Miguel Arraes BRAZIL: THE PEOPLE AND THE POWER Miguel Arraes, an exiled member of Brazil's once legal socialist party, re-examines the situation of his nalive country to estimate the weaknesses of the left and the strength of its enemies. Committed but detached, he analyses the economic and political history of Brazil, the military coup of 1964 and the workings of the present regime. He shows how economic dependence, first on Portugal, now on Brilain and the United States, has hampered national development and ensured that official policy upheld conservative interests. Unlil the resources of Brazil are fairly distributed and properly exploited, he argues, millions must live in acute poverty, while a ll popula r movements are suppressed.
Based on a thorough appreciation of political realities, and appearing for the first time in English, Brazil:The People and the
Power is a statement of faith in the people of Brazil and their ability to overthrow an intolerably repressive regime.
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19 THE PELICAN LATIN AMERICAN LIBRARY
Gtllerai Edito'; Richard Gott
Brazil: The Peo ple and the Power
Miguel Arrae� was born in 1916 in North·East Brazil, where he lived until 1964. Early in his career he was made Financial Secretary to the State of Pernambuco and a member of the state parliament. He later became Mayor of Recife and in 1962 was elected Governor of Pernambuco, the first socialist to hold this office. In 1964, after the military coup, he went into exile. He now lives in Algeria and continues the struggle t o overthrow the Brazilian regime.
Brazil: The People and the Power Misue/ Arraes Translated by Lallcelot Sheppard
@
Penguin Books
Contents
Penguin Books Lt d, Harmondsworth.
Middlesex, England
Books Inc., 1110 Ambassador Road. B3himore, Maryland 11101, U.S.A. Penguin Books Australia Ltd, Ringwood. Victoria, Australia
Inlroducrion by Yves Goussault Foreword 19
Penguin
1 The Brazilian Economy 2 Brazilian Political Life
7
21 75
3
The Ru1ing Gasses: How They Dominatcd The People and Popular Movements
Translation copyright
4 5 6
The Military Regime
7
The Political Unity of the Masses
Made and printe d in Great Britain by
8
Fresh Stage in a Long Struggle
le Brkil, Ie pollVoir e,le pc:uplt lirst published by Fran4;ois Maspcro, P�r is 1969 English translation published in Pelican Books 1971 Copyr igh t CO Miguel Ames, 1969
Hazell Watson & Viney Ltd, Aylesbury. Bucks Set in Linotype Ju li ana This book is
sold subject
to the condition that
it shall not. by way of trade or otherwise, be lent. re-sold, hired out Or otherwise drculated without .
the publisber's prior consent in any form of binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser
thc Country
9')
The Coup d'�tat of 1964
Index 225
119
155
169 213
196
Introduction
'Exile is a step taken in the last resort, to keep faith with the people and indeed to deepen the relationship.' That thought from Miguel Arraes. published in a Brazilian newspaper in 1968. provides a key to the meaning of the book that he was writing at the time: its translation is now offered to the English-speaking public. We must not get the wrong idea about the hoolc or it<; autbor. Like other exiles, Anaes could well have offered the public in foreign lands the thoughts of a politician who. by force of circumstances. was an exile from and a disillusioned observer of his own country. We should then have had yet another addition to the already vast literature of experiences and projects. all exhibiting the signs. more or less. of self justification and failure. Although the book was "'Titten out side Brazil, its author is by no means alien to what is happen ing there at the present time. In the first place because he declines to withdraw from the struggle - which is obvious enough - md next. and more especially. because in popular estimation and among those a t present in power be is identi· fied with those events which are at the very heart of Brazil's political crisis and revolution. These events began in the north-east of the country. Arraes was bom thete in 1916 in a small town of the sertGo. Save for a short period in Rio he was never to leave this remarkable region. whose landscape. population and poverty have been
8
Brazil: The People and the Power
made almost familiar to us by television broadcasts. His north.eastem origin can be dearly discerned in his personal. iry, and it was this which was to involve th� man, when he had become a political figure, ill a singh: political destiny with the people, to whom he continued to belong. The whole cultural heritage of this poor and proud peasant people can be found in Attacs' bearing. In a few years he became finan cial Secretary to the State of Pernambuco, a member of the State parliament and then Mayor of Recife. The prim i tive messianic element described by Rui Faco,! the agrarian rebel lions. and even tbe Cangaceiro epic - all these he had experienced at first-hand and through his childhood associa tions; this cultural mixture and the life of the workers in the sugar industry. such as those studied by Gilberto Freire. formed the setting for his adolescence together with the hunger marches and the droughts recorded by Graciliano Ramos.2 These memories accompanied him constantly in his p oliti ca l respo n s ibili ti es ; they formed the habitual background from which nothing separated him. He was always conscious of the scandal represented by their age-long c ontinuance. And it was precisely because he remained identified widr the mass of the people, their culture, way of life and aspirations that Migu el Arraes. without seeking it, found himself at the very centre of a social and political phenomenon entirely new to Brazil - namely the development of a mature popular movement which, losing nothing of its traditions or spon· taneous nature. obtained access to the successive stages of government and threatened the privileges of the ruling
classes.
In 1961, after an electoral struggle fought bitterly by his
1. Rui nco. (llngaceiros e fllnllticos. Edit6ra ChiJiza(:ao Brazilena. Rio de: Janeiro. 1\)6). 2. GraciHano Ramos, VicUu secas. trans. &men livts. University of Texas, 1966.
Introduction 9 opponents, and despite the constitutional limitations of the popular vote, Arraes was elected Governor of the State of Pernambuco. In the speech at his investiture at the State Asselllbly hI;! l>"itid. 'This new phenomenon - the t:mergt!u<."t: of the people as an historical category - explains why I stand here, not in the name of the people, not in place of the peo ple. but a man of the people. as the peopl e, (0 take on the government of the State.' And, in fact, throughout the country it caused surprise that a man who belooged to no party, and was practically unknown outside the north-east, should come to power i n the leading State of Brazil. further more, the political upheaval bad been accomplished legally and by no other means than with the support of the masses. In other words, the regime was no longer protected against popular movements. The real reasons for the excitement must be understood. Arraes himself gave no cause for anxiety; nor was the danger the murmured threat s of rebellions and peasan t leagues following this vic tory - the Brazilian coronels were inured to them - but rather it was the combination of a legal rise to power and a popular movement with a political leader springing from it. both bringing in their wake elements from other social classes all in unconcealed support of a pro gramme of relom. This represented a totally unacceptable and unsuspected contradiction; and in his book Arraes shows that it marked the beginning of a period of qUEStioning of democracy by the supporters of the central government and, with the renewal of economic pressure from abroad, the prelude to the military coup d'etat of 1964. For the fourteen months of this short-lived mandate at the head of the State of Perna m buco the move.ment developed . Characteristic indications of an unusual experience made their appearance, distinguished both by the institutional framework (of the State and the federal structure) and by the typically Brazilian tendency to innovation. On the other hand, indeed, the new government had to
10
Brazil: The People and the: POWtr
cope with the obstacles raised for it by a social and political structure that had remained practically unchanged. Its oppo nents' provocations were continual, as were their attempts to confiue Arraes in the obvious contradictions of holding power while deprived of the means of exercising it. Within these narrow confines the head of State resolutely took his stand with the popular masses. 'I speak with such conviction and so forcefully: he told the Assembly, 'bec2use I know that thousands upon thousands of Brazilians, who are my equals, could SlaDd in my place; and this not only in the Dorth-east
but in the whole of Brazil: Never was popular support to fail him and yet those who lived through this period know
that his confidence was often sorely tried. There are numerous examples, from the explosive negotia tions between the usintiros (the factory proprietors) and the sugar workers in September 1963, over which he presided and
bro ught to a successful conclusion, down to the tragic �trike
in February 1964 (a few weeks before the coup d'etat) in which he succeeded in obtaining respect for the law without in any way diminishing popular demands. And when Presi dent Goulart came to Recife in July 1963 to set up the federal govtmment there as a symbolic gesture towards the people of the north-cast, he was welcomed by 150,000 workers and peasants, accompanied by their Governor, who asked him to start resolutely on a programme of structural reform. They were aware that reforms did not fall solely within the compe tence of the government of Recife and. in this sphere, Arracs and his colleagues would not act irresponsibly. So far as agrarian reform was concerned - one of the most far.reach ing and urgent of their aspirations - no attempt was made to hide the fact that within the framework of the powers and limitarions of the State of Pernambuco it was impossible. When the Christian trade unions, with the support of SUDENE (regional development office for the north-cast), organized a cooperative for the production of cane sugar on
Introduction
11
land rented from a large estate, and had it inaugurated by tbe President of the Republic, Arraes took them to task for giving
out that this was an 'agrarian reform', and refused to see peasant good-sense misled. 'The only reform worthy of this name and popular support: said Arraes, 'is the one which consists of modernizing our agriculrure through the liquida tion of its semi·feudal structure.' Where it had more scope for manoeuvre the government was not on the defensive and initiated several important re forms. First among these was the radical change of at mosphere in the State arising from the effective guarantee of the exercise of basic freedoms granted to the population as a whole. Hitherto the government had acted almost exclu sively in the interests of the great landowners so that social problems were treated as police matters, that is, by repression. The State police were in the hands of the landowners, who made fun use of them. When Miguel Arra� came to power the police became the servant of the government for the pro tection of the people. A wholly new situation was created. The privileged class protested violently and mobilized press, radio and television, iri the north-east as well as in the rest of Brazil, in protest against the 'insane regime established in Pernambuco'. The work undertaken for the education of the masses became well known. During these few months Pernambuco was turned into an extremely active school for the improve ment of the people. At this point, however, a theoretical prin ciple which forms, so to speak. the central theme of Miguel Arraes' book requires to be stated clearly. For him 'the people' is not limited to the workers in their uniOns or as wage earners connected with what he calls 'industrial society'. The Brazilian nation caDDot be confined within such arbit rary boundaries, even if this falls in with the views of many economists. One important partner is lacking in such a re strictive division of the population, one holding the key to the
l2.
Brazil: Tht: Pt:oplt: and tht: Powt:r
future; this parmer, doomed hitherto to practical exclusion from modem society, is made up of the 'poor masses', the term often used by Arraes. These are still enclosed within a
society he calls 'traditional', though hc makes it dC3r that the term is unsuitable. But the name is of less importance than the reality which it connotes; it is a dear reference to all
Introduction
13
place, sometimes in the restricted circle of popular leaders and officials, sometimes in plenary session in the public square," on the decisions to be taken on economic and social matters, and the reciprocal responsibilities of State 3nd peop le. This direct democracy had a twofold purpose in view. The first was to make a break with the usual administrative practice
the social elements in the nation which have been rejected by development i n the rountry, to the masses condemned to
which was wedded to its decision-making and executive pro
a roving life of rural undeHmployment and suburban pov erty. On the basis of these latter a popular movement and
was largely bound up with the 'regime'). The second was
real social renewal are
possible, unaccompanied by the
danger, ronstant in Latin-American history, of a reaction and manipulation by those in power. This reference to the 'poor masses' was stated even more strongly by Miguel
cesses (the government of the State, it should be remembered, to
train the people in the administration of public rerources, by passing the ill-qualified protests of the municipal authorities and their spokesmen who had always condemned the people to a passive role. The wealthy held the greater Dumber of elective positions as a result of the general exclusion of the
Arraes after the coup d'etat; the conclusions of his book are
masses from the electoral roll and because of living conditions
quite explicit on the subject. Without these masses no reform
and political practice, particularly in the country districts.
of inst tutio ns , parties and socio·economic structures wa.<: pos i
sible, for no movement of renewal could be decisive without their revolutionary contribution. Tn 1963-4 the basis of his government's programme was formed by concern for this 'marginal' population and the intense effort for their educa tion and development which took place. The most publicized elements of this programme are well known; literacy and the cultural circles, the popular culture
Reporting on the first years of his manrlate Arrae<> empha
sized ; in a government li ke ours the conduct of public business must be e nvisaged differently from what has been traditional among us.
The mistake of trying to govern from the top downwards must be avoided. The democratic exercise of power must be the result of a free alliance of wills for the purpose of a common poHoal
number of educationists and spread outside the boundaries
objective. No administr:ltor, however wen informed, can know the rea l concerns of a communi ty if he does not question it or remain in continual dialogue with it on equal terms.
of Pernambuco, the basic education movement with its radio
In this way the efficiency of the government services is im
movement which was able to call upon the cooperation of a
schools, etc. On the other hand little has been said of the great change efll'ctro in the taking of governmental decisions - what Arraes
called at the time the participation of the people in the 'ad ministrative process'. Denouncing the previous paternalism and the 'assistance mentality', the govemn:ent and those in charge of the public services left the capital and summoned the people to regional meetings. At these, discussions took
proved and at the same time there is greater popular aware ness of the issues at stake. 'As Pernambuco is a poor state our chief task is to :tvoid unnecess:try, in:tdcquate or non essential expenditure; the only way to proceed is to make use of our meagre resources i n the areas of greatest importance for each community.' This systematic determination to give full explanations was extended to serious social problems whose gravity had
1';
Brazil: The People and the Power
led previous governments to use every possible �eans to hold popular pressure in check. Such was the �ase With �e qu:s tion of housing and the .shanty towns, m connecnon. � th which Arraes' investiture speech contained a denunciation of official hypocrisy: with the assistance of the 'League for ProgrtSS' promises were made to give the people houses and solve the probl em of the mocGmOOs [shacks]. To put up J,C1OO houses and give �em to the . people would do no harm to anyone and I am not agaInst It; ut . to giv e out, as was done, that this would solve th� hou smg problem was at the very least lyin g to the people. Hitherto no count had been taken of the shacks. But I had an estimate made. Recife and its 800,000 inhabitants possess ed only 74,000 stone built houses, while the number of mocambos was as high as 110,000. No on e can solve this problem by giving the people 3,000 houses, or by providing each of the families who live in the
?
shanty town with
11
house.
Here again Mra es' gove rnm ent opted for a policy of o�en . ness and dia logue with those concerned. It started buildmg sites in which the people's work-conttibution was allied with
�
the State's public aid. What was done in the Cajueiro district, in tbe suburbs of Recife, is aD example of thiS realistic approach, since the problem, before being considered
in terms of public or private expenditure, was onc of increas ing the income of a population which in general was without regular employment.
Cajueiro Seco is the best example of tbe antipatemalism of OUI policy. No one here will find the government building houses to give them to people not in a position to maintain them! . . . What we an doing here is to create conditions in which a man, in an area developed by tbe government. may build his own house in accordance with his means and has the possibility of improving it in line with the further needs, both ob jective �nd subjective, that he creates once he forms part of tbe community.
I
Introduction
IS
Thus tbe central activity of the government consisted in explaining, commenting on and analysing the actual condie tions of the exercise of power in direct contact with tbe
ll'1.:oVl�, aud in b(Uadeuiu� lhe base of tilLs vopular audience increasingly to include_within it the 'poor masses'. The lack of time and resources appeared obvious, and seen in per spective after some years they seem deriSOry. Whatever the
hopes at the timc of the electoral victory in Hj61 - and any popular triumph e ngenders such illusions - a sense of reality
returned almost at the outset as the difficulties mounted. As a matter of fact, it had never been supposed that the time had
come for the people's revolutionary aspirations to be realized and, as we have seen, the government's whole activi ty was
turned on the contrary to an objective analysis of the obstacles to revolution. The idea of national independence which is central to Miguel Arraes' book - wa s a lready to the forefront of the pr ogramme undertaken by th e new team; Ihis by itself was enough to moderate the hopes of the people.
'Poverty of itself does not cause revolution; a clear idea of the reasons for this poverty is also necessary', and those in charge of the State of Pernambuco continually explained that these reasons were to be found in the foreign domination of the political and economic life of Brazil. Miguel Arraes' book must be inte rpre te d in this sense. It is the politician speaking not to claim his place in future political developments, but quite simply because the dialogue
continues within the popular movement and all Brazilians are implicated in it. Pernambuco, actually, was only a flash point in a wider and already long-standing struggle - the
struggle of Brazilian government with its people. The contra dictions created and revealed by the election of Miguel
Arraes are the same as those which from Ge t ulio Vargas down to the coup d'etat of 1964 affffted the country as a whole. If from the outset the popular success in Pernam buco attracted attention it was because it went far b eyond
16
Brazil: The People and the Power
Introdtlction
17
the boundaries of that north-eastern State. Similarly, the
complacency on the chances of the struggle. but the
progress that followed and the methods of government
partners in it stand dearly revealed with such logic in theil'
brought into use could not be reduced to a mere fortuitous
intentions. means of action and influence that there emerges, If lIot optilllblll, at kasl a certainty justifying and shedding
and localized
experience. It was the whole problem of
Brazilian independence which was raised again by the victory in Pernambuco, the assertion that it was possible for the
c0-
light on the struggle. But over and above the provision of a fresh appreciation of
country to base its emancipation and progress on its own
the opposing forces this book is an appeal for a wider realiza·
resources. And this explains why contact between heads of
tion of the elements in the national situation and for the
movements, trade unions and political leaders was continuo
union of all those who are fighting for the liberation of Brazil.
ally increasing for the purpose of establishing at national
By the translation of this book the European public will be
level a front that could wipe out the growing threat of ex·
in a position to acquaint itself with the reality and the
ternal intervention. The coup d'etat brought this to an abrupt end and the sequel is well known. But those exemplary months lived through by the people of Pernambuco have kept for the whole Brazilian emancipa. tion movement their symbolic value as a successful experi·
mem, and for this reason they have been recalled 3t the begin. ning of this book. Actually, this is the political thought of one who on coming to power in the government did not with· draw from taking part in the people's struggle, and whose special position enabled him to realize very quickly the whole importance and weight of the 'system' and the extent of the effort needed to overthrow it. This realization was not general
within the popular movement and many of its members were tempted to underestimate the forces ranged on the side of the status quo. On the other hand, no comprehensive analysis of
the national situation was available. One would have resulted in a better understanding of the position and enabled a com·
plan of campaign of what i s happening in Brazil. Notice. too, the scientific interest of Miguel Arraes' book. It is note.. worthy that the analyses to which his experience 2S 2 man of action and leader of a movement have led him form an approach to the subject which is in agreement with the methods and ide3S of 3n up-to-date political SOCiology. Pat· ticularly prominent is the way in which the ideas of power, political organization, the masses. and popular forces arc treated; their application to a situation in which political and social contradictions ate connected with foreign domination is apparent. Similarly. there is the analysis of the relations between parties and government and of the role of movements as structural links unsuited to a5Sume charge of popular or national recovery of power. We have here a contribution to the study of imperialism whose importance is the greater since it
is
approached from the viewpoint of the dominated
nation and is written by a man who has experienced its direct
mon strategy for the Brazilian revolution to be developed. Mi g uel Arraes bas applied himself to jU'"t such a thorough·
effects both at a popular level and at that of the government.
going analysis. The interruption of the legal course of the
is not resigned to this situation.
political life of Brazil in 1964, caused by the emergence of a popular movement that was not yet organized, has not sub stantially changed the previous situation of dependence. Nevertheless, it bas made it more obvious. There can be litde
Moreover it is written by it man who. it is worth emphasizing.
YVES GOUSSAULT
Foreword
The coup d'etat on I April 1964 brought the people of Brazil to a new stage in their struggle for freedom. It is essential that together with the natural unity among the people there should also be a greater and more firmly based union among those with political responsibilities and among their respec tive organizations. Only in this way will the combined efforts of aU lead to the defl:at of the common enemy. Nevertheless, to work out a plan of campaign calling to action all who oppose imperialism implies an analysis of national problems ill the light of the new situation created for the country. The follOWing observations, therefore, re-examine a certain num. ber of old questions in the light of this new situation. Some of them, of course, have been dealt with on many occasions by Brazilian authors. To facilitate discussion on the problems now concerning us it will be useful to take a fresh look at past events. It seemed necessary to begin this analysis with a descrip tion of the economic structures and the most significant changes in them in the course of our history, and only to deal
with the corresponding political events in a :.:ocond parr. Instead of examining together the economic, social and politi
cal factors at each stage of our history I preferred an analysis of each in tum. This method is intended to facilitate the Ie-examination of the questions involved, the continuance of a discussion that is essential for the destruction of certain
10 Brazil: The People and the Power problegends and the acquirement of a realistic view of OUf lems. de an I did not undertake the writing of this book to provi Nor is academic analysis unrelated to our political �ituation. emporary it the testimony of someone of importance In con contrI history. It is the book of a militant � ng an ac?ve , of the ves bution in the fannulation of the prmclpal objecti
a�
�
popular movement at the present time. . the The genesis of this book is to be found, therefore, In ms affect quest for new light on a certain number of proble these ing the Brazilian people's struggle. To the extent that amo d debate �g problems - and many others - are widely the easier Brazilians the clearer will our views become and QUI future course of action. n A quick glance at the most important c;rents of Brazili� ies history will enable our many fricnds, �ho m other countr . also are in contest with foreign domination, to aSSOCiate them selves with greater understanding
Algiers,September 1968
in our struggle.
M(GUEL ARRAES
CHAPTER 1
The Brazilian Economy
Any understanding of the economic and political evolution of Brazil requires a proper grasp of the way in which sub ordination to world capitalism works, and the successive stages of the development of such a subordination in the history of Brazil. The establishment of a new system of re lationships between the internal elements of Brazil and the expanding international economic forces has characterized the succeSsive stages of the development of western capital. ism, both European and Northern American the commer cial period, the industrial period and the financial or imperial period. On each occasion these relationships have been deter mined by the particular needs of these new economic forces. The discovery of Brazil in 1500 corresponds in Europe to the golden age of mercantile capitalism. Colonized by Portu gal, the new territory became part of the commercial system of the period as a producer of tropical goods. The need to organize production on the capitalist model caused the emer gence in the country of the rural estate owners closely linked with the Portuguese commercial class. From that time a twofold system governed relations be tween the colony and the metropolis. In the colony the rural landowners held all the economic and political power. They exercised this power in the name of the metropolis, to which was despatched the whole of Brazilian production. This com mercial monopoly ensured Portugal's prosperity. _
22
The Brazilian Economy
Brazil: Tht: Pt:o plt: and the Power
Portuguese colonial governm ent, neu tralizing the natural tendency of the system of large estates to separ atism and dis
23
twentieth witnessed the development of the struggle for
the industrialization of the country. The First World War.·
integration, imposed political unity on the new territory from outside and contrived to maintain it for upwards of three
the economic crisis in the thirties, and the Second World War,
centuries.
centres - for a certain period it adopted a nationalist ideology
At the time of the industrial revolution in Europe the in crease in production units caused the gradual appearance in
the colony of numerous groups of businessmen who, without
changing to any great extent the colony's original structure, acttd as intermediaries between the estates and the mother country. The community o{ interests which grew up at this time between Brazilian businessmen and British industrial capitalism led to the break between Brazil and Portugal. and finally to the proclamation of independence in 18n. The new economic system based on the export of raw
enabled the industrialist class which emerged from the urban
- to work for the establishment of a new sector of the Brazilian economy, th e urban industrial sector.
After the first World War, however, En gland and the
other
European countries gradually lost tbe economic and
political control of the country. The already clearly im perialist interests of the United States were progressively superimposed on those of industrial capitalism. The increased industrialization of the country after imperialist ambitions.
1930 encouraged these
At the economic and internal pol itical levels indLlstrializa
materials and the import of manufactured goods b ought in England made no change in the internal structure of the
tion in fact acted as a unifying factor between the interests of
Estate owners and businessmen however g ained access to
int eres ts of North-American imperialism.
control the government of the country.
b y a diversified system that was complex enough to allow the
country as it had been inherited from the colonial regime. immediate political power and were thill in a position to Political unification under the Empire, which followed the colonial regime, was conceived fundamentaUy
in relation to
the interests of British industry. To destroy opposition to this
the different sectors (agrarian, commercial and industrial) of the Brazilian middle class and ensured their alliance with the The s implici ty of the colonial structure had b een succeeded
emergence of new social classes, though without abolishing the former ones. On tbe
contrary,
these latter derived a re
newal of political power from this development.
unification there was no hesitation, should it be necessary, to
throw into the scale the power of the Britisb army.
During this period a new product for export appeared in
the shape of coffee. It was to enable Brazil to occupy a lead ing position on the international market and strengthen the
interests between British industry Brazilian producers and businessmen.
community
of
and
But the increase in population and the growth of urban
centres soon led to the appearance of interests opposed to those of
a
purely commercial and colonial economy. The
second half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the
COLONIAL BRAZIL
The expansion of the
capitalist
system at the end of the in the commer
fifteenth century necessitated the integration
cial markets of new geographic:d regions. One of these was Brazil. Here, however, capitalism encountered entirely new conditions, very different from those prevailing in Europe where it had originated and developed. This obliged it to seek other forms of economic organization. At the time of the great maritime discoveries Portugal bad specialize
in trade
24
Brazil : The People and the Power
The Brazilian Economy
15
from which she derived enonnous profits. In the new and
product constandy in demand on the international market in
immense land of Brazil the absence of centres of population
unlimited quantity.
already provided with a developed economic organization
(2) It fell to the private sector to find a solution
to
another
formed an obstacle to me lII aking of quick profits. During
basic problem, namely, to get together the necessary capit21
the period following the discovery (1500) only one product
for the huge investment needed. Businessmtn who had
offered any possibility of regular trade; this was the pau
settled in Brazil, the holders of the captaincies, or settlers who
brasil. a tincture-producing tree, very plentiful throughout
had the concession of a smallholding (sesmaria), obtained
the country. The Portuguese crown at once claimed the
from Dutch capital. associated with Portuguese undertakings
monopoly and, reserving the right to a royalty on production,
since tht fifteenth century, the financial resources required
sought to interest private capital in the extraction of the product. But this method of explOitation could not go on for long. An n i dustry confined to extraction only by destruction of the national reserves led rapidly to their exhaustion. It soon became obvious that conservation of the new terri tories in the long tenn would depend on success in organizing i terms of capital the exploitation of the country's resources n which would
ensure a
perm.ment income, :md aim that the
purely commercial activity of the early days would have to
be transformed into a colonial undertaking on a large scale. But such an undertaking would only become economically
viable when, on the one hand, i t was possible to take advan tage of the natural asset present in unlimited quantity, that is. land, as the principal economic benefit. and on the other, when the new territories had been successfu1iy prOVided with the means that they lacked, namely man-power and capital.
(I) Under these conditions agriculture became the principal
industry of the new colony. The need to utilize a plentiful asset, the land. led to the specialization of this agriculture.
The ecological formation of these new regions was especially suited to the cultivation of sugar cane; consequently, the Portuguese crown divided up the territory into twelve large zones - the hereditary captaincies - which it shared out among members of the Portuguese lesser nobility (1532)·
This measure led to the exclusive cultivation of sugar cane, a
for them to settle in the new country and for their first operations. For many this proved a failure and their utter ruinarion. Nevertheless, the undertaking as a whole was highly profitable, particularly in the Bahia region and in the north-eastern territories which correspond nowadays to the State of Pernambuco; cultivation of sugar cane spread over the whole of the then known coastal region of Brazil. (3) There remained the man-power question. Sugar cane requires a large labour force and there could be no question of bringing it· from Europe which, in any case, was in no position to provide it. Moreover. the industry would prob ably have been unable to afford the wages of a large number of European workers. Another solution had to be found. Gradually tbe
use
of slave labour was seen as the only poss
ible ahemative and from the sixteenth century onwards
first Brazilian natives and then African negroes were em ployed
as slaves.
In this way the two conditions inherent in the mercantile capital system - that is, the production of income and partici pation in the great international commercial movements of the period - were the detennining factors in the establishment in Brazil of a clearly defined economic organization : large
estates (the latifundios) based on the cultivation of a single {lnd directed towards external trade.
crop
The basic economic organization imposed on Brazil for four centuries had at this time just taken definitive shape. As
26
The Brazilian Economy
Brazil: The People and the Power
an economic organization of the capitalist type the large slave estate was certainly a great success; until the end of the seven teenth century, in fact, Brazil was able to k.eep her place in . only with the the first rank of world sugar producers. It ....as appearance of regions enjoying greater advantages that pro duction in Brazil lost its importance on the international market, though this was no reflection on the efficacy of the system. This model of economic organization peculiar to Brazil was to introduce into the economic history of this country a monotonous succession of cycles - the sugar, the gold, the cotton and the coffee cycles. The change of cycle occured r when 3 new situation appeued a t one end of the system and it was possible to match it with a new situation at the other. With 8uctuations in demand on the international market there could be matched in Brazil the possibility of exploiting other natural :lsset� :lnd the u tiliza tion of other potential economic re sources. Each new product for export thus enabled the development of a fresh region to go forward - sugar for the north-east, gold in Minas Gerais, coffee in Sao Paulo, rubber in the Amazon. This process led to the progressive incorporation in the Dational hegemony of various regions of the country. Territorial expansion and the populating of the country were therefore but reflections of the system's operation, consisting in an alternation of contractions and expansions in har mony with the rhythm of the internation31 economy. The other economic and social forces which arose in the country - stock·farming, subsistence economy, the middle-class traders and officials - were from the outset subordinated to tbe evolution of the foreign trade. At the internal level the evolution of the system led to the appearance of a class of great landed proprietors - the Brazil ian bourgeoisie (of the latifundios, or large (5tates). But grad· uaDy they found that trade in what they produced was
27
denied to them; it remained in the hands of the Portuguese merchant class until the beginning of the nineteenth century. This specialization, making the rural estate owners depend. ent on the traders of Portug..l, enabled the home country to appropriate the wealth produced in Brazil. Until the end of the nineteenth century the great rural landowners �lone had any power, a political power which re mained uncontested. The opposition which they encountered after the proclamation of the Republic (1889) was never strong enough to break their power. Even today, in more mod em forms perhaps, they hold most of the political po.....er. From the international point of view the Brazilian oom omy remained under Portuguese domination; but other countries benefited from local sources of wealth, especially the Low Countries, which, as the former sleeping partner in Portuguese activities, were for long in control of a great part of its trade. After 1703. as a result of the Treaty of Methuen, England indirectly secured the transfer of this wealth. Grad· ually she established organizations enabling her, unhindered, openly to dominate the Brazilian economy during the Empire period and after the proclamation of the Republic. I
THE EMPIRE
The opening of Brazilian ports to all nations friendly with Portugal (1808), in actual fact to England, marks the end of the monopoly held until then by the Portuguese metropolis. This measure, of the highest importance, destroyed the funda· mental Hnb between Brazil and Portugal and thus prepared l. By this treaty Portugal beume to all intents and purposes a l was Gllled on to m3ke good Portu· British colony. M 3 result, Brazi gal's ever.increasing trading debt with her ally. The duration of this
treaty coincides with the period of mineral explOitation. Up to the end of the eighteenth century the amount of gold sent to England on this lccount has been estimated at two hundred m illion pounds
(sterling).
28 Brazil: The People and the Powr.:r the way for the proclamation �f ind�pendence in 1822. It� . life can hardly � over profound repercussions on Brazilian emphasized. It was the cause of a re-alig� ent of the lDtern�1 and external forces in contrul of the BraZl ha.n economy lind It created the conditions necessary for the counrry to enter the British free trade system. . The links directly established with England and m�lD tained for thirteen years so effectively estrang� the 1Il � porlant Brazilian exporters from their Portuguese )fltermedl aries that when the monarchy, after the return of the cou� t to lisbon in 1821, wished [0 restore the positi.on to :-vhat It had been before 1808, the ruling class of Brazil, havmg lost all interest in the mother country, instigated the proclama tion of independence. The separation of Brazil from Portugal enabled England to , . become the external centre of attraction for the BrazIlian economy. As the first country to be n i dmtrialized. Great Britain earlier than others set out to obtain external markets for her manufactured goods. The export of her industrial merchandise thus became an important element in the expan sion of industrial capitalism and ensured British supremacy over the non-induslrialized countries. The transfer to England of the control of the Brazilian �onomy was a clear . , example of adaptation to the new co� dlhon � of operat�on of European capitalism created by the mdustrlal rev?lutlOn. When BraZilian independence occurred England s econom ic interests were already protected by the commercial trea� signed in Brazil by John Vl. In this way Portugal pal� England for her help in the transference of the court to Brazil at the time of the Napoleonic invasions. The manufactured goods bought from England by Brazil were liable to customs duty of only fifteen per cent of their value, far less than the goods of other nations, including those of Portugal herself. The duration of the treaty was fixed at thirty-three years. For the first half of the nineteenth century it fonned a con-
The Brazilian Economy
29
siderable obstacle to any initiative on the part of the Brazilian government in tbe economic field. In 1827 under intema� tional prC$ure the privilege was extended to other countries. The almost absolute lIIouupuly in the Brazilian consumers' market was nevertheless secured to England by reason of her lead in industrialization. In 1843 at the expiration of the treaties of 1810 it was pos sible to adopt a more favourable attitude to Brazilian in terests. The tariff then drawn up made provision for more than 3,000 kinds of imported goods, among which 2,000 were to be subjected to customs duty of 30 per cent. For other goods the duty varied between 20 and 60 per cent. This tariff nevertheless was essentially fiscal in character; it was a ques tion of obtaining resources to finance the State's activities. Regarded in isolation it exerted a small and debatable influ ence on the industrialization of the country. Thus the relatively simple system f or the exploitation of Brazil by Portugal, a system which i n theory continued in use down to 1822, became sufficiently flexible to originate a more complex system. At this period Brazil's position was emerging as tbat of a country specializing in the production of food and raw materials and importing manufactured goods. The funds obtained by export of the raw materials were disbursed abroad i n the purchase of manufactured goods. To the increasing demand for imported products was added the drop in the prices paid for Brazilian exports. The two together combined to cause a permanent deficit in the Brazil ian commercial balance during the whole of tbe period from 1811 to 1860. The accuIDullltecl f'if'fidt in thr. halance of pay ments reached a total of thirty-two million pounds in gold, despite an increase during this period of more than 100 per cent in the export of sugar and cotton, the maintenance of the export level in leather, skins and tobacco and the great success of coffee in the export market.
The Brazilian Economy
30 Brazil: The: Pe:ople and the: Power In view of the rigidity of the new system of trade and the distinctive nature of internal production the balance of pay ments position would have been worsened but for the rapid· ity with which this new export won its place on the Inter· national market. Its cultivation was developed in the country by taking advantage of the extraordinary suitability of the local soil. At the end of the eighteenth century the French colony of Haiti, the leading world producer of coffee, experienced the collapse of its production while in the North-American mar ket consumption increased enormously. Brazilian coffee bene fited from this favourable situation and taking the lead on the international market it gradually reached first place among Brazilian expons. During the whole of the nineteenth century i t was coffee which accounted for the total increase in the value of exports.
After the proclamation of indepenileun: coffee r epresented
1 8 per cent of the value of Brazilian exports. This proportion rapidly increased and, twenty-five years later, it reached almost
50 per cent, despite the fall in price of this product.
Brazil's annual export of coffee, expressed in thousands of sacks (60 kg), developed as follows :
31
own benefit and by their political action were successful in preventing any important changes in the politico-economic structures inherited from the colonial period. By its special
methods of production the coffee plantation was a factor in
accentuating the predominantly colonial features of the Brazilian production system. namely, very large estates, low level of capitalization and recourse to slave labour. It con· fined itself to exploitation of prc-exisrent and hitherto unused resources. In its quest for land the coffee industry caused the dis
appearance not only of the small estates of the central soulh· ern region so far unaffected by large scale agriculture but also the other agricultural undertakings and local handicrafts. In addition its development caused the collapse of various in· dustrialization projCi:ts in the country. The extraordinary profitability of coffee led to a change in the flow of capital
invested in the srn:dl industries, �ially in textilf'S, which
used the raw materials of the country and which had enjoyed
certain advantages during the time that the Portuguese court was in residence in Brazil. The (;conomic result of this transformation was undoubt edly the intensive concentration of resources in the central southern region and the considerable increase in Brazilian imports, among which must be included slaves and foodstuffs. A further result was the relegation of all other undertakings
3 .8
1,83i
to second place, and the opportunity thus offered to foreign
buyers to gain control of the national economy. The immense influx of funds brought to the country by the coffee industry
The cultivation of coffee, established especially in the cen
served no purpose save for the purchase of British manu
then and more especially in Sao Paulo, attracted to this region
At the time of the proclamation of independence the
rral southt:m region of the country, first in Rio de J:meiro.
resources (capital and slave labour) in very great quantity. far in excess of other parts of the country. With British support the owners of the large coffee-produc. ing estates SCi:ured the use of the State machinery for their
factured goods. government was in a difficult position because it was unable to get in the funds required to finance the Sl
32
The Brazilian Economy
Brazil: The People and the Power
means and inflexibility of the prevailing economic system; the large estate owners. having acquired control of the central government. were in a position to oppose any plan for the taxation of exports; in addition the taxation of mports i was
impossible. since the British were against it and it encount· ered resistance also from the consumers. There was no solution; the Brazilian government. unable to collect suffident funds
to
meet public expenditure. was
obliged 10 accept the solution pllt forward by the British banks. that of an external debt. In 1824. wim its 6rst loan of three million pounds. Brazil started
on
a policy of inter·
national borrowing. regarded indeed as ruinous. but wbich
33
control of the internal banking system. The British banks established in Brazil under (he Empire regarded as their prin<
cipal function the strict control of credit for production and the
management
of the rate of exchange. Through credit
control throughout the Empire Britain prevented the develoP'" ment of further prodUcing industries. One by one me indus. trial undertakings which succeeded in establishing them·
selves passed into the hands of the British banks. Thus began a new form of foreign dOmination, the domination of direct investment.
The management of the rate of exchange was systematic· ally directed towards devaluation of me national Dloney. The
was to continue unaltered for a century until the economic
value of the mil-reis! at the beginning of independence was
crisis of 1930 caused the collapse of the international mane-
�s. 6y)d. At the time of the proclamation of the republic
tary system.
(1889) it was less than 2S, 3d. This policy of permanent de
As recourse to local resources was impossible it was neces·
valuation reconciled the interests of Britain with those of the
contract fur tllt:r debts. TIlese followed one after the
group of exporters, especialIy the coffee exporters whose prod
olber. often for the sale purpose of paying off previous debts.
ucr largely dominated Brazilian exports. and encountered a
sary
to
During the Empire period BrazH thus contracted seventeen
warm wekome on the international market. Thus for me
debts to British banks. The initial external debt taken over
same quantity of merchandise the exporters received an ever·
from Portugal in exchange for independence amounted to
increasing sum in the national currency. Any increase in the
£1 .400•000. At the time of the proclamation of the Republic
volume of their exports could only increase the pr06ts al·
in 1889 this debt had reached the sum of £30.419.000. The
ready obtained for them by devaluation.
Minister of Finance of the republican provisional government
In addition to this management of the exchange rate for
stated at the time that the public external debt inherited from
the purpose of profit.making. the interests of the coffee in·
the monarchy amounted to the equivalent of seven times the
dustry were at one with those of British capitalism in main·
total annual income of Brazil.
taining the economic structure inherited from colonial times.
The policy of borrowing solved for the time being the
On account of its m i portance as an export. coffee allowed the
government's problem in balancing me budget; in the long
large-property owners to remain in power throughout the
the financial position of the country. By
nineteenth century. and this without any significant change of structure in Brazilian society.
term
it
worsened
means of this system of loans Britain secured an even greater hold over the Brazilian economy and strengmened the sub or
1. The mil·reis was the unit of currency in Brazil until 1941. when it was replaced by the cruzeiro.
I
November
Tht: Brazilian Economy
34 Brazil: The People and the Power
country and to attack the colOnial structure inherited from the empire.
THE TRANSITION CRISIS
During the second half of the nineteenth century a number of new undertakings enriched the ecouumit: life of tbe country. One after another banks were established, savings banks appeared, not to mention gas companies, urban trans port companies, insurance and shipping businesses. Yet the basic economic structure was not modified. At the same time manufacturing businesses experienced some success owing to the large supply of raw m aterials
and the existence of cheap labour. As a result. in the dosing years of the century important interests were in volved
in the struggle
for industrialization.
Relatively
developed urban centres were esrablished in which new social classes were to be found. including those working in national mde, the civil service. the army and the liberal professions. AJJt:d to the wage earners these new classes now accoumed
for
an
appreciable proportion of
the
population. The constant devaluation of the currency constituted a permanent cause of discontent for these sections of the popu lation. A considerable proportion of them were living on fixed incomes; thus the rise in the cost of living consequent to the increasing prices (in
the national currency) of imported
manufactured goods made tbe need for the industrialization of the country increaSingly clear. In
35
1888 the abolition of slavery annoyed the great land
owners. From this time onwards they lost interest in the fate of the monarchy. The army took advanrage of the existing unrest (lOd in November 188g its more advancerl elements overthrew the monarchy and proclaimed the Republic. This
change in the form of government enabled the urban middle classes. hitherto kept out of political life. and thus politically unrepresented, to come to power. They took advantage of
their new position to encourage the industrialization of the
The ideology of these middle classes - as we have seen, their members did not derive their incomes directly from agricul. ture - reflected at the political level the liberal ideas of the period, while economically they used a protectionist policy in favour of industrialization. Through the action of these new social classes, within which the anny played a leading role,
th� first ten years of the life of the Republic were marked by a
senous effort to use the machinery of government to en. courage industrialization and the economic liberation of the country. It was the first time stich an effort had been made.
Among the political and economic measures adopted at the time the follOWing are noteworthy:
(I) The abolition of the loans granted to the estate owners as a form of indemnity for the abolition of slavery.
(2) The establishment of a discriminatory customs tariff to protect the national industries.
(3) Credit facilities for the new industrial establishments. (4) The issue of the paper money necessary for the expan. sion of production and the payment of the wage-earning labour force.
