy this status. When integrating a group that lives in one region only and has a historically developed group consciousness, taking into account local circumstances is unlikely to permit any other solution than regionalisation and decentralisation of the institutional State structure. In order to minimise the misuse of autonomy, there should be clear and precise agreements between the sides concerned. The following points are essential: A precondition of autonomy is the willingness of the organ of self-government to comply with human rights and minority rights standards. Other crucial prerequisites include ensuring the safety of its citizens and the creation of representative and elected bodies necessary for democratic legitimisation. Funding territorial autonomy will necessitate further rights and could even include the competence of taxation. Mechanisms are needed for the resolution of conflicts between the State and the organs of the autonomous region. In most cases, preparatory and transitional rules and agreements will be necessary too. 2. CONS OF AUTONOMY? Wippman rightly argues that it depends on different aspects whether a proposal for autonomy will be productive or counterproductive. He mentions the goals of the relevant actors, the size and political strength of the minority population vis-à-vis the majority and vis-à-vis other minority groups in the society, the territorial concentration of the relevant groups, the timing of the proposal, the history of the majority-minority relations in that society, the goals and involvement of kin-States and other interested outside actors, and a host of other variables.50 The territorial autonomy that may work for the Åland-Islands or the Trentino-Alto Adige region may be totally impractical or unnecessary for minorities in other States.51
50
D. Wippman, ‘The Evolution and Implementation of Minority Rights’, 66 Fordham Law Review (1997), p. 624. 51 G. Malinverni, ‘Local Self-Government, Territorial Integrity and Protection of Minorities’ in European Commission for Democracy Through Law (ed.), Sciences and technique of Democracy, Vol. 16 (Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 1996) p. 314 et seq.
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TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY 2.1. Division of the Population into Groups It is possible to argue that autonomy does not make sense if human rights are respected and the society is organized in a democratic way.52 There is no doubt that the implementation of the whole body of human rights law, including effective remedy mechanisms, is the fundament of minority protection. If the inhabitants of a State are free of fear and discrimination resulting from minority status then there is no reason for engaging in a conflict with the majority. Under those conditions the demand for autonomy as an instrument of minority protection, has been criticised. Its opponents claim that assimilation has advantages over autonomy because any different treatment of people due to their belonging to a group calls forth the opposition of other groups, which eventually leads to ethnic conflicts.53 Autonomy regimes rest on the assumption that differences enrich more the endanger the society. Cultural survival is defended by counteracting the (Western) homogenisation. This means according to Steiner ‘a state composed of segregated autonomy regimes would resemble more a museum of social and cultural antiquities than any human rights ideals’.54 Moreover, a system, which recognises minorities, is regarded as economically and politically inefficient: The free market is impeded because minority members are less inclined to leave the group’s territory. Politically, the division of society made it more difficult to reach consensus. Autonomy might also isolate the minority and alienate different groups, which could eventually lead to segregation. The dialogue between groups, essential for a multi-ethnic State, could cease. There is, in the opinion of some authors, considerable reason to argue that the institution of territorial autonomy may foster ethnic mobilisation, increased secessionism and even armed conflict.55 Therefore, those structures may be counterproductive under certain circumstances.56 A further negative consequence of autonomy legislation may be that the government feels less responsible for the political stability, development and prosperity of the autonomous region.57 2.2. Autonomy, Human Rights and Discrimination It has been criticised that autonomy promotes the separate ethnic identity of a group and the responding minority is singled out as being different. The very existence of such a special status would discourage the development of overlapping and inclusive identities. Cornell points out that the concept of all citizens being equal and 52
See Kälin, supra note 22, p. 172. D. Steiner, ‘Collective Rights’, 13 Human Rights Quarterly (1991) p. 368. 54 H. J. Steiner, ‘Ideals and Counter-Ideals in the Struggle Over Autonomy Regimes for Minorities’, 66 Notre Dame L. Rev. (1991) p. 1552 55 M. Brems, Die politische Integration ethnischer Minderheiten (Frankfurt/M., 1995) p. 142. 56 See Cornell, supra note 3, p. 7 57 L. Lyck, ‘Lessons to be learned on autonomy from the Faeroese situation since 1992’, 64 Nordic Journal of Int’l law (1995) p. 481. 53
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HANS-JOACHIM HEINTZE members of a civic nation would be hardly compatible with the singling out of specific groups on the basis of their ethnicity.58 Wheatley warns that the ethnic ‘cantonisation’ of a multi ethnic State or ‘consociational democracy’ (regardless of its form) are in the long term unhelpful, because they explicitly discriminate between groups on grounds like religion, language, race or national origin. His criticism is a consequence of that fact that power-sharing schemes are concerned with the rights of the group and not with the rights of the individuals.59 Indeed, this danger is inherent to the concept of autonomy because the holder of territorial autonomy is always a group. Hence the prerequisites of autonomy are recognition as a minority or group on the one hand and the acceptance of collective rights on the other. Another condition for self-government is the existence of a representative organ recognised by the State granting autonomy as well as by the group. This may lead to power struggles within the minority. The advantage of minority protection systems under international law – to transform minority rights into human rights and to make the individual the holder of those rights – is questioned by such an approach. Rights held by a group are by nature dissimilar to those held by individuals. According to some theories about the character of collective rights this might create problems. Granting autonomy to a territory may be perceived as a disadvantage and an act of discrimination against other groups who live in that area. Therefore, the autonomy legislation has to safeguard the rights of other groups rather than just the holders of territorial autonomy. The power relationship in an autonomous territory is reversed. The group, previously in the minority, takes power and the relationship between majority and minority is for practical purposes inverted. Therefore, there is always a danger of acts of revenge and one has to emphasise that the authorities of an autonomous region must respect and ensure the human rights in particular of the ‘new minority’. This must be seen as a basic rule of any autonomy legislation whatever its nature and an important challenge to the new administration. For example, in the case of Kosovo, the UN General Assembly60 and other human rights institutions became after 1999 – i.e. after the NATO intervention – increasingly concerned about the frequent instances of harassment, periodic kidnapping and murder of ethnic Serbian, Roma and other minorities by ethnic Albanian extremists.61 2.3. Autonomy and Secession The question arises whether autonomy relates only to a purely domestic and mainly constitutional dimension or whether there are international underpinnings to that concept. Especially the uncertainness of the norm of self-determination opens a wide 58
Cornell, supra note 3, p. 228. Wheatley, supra note 9, p. 201. 60 UN-Doc. 54/183 (29 February 2000). 61 J. Kokott, ‘Human Rights Situation in Kosovo 1989−1999’ in Tomuschat, supra note 17, p. 26. 59
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TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY field of problems. Under which circumstances self-determination may create an entitlement to autonomy is thus doubtful.62 The criticism by many States of the proposal of Liechtenstein in the General Assembly in 1991, according to which communities having a distinctive social and territorial identity should be able to enjoy autonomy to realize their right to self-determination over their affairs, reflect the unclear legal situation. Under those circumstances it is not surprising that there has been a need for pressure on both the Albanians and the Serbs in Kosovo by the UN to come to an agreement on autonomous regulations.63 But other States are also extremely reluctant to grant any form of self-government to groups and consider decentralization as a step in the direction of ‘Balkanization’.64 Delegating State competencies to autonomous institutions is often suspected of being a step towards secession. Cornell even argues that secessionism is likely to be significantly higher for minorities equipped with an autonomous region compared with non-autonomous minorities and mentions the post-Soviet experience as evidence.65 Due to the fact that autonomy can create institutions with some legitimacy can create a widespread fear of the spiral from cultural autonomy and administrative autonomy to secession. This explains, in a large measure, the reticence of States to accept any kind of legal instrument containing an obligation to grant persons belonging to a national minority the right to have at their disposal appropriate local or autonomous authorities. Autonomy doubtlessly increases the group cohesion and the incentives of the group to act; its political institutions also increase their capacity to act. Gurr underlines that capacity for collective action is relative high among those groups that control an autonomous government.66 The possession of State-like institutions has very often the effect of ethnic mobilisation that can challenge the central State’s integrity. The local bodies and the parliaments can be used, inter alia, to pass language laws or to refuse to accept legislation from the central government. In situations when the leadership of the autonomous structure is nationalistic the whole bureaucracy is in danger of adopting a more nationalistic profile.67 It may increase the risk of politicians resorting to ethnic mobilisation for career purposes. Elite power may be positively correlated to the level of autonomy, which means at the end of the day that the elite has an interest to keeping nationalist emotions alive. Due to financial autonomy, which is very often part of the autonomy arrangements, the leaderships dependence from the central government is lesser. Last but not least, it is more likely that an autonomous entity – especially if there is a kin State – gets more international support than a minority without that special status. Autonomy may be a 62
G. Welhenga, ‘The Legitimacy of Minorities’ Claim for Autonomy through the Right to Self-Determination’, 68 Nordic Journal of Int’l law (1999) p. 420 et seq. 63 Kokott, supra note 17, p. 8 64 L. C. Bucheit, Secession (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1978) p. 104. 65 Cornell, supra note 3, p. 19 66 T. R. Gurr, Peoples versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century (Washington D.C., United States Institute for Peace Press, 2000) p. 19. 67 Cornell, supra note 3, p. 18.
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HANS-JOACHIM HEINTZE possible way to regulate the ethnic affinity of a minority with the kin State but this can also increase tensions between States. This explains why autonomy cannot be seen to be isolated from the case-to-case circumstances. 3. CONCLUSION Autonomy is not a well-defined concept in international law, there are no commonly accepted models of autonomy which can be used, and minority groups or peoples do not have any legal right to it, however, its efficacy as a means of settling ethnic tensions, preventing existing States from falling apart and of implementing internationally recognised human and minority rights is becoming more and more apparent. Evaluating the current debate on autonomy one can say that the advantages – safeguarding international stability and protecting the identity of minority groups – supersede the possible drawbacks. However, autonomy is not automatically a recipe for success. It is only one part of conflict resolution and has to be combined with other measures according to the circumstances of the case. It must be backed by the political will of the partners to make autonomy a success. The case of Palestinian autonomy is overshadowed by a lack of such a will. Therefore, one has to take those voices into consideration, which argue that the existence of territorial autonomies can increase the risk of conflict.68 It must also be taken into consideration that international law must not lead to the destabilisation and disintegration of States. That means therefore that one has to see autonomy within the framework of human rights, minority rights, self-determination and the sovereignty of States. Any isolated overestimation of one aspect of international law would lead to instability and is not in accordance with modern international law.
68
Cornell, supra note 3, p. 14.
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COLLECTIVE & INDIVIDUAL SET BACK TO BACK: AUTONOMY AND THE INTERPLAY OF INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE DIMENSIONS IN ARTICLE 27 OF THE UN INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS Zelim A. Skurbaty 1
1. PRO PATRIA MORI: THE WHYS AND WHEREFORES What always seemed prima facie strange is that mysterious sense of self-conscious identification of individual actors with a community as well as the subjective feeling of compulsion to adjust their conduct and expectations in relation to that selfimposed identity. So far no “objective” categorizations could explain it. No matter how strongly this sense of attachment is politically promoted by e.g., group leaders, the fact remains that there always exists a sustained, structured interaction between members of a group, giving them a sense of being part of a “bounded whole”, which, over time, can turn into a willingness to sacrifice oneself completely for the survival of the group as a whole. There are different degrees of such mutual concern and involvement, which – in the context of the group being at war – may become a legal obligation, supported by the group’s custom or the state’s coercive power, endorsing fight, punishing flight.’ In the specific context of the present article we could proceed from the following question: can autonomy be conceived of as a group right per se or as a right of an individual to share and express her most intimate needs in community – and in the community2 − with other members of the group? To answer this question, we should give a brief analysis of the standing collective (or group) and individual rights enjoy in the international minority and human rights discourse. The best way to do that would be to demonstrate how these rights or dimensions interact in one specific human rights provision – Article 27 of the ICCPR, as the most widely used venue of complaint for individuals belonging to different types of minority groups, including indigenous populations. The dynamics revealed from such analysis would be indicative of the attitudes of the international community toward group rights in general and autonomy in particular. As is now well-known in both academic and non-academic circles, the reason why the very term ‘group rights’ has constantly been avoided after World War II was the pragmatic consideration not to provoke the resentment of member States – especially of newly independent States emerging after de-colonization – sensitive to 1
‘To die for one’s fatherland’, the shortened form of Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori. Meaning by ‘community’ any form of ‘autonomous’ entity or arrangement, both personal and territorial. 2
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ZELIM A. SKURBATY any attempts of limiting the exclusive prerogatives of their recently acquired statehood. These sovereign fledglings were suspect of any legally binding propositions designed to protect whatever groups within their boundaries, be they ethnic, religious, racial, linguistic or otherwise. Groups rights phobia developed as an overreaction to the perceived threat of an attack on the ‘sovereignty’ and of ‘interference in the internal affairs’, and was symbolic of repressed anxiety. The understanding of society as a set of independent individual wills is based on a belief in the priority of individual over cooperative values and goes back to Leibnitz (Baron von Gottfried Wilhelm, 1646–1716), who was the first to state in his major work ‘New Essays on Human Understanding, a treatise on John Locke’s Essay concerning Human Understanding’ (1704), that the physical world (and by extension, humankind) is composed of irreducible self-contained elements – monads – that are infinite in number, hierarchically arranged, nonmaterial, and in constant motion. The individualistic – monadic assumption lying at the heart of the West’s super-indulgence in individual rights was afterwards transferred matter-of-factly to the field of protection of human rights. Accordingly, the dominant ideology has taken comfort in the following clichés: collective rights are not human rights per se, because only the rights of individuals, e.g., the right to freedoms of expression, press, assembly, etc., really and truly matter in democratic societies. The latter (i.e., the individuals) can pursue their specific interests ‘in community’ with other members of kin social groups; but when the prospect of the individual-collectivity clash emerges, the individual human rights should – under all circumstances – get the upper hand over collective ones, lest the latter be used as pretexts for violating the former. Thus, the exercise of individual rights would automatically supersede collective rights, eliminate ipso facto any non-recognition or non-application of the rights pertaining to a group’s (or community’s) existence, and as a sequitur, obliterate any need for the latter. If it were so, it would be logical to suppose that from time immemorial, individuals in different societies should have been preoccupied with questions pertaining to their basic individual rights, while the questions of ethnicity and collectivity should have had a tangential, peripheral role. Even the pursuit of autonomy would be considered as something having nothing to do with the real needs of either individuals or groups. However, history proves otherwise. One of the central features of the great revolution of our times which has brought the modern world into being, writes R. Emerson, is that ‘the peoples of mankind in successive stages have been swept into a vivid and sometimes all-consuming sense of their existence as nations – or at least of their desire to create nations where none existed before’.3 If ‘group rights’ were merely varieties of the rights of individuals to associate in pursuit of particular interests, then collective rights could have been viewed in the light of Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which stipulates that, 3
See R. Emerson, From Empire to Nation: the Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples (Beacon Press, Boston, 1960), p. 89.
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AUTONOMY AND THE INTERPLAY OF INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE DIMENSIONS ‘(1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible. (2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.’4
The essence of the problem, however, boils down to whether we can afford to ignore the intimately individual human experience referred to under the rubric of ‘ethnicity’, which manifests itself in the constant search of ethnic markers in order to belong and share – the more so, if it is an experience with the potential ‘to be transformed into “aggressive nationalism” snapping back with fury like a bent twig when it is forced down’.5 We can no longer afford to be ‘blind to the fact that many demands for self-determination have been made and will continue to be made outside the colonial context’6 and should accept nolens volens that ‘[c]ultural minorities are a fact of life. Political stability requires that minority rights be acknowledged and accommodated.’7 Running ahead of our argumentation, a radical view of the whole subject can be propounded, to the effect that the entire controversy is unreal, artificial and strictly beside the point, because it assumes something that has to exist for there to be any controversy at all. It is a delusion created by uncritically assumed assumptions or presuppositions. There is simply no need to shuttle between the cracks of conceptual fragmentations (either individual or collective) and simplistic holisms (‘individual’, ‘collectivity’): the one is an equal ingredient as well as a complementary facet of the other; both represent fundamental constituents of the same universe. The question then is not what to give prevalence to – to individual or collective rights – but how to forge their modus vivendi in such a way that they establish a harmonic, complementary relationship while retaining their specific contributive value and distinctiveness. We can (and should) separate them for analytical reasons, but in existential terms they are inseparable to the extent that an individual might feel threatened, ‘desperate’, ready to ‘snap back with fury’. This is because a (ethnically-based) ‘nation’ is nothing but a community of people, ‘who feel that they belong together in the double sense that they share deeply significant features of a common heritage and that they have a common destiny for the future. In the contemporary world the nation is for great portions of mankind the community with which men most 4
GA Res. 217 A(III) 10 December 1948. See ‘Two Concepts of Nationalism: An Interview with Isaiah Berlin’, by Nathan Gardels, The New York Review of Books, 21 November 1991, p. 19. 6 See M. Sornarajah, ‘Internal Colonialism and Humanitarian Intervention’, 11 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law (1981), p. 846. 7 See D. Sanders, ‘Collective Rights’, 13 Human Rights Quarterly (1991), pp. 369–370. 5
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ZELIM A. SKURBATY intensely and most unconditionally identify themselves, even to the point of being prepared to lay down their lives for it, however deeply they may 8 disagree among themselves on other issues.’
This double entendre nature of the individual-collective discourse is all too obvious and there is no reason why the second meaning should any longer be passed for a risqué. It is hoped also, that by now some common though erroneous interpretations (amounting to caricature) have been exposed and bypassed. To sum up: Far from being Leibnitzean atomized entities, individuals are intimately integrated into specific groups engaged in collective symbolic interaction and sharing inter alia common value-systems and assumed beliefs about orderings of the world. In the broadest possible sense then, we can assert that the group (or kith-and-kin community) dimension is embedded in the consciousness of individuals, or is constitutive of individual beings, their collective unconscious and bio-social makeup. It inevitably flows from this that group rights should be accepted as a sui generis category of the national and international legal regimes. Such a recognition (of group or collective rights) should not prima facie be associated with sidelining and the violation of individual rights. In fact, the contrary can be true for the following reasons: a) individual rights of persons – voicing claims on behalf of groups and being persecuted by governments – can more effectively be vindicated and protected; b) legally authorized weighing and mediating of possible recognition (or rejections) of claims to ethnic self-determination, especially at an early stage of tension, would become more feasible with the effect of stabilizing inter-ethnic relations by subjecting them to the rules of international law.9
8
See Emerson, supra note 3., pp. 89−95 (emphasis added). Peter Juviler, reflecting on the recent developments in the former USSR, argues that collective rights to self-determination may be recognized in the form of internal autonomy, or even full secession, providing the following conditions are met: (1) ethnic groups are recognized as subjects of international law; (2) the inviolability of States territorial integrity should be conditional on State’s living up to their commitments as regards persons belonging to ethnic minorities; (3) collective self-determination should aim at autonomy, rather than secession; (4) valid grounds for secession might include discriminatory retribution, and violations of minority rights; (5) international recognition for such a new State should depend on ‘internationally monitored and credibly guaranteed undertakings to respect the rights of members of majority and minority ethnic groups in a mutt-ethnic community of equals’; (6) the international community must develop proactive rather than reactive means of resolving conflict; and (7) in such cases CSCE and UN mechanisms should be applied with vigor. See Juviler, pp. 281−282.
9
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AUTONOMY AND THE INTERPLAY OF INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE DIMENSIONS 2. ARTICLE 27 OF THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: JANUS10 EX (LEGAL) MACHINA11 HAMLET: Do you see yonder cloud that’s almost in the shape of a camel? POLONIUS: By the mass, and ‘tis like a camel, indeed. HAMLET: Methinks it is like a weasel. POLONIUS: It is backed like a weasel. HAMLET: Or like a whale? POLONIUS: Very like a whale. Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act III, Scene 2 2.1. Taking Individual Rights Seriously In contradistinction to the ambiguity of the status of collective rights (and I put as charitable a light on the matter as possible), individual rights have already achieved a position of status in international law. Although the rights and immunities of sovereign States still occupy commanding heights in current juridical consideration, recent developments point to the fact that the new definition of the law of nations goes beyond its traditional definition as a system composed of rules governing the relations between States exclusively. The concern of the international community extends now to certain rights and duties of individuals and non-State entities. Of special importance is the exponential growth of international human rights law, manifested inter alia in the adoption of new rules by which certain acts were declared to be international crimes, namely, crimes against humanity and peace and conspiracy to commit such crimes (e.g., the judgments of the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg in 1946, of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in 1948, or The International Tribunal on War Crimes in former Yugoslavia12). Whether such rules comprise international treaties or international customs, they have a tendency to assume the force of law in the international community, and thus to become – by virtue of the fact that contemporary international law is applicable to all States – universal. Both justice and peace are gradually promoted by transferring legal cases, especially those concerning the gross violation of human rights, from the diplomatic to the international judicial forum. Since the question is important qua
10
Janus (Mythology) 1. The god of gates and doorways, depicted with two faces looking in opposite directions. Janus-faced: Hypocritical. See The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language. 11 Deus ex machina [New Latin deus ex machinâ : deus, god + ex, from + machina, machine (translation of Greek theos apo mêkhanês)]. 1. In Greek and Roman drama, a god lowered by stage machinery to resolve a plot or extricate the protagonist from a difficult situation. See The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language. 12 The entry into force of the Rome Statute (Rome Statute of 1998) of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is the most recent example of this trend. The entry into force means that the ICC will be able to investigate and prosecute people accused of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed from this time onwards.
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ZELIM A. SKURBATY one of the horns of the individual/collective dilemma, I should, perhaps, further document this aspect of the contemporary international juridical scene. In 1981 the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities appointed (by decision 1981/142) one of its members, Mrs. Erica-Irene A. Daes (Greece), as a special Rapporteur to undertake a study on the status of the individual and contemporary international law. The final report on the study,13 presented to the sub-commission at its 1989 session, was based on the information received in response to a questionnaire from a number of States, specialized agencies, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and some other international agencies and organizations. Having reviewed developments relating to the subjectivity of the individual in international law, the special Rapporteur came to the conclusion that the individual is indeed a bearer of international rights and responsibilities and that she has a restricted procedural capacity directly under international law and, as a sequitur, should be considered, at least alongside the State, as a subject of contemporary international law.14 More specifically, her final conclusions can be presented as follows: (1) the individual is a subject of rights under a great number of rules of international law, is the beneficiary of international law and, in certain cases, bears the liabilities and disabilities which it imposes; the right to the protection of law, the right to own property, the right to education, the right to work, freedom of thought and assembly and the freedom of movement, residence and correspondence are examples of the rights and freedoms enjoyed by the individual irrespective of her origin, nationality, religion or language. Moreover, contemporary international law provides additional and specific protection to certain individuals: e.g., by international organizations, and in some instances against international organizations; 15 (2) of special importance is the individual complaint procedure established under the Optional Protocol – the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which came into force in 1976, and the procedure for human rights complaints established under Economic and Social Council resolution 1503; both of them represent important steps in the direction of the forthcoming (to be overly optimistic) world tribunal from which an individual will be able to seek redress and which will be capable to enforce its decisions; 13
See E.-I. A. Daes, Status of the Individual and Contemporary International Law: Promotion, Protection and Restoration of Human Rights at National, Regional and International Levels (United Nations, New York, 1992). UN Doc. E/ CN.4/Sub.2/1989/40. 14 ‘The elaboration of the present study demonstrates from theoretical and practical points of view, among others, that the individual is a bearer of international rights and responsibilities, his position in international law is constantly being strengthened. He has a restricted procedural capacity directly under international law and should be considered, at least alongside the State, as a subject of contemporary international law.’ See E.-I. A. Daes, op.cit., p. 56 (emphasis added). 15 Ibid. See also in this respect C. Parry ‘some Considerations upon the Protection of Individuals in International Law’, II Recueil des Cours, (1956) pp. 713−723.
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AUTONOMY AND THE INTERPLAY OF INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE DIMENSIONS 3) although the place of the sovereign State in international law remains to a degree sacrosant, it is difficult to overemphasize the notion that the State exists not as an end in itself, but as the means to welfare and prosperity of individuals (and we would add – groups) residing within its borders; its raison d'être is to be an effective means for the attainment of the individual and community values, and is thus, of a purely functional, pragmatic nature; 4) the relationship between the individual and contemporary international law is becoming more intimate as the international community becomes increasingly aware of the fundamental human values which underpin the law of nations. The concept of the international personality of the individual in international law holds encouraging prospects for the future. The full recognition of the individual as a subject of contemporary international law would be useful and important for the improvement of the enjoyment and the effective protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms at the national, regional and international level; 5) as Article 1, common to both Covenants, provides expressis verbis: ‘All peoples have the right of self-determination . . .’, it constitutes one of the cornerstones on which the legal basis of the struggle of national liberation movements and of their protection is based. The recognition of the observer status of the Palestine Liberation Organization and certain African liberation movements by the United Nations and other international organizations, clearly shows that the role of the liberation movements is on the increase and has a significant impact on international relations and the evolution of international law. The development is also indicative of the fact that the growing and ever-changing needs and the interdependence of communities and the real interest of modern society requires the existence of various subjects of international law. The study undertaken by the Special Rapporteur shows that, although it is a long way to the full recognition of the individual as a subject of contemporary international law, its legal standing as one of the prime beneficiaries of international law (especially what concerns the protection of individual human rights) is nonetheless firm and stable. Since individuals are not atomized entities (and we have already tried to refute this notion), and are, moreover, partly defined by the mode of their integration into specific groups, both national and international legal orders should have responded to the challenge of groups rights. The biggest challenge they were presented with was the question of balance between individual and group ‘ingredients’ in the relevant legal provisions. How the issue was handled in the legal domain and at the international level is our next and immediate concern. 2.2. Travaux Préparatoires: Orwellian Language vs. True Acceptance of Contradictions ‘Doublethink’ is the power of holding two contradictory beliefs in one’s mind simultaneously, and accepting both of them
G. Orwell 69
ZELIM A. SKURBATY In the recent legislative history on minority-related issues there is nothing that might suggest that the preservation of cultural diversity is an accepted, matter-of-fact idea or virtuality. Far from it, despite the fact that the opposite – the idea of (forceful) assimilation – openly clashes with the beau ideals of Western individualism, democracy, and freedom. It is the hidden imperative of a State and Sovereignty, which has prompted the States – both socialist and capitalist – to nip in the bud the initial proposal to include an Article on minorities in the Universal Declaration. ‘Communist’ China, ‘non-aligned’ India and the ‘capitalist’ United Kingdom have united in the belief that the entire Article should be deleted.16 As stated in the introduction to the present book, the meaning of international legal norms vis-à-vis minority groups (including the nascent provisions on autonomy) is an imposition of specific obligations upon States designed to facilitate the preservation of those differentiating features on which those groups place a high premium. The obligations can be pressed up to a point after which any sub-State entity should be given an opportunity to find other forms of interdependence, i.e., to exercise any appropriate (e.g., the so called internal or external forms) form of the right to self-determination. On the less dramatic side, the States might assume obligations both within the domain of their internal (municipal) law and pursuant to the 1966 International Conventions and bilateral treaties (where there are specific provisions concerning minorities), which they signed (or acceded to). The specific measures the States pledge to undertake can be subdivided in legal jargon into two major categories: those designed to prevent the discrimination of the members of minority groups (non-discriminatory legal provisions and practices), and those aimed at helping the minorities to catch up with and to be on par (in terms of socio-economic and cultural opportunities) with the dominant group (preferential treatment or affirmative action programmes). What follows is an account of the discussion, dissent and debate of the relevant – and uniquely legal – provision of an important international instrument, a provision, containing the essence of the international institutionalized response from the international community. Reliving the debate, however, is a rewarding experience because it gives a firsthand account of the vectors of power that have contributed to the particular 16
See UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR. 73, at 5 (1948). In supporting this proposal, Eleanor Roosevelt, a U.S. delegate to the UN and a chairman of the Commission for Human Rights, took a diplomatic tact when she pointed out that, ‘the aim of States was to assimilate and absorb large foreign groups, and to make them part of the nation. Unless all the citizens of a given country could speak the same language, there was the danger that public order might be disrupted by persons who might not understand their duties as citizens of the country in which they were a minority. It was not a question of teaching children in a language different from that of the majority, but of adult persons who would be unable to assume their duties as citizens of the larger country’, see UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR. 73,, p. 7. In a more open fashion, Wilson (United Kingdom), stated that ‘the principle of diversity in some States, far from raising cultural levels, might create minority problems’. Op. cit., p.12. The Article on minorities was deleted by ten votes to six. UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.74, at 5 (1948).
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AUTONOMY AND THE INTERPLAY OF INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE DIMENSIONS configuration of the clause. The problems which concerned the drafters of Article 27 are still at the sharp end of human rights law in general, and minority and groups rights in particular, without any one of them being crystallized into any final or even workable form. Thus, the reasons why we have chosen to parse this Article in the context of autonomy and minority rights are the following: a) it is the most important legally binding provision in the whole discourse of international human rights law; b) as a corollary, it provides the most widely used (and abused) avenue of complaint or redress for persons belonging to specific groups; c) it embodies the compromise between seemingly mutually-cancelling dimensions, such as those for individual and collectives; d) it is an outcome of a fierce debate, ‘where hundreds of schools of thought’ were ‘contending’ and representing the full palette of the then existing powers, systems and opinions; e) it reflects an institutional response from the international community, not a regional organization. We can credit this Article for both successes and failures of the minority system, autonomous arrangements included, as it stands today without mulling over similar less legally important and meaningful provisions in other relevant instruments. With this in mind, we shall try to proceed in a manner, which might avoid any suspicion of arbitrary or subconscious selectiveness. 2.2.1. Numerical Factor, Positive/Permissive Formulation The Drafting Committee, on its 1st Session (1947) considered the following proposal ‘In States inhabited by a substantial number of persons of a race, language or religion other than those of the majority of the population, persons belonging to such ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities shall have the right to establish and maintain, out of an equitable proportion of any public funds available for the purpose, their schools and cultural and religious institutions and to use their own language before the courts and other authorities and organs of the State and in the press and in public assembly.’17
We see here the emphasis on the numerical factor, albeit without qualification (what is ‘substantial’?), and a positive formulation of the right formulation withheld later on at the 9th Session (1953) of the Commission on Human Rights:18 ‘There was also some discussion on the extent of the obligations of States towards minorities. A proposal that “the State shall ensure to national minorities the right” was rejected.’19 The proposal that was rejected20 by eight votes to four, with four abstentions was formulated as follows: ‘The State shall ensure to national minorities the right to use 17
The proposal E/CN.4/21, annex A (Secretariat) Article 46 [27] (hereinafter, if not otherwise stated, the emphasis is that of the author’s) 18 A/2929, Chapt. VI, §18. 19 E/CN.4/5R.369, p. 4 (PL) 20 the proposal E/CN.4/L.222 (SU)
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ZELIM A. SKURBATY their native tongue and to possess their national schools, libraries museums and other cultural and educational institutions’.21 On second thought, though, the proposals of a more specific character, ‘to possess their national schools, libraries, museums and other cultural and educational institutions’, were not accepted.22 It was argued further that, ‘under such a text which imposed a positive obligation on States, minority consciousness could be artificially awakened or stimulated’.23 The formula ‘“the persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right”, which was adopted, seemed to imply that the obligations of States would be limited to permitting the free exercise of the rights of minorities’.24 The foregoing qualification of a minority qua group had popped up almost à la Freudian slip,25 because already in 1951, at the 5th (1950) and 6th (1951) Sessions of the Third Committee [A/5000, §119], ‘[t]here was general agreement on the basic provision that persons belonging to a minority should not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language’. The text elaborated by the Commission on Human Rights was widely regarded as satisfactory.26 2.2.2. ‘Persons Belonging to’ vs. ‘Minorities’ Why was the question of protection of minorities qua groups, especially concerning their equal status with the majorities, considered so vital? Because, ‘It was agreed that, while Article 2, paragraph 1, and Article 24 [26] of the draft Covenant on Civil and Political Rights contained a general prohibition of discrimination, differential treatment might be granted to minorities in order to ensure them real equality of status with the other elements of the population. It was felt that an Article on this question 27 should be included in the draft Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.’
But what meaning should be invested in the notion of ‘minorities’? The ensuing discussion on the meaning of the word ‘minorities’ at the 6th Session (1950), 8th Session (1952), 9th Session (1953) of the Commission on Human Rights [A/2929, Chapt. VI, §184], resulted in an agreement that ‘the Article should cover only separate or distinct groups, well-defined and long-established on the territory of a
21
E/CN.4/SR.371, p.6. E/CN.4/SR.257, p.5 (PL); E/CN.4/SR. 368, p. 4 (SU), p.8 (RCH), p. 14 (SU), p. 16 (F); 23 E/CN.4/5R.368, p. 9 (RCH); E/CN.4/SR.369, p.5 (GB) 24 E/CN.4/SR.368, p. 12 (YU); E/CN.4/5R.369, p. 12 (USA). 25 A verbal mistake that is thought to reveal an unconscious belief, thought, or emotion. See The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language. 26 A/17C.3/SR.289, §34 (SU); A/C.3/SR.290, §4 (PL); A/C.3/SR.291, §21 (YU); A/C.3/SR.366, §29 (LIB), §53 (EC); A/C.3/SR.401, §2 (BSSR) 27 Commission on Human Rights, 5th Session (1949), A/2929, Chapt. VI, §183 22
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AUTONOMY AND THE INTERPLAY OF INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE DIMENSIONS State’.28 This appeared to be the meaning of the opening clause, ‘[i]n those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist’.29 According to one opinion, the draft Covenant should deal with ‘national minorities’30; according to another opinion, ‘ethnic or linguistic groups’31; according to a third suggestion, ‘national, ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities’.32 The expression, ‘ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities’, was adopted.33 The hybrid Article under the heading of ‘amendment’34 had taken the following shape: ‘In those States in which stable and well defined ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities have long been established, persons belonging to such minorities should not be denied the right, in community with the 35 other members of their group to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion or to use their own language.’
It was proposed to modify the text of the amendment36 by deleting the phrase ‘stable and well defined’ and by replacing the words ‘have long be established’ by the word ‘exist’. The first clause should then read: ‘In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist’. The proposal, as modified orally, was adopted by five votes to one, with ten abstentions.37 It was thought that disruptive tendencies might result if ‘every person’ were to claim the benefit of the rights of minorities. For this reason, it was decided to qualify the exercise of minorities’ rights with the clause ‘in 28 E/CN.4/SR.256, p.5 (IND); E/CN.4/SR.257, p.3 (RCH); E/CN.4/SR.368, p.9 & p.14 (RCH), p. 17 (F); 29 E/CN.4/SR.369, p. 8, (U), p. 15 (RCH), p. 16 (SU); E/CN.4/SR.370, p. 11 (AUS). 30 E/CN.4/SR.369, p.6 (PAK), p. 9 (UkSSR), p.10 (AUS), p.13 (SU), p. 14 (GB); E/CN.4/SR.370, p.8 (PI), p. 11 (AuS) 31 E/CN.4/SR.369, p.7 (IND) 32 E/CN.4/ SR.369, p.9 (ET), p. 15 (RCH)] 33 ibid. 34 Amendment E/CN.4/L.261 (RCH) to E/2556 (Sub-Commission) 35 The analogous phrase ‘in community with others’ can also be found in Article 18(3) of the CCPR, concerning freedom of religion: ‘1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching’. It is noteworthy that no limitations of Article 18 – ‘necessary to protect public safety, etc.,’ − are permitted in Article 27. It compares also favourably with the next paragraph of the same Article which stipulates that ‘3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others’, and the 1947 draft by the Sub-Commission of a minority provision to be inserted in the Declaration of Human Rights, which stated that persons belonging to minority groups shall have institutional and linguistic rights ‘as far as is compatible with public order and security’. UN Doc. E/CN.4./52 at 9 (1947). 36 E/CN.6/L.261. 37 E/CN.4/SR.371, p .6.
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ZELIM A. SKURBATY community with the other members of their group’.38 As the Commission’s report shows, the mode of naming of a minority group was considered to be a factor having a direct influence on the nature of their claims: ‘Those who were in favour of the expression ‘ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities” were of the opinion that persons belonging to such minorities should have the right, in community with the other members of the group, ‘to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their religion or to use their own language. Those who were in favour of the expression ‘national minorities’ emphasized the right of such minorities ‘to use their native tongue and to possess their national schools, libraries, museums and other cultural and education institutions.’39
2.2.3. ‘Sheer Romanticism’ or the Roots of ‘Group-Protection’ Phobia Factions that clashed on a mode of minority protection shared one overriding fear: that any protection of a group might give an incentive to invoke the principle of selfdetermination with the concomitant secessionist claims. On the one hand, as one proposal held it: ‘Every people and every nation shall have the right to national selfdetermination’;40 on the other – a kind of a consensus of opinion was established among the State Parties, that the provisions concerning rights of minorities, ‘should not be applied in such a manner as to encourage the creation of new minorities or to obstruct the process of assimilation’.41 It was widely felt that ‘such tendencies could be dangerous for the unity of the State’.42 No minority, it was argued, ‘had the right to subversive action, and the Article [on self-determination] would not give it that right’.43 The long and ominous shadow cast by Article 1 was unsettling, especially: ‘the dangers of mistaken or over-simplified theories regarding the exercise of that right, which might lead to confusion and disorder; if selfdetermination was misused and considered as an absolute right, nothing but anarchy could result. The right could be exercised only within the limits of national sovereignty. It must not be used to undermine a sovereign Power’s rights over its territory and national resources; to use the right of self determination in order to incite dissident minorities to rise 38
E/CN.4/5R.369, p. 6 (GB). See UN Doc. E/2447, supra note 16, para. 53. See also the statements by India, UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.369 at 7 (1953); the Soviet Union, UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.368 at 14 (1953); the Philippines, UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.370 at 8−9 (1953). 40 Commission on Human Rights, 5th Session (1949), the proposal E/CN.4/237 (SU). 41 A/2929, Chapt. VI, §186 E/CN.4/5R.368, p.10 (RCH); E/CN.4/SR.371, p. 5. 42 Ibid. 43 Statement by Saudi Arabia during the debate on Article l, 10 GAOR, C.3 (648th mtg.), UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.648 at 121 (1955). It is interesting to note how quick some States were to equate Article 1 and Article 27 of the CCPR despite the fact that the drafters did their utmost to separate them both linguistically and semantically and to infuse them with different meanings. It shows, moreover, that self-determination was perceived as a loaded field common to both articles despite the intentions of the drafters. 39
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AUTONOMY AND THE INTERPLAY OF INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE DIMENSIONS against the State and imperil its stability would be as contrary to the true spirit of self-determination as aggression or subversion itself. And yet, as history went to show, groups with subversive and aggressive aims had been used by foreign Powers to overturn the governments of countries whose territory they wish to seize. Many independent countries had been the victims of irresponsible groups which had been encouraged to destroy the national unity of their own country. Furthermore, the right of selfdetermination must never be confused with the right of secession. Secession was the outcome not of respect for the right of selfdetermination but of disregard for fundamental human rights and the absence of the free consent of peoples to the exercise of the right of selfdetermination . . . [No] country represented on the Committee would be in existence if every national, religious or linguistic group had an absolute and unrestricted right to self-determination.’44
Also rejected was a proposal that ‘[e]very person shall have the right to show freely his membership of an ethnic or linguistic group, to use without hindrance the name of his group, to learn the language of this group and to use it in public or private life, to be taught in his language as well as the right to cultural development together with other members of this group’.45 In the light of time’s perspective, it is clear that the way the Commission has handled the problem of a ‘national’ or ‘ethnic homeland’, addressed later by the Badinter Commission, illustrates a lack of foresight (to put it mildly). During the 16th Session (1961) of the Third Committee46 some States were especially apprehensive of the prospect of ‘minoritization’ of the immigrant groups, which might gradually extend their claims to extreme forms of self-determination: ‘Many delegations representing countries of immigration stressed . . . that persons of similar background who entered their territories voluntarily, through a gradual process of immigration, could not be regarded as minorities, as this would endanger the national integrity of the receiving 47 States ; while the newcomers were free to use their own language and follow their own religion, they were expected to become part of the national fabric. It was emphasized that the provisions of Article 25 [27] should not be invoked to justify attempts which might undermine the 48 national unity of any State.’
In view of the clarification given on those points, it was thought unnecessary to specify in Article 27 that ‘such rights may not be interpreted as entitling any group settled in the territory of a State, particularly under the terms of its immigration laws, to form within that State separate communities which might impair its national 44
13 GAOR C.3 (888th mtg.), UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.888 at 257 (1958). The proposal E/CN.4/L.225 (YU), E/CN.4/5R.368, pp. 5-7 (YU), E/CN.6/SR.370, p.6. 46 A/5000, §120. 47 A/C.3/SR.1103, §50 (LIB). 48 A/C.3/SR. 305, §78 (U); A/C.3/SR. 1104, §21 (RMM). 45
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ZELIM A. SKURBATY unity or security’.49 Latin America formed the leading edge of the restriction tide50: ‘It was further stressed that the autochthonous population in Latin American countries could not be regarded as a minority. It should be treated as a vital part of the nation and should be assisted in attaining the same levels of development as the remainder of the population.’51 Although the Commission on Human Rights has acknowledged that the proposed amendment52 was supported by the majority of the Commission’s members, it had to reject it.53 However, after a second thought, the Commission decided that the limited rights guaranteed by the Article to the individual members of immigrant groups, were not likely to affect ‘national unity’ of States, be it by specific political activities, by using cultural institutions, or by spreading ‘political theories’.54 The prevailing sentiment during the debate55 was that minorities, or, to be in keeping with the accepted jargon, persons belonging to minorities, should be allowed to be assimilated if they (presumably) wished so: ‘A certain amount of discussion took place on the general questions of integration of minorities and protection of minorities. The question was raised whether protection should be accorded to individual members of a minority group or to the group as such’.56 It was emphasized in this connection that ‘any assimilation which might take place must be clearly voluntary’57, and that ‘members of minority groups should not be deprived of the rights enjoyed by other citizens of the same State, so as to enable them to integrate should they so desire’.58 Several delegations stated that ‘existing minorities were groups which had succeeded in maintaining their separate identities and that Article 25 [27] should not be used to encourage the emergence of new minorities’ and ‘pointed out that the protection of minorities was not meant to derogate from the principle of majority rule; there were regions, such as certain parts of Africa which were dominated by privileged minorities and Article 25 [27] was not intended to protect such domination’.59 But subject to this point, it would be fair to suppose that the majority rule might suppress the subjective willingness of the minority to maintain its special 49
E/CN.4/5R.368, p.10 (RCH); p. 16 (F). A/5000, §121. 51 A/C.3/SR.1103, §§ 20-21 (RCH), §43 (EC). 52 Providing that minority rights should not be interpreted as entitling immigrant groups settled in the territory of a State ‘to form within that State separate communities which might impair its national unity or its security’ – see UN Doc. E/2447, at 75. 53 Ibid. 54 UN Docs. E/CN.4/SR.370, at 4, 7, 9−10. 55 A/5000, §122. 56 A/C.3/SR.1103, §39 (IND); A/C.3/SR.1104, §18 (BR). 57 A/C.3/SR.1103, §30−31 (K); A/C.3/SR.1104, §11 (SU). 58 A/C.3/SR.1103, §54 (YU); A/C.3/SR.1104, §3 (MEX), §13-14 (YU), §23−25 (RCH), §32 (SA). 59 A/5000, §124. 50
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AUTONOMY AND THE INTERPLAY OF INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE DIMENSIONS characteristics. The challenge seemed far from being academic posturing. There is a rich irony in the fact that it was the government of Yugoslavia that took a firm stand on the issue vindicating the ‘subjective element’: ‘The Yugoslav Government wishes to underscore its conviction that the so-called “subjective factor” is in many respects dependent on the political atmosphere, and the cultural and social circumstances prevailing in the individual social communities in which the members of minorities live and work. Historical experiences have shown that the “indifference” of the members of minorities towards their national origin, position and rights [is], as a rule, the consequence of the social and other circumstances in which they live. In societies with a prevailing negative attitude of the “majority” towards the “minority” the members of the minorities are fearful that any declaration of one’s national, ethnic, cultural and other characteristics might be interpreted as a so-called “civil disloyalty” on his part as citizen of the country concerned. Therefore, it would be inappropriate to ascribe too much importance to the need of a “declaration of desire” by the members of any minority in order to preserve their own national, ethnic, cultural and other features and to manifest their awareness of their affiliation to a particular minority, especially in the case of a minority which has for decades been subjected 60 to the pressures of systematic assimilation and denationalization.’
Some States, especially Latin American ones, were even less willing to accord the status of minorities to indigenous populations. The unwillingness to recognize a group as a collective entity, with prospects of acquiring an international juridical personality, was covered up by false concerns of the State of its economic wellbeing. The position of Mexico in the debate has become paradigmatic in that it faked caring to avoid a status problem. Its government pointed out that Mexico, ‘was at present earnestly pursuing the incorporation within its national community of large indigenous groups which had hitherto led, so to speak, a marginal existence owing to lack of communications and the rudimentary level of economic development attained in the areas in which they lived. Those groups had remained untouched by the benefits of modern civilization, and had their own modes of thought and their own languages, but it would be sheer romanticism to make them into minorities.’61
60
See F. Capotorti, Study on the Rights of Persons belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (United Nations, New York, 1991), pp. 8−9. Also in: (UN docs E/CN4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1, Sales No. E78XIV1), ibid. 61 See UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.368 at 10 (1953).
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ZELIM A. SKURBATY If we assume some sort of conceptual succession between the reasoning above and their modern interpretations, then the ‘General Comment’ of the Human Rights Committee (1994) on Article 27 would represent a typical example of what I call below a ‘post hoc legal rationalization’. It is an attempt to infuse the rather ostensible message – easily inferred from the above-cited travaux préparatoires – with some profitable motives, existent, in all probability, only in the heads of the interpreters: ‘The terms used in Article 27 indicate that the persons designed to be protected are those who belong to a group and who share in common a culture, a religion and/or a language. Those terms also indicate that the individuals designed to be protected need not be citizens of the State party. In this regard, the obligations deriving from Article 2(1) are also relevant, since a State party is required under that Article to ensure that the rights protected under the Covenant are available to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction, except rights which are expressly made to apply to citizens, for example, political rights under Article 25. A State party may not, therefore, restrict the rights under Article 27 to its citizens alone.’62
And further: ‘Article 27 confers rights on persons belonging to minorities which “exist” in a State party. Given the nature and scope of the rights envisaged under that article, it is not relevant to determine the degree of permanence that the term “exist” connotes. Those rights simply are that individuals belonging to those minorities should not be denied the right, in community with members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to practice their religion and speak their language. Just as they need not be nationals or citizens, they need not be permanent residents. Thus, migrant workers or even visitors in a State party constituting such minorities are entitled not to be denied the exercise of those rights. As any other individual in the territory of the State party, they would, also for this purpose, have the general rights for example, to freedom of association, of assembly, and of expression. The existence of an ethnic, religious or linguistic minority in a given State party does not depend upon a decision by that State party but requires to be established by objective criteria.’63
Although the very fact of the more ‘profitable’ interpretations of the existing provisions should be viewed favourably (their non-binding character notwithstanding), the real meaning of such efforts will be more understandable if we take into account the notion of the progressive realization of the basic, core concepts concerning ‘minorities’, ‘self-determination’, etc. 62
See Report of the Human Rights Committee, Vol. I, GAOR, Forty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 40 (A/49/40), pp. 108−109. 63 Ibid.
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AUTONOMY AND THE INTERPLAY OF INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE DIMENSIONS 2.2.4. Finalized Version of Article 27: the Transpired Rationale and the Caveat The foregoing discussions suggest a simple conclusion for which no originality can be claimed at this stage of our discourse: the recognition of the collective or group dimension does not mean an advocacy of its supremacy over individual rights; even less the impairment of the responsibility of individual citizens for their individual decisions and actions; and even less – the imposition of collective guardianship over individual’s morals or self-consciousness. It is the hope of the author that he made this thesis clear, because to expand on this point in detail would be a resumption of the line of argumentation taken up above. This having been said, let us revenons à nos moutons.64 What the laborious debate amounted to was the following version of Article 27 of the Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, which was destined to become the only legally binding provision concerning ‘minorities’ in the whole discourse of international law of human rights65: ‘In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.’66
In the light of the considerations set out above, it becomes obvious that the particular wording and message of the Article are not random creatures and cannot be viewed just as an accident of drafting, but represent a deliberate decision, having a loosely concealed background determinant. The travaux préparatoires of Article 27 as well as their wording indicate the reluctance of the drafters to accept any reference to minority or group rights per se. The overriding interest, propelling the States to come to this particular decision was to avoid conferring an international legal personality on groups (or collectivities). I consider this as the single most important distinction and could theoretically leave out everything else as having no added (explanatory) value. But the rationalization of this avoidance does add value to the rationale of the overall States-Minority problematique. First, by denying the victimized groups an international legal personality States deny a ‘minority’ or a ‘people’ the capacity to vindicate their rights before a competent international institution, such as the
64
French., literally. ‘let us return to our sheep’, with allusion to the confused court scene in the old French Farce de Maistre Pierre Pathelin (c. 1470). ‘Let us return to the subject’: an exhortation to cease digressing. See Oxford English Dictionary 65 The Council of Europe Framework Convention on Minorities is of a programmatic nature and does not provide any venue for individual complaints. 66 In International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976, G.A. Res. 220A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 UNTS 171, reprinted in 6 ILM 368 (1967).
