BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS
Kellam Conover
A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY IN CANDIDAC...
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BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS
Kellam Conover
A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
RECOMMENDED FOR ACCEPTANCE BY THE DEPARTMENT OF CLASSICS Adviser: Andrew Ford
March 2010
UMI Number: 3401570
All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.
UMI 3401570 Copyright 2010 by ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This edition of the work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346
© Copyright by Kellam McChesney Conover, 2010. All rights reserved.
ABSTRACT This dissertation proposes a fresh look at bribery and its regulation to examine how bribery shaped the development of the ancient Athenian democracy (508/7-322 BCE). Political scientists and economists commonly treat bribery as a kind of inefficiency that can be minimized through proper institutional incentives and legal sanctions within a static polity. Yet Athens’ democracy was anything but static, and the very ‘problem’ of dōrodokia changed considerably over time. Exploring this dynamic change thus refocuses our understanding of the relationship between bribery and democracy. As Chapter One shows, the concept of dōrodokia was used to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate forms of political collaboration vital to the success of the democracy. Rather than define dōrodokia by the context in which the gift, favor, or payment was made, the Athenians looked to the outcome of the transaction. ‘Good’ results, processes, and players were aligned with dēmokratia, ‘bad’ with dōrodokia. Chapters Two through Four show how changing conceptions of dōrodokia were consistently tied to evolving ideas about what good democratic politics looked like. The figure of the corrupt man, or dōrodokos, was consistently conjured up in public discourse to explain bad political results. In this way, he played a central role in public discourse as a conceptual bogeyman to changing ideals within democratic politics. As Chapters Five through Seven investigate, the very hallmarks of the Athenian democracy—public accountability, selection by lot, and a clearer demarcation between public and private spheres—were developed in opposition to dōrodokia. In this sense, the Athenians articulated the constantly changing shape of their democracy by heavily
i
legislating dōrodokia. Rather than focus on minimizing profit from public office, the Athenians designed their institutions so that frequent dōrodokia would be leveraged for the common good. In both public discourse and political practice, dōrodokia emerges as an integral mode of democratic politics. Not only did the Athenians think through their democracy by thinking with the figure of the dōrodokos, but they designed democratic institutions expressly as anti-dōrodokia measures. The central question about Athens thus becomes how she succeeded not in spite of, but because of such prevalent bribery.
ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Thinking about corruption for an extended period of time does funny things to one’s brain. It’s a disconcerting, frustratingly intricate topic, and prolonged exposure slowly corrupts one’s thinking, causing significant distortions to one’s social life and livelihood. In my case I fear writing this dissertation has made me a slight bit insane. It is with great pleasure, then, that I acknowledge here those who had a hand in precipitating my condition; it is hoped that others will take my words to heart, lest they incur the same affliction. The ideas in this dissertation have unsettled me for a long time. In my first graduate seminar, the play of economic images and justice in Aeschylus’ Oresteia kept me up for nights on end, and the interpretive problems I encountered at that time have lingered in my mind, festering and causing many a sleepless night since. I give fond thanks to David Rosenbloom, who encouraged me then to obsess over these images, and to the custodial staff of East Pyne, whose bright smiles tricked me into correlating positive feedback with my incipient insomnia. I doubt they knew the utter madness towards which they were leading me, but they meant well. A few other guides were not so innocent. I say ‘guides’ because they have, in their own ways, been unwitting mentors to me over the years; ‘not so innocent’ because I suspect they knew full well what they were doing in welcoming me into their fold. It is in no small part to them that my affliction took the particular form of this dissertation. Dirk Hartog introduced me to the Dark Side of law and legal history, and with that he made my life inestimably more complicated. Kim Scheppele completely dismantled my own understanding of law and its myriad roles in society; and it was her unfailing
iii
encouragement that made me crazily think it a good idea to add three chapters to this work. And Viviana Zelizer, who took a chance on a maddened classicist, has generously illuminated a path to still more frustration, anxiety, insomnia, and lunacy. For their guidance and unflagging support, I owe profound thanks. My readers know particularly well the fits and fixation this work has caused me. Each and every time I felt utterly shattered, defeated by the conundra I faced, with a few choice words, a smile or an open door, and always a continuing faith that I would prevail, they helped me to put the pieces together again. Marc Domingo Gygax has been a true colleague; his warmth, humor, and strong vision of my project provided much-needed moments of clarity amid years of confusion. Josh Ober gave detailed comments on every chapter and consistently encouraged me to embrace the crazy by thinking big and outside the box. His perspective and sage wisdom have been continuing sources of inspiration. Andy Ford, friend and toughest critic, has been a stellar advisor, better than I could have dreamed. He has always known the right remedy to free my thinking, and he has taught me to grow upward from my roots. As a token of my heartfelt appreciation, and for their masterful management of a difficult, irrational, and often elusive student, I dedicate this work to my teachers. Any other institution probably would have sought to quell a neurotic student’s angst, but Princeton University has proven an uncommonly rich place for breeding anxiety. Under the extremely generous support of a Porter Ogden Jacobus Fellowship, a Robert Hoffman ’58 Scholarship, and a Center for Human Values Graduate Prize Fellowship, I was ensured to spend my every waking thought, for years, obsessing over
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bribery and the law. Without these gifts, my anxiety might never have transformed into full-fledged neurosis. Thank you, Princeton. Writing a dissertation is often a psychological battle.
Luckily, every time I
thought I had answered one question, a number of people reminded me that, actually, there were many, many more unanswered questions that should be gnawing at me, daily. Warm thanks, then, go to audiences who heard presentations of parts of various chapters at the Princeton Research Symposium, the Hoffman Scholars presentation, LEGS, the CHV seminar, and the Classics Department’s dissertation colloquium, masterfully led by Brent Shaw. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Jessica Clark, Meredith Safran, Arudra Burra, Philip Pettit, and Rahul Sagar for their pointed, friendly reminders that my task was far vaster than ever I had imagined. If my experience writing this dissertation appears unusually sunny, it is only because along the way I have had such loving, supportive friends who have distracted me—repeatedly and unabashedly—from conquering these demons. A certain few have left an indelible mark on me, and, far from distracting me—good friends, they—they have but heartened me to bang my head against the wall all the more. Dana Fields, Emma Ljung, Sydnor Roy, Alana Shilling, and Tom Zanker are all bright lights each of whose warmth, heart and distinctive mind has been an inspiration. Sean Corner, Luca Grillo, and Mira Seo, carissimi, have enabled my neurosis seemingly without end. Their insistence that I eat lavish meals has taught me to taste and savor life; for their everloving support I am profoundly grateful. Though bearing the brunt of my madness, Breanden Beneschott repeatedly went above and beyond the call of duty as dear friend, drill sergeant, and disc jockey; his love
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and long-lasting patience were critical throughout the revision process. I cannot thank him enough. My family, especially my parents Pam Conover and Chris Conover, would probably prefer not gratitude but a sincere apology for letting myself succumb to the insanity that was this dissertation for so long. No doubt they were positively dismayed at holiday dinners when I was unable to stop talking about the intricacies of Athenian tax collecting, among other arcane topics I was writing about at the time. Yet they always so graciously pretended that I was not even the slightest bit loony. From the bottom of my heart, I’m sorry. Last but certainly not least, I would like to thank Jill Arbeiter and particularly my work spouse Stephanie Lewandowski for all they have done to make the department feel like my home for six years. As consummate administrators for the Classics Department, they made my job so easy it felt like a vacation. And as friends armed at all times with a bright smile and a warm hello, they duped me into thinking that being crazy wasn’t so bad after all. Either way, they have my warmest gratitude and sincere pledge to keep some madness with me forever.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS i
ABSTRACT:
INTRODUCTION: In the Shadows of Democracy: Bribery in Classical Athens
1
CHAPTER ONE: Bribery, Politics, and the Problem of Definition
26
CHAPTER TWO: Dōrodokia, Elites, and the People’s Authority, 508/7-404 BCE
81
CHAPTER THREE: Dōrodokia in the Generation after the Peloponnesian War, 403-378 BCE
126
CHAPTER FOUR: Dōrodokia and the Rise of the “Crop of Traitors,” 378-322 BCE
169
CHAPTER FIVE: Approaching Bribery and the Law at Athens
212
CHAPTER SIX: Legal Innovation and the dōrodokos
252 vii
CHAPTER SEVEN: Athenian dōrodokia Legislation in Practice
295
CONCLUSION: Rethinking Political Bribery: The View from Athens
322
REFERENCES:
333
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Bribery in Classical Athens
Introduction
In the Shadows of Democracy: Bribery in Classical Athens
In the early summer of 367 BCE two Athenians, Timagoras and Leon, set out on an embassy to negotiate the terms of an alliance between Athens and Persia. Envoys from both Athens and Sparta were making the three-month journey to the Persian capital at Susa to discuss a most pressing concern: the recent aggression of Athens’ northerly neighbor Thebes. Just a few years prior, Thebes had overwhelmingly defeated Sparta and thereby set into motion a seismic shift in alliances. Renouncing her former alliance with Athens and turning instead to ravage Sparta’s allies in the Peloponnese, Thebes quickly became the dominant force in Greek politics. Understandably, Athens and Sparta were uneasy, and they were sending envoys in the hopes that the Persian King might help limit the Thebans’ strategic gains.1 For the Athenians, the Congress at Susa was not without its complications. Timagoras was apparently not at full health, and the trip to Susa in the summer heat would have been hard on the Athenian. When he arrived, he inexplicably refused to room with his fellow ambassador Leon, and the two spent an entire month sleeping in separate quarters. Nor was this clash of personalities Athens’ only cause for concern. Within a few weeks of Timagoras and Leon’s departure, Thebes got wind of the embassy to the King and sent forth her own ambassador, the renowned general Pelopidas, together with envoys from her new allies in the Peloponnese. Given Timagoras’ sickness and 1
Xen. Hell. 7.1.33-8; Dem. 19.31, 137, 191; Plut. Pelop. 30.6-7, Art. 22.4-6; Athen. 6. 251b; Val. Max. 6.3.ext.2. Mosley (1968), Perlman (1976: 228-9), Buckler (1980: 153-8), Lewis (1989: 228-9), Heskel (1997: 101-8), Mitchell (1997: 128-9). For the chronology of this embassy, see especially Heskel (1997: 105-7). Thebes’ ascendancy during the 360’s: Davies (1978: 217-27), Buckler (1980).
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Introduction
Bribery in Classical Athens
unexpected unfriendliness with Leon, and up against the peerless reputation of Pelopidas, Athens increasingly seemed to be fighting a losing battle at Susa. The city’s hopes were finally dashed when Timagoras supported Pelopidas’ counsel to the King, in effect defending Thebes’ interests, not Athens’, and leaving only Leon to protest the final, proTheban terms of the alliance.2 Even so, Timagoras surely emerged from Susa in good spirits. Given Thebes’ recent ascendancy, it was unclear whether Athens would have any real bargaining power with the King, so the pro-Theban terms of the alliance were not unexpected. And, in any case, Timagoras’ embassy had secured at least the chance for further negotiation, for the King had explicitly invited the Athenians to send another embassy if they found the terms of the treaty unfair. Personally, too, the Athenian fared quite well at the Congress, for the King had held him in esteem second only to the Theban Pelopidas. At his departure he consequently received substantial parting gifts (dōra) from the King. returned to Athens with a number of aids for his ailment:
All told, he
among other dōra, an
amazingly expensive couch made with luxurious bedding so intricate that slaves were provided solely to make it (because Greeks did not know how); 80 cows with 80 cowherds to tend them so that he could have cow’s milk for his illness; and even a litter to ride on from Susa, together with four talents’ pay for the carriers.3 Of course, the rest
2
Timagoras’ ailment: Plut. Pelop. 30.6, Art. 22.4-6. Plutarch’s biographies of Pelopidas and Artaxerxes are the only sources referring to Timagoras’ ailment, and both depict the King’s gifts to Timagoras as relief for his illness. Although it is entirely possible that the narrative of an illness was a later rationalization added to the story, it is difficult to understand when or why this element would have been added; one possibility, however, is that, in order to defend himself against Leon’s accusations and suspicions about the King’s gifts, Timagoras himself later claimed that he was sick. Problems during the embassy: Xen. Hell. 7.1.35-38. 3 Plut. Pelop. 30.6, Art. 22.5. Future negotiations: Xen. Hell. 7.1.37 with Heskel (1991: 107-8). According to Demosthenes, the King gave Timagoras the colossal sum of 40 talents, but this figure is more likely an exaggeration by the orator himself or by others (cf. w(j le/getai, Dem. 19.137), a total reached by multiplying by ten the misthos given Timagoras in Plutarch’s account (Pelop. 30.6).
2
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Bribery in Classical Athens
Introduction
of the Athenians were not so pleased with the ambassador’s efforts. Upon his return to Athens, Timagoras was brought to trial for bribery (dōrodokia) and sentenced to death. No doubt shocked by this turn of events, the King reportedly never gave an ambassador money again.4 To modern eyes, Timagoras’ fate provokes diametrically opposed reactions. In reading our sources, one is struck by how quickly the charming details of the story give way to its macabre conclusion. Particularly in Plutarch’s hands, Timagoras’ embassy becomes a parable writ large: in a dramatic twist of Sophoclean irony, the seemingly innocuous gifts the Athenian takes to cure his illness become the very cause of his demise. Yet in that case it is equally striking just how much the story of Timagoras lurks only in the background of Plutarch’s narrative, in the shadows of the history he crafts. Timagoras’ fate is something of a tangent in Plutarch’s Life of Pelopidas, at best a counterpoint for Pelopidas’ own virtue in taking but few gifts from the Persian King. In this sense, Plutarch uses Timagoras’ bribery as only a narrative foil, an implicit reminder of how things with Pelopidas could have turned out. And this leads to a second reaction, common among ancient historians in particular: no reaction at all. Classical Athenian history is rife with stories of bribery. A
4
Conviction of Timagoras: Xen. Hell. 1.38; Dem. 19.31, 137, 191; Plut. Pelop. 30.6, Art. 22.6; Athen. 6.251b. The charge was most likely one of dōrodokia, as given in Plutarch (Art. 22.6) and as accords with Demosthenes’ references (esp. Dem. 19.137). Contrary to this view, on the basis that Xenophon seemingly does not mention any bribery of Timagoras, Perlman (1976: 229) presumes that dōrodokia was not part of the original charge against Timagoras, but was later added to the story. Yet Xenophon does appear to allude to some kind of dōrodokia: in describing how Antiochus the Arcadian ambassador refused the King’s gifts, Xenophon refers to them as ta\ dw=ra (Xen. Hell. 7.1.38). The use of the definite article here presupposes that the dōra had already been mentioned—in other words, that they were, in fact, implicit in the historian’s remarks about Timagoras’ conviction. On this reading, we should understand the w(jclause describing Timagoras’ conviction as an elaboration from Leon’s prosecution of Timagoras, not as the formal charge itself. Similarly, Athenaeus’ explanation that Timagoras was prosecuted for obeisance to the King (w(j basile/a proseku/nhsen, Athen. 6.251b) is most likely just another way of indicating that he had been bribed to join allegiance with the King. On the King’s subsequent refraining from dōrodokia, see Dem. 19.137.
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Bribery in Classical Athens
Introduction
bribe-taker like Timagoras appears on average once in every twelve pages of Greek for the democracy, amounting to well over 450 accusations and descriptions of bribery in extant sources ranging from tragedy and comedy to historiography, inscriptions, forensic oratory and philosophy.5 When we encounter yet another instance of Athenian bribery, the sheer familiarity of the phenomenon, its omnipresence, renders it invisible.6 As the shocking events surrounding Timagoras’ execution call to witness, though, bribery was never so invisible in the democracy. Just as Timagoras’ own politicking serves as a narrative foil to Pelopidas’ virtuous course in Plutarch’s biography—a bad alternative, a reminder of how Pelopidas could have erred—at every incremental step in the development of the democracy bribery seems to have been there, lurking, reminding the Athenians of how their polity might still err. Far from being invisible, instances of bribery always brought to light an important decision for the Athenians to make. Should they follow the course of a Timagoras or of a Leon? Should they punish the purported bribe-taker or legitimate his actions? To chart the course of the democracy, therefore, is to uncover from its shadows a continuous series of historical foils, points at which the Athenians briefly considered which direction their polity should take. 5
Particularly given our dearth of contemporary sources for nearly half of the democracy, this number seems remarkably high. It amounts to, on average, one accusation per oration of Lysias, one account of bribery per year in Thucydides’ Histories (excluding the Archaeology in Book I), and three accusations per Aristophanic comedy. My count is derived from the index of sources in Harvey (1985) as compared to pages of non-fragmentary Greek in the Oxford Classical Text series of classical authors. 6 Within the past 80 years, there have been only a handful of articles devoted expressly to Athenian bribery, despite the fact that each author notes the omnipresence of bribery in our sources: see recently Perlman (1976), Wankel (1982), Cargill (1985), Harvey (1985), Strauss (1985), Kulesza (1995), Taylor (2001); cf. Lipsius (1905-15: esp. 2.401-6), MacDowell (1983a), Herman (1987: 73-81), Mitchell (1987: 181-6), Noetlichs (1987), von Reden (1995: 93-99, 117-20), Mastrocinque (1996), Hashiba (2006). Athenian bribery features in only two footnotes in Noonan’s (1984) otherwise magisterial study of bribery and was absent from Heidenheimer’s handbook on political corruption until the second edition. When Athenian bribery has been analyzed, scholars have been content merely to answer basic questions: what was bribery? who committed it? how prevalent was it, and why was it so prevalent? and how was it kept under control? To my mind these kinds of questions, while undoubtedly helpful, only perpetuate the invisibility of Athenian bribery as a phenomenon, for they do not engage with the more profound ways in which bribery, as practice or idea, fundamentally shaped the democracy.
4
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Bribery in Classical Athens
Introduction
This dissertation seeks to recover Timagoras and countless others like him from the shadows of the democracy: to restore to mind the significance, for Athenians then as for us now, of viewing bribery as a foil to the desired course of political history. I aim here to uncover how someone like Timagoras understood his own actions: not simply whether they were ‘good’ or ‘bad’, but how they were envisioned as fitting into the workings of the democracy.
Such an inquiry certainly entails examining what the
Athenians thought about bribery. Yet in bringing to light the significance of bribery as an alternate trajectory for democracy—an alternate path for conceptualizing and practicing politics, an alternative that the people could always choose to legitimate at any given time—I am especially interested in uncovering how the Athenians thought with and through bribery. In essence, this dissertation hopes to rid our minds forever of the assumed familiarity of Athenian bribery. My hope is that, for every mention of bribery, we might take to heart both why an Athenian in that position chose to take dōra and why Athens in that context responded as she did. Rescuing Timagoras from the murky shadows of Athenian history is a difficult endeavor, for we must thereby confront our own preconceived ideas about why he might have taken bribes or how Athens should have responded. The more we peer into the story, picking out the details that give it such distinct color—the lingering illness, the infighting with Leon, the extensive list of dōra, the death sentence—the more bizarre and alarming it becomes. Specifically, two glaring incongruities emerge: why, after all, did Timagoras take the King’s gifts, and why did the Athenians kill (!) him for doing so? Our sources note that certain other ambassadors refused to take gifts (Xen. Hell. 7.1.38) while even the Theban Pelopidas limited himself in what he took home (Plut.
5
Conover Pelop. 30.6).
Bribery in Classical Athens
Introduction
Even with the well-documented Persian custom of giving dōra to
ambassadors, then, Timagoras did not need to take any gifts.7 He certainly did not need to take home such an ornate couch, together with 80 cows and 80 cowherds, a litter and attendants. So why did he? Plutarch’s account of Timagoras’ embassy attempts to answer this question, but in so doing it only complicates our efforts at understanding the ambassador’s motivations. According to Plutarch, Timagoras recalled what a certain Epicrates had once said about receiving gifts on an embassy and apparently not being punished. Presumably it was this memory that gave Timagoras confidence in his own gift-taking with the Persian King (Plut. Pelop. 30.7). This Epicrates had been a prominent politician in the 390’s, and here we should understand reference to an embassy to the Persian King in the late 390’s during the Corinthian War.8 On the face of it, the pair had much in common. Both were sent to draft an alliance with the King in an effort to curb the aggression of one power: Sparta in Epicrates’ case, Thebes for Timagoras. And both, apparently, took bribes. Plutarch’s Timagoras recalls Epicrates’ embassy ostensibly as a reminder that the Athenians did not care if an envoy received gifts, but this is a baffling, selective reading of the earlier embassy. Though Plutarch does not indicate this, the specific anecdote that Timagoras purportedly recalled seems to have come from a comedy lampooning Epicrates’ expedition to the King. There, having returned laden in dōra from the King, 7
On bribery and gifts from the Persian King, see especially Perlman (1976), Lewis (1979), and Mitchell (1997: 111-33). 8 Epicrates is called ‘shield-bearer’, sakesfo/roj at Plut. Pelop. 30.7. Ancient scholiasts note that this was the nickname of Epicrates because he had a big beard: schol. Ar. Ec. 71, Harpocrat. ad ’Epikra/thj. This confirms the identification. The embassy of Epicrates and Phormisius, along with Plato Comicus’ Presbeis can be dated to 394/3 or 393/2. The embassies of Timagoras and Epicrates are juxtaposed again in Athenaeus 6.251b. Conceivably, both Plutarch and Athenaeus were drawing on the same source, i.e. the third-century collector of anecdotes Hegesander, but we have no indication that Plutarch had actually read Hegesander’s work. Epicrates’ embassy: Lys. 27.3; Plato Com. frr. 119-27; Hegesander FHG 4.414=Athen.6.251b; Athen. 6.221f, 6.251a-b.
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Bribery in Classical Athens
Introduction
Epicrates wittily remarks that the Athenians should send to Persia numerous ambassadors drawn from the ranks of the poor, that they, too, might share in the King’s wealth and thereby solve the city’s financial woes.9
As Timagoras recalls, the people on that
occasion—that is, at the comic performance—laughed at Epicrates.
By no means,
however, did this laughter signal approval. The entire embassy seems to have been put on trial for dōrodokia; while Epicrates was famously acquitted in that trial, Epicrates’ fellow ambassador Onomasas was found guilty and sentenced to death, just like Timagoras later would be.10 And within two years Epicrates himself would be sentenced to death, again on a charge of dōrodokia while on an embassy.11 If we follow Plutarch, Timagoras’ fatal misstep came in recalling the wrong ambassador, or perhaps the wrong embassy altogether. In that case, though, we are hard-
9
That Epicrates is here referred to by his nickname as ‘shield-bearer’ strongly suggests that Timagoras was recalling not a private conversation between himself and his ‘shield-bearer’, but some public event that had involved the well-known figure of Epicrates ‘shield-bearer’. I propose that the event he recalls was the very scene parodied in Plato’s Presbeis, precisely the kind of context in which we would expect the dēmos to ‘laugh’ at Epicrates’ words. Dover (1950) notes, contra the standard view, that the comedy itself need not have referred to any actual expedition but could have been a comic fiction, much like Trygaeus’ private embassy in Aristophanes’ Peace. Yet in response it should be pointed out that even a private fiction could have parodied an actual expedition. 10 Following Lysias 27.3. There are, however, considerable problems with the chronology of Lysias 27 and the reference therein to an expedition with Epicrates and Onomasas. Including these two embassies, there were potentially five different major events involving Epicrates in the second half of the 390’s. In 395 Timocrates was sent by the King to bribe Greek leaders, including Epicrates and Cephalus at Athens, to adopt an anti-Spartan alliance: Paus. 3.9.7-8, Hell. Oxy. 2.2-5, Xen. Hell. 3.9.1-2 with Bruce (1967: 60 ad Hell. Oxy.II.2) and Rung (2004). Epicrates’ envoy to Persia with Phormisius (394/3 or 393/2) is parodied in Plato Comicus’ Presbeis; see also Athen. 6.251a-b. Finally, Epicrates was part of the embassy to Sparta to secure ratification of the King’s Peace (392/1). I follow Davies’ (1971: 181 ad APF 4859) suggestion that the reference at Lys. 27.3 is to the very embassy parodied in Plato’s Presbeis, meaning that that embassy included Epicrates, Phormisius, and Onomasas. The date of Lysias 27 is more problematic. It cannot be from 394/3, for then when would the previous embassy with Onomasas have occurred? It might refer to 393/2, but we would have to posit an otherwise unattested embassy in that case. One difficulty with assuming that the speech comes from the trial of 392/1 is that Philochorus records that Epicrates and the others were tried in absentia (328 FGrH F149a); still, Epicrates potentially was present for his own trial but left before he was sentenced. This accords well with other instances in which those sentenced to death left Athens before the sentence was pronounced: see Chapter Six below. 11 Dem. 19.277-80, Philochorus 328 FGrH F149a, Aristid. 1.283 Dindorff with schol. Our evidence is inconclusive, but possibly Epicrates was allowed to return to Athens: see APF 181 on an early fourthcentury gravestone for an Epicrates of Cephisia (IG ii2 6444).
7
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Bribery in Classical Athens
Introduction
pressed to answer how Timagoras could have been so wrong or why he would have risked the decision that he did, particularly when the stakes for being wrong were so incredibly high. Framed this way, we have fundamental problems in understanding Timagoras’ intent in taking the King’s dōra. And this leads us to the second apparent incongruity in the story: why were the stakes so high? Given the ascendancy of Thebes, Athens had effectively little bargaining power when Timagoras’ embassy went to Susa; she realistically could have hoped for little more than the negotiations gained her. As a result, any bribes from the Persian King had probably little effect on the resultant terms of the alliance, so it is difficult to see how Timagoras was solely to blame for the treaty. It is hard to understand, moreover, how his offense could have been considered egregious enough to warrant capital punishment. On both counts, we fail to understand the Athenians’ intent in killing Timagoras. Addressing both of these ‘incongruities’ entails placing ancient Athens into critical dialogue with the present: confronting differences between ‘then’ and ‘now’, but also—I would argue ‘especially’—using the past to refocus how we think about the present.
Certainly there were considerable differences between Athenian-style
democracy and the democracy we are used to: notably the exclusion of women, slaves, and resident aliens from the political franchise; direct participation as opposed to representation and delegation; in the second-half of the fifth century the largest Greek empire over other Greeks; and no robust conception of ‘rights’ as we might think of them.12
Still, there were striking similarities as well, particularly in terms of the
12
See generally Finley (1973), Ober and Hedrick (1996). On Athens’ treatment of slaves, metics, and women, see variously Whitehead (1977), Cohen (2002), and the essays collected in Hunter and Edmondson (2001). Empire: e.g. AE (passim), Finley (1973: esp. 95-6), Raaflaub (1994). Increased participation: Sinclair (1988a). Rights: Finley (1976), cf. Wallace (2006).
8
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Introduction
Bribery in Classical Athens
ideological principles that underpinned political organization. Political and legal equality among citizens, cooperation and collective action, public accountability, and the preservation of certain quasi-rights like personal security or the liberty to speak out in public were all hallmarks of the Athenian democracy.13
In this respect, trying to
understand Timagoras’ motivations does not require stepping into a wholly ‘different’ world; as such, it can allow us to look back and see that our own world might be more ‘different’ than we normally assume. By confronting the assumptions that differentiate ‘then’ from ‘now’, I mean to call into question why we make those assumptions in the first place. In other words, examining the potential trajectories of Athens’ democracy—recovering bribery from its shadows—can be a valuable exercise in re-examining the potential paths of our own government, in rethinking the tenuous line we draw between politics and corruption, and in reconceptualizing the relationship between bribery and democracy. One goal of the chapters to come is to present a different way of drawing these lines, using Athens as an example but always being careful to abstract an analytical framework that can readily be applied to the contemporary world.
That said, this dissertation can provide only
suggestions for future work and ultimately leaves such application to others. There are three main assumptions, three specific ways of thinking about bribery and its regulation that must be set aside if we are to understand the actions of Timagoras and the Athenians. We can group these assumptions into theoretical problems as follows. In order to understand Timagoras’ motivations in taking dōra, we must first clearly 13
Viewing Athens as a case-study in democratization has been recently championed by Ober (2008); cf. Lanni (2006; forthcoming), Karayannis and Hatzis (2008). For detailed studies of the development— though not necessarily the ‘democratization’—of the Athenian polity, see Ostwald (1986) and Sealey (1987); for an overview of the Athenian democracy in the fourth century, Ober (1989), Hansen (1991). Equality: Raaflaub (1996). Quasi-rights: Ober (2005: 92-127).
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define what actually constituted his action—was it bribery or not? This is the problem of definition. With that established, we can move on to his intent in performing that action: how did he frame his decision, and what, accordingly, was his motivation? This is the problem of intent. Finally, we must investigate the motivation behind Athens’ use of the death penalty here. Why was Timagoras killed, rather than fined or sentenced to some other punishment? This is the problem of the role of law. Each of these problems will be discussed in a bit more detail here before we turn to a different, more fruitful way of understanding Timagoras’ embassy. When we think of bribery, we tend to think of a kind of abuse of public power for private gain, but how should this ‘abuse’ be defined?14 This problem was hotly debated by political scientists and legal scholars in the 1960’s and 1970’s.
Three distinct
definitions of the ‘abuse’ inherent in bribery emerged from that literature, each of which proved helpful as an analytical category, yet none of which was commonly accepted as a comprehensive definition of bribery. Certain social scientists defined ‘abuse’ according to formal, legal regulations: bribery was thus a kind of illegal use of public power for private profit.
Alternatively, recognizing that legal definitions were not always
comprehensive and were sometimes at odds with the interests of the public at large, other scholars posited that ‘abuse’ should be defined according to what is against the public interest: bribery, so defined, was when an official profited from public office in a way detrimental to the public interest. Finally, a third group posited that, in part because the public interest was a complex idea often difficult to gauge, ‘abuse’ was to be defined
14
See especially Johnston (2005: 10-12) and Chapter One below.
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according to prevailing public attitudes about the proper use of public office. On this definition, bribery constituted an illegitimate use of public power for private profit.15 With the rise of a market-centered approach to studying bribery, in recent decades the problem of definition has been eschewed or, to be more precise, thought settled. On a market-centered model, public officials are a kind of agent who, in abusing their power, thereby violate the terms of a contract they have between themselves and their principal (usually the people as a whole). By viewing public office through a principal-agent relationship, political economists have reached some striking albeit conventionally accepted conclusions: namely, that all public officials are inclined to use their office to maximize private gain or influence provided the costs do not outweigh the gains; and that, accordingly, bribery can be minimized but never completely eliminated.16 The significance of this model will be clear in a moment when we examine the problem of intent. For now it is enough to point out that, in reality, a market-based approach is predicated on a legalistic definition of bribery, as ‘bribery’ is always defined in reference to the ‘contract’ between principal and agent.17 Note how all of these definitions focus on the intent of the bribe. By positing that private gain is the reason for the abuse of public power—however we define it—these
15
This is a modification of the categories set forth by Heidenheimer (1989); cf. Caiden and Caiden (1977), Philp (1997, 2002), Johnston (2005) and Chapter One below. Instead of the public opinion, Heidenheimer includes market-based approaches, on which see further below. Legalistic definitions: Leys (1965), Nye (1967), Scott (1972). Public interest approach: Gronbeck (1978). The public opinion model set forth by Peters and Welch (1972) and Gibbons (1989) never gained much traction with other scholars, but see the recent legal anthropological approach in Pardo (2004a), Haller and Shore (2005). 16 Market-based model: Banfield (1975), Rose-Ackerman (1978, 1999), Goudie and Stasavage (1998), della Porta and Vannuci (1999), Lambsdorff (2002). A principal-agent model is also employed in section 1 of the British Prevention of Corruption Act (1906). This kind of approach has been criticized both for failing to explain collaboration and cooperation within politics (i.e. ‘altruistic’ acts at odds with an inherently selfish rational actor) and for failing to predict the efficacy of certain anti-corruption reforms: see DiIulio (1994) for the former and Robinson (1998) for the latter. Sarat and Simon (2001: 11-12) point out that the turn to rational actor modeling is a broader shift in legal studies more generally. 17 On this point, Philp (1997: 445) is particularly helpful.
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definitions hinge on an actor’s self-conscious decision to commit an abuse in order to receive, or because she has already received, a bribe. In this sense, a bribe is constituted by a corrupting intent. This is precisely how numerous laws define bribery.18 When we ask whether or not bribery was committed, therefore, we tend to frame this question in terms of intent. In the case of Timagoras, the question becomes, “Did Timagoras intend to abuse his power in order to receive dōra from the King?” By focusing on the intent of the bribe, these definitions all implicitly answer the very problem of intent: “What was Timagoras’ motivation in abusing his power? To win dōra from the King.” Market-based approaches to bribery have been particularly popular theoretical models, in this regard, precisely because they promise to predict the behavior of political agents who, like Timagoras, are placed into a situation in which they must represent the interests of their agent, here the Athenian people. Perhaps unsurprisingly given that this model was developed by political economists, such predictions stem from rational actor models of behavior. Why, then, did Timagoras take the King’s dōra? A more specific answer would posit that the incentives—the dōra themselves—outweighed the risks of any potential costs, such as death, loss of prestige, or, in Timagoras’ case, prolonged illness. In gauging the intent of someone like Timagoras, the question is thus framed in terms of a cost-benefit analysis, precisely as we asked earlier: “why, given the high risk of death, did Timagoras take bribes?” It should be noted that the most prominent factor in structuring an agent’s costbenefit analysis is usually taken to be the law itself; this is, in fact, a major reason why market-based approaches feature so heavily in public policy debates today. To be sure,
18
See, for example, 18 U.S.C. § 201 (b) and, generally, “Campaign Contributions and Federal Bribery Law,” 92 Har. L. R. 451 [1978]; section 1 of the British Prevention of Corruption Act (1906).
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this assumes that the law plays a particular role in society—namely as a force that deters people from performing certain actions, and as the sole legitimate force in society for doing just that—but ultimately this assumption is presumed to be trivial. Yes, the law seems to act as a deterrent after all; and, yes, it seems reasonable to conclude that laws are intended to be legitimate. Given these assumptions, our question about the use of the death penalty against Timagoras becomes, “why did the Athenians place such a high penalty on bribery? Was bribery that bad? Or was no other punishment acting as a deterrent?” I have reframed each of the problems of definition, intent, and the role of law in terms of questions that might typically be posed by someone, scholar or layman, coming across the story of Timagoras. As we will see shortly, however, these questions are essentially dead-ends in the Athenian context for they incorporate theoretical assumptions that simply do not apply to ancient Athens—ironically, I would argue, they may not apply to most contemporary polities, as well.19 A more particularistic analysis is needed for examining the Athenian case, and this dissertation aims to provide just such an analysis. The above theoretical questions about how to approach bribery provide a skeleton for the dissertation. Turning now to the ways in which Timagoras’ embassy
19
Finally, it should be noted that my account focuses solely on dōrodokia, which, unlike extortion, coercion, or blackmail, was thought to have been devoid of any violence or force (bia). While I do not deny that bribery can often be combined with these other forms of corruption, dōrodokia, as the Athenians conceptualized it, was a discrete problem and will be treated accordingly. It was also a far more prevalent problem, based on the relatively scarce reference made to extortion during the democracy. Note how the practice of sycophancy, in which a citizen blackmailed another citizen by bringing a false suit against him, was in fact depicted in the language of violence and coercion: Christ (1998) is essential here; cf. Osborne (1985) and Harvey (1985). Yet even such blackmail was relegated to the judicial sphere and does not appear to have carried over into other political spheres. That an official like Miltiades might extort money was, by comparison to the frequency of dōrodokia charges, exceedingly rare: Hdt. 6.136, Corn. Nep. Milt. 7; cf. Plut. Them. 21.
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signals a different approach to bribery and its regulation will thus motivate a synopsis of the larger argument to come. In defining what bribery was, the Athenians focused on outcome, not intent. The Athenian word for bribery was dōrodokia, which literally meant “the receipt of gifts in anticipation of some bad outcome.”20 There was no word for ‘bribes’, and without a bad outcome associated with the gifts, there was no bribery to speak of. Thus, the main law against dōrodokia explicitly defined the offense of bribery as whenever someone gives or receives “to the harm of the people” (e)pi\ bla/bh| tou= dh/mou, Dem. 21.113).