(5) The introduction of a law on limited companies. (6) The establishment of a popular credit bank. These measures were effective and were the cause of a very rapid expansion in production. The country was seized by a real busmess fever. In 1889 Brazil possessed 600 industrial establishments and an invested capital of (about
£25 million),
400,000 contosl
60 per cent of which was in the textile
industry and 1 5 per cent in food production. Upsetting . the conservative balance maintained by the Empire the economic policy of the first republican ministers allowed the ). A conto was worth 100 mi l·res i The continuous inflation of Brazilian currency is apparent in the names of the units - 'mil' In 'mil·reis· signifies one thousand. .
36
Brazil: The Prople and the
Power
Tht: Brazilian Economy
c.�tablishment of 452 new undertakings and an investment of capital of over 200,000 contos of reis, that is, amounting 10 50 per cent of the total investment previous to. I 8&). The �doption of these different measures was a derermllll. ng fa,: tor . penod; in the political regrouping which occurred at thLs among those principally concerned were the importers, the declining large estate owners and the wealthy coffee prod ucers. Yet it was from abroad that the real decisions came. The re action of international financial interests was violent, nor was it confined to high-level contacts. It was made known through the newspapers that economic sanctions might be applied to Brazil if loans were granted to national industri�. The local journal of commerce repeated the news : , There IS reason to believe that Messrs Rothschild, in a telegram to the Minister of Finance, point out that the issue of loans for the development of industry authorized by the government �i11 harm national credit. ' Two days later, the same paper earned the following telegram from London : 'Brazilian four per cent loans have today faUen to 60'25', that s, i to 60·25 per cent of their nominal value.4 Pressure on the exchange rate was maintained throughout this period. In 1889 a mil·reis note, the BraziUan currency of the time, was quoted at 1.S. )d.; in L898 it was worth only 6<1. The average price of a sack of coffee - a product. it should be remembered, accounting for seventy per cent of the total value of Brazilian exports. dropped from 4'09 in 1893 to £1.'91 in 1896 and £1'48 l� 1899. The presence of British, Portuguese, French and Amen can warships in the port of Rio de Janeiro constituted 'an incitemen( to rebellion against the new republican govern· ment. The downfall came when Campos Sales was president {LB98-11)02}. In a presidential message he laid down his policy as follows : 'We must strive to export everything that 4. Historia nO"l>a.
Editora Brasiliensc, sao Paulo, ,964. vol. 4, p.
116.
37
we can produce under more advantageous conditions than the other countries, and to import everything that they �n produce more advantageously than we.' Joaquim Mortinho, his minister uf fin.mce, made it quite clear in 1901 : 'Produc. tion in new countries like ours cannot be developed without the aid of foreign capital and workmanship.' And so the movement for modernization was slowed down. The most reactionary forces seized power and set up a system of internal government which allowed imperialism, a new. comer on the political scene. to check the industrialization of the country. From this time onwards progressive forces were obliged to contend with the government's declared hostility. Up to 1930 they were reduced to plotting in secret. During this period of minority government of the Republic a series of rebellious movements shows the determination to seize control of the government from the hands of the bourgeoisie .
THE MINORITY REPUBLIC
The minority, now united again, took control of the machin· ery of economic policy. With the social classes concerned in the establishment of an urban industrial system removed from the centres of political decision, the new politiCO economic structure which prevailed in the country until 1930 took shape clearly as follows: (I) The important coffee planters : they secured control of the machinery of economic policy at the national level; at the same time they guaranteed stability to the central govern ment. (2) The other large estate owners; in the federal system set up by the Republic they possessed an effective guarantee of their interests through the definitive establishment of regional centres of political power. (3) International financial interests : they secured a privi-
38 Brazil: The People and the Power
The Brazilian Economy
lEged posicion in the country and the cootrol they exercised . very large profits. over production enabled tbem to obtam The central government held the balance between interests al home and activities abroad; between the coffee exporters and imperialism it adopted a policy of conciliation which found expression in the pursuit of the 'valorization' of our principal export. . With the help of exceptionally favourable condJtlons the production of coffee had developed with great strides : between 1890 and II}OO the plantations of the Sao Paulo region bad increased from 220 to po million heads. The crop which in 1880-81 had been 3-7 million sacks (of 60 kg_) rose on an average to 6-1 millions during the years I8&) to 1892. Ten years later (1B99-19()2.) on an average it exceeded 11-5 million sacks or 70 per cent of the annual world con sumption. These surpluses exerted growing pressure f�r a lowering of pric('s on the foreign market. to the great preJud ice of the exporters_ Taking advantage of the producers' difficult financial position international finance concentrated in the first place on the coffee industry. The treaty of Taubate n i iC)06 was the first step in the direction of what would be later called the 'policy of valoriza tion' of coffee. In short, this policy consisted in holding back considerable quantities of coffee in order to release them on the market a t times of expansion of demand or shortage of supplies from other producing countries. To finance the pur chase of the stocks accumulated by the coffee producers the governmenr was obliged to have recourse to foreign loans, which proved a heavy burden on the country's balance of payments: between 1<)06 and 1930, the time wben inter· national conditions imposed a change in the financial arrange ments, the government was obliged to borrow £72'7 million for this purpose. The policy of 'valorization of coffee' obvi ously served the interests of the ruling class by maintaining the level of its profits, but not those of tbe people. It made _
39
plain the alliance of this class with international finance. For the coffee producers this policy acted as a powerful encouldgement to investment. The stabilization of price brought lIooul by lhe control of supply, the high margin of profit and the guarantee of purchase and of stocking the sur· plus provoked increasing expansion in this sedor. In the long term, the uncontrolled increase of production caused an excessive increase in supply and led to the accumulation of enormous stocks. In 1930, when the great economic crisis occurred, Brazil had more tban 2,500 million heads of coffee. Production for export had increased excessively while world consumption developed only very slowly. During the three years 1927-<) exports scarcely reached two thirds of the quantities produced; during the last of these years, when production had risen to upwards of 28 million sacks, only 14 million sacks could be exported. The increase in unsold stocks from this harvest alone amounted to mOle than one tenth of the value of Brazil's gross national product for this year (' 9'9)·
The unprecedented increase in production took place with a corresponding technological improvement. The same primitive methods of cultivation continued to be used, giving rise to a decrease in productivity even in tbose districts whose soil and climate were particularly favourable for the crop. But because the cultivation of coffee was exceptionally profi t able, these districts attracted all the available capital to the prejudice of other sectors of the national economy. Thus the profits made from growing coffee were reinvested in ttie same product to establish new plantations, without other forms of production being able to benefit from it. The policy of 'valorization', then, had but one resul t : it increased the dependence of tbe national economy on a very small number of exports_ The international financial groups, first the British, then tbe Americans, derived large profits from the expansion of OUI
40
Brazil: The Prople and the Power
coffee production. Financing of this expansion, combined with direct or indirect control of the trade and export of the product, earned for international capital a very large profit margin; the banks and foreign companies - or even Brazilian companies, to the extent that they were allied with imperialist interests - drained off abroad the capital produced by these financial or trading operations. Shipping and distri· bution of the product to the great world centres of consump tion were dominated by foreign groups and so they were able to profit from the increased business in this sector of the economy. Right up to the present day Brazilian coffee has remained the foundation of a vast worldwide commercial organization for its processing and distribution. This organ ization is a far larger financial undertaking than the business of the coffee growers from which it is derived and the profits i their entirety to these same international of which go n financial groups. The interests of the coffee growers and international capital so far coincided as to cause a continuing fall in the rate of exchange, in other words, the devaluation of the Brazilian currency. For the coffee planters this meant that their prod UCt was made more competitive on the international market by lowering the price of coffee in terms of foreign currencies. For foreign capital a favourable rate of exchange increased its purchaSing power inside the country. In 1901, under Alfonso Pena's government, fixing of the rate of exchange at an artificially low level became tbe official policy. At that time a conversion fund was estahushed with the declared intention of keeping the value of the mil-reis at IS. 3d although the total situation of the country's external balance would have warranted a rate of 2S. ad. In other words, a general reduction n i the income of the country was de creed to give advantage to coffee and international capital. During the presidency of Washington Luiz (1926-30), more over, the conversion fund was turned into the stabilization .
The Brazilian Economy
41
i sues this fund endeavoured to pre fund. By means of its s rising above the legally £Xed rale of rate exchange tbe vent one mil·n�js for S ttl pence. This policy, pursued by the dom i nant minority n i alliance with international capital, created the situation in which there was always a budget deficit. Badly organized bond issues together with borrowing abroad became tbe normal practice. Borrowing by the First Republic (1889--1930) thus reached the sum of £361 million. The external debt of the country was £30 million in 1889; it rose to £90 million in 1910. In 1930 the total of the Brazilian federal, state and municipal external debt amounted to £231'3 million to service which. in interest and redemption, £23'1 million was reqUired. that is 23 per cent of the federal government income for that same year. If we now look at the longer period from 1814 to 193 I we see that total foreign loans amount to £41:q. million, that the sums paid out during this same period (interest, redemption, conversion) amounted to £438'1 million and that at the end of this period Brazil still owed £277 million, the annual service of which required upwards of £23 million.' Tbe search for a solution to the international finanCial problem was the fundamental and almost exclusive concern of successive governments between 1890 and 1930. All the government's external activities, practically speaking, were for one purpose alone - to obtain funds from abroad to finance the country's budget deficits and to maintain the balance of payments. Thus the whole organization and run ning of the country. indeed the very stability of the govern· ment. depended on a regular and increa.�ing flow of foreign cOlpitaL Paradoxically enough, throughout this period Brazil's trade balance was at aU times a largely favourable one. This 5. Werned: Sodre. Formacao his!orica do Brasil. Sio Paulo, l¢), p. 34).
Editor;!. Brasilicnse,
41.
Brazil: The People and the Power
The Brazilian Economy
surplus of exports over imports was due in part to the expan sion of the coffee trade, which from
1860 onwards grew con
siderably, but also, and more generally, to the growth of the
intinstrialized countries during the first thirty years of the twentieth century. The growth of these countries, especially of the United States, Jed to a substantial increase in their imports of foodstuffs and raw materials of which Brazil was one of the exporters. When after the First World War the United States took Britain's place as the leading world power in the economic field this was reOected by a considerable in crease in Brazilian exports to North America. The advance in Brazilian exports during the period of the First Republic resulted from sales abroad of a certain number
of products which had already been exported before this and
surplus which was to be maintained until our times. It wa� thus equally clear that by the favourable state of her external trade Brazil could have accumulated foreign exchange in increasing amounts. As can be seen from the table, over the medium or long period exports were always in excess of impor ts. The credit balance left by the exports. 468 million (gold), shows clearly that throughout this period the country's financial problem was certainly not due ro its being unable to export more than it imported. Brazil's trade balance. 1891-1930 in thousa nds of pounds (gold)
Imports
189,-1900
2.91,011
lp.811
+ 38,2.00
H)OI-IO
476.221.
)18.843
+ 1 57.379
1911-1.0
688,0}8
,,6,.,00
+1.11,1]2
192.1-}0
80,,848
674,479
+131.31>9
2.,261,125
1.793.045
+<68,080
Period
of which rapidly forged ahead. Among these latter was rub ber; hitherto it had hardly figured among rhe country's ex products. Between
1901 and 1910 34,500
{Ons on an average
were exported annually, amounting to a value of lion (gold). or
£13'4 mil
1.8 per cent of the total value of Brazilian ex 1910 i t accounted for 40 per cent of
ports at this period. In
this value - that is. a little less than coffee - and it reached its maximum in
Balance
Exports
from the appearance on the scene of new export goods, some
ports but it was suddenly to be found among the leading
43
Total for
the period
1911. with a figure of 41..000 tons. At this
time cocoa was also increasing in importance. The 6.132 tons
The many difficulties arising from a backward form of agri.
exported in
culture, the undeveloped technology and the constant low
the great advance occurred : in
export prices did not. therefore. prevent the country's trade
1&)5 had become 13.131 by 1900. At this point 1905, 1.1,090 tons; i n 1915. 44.980 tons ; in 191.5. 64.526 tons; lastly. in 1935. 100,000
tons. In the south of the country frozen meat and other
animal products were increasingly produced and exported
balance from shOWing a regular surplus. In these circum stances to talk of Brazil's 'financial helplessness' served only to hide the real natnre of a problem arising from the alliance
during the First World War, but declined appreciably, it
between the local minorities and international financial
must be admitted. dir�tly afterwards.
interests.
The increase in exports during the first forty years of the
Republic had transfonned the favourable tendency of the country's trading balance into a clearly marked position of
As the government was dominated by the large estate owning minority. which provided the goods for export. it never even considered establishing a system enabling it to
44
The Brazilian Economy
Brazil: The People and the Power
take control of the large sums produced by the exports. And so these considerable financial resources, which could have been used for the benefit of the nation, always remained in the bands of the private sector. Nor is there any doubt that the despatch of funds abroad represented by profits earned, interest charges and dividends - the necessary counterpart of public
or
private loans - represented a heavy charge for
the balance of payments, aldlough i t is impoSSible with the information available to estimate its effect with accuracy. It shouJd be added that the principal activity of the great inter national banks established in Brazil was to operate with the large amount of foreign currency produced by the exports. Funhermore. this foreign currency was always in their hands since the Brazilian banks did not function abroad. The Brazil ian government, deprived of any possibility of controlling these operations. never succeeded in finding out with any accuracy what
W:lS
the Tcal position of the country's balance
of payments. Even now it is almost impossible to estimate the sums taken from Brazil by means of all these operations, It can merely be stated that government control over the cur rency derived from exports would have been sufficient to have obviated aU need for concern about the balance of pay ments and any necessity to call on foreign capital. Thus it is clear that the key to the financial problem is to be found in the alliance between the governing, estat«lwning class and foreign imperialist capital. And this alliance prevented the cunency earned by exports from contributing to the accumu lation of capital necessary for the industrialization of the country and the development of its production. Efforts at industrialization did not however come to an end during this period. Despite the absence of any policy of industrialization and offiCial
iII·wiU towards undertakings of
this kind production increased conSiderably. In 1907. at the time of the first general census of industrial undertakings in Brazil. there were already more than 3,300 of them with a
45
capital investment of some 650,000 conros and a labour force of about 150,000. But the organization of production bad · remained unchanged since 18&}: the textile and food indust ries always held the leading place.
The First World War hastened the process of industrializa tion. With the relaxation of imperialist control over the Brazilian economy another investment craze hit the country. Between 1 9 1 5 and 1919 6,000 new businesses were started and locally manufactured goods began to take the place of non-durable imports. In 1920, the date of the first census after the war, the situation had developed as follows :
I },300
industrial undertakings. capital in tbe region of 1,820,000 contos and a labour force of 275,000. The food·producing industries which in 1907 accounted for 27 per cent of produc tion in 1920 had reached 40 per cent. From this time onwards industry occupied a leading place in the economy of the country. replacing imports with its own goods manufactured for internal consumption. But even at this initial stage of its development Brazilian industry showed its subordination to the prevailing system. The deteri oration in the financial position of the country during this period amounted to a powerfuJ form of protection for in dustry. Actually, the continuously low rate of exchange, making mported i goods dearer for the consumer, created a favourable situation for home production and enabled new industries to subsist at a low technological level. Customs barriers and depreciation of the currency brought these in dustries a high profit margin and an assured market. Those periods, on the other hand. when the country's finances were more buoyant were less beneficial for industry. For example, between 1927 and 1930, years when [he balance of paymeniS was particularly favourable, a great number of businesses were obliged to close. And still more were well on the way to ruin. The existence of a plentiful labour force in the COWltry
46
Brazil: Tht: Pt:oplt: and tht: Powt:r
The Brazilian Economy 47
together witb a good market provided a further stimulus.
in the life of the nation in
The labour force available had already enabled tbe large
oligarchy then in power.
1930 by overthrowing the rural
estate-owners to increase agricultural production without
There now thus came into being the conditions required
being obliged to raise wages. The govt'mrnent's action in en
for a policy intended to achieve Brazil's economic independ ence. Between 1930 and 1945 - a period, in fact, correspond
couraging the immigration of foreign workers was a conrri butory factor in maintaining the low wage level. Between
ing to GetuJjo Vargas's first period n i office - with the support
1889 and 1930 in the State of Sao Paulo alone the government
of the nationalist middle class a policy combining all the in
allowed nearly two million foreign workers to enter and in
ternal economic factors favouring the industrial development
addition paid their fare. The greater proportion of this labour
of tbe country was put into operation in Brazil. This led, of
force was absorbed by the coffee plantations. By the very fact
course, to confrontation with imperialist capitalism. The most important economic consequence of the world economic crisis was a drastic reduction in the counlT)"s capacity to import. This was caused by the following factors:
of its numbers i t unwittingly played a decisive part in the maintenance of a low wage level. The new industrial under takings were established on the basis of taking advantage of
(I) The fall in Brazilian exports : exports, which during the years '92. 1-)0 had reached an average value of £80·6 million (gold) a year, fell during the ten follOWing years
the low wages to increase their profits and to remain slighdy competitive with imported manufactured goods. But these
latter came to control the market and succeeded in preventing the development of the national n i dustry, since the main tenance of a low level of wages formed no obstacle to a high
(193 t-40) to an average yearly value of £37'7 million (goM). (1) The cessation of the entry of foreign capital : at the
level of capitalization in the national industry. New industry tended to be located in the central southern
region, encouraged by the extraordinary accumulation of capital caused by the expansion of the coffee industry. When in the following period concrete measures were taken to
stimulate industrial development this region derived the most btnefit from them. It thus became the most developed part of the country. ' GETULfO VARGAS S FIRST PRESIDENCY
The international economic collapse resulting from the crisis in the thirties was the cause in Brazil of a violent change in the prevailing system. The crisis itself, and the World War which followed it, contributed to the relaxation of imperialist
control over the economy. Cetulio Vargas, at the head of a liberal revolution, had at the same time begun a new phase
same time the flow of foreign capital suddenly ceased, al though its contribution had hitherto been regarded as essen· tial for the country's external balance of trade. I
(3) Fall in the rate of exchange. Despite th� measures
adopted for exchange control Brazilian currency rapidly lost its value: the value of the mil·reis in relation to sterling in
1934 was less than half what it was in 1919, and this despite the devaluation of sterling in 1933. In these circumstances the price of foreign goods increased conSiderably and the possibility of importing them grew more limited still. Thus a fall in imports occurred : from an average yearly value of £67'4 million during the period 191 1-)0, imports fell to an annual 6gure of £30 million during 193 1-40.
For production dirttted towards the home market this situ ation acted as a powerful means of protection. Faced with a drastic reduction in home consumption of imported goods in
both tbe industrial and agricultural sectors, Brazilian produc-
¥l
Brazil: The People and the Power
The Brazilian Economy 49
tion of goods to supply the home market registered a more rapid increase tban at any other previous period. The general riSie in price levels caused by devaluation enabled correspond ing home products to obtain a higher price also, thus assuring their existence. Under these conditions it is hardly surprising to see that Bntzil's industrial production, exclusively directed cowards the home market, doubled between 1931 and 1938, the in crease being in the region of 13 per cent annually in the years 1934 to 1938. The textile industry forms a good example of
this rapid industrial expansio n : its production increased by
about 85 per cent between 1929 and 1936. Agriculture also was not left behind and irs production increased at the same speed as industry'S. During the first phase this expansion was possible because
to nearly £153 million, was thus reduced to £130 milli0.n
Later, n i 1934, 1940 and 1944, foreign credits were drastic ally reduced once more and brought down CO a small fracti�n uf lhdr nominal valut:. This small remainder could be paid
o:
by being set off against Brazilian credits derived from ports which were frozen abroad during the 1939-45 war. It I S un necessary to emphasize the importance of these measures for
the country's external balance and for the new forms of
production then in full course of development. The actual impossibility of obtaining foreign currency
.
III
sufficient quantity obliged the government to freeze the profits of those foreign businesses with investments in Brazil. The free market in currency was abolished and severe control of the transfer of profits and payments abroad was intro duceci. The monetary authorities were thus in full control of
the country's means of production were not used to capacity.
all the currency of the country. When in 1934 the free
improve their trade figures; the effect of this, combined with
nonetheless not abolished, and the whole amount of currency
The utiJiZation of the means available enabled businesses to that of the raised price level, increased the profitability of the capital invested and provided industry with the funds it needed for its further expansion. These circumstances proved exceptionally favourable to the engineering industry. In
19}1 production in this secror had already increased by 60
per cent in comparison with 1929.
Vargas's revolutionary government endeavoured
CO
carry
our a policy of open defiance of mperialism, i the reconcilia tion of internal economic interests and the protection and encouragement of all forms of production whether new or traditional. The first measure, and by far the most important of those in opposition to imperialism, was dictated by the actual circumstances of the crisis n i the balance of payments; in 1930 not only was payment of interest on the external debt suspended, but the greater part of the national debt was re pudiated. Brazil's external debt, which in that year amounted
market was partially re-established the official mnket was available was divided in varying proportions between the two markets. With the beginning of the Second World War the country entered a period of change though remaining remarkably stable. There was a strong international demand for food stuffs and raw materials, and the unprecedented rise in prices resulring from it increased the value of Brazilian ex ports proportionally. At the same time supplies from the industrialized countries ceased almost completely. Under these favourable conditions between 1940 and 1946
the
Brazilian balance of trade showed a series of credit balances the whole sum of which reached 1,100 million dollars. This allowed the national currency to achieve extraordinary stab ility, and it was possible to avoid a revaluation. For this purpose, the government had recourse to the issue of large internal loans so as to be in a position co acquire the currency which the importers did not need and which corresponded
Brazil: Tht Pt:oplt and the Power
50
The Brazilian Economy
to the credit balances in foreign trade. This policy enabled the high level of prices to be maintained and was of great advanrage to the already considerable sectors whose products
were destined for tbe borne market.
But it led irreuit:vaLly to
the inflationary process which characterizes the later periods of the Brazilian economy. In the years after the war manipu lation of the exchange rate to produce a devaluation of the currency and the rise in prices at home were to benefit the industrial sectors by the accwnulation of capital which in flation allowed. The need to support home production led the government to adopt nOt only a policy of protection by means of tariffs but also a positive attitude of public intervention in the economic field. This interventionist policy was not aimed at pIeventing or limiting the activities of the private sector but, on the contrary, at giving it the opportunity of further de velopment. Its principal features can be summarized
;IS
51
which profitability was uncertain or would take some rime to be realized. The State took cbarge of the · prospecting for and exploitation of oil - finally discovered in
(2) Sectors
i n
1938. A National au Council was set up.
(3) Sectors requiring beavy supporting investment. A
whole series of official organizations was set up, among which were the national road department (DNER) and the national department for works to alleviate drought (DNOCS). The coastal navigation company was nationalized. During this same period preparatory studies for the construction of the barrage on the Sao Francisco were undertaken. Tbis was a step of vital importance for the development of the whole
of the north·west of the country. The project was only fin ished after Vargas had left the government. In an attempt to reconcile all the national interests the government was led to follow a policy supporting and pro tecting the opcnttion of the traditional forms of production.
follows: on the one hand, to private initiative was reserved
With this intention
investment in those sectors producing consumer goods in
organizations was set up. Among these may be mentioned the National Coffee Council (1931) which became later the
whkh, with a protected market, the suocess of the under· taking and a high return on the invested capital could be forecast. On the other, the State took charge of the invest ments whose profitability seemed doubtful or difficult to
realize and which required a particularly long and sustained effort.
As a result the State's activities were spread over various
fields :
Those sectors requiring heavy investment. The estab lishment of the metallurgical industry of Volta Redonda be
(I)
longs to this category of investment. It was the country's first heavy industry and as such encouraged the development of the private industrial sector. The financing of it was negoti ated with the United States; the political price paid to the Americans was Brazil's joining the war on the side of the Allies.
a
certain number of national or regional
Brazilian Coffee Institute (IBC), the Sugar and Alcohol Insti· tute (1933), the Bahia Cocoa Institute, the Salt, the Pine and (he Mate Institutes. The purpose of all these bodies was to grant credit facUities to producers and to guarantee minimum prices.
In the special case of coffee, of fundamental importance for the economy of tbe country, the government continued the
policy of the 'valorization' of the product : they burned eighty million sacks of coffee (the equivalent of three years' world consumption) to withdraw them from the market; in place of financing stocks that could not be sold by means of
foreign credits, finance in the national currency was pro vided. And after the sao Paulo revolution of 1932 the govern ment arranged with the banks for a 50 per cent reduction of debts in favour of the coffee planters.
The Brazilian Economy
Brazil: The: Prople: and the: Powe:r
52
For the same purpose of checking foreign domination of the Brazilian economy, in 1934 the government published
sets of rules for the mines and for water; thereby it meant to
ensure national control over the country's mineral resources and to regulate investment in this sector.
To provide credit facilities for all forms of production,
whether intended for the home market or not, the Agricul tUfal and Industrial Credit Department of the Bank of Brazil was set up. backed by a Treasury guarantee. qUired support, and others which had remained outside the production movement needed to be brought in. For this pur pose commissions were formed for the development of the Amazon (SPVEA), for the Sao Francisco dock (CVSF) and the Rio Doce Dock Company.
tht: claims from the workers the
government brought in a fairly prog�essive form of labour legislation and established a system of social security. In addition, some political organization was needed for the
working class, in order to obtain its support for the nation alist middle class and for it to form an alliance with the latter to work for the development of the country. For this purpose Vargas established the Brazilian Labour Party
economy.
To a great extent home consumption at this time had freed Import figures were fall· i itself from dependence on mports.
ing and means of production in the country were in a posi tion to satisfy home demand: this process of prOviding
substitutes for imported goods continued on its own momen tum.
duced in the country exerted a stranglehold on economic development. Under these conditions the level of imports in the aggregate became the detennining factor for investments
and. as a result, for expansion of the system. Relations with foreign powers now had a different objective but the ties holding the country in dependence on these powers were by
In an endeavour to reconcile the various national interests
wlut:r pr�urt: of
level of investment, that is on the development of the
Imports of certain raw materials and machinery not pro
The economic activity of certain less-favoured regions re
,md
53
(PTB).
The scope of the country's economic activities had under
gone profound modifications during the Second World War.
An urban industrial sector had taken shape within the
no means broken.
The policy auoptoo. by tLt: govl::rument of recoociling all
the national interests included, among other things, giving
protection to the traditional sectors. The system of large estates as a form of organization for production was there
fore not in danger. Their interests were able to gain new strength by the gradual integration economically of the
national territory into an organized system whose internal relationships could develop and thus afford prospects for the future.
The reorganization of home trade which occurred between
1930 and
1945 provided the basis for the fonnation of the
Brazilian economy. a sector whose fonnation was the result
national economic system: its governing factor was the earn
mined policy of economic development. A new economic
ally the north and the north·east. became the suppliers of
of the expansion of production. itself deriving from a deter system had been established in which home demand had be
come the essential and determining factor of the whole economy. From this time onwards fluctuations in foreign de
mand and the increase in exports no longer exerted direct and crucial influence on the volume of consumption and the
ing of profit. The agricultural regions of the country, especi
food and raw materials for the regions in an advanced state
of industrialization; from these latter they transported the manufactured goods that they needed. For the predominandy
agricultural regions this internal trade at the end of the
Second World War had grown to be of greater importance
54
Brazil: The People and the Power
than the foreign trade which they had carried on prior to 1930. As a matter of fact. industrialization brought to the home market the system of specialization which formerly governed Brazil's relations with the rest of the world : raw materials for export. manu1actured goods for internal trade. Some parts of Braz.il were now specializing in providing raw materials. others in producing manufacrured goods. Trade between the regions. by fostering contacts within the governing class, was a factor in revealing clearly the identity of interests between the different parts of this class which hitherto had acted independently of each other. At the same time migration within the country increased enormously; n i this way the regions undergOing rapid indus trial expansion were provided with a work force from the surplus of other regions. During the subsequent periods this was an important factor in the maintenance of wage levels, keeping them low in the industrial sectors. Among other factors. the combination of a low level of wages with a high price level resulting from the government's exchange-rate policy was one cause of the exlTaordinary accumulation of capital achieved by Brazilian industry during the following periods. The transfer within the country of the system of speciali zation which formed the basis of trade relations with countries abroad divided Brazil into rich and poor regions. It caused the variations in development in the regions, a prob lem which in subsequent years gave rise to considerable de bate. Specialization of function led to the increasing im poverishment of the north and the north-east particuJarly. and their relative distance from the industrial centres of the country only served to increase their poverty. In these im poverished regions the ruling class benefited from this divi sion of the country; in conjunction with the industrial sectors they retained control of the government and were
The Brazilian Economy
55
able to use it for the advantage of their short- and long-term economic interests. In this way the economic policy of supporting the activities of the large estate owners resulted not only in diminishing or destroying the opposition between the urban industrial system and the agrarian system. but it enabled the landed proprietors to concentrate in their own hands tremendous economic power on me capitalist model. The conditions for the profitable exploitation of a large estate had substantially changed since colonial times. The rural bourgeoisie was certainly numerically smaller but it enjoyed immense economic and political power. To the land they held in great abundance was now added a great abund ance of cheap labour. The abolition of slavery. natural demographic increase and the concenttated immigration en couraged for nearly three quarters of a century. had led to considerable increase in the population. especially in the country districts. In 1945 when the Vargas government went out of office nearly thirty�ne million persons. that is, two thirds of the whole popu1ation of the country. were settled in rural districts and obtained their living from agriculture. Thus the basic economic problem that the estate owners had to solve was that of the use of the two elements that were to be found in quantity. namely. land and cheap labour. They had to reduce to a minimum the need for mechanization of the estates and the necessary investment this wou1d require. The twofold necessity of making use of large areas of land and of controlling large numbers of rural workers caused the appearance and pennanent establishment in the country dis tricts. particularly in the north and north-east. of a whole series of institutions which became characteristic of the large estate economy. The concentration of land in the hands of a few gave rise to a retrograde rent system. In the meaciio and parceria systems (two methods of payment for the right of using the
56
Brazil : The People and the Power
The Brazilian Economy
land), as payment was made in kind. the landlord remained
the sole possible purchaser of
the crops belonging to
the
tenant. In these two cases the whole of the produce is placed on the national or international market. Under the cambiio system the tenant undertakes to pay his rent in work for the landlord; a part of his time is spent in cultivation of the estate of his landlord, to whom all the produce belongs, and the rest of his time is spent working on the land rented to him. Here.
too,
all the produce reaches the consumer through
the trade channels.
57
allowed them to concentrate in their own hands a very large share of economic
power and
produced by this sector.
the gte.3ter
p
Thus the political and economic rise of an industrial
bourgeoisie was not balanced in Brazil by an intensification of the contradictions between the urban industrial system and the traditional agricultural system. On the contrary. the economic integration of the country undertaken by the in dustrial and nationalist sections during the years 193O-4� unified these apparently divergent interests; they were held
Th,e plentiful supply of labour not only enabled money wages to be kept at a low level, but it also allowed the intro
together by concern to maintain a high level of remuneration
labourer. The most characteristic of these was probably
the various institutes for the assistance and protection of
duction of various forms of exploitation of the agricultural
payment in kind by means of the 'barraciio system, operated on the large estates. The barraciio is a kind of shop from which the peasant is obliged tOI obtain the supplies necessary to his daily life. These establishments belonged to the land owner, who took advantage of the position to charge exces sively high prices in exchange for the labour of his worker
for the employers in these two sectors of the economy. The economic organizations set up by the government, including traditional production. were thus changed into mere means
of political conservatism for the benefit of the ruling classes.
Under the new system of national unity, with its object as
the economic and political plunder of the mass of the workers, the various aspects of the economic and social policy followed by the Brazilian state
can be
explained in the last analysiS by
part of the country. The landowners also held the agricul
the necessity to serve the manifold, distinct, though not opposing interests in the ascendant in Brazilian society.
by trading in goods produced by these workers. The worker's
THE
who, always in debt, was even unable to move to another tural workers in their grasp by means of credit control and
subordination to the estate-owner was thus increased. These institutions, peculiar to the large Brazilian estates, have been likened by some specialists in Brazilian affairs to
1945--64 PERIOD
During the twenty years following the Second World War the Brazilian economy underwent a period of intense indus
feudal or semi-feudal institutions. The comparison is false.
trial development based enmely on the replacement of im
They came into being after the abolition of slavery and still
ported goods by home-produced goods. Despite the fall of
exist today. Their specific purpose is greater profit .margin and sale on the market under theconditions mentioned above. Clearly they are capitalist institutions fallen into decay under
conditions of extreme underdevelopment. The largc"scalc use of the two factors, land and labour. enabled the agricultural proprietors' cost of production to remain very low and
Vargas - who was recalled to power as president of the Re
public aiter the 1951 elections - the policy of development initiated by him was not given up. Accordingly, the State
assumed wide responsibilities for the encouragement and
stimulation of trade in the private sector and these were pur sued to their ultimate conclusions.
58
Brazil: The People and the Power
But external conditions had completely changed. The rela tive weakness of imp erialist pressure on account of the Second World War
-
a situation which Vargas had contrived to
turn to wonderful advantage - was over. With the end of the waf American imperialism, strengthened by its victory over Nazism, returned to and intensified its former aggressive attitude. The United Scates, having become the most power
ful economic force in the world, turned resolutely to Latin America as its first choice for an exclusive sphere of economic and political influence. ObViously this further imperialist offensive was to have a profound effect on Brazilian life. As a result of numerous changes the Brazilian economic system had reached a stage of great complexity. At the begin
The Brazilian Economy
59
,
consumer goods; plant and eqUipment that might be manu
bctured was retained for its own expansion. A whole serit'S"
of articles, necessary for its working and expansion, were be yond its reach. Ie was obliged therefore to import machinery,
plant, fuel and raw materials which were provided by the
imperialist
sector. In other
words,
the industrial sector be
came the principal currency spender.
(3) The imperialist sector purchased the produce exported by the agricultural sector. The currency which thus came into the country made its way out again as payment for the imports made by the industrial sector. Throughout this period
imperialism made extensive investments in the various indus trial sectors
-
investments which enabled it to take out of the
ning of the period that we are about to study three distinct
country in different forms the considerable financial resources
mene, which were interdependent and influenced each other.
its control over the sources of n i ternal and international
These were the urban industrial sector, the agricultural (large
finance enabled i t to exert increasing power over the
systems could be discerned, each at its own stage of develOp
estate) sector and. thirdly. imperialism as represented by foreign capital interests.
of interest, profits. debt repayments and royalties. In addition,
country's production. The new system, based on this plan of a threefold relation
The three sectors each formed an integral part of the
ship, gave proof of extraordinary dynamism. Brazil was now
teraction berween them, although this did not prevent their
beginning of the sixties the country possessed one of the
same dynamic and unstable system; there was continual in comending for politiCal supremacy within the system.
From the economic viewpoint each of them performed
specific functions which can be listed as follows :
(I) The large-cstare
agricultural sector. producer of food
and agricultural supplies, performed three functions: supply of the rural and urban regions; provision for these same urban
centres with the raw materials necessary for industries; des patch on the international market of a considerable propor
in a position to develop ber industry intensively so that at the largest industrial sectors in the whole of Latin America. The
relationship between the three sections became increasingly
closer, thus consolidating the economic integration of tbe
country initiated by Cetullo Vargas. Despite occasional
differences over control of the machinery of government the
ruling class remained firmly united in defence of its common interests; political and social structures remained unchanged,
and no Significant reform was introduced into the life of the
tion of production constituting almost the whole of Brazilian
nation. But at the ideological aDd political level the need for
exports. Thus this sector continued exclusively to act as the
an independent national development came in con.Bict with
provider of foreign currency for the country. (2) The urban industrial sector, producing manufactured
goods, supplied the home market, both urban and rural, with
the external seeton of the system, though none of the institu tional measures necessary to keep a check on investments and control foreign capital were adopted.
The Brazilian Econom)'
Brazil: The People and the Power
60
During this period the government's economic policy be
c;lIne of
considerable importance in the life of the country on
account of the level achieved in
1945.
of industrial development already
The central government used every means
in its power to encourage industrialization. This was the out standing characteristic of the times.
At the end of the war the Brazilian industrialists, both
economically and politically, had become of comiderable im portance. Under the new system the industrialists kept con
trol of the central government and made
use
of the federal
machinery to stimulate the process of industTialization. The landowners remained in control of those departments which
could be useful to them in their undertakings and also of
political power in the regions where agriculture predomin ated. In the parliamentary sphere. despite the influence won
by the industrialists, the agricultural regions contrived to be
represented in sufficient numbers to ensure the defence of their interests.
The outstanding event of the period. therefore, was the
progress of industrialization. AJmost all the energies of the
country were concentrated on this and. economically at
least. considerable success ' was achieved. Between
1961
1945
and
the growth of the gross national product reached an
annual average of
6 per cent; for the last of these years this 154 per cent over 1945. The real
represents an increase of
income, due to the emergence of a favourable rate of ex change in trade with foreign countries during the first ten years
(1945-55) of
this period, increased still more rapidly :
with an annual rate of increase of apprOXimately 6·8 per cent, the real income in
1945·
1961 was 188 per cent higher
than that of
A more detailed examination shows that the growth of the
industrial product was very rapid: an annual rate uf iucrease
of 9 per cent was maintained; for the last of the years under consideration this represents a total increase of nearly
61
300 per cent in comparison with 1945. On the other han� agriculture expanded more slowly, only a little more rapidly in fact than the rate of population growth (between 19-45 and 1961 the total increase of agricultural production did not reach 100 per cent). Thus it is industria l expansion which
accounts for the country's economic growth. As a result of this expansion the manufacturing industries' share of the gross internal product increased Significantly, and from 16 per cent in
1945
reached nearly
30
per cent in
1961. Of all
the industries the follOWing stand out for the rapidity of mfU
growth : electTical apparatus, machinery. transport, rubber. metallurgy, paper. minerals, chemical and pharmaceutical products. The total number of industrial establishments in creased from 45-l)()() in 1940 to 84,000 in 1950 and 1 10,000 in
1960.
The principal cause of the industrialization during this period was the substitution of home-produced goods in place of imports. The movement had begun in the previous periods
by the production in the country of non-durable consumer goods, which could take the place of foreign goods more easily; attention was then turned to durable consumer goods and machinery and plant. The process of substitution was so rapid that towards the end of the period it bad practically exhausted its possibilities.