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ZELIM A. SKURBATY Committee on Human Rights established by the Covenant.67 How? Because the Optional Protocol to the Covenant gives the right to file communications to the Committee only to individual members of groups, not groups as such, which means that such communications stand every chance of being rejected at the level of admissibility criteria. Although the Human Rights Committee in its ‘General Comment’ (23 (fiftieth session, 1994) states that this Article establishes and recognizes a right which is ‘distinct from, and additional to, all the other rights which, as individuals in common with everyone else, they are already entitled to enjoy under the Covenant’, a clear-cut distinction is drawn between ‘the right to self-determination and the rights protected under Article 27’, because ‘the former is expressed to be a right belonging to peoples and is dealt with in a separate part (Part I) of the Covenant’; self-determination ‘is not a right cognizable under the Optional Protocol’, while Article 27 ‘relates to rights conferred on individuals as such and is included, like the articles relating to other personal rights conferred on individuals, in Part III of the Covenant’ and – thus pigeonholed – ‘is cognizable under the Optional Protocol’.68 The fact the latter is the saving clause is apparent by the reference that ‘the enjoyment of the rights to which Article 27 relates does not prejudice the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a State party’.69 Second, the opening words, ‘[i]n those States in which . . .’, are a clear indication of the resistance to accept the broader concept of minority rights. From the purely legal standpoint, there is confusion here between the rights protected under Article 27 and the guarantees under Articles 2(1) (i.e., to enjoy the rights under the Covenant without discrimination as applied to all individuals within a State’s territory irrespective of their group affiliation), and Article 26 (equality before the law and non-discrimination in respect of rights granted by the States) – a fact profitably exploited by certain States (e.g., France,70 Turkey, India, to name 67
10 GAOR C.3 (642d mtg.), UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.642 at 90 (1955). See Report of the Human Rights Committee, Vol. I, GAOR, Forty-ninth Session, Supplement, No. 40 (A/49/40), pp. 107−108. 69 Op. cit., p. 108 70 The example of France, so far as the recognition of minorities is concerned, is most telling. Numerous cases submitted by French citizens of non-French ethnic origin (e.g., Bretons or Corsicans) to the Committee under Article 27, were uniformly dismissed by the Government of France under the pretext that ‘in the light of Article 2 of the “Constitution of the French Republic . . . Article 27 of the Covenant is not applicable so far as the ‘Republic’ is concerned”. Article 2 of the French Constitution stresses the famous (and very much − historically − French) egalitarian principle, which ‘shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race or religion’. When the Human Rights Committee requested France to submit the periodic report under Article 40 of the Covenant, it expanded on the egalitarian rationale for denial the minority rights: ‘since the basic principles of public law prohibit distinctions between citizens on grounds of origin, race or religion, France is a country in which there are no minorities and, as stated in the declaration made by France, Article 27 is not applicable as far as the Republic is concerned’. See 27 Documents CCPR/C/22/Add.2 and CCPR/C/46/Add.2. There was nothing left for the Human Rights Committee but to recognize its ‘incompetence’ − in the cases of 68
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AUTONOMY AND THE INTERPLAY OF INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE DIMENSIONS only a very few) when they deny both the minority rights and the existence of minorities as such. The fact has been heeded by the Human Rights Committee: ‘Some States parties who claim that they do not discriminate on grounds of ethnicity, language or religion, wrongly contend, on that basis alone, that they have no minorities’.71 The stance of the government of India is representative of the position taken by a number of States. The reference to ethnic minority (in Article 27) ‘does not apply to Indian society’, reads the country Report submitted to the UN Special Rapporteur A. Eide (as a reply to the questionnaire he sent out beforehand). Why? Because Article 18 of the CCPR, which ‘deals with the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion’, is of greater ‘importance to India, which comprises people belonging to different religions, faiths and beliefs’.72 The said aspects of ethnic identity are addressed by Article 29 of the Indian Constitution which reads: ‘Any section of the citizens residing in the territory of India having a distinct language, script or culture of its own shall have the right to conserve the same. No citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds of religion, race, caste or language. The Indian Constitution provides suitable protection to linguistic minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.’73
Third, no matter how liberally we interpret the text of the Article (and thus follow the advice of Francesco Capotorty), the words ‘shall not be denied the right’ – in contrast to the turned down ‘shall enjoy’ – are indicative of tolerance and concession, not of positive affirmation or even of a recognition of rights. The provision, as a safeguard for particular minorities, has a distinct negative purport because it gives a place of pride to an interdiction of interference with certain collective human activities, not to their positive protection. Again, it is difficult to e.g., T.K. v. France and M.K. v. France − ‘to consider complaints directed against France concerning alleged violations of Article 27’. Moreover, in S.G. v. France, G.B. v. France, R.L.M. v. France, and C.L.D. v. France (Communication No. 439/1990) the Committee observed that France’s declaration ‘is tantamount to a reservation and therefore precludes the Committee from considering complaints against France alleging violations of Article 27’. Only Committee member Rosalyn Higgins, in an individual dissenting opinion, argued that the French declaration need not be equated with a reservation, and that the Committee was competent to examine the Article 27 claim. 71 ibid. 72 See India, CCPR/C/37/Add.13, cited in A. Eide, Possible Ways and Means of Facilitating the Peaceful and Constructive Solution of Problems Involving Minorities. E/CN4/Sub.2/1993/34 10 August 1993 pp. 45−46. 73 Ibid.
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ZELIM A. SKURBATY reconcile an assertion that ‘Article 27 is expressed in negative terms’ with “the existence of a right’” which ‘requires that it shall not be denied’.74 It is rather evident from the above that the cited Commentary as a whole, is nothing but a string of post hoc legal rationalizations; and, although it sounds anecdotal to repeat endlessly the claims of groups in the context of an overriding, State-sided running commentary, it is exactly what the background debate – the travaux préparatoires of Article 27 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – offers. The short lesson that comes out of this experience is something like this: all the motive power in all of the movements of the States Parties during the drafting of Article 27 was the instinct of State – and status-quo – preservation. States deliberately wished to adopt rules and procedures that would maximize the chances of survival of the political status-quo (or preservation). All the obstructions came from attempting to rely on something else than status quo. All the attempts at bridging the differences of opinions and claims proved to be half-hearted and ineffective. The provision (Article 27) has not provided either enforcement with temper, or conciliation with dignity. It could not strengthen the hand of a ‘minority’ representative in advancing claims for the minority but only – for the protection of the ‘minority’ members by a State. The background assumption that if individual rights were honoured, ‘minorities’ would have no legitimate or defensible claims to further – not to mention special – protection under international law, proved – as History and modern developments testify − wrong. Given the above mentioned political constraints on the drafting of Article 27, it went as far in this direction as it could possibly go. The debate over the content and context of Article 27, however, has paved the way for the realization that the State-Minority stand-off can be resolved, at the fundamental level, only in the form of an effective international legal arrangement which takes into account the collective – along with an individual − dimension of a ‘minority’. Knowing what we know now, one could put forward a well-founded assumption that the alleged form of such an arrangement could, ideally, be a legally recognized right (at both national and international levels) to autonomy.75
74
Ibid. It goes without saying that the semantic scope of ‘autonomy’ exceeds in our deliberations the notion of a ‘territorial autonomy’, pure and simple. 75
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PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE ECONOMIC VIABILITY OF AUTONOMOUS ARRANGEMENTS CENTRALISM AND FISCAL FEDERALISM Gisela Färber 1. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FINANCIAL CONSTITUTION FOR AN EFFICIENT PUBLIC SECTOR Intergovernmental financial relations are crucial for the balance of power either in a centralist state or in a federal state. It has recently become also an important concern for supra-national organisations like the EU, EMU and other international relations e.g. the international climate negotiations. Independence, interdependence and general rules about intergovernmental tax and non-tax ‘prices’ build the frame in which governments ‘communicate’ with their voters as well as with regional and foreign tax payers and consumers of public goods. Centralist and federal systems differ strongly concerning intergovernmental financial relations. This paper shows the fundamental concepts of both presenting the respective approaches of the theory of public choice and of fiscal federalism. It starts with the contrast of the two opposing concepts concerning the division of public responsibilities among administrative units and independent jurisdictions on different federal tiers. To be able to determine in a nearly optimal way the volume and structure of the central, regional and local public goods, all jurisdictions need certain rights concerning taxation and public expenditures. Particularly regional spill-overs, and other imperfections in the intergovernmental relations, but also arguments in favour of an interregional solidarity cause the need for a system of fiscal equalization. There are different construction principles of fiscal equalization including horizontal intergovernmental transfer payments among different jurisdictions at the same governmental tier and – more often – vertical transfers from central government to state governments, from state to local governments, as well as directly from central to local governments. Financial equalization payments do not only exist in federal states, but also in centralist countries between central and local governments which have a certain autonomy to regulate local concerns. In part two, the paper is concerned with the fiscal constitutions of ‘real’ systems of centralist and federalist countries. Most centralist countries have started to implement federal elements like regional parliaments including certain autonomous 83
GISELA FÄRBER competences into their governmental and administrative structure. All federally constituted countries suffer under long established poorly constructed and unbalanced taxing and spending powers which actually provide increasing problems for the respective international competitiveness of the national economies. Against this background questions arise as to what are the future functions of fiscal equalization. How is it to be constructed? How much redistribution among jurisdictions is required? Should more horizontal elements of redistribution be implemented? Or should the central government take over more responsibilities of redistribution of tax revenues, and a more ‘centrally’ directed financial constitution be established? 2. ALLOCATION INSTRUMENTS IN CENTRALIST AND FEDERAL STATES 2.1. Principles of Political Decision Making and Supply of Public Goods in Centralist and in Federal States One of the most difficult questions in market economies is which public goods and how much of them are needed. The decisions about an optimal size and structure of private goods are coordinated by the market mechanism. But there are certain cases of so-called market failures in which the government sector has to guarantee or regulate a provision of goods or even to produce it by its own public administration or public enterprises because a private market supply will not be sufficient. In theoretical models, all information is available to determine the optimal quantity of public goods including an optimal taxation. In reality however, there is no wise dictator. Instead democratic elections are used to make the citizens’ preferences visible. That means that people vote for a certain bundle of public goods, for a certain political program according to their preferences. Politicians who want to be elected or re-elected offer those programs with which they hope to win the elections. Therefore, politicians are, in basic public choice model, mediators of citizens’ preferences for public goods. Centrally and federally constituted countries differ strongly in regards to the mechanisms of allocation decisions of public goods. In a centralist state, the central government decides about all public goods and has to guarantee the provision and administration of the public good equally across the whole territory. That means that only one government is elected and has the right to determine the size and the structure of public goods. Conflicts among diverging preferences are solved by majority decision for a certain program. Preferences of public goods, which are not offered by the winning party, are not satisfied. In federal states, the legislative responsibility is divided among several government tiers: Each of the many jurisdictions decides about the structure and volume of ‘their’ public goods and has to get the approval of their voters. That way, federal states have the ability to provide different bundles of public goods at state and local levels according to the diverging regional preferences of the respective regional and local voters. Also, the problems of ethnic minorities – which are always 84
CENTRALISM AND FISCAL FEDERALISM also connected with different preferences for public goods – can be solved by establishing a federal structure. The overwhelming advantage of a federal structure against a centralist state is the ability to cover diverging preferences for public goods. Therefore the number of ‘losers’, of unsatisfied preferences is much lower in federal states. Usually this advantage of benefits should exceed the additional costs of the higher number of governments and the higher costs of information necessary for political decision-making and for the voters. By a federal governmental constitution, the number of federal tiers and the number of jurisdictions on the different levels of governments is determined. This structure is not to remain unchanged for eternity. Rather changes concerning significant changes of preferences e.g. of ethnic groups can lead to separations or unifications of jurisdictions or even to moving frontiers of jurisdictions. Examples are the establishment of a new Canadian Province, Nunavut, located in the North and containing only 25,000 inhabitants, or the new determination of the frontiers of the Swiss Canton Jura according to the linguistic affiliation of the people. The developments of the last ten years in the territory of the former Yugoslavia show another more tragic example of the living structure of a multi-ethnic state. Economists tend to reduce economic transactions to the goal of efficiency. Since Musgrave published his ‘Theory of Public Finance’ two other fundamental goals of government activities, distribution and stabilisation, have been accepted.1 Efficiency however is the dominant decision criterion and is used to construct rules how to distribute the potential public goods among the government tiers in a federal state. According to the subsidiarity principle, the responsibility to decide about the structure and the amount of public goods should be as decentralized as possible, particularly if • • •
people in different regions show diverging preferences for public goods, diseconomics of scale exist. Additionally, the costs for innovation are lower at the decentralized levels, because only a limited number of citizens are forced to suffer under ‘administrative experiments’. In the positive case there are also strong incentives of imitation of the new procedures so that in general federal systems tend to be more innovative than centralist ones.
A centralization of responsibilities increases the efficiency of public good production in the cases of • •
economics of scale and regional spill-overs.
Since the discussions of public choice arguments we additionally know that the necessary political control is more effective at decentralized government levels. It 1
See R. A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance (New York, 1959).
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GISELA FÄRBER also increases in the cases when direct democratic instruments are provided, and is weaker the less people can influence politicians and the political decision making processes. Concluding all arguments for a federal structure of responsibilities for public goods, there are as many optimal government tiers as public goods2 because only occasionally two public goods are covered by identical areas of homogeneous preferences. But special service jurisdictions only exist exceptionally. Normal jurisdictions usually bundle those regional and local public goods with a comparable spatial homogeneity. The efficiency losses due to an imprecise optimal cut of the jurisdiction according to the preferences mostly are more than compensated by the efficiency gains resulting from the fact that a lower number of administrative bodies has to be established and that capacities for public services which necessarily have to be offered are better occupied. 2.2. Division of Responsibilities: Two Types of Federalism Federal states have been established for various reasons. The Swiss federation was set up as a union against a suppressor. Belgium and the former Yugoslavia took it as a way to solve their multi-ethnic problems. Many of the former British colonies3 – the USA, Canada, Australia, but also India and Nigeria – chose federal structures for their independent life in the frame of the Commonwealth. Germany established the Second German Empire under the hegemony of Prussia, which was clever enough not to continue its military strategy to unify the independent German states but to establish a supra-state common government level. Austria’s federal system has existed since 1922 when after the break down of the Imperial and Royal Monarchy a democratic government system was set up. Nobody would expect all these federal systems to be constructed identically. But two basic types of federalism, which dominate all variations, can be distinguished: • •
federal systems where the tiers are in principle independent from each other, and the so-called systems of administrative federalism with interconnected responsibilities.
The second type is realised in Germany and in Austria and in principle also in the European Union. Here governmental responsibilities as concerned with legislation 2
From this theoretical point of view, the approach of FOCJ (Functional, Overlapping, and Competing Jurisdictions) has been developed by Bruno S. Frey and Reiner Eichenberger (see their contribution: ‘Jenseits des Gebietsmonopols des Staates’ in Gerken, Lüder; Schick, Gerhard (eds.) Grüne Ordnungsökonomik: Eine Option moderner Wirtschaftspolitik, (Marburg, 2000) p. 331. 3 Astonishingly, the former French colonies did not set up federal, but only unitarian or centralist government structures.
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CENTRALISM AND FISCAL FEDERALISM and with administration are not at the same federal tier: e.g. in Germany, the Länder are according to Article 84 GG responsible for the execution of federal laws. The Federal Parliament therefore passes in many fields federal laws which are then executed by state or even local administrations in their proper responsibility. If a federal law regulates details of state administration the approval of the Bundesrat is required. From this point of view it is quite logical that members of the Bundesrat are representatives of state governments and not of state parliaments or otherwise directly elected representatives as it is regulated by the Senate model which is common for the type of federalism with independent responsibilities. Which of the two basic types of federalism provides a more efficient public sector is not clear ex ante. Both systems offer certain advantages and suffer from other disadvantages: •
•
•
•
Federal tiers which are widely independent from each other can better follow different regional preferences while administrative federalism tends towards a high degree of centralization of legislation and highly regulated administrative procedures. From the ideal perspective however, the freedom to decide how to execute a federal law, how to produce or guarantee a public service which is regulated by federal law in general terms should be broad enough to find different regional administrative solutions according to regional preferences. Administrative federalism is easily open for changes of public good responsibilities, particularly for centralization if changes in the tier of responsibility are required according to the above-mentioned criteria. Economic and technical development demands a fundamental revision of federal responsibilities every 30 years. During that period, other more marginal changes may be required. In the federal systems, which are not interconnected, changes of responsibilities from state to federal government level are difficult to negotiate and tend to be extremely expensive for the central government. The large part of federally uniform law in administrative federalism additionally provides advantages concerned with information costs for those citizens who are highly mobile in their economic or private activities. The larger a country is and the less people cross state frontiers the less this perspective becomes important. In small countries a certain harmonization among state regulation is necessary particularly in those cases in which citizens tend to optimize their economic sphere in a way, which reduces the same rights of people in other parts of the country. Interpersonal (re)distribution is easier in those federal systems which have a high degree of central legislation. In highly decentralised federal countries redistribution of the government sector is limited to the degree which is accepted within a jurisdiction. Therefore, a country-wide uniform redistribution is lower in the independent federal constitutions,
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GISELA FÄRBER while it is higher in the types of administrative federalism and – certainly – in centrally constituted countries. What kind of federal system should be established is before this background depends on the size of a country, the interregional mobility particularly of the labour force and the consumers, the homogeneity of citizens’ preferences and their preference for a high degree of interpersonal redistribution. 2.3. Structure of Financial Constitutions in Federal States The structure of financial constitutions has to be discussed in three parts, firstly the budgetary spending competences, secondly the taxation competences, thirdly the construction of fiscal equalization. To enable the jurisdictions of a federal system to fulfil their responsibilities it is necessary to equip them with certain rights and securities. The leading model was established by Samuelson4 and Lindahl who asked in the 1950s which would be the optimal size of the government sector – in centralist states.5 According to the ideas of public finance welfare economics the two economists stated that citizens would have additional benefits from the provision of public goods and would suffer from a respective withdrawal of benefits by the taxes, which they had to pay for the provision. Because of different marginal benefits of public goods and tax payments dependent on the size of the public budget – the first marginal benefits of public goods are high while the first units of taxes only have small losses of benefits – the optimal size of government budgets is at the point where the marginal gains of benefits from public goods and the marginal losses of benefits resulting from tax payments are equal. Although nobody has the exact information at which point the optimal budget is reached, democratic elections expose the voters’ preferences in a nearly optimal way. This idea can be enlarged to the construction principles of federal financial constitutions. To be able to determine in a nearly optimal way the volume and structure of the central, regional and local public goods, all federal jurisdictions need the rights • •
to spend their taxpayers’ money independently and to levy taxes autonomously at least at the margin.
The power to determine both sides of the public budgets is essential for the democratic allocation mechanism in the public sector. For the empirical construction of fiscal constitutions the details of both rights are very important. But because of the fact that the first three different stages of a fiscal constitution – the distribution of responsibilities for public goods, the spending competences and the rights of 4 See P. A. Samuelson, ‘Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditures’ in Review of Economics and Statistics (1955), p. 350. 5 See E. Lindahl, Die Gerechtigkeit der Besteuerung, (Lund, 1919), p. 85.
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CENTRALISM AND FISCAL FEDERALISM taxation –- never will work perfectly, a fiscal equalization is necessary at the last fourth stage for compensation of the inbuilt deficits. 2.3.1. Budgetary Spending Competences Spending competences are narrowly connected with the right to decide about the amount, the method, and the quality of public service production. It is obviously rational that the federal tier, which is responsible for the determination of a public good, should also be responsible to pay for the provision. In all unconnected federal systems spending rules are constructed according to that principle: All jurisdictions pay for those public goods for which they have taken legislative decisions. Although there are almost always direct and indirect effects of the public goods provision of a jurisdiction to the economy, the production functions of ‘foreign’ public services and the taxation base of other jurisdictions they only scarcely reach a level of importance that the burdened jurisdictions complain about. Exceptions are sometimes concerned with vertical financial relations particularly when the higher tier affects the budgets of the lower ones by its legislation. The debate about the ‘unfunded mandates’ in the USA is a good example and led to a reform of the 6 respective intergovernmental relations in the mid-1990s. In general, in federal systems the principle that the responsible legislating jurisdiction has to pay for the production or provision of public goods is fulfilled and is a certain guarantee for the efficient provision of public goods. Otherwise the burden of taxation, which is a direct result of public spending, becomes too high and th government will not be re-elected. It is obvious that the rules of public borrowing are very important for the taxation-spending mechanism. If governments are not able to shift financial burdens to other generations of taxpayers the mechanism is workable. In the systems of administrative federalism, the spending rights are constructed differently: They are not tied to the legislation right, but to the administration competence. In Germany as well as in Austria and in the European Union, the executing federal tiers have to respect expenditures, which are ‘ordered’ by the central legislation. Exceptions are valid for certain direct transfer payments. Article 104a(3) of the German Grundgesetz indicates e.g. so-called ‘Geldleistungsgesetze’ which regulate certain social transfer payments of which federal and state governments share the financial burdens. Among this type of public expenditure include location aids, students’ transfers and loans, and young parents aids. Additionally, public expenditures in the context of the European agricultural market are financed, precisely: refunded from the European budget while the member states have to bear the costs for the administration. But in general, state and local governments have to cover the costs for those public goods which are regulated – partly in a very detailed way – by federal laws out of their budgets, out of the tax 6
C. R. Wise and T. L. Brown, When Governments disagree: A Comparative Analysis of Conflict Resolution Mechanisms in Intergovernmental Relations in Three Nations, <www.napawash.org/fsp.nsf/83…2a339852568da0014693e?OpenDocument>, S. 10
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GISELA FÄRBER revenues they impose on their regional or local taxpayers. It is also obvious that the principle of congruency of legal responsibility and of cost carrying is not fulfilled. From an isolated perspective it can be expected that huge distortions − an inefficient and too high supply of public services under federal regulation and too few regional and local autonomous public goods − will result from that construction mistake. Before that background the question should be kept in mind what are the resulting compensating constructions on the two following stages of the fiscal constitution concerning taxation and fiscal equalization. 2.3.2. Taxation Competences If the ideals of optimal taxation could be implemented in reality there would be no problems concerning the distribution of taxation principles. In a centralist state, a lump sum tax would be levied which for its part would not cause any welfare distortion, and the taxation-spending mechanism could work. The sum of welfare distortions might be marginal in the case where all federal tiers have the right to levy a lump sum tax which is constructed solely to finance public expenditures. For many economists, it is a sad reality that a lump sum tax is neither accepted as fair nor is executable. The last example was realized by Margaret Thatcher after the implementation of the poll tax which directly lead to her losing the elections. Using practicable types of taxes many problems arise. Beside those problems which are common for all practiced tax systems, including centralist countries with only one deciding institution, there are special taxation problems in federal systems in which all jurisdictions should have tax sources of their own. Principally, the rights of taxing certain typical tax sources are divided among the federal tiers. But the right of taxation is not a uniform one and can be distinguished into the right of legislation and the right of revenue of the whole tax amount or part of it. Further, the rights of tax administration can differ from those of legislation and those of revenues. Additionally, some economists and many politicians want to use taxes as instruments to influence private behaviour and economic activities. Income taxes therefore give after several years of validation the picture of a Swiss cheese with many, many loopholes, decreasing revenue capacities and increasing individual tax burdens.7 But before regarding the problems it is necessary to have an insight into the goals, which a division of taxing powers should follow in a federal system: 1.
7
Taxation revenues should be the most important instruments to finance public spending. They therefore have to create revenue capacitie, which
This fact is often overlooked because of the progressive income tax rates, which lead to an automatic increase of income tax revenues exceeding the growth rate of economic activity. The marginal income tax gains are therefore often used by politicians to offer new tax exemptions without being forced to discuss the use of taxpayers money for certain purposes. In truth, the tax burden of the average taxpayer increases and increases until the latter is no longer willing to pay and starts diving into the shadow economy.
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CENTRALISM AND FISCAL FEDERALISM
2.
3.
4.
follow the burdens of spending themselves resulting from the division of responsibilities of public services. They should be sensitive to the variation of tax rates in those cases that the jurisdictions of a certain federal tier follow diverging citizens’ preferences for public services. If an equal level of regional and local services is desired by the voters then taxes should also spread very evenly. They should also have c.p. an equal or better: a rather even revenue capacity if the production costs for public services are similar across the whole country. They should in contrast differ with respect to production cost differences. It has to be guaranteed that the taxation powers are able to fulfil the functions of ‘regional tax prices’. That means that from an ideal point of view taxes should be paid to those jurisdictions where a taxpayer – a private person as a consumer or a member of labour force or an enterprise – uses regionally and locally immobile public infrastructure capital for his or her benefit. According to an international tradition (and for good economic reasons) taxation is tied to the residence of a natural person or the location of an enterprise. But a person can work and consume in other jurisdictions than in his or her residence jurisdiction, and enterprises can produce at several locations. From this perspective it becomes clear that the procedures of corporate income tax cutting according to the amount of wages or value added at the different locations is not an act of arbitrariness rather than of a fair sharing of tax revenues among the jurisdictions which offered infrastructure capital necessary to make the enterprise profit. If the production factors labour and capital were not mobile, there would be no need of a competition among the jurisdictions of the same tier. This assumption has to be left more and more, as the discussion about the models of competing federalism shows. From the functions of ‘tax prices’ and of a fair tax competition can also be concluded that the different economic tax bases are not equally useful for all federal tiers. The lower the federal level the more functional are taxes on immobile factors, starting with land taxes. Meantime, the high international mobility of capital even sets limits for an independent national taxation of capital incomes. Many other taxes are in principle due to be used as tax sources at many federal tiers, but certain construction principles have then to be regarded. For a fair competition among jurisdictions the tax sources should be distributed in a way that the tax capacities do not spread too strongly. If a fiscally strong jurisdiction disposes e.g. about twice the tax base of a fiscally poor one, the first could c.p. easily change the ratio of public services and the necessary spending level on the one hand and/or the tax rate on the other hand to its favour because it needs a lower tax rate to have the same amount of tax revenues. High divergences in tax capacities without compensations by fiscal equalization measures would 91
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5.
6.
7.
8.
lead to an unfair tax competition and a high degree of migration which is inefficient if it is only caused by those differences of the taxation base. Furthermore it has to be guaranteed that all jurisdictions only can tax activities and assets which are in their own area. Unfair tax competition also takes place if some jurisdictions can appropriate parts of the tax base of other jurisdictions. All jurisdictions need at least two broad tax bases to be able for a fair tax competition. If the tax bases are too small the change of tax rate can again lead to inefficient migration of the mobile production factors. With regard to the absolute and relative importance of the personal income tax all over the world it should seriously be reflected if the participation in the personal income tax base – however it is constructed - should not become some sort of ‘basic right’ of all jurisdictions in federal systems. For local governments should additionally be required that aside of an access to a personal income tax base they should also have the right to levy a tax on the economic activity of local enterprises. From the point of view of a rational tax system the number of taxes should be limited. Many small taxes prevent citizens from feeling the burden of taxation and mostly increase the share of administration costs of the tax system. If tax exemptions lead to remarkable losses of tax revenue of other jurisdictions of other federal tiers they have to be avoided, at least to be refunded. This principle becomes more important if the tax exemptions of a jurisdiction at a higher federal level does not lead to even revenue losses, but concerns certain regions more than others.
Many of these principles are realised in many federal fiscal constitutions. There are typical patterns of distribution of tax sources: taxes on land and immovable property are local taxes in most federal states. Progressive income taxes sometimes are centralised to the federal tiers, in other countries several tiers participate in that important tax base. Turnover taxes with deduction of pre-taxes are located at the central government level while state governments often have the right to levy a sales tax. Special excise taxes are located at the federal or at the state level. A central taxation minimizes the administration costs because excises can easily be taxed at the producers. If the taxation technique offers reasonable possibilities to levy the taxes at the wholesale or even retail trade turnover then the taxes are suitable as tax sources of state governments. Motor vehicle taxes and taxes on land acquisition often are state taxes, inheritance taxes at the state level have started to disappear because they – as you can see in Australia and also in the relation between Austria and Germany – are sensitive for a down sizing competition. A sacrifice of tax competition has become the local trade tax, which was very common across whole Europe until about 20-25 years ago. The European employment crisis then lead to a distortion to that traditional and a bit old-fashioned tax. The poor remains of that tax on enterprise gains – instead of their value added – are now ready for a German 92
CENTRALISM AND FISCAL FEDERALISM museum after they can be deducted by 100% from the corporate and the personal income tax. If these facts did not lead to sufficient confusion the above-mentioned differences concerning legislation, revenue and administration competences would shortly have to be discussed. In central systems they necessarily fall in one hand, in not interconnected federal systems they generally do. Each jurisdiction decides about the legal tax base, the tax rate and the details of tax administration, which is executed by a tax office of the same jurisdiction. In Canada e.g., federal government has offered agreements to provincial governments to levy their income taxes in the case that they chose the same tax base as federal government. With that instrument federal government offered an incentive for a common tax base all over Canada. Most of the Provinces – except Québec – accepted the personal income tax. But concerned with the corporate income tax several agreements were recently cancelled by the rich Provinces, which can be interpreted as an indicator of a growing tax competition. Switzerland e.g. has the identical personal income tax base across the whole country and a cantonal right of determining the – in all Cantons except one progressive - tax rates and a local right to determine proportional surplus onto the cantonal tax liability (lokaler Steuerfuß)8. There are good economic reasons to limit the right of determination of the tax base: because it is more sensitive to unfair tax competition than the right to determine the tax rate(s). The smaller the country is the more intensive can the mobility of labour be assumed and the more potential and the stronger are the distorting effects of an unfair tax competition by means of the tax base. Therefore a harmonization of tax bases is needed, meanwhile not only in the national federal context, but also in the European context. If the tax bases are broad enough the right to determine the tax rates is sufficient for an efficiency increasing tax competition. In certain cases, not only the right of determination of the tax base, but also of the tax rate is centralised. Only the right of tax revenue is decentralised. Examples are the Australian Goods and Services Tax (GST) with the legislation competence at the Commonwealth level and the revenue competence at the state level, and the Austrian and the German Personal Income Tax the revenues of which are divided among federal, state and local governments. In the other direction, from below to above, European Union gets a certain share of certain tax revenues of the member states without the right to determine the tax rates.9 In Germany, a flexible revenue sharing key is used for the federal and state shares of the Value Added Tax (VAT).
8
See B. Dafflon, ‘Länderbericht Schweiz’ in H. H. von Arnim et al. (eds.): Föderalismus – Hält er noch, was er verspricht? Seine Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft, auch im Lichte ausländischer Erfahrungen; Schriftenreihe der Hochschule Speyer Bd. 137, Speyer 2000, p. 269 et seq. 9 The negotiations about determining a common tax base and minimum tax rates for the member states results from aspects of the Common Market competition rules not for governments, but for goods and services, and are independent from the financial needs of the European Commission.
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GISELA FÄRBER The key has to be changed when the needs of the two fiscal tiers – measured by necessary expenditures of both – develop divergently. It is remarkable that this revenue sharing construction with an uniform tax legislation all over the countries is – with exception of the Australian GST – only used in the systems of administrative federalism. Without discussing all the problems connected with that construction, it should be sufficient for the moment, that this construction is very scarce and probably results from reasons of tax techniques in Australia and from the idea of the necessity of uniform tax laws across the whole country in Germany.10 If tax legislation and tax revenue competence do not coincide, then no interest stands against the determination of a special tax administration with the first two ones. Neither is it rational to divide the administration of taxes according to the revenue competences, nor are there enforcing causes to combine it with the legislation competence. So in Germany the biggest burden of tax administration lies on the states which execute many federal tax laws with common revenue competences on behalf of federal government. But until today, the Presidents of the Upper Financial Directions are federal and state civil servants at the same time. That is absolutely unique in the history of Germany. But state tax administration also prepares taxation documents for local governments. So they establish e.g. the so called uniform values for real estate which is then used by local governments to put upon the autonomous local multiplier. 2.3.3. Principles of Fiscal Equalization Fiscal equalization transfers usually are suspected to be instruments of distribution. From the theoretical point of view however, they have many functions concerning allocation. They have to repair mistakes, which remain from other previous stages of the fiscal constitution and to internalize regional spill-overs, to equalize different marginal productivities of the immobile regional infrastructure, avoidance of inefficient migrations etc.11 Regional spill-overs are regional external effects of private or public sector activities which affect citizens of other, neighbouring jurisdictions either by burdening them with external costs or by not compensating external benefits. In both 10
See the ideas of Fischer-Menshausen in the documents of the preparation of the Basic Law by the Parliamentarian Council in 1948 at the famous Herrnchiemsee Conference. Until today, the Grundgesetz contains the formulation “uniformity of the legal and economic unity” as a requirement for the centralization of state competences. The uniformity of tax laws was summarized below that label (see the documentation of H.-P. Schneider, (ed.) Das Grundgesetz: Dokumentation seiner Entstehung, Bd. 25, Articles 105 – 107 (Frankfurt 1997), Article 105, p. 6.). 11 See G. Färber, ‘Finanzverfassung, Besteuerungsrechte und Finanzausgleich’ in H. H. von Arnim; G. Färber; S. Fisch (eds.) Föderalismus – Hält er noch, was er verspricht? Seine Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft, auch im Lichte ausländischer Erfahrungen; Schriftenreihe der Hochschule Speyer Bd. 137, Speyer 2000, p. 138 and the literature cited there.
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CENTRALISM AND FISCAL FEDERALISM cases, a government is not able to determine the optimal size of a public good. Horizontal compensation payments, or vertical equalization transfers are intended to equip the respective, e.g. local government with financial means so that it is able to offer not only schools for its own citizens but also for the pupils of the neighbouring municipalities. That way the local jurisdictions are all together able to realise economics of scale and not only the cities, which have the minimum number of inhabitants to allow themselves a high-school. But regional spill-over can result from decisions to allocate the responsibility for a certain public service at a comparably decentralized tier in cause of diverging preferences. Suppose there are two neighbouring municipalities A and B, in A the citizens have by majority a preference for a high supply of a certain public goods, in B the preference of the majority is low. The tax burdens in the two municipalities follow the preferences of the decisive majority. If no consumer can be excluded from the consumption of the public good – which is a typical quality of public goods – the defeated minority of B walks or drives to A and consumes in the role of free riders without paying taxes. Citizens from the majority of A could now migrate to B to get the position of free-riders until they build together with the former residents of B a majority in favour of the high provision of the public goods which leads to an increase of tax burdens also in B. Tiebout called that phenomenon “voting by feet”’.12 If the economic world only existed of a very small number of public goods the internalization mechanism could be accepted to be efficient. But in reality, there are many public services and also private goods and different equipment with immobile natural equipments of a location, there are costs of migration, which mostly lead to the conclusion that it is more efficient to construct internalization mechanisms by fiscal equalization instead of migration or instead of a centralization of the responsibilities. It is furthermore often forgotten that the correction of ‘mistakes’ concerning the second and the third stage of a fiscal constitution, the principles of cost carrying and the distribution of taxation bases, cover a bigger share of the equalization transfers than the proper internalization functions. Here particularly those distortions have to be respected which result from regulations of other higher federal tiers. It is obvious that the systems of administrative federalism show with this respect a higher degree of equalization than the not interconnected ones. And if the taxation competences are not distributed in a way that they can fulfil the above mentioned functions a financial equalization scheme can help to make a fair tax competition workable which is more fundamental for efficiency of the total government sector, for the whole fiscal federalism than some transfer or compensation payments. It should however not be neglected that fiscal equalization transfers often are used for distribution goals. They can be proved if a financial constitution requires a minimum or even an equal equipment with public goods for all jurisdictions of a fiscal tier. Two aspects have to be considered with regard to distribution policies by 12
Vgl. C. Tiebout, ‘A Pure Theory of Public Expenditures’ in Journal of Political Economy (1956), p. 416 et seq.
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GISELA FÄRBER means of fiscal equalization: If a central tier legitimately decides to follow the goal of a minimum level of public goods across e.g. the whole country, it is the better, it is the more efficient solution to build up equalization transfers than to centralize the responsibilities for public goods supply which are necessary for this goal; the decentralized process of uncovering special regional and local preferences which concerns not only the total amount, but also the combination and the qualities of public goods supply, should better be kept intact. And furthermore, in a market economy goals of direct or indirect income distribution are also permitted, are sometimes even necessary and unavoidable to fulfil the allocation goals and are – if certain construction principles are regarded – up to a certain degree of distribution which is not hostile against economic welfare optimization. The biggest need of correction of the financial equipment of federal jurisdictions results from deficiencies of the distribution of taxation competences. It was already noted that the ideal tax under economic welfare aspects is not practicable. All other – practiced – tax bases however show certain, partly huge problems which have to be regarded under their vertical effects as sources of taxation of the different federal tiers and under their horizontal effects among the jurisdictions of the same tier: •
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In general, the taxation competences of each federal tier should be sufficient to cover the budgetary expenditures which result from the production or provision of public services of which the jurisdictions are responsible. But it can happen that a certain tax bas, which might be almost ideal as a source of finance for a special federal tier with concern to its features is too small to cover the financial needs of the tier. This is e.g. to be stated for almost all countries as far as the taxes on real assets as the only source of local taxation is concerned in whatever form land can be taxed: rates, property taxes, taxes on standard values of real estate like they are practiced in Germany – these taxes are too small for financing all local services. In Australia, the only country where the rates seem to be sufficient, a very low level of local responsibilities has to be stated. In the United States however, the strong tensions of the property tax rates lead to the strikes of e.g. the Californian taxpayers in 1977, to a limitation of property tax rates and tax bases by the famous Proposition 13, but later to severe financial problems particularly of the counties and school districts in the late 1980s. If the tax base of jurisdiction is too small and no financial grants are afforded either the amount of the jurisdictions public services is too small or the tax rates become so high that the distortions in cause of taxation leads to high welfare losses for the whole economy. In this case, other taxation rights have to be conceded or vertical grants from upper tiers have to equalize the deficient tax base of a fiscal tier. Similar results provide taxation competences, which provide highly spreading tax revenues among the jurisdictions of the same fiscal tier. If
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jurisdiction A needs a tax rate twice as high to have the same tax revenue (per inhabitant) as jurisdiction B there is no chance to offer a similar level of public services for the same or comparable tax price. Consumers, labour force and capital then start to migrate only in cause of the uneven financial equipment of the jurisdictions. This federal competition however does not increase the economic welfare of the whole economy. The effects become stronger, if the jurisdictions have to apply a common tax law, the same tax rates, as this is practiced in Germany and in Austria.13 In this case financial equalization grants – for the moment either vertical or horizontal ones – prevent an inefficient migration and increase the total economic welfare. If the tax bases of the jurisdictions of the same federal tier strongly diverge in cause of a country-wide and centrally regulated redistribution by taxation means – progressive income tax rates tend to fall under this case - or in cause of an uneven regional distribution of special tax exemptions (which cannot be justified by the systematic rules of taxation, but result from goals of economic or social interventionism) the differences have to be compensated. Horizontal equalization transfers can be accepted and are in reality, the smaller the divergences of the tax bases are and the more centrally regulated, the more uniform the tax laws are in a country. As most tax bases differ nearly with the economic capacity of a jurisdiction – because taxation always is a governmental ‘grip’ onto a certain part of the economic activity or circulation within a jurisdiction and has to follow the principles of a taxpayer’s ability to pay – the nearly economic homogeneity is condition for a horizontal fiscal equalization among jurisdiction. High divergences undermine the willingness of sub-central governments to pay for their poor ‘neighbours’. High divergences of the regional and local economic capacity make the instrument of vertical equalization grants preferable. The grants are then calculated – mostly or ideally by a formula – to equalize the tax capacity of the jurisdictions. Vertical grants can furthermore be better used for all the cases in which not only tax divergences have to be equalized, but also differences of the so called ‘public needs’ of jurisdictions. These can result – apart from the different preferences for public goods, which are not relevant for fiscal equalization! – from regionally diverging necessities of public intervention – e.g. in case of unavoidable economic structural change as could be still observed in East Germany and all transformation countries – and diverging production costs for public services for its part resulting from natural conditions and regional factor price differences.
13
See R. Müller, Horizontal und vertikale Transfers zur Durchsetzung eines horizontalen Finanzausgleichs; Frankfurt/M 1995, p. 149 et seq.
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GISELA FÄRBER Asymmetrical production functions in case of increase and of decrease of the number of regional/local consumers respectively inhabitants are a third case calling for equalization. The latter is probably highly relevant for fiscal equalization, but until now nowhere practiced, it is only seriously discussed in Australia. The shrinking and aging populations will bring the discussion to all industrial countries. The high number of cases for general – horizontal or vertical – fiscal equalization grants might be astonishing. So far the intervention causes for special purpose or matched grants have not been discussed. Although they can also be used as instruments, which have a general function of intergovernmental financial relations, their function as a ‘golden rein’ is so dominant that the inclusion would blast the frame of this paper. To summarize the arguments: Not only distributional, but particularly arguments in favour of an optimal allocation of resources in the public sector as well in the whole economy between private and public sector justify financial equalization grants. In practice, it might be difficult to separate the various causes and their instrumental constructions among the many rules, which are all occupied with the distribution of ‘public money’. Obviously, among all good reasons there are always mixed up distributional interests of the negotiating parties in a federal system. As a clear result should finally be noted that the more need for vertical equalization grants exists in a concrete federally constituted country, the higher must be the degree of centralization of the tax system, precisely: the revenue competence. Otherwise the upper tiers do not dispose of the financial means necessary to spend vertical equalization grants. 2.4. How Much Centralization, Respectively, Decentralization, Autonomy and Solidarity is Needed in a Federal Constitution? After all the details finally the question comes up how to find the optimal balance between centralization and decentralization, between autonomy and – I want to call it – solidarity in a federal system. The mainstream of the 1960s and 1970s followed the idea of a rational government sector by using nearly perfect instruments like cost-benefit-analysis, PPBS and many more. Under that label it is not necessary to differentiate among the ideal levels of public decision-making, because there is but one rational solution to solve the problems of society. And the governments sector is big, powerful and costly under this regime. The more recent ideas tend to emphasize autonomy and decentralization instead because one enormous advantage of decentralization lies in the stronger political control. Political decision making processes happen close to the living sphere of the citizens and they are able to articulate their preferences for local and regional public goods directly. The growing importance of instruments of direct democracy like referenda also shows that many citizens want more decentralization after a period of a costly and more technical centralised government. 98
CENTRALISM AND FISCAL FEDERALISM Intergovernmental financial relations must follow this development. But in the case that responsibilities for public goods are re-decentralized there is no guarantee that e.g. the regional spread of tax capacities also decreases. That means that a decentralization of responsibilities for public services can – not must – lead to in increasing centralization of tax revenues because the necessary amount of vertical equalization transfers grows. This result seems almost to be a paradox. It is of course not. It shows however that a federal constitution always has to balance autonomy on the one hand and solidarity or equalization on the other hand. Otherwise it would give up its advantages against centralistic constitutions, which mainly lie in the better consideration of citizens’ preferences and a more intense political control. 3. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EMPIRICAL CENTRALISM AND FISCAL FEDERALISM Before that background of a principal tension between autonomy and solidarity in federal constitutions, the final chapter of this paper regards some developments in centralist and federalist countries. The question is no longer that of superiority of one ideal system to the other, but of their ability to provide necessary reforms and their flexibility to react to future challenges. Due to their fundamental constructions the systems are supposed to react differently, but they have also the chance to undertake reforms and converge to each other. Four different, but interdependent developments can be distinguished: •
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World wide competition for capital and labour under the conditions of increasing factor and consumers’ mobility: All federal and all national fiscal constitutions can no longer be isolated against foreign users of national and regional infrastructure. Globalisation has lead to an increasing mobility not only of financial capital and labour force and consumers. Enterprises have started to exploit intensively national and regional divergences of production costs. The increase of inter- and intra-industry trade as well as of direct investment is the direct result of these developments. The low transportation costs not covering the social costs for the environment subsidize the process. The so-called new economy and the decrease of information time and costs have provided further independence of production places from consumption places. This process has put the previously nationally closed tax system under pressure. At least with concern to certain corporate income taxes the international competition has increased to a race not “to the bottom”, but to a lower level of enterprise taxation. National tax bases are for all those taxes under competition where the taxation base is comparably mobile which are enterprise profits, interest and other capital incomes and highly skilled labour force incomes. That means that centralist and federal countries both are set under an international tax competition 99
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which overlies many other common necessities of reform e.g. due to the aging population. Most of the countries have started more or less intense reforms. The reforms have in common to ask for the necessary harmonization of tax systems or tax bases to avoid an inefficient tax competition. It is remarkable that this discussion can also be observed in Switzerland with regard to the cantonal taxation rights and a resulting need of fiscal equalization. Process of regionalization and federalization: Since the late 1970s and the early 1980s, at least in Europe a continuing process of regionalization and federalization can be observed. The centralist countries have started reforms to give more autonomous rights to the regional level. Although the processes and constructions differ slightly because of the national and cultural divergences, each member state of the European Community has followed that development.14 Remarkably the centralist countries only have undertaken a regionalization, and not a federalization. Regions in Italy and France e.g. have – compared with states or provinces in federal states - very limited responsibilities and are with regard to financial concerns treated like typical local jurisdictions in federal systems. The regionalization process was closely connected with an increase of regional cultural identities. The recent discussions about the legal status of Corsica is almost unbelievable with regard to former national positions of the French central government. The Italian debate about the establishment of an independent Padania was observed with interest by experts of federalism as was the break down of the former federal state Yugoslavia observed with fright. All in common are two dependent developments: The importance of regional ethnical identities is increasing without that – this is my hypothesis – the respective national systems were able to react flexibly upon the political challenges or even had the political will to do so. And regional cultural identities have lead to a general loss of importance of national frontiers and national communities because regions find more common interests with the neighbouring regions across the national frontiers than with far distanced regions in the same national country. The actual conference is an excellent example for the hypothesis. Fiscal equalization under pressure: The national intergovernmental relations have come under political pressure. Although centralist countries have by definition no financial equalization system in the federal sense they have systems and rules how to distribute the national tax revenues, which are uniformly collected across the whole country
See e.g. the contributions of the conference reader G. Färber and M. Forsysth (eds.): The Regions – Factors of Integration or Disintegration in Europe? Föderalismus-Studien Bd. 8, hrsg. v. Hans-Peter Schneider, Baden-Baden 1996.
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under regional aspects. Furthermore, also centralist states have established local governments which traditionally have certain autonomous competences of self-determination of local public goods and certain autonomous taxation rights. Local governments were traditionally also additionally financed by a fiscal equalization system which included either local financial needs and local fiscal capacities. Centralist and federalist countries have in common that the regional distribution and re-distribution of tax revenues has come under suspicion. The interregional flow of purchasing power by central taxation and central public spending decisions is not yet accepted because the rich regions want to use it for their proper economic development and the poor ones are afraid of losing further locational competitiveness by getting rid of public resources. A consensus about an accepted relation between competition and solidarity is not in sight. Supra-national, national and regional cross-border fiscal ‘federalism’: Instead of national solidarity closer relations come up among neighbouring jurisdictions for those regards in which the new partners suppose to be stronger together. Not only were competences concerning a Common European foreign and security policy delegated to the supra-national tier by the European member-states. Also in the national context, more trans-border economic regions are established. Some German states negotiate common administrative bodies. The economic regions of the metropolitan areas have expanded across all state and local borders already for a long time. The explicit establishment of special types of jurisdictions with particularly economic planning competences has begun almost ten years ago. And even local governments have started to offer common industrial areas to attract bigger enterprises by preventing an unfruitful local competition and to realise economics of scale by common institutions. If these new special jurisdictions and pre-jurisdictions need financial means and do not get sufficient grants from public budgets of the upper tiers they levy contributions from their members which often are calculated according to the fiscal capacity of the member jurisdictions. This can be regarded as a starting point of some sort of fiscal equalization system.
The closer trans-border relations of European jurisdictions of whatever federal tier show common interests and simple approaches of institution building. This development had to be expected because positive common interests and cooperation gains easily lead to an agreement. All partners win. Economists call it a win-winsituation. Unsolved are many situations with a winning and a losing party which mostly can also be analysed as cases of external costs crossing regional and national borders. The nuclear plant Temelin just after the Austrian frontier in Slovakia and the expected costs of the additional migration after the Eastern enlargement of the European Union are only two examples for contradictory negotiation situations. The 101
GISELA FÄRBER problems to find a solution increase by the fact that the partners are not equal with regard to the economic capacities and do therefore not have common or equal preferences of the citizens. The logic of fiscal federalism indicates that establishing special inter- or trans-national financial relations could help to find agreements with situations of net gains and could smooth the economic development of the future European member-states on their way to integration. The example of the Common European Agricultural Policy however shows that not special subsidies open the way to win-win- or net-gain-situations. The profiting special rent-seekers can scarcely be ‘bought out’ or only at extremely high budgetary costs. Fiscal federalism win-win or net-win-situations can however be reached by general fiscal transfers or compensation rules and special purpose transnational cooperation agreements. But they demand a sufficient autonomy of all participating jurisdictions. 4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION This paper has developed the fundamental construction principles of fiscal federalism starting with the differences to the fiscal constitutions of centralist countries. The different stages of division of responsibilities, the rules of distribution of costs for the production of public services among the different federal levels, the principles of determination of taxation rights and the goals and equalization necessities for a more efficient allocation of resources than in centralist countries have been shown. Finally, the international pressure of globalization has brought up common challenges of countries of both basic types which break up the national frontiers and solidarities and establish new relations among neighbouring jurisdictions across national borders where in doubt the grown cultural identities are closer than among far distant regions within national frontiers. The construction principles of fiscal federalism offer broad chances to establish flexible instruments and new institutions for the new relations. May be the 21st century will become – as my colleague Hans-Peter Schneider has formulated – the ‘century of federalism’. This might also depend on the successful development of the principles and instruments of fiscal federalism not only for the national intergovernmental relations, but also for international relations and governance. But before we can start doing so the ugly suspicion and bad reputation that fiscal equalization was always an instrument of the economic distribution has to be abolished. It should primarily stand and is in many parts an instrument for a better, a more efficient allocation of public resources.
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SOCIAL STRUCTURE, SOCIAL CAPITAL AND INSTITUTIONAL AGREEMENT: THE TRENTINO-ALTO ADIGE MODEL Antonio M. Chiesi1 1. INTRODUCTION This contribution will discuss the role of social capital in the development of the Trentino-Alto Adige region, and in the management of political and administrative autonomy. This is a tentative paper for at least two important reasons: a) the concept of social capital, in spite of its appeal among social scientists and also intellectuals in general, is still too vague and theoretically unstable, so that its application implies a number of difficulties both conceptual and empirical; b) an extensive analysis of the amount and diffusion of social capital among the inhabitants of the Trentino-Alto Adige region has not been accomplished yet. Nevertheless we think that a preliminary discussion of this concept can be of interest because it has been related to the quality of the institutional performance at a local level, not only in Italy, but also in other countries (Putnam 1993). Although empirical studies on the amount and role played by social capital still have to be conducted, it is however possible to develop some preliminary considerations. The first paragraph of the paper will review the different meanings that have been given to the term ‘social capital’, through a brief summary of the theoretical debate and the discussion on the semantic boundaries with other kinds of capital (i.e. economic and cultural) and with other kinds of related concepts. We then discuss what kind of social capital is useful to analyse the specific development of the Trentino-Alto Adige model and what technical tools are more useful to identify and measure social capital. We shall conclude the paper by putting foreword some hypothesis on the role of social capital in the development of the region and confronting a few problems in the application of the concept of social capital in the Balkan area. 2. WHAT IS SOCIAL CAPITAL As it often happens with concepts ‘in fashion’ the literature has sometimes forgotten that concepts very similar to that of ‘social capital’ had already been proposed by the sociological tradition. In this respect at least four fathers of classical sociology have to be mentioned. Tocqueville was the first to point out the importance of associational ties in getting and motivating co-operation. Durkheim has identified the pre-contractual bases of exchange, i.e. shared norms, values and social 1
University of Trento, Department of Sociology and Social Research.