The
Athenians conceptualized dōrodokia by focusing on the outcome: what mattered was the result of the gifts, not the context in or intent with which they were given. Gifts with bad outcomes were bribes; and bad outcomes were presumed to be caused by bribery.21 In this sense, the appropriate question we should ask about Timagoras was not whether or not he intended to abuse his power, but whether or not the outcome of his actions was acceptable. Surely disagreements over what constituted an acceptable outcome arose in the democracy: witness Timagoras’ misestimation of Athenian attitudes towards his gifttaking and especially towards the outcome of the treaty he negotiated with the King. These evaluative discrepancies underpin Chapter One, in which I respond to the problem of definition by outlining a relational model of bribery. This model treats bribery not as a class of political actions, but as a political claim about actions. Bribery, on my view, is a kind of social frame:
a normative assessment of a sequence of events positing a
20
This is a controversial translation, defended at length in Chapter One. Usually scholars translate dōrodokia as “receipt of gifts”: Harvey (1985: 83), Kulesza (1995: 11-12), Taylor (2001: 53), Hashiba (2006: 62), but this is inherently problematic: Chapter One below. 21 I thank Arudra Burra for clarifying for me the distinction between these constitutive and denominative definitions of bribery.
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particular exchange as the cause of some normative violation.
Introduction Whether or not an
exchange really did cause the violation is beside the point, I argue, because accusing someone of bribery was a particular mode of Athenian politics. In this sense, it would have mattered little to the Athenians whether Timagoras’ actions as ambassador were caused by, specifically, the dōra he received from the King; all that would have mattered was that he had failed to advocate Athens’ interests enough. Accordingly, we can see how discrete claims that bribery had been committed could be linked up with broader political narratives about bribery and the democracy. This is the value of the ‘potential trajectory’ represented by Timagoras’ bribery. By weighing whether or not Timagoras’ actions should be deemed legitimate, the Athenians transformed an accusation of bribery into a constitutive part of public discourse. As will be outlined in Chapter One, individual accusations of bribery framed a bribe-giver or bribe-taker in terms of a broader social type, the dōrodokos or ‘corrupt man’. By casting an offending individual as a stereotype, each accusation of bribery thus negotiated broad public norms structuring who the dōrodokos was and what role he should play in the democracy. For his contemporaries, Timagoras qua a dōrodokos was an example of a bad friend, a man who betrayed his friend and fellow ambassador Leon for money and the company of others. Timagoras was thus prosecuted in part because he refused to room with his fellow ambassador and because he followed the Theban ambassador Pelopidas’ counsel in all matters (Xen. Hell. 1.35). As Demosthenes clearly indicates, these two accusations were conceptually linked, for both represented the breaking of a “compact”
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Introduction
(spondai/), whether between friends or between a citizen and his country.22
By not
rooming with Leon, Timagoras was thought to be signaling his alignment with a different set of political friends—here, Pelopidas, whose policy recommendations he endorsed even when they proved detrimental to Athens’ interests (Xen. Hell. 1.35-6). Similarly, when the King followed Pelopidas’ recommendations and demanded that Athens beach her warships, Leon warned that the King was no longer behaving like Athens’ friend (cf. fi/lon, Xen. Hell. 1.37). Just as the King’s policy suggested a rupture of the friendship he enjoyed with Athens, Timagoras’ actions towards Leon and his counsel to the King suggested that he was betraying friend and city, alike.23 In Timagoras’ case, the dōrodokos was, specifically, a traitor to the city. So the end of Plutarch’s story hints that it was Timagoras’ implicit treason that explains his punishment, for the Athenians had a hard time accepting that everything had gone to the Thebans’ advantage. This explanation also underpins the more contemporary treatments given by Xenophon and Demosthenes. In both of these accounts, there is considerably more at stake than an unfavorable peace settlement. Instead, these versions underscore that what was Thebes’ gain was explicitly Athens’ loss: in this light Timagoras’ actions reflected a reprehensible readiness to join with Athens’ enemies; he was a traitor.24 From this we can begin to see that the way in which Athenians conceptualized dōrodokia might
22
Note here the parallel structure of Demosthenes’ thought, which syntactically balances public and private compacts: oi9 a)dikou~ntej dhlono&ti ta_j o3lhj lhj ge th~j patri/doj sponda&j...ou) mo&non ta_j i0di/aj (Dem. 19.191). Moreover, the orator underscores how such private bonds emphatically connoted public bonds, as well, for he fronts the word o3lhj (“entire”), which is itself already intensified by , within the articleadjective-noun-noun sequence. 23 In the same vein, Xenophon contrasts Timagoras’ actions in being a bad friend to Leon with those of Antiochus the Arcadian, who refuses the King’s gifts precisely because the Arcadian League was “slighted” by the King (h)lattou=to, Xen. Hell. 7.1.38.). 24 Dem 19.137, 191; Xen. Hell. 7.1.37. Plutarch is even more explicit on this point in calling the King’s gifts a “reproach unto treason more than a token of friendly charis” (o)neidismo\j e)j prodosi/an ma=llon h)\ xa/ritoj u(po/mnhsij, Plut. Art. 22.6).
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Introduction
have a significant effect on how they regulated it. After all, we might be less inclined to query the death of a traitor than that of a venal politician. It is precisely on this point that Plutarch’s juxtaposition of Epicrates and Timagoras becomes so instructive, for accounts of Epicrates’ embassy condemn him not for treason, but for profiteering. With Epicrates, the excessive amount of the King’s gifts seems to have been the only issue. In his comedy The Presbeis, Plato Comicus describes in detail the range of different gold and silver cups that Epicrates took (Plato Com. frr. 119-21K). The comic poet even comments on how many of them there were (cf. plei=sta, Pl. Com. fr. 119.2K) and notes that both ambassadors made off like thieves (cf. e)klepte/thn, Pl. Com. fr. 120K; kle/yaj, Pl. Com. fr. 121K). Indeed, the entire anecdote is framed around how Epicrates had profited, while the rest of the city remained poor (Plut. Pelop. 30.7). Earlier, too, when Epicrates purportedly took dōra from Timocrates, the author of the Hellenica Oxyrhyncia notes that the dōra themselves did not change Epicrates’ mind; they were pure profit (Hell. Oxy. 2.2-5). Instead of being a traitor, Epicrates seems to have been much closer to a thief. In this way we can tease out of Plutarch’s account the idea that conceptions of who the dōrodokos was actually changed throughout the democracy. This fundamental point courses through Chapters Two through Four, which examine how and why political narratives about the dōrodokos changed throughout the democracy. Building on the relational model developed in Chapter One, these chapters explore how changing economic and political circumstances, as well as patterns of social relations in politics all shaped how the dōrodokos was conceived: he changed from a kind of disobedient citizen in the fifth century (Chapter Two), to a thief in the early fourth century (Chapter Three),
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and finally to a traitor in the last half century of the democracy (Chapter Four). As will be clear, by focusing on changing social relations and the obligations that inhere therein, we are forced to frame the intent of the dōrodokos in a very different light. Rather than behave like a rational actor pursuing his own (financial) utility, the dōrodokos emerges as a bad friend unsuccessfully negotiating a range of different relationships, in particular his ‘friendship’ with the community itself. In these cases, the ‘motivation’ we seek to explain is not so much why a given individual violated a norm for personal gain as why he failed to frame his actions in those terms. This was true of Timagoras, who delicately balanced relationships with Leon, Pelopidas, and the Persian King, in addition to his civic ‘friendship’ with the Athenian people.
Hence, contemporary accounts of the embassy focused intensely on the
friendships forged and broken in Susa. Timagoras effectively renounced his personal friendship with Leon (a major reason for his subsequent trial) and in doing so signaled that he was renouncing his friendship with Athens, too. In addition, the details of Xenophon’s and Demosthenes’ versions suggest that Timagoras may also have been thought to have conspired with Pelopidas and the King:
this would explain why
Timagoras “testified on behalf of” Pelopidas’ speech and why the King subsequently held Timagoras in such high esteem (sunemartu/rei, Xen. Hell. 7.1.35). On this reconstruction, for Timagoras’ critics, the danger he posed was that he was actively colluding with political friends outside the city in order to do damage to the city itself. As Plutarch notes, the gift given by the King was not in itself considered bad, but the exchange was blamed because of the collusion and treason it concealed. For all we know, however, Timagoras simply viewed things differently: he might have thought
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Introduction
Athens had little negotiating power, and he might have blamed his sickness for why he would not room with Leon.
In short, we must take seriously the possibility that
Timagoras never considered himself a traitor. To that extent, a rational actor model simply fails to understand his motivation. Timagoras was not alone in being wholly ignorant of the ways in which he was unsuccessfully negotiating his relationship with the community. The first four chapters reveal how Athens’ greatest politicians—Themistocles, Cimon, Pericles, Cleon, Aeschines and Demosthenes—were all accused of dōrodokia, yet few seemed to think of their actions as ‘bribery’. Indeed, if Timagoras and countless other officials like him were somehow unaware that they had failed the Athenians, they must have understood their own actions as benefiting the democracy in some way. They must have slotted their own actions into some larger political narrative about how a ‘good’ democracy functions. This claim will be taken up extensively in Chapters Two through Four, which collectively show how dōrodokia operated very much in the shadows of democracy: the monies taken by the dōrodokos were constantly weighed against the monies of democracy as two sides of the same coin. In effect, Timagoras and other dōrodokoi may have thought they were dealing in legitimate political monies, only to discover, too late, that the Athenians considered them bribe monies. Considerable disagreement arose, in large part, because within both dōrodokia and the democracy, monies were used as metaphors for the relationships they negotiated. Bribes signified corrupt social relations in politics, just as the legitimate monies of the democracy—e.g. state pay, public honors, tribute—signaled the proper social relations constitutive of the democracy itself. Such ‘weighing’ of monies, then, underscored a more profound weighing of how politics
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Introduction
should be conducted. Whereas the dōrodokos might have thought his actions were legitimate, even downright beneficial to the polity, his opponents called them dōrodokia and corruptive of the democracy. It is in this sense that discursive shifts in the figure of the dōrodokos reflected changes in broader political narratives about the democracy. As the polity developed, new monies were used to negotiate new social relations within politics, and these new monies reflected new ways to conceptualize the ideal relationship between citizen and community. What we will discover in these chapters, though, is that the Athenians essentially thought through such discursive shifts by thinking with the figure of the dōrodokos.
Bribe monies signaled illegitimate relations, processes or outcomes; by
articulating what constituted such illegitimate monies, the Athenians implicitly outlined the contours of the legitimate practice of politics. In detailing how the Athenians conceptualized dōrodokia, the first four chapters illustrate just how far removed we are from intent-based, rational actor approaches to bribery. Indeed, the Athenians focused on outcomes, and they located bribery squarely within the framework of gift exchange and the relationships it negotiates. The relevant questions they would have posed of Timagoras would have been: “was the outcome of his actions good?” and “what made him think he was successfully negotiating his relationship with the community?” Answering these questions would have answered, for an Athenian, whether Timagoras’ actions constituted dōrodokia, and what his ultimate motivation was. Again, accusing someone like Timagoras of dōrodokia was a way to signal that a given political outcome was bad. It opened up public discussion about
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Introduction
whether or not the ‘potential trajectory’ constituted by his actions was, in fact, a desirable path for the democracy. Judging by the rates of bribery trials in the democracy, the Athenians apparently thought that a lot of just such ‘potential trajectories’ in their democracy had been bad; in this sense, the outright presumption of bribery was perhaps not entirely unwarranted. Scholarly estimates of the prevalence of Athenian bribery have varied considerably, but the number of bribery prosecutions and convictions, to say nothing of instances that never came to trial, is enormously high by Western standards.25 Even with considerable gaps in our evidence, we have attested 32 different prosecutions of bribery with an additional 22 cases of varying degrees of certainty; all but a handful of these cases fall during the period 430-322, the best-attested period of the democracy.26 At least 36 of these 54 trials resulted in conviction.27 Although extrapolating from our evidence is hazardous, we can plausibly estimate that roughly 6-10% of major public officials would have been brought to trial on accusations of bribery, and roughly half of these officials would have been convicted.28 25
Kulesza (1995: 39-40) rightly remarks that, given the tremendous gaps in our sources, the unusually high prevalence of bribery attested in our sources is most likely only the tip of the iceberg. Scholarly estimates run the gamut from positing widespread peculation—MacDowell (1983), Cargill (1985), Strauss (1985)—to claiming that dōrodokia was “more [frequent] than would be regarded as acceptable in our own society” (Harvey [1985]) or, in the exceptional view of Perlman (1976: 231), “not very widespread.” Estimating the prevalence of bribery is notoriously difficult even in non-historical societies and cannot be our aim here. Still, it is worth considering that, by the standards defined by political scientists—on which see Chapter One—bribery was probably a regular occurrence in the democracy: cf. Cargill (1985: 79). 26 For the catalog of bribery trials, see Kulesza (1995: 85-90) and, for a slightly modified list in English, Taylor (2001). 27 For the 34 known dōrodokia trials (32 known plus 2 for which dōrodokia is mentioned in our sources but not at the trial), 19 resulted in conviction, 4 resulted in acquittal, 6 presumably resulted in acquittal, and the result for 5 is unknown. Of the remaining 20 trials, 17 resulted in conviction, 1 probably did so, there was 1 acquittal, and 1 with unknown outcome. Of these latter 17 convictions, however, 9 come from the trial of the Treasurers of Hellas (Hellēnotamiai), who reportedly were convicted unjustly; the tenth was saved from certain death when proof of their innocence was discovered during his trial (Ant. 5.69-71). 28 The vast majority of our attested bribery trials are prosecutions of generals, public speakers (rhētores), or ambassadors (the latter two categories after 411). If we assume roughly 100 rhētores during the 90 or so years after the introduction of an eisangelia for bribe-taking by a rhētor and, on average, a total of roughly
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Introduction
Our sources suggest, moreover, that the Athenians enacted and modified more legislative and institutional reforms dealing with bribery than for any other offense. They created no fewer than seven legal processes for prosecuting the gift or receipt of bribes, whether generally or involving specific officials in specific contexts; some of these were modified more than once over the course of the democracy. The penalties attached to these legal processes—a tenfold fine, disfranchisement, or death—were considerable. There were, in addition, public curses and oaths against taking bribes, as well as numerous changes to the jury and magistrate allotment procedures, reportedly to reduce the potential for corruption. And in the fourth century, on at least one occasion the entire registry of citizens had to be re-ratified under suspicion that some residents had bribed their way into the citizenry.29 These legal and institutional reforms certainly suggest that dōrodokia was a persistent problem at Athens, but is that all they suggest? Were the severe penalties for dōrodokia indications that the Athenians had trouble deterring it? Timagoras’ embassy provides two clues to the contrary. First, it is important to note that, in all of our accounts, the only person who was ‘deterred’ by these laws was the Persian King, not Timagoras or any other potential dōrodokos. Demosthenes remarks that, once the King saw how serious the Athenians were about dōrodokia—by killing Timagoras—he 15 unique ambassadors and generals per year over the same time period, this amounts to around 1500 possible bribery cases during this time for the most prestigious public positions, of which we have attested in one form or another 45 trials. Given the tremendous gaps in our evidence—with the high frequency of trials in the early fourth century (so Strauss [1985]), the general dearth of evidence for the 370’s is particularly striking—let us assume that these trials represent only half of the actual number of trials, or about 90 (6%) out of 1500 possible cases. By contrast, Hansen (1975; cf. 1999: 217) points out that, for the most important position, the generalship, we know of only 289, or 37%, of the 770 generalships held between 432 and 355 BCE. A more accurate assessment of the prevalence of bribery trials thus might be closer to 10% (or even 15%) of the major political positions held. This figure excludes prosecution of minor officials, for an example of which see Ant. 6.49-50. 29 On these legal procedures, penalties, and institutional reforms, see most recently MacDowell (1983), Hashiba (2006). All of these developments will be treated in detail below in Chapters Five and Six.
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Bribery in Classical Athens
decided never to give anyone dōra again (Dem. 19.137).
While we might take
Demosthenes’ words with a grain of salt, it is significant that an Athenian like Demosthenes viewed the law’s deterrent effect in terms of bribe-givers, not bribe-takers. At the very least, we should reconsider our assumption that the law was intended primarily to deter potential bribe-takers. Second, it is also significant that, at least in Plutarch’s account, Timagoras weighs his decision not in terms of the letter of the law— i.e. what the law actually says—but in terms of the law in action. He recalls how Epicrates happily took dōra and went unpunished, and it was this purported legal result, rather than the law itself, that influenced his own decision. Accordingly, Chapters Five through Seven show that, in order to understand why the Athenians created the specific anti-dōrodokia legislation that they did, we need to move beyond thinking about the law solely in terms of deterrence.
Chapter Five
develops a theoretical framework for examining Athenian legislation on dōrodokia. In particular, it focuses on the ways in which such legislation ‘translated’ the figure of the dōrodokos into a legal entity. This framework will then be used, in Chapter Six, to trace a legal history of dōrodokia: both the kinds of legal spaces created for dōrodokia, and how those spaces were used to articulate ‘democratic’ legal and political institutions. Finally, Chapter Seven considers the function of those laws and legal processes in action, specifically how dōrodokia trials might be used not only to educate Athenians in civic values, but even to legitimate policies, political processes, and even political players. Given the sheer number of attested dōrodokia trials as well as the extensive breadth and depth of reforms geared towards dōrodokia, this legal history provides us with a uniquely detailed look at the changing relationship between law and society at
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Introduction
Athens throughout the democracy. As the second half of the dissertation shows, in the same way as the dōrodokos was articulated in opposition to the good democratic citizen, the Athenians used the dōrodokos in law to think through what ‘democratic’ institutions and legal processes should look like.
We find, then, a complex process of norm
articulation whereby legal and institutional changes both reflected and influenced social norms governing the dōrodokos. In particular, picking up on the idea of bribery as an alternate trajectory for the democracy, these chapters suggest that the Athenians actively sought to create a political space in which the power of bribery as a distinct mode of politics could be leveraged for the good of the democracy. The Athenians took seriously the idea that political outcomes were neither good nor bad until they were so legitimated (or delegitimized) by the people. And one prominent way to legitimate outcomes was through dōrodokia trials. Hence, the reason why the Athenians killed dōrodokoi like Timagoras often had more to do with this process of legitimization than with any inherent desire to deter dōrodokia. There are numerous areas of Athenian political practice that will always be frustratingly beyond our reach. How often were dōra given with the explicit intent of changing an official’s mind? Were dōra given and received only within the context of pre-existing relations, or were one-off bribes also common? What were the real-life political and economic effects of undeniable cases of dōrodokia? These are big questions for any account of bribery. As often, even in modern case-studies, they will regrettably be left unanswered. For a host of reasons, there is no systematic way to gather evidence on bribery, ancient or modern, including records of bribes received or testimonies of the parties involved. The Athenian case, though frustratingly incomplete, might nevertheless
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Introduction
be of just as much use as any contemporary study in shedding light on current models used to examine bribery. On the whole, the goal of the following seven chapters is to paint a picture of how dōrodokia shaped the development of the Athenian democracy: representing an alternate trajectory that the democracy might take, instances of purported bribery were significant political and cultural moments at Athens. The Athenians consequently enacted a range of legal and institutional measures to weigh these moments and leverage them for the collective good. Each time dōrodokia was thought to have arisen, the Athenians decided as a collective body whether a particular outcome associated with dōrodokia was legitimate—and hence consonant with the democracy—or illegitimate—and hence bribery. And in looking back at the development of the democracy, they repeatedly looked to the dōrodokos as the conceptual bogeyman of their polity: the anti-citizen who violated his ‘friendship’ with the community. As we will consider in the Conclusion, even though dōrodokia appears to have been quite frequent, it need not have been detrimental to the polity. In fact, this dissertation suggests that we should take seriously the idea that more frequent bribery, playing the specific role it did in Classical Athens, actually may have helped, not harmed the emergence and persistence of democracy.
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Bribery in Classical Athens
Chapter One
Bribery, Politics, and the Problem of Definition
Every inquiry into bribery must grapple with the question of definition: what is bribery? Typically, bribery is assumed to be an illicit payment to an official to obtain services or to avoid costs; that is, bribery is considered a particular type of abuse of public power for private gain.1 So, for instance, paying a policeman not to write a speeding ticket, paying a legislator to vote a particular way, or paying a bureaucrat for a public contract or to expedite some public service are all classic examples of bribery in action, according to this definition. But what about paying a student to get good grades, a referee or athlete to throw a sporting event, or a bureaucrat who demands additional compensation for the provision of a public service? Are these not bribery, as well? Are they somehow qualitatively and meaningfully distinct from the above definition? One response might be to narrow our scope to include only ‘political’ bribery—so that pay-for-grades and athletic bribery are not included—and to differentiate between bribery and extortion, which might eliminate the last example given. In this way, we might arrive at a satisfactory set of actions, all firmly located within the public sphere (however that is defined), and all readily described as bribery. This is, in fact, the course adopted by most scholars, and there is much to recommend it, as it allows us to compare cross-culturally what does and does not constitute bribery. In the case of ancient Athens,
1
On this definition, see the recent discussion in Johnston (2005: 10-12). Alternatively, bribery is conceptualized as a means to corrupt a person’s (sc. public official’s) judgment, a definition used by Harvey (1985: 77) and Taylor (2001: 53) in their examinations of ancient bribery. Such a definition, however, quickly blends into an “illicit payment”: if it were licit, there would be no corruption of judgment; and the payment would not be necessary if the official was already going to do what was being paid for. The definition of bribery given above can thus be taken, simply, as an elaboration of why a corrupting payment is successful (because it succeeds in creating an abuse of public power for private gain).
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for example, by obtaining even just a rough approximation of what the Athenians considered an ‘abuse’, ‘public’, ‘power’, ‘private’ and ‘gain’, we might begin to understand which actions did and did not constitute bribery at Athens. From there we could more accurately differentiate between those actions that were really bribery at Athens and those that only seem (to us) like bribery but were perfectly licit for the Athenians, and so forth. Or so the theory goes. There are immediate, salient problems with taking a definition like “abuse of public power for private gain”—already laden in specific normative terms, it seems—and trying to translate it from one normative context to another.
Even within a given set of cultural norms, it is unclear on what grounds
‘abuse’ should be defined. Is it a violation of formal (legal) rules regarding the conduct of public officials, an action that goes contrary to the public interest, or one that goes against the public’s conception of what is acceptable?2 Again, we could simply limit ourselves to one way of defining ‘abuse’ (or ‘power’ or ‘gain’, for that matter). But doing so obscures the crucial political work done by, say, limiting our scope to formal regulations of official conduct while disregarding both public opinion about what the law should say and the extent to which the law is seen to foster the public interest. This is not just an issue of asking, when a particular law is thought unjust, whether it should be 2
These three options correspond to a modified version of Arnold Heidenheimer’s (1989) threefold typology of definitions of corruption. Heidenheimer differentiates between defining ‘abuse’ according to the norms of public office (i.e. legal norms) or the public interest; alternatively, under a market-based approach, public officials qua rational (utility maximizing) agents always tend to use public office to maximize private gain or influence. As Philp (1997: 445) has convincingly shown, however, market-based approaches always already incorporate legalistic definitions insofar as they presume that proper official conduct is determined by the law. In place of the market-oriented approach, therefore, I have included Gibbons’ (1989) definition based on public opinion even though this approach has not gained much traction; see also Peters and Welch (1978). Legalistic approaches can be found in Leys (1965), Nye (1967), Scott (1972). Public interest approach: Gronbeck (1978). Market-based model: Banfield (1975), Rose-Ackerman (1978, 1999), Klitgaard (1988), Goudie and Stasavage (1998), della Porta and Vannuci (1999), Lambsdorff (2002).
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considered bribery if officials follow public opinion and the public interest by regularly accepting bribes not to heed the law; or, conversely, whether perfectly legal lobbying efforts or campaign contributions should not, in fact, be considered legalized bribery. Rather, I am calling into question what is at stake—what is actually being measured—by terming such instances ‘bribery’. Certainly it is valuable to try to reduce bribery to an essential core which can then be compared across normative contexts, but the standard definition seems to misunderstand the nature of that core. In positing an apolitical, neutral definition of bribery that need only be adapted to a particular culture’s norms, the standard view misses the fact that every definition of bribery is a political claim: by marking out what is considered ‘bad’ government, the actions that constitute bribery negatively define the contours of good government.3 To that extent, the standard definition actually posits a specific normative framework for understanding bribery, while allowing only the contents of that framework to vary cross-culturally; far from being apolitical or normatively neutral, the standard definition is, itself, a political, normative definition. Definitions of ‘abuse’ likewise hinge on the terms by which we define the workings of good government: whether it functions in accordance with the law, public interest, or public opinion. While it might be illuminating to measure to what extent different countries adhere to a given definition of good government, this is ultimately a bizarre comparison, not least because different polities can be organized under different guiding principles. Phrased this way, the standard approach to defining and measuring
3
Euben (1989), Philp (1997), Génaux (2004) and, with reference to US campaign contribution debates, Burke (2006). Harrison (2004) highlights the importance and power entailed in naming something ‘corruption’.
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bribery seems an odd approach to take particularly for historical societies like ancient Athens. This chapter presents a different approach to how we should define and measure bribery, one that treats bribery not as a class of political actions, but as a political claim about actions. The first section will present an overview of this approach, examining how bribery, as a social frame, creates distinct normative patterns in every polity. The following section will apply this approach to the case of democratic Athens by focusing, in particular, on the language of bribery and the practice of politics. There it will be shown that the medium of bribery, the bribe, is emblematic of a host of different ways in which the Athenians leveraged social relationships in the practice of politics.
In the
third and last section, we will consider how the normative value of the bribe often shifts depending on whether one adopts the frame of an insider—someone part of the bribe relationship—or an outsider. In turn, public discourse on what did and did not constitute bribery was, itself, composed of numerous, competing accusations of bribery. Understanding how this public discourse was constructed will enable us, in the chapters to come, to measure how and why Athenian conceptions of bribery changed over the course of the democracy, and how bribery played an integral role in how the Athenians thought through their democracy.
A Relational Approach to Bribery The relational approach adopted here begins with the simple claim that bribery entails both social relations and norms. First, bribery is never conducted in a social vacuum: there are always at least two participants linked by some kind of social tie, even
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if that tie is as bare as an arms-length bureaucrat-citizen relationship. Second, and this is precisely the phenomenon captured by defining bribery as a kind of “illicit payment” or “abuse,” bribery implies a violation of some norm. The crucial distinction between the standard view and my own is how these two components—social relations and norms— are combined with each other to create the category ‘bribery’. On the standard view, the norms are taken to define the social relations involved in bribery. As noted earlier, once we define the categories of ‘abuse’, ‘public’, ‘power’, etc., we purportedly can determine the class of actions that constitute bribery. The social relations that pertain in these actions are thus wholly incidental, but they are also, themselves, determined by how we define the prevailing norms concerning ‘abuse’, ‘public’, etc. For an illicit payment to constitute bribery, in the sense that we want, it would necessarily entail some counterbalancing of ‘public’ and ‘private’. In other words, bribery would be possible only among those social relations that involve a ‘public’ individual. This may seem like an acceptable result, but note how quickly it can both underdetermine and over-determine what scholars are actually trying to measure. Where a strong informal network holds considerable power in society, for example, even if it does not control the formal organs of government, within the network there may be no ‘public’ individuals, proper. Hence, the use of bribe-like payments within the network should not strictly be considered bribery under the standard definition. Conversely, it is not always an ‘abuse’ of power for a public official to receive some kind of gain in exchange for a favorable vote:
again, vote-swapping, campaign financing, and lobbying by special
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interest groups may be perfectly legal modes of conducting politics, even if to most observers such payments may look like bribes. What we find, then, is that by forcing actions into an already culturally determined framework, scholars have defined a pattern of actions that only imperfectly approximates the phenomenon they wish to study. It should be noted that the same problem will recur given any attempt to define bribery in apolitical terms: bribery is a political phenomenon, so we should expect that there are as many definitions of bribery as there are of polity. Accordingly, bribery qua a pattern of actions defies rigorous definition. I propose, instead, a relational approach to bribery in which the social relations, not the norms, assume a prior role in definition; in this way, we should think of bribery not as a distinct pattern of actions generated by specific cultural norms, but as a normative pattern generated by distinct social relations.4 My approach follows on recent work by economic sociologists, who have sought to break down the orthodox divide between ‘economic’ and ‘social’ modes of behavior, traditionally considered to occupy separate spheres of action and hence to be predicated on different logics of action.5
4
By ‘relational’ I intend to move past the concept of ‘embeddedness’, as classicists might recognize from the influential work of Polanyi (1968)—e.g. Finley (1977), von Reden (1995a), Kurke (1999)—and as underpins the work of recent economic sociologists like Granovetter (1985), Uzzi and Lancaster (2004). Embeddedness points towards how social relations shape economic activity. Yet these social relations are largely taken to be a flat structure within which ‘economic’, as distinct from ‘relational’, activity is carried out. On a relational view, within this structure the only work that occurs—the only meaning that is defined, contested, and negotiated—is relational work. In this sense, ‘economics’ does not occur within social relations—it is not simply “embedded” in them. Rather, economics is about social relations and is, in this sense, constitutive of them. For a helpful overview of the differences and similarities between a relational approach and Polanyi’s work on embeddedness, see Steiner (2009). 5 People have persistent fears over mixing money and relationships, as if the former are destructive or corruptive of the latter. Zelizer calls this fear “Hostile Worlds” and discusses it at length in Zelizer (2005b). In terms of ‘economic’ activity, this dichotomy had until recently amounted to scholars’ polarization of gifts and commodities—that is, inalienable goods exchanged between interdependent actors and alienable goods exchanged between independent actors, in Gregory’s (1982) influential formulation— which are, accordingly, exchanged according to different logics: see also Sahlins (1972: 277-314). As
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Instead of claiming, like neo-classical economists, that economic behavior is not shaped in any significant way by social context or prevailing social norms, economic sociologists posit that economic actions are constitutive of social relations and the cultural meanings attached to them.6 Production, distribution, and consumption, the traditional spheres of ‘economic’ activity, are always already relational activities, playing a valuable role in the relational work people perform every day.7 In particular, Viviana Zelizer has developed a relational framework for analyzing economic activity, one that will lay the foundation for our investigation of bribery. Zelizer defines economic transactions by the presence of a transaction medium, called a ‘money’: “a representation of rights to goods and services, usually in the form of concrete tokens.”8 Just as important as the transaction medium (the money given or received) are the transaction context and the social relation of the transactors. While the relations of the transactors can vary almost infinitely, Zelizer distinguishes among only three types of transaction contexts—gift, compensation, and entitlement—which
Bourdieu (1977: 171-7) points out, however, transacting even in gifts requires misrecognition; ‘economic’ calculation can and does factor into how or what gifts are exchanged. See further discussion at Appadurai (1986: 13), Bloch and Parry (1989: 8-12). What economic sociologists like Zelizer have done, therefore, is to posit that the logic of the exchange is oriented around the social relations of the transaction, not necessarily the exchanged goods, themselves. 6 To be sure, recent literature in the New Institutional Economics and the contextualist camp of the New Economic Sociology has modified the neo-classical model tremendously: see the overview in Lambsdorff, Taube and Schramm (2005), with examples in della Porta and Vannuci (1999) and Warburton (2001) on networks and corruption. Still, the essential core of these models is assumed to be the traditional homo economicus rational actor. It is here, in dissolving a rational actor approach, that the alternative camp of economic sociologists makes its boldest and most stimulating claims. 7 See further Abolafia (1996), Tilly and Tilly (1998), Biggart and Delbridge (2004), Fourcade and Healy (2007). 8 Quote from Zelizer (2001: 9992). Zelizer (2001) provides a helpful overview of the sociology of money summarized here; see also Davis (1992), Zelizer (1994; 2005b), Zelizer and Tilly (2006).
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correspond, respectively, to whether or not the transaction medium represents a voluntary bestowal on another, direct exchange, or rightful claim to a share.9 Building on Zelizer’s ideas, I argue that bribery should be understood no less as a way of negotiating social relations. After all, bribes are commonly taken to be just such a form of money, as it is the bribe itself—whether in cash or in kind, explicit or not—that establishes someone’s right to a particular good or service. Given that bribery is thought of as a kind of quid pro quo, we can readily classify it as a transaction of compensation (direct exchange). More specifically, I propose, something is ‘bribery’ if and only if there is an exchange, a violation of an obligation inhering in a social relationship, and a causal link between the two such that the violation is thought to occur because of the exchange. These three components should be uncontroversial given that they are always implicit whether we define bribery as a kind of “abuse [violation] of public power for [causality] private gain [exchange]” or as an “illicit [violation] payment [exchange] meant [causality] to change one’s mind.” Yet bribery occupies a special role within Zelizer’s typology because the relevant, violated social relationship is usually not that between bribe-giver and bribe-taker (i.e. the two transactors); instead, it is usually a relationship between the bribe-taker and some third party.10 Note how extending the frame in this way to encompass the perspective of a thirdparty creates the potential for a crucial conflict between social frames. In part because of uncertainty surrounding what constitutes bribery, in part because of the high risks 9
This is a different typology than the schema of general, balanced, and negative reciprocities developed by Sahlins (1972: 185-230, esp. 191-6) and which classicists typically use: see most recently Herman (2006: 30-8). 10 Of course, this is not always the case. I would argue that, in the case of ‘bribing’ a child to get good grades, the child is thought to have violated an obligation either to herself or, more likely, to her parents. In this case, the exchange constitutes the violation: thereafter the child presumably would be striving to get good grades not because she owed it to her parents, but because she would be compensated for doing so.
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associated with bribery, transacting in bribes—i.e. violating social norms—requires an enormous amount of trust.
Typically, high-risk transactions are conducted through
previously existing social relations, as the social relations themselves act to diffuse the risk associated with the transaction.11 Where there are no previous social relations to guide transactors, local norms can guarantee the security of the transaction: where bribes are expected, there is little risk that they will be punished.12
The majority of bribe
transactions is thus conducted between actors who are either already linked through some social network or who can rely on prevailing institutional norms to know that the transaction is safe. This confines the giving and taking of bribes predominantly to welldefined networks of actors; people are either ‘in’ the network, or they are ‘out’ of it.13 Conflicting social frames arise when ‘insiders’ view the actions in terms of one frame, ‘outsiders’ another. On the one hand, bribe-giver and bribe-taker (the insiders) regularly frame the bribe and the service for which it is purportedly exchanged as distinct media for negotiating, contesting, and constituting a local relationship amongst themselves. As such, bribe and service can readily be framed as reciprocal gifts, not as quid pro quo compensation14; often, too, they are understood as part of a longer sequence
11
DiMaggio and Louch (1998), and, on bribery, Humphrey (1991), Ledeneva (1998, 2008), Lambsdorff (2002), Uslaner (2004), Pardo (2004b). 12 Graeff (2005). 13 Pardo (2004b)’s study of Italian corruption demonstrates this point well in illustrating how low-level corruption requiring relatively little trust was conducted among individuals outside of any network whereas high-level corruption, requiring much higher levels of trust, was conducted via networks. Of course, in the case of prevailing local norms, simply entering into the correct institutional context—e.g. interacting with the appropriate governmental office, widely known to demand bribes—can be all it takes to become an ‘insider’: see further Humphrey (1991) on outsider distinctions involving bribery. Ledeneva (1998: 3942) differentiates bribery from blat (personal influence) by the presence or absence of networks, but she takes too narrow an understanding of bribery as entailing the use of money (qua cash). Instead, I would point out that the currency of blat networks can appear to be bribes to outsiders. In this sense, blat and bribery on Ledeneva’s definition are gradations of a range of collaborative activity that can be termed ‘bribery’ on my definition. 14 Indeed, when there is frequent reciprocal giving within a relationship, the particular ‘bribe’ and service may be thought by insiders as completely unrelated to each other. Note how the reverse is usually the case
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of reciprocal exchanges that define the dynamics of that local relationship.15 Within this frame, the transactors readily view their own actions as unproblematic or, at worst, normatively ambiguous. Even when it is recognized that some kind of non-local ‘line’ has been crossed, this short-term violation is frequently justified on the grounds that it is necessary or will bring a benefit in the long-term.16 On the other hand, outsiders might frame the transaction as a bribe, that is, as compensation constituting or resulting in a violation of broader societal norms—though precisely which norms have been violated is often contested. On this view, too, the bribe performs crucial relational work, but the proper field for that relational work is often viewed as a bribe-taker’s relationship not to some bribe-giver, but to society as a whole.17 For precisely this reason, public officials who take bribes are thought to have breached some kind of public trust or to have transgressed the formal rules for office.18
in bureaucratic contexts where bribery is expected. There, ‘bribe’ and service can be closely correlated as direct exchange precisely because the local bureaucrat-citizen relationship being negotiated is an armslength tie in which market norms (like direct compensation, not gifts) prevail. On the distinction between market and social frames, see especially Heyman and Ariely (2004); as MacKenzie, Muniesa, and Siu (2007) point out, however, an arms-length tie is nevertheless a relational distance that must be constantly negotiated by two social transactors. 15 Ethnographic accounts of bribery are particularly helpful on this point, as they point to how the discourse of friendship pervades how transactors frame the transaction: e.g. Ledeneva (1998: 59-66), Parry (2000: 33), Pardo (2004b: 40), Rigi (2004: 111), Sedlenieks (2004: 125), Smith (2007: 85-6). 16 American legislators frequently justify lobbyists and campaign contributions from special interest groups on precisely these grounds as necessary, if ambiguous, means for them to stay in office; after all, they can represent their constituents well only by remaining in office. Cf. Thompson (1995: 66). In examining US federal laws on campaign financing, Lowenstein (2004) underscores the role corrupt intent plays both in the law and in how people negotiate the giving and receiving of campaign contributions. I would reframe his question of intent (is quid pro quo intended?) as a question of framing (according to the transactors, is it quid pro quo or gift exchange?). 17 Alternatively, some set of non-universal norms might provide a competing frame. So a local high-school athletic team might be let down if one of the teammates is bribed to throw the game, but we probably would not say that a societal or universal norm had been transgressed. Schweitzer’s (2005) analysis of bribery through the lens of particular vs. universal norms should thus be modified, as there is no requirement that bribery be framed from the perspective of universal, societal norms. Often times, in fact, which norms should be considered universal, which particular, is precisely the kind of political question that is negotiated through practice. 18 This is, of course, where public-office and public-interest definitions of corruption derive their normative force. For the relationship between corruption and the breach of trust, see especially Uslaner (2002, 2005), Graeff (2005).