That is why, despite the rapid growth of imports which, in 1962, had reached a figure of 1,300 millions of dollars com i 1945-6, the total pro p
portion of imports to the gross national product declined Significantly. During the previous periods this proportion exceeded 10 per cent; in 1963 it was scarcely more than 4 per
i ported accounted cent. At the same period consumer goods m for less than 1 per cent of the country's total consumption.
and practlc
plant and machinery Buctuated around
20 per cent
of the
62 Brazil : Tht Proplt and the Power gross sum of fixed capital for the whole country (investments) while raw materials accounted for 3 per cent of the gross product and fuels 1'5 per cent. All the same, such as they were, these imports were indis pensable to the functioning and expansion of the Brazilian industrial sector. Made up almost exdWiively of raw materials, fuel. plant and machinery imports had become excessively rigid in their composition and their amount im
possible to reduce. Balance of payments problems grew worse after 1955. resulting in serious financial difficulties for the country. Substitution of home-produced goods for imports could thus go no further while the problems of the balance of payments and of dependence on foreign imports remained unsolved, since the continuation of industrial development required an increasi ng volume of imported goods. Owing particularly to the fall of export prices in the fifties the total value of exported goods - a reduced number of im portant agricultural goods and minerals - displayed a clear tendency to fall although therr volume continued to increase. To take a single exampl e : in 1951 for a total of 4.852,000 tons of exports, the country received 1.]70.000 US dollars, a sum which was reduced to 1.2 14.000 in 1962 for total exports of 12,}61,000 tons. 'I'hh giv� ;m idea of the increasing effort required. and the heavy pressure on the national capacity, for production to enable the country to meet the cost of the imports essential to its economic life. By concentrating on the import of raw materaIs. inter mediate goods, machinery and plant, the process of substitut ing home-produced goods for imports had made the Brazilian economy more vulnerable from abroad, since to maintain the economic activity of the country at the level already reached necessitated a large and irreducible number of imports. Indusrri:d growth was gready stimulated by the decisive action of official bodies. During the post-war period, especi ally in the fifties, economic protectionism became the govern-
The Brazilian
Economy
63
ment's official policy. Competition with better-equipped foreign producers operating under more favourable condi� tions and able to dominate the market showed clearly that i industry was to expand. IneVitably protection was essential f in the circumstances in which the industrialist class origin ated and developed it caused appreciable distortions in the
industries which it had helped to bring into being and which were to distingUish it and endow it with its own charac teristics. The part played by the State in the development of the country assumed increasing importance both in subsidiary services (roads. railways. ports, electric power, sanitation. navigation, etc.) and in essential investments (oil, iron foundries. liquefied gas. motor vehicles, the chemical industry, transport. etc.). During these years private industry could rely on far stronger forms of protection than it had known prcviously. The most effective of these was certainly the guaranteed pre ference in favour of nationally produced goods on the home market. At first imported goods were subjected to a high rate of duty with the purpose of raising their price and discourag i portation; the next step, which soon fonowed. ing their m was the prohibitiOn. purely and simply. of the importatiOn of goods regarded as inessential to industrial development. This protectionist policy was to have profound repercus sions on the working of the economy: the competitive spirit between firms was dulled. and economic efficiency was for gottcn; the problems of prime cost and the scale of production lost their importance since a continually expanding market could be counted on in advance. On the other hand. during this period the country's finan cial institutions underwent appreciable expansion with the
creation at national. regional or State level of organizations
for action in the economic field : the National Bank for Ea> nomic Development (BNDE), the Commission to Control
64 Brazil : The Prople and the Power
Currency and Credit (SUMOC), the North-East Brazilian Bank (BNB). and Commission for the Development of the North-East (SUOENE) and in each state an organization for
the planning and distribution of government aid to industry. These bodies tried to stimulate economic activity and administered aid in many different forms regarded as essen tial to the national indusrry; in each case these were of a markedly inflationary character. Among the means used to stimulate activity in the private sector the following have played an important part with the leaders of indusrry : (1) The general exemption from taxation allowed to new concerns without reference to their importance for the economy as a whole. Even the tax on profits could be
avoided if the amount was reinvested in the industry. As is obvious, this exemption amounted to the transference to the indusnial sector of an appreciable part of national funds and the guarantee to it of a considerable margin of profit in return for no special effort. (2) Plentiful and easy credit for short- and middle-term operations. The financing of these credits, which could be
made in the national money or foreign currency. took no counl of inOation - then rwming at 50 or (jo per cent and even higher a year - which would have required monetary adjustment. On account of the constant devaluation these credit concessions also amounted to the allocation to the industrial sector of a large part of public funds. (3) Direct participation by the government in private enter prise by the purchase of shares. This participation was always on a small scale and the operation of these companies thus escaped State control. (4) Fixing of a special rate of exchange for the importing of industrial machinery and equipment. By making a fixed rate of exchange for imports regarded as essential for indus trial development the government in actual fact was making
Th, Brazilian Economy 65 the purchase of plant and raw materials less costly since the. , u s rate of excbaogt: was always rising on the free market. TI represented a further profit for the industrial sector. In addi tion. the permanent devaluation of the currency enabled companies constantly to increase their level of capitalization by clever accountancy. The inflationary consequences of these measures is obvious; by the importing of plant and essential raw materials at fixed prices. and by charging their expenditure according to tbe dollar rate on the free market. these companies could artificially inflate their sale price to the consumer and so increase their profit. Devaluation of the nalional currency thus �me an important me:lns of in creasing the profit margins of indusrry. (5) Devaluation of itself was thus an advantage to indus· trial undertakings while at the same time it held advan tages also for exporters and foreign capital that might invest in Brazil. In other words, manipulation of the rate of ex· change for devaluation united the leading commercial in terests in the country - the traditional and modem sectors of the national economy - with those of the foreign capital £lowing into Brazil. This combination of interests caused the dollar rate of 18.38 cruzeiros. between 1947 and 1951. to faU to more than 1,000 cruzeiros in 11)64. This manipulation and exploitation of the exchange rates caused the violent wave of inflation characteristic of this period. Brazilian industrial development would scarcely have been possible without this effective government cooperation either by direct financial assistance or by investment in those sectors considered to have priority. The weakness of the national economic group was the reason aUeged to justify this support given to investors. As a matter of fact, with the help of public funds the government made a conSiderable effort to create [he basic conditions for development. Public participation in capital structuring grew throughout this period. The State's share
66
The Brazilian Economy (y;
Brazil: The People and the Power
doubled in a few years. In 1947 the government accounted for 15·8 per cent of the gros:<> fixed capital, private enterprise be ing responsible for the rest. [n 1960 the position was very different, the State's share and that of private companies being now 38 and 62 per cent respectively. This trend con tinued in the following years. If allowance is made for the operation of public undertakings and the direct and massive transfers of public money to private enterprise the consider able amount of State participation would be even more strikingly obvious. Yet during this period, despite the apparent economic and political rise of the nationalist bourgeoisie, the pressure from foreign capit al and its penetration into the country did not grow less. Leaving aside no possible means of pressure on succeeding governments and on private groups, imperialism made use of investments in the key sectors of the national economy as its favourite method of securing control and domination of an industrial development which it found it quite impossible to prevent. Of course, dear-minded people and those political groups allied to the popular movement opposed foreign capital's invasion of the COllDtry_ But the federal government, on which the decision rested, was unable to stand 6rm. Gctulio Vargas's suicide in 1954. at lht! very time when he was seeking to control foreign capital and to re sist the transfer of its pr06ts abroad, was the immediate conse quence of pressure inside and outside the country; he could not avoid but would not bend before the onslaught. Other statesmen, ostenSibly independent of the foreign groups and pretending to protect national interests. were actually agents engaged in surrendering the country to imperialism. Analysis of the most Significant stages of the invasion of Brazil by foreign capital shows chat there are four of them : (1) Immediately after the war. hetween 1946 and 19So, dire<:t investment from foreign sources amounted to 220 million dollars - a yearly average of 44 millions. These com-
paratively modest figures are explained by the post-war diffi . culties anrl European reconstmction. (2) The following period (1951-5), marked by the return to power of Vargas, witnessed a revival of foreign invest ment: a total sum of }SO million dollars, or an annual average of 70 millions. Examination of the annual 6gures shows that the trend was irregular. Year
mil/ions of dollan
1951
6)
195 2-
9'
1954-
" 8.
1953
1955
1951-S
60
350
Foreign capital. already at work to recapture control of production in the country. encountered opposition from the government of Getulio Vargas. The year of his suicide (1954) was precisely the year wben less foreign capital than in any other year came into the country. This was no mere coin
cidence. (3) In the third period (1956-60). corresponding exactly with the presidency of Juscelino Kubitschek, foreign invest ment increased rapidly. Its total volume reached a value of nearly 750 million dollars - an annual average of nearly 150 millions. The yearly statistics are as follows : YM.
millions of dollan
1956
,,0
1957 1958
'79 . .8
1959
,,8
'...
1956-60
,)8 74l
,
68
Brazil: The People and the Power
(4) In 1961 during Janio Quadros's brief period of govern ment. foreign investments remained at the high level of the immediately preceding years with a total of 147 million dollars. In H)61, when Goulart's government first took over. the� dropped suddenly to 69 million dollars. They remained
at this level during the following years. Hence it is dear that the period from 1956 to 1960, when the industrialization of the country was increasing most rapidly, was also the time when imperialist penetration was at its height. On account of these very heavy investments of foreign capital Brazilian firms and private undertakings had to give way to the great international monopolistic corporations. In May 1961 the review Desenvolvimento e COt1juntura pub lished the results of an investigation of the 6,818 companies regarded as the most important. Among them, si xty-six firms or financial groups enjoyed a capital of over one thousand million cruzeiros, quite certainly making them the most JXlwerful undertakings in the country. Their joint capi tal amounted to no less than 301'9 thousand million cruzeiros, or 46'3 per cent of the whole capital of these 6,818 companies. On the division of this sum between national and foreign capital ili� L'QudusiulI$ of the inquiry were as follows : Among the 66 companies and economic groups showing the highest concentrations of capital the foreign under takings were the most numerous (31); the total sum of their
capital reacbed 101·8 thomand million cruzeiros (34 per
cent). The national companies or groups numbered 1 9 with a capita] of 39 thousand million cruzeiros (II per cent). usdy, the remainder belonged to the State. The foreign firms held various strategic points in the Brazilian economy. They were to be found in a great variety of sectors - in the metallurgical industry and those concerned with tbe motor car, tyres, production and distribution of
The Brazilian EcOt1omy
69
electticity, telephone, petrol disttibution, manufacture of agricultural macbinery and equipment. cbemical and phar- " maceutical products, paper and cellulose, foodstuffs and drink, tobacco and cotton. In very many ways the establishment of these n i dustries i discriminate concession of facili· was encouraged. by the n ties granted. (0 all new industrial establishments. The absence of any control on the transfer abroad of the profits of these companies and the fact that reinvestment in Brazil was not
obligatory gave furtber encouragement to foreign capital to come to Brazil. Once established it enjoyed in its tum the advantage of all the protective legislation for industrial development. In the competition to capture strategic positions in the economy national private capital rapidly lost to foreign capi tal control of the movement towards industrialization. Lastly, when the possibility of substituting borne-produced goods for
imports was exhausted, private Brazilian companies and groups bad no other alternative than to submit to foreign interests. The conscious effort made to ensure economic growth at the beginning of the sixties had resulted in Brazil's possess ing a relatively modern indu.strial and capitalist organization, technologically advanced and in a position to satisfy in large measure the requirements of borne demand. But as this in dustrial expansion developed it became obvious that the capitalist system would be incapable of effecting the incor JXlration of the whole of the country in this process of grewell. It was also apparent tbat the very force of this development was the cause of considerable limitations to the expansion of the home market necessary to the continuity of industrial expansion. Industriali7.ation was �rearl very unequally over the country. Capitalist requirements settled the geographical con centration of the productive industries and their establish-
70
Brazil: The Prople and the Power
The Brazilian Economy 71
ment very quickly came to be confined to the central southern part of the country and, in this region, more especially in certain states. The other parts of the country were untouched.
the shameless exploitation of the workers. The combination
of these rwo elements - nduction in the number of jobs and · freezing or else continual fall in real wages at a time when
Manipulation of the exchange rate, mentioned above, resulted
the general productivity of the economy. and particularly
in the less developed regions exporting their capital to the
of the industrial sector, was continually growing - produced
industrial centres, thus financing
an exrreme concentration of wealth n i the hands of the
their expansion. This
system ensured for the ruling classes in all the regions the
ot capital during this period; its beneficiaries were certain
immediate satisfaction of their interests. While the capitalist organization
employers. This was the cause of the extraordinary growth
thus fixed the geo
groups at home and abroad. The concentration of wealth
graphical boundaries of industrial development it tended of
among a few also prodoced a large number of industrial
necessiry to reduce the labour force employed. Capitalist
undertakings manufacturing unnecessary consumer goods
development required tbe installation of an advanced techno
intended to satisfy the demand of the high-income-Ievel social dasses.
logical system characterized by huge capital invesonent and reduced
use
of manpower. As a result industry was power
The limitation of industrial development to a few favoured
less to provide a sufficient number of jobs to employ tbe in
regions. the lack of a sufficienr number of jobs arising from
habitants of these urban centres. Brazil was going through
industrialization. the low level of wages, the concentration
a period of rapid expansion of population, and so an increas
of wealth in the hands of a small group of consumers. were
ing section of'the population was without work.
all factors which in combination had the effect of leading to
In these circumstances wage levels, already very low. con
a progressive shrinking of the home market. While the pro
tinued to fall in real value or, under the best conditions. they
gress of industrialization enhanced the negative effects of
remained at their previous low level. The indices of real wages
these factors the reduced size of the home market rapidly
for the two most developed states in the Federation (sao
became the measure both of the needs and of the possibilities of greater industrial deve!oplllt:nt.
Paulo and Guanabara) allow no doubt on the subject :
Modem technology, tacked on to an under-developed
Index of rea! wages of industrial workers
economy still on the colonial pattern, gave rise to the growth
Year
Guanabara
Sao Paulo
1940
100
100
1949
81
100
1959
,6
9S
The wage index of other states would reveal a still more negative result, for sao Paulo and Guanabara enjoyed the highest wage level.. Tn the .
agricultural regions where wages
of very large undertakings whose capaciry for production largely exceeded the possibility of absorption by the market.
All the factors were present to make the industrial sector tend to function as a monopoly, that is, with price control and
domination of the market. without the companies necessarily joining in large combines as happens in systems of complete monopoly. The official policy of protection. afforded indiffer
ently to all new industrial establishments. by reducing com
were usually a quarter or a fifth of those paid in industry the
petition also increased this tendency. For these companies it
situation was far worse, prodUCing extremes of poverry and
created. artificial conditions of operation enabling lbem to
72.
The Brazilian Economy
Brazil: The People and the Power
maintain (and guaranteeing them) a relatively high minimum profit margin. The need to operate in monopolistic terms was imperative also in those sectors where the number of undertakings set up with official encouragement and facilities was large. The great number of these companies in important sectors of industry increased the problems arising &om a capacity for over-production. Without offiCial protection a great number of these companies would have disappeared. The consequence of this policy of non·selective aid was the sharing out of pro duction among the companies. A considerable margin of un· used capacity thus appeared and a continual rise in prices thus became a necessity for the very operation of industry. The table below for the period now under examination (1945-61) shows the movement of the accelerated rise in prices !
Price index
1945 1950 1955 1960 I¢l
100 165 }68 1014
1530
In the �ollowing years the rise in prices was still greater . and m£latlon reached something like 80 or 90 per cent per annum. Industrial gro,:th based on the substitution of home-pro duced goods for Imports, the indiscriminate protection mea. �ures a�d the monopolistic conditions of operation of the mdustrJal sector ensured it an excessive profit margin. The guarantee of high profits made it unnecessary to pursue greater t�hnical, economic and administrative efficiency; the . under·utilizatlon of production capacity together with the restriction nf supplies, which was its consequence, were amply compensated for by the increase in prices; the reduc.
13
tion of wage levels caused the whole weight of the ineffi ciency of the system to press heavily on the workers: i t was' aU perfectly logical and yet it was in its very logic that the :ystem was to find its limitations. .. This policy of substituting home-produced goods for im ports, pursued to its final consequences, rapidly found its field of application exhausted; as a result of its limited power of expansion, inherent in the 'system', the home market qUickly became unable to support industrial development; the in creasing non-employment of large sections of the population, actually caused by industrialization, limited still further the possibilities of economic expansion. In tIll; very logic of its own progress the system created problems to which it was incapable of providing an answer within the institutional framework then in force, and it started to show signs of obsolescence. Investment began to i dustrial growth, which had shown a rapid diminish; n increase in the forties, began to run down. In comparison with the results obtained between 1955 and 1960, the rate of in dustrial expansion in 1961 (6 per cent) already showed a considerable fall; in 1962. it fell again (4') per cent) reaching its lowest point in 1963 (0'1 per cent). Things were coming to a standstill. As a result, the Ioral growth rate of the Brazilian economy also feU rapidly and income per capita began to grow less. A new form of development had therefore to be attempted. From the point of view of the heads of industry a possible solution lay in the export of manufactured goods which would enable the wide margin of unused productive capacity in Brazilian industry to be brought into usc. For that to be done, however, the economy of the country would have to be integrated with the great international combines which con trolled the world market. Since these combines already con trolled a large part of the industrial sector why should they not themselves head this integration? The coup d'etat of ·'···· -4
74 Brazil: The People and the Power April 1964, which overthrew the constitutional government and installed its place a military dictatorship, finally gave . them the poltncaJ power after which they hankered.
�
�ey had now to proceed with the n i crease in efficiency
. . reqUired by interna tIOnal competition and to neutralize the pressure of the consumer groups who looked for a greater share in the national income. The bourgeoisie established in
CHAPTER
2
Brazilian Political Life
Brazil saw a new period opening before it,
Up to the present time tlIe Brazilian economy has existed in a state of dependence on foreign interests. But the forms of this dependence have changed at each period of Brazilian history - direct colonization under the Portuguese, in the
first place; then British neo-colonialism with its burdensome
loans and its development of the exchange system of raw
materials for manufactured goods; lastly, control by the United States of the country's chief resources and of its indus· trial sector. To the observer the establishment of each of these types of
economic domination seems to be marked by the introduction
into Brazilian home policy of cbanges intended to ensure
adaptation to each new situation, The central government, whose functions and form changed according to times and circumstances, was responsible on each occasion for the proper working of the prevailing system of domination in the country as a whole. Of course, on many occasions tensions occurred between, on the one hand, the central government and on the other, the regions, the various sections of the population or sectors of production; these were resolved by the introduction of small changes. But the pressures ariSing from these internal conflicts never succeeded in changing the general trend of the country's policy. Thus control of the central government remained the essen· tial factor throughout this whole period since the govern·
76
Brazil: The Proplt : and the Power
Brazilian Political Life
ment alone could take the decision to accept the type of rela tionship offered by the foreign power. In the various ways
open to it the central government passed on foreign pressure to the home front. So far as possible it endeavoured to har
monize and to guide the different interests at work in tbe country. At the outset these interests exerted little influence, but as the country developed they became more important and opportunities to influence decisions of the central govern ment increased. Thus the dominant interests inside and outside the country came
ro
act in concen, and this tendency developed to
the point where a great part of the population was left on the fringes of economic life. Examlnadon of the progress of thl!
�.
p people of Brazil in their quest for means of political ex
sion shows how true this assertion is. Right from the colomal period the great landowners could make their opinion heard within the political system while the middle and poor classes had no means of expressing their views and no appropriate action that they could rake. They had to struggle for their
views to be taken into account in the making of political decisions, and their first attempt of this sort, the Tiradentes plot, in actual fact was to take the form of opposition to
foreign domination. The situation has remained essentially
the same up to the present day: the immense majority of the population is kept on the fringe of the country's political life and if it wants to take its part it must, as in the past, rise up
against foreign domination.
. The central government was in the hands of vanous
groups, all belonging to the ruling classes. Since they were
concerned above all with coming 10 tenus with foreign in terests they abandoned any attempt to win national inde pendence. They made use of the instirutions of 'he c�untry . and of political action to keep conrrol of the SituatIon by sharing among themselves the various offices to which power was attached. Thus they kept in their hands the central
77
government, government of the states and of the basic units�
the citie. and ml1ntry districts By control of .all these they .
were able to consolidate their authority in its particular sphere of influence and also, of course, to establish dialogue with the various competing interests. For some time the governments of the different states, with the support of the local leaders, were, practically speak ing, almost alone in keeping the central government in rauch with the rest of the country. The state legislative assemblies and the National Congress representing the interests of the local magnates formed integral parts of this system. As time
went on other interests came on the scene : the army. for example, and more recently the industrial employers, the trade unions, the student movemcnt. All of these acqUired a certain importance at the national level and also achieved some inOuence on the central government. The central government, acting as a meeting place be
tween foreign interests and those of the country, was under pressure from various sectOTS. Firstly there were the im·
perialists who have always dominated, and still dominate, the economy of the country. Then there. were the regional and local governments, whose members owed their positions to those imperialists who for thcir own interests sought greater influence. Lastly, there were those sectors which, by avoiding control at state or local lcvel, succeeded n i finding expression at national levcl. The central government's reaction to these several pres
sures differed in each casc. As the opporrunity arose it made use of centralization or decentralization as a regulator, satis fying one party and getting rid of others, by force f i neces'
sary. But one objective remained constant throughout its history and that was to prevent the ordinary people taking
;Iny part in political life and to maintain the SYSh:llI of
domination in the country.
(
78 Brazil: The Pt:oplt: and
Brazilian Political Life 79
tht: Powt:r
THE COLONIAL REGIME
By definition colonial government is government thrust on
only real economic power and they contended among them
selves for prestige and influence. It was not long before Tbe ' traders demanded their voice in the communal councils. They
a country from outside. In Brazil's case the situation was still
based their claim for satisfaction on their relations with the
guese crown could delegate a certain number of administra
of fact, from being mere distributors of imported goods
clearer since there were no local chiefs to whom the Portu· tive functions. The primitive character of Indian culture
mother country and their increasing importance. As a matter as
they were at the outset, they gradually became in reality
made it impossible to establish the kind of relations between
the representatives of the foreign groups dominating the
The progressive occupation of the country necessitated the
The remainder of the population, on the other hand, had
i other countries. conquerors and conquered to be found n
appointment by the colonial power of the regional and local authorities essential to the establishment of the administra. tive machinery and the defence of the colony. In addition, but with a time gap, the economic and social interests which sprang up in the different occupied regions
movement of imports and exports. no part at all in these early political activities. Obviously the slaves were excluded and a t the beginning the other groups - the small traders, the craftsmen and The rest of the urban
population - had no voice a t all. The produce of The large estates was actually sent abroad in its entirery and from there
gradually contrived for their part to establish some form of
they received everything that they reqUired; thus the ports
the Middle Ages was chosen; it was based on the viJIage
the large country estates. Hence for the 'elections to the
political expression. A type of organization borrowed from councils and, adopted by the middle class in the European
cities once they were set free from the feudal yoke, it now afforded the large estate owners the possibility of expressing their views.
In principle the jurisdiction of These councils was confined
to The problems of their own districts. When their position grew stronger vis-a-vis the colonial authorities they were
able to go outside these boundaries and in certain cases were in direct communication with the crown in Portugal. These councils fixed wages, the prices of goods, decided the ex change rate and value of the coinage, settled the taxes to be paid to the crown, arranged the building of villages and in general all the business to do with trade and industry or local
administration. Some of them even succeeded in deposing the governor or 'capt2in' appointed by the colonial power and in replacing him by a man of their own choice. AT the local level the estate owners at first represented the
were only transit centres between the foreign countries and
communal councils only gentlemen and the nobiliry, as the landowners called themselves, possessed the right to vote'.' At tbe outset, then, the machinery of the colonial system
seems to have been
extremely simple. II amounted to a central
government which ensured the sovereignty of the mother country, kept the peace within the colony and exerted itself to maintain continual communjry of interests between the local producers and the mother country by making conces· sions to these local interests as the need arose.
This simple colonial structure, in which only the landed
proprieTOrs had a voice, became more complex when the traders arrived, for their participation in the affairs of the country increased continually and was
i n
with the interests of the mother country.
I. Caio Prado. Inr., Evoluciio poliricll do BrllSiL
direct association
80
THE E M P I R E
81
Brazilian Political Life
Brazil: The People and the Power
Brazil was resolved by the utter defeat of these latter and by the abdication ofpedIo I (1831).
The struggle for independence was actually a struggle to
The political struggles continued nonetheless in several
abolish the absolute control exerted by the Portuguese over
regions where the economy was in a state of crisis owing to
the country, a control which had already been overthrown
the difficulty of disposing of produce on the international
in 1808 by throwing open the ports of Brazil. Direct conflict
markets.
with the Portuguese forces was however avoided. Dom Pedro I, at that time Prince Regent, and in charge of the Portuguese
Certain
provinces found
expression for their
struggles by seeking political independence. In these cases it
was a kind of reaction on the part of the local landowners
troops operating in Brazil, was put forward and proclaimed
against the transfer to the coffee zone of control of the central
as Emperor. His origins and interests, however, did not allow
government. None of these movements occurred in the cen
him to break entirely with Portugal, and they made difficult
tral southern region (states of Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais,
any realization of what, in the view of the various economic forces fighting for the independence qf Brazil, was the most
sao Paulo) where the economy was rapidly expanding; as a
important measure. This fact was to change the commercial
government to the prejudice of the sugar magnates. These
result the coffee magnates had obtained control of the central
system then in force by the substitution of one more
latter remained masters in their own sphere of influence, but
adapted to the new situation created by the rise of British
the former now decided the general policy of the country.
power. The independence called for by certain revolutionary move
The differences between the great landowners of the various regions turned only on secondary matters. On essen
the objective was the establishment of a repUblican govern
tials, namely, the continuance of slavery, the preservation of their privileges and, more generally, the maintenance of the
ment. A Significant factor was the popular support for this
status quo, they were in agreement. Political concessions,
programme and the presence of clergy at the head of the
moreover, prevented the situation provoked by these differ
n:voluuullary movements. These revolutionary aspirations
ences from becoming more acute. Thus in 1834 the provineal
must not be confused with the struggle to obtain influence
councils were set up to act as the mouthpiece of the local
with the Emperor which began to appear di,rectly the country
landowners, and a few years later, with the resignation of
had achieved independence.
President Feijo, the powers of the federal parliament were
ments, especially in Pernambuco, was quite different. Here
The Emperor's power was absolute. The only means by
widened, thus enabling regional interests to be brought into
which the economic interests might obtain change from the
some sort of agreement at a time when the central southern
former system of trade was to be in a position to control the Emperor. The Constituent Assembly, summoned in 182},
region had definitely established its economic and political supremacy. Despite its reactionary nature the federal parliament none
which was dominated by the landed proprietors, endeavoured to do this. It attempted to reduce the imperial powers, but was dissolved before it realized its intention. The struggle
theless represented a certain progress in comparison with
between the supporters of the privileged positions of the
composed of life members appointed by the Emperor. Al
British and the Portuguese interests still to be found in
though they were hardly representative, the regional councils
previous political institutions like the Senate, which
WilS
82
Brazil: The People and the Pow er
Brazilian Potitical Life
had thus obta ined great.er scope for action in rela tion to the
central government; thi� .�rved the useful purpose of reduc
ing the risk of a rising n i the country.
The creation of these political institutions later allowed the emergence within these $lme ruling classes of somewhat more advanced tendencies than were common at that period. The governing classes were divided into two political parcies. called. foll owing the English custom. Conservative and Liberal. A section broke ofT from the Liberals and founded the Republican Party in
1870.
These same more advanced liberals launched the campaign
for the abolition of slavery. For this purpose they enlisted the help of the middle classes and of the workers in the cities. The latter had already taken an active part in the 6ght for
independence; they felt themselves called on now to defend another great national cause. After a number of violent inci dents the abolitionists finally triumphed; in 1888 Princess Isabella. who occupied the throne only temporarily, issued the decree abolishing slavery. The situation in the country had changed. In 1887 in a population of fourteen million there were only 72 3419 slaves. 2 The follOwing year, at the time of abolition. slave manpower had already ceased to form any considerable prupor lion of the labour force of the country. After 18]0. Europea n workers flocked to the coffee plantations, and the former institutions of Ihe Empire proved inadequate to the new social structure of the Brazilian population. In 1889 the same liberal movement supported the estab lishment of the Republic proclaimed by the army officers who. for the most part, were of middle
3rts of tbe :iIIgricultur:illl sector which
1. From .860 partial measures had been adopted which led gressive reduction in the number of slaves.
to a pro
83
the coffee policy had made redundant did not give positive
support to the new regime. at least they adopted a passive
attitude towards it. It might have been thought that loss of control of the central government would have sent them straight into oppoSition; but their motive for support of the monarchy - the maintenance of the status quo - had dis appeared with the abolition of slavery. The Republic allowed certain changes to occur in national life, hitherto exclUSively dominated by the alliance between the great landowners and the foreign buyers of raw materials. Within the rul ing dass now there was a new party. in favour of industrialization. which could well gi ve a new direction to the development of Brazil.
THE
MINORITY REPUBLIC
Under these circumstances the proclamation of the Republic in 1889 by Marshal de Fonseca might have proved the oppor tunity for a profound change in the policy inheri ted from the monarchy. Two trends were opposed at this time - those of the minority groups which still dominated Congress and were supported by the navy, and the new forces which had just proclaimed the Republic among which the army played a leading part. Once he was elected presiden t of the Republic. Deodoro was unable to withstand the pressures on him to return to the previous policy. In addition, and to the great
dissatisfaction of the navy. he took the step of dissolv i ing congress. Faced by threats of civil war he resigned n 1891.
His successor. Marshal Flonano Peixoto, dealt with the rebellion. He endeavoured to adopt measures likely to set the country on the way to independent developm ent To effect a radical change in the policy of the Empire Le hotd to do away with the prevailing system of the exchange of agricultural produce for manufactured goods. In other words. he had to .
Brazilian Political Life
84 Brazil: The People and the Power oppose powerful interests both at home and abroad. The size to pressure from that the government was obliged to solve
of the Brazilian debt exposed the collnrry foreign banks
so
85
strengthening the police services of the different states of the Federation. Industrial interests, which were comparatively weak,
were
its financial problems with the means at its disposal and this.
unable to enforce a different line. The wealth of the country
for the time being. made life more difficult for tbe population
remained in the hands of the great landowners and of those
at large. Pressure by the British was not confined to financial
traders in a large way of business. their traditional com·
Floriano Peixoto's term of office they
mercial activities supported by the central government's
threatened to send a naval squadron to cLUb the country's
policy. The pioneering industrial undertakings were easily
aspirations to independence,
crushed by the competition of imported goods.
measures; during
Thus the conditions existed in which the great landowners
England retained its position as the dominant power. but
could once more find themselves in agreement; and. in actual
had lost the near-monopoly that it enjoyed in Brazil through
the old minority faction succeeded in laying hands once more on fact. with the government of Campos Sales
(1898-1902)
out the nineteenth century. Thus it was obliged to allow France, Germany and other European producers of manfac
the central government. The policy of the exchange of raw
tured goods their share in the exploitation of the country. In
materials for imported manufactured goods was restored in
1&)1 the United States entered the lists and their first com
full. At the social level the abolition of slavery had not
mercial treaty with Brazil began a period of penetration
changed the economic plight of the emancipated blacks. Their
which progressed from strength
living conditions remained inferior to those of the poor farm
twentieth century.
to
strength
into
the
Within the country some slight concessions were made to
labourers, who were themselves subjccted to conditions of semi-slavery.
the middle classes in the cities where there were a consider·
Although this system continued unchanged in its essen tial structure. two new and connected factors began to appear and were to glOW in illllJOrt
vote and tbis was henceforward given to all who were not illiterate.
were, firstly. the expansion of the urban population with its continually growing participation in the life of the country, and, secondly, diversification among the ruling classes.
The army had bccome a power in the life of the nation and some of its leaders defended progressive positions. To counter
act this the central government introduced the 'policy of the government'; it sought in fact to obtain support from the regional governments which themselves remained under the authority of the large landowners. Thus it was seeking to prevent the formation of a new national political force inde pendent of the minority. Similarly it endeavoured gradually to neutralize the national anny's military power by
able number of public officials. They obtained the right to
To sum up. the system inherited from the Empire under went only those modifications made essential by the new circumstances. Its structure remained untouched. Colfee and its interests dominated the central government throughout the period of the first Republic and economic policy developed in accordance with what suited its producers. ' GETULIO VARGAS S FIRST PRESIDENCY
Nevertheless. during the first Republic some industries ex
perienced a period of expansion in which the conditions
created by the First World War played a part. The corrup-
Brazil: The People and the Power
86
Brazilian Political Life
rion prevalent in the administration, the fraudulent elections, the machination� of successive governments and all the con sequences of minority government added fresh fuel to the
people's dissatisfaction, particularly among those in the cities who had obtained a certain degree of political action and expression. These new forces formed the advance guard of the 1930 revolution which brought Vargas to power.
87
were struggling to remain in existence. The 'Constitutionalist
r('volution' of S;io Paulo in 19J2 was an attempt by the coffee
producers to return to power. The movement was defeated, of course, but not completely since there now began a period of political compromise. Radical economic changes are not made in a day, especially
when former privileges still remain intact. The need to main·
The forces which came together for this revolution were
tain the level of coffee production, which was practically
not powerful enough, however, to seize power and neutralize
speaking the only source of foreign currency, Jed the govern
all the parties of reaction. Besides, they lacked homogeneity and although they came to agreement to overthrow the olig use
ment to come to an agreement with the estate owners.
Vargas's first government thus acted as a means of recon·
of the
ciliation between the conflicting interests. It represents a
The revolutionary parties from among the upper classes,
attempted to establish its influence. Through the economic
and generally speaking the politicians who represented these
machinery operated by the State the traditional sectors re
classes, insisted on the need to restore law and order. They
ceived help enabling them to survive. In addition, industry,
archy, they disagreed when it came to making power they had won.
tended to favour some sort of reconciliation with the defeated party in order to ward off the possihility of more radical revolutionary measures in the future.
Among the young army officers} who were of middle
transition period during which the industrialist bourgeoisie
just beginning to develop, was assisted by a series of measures to encourage its progress which in the immediate future did not involve any profound changes in the traditional sectors. Lastly, workers in the cities benefited from regulations re as
origin and in general took no part in party politics, there
garding working conditions,
were two groups. There were those who supported a certain
agreements reached with the government's assistance and the enactment of labour legislation.
number of measures of a popular nature - the Introduction
may be found in the wage
of labour legislation, the establishment of cooperatives, the
It should be remembered that this happened when im·
nationalization of the mines and the continuation of the
perialism was going though a period of decline, the period,
opposition to the large-estate interests. But they had no plan of action, nor did they seek to represent the depressed sections
of the population and thus give greater cohesion to the move
that is, dating from the great economic crisis of 1929 until
October 1945, shortly after the end of the Second World
War. All the great powers were busy repairing their own
ment. On the other hand, there were those who confined
economies, getting ready for the war or fighting it. The
themselves to showing the prevalent mentality, and the
interests that they had acquired were not touched, but they
divorce between the constitution and its practical application,
had not the means to intervene in the country's economy in
as the cause of all the evils afflicting the nation. While amid these conflicting views 3n 3ttempt
W3S
being made to by
down a new policy for the country, the old political powers }.
They were called 'the ieuten�nts' l without
distinction.
the aggressive fashion that the United States was to mani·
fest after the Second World War. They confined their activities to defending their interests, although without
despising the profirs that were still within thea reach.
.
88 Brazil: Tht: Pt:oplt: and t1:t: Powt:r Thus the fifteen years of the first government of Vargas
were characterized by a decentralization of government in order to establish the predominance of the industrial sectors for which circumstances were now favourable. The increased security of the regime and its transfonnation into a dictator ship between
1937
and
1945
had two objectives in view: to
reduce the pressure of the regional parties whose n i fluence would have increased if the electoral system had been kept unchanged, and to check the popular movement which was trying to become more powerful and more radical, despite the concessions already made to the working class. In
1945,
when Vargas was deposed, the in8uence of the
United States in the country was already clearly growing stronger on account of the political and economic position obtained by the Americans during the war. Indeed, they made no secret of their intention; the deposition of Vargas was preceded by a speech by the American ambassador Adolf A. Berle Jr
.•
which gave the Signal for the start of the
operation. The fall of the regime was followed by the establishment of an improved system of domination. one better adapted to the changes arising from the war. The Brazilian economy had
undergone clear changes, particularly between 1939-45.
the increase in industrial production was considerable. Great
technological progress had been made in the United States. In addition, and this was of fundamental importance. the British withdrew from Brazil and, in exchange for the cur rency accumulated by the nation during the war. sold to the government the old railway system which had been built at the beginning of the cenrury. The Vargas government had
Brazilian Political Life B9 the country. The Dutra government Oanuary :uy
1946
to Janu
19P) was given the task of reversing the policy of
Getulio Vargas.
The international situation tempted the United States, which was just then beginning on its career of world leader ship, to look first to Europe where the application of the Marshall Plan required its full attention, and it left Brazil for a later stage in its expansionist aims. The technical com missions at that time sent out to Brazil laid all the emphasis on the country's 'agricultural vocation'. The Brazilian news papers under American influence showed the disadvantages of abandoning this vocation and setting up a considerable industrial sector in its place : the origin of our ills was to be
found in the backward state of our agriculture and what had to be done was to modernize it without delay. The autonomous development enVisaged under the Vargas government was thus dealt a heavy blow and those sections of national industry which asserted their intention of becom· ing independent of foreign interests saw their hopes fade. But integration with American undertakings was not
so
far ad
vanced as it was to become a few years later and it still remained possible to envisage a return to the policies for merly in vogue.
' VARGAS S SECOND TERM A S PRESIDENT
The return of Vargas to the presidency of the Republic (fanuary
1951)
represented a defeat for those forces which
had obtained control of the central government and made their decisions in accordance with the requirements of foreign
intended this currency to be used for the purchase of modern
interests. These forces retained control of most of the state
'scrap iron' and the importation of consumer goods upset the
governments as well as of the National Congress; in addition thele was the economic power still at their disposal. The
equipment for industry. Its use for the purchase of thiS plans of the industrial interests, which had assumed that they would be able to keep the place they then occupied in
'progressive' sectors of the national bourgeoisie, which sup
ported Vargas. represented only a small proportion of the
90 Brazil: The People and the Power
Brazilian Political Life 91
interests in the country and they owed their relative political success
to the government's financial aid. The situation was no longer the same and the return to the previously prevailing system encountered serious difficulties. Plant and machinery were needed for industrial expansion as
well as for those undertakings already in existence both in the public and private sectors. The Dutra government had exhausted the country's supplies of currency. As a result purchases for industry depended on the export of the tradi tional products, particularly of coffee; rhus once
more
national industry was linked with the existence of external resources. Imperialism was the principal obstacle to a return to tbe
policy followed between 19}0 and
1945;
this had already
been doomed by tbe coup d'etat which unseated Vargas. Against this obstacle the government adopted a more radical nationalist policy, initiating a whole series of defen
sive measures. Among these was the establishment of a State monopoly in petrol and the launching of a severe campaign
of denunciation of the interests opposed to it. On 20 Decem ber 1953 Vargas stated at Curitiba (parana State) : 'My policy is being sabotaged by private n i terests which have already taken
large profits from Drazil and hxJay possess In cruzeiros
two hundred times the value of the capital that they brought into Brazil in dollars; they oontinue ro change our cruzeiros
into dollars and transfer them abroad in the form of divi dends.' And on } 1 January 1954 he spoke to the nation in these terms : I have given orders for the declarations made by exporters at our consulates to be compared with their declarations to the Trade Department of the Uoited States. Over a period of eighteen months an increase on invoices of 150 million dollars on OUI
orhit balance has been disclosed. 1£ we take it that this practice is general there is no difficulty i.n concluding, since trade with the United States represents fifty·five per cent of the whole of our
external
trade, that in eighteen months the country has been
victimized by a
currency
exodus of 1.50 million dollars.
The m i perialists mounttd a violent campaign against this policy; they counted on the support of the allies they already possessed in the country, and also on certain groups which, though unconnected with their interests, threw in their lot with them for reasons of internal policy. This campaign brought about Vargas's suicide (August
1954).
His actions, and the political testament that he left behind
him reasserting his fidelity to the nation, show him as a great
patriot. But his death marks the end of the relative hegemony
of the sectors of indu..try which. with the a.<;si.�tance of the State, laid claim to being in charge of the development of Brazilian capital. From now on these sectors, which thought themselves in control, were progressively eliminated or were absorbed by foreign combines and reduced to a secondary role. THE
1954-64
PERIOD
For tbe next ten years Brazil passed through a period of political confliCts with the two rival parties contending for
the centrill governillent. III tIn: t:Collulllic sphere Vargils's
death ushered in a period of concessions to imperialism, which was now able to extend its participation in the economic life of the country and bring into subjection those sectors which still cherished some hope of independence. The facilities made available by Cafe Filho's government (August
1954 to November 1955),
which were continued by
his successors, opened the door even wider
[0
invasion by
international combines. This invasion reached its culminal ing point under Juscelino Kubitschek's government Oanuary 19�6 to January 1961).
The Americans, who only a short
while before had been preaching Brazil's agricultuul voca·
tion, gained possesis on a t [his time of various branches of
92.
Brazilian Political Life
Brazil: The People and the Power
industry hitherto belonging to Brazilians, set about building far.torif$, :mil thus secnren control of the
dustrial sector of the national economy.
m('Jl;t advanced in
But the political evolution of the country did not make for an entirely peaceful existence for the international com bines. The establishment of industries gave greater political importance to the urban centres, themselves at the height of expansion. Brazil, like aU other Latin American countries, was experiencing the phenomenon of rapid urbanization as a result of the increasing rural exodus and industrial develop
93
in the eyes of the nation as a supporter of subordination to the Americans. This was the factor which led {he National Democratic Union party (VDN) to choose Janio as its candi date for the presidency, despite his support of a certain num
ber of propositions opposed to the parry's general policy. The
anti-national forces. concealing their true nature from the public, made use of the machinery of govemmeOl to obtain their ends. Ja.nio Quadros, at variance with the policy of the government which he had formed, was obliged to resign and an a((empt was made to prevent the presidential investiture
ment.
of Goulart, the vice-president elected during these same
In some parts of the country the traditional ruling party lost control of the situation when representatives of the
which his successor supponed even more strongly, consti
working class succeeded in obtaining scats on the local or regional councils. The legislative bodies of the states and the National Congress, although still dominated by the tradi tional parties, had now to contend with representatives of a more progressive tendency. The workers and the students were organized on a national
elections. Actually, the policy followed by President Quadros, tuted a threat to the imperialists not only on account of the measures taken but also because it opened the door to greater popular participation n i politics. It was obvious that such participation would lead to an increasing tendency to effec tive independence and structural reforms for which the ruling classes were unwilling to pay the price. The coup d'Ctat of
scale. They constituted a new force which in a short time
April 1964 in fact was launched to obviate this danger of
was to consolidate the poSition of the most enlightened sections of the Brazilian population. Thus there appeared a
in the legal protection of the governing classes' privileges.
although it was spread rather thinly over the country,
Brazil has remained subject to foreign domination. This has
nationalist and popular movement opposed to imperialism;
although it was disunited and in search of its own policy. when its various elements succeeded in agreeing on specific and clearly determined objectives it already counted for an appreciable power in national life. Without a clearly defined structure and lacking cohesion and weight it was able none theless to �ake a positive contribution and even to play a . determmatlve role at decisive moments - at presidential elections, for example. Thus during the electoral campaign which brought Tanio Quadros to power, all the candidates put themselves forward as defenders of nationalist positions. No one wanted to appear
popular participation and
to
stop up the gaps already made
Thus th roughout its history right up to
�en 10
so despite
IBn
the present time,
political independence snatched from Portugal
and despite the changes that have occurred in the
nature of the parties in power in the central governmen!. Those who heJd power
were
only able to do so through
dependence on external factors which affected their conduct of the in ternal affairs of the country. Thus during the colonial period the sugar magnate; and the traders with close ties with Portugal held power under the protection of the central government controlled by the mother country. Then under the Empire it was the sugu magnates once more and then the coffee magnates, aU closely connected with the British
94 Brazil: The: Pe:ople: and the: Powe:r trade system, who, through certain financial arrangements, dominated the central government. Under the First Republic the same parties remained in power supported by the British and American control of the means of transport and the sources of electrical energy. The temporary and feeble influence of the Brazilian industrial interests which had been able to rely on help from the State during the government of Getulio Vargas was completely swept away by the coup d'etat of 1964. From this time on. wards imperialism was able to dominate practically without opposition the most advanced sectors of the economy.
