Bridging the Barrier

BRIDGING THE BARRIER

This page intentionally left blank

Bridging the Barrier Israeli Unilateral Disengagement

TAMI AMANDA JACOBY University of Manitoba, Canada

© Tami Amanda Jacoby 2007 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Tami Amanda Jacoby has asserted her right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the author of this work. Published by Ashgate Publishing Limited Gower House Croft Road Aldershot Hampshire GU11 3HR England

Ashgate Publishing Company Suite 420 101 Cherry Street Burlington, VT 05401-4405 USA

Ashgate website: http://www.ashgate.com British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Jacoby, Tami Amanda Bridging the barrier : Israeli unilateral disengagement 1. National security - Israel 2. Arab-Israeli conflict, 1993- 3. Israel - Foreign realations 4. Israel - Defenses I. Title 327.5'694 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Jacoby, Tami Amanda. Bridging the barrier : Israeli unilateral disengagement / by Tami Amanda Jacoby. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN: 978-0-7546-4969-4 1. Israeli West Bank Barrier. 2. Arab-Israeli conflict--1993- I. Title. DS119.76.J334 2007 956.9405'4--dc22 2006039323 ISBN: 978-0-7546-4969-4

Printed and bound in Great Britain by TJ International Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall.

Contents Preface

vii

Introduction Bridging the Barrier

1

Chapter 1

Evolution of Separation in Israel/Palestine

9

Chapter 2

The Separation Barrier: Structure, Routing and Challenges

25

Chapter 3

Israeli Perspectives

33

Chapter 4

Palestinian Perspectives

59

Chapter 5

Legal Challenges and the ICJ

81

Chapter 6

The Barrier in Jerusalem

89

Chapter 7

Lessons From Lebanon

111

Chapter 8

Concluding Remarks

137

Bibliography

147

Index

151

This page intentionally left blank

Preface Throughout my life, my mother had only one joke: “What did one wall say to the other wall?” The answer: “Meet you at the corner”! Perhaps not the most humorous of witticisms, but one I have always managed to remember and which, ironically crafts a meaningful starting point for contemplating Israel’s separation barrier. With all joking aside, consider the generally accepted definition of “corner”1 as a “place where two or more sides meet”. There are speaker’s corners, poet’s corners, boxing and wrestling corners, and so on. The term calls to mind a place to rest, a time-out between rounds, somewhere remote and calm, but where people congregate for leisure or to exchange ideas. Now consider the opposite and very different definition of the term “corner” that identifies “a difficult or awkward position” or having to “fight one’s corner”. When referenced as a verb, corner means to “force into a place or situation from which it is hard to escape” or to “control by dominating the supply of a particular commodity, as in a market”.2 Here the term implies the use of force, a complex situation, tension, competitiveness, and even domination. These incompatible definitions of “corner” are my point of departure for exploring the variety of human circumstances, which define that point where walls, fences, borders and other physical demarcations influence human life. What is the impact on the people who are situated in and around the corner? Is the corner a site of repose or are people being cornered? This brings us to the most difficult question of all: what if there is no corner? Central to the controversy around Israel’s separation barrier is the question of how the configuration and routing of the barrier affects people’s lives and livelihoods. For some, it provides security, for others misery. Do good fences really make good neighbors? Or does the very existence of a barrier preclude the possibility of being neighborly in the first place? What are the sites of friction along the barrier? What possibilities are there for harmonious flow-points3 and peaceful integration through the barrier? Is it possible to build bridges between communities that are physically separated by a barrier? How, if at all, can the barrier be reconciled to the different needs and aspirations of Israelis and Palestinians, two national communities that have been unable to peacefully coexist in territory they both envision as their own? Most importantly, how do Israelis and Palestinians view these questions and ponder 1 “Corner”, Compact Oxford English Dictionary, http://www.askoxford.com/concise_ oed/corner?view=uk. 2 “Corner”, Compact Oxford English Dictionary, http://www.askoxford.com/concise_ oed/corner?view=uk. 3 The term “flow-point” is taken from Ben-Ari, Maymon, Gazit and Shatzberg, 2005.

Bridging the Barrier

viii

possible solutions? Finally, is there some way that Israelis and Palestinians can live separately yet meet…somehow…at the corner? This project grew from a desire to understand the context in which IsraeliPalestinian relations have drastically deteriorated since September 2000. What was once a relatively optimistic context with negotiations proceeding apace throughout the 1990s and with progress being achieved slowly yet incrementally is now nothing short of deadlock. In fact, the escalation of conflict on two fronts, between Israel and Hamas (the Islamic Resistance Movement) and between Israel and the Hezbollah (Party of God) in Lebanon since July 2006 has pushed the Arab-Israeli conflict to the point of war, threatening to plunge the entire region, into an abyss. The situation today is nothing short of a tragedy for many peoples, both in the region and beyond. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the first in a series of mutually reinforcing concentric circles of conflict in the region, surrounded by the Arab-Israeli conflict in the middle, and the more amorphous struggle between radical Islam versus western democracies and the Judeo-Christian world at the widest edges. The entrenchment of the IsraeliPalestinian conflict within other, more complex conflicts, whether regional struggles or superpower rivalries, with an infinite number of actors, often obscures the real issues that need to be resolved. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is ultimately a struggle over land and rights to use it and call it home. Granted, the conflict has transmuted over years and generations into a range of other issues resulting from mounting casualties on both sides and the development of suspicions, hatreds, desires for revenge, and extremist attitudes towards the other. Israel and Palestine are pushed and prodded by an array of broader forces with their own political, religious, social and geopolitical agendas. Nevertheless, it is for Israelis and Palestinians to learn to coexist because it is them and their children, and their children’s children that will face the consequences of the actions taken by the leaders and peoples of today. Since 2002, the barrier has entered the scene as an additional complicating factor in Israeli-Palestinian relations. The barrier has no clear course or timetable for its completion. Perhaps it may never be complete. That is not the issue. What matters is that it has influenced and will continue to influence the course of events in the area and people’s perceptions of the viability of peaceful conflict resolution. Considering the myriad of political, legal and other challenges, the violent protests surrounding it and the rapid pace of political developments in the region, the barrier is something that cannot be disregarded in analyzing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Even when other more dramatic events top the political agenda, the barrier is still there, standing often times in limbo within a tumultuous environment. However, no matter which way you look at it, the fact is, as Isabel Kershner claims, apart from the settlements, the barrier is “the most politically significant and decisive ‘fact on the ground’ since 1967”.4 As such, whatever other events occur in the region, they do so against the background of struggles over the barrier, its motivations and effects and all the hopes and dreams that have been invested in or against it. The question is what role will Israel’s separation barrier serve either in bringing the sides closer together or pulling them further apart? This research was completed over the course of four years during which time I conducted fieldwork in Israel and the Palestinian territories on three separate 4

Kershner, 2005: 66.

Preface

ix

occasions. On each trip, which lasted between one and two months, I interviewed a variety of individuals: Israeli and Palestinian, civilian and military, academics and practitioners, lawyers, activists, both governmental and non-governmental, who in one way or another were actively promoting or resisting the barrier and its route. The research I undertook on these occasions was informed by many years of having lived in the region and studied Israeli-Palestinian politics. My personal vantage point is important to consider in this research project because I am both an “insider” and an “outsider” to the political context under investigation. Tamar Hermann, in her methodological discussion about researching violently divided societies, would refer to me as an “involved outsider”, an individual who is “personally connected to the conflict by virtue of belonging to one of the national, religious or ethnic groups involved in it”.5 Such positioning offers me a unique vantage point from which to understand the political context under investigation. However, it also involves challenges, to be discussed in the introductory chapter. My subject position in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be described as both participant and observer. I resided in Israel for seven years, beginning as a child at the age of 10. I then immigrated to the country on the basis of my right of return as a Jew born to a Jewish mother. I returned at 17 for undergraduate studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem during the first Palestinian Uprising against Israeli Occupation in 1987. I returned again to complete a Masters Degree at the Hebrew University in 1991 following the Gulf War, the Madrid Conference and during the initial years of the Oslo Peace Process. I was active in student politics and formed my views on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a result of direct observation and in some cases, participation in the unfolding events. I worked at the Israeli Ministry of Immigrant Absorption during the massive influx of Russian immigrants in the early 1990s and I married an Israeli citizen with whom I had my first child in Israel. These connections inform my political views, my identity, and fuel my ongoing passion for the region and its people. Over the years, I came to know many Israelis intimately as friends, colleagues, activists, students, and members of my extended family. I have been an ongoing and keen observer of their lives. These relations provide me much insight into the dynamics of Israeli society and the driving obsession with security. I also, although to a lesser extent, have come to know Palestinians involved in a variety of academic, political and human rights organizations that have informed me of what life is like under Occupation. I visit them regularly during my yearly visits to Israel and the Palestinian areas. Therefore, while I am an Israeli citizen and identify more with the Israeli side of the barrier, I also empathize with the Palestinians. I have shed tears for both. I think it is a human response. A dead child or an injured mother is equally tragic on either side of the barrier. I am equally disappointed by the failure on the part of both sides to attain their desired objectives. I loathe any attempt to radicalize the conflict or promote rejectionist agendas. I am still optimistic that the conflict can be solved. Where does this optimism come from? My years studying at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem were very hopeful times regarding the possibility of an historic reconciliation of the Israeli-Palestinian 5

Hermann, 2001: 79.

x

Bridging the Barrier

conflict. Mount Scopus, where the main university campus is located, is situated like an island within Arab East Jerusalem. Arab, Israeli and international students intermingled in classes and in the university dormitories, much more so than in the wider Arab and Israeli societies. We got to know each other well through student politics and social events in which we behaved as students do anywhere, regardless of the growing unrest around us. The Israeli peace movement and its Palestinian counterparts were vibrant participants in the political process back then. The international community was supportive and invested much efforts and funding into diplomatic negotiations, democratic governance, civil society projects and cross-cultural dialogue initiatives. I was honored to be witness to what I felt was a momentous period in Middle East history. The reality of the 1990s has, unfortunately, been replaced by one with much bleaker prospects. The moderate camps on both sides have lost their appeal and in many cases, their constituencies. Peace and human rights groups have reneged from once very ambitious agendas and some have even disappeared from the political map. Both Israelis and Palestinians are disappointed by the apparent disregard for the reciprocal commitments they signed in the Oslo Agreements. Both sides are quick to blame the other for promises broken. Indeed, it has become clear that the Palestinian Authority failed to eradicate terrorist activity and renounce its armed struggle against Israel. And Israel did not stop the Jewish settlement activity that increased economic hardship for Palestinians and hindered the development of a viable Palestinian state. The escalation of violence and failure of diplomatic solutions narrowed the range of options available to either side as radical and violent components took over the political agenda. To be sure, the Israeli-Palestinian relationship is a profoundly asymmetrical one. Although it does not absolve parties to the conflict of their responsibilities and commitments, it is nonetheless crucial to remember that Israel is a strong, democratic and established state while the Palestinian Authority is a weak and largely ungovernable non-state entity. This asymmetry is the background against which Israel decided to build the separation barrier unilaterally as well as the context in which Palestinians selected Hamas and the continuation of armed resistance as their political strategy. It is not my intention to judge the actions of Israelis or Palestinians in this book. My aim is to try, as much as is possible, to encompass and explore the widest range of Israeli and Palestinian views on the barrier in order to identify where, if at all, they can come together. I recognize, of course, my limitations as an Israeli citizen who by virtue of living while on fieldwork on the Israeli side, experiences the barrier from the perspective of Israeli society. However, as a Canadian academic who knows what it means to live in peace, far removed from the conflict zone and who is dedicated to the pursuit of scholarly knowledge, I searched beyond traditional partisan positions, with a view to seeking out potential points of conciliation. However, I do not claim to have achieved comprehensiveness and have come to the realization that there is always more to learn than there is to know about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This book is the result of many experiences and encounters I have had over the years that have fuelled my passion for the politics of Israel and the Palestinians. So many people accompanied me during this long journey that I welcome this

Preface

xi

opportunity to express my appreciation. I would like to thank first and foremost the Dean of Arts and the Department of Political Studies at the University of Manitoba, Canada, which through various funds and grants provided me the opportunity to conduct fieldwork in Israel and the Palestinian areas towards this project. I thank members of the Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Jim Fergusson, Paul Buteux, George Maclean, Lasha Tchantouridze and Pat Kruchak who have always been very supportive of my research interests. I am also indebted to the Taub Center for Israel Studies at New York University, which provided me a supportive environment during my sabbatical in the Fall of 2006, and the time in which I wrote the initial phases of this manuscript. Thank you to Ran Ukashi, my graduate research assistant, who helped verify select background data. Finally, I much appreciate the guidance of Kirstin Howgate from Ashgate Publishing in the development of this manuscript. I have special gratitude for the many individuals who interviewed for this project and took time out of their own lives to educate me about the barrier. In no particular order, I thank Colonel (res.) Dany Tirza, Head of the Seam Zone Administration, Sarit Michaeli from B’Tselem, Ziad Al-Hammouri of the Jerusalem Center for Social and Economic Rights, Jamal Jouma, from the Grassroots Campaign to Stop the Wall, Mark Luria of the now defunct Security Fence for Israel and currently involved in TAFNIT (“Turning the Corner” headed by former Israeli National Security Advisor, Uzi Dayan), Rachel Ashkenazi, Spokesperson for the Israeli Ministry of Defense, Justus Reid Weiner from the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Dana Alexander from the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI), Mohammad Dahleh, a Palestinian-Israeli lawyer and activist representing the villagers in the Case of Beit Surik, Rachel Greenspahn from B’Tselem, Gideon Meir representing the Media and Public Affairs Division of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ron Nachman, Mayor of Ariel, Shmulik David from Shatil, Shaul Arieli of the Council for Peace and Security, and Nina Gilbert from the Jerusalem Post. I am also thankful to people who met with me in the past for other projects, but whose knowledge and expertise played a crucial role in my ongoing education about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These include Galia Golan, Molly Malekar, Judy Blanc, Gila Svirsky, and Naomi Chazan. Finally, this book is dedicated to Gady, my “partner” in shining armour.

This page intentionally left blank

The Separation Barrier in the West Bank Reproduced with kind permission of B’Tselem, www.btselem.org

2

1

5

3 6 2 3

7 4 1. Surveillance cameras 2. Barbed wire 3. Fine sand 4. Paved road 5. A ditch 6-8ft (1.8-2.4m) 6. Fence (10ft/3m) 7. Dirt road

Composition of the Separation Barrier Reproduced with kind permission of the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Separation Barrier at Abu-Dis Photograph by Tami Amanda Jacoby

Introduction

Bridging the Barrier Whether a fence or a wall, the structure separating Israel from the West Bank has become the site of one of the most heated controversies the world over, the source of virulent propaganda, incitement and hatred, the subject of extensive coverage in international media networks and policy forums, a point of ongoing debate in the United Nations General Assembly, and one of the most notable cases referred to the International Court of Justice in the Hague. This structure has been both celebrated as a panacea for Israeli national security and condemned as an oppressive extension of Israeli occupation over Palestinian territories. Advocates refer to it as Israel’s anti-terrorist fence, a seam zone, a defensive measure, a passive structure that saves lives by separating Israel from the Palestinians and significantly reducing the number of suicide terrorist attacks against Israeli citizens. Palestinians refer in Arabic to “jidar al-fasl al-’unsuri” (racist segregation wall). Other critics call it an apartheid wall, a prison wall,1 a wall of shame, a form of collective punishment, a catastrophe that annexes territory to the State of Israel, separating Palestinians from each other, and confining them into cantons and enclaves to the detriment of their individual freedoms and prospects for national self-determination. A Note on Truth and Bias Which narrative is true? Truth in the Israeli-Palestinian context is a difficult, if perhaps impossible ideal to attain considering that the reality under consideration is fundamentally contested. What counts as fact to a Palestinian may be contradicted by what an Israeli believes to be true, and vice versa. Certainty on one side of the conflict is a product of what has been experienced over a lifetime and which forms fundamental belief systems passed down from generation to generation. Human experience in general can be best described as partial, complex, and in constant flux. For this reason, I suggest defining truth in the Israeli-Palestinian context not as fact but “simply as a telling of one’s story, a narrative that represents the choices and priorities of the particular individual or group under consideration. There are many ways to tell a story, many purposes for telling the story, and many ways to interpret the story of others.”2

1 “Prison wall” quoted from Michal Levertov, “Another Brick in the Wall: Israel’s ‘security fence’ is no solution to its problems”, Time Europe, http://www.time.com/time/ europe/me/printout/0,9869,473294,00.html. 2 Jacoby, 2006: 162.

Bridging the Barrier

2

Narrating stories of other human beings is a complex methodological issue. The narrator is poised between a participant and an observer in the events being examined. Some researchers deliberately make a political case for one position or another and thus become an active contributor to the political phenomena they are seeking to explore. Some even go further and become a part of their object of inquiry by participating in the events which unfold. But others who consider different sides of an issue are also involved in the research environment since they too come with preconceived notions that penetrate their research agenda and their actions, as Tamar Hermann describes, “Simply by being a member of the human race, researchers of a conflict become part of it”.3 These methodological dilemmas become all the more complicated in conflict zones such as Israel/Palestine because of heightened emotions, physical violence, and the rapid pace of change in the political process. Regardless of the methodology employed, it is imperative to consider how those being researched interpret for themselves the unfolding of events around them and how those perceptions change over time. In any case, awareness that the choices and directions taken by the researcher have concrete effects on the research project is crucial to locate and mitigate bias, an unconstructive component of social science research, particularly on societies plagued by war and violence.4 The accusation of bias in Middle Eastern studies is not uncommon. In studies of conflict zones and other disputed contexts, claims of partiality are even more widespread when researchers are seen to identify with one group over another. Although many researchers are themselves activists in a political context and thus openly side with one party to the conflict over another, this form of identification may cloud their judgments and alter the capacity to be critical of those they support. There is nothing inherently wrong with this type of research. Much feminist, socialist and postcolonial research grew out of political activism and continues to ally itself with social, political and cultural causes that support the liberation of women, workers and other oppressed groups, broadly defined.5 But feminism, socialism and any other such political causes belong to a category separate from research that considers the viewpoints of different sides to a conflict including those views for or against and with which the researcher does not necessarily agree. This type of balance is difficult to attain when the researcher is entrenched in researching an ongoing political campaign with all the emotions surrounding it. In this book, a consideration of bias is important. However, the term bias is by no means straightforward in its meaning and effect. In general, bias refers to the assumption of a particular viewpoint from which some aspects became salient and others disappear from view. One can make a valid argument based on only a certain set of assumptions and without taking into consideration a broader range of relevant factors. More specifically, bias connotes a prejudice that exposes predilection to one particular paradigm or viewpoint. Some researchers may construct and interpret their subject matter in ways that incline them towards erroneous conclusions 3 4 5

Hermann, 2001: 79. Direction taken from Bickerton and Klausner, 2005: 11. See Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Mohanty, 1991; Wolf, 1996.

Bridging the Barrier

3 6

which nonetheless coincide with their political commitments. Others produce biased research intentionally, in which case the product is more inclined towards propaganda, a specific type of message whose purpose is to influence and alter the opinions of a targeted audience. One is said to be biased if one is influenced by one’s biases. A bias could then lead to the acceptance or rejection of the truth of a claim, not on account of the strength of the claim itself, but because it does or does not correspond to one’s own preconceived ideas. Bias then depends on other concepts such as “truth” and “objectivity” whose place in the social sciences has been hotly debated. The only way to mitigate the effects of bias is to be aware that it exists, to continually question one’s own assumptions, and be open to information that conflicts with one’s own conclusions. This is a strategy I continuously take into consideration when building and substantiating arguments throughout the book. It is impossible to take into account all relevant information about a topic being researched, particularly one so contested as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Data concerning the political world is decidedly infinite and the parameters of any object of inquiry are malleable and subject to change. The problematic question of bias permeates any analysis of Israel’s separation barrier and is thus taken into consideration at all stages of this research project. Defining the Barrier According to the WordWeb Online, a barrier has three definitions: 1. a structure or object that impedes free movement 2. any condition that makes it difficult to progress or to achieve an objective 3. anything serving to maintain separation by obstructing vision or access.7 Undoubtedly, all three definitions provide negative connotations to the term. Barrier is perceived as either an impediment, a withdrawal, or some form of separation. Real life barriers map boundaries that include some people and exclude others. But is a barrier necessarily negative? Could a barrier promote free movement, make the achievement of an objective possible, or encourage new forms of unity? These questions may prompt alternative understandings of the fence/wall controversy in the Israeli-Palestinian context when considered from a variety of viewpoints and identities. More important than the barrier itself, is how people perceive of it. Does it affect them positively or negatively? Does it contribute to their goals or detract from them? The structure under investigation henceforth referred to as the “separation barrier”, has been constructed unilaterally by Israel since 2002 against the background of the dissolution of the Middle East Peace Process and the renewed violence of the second Intifada since September 2000. Whatever one’s view of the matter, the barrier being 6 Hammersley, M. and Gomm, R. (1997) “Bias in Social Research”, Sociological Research Online, vol. 2, no. 1,
4

Bridging the Barrier

erected between Israel and the Palestinians is critical, whether as a problem or a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Not only is the barrier a political issue that influences the course of Israeli-Palestinian relations, it strikes at the very core of “questions of identity and belonging”8 that make up the two national entities. The barrier issue is a major factor in both Israeli and Palestinian self-images and views of the other. It cuts to the very core of the yearning for a homeland, on the part of both national groups and the meanings instilled in this concept. The intensity of views on the barrier is equally strong regardless of whether it is seen as the ultimate problem of—or ultimate solution to—the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This book approaches the separation barrier controversy by analyzing the nature and evolution of “incongruent narratives” of Israelis and Palestinians,9 in terms of how they perceive the barrier influencing their lives, their national identities, their security and political aspirations. The process of politicization of the separation barrier is the starting point for any discussion of its nature and effects. How does an inanimate object take on such intense political meaning? In uncontested political contexts, a fence or a wall may be completely benign, unremarkable and even mundane, hardly ever noticed by anybody and with no meaning attached to it beyond the immediate and technical purpose for which it was built. Millions of such structures populate the world’s terrain, in urban and rural areas, residential and commercial, whose architecture is designed to serve an aesthetic or technical function. Fences between good neighbors, barbed wire in airport terminals, highway sound barriers, and even borders between countries configure public and private property and regulate space and noise in order to facilitate the routine and orderly movement of people, goods and services. In such a violently disputed space as Israel/Palestine, however, geography is decidedly political. The construction of a barrier in a conflict zone can be a highly loaded act that holds the prospects of power and resistance, in the present as well as the future tense, in relation to local matters as well as regards the scope of major geopolitical significance. Beyond the immediate entity, a barrier is a “meaning structure” that has political, economic, social, cultural, and even existential effects on the broader course of political events and the very nature of the peoples and communities entangled in its path. What meanings are attached to Israel’s separation barrier? How has it influenced Israeli and Palestinian narratives of their national identities and aspirations? How has the erection and routing of the barrier influenced the perceptions of Israelis and Palestinians of each other? And to what extent does the barrier contribute to—or detract from—a final solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? The answers to these important questions are radically different and even contradictory depending upon the political identity and affiliation of whom is asked. They form the basic motivation for this research agenda.

8 Kershner, 2005: 206. 9 Dr. Barry A. Feinstein and Justis Reid Weiner, “Israel’s Security Barrier: An International Comparative Analysis and Legal Evaluation”, George Washington International Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 2, 2005.

Bridging the Barrier

5

Surprisingly, very little sustained academic research has been conducted on the separation barrier and its underlying effects despite its centrality to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. Much of what has been written on the barrier to date is partisan and journalistic, styles that hold strong views of who is right and who is wrong, who is the oppressor and who is being oppressed. Sometimes the bias is analytically embedded as with Feinstein and Weiner’s 28-page introduction to Israel’s separation barrier using reference to other security barriers worldwide as a means to legitimize the Israeli case. Other separation barriers, they argue, serve to prevent terrorist infiltration and protect populations. Unlike the Israeli one, other barriers are electrified fences, manned by armed guards and attack dogs, surrounded by mine fields and plastered with signs warning that trespassers will be shot. In comparative context, they argue, Israel’s barrier is much less aggressive, imposing and immediately dangerous for those who dare to cross. Therefore, the logic is that despite it being the only barrier singled out by the United Nations and the International Court of Justice for recrimination, the Israeli security barrier is not unique and thus should not be given disproportionate attention.10 Very little has been written on the barrier in a purely academic mode, seeking to represent the complexity of the issue and taking into consideration both sides of the conflict as well as their internal differences of opinion. Neill Lochery in The View From the Fence, places the issue of the barrier in a broader historical and political setting and would thus most approximate a scholarly account. However, the barrier is discussed by Lochery in the first chapter only while the rest of the book gives the standard historical account of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with its accompanying issues and challenges. As a result, the specificities of the barrier are treated in limited format. A more comprehensive account of the barrier specifically is given by Isabel Kershner in her book Barrier: The Seam of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Kershner seeks to be objective throughout her book but the semantic direction in the book’s introductory passage gives away much of her political perspective. Kershner opens her discussion with a personal Palestinian testimonial of the barrier as an “immense, glowering wall”, thereby drawing the viewer to at least initially empathize with the Palestinian side of the barrier controversy.11 Throughout her book, Kershner makes references to a range of parties to the conflict, both Israeli and Palestinian. Nevertheless, the cover of her book (similarly to Lochery’s) depicts that portion of the barrier that takes the form of a concrete wall, the same small section that television reports have chosen to show footage of in order to sway the perceptions of the viewer. Showing the concrete portion of the barrier is a deliberate choice that holds a clear political predisposition. Although representing only about 4% of the overall barrier, this section has been used by anti-wall activists and international media to prove the imposing nature of the entire barrier, despite the fact that a solid wall represents a very limited portion of the barrier project. Instead, most of the barrier is built as a multi-layered composite, which does not lend as well to partisan media images. With Kershner and Lochery therefore, as exceptions in their consideration of different 10 Feinstein and Weiner, 2005. 11 Kershner, 2005: 1.

6

Bridging the Barrier

parties to the conflict and attempts to present a more balanced view, the literature on the barrier to date is either inadequate or simply an appendage to the growing sea of political, media, and policy propaganda surrounding the issue. Some references seek more explicitly to denounce Israel’s separation barrier by placing it in the same political context as the Berlin Wall or South Africa’s Apartheid Wall. Just as these walls were dismantled, the assumption is that history is not on Israel’s side and that Israel’s barrier will ultimately succumb to the same fate. Much of this literature can be found on the Internet where the brunt of the propaganda war is being waged. Consider titles like “Israel’s Apartheid Wall”,12 “Israel’s unholy wall”,13 “Israel’s Berlin Wall”,14 “Fighting Israel’s Wall”,15 Israel’s Bloody Wall”,16 and many others. On the proponent’s side of the barrier controversy, a variety of web columns are entitled “Saving Lives—Israel’s anti-terrorist fence”,17 “the Arafat Fence”,18 and “Israel’s Security Fence”.19 This book employs a methodology that takes into consideration the subjective views of individuals and groups based on a series of interviews of policy makers and political activists conducted by the author in Israel/Palestine. The second series of interviews were done during the heady months of June-August 2005 leading up to Israel’s disengagement from Gaza. As well, it draws from secondary literature such as newspaper and web-based articles, and information published in the form of pamphlets, brochures and opinion pieces by political movements and organizations active in the field. Much of this information is available on the Web since the campaign on either side of the barrier seeks to influence international public opinion. The focus of this research is on the barrier project between Israel and the West Bank, with emphasis on the areas surrounding Jerusalem and areas within Jerusalem’s municipal boundaries. The barrier surrounding the Gaza Strip and the dilemmas it entails are unique and would require separate analysis that exceeds the scope of this book. The analysis seeks to incorporate the points of view of different parties to the conflict in the context of a rapid profusion of political events in which emotions run high and much is at stake. As a result, no singular line of reasoning is adopted in 12 “Israel’s Apartheid Wall”, Stop the Wall, Colorado Campaign for Middle East Peace, http://www.ccmep.org/2003_articles/Palestine/050903_the_wall.htm. 13 “Israel’s unholy wall”, Palestine Media Center, December 3, 2003, http://www. palestine-pmc.com/details.asp?cat=4&id=622. 14 “Israel’s Berlin Wall”, NewsHour Extra, September 22, 2003, http://www.pbs.org/ newshour/extra/features/july-dec03/wall_9-22_printout.html. 15 “Fighting Israel’s Wall”, The Nation, July 13, 2004, http://www.thenation.com/ doc/20040719/petter. 16 “Israel’s Bloody Wall”, The Council for Advancement of Arab-British Understanding, August 23, 2003, http://www.caabu.org/press/articles/mostyn-wall.html. 17 “Saving Lives: Israel’s Anti-Terrorist Fence”, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 1, 2004, http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/mfaarchive/2000_2009/2003/11/saving%20lives%20israel-s%20anti-terrorist%20fence%20-%20answ. 18 “The Arafat Fence”, Michal Buch, Spokesperson, Embassy of Israel, New Delhi, The Hindu, January 28, 2004, http://www.hindu.com/2004/01/28/stories/2004012802461008.htm. 19 “Israel’s Security Fence”, Mideast Newswire, http://www.mideastnewswire.com/ archive/me_il_fence.html.