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In the final section we will address some of the crucial implications that emerge from this conflict in social frames, but for now I would like to point out two advantages that a relational model of bribery has over the standard view. First, thinking of bribery as a social frame allows us to underscore the contiguities between bribery both inside and outside the practice of politics. Bribing a legislator is structurally homologous to bribing an agent, corrupting an athlete, or simply bribing a child to get good grades; that the one happens within the ‘political sphere’, while the others do not, is incidental to a large degree. English readily uses the same verb, “to bribe,” in each context, after all. Because there is little reason to think that political bribery is somehow unique among social practices, a proper understanding of bribery would locate political bribery within the larger context of norm violations purportedly induced by gain. This is precisely what a relational approach does. Even so, what does change among these last examples is the normative value of the bribe.19 In other words, within each distinct social (hence normative) context this social frame takes on different normative values. For Zelizer, the ‘social meaning’ of money—whether we understand it as gift, sale, salary, bonus, bribe, allowance, tip, etc.— derives from the precise combination of transaction medium, transaction context, and relationship between the transactors. Though partially independent, these categories must always be ‘matched’; a mismatch can result in an undesirable, even an immoral, exchange.20 For example, pretend you come across a man handing a woman $100 in 19
Underscored by Pardo (2004a: 4-7) and the essays collected in the same volume; see also Sahlins (1972: 196-9). 20 Zelizer (1994; 2001: 9993-4). That the ‘meaning’ of money thus stems from the context in which it is transferred is likewise highlighted by Appadurai (1986: 3-6) and Bloch and Parry (1989: 19-23), who emphasize the role played by cultural context in specifying which ways money can be represented, i.e. which specific ‘meanings’ money can have. See also the essays collected in Parry and Bloch (1989), DiMaggio (1994) and Levin (2008).
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Bribery in Classical Athens
how do you evaluate that scene normatively?
Chapter One Understanding the pair’s
relationship—husband/wife, father/daughter, citizen/politician, store-owner/customer, to name but a few examples—is absolutely necessary. So, too, is understanding whether the cash represents a gift, payment, loan, kickback and so forth. Just as the social meaning of money hinges on the other two categories, the social meaning of a relationship or even of the transaction context can hinge on how much money is given, of what kind, to whom or from what source.21 In the case of bribery, therefore, for different outcomes (i.e. when different obligations have been violated), for different social actors or for different relationships between them, the degree of illicitness varies.22 This is a second crucial advantage to the standard view’s focus on what does and does not constitute bribery, an advantage that allows us to assess why there might be a normative distinction between, say, bribing an opponent in court to drop a lawsuit and bribing a bureaucrat to obtain a public contract. On the standard view, identical actions within two different normative contexts (e.g. two different countries) are very difficult to compare. Often scholars must resort to the blanket assumption that there are ‘different values’ involved, without clearly pinpointing what exactly motivates the change in normative value. By contrast, as we will see in the
21
Zelizer (1994: esp. 208-16) focuses on the social meaning of money and analyzes how people ‘earmark’ currencies with specific meaning, making the currencies non-fungible so that the specific content of discrete social ties can be maintained. Thus, an allowance is different from a gift, which is different still from payment for chores—all of which transactions can signal different aspects of a parent-child relationship. Note, though, how the amount of payment for chores, including whether or not such ‘payment’ is distinct from an allowance, can signal a distinctively parent-child relationship and not, say, that between employer and employee, as in the case of hiring someone to do the same chores. 22 Rigi (2004: 105-8) makes a similar point in isolating the various social variables—like relational distance, amount of trust, power dynamic between transactors—that influence how and when bribery occurs.
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sections that follow, with a relational approach we can directly obtain how and why normative assessments change across social contexts.23 Two caveats before moving on to how this relational approach can be applied to Athens. Perhaps the most controversial difference between my own approach and the standard view of bribery is that I am taking bribery to be a social frame for understanding actions, not a class of actions per se. In this sense I am defining bribery by its outcome (normative violation) rather than assuming its outcome by focusing on intent (corrupting payments). When I claim that a particular transaction was an instance of bribery, I am saying, merely, that one could construct a narrative of events such that A paid (or promised to pay) B to do C, and that either C or this payment (or both) constituted a violation of some norm. This is only a narrative frame. It does not establish any fact of the matter; I think, and doubtless most scholars would agree, that normally it is
23
Although this will play little role in my analysis here, it should be noted that a third advantage to a relational approach to bribery is that it allows us to be more precise about the relationship between bribery and other forms of corrupt activity, specifically extortion and conflicts of interest. I do not focus on either extortion or conflict of interest largely because the former seems to have been rare at Athens—except under the Thirty, on which see Chapter Three—and the latter was simply a non-issue, as the Athenians were concerned not that officials might take gifts, but that they might take gifts from the wrong source: e.g. Plat. Leg. 955c8, Hyp. 4.24-5, pace Humphreys (1978b). Contemporary scholars frequently confess difficulty in distinguishing among these three concepts. When something is given to a politician, is it a ‘gift’ (without any specific strings attached) that thereby creates a conflict of interest, or is it a ‘bribe’ (with specific strings attached)? When a bureaucrat must be given an inducement to do her job, is this bribery (meaning the bribe was voluntarily initiated on both sides) or extortion (meaning the payment was expected, not voluntarily given)? Our relational approach would point out that these distinctions stem from differences in framing: bribery (compensation), extortion (entitlement), and conflict of interest (gift) fundamentally differ in terms of perceived transaction context. Moreover, and this is the crucial advantage gleaned from our relational model, to the extent that differences in transaction context are shaped by the social relationship of the transactors, these differences stem, in part, from the patterns of social relationships that configure them. We simply would not expect a gift between relative strangers, just as we would not expect direct exchange between close friends. This is one reason why there is often a difference between how participants (who might be close friends) and observers understand a particular transaction. Finally, a relational model allows for shades of distinctions between these categories: surely there is a difference—different causes, different effects, and different meanings—between explicit extortion and when a citizen thinks a bureaucrat is extorting money, while the bureaucrat views the money as a bribe. Rather than having to call such a situation either bribery or extortion, a relational view helpfully explains how and why there might be different understandings of the events. With a relational approach, we can thus gain tremendous insight into when and where we might expect bribery, extortion, and conflicts of interest to arise.
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impossible to establish any fact of the matter. Hence, I am not saying that A actually paid B to do C—meaning both A and B considered the transaction context a ‘payment’, as opposed to a ‘gift’ or ‘entitlement’—nor am I saying that C actually constituted some norm violation. Instead, I am indicating that, according to one perspective, ‘A bribed B to do C’ is a valid way to construe the events in question, meaning it is a valid way to understand C and the causal link, if any, between C and the transaction between A and B.24 Adopting the social frame of bribery necessarily assumes that A paid B to do C, and it accordingly assigns these events a particular normative value; but, again, note how A and B, or anybody else for that matter, might adopt a different frame for understanding the situation and thus might evaluate it differently. This is an inevitable agnosticism in assessing any individual’s real motivations, I think, and for this reason intention-based models of bribery have a critical problem in that they can rarely, if ever, be accurately measured. As a corrective, therefore, the relational view I am espousing focuses on the outcome, not the intent, of the ‘bribe’. Shifting our focus in this way from bribery qua a set of actions to bribery as a political claim—and, specifically, allowing that different frames might prevail among participants and observers—can have major implications for how we think about anti-corruption agendas.
Although these implications will be
addressed formally at the end of the dissertation, it is hoped that insights on this question will emerge periodically throughout the chapters that follow. A second disclaimer that should be mentioned is that following a relational model of bribery necessarily moves us away from rational actor explanations for bribery as a
24
On this point, I have benefited greatly from extended conversations with Arudra Burra, whose own work on coercion takes a similar approach.
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form of behavior. It is, after all, a premise of relational models that ‘economic’ actions really are about negotiating social relationships. Moreover, because we are focusing on outcome, not intent, our relational model seeks to uncover why individuals might frame an action as bribery, not necessarily why they might decide to pursue bribery as a course of action. Indeed, if they do not think of their own actions as ‘bribery’, it is difficult to understand in what sense they could be said to have ‘decided’ to takes bribes. One significant shortcoming of rational actor models, I suggest, is that they simply presume that individuals always frame the transaction as bribery. Undoubtedly this is true some of the time, but, as was noted above, the prevalence of conflicting social frames suggests that it is not true a significant amount of the time. In those cases, explaining the person’s exact ‘intent’ is almost impossible; by contrast, explaining why somebody might be inclined to frame the situation as bribery is almost always measurable. This is precisely what we will seek to do in outlining a relational model of bribery in democratic Athens.
Bribery and Relational Work in Athenian Politics In 480, the Athenian stratēgos Themistocles was in charge of the Athenian fleet as it fought against the Persians. According to Herodotus, when the Greeks arrived at the town of Artemisium in Euboea, they feared the size of the Persian fleet and wanted to leave. The Euboeans tried to convince the Spartan leader Eurybiades to stay, but they could not persuade him. They turned instead to Themistocles, offering him 30 talents of silver should the Greeks stay and defend Euboea. With this money, Themistocles gave five talents to Eurybiades, three to the Corinthian admiral Adimantus—purportedly more
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than the Persian King would have offered—and kept the rest for himself. So the Greeks remained at Artemisium.25 The details of this story are bizarre and defy interpretation under the standard view.
If we think of the thirty talents and subsequent payments as bribes given and
received by rational actors, we are left with a few puzzling facts. First, if Eurybiades could be bribed by Themistocles for only five talents, why were the Euboeans unable to persuade him? Why did they not simply offer the Spartan general five—or thirty!— talents from the beginning? Second, if the Persian King would have paid Adimantus less than three talents to betray the fleet, then we would expect that three talents would have been the going price for treason in this case. So why would it have taken a full five talents to persuade Eurybiades? And third, why was Themistocles’ price so high? Why did he require 22 talents, when the others required only 3 or 5 talents? Why did the Euboeans not pay him, instead, a more modest bribe of, say, 20 talents, or even 15? In theory, if Eurybiades, Adimantus, and Themistocles were rational rent-seeking politicians, we would expect that their bribe-price would have been set at a marketclearing price just above whatever the Persian King would have paid. Anything below such a price would have been irrational for themselves because they could have always received more money from the King; anything above such a price, though, would have been irrational for the Euboeans, since theoretically they should always desire the lowest price possible. Neither the bribe prices nor the eventual series of payments seems ‘rational’ under the standard model. Thus, even if these details have little historicity, at
25
Hdt. 8.4.2-8.5.3; cf. Plut. Them. 7.5-6=Phanias fr. 24 Wehrli.
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the very least we are hard-pressed to ascertain why Herodotus, or one of his sources, would have accepted, let alone passed on, the story at face value.26 Understanding the significance of the events at Artemisium requires moving past the standard view. This section presents a case for how a relational approach can help. Two aspects of a relational approach to bribery lend themselves particularly well to the Athenian context.
Because the Athenians had no word for ‘bribe’, the Athenian
vocabulary of bribery focused on compensation and the violation of social norms. As we saw in the previous section, these were the two critical components in a relational model of bribery.
Moreover, as has been underscored by much recent literature on gift
exchange and economic activity in ancient Athens, gifts like those given to the Greek generals at Artemisium were consistently used to negotiate social relationships.27 We have good reason to think, therefore, that the Athenians themselves understood bribery through the relationships that structured it. Both claims will be treated in this section as we investigate the vocabulary of bribery and the social contexts in which it could have appeared at Athens. The next section will examine how contested claims about bribery implicated broader public discussions about politics. 26
The historicity of the scene at Artemisium has been seriously questioned for a number of reasons, not least of which is the curious problem that, because the fleet was stationed at Artemisium explicitly in order to back up the Spartan land forces at nearby Thermopylae, it is odd that the Spartan leader Eurybiades would have wanted to leave. See further Cawkwell (1970: 41), Wallace (1974: 22-5), Podlecki (1975: 17-18), Frost (1980: 107-8 ad 7.6-7), Kurke (2002: 90). Cf. Plut. De Hdt. Mal.872BC. Doubts of historicity aside, many scholars paint Themistocles as a venal profiteer: see discussion, including ancient testimony, in Kurke (2002). Recently, Blösel (2001; 2005: 135-44), Baragwanath (2008: 292-4) and, less so, Fornara (1971: 66-74) have attempted to salvage Themistocles’ reputation as a cunning patriot. Blösel’s proposed scenario in which Herodotus uses Themistocles as a metaphor for Athens’ imperialism is possible—similarly, Cresci Marrone (1986), Balot (2001: 99-135 esp. 117-20)—but he goes too far in trying to model this scene off of, specifically, Pericles’ bribing of Pleistoanax: cf. Steinbock (2006). While I do not come down on either side of this issue, I would like to underscore that these normative assessments are all inherently political claims. 27 By ‘negotiate’ here and throughout I intend reference to some kind of relational work. Two social actors ‘negotiate’ a relationship in defining, redefining, adjusting, calibrating, or rejecting the obligations that inhere in their relationship. That is to say, they negotiate a social relationship in performing the work necessary to create, maintain or end it.
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The Athenians had no word for a ‘bribe’, no noun that signified that something— whether a gift, a tip, a wage, perquisite or inducement—was a ‘bribe’. They had only the word dōron (plural dōra), which should always be translated as ‘gift’. This is not to say that the Athenians had no concept of bribery; clearly they did, as witnessed by the verbs dōrodokeō (“receive bribes”), dekazō (“bribe”) and the noun dōrodokia (“bribery”). Nor is it to suggest that the Athenians euphemistically described all ‘bribes’ as ‘gifts’—they did not. Rather, when the Athenians wanted to mark something linguistically as bribery, they did so through context, usually with a verb or attendant prepositional phrases; they never marked the noun, the ‘bribe’ itself.28 Classicists regularly complicate this picture by claiming that the Athenians in fact used the same word dōra to denote both gifts and bribes, but this idea is untenable.29 On their view, if an Athenian wanted to talk about any ‘bribes’ given or received, she would have used the word dōra or, occasionally, lēmmata (“takings”), and context would have dictated whether the dōra were ‘gifts’ or ‘bribes’.30 But if context always indicated that something was a bribe, it is curious to assume that, nevertheless, the word dōra continued to denote an explicit ‘bribe’ on its own. By analogy, note how, whereas we might distinguish ‘dog’ from ‘animal’ either by using distinct words (‘dog’, ‘animal’) or by 28
On the vocabulary of Greek bribery, Harvey (1985: 82-9) is indispensable and see further below. Here, it is telling that when the Athenians did use a noun for “a bribe” (dwrodo/khma), not only was it exceptionally rare—attested once in Comedy (Pl. Com. fr. 119K)—but its meaning was also not clearly defined as a “bribe” given or received. It sometimes referred, instead, to an instance of bribery: e.g. Dem. 18.29, 31. 29 It would be entirely unexpected for the same word—whether dōron or lēmma—to connote, on its own, dramatically opposite meanings within a language, particularly given the social and political significance of a concept like bribery. After all, having the same word denote both ‘gift’ and ‘bribe’ would create a tremendous amount of confusion; we would expect, instead, that the two would always be distinguished, if not with different words—just as our word ‘bribe’ is always a marked term distinct from ‘gift’—then by some other linguistic means. 30 The comments of Harvey are characteristic in this regard: “It is important to stress that dōron means both what we call a gift and what we call a bribe…one and the same word is used for both types of transaction” (1985: 82, emphasis retained). Cf. Herman (1987: 85), Lewis (1989: 229), von Reden (1995a: 94), Taylor (2001: 53).
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context (“The animal that is furry and barks...”), we would never use both at the same time (“The dog that is furry and barks…”) merely to convey the idea of ‘dog’.31 Given that the Athenians always provided some additional indication that something was a ‘bribe’, we should think not that the Athenians used the same word for both ‘gift’ and ‘bribe’, but that they had no word for ‘bribe’.32 As in a relational model of bribery, there was nothing that could inherently be considered a bribe; it was the outcome of the gift, the way in which it was framed, that determined its normative value. The language of gift exchange and persuasion was regularly used to describe the workings of Athenian politics and society.33
Indeed, scenes of bribery were often
described in much the same language—a curious yet understandable result given that the Athenians had no word for ‘bribe’. Note how the entire scene at Artemisium is couched in the neutral language of gift exchange and persuasion and thus provides no indication that Themistocles’ actions would have constituted bribery (Hdt. 8.4-5). The Euboeans unsuccessfully tried to “persuade” Eurybiades (e1peiqon), but successfully “persuaded” Themistocles (pei/qousi), who then “won over” Eurybiades and Adimantus (a)nepe/peisto; a)napepeisme//noi). In each case, Herodotus says that persuasion was successful because it was coupled with either the giving of “gifts” (dw=ra dw=sw; dw/roisi) or “money” (e.g. tw=n xrhma/twn metadidoi=) or, in Themistocles’ case, the
31
Thus, in the sentence, “The dog that is furry and barks is mine,” we do legitimately use both kinds of linguistic markers, yet they do not perform the same function. While “dog” marks out that the subject is a dog—not, say, an ‘animal’ generally—the limiting phrase “that is furry and barks” signals which dog is intended, much like “the animal that is furry and barks” signals which animal is intended (a dog). 32 On comparative grounds, too, this interpretation may be preferable. For instance, the French language notoriously lacks a word for ‘bribe’; but, like ancient Greek, it successfully conveys the notion of ‘bribery’ through verbs, euphemisms, and context. Outlining the Russian vocabulary for blat (personal influence) and bribery, Dunn (2000) shows how the popular language of bribery is neither identical to the language of everyday transactions, nor is it aligned with vocabulary used in criminal circles; it is marked off in some way from both categories because it fits neither. 33 Harvey (1985: 82-3), Strauss (1985: 72-3), Taylor (2001: 160-2).
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provision of a “payment” (misqw|=).34 Although we might think of bribery when someone persuades with gifts or money, as in Themistocles’ case, we should be aware that such a phrase by itself did not denote bribery, as it need not entail a violation of norms.35 Again, just as we might expect, the exact same description of an unproblematic giving or receiving of dōra never denoted, on its own, the highly problematic idea of bribery.
Instead, there was always some additional clue to indicate that a speaker
intended ‘bribery’ (compensation + norm violation): additional phrase, or contextualizing details.
a distinct verb, euphemism,
What we are after, therefore, is those
additional clues, a set of lexical tools that an Athenian had at his disposal to communicate the social frame of bribery. Let us call this the Athenian vocabulary of bribery. It was noted in the Introduction that, in evaluating a scene, the Athenians stressed the outcome of any transaction. This outcome was conceptualized in two different ways. The Athenians measured the result of a gift, meaning they tried to establish whether something had been given in exchange for something else (i.e. compensation); and they measured the acceptability of the final result, whether the outcome was to be deemed good or bad (norm violation).
Perhaps unsurprisingly, therefore, we find that the
vocabulary of bribery was broken down into two groups of words, each consonant with a different way of conceptualizing an ‘outcome’: those that conveyed compensation, and those that signaled a violation of some norm. In other words, the Athenians’ focus on outcomes inclined them well towards a relational model of bribery. 34
Even the verb anapeithein (cf. a)nepe/peisto, a)napepeisme//noi, Hdt. 8.5), though often used in dōrodokia contexts—e.g. Ar. Pax 622, Eq. 473, V. 101—is no clear indication of wrongdoing: LSJ s.v. a)napei/qw 1-2. 35 Far from it: as Baragwanath (2008: 292) plausibly argues, Themistocles’ reputation may have been enhanced, not hurt, by the fact that he profited while reconciling Greek and Euboean interests; similarly, Frost (1980: 10). Persuasion with gifts or money need not entail bribery: e.g. Hom. Il. 9.112-13, Hdt. 8.134.1, Lys. 21.10, Xen. Cyr. 1.5.3. Cf. Theog. 192-3.
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As in English, in Greek the word for ‘bribery’ and its cognates conveyed both compensation and norm violation: so dōrodokia (“bribery”), dōrodokeō (“be bribed”), and dekazō (“bribe”), all of which are attested only from the classical period onward.36 The literal translation of dōrodokia is commonly taken to be “the receipt of dōra,” taken from dōra (“gifts”) + dekhomai (“receive”).37 Note how this derivation implies neither compensation per se nor normative violation. As we will see, however, this literal translation is misleading because it misses crucial nuance in the verb dekhomai. In fact, the morphology of ‘bribery’ words in Greek points toward a semantic meaning closer to “the receipt of dōra in expectation of something bad.” Just as we might expect, therefore, dōrodokia, dōrodokeō, and dekazō were a marked class of words that conveyed, specifically, direct exchange (compensation) and a bad outcome (normative violation). Let us take a closer look. Both dekazō38 and cognates of dōrodokia39 (dōra + dekhomai) stem from an early Greek verb *dekmai (“receive what is given”).40 The literal translation of dōrodokia 36
Dekazō first appears sometime between 440 and 420 (sundeka/sai, rightly emended from the manuscripts’ sundika/sai, [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 3.7), dōrodokeō around the same time (Hdt. 6.72, 6.82). 37 E.g. Harvey (1985: 83), Kulesza (1995: 11-12), Taylor (2001: 53), Hashiba (2006: 62). This seemingly innocuous translation is highly misleading, however, as dōrodokia never has such an innocent meaning in the classical period, and there is no evidence that it ‘originally’ meant “the receipt of dōra.” 38 As the factitive form of the thematic verb de/komai, deka/zw literally meant “to cause someone to receive in exchange for something,” but it always has connotations of bribery in the classical period: cf. Szemerényi (1964: 126-8), Chantraine s.v. deka/zw. Note how Hesychius defines de/kwn as “the one who has been bribed” (o( dekazo/menoj). Some scholars have followed an ancient folk etymology in positing a different derivation of deka/zw from the way that jurors supposedly lined up in groups of ten (deka/j) to receive their bribes: Frist s.v. de/ka, MacDowell (1983: 63-8), Harvey (1985: 88-9). Certainly this derivation n is preferable from a formal perspective, but semantically it is not at all clear that deka/zw is the correct formation from de/ka. After all, it is the jurors, not the bribe-giver, who ‘make a decad’; we would thus expect deka/zw to describe the jurors. Moreover, the force of the prefix sun- in sundeka/sai is redundant if we assume that ‘tenning’ entailed bribing the entire jury. sun- is perfectly understandable, however, if we derive deka/zw from de/komai. This is to say nothing of the dubious value of Eratosthenes as our source—pace Harvey (1985: 88)—or the implausibility of an etymology which, as Szeremerenyi (1964: 126) aptly notes, “explains nothing and clearly bears the stamp of desperate invention.” At best, Eratosthenes’ testimony might be a good indication of how entire juries were bribed—although MacDowell’s (1983: 63-8) reconstruction seems fanciful—but we should seek the origins of deka/zw in de/komai, not de/ka. Cf. Lipsius (1905-15: 174), Calhoun (1913: 67-70), Boeghold (1967: 113-14).
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straightforwardly follows this derivation and posits that the word literally meant ‘the receipt of gifts’. This etymology is dangerously simplistic, however, and overlooks crucial details about the peculiar morphology of dōrodokia and its cognates. In fact, the morphology of dōrodokia suggests strong affinity to the verb dokeō. To make matters a ̂ albeit in the bit more confusing, dokeō, like dekhomai, was also derived from IE*dek-, ̂ form IE*dek-eye (cf. Gr. dokeuō).41 So was dōrodokia derived from dokeō?
Not exactly.
Dokeō is actually a
relatively late verb formed in the classical period. Even before the archaic period, the early Greek verb *dekmai began to split into two verbs: dekomai (dekhomai in the Attic dialect), from which dōrodokia is usually taken, and a group of iterative forms that would eventually converge in the verb dokeō. In other words, in the archaic period the forms 39
For the sake of clarity, throughout this discussion I transliterate x as ‘kh’. Throughout this discussion, I use the standard linguistic convention of an asterisk (*) to indicate a form ̂ but the that is unattested yet hypothesized. Gr. *de/kmai comes from an Indo-European root *dek̂- or *dēk-, precise meaning of this original root has been hotly contested. There is still no consensus on how to sequence the subsequent morphological and semantic change. At issue are how and why the athematic, acrodynamic Greek verb *de/kmai transformed into the thematic verb de/komai, or de/xomai in the Attic dialect. Were the latter formed from a root aorist which became generalized and lost its aspect (cf. García ̂ Ramón [2004: 506n.40])? Or do they represent subjunctive forms—de/ketai > *dék-e-toi, an IE subjunctive—which later became a thematic present (cf. Tichy [1976])? Amid semantic shifts in reduplicated forms, aorists that work like presents and presents that look like aorists, to say nothing of the semantic swamp of dek̂- verbs ranging in meaning from “wait” or “honor” to “receive” and “watch”—the linguistic problems behind dōrodokia are thorny indeed. For a guide through the quagmire, see Szemerényi (1964: 170-6), Chantraine s.v. de/xomai, Frisk s.v. de/xomai, with treatments of various aspects of the problem by Tichy (1976), Forssman (1978), García Ramón (2004), and Ruijgh (2005). I offer here a plausible new alternative, although I am not qualified to explain precisely how it may have arisen. 41 LSJ s.v. doke/w I, Chantraine s.v. doka/w II, Frisk s.v. doke/w. With the sole exception of dōrodokia and its cognates, for every compound formed from the e-grade de/xomai (“receive”), there is a combination of aspirated and unaspirated forms based on the –dek root: nouns end in –doki/a or –doxi/a, adjectives appear as –do/koj or –do/xoj, and compound verbs end in –doke/w or –doxe/w. So we find cenodoxi/a, cenodo/xoj, cenodoxe/w with cenodo/koj and cenodoke/w; qewrodo/xoj with qewrodo/koj and qewrodoke/w; oi)nodoxei=on and oi)nodo/xoj with oi)nodo/koj. For all forms related to dōrodokia, however, there is never any aspiration, as every compound retains –dok–: dwrodoki/a, dwrodoke/w, dwrodo/koj, dwrodo/khma, a)dwrodo/khtoj. Strikingly, these latter compounds have a morphology identical to that of compounds derived from the classical o-grade verb doke/w (“expect, await”): thus karadoke/w (“eagerly expect”), karadoki/a, a)karado/khtoj and prosdoke/w (“expect”), a)prosdoki/a, prosdokh/toj, and especially a)prosdo/khtoj next to a)pro/sdektoj from prosde/xomai (“receive favorably”). 40
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that would become dokeō were crucially linked to dekomai as iterative forms of that verb: “receive again and again” (iterative) later turned into “expect, await.”42 Over time, therefore, a special meaning of dekomai (“expect, await”) came to be attached to an entirely new verb (dokeō). But was there anything left behind? When these iterative forms broke off from Gk. *dekmai, did any of their semantic meaning (“expect, await”) subsequently remain attached to the verb dekomai? I propose that, yes, a meaning akin to “expect, await” was preserved in dekomai and the Attic form dekhomai—and that this meaning was later preserved in the noun dōrodokia and other similar compounds.43 Positing this kind of semantic affinity to the verb dokeō explains why dōrodokia follows the morphology of
42
Note how the rare verb dokeuō (“watch, observe”), off of which dokeō is based, appears in contexts that suggest that it, too, functioned as an iterative form of Gr.*dekmai.Cf. Tichy (1976: 81-2). Homeric evidence for de/xomai (“expect, await”) unquestionably proves that the classical meaning of doke/w (“expect, await”) was formed as an iterative of de/komai and hence is derived from Gr. *de/kmai: e.g. Hom. Il. 4.107, 5.228, 238, 20.377. This has no bearing on the problematic relationship between Homeric dei/dex- (“greet, honor,” e.g. dei/dekto, Hom. Il. 9.224) and de/dex- (“await,” e.g. de/deco, Hom. Il. 5.228, Od. 20.377, 22.340), the former of which has been derived alternately from IE *deik̂- (“show”)—see most recently Forssman (1978)—or from IE *dēk̂- (“accept”): e.g. Frisk s.v. doke/w, Chantraine s.v. doka/w, Tichy (1976). My derivation is motivated by the following observation: instead of beginning with de/xomai and asking why dōrodokia compounds follow the morphology of doke/w, it is fruitful to ask why, if dōrodokia compounds look like doke/w, the verb doke/w does not also mean “receive” or “receive illicitly.” We need to account for this. For my argument, it is sufficient to point out only that Homer evinces semantic convergence of forms of de/xomai and dokeu/w (later doke/w). What I propose here is that in the shift from Gr.*de/kmai (“receive”) to its iterative meaning in reduplicated forms (“expect, await”), an intermediary semantic form—“receive” + “expect”—was also retained. This meaning subsequently inhered in the verb de/xomai; when compounds were formed from this particular meaning, they were marked in a formally distinct way by following the morphology of the distinct yet closely related verb doke/w. Ruijgh (2004: 58-9) traces a similar development from *de/khti to doke/ei (“it seems good”) through influence by doke/w (“think”). This morphological divergence, suggesting as it does that dōrodokia was derived not solely from de/xomai but was also influenced by doke/w, cannot be explained simply in terms of distinction in dialect or time. That Attic consistently aspirates –dok- compounds is clear enough from a wide range of compounds, many of which are attested only once or twice. By contrast, dōrodokia and its cognates, by far the most prevalent –dok- compounds, are attested hundreds of times in Attic, yet not one of these compounds is aspirated. Perhaps in recognition of this point, both the Suida (s.v. dwrografh/) and Thucydides (dw/rwn do/khsin, 5.16.3) derive dwrodoki/a not from dw=ra + de/xomai but from dw/ra + doke/w (“be suspected of [the legal suit of] dōra”). My own derivation follows the spirit, if not the content, of their etymologizing. 43
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dokeō, not dekhomai. After all, all other –dok- words with similar morphologies connote “expect, await,” not “receive.” If this derivation is correct—and no other derivation satisfactorily accounts for these problems in morphology—then dōrodokia conceals a meaning of dekhomai used to mark out a category of transactions expecting a specific return (“receive [what is given] in expectation of something”).44 As the above reconstruction indicates, this meaning probably dates back to early Gk.*dekmai, when the iterative forms that would much later become dokeō began to diverge from those that would become dekhomai.45 Incidentally, such a reconstruction compellingly explains why dekomai/dekhomai was often used in scenes of bribery in archaic poetry.46 So already in the archaic period dekomai/dekhomai could, on its own, denote compensation. What about normative violation? Certainly by the classical period, the verb on its own could unambiguously signal bribery (i.e. “receive what is given in
44
Cf. von Reden (1995a: 93-5). de/xomai (“receive gifts”): Hom. Od. 8.419-20; Hes. WD 86-7; Hdt. 3.39, 3.135; Eur. Alc. 375-6, Med. 958, 973, 1003; Soph. Aj. 662-3. Likewise, de/xomai (“receive gifts in return for something”): Hom. Il.11.124, 24.420, Od. 11.327, 18.286-7; Hes. fr. 76.10; Sapph. 1.22; Pi. O. 2.62; Hdt. 9.91. Cf. Frisk s.v. doko/j. 45 Dating this meaning of de/xomai back to Gr. *de/kmai is preferable for the following reason. By the time of Homer, the expectation of receiving dōra—and in a bribery-like scenario, at that—can be represented not only by de/xomai/de/komai (“receive what is given”), but also by iterative forms of the earlier Gr. *de/kmai (“expect”). For the latter, note how in the Odyssey Eurymachus rebukes Halitherses’ speech on the grounds that he had spoken “looking for a gift for [his] home, whatever [Telemachus] might provide” (sw=| oi1kw| dw=ron potide/gmenoj, menoj ai1 ke po/rh|sin, Od. 2.186). Here, Halitherses is thought to provide counsel in expectation of receiving dōra from Telemachus, and the result is considered explicitly bad counsel (cf. Od. 2.188-93; similarly xruso\n…dedegme/noj, Il.11.124). Likewise, when Priam tries to give gold to Achilles’ guard to be let into the Greek camp, Homer uses the verb de/cai (Il.24.429; cf. de/xesqai, 24.434). Note here how it is the verb de/xomai, not any of the other verbs of giving and receiving, that differentiates this scene from regular, unproblematic gift exchange, and it does so, specifically, by indicating that the gift of Priam’s goblet was to be conducted behind Achilles’ back (pare\c 0Axilh=a, 24.434). Positing a shared semantic root in Gr. *de/kmai (i.e. “receive what is given in expectation of something”) would help explain why two different meanings of the same verb—meanings that later split into two different verbs—might be used to describe similar situations. 46 Hom. Il. 24.429, 434, Od. 11.327; Hom. H.Mer. 549. Without the additional semantic nuance of “receiving in expectation of something given,” nothing would have distinguished de/xomai from other verbs of receiving; with this addition, however, the verb became a natural choice for describing bribery.
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exchange for something bad”=“receive as a bribe”), just like cognates of dōrodokia.47 How, then, did dekhomai come to acquire such an association with bad outcomes? One likely source of influence was the law. Early codification of dekhomai in law could have subsequently conditioned, though not caused, the word’s semantic shift outside of legal contexts.48 Whatever the reason, by the time of the classical period, the verb dekhomai and its cognates—like dōrodokeō and dekazō—were used, on their own, to denote “receive in exchange for something bad.” Likewise, dōrodokia should be translated literally as “the receipt of dōra in exchange for something bad”, i.e. “bribery.” In this way, the Athenians’ main vocabulary for bribery all indicated quid pro quo compensation and normative violation. Dōrodokeō and dekazō represent distinct ways of using a single verb to signal the frame of bribery; by contrast, if the regular verbs of giving, receiving, or persuading were used, an Athenian could still signal ‘bribery’ by indicating both that the dōra were a kind of compensation and that this compensation had caused some bad result. In those cases, commercial metaphors and prepositional phrases could be used for the former, while the verb diaphtheirō (“corrupt”) and alimentary metaphors could be used to indicate the
47
Cf. Harvey (1985: 83). There are two notable exceptions to this rule: Harvey (1985: 83n.30) notes how at Ar. EN 1163b11 dōrodokos refers to someone who receives gifts, not bribes, but see also Ar. Eq. 403, Pl. Rep. 390d7, Dem. 18.61; similarly, Sosiades lists in his Maxims of the Seven Sages that one should “usefully receive gifts that demand a return” (Dwrodo/kei xrhsi/mwj, Phil. Sent. 215.27). In all likelihood, however, this is a late fabrication. A few examples where dw=ra + de/xomai does not appear to indicate bribery can be found at Xen. Cyrop. 8.5.18 and in Plato’s Laws, where taking gifts from good sources is contrasted with taking gifts from bad sources or with an eye to bad results: para\ de\ miarou= dw=ra…de/xesqai, Leg. 716e3; w(j e)p’ a)gaqoi=j me\n dei= de/xesqai dw=ra, e)pi\ de\ flau/roij ou!, Leg. 955c8; cf. Leg. 905d4. This distinction helps affirm the Athenian focus on outcomes. 48 For the (early sixth century) use of de/xomai in Athenian law, see below Chapter Six. In the same vein, deka/zw might represent a similar crystallization of semantic meaning due to its codification in the law governing the graphē dekasmou: cf. Dem. 46.26 for the text of a compilation of laws including that for the graphē dekasmou, with discussion in Chapter Six below. Ultimately, it is impossible to prove these kinds of correlations. If this reconstruction is correct, it would be a rare instance in which explicitly legal language at Athens influenced the semantic field of a word used in popular contexts: so Todd (2000a: 26-31) and see further discussion in Chapter Seven.