CHAPTER 3
The Ruling Classes: How They Dominated the Country All down the history of our nation the people have been pre vented from having any say in the government of the t;ouutry. Of course, their struggles were largely the C'duse of the changes that did occur, for they supported those who stood for progress in comparison with the state of affairs preViously existing. But on their own they were in no posi tion to insist on some reform. Various tactics were employed to prevent the people taking any part in political life; this even applied to the middle classes, but more especially to the poorer classes of the cities and of the country districts. Of course force was brought into play and various arguments were used to justify it according to circumstances. Thus while slavery prevailed a whole philosophy was developed to excuse it The ideals of liberty. equality and fraternity proclaimed by the French Revolution penetrated to Brazil by the end of the eighteenth century. Parliament under the Empire sought to adopt the philosophical and political principles then in fashion. Bur the adoption of a whole ideological system in a situation completely foreign to it obliged those in power to perform feats of intellectual gymnastics so as to discover formulas that would allow the formal integration of this ideological system into a world with interests of the kind that they were defending. The Constituent Assembly of 1823, for example, claimed
96 Brazil: The People and the Power to be inspired by the principles of Jean-Jacques Rousseau_ It wanted to appear liberal, in agreement with the ideas that were proving most popular at that tinie. But how was it to reconcile these liberal principles with the existence of a system of slavery that the law could not ignore? The legis lators found no difficulty in this clear contradiction; in the draft constitution they inserted a prOvision (article 1.36) giving approval to the contract said to exist between the master and bis slave : 'The Constitution recognizes the contracts between masters and slaves; the government ought to ensure that these contracts ale enforced.' And so slavery based on the forced transfer to Brazil of African Negroes was made to appear something quite normal and guaranteed by tht: pre sumed consent of both parties. For anyone who could reconcile Rousseau's philosophy with slavery it was mere child's play to draw up an electoral law to match. By use of the political system and coercion the ruling classes thus succeeded in keeping power in their own hands, justifying their position of dominance by the most ingenious of legal quibbles. In their political activity, the vote, the parties and coercion were all used as the means to serve their own interests. THE V O T E :
SELECTiON O F THE ELECTORAL
BODY AND THE CANDIDATES
The draft Constitution of 18)1. reserved the right to vote to citizens with an annual income of more than 150 alqueires' of manioc flour. The charter of 182.4, promulgated by the Em peror directly he had dissolved the Constituent Assembly i t had just legislated in this way regarding the right to vote - contained similar provisions. The differences that had
I. An area of land. whose exact d imensions vary with usage in different pates of the country. Tbey range from 242 t00484 acres.
The Ruling Classes 97 emerged between the deputies and the Emperor were not about this but about the extent of his powers as sovereign. Bachelors under twenty·five who were not government officials, all domestic servants, clerics and others living in commun�ty and all citizens whose annual income did not amount to 100,000 reis, were debarred from voting. On the other hand, to be a candidate reqUired an even larger income. The electors as a whole were termed, rather significantly, the 'body of active citizens'. This situation remained unchanged throughout the whole period of the Empire, the changes that were introduced being aimed at further restriction of the right to vote. According to a decree of 1876 the electoral body of Brazil was composed of 1.4,637 citizens out of a total population of ten millions, namely 0·1. 5 per cent of the population. The Republic extended the right to vote to aU those who were literate, but since voting was not secret it could be controlled. The citizen remained at the government's mercy; it could use all sorts of pressures against him - taxation, police, the courts, the right of appointing and dismissing officials. i hardly surprising that right up to 1930 political Thus it s power should have temninoo in tbe bands of a minority and that no coup d'etat occurred to disturb the working of the system. At the appropriate time appoinnnents were made to the various offices, including the presidency, according to the accuSlOmed formalities. In a system of this kind, the opposition was unable to exert any influence over political life; still less could it come to power by legal means. And this situation remained un changed despite the apparent democratic advance represented by granting the vote on 2 wider basis. Concessions of the right to vote to all who could read and write meant in prac tice that power was in the hands of a minority since the immense majority of the population was illiterate. 8:P.P· -S
98 Brazil: The People and the Power
The Ruling Oassts 99
Take, for example, the elections under the First Republic. Comparison of the number of votes obtained by the different presidents elected with the population as shown by the census at various dates shO'lllS that on an average the most important election for the destiny of the nation was decided by only 5 per cent of Brazi l ians; and this is looking at it on the most favourable hypothesis, for in addition account should be taken of electoral frauds and other methods of falsifying the returns in use at this period.
0."
.s., ·898
'9'"
'gOO 19 10 1914
1918 1919
President Elected
Prudente de Morais Campos Sales Rodrigues Alves Alfonso Pena Hermes de Fonseca Venceslau Bras Rodrigues Alves Epitado Pessoa
19l1.
Artur Bemardc;s
1926
Washington Luiz
1930
Julio Prestes
Votes Cast
l]6,583 420,286
Total
Population
Dateof Cen""
14.33].915
·800
170438,434
'000
30,6}5'()()5
1920
592,039 188,285
403,867
531,107 ,86.,6]
286,373 466,8n 688.,,&
rigbt. The Constitutions of 1934, 1937 and 1946 continued to disenfranchise the illiterate wbo formed the majority of the population of the country. At the end of the Soo:md World War the number of electors registered in the large cities already formed a con siderable proportion of the electorate. For the first time the working class and part of tbe poorer sections of the popula tion were able to exert some influence on the government. When a section of the middle class, making what turned out to be a decisive intervention, voted along the same lines as the majority of the workers (the illiterate did not vote) and with the other more explOited sections of the population. the tradi tionalist parries lost me government offices which had hither m always belonged to them. The increase in population continually enlarged the elec torate. The number of voters went up from 6.200,805 in 1945 to 14,747.221 in 1962, though even this accounted for only 19'7 per cent of the total population. But it was no longer possible to be elected to office quite so easily as in the past, although candidates could still be elected with a very low percentage of votes in comparison with the loral population. President Elected
Votes
1945
Eurico Dutra
3.251,507 4],236,315
1940
Population
1,091,709
It was only in 193 0, 108 years after political independence bad been won, that the secrecy of tbe ballot was brought in. As may well be imagined, rerognition of this elementary right of every liberal democracy had become a fundamental question and fonned one of the chief de� a nds of �he 1 930 revolution. And yet after rhe success of th lS revolutIOn nght up to 1945 tbere was only one opportunity - the �Iecrion �f the Constituent Assembly in 19 3-4 - for the exerose of this .
Date of
0."
unsus
1950
Gctulio Vargas
3,849,040
51,944,397
1950
1955
Juscclino Kubitschek
3,177,411 5,636,623
70,967, 185
'gOO
'gOO
Janio Quadros
The largest vote, namely that obtained by Janio Quadros in 1960, amounted to something like 8 per cent of the total population of the country, and to about 15 per cent of the population of an age to vote. The ideas of tbe French Revolu-
100
Brazil: The People and the Power
tion introduced into the country towards the end of the eighteenth century had thus made some progress, since in up wards of a century the percentage of electors had increased from 0'15 per cent to 10 per cent of the total population. It was no longer quite so easy to manipulate the electorate as at the time of the First Republic. Of course, in many
regions the rules of the 'Coronels' still prevailed. They were large landowners as well as political leaders and to secure election candidates would make use of other landowners by purchasing from them the votes of the population controlled by them. But such a system was confined to certain localities and hardly affected the important centres. In these, modem
propaganda methods -
-
newspapers, radio stations, h:lt:visioll
were all brought into play a t great cost. The type of pub
liCity campaign often proved decisive in its effe<:t on public opinion. particularly when the opposition did not possess the means to fight back. The election of Getulio Vargas had shown for the first
The Ruling Classes
101
found in the National Congress. the regional Assemblies, the municipal councils and in responSible positions at different ' levels of executive government men who, entirely uncon nected with the rraditional political parties. were working hard for the adoption of a policy of national independence. In addition, the trade unions of the city workers and the student movement exerted a growing influence on govern ment decisions and in some parts of the country the peasants were beginning to set up their own organizations.
AlI this is normal in liberal democracies. BUI in Brazil it
was a new phenomenon, enabling certain demands to be heard for the first time, some of them being merely that existing legal prescriptions should be put into practice. The
attempt to bring the law into daily use for the satisfaction of popular demands hardly formed more than slight progress towards ordinary freedoms. but it was enough all the same toJ raise the question of certain privileges of the ruling classes. It was the whole question of legality that had to be called
time that it was possible to break the power of the two great parties. the PSD and the UDN. The latter. beaten in the
the counny's life; and it was precisely this that they did.
support of the workers. was obliged to call on Janio Quadros
from the coup d'etat of 1964 intendcd to re-establish this
1955 elections by Juscelino KubitsChek who had received the
to fight the 1960 election. As a remit of the popularity of its candidate. who did not actually belong to the party, it was able to attract votes which its usual methods would never have affected. Other symptoms of the people's presence were
to be discerned in the political struggles at state and local
level.
It would be an exaggeration to as..�ert that it had become
possible to fill the various elective offices with candidates
belonging to the people. Even in the most advanced demo cracies this has never happened. But at any rate the ruling classes were no longer in a position to keep total and absolute control of the counny in their own hands. When the coup d'etat occurred in 1964 there were to be
ill question if these classes were to regain their control of Among the measures taken by the government resulting control may be mentioned the following; the election or the
president of Ihe Republic no longer by direct suffrage but by a limited body of electors, namely, Congress; the require ment of previous approval by the National Security Services of all candidates for election to office; the simple suppression of municipal elections in a certain number of important centres and various industrial cities where there was an)' danger of the election of a mayor from the working classes. These measures were only new in the form that they took, Fundamentally, they were identical with all those affecting the right to vote in the past. Their ohject
rem..inerl
the s;,me
- to prevent the people having any say in political decisions.
102
The Ruling Class,s
Brazil: The People and the Power
THE PARTIES
At no time in the history of Brazil have the parties fairly and squarely faced the fundamental problems of their times. They have always been instruments in a struggle for power confined to the same circle of interests. All the great move
10}
They were WlSuccessful in forming a coherent party with its . own policy and structure. Such a party only made its appearance when the Liberal Alliance came into being. This was not a party in the proper sense of the term, but a united front. It formed the main support for the campaign by Cetulio Vargas in 1929 and the
ments of national history have arisen quite independently of
revolution of 1930 was its doing. Together with the different
them. The initiative in these movements belonged always to
regional op]XlSitions which belonged to it the Liberal Alliance
new sections of public opinion seeking to take shape outside
included a certain number of new elements represented by
parry structures. In reality the parties are the result of a
the army, the industrialists, the middle classes and the city
system of legality established to ensure maintenance of the status quo. As a result all their measures are devised in rela
wage earners. It fanned therefore a heterogeneous front, com posed of various social classes united to achieve common
tion to chis partiCular situation.
objectiVes. The Alliance included a number of elements vary
The establishment of parties in Brazil dates from the
ing from local politicians intent on seizing power from their
Empire, at a time when the Conservatives and Liberals gave
opponents to those in the cities who wanted to initiate social
Parliament a party structure. Two very similar parties had emerged which were to hold power in tum. Formed a little
reforms. In ]922 the Communist Party was fanned. For the time
later, but still during the time of the monarchy, the Republi
being its influence was confined to small groups of workers
can Party (PR) did not constitute a serious threat to the
of certain large cities. It took no parr in the revolution of
established system. Although it called for the establishment
19}0. But the fact of its existence shows that a whole series
of the Republic, it did not face any of the fundamental prob
of new ideas had begun to make their way in the country and
lems of the times such as the abolition of slavery. Even the procLamation of the Republic was not the work
to characterize the more advanced groups of the liberal
Alliam:t:.
of a party. Of course, it was supported by the Republicans,
lbe new pattern of national political life emerged very
who were then organized in two or three provinces, but it
clearly during the elections for the Constituent Assembly in 1934. It came to an end with the coup d'etat of 1937 which
was the army and the political tendencies that emerged among civilians during the aboHtion campaign which formed
inaugurated Vargas's dictatorship. Between 1930 and 1945
the basic strength of the movement.
the old parties were in a dormant state, although the local
At the time of the First Republic, under the presidency of
divisions and rivalries of former years still went on.
Campos Sales, the dominant party was once more an alliance
A new law allOWing the establishment of political parties
between the various state oligarchies. They were in control
was promulgated in 1945 by Vargas, at a time when the cir·
of the government. As for the opposition, it was no more
cumstances created by the World War necessitated the hold
than a group of various factions contending with others for the government of the states, and they were only united at
ing of elections. Among the fourteen parries then registered was the Communist Party, whose two years of legality were
the narional level in a bid to obtain control of the government.
the only ones in its history in Brazil.
104
The Ruling Classes 105
Brazil: The People and the Power
The new social conditions prevailing in the country made
it possible to give up the bi�rtite system of the First Republic.
Vargas therefore established two parties - the Brazilian Workers (PTB) whose presidency he assumed and the Socialist Democrat Party (PSO) which made him its honorary presi· dent. The PTB sought its members among the city wage earners; in this it was in competition with the Communist Party. PSO appealed to members of the national bourgeoisie and the political leaders of the inland regions. The fact that Vargas wanted to remain at the head of both of them shows clearly his intention to obtain electoral advantage from the policy of conciliation between tbe social classes evident n i the previous fifteen years. In opposition to these parties the National 'Democratic Union (UON) was formed; it had at first emerged as an illegal body and
in Ihis first phase it embraced various
elements from Conservatives to Communists with
the
struggle against dictatorship as their common interest. The legalization of the Communist Party and the formation of other small groups deprived the VON of its left wing. It then became the party of the most reactionary elements in the country. Its influence on the urban middle classes was con· siderable, due to its programme of opposition to the dictator
the national level. Some of them were suffiCiently powerful at local level to be n i a position to nf':goti;Jte ;It national level with the great parties. This was the case with the Social Pro
gressive Party (PSP) of Mr Adhemar de Barros. who was sup poned by a considerable part of the electors of Sao Paulo. Others formed a refuge for new points of view which at the local level succeeded in escaping the electoral organization
of the large parties. This was the case with the small groups on which Janio Quadros relied at the beginning of his career before the special conditions of the presidential campaign obliged him to have recourse to the electoral machine of the VDN.
These small parties oftm had no other members besides those of their central committee. They were really attempts at political expression on the part of social classes whose ideas were not taken into account by the great parties. These marginal political trends assumed a certain importance when, on occasion, they were joined by politicians of some standing. Then they were in a position to bargain and to influence the more m i portant parties. Yet they cannot be regarded merely
as pressure groups. for they often disappeared when the con· ditions that brought them into being came to an end and, in the last analysis. they were of u.st: to tLt: murt: m i pon3m party
ship and in favour of the restoration of elections. Actually
organizations.
the VON represented the interests of the groups defending
The great political campaigns were not directly supported by the parties. but rather by 'organs' which succeeded in
integration of the country with the Americans in opposition to 'he small section of the bourgeoisie which, with Vargas's support. sought to maintain its autonomy. Moreover. in the VON's statutes there is an article defining quite clearly the party's position on this question: 'It is advisable to call on foreign Capital to enable our unused assets to be explOited; it must be given fair treatment and allowed to export its profit s:
In addition to these three great parties there were others. which were more or less satellites of the former. since they
could hardly expect to run for power alone. particularly at
recruiting men belonging to different parties. The national oil campaign, among others of the same kind, provoked con· siderable political reperCUSSions without being the action of any one party. The Nationalist Parliamentary Front. whose purpose was the struggle inside Congress for economic inde· pendence. was made up of deputies from various parties. thus provid ing proof that these parties were nothing more th an electoral devices which operated without conSidering the problem of foreign domination.
106 Brazil: Tht Ptoplt and tht Powtr Yet the party system prevailing after the end of the Second World War enabled political action to assume greater flexi bility. In this way it represented a certain progress from the bi-partism of the oligarchic republic under which political activity was for so long stifled. The greater freedom of action that prevailed allowed the emergence of new political forces and leaders in a SOCiety in process of transformation. These new arrivals helped to make the activities of the parties in power far more difficult. To preserve their key positions these groups were thus obliged to make some concessions. Despite the limitation placed on the right to vote by the electoral system then in vogue and the repression which at some periods was visited upon defenders of the country's in terests, under the accusation of communism, an increasing proportion of the population took part in political life. A5 a result fresh demands coming from the people were able to make their appearance. Gradually the popular movement spread; in this it was furthered by the work of the trade unions, the organizations of the student world and other associations besides. It thus came to exert an influence on the parties and to count for more in the elections. It was precisely to check thi� popular movement that the coup d'etat of 1964 was organized. The new regime began by keeping strict control over the various organizations men tioned above; very quickly it went on to reorganize the politi cal system, redUcing it to two parties, the AUiance for National Renewal (ARENA), the government party, and the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MOB), the opposition party. The creation of these parties from scratch by the mili tary dictatorship was an attempt to keep some appearance of democracy. and a return to what occurred when the country was governed by the minoriries. Although the choices, which from the end of the Second World Wilr up to 1964 could have permitted a greater degree of freedom, were narrow, they were still too wide for the new regime and i t felt obliged to
Tht Ruling C1asstS
107
seek some appearance of democracy but with better guaran ,.,." The provisions governing the working of the party system at the present time must be regarded as complementary mea sures of the police state. These are: the indirect election of the president and the requirement of previous approval by the military authorities of alJ candidates and of all measures taken and applied in any sphere. Their purpose was the same for all : limiting the part people were taking in politiCS. THE USE OF FORCE
Ever since the colonial period the machinery enabling the counrry to be ruled by force functioned at national. regional and local levels. There was no inherent contradiction n i this method of organization; the purpose common to the three levels was the maintenance of order. But they were governed by a different principle, since each evolved with the ruling class to which it was bound and from which it derived its relative importance. The predominance of the big landowners, for example, brought the local and regional forces to the fore; the national army was only to emerge later with the appearance on the political scene of other economic forces. The first troops came from Portugal. The Indians put up very little resistance to colonization and the principal func tion of these troops was to repel all foreigners who sought to seize the territory. As a resuh, they were concentrated along the coastline where they established fortresses intended to prevent invasion. The subsequent establishment of centres of population and of large agricultural estates gave rise to two other types of armed force. First there were the urban militias, made official at a later date by the Portuguese authoritie.s; rncmLcrs uf lhcst: militias performed civil functions as well. Second there were bodies of mercenaries in the service of the individual owners
108 Brazil: The People and the Power for the protection of their estates. As these estate owners at the same time held all political power both forces were in reality in their scrvice.
Both forces were intended 10 preserve the political and social structure as it had been established by Portugal. But Ihey also played a further role closely related to the terri·
torial formation of Ihe country. Thus in the norlh-east, a region of stable cultures, in 1648 and afterwards they formed a real army made up of whites, blacks and Indians. Without any help from Portugal. this army managed to defeat and drive out the Dutch who bad established a foothold in Per
nambuco. The great leaders i:!. the war were loao Fernandes Vieira, a wealthy landowner of the region, Henrique Dias, the commander of the blacks and Felipe Camarao, governor of the Indians. A little later, the growth in the activities of the colony and the difficulty encountered by Porrugal in sending troops led 10 the creation of a permanent militia recruited from the local
The Ruling Classes 109 guese court was transferred to Brazil, troops from the mother. country were increased in number; they played an essential part in the struggles during the regency of Pedro I and throughout bis reign. Thus the rising in Pernambuco in which partially relied on the assistance of troops re cruited from Brazilians, was put down by contingents from the central southern region witb the complicity of the estate
1817,
owners of the north-east.
Afler the granting of political independence (18n) foreigners were called on to take the place of some of the repatriated Portuguese trOOps. The British Admiral Cochrane, who took part in the wars for the liberation of the Spanish American colonies, was thus given command of the Brazilian navy. With him were engaged a large number of British officers and five hundred British sailors. In
1814, Taylor, one of these officers, blockaded the port of
Recife while Cochrane led the reinforcements which defeated rebels who had raken possession of the s i
inhabitants. This occurred particularly in the mining areas
mercenaries
where the nature of the work carried on precluded the intro
of Maranhao, Para and other places.
duction of large-scale agriculture. As a result it was difficult
to organize forces on the model of Ihose of the estate owners.
Nevertheless, rhe progressive occupation of the country made the establishment of a permanent armed force an in
city. The same use of
to be found in tbe struggles against the rebels
Gradually, however, Brazilians replaced foreigners. Thus among the troops at the time of the abdication of Pedro r (l831) an echo can be heard of those yearnings after freedom
creasing necessity. In this force the officers were always
thaI characterized the micdle classes. Rebellions within mili tary units which occurred one after the other during the
Portuguese, whether the troops came from Portugal or were
Regency are some indication of this. These risings often
local. However, in the colonial army rerourse was had to
obliged Ihe government to cut down the strength of the
foreign officers. This latter army, in addition, was assisted by
national army, preventing its becoming a decisive factor at
the British naval squadron in the operations on the southern
a time when it began to show obvious signs of disagreement
frontier at the beginning of the eighteenth century, after the
with the government.
Methuen treaty between England and Portugal. Only in
The government then established the National Guard, made
ferior positions were entrusted to the Brazilians. Thus Tira
up of those citizens it regarded. as the most important in each locality. It thus consolidated the regioual amI local forces,
dcntes was only a sub-lieutenant in the militia w hen he organized the plot for independence. Towards the end of the colonial period, when the Porm-
endOWing them with a framework of a national organiza
tion parallel with the anny and dominated by the land-
110
Tho!: Ruling Cluss'-S
Brazil: Tho!: Po!:oplo!: and tho!: Powo!:r
owners; its basis had been in existence since the colOnial
III
disposal of the governors of the states, were strengthened
during fhe prpsirlpncy of Campos Sales (1&]B--1I}02). This '
period. The war against Paraguay (1864-70) increased the im
police force was intended to counteract the power of the
portance of both the anny and the navy. The victorious mili
army, and the army. together with the navy, found itself re
tary leaders acquired influence in political life and were able
duced to being the protector of the civil power. Nor is it sur
to demand benet treatment for the anned forces. The army
prising that this role was accepted by the army since the
took part in the campaign for the abolition of slavery; it re
idea derived from the same source by which they had been
fused to seek out fugitive slaves and its leaders played a deci
inspired in the proclamation of tbe RepubliC. Actually the
Hitherto the most important political offices had been held
of the army as guardian of the civil power. In Brazil the
sive part in the proclamation of the Republic ( 1889).
by the 'Bachelors'2 from the leading families of the nobility. The army, relegated to a secondary position during the Empire, did not attract such men and its officers were largely recruited from among the middle classes and from soldiers
European bourgeoisie was responSible for creating the myth great landowners. once they had regained their political power, obliged the military to accept this role in the name of their own principles. Thus the armed forces continued as institutions outside
riscn from the ranks. During the first years of the republican
political conflict, confining themselves to ensuring the instal·
regime two politically prominent marshals, Deodoro de Fon·
lation in their new functions of the successive presidents
seca and
representing the ruling oligarchy. But there were frequent
Floriano Peixoto, sought openly to impose an
economic policy which would encourage industrialization.
protests from within their ranks. eSpecially from young
But soon tbe estate owners, recovering from the blow dealt
officers. who were revolted by the corruption which dis·
to their political influence by the abolition of slavery and the
figured the regime and affected the organization which they
proclamation of the Republic, relegated the army to second place once more. Until the end of the First RepubliC only one marshal. Hermes de Fonseca,
i ed supreme power. obt an
All
the other Presidents were dvilians. This was not the only consequence of the estate owners' recovered political power;
as
had already happened under the First Empire measures
were taken to neutralize the national anned forces. The
National Guard was maintained and only disappeared in
1918.
The military police, fanning tbe regular forces at the
2. In Brazil bacharel means one who had done a course of legal studies. More generally this term possesses certain cultural implica_ tions. It w�s used formerly to design�te those with �ome education who. on this �ecounr, enjoyed a certain cultural superiority over the rest of the population. By extensicn bachard is used of those holding arts degrees as distinguished from those with science degrees.
professed to serve. Some of them called for a reorganization of
the anny and in
1918,
in order to satisfy their demands, the
government accepted a French military mission. Others went further and rebelled against the government. It was they who (among other manifestations of rebellion) were at the bottom of the risings in Rio de Janeiro in 1922, of sao Paulo and of tbe Rio Grande do SuI in In
1930
1914.
they crop up again, this time Ihroughout the
country, at the core of the plot led by Vargas and supported by the governments of the states of Minas Gerais. Rio Grande do Sui and Paraiba. This was a plot in which they were sup ported by the civil opposition. The revolutionary troops from the Rin
Grande right to Rio
de Janeiro were led by a mere
lieu renant-colonel. Tbe generals and admirals took no part in the revolution.
112
Brazil: The People and the Power
The Ruling ctasses
They remained faithful to the established government. When it became obvious that two thirds of the country was in the hands of the insurgents they merely deposed President Wash·
113
of Fascism and adopted an anti-communs i t stance which after the rising of '935 became the compul.\l)ry position: Nevertheless, the majority were in favour of the formation as
ington Luiz and formed a military junta which transferred
of a political army. one worthy of Brazil
the power to Getulio Vargas. The new government thus pre
great power. And as their aspirations needed some theoretical
served intact the traditional structure of the armed forces
justification many turned towards Fascism, from which they
side by side with the revolutionary army to which both pro
took their ideas, methods and style of conduct.
an emergent
In addition the policy of the times required a sufficiently
fessional soldiers and civilians belonged. Moreover the revolutionary army dispersed once it had
coherent national force to ensure the conciliation of the most
accomplished the task that it had set itself, namely, the over throw of the government. After this its members returned to
varied interests. This was the rime when the national bour
forces. After the Sao Paulo revolution (1932), during which
civilian life or were once again absorbed by the regular armed
other social classes by making them concessions. Once Brazil had entered the war on the Allies' side and
the army took part in the defence of the government, the
sent an expeditionary force to the Italian front, where it was
geoisie. relying on the State, sought to obtain control of the
process of absorption was n i tensified. The old military forma·
incorporated into an American unit, Fascist ideas were no
tions became the support of the new established order.
longer in favour. American influence on the Brazilian mili
The military groups which had taken part in the risings of
tary leaders became more far-reaching; everything encoUI
1922, 1924 and 1930 always remained centres of political
aged it, from men of all ranks fighting side by side to the
action and their positions could not be confused with those
provision of arms and the training of officers.
of the regular armed forces. They kept their position essen·
It was actually these military leaders who overthrew
tially as a means of defence for the government and remained
Vargas, after he had begun the presidential elections. They
faithful to it down to 1945.
gave their support to two candidates from their own ranks :
The
19H
rising organized by
the
National Freedom
Marshal
Eurico
Gaspard Dutra and
Brigadier-General
Alliance with the support of the Communists was the work
Eduardo Gomes. Moreover they did so in the name of demo
particularly of officers determined to go further along the revolutionary road. But these officers formed only a very
on to the post of minister of war.
small minority of the army - as did also their colleagues with
cracy, although Dutra all through the Estado novo had held American political influence was then extensive through.
Fascist tendencies who took part in the reactionary risings
out the anned forces; it became predominant when the
which endeavoured to depose Vargas in 1938 at Rio de
nations of the West were obliged to define their position in
Janeiro.
the Cold War against the socialist nations. The division of
In 1937 the armed forces as a whole supported the coup
the world and the prospect of a further conflict made pre
d'etat which established the dictatorship - the 'New State'
parations for this eventuality necessary. The links between
(Estado
the principal ally and Brazil had to be strengthened, military treaties signed and arms and technological processes made
novo).
They thus emerged in national life as a power
to be reckoned with. Throughout this period many members of these forces allowed themselves to he led astray by the rise
uniform. All this resulted not only in the establishment of
114
Brazil: The People and the Power
TheRulingClasscs
direct relations between the officers of the two countries, but
also the sharing of a common view of the objectives to be attained and the propagation of an ideology. Anti communism, which had become the Americans' favourite weapon, was welcomed with open arms by those officers who readily accepted the United States' world strategy. At the same time a nationalist tendency emerged. It was successful at the 1950 elections for the chainnanship of the 'Military
Club'. This nationalis t trend, in tune with popular aspira tions, was able to launch a campaign in favour of 'legality'
and ensure the investiture of Vargas as president of the Republic in January 1951. This division among the members of tbe anned forces played an important part at the time of the establishment of the State monopoly in oil and the adoption of a certain num ber of other measures of national interest. The oil question roused the whole country and made clear the existence of two tendencies among the military; it reflected a struggle, by no means confined to the armed forces, fought out between those who defended the independent development of the country and those who openly advocated leaving oil to the
�
foreign groups and allowing these groups full participa on in the exploitation of the other wealth of the country. WIth
in the armed forces, nevertheless, these two views were held
by a minority. The great majority of the officers were
un·
decided and more likely to be interested in specific profes sional problems; they favoured one or the other view accord. n i g to time and circumstances. During the office of the Vargas government an intensive campaign was launched to brand as communists those officers who were particularly devoted to national interests. Control of the Ministry of War fell at this time to the nationalists with the Te.
115
ing committee of the Military Club in 1952 resulted in the defeat of the nationalist list. The general staffs at Ihis rime began to exert a decisive
influence over political events, especially when appeal 10 rules and established principles, organized authority, legaliry,
anti
means of transcending fundamental differences on burning questions. Only on adherence to one or other of the tradi tional political schools of thought could any clash of views
persist among the military leaders. But that proved sufficient to render difficult any adherence of the armed forces as a whole to the policy of integration with the United States, as favoured by the High Command and especially the Higher
Military Academy.
This Academy was made up of military and civilian mem bers. It functioned as a study centre working to produce a basic plan for the conduct of the armed forces as a whole and for the national life in general. War on the southern frontier of the country had been reg�rded as a poSSibility ever since the days of the Empire and right up to the Second World
War. This view had governed the organization and deploy ment of the anned forces and probably had its origins in the continuing influence of the engagements that occurred in the
southern part of the country at a time when frontiers had not yet been conclUSively 6xed. After the war thoughts of the staff of the Miljtary Academy were no longer turned in this
direction; they now saw communism, from outside, as the real threat to the whole continent. This change of viewpoint, once it prevailed, entailed a
whole series of decisions. Since the continent was threatf'nel'l
i t was the time to unite in its defence and to effect integra tion with the most powerful ally, the United States. The
116
Brazil: The People and the Power
economic and political repercussions of such a policy are obvious; the proposed measures were all put forward as logical consequences of the policy and quite normal since
they were meant to promote victory for the ally. Actually they amounted to the complete subordination of the country and transfer of its sovereignty. The army endeavoured to impose this policy on several ions. Its frequent attempts to do so between 1945 and occas
The Ruling Classes
117
foundations of this hierarchy and of encouraging com-. munism. These formed the pretexts for the coup d'etat of 1964. The policies chosen on which to take action touched
the army on a tender spot and it was due to this that the results, which we now know, were obtained.
Actually, the coup d'etat took place for quite other reasons and its objectives were not confined, of course, to the re-estab Iishment of the military hierarchy. It was a question of ob
1964 were never completely successful or wholly unsuccess· ful. Ali the political events of the period witnessed interven
taining victory for the policy of subordination to the
prevent the investiture of Juscehno Kubitschek. the resigna·
directly he was established in power. The purge of the armed forces. and of the whole of the civil service, wa.� thm;; aimed
tion by the army - the suicide of Vargas. the efforts to
tion of J�nlo Quadros. On the political chessboard the twO parties faced each other, sometimes beaten, sometimes vic torious or obliged to compromise. At the time of the crisis over the investiture of Juscelino Kubitschek the presence of Marshal Lott at the war ministry was one of the factors that determined the issue. He was also responsible for preventing tne gains of the nationalist and popular parties, particularly the State oil monopoly, from being lost. The resignation of Janio Quadros resulted in the compro mise of setting up a parliament:Jry type of regime,l though in the event it proved only temporary. The ministers belong ing to the forces had not bet"n able to obtain the unanimous . support of the troops in preventing accession to the presI dency of Vice-President Joao Goulart. A resort to force of this kind wouJd have been regarded as a breach of legality by the armed forces, and legality was one of the principles which helped to maintain a certain balance between the opposing forces in the country. The breach of another principle, that of the military hier archy, enabled the pro-American party to involve the officers in action against a government accused of undermining the 1. The object being to reduce the powers of the president.
Americans. a policy that Castelo Branco adopted to the full
at the elimination of leading elements of opposition and at facilitating the unity of the military structures. Unity within rhe armed forces was strengthened by the fear of reactions from the people, the real victim of the policy of subordination. The period of the Cold War was over so the enemy was no longer hom outside the country but was the
people itself, those living in the country. The whole plan
therefore had to be changed and a beginning was made in the training of troops for fighting against guerillas. The inter-American force, intended for the precise purpose
of putting down popular risings anywhere on the continent, was now on the agenda. Although it has not been formally constituted it really does exist. Its existence is vouched for by the uniformity of policy on the part of the various govern ments and by the relations between the general staffs, all trained in the United States.
Throughout its history the anny had been led by the quest
for means to assert its authority in the face of the nation so
as to stand always on the side of a nationalist bourgeoisie
seeking to develop on its own account.
Under the Empire, in the n:giunal forces as a whole, c1osel)'
allied with the estate owners, it encountered some limitation of its own powers. At the time of the proclamation of the ., •.•._6
1 18 Brazil: The Prop/ e and the Power Republic it was able to assert itself and contrived to support the most progressive political trend of tbe period. The re establishment of minority power reduced it once more to a less prominent role from which it only emerged in 1930 when the industrial sector, having come to terms with the other
sectors, took the lead in the process of development. The desire to build up an independent military force, an idea shared by the army and navy at that time, reflects the aspira
tions of the industrial sector, which for its part was engaged on the development of an independent industrial potential. The division in the armed forces between the supporters of independence and the supporters of American integration coincided also with the division among the employers at the
end of the war; it lasted up to 1964. The coup d'etat marked the defeat of that section of the employers who actively sup ported independent development; their capacity for resist
ance, already seriously affected by twenty years of effort, finally came to an end in the face of the measures adopted by the new government.
Another sign of this defeat was the purge of the armed forces in 1964. Despite .the resistance of some of their mem
,
bers these forces became not only tbe essential means of repression, but above all the effective means of subordina tion of the country to the United States.
CHAPTER 4
The People and Popular Movements The historical notion of the people, as contrasted with the nobility and the clergy, was based on a reality quit.. different from our own. The term cannot be rigidly defined, but the
basis for a definition can be found in a certain number of dynamiC elements which make i t possible to identify the people through knowledge of its interests. and to characterize the movements it has undertaken in connection with these same interests. In the case of a subject country, whether the subjection
takes the colonial or semi
bound up with that of liberation. From this viewpoint we must examine the various stages of the history of Brazil in order to define its people by the role they played. At a given
period, the struggle for independence, the struggle for the Republic. for the secret vote, for the State oil monopoly (the
Petrobras).
and many other manifestations besides can be
regarded as ends in themselves or
as
a means of national
liberation. The actual idea of liberation is not always very explicit, but it is always there in the background. The differ ences still continuing at the present time always
tum
on the
means to be employed, even if they must be invented, to secure this liberation, The ruling classes have often adopted the people's ideals to use them for their own benefit. thus deflecting the whole potential of the action from its chief objective. which is the
)20
Brazil: The People and the Power
acquisition of real independence. Since these ruling classes have intere!>ts oppo!>ed to tho!e of the rest of the population because of their dose connection with foreign interests, they constitute what can be called the 'anti-people', an obstacle lO national construction. THE COLONIAL REGIME
At the time of the discovery of Brazil the native tribes consti tuted the people. Then came the Negroes who had been re duced lO slavery. Their aspirations were simple enough : they longed to escape from their masters by flight or violence. indiVidually or as a body. Once the escape was made they gathered together in their thousands and set up real com munities on the African model, known as the quilombes; the most considerable of these, at Palmares, containing a large number of slaves, was destroyed by the colonial troops. Irs leader. Zumbi. threw himself off a precipice and became a legendary figure for preferring death to a return to slavery. Although they were really popular in character these struggles were concerned with immediate problems and had nothing to do with more general questions. They did not Invoke (he ideal of independence and their promoters' politi011 views did not yet include the idea of nation. Whites. blacks, Indians and half.castes took part in the war against the Dutch (1645--9). The recruiting of the com batants from such different milieus, organized by the oWllers of the sugar cane plantations, made this a genuinely popular war; the guerilla methods employed brought victory over the European trained troops. On this occasion the objective was the re-establishment of Portuguese domination. Despite the form that it had taken there was nothing authentically popu lar in the objective since it was unconnected widl lIu:
The Pwple and Popular Movemt::nts
121
count on the people's participation. But they were only con · cerned with particular aspects of Portuguese domination and did not dare to contest it radically. This was the case with Beckman's rising in Maranhao. This wealthy cotton exporter succeeded in retaining power in the province for upwards of a year (1682) with the support of the population, but was always ready to submit to the crown. This was the case also of the 'peddlers' war' in Pernambuco (1710-11) between the Portuguese traders and the sugar plantation owners. The people supported the latter against those i t regarded as the principal enemy. Certain decisions by the mother country against the interests of the dominant groups affected the people also, since in the last resort they had to bear the full brunt of the system in vogue. Thus far the people were confined lO taking part in con· flicts arising between Ponugal and her colonial allies. The formulation of a more general objective only became possible with the development of a more complex social structure. a situation which occurred in the second half of the eighteenth century when the middle classes had obtained a certain im portance n i the society at large. These middle classes, won over to the idea of independence, showed their opposition to Portuguese rule by a whole series of isolated manifestations. which culminated in the rebellion of 178c) in the State of Minas Gerais. The movement was nipped in the bud when it was still at the plotting stage and its leaders were im prisoned. In the event this proved to its advantage and the immensely brutal reaction in this respect is Significant. The refinements of cruelty in the execution of Tiradentes, the leader of the plot, who was hanged, quartered and his head and limbs set up on the main roads, shows how much the colonial authorities feared a popular movement in full growth. Still later several provinces came out in favour of inde pendence. In 1798 at Bahia the 'tailors' revolution' called fOI
III
Tht: Prople and Popular Movemt:nts
Brazil: The Proplt: and the Power
found support in the governing classes of Brazilian society for whom the abolition of Portugllese interests me�llt rhe' establishment of economic ties with England. These same groups - the 'moderates' - were in opposition to the govern
the establishment of a republican government, freedom of trade and the abolition of slavery. The Pernambuco revolu tion in
1817,
also republican in inspiration, succeeded in
holding out for eighty days; it was able to command popular
ment, but did not seek to destroy it for fear of lOSing their privileges, including that of possessing slaves. The 'radicals' of Pernambuco, with the help of neighbour
support and even set up an independent government. Troops had to be called from outside to quell it.
Its
leaders belonged
to the middle class and included priests of the Catholic
ing provinces, proclaimed a republic which they called the 'Confederation of the Equator'. This revolution, in whim several priests had taken parr, was put down by naval forces
Church. These latter had adopted a very different position from that of the European clergy prior to the French Revolution. These popular movements finally convinced the Portuguese of the impossibility of keeping their colony. After
1815, in
fact, Brazil was regarded as a kingdom united wi th Portugal, a kind of overseas province with the right of sending deputies to the cortes in Lisbon. Dom Joao
VI
himself had no great
confidence in the efficacy of this concession, one like others later agreed to by colonizing counnies. Before embarking for Europe he recommended his son Pedro, whom he appointed regent, to assume the crown of the new Empire before i t fell into the hands of some adventurer.
123
,
under the command of Lord Cochrane, the English head of the Brazilian navy, and by the forces of Francisco de Lima e Silva and of the MarquiS de Recife.
Popular pressure, with the support of the 'moderates', soon caused Oom Pedro to abdicate (1831). No longer in collisioo
with Portuguese interests the ruling classes then joined forces in opposition to the popular radical movement, and during the Regency and the Second Empire they succeeded in wiping out all the rebellions which occurred in varions provinces of the country. In
THE E M P I R E
The Dight of the Indians, the rebellions of the slaves, and the revolutionary movClllents of the colonial period had made
the people aware of a more important objective. This was a complete break of all connection with the mothercounrry. But the independence achieved in
18n
was the result of action
by the ruling classes. Turning to their own account a wide spread popular aspiration, they sought to be freed from Portugal the better to be joined to England. As independence was granted in a very special manner,
I8'H the revolution of the 'humble' seized Para and was
only finally crushed with the help of the naval forces under the command of the Englishman Taylor. The oUlcome was the same in the rebellions of Ceara (1831-1), Bahia (1837-8),
sao Paulo and Minas Gerais (18.p). The series concluded in Is..O with the rebellion of 'the beaches' in Pernambuco, in
which for the first time in Brazil socialist aspirations were found side by side with those of the liberals. These different risings were unconnected, a factor which
made their suppression easy, since the government could send troops from one place to another as circumstances required.
since it was proclaimed by a Portuguese prince, the heir pre
The ruling classes thus succeeded in capruring aspirations for
sumptive to the PortLlgue.�e throne, it could easily have
independence, declaring indeed that it had already been ob
amounted merely to a formal declaration of autonomy. The
tained, while in actual fact they were making Brazil's
people therefore sought to give it real Significance and they
economy dependent on England.
124
Brazil: The People and the Power
' Progressive forces at this time were split up. The campaign for the abolition of slavery ensured their unity, not without some mistakes and hesitation provoked by concessions on the
part of the supporters of slavery. In order not to lose the essential - the continuance of slavery - they were clever enough to give up what was only accessory. They were thus
successful in causing a division of opinion. What was the point of fighting for total abolition if successive reforms
The People and Popular Movements
125
in the hands of the landowners, while immigration, com of a high birthrate, led to the creation · the bined
with
effe<:t
of considerable reserves of manpower. Since the opportunities
for jobs occurred in those regions whose products were in demand on the international market (coffee for Sao Paulo. rubber for the Amazon) they attracted the workers to pre cisely those regions.