Bridging the Barrier

7

this book as to incline the reader towards a particular point of view. The fence/wall controversy is a dynamic topic since it is highly disputed, relatively new and at the time of writing, yet unfinished albeit subject to slight and even radical changes. Therefore, this analysis is a contemporary account, which considers past views and events to the extent that they have shaped the current political spectrum and aspirations for future achievements. Most academic literature on the Middle East in general and the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular has either explicit or implicit policy implications. This book is no exception. The luxury of naval gazing is not available when writing about a political context in which human beings are losing their lives due to the lack of resolution of the conflict. There is a number of policy directions followed in this book, which result from the different perspectives under investigation. Of course, there is no magical solution but a number of positive steps will be put forward that can potentially alleviate the stresses caused by the barrier, which will be explored in the concluding chapter. The book proceeds with eight chapters. The first chapter traces the historical evolution of the concept of separation from the onset of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict until the present time. The second chapter details the concrete constituents of the separation barrier in terms of its construction, design, routing, and challenges to it from the Israeli Supreme Court of Justice. Chapter 3 introduces Israeli policies and rationales for building the barrier, Israeli public opinion and debates about future borders and the “demographic struggle” for Jewish statehood in Israel. The fourth chapter examines Palestinian perspectives on the barrier with emphasis on the deleterious effects the barrier has had on Palestinian lives and communities and the resulting campaign to “stop the wall”, which has developed through global media and web-based networks, nongovernmental organizations and local protests. In Chapter 5, the case of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the barrier is considered along with the status of barrier construction according to international law. The sixth chapter examines the unique challenges posed by constructing a barrier in the holy city of Jerusalem. The seventh chapter considers the lessons learned from the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel in Lebanon in 2006 and accompanying debates about the viability of separating warring parties through a policy of unilateral withdrawal. The concluding chapter offers some bridging strategies and explores the relationship between the separation barrier and possibilities of returning to final status negotiations and ultimately reaching a comprehensive settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

This page intentionally left blank

Chapter 1

Evolution of Separation in Israel/Palestine Israel’s separation barrier has its roots in the evolution of over a century of IsraeliPalestinian strife. As such, the historical background against which ideas about separation took place is crucial to consider in some detail. Lochery suggests that “the creation of a Security Fence in many ways turns the clock back to 1947 and the findings of the United Nations Special Commission on Palestine (UNSCOP)”, which called for a separation of Palestine into two states, one Jewish, the other Palestinian. It is important to remember that throughout history, separation was not the only option considered as a solution to the struggles between Jews and Arabs in historic Palestine. The idea of separation between Israelis and Palestinians followed a circuitous route, alternating since the beginnings of the conflict with other possible solutions such as a unified state, a binational state, a federation with neighboring Jordan and other views expressed through the channels of diplomacy and public debate. However, with diplomatic, political and other peaceful avenues seemingly exhausted, the notion of physically separating the two national entities has persistently returned to top the political agenda, particularly with the evolution of Israeli unilateral thinking on security in the absence of a Palestinian partner for peace negotiations. Therefore, the idea of separation, although old in its conception, has only recently achieved tangible form. Separation was a non-issue during the first period of Jewish immigration (Aliyah) to pre-state Palestine in the early 1880s, when initial contacts between Jews and Arabs in the region were conducted for the most part without incident. Jews and Arabs in pre-State Palestine developed relations that were not characterized by the polarized communal gulf upon which the IsraeliPalestinian conflict is known today. Early Jewish settlements in Palestine employed Arab labor and thus drew many Arabs from neighboring areas in search of work and prosperity. Jews and Arabs were in daily contact as the Jewish settlements “relied on neighboring villages for food and manure, for seasonal laborers and guards, and for the transporting and marketing of their produce”.1 In the absence of a threat, the earliest Jewish settlements did not coordinate their own defense units as there was no need for organized protection. Writings on the period of the first Aliyah suggest that Jewish-Arab relations were relatively peaceful and that both sides did not anticipate problems. The Bilu, for example, whose name originated from a verse in the Book of Isaiah2 “Beit Ya’akov 1 2

Morris, 2001: 46. Book of Isaiah, 2: 5.

Bridging the Barrier

10

Lekhu Ve-nelkha” (“House of Jacob, let us go [up]”), was a group of Jewish idealists who sought to establish a national home for the Jews in the Land of Israel. The manifesto of the Bilu “vaguely suggested that the Jewish settlers might ‘help our brother Ishmael [i.e., the Arabs] in his time of need’”.3 In 1906, David Ben-Gurion wrote of his first encounter with Arabs on the way to Jaffa, that “they made a very good impression”.4 Some of the pre-State Zionist thinkers such as Asher Ginsberg (also known by the pen name Ahad Ha’am) sought to promote good will among Jews and Arabs. Benny Morris, the prominent Israeli historian claims that initially the Jewish settlers sought to attain mutual respect with their Arab neighbors in a situation that was not conducive to this and that “violence was sometimes triggered by accident or misadventure”.5 Chaim Weizmann, President of the World Zionist Organization and first President of the State of Israel is remembered to have been “patient and prudent” in his relations with the local Arabs, prepared as he was to accept Arabs as partners in running Palestine through an elected council based on parity between the two communities. However, Weizmann preferred to conduct negotiations on the future of the territory with the British, thereby crystallizing a developing sentiment in the Jewish Zionist movement as dismissive of the local Arabs in matters of policy.6 Separation entered the political lexicon in pre-state Palestine with the development of Zionism, Jewish nationalism, and its accompanying ideologies and practices. When the immigrants of the Second Aliyah (1904 and 1914) arrived, they introduced the goals of Hebrew labor and self-defense, influenced as they were by socialist and communist ideals brought with them from Russia and incorporating the militant underpinnings of such groups as Hashomer and later the Irgun. Many Russian immigrants had engaged in improvised resistance to pogroms (massive acts of violence against Jews and Jewish property in Russia) in their former villages and brought combative characteristics with them to Palestine. “Convinced that force would be met only with force”,7 Hashomer members took over a range of guard duties in many Jewish settlements, including recovering stolen property, conducting raids and ambushes, escorting people from place to place and even conquering lands, all actions that exacerbated relations with neighboring Arab villages. The replacement of Arab with Jewish labor was one of the earliest and most fundamental sources of friction between the two communities as many local Arabs lost their primary source of income from working in the Jewish villages. Local Arabs tended to perceive the Jewish immigrants of the Second Aliyah as “turbulent and aggressive” and were insulted by the attitudes on the part of settlers that intimated feelings of superiority towards them.8 Therefore, the Arab fear of dispossession was initially personal. But it grew to a broader scale when Arabs encountered an increasingly organized and exclusive Jewish nationalist movement. Jewish 3 4 5 6 7 8

Morris, 2001: 18. Ben-Gurion quoted in Morris, 2001: 44. Morris, 2001: 47. Shlaim, 2001: 9. van Creveld, 2002: 13. Morris, 2001: 47.

Evolution of Separation in Israel/Palestine

11

redefinition in Palestine was constituted by a cultural effort that focused almost entirely inward and did not take into consideration the established rules and the customs of the local population. In fact, the famous slogan of the Zionist movement “A Land without People for a People without a Land” ignored the deep roots of Palestinian Arabs politically, culturally, socially and economically.9 The new Jewish settlers were focused on a project of self-emancipation. Jews in Palestine sought to overcome the precariousness and vulnerable state of centuries of Jewish life in Europe. Appreciation for the claims of the local Arabs and the political ramifications of the absorptive capacity of the land were secondary considerations if at all in relation to the Zionist ideal of the “new Jew”. For their part, local Arabs perceived the new immigrants as “actual or potential agents of hostile penetration and expansion”.10 The increasing campaign to purchase land for Jewish farming and settlement was the ultimate source of conflict however, as it caused the personal displacement of— and bitter acrimony—among the local fellaheen (Arab agricultural workers) who felt increasingly dislocated and distanced from their traditional livelihoods. Early roots of tensions were local in nature, over this or that plot of land, or this or that water source, and consumption of the accompanying resources. However, increasingly, clashes between the two communities broadened to a nationalist scale and enflamed sentiments on both sides to distinguish themselves as two separate national entities. At the close of World War I, Great Britain undertook a crucial role in shaping Jewish-Arab relations in Palestine. Under the Mandate system granted by the League of Nations, the British (as well as the French) were permitted to pursue their colonialist ambitions in the Middle East and thus they became another actor on the scene with not altogether altruistic motives towards the region. Under the British Mandate of Palestine (1922-1948), both Jews and Arabs sought to substantiate their claims and increase their status by competing for favor with the British authorities. This resulted in a series of secret agreements,11 which were designed primarily to strengthen British power in the region by securing local support. However, the agreements had the effects of intensifying local tensions on account of the granting of contradictory rights and assurances to either of the parties. The Balfour Declaration, for example, was the most significant document for the Jewish claim to independent status as a national entity, as separate from the Arabs of pre-state Palestine. Chaim Weizmann, a prominent figure in the Zionist leadership, was dedicated to high-level diplomatic activity along with grassroots activities, and thus promoted an “alliance between the Zionist movement and Great Britain”12 to procure support from the British for the establishment of a Jewish state. After much diplomatic wrangling and strenuous effort, this support was given on November 2, 1917 in the form of a letter from Foreign Secretary Arthur J. Balfour 9 Nakhleh, 1991: 33-34. 10 Morris, 2001: 39. 11 The British entered into three separate agreements, which made contradictory promises to Jews and Arabs in relation to their claims to national self-determination in Palestine: The Hussein-McMahon Correspondences of 1915-1916, the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, and The Balfour Declaration of 1917. 12 Shlaim, 2001: 5.

12

Bridging the Barrier

to Lord Rothschild, a prominent Zionist philanthropist, which stated “His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish People”.13 Weizman expected that the Arabs of Palestine would remain passive in the face of Jewish state building because they did not, in his view, constitute a separate political community with nationalist aspirations of its own. This view was proven wrong as the Balfour Declaration prompted a serious deterioration of Jewish-Arab relations and the emergence of a Palestinian national movement under the leadership of Hajj Amin al-Husseini, the grand Mufti of Jerusalem.14 AlHusseini, a Palestinian Arab nationalist and religious leader, openly denounced the Balfour Declaration as a bitter betrayal of the Arabs by the British Mandate. As against the Balfour Declaration, the Arabs of Palestine extracted their own promise from the British in 1922 in the form of Churchill’s White Paper, which built upon British support for an Arab state given earlier in correspondences between Sharif Hussein of Mecca and Sir Henry McMahon, his Majesty’s High Commissioner at Cairo (the Hussein-McMahon correspondences), between 1915-1916. The Arabs of Palestine sought to restrict Jewish immigration to, and stop Jewish land purchases in, Palestine. They wanted the British to ensure that the Jewish population of Palestine would not continue to grow. In both cases, Jews and Arabs sought to establish their homeland on the same plot of territory. Ideas about dividing that land between two states had not yet been voiced. Attitudes towards the British led to divisions within the Zionist movement that later formed distinct ideological camps. While the mainstream Zionist movement’s main response to the setback of the White Paper was to remain conciliatory towards the British and continue to “build the Jewish national home step by step, immigrant by immigrant, settlement by settlement”,15 other more militant voices grew in the Zionist camp. Chief among those representing the more militant wing of Zionism was Ze’ev Jabotinsky, founder of revisionist Zionism, a precursor to the Israeli rightwing. Jabotinsky was the most vocal opponent of any partition of the biblical Land of Israel. According to scripture, the Land of Israel was land promised to the Jews (the Promised Land) by God to Abraham and his descendents in perpetuity.16 This biblical claim became the root for declarations of Jewish entitlement to political sovereignty over the whole of the original borders of the Palestine mandate. Jabotinsky recognized that the Arabs of Palestine saw themselves as a distinct national entity which would not give in to a Jewish majority in Palestine. He envisioned “the protection of a force independent of the local population—an iron wall which the native population cannot break through”. These thoughts were published in two significant articles in 1923 under the heading “The Iron Wall (We and the Arabs)”. In an article published in Ha’aretz newspaper in 1923, Jabotinsky articulated his policy towards the Palestinian people:

13 For full text of the Balfour Declaration, see http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1917/ balfour.html. 14 Shlaim, 2001: 10. 15 Shlaim, 2001: 10. 16 Genesis, 15: 18-21.

Evolution of Separation in Israel/Palestine

13

Zionist colonisation must either stop, or else proceed regardless of the native population. Which means that it can proceed and develop only under the protection of a power that is independent of the native population, behind an iron wall, which the native population cannot breach. That is our Arab policy; not what we should be, but what it actually is, whether we admit it or not.17

Jabotinsky’s concept of the iron wall portrayed one of the earliest concepts of separation between Israel and the Palestinians. The iron wall ideology has ebbed and flowed in Israeli political discourse until the present day depending upon perceived possibilities for resolution of the conflict either through peaceful negotiations or armed struggle. The first official declaration of partition as a possible solution to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict came at the height of the Arab revolt between 1936 and 1939, which demonstrated the utter deterioration of Jewish-Arab relations during the British Mandatory period. The revolt conveyed Arab grievances towards British tacit consent of restricted Jewish immigration and land purchases in Palestine, which the Arabs believed would seal their fate as a future minority in Palestine. A Royal Commission of Inquiry, headed by Lord Robert Peel was dispatched from London to Palestine to hear testimonies from all sides about the roots of the conflict. In July 1937, the Peel Commission released its unprecedented recommendation to abolish the British Mandate and partition the country between two peoples. The significance of the Peel Commission’s plan was its claim that Arab and Jewish aspirations were irreconcilable, that neither nation should rule the other, and that the two peoples could not live together but only separately.18 The Peel Commission recommended that a small Jewish state of roughly 5,000 square kilometers be granted on a coastal strip (from Mount Carmel to Be’er Tuvia), the Jezreel Valley and the Galilee, while a larger Arab state be allotted the hill regions, along with Judea and Samaria and the Negev, and an enclave be established from Jerusalem to Jaffa under international supervision. The idea of separation did not receive unanimous consent in either of the two communities. The core concerns of the Zionists were the small size and doubtful viability of the Jewish state in the territory allocated to them. At the time, many in the Zionist camp did not acknowledge the Arabs of Palestine as a separate national entity due to the profusion of Arab states in the region, and were reluctant to accept responsibility for establishing a nation for them alongside a Jewish state.19 Divisions within the Zionist camp were voiced at the Twentieth Zionist Congress in Zurich in August 1937, the first major public debate on partition, which resolved to negotiate a more favorable partition of Palestine with the British. The leaders of the pro-partition camp, including Chaim Weizmann, David Ben-Gurion and Moshe 17 “Vladimir (Ze’ev) Jabotinsky, 1923, The Iron Wall”, Mideast Web. http://www. mideastweb.org/ironwall.htm. 18 For two separate sources on the Peel Commission, see Palestine Facts, http:// www.palestinefacts.org/pf_mandate_peel.php and Jewish Virtual Library, http://www. jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/peel1.html. 19 This sentiment was summarized later on by the famous statement of Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir (1969-1974) that “there is no such thing as Palestinians”.

Bridging the Barrier

14

Sharett argued that an independent Jewish state even in a small part of Palestine would be better than any of the alternatives. Those in favor of accepting a Jewish state on any size of land, however small were referred to as “minimalists”, while those in favor of a full implementation of international promises and an independent state on territory of a larger magnitude were known as “maximalists”. The main difference between Ben-Gurion and the Revisionists was that the former favored a gradualist strategy of territorial expansion, while the latter promoted an all-ornothing approach.20 A clear majority among the Arabs rejected the partition plan outright along with any compromises, which would have involved legitimizing Zionist aspirations in Palestine. Arabs feared that because a Palestinian state would lose access to the most fertile agricultural lands and the Jewish state would include a sizable Arab minority, approximately 45% of the total population,21 the portioning of territory and peoples in the Peel plan was to be accomplished simultaneously with a population transfer that would have entailed a large-scale dispossession of Arabs.22 Many Arabs feared this fate, which would involve dispossession from lands that many held for generations. Another consideration for the Arab population of Palestine was the political objective of a United Arab state encompassing all Arab peoples including Palestine. Claims to Palestine were made on behalf of patron Arab leaders often without the input of Palestinians themselves. Original challenges to the Ottoman Empire as well as the British Mandate were based on the claim that Palestine was part of a Greater Syria, an area of the Fertile Crescent encompassing the modern states of Syria, Israel, Lebanon, Jordan and the West Bank and Gaza Strip. At the General Syrian Congress in Damascus in March 1920, King Faisal of Syria proclaimed that the independence of Syria included Palestine within its natural boundaries. However, the French and British rejected this proposal and removed Faisal from power in July 1920. The British received the Mandate for Palestine at the San Remo Conference of 1920.23 The Arabs of Palestine took some time to unify their fledgling nationalist movement. The main reason for disunity was clan rivalry in Palestinian society and a political system divided between the two most prominent Arab families, the Husseins and the Nashashibis and their respective constituencies, which consisted of allied clans. In 1936, Hajj Amin al-Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem and head of the Higher Muslim Council took over leadership of the newly established Arab High Committee. This executive body represented all rival Arab groups in Palestine and formed the core of a Palestinian nationalist movement. The Arab High Committee replaced preceding calls to unify Palestine with Syria with the explicit aim of establishing an independent Palestinian state. This idea was met with growing acceptance by widespread constituencies in the Arab world, at least officially. However, the Palestinian camp promoted a rigid ideology and came to be characterized by the “all or nothing” attitude of Hajj Amin al-Husseini himself. 20 21 22 23

Shlaim, 2001: 21. Rubenberg, 2003: 6. http://www.passia.org/publications/bookmaps/page1.htm. http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Parliament/2587/syria.html.

Evolution of Separation in Israel/Palestine

15

This tactic did not bode well with the diplomatic style of the British who wished to negotiate and develop compromise positions between the rival communities. As well, Palestinians did not break their dependence on the Arab League and were continuously weakened by encroaching annexationist ambitions of King Abdullah of Transjordan and general powerlessness in the face of the Zionist movement and the British Mandate.24 The major debate at this time was whether or not the parties to the conflict constituted independent national entities in the first place and whether or not they should be separated. In all the recommendations of the Peel Commission, and despite clear reference to geographical boundaries and territorial divisions, there was no mention of what type of body or structure, if any, would be positioned between the two incipient states. For example, in subsequent armistice agreements between Israel and Egypt or between Israel and Syria in 1949, the states were separated by demilitarized zones patrolled by peacekeeping forces and barbed wire fences. By contrast, the Peel Plan did not encompass a tangible architecture of partition and ultimately was abandoned. The next significant step towards separation came with relegation of the problem of pre-state Palestine to the United Nations. Mounting tensions between Jews and Arabs had the effect of embroiling the British in the violence. Jewish armed clandestine groups, particularly the Etzel (National Military Organization) and the Lehi (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel) clashed with the British Authorities over their refusal to allow entry of European Jewish refugees into Palestine. The apex of their campaign was the Irgun attack of the British government of Palestine at the King David Hotel in Jerusalem on July 22, 1946. The King David bombing resulted in 91 casualties, 28 of which were British nationals. The British response to rising aggression directed against them was to declare the Mandate in Palestine “unworkable”. Great Britain ultimately affirmed its intention to evacuate and absolve itself of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Palestinian question was thus placed on the shoulders of the newly established United Nations. In 1947, the UN assembled the UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), consisting of 11 nations to investigate the source of disturbances in mandatory Palestine. Again, the Committee acknowledged the contradictory nationalist aspirations of Jews and Arabs in Palestine. On November 29, 1947, the UN General Assembly adopted partition by majority vote although 3 of the 11 nations (India, Iran and Yugoslavia) recommended a unitary state with Arab and Jewish provinces. Drawn up according to demographic considerations, either of the two recommended states would have resulted in a population of the other national community within its borders. This intermingling of national communities was considered to be potentially problematic for both. This was a greater concern for the Jewish state since it would comprise roughly 538,000 Jews as well as 397,000 Arabs while the Arab state would have a population of 804,000 Arabs and only 10,000 Jews. In the end, a political resolution to the partition of Palestine was precluded by the onset of military confrontation and the first Arab-Israeli War in 1948, which resulted in the establishment of the State of Israel, the displacement of approximately 24 United Nations: VII. Mandated Palestine: The Partition Plans. http://www. palestineremembered.com/Acre/United-Nations,’The Palestine-Problem/Story719.html.

16

Bridging the Barrier

700,000 Palestinians and the onset of the Palestinian refugee problem.25 This result set the stage for four decades of Arab-Israeli Wars and Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israel’s dramatic military victory in the 1967 Six Day War reset the boundaries within which the development of Israeli-Palestinian relations and discussions of partition would be conducted from then on. With Israeli Occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (along with East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights and the Sinai), Israeli public opinion was divided over what to do with the territories as the conquered land was populated by over a million Palestinians. International public opinion on the matter made itself known through United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 adopted unanimously on November 22, 1967. UN Resolution 242 called for: Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict and the termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.26

Despite its terminological ambiguity, 242 is the UN document most widely referred to in the context of promoting a diplomatic two-state solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israeli views of separation were fashioned by Israeli control over the West Bank and Gaza. Then-Defense Minister Moshe Dayan proposed the opening of borders between Israel and the territories. However, “the idea, which carried the day, ran contrary to the opposition led by then Finance Minister Pinchas Sapir, who wanted separation”.27 Any chance to return territories in exchange for peace was overshadowed by calls to populate what was regarded as “liberated” territory that substantially widened the territorial integrity of the State of Israel. The choice of not returning territory was strengthened by the Arab response to 1967 articulated at the Arab Summit meeting at Khartoum in August-September 1967. The Khartoum platform promoted continued struggle against Israel as represented by the famous three “nos”, namely “no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it, and insistence on the rights of the Palestinian people in their own country”.28 Both Israeli and Arab responses after 1967 left little room for negotiation and compromise.

25 There has been dispute about the actual number of Palestinians displaced in the 1948 War as well as the actual number of the refugee population today, and the circumstances under which they left their homes, whether voluntary or involuntary. 26 United Nations, Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967. http:// domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/d744b47860e5c97e85256c40005d01d6/7d35e1f729df491c8 5256ee700686136!OpenDocument. 27 Gil Sedan, November 12, 1999, “West Bank barrier has opponents on both sides of the fence”, Jewish Telegraphic Agency. http://www.jewishsf.com/bk991112/iwestbank.shtml. 28 “The Arab League Summit Conference Resolutions, Khartoum, Sudan, 1 September, 1967”, Yehuda Lukacs, The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: a documentary record 1967-1990, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992: 454.

Evolution of Separation in Israel/Palestine

17

Partition became the cornerstone of the Israeli Labor Party’s platform with the election of Golda Meir as Prime Minister and her adoption of the two principles of “no return to the prewar borders” and “no withdrawal without direct negotiations”.29 Israeli public opinion grew polarized with the emergence of two extra-parliamentary political movements: the peace movement and the Greater Israel movement. The agenda of the peace movement in Israel built upon UN Resolution 242’s formula of exchanging land for peace and promoted an historical conciliation with the Palestinian people. While groups such as the Land of Israel movement and Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful) grew within the newly established stream of religious Zionism, which promoted Jewish settlement of the land, an imperative many believed was promised to Jews in the original covenant between God and Abraham from biblical times. The Palestinians had no voice in the drafting of UN Resolution 242 and became an occupied people during the twenty years of Israeli Occupation over the West Bank and Gaza Strip, from the 1967 War until 1987. However, Arab defeat in the 1967 War caused a transition of power in the Arab world that paved the way for the emergence of the Palestinians as an independent factor in the Arab-Israeli Conflict. The 1967 War destroyed the credibility of those Arab leaders who claimed patronage over the Palestinian cause, particularly Egypt’s President Gamal Abdel Nasser who formed the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1968, as a force within the broader ideology of pan-Arabism. The Palestinian National Covenant, established in 1968 resolved that “armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine”. However, the Arab states were in no position to fight Israel after 1967.30 As against panArabism, a movement promoting the liberation of Palestine by Palestinians grew out of elements of a Palestinian Diaspora representing younger professionals working for the most part in the Gulf region. The younger and more militant Yasser Arafat and his Fatah Party gained control of the executive bodies of the PLO and Arafat was appointed PLO chairman at the Palestinian National Congress on February 3, 1969. Initially, Arafat and his Fatah Party called for the destruction of the State of Israel and advocated guerrilla warfare to achieve this goal. The Palestinian nationalist movement assumed stronger and more militant characteristics as time went on. The refugee camps housing Palestinians in neighboring Arab countries became breeding grounds for recruitment to Palestinian guerrilla organizations. Fatah’s commanders set up a state-within-a state in Jordan. The border between Israel and Jordan became a focal point for Israeli-Palestinian tensions. Palestinian fighters conducted countless cross-border raids into Israeli territory. Mostly the raids were crushed by Israeli forces. However, the battle at Karameh, a border town in Jordan spanning the Jordan River, in March 1968 provided the opportunity for the PLO to prove itself as a force to be reckoned with on the world stage. The Israeli Defense Forces were “stung into retaliatory action by Palestinian

29 Shlaim, 2001: 285. 30 “The Palestinian National Covenant, 1968”, Yehuda Lukacs, The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: a documentary record 1967-1990, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992: 291.

Bridging the Barrier

18 31

raids and bombings”. Israel sustained many casualties including the loss of six jet fighters and twelve armored tanks. For Palestinians, Karameh became the site of bloody confrontation between the stronger and more technologically advanced Israeli military against the weaker Palestinian fighters. The Palestinians mounted much stronger resistance than was anticipated forcing the Israeli army to retreat earlier than planned. Karameh became a rallying symbol causing thousands of young Palestinians to join the nationalist movement. The mounting challenge of the Palestinians in Jordan to the Hashemite monarchy caused a bloody civil war in 1970 that Palestinians refer to as Black September and after which the guerrilla fighters were expelled to Lebanon. The PLO went on to recruit fighters from Lebanese refugee camps and continued to organize raids into Northern Israel. By the time Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, the country had become a center for international terrorism, having drawn guerrilla movements from all over the world. At the end of the fighting however, Palestinian fighters were compelled to leave under escort by the Americans to a number of different Middle Eastern countries, while the Fatah leadership found itself marginalized and forced to operate from Tunisia, far from its center of actions. The official policy of the PLO towards Israel at this time was to establish a secular democratic binational state in historic Palestine in which equal rights and status would be available to all citizens, as a precursor to the liberation of the entire territory. This, of course, would preclude the existence of a Jewish state in the region and was thus rebuffed by Israel. After the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the PLO gained further esteem at the Arab Summit in Rabat in October 1974, which recognized the PLO as the “sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in any Palestinian territory that is liberated”.32 The United Nations followed suit with Resolution 3236 Concerning the Question of Palestine, which granted the PLO observer status and recognized the Palestinian right to “national independence and sovereignty”.33 Yasser Arafat was invited to give a speech to the UN General Assembly on November 13, 1974.34 While the PLO gained in status, Israel was undergoing major political changes. In 1977, the Labor Party was ousted in national elections and replaced by the right-wing Likud, which remained in office until 1992. The Likud Party under the leadership of Menachem Begin promoted a hardline approach towards the Palestinians. As a major disciple of Ze’ev Jabotinsky, Begin was a strong believer in the Iron Wall theory. The issue of partition, which would eventually be coupled with the idea of a two-state solution—the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel—was raised sporadically during the 1970s negotiations between Egypt and Israel. Although the Camp David Accords of 1978 concluded with an 31 Goldschmidt, 2002: 324. 32 “Arab League Summit Conference Communiqué, Rabat, Morocco, 29 October, 1974”, Yehuda Lukacs, The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: a documentary record 1967-1990, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992: 464. 33 “UN General Assembly Resolution 3236 Concerning the Question of Palestine, 22 November, 1974”, Yehuda Lukacs, The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: a documentary record 1967-1990, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992: 15. 34 “Speech by Yasser Arafat to the UN General Assembly, 13 November, 1974”, Yehuda Lukacs, The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: a documentary record 1967-1990, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992: 317.

Evolution of Separation in Israel/Palestine

19

Egyptian-Israel peace treaty, the article on Palestinian statehood fell by the wayside. The PLO continued to mount terrorist attacks against Israelis on the world stage but eventually lost steam on account of the lack of progress on the return of territories captured by Israel in 1967 and the habitualization of life under Occupation. During the years of Likud Party rule, neither Israel nor the Palestinians would accept the other as a legitimate negotiating partner. While Palestinians struggled and the PLO maintained its policy of non-recognition of the State of Israel, the Israeli government in turn sustained its military occupation, continued Jewish settlement activity in the West Bank and Gaza, and refused to recognize the PLO. These hardline attitudes precluded any movement towards negotiation at the time. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, despite intense pressure from the United States, opposed entering into negotiations with the Palestinians. It was only with the 1987 Palestinian Uprising (Intifada) that the world and the Israeli public first took notice of the plight of the Palestinians under occupation. The widespread belief underpinning Israeli public opinion that the occupation was benign and that the Palestinians were satisfied with their lot was shattered by televised images of the brutal confrontations between the Israeli military and Palestinian men, women and children who protested with rock throwing, tire burning and demonstrations. Israeli attitudes towards the occupation changed fundamentally. At the height of the Intifada, the Labor Party set forth ideas of a fence as a constructive feature in the separation process between Israelis and Palestinians.35 The Intifada eventually lost steam and was overshadowed in 1990 by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and subsequent Gulf War of 1991. That the Palestinians took sides with then Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein against the American-led coalition damaged their image in world opinion. It was only with the opening of official talks between Israel and the Palestinians at the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991, which proceeded along bilateral and multilateral tracks, that the parties to the conflict were brought together and recognized each other as negotiating partners. Officially the Palestinians were represented in a joint delegation with the Jordanians and thus did not have independent negotiating power. However, that Palestinians and Israeli delegates were meeting face to face for the very first time was a major achievement. Another year passed before the Israeli electorate was ready to accept the land for peace formula and consider the possibility of making painful territorial concessions for the purpose of the establishment of a Palestinian state. The election of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and the Labor Party in Israel in 1992 led to a turnaround in Israeli policy. For the first time since the partition debates of the 1940s, the idea of a physical separation of historical Palestine into two independent states was placed squarely at the top of the political agenda. The new Labor ideology “marked the transition from the first to the second stage of the iron wall strategy, the transition from deterrence to negotiations and compromise”.36 In the electoral campaign that 35 Michal Levertov, “Another Brick in the Wall: Israel’s ‘security fence’ is no solution to its problems”, TimeEurope.com, Tuesday, August 5, 2003. http://www.time.com/time/europe/ me/article/0,13716,473294,00.html. 36 Avi Shlaim, “Ariel Sharon’s War against the Palestinians”, Logos: A Journal of Modern Society and Culture, 3.3, Summer, 2004. http://www.logosjournal.com/issue_3.3/shlaim.htm.