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ANTONIO M. CHIESI recognition that are conditions for exchange, as well as a very general mechanism of social cohesion that he calls solidarity. The concept of social closure in Weber has to do with the strategies of inclusion and exclusion as well as of reciprocal recognition, which has been recently attributed to social capital by some authors. Simmel’s concepts of social circle and intersection of social circles seem immediately related to the structural approach to social capital, that has been developed during the last ten years by authors like Burt (1992), Coleman (1990) and Lin (2000). Both Weber and Simmel point out the centrality of the concept of social relation in sociology. While the sociological tradition gives ideas pertaining both to the micro and to the macro level, the recent concept of social capital has been related to two different theoretical approaches. The micro approach, which is rooted in rational choice theory (Coleman 1990) and social exchange theory (Homans 1958), permits to conceive social capital as an appropriable resource. In the light of social exchange theory it is possible to distinguish those relations that entail social capital and are based on reputation (Lin 2000), from those that entail money and are anonymous (economic capital), as well as from those that entail power and influence and are typical of hierarchical organisations. The macro approach is rooted in the classical functional theory and conceives social capital as part of a shared culture. Applied to the economic and political performance of a community (Putnam 1993) or an entire society (Fukuyama 1995), this approach has two serious drawbacks: it tends to origin tautological explanations and identifies social capital as something which is intrinsically good.2 Unhappily these two approaches re-propose the traditional contrast between micro and macro sociology. Social capital has often been defined as an asset of social relations (Bourdieu 1980). This is another very general definition that cannot distinguish any kind of specificity: society itself is a system of relations. Social capital has also been defined as a resource, like the other two types of capital: economic and cultural. If we are consequent to the implications of this definition we should identify strategies of capital accumulation, both individual and collective, and also processes of social capital destruction, which could be thought, for example as result of interpersonal conflicts by which actors lose the likelihood to use personal ties.3 Moreover, if social capital is a kind of capital tout court, relations
2 Fukuyama, for example, defines social capital as the propensity to cooperate and to share mutual trust, which is fed by a culture of cooperation. 3 Family disruption is the most important example of social capital destruction, as it entails not only that conjugal relations are cut but also indirect relations with the partner’s relatives. The expulsion from an association or guild is another example, which gives evidence that the access of social capital can be used as a mechanism of social control, especially when collective goods are implied.
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SOCIAL STRUCTURE, SOCIAL CAPITAL AND INSTITUTIONAL AGREEMENT: THE TRENTINO-ALTO ADIGE MODEL among the three different types of capital should be studied as well as mechanisms of reciprocal trade off.4 If we put together the different definitions proposed by the available literature, we can identify at least three dimensions of social capital: a) The structural dimension, which pertains to the form of the relational structure; b) The content dimension, which pertains to what flows inside the relational structure; c) The idea of social capital as collective good, more specifically: club goods – those goods that are possessed by a group and from which outsiders are excluded – and/or public goods, which are available to everyone, no matter if the subject has contributed to their production. Table 1 − Different dimensions of social capital according to available literature Micro level
Meso level
Macro level
Structural The pattern of steady relations of ego with others dimension: Content dimension: Recognition (Coleman 1990, Lin 2000), cooperation Personal trust (Mutti 1999), solidarity, loyalty Reputation (Lin 2000) Access to sensible information Club good: Social identity and belonging Inclusion of insiders in a common social circle and exclusion of outsiders Organisations (Coleman 1990) Public good: Civicness (Putnam 1993), systemic trust, shared norms and values (Fukuyama 1995), ‘rules of the game’
While the two first dimensions pertain to the micro level, the third operates at meso and macro levels. We can develop further these dimensions using table 1. Let’s have a look at the first row of the scheme. While there is consent on the fact that the relevant relation must have stability over time – i.e. it is part of a structure – otherwise the interaction cannot be relevant for the formation of social capital, the debate is open about the nature of relationship. Some scholars prefer not to specify and consider any kind of stable social relation as potentially relevant for one’s social capital (Coleman 1990, Piselli 1999). On the contrary others argue that social capital is not a social relation at large, but a specific one. The argument in 4
We know from the classical studies by Blau and Duncan (1967) that human capital and social origin are significantly correlated and that the acquisition of education needs to be funded, while educated people earn higher incomes.
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ANTONIO M. CHIESI favour of this position is directly drawn from exchange theory that allows one to distinguish between economic transaction, power relation and social exchange (Lin 2000, La Valle 2000). Economic transaction is based on bounded rationality and profit-seeking motivations. Power relation is based on threat or recognised authority and is asymmetric. Social exchange is based on reciprocal recognition, and yields trust and/or loyalty.5 If we conceive social capital as a resource typical of social exchange, we have to conclude that: 1. 2.
not every social relation implies social capital; the relational dimension of social capital implies a specific content of the relation.
In this way we are drawn to the second row of the scheme. Recognition, cooperation, trust, reputation, information, loyalty are the more quoted concepts. Their meaning is very close in some cases (recognition-reputation; trust-loyalty), or one concept can be seen as the effect of another (trust is a condition of co-operation, trust demands loyalty). Therefore, we can try to simplify the nomenclature putting into the background those concepts that are consequences of others and choosing only one word among different synonymous. As far as information is concerned, it is important to stress the fact that, again, it is not a matter of any kind of information. In the society of information people have potentially the same opportunity to get information in anonymous ways through mass media. The information relevant for the formation of social capital are those circulating through personal communication where the reputation of the sender is brought into play with the receiver. An important feature of these concepts is that they refer to mechanisms that play both at micro and at macro levels.6 This double level brings us to the third and fourth rows of the scheme. The problem of identifying social capital at the associational level and at the system level has been stated mainly at the macro level of analysis. It has been stressed that the micro-macro link could consist of unanticipated consequences or by-products of purposive actions (Bagnasco 1999, Trigilia 1999). In short, the problem of the relation between the two levels of social capital incorporates the still open problem of explaining collective phenomena starting from methodological individualism, to which exchange theory pertains. For this reason social capital at 5
Of course these three kinds of relations are ideal typical models. The role of mutual recognition and trust in economic exchange is stressed by the transaction cost theory and by the institutional approach in economics, while in organisational hierarchies power relations are mediated by economic exchanges through salaries. 6 A good example is trust that can be personal (to trust someone belonging to one’s personal network) and systemic (to trust in the value of a currency or in the media). As we shall see later, there are mechanisms of reciprocal strengthening between social capital at macro and micro levels.
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SOCIAL STRUCTURE, SOCIAL CAPITAL AND INSTITUTIONAL AGREEMENT: THE TRENTINO-ALTO ADIGE MODEL the macro level has been identified as an institution (shared norms), whose origin is not explained, but whose function is clear.7 In any case, when applied at the macro level, the concept of social capital takes the form of a collective good and has been mainly identified at the level of shared culture, therefore as a feature of the system as such. In the scheme I have identified three levels: micro, meso and macro (Smelser 1995), because I doubt that social capital can work in the same way at meso and macro levels. In fact we have to take into account the fact that there are two kinds of collective goods: public goods and club goods. They work very differently. While public goods are at everyones disposal, club goods are a common property of a group. Each member has a direct interest to maximise the exploitation of it and to minimise the cost of its production, while the insiders are jointly interested to protect it from outsiders. The specificity of this meso level has not been recognised enough by the current literature and put together with the macro level. In my opinion this distinction is useful in separating different strategies of the actors and the different nature of the outcome of their combined actions. In particular it is easier for rational actors to mobilise collectively in defence of a club good when it is threatened by outsiders’ claims, while the outcome of the prisoner’s dilemma prevents the same mobilisation in defence of public goods. In short, social capital as club good allows one to highlight its dark side. Social capital has been seen as a virtuous mechanism capable of many good things for human beings such as solidarity at the micro level and economic development at the macro level. In this line public policies that affect the growth of social capital have been foreseen, especially by economists. More recently some important negative effects of social capital have been identified because of its particularistic and collusive functioning. Portes (1998) for instance identifies four negative consequences of social capital: encouragement of members’ claims, excessive social control on members, levelling down, exclusion of outsiders. If we distinguish economic exchange and power relations from social capital, the idea of the latter is mainly related to symmetrical informal relations, which are mutual by definition. Nevertheless some studies have shown that the instrumental effectiveness of a personal relation is higher if alter has a higher social status than ego. If asymmetrical relations are concerned, the analytical problem of distinguishing social capital from power and influence relations can be confronted taking into account that exchanges of reciprocal reputation usually occur in hierarchies and function as mechanisms of motivating people beyond their formal duties. In this light an employee can get informal help from his boss, who will exert the influence of his post in favour of him, in exchange for personal loyalty in the office.
7
A clear example of this lack of explicative power is Putnam’s explanation of ‘civicness’ in Italian regions: civicness is present because it has been present since the Middle Age.
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ANTONIO M. CHIESI This use of social capital is very similar to clientelism and – together with strategies of social closure, typical of club goods – it works like a mechanism that generates social inequality (Bourdieu 1986). The above mentioned example is also consistent with the idea that social capital is a by-product, sometimes unintentional, of social or economic activities. The production (destruction) of social capital has therefore to be seen as a process. Network analysis has stressed the importance of considering social relations as multiplex ties, i. e. as relations that convey different functions and carry different meanings for the actors involved. We know that a social tie, which has been created mainly for economic reasons, often needs fiduciary premises (especially in case of information asymmetry and of incomplete contracts) and can also supply the condition for the creation of other types of relations (information exchanges, social recognition, increased reputation, reciprocal liking, and so on). The same holds true for power or hierarchical relations that are mainly based on influence and dependence, but can convey other types of relations as well. Of course, the transformation of a simple tie in multiple tie needs time, that’s the reason why social capital implies, in any case, ‘steady’ relation. The problem of the analytical relationship between the pattern of relations and the content of relations is clearly evidenced in the case of mutual trust formation. Is trust a consequence of repeated exchanges (repeated games) or it is a pre-condition for them (a non rational attitude which is functional to the creation of networks)? If we assume that social capital is a resource, associations are an environment in which this kind of resource can be produced and exchanged and of which not only single actors can benefit through personal ties but the group as such, and from which outsiders can be excluded. To identify the association – or even the organisation as Coleman proposes (1990) – as social capital is perhaps a way of confusing the resource with a specific institutional mechanism that allocates it. Looking at social capital formation as a process has also the advantage of identifying mechanisms that link together the three levels: micro, meso and macro. In scheme n.1, which tries to sum up some ideas of the available literature, it is taken into account that actors are in a better position to use and enlarge their personal networks if they live in a cultural environment that supports stability of social relations and mutual sharing of trust and reputation. Trust and reputation are not simple cultural features, which are handed down to posterity, but rather the outcome of actors’ strategies at the micro level. In turn reputation and trust can be played at all three levels as well. At the individual level they increase one’s personal social capital. At the group level (meso level) they can be spent as a club good, they can play a role in social closure strategies, but can also be spoiled by somebody’s moral hazard. If there are favourable institutional conditions – which cannot be identified with social capital as such – the production of reputation at micro level can in turn strengthen the macro-cultural prerequisites that make social relations stable.
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SOCIAL STRUCTURE, SOCIAL CAPITAL AND INSTITUTIONAL AGREEMENT: THE TRENTINO-ALTO ADIGE MODEL Scheme 1 – Social capital as a process
Finally, it is interesting to think of reputation and trust in terms of a trade off between the two levels of public goods and of club goods. This trade off depends on the specific social and economic context. If systemic trust is widespread perhaps actors needn’t build exclusive social relations, while its lack can induce them to react to systemic mistrust through the organisation of social circles where mutual social recognition and social control can give assurance both among insiders and to outsiders. 3. SOCIAL CAPITAL, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL COHESION. If we try to apply the three levels of social capital to the region under study, we can draw some conclusions from the use of available data and develop some hypothesis where evidence is not yet available because of a lack of specific research. This is particularly true at the micro level. As we have sketched before, at the macro level, social capital is a public good that allows social and economic co-operation. Indicators of a widespread presence of social capital in the line suggested by Putnam are the high rate of voluntary association among the population and the consent given to the local administrators and politicians. Other indicators of systemic trust are shown in table 2.
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ANTONIO M. CHIESI Table 2 – Some indicators of systemic trust in 1999 in the provinces of Trento and Bolzano Indicators: Trento Bolzano Italy Voluntary associations per 100.000 inhabitants 46.44 54.91 35.97 Car thefts per 100.000 inhabitants 66.07 51.67 510.97 Credits under protest per inhabitant in lire 14,491 14,120 48,212 Bankruptcies per 1.000 firms 17.67 12.32 35.85 Civil trials before the Courts per 1.000 inhabitants 11.44 20.21 45.87 Source: Sole 24 Ore 11 December 2000, from different official statistics, and local opinion polls. A social environment like this allows a steady economic development and a high level of per capita income, but of course in this virtuous process it is difficult to state what is the independent and the dependent variable concerning the relation between social environment and economic performance.8 One is usually backed by the other in a reciprocal relation. Moreover, a routed practice of co-operation and solidarity, in the light of a widely shared catholic tradition, has fostered a vision of social capitalism that is different from the individualistic approach, which is more common in the rest of north-eastern Italian economic miracle. At the meso level not only are associations widespread in general, but especially those related to non-profit. This means that the outcome of associative activity is more likely to be public goods instead of club goods and inclusion and participation mechanisms prevail on social closure. At the micro level it is more difficult to say something because of a complete lack of information on the quality and frequency of interpersonal relations and personal network structures. Nevertheless we shall try to make conjectures through indirect indicators related specifically to the ethnic cohabitation of two linguistic groups. We can suppose that personal social networks are structured through ethnic cleavages. Although the available literature is mainly concerning the States and little is known at the European level, research on social capital has pointed out that the structure of personal networks of acquaintance and mutual help is heavily affected by ethnic cleavages, whenever social identity of individuals is built around the coexistence of different ethnic groups, as typical of most American cities. This ethnic structure of social relations, which originated by spontaneous choices (from endogamous spouse, to friendship, to next door neighbours) is at the origin of a split of personal relations into bipartite networks in which a high intra-group density of 8
The per capita value added expected in the province of Bolzano is 46,8 million lire in 2000, while in the province of Trento is 44,0, compared with a country average of 36,9. The unemployment rate in the province of Trento has been 4.4 per cent in 1999 (Source: Agenzia del lavoro della Provincia Autonoma di Trento, 2000). According to Prometeia Agency (2000), the expected unemployment rate in 2000 is 3.3 per cent in Trento and 1.8 in Bolzano.
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SOCIAL STRUCTURE, SOCIAL CAPITAL AND INSTITUTIONAL AGREEMENT: THE TRENTINO-ALTO ADIGE MODEL culturally homogeneous insiders is confronted with a low density of relations between the groups (i.e. lack of inter ethnic personal relations). In this way personal trust tends to originate inside the group, while prejudice between the groups is fed by social distance, which in turn is increased by the lack of contact. This mechanism is not necessarily a hindrance to economic development and co-operation. A consolidated literature about ethnic entrepreneurship (Light and Karageorgis 1984) has stressed the fact that ethnic homogeneous immigrants find an advantage in solidarity chains in order to establish new economic activities. Moreover the identification of a specific economic activity with an ethnic minority gives a sort of informal brand on which good reputation among consumers and customers can be established. In turn, the fact that good reputation is shared among entrepreneurs belonging to a specific ethnic group has fostered activities of self organisation that sometimes control the quality of the output, furnish collateral securities, lend money, help to meet demand and supply on the labour market. In this way social capital takes the form of social closure at the meso level. 4. SOCIAL CAPITAL AT DIFFERENT LEVELS AND THE PROBLEM OF INSTITUTIONAL AGREEMENT We shall conclude the paper by putting foreword some hypotheses on the role of social capital in the development of the region and confronting some problems in the application of the concept of social capital in the Balkan area. In the case of Trentino Alto Adige the important difference between the two ethnic groups is language. Their specific history and tradition is routed into linguistic difference, different national identity and references, while they have religion in common. In spite of a period of conflict and violence during the 1960s and mutual distrust that since the end of the Second World War had conducted the case before the United Nations, this has given opportunities to reach institutional agreements that would have been more difficult if religion was also different. In the case of the Balkan area, it is evident that after the disruption of the former Yugoslavia, there has been a destruction of social capital. The feedback mechanisms that interplay at macro and micro levels (see scheme n.1) have reduced public trust, both at political and economic level. The consequent lack of systemic trust and of a national reference has perhaps modified the structure of interpersonal relations inducing individuals to rely mainly on ethnic relations, which are mechanisms of social closure. As it is usually difficult to reverse the mechanism of the relation between macro and micro levels, the international peace keeping intervention has been an exogenous factor at work for the recovery of systemic trust at institutional level.
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ANTONIO M. CHIESI 4. REFERENCES Bagnasco, A. 1999, ‘Teoria del capitale sociale e political economy comparata’, in Stato e mercato, n.57, pp.351−372. Blau, P. M., Duncan, O. D., The American Occupational Structure (New York: Wiley, 1967). Bourdieu, P. 1980, ‘Le capital social. Notes provisoires’, in Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales, 1980, n. 32, pp. 2-3. Burt, R., Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992) Coleman, J., Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press., 1990) Fukujama, F., Trust: the Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York: The Free Press, 1995). Homans, G. C., ‘Social Behavior as Exchange’ in American Journal of Sociology, 1958, n. 63, pp. 597–606. La Valle, D. Il capitale sociale nella teoria dello scambio, paper presented at the International Workshop on Social Capital, Trento, 2000, October, 19–20. Lin, N., ‘Reputation and Social capital: the relational Basis of Social Exchange’ in Nan Lin., Social Capital: A Theory of Social Structure and Action (Cambridge: CUP, 2001). Light, Y., and Karageorgis, S., ‘Ethnic Economy’ in N. Smelser and R. Swedberg, (eds.), Handbook of Economic Sociology (New York: Princeton Univ. Press, 1994). Piselli, F., ‘Capitale Sociale: un Concetto Situazionale e Dinamico’, in Stato e Mercato, 1999, n. 57, pp. 395–417. Portes, A., ‘Social Capital: its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology’ in Annual Review of Sociology, 1998, n. 22, pp. 1–24. Putnam, R. D., Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, (Princeton: Prienceton Univ. Press, 1993) Smelser, N., Problematics of Sociology. The Georg Simmel Lectures (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). ‘The Forms of Capital’, pp. 241–258 in J. G. Richardson, ed., Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1986). Trigilia, C., ‘Capitale sociale e sviluppo locale’ in Stato e Mercato, 1999, n. 57.
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LOCAL ECONOMIC AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AS AN ASPECT OF THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTH-EAST EUROPE: BRINGING THE LOCAL STATE BACK IN Milford Bateman1 1. INTRODUCTION The disintegration of the former Yugoslavia at the end of the 1980s was the beginning of a major humanitarian tragedy. It very quickly led to a civil war, economic collapse, social upheaval, and the creation of major refugee populations. The bitter civil war that began in 1992 was the worst to be seen in Europe since the Second World War. For several agonising years the conflict raged across Bosnia and parts of Croatia, until finally a conclusion was reached in late 1995 with the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement. Tragically, further conflict was still to come just a few years later with the NATO bombardment of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in early 1999. This brought a further and quite devastating round of physical, economic and social destruction to Serbia and to the wider region. Moreover, unfortunately, no definitive settlement appears to have been achieved in many of these disputes: on the contrary, the region today remains poised for further change, possibly violent, on account of the still powerful nationalist and separatist currents that exist. The violent demise of the former Yugoslavia and its descent into inter-ethnic confrontation was an event that caught many by surprise. After all, the former Yugoslavia was well known as the most liberal, tolerant and economically advanced of all the communist states. Its pioneering system of decentralised government, indicative planning and worker self-management was responsible for the East Asian ‘Tiger’ economy-style growth rates experienced in the 1950s and 1960s. For several years Yugoslavia was actually the fastest growing economy in the world. The worker self-management system, as Horvat (1976) has consistently pointed out, signally contributed to the extremely rapid and equitable reconstruction of the country after the devastation of World War Two, not least through the construction of a high level of social solidarity and enterprise level motivation. Conceptually, the long experience with worker self-management helped to establish the broad feasibility of an industrial system based upon important – though far from perfect in practise – elements of democracy, consensus-building, social justice and humanity (Horvat, 1983, 2002). It was entirely feasible, therefore, that through negotiation and 1
The views expressed here are the author’s personal viewpoint. This chapter is primarily based on ideas present at two conferences in 2001 in Hvar, Croatia and in Trento, Italy. The author wishes to thank all those participants who commented on the paper at the original conferences and subsequently.
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MILFORD BATEMAN compromise the various incremental movements towards separation and pluralist democracy could have ultimately led to a Czechoslovakia-style peaceful parting of the ways. However, this was not to be. Against a background of economic stagnation, hyper-nationalist propaganda and popular resentment at the unequal impact of an IMF-imposed ‘shock therapy’ reform programme (see Woodward, 1995), the country’s collective leadership failed, tragically, to agree on a way to peacefully lay to rest the Federation. The policy framework within which the reconstruction and development of the region has been undertaken since 1988 is based upon the radical free market neoliberal political project that came to prominence in the late 1970s. Even though the neo-liberal model has been quite unable to ensure a sustainable and equitable growth trajectory almost everywhere where it has been adopted, and in many countries it has directly led to catastrophic economic and social consequences, its establishment as the conventional policy wisdom was nevertheless secured by the self-interest and power of its main proponents – that is, the US government, the World Bank and the IMF (see Stiglitz, 2002). The Washington ‘troika’ argued that only if the neo-liberal fundamentals were put into place would a successful recovery be forthcoming (for example, see World Bank et al 1996; World Bank, 1997, 1999, 2000). Crucially, it was agreed by all international bodies and western governments that a successful economic recovery was absolutely central to the peace-building process underway across the region. It is therefore extremely unfortunate that the neo-liberal policy model has been associated with very little substantive progress in South-East Europe in terms of establishing a sustainable economic and social development trajectory. The on-going physical reconstruction of the region – roads, bridges, buildings, shops, etc – has given a superficial gloss of progress and normalcy in many parts, and for a very small urban elite in each country there has been an historically unique opportunity to appropriate unimaginable wealth and power. However, the underlying prospects for the vast majority of the people in the region remain quite bleak. Poverty and social exclusion have risen to historically unprecedented levels, the industrial sector has largely collapsed, the trade balance in nearly all countries is now unsustainable, the agricultural and rural sectors have been decimated, the young and best educated have left the region in significant numbers, unemployment levels are now officially among the highest in the world, a large percentage of the jobs that still exist increasingly involve subsistence wages, the previously equal access and comparatively high quality public infrastructure (health, education, recreation) has all but imploded and what remains is now restricted to those lucky few with an ability to pay in hard cash, and inequality has risen to unprecedented heights (see UNDP, 1999, 2002; Young, 1999; Stojanov, 2000; Daianu, 2001: Horvat, 2002). Moreover, the high level of international financial assistance that has so far effectively underpinned what little genuine economic development has taken place in the region, particularly in the case of Bosnia (Kekiü, 2001), is now very worryingly coming to an end.
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LOCAL ECONOMIC AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AS AN ASPECT OF THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTH-EAST EUROPE This chapter argues that the neo-liberal approach to reconstruction and development imposed upon South-East Europe has manifestly failed. I specifically focus here on the enforced inactivity of one of the potentially key democratically mandated institutional vehicles – the local state2 – and argue that this factor might account for a significant part of the poor local and national economic development progress to date. The basic argument is informed by a number of factors. First, the very negative experiences so far in South-East Europe with the local strand of the neo-liberal policy model are now becoming quite apparent. The set of local economic development institutions that the international community effectively imposed – the institutions of civil society – were launched amid a fanfare of promises that there would henceforth be greater ‘empowerment’, ‘participation’ and ‘community involvement’, as well as rapid local economic development. Essentially, however, this new local institutional structure has proved not only to be profoundly undemocratic, but also patently unsuitable as an instrument to facilitate sustainable local economic development in practise. I then turn to the wider lessons that emanate from other major reconstruction and development experiences also shaped by neo-liberal policy parameters – South America and post-Communist Eastern Europe – to see whether neo-liberal policy failure in South-East Europe is perhaps an exception to the rule. Finally, I consider a number of countries – postwar Western Europe, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and China – where success was registered in a very similar reconstruction and system-change context to that pertaining to South-East Europe today. These successful examples of reconstruction and development demonstrate that local state agency can be an important, and in some cases a decisive, factor in local economic and social development policy. I conclude that South-East Europe urgently needs to examine the possibility to ‘bring the local state back in’, in the sense of establishing pro-active local state institutions and programmes nested within a democratic governance framework and which prioritise sustainable local economic and social development. The concept of the ‘local developmental state’ sums up the core aspects of the required approach. The chapter is organised as follows. Section two provides some background to the neo-liberal local policy regime imposed upon South-East Europe since the end of the 1980s. The performance of the two key local economic development interventions that emerged under the guise of a new civil society agenda – local enterprise development agencies and micro-finance institutions – is then briefly surveyed. Section three outlines the experience of the neo-liberal policy framework as it has been implemented in Central and Eastern Europe since 1991 as well as in South America since the 1970s. Section four then outlines the successes achieved in a number of reconstruction and development episodes where local state agency was an important – in some cases, decisive – institutional intervention. I turn in the final section to some consideration of the important constituent elements of what a ‘local 2
By ‘local’ we mean all sub-national levels of government (regional, local, township, village, etc) unless otherwise made clear.
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MILFORD BATEMAN developmental state’ policy framework might involve with regard to South-East Europe today. 2. BACKGROUND TO THE RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH- EAST EUROPE As is well known, the policy framework established in South-East Europe from 1988 onwards is a derivative of the standard neo-liberal model espoused by the Thatcher government in the UK from 1979 and by the Reagan administration in the USA from 1980 onwards, and thenceforth established as the dominant policy orientation in the world through the auspices of the World Bank, IMF and other multilateral bodies. The neo-liberal policy model is premised upon the supposedly smooth efficiency of the textbook free market mechanism – the ‘invisible hand’ – and its presumed ability to articulate a successful growth and development trajectory under all conditions (Sachs, 1990), including difficult post-war scenarios (Haughton, 1998). Recovery will be a spontaneous process based upon the rapid response of domestic and international actors (local companies, entrepreneurs, foreign investors, private banks, etc) to a newly embedded system of market incentives, private property rights and complete business freedom. Crucially, the assigned role for the state within the neo-liberal model remains quite clear and unambiguous: to ‘get out of the way’. The international community thus quite deliberately ensured that state agency would have almost no role to play in South-East Europe. Those arguing early on in favour of a pro-active economic development role for suitably modified state institutions and funding vehicles, perhaps along the broad lines of the Marshall Plan established in western Europe after 1945 or the state-led development institutions that served East Asia extremely well in the 1960s and 1970s (for example, see Amsden et al, 1994), were either ignored or else ridiculed as being in favour of providing a life-line for communism. One result of this preference was that the richer western countries thus effectively precluded in South-East Europe the use of the very same state-coordinated industrial, financial, trade and technology policies that they themselves had earlier used to develop and grow rich, a process Chang (2002) has described as ‘kicking away the ladder’. Even though this heavily ideological and self-interested approach encountered criticism and calls for (at the very least) a more pro-active role for state structures and local industrial policy (for example Bateman, 1995; Petrin, 1995), the promise of financial assistance to the governments of South-East Europe, and/or the threat of withdrawing it, was usually enough to persuade any doubters in government that there was no alternative to the neo-liberal model. This neo-liberal ‘minimal state’ preference was also played out in spite of the decisive role played by state institutions at the community, municipality, city and county level in the successful reconstruction and development of the former Yugoslavia after 1945 (Horvat, 1976, 2002). Inter alia these sub-national institutions managed to produce positive local economic and social development responses to the (often sub-optimal) macro-economic framework set jointly by the 116
LOCAL ECONOMIC AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AS AN ASPECT OF THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTH-EAST EUROPE Federal and Republican governments (Bateman, 1993). However, after 1991, but particularly after 1995, local governments were effectively stopped in their tracks from attempting to re-build and modify this earlier capacity (Bateman, 2000a). The international community specified, instead, the dismantling and disengagement of most local state capacities and institutional vehicles. As very much in Africa and many parts of Asia from the 1970s onwards, local civil society institutions were to be vigorously marketed as the replacement for state agency with regard to promoting local economic and community development. This goal was assured in practise by channelling the bulk of international financial support for local economic development directly to civil society institutions and initiatives, and by also ensuring that any remaining central and local government funding for local economic development followed suit. As the power, resource-base and scope of newly democratised local governments began to decrease sharply in the 1990s, this was paralleled by an explosive growth in the number of un-elected and unaccountable local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) engaged in the full range of local economic development issues. The vast majority of local people who might otherwise have felt that they were in a position to influence and shape the process of reconstruction and development through the democratic process, and thereby more closely identify with the likely sacrifices and burdens required, were effectively disenfranchised at the very point where democratic structures were of the utmost importance to their future. Elected local (and national) state institutions across the region now had to articulate and implement local economic development policy priorities through the lens of the new raft of NGOs. Thus, a key feature of previous successful reconstruction and development episodes – democratic legitimacy, genuine popular participation and real public-private interfacing – was largely absent in South-East Europe from day one. Two local institutions within the neo-liberal model were accorded overall responsibility for driving forward local economic development – independent local enterprise development agencies and commercially oriented micro-finance institutions. The vast bulk of international donor resources for local economic development went into establishing these civil society institutional vehicles at the local level, often against the wishes of the government and local economists. What has been the outcome of these particular local strands of the neo-liberal model? The role of local enterprise development institutions was understood in SouthEast Europe well before the 1990s. In most parts of the former Yugoslavia, but particularly in the more advanced Republics of Slovenia and Croatia, there were already very many municipality-led local enterprise development institutions working successfully within the community as early as the 1960s, including some involvement in small-scale private enterprise development (Waterston, 1962: World Bank, 1981). Moreover, by the mid-1970s a whole new wave of ideas to reform the worker self-management system in the direction of greater dynamism and private entrepreneurship began to be put into practise, starting in Slovenia and then spreading south across the whole of the former Yugoslavia. This included the 117
MILFORD BATEMAN concept of pro-active local enterprise development bodies that could offer concrete support to new business projects and industrial clusters, as well as help to create spin-offs from declining large enterprises. Thus, when communism collapsed in the former Yugoslavia in the late 1980s, the local enterprise development agency concept was already a familiar concept. After 1991, but particularly after the end of the civil war in Bosnia in 1995, substantial financial support was made available to support the establishment of networks of local enterprise development agencies in most regions.3 As elsewhere in the transition economies (Bateman, 2000b), it was clearly intended that these agencies should be non-governmental, commercially oriented, private sector-led, and should ‘earn their keep on the market’ by eventually charging for the services they provided. In order to qualify for donor funding, proposals for new agencies submitted by local governments had to accord with these demands. In a number of cases, a successfully operating municipality-led local enterprise development agency was closed down and re-opened in the approved format. Reality forced most governments to recognise ‘the way the wind was blowing’ and so put aside their misgivings with the new model in the hope that desperately needed donor funding would be forthcoming.4 In addition, many well-connected individuals confident of securing employment in the new donor-funded agencies, and others expecting to benefit from related donor funding streams (such as University economics and business departments, private consultants, trainers), self-interestedly lobbied hard for the new model to be accepted. Moreover, and a clear indication that embedding free market ideology was of far more importance than any possible results, there was almost no ‘learning by doing’ or modification of the basic model in the light of highly relevant experiences elsewhere. The initial results of the neo-liberal model in other parts of Central and Eastern Europe after 1990, for example, were very discouraging indeed – most of the new agencies simply could not ‘earn their keep on the market’ and so quickly began to collapse after the donor funding came to an end (Bateman, 2000b). The very first EU-funded network of twenty agencies in Hungary went into a ‘sustainability crisis’ within only three years of its establishment. Local businesses and entrepreneurs were simply unwilling to pay for the services provided by these agencies, especially in the face of strong competition from other private service providers. Closure of the entire network was only averted by an additional tranche of donor funding and urgent attention to developing new funding sources that would allow it to continue. Crucially, by tying the agency to the provision of very simple revenue-raising business support services, in order to help it avoid becoming a 3
The name of such agencies varied across countries – Business Support Centre, Regional Enterprise Support Agency, Local Enterprise Agency, and so on - but the function generally stays the same. 4 Slovenia was one of the rare transition countries where government officials were bold enough to openly disagree with the proposed model for local enterprise development agencies. As a result, the EU’s PHARE programme of support for new local enterprise development institutions was effectively cancelled (EC, 2000).
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LOCAL ECONOMIC AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AS AN ASPECT OF THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTH-EAST EUROPE permanent financial ‘burden’ on the state or donor community, it became quite apparent that the substantive tasks involved in promoting sustainable local economic development were not being undertaken (see Bateman, 2000b; EC, 2000). Yet in spite of these emerging and well-documented problems in the early transition economies, after 1995 the countries of South-East Europe were still very firmly instructed that they too must accept the neo-liberal model if they wished to receive donor funding. It should have been no surprise, therefore, given the more unfavourable post-war circumstances, that the serious problems that had emerged earlier in Central Europe quickly began to emerge here too, and to a greater degree. What were these problems precisely? First, it quickly became abundantly clear that the market for simple business services in South-East Europe was woefully inadequate, much more so than in Central Europe, in terms of being able to underpin the long-term funding requirements of the local agencies. Moreover, in many parts the capacity of private business support services providers was quickly increasing and providing strong competition for the few clients around. Most agencies thus quickly went into head-to-head competition with private sector suppliers. Major ‘displacement’ effects thus arose in some regions as the new well-funded (subsidised) agencies took the very few clients willing to pay for business services, leaving the emerging private sector suppliers in jeopardy. In other regions, though, the absolute lack of clients meant all business services suppliers were in real difficulty right from the start. Essentially, if an agency could not develop an income stream from commercial sources this spelled real trouble, which seems to include most of those established since 1995. However, even if the local agencies could actually survive on commercial fee earning, then they still contributed almost no ‘additionality’ in terms of local economic development because the very simple services they generally provided – business plans, simple training, marketing advice, accessing finance, contact-making, etc – could have quite easily been supplied by the private sector. Second, the commercial imperatives built into the operation of the local agencies inevitably drove them to focus on developing business opportunities unrelated to their original mandate, especially if these opportunities were particularly lucrative. This ‘mission drift’ included working with large local companies on privatisation issues, with central and local government on a range of R&D and programme activities, and with incoming foreign companies seeking information or partners. Quite a number also gravitated back towards the international donors themselves, who were usually quite willing to hire trustworthy and known local partners to work on other projects unrelated to local economic development. Most local enterprise development agencies also began to engage in a whole variety of private business deals – trading, consulting abroad, financial wheeler dealing and contact-making – in order to raise funds to keep going. Of course, a good many of the personnel took advantage of their freedoms and lack of local government oversight to indulge in their own private business ‘on company time’. Exactly as in Central Europe, therefore, the need to ‘earn their keep on the 119
MILFORD BATEMAN market’ meant that the agencies in South-East Europe all very quickly lost sight of the most important tasks and interventions that would benefit the local economy over the longer run. Thus, those local agencies that did not collapse after donor funding ended may well have remained in operation for some time, but almost all of them were not doing what they were supposed to do. In sum, three outcomes are apparent with regard to the neo-liberal model for local enterprise development agencies: most have closed down completely, some have converted into a fully private consulting firm and thus formally abandoned any local enterprise development role, and some have opportunistically integrated into other financial flows simply in order to retain the well-paying jobs of senior staff (for example, by integrating into the new wave of Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) supported largely by the EU). All these practical outcomes are indicative of there being very little, if any, local economic development return on the huge initial donor funding commitment. Irrespective of these manifest failures on the ground since 1995, establishing the neo-liberal civil society model for a local enterprise development agency still remains the top priority in South-East Europe today. For example, support for enterprise development re-started for Serbia and Montenegro in the aftermath of the NATO intervention of 1999 has permitted almost no modification of the basic model to account for these previous difficulties. In Croatia non-governmental local enterprise development agencies – so-called Entrepreneurship Centers – are still being uncritically supported and constructed in some regions using scarce second generation donor funding, with almost no concern whatsoever to account for why the very same structures are collapsing or are moribund in most other regions of the same country. The huge pressure to persevere with the correct ideological model is apparent also at the national level, in relation to national enterprise development agencies. For example, the World Bank and the EU remain adamant that national agencies being established in the region can be self-funding through developing their own commercial revenue opportunities (see World Bank and EU, 2001, p 102). With no evidence whatsoever to justify such a claim, it is as if the last ten years of failed attempts at institutional sustainability across the region have never happened. To repeat, such obfuscation and omission can only mean one thing: that the overarching importance of such interventions is very clearly less to do with their actual performance as local enterprise development instruments, and much more to do with ensuring that the ideologically correct non-governmental structures become embedded within the emerging post-communist society. Turning now to the role of micro-finance institutions (MFIs) in local economic development, it would appear that here also a radically new local institutional structure has emerged in line with key neo-liberal imperatives, rather than according to sustainable local economic and community development criteria. This is the socalled ‘new wave’ of MFIs. The ‘new wave’ MFI model refers to the large-scale delivery of financial services to poor communities through commercially-oriented, competing, non-governmental, financially self-sustaining lending bodies (see Otero and Rhyne, 1994; Robinson, 2001). The ‘new wave’ MFI is effectively meant to 120
LOCAL ECONOMIC AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AS AN ASPECT OF THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTH-EAST EUROPE supersede those MFIs associated with state or collective/co-operative ownership and/or control, linked in with government policy priorities, possibly requiring continuous financial support, and generally working to support sustainable enterprise projects rather than just those capable of repaying a loan over the shortterm allowed. The ‘new wave’ MFI model has to date received an enormous amount of support from the major multilaterals (especially the World Bank and EBRD), key western governments (particularly the US government through its USAID arm) and international NGOs. Conceptually and practically the model has been offered significant support from organisations not conventionally associated with a concern for the situation confronting the world’s poor, such as multinational corporations and major conservative media outlets.5 Accordingly, the ‘new wave’ MFI model has attracted substantial political support and donor agency funding in the context of the reconstruction of South-East Europe (World Bank, 2000). The presumed positive overall outcome of the ‘new wave’ MFI model can be directly traced back to the standard neo-liberal contention that poverty and underdevelopment are a result of market imperfections – here a generalised lack of smallscale finance – rather than related, say, to structural constraints within society associated with class, power, gender, ethnicity, and so on. It is posited that commercially-viable MFIs that can achieve both sustainability and greater outreach will ensure that the largest number of people have access to finance over time and can therefore engage in small-scale entrepreneurial activities; ergo the largest number of clients that will be able to raise their individual and household income levels and thereby effect an escape from poverty. The crucial conjecture is that because individual clients generally tend to be seen to be better off than non-clients, an overall increased supply of small-scale finance, which leads to more clients being supported, can thus be aggregated to give a wider beneficial outcome for the community and national economy too. However, four longer run negative externalities on the ground appear to be overwhelming whatever short run positive impacts there may be (see Bateman, 2003). First, there is an obvious de-industrialising effect that arises as the entrepreneurial/financial incentive structure within the local economy is incrementally adjusted in favour of short-term, high profit, low technology, quick payback ventures. This new environment has clearly acted to ‘crowd out’ those projects requiring greater investment, using skilled labour, adapting relatively sophisticated technologies, and where there are long financial break-even points, only ‘adequate’ profits or costly ‘learning curves’ to endure. Such an environment – 5
For example, the high-profile Micro-Credit Summit campaign has garnered a very exclusive list of individuals, senior politicians and multinational corporations, who have agreed to offer support for its aim of bringing commercial micro-credit to an additional 100 million families throughout the developing world by 2005. The New York Times and magazines such as Business Week have increasingly seen fit to editorialise and uncritically publicise the presumed benefits of commercial (i.e., ‘new wave’) micro-finance provision as a way of helping the poor in poor countries.
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MILFORD BATEMAN it can be termed a ‘disabling’ environment – is overwhelmingly suitable to facilitate mainly the growth of kiosks, shuttle trading, catering, petty retailing and small-scale food processing operations that add value very quickly. It has proved wholly unsupportive towards the many possible ventures that could, say, have emerged from the region’s substantial defence, construction and engineering sectors. It should also be stressed that this ‘crowding out’ effect is central to the operation of the ‘new wave’ MFI model, rather than peripheral, because of the sheer size and coverage achieved in the region: there are often simply no other MFIs to approach if one wants to obtain small-scale sums of money for a new business project. Partly this is because ‘new wave’ MFI advocates tend to be the most vociferous critics of any ‘soft loan’ alternatives and have a history of actively resisting such ideas whenever they emerge from local bodies and individuals (see next point). Moreover, even if ‘new wave’ MFIs eventually reach sufficient scale and outreach to deal with riskier and more sophisticated businesses, as proponents claim will indeed be the case (Robinson, 2002), irreparable damage will have been done to the local economy in the meantime and few individual entrepreneurs or businesses may then need their services – a clear case of the cure being found, but in the meantime the patient has died. This de-industrialising role has been particularly marked in Bosnia, where a network of ‘new wave’ MFIs was established in 1997 by the World Bank with over USD 40 million of donor funds, followed shortly after by the country’s first ‘new wave’ micro-enterprise bank – MEB Bank – using just over USD 20 million of mixed donor funding. Overwhelmingly the main clients of these structures are as elsewhere – kiosks, retailers, caterers, shuttle traders and the like. Most other ventures, including most sustainable ones, were effectively ‘crowded out’ by the combination of very high interest rates and short-term repayment requirements, and sometimes also the need for significant collateral. The early results prompted some of Bosnia’s best economists to suggest an alternative. Quickly recognising that the country’s hard earned and not insignificant industrial legacy was effectively being abandoned thanks to this new local financial structure, they lobbied the international financial institutions to support an SME (small to medium-sized enterprise) Development Fund that would attempt to identify and comprehensively ‘crowd in’ the most dynamic ventures. But the response from the international financial institutions was patently clear: the ‘new wave’ market-driven MFI simply had to become the benchmark for all local financial institutions in Bosnia (as elsewhere). The alternative approach was pointedly blocked. This left the ‘new wave’ MFIs as effectively the only source of capital for small enterprise development in Bosnia.6 Notwithstanding the welcome short term boost to employment and wealthgeneration registered in those micro-businesses that were supported by Bosnia’s ‘new wave’ MFIs, the longer run result of the ‘disabling’ financial environment 6
Bosnia’s new private and privatised commercial banks were then (and still are) extremely risk-averse and resisted to deal with the local enterprise sector, preferring instead to ‘invest’ their locally mobilised financial resources in German and UK bank accounts (ýauševiü, 2002).
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LOCAL ECONOMIC AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AS AN ASPECT OF THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTH-EAST EUROPE thereby created is proving to be catastrophic for the Bosnian economy overall, a fact lamented by many local economists (see Stojanov, 2000). The UNDP bleakly concurs, reporting that the Bosnian people have effectively been ‘condemned to reliance on a grey, trade-based, unsustainable economy rather than a productionbased one’ (UNDP, 2002, p. 38). Related to the de-industrialisation argument is a second adverse consequence of the ‘new wave’ MFI. This is the causative link between the type of clients necessarily (if only initially) preferred by the ‘new wave’ MFIs and the rise of import dependency in South-East Europe. As noted, ‘new wave’ MFIs were obliged to support large numbers of shuttle traders and small-scale importing operations, these being the only activities capable of repaying high interest rates on loans offered over very short time periods. The additional and immediate flood of imported products thereby generated added to the existing pressure on potentially viable local production-based enterprises engaged in the process of re-learning, reinvesting, re-tooling and restructuring in order to compete on local markets. The wholesale collapse of great swathes of industry followed, a good deal of which could eventually have been put into profitable use given more time and support. Moreover, it was very well known beforehand that deliberately and quickly established import channels would likely destroy even the most viable local industrial units before they had had time to ‘get their act in order’ (see SAPRIN, 2001). The situation has now reached comic proportions in some parts of the region, notably in Bosnia and Kosovo. Here the donor funded ‘new wave’ MFI banks have become very profitable – in fact, the most profitable in all of Central and Eastern Europe7 – largely by helping a new trading and importing class to emerge. Meanwhile, however, the local industrial and agricultural economy continues to stagnate under the weight of the imported items that such traders facilitate, and genuinely sustainable development ventures continue to be cast aside largely because of their initial inability to cover the high price of capital on offer. It would be hard to conceive of a policy model better able to establish in the region an ‘African-style’ colonial scenario of a small, but very rich and powerful trading/importing class ranged uneasily against an impoverished and largely unemployed or under-employed population. Third, the lobbying power of the ‘new wave’ MFIs has increasingly sought to de-legitimise the role of state agency in local economic and community development. As noted above, there are a great many examples where pro-active state-led development funds and financial institutions have been proposed in the region, but these ideas have been firmly blocked by the international financial institutions. The ‘new wave’ MFI approach could exist side-by-side with other more pro-active structures offering long-term financial support, not least because their client base is likely to be very much different. But such a multi-faceted approach has simply not been tolerated. Unlike in many other countries under reconstruction 7
Reported in The Economist magazine, 14 September 2002.
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MILFORD BATEMAN where pro-active state SME development banks and local financial funds provided absolutely critical support for local economic development (see below), this option – of course suitably modified to take into account local conditions – has been denied to South-East Europe. Institutional diversity, a critically important aspect of any successful reconstruction and development policy (Chang and Kozul-Wright, 1993), has thus been precluded. Finally, the ‘new wave’ MFI approach paradoxically undermines one of the new cornerstones of the neo-liberal policy agenda itself – the concept of social capital as derived from the work of Putnam (1993) and which the World Bank now sees as a “missing link” in development (Grootaert, 1997). In truth, the de-contextualized concept of social capital associated with Putnam’s original contribution has been largely de-bunked since it came to prominence in spectacular fashion in the mid1990s, devastatingly effectively by Fine (2001) and Harriss (2002). However, leaving aside the question of what objective value is inherent within the social capital concept as deployed by the main international development agencies today, if social capital is construed as being critical to development then it should surely be of real concern to them that the ‘new wave’ MFI approach undoubtedly serves to undermine its accumulation. In general, by re-casting individual survival solely as a function of individual entrepreneurial success, the bonds of solidarity, trust and cooperation that traditionally exist within, and serve to bind together, communities are inevitably undermined. More specifically, whenever community development and support activities are recast as commercial operations – a central operating principle of the ‘new wave’ MFI model – the unavoidable consequence is the degeneration of the level of local solidarity, interpersonal communication, volunteerism, trust-based interaction and goodwill (see Leys, 2001). As commercial bodies increasingly operating to profit-maximising goals, the raft of ‘new wave’ MFIs established in the region has so far been largely unable to build the longer term local commitment, identification and trust associated with those MFIs more firmly embedded within the community, such as a local development banks, artisan funds, financial cooperatives and credit unions. For example, ‘new wave’ MFIs entering the poorest mountain and upland villages of Albania in 1991 soon moved away in search of better commercial opportunities in the urban areas, leaving their unfortunate clients once more to go without support. Already better off communities were seen to be receiving a further injection of external funds, and inequality between communities grew even faster. The new community-based MFIs that had to be established in the vacuum had major difficulties to overcome the cynicism, suspicion and collapse of inter-village co-operation generated by the first project. In Bosnia and Montenegro, a number of the most successful ‘new wave’ MFIs have already converted into commercial banks, and they too have largely abandoned working with very poor clients in favour of comparatively well-off individuals able to afford high interest rates and provide substantial collateral. Note that, as above, even if scale economies do eventually allow ‘new wave’ MFIs to expand their operations once more to the poorest communities, the damage inflicted on local social capital stocks in the meantime may be irreparable. 124
LOCAL ECONOMIC AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AS AN ASPECT OF THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTH-EAST EUROPE Given the above problematic experiences with the main local instruments of the neo-liberal policy model to date in South-East Europe, a number of issues naturally arise. First, a question – if the key civil society institutions used are so inefficient, as I argue is the case, how is it that they are not only tolerated but also actively promoted above all others? Here I would simply reiterate the argument made by Chang (2002), but also in keeping with possibilities raised by earlier conservative institutional theorists such as North (1990), that socially inefficient institutions can routinely persist because they reflect the demands of the powerful (see also Wade, 1996). In post-communist Eastern Europe it is the unquestioned application of neoliberal market imperatives that is of fundamental importance to the international financial institutions, and not so much the actual results of specific interventions. The second area of enquiry is to consider what other past experience there is of the neo-liberal policy model being used as the basis for reconstruction and development. Perhaps this will indicate the real potential of the neo-liberal model over a longer time period than in South-East Europe. The next section therefore considers in more detail some other examples where the neo-liberal policy model has been central to the articulation of a reconstruction and development trajectory. 3. NEO-LIBERAL POLICY AND RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT There is a relative wealth of experience of the application of the neo-liberal policy model in a number of testing circumstances. Perhaps the model’s first big test was in the USA itself, in the aftermath of the First World War. Here, Pieper and Taylor (1998) point out, the promotion of extensive financial liberalisation and industry self-regulation in the 1920s was perhaps not the answer, since it ended up precipitating the Great Depression.8 This catastrophic experience led to the important works by Polanyi (1944) and others, famously including Keynes, which effectively ended the myth of the self-regulating market (for the next couple of generations that is). There are also more recent experiences with neo-liberal policy in practise that are perhaps more relevant, including South and Central America from the 1970s onwards and, for sure, the experience of Central and Eastern Europe after 1990. These deserve a more detailed consideration. 3.1. South and Central America Neo-liberal policy was first operationalized in South America in the 1970s in the form of World Bank and IMF Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). Growth was resumed for a time, and the initial successes seemed promising. However, the programmes came unstuck because they ultimately led to a huge increase in poverty 8
The parallels here with the extreme liberalisation and industry self-regulation policies promoted by the US government in the 1990s, which have also severely undermined economic performance, are quite striking (see Hutton, 2002).