In the regions without large estates were to be found the
would ineVitably lead to the end of slavery ? In 1850 trade in Negroes was forbidden; in 1870 new·bom infants were set free, but the law contained provisions by which in practice
manufactured goods that they needed. Their dealings were
of twenty-uut:.
confined to the nearest vinages and small towns where these modest exchanges took place. Through these centres the
the children remained in slavery until they reached the age After
the campaign was intensified and in several provinces societies appeared which later were to fonn the
1879
abolitionist confederation. The struggle for a cause on a national scale had thus contributed to the union of progres
sive forces. The army formed the means which were to lead to the proclamation of the Republic. The people found an ally also in the bourgeoisie, then just
emerging with its dreams of industrialization and support of the ideals of the French and American revolutions, ideals which for long past the poor and middle classes of the popula· tion had made their own.
'free men' practising subsistence farming which enabled them to barter their few products against the very small number of
government ensured the economic and political organization of the population.
Relations between the inhabitants of one centre and
another were not easy in the first place because of the dis· tances, and then because the whole horizon of activities was confined within the framework of the place of work and the nearest towns. It is difficult to envisage how under these conditions there could come into being political organizations in a position to defend the interests of this great body of exploited workers. A certain number of strikes by foreign workers took place. They were protesting against the inhuman conditions under
THE REPUBLIC
The popular movements had hitherto encountered support only in the cities. The wretched conditions under which the
great mass of peasants lived - and still live - were by them selves enough to prevent the formation of any organization amOllg them.
On the large estates agricultural wage earners po!>Sessoo no rerourse against the conditions of semi.slavery to which they
were reduced. The whole apparatus of repression was always
which they were made to live. But these were only isolated
cases, confined to the southern part of the country where
there were greater numbers of European workers. The
majority, since they were powerless to do otherwise, accepted
conditions as they were, though a minority sought to give ex· pression to their rejection in primitive and violent fashion. This was the case with the armed bands who dominated
Caatinga and who were admired and feared by the peasant! of Sertio in the north-east. The most Significant violent manifestations of this state
126
Brazil: The People and the Power
of affairs were the Canudos and Contestado rebellions. The first broke out in 1897 in the north of the State of Bahia under (he command of a semi·illiterate mystic, Antonio the Counsellor. Twice the peasants routed the troops sent to oppose them and were only pur down finally by a third expedifion. The second rebellion (berween 1914 and 1918) was also quelled by the central government. These rwo manifestations, which amounted to real civil wars, are part of a series of less important conflicts which nonetheless are just as revealing of the situation prevailing ill the country. It was the poverty of the peasants which brought thcm to despair and rebellion. These struggles had no political cffects although they were in reaction against the social structures of the times. Manifestations of violence like these were often explOited by the local leaders. They made use of the peasants to establish real private armies and so ncrease i their influence with the state governments. It was therefore not always only in the cities that the political struggle took place and found its supporters. How ever, the stability of the dominant oligarchy afforded no op portunity of political expression to a powerless opposition and in the early days of the Republic the small number of workers did not allow mass action. A few strikes did indeed occur in the lasr century but the political dimension of the working class was sciU very small indeed. As time went on, however, the increase in city populations changed the compo sition of the people by the n i corporation of a larger number of workers, craftsmen and employers in smalJ- and meruum scale industries; in this way the people grew stronger. The 'minOrity Republic' fonned a new phase in the evolu tion of the bourgeois revolution. On the first occasion this revolution had already proved abortive when the oligarchy took over the Republic for its own advantage. as it had done with independence, stealing it from the people who had pro claimed it. Some sort of unity was now to be established in
The People and Popular Movements
117
the opposition to the government. Political institutions them selves. as such, were not under attack either by the most · representative members of the opposition or by those who at a later date were to take to armed resistance. The principal arguments put forward were concerned wi th the govern ment's actions, corruption and the electoral system. The 'civilized nations' were quoted as an example and it was to the straightforward application of the principles inspiring them that the success of liberal democracy was attributed. No one in the opposition thought at this time to distinguish between colonizing nations and colonized or semi-colonized
countries like Brazil. But the powerlessness of the opposition in the face of the fraudulent elections gradually led to the conviction that no change in the working of the system could be hoped for with·
out an armed rising. Some politicians defended the principle of rebellion but did nothing to translate their conviction into deeds. Rui Barbosa, who on two occasions was the opposition candidate for the preSidency of the Republic, declared : 'In extreme cases after appeal to all the courts rebellion is the people's sacred right - a right coming before all political systems and forming the basis of all constitutions.' rropaganda on these lines soon found its way into the barracks, but i t had behind it no nation·wide political organi zation, such as was a prerequisite for the success of the armed movements which between 1920 and 1930 increased and multiplied. These movements were undoubtedly the expres· .'lion of a general aspiration but they remained the work of a minority which, without the necessary means, would remain isolated when the time for action came. The absence of tbe working classes from these movements in the rwenties has been deplored; it was the middle classes in the citit'S and a part of the upper da� whkh tonk part in them. Actually, the working-class movement, although it began to assert itself through a series of strikes, including a
Tht PtOple and Popular Movements 129
u8 Brazil: The People and the Power general strike in
1917,
remained under the direct influence
of European organizations. At S:io Paulo the number of
foreign workers was higher than that of Brazilian workers.
As Leondo Rodriguez points out:
Standing apart from national politics [he trade union move
ment was concerned principally with questions directly related to the strengtllening of working
sao Paulo and the Rio Gnnde do Sui. Like its predecessors
it was unconnected with the working classes and was con fined (Q the military. The rising having failed. two armed groups retreated to the interior of the country : these formed the Colonne Prestes which traversed nearly twenty.five thou·
sand kilometres, defying the legal forces in a cunningly fought running battle. The Colonne was a considerable suc· cess militarily since after twO and a half years it succeeded in getting mo st of its forces over the frontier n i to Bolivia.
Like the Fort rising it was an expression of scattered popular
aspirations without any unifying factor. Nor did it succeed
Thus the working-class movement and the middle classes
in transforming itself into a genuine people's army as it had intended. The level of political awareness was not high in
early stages, in an effort to follow in the footsteps of the
no policy of immediate demands that might have mobilized
were both looking outside the country: tbe first, in its very
those regions thaI it traversed and the Colonne itself offered
European workers: the second to adopt the principles de
the peasants.
more developed countries. For as a matter of fact their aspira
which the country passed, served as a preparation for the
fended by the middle classes and lower middle classes of the
tions scarcely went any further than the pre("ise application
These various risings. and the period of agitation through
popular rising in 1930. In 1929 the presiden tial campaign by
to Brazil of the regime to be found in all the great democratic
Getulio Vargas had allowed the formation of a national front
as
fundamental to the middle
the political base for the armed movement. Vargas's official
These activities worked in conjunction towards weaken
increased the conviction that only the use of violence could
nations. From this point of view the demand for the secrecy of the baJlot box appeared
classes.
ing the power of the oligarchy. They were the reflection of
popular aspiratiOns. Yet they remained side by side rather than reaching unity. They evolved from partial views of
problems and situa tions experienced by the corresponding so
they lacked a synthesis capable of bring ing together and ruming in the same direction the efforts of all those who sought to change the general situation of the social classes and
country.
Iu 1924 a fresh armed rising took place in the barracks of
p.
I.
Con�icto industria!
Ill.
t
sindic:alismo no Brasi!. sao
Paulo. 1966,
of opposition parties - the Liberal Alliance - which served as
defeat redoubled the complaints about doctoral f.rilud ilnd
change the position. The assassination of Joao Pessoa, the Liberal Alliance's candidate for the vice-presidency. touched
off the explosion. The revolution lasted twenty days; iI had
i three places - Rio Grande do Sui, begun simultaneously n the north-east and Minas Gerais. The revolutionary forces
were predominantly drawn hom the middle classes, but work
ing-class clements and recruits from other poor sections of society formed a by no means negligible fraction - in certain places it even proved
decisive - despite the lack of encourage
ment from the trade unions.
130 Brazil: The People and the Power
The People and Popular Movements
131
' GETULIO VARGAS S FIRST PRESIDENCY
sections was accentuated by Prestes's loss of confidence in the
Want of organization and lack of action in the country dis
was critical of the presence of traditional politicians in the
tricts was one of the characteristics of the popular movement in Brazil. The campaign against the system of large estates was one of the themes of political statements, but in tenns of actual opposition the situation was very different, for those primarily concerned, the peasants, were not taking part in the struggle. Shortly before the revolution of May
1930
joining the Communist Patty. 'Ptestes
ranks of the Liberal Alliance although he acknowledged the revolutionary sincerity of a part of its membership. After the success of the
1930
revolution he refused to take advantage
of the amnesty and only returned to Brazil to organize the National Freedom Alliance, which called for the abolition of the latifundio. opposition to Fascism, the struggle against
Luiz-Carlos
Prestes addressed a manifesto to the nation. He was the hero of the column which crossed the country from
LiberOll AlliOlnce and his
1924 to 1926,
and had recently become a member of the Communist Party. In his manifesto he declared : 'This country is suffocated by the large estate system, by the feudal system of land owner ship n i which the worker, if he is no longer a slave, is all the
imperialism and the annulment of Brazil's external debt.
After it had been in existence for a few months this organiza tion was prohibited by the government as a result of the rising of
1935 which it had inspiIed.
At the same time there came iota being Integralist Action. taking its inspiration from Italian, German and Portuguese forms of Fascism. Its n i fluence in popular circles was small. It
same reduced to the state of disguised serfdom and semi
relied principally on a section of the middle classes and on the
slavery:
officers of the armed forces.
And Vargas in his investirure speech as head of the revo
Throughout the world this was the period of anti-Fascist
lutionary government also criticized the large estate system,
fronts, and the Communist Party called for the formation of
although in more moderate tenns. In the sixteenth article
an organization to include all the oppressed classes to fight
of his programme he called for 'action to stamp out (progres
against feudalism, imperialism and Fascism. The set-back to
1935
SIvely), though avoiding violence, the latifundio [large estate
the
systemJ; support for the organization of small holdings
d'etat of
through direct transfer of parcels of land to the agricultural
dictatorship. The conspirators of
workers, and aid for these new landowners take charge of their own destiny.'
so
that they can .
Bur it must be pOinted out that the fifteen years of Vargas's government, like the years follOWing it, left the latifundio un
movement, added to the repression and the coup
1937.
transformed Vargas's government into a
1935 were convicted, Prestes
among them, and the communists then suffered a period of political eclipse which lasted, practically speaking, down to
1945· In
19}0 Vargas took measures intended to obtain
the sup
touched. The peasants, lacking their own organization, re
port of the urban wage-earners and to win them over to his
mained isolated and at the mercy of the local political leaders.
policy of national union. A month after coming to power on
which at certain moments
26 November 1930 he set up the Ministry of Labour, In dustry and Trade and signed the first decrees concerning
joined forces and worked together: the first followed Vargas.
working conditions. Later he was to fix working hours at
The popular movement was confined to the mban centres. It
was
divided n i to two
the second Prestes. In
sections
1929 the opposition between these two
eight per day in trade
(22 March 1932) and industry (4 May
.
132
Brazil: The People and the Power
1932). to initiate collective agreements for work. lay down
[he minimum w�ge �ntl found the lnstitult' of Social St>curiry. Other measures for the benefit of urban wage-earners were to succeed one another up to 1945. The trade unions, which until 1930 had remained free associations and extremely jealous of their independence in their own sphere of interest. became official organizations and passed under the control of the minister of labour. As such they were to play an important part in the policy of class reconciliation inaugurated by Vargas. The social benefits granted by decree earned the government the support of a wide section of the ciry populations. On the other hand the government had control of the trade Wlion movement throughout the country. As it was also in a strong position in relation to the industrialists it was able to encourage wage agreements which lessened the tension between employers and workers. This system encountered no great difficulties, especially after 1937. The communists were barred from political life; actual poliCies were not put before the workers. and the legislative assemblies, composed of conservative deputies. had been dissolved; finally. the armed forces up held the government and guaranteed it stability. The regime did practise repression and torture and left behind a large number of blameworthy and even revolting actions. But these did not constitute the dictatorship's only weapon; the power that i t enjoyed to enforce conciliation be tween employers and workers gave satisfaction to the majority of the latter. In the past the urban wage-eamers had never had the slightest possibility of dialogue with the authorities but now at least they enjoyed relative protection. Vargas's paternalist policy had brought him the support of the workers and at the beginning of the Second World War, the efforts of the progressive and liberal groups were all directed towards preventing the anned forces and the extreme right from forCing Brazil into the Axis camp. Declarations
The People and Papillar Movements
133
and popular manifestations. when such were possible. were . entirely concerned with the great international problem of the moment. Brazil finally joined the Allies and the Roose velt-Vargas agreements launched the country decisively into the war effort. Plots against tbe regime were consequently much reduced. In 1944. however. when the issue of the conflict could be foreseen, contention returned to the country. A campaign was initiated for the amnesty of political prisoners and free dom of the press was regained. These resmts were the fruit of the combined efforts of the popular parties and of certain traditionalist forct'S opposed to Vargas which had secretly formed the National Democratic Union (UON. 1943-4)· Joining the struggle against Fascism, together with these events. had led Vargas to eliminate the more negative aspects of his policy while retaining the general nationalist trend. He granted the amnesty and summoned a Constituent Assembly. The communists. whose organization was in a very pre· carious state, since their principal leaders were in prison, had themselves provoked and poSSibly inspired the formation of the National Democratic Union. They did not fear to ally themselves with politicians of the traditional parties the better to oppose Vargas. When the more repressive aspects of the dictatorship were diminished they adopted a position similar to that of Vargas and campaigned for the Constituent Assembly at the same time as the workers. The latter de manded in addition merely that Vargas should remain at the head of the government. The UDN, which wanted to be a papmar movement. be came the most important right.wing party in the country. Its left-Wing elements. coming in general from the middle classes. regained their freedom and formed the socialist party, which never obtained electoral success. even in working-class circles. The fifteen years of Vargas's government were thus charac·
134
Brazil: Tht Ptoplt and tht Powtr
terized by the absence of movements in the agricultural regions. by the granting of .it series of social benefits to the city wage-eamers and more particularly by the influence of a rising industrial bourgeoisie supported by the State. The popular movement remained confined to the urban regions when conditions favourable to a powerful mass movement were created. So far as the traditional economic sectors were concerned the government faced them in a strong position as a result of the conciliation that it had effected between the
interests of the industrial bourgeoisie and those of the workers,
The government's intention to red uce the opposition, in· c1uding that of imperialism, was obvious, However no direct antagonism was shown to foreign capital established in Brazil. Perhaps it was thought that the latter, weakened by the great crisis of 1929 and the Second World War, would
die a natural death and that the economic development of the country would cause the emergence of an economic force
within it capable of taking the place of foreign capital. This plan clearly appears in the numerous tactical manoeuvres of which Vargas was a past master, The hetero geneous nature of the forces that had brought him to power, the absence of any political organization with a policy that would support him, the social and economic diversity of tlie country - all these factors enable us to understand the diffi·
culties encountered by this man who stood practically alone at the head of the country.
Referring at the end of this period to his presence at the head of the government he was led to speak of 'a short period
of fifteen years'. This was not merely irony towards his opponents who accused him of clinging to power, but also a statement about the harsh reality that he had experienced in his attempt to transform into an industrial nation a vast country organized on a system of large-scale estates.
Tht Peoplt and Popular Movements T HE
1945-64
135
PERIOD
Vargas's policy during his first period of government owed its success to an exceptional international situation - the great imperialist powers were then experiencing the full effects of the economic crisis or else were at war with one another. Each of them was busy prodUCing the material and political weapons needed in its struggle against the enemy. Thus competition among the powers at this period led them to attempt to lure into their sphere of influence those dependent nations which, like Brazil, still preserved their political au tonomy
.
Thill left room
for manoeuvre to the
benefit of the various governments. Thus Vargas in a speech
made in 1940, before Brazil entered the war on the side of
... able to mention his support for the Axis the Allies, ....as
powers. But the possibility of speaking or acting with some show of independence came to an end for Brazil with the conclusion of the war, Vargas's policy was incompatible with the aims of the United States in Latin America, and his fall
was the result of renewed influence by foreign n i terests in the affairs of the country. Of course, internal affairs also played a part in his fall. There was no lack of pretexts: Vargas had been president for fifteen years and he was accused of wanting to hold on to power for ever; he had set up a dictatorial regime and this was incompatible, it was asserted, with the ideals which the Allies had defended and for which our soldiers had died on the battlefields of Europe. These pretexts were invoked for the political action that was taken, All the same they could be questioned : wasn't the
country to have the opportunity of deciding in free elections and weren't the candidates already nominated? Moreover, Vargas's tenure of power was no longer than that of .several
other dictators in Latin America; and the Allies themselves were beginning to make some show of tolerance towards
136
The Proplt: and Popular Moveme:nts
Brazil : The Peopk and the Power
Salazar and Franco, whose regimes were not exactly repre sent2rive of the ideal for which our soldiers fought.
But these arguments were valueless in the face of the
interests of those economic groups for whom an alliance with the Americans was far more advantageous than Vargas's nationalist policy. For these groups had continued to exist, finding in the system of co-existence prevailing during the fifteen years of Vargas's gO"ernment the means to remain in being. With the end of the war and with support from abroad they revived and contended for power with the nationalist group of the industrial bourgeoisie. Among the ruling classes Vargas's fan represented a victory for those groups con nected with imperialism. General Dutra. elected on a
PSD-PTB
coalition ticket.
came to terms with his previous opponents. the UDN, and formed a government of 'national union'. The old style of national union, on the Vargas pattern, made use of the mass of wage earners to bolster up the authority of the nationalist bo�rg�isie_ Dutra's spurious national union was something qUIte different: the government's economico-financial policy was aimed at the elimination of the influence of the national s i t bourgeoisie and the encouragement of foreign investment. Politically this required the suppression of the popular move �ent that had recently emerged in the country under the . directIOn of the PTB. the Communis t Party and others. Two series of measures were adopted against the principal elements making up the popular movement. The Communist Party was prohibited, its deputies in parliament deprived of their scats and its members obliged to go into hiding. The work�rs accustomed to government favour were now subject to stnct control. The government was in charge of the trade �nion machine and now made use of it to resist any claims. . mcl udmg wage claims; strikes, if any occurred. were put
down by force. The politicians of the
PTB were disconcerted,
not knowing whether to opt for open opposition or to seek
131
a compromise with a government whosc election was partly the result of their own support. In addition they were afraid ' of being confuscd with the communists, who were the first victims of the forces of reaction. As a result the two principal parties on which the popular movement then depended broke up and the independent
groups, which. not organized on party lines, had gravitated round the two great parties or worked alongside them, dis appeared.
Nevertheless, the left-wing and nationalist parties found it poSSible to launch one of the most important civic cam paigns in the history of Brazil, the campaign against giving up the oil-fields to foreign interests. The oil law. a bill sent to
Congress by the Dutra government in 1948. sought to change legislation adopted under Vargas and allow foreign capital to take part in the exploitation of the oil discovered in 1938.
Before this date the official belief was that no oil could be found in Brazil. Two American technicians had come to this conclusion and their view had been adopted by General Juarez Tavora, Minister of Agriculture at the outset of the Vargas government. But once the National Oil Council was �'tt up aud the first wells had been drilled it became rather difficult to continue to support this view. It was then urged that the country lacked the resources to develop this asset. Furthermore, Dutra's policy was based entirely on the strange
argument that the backward state of the country was the r�ult of the laws protecting the national interests. These laws, the technical commissions asserted, formed an obstacle to the entrance of foreign capital and without it no develop
ment was poSSible. Nothing was said of the foreign currency accumulated during the war which was in process of being squandered. Against the plan to make over the Brazilian oil-fields to foreign interests it proved JXlssible to mobilize nationalist ·:····-1
138
Brazil;
The People and Popular Movements 139
The People and the Power
public opinion. especially in the large cities. General Horta Barbosa. former chairman of the National Oil Council under Vargas. took charge of the campaign. Politicians from various
munist Party. holding aloof from the official trade unions. attempted unsuccessfully to take their place with inde- . pendent unions; tbey thus lost touch with the mass of the
parties and military men joined in and the government found
workers. The PTB continued its work along the lines that it
it impo5:'iible to dub them all communists. Police repression
had adopted at its n i ception.
went on. however. In the government view defence of the . national interests amounted to subversion. but to want to give up the oil to foreign trusts was patriotism ! Under pressure from public opinion some of the defenders of foreign capital stated that the exploitation could be carried out under State control. They were unsuccessful in obtaining unanimous support in the official commissions dealing with the question. Some of their members demanded that the oil industry should be subject to no conditions of any kind lest foreign capital should take fright and pull out. Although the government was certain of a large parlia mentary majority. in the event the bill was not brought be fore a full session of Congress. This was the first time that a popular campaign was
so
successful. To solve the problem it
was necessary to wait for the new Vargas government (195 1-
4) which approved
the law to set up the State monopoly and
establish Petrobras. the national company for the oil industry.
Although the oil campaign was successful it did not lead
to the creation of an organized political party. Those it gathered together belonged to very different parties and ways
ot thinking and their divergences were difficult to bridge. The attempts made in this sense did not meet wi th the success expected of them. The League for National Emancipation and the Nationalist Movement. irs successor. were not calculated to rouse the masses. Thus the popular movement remained limited to two parties whose positions were then diametrically opposed, the PTB and the Communist Party, then in hiding. The latter was looking forward to annet! revolution and the former to the return of Vargas by way of the ballot box. The Com-
In the electoral campaign to choose Marshal Dutra's suc cessor as President of tbe Republic, the Communist Party supported the PSD candidate. Cristiano Machado. though
they were unsuccessful in obtaining the votes in the large ;ities. Much occupied with its plans for armed rebellion the
parry had not attached great importance to the electoral cam paign. Vargas. on the other band. found that the city dwellers crowded to his meetings. To everyone's surprise he
obtained a great number of votes and was elected president. This was the first time in the history of Brazil that a govern ment in power lost the election for president of the RepubliC.
The communists now changed their line. While retaining their independence they began a more intensive campaign among the trade unions seeking, like the PTB, conciliatory fonnulas which would enable the unity of the working
to criticize until right up to his death. Vargas. during his second tenn as president, carried on a bitter struggle against imperialism. Until the end he kept to
the main features of the policy that he had laid down during the electoral campaign and to the undertakings that he had given about oil. As the pressure increased, the stand he took grew the more clearly defined. On 31 December
1951
be
stated :
Despite what is being said, we arc not opposed to the entry of foreign capital. On the contrary. We want it to come. But we do not agree with giving up our natullll resources and our reserves to the control of foreign companies neatly always in the service of monopoly capitalism . . . I have said already and I now solemnly
Brazil : The: People. and the. Power
140
The People and Popular Movements
repeat it: a country which giYeS up its oil at the same time parts with its sovereignty. On another occasion, on the subject of the transfer of pro fits abroad, he said:
141
passed into the hands of those who had deposed Vargas in
1945. Shortly afterwards came the tum of the minister of .
labour, Joao Goulart, against whom the colonels of the army
had published an extremely violent manifesto. These resigna. tions, far from pacifying the opposition, increased its strength
and in its growing isolation the government found it impos
So what arc we paying back? What we do not owe; what we have not received ; what belongs to us; what has been increased in �alue by the mere magic of figures, to bolster up foreign capItal to the detriment of Brazilian assets and production . . .
nationalist bourgeoisie thus came up against fierce attack
This stand was taken a t the time when important questions
shot with which Vargas ended his life. The struggle was to
came up for decision: in addition to oil, there was the
Amazon questioli, guarantees for foreign investment and other matters as well, concerning which the previous govern ment had sent various proposals to Congress and on which no deci�ion had been reached. On foreign capital, for example, Article One of the Dutra bill laid down that 'any foreigner,
�
whet er a �oral �r physical person, is guaranteed the right . of bnngmg In capital to Brazil, of employing i t for all goods a ?d undertakings of which ownership or control is not for
bidden by the constitution, and of withdrawing this capital
freely from the country together with the profits that it has earned'. By setting himself against these interests Vargas drew . government a violent campaign of opposition down upon hiS from foreign imperialists and their collaborators in the country. Dutra had
run
down the currency reserves and,
as
a result, international organizations created difficulties in granting the credits the country needed. They even went so
sible to carry out its political programme. The attempt to re-establish the hegemony of the industrial from imperialism. Its death knell was sounded by the revolver continue sporadically up 10 the military coup of 1964 which
managed to establish a dictatorship for the purpose of com·
pletely 'cleaning up' the country. Vargas's government was progressively deserted by the traditional politicians. The opposition campaign initiated by the journalist Carlos Lacerda and joined by almost all the newspapers increased in bitterness
after the attempt on
Lacerda's life when an air-force officer was killed. When it was discovered that the attempt was inspired by the presi· dent's personal guard the generals demanded Vargas's provi sional suspension and then his resignation. After a cabinet meeting during which the milit:try members actually took" the side of their army colleagues, Vargas committed suicide. He was convin'ced that in solation i it would be impossible to offer any effective opposition and preferred to die rather than surrender to his opponents. But the proclamation that be left behind him roused the whole country.
His funeral brought a large crowd into the streets. In
far as ro provoke an artificial crisis in coffee to stop its price
several provincial cities it provoked manifestations on a con
incr�asing on the international market and thus deprive Brazil of a part of the profit from its exports.
siderable scale, sometimes leading to rioting. These popular
Gradu�lly pressure against the government built up. The . war IDIllister, a supporter of Brazil's independent develop ment, was obliged to resign and control of the armed forces
demonstrations served to moderate somewhat the ardour of
Vargas's enemies and played an important part in subsequent political events.
Tbey were the cause, more especially, for the constitutional
141
Brazil: Tht: Pt:oplt: and tht:
Powt:r
regime remaining unchanged. The elections actually took place within the prescribed interval. The nationalist and popular voters gave their support to the candidature of
Tht: Proplt: and Popular Movt:mt:nts
143
In alliance with Juscclino Kubitschek the YTB in the event
confonned to the demands of electoral strategy. In each state · of the Federation it made efforts to obtain the adherence of
Juscelino Kubitschek; he had based his campaign on the
influential persons not affiliated to the great parties; it thus
various freedoms (to be won or preserved) without however
transfonned itself into a very mixed coalition and showed
committing himself to continuing Vargas's economic policy.
that it was incapable of gathering its forces around the
In the face of the virulence of the campaign waged by the ex·
nationalist programme contained in the testamentary letter
treme right, these popular and nationalist voters were fight
left by Vargas. An extreme case provides a good illllStration
ing to keep the possibility of continuing to take part in
of the ¥TB's inconsistent position. This is to be found in the
polities. They chose, or were obliged to choose, as the princi·
conduct of Jose Lopez, a sugar magnate and a member of the regional committee of the PTB at Pernambuco, who on I
pal plank of their campaign the dcf�nce of democracy, although Vargas's final letrer represented the real substance of their programme. The terms of this option - the fight for democracy or the
April 1964 took up arms against the government of his state .lthuugh it was ill the b.llds of his OWlI p
The nationalist movement, since i t was made up of differ·
anti.impcrialist struggle - were to continue to dominate the popular movement. even after the coup of 1964. Although at
ent parties and men from various social backgrounds. repre.
ths i time the movement supported Kubitschek it did so on
as liberals and communists. once they were in opposition to foreign domination, could all be nationalists. Under Vargas's
account of exceptional circumstances - at all costs the estab
sented divergent interests. Industrialists and workers as well
lishment of a military dictarorship had to be prevented. As
government, this union was an authentic one since the
the popular movement could not carry on the struggle
'people' as a category included the proletariat a t one end and
against imperialism on its own. it sought survival for the time being in an alliance with the PSD. Thus, too, it con
the indllStrial bOurgeoisie at the other.
tinued its support of Jusceliflo despite his concessions to the
tended to change. Its position, always somewh:lt equivocal
international groups. The popular movement struggled to save the positions it had won and to gather strength for the future. In the end it put up a candidate in the person of Marshal Lott (1960); he was supported by the ITB, PSD and other popular groups, though Joscelino took good care not to associate himself with the campaign, since he had in mind one of his own for a mandate in 1965. The nationalist positions had won over a fair proportion of public opinion. but they were not the expression of an organized movement. The death of Vargas meant the dis· appearance of a centre of political decision - the one held by him personally - without the PTB being able to fill the gap.
But the interests of this nationalist industrial bourgeoisie owing to its economic weakness. grew steadily worse as i t lost state support and as imperialist penetration increased follow ing the concessions granted to foreign capital by the govern· ments of Cafe Filho and Juscelino Kubitschek. In theory, two courses were open to the national bourgeoisie: they could encourage the building up of a national economy with the support of the people on the pattern of what had been done in Europe before the emergence of imperialism; or they could
give up this policy, laid down by Vargas, and seek alliance with imperialism, by the same token abandoning their own much vaunted historical role. The poorer sections of the population, for their part, had
144
Brazil: The People and the Power
The People and Popular Movements 145
no alternative to opposition to imperialism, a course which in the last analysis implied fighting for their own m i mediate !leeds. These were the circumstances which for some time had obliged them to join forces with the nationalist bour geoisie - the sole power capable of influencing the political course of events. We have already seen how the repeated attempts of the �ommunist Party to break this alliance had failed. POSSibly these failures were caused in part by tactical mistakes. But there is no doubt that the existence of an apparently easier option, whose advantages the nationalist bourgeoisie made a point of pressing, was a contributory cause in the failure of this attempt.
In
exchange for its support it was willing
10
grant the working class economic concessions of a kind that would solve its immediate difficulties. It thus made irrelevant the argument to the effect that anti-imperialist action was necessary at all costs, and that despite its objC1:tivity it did not affect those whose political awareness was sufficiently awakened. While Juscelino Kubitschek was in power foreign capital came into the country. This occurred through the purchase of certain sectors of national industry and also through in vestments in those sectors whose operation affected a large number of industries. The setting-up of the automobile industry, for example, provided a market for several manu facrurers of parts; their objective was the production of these same parts, and the nationality of the customers to whom they diSposed of their production - whether to the national undertakings or foreign industries - mattered little. In addi tion, there was the fact that foreign industries were in their view the bctter customers since they had greater credit facili ties with the banks. Investments in service industries played a part for these manufacturers similar to that formerly per formed by the great national companies like the Volta Redonda metallurgical company. They created employment
at all stages of the large undertakings where previOusly it ' came only at the final stages. . It should be noticed that these investments particularly created jobs for qualified workers, while in the case of public works it was the non-skilled labourers who were affected. Public works, it is true, as with the building of Brasilia, were carried out with funds provided by the State Social Insurance .to and by issuing paper money. Objectively they hel . h lD spread a fccling of optimism peculiar to penods of hig
�
vestment of this kind_ i hardly surprirutg that the Kubitschek government It s was able to restore certain freedoms hitherto denied, for al and example semi-legality for the Communist Party. beral to economic conditions were such that they enabled a li
�
remain in power. The position at the end of the presiden al te:m was ar different from that of the previous one: inflation was In creasing rapidly, foreign influence was beco��g marked in the industrial sector. The industrial bourgeoISie had largely gone over to imperialism, and no loo?er contain� any in flucntial nationalist group. The industnal leaders StlU capable of resistance shared between them the twO candidates for the
�
�
presidency.
Janio Quadros and lot�.
. .
. General Lott's candidature, which ordinarily would ha,e been supported by large industrial concerns, actually received support from only some of those engaged in the struggle . against imperialism. Quadros, on the other hand, r�ved s�p port through the UDN from those associat� .Wlt fOreJgn interests. These possessed economic power, poh�cal lllfluence and freedom of action, which were the greater SiDce they were supported hom outside the country. while the forme� could count only on support from inside the country and thlS only
�
the State was in a position to give them. The nationalist point of view bad won the approwl of th� larger part of public opinion and candidates for the prest-
146
Brazil: The People and the Power
dency had to take this into account. No one now ventured to maintain openly the belief: once commonly held, that the country should be given over to foreign interests. But in reality Ihis transfer to foreign domination was in the process of taking place and its partisans came into power together wi th President Janio Quadros (1961). However, there was some contradiction between Janio's statements and the policy of his supporters. This contradic tion was not a matter merely of personal differences. It was inherent in the economic and social situation created in the country, and was to be inherited by the Goulart government. The annual increase of industrial production had dropped since 1I}61, and the general optimism, characteristic of Juscelino Kubitschek's government, had disappeared. It be came difficult to allow the claims of the urban wage-earners on account of the recession and the rapid increase in inflation. External debts fell due for repayment while the possibility of the injection of foreign capital, as in the past, was con stantly diminishing. Quadros was faced with the task of re-establishing the economic, political and social equilibrium of the country and the only means at his disposal was the prestige that he had acquired during hi.� political rampaigm. Or. .�trictly speaking. he had to find for the country a new eqUilibrium correspond. ing to the position that had arisen after the death of Vargas. Although he fought his electoral campaign on a nationalist and left,wing policy, right from the beginning Quadros was obliged to ask the popular movement for a certain number of conCt'SSions. The first was contained in Resolution 204 of the SUMQC (Secretariat of Money and Credit) which in· volved a substantial rise in the cost of liVing. To obtain its acceptance by the working class the President had to use his influence with the trade union leaders supporting him. But it was clear that his prestige could not stand up to a series of measures of this kind.
The PropIt: andPopular Movemtnts
147
It can even be admitted that Quadros shared the views of the nationalist employers who had supported him and that it . was his personal position that he had made known n i his repeated declarations of independence from the United States. But to be able to maintain these positions he would have found it necessary to make changes in the political system and in those organizations which directed the economy and the finances of the country; in the last resort he would have to obtain the support of very different forces from those
which were represented in his government. It is possible that because he felt the need to do this he was led to seek the collaboration of men like Leonel Brizola, at that rime governor of Rio Grande do Sul. The same way of thinking produced the theory according to which Quadros, by resigning from the presidency. counted on manifestations in his fa�?ur which would bring him back to power in a strong posItIon and with the support of the people. As it turned out the popular manifestations which took place were not for the retum of Janio Quadros b�t for the investiture of Goulart, his vice-president. and agamst what amounted to the dictatorship established by the three ministers for the armed forces. This was a largc-scalc movement which roused public opinion among the greater part of the population and also affected the armed forces. Finally a compromise was reached by replacing the presidential regime with a predominantly parliamentary system of government. In practice this new system deprived Goulart of his powers which now passed to Congress on which had devolved approval of the composition of the government. R�lacement of persons and parties in government posts ObvIOUsly was insuffident to change the position left by Kubitschek and scarcely alterecl hy Quadros. The Brazilian industrial bourgeoisie no longer regarded gaining independence as fundamental. On the contrary,
48
Brazil: The People and the Power
Tht Propl!: and Popular Movtmtnts
foreign groups were now dominating national industry. The industrial bourgeoisie, without losing State support, found itsei£ with foreign guarantees as well. AJthough this was no
149
lion a nationalist bourgeoisie would be unable to oppose the control of the transfer of profits and the nationalization ot . the refineries. These measures were a blow to the Americans
solution for national problems individual heads of induSlTies found n i i t an answer for their own particular position. Of
within the framework of the capitalist development of the
sized undertakings but these had never held a decisive posi
In prinCiple, therefore, they ought to have found a place
and their allies in the country; nonetheless they were inserted
course this policy caused the closure of small and medium
country.
tion among the bourgeoisie.
in the programme of a nationalist bourgeoisie eager to avoid
While the bourgeoisie was capitulating the peasants were
the aggravation of the social crisis. But either because they had completely capitulated to the Americans or because the),
beginning to take part in political life. In 1956 Francisco JuWio founded the first peasant leagues. Shortly afterwards
were afraid that popular demands would escalate, the em·
the Church began organizing rural unions. The struggle by
ployers did not understand the matter in this way. Some
the peasants began
to
be
a
politicians, it is true, representing various sections of the governing classes, adopted a moderate position towards the
feature of certain regions and Ihe
problem of agrarian refono, hitherto avoided as being too explOSive to touch, became an obligatory item in all political
reforms. One of these was Magalhaes Pinto, a banker, and at
discussions. Under the Goulart government trade unions
the time governor of the state of Minas Gerais. who was later
increased in number and a rudimentary national peasant
to become civilian leader of the military coup in 1964-
organization - the National Confederation of Agricultural
Another was
Workers (CNTA) - was formed in an endeavour to unify efforts being made virtually everywhere throughout the
of the MiniStry of Finance of the Goulart government
country. The movement among urban wage earners was thus
Like these two politicians other representatives of the bour
strengthened by these new rural organizations.
These change<; in th!! composition of the poplllar move ment modified the balance of power in the struggle for libera tion. Since the poorest sections of the population were the most active in the struggle, the anti-imperialist campaign was now hound up with that for structural refonus intended to meet the claims of the poor. The reforms announced by the government satisfied the
M. Carvalho Pinto, whose presence at the head
heartened the industrialisl5 of Sao Paulo. .
geoisie soon ceased to support the government; as a result it becllme ;ncrea...-ingly dependent on the popular movement.
although this situation could hardly be interpreted as an
indication of a change of position by the government or of a
search for radical solutions to problems.
Goulart was supremely uninterested in all this. As Vargas's
political successor he was the prisoner of a policy seeking a
reconciliation that would put an end to the ban against him
large majority of the popular movement, including the com
by various sections of the population and encourage Ihe
munists, without being of a kind to alann a nationalist bourgeoisie prepared to play the managing part aSSigned to
country's independent development. But reconciliation had become extremely difficult in the new context of the internal situation of the country. The government no longer enjoyed
i t by Goulart's policy. His agrarian reform followed the 1930 recommendation and merely prOVided for a limited division
the support of the bourgeoisie to help it take the lead in the
of estates and the establishment of small properties. In addi-
reforms that it advocated; and the more widespread sections
150
Brazil: The People and the Power
of the popular movement demanded more radical measures though there was no general agreement on exactly what w� required. Moreover, the foreign hold on the country had grown to be so ��e�t that there was no longer any possibility of a reconci liation; co-existence with imperialism was now en �rely �ealistic. The partial measures taken against the mternational groups, although still valuable, were Dot enough to change this situation in depth. The government could no longer postpone adopting an unequivocal position �y taking �ction to deliver the country from foreign domina tIOn. That IS easy enough; indeed it is inevitable at the end of a revolution wllt!ll, by the mobilization of the whole of the population, it is possible to inspire it with confidence in the �u�cess of a difficult and long-drawn-out undertaking. But It IS b� no means the same - as the history of Brazil proves . necessary to keep to the when It IS traditional machinery of government and the strict observance of the political rules both within and without the country. The presence at the head of government of one connected wi.th the popular movement did not mean that he could freely use the armed forces or the civil service for the pmposes of reform. Congress was opposed to reform. The federal govern ment co�Id n�t count on the state governors or on the general staff whIch, smce the resignation of Janio Quadros, was con tinually plotting against the government. Even the govern ment was by no means unanimous on the great national problems; it w�s subject to frequent change and to the agree ments made WIth the PSD and other less important parties. ��ost all the communications media - press, radio, tele VISIon - whose influence on the middle classes was decisive rejected the official line. The ruling classes were thus in ; strong position; opposed to them was only the popular move ment mobilized by the government and the different leftist nationalist groups.
The People and Popular Movements 1 5 1 Of course the government could count on the people in the . anti.imperialist struggle, but there was no national organizaparty tion to guide them in the campaign. Even Goulart's was in no position to take and keep the initiative in these s matters. The popular movement was tossed between variou i agreement to uphold the official policy, organizations, all n but disagreeing among themselves about the solution of national problems. Thus the popular movement. closely con , neeted with the government without sharing all its views i creating a force to counterbalance the could not succeed n weight of the political and military bodies bent on maintain ing the status quo, and determined to delay as long as pos· sible the reform measures demalllk...J by the people. To these difficulties were added those arising from the urgent necessity of improving the external debt. To do this the agreement of the United States was required; and it was obviously not prepared to encourage the policy of self-
152 Brazil: The People and the POWer and restore to him the necessary authority for the exercise of his mandate at the head of the nation. Nevertheless. the compromise with Congress and with the parties which had just defeated it produced a government whose composition reduced the effects of this victory to nothing. What was at stake here was not the personal worth of the ministers appointed but the fact that, for the second time, Goulart was giving in to the existing institutions instead of taking a clear stand at a time when he had just been given an overwhelming vote of confidence. Janio Quadros had staked all on his personal authority to dominate these same institutions. Goulart, for his part, cherished the illusion of gainiug ltis �lltiS through a compromise. Opposition increased and the policy taken by Goulart from i terests of the different social Vargas. of reconciling the n classes, became daily less viable. Among other indications, the frequent cabinet changes showed the need for a thorough. going change in the nature of government. The popular movement. despite the great strength that it had acqUired, did not possess at national level the unified structure which would enable it to support the government in this change. In this context. the attempt made by Goulart in J¢3 to doclare martial law can be seen 2S a step in this direction. For a government with popular support such an attempt was meaningless and only the extremity to which it had come can explain it. Goulart was probably trying in this way to make up for the loss of political support. to weed out the centres of resistance belonging to the extreme right like the Lacerda government in the State of Guanabara. and thus to ensure by military power easier control and handling of his own supporters. This step deprived the government of the strength that it obtained from the support of the masses or at least i t weakened iti yet it was this support which formed the most important factor on which it could count and of which it bad absolute need to break the ties with imperialism.