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latter. Of course, contextualizing details could also make it clear that one or both of these components was present.49 When the language of gift exchange was used—‘giving’, ‘receiving’, ‘gifts’, etc.—usually the transaction context was closer to gift than to compensation. In order to signal that, in fact, some kind of quid pro quo had occurred, commercial language was frequently used. Verbs like priamai (“buy”) or pōlō (“sell”), and nouns like misthos (“payment, wage”) or kerdos (“profit”) and their cognates all clearly shifted the transaction context from gift to compensation.50 Likewise, a dative of instrument or prepositional phrases like e3neka + gen. (“for the sake of X”), e)pi/ + dat. (“with an eye towards X” or “for the price of”), or i3na + purpose clause could reframe a voluntary gift as compensatory exchange.51 These prepositional phrases played a particularly important role in legal regulations of dōrodokia: archons swore never to receive gifts “for the sake of [their] office” (th=j a)rxh=j e3neka, AP 55.5, cf. Pollux 8.86); jurors swore never to take gifts “for the sake of [their] role on the jurycourt” (th=j h(lia/sewj e#neka, Dem. 24.150); and the law against dōrodokia specified that no one could give or take “to the harm of the people” (e)pi\ bla/bh| tou= dh/mou, Dem. 21.113); similarly, the law against judicial bribery
49
One or the other of these components could just as easily be implicit—and not clearly evident in the language used. Hence, I do not maintain that, in order to employ the frame of bribery, both of those elements must be included. I would argue, instead, that explicit inclusion of any of these elements can, but need not, indicate that a scene is being viewed through the frame of bribery. What I would like to avoid, however, is the common scholarly mistake of reading a scene of gift exchange—with no explicit markers of compensation or normative violation—and calling it ‘bribery’ simply because it involves a public official. As a social frame, bribery has tremendous social significance, so any time the frame of bribery is employed we should expect to find some linguistic trace of this significance. 50 Harvey (1985: 84-6) comprehensively surveys the commercial language of bribery; see also von Reden (1995a: 89-92) on misthos. 51 I list a few examples of each. Dative of instrument: Hdt. 5.63, Plut. Cim. 14.3, Thuc. 4.65.3. e3neka + gen.: Hom. Od. 11.521, 15.247, Theog. 46 West. e)pi/ + dat.: Pl. Rep. 590a2, Leg. 955c8; Dem. 21.113, 46.26. i3na + purpose clause: Hom. Il. 23.297, schol. ad Ar. Ach. 6.
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prohibited giving money to anyone on a judicial body “for the sake of dōrodokia” (e)pi\ dwrodoki/a|, Dem. 46.26). All of these contextual markers focused on the explicit return expected for the dōra, thereby characterizing the transaction as quid pro quo compensation.
In
Herodotus’ story of Themistocles at Artemisium, for example, the thirty talents given to Themistocles are explicitly called a “payment” (e)pi\ misqw|= trih/konta tala/ntoisi) given “on the condition that” (e)p’ w{|) the Greek fleet stay and fight the Persians. Similarly, the historian later juxtaposes the gifts to the Greek generals with the return (cf. e)kexa/risto) given to the Euboeans (Hdt. 8.4-5). Such characterizations sometimes also implied a negative evaluation of the scene. For instance, prepositional phrases denoting “against X” or “against the interests of X” (e.g. kata/ + gen.) could be used, while compounds derived from misthos always indicated the speaker’s disapproval.52 Alternatively, Athenians might denounce a particular exchange by saying that its outcome constituted some sort of bad (violation of norms). It should be noted that no explicit condemnation can be found in Herodotus’ story. Whereas commercial language and prepositional phrases differentiated the transaction context, alimentary metaphors and the verb diaphtheirō (“to corrupt”) could signal that some kind of norm violation had occurred. For the Athenians, alimentary metaphors usually conveyed some negative value about a particular exchange.53 We hear of “gift-devouring” kings who judged cases unjustly (dwrafa/goi, Hes. WD 11, 202,
52
The use of kata/ + gen. implied both exchange and a bad outcome: taking gifts “against the dēmos’ interests” was shorthand for taking money in return for a specific outcome that ended up harming the dēmos. Harvey (1985: 85) on the use of misthos compounds exclusively to connote censure and abuse: e.g. mistharnia, misthōtos. 53 These metaphors recur throughout the Aristophanic corpus: see Taillardat (1962: 310-11, 414-18) and generally Davidson (1993).
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238); “stuffing” someone’s mouth with money (xrusi/w|…e)bu/noun to\ sto/ma, Aristoph. Pax, 645; to\ sto/m’ e)pibu/saj ke/rmasin, Aristoph. Pl. 379); and vomiting up bribe monies received (Aristoph. Eq. 1149). In fact, in a different version of the scene at Artemisium, the Athenian leader Architeles reportedly wanted to leave because he did not have enough money to pay his men. Themistocles hid a talent of silver beneath Architeles’ dinner and bid him to dine on it and feed his men in the morning (Plut. Them. 7.6-7=Phanias fr. 24 Wehrli). Consuming the food became a metaphor for taking the talent of silver.54 Likewise, the verb diaphtheirō (“corrupt”=“bribe”), itself the most negative Greek word for bribery, indicated a bad outcome; frequently, it also indicated a causal link between the means of corruption and the outcome itself. The verb phtheirō, at the root of diaphtheirō, meant “to destroy,” and diaphtheirō consequently had a range of meanings, including “to destroy,” “to seduce,” and finally “to corrupt.”55 The semantic range of diaphtheirō is not easily explained, but by the end of the fifth century we find it repeatedly denoting a deterioration—one might say a ‘destroying’—of the nature or
54
In the same vein, the Rhodian poet Timocreon censures Themistocles for serving “cold meats” (yuxra_ krei=a) or “leftovers” to others (PMG 727.10). Timocreon seems to suggest that these leftovers were monetary in nature when he insinuates that Themistocles was “full of silver” at the Isthmus (a)rguri/wn d' u(po&plewj, following Bergk at 727 PMG 9). This appellation works nicely on two levels: first as a straightforward indication of how Themistocles had the means to serve cold meats to everyone (he had a lot of money after receiving so many bribes); and, second, as a euphemistic signal of the food imagery to come (though himself ‘full on silver’, he served but leftovers to everyone else). 55 Accordingly, the development of this semantic field, specifically its extension to the realm of bribery, has troubled scholars. Wankel (1976: 315) has suggested that the ‘corruption’ at the root of bribery is a kind of ‘seduction’, while Harvey (1985: 86-7) has posited that diaphtheirein represents a surrendering of free will, an idea extended to bribery more generally by Ober (1989: 236-8), von Reden (1995a: 95), Euben (1997: 103). Yet Harvey’s interpretation gives too much weight to select evidence (e.g. Dem. 19.118, his only cited example) and I disagree with his interpretation of Lys. 1.33 (tou\j de\ pei/santaj ou#twj au)tw=n ta\j yuxa\j diafqei/rein). There the point is not that a seduced woman surrenders her free will, but that she no longer belongs exclusively to her husband—a morally unacceptable outcome. In other words, her subordinate role in the household is destroyed and changed for the worse. Note how nearly identical syntax is used at Xen. Symp. 8.21—cf. o( de\ pei/qwn th\n tou= a)napeiqome/nou yuxh\n diafqei/rei—where the concern is not about the surrendering of free will, but about changing the character of a lover.
53
Conover character of something.56
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Given that the emergence of diaphtheirō (“bribe”) was
contemporary with this shift towards the destruction of character, I suggest that this is the conceptual link between the two meanings of diaphtheirō as “to bribe” and “to destroy.”57 What ‘corruption’ (diaphtheirō) does, therefore, is to change the character of an outcome so that it is bad; when a payment is the source of this corruption, we have bribery. So the Athenians used a relational vocabulary for bribery, couching descriptions of politics in the language of social relations. We can push this point even further, however, and this brings us to the second reason why a relational approach is particularly well-suited to the study of Athenian bribery. For the Athenians, describing politics in the vocabulary of gift exchange and persuasion belied a close conceptual affinity between
56
I find this meaning of diaphtheirein more likely a product of late fifth-century nomos-physis debates. Just prior to this time, in Sophocles’ Antigone dated to around 440, Creon complains of the potential evil that money can cause: “by its teaching perverts men’s good minds so that they take to evil actions!” (to/d’ e)kdida/skei kai\ paralla/ssei fre/naj/xrhsta\j pro\j ai)sxra\ pra/gmat’ i3stasqai brotw=n, Soph. An. 298-9). The concern that something might change one’s nature or character emerges later in the play when erōs, too, smashes men’s wits unto ruin (Soph. An. 791-2). Euripides likewise talks of ‘corrupting’ the name or physis of something: Hec. 398, Or. 297, fr. 377.3, 411.1, 526.2; cf. Aesch. Ag. 932; Isoc. Paneg. 151, Areo. 47, Panath. 32, 196. In the fourth century, we often find mention of ‘corrupting’ the nature of something, including archai (Lys. 30.28), the polis (Pl. Rep. 415c5), legal documents (Isoc. Trap. 23, 24, 31, 33), and the laws (Isoc. In Call. 11, Pl. Crito 50b5, 53b7, Leg. 788b6, 864d2, 891b5, 913c6). Harvey (1985: 87n.44) rightly points out that ideas of ‘impurity’ may have something to do with the extension of the semantic field of diaptheirein to bribery: see Thuc. 7.84.5, Lys. 30.28; Aristotle’s explicit comparison of political corruption and the muddying of water at Pol.1286a31-5; and instances where the character of someone or something is so corrupted, e.g. Isoc. Antid. 30, Xen. Mem. 1.2.8, Pl. Ap. 25d5, Men. 89b6, Rep. 421d1, Leg. 894a7. I would note, in addition, that in other vocabulary for bribery we find this same idea of ‘changing’ the status or outcome of something. The verb anapeithein, for instance, literally means to persuade someone to do ‘the reverse’ of what might be expected or intended: LSJ s.v. a)na/ F2 with Harvey (1985: 83n.32). 57 Harvey (1985: 86-7), followed by Hashiba (2006: 70n.31), has claimed that the use of diaptheirein at Hdt. 5.51 implies that the meaning “corrupt by bribes” was current in the mid-fifth century, but I find this unlikely. The passage could simply intend that Aristagoras would “corrupt” or “change” Cleomenes’ mind or character; that money was the reason for this change was implicit and need not have been explicit in the verb diaphtheirein (as we would need for it to signify “corrupt by bribes”). The meaning “corrupt [by bribery]” is not again attested until the fourth century, and then frequently at that: Lys. 2.29, 28.9; Xen. Hell. 7.3.8; Isoc. 8.50, 17.12; Pl. Leg. 768b; Theopompus FGrH 115 F81; and twenty times in Demosthenes and Aeschines. Cf. Lys. 20.38. The absence from Old Comedy is striking, and Harvey unsatisfactorily suggests that the verb was originally slang of a sort, at first used only in spoken discourse; yet such an explanation would make its absence from comedy all the more unexpected.
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political and social relations. As we will now see, Athenian politics, including actions framed as bribery, was rooted in the cornerstone of ancient Greek society: reciprocity. For this reason, a relational model of bribery is a natural choice for Athens. Reciprocity
fundamentally
guided
how
relationships—social,
political,
commercial—were forged and negotiated in Athens.58 The common expression, “Help friends, harm enemies,” concisely expressed the ethos of reciprocity that underpinned the exchange of gifts (dōra) between friends (philoi).59 Gifts could be given for a variety of reasons between a variety of relations, including friends, family members, and political allies; in this sense, they were the fundamental currency of social relationships. When someone gave a gift, it created an obligation, for it was a symbol of the relationship itself: one had to return gift with counter-gift or else risk marring the dynamics of the relationship.60 Dōra were thus calibrated to the dynamics of the relationship or the circumstances of the exchange. Giving more or more valuable dōra might signify greater social standing or a greater request (reward, thanks, honor) being made.61 As in our
58
The scholarship on gift giving and reciprocity in Archaic and Classical Greece is vast. I list here the works that have had the greatest impact on my thinking: Finley (1977), Humphreys (1978a: 107-74), Donlan (1981-2; 1989), Herman (1987), Seaford (1994), von Reden (1995a), Millett (1997), Mitchell (1997), Gill, Postlethwaite, and Seaford (1998), Knippschild (2002), Domingo Gygax (2007, forthcoming). It should be noted, with Will (1954), that the reciprocal justice forged by gifts was also created by other monies, including currency. 59 See further Sinclair (1988a: 187), Seaford (1994: 7-10), Domingo Gygax (2007: 113-19). This ethos readily shaped how political networks were constructed: Lys. 9.13, 14, 21; Pl. Rep 362b, Men. 41e; Xen. Mem. 2.4.6, 2.6.25, 3.7.9. Connor (1971: 35-47), Dover (1974: 180-1, 304-6), Sinclair (1988a: 187). 60 Hence the frequent injunctions in Greek literature to match gift with gift, to give when one has given to you: Hom. Od. 24.283-6, Hes. WD 353-5, Epicharmus fr. 273K, Hdt. 1.69-70, Xen. Cyr. 5.3.31, Aristot. EN 1167a14-16. Cf. Mauss (1990: 47-8), von Reden (1995a: 18-24), Domingo Gygax (2007: 113-19; forthcoming: 23-5). 61 Cf. Arist. Rhet.1.5.9, Mastrocinque (1996: 9). The exchange of armor between Glaucus and Diomede at Iliad 6.234-6 has been taken as the locus classicus for discussions of how dōra are calibrated to a relationship. See further Donlan (1989), Brown (1998), and generally Mauss (1990: 43-6), von Reden (1995a: 18-31). von Reden (1997) rightly extends this point to say that all money takes its meaning and value from the (social) context in which it is used.
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relational approach to bribery, the logic of the gift accorded with the logic of the relationship in which it was given. Take the case of Themistocles and the thirty talents. Recall how, under the standard view, the payments in Herodotus’ depiction of the Greek fleet’s deliberations at Artemisium seemed baffling; on a relational view, by contrast, these dōra are perfectly ‘rational’. As Herodotus writes, Themistocles successfully persuades Eurybiades, but only by giving money as if “in fact” it were coming from himself (w(j par) e(wutou= dh=qen didou/j, Hdt. 8.5). In other words, Themistocles lies about the source of the money in order to leverage his own friendship with Eurybiades. After all, we can imagine how Eurybiades might readily accept money from Themistocles—who personally yielded his command to the Spartan (Plut. Them. 7.3)—but might balk at the idea of taking money from (or simply being persuaded by the entreaties of) the Euboeans, whose shores Eurybiades in particular wanted to abandon (Plut. Them. 7.4).62 Similarly, Themistocles and Adimantus were not on the best of terms—note their bickering before the Battle of Salamis (Hdt. 8.59-62)—and the dōra given and received reflect this enmity. Themistocles couches his offer of dōra within a thinly veiled threat: he flat-out commands Adimantus that the Corinthians not abandon the Greek fleet; and he ominously refers to bribery by the Persian King, in effect suggesting that, unless Adimantus were to comply, he would be accused of taking bribes from Xerxes. In an alternate version, in fact, Themistocles makes precisely this threat to one of his own men (cf. Plut. Them. 7.4.6).
The dōra were calibrated to the dynamics of a specific
relationship in each case. 62
Even if we assume that Eurybiades simply wanted to move the Greek fleet elsewhere to give the Spartans at Thermoplyae a better chance—so Frost (1980: 106 ad 7.6)—it is crucial that he could not have been paid by just anyone to do so. Themistocles still had to leverage his own relationship with the Spartan.
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Because dōra were used to negotiate the relationship itself, the obligation they incurred need not be repaid immediately.
Often, in fact, outside of the ritualized
exchange of dōra on-the-spot, a gift entailed only a general return, that is, a return unspecified in terms of both quality (what kind of gift, how valuable it was) and time (when it would be given).63 In this sense, assuming they were gifts not quid pro quo compensation, we should not causally link the gifts given to Eurybiades and Adimantus with their decision to stay and defend Artemisium. Rather, both the talents of silver and the generals’ subsequent decision to stay could be viewed as independent ‘gifts’—we might say ‘favors’—that separately negotiated a friendship. Much like we saw with ‘insider’ framing in the previous section, within the framing of the relationship it would have been difficult to construe the gifts as bribes, for they likely would not have obligated a specific return. This reciprocity—gifts obligating non-specific returns—created a continuously off-set equilibrium by which dōra could symbolize and strengthen relationships. The Athenians had a preference to give rather than to receive, meaning it was better to obligate others than to be so obligated.64 As a result, when someone gave a gift, often the counter-gift would not simply repay an obligation, but would seek to off-set the equilibrium of the relationship by further obligating another, as well.65 The exchange of gifts was not a series of immediate, equal exchanges, but was a continuous string of gift/counter-gift/gift (counter-gift)/counter-gift… Although an Athenian often claimed to give dōra spontaneously and unprompted as a way to initiate a new sequence of 63
Mauss (1990) is seminal on this point. Finley (1957), Seaford (1994: 7-23), von Reden (1995a: 1824), Domingo Gygax (2007: 119-20; forthcoming: 29-30) helpfully lay out these concepts out for an ancient Greek setting. 64 E.g. Aristot. EN 1124b. 65 Millett (1992: 32-3), Domingo Gygax (2007: esp. 120-2).
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reciprocal exchanges, more often than not his ‘gift’ was actually both a ‘counter-gift’ repaying a previous obligation and a ‘gift’ incurring a new obligation. In practice, therefore, the distinction between gift/counter-gift was usually blurred.66 So gifts and the reciprocity that governed them symbolized a long-term relationship between two social actors. In this sense, dōra could be used not only to reinforce existing social ties, but even to forge new ones: by accepting dōra, one was obligated to repay them, thereby setting off a potentially long-term sequence of gifts and counter-gifts. To an observer looking in, the acceptance of a single gift might signal a long-term relationship of reciprocal exchanges. For the Athenians, where there were dōra, there were friends; and where there were friends, there were dōra. In this respect, dōra acted as a kind of social glue, a way to bind people together into long-term, reciprocal relationships. Certainly these kinds of long-term relationships were the fabric of Athenian society, but the story of Themistocles highlights how such ‘friendships’ (philia) also played an important role in the practice of Athenian politics, whether we call these ‘friendships’, ‘political friendships’, or ‘associations’.67 Indeed, a range of evidence supports the claim that much of Athenian politics was conducted through the leveraging of personal relationships.68 This makes sense at first glance, as the majority of Athenian
66
Duly noted by Domingo Gygax (forthcoming: 86-90) in a discussion of the epinikion as both gift and reward. Cf. Mastrocinque (1996: 12-13) on the difficulty in distinguishing between ‘gift’ and ‘tribute’ in archaic Greece. We can see this idea in practice in the way that public honors were represented sometimes as payment for past deeds, sometimes as encouraging (obligating) future benefactions, on which see most recently Liddel (2007: 160-82). 67 The semantic field of philia and its cognates, especially philos/philoi, was broad. Philoi could range from family members to friends to fellow citizens, while philia was more restrictively applied only to kin or lovers: Konstan (1996); cf. Goldhill (1986: 88-106), Blundell (1991: 26-59). 68 Connor (1971), Dow (1976), Whitehead (1986: 301-5), Strauss (1987), Sinclair (1988a), Littman (1990), Mitchell and Rhodes (1996), Mitchell (1997), Ober (2008). Cf. Calhoun (1913), Hunter (1994), Rubinstein (2000) for the leveraging of social relations in the courts.
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officials were not professionals per se, but were amateurs serving one-year terms; that they would leverage their own social relations could only help them be more effective.69 Here I would like to point out three different areas in which specific social configurations pertained in politics so that we can get a better idea of the kinds of transactions that could have been used to negotiate those relationships. Of the relatively few elected officials in Athens, frequently those dealing with foreign policy—like military generals (stratēgoi) or ambassadors—were selected in part because their personal relations might provide a strategic advantage for Athens. This strategic advantage might entail securing resources, funds, or simply more favorable negotiations. The stratēgos Alcibiades thus used Thracian men in his army—troops whom he later called his philoi or ‘friends’—in order to besiege Byzantium in 409; and in 413 Nicias hoped to overthrow Syracuse specifically through insiders who knew him.70 Demosthenes, Aeschines, and Philocrates were elected and re-elected as ambassadors to the Macedonian King Philip in part because of the relationship they had and continued to develop with him.71 Examples can be multiplied.72 To be sure, the Athenians realized 69
This principle is manifest in the selection of paredroi, two of which assisted each of the eponymous archon, the archon basileus, and the polemarch: Dow (1976), Whitehead (1986: 301-5), Kapparis (1998). AP 56.1 records that the three archons selected their paredroi on their own accord, meaning that their philoi were likely the primary beneficiaries: Whitehead (1986: 304-5) collects the sources on this practice; cf. Kapparis (1998: 388-9). Even if such an arrangement were simply a holdover from the archaic period— so Rhodes (1981: 622 ad AP 56.1) and recently Kapparis (1998: 385-6)—it nevertheless made sense in the democracy if the Athenians actually wanted the archons’ work to proceed smoothly and efficiently (a necessity given the wide range of their tasks): cf. [Dem.] 59.81. So, for example, several sources attest that an inexperienced archon should be balanced out by an experienced paredros: schol. ad Dem. 21.178, schol. ad Aeschin. 1.158; Anecd. Bek. 288.16. 70 Philoi: Diod. 13.105.3, cf. Plut. Alc. 36.6-37.3. Nicias: Thuc. 7.48.2, 7.73.3, cf. Diod. 13.27.3. 71 Cf. Dem. 18.51-2, 18.284, 19.167. Conversely, foreign ambassadors were frequently invited to institutionalize some kind of tie to the city through xenia: Dem. 19.234-5. On the preference for a connection between an ambassador and the polis to which he would be sent, see especially Mosley (1973: 43-9, 55-62). 72 E.g. Dem. 19.166-7; cf. Dem. 18.50-2, 18.109, 18.284, 19.138-40 and generally Herman (1987) and Mitchell (1997), who collect the sources. Note how Pericles confirms his xenia with the Spartan general Archidamus, but explicitly mentions that this relationship had never brought any ill upon the polis (Thuc. 2.13.1).
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the potential danger of these relationships—a point which will prove pivotal in the next section—but the dēmos was happy to elect magistrates who would use their personal connections for the public’s interest.73 A second area in which social relations were regularly leveraged in politics was in the provision of essentially public services through private initiative. Taxes were farmed out to enterprising individuals who would collect them on behalf of the polis.74 Grain, too, was collected by citizens who bid on public contracts for the responsibility to ensure that a certain amount of grain made it to the Piraeus port.75 Elite citizens (and sometimes resident aliens) spent enormous amounts of money on public liturgies, like hosting and training a dramatic chorus (chorēgia), fitting out and commanding a naval ship (triērarchia), or a property tax (eisphora) that was collected, from 378/7 onwards, by means of share-groups (symmories) of about 15 members who shared the burden of the tax.76
73
Badian (1987: 14), Herman (1987: 156-61), Mitchell (1997: 65-71). No Athenian seemed to mind, for instance, when Pericles gave dōra to the Spartan king Pleistoanax not to invade Attica. On the contrary, in his description of Pericles’ actions, Plutarch writes that some people, including Theophrastus the philosopher, thought that this was one among a number of payments that Pericles made to the Spartan leaders over a ten-year time period (Plut. Per. 23.1). Plutarch’s additional testimony is instructive, for he says that in this way Pericles ‘paid court to’ the Spartans (qerapeu/wn, Plut. Per. 23.1), meaning the stratēgos was giving money within the context of an ongoing exchange relationship. When Pericles’ accounts for the year came up for scrutiny at his euthynē, he reportedly said that he ‘lost the ten talents out of necessity’, and the people did not press the issue further: ei)j to\ de/on a)pw/lesa, as Aristophanes quotes at Clouds 859 (cf. schol. ad loc.). On Pericles’ dealings with Pleistoanax, see Thuc. 2.21.1, 5.16.3; Eph. 70 FGrH F193; Diod. 13.106.10; Plut. Per. 22-3, Nic. 28; Arist. Nu. 859 with scholia. For further discussion, see also Rhodes (1981: 313 ad AP 25.i), Dover (1968: 204 ad Nu. 859). 74 Tax farming: de Ste. Croix (1953), Brun (1983), Hansen (1991: 113-14), Liddel (2007: 279-80). 75 Grain provision: See Stroud (1998), Osborne (2000), Moreno (2007), and most recently Ober (2008: 260-3). 76 On the liturgical system: Davies (1981), Sinclair (1988a: 64-5). Chorēgia: Wilson (2000), Liddel (2007: 264-70). Triērarchia: Sinclair (1998: 61-2), Liddel (2007: 270-4). Eisphora: Sinclair (1988a: 62-3), Liddel (2007: 274-5). In the 340’s the symmory system for the eisphora system was expanded to create 60 groups of roughly 20 members; at the same time, these groups could also be held collectively responsible for paying for a trierarchy. On the symmory system, see Ruschenbusch (1978), Rhodes (1984), Gabrielsen (1985: 36), MacDowell (1986).
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For each one of these services, there was a single output—an amount of tax or grain, a naval ship, or a trained chorus—that was the product of enormous collaboration among an entire network of people. The richest three members from each eisphora symmory were responsible for providing the tax owed by the symmory as a whole; how they collected reimbursement from the other members, however, is something of a mystery. It is clear that there were considerable disagreements over the most equitable distribution of contributions: in order to make the actual payment owed by the symmory, therefore, there was doubtless interpersonal negotiation within the symmory—friends helping each other out, signaling their own status within the group by the payment they could contribute, etc.77 Likewise, tax collectors, grain distributors, and liturgy performers could not have performed their obligations single-handedly: they would have had to rely on friends to ensure that all the necessary provisions were in order, that a certain amount of the tax would be guaranteed to be collected, and so forth.78 For all public contracts, as well as for the trierarchy, there would have been the opportunity to recoup some losses and even profit; in that case, we can readily imagine that the proceeds were redistributed among friends who had been a part of the collaboration.79 Each one of these areas of politics thus leveraged a different configuration of social relationships, ranging from one or two immediate, close friends to more extensive
77
Of course, those in charge of a symmory might consequently force the other, less wealthy members of the symmory to pay more—e.g. Dem. 18.104, Hyp. fr. 160—and this could cause tremendous problems at wartime in trying to secure a fleet quickly. Cf. Dem. 4.36. On in-group distribution and remuneration, see also Dem. 37.37, 50.9. 78 Wankel (1982: 46-7), Domingo Gygax (forthcoming: 102-6). That groups of people, not individuals, might bid on amounts of grain is clear from Agyrrhios’ grain-tax law of 374/3: see SEG XXVI 72.31-3 with Stroud (1998: 65-6 ad 31-6), Osborne (2000: 173). Millett (1992: 69-71) notes that elites would often borrow money from friends in order to pay a liturgy up-front. 79 For the redistribution of booty as prizes (aristeiae) or misthos, see Pritchett (1972: 1.85-92).
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networks of informal ties and formal associations, as in the case of the symmories. Accordingly, we can posit that each area, too, would have admitted the giving and receiving of dōra within its own specific configuration of relations. These dōra could represent anything from well-defined shares of profit—that is, specific monetary sums— to general charis (“thanks”) recognizing a contribution to a collaborative effort; or, in the case where collaboration was itself a favor repaying a previous relational debt, subsequent dōra may not even have been ‘earmarked’ as thanks for any specific gift. Even without getting into any specifics, therefore, we can see how wide-ranging the intent, use, and meaning of these dōra could be. All of these dōra were essentially informal payments (or gifts) that both initiated and sustained the collaboration entailed in the above political domains. Yet there were also formal payments made, and these constitute our third area of politics in which important social configurations might emerge. In contrast to the above situations in which a pre-existing social relationship was leveraged in the interests of accomplishing some political task, where there were regular, formal payments, we need not assume that the transactors already knew each other. The social relationship negotiated in these cases usually would have been merely an arms-length tie. Thus, even if a particular general, say, did not know any of the leaders in a foreign city, he might still receive a payment from them as compensation for defending the city.80 This is precisely what seems to have happened with Themistocles and the Greek fleet at Artemisium.
Although Themistocles leveraged his own relationship with
80
Wallace (1974: 25n.8) on these payments; cf. Hdt. 7.158.4. Even if a payment from the Euboeans would have been irregular, Themistocles’ contemporaries probably would have viewed his payments in light of money from Athens to finance the expedition: Hdt. 8.5.3, Ephorus FGrH 70 F193. Certainly by the end of the fifth century, when the Persian King was financing a number of Spartan expeditions, this practice had become more regular: Lewis (1989).
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Eurybiades and Adimantus by providing them with dōra, the Athenian himself seems to have been given veritable compensation, a “payment” (cf. misqw|=, e)kexa/risto, Hdt. 8.45) in order to stay at Artemisium. No close relationship need be presumed here, and the use of misthos might signal both the particular frame of compensation and especially a formal payment by the Euboeans. On this point Phanias’ alternate version—in which Themistocles offers a talent of silver to the trierarch Architeles—is explicit, for Themistocles’ offer could readily be interpreted in light of the regular payment of misthos made by a general like Themistocles to a trierarch like Architeles (Plut. Them. 7.6).81 On one reading of the scene, in fact, the ‘bribes’ given were no more than payments often given to generals to ensure that their men would be fed.82 Examples can be multiplied. Trierarchs who did not wish to command their ship could hire out someone to take their place.83 Although Athenian ambassadors were given a per diem for the duration of an embassy, they were often still provided accommodation by proxenoi living in the city they were visiting.84 From the mid-fourth century onwards, magistrates were publicly honored on an increasingly regular basis simply for performing the duties of their office.85 In addition to various rates of pay for public officials including
81
On the regular payment of a misthos for military service, see Pritchett (1971: 3-27); for the distribution of this misthos by the stratēgos, Pritchett (1971: 85-92). Although there are chronological problems with positing that a stratēgos might provide a monetary wage in the 480’s—so, Pritchett (1971: 11), Frost (1980: 107 ad 7.6-7), Blösel (2001: 182)—it is enough for our purposes that later Athenians hearing of Themistocles at Artemisium would have understood his payment to Architeles in light of regular payments in political practice. 82 Cawkwell (1970), Wallace (1974), though cf. Blösel (2001: 135-6). The explicit purpose for which funds were accepted was often hard to determine, as monies collected for the tribute, say, were nevertheless used to provide provisions or misthos for soldiers: Pritchett (1974: 40-1). 83 Lys. 21.10, Dem. 21.80, 51.7. Given the purported reputation of the helmsman hired in Lysias 21.10, we need not presume that the speaker had known him before hiring him. 84 Mitchell (1997: 29). 85 See the examples provided by Whitehead (1983: 73n.32). Note how, by the time of Aristotle’s Constitution of Athens (late 330’s to early 320’s), the Council regularly received a dōrea of a gold crown after successfully submitting its accounts: AP 46.1; Aeschin. 1.111-12, Dem. 22.36, 22.38-9; cf. Dem. 22.8-20.
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councilors, judges were provided small court fees by litigants at the preliminary hearing of suits (Poll. 8.38, Dem. 47.64), while jurors were paid at the end of each day for which they served on a jury (Ar. Eq. 225, AP 62.2). These last payments were made by the polis and certainly, to that extent, signaled a formal political relationship between citizen and polis. It is important to remember, however, that the polis seems to have had a monopoly over the legitimate provision of these kinds of pay; these particular transactions were strongly associated with the specific, fixed transactors of citizen (or official) and polis. If somebody else tried to provide the same kind of compensation, it was often considered bribery, where the bribe monies were viewed as a substitute for the pay normally provided public officials.86 As suggested by a relational approach to bribery, simply changing one of the transactors— allowing a regular citizen, say, to give a payment to a public official in return for a particular service—could shift the normative value of the transaction considerably. By the same token, it should be noted just how often informal gifts to an official within the context of a social relationship would have flowed side-by-side with formal payments from the polis.87 How the scene was evaluated thus often hinged on whether one adopted the perspective of an ‘insider’ or ‘outsider’.
Again, consider how
Themistocles leveraged reciprocal relationships with both Eurybiades and Adimantus in 86
Public officials were paid certainly in the fifth century and perhaps in the fourth century as well. The issue of fourth-century pay for public office is a vexed one among Greek historians: for an introduction to the debate, see Gabrielsen (1981) for and Hansen (1979, 1980) against the idea that fourth-century officials were regularly paid. I tend to side with Hansen: see Chapter Four below. Note how in the Heliastic oath, the jurors swore never to take gifts on behalf of their office from anyone in any way whatsoever (Dem. 24.150). Although the pay was modest—intended mainly to pay for meals and as an honorarium, on which see Markle (1985) and Chapter Two below—we never hear of officials taking bribes expressly because they were paid too little. 87 We can reframe this idea in terms of the rewards or perquisites of office, treated in detail by Hansen (1980) and Sinclair (1988a: 179-86) and see also Lys. 19.57, 25.9, 25.19, 30.25; Dem. 3.29, 19.215, [Dem.] 58.35; Aeschin. 3.173; Din. 1.41, 1.77. Cf. Lys. 28.9, 29.6; Ar. V. 669-77, Pl.377-9, 567-70. The central issue of perquisites is whether they are legitimate or illegitimate (i.e. bribery, as oft). In this sense, legitimate rewards might come from either a formal or informal source.
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order to get the leaders to stay and defend Euboea. We can imagine that the dōra he gave were viewed among ‘insiders’—himself and anyone else part of the same relational context—as just one installment in a long series of gift/counter-gift reciprocal exchanges. Similarly, each general contributed his own ‘counter-gift’ to Themistocles: a pledge to stay and defend Artemisium. But note how, in that case, the counter-gift itself was a political service that represented its own set of obligations in a different social context:
the ‘outside’
relationship between public official and community, for example. The services provided by the generals to Themistocles (and, for that matter, those provided by Themistocles in return for the Euboeans’ payment) performed relational work within the twin contexts of an inside and outside relationship.
In other words, both sets of relationships were
negotiated at the same time; the generals’ ‘counter-gift’ to Themistocles was also a gift/counter-gift to some third party. By using a political service, normally used to negotiate the outside relationship, as a token to perform relational work in the inside relationship, all the generals at Artemisium thus lay themselves open to the claim of bribery. The issue faced by Themistocles and his associates was one of dual framing, a conflict between insider and outsider perspectives discussed in the previous section. The monies that did relational work in one relational context simultaneously entailed obligations within another context.