20

Bridging the Barrier

brought him to power in 1992, Yitzhak Rabin raised support for this most recent manifestation of the separation of Israel from the Palestinians with his famous slogan that “Israel must ‘take Gaza out of Tel Aviv’ and create two distinct entities by disentangling the two populations as to avoid friction” (chikuch). Widespread support for the land-for-peace formula led Rabin to sign the Oslo Accords with Yasser Arafat representing the PLO in 1993. This agreement paved the way towards the establishment of a Palestinian interim authority and a plan for exchanging land for peace in stages until the negotiation of final status issues (the status of Jerusalem, water, Palestinian refugees, Jewish settlements, Palestinian statehood and borders). By the mid-1990s, Israel and the Palestinians had signed a series of diplomatic agreements that aimed to put an end to their history of confrontation and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement. The winning formula was to separate the two national entities but through negotiations so that both sides would have some influence over the final territorial configuration. Through these negotiations, Israel recognized the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians and the PLO recognized the right of the State of Israel to exist and renounced aims towards its destruction. After the international peace conference in Madrid in October 1991, Israel and the Palestinians signed the Oslo Accords, officially known as the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements at a public ceremony at the White House on September 13, 1993. The famous handshake between former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat broke a longstanding taboo against mutual recognition that significantly altered public perceptions towards peace. It also secured Nobel Peace Prizes for Rabin, Arafat and then Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. The Oslo agreements paved the way for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from parts of the West Bank and Gaza and the resumption of authority in those areas by Palestinian self-government referred to as the Palestinian National Authority (PNA or PA). The first transition of authority was conferred by the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area (referred to as the Cairo Agreement) signed on May 4, 1994. Based on the principle of Gaza and Jericho first, the Cairo Agreements transferred the bulk of the Gaza Strip and the city of Jericho in the West Bank over to PA control. After that, concrete changes took place on the ground including the establishment of Palestinian self-rule in the major cities of Ramallah, Nablus, Jenin, Qalqilya, Bethlehem, Hebron, Tulkarm, and some 450 villages. The stages of Oslo were celebrated in the Palestinian territories as Yasser Arafat returned from exile in Tunis, and national institutions prepared the groundwork for a potentially democratic state with a workable legislature, legal system, and electoral process. In addition, a Palestinian police force was created, which embarked upon joint Israeli-Palestinian patrols, a Palestinian sea port and international airport, and initiatives for economic cooperation and regional stability were also put into place. The resolution of final status issues, namely Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, final borders, Palestinian statehood, Jewish settlements and water, were postponed to the end of a five-year interim period during which time it was expected that Israelis and Palestinians would develop trust in one another through continuous interactions and confidence building measures.

Evolution of Separation in Israel/Palestine

21

Oslo I was followed by the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, known as “Oslo II” signed on September 24, 1995 in Taba. The goal of Oslo II was to promote further redeployment of the Israeli Defense Forces beyond the Gaza and Jericho areas. The Wye River Memorandum signed on October 23, 1998 provided a timeline for the implementation of the mutual responsibilities signed by the two parties in earlier agreements. However, by the time the al-Aqsa Intifada erupted in September 2000, both sides had lost faith in the peace process. The Palestinians had initially endorsed the Oslo Process overwhelmingly as they were convinced it would bring them national self determination. But from the very start of the period of interim self-government, the Palestinian Authority lacked the financial wherewithal to pay wages and invest in infrastructure. There was much disappointment in the “limited help or aid received from their ‘brothers’ in the Arab states”.37 Also, Israeli closures and continued control over access in and out of the Palestinian areas hindered Palestinian movement of people, goods and services. The Palestinians experienced a downward spiral of poverty and hardship at the very time in which expectations were at their peak. As a result, many Palestinians became disillusioned by the absence of a peace dividend in their daily lives as their economic status not only did not improve but in many cases deteriorated. Many regarded the Oslo Process as a sell-out to Israel and its superpower ally the United States. Palestinians were soon to be disappointed by the repressive and incompetent nature of their own leadership; many blamed these inadequacies on continued Israeli domination. Militant organizations responded by planning and executing numerous large-scale attacks. “The 1994-1996 period was the heyday of the suicide bombers.”38 Israeli urban metropolitan centers were rocked by suicide bomb attacks, which caused intense damage, both physically and psychologically as a widespread sensation of trauma spread throughout all sectors of Israeli society. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin had insisted that official agreements would be complemented by a clear border that he referred to as a “physical mechanism for peace”.39 In 1995, Rabin appointed Public Security Minister Moshe Shachal to head a committee enquiry into the specifics of building a fence. This decision clarified Rabin’s view of peace as one in which Israelis and Palestinians would be physically separated and that the Palestinians would have to seek assistance from neighboring Jordan to strengthen their economy” rather than depend on Israel. This notion of Israeli separation “brought to an end a quarter of a century of the Israeli policy of functionalism towards the West Bank”.40 The Shachal proposal called for erecting a fence along Israel’s approximately 190-mile future border with the West Bank that would resemble the fence along its border with the Gaza Strip. The plan included 15 to 18 checkpoints along the border, with similar arrangements to be made around Jerusalem along with border patrol units, thermal detection devices and reconnaissance planes to prevent any unauthorized crossings and infiltration. 37 38 39 40

Rubin, 1999: 8. Morris, 2001: 627. Makovsky, 2004: 2. Lochery, 2005: 4.

22

Bridging the Barrier

Altogether, the fence project envisioned by the Shachal Committee was estimated at approximately $300 million. During the 1990s, opposition to the barrier idea was widespread. Palestinians never came out in favor of a physical architecture of separation. The Palestinian perspective back then on what type of structure would be placed between the two states was not clear. Much opposition to the notion of a barrier developed within Israeli society. Shimon Peres and the Israeli Left criticized the idea of a barrier for its expected interference in Israeli-Palestinian integration. Shimon Peres articulated his vision of a “New Middle East”, in which regional dynamics would render war a thing of the past thereby allowing peoples of the region to bring about peace through socio-economic cooperation and democratization.41 Early in its conception, much opposition originated from among the Israeli Right as well because they saw a fence as a future border beyond which all Jews would be evacuated. During the 1990s, Benjamin Netanyahu and the Israeli Right were urged by elements of the Israeli settler movement in the governmental coalition to prohibit any division of the Land of Israel by such measures as a fence. “Virtually all Jewish settlers were initially opposed to the barrier.”42 However, the official representatives of the settlers as organized through Moezet Yesha43 (the successor to Gush Emunim), in time proclaimed their support for the barrier fearing loss of public support. Jewish settlement leaders came to embrace the idea of a security fence and lobbied to include as many settlements as possible within its boundaries and thus prevent their evacuation.44 After the assassination of Rabin in 1995, the political landscape of the IsraeliPalestinian dispute changed fundamentally. Israeli public opinion expressed less enthusiasm over the issue of a separation barrier and plans for its construction were put on hold. With the deterioration in relations between Israelis and Palestinians over lack of progress and accusations of broken promises in the Oslo process, the notion of erecting a barrier became increasingly articulated by Israel in terms of unilateral disengagement, that is, outside the framework of a negotiated resolution of the conflict. The two-state solution was put on hold as Israelis feared that a Palestinian state led by Yasser Arafat would become a dangerous threat to Israel’s existence. In July 1997, with objections from Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai, the separation fence plan was officially discontinued. Labor Prime Minister Ehud Barak resurrected movement towards a negotiated separation between Israel and the Palestinians tied to the establishment of a Palestinian state. Barak reintroduced the notion of separation at the start of the final-status talks to provide a “technical solution” that could be “translated” into

41 Peres, 1993. 42 Personal interview with Justus Reid Weiner, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Jerusalem, July 6, 2005. 43 Council of Jewish Communities in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District. http://www. moetzetyesha.co.il/. 44 Barry A. Feinstein and Justus Reid Weiner. “Israel’s Security Barrier: An International Comparative Analysis and Legal Evaluation”, The George Washington International Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 2, 2005: 372.

Evolution of Separation in Israel/Palestine

23

45

practical terms during the negotiations. Barak was the first Israeli Prime Minister that attempted to negotiate final status issues with the Palestinians. However, failure of the Camp David Summit in the summer of 2000 and the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada riding a new wave of violence and retribution a few months later halted any progress towards a negotiated settlement. At the same time, it made “separation seem all the more urgent” in Israel.46 The Camp David Summit of July 2000 is generally identified as the beginning of the end of the peace process era as the negotiators could not surmount the difficult issues of territory, control over Jerusalem and the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif and the claim of the right of return for Palestinian refugees. Both sides held the other accountable for the impasse. Israelis blamed Yasser Arafat for rejecting the most generous package ever offered to the Palestinians and leaving the negotiation table without a counter-offer, while the Palestinians declared that Israel’s offer was not generous enough. Shortly after the failed Camp David Summit, then Likud Party Chairman and MK Ariel Sharon along with a group of Likud party members took a walkabout on the Temple Mount. Whether this was an intentional provocation to demonstrate Israel’s control in Jerusalem, or an innocuous tour of the holiest site of the Jewish religion, it is difficult to say. However, Palestinians reacted fiercely staging violent demonstrations upon which Israeli police opened fire. This was the start of the al-Aqsa Intifada that continues to this day. As a result of the failure of Camp David and the onset of violence, it was under the unlikely leadership of Ariel Sharon that the construction of Israel’s separation barrier actually began. Ariel Sharon was elected Prime Minister of Israel on February 6, 2001 and again on January 28, 2003. As a pillar of the Israeli Right and architect of the Jewish settlement enterprise, Sharon was not expected to promote policies that would divide territory that may be annexed to the State of Israel in the future. Pundits are divided about the actual extent of transformation in Ariel Sharon’s ideology. Ariel Sharon was a unilateralist, a fierce hawk, and a man of war throughout his career. Although hard to pinpoint the exact moment of transition, some date Sharon’s ideological shift to “when he slid into the driver’s seat”, namely when he undertook the responsibilities of becoming Israel’s Prime Minister. The common assumption is that as an illustrious general, he began to see that Israel had no answer to terror, and as a prime minister, flying back and forth to meet President Bush, he realized that Israel could not cut itself off from the family of nations. Most of all, he worried that the United States might someday impose an accord on Israel…Sharon was elected prime minister as the father of the settlers. But when he realized there could be no agreement without a Palestinian state and painful concessions, he found himself in a face-off with his supporters, his party and the entire far right.47 45 Gil Sedan, “West Bank Barrier has opponents on both sides of the fence”, Jewish Telegraphic Agency, November 12, 1999. http://www.jewishsf.com/bk991112/iwestbank. shtml. 46 Makovsky, 2004: 4. 47 Yoel Marcus, “Goodbye, giants of 1948”, Haaretz, Tuesday, July 18, 2006. http:// www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=666993&contrassID=2&subContrassI D=20&sbSubContrassID=0&listSrc=Y.

24

Bridging the Barrier

Growing Israeli support for unilateral actions such as the barrier occurred at a time when Israeli and American relations were strengthened and suicide bomb attacks became commonplace in Israeli metropolitan centers, thereby creating a crisis of personal security for Israeli citizens. The most recent diplomatic effort towards resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict began in July 2002. The so-called “quartet” representing the United States, the United Nations, the European Union and Russia delineated principles of a “performance-based and goal-driven roadmap with clear phases, timelines, target dates, and benchmarks aiming at progress through reciprocal steps by the two parties in the political, security, economic, humanitarian, and institution-building fields”.48 The intended two-state solution was to see Israel living side by side with a Palestinian state in peace and security. As yet, neither Israel nor the Palestinians have lived up to the commitments demanded of them by the road map. The resulting stalemate has been characterized by the expansion of Jewish settlements, a growing Palestinian terrorist infrastructure and Israeli military incursions into Palestinian areas, Israeli reoccupation of West Bank cities, mounting casualties on both sides, a severe deterioration of the Palestinian economy, and ultimately the construction of Israel’s separation barrier. At the same time, the Palestinian leadership and its institutions were increasingly bankrupt and unable, or unwilling, to clamp down on terrorist activities emanating from within its territory. Yasser Arafat ceased functioning as Palestinian President in all but symbol as his popularity was eclipsed by Islamist groups, particularly active in Gaza through the provision of social services, programs for children and the elderly, education, and other basic services. Arafat was dismissed outright as a negotiating partner by the Bush Administration, and was all but marginalized, imprisoned in his compound, until his death in Paris on November 11, 2004. The election of a Hamas government on January 26, 2006 further problematized prospects for Israeli-Palestinian conciliation. In its Charter, Hamas states that peace initiatives and international conferences are “in contradiction to the principles of the Islamic Resistance Movement”.49 With its refusal to recognize, and calls for destruction of, the State of Israel, Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) in effect legitimized Israel’s decision to pursue unilateralism. Therefore, separation was only one of the many different strategies considered to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, the widening political gulf and glaring asymmetry between Israel and the Palestinian Authority was a basic foundation for the building of Israel’s separation barrier.

48 “A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the IsraeliPalestinian Conflict”, US Department of State, Press Statement, Office of the Spokesman, Washington, DC, April 30, 2003. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm. 49 “The Covenant of Hamas (The Islamic Resistance Movement in the West Bank), 18 August, 1988 [Excerpts]”, Yehuda Lukacs, The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: a documentary record 1967-1990, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992: 401.

Chapter 2

The Separation Barrier: Structure, Routing and Challenges The Israeli Government led by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon began the first phase of construction of the separation barrier on March 29, 2002. The Israeli Government nominated the Ministry of Defense to carry out the project while the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) was given responsibility for the operational side of its activation.1 The first continuous segment of the barrier commenced building at the end of July 2003. The separation barrier is said to be the “largest infrastructure project in Israeli history”.2 When all elements of the barrier’s construction, implementation, and management are taken into consideration the project will cost upwards of $1 billion US, approximately $1.6 million US per mile. The separation barrier is being built in subsections by 22 private contractors that won tenders for infrastructure work publicized by the Israeli government. The infrastructure work involves anything from digging, filling, bedding, paving asphalt roads, erecting barbed wire and anchor posts and security. Three companies (Magal Security Systems, and Elbit Systems together with the American Detektion) provide intrusion detection fence for the different sections of the barrier. Observation systems using electro optical scanning radar, video motion detection systems and tactical aerostats have been procured by the Ministry of Defense from various companies.3 The separation barrier is a complex structure that incorporates many different infrastructural elements. Roughly 96% of the barrier is in the form of a “multi layered composite”4 between 40 to 80 meters wide depending on the topography and comprised of 4 elements: (1) a ditch and pyramid shaped stack of six coils of barbed wire on the east side, along with barbed wire only on the western side, (2) a patrol path on both sides for IDF and border police, (3) an intrusion-detection fence in the middle with sensors to warn the command post with online data from the various observation systems and devices of any incursion on each and every sector, and (4) a dirt road covered by sand that is raked daily to detect crossings. The remaining 4% of the separation barrier is a wall built from concrete slabs, each weighing 17 tons 1 “Execution of the Security Fence project”, Israel Ministry of Defense Website. http:// www.securityfence.mod.gov.il/Pages/ENG/execution/htm. 2 “Israel’s Security Fence”. http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/fence. html. 3 “Execution of the Security Fence project”, Israel Ministry of Defense Website. http:// www.securityfence.mod.gov.il/Pages/ENG/execution/htm. 4 “Israel’s Security Fence”, Israel Ministry of Defense Website. http://www. securityfence.mod.gov.il/Pages/ENG/operational.htm.

26

Bridging the Barrier

and measuring 8 meters in height and 1 meter in width.5 The wall design is employed mainly along major roads and highways such as the new Trans-Israel highway and in heavily populated urban areas like Jerusalem.6 Barrier Route The routing of the barrier has proven to be the most contentious element of the barrier project with critics from within and without in vicious conflict over where the barrier should go. The barrier’s routing is the area in which the legal system in Israel has taken a significant role. Most pundits acknowledge that Israel has a right to build a barrier within its own territory but not within territory occupied since 1967 and thus completely reject any attempt by Israel to place the barrier east of the so-called Green Line, the 1949 armistice line between Israel and the West Bank. The Israeli government planned to complete the route in stages. The first stage of construction from Salem to Elkana (137 kilometers, 85 miles) was approved in August 2002 and completed by July 2003. The second stage from Salem towards Bein Shean (through the Jezreel Valley and the Gilboa Mountains) was decided in December 2002 and completed by December 2003. The third stage of construction incorporated the city of Jerusalem. The original “Jerusalem Defense Plan” approved in March 2003 was intended to run 64 kilometers (40 miles) around the municipal boundaries of the city. However, as a result of legal challenges, in March 2005, Israel built a temporary fence and planned an alternative route of approximately 51 kilometers (32 miles), which at the time of writing has not yet been completed. The fourth phase of the separation barrier was to extend from Elkana to Ofer along with additional inner fences around Jewish population centers (such as Gush Etzion and Ariel) and traffic routes (such as Route 60 between Gush Etzion and Jerusalem) in the West Bank. Altogether, the planned route was roughly 737 kilometers (458 miles) but has been modified on a number of occasions as a result of legal disputes and Supreme Court cases and has recently been reduced to approximately 619 kilometers (385 miles).7 The government approved a revised route in closer proximity to the Green Line on February 20, 2005 as a result of an Israeli Supreme Court decision on June 30, 2004 to take into greater consideration the impact of the barrier on local Palestinian 5 Information obtained by author through discussion with Marc Luria, head of an Israeli grassroots initiative in support of the construction of the barrier, on a tour of the separation barrier, July 5, 2005. 6 “Israel’s Security Fence”, Israel Ministry of Defense Website. http://www. securityfence.mod.gov.il/Pages/ENG/operational.htm. 7 The length of the barrier is subject to different measures depending on the source. According to the United Nations, the total length of the new barrier route is 670 kilometers (416 miles) compared to 622 kilometers (386 miles) of the initial route. See The Humanitarian Impact of the West Bank Barrier on Palestinian Communities, a report to the Humanitarian Emergency Policy Group (HEPG) compiled by the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) in the occupied Palestinian territory, Update No. 5, March 2005.

The Separation Barrier: Structure, Routing and Challenges

27

residents. However, some sections of the barrier include Jewish settlements that deviate from the Green Line. For example, the barrier runs a mile to the East in three places to allow the inclusion of the settlements of Henanit, Shaked, Rehan, Salit and Zofim. The most significant deviation of the separation barrier is in relation to Ariel, a town of approximately 20,000 residents, which is located 19 kilometers (12 miles) into the West Bank. The original plan to build a fence around Ariel was substituted by the decision in February 2005 to incorporate Ariel within the main fence at a later date.8 In some areas, the barrier has created enclaves, which surround Palestinian villages and cause many variations of encircling, which hampers freedom of movement between the barrier and the Green Line, and at various other points of passage between and within the State of Israel and the West Bank. As will be discussed in Chapter 4, these enclaves are among the most problematic effects of the barrier for the Palestinians. As a result of these problems of movement, the barrier has been built simultaneously with a complex network of Israeli checkpoints, terminal crossings, agricultural gates, a system of transit permits, and a number of other methods and procedures to either facilitate or impede the movement of people, goods and services. The routing of the barrier has been a frequent subject of deliberation at the Supreme Court of Israel. However, the final say on the route is determined by the Seam Zone Administration. Colonel (res.) Dany Tirza, head of the “Rainbow Operation” administration (Seam Zone Administration) of the Israeli Defense Force Center Command is the official responsible for planning the routing of the fence. Tirza served as territorial expert for the 2000 Camp David negotiations who drew up all the maps in preparation for the discussion. There is little, if any, public information on how the Seam Zone Administration actually functions except that it was established on April 14, 2002 under the jurisdiction of the director general of the Israeli Ministry of Defense to implement the construction of 80 kilometers of barrier in the West Bank. Israeli government planners claim humanitarian issues were taken into consideration during all aspects of the barrier project. Intimately familiar with the geography of Israel and the territories, Tirza explains that “all decisions about the route of the fence involve up to 45 people from all governmental bodies including archeologists and experts from nature reserves”, who discuss a multitude of issues from potential damages to the view, animals, burial sites, etc. Then I decide. Decisions are very difficult. We go to the affected places and consult with the people. I didn’t destroy even one building to build the fence.9

Tirza places great faith in the possibility of “working things out” through discussions with local Palestinians and joint efforts to mitigate the negative effects of the barrier project. The Israeli government claims that “Israel is doing its best to minimize the negative impact on Palestinians in the area of construction and is providing agricultural 8 “Israel’s Security Fence”. http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/fence. html. 9 Personal Interview with Dany Tirza, Head “Rainbow Operation” Administration on June 28, 2005 Central Command, Neve Yaacov in Hebrew.

28

Bridging the Barrier

passageways to allow farmers to continue to cultivate their land and crossing points to facilitate freedom of movement and the transfer of goods. As well, property owners are offered compensation for the use of their land and contractors have uprooted and replanted over 60,000 olive trees.10 In order to manage the day-to-day issues that arise, the Civil Administration established a humanitarian “moked” with a telephone number and an Arabic speaking operator for any Palestinian that feels he or she was harmed in any way by the barrier. “It is an opening to not see the occupying power as bad.”11 In an interview, Tirza described three options that were considered for the routing of the fence. The first was to place the fence between Israeli and Arab neighborhoods. “But,” he argues, “Israel is a democracy and you cannot differentiate between Jews and Arabs, only Israelis and Palestinians.” The second option was to expand the area of the fence and include close to 120,000 Palestinians with Orange identification cards within the fenced area. The problem is I don’t know them. They would be able to travel everywhere and many more people would want to join them. The security problem would become greater.12

In the end, Tirza chose a “middle option” which involved following the municipal boundaries in the routing of the barrier and trying to mitigate people’s problems on the ground. Tirza argues that the advantage of this choice was that it coincided with Israeli law and decreased the number of Palestinians cut off from their communities in the West Bank.13 The separation barrier operates through a complex decision making regime that has a profoundly disruptive influence on local Palestinian residents. Israeli officials are aware of this disruption and have dealt with it in a number of ways. Israel’s relations with Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are conducted through the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) Commander in the West Bank and the Seam Zone Administration. The Israeli government claims that it seeks “an appropriate balance” between the security goals of the State of Israel and the humanitarian needs of the Palestinians.14 Outlining its commitment to humanitarian issues, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs states, Most Palestinians will be on the eastern side of the fence. They will not be cut off from their commercial and urban centers. No Palestinians will have to relocate. Israel will make every effort to avoid causing hardship and interference with their daily lives. Dozens of crossing points have been set up to enable the movement of people and goods. The security fence was located, to the greatest possible degree, on unused land to avoid 10 “Israel’s Security Fence”. http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/fence. html. 11 Personal Interview with Dany Tirza, Head “Rainbow Operation” Administration on June 28, 2005 Central Command, Neve Yaacov in Hebrew. 12 Personal Interview with Dany Tirza, Head “Rainbow Operation” Administration on June 28, 2005 Central Command, Neve Yaacov in Hebrew. 13 Personal Interview with Dany Tirza, Head “Rainbow Operation” Administration on June 28, 2005 Central Command, Neve Yaacov in Hebrew. 14 “Humanitarian Aspects: Impact on Palestinians”, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. http://securityfence.mfa.gov.il.

The Separation Barrier: Structure, Routing and Challenges

29

harming agriculture. Palestinian farmers will have access to their fields and will reach them through special gates that are being built into the fence. Trees affected by the construction will be replanted.15

The extent of negative influence by the barrier on Palestinian lives is the subject of great dispute. One of the major areas of jurisdiction for the Civil Administration is the use of lands for the barrier’s construction. Building of the separation barrier has required the use of thousands of dunams of land. Land obtained for building of the barrier is requisitioned by military orders in the West Bank and by the Ministry of Defense in the Jerusalem Municipality. Landowners have one or two weeks from the date of the signed order to file an appeal to the military authorities or the civil administration. If rejected, the petitioner is given an additional week to appeal to the Supreme Court of Israel on behalf of the family or the entire village affected by the requisition order. The State of Israel insists that “in each and every case, before any seizure of property is ordered, the necessity of the act is closely examined by the highest level of authorities”.16 Justus Reid Weiner, advocate and scholar in residence at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, claims that Israel and all governments for that matter are entitled to exercise the authority of “eminent domain”,17 a legal term which describes the acquisition of private property for public purposes in exchange for just compensation.18 That Israel uses this right is no different from its use by any other state seeking to complete a public project such as a road or other infrastructure. The Israeli government maintains that private lands are “requisitioned” rather than “confiscated” because they remain the property of the owner, who has access to legal procedures to object the use of the land and receives full compensation in the form of a lump sum and on a monthly basis, which is either paid or placed in a special account in the Treasury until such time as the owner wishes to access it. Although Israel claims it has “made the use of public lands a priority in building the security fence”,19 there are many instances in which the requisitioning of land has set in motion a complex series of changes whose effects on families and neighborhoods cannot as yet be anticipated. Critics point to the political nature of the land’s use and not only reject the state’s authority to take private property, but also the process by which the seizure occurs.20 In practice, many Palestinians have claimed that land seizure orders are given haphazardly, sometimes left on the property itself, on trees or are served on the village council without any personal contact with

15 “Humanitarian Aspects: Impact on Palestinians”, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. http://securityfence.mfa.gov.il. 16 http://www.seamzone.mod.gov.il/Pages/ENG/execution.htm. 17 For legal definition of “eminent domain”, see Wikipedia’s entry on “eminent domain”. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eminent_domain. 18 Personal interview with Justus Reid Weiner, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Jerusalem, July 6, 2005. 19 “Humanitarian Aspects: Impact on Palestinians”, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. http://securityfence.mfa.gov.il. 20 “Report of the Secretary-General prepared pursuant to General Assembly Resolution ES-10/13”, November 24, 2003, United Nations General Assembly. http://www.reliefweb. int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsbyUNID/.

Bridging the Barrier

30 21

the individual property owner. Tensions and differences of opinion have arisen about the actual treatment of the local residents and the land’s future status has become the subject of much virulent political debate. Case of Beit Sourik and the Supreme Court of Israel Petitions to the Israeli Supreme Court have demonstrated the degree of discord that has at times characterized relations between the State of Israel and the Israeli legal system over the separation barrier. Palestinian residents, backed by a number of key human rights and other organizations have filed numerous appeals to the Israeli Supreme Court challenging the legality and routing of the separation barrier. The most precedent setting legal challenge was the landmark case of Beit Sourik versus the Government of Israel and the Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank to the Supreme Court of Israel.22 The petition was submitted by several villages and their inhabitants who received orders notifying them of the seizure of plots of land in their area for the purpose of constructing 40 kilometers of separation fence. The Court deliberated on two main issues: (1) the legality of the IDF commander to erect a fence in the West Bank and (2) the proportionality of security and humanitarian considerations taken into account when determining the barrier’s path. The Supreme Court judgment handed down on June 30, 2004 determined that the IDF Commander does have the right to build a fence in the West Bank. However, the Court found that the IDF commander “did not exercise his discretion proportionately” and “did not take into account the infringement on the lives of 35,000 local residents”.23 Therefore, because the Commander has a legal duty to balance properly between security considerations and humanitarian ones, a reduction in security must be endured for the sake of humanitarian considerations. Upon release of the Supreme Court’s verdict, “Prime Minister Ariel Sharon directed the defense establishment to review the entire route of the Separation Barrier and to conform it to the spirit of the Court’s judgment. The original route of the fence in the Beit Sourik area was disqualified by the High Court in late June 2004 and the state subsequently altered 30 kilometers of the route there and in other areas such as the southern Hebron Hills. The new route, which was proposed by the defense establishment in September 2004, was approved by the Cabinet on 20 February 2005.”24 21 “Report of the Secretary-General prepared pursuant to General Assembly Resolution ES-10/13”, November 24, 2003, United Nations General Assembly. http://www.reliefweb. int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsbyUNID/. 22 “HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. 1. The Government of Israel [The Fence Case] and 2.The Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank. Abstract of the Judgment”, Judgments of the Israel Supreme Court: Fighting Terrorism within the Law. 23 “HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Government of Israel [The Fence Case} and the Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank”, Judgments of the Israeli Supreme Court: Fighting Terrorism within the Law. Israel Supreme Court. 24 “Separation Barrier: Judgment of the High Court of Justice Regarding Beit Sourik”, B’Tselem: The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories website. http://www.btselem.org/english/Separation_Barrier/Beit_Surik_Ruling.asp.

The Separation Barrier: Structure, Routing and Challenges

31

The Beit Sourik case was a “huge event in Israel” according to Mohammad Dahleh, a Palestinian-Israeli lawyer who was involved in the case and served as a member of the Palestinian team to the Hague. Although well practiced in the workings of the Israeli Supreme Court, he admitted that “the case did not make as much of an impact among the Palestinians”.25 Local residents noted that slight alterations were made in the fence’s route but claimed that they did not conform with the High Court ruling regarding the barrier’s potential to violate human rights. The specific advances and setbacks in the legal arena develop against the broader background of continued Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Struggling against the Israeli occupation through the Israeli Supreme Court has been an issue of debate in the Palestinian community for many years. Many Palestinians are skeptical of using the Israeli legal system to challenge Israel to begin with since it involves conforming to Israeli structures and standards. Moreover, they recall that this is the same Supreme Court that upheld controversial IDF policies such as house demolitions, and forcible transfer of family members of alleged suicide bombers.26 “Either it is a legitimate occupation or the Supreme Court does not have the authority.” For Dahleh, “the whole discourse of Beit Sourik was an Israeli discourse based on Israeli precedents, Israeli law and Israeli judges. Palestinian petitioners were non-existent.”27 A second landmark case of the Israeli Supreme Court resulted from the judgment on the fence surrounding Alfei Menashe handed down on September 15, 2005. The Israeli town of Alfei Menashe lies southeast of the Palestinian town of Qalqiliya, approximately 4 km east of the Green Line. The dispute arose over a segment of the separation barrier in August 2003 around Alfei Menashe that created an enclave around 5 Palestinian villages. A petition was submitted by residents of the affected villages with support of the village council heads and the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI).28 ACRI has participated in many cases submitted to the Supreme Court of Israel on the issue of the separation barrier with the position that Israel cannot build in occupied territories in ways that “hurt people”, says Dana Alexander, Director of ACRI’s Law Department.29 The petition concerning the route of the barrier by Alfei Menashe built on the concept of “proportionality” as set forth by the judgment of the Supreme Court of Israel in the case of Beit Sourik. They argued that the grave damage caused to the residents of the enclave was not proportional to 25 Personal interview with Mohammad Dahleh in East Jerusalem, July 20, 2005. 26 Rubenberg, 2003: 398-400. See Israeli Supreme Court Decision On Deportation of Family Members of Terrorists (September 3, 2002). In a landmark decision, the Israeli Supreme Court unanimously approved the expulsions of Intissar and Kifah Ajouri, sister and brother of Ali Ajouri, accused of ordering several suicide bombings. This was the first time the court upheld the planned expulsions of relatives of terror suspects rather than perpetrators. http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Terrorism/sctdec.html. 27 Personal interview with Mohammad Dahleh in East Jerusalem, July 20, 2005. 28 The Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI), Israel’s largest human rights organization was established in 1972 as a non-political and independent body whose objective is to promote human and civil rights in Israel and in the territories under Israeli control. http:// www.acri.org.il/english-acri/engine/index.asp. 29 Personal interview with Dana Alexander, Director of the Law Department of The Association for Civil Rights in Israel, July 7, 2005, Jerusalem.