The Ptoplcand Popular Movemcnts
153
It is difficult to see how the people could continue to support ' it under a regime of martial law. Santiago Dantas then proposed (at the end of 11)63) as a substitute solution the formation of a CQ.1lition (Frentc ampla). By broadening the basis of support this was intended to ensure the government greater stability. The realization of a few reforms with the agreement of the popular movement and the liberal wing of the main parties would then enable it to continue in office without hindrance until the presi· dential elections of 1965. The failure of this further step was confirmation of the impossibility of solving the problem by the mere expedient of politicafrestructuring. Meanwhile the reactionary groups were re·forming, with· out worrying overmuch, so it seemed, about the popular support enjoyed by the government. They cunningly set on foot a Widespread campaign aimed at public opinion among the urban middle class. To influence people and provoke de fensive reactions, the conservative newspapers gave great prominence [0 the more radical statements of certain popular members of the government, exaggerating them sometimes or else manipulating them in such a way as to make them say what they wanted them rosay. There were two courses open to these right·wing groups if they were to come to power. They could isolate the govern. ment politically and defeat it at the coming elections, or they could take part in the final stages of the military plot which since the end of the war had never entirely ceased its underground activity. In this way tbey could overthrow Goulart. The anticipated launching of the candidatures of Carlos Lacerda and Juscehno Kubitschek. by the UDN and the PSD respectively, formed the first of these two steps. 11 was necessary to adopt this course since the manifestations of the wiU of the people had up to that time prevented the success of any attempts at military intervention. But in the end circumstances enabled military intervention
154 Brazil: The People and the Power to take place with the coup d'etat of 1 April 1964. The nature of the government was then changed, a system of repression, legal and material at the same time, being henceforward em bodied in it.
CHAPTER 5
The Coup d'Etat of April 1964 On 1 April 1964 the anned forces intervened in the political life of Brazil, causing the fall of the Goulart government and, of grealer importance, the break-up of a political system which was no longer adapted to the realities of the economic life of the country. The coup brought a whole period of development in Brazilian society to an abrupt conclusion. At the institutional level it destroyed the existing structures, which had arisen as a result of a process of economic change and had now reached the limit of their potentialities. The structures in question were the 1946 constitutional regime, rhe popular political organizations, trade union organizations,
and so on. In their place an attempt was made to establish a
political structure more closely rel.ated to the new economic situation of the ruling classes. The 1964 coup s i sometimes interpreted as a Single political episode which left substantially untouched the general con text in which it occurred. There are of course variants of this view but they do not differ from each other very greatly. According to this interpretation of the situation, the coup was the means chosen by the reactionary forces in the country to end the instability which marked Goulart's presi dency and to suppress utterly a popular movement whose expansion was taking place amidst great disturbance. The coup. then, was the result of incapability from two sides : from Goulart and from the popular parties. The first
156
Brazil: The Prople and the Power
was powerless to govern the country and oppose effectively the manoeuvres of the reactionaries, while the second could not agree on common action to deal with problems on which
their views were similar. And,as a logical deduction from this
theory, the coup d't�tat was to be seen merely as a pause in
the development of the demOCT;ltic process that the country
had been going through before 1964. In political terms, this
conclusion implied that the only outcome to this temporary situation could be the restoration of the democratic process.
No one was openly hostile to this restoration, for to all
appearances it would be what in general terms was called
'the normal life of the country'; but there were some who
The Coup d'Etat of April t 964
151
fidal views and to attribute the success of the coup to these
factors. In this way they hoped to win tbe sympathies of
liberal and middle class groups impressed. by events whose real implications they could not perceive al thai time.
This limited and narrow view of events in the end helped
to pass off as true the reasons put forward by the authors of
the coup in justification of their conduct. Since it dwells on isolated. episodes il conceals wh!lt really happened, prevents
understanding of the country's situation as a whole and
eschews the perspective that would enable tbe popular move ment
10
establish its fundamental objectives.
The military coup, carried out at a time when the latent
preferred this su�rfichll view and did not stop to examine
crisis could have come into the open, was only intended to
in the democratic process no effort was made to check the
changes. The basic origin of this desire for change can be
Brazil's actual situation. Because the coup had led to a break
objective of those responsible for this intervention; and only
its circumstantial aspects were analysed.
By confining the analysis to this narrow framework this theory reduced. the interpretation of political events to the
level of a mere difference of opinion on the behaviour of persons or parties. The events during which both took or did
not take effective and appropriate action were given pro minence and national problems were thus considered.
as
part
of a disagreeable controversy concerned with personal merits
and shortcomings.
Of course it s i true that good and bad choices and the effi ciency or the failings of certain parties or groups intervened 10
make tbe coup easier or more difficult. But these factors
are secondary when considered within the framework of the situation as a whole, for the true situation was far more com
enable its perpetrators to undertake a series of institutional
found through analysis of Ihe rapid process of economic,
political and social development experienced by Brazil be tween 1945 and 1964. This period is outstanding for the struggle that occurred between the two wings of the Brazilian
bourgeoiSie contending for domination of the country's pro
duction and control of the Stale. One of these wings, which,
although the expression is a little vague, can be called. the 'Brazilian national bourgeoisie', aimed at the Independent development of the country; it was partly fonned by groups of industrialists concerned for the fonnation of an economic ally independent Brazilian nation. To hold out effectively
they needed means of expression and State aid, two factors of which, afrer the war and especially since Vargas's death, they
were depriVed.. The other wing, made up essentially of tbe groups of
plex and its roots were in a long economic, political and social process and the existing concrete historical conditions of the
some groups of leading industrialists, supported dose col
And it was the actual perpetrators of the coup, the officers
complete integration of the Brazilian economy with that of
country.
who seized power, who were the first to insist on these super-
financiers in league with foreign capital in associalion with
booration with imperialism. They defended the theory
that
the United States was necessary since this was the only way
158
The Coup d'Etat of April 1964
Brazil: The People and the Power
effectively to encourage the development of Brazil. These groups, entirely lacking in national
idealism, sought a
guarantee for the preservation of their own interests through
159
parties, the Social Democratic Party (PSO) and the Brazilian Labour Party (PTB), and became president of both in a clever ' move to explOit his personal influence for the benefit of the
Thus the struggle in question was fundamentally an
industrialization of the country. The PSD was the party of the ruling class. It gave expression to the essential unity of
economic one and was a reflection of the conflict of interests
interests existing between the industrial and large-estate own
subordination to those of the imperialists.
among the ruling classes. But it went far beyond the strictly economic field and entered the spheres of ideology and politics.
At the ideological level the national bourgeoisie used to put
forward a whole body of theory established to counter
ing interests of the Brazilian bourgeoiSie. For this reason it found support both in the cities and in the country districts.
And it was precisely these interests that it defended and to which it remained rigidly faithful until 1964.
The PTB claimed to unite the workers. Its function within
Nationalism thus became the ideological weapon of a
the system was to bring the great urban masses closer to lhe industrial bourgeoisie, which needed them to consolidate its
Brazilian industrial bourgeOisie at the height of economic
position.
foreign domination and encourage the real national interests.
expansion and politically in the ascendant. It came into be
Regarded from the political angle the nationalist movement
ing with the first Vargas government; the integralist, move
thus consisted in an association between employers and wage
ment, openly Fascist in tendency, had tried to shape it into a
earners for the benefit of the development and economic inde
coherent theoretical system; the group of intellectuals, most
pendence of the country. Without the support of the popular
of them of integralist origin, which later was to found the
sections it would not have been of much account in the life
Higher Institute of Brazilian Studies (ISEB) finally endowed
of the country. The trade unions and the popular organiza.
it with its completed theoretical basis. At the political level a nationalist group had taken shape giving expression to the ewnomic li ltt:cests mentioned above. It acquired a new dimension after the war when the popular movement gave political support to its efforts for the develop ment of the country on a capitalist basis. The origin of this group goes back to Vargas's first term although at this time there was full realization of an the aspects of the question. The nationalistic political movement came into being after fifteen years of conciliating all national interests in order to unite the economic and social interests for the industrializa tion of the country. During the evolution of the Brazilian bourgeoisie Vargas's personal influence on the political parties as a whole was con siderable. We have seen how in 1945 he established two
tions in their struggle for better living conditions exerted pressure for economic growth and national independence; they thus gilVt: niut:l!ce uf il hitht:rto UIlSUSpectt:tl UyllilJilic
quality and political ability. The explOited masses formed in reality the principal support for the industrial growth of the nation and, by their renunciation of the advantages that economic development could bring them. enabled the indus trial enterprises to achieve a higher level of capitalization. After 1954. when the Brazilian Communist Party adopted a political line similar to the PTB's, the nationalist movement became the rallying point of all the forces of the left and the most considerable progreSSive political force
that the country
had ever known. Political action now assumed wider propor tions and became more dear cut, leading to demands -for structural reforms. But the movement possessed no machinery
160
The Coup d'Etat of AprH 1¢>4
Brazil: The People and the Power
161
to ensure the coordination of the various forces supporting it,
hegemony that it had so farenjoyed. That it succeeded in con·
so that it remained as a widespread movement of public opinion.
tinuing in existence and e\·en in obtaining a certain number
PSD
lar movement, which imbued it with far greater political
The combined action of the forces of the left and the
- following the old policy of Getulio Vargas - made possible the election of Juscelino Kubitschek as president of the Re public. This electoral success designated an apparent victory for the nationalist parties. In fact, the Kubitschek government marked the failure of Vargas's principles. The nationalist groups and the parties of the left became more radical during this period, while the national bourgeoisie, having adopted a purely defensive position, lost ground economically in the face of the massive penetration of foreign capital. The demo
of advantages could be attributed to the support of the popu strength than its own economic power could have ensured. Owing to economic development this inferior status of the
national bourgeoisie undermined the former agreement 00.
tween employers and workers at its foundation, in spite of
growing popular support. The economic structure itself was going to develop n i such a way that this agreement couId no
longer work.
In other words, the nationalist movement could in future count only on the people, since the bourgeoisie was giving
cratic and liberal atmosphere that undoubtedly prevailed
way to conditions imposed by the economic position. By thus
under Kubitschek's government, tended, as a matter of fact, to conceal this penetration of foreign capital and, indeed, the
the Vargas government; it was this that had served as the
surrendering they gave up the power that they held under
new economic position of the country.
support of the movement.
Thus the political successes achieved by the popular move ment were scarcely reflected on the economic front. There the
amounted to recognition of the division that had already
nationalists were held in check even when they had the ear of the government or even when they appeared to manipulate
At the economic level the coup d'etat of
1
April only
occurred in the structure of the nation itself. It only remained to remove from political life those connected with the popular movement who were occupying positions of responSibility in
it. At certain moments, it is rrue, they were successful in im peding the advance of illlvcrialislII fur ex,uuple in the Petro
V3riOUS spheres of national life. This was done on this date:
nationalist aspirations checked the attempted penetration of
organizations.
-
bras affair, when Marshal lott's intervention on behalf of the international groups. But the general trend of the Ministry of Finance and the institutions depending on it during the whole of this period remained favourable to the principle of integration with the United States. The men in key positions almost always favoured the North American point of view, and external pressure, of course, was always
there to secure its adoption. The pro-American view thus
weighed decisively on all the import:mt questions of economic and financial policy.
On this account the �ational bourgeOiSie lost the economic
next it was the tum of the trade unions and other popular In fact there was no single coup d'etat but a series of inci dents leading up to the 6nal act of April 1¢4: in
1945.
the
1954. the crisis which led to 1955 the attempt [0 prevent Kubitschek's in 1961, the resignation of Janio Quadros and the
deposition of Vargas occurred; in Vargas's suicide; in investiture;
legality crisis - a term designating the constitutional crisis
provoked by those opposing Goulart's investiture: lastly, in
1964 the coup d'etat itself.
Matters had come to a head and the theory of the economic integration of Brazil with the USA couId now prevail. " •.•• _8
162
The Coup d'�tat of April 1964
Brazil: The People and the Power
This was due to the development of economic forces - the
integration with the American economy; this capitulation
preceding period had witnessed in fact an intensive influx of
was rendered an the easier by the dose subordination of .
foreign capital into Brazilian industry and the taking over
Brazilian industry to foreign, particularly North American,
of the control of strategic sectors of the economy; the possi
capital.
bilities of industrial expamion. on the other hand, had In
1964
Thus in Brazil there were two factors intervening to put an end to the phase of independent development under the
reached the point of exhaustion. the replacement of imports by home-produced
influence of a nationalist bourgeoisie. On the one hand was
goods (hitherto essential in the industrialization of the
the fact that industrial development was losing its impetus
country) had
reached its limits. Consumer goods. both
as a result of the special characteristics of substituting home
durables and non-durables. were already wholly produced in
produced goods for imports. This was now encountering the
the country; it good proportion of the raw materials and inter
mediary products were processed in the country; investments
were
running at a
(jgur� uf at It!ilst 75 per cent with the plant
slow growth of the nternal i market arising particularly from the high concentration of income among the employers' sector which in its tum was conditioned by the special requirements
and machinery produced by Brazilian industry. On the other
of the capitalist mode of development. On the other hand,
hand imports - chiefly fuel, intennediate goods and plant and
there was the fact that the heavy investments made by the
machinery not produced in the country - representing nearly 4 per cent of the gross national product had reached a level
that could not be reduced without relative difficulty. As a result, the growth of industrial production in about
1961
began to show signs of running down. This loss of im·
petus in the industrial se(:tor increased during the next few years, leading to a relaxation in the growth of the Brazilian
economy. The fact hecame very crease in
per capita income.
clear
in
1963
with the de
This dormant stale of affairs was not therefore an isolated phenomenon, the result of passing events. It revealed the ex haustion of the type of development Ihat Brazil had experi enced during the preceding ten years, based essentially on the substitution of home-produced goods for imports. It had grown impossible to maintain �he level of investments in the industrial sectors concerned with the home market. The economic stagnation deprived the Brazilian bour geoisie of its remaining power of resistance. The actual im possibility of expansion was the cause of the complete capitulation of the bourgeoisie in favour of the policy of
•
163
imperialist groups gave foreign capital control over a large
part of national production. As a consequence in 1/)64 condi tions were ripe for an agreement between the Brazilian indus trial bourgeoisie and imperialism.
As imperialism effected its massive penetration of the Brazilian economy it laid plans to win the battle on the political and military fronts. On the military front the coup d'etat was preceded by the thorough indoctrination of the officers of all the armed forces,
many of them spending periods of training in the United States. Since the war the failure of various attempts al mili tary intervention made this preparation necessary; plans had been made for a long time beforehand, particularly at the Higher School of Warfare.
On the political front the national sectors linked with
imperialism were organized wilhin the framework of the National Democratic Union - a body which did not conceal its dose connection with foreign interests. despite the fact that among its members were to be found eminent nationalist
figures, such as the minister Gabriel Passes. In its articles of
164
The Coupd'Etat ofApril lg64
Brazil: The Pr;ople and the Power
association was the statement asserting the fundamental role of foreign capital in the development of the country. Specialized organizations, inter-party and otherwise, arose around the UDN with the purpose of encouraging political action favourable to imperialism. Some of the most important were the Brazilian Institute for Democratic Action (lBAD) and Parliamentary Democratic Action (ADEP), which in
165
were fighting each other for power, they were both pursuing the same policy. This was by no means unheard of. since
a
similar agreement between two opponents had already contri buted to the downfall of Vargas in 1945. Lacerda and Kubits chek, moreover, were to show dearly that they were not irreconcilable enemies when after the coup d'etat they
collaborated in establishing the
Frr.:nte
ampla (literally, the
cluded a very numerous group of deputies.
wide front).
post-war period had all more or less totally failed. Vargas's
tendencies to be found on the economic front. Caught be
The various attempts at military intervention made in the
suicide, for example, was torally unexpected and prevented
the coup d'etat being brought to a successful conclusion. These failures show that the problem couJd not be solved by mere force of arms; political and military solutions had to go hand in hand. The greatest political victory obtained by the UON was
The instability of Goulart's government reflected the
tween political forces on the left and those interests within
tbe country allied with foreign capital, Goulart's govern.
lIIeul .showtil lhe al;tual illl po.s:>ibili ty of political power based
on the advantage of certain clearly defined interests. The econom.ic policy then followed could satisfy no one: all the interests in conflict - national industry, imperialism, the
amounted actually to failure. The political solution was
workers, the large-estate owners, the peasants - were at the same time its beneficiaries and its victims. The internal con
government. There was a twofold objective in view: the
of Vargas and reached a critical pt.int in 1964.
the election of Tanio Quadros, but its final consequences always enVisaged by these same forces under Joao Goulart's
political isolation of the government in order to facilitate a possible coup d'etat and preparation for the elections if a solution by force of arms proved to be impossible.
Putting up candidates in advance in the persons of Carlos
lacerda (UON) and Juscelino Kubitschek (PSO) to succeed Goulart was quite certainly a move to embarrass the govern ment. By opening the campaign for the succession, and thus at an early dale provoking the dear alignment of forces, the traditional parties aimed a t obliging Goulart to make an early choice : he must either come to an agreement with them or else adopt an independent position; in this case he would have to be content with the support of the popular movement, and
a t that time if nii! not possess the means effectively to oppose the
,,:"0 �werful electoral machines dominating the country.
ObJectively, and despite the fact tbat the two candidates
tradictions of the situation had heen evolVing since the death DUring the final months of its period in office the Goulart government endeavoured to reformulate its policy, relying on the support of the masses and the more thoughtflll sections of the middle class.
The political battle was practically lost. The only advan tages on the government side were the possession of the people's confidence. its own legitimacy and the general aware
ness of the inevitability of the reforms. Events preceding the army's action added reinforcements to the opposition in the form of a large section of the middle dass who joined as the result of an n i tensive propaganda campaign. A law extending a guaranteed minimum wage to em ployees in the agricultural regions increased considerably the remuneration of workers suffering from a very low standard
of Jiving. Its most marked effect was to unite the landed pro-
.
166
The Coup d'Etat of April
Brazil: The People and the Power
prietors against the government; the lowness of the wages paid to their workers had always been their principal -asset, and they were accustomed to the advantages of a cheap labour force. Thus the prospect of agrarian reform 611ed them with
1964
16]
fluential on the political front and succeeded n i fOisting the
idea of integration even on the armed forces. The outcome. could then be foreseen; it was the conclusion which flowed
logically from the forces at work.
A radical change in the structure of Brazilian society had
horror. Laws concerning the transfer abroad of profits and the nationalization of the oil refineries ran directly counter to
occurred with the death of Vargas in 1954. The importance
of this was not always appreciated by the nationalists or by
imperialist interests; they did not therefore obtain the sup
left-wing parties. Lacking accurate knowledge of the new
port of a bourgeoisie only mildly n i terested in the inde
situation they did not feel compelled to formulate a new in
pendent development of the country. Some few individual
clusive plan of action. Perhaps their political victories con
industrialists may have welromed it, but as a whole they
cealed a more general view of the situation from them and
went to swell the ranks of the opposition. Finally, in the last week of March the closing of rhe discount branch of the Bank
caused them to underestimate the power of their opponents.
of Brazil deprived industry of an easy source of credit.
should have envisaged a different type of political action,
Reformulation of policy came therefore too late as the government was already isolated and had lost the support of
11
has now bcx:ome clear that from this time onwards they
and reshaped the strategy and tactics of the popular move ment.
those sections of the population on which i t could preViously
It is true that during the years before the coup thCIe
count. It is true that its popularity ncreased i among the
were numerous interpretations of the Brazilian situation and
poorer sections of the people but the organizations repre
a whole series of plans. But these studies were not the ex
senting these social classes were in no position to confront on
pression of
their own the powerful forces ranged against them, for the
they were merely the reflection of the many varied political
'government' was not merely the President of the Republic
trends in the several sections of Brazilian society. In this
an
inclusive and cohereD[ view of the situation;
but also the National Congress, the governors of the states, the armed forces, the various national and regional authori
climate of ideological Coof11510n any artempt at comprehen sive and unified action against the existing politiro-economic
ties and institutions which almost without exception were
structure was doomed to failure. There was nothing left but
opposed to the measures recently adopted. It seemed clear
partial and isolated efforts, and these were ineffective because
that the conflict could be resolved only by force; either the
they in no way questioned the value of the system as a whole.
government was to impose the reforms demanded by the
Any desire to effect stmctural reforms under the gUidance
nation, or the reactionaries would overthrow the government
of a nationalist bourgeoisie had become utopian. The most
and thus emphaSize further the country's subordination to
advanced sections among the employers were certainly in
the United States.
favour of these refomls,
but that is another question.
The coup thus appears as the result of a slow process of
Actually it was by the conciliation of the traditional eco
hy imperialism and of its alliance with those
nomic sections that the rapid process of economic develop ment had been made po>siblc. As we have seen, Ihe first
infilmtion
internal forces which would accept its domination. These forces, already in control of me economic sector, became in-
Vargas government had encouraged the large-estate owners'
168
Brazil: The People and the Power
interests as well as those of industry. Consequently, preser· vation of the agrarian structure, far from being an obstacle to industrial development, had become a prerequisite for it. There was no serious question of agrarian reform; it was pre vented by the policy of conciliation and this was continued down to the present time. Lastly. after Vargas's death the alliance of the industrial bourgeoisie with foreign capital
CHAPTER 6
The Military Regime
prevented its working for the independence of the country. Thus it seems that circumstances, particularly after '954, demanded a political reformulation which was only achieved in the last months of the Goulart government when a few
The coup d'etat of 1 April 1964 brought to power the most
measures were taken with the support of the masses alone.
reactionary and backward military factions in Brazil; they
But no one created a united,
resolutely
anti·imperialist politi
were supporters of the economic integration of the country
cal structure capable of assuming responsibility in the face of
with the imperialist interests of the American economy. The
this new situation.
new government's principal objective was the adaptation of
In the past independence was compromised by various
all departments of Brazilian life, in its economy, social and
sections of the ruling class. At the present time it is com
military organization, education and ideology. to the new
promised by the industrial bourgeoisie which has now allied
form of foreign domination.
itself with imperialism after previously being united for some
After the coup the two successive military governments
time with the people. Even if the imperialist position is not
maintained perfect political unity in their pursuit of the 0b
held by all the leaders of industry as individuals and as
jectives laid down for them. Both followed a general plan
Brazilians. nonetheless i t is that of the bourgeoisie as a class.
whose purpose was to emure the consistency of the measures
In these circumstances it is for the people. for the poor and
adopted for the consolidation of imperialist domination over
middle-class sections of
the country. Both governments took care to give priority
Brazilian
society.
direction of the struggle for national liberation.
to
undertake
to
comprehenSive measures dealing with the country's economic
and institutional structure rather than to be concerned with details; both were aware that time was required to complete the establishment of the new type of domination now made possible by the development of the Brazilian and North American economies; they saw that this could only be achieved within the framework of a long-tenn programme. To understand exactly the measures adopted in all fields of national life it s i important, therefore. to consider the comprehensive and unifonn character of the actions under taken; in addition they must be seen from the long·term view-
170
Brazil: The People and the Power
The: Military Regime:
171
point. In this wide context these apparently isolated and
superiority of the United States integration means in actual
indiscriminate actions assume significance.
fact subordination of the Brazilian economy to North Ameri�
For this reason, if we are to avoid the only too frequent
mistakes that arise from partial analyses of national prob lems, we must continually have in mind the fundamental
can imperialist interests. These are the conditions of this subordination :
(I)
At the economic level the regime must control directly
data of the problem. Analyses made exclusively within the
the country's production. This control presupposes, of cornse,
narrow framework of immediate activities do not provide a
a close alliance with the Brazilian borngeoisie, an alliance
general view of the political activities of the country. A
which here and now has been achieved in all its essentials.
comprehensive analysiS of imperialist action can alone furnish
The isolated attitude of a few industrialists opposed to this
the data that would enable appreciation of what s i obtained
subordination is no indication of the position of their class
from observation of apparently isolated events; in this way
too the connection between the facts can be seen and the
as a whole. (2.) Politically the new regime must dominate the machin
general plan of domination to which lht:y Ix:long madc uul.
ery of government in order to make it serve tllt: illlt:!t'Sl:i uf
Exact knowledge of these events and their situation wi thin
foreign capital. In view of the extensive and widespread
the framework of this plan shows the direction to be follow�
nature of the popular movement the necessary preliminary
in face of the enemy's acts which, without this general view,
to this domination is the liquidation of the workers' and
appear to be lacking in order and sometimes contradictory.
peasants' organizations and their replacement by new ones
Such knowledge prOvides the individual with the indispen.
subject to imperialist interests.
sable facts enabling him to corne to a decision about the role
(3) So far as security is concerned, political and police
can·
to be adopted in the struggle. A comprehensive view of im
trol of the whole population is essential in order to foresee
perialist action can rid us of the illusion that it can easily be
and prevent any attempted opposition to the regime.
led into error; this illusion occurs when imperialism is can·
(4) Socially it is necessary to establish attractive future
fused with the mf'n who in appearance are temporarily
pro.�pect� for thf' mirlrlle classes :mrl to create jobs for techni·
governing the country.
cians and intellectuals so that their adhesion to and integra
The personality of these men is not of course unimportant and their action, according to its degree of effectiveness, can
tion in the regime may be assured.
(5)
Psychologically, the regime must create an ideological
facilitate or impede the progress of imperialism. It is certain
climate favourable to the acceptance of the new system by
nonetheless that they can be rapidly replaced when they fall.
large sections of the population and capable of winning over
Perfect political and economic knowledge of the nation's
to the policy of subordination those sections of opinion which
condition and of the effects of imperialism are essential and
still oppose it.
every effort must be made in this direction; this knowledge
The economic control of the country, in this further stage
should extend to identification of the people and of the
of foreign domination, is to be acquired principally by direct
groups in the service of imperialism. Undeniably the regime's fundamental aim is integration
investment in various sectors of production: in industry.
with the United States. Given the economic and technical
The first measures taken by Castelo Branco's government
agricultrne and in mining.
The Military Regime
1 72 Brazil: The People and the Power in the limiting of credit to the economy were put before the people as necessary for the rehabilitation of the currency and for the cure of inflation. These extremely violent measures were intended nonetheless to create financial difficulties for undertakings in the different sectors of industry and to allow imperialist control
to
be extended over
the country's
economy. It led to the purchase of a whole series of industries by North American capital. These industries, finding them selvcl deprived of local credit facilities for their immediate working, were not in a position to resist foreign pressure.
173
appropriate ministry in Washington and the compensation thought necessary was paid by the government of the United States, which became the creditor of the Brazilian govern· ment for this sum, reserving the right to recoup it from any credit held by the Brazilian government in the USA. Settle ment was always to be made in dollars. Should one of the
governments renounce the treaty, investors would have six months more to ask for guarantees, and when these were obtained firms could send in their records for a period of twenty years following the cancellation of the treaty.
Other ndustrialists i opted for survival through formulas
Through association with the leaders of Brazilian industry
associating them with the American investors. For a great
foreign investors obtained representation of their n i terests thus could They nationals. own its by within the country
number of small and medium-sized businesses it meant ruin and bankruptcy pure and Simple. Credit restriction produced
profit from the s()-Called measures of 'protection' for national
a stronger concentration of industry, weeded out those busi·
industry. In this way through its association with Brazilian
nesses which did not reach the level of efficiency thought
firms imperialism was able to profit by all the legislation
necessary to justify their survival and led to the growth in
brought in before 1964 for the purpose of encouraging in·
importance and influence of the great monopolies. Elimination of any kind of risk to foreign capital was en· sured by the Agreement Relating to Investment Guaranties,
dustrial development. In this way, too, it benefited from exemption from taxes, long-term loans in Brazilian currency, preferential rates of exchange and so on.
signed in February 1965 between Brazil (Castelo Branco's
From this association, also, Brazilian industries obtained
government) and the United States. This treaty confirmed
in the first place access to international financial support and
the policy of the sectors under USA domination and trans
to external sources of credit. The support that they received
lated into fact the recommendation in the statutes of the
at this time from the international combines enabled them
UDN regarding foreign capital. It provided North American
also to reach a more advanced technological stage, creating
investors with greater facilities than those normally enjoyed
in the country a mistaken feeling of 'modernization'. 1m·
by national investors and on this account forms an excellent
perialist action, since it eqUipped and made more profitable
illustration of the trend in foreign relations.
certain types of industry, o'n occasion created the illusion
According to this treaty a North American industry could
that it was making a positive contribution in some sectors.
ask the Brazilian government for the issue of a guarantee
Actually, this progress was principally intended to improve
against damage of any kind that it might suffer as a result of
conditions for exploiting the country.
inflation, appropriation. revolution and so on. By the grant
More recently, by the time that imperialism had carried
of this guarantee, the Brazilian government at once lost all right of judgement: if the undertaking asserted that it had suffered injury the matter went before the officials of the
out the essentials of its plan to gain a foothold in the various sectoTs of industry, the Brazilian bourgeoiSie discovered a new way of deriving profit from its association with foreign
174
Brazil: The Pe:ople: and the Power
capital. This took the fonn of the possibility of being able to invest in foreign firms. Sucb investments did not amount to an etl"ective victory on the parr of the Brazilian bourgeoisie for it always appeared as an auxiliary, an accessory and as sub sidiary to imperialism, which in any case was in complete control of the investments. All the same, these operations held out the prospect of an exploitation of the country in dose collaboration. Of course, there were some employers who did not take pan in the alliance with the Americans. Some of tbem de· rived no direct advantage from this association. But it is cerrain that tbey aU bad one n i terest in common - the main tenance of the status quo :md the reduction of the wage earners' share in the national income. The predominance of onc sector of production could never cause the destruction of this fundamental solidarity between the different sections of the ruling classes. At the time when coffee was the principal product, for example, the other sectors were no less concerned to preserve the social structures prevailing in the State until 1930. The same is true today when foreign n i terests and the more important section of the Brazilian bourgeoisie are pre dominant; the other sectors confine themselves to the quest for possible concessions from within the regime to enable them to survive and even to make progress side by side with the others. The present attempts at 'humanization' of the economy correspond precisely to the need to gain control over the sectors that are not immediately connected with foreign capital, to widen the bases of government and, as a result, those of imperialism, within the ruling classes. To the penetration of foreign capital into industry must be added the concessions made to the international combines in the field of tbe mineral wealth of the country. As with industry. the form in which me country is exploited am be direct or by means of the agency of Brazilian associates. i carThe exploiration of the mineral resources of Brazil s
The: Military Re:gime
17>
ried on on a large scale whether it is for the provision of raw materials for ndustries i at home or for export to me USA, . where the minerals are used in industry or are stock'pUed against a time of scarcity. At the present time we are witnessing a fresh onslaught on the oil industry, which is a State monopoly. Here i� � i a much more hazardous affair owing to the far greater VIgilance of the public; for a long time people have been alive to this problem. The arguments put forward to justify giving up Brazilian oil to foreign capital are dishonest and are sup ported now by more direct action going so far as sabotage of Petrobras, the State company. There has been no essential l:hangt' in the relations of the agricultural sector to the urban industrial sector and to im perialism. We have seen how the economic int�ratio� of the , . national territory, the result of Vargas s policy durmg hIS first government, led to a close association between the interests of the agricultural and urban industrial sectors of the Brazilian bourgeoisie. This concurrence of interests enabled the ruling class to preserve a remarkable political unity. The alliance between the two sectors of the Brazilian bom· geoisie is at the present time of capit:ll impn�t:mc.e fo� the . imperialists, as they see in it a guarantee of URlty of pohl1cal action for the preservation of the present regime. Actually, the large-estate owners formed the principal support for the April 1964 coup and they remain among the most reliable upholders of the new government. The political unity of the ruling class has thus become indispensable to imperialism if it is to bring its programme of integration to a successful conclusion. Despite the political strength due to its system of alliances, the latifundio is nevertheless economically weak on account of the decadent forms of capitalism prevailing in the nm-I areas of Brazil. Its obvious economic inefficiency makes it
176 Brazil: The People and the Power incapable of ensuring the increase in the supply of foodstuffs and raw materials necessary not only for tbe expansion of the system, but also to obtain foreign currency for the country by exporting to the developed countries. On the other band. the intense concentration of income caused by the system of large estates prevents that extension of the home market necessary for industrial development. Lastly. the ability to make a large profit by the use of cheap labour. an essential principle of the latifundio system which ensured irs survival, stood "in the way of investment that could lead to the introduction of modern technological methods necessary to increase agricultural production. Imperial ism and the military party directly associ ated with i t are well aware of the weakness of their ally and are striving to find a solution to the economic problems of the latifundios which will also serve their political interests. At the Punta del Este conference (1961) the problem was raised quite clear ly and the term 'agrarian reform', hitherto forbidden as highly subversive, made its appearance in an official document at an international level. Directly he came to power, Castelo Branco rackled the land problem and on 9 November of that same year obtained the approval of Congress for an amend ment to the constitution in the �Iion clealing with expro priation. Previous regulations laid down that there must be a preliminary payment in cash for expropriated land; the new rules authorized payment by national bonds repayable in twenty years. On }o November the 'Land Law' was approved. It was a serious attempt to lay down the rules for the new government's agrarian policy. This legislation, whose purpose was to remedy the ec0nomic advantages of the large-estate system, prOVided two kinds of action; on the one hand it aimed at the creation of an economically stable rural middle class occupying a posi tion between the great landowners and the peasants; on the other. i t was intended as a means to raise agricultural pro-
The Military Regime
171
duction by mechanization and the adoption of advanced methods of cultivation. To encourage the creation of a rural middle class the government would be able 10 use, among other legal mea sures, the sharing out of land and the colonization of hitherto virgin territory. Increase in production was expected as a result of various measures, such as technical assistance, mechanization, financial help and credit, rural electrification. subsidiary works, minimum price guarantees for farm pro duce. etc. Despite the alacrity with which the problem was initially tackled these measures remained at the stage of preliminary studies and statistical illvtstigaliou. Tilt: [t:w t:xpruprialiQus actually carried out were merely to save certain landowners from ruin. The really rather limited procedure for dividing up estates, as provided by the law, was not even applied. As a matter of fact the stubborn resistance of the landowners did not allow even the Simplest measures to be put into operation. Those of a more general nature provoked violent protests from all the landowners and the military party found itself threatened with the loss of a further source of support. This resistance on the part of the landowners to any change in the agricultural structure of the countTy derives from the labour problem. It has already been pointed out that the existence of a plentiful and cheap labour force, which could be transferred without difficulty from one type of work 10 another, is the key to the economic profitability of the large estates as a fonn of capitalist organization. Furthermore, control over the land and direct authority over a great parr of the population ensured for the great landowners considerable political power. The colonization measures and the transfer of surplus man power to unoccupied regions of the country would have de prived the landowners of precisc�y what enabled them to hold on. The inevitable increase in the cost of manpower result-
178
Brazil: The People and the Power
ing from these measures would have necessitated the enti�e reconstruction of the whole system if it was to remam economicaUy profitable. It would have been thrown Out of . joint and the distinct characteristics of the estate-ownmg class would cease to exist. Mere increase in the productivity of the land or of labour, if it were not accompanied by a large-scale redistribution of ownership so as to provide a living for a large number of workers, would cause a massive increase in rural unemploy ment and make the political problems created by the peasant masses still more acute. Under these conditions imperialism was obliged to facilitate so far as it could the preservation of the status quo in order to protect its alliance with the rural bourgeoisie. At the same rime it endeavoured, unsuc· cessfully, to prevent further worsening of the social situation in the country districts by various measures of assistance. On the political front the first steps taken by the govern· ment fonned after the coup were directed against the workers', peasants', students' and trade union organizations with a view to abolishing them. This was of importance both for the imperialists and the Brazilian bourgeoisie. The former wished to get rid of a very popular political movement whose roots were among the people and which was hostile to foreign domination - the only movement, in fact, capable of holding it in check; the latter wished to prevent the wage claims and political demands of the masses. In other words, the destruc· tion of the popular movement was intended to prevent any possibility of effective opposition to the new regime and to oblige the masses to submit to the necessity of integration with the economy of the United States. Next came the turn of public freedom, which vanished from aU sections of national life. The various Constirutional Acts of the 1966 Constitution concentrated in the hands of the federal executive greater powers than had ever been known in the history of Brazil, even during the periods of
The Military Regime
179
dictatorship. The concentration of powers in the hands of the president of the Republic was one of the headings chosen by . the coup's instigators under which to arrack Goulart's government. However. once in power they increased this concentration considerably. Similarly, the new government claimed to be restoring the power of the member states of the Federations which had been gradually reduced for the benefit of the federal executive. Nevertheless, ever since the coup d'etat the federal system had been even more severely limited than before. The concentration of power and lessening of the authority of the member states are direct consequences of the country's economic state. They result from the need to regulat� t'l:o. nomic activities, to organize State intervention in the economic field and for a minimum of planning in the channel· ling of government investments and activities. In this sense the necessity for concentration of power goes back to well before the coup. The difference between then and now is that at present this concentration is for a new purpose. It is meant to ensure the coherence and convergence of all measures to facilitate subordination of the Brazilian economy. The federal structure, with its multiplicity of regional and local powers. formed an obstacle to activities of the milit:uy party which had seized power. It was necessary for it to transform regional authorities into mere government representatives and subject them to severe con trol. The same need for intervention in the economic life of the country led to the attempt to submit the National Congress and the regional legislative assemblies to military control so as to achieve fleXibility of legislation for the needs of integra tion. The suppression of the multi-party system and the creation of two new parties. one the governmental, the other the opposition party, comes not only from the desire to preserve a semblance of democracy but also, and principally, from the
ISo
Brazil: The; Pe;op le; and the; Powe;r
The; Military Re;gime;
intention to establish a political organization capable of en suring the operation of the government's plan and the trans mission of the orders of the military authority to the country. The existence of an 'agreed opposition' changes nothing in tbe dictatorial nature of the regime since this opposition is in every case strictly subjected to the Tules laid down by the government. Obedience to these rules transforms the opposi tion into a part of the system, entirely incapable of offering the slightest resistance to the military dictatorship. All these measures (the purge, centralization of decision making, reorganization of the parties, etc.) were aimed at a modification in the previous structure of government. The
new structure
s i meant to prevent the political mobilization
of the people as alJowed by the theoretical freedom in force.
Political power was to be reshaped to facilitate carrying out the plan of integrating the country with the United States. Thus, to ensure the consolidation of the new form of domina tion, the State prOVided itself with the repressive machinery that it needed to eliminate all obstacles in its way.
�
The various measures for the modification and reorganiza
t on of national life also affected the police forces very con Siderably. Both tbe military governments strove to increase and modernize the police, to tum it into a repressive force able to ensure strict control of the population. The immediate obj�tive �f this intensification of police action is painfully obvIous : It was to stop the popular and mass-appeal organi zations from reforming and continuing their political activi4 ties. It was intended to forestall manifestations against the government, prevent the growth of a climate of opinion hostile to the government's policy, and suppress mass move ments and popular demands on both
the political and
economic fronts. For this purpose the government could count on the finan cial support and direct technical assistance of the United States. Their various specialist services, coordinated by their
t8t
embassy in Rio de Janeiro, played a decisive role in this reorganization. An unprecedenterl llmount of material and · technical aid was put to work in the cities and rural districts and training of specialized personnel was increasingly to the fore.
Through the control of the various branches of the police that this coUaboration brought them, the Americans were in
a position to make use of the Brazilian information services for their own purposes. The National Infoonation Service set up under the Castelo Branco government functioned in close collaboration with the Central Intelligence Agency. With the intensification of police activity the army also began to undertake police work and to take part n i the control of
the civil populations. It had its share in the campaign of
Violent repression inflicted on the country after April 1964, and many of the barracks became centres in this campaign. The failure of this system of police repression is now ob vious. At the present time, after the state of paralysiS follow· n i g immediately on the coup. the popular movement and the mass organizations are slowly setting to work again and seeking new forms of expression. There is a succession of protest movements;
demonstrations in the streers are In·
creasingly numerous; new leaders. better prepared for the struggle through the harshness of the regime. have come to the fore and give evidence of great courage. Despite the power of the police, the oppressed Brazilian masses are rapidly pre paring for new foons of the political struggle and the decisive confrontation with imperialism and the regime. On the politico-social front one of the government's greatest concerns was to ensure that there was a contented urban middle class by giving them the opportunity of attractive, pleasant and stable condilions of life. Several sec
tions of the middle class. who felt their privileges threatened,
had supported the coup in 1964 and the military regime thai
181
Brazil: The: P&Op!e: and the: Powe:r
it established n i the country. By propaganda n i favour of
The: Military Re:gime:
183
middle classes in general, and still more of course with the
freedom, in the name of the ideals of liberty and the preserva tion of Christian and moral values. coupled with promises of
wages of the masses of urban workers. In this wayan attempt ·
agreeable social prospects, the leaders of the coup had ob
setting the rest of the pop�lation. in the hope that by their
tained the support of the middle classes. Most of the press, together with radio and television, welcomed these ideas, and a well-planned campaign succeeded in hiding from public opinion the coup's real objectives_ Yet the situation of economic stagnation. and even regres sion, that characterized Castelo Branco's government was such that the middle classes soon lost their enthusiasm. The military group in power saw that they must not let this dis appointment on the part of one of the government's allies, which also regarded itself as one of its chief beneficiaries,
degenerate into political dissatisfaction. Support of the middle classes and particularly of the tech nicians and intellectuals thus became a necessary preliminary before the government could give the impression of a mini mum of democracy and of the controlled 'liberalization' of the regime. A large-scale conversion of the middle classes was therefore absolutely necessary for the regime as .such and not merely for its successive governments. Now this support has been won, through the device of using the middle classes for tecqnical or intellectual tasks apparently devoid of poli tical implications but which in reality served the interests of imperialism. Technicians, specialists in very varied fields, members of the liberal profesSions and intellectuals in general were used
in the country in differing but detenninate activities. Some
were directly connected with production while others were
confined to research of benefit apparently to the development
of the country, to social progress or national education.
was made to free the technicians from the daily cares be
good knowledge of the special conditions prevailing in the country they would become more efficient in applying the measures essential to the functioning of the system.