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MILFORD BATEMAN and inequality. Barraclough (1991) also points to the dramatic growth of landlessness in the agricultural community as a major factor in undermining both the legitimacy and efficiency of the programmes. Popular resentment at the harshness of the reforms rose dramatically, not least because of the seemingly unfair treatment meted out to the bulk of the population (the rich urban elites were shielded from the effects of the structural adjustment programmes). Strikes, unemployment and social unrest grew alarmingly, and the early gains began to unravel. One ultimately crushing aspect was that the neo-liberal programmes stipulated that central and local governments could not interfere with the private sector’s wish for unrestricted access to foreign loans. Most governments were quite unable to stop most of this new loan capital going into speculative land projects, extensive equity purchases of both domestic and foreign issue, and other short-term ‘get rich quick’ projects. But when conditions changed and the private sector (which included very many subsidiaries of major western multinationals) was unable to service the huge foreign debts it had built up, many free market-oriented governments were forced to socialise their entire banking system in order to avert a major financial sector collapse (Akyüz, 1998). Nationalisation of the banks was a major diversion from the standard neo-liberal policy model, but it was thought important enough in order to protect the small number of bankers and investors from the folly of their own decisions. A succession of Latin American countries only managed to stave off complete economic collapse thanks to the urgent infusion of substantial international financial support. The resulting imposition of austerity programmes to shore up the fiscal balance tore into the social fabric and effectively cancelled out all of the previous gains made through many social and rural community programmes (including donor financed ones). Public spending rose to address the new needs of the collapsing economy, though the burden – once more – was unequally distributed. A number of bodies, such as UNICEF (1993), have pointed to the fact that personal income tax in South America is very low in comparison with most other developing countries, so that public spending on the infrastructure and other key social assets could actually be maintained through increases in income tax on higher earners. However, neo-liberal policy insists that increasing taxes on consumption, which clearly hit the poor hardest, must take priority over increasing taxes on income (and, of course, low taxes are to be preferred to high taxes), and so this obvious policy option was not explored. Meanwhile, according to Oxfam (1996, p. 13), the number living in extreme poverty in South America increased from 62 million in 1980 to 93 million by 1990. From 1984 onwards, neo-liberal reform policies were introduced into Central America too, in Mexico under the Salinas administration. Here the end came just under ten years later, in 1994, when a financial collapse found the international community once more forced into putting together a major emergency rescue package in order to bail out the banking and investment communities. As in South America, inequality in Mexico grew dramatically in the 1980s and early 1990s, rising by 15 per cent in the 1994–1995 period alone (Faux and Mishel, 2000). The tragedy continued into the 1990s, spectacularly in the case of Argentina. Following the earlier breakdown of the previous neo-liberal programmes in 126
LOCAL ECONOMIC AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AS AN ASPECT OF THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTH-EAST EUROPE Argentina undertaken under the military dictatorship, in the late 1980s the new government agreed to implement once more, and even more decisively this time, the full package of neo-liberal policies. Indeed, Argentina stands out today as one of the countries that have most vigorously and thoroughly implemented the neo-liberal policy model. Unfortunately, the results of this latest version have been even more catastrophic than its predecessors. The initial early 1990s boom was underpinned by the sale of virtually all of the countries main public utilities and other assets to foreign multinational companies, which quickly hiked up prices and began repatriating profits back to their home country on a huge scale. The downward effect on the incomes and demand of the poorer communities brought about by the now higher utility prices was marked. Terminated contracts for non-payment meant that whole new communities now exist 19th century-style without access to energy, water, waste collection and other amenities. The apparent ‘boom’ effectively came to an end when there was nothing left to sell off, though other crises elsewhere – in particular East Asia – no doubt helped to push the teetering economy over the edge. Argentina was forced to signal in 2001 that it was likely going to have to default on its debts of over USD 128 billion, creating the largest sovereign debt default in history. Poverty and unemployment subsequently rose dramatically, wages of the bottom sections of society collapsed even further, great swathes of domestic industry got into serious difficulty and/or closed down, and the entire country seemed about to explode. Even if a recovery can somehow be fashioned in the coming years to save what remains of the economic structure, perhaps through a one-off devaluation boost, it will once more take many years before the situation is back to where it was at the start of the decade.9 3.2. Central and Eastern Europe Since 1990 Consider also the case of post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe. Here also, as pointed out by such as Amsden et al (1994) and later by Stiglitz (1999, 2001), the neo-liberal policy approach appears to have fared very badly, if indeed it has not been responsible for an outright calamity in the region (Andor and Summers, 1998). In spite of some uncertainty on the part of local post-Communist elites as to the efficacy and desirability of the neo-liberal ‘shock therapy’ policy model, it was nevertheless adopted by most governments in the region. As very much in SouthEast Europe, the promise of substantial financial support to the first post-communist governments was made conditional upon its adoption. Initially, the transition to more market-based economies in the region was widely supported by the 9
Ironically, while the neo-liberal macro-policy packages were extremely problematic at the national level more or less from the 1970 onwards, there has been a wealth of pro-active local, city and regional government-driven economic development activity in Argentina and Chile that have significantly helped to offset these negative aspects (for example, see Casaburi’s (1999) description of the government’s strategic role in the creation of the fresh fruit and dairy export industries).
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MILFORD BATEMAN overwhelming majority of the people, in the expectation that it would bring fairly quick economic recovery, and that western-style living standards would soon follow. This is indeed what most incoming advisors predicted if only the basics of the neoliberal model were adhered to (Sachs, 1990). However, save for a small urban elite, the rapid dismantling of central planning and the imposition of neo-liberal policy programmes has brought far less immediate benefit than expected. In fact, the transition process has so far simply reshaped and, for a great number of people, actually intensified the nature of the poverty, inequality, exclusion, despair and powerlessness that existed under communism. A collapse in output was followed by major increases in poverty and unemployment, and drastically deteriorating public health and social welfare systems (Standing, 2002). A new class of ‘working poor’ began to emerge after just a few years (Standing and Vaughn-Whitehead, 1995), while inequality and social exclusion have risen steadily, and at times dramatically, over the last ten years (Milanovic, 1998). Debt levels began to rise to exceed pre-communist levels in many countries in the region, while the crucial fiscal stopgap provided by the proceeds from privatisation is now coming to an end. In order to encourage FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) and mobile multinational capital flows, wages had to be capped and trade unions suppressed. But even where FDI has been forthcoming to a significant degree the benefits have often largely flowed to foreign and local elites, and are anyway often transitory. Privatisation has denuded the previously comprehensive health system in favour of one where cash payment is now routinely required for basic access and emergency treatment. Lastly, agricultural production has declined in nearly all of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as a result of intense competition from heavily subsidised (mainly EU) suppliers, creating rural poverty of a historically unprecedented magnitude. Most countries in the region have only recently begun to approach the GDP levels they started with in 1990 when they brought their respective centrally planned economies to a sudden halt, though these statistics, it must be strongly emphasised, mask the dramatically skewed distribution of whatever real gains have been made since then. Stiglitz (2002) points out that Russia has been devastated on virtually all fronts – industry, infrastructure, inequality, health, corruption, criminality – thanks to the sudden imposition of the neo-liberal reform package. Thanks to a near 40 per cent decline in GDP in the first few years of the transition, the number of poor people in Russia (those living on less than USD 4 per day) rose from 2 million to 60 million by 1995 (Stiglitz, 2002), with the new poor co-existing very uneasily alongside the tiny, but stratospherically wealthy, new Russian elite. Consider further the case of Poland, which is often considered to be the ‘star performer’ of all the transition economies. For a very small urban elite there has undoubtedly been a major improvement in living standards since 1990, but the situation otherwise is very bleak – dramatically rising levels of poverty in non-urban areas, vastly increased social tension, the rise of ultra low pay as the norm, a significant deterioration of the health of the population since 1989, and unemployment reaching 18 per cent by mid-2002 and likely to go even higher as the 128
LOCAL ECONOMIC AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AS AN ASPECT OF THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTH-EAST EUROPE long-delayed privatisation program finally gets into gear and a new ‘flexibilityinducing’ Labour Code is introduced. There have been particularly severe problems in the agricultural sector, once one of the main motors of development in the Polish economy. On instantly liberalising the economy, Poland was immediately exposed to the stronger EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) supported agricultural sectors to the west. The immediate result was that the agricultural sector quickly lost significant market share in just about all categories, turning a USD 557 million surplus on agricultural products in 1989 into a USD 333 million deficit with the EU by 1993 (Andor and Summers, 1998, p. 109). Farm incomes fell by 50 per cent and by 1995 60 per cent of farms were technically bankrupt (Andor and Summers, 1998, p. 109). Field researchers such as Kowalski and Kaminski (1999, p. 52) report that in the rural areas of Poland today there is abundant evidence of a decline in the average conditions of employment ‘to those prevalent in the nineteenth century’. Moreover, by around 2001 a deterioration in the underlying economic situation was exposed that threatened to cancel out what progress has been made to date. Even EU Accession appeared to be under threat from the rising tide of bad economic statistics and ongoing industrial collapse.10 Summarising the adverse trends in mid-2002 the Economist magazine – an earlier very strong advocate of the radical neo-liberal policy approach to post-Communist reconstruction – was forced to lament that against a background of a now quite unsustainable trade deficit (over USD 6 billion in the first half of 2002) and seemingly unstoppable industrial contraction, it had come to the point where it no longer had any idea ‘what Poland will [now be able to] export to support its 40m people . . .’.11 But of most interest, given the theme of this chapter, is the initial explanation for the so-called ‘Polish economic miracle’12 – successful local economic development via small enterprise development. This ‘success’ was supposedly manifest in the massive early rise in micro-entrepreneurship after 1990 (more than 2 million new entrepreneurs registered in just two years), which was celebrated as a direct result of the neo-liberal policy package. This was the up-beat approach adopted, for example, by Johnson and Loveman (1995).13 However, and notwithstanding the obviously important monetary and other benefits accruing to those directly concerned, the huge initial inflow of shuttle-traders, importers, retail 10
The Economist, 21 April 2001, p. 32. The Economist, 27 July 2002, p. 38 12 Less attention has been paid to the fact that the early fears that the Polish ‘shock therapy’ programme might collapse early on and discredit neo-liberal policy programmes throughout the post-communist world prompted Poland’s official creditors to agree to an immediate 50 per cent debt forgiveness programme (worth about USD 25 billion) in 1991 (Andor and Summers, 1998, p. 71). This massive level of support was not forthcoming to the other countries in the region and is generally not factored into any account of its early success. 13 In the foreword to Johnson and Loveman’s book, Jeffrey Sachs, considered by many to have been the principal architect of the neo-liberal ‘shock therapy’ programme adopted first in Poland, gave unqualified support for these conclusions. 11
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MILFORD BATEMAN outlets and kiosks that largely constituted this new entrepreneurial class gravely undermined the industrial and agricultural fabric of the country. Whole swathes of potentially competitive industry were quickly wiped out thanks to the instant arrival of competition. The huge initial surge in the number of ‘buy cheap (from abroad) and sell dear (locally)’ shuttle-traders and self-employed importers in Poland thus very effectively smoothed the way towards growing trade deficits, particularly with regard to the one sector – agriculture – where local comparative advantages were initially quite high. Whole swathes of small-scale retailers originally established as job generation projects were then wiped out as the inevitable and predictable largescale retail developments missing in Poland finally came on stream. Moreover, the temporarily high profits realised in many sectors dramatically adjusted the incentive structure affecting entrepreneurship throughout the country,14 greatly discouraging industrial and technology-intensive business projects – in fact any business idea where commercial viability was expected over a marginally longer-term time period than six months to one year. Given the Polish government’s unwillingness to offer any local industrial policy assistance to small-scale projects,15 just as for large-scale restructuring projects (Amsden et al, 1994), it was only to be expected that the industrial base at the local level would begin to dissolve as it has. 4. AN ALTERNATIVE POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT Contrasting with the above experiences are a number of countries that adopted an alternative economic policy framework to the neo-liberal package. Most often described as the ‘developmental state’ model (Johnson, 1982; Chang, 1994), it is an approach founded upon a pro-active state apparatus working towards long-term industrial developmental goals, social inclusion and technology ‘catch up’. However, one of the central explanatory factors behind the success achieved in a number of countries covered by the ‘developmental state’ argument was actually the pro-active role of specifically local, rather than national, state institutions. Consider the following brief examples, starting with Japan. In Japan, a dense tissue of local and prefectural (regional) state-led institutions worked very successfully to promote the community and SME development. Local 14 Real interest rates are partly a function of the local opportunity cost of capital. Accordingly, with the local opportunity cost of capital in Poland initially very high thanks to the high margins made on trading and importing operations, most banks pushed to raise their effective interest rates as much as possible via the imposition of fees, management charges and one-off payments. Effectively, this was in order for them to capture a share of the high returns being generated elsewhere. Those enterprises not in the trading and importing sector, of course, also had to cover these high interest rates if they wished to access a loan. Most couldn’t. 15 Leszek Balcerowicz, the architect of ‘shock therapy’ in Poland, made it quite clear that he favoured offering no state financial support for small enterprise development whatsoever, believing that stabilisation, privatisation and liberalisation – that is, the neo-liberal model – were essentially all that would be required for sustainable small enterprise development to take root (Balcerowicz, 1995, p. 246).
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LOCAL ECONOMIC AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AS AN ASPECT OF THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTH-EAST EUROPE governments were encouraged after 1945 to develop a wide array of support programmes and measures to assist small enterprises. They were particularly quick to introduce an extensive range of low-cost financial support policies to help the most vulnerable individuals (particularly de-mobilised soldiers) establish new small industrial units. The resources for these measures came partly from central government and partly from local savings mobilisation through local state-owned banks. In addition, large numbers of credit unions, financial co-operatives and other forms of small-scale mutual association were also re-established by state prompting and initial capitalisation. Crucially, these non-state financial institutions were also strongly regulated by prefectural and local governments, working alongside the Ministry of Finance, in order to avoid any fraudulent activity that might undermine both the fragile economic situation and the important social consensus constructed within the community. These local financial institutions became important complimentary community-based providers of funds for new starts and small growing enterprises outside of the state support schemes, thus promoting important local ‘savings and investment cycles’ (Nishiguchi, 1994). Friedman (1988, p. 167) summed up the financial system for small-scale enterprises in Japan as being nothing less than, ‘an industrial equivalent of the American savings and loan system for the US housing market (but funding) not home ownership but independent factories’. Crucially, very many of these small-scale enterprises found their way into the supply chains then being constructed around the large export-oriented motor vehicle and electronics firms. The market mechanism thus provided the background against which the local state was able to promote and finance those local enterprise sectors and foreign technologies it calculated would generate most benefit to the economy in the longer run, yet which the market was unwilling to support because of the high risk and low profitability. Overall, local economic development policy has been officially cited as one of the ‘two major pillars of Japanese economic development policy since the Second World War’ (MITI, 1980, p. 14).16 In northern Italy, a raft of very successful small enterprises arose after 1945 in a region that became known as the ‘Third Italy’. The contribution of the local state was critically important. Pro-active municipal and regional governments, often working with very little support from central government, were determined to reconstruct the region through local economic development and, particularly, through small enterprises. Great value was placed on promoting small enterprises that would become embedded within an industrial community where local cooperation mattered as much as, if not more so, than local competition. These factors provided the motivation to build a solidly supportive institutional structure within, and within the orbit of, the local administration (a development that did not, however, take place in the south of Italy). Extensive systems of local financial support were established by both the regional and municipal administrations. For example, Peluffo and Giacche (1997) highlight the importance of the regional state16
The other was the more familiar national export policy.
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MILFORD BATEMAN owned banks and credit institutes, which were encouraged to channel affordable financial support into local small enterprises. A whole host of other local financial institutions were established by the regional and municipal governments, including Artisan Funds that were, as Wiess (1988) emphasises, extremely important to machine purchase and workshop modernisation. In addition, large chunks of abandoned land and business premises were rapidly converted by local governments into industrial parks and “cottage industry” incubators, in order to encourage a large number of entrepreneurs to try out new business ideas with a minimum of fuss and risk (Best, 1990).17 A critically important factor behind the early post-war success of small enterprise development in the northern regions was the high level of social cohesion, trust and civic tradition fostered by the pro-active regional and local governments. These factors underpinned the multiple layers of inter-enterprise and community cooperation that strongly encouraged local business development and investment. One practical indication was seen in the high-trust region of Emilia-Romagna, which also had the highest concentration of co-operatives and co-operative institutions in all of Italy (Birchall, 1997). High levels of local trust and social cohesion also meant that the municipal and regional governments generally had the moral authority to enforce a local inter-class consensus or ‘social contract’. For example, local workers willingly accepted an initial period of wage flexibility (i.e., low wages) during the reconstruction period as part of a fair disbursement of the costs and benefits of local economic success, with the guaranteed return on this ‘sweat equity’ investment coming a little later in the form of extensive kindergarten provision, high quality social welfare services, quality public infrastructure, and so on. This widespread understanding that all must benefit from the reconstruction effort, and not just the most aggressive or entrepreneurial, encouraged most people and social groups to ‘buy in’ to the sacrifices and efforts required. In the former West Germany the Lander (regional) and local state were important development catalysts. Indeed, the former West German economy became noteworthy for its very dense and well-financed institutional fabric at the local and regional level (Cooke and Morgan, 1998). Of particular importance, as stressed by Meyer-Stamer and Wältring (2000), were the strong Landerbanken (regional banks) owned by the Lander governments and the publicly-owned Sparkassen (savings banks), both of which provided to small enterprises a substantial amount of affordable and easily accessible credit. Credit was affordable since these banks were aiming for longer-term sustainability through developing a solid base of industrial clients, rather than short-term profitability through servicing high-profit but ‘here today and gone tomorrow’ trading and importing ventures. The Sparkassen also became involved in the provision of other forms of institutional support for the small enterprise sector, such as technology centres and economic development agencies. The credit co-operative sector also played a vitally important role in local 17
Speculation on land was also strongly prohibited so that entrepreneurs outside of these property-led initiatives could also benefit (Best, 1990).
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LOCAL ECONOMIC AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AS AN ASPECT OF THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTH-EAST EUROPE development in post-war West Germany, with the urban-based Volksbanken and rural-based Raiffeisenbanken becoming major providers of credit to micro- and small enterprises (Birchall, 1997). Above all, this dense local institutional structure was critical to the re-emergence of the Mittelstand (medium enterprise sector). The state’s concern to promote the Mittelstand came to be known as Mittelstandpolitik – the idea that support for the Mittelstand could ensure competition in the industrial sector, while also providing a vital social and political pillar in post-war German society, particularly in the rural communities (Braun, 1990). As in Japan and Italy, therefore, the new West German state very much based its post-war development upon pro-active regional and local state administrations that were able to develop the capacity and generate the local resources to be able to promote recovery and development from the bottom up (Weiss, 1998). Taiwan and South Korea are somewhat different from the above examples because superior industrial performance has been largely attributed to the activities of the central state, rather than local state institutions (see Chang, 1994). Democracy was also a late arrival in these countries. However, it is the case that both the initial and a complimentary development impetus was very much provided by pro-active local and village administrations working in conjunction with highly motivated local populations. In South Korea after 1960, the local township and village administrations were quick to support local farmers’ credit unions get started, establish an extensive out-reach service for farmers and potential rural entrepreneurs, and construct a layer of community services that promoted social cohesion through greater economic security and fairness (Wade, 1982). According to Whang (1981), following the establishment of the Saemaul Undong (New Community Movement) in 1970, local government became even more visible, responsive and active in its own right in promoting an Integrated Rural Development (IRD) approach to community development. In Taiwan, the townships and village state bodies supported local farmers’ associations which were able to offer credit, key inputs, technical support, co-operative marketing channels, and so on (Wade, 1982, 1983). The government initially put most of its effort into the rural communities in order to facilitate the growth of agricultural productivity. The number of agricultural outreach workers in Taiwan provided through local and village administrative units was far and away above that in other East Asian countries. As agriculture was able to provide for the food requirements of the population, by the 1960s the emphasis began to shift towards export-promotion and technology-intensive SME development, with the government establishing a myriad of local supporting institutions, state-owned banks and other local financial programmes (see Lall, 1996, pp. 98–99). Indeed, Lall (Lall, 1996, p. 207) considers the de-centralised technical support offered by the state to small-scale enterprises in then still very poor Taiwan to have been ‘the developing world’s most advanced system of technology support for small and medium enterprises’. Crucially, this technology support was quite critical to the huge entry of new manufacturing SMEs, which from the 1960s onwards, very rapidly created its highly successful small 133
MILFORD BATEMAN enterprise-dominated industrial system. Overall, Wade (1990) attributes the success in Taiwan to the fact that the government was very quickly able to establish a ‘mass of publicly owned assets and organisations . . . able to guide the market’ (p. 325). Finally, local state agency has unequivocally been at the heart of the staggering rural and local industrial transformation that has taken place in China since 1980. By allowing extensive autonomy for the local state the Chinese government was able to encourage a strong rural and urban industrial development trajectory that acted to counter-balance the reduction of activity in inefficient large-scale state industries. From the mid-1980s onwards, as Blecher (1991) points out, local governments became the key element of a decentralised developmental state apparatus willing and able to promote local economic development institutions, mechanisms and trajectories, often in conjunction with higher levels of government where appropriate. The local state was encouraged to engage in a wide range of local economic and social development initiatives that created local wealth, encouraged greater local participation in economic development and, significantly, repaired the damage to the social fabric in most local communities caused by the horrors of the Cultural Revolution. The main instrument for rural industrialisation has overwhelmingly been the local government and community-owned Township and Village Enterprise (TVE), the numbers of which rose rapidly from 1986 onwards to nearly 8 million by the mid 1990s (O’Connor, 1998). Crucially, despite their ownership structure, TVEs are profit-seeking, work under hard budget constraints and operate according to strict performance targets.18 Purushotham (1998) notes that in 1996, for example, the TVEs accounted for manufactured products valued at USD 213 billion, which amounted to two-thirds of rural economic output, one third of national GDP and 40 per cent of national exports. The high profits and taxes generated by the TVEs enabled local governments to finance a range of increasingly sophisticated business infrastructures, such as industrial parks, incubators and modern production facilities geared to foreign investors, which in turn helped to deepen and sustain the local growth trajectory well into the 1990s. Strong support was also offered to social and community development projects that extended the financial benefits of the TVEs to the wider social community, and thereby promoted the wider participation of the local population in the process of change taking place. In 1992, for example, 59 per cent of after-tax profit of the TVEs was reinvested and 40 per cent used for local public expenditure.19 Rural poverty was greatly reduced in most regions of China and, after many years of passively coping with the results of an inefficient system of central planning, local communities were able to re-emerge once more as strong and self-sufficient entities.
18 However, some of the TVEs have undoubtedly been engaged in straightforward local rentseeking operations, but this is officially tolerated (if not encouraged) because the profits and local tax revenues thereby generated flow to the local community rather than to rich individuals (for example, see Duckett, 1998). 19 Figures quoted in the Statistical Survey of China, 1993.
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LOCAL ECONOMIC AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AS AN ASPECT OF THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTH-EAST EUROPE 5. KEY OPERATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE ‘LOCAL DEVELOPMENTAL STATE’ APPROACH IN SOUTH-EAST EUROPE The various experiences adumbrated in the above two sections illustrate two related and important conclusions. First, that neo-liberal ‘minimal state’ policy parameters have achieved very little success as reconstruction and development policy. Second, on the other hand, there are many well-known experiences of successful reconstruction and development involving a central role for pro-active state institutions. As was indicated, in many of these examples local state institutions lay at the core of the success achieved. The local state often collaborated with central state institutions (Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and China), but sometimes also it acted pretty independently (the former West Germany) and even in the face of strong resistance from central government (northern Italy). Even in some failing economies, such as in South America, there exists an interesting core of experience pointing to the potential contained in local state agency against a backdrop of macro-economic failure. From these varied experiences it is possible to distil an alternative local economic developmental model based upon pro-active sub-national levels of the state. Following Blecher (1991), we can denote this as the ‘local developmental state’ model (Bateman, 2000b). The ‘local developmental state’ (LDS) model can be broadly defined as a regional, city, local or village state administration that has developed the competence, democratic or popular legitimacy, long term vision, institutional vehicles, trust-based linkages within the community, and a range of policy interventions that combine to continuously promote, adapt and upgrade the local rural and industrial structure in response to emerging internal deficiencies and external opportunities, threats and other environmental parameters.20 Market forces are important as the background against which the LDS model is operationalized, but not in the neo-classical sense of being able to orchestrate efficient market dynamics into place through individual self-interest and market signalling. The local resource base is sometimes important to support the LDS approach, as in post-war northern Italy, but so too are the technical support and financial resources routinely passed down from the centre to local administrative units, such as in Japan, Taiwan and South Korea. Moreover, while full local autonomy and formal democracy is preferable to top down control, it is has not always been necessary on the ground. The examples of East Asia indicate that an authoritarian government denying a democratic mandate to the local state must nevertheless still allow sufficient autonomy for local state administrative units to function effectively within the local community. Non-democratic regimes realise that local economic progress can underpin their survival. Having said that, energetic local state institutions and 20
This definition owes much to the idea of ‘transformative capacity’ developed by Weiss (1998) to describe the activities of the central state in promoting successful upgrading, adaptation and restructuring.
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MILFORD BATEMAN popular participation in economic development will inevitably precipitate democracy-building measures, as was eventually the case in Taiwan and South Korea, and will surely be so in China in the not too distant future. Crucially, drawing from these examples, we can begin to outline some of the likely key components of the LDS model that might be useful in the context of the ongoing reconstruction and development of South-East Europe. 5.1. Strong Local State-led Institutional Vehicles The key base-line criterion for sustained local economic and community development is the existence of a range of local state-led institutions (i.e., owned or effectively controlled by the local state) charged with promoting a sustainable local economic development trajectory. It is important to underline the fact that it is not impossible to reproduce the key pro-active developmental aspects of state institutions, including local state institutions, that lie behind successful economic development trajectories elsewhere. As Akyuz et al (1999) make clear, key aspects of the Japanese state institutional support structure for small enterprise development were successfully adapted by Taiwan in the 1950s and 1960s, and then parts of the Taiwanese experience was in turn copied very successfully by the Chinese after 1980. Urgent local state capacity-building measures are therefore required in SouthEast Europe in order to create local institutional vehicles that can competently and impartially promote local industrial restructuring and community development. The local state must be able to act as an ‘institutional bridge’ that can facilitate the conversion of unsustainable development trajectories (e.g., de-industrialisation, growing import dependence, social exclusion, abandoning technology) into longer run trajectories that are locally sustainable and equitable. It must be able to construct and maintain the necessary technical, business and physical infrastructures that underpin effective SME development. Accordingly, training, advice, technologies, resources and legitimacy must be conferred on the local economic development capacity within the local state. One important aspect will be to reverse the trend to smaller local government units and to fiscal centralisation that has left many local state units way below a minimum efficient scale of operations. This is finally happening in some parts, (e.g., Macedonia), but in others there is much to be done to reconstruct a local administration commensurate with the ability to act meaningfully to promote the local economy. 5.2. Local Financial Support Policies The LDS approach is to take comprehensive action to build accretions of local capital (i.e., savings) and to ensure that the disbursement of local capital (and any capital coming in from outside) takes place in a manner that benefits the wider community and promotes sustainable local economic development. So-called ‘narrow development’ – development that does not address poverty and actually increases inequality – can be a direct outcome of the local financial system if it is 136
LOCAL ECONOMIC AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AS AN ASPECT OF THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTH-EAST EUROPE structured in a way that benefits local elites, fails to deter fraud or prioritises obviously temporary forms of business development (see Addison et al, 2000). The establishment of local sources of affordable finance was a crucial aspect in all of the above examples of successful community and local economic development. Restructuring and promoting promising local enterprises is not easy, but in the absence of local financial support it is virtually impossible. This financial support was extensive (in comparison to that supplied to the large enterprise sector), affordable (i.e., below market price) and relatively accessible (i.e., no collateral required). Current financial support initiatives in South-East Europe are dominated by the so-called ‘new wave’ MFIs. Yet, as we noted above, their track record on the ground is remarkably poor for an institutional innovation gearing up to receive an even larger share of the financial support being offered to the region. The LDS policy model would therefore suggest the use of a number of alternative local financial sector interventions. First, the more extensive use of local development funds to support key small enterprises and key local growth sectors (e.g., externality creating, export potential, technology transfer promoting) that have a long-term commercial perspective. The most advanced of the South-East European states – Slovenia and Croatia – have some positive experiences with local funds established by municipalities that can be referred to. Research by Grundner and Komar (1999) in Slovenia demonstrated that the local funds established in 48 municipalities became an important source of flexible and affordable loan capital for micro and small businesses in the community. Croatia developed municipal funds as well and has also accumulated some good experience under more difficult conditions (ŽelinskiMatunec, 2000). Whether managed by competent officials or sub-contracted to outside private bodies is of little importance: what is important is that financial support is channelled directly towards potentially sustainable enterprise development and that longer run local development trajectories are patiently and judiciously supported. There is also some merit in the establishment of a local development banking function. For example, some local state-owned banks can be converted into smallscale development banks using international advice and financial assistance.21 One possible route, as proposed by Seviü (1999), is to adapt the US-inspired Community Development Bank model for use in the region. Accepting lower rates of return than commercial banks can be fully justified on the grounds that community and local economic that might be most interested are currently cash-starved, and so find it hard to address their known longer-term survival requirements, an external source of long-term financial support and technical advice is crucial. Independent venture capital funds and long-term equity investments are another area where the local state can be usefully involved. Venture capital funding and equity participation by the 21
To date the international community has offered little support for development banking in the region, as in the wider Central and Eastern Europe (see Amsden et al, 1994).
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MILFORD BATEMAN local state can be used to recycle local rents (e.g., where transport facilitates are disrupted) or benefit from local spending or development (e.g., where government spending increases land values). The Chinese example where local governments used their own capital resources to establish new industrial SMEs is a salutary lesson of what can be achieved at the local level given local commitment and a reasonably competent administration. Second, support for traditional non-governmental financial institutions – credit unions, rural savings associations, financial co-operatives and so on – is vitally important as a way of promoting local savings mobilisation and in meeting the investment needs of small-scale business projects. These independent small-scale local ‘savings and investment cycles’ are a very useful adjunct to the judicious support for key sectors noted above. While ultimately independent and selffinancing, these institutions often need an appropriate stimulus and concrete help from the local state to get established. Most importantly, as experience has amply demonstrated, in low trust environments, such as in South-East Europe at present, such financial schemes are an open invitation for unscrupulous individuals and groups to take advantage of the situation. There is therefore a need for strong regulation and oversight by the local state (see also below). 5.3. Promoting Technology Transfer and Diffusion The notion that low labour costs alone would ensure successful recovery in postCommunist Eastern Europe was a fundamentally wrong proposition to make in 1990. Instead, it was generally low product quality, lack of innovation, poor design, and the continued use of out-dated technologies that largely precluded successful reconstruction of individual enterprises. The same holds for South-East Europe today, where wages have spiralled downwards in many regions, yet most enterprises still find it difficult to find and maintain a market for their product. While technology is at a reasonably high level across heavy industries in the region, there remains much to be done at the local level to support the small enterprise sector. South Korea represents an excellent example of a country where heavy industry came to dominate the economy, but where concerted moves to then diffuse new technologies to the small enterprise sector paid very high dividends. Particularly in rural areas, its patient investment in the establishment of solid technology diffusion and upgrading processes facilitated through local and village administrations, as well as several major funds through which local supply chain-oriented small enterprises could obtain new technologies with grant and loan support, greatly improved the performance of the Korean economy. Technology upgrading support offered to small enterprises in initially very under-developed Taiwan was largely planned and implemented locally through competent local administrations, combining a mixture of central state funds and local co-financing arrangements. The end result took the country’s small enterprises to the very frontiers of new technology development in only twenty years, and underpinned the spectacular rise to power of the economy in that period. It is important to remember, particularly for 138
LOCAL ECONOMIC AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AS AN ASPECT OF THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTH-EAST EUROPE those who might otherwise argue that a country ‘cannot afford’ such new institutions and policy interventions, that at the start of the processes described, both South Korea and Taiwan were officially among the poorest countries in the world. Clearly, promoting technology transfer and diffusion are crucial imperatives if the local industrial structure in South-East Europe is ever going to be able to incorporate a level of technology sufficient to compete for local and, later, more discerning foreign markets. To (re)start the technology transfer process then requires, firstly, that existing local applied R&D institutions are strongly supported and encouraged to develop their work in line with current and potential sectoral specialisations. New institutions may be required where the existing infrastructure is particularly weak, but existing (albeit exhausted) institutions should be targeted in the first instance if appropriate. Even in places like Bosnia, where little might be expected to remain after the bitter civil war, some extremely high quality applied R&D institutions are still just about operational.22 Second, university and other academic institutions should be brought into the frame through dedicated applied projects, and by building up a cadre of specialists in key areas ready to undertake consulting activities with local enterprises. The German method of financing secondments from the University system into local technology transfer institutions is one possibility to replicate locally to a modest degree (see Pyke, 1994). Third, the level of education and technology training needs to be supported and co-ordinated in line with local potentials. In some countries in South-East Europe where employment subsidies remain an important labour market policy (e.g., Croatia), the targeting of such subsidies to trainees and work-placements in specific technologyintensive enterprises could be a very useful approach to facilitate technology transfer. Fourth, large firms unlikely to have a commercial future should be nurtured to the extent that they can spin-off key technologies, business units and personnel into new, smaller commercial undertakings before they exit. Finally, if structured and financed appropriately, technology incubators and Technology Parks could play a major role here in co-ordinating the (re)use of specialised accretions of expertise, skills and equipment and helping newly established technology-intensive enterprises to achieve full commercialisation in the longer run. 23 5.4 Strong and Effective Local Regulation Mechanisms and Control of Speculation As noted above, there is no doubt that one of the main destabilising factors in SouthEast Europe to date has been the progressive stripping away of legislation and regulations in line with the perceived need to ‘get government out of the way’. Given also the ‘winner takes all’ mentality that has typically arisen in association 22
For example, the Energo Invest Centre in Sarajevo. Business Incubators have also had to accord with neo-liberal policy imperatives in order to obtain legitimacy and funding, and now have to ‘earn their keep on the market’ in order to survive. As elsewhere (see Bateman, 1999), this has been deeply damaging to their ability to nurse potentially high value technology businesses into existence.
23
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MILFORD BATEMAN with the imposition of neo-liberal reforms elsewhere in the world, this provided the obvious foundation upon which illegal and anti-social activities would flourish: and they have. 24 Specifically, it was widely predicted that the weak regulation of the local financial system would inevitably allow for large-scale financial fraud, ‘wildcat banking’ and bogus savings schemes. These manifestations then undermine the vital local savings mobilisation function and wider social acceptance of the reform process. An important element in building social cohesion is therefore the willingness of the local state to robustly regulate local business activities and financial systems where it has the competency and jurisdiction to do so. For example, it makes sense that local private banks should only be established by investors who can demonstrably prove they have a depth of banking knowledge, integrity and sufficient capital assets. Any financial scheme that involves the mobilisation of savings simply has to be carefully examined. Regulations may also be required to discourage certain activities, such as land and property speculation, as well as the practise of equity purchase with commercial bank loans. Second, it has also been well recognised that effective regulation of the local labour market is one task usefully performed by local government in order to minimise competition based on low-wages and low investment, and maximise competition based on high investment and flexible specialisation techniques. The local state can articulate this fair outcome through regulations ensuring fairness at work, support for Trade Unions and through local forms of redistributive taxation. 5.6. Co-operative Development The co-operative is a business format that is universally recognised as a way of promoting fairness, motivation, solidarity and inclusion at work, as well as underpinning wider community-level cohesion. In all its various guises – agricultural, workers, financial, consumer, housing, marketing, and so on – cooperatives also evince efficiency-enhancing forms of horizontal and vertical cooperation between individuals and institutions. This has particularly been the case in the northern Italian region of Emilia-Romagna, for example, which is the most successful region in Italy very much because of the multi-faceted layers of cooperation that exist between SMEs – the famous ‘Industrial Districts’ – as well as within businesses – Emilia-Romagna has the highest concentration of co-operatives in Italy (Birchall, 1997). Co-operatives were also important in Germany’s economic development trajectory in the last century, where the first financial co-operatives were established (Birchall, 1997). Networks of co-operatives established in many of the East Asian ‘Tiger’ economies, notably in Taiwan and South Korea, have proved highly instrumental in both spreading the benefits of rapid urban growth down to rural communities and in underpinning the necessary wider social inclusion that served as the basic foundation for that high growth (Wade, 1990). 24
See Hutton’s (2002) excellent treatment of these issues with regard to the USA.
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LOCAL ECONOMIC AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AS AN ASPECT OF THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTH-EAST EUROPE Reflecting the higher economic and social returns historically generated by the co-operative sector (see Birchall, 1997), it is natural that co-operative development is a crucial aspect of the LDS model. This support should start with educational programmes that endeavour to illustrate the benefits of co-operative enterprise to all concerned – employees and the community – and that lay particular stress on how ‘normal’ it is to work co-operatively. Second, dedicated co-operative support structures and programmes should be established. Mainstream enterprise development agencies certainly need to be made much more aware of the important role of co-operative development in helping to fulfil their immediate mandate to create employment and wealth, as well as their relationship to other important community-wide goals, such as poverty reduction and social inclusion. A solid and continuing level of technical assistance will be required to help new and existing cooperatives to achieve their goals. Given that many co-operatives often require considerable time to establish and perfect a co-operative management system, special training and mentoring support is required to offset this initial disadvantage. For sure, also, special forms of financial support – grants and loans – are clearly required to help overcome the historic financial sector bias against the establishment of non-traditional enterprises structures. Establishing a co-operative development bank is the obvious approach to take here. Third, the legal, regulatory and taxation system should be structured to encourage the co-operative option over other traditional investor-driven enterprises. A discriminatory taxation system, such as in Italy, can help to encourage both greater reinvestment in the co-operative and the conversion of a larger number of conventional businesses into the co-operative format. This will also help co-operatives compete against those informal sector competitors who choose to hide from the authorities and engage in anti-social hiring employment practises (low pay, ‘hire and fire’ policies, poor working conditions, etc.). Common ownership of co-operative assets should also be legislated for, as opposed to individual ownership, in order to encourage re-investment and grow successful co-operatives across generations. Fourth, government procurement policies can be used to offer ‘starter contracts’ to new co-operatives and also just to provide a better quality service for the public in the longer term. Fifth, secondary cooperatives that facilitate market access for groups of small-scale farmers, independent artisans and other producers, should be targeted for special support as a way of promoting economic development from the ‘bottom up’. 5.7. Supporting Local Clusters, Sub-contracting and Networks Involving SMEs The establishment of local clusters, networks and sub-contracting chains involving small enterprises has been important to the success of virtually all of the historical episodes of post-war and post-crisis reconstruction and development, particularly with regard to economies of scale, reduced transactions costs and promoting technology diffusion. In the Italian experience, this was the ‘Industrial District’ model (Brusco, 1986), while in post-war Japan and Germany it was the emergence 141
MILFORD BATEMAN of strong local sub-contracting chains involving small and large enterprises. Meyanathan (1994) points out that local inter-enterprise linkages have also flourished in East Asia. The local state has played an important role in both creating the background conditions that provide the most propitious environment for clusters, sub-contracting and networks, as well as actually helping to form them directly. The local state can thus play an important role in promoting new entry into sectors where clusters, networks and local subcontracting chains may well emerge, as well as promoting the growth of those links that have spontaneously emerged. First, special forms of financial support for inter-enterprise linkage establishment and growth must be established at the local level. Since inter-enterprise structures rarely prove their effectiveness (i.e., are rarely profit-generating) in the short term, Bateman et al (1998) advocate the use of special forms of affordable finance and technical support to make them attractive propositions to the many enterprises desperately struggling to survive on a day-to-day basis. Second, it is possible to establish local information and ‘marriage-broking’ functions that bring potential partners together. Many potential partners are unaware of what can be achieved and with whom they might be able to achieve it with. Bringing potential partners together, assisting them with problem solving and promoting a culture of cooperation are all-important activities. Third, there should be support for local business and technical associations that might lead on to concrete linkages. Inter alia, such associations have a track record of being the seedbed for many interenterprise links, and so they should be tapped for the potential they contain. Fourth, greater provision of common services and forms of business accommodation (e.g., incubators) to promote cluster development may be needed. Bringing potential partners together physically is an important way of identifying and then nurturing potentially efficient links. 6. STRONG LOCAL ACTION TO PROMOTE EQUITY, EDUCATION, FAIRNESS AND SOCIAL COHESION Poverty alleviation and social inclusion are crucially important to the reconstruction and development process and community building in South-East Europe. When some sections of society are seen to benefit more than others from reconstruction and development, the bonds that link communities together – social capital – are often decisively broken. Motivation and commitment collapse and each section of society ends up pushing for the immediate redistribution of the existing wealth and assets (rent-seeking), rather than focusing upon the longer term local wealth creation process.25 This has, for sure, been the fate of many of the states in post-communist Eastern Europe. But we can contrast the situation there with that in the Indian state of Kerala, which Parayil (2000) shows has managed to achieve comparatively very high levels of social inclusion and living standards through the auspices of a very active and politically committed local state. Thus, to increase motivation and popular identification with basic reconstruction and development objectives 25
The best example of this is probably Russia since 1991 (see Stiglitz, 2002).
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LOCAL ECONOMIC AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AS AN ASPECT OF THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTH-EAST EUROPE inevitably means having to ensure high levels of equality, education and social welfare provision. In South-East Europe, the links within the community are not entirely broken, but they are severely strained. The local state thus has a crucially important role to play in promoting the new programmes that will underpin the notion of community and inclusion. Note that this is not the same as extending the institutions of civil society into the space conventionally inhabited by the local state (see above), which is largely related to the neo-liberal imperative of attempting to disengage the poor from activating state agency on their behalf. By far the most important of the measures to be taken by the local state, then, is to ensure the retention of the social welfare entitlements of poorer sections of the community. Social welfare programmes require local state co-ordination, economies of scale realizable through public provision, and a strong local tax base. Ensuring sustainable provision may often require the passing of many social welfare functions from the nongovernmental sector back to the local state – that is, the reverse of the current vogue in the region. These measures should be implemented alongside suitable reforms to ensure competence, value-for-money and transparency. A related imperative here is to maintain the quality of the general education system. Inter alia high levels of education are robustly linked to local participation in promoting and achieving community development goals. More immediately, high levels of education are also linked to high levels of entrepreneurship and non-farm rural business activities. 7. CONCLUSION I have argued in this chapter that local state agency should have been quite central to the reconstruction and development project that began in South-East Europe after 1991, not least because there is a wealth of experience emerging from very similar reconstruction and development contexts (including in the region itself) pointing to the efficacy, adaptability and transferability of pro-active local state-level economic development interventions. However, the neo-liberal ideology and policies imposed upon the region by the main international financial institutions effectively forbade state agency at any level, local, regional and national. At the local level across South-East Europe local state capacities have been deliberately under-funded and local government progressively stripped of any power to formulate, plan and implement policy choices on behalf of its constituents. Instead, local economic development policy has increasingly been turned over to the un-elected and unaccountable institutions of civil society for their deliberation, action and veto. Quite apart from this being thoroughly anti-democratic in a region crying out for an extension of democratic legitimacy and institutional responses (see Chandler, 1999; Kekiü, 2001), this ideology-driven local economic development approach has, as elsewhere, decisively failed in its assigned task. I argued here for consideration of an alternative policy response in South-East Europe to the neo-liberal programme of ‘dumbing down’ the local state. This is the 143
MILFORD BATEMAN Local Developmental State (LDS) approach. Of course, replicating earlier successful examples of the LDS model will not be easy: there are some historical, cultural, geographical and social specificities that preclude an easy transfer of models and experience. However, the very varied nature of the environments in which the LDS model has been able to function to date, from a destroyed post-war northern Italy to a very poor, but rapidly changing, post-communist China after 1980, strongly suggests that key aspects of the model are generalizable. But to accomplish anything concrete in South-East Europe the local state must be legitimised, reanimated, upgraded, resourced, more extensively democratised and, crucially, assigned a proactive function in the local economic development process. There will be many problems along the way. Corruption, political interference and basic inefficiency have been characteristic of all too many local governments in the region, and this is likely to remain a problem well into the future. Resource constraints are also a significant barrier. In addition, the aggressive form of economic globalisation now being imposed upon the world economy manifestly reduces the local scope for promoting sustainable economic, environmental and social policies. Perhaps proving to be most intractable, however, will be the international financial institutions and major western governments that first imposed the neo-liberal policy model on the region, and who continue to profess their belief that it is the only way to improve the lives of ordinary people. Notwithstanding, now that the populations of South-East Europe have finally acquired democratic control over the(ir) local state, this should encourage the development of their own pro-active and democratically accountable policy responses to the huge array of problems that currently exist and which were, as I have argued here, largely not of their own making. REFERENCES Addison T, Le Billon P and Murshed M S (2000) Finance in conflict and reconstruction, Institute of Development Policy and Management Working paper no 20, IDPM, Manchester. Akyuz Y (ed) East Asian Development: New Perspectives, London: Frank Cass. Akyuz Y, Chang H-J, Kozul-Wright R (1999) New Perspectives on East Asian Development, in Akyuz Y (ed) (op cit). Amsden A, Kochanowicz J, Taylor L (1994), The market meets its match: restructuring the economies of Eastern Europe, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass Andor L and Summers M (1998) Market failure: Eastern Europe’s “Economic Miracle”, Pluto Press, London. Balcerowicz L (1995) Socialism, Capitalism, Transformation, Budapest: Central European University Press. Barraclough S (1991) Migrations and Development in Rural Latin America, Economic and Industrial Democracy, Vol 12.
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LOCAL ECONOMIC AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AS AN ASPECT OF THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTH-EAST EUROPE Bateman M (1993) Local economic strategies and new small firm entry in a Labour-Managed economy: the case of Yugoslavia 1950-1990, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Bradford, UK. Bateman M (1995) “Industrial Restructuring and local SME development: the case for a "hands on" approach” in: Z Frohlich, S Malekovic, J Padjen, M Polic and S Svaljek (eds), Industrial Restructuring and its impact on regional development, Zagreb: CSRA Publishers. Bateman M (2000a) Small enterprise development in the Yugoslav successor states: institutions and institutional development in a post-war environment, MOCTMOST, Vol 10, No 2. Bateman M (2000b) Neo-liberalism, SME development and the role of Business Support Centres in the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe, Small Business Economics, Vol 14, No 4. Bateman M (2003) “Promoting “New Wave” Micro-Finance Institutions as Poverty Reduction and Local Economic Development Policy in South-East Europe: A Short Critique”, Collection of Economic Papers of the Economics Faculty of Sarajevo, Vol XXIII, Sarajevo; University of Sarajevo. Bateman M, Vehovec M and Kastelan-Mrak M (1998) Industrial restructuring and the development of small enterprise clusters: the case of the shipbuilding industry in the Primorsko-Goranska county of Croatia, Journal of Applied Management Studies, Vol 7, No 1. Best M (1990) The New Competition: Institutions of Industrial Restructuring, Polity Press, Cambridge. Blecher M (1991) Development state, entrepreneurial state: The political economy of Socialist reform in Xinju Municipality and Guanghan County, in White G (ed) The Chinese State in the era of economic reform: the road to crisis, MacMillan, Basingstoke. Birchall J (1997) The International Co-operative Movement, Manchester University press, Manchester Braun H-J (1990) The German Economy in the Twentieth century: the German Reich and the Federal Republic, Routledge, London. Brusco S (1986) Small firms and Industrial Districts: The Experience of Italy, in Keeble D and Weber E (eds) New Firms and Regional Development in Europe, Croom Helm, London. Casaburi G (1999) Dynamic agroindustrial clusters: The political economy of competitive sectors in Argentina and Chile, MacMillan Press, London. Chandler D (1999) Bosnia: Faking democracy after Dayton, London: Pluto Press. Chang H-J (1994) The Political Economy of Industrial Policy, London: MacMillan. Chang H-J (2002) Kicking away the ladder: Development strategy in historical perspective, London: Anthem Press.