32

Bridging the Barrier

the security needs of Alfei Menashe residents. As well, drawing from the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice at the Hague (to be discussed), the petitioners argued that the fence is illegal and thus the State of Israel does not have the authority to build a fence in occupied territory. The court deliberated on both the legality and the routing of the fence. On the issue of the fence’s legality, the court applied public international laws pertaining to belligerent occupation as stated in regulation 43 of the Hague Regulations: The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.30

With the military commander having jurisdiction to take all steps necessary to ensure security, the court determined that the separation fence is a justifiable means to protect the lives of Israeli settlers in the West Bank. This authority was not considered conditional upon the question of the legality of the settlements themselves, which were determined as illegal by the ICJ under article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention.31 The court also considered extra-territorial application of Israel’s Basic Laws and Israeli common laws which are granted to every person within Israel including every person living in areas held under Israeli control. However, the judgment ordered the state to “reconsider, within a reasonable time, alternatives to the route of the Barrier by Alfei Menashe” due to the disproportionate violation of the human rights of Palestinians living in the enclave. This would involve improving the infrastructure and logistical measures by which the barrier affects the Palestinian residents. In all, the separation barrier has created many political, social, economic and legal challenges. In many instances, the barrier has intensified tensions between Israelis and Palestinians on account of incongruent perspectives on the barrier expressed by each national community. However, actions through the court have provided opportunities for Palestinians and Israeli human rights organizations to cooperate on challenges to the barrier’s legality, but mostly to the specific routing of the barrier. Public opinion on the barrier is far from homogeneous on either side, although there are more diversified views on the Israeli side due to the democratic framework for political expression. Nevertheless, the goals, intentions, expectations and effects concerning the barrier are vastly different depending upon one’s location geographically and politically within the broader context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

30 Military Authority over the Territory of the Hostile State, Section 3, Article 43 of Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, October 18, 1907. http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/385ec082b509e76c41256739003e636d/ 1d1726425f6955aec125641e0038bfd6?OpenDocument. 31 See discussion in http://www.geocities.com/toi_billboard/Neta_Ammar.htm.

Chapter 3

Israeli Perspectives Whether the border between Israel and a Palestinian entity takes the form of a fence, a wall, a demilitarized zone or a friendly crossing point, the border is, as Michel Warschawski describes, “a pivotal concept in the life of every Israeli: it is a formative element in our collective life, it defines our horizons, serves as the boundary line between threat and the feeling of safety and between enemies and brothers”.1 Israelis look to the border on their east with a premonition of what is to come, what challenges and dangers may be lurking, waiting for the precise moment when a mistake in intelligence or crack in the infrastructure brings disaster. Not everybody sees the border this way. However, conditions of war justified retaining border security as a guiding principle of the Israeli national agenda. Israel has consistently expressed its preference for managing the IsraeliPalestinian conflict at the national level and thus has repeatedly rebuffed proposals for an international mission or presence of any kind within or around its borders. Diplomatic negotiations have held greater promise for Israel because they include the international community with its sanctions and prohibitions but leave the final decision in Israeli hands. Israel has, throughout its history, wavered between policies of rapprochement and unilateralism as evidenced in the early debates between Moshe Sharett and David Ben-Gurion about third party intervention in Israeli politics (Troen and Lucas, 1995: 165). Sharett’s more liberal political attitudes and sensitivity to international public opinion, contrasted fundamentally with Ben-Gurion’s disdain for the external environment. While Sharett favored a greater role for international institutions in pursuit of Israeli national security, Ben-Gurion promoted self-reliance based on his faith that the Jewish people would shape their own destiny and capacity for self-defense (Shlaim, 2001: 97). Many variations of this debate characterized the Israeli political spectrum throughout its history, between the two poles of confrontation and conciliation, unilateralism and multilateralism, compromise and inflexibility, and confidence and suspicion towards exterior factors. In all, Israel has remained skeptical of outside interference in its internal affairs and has sought to reduce its reliance for security on third parties and external forces. The separation barrier is one in a long line of Israeli policies that lean towards the unilateralist side of this debate as against the tide of international public opinion. The construction of the barrier is seen by many as Israel’s attempt to determine on its own where the boundaries between Israel and a Palestinian state will be without outside interference. Israel is reluctant to allow states and organizations to influence its decisions in ways that hamper Israeli security although Israel has been open to cooperation with the great powers, particularly the United States. For example, the most recent attempt 1

Warschawski, 2002: 3.

34

Bridging the Barrier

by the international community to mitigate Israeli-Palestinian strife, motivated to a large extent by American pressure, is the “road map” for peace. The road map seeks to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as proposed by the “quartet” of international entities: the United States, the European Union, Russia, and the United Nations, and outlined in a speech by US President George W. Bush on June 24, 2002. The road map2 is based on reciprocal steps taken by Israel and the Palestinians: Palestinian Authority reform and abandonment of the use of violence in exchange for statehood, and Israeli support for a reformed Palestinian government and halt of Jewish settlement activity in the West Bank and Gaza once the threat of violence from Palestinian terrorism is removed. The road map remains a leading diplomatic document in the Israeli-Palestinian context. According to a joint survey of Palestinian and Israeli public opinion between March 8-13, 2005, 59% of the Palestinians and 60% of the Israelis support the Quartet’s Road Map plan compared to 35% among Palestinians and 36% among Israelis who oppose it.3 Although still referenced by both parties to the conflict, the road map was put on hold after a series of retaliatory attacks by Israel4 and the Palestinians and lack of compliance with the obligations set forth in the first phase. Palestinian terrorism and Israel’s reoccupation of West Bank cities marked a reversion to unilateral measures of which the separation barrier is a major component. The international community protested vehemently against these Israeli actions. As against a hostile international environment, the Government of Israel has waged an ardent campaign to explain and justify the reasons for building a separation barrier. Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs website explains that the ultimate reason for building the barrier is that it saves lives. The Ministry establishes its case for the barrier against a backdrop of photos of the victims of terrorism and power point presentations detailing the facts and figures of terrorist acts, casualties, fatalities and the effectiveness of the barrier in preventing their occurrence. Suicide terrorism has become the foremost challenge for the Israeli national security establishment, particularly since the start of the second Intifada in September 2000. Statistical data compiled by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs shows a strong correlation between the construction of the barrier and a decrease in terrorist attacks that originate from those areas on the other side of where the barrier has been completed. According to the Ministry’s data, there was a “30% drop in the number of terrorist attacks that took place in 2003 compared to 2002, when the barrier was just 2 “A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the IsraeliPalestinian Conflict”, Press Statement, US Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, Washington, D.C., April 30, 2003. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm. 3 Poll #11: Palestinians and Israelis disagree on how to proceed with the peace process, March 16, 2005, Poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ramallah and the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. http://truman.huji.ac.il/polls.asp. 4 For example, on June 10, 2003, Israeli helicopters fired missiles at a car in Gaza in a failed attempt to assassinate Abdel Aziz Rantisi, one of the highest profile figures of Hamas, the Islamic Resistance Movement, who was later assassinated on April 17, 2004, see “Hamas leader killed in Israeli airstrike—Targeted killing follows deadly suicide bombing in Erez”, CNN.Com, Saturday, April 17, 2004. http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/04/17/ mideast.violence/.

Israeli Perspectives

35

being built. Similarly, there was a 50% decrease in the number of victims murdered by terrorists in 2003 compared to the previous year.”5 The data demonstrate a sharp rise in the number of terrorists intercepted by the IDF since the construction of the barrier began in May 2002 and a simultaneous sharp decline in the number of terrorists that succeeded in executing their attacks. There were 17 suicide bomber attacks inside Israel that emanated from the northern part (Samaria) of the West Bank during the months April-December 2002. In contrast, since construction began on the barrier, throughout all of 2003, only 5 suicide bomber attacks emanated from the same area.6 Gideon Meir, deputy director of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggests that the effectiveness of the separation barrier is a result of the barrier itself as well as Israeli military operations and intelligence.7 In all, the widespread belief in Israel is that the separation barrier is an effective counterterrorist strategy. Israel’s international campaign to promote the separation barrier through governmental departments such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Israeli Defense Forces and the official Government of Israel site is buttressed by the participation of a number of key Jewish organizations based abroad such as the Anti-Defamation League, the Jewish Agency for Israel, the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee and Americans for Peace Now. Through the labyrinth of press releases, opinion pieces, position papers and publications published online, the Israeli position is consistently that the separation barrier is a defensive measure anchored in international law that was built to promote national security and halt the infiltration of terrorists from the West Bank into Israel. Israel defines the situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as “an armed conflict short of war” and so contends that the authority to “seize private land is legitimate when the seizure is ‘imperatively demanded’ by the necessities of war”.8 This is a specific interpretation of the Laws of Armed Combat as set forth in Article 23 of the 1907 Hague regulations, which states that it is forbidden “To destroy or seize the enemy’s property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war”.9 Since Israel accuses the Palestinians of initiating the violence of the second Intifada, the separation barrier is viewed in light of the fundamental right of self defense. It is the fundamental responsibility of all governments in the world to protect the lives of their citizens and boundaries of the state from external threat. Israel also claims that the Laws of Armed Combat are applicable in situations when the military aim is to protect the lives of both the citizens of the State of Israel and the Palestinian residents of the West Bank. 5 “Saving Lives—Israel’s Security Fence”, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 2003. http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2003/22/Saving+Lives+Israel. 6 “Saving Lives—Israel’s Security Fence”, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 2003. http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2003/22/Saving+Lives+Israel. 7 Personal interview with Gideon Meir, deputy director of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem, July 21, 2005. In Hebrew. 8 Israel Diplomatic Network, the Anti-Terrorist Fence, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. http://securityfence.mfa.gov.il/mfm/web/main/document.asp?SubjectID=45665&Mi ssionID=45187&LanguageID=0&StatusID=0&DocumentID=-1. 9 “Laws of War: Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague Convention IV)”, October 18, 1907, The Avalon Project at Yale Law School. http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/ lawofwar/hague04.htm.

36

Bridging the Barrier

Israel regards the separation barrier as reversible as the “relevant parts can be moved to different locations” and has until recently been disassociated from a political campaign or a future border, which the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs claims will be “determined by negotiations”.10 However, with the rise of power of the Kadima Party in 2006, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert changed course and set as his goal the establishment of Israel’s permanent borders by 2010, with the boundary running along or close to the barrier. Israel’s Ministry of Defense website states: “The operational concept underlining the Security Fence is to provide a response to the threats posed to the State of Israel and protect its population from the threat of terror and criminal activity”.11 The Government of Israel has consistently maintained that the barrier was erected for security reasons alone, which respond to the following three threats that endanger the security of Israelis (Jews and Arabs) and the State of Israel: (1) terrorist attacks including shootings, explosive charges, booby rigged vehicles and suicide bombers, (2) smuggling of weapons, explosives and explosive charges into Israel and (3) initiation of violent acts and terrorist activity through the assimilation into the local Arab population.12 In all, the security barrier is envisioned by the Israeli government and its supporters as an integral defensive and preventative component of Israel’s national security agenda. Not only does the Israeli government claim that the barrier halts terrorism and the smuggling of weapons into Israel, but it also arrests the passage of illegal workers or thieves coming from areas controlled by the Palestinian Authority into Israel who intend to steal automobiles, farm machinery, animals and other valuable items. The dual articulation of the security barrier in terms of security and law enforcement is intended to further bolster its legitimacy since terrorism and crime are universally condemned by international law and the international community. Israeli Public Opinion In relation to official announcements on Israel’s separation barrier, there is ongoing debate in Israeli public opinion. Despite overwhelming and “across-the-board support”13 for the separation barrier, there are differences of opinion on the barrier and its relation to such issues as unilateral disengagement, Jewish settlements and routing, diplomatic considerations, as well as different levels of commitment to the government’s project emanating from party politics and political constituencies. 10 “Saving Lives—Israel’s Security Fence”, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 2003. http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2003/22/Saving+Lives+Israel. 11 “Israel’s Security Fence”, Ministry of Defense. http://www.securityfence.mod.gov. il/Pages/ENG/operational.htm. 12 “Israel’s Security Fence”, Ministry of Defense. http://www.securityfence.mod.gov. il/Pages/ENG/operational.htm. 13 Peace Index: June 2004, Prof. Ephraim Yaar and Dr. Tamar Hermann, The Tami Steinmetz Center for peace Research, Tel Aviv University. The June 2004 Peace Index is based on 579 telephone interviews conducted from Monday to Wednesday, June 28-30, 2004 by the B.I. Cohen Institute of Tel Aviv University of respondents who represent the adult Jewish and Arab populations of Israel, including the territories and the kibbutzim.

Israeli Perspectives

37

Israel’s major parties take issue with different components of the barrier project. For example, the Likud under Ariel Sharon officially backed the barrier14 although individual party members expressed their reservations and sought to delay and immobilize barrier construction. The implementation of Israel’s unilateral disengagement unleashed major divisions inside the Likud and Israeli society more generally, with challenges emanating from the right and the left of the political spectrum. Sharon became increasingly frustrated by key shifts in the coalition government, first with Benjamin Netanyahu’s resignation as Minister of Finance on August 7, 2005, claiming he could not serve in a government that endangered the safety of Israeli citizens, and followed by the ousting of Sharon’s key ally Shimon Peres as leader of Labor in an internal party ballot on November 8, 2005. With growing opposition to his policies, Sharon officially broke from the Likud on November 21, 2005 and formed Kadima, Israel’s centrist political party, which emerged as the strongest party in Israel after the elections on March 28, 2006. Kadima granted Sharon the authority to carry out his policy of unilateral disengagement based on removing Israeli settlements from Palestinian territory and fixing the borders with a separation barrier. Followers of Shinui15 (Change), the now-defunct16 secular Zionist and free market liberal party in Israel supported the barrier conditional upon alleviating concerns about its feasibility, expenses and resulting rifts with the American Administration. The National Religious Party’s (NRP) support for the barrier has also been conditional upon the inclusion of the town of Ariel in the West Bank. The core belief of the NRP is “the Land of Israel for the People of Israel according to the Torah of Israel”, which, in relation to the barrier promotes Jewish settlement in all parts of the Land of Israel based on belief in the “realization of the Divine precept of the return of the nation from exile to its homeland”.17 The National Union rejects all current peace efforts, including the notion of a Palestinian state, and advocates voluntary transfer of Palestinians. In support of Jewish settlement in the Land of Israel, the National Union rejects the barrier project and has attempted to sabotage it by delaying funding allocated by the defense appropriations subcommittee.18 Labor19 and Meretz20 have been critical of the barrier project from the Left of the political spectrum. Although a member of Sharon’s coalition government, Labor takes issue with the routing of the barrier, preferring a route that runs closer to the Green Line. In fact, Labor leader Shimon Peres was the “lone dissenter when the cabinet originally approved the fence on June 23, 2002” because of the amount of West Bank territory it would incorporate. Meretz’s party platform sees Jewish settlement as the primary obstacle to peace and strongly supports the establishment of a Palestinian

14 Likud party website. http://www.likud.org.il/. 15 Shinui Party website. http://www.shinui.org.il/site/. 16 Shinui did not pass the necessary threshold to be represented in the Israeli Knesset in the 2006 elections. 17 National Religious Party (NRP) (Mafdal) website. http://www.mafdal.org.il/?sid=27. 18 National Union website. http://www.israelvotes.com/demo/platforms_unity.html. 19 Israel Labor Party website. http://www.aavoda.co.il/. 20 Meretz Party Platform at http://www.knesset.gov.il/elections16/eng/lists/plat_20-e.htm.

38

Bridging the Barrier

state. Meretz has expressed opposition to construction of the barrier due to its potential interference in diplomatic negotiations.21 The Pensioners’ Party, a newcomer to the Israeli political spectrum, which campaigned for the March 28, 2006 elections on the platform of restoring pensioner benefits depleted by the previous government and improving health care for the elderly, did not show a clear position on the separation barrier. However, when polled in April 2006, 86% of Pensioners favored building the barrier so that as small a Palestinian population as possible would be included in Israel, thereby demonstrating overall support for the barrier project.22 Opinions on whether the barrier should exist altogether are the least diversified as a majority of Israelis support it. According to the Peace Index, a publication of the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, “the construction of the separation fence is overwhelmingly supported by the Israeli-Jewish public”, most of which believe that the fence has improved Israelis’ sense of security. The Peace Index of March 2004 found that 84% supported it, while 13% opposed it and 3% did not know.23 The Peace Index of April 2006 demonstrated a small drop in the number of members of the Israeli Jewish public that support the fence to 81%, while 12% opposed it and the rest had no opinion. However, a large majority of 69% of voters from all the Jewish parties believes that “in setting the route of the fence security and other consideration of the Israeli government should take precedence, with only 15% saying the route should coincide with the Green Line”.24 Supporters of the separation barrier agree with the government’s assessment that it has improved security and has been a successful tool for fighting terrorism. The Peace Index of February 2004 indicates that along with widespread support for the separation fence, a large majority supports the right of citizens who oppose the fence or its route to express their protest by legal means. Protest by illegal means, on the other hand, is unanimously rejected. Separation and Demography For Israelis, the separation barrier is inextricably tied to the issue of Jewish settlement in the West Bank. Since the 1967 War and Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the will to populate newly acquired territory and expand the demographic boundaries of what had been until then, a highly vulnerable and narrow-waisted Jewish state, overpowered the debate about whether to return the 21 “For and Against: Where Israel’s six major parties stand, or sit, on the Fence issue”, The Jewish Agency for Israel—Department for Jewish Zionist Education. http://www.jafi.org. il/education/actual/conflict/fence/appendices1.html#6. 22 Peace Index: April 2006, The Tami Steinmetz Center for peace Research. http://www. tau.ac.il/peace/. 23 Peace Index, March 2004, Prof. Ephraim Yaar and Dr. Tamar Hermann, The Tami Steinmetz Center for peace Research, Tel Aviv University. The March 2004 Peace Index is based on 580 telephone interviews conducted Monday to Wednesday, March 1-3, 2004 by the B.I. Cohen Institute of Tel Aviv University of respondents who represent the adult Jewish and Arab populations of Israel, including the territories and the kibbutzim. http://www.tau.ac.il/peace/. 24 Peace Index, April 2006. http://www.tau.ac.il/peace/.

Israeli Perspectives

39

territories or keep them. As a result, an increasing Jewish presence was built up in areas of the West Bank that would eventually become designated for a Palestinian state in a comprehensive final status agreement. In the early post-1967 settlement drive, supporters of the Movement for the Whole Land of Israel25 and Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful)26 were driven by ultranationalist motivations. A strong impetus for the religious Zionist settlement drive stemmed from the teachings of Rabbi Abraham Kook and his son, Rabbi Tzvi Yehuda Kook, who preached the 1967 conquests as the start of the “messianic age” in which the coming of the Jewish messiah would be hastened through Jewish settlement on land that God alloted to the Jewish people as affirmed in the Hebrew Bible. Later, new immigrants from Russia and Eastern Europe as well as lower income Israeli-Jewish families moved to the West Bank to take advantage of the lower real estate and living costs. Close to 40 years of Jewish settlement and natural population growth in the West Bank has resulted in a hodgepodge of approximately 187,000 Jews (along with an additional 177,000 in East Jerusalem) and 2,385,615 Arabs27 living in close proximity. The route of Israel’s separation barrier will redefine the demographic makeup of the population of the West Bank depending upon where the line is drawn and whether or not it will serve as a future border of the State of Israel. The relationship between separation and demography has long touched the core of Israeli national identity in the region. According to Choshen and Asaf-Shapira, Demographic processes reflect the interplay between the characteristics of the population at a given time and economic, social, and political processes in the country in general and a specific city or region in particular.28

Population rates change on account of natural increase based on the difference between birth and mortality rates, immigration and emigration and other environmental factors such as war, security, and healthcare. Demographic policies have been a keystone of Zionist settlement since the prestate period and the effort to establish a Jewish majority in Palestine.29 Demographic concerns stem from the dual identity of the State of Israel as both Jewish and democratic. Jewish demographic concerns developed over centuries of anti-Semitic persecution in the Diaspora which reached an apex during the Second World War and the Holocaust. The immeasurable loss to European Jewry had major influence over Israel’s policies on citizenship. The Law of Return passed by Israel’s Parliament on July 5, 1950 and the Law of Citizenship of 1952 gave every Jew throughout the world 25 Supporters of the Movement for the Whole Land of Israel were secular Jews convinced that retention of captured territories was necessary for Israeli security. For more information see Lustick, 1988. 26 For more on Gush Emunim, see Sprinzak, 1991. 27 Population figures taken from the World Factbook. http://www.odci.gov/cia/ publications/factbook/index.html. 28 “Jerusalem: A City in Transition: Population and Spatial Relations”, Maya Choshen and Yair Asaf-Shapira, March 2005, Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies. http://www.jiis. org.il/jerusalem-in-transition.pdf#search=’Israel%20and%20population%20and%201967’. 29 Yuval-Davis, 1997: 31.

40

Bridging the Barrier

an automatic right to acquire Israeli citizenship.30 This right is articulated as the legal confirmation of an “age-old yearning for the return to Zion” and “ingathering of the exiles”, which lies at the heart of Israel’s being and extends to the Jewish people everywhere. Therefore, the Law of Return has religious, historical and nationalistic significance but also sought to confront the practical need for survival of a people subjected to religious persecution. The small size and positioning of the country within a disproportionately larger Arab and Muslim region, led Israeli planners to actively encourage the immigration to Israel of as many Jews as possible. In 1948, the Jewish population of Israel was estimated at approximately 650,000.31 During the first four months of independence, some 50,000 immigrants, mainly Holocaust survivors, arrived from Europe and over 300,000 Jewish refugees disembarked from Arab and North African countries, many whose property and livelihood was confiscated.32 In addition to immigration, Israel also formulated national demographic policies designed to encourage a higher birth rate in the Israeli-Jewish sector. At the first session of the Israeli Knesset, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion referred to the special “mission” Israeli Jewish women have as mothers, and established funding for “heroine mothers”, women who give birth to 10 children or more. As well, the Israeli Housing Ministry subsidized housing for Jewish families with three or more children through the Fund for Encouraging Birth (Yuval-Davis, 1997: 80). Jewish democracy has developed historically in uneasy relation to the high Arab birthrate, a trend that over time threatens to overturn Jewish majority decision making in Israel. The possibility of a Jewish minority in the region awakens long held concerns about an “existential threat”, an end to Jewish statehood in the Middle East. The Jewish demographic concern has intensified since the Israeli Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, which added approximately 1.5 million Arabs to the already existing 300,000-strong Arab minority living within Israeli borders. Policies of Jewish settlement in territories conquered during the 1967 War seemed to overlook the potentially problematic population dynamics. However, eventually, the decline in Jewish immigration rates and an increase in Jewish emigration rates in the 1970s, raised concerns that the higher Arab birthrate would lead to a Jewish minority in the State of Israel (Jacoby, 2005: 60). At the end of 1948, Israel had a population of nearly 900,000. By the end of 2000, its population had grown to 6,400,000 and projected at 8,700,000 in 2020. In 1990-2000, over one million immigrants arrived, including 875,000 from the former Soviet Union, 42,000 from Ethiopia, and 19,000 from the United States. The 5,200,000 Jews in Israel account for 81% of the population. The proportion of Jews verged on 90% after mass immigration and declined from the 1960s on.33 Currently, the Israeli population growth rate is decreasing on average in relation to the Arab 30 “Law of Return, 5710 (1950)”, The Knesset. http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/ eng/return.htm. 31 http://www.factsofisrael.com/blog/archives/000213.html. 32 Facts About Israel. 1992. Israel Information Center: 36. 33 “Population”, Statistilite 15, Nurit Yaffe, State of Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics. http://www.cbs.gov.il/statistical/population_e.pdf.

Israeli Perspectives

41

population in Israel as well as the West Bank and Gaza. According to the World Fact Book, the population growth rate of Israel is 1.18% compared to 3.06% for the West Bank and 3.71% for the Gaza Strip.34 Responding to the ongoing debate about Israeli demography and democracy, Maj. Gen. (res.) Uzi Dayan claims, In order for Israel to be a Jewish democratic state, Israel must decide on its borders. In order to protect the essence of our existence, we must make sure we have a Jewish solid majority within moral and legal means. We must disengage from the Palestinians to be a Jewish democratic state. The only other possibility is a bi-national state.35

There is a constant tension between separating territories and separating populations. According to Dayan, separation has to be between populations. “If we continue to hold on to the territories, we will be a minority that is ruling a majority, like it was in South Africa. Alternatively, the new majority could, through democratic means, eliminate the Jewish state.”36 This so-called “ghetto mentality” stems from a fear that what happened in Europe may happen again. The prospect, whether rational or irrational, has been offset throughout the history of the State of Israel by policies designed to promote Jewish population growth through immigration, pronatalism, as well as voluntary and involuntary departure of Arabs from the region. Initial pronouncements on the barrier model made no reference to the fate of Jewish settlements in the Israeli occupied territories. Two main lines of thought exist regarding the barrier’s relation to Jewish settlements. One, a tightly drawn barrier in closer proximity to the Green Line would lead to a result in which less Palestinians from the West Bank are included in the State of Israel and more Jewish settlements end up on the eastern side of the barrier. In this case, the debate about whether to retain the Jewish settlements or evacuate them becomes increasingly urgent, particularly if the barrier turns into an internationally recognized border. Second, a more loosely drawn barrier that runs deeper into the West Bank, on the other hand, results in inclusion of more Jewish settlements as well as more Palestinians, who would require citizenship rights and status. The main demographic question that stems from the barrier’s routing is who should be included in and/or excluded from the State of Israel. The Peace Index of April 2006 demonstrated that in addition to security, demographic considerations were of greater concern to the Israeli-Jewish public than territory.37 The large majority of 63% supported building a fence in a way that would include as small a Palestinian population as possible within the boundaries of Israel, while only 19% prefer retaining territories as large as possible even if it 34 World Factbook. http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/gz.html. 35 Maj. Gen. (res.) Uzi Dayan, former National Security Advisor, is currently President of the Zionist Council in Israel and in charge of strategic relations between Jerusalem and Washington. Speech to delegation of American rabbis at Hartman Institute in Jerusalem on July 8, 2005. 36 Yiftah Spector, quoted by Lily Galili. “A Jewish Demographic State”, Haaretz, Monday, November 7, 2005. http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=181001& contrassID=2&subContrassID=5&sbSubContrassID=0&listSrc=Y&itemNo=181001. 37 Peace Index: April 2006, The Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research. http://www. tau.ac.il/peace.

42

Bridging the Barrier

means that a large Palestinian population will remain within Israeli territory.38 Israeli demographic considerations of the barrier further the goal of protecting the Jewish nature of the State of Israel. Former Israeli Cabinet Minister for Jerusalem, Haim Ramon, articulated this goal in 2005 that while the initial purpose of the barrier was security, the barrier ultimately makes Jerusalem more Jewish. “The safer and more Jewish Jerusalem will be, it can serve as a true capital of the State of Israel.”39 Among segments of the Israeli public that support the separation project, widespread debate has erupted about the viability and future of Jewish settlement in the West Bank. This debate does not conform to ideological divisions of Right and Left. Recall that the barrier originated on the Israeli Left as a dovish policy that would preclude more aggressive actions against terrorism such as military incursions into Palestinian areas and targeted assassinations. Many individuals from the nationalreligious camp and the secular Right who support Jewish settlement in the West Bank either for political or ideological reasons oppose the barrier precisely out of fear that Jews living in the West Bank will be left “relatively unprotected” and later forced to relocate behind the barrier if it becomes a political border.40 As well, many continue to reject placing any barrier that would deny the indivisibility of the Land of Israel and sabotage Jabotinsky’s historical vision of a maximalist state encompassing both banks of the Jordan River. In planning the route of the barrier, an effort has been made to maintain Jewish concentrations in the West Bank and their contiguity to the State of Israel. Critics such as B’Tselem who take issue with the barrier’s route accuse the Israeli government of intentionally planning a route east of as many Jewish settlements as possible, to facilitate their ultimate annexation into Israel and to avoid the political price to be paid if the Green Line were set as Israel’s border.41 Israel’s Unilateral Disengagement By 2003, there was deadlock at the diplomatic level. In addition to building the separation barrier, Israel chose to alleviate its security and demographic challenges through a policy of unilateral disengagement. Disengagement meant evacuating the mass of Jewish settlers from the Gaza Strip initially, in order to remove all Israeli presence, both civilian and military from Gaza. Surrounded by a fence, Gaza would then be cut off from the rest of Israel and, according to Israeli aspirations, cease to pose a threat to Israeli security. This was the first stage in an attempt to disentangle both nations and establish a border between the two. Former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon first spoke of the disengagement plan on December 18, 2003 at the Fourth Herzliya conference, a gathering of influential Jewish and international leaders in Israel. Although endorsed at the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit in February 38 Peace Index: April 2006, The Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research. http://www. tau.ac.il/peace. 39 “Barrier will make city ‘more Jewish,’ Israeli official says”, Monday, July 11, 2005, Columbia Daily Tribune. http://www.columbiatribune.com/2005/Jul/20050711News007.asp. 40 “Israel’s Security Fence”. http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/fence.html. 41 “Separation Barrier”, B’Tselem: The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories website. http://www.btselem.org/english/Separation_Barrier/Index.asp.