Realistically, people encounter these kinds of
scenarios all the time and unproblematically negotiate both relationships simultaneously through compromise. A problem arises, however, when one relationship is not given its proper due, that is, when the relative balance between the two relationships too much
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favors one or the other.88 In that case, it can appear that some inherent obligation has been broken and, crucially, that this normative violation has resulted from how someone has tried to negotiate the other relationship. Because such relational work is often performed through monies—gifts, counter-gifts, cash, favors, entitlements, etc.—the normative violation is often blamed on the transaction, the very site and means of relational negotiation.89 Examining Athens from a relational perspective allows us to push our relational model yet further. As the case of Themistocles suggests, dōra in political collaboration can negotiate two relationships simultaneously; when one of those relationships is thought to outweigh the other unjustly, outsiders readily frame the actions as bribery.90 We can generalize this claim as follows: wherever there was political collaboration, there was the possibility that someone might look at the scene and call it bribery. After all, Athenian politics did not merely leverage these configurations of social relations, but was in fact constituted by them. Hence, politics at Athens, like politics anywhere, should be viewed as a specific subset of all the social relations that attain in society. Each political 88
Hence ‘private gain’ at ‘public loss’ shows an undesirable favoring of private over public regard. The imbalance between a bribe-taker’s profit while the rest of the polis suffered was central to the topos of “profiting at your [sc. the people’s expense,” treated in Chapters Three and Four below. 89 This is precisely what occurs in Zelizer’s (1994; 2005b) ‘Hostile Worlds’ scenarios, on which see above. 90 Cf. von Reden (1995a: 94). It should be noted that such dual framing always arises in political situations, but can be found in other social contexts, as well. To return to Timocreon’s abuse of Themistocles, the Athenian is called a “liar, con, traitor...won over by roguish silver” (yeu&stan a1dikon prodo&tan…a)rguri/oisi kobalikoi=si peisqei\j, 727 PMG 4-5) for having taken money from Timocreon’s enemies to keep Timocreon in exile, rather than to restore him as he had pledged to do. Timocreon was Themistocles’ guest-friend (cf. cei=non, 727 PMG 4), and the entire poem details how, in repeatedly committing bribery, Themistocles harmed not only Timocreon, but a number of other friends, as well. There, not restoring Timocreon from exile is a service that negotiates two distinct sets of relationships—Themistocles and Timocreon, Themistocles and Timocreon’s enemies. Although Timocreon blames this service on “roguish silver” and thereby assumes Themistocles had been bribed, in theory Themistocles may have been given this silver as a ‘gift’ with no strings attached and may simply have been showing more favor to one set of friends (Timocreon’s enemies) than to another (Timocreon). The poem has been much discussed: see especially AE 415, Fornara (1966: 260), Stehle (1994: 510-11) on historical issues and Podlecki (1975), Scodel (1983), and Stehle (1994) on the thorny issue of the poem’s genre.
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system is constituted by a different constellation of social relations, and each has its own constellation of social obligations that inhere in those relations. As a result, wherever there is politics, there is the possibility of dually-framed dōra and, consequently, the possibility of bribery. In those cases, trying to disentangle which dōra or services negotiated which relationship is misguided, even impossible, because they can be construed as performing relational work in both relationships. Themistocles’ actions at Artemisium helpfully show the problems in trying to fix only one kind of social framing; instead, there as elsewhere we should ask what is at stake in adopting one social frame, hence one normative evaluation, over another when both really seem to apply simultaneously. In terms of politics, certain practices are considered legitimate, others not, but ultimately this evaluation hinges on how we frame the social relationships involved and on how we define the social obligations entailed by those relations. So, I underscore, the normative value of vote-swapping in the legislature, paying a public official to win a public contract, or accepting money from an ally and redistributing it among friends is not absolute, but is subject to contestation among competing social frames. This contestation of frames is a crucial part of politics. In the next section, the last part of the relational model of Athenian bribery we have been developing, we will examine how these competing frames tied into broader political narratives within the democracy.
From Definition to Discourse: dōrodokia and the Commerce of Bad Friends Any relational approach to bribery must begin with identifying configurations of social relations within a society. From there, by examining the vocabulary of bribery, the
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mechanics for assigning and contesting value, we can begin to uncover the patterns of normative values generated by those social relations. But what happens when these values are contested? What happens when the meaning of a relationship is negotiated, or when competing social frames are brought to bear on the same actions? At that point, people turn to broader cultural norms to guide how they should assess such competing political claims—in short, people determine the narrative of a specific sequence of events by looking to broader cultural narratives about how similar events are typically framed. In this way, the frame of bribery interlocks with larger narratives about how politics is conducted, at Athens as in any other polity. Exactly how this interlocking of social frames and political narratives plays out will be the focus of this section, one that will lay the groundwork for our relational approach.91 In this last section, therefore, we must shift our focus from social relations to political norms, with an eye towards understanding how political norms can change over time. As we just saw, there were a number of different ways in which social relations could be leveraged in Athenian politics, but one of the critical problems the Athenian democracy faced was the inherent danger in allowing certain kinds of social relations to pertain in politics. A well-connected general or ambassador was certainly in a good position to obtain a favorable result for the community, but he was just as able to obtain a less than favorable result, as well. There was, accordingly, a pressing need for the
91
Although bribery functions as a narrative about politics in practice in other cultures, too—see, e.g. Gupta (1995), Ledeneva (1998), Sedlenieks (2004), cf. Thuc. 2.97.4 about the Odrysians in Thrace—it is nevertheless remarkable that the Athenians adopted it. After all, the presumption of bribery can be a major distortion of the causality of events. Even if there had been a long sequence of gift and counter-gift in the transactors’ eyes, in which case no particular ‘bribe’ could be associated with the specific counter-gift of the political service provided, within the frame of bribery this long sequence was narrowed down to a single quid pro quo transaction, the exchange of bribe for service. Likewise, to presume that politics was conducted through bribes entails a considerable amount of civic distrust: see especially Chapter Four below.
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Athenians to define when leveraging a social relation was okay, when it was not. As the Athenian democracy developed, there was also a need to be able to redefine these broad political norms over time. As we will examine here, bribery qua a social frame was the political narrative par excellence for conceptualizing what had gone wrong in a particular case and why this was ‘wrong’ in the first place. To frame something as bribery was a way to contest its legitimacy; in this way, competing claims over which social frame should become social fact were competing claims over how best to understand the democracy. Bribery was a popular explanation for political injustice at Athens. When a public official’s obligation to the community was breached, bribery was usually assumed to be the cause. These assumptions pervade Athenian political history as public officials’ failure to do what was expected of them—their violation of the obligations inherent in their relationship with the community—were blamed on bribery.92
Yet in order to
assume that a specific outcome was caused by bribery, an Athenian had to have had the idea that most bad outcomes were caused by bribery. How a particular outcome was framed was therefore shaped by prevailing norms and expectations about politics. In short, each time an Athenian assumed that bribery had occurred, the very choice of social frames hinged on broader political narratives. There are two parts to this idea that the social frame of bribery at the individual level was interlocked with common narratives of polity. First, bribes were associated with ‘bad friends’; to claim that someone had taken bribes was to identify him with a specific social type, what I will call the dōrodokos or corrupt man. In this way, the 92
Strauss (1985: 71-2), Todd (1993: 306), Kulesza (1995: 42-4), Taylor (2001: 161). Pritchett (1974: 2.24) on generals’ responsibility for everything, as well as prosecution of generals for major defeats (1974: 2.20); cf. Roberts (1982), Elster (1999).
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framing of a specific outcome as bribery hinged on whether or not that outcome fit with generally recognized trends in politics: discrete events were framed as bribery (or not) depending on how well they resembled broader, common conceptions of what bribery looked like. Once idealized in this way, the stereotype of the dōrodokos could play an important role in public discourse. This will be the second argument sketched here. It was through social types like the dōrodokos that Athenians thought through the democracy itself. Hence, adopting the narrative frame of bribery implicitly (or explicitly) told a larger narrative about politics and society, for it assigned a particular role to the dōrodokos within the broader democracy. By telling a story about one sequence of events, an Athenian was staking a claim in broader public discussions about how democratic politics should be conducted. Discourse on dōrodokia was the discourse of democracy; and it was here, through competing narratives on dōrodokia and democracy, that deliberative politics was fashioned. First, the dōrodokos and ‘bad friends’. Dually-framed dōra can simultaneously make and break friendships, with the normative value of the dōra hinging on how they are framed. If framed through the lens of a ‘broken’ relationship in which a social obligation has been violated, bribery emerges.
Recall from the Introduction how a
dōrodokos like Timagoras was called a ‘bad friend’. Precisely the kind of person who had harmed, not helped, his friends—a person who had failed to understand the principle of reciprocity—was the type who might violate the obligations in one friendship in order to negotiate those in another. This is precisely the kind of person Timagoras was called when he was impugned both for taking bribes and for treating his fellow ambassador
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poorly.93 In subsequent chapters we will encounter a number of other dōrodokoi who were similarly ‘bad friends’. What kind of ‘bad friends’ were born of bribery? Although the frame of bribery could be used if an obligation within any friendship was thought violated, there is good reason to think that, for the Athenians, there was one relationship in particular—that between citizen and community—through which bribery was continually framed.94 Throughout the democracy, there was a strong ethos of civic obligation: citizens qua members of a political community had an obligation to take a hand in bettering that community.95 This obligation was sometimes informally expressed through social norms on entering political office, serving on a jury, respecting other citizens, or taking part in a festival. Alternatively, there were formal requirements like property taxes and liturgies for the elite, laws on military service or on speaking against the people’s interests. Either way, a citizen’s membership in the polity was defined by the duties he had towards the community and the rewards he received as a member of the franchise.
It was a
relationship founded on reciprocity.96 93
Similarly, Timocreon lambastes Themistocles for taking bribes and thereby betraying his friend (727 PMG). Demosthenes accuses Aeschines of being a bad friend (Dem. 19.191) and bad guest (Dem. 19.1968), both of which signal that Aeschines failed to understand the value of reciprocity. 94 So Leslie Kurke (2002: 94) writes, “gift-giving…becomes negatively inflected as ‘bribery’ (dōrodokia) when it is felt to interfere with a citizen’s obligations to his civic community.” While Kurke is certainly right to point to the discursive power at the heart of insinuations of bribery, I would argue that what was called bribery need not, but often was, framed in relation to a citizen’s obligations to the community. Of course, a citizen’s violated obligations to his friends—as in Timocreon’s invective against Themistocles (727 PMG)—could also result in the inflection of gift-giving as bribery. 95 E.g. Thuc. 2.35ff. On the range of these civic obligations, Liddel (2007) is essential. For Aristotle’s thoughts on civic obligation, see Rosler (2005). So Demosthenes notes that the freedoms of democracy were guarded by rivalrous competition to participate politically and to win rewards from the dēmos (Dem. 20.107-8). For an idea of the breadth and depth of Athenian civic participation, Sinclair (1988a: esp. 514). 96 Liddel (2007: 139-43). Aristotle commonly writes that the goal of political life was to win honor (timē) from the community: EN 1159a15-25, 1095b14-31, Pol. 1302a31-b18, 1283a16-22, Rh. 1361a28-b2. Recent scholars have explored how this timē was frequently expressed as charis or reciprocal “thanks” for the provision of some good deed to the community: see especially Davies (1981: 92-8), Ober (1989), Domingo Gygax (forthcoming: passim).
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There were specific reciprocal obligations that defined a public official’s relationship to the community. Under Solon a century before the democracy, public office was conceived of as a tax, a contribution to the polity proportional to one’s income: the more affluent the citizen, the greater his expected contribution and the more important his role in the polity.97 In this sense, public office was conceptualized as a public service, a good work or benefaction, much like liturgies familiar from later in the democracy.98 Indeed, all would-be public officials had to undergo a public scrutiny, or dokimasia, in which their legal qualifications were assessed and, crucially, their past good works to the city were vetted.99 The dokimasia ascertained that the reciprocal relations between citizen and community had been well-established and would presumably continue during that citizen’s tenure in public office.100
Although the
Athenians did not conceptualize these reciprocal relations as a ‘friendship’ per se, it is clear that the relationship between citizen and community was a reciprocal one constantly negotiated by civic obligations.101
97
Following Ostwald (1995: 374-6), who understands Solon’s ‘property’ (telē) classes as tax classes. Finley (1977: 96-7) on the similar reciprocity between kings and communities in Homeric society; this was part of a broader reliance on elite contributions to the polis in the archaic period, on which see most recently Domingo Gygax (forthcoming: 91-107). 98 Xenophanes (fr. 2 DK) explicitly compares elite political wisdom to the benefaction of an athletic victory: cf. Pl. Ap. 36d, Rep. 465d and see Doming Gygax (forthcoming: 110-15) for discussion. Not coincidentally, in the second half of the fourth century, serving in public office was regularly awarded public honors just as liturgies were: Whitehead (1983: 65) lists the sources. In the fifth century, too, certain extraordinary successes in public office were rewarded exceptional honors: Themistocles was awarded a statute in the Temple of Artemis Aristoboulē (Plut. Them. 22.2); commemorative herms were erected in the agora for Cimon and the other generals at Eion (Aeschin. 3.183, Plut. Cim. 7.4); and Cleon received proedria and sitēsis after Pylos (Ar. Eq. 573-80). It is more striking, however, how the achievements of prominent leaders of the fifth century are characterized as elite benefactions: Sinclair (1988a: 34-6), Schmitt-Pantel (1992: 179-208) are fundamental on this point. 99 MacDowell (1978: 168), Ostwald (1995: 325-6). Specifically, a candidate was asked whether he treated his parents well, paid his taxes, and had fulfilled his military obligations (AP 55.3). Broader considerations of goodwill towards the community could be brought up by accusers: see esp. Lysias 16, 25, 26, 31, all presented at dokimasiai. 100 Adeleye (1983: esp. 30), Hansen (1991: 218-20); cf. Todd (1993: 285-9). 101 Plato’s Crito is fundamental on this point. Aristotle EN viii-ix, esp. viii.10-11 posits that the reciprocal exchange relationship at the heart of political friendship—though not strictly philia—nevertheless exhibits
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The dōrodokos, then, was a ‘bad friend’ to the community: not a specific bad friend, but an example of a generic category of individuals in the democracy. Whether we encounter him in comedy or forensic oratory, he is a kind of idealized figure—in a word, a stereotype.102 Again, a relational view helps illuminate why this could have been the case. Whenever we negotiate any social relationship—a friendship, say—we have in mind certain social benchmarks by which we define and redefine its terms. “Friends are supposed to do X or Y,” we think, and this generic expectation consequently structures our interactions with specific friends by helping shape the norms of the relationship. Behavior and expectations are shaped according to some ideal about what a relationship is or is not, what it should and should not be. Because of his dual framing as insider and outsider, the dōrodokos was potentially identified with two relational roles, two ideal types, at once. Within the relationship negotiated by the bribe, the dōrodokos was aligned with one relational role, whether friend, neighbor, father, associate, etc., and his behavior was measured according to the yardstick of the ideal friend, neighbor, etc. From the community’s perspective and within the context of his relationship with the community, however, he was aligned with the role of ‘bad friend’. By failing to provide an expected, obligatory return in his ‘friendship’ with the community, the dōrodokos had intentionally or unintentionally identified himself with the community’s other ‘bad friends’.
the same reciprocity inherent in philia: Hutter (1978), Schofield (1998). While I would venture that every society establishes a similar kind of reciprocal relationship between citizen and community, it should be noted that both the nature and the content of this obligation can vary tremendously. In Athens this obligation was defined primarily by informal, not formal norms: relatively few legal regulations restricted official conduct, while the social standard of reciprocity—help the community, don’t harm it—prevailed. 102 Wankel (1982: 33), Kulesza (1995: 45-83, esp. 81-2).
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Remarkably, what is distinct about the dōrodokos as a social type is that there were never any generic features that uniquely identified him.103
Theophrastus’
Characters provides short character sketches of 30 different social types that could be found in Athens just after the democracy: the flatterer, the garrulous man, the oligarch, the miser, the greedy man, the coward, the busy-body—all of these types had defining features by which each character could be picked out in a crowd. The dōrodokos is nowhere to be found.104 Aside from perhaps being a ‘bad friend’, the dōrodokos was essentially an empty set, an open sign that could be filled in as needed. Sometimes he was assumed to be poor, other times rich.105 Sometimes he was assumed to have a bad character through and through; other times his transgression was considered an isolated affair.106 He could be working alone or part of a vast network of dōrodokoi.107 When I speak of the dōrodokos, then, I intend it as a heuristic that signals the ideal type with which a bribe-giver or bribe-taker was identified. When someone was suspected of dōrodokia, he was identified with a social type—a kind of person in the democracy—but the exact contents of this type shifted over time. 103
Ober (1989: 237) notes in passing the reverse of this claim, that the Athenians never had a topos of the adōrodokētos or unbribable man. Wankel (1982) and Kulesza (1995: 48-83) examine the generic construction of bribery accusations, but are unable to identify any unique characteristics beyond lack of loyalty to the polis. Again, we might call the dōrodokos, simply, a ‘bad friend’. Cf. Kulesza (1995: 81). Accordingly, the dōrodokos, though idealized, never claimed the status of a range of other ‘bad citizen’ anti-types in the democracy, like the military shirker or avoider of liturgies—on which see Christ (2006, 2008)—or the whore, the flatterer, and the sykophant, helpfully discussed by Fisher (2008). For the affinities between bribery and prostitution, again in terms of character types, see von Reden (1995a: 11720). 104 Bribery appears but once in the Oligarch’s complaint about how the courts are corrupt: Theoph. Char. 26.5. 105 Poor: Xen. Hell. 2.3.48, Aeschin. 1.88, Dem. 18.131, Arist. Pol. 1270b6-13, Din. 3.18. Rich: Aeschin. 3.94, Hyp. 3.35, Din. 1.40, Dem. 21.112, 23.201. 106 Character: Ar. Pl. 569-70, Lys. 28.10-11, Dem. 23.146 and see Chapter Three. Isolated incident: Aristides, nicknamed ‘the just’ for his apparent refusal to seek personal gain in his public service, was reportedly convicted of dōrodokia for once taking money from the Ionians when assessing their tribute (Plut. Arist. 26.2-5=Craterus FGrH 324 F12). 107 Working alone: Timagoras (Plut. Pelop. 30.6-7) and Arthmius (e.g. Din. 2.24) were isolated incidents of bribery. Network: Euxenippus (Hyp. 4.39), those involved in the Harpalus Affair (Ath. 8.341f-342), Ant. 6.49-50, and see generally Chapter Four below.
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As the next three chapters will detail, during each of three different periods in the democracy a different conception of the dōrodokos prevailed: the disobedient citizen, the thief, and the traitor. Each one of these latter types, and the dōrodokos by extension, had its own distinct characteristics, but we will find that the choice of which type or which characteristics to assign to the dōrodokos was determined in large part by how dōrodokia was conceptualized. At the end of the dissertation, we will return to the question of why the Athenians treated the dōrodokos uniquely as an ideal type yet one which never had any distinct features of its own. For now it is enough to note that the dōrodokos played this role in the democracy and that the next chapters examine in greater detail how this process actually worked. So calling someone a dōrodokos identified him with a social type within the democracy, although this type shifted over time along with changing conceptions of dōrodokia.
This brings us to the second point I would like to highlight about the
normative construction of narratives of bribery in the Athenian democracy. In public discourse, the stereotype of the dōrodokos was used to tell a larger story about politics and society at Athens. This idea will play a prominent role in the second half of the dissertation, where we will see how distinct narratives of dōrodokia became legitimated in public discourse through legal institutions. It is worth outlining the contours of this claim here, however, so that in the chapters to follow the reader can glean hints of the broader role played by narratives of dōrodokia. We have been focusing on competing social frames, on the difference between an insider’s and outsider’s potential framing of a sequence of events. To an outsider, the monies used to negotiate a relationship of political collaboration could quickly blend into
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bribes; an insider, however, could contest this framing of events in two distinct ways. First, a different relational frame with a different transaction context could be adopted. By claiming that the monies were not compensation, but were gifts that required no specific return, an insider could contest the twin ideas that there had been an exchange and that this exchange had caused some normative violation. Moreover, and this way is most important for our purposes, the frame of bribery could be contested by claiming that there had been no violation of obligations in the first place. This last view posited that the norms of the outside relationship should be defined along different lines from those adopted by the outsider: new practices, like the insiders’ quid pro quo exchange, should be allowed, or old practices should take on new meaning. Again, this makes sense from a relational perspective. When we try to negotiate the terms of a relationship—as we switch the ideal types that define it, changing from friend to lover, say—we restructure the norms governing that relationship. By changing how we understand the ideal form of the relationship, we let new practices become accepted, or old practices become imbued with new meaning. After a certain point, it no longer makes sense to think of the relationship through the previous ideal (friends), and a new ideal (lovers) must be adopted; the relationship is then likened to a new, idealized social type. Crucially, this new type is structured according to a new set of norms.108
108
In the same vein, Rose (2003: 232) suggests that moral discourses are ultimately statements of imagined unities: the kinds of things ‘we’ do or do not do. Changing the contents of these discourses thus signals a new conception of who ‘we’ are—a redefinition of the boundaries of community. I view such a process, whereby accretions of meaning slowly change a core concept until it must be reinvented or redefined, as analogous to the accretion of meanings and practices attached to rituals: cf. Beard (1987) and Feeney (1998: 129-31) for a relevant discussion of how literary texts represent the multiplicity of meanings in ritual processes. In this light, it is perhaps unsurprising to find contemporary sociologists like Miller (1998: 73-110) and Wuthnow (1996: 183-97) speaking of rituals within and concerning practices of consumption. For these scholars, it is precisely through ritual that consumers align purchases (consumption) with broader cultural values and thereby negotiate social relationships. I would argue that the same could be said about engaging in bribery, as well.
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Now we can begin to see what was considered so bad about dōrodokia and why adopting the frame of bribery (or not) was an inherently political act. By taking what his opponent called ‘bribes’, the dōrodokos effectively represented a change to the logic of an existing relationship. At best he was re-negotiating, at worst rejecting, the norms governing the relationship between public official and the people, citizen and community. Potentially each side viewed the other as trying to establish a new ideal, a new standard by which political friendships with the community were to be negotiated. For this reason, dōrodokoi are often portrayed as weighing the currency of one relationship against another, esteeming the bribes as more valuable than any rewards inherent in benefiting the community.109
This process of weighing was both literal and symbolic:
the
dōrodokos had to determine not only which social frame would be given greater weight in his simultaneous negotiation of two relationships, but especially which normative context, which set of ideal types, was more important to him. Such weighing of currencies often resulted in the alignment of bribe monies with cash, that is, the currency of the marketplace. No doubt some of the time the form of the bribe was in actual Athenian drachmas; to this extent, calling the bribe monies ‘cash’ could form a purely descriptive role. But often, too, referring to the bribe monies as ‘money’ played a crucial discursive role: it was a way to signal that the relations, practices, or outcomes associated with the bribe were illegitimate. In this light, bribe monies functioned as an ‘anti-currency’ to the legitimate monies of democracy; the former derived their full social meaning as conceptual opposites to the latter. In both cases, then, the monies used to negotiate political relationships, whether legitimate or
109
E.g. Lysias 21 (philotimia weighed against bribery), Dem. 19.142 with Dem. 19.223, Din. 1.21. Subsequent chapters will illustrate this point in more depth.
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illegitimate, acted as a conceptual frame for thinking about politics. Encoded within each was a lens for understanding how politics should or should not be conducted. Herein lay the importance of bribery as a political narrative. In claiming that an insider had committed bribery, or in defending oneself against an outsider’s accusation of bribery, an Athenian implicitly (or explicitly) tried to legitimate one set of political norms—one way of understanding the dōrodokos or the ideal public official—while delegitimizing another. As was suggested in the first section of this chapter, he was aligning himself with a particular narrative about how politics should be conducted. This narrative both framed what the norms governing the moral community of the people should be and cast an opponent—whether the dōrodokos himself or his accuser—outside that moral community. Within the practice of politics, accusations of dōrodokia could thus be used to (de-)legitimate new ways of conducting politics.
As new social
relationships were leveraged in new ways in the democracy, whether they had been leveraged in a good or a bad way was framed through the idea of bribery. As will be crucial in the story we will trace, acceptable outcomes were defined as ‘democracy’, unacceptable as ‘bribery’. Crucially, these attempts at legitimization or delegitimization focused on the currency of political relationships: the monies of one were counterpoised against the monies of the other. Tracing these monies will tell us much not only about dōrodokia, but especially about dēmokratia.
Looking Ahead: The above framework for understanding bribery will form the basis of the next three chapters, which will take a diachronic look at the figure of the dōrodokos in the Athenian democracy.
As we will see, the dōrodokos was the bogeyman of the 78
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democracy, a figure aligned with a number of distinct social types at specific periods within Athens’ history. Through most of the fifth century, the dōrodokos was like a disobedient citizen (Chapter Two). A different type emerged in the last quarter of the fifth century and especially in the decades after the rule of the Thirty Tyrants, as the dōrodokos became a thief of sorts, someone who was plundering the polity for his own gain (Chapter Three). And finally, in the middle half of the fourth century, amid the constant threat of civil conflict throughout the Greek world, the dōrodokos was a traitor (Chapter Four). On a relational view of bribery, there are a number of factors that contributed to the dōrodokos’ transformation from a disobedient citizen to a thief and traitor, and our focus in these chapters will be on understanding precisely why this diachronic development occurred. Changing social configurations, both inside and outside politics, created different patterns in which the frame of bribery might arise. This, in turn, created changing patterns of how social relations were leveraged within politics—for what kinds of duties, how often or how thoroughly they were leveraged—and, consequently, shifted the frames through which Athenians conceptualized the civic obligations of public official and citizen, alike. Of course, these factors shifted the ways in which the regular, legitimate monies used to negotiate social relationships in politics were conceptualized, as well. One of the most striking stories we will trace, then, is how the monies of dōrodokia were constantly counterpoised with the monies of democracy.
There are two components to this
argument, each of which will be fleshed out in the chapters to come. First, the dōrodokos was consistently thought to weigh illegitimate bribe monies against legitimate political
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payments (honors, gifts, tribute, etc.). What is more, each set of monies, whether legitimate or not, was used as a conceptual metaphor for the relationship between official (and often citizen) and community. The monies of dōrodokia and democracy, alike, were thus used as conceptual proxies for the relationships they signified.
By tracing the
changing ways in which dōrodokia was configured, we will thus throw into relief how the Athenians used political monies—and above all their dark twin, dōra—to think through relationships within their polity. For each period of the democracy we will ask who the dōrodokos was and what role he was thought to play amid these shifting social, political, and economic circumstances.
By no means was ‘the’ Athenian perspective on the dōrodokos
monolithic; again, for each distinct notion of polity, there was a distinct view of bribery, as well. However, within each period the views of a range of Athenians tended to converge on who the dōrodokos was; in turn, these narratives were used to think through broader political commitments about what the democracy should be. Accordingly, in Chapters Five, Six, and Seven we will examine how such narratives factored into public policy, helped shape public discourse, and thereby constituted a vital part of politics in practice.
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Dōrodokia, Elites, and the People’s Authority 508/7-404 BCE
In 463/2 the Athenian stratēgos Cimon returned to Athens after a successful campaign fighting the Persians in the Chersonese and subduing a revolt by the Thasians. Apparently not everything had gone according to plan. Upon his return, the people elected special prosecutors to bring a charge of dōrodokia against the general.
As
Plutarch records, Cimon apparently had had it “within his grasp” (parasxo/n) to “easily” (r(a|di/wj) mount an attack against Macedon (Plut. Cim. 14.3). He withdrew, instead, and the Athenians assumed that he must have received dōra from the Macedonian king (Plut. Cim. 14.2-3). Though convicted by the Assembly, he was subsequently acquitted by the Areopagus Court and soon elected to a new command as general.1 Despite its oddities, the trial itself is remembered perhaps more for its aftermath than as a significant historical moment in its own right. As Aristotle’s Constitution of Athens explains, when Cimon was acquitted, there was considerable public outcry at Athens (AP 25, 27.1). In particular, one Ephialtes led the charge, first publicly accusing members of the Areopagus court of corruption because they had acquitted Cimon and then moving to pass legislation that stripped the Areopagus of certain powers, including the oversight of officials. Read this way, with the benefit of hindsight Cimon’s trial becomes a critical catalyst in the development of the democracy:
not so much an
important or unusual event in itself, but a legal means to a political end. As the story has
1
Plut. Cim. 14.1-4; Plut. Per. 10.6; cf. AP 27.1. For scholarly accounts of Cimon’s trial, see Roberts (1982: 55-6), Ostwald (1986: 41-2), Carawan (1987: 202-5), Raaflaub (2007: 113, 137-8). I follow Carawan’s reconstruction of the procedure of the trial; see further Chapter Seven below.
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gone since at least Aristotle, that political end was the assertion of the dēmos’ authority within the courts. In other words, Cimon’s trial is best remembered for ushering in the democratic hallmark of public accountability.2 The issue of the people’s authority was an important theme in the democracy from its inception under the leadership of Cleisthenes in 508/7.
In Herodotus’
Constitutional Debate, mass rule (plh=qoj a1rxon) is distinguished by public accountability, use of the lot in selecting public officials, and policymaking by the people themselves (Hdt. 3.80.6). Within 50 years of Cleisthenes’ reforms, all three marks of the people’s authority were present in the Athenian democracy. As suggested by Cimon’s trial and the public accountability it fostered, the story of dōrodokia in the fifth century is closely tied to the growing institutionalization of rule of the people at Athens. Accordingly, this chapter has twin aims: both to read dōrodokia in light of the development of the dēmos’ political authority and to re-read the democracy in light of issues raised by examining dōrodokia. As we will see, inasmuch as the story of dōrodokia and bribe monies shadows important trends in the democracy, examining what kinds of monies were used to negotiate legitimate political relationships can help us see how the nature of political power changed over time.
Cimon’s trial will act as a
touchstone throughout our investigation: first, for establishing two thematic trends in the fifth-century democracy that underpinned how the dōrodokos was conceptualized; second, as a counterpoint to how these interrelated trends subsequently shaped the development of the democracy. The image of the dōrodokos that emerges from Cimon’s trial is one that is reflected and refracted throughout the fifth century, as we will
2
Ostwald, Raaflaub, Bauman (1990: 28-31), and Carena, Manfredini, and Piccirilli (1990: 250 ad Plut. Cim. 14,12) underscore the political utility of Cimon’s trial, but see further Chapter Seven.
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investigate in Sophocles’ Antigone and Aristophanic comedy. Tracing these changes through a character as ubiquitous, if marginal, as the dōrodokos will provide, it is hoped, greater historical insight into why the democracy developed as it did.
Cimon and the Politics of Power: Despite its idiosyncrasies, Cimon’s trial is representative of the handful of fifthcentury dōrodokia trials that survive in the historical record. The great majority of these trials were of Athenian stratēgoi like Cimon: military generals elected ten per year to command the polis’ navy and hoplite soldiers.3 In part this preponderance reflects the bias of our sources, which tend to focus on the most important political actors and therefore are less inclined to report dōrodokia among minor public officials. Yet such bias is nevertheless indicative of the crucial role played by stratēgoi in the fifth-century democracy. Indeed, throughout the century Athens’ military leaders were also her policy leaders, the very men who would persuade the Assembly of the best course of action.4 Men like Cimon were the lynchpins of the democracy, and some of the more monumental political changes in the fifth century thus focused on the delicate relationship they maintained with the dēmos.
3
In addition to Cimon’s trial we hear of dōrodokia prosecutions of the stratēgoi Laches (Ar. V. 240-2, 8947, 960-1); Sophocles, Pythodorus, and Eurymedon (Thuc. 4.65.3-4, Philochorus FGrH 328 F 127); Pericles (Per. 32.2); and Cleon (Ar. Ach. 5-8 with schol.). Dōrodokia trials are also attested, less securely, for the stratēgoi Miltiades (Nep. Milt. 7.5); Phormio (Ar. Pax 347-8, Androtion FGrH 324 F 8); Themistocles (DS 11.27.3); Aristides (Plut. Arist. 26.2-5, Craterus FGrH 342 F 12); and Alcibiades (Nep. Alcib. 7). Nonstratēgoi prosecuted for dōrodokia include the Hellēnotamiai (Ant. 5. 69-71), the unnamed magistrate of Lysias 21, various minor officials in Ant. 6.49-50, and the ambassador Callias (Dem. 19.273) if the Peace of Callias is not spurious. 4 It was only in the fourth century that we begin to see any significant separation of policy formation by public speakers (rhētores) from policy execution by military generals (stratēgoi): Davies (1981: 124-31), Hansen (1983). Still, as the career of the fourth-century politician Phocion witnesses, this trend was not a hard-and-fast rule.
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Cimon’s trial was no exception. Though we have but few sources on the trial, it seems clear that it was in some sense ‘about’ his relationship to the community. After all, the dēmos had initiated the suit by appointing ten public prosecutors—a rarity in Athens—and at least part of the trial was held before the Assembly (Plut. Per. 10.5-6, Cim. 14.5). More telling is Cimon’s defense, a brief portion of which Plutarch records, in which the stratēgos defended his relationship to the community. The excerpt is worth quoting in full here, for it raises a couple of points to which we will return frequently: [Cimon] said that he was the representative (procenei=n) not of wealthy Ionians and Thessalians, unlike others who were their representative in order to be fawned over and to receive [dōra] (i3na qerapeu/wntai kai\ lamba/nwsin), but of Spartans, whose thrift and moderation (eu)te/leian kai\ swfrosu/nhn) he loved and imitated. These were more valuable to him than any amount of wealth (h{j ou)de/na protima=n plou=ton). Instead, he delighted in enriching the polis from her enemies (plouti/zwn a)po\ tw=n polemi/wn th\n po/lin). Plutarch, Life of Cimon 14.4
Cimon does not directly address the charge of dōrodokia here, and it is impossible to assess how, if at all, he did so elsewhere in his defense speech. Nevertheless, we are fortunate to possess this one record of the trial, for it juxtaposes Cimon’s actions against those of other purported dōrodokoi, namely proxenoi of Ionia and Thessaly. In that light, it helps orient us around what Cimon, at least, thought was problematic about dōrodokia and, by contrast, how he thought an upstanding citizen should act.5 Cimon frames the dōrodokos both positively and negatively. On the one hand, he suggests that proxenoi of Ionia and Thessaly were themselves dōrodokoi precisely
5
Given Plutarch’s use of Ion elsewhere in the Life of Cimon (e.g. Plut. Cim. 5.3, 9.1, 16.10), Cimon’s speech probably comes from Ion, who admired Cimon and disliked Pericles (cf. Plut. Per. 5.3, 28.7) and was likely in Athens at the time of the trial: Blamire (1989: 15). Theopompus may also have been a source for the trial, but it is unlikely that he would have reported the details of Cimon’s defense: cf. Sandys (1912: 113 ad AP 27.1).
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because they had assumed their political role as proxenoi in order to receive dōra.6 The i3na clause of purpose contrasts with the general’s own stated reason for engaging in politics: he derives his glory from enriching the polis.7 On the other hand, therefore, the dōrodokos is negatively depicted as enriching himself instead of the polis. Note how, in Cimon’s eyes, the difference between himself and the dōrodokos hinges not on whether or not money was received, but on where that ploutos, once received, was then directed. In effect, he evaluates the dōrodokos according to the path that the ploutos took; it is ultimately the dora’s meaning within the domestic sphere of the polis that fixes the assignation of dōrodokos or praiseworthy politician. In tracing the path of the dōra, rather than their mere presence or absence in politics, Cimon subtly points to two different political spaces they come to occupy. First, the currency of proxeny relations, be that with Ionia, Thessaly, or Sparta, helps negotiate Athens’ relation to other poleis. This is the realm of foreign politics, one marked in the first half of the century by Athens’ rise as an imperial power under the auspices of the Delian League. The second space is the realm of domestic politics, specifically the relationship between individual officials like Cimon and the rest of the community. Here, the particular ways in which Cimon acts as the polis’ patron by enriching it help shape the meaning of the ploutos he acquires. In other words, Cimon suggests, if we peel away the Athenians’ contemporary concerns with the people’s political authority, we find that such authority was actually 6
Cimon’s choice of Ionia and Thessaly appears to be random, but it should be noted that Thessaly was known for its wealth and merchants, and Ionia already had a reputation for bribery, if Craterus’ record of the bribing of Aristides is to be believed (Plut. Arist. 26.1-2). Both regions, therefore, could have been thought prone to bribery, as Cimon suggests. Of course, the authority of Plutarch and his source should be taken with a grain of salt: within ten years, Cimon himself became a proxenos of Thessaly (and named his third son Thettalos!). Plut. Cim. 16.1, Aristid. 3.515. Dindorff with Connor (1967). 7 Cimon was commonly linked to Athens’ wealth in this way: cf. Plut. Cim. 9, Them. 2.3.
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intertwined with two other developments in the fifth-century democracy:
Athenian
imperialism and the politics of patronage. As Cimon suggests, the relation between the two intimately shaped the figure of the dōrodokos.