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MILFORD BATEMAN Chang H-J and Kozul-Wright R (1993) Organising development: comparing the national systems of entrepreneurship in Sweden and South Korea, Journal of Development Studies, 30(3): 859-891. Cooke P and Morgan K (1998) The Associational Economy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. ýauševiü F, (2002) “The effects of financial deregulation in Bosnia and Herzegovina – 1997-2001” in: Jubilant Collection of Papers of the Economics Faculty of Sarajevo, XXII, Sarajevo: University of Sarajevo. Daianu D (2001) “Transition failures: How does Southeast Europe fit in?” in: Veremis T and Daianu D (eds) Balkan Reconstruction, London: Frank Cass. Duckett J (1998) The Entrepreneurial State in China, London: Routledge. EC (2000) An Evaluation of Phare SME Programmes, Evaluation Unit of the Common Service for External Relations, European Commission, Brussels. EU-World Bank (1999) Bosnia and Herzegovina: 1996-1998 Lessons and accomplishments: Review of the priority reconstruction and recovery program and Looking ahead towards sustainable economic development, a report prepared for the May 1999 Donors conference co-hosted by the European Commission and the World Bank, Brussels. Faux J and Mishel L (2000) Inequality and the Global economy, in Hutton W and Giddens A (eds) On the edge: Living with Global Capitalism, Jonathan Cape, London. Fine B (2001) Social capital versus social theory, London: Routledge. Friedman D (1988) The Misunderstood Miracle: Industrial development and political change in Japan, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press. Gowan P (1995) Neo-liberal theory and practice for Eastern Europe, New Left Review, 1213, p 3-60. Grootaert C (1997) ‘Social capital: “The Missing Link”’, in: Expanding the measure of Wealth: Indicators of Environmentally Sustainable Development, Washington DC: World Bank. Grundner P and Komar M (1999) Redevelopment of the local credit funds for small businesses in Slovenia, Report commissioned by the OECD-LEED Programme, Vienna: ÖSB-Unternehmensberatung Gesellschaft m.b.H. Harriss J (2002) Depoliticizing development: The World Bank and Social Capital, London: Anthem Press. Haughton J (1998) The Reconstruction of War-Torn Economies, (Technical paper) Harvard Institute for International Development, June. Horvat B (1976) The Yugoslav Economic System, M E Sharpe, New York. Horvat B (1983) The Political Economy of Socialism, Oxford: Martin Robertson. Horvat B (2002) Kakvu Država imamo, a kakvu Država rebamo? (The sort of state we have, the sort of state we need?), Zagreb, Croatia: Prometj. Hutton W (2002) The World We’re In, London: Little, Brown. Johnson C (1982) MITI and the Japanese Miracle, Stanford CA: Stanford University Press. 146
LOCAL ECONOMIC AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AS AN ASPECT OF THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTH-EAST EUROPE Johnson S and Loveman G (1995) Starting over in Eastern Europe: Entrepreneurship and economic renewal, Boston, Mass: Harvard Business School Press. Kekiü L (2001) “Aid to the Balkans: Addicts and pushers” in: Veremis T and Daianu D (eds) Balkan Reconstruction, London: Frank Cass. Kowalski R and Kaminski R (1999) Business Development Services in Poland reaching rural areas, Small Enterprise Development, Vol 10, No 3. Lall S (1996) Learning from the Asian Tigers: Studies in Technology and Industrial Policy, London: MacMillan Press. Leys C (2001) Market-driven politics: Neo-liberal democracy and the public interest, London: Verso. Meyanathan S (1994), (ed) Industrial structures and the development of small and medium enterprise linkages, EDI Seminar Series, World Bank, Washington DC. Meyer-Stamer J and Wältring F (2000) Behind the myth of the Mittelstand economy: The institutional environment supporting Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in Germany, INEF Report 46/2000, Institute for Development and Peace at the Gerhard-Mercator-University Duisburg, Germany. Milanovic B (1998) Income, Inequality, and Poverty during the transition from Planned to Market Economy, Washington DC: World Bank. MITI (1980) Vision of the Small and Medium Enterprises and their policy direction in the 1980s, Document B1-43, Tokyo: MITI. Nishiguchi T (1994) Strategic Industrial sourcing: the Japanese advantage, Oxford: Oxford University Press. North D (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. O’Connor D (1998) Rural Industrial Development in Vietnam and China: A Study in contrasts, MOCT-MOST, Vol 8, pp7-43. Otero M and Rhyne E (1994) The new world of micro-enterprise finance: building healthy institutions for the poor, London: IT Publications. Oxfam (1996) A case for reform: fifty years of the IMF and World Bank, Oxford: Oxfam Policy Department, Oxfam. Parayil G (2000) (ed) Kerala: The Development Experience – Reflections on sustainability and replicability, London: Zed Books. Peluffo P and Giacche V (1997) Soria del Mediocredito Centrale (History of the Medium Term Credit Bank), Milan: Editori Laterza. Petrin T (1995) Industrial policy supporting economic transition in CentralEastern Europe: lessons from Slovenia, EDI Working paper no 95-07, Economic Development Institute of the World Bank, Washington DC: World Bank. Pieper U and Taylor L (1998) The revival of the liberal creed: The IMF, the World Bank, and inequality in a globalised world, CEPA Working paper series 1, No 4. Center for Economic Policy Analysis, New York: New School for Social Research.
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MILFORD BATEMAN Polanyi K (1957) (originally 1944) The Great Transformation, Beacon Press: Boston, Ma. Purushotham P (1998) China’s Township enterprises, Small Enterprise Development, Vol 9 (1) March. Putnam R (1993) Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy, (Princeton, Princeton University Press). Pyke F (1994) Small firms, technical services and inter-firm co-operation, Research Series No 99, International Institute for Labour Studies, Geneva: ILO. Robinson M (2001) The Microfinance Revolution: Sustainable Finance for the Poor, Washington DC: World Bank. Sachs J (1990) What is to be done? The Economist, January 13 SAPRIN (Structural Adjustment Participatory Reviews International Network) (2001) The policy roots of economic crisis and poverty, Washington DC: SAPRIN. Sevic Z (1999) Entrepreneurship and SME development in transition economies: Is there a case for “community development banking”? paper presented at the Third International Conference on “Enterprise in Transition”, Split, May 2729, 1999. Standing G (2002) “The Babble of euphemisms: re-embedding social protection in ‘transformed’ labour markets”, in: Rainnie A, Smith A and Swain A (2002) (Eds) Work-Employment and Transition, London: Routledge. Standing G and Vaughn-Whitehead D (1995) What role for minimum wages in Central and Eastern Europe? in: ILO, From protection to destitution, ILO, Geneva. Stiglitz J (1999) Whither Reform? Ten years of the Transition, paper presented at the Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington DC, April 28-30, 1999. Stiglitz J (2002) Globalisation and its discontents, London: Allen Lane. Stojanov D (2000) “Bosnia-Herzegovina since 19995: Transition and reconstruction of the economy” in: Papiü Z (ed) International support policies to South-East European Countries: Lessons (not) learned in B-H, Muller: Sarajevo. UNICEF (1993) Poverty and inequality in Latin America, UNICEF, New York: United Nations. UNDP (1999) Human Development Report for Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS, Bratislava: UNDP. UNDP (2002) Human Development Report – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo: UNDP. Wade R (1982) Irrigation and agricultural politics in South Korea, Boulder, Col: Westview Press, Boulder. Wade R (1983) South Korea’s agricultural development: the myth of the passive state, Pacific Viewpoint, Vol 24, No1. Wade R (1990) Governing the Market, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. Wade R (1996) Japan, the World Bank, and the art of paradigm maintenance: The East Asian Miracle in Political Perspective, New Left Review, 217, pp 3-36.
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LOCAL ECONOMIC AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AS AN ASPECT OF THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTH-EAST EUROPE Waterston A (1962) Planning in Yugoslavia: Organisation and Implementation, The Economic Development Institute, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. Weiss L (1988) Creating Capitalism: The state and small business since 1945, Blackwell, Oxford. Weiss L (1998) The myth of the powerless state: governing the economy in the global era, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK. Whang I-J (1981) Management of rural change in Korea: The Saemaul Undong, Korean Institute of Social Sciences Series No 5, Seoul: Seoul National University Press. Woodward S (1995) Balkan tragedy: Chaos and dissolution after the cold war, Washington DC: Brookings Institution. World Bank (1981) Yugoslavia: Small-Scale Industry and Industrial Policy, Report No. 3452-YU, Washington DC: World Bank. World Bank (1997) Bosnia and Herzegovina: From recovery to sustainable growth, Washington DC: World Bank. World Bank (1999) Lessons for rebuilding South Eastern Europe: The BosniaHerzegovina experience, Washington DC: World Bank. World Bank (2000) The road to stability and prosperity in South Eastern Europe, Washington DC: World Bank. World Bank, European Commission and EBRD (1996) Bosnia and Herzegovina: Towards economic recovery, Discussion paper no 1, prepared for the Second Donors Conference. World Bank and European Union (2001) Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Breaking with the past: The Path to Stability and Growth, Vol I, Brussels: World Bank and European Union. Young B (1999) Nothing from nothing is nothing: privatisation, price liberalisation and poverty in the Yugoslav successor states, in Schierup C-U (ed) Scramble for the Balkans: Nationalism, Globalism and the political economy of reconstruction, MacMillan Press, Basingstoke. Želinski-Matunec S (2000) SME’s crediting in co-operation with local government unit: Croatian experience, paper presented at the International conference “Financing of small and medium enterprises” Bled, Slovenia, 10-13 October 2000.
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PART II THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS
CONCEPTUAL ISSUES PERTAINING TO AUTONOMY TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY: PERMANENT SOLUTION OR STEP 1 TOWARD SECESSION? Hurst Hannum 1. INTRODUCTION As the present volume and the conference on which it is based suggest, the concept of ‘autonomy’ has become widely seen as an effective means of implementing minority rights. However, while it is a topic that has been widely discussed in the past decade, autonomy as a means of protecting human rights is, in fact, a relatively recent phenomenon. It was not until the late 1980s that it became apparent to most observers that a purely individualistic approach to human rights was insufficient to respond to the demands of ethnic minorities and other groups for greater recognition of and protection for their culture and, in many cases, greater political authority over their own affairs. However, neither international human rights law nor the thencontemporary understanding of ‘self-determination’ addressed these issues; human rights could be asserted only by individuals, and self-determination in the form of independence was available only to colonial territories. Nonetheless, bringing together the strands of human rights, attempts to promote the rights of minorities and indigenous peoples, and movements to foster fuller participation in both economic and political development activities, I argued in a book first published in 1990 that ‘a new principle of international law can be discerned in the interstices of contemporary definitions of sovereignty, selfdetermination, and the human rights of individuals and groups’.2 Although it is doubtful that this ‘right to autonomy’ has yet achieved the status of international law, it has become the solution of choice for many of those engaged in attempting to resolve conflicts between territorially based ethnic groups around the world. Since the end of the Cold War, minority rights and, to a lesser extent, autonomy have been at the centre of human rights discussions within Europe and in many other parts of the world. 1
Copyright Hurst Hannum 2001. H. Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights (Philadelphia, PA, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990) p. 473. 2
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HURST HANNUM Autonomy has been proposed or adopted as a solution in countries as diverse as Finland, Norway, Sweden, Belgium, Spain, Denmark, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Italy, United Kingdom, Turkey, Iraq, India, China, Sri Lanka, Papua New Guinea, Cyprus, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Russia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Sudan, Senegal, Canada, United States, Mexico, Brazil, Nicaragua, and Panama − and this is certainly not an exhaustive list. Why has this particular form of conflict resolution acquired such popularity? 2. ADVANTAGES There are many advantages to ‘autonomy’ as a solution to ethnic conflicts. Perhaps the most obvious is the flexibility of the term, which is not a term of art under international law and may therefore encompass a wide range of constitutional relationships. Thus, the ‘highest’ degree of autonomy accorded by China to Hong Kong includes the retention by Hong Kong of a wide range of political, judicial, and economic powers, from a separate legislature and judiciary to a fully independent financial authority. Autonomous entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina also have a broad range of independent authority, although autonomy in that instance was designed to maintain the facade of a unified state, rather than to integrate a new territory into an existing state. Autonomy in Belgium and the Åland Islands is expressed through territorially based powers over language, education, culture, and, in the latter case, residence. Autonomy also may be a means of responding successfully to concerns about minority rights, particularly when minorities are territorially concentrated in significant numbers. Territorial autonomy is mentioned as a possible option in the 1990 CSCE Copenhagen Document, although its formulation is fairly minimal and reflects the sensitive nature of such proposals.3 In 1993, the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly more specifically recommended, ‘[i]n the regions where they are in a majority the persons belonging to a national minority shall have the right to have at their disposal appropriate local or autonomous authorities or to have a special status, matching the specific historical and territorial situation and in accordance with the domestic legislation of the state’.4 Territorial autonomy is discussed in some detail in the Lund Recommendations on Effective Participation by National Minorities in Political Life, which were adopted in 1999 in conjunction with the office of the OSCE’s High Commissioner
3
See Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, adopted 29 June 1990, reprinted in 29 Int'l Legal Materials (1990) 1305. In paragraph 35 of the document, the participating states merely ‘note’ efforts to promote the identity of national minorities through the establishment of ‘local or autonomous administrations, corresponding to the specific historical and territorial circumstances of such minorities and in accordance with the policies of the State concerned’. 4 Recommendation 1201 (1993) on an additional protocol on the rights of national minorities to the European Convention on Human Rights, Annex, Article 11.
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TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY: PERMANENT SOLUTION OR STEP TOWARD SECESSION? on National Minorities.5 Under the heading of ‘self-government’, both non-territorial and territorial arrangements are discussed. Functions which might fall under the latter include education, culture, use of minority language, environment, local planning, natural resources, economic development, local policing functions, and housing, health, and other social services.6 Noting that all democracies have arrangements for governance at different territorial levels, the Recommendations urge states to ‘favourably consider’ territorial arrangements ‘where it would improve the opportunities of minorities to exercise authority over matters affecting them’.7 The Recommendations also specify that territorial self-governance institutions should be based on democratic principles rather than ethnic criteria and should respect the human rights of all persons within their jurisdiction, including minorities.8 A third advantage of ‘autonomy’ solutions is that, by definition, they maintain the territorial integrity of existing states. However powerful they may be, autonomous units are not sovereign on the international level and remain ultimately subject in varying degrees to the jurisdiction of the state in which they are found. This is obviously attractive to the states concerned, as well as to outsiders who fear the destabilizing effect of the proliferation of ever smaller, ethnically defined states. Autonomy thus can be seen as contributing to the stability of the existing international order. A strong commitment to autonomy solutions within states also obviates the need to develop criteria for secession, since secession (except by mutual consent) is simply not available as an internationally sanctioned outcome. This is the approach taken by the international community thus far in Kosovo, for example – although the situation there is far from resolved, and division of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by consent may yet occur. In a more theoretical sense, as the nature of the state changes and its role as an economic mediator between individuals and transnational actors wanes, creative autonomy arrangements may provide a more appropriate means of reflecting more accurately real power relationships. Complex autonomy arrangements diminish the traditional role of the state as the holder of all important rights and deemphasize the relevance of state boundaries. In this manner, they may offer a realistic and pragmatic response to particular situations, even though the result may confuse international lawyers and foreign relation experts. This approach can be seen in the commitment of the European Union to the principle of ‘subsidiarity’ and the increasing role played by sub-state or cross-state regions in both economic and political affairs.
5
Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations (June 1999) The Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life & Explanatory Note. The Hague: Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations. 6 Ibid., para. 20. 7 Ibid., para. 19. 8 Ibid., paras. 16, 21.
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HURST HANNUM Since autonomy is potentially responsive to both majority concerns – preserving the integrity of the state – and minority demands – exercising a meaningful degree of self-government – it is often seen by outside mediators as inherently feasible politically and therefore useful as a means of halting conflict. It provides an obvious compromise solution, even if its precise definition is uncertain. Promoting autonomy also permits outsiders to be perceived as maintaining an impartial position between the minority and the central government, since autonomy rarely responds entirely to the wishes of either side. 3. DISADVANTAGES Perhaps inevitably, each of the advantages noted above has a corresponding disadvantage. For instance, what may appear to one observer as desirable flexibility may lead others to criticize the very vagueness of autonomy as unlikely to encourage a meaningful dialogue. Since neither minorities nor governments understand exactly what autonomy comprises, autonomy itself may end up being little more than a slogan, used by one side or the other to substitute for other, equally vague, slogans, such as sovereignty or self-determination. Demands for autonomy may therefore make it more difficult to identify the actual interests of the parties, such as linguistic or educational rights or a greater share in economic life. While autonomy may respond to assertions for greater rights by an ethnic or other minority, the political elements contained within most autonomy regimes go far beyond those traditionally considered to be essential to protect minority cultures. Minority rights are still understood as responding primarily to those elements which define minorities themselves, i.e., the need to retain control over and develop their language and culture, practice their own religion, and influence or control the education of their children. In a word, minority rights are about minority identity, not (until recently) about greater political power. If minority rights become increasingly viewed as encompassing a right to territorial autonomy, this could encourage greater demands by aggrieved (or greedy) groups that go well beyond protection of minority identity. Territorial autonomy, when exercised by an ethnically distinct minority within the country as a whole, is intended to respond primarily to group demands rather than to individual rights to equality and non-discrimination. However, many states are wary of subordinating individual rights to the purported needs of the group. The countervailing position to the argument that autonomy is a means of preserving territorial integrity questions whether a slavish devotion to territorial integrity remains appropriate in today’s world. Why should we assume that the frontiers that existed at the dawn of a new millennium should be maintained forever? Aren't other values – preserving cultural identity, increasing meaningful and effective participation – equally important? An absolute commitment to preserving current borders ignores the history of Europe, in which border changes have played a notable part until the mid-twentieth century, as well as the more recent changes that have occurred in the former Soviet 156
TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY: PERMANENT SOLUTION OR STEP TOWARD SECESSION? Union, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Ethiopia. Such a state-centric position discourages necessary thinking about what the criteria should be for statehood and secession, precisely when such thinking should be in the forefront of international attempts to deal with internal ethnic conflicts. Continuing to deify sovereign statehood and static frontiers as the only desirable goals reduces the political and economic complexity of the twenty-first century to simplistic slogans. It ignores the deliberately ‘soft’ frontiers being introduced by the European Union and other supra-state organizations, which are seen by many as the key to resolving regional conflicts in, e.g., the Balkans, Caucasus, and even central or south Asia. If autonomy is seen by both parties to ethnic or secessionist conflicts as an undesirable compromise, it may be unlikely to resolve those conflicts in the long run despite its attractiveness to potential mediators. Secessionist groups see acceptance of an autonomy arrangement as a defeat, since by definition their goal is independence. Even where autonomy may ultimately be accepted (or desired), it is generally seen as valuable only if it is as ‘high’ or broad as possible, thus substituting a demand for greater political-economic power for what may have originally been complaints about discrimination or other violations of minority rights. Minority rights themselves rapidly become viewed as woefully insufficient, as evidenced by claims from, e.g., Abkhazia, Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, Kosovo, Bougainville, Aceh, Kashmir, and northern Cyprus. States, on the other hand, resist wide-ranging autonomy, which may be seen as removing a part of the country from the effective control of the central government and psychologically dividing, rather than integrating, the country’s population. In the former Yugoslavia, neither the Bosnian nor Serbian/Yugoslav governments favour the de facto partition and quasi-independence that have been given to the Republika Srpska and Kosovo, respectively, and which will be enforced for the foreseeable future by foreign occupation. Indeed, the role of NATO in Kosovo seems to be to prevent Albanians from achieving independence and to prevent Yugoslavia from controlling its own territory; it does not seem likely that such a ‘lose-lose’ scenario will stand the test of time. Finally, the precedent of Yugoslavia, in particular, may give rise to a perception that autonomous or federal states may be more vulnerable to secessionist pressures in the future than are unitary states. Although it adopted a somewhat more nuanced position in a later opinion, this perception was reinforced by language in a decision of the Badinter Commission, which applied the concept of uti possidetis to the internal boundaries of Yugoslavia.9 Such a distinction in the international personality of a state, based on its internal constitutional arrangements, is unheard of in international law, and it is likely to discourage the kind of effective devolution of power that may well offer a solution to many ethnic conflicts within states.10 9
Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 2 (1 January 1992), reprinted in 13 Int'l Legal Materials (1992) 1497. 10 See generally H. Hannum, ‘self-Determination, Yugoslavia, and Europe: Old Wine in New Bottles?’, 3 Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems (1993) pp. 57−69.
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HURST HANNUM 4. THE PROPER ROLE OF AUTONOMY The counterbalancing or even contradictory arguments sketched briefly above suggest that autonomy should be seen neither as a panacea nor a provocation. Autonomy will not necessarily lead to a permanent solution which will contain all ethnic tensions, nor will it inevitably encourage demands for ever greater political power and eventually independence. Instead, autonomy is simply one tool in the arsenal of constitutional drafters, politicians, and diplomats that must be suited to the particular task at hand. In brief, autonomy is a means, not an end. In every case, whether or not autonomy is an appropriate tool depends on a careful identification of the goal(s) to be achieved, not all of which may be mutually compatible. If the overriding goal is to end violent conflict, proposing autonomy as a solution will not always be a good idea. By freezing incompatible demands, one may only postpone later conflict, leaving displaced or ‘cleansed’ persons without redress. Some divisions within states are sufficiently deep that ‘giving war a chance’ and allowing a definitive settlement to occur may be the best assurance that the conflict is unlikely to recur.11 Barbara Walter has argued that intervening in a civil war before one side achieves victory almost always requires the presence of armed peacekeepers to enforce the resulting stalemate, and the willingness of the ‘international community’ to make such a commitment seems to be eroding rather than growing stronger.12 While it is true that autonomy may be a useful tool if the international community decides to maintain territorial integrity as a jus cogens norm, such a position begs the question of when we might be morally and politically justified in supporting a right to secession as an appropriate solution in certain circumstances. I would argue that such a right should be supported, but only under very narrow conditions. These conditions might include situations where secession is the only plausible response to continuing, massive, discriminatory human rights violations (arguably the case for Kurds in Iraq and Turkey in the 1980s and Tibetans in China during the Cultural Revolution) or where secession might be employed retroactively as a means of punishing egregious violations of humanitarian law (as occurred in Kosovo). In such cases, any internationally recognized right to secession would depend on the actions of the recognized government, not merely on the wishes of an ethnic or other minority. But where the government of a state refuses to ease repression, recognize legitimate minority claims for respect for their identity, or conduct an anti-guerrilla or anti-terrorist campaign in conformity with the basic laws of armed conflict, international support for secession may be appropriate. Even when secession cannot be supported as a matter of law, the international community should consider more fully whether applying the concept of uti possidetis to internal borders is likely to discourage or exacerbate violence. In the 11
See E. Luttwak, ‘Give War a Chance’, 78:2 Foreign Affairs (1999) pp. 36−44. See generally B.F. Walter, Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars (Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2002). 12
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TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY: PERMANENT SOLUTION OR STEP TOWARD SECESSION? former Yugoslavia, for example, the West’s insistence on keeping ‘trapped’ Serbs within Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (and trapped Croats within the latter) may have actually contributed to continuation of the violence, since peaceful means of redrawing borders seem to have been excluded. As purportedly stated by one participant in the conflict, ‘Why should I be a minority in your state when you can be a minority in mine?’ Plebiscites and referenda are not always desirable or even possible, but some attention should be paid to the wishes of individuals caught in transitional states whose borders are in the process of changing. If the goal of the international community is to reward those who fight by the rules and punish those who do not, assuming that autonomy is an appropriate solution (as opposed to lesser minority rights protection) may unfairly strike a middle course where the ‘bad guys’ belong to the minority. Should we, for example, reward terrorist violence by members of aggrieved groups, even if the government offers reasonable responses to their demands? Once violence occurs, should we require fundamental constitutional changes in a state, rather than merely the guarantee of recognized rights (including minority rights) to all, without discrimination? Again, perhaps the answer should depend on the actions of the respective parties in either initiating or responding to violence, not upon nebulous claims of sovereignty or ethnic self-determination. One goal upon which all could agree is that of protecting human rights, including minority rights, and promoting democracy for all those within a state. Stated differently, these norms would include the protection and promotion of minority identity and their right to effective participation in government, and certain forms of autonomy may well respond to these goals. At the same time, however, it should not be the goal of outside advocates to resolve internal debates over the disposition of political and economic power according to the outsiders' own assessment of the situation. The proper concern is rights, not policy, and fixating on autonomy as a one-size-fits-all compromise solution is unlikely to respond to the needs either of the concerned parties or the international community. In conclusion, autonomy is not a magic bullet that can resolve all conflicts, prevent violence, or guarantee political and economic development. It cannot automatically ensure social justice or bring good things to all people. Autonomy remains a useful concept, but it will be successful only where there is a sufficiently strong willingness to live together, combined with an understanding of which purposes autonomy is – and is not – likely to serve.
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THE ROLE OF AUTONOMY IN STATE-NATION DIALECTIC Johan Galtung 1. INTRODUCTION The State-Nation dialectic – with rich-poor, man-woman, USA-West-rest, Christianity-Islam (one of the major conflict formations in today’s world) – brings up the basic human need for ‘identity’. We humans derive much identity from the identification with our own kind, or group, with people who look, feel, think, talk and act like ourselves: Our own nation, with which we are familiar. My basic thesis is that people want to be governed by their own kind, even if they are unkind and even autocratic. Identity becomes a priority. Not that identification with rulers as ‘our own kind’ implies compliance. However alienation, resulting from rulers being different, if only phonetically, by accent, makes governance even more problematic. So does identification with alien leaders. The consequence of that empirical sentiment, deplorable or not, is autonomy, from being independent as a state to participation in local decision-making. But the term ‘identity politics’ is misleading: there are also issues of survival, of physical quality of life, and freedom; and the theory – right, wrong, or in the middle – that when ruled by our own kind this will all change for the better. Autonomy is a basic needs package. As basic needs are by definition non-negotiable, so is autonomy. This opens a range of possibilities, to be explored. So much about basic needs. How about human rights? The most extensive exploration, to my knowledge, is found in Zelim Skurbaty’s book entitled As If Peoples Mattered.1 The book contains a very deep and inter-disciplinary overview, giving perspective to the case studies and analysis based on the TRANSCEND experience. 2. THE DIALECTIC BETWEEN NATIONAL IDENTITY AND STATE INTEGRITY, AND THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION With about 200 states, containing approximately 2000 nations with claims to sacred space and with memories of a sacred time, and about 20 nation-states, there is worldwide potential for 1,980 wars of independence, pitting status quo-oriented states against change-oriented nations. The ‘sacred space-sacred time’ combination, probably best understood as a secular sequel to the religious tradition of endowing space and time points with sacredness, is then used to define ‘nation’ as distinct 1
The Hague, Kluwer, 2000, 498pp.; see my review in Nordic Journal of International Law, 2001, pp. 263–65.
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JOHAN GALTUNG from ‘culture’, defined in terms of symbols, like language, religion, and myths. A nation is or has a culture, but a culture is not necessarily a nation. Cultures do not have claims on points, even regions, in space and time; space being the most important since that is where territorial conflict arises. Territory is tied to the sovereignty of states and states to the monopoly of power. States come and go. But nations remain, a major source of human identity, often crazy, often violent, because of the psychological energies generated. About 180 states are multi-national, almost all dominated by one nation, often because of historical patterns of conquest. Expansionist nations, many of them European-Christian or Arab-Muslim, have come to dominate others with similar patterns among themselves before that uninvited arrival of the abrahamic Occident in Asia, Africa, and the Americas. In the world it is difficult to identify more than one state, or country, that is both multi-national and symmetrical. The name of that country is, of course, Switzerland, possibly because of the high level of autonomy given to the non-Germans, and low level of conquest. The word ‘sacred’ is used to inform us that nationhood is serious, and not a matter to be psychologized away as prejudicial and discriminatory, even if these two patterns of attitude and behaviour play important roles. If two or more nations lay claim to the same points in space, then we have a genuine incompatibility/contradiction/problem, or whatever we choose to call it, even if their relationship is symmetrical, and egalitarian. They may simply not want to live too close to one another; there are signs of that also in Switzerland. The problem is unlikely to go away by preaching ‘tolerance’, meaning tolerating the close presence of the ‘Other’. Even equality may not help, or only help in the long run. Individuals have their private sphere; nations may have the same and yet be hospitable to guests that do not overstay their welcome. Correspondingly, a nation divided among two or more states may be filled with a longing to come together. Their separation by the structural violence (often supported by direct violence) of forcing apart those who want to live together is similar to the structural violence (also supported by direct violence) of forcing together those who want to live apart. We may regret that people, like Koreans, and the inhabitants of Bosnia, do not like to be forced apart, or forced together, but we may come closer to a solution by acknowledging and deploring the structural violence (and the direct violence behind it) and trying to do something about it. To develop patterns of conflict transformation by peaceful means for this ubiquitous conflict, the state/nation interface is a top global priority to avoid war. Obviously, conflict arenas like the former Soviet Union, former Yugoslavia, Northern Ireland, and the Basque Country inform us that we have not been good at developing these patterns. Too much violence too much oppression, and too much suffering has gone on. As we know only too well today2, many of these nationalistic feelings came out in the open when the Pandora’s box of the Cold War was pried open. Those 2
The time reference here is the beginning of 2002.
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THE ROLE OF AUTONOMY IN THE STATE-NATION DIALECTIC uninformed by history tried to believe that they were created by that event. They were not. Most of these feelings and tensions are age-old, but had been suppressed by a socialism convinced that under a unified working class, with the means of production socialized, national struggle would disappear as a major social force, only surviving as a relic artificially kept alive by other feudal relics; clerics, nobility and bourgeoisie. They were wrong, and stimulated nationalism by placing taboos on any manifestation beyond arts and language. When they then went about reconstructing their societies after the Cold War they made the same mistake, guided by a liberalism convinced that under a unified nation, with power democratised and the market privatised, class struggle would disappear as major social force and only survive as a relic artificially kept alive by relics like old communists and nostalgic people. They are also wrong. The question then is, whether, and under what circumstance and to what extent, the right to self-determination can serve as a mechanism for conflict resolution, or at least transformation. Ideally it might look like this: any nation living on the territory of a state it views, rightly or wrongly, as a prison of nations organizes a plebiscite for its nationals, invites observers from the ‘international community’ to supervise the plebiscite, and if the majority exceeds some (fairly high) floor (say, 2/3, or 3/4, or 4/5) declares that the national self has determined the right to their own state, meaning to their own territory protected by their own power monopoly. In other words a new state is born. What guidance do we get from the International Bill of Human Rights? Article 1 in the 1966 International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, reads (also see UN Charter, 1(2), 73): 1) All peoples have a right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. 2) All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.
However, independence is not mentioned. Moreover, this collective human right is not treated like an individual right. Whereas the right of assembly, or free speech, can be practiced right away, the right of self-determination is conditional on the right being recognized. By whom? By the state having that nation in its midst? Like a slave owner recognizing the right of a slave to freedom? Or, by certain big powers like US/UK, with a strong international law tradition and a keen sense of the precedents that might arise from any recognition of the right to self-determination? Or, by the International Court of Justice, like in the Western Sahara Case (1975 ICJ Rep 12), making self-determination the overriding principle, as opposed to the Eastern Greenland Case, 1933, viewing the case as a conflict between two colonizing countries, Denmark and Norway? Is this really an intrinsic right, or is it 163
JOHAN GALTUNG conditional, like the ‘right’ to conscientious objection? If so, are we only talking about some convenient, Wilsonian, post World War I rhetoric for dismantling the defeated and dying Habsburg and Ottoman empires; or post World War II rhetoric for the administration of ending a colonization that should never have been there in the first place? Some of the reasons for this probably lie in Article 1(2), ‘freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources’ and ‘a people may /not/ be deprived of its own means of subsistence’. These are laudable but also very strong words, pitting the basic needs of the people against the power of the sovereign state and the corporations operating in that territory. There is at least an economic basis for the conditionality. Like the status as conscientious objector: there is a clear and present danger to the state and state logic if self-determination is recognized. But how about people logic? It can exercise the strength of freezing water in the crevice of a mountain, and of budding seeds under asphalt: difficult to contain in the long run as evidenced by, say, the American Revolution/War of Independence 1776–1812. That force goes beyond the ‘right to dispose of their natural wealth and resources’ for the satisfaction of material needs. There is a solid non-material need at stake, written ambiguously into democratic theory: not only the right to invite, and then to uninvite, the rulers to rule them, but also the right to be ruled by one’s own kind. Sovereignty over a territory is neither a necessary, nor a sufficient condition for this right to be met. If that sovereignty is not a part of the package, then we are talking about autonomy, not about statehood. (Sooner or later statehood may follow, ‘trusteeship’ being one example of a transition formula.) Autonomy, then, becomes the lower level outcome of self-determination; independence, the new-born state, being the higher level. Autonomy carries some sovereignty but not ultimate sovereignty, as the state in command still possesses the ultima ratio regis, the King’s last argument: the heavy guns. Thus the right of self-determination is not only conditional, but it can also be eroded by offering a lower level outcome, which may or may not be acceptable to the nation exercising its right to self-determination. On the other hand, however, a situation whereby any group declares itself a ‘people’ and runs away with ‘their natural wealth and resources’ is also unacceptable. The UNESCO Expert definition of ‘a people’ is in terms of racial or ethnic identity, linguistic unity, religious or ideological affinity and territorial connection. There are many groups that would fit this definition. The definition can also apply to people of power and privilege, often living in separate niches of a country. In the age of globalisation they may declare themselves ‘a people’ and convert their territorial niche into a global economy centre. The UNESCO definition is helpful, but is the broad term ‘a people’ helpful? ‘Territorial connection’ is also too soft to cover ‘nation’ as defined here. We are dealing not only with ‘connection’, but also with ‘attachment’, to the point of cultural sacredness, and to the point of juridical territorial claims.
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THE ROLE OF AUTONOMY IN THE STATE-NATION DIALECTIC The problem does not lie in definitions, however, but in what happens when two or more groups/peoples/nations have ‘attachments’, even claims, to the same territory. The relation is usually asymmetrical, between powerful and powerless. We may sympathize with powerless, suppressed and stateless Jews, Roma, and Palestinians and their right to possess territory and state, like the individual right to possess property. But the powerful may have lived there for generations, and be not only ‘connected’ but ‘attached’, and voice their claims eloquently. There is a complex dialectic not only of power, but also of rights. There may be good arguments on both sides of that dialectic. Can we cut that Gordian knot by some simple decision-making mechanism? There are three nations in a country and a referendum in one of them, N, establishes its will to secede. The other two vote against that secession. They use their majority status to impose a referendum on the whole population, proving that only a minority vote in favour of independence. Of course, this argument only restates that N has been denied the right to be ruled by its own kind. The three separate votes define the parties, or actors. But the combined vote of three nations tossed together in a country may only be a signal from an entity about to disappear. Self-determination is a right of the Self, not of the Other to exercise Other-determination. Could we recognize the ‘recognition institute’ and the two-step process, 1) recognition of the right to self-determination for N, 2) the exercise of self-determination by N? The problem is the step from recognizing the recognition to recognizing a recogniser. Neither big powers, nor their lawyers, nor the UN General Assembly, a trade union of states, nor for that matter, a trade union of nations will do: their conclusion is too linked to their own interests, and terribly predictable. Their opinion should be known but not obeyed. The search for disinterested parties, possibly the International Court of Justice, is on; but the outcome is by no means clear. And the reason may be that we are talking about absolutes, even with sacred connotations. We have indicated above that decisions in this matter cannot be made by voting; votes against sovereignty will not necessarily be respected. Are problems of national will subject to law at all? The details, yes; but the ‘Law of the land’ is not known to have been able to silence the struggle for freedom. Moreover, self-determination works like Chinese boxes. A state may be ‘a prison of nations’ and, cause violent conflict, often called ‘internal war’ even if no such thing exists in the age of intervention. But this also applies to states emerging from such conflict, giving rise to the problem of recognizing nations, within nations, within nations, etc. The principle of uti possidetis, respecting existing borders within (colonial) empires and federations like the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (used by the International Court of Justice in the Frontiers Dispute Case, 1986, between Burkina Faso and Mali), gives too much weight to past administrative decisions. Rights to self-determination for Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-I-Herzegovina were recognized, but not for Serbs in Krajina/Slavonia, Serbs and Croats in Bosnia and 165
JOHAN GALTUNG Herzegovina and Albanians in Kosovo(a). The result was war and immense suffering that possibly could have been avoided had a ‘lower level’ equal right to self-determination been recognized. The conclusion so far can only be that the right to self-determination is an important collective human right. But it should not be interpreted as an automatic right to secession, independence and recognition by the inter-state community as a state, not even to a high level of autonomy within a state. The right to selfdetermination is the right of a people itself to determine its status within a state, and by implication in the world, including the option of independence and the option of maintaining the status quo. But, regardless of the decision, a right to autonomy at a low or high level is not a right to be autistic, disregarding others completely, just like the right to free speech does not imply the right to disregard the consequences of exercising that right. There is an overriding principle of responsibility. 3. THE DIALECTIC BETWEEN NATIONAL IDENTITY AND STATE INTEGRITY, AND THE DUTY TO CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION Our conclusion so far has been that the right to self-determination is necessary but not a sufficient basis for guiding the national identity vs. state integrity dialectic to outcomes that satisfy the conditions for conflict resolution: acceptability by the parties concerned, and sustainability (the outcome does not have to be propped up). There are many disciplines dealing with this, law is only one. A vast spectrum of alternative dispute resolution formulas has opened up, all of them, or so it seems, are based more on dialogue between or with the parties, and less on codified law. Whether this is a process of de lege ferenda, law in the making, or not, remains to be seen. History usually moves in cycles from the code to the search, from the cooked to the raw, le cuit et le cru, and back again. The following will be based on the experience most familiar to the present author, the TRANSCEND method, and on conflict practice with 33 cases involving states, nations and territory. Of course, this is only one kind of experience out of very many from around the world, but maybe it speaks to the conditions of some people and peoples. All of the perspectives on these conflicts have been derived from long in-the-field dialogues with many conflict parties and participants; they are not library exercises. The pattern to be explored below was not at all clear from the beginning (30−40 years ago), not even the simple typology below. It takes time and experience before patterns emerge. And there is certainly no assumption to the effect that what we have now is the final word; nothing ever is. But there is some advantage to numbers when patterns are in demand, and 33 is a good number, not very high, but high enough for some form of pattern to be present. We imagine a piece of territory, and on that territory: - ‘one state’, or ‘two or more states’; and inside them - ‘one nation’, or ‘two or more nations’ and four combinations:
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THE ROLE OF AUTONOMY IN THE STATE-NATION DIALECTIC Table 1: Number of States/Territories x Number of Nations No. of states
ONE STATE/ TERRITORY
TWO OR MORE STATES/TERRITORIES
No. of nations ONE NATION
A 20 nation-states:
B KOREA
(almost) homogeneous
THE KURDS
(almost) no diaspora
THE MAYAS
Ideal not real reality C ISRAEL/PALESTINE RHODESIA-ZIMBABWE HAWAI'I HINDU-MUSLIM SOMALIA CHINA LEBANON JAPAN-RUSSIA ECUADOR-PERU
THE SAMIS D CYPRUS NORTHERN IRELAND KASHMIR PAX PACIFICA YUGOSLAVIA a YUGOSLAVIA b SRI LANKA CAUCASUS OKINAWA THE GREAT LAKES EUSKADI GIBR/CEUTA/MELILLA AFGHANISTAN EAST-WEST a EAST-WEST b GULF a GULF b CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM TRIPARTITE EUROPE CHRISTIAN-HEATHEN
TWO OR MORE NATIONS
The reader will find the 33 conflict arenas, as indicated by national and/or geographical terms. The conflicts are over control of territory and involve nations, meaning geo-politics. For brief diagnosis-prognosis-therapy characterizations of the 33 conflicts, see the Appendix; for more see www.transcend.org. The reader will notice that there are only four ‘one nation-two or more states’ cases and nine of the ‘two or more nations-one state’; the bulk, twenty, being in the most complex category D. The classification depends on the number of states and nations in the conflict arena, and that makes for some ambiguity in the classification, but is of no great consequence. Let us now make use of the same basic typology, but this time not focus on the classification of concrete cases, but on what can be done, the possible remedies/therapies:
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JOHAN GALTUNG Table 2: The State/Nation/Territory Dialectic: Therapies No. of states No. of nations ONE NATION
TWO OR MORE
ONE STATE/TERRITORY
TWO OR MORE STATES/TERRITORIES
The classical case, now challenged by globalisation and migration, and then 1. B, C, or D; or 2. nation-absorption into super-nations; withering away of nations; 3. state-absorption into superstates; withering away of states into regions
Increasing functional sovereignty:
NATIONS 1. unitary solution, integration with -equality, symmetry -human rights -tolerance 2. autonomy 3. federation - territorial - non-territorial 4. confederation - territorial - non-territorial 5. independence 6. condominium
1. unitary solution, integration with -equality, symmetry -human rights -tolerance within states 2. autonomy, within all states 3. confederation, of autonomies or states 4. federation, of autonomies or states 5. New unitary state Creating a context with increasing regionalization: 1. associative system of states 2. confederal community of states 3. federal union of states 4. New unitary state
The table shows many options, no doubt there are more. The general point of departure is a simple assumption: The higher the number of alternatives to the awesome dichotomy of the status quo in a unitary state vs. secession-independence, the lower, ceteris paribus, the probability of violence. Since the (understandable) recognition institute often blocks the road from self-determination to independence, the nation in search of statehood may see violence as its only alternative. In no way should this imply that self-determination as a human right is given up. But the right to self-determination must be linked to a duty to conflict transformation. To secede, doing nothing to clean up the mess created, is like a spouse walking out of his/her marriage with no regard for the other party and third parties (children, in-laws, friends, neighbours), whether the person walking out is a 168
THE ROLE OF AUTONOMY IN THE STATE-NATION DIALECTIC battered, exploited wife or an egoistic, tyrannical husband (or any other combination). After violence there is more mess, and less inclination to clean it up, so the conclusion can only be to engage in conflict transformation before, not after any violence, hopefully preventing that violence. Even if self-determination is a right, like women’s right to equality, its exercise may lead to conflict. That conflict has to be transformed within the context of the human right. The conflict does not invalidate the right. But neither is that right the only consideration in the conflict. Before we proceed, let us dispense with one argument: that secession may lead to small and nonviable states. Europe has a number of small and viable states, both economically (wealth well distributed) and politically (democracies), like the ministates Liechtenstein and Andorra, and the small states Iceland and Luxembourg. The world also knows very large states whose economical and political viability can be disputed, among other reasons because they are ‘prisons of nations’. Their worry about small states is a vicarious argument. The history of city-states should be indicative; highly viable till they were absorbed by some of today’s ‘nation-states’. More problematic would be a UN with 2,000 members, but then confederations may be encouraged (like the Nordic Community) with joint delegations. Let us then combine Tables 1 and 2, applying perspectives and approaches from Table 2 to the conflict cases in Table 1. A: One nation-one state/territory. We cannot blame Herder and Fichte, whatever they said seems to have fallen on fertile soil as discussed in the first section. However, these are not eternal, essentialist truths. Other fault-lines, such as gender and class, are or could be more salient, as feminists and Marxists argue. Or faultlines may recede into the background in favour of an unstructured, amorphous mass of individuals, as post-modernists seem to think. But today nations matter, and will continue to do so for quite some time, while states probably will to a lesser extent. We have indicated that however that may be, open borders and a globalisation of the world carries migration in its wake, by push and pull. Each migrant carries a foreign culture, with claims not on niches in geographical space or land (migrants are not nations when abroad, or only after several generations like the Northern Ireland Protestants), but on niches in cultural space. Over time this may lead to B, C or D type problems. But then something else may happen, also involving countries of origin: - Nation-absorption; over time they all join a super-nation which has been the case for some time in the Nordic countries, linked to heavy intra-Nordic migration, and to the EU countries. It may take generations, even centuries for the statements ‘I am Nordic’, or ‘I am European’ to stick. The experience with ‘jesam jugoslav’ and ‘sovjetskij tchelovjek’ indicates that it cannot be enforced. - State-absorption; this process is (European Union), or is not (Nordic Community) accompanied by the creation of a super-state. Is the problem
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JOHAN GALTUNG solved? No, super-nations/states are similar to nations/states; super-levels also leading to super-conflicts/wars. B: One nation-two or more states/territories. Four cases, similar and different, of divided nations: the Koreans divided between North, South and Japan; the Kurds divided between five countries, Turkey, Iraq, Iran and (to a lesser degree) Syria and Armenia; the Mayas divided between Mexico (Chiapas), Guatemala (as a majority) and Honduras; and the Sami between Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Russia. One difference: the Koreans are alone in divided Korea. Table 2 offers five outcomes or stages. What is acceptable and sustainable depends, as usual, on the circumstances: first, human rights wherever they exist, certainly not realized for the Kurds and the Mayas, more for the Samis, more for the Koreans in the South than in Japan and less in North Korea. Second, autonomy within the states, meaning not only human rights but the right to be ruled by one’s own kind based on the ‘territorial attachment’; this is not a problem for Koreans in Korea, probably not viable for Koreans in Japan, but highly meaningful for Kurds, Mayans and Samis where they are numerous. Third, linking the autonomies in a confederation, possibly with its own parliament, which may have to meet in some other country, and its own representations abroad, taking on the functions of a state without being one. This is highly relevant for all four cases. Fourth, linking the autonomies in a federation, i.e., statehood with some autonomy for the constituent parts, like in the creation of the USA (from the years 1776-1865). Again, this is also highly relevant for all four cases. Fifth, a unitary state solution, taken by East and West Germany in 1990 (the federal aspects are along other lines). Like the fourth step (maybe also the third) this is likely to be heavily resisted by the states. Most relevant for the Koreas; in fact, President Kim Dae-Jung has a three-stage formula (3)-(4)-(5). C: Two or more nations-one state/territory, the state-territory being a ‘prison of nations’. Five outcomes are offered; what is acceptable and sustainable depends on the circumstances. They can also be seen as five stages, this time reflecting state disintegration more than integration: First, a unitary state solution, meaning that all irredentist, recalcitrant nations are given MFC (most favoured citizen) status, enjoying equality/symmetry, human rights and tolerance. If this is acceptable/sustainable, then so far so good. This turned Rhodesia into Zimbabwe, and has been the formula for Muslims in India, demanding symmetrical approaches to the Ayodhya conflict; Second, autonomy within the state, ‘sovereignty’, is what has been offered to the Palestinians and what may emerge in Hawaii for Hawaiians. Being asymmetrical it may be nonviable over time, calling for independence and possibly confederation for IsraelPalestine, federation being too close for comfort. Third, the federal state, based on territorial attachment or cultural identity, territorial or non-territorial with joint finance, foreign and security policies, like Switzerland. The formula has the advantage of symmetry, and a non-territorial version based on clans is interesting for Somalia. This (or (4)) may solve Beijing’s troubled relations with Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia. (Interesting for Lebanon?)Fourth, making the state a 170
THE ROLE OF AUTONOMY IN THE STATE-NATION DIALECTIC confederation, with de facto independence for the constituent parts flictto have their own finance, foreign and security policies. (Interesting for India?) Fifth, secession and independence, one (or more) new states are born both de facto and de jure. This is indispensable for Palestine, and possibly a solution for an Okinawa lorded over by US/Japan. Guiding the choice of alternatives (1) to (5) is how much sovereignty an ‘imprisoned’ nation actually wants. To know, ask questions like ‘how about separate stamps?’ ‘how about your own Olympic teams?’, ‘how about separate currencies?’, ‘how about a seat in the UN?’, ‘how about your own army?’, etc. Classical 19th century independence with a resounding yes! to such questions is on the way out. Other options have entered the discourse; statesmen/diplomats/journalists at least should learn even if they cannot create these options. People may in fact be much less dualistic than the stark ‘prison’/independence formula indicates, again by no means rejecting the formula completely. Sovereignty is a question of degree, of what is functional. What remains are Ecuador-Peru over la zona inejecutable, the disputed territory in the Andes mountains, and Japan-Russia over the Northern Territories/South Kuriles, the disputed territory off Hokkaido. The cases are somewhat different from the cases above. There are certainly two nations (Ecuadorians and Peruvians in the first case, Japanese and Russians in the second), and there is a territory, but not with an ‘imprisoned’ population of any magnitude. It is difficult to conceive of independence or steps in that direction, which is essentially what (1) to (5) in Table 2 are about. So a number (6) has been added for this case: holding it together, making it bi-national, a condominium, with shared/joint sovereignty, is also possible in cases like Northern Ireland and Basque Country and the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) between the Koreas. As zone of peace there would be a number of non-threatening, cooperative measures such as natural parks, joint economic zones, camping grounds, conflict centres, etc. gradually attaining model character. D: Two or more nations-two or more states/territories. We then turn to the most complex, and most frequent combination, typical of today’s world, combining B and C. Generally speaking we are dealing with a messy combination of nations and states, like in the Caucasus with three states, 28 nations within them and each other, and four states intervening from the outside; something to consider for those who think the Basque Country, Northern Ireland and Yugoslavia/Balkans are complex. They are, but not always, found in mountainous areas; Caucasus, Pyrenees, Yugoslavia, Himalayas, Hindukush, where groups can be nesting in a valley for centuries only to be ‘discovered’ and claimed by the centre on the plains (Moscow, Paris/Madrid, Beograd/Zagreb, Beijing, UK/USA). For the Alps: the Swiss/Austrian models. The general formula is obviously to combine the approaches from B and C. The intellectual task of finding comprehensive and comprehensible formulas should not be underestimated. But there is another guiding formula: creating a context. In principle all these problems should be more tractable in a context of increasing 171
JOHAN GALTUNG regionalization and globalization, based on inter-state, inter-corporate and/or intercivil society cooperation. A new territorial border becomes less dramatic if it is osmotic, with those three types of cooperation seeping through at many points. Wherever there is a conflict because more than one nation has claims on the same territory, IGOs, TNCs and NGOs should be encouraged to engage all nations concerned, providing closeness across borders. The intergovernmental umbrella may be needed, whether in the form of an associative system, a confederal community, a federal union or even a unitary state; in this case the regional super-state. More concretely, here is a list of inter-state contexts that either exist, that could be strengthened or could be created (organizations that will have to be created are in brackets): United Nations (UN, N=189) (inadequate, but the only one) - for East-West b, the NATO-Russia/China/India-AMPO triangle - for Europe; the Catholic/Protestant-Orthodox-Muslim triangle - for the Christianity/Islam, Christianity/ ‘heathens’ formation Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE, N=55) - for East-West a, the NATO-WTO-Non-aligned/Neutrals triangle European Union (EU, N=15) - for Cyprus, with both parts as members, with Greece and Turkey - for Northern Ireland, with separate status as ‘entity’ (and, in addition, a Confederation for the British Isles). - for Basque Country, giving it separate status as ‘entity’ South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC, N=7) - for tripartite Kashmir (Azad Kashmir, Valley, Jammu-Ladakh) - for tripartite Sri Lanka (Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims) [Pacific Hemisphere Forum] - for Pacific Islands, Australia/New Zealand and Pacific Rims 172
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- for Japan-Russia - for Hawaii (with sovereign Hawaii as a possible centre?) [Organization for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East] - for Gulf a over Iraq’s relation to neighbours - for Gulf b over monitoring Iraq - for Kurdistan - for Israel/Palestine [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Southeast Europe] - for Yugoslavia a over Serbia—Croatia—B—I-H + - for Yugoslavia b over Serbia − Albania-Macedonia + [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Caucasus] - for Caucasus [Central Asian Association for Regional Cooperation] - for Afghanistan and neighbours [Community of Central African States] (Indian Ocean to Atlantic) - for The Great Lakes [Organization for Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean] - for Gibraltar/Ceuta/Melilla - for Israel/Palestine [East Asian Community]: for China/Korea/Taiwan/Okinawa/Japan/NT [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Asia/Pacific] - for the whole region
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JOHAN GALTUNG All of them are useful, and dangerous lest they become super-states. 4. CONCLUSION: THERE IS WORK TO BE DONE Apart from interstate regional organizations, the five modelled upon the OSCE, there are some new ideas in need of exploration: Non-territorial (con)federations, functional sovereignty, and condominium/joint sovereignty. Below are some remarks on each idea. Non-territoriality is an answer to mobility that lowers the correlation between the culture and the territory of ‘a people’. Thus, a Norwegian Sami registers as a Sami, not defined by the territorial connection (address), but by territorial attachment (nation). A country with nations living around each other could have one parliament for each nation and a super-parliament for federal matters. That arrangement could take much of the heat out a mixture that becomes even more volatile and dangerous the less the nations are territorially separated (Yugoslavia, and Rwanda for example.) Functional sovereignty softens the status quo-independence dichotomy, introducing degrees of sovereignty, meaning control. The point of departure would be a list of functions attributed to countries in general, and states in particular; asking people in favour of independence what they really want, and people in favour of the status quo what they could concede. The process defines areas that can be negotiated, subject to review after X (to be negotiated) years. Condominium/joint sovereignty challenges the idea that each piece of land belongs to one and only one state and that res communis is res nullius, what is owned in common is owned by nobody. Condominium brings modern marriage into geopolitics, so far only used in colonial regions (New Hebrides, the Cameroons), and the Antarctic. The idea carries great conflict-solving potential, but also leads to interesting problems about the legal status of people living (not to mention born) in the area. That concludes this exploration of the dialectics between national identity and state integrity. Neither is absolute. If a state fails to meet individual human rights, civil-political and economic-social-cultural, it forfeits its claims on citizens to honour that state, pay taxes and lay down their lives for the state. The right to selfdetermination is the right of a nation to secede from such a state and to be ruled by their own kind, or else to demand major reorganization short of independence, in line with Article 28 of the Universal Declaration: Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized. A nation cannot opt out of one state to set up another and then deny the same rights to peoples now under their control. There are limits to national identity, like there are to state integrity, regardless of how much the nation considers itself a
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THE ROLE OF AUTONOMY IN THE STATE-NATION DIALECTIC chosen people, with the glories of the past lining the future, compensating for the unspeakable traumas suffered and inflicted. States and nations should be demystified. But so should also discourses about majority vs. minority (a historical right is not numerical, it remains even if there is a majority to be concerned about), about multi-cultural societies (cultures as such have no territorial claims), about internal vs. external suppression (suppression is suppression), salt water colonialism (salinity is immaterial). A nation should not be forced to choose between the status quo and total independence because alternatives are not offered and a nation should not be forced to choose between acquiescence and violence because their right is not recognized. Adequate conflict transformation becomes a right, not only a duty. And it becomes a major task of the international community.