Israeli Perspectives

43

2005, disengagement sparked widespread opposition from all sectors of the Israeli political spectrum, including members of Sharon’s own party. Repeated challenges and resignations induced him to establish a National Unity government in January 2005. The Disengagement Plan was then approved by Israel’s cabinet on June 6, 2004 and by the Israeli Knesset on October 25, 2004. The Israeli Defense Forces had consistently rejected the notion of unilateral withdrawal based on the idea that evacuating settlements prior to a negotiated settlement would mean surrendering to terror. The IDF preferred a policy termed “regularization”, which would mean vacating territory through bilateral relations. However, after attempts at containment, leverage and the use of military options failed, the IDF was forced to implement Sharon’s plan.42 Sharon articulated the two main objectives of disengagement as enhancing Israel’s security by reducing terrorism and boosting Israel’s economy by improving the quality of life. In his Herzliya speech Sharon stated, The purpose of the “Disengagement Plan” is to reduce terror as much as possible, and grant Israeli citizens the maximum level of security. The process of disengagement will lead to an improvement in the quality of life, and will help strengthen the Israeli economy. The unilateral steps which Israel will take in the framework of the “Disengagement Plan” will be fully coordinated with the United States. We must not harm our strategic coordination with the United States. These steps will increase security for the residents of Israel and relieve the pressure on the IDF and security forces in fulfilling the difficult tasks they are faced with. The “Disengagement Plan” is meant to grant maximum security and minimize friction between Israelis and Palestinians.43

The purpose of the disengagement plan was to remove all permanent Israeli presence from the Gaza Strip as well as four settlements in the northern West Bank. Settlers were offered a compensation package by the government, which would allow them to relocate inside Israel. The numerous Israeli Defense Force installations in the areas were slated for evacuation as well. Disengagement sparked major controversy and left major scars on the Israeli psyche. The plan ignited massive protests throughout the country, symbolized in part by the ribbon campaign. Orange ribbons represented opposition to disengagement and blue ribbons signaled support. Although most settlers from the Gaza Strip left without incident, a minority of civilians were evicted by force. Some 14,000 Israeli soldiers and police officers were prepared to forcibly evacuate settlers and “mistanenim” (infiltrators) who entered the areas illegally. The disengagement from Gaza was officially over on September 12, 2005, ending Israel’s 38-year presence in the Strip and the military pullout from the northern West Bank was completed 10 days later. The evacuation of Amona, a religious Israeli outpost on the West Bank, upped the ante in the conflict over disengagement as violent clashes ensued. Settlers and their supporters streamed in from across the country to obstruct or delay the evacuation. Approximately 42 Yoram Peri, 2006. Generals in the Cabinet Room: How the Military Shapes Israeli Policy, United States Institute of Peace Press: Washington, DC: 249. 43 “Prime Minister Sharon’s Speech at the Herzliya Conference”, December 18, 2003. http://www.israelpr.com/sharonspeech1006.html.

44

Bridging the Barrier

4000 settlers fortified themselves inside houses and on rooftops against the 10,000 soldiers and police sent to carry out the demolition orders. The confrontation between Israeli security forces and Jewish civilians was the most violent in Israeli history. Although many Israelis agonized over the prospect of territorial compromise, a majority of the Israeli public came out in support of disengagement on account of the widespread assumption that separation would bring security. Israeli support for disengagement increased after the fact as compared to the period in which disengagement was being implemented. According to the Peace Index of the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research at Tel Aviv University, for the end of August, 2005 the rates of supporters and opponents of the disengagement stood at 41.3% and 52.5%, respectively, whereas the same rates in September changed to 59.4% and 33.3%.44 Ariel Sharon made no official linkages between disengagement and the drawing of final borders between Israel and the Palestinians alongside the separation barrier. However, both Israelis and Palestinians were cognizant of the need to be on the “right” side of the barrier once the movements of peoples had settled. The relationship between disengagement, demography and the barrier became clear only with the convergence plan articulated in the post-Sharon period. Convergence The term “convergence” generally means to merge or come together. In the IsraeliPalestinian context convergence operates at two levels. On one level, convergence further extends the logic of disengagement by separating the State of Israel from the large concentrations of Palestinians in territory destined for a future Palestinian state. At another, more significant level, however, convergence seeks to mitigate the demographic challenge by dividing the land in a way that ensures a continued Jewish majority in the State of Israel. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert outlined his “convergence plan” in an interview with Karby Leggett of The Wall Street Journal on April 12, 2006. His stated goal was to withdraw 70,000 Jewish settlers from the West Bank, less than a third of the 250,000 currently still residing east of the Green Line. In return, Israel will retain the large settlement blocs where most of the evacuees will be relocated meaning that parts of the West Bank will be annexed to the State of Israel, particularly the bedroom communities built up around Jerusalem. The solution involves creating contiguity between the large Jewish settlement blocs east of the Green Line and the State of Israel. To do this, convergence maximizes the number of Jews and minimizes the number of Palestinians in the State of Israel. Israeli policy expresses preference for keeping Jewish settlements that are situated close to Israel’s Green Line and giving Arab neighborhoods over to the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority. In order to prepare for the evacuation of settlers, the Israeli Civil Administration began mapping of “all illegal construction by settlers in the West Bank”. The mapping operation was declared at the Israeli Supreme Court by the commander of the Civil Administration in the West Bank Brigadier General Kamil Abu Rukun, in response

44 The Peace Index, September 2005, The Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research. http://www.tau.ac.il/peace/.

Israeli Perspectives

45 45

to a petition by Peace Now, calling for the demolition of Horsha and Hayovel. The evacuation of settlements deemed “illegal outposts” enjoys a high level of support in Israeli public opinion. However, there remain key Jewish settlements whose evacuation has been highly disputed, the most controversial of which is the town of Ariel. The Case of Ariel Ariel is Israel’s so-called “Smart City” and self-proclaimed “capital of Samaria”.46 A Jewish village located 19 kilometers (12 miles) into the West Bank and consisting of a population of approximately 20,000 residents, mostly Likud supporters, Ariel is the settlement located the most eastward of the Green Line, into the very heart of the West Bank. The debate has revolved around whether to include Ariel within the main barrier or to encircle it with a separate section of barrier. Ariel has presented a particular dilemma for Israeli planners on account of their discord with the US government’s demand that the separation barrier project in such West Bank areas be deferred for the foreseeable future. The area was host to serious clashes between IDF soldiers and Palestinian demonstrators and their supporters who protested the annexation of West Bank territory after affected residents of the Salfit town, south of Ariel, received appropriation orders for land upon which the barrier would be built. The lands to be appropriated in the Salfit area are the southern part of what Israeli security officials refer to as the “fingernails” zone, stretches of the separation barrier that will ring large Jewish settlements on the West Bank.47 According to plans, the fingernails will in the future be expanded into what Israeli officials call “fingers”—meaning the separation barrier will be continued up to the 1967 Green Line border. The so-called “Ariel Finger” of the barrier’s route is a 50-kilometer section that loops through the West Bank, around the town of Ariel and returns to the main line of the barrier near the Green Line.48 The position of Ariel vis-à-vis the separation barrier is illustrative of the broader debate about Jewish settlements and unilateral disengagement from the Palestinians. Leading the debate about the future of Ariel is the city’s mayor, Ron Nachman. Nachman was among the first 40 families that constituted the initial group of pioneers in 1977 that turned Ariel from a barren hilltop into a vibrant city. Nachman has served as the popular mayor of the city since 1985 and is perceived as the only authentic member of Knesset that represents the needs and rights of the people of Judea and Samaria.49 In principle Nachman is a strong believer in the notion of a 45 “Israel works on mapping illegal outposts in the West Bank”, Relief Web, May 8 2006. http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/VBOL-6PLEED?OpenDocument. 46 Ariel home page. http://go.ariel.muni.il/ariel/en/index.php?option=content&task=vie w&id=37&Itemid=50. 47 Fingernails planned for construction include the area around Kedumim in the north; around Immanuel and Karnei Shomron in the center of this West Bank region; and Ariel in the south. 48 Ellis Shuman, “Construction starts on security barrier just north of Jerusalem”, Israel Insider, November 14, 2005. http://web.israelinsider.com/bin/en.jsp?enPage=ArticlePage&enDisp lay=view&enDispWhat=object&enDispWho=Article^l3757&enZone=Security&enVersion=0&. 49 “Landslide Victory for Ariel Mayor”, Shalom Ariel, Summer 1995. http://www.easyaccess.com/ariel/Summer95/cover.htm.

46

Bridging the Barrier

secure and integral Land of Israel and sees Ariel as a kind of “renaissance of the pioneering spirit that built the Jewish homeland”. For this reason, he rejects the idea of erecting a barrier anywhere in the Jewish homeland. However, like many Jewish settlers in the West Bank, he supports the barrier project pragmatically and has campaigned vigorously to have Ariel included in the barrier project. In addition to arguments that such settlements as Ariel bolster Israel’s “strategic depth” and assure access to vital West Bank resources, particularly water, Nachman articulates his positioning as a kind of “front line” in Israel’s demographic struggle: Time is on Israel’s side. We must build a critical mass. If more settlements were built or were built bigger, it would have been a fait accompli. We must have large communities to establish a national fact. This way, the Arabs will have more and more difficulties in negotiating the facts on the ground.50

Although Nachman acknowledges that Israel must concede some of the territory and make some compromises through negotiations, he ultimately dismisses the notion of a “third state” between Israel and Jordan. The issue of Ariel, as the most extreme representation of Jewish settlement activity west of the barrier, has been the most visible obstacle in Israeli foreign relations with the United States, its closest ally. Strains in Israeli-American Relations Jewish settlement activity in the Palestinian territories has been a consistent source of friction in Israeli-American relations, of which Ariel is currently one of the main sticking points. The United States and Israel have shared a “deep and abiding friendship”51 throughout their history based on common interests and values. Although the two countries may disagree on particular policies, their overall relationship has been relatively smooth. Advancement of American interests in the Middle East has been formulated through close ties with Israel in the areas of political, economic and military cooperation and coordination on Middle East geopolitics. Israel receives upward of $3 billion in US foreign assistance annually.52 This assistance has protected Israeli national security in the region, although it has also perpetuated a relationship of dependence, which arguably, limits Israeli policy options. Since the first Jewish settlements were established in territories occupied by Israel in the 1967 War, the United States has considered these settlements illegal under international law (specifically Article 49 of the Geneva Convention, which states that an occupying power may not transfer its civilian population into occupied territory). Since the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt in 1979, the United States has acted as the principal extra-regional interlocutor in peace negotiations between 50 Personal interview with Ron Nachman, Mayor of Ariel, July 22, 2005, Ariel, West Bank, in Hebrew. 51 R 238, 2002-H 8123, Enacted 05/09/2002, House Resolution, Celebrating Israel’s 54th Anniversary. http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/PublicLaws/law02/res02/res02238.htm. 52 Shirl McArthur, “A Conservative Total for US Aid to Israel: $91 Billion—and Counting”, Congress Watch, Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, January-February, 2001: 15-16. http://www.wrmea.com/archives/Jan_Feb_2001/0101015.html.

Israeli Perspectives

47

parties to the conflict. In the context of the Middle East peace process, American policy views Israeli settlement activity as an “obstacle to peace”. Israel’s separation barrier project has deepened points of friction with the American Administration over settlement activity. American policy supports the barrier in principle within pre-1967 boundaries but has expressed grave reservations about the purpose and nature of the routing of barrier segments that extend in to Palestinian territories. In his welcoming statement to President Mahmoud Abbas, President George W. Bush claimed that “the barrier now being built to protect Israelis from terrorist attacks must be a security barrier, rather than a political barrier. Israeli leaders must take into account the impact this security barrier has on Palestinians not engaged in terrorist activities.”53 In other words, American policy supports Israel’s right to security from terrorism, particularly since the United States has been embroiled in its own war on terror. However, the United States rejects potential use of the barrier as a means by Israel to influence the negotiating process. This view is based on the assumption that Israeli settlements in territories occupied since 1967 preclude the development of a contiguous Palestinian state and therefore renders problematic the development of a two-state solution. In a Press conference at the White House on October 28, 2003, Bush responds to queries about the barrier: You asked about the fence. I have said the fence is a problem to the extent that the fence is a opportunity to make it difficult for a Palestinian state to emerge. There is a difference between security and land acquisition. And we have made our views clear on that issue. I’ve also spoken to Prime Minister Sharon in the past about settlement activities. And the reason why that we have expressed concern about settlement activities is because we want the conditions for a Palestinian state on the ground to be positive, that when the Palestinians finally get people that are willing to fight off terror, the ground must be right so that a state can emerge; a peaceful state.54

According to American policy views, changes in the status and number of Jewish settlers in those areas alter facts on the ground in a way that may impede Israel’s willingness to negotiate. This view dates back to Bush’s June 24, 2002 speech in which he stated that according to the recommendations of the Mitchell Committee,55 “Israeli settlement activity in the occupied territories must stop.”56 US policy towards Israeli settlement was reaffirmed in the Road Map for 53 “President Welcomes Palestinian President Abbas to the White House”, The Rose Garden, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House Website, October 20, 2005. http:// www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051020.html. 54 Press Conference by the President, President George W. Bush, The Rose Garden, The White House, Washington, DC, October 28, 2003 , 11:15 A.M. EST, US Department of State. http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/25747.htm. 55 The Mitchell Committee urged the Government of Israel to “freeze all settlement activity, including ‘natural growth’ of existing settlements”, Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee Final Report, April 30, 2001, US Department of State, USinfo.state.gov. http://usinfo.state.gov/ mena/Archive_Index/Sharm_ElSheikh_FactFinding_Committee_Final_Report.html. 56 “President Bush Calls for New Palestinian Leadership”, The Rose Garden, June 24, 2002, The White House Website. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/2002062 4-3.html.

48

Bridging the Barrier

Peace, the first phase of which called on Israel to freeze settlement activity and dismantle outposts.57 According to powers granted under the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2003, the United States has used its loan guarantees to Israel as a means to strengthen its position vis-à-vis Jewish settlements and the barrier. Loan guarantees and military aid have been made contingent upon a freeze in Israeli settlement activity. According to US guidelines, Israel is required to use the funds within the pre-1967 borders and the amount of the guarantees may be reduced by an amount equal to Israel’s expenditures on settlements in the territories.58 On this basis, settlement activity renders Israel susceptible to reduced funding in other areas. Nonetheless, President Bush has sent mixed messages about the extent of American support for a barrier that deviates from the 1949 armistice. In a letter to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Bush expresses flexibility with regard to the route of the barrier: As part of a final peace settlement, Israel must have secure and recognized borders, which should emerge from negotiations between the parties in accordance with UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338. In light of new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli population centers, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949, and all previous efforts to negotiate a two-state solution have reached the same conclusion. It is realistic to expect that any final status agreement will only be achieved on the basis of mutually agreed changes that reflect these realities.59

This statement suggests that the United States intends to be flexible on the barrier route in relation to places where Israel seeks to annex those settlements closest to the Green Line. However, the United States has been forthright in opposing significant deviations from the Green Line with respect to the area of Ariel. Sources in the administration have indicated that should the barrier be extended around the settlement of Ariel, a sum equivalent to that allocated for its construction would be deducted from loan guarantees to Israel. “This policy would force the government to choose between Ariel and the guarantees.”60 In an interview by the Washington Post,

57 “Roadmap for Peace in the Middle East: Israeli/Palestinian Reciprocal Action”, Quartet Support, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, DC, July 16, 2003, US Department of State. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/22520.htm. Also, see http://usinfo.state.gov/mena/ Archive/2004/Feb/04-725518.html. 58 Loan guarantees are loans that the United States cosigns for Israel that improve bankers’ confidence in lending money to Israel at more favorable terms in the form of lower interest rates and longer repayment periods. Mitchell Bard, Loan Guarantees, Jewish Virtual Library. http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/US-Israel/loan_guarantees.html. 59 “Letter From President Bush to Israeli Prime Minister Sharon”, President George W. Bush, Washington, DC, April 14, 2004, US Department of State. http://www.state.gov/p/nea/ rls/rm/31490.htm. 60 Nathan Guttman and Aluf Benn, “US to hold off on cuts to loan guarantees”, www. Haaretz.com, September 23, 2003. http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/objects/pages/PrintArticle En.jhtml?itemNo=343001.

Israeli Perspectives

49

then Secretary of State Colin Powell said “we are examining what our obligations are under the relevant legislation that set up the loan guarantees”.61 Personal Insecurity and Fear Although the campaign in support of Israel’s separation barrier consists of political arguments, facts and statistical data, Israeli public opinion is best understood at the emotional level. A majority of Israelis support the separation barrier out of an overwhelming belief that a solution to Israel’s chronic insecurity has finally been achieved. This belief emanates from living with the constant threat of suicide attacks and worrying about being targeted in public spaces, restaurants, coffee shops, movie houses, public transportation systems and the street. All the activities that make up everyday life in Israel since the onset of the second Intifada in 2000 were increasingly subjected to violence and regarded as unsafe, thereby confining Israeli society to an ever narrowed area of secured space. One factor that makes suicide bombing particularly terrifying is the sense that there is no possible shelter.62 Many Israelis stopped taking the bus, going for coffee, or leaving the home unless out of absolute necessity. Many feared their loved ones would not come back at the end of the day. Guards were placed at the entrance of every public building. As potential targets of violence, Israelis came to feel—what David Horovitz describes as—“scared and saddened and sobered and scarred” (Horovitz, 2004: 44). A typical example is given by Nikki Hasson-Moss who was alarmed by a suspicious-looking youth on an Israeli bus. She reveals the psychological torment she underwent: I was on the bus on Hebron Road on the way to work about a year into the second Intifada….This kid got on—dark-skinned, tallish, with a backpack slung over his shoulder and wearing a heavy coat on an already warmish day—at the stop near Abu Tor, a mixed Arab and Jewish neighborhood….Well, I just panicked. I kept it inside, but I panicked. This is it, I was saying to myself. This is the end. He’s going to blow himself up any second. I was asking myself, Why did I insist on taking the bus? I knew I shouldn’t take the bus. And now I’m going to die on the bus. Now this is going to happen to me. And who is going to pick up my children from school?

Although the boy was not a suicide bomber and posed no threat to anybody, the feelings of panic and fear narrated by Hasson-Moss tell of the effects that the indiscriminate nature of suicide terrorism implants in an entire society.63 Along with the fear of course, is the reality of thousands of Israeli casualties resulting from suicide bomb attacks. Many personal testimonies have been taken from victims of terrorist attacks and organizations have been established to care for 61 Interview by The Washington Post, Secretary Colin L. Powell, Washington, DC, October 3, 2003, 2003/1030, (3:30 p.m. EDT), US Department of State. http://www.state.gov/ secretary/former/powell/remarks/2003/25139.htm. 62 “Erased In A Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks Against Israeli Civilians”, Human Rights Watch, October, 2002, New York. http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/isrl-pa/. 63 Quoted in Horovitz, 2004: 47.

50

Bridging the Barrier

survivors and their families. OneFamily,64 for example, is a volunteer-based, nonprofit organization in Israel established as a result of the suicide bomb attack on the Sbarro restaurant in Jerusalem on 9 August 2001. Twelve year old Michal Belzberg was preparing for her Bat Mitzvah when the attacker struck. She was moved to cancel her celebrations and raised the initial $100,000 from her friends and relatives to donate to the victims of the Sbarro attack. This was the beginning of the OneFamily organization. Since then, OneFamily has provided on-going assistance to over 2200 victims of terrorism and their families in the form of financial, material, legal, and emotional assistance to provide social and therapeutic opportunities for the victims and to aid in their recuperation.65 According to the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1086 people had been killed by Palestinian violence and terrorism between September 2000 and the beginning of 2006. Between September 29, 2000 and November 1, 2005, Magen David Adom, Israel’s national emergency medical, disaster, ambulance and blood bank service, treated a total of 7555 casualties (976 killed, 621 severely injured, 902 moderately and 5056 lightly injured, among them 11 MDA staff members).66 The lives of those Israelis directly affected by a suicide bomb are altered forever. “Your whole life—erased in a moment,” said Moti Mizrachi, a terrorist victim interviewed by Human Rights Watch.67 Mizrahi suffered life-threatening injuries in the attack at the Moment Café on March 9, 2002. The bomb, which killed eleven and wounded over fifty civilians blasted nails and small pieces of shrapnel, of which one just missed his aorta. As a result, his left hand was almost severed, and he suffered a large head wound which left him in interminable pain, his hand and arm held together by pins. One quick minute and everything is radically changed. It’s like your life was erased— everything that you did until age thirty-one vanished into nothing. I used to be active, to play soccer two or three times a week, I was on teams, I danced...68

Between September 30, 2000 and August 31, 2002, Human Rights Watch compiled a list of 60 suicide bombing attacks against Israeli civilians and military targets, the most deadly of which was the suicide bombing attack on March 27, 2002, when twenty-five-year-old ’Abd al-Basit ’Awdah, a Hamas activist from Tulkarem, blew himself up in a Netanya hotel as some 250 people sat down to a Passover Seder. The blast killed at least nineteen Israelis immediately and wounded scores of others; the death toll later climbed to twenty-nine. 64 OneFamily homepage. http://www.onefamilyfund.org/default.aspx. 65 “Frequently Asked Questions”, OneFamily. http://www.onefamilyfund.org/Default. aspx?tabid=103&pid=0. 66 Victims of Palestinian Violence and Terrorism since September 2000, September 27, 2000, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+since+2000/Victims%20of%20Palestinian%20Viol ence%20and%20Terrorism%20sinc. 67 “Erased In A Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks Against Israeli Civilians”, Human Rights Watch, October, 2002, New York. http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/isrl-pa/. 68 Human Rights Watch interview with Moti Mizrachi, age thirty-one, Jerusalem, June 23, 2002, see http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/isrl-pa/ISRAELPA1002-03.htm#P298_35555.

Israeli Perspectives

51

Behind the attacks is a complex network of armed groups in the Palestinian territories, the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), currently in government, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, the Popular Resistance Committees (PRC) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). These groups subsist on a combination of internal recruitment and external funding and logistical support. To this are added troubling factors that contribute or at least do not detract from terrorist pursuits such as the increased use of children in suicide bomb attacks, mixed messages from Palestinian officials who simultaneously condemn terrorists but praise martyrdom, popular support, media involvement69 and an educational system that demonizes Jews and does not recognize the sovereign status of the State of Israel.70 The savage and immoral tactics used by these militant groups casts a dark shadow over a potential resumption of peace negotiations, thus the desire in Israel to pursue unilateral measures. Israelis Against the Barrier and/or its Route Those who reject the barrier constitute a minority in the Israeli-Jewish public although there is wide opposition to the barrier in the Israeli-Arab sector. Israelis, whether Arab or Jewish who reject the barrier altogether claim that it is not successful against terrorism, it has a political rather than security agenda and it creates an illusion Israel can manage rather than resolve the conflict. Organizations on the radical Left of the Israeli political spectrum are among the most vocal critics from within of Israel’s separation barrier. Eight Israeli human rights organizations are coordinated through forum hagader (fence forum), an initiative of the New Israel Fund and its empowerment and training center Shatil.71 The forum consists of B’Tselem, Physicians for Human Rights-Israel,72 Rabbis for Human Rights, Council for Peace and Security, Bimkom,73 HaMoked,74 Ir Amim and the Association for Civil Rights 69 “Martyrdom, Public Officials, and the Role of the Media”, “Erased In A Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks Against Israeli Civilians”, Human Rights Watch, October, 2002, New York. http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/isrl-pa/ISRAELPA1002-03.htm#P514_99133. 70 “Jews, Israel and Peace in Palestinian Textbooks—The New Textbooks for Grades 3 and 8”, Compiled and Translated by Dr. Arnon Groiss, edited by CMIP staff, May 2003, Center for Monitoring the Impact of Peace. http://www.edume.org/reports/11/toc.htm. 71 The New Israel Fund’s empowerment and training center was established in 1982 to promote democracy, tolerance and social justice in Israel. Shatil provides over 1000 nonprofit organizations with consulting, advocacy, media and PR, coalition building, resource development and volunteer management each year. http://www.shatil.org.il/site/static. asp?apd=27&scd=98. 72 Physicians for Human Rights-Israel was established in 1988 to promote human rights, particularly the right to health in Israel and the Occupied Territories. http://www.phr.org.il. 73 Bimkom: Planners for Planning Rights was established in May 1999 by planners and architects whose aim is to promote human rights in spatial planning in Israel. http://www. bimkom.org. 74 HaMoked, Center for the Defense of the Individual is an Israeli human rights organization that promotes human rights in the Occupied Territories. http://www.hamoked. org.il/index_eng.asp.

52

Bridging the Barrier

in Israel. The forum meets once or twice a month, not to arrive at policy decisions but to coordinate their activities on the issue of the separation barrier. There is not a consensual position among the groups. For example, HaMoked is against the barrier completely while others simply want to change the route.75 But as a whole, the forum is an active component of the dissenting stream within Israel on the barrier. Within the forum, B’Tselem, the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, provides the most documented information on the separation barrier. B’Tselem was established in 1989 and is currently Israel’s leading human rights organization.76 It monitors human rights in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and seeks through public education and advocacy to “combat the phenomenon of denial prevalent among the Israeli public, and help create a human rights culture in Israel”. B’Tselem has conducted an ongoing campaign to educate the Israeli public about the separation barrier through documentation in the form of reports, press releases, specific case studies and testimonials from individuals who claim their human rights have been violated. This information is obtained through fieldwork that B’Tselem conducts on its own and which is cross-checked with official government sources.77 Officially, B’Tselem upholds Israel’s right to defend itself and states clearly that “if Israel requires a barrier to protect its citizens, it must construct it along its 1967 boundary”.78 However, it is highly critical of the routing of the barrier and the humanitarian and human rights issues that it claims to have caused. The Council for Peace and Security in Israel is another of Israel’s strongest advocates of changing the route of the barrier. The Council for Peace and Security79 is a voluntary and nonpartisan association of over 1000 national security experts with high-ranking backgrounds in the security and diplomatic fields. Members come from high-ranking posts in the Israeli Defense Forces, the Mossad, Shin Bet, the police service, the diplomatic corps and academia. Established in 1988 by a group of senior reservists led by the late Major General (res.) Aharon Yariv, the Council’s major goal is to discontinue Israel’s rule over the Palestinian people as a result of the moral and strategic liabilities the occupation presents to the State of Israel. By contrast to other more grassroots segments of the fence forum and due to the nature of its membership, the Council for Peace and Security holds a much higher profile and is much more mainstream oriented as it seeks to retain a Jewish majority in an independent State of Israel. Although the Council is critical of the moral problems associated with Israel’s ongoing rule over the Palestinian people, its main emphasis is on the threats that face Israel and Israeli security on account of the current impasse. For example, five main goals of the Council are to: (1) reduce the burden, both in 75 Personal telephone interview with Shmulik David, Shatil on July 27, 2005 in Hebrew. 76 For more information published by B’Tselem on the separation barrier, see www. btselem.org. 77 “About B’Tselem”, B’Tselem website. http://www.bselem.org/english/About_Btselem/ Index.asp. 78 “Separation Barrier Threatens to Obstruct the Road Map”, B’Tselem Press Release, June 24, 2003. 79 Council for Peace and Security website. http://jnul.huji.ac.il/IA/ArchivedSites/ peacesecurity231103/www.peace-security.org.il.

Israeli Perspectives

53

terms of resources and personnel, of the Israeli security establishment, (2) strengthen the defensive capacity of Israel’s security forces by shortening Israel’s lines of defense and removing settlements and installations beyond the Green Line, (3) minimize points of friction with the Palestinians, (4) reduce the danger of escalation into allout war, and (5) overcome the negative demographic trend of the Jewish people becoming a minority in the historical Land of Israel between the Mediterranean Sea and Jordan.80 Shaul Arieli, a member of the Council for Peace and Security who retired from the army after 25 years, having served as a Brigadier in Gaza, currently works on the Geneva Initiative, the disengagement plan and the barrier. Arieli argues that Prime Minister Sharon’s plan after being publicly pressured was to build a barrier with maximum territory and in a way that postpones the political process. “Without a Palestinian partner, we have an unstable situation with thousands of friction points among the Palestinians, the settlers and the Israeli army. This is exactly the situation that Sharon wants: a low level of violence, no political process and 10 years to change the demographics of the seam zone.”81 Arieli works often with the Israeli Supreme Court offering alternative routes to the ones adopted by the Israeli government. The unilateral construction of the fence is a way to manage the conflict rather than solve the conflict. So we must build according to Israeli strategic goals, which is to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But that must be based on a final settlement. However, not all issues are territorial such as refugees. We must build a stability situation to cope with the three threats that Israel faces: territorial, demographic and economic. The first fence approved by the government was less viable from a security and economic perspective. It included over 400,000 Palestinians. We took their land, their water and their olives, so they are poorer and they want revenge. We suggested a different route for the barrier that runs closer to the Green Line, excludes more Palestinians and decreases those three threats.

While the Council for Peace and Security is concerned with establishing a less destructive route of the barrier, its main emphasis is on Israeli security and Israeli society. Indeed, the Council’s criticism of the current barrier’s long and meandering route echoes objections from the Israeli military establishment that claim an effective fence must be as short and straight as possible in order to monitor lines of defense. Other groups in the fence forum are more concerned with the Palestinian side of the barrier and place greater emphasis on personal contacts and reconciliation efforts. A major problem, they point to, is the disruption of the daily lives of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians along the barrier’s route.82 B’Tselem has documented extensively the damage caused as a result of the barrier to local Palestinian residents, 210,000 of which, it claims, were hurt by the first stage of the barrier alone. A major problem, they claim, is the isolation of Palestinian villages from nearby urban centers upon which they rely for basic services such as health, education, and work. As well, the barrier impedes access to farmland, orchards and water resources thereby preventing residents from working 80 “Primary Objectives of the Plan”, Council for Peace and Security website. http://jnul. huji.ac.il/IA/ArchivedSites/peacesecurity231103/www.peace-security.org.il. 81 Personal interview with Shaul Arieli, July 31, 2005, Tel Aviv, in Hebrew. 82 “Israel Confuses the Justification for a Separation Barrier with the Specific Route Chosen”, B’Tselem Press Release, January 12, 2004.