Let us take a brief step back, then,
and trace the narrative arcs of these two developments before returning to how they were combined in the figure of the dōrodokos. Cimon’s fateful campaign was conducted under the auspices of the Delian League, an offensive and defensive alliance formed among Athens and a large number of Greek poleis in the years after the Persian Wars.8 While Thucydides records that the pretext for the League’s formation was to gain revenge on Persia by ravaging the Great King’s territory (Thuc. 1.96), in fact almost from the League’s formation Athens appears to have used the League to pursue its own agenda of controlling Aegean trade routes to the Hellespont.9 Indeed, the League had a peculiarly Athenian flavor to it. Allies contributed either money or military forces—men and ships—to the League’s campaigns, but the size of a polis’ contribution was assessed and then collected by Athenians.10 As the demands of the League heaped up, more and more of the allies chose to pay money
8
AP 23.5 calls it an offensive/defensive alliance. Background to and formation of the Delian League: Thuc. 1.94-97.1. 9 Certainly, the Spartan-run Hellenic League that preceded the Delian League appears to have focused on driving the Persians out of the Aegean and the coast of Asia Minor: note in particular the expeditions against Cyprus and Byzantium (Thuc. 1.94.2), continued under Cimon (Plut. Cim. 12.1, DS 11.60-2). Yet under the Delian League, even attacks against a Persian outpost like Eion (476/5?) seemed less about ravaging the King’s land and more about gaining financial footholds in the region. Within a decade, Athens had founded a colony at Amphipolis a bit further up the Strymon river from Eion, and even the siege at Skyros may have been over disgruntled trade relations (cf. Plut. Cim. 8.4). While doubtless a number of anti-Persian campaigns were launched by the League—as in the Chersonese (Plut. Cim. 14.1)—it is crucial how the non-Persian campaigns changed the character of Athens’ relations to her allies, and from the first years of the League, at that. On the meaning of ‘pretext’ (pro/sxhma, Thuc. 1.96) here, I follow Rawlings (1977) in positing that Thucydides offers the (false) reason for the formation of the Delian League; my argument is not affected if we follow Kallet-Marx’ (1993: 44-5) interpretation of the passage as understanding the reason for collecting tribute. 10 The Athenian leader Aristides first assessed the tribute, or phoros (AP 23.5, Plut. Arist. 24). The Hellēnotamiai who ministered the phoros were elected by and from the Athenians: Thuc.1.96.2. Additionally, Athenian leaders were the commanders of League expeditions.
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instead of send men and ships on the League’s expeditions (Thuc. 1.99.3; Plut. Cim. 11.1), with the result that Athens assumed an increasingly disproportionate role in providing the men and ships needed for the League’s expeditions. While she assumed a greater role in the League’s military operations, Athens also assumed a more authoritative position within the League itself. Already in the 470’s Athens was sending settlers to conquered territories in the Aegean, and by the 460’s she was using force to maintain control over League members.11
The ‘enslavement’
(e)doulw/qh) of Naxos is taken by Thucydides as a precedent for Athens’ subsequent hegemonic actions with other League members, but treating League members in this way actually seems to have been an extension of Athens’ earlier, real enslavement of nonleague members like Skyros and Karystos (cf. h)ndrapo/disan, Thuc. 1.98.2-3).
In
454/3, the League’s treasury where tribute monies were deposited was moved from Delos to Athens. By this point, Athens had already begun to take a hand in the judicial affairs of certain allies; by the end of the 450’s, she began to assume a pivotal role in setting up democracies throughout the League, as well.12 According to Thucydides, Cimon’s siege of Thasos in 465/4-463/2—the very expedition after which he would be charged for dōrodokia—marked the precise moment when the League transformed from an alliance into an Athenian-controlled “hegemony” (Thuc. 1.101). While it is perhaps fruitless to seek just such a turning point, the 11
Notably, colonies were set up at Eion (Plut. Cim. 8.2), Skyros (Thuc. 1.98.2, Plut. Cim. 8.3), and Amphipolis (Plut. Cim. 8.2). Additionally, it appeasr that Athenians were trying to set up a colony at Ennea Hodoi just upriver from Eion when they were defeated: cf. schol. ad Aeschin. 2.31. 12 Thuc. 1.77.1-4, Antiph. 5.47, and, on the financial revenue from holding the trials of allies at Athens, [Xen.] Ath. Pol 1.16-18; AE 205-19 provides a good discussion. Redefining the juridical relations between Phaselis and Athens, the Phaselis decree (IG i3 10=ML 3; perhaps late 460’s or early 450’s) grants the Phaselites the privilege of trial before the polemarch whenever a cause for a suit arose at Athens, a privilege that had already been granted to the Chians. See also the Calchis decree (IG i3 40=ML 52; either 440’s or 420’s); IG i3 21 on judicial affairs in Miletus, dated probably to 450/49 BCE. Democracies were set up in Erithryae (IG i3 14=ML 40; 460’s or 450’s) and Samos (Thuc. 1.115.3; 440 BCE).
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historian’s focus on Thasos does underscore a crucial aspect of Athenian foreign policy throughout this period, one that Cimon brings out in proudly reporting that he enriched Athens from her enemies (plouti/zwn a)po\ tw=n polemi/wn th\n po/lin, Plut. Cim. 14.4). Athens’ archē, her power over her allies, was thus intimately bound up with the economic rewards of exerting that power. Yet so long as other allies were contributing men and ships to the cause, they, too, might expect economic rewards from the League.13 Once those allies began providing monetary payments, though, the nature of the payments effectively changed into a contract for protection by Athenian forces.14 Precisely because Athens continued to provide an increasingly greater share of the League’s navy, she deserved a greater share of the rewards from the League’s expeditions. This explains in part why Athenians assessed, collected, and administered the tribute; Athenian citizens colonized conquered territories; and Athens so frequently assumed control over local resources in subjecting a particular ally.15
As Thucydides’
account of the 50 years after the Persian Wars suggests, money equaled power and Athens’ power directly translated into more money. Lisa Kallet has persuasively illuminated the striking extent to which this equation of money and power infused Athenian political debates and policies throughout the fifth century; with more power, Athenian stratēgoi like Cimon could directly and indirectly
13
At the League’s inception, the allies, too, would have anticipated tangible rewards from ravaging Persian territory. It was only after they stopped providing men and ships that the nature of the alliance shifted. Sealey (1966: 233-55). Cf. Kallet-Marx (1993: 53-4). 14 Cf. Thuc. 1.99. Kallet-Marx (1993: 65-7) is essential on this point, but it should be noted that cause and effect here are still somewhat murky. Doubtless some of the allies, disillusioned by the League’s expeditions—which, in benefiting Athens predominantly, already reflected her near hegemonic position— shifted to monetary payments as a pragmatic matter. In a sense, therefore, the switch to monetary payments could have both anticipated and responded to Athens’ changing relationship to the League. 15 Like Thasos, Aegina was also forced to surrender her warships and mainland possessions in 458 (Thuc. 1.108.4).
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bring more money into the polis.16 She rightly points to 483/2 as the pivotal year in this discursive archaeology at Athens, for it was in that year that, with a sudden boon from the local silver mines at Laureion, the Athenians chose to invest that silver in their navy rather than to receive distributions for themselves.17 This decision marked the navy as explicitly publicly-owned (dēmosia) inasmuch as it served as a substitute for the handouts that would have otherwise fallen to the Athenians.18 As Aristotle notes in his Consitution of Athens, the decision to build a fleet and thereby to pursue hegemony over the other Greeks increased the livelihood of all Athenians (AP 24.1), and arguably the Athenians in Themistocles’ day debated the issue on these very terms. Underpinning the formula money=power, therefore, was a conceptual link between possessions and archē. Within the context of the League, ‘power to’ slowly came to mean ‘power over’, as the allies themselves became ‘property’ or ‘subjects’ of Athens.19
16
See Kallet-Marx (1993, 1994), Kallet (2001); cf. Kurke (1999, 2002). Financing the navy: Hdt. 7.144; Thuc. 1.14; AP 22.7; Plut. Them. 4.1-3, Arist. 46 with Gabrielsen (1985), Kallet-Marx (1994: 244-5), Kurke (2002: 95-6). 18 Kallet-Marx (1994: 244) points to similar distributions after a surplus in Siphnos (Hdt. 3.57.2) and perhaps Thasos (Hdt. 6.46). Even if such distributions were not the norm, it is nevertheless emblematic of their public nature that the dēmos as a whole would vote on how to manage them. As we will see, this scene of employing political authority to control the flow of financial resources encapsulates fifth-century attitudes towards the monies that were used to negotiate politics. In a similar story—probably apocryphal, as Hamel (1998: 47n.20) rightly argues—after the campaigns at Sestos and Byzantion, Cimon rounded up the Persian prisoners and asked the allies whether they wanted to take the men or their belongings; the allies chose the belongings, so Cimon took the men as slaves and sold them, profiting enough to supply his ships for four months and give some leftover gold to the city (Plut. Cim. 9.3-6). Again, note how the mode of conquest—an Athenian divvies up the rewards of conquest and ultimately takes that which is most profitable—tellingly signifies the absolute authority of Athens’ position qua manager of resources and master of slaves. 19 Cf. Thuc. 1.99.1, which attributes Athens’ growing despotism to a need to police allied contributions to the League. Allies as ‘property’: Thuc. 2.63.2, 3.37.2; IG i3 156.2, 15. Allies as ‘subjects’: e.g. Thuc. 1.121.5, 1.22.2, 4.87.3; cf. Thuc. 1.8.3, 2.6.3. By mid-century, inscriptions could refer to the allies as “cities which Athens [controls]”: IG i3 19.8-9, 27.14-15. The equation of ‘power to’ (authority to distribute) and ‘power over’ (oppressive control over) is clearest in the Athenian siege of Thasos, one reason why Thucydides might have picked that siege as the decisive turning point in the League’s history (cf. DS 11.70.3-4). As Thucydides relates, the rebellion was caused by a dispute with the Athenians about the Thasian mines and a trading post on the shore opposite Thasos (Thuc. 1.100.2); transparently, when the Thasians lost, they were required to give up both the mainland and their mine (Thuc. 1.101.3, Plut. Cim. 14.2). 17
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The equation of money and empire should by now be clear—indeed, for Athens’ imperial heyday in the second half of the century, it has long been obvious—but one oft neglected component of this pairing is the money of empire, or, to be more precise, the monies of empire.
Whenever our sources juxtapose Athenian hegemony with its
consequences, especially its baldly economic returns, we find the monies of empire. Tribute,20 cleruchies,21 naval pay,22 cows and panoplies23—all functioned as monies of empire, media that were transacted and used to negotiate Athens’ relationship with her allies. Crucially, all of them symbolized Athenian hegemony: it is in that sense that I call them monies of empire, even though some of them were transacted from the earliest years of the Delian League.24 Ultimately the monies used to negotiate foreign political relations signified the imperial power of Athens, the power her people had over the resources of empire.
20
phoros: Plut. Cim. 11.3. Kallet-Marx (1993: 44-9) underscores the novelty of a long-standing phoros and rightly connects it to the Persian system of taxation and compulsory gifts. As Brasidas remarks in Thrace, the allied tribute was a mark of friendship and slavery (cf. doulei/aj, Thuc. 4.87.3). 21 Cleruchies: Plut. Per. 11.5-6; cf. DS 11.88.3, Paus. 1.27.5 all connect the establishment of cleruchies with the need to control disloyal allies. IG i337=ML 47 (Colophon, 440’s or 420’s), IG i346.43-6=ML 49 (Brea, 440’s-420’s). Cleruchies, in particular, connoted imperialism; when the Second Athenian League was formed in the fourth century, the charter contained a clause explicitly banning the establishment of cleruchies and Athenian private ownership of land in allied cities: IG ii2 43.35-41; cf. Cargill (1981: 60, 148-50). Although land owned by individual Athenians is not well attested for the empire, Oionias’ considerable property holdings abroad—over 81 talents’ worth according to IG i3 422.311-14—suggest that it was extensive. Cf. IG i3 426.45-6. 22 Naval pay: AP 24.2-3. This came directly from tribute monies and was one of the ways in which empire was thought to have supported the democracy: AP 24.3. 23 From perhaps the 440’s, Athens required allies to send “a cow and a panoply” to Athens, to be escorted in the procession of the Greater Panathenaea festival as if they were colonists: IG i3 34.41-3=ML 46 (447/6?) appears to be the earliest inscription; see also IG i3 71.56-8=ML 69, IG i3 46.15-17=ML 49.11-13. For discussion, Meritt and Wade-Gery (1962: 69-71), AE 292-4; Smarczyk (1990: 549-69) is particularly helpful on the Panathenaea as a symbol of Athenian military power. Along the same lines, the requirement that subject cities send the aparchai or ‘first fruits’ of corn and barley to Eleusis—cf. IG i3 78=ML 73— also reified an image of Athens as patron over her empire: Isoc. 4.28-31 with Smarczyk (1990: 224-52). 24 This claim should be uncontroversial for Athens’ imperial heyday in the second half of the century. What I would like to argue here is that such social meaning was invested in political monies even in the earliest years of the Delian League.
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If I am right about the social meaning of the monies used to negotiate foreign politics at this time, then we are halfway towards understanding Cimon’s presentation of the dōrodokos at his trial. Recall that Cimon contrasts himself with the dōrodokos according to the path that the dōra took: while his own wealth is directed towards enriching the city, the dōrodokos’ is not. Yet because for both Cimon and the dōrodokos the source of that wealth derives from Athens’ foreign relations, we should expect that the proper use of that wealth would reify its social meaning as a money signaling Athens’ power. This is precisely what Cimon’s enriching of the city ‘from her enemies’ (a)po\ tw=n polemi/wn) signifies, as it assigns to Athens possession over and ultimately benefit from those monies. By contrast, rather than channeling his monies into services that benefit the city, the dōrodokos keeps them for himself and thereby manifestly assigns them a different meaning. For the dōrodokos, the monies used to negotiate politic relationships end up asserting the authority of himself—or, worse, his foreign friends—to distribute the rewards of empire. What I would like to suggest, in short, is that by differentiating the path of the dōra, Cimon also differentiates their meaning. The stratēgos points to one critical way the Athenians signaled their control over the rewards of empire: public works at Athens, or ‘enriching the polis’, as Cimon calls it. Indeed, we find a series of public buildings with clear links to Athens’ hegemony and the wealth it brought in: the Temple of Artemis Aristoboule, the Stoa Poikile, the Piraeus and Long Walls, and the Theseion all date to the first few decades of the League. In the same vein, we might add the later
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Periclean building programme on the Acropolis.25 Contemporary sources consistently link these public works to Athens’ military success; again, Athens’ control over the monies of empire was reified by financial outlays on public works that signaled her powerful position.26 Even if the actual monies used to construct these buildings came from separate financial accounts—more on this in a moment—the Athenians nevertheless posited an economy in which the monies of empire, i.e. monies symbolizing empire, were converted into public buildings redolent of Athenian archē.27 As Cimon’s reference to the proxenoi of Thessaly and Ionia suggests, the dōrodokos short-circuited this economy.
By pocketing the monies of empire, the
dōrodokos removed them from circulation and hence prevented Athens from asserting control over their distribution. In this way, the dōrodokos posed a significant threat not just to Athens’ acquisition of imperial monies, but especially to the processes by which those monies were re-invested with meaning as tokens of Athenian power.28
25
On the Periclean building programme, see Plut. Per. 12-13, IG i3 436-51 (Parthenon), 453-60 (gold and ivory statue of Athena), 462-6 (Propylaea), completed in 434/3 BCE according to the decree of Callias (IG i3 52=ML 58). Stadter (1989: 157-63 ad Per. 12.6), Kallet (1998: 49-52). 26 See generally Plut. Cim. 13.6-7. Temple of Artemis Aristoboule: Plut. Them. 22.1-2. Piraeus: explicitly connected with Athens’ naval empire at Plut. Them. 19.2. Plutarch also records how part of the wall of the Acropolis was constructed from war booty (Cim. 13.6), and the Marathon Base and statues of Athena, Apollo, and Miltiades set up at Delphi were paid for from a tithe of spoils from Marathon (Paus. 10.10.1). 27 On this point, see generally Kallet (1998). 28 Plutarch records an anecdote about Cimon that affirms the lines of this argument (Plut. Cim. 10.9). A Persian defector named Rhoisakes came to Cimon’s home, seeking exile. He placed two bowls of gold and silver at Cimon’s door, to which Cimon asked whether Rhoisakes wanted Cimon as a friend or as a hireling (misqwto\n h2 fi/lon). When Rhoisakes said a friend, Cimon gave him back the money, telling him that, as his friend, he would be able to use it whenever he needed it. Apart from Plutarch’s dubious framing of the story—in contrast to the named sources he provides elsewhere in the same paragraph, the biographer writes simply that ‘it is said’ (le/getai)—Rhoisakes is otherwise unattested, and we know of only one other Persian defector from this time period: cf. Hdt. 3.160.2; Ctes. Pers. 43. It is, then, at least possible that the story is apocryphal. Reading the tale along those lines, it is striking how Cimon’s dealings with a Persian defector (i.e. a Greek polis that had been under Persian control during the Persian Wars) are framed as a choice between being a philos and being a bribe-taker, as misthōtos regularly connotes: see Chapter One above. These are precisely the two possibilities Cimon presents in his trial when he contrasts his own civic services with those who took bribes from Thessalians and Ionians (both Persian defectors, incidentally). In the story of Rhoisakes, Cimon’s choice is split not between taking the money or rejecting it—in both cases he makes
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Yet if the dōrodokos played such a pivotal role in this economy of imperial monies, so too did an elite figure like Cimon. The stratēgos is unabashed about his central position within this economy of money and power: he himself “derives honor” by enriching the city (a)ga/llesqai, Plut. Cim. 14.4). Indeed, he confesses, the pursuit of such honor is more important to him than the riches themselves. Cimon’s claim points to a second space occupied by the dōra—the realm of domestic politics—and hence to a second relationship negotiated by those monies:
that between elite citizen and
community. Strikingly, the dōra in this second space took on the same valence of political authority as the monies of empire. So, for example, Plutarch draws an analogy between Athens’ relation to the rest of Greece and Cimon’s famed generosity toward the Athenians (Plut. Cim. 10.6).29 Such generosity was considerable, as he spent vast unprecedented resources on public works and feeding his fellow citizens. In addition to constructing the Theseion and helping finance the Long Walls, he planted trees in the Agora and gardens in the Academy (Plut. Cim. 13.8); opened his fields to all (Plut. Cim. 10.1); gave money to the poor (Plut. Cim. 10.3); and provided dinner every night, it is reported, for either his demesmen (AP 27.3) or any Athenian (Plut. Cim. 10.1-2).30
use of it—but in being able to control when and how that money is used. Like Athens’ use of the monies of empire, Cimon accepts Rhoisakes’ friendship so that he can control how the gold and silver is distributed. 29 Plutarch compares the golden age under Cimon with the civilizing effect other Athenians—and, by extension, Athens herself—had on the rest of the Greeks. Such Athenian mythologizing—emphasizing the autochthony of the Athenians, the civilizing conquests of her first king Theseus, or her patron-like role over the rest of Hellas—was a potent political metaphor for empire: see variously Herter (1939), Barron (1964), Loraux (1981b), Walker (1995), Miller (1997: esp. 1-86). Important here is the way that elite citizens inserted themselves into the iconography of empire: Miltiades was given a statue alongside Apollo and Athena at Delphi (Paus. 10.10.1); under his son Cimon’s influence, he was featured in a painting of the Stoa Poikile next to Theseus’ defeat of the Amazons (Paus. 1.15.1-4); likewise, a statue of Themistocles stood in the Temple of Artemis Aristoboule (Plut. Them. 22.1-2). 30 On Cimon’s civic works, see further Schmitt-Pantel (1992: 180-6), Domingo Gygax (forthcoming: 197202).
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This was patronage politics, and Cimon was commonly held to be its most illustrious practitioner (e.g. Plut. Cim. 10.4-6). While such bald patronage was a holdover from the archaic polis—in particular, the tyrant Pisistratus was said to have earned the support of the masses through private benefactions31—it nevertheless was the primary mode of politics throughout Cimon’s lifetime. Other notable political figures likewise used their own money to fund public works and feed fellow citizens.32 In effect, patronage in local communities, as when Cimon fed his demesmen, established concentrated networks of political supporters or ‘friends’ (philoi); together with family connections, these networks were leveraged to win political honors and authority at the city-level.33 As Gorgias writes of Cimon, he made money to spend it and spent it to win political honor (Plut. Cim. 10.5). It is significant that Cimon’s patronage was always framed in light of his considerable military successes, for in this way the monies of patronage were linked to the monies of empire, just as his depiction of the dōrodokos suggests.34 Consider, for instance, Cimon’s campaign in Skyros and his retrieval of the bones of Theseus.35 On the one hand, Skyros was a strategic acquisition for Athens, for it lay on the route to the 31
So AP 16.2, 16.9. For discussion, Millett (1989: 2 2-3), Kurke (2002), Kallet (2003: 124-6), Domingo Gygax (forthcoming: 201). 32 Schmitt-Pantel (1992: 179-208) is essential here. See further Millett (1989: 21-5), Domingo Gygax (forthcoming: 197-206). Themistocles rebuilt a temple for his genos (Plut. Them. 2.1) and was known for entertaining others and paying for sacrifices (Plut. Them. 5.1, cf. 22.1); his iconic works were commonly thought of as patronage of a sort—providing cakes and fish for the people, as Aristophanes suggests (Eq. 813-19): see especially Kurke (2002: 105-8) on this point. Such patronage was exemplified by (later) associations of various Athenian elites with the age of Cronus, known for its agricultural plenty: Pisistratus (AP 16.7), Hippias (Pl. Hipparch. 229b), Aristides (Plut. Arist. 24.3), Cimon (Plut. Cim. 10.7), Themistocles (Teleclides Prytaneis fr. 5). 33 Connor (1973: 53-64), Finley (1983: 24-49), Mitchell (1997: 42-6). Elite families: cf. Davies (1971), Littman (1990). On the clubs, or hetaireiai, see especially Calhoun (1913), Hutter (1978: 26-9). 34 Clearly stated by Plutarch: “Since he already had great wealth (eu)porw=n), Cimon spent monies from his generalship which, it seemed, he had acquired in fine manner (kalw=j) as booty from the enemy, in an even finer manner (ka/llion) on the citizens” (Plut. Cim. 10.1). 35 AP fr. 4. Kenyon; Plut. Cim. 8.6-7, Them. 36.1-3; Paus. 1.17.6. For discussion, see Podlecki (1971), Blamire (1989: 119-22 ad Cim. 8.6-7).
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Hellespont; clearing the area of pirates and establishing an Athenian colony there manifestly fell in line with Athens’ desire to reap and control the rewards of empire.36 On the other hand, the expedition is also presented as a ‘personal’ one undertaken by Cimon to recover the bones of Theseus (esp. Plut. Cim. 8.5-6). When he returned to Athens, he housed the bones in a Theseion which he (re-)built and which had on its walls paintings depicting Theseus’ exploits: battles against the Amazons and Centaurs, and a visit to his father Poseidon under the sea, no doubt a potent metaphor for Athens’ thalassocracy (Paus. 1.17.2-3).37 Such a gift to the city, funded by Cimon’s conquest, both signaled Athens’ naval archē generally and glorified Cimon’s excellence in particular.38 It thus simultaneously negotiated Athens’ relations to her allies and Cimon’s relationship to the polis. The monies of patronage and empire were functionally identical: both circulated within a kind of economic distribution—whether tribute or handouts, food or military protection—saturated with the valence of vertical political relations: enslavement to Athenian hegemony in the case of the tribute, political authority over the dēmos in the case of elite services to the city. But if these monies functioned as metaphors for a distinct set of vertical relations, bribe monies short-circuited those relations. Elsewhere in Plutarch’s Life of Cimon, in fact, Cimon is again praised for being “incorruptible and untouched by dōrodokia in politics” (a)de/kaston kai\ a1qikton e)n th|= politei/a| dwrodoki/aj) while nearly all of the other public officials of his day took their fill of 36
Podlecki (1971: 142). Pirates: Plut. Cim. 8.3-5. Colony: Thuc. 1.98.2, DS 11.60.2. On the wall paintings and their political symbolism, see Walker (1995: esp. 58), Mills (1997: 36-8). 38 Pace Walker (1995: 56-61), Podlecki (1971) makes a compelling case for how Cimon’s private expenditure brought him consider public honor in this case; cf. Domingo Gygax (forthcoming: 202). For other public monuments that glorified individual citizens and were funded through military campaigns, see also Themistocles’ erection of the Temple of Artemis Aristoboule (Plut. Them. 22.1-2) and Cimon’s probable role in the construction of the Stoa Poikile, which featured, among other paintings, depictions of both himself and his father Miltiades (Paus. 1.15.1-3). 37
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public monies (lhmma/twn de\ dhmosi/wn…a)napimplame/nouj, Plut. Cim.
10.8).39
Whereas Cimon continually gave to the city and thereby affirmed Athens’ archē over her allies (and his own archē and informal leadership within Athens), others thus failed to redistribute the monies of empire.
Accordingly, those ‘public’ (dēmosion) monies
stopped signifying the Athenian dēmos’ hegemonic power over the League. It was in this sense that the dōrodokos became problematic, for he subverted the value assigned to the monies of empire.
The Disobedient dōrodokos: Pericles, Creon and the Breakdown of Political Patronage So far we have sketched a picture of the dōrodokos as a figure who, in subverting the political value attached to the monies of empire, implicitly contested the dēmos’ authority to control them. Rather than position himself as a patron adorning the city with those monies, he pocketed them for himself, in effect removing them from an economy in which they signaled Athens’ hegemonic relationship to her allies. By contrast, Cimon and other political leaders of the first half of the fifth century were presented as authoritative stewards of those monies: elite citizens whose own archē and informal political standing were reified by the act of distributing to the polis monies linked to empire. Of course, after Cimon we have little evidence that there were any similar ‘patrons’ in Athens.40 How and why, then, did the breakdown of patronage occur? As
39
The phrase lhmma/twn de\ dhmosi/wn could indicate embezzlement or peculation, but bribes qua lh/mmata are probably intended, as well. Plutarch explicitly singles out Aristides and Ephialtes as the only other two politicians of Cimon’s day to be incorruptible (Plut. Cim. 10.8)—itself a surprisingly rare epithet in the democracy: cf. Ober (1989: 237). And both are elsewhere praised for being, specifically, not bribed: cf. xrhma/twn…a)misqi/ of Aristides (Plut. Arist. 3.3), a)dwrodo/khtoj of Ephialtes (AP 25.1). 40 Millett (1989) is essential here; see also Connor (1971).
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the next two sections will show, the figure of the dōrodokos can indirectly point us to an answer. Fundamentally, the story of the breakdown of patronage is about how politics changed as the result of shifting meaning in the monies used to negotiate political relations. As we have already seen, Cimon’s picture of two different economies—one imperial, one patronal—negotiated by distinct monies that nevertheless assumed the same valence could quickly break down. Indeed, the lines between the monies of empire and patronage were often blurred.41 Over the course of the fifth century, the Athenians certainly created distinct financial accounts for these monies, like the Treasuries of Athena and other gods, imperial monies, and public (dēmosion) property managed by the kolakrētai, but in that case it is worth probing what was at stake in keeping such accounts separate.42
On what grounds were they distinguished, and why bother keeping the
accounts distinct in the first place? As Zelizer astutely points out, people tend to police the boundaries between distinct accounts at precisely those moments when allowing the accounts to blur would disrupt the meaning of the social relations they signify.43 As Athens’ relationship to her allies became increasingly hegemonic, then, Cimonian-style patronage grew out of place in the democracy. This discursive shift was reflected most vividly in the figure of the dōrodokos. Nearly two decades after Cimon’s trial, in 446 BCE his accuser Pericles had to explain at his own public audit what had happened to a considerable sum of public 41
For instance, Samons (2000: 54-70) notes how booty was often spent on public purposes, like soldier pay (Thuc. 6.31.3) or public works, as when the booty from Eurymedon was used to finance the rebuilding of the south wall of the Acropolis (Plut. Cim. 13.6), yet these same monies were also linked to Cimon’s private beneficence, like clearing the Academy and planting gardens (Plut. Cim. 13.7). 42 The Athenians’ practice of maintaining distinct accounts has been vigorously championed by Samons (2000: esp. 55) and Kallet (1998); we will return to this idea in the next section. 43 Zelizer (1994, 1996) and see above Chapter One.
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money.44 He replied that he had used it “for what was necessary.”45 As Plutarch relates, when Pericles had been faced with a hostile Spartan army at the borders of Attica, “what was necessary” in fact entailed bribing the Spartan King Plistoanax to retreat from Attic soil. Upon his return to Sparta, Plistoanax was subsequently fined so heavily that he had to go into exile (Plut. Per. 22.3). In a related anecdote, Pericles alternately resisted the Samian oligarchs’ attempts to bribe him—so Plutarch in the Life of Pericles (25.2)—or actually exacted an indemnity of 80 talents from them (cf. praca/menoj, DS 12.27.2). These stories are mirror opposites of each other, but both point to the blurred boundaries between ‘public’ and ‘private’ funds: in one Pericles personally directs the flow of public funds; in the other, he collects for himself (or not) what normally would have been public monies.46 For our purposes it matters little whether or not ‘bribes’ really were given in either case; what does matter is how the frame of bribery was employed to signal potentially problematic social relations.
So, if we understand that the Samians’
indemnity was ‘really’ a standard fine imposed by Athens, albeit collected by Pericles, the frame of dōrodokia highlights the potential danger in having an individual control the process of exaction.47 Likewise, even though the Plistoanax incident did not seem to cause any alarm at Athens, there were nevertheless troubling implications for Pericles’ 44
Ephorus FGrH 70 F 93, Plut. Per. 22.2-23.1, DS 13.106.10; cf. Thuc. 2.21.2, 5.16.3. The sum has been variously represented as 10 talents (Plut. Per. 23.1), 20 talents (schol. ad Ar. Nu. 859=Ephorus 70 FGrH F193), and 50 talents (Suida s.v. de/on). 45 ei)j to\ de/on, Plut. Per. 23.1; cf. Ar. Nu. 859, Suida s.v. de/on. Ephorus 70 FGrH F193 writes to\ e)ndee/j. 46 The middle praca/menoj clearly has this meaning: LSJ s.v. pra/ssw VI; cf. Hdt. 2.126, Thuc. 4.65, Ar. Ra. 561. At this time Athens, as a polis, was known to take hostages in order to guarantee compliance: e.g. IG i3 40.47-50=ML 52 (Chalcis and Eretria; 446/5) and Hesychius s.v. )Eretriko\j kata/logoj. But such actions clearly operated within the economy of empire; for an individual to exact these monies thus reflected a blurring of economies. It is most likely in reaction to such blurring, and in defense of Pericles, that stories of his not being bribed cropped up. 47 In fact, given the widespread rumor that Aspasia had convinced Pericles to take action against Samos (Plut. Per. 24.2, 25.1), Pericles’ motivations and role in the Samian War were already suspect.
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use of dōrodokia.48 In the first place, his bribe of Plistoanax does not seem to have been the only time he sent money to the Spartan leaders. Theophrastus records that every year Pericles “flattered” (qerapeu/wn) Spartan officials with ten talents in order to buy himself time (paraskeuasa/menoj, Plut. Per. 23.2), an image that directly recalls Cimon’s description of bribe-taking proxenoi “flattered” by the Ionians and Thessalians (qerapeu/wntai, Plut. Cim.14.4). If these payments were, in fact, regular payments among an inter-city network of elites, then the use of public funds to underwrite this network would have come into direct conflict with their significance as monies of empire. Telling in this respect is the precise way in which Thucydides praises Pericles’ incorruptibility. In two different passages, the historian describes Pericles as “stronger than money” (xrhma/twn krei/sswn, Thuc. 2.60.5) and “manifestly taking absolutely no gifts of money” (xrhma/twn te diafanw=j a)dwro/tatoj, Thuc. 2.65.8). Both phrases come from defenses of Pericles’ leadership over the dēmos, as opposed to the dēmos’ rule over Pericles.
As such, both serve as implicit justifications for why Pericles’ own
particular actions were legitimate even though they effectively transformed the democracy into a mere name covering up the reality of “rule by the first man” (u(po\ tou= prw/tou a)ndro\j a)rxh/, Thuc. 2.65.9).49 While claims of dōrodokia problematized the relationship between individual citizens and public monies, Thucydides’ praise of Pericles’ incorruptibility serves as a defense of that very relationship. All of these
48
Plut. Per. 23.1. Indeed, a character in Aristophanes later jokes about the scene (Ar. Nu. 858-9), but such a joke may only have highlighted just how much Pericles had gotten away with. 49 He was followed in this respect by Plutarch’s verbatim praise of Pericles’ incorruptibility: cf. a)dwrota/tou perifanw=j genome/nou kai\ xrhma/twn krei/ttonoj, Plut. Per. 15.3. Note how this differs markedly from Plutarch’s passing mention (catalogue?) of Aristides’ and Ephialtes’ incorruptibility: Plut. Cim. 10.8; similarly, Plut. Arist. 3.3 is not a justification for Aristides’ political role.
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anecdotes thus expose a dōrodokos actively—and problematically—controlling public monies.50 We can trace the roots of this problem back to the dēmos’ early efforts to control the distribution of political rewards. From at least the beginning of the democracy, the dēmos managed the assignment of public honors in return for services to the community: witness the misthos provided the generals of Eion in 476 BCE, or the dēmos’ refusal to honor Miltiades when he asked to be honored for military victory.51 The rewards of membership in the polity—specifically, public office and citizen benefits—were also symbolically controlled by the dēmos. While this idea is manifest in the dēmos’ direct election of stratēgoi, the use of the lot to select the vast majority of magistrates, itself heralded as a democratic institution, established the dēmos as apportioner of the honor of public office.52
This idea can be extended, too, to the dēmos’ opening up of the
50
Indeed, in Chapter Six we will examine how, when the Athenians developed procedures for holding officials accountable in the second half of the fifth century, they did so with an eye towards punishing, specifically, the dōrodokos who had mismanaged public monies. 51 Eion epigrams: Aeschin. 3.183-5, Plut. Cim. 7.4-6. The Herms are collectively called a misthos in the text cited at Aeschin. 3.183, Plut. Cim. 7.5. For discussion, see Blamire (1989: 112-14 ad Cim. 7.4-6). Plutarch Cim. 8.1 recounts how Miltiades was refused a crown when he asked for one; in Aeschines, Miltiades is said to have been refused the honor of having his name inscribed on the painting of the Battle of Marathon in the Stoa Poikile (Aeschin. 3.186). 52 Lot as a democratic institution: [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 1.3; Hdt. 3.80.6; Pl. Rep. 557a, 561a-b; Xen. Mem. 1.2.9; Isoc. 7.22-3, 12.153-4; Aristot. Pol. 1294b7, 1317b20, 1320b11. Hignett (1952: 321-6). In 487/6 selection by archons switched from election to selection by lot from a short-list (AP 22.5), on which see Badian (1971), Ober (1989: 76-7), Hansen (1990c), the latter of which provides extensive bibliography. At this time, selection by lot was also probably introduced for other magistrates and Councillors: Ober (1989: 76) and Hansen (1990) provide discussion. Ober (1989: 76-7) and recently Taylor (2007) have examined the sociological effects of the lot, but two aspects of its usage have gone hitherto unnoticed. First, as a randomized distribution mechanism, the lot was used to distribute egalitarian shares. Scholars commonly pick up on the ‘egalitarian’ piece of the puzzle—i.e. the lot prevented elites from monopolizing public office—but the ‘shares’ piece is just as crucial. In effect, honorary shares of the political pie—timai, on which see Ostwald (1995)—were distributed equally to those who were eligible, just as shares of sacrificial meat were often apportioned by lot: Detienne (1989:13) and, for the contiguities between civic equality and the apportionment of meat, Loraux (1981a: 620). Note, too, how the Gods were said to have divided up the cosmos and the regions of earth into various timai via a lottery: Hom. Il. 15.187-93, Pi. O. 7.54-68. This egalitarian distribution of political power very well may have underpinned the early democracy’s championing of isonomia: cf. Hdt. 3.80.6 with Vlastos (1953: 356-66) and Schmitt Pantell (1992: 45-52).