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AMBIGUITIES IN AND CLARIFICATIONS OF THE CONCEPT OF AUTONOMY1 Matti Wiberg 1. INTRODUCTION Was it an autonomous act when the Finnish rock musician Juice Leskinen in the beginning of the 1980s declared unilaterally and categorically his backyard a ‘nuclear free zone’? The property rights were undisputed: he owned his backyard. No nuclear weapons were located in his backyard. He did not like nuclear weapons. The declaration was authentic in at least two strong senses: He made the declaration of his own free will by himself without following orders or wishes of anyone else and he was probably also the first person in the history of the human race to make such a marvellous announcement. But was it in his discretion to make such a decision and a declaration? It is difficult to say, because the notion of autonomy is vague, to say the least. Maybe it was just a void, non-credible promise or threat, a mere symbolic gesture? For sure, it did not have any noticeable practical political implications. It is very disturbing that almost all writers on the topic of autonomy do not make clear to the readers (or even to themselves!) what they actually mean with the notion. The word is used in many different meanings in a bewildering amount of contexts, ranging from political philosophy to medical ethics, from epistemology to international law. There is little hope that the use of language could be unified to such a degree that the concept of autonomy would be used in only one meaning in political contexts It is fair to claim that no clear account of the concept of autonomy is available. Autonomy is a hopelessly confused concept. It does not help that it is somehow closely connected to such contested concepts as authority, control, freedom, interdependence, interest, liberty, non-interference, paternalism, power, responsibility, social coordination, and sovereignty – all core concepts in modern political theory. In political context autonomy is usually referred to as autonomy of agents. There are many kinds of entities that can be classified as agents, ranging from individual persons to various kinds of aggregate collectivities and to such emergent things as certain geo-political areas, which are administrative constructions. In the latter contexts an autonomous entity is something less – not more – than full sovereignty and complete independence. There is little hope to get a clear and unique understanding of what autonomous political entities stand for. 1
In order to save space the cumbersome (s)he-problem is in this chapter expressed only by he. No politically incorrect consequences are implied by this convention!
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MATTI WIBERG The concept of autonomy has many synonyms in the political discourses such as independence, self-government, self-determination, self-direction, self-reliance, and self-legislation. An autonomous agent is one that is exempt from arbitrary control, uncoerced, unrestricted. An autonomous agent is free to choose without any deterministic intervention by external facts or agents. But is it the case that an autonomous entity also must be autarchic, selfsufficient and self-sustaining? This does not seem to be a general requirement for political philosophers, who have systematically thought about the question. Autonomy does not require isolation from other agents and external facts can impact the autonomous agent. Autonomy should refer to self-direction rather than to selfsufficiency. The principle of autonomy is the belief that a person has free will and the capacity for making moral choices. As the individual has free will and can make moral choices, then each person has the right to do whatever he pleases as long as it does not directly hurt other people. Autonomy is understood both as a necessary condition for moral activity and is also understood negatively – being free from intentional coercion. To be autonomous is to act on self-chosen principles. In a choice theoretic perspective an autonomous agent chooses to pick one alternative from the agent’s choice set, in a very strong sense, independently from all external factors, such as other actors. An autonomous agent is in some sense input-independent: what the agent decides to choose is a matter of the agent’s – and only the agent’s – deliberation. There is no causally decisive intervention by any external fact or agent. But it does not make sense to claim that an autonomous agent completely ignores (external) facts: if an agent ignores, say the laws of nature, the laws of nature will sooner or later remind the agent of their existence! An autonomous agent pays attention to his action environment, but is not entirely determined by it. So it is the case that autonomous agents are also in some sense dependent on the external world. But in which sense are they dependant? Autonomy refers to acting as a causal agent in one’s life making choices and decisions regarding one’s quality of life free from undue external influence or interference. In some sense an autonomous agent can decide in an arbitrary way. Autonomy means independence of something, not everything, however. Nobody wants autonomy for its own sake, but only in order to further one’s goals. Autonomy is not a goal in it itself, but an instrument to guarantee that the preferences of the choosing autonomous agent are fully taken into consideration. We will restrict the following conceptual explications of political autonomy to democratic political systems, even when they constitute a minority of all political systems, past or present. It does not seem to make much sense to talk about autonomous political entities in non-democratic political contexts. In such contexts, by definition, there is always some agent that exercises power over some other set of agents in a morally justified or not justified manner. In non-democratic political systems autonomous arrangements have been used precisely because the central 178
AMBIGUITIES IN AND CLARIFICATIONS OF THE CONCEPT OF AUTONOMY power has been too weak to enforce its will; the local agents have thus been able to guarantee some local discretion, at least on the paper. Democracy is just the doctrine of majority rule. Its main idea may be summarized by stating that only the preferences of the majority should be taken into consideration in political decision making: if the majority has it its way, the arrangement is democratic, otherwise not. There are no substantial constraints as to what kind of policy the majority may choose to implement. The notion of democracy is, thus, content-free. Democracy only captures the idea of one agent, one vote. The outputs of the application of majority rule may by no means be only of the kind that a moral agent could or should accept. There are no inner constraints or filters that somehow automatically guarantee that only morally justified policies are enacted and implemented through the mechanisms of democratic means of majority rule. This is important to have in mind, especially for all those wellmeaning persons who try to defend simultaneously both democracy and autonomy. They may easily contradict each other in most political contexts. 2. THE RESEARCH PROBLEM The purpose of this chapter is to shed some analytical light on the notion of autonomy from the viewpoint of political theory and political science. The chapter is organized as follows. Firstly we start with some lexicographical remarks. Then we turn to some representative historical political philosophers in order to get a proper historical perspective of the concept. Next, we discuss some of the most helpful modern presentations on various aspects of autonomy. The chapter ends with a discussion and a few conclusions. We will study the following proposition, p: p: X is autonomous Under which kinds of conditions does this make sense? There is little, if any, hope that we could at the current maturity level of political theory end up with a unique specification for A in the following. Definition: X is autonomous if and only if A Can X be autonomous in isolation, i.e. can X be autonomous without being in any relation to any other actor? Or does the proposition p make sense only if we have some particular context C in mind: pC: X is autonomous if and only if A in context C The context refers here to all external things that can be separated from X but are somehow relevant for the understanding of the X’s true nature. 179
MATTI WIBERG The context can be described in many ways. It could, for instance, refer to a certain set of other agents who have certain characteristics with respect to the issue at hand. Surely, if an agent claims that he is autonomous in the strict sense that he is completely independent of any external causal factors, we simply consider him a particularly ill-informed, absurdly self-centred person, if not directly a madman. All agents, even the freest ones are in many ways dependent on some external forces, such as certain physical preconditions of human life (food, oxygen, suitable temperature, etc). An autonomous agent must have certain environmental conditions fulfilled before he can be classified even as an agent. And not all agents are autonomous or free in any meaningful sense of these notions. We may illustrate these points by considering a one-dimensional continuum, where an autonomous agent is situated between total social isolation and entire dependency upon others in a foolproof deterministic manner. Autonomy is thus a matter of degree, not a dichotomous thing. Any satisfactory theory of autonomy should be able to answer in a convincing way questions such as the following: • What is autonomy? Which necessary and sufficient criteria should be fulfilled before an agent can be claimed to be autonomous? Under which conditions can we argue that an agent is autonomous? • What of interest, if anything, follows from the claim that a certain agent or a particular act of his is autonomous? • How can it be that an agent is on one hand a social product through education and socialization in general, and on the other hand he is supposed to be a free agent in a moral sense? • Must the autonomy of an agent X be somehow accepted or confirmed by some other agents? • Do all relevant ‘others’ have to give their consent before an agent can be classified as autonomous? Which criteria for relevance should be applied here? • How important is autonomy compared to other values? • Can an agent pretend to be autonomous? • Must an agent know that it is autonomous in order to be autonomous? • Can an agent be autonomous by chance or is it possible to autonomous only if the agent itself in question has earlier somehow decided to be autonomous? • Can a prisoner in any sense be autonomous if he continuously and systematically rejects to comply with formally valid regulations? • Is autonomy a good thing? If it is, on which grounds is it? • Should autonomy be respected? If yes, why? • Is autonomy something that can be realized? • If agents X and Y both are autonomous, how do we know in a particular situation, which of these agents is more autonomous? 180
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Can a representative be autonomous with respect to those he is representing and still be a responsive politician? There is no theory of autonomy that would answer all of these trivial questions in a satisfactory way. 3. LEXICOGRAPHICAL REMARKS The notion of autonomy has a general dictionary meaning of being subject to one’s own rules, from the Greek auto (self) and nomos (rule or norm). Thus autonomy has its etymological roots in the two Greek words for self and rule or law, literally it stands for self-rule: the having or making of one’s own laws. In order for an agent to be autonomous, he should, firstly, have a developed self, to which ones actions can be ascribed. This in turn requires a consciousness of oneself as a being who acts for reasons, whose behaviour can be explained by reference to one’s own goals and purposes. The other dimension of autonomy requires a freedom from external constraints. An autonomous person is not someone who is manipulated by others, or who is forced to do their will. An autonomous person has a will of their own, and is able to act in pursuit of self-chosen goals. (Lindley 1986, p. 6, cf also Berlin 1958, esp. p. 131). When applied to individuals the word autonomy has four closely related meanings (Feinberg 1986, p. 28). It can refer either to the capacity to govern oneself, which of course is a matter of degree; or to the actual condition of self-government and its associated virtues; or to an ideal of character derived from the conception; or (in the analogy to a political state) to the sovereign authority to govern oneself, which is absolute within one’s own moral boundaries (one’s territory, realm, sphere, or domain). Note that corresponding to these senses of autonomous there are parallel senses of the term independent: The capacity to support oneself, direct one’s own life, and ultimately be responsible for one’s own decisions; the de facto condition of self-sufficiency which consists in the exercise of the appropriate capacities when the circumstances permit; the ideal of self-sufficiency; and the sense, applied mainly to political states, of de jure sovereignty and the right of self-determination. The opposite of autonomy is heteronomy. It can be either cognitive (to do with belief), or conative (to do with will). An agent is heteronomous if his beliefs or desires or actions are not autonomous. Lindley (1986, p. 70) offers the following conception which simply characterises ways of failing autonomy, that is, being heteronomous: An agent ‘A’ is cognitively heteronomous with respect to a particular belief or set of beliefs if either A holds that belief or set of beliefs on account of a failure of A’s passive or active theoretical rationality, or the belief or set of beliefs is false. An agent is conatively heteronomous with respect to a particular action or set of actions if either A acts through domination by lower-order desires, or A acts through weakness of will.
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MATTI WIBERG 4. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES One of the great classical authors of the notion of autonomy is Niccolo Macciavelli (1469−1527), who in the Discourses (1531) developed two senses of autonomy: the first was freedom from dependence, the second the power to self-legislate. The notion of autonomy and self-determination is above all an Enlightenment idea. In Western political thinking autonomy stands for freedom. It is a concept, which has played an essential role in the definition and development of democracy since the French Revolution. The most important classics in political theory who have contributed to our current understanding of autonomy are Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712−1778), Immanuel Kant (1724−1804) and John Stuart Mill (1806−1873). Let’s have a look at each of these political philosophers’ core ideas concerning autonomy. In order to get a proper understanding of the notion of autonomy in the major classical texts in political theory, I conducted a computer search for the words ‘autonomy’ and ‘autonomous’ in order to find the relevant contexts in the main original sources. The results were somewhat surprising: The words do not appear at all in the following texts: Arostotle’s Politics, Hobbes’ Leviathan, Locke’s Civil Government, Machiavelli’s Prince, Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France, Mill’s On Liberty. The only hit I found was in Mill’s Representative Government, but even here the word ‘autonomy’ appears in a context that is not interesting for us. The big classics did not systematically discuss the notion of autonomy, but it is still safe to claim that they were discussing relevant issues even when they did not mention the words ‘autonomy’ or ‘autonomous’. Rousseau deals with the notion of autonomy in Book 1, chapter 6 of his Du Contrat Social (1762), where he argues that freedom is obedience to a law that we prescribe to ourselves. The problem of social order, then, becomes the problem of reconciling the individual’s right to autonomy with the existence of the state, and in particular with the state’s right to create and enforce laws. Rousseau sets out this problem as the need to find a kind of association ‘in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before’. Rousseau’s solution is ‘simple and elegant’ (Wolff 1995, p. 107): all must equally play a part in the creation of laws to which all will be equally subject. In other words, individual autonomy is reconciled with the autonomy of the state by a form of direct, participatory democracy. At the same time, group autonomy is preserved: Rousseau’s ideal state is self-governing. It does not take a political philosopher to see that Rousseau wants to combine mutually exclusive things; he is simply demanding too much. For the German philosopher Immanuel Kant an actor is autonomous if and only if he chooses the principles of his action as the most adequate possible expression of his nature as a free and equal rational being. The principles he acts upon are not adopted because of his social position or natural endowments, or in view of the particular kind of society in which he lives or the specific things that he happens to want. To act on such principles is to act heteronomously. This is one of the leading principles in Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason (1788). For Kant the most 182
AMBIGUITIES IN AND CLARIFICATIONS OF THE CONCEPT OF AUTONOMY important thing about people, from the moral point of view, is that we are creatures with a will (Lindley 1986, p. 16) Kant was inspired by Rousseau. Kant’s rather complex argumentation may be summarized by stating that the fundamental assumption of moral philosophy is that actors are responsible for their actions. From this assumption it follows necessarily that agents are metaphysically free, which is to say that in some sense they are capable of choosing how they shall act. The obligation to take responsibility for one’s actions does not derive from the actor’s freedom of will alone, for more is required in taking responsibility than freedom of choice. Only because the actor has the capacity to reason about his choices can he be said to stand under continuing obligation to take responsibility for them. Since the responsible actor arrives at moral decisions that he expresses to himself in the form of imperatives, he so to say gives laws to himself, or is self-legislating. For Kant moral autonomy is a combination of freedom and responsibility; it is submission to laws that one has made for himself. The autonomous agent, insofar he is autonomous, is not subject to the will of another. The fact that he may do what another asks of him is purely accidental and contingent. He does not follow anyone’s orders. He does not act in a certain way because he has been told by someone to do it. The orders or wishes are not causally connected to the agent’s actions. For the autonomous agent there is no such thing as a command by some other agent. A Kantian autonomous agent may listen to the advice of others, but must decide for himself whether it is good advice: no moral agent can, by definition, delegate that decision making to someone else. For Kant autonomy is displayed when a person freely decides, out of respect for a moral demand, to act morally and independently of any external incentives. In Rousseau’s theory the people are both sovereign and subject. The people are bound by laws, but only those they have themselves made. Kant applied a similar conception to the individual person at the end of Foundations of the Meaphysics of Morals (1785). He used it to describe how we can be strictly bound by demand of morality, and yet have the freedom and dignity essential to personhood. Our compliance with a demand of morality has genuine moral worth only if it is done out of respect for a law which is seen as springing from our self-legislation (Critique of Practical Reason 1,1, section 8). (Mautner 1996, p. 40) Needless to say, it is entirely confused where Kant, strictly speaking, draws the lines of freedom and responsibility. The behavioural consequences are not spelled out clearly enough in an unambiguous way – a true indicator of a classical text, by the way! The Kantian view could be described as an extreme rationalist conception of autonomy, since it claims that rationality is not merely necessary, but also sufficient for autonomy, and identifies rationality (the avoidance of irrationality) with pure rationality (being untainted by desire or inclination). The most important contribution to liberal theory of the Kantian view is the principle of equal respect for individual people, which is based on recognition that people are (equally) creatures with a will. (Lindley 1986, p. 27)
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MATTI WIBERG But Rousseau and Kant are by no means the only confused social philosophers. J. S. Mill states in the opening chapter of the On Liberty (1859): ‘The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil, in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to some one else . . . The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign . . . The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily, or mental or spiritual. Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves, than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest.’ (Mill 1979, pp. 71−72) There is an enormous debate on what Mill actually meant with the rule that harm is a relevant constraint on individual liberty. There are at least two sets of principles: other-regarding (referring to harm inflicted on others) and self-regarding (referring mostly to harm inflicted on oneself). The other-regarding principles of restricting individual liberty must be split into different categories according to three major criteria: first, the kind of unpleasantness inflicted on others; second, whether the unpleasantness is inflicted actively (by actually ‘harming’) or passively (by ‘withdrawing or denying a benefit’); and third, whether the unpleasantness or embarrassment is faced by an individual or an institution. (Feinberg 1973, p. 33) Employing the first criterion, at least four principles can be spelled out, stating, for instance, that a person’s individual liberty may be curtailed (Feinberg (1984, pp. 45−51)) (1) to prevent harm to others; (2) to prevent hurt to others; (3) to prevent offences to others (4) to prevent other kinds of unpleasantness to others
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AMBIGUITIES IN AND CLARIFICATIONS OF THE CONCEPT OF AUTONOMY Harm here is defined as a frustration of a person’s vital interests. Hurts and offences in their turn can be defined, respectively, as non-harmful physical and mental pains or other discomforts. In addition to them, states such as anxiety and extreme boredom, which do not seem to fit readily into either of the categories, must be labelled as others. Non-harmful experiences are not unpleasant enough to amount to a genuine frustration of vital interests. Harmful and non-harmful experiences may be causally produced either directly or indirectly. Activity and passivity in causing, say harm, to others can be spelled out by making the distinction between curtailing the individual liberty of an actor either to prevent harm to others or to benefit the others. It is not at all clear from Mill’s own writings which of these various reasons for curtailing individual freedom would have been acceptable to him. Other-regarding unpleasantness was, according to him, sometimes a good ground for constraining people’s behaviour but not always. However, the other half of Mill’s view is more rigidly expressed: since self-protection is the ‘sole end’ and ‘only purpose’ for which the liberty of one person may be legitimately curtailed by others, selfregarding harm can never justify constraint. Although this is his general thought, he does oddly provide some exceptions. In addition to the positive harm principles, Mill presents three or four major negative principles. A person cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear (5) because it will be better for him to do so; (6) because it will make him happier; (7) because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise; or even (8) because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be right. The Millian approach to autonomy has the virtue of combining the Kantian insistence on rational activity with the Humean recognition that the ultimate ends of human beings may be as diverse as their sentiments. It thus offers ‘the most plausible account on why autonomy might be something especially valuable’ (Lindley 1986, p. 61). The Millian account of autonomy combines the Kantian insight that human beings are not just the passive victims of whatever passions happen to beset them with the Humean insight that the goals that are rational for a given person to pursue are relative to his own distinct characteristics (Lindley, p. 63) 5. MODERN PRESENTATIONS The concept of autonomy is discussed in many contexts of modern political philosophy, as may be seen from the following random sample of presentations of the concept of autonomy: An autonomous agent is a free agent, being self-directed in that he knows what he wants and that he is not obstructed in the pursuit of it (Hollis 1994, p. 73) Autonomy signifies the power and authority, as well as the legitimate capacity, to govern oneself in those matters, which form the basis of the community. (Friedrich 1963, p. 595) 185
MATTI WIBERG The American political scientist Robert A. Dahl (1982, p. 26) defines relative autonomy in the following way: ‘An organization is relatively autonomous if it undertakes actions that (a) are considered harmful by another organization and that (b) no other organization, including the government of the state, can prevent, or could prevent except by incurring costs so high as to exceed the gains to the actor from doing so.’ Here autonomy refers to the agent’s power of having it its own way, despite the preferences or wishes of others. Oddly, Dahl also requires that the decisions made and implemented by an autonomous agent unavoidably must contradict the wishes of some others: ‘Literally meaning self-rule, autonomy is ascribed in popular political parlance to self-governing states, or to institutions or groups within states that enjoy a substantial degree of independence and initiative. In political thought the term is often now used to refer to an aspect of personal freedom. Autonomous individuals are those whose ends and purposes are authentically chosen, as opposed to those who allow themselves to be conditioned by external forces. But, as with positive senses of freedom generally, the criteria of authentic choice may be specified in different ways, and so it may be a matter of dispute which persons should be counted as autonomous’ (Miller 1987, p. 31)
Isaiah Berlin (1969) makes in his classical essay Two Concepts of Liberty a distinction between negative and positive liberty. Negative liberty refers to the area on non-interference by society in the life of the individual. Positive liberty, on the other hand, has to do with who or what controls an individual’s life. In his celebrated A Theory of Justice, the American political philosopher John Rawls (1970, ch. 78, p. 515) characterizes autonomous action in the following way echoing Kant’s position: Persons are acting autonomously when ‘they are acting from principles that they would acknowledge under conditions that best express their nature as free and equal rational beings’. He also states that ‘acting autonomously is acting from principles that we would consent to as free and rational beings’ (Rawls, p. 516) Thus, a free person is an individual who has the disposition to act rationally in view of the goals he has chosen in an autonomous way, i.e. independently. Robert Nozick discusses the notion of autonomy in passing in his Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974). Nozick links the concept of autonomy with the concept of inviolability. Respecting the domain of human autonomy is defined in terms of putting side constraints upon how other human beings may behave towards me and me towards them, and these side constraints will define the class of rights, which I have to protect my domain of autonomy. Similarly you have a duty in respect of these rights − to forbear a range of actions, which have interfered with the domain of autonomy. Rights are thus defined in terms of non-interference − the right not to be interfered with so long as one is not interfering with anyone else. (Plant 1991, p. 267−268) 186
AMBIGUITIES IN AND CLARIFICATIONS OF THE CONCEPT OF AUTONOMY Robert Paul Wolff (1970) is one of the current political philosophers who have given the notion of autonomy considerable thought. Wolff tries to theoretically defend the very possibility of philosophical political anarchism. He defines authority as ‘the right to command, and correlatively, the right to be obeyed’. Authority must be, according to him, distinguished from power, ‘which is the ability to compel compliance’. (Wolff 1970, p. 4) Since the defining mark of the state is authority, the right to rule, and since the primary obligation of man is autonomy, the refusal to be ruled, Wolff claims that there can be no resolution of the autonomy of the individual and the putative authority of the state: ‘Insofar as a man fulfils his obligation to make himself the author of his decisions, he will resist the state’s claim to have authority over him. That is to say, he will deny that he has a duty to obey the laws of the state simply because they are the laws. In that sense, it would seem that anarchism is the only political doctrine consistent with the virtue of autonomy’ (Wolff, p. 18). He claims radically that authority and autonomy are genuinely incompatible, and argues that it is ‘out of the question to give up the commitment to moral autonomy’ (Wolff, p. 71–72). Moral autonomy is something to be maximized. To the extent that an agent insists on remaining to be the author of its own practical decisions it must resist the suggestion that the state – or indeed any other collective of people – has the right to make those decisions for it, or to tell it what to do. Wolff’s thesis is that autonomy implies the refusal to be ruled (see Graham 1982 for an overview of the relevant literature on Wolff and a critical discussion on Wolff’s core argumentation.) Graham argues that the supreme importance of the autonomy of moral agents is not merely compatible with one form of democratic decisionmaking but actually require it. Taylor (1982, pp. 148−150) provides many sober statements and clarifications on the concept of autonomy. The following points are his. Two things are involved in the notion: rationality (having and using capacities of the intellect, thus excluding inter alia brainwashed persons and those acting under hypnosis) and authenticity. Both notions are ambiguous. An agent who acts on the results of rational deliberation may yet have wants and needs, subscribe to norms and principles, and lead a way of life, which he has taken over uncritically from his social milieu or which are provided for him ready-made by his social roles – which are not, in a word ‘his own’ – and in this case he is said to lack authenticity. But if a person’s wants, principles, and so on are not simply provided for him by others (as of course they must be to some extent), how do they arise? What does it mean to say that they are ‘his own’? There are two sorts of answers in the literature: The first is to say that the agent’s thoughts or actions are authentic if they are an expression of his ‘core self’, which is defined as something like a constellation of relatively deeply rooted, important dispositions, knowledge of which helps us to anticipate and explain his actions over a relatively extended stretch of his total behaviour. If such anticipation and explanation is to be possible, it should be added that these basic dispositions must cohere; if they do not, the person lacks a ‘core self’. An individual’s thoughts and actions, on this account, are ‘his own’ (though the same thoughts and actions might be characteristic of many other individuals). This account of authenticity will 187
MATTI WIBERG not suffice though, since it makes no reference to the source of the ‘deeply rooted dispositions’ that make up the individual’s character. The second approach to authenticity says that an agent’s wants, principles, etc. are ‘his own’ when they have been adopted or affirmed critically; when his actions are expressive of a character he has chosen to become or affirm as one he identifies with; and when he plays his role critically, with distance. The life of an autonomous agent has a consistency that derives from a coherent set of beliefs, values, and principles, by which his actions are governed. These are not supplied to him ready-made as are those of the heteronomous man: they are his, because the outcome of a still-continuing process of criticism and revaluation. He does not simply accept the roles society thrusts on him, uncritically internalising the received mores, but is committed to a critical and creative search for coherence. The point here is that the agent must make himself, he shall not be a product of causal determinants, which are external to the agent-ansich. Politics is characterized above all by two features: heterogenous preferences and informational asymmetry, i.e. different actors typically want at least partially different things and they usually also know at least partially different things. When political actors refer to the norm of autonomy, they usually do it instrumentally: they do want to further their own goals, which may deviate from the objectives of the other relevant actors in a given situation or context. The relevant actors usually do not share all beliefs. This makes it possible for actors to try to profit from their private knowledge, which is defined as that part of their belief system, which is not shared with any other actor. No man is an island. Not even an autonomous agent can ignore the existence of other actors. The actuality of other actors may in many ways influence even autonomous agents choices. The interdependence of decisions is a common feature to all of our strategic interactions: one actor’s choices may be influenced by another actor’s choices. Any rational actor must anticipate the other actors’ possible choices and their consequences in order to be able to choose rationally. This is studied in game theory. Any agent ignoring the causal powers of other actors or their existence commits the so-called Robinson Crusoe-fallacy: They behave as though they were the only actors around in situations where the final outcomes actually depend also on the choices of other actors. Social life is, by definition, a sphere of interdependence, thus excluding the very possibility of extreme or genuine autonomy of any agent. Any individual is born into a social world, which is already organized into regular patterns of behaviour and expectation. These patterns are not to be completely reorganized or designed at will by all new persons that happen to be born. The actual chance for autonomy is thus, in very strong senses of the notion, constrained from the start. 6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS The previous presentation has showed that the concept of autonomy is used in a bewildering array of different meanings. No clear common pattern has emerged in 188
AMBIGUITIES IN AND CLARIFICATIONS OF THE CONCEPT OF AUTONOMY Western political thought. Consequently two norms come into mind immediately: every writer should define what he, strictly speaking, means when he uses the notion, and he should then stick to this meaning in a consistent manner. It is trivially obvious that practically all writers break against both of these rules. There are, however, some good political reasons for this: The strategies of ambiguity may be politically profitable. The vague notion of autonomy is very useful in many instances precisely because of its vagueness: when there is no commonly shared clear notion of what autonomy in the final analysis stands for – what it covers and what it excluded – it is very helpful for many actors in various kinds of social disputes. Take, for instance, the Camp David Agreement, which was signed on 17 September 1978 by president Jimmy Carter of the USA, president Anwar Sadat of Egypt, and prime minister Menachim Begin of Israel. It would end the state of war between Egypt and Israel, and supposedly offered a solution to the Palestinian problem, which had been at the heart of the Middle East conflict since 1948. Sinai was returned to Egypt by Israel, and the Israelis agreed to offer autonomy to the Palestinian Arabs living in the West Bank and Gaza regions. It was no coincidence that the agreement did not define autonomy. The different parties to the agreement interpreted the content of the agreement differently: the Israelis understood autonomy to be a very limited form of administrative control over some day-to-day affairs. If the Israelis have their way the lands over which the Palestinians might have autonomy would come permanently under Israeli sovereignty, and the Israelis would maintain complete control over such vital matters as internal security and foreign policy. On the other hand the Egyptians understood autonomy to be something more substantial. For them autonomy meant no less that self-government, perhaps in the sense of territorial sovereignty. (Lindley 1986, p. 1–2) Another paradigmatic case is of more recent origin. When in 1996 neither the Russians were able to defeat the Chechen armed forces – called rebels, of course, by Moscow – nor were the Chechen separatists able to defeat militarily the Russian army, the conflicting parties settled for some kind of autonomical arrangement. Again, it was an essential element of the success story of the settlement that the details of the arrangement were not spelled out. Only a political idiot would take this as the final word in the dispute and every political realist understands that this settlement was so useful to both parts in the dispute since it gave both parts the possibility to save face in a military stalemate. It was precisely the ambiguity of the notion of autonomy, which made the deal possible; both parties could explain to their relevant in-groups that they had won. This is not a minor accomplishment in a zero-sum situation. This is also one of the main reasons why we are to expect that the notion of autonomy will flourish in many kinds of political texts and practices in the future: Not the clarity, but the ambiguity, of the concept is the most important guarantee of its frequent popularity: it is a wishing box ready to serve anyone.
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MATTI WIBERG 7. REFERENCES Berlin, Isaiah (1969) ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ [1958], in Four Essays on Liberty. (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1969). Dahl, Robert A. (1982): Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Contro (Yale University Press: New Haven, 1982) Feinberg, John (1973) Social Philosophy (Prentince-Hall: Englewood Cliffs, 1973) Feinberg, John (1984) Harm to Others (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1984) Feinberg, John (1986) Harm to Self (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1986) Friedrich, Carl Joachim (1963): Man and His Government: An Empirical Theory of Politics (McGraw-Hill: New York, 1963) Graham, Keith (1982) Contemporary Political Philosophy: Radical Studies (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1982), pp.113-137. Held, David (1991): Political Theory Today (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991) Hobbes, Thomas (1979): Leviathan (Penguin: London, 1979 [1651]) Lindley, Richard (1986) Autonomy (London: Macmillan, 1986) Locke, John (1965), Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965) Mautner, Thomas (1996), A Dictionary of Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996) Mill, John Stuart (1979), On Liberty (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979) Miller, David (1987), Autonomy, in Miller, David (ed.): The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987) Nozick, Robert (1974), Anarchy, State and Utopia (London: Blackwel, 1974) Plant, Raymond (1991), Modern Political Thought (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991) Rawls, John (1972), A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972) Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1966), Du Contrat Social (Paris: Flammarion, 1996) Taylor, Michael (1982), Community, Anarchy and Liberty (Campbridge: Cambridge University Press: 1982) Wolff, Jonathan (1995), Autonomy, in Lipset, Seymour Martin (ed.): The Encyclopedia of Democracy (London: Routledge, 1995) Wolff, Robert Paul (1970): In Defense of Anarchism (NY: Harper Torchbooks, 1970)
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META-LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF AUTONOMY PARADOXES OF AUTONOMY: TENSIONS, TRAPS AND POSSIBILITIES Thomas W. Simon 1. INTRODUCTION Autonomy implies freedom – minimally, freedom from intrusion and freedom to flourish. Autonomy begins with a protective shield. Before engaging in some creative explorations, an immediate application of autonomy’s protective shield faces us. Organizations presuppose a certain degree of autonomy necessary to function as organizations. Organizations warrant a protected space and uninterrupted time to do what they do best. Organizations that speak on behalf of those with little or no voice deserve special consideration. Particularly, organizations that place the interests of others ahead of their own warrant autonomy. Human rights organizations, which speak for the weak, must have maximum autonomy. The government of Denmark has undermined the work of the Danish Centre for Human Rights first through the later-rescinded act of dismantling the Centre and then through severe budget cuts. Attacks on the autonomy of a human rights organization are similar to attempts to dismantle charities dedicated to helping the weak and the infirm. Often, an organization that promotes a policy ironically fails to apply the policy to its organizations because of the policy’s negative impact on the organization. In this case, however, the organization that sponsors a conference on autonomy could benefit from asserting its autonomy. This basic, minimalist form of autonomy should not require assertion since any civil society would simply take this minimalist sense of autonomy for granted. The discussion below addresses some more controversial senses of autonomy.1 Autonomy has appeared in the midst of ethnic conflict and disputes over minorities. At times, autonomy may come to the rescue to quell conflicts and resolve disputes. More often, autonomy represents one of many pieces of an extraordinary complex puzzle. Before pinning our hopes on it, we should know its potentialities and its limitations.
1
For the classic text and compilation of documents see H. Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self-Determination (Pennsylvania University Press, Philadelphia, 1990) and Documents on Autonomy and Minority Rights. (Dordrecht: M. Nijhoff, 1993).
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THOMAS W. SIMON 2. AUTONOMY’S CONCEPTUAL STATUS In some political philosophies, autonomy applies exclusively to the individual. Individual autonomy signifies the freedom of an individual to make choices free from intrusion by external agents. The picture of an autonomous self has ennobling as well as distorting features. At the heart of individual autonomy applied lies the hopes and aspirations captured by the aphorism ‘Think for yourself’. When individuals give meaning to their lives and when they make moral choices, they manifest their human identity. So-called ‘autonomous selves’ make fundamental decisions. Other individuals should not force their decisions on an autonomous self. The autonomous individual serves as a foundation or at least as an inspirational goal of Western liberalism. Yet, the image of autonomous individuals who think for themselves gives a distorted picture of individuals. The picture leaves out the social component. No one truly thinks in isolation. Thought involves the social phenomenon of language. In addition, the process of thinking demands social interaction through discussion and dialogue. Any discussion of autonomy should remain alert to distorting features contained in idealizations of it. Collective autonomy, unlike individual autonomy, includes the social aspect. The term ‘collective’ encompasses some social phenomena. Collective autonomy enables individuals to flourish as part of a social group. Individuals develop within and through group identification.2 Collective autonomy protects individuals and a group through mutual nourishment. Yet, collective autonomy distorts just as individual autonomy distorts. More so than its individual brethren, however, its contorting features operate on multiple levels. Since the idea of collective autonomy places the protective shield around a group, when the idea is put into practice, a tension with the individual arises. Given that the formulation begins with the group, collective autonomy constructs an asymmetrical tension between group and individual. The group, conceptually, has a higher place than the individual within the framework of collective autonomy. This means that any collective autonomy arrangements will have to be especially sensitive to the individual. The under-evaluation of the individual in collective autonomy complements the under-evaluation of the collective in individual autonomy. The tensions inhering in collective autonomy, however, go beyond these well known conflicts. No matter how benign or well meaning a proposal for collective autonomy might be, it additionally creates tensions with other collectives. The placement of a protective shield around one group raises potential questions about establishing protective shields around other groups. Another way to see the tensions inherent in the idea of collective autonomy is to note paradoxes arising with each of the three different values used to justify autonomy. Each value – democracy, community, and peace – contains some form of a paradox.3 The term ‘paradox’ is not being used in its more philosophical sense to 2
I shall use the terms ‘community’, ‘group’, and ‘minority’ interchangeably. For the purpose of this analysis, nothing hinges on differentiating them. 3 See Appendix C.
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PARADOXES OF AUTONOMY: TENSIONS, TRAPS AND POSSIBILITIES mean a logical argument that seems to produce contradictory conclusions. Justifications of collective autonomy produce something akin to a dilemma. A dilemma classically arises when a logical analysis of a claim produces equally unsatisfactory conclusions stemming from that claim. Yet, the dilemmas found in thinking through collective autonomy do not have these neat logical lines. A closer look at collective autonomy reveals tensions captured by a more common sense use of the word ‘paradox’. Before exposing these paradoxes, we need a clearer idea of the concept of collective autonomy. Within international law, the concept of autonomy occupies what we can think of as a middle-level position.4 On the one hand, it does not sit among the higher levels of more established concepts such as sovereignty. On the other hand, the idea of autonomy has a more secure conceptual stature than controversial notions such as a ‘right to development’ (a third generation right). Autonomy has a relatively secure but not completely stable foundation in international law. The concept of autonomy will not garner a consensus among international jurists, but its semantic indeterminacy, that is, having different meanings, does not provide grounds to dismiss it as too vague or as open to any interpretation whatsoever. Autonomy’s indeterminacy-of-meaning creates room for creative but limited interpretations. The middle level position taken by the concept of autonomy should inform strategies for its use. It would make sense to avoid over emphasizing autonomy, but it also makes sense to take advantage of opportunities to use it. Further, autonomy’s intermediate conceptual status means that it connects, in critical ways, to other legal concepts, especially, as we shall see, to the concept of citizenship. Finally, autonomy’s intermediate status makes it particularly sensitive to context. Collective autonomy occurs within a context. The dynamics inherent in these contexts makes autonomy a justifiable device but never a panacea, a problem but never a scourge. The successful implementation of an autonomy device does not assure an outcome – good or bad. 3. AUTONOMY AND CLOSELY RELATED CONCEPTS As a middle-level concept, autonomy does not stand isolated from other key concepts in international law. It spills over onto other concepts. Please forgive the pun, but autonomy does not have autonomy. Autonomy overlaps with other concepts within international law. Autonomy does not just relate to other concepts. Other more entrenched concepts set conditions for autonomy. The problem is which concept best relates to autonomy. Let us consider two candidates. Radically different analyses result depending if self-determination or citizenship become autonomy’s closest kin. The minority treaty system, put in place following World War I, acknowledged a weak form of the right to self-determination. Following on the heals of the 4 A similar analysis of the autonomy’s conceptual status is found in Hans-Joachim Heintze ‘On the Pros and Cons of Autonomy from the Viewpoint of International Law’ (‘the concept of autonomy is not a well-fitted legal concept’) in this volume.
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THOMAS W. SIMON disintegration of the Austrian-Habsburg and Ottoman Empires, international law recognized a weak form of integrity for certain territorial groups. Following World War II, international law took a radically different approach by effectively shunning territorial groups and largely ignoring non-territorial groups. If there were a right to secession in international law, it would be difficult to argue the case before the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Accordingly, all colonial territories had the right to independence. So, a statebounded territorial group had a right to self-determination. The question remains whether paragraph 2, which declares that ‘[a]ll peoples have a right to selfdetermination’, has a more expansive interpretation. A decade later, the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations seemed to provide the groundwork for expanding the right to self-determination beyond colonial peoples to ethnic, linguistic, and national groups. Autonomy provided a sense of political boundaries distinct from the state. The issue then becomes whether those within a political boundary distinct from the state had a right to determine their own fate. Citizenship provides another possible concept to associate with autonomy. If citizenship takes precedence over self-determination in its relationship to autonomy, then a different analysis follows. Citizenship comes in different degrees and varieties. Variations in citizenship affect the degree and type of autonomy and vice versa. Similarly, the legal status of various types of collectivities has an important bearing on autonomy. Before we make proposals for future autonomous and integrationist measures, it might prove helpful to reexamine past conflict cases where autonomy did or might have played a role. Two regions where conflicts recently have erupted, namely, the Balkans and Central Africa, contain important examples where autonomy operated in the midst of other legal concepts such as citizenship. Former Yugoslavia. Group designations, types of citizenship types, and degrees of autonomy played critical roles in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.5 This, in turn, set the background for the conflicts in the 1990s. The 1946 Constitution of the Former Yugoslavia used a three-tired classification system. Federal Yugoslavia had three types of citizens: ‘nations’ or narodi (Serb, Croat, Slovene, Macedonian, Montenegrin, and Muslim), ‘nationalities’ or narodnosti (those with a ‘national homes’ outside Yugoslavia, such as Albanians), and ‘other nationalities and ethnic minorities’ (Jews, Yugoslavs). ‘Everyone held a Yugoslav citizenship but no one held Yugoslav nationality’, except in a census.6 Individuals could designate their national identity under one of the six nations or as Yugoslavs in a census taken every ten years. National identity never appeared on an individual’s passport, although it did appear on the Yugoslav Peoples Army’s identity cards. The 1946 Constitution recognized Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, 5
See Appendix A. Tonc Bringa, Being Muslim the Bosnian Way (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1995) p. 27.
6
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PARADOXES OF AUTONOMY: TENSIONS, TRAPS AND POSSIBILITIES Montenegrins, and Macedonians as nations. It did not recognize Bosnian Muslims as a nation or as a nationality. In the 1961 census, Bosnia Muslims became a nationality (formalized in the 1963 Constitution). In the 1971 census, Bosnian Muslims became a nation (formalized in the 1974 Constitution), that is, Muslims then had a national home in the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the 1974 Constitution, Bosnia-Herzegovina became one of the six primary republics, but the constitutional drafters only defined Serbo-Croatian, Slovenian, and Macedonian as official languages. This is not to say that the idea of Bosnian Muslims appeared out of thin air. The late 1970s saw a campaign to designate Bosnia a Muslim Republic as well as official authorization of mosque building. Yet, during that same period, Yugoslavs saw Bosnian Muslims as the hope for constructing a national Yugoslav identity, which, as noted above, constitutionally held the bottom tier of ‘Other’ along with Jews. This brief history shows the designation ‘Bosnian Muslim’ as a distinct, contested and changing minority classification. Further, it illustrates the complex interplay among determinations of group and of citizenship. The 1946 Constitution designated the region of Vojvodina, with its majority Hungarian population, as an Autonomous Province. Kosovo (more accurately, Kosovo-Metihija) then became an Autonomous Region, a decidedly lower designation because unlike Vojvodina it did not have an independent legislature or a supreme court. The 1963 Constitution upgraded Kosovo to the same status as Vojvodina, but this Constitution decreased the powers of autonomous provinces. With the 1974 Constitution, Kosovo became a full constitutive member of the Yugoslav Federation as one of eight federal units. However, unlike Bosnian Muslims, who by that time had attained nation status, Albanians remained in the lower category of nationality. From this constitutionally mandated design and Yugoslavia’s demographics, two critical observations emerge. First, Albanians remained second-class citizens (a nationality) ‘despite their numerical superiority over less numerous Slav nations of Yugoslavia, which did have their own republic within the federation’.7 Second, the creation of the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo meant, ‘21% of the Serbs in Serbia were not under the jurisdiction of Belgrade’.8 Albanians in Kosovo solidified their legal identity earlier than Bosnian Muslims did. Constitutionally, Albanians achieved nationality status in 1946 whereas Bosnian Muslims did not do so until the 1960s. From the 1974 Constitution to the 1989 constitutional crisis, when Serbia amended its republic constitution to undermine Kosovo’s autonomy, ‘the Albanians of Kosovo had a better situation in terms of representation and cultural autonomy than they had known at any time since the end of the Ottoman Empire and arguably in their entire history’.9 Up until 1990, when 7
M. Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo (Columbia University Press, New York, 1998) p. 217. 8 M. Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo (Columbia University Press, New York, 1998) p. 179. 9 M. Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo (Columbia University Press, New York, 1998) p. 217.
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THOMAS W. SIMON Serbia removed Kosovo’s autonomy and imposed repressive emergency measures, Albanians had co-existed with Serbs in Kosovo. Given all the platitudes about the advantages of hindsight, it is difficult to pinpoint how to have taken different actions to avoid the subsequent decade of conflict in the Balkans. Perhaps, hasty recognition of secession claims by Slovenia and Croatia fueled the flames of conflict. Interim measures of autonomy for the breakaway republics might have controlled the conflicts. Maybe the European Union’s Badinter Arbitration Commission should not have so rigidly adhered to uti possidetis (a high level concept), which freezes previously established borders.10 Through all the speculation, one thing stands out, namely, the critical function that the rule of law should have played. Whatever scenarios of what might have worked, it is critical that the rule of law played a central role in the better approaches. For purposes of our discussion, a critical event occurred when Serbia violated the lawfully established autonomy of Kosovo. Devoting this much space to the Former Yugoslavia may expose a raw nerve. Western European or American jurists do not sing (at least not officially) the praises of the political designs and policies of the former communist regime in Yugoslavia. Yet, one may notice similarities between some recent proposals and features of the Former Yugoslavia. In any vent, the recent past provides a fruitful laboratory for reflective thought. Central Africa provides another conceptual laboratory for thinking about the affects external citizenship policies have on minority issues.11 Rwanda. Hutus and Tutsis, inside and outside Rwanda, are Banyarwandan, that is, speakers of Kinyarwanda (who number over ten million), who also practice the same religion and have similar cultural habits. Within Rwanda, however, Hutus and Tutsis have constituted radically different political identities. Rwandan independence ushered in varying waves of discrimination against the Tutsi minority under two Hutu led regimes. The system put into place in the First Republic (1961– 1975), under Gregoire Kayibanda (president until a 1973 coup), functioned as an apartheid system placing Tutsis in education and government jobs. While international protests against apartheid were voiced loudly against South Africa, they were largely silent about Rwanda and Kosovo. Rwanda’s First Republic ended with massive slaughters of Tutsis. During the First Republic, Rwanda lost over one half of its Tutsi population to refugee flight, primarily to Uganda but also to other neighboring countries. Kayibanda’s army chief of staff, General Juvenal Habyarimana, seized power and ended the anti-Tutsi pogroms. As president of the Second Republic Habyarimana abolished the First Republic’s ‘national Hutuism’. He granted citizenshipto resident Tutsi but not to those Tutsis who had fled, mainly to Uganda. In 1986, the Museveni regime in Uganda changed citizenship requirements from ancestry to residence. The Ugandan Diaspora group formed the 10
See R. Falk 'The Right of Self-Determination Under International Law: The Coherence of Doctrine Versus the Incoherence of Experience' in W. Danspeckgruber and A. Watts (eds.) Self-Determination and Self-Administration: A Sourcebook. (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., Boulder, CO, 1997) pp. 47–63. 11 See Appendix B.
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PARADOXES OF AUTONOMY: TENSIONS, TRAPS AND POSSIBILITIES bulk of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). However, the Museveni government, for internal political reasons, reversed the citizenship policy and made members of the RPF refugees in Uganda. The Tutsi guerrilla fighters found themselves between the Rwandan devil and the Ugandan deep sea. The 1990 RPF invasion symbolized an attempt to escape the closing scissors of a postcolonial citizenship crisis in Rwanda and Uganda.12 The 1993 Arusha Accords, designed to end the civil war brought about by the 1990 RPF invasion, required the repatriation of Tutsi refugees to Rwanda. This brief account illustrates the complex interplay of citizenship, internally and externally determined. Further, it demonstrates the critical aspects of the political solidification of Tutsi identity over roughly a thirty-year period. As a stopgap measure, granting an interim autonomy (deliberative or humanitarian autonomy, as described below) to Butare, a region with the heaviest concentration of Tutsis within Rwanda, might have helped to stem the tide of brutality. While some would regard another proposal as insanely utopian, the idea of a regional Central African citizenship as a counter-balance to ethnic autonomy had and has a great deal of potential. As discussed below, the regional organization that made proposals on autonomy for Southern Sudan might serve as a model. 4. AUTONOMY’S VALUES AND THEIR PARADOXES Autonomy has three primary justifications: communitarian, democratic, and protective. These justifications can be formulated, respectively, as follows: autonomy promotes identity with a community (group); autonomy enhances democratic participation; and autonomy protects groups.13 The following paradoxes arise within each justification: communitarian autonomy includes a group while at the same time it excludes other groups; democratic autonomy enhances and stifles democracy; and protective autonomy protects those groups least in need of protection. The protective paradox can be put more pointedly as follows: autonomy is most needed when least viable and least needed when most viable. Understanding the paradoxes, analyzed below, should stimulate more carefully analyzed but also more creative proposals about autonomy than the ones that dominate the literature. Community and Communitarian Autonomy. An underlying goal of autonomy regimes is to enable and to enhance individual development within a group. According to communitarian political theory, individuals find meaning in their lives against a background of culture and tradition. Their roles in a group provide them with access to culture and tradition. People define themselves within the context of a community or group. ‘Who they are’ depends upon belonging to a community. ‘Minority’ designates one type of community through which people find meaning for their lives. Collective autonomy provides a means to protect this, at times, 12
M. Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers (University Press, Princeton, 2001) p. 38. For illustrations of these values with international legal documents see H.-J. Heintze ‘New Directions in the Approach of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities’ in this volume. 13
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THOMAS W. SIMON vulnerable source of meaning. In the United States, the Amish receive constitutional and other forms of protection. In Canada, the controversy over Quebec’s secession involves claims for communitarian autonomy, that is, protection for Canada’s francophone culture.14 Paradoxically, autonomy protects and rewards one community at the expense of other communities. While autonomy enables one group to flourish, it, at the same time, puts other communities in less favorable lights.15 A state may single out some communities by granting special privileges to them. Some eastern European states have granted forms of autonomy to certain minority groups. The Slovenian constitution gives special rights to its Italian and Hungarian ethnic minorities. In many ways, the designation of one group downgrades other groups. Suddenly, after the designation of one group, other groups do not have something valuable. The non-designated groups do not have whatever benefits the one group gained by its designation. When Slovenia granted autonomy to Italians and Hungarians, it imposed a deficit on non-designated groups. For example, a group of non-Italian citizens (‘Slovenian Istria’) challenged a voting scheme that gave members of the Italian ethnic community a double vote. Slovenia’s Constitutional Court rejected their claim that these special measures discriminated against Slovenes and that they helped to ‘Italianize’ part of Slovenia.16 As the example shows, often, special measures for one group produce a troublesome reaction by a relatively new group. To put the paradox more starkly, communitarian autonomy simultaneously includes and excludes. The drawing of an inclusive circle around individuals within one group automatically erects an excluding border for individuals outside the circle. When the autonomous boundaries are territorial, a new majority and a new minority often arise within the borders. The creation of Vojvodina and Kosovo as autonomous units within the Former Yugoslavia created new group-demographics. Hungarians within Vojvodina and Albanians in Kosovo became new majorities relative to a new Serb minority in each unit. As noted before, over twenty per cent of the Serbs of the Republic of Serbia, then, no longer fell under Belgrade’s control. The rest, some skeptics might say, is history. The distinction between cultural and territorial autonomy raises another communitarian paradox, which, in turn, overlaps with the protective paradoxes 14
See the excellent survey and discussion by M. H. Giroux, ‘The Canadian Charter of Rights, Nationalism and the Question of Autonomy in Quebec’ in this volume. 15 ‘Because the new ‘us’ often becomes just another framework that appears to limit the freedom of the individual, of the real ‘self’, the perception of a new ‘them’ is prompted, and hence the formation of a new ‘us’, for the further pursuit of the aspired-to ‘freedom’ and ‘good life’. And so a quest for self-determination evolves, with anther new ‘us’; and then another, possibly as infinitum’ (D. Ronen, Quest for Self-Determination as quoted in A. Etzioni ‘Commentary’ in W. Danspeckgruber and Sir A. Watts, (eds.) Self-Determination and Self-Administration: A Sourcebook (Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 1997), p. 391). 16 C. Ribicic ‘Constitutional and Legal Status of Italian and Hungarian Ethnic Communities in the Republic of Slovenia’, in M. Zagar, B. Jesih and R. Bester (eds.) The Constitutional and Political Regulation of Ethnic Relations and Conflicts (Institute for Ethnic Studies, Ljubljana, Slovenia, 1999) p. 233.