54

Bridging the Barrier

their land and marketing their produce.83 This will result, according to B’Tselem, in increasing poverty and unemployment in Palestinian communities, a predicament that when combined with continued dependence on Israeli control and arbitrary decisions about matters crucial to Palestinian life, promotes anger, despondency and alienation, sentiments that do not promote the long-term goals of peace. Further, Israeli policies which encircle villages, establish closed military zones and restrict movement through checkpoints, concrete blocks, dirt piles, trenches, curfews and closed roads contribute to the framework of occupation that will eventually destroy the social fabric of Palestinian life and prohibit the possibility of any viable and contiguous Palestinian state.84 B’Tselem has already worked for years against Israel’s policy of house demolitions, expropriation of Palestinian property and the expansion of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, which it believes are contrary to the prospect of a two-state solution.85 A second issue critics have with the Israeli government’s barrier route is that it is not, they claim, dictated solely by security needs. B’Tselem disagrees with Israel’s categorization of the situation in the Occupied Territories as “an armed conflict short of war”, which according to international law allows for the application of the laws of warfare. “Israel uses this position to justify violations of human rights of Palestinians.”86 B’Tselem defines Israel as the occupying power, whose duty is to protect the civilian population and act in accordance with international law even in the harsh circumstances of warfare. Even if security needs must prevail, in the case of the separation barrier, extraneous considerations were taken in determining the barrier’s route. “Security may even be compromised to achieve political goals. The planned route is twice as expensive and twice as difficult to patrol. This route is primarily dictated by the desire to maintain Israeli settlements and to influence future diplomatic negotiations.”87 According to the Council for Peace and Security, Israel needs to shorten its lines of defense by placing the separation barrier on the Green Line and removing settlements and installations to the east. The dismantlement of settlements and territorial concessions are highly disputed issues with the Israeli public. However, Shaul Arieli clearly states “you can provide security to Israel with much less territory”.88 A second argument is that rather than security, the barrier’s route is motivated by political party considerations,89 and the influence of right-wing politicians and 83 “Behind the Barrier: Human Rights Violations as a Result of Israel’s Separation Barrier”, Position Paper, B’Tselem, Jerusalem, March 2003: 19. 84 “Behind the Barrier: Human Rights Violations as a Result of Israel’s Separation Barrier”, Position Paper, B’Tselem, Jerusalem, March 2003: 13 85 “Israel’s Unilateral Measures Futher Polarization in East Jerusalem”, B’Tselem Press Release, February 3, 2005. 86 “Behind the Barrier: Human Rights Violations as a Result of Israel’s Separation Barrier”, Position Paper, B’Tselem, Jerusalem, March 2003: 29. 87 “Israel Confuses the Justification for a Separation Barrier with the Specific Route Chosen”, B’Tselem Press Release, January 12, 2004. 88 Personal interview with Shaul Arieli, July 31, 2005, Tel Aviv, in Hebrew. 89 For an outline of Israeli political party platforms and positions on major issues, see http://www.israelvotes.com/demo/index.html.

Israeli Perspectives

55

settlement officials who are reluctant to recognize the 1967 Green Line as a future border. B’Tselem points out that the barrier’s routing took into consideration the safeguarding of antiquities and access to religious sites, which although crucial to the Jewish faith, have nothing to do with protecting the security of Israel and Israelis. As well, B’Tselem argues that the barrier’s route was motivated by a desire to include as many Jewish settlements as possible, which it regards as illegal and must be dismantled, west of the barrier.90 A third issue is the government’s claim that the separation barrier is a “last resort”. The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs blames the Palestinian Authority and its leadership for “doing nothing” to stop terrorism and even encouraging the terrorists. “The Palestinian Authority, since its establishment, has incited the Palestinian population against Israel and against Jews. Its educational system, from kindergarten through university, teaches hatred of Israel, and not only legitimizes but encourages admiration of suicide bombers.”91 Israel takes issue with the basic premise of the Palestinian claim that the “occupation” causes terrorism. This premise, Israel argues is historically flawed. “Arab and Palestinian terrorism against Israel existed prior to the beginning of Israeli control over the West Bank and Gaza as a result of the Six Day War of June 1967, and even prior to the establishment of the State of Israel in May 1948.”92 On this basis, Israel’s claim is that the security barrier is a measure that would not have been necessary had the Palestinian Authority not violated the obligations that were contained in the Oslo Agreements and the Roadmap of May 2003 to clamp down on terrorist and extremist elements. B’Tselem concludes that “erecting the barrier to prevent attacks in Israel is the most extreme solution”93 and suggests consideration of alternative courses of action that were overlooked in order to thwart terrorist threats in ways that infringe less upon the human rights of Palestinians. For example, based on an evaluation of the State Comptroller’s Audit Report on the Seam Area, B’Tselem claims that the assumption that terrorists enter Israel to perpetrate attacks through open areas is mistaken. Instead, “most of the suicide terrorists and car bombs crossed through the seam area into Israel through the checkpoints where they underwent faulty and even shoddy checks”.94 This criticism of the logic of Israeli policy turns on the quality and professionalism of Israeli Defense Forces at the thirty-two checkpoints 90 “Behind the Barrier: Human Rights Violations as a Result of Israel’s Separation Barrier”, Position Paper, B’Tselem, Jerusalem, March 2003: 33-34. 91 “Suicide Terror: its use and rationalization, communicated by IDF spokesperson”, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, July 23, 2002. http://www.israelmfa.gov.il/mfa/ mfaarchive/2000_2009/2002/7/suicide%20terror-%20its%20use%20and%20rationalization %20-%20july. 92 “Which Came First—Terrorism or Occupation—Major Arab Terrorist Attacks against Israelis Prior to the 1967 Six-Day War”, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 31, 2002. http://www.israel.org/MFA/Terrorism+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+before+2000/ Which+Came+First-+Terrorism+or+Occupation+-+Major.htm. 93 “Behind the Barrier: Human Rights Violations as a Result of Israel’s Separation Barrier”, Position Paper, B’Tselem, Jerusalem, March 2003: 39. 94 “Behind the Barrier: Human Rights Violations as a Result of Israel’s Separation Barrier”, Position Paper, B’Tselem, Jerusalem, March 2003: 31.

56

Bridging the Barrier

stationed along the Green line. This argument suggests that the barrier, with its increased number of checkpoints, will have the opposite effect of increasing rather than decreasing the danger of attacks inside Israel. The other major critique targets the manner of deployment of IDF forces, which were reorganized in a new policy directive in January 2002 to give higher priority to combat deep inside the territory of the Palestinian areas and in relation to its infrastructure rather than the seam zone. B’Tselem argues that a reallocation of soldiers and resources to the seam zone area and closer coordination between the IDF and Police forces there would improve the protection system responsible for overseeing the entry of people into Israel from the West Bank. The entreaty to reopen the debate about Israel’s anti-terrorist policy touches upon the broader grievance in Israeli society against the highly centralized and inaccessible planning for the route of the barrier, the lack of transparency and the absence of information, which B’Tselem claims “violates the rules of proper administration and hampers informed public debate on a project of long-term, farreaching significance”.95 Absent from Israeli public debate on the barrier according to Israeli human rights organizations is the human face of those negatively affected by Israeli policy. While Israelis lament delays in construction and blame the government for faulty planning,96 little emphasis—apart from a handful of human rights and peace organizations on the Israeli Left—is on the human cost of the barrier shouldered by Palestinians. The Peace Index of March 2004 found that the Israeli-Jewish public’s strong support for the separation barrier is manifested in a “low level of consideration for the suffering caused to the Palestinian population”.97 The Peace Index of May 2006 showed that the majority position in Israeli public opinion claims that Israel has a moral right to decide its permanent borders without consulting the Palestinians. Of the Jewish public, 51% feels that even though disengagement would entail annexing territories belonging to the Palestinians, it is not important that Israel compensate them with lands of the same size within Israel, as opposed to 40% who think the Palestinians deserve such compensation.98 As all unilateral measures demonstrate, the decision to “go it alone” undercuts a process through which the interests and even existence of the other party are not taken into consideration. The capacity to empathize across the barrier is barred by a strong emotional current, the widespread belief in Israel that the security barrier saves lives. Many Israelis, when faced with the prospect of making concessions on their security, argue that life is more important than inconvenience or deprivation and cannot relate to Palestinian concerns about human rights. “The inconvenience caused to Palestinians by the security fence is temporary and reversible”99 as opposed to 95 “Behind the Barrier: Human Rights Violations as a Result of Israel’s Separation Barrier”, Position Paper, B’Tselem, Jerusalem, March 2003: 9. 96 “Behind the Barrier: Human Rights Violations as a Result of Israel’s Separation Barrier”, Position Paper, B’Tselem, Jerusalem, March 2003: 39. 97 Peace Index, March 2004, Prof. Ephraim Yaar and Dr. Tamar Hermann, The Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, Tel Aviv University. 98 Peace Index, May 2006, The Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research. http://www. tau.ac.il/peace/. 99 “The Anti-Terrorist Fence”, Israel Diplomatic Network. http://securityfence.mfa.gov.il.

Israeli Perspectives

57

100

death, which is “irreversible”. Gideon Meir, deputy director of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, argues that life is a priority over quality of life. “Some people will pay with their quality of life but they’re alive. They have a more difficult life, but the fence is reversible so you can bring back their quality of life. You can’t bring back people who died.”101 Among those who support the barrier is a strong belief that the Israeli government was pressured by the grassroots level to build a barrier due to omnipresent fears of suicide attacks. Proponents dismiss the argument that the separation barrier is an intentional land grab by the Sharon government and the Right wing. If anything, the opposite is true. Support for the fence was strictly a grass-roots affair originating in communities most directly affected by the suicide bombers who simply strolled over the barrier-less Green Line and blew themselves up in their midst. The project was rejected by both the far-Left and far-Right, the former opposed to unilaterally imposing any measures on the Palestinians, the latter out of fear that the fence might turn into a border that would lead to territorial compromise. It is the Israeli center, a solid majority of the population that doesn’t want any part of ruling over the Palestinians, but sees no viable leadership among them ready to negotiate a real peace, that has pushed for the fence. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon only belatedly climbed onto the fence, and even now has not pursued its construction with the fervor it deserves. The far-Right continues to try and torpedo it, with National Union MK Uri Ariel acting unconscionably in trying to delay funding for it from his perch as head of the Knesset defense appropriations subcommittee.102

Those who support the separation barrier complain that it was not built fast enough. Marc Luria, a leading political activist from Security Fence for Israel (a group that has since closed down) and a new political movement, TAFNIT (Turning the Corner, with Uzi Dayan),103 focuses his efforts on pressuring the government to increase the pace of building. Motivated by personal reasons, Luria wholeheartedly supports the barrier project. “At the personal level, I have had friends and neighbors killed. Even a partial fence has increased security. Four years after the Sbarro bombing of August 9, 2001, we sued the government over the fact that they did not build the fence. This had the effect of pushing the government to build the fence. It took a long time though due to the stubbornness of the government and its planners. Now our work is on getting the fence finished.”104 For those who believe the barrier is effective against terrorism, the main goal is to get the government to build and finish the barrier as fast as possible because every segment in which the barrier is not built is regarded as increasing the likelihood of Israeli casualties. 100 “Saving Lives—Israel’s Security Fence”, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 2003. http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2003/22/Saving+Lives+Israel. 101 Personal interview with Gideon Meir, Deputy Director of the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem, January 21, 2005. In Hebrew. 102 Calev Ben-David. “Snap Judgment: The other side of the fence”, Jerusalem Post, December 9, 2003. http://209.157.64.200/focus/f-news/1037875/posts. See Land Grab: Israel’s Settlement Policy in the West Bank, B’Tselem, May 2002. 103 Uzi Dayan is President of the Zionist Council in Israel and former chairman of the National Security Council and the National Security Adviser. 104 Personal interview with Marc Luria on June 21, 2005 in Jerusalem.

58

Bridging the Barrier

The intention of the movement Security Fence for Israel was to build a consensus position in Israeli public opinion on the barrier without taking an official position on the routing of the barrier, disengagement or the fate of Jewish settlements in the West Bank. Personally, Luria is “not in favour of the settlers” but argues that “we must protect them and eventually we’ll have to make hard decisions”. However, ultimately he suggests “the fence need not be tied to disengagement and the evacuation of settlers”.105 This chapter demonstrates that the barrier holds different meanings for different segments of Israeli society. While a majority of Israelis support the barrier, Israeli critics belonging to political and human rights organizations have actually been at the forefront of the struggle, in support of the Palestinians, to change the routing of the barrier and mitigate the deleterious impacts on Palestinian society. Interestingly, most Israelis have not seen the separation barrier and have a rather vague understanding of how it actually functions.106 Education and media coverage of the barrier does not seem to promote understanding or conciliation between the two nations, at least in the short term. Being physically separated from the Palestinians by a barrier that keeps them out reinforces in the Israeli psyche a view of Palestinians as threat. Increasingly less opportunity for Israelis to intermingle with Palestinians as a result of physical separation has lead to decreased capacity to empathize with them. Faced with the specter of continued suicide bomb attacks, Israelis welcome means for physical separation from the Palestinians. Placing the Palestinians behind a barrier gives many Israelis the impression that so long as suicide bomb attacks do not occur, the problem has been solved. Public opinion on the security barrier stems from overwhelming feelings of fear, anger and emotion. Experience of living what feels like a precarious lifestyle in Israel and the sensitivities that accompany it derive from the unpredictability of terrorism and the “trauma of annihilation” that has been triggered by the conflict. These feelings have had such a profound impact on the national psyche that Israelis “cling” to the security barrier as an “easy solution”.107 As a result, belief in the prospect that the barrier will restore security and normalcy to life in Israel overrides any rational evidence to the contrary. In fact, polls demonstrate that despite widespread Israeli support for the barrier, Israelis concede it won’t bring about a long-term solution to the conflict and thus ironically will not bring security in any permanent and lasting way.

105 Personal interview with Marc Luria on June 21, 2005 in Jerusalem. 106 Yoel Esteron “Let’s Dismantle the Fence”, www.haaretz.com, July 7, 2004. http:// www.haaretz.com/hasen/objects/pages/PrintArticleEn.jhtml?itemNo=448224. 107 Birgitte Enemark. 2002. “A Battle for Survival: Israeli Public Perceptions of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, Folkekirkens Nodhjaelp. Dan.Church. Aid: 28. noedhjaelp/…/ $FILE/Battleforsurvival.pdf.

Chapter 4

Palestinian Perspectives If Israeli views of the separation barrier are emotionally laden, Palestinian views are equally so, if not more. Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza represent “a story of continuing dispossession, occupation, humiliation and oppression, and cruelly lowered expectations, all the more bitter given raised hopes of peace”.1 The history of the Palestinians as a people suffering from extreme poverty and subjugation, by Israel, other Arab governments, and their own national authority, has nurtured a culture of militancy and struggle. Beginning with the first “nakbha” (catastrophe) of the 1948 War, which caused the dispossession of 700,000 Palestinians and the 1967 War, Palestinians were beaten in combat, forced to leave their homes and depleted of any immediate hope for a homeland. With the subsequent Israeli Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip through the years of the first Palestinian Uprising (Intifada) (1987) and the al-Aqsa Intifada (2000), the Palestinians have consistently held the status of an “occupied people”, as recognized by international law and all major governments. They are thus clearly the weaker party in the IsraeliPalestinian context despite the personal insecurity their militants can cause to the lives of individual Israelis. Like the Israelis, Palestinians have developed a deep skepticism towards diplomatic efforts to end the conflict. The continuation of Jewish settlement expansion during the Oslo years, which has been the “epicenter of the Palestinians’ consuming rage since the outset of the occupation” (Rubenberg, 2003: 392), along with increasing poverty and restrictions, have led many Palestinians to despair. Many prefer to continue the route of armed conflict against Israel as evidenced by the recent election of Hamas to government, even though it may impede the ultimate goal of establishing a Palestinian state alongside Israel. The Palestinian struggle for national self-determination extends beyond the Israeli-Palestinian context. The question of Palestine has long been a cardinal principal upon which Arab-Islamic identity has stood (Sela, 1998). Arab leaders, from Gamal ’Abdel Nasser to Saddam Hussein, have championed the Palestinian cause to appease their detractors, lead the campaign against Israel, and strengthen their position in the Arab Middle East. The Palestinian struggle has shaped domestic and inter-Arab alliances and informed the discourses of indigenous and national liberation movements worldwide. As a result, the pursuit of Palestinian security and statehood is significant beyond the immediate context. Many actors have developed a stake in the question of a Palestinian entity, both for and against it, and thus the fate of Palestinians is wrapped up in an intricate web of relationships and alliances. 1 “Understanding Palestinian Anger”, BBC News, Friday, October 6, 2000. http://news. bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/959750.stm.

60

Bridging the Barrier

The Palestinians overwhelmingly perceive Israel’s separation barrier, which they refer to as a wall, as a linear extension of their history. The barrier is reminiscent for them of the “Stockade and Watchtower” campaign of the early Jewish settlers in pre-state Palestine. By “Stockade and Watchtower”, Jewish immigrants constructed new settlements swiftly with prefabricated huts and fortifications, which when complete, were surrounded by a protective fence and dominated by a watchtower from which to protect against hostility. Over a hundred settlements were established in this manner between 1936 and 1947.2 The attempt to establish Jewish sovereignty on the land is viewed as a movement that sought and continues to seek seizure of territory and the eradication of Arab presence on it. For Palestinians, the barrier is a preconceived extension of Israeli Occupation and policies which control their lives and impede their movement towards national self-determination. Palestinians reject Israeli claims that the barrier is for security. The Campaign to Stop the Wall places the barrier within the context of longstanding imperialistic goals in Palestine. The Occupation might want to converge or to disengage, but it is doing so in pursuance of racist and colonial interests to ensure all that remains for Palestinians are enclaves without sovereignty.3

Renowned champion of Palestinian rights, Noam Chomsky, declares: It is obviously not a security wall. That is inarguable. If Israel wanted a security wall, no one would object, there would be no international objection, and we would know exactly where they would build it: a couple of kilometers inside the Green Line. That’s the way you can build a perfect security wall: you make it a mile high, you can have the IDF patrolling on both sides, totally impenetrable. So if you want security, that’s the way to do it.4

Chomsky’s words echo most Palestinian views of the barrier as a political tool, which furthers the ideology of the Israeli Right-wing under Sharon and his successor Ehud Olmert, whose goal, they argue, is to postpone a comprehensive settlement indefinitely by making life miserable under occupation and changing facts on the ground so as to preclude the development of a Palestinian state. An even stronger accusation comes from Qalqilya Governor Mustafa Malki who charges that the barrier is “a systematic program to destroy the infrastructure of the Palestinian people”.5 Fakhri abid al-aziz Kadeeh from the village of Shuqba describes how the Wall has destroyed his life: 2 “Hityashvut: Jewish Settlement in the Land of Israel”, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 29, 2002. http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/MFA/History/Modern+History/ Centenary+of+Zionism/Jewish+Settlement+in+the+Land+of+Israel.htm. 3 “The Occupation’s ‘Convergence Plan’: Legitimizing Palestinian Bantustans”, Analysis, The Grassroots Palestinian Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign, May 17, 2006. http:// stopthewall.org/analysisandfeatures/1157.shtml. 4 South Africa, Israel-Palestine, and the Contours of the Contemporary Global Order, Noam Chomsky interviewed by Christopher J. Lee, Safundi, March 9, 2004. http://www. chomsky.info/interviews/20040309.htm. 5 “Palestinians say wall is a noose”, Christian Science Monitor, February 27, 2003 edition. http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0227/p06s01-wome.html.

Palestinian Perspectives

61

When I saw the bulldozers I told the soldier he would need to shoot me first and then I laid down on the ground in front of the bulldozers. The soldiers told me that it is better for me to move or they will really shoot me. It was so terrible. I’m standing on my land and they are threatening me to kill me. So what I thought. They already took the land so let them kill me. They took the land to build three bypass roads of 70 meters wide. Then they said there is to be a 200 meters wide “Seam Zone” next to the road. They put cameras all along the road and the military hummers (cars) come and go and threaten to shoot us if we come close to these roads.6

At the first commemorative meeting marking the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory on July 11, 2005, Khaled Al-Jundi from the PLO Negotiations Support Unit insisted that the wall be seen in the historical context of the Israeli settlement project. “The wall is determined by Israeli settlement policy and Israel’s desire to impose a final status solution.”7 With reference to the Jerusalem segment of the barrier, Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat stated “This is a policy of dictation and not negotiation. This prejudges and prejudices the outcome of permanent status negotiations.”8 There is no reciprocal movement for unilateral separation on the Palestinian side because as Arie Nadler explains “occupied groups cannot, realistically, contemplate unilateral actions”.9 In this light, it is by no accident to Palestinians that former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon was the Israeli leader chosen to determine barrier construction and routing. Current plans are viewed in light of Sharon’s long-held intention of isolating and cantonizing the West Bank since 1973 and which date to detailed plans that he held since 1978. The possibility that Sharon or his successor Ehud Olmert have altered this ideology over time or have been pressured by outside influences, both within and without, to change course is discounted. Indeed, Israeli policy is seen as a direct result of the leader’s ideology without significant influence by political, bureaucratic, social, or international factors. In this sense, the current separation barrier is “an old scheme that is constantly renewed in a bid to rob the lands and force immigration of the indigenous inhabitants before confiscating their lands”.10 As a result, any Israeli claims to security are interpreted as a “pretext”11 to hide the more elaborate and 6 “A living image of misery in Shuqba”, Community Voices, The Grassroots Palestinian Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign, September 17, 2005. http://stopthewall.org/ communityvoices/1017.shtml. 7 Statement by Khaled Al-Jundi, PLO Negotiations Support Unit, at the First Commemoration of the International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem—“One Year Later: Follow-up and Implementation of the ICJ Advisory Opinion”, July 11, 2005, Cultural Palace, Ramallah, Palestine. 8 “Israel Approves Final Route Of Jerusalem Segment Of Separation Barrier”, 7 News Boston, March 14, 2005. http://www2.whdh.com/news/articles/world/C71015. 9 Nadler, 2002: 55. 10 “Segregation fence…the impacts and the dangers”, Palestine-info.co.uk, November 2, 2003. http://www.palestine-info.co.uk/am/publish/article_3705.shtml. 11 “Segregation fence…the impacts and the dangers”, Palestine-info.co.uk, November 2, 2003. http://www.palestine-info.co.uk/am/publish/article_3705.shtml.

62

Bridging the Barrier

systematic meaning of the separation barrier. No room exists in this explanation for Israeli claims to building the barrier as a “last resort”, and the entire period of peace negotiations are viewed as a “political cover” to grant the occupation time for continuing its colonization policies.12 The Barrier, Enclaves and Human Rights Violations While a majority of Israelis have not seen the barrier first hand and generally hold a vague understanding of how it functions, thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of Palestinians are directly affected by the barrier’s construction and routing.13 The most immediately deleterious consequence of the barrier is for those Palestinians trapped in what is referred to as an “enclave”, an area between the barrier and the Green Line, representing the 1949 Armistice lines. At many points, the barrier extends inside the territory of the West Bank, sometimes in close proximity of the Green Line, but in many instances reaching much further east. In some areas, there are also secondary barriers which have created a number of completely enclosed enclaves. Life in an enclave has been described as intolerable. The Israeli human rights organization B’Tselem sheds light on life in an isolated enclave through its documentation of countless personal testimonies. Its report from March 2003 introduces residents of the isolated enclave of Al-Mawasi in the Gaza Strip. The following are excerpts from the personal testimony of Al-Mawasi resident, Masbah Tamim al-’Aqed: I have ten brothers and one sister, and my parents are still alive. My sister is married and lives with her husband in Khan Yunis. Five of my brothers and I live in our parents’ home in al-Mawasi….We own five dunam of land on which my father and I grow vegetables. Our entire income comes from the sale of the produce. We work the land throughout the year, from 6:00 AM to dusk. In the past, I brought the produce to the Tufakh checkpoint and loaded it onto a vehicle that my brothers sent to Khan Yunis. My brothers sold the vegetables at the wholesale market in Khan Yunis, where our family has a shop. Over the past two years, it has been very hard to transport our produce because of the restrictions imposed by the IDF on the transport of merchandise, and also because they closed the Coastal Road, which was our alternate route when the army did not let us through the Tufakh checkpoint. When the checkpoint is closed, we have no way of getting the produce to Khan Yunis, and it goes to waste.14

12 “The Segregation and Annexation Wall: A Crime Against Humanity”, August 9, 2005, MIFTAH.org, The Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy: 8. http://www.miftah.org/Doc/Factsheets/MIFTAH/English/The_Segregation_ and_Annexation_Wall_FINAL.pdf. 13 According to B’Tselem, 67 Palestinian villages (254,800 residents) will be directly affected by the new route of the separation barrier approved by the Israeli government on February 20, 2005 as compared to 81 villages (263,300 residents), who were affected by the previous route (not including East Jerusalem). “New Route of Separation Barrier, reduction in land and population on Israeli side, three major territorial incursions remain”, B’Tselem Press Release, March 24, 2005. 14 “Al-Mawasi, Gaza Strip: Intolerable Life in an Isolated Enclave”, Status Report, March 2003, B’Tselem, Jerusalem.

Palestinian Perspectives

63

Al-’Aqed left al-Mawasi and was not allowed to return. The financial conditions of the family deteriorated and their savings ran out. This situation is typical of many other families living in isolated enclaves without the possibility of free movement in and out, and lack of access to a decent livelihood. In October 2003, the territory between the barrier and the Green Line was declared a special military area with an administrative system in which different rules applied to Palestinians and Jewish settlers living there. Although all Israelis can enter the region freely, Palestinians can enter only with special permits even if their family resided in that area for many generations.15 Palestinians over the age of 12 were directed to obtain a “permanent resident permit” from the Civil Administration to continue living in their homes. Other residents had to obtain special permits just to enter the area and many who tried to obtain permits were refused them. An example of such an enclave is Alfei Menashe, which Israeli authorities declared a closed military zone. The Alfei Menashe enclave severs the historical connection of five small Palestinian villages from the rest of the West Bank, upon which they depended for educational and health services. Separation from families and communities in the West Bank caused severe social problems as Palestinians from the neighboring villages or those seeking work were unable to enter the enclave without special permits. In some cases, farmers whose lands were only several kilometers away had to travel around the barrier for up to two hours to reach their properties. In the meantime, a new Jewish settlement, Givat Tal, was being built, on 3,000 dunums of West Bank land confiscated from the Arab villages of Isla and Azzun.16 The Alfei Menashe enclave created such a political storm that in September 2005 the Supreme Court of Israel ruled that the government must alter the routing of the barrier in this area. The barrier has infringed upon a range of human rights of Palestinians including the right to property, the right to freedom of movement, the right to work and to an adequate standard of living, and the right to receive medical treatment.17 First, the take-over of property that the barrier entails has intensified the longstanding Palestinian fear of further dispossession. Since the beginning of the Israeli Occupation in 1967, the government of Israel has seized control of hundreds of thousands of dunams (4 dunam = 1 acre) throughout the West Bank to establish new settlements and provide space for their future expansion. The seizure of land is accomplished either by requisitioning land for military needs, declaring the land as abandoned property, or expropriating the land for public needs. Since taking power in 1977, the Likud government actively assisted Israelis in purchasing West Bank land on the free market.18 During the Oslo years, Israel pledged not to build any new Jewish settlements in the West Bank save for the construction of units, which would 15 “Israeli West Bank Barrier”, Wikipedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israeli_West_ Bank_barrier. 16 “The West Bank Barrier, Profile: Alfei Menashe and Habla”, Update August 2005, UNWRA. http://www.un.org/unrwa/emergency/barrier/profiles/alfei.html. 17 See “Behind the Barrier: Human Rights Violations as a Result of Israel’s Separation Barrier”, B’Tselem Position Paper, March 2003, Jerusalem. 18 “Land Grab: Israel’s Settlement Policy in the West Bank”, B’Tselem, May 2002: 47.

64

Bridging the Barrier

meet the “natural growth” needs of the local population. However, the ambiguity of the term “natural growth” provided loopholes for the Israeli government to expand settlements to account for growing families as well as those migrants who received generous financial incentives to move from Israel to the settlements.19 Israel’s policy of encouraging construction in the settlements while restricting construction in Palestinian villages has created a discriminatory policy of administration in the West Bank. Israeli settlements in areas captured during and since the Six-Day War have been categorized as illegal according to Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, a position held by the United Nations Security Council, the International Court of Justice, and a majority of UN member states. The confiscation of land for purposes of barrier construction has bolstered the charge that Israel is violating the Palestinian right to property as upheld by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention which states: Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.

Some parts of the barrier are situated on land confiscated from Palestinians. Israel claims that private land is requisitioned rather than confiscated and remains the property of the owner. Owners of private lands have the opportunity to either file an objection to the use of their land or receive compensation as a lump sum and also on a monthly basis.20 However, many Palestinians have not gone that route for political reasons or for fear of reprisals by Palestinian militant groups. As of May 2004, the barrier rested on 15,000 dunams (3,705 acres) of confiscated land, in close proximity to Palestinian villages. In order to build or move sections of the barrier to the Green Line, shops and homes have been demolished. Since the outbreak of the second Palestinian Uprising, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have impeded travel within the Palestinian areas. Barrier construction has further limited the right of Palestinians to freedom of movement both within the West Bank as well as between the West Bank and Israel. The army has periodically cut the Gaza Strip into three sections to prohibit movement from one section to another with nobody allowed in or out.21 The barrier adds to an already complex system of staffed checkpoints, closures, patrols, physical roadblocks and special roads for settlers. Israel has established a series of bypass roads throughout the West Bank. The roads are classified by those in which Palestinian travel is completely prohibited, partially prohibited or 19 “Land Grab: Israel’s Settlement Policy in the West Bank”, B’Tselem, May 2002: 16. 20 “Humanitarian Aspects: Impact on Palestinians”, Israel Diplomatic Network, the Anti-Terrorist Fence, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. http://securityfence.mfa.gov.il/mfm/ web/main/document.asp?SubjectID=45227&MissionID=45187&LanguageID=0&StatusID= 0&DocumentID=-1. 21 “Al-Mawasi, Gaza Strip: Intolerable Life in an Isolated Enclave”, B’Tselem Status Report, March 2003: 5.