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archonship to the third census class of citizens, the zeugitai, in 457 BCE.53 Again, with Pericles’ citizenship law in 451/0 BCE, which restricted citizenship to those Athenians who had both an Athenian mother and father, the dēmos asserted its manifest authority to distribute shares of the franchise.54 By mid-century, then, the dēmos had firmly asserted its political authority to distribute and control domestic monies, including rewards, political office, and the privileges of citizenship. Note how none of these monies overlapped with the monies of patronage, and in fact the dēmos’ authority to distribute these monies was never contested. Yet in Pericles’ time—in competition with Pericles, as it turns out—the dēmos did begin to contest the blurred boundaries between the monies of patronage and those of empire, particularly elite expenditure on public buildings. Beginning with Pericles, in an effort to ensure that the lines between those two economies would be kept distinct, the dēmos actively differentiated between tribute monies and private outlays. The so-called Springhouse Decree, for example, records how Pericles and his sons offered to help finance expenses concerning the water supply, but were refused by the dēmos; tribute
The second, and crucial, overlooked aspect of the lot was that it established the dēmos as the authoritative leader distributing shares to citizens, much as a general might distribute booty to his soldiers: Hamel (1998: 44-8). The very act of awarding timē to another was a source and sign of political authority: see Hom. Il. 1.123-9, 2.226-8, 9.318-19 with Raaflaub and Wallace (2007: esp. 27-9) on the “people’s power” in Homeric Greece. While it is manifestly true that, at least after the institution of scrutiny (dokimasia) at the deme level, the dēmos in a sense ‘controlled’ the selection of magistrates, I wish to underscore that the allotment process, too, reified the dēmos’ authority to distribute the rewards (timai) of polity. 53 AP 26.2 with Raaflaub (2007: 115). 54 AP 26.4, Plut. Per. 37.3, Aelian VH 6.10. Patterson (1981: 104-7), Hansen (1991: 188) and Raaflaub (2007: 115) on the connection between Pericles’ citizenship law and the dēmos’ desire to control the qualifications for citizenship—and, by extension, the rewards accrued therefrom. For an overview, see Rhodes (1981: 333-4 ad AP 26.4), Patterson (1981: 97-104), Stadter (1989: 334-5 ad Per. 37.3). Certainly by the 420’s it was taken for granted that citizens, in particular, had the right to benefit materially from Athens’ imperial power: Ar. V. 655-64, AP 24.3; Samons (2000: 65).
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monies were used instead.55 As Plutarch records, rather than allow Pericles to put his name on the building (in return for funding it), the Athenians competed with him for the honor and spared no expense in the “liturgy” (xorhgei=n) they collectively performed.56 Individual expenditure on public works all but vanishes from our record after this time. In keeping distinct the monies of patronage and empire, the dēmos thereby underscored how problematic their overlap—represented, above, by the dōrodokos— could be. What, though, was so problematic about their overlap? We can perhaps find an answer in reversing the direction of an analogy Plutarch makes between liturgies and the dēmos’ outlay of imperial monies. If the dēmos’ outlay of imperial monies (public works symbolic of Athenian archē) was analogous to an elite patron’s benefactions to the city, then were not a patron’s benefactions steeped in the same symbolism as the monies of empire? So long as the boundaries between the two economies remained porous, so long as the same monies could be used to negotiate both economies simultaneously, Athens’ recent shift to empire could be refracted through the monies used to negotiate the relationship between an elite citizen and the community.57 Patrons of the community could fast become imperial masters of the dēmos. In fact, this exact discursive shift seems to have occurred, and we can track it, again, by looking at the dōrodokos. I suggest that, as Athens’ imperial archē became
55
IG i3 49.13-14 (430’s BCE); cf. Plut. Per. 14.1-2. For background and discussion, see Stadter (1989: 181-2 ad Per. 14.1), Kallet (1998: 48), Domingo Gygax (forthcoming: 206-7). 56 Plut. Per. 14.1-2. Plutarch’s use of the language of liturgies—cf. pro\j th\n do/can a)ntifilotimou/menoi tw=n e1rgwn…xorh/gein—is telling. 57 Chapter Six traces another reason for why the blurring of these two economies could be so problematic: precisely because the dēmos was increasingly concerned to exact a certain amount of tribute each year, there were greater fears that individuals involved in tribute collection might somehow tamper with the funds. See, for example, IG i³ 34=ML 46.35-7, IG i3 71.36-7. By more clearly separating public monies from the economy of patronage, the dēmos could more readily regulate them. As a result, in the second half of the fifth century we first begin to find a greater separation between ‘public’ and ‘private’: Humphreys (1978b ).
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increasingly marked with the valence of political subordination, the Athenians sought to control not merely the resources but especially the relations of empire; as a result, the figure of the dōrodokos crystallized as a disobedient official. Our guide for this emergent conception of the dōrodokos will be Sophocles’ Antigone, performed some two decades after Cimon’s trial. In that play, the Theban king Creon paints a detailed picture of the dōrodokos, one that illuminates our understanding of Periclean politics in important ways. For Creon, the bribes taken by the dōrodokos were illegitimate precisely because they signaled a refusal to obey the king’s political authority. Rather than exchange good works for public honor, the dōrodokos disobeyed the king and pursued a wage of silver, a bribe, instead.
Crucially, therefore, Sophocles’ Antigone reveals how the monies
counterpoised with bribes signaled political obedience; indeed, the monies of dōrodokos and obedient citizen alike were used to think through the nature of political authority. Sophocles’ Antigone opens with an edict from Creon, the king of Thebes, who condemns one nephew, Polynices, while honoring the other, Eteocles, for their respective roles in the recent siege of Thebes (cf. Soph. An. 191-210).
Fundamentally, this
proclamation is underpinned by what amounts to a contested definition of the kinds of social relations that should be the source of legitimate authority within the polis. Whereas Creon conceives of philoi in civic terms as those who benefit the city, his niece Antigone, sister of both Polynices and Eteocles, privileges a definition of philia along familial lines. The entire play thus hinges on this disagreement, as Antigone ultimately chooses to privilege unwritten laws over Creon’s edict.58
58
The conflict between Antigone and Creon has been central to interpretations of the Antigone since Hegel. The terms of this conflict—individual liberty vs. the state, religious vs. secular order, private vs. public, human vs. divine, man vs. woman—are by now well-worn in the scholarship and perhaps distort the ways
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For Creon, those like Eteocles who are his—and the city’s—philoi receive honor (timē) accordingly; by implication, people like Antigone are not well-disposed to the polis and should never be honored by the polis or its ruler. Timē is awarded to philoi, not the kakoi who bring harm to the city (Soph. An. 207-10). Crucially, if philoi receive timē, kakoi are aligned with bribe monies:
for Creon, the two sets of monies are thus
counterpoised and used to mark distinct sets of political relations.
What we will
investigate here, then, is the valence of those political relations; in essence, we seek to uncover what is distinctive about the relations negotiated and ultimately signified by timē and bribe monies. In his first speech Creon submits his policy for how to make the city great: by holding no friend dearer than his polis and maintaining a friendship with no enemy of the city, Creon hopes to ensure smooth sailing for the ship of state (Soph. An. 182-7). Essentially, the king establishes himself as a philos of the polis, and his philoi are precisely those people who are the philoi of the polis, as well.59 It is in this context of relations among one’s philoi that Creon denounces those responsible for breaking the law in attempting to bury Polynices’ body: h2 tou\j kakou\j timw=ntaj ei)sora|=j qeou/j; ou1k e1stin. a)lla\ tau=ta kai\ pa/lai po/lewj a1ndrej mo/lij fe/rontej e)rro/qoun e)moi, krufh|= ka/ra sei/ontej, ou)d’ u(po\ zugw|= lo/fon dikai/wj ei]xon, w(j ste/rgein e)me/. e)k tw=nde tou/touj e)cepi/stamai kalw=j parhgme/nouj misqoi=sin ei)rga/sqai ta/de.
290
in which an Athenian would have understood the play: Ostwald (1986: 148-61), Sourvinou-Inwood (1989). 59 Though this definition of philoi is contested by Antigone, who champions a kin-based understanding of philoi, Creon’s definition seems to have been standard within Athens. Nearly one century later, his words were still being performed and heralded as a model for good citizenship: cf. Dem. 19.247. That said, Segal (1964: 52) rightly underscores that Creon’s worldview is wholly civic in nature, as everything is refracted through a political lens for the king. On philoi and philia in the Antigone, see Goldhill (1986: 88106), Blundell (1991: 106-48), Konstan (1996: 82-5, 89-91).
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ou)de\n ga\r a)nqrw/poisin oi[on a1rguroj kako\n no/mism’ e1blaste. tou=to kai\ po/leij porqei=, to/d’ a1ndraj e)cani/sthsin do/mwn: to/d’ e)kdida/skei kai\ paralla/ssei fre/naj xrhsta\j pro\j ai)sxra\ pra/gmat’ i1stasqai brotw=n: panourgi/aj d’ e1deicen a)nqrw/poij e1xein kai\ panto\j e1rgou dusse/beian ei)de/nai. o3soi de\ misqarnou=ntej h1nusan ta/de, xro/nw| pot’ e)ce/pracan w(j dou=nai di/khn. a)ll’ ei1per i1sxei Zeu\j e1t’ e)c e)mou= se/baj…
295
…ma/qhq’ o3ti ou)k e)c a3pantoj dei= to\ kerdai/nein filei=n.
311
Do you see the gods honoring evil men? No. But long since men in the city who find it hard to bear me have been murmuring against me, unwilling to keep their necks beneath the yoke, as justice demands, so as to put up with me. I know well that these people have been bribed by those men to do this thing. There is no institution so ruinous for men as money; money sacks cities, money drives men from their homes! Money by its teaching perverts men’s good minds so that they take to evil actions! Money has shown men how to practice villainy, and taught them impiousness in every action! But those who to earn their fee have contrived to do this thing have ensured that in time they will pay the penalty.
300
304
290
295
300
304
...learn that 311 you must not grow used to making money out of everything. (Soph. An. 288-304, 311-12. trans. Lloyd-Jones)
Recalling his earlier pronouncement that philoi, not kakoi, would be honored by the polis, Creon here asks how the gods could bestow honor upon kakoi like Polynices, who have done nothing but destroy their temples and break the laws of the land (Soph. An. 284-8). In this respect, Creon prefaces his rant on dōrodokia by emphasizing how timē marks the presence of a reciprocal relationship between philoi. If the gods were to have honored Polynices, the king remarks, they would have been doing so just as if he were a euergetēs (Soph. An. 284), that is, as someone explicitly rewarded—like Cimon and his ilk—for the good services (erga) he provided the polis. 105
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Creon delegitimizes the dōrodokos by problematizing the monies used to negotiate his relations with others. While timē marks a relationship between philoi, silver or money marks relations among kakoi like the dōrodokos, at least from Creon’s perspective.60 After all, silver money is that “bad institution” (kakon nomisma) that has arisen among men (Soph. An. 295-6). Creon is certain that a misthos or ‘wage’ of silver caused someone to bury Polynices (Soph. An. 293-4), but his language is telling, for he envisions a misthos of silver as the reward for a heinous ergon like Polynices’ burial (cf. ei)rga/sqai, Soph. An. 294), just as timē had been the reward for the good deeds of a euergetēs only a few lines prior. In effect, money replaces the timē doled out by king and polis alike, as Creon sets up two different reciprocal relationships, one negotiated by good works and civic honor (timē), the other by a misthos and dōrodokia.61 For Creon, silver money is more than a medium transacted by the dōrodokos; it is a conceptual frame for understanding their relations. There are, then, major problems with this substitution of money for timē in exchange relationships. First, as the ‘wrong’ medium, silver itself symbolizes the corruption of proper relations between citizen and king. The king warns, “money by its teaching perverts men’s good minds so that they take to evil actions” (Soph. An. 298-9). It is important here that Creon does not presume that the crime was perpetrated by people who were already kakoi; instead, he infers that kakoi
led
astray
perfectly
good
citizens
to
join
their
ranks
(e)k
tw=nde
tou/touj…/parhgme/nouj, Soph. An. 293-4). It is in this sense that the money is thought 60
For a fuller treatment of Creon’s views on money, see Seaford (1998: 131-8). It should be noted, however, that whereas I assume that Creon’s silver functions as a money, Seaford must argue that it specifically constitutes general all-purpose money, in the modern use of the term. The difference stems from my adoption of a relational view of economics, on which see Chapter One above. 61 Creon’s use of misthos here only underscores this point. Insofar as a misthos is a payment—in cash or kind—from a superior to an inferior, it is directly analogous to the hierarchy posited when king or polis bestows honors upon a citizen. Recall that the Eion epigrams, in honor of soldiers who died in battle, were also called a misthos (Plut. Cim. 7.4).
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to have corrupted the relationship. When the newly minted dōrodokos citizen substitutes silver for timē, then, he privileges an altogether different economy of value—one symbolized by silver, not timē—and hence a different way of valuing relations in the polis. This image of the dōrodokos recalls Cimon’s warnings about short-circuiting the polis’ economy of empire, and the same picture emerges again about two-thirds of the way into the tragedy, when Creon accuses the prophet Tiresias of being bribed to side with Antigone.62 Again we find the substitution of bribe monies for an economy of public honor: Tiresias’ own divine wisdom made him a benefactor and leader within the city, yet his association with bribery quickly turns this economy of honor into one of base profit.63 As a result, whereas Tiresias’ good counsel, that “most powerful of possessions” (kra/tiston kthma/twn, Soph. An. 1050), previously reified the king’s own power, the seer’s purported bribe-taking inverts the power dynamic of their relationship. Rather than have control over the possessions symbolic of his archē, the king himself becomes a possession bought and sold by his enemies (cf. Soph. An. 1036). In this way, the monies used to negotiate relations among philoi and kakoi are themselves metaphors for those relations—witness the misthos for Polynices’ burial and Tiresias’ commercial cargo—yet each moves past symbolizing mere archē. Indeed, in both cases, the monies signal domination and physical control, as well.64 Creon’s second
62
See especially Soph. An. 1035-43, 1055, 1061, 1063; cf. 1077. The prophet’s wisdom is said to have made him a hēgemōn within the city (Soph. An. 993-4, 1058), one who provided a great “benefit” to the community (o)nh/sima, Soph. An. 995). Once Creon thinks that Tiresias has taken bribes, however, he employs commercial imagery to characterize his relationship with the seer. He claims to have been “bought and sold for a long time” by prophets like Tiresias (e)chmpo/lhmai ka)mpefo/rtismai pa/lai, Soph. An. 1036). Cf. the king’s use of kerdos (“gain”): Soph. An. 1047, 1061 and the similar accusation at Soph. OT 124-6. 64 Hence, Creon grounds his debate with Tiresias in terms of which laws, those of the gods or of the polis, can compel obedience. When he finally does obey (cf. pei/somai, Soph. An. 1099), he submits himself to 63
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major problem with the dōrodokos’ substitution of misthos for euergetism, then, is that the dōrodokos works only for his paymaster and no longer provides good work— obedience—to the city. The king is explicit on this point, describing the bribe-givers as those “unwilling to keep their necks beneath the yoke, as justice demands” (ou)d’ u(po\ zugw|= lo/fon dikai\wj ei]xon, Soph. An. 291-2). Even if we temper Creon’s vision of the proper relationship between rulers and citizens, the king’s model of politics as a reciprocal give-and-take—receiving honor in return for the good works of obedience— accords well with the idea of civic obligations at Athens developed in the previous chapter.65 Those who accept bribes in contravention of the king’s laws cease to submit themselves to the yoke of the king’s authority.
In effect, they fail to provide the
obedience and goodwill required of all citizens. This is a significant accusation. Throughout the Antigone, Creon focuses on the reverence owed to his political authority and, consequently, the control he should have over others. In his opening speech, he turns to the chorus, those stalwart citizens, and notes their continued reverence, or sebas, for the seat of his political power (tou=to me\n ta\ Lai+/ou/se/ se/bontaj ei)dw\j eu] qro/nwn a)ei\ kra/th, Soph. An. 166). The moment that the attempted burial of Polynices is reported, however, Creon expresses alarm at the illreverence, or dusse/beia, now in the polis as a result of the kakon nomisma that is money
the authority not of his own nomoi but to the established laws of the gods (cf. tou\j kaqestw=taj no/mouj, Soph. An. 1113). As a result, Tiresias’ claim that he will ‘teach’ the king and that the king will ‘obey’ (e)gw\ dida/cw, kai\ su\ tw|= ma/ntei piqou=, Soph. An. 992) should be read as all the more politically charged: cf. Seaford (1998: 133-4). 65 See Chapter One above.
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(Soph. An. 300-1). From that point on, Creon’s authority risks not being duly respected, and he accordingly asserts it at every turn.66 Throughout the tragedy sebas and its cognates are contested terms—should citizens reverence the authority of the king, or that of the gods?—but it is important for our purposes that Creon views this sebas through the lens of power and, explicitly, control.67 When Creon claims that the money at the heart of a bribe ‘reteaches’ men, the verb ekdidaskein thus locates bribery at the heart of the tragedy’s fundamental concern with ‘teaching’ citizen and king alike how to obey.68 Bribe monies signal not just disrespect for the king’s archē but especially disobedience. For the corruptive power of bribe monies to ‘reteach’ citizens is identical to that of anarchia, or lawlessness. Bribe monies are thought to sack cities and to drive men from their homes (tou= tou=to kai\ po/leij porqei=, to/d’ a1ndraj e)cani/sthsin do/mwn, Soph. An. 296-7), just as anarchia destroys cities and overturns homes (au3 au3th po/leij o1llusin, h3d’ a)nasta/touj oi1kouj ti/qhsin, Soph. An. 673-4). The dōrodokos was a citizen whose disobedience threatened the social order. For Creon, the monies taken by the dōrodokos replace euergesia with disobedience. And so in Sophocles’ play our picture of the dōrodokos takes on new meaning: concern over controlling the rewards of empire gives way to anxieties over absolute political power, i.e. the ability to compel action.
66
This shift in the dōrodokos
Cf. Soph. An. 165-9, 199-201, 280-314, 508-25, 661-78, 730, 744, 780. Segal (1994: 49-51) is particularly helpful in illuminating the relationship between sebas and political control in these passages. 67 Note how frequently he frames his struggle with Antigone in gendered terms as his being mastered by a woman: Soph. An. 484, 525, 678, 746, 756. Segal (1964: 52-4) especially illuminates how Creon’s entire worldview is shot through with intonations of weaker vs. stronger, domination vs. obedience. 68 So the chorus sums up at the end of the play, “The great words of boasters make atonement with great blows, and in their old age teach them wisdom,” (Soph. An. 1350-3). The final word of the tragedy is “teach” (e)di/dacan, Soph. An. 1353), a word that recalls the Ode on Man’s heralding of mankind’s ability to teach himself (e)dida/cato, Soph. An. 356) how to be master over nature.
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tracks an identical movement towards conceptualizing authority as the legitimate power to compel action (kratos). This focus on kratos was reflected in Athens’ transition to empire, examined above, and with Ephialtes’ reforms in 462/1 BCE infused domestic politics as well.
Though much of the substance of these reforms remains murky, it
seems clear that they transferred to the Assembly and Council the ability to hold public officials accountable at a euthyna and perhaps at an eisangelia, as well.69 They thereby reinforced the idea that officials should be obedient to the dēmos—one reason why these reforms have been convincingly tied to the contemporary emergence of dēmokratia as a buzzword in political discourse.70 Tellingly, such focus on the dēmos’ kratos paralleled a discursive shift in the word nomos, which at this time increasingly connoted a prescriptive rule or law that compels action.71 With Ephialtes’ reforms, then, the dēmos asserted its political authority within the courts, in effect extending its control over more than just the domestic management of imperial resources. With these reforms, the dēmos had full control over the very agents who managed imperial monies.72 And control those political agents it did. In at least two instances during the Peloponnesian War in the last few decades of the fifth century, stratēgoi were formally charged, or feared being charged, for dōrodokia, and the dēmos was acutely concerned to
69
Humphreys (1983: 242-7), Ostwald (1986: 70-3), Ober (1989: 77-8), Hansen (1991: 36-7), Raaflaub (2007). Ephialtes’ reforms are discussed at length in Chapter Seven below. 70 Raaflaub (2007) collects the sources on dēmokratia and argues persuasively for their connection to Ephialtes’ reforms. 71 For the development of nomos in the fifth century, see Ostwald (1986: 89-136). Ephialtes’ association with bringing nomos to the people is attested in Anaximenes, who records that the leader moved Solon’s laws from the Acropolis into the public spaces of the Agora and Boule (72 FGrH F 13). This highly political act presented the laws themselves as a possession belonging to the people at the precise moment when the dēmos was using law to claim possession over imperial monies and public officials, alike. 72 The subsequent development of the euthyna process, examined in Chapter Six, strongly suggests that the Athenians were most concerned about holding accountable, specifically, those magistrates who handled imperial monies.
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control the disobedient dōrodokoi.73 First, in 424 BCE the stratēgoi Pythodorus and Sophocles were sentenced to exile, while their colleague Eurymedon was fined, because they had all purportedly been bribed to withdraw from Sicily according to the terms of a pact with the Sicilian king Hermocrates (Thuc. 4.65.2-3; Philochorus FGrH 328 F127). In his account of these events, Thucydides ascribes the trial to the arrogance of the dēmos, which he claims expected to succeed militarily even in the most adverse circumstances (Thuc. 4.65.4). And again, on the disastrous Sicilian expedition in 413 BCE the stratēgos Nicias counseled against withdrawing from Sicily, in part out of the fear that upon his return to Athens the soldiers would accuse him of withdrawing because he had taken dōra (Thuc. 7.48.4; cf. Thuc. 3.98.5). As Thucydides suggests, the dēmos controlled its generals; for them to have acted without explicit approval from the dēmos would have been an unjust arrogation of authority, a sure sign of disobedience.74 To recap the argument so far, just as Athens assumed first economic control over allied possessions and then political and economic control over the allies themselves, the Athenian dēmos asserted its control over monies within the polis and then over people within the polis. As a result, political monies that had operated simultaneously within the economies of empire and patronage gradually took on the valence of political control and subordination. This new meaning was particularly problematic within the space of domestic politics because it signaled a subordination of the dēmos to an individual
73
Stratēgoi were responsible for everything, good and bad, that happened on their expedition: Din. 1.74; Pritchett (1974: 74). Even an autokratōr general like Nicias, one who had been given complete authority to do as he pleased, could suffer tremendous penalties if he did not do certain things: cf. IG i² 98/99=ML 78. 74 Explicit when the dēmos blames its stratēgoi for the terms reached at the surrender of Potidaea (Thuc. 2.70.4); cf. [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 2.17. Reading dōrodokia through the lens of obedience in Thucydides follows straightforwardly from the historians’ trope of the inversion of leaders and led, a motif closely connected to the insubordination of troops in the field: Rood (1998: 28-31, 142-5). Crucially, for Thucydides the analogy between a stratēgos’ command of his troops and the dēmos’ control of stratēgoi was clear.
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While elite citizens might still acquire political authority through their
contributions to the polis, the means by which they acquired this authority needed to be kept distinct from monies of empire so imbued with the valence of kratos. New modes of politics arose, as the next section will trace, but the legitimacy of these modes was constantly contested. In what should be by now a familiar move, the terms of this debate focused on the dōrodokos, as the Athenians used him to think through what legitimate politics really looked like.
The New Politicians as dōrodokoi: In the previous section we saw how, around the time of Pericles, the dēmos began to compete with elites for the authority to be the patron of the dēmos. This idea was considered briefly in conjunction with public buildings and the Springhouse Decree, but it seems to underlie two other shifts that occurred in the second half of the fifth century. First, there was a proliferation of political monies: cleruchies, colonies, and pay for various groups of people, including soldiers, jurors, artisans and laborers, public officials and many, many others. These monies have rightly been understood as ways for the dēmos to enjoy a share of the empire, and doubtless, too, they at least fostered greater participation in the democracy, as scholars frequently emphasize.75 But these monies also played a crucial role, as we will see, in legitimating the dēmos’ position as patron of the community.
These monies helped forge a ‘new politics’:
like patronage, only
redistributing the dēmos’ own money back to itself.76 As this section will trace, these two
75
Rhodes (1981: 339-40 ad AP27.4), Markle (1985), Ostwald (1986: 182), Ober (1989: 143), Stadter (1989: 117 ad Per. 9.3). 76 Connor (1971) is essential on this shift. See also Ostwald (1986: 175-91), Whitehead (1986: 305-10), Schmitt Pantel (1992: 179-208).
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political innovations were interrelated, and the figure of the dōrodokos intimately shaped their development. Army pay, naval pay, pay for public magistrates and jurors—all of these misthoi were ways that Athens’ empire fed her citizens, according to Aristotle (AP 24.1). Indeed, the provision of both naval and military pay—attested by the start of the Peloponnesian War—came directly from tribute funds, and providing food (trophē) for the soldiers was the explicit purpose for those funds.77
We can also add to this list cleruchies and
colonies, which were likewise possessions of the dēmos, as well as direct and indirect sources of food.78 Similarly, to the extent that the Periclean building program on top of the Acropolis was funded, at least in part, by the Hellēnotamiai, pay for the workers on those building projects seems to have come directly from the empire.79 What caused this proliferation of monies? Common to all of them was that they came from the dēmos’ purse—whether directly from the public treasury or indirectly through the dēmos’ ‘ownership’ of imperial resources—and that they explicitly ‘fed’ the dēmos, just as Cimon and others had previously done.80 In other words, this proliferation of monies represented the dēmos’ attempt to lay claim to the economy of patronage. As
77
Both existed by the start of Peloponnesian War: AP 27.2, [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 1.13 with Pritchett (1971: 714). Plutarch attributes pay for both the fleet (Plut. Per. 11.4) and the army (Plut. Per. 12.5) to Pericles, but see AP 24.1. On the use of tribute funds to provide trophē for Athenian troops, see Pritchett (1971: 40-1). 78 See AP 24.3 with AE 255-72. Cleruchies and colonies were commonly populated by poor Athenian citizens and, in this respect, provided a livelihood for those citizens (cf. Plut. Per. 11.6). Yet cleruchies like those in the Thracian Chersonese (Plut. Per. 11.5, DS 11.88.3) were often strategic acquisitions that would then be leveraged to feed the citizens back at Athens: Brunt (1966). 79 Plut. Per. 12.4-5 and IG i3 439, but see Kallet (1994: 49-50) for doubt on taking our sources at face value. My argument would actually be stronger if the Periclean building programme was not funded mainly by imperial monies: that would mean that, for both public works and public pay, the dēmos actively, though fictively, conceptualized them as if they were monies of patronage. 80 AP calls them, explicitly, trophē (AP 24.1, 24.3), which is precisely what Cimon provided his demesmen (cf. diatrofh/n, Plut. Cim. 10.1). At AP 24.1-3 the shift to providing trophē for Athens’ citizens is directly tied to Athens’ ascendancy as hegemon over the League, and it is tempting to follow Aristotle on this conceptual correlation. As the proliferation of political monies in the 450’s and 440’s suggests, as Athens grew more imperial, the dēmos also grew more patronal towards itself.
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with the Springhouse Decree, I suggest, we can imagine that the dēmos actively competed with elites for the authority to control these monies. We can see this story play out in the development of misthophoria, or pay for public officials and jurors. Typically, these monies are understood as necessary steps to enable mass participation in the ‘radical’ democracy following Ephialtes’ reforms: by paying citizens for serving in public office or on a jury, the dēmos ensured that even the poorest citizens could participate in politics and, hence, the democracy could truly achieve ‘rule of the people’.81 Doubtless this was one potential result of misthophoria— though it is impossible for us to assess either way whether or not the poorest citizens actually participated more often as a result—but we should be wary about positing this as the motivation behind the reforms. After all, it is striking that no source mentions such a motivation; in fact, all of our sources suggest that misthophoria was established as a way for the masses to profit from empire.82 Yet it is surprising to find even this motivation posited by ancient testimonia, since pay for both public office and jury duty was funded not by the hellēnotamiai, who were in charge of the tribute, but by the kōlakretai, who administered Athens’ public treasury (to dēmosion).83 When the Athenians set up the funds for misthophoria, in other words, they consciously did not treat those funds as similar to the monies used to pay the army and the fleet. Why, then, was jury pay ever associated with empire?
81
See Rhodes (1981: 339-40 ad AP27.4), Markle (1985), Ostwald (1986: 182), Ober (1989: 143), Stadter (1989: 117 ad Per. 9.3), Hansen (1991: 188). Cf. Sinclair (1988: 71). 82 AP 24.1, [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 1.16. Cf. Ar. V. 655-64. Samons (2000: 65). 83 Samons (2000: 57-9) on the kōlakretai. On the meaningful distinction between imperial and domestic funds, see Kallet-Marx (1994: 246-7), Kallet (1998: 47), and Samons (2000: esp. 55). Note how, after the public treasury was combined with the Treasury of Athena in 411, jurors were paid by the Treasurers of Athena: IG ii2 1629.213-17.
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I propose that the reason jury pay and pay for public officials were consistently associated with ‘feeding’ the dēmos from imperial monies was that they represented selfconscious ways in which the dēmos was replicating—or, to be more precise, competing against—Cimon-style patronage.
Certainly thinking of these monies as providing,
explicitly, food for the dēmos would have resonated strongly with the way Cimon had invited his demesmen to dinner. So, too, would the source of the funds: the kōlakretai, or “collectors of limbs” or “hams” (kw=la),” who probably date back to Solon (AP 7.3) and whose name suggests a connection to the collection of honorary shares of meat at a sacrifice.84
Later dispensing public monies for a range of purposes, the kōlakretai
frequently provided monies associated with public honors, just like the kw=la they presumably once collected.85 Moreover, that the payment was called a misthos need not have connoted a commercial “wage,” but readily could have evoked the honorary misthos awarded the victorious generals at Eion (cf. Aeschin. 3.183): that is, it may have signaled, especially, a money from a superior (the dēmos) to a citizen, just like Cimon’s handouts to his demesemen.86
If we liken misthophoria to the monies of patronage, which
themselves were derived from the monies of empire, it makes sense that even misthophoria, though paid for from domestic funds, was nevertheless linked to the monies of empire.
84
As Samons (2000: 55) notes, jury pay and pay for magistrates are absent from the epigraphic record dealing with reserves from the sacred treasury. By contrast, sources explicitly attest that the kōlakretai doled out the payments: Ar. V. 695, 724, schol. Ar. Av. 1541, Hesychius s.v. kwlakre/tai. Cf. Kallet (1998: 47) and Samons (2000: 57). On the connection between the kōlakretai and the collection of sacrificial meat, see Samons (2000: 57), Harding (2001: 93-4). 85 On the associations of civic honors and kw=la qua honorary portions of meat, see especially Tsoukala (2009). In the inscriptional record, we find the kōlakretai dispensing funds for the erection of stelai (IG i3 11.13-14, 71.25-26, 165.10), paying various religious officials (priestess of Athena Nike, IG i3 36.10; those making a theōria to Delphi, Androtion FGrH 324 F 36), and providing meals in the prytaneion (Androtion FGrH 324 F 36). 86 On this definition of misthos, see especially von Reden (1995a: 89-92).
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Instead of asking why the Athenians instituted public pay, therefore, if we ask why public pay took the specific form that it took, it seems clear that the Athenians were conceptualizing misthophoria through the lens of patronage politics: the collective dēmos, not an individual citizen, served as patron to the masses. We find indirect corroboration for this idea in a second set of descriptions of public pay, which frame it as a money used to negotiate patronage politics, albeit between an elitie citizen and the community. Aristotle, followed by Plutarch, is explicit on this point: in providing jury pay,87 other kinds of public pay,88 and theoric pay,89 Pericles “demagogued” in opposition to Cimon’s patronage.90 Alternatively, it is reported that Pericles instituted these public monies in order to compete against the political authority of Thucydides, son of Melesias (Plut. Per. 11.4). We do not know Plutarch’s source for that latter political rivalry; in any case, what is important here is that, when they were not associated with Athens’ empire, these measures were viewed as tokens in a political competition to secure support from the dēmos. Our sources paint a consistent picture of Pericles’ taking the initiative to create a new mode of politics, one in which he redistributed the dēmos’ own funds to itself, but
87
Jury pay: AP 27.2-5, 62.2; Aristot. Pol. 2.1274a9. Cf. [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 1.16. We do not know the original amount of jury pay, but Cleon is said to have increased it from 2 obols to 3 obols per day: schol. ad Ar. V. 88, 300. 88 It is unclear what Plutarch means here by a1llaij misqoforai=j, or “other kinds of provision of misthos” (Plut. Per. 9.3), but elsewhere pay for the navy (Plut. Per. 11.4), pay for the navy (Plut. Per. 12.5), as well as pay for artisans and laborers working on the Acropolis building programme (Plut. Per. 12.5-6) are attributed to Pericles. Potentially pay for public officials is included here too, on which see Ar. Ach. 65-7, [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 1.3, IG i3 82.17-21. See Stadter (1989: 117-18 ad Per. 9.3) for further discussion. 89 It is difficult to determine what exactly is meant by qewrikoi=j, “theoric” payments (Plut. Per. 9.3). Probably these payments had nothing to do with the Theoric Fund which Eubulus managed in the midfourth century: Ruschenbusch (1979). What, then, would they have covered? Stadter (1989: 116 ad Per. 9.3) makes a compelling case that Plutarch is following a tradition found in Ulpian (ad Dem. 1.1=Dindorff 33) that Pericles designated that leftover public funds should be devoted to public festivals (theōroi), as a way of pleasing the dēmos. Ulpian’s note, however, might simply be a garbled misreading of Pericles’ famed generosity in putting on festivals and theatrical performances: cf. Thuc. 2.38.1, [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 2.9. 90 a)ntidhmagwgw=n pro\j th\n Ki/mwnoj eu)pori/an, AP 27.3; katadhmagwgou=menoj, Plut. Per. 9.3.
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such a narrative was in fact contested in Pericles’ day.91
Chapter Two Note how, if we follow
Plutarch’s narrative here, Pericles’ innovation is actually shot through with overtones of political subordination of the dēmos.92 This would not have sat well with all Athenians. In fact, some of Pericles’ contemporaries referred to his measures and others’ as bribes. Plutarch himself says that with public pay Pericles was able to “bribe” the masses (sundeka/saj to\ plh=qoj, Plut. Per. 9.3; cf. Plut. Per. 34.2), and Aristophanes also insinuates that public pay was a bribe from politicians to obtain favorable jury treatment (Aristoph. V. 669-79; Pax 632-3, 644-8; Eq. 801-9; cf. fr. 100).93 As in the previous section, where we saw that Pericles’ problematic control over public monies was reflected in public accusations of dōrodokia, again accusations of dōrodokia crop up as Athenians tried to police the borders of legitimate politics. Crucially, the dōrodokos was again configured as a disobedient citizen, someone who had somehow inverted the vertical relations between community and citizen. In Aristophanes’ Wasps and Knights, for example, Cleon is lambasted for corrupting the dēmos by bribing it with jury pay.94 This is a problem not just because the dēmos is corrupted—although the Wasps’ satire of jurors who pursue money over just judgment is
91
Administering the dēmos’ own funds: th\n tw=n dhmosi/wn dianomh/n, Plut. Per. 9.3; cf. dido/nai toi=j polloi=j ta\ au(tw=n, AP 27.4. 92 In currying their favor by instituting misthophoria, he was said to “relax the reins” of his rule somewhat (ta\j h(ni/aj a)nei/j, Plut. Per. 11.4), a metaphor that parallels both Creon’s own inability to control Antigone (Soph. An. esp. 473-7) and contemporary discussion about Ephialtes’ problematic role in the democracy (Plut. Per. 7.6). Similarly, Plutarch frames Pericles’ use of political monies—specifically, cleruchies and misthoi, or wages—as the means by which he acquired such exceptional authority within the polis (Plut. Per. 9.1). 93 In this light, note Aristotle’s clunky transitions from Pericles’ provision of public pay to the issue of judicial bribery (to\ deka/zein), which he claims first arose at this time (AP 27.4-5). Because it was Anytus, not Pericles, who first made judicial bribery public, this line reads almost like a non sequitur unless we supply a missing conceptual link between Pericles’ public payments and ‘bribery’ of jurors. 94 Ar. V. 669-79, Eq. 801-9. In both plays, Cleon is frequently accused of both giving and receiving bribes: Ar. V. 960-1, 669-79; Eq. 402-3, 453-9, 994-6, 1080-3. Cf. Nu. 591 and, for similar accusations, Ar. Eq. 103, 258, 707, 824-7. See also Ar. Ach. 5-8 with scholiast (=Theopompus FGrH 115 F 94) with discussion in Olson (2004: ad loc) and Carawan (1990).
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troubling even without the overtones of bribery.
Chapter Two
Cleon’s corruption is particularly
problematic because it enables him to escape accountability.95 Accordingly, his bribegiving enables him to invert his relationship with the dēmos so that he, not the dēmos, becomes master.96 Just as Pericles’ control over public monies was called into question by accusations of dōrodokia, here too it is assumed that public speakers illegitimately control, and disproportionately benefit from, the allies’ imperial monies (esp. Ar. V. 66079). All of the monies found in the ways corrupt politicians negotiate politics are thus cast as the bribes. Hence, that we find Cleon’s misthophoria recast as bribe monies strongly suggests that a number of Athenians thought that Cleon’s relationship to the dēmos, like Pericles’—specifically, his influence on the distribution of public funds—was inherently problematic. I am suggesting that, as with the Springhouse Decree and public works, with misthophoria and other political monies created around mid-century the dēmos selfconsciously strove to be its own patron.