Rationalization of the processes of production aimed at an
improved application of technology, far from being in the national interest as is claimed, actually provides the oppor tunity for putting the knowledge and labour of thousands to the service of foreign capital. And many of these are well informed enough to be personally hostile to imperialist domination. In the same way the schemes of education and social assistance carried out by Brazilians fascinated by professional technicians' use of modern techniques are aimed at the crc
ation of an emotional and ideological climate favourable to American domination. In this general context, favourable to imperialism, the specialist bodies and the organizations for industrial and agricultural development (to all intents and purposes by the very nature of their activities) were transformed into auxi liary organizations of imperialist penetration. The activities were pursued, of course, under the guise of support and pro tection of the national economy_ But in actual fact, in the absence of all differentiation between national and foreign
capital there was no stimulant to the national economy which did not become at the same time a stimulant to imperialist penetration. In the various departments of research, both in the natural
as in the human sciences, Brazilian technicians have opened
Thus the technicians belonging to the val'iOllS government
Ollt far-reaching po�sihilities. The government h;ls �eemed
bodies had the benefit of salary increases out of all proportion
disposed to give Brazilian specialists living abroad for some
with those of other civil servants or of other members of the
motive or other, including even political persC{;ution at its
184 Brazil: Tht: Pt:oplt: and tht: Powt:r own hands, the possibiliry of returning to Brazil, offering them posts of distinction with bigh salaries. The possibility of having large resources at their disposal and the use of modern technical apparatus is naturally attractive to scientists who would prefer to work in their own country, in the belief that they will thus be making some contribution to its development. The emphasis placed on the technical aspects enables the military power's real intention
to be hidden; many people are upset, for it is true that it is difficult to oppose the transformation of the country.
By modernizing a whole series of jobs and facilitating the
carrying out of certain works, the imperialists sometimes give the impression that they are making a positive contribution. This is similar in every way to what happened at the begin ning of tbe century; loans intended for the construction of ports and railways seemed to many to be for the good of the nation, but although ports and railways in themselves con stitute progress, undeniably this progress was intended ex clUSively
[0
improve conditions under which tbe country
could be exploited by foreigners. The present 'modernization' is no different. Many of those who in otber respects sincerely reject subordination to the United States are actually working
for it by the collaooratiull Ih"t for various rt!
giving it. Not to mention those who. fully aware of what they
are doing. accept this subordination and justify it. At the idcological level every means is sougbt to influence the minds of the people and to create a favourable climate of opinion for the acceptance of imperialist domination by the majority or at least by a considerable section of the popula tion. While 'order' and 'peace' are urged as necessary to the realization of social progress, political power is increasingly
cenlT;lIi'loo. pbnning bodies :Ire set up. numerous dep,lIrt ments and commissions are established in connection with
different sectors of tbe economy or special regions of the
Tht: Military Rtgimt:
185
these elements are eviden� of. � new type of . government which strives to make publiC opmlOD ::Iccept protection of a 'new' strong government, capable of rulillg
country. All
�e
the nation and gUiding its development. Jmperialist and government action. of course, is not can· fined to simple use of modem means of propaganda to be found in tbe country. Their psycbological action extends to
all sectors, urban and rUlal. to tbe middle classes and the more popular section of society. seeking by every means, natural or artificial, to lull the national conscience and to show that for Brazil integration with the United StatC$ fonns
the he�t possible solution. . . . Among the measures intended to extend the unpenahst influence to various sectors of national life one of tbe most
significant, it must be empbasized, was the treaty signed . between the Brazilian Ministry of Education and the Inter· national Development Agency (AID) of the United States.
This agreement subordinates the Brazilian education system a t aU levels to American gUidance and direction. The purpose was to establish among the youth of Brazil a favourable opinion of the United States by acknowledging its claim to be superior to the rest of the world. This treaty was intended to corrupt Brazilian youtb and imbue it with
an alien view of national problems. It is obvious tbat educa· i a system of domination and tion forms an important factor n that control of educational bodies enables a twofold objective
to be acbieved. On the one band. it made more effective tbe spread of propaganda in tbe interests of . tbe dominating power; on tbe other, it promoted the adaptation of these same
educational organizations to the new needs of the labour market resulting from 'development' integrated with im· perialism. In this way a more rational form of training could be obtained for the personnel necessary to the propt:r fune' lioning of the regime establisbed in tbe country.
Taken out of context, the expression 'educational reform' " •.•. -9
186
The Military Regime
Brazil: The People and the Power
is very ambiguous. It cannor be used wirh a neutral meaning for its political implications an: ubvious. Outside the context of national emancipation it is useless to think of an authentic
transformation of the Brazilian educational system that is compatible with the independent development of the country.
187
years. Does this mean that imperialism is beneficial to the country ?
This a dmission of the benefits of integration is exactly what the imperialists dearly want to make public opinion in Brazil believe, but without allOWing it to concern itself with
This transformation could not take place were it not dictated by the political conditions peculiar to the struggle for libera·
the really important questions. Who, for example, are those
tion.
bear its burden? These allegedly impartial analyses do not
The assistance given by the American government, directly or indirectly (food 'for peace', medicines, services of the peace corps and so on) solves none of the problems. These measures are intended to pave the way for American propaganda among rhe poorest sections of the population.
mention the growing pauperization of the masses, the com·
Although they are without effect on the position of the population, the exi,stence of the services that go with such assistance increases surveillance over the people; these services
in fact form a vast information network covering the whole country including even the most remote regions. It is essential
�or the Americans to be well informed on what is happening III
the poor districts of the cities and especially in the rural areas, for they want to be in a position to prevent the form.
ation of any movement hostile to the regime. Thus they have under observation the people who are the first victims of the system and who prOvide their allies in the cities or the
country with the cheap labour force that they need. Some analysts of the Brazilian situation, especially ocana. mists and sociologists, have given their support to the forma. tion of a climate of opinion favourable to integration. For these spmalists in the social sciences the study of the trans. formations through which the country is passing is reduced
�
to the is�la ed and uncritical presentation of a series of figures �nd st� tICS of production. Now, quoting figures in this . mdl�cn ml�a(t: way with no regard whatever to political conSideratIOns does lead to the conclusion that some sectors of the economy have expanded during these four and a half
�
who really profit from the system, and who are those who
plete alienation of the Brazilian economy, the transfer abroad of the wealth of the country, the profits accruing to foreign and Brazilian companies at the cost of the labour of millions of Brazilians, the imperialist domination over all sections of national life. In hiding essentials and in glorifying the succe�es of the system by chOOSing those activities which actually concern foreign capital and the ruling classes, such analyses really amount to propaganda in favour of im perialism and commendation of the prevailing system. Others are bold enough to criticize particular measures taken by government organizations. but these criticisms remain at the purely technical level and in the last analysis help the government to set up improved organizations. In Brazil's present position this purely technical or technological
way of approaching national problems without taking into account essential political questions, amounts to adopting a position in favour of imperialism and to collaborating for the success of the regime. The coup d'etat within the coup d'etat (13 December 1968) which formed the final blow for those who still believed in the redemocratization of the regime was the result of a twa.
fold conflict. On the one hand, the question was whether the military state that emerged from the coup d'etat of April 1964 was just a period of transition between two traditional bourgeoiS regimes, or whether rhe control of the govern ment by the army betrayed a deep-rooted tendency inherent
188
The Military Rt:gimt:
Brazil: The People and the Power
in the system. On the other hand, in 1968 the dictatorship had experienced the growing opposition of the masses, and the first armed resistance. When it is remembered that the
1967
measures (the new Constitution and the Law for
National Security) were supposed to he the definitive consoli· dation of the revolutionary process (that is, of the
1964
regime) it will be understood that by starring the coup of December
1968
the armed forces had made a clean sweep of
that very 'legaliry' which they themselves had just invented.
Institutional Act
5 dissolved
cratic opposition
and
Congress, abolished all constitu
tional guarantees, began to settJe accounts witb the demo
!:aid down the juridical framework of
the counter-revolutionary war. In this sense it was a con
fession of failure. The regime had been unsuccessful in achiev
ing nonnality; it was incapable of resisting the rise of the mass movemcnts, or rather, in conflict with them it could only be victorious in
1968
by calling 011 the army. It showed
thus where its strength lay. The government and the high command of the armed forces were one and the same.
�
The arm forces were divided into two political groups . ornllng a? lDtcg� al part of the regime. The two parties now . ill compelltlon With each other are the pro-imperialist party
�
and tbe party known as 'the young officers'.
(I)
The imperialists are divided into 'hard-line' elements
and moderates. Their chief policy-making and propaganda
centre is at the Higher School of Warfare (the 'Sorbonne'). After Marshal Castelo Branco's death, the moderates joined
forces with tbe political groups working for the liberalization
of the regime and the return of democracy to the country,
though without seeking in auy way to upset the political system established after April
(2)
1964.
The group known as 'the young officers' has de
veloped �raduallr d�ring these five years of military rule and become mfluential m the army. Here again thcre are two movements. The first terms itself 'nationalist' and seems to
189
be made up of soldiers who are not strictly speaking linked
i the final analysis suI> . with the international groups, but n
port them since they support the present government. The second movement. also regarded as 'hard line'. opposed the
Costa e Silva government on the grounds of a pseudO-social
moralism. They favour- the 'strong arm' methods of police
states. In practice their day-to-day policies are not to be distinguished from those of the pro-American politicians and
soldiers regarded as sturdy defenders of even greater institu· tional violence. They tend to gravitate round the officers' training school (ESAO).
The seizure of power on 13 December
1968 was carried out
by soldiers particularly provoked by the pressure for 're democratization', limited though it was. So far this has had
two results which appear dearly enough in a somewhat con·
fused and fluctuating situation :
(1) Firstly.
the groups more openly supporting propaganda
for the liberalization of the regime bave been removed from powers. These fan out from Martins Rodriguez, the centre, to Carlos Lacerda on the right.
(2) Next,
a
deputy at
an attempt was made to remove or restrict the
groups identified with those in the army labelled 'nationalist'.
TIle retum to
power by (he generals in opposition
to
these
'yo�g officers' and the removal from the Ministry of the Intenor of General Albuquerque Uma shows dearly that
the military party known as the ESAO group has been re
moved from power; on the other hand i t is nonetheless mIe
that the events which in October
1969
finally brought
General Garrastazu Medici to power pointed to the return in strength of the ESAO group.
Finally, the changes effected wi thin the government after
13 December lC)68 have resulted in the removal of the 'liberal'
wing ;md the reduction of the struggle for power to competi
tion between the 'hard·line' pro-imperialists and the 'bard
line' nationalists; the former represent principally the im-
190
Brazil: The
The Military Regime
People and the Power
portant interests of foreign monopoly capital. while the latter support the strengthening of Ihe public sector of the economy which would act as arbiter berween the international mono polistic corporations and the national economy. Other measures belonging to the political and institutional sphere, such as the closing of the Federal Congress and the State chambers, limitation of the power of state governments and civil couns, nomina tion of mayors and
so
on, are all
evidence of a considerable increase in the concentration of political power in the hands of the federal government. This strengthening of the executive, a noticeable trend for some years past, was matched by a higher degree of monopolization and the tactics adopted in Brazil by the huge foreign com bines established in the country. The progressive penetration of the large firms throughout the country showed actually a further extension of the control exerted by foreign capital over the large economic groups of the south of the country. This trend was encouraged to the extreme by various mea sures, among which was anicle 34/18 of the SUDENE law which, by conceding a reduction of 50 per cent of their tax on profits to companies investing in the north-east a sum at least equal to the 50 per cent thus saved, allowed the large economic groups from the central-southern region to spread to the north-east also. This measure at least enabled a certain
191
half of the funds available in that year for the industrializa tion of the north-east. The tragic effects of the 1969-70 . drought - millions of peasants overtaken by famine, scores of cities and villages in the north-cast invaded for months on end by groups of hundreds and even thousands of starving men, women and children - are only one result of the funda
mentally anti-national and anti-populist policy of the regime. It is quite unable to do anything at all to alter the present
system of land ownership and to improve the lot of the mass .. of poor peasants and agricultural wage-earners.
At the economic level the measures adopted by the Institu tional Act 5 and by later complementary Acts were intended
to benefit the large industrial undertakings and the foreign
capital which conrroIs them. The new law on the tax on business profits, the decree-law on the tax on certain shares, the decree on uranium and the decision concerning the oil products industry are all evidence of this. The special purpose of these measures of economic policy is :
(I)
To increase companies' assets by allowing them to
deducl from the company tax the sums corresponding to their normal needs for liquid funds; the effect of this is to diminish the amount of public funds obtained from business concerns.
(:z.) Tu illt;n:ilSt: colilpany reserves by redUcing from forty to
fifteen per cent the tax on the distribution of profits of limited
industrial structure to be set up in this region. But after
companies.
from these same groups, issued the decree-law 42 which gives
term saving. by reducing to four per cent the tax on income
January 1969 the Costa e Silva government, under pressure
corporate bodies the power of Withholding up to 50 per cent of tax on profits for ploughing back into the business or to maintain cash reserves (sec below). This last measure, in force in 1969, may well have reduced what was due under article 3 4 / 1 8 (fiscal measures for the benefit of the north-east
(3)
To strengthen the capital market by encouraging long
derived from fixed intercst shaxes repayable in more than
twO
years.
(4)
To suspend the measures protecting the newly dis
covered uranium deposits against excessive exploitation. These decisions were published in the official journals with
and the Amazon) by something in the region of }OO million
out commentary. On the other hand, the daily press drew
of the country, since this sum comes to something like one
as raising the moral standard of public life : increase of the
new cruzeiros, thus creating serious difficulties for these parts
the attention of readers to a series of measures put forward
192
The Military Regime
Brazil: The People and the Power
taxes on the import of luxury products (motor cars. domestic
electrical appliances. etc.); measures against smuggling;
restriction on goods brought into the country by tourists
and regarded by them as for personal use; confiscation of for tunes made iIIegaUy.
If we leave out of account the pretext of raising the moral
193
when the Junta was assuming government of the state, and bstly a third dictator of the regime. General Gafra.�tazu Medici. was appointed. The 'young officers' party now re gained importance in proportion as the party in power be
came discredited. That is why, although Albuquerque lima was passed over as successor to Costa e Silva, the third
will be seen that they have a dual purpose : to protect the
government of the regime has had to adopt certain 'nation alist' positions as part of its policy.
frighten certain rich Brazilian citizens and prevent their try
lima. aspire to become an important pressure group, capable
the chief fortunes obtained by illicit means enjoy and con tinue to enjoy the protection of those at present n i power.
but of influencing the present ·government. Obviously this
damage it caused to the national economy was proved even
fundamentally. In the last analysiS, it only brings into conflict
tuced commissions of technicians.
Brazilian bourgeoisie with the imperialist system of domina
the outcome of the struggle between the two chief sei:tions
status, and those who want Brazil to become a wholly im
in the hands of those groups whose activity is conceived in
rather as a form of association. Nevertheless, the revolu
perialism is partially oltset by the development of the public
their opponents and make a careful study of their internal
standard claimed by the dictatorship for these measures. it foreign industries already established in the country, and to
ing to unite to fonn an opposition party. As a matter of fact.
This is particularly Ihe case with the electrical industry; the before
1964 by
costly public inquiries carried out by consti
The military regime's future course of action depends on
of the oligarchy. The tendency to concentrate economic power monopolistic tenns closely associated with American im
The nationalist 'young officers', supported by Albuquerque
not only of making a bid for the succession to Garrastazu
dispute between the pro-imperialist party and the so-called
nationalist parry could not question the present regime
the most backward sections, for whom integration of the tion means subordination pure and simple, real satellite
perialist state and who. as a result. interpret integration
tionary forces must take into consideration the tactics of so
seclOr of the economy, although, to an extent varying with
divisions
foreign monopolies. The prevailing tendency at the present
shades of opinion among the nationalists distinguish those
the branch of industry concerned, this is often associated with
time is towards association. But as a consequence of the
serious political crisis in September
19&} some
alteration has
occurred in the relative strengths of the different military and political groups struggling for power.
It must be remembered that at this very time Costa e Silva
fell ill and power was assumed by a military junta, although
according
to
the If#q constitution the vice-president. Pedro
Aleixo, should have succeeded to the presidency. Then the
American ambassador a t Rio was kidnapped at the very time
as to take advantage of them. For example, they
can attempt to isolate the pro-imperialists and from the many
who up to a certain point are capable of opposing Yankee
imperialism. In this way, the ideolOgiSts among the adherents of the regime, who will always oppose political self-deter
mination on the part of the masses, must be separated from the 'tepid' who suffer it rather than support it.
Having said this. and whatever may be the result of the
dispute between the pro-imperialists and 'nationalists', if the
regime is to survive it will have to strengthen still further the power of the federal executive by severe restrictions im-
194
Brazil: The People and the Power
posed on the legislature and the judiciary_ The 1969 Consti tution (the third of the regime) and the dire<;t nomination of governors by the dictator Garrastazu are clear evidence of this. In this sense the 'hard line' officers form the common denominator between the pro.imperialists and the 'nation alists'. The extreme rigidity of the system can tolerate no concessions to the masses. If these concessions were made the dictatorship would run the risk of a movement leading to mass-mobilization for action. The military dictatorship must necessarily prevent throughout the country the organization of the workers, peasants and students. An equal threat now is constituted by the middle-
The Military Regime 195 tion of the most atrocious methods (including torture), it must be expected that the regime will continue to make 0 show of 'nationalism', enabling it thus to neutralize the most radical (and the least inconsequential) party of military nationalism.
.
The Political Unity of the: Masses CHAPTER 7
197
at stake. Actually, and although it assisted other sections o� the population, it was particularly concerned with the forma
The Political Unity of the Masses
tion of the industrial employer class which needed its direct help. For this was the idea of development prevalent at this time. Development, however, assumes different meanings according to the interests involved. To enable foreign capital to enter Brazil the country had to be changed; after all, policy emphaSized espcciaJly the role of the State and industry. This was why, in the fifties, development became synonymous
In its effort to create a 'peaceful ahnosphere', or merely to establish a semblance of democracy, the military government has encountered very great difficulties. These come from the immense majority of the population, including those sections of it which had at the outset supported the coup d'etat. The truth is that the regime imposed on the country in April
1964
had aggravated the contradictions of the previous system; the State had been endeaVOUring to correct at least the most serious of these shortcomings by various provisions dating from
1930 onwards. State intervent.ion was the method
adopted to gUide the development of the country under the hegemony of the industrial bourgeoisie. The disadvantages of such a system, apart from the wrong perpelrated by the use of public funds and credits for the ex
clusive benefit of a single section of the population, were those characteristics of capitalist development. In Brazil it increased the differences between the regions; it also increased the distance separating the technologically efficient industrial sectors from the out-of-date and under-capitalized agricul tural sector; it created a rich minority, who profited from the growth of the economy, side by side with an immense
majority of very poor people. State intervention was aimed among other things at lessen ing these inequalities. It did not always succeed. In theory its purpose was to hold the balance between the various interests
with industrialization at all costs: it was enough to put up factories using national resources or foreign capital for all the country's problems
to
he
solved at one stroke. Thus the
investments made would themselves set off a chain-reaction and their effects would spread in conccnrric circles over the whole of the country. Their repercussions on the life of the people would be felt automatically, almost miraculously. In those days there was considerable discussion on the pros
and cons of this policy, but with the passage of time this dis cussion is no longer relevant. The fact is that although Brazil b£'gan to manufacture practically all the consumer goods she needed, and now has a large motor industry, it is quite clear
just the same that the country's problems have not been
solved.
Measures of this kind can be regarded as profitable if they are examined from the point of view of the country's pro duction capacity, of the modernization of certain branches of
industry, the increase in the number of qualified wo�kers, and . the improvement in the circumstances of certalO cllcles
�
directly concerned. These are the advantages of all the �n er takings of this kind when they are regarded from the limIted point of view of their immediate effects. But to obs�rve the total effects of such a policy in Brazil a different vIew point must be adopted. The way it was carried out corres·
ponds with the foreign operator's need to modernize the fo�m . of exploitation and adapt it to his purposes. The Brazi li a n
The Political Unity of the Masses
198 Brazil: The People and the Power industrial field is daily and increasingly dominated by the Americ:ms and. it is well known. the production of American undertakings situated in numerous countries grows with increasing rapidity. For tbe United States this represents one
of her largest sources of income. In an exploited country industrialization causes changes, but the results obtained are
only apparent or purely marginal; the increased income re mains in the hands of the foreign operator.
This form of development is always associated with very extensive propaganda in favour of free enterprise. It easily
obtains the support of the employers in the country who dread the state's interference in their concerns. American propaganda has always given out that this interference is a
form of communism and the military party at present in power strictly follows this line. National private capital is nothing like powerful enough to carry out all the large-scale undertakings that the country needs. In Brazil only tbe State would be in a position to nnd resources of this kind. And so the campaign n i favour of free
enterprise aims at keeping i t out of the economic sector in order to create a void which foreign capital alone would be n i
a position to fiJI. By acting thus it intervenes in the guise of a benefactor for the well-being of the country. Yet this argument is not put forward when to do so would be against the interests of foreign capital. Such was the case in the negotiations for the purchase and nation3lization of the electrical factories fonnerly belonging to 'Amforp', one of the military government's largest commercial transactions.
On this occasion no one alluded to the sacred principle of free enterprise. usually hotly defended by imperialism and its associates. This W3S because the proceeds could be applied by the foreign capitalists to more profitable invesnnents. In the 6nal anal)'3is. the entry of foreign capital lJa:; lx:t:n of
no advantage at all to the country since the sums leaving it always exceed what comes i? Further?lote. the foreign com-.
199
panies obtain from the country itself a large proportion of the funds that they use. through the credits made av;tihhle to ' them by the banks solely on the strength of their establish i why it has never been a regular ment in the country. This s practice for foreign capital to be declared. As a consequence, the transfer of profits abroad has become an explosive ques it was no coincidence - just before tion. It was raised -
Vargas's death and before the fall of Goulart
But these are only the 'official' forms of the exploitation of the country. The unofficial methods are actually of far wider application. The over- and under·invoicing of goods.
smuggling and other methods of the kind make manipulation of the national finances an easy matter. Even leaving out of account these secret exits of capital, the United States re ceives from Latin America far larger sums than the invest ments that are realized. Between 1951 and 1963 it received 1 1 '3 thousand million dollars as income from direct private investments in Latin America. whiJe the investmcnt during this same period amounted to only 5 '7 thousand million dollars.'
The policy of industrialization at any price and through frcc enterprise amounts actually to defence of free penctration by foreign companies. Modernization of certain sectors creates an illusion of progress and conceals the real purpose in view, which is to bring to perfection methods of exploiting
the country. In adopting American theories on development and the principle of free enterprise the military regime put
the finishing touches to this exploitation and set to work to substitute the complete domination of imperialism for the
system previously in operation. In this way it effectively countered the arguments, already few enough and not very convincing. put forward by the Brazilian industrial bour· gooisit: to the
effcct
that the people should be rcady to make
sacrifices. I.
E! /inancimento ""terna de America Latina. CEPAL UNO, 1964-
and tht power Brazil: Tht P&Ople
. 1964 did April 1 before ment in office . Actually the govern the hands of O f wealth in m ac the ustify did not � � its best to j t r aU this wealth O assertl the e a l a minority by the example of th . It was . nly. fo lowing country funcleave the. . I· ·ch it is the State's Ifl Wh, ed nalOOS a m t ustn lZ d III . system modem ve aspects of the ne(Jatl the 0 anee 1 a b r regarded as tion to counte asseTti·ons and ered as mere ·d onsl C ways. other thi> position at · 0f View, pomt ' . sses a I c ng U he TU expressing t than that nowb clO ' g mote logical f 0 ge advanta least had the . ment. the m ilitary govern acks. adays maintamed bY , add'tion to its inherent drawb m . system it The previous bee substituted for cr h n able. unwork has had become whi�h in addition to�a1��te b:tS doomed also is which the first, particu negan�e aSPeets of the further ated agClTav 0blems. d w'th SOCIal pro ing in larly those co�ecte incapable of produc found . een has That capitalism . . success wh,·ch characterize its 1 SOCIa nd a nomIc Brazil the ceo is entirely due . Eurore and the United States 10 ment , . develop present time, th e world at the cn m alts imper Divid � . to the hold of les to its interests, aU l ce . su in eveloped bJ t lf and its action ons the underd d Olte exp the . ing the world into the developed ng nat10ns i t loi -J" ,." ,.. e h t d an countries in the way of the . . ' not on1Y stands rialism unpe countrtes ted countrtes, exploi the the Pr d�ctt" :ction to satisfy its own free development of IS P f 0 use makes hut it also and interestS. . ade its appearance S r ta ca n wh at � developed It is obvious t �� e\ ��ion in the penod P ItS arising went through I the restrictions ha�e to de I XW'th not did it ies countr , �. it was able That is why pert l of ce enable � from the existen feudal world and to 0; atton r transf wealth � � to effect the oot to accumulate It h tak ��lCh in al coloni nations tht: obtained by weal: so;��mes ties, quanti in great �aces. time the exploitation of other 'ted at the present 01 1 exp bemg In the nations
200
�
��� �
•
�
�
r '::�
� ��
�
:
_
Tht:Political Unity of the Masses 201
evolution of the industrial bourgeoisie s i conditioned by the situation in the world at large and more especially by ' the existence of a more advanced technology under the control of imperialism, Brazil furnishes a typical example of the dependence of this bourgeoisie. During the colonial period the Brazilian bourgeOisie was only the representative of Portuguese interests; under the Empire and during the first republican period it changed itself into the servant of Eng· Iish capitalism; after the First World War American influence spread to such an extent as to assume control of the country's
whole economy. The mere adoption of the ideas of 'free enterprise', 'de· velopment' through private initiative, and other slogans meant to express in the language of publicity the domination of the large combines, has other implications. The use of an advanced technology not only gets rid of small- and medium-sized undertakings, but limits the num· ber of jobs in industry. The growth of industry is far from sufficient to absorb all the manpower available, In addition to this, the inability of the regime to solve the agrarian prob lem means that there is no prospect of work available for a population that is rapidly increasing. In the face of these social problems that grow more seriOUS every day, the Americans' only answer, when they are not advocating the mass sterilization of Brazilian women, is to sell their agricul.
tural surplus, The predominance of the large combines widens the in equalities between the different regions as a result of the concentration of industry within a comparatively limited zone_ According to the 1960 census in Brazil, on 3 1 December 1959 there were 1 1 0,771 industrial establishments giving work to 1,799,376 persons. Of this total 58,452 establish· ments (P'7 per cent) with 1,2.58.oj8 workers (n per cent) were located in the central-southern region (states of Guana· bara, Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais and Sao Paulo). The pro-
202
Brazil: The People and the Power
Th,Political Unity of the Masses
duction of electricity in this same region in 1966 amounted to 80 pt!r l."t!Ul of Ill!; national total. This excessive geo graphical concentration of the industrial population is the i equality between the regions. to an reason for the serious n
203
'intervenes' for the benefit of free enterprise so that the latter . can solvt: the problem itself. This meant adopring a policy whose uselessness at national level had already been shown by experience, namely, that the establishment of industries by itself can automatically solve all problems. In addition it
extent indeed that their relationship could be compared with that of the industrial nations with the dependent countries_ Actually the industrialized region always possesses the
was the leading firms of the developed region which by them selves or together with the local firms were recipients of the
advantage of a higher revenue and its accumulation increases still further the region's advantage in relation to the poorer regions_ Some have gone so far as to talk of 'internal
grant made by the State for those setting up faerories in the
new industrial regions. In the end it amounted to the cre arion of a further channel for draining off public resources.
colonialism', but the expression may lead to confusion of the prev2iling state of affairs with exploitation of the de
Increase in the volume of investment in a zone whose economy is stagnant reprf'Sl'nts, of cnllT.�e. progress of a kind.
pendent nations by the developed nations.
From this point of view the plans for regional development
In Brazil's case the whole thing happens within the same
are not wholly without merit. But their scope is somewhat
national community. The development of one particular
limited. The latest report of the SUDENE shows that since
region was the result of the privileges granted to its chief
1960,
product, that is, coffee, which enabled it to muster the re
created annually in the north-east as a result of its activit}'
when it was set up. down to
1967,
the number of jobs
sources for the introduction of industrialization. In its turn,
scarcely reached
the latter, while allowing the economic integration of the
were something like
country to take place, increased the inequality between the
age, whose presence merely swelled to excess the number
central-southern regions and the rest of the country.
of workless and under-employed in the region. It s i obvious
Industrialization under the guidance of a nationalist bour
10.000. Now during this same period, there 700,000 persons reaching employable
geoisie in any case could not avoid these inequalities. since
that the regional plans do not furnish even a remote solution to the real needs of the country and that they represent
inequality was actually one of the factors in its rapid expan
merely a stop-gap remedy in a situation which is continually
sion. But the domination of the industrial sector by foreign
growing worse. Actually the very fact that these regional
groups made these inequalities more flagrant still, by the way
plans exist independently of any link with a large-scale all
in which its very domination Jed to a still higher concentra
inclusive scheme for the whole country shows that the prob
tion. The central-southern region in addition acts as a suction
lem was tackled in the wrong way. These plans tend to give
pump from the inside to the outside of the country; it has to
the impression that under-development is the result of local
supply the needs of its own operation and also serve the
causes, geographical situation or conditions peculiar to each
interests of foreign investors. This is a further factor explOitation of the underdeveloped regions.
n i
region. In fact it is the result of rigid specialization in pro
the
duction, of the various combinations of factors (capitaL
J'he suggested solution for the poverty of these regions
labour) of this production and of the kind of relationship In
was to start regional plans under which factories would be
existence between each region and economic sector on the
established in other parts of the country. The State thus
one hand and the more developed centre on the other. This is ,
204
Brazil: The People and the POWI:T
so true that the social inequalities are not confined to the poorest regions. With them the poverty s i more terrible ;lnd
on a wider scale. bUI i t is also to be found close to and even in
the more prosperous regions. which proves that the disease
attacks the whole national organism.
It is at national level that steps must be taken to modify
the nature of production. the factors which determine it and
the relations it creates between the various regions of the country. in order to eliminate the reat causes of problems that are not regional at all but national. It is only under
Ihese conditions that such measures can be beneficial to the
whole population scattered throughout the entire national territory. Within the framework of a project of this import
ance the regional plans assume their real dimension as com
plementary measures necessary to the achievement of wider
aims.
Caught up in the contradictions inherent in the system
that it has established. the military regime has to rely on force
to remain in power. The ever more acute economic and social
problems caused by a policy contrary to the real interests
of the country and the people do not pemit the creation of
The Political Unity of thl: Masst:S 205 traditional republican institutions. But the military regime is
incapable of responding to this dementary objective, for dlt:
concession of these formal freedoms is bound up with the
economic success of the ruling classes, even if there s i no working relationship between them. The people's struggles
certainly play a decisive role in obtaining a higher degree of democratization. All the same, it is certain that when ec0nomic prospects enable the governing classes to make con
cessions to urban wage-eamers they are also inclined to grant
some degree of relaxation of the regime. When Ihe wage
earners have been temporarily satisfied, there is no greal risk
any longer in accepting the hypothesis of a politic:tl struggle
within the ruling classes, and events have always turned out
like this. When, on the contrary, the economic situation docs
not allow these concessions to wage-earners repression must be used to resist claims when they are put forward. When the
economic situation improves again the fonnal freedoms are
regained under pressure from the urban population. sup ported. according
10
circumstances, and in differing propor·
tions, by the more liberal wing of the ruling class. This swing
that long desired peaceful atmosphere. Quite the contrary. in
of the pendulum - from relaxation to severity and back to
retain and even increase its para-Fascist characteristics. The
ally affecting thc social structure.
legality which they had introduced at the beginning of the last century; liberal democracy has failed in its attempt to
occurred within a narrow circle and was never widespread;
fact. for the difficulties that the regime encounters drive it to ruling classes, as a result, no longer support the system of
solve the country's fundamental problems. It has merely
served as a channel of political expression for a small part of the population, in particular the urban middle classes. These sections of the population are thus ripe for mobilization
in
the contest aga inst the dictatorship, but the immediate ob jectives (the tight for democracy) must be linked with those of the popular movement as a whole, failing which they will
be no more than the hypothetical re-establishment of the
rebxation again - goc.<; on continually without fundament The struggle for the establishment of democracy always
consequently in the coursc of Brazilian history the tradi
tional banner of democracy and freedom has been carried by
very different movements, sometimes in opposition to each other; this was what Vargas did before 1930, against the old
coffee planlers' oligarchy; it was whal the coffee planters did against Vargas during Ihe constitutional revolution of
1932,
as did the VON againsl Vargas's dictatorship before 1945. Vargas did so again agaimt the manoeuvres of the VON to
pre;cnt his investiture; Kubitschek followed his example
agamst the UON during his electoral campaign and at the
206
Brazil: The People and the Power
The Political
Unity of the Masses 201
time of his investiture; and so did Goulart against the UDN dUling the 'legality crisis'. Nowadays it forms a plank in the i the struggle against the dictatorship. piadonn n
for its nature would depend less on its own programme and . policy than on this effective support. Although the specific
This observation in no way impairs the value of these struggles for democracy and freedom. It merely shows that
take precedence over national aims as a whole, it is true, all
aspirations of these classes and the various regions must not the same, that immediate political action must pay particular
when they are carried on without reference to a wider con text these demands, though liberal in character, can be used in support of very different viewpoints according to historical
attention to the diversity of economic and social situations.
circumstances; in actual fact they are confined to demanding
the degree of their political awareness throughout the regions.
very superficial modifications in the country's political superstructure. With no claim to solve national economic and social problems, they do not dare call for a government which could solve these problems; they are limited to demand ing changes to guarantee traditionally granted rights. With the extension of imperialist domination and aggrava tion of the internal situation, a government of the classical liberal pattern, if returned today, would have a very short life. The swing of the pendulum has grown qUicker and the period between the phases of severity and relaxation has shortened. Criticism of the inefficiency of liberal democracy in no way implies giving up the struggle for freedom and democracy. What must be sought and put into operation is a new form of popular participation in the political process
so
that condemnation of traditional institutions does not result
in the exact opposite, namely, suppression of elementary freedoms and the establishment of near-fascist governments, even if they call themselves nationalist. Development which is really the expression of the in
At the present time in Brazil the explOited sections of the population are by no means uniform in their interests and No one of them on its own, therefore. is in a position to take in hand the work of national reconstruction and so it is neces· sary to unite all the sectors opposed to imperi3lism to fight
against it. The industrial workers form the most homogeneous of
these sections of the exploited population. For this reason
they can exert a profound influence over political events. Their opposition affects the economy at its most sensitive point, and to a far greater extent than the others the ver)' nature of their work enables them to organize themseJves. The fact that this opposition finds expression in the great cities encourages the development of political awareness and their opposition has a greater effect on public opinion. The IBGE's statistical yearbook for ing age of 48'7 millions. Of these
1 ) ·6 million Brazilians were
employed in agriculture and the other jobs of the primary sector at that date; 2·6 millions in trade, transport and storage of goods;
4'9 million were occupied in the various service in· the balance, that is, 26'1 millions, was regarded as
terests of the great mass of the population requires the estab
dustries;
representing the non.working population.
trends in the modern world, quite obviously presupposes the winning qf national independence. This new type of government would have to rely on the ex ploited classes of the population in all regions of the country,
records 3"3
millions of industrial workers for a total population of work
lishment of a new form of government. This development, resolutely social in character and n i tune with the different
1965
In addition to the fact that they still represent only a small proportion of .the population the industrial workers are con· centrated in a well-defined and fairly small part of the country. Nearly half of them are in the state of Sao Paulo and prinCipally in the state capital and its immediate neighbour.
Brazil: The People and the Power
208
The Political Unity of the Masses 209
hood. Seventy per cent of them aTC divided between the great industrial centres of Siio Paulo, Guanabara,l the State of Rio
of the population lives in destitution. unemployed or under
employed. The second conclusion is that the number of job� '
de Janeiro,3 and Minas Gerais. In the north-east. on the other hand, with an area of 1·6 miUion square kilometres, which
offered by industry remains lower. despite the expansion men
only amounted to 200,000 at this date. In vast stretches of
trial workers must he seen as forming part of a wider context.
in
1962
contained 13 million inhabitants, industrial workers
tioned above. than the number of those without work.
Thus. despite its importance. the opposition of the indus
this region the predominant activities are therefore of a
And it is this wider context which will endow the struggle
an important economic factor. other social classes possess
To the industrial worker mllst be added the other urban
different character. Even when in onc district industry is considerable influence, as is the case for example with the
for national liberation in Brazil with its own special character. and rural social categories. As has already been pointed out.
agricultural wage-eamers in the sugar cane regions.
urbanization in latin America has its own characteristics.
on such a scale that this sector could become in the short or s i true of
was a direct result of the industrial revolution. In BraZil.
The increase in the number of industrial workers was not
medium term the largest employer of labour. It course that between
1940 and 1960 - the most intense phase
of industrialization - the numbers employed in industry went up from
millions to
1·8
3·3
millions. But these figures
different from those of Europe in the last century when it
although the establishment of facrories cannot be regarded
as without influence on urbanization. it is more especially
the result of the exodus from the country districts. This exodus has given rise to a whole population that can only be
need to be seen wi thin the context of the whole of the
called marginal. since it is tossed between the rural world
find that the number of new jobs olTered in all sectors during
ing it. This population represents a potential political force
country's labour market. From the same statistical source we this period was
million while the total number of persons
8·1
coming on the labour market was
19·7 millions.
It is unnecessary to examine the kind of jobs alTered. In
most cases and in all sectors the level is very low. An examin
which rejects i t and an industrial word incapable of absorb
which cannot be regarded as negligible.
Even before 1964 the marginal population of the great
cities made its influence felt in political life with a line which
did not often differ from that of the industrial workers. It
re
openly supported them and thus strengthened the popular
can confine ourselves to two conclusions from these figures,
suffiCiently attractive. The obstacle to systematic participa
ation of this kind would show that the social Situation,
vealed by the official figures, is still more alarming. Here we
which could indeed be reached by direct observation of the
lives of people in Brazil as a whole. The first is that the system
has shown itself quit incapable of absorbing the growing in � It is no secret that a high percentage
�
crease in ma npow 1.
}.
The city
of R io lie
J�nriro i� Tf'g�rrlerl u a state of the Federation.
state of Rio de Ja neiro comprises in particular the outskirts the former capital of Brazil, out not the actual city of Rio de
The
of Janeiro.
movement when the justice of its political positions proved
tion in politics by this section of the population is to be
found more in the difficulty of discovering suitable forms of
organization than in other reasons.
In the cities of the agrw:ultural regions a great number of
workers are to be found who. so far as poSSible. work on the
neighbouring rural estates for a wage or for the produce that
they can obtain from the land which does not belong to them.
In those cases where there is a particuJarly plentiful supply .: P.P. · .o
The Political Unity of the Masses 211
Brazil: The People and the Power
210
of labour the estate owners prefer not to establish the workers
on their la �d and only to mak� temporary arangements with t em. Durm� the months preceding and folloWing the coup
�
d et� t expulsIons of the peasants were frequent owing to the pamc of the estate owners when faced with the demands of the �asses who had hitherto been easily controlled by the traditional means of repression.
�e organization
of the masses was however only at its
, begmnmgs It occun�d particularly in those areas with a high : concentratIon of agflcultural wage--eamcrs or in those where
there were clashes over land ownership. From these centres
where the tension was greatest the mobilization of the workers spread and gave promise of the advent of a popular �yement of some importance. olitical action in the rural areas is a relatively recent phenomenon in Brazil, going back about fifteen years. Since
�
they were without direct and constant contact with the rural masses t�e o�ganizations lacked the necessary information on . I e posItion to the counrry districts, and this led them some times to ad��t attitudes that were incompatible with the actual conditions to be found in the various parts of the coun�ry. The theoretical dis<:ussion of the problem of agranan r:eform remained almost consistently unconnected . . with political action. It was only to the extent that the actual proble�s came to light that change occurred in the purely theoretlcal approach to these questions. "" .
�
OWlOg to the existence in Brazil of a great mass of indus . tnal workers and of peasants whose circumstances are little
known, what is required is not a theoretical plan, but one foun ed on practical action and sustained by it. The Brazilian
�
ag�ar�an problem in fact is very complex, and its charac tenstlcs arc quite unlike those of any foreign counterpart. . Those workmg in agriculture aft: (;u!lsialitly growing In absl)o lute numbers although, according to official statistics, these
workers represent a decreasing proportion of the national
32 per cent in 1940, 27 per cent in 1950, 24 per cent in 1960. The number of those employed in agricul ture increased from 9'4 millions in 1940 to 9.8 millions in 19')0 and 11'1 millions in 1960. The number of those re
labour force :
garded as 'not working' by the official statistics increased very conSiderably during the same period : 14'2 millions in 1940; 19'4 millions in 1950; 26'1 millions in 1960. Thus in the course of twenty years the number of those regarded as without work increased by nearly I t millions. Most of these.
if not all, probably came from rural areas.
In Brazil there are various forms of foreign exploitation
existing side by side: there is the domination of the indus trial sector, control of cxplrfS and imports by foreign COlll bines and the grant of concessions on the colonial model. There is also great variety in the internal pattern of produc
tion : it extends from the �killed workmen of the large cities down to the great mass of 'marginal' workers without any professional training and for the most part illiterate, and from the agricultural wage-eamers of certain modern estates in Sao Paulo down to the peasants who are the victims of the most backward forms of remuneration for their work, the carubno, the mctayage system and the lerca. All these urban or rural masses po.�css this in common :
they both have to bear the weight of heavy exploitation. The
very nature of imperialist domination depends more than ever on these masses being debarred from any participation in national deciSions, for on their own they could confront im perialism and vanquish it. The slTuggle for the liberation of the country is also the struggle of the social classes for their very just demands since these can only be met satisfactorily with the winning of economic and political emancipation. That is why the struggle for liberation must first channel in the same direction all the social forces that are not com promised with imperialism. Collaboration must be sought from those n i dustrialists who have not wholly given way to
212
Brazil: Tht: Proplt: and tht: Powt:r
the present form of foreign domination or to the military
governm.enr . They are not at present strong enough to oppose
!he offiCial policy - it is that of their own class - but their
�ltppor� ��ld be important to the extent that they are will mg to Jom m the new form of the struggle for emancipation
that has already been begun under the leadership of the
CHAPTER 8
Fresh Stage in a long Struggle
most explOited classes.