Palestinian Perspectives

65

restricted. The road system enables Jewish settlers to travel to and from their homes by circumventing Palestinian villages. Israel argues that the system of separate roads reduces the level of friction between Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank. However, in a special report, B’Tselem accuses Israel’s road regime in the West Bank of being discriminatory and having detrimental effects on Palestinian travel practices such as wasted time, arriving late or not at all to their destinations, exhaustion, increased cost of travel and added wear-and-tear on vehicles traveling on unpaved roads.22 Third, on account of reduced mobility, the barrier has had significant detrimental effects on the ability of many Palestinians to get to work either in Israel or in other parts of the Palestinian territories, and thus sustain an adequate standard of living. The UN estimates that more than 100,000 Palestinians out of the 125,000 who used to work in Israeli settlements or in joint industrial zones prior to the second Intifada have lost their jobs.23 Many have been replaced by foreign labor. For example, in the farming industry, more than 23,000 Thai workers were imported in 2005 to fill long-term agreements in jobs that were once largely occupied by Palestinians.24 The traditional Palestinian economy in the West Bank has been heavily dependent upon the agricultural sector, particularly with the export of olives, fruit and vegetables to Israel, the Gaza Strip and Jordan. Those lands situated west of the separation barrier are said to be of the most fertile, containing almost 40% of the agricultural land of the West Bank. For example, one quarter of the residents in the districts of Jenin, Tulkarm and Qalqilya, works in agriculture, more than twice the percentage of the entire West Bank. The lands in these districts contain around two-thirds of the water sources in the West Bank.25 Israel’s seizure of land for barrier construction hitherto used for farming, grazing and sources of water has contributed to the deterioration of farming as a primary source of income for entire families. Israel has promised that olive trees, an inherent symbol of the Palestinian cause, affected by the construction will be replanted. As of May 2004, barrier construction uprooted an estimated 102,320 Palestinian olive and citrus trees, demolished 75 acres (0.3 km²) of greenhouses and 23 miles (37 km) of irrigation pipes.26 Fourth, the barrier is blamed for putting at risk the entire system of Palestinian healthcare, including psychological well-being.27 The barrier has delayed either 22 “Forbidden Roads: Israel’s Discriminatory Road Regime in the West Bank”, B’Tselem Information Sheet, August, 2004: 19. 23 “The West Bank”, World Factbook. http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ geos/we.html (last updated June 29, 2006. 24 “Palestinians Need Work in Israel, Experts Say”, Julie Stahl, CNSNews.com Jerusalem Bureau Chief, GOPUSA, March 28, 2005. http://www.gopusa.com/news/2005/march/0328_ palestinians2.shtml. 25 Meron Rappaport, “A Wall in their Heart”, Yedioth Aharonoth, May 23, 2003. http:// gush-shalom.org/archives/wall_yediot_eng.html. 26 “Israeli West Bank Barrier”, Wikipedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israeli_West_ Bank_barrier. 27 Ruchama Marton, a psychiatrist who heads Physicians for Human Rights-Israel stressed the negative psychological impact of the barrier on both Israelis and Palestinians,

66

Bridging the Barrier

Palestinians at checkpoints on their way to receiving medical treatment or medical crews on their way to giving treatment.28 Three leading health organizations, Medicins du Monde, the Palestinian Red Crescent Society and Physicians for Human Rights, charged that in 2005 the barrier prevented access to medical care of approximately 10,000 chronically ill Palestinians and at least 100,000 pregnant Palestinian women. In addition, they forecasted that 130,000 Palestinian children may not be immunized once the barrier project is complete.29 The barrier is expected to lead to crisis in the Palestinian areas. A report released by the UN Human Rights Commission’s Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food warned that the West Bank and Gaza Strip were “on the verge of humanitarian catastrophe”.30 The separation barrier is blamed for a deepening food crisis in the West Bank. The United Nations’ World Food Program Assistance in the Occupied Territories (WFP) has responded to the crisis by designating rural areas with the least possibility for diversifying income that are adversely affected in a direct manner by the separation barrier as a geographic unit with a “high rating” for granting food aid to residents. The WFP attributes “a steep increase in the number of people in need of food assistance” to the negative impact of the separation barrier on economic activity, noting the loss of a substantial portion of fertile agricultural lands, and disruptions to the local economy caused by restrictions on the mobility of people, goods, and service providers.31 Framing the effects of the barrier in existentialist terms as malnutrition and food insecurity reinforces the narrative of powerlessness and dependency of the Palestinians as a nation and thus the barrier as a “starvation fence”.32 The prospect of further deterioration as a result of the separation barrier is expressed through thousands of personal testimonies. Farid ’Omar Abu Dahim of the village of Sheikh Sa’ad describes the difficulties his family faces as a result of the closures, curfews and other policies of the Israeli military administration: Our village is cut off from the rest of the West Bank, separated from it by a deep valley…. Many of the young people in the village are depressed because of the situation. Some are even on the brink of a mental breakdown….Residents of the village have close family ties with relatives living in villages adjoining Jerusalem. The roadblock makes it very difficult for them to maintain these ties. This means we cannot take part in family events that see “Israel’s barrier affects half a million Palestinians”, Aljazeera.com Magazine, March 24, 2005. http://www.aljazeera.com/me.asp?service_ID=7229. 28 “Forbidden Roads: Israel’s Discriminatory Road Regime in the West Bank”, B’Tselem, Information Sheet, August, 2004: 19. 29 “Israel’s barrier affects half a million Palestinians”, Aljazeera.com Magazine, March 24, 2005. http://www.aljazeera.com/me.asp?service_ID=7229. 30 “Israel’s Wall for Ethnic Cleansing”, Revolutionary Worker #1220, November 23, 2003. http://rwor.org/a/1220/palestine.htm. 31 Amira Hass. “Separation fence forces expanded UN food program”, Haaretz.com, November 22, 2005. http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=445447&co ntrassID=2&subContrassID=1&sbSubContrassID=0&listSrc=Y. 32 Daniel Ben-Simon, “One Man’s Fence is another man’s prison”, Haaretz.com, November 28, 2005. http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=275277&co ntrassID=2&subContrassID=15&sbSubContrassID=0&listSrc=Y&itemNo=275277.

Palestinian Perspectives

67

take place in those villages. This is an especially grave problem because, in our Beduin tradition, close family ties are very important.33

Many personal stories detailing the impact of the separation barrier on Palestinian lives have been compiled by Palestinian, Israeli and international NGOs. For Palestinians, the majority of which are not involved in any terrorist activity (although many support continued resistance against occupation, to be discussed) and simply wish to earn a living and take care of their families, see the barrier as a form of collective punishment. Israel has typically imposed collective restrictions that punish the population in a particular location for an attack against Israeli civilians or soldiers that is attributed to a resident or residents of that community.34 The infringement of human rights documented under occupation is made more pronounced by living in an increasingly two-tier system in the West Bank in which Jewish settlers (including any Jew in the world who decides to immigrate to Israel according to Israel’s Law of Return) can move around freely while Palestinians are stopped, searched and restricted to a circumscribed sphere of movement and residence. According to Jamal Juma, campaign coordinator of the Palestinian Grassroots Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign (AAWC), “the barrier for Palestinians is a voluntary expulsion project that completes a ghetto system”.35 The idea of forced expulsion or what is increasingly referred to as “ethnic cleansing”36 is said to be particularly pronounced in the seam zone, territory between the barrier and the Green Line, which has been declared a closed military zone. Palestinians and not Jews must obtain passes to live there. A report submitted by John Dugard, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967, concurs that Israeli policy has promoted a “de-Palestinization of the ‘closed zone’”.37 Apartheid Wall The Israeli system of control in the Occupied Territories reinforces for many Palestinians the notion of apartheid. Semantic use of the term “apartheid” represents a deeply held view of unilateral separation as racist, a system that reflects an “assumed 33 “Testimony of Farid ‘Omar Abu Dahim”, given to Nidal Kna’aneh on February 12, 2004, “Facing the Abyss: The Isolation of Sheikh Sa’ad Village: Before and After the Separation Barrier”, B’Tselem Status Report, February 2004: 12-13. 34 “Behind the Barrier: Human Rights Violations as a Result of Israel’s Separation Barrier”, B’Tselem Position Paper, Jerusalem, March 2003: 13. 35 Personal interview with Jamal Juma, July 11, 2005, Al-Bireh, Palestinian Territories. 36 “Israel’s Wall for Ethnic Cleansing”, Revolutionary Worker #1220, November 23, 2003. http://rwor.org/a/1220/palestine.htm. 37 “Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967”, submitted by John Dugard, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, United Nations General Assembly, A/60/271, August 18, 2005. http://domino.un.org/ UNISPAL.NSF/a39191b210be1d6085256da90053dee5/02bf82d785fe854a85257088004c 374c!OpenDocument.

68

Bridging the Barrier

superiority” on the part of Israel and policies designed to support and extend it. The term “apartheid” derives from the National Party-led state and society in South Africa between 1948 and 1994, based on the notion of separation of racial groups. The separation rhetoric, which should remind everyone of the Afrikaans word for separation—”Apartheid”—is not a reflection of real geographic or a historic physical divide between two peoples, but rather is reference to Israel’s continued campaign of forcible, unilateral separation and expulsion plans that disregard national or economic sovereignty for Palestinians.38

According to this view, critics argue that the wall promotes “the ‘bantustanization’” of the West Bank into hundreds of small, dependent entities that cannot sustain themselves and that are more akin to small, disconnected open-air prisons surrounded by Israeli military checkpoints and settlements, than anything else”.39 Palestinians living their lives in poverty with families torn apart and subject to closures, curfews, an extensive system of permits,40 forbidden roads,41 house demolitions, the threat of expulsion,42 and abuse at checkpoints,43 clarifies the basic asymmetry between Israelis and Palestinians founded on the clear positioning of the latter as powerless and dependent. These allegations of apartheid cut deeply into debates about the so-called demographic struggle in the State of Israel. As Israeli-Jews agonize about the eventual surpassing of a Jewish majority by higher Arab birthrates, Palestinians counter that the problem will not be solved by dexterous separation plans. Jamil Hilal, member of the Palestinian National Council, dismisses the Israeli argument that presents the wall as a way to avoid the development of an apartheid system: They argue that apartheid exists only when a minority rules over a majority and that physical segregation is not a sufficient condition for apartheid. They argue that since Palestinians will soon become a majority in Mandate Palestine (perhaps as early as 2010), Israelis favor separation to safeguard against the gathering danger of political apartheid. According to this view, political and physical separation is the only way to avoid Jewish minority rule over an Arab majority in the near future, and for the State of Israel to remain both Jewish and democratic (ethnocratic some say). But there is no reason that apartheid 38 PENGON launches The Apartheid Wall Campaign Palestinian Environmental NGOs Network (PENGON), November 21, 2002, The Palestine Monitor, the Voice of Civil Society. http://www.palestinemonitor.org/Other%20Updates/pengon_launches_wall_campaign.htm. 39 PENGON launches The Apartheid Wall Campaign Palestinian Environmental NGOs Network (PENGON), November 21, 2002, The Palestine Monitor, the Voice of Civil Society. http://www.palestinemonitor.org/Other%20Updates/pengon_launches_wall_campaign.htm. 40 Hadas Ziv, “The Bureaucracy of Occupation: The District Civil Liaison Offices”, Joint Report of Machsom Watch and Physicians for Human Rights-Israel, May 2004. 41 See “Forbidden Roads: Israel’s Discriminatory Road Regime in the West Bank”, B’Tselem Information Sheet, August 2004. 42 See “Nu’uman, East Jerusalem: Life under the Threat of Expulsion”, B’Tselem Status Report, September 2003. 43 “Abuse of Palestinians at the Sarra Checkpoint”, Nablus District, December 27-31, 2003, B’Tselem Case Study 18, January 2004. For discussion of abuse of Palestinians at checkpoints see also also Rubenberg, 2003, especially chapters 3, 8 and 9.

Palestinian Perspectives

69

should exist only when a minority rules over a majority. What is significant is a system of segregation (geographic, political and cultural) that is imposed by a powerful group against the will of a less powerful one. This is exactly what is happening in the IsraeliPalestinian situation.44

So long as Jews and Arabs in the region encounter each other through a grossly imbalanced distribution of power, Palestinians argue that there will be no peace. These are among the most tangible sources of Palestinian public opinion on the separation barrier. Palestinian Public Opinion Palestinian public opinion is an embryonic indicator due to the weakness of Palestinian public institutions and impaired access to, and flow of, information. However, a number of organizations conduct regular opinion polling such as the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center,45 Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research,46 Palestinian Center for Public Opinion, Palestinian Center for Research and Cultural Dialogue,47 and An-Najah National University Center for Opinion Polls and Survey Studies. Often, the “mood on the street” or the category of “the street” is referenced as a strong, albeit indistinct measure of public opinion due to the basic gap between Palestinian elites connected to governing institutions and the common people, as well as the absence of a politically conscious middle class. To date, there has been no opinion poll conducted in the Palestinian areas on the specific issue of the separation barrier. However, the general sentiment gleaned from writings and activism is that for Palestinians, the barrier has a profound and overwhelmingly negative influence over their lives over which they have no control. There is less of a debate among the Palestinians about the existence of the barrier as most, if not all, oppose it steadfastly. In public, Palestinians have claimed “unanimity” against the barrier on account of its negative impacts on Palestinian lands and people. One of the reasons however, is concern about the lack of access to Israeli markets and labor. Although no Palestinian leader would publicly admit how dependent Palestinians are on the Israeli economy, long-term physical separation would put the nail in the coffin of any hopes for future economic integration. The threat of the barrier and the end of functionalist ties between the two economies has catalyzed a “series of internal debates within the Palestinian Authority leadership and the wider Arab world”. Without access to Israeli markets for their goods and labor, Palestinians would need to approach other countries, the most likely of which would be Egypt and Jordan. However, the leaders of these two countries have been unwilling to shoulder the burden of a Palestinian state by bailing the Palestinians out economically. 44 Hilal, 2002: 43. 45 http://www.jmcc.org. 46 http://www.pcpsr.org. 47 For contact information, see http://www.tamkeen.org/tamkeen1/contact_us/CSO_ Contact_List_Info.asp?ID={B5EE9F22-3B04-41BF-A675-7383B9ED180F}.

70

Bridging the Barrier

Two main streams of thought underscore Palestinian views on the separation barrier. First, Palestinians who support Israel’s right to exist and a two-state solution do not reject the idea of a barrier out of hand.48 According to a poll conducted jointly by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research and the Harry S. Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace, released on September 25, 2005, 63% of Palestinians polled support a mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people after the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and the settlement of all issues in dispute (35% of Palestinians polled oppose such a step).49 This percentage remained relatively constant compared to a Palestinian public opinion poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research October 7-14, 2003 in which 64% supported a two-state solution.50 Although some Palestinians in this category acknowledge Israel’s legal right to build a barrier between itself and the West Bank to protect against attack, 78% polled in October 2003 believed that current Israeli measures, including the building of the separation wall, “reduce the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the future”.51 Most Palestinians reject the current barrier’s invasiveness, its routing deep within the occupied West Bank and its de facto annexation of Israeli settlements. However, Palestinians who support a two-state solution acknowledge the eventuality of a border between the two states but prefer to erect a border within the context of a comprehensive negotiated settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Many Palestinians who wish free access to work in Israel envision a more porous border that would promote a stable Palestinian economy and a less invasive system of monitoring cross-border movement of people, goods and services. Second, Palestinians who do not support Israel’s right to exist and prefer in its place a single or binational state tend to reject the notion of a barrier under any circumstances. The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research’s poll conducted in October 2003 found 12% supporting a one-state solution (for Palestinians and Israelis) and 23% wanting all of Palestine back to the Palestinians.52 By this logic, there should be no wall, as Jamal Juma explains “it is destructive wherever you build it”. Juma supports a one state solution with democracy for all its citizens rather than a Jewish state alongside a Palestinian state. “I was for a long time for a two state solution but

48 Human Rights Watch commentary “Getting an Opinion on the Wall”, Friday July 9, 2004. http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/07/09/isrlpa9050.htm. 49 Press Release: Two Third among Palestinians, Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs support the mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people, PSR—Survey Research Unit: Palestinian-Israeli Joint Press Release. http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2005/p17ejoint.html. 50 PSR—Survey Research Unit: Poll No. 9—Press Release, October 15, 2003. http:// www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2003/p9epressrelease.html#peace. 51 PSR—Survey Research Unit: Poll No. 9—Press Release, October 15, 2003. http:// www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2003/p9epressrelease.html#peace. 52 PSR—Survey Research Unit: Poll No. 9—Press Release, October 15, 2003. http:// www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2003/p9epressrelease.html#peace.

Palestinian Perspectives

71

53

Israel makes it impossible.” This second Palestinian view is strengthened by the allegation that Israel is an apartheid state, which evokes the image of South Africa under apartheid as uniquely brutal, based on racial classification and subordination. Since apartheid South Africa is often seen as the illegitimate state par excellence, comparisons between Israel and South Africa evoke a sub-text of Israel’s illegitimacy with the implied charge that as an apartheid state, Israel has no right to exist.54 Campaign to Stop the Wall In comparison to Israel, Palestinians have consistently supported internationalizing the conflict and having extra-regional actors take a greater role in influencing the course of events. The campaign against the wall is both local and international with strong connections between the two streams. In response to the immediate ramifications of the barrier, a grassroots Palestinian anti-apartheid wall campaign has developed. Its goals are to (1) stop the wall, (2) dismantle parts already built, (3) return all land confiscated for the wall, and (4) compensate for all losses.55 Adherents of this campaign represent a variety of different political backgrounds and constituencies but have in common a rejection of the wall altogether. As consciousness about the humanitarian effects of the wall have spread, international support for the Palestinian struggle has risen in the form of civil society conferences, student movements and activism in churches, trade unions, and supportive states. The campaign against the wall is a multidimensional movement that operates with different albeit reinforcing emphases at the local, national and international levels. At the local level, the Campaign brings together organizations such as the Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees (PARC), the Palestinian Hydrology Group (PHG), Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees (UPMRC), LAW, the Applied Research Institute—Jerusalem (ARIJ), Land Research Center (LRC), and the Society for the Development and Protection of the Environment as well as local grassroots efforts and actors in the various localities affected by the barrier. The Campaign acts as an umbrella for NGOs and local groups and movements in order to best answer to the needs of those affected by the barrier.56 Local activities against the wall have taken the form of demonstrations and rallies around specific segments of wall in the West Bank, targeting blockades, gates, and checkpoints. For example, in the west Ramallah district of Bi’lin, demonstrations have taken place every Friday since the wall was first constructed there. A demonstration, organized as part of national and international week against the wall on November 11, 2005 involved a march by villagers against bulldozers, which were “destroying 53 Personal interview with Jamal Juma, July 11, 2005, Al-Bireh, Palestinian Territories. 54 Susie Jacobs. “Israel as ‘Apartheid’”, May 20, 2005, Urbana-Champaign Media Center. http://www.ucimc.org/newswire/display/35618/index.php. 55 http://www.stopthewall.org/. 56 “PENGON launches the Apartheid Wall Campaign—Palestinian Environmental NGOS Network (PENGON)”, November 21, 2002. The Palestine Monitor: The Voice of Civil Society. http://www.palestinemonitor.org/Other%20Updates/pengon_launches_wall_ campaign.htm.

Bridging the Barrier

72 57

their lands on a daily basis”. The demonstrations resulted in a disruption of barrier construction. Eyewitness accounts saw Israeli forces arriving in large number, firing tear gas and using sticks to beat and hit people resulting in numerous casualties. Similar forms of resistance have characterized local Palestinian opposition in numerous locales where the barrier will encircle villages and impede freedom of movement. At the national level, the Palestinian Authority has expressed its opposition to the separation barrier. The PNA Ministry of Foreign Affairs website states “the route of the wall is totally irrelevant to security reasons but it aims at two goals for Israel; annexation of as many large settlements located westward of the wall to Israel and evade any political cost had the Green Line been recognized as a border line to Israel”.58 Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas made the separation barrier an issue in his campaign in the January 9, 2004 Palestinian national elections. Visiting numerous towns affected by the barrier on his campaign trail, Abbas told a rally at a Tulkarem stadium, not 500 yards from the barrier, “I say to our neighbors … no fence will bring peace or bring you security”. In Qalqilya, a town almost entirely encircled by the barrier, Abbas went even further in stating “We hope the Israelis will take the wall down. If the Israelis want to reach a fair and just peace, they will take down the wall.”59 After securing the presidency, however, criticism has mounted about the lack of official Palestinian response to ongoing barrier construction. Riad Malki, Director General of Panorama, the Center for the Dissemination of Democracy and Community Development, argues that the Palestinian Authority has “neglected the issue and has not devoted enough attention to it”. Taking into consideration the internal weakness of Palestinian institutions and their inability to counter Israeli policies in any meaningful way, Malki suggests taking the PA reform process as a point of departure after which stronger and more credible structures would be capable of mounting “emergency measures” to counter Israel’s barrier project (Malki, 2002: 49). Despite the few official pronouncements made by the Palestinian Authority on Israel’s separation barrier, some official activities held at the national level have demonstrated PA involvement in the anti-wall campaign. On July 11, 2005, the Palestinian Ministry of Foreign Affairs held a commemorative meeting, “One Year Later: Follow up and Implementation of the ICJ Advisory Opinion” at the Cultural Palace in Ramallah, Palestine. The program contained official statements by the Ambassadors of South Africa, Egypt, Jordan, the Russian Federation as well as the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), among others.

57 “Bil’in –Spirit of Resistance Continues!” Latest News, The Grassroots Palestinian Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign, November 11, 2005. http://stopthewall.org/latestnews/1035. shtml. 58 “Half a million Palestinians are victims of the Revised Wall”, Palestinian National Authority Ministry of Foreign Affairs website. http://www.mofa.gov.ps/view_subjects. asp?subject_id=1787. 59 “Abbas Urges Israel to Tear Down Barrier”, ABC News International, December 29, 2004. http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=370015.

Palestinian Perspectives

73

Dr Nasser Al-Kidwa, former Palestinian Minister of Foreign Affairs ended the first Commemoration of the International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion on July 11, 2005 with a 10-point statement detailing the components of a national action plan against the barrier: (1) creation and intensification of a mass movement including demonstrations and disobedience, (2) enaction of laws that prohibit any Palestinian entity or person from working on or trading with Jewish settlements, (3) encouragement of international media to cover the issue, (4) promotion of the issue in the Palestinian educational system, (5) encouragement of the steadfastness of Palestinians located West of the wall, (6) rendering of Israel’s non-compliance as illegal and a non-partner in negotiations, (7) emphasis on compliance with the ICJ opinion in bilateral relations with states including Israel, (8) calling upon the Quartet to take a clear opinion on the wall and Jewish settlements, (9) call for imposition by the UN General Assembly of punitive measures against any business or entity taking part in the building of the wall, and (10) promote the establishment in the UN Secretariat of a register of damages to preserve the rights of Palestinians.60 The meeting ended with a call to a peaceful and negotiated solution to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. However, Jamal Juma expressed his reservations about the meeting and what such activities can achieve, saying “it’s all talk”.61 This skepticism in official pronouncements and meetings marks a deeply-held reluctance to believe in the ability and will of PNA institutions and its supporters to make good on their promises. At the international level, the struggle against the wall in solidarity with the Palestinians has taken many forms, including parliamentary actions, popular awareness raising events, mass meetings, conferences, and other activities in Austria, Basque country, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, the Philippines, Scotland, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United States, the UK, and Venezuela.62 The international campaign to stop the wall has tapped in to the broader campaign against Israeli policy (and critics would say Israel), which focuses on divestment, boycott, international arms embargos, and other activities, which seek to sever the lines of international assistance upon which the State of Israel depends.63 The Palestinian campaign has extended its focus to make common cause with other struggles such as the people in Iraq who have suffered from the American-led war and subsequent occupation. Linking the two contexts further justifies the Palestinian cause at a time when American presence in Iraq has become increasingly unpopular in world public opinion and even among segments of the American public, thereby framing American and Israeli actions in the same light. 60 Statement by Dr Nasser Al-Kidwa, Palestinian Minister of Foreign Affairs at the First Commemoration of the International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem—“One Year Later: Follow-up and Implementation of the ICJ Advisory Opinion”, July 11, 2005, Cultural Palace, Ramallah, Palestine. 61 Personal interview with Jamal Juma, July 11, 2005, Cultural Palace, Ramallah. 62 For international activities, see http://stopthewall.org/worldwideactivism/1028.shtml#5. 63 “Boycott Section”, Stop the Wall, the Grassroots Palestinian anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign. http://www.stopthewall.org/boycott/first/campaignfirstpagee.htm#12.

74

Bridging the Barrier

The campaign to “divest” calls upon private companies and public institutions to cut their ties with Israeli companies and from companies that do business with Israel. It also pressures governments to impose sanctions on Israel. Advocates view the campaign as a legitimate punitive tool against Israel for its policies and actions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip since the outbreak of the second Palestinian uprising in September 2000. The divestment campaign is modeled after the 1980s protests against apartheid South Africa, an inherently racist system that advocates claim resembles the current character of Israel, the West Bank and Gaza.64 Supporters of the campaign claim it is a means to end the occupation and promote peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. “This new divestment/disinvestment campaign should provide the Palestinians with enough economic and political leverage needed to negotiate a just and comprehensive peace settlement with the Israelis—just as it did for the Blacks in South Africa.”65 The divestment campaign was taken up, with varying degrees of success in three main areas: academic, religious, and municipal institutions. On university campuses throughout the United States, divestment activities were particularly strong. The Divest from Israel Campaign was launched on May 2, 2002 by Harvard and MIT Faculty, based on the petition adopted at Princeton, which calls for Harvard and MIT to withdraw investments from companies that do business with Israel.66 Major university campuses throughout the United States, including Tufts, Cornell and the University of California followed suit with their own petitions and with support from such distinguished leaders as South African Archbishop Desmond Tutu and Dr Gilles Corcos, UC Professor Emeritus. Although no university actually divested from Israel, the campaign had a strong impact on student relations on campuses throughout North America and divestment activities were transplanted from college campuses to other public forums. In the area of religious institutions, divestment activities found expression in the Presbyterian Church. At the 216th annual General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, USA between June 26 and July 3, 2004, the General Assembly approved several measures against the Israeli occupation, which included a vote by large margins to condemn Israel’s construction of a “security wall” across the West Bank. The most contentious decision was the call to support a phased selective divestment resolution of holdings in multinational corporations that do business with Israel.67 The assembly voted in a 431-62 margin to have the church’s Mission Responsibility Through Investment Committee (MRTI) study the matter and make recommendations

64 “The Anti-Israel Divestment Campaign”, Anti-Defamation League, posted February 17, 2005. http://www.adl.org/main_Israel/Divestment_02_17_05.htm. 65 Francis A. Boyle, “Israel Divestment/Disinvestment Campaign”, Media Monitors Network, May 18, 2002. http://www.mediamonitors.net/francis16.html. 66 Jenna Russell, “Harvard and MIT Faculty launch Divestment Petition”, May 6, 2002. http://www.ucdivest.org/newsitems/mitharvardteachin.php. 67 “A Background and Overview of the ‘Phased Selective Divestment Resolution’”, Presbyterian Church (USA), 216th General Assembly, June 26-July 3, 2004. http://www. nassauchurch.org/mission/mideastresolutionoverview.pdf#search=’Presbyterian%20Church %20and%20Divestment’.

Palestinian Perspectives

75

68

to the General Assembly Council (GAC). The Presbyterian Church is the largest organization and the first Christian denomination to join the divestment campaign against Israel. The significance of this move is that Presbyterians boast a membership of close to three million in the United States, and its combined pension fund and foundation assets are estimated at $7 billion. The Presbyterian Church’s resolution served as model for a similar recommendation of the World Council of Churches (WCC) Central Committee, which encouraged its 347 member churches to consider divesting from companies doing business in Israel.69 Church divestment activities have received a firestorm of criticism from the American Jewish community.70 Jewish organizations expressed disappointment and alarm in the resolutions. The anti-Defamation League (ADL) sent a letter to Rev. Dr Clifton Kirkpatrick, Stated Clerk of the Presbyterian Church, USA, which labeled the resolution anti-Semitic because no other nation was “singled out for divestment, not even those whose violations of human rights are truly egregious”.71 Calling for its repeal, an on-line petition was launched, which obtained 13,648 signatures. The accusation of anti-Semitism in Divestment activism initiated tensions in interfaith dialogue between Jews and Presbyterians and sparked widespread debate over the motives behind the campaign. A full-fledged campaign against the Divestment from Israel campaign has been led by Divestment Watch, whose main argument is that divestment is a form of “economic terrorism” that seeks to destroy the Israeli economy and “stands in violation of US laws to prevent foreign countries from imposing their foreign policy on the US”.72 Divestment efforts in municipal institutions have been less successful as witnessed by the failed effort to promote divestment in Somerville, Massachusetts, a densely populated, ethnically diverse city near Boston and Cambridge. On October 28, eight out of eleven members of the Board of Aldermen, the local legislative council, voted to recommend that the city’s retirement fund divest itself from Israeli bonds and companies doing business with the State of Israel. The campaign was initiated by the Somerville Divestment Project, a pro-Palestinian group that sought to make Somerville the first city in Massachusetts to protest against Israel through a divestment campaign. The city’s retirement portfolio consists of a small holding of Israeli bonds as well as stocks in a number of defense contractors that do business 68 Alexa Smith, “Assembly endorses Israel Divestment: Palestinian says merely issuing another statement is not enough”, GA04121, Presbyterian News Service, Office of Communication. http://www.pcusa.org/ga216/news/ga04121.htm. 69 Stephen Brown, “World Council of Churches gives nod to Israeli divestment proposal”, Episcopal News Service, February 21, 2005. http://www.episcopalchurch.org/3577_58769_ ENG_HTM.htm. 70 Eric J. Greenberg, “Protestant Group OKs Divestment From Israel”, Forward, July 16, 2004. http://forward.com/main/article.php?ref=greenberg200407141104. See also, ADL Dismayed By World Council of Churches Decision to Pursue Divestment As Means to Punish Israel, Anti-Defamation League, February 22, 2005. http://www.adl.org/PresRele/ChJew_ 31/4652_31.htm. 71 “Call to the Presbyterian Church to reverse its anti-Semitic resolution on divestment”. http://www.petitiononline.com/presby2/petition.html. 72 Divestment Watch website. http://www.divestmentwatch.com/.