It identified a money of Cimonian-style
patronage—feeding the public—and refashioned it in democratic form, in effect blocking elite citizens from playing that role using the old monies of patronage. Nevertheless, elites like Pericles and Cleon, who previously would have derived political authority from the politics of patronage, instead tried to appropriate for themselves the dēmos’ new monies; in this way, they forged a new kind of politics.97 Even if the picture I am
95
esp. Ar. Eq. 801-9; cf. V. 669-79, 960-1. This point is explored at length in McGlew (2002: 86-111), which focuses on Aristophanes’ Knights and Cleon’s desire to control the dēmos. See also Wohl (2002) and Scholtz (2004) on the politics of domination latent in conceptualizing politicians as erastai. 97 So in Aristophanes we find explicit comparisons between the contributions of new politicians and oldstyle patrons of the dēmos. In the Knights, for instance, the Sausage-seller uses metaphors of food consumption to compare his deeds to Themistocles: Ar. Eq. 810-19 with Anderson (1989: 15-16), Marr (1996). As Davidson (1993: 57-62) explores, the comparison, and implicit contrast, with past public officials signal how unjust the New Politicians’ patron-like redistributions were thought to be. 96
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sketching must remain mere suggestion, as the relationship between mass and elite shifted in the second half of the fifth century, it is clear that the terrain on which they battled for political authority focused on the proliferation of legitimate political monies— like misthophoria, army and naval pay, or cleruchies—and on their purported corruption, as represented by bribe monies.98 To invoke the dōrodokos, as Pericles’ and Cleon’s critics certainly did, was to contest the implicit meaning of the relationships structured by those monies: it was to contest their claim to be patron of the dēmos. Such contestation of the legitimacy of political payments—or, more properly, the legitimacy of monies used to negotiate political relations—attended a major shift towards a new style of politics, as practiced by Cleon and his successors.
The old-style,
patronage-like model of politics practiced by Cimon, Themistocles or Aristides was replaced by redistribution of the dēmos’ own money, and we have already examined in this context how misthophoria was re-read as bribe monies. Yet the New Politicians were considered dōrodokoi also for the way they purportedly took bribes to speak in public.99 As we will see, this last image of the dōrodokos, too, was used to contest the legitimacy of the New Politics. The New Politicians represented both a significant improvement for, and a new potential danger to, the democracy. On the one hand, their use of rhetoric explicitly to 98
In addition to employing the dōrodokos discursively to delegitimize some monies, the dēmos may have used the law to legitimate other monies. Probably between the 450’s and 430’s, the Athenians imposed limits on escaping liturgical service and created the antidosis procedure, which helped prevent elites from shirking their liturgical duties: Gabrielsen (1986), Christ (1990) on antidosis and, on liturgies more generally, Davies (1981: 98-9), Sinclair (1988: 188-90), Christ (2006: 143-204), Domingo Gygax (forthcoming: passim). These legal changes have rightly been connected to the rise of the people’s power—so Christ (2006: 158-61)—but another motivation for their enactment could have been to signal and enforce through law which kinds of elite contributions to the community were legitimate. Indeed, codifying legitimate political monies in law could have simultaneously broadcast an authoritative list of legitimate contributions to the polis and, importantly, signaled the dēmos’ control over determining that list in the first place. 99 See, for example, Ar. Eq. 930-4, 1196-8; V. 100-2, 240-1, 906-8; Th. 936-7.
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win over the masses fostered more ‘democratic’ politics: attention to and inclusion of the interests of more citizens, and consequently policies aimed at the benefit of the masses as a whole, instead of a smaller subsection of it. In effect, this meant that any citizen who had an idea would have a greater chance of having it proposed by a politician (and thereby hopefully approved) than he would have earlier in the democracy. On the other hand, this meant that any citizen who had an idea would have a greater chance of having it proposed by a politician. When all it takes is a persuasive public speaker to have a motion approved, there is potentially less quality control on the kinds of issues brought up for public discussion or, worse, the kinds of proposals successfully voted on. Perhaps unsurprisingly, therefore, this new, potentially more democratic political technology brought with it concomitant concerns that the democracy had become an ochlocracy or a polity ruled by the fickle masses.100 This outline should be familiar, but what I would like to pose here is the question of how this shift actually came about. How exactly did Cleon and others manage to forge this new style of politics? Cleon’s most distinctive difference from his predecessors was that he repudiated his circle of friends and proclaimed himself to be friend—‘lover’ as Aristophanes would call it—of the dēmos as a whole.101 While no subsequent politician would follow suit in rejecting his own philoi, after Cleon most of them did try to court the people’s favor, as Aristophanes famously parodies in the Knights. Like Cleon, however, these politicians were consistently open to the accusation that they were peddling their 100
Ober (1998: 72-121) thoroughly discusses the criticisms that emerged in the late-fifth and early-fourth centuries. 101 Ar. Eq. 732-4, 1340-4 with Connor (1971: 96-104). See also Thuc. 3.36.6, 4.27.5-28.5, 4.21.3; AP 28.3; Plut. Nicias 8.3; Theopompus FGrH 115 F 92. As Creon’s own civic-oriented conception of philia might suggest, the conceit that a politician was a ‘polis-lover’ was common in this period—e.g. Thuc. 2.60.5 (Pericles); Thuc. 6.92.2, 4 (Alcibiades); cf. Thuc. 2.43.1, Ar. Lys. 541-8—and was symptomatic of this broader realignment of civic values: Connor (1971: 103-5), Raaflaub (1994: 129-30). For Cleon’s relationship with his friends, see especially Connor (1971: 91-4).
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political services—in short, trafficking in decrees, laws, honors, and policies.102 Cause and effect are somewhat muddled here—did Cleon first befriend the dēmos and then begin to profit from it, or was it the other way around?—but the difference is crucial. In the first instance, we are led to believe that Cleon was corrupted by power gained from his newly acquired mass support; in the second, Cleon’s corrupt activity was constituted by his courting of the masses. There are good reasons for thinking that the latter occurred, that is, that Cleon’s new practice of politics was inherently considered corrupt and that, in fact, it was plied through money.103 First, we should note that political alliances do not spring up ex nihilo; some kind of reciprocal relation is needed in order to leverage political support. For the old-school public speakers, this relation readily appeared in the form of philia; for Cleon, who had renounced his friendships, at first there would have been no such basis for establishing and organizing mass support. Cleon required an ersatz philia, some kind of relational glue to enable him to open up political access to a broader swath of the public. I suggest that this glue entailed what his opponents called dōrodokia; because Cleon’s politicking forged new patterns of social ties within the practice of politics, the monies used to negotiate those ties were deemed illegitimate by opponents. Accordingly, Cleon was called a dōrodokos.
102
Note how insults of the New Politicians typically came in the form of epithets signaling the politician’s associations with trade, i.e. that he was profiting from his politicking. Cf. Cleon the tanner (e.g. Eq. 44, Nu. 581), Hyperbolus the lamp-maker (Eq. 1316, Nu. 1065, Pax 690), Cephalus the potter (Ec. 248-53), Aristoxenus the needle-seller (Pl. 175 with scholiast), and the catalogue of politicians at Knights 129-45 with Sommerstein (1981: 150-1 ad loc.). This became a common motif in Comedy: Jackson (1919) collects the evidence, while Connor (1971: 152-8) helpfully points out the potential class tensions inherent in calling someone a ‘peddler’ or ‘manufacturer’. 103 That rhētores received a misthos was later taken for granted: Ar. Plut. 377-9, 567-70; Pl. Phdr. 257c-d; Aeschin. 2.180, 3.173; Dem. 19.246; Hyp. 3.3, 4.28. Cf. APF 518-19.
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Let us reframe the issue of access from the perspective of a relatively poor Athenian who, in the Cimonian system of patronage, would have lacked the philoi needed to pass a proposal on his own in the Assembly. One way to overcome such social distance would have been to create and leverage a similar relational tie through money: by simply paying a public speaker to make a proposal, a citizen could potentially tap into that speaker’s network of philoi or, better yet, his clout with the Assembly. Whereas this kind of practice would have been antithetical to the aims of the old style of politics— because it gave political authority to someone other than a local patron—and understandably would have been viewed as the corruption of the friendships that were the foundation of that system, for Cleon and the New Politicians money for political services would have been less problematic. Indeed, it naturally would have bonded politician and citizen into the desired kind of reciprocal relationship, albeit one between two otherwise complete strangers. Note how the accusation of dōrodokia here does double-duty both as a descriptive claim, as we have traced, and as a conceptual lens for understanding Cleon’s actions. Precisely because Cleon’s political support came from the masses, not his philoi, the content of his ties to his supporters would have been arms-length: the same kind of tie frequently found in commercial markets. In this sense, that a commercial misthos was used to characterize how Cleon’s relationship was negotiated only signaled how, from the perspective of old-style politicians, Cleon’s political friends were closer to commercial transactors than actual social relations like philoi. Yet the illegitimacy of these relations was also signaled by the accusation of dōrodokia itself; it was precisely by delegitimizing
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the currency of the relationship (the bribe monies) that critics of the New Politicians leveled their attacks. On this view, we should perhaps flip our picture of the New Politicians on its head and assign the real innovation not to Cleon but to the political entrepreneurs who tried to overcome the inaccessibility of the old system of politics by paying public speakers to make a motion on their behalf—that is, to the masses who stopped subordinating themselves to patrons and began subordinating patrons to themselves by giving them a misthos. I suggest that Cleon was simply the first-mover, the first public speaker to accept the bribes of non-philoi and thereby allow them a kind of political access usually granted to one’s philoi. For this reason, he was thought to have renounced his friends among the elite; and it makes sense that he did so, too, for his purported dōrodokia enabled him to secure broader support with the masses. The bribe itself served as the initial basis for a reciprocal relationship between public speaker and citizen. Over time, that relationship was only reinforced at both an individual level (when individuals continued to pay Cleon for his services) and a more general level (when Cleon exchanged favorable public policies for broad-based support). To modern ears, Cleon probably comes across as a corrupt crook at worst or a political opportunist at best, but it should be noted that the style of politics he began on the dēmos’ initiative became the standard for generations to come. In other words, what initially were considered ‘bribes’ later became perfectly licit ‘payments’, a shift that makes sense if we assign the political innovation here to the dēmos.104 Far from being a
104
This is a somewhat controversial claim given how often our sources rail against the payments received by rhētores: e.g. Hyp. 5.25 (Demosthenes received 60 talents for his decrees and for proposing his trierarchic law); Dem. 18.312 (Aeschines received 2 talents to oppose Demosthenes’ trierarchic law), Plut. Mor. 848B (Demosthenes received 5 talents for not saying anything). The veracity of these claims is
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self-interested opportunist, in fact, he might genuinely have thought himself ‘champion of the people’ (or the two could be one and the same).105 After all, in renouncing his old friendships, he reportedly criticized the corruption that could result from conducting politics through selective social and political channels. Philia, Plutarch has him claim, “often softened one’s thinking and led one astray from right and just policy in politics.”106 Following Plutarch, we might imagine that Cleon, like his paymasters, was himself trying to improve a corrupt system. Whether this testimony is apocryphal or not, we cannot be certain, but it does make sense if we adopt the perspective of those Athenians for whom political subordination to a patron was no longer necessary and no longer desired. This chapter has examined the figure of the dōrodokos in the fifth century: a disobedient character whose presence signaled problems in the distribution of monies in Athens’ public economies of empire and patronage. By the end of the century, the dōrodokos was not simply a disobedient citizen, but one who had inverted the vertical relations between citizen and community; in this respect, he was opposed completely to “people’s power.” As the Peloponnesian War drew to a close, such opposition to the democracy crystallized in the form of two different oligarchic coups, at which point the figure of the dōrodokos became inextricably linked with oligarchy. Along with civil war,
impossible to assess—despite the best efforts of Wankel (1982): cf. Harvey (1985) and Hansen (1991: 274-6; cf. 1980). Given the extraordinary sums cited, these instances most likely represent problematic exceptions, that is, instances when a rhētor’s fee was blamed for his bad performance, rather than strong indications that payments themselves were banned. In fact, the very point of Hyperides’ testimony is that these kinds of payments were allowed so long as they did not result in harm to the dēmos. 105 Prostatēs tou dēmou: Ar. Eq. 1128, Ra. 569; cf. V. 419, Pax 684, Pl. 920; Thuc. 8.89.4. Connor (1971: 110-15). 106 w(j polla_ th~j o)rqh~j kai\ dikai/aj proaire/sewj mala&ssousan e0n th|~ politei/a| kai\ para&gousan, Plut. Mor. 806F.
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therefore, oligarchy brought with it a new conception of the dōrodokos; and it is to this newly conceived figure that the next chapter turns.
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Chapter Three
In the Shadow of the Thirty: Dōrodokia in the Generation after the Peloponnesian War 403-378 BCE
When Plato’s Socrates sets up his ideal city in the Republic, he explicitly bans its citizens from becoming bribe-takers and money-lovers (dwrodo/kouj…filoxrhma/touj Pl. Rep. 390d6); the dōrodokos was not allowed in Callipolis. As a result, Socrates argues, the city should ban all poetry that praises or describes dōrodokia, including lines from Hesiod, parts of the Iliad in which Achilles accepts bribes, and even certain stories about the gods, like the hero Asclepius who according to tradition took bribes to bring a man back to life (Rep. 3.390d-e, 3.408b-c). Socrates fears that the moral education of the citizens of Callipolis might suffer if such poor exempla were held before them. Indeed, the philosopher goes so far as to say that they should deny that Achilles was ever so greedy (filoxrh/maton) as to take bribes from Agamemnon or Priam (Pl. Rep. 3.390e68). As Socrates later explains about Asclepius, if someone is the son of a god, they should insist that he is not venal or greedy (ai)sxrokerdh/j), and if he is greedy, they should insist that he is not the son of a god (Pl. Rep. 3.408c1-3). The two are simply incompatible social types. For Plato, not only was the dōrodokos a distinct social type in its own right, but that type was, specifically, money-loving just like an Achilles or an Asclepius, a corrupt character born of economic excess. Elsewhere in the Republic Plato identifies the causes
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of this character corruption (diafqei/rei) as wealth and poverty (Pl. Rep. 4.421d1-4).1 He consequently devotes considerable attention in the dialogue to how to separate the guardians from wealth, poverty, and commerce lest they be corrupted by the taint of money.2 In many respects, the dōrodokos of the Republic is strikingly familiar to a modern audience used to pictures of venal politicians who seek rents out of a desire for money or power. Although Monoson (2000: 127) astutely points out that the Republic’s policy recommendations—essentially separating the public and private spheres completely so that they can never mix—mark a considerable departure from democratic policy reforms, like the institution of accountability or rotation of office, it should be noted that Plato’s vision of a complete separation of private and public actually represents the logical, though radical, extension of contemporary anti-corruption reforms. The philosopher comes off as one of the first advocates of completely removing the market from politics. But if in Plato’s dōrodokos we can detect the seed of modern depictions of venal politicians, it is striking just how far removed the greedy, money-loving dōrodokos of the Republic is from the disobedient figure we encountered in the previous chapter. Certainly, when Creon asserts that money perverts men’s minds so that they take to evil actions (Soph. An. 297-301), we can detect some affinity to Plato’s sentiment. Yet for Creon, as we saw, money serves as an explanation for only a single incident; he may lambaste the power of money to achieve discrete aims, but nowhere does he suggest that 1
Along the same lines, elsewhere in Plato wealth is contrasted with virtue (aretē): cf. Pl. Rep. 421d, 591d, Leg.742e, 705b, 893c, 836a, 919b; Arist. Pol.1273a37-38. 2 Pl. Leg. 9.875a-e similarly posits that self-interest can corrupt even the most just of characters; cf. Pl. Leg. 3.691c-d, 4.713c-d, 9.875a. This point comes out most forcefully in Socrates’ discussion of the Hesiodic races and their corruption over time (Pl. Rep. 8.547a-b, cf. 4.415a-b). There, the mixing of like and unlike metals—the races of gold, silver, bronze, and iron—constitutes a form of political degeneracy that leads to subsequent degradations in political constitution as individuals and society are increasingly ruled by desires, not reason (Pl. Rep. 8.547a-53e). See Irwin (1995: 281-97) and Balot (2001: 246-7).
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the guard was inherently the type of person, the kind of character who was prone to take gifts. Indeed, the question of character or character types is largely absent from Creon’s discussion of bribery, and this marks a crucial difference between Plato’s and Sophocles’ presentation of the dōrodokos.3 Plato’s distinct correlation of money and character types signals a broader shift in how the dōrodokos was conceptualized at Athens in the first few decades of the fourth century. Long before Plato, it had been thought that wealth or poverty could corrupt one’s character: greed was certainly a well-defined concept before the fourth century.4 What changed around Plato’s time, however, was that wealth and poverty came to be heavily correlated with dōrodokia, as well. Dorodokia was conceived primarily as a kind of financial crime, the dōrodokos a character who had violated economically defined obligations. Again, to a modern audience this particular conceptualization of bribery may seem self-evident, but it emerged at Athens for very particular reasons. This chapter will uncover those reasons, examining what changed from the late fifth to the early fourth centuries, and then detail the period’s resultant picture of the dōrodokos. After sketching the political anti-type of the Thirty that pervaded Athenian political ideology in the decades after their bloody regime, we will examine how the dōrodokos was closely mapped onto this anti-type in two court cases dealing with dōrodokia (Lysias 28 and 29). The final section, focusing on Aristophanes’ Wealth and a
3
The distance between Sophocles and Plato is emblematic of the fundamental shift in politics brought on by Pericles and his successors. Recall that, through provision of jury pay and misthophoria for magistrates Pericles was similarly thought to have ‘bribed’ the dēmos (e.g. sundeka/saj, Plut. Per. 23.5). Plato later says that Pericles actively made the Athenians “money-loving” (filargu/rouj, Plat. Gorg. 515e), but already in Aristophanes we find reflection of whether Pericles improved or corrupted the dēmos. It was only in discussions of the shift to the New Politics, however, that issues of character corruption arose. 4 Balot (2001: 58-98) on greed (pleonexia) in the archaic period. On the relationship between wealth and civic character, Solon’s poetry provides particularly relevant comparanda for this chapter: see Sol. fr. 4.56, 6.3-4, 13.11-13W.
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defense speech on the charge of dōrodokia (Lysias 21), will illuminate why this conceptual convergence took place.
As will be clear, primarily
because of the
Athenians’ political and economic efforts to get along as a democracy after the horrors of oligarchy, the dōrodokos became a thief of sorts, someone who sought actively to harm the dēmos.5
The Thirty as Anti-type at Athens: That an Athenian like Plato might view the dōrodokos through an economic lens ostensibly reflected the dire financial situation Athens faced at the beginning of the fourth century.6 Sparta’s occupation of the Attic countryside during the last decade of the Peloponnesian War had ravaged much of the land, including olive trees, grain, vines, and livestock and had consequently disrupted agricultural production and patterns of rural land tenure.7
Sparta’s threatening position effectively shut down production at the
Laureion silver mines, as well.8 Moreover, a drop in commercial production and the loss of virtually all of Athens’ overseas possessions, not to mention the immense annual
5
It should be noted at the outset that the great majority of examples and evidence discussed in this chapter come from the 390’s and 380’s. Historical sources for the 370’s in Athens are notoriously scarce, while sources on dōrodokia in the 360’s are few and far between: Timagoras (367 BCE) was discussed in the Introduction; and our only other attested trial of dōrodokia, that of either Callistratus or Philon (361/0 BCE), receives only a passing reference in Hyperides and Lycurgus (Hyp. 4.1-2; Lyc. 1.93; cf. Dem 50.48). We simply do not have enough evidence for these two decades to make anything more than a tentative claim about how Athenians conceptualized bribery at this time. The limited extent to which we can discuss how the Second Athenian League (379/8-355 BCE) may have affected conceptions of bribery and politics is discussed below. 6 For general historical overviews to this time period, see Seager (1967), Funke (1980), David (1986), Strauss (1986), French (1991). On Athens’ economic conditions after the Peloponnesian War, see Andreyev (1974), Strauss (1986: 42-69), Ober (1985: 14-31), Burke (1990), French (1991). Politics in the post-war period: Cloché (1919, 1923), Sealey (1956), Bruce (1966), Seager (1967), Funke (1980: 1-26, 102-67), Krentz (1982), Strauss (1986: 11-41, 89-178). 7 Thuc. 7.27.3-4, Lys. 7.6, Aeschin. 2.147, 175. Andreyev (1974: 6-7, 18-25), Ober (1985: 113-14), Burke (1990: 3-4), French (1991: 24-7). Cf. Hanson (1983: 131-73). 8 Thuc. 6.91.7, 7.191.1, 7.27.5. Ober (1985: 14), Strauss (1986: 46), French (1991: 33).
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tribute paid by the allies, had taken its toll on the Athenian treasury.9 The result, as contemporary literary sources dramatically illustrate, was that Athenians were acutely aware that they did not have as much money as they used to.10 While having less money surely might incline an Athenian to focus more intently on financial recovery, it is less clear how economic losses would by themselves shift how he thought about dōrodokia, economic obligations, public office and the like. Such a broad cultural shift suggests that the important factor here was the social meaning of the monies lost: how they had been lost, who had lost them, what they had signified and what, by contrast, their absence now signaled. Only by grasping this social meaning can we make sense of the fact that, elsewhere in the Republic, Plato groups dōrodokia together with crimes like theft, burglary, temple robbery, and blackmail (Pl. Rep. 9.575bc), in other words, with outright stealing. Such crimes were financial (and sometimes violent) in nature, but for Plato they shared one additional feature: they were all also the crimes of a tyrant, a man of most evil character (cf. to\n ka/kiston, Pl. Rep. 576b3). The dōrodokos thus acquired distinct political significance, as well—he was a thief just like a tyrant—and tracing how this particular meaning came to be assigned to him requires that we examine not just Athens’ economic circumstances, but also her changed political and social environment in the early fourth century. Plato’s association of dōrodokia with tyrants was not by chance, for the image of a tyrant evoked the memory of oligarchs, specifically the oligarchic Thirty who had 9
Strauss (1986: 48-52), Burke (1990), French (1991: 31). To take but a single anecdote, in 399 BCE Athens had difficulty paying back a mere two talents to Boeotia (Lys. 30.22). Cf. Hell. Oxy. 17.4, Lys. 19.11, Ar. Pl. and Ec. passim. See Ober (1985: 17-19) and especially David (1984) on Aristophanes, Fuks (1972, 1977) on Isocrates and Plato, respectively. Although Athens was able to recover somewhat with the Second Athenian League in the 370’s and 360’s, this state of affairs continued at least through the end of the Social War in 355: in his Poroi, or Ways and Means (355 BCE), Xenophon remarks how contemporary politicians still blamed poverty for Athens’ imperialistic needs (Xen. Por. 1.1). 10
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briefly ruled Athens in 404/3 during the aftermath of the Peloponnesian War.11 This proSpartan junta initially oversaw the re-drafting of Athens’ laws, including a return to the ancestral laws (patrioi nomoi), which did not include Ephialtes’ contentious, if prodemocratic, reforms in the mid-fifth century.12 Yet their rule quickly turned violent and exclusionary: sykophants and other scoundrels (ponēroi) were executed, as were certain metics, and the franchise was limited to 3,000 citizens.13 The oligarchs later confiscated property and used the Council of 500 as a court to purge the city whether by exiling or killing their enemies.14 Civil war soon erupted between the exiled Athenians and those still in the city, led by the Thirty. After the exiles’ victory at Phyle, the Thirty were deposed, but a Spartan force defeated the exiled Athenians at the Piraeus, and the Spartan leader Pausanias effected a reconciliation between the opposing Athenian camps. When the democracy was reinstated, all citizens swore an oath of amnesty: with the exception
11
To be fair, the image of the tyrant was central to Athenian political ideology throughout the democracy, as detailed by Rosivach (1988), the essays in Morgan (2003), and Ober (2005: 212-48). I emphasize here two important points. First, Ober rightly argues that anxieties over the threat of tyrannical oligarchs were particularly pronounced towards the end of the fifth century; cf. Osborne (2003). Just after the restoration of the democracy in 410, for example, Demophantus passed an anti-tryanny decree which was sworn by all citizens and which explicitly rewarded to anyone killed in attempting to kill a tyrant the rewards given to the tyrant-slayers Harmodius and Aristogeiton (Andoc. 1.96-8). Likewise, Gallia (2004: 458 n.36) sees further parallels between the early tyrant-slayers and the murderers of Phrynichus, one of the oligarchic leaders in 411/0. Second, as will be argued in this chapter, the rule of the Thirty in particular marked a watershed moment in the history of Athenian political ideology. Beginning in 403, Athenian democratic ideology came to define the democracy in opposition not to tyranny more generally, but to the oligarchy of the Thirty, in particular. For reasons that will become apparent, it was in conjunction with this shift that the dōrodokos came to be associated with tyrant-like (greedy, harm-dealing) oligarchs. 12 Xen. Hell. 2.3.11-12, Diod. 14.3.7-14.4.2, AP 35.1-2. Note how Critias is referred to as a nomothetēs at Xen. Mem. 1.2.31. Rhodes (1981: 440-5 ad AP 35.2), Krentz (1982: 49-50), Ostwald (1986: 477-8). 13 Execution of sykophants: Xen. Hell. 2.3.13-14, Lys. 25.19, AP 35.3, Diod. 14.4.2; cf. Lys. 12.5. Metics: Xen. Hell. 2.3.21. Franchise: Xen. Hell. 2.3.18, AP 36.2. For discussion of the Thirty’s political measures, see especially Rhodes (1981: 415-55 ad AP 34-37), Krentz (1982), Ostwald (1986: 475-90). 14 Prosecutions to confiscate property are mentioned in Lys. 19.4, 27.1, 30.22. Further executions: Xen. Hell. 2.3.21, 2.4.21; Isoc. 7.67, 20.11; Aeschin. 3.235; AP 35.4, 37.2; Diod. 14.2.1, 14.4.4, 14.5.5; in the Apology Socrates recounts how he disobeyed an order from the Thirty to arrest Leon of Salamis (Pl. Ap. 32c4-e1). Ostensibly, the bulk of these measures could have been enacted at least under the auspices of purging the city of unjust men (cf. Lys. 12.5, Xen. Hell. 2.3.18, AP 36.2), but contemporary observers were not always favorable to the Thirty’s actions.
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of a few select magistrates, nobody could be punished thereafter for any crime committed during the Thirty’s reign and the ensuing civil war.15 The ‘amnesia’ sworn by the Athenians was a means of communally forgetting the horrors committed during the Thirty’s reign; and in other respects, too, the Athenians tried to forget or undo the period of oligarchy under the Thirty.16 But, as Plato’s Republic obliquely evinces, the oligarchs’ legacy lived on. Decades later speakers in court still brought up their opponents’ involvement in the events of 404/3 as important evidence that they thought should have continuing relevance.17 Members of the cavalry, which had actively cooperated with the Thirty, were resented.18 Likewise, the good or bad of someone’s actions was often measured against the Thirty’s example. So, in a prosecution speech at a dōrodokia trial, one speaker frames his opponent’s bribery in terms of the Thirty’s heinous actions.19 We might say that in the decades after the Peloponnesian War, political behavior was reconfigured in the shadow of the Thirty, as the oligarchs became an anti-type against which public officials were measured.20
15
The amnesty applied to all Athenians except the Thirty, their successors the Ten, the Ten supervisors of the Piraeus, and the Eleven; any of these latter would have been covered by the amnesty had they submitted their official accounts, but few likely did so (AP 39.6). Carawan (2002) says that the amnesty only applied to those who were atimoi at the time, but see the cogent reply by Joyce (2008) who reinstates the orthodox view that the amnesty was about general political forgiveness. See further Loraux (1997), Wolpert (2001), Ober (2005: 171-82). 16 Demosthenes records that all court decisions from the Thirty’s reign were deemed invalid (Dem. 24.56), and in 402/1 the properties confiscated by the Thirty were sold by the poletai if not to their original owners (many of whom had been excecuted), then often to their owners’ neighbors: SEG 16.120-1, 32.161; 38.149, 41.100=Athenian Agora XIX part 2; see also Walbank (1982) for text and discussion. Xen. Hell. 2.4.38 also notes the return of possessions to their owners after the peace. 17 See, for example, the accusations found passim in Lysias 16, 25, fr. 9 (Eryximachus); Lys. 31.12-14 condemns the Athenian Philon simply for not actively opposing the Thirty. 18 Cf. Lys. 16.8, 26.10. On the cavalry’s involvement in the Thirty’s reign, see Bugh (1988: 120-53), Krentz (1982: 116-17), and Németh (2006: 86-90). 19 Lys. 28.14, discussed in greater detail below; cf. Lys. 25.30. 20 Similarly, in 411/0 less than a decade earlier, the oligarchy of the Four Hundred had set a precedent for a number of the Thirty’s measures, including vitiating the power of the jury courts (Thuc. 8.67, AP 29.4) as well as exiling, imprisoning and executing citizens (Thuc. 8.70.2; cf. Andoc. 2.13). Again, though, the Thirty in particular became a powerful anti-type in democratic politics in the early fourth century, and it was the latter oligarchy, not the former, that was continually evoked in public discourse. For this reason I
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What was this anti-type exemplified by the Thirty? As Ryan Balot perceptively details, critics of the Thirty consistently condemned the oligarchs’ lawlessness and greed, in effect likening them to omnivorous tyrants.21 In the first place, the Thirty became sole masters of the polity, just like tyrants, and were later castigated for using political institutions in harmful, unjust, and undemocratic ways. They replaced the Council with 500 partisan members, and, in later limiting the franchise to 3,000, not only arrogated the dēmos’ authority to determine who should become a citizen, but effectively transformed the Assembly into a partisan body, as well. The effectiveness of the courts was vitiated: public accountability, granted under Ephialtes’ reforms, was removed, and the Thirty began executing citizens by circumventing the courts and holding trials in the Council of 500. After the franchise was limited, this circumvention became moot, for a law was passed allowing the oligarchs to execute without trial anybody who was not one of the 3,000.
Thus, although the Thirty began favorably by prosecuting sykophants,
embezzlers, and bribe-takers—reportedly much to the people’s delight—their impulse to use political organs to strengthen their position quickly devolved into a bloody perversion of democratic institutions.22 Plato is sure to point out that the lawlessness of the tyrant stemmed from his incessant, unyielding desire (erōs): in other words, precisely the same cause as his greed and dōrodokia (Pl. Rep. 9.574e2-575a5). Perhaps unsurprisingly, therefore, source after focus more on Athenian narratives of the dōrodokos ‘in the shadow of the Thirty’, not ‘in the shadow of oligarchy’. 21 Balot (2001: esp. 220-2) on the Thirty; the comparison to tyrants appears already in Xen. Hell. 2.3.16. Balot (2001: 234-48) provides a particularly compelling reading of Plato’s Republic within the context of contemporary Athenian conceptions of greed. I follow his analysis in juxtaposing the Thirty with Plato’s Republic, though ultimately I am more interested in Plato’s depiction of the dōrodokos (qua a greedy official). 22 Council: AP 35.1. Ephialtes’ reforms and the courts: AP 35.2. Jury courts: AP 35.2 with Bonner (1926: 213-15). Execution without trial: Xen. Hell. 2.3.14, 17, 21; AP 37.1. Favorable response from dēmos: AP 35.3; cf. Xen. Hell. 2.3.12, Lys. 12.5, 25.19.
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source posits that the Thirty committed these injustices in order to gain money and satisfy their greed. Lysias, for example, reasons that the Thirty may have done a number of things in the name of bettering the constitution, but in fact they simply wanted money, and he was not alone in his estimation.23 Yet an equally damning reason for these sources’ focus on money might stem from the use to which some of that money was put: namely, to pay the Spartan guard that the Thirty had hired to support and protect the oligarchy. Xenophon explicitly makes this connection, and it is tempting to follow him on this point.24 After all, the Spartan guard had reportedly been instrumental in arresting Athenians before their execution, disarming those who were not part of the 3,000, and compelling the 3,000 to condemn the Eleusinians so that the Thirty could seize their property.25
On this view, just as much as
injustice was a means to acquiring more money, money was a means to injustice—indeed a very symbol of that injustice. Whether in taking from the polis or in harming the polis for their own profit, the Thirty’s desire for money entailed engaging in negative reciprocity, providing bads for goods to the Athenian people. In pointing to the Thirty’s purported greed, therefore, contemporary sources called attention to just how problematic the oligarchs’ relationship to the rest of the city really was: they essentially only ‘took’ from the city, providing 23
Lys. 12.6-7; cf. Xen. Hell. 2.3.16, 21, 43. See further Balot (2001: 220-2) and Lys. 12.5, 12.6, 12.11, 12.83, 12.93, 25.18; Xen. Hell. 2.3.21-2, cf. 2.4.40-2; AP 35.4; Diod. 14.4.4-5, 5.5-7. On the greed and financial crimes of the Thirty, see also Dillery (1995: 139-63), Németh (2006: 159-66). 24 On the hiring of the Spartan guard under Callibius, see Xen. Hell. 2.3.13, Diod. 14.4.3-4; cf. AP 37.2. Xenophon reports that the guard had been hired out of the Thirty’s own pocket; yet, given the elite but by no means super-wealthy status of the Thirty—on which see now Németh (2006: 159-66)—it is unclear how exactly this cost would be paid for. Xen. Hell. 2.3.21 states that the oligarchs confiscated additional property and executed metics and former citizens alike explicitly in order to pay for the guard; Lys. 12.6 probably alludes to this same reason. 25 Ostwald (1986: 488-90) points out the potential difficulties in following Xenophon’s chronology here and in positing that the Spartan garrison was requested early in the Thirty’s rule; I nevertheless follow Xenophon because Lysias 12.6 seems to refer to the same sequence of events. Arrests: Xen. Hell. 2.3.14. Disarming: Xen. Hell. 2.3.20. Eleusinians: Xen. Hell. 2.4.9-10, Diod. 14.32.4.
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nothing or, at worst, only bads in return for the goods (monetary and otherwise) they had received. We will return to this point later, but for now it is worth mentioning that this focus on ‘taking’ effectively redefined the civic friendship between oligarch and community. Rather than having a relationship predicated on reciprocal exchange, as under the democracy, the rulers of the oligarchy only took, never gave, and often actively harmed. As ‘enemies’ of the city (e.g. e1xqra pro\j th\n po/lin, Lys. 12.2), they were perceived to be already outside the moral community of the polis, that is, outside of any reciprocal exchange relationship with that community.
The oligarchs’ problematic
relationship to money, therefore, was symptomatic of their problematic relationship to polity, as well. So the metic Lysias brings out the injustice of this ‘exchange’ relationship when he describes his own treatment at the hands of the Thirty. “We were not worthy of this treatment by the polis,” he laments, “but had produced all our dramatic choruses and paid numerous taxes” (Lys. 12.20). By weighing his own payment of liturgies and taxes against the actions of the oligarchs—extortion, property confiscation, theft, and the murder of Lysias’ brother (Lys. 12.8-19)—the orator underscores how he had given, while they only took or, worse, gave him but the death of his brother in return. Civic reciprocity was nowhere to be found. The context of Lysias’ description helps illuminate another, slightly different shade of meaning. The orator infers that the Thirty were rounding up metics at the time in order to pay for their own government (Lys. 12.6; cf. Xen. Hell. 2.3.21). As noted above, the property stolen by the oligarchs was thus symbolic of the power they were unjustly exercising for themselves. Lysias makes this point, too, in describing a bribe he
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gave the oligarch Peison (Lys. 12.8-11). Peison swears an oath that he would rescue Lysias from death were he to receive one talent of silver, which Lysias duly provides even though he suspects that Peison was untrustworthy. Not only does Peison break his oath, but he takes far more than just the promised talent.
His dōrodokia thereby
constitutes an act of greed, an unjust transgression in its own right and a symbol for the unjust power that Lysias’ money would be used to support. So the oligarchs profited from the city’s misfortunes, and their profiting caused the city added misfortune. As Balot outlines, the dominant image of greed at this time was of an aristocrat plundering the dēmos’ possessions—providing bads to the community—and it is in this light that we find the Thirty’s actions l