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PARADOXES OF AUTONOMY: TENSIONS, TRAPS AND POSSIBILITIES described below.17 Faced with a choice between cultural and territorial autonomy, it seems easier (especially from the viewpoint of someone outside the community in question) to justify cultural (functional) than territorial autonomy. Cultural autonomy poses less of a threat to others and to the state than territorial autonomy does, and it seems less likely to lead to serious conflicts within a state. Yet, although relatively non-threatening, cultural autonomy has the downside of protecting ‘the least with the least’. Cultural autonomy offers mild protection of relatively innocuous features of a minority’s identity. In contrast, although more potentially threatening, territorial autonomy protects ‘more with more’. Territorial autonomy offers stronger protection of more aspects of those things considered of value by the minority group. The distinction between cultural and territorial autonomy begins to blur, as some examples show, especially when we add self-governance to the mix. The Slovak Constitution guarantees linguistic rights to its Hungarian minority, but it provides for only ad hoc participation on affairs concerning the minority. In comparison, Slovenia’s Constitution includes provisions not only guaranteeing linguistic rights and special rights regarding education to the Italian and Hungarian communities but also for the continuous participation of minorities representatives in local and state legislative bodies. Further, in the Italian and Hungarian regions, members of these communities may establish their own self-governing bodies for the realization of their rights.18 By working through examples like these, it seems reasonable to conclude that the more territory based the autonomy is, the greater the protection it provides. A cultural autonomy regime that includes the protection of linguistic rights provides a modicum of protection. The following exemplifies a cultural autonomy protection: members of minorities should not be discriminated against for speaking their minority language. This linguistic right attains greater status when coupled with a right to educate in the minority language. The move from language rights to education rights, however, represents a step towards territorial autonomy, not in the full sense of minority governance over a specific territorial region but in the sense of minority governance over a school district. In conclusion, then, advocates of cultural autonomy need to overcome the impression that their proposals are designed only to quiet demands by minorities. If they have a full commitment to cultural autonomy, then it seems that they should propose stronger protective measures, including territorial autonomy.
17 The distinction between cultural and territorial autonomy underlies the Lund Recommendation on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life (1999) (Foundations of Inter-Ethnic Relations, The Hague, 1999). For a discussion of the document see G. Alfredsson, ‘Lund Recommendations’ this volume. For an initial defence of the distinction see A. Eide, ‘The Common and the Separate Domains within the State -Cultural Autonomy and Territorial Democracy’ this volume. 18 M. Zagar and A. Novak ‘Constitutional and International Protection of National Minorities in Central and Eastern Europe’, in M. Zagar, B. Jesih, and R. Beste (eds.), The Constitutional and Political Regulation of Ethnic Relations and Conflicts, (Institute for Ethnic Studies, Ljubljana, Slovenia, 1999).
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THOMAS W. SIMON As with each value underlying autonomy, the paradoxes do not pose insurmountable obstacles. However, by exposing the paradoxes, we highlight the need to approach the issues more sensitively, with a clearer conceptual perspective, and with a greater appreciation for complexity. Democracy and Democratic Autonomy. Commentators on international law increasingly rely on democratic values to justify collective autonomy. Democracy serves as the fall back rationale for autonomy. As they point to numerous cases of ethnic conflict, many commentators express suspicions about the community values thought to underlie autonomy. While an appeal to community engenders controversy, a democratic justification seems incontrovertible. The following seems to be a truism: autonomy enhances democratic participation. New grants of autonomy seem to confirm the claim. Autonomy has given Scotland greater democratic participation and more effective control of its affairs than it had previously within a more centralized United Kingdom. Yet, things are not what they seem even for the democracy advocate. While commentators readily acknowledge democratic justifications for autonomy, they do not agree about the depth and extent of democracy as applied to autonomy issues. The literature on autonomy contains little discussion of the following questions: (1) to what extents are autonomous arrangements democratically determined by those most immediately affected? (2) To what extent should they be so informed? It is one thing to promote the development of selfgovernment or democracy within an autonomous unit and quite another to advocate the democratic formation of autonomous units. An externally imposed autonomy does not preclude the emergence of democratic governance within an autonomy arrangement. In fact, in some cases, the possibility of internal self-governance may depend on an imposed autonomy. Oddly, democratic autonomy may also stifle democracy. Although this currently does not seem to be the case, nevertheless, it is conceivable that the arrangement in Scotland may have decreased Scotland’s overall power considerably. If autonomy gives a group greater control over fewer or less valuable resources than before, its democratic benefits seem suspect. Whatever the long-term affects of autonomy might be, it is clear that attempts to increase democratic participation through autonomy creates tensions between the autonomous part of the political system and many other parts of the political system, including its overall structure. The most pernicious effects of promoting democracy through autonomy may remain hidden. Democratic structures may be implanted at the expense, literally and figuratively speaking, of economic well-being.19 Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, has an incredible array of democratic devices and institutions.20 Yet, largely ignored in the discussions, Bosnia-Herzegovina also has an incredibly high unemployment rate and an embarrassing low rate of foreign investment. Calls for more equal 19
See T. Simon, ‘The Injustice of Procedural Democracy’ in F. Bieber and D. Sokolovic (ed.s.), Bosnia-Herzegovina and Southeastern Europe (Ashgate, London, 2000). 20 For a detailed description of Bosnia see M. Weller, ‘Autonomy and Self Governance in the Balkans’ this volume.
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PARADOXES OF AUTONOMY: TENSIONS, TRAPS AND POSSIBILITIES participation among groups in a state’s economy must first address the state of the economy itself. Before or in tandem with addressing the economic disparity between the Republic of Srpska and other parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the desperate state of the entire economy needs to be faced. One final consideration, connected to the protective form of autonomy discussed next, raises a disturbing possibility. Democracy may fuel rather than abate conflicts.21 Democratic justifications of autonomy seem particularly vulnerable to this charge. Given that any form of collective autonomy will make some basic distinctions along group lines, any accompanying proposal for democracy seems committed to carving at least some political units according to group affiliation. A democratic justification would have to accept some overlap between demos and ethnos.22 Any democratic justification of autonomy then becomes open to the possibility of ethnic democracy, which, in turn, creates potentials for group conflicts. Again, the paradoxes and difficulties do not undermine a democratic based autonomy. However, it should put caution to the wind whenever we appeal to an unanalyzed sense of democracy. Although ‘democracy’ may have a more secure meaning than ‘autonomy’, democracy is also a contested concept. Protection and Protective Autonomy. In addition to the communitarian and democratic functions, autonomy has a protective role to play in the international system. Past and current cases where autonomy might apply reveal a disturbing pattern. The following paradox applies to minority rights regimes and secession claims as well as to autonomy schemes. Autonomy is most needed when least viable, and autonomy is least needed when most viable. The past case of Biafra23 and the current case of Chechnya illustrate the first part of the paradox. The parallel cases of Katanga24 and Quebec provide evidence of the second part. Relative to 21
For a provocative defence of this thesis see J. Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict (W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 2000). 22 ‘The word “democracy” has roots other than demos, the people. It also has important historical connections to demes, the political units designed by Cleisthenes to bring about democratic reforms of the constitution in ancient Greece. So, democracy not only ties closely to "the people," it also raises questions about the best unit of governance. Cleisthenes tried to break up traditional tribal boundaries as the units of governance and replace them with demes, which cut across tribal boundaries. He saw demes as a mechanism for inculcating a general sense of citizenship.’ Thomas Simon, Democracy and Social Injustice (Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, MD, 1995) p. 258. 23 In May 1967, Biafra proclaimed secession from Nigeria, initiating a thirty-month civil war that cost many lives. Severe harms directed at the Ibo preceded the secession demand. In July 1966, hundreds of Ibo military officers and enlisted men were assassinated in retaliation for the January 1966 coup of Ibo majors. September to October 1966 marked the period of pogroms in northern Nigerian cities, resulting in the deaths of 6–30,000 Ibos and the displacement of over a million Ibos. 24 In 1960, the newly declared independence of the Republic of Congo immediately faced a secessionist movement by its southern-most province, Katanga. With only 13 per cent of the Congo’s population, Katanga had most of the country’s wealth. The United Nations immersed
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THOMAS W. SIMON Katanga and Quebec, the political units of Biafra and Chechnya are extremely weak and vulnerable. Given their vulnerability and instability, they stood or stand in desperate need of protective shields offered by devices like autonomy. Comparatively, Katanga and Quebec contain powerful political organizations capable of forming and maintaining their own protective shield. Paradoxically, special measures, autonomy, and even secession, generally, have a greater chance of becoming a reality for groups least in need of them. These measures have the least chance of implementation where group members stand in danger of grave harm. This describes a political reality that becomes further entrenched by a failure to question it. Another paradox related to the protective function of autonomy is the following: autonomy represents the best choice for preventing conflict, and autonomy represents the worst choice for preventing conflict. I shall not say a great deal about this version of the protective paradox since it depends almost exclusively on counterfactual conjectures. I have already mentioned how interim autonomous status for Slovenia and Croatia may have been the best of a number of bad choices, assuming the availability of choice.25 In parallel fashion, some commentators have argued that the referendum for some form of independence for Bosnia-Herzegovina was the worst of a number of bad choices. It would complicate matters unnecessarily to examine the relationships among the values of community, democracy, and protection. However, the contrast between the values of community and democracy with the value of protection merits attention. A strong emphasis on community and democracy puts the legislature at the center of the discussions. Proportional representation, including quotas for minority representatives, within an autonomous region promotes community and democracy. In contrast, a focus on the protective function of autonomy places the judiciary at the center of the debates. When considering what autonomy mechanisms would help minorities the most, the discussions seldom turn to the judicial aspects of self-governance. While providing a minority with its own legislature seems plausible, allowing a minority to form its own court system seems preposterous. Yet, the initial negative reaction misses the point. A focus on the judiciary does not lead to a call for a complete overall of a court system. Lower-level adjudication devices could produce significant results. Specific measures to aid minorities in settling grievances, internally and externally, deserve more serious attention.26
itself in the controversy, ultimately helping to stifle Katanga’s secessionist aspirations. Katanga’s wealth status stemmed from its unsavoury associations with neo-colonialism and mining interests. 25 See C. C. Hodge, ‘Botching the Balkans: Germany’s Recognition of Slovenia and Croatia’. 26 Rwanda, for example, has turned to a traditional court system called ‘gacaca’ to deal with the over one-hundred thousand Hutus jailed for participation in the 1994 genocide.
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PARADOXES OF AUTONOMY: TENSIONS, TRAPS AND POSSIBILITIES 5. TYPES OF AUTONOMY Autonomy has different conceptual types. Differentiating among the types helps to clarify already known, but previously confused distinctions. Further, the classification schema provides an opportunity to examine seemingly new forms of autonomy. None of the types described below represents an entirely new category. Each type has a basis in international law. The previous discussions of related concepts and paradoxes prove helpful in constructing the categories. The exercise has the added benefit of stimulating legally sound creative thought. Each section ends with a recommendation. Legal (De Jure) Autonomy. Legal autonomy should come first, particularly since debates over autonomy often ignore it despite its centrality to international law and international relations. Many states already have designated certain cultures and territories with some form and degree of autonomy. Subsequent discussion of autonomy should build upon or start with de jure autonomy. The importance of adhering to the rule of law, substantively and procedurally, cannot be emphasized enough. The failure to acknowledge the legal substance of autonomy and the refusal to follow procedures set forth or required by law can have disastrous results. No matter what one may think of a state granting cultural or territorial autonomy to a minority, once a state has enacted legislation or judicially examined provisions on minorities, those measures and decisions must be fully respected, internally and externally. This does not imply strict adherence to the status quo. Instead, it argues for peaceful change as opposed to violent disruption. Interestingly, justifications for humanitarian intervention in Kosovo contain comparatively few reference to the violation of Kosovo’s previous legal autonomous status, first as an autonomous region (1946), then as an autonomous province (1963), and finally as a federal unit (1974). 6. RECOMMENDATIONS 1. States should recognize, internally and externally, already existing forms of autonomy. 2. Change in autonomy should come about through lawful and peaceful means. Reciprocal Autonomy. A grant of autonomy within one state may be conditioned on a grant of autonomy in another state. If implemented, reciprocal autonomy would fall under the heading of a de jure form of autonomy that warrants respect. Getting to the point of mutual designation, however, presents major obstacles to reciprocal autonomy. At times, reciprocal autonomy may represent an unstated goal. Slovenia, for example, granted autonomy to its Italian and Hungarian minorities to encourage other states to protect their Slovene minorities. The Slovak government under its first prime minister, Vladimir Mecier, conditioned making concessions to its Hungarian minority on Hungary doing the same for the (comparatively few?)
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THOMAS W. SIMON Slovaks residing in Hungary.27 Even more bizarrely, Austria parried Slovenia’s push for autonomy for its Slovene nationals in Austria by a demand that Slovenia grant autonomy to the (effectively non existent?) German minority in Slovenia.28 The process of attaining reciprocal autonomy contains many of the tensions and paradoxes noted in the previous discussions. The process of promoting one community or minority and the policy of seeking protection for another community or minority conjoin to increase the likelihood of conflict. The externally (NGO) negotiated agreement between the Romanian government and its Hungarian minority may serve as a better model than any form of reciprocal autonomy. Nevertheless, the idea of reciprocal autonomy has the virtue of treating autonomy issues dynamically. While filled with warning signs, reciprocal autonomy merits consideration under carefully limited circumstances. Recommendation: Demands for reciprocal autonomy between states should be approached and examined with great care. Variegated Autonomy. The category of variegated autonomy more fully captures the lessons about the dynamic character of autonomy. No matter what form autonomy takes, it helps to remember its dynamic character. Autonomous devices do not operate in isolation. While we tend to think of autonomy as, in some sense, freezing relations among political segments of society, autonomous arrangements change over time and reverberate into other areas. A different way of thinking might take better advantage of the dynamic character of autonomy. A more holistic view, for example, treats autonomy as part of a bigger package of political configurations. To offset the inward-looking tendencies of a territorial autonomous arrangement a holistic perspective might include proposals for more outward-looking regional arrangements and affiliations. A grant of autonomy to a minority, then, could be coupled with giving individuals an additional option of formalizing larger, regional affiliations. A combination of local group affiliation and a regional one has emerged as the choice of many young people throughout many newly independent states in Europe. Another fruitful way to utilize the dynamic qualities of autonomy lies in first recognizing that group identity does not need to focus on a single group. Socially, individuals often find themselves negotiating among multiple group identities. Although minority identity is not entirely malleable, group membership, politically 27
The Hungarians opposed the Slovak Republic’s admission into the Council of Europe because of the unprotected state of ethnic Hungarians in Slovak Republic. The Slovaks countered by making the granting of rights to ethnic Hungarians in the Slovak Republic contingent upon the Hungarians granting similar rights to the ethnic Slovaks in Hungary. Hungarians comprise over 10 per cent of the Slovak Republic’s population; estimates of the number of Slovaks residing in Hungary vary from tens to hundreds of thousands. S. Pufflerova, ‘National Minorities in Slovakia’, Unpublished manuscript (September 1993). 28 In Slovenia’s 1991 census, 546 citizens identified themselves as German and 182 as Austrian. Balkan Report, Vo. 6, No. 11 (1 March 2002).
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PARADOXES OF AUTONOMY: TENSIONS, TRAPS AND POSSIBILITIES and legally, could be more open-ended. The full recognition of multiple identities would make territorial autonomy less rigid and less threatening to the stability of the state. Further, the greater used of the dynamic, interactive qualities of autonomy brings it closer to integrationist approaches.
Recommendation: States should treat autonomy more holistically as a dynamic, multi-dimensional arrangement. Deliberative (De Facto) Autonomy. The next type of autonomy recognizes situations where the semblance of a territorial autonomy serves as a means to build greater protection and as a way to enhance self-governance. The example of Kosovo helps to establish or at least to recognize an important de facto form of autonomy. To make a case for deliberative autonomy all one has to do is to ask the following embarrassing question about Kosovo’s current status within international law: is Kosovo an independent state or an autonomous unit within the current state of Yugoslavia? In reality, Kosovo qualifies neither as an independent state nor as an internally autonomous unit. Kosovo has an external autonomy. States generally have come to recognize Kosovo’s odd status, and, of course, some of the most powerful states currently ‘normatively’ guide and support Kosovo as a quasi- or semiautonomous unit. Although Kosovo represents an embarrassing loophole in international law, its odd status also opens a door of opportunity for states to acknowledge another form of autonomy. Deliberative autonomy signifies a temporary, interim form of autonomy. External support by states for this autonomy form creates a critical breathing space for deliberation and for establishing a fully functioning political unit. Whatever the future holds for Kosovo, its deliberative autonomy status has put it into a better position to negotiate for its future than it had before. There are some similarities between Kosovo and the (benign?) occupation of defeated Japan by the victorious United States. The analogy, however, should further remind us to remain cautious of unwittingly opening doors for states to impose autonomy on portions of weaker states. However, an externally supported deliberative autonomy may serve as a means to establish a peaceful interlude in, for example, strife-ridden Sudan.29 International and regional organizations as well as other states could propose
29
The Kurds in Iraq (comprising thirty per cent of Iraq’s population) also live in a de facto autonomous region under U.S-U.N. protection. The complexities of the situation for the Kurds are well documented. A novel argument against independent status for Iraq’s Kurds is ‘Were they to break away, they would leave a Sunni minority to face a Shiite Arab majority in what remains of Iraq. Because the bulk of Iraqi Kurds are Sunni, they represent an element of security for the Sunni Arabs.’ John Waterbury, ‘Avoiding the Iron Cage of Legislated Identity’ in W. Danspeckgruber and Sir A. Watts (eds.) Self-Determination and SelfAdministration: A Sourcebook (Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 1997) p. 387.
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THOMAS W. SIMON deliberative autonomy status for Southern Sudan as a means to broker peace and to enable the parties to enter into deliberative dialogue.30 Chechnya provides a further possibility for deliberative autonomy. Whatever the complications and complexities, the untold devastation in Chechnya should increase feasible proposals. Recently, Yvegeni Primakov, former prime minister of the Russian Federation, proposed another autonomy regime for Chechnya, modeled on the quasi-autonomous status of Finland as a grand duchy under the Romanov Russian Empire.31 However, even the only serious former rival to Putin for the Russian presidency could not bring himself to include a call for external help in the Chechen conflict. Recommendation: States and other organizations are encouraged to give active support to potential and emerging autonomous territorial unites especially where a deliberative autonomy would help end or dissipate severe conflict. Humanitarian Autonomy. Autonomy and humanitarian law seldom, if ever, work in tandem. Yet, the time has come to associate autonomy’s protective function and humanitarian intervention in creative and constructive ways. Some situations, such as when a minority faces serious harms, cry out for something like humanitarian autonomy. When a minority faces mass destruction, short of attributions of genocide, then international law should obligate external intervention. Under these circumstances of grave danger to a minority, an external recognition of a minority’s autonomy rests on something akin to ‘a sacred trust of civilization’. Outside states should not await a de facto form of autonomy to emerge as they would in cases of deliberative autonomy. To whatever extent it is viable within international law and 30
I am not trying to underestimate the difficulties in making deliberative autonomy a reality in Southern Sudan. Various forms of autonomy for Southern Sudan have been tried. The first occurred under colonialism. British policies from 1926 to 1946 divided the Sudan, now the largest country in Africa, in a northern half populated by Arabic-speaking Islamic people and a southern half consisting of English-speaking Christian or native African-language-speaking inhabitants who practiced traditional African religions. The British discouraged contact between the two regions and did little to develop the south. ‘The Egyptian condominium rule, while objectionable in principle, gave the South the only period of peace, tranquillity, and relative independence in the form of ‘tribal’ autonomy that they had experienced in centuries.’ Francis M. Deng, ‘sudan: The Challenge of Nationhood’, in W. Danspeckgruber and Sir A. Watts (eds.), Self-Determination and Self-Administration: A Sourcebook (Lynne Rienner President Publishers, London, 1997) p. 345. In 1972, under Nimeiry, Sudan granted the southern provinces regional self-government. Regional autonomy unravelled through a series of decrees by the same President Nimiery. The last gap for a possible autonomy came in 1994 from a regional group. The Inter-Governmental Authority on Draught and Development formed the Mediation Committee of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, and Uganda. The committee, chaired by President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya, issued a Declaration of Principles, which, however, was not accepted. I would argue that this history sets a basis for a regionally and internationally administered deliberative autonomy. 31 W. Pfaf, ‘Peacemakers Show the Way’, International Herald Tribune (19 March 2002).
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PARADOXES OF AUTONOMY: TENSIONS, TRAPS AND POSSIBILITIES plausible within international politics, external agents should then ‘impose’ humanitarian autonomy on behalf of a vulnerable group. In some cases, neither the state nor the minority group might agree to this form of intervention. In other cases, the state and the minority might welcome humanitarian autonomy. Again, humanitarian autonomy should not automatically open doors to any kind of intervention. However, the recent escalation of harm inflicted upon Palestinians by Israel provides a vivid example of the critical need to consider humanitarian autonomy. Recommendation:
International
law
should
formulate
an
obligation
for
humanitarian autonomy under certain limited conditions of harm directed against a minority. 7. CONCLUSION To the extent that this largely conceptual analysis has clarified thinking and stimulated creative thought, it may lay claim to a modicum of success. The proposals represent attempts to demonstrate the importance of theoretical approaches. The idea of autonomy provides a rich field for theoretical reflection. However, the stakes are high. Any theoretical explorations should translate readily but cautiously into law and policy. The concept of autonomy contains paradoxes, tensions, dilemmas, and other difficulties. These challenges should make us wary but not dismissive of the use of autonomy. Autonomy does not provide a conceptual, legal, or political safe-haven, but neither do many of the other concepts, including democracy, commonly used to address conflict. There are no conceptual safe zones. The lesson to be learned here is not to put theory aside and deal with the issues on a case-by-case basis. Piecemeal, ‘legal engineering’ employs theory or, more often, theories but in unanalysed forms. The discovery of conceptual difficulties should produce a demand for more theory; the issues posed by autonomy demand attention, theoretical and practical. Given our relative state of well-being enjoyed by those privileged to engage issues in this manner, we should take risks for others. The Danish Human Rights Centre, despite having its autonomy threatened, has provided opportunities for us to risk thinking anew about autonomy.
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THOMAS W. SIMON APPENDIX A Former Yugoslavia TYPES OF AUTONOMY 1946 1963 1974 Republics Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia Bosnia-Herzegovina Montenegro, Macedonia Kosovo (to 1990) Autonomous Provinces Vojvodina [Kosovo] Autonomous Regions Kosovo TYPES OF INTERNAL CITIZENSHIP 1946 1963 1974 Nations Serbs, Croats, Slovenes Bosnians Montenegrins, Macedonians Nationalities Albanians Bosnians Other Bosnians (Bosnian Muslims) Jews Yugoslavs APPENDIX B Rwanda and Uganda TYPES OF EXTERNAL CITIZENSHIP 1961: Rwanda, First Republic, Kayibanda ‘national Hutism’ 1975: Rwanda, Second Republic, Habyarimana citizenship for national Tutsis, residency 1986: Uganda, Museveni citizenship from ancestry to residency 1990: Uganda, Museveni reversed citizenship, residency to ancestry APPENDIX C Paradoxes of Autonomy COMMUNITARIAN PARADOX Justification for Autonomy: cultural identity Related Concepts: rights of minorities, cultural versus territorial autonomy Thesis: Autonomy enables individuals to develop within a flourishing community. 208
PARADOXES OF AUTONOMY: TENSIONS, TRAPS AND POSSIBILITIES Historical Cases: Kosovo and Vojvodina in Former Yugoslavia Contemporary Cases: Italian and Hungarian Ethnic Communities in Slovenia Antithesis: Autonomy rewards one community at the expense of other communities. Contemporary Cases: Romani throughout Eastern Europe. Resolution: Grants of autonomy status to one group should be done holistically, that is, in conjunction with policies that address other groups. DEMOCRATIC AUTONOMY Justification for Autonomy: democracy Related Concepts: susidiarity (decisions made at lowest feasible level) Thesis: Autonomy enhances democratic participation. Contemporary Case: Scotland Antithesis: Autonomy fosters democracy based on exclusion. Contemporary Case: Bosnia-Herzegovina Resolution: Autonomy should enhance participation, locally and nationally, within and outside the region. Test Case: Catalonia PROTECTIVE AUTONOMY Justification of Autonomy: protection Related Concepts: secession Thesis: Autonomy is most needed to protect groups when least likely to be implemented. Historical Case: Biafra Contemporary Case: Chechnya Antithesis: Autonomy is least needed to protect groups when most likely to be implemented and maintained. Historical Case: Katanga Contemporary Case: Quebec Resolution: Autonomy should have initiatives and supports, internally and externally. Test Cases: Kosovo, Southern Sudan APPENDIX D Types of Autonomy LEGAL (DE JURE) AUTONOMY Many states already have already designated certain cultures and territories with some form and degree of autonomy.
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THOMAS W. SIMON Recommendations. States should recognize, internally and externally, already existing forms of autonomy. Change in autonomy should come about through lawful and peaceful means. RECIPROCAL AUTONOMY A grant of autonomy within one state may be conditioned on a grant of autonomy in another state. Recommendation. Demands for reciprocal autonomy between states should be approached and examined with great care. VARIEGATED AUTONOMY Autonomous arrangements change over time and reverberate into other areas. Recommendation. States and others should treat autonomy more holistically as a dynamic, multi-dimensional arrangement DELIBERATIVE/INTERIM (DE FACTO) AUTONOMY In some situations, the semblance of a de facto territorial autonomy may serve as a means to build greater protection and as a way to enhance self-governance. Recommendation. States and other organizations are encouraged to give active support to potential and emerging autonomous territorial unites especially where a deliberative autonomy would help end or dissipate severe conflict. HUMANITARIAN AUTONOMY When a minority faces mass destruction, short of attributions of genocide, then international law should obligate external humanitarian intervention to establish an interim “sacred trust of civilization”. Recommendation. International law should formulate an obligation for humanitarian autonomy under certain limited conditions of harm directed against a minority.
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AUTONOMY AND CULTURAL RIGHTS THE ARGUMENT OF CULTURAL DISADVANTAGE Juha Räikkä 1. INTRODUCTION Judging from the recent philosophical literature, one might conclude that differenceblind public policy is a thing of the past.* However, defining the status of cultural and other minority groups has become one of the main tasks of political philosophers, and most theorists take it for granted that many laws should be membership-sensitive rather than membership-blind. Groups have different identities, and they need – and are morally justified in having – group-differentiated legal rights, rights that are their rights. In multicultural societies, the notion of toleration is not useless, but it is insufficient, i.e. if it is not radically reinterpreted. What is needed is politics of recognition, politics of difference, a theory (or theories) of group representation, and a theory (or theories) of multicultural citizenship. In the age of diversity, the traditional doctrine of separation of state and group-identity should be rejected.1 While the general tendency in recent political theory is clear enough, there are many large questions that remain open. These open questions range from the grounds of membership-sensitive public policy (why is difference-blind public policy not morally justified?), to the limits of group-differentiated legal rights (which rights are morally justified?), and to the eligibility problem (which groups are justified in having special legal rights?). A more specific question that has a direct bearing on the main questions and that has achieved considerable attention in the discussion is the question of whether the fact that the cultural market-place leaves some cultural minority groups at a disadvantage is a relevant feature when formulating the public policy of a multicultural society. Should a group be supported by group-differentiated legal rights if its group culture is undermined by the * I would like to thank John F. Corvino (Wayne University), Alon Harel (The Hebrew University Jerusalem) and Mikko Wennberg (University of Turku, Finland) for helpful comments and written suggestions for earlier version of this article. An earlier version of this article is published in 78 Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2000). I am grateful to have their permission to publish this version. 1 See e.g., W. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1989), I. Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1990), C. Taylor et al., Multiculturalism and ‘The Politics of Recognition’ (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1992), and W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995).
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JUHA RÄIKKÄ economic, technical and political decisions made by the majority? As is well known, both in Liberalism, Community, and Culture (1989) and in Multicultural Citizenship (1995) Will Kymlicka’s answer to this question is, with certain important reservations, ‘yes’.2 But many of his critics have argued that the right answer to the question is, with certain important reservations, ‘no’. In their view, referring to cultural disadvantage in the justification of minority rights leads to serious difficulties; while many cultural groups are justified in having special rights, these rights cannot be justified by the disadvantage criterion.3 In the next few pages, I would like to analyze the nature and varieties of the argument of cultural disadvantage, as I shall call it. In particular, I try to show how it differs from the alternative argumentative patterns for minority rights. It is not my intention to interpret and comment upon Kymlicka’s theory, although the present discussion is certainly relevant both for his arguments and especially for his critics’ objections. My ultimate aim here is to say something important regarding questions about how the argument of cultural disadvantage can be defended and what the limits of the argument are. 2. VARIETIES OF THE ARGUMENT OF CULTURAL DISADVANTAGE Most arguments for group-differentiated legal rights aim to show that in certain cases membership in a group is a relevant feature that indicates that the group (i.e. its members) should have a right that other members of the society do not have and are not justified in having. According to these arguments, for instance, Jews and Muslims may have exemptions from animal slaughtering laws, disabled people may have a right not to follow the usual parking regulations, some ethnic groups may have exemptions from sex discrimination legislation, and some aboriginal groups may have a special right to hunt endangered species. Other arguments for groupdifferentiated rights defend the view that the majority of a society should provide, at 2
Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, ibid., esp. pp. 182−205; Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, ibid., esp. pp. 94−106, 144−147. 3 The notion of cultural disadvantage, as used by Kymlicka, is evaluated for instance in J. R. Danley, ‘Liberalism, Aboriginal Rights, and Cultural Minorities’, 20 Philosophy and Public Affairs (1991) pp.168−185, esp. p. 175; W. Cooper, ‘Critical Notice of Liberalism, Community, and Culture’, 23 Canadian Journal of Philosophy (1993) pp. 433−452, esp. p. 438; C. Taylor, Multiculturalism and ‘The Politics of Recognition’, 40–41fn; G. Brahm Levey, ‘Equality, Autonomy, and Cultural Rights’, 25 Political Theory (1997) pp. 215−248, esp. pp. 219–224; J. Nickel, ‘Review on Multicultural Citizenship’, 93 The Journal of Philosophy (1996) pp. 480–482; C. Kukathas, ‘Multiculturalism as Fairness’, 5 The Journal of Political Philosophy (1997) pp. 406-427, esp. p. 411; M. Galenkamp, ‘The Rationale of Minority Rights: Wishes Rather than Needs?’ in J. Räikkä (ed.), Do We Need Minority Rights? (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1997), pp. 41−57, esp. p. 43−44; J. Waldron, ‘Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative’, in W. Kymlicka (ed.), The Rights of Minority Cultures (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995) pp. 93−119, esp. pp. 105−110; A. Favell, ‘Applied Political Philosophy at the Rubicon: Will Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship’, 1 Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (1998) pp. 255−278.
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THE ARGUMENT OF CULTURAL DISADVANTAGE least partly, certain services for minorities, even if the majority itself is not interested in those services. These arguments include the claim that linguistic minorities should have a legal right to use their own language in court houses and the claim that sexual minorities should have a legal right to their own social services that concern sexuality. Both linguistic and sexual rights can be said to be groupdifferentiated rights, because even if all citizens are justified in having these rights, they are not – even in principle – interested in using them. These rights exist just because there are linguistic and sexual minorities. Arguments for group-differentiated legal rights are not arguments for mere toleration. In one traditional sense (there are many), toleration does not incur costs for the party who tolerates – except that it may be unpleasant to live in a society that allows practices of which one disapproves, say, sexual discrimination, ritual animal slaughtering or sadomasochistic behaviour.4 No doubt, toleration in the traditional sense may incur moral costs. For instance, if ritual animal slaughtering is tolerated and if it is in fact morally wrong, then tolerating ritual animal slaughtering incurs moral costs (which of course may be acceptable). However, group-differentiated legal rights incur costs not only in the latter sense but in the former one too. If members of a minority group have legal rights that no other citizen has, then rights are distributed unequally, which is presumably a (possibly acceptable) moral cost. But at the same time, it is a cost for the members of the majority too: they have fewer rights than the minority. Toleration incurs costs for the majority only if tolerated practices are permitted only for minority groups. When cultural rights, for instance, are carried out with special territorial rights, they limit the majority’s (but not the minority’s) right to move within the territory of the state. If the majority finances multilingual public services for linguistic minorities, or if ethnic associations are publicly supported, it is a cost for the majority. The main costs of group-differentiated rights are their domino effects, so to speak. Domino effects are the unintended, although often easily predictable, practical results of group-differentiated rights. These effects are both moral costs and costs for the majority. All sorts of group-differentiated rights may have domino effects; many group-differentiated rights in fact have domino effects. Linguistic rights, for instance, may help members of linguistic minorities go to good schools, get well-paid jobs, earn high social status, and live longer than members of the
4
For recent work on toleration, see e.g., G. P. Fletcher, ‘The Case for Tolerance’, 13 Social Philosophy and Policy (1996) pp. 229−239; M. Walzer, ‘The Politics of Difference: Statehood and Toleration in a Multicultural World’, 10 Ratio Juris (1997) pp. 165−176; D. H. Fisher, ‘Loyalty, Tolerance, and Recognition: Aspects of Morality in a Multicultural Society’, 31 The Journal of Value Inquiry (1997) pp. 339–351; S. Leader, ‘Toleration without Liberal Foundations’, 10 Ratio Juris (1997) pp. 139−164; R. Cohen-Almagor, ‘Why Tolerate? Reflections on the Millian Truth Principle’, 25 Philosophia (1997) pp. 131−152. See also K. Anthony Appiah, ‘The Multiculturalist Misunderstanding’, The New York Review of Books XLIV, 9 October (1997), pp. 30−36.
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JUHA RÄIKKÄ majority.5 Indigenous people’s special right to certain sources of livelihood may make them relatively wealthy, i.e. in comparison to majority members who live in the same area.6 Of course, the point of linguistic or cultural rights is not to cause injustices. But sometimes they do cause them, and in these cases the majority pays a remarkable price for the minority protection (which again, may be perfectly acceptable). Since group-differentiated legal rights are costly, they need specific justification. Those who defend unequal distribution of rights seem to have the burden of proof: if there is no reason to distribute rights unequally, they should be distributed equally. So how can group-differentiated rights be justified? The most common and perhaps intuitively most plausible argument for cultural group-differentiated legal rights is the argument of cultural disadvantage. The main idea of this egalitarian argument is simple. Because of the decisions made and practices adopted by the majority, cultural minorities are denied access to their own specific ethnic, national, linguistic or other sub-culture. Thus they are disadvantaged in realizing the good of cultural membership – whatever its form happen to be. But relevant group-differentiated legal rights promote egalitarian fairness and cultural equality by counteracting the superior power of mainstreamers. Therefore, those rights are morally justified. Although the main idea of the argument of cultural disadvantage is clear-cut, the argument has several varieties. It is crucial to distinguish between arguments that defend group-differentiated rights of minorities that are in a strongly disadvantaged position and arguments that defend group-differentiated rights of minorities that are in a weakly disadvantaged position. A cultural minority is in a strongly disadvantaged position if (and only if) without relevant group-differentiated rights its members are completely unable to use certain moral rights or common citizenship rights that the majority is easily able to use. A cultural minority is in a weakly disadvantaged position if (and only if) without relevant group-differentiated rights it is difficult and painful for its members to use certain moral rights or common citizenship rights that the majority is easily able to use. In their plain forms, the argument of cultural disadvantage for minorities that are in strongly disadvantaged position (A1) and the argument of cultural disadvantage for minorities that are in weakly disadvantaged position (A2) go as follows. (A1) Because of the fact X, there is a general moral right or a common legal citizenship right to Y. Without a group-differentiated legal right to Z, the members of group W are completely unable to use their right to Y. Therefore, group W is morally entitled to a group-differentiated legal right to Z (even if this may incur both moral costs and costs for the majority).
5
In Finland, members of the Swedish-speaking minority live longer than members of the Finnish-speaking majority. But the reason for this does not necessarily depend on minority rights. 6 In Norway, only Lapps can be reindeer-owners. It is only speculation that this will, as such, have effects of greater wealth.
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THE ARGUMENT OF CULTURAL DISADVANTAGE (A2) Because of the fact X, there is a general moral right or a common legal citizenship right to Y. Without a group-differentiated legal right to Z, it is difficult and painful for the members of group W to use their right to Y. Therefore, group W is morally entitled to a group-differentiated legal right to Z (even if this may incur both moral costs and costs for the majority). The following argument exemplifies version A2. Because one’s language is part of one’s identity, there is a moral right to use one’s own language in schools, for instance. But if minority languages are not publicly supported in schools, the only way members of linguistic minorities can use their own language in schools is for them to change their language to the majority language. However, this would be difficult and painful for the members of the minorities. Therefore, linguistic minorities should have publicly supported schools that use their own, original, language – even if this is a financial cost for the majority. All group-differentiated-rights arguments that are based on the view that cultural change – change of one’s language, communal membership, ethnic identity and so on – sometimes causes harm for the individuals who are asked to change, represent version A2 of the argument of cultural disadvantage. The easier it is for the members of a minority to assimilate to the mainstream, the weaker their disadvantaged position is. It is possible, perhaps even typical, that part of a given minority is in weakly disadvantaged position while another part of it is in a strongly disadvantaged position. The next example represents version A1. Because we do not know which religion, if any, should be followed, there is a general moral right to practice one’s own religion. But if Jews do not have exemptions from animal slaughtering laws, they are unable to practice their religion – and changing one’s religious beliefs, in the face of external forces, is practically speaking impossible.7 Therefore, Jews are justified in having the group-differentiated legal right to ritual slaughtering – even if this may cause animal suffering and mean that the majority has fewer rights than the Jewish minority. Both versions (A1−A2) of the argument of cultural disadvantage can be interpreted in four different ways. The above formulations suggest that the argument of cultural disadvantage says that disadvantage is a sufficient condition for relevant group-differentiated legal rights. But this is not the only way to use the argument. One might argue that cultural disadvantage is a necessary condition or a necessary and sufficient condition for special rights. Or one might claim that cultural disadvantage is simply relevant, although it is neither necessary nor sufficient for special rights. To make the discussion easier, let us give names to these separate interpretations of the argument of cultural disadvantage. 1. The Pure Disadvantage Criterion. Cultural disadvantage is a sufficient condition for relevant group-differentiated legal rights. 7
Let us suppose here that animal slaughtering is a part of Judaism. It is a theological question whether this is so.
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JUHA RÄIKKÄ 2. The Modified Disadvantage Criterion. Cultural disadvantage is a necessary condition for relevant group-differentiated legal rights. 3. The Strict Disadvantage Criterion. Cultural disadvantage is a necessary and sufficient condition for relevant group-differentiated legal rights. 4. The Modest Disadvantage Criterion. Cultural disadvantage is a relevant factor when justifying relevant group-differentiated legal rights.
The modified disadvantage criterion and the strict disadvantage criterion do not allow other justifications for special minority rights in place of the argument of disadvantage. So they do not only say that the argument of cultural disadvantage is correct; they also say that alternative forms are erroneous. The pure disadvantage criterion is less demanding than the modified disadvantage criterion and the strict disadvantage criterion in the sense that it does not reject alternative arguments for group-differentiated legal rights. The common characteristic of the pure disadvantage criterion and the strict disadvantage criterion is that they both entail that there are no circumstances that would cancel a group’s special rights if they are in a disadvantaged position: if a cultural minority is disadvantaged by being minority, that’s all that’s needed. The modest disadvantage criterion differs clearly from the three other interpretations of the argument of cultural disadvantage. The modest criterion allows that there may be many acceptable justifications for special minority rights, although it does not say that there should be many justifications. The modest disadvantage criterion allows that disadvantaged position alone to be sufficient justification for special legal rights, but it does not say that this should be the case. The point of the modest criterion is that, although there might be many justifications, cultural disadvantage, perhaps when supplemented with other relevant factors, justifies group-differentiated rights for cultural minorities. (Note that the claim that there may be many different justifications for group-differentiated legal rights does not necessarily entail that such groups that are not in a disadvantaged position are also entitled to group-differentiated legal rights. It is possible that only disadvantaged groups are justified in having special rights even if these rights are not justified by referring to cultural disadvantage). Since the argument of cultural disadvantage can be used to defend either minorities that are in a strongly disadvantaged position or minorities that are in a weakly disadvantaged position, and since the argument can be interpreted in four different ways, it follows that there are eight different readings of the argument of cultural disadvantage. It is unnecessary to give an example of each type. In both civic discussion and philosophical literature the most commonly used type is the one that says that disadvantage is a relevant feature (the modest disadvantage criterion) and that even minorities in a weakly disadvantaged position should have relevant group-differentiated legal rights. An example of this type is the claim that indigenous people should have territorial rights, since they are in a (weakly) disadvantaged position, while immigrant groups, which are also in a (weakly) 216
THE ARGUMENT OF CULTURAL DISADVANTAGE disadvantaged position, are not justified in obtaining similar rights, since they have changed their culture voluntarily.8 3. ON THE VALUE OF CULTURAL PLURALISM The argument of cultural disadvantage is based on the rights of the members of cultural minorities who are practically speaking forced to leave or change their culture or simply suffer if not supported with special legal rights. However, not all arguments for group-differentiated legal rights are based on the rights of these persons. Suppose there is a cultural minority that is not even in a very weakly disadvantaged position, i.e. it would be perfectly easy and painless for them to assimilate to the mainstream. Furthermore, let us imagine that giving groupdifferentiated legal rights to the group to avoid assimilation is very costly, i.e. the side-effects of minority protection involve serious moral costs and costs for the majority. Finally, let us assume that the main reason why most members stay in their group is that, because of special legal rights, they have many benefits from group membership. In this case, the argument of cultural disadvantage does not provide grounds for special rights, for the condition of disadvantage does not hold. However, there are arguments for group-differentiated rights that are not based on the rights of disadvantaged members of minorities which can be employed in the situation described. First, an argument can be based on the interests of those who have a patriotic reason to value a cultural group. According to this argument, it is crucial to take into account the concerns of those who value their cultural group intrinsically, and therefore special legal rights are justified even if there is no cultural disadvantage. Second, an argument can be based on the presumed intrinsic value of cultural groups. This argument maintains that because of the intrinsic value of (certain) cultural groups, they should be protected by special legal rights, whether or not they are disadvantaged. Finally, an argument can be based on the interests of the majority and the larger society. According to this argument, cultural diversity contributes to the richness of the lives of the majority, in aesthetic and many other senses, and so cultural groups are justified in having special protection, even if they are not disadvantaged. These arguments can be designated as the following: (1)
The Patriotic Argument.
(2)
The Intrinsic Value Argument.
(3)
The Cultural Diversity Argument.
Let us briefly estimate each of these arguments. (1) The Patriotic Argument. Consider the case of a small cultural minority most of whose members do not see much point in belonging to their group. Good schools, 8
Cf. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, supra note 1.
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JUHA RÄIKKÄ good jobs, and new opportunities are in the big cities, where people watch CNN and drink Campari in the evenings. Gradually, most members decide to leave, and the result is that the members who decide to stay watch as their culture slowly disappears. According to the patriotic argument, however, the larger society should prevent the ongoing process by giving appropriate (i.e. effective) groupdifferentiated legal rights to the members of the group. This is because some members are strongly interested in preserving their culture, and if their culture is not preserved, they are seriously harmed. As Charles Taylor argues, when there are persons in a group whose crucial interest is the ‘goal of survivance’, then they are harmed if the group is permitted to vanish.9 According to Taylor, it is important to ‘meet the concerns of those who see their communities as intrinsically valuable’.10 Taylor’s example is the people of French-Canadian ancestry. ‘In certain circumstances, a case could be made for rapid assimilation, particularly for future members of the community, if the only goal were to ensure that all individuals have the cultural resources necessary to undertake their own pursuit of the good. The people of French-Canadian ancestry, now assimilated in New England, are doing just as well as any other segment of the U.S. population in leading their lives in the Englishlanguage medium their share with their present compatriots. But the loss 11 from the point of view of survivance is clear.’
The patriotic argument has some plausibility in its simplicity. Obviously, some people do value their culture intrinsically, and cultural decay harms their interests. However, there are important queries regarding the argument. It is obvious that members of minorities cannot have an all-things-considered moral obligation not to disassociate from their group (although they may well have a prima facie obligation not to disassociate). Instead, individuals should be free to leave communities or groups whose terms they no longer accept.12 So one might ask why the majority should have an obligation to grant group-differentiated rights to a minority in order to preserve it, if the members of such a minority do not have obligations to preserve it, if they are largely not interested in preserving it, and if the persons who are planning to leave the group are not harmed if they are not given group-differentiated rights. Another problem is that it is not clear that a few people’s interest in the ‘goal or survivance’ is more important to take into account in legislation and policy decisions than the majority’s interests in avoiding moral costs and costs for themselves. Much hinges on what values agents embrace. Surely a further argument is needed to show that interest in the ‘goal of survivance’ is prior to interests concerning equal distribution of citizenship rights.
9
C. Taylor, ‘Can Liberalism Be Communitarian?’, 8 Critical Review (1994) p. 260. Ibid., p. 257. 11 Ibid., p. 260. 12 Cf. e.g., C. Kukathas, ‘Are There Any Cultural Rights?’ in W. Kymlicka (ed.), The Rights of Minority Cultures (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1995) p. 238. 10
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THE ARGUMENT OF CULTURAL DISADVANTAGE (2) The Intrinsic Value Argument. Another argument for group-differentiated rights that is not based on the rights of the members of a disadvantaged minority claims that cultural groups have intrinsic value. Not only do some people think that communities and cultural entities have intrinsic value, as pointed out by Taylor; they have intrinsic value in fact. To let certain groups vanish is bad not because it hurts those who value them, but because they are in fact valuable. This argument is presented for instance by Steven C. Rockefeller in his essay concerning ‘the intrinsic value of the different cultural forms’.13 Rockefeller writes: ‘It may be argued that human cultures are themselves like life forms. They are the products of natural evolutionary processes of organic growth. Each, in its own distinct fashion, reveals the way the creative energy of the universe, working through human nature in interaction with a distinct environment, has come to a unique focus. Each has its own place in the larger scheme of things, and each possesses intrinsic value quite apart from whatever value its traditions may have for other cultures.’14
The intrinsic value argument is interesting, and as the notions of intrinsic value and cultural form are anything but clear, it is not easy to say without qualification whether the argument is tenable. However, if one wishes to support groupdifferentiated rights with the intrinsic value argument, again there are important remarks to be made. First, if we should preserve cultural groups like we preserve nature and the environment, then we should allow natural changes of cultural groups – just like we allow natural changes when preserving ecosystems. So if a culture vanishes naturally, not as a result of violence or hidden pressure, is there anything wrong? Of course, historically speaking, cultures have not often vanished naturally, but surely one should allow a place in one’s theory for such natural vanishing. After all, cultural minorities are by their nature static entities only in myths and romance movies. In real life, cultures’ compositions, practices and characteristics change all the time – which is often a fortunate thing. Second, even if it were bad in all cases if cultural groups vanished (because they are intrinsically valuable), it would not follow that therefore they should be preserved by groupdifferentiated rights. A further argument is needed to show that the presumed intrinsic value of cultures is more important than the value of justice and well-being
13
S. C. Rockefeller, ‘Comment to Taylor’, in C. Taylor et al., Multiculturalism and ‘The Politics of Recognition’ (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1992) p.87. 14 Ibid., p. 94. Cf. M. Walzer, Thick and Thin – Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (Notre Dame University Press, Notre Dame 1994) p. 72. Albert Musschenga discusses Rockefeller’s argument in detail in his ‘Intrinsic Value as a Reason for the Preservation of Cultures’, a lecture presented in the meeting on Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Liberal Democracy, Amsterdam, November 1997.