. Th� existe�ce of influential or even authoritative organiza
tIOns m.certam sC{:tions of the population is a positive advan . tage; It IS � particularly in those cases where as expert bodies
they �plaill nationalist policy fa those sections of society or regIOnal groups reached by their influence. But their role is less useful when they are unaware of the general conditions of the anti-imperialist struggle and think that by themselves
they are capable of carrying it through by isolated actions.
and that on their own they can advance national liberation.
This attitu�e would cause the fragment�tion of the popular
movement JIlto a variety of differellt courses of action and
rc�ult in the weakening of the anti-imperialist struggle; a t t�IS very moment i t requires more than ever the participa
�on of all the people and the establishment of an organiza
tion that can really advance the cause of national political illtegration.
Thus the establishment of a popular government, if it is
to � a rd'lity, requires a unified popular movement, in a
poslllon to act in conjunction with each of the sections of
society opposing imperialism; it must be able to transform
�
itself into a united national force, capable of overcoming the
Y'
The fight for freedom, a further stage in the historical de velopment of the Brazilian people, must rely of course 011 the support of [he various popular movements. Examination 01
the past shows that although many victories were won, many mistakes were also made; it shows, too, that previous struggles were characterized by the lack of suffident theoreti cal background and failure on the practical side. All the same these struggles, which at every stage reflected the conditions prevailing at the time, enabled the people's political con·
sciousness to assert itself. They all went to the creation of the present-day reality on which all the forces engaged in the lasting battle against imperialism and against its allies in the country must rely.
The facts show that Brazil, like other dependent countries, has been subjected to the most varied forms of foreign domination. In the past those in power have always given way [0 foreign interests. Nowadays, the alliance of the indus
trialists with imperialism is really only the new form of a very old alliance which from colonial times down to our own has contrived to adapt itself to the fonn of explOitation pre vailing at each period of history.
The fact that on each occasion the dominant nation has always been very strongly entTenched has facilitated the alliance of the various social classes with the power in ques tion. There bas never been the threat of foreign intervention
114
Brazil: The Pt:opltand the Power
in one region or another to support a faction which might h:lVe wanted to join lip with another �urce of foreign domination. On the contrary the threat of foreign interven tion arose directly the alliance that the central government desired CO preserve was in danger, for this government was considered to be the only parry in a position to guaranlee the treaties which ensured to the foreign power the exploita tion of the country as a whole. This was the case with Eng land, whose inrerventions from the colonial period onwards were aimed at supporting the foreign government, enforcing the treaties with Portugal and. later, keeping the agreements made with the government of the Empire. This s i the case at the present lime with the United States, whose interven tion is directed at the maintenance throughou t the country of the alliance between the ruling classes so that the new plan of domination may be carried into effect unimpeded. Since their existence is closely bound up with the domin ating country, and since they are united among themselves in their common desire to preserve the present structures, the ruling c1<1sses have never had occasion to tum their thoughts to any form of separatism. Last century the idea was can vassed, but at a time when Ihe people did nol think of the country as il is now and when if was still impossible to organize on a national level. Among the governing classes however, Ihere was some thought of separatism in 1932 at the time precisely when the government that had come into existence in 19)0 claimed wider powers of internal decision. Thus the integration within the nation of the regions
was not disturbed by the action of foreign powers; in other countries they caused artificial divisions in territory or even provoked them among the populations. The fixing of the present national frontiers was made possible by the fact that they caused no prejudice to e interests of the dominating ., power, at home or abroad. On the economic and social fronts the case was very differ-
�
�
Fresh Stage in a Long Struggle
21)
ent : the gulf between the small numbers of the privileged class and the mass of Ihe people grew increaSingly wider and · the various remedies brought into operation were powerless to prevent it. The political unity sought up to now by the governing classes had maling the exploitation of the country easier as its sole objective; there was certainly no concern for real national integration. That is why the policy of Vargas. who moved the country a litlle way in this direction, deserves to be mentioned, despite the criticism that can be levelled against it. At least it was an attempt to restore the government to power within the country, to link the various regions among themselves and so facilitate the development of internal trade. These measures were an undoubtedly necessary first step towards establishing the country's independence. But they were nOI enough; and it emerged dearly that they were powerless to abolish social and economic differences. Any analysis that might be made at the present time of their effect, had it been possible to apply them unhindered, would be quite useless; events themselves have acrually shown that the model of development chosen for Brazil at this period was not the right one. It had been thought that development on the Amerialn or European model, with a few necessary modifications reqUired by the differences of time and place. would have been possible. But a model of this kind, or indeed any other brought in from outside, is unsuitable for Brazil. It is possible to introduce technical methods or to profit in some way from the ex· perience of other nations. Beyond this, Brazil musr find its own way. as it stems from the country's historical origins and its economic and social conditions. The political organization of the various social strata and the degree of their participation in politics will have a deci sive influence on the development of the new system of relationships which will be set up with the establishment of
216
FrtSh Stage in II Long Struggle
Brazil: The People and the Power
a national government. The extent of tbe employers' resist ance to the reforms demanded by the people, for example, will
determine from the outset the degree of the State's interven.
tion in economic life. The very composition of the govern ment will be 'he result of these factors. That ,here are various unknown factors does not prevent our fixing even now the main features of the plan to be fol· lowed in order to overthrow the present system and establish a government in a position to guide the country during the transitional phase which it mllst of necessity pass through. National construction - by this is meant the admission of the people as a whole to the economic, political and sodal life of the country - requires at every level State action of an aU embracing kind. But this must be nothing less than the reflection of the people's will, which at this point must make use of the State as the means of fulfilling its aspirations. Political unification, which must not be imposed from the top but must develop from below to the top, forms the one and only means of setting this total process in motion. To encourage it, it will be sufficient to lay down its essential ob jectives - extinction of foreign domination and the ascent of the people as a whole to the political control of the country.
Practically speaking, it is (.Ill these twu aims that the division will be found between those who are oppos,ed to the inde pendent development of the country and those who are fight· ing for national reconstruction. This opposition of two parties wi thin the nation comes. as we have seen, from a long way back, so that to define the nation that we must build we can make our own the terms
used by Frei Caneca in his speeches.' He wanted a nation that was not just a copy of the European nations but rather a unified nation of whites, blacks, Indians and half-castes. The implic�tions of such an apparently simple definition are .
I . A �r:'nd$C1l� friar. sh�t
in 1814 at Recife, for having taken part
m the rlsmg which proclaimed the 'Confederation of the
Equator'.
1.1]
obvious. Translated into terms of our present position it means that only the union of all the explOited classes of the · population will be in a position to do away with foreign domination and bring an end to the backwardness and
poverty from which the majority of the population suffers. This task, today like yesterday, fonns the principal mission of the popular movement. How s i it to be carried out? What forces can be counted
on for liberation ? AU these questions are important for an
understanding of the potency, purpose and prospects of this new stage in the people's struggle. Generally speaking the struggle by the oppressed and ex
ploited in Brazil has been characterized by Its fragmentary, scattered nalUre and its lack of coordination. The reason for
this is easily understood when it is remembered that those
concerned were peasants: the very conditions of their lives and work made for their political and social isolation. Yet it is true that as the people's struggle grew during the period preceding the 1964 coup the most advanced sections of the
peasant eJass were able to mobilize and organize themselves
politically without encountering the oppressive measures
wielded by the ruling classes. This is quite different from what happened in all the preceding campaigns of pe-�sant
political opposition, including those of Canudos and Can testado. The growth of this opposition, both in extent and in depth, was abruptly cut short by the
11}64
coup. The agricultural
wage earners of the north-east, the poor peasants of the west
central region and the workers on the land as a whole could
no longer rely on the benevolent neutrality of the State in the assertion of their claims and hopes. Subjected to violent repression they lost aU their short-lived economic and political gains. And more especially the still fragile links that they had established with the popular movement in the cities
were broken. The urban popular movement on its side was
218
Brazil: The: People and the Power
Fresh Stage in a Long Struggle
219
unsuccessful in maintaining its unity during the period im
These were the two opposing attitudes apparent i n the
mediately following the coup. Once the central trade union organization, which coordin
reactions to the 1964 coup, its consequences and the possi bilities it offered of resistance and of restoring the political
ated the workers' movement during the Goulart government
initiative to the masses. After 1966 especially the question
(the CGT), was dissolved and those of its leaders who did not
arose of whether the opposition shouJd be non-violent or
accept the dictatorship's anti-popular policy were removed,
anned. The controversy over the chief form of opposition
the machinery and organization on which the city workers
must be understood in the context of the analysis of the
relied fell to pieces.
fundamental policies of the regime and the role of the popular
There followed a period of decline during which the various
movement. Those who regarded the 'process of return to
sections of the popular movement suffered in silence, bearing
democracy' as an inherent tendency of the regime endea
the burden of increased exploit:ttion and oppression. The
voured to ally the popular movement with the 'moderate'
situation only changed in 1968 as a result of various factors, the more important of which we shall now examine.
section of the bourgeOiSie and condemned anned opposition as mere foolhardiness. Those who regarded Castelo Branco's institutional 'normalization' and Costa e Silva's 'overtures'
1.
Regrouping of ProgreSSive Forces
as mere t:tctical expedients intended to offset their growing unpopularity maintained that the popular movement could
In general, there appear to have emerged on the left two
count only on its own strength in the struggle against dic
attitudes towards the military dictatorship established by the
tatorship and imperialism. This second policy was supported
coup (I'etat of 1964. One was to advocate an alliance with
by those who in 1968 assumed the leadership of the masses
the traditional political parties in the hope that they would
in their opposition and began armed resistance against the
be strong enough to work for the re-jntroduction of demo
regime,
cracy. Experience has shown how illusory this view was. The other considered
that the popular movement could only rely
on its own strength and that the association of the influential
sections of the Brazilian bourgeoisie with imperialism was not just an unfortunate and passing episode, a temporary halt in the national and democratic development of Brazilian capitalism. It was rather, in this view. a manifestation of the only type of capitalist development possible in Brazil. Yet this is development which is dependent and very one-sided, which dooms great masses of the population to under-.employment and poverty, and which requires for its political system an authoritarian and oligarchic State in which the great power of the generals is complemented by the viciousness of its torturers.
2.
The Fresh Outbreak of Popular Resistance in
1968
Its principal characteristics were : (a) Political
independence
The paternalist links which until
1964 existed between the workers and the nationalist and democratic sections of the bourgeoisie had as their institu· tional basis the consolidation of the labour laws which built up trade union organization on a cooperative pattern. These links were broken by the military coup d'etat.t 2.
Inflexibility has hardly
betn
the characteristic of the Brazilian
Communist Party. Ir took: part In the formation of the 'broadened
front' (an attempt to regroup tt.e traditional democratic parti es with Kubitschek, Carlos Lacerda and Janio Quadros) and in the endeavour
210
Fresh Stage in a Long Struggle
Brazil: The: Pe:ople: and the: Powu
In the short term the disappearance of paternalism and
111
easier, This was the case for example in industrial cities like
reformi.�m di�rmed the workers. They could no longer count
Belo-Horizonte and Osasoo in sao Paulo where the largest .
on the trade union machinery instituted by Vargas to obtain
strikes since 1964 occurred. Yet the places where the factory committees and the oppo
for them satisfaction of their economic demands. But on the longer view the effects of this separation turned
sition forces of the trade unions were capable of really
out to be positive : through the elimination of the institu
mobilizing the masses were few in number, and the strikes
tions and practices on which reformism relied and by sub
between April and July 1968, although tough and bellicose.
stituting for them police and military intervention in trade
remained confined to certain sectors of indusny (metallurgy
union affairs, in its reactionary blindness the dictatorship
more particularly) and to certain parts of the country (the
helped the working class to come to count only on its own
working-class districts of
Sao
Paulo and Belo-Horizonte).
capacity to organize and fight in defence of its own interests. To the extent indeed that defence of its interests implied opposition to the dictatorship itself this meant also defence
3.
of the interests of all the oppressed and exploited.
The UNE is at present the only body of any size spread
(b) Scattered nature of the popular struggle
The Dynamic Role of the Student Movement
The workers'
throughout the country and the student movement is the
uprising was relatively short; it lasted in all from April to
only mass movement organized on a national scale. This
July 1968. The workers' struggle was organized sometimes
situation is an indication of the political limitations of the
apart from the unions when there was no union opposition
popular movement in Brazil. These students took the lead in
of any consequence. The various groups - Marxist and Chris
most of the popular manifestations; they even took part, at
tian (with several priests among the.m) - e.volved a whole
various stages, in the workers' struggles. All attempts by the
scheme of agitation, propaganda and organization by means
dictatorship to bring the student movement into subjection
of factory committees and snike committees. These moves
were useless; they reached their culminating point with the
originated more especially from those who were most com mitted in the anned struggle which was beginning to take
cultural terrorism tlt"t has become " perm"nent feature in the universities and schools of the country.
shape in the cities. The existence of trade-union opposition
Still more recently under the severest of repressive condi
on some scale made the emergence of working-class action
tions the students of Rio organized the first great street
to make use of President Goulart, bath before and after his tenn of
office. Its re,,1 mist"ke hll$ been the palitical line th"t it adapted.
True though It is, the foregoing statement on the 'political inde pendence' of the trade unions cans for same "nalysis of the function of the unions, Despite their defects of organization "nd the whale burden of subjection to the State, the unions have linally came
to
play a part in national policy at the same time as the popular move ment enabled them Lu du .u. It mUSI be added that at different times the gener,,\ situation has always goverlled the action of the unions "nd they have brought their inBuence to bear an it.
demonstration against the dictatorship (after Act 5) demand· ing the end of torture and calling on the people to fight against Fascism.
4. The Last Stage The great change that has occurred in popular opposition since 1968 is the emergence of armed resistance. Guided by
the principle that the front line troops find their mettle in
222
Fresh Stage in a Long Struggle
Brazil: The People and the Power
11J
battle, revolutionary groups coming from various political
of all popular forces to carry on the struggle. For this unity
formations on the left and the most varied sections of the
to become a reality the many and various manifestations of ·
popular movement bave begun a series of armed actions with
a view to a prolonged popular rising. They have suffered several blows during the past two years of conflict and many of their fighters have been killed or have faUen into the hands of the army or police torturers; they have not yet succeeded
in extending the revolutionary battlefield and are stiU separ
ated from the mass of the people; they have not yet managed to get any further than their initial stage of dispersal and to
become an integral part of a national liberation front. Despite all these disadvantages these different combatant groups and
organizations at the present time form the advance guard of the army of the Brazilian people. •
The campaign that began in 1968 has certainly led to a further stage in the long struggle by tbe Brazilian people for its own liberation. The progre£'i already made is not very great compared with what remains to be done. But it is quite considerable if we look at it from its starting-point. Yet more important than the example of past struggles and the hopes
from their outcome are the tasks of the present.
The need to decide and coordinate the different fronts of
the Brazilian people's struggle is essential for determination of the fundamental principles of a total strategy for the over throw of the dictatorship, the advancement of natioDal libera rion and the establishment of a workers' democracy. That is why it is important to fight now for the achievement of three fundamental tasks : these are the unification of the
the armed struggle in the country must continue and de
velop. It is the duty of the armed combatants to organize
their forms of action in accordance with the exceedingly complex situations prevailing.
But it is also necessary that aU the political forces on the
side supporting the fight against the dictatorship and im perialism should take their stand decisively and share,
so
far
as they can, in a struggle which s i the concern of the whole of the people, in the company of those who show by tbeir actions that they really are in the forefront. The importance of the unification of all the popular forces is therefore a decisive factor. It is essential to discover now who is to be
isolated - to find out, that is, whether the people united around its militants will be successful in isolating the dic
tatorship or, on the other hand, whether the dictatorship using the means at its disposal (terror, corruption and the
tactics of division) will isolate the forces of the popular move ment. The oppressed and exploited sections of the Brazilian community wiJI only achieve adequate political organization through unity among themselves.
The problem of the minimum programme to be pursued
in common can be solved objectively even now; there must
be an end to the fruitless and debilitating controversies in which some groups on the left seem to take pleasure. Among
the majority of militants in the popuJar movement there is already fuU agreement regarding the following minimum
objectives :
The severance of all ties with imperialism, particularly
popular and anti-imperialist forces, the establishmem of a
American imperialism.
armed resistance against the dictatorship. The problem of unity in Brazil is not merely tbe problem
sacrifices the most elementary interests of the great mass of the population to those of the great monopolist combines.
minimum common programme, and the continuation of
of the unification of the armed groups, but that of the unity
The need to get rid of the present economic system which
The people's governing role, to the extent that the in'
ll4
Brazil: The People and the Power
fluential sections of the bourgeotsie are actually a party to the imperialist exploitation-of our country.
Index
The abolition of all the fonns of economic, political and ideological oppression introduced by the 1964 regime. In the last place there remains the problem of the continu ance of armed resistance. Firstly, it is a question of organizing support on the fullest and most effective scale for the mili tants in the cities who at the present time have to meet an intense and pitiless counter-offeruive from the regime's police and military forces. There is also the need to do everything possible to make armed resistance general by widening the social and the political basis on which it has hitherto relied. These tasks concern all those fighting on the side of anti-imperialism, inside and outside Brazil, Brazilians and non-Brazilians. The common victory wiD depend on the effort and union of all.
Abolitionist Confederation, 114 ADEP. 164 Agrarian rebellions, 8 Agrarian reforms, 100ll, 148, 166, 168, 17&-7· 101 , 1 10 Agreement Relating to Invesunent Gu..r.."!;.,,,; I]<-J Agriculture, 14. }I, }5, 4), 46-8. 51-}, 55--8, 60-61, 69-]0, 81, 89,91, 10]--8, U4-S, 1)0, I,"", 1,.8, 165, 101, 10]-1 1 , 1 1 7 Agricultural and Industrial Credit Department, 51 AID, 185 Air Force, the, 141 Alelxo, Pedro, 191
Alg iel'li, lo Alliance for National RenewJI, ,,
"
Alves, Rodriguez, 98 Amazon, 16, 51, u5, 140, 190 Amforp, 198 Antipaternalism. 1 4 'Anti.people·. 110 Antonio the Counsellor, 116 ARENA, I06 Army, the. 14-S, ]]' 81-04, 86, 101-3. 10]-18, 111-4, 116--9. 1)1-1, 1)8, 140-41, 147, I�o, 1 11-) , IH�, 169-9J. 111-1. '"
Arrne�, Miguel. 7-17. 10 Automobile industry, 144 Axis forces, l)l, 1 ) 5 BJchard. 1 1 0
Bachelors, 110 Bahia. IS, 111. II}. 116 Bahia Cocoa Institute. 5 1 Balance of Payments. 19-}O, }8, 41, 44-�. 48, 61 Balance of Trade. 41-}, 47. 49 B�"kj"g, .l,-6, 4U, 44. �I-�. 6}, 84, 144. 149. 166, 199 BankruplCY. 171 Barbosa, Horta, 1}8 Borraciio, J6 Barros. Adhemar de. 105 Be<-kman, 111 Belo-Horizonte. 111 Berle, Adolf. A.. 88 Bernardes, Artur, 98 Bipanite System. 104 BNB,64 BNDE, 6) Bolivia. 119 Bourgeoisie. 16. J7, H. 66. ]4, 81. 87, 89, 104. I I I , I I ) . I I ] . 114. 116, 1}4, 1)6, 1 4 1 . 141-5. 147--9. 1 5]-6), 166-8. 1]1. 17)-5. 178. 187, 191, 196. 199.101-1, 118-19. 114 Branco, Castelo. II], 1]1-1, 1]6, 181-1, 188.119 Bras. Venreslau. 9B Brasilia, 145 Brazilian Coffee Imtirute, $1 Brazilian Oc:mocratic Union. 106 Brazilian Institute.' for iftmOCTatic Artion, 164 Brazilian Labour Party (see also PTO), Sl. 159
226
Inde:x
Brazilian Workers' Parry. 104 Brizola, leonct, 147 Bud8er�, )1, '" Caating�, 11f Cajueiro Scro, 14 Camar]o, Felipe. 108 CamlXio. 56, I I I Caneca, Frei, 116 Cangaceiro epic. the. 8 unudos rebellion (1891), 116.
"7
upitat. 14-5. }o-n. 15-]. )9-41. 44-8, 50. 54, 58"'"9, 61. 65-] I. QO"-9I, 104, u8, 134, 111-40. 141 4, 146, '17. 1�9 60, 161-:;, 168. 171-5. 18). 187. 190-91. 197-9, 10} upitaHsm. 11-), 15-6.18. 11-). 47, ss-6, 69-]0, IJ9, 149. 158, 16}, 115, 17], Igti. II)!!. 100-201. 118 Catholic Church, the, 121. I.e Ceara. rebeltion of. 113 Cellulose, 69 Censuses. 44-f, I)!!. 101 CentTal lntelligence Agency, ,8, CentralizatIon, 77, 180. 184 CGT. 118 Chemirnls, 61. 61. 69 Cities (see Urban centres) Civil Service, )4, " 1, 1 50. 181 Civil War. 116. 151 Oass �ondli�tion. 1)1 Clergy. 80, 119, 111-), no CNTA. 148 Coastal Navigation Company. 5 1 Cochrane, Admiral. 109, III Cocoa. 41, 5 1 Colfee. 11, 26. 19-1 1. n . )6-40. 41. 46. 5 l, 81-). 8s. 90. 9). 115. 140. 174. 202. lOS Cold War, 11). 1 1 7 Colonialism and (oloniUltion.
11-7. ) 1 . 3 3 . 3 5, 11. 15--6. 18-9. 93. 107-8. 110. 1 19-21, 117, 177. lon-l(11. 11 I. 11 J-14 Colonne Prcstcs. 119 Commerdal Treaties. 18-9.85 Commission to�nml Currency and Credit. 6)-4 Commission for the Development of the North East. 10. 64 Communism. 104, 106. Ill-IS, 111.143. I.e. 198 Communist Party. 10)-., 1)0-)3. 1)6-9. 144-5, 159.119 Compensation, 173 Confederation of the Equator, 11).1,6 Con�crv�tives, $7, 8�. 'o�. 104, 1)1. I n Constituent Assembly. 80. 95-6. gB. 10). I)) Consdtutionalist Revolution. 8, Constitutions, 99. 140, ISS, 176. 178-9. 188. 191. 194 Contestado rebellion (1914), 116, "7 Conversion Fund. 40 Cooperatives. 10-11.86 'Coronels·. 100 Corruption. 1 1 1 . II]. 129.123 Cotton. 16. 19, 69. III COup ll'clal (19J7). 103. 111. 1 , 1 Coup d'�tat (1<)64), 9-10. 11. 16. 19. ])-4. go. 91-4. 100- 101. 106. 1 11-18. 141-1. 149. 1 54--61). 115. 1]8-9. 181-2, 187. I�, 196.110. 11]-19 Coup d'etat (I gti8), 18,"'"9. 194 Credit control . B . 56, 111 Credit fadlities. }S. 49-51. 6". 144. 166. 171-). 1]7. 196. 199 Cuba. lSI Curitiba. 90 Customs duty. 18-9. jJ, -45. So.
5,
CVSF. S2 Cycles. 16
lndex Dantas. Santiago. 1 5 1 . IS} Decentralization. ]7.88 Deodoro. President. 8) Lksenvolvimento e Coniuntur�,
68
Dev3lu3Iion. H-4. )6. 40. 4S. 47-8. So. 64-5 Dias. Henrique. loS Dirfft democracy. I} DNER. 51 DNOCS. 51 Oom Joio VI. 111 Dam Pedro I. 80-8 1. 111-) Draft cOllni tution, !)6 Drought. 51.191 Dutra. Enrico Gaspard, 8!iH)O. 99, II). 1)6-}. 1)9-40 Economic sanctions. )6 Economy of Brazi ! . ll..,." passim. n-8 I . 87-8. lOS, 107, 1 1 0, 1 14-]. 141..,.. I H-]I. 174-i). 181-4. 186--]. 190-91. 19Ii. 19B. 101-8. 111. 1 1-4-1]. 110, 21)-4 &luntion. 1 1-11. 169. 182-), 185-6 Elections and Elector�1 systems. 8-<). 'S. n.
]9. 86. 88. 91.
g6-101. 10J-]. 1 1 }�14. 119. 1lJ-9. Ill. IH. Il}-i). 1-41-). 146. If}. 160. 16-4.105 Elfftoral frauds. 98. 100 ElectTical industries. 61. 63. 69. Q4. 117. IQl. 19B. 201 Engineering. 48 ESAD. ISg Estado navo. I l l-I ) Exchange rate. B . 36. 40-41. -45. 4]. so. �4, 60. 64-5. ]0. 18. I]) Exports. 11. 16, 18-30. l1�}. 36-40, 41-4. 41, 49. 51. 54, 18-<}, 6�. 61. 7). ]f). 140, 175-6. '"
Expropriation. 176-}
227
External debt. }l. }6-8. 41, -48-9, 15. 84. 1)1. 146, 1 5 1 Factory Commiltees. 110-11 Fascism. I ll-I}. IJI, 1)3. Is8. ID,4. 106. 111 Federal Congress. 100 Federal Parliament. 8 1 Federation. 85. 14}. 119. loB Feiio. President. 81 Feudalism. 56. 18. I}o-)I. loo Fitho. Cafe. 91. 14) First Republic. 41-1. 8s. 94. 98. 100. 101. 104. 11 0. 101 Fonseca. Ikodoro de. 81. I 10 FonSC<'ll. Hermes de, 1)8. 110 Force, 101-18 Foreign rapital. see Capital Fort rising. 119 France, )0. )6.85. 9f. 9!)-100. 1 1 1 . 111.114 fr:tnco. General. 116 Free enterprise, IgB""\l. 101. 10} Free mrn. 115 Free rrade. 18. III Freezing of profils. 49 Freezin� of wages. ]1 Freire. Gilberto. 8 Frente ampla. In. 165 Frozen meat, 41
Gas. )4. 6) Germany. 8S. I}I Gold. If1-.7 Gomes, Eduardo. I I } Goulart. raio. l a- I I . 68, QJ. 116. 141, 146-i), 1 51-}. 1 ';5-6. 161, 16,,-5. 168. 1 79. 199. 106, 118, no
Gouss3ult Yves. 11 Great Britain. 11-). 17-H. }6. )9. 41. 1S. 80. 81. 84-5. 88. 9)-4. 108"'"9. 111-1. 101 . 114 Gross National Product, 39. 60-61, 16�. '74 GuanabU3. 10, lSI. 101. loB Gu�rallleed preference. 6}
228
Index
Guerillas. 117. 120 Haiti, )0 Higher Institute of Brazilian Studies, I �S Higher Military Academy. I I� Higher School of Warfare, 163, ,88 Holland, 15, 17. 108, uo Housing, 14 Humaniution, 174 Hunger Marches, 8 tBAD. 164 IBC. 51 IBGE, 107 Idt'ology. ISS, 167. 169. '11. 18)-4, 19)-4, n4 Immigration, 46. 55, 115 Imperialism. 17. 19, 11. 1). )]-3. 40.44-3, 58-9. 66,68.17.80• 87.90-94. 1)1, 134--6. 1 39-44, I+!, ISO-51, 157-3. 160. 16)--6, 168-,]6, 178, 181-5. 187""9, 191-4, 198-101 , 106--]. 11 1-1). 118-19, 111-4 Imports, 11, 19, )1-2. )4, )6-]. 42-}, 4�. 47, 49, 53. 57, 59, 61-4. 69, 71- ). 79.84-5. 1 61-) . 191.. Indians, 107-a. 120, 112,1.16 Industry ;md Industrialiutlon, 11-}, 1.8""9, ) 1 , )4-5, )]. 41.. -«-5, 48-9. 51.-5. 57-66, 6S-n 82-}, 88, 92, 10}, 110, 11", 1)1-1., 1)4. 136, 1)8.1,,1, 1")-5. 14]-9, 157""9, 162-), 165-6, 168, 171--6, 18), 191-1, 196-101.. 207-1 1, lll, UI Inflarion. )4--6, "5. 4,.-8, 50, 64-5. 72, I..S-6, 171 Institute of Social Security. III Institutional Act, 191 Insurance, 34 Integralism, 158 Inregralist Action. 1 ) 1
Integration. 170--,1, 175. 178, 180, 185-']. 19}-4, 101.-}, 111.. 114-15 Imernarional combines, 173-4. 190, 101.1.11, 11) International Development Agency. 18S Inlerventionism. So-SI. 196-7. 1.0}. 1 1}-14. 216 hon, 6} babelle. Princess, 81 I$EB, 158 Italy. II). III John VI, z8 Juliao. Francisco,
funtll, 191-)
I+!
Kubitschek. ruscelino. 67, 91, 99-100. 1 16. 142-']. lB. 160-61, 164-S, 205-6.219 labour force, 24-5. 34-5 ... s-6, 54-6, 7G-71, J3, 86-]. 99, 10)-4. 124-6, 1l.8-)1. 134, 1)6. 1)9, 14)-6. 1,.8, 159. 161, 165-6. 171• 174. 176-8. IS,. IS5--]. 191, 194,101. 20). 105.107-11. 1.17-U labour reform. 52, 131-2, 219 laa:rda, Carlos, 141. IS1-}. 16..-;. 1&g, 219 land Liw, 1]6 latifundios. 2S--{j, 1)0-)1. 115-6 Law for National Security, 188 League for National Emandpation, 138 Leag ue for Progress, 14 Estil!ac, 1 1 4 Leather. 19 liberal Alliance, 10). 1l9-30 Liberalism. 81.. 1)6, 98, 101-1, 11). 1l7. l)l, I,,), 145. IB, 157, 160, IS1, 188""9. 204-6 Lima. Albuquerque, 189. 193 Limited Companies. lS
Leal,
Index lisbon, 18. III literacy. 97, 99, 1. 1 1 Local goverlUnent. 77�. 101 London, }6 Lopez. Jose, 143 Lott, Marshal. 1 16. 1,,2, 1"5. 160 Luiz, Washington, ,,0, 9/1, III Machado Cristiano. 139 Maranhao, 109. 111 Marshall Plan. 8\1 Martial law. 151-3 Marxism, 120 Mate Institute, 5 1 MOB, 106 M�rJciio. 55-6 Mechanization. �; Medici, Garrastazu, l&g. 19)-" Mera:naries, 107. 1 09 Metallurgy. 50, 61, 68, 1"4.211 Metayage system, 111 Middle ages, 78 Mig ration . 54 Milituy club. 11,,-1 ; Military police. 110-11 Military regime. I69-<;1S, 196, 198-100, 10"-S,111. 119, 21" Minas Gerais. 16. 81. I I I , Ill. 11). 120,140.101. 108 Minimum price guarantees. 177 Mining. 51, 86, 108, 171 Ministry of Education. ISS Ministry of Finance, 1 ..\1. 160 Ministry of the Interior, l&g Mininry of Labour, 1 3 1 Minority Republic. )7-46, 8)-i.
n'
Moderates. 1l3. 119 Modernization. 37. 113. 18... 197. ' 99 Monopolies. 11, 14, 27, 29, 68, 11-2, 85, go, 114, 116, 119, 1}8-9, '11, 11;. 190. loa, U) Morais, Prudente de, 98 Mortinho. JoaqUin. 37
229
Napoleon, 28 National Bank for Economic Development.6} National Coffee Coundl. 5 1 National Confederation of Agricultural Workers, 148 National Congress. 71. 8}, 89, 91, 101, 105. 1}:r8, 14-0, 147. 15G-51, 166. 176. 179, 188 National Democratic Union. 9J. 10", lB. 16} National Department for Works to Alleviate Drought. S I National Freedom Alliance. 111. 'l'
National Guard. lotI-l0 National Information Service. lSI National liberation Front, 111 National Oil Coundl, 51, 1)7-8 National Road Depar�nt. SI National Security Services, 101 National Union, 1)6 National Unity, )7. IJI Nationalist Movement, I JS. 158. 161.19) Nationalization. 51. 86. IJ8. 1..9, 166. 175. 198 Nationalist Parliamentary Front. '"
Navy. R}-4. 'Ol)�n. liS. 11.) NaZISm. S8 New State. 1 1 1-13 Normaliution, 119 North East Brazilian Bank. 64 Oil, 5 1 , 6), 10j, II". 1 16. 119. 1)7-40. 166. 175,1\11 Osasco. 111 Overproduction, 71 Palmates, 120 Paper. 61. 6c} Para. 109, 11)
P3ragu3y. I IO Paraiba. I I I
Parana. 90
230
I
Index
Parctria. SS-6 Parliaments. 60, 95. 101. 116. 1}6. 1)8. '4'. ' 5 1
Parliamentary Democratic: Action. 16.. Passos. Gabriel• •6) Paternalism. 1)1. 211)-10 Pall brasil. 14 Peace Corps. 186 Peasant Leagues, 9. 148. 1,8, 194, "7
Peddlers' War. 111
Pedro I. 109 Peixoto. Floriano, 8)-4, 1 1 0 Pena, Alfonso, 40, 98 Pernambuco, 8-1). 1j- 16. lS. 80, 108""9, 1 11-), 143 Pessoa, Epitacio. 98 Pessoa, JOOo. 119 Petrobras, 119. 1)8, 160. 1,5 Petrol, 69. 90 Pharmaceutical industry. 61, 69 Pine Institute, 51 Pinto, Carvalho, 149 Pinto. Magalhaes, 149 Police. 1 1 , 8 5 . 9'. 107. 110-11. .)8. 1,1, .8(Hh, 189, 110, 111. '"
Politics, 15""94, 95-118. 115-9, 130-54, 155-68, 17G-11. 175-81. .H4, ll1b-?, 190, 191. 194.104"1, 101)-1 1 , 1 1)-14 Political prisoners• •3) Political Unity, 1¢-1 1 1 . 1 1 5 Popular Movements. 8-10, 11. 16. 10,66.91, 106, 116. 1 11)-54 passim, ISS, 157-8, 160-61. 164, 16,. 171. 178• 180-81, 104, 101)-10. 111-1). 11,-13 Population of Brazil. 16. 55, 61, '}O, 7), 7S-6. 79. 84. 86, 91• 9]-100. 106, 1 11)-54. 1',. In. •80, 18)-4, 186, 194. 196-114 PortulZal, 11-5, 17-9, )1-1 , 36, 75. ,8. 80,9), 101""9, !lo-I). 1)1, 101 . 1 1 4
P.R., 101 Prado. Cal0. 19
PrC$$urc Groups. 10,. 194
Prestes, ,ulio. 98
Prestes, Luiz-<:arlos. 1)0-)1 Proclamation of Independence (.811). 22.18. )0-) 1. '09
Proclamation of the Republic
(1889), 17. }l-4. 81-). 101. 110-1 1 , 1 11-18. 124 Profits. 14. 'I. H. )8-40.44-6. 48""9, 50-51, B. H-6, S9, 64-6. 69.,1. 8,.1)0, 104, 140, 149. 166. 17}. 116-8, .8,. 190'-91. ."
Propaganda. 1l7-8. 16S. 181.
18j-,. 18<). l"s. uv Protectionism, 95. 45, 41-8. SO-51, 51, 51.61-).69. 11-1. In 191 Provincial Coundls, 81
f
Index 1.31 Rebellion of the beaches. 113
1I..edf",. II. 10. 14. 100. 216 Recife. Marquis de. il} Redemocntization. 194 Reforms. 9-IS. 95. 10]. 114, 148-51. 153• •66. 216. 110 Rents. 55-6 Republic:. the. 9'. 114-'9. 139,
160. 166. 119 Republicanism. 80, 81. 101. 110, Ill, lOS
Return on capital. SO Revaluation. 49 Revolution of Revolution of Revolvtion of Revolution of
1811. III 183S. 11) 1930. 86, 98. 10} 19)1. 105
PSD (see also Socialist Democratic
Revolution of the humble. III Rio Doce Dock Company. 51 Rio de Janelro. ,.....s )0. 36. 81.
Punta del Este, conference of
Rio Grande do Sui, Ill. il9, 147 Rising of 19)0, il9-)1 Rising of 19J5. 11]. 1)1 Rodriguez, leoncio. 118 Rodriguez. Martino. 189 Roosevelt. Franklin D., In Rothschild,. )6 Rousseau, Jean.Jacques. 95
Party), 100. 104, I }6. 1)9. 141, Ijo. In. ISg--60. 164 PSP. 105 ITB (see also Brazilian Labour Party). 51. 104. 136. 138""9, 141-), 1 59 Public Participation, 65. 106. 1 1 1-1l. 1 I S (1\)61), 176 Purges, 118
Quadros. lanio, 68. 91-3. 99-100.
lOS, 116. '45"1. ISO. 151. 161. 164. 119
Quilombes.
IlO
Radicals. III lailways. 6). 88, 184 lamas. Gradliano. 8 Rationalization. 18} Raw materials, 19. J I , )4. 41. 49.
5)-4. S8""9. 61, 6s. 15. 8)-4. 161. 115-6 lebelllon of '189, III
1 1 1-11.181. 191,101. 108. 11.
Rubber. 16, 4�, 61. ""5 Rui Barbosa. 111 Rui Faco, 8 Ruling (lanes. 76. 81-4. 91-3. 95-1 18. 1 19"'10, 111-3. 1)6. 150, 155. 1 58""9. 168. '74-5, 18,,100, l04-S, 114-IS, 1 1 1 Rural Unions. 148 Russia. lS I
Salazar. 1}6 Sales. Campos. 36-,. 84.98, 101,
81. 8,. 105, 111-11, 113. I1S, 118""9. 149.101. 101-8. 111,111 Second Empire. ill Secret vote, gil, " 9. 118 Self-determination. 1 5 1 . 19) Separatism. 11, 114 Sertio, 1. IlS S!:smaria, 15 Shipping, 34. 40 Silva. COStll e, 189-90. 191-), 119 Silva. Francisco de lima e. 11) S1avery. 15-6. 30-)1. 34-5. 55-6, 19. 81-4. 9s-6. 101. 110, 110, 121-4. 1)0 Smuggling. 191, 199 Soci:ll'Snl. I I ) . IlJ. u8. 1 3 )
Socialist Democrat PaTlY (see also PSD). 104. 159 Social Progressive Party. 105 Social Security. 51. 1)1. 1)4, 145. .,)
Sodre. Werneck.•• Sorbonne, 188 Spanish ALIlerican Colonies. 109 Specialization. 14, 11. H. 103 SPVEA. ,S1
StlIbilization Fund. 40-41 State Aid. 14. 64. 151. 103
Sterilization, 101
Stock f�rming. 16 Strikes. 10, 115-8. 136.110 Structural reform, 10, 93. 148. 159. 16, Stud"nt Movements.n, 91.101, 106, 1,8, 194.221 Substitution. 53. 61-1. 69, 1), 16} SUDENE. 10. 64, 190,10) Sugar industry. 8. 10-1 1, 14-6. 19.81. 9). 110-11. 143.108 Sugar and Alcohol Institute. 5 1 SUMOC, 64, 146
".
Salt Institute. 51
S;tnitatioll , 6 ) 510 Frandsco, jI-l SioPaulo. 16. 30, )8. 46. 5 1 . '}O,
Tailors' revolution. 111-1 Tavon, Juarez. • n Taxalion. )1, 64, ,8.91. '13, '90"1>'
l3l
Index
TayloT, 109. 11} Telephones. 69
Tered , 1 1 1 Textiles, )I,}5, 4S. 4B Tiradentes plot, ,6. 108, III Tobacco, 29. 69 Tourism. 191 Trade unions. 10-11, 16. 77. 101, 106, 128-9. 111. 136, 139. 146. 148. IH. 159. 161, 178, 218-11 Transport. 34, 61, 63. 68, 94. 191, "',
Treaty of Methuen, 17, 108 Treaty of Taubate (19Of'i), )8 UON. OJ. 100. 104-S. 1}3. 1}6, L4S, IB, 164. '71, 105-6 UNE,111 Unemployment. n, 73. 178.101. 10). 107-9. 111, 118 United States, lJ, 16. 19. 41, 50, j8.61. ]5.8s.87-9L. 91-4. 104. IL}-IS, 114. 13)-1. 147. 149, l S I , 157. 160-61, 163. 166, 16<)-']5. 178, 180-8 1, J81-6. 189. 191, 198-20 1,114- lj. llj
Universities, 111 Uranium. 19' Urban centres, 11-4. 34. 37. S1,
H-f. S,..g. 10. 70· 84. 91. 09. 101. 10), 10]. 114. 116-'], !JO11. 1}4, 1}8-9. 141, 146, 1,.8. In, 159. 181, 186. 1 9 1 , 105. 107""9, 1 1 I, 11 :t18, 110-11, 114
Urban Industrial sector. s8-g Urban militia. IOJ Usin�iros. 10
Valorization. )8-g, �I Vargas, Getulio. 15, 4(}-n. 58-9, 66-,. 85""91, 94.99'"100. 10)-4. 1 1 1-14. 1 16. 12<)'") 5 . 1 ) 6-.13. 146. 149. 152. 151-61. 164-5. 16,-8. 115.19 9.205 .115. 220
Vieira. Toao Fernandes. Vilbge Coundls, , 8 Volta Redonda, 50. 144
108
Wage-earners (see Labour force) Wage levels. 15. }4-5. 46. 54-6. 10-']1. 18,87, 1)1, 1)6. 165. 116-8. 182-4. 186, 1 1 1 Washington. 171
Water. 51 Working Oass (see Labour force) World War. First. 2). 41. 45-6. 85.201
World War, Second. 1), 49-50,
52-). 5]-8, 60,8,-8,99, 10), 106. II). liS. 1)1-6, IB, 157-8. .6,
Young Officers' Party, Zumbl. 12o
188-9. 19}