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JUHA RÄIKKÄ of individual persons, granted that group-differentiated rights have moral costs.15 In its anti-individualism and romanticism, the claim that all cultures or all cultural practices are in all cases more valuable than justice sounds plainly false.16 (3) The Cultural Diversity Argument. According to the argument for special legal minority rights based on the interests of the majority, it is bad if minority cultures vanish because that is bad for people who interact and cooperate with them. The majority values cultural diversity, and even if they are sometimes unaware of the positive impacts of so-called multiculturalism, these impacts are real. This is why cultural groups should be protected by group-differentiated rights. Richard Falk defends special rights of indigenous people with the cultural diversity argument in the following way. ‘In a fundamental sense, indigenous peoples preserve and embody alternate life-styles that may provide models, inspiration, guidance in the essential work of world order redesign, an undertaking now primarily associated with overcoming self-destructive tendencies in the behaviour of modern societies . . . The Aboriginal viewpoint corresponds closely with the ecological perspective, and is at odds with developmental and growth perspectives of modern industrializing societies. The importance for all of us to maintain these societal models of ecological success, tested over a long stretch of time, provides a pragmatic rationale for safeguarding Aboriginal peoples. Beyond this, societal diversity enhances the quality of life, by enriching our experience, expanding cultural resources.’17
The cultural diversity argument includes important truths, in particular, the claim that sometimes diversity improves quality of life. However, the critical question regarding the argument is easy to guess: Does the fact that cultural variety may have desirable societal consequences, from the point of view of the majority, justify group-differentiated legal rights, granted that these rights have undesirable 15 Here I presume that it makes sense to say that some intrinsic values are more (or less) important than other (intrinsic) values. Whether this presumption is justified depends on one’s theory of the nature of intrinsic values. 16 There has been much discussion about what is the relation between minority protection and human rights, see e.g., C. C. Gould, ‘Group Rights and Social Ontology’, 28 The Philosophical Forum (1997), p. 81; Kukathas, supra note 12, p. 234; Leslie Green, ‘Internal Minorities and their Rights’, in W. Kymlicka (ed.), The Rights of Minority Cultures (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1995) pp. 261−267. Presumably, any moral evaluation must, ultimately, in order to be a moral evaluation, consider how actual individuals (and not only groups) have been or might be affected. 17 R. Falk, ‘The Rights of Peoples (In Particular Indigenous Peoples)’, in J. Crawford (ed.), The Rights of Peoples (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988) p. 23. Cf. W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 121−123. See also W. Cragg, ‘Two Concepts of Community or Moral Theory and Canadian Culture’, 25 Dialogue (1986) pp. 31−52, esp. p. 46, where Cragg argues against the liberal theory of justice on the basis that, as he sees it, it is compatible with cultural homogeneity (as it should not be).
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THE ARGUMENT OF CULTURAL DISADVANTAGE consequences, again from the point of view of the majority? Perhaps, perhaps not: The answer depends on details (i.e. on the amount and nature of costs, the quality of desirable effects, etc.). Another question is whether preserving cultural diversity in fact requires special rights. Surely it is not impossible that cultural diversity, in a relevant sense, would remain even without special rights. Furthermore, when cultural minorities are assimilated with the majority because they lack special legal rights, this situation may improve cultural diversity in a more desirable way than the ‘politics of recognition’. Of course, the cosmopolitan outlook of metropolises around the world is not the result of membership-sensitive public policy, but the consequence of assimilation. The argument of cultural disadvantage differs from the patriotic argument, the intrinsic value argument, and the cultural diversity argument, since the argument of cultural disadvantage does not presuppose that cultural groups are intrinsically valued, that groups have intrinsic value, or that cultural diversity contributes positively to the larger society; still less does it claim that these things could morally justify group-differentiated legal rights. Whether the patriotic argument, the intrinsic value argument, or the cultural diversity argument is correct, or whether they all are correct, is a question beyond the scope of this essay. However, if one or more of them is indeed correct, this does not show that the argument of cultural disadvantage is incorrect. For both the modest disadvantage criterion and the pure disadvantage criterion allow that there could be many justifications for group-differentiated rights.18 Indeed, the argument of cultural disadvantage, in particular the modest disadvantage criterion, can fruitfully be used with the alternative arguments. For instance, one might argue that a cultural group is justified in having relevant groupdifferentiated legal rights (i) if it is in a disadvantaged position and (ii) if giving group-differentiated rights to it has clear positive societal effects (the cultural diversity argument). Or one might say that a group is justified in having relevant group-differentiated legal rights (i) if it is in a disadvantaged position or (ii) if it has intrinsic value (the intrinsic value argument). In the final analysis, if we justify special minority rights with some form of the argument of cultural disadvantage, then perhaps the patriotic argument, the intrinsic value argument, and the cultural diversity argument tell something important about the positive side-effects of such morally justified legal rights. 4. NON-EGALITARIAN JUSTICE AND MINORITY PROTECTION There are arguments for group-differentiated minority rights that are not based on the disadvantage criterion but that are still based on the rights of members of minorities, unlike the arguments discussed in the previous section. This distinct category of arguments includes the contractian argument, the compensatory argument, and the original acquisition argument, as they might be called.
18
In Multicultural Citizenship, supra note 1, p. 120, Kymlicka is quite explicit that the argument of cultural disadvantage can work together with other arguments.
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JUHA RÄIKKÄ According to the contractian argument, some cultural groups have made historical agreements with the larger society that entitle them to group-differentiated legal rights, and therefore they are morally justified in having them. In Multicultural Citizenship Kymlicka defends this view and emphasizes the ‘importance of honouring historical agreements’, since ‘the way in which a national minority was incorporated often gives rise to certain group-differentiated rights’.19 The compensatory argument says that throughout history members of many cultural minorities have been discriminated against – for instance because of their nationality or ethnic background – and relevant group-differentiated legal rights will compensate for the earlier wrongdoing. This is why these rights are morally justified. Among others, Vernon van Dyke puts forth this argument: ‘where a group has been denied equality by discriminatory policies and practices, compensatory justice should be afforded’.20 According to the original acquisition argument, the rightful owners of the land are in many cases cultural minority groups, and therefore they are justified in having relevant group-differentiated rights, in particular territorial rights. As David Lyons puts it, the original acquisition argument concerns morally legitimate transfers by claiming that the transfers by which many minority cultures ‘lost lands were illegitimate’.21 Since the contractian argument, the compensatory argument, and the original acquisition argument are familiar from many contexts, and since the problems of the arguments are well known, it is needless to consider them in any detail. Whether some of them are acceptable (in certain historical cases) is not the issue here. A relevant question is, what is the essential difference between the argument of cultural disadvantage and the contractian argument, the compensatory argument, and the original acquisition argument? All of these arguments concern justice, and all of them ground the justification of special legal rights on the rights of the members of minorities, not on the interests of a few patriots, the interests of the majority, or the presumed intrinsic value of cultural groups. The difference lies in the fact that the argument of cultural disadvantage, unlike the contractian argument, the compensatory argument, and the original acquisition argument, is based on rights that minorities have but members of the majority do not. Of course, the point of these arguments is that members of minorities have special moral rights (because of agreement, past discrimination, or original acquisition), which is why they earn special legal rights as well. In this sense, these arguments represent non-egalitarian justice. So one may try to justify group-differentiated legal rights by saying that these rights are justified because we all have the same moral rights (the argument of cultural disadvantage) or by saying that they are justified because we do not have the
19
Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, supra note 1, pp. 116−117. V. van Dyke, ‘Justice as Fairness: For Groups?’, 69 The American Political Science Review (1975) p. 612. 21 D. Lyons, ‘The New Indian Claims and Original Rights to Land’, in J. Paul (ed.), Reading Nozick (Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1981) p. 358. Lyons does not accept the original acquisition argument. 20
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THE ARGUMENT OF CULTURAL DISADVANTAGE same moral rights (the contractian argument, the compensatory argument, and the original acquisition argument). Historical facts aside, suppose that Maoris are not in a disadvantaged position: suppose it will be easy for them to assimilate into the mainstream. (Let us again assume that it is possible that assimilation to the mainstream can be perfectly easy and painless for minorities). Suppose further that without special legal rights their age-old culture would vanish. In this case, should Maoris be protected by special legal rights? Surely common intuition is that they should, and because the disadvantage condition does not hold, this intuition cannot be justified by referring to the argument of cultural disadvantage. However, one may try to justify the intuition by the contractian argument, the compensatory argument, or the original acquisition argument. If Maoris have relevant special moral rights, these arguments could possibly do the job. A crucial question, however, is would it be unjust, in the case described, if Maoris were left without group-differentiated-rights, or would it be merely morally wrong? If our common intuition has nothing to do with justice, which is very much possible, then the contractian argument, the compensatory argument, and the original acquisition argument are no more useful than the argument of cultural disadvantage here, and they are not different in this respect. If the majority culture’s ‘assimilationist drive’ is not intended, but rather the undesirable consequence of historical circumstances far beyond their control, and if it is undesirable because not to correct it would be morally wrong rather than unjust, then perhaps we should talk about morality and collective responsibility rather than justice.22 5. PROS AND CONS OF THE ARGUMENT OF CULTURAL DISADVANTAGE The argument of cultural disadvantage can justify only such group-differentiated legal rights that incur moral costs (unequal distribution of rights and domino-effects) that are morally acceptable because of cultural equality. When a particular groupdifferentiated legal right is defended on the basis of the argument of cultural disadvantage, there is always an empirical question – what are the social consequences of that particular right – and a normative question – are these consequences morally acceptable because of cultural equality, or should we rather accept cultural disadvantages because the costs of the special right would be unreasonable? Any argument for special legal rights raises similar questions. For any justified moral argument for special legal minority rights should give moral reasons to accept the moral costs special legal rights produce.23
22
Cf. Cooper, supra note 3, pp. 438, 440. I apologize for the Maori-example: to repeat, the case is more or less counterfactual. At the same time, however, it seems to help us to clear our minds. 23 Cf. Kukathas, supra note 3, p. 423. Levey, supra note 3, pp. 222, 234. Note that one may reject the argument of cultural disadvantage simply by denying egalitarian philosophies in general, i.e. if it is true that the argument of cultural disadvantage is necessarily egalitarian.
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JUHA RÄIKKÄ However, when evaluating the argument of cultural disadvantage, there are questions to be asked that are not relevant if one evaluates any other argument from group- differentiated rights. The credibility of the argument of cultural disadvantage depends on various, distinct but interrelated, factors. In particular, the credibility depends on (F1) what type of argument of cultural disadvantage one uses (pure, strict, modified or modest disadvantage criterion), (F2) how badly a group whose rights are defended is disadvantaged (is it in a strongly or weakly disadvantaged position, how easy would assimilation be for the members) (F3) what the content of the argument is (what legal right is defended, what moral right grounds the claim, how is the existence of such a moral right defended) (F4) how the basic concepts of the argument of cultural disadvantage are defined (what counts as ‘systematic disadvantage’, which groups are ‘cultural’).
Consider each factor (F1−F4) briefly. (F1) It is obvious that the pure disadvantage criterion and modest disadvantage criterion are better formulations of the argument of cultural disadvantage than the modified disadvantage criterion and strict disadvantage criterion, since unlike the latter formulations, the former do not claim that disadvantage is a necessary condition for special rights. They allow that there are many acceptable arguments for group-differentiated legal rights – arguments that do not presume that disadvantage is a necessary condition for special rights – which sounds plausible. Intuitively it is at least possible that a cultural group is entitled to special rights even if it is not in a disadvantaged position. (Recall the Maori case above.) To explain and justify this intuition one needs considerations that are not based on the argument of cultural disadvantage. Sometimes the argument of cultural disadvantage is criticized simply on the grounds that it is unable to justify certain beliefs people commonly have (i.e. according to the criticism) regarding minority protection. Taylor, for instance, argues that the argument ‘fails to capture the heart of a politics of cultural survival’ since it does not see anything wrong in assimilating cultural groups that are happy to join the main crew.24 Whatever the merits of this objection, however, it does not show that the argument of cultural disadvantage is mistaken. For both the modest disadvantage criterion and the pure disadvantage criterion can be used together with the arguments Taylor prefers, i.e. the arguments that ‘meet the concerns of those 24
Taylor, supra note 9, p. 260. We may say that because of cultural disadvantage of the group we need to provide it extra-help to integrate in the broader society. In Israel for instance the children of immigrants get extra hours of Hebrew teaching aimed at reducing the pain of integration.
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THE ARGUMENT OF CULTURAL DISADVANTAGE who see their communities as intrinsically valuable’,25 and other arguments that aim to justify the belief that it is possible that a group should have special rights even if it is not in a disadvantaged position. (F2) The argument of cultural disadvantage works better if the group whose special rights are defended is in a strongly disadvantaged position than if it is in a weakly disadvantaged position. In general, the weaker the disadvantaged position, i.e. the easier it is for the members of minority to assimilate to the main culture, the weaker the argument of cultural disadvantage. The explanation for this is obvious. If a group is unable to use certain moral rights or common citizenship rights without appropriate group-differentiated legal rights, there is a strong moral reason to grant such legal rights. But if it is relatively easy (although not completely painless) for a minority to use certain moral rights or common citizenship rights even without group-differentiated legal rights, the moral case for allowing such rights is weak (although nevertheless real). John R. Danley has argued that the argument of cultural disadvantage does not work at all if the group whose rights are defended is not in a strongly disadvantaged position. Danley writes that the core intuitions that the argument of cultural disadvantage seeks to tap ‘are associated with circumstances such as physical handicaps or social conditions such as being born into a poor family’.26 Just as handicapped people are justified in having their own parking places etc., so members of minority cultures are justified in having relevant group-differentiated rights, or so the argument of cultural disadvantage goes. However, in Danley’s view, the ‘very comparison of cultural membership with the possession of a handicap is disingenuous’, for most ‘individuals with handicaps would readily give them up if they could, but they cannot’, while ‘members of minority cultures are usually not at all willing to give up membership in their culture, but they can’. Danley asks’ ‘[w]hat if one could choose not to be handicapped or to be born into poverty’, and his answer is that then, immediately, ‘our intuitions shift’.27 For special rights are acceptable only if no voluntary component is included. While Danley is certainly right in pointing out the difference between the moral relevance of being in a strongly disadvantaged position and the moral relevance of being in a weakly disadvantaged position, his criticism rests on an exaggeration. Surely there is also a moral difference between being able to choose one’s culture without difficult and painful experiences (a minority that is not in a disadvantaged position) and being able to choose one’s culture with such experiences (a minority that is in a weakly disadvantaged position). Some group-differentiated rights may be well justified solely on the basis of preventing difficult and painful experiences. 25
Ibid., p. 257. Danley, supra note 3, p. 176. Cf. Cooper, supra note 3, p. 437. 27 Ibid., p. 177. Cf. argument for homosexual minorities. It is (typically) not a matter of free choice whether one is disabled, and likewise one probably cannot choose one’s sexual orientation either. For a discussion, see J. F. Corvino, ‘How Not to Argue for Gay Rights’ in J. Räikkä (Ed.), Do We Need Minority Rights? (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1997) pp. 215−235. 26
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JUHA RÄIKKÄ Even if one can choose his or her language, choosing one’s language is very different from choosing, say, one’s clothes.28 (F3) It is obvious that it is the content of the argument of cultural disadvantage that makes it tenable or, alternatively, ambiguous. Suppose that someone presents the following argument: Because this is a free world, there is a moral right to enjoy the concerts of one’s favourite artists. But if Luciano Pavarotti fans do not have reduced prices for plane tickets, it is painful and difficult for them to exercise their moral right. Therefore, the subculture of Pavarotti fans is entitled to reduced prices for plane tickets. In the name of cultural equality, the majority should help them pay for their tickets.
Formally speaking, this is an instance of the argument of cultural disadvantage. But clearly the argument is not justified. (It is unnecessary to specify all the misunderstandings contained in it.) A common objection against the argument of cultural disadvantage is the claim that the argument would vindicate too many group-differentiated rights for too many minorities. Geoffrey Brahm Levey, among others, argues that the ‘attempt to develop a general theory of minority rights via the value of equality and the notion of cultural disadvantage is a mistake’, since the argument ‘seems to mandate too much given the number of minorities eligible for recognition’.29 Levey’s target is Kymlicka’s version of the argument of cultural disadvantage, and to be sure, it is possible that, unintentionally, it does mandate ‘too much’.30 However, the fact that this form of the argument of cultural disadvantage can be used to defend of all kinds of group-differentiated rights for all kinds of minorities does not entail that therefore all versions of the argument are wrong. Of course, it is possible that some versions of the argument are obviously wrong, as exemplified by the above argument for special rights for Pavarotti fans, while some other versions are as obviously correct. If a version of the argument of cultural disadvantage is found unjustified, this is insufficient evidence for the conclusion that it is a mistake ‘to develop a general theory of minority rights via the value of equality and the notion of cultural disadvantage’". (In short, to show that Kymlicka’s theory fails is not to show that all theories that are based on the value of cultural equality must fail.) (F4) A crucial and probably the most difficult question regarding the argument of cultural disadvantage is what exactly is meant by ‘cultural disadvantage’, or
28 Danley, supra note 3, p. 177, says that individuals are responsible for their culture, i.e. he thinks that in a relevant sense individuals are able to choose their culture ņ like clothes. 29 Levey, supra note 3, p. 224. Cf. Danley, supra note 3, p. 169. 30 Kymlicka’s explicit intention is to limit the number of groups eligible for groupdifferentiated rights. See e.g., Multicultural Citizenship, supra note 1, pp. 143–149. Note that the pure disadvantage criterion allows more group-differentiated rights than the modest criterion, since it claims that cultural disadvantage is a sufficient condition for such rights.
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THE ARGUMENT OF CULTURAL DISADVANTAGE ‘systematic cultural disadvantage’.31 There are two ways the argument of cultural disadvantage can collapse if the notion of cultural disadvantage is defined carelessly. Either the argument does not imply anything whatsoever, since it is impossible to interpret it concretely. Or the argument implies conclusions that are plainly false, say, the conclusion that a ‘subculture’ of Pavarotti fans have a group-differentiated legal right to discounted plane tickets. If the notion of cultural disadvantage is understood widely, the implication is that almost every citizen belongs to a group that is disadvantaged. Iris Marion Young writes that perhaps ‘in some utopian future there will be a society without group oppression and disadvantage’, but in (United States) today ‘at least the following groups’ are disadvantaged in some way or another: ‘women, blacks, Native Americans, Chinanos, Puerto Ricans and other Spanish-speaking Americans, Asian Americans, gay men, lesbians, working-class people, poor people, old people, and mentally and physically disabled people’.32 Young does not claim that these disadvantaged groups are all culturally disadvantaged, but it is clear that if we grant that being in a (culturally or socioeconomically) disadvantaged position as such justifies special legal rights (like the group representation rights that Young defends), then Levey’s and others’ concern that too many rights will be recognized resurfaces.33 If the argument of cultural disadvantage mandates too much, perhaps one should either check whether one’s notion of cultural disadvantage can be defined in a way that produces more plausible results or extend one’s argument with criteria that prevent counter-intuitive consequences. A deep philosophical question here is whether one is entitled to reject (or strongly revise) a moral argument simply because he or she thinks that its implications are counter-intuitive. Are we justified in rejecting a version of the argument of cultural disadvantage, if it implies that immigrants should have certain group-differentiated legal rights and if we think that they should not have those rights?34 If we are so justified, what, then, is the purpose of moral arguments 31
There is a large body of literature concerning the notion of systematic disadvantage and systematic discrimination. See e.g., N. Glazer, ‘Individual Rights against Group Rights’ in A. Tay and E. Kamenka (eds.), Human Rights (Edward Arnold, London 1978) pp. 87−103, esp. p. 93; J. Bohman, ‘Public Reason and Cultural Pluralism’, 23 Political Theory (1995) pp. 253−279, esp. p. 272; J. Räikkä, ‘On the Ethics of Minority Protection’ in M. Suksi (ed.), Autonomy: Applications and Implications (Kluwer Academic Publishers, The Haque 1998) pp. 33−42. 32 I. M. Young, ‘Polity and Group-Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship’, 99 Ethics (1989) pp. 250–274, esp. p. 261. Cf. I. M. Young, ‘Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy’, in S. Benhabib (ed.), Democracy and Difference (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1996) pp. 120−135, esp. p. 126. 33 Cf. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, supra note 1, p. 141. 34 Both Levey and Danley think that we are justified in rejecting a theory if its implications are wrong. See Levey, supra note 3, pp. 222−224; Danley, supra note 3, p. 169. For a discussion, see J. Räikkä, ‘Is the Membership-Blind Model of Justice False by Definition’ in J. Räikkä (Ed.), Do We Need Minority Rights? (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1997) pp. 3−19.
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JUHA RÄIKKÄ anyway? Another question is exactly when a version of the argument of cultural disadvantage does mandate too much. Some people have a belief that immigrants are not justified in having special legal rights even if they are as disadvantaged as indigenous people. But there are different beliefs too. There are good grounds to argue that many different cultural groups are entitled to group-differentiated legal rights, since the content of these rights varies case by case, and therefore there is no danger that the result is catastrophic inflation of special rights.35 Perhaps only indigenous people are entitled to territorial rights, but immigrants may be entitled, say, to linguistic rights. 6. CONCLUDING REMARKS I have argued that, in principle, group-differentiated legal rights of minority cultures, i.e. the members of such groups, can be defended by referring to the moral value of cultural equality. Whatever the objections and alternatives to the argument of cultural disadvantage show, they do not show that the basic idea of the argument is mistaken. Cultural disadvantage is a morally relevant factor that should be taken into account when formulating laws and public policies of multicultural liberal democracies. Perhaps this is unsurprising; but if it is, then it is surprising that many theorists have thought in other way. The argument of cultural disadvantage can be defended by defining its basic concepts carefully, by supporting its content with plausible reasons, by trying to formulate it so that it rests on a plausible form of the argument (i.e., on the modest disadvantage criterion), and by not using it in defence of minority groups that are merely in a very weakly disadvantaged position. All this may sound relatively trivial, but in practice it is difficult to state the argument of cultural disadvantage so that all the relevant factors are taken into account, and here are the limits of the argument, too. For instance Kymlicka’s main argument for the group-differentiated legal rights of cultural minorities is a highly sophisticated version of the argument of cultural disadvantage, and even that version is found dubious by many commentators. While some critics’ objections may have been mistaken, their criticisms show that concrete versions of the argument of cultural disadvantage are bound to be contestable. It is often difficult to judge how easy it would be for the members of a particular minority to assimilate to the majority culture. Those who passionately defend groupdifferentiated rights tend to think that assimilation is often very painful and difficult, while their critics do not see many problems in assimilation. It is obvious that these questions should be solved on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the historical circumstances: general philosophical theories of minority protection are quite useless here. However, one should keep in mind that it is one thing to evaluate how easy assimilation would be and another thing to evaluate how acceptable it would be. Some people think that in certain cases assimilation should be accepted whether or not it is painful and difficult for those who assimilate. In Estonia, for instance, 35
As argued by Green, supra note 16, p. 261.
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THE ARGUMENT OF CULTURAL DISADVANTAGE many people think (wrongly perhaps) that the Russian minority, the descendants of those who once occupied the country, should not have linguistic rights even if they know that learning Estonian is anything but easy for the Russians. In this and similar cases the question is really not about whether cultural disadvantage is a fact but whether cultural disadvantage is a morally relevant fact such that it suffices, when other relevant factors are taken into account, to justify special rights. Here a philosophical theory of minority protection is needed.
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THE RIGHT OF A PEOPLE TO EXERCISE THEIR CULTURE – A SCANDINAVIAN MODEL Isi Foighel1 The international trend of the transformation of the colonies to independent states which matured in the years after 1950 – was first inspired by the desire of the independent people to take over the responsibility for their own destiny. This trend, which resulted in many new states, had its price. Very seldom did the transformation take place without bloodshed and more often than not the development led to a severing of relations with the former colonial power. In Scandinavia, the international development had its effect on groups of citizens who defined themselves as a people and whose language, culture and other characteristics were distinct from those of the majority of the population. In contradistinction to what happened in the world at large, the indigenous people of Scandinavia did not aim at independence, but they wanted a type of autonomy which gave them the right and the possibility to manage and decide their own affairs. They wanted respect for their cultural and other rights according to international law. The question of the rights of indigenous people had also played a decisive role in Denmark.2 The Faeroe people had obtained local autonomy with a wide right to self–government already in 1948, and Greenland received local autonomy by the Greenland Home Rule Act of 29 November 1978. This act was based on a report made by a Commission on Home Rule appointed by the Government. The Commission comprised five members elected by the Greenland Provincial Council, the two Greenland members of Parliament, seven members elected by Parliament and a Chairman appointed by the Minister for Greenland. The background for the commission’s report was the following: With a total of 2,175,600 square kilometres, Greenland constitutes the largest island of the world. By far the greater part of the Island is permanently covered by the icecap, the ice-free areas covering only 341,700 square kilometres. This area is inhabited by some 45,000 persons of which nearly 40,000 were born in Greenland, ethnically being Inuit. By far the greater part of the working population (some 13,500 persons) make their livelihood from hunting, fishing and sheep-breeding, 1
Parts of this article have been published in Meddelelser om Groenland, Man & Society, no.1,1980, and in Rettsteori og rettslov, Universitets-forlaget, Oslo 2002. 2 In Norway, the Sami people wanted recognition of their minority rights as an indigenous people. The Norwegian Government appointed Carsten Smith as the first chairman of the Sami Rights Committee (1980-1985). It was a good appointment. Carsten Smith accepted as his basic standpoint that the right of a people to exercise their culture is one of the fundamental human rights. The Committee’s reports from 1984-1987 earned the full support of the Government and the Storting. The work of the Committee resulted in a separate Sami Act and changes in the Norwegian Constitution.
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ISI FOIGHEL whereas the rest today is occupied in the field of administration, transport, building, construction etc. Since the famous voyage of the Danish missionary Hans Egede to Greenland in 1721, Greenland has been considered a Danish colony. The first major general regulation concerning Greenland, ‘Instructions regarding Trade and Whalehunters in Greenland’, was issued on 19 April 1782. In this act the Danish King laid down the general policy regarding the Northern colony. The instructions provide that the administration should apply the guiding principle that any work undertaken in Greenland should be made in the best interest of the Greenlanders. Trading interests should also be promoted as much as possible, but should have second priority. The administration of Greenland has had its seat in Copenhagen, but in the second half of the nineteenth century local organs of government were established: Elected Advisory Councils – subsequently replaced by Municipal Councils – and two Provincial Councils for Northern and Southern Greenland respectively, which were merged into one Council in 1960. The status of colony could hardly survive the second world war, during which, above all, the association with the USA meant stronger contact with the surrounding world. This, in conjunction with the import of many novel and exciting goods and an extended economy, created a need for – as well as an expectation of – a new epoch. When the new Danish Constitution was adopted in 1953, Greenland became an integral part of the Danish Realm with equal rights. In this connection it is interesting to note, that Greenland becoming integrated in the Danish Realm - in spite of the Declaration regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories in Chapter XI in the UN Charter - was approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1954 upon representatives of the Greenland population having appeared and expressed their agreement with the amended constitution. At the same time a tremendous programme of development was initiated in all areas in order to fulfil the goals of the new order set by Denmark as well as by Greenland: to create the greatest possible equality between Danes and Greenlanders. The fact that this task involved enormous problems may be seen from the number of commissions and committees which, since then, have been established in order to adjust the goals and the methods. The work of the Commission on Home Rule was influenced by three major elements: 1) Due to its political composition, the Commission had to find a political solution, which – at the time was critical in the evolution of the relations between Denmark and Greenland – could prevent any breaking off of these relations and which, on the contrary, could contribute to the creation of a new basis for strengthening the ties which hold the two parts of the Realm together.
The fact that it was justified to characterize the relation between Denmark and Greenland was critical in the early seventies stems from a number of circumstances.
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THE RIGHT OF A PEOPLE TO EXERCISE THEIR CULTURE – A SCANDINAVIAN MODEL First of all one may point to the fact that the evolution which had commenced some 25 years earlier involving a mutual wish of equality in terms of social status, education, housing and other matters between Greenland and Denmark had changed the Greenland society in major ways and in comparatively few years.The efficiency and the speed with which the changes took place had created in many people in Greenland some uncertainty and insecurity in relation to the many novelties, which created dissatisfaction and strains in the relation between Greenland and Denmark. However, even though it is difficult to argue that efficiency goes too far and although, by definition, one cannot proceed too speedily in creating decent dwellings, fighting tuberculosis, modernizing a fleet of fishing vessels, etc., the enormous Danish investments and the great number of experts and workmen dispatched to Greenland, nonetheless meant that the influence of the Government upon everyday life in Greenland in all fields was felt more strongly. Consequently, Greenlandic influence was seen as correspondingly constantly decreasing. In other words, Greenland felt that equality was hardly a reality. ‘One was a tenant in one’s own country’, as the saying went. Secondly the referendum in 1972 regarding the European Community played a role. The result of the referendum in Greenland was that only 28.4 per cent wished to join the EC. The votes cast in Greenland were - in fact fully in accordance with the constitutional status of Greenland – combined with the votes in the rest of Denmark, so that Greenland became included in the Danish EC-membership. For the first time the Danish Government engaged in a Greenland policy, which many conceived as contrary to the wishes of Greenland. This created a feeling of powerlessness. Finally, there is no doubt that the fact that concessions for the exploitation of oil outside the coast of Greenland were given in the spring of 1975, created some disturbance although the decision had been approved by a majority of Greenlandic politicians. The concession likewise created expectations regarding a different future, speeding up new thoughts on the relationship between Denmark and Greenland. 2) The Commission was furthermore obliged to find a solution which could be implemented by Greenlandic politicians at a time when even the Greenlandic society had become complex, but did not have the requisite number of educated Greenlanders. In this respect the Commission felt its task was to contribute to the drafting of blue-prints which were not binding upon the future home rule authorities but which, on the other hand, would be applicable if so desired. Such proposals, for instance regarding Greenland schools, radio and churches, were therefore purposely drafted by the Greenlandic members of the Commission, the remaining members contributing exclusively with their expert knowledge and experience stemming from their participation in legislative work for a great many years. Unanimity between Greenland and the Danish members was not attempted in this part of the Commissions work.
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ISI FOIGHEL 3) Finally, the work of the Commission on Home Rule was influenced by the distinct and obvious limitation, accepted by both parties, that the arrangements to be established would have to be in conformity with the Danish Constitution. Amending the Constitution was out of question.
The terms of reference of the Commission which have been accepted by the Danish as well as the Greenlandic members provided that introducing home rule should be done within ‘the frames of the unity of the Realm’. This principle was derived from Article 1 of the Danish Constitution. The assumption that national unity is to be preserved implied: - that upon home rule having been established, Greenland remains a part of the Danish Realm; - that sovereignty continues to be exclusively held with the authorities of the Realm (the Government and Parliament); - that home rule for Greenland cannot be established through a treaty based on international law, but exclusively on the basis of constitutional law through a Danish act by means of which the Danish Parliament delegates a certain, precisely defined, part of its competence to home rule, and - that only part of the competence of the authorities of the Realm may be delegated to home rule, just as only fields which pertain exclusively to Greenland but not to the Realm as a whole or to other parts of the Realm may come under home rule. Consequently, national unity means that certain fields, as for instance security, foreign policy, and currency policy must remain with the authorities of the Realm, just as it will not be possible to make an unlimited delegation of fields to home rule. However, there is also implied in national unity a significant, although somewhat diffuse, assumption of a political-moral nature regarding mutual solidarity between the various parts of the Realm which, among other things, involves mutual support and a willingness to take the interests of the Realm into due account in major issues. Against this background one may describe home rule as a particularly qualified type of self-government. Self-government means a statutory delegation of certain powers, so that parliament and the government refrain from legislating or administering certain fields, but leaves this to local organs, as for instance municipal self-government. The characteristic feature of home rule is that the powers which have been statutorily transferred are, in terms of their area, identical to the powers exercised by the national authorities in other parts of the Realm. As far as municipal self-government under the Constitution is concerned, the limitations upon the national authorities which the various types of self-government involve may be classified as functional ones, whereas the limitations upon the powers of the national authorities under home rule are territorial ones, the powers being limited to that part of the Realm which does not come under local home rule. In other words, the difference between municipal self-government as established by the Constitution and home rule is significant. 234
THE RIGHT OF A PEOPLE TO EXERCISE THEIR CULTURE – A SCANDINAVIAN MODEL The main purpose of home rule is to transfer (delegate) powers and consequently responsibility from Danish political authorities to Greenlandic political authorities which shall administer not only such community tasks as are taken over from the state, but which shall also establish rules to be applied in administration and have an independent financial responsibility for solving the various tasks. Consequently, the main task has been to try to implement this objective by creating the framework (the rules) in the Home Rule Act for exercising this responsibility and for the establishment of the competent executive organs. The home rule authorities should comprise of a popularly elected landsting (Greenland Assembly) and a landsstyre (Greenland Executive) elected by the assembly, so that the administration, at least for the time being, acts on behalf of the assembly. There is, however, nothing preventing the assembly from giving the administration independent powers in due course. It follows from the principle of national unity that certain fields cannot be transferred to home rule authorities. This applies particularly to such fields as constitutional law (including the highest branches of government, the right to vote at parliamentary elections as well as eligibility, the administration of justice and constitutional rights), external relations (including the treaty-making power), national finances (including the Central Bank and its functions), financial policy, monetary policy, currency policy, defense policy, criminal proceedings and imprisonment, as well as fundamental principles regarding the law of persons family law, inheritance law, and the law of contracts. Just as under the Faeroe Island home rule system there has been unanimity in relation to the Greenland home rule on the basic principle, that legislative power and the power of the purse should not be divided. There has, however, also been unanimity that this principle does not prevent those fields in which Greenlandic self-financing is not possible, at least not within the immediate future, may be transferred to home rule authorities, since it should be possible to grant government subsidies to such tasks. From national unity stems the distinct consequence that the power to maintain and develop foreign relations, which are part of Danish sovereignty, is vested in national authorities. This applies also to the power to enter into international obligations within areas which have come under home rule. Introducing home rule means that legislative powers, as well as other powers to establish rules, to some extent are transferred to Greenlandic home rule authorities. But where the Government’s undertaking of obligations under international law becomes consequential in areas where power to establish internal rules has been transferred to home rule authorities, the latter will have to cooperate in the necessary steps of implementation, including the adoption of new rules. Consequently, it becomes necessary, when entering into treaties, to engage in a prior consultation with home rule authorities. Both politically and legally the question of exploitation of mineral resources in Greenland gave rise to special problems.
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ISI FOIGHEL Under the Greenland Mineral Resources Act of 1965 the legislative position has been that ‘all mineral resources in Greenland belong to the state’ (Article 1 of the Act). Although the exclusive purpose of this provision is to establish that natural resources are not subject to private ownership, the phraseology of the Act has, in later years, been deemed offensive by the majority of the public of Greenland. It is interpreted as expressing the fact, that the state, i.e. Denmark rather than Greenland, has complete powers over the natural resources with the consequence, that Greenlandic political authorities have no decisive word on this issue, be it in relation to actual exploitation, the protection of environmental values, or the like. Furthermore, Inuit as well as First Nations living in Canada and in the United States have recently advanced claims of ‘aboriginal rights’ to natural resource found in the areas previously occupied by former colonial powers. These points of view, as well as the hope stemming from the believe in the existence of a tremendous richness of oil, and the issuance of concessions and actual exploitation on the Greenland Continental Shelf in 1975 put their mark on the debate in Greenland and came to a climax in the adoption of a resolution by the Greenlandic Provincial Council in November 1975. The effect of the resolution was that ‘mineral resources belong to the permanent population of Greenland’. As for the doctrine on ‘aboriginal rights’ as invoked in Canada and the United States it hardly seemed to amount to anything but ownership of a right to use surface soil, and it appeared to be connected with legal systems under which private individuals had ownership to soil as well as to subsurface resources. At any rate, the main purpose of the doctrine in Canada evolved so as to be interepreted that the indigenous population should not be relegated to a second-rate position compared to the position of the remaining population of Canada and its provinces under the federal Constitution. The doctrine had, however, at the time for the Commission’s report, not been recognized as a positive legal principle in Canada, nor in the United States. Furthermore, private ownership of soil is unknown in Greenland, and at the same time natural resources in Denmark are, on the whole, not subject to private ownership. Even if the doctrine on aboriginal rights had been generally accepted as an internationally recognized legal principle, its substance would hardly be applicable to the situation in Greenland. Although Greenland’s conception of the current legal position was to some extent based upon a misinterpretation of the Danish Mining Act, there was on the other hand, no doubt that the permanent population of Greenland has seen the current arrangement as an infringement, and during the debate in the Commission it was obvious that the previous phraseology could not be maintained which, incidentally, was not even desired by Denmark. From the Greenlandic side it was further claimed that sovereignty over natural resources stems from the Greenlandic people’s right to self-determination as formulated in the UN Covenants on Human Rights Article 1. Some members of the Commission felt that the Greenlanders were not a ‘people’ in the legal sense of the 236
THE RIGHT OF A PEOPLE TO EXERCISE THEIR CULTURE – A SCANDINAVIAN MODEL Covenant. Others felt that the Greenlanders had already used their right to selfdetermination in 1953 by opting for the solution that Greenland should constitute an integral part of the Kingdom of Denmark. The basic principles agreed upon on natural resources have been laid down in section 8 of the Home Rule Act which runs as follows: (1) The resident population of Greenland has fundamental rights to natural resources of Greenland. (2) To safeguard the rights of the resident population in respect of nonliving resources and to protect the interests of the unity of the Realm, it shall be enacted by statute that preliminary study, prospecting and the exploitation of these resources are to be regulated by agreement between the Government and the Landsstyre. (3) Before any agreement under subsection (2) is entered into, any member of the Landsstyre may demand that the matter be laid before the Landsting, which may determine that the Landsstyre may not consent to an agreement of the proposed content.
The first paragraph of this section amounts to a political declaration of principle. Although an actual legal construction is therefore hardly possible, one may stress that the political/moral demands supporting the recognition of fundamental rights to natural resources of the permanent population stem, above all, from an emotional cohesiveness between a population and the land which it has inhabited for centuries.This cohesiveness naturally leads to demands for certain rights not covered by traditional legal parlance. The official comments to the act further states that the rights to be taken into account in framing the arrangement on natural resources are the following: (1) A right to a decisive influence in the area of natural resources, in particular an influence upon the framing of a natural resources policy and the speed with which it should be implemented. (2) A right to secure contraction of any possible detrimental influences upon the physical or social environment so that the traditional business life, culture, and way of life of Greenland is preserved. (3) A right to a dividend of enterprises exploiting natural resources with a view to creating a financial basis for an improvement of living conditions, particularly in the long run.
None of these rights are absolute rights in the legal sense, and they must also be seen in the light of the constitutional structure desired for the nation and the population, which has been acknowledged by both parties. Consequently, the provisions of the Home Rule Act concerning the natural resources arrangement have been framed as a mutual right of veto. In principle the right of veto may serve its purpose without ever being explicitly exercised. The 237
ISI FOIGHEL existence of the right of veto will in itself be a reality in relation to the administration’s drafting of proposals as well as in relation to debates and submissions and direct negotiations between the Government and the home rule authorities. The mere existence of the right of veto may be seen as a means available to both parties to force a development or concrete decisions agreeable to them. The right of veto will namely enable them to specify the particular assumptions and conditions upon which their accession to a proposed decision rests. In other words, the right of veto may operate as an effective instrument without actually being exercised. The issue regarding the division and application of any possible future income from natural resources accruing to the Treasury involved serious elements of uncertainty at the time the Home Rule Act was adopted, both in relation to the question whether natural resources actually existed, the magnitude of any possible resources, the financial outcome of any exploitation as well as the timing of it. Against this background the Home Rule Commission proposed that public revenue from natural resources in Greenland should be first applied for compensating the previous transfer of capital from Denmark to Greenland. There was a joint Danish/Greenlandic desire that home rule authorities should become independent of subsidies from Denmark and as such Danish subsidies had an inversely proportional relationship with any increase in income from natural resources. Any other additional public revenue should be for the benefit of the nation as a whole as well as for Greenland, so that part of such additional income should belong to Greenland. Article 9 of the Home Rule Act concerns a special subject, namely that of the Greenlandic language. The idea was that the introduction of home rule should also lead to a formal recognition of Greenlandic as the main language of Greenland. In an overriding way Greenlandic is an integral part of the way in which the population of Greenland conceives its own identity, and it is consequently of major significance in maintaining and strengthening this identity. As a national language Danish is, firstly, the linguistic link between population groups of the entire nation, but as for Greenland it is, furthermore, a means of communication with the world at large, due to the fact that, conditions being what they are, this communication takes place through Danish authorities and Danish institutions. Above all, the major part of higher education must take place at educational institutions in Denmark. Consequently, the Home Rule Act also provides for thorough teaching of the Danish language. In public relations both languages may be applied on equal terms. This involves, above all, that both languages may be applied in the relations between Greenland and Danish authorities, and that any citizen of Greenland in addressing or contacting public authorities may claim, that the contact be carried out in the language which the person in question prefers to use. Incidentally, this is in line with the practice which has been used by Greenlandic courts in later years. The Greenland Home Rule Act together with accessory legislation - which was adopted by Parliament on the 29 November 1978 - serves the purpose of meeting 238
THE RIGHT OF A PEOPLE TO EXERCISE THEIR CULTURE – A SCANDINAVIAN MODEL Greenland’s wishes within the bounds of local influence upon political decisions which in those years characterized developments also existing elsewhere in Danish society. The basic philosophy may be expressed in the terms, that the population of Greenland did not wish national independence but improved possibilities of strengthening and expanding the identity of Greenland through an increased independent responsibility. The Act is likewise an expression of the fact, that the principle of equality between Greenland and the rest of Denmark has been abandoned in the light of a recognition of the impossibility of creating equality between population groups living under conditions so much at variance. Instead the act is based upon the principle of equal rights regarding responsibility and powers concerning the future of the respective societies. The introduction of Home Rule in Greenland meant entrusting to the population of Greenland and its elected representatives not only important, but at the same time difficult and perhaps even onerous tasks. It was, therefore, only natural that implementation of home rule should take place as a gradual process and on the basis of a carefully worked out schedule, which was also Greenland’s desire. The 25 years which have passed since home rule was introduced in Greenland has shown beyond any doubt, that a sense of mutual understanding in implementing the transfer of public tasks, and the overall relation between the two parts of the Realm has evolved in a harmonious manner satisfactory to Greenland as well as to Denmark.
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PART III CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION, INTERNATIONAL MONITORING AND IMPLEMENTATION
INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES OF AUTONOMY AUTONOMY (INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES OF AUTONOMY) Yoram Dinstein 1. What is autonomy? Linguistically, the term is derived from Greek: auto means self and nomos is law. Autonomy, in the legal-political vocabulary, denotes selfgovernment. Self-government is obviously a broad concept applicable in manifold contexts. It is therefore necessary to clarify that in this paper it will be confined to a system of self-government granted to a particular region (or several regions) within a certain country. In this sense, autonomy is not to be confused with federalism.1 Like federalism, an autonomy regime is predicated on the principle of political integration without homogeneity. However, federalism is a system of general decentralization of powers dividing the entire (or almost the entire) country into cantons (by whatever semantic designation) all of which enjoy a prescribed measure of self-government. Equal or essentially similar self-government of all the cantons is the rule in a federal State. In an autonomy regime, the degree of self-government granted to a chosen region (or regions) is unique and withheld from other parts of the country. An autonomy regime is thus an exception to the rule: it is based on a preferential treatment of a selected region (or regions). An autonomy regime is usually established in a region inhabited largely by a national minority. The gist of the international legal protection of minorities at the present time is expressed in Article 27 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: ‘In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own 2 language.’
1
See R. Bernhardt, ‘Federalism and Autonomy’ in Y. Dinstein (ed.), Models of Autonomy (Transaction Books, 1981) pp. 23−47. 2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, (1966) United Nations Juridical Yearbook 178, 186.
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YORAM DINSTEIN A parallel provision appears in Article 30 of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child.3 In the opinion of the present writer, the rule encapsulated here is declaratory of customary international law as it exists today. The categories of minorities benefiting from international legal protection pursuant to Article 27 are solely ethnic, religious and linguistic: other types of minorities are excluded from the range of that protection (although they may benefit from some protection under domestic law). It is frequently argued that the rights conferred in Article 27 are bestowed only on ‘persons belonging to . . . minorities’, and not on the minority groups as such.4 But in the opinion of the present writer, the correct approach is that Article 27 confers collective human rights on minorities as groups and not merely on the individuals belonging to such minorities.5 The collective human rights granted to ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities apply throughout every State, irrespective of any autonomy regime. But, of course, an autonomy arrangement ensures the implementation of the minority’s collective human rights by putting the beneficiaries in charge regionally. Within the autonomous region, the minority can take direct action in order to secure the development of its own separate culture, religion or language. It must be appreciated that, insofar as religious and linguistic minorities are concerned, an autonomous arrangement is the optimal solution: such minorities cannot ask for more. However, that is not necessarily the case with an ethnic minority. An ethnic minority consists of a people or a part of a people. When a people constitutes a majority in a particular region of a State, it is entitled to selfdetermination. As common Article 1(1) of the twin International Covenants of 1966 (the one on Civil and Political Rights, and the other on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) proclaims: ‘All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 6 economic, social and cultural development.’
The right of self-determination is accorded to all peoples wherever they are, regardless of the actual conditions in which they live. Even if an ethnic minority enjoys the full spectrum of protection pursuant to Article 27 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – and notwithstanding the fact that it already benefits from 3
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989, 28 International Legal Materials (1989) 1457, 1468. 4 See e.g., A.H. Robertson and J.G. Merrills, Human Rights in the World: An Introduction to the International Protection of Human Rights (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1989), p. 139. 5 See Y. Dinstein, ‘Collective Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities’, 25 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1976), p. 118. 6 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, at 179; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966, (1966) United Nations Juridical Yearbook, pp. 170, 171.
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AUTONOMY (INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES OF AUTONOMY) an autonomy regime − it is entitled to freely determine its political future as a people. Provided that the people is territorially concentrated in a specific geographic region where it forms a majority, it may opt for internal self-determination within the borders of a ‘multinational’ State (preeminently through an autonomy regime), but it can also invoke the right of external self-determination, namely, secession and the formation of a new sovereign State.7 2. The purpose of an autonomy regime granted to a particular region is to enable a national minority to become a regional majority. Still, an autonomy regime is not always an option available to a national minority group. If that minority is dispersed all over a State in such a manner that it does not form a demographic majority in any geographic portion of the country, the grant of autonomy to a particular region would not alter the situation that the minority (nationally) would remain a minority (regionally). In any event, an autonomy regime cannot remove or resolve all problems characterizing cohabitation of majority and minority groups. In fact, the very grant of self-government to a national minority (which is a regional majority) would mean that – within that region – the national majority (which is a regional minority) may need protection from the local (autonomous) authorities. Furthermore, assuming that there are several minorities in the country, the creation of regional autonomy for one of them would not solve the problems of the others (who would remain minorities both nationally and regionally and whose relations with the regional authorities are liable to be no less – perhaps more – troublesome than with the central government). Additionally, the solution of the problem of members of a national minority living in the region subject to an autonomy regime does not address (and perhaps even complicates) the predicament of members of the same national minority living elsewhere in the country without access to the benefits of autonomy. The texture of an autonomy regime changes from one arrangement to another, there being no hard and fast rules defining the degree of self-government accorded to a region benefiting from autonomy. There is room for many alternative formulas, and it is important to scrutinize not only the latitude given to the local authorities in running their region but the measure of influence that they have on the three branches (executive, judicial and legislative) of the central government. As well, there is a question whether – and to what extent − the autonomous regime is allowed to establish some direct international contacts with foreign countries (especially countries with cultural affinity to the autonomous region). The question why a certain people is satisfied with (or at least reconciled to) the status of internal self-determination − living in an autonomous region – whereas another insists on external self-determination is impossible to answer. Sometimes 7
On the right to secession, see Y. Dinstein, ‘self-Determination Revisited’, in M. RamaMontaldo (ed.) International Law in an Evolving World (Liber Amicorum Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga) pp. 241−253.
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YORAM DINSTEIN this can be due to economic, social and political incentives offered with a view to maintaining the territorial integrity of a ‘multinational’ State. But on other occasions, a people would rather have sovereignty even at the expense of economic prosperity. Improved living conditions per se provide no assurance of a successful autonomy regime. It is very difficult to explain why in the same country – Spain − autonomy is an obvious success in Catalonia but, notwithstanding tremendous economic progress, is still causing unabated terrorism in the Basque region.8 There is no set formula of successful autonomy that can be imitated or transplanted elsewhere. Once autonomy is introduced, there can movement onwards to full independence. But any movement backwards to unilateral abolition of the autonomy by the State concerned is bound to backfire. The two examples are Eritrea and Kosovo. In both places, autonomy was largely accepted by the ethnic minority until arbitrarily abolished by the State (Ethiopia and Yugoslavia, respectively). The abolition of autonomy only radicalized the situation and fuelled the fire of secession: Eritrea is already an independent country and the Kosovars are currently fighting for independence (notwithstanding the restoration of autonomy following Security Council 1244 (1999) (see infra, IV(7)). 3. There are three primary scenarios in which an autonomy regime is granted to a specific region in a country, and not surprisingly the prospects of having the desired effect of peaceful cohabitation vary with the factual background: (1) When autonomy within the boundaries of a State (internal selfdetermination) is all that a people wishes for – what the people wants is what it gets. The result, obviously, is that the autonomy regime functions in a generally satisfactory manner. Two illustrations are Greenland (within Denmark) and Catalonia (within Spain). (2) When autonomy within the boundaries of a State (internal selfdetermination) is not what a people wants – the people aspires to full-fledged statehood (external self-determination), but realistically finds itself compelled to accept autonomy as a matter of political compromise – there are built-in tensions that frequently flare up. In this scenario, all too often, autonomy is reluctantly offered and ungratefully received.9 The result is a mixed success: much depends on whether or not the internal situation is affected by crossborder interference by neighbouring States. If a neighbouring State (with a similar ethnic composition as in the autonomous region) has irredentist demands, autonomy is generally doomed to failure. An example is Memel in the period between the World Wars, in which German interference (even prior to 8
See H. Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights (University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 1990), pp. 275−279. 9 See R. A. Friedlander, ‘Autonomy and the Thirteen Colonies: Was the American Revolution Really Necessary?’, in Dinstein, supra note 1, pp. 135, 136.
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AUTONOMY (INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES OF AUTONOMY) the Nazi takeover of power) generated disputes and a singularly important judicial decision by the Permanent Court of International Justice.10 Of course, if the neighbouring States