76

Bridging the Barrier

with Israel. The most contentious contract is with Caterpillar Tractor, a company that has been the target of severe criticism by the national section of the Israel boycott movement after the death of Rachel Corrie, a member of the International Solidarity Movement (ISM) who traveled to Gaza to protest the demolition of Palestinian homes.73 Corrie was killed in Rafah on March 16, 2003 trying to obstruct an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Caterpillar D9 bulldozer in an Israeli “security zone” by the Egyptian border.74 Despite the immense attention and political debate garnered by the issue, the citizens of Somerville ultimately rejected the divestment proposal.75 The perceived lack of progress at the international and national levels has promoted widespread skepticism among the Palestinian people that their cause is being heard. This skepticism has promoted ongoing debate within Palestinian society about the viability of continuing the Intifada as a means to struggle against the barrier and thus take the matter back into local hands. Hamas and the Continuation of Armed Struggle The barrier controversy has recently taken a back seat to other recent developments in the Israeli-Palestinian context since the landslide victory of Hamas, the Islamic Resistance Movement in Palestinian legislative elections on January 25, 2006, and Israel’s reactions to it. However, the resort to unilateral measures such as the barrier on the part of Israel was a direct reaction to the groundswell support for a movement in Palestine that would continue to fight against Israel. The rise to power of Hamas was, in part, the culmination of key fissures in Palestinian society that had been brewing over a number of years. During the peace process era, the Fatah government came to be perceived as increasingly corrupt. Party officials pocketed funds from donor countries and evaded public accountability, relying instead on nepotistic and fraudulent governing practices. A complex network of security services was built up to serve the exclusive purpose of protecting Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Authority (PA). The regime meted out extrajudicial punishments for its opponents, which followed no systematic inquiry or investigation. “Now no one could avoid confronting the reality of the nation’s small size, poverty and relative weakness, as well as the human elements of corruption, incompetence, and greed in the Palestinian movement” (Rubin, 1999: 9). By 2002 it was clear that the PA had become a political entity short of statehood with very little, if any respect, for the rule of law. As well, a yawning gulf between the miniscule 73 For more information, see the Rachel Corrie memorial page at http://www.rachelcorrie. org/. 74 The circumstances of Rachel Corrie’s death are disputed. The International Solidarity Movement and other eyewitnesses claim that the bulldozer driver deliberately ran over her twice, while the IDF claims that the bulldozer driver didn’t see her and that the cause of death was falling debris pushed over by the bulldozer, Rachel Corrie on Wikipedia. http:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rachel_Corrie. 75 Benjamin Gedan (Globe correspondent), “Somerville rejects divestment plan”, Boston.com News. http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2004/12/08/ somerville_rejects_divestment_plan/.

Palestinian Perspectives

77

ruling class affiliated with the governing institutions and the underprivileged masses demonstrated that very few Palestinians were benefiting from the peace process with Israel. As a result, the continued negotiations between Palestinian and Israeli officials were occurring at a time when the ruling Fatah party had lost a significant base of popular support. For its part, Israel continued to pursue unilateral measures and create facts on the ground that would prejudice the negotiating process. Israel continued to conduct Jewish settlement activity and employed targeted assassinations to take out militants of the Islamic Jihad and the Hamas. This policy was very unpopular and seen by many critics as contrary to international law. The building of the separation barrier was one such unpopular unilateral measure that rendered joint work illegitimate in the eyes of the Palestinian people. In fact, the separation barrier gave new incentive for Palestinians to continue resistance and for this job, Hamas was the most likely candidate.76 Hamas has always made clear that the Israeli separation wall would not protect it from what it calls “resistance attacks”.77 For years, Hamas had been able to build a power base at the grassroots level on account of the bankruptcy, both political and economic, of the Palestinian Authority. Its power was channeled through a loosely knit group of operatives functioning clandestinely and openly, recruiting through mosques and a comprehensive network of social welfare services. These institutions obtained loyalties in exchange for badly needed relief at a time when basic services were unavailable from the main governing bodies. As a result, the Palestinian Authority, Israel and the entire peace process were undermined by a more radical agenda that burgeoned tenaciously throughout the Palestinian areas and funneled into the transnational development of radical Islam. For many Palestinians, the election of Hamas was a protest vote that, although highly controversial, represented the hope of a better future in which corruption, nepotism, lawlessness, poverty and oppression would disappear. However, Hamas has proven that it can destabilize the entire region by escalating the IsraeliPalestinian conflict and transforming the Palestinian areas into breeding grounds for international terrorism. Supported by fundamentalist Iran, the Hamas is designated within the overall global war against terrorism as a terrorist entity by the United States, Canada, the EU, and Australia. Hamas activists, through the Izz al-Din alQassam Brigades, were responsible for 67% of suicide bomb attacks between 2000 and 2005 (sometimes in collaboration with the Palestinian Islamic Jihad) resulting in thousands of Israeli casualties. The Hamas considers suicide attacks as a legitimate tool in the asymmetric war against the stronger and better equipped Israel. Due to mandatory military service for Israeli men and women, Hamas considers all of Israel to be a “militarized society” and so does not distinguish between civilian and military targets. 76 “Segregation Fence…the impacts and the dangers”, Palestine-info.co.uk, November 2, 2003. http://www.palestine-info.co.uk/am/publish/article_3705.shtml. 77 “Security areas to protect settlements, annexed lands; Hamas: Israeli wall will not stop resistance”, Palestine-Israel, Military, 10/4/2003. http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/ Daily/Day/031004/2003100418.html.

78

Bridging the Barrier

Hamas does not recognize the existence of the State of Israel, which it calls the “Zionist enemy” and appeals for its destruction in its Charter. All the territory upon which Israel currently rests, including the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, is regarded by Hamas as an Islamic waqf. In Islam, a waqf is a bequest that is generally in the form of land used for religious purposes. This land is inalienable and thus can not be surrendered to non-Muslims. In Article 13 of its Charter entitled “Peaceful Solutions, [Peace] Initiatives and International Conference”, the Hamas establishes that: renouncing any part of Palestine means renouncing part of the religion; the nationalism of the Islamic Resistance Movement is part of its faith, the movement educates its members to adhere to its principles and to raise the banner of Allah over their homeland as they fight their Jihad.

For the Hamas, struggle (jihad) to regain control of the historic Palestine is the religious duty of every Muslim (fard ’ain) and therefore, continuation of the Intifada against Israel is one of their main prerogatives. The hardline and rejectionist attitudes of Hamas have caused major international controversy. Both the United States and the European Union are unequivocal in their designation of Hamas as a terrorist entity and have frozen donors’ funds destined for the Palestinian Authority. In immediate reaction to the elections, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice praised the vote for being peaceful and “by all accounts fair”, yet at the same time stated “you cannot have one foot in politics and another in terror”.78 The Bush Administration made clear that the United States would conduct no relations with Hamas until it stops calling for Israel’s destruction. Continuation of Intifada in Palestinian Public opinion The election of Hamas is part of the ongoing internal debate in the Palestinian areas about whether to continue armed struggle or pursue the route of peaceful negotiation. A number of public opinion polls have been conducted on this issue since the start of the barrier construction in 2002. Resistance against Israel’s separation barrier is part of continuing the Intifada. The polls reveal a range of uncertain and at times contradictory findings although taken together they show that Palestinians want to continue armed struggle. The first poll considered here was conducted by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC), established in 1988 by a group of Palestinian researchers and journalists, which has sought to provide reliable information on the Palestinian territories. The JMCC conducted its first opinion poll in 1993 and since 1999 has provided online polling information on Palestinian politics and attitudes towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including the question of Intifada and resistance against Israel. A JMCC poll conducted in June 2002, around the time of the beginning of barrier construction, showed that 79% of Palestinians supported 78 “Hamas Rules: A chance to show it has an agenda beyond terror”, Friday, January 27, 2006 12:01 a.m. EST, Wall Street Journal Editorial Page. http://www.opinionjournal. com/editorial/feature.html?id=110007874.

Palestinian Perspectives

79

the continuation of the Intifada. A poll conducted approximately two years later in December 2004 resulted in a drop of Palestinians in support of continuing the Intifada to 63% of those polled. Although the number decreased over the course of two years, it continues to represent a majority of Palestinians polled. The larger majority of those interviewed in the June 2002 poll (71.7%), believed that Palestinian military operations were a suitable response during the current political situation as opposed to only 22.5% who objected to military operations during the Intifada and considered them harmful. At that time, 47.9% of Palestinians did not differentiate between Palestinian military operations conducted inside Israel or Palestinian military operations targeting the occupied territories. Regarding suicide bombing operations, 68.1% of those interviewed in June 2002 supported them and only 26% opposed them.79 These statistics accord with the policy of Hamas to conduct attacks on the Israeli side of the separation barrier. In its most recent poll in December 2004, the JMCC found that 41% of Palestinians supported military operations against Israel while 52% rejected them. This does not explain the increased support for Hamas during the time period between 2002 and 2004 although with margins of error taken into consideration, a large number of Palestinians does indeed support a continued Intifada against Israel. The Independent Media Review Analysis (IMRA)80 established in 1992 also provides an online digest of media, polls, significant interviews and events concerning the Arab-Israeli Conflict. In Poll No. 118 conducted by the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion (PCPO) and commissioned by Al-Quds newspaper on December 22, 2003, respondents were also asked whether or not they supported the continuation of the Intifada. Results showed that 50.1% were in favor of continuing the Intifada while 36.7% preferred to halt the Intifada, and 13.2% either did not know or refused to answer.81 Finally, in a more recent opinion poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Research and Cultural Dialogue (PCRD) in Beit Sahour on March 9, 2005, results revealed that only 28.2% of Palestinians believed that the al-Aqsa Intifada has served their own interests, whereas more than twice this percentage 68.2% believes it has harmed their interests.82 Therefore, with all three polling sources taken into consideration, it would seem that ideologically Palestinians perceive that continuation of the Intifada is a means of legitimate resistance against Israel even though actual struggles may not have served their interests concretely. This chapter explores different aspects of the Palestinian struggle against the wall, which has taken place at the local, national and international levels. In this 79 Jerusalem Media and Communication Center. http://www.jmcc.org/publicpoll/ results/2002/no45.htm. 80 See IMRA website at http://www.imra.org.il/aboutus.php3. 81 http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1044782/posts. 82 The PCRD’s poll was conducted during the period of February 26-28, 2005 and included a random sample of 910 Palestinian adults, 18 years and older, from the West Bank including East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip. The margin of error was (4%) and the percentage of male respondents was (51.1%) while that of the female ones was (48.9%). The sample distribution over the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip was (63.7%) and (36.3%) respectively. http://www.minfo.gov.ps/polls/english/10-03-05.htm.

80

Bridging the Barrier

struggle, Palestinian public opinion is relatively homogenous and supported by an overwhelming segment of the international community. In the short term, Palestinians express alarm about the immediate humanitarian impact of the wall on the socio-economic structure of Palestinian society and on the lives of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian individuals, families and villages. The deterioration of the general standard of living in the Palestinian territories as a result of difficulties in the free movement of people, goods and services is of particular concern. Calls have been consistently made to the international community to intervene and both provide humanitarian assistance and establish a presence to prevent the further violation of Palestinian rights by Israeli barrier construction. In the long-run, Palestinians overwhelmingly reject the wall because they see it as an extension of longstanding Israeli aims to colonize disputed territory and annex it to the State of Israel, thereby hindering the development of a viable Palestinian state. In making this argument, Palestinians point to the contentious routing of the barrier away from the Green Line and the many points at which it dips into West Bank territory. They see Israeli disengagement and convergence plans as a means to consolidate Jewish presence east of the Green Line in order to enlarge the territory of the State of Israel. Although many Palestinians support a two-state solution and do recognize this will ultimately require an internationally recognized border, they do not accept the type of border that Israel’s separation barrier seems to be creating. Hamas and its constituency have not accepted the notion of a two-state solution and thus reject any attempt to divide the lands of historic Palestine. In perceiving the barrier as part of the linear evolution of Israeli annexationist policies, Palestinians do not seem to take into consideration the tremendous impact suicide terrorism has had on Israeli policy and the extent to which public opinion has changed as a result of national security concerns. Palestinians see themselves as the only victims in this conflict situation. In fact, there is very little, if any, expression of empathy for the Israeli victims of suicide bomb attacks because all Israelis are perceived by Palestinians as part of the grand colonialist regime. For the most part, Palestinians justify their continued struggle against Israel on grounds that every policy and action on the part of the State of Israel and the Israeli Defense Forces are intended to defy Palestinian nationalist ambitions. Therefore, very little space is available for negotiating separation and making compromises towards the aim of PalestinianIsraeli coexistence.

Chapter 5

Legal Challenges and the ICJ The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has long been characterized as a multifarious conflict, waged at the local, national and international levels, and through social, political, economic, diplomatic and other areas. The conflict around Israel’s separation barrier is no exception and in fact, has intensified the involvement of international institutions in the struggle. International activism both for and against the barrier has relied heavily upon the legal realm, with particular emphasis on the framework of international law. Legal challenges to the barrier have proliferated through Israel’s Supreme Court, resulting in changes to the routing of the barrier but not to the legitimacy of the barrier itself. Israel’s High Court of Justice promotes the view that terrorism in Israel can be fought within the framework of the rule of law. Aharon Barak, President of the Israeli Supreme Court claims that fighting terrorism is a complex process that requires “finding the right balance between security and public interests, on one hand, and the need to safeguard human rights and basic freedoms, on the other hand”.1 Palestinians and the international community are not satisfied with solutions to the barrier controversy promulgated by the State of Israel and turn instead to international organizations to buttress their campaign against the wall. A more controversial campaign on Israel’s security barrier has been waged through the institutions of the United Nations, principally the International Court of Justice (ICJ) also known as the World Court. The ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It was established in 1945 to replace the Permanent Court of International Justice and is situated in the Hague, Netherlands. The ICJ performs the two main functions of settling legal disputes submitted to it by states and providing advisory opinions on legal questions submitted to it by suitably authorized international bodies. The second condition paved way for the Palestinian Authority, which is not officially a state according to international law, to approach the ICJ with its grievance against the barrier. Most of the legal challenges to Israel’s separation barrier have been directed through Israel’s High Court of Justice by individual claimants and villages that are directly affected by the barrier and its route. However, Palestinians look beyond Israeli Supreme Court decisions, which they regard as “not neutral”,2 to international institutions to justify and receive support for their rejection of the barrier. Pointing to central terms of reference in international law such as UN Resolution 242 and 1 Judgments of the Israel Supreme Court: Fighting Terrorism within the Law, Israel Supreme Court. 2 Personal interview with Dana Alexander, Director of Law Department of ACRI, Association for Civil Rights in Israel, July 7, 2005, in Jerusalem.

82

Bridging the Barrier

the Geneva Conventions, Palestinian have long claimed that Israeli Occupation of Palestinian territories and Jewish settlements are illegal and this places a precedent for arguments about the building of a barrier in occupied Palestinian territory. The evocation of criminal terminology, namely that the barrier is “illegal”, is used against Israel’s “law and order” justifications for building the barrier to justify Palestinian claims. The United Nations and its agencies and experts have served as the preferred arenas for the Palestinians through which to struggle against Israeli Occupation and now the barrier. The most significant event was the case concerning the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (request for advisory opinion) taken to the International Court of Justice in the Hague in July 2004.3 The impetus for deliberations on the barrier by the International Court of Justice originated from within the United Nations General Assembly, an arena which, on account of its composition, has traditionally championed the Palestinian cause against Israeli policies and politics. The General Assembly held an Emergency Special Session on April 24 and 25, 1997 to consider the “Illegal Israeli Actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the Rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory”. The 10th Emergency Special Session was resumed on July 15, 1997, November 13, 1997 and March 17, 1998 in order to follow up on the implementation of the provisions of the adopted resolutions.4 On October 21, 2003, the resulting UN resolution ES-10/2 demanded that “Israel stop and reverse the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem”5 and provide compensation to those Palestinians who experienced injury as a result of the wall’s construction and routing. Not only did the Resolution establish that construction of the barrier is contrary to international law, it also admonished the international community to not recognize the reality the barrier created and not assist in maintaining it. While resolutions passed by the UN General Assembly are not binding, they strengthen the anti-wall campaign on account of the moral and political weight they carry in international public opinion. The comprehensiveness and strong phrasing of the Resolution expressed through such terms as “occupied Palestinian territory” and “illegal Israeli actions” bolstered the Palestinian position by clearly identifying Israel as the aggressor in this case. 3 “Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory”, International Court of Justice, July 9, 2004, General List, No. 131. http://www.icj-cij. org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwp_advisory_opinion/imwp_advisory_opinion_20040709.htm. 4 “Introduction to Xth Emergency Special Session on Jerusalem and Illegal Israeli Actions”, Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations. http://www. palestine-un.org/tenth/frindex.html. 5 “Assembly, In Resumed Emergency Session, Demands Israel Stop Construction of the Wall, Calls on Both Parties to fulfill Road Map obligations, October 21, 2003. United Nations website. http://www.un.org/av/photo/ga/gaes102103.htm. In response, Kofi Annan, the Secretary-General of the United Nations reported to the UN General Assembly on November 24, 2003 on Israel’s separation barrier. In his report, Annan concluded that the barrier’s construction was “deeply counterproductive” and would “impair future negotiations”. Report of the Secretary-General Prepared Pursuant to General Assembly Resolutions ES-10/13, November 24, 2003.

Legal Challenges and the ICJ

83

More important than the UN Resolution itself however, was the series of events it set in motion by further requesting that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) urgently render an advisory opinion on the following question: What are the legal consequences arising from the construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, as described in the report of the Secretary General, considering the rules and principles of international law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions?6

The ICJ provides advisory opinions only to specified United Nations bodies and agencies. The legal position of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in its request for an advisory opinion from the ICJ recognized Israel’s right to undertake “certain limited measures in cases of strict military necessity and to protect its legitimate security interests”.7 However, beyond this, the Palestinian dossier pointed to a series of human rights violations and injury, which resulted from Israeli measures deemed unnecessary and disproportionate. The Palestinian grievance with the barrier focused on its destruction of Palestinian property, hindrance of the Palestinian right to freedom of movement, infringements on the rights to education, work and an adequate standard of living, arbitrary interference into Palestinian lives, and more broadly obstruction of the territorial sovereignty and right to national self-determination of the Palestinian people. The solution to the barrier controversy provided by the Palestinians was to build the barrier within Israeli territory or on the Green Line and evacuating Israeli civilian nationals in the West Bank. Whether or not the ICJ had the jurisdiction to render an opinion on Israel’s security barrier was a highly disputed affair, whose motive many dismissed as political. Taking a stand on such a controversial issue as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was seen by many critics as outside the purview of the ICJ because of the need to acquire consent of the parties to the conflict. However, the ICJ concluded that it did have jurisdiction on the matter based on its statute to which the Court “may give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever body may be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such a request”.8 On July 9, 2004, the ICJ passed its advisory opinion on the wall by a margin of 14-1, with the lone negative vote cast by the American justice, Thomas Buergenthal. 6 International Court of Justice Press Release 2004/28, July 9, 2004. http://www.icj-cij. org/icjwww/ipresscom/ipress2004/ipresscom2004-28_mwp_20040709.htm. 7 “Summary legal position of the Palestine Liberation Organization”, Annex II, Legal Consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territory, United Nations General Assembly, December 3, 2003. http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/ imwpframe.htm. 8 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Request for advisory opinion), Summary of the Advisory Opinion of July 9, 2004, International Court of Justice, Summary 2004/2. http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/ ipress2004/ipresscom2004-2_summary_mwp_20040709.htm.

84

Bridging the Barrier

In his declaration, Judge Buergenthal stated that he recognized the serious questions of international law that Israel’s construction of a barrier in occupied Palestinian territory raises. However, he contends that the Court did not have the requisite factual bases for its sweeping findings and thus should have declined to hear the case.9 The fact that the opinion was almost unanimous gave it immense political weight and confirmed the widespread perspective against the barrier as expressed in international public opinion. The Court’s condemnation of the barrier was based on four major principals. First is that the construction of the barrier does not coincide with the letter and the spirit of international law. The advisory opinion stated: The Court finds that the construction by Israel of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and its associated régime are contrary to international law.10

Second is the Court’s determination that Israel violated guarantees of freedom of movement under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the right of Palestinians in the West Bank to work, health, education and an adequate standard of living as proclaimed in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. The ICJ concluded that construction of the barrier causes human rights violations emanating for the most part from substantial restrictions on the freedom of movement of the inhabitants, separating Palestinians from farmland, primary sources of water and livelihood, and has intensified difficulties for the population with regard to access to health services and education. Third, the ICJ denounced Israel’s attempts to “alter the demographic situation in the Occupied Territories”, which contravene Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention and Security Council resolutions. The forcible transfer of population, deportations and the destruction of private property being carried out as part of the barrier project were found contrary to Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Finally, the Court did not accept that Israel’s actions were “necessary to attain its security objectives”.11 The ICJ ruling was seen by many as a moral victory for the Palestinians and has since become a pillar of the Palestinian campaign to stop the wall, with their cause placed squarely within the domain of international law and support of the international community. For Israel, the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice was seen in a very different light. Israel has never consented to settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by the Court or by any means of compulsory adjudication, whether locally or internationally. Israel’s absence at the International Court of Justice proceedings in the Hague over the barrier showcased the long-held skepticism of Israelis towards 9 “Declaration of Judge Buergenthal”, Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territory. http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwpframe.htm. 10 International Court of Justice Press Release 2004/28, July 9, 2004. http://www.icj-cij. org/icjwww/ipresscom/ipress2004/ipresscom2004-28_mwp_20040709.htm. 11 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Request for advisory opinion), Summary of the Advisory Opinion of July 9, 2004, International Court of Justice, Summary 2004/2. http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/ ipress2004/ipresscom2004-2_summary_mwp_20040709.htm.

Legal Challenges and the ICJ

85

12

the United Nations, its institutions and resolutions. Israel, for its part, boycotted the World Court hearings at the Hague, accusing the UN tribunal of bias, politicization and claiming the ICJ did not have the authority to deliberate on issues of a political nature. Those who opposed the ICJ’s assumption of the case argue that the issuing of an opinion by the ICJ on such a highly contentious and political issue as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a “serious misuse” of the court, which threatens to undermine its integrity and the integrity of international law. Israel pointed out that the question to be deliberated by the court did not include any mention of Palestinian terrorism, Israel’s stated reason for building the barrier in the first place, and employed politically-laden terms such as “wall”. In its written submission to the ICJ,13 the Israeli position stated that such issues as the barrier, should be settled through bilateral negotiations, and not be predetermined or imposed by the ICJ or other international bodies.14 Israel also accused the ICJ of not being apprised of sufficient facts to deliberate on the case in a fair and meaningful manner. The Court responded that the dossier submitted by the Secretary-General, which includes several reports based on on-site visits by special rapporteurs and competent organs of the United Nations as well as numerous written statements by other participants were sufficient to give a response to the question put by the General Assembly. An important distinction is that as opposed to Israeli Supreme Court cases, which dealt with portions of the barrier route, the case before the ICJ considered the route in its entirety. The Israeli Supreme Court accused the ICJ of rendering its judgment based on the facts regarding the injury to the rights of the Palestinian residents without dealing with the factual basis regarding Israel’s security-military need to erect the barrier.15 In other words, Israel argued that the ICJ did not consider the many issues that lead Israel to build a barrier in the first place, particularly the threat of Palestinian suicide bombers in Israeli urban metropolitan centres whose base of operations, sites of recruitment and weapons facilities are located in areas that the barrier cut off from the State of Israel. While Israel did not appear before the Court, it submitted written briefs arguing that Article 51 of the UN Charter enables it to construct the barrier in self-defence against Palestinian attacks. In response, the Court dismissed Article 51 as irrelevant because it recognizes the inherent right of self-defense only “in the case of armed attack by one state against another state”. Of course, the ICJ did not consider the complexities of asymmetrical warfare, counterinsurgency, and terrorism which 12 Alan Dershowitz argues in his book The Case For Israel, that Israel has been singled out for condemnation by international institutions and specifically the United Nations. For example, “The Commission on Human Rights has spent more time on Israel than any other country” and thus uses double standards when dealing with Israel in relation to other states in conflict. Alan Dershowitz, 2003, The Case for Israel, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.: New Jersey: 182. 13 For full text of Israel’s written submission to the ICJ, see http://securityfence.mfa.gov. il/mfm/Data/49486.pdf. 14 “The International Court of Justice and Israel’s Security Fence”, Anti-Defamation League, July 9, 2004. http://www.adl.org/Israel/court_of_justice.asp. 15 “The Judgment of the Fence Surrounding Alfei Menashe”, September 15, 2005, Jewish Virtual Library. http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/alfei.html.

86

Bridging the Barrier

constitute the bulk of Israel’s security dilemma. Then Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon described the ICJ ruling to his Cabinet as a “slap in the face in the global fight against terrorism”.16 Nevertheless, since Israel does not claim that Palestinian attacks, which originate from territory under its military control, are imputable to a foreign state, the ICJ rules it cannot invoke Article 51. Ultimately, the Court rejected Israel’s assertion that construction of the barrier was necessary to safeguard its interests and concluded that Israel’s right to protect its citizens from indiscriminate and deadly acts must conform to applicable international law. Those critical of the ICJ’s decision to deliberate on the case of Israel’s separation barrier argue that the case makes a mockery of international institutions and distorts the purpose of international law. “Fundamentally, arguing that a state that is facing daily threats from suicide bombers cannot legally erect even passive defenses suggests that the critics’ real problem is Israel’s existence.”17 Critics of the ICJ’s advisory opinion have drawn parallels between the politicization of the ICJ and UN General Assembly Resolution 3379 passed on November 10, 1975, stating that “Zionism is Racism”. The Resolution was supported by a bloc of Arab, African and Soviet states, seeking to annul the UN resolutions, which brought into being the creation of Israel thereby legitimizing the right of the Jewish people to national self-determination. Critics of UN involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict also point to the transformation of such well-intentioned forums as the UN World Conference Against Racism in Durban, South Africa in 2001, into a platform upon which to delegitimize Israel and promote hateful anti-Jewish rhetoric and anti-Israel propaganda.18 The American and Israeli delegations left the Durban conference over the anti-Israel language of the conference text. Jewish groups have expressed grave concern about the misuse of international forums such as these by Palestinian, Arab, Islamic and other peace, human rights and social groups loosely associated within the anti-globalization movement. Irwin Cotler, veteran advocate in the international struggle against racism and discrimination and expert on international law, has argued that expressions of certain forms of anti-Zionism act as cover for traditional anti-Semitism, thereby allowing anti-Semites to articulate a socially unacceptable religious or ethnic hatred through currently acceptable expressions of opposition to the State of Israel and its policies. The new anti-Semitism according to Cotler, is to be found in the “singling out of Israel and the Jewish people for differential and

16 Aluf Benn, Shlomo Shamir and Yuval Yoaz, “AG appoints special team to examine ICJ ruling on fence”, Haaretz.com, July 12, 2004. http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt. jhtml?itemNo=449833&contrassID=1&subContrassID=1&sbSubContrassID=0&listSrc=Y. 17 David B. Rivkin and Darin R. Bartram, “Israel’s barrier: In defense of the fence”, International Herald Tribune, Monday, January 19, 2004. http://www.iht.com/ articles/2004/01/19/edrivkin_ed3_.php. 18 Tom Lantos. “The Durban Debacle: An Insider’s View of the World Racism Conference at Durban”, Special Reprint Edition of The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 26.1, Winter/Spring 2002. http://www.house.gov/international_relations/democratic/Durban_ Debacle.pdf#search=’World%20Conference%20against%20Racism%20and%20Durban%20 and%20Israel’.

Legal Challenges and the ICJ

87

discriminatory treatment in the international arena—where United Nations human rights bodies are used as the mask or protective cover for this anti-Jewishness”.19 The United Nations General Assembly passed a subsequent resolution on July 20, 2004 calling upon Israel to abide by the ICJ ruling. The Israeli government reacted to the ICJ ruling calling it “one-sided and politically motivated”.20 Then Israeli Finance Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rejoined in the New York Times that “none of the arguments against the security fence have any merit”21 and emphasized that the barrier is being constructed in territory that Israel took in 1967 in the context of a defensive war. Former senior advisor to then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Ra’anan Gissin went even further by commenting that “I believe that after all the rancour dies, this resolution will find its place in the garbage can of history”.22 Israel’s political leadership showed no sign that it would follow the ICJ ruling. Former Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom said during a visit to Washington, “The decision of the High Court of Justice in Israel on the wall proves that we can deal with this on our own”.23 However, in its study of the findings of the Hague advisory, the Israeli Supreme Court incorporated the spirit, if not the letter, of the Hague when making its own changes to the barrier’s routing, particularly in the subsequent decision regarding routing of the barrier in the case of Alfei Menashe. In August 2004, Israeli Supreme Court President Aharon Barak conceded that Israel has to take into consideration the ICJ ruling because “We do not live on a desert island”. This suggests that despite official pronouncements, the Israeli legal system was, in fact, influenced by the ICJ’s decision and sought, at least in relation to routing of the barrier if not the barrier itself, to mitigate its most harmful effects both on Palestinians and on international public opinion.

19 Irwin Cotler. “Human Rights and the New Anti-Jewishness”, FrontPageMagazine. com, February 16, 2004. http://frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=12191. 20 Aluf Benn, Shlomo Shamir and Yuval Yoaz, “AG appoints special team to examine ICJ ruling on fence”, Haaretz.com, July 12, 2004. http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt. jhtml?itemNo=449833&contrassID=1&subContrassID=1&sbSubContrassID=0&listSrc=Y. 21 “Israeli Reaction to the ICJ Wall Ruling”, July 13, 2004, Council for the National Interest. http://www.cnionline.org/learn/wall/icj3.htm. 22 “The Political Scene” (July 19, 2004), Middle East Economic Survey, Vol. XLVII, No. 29, July 19, 2004. 23 “Getting an opinion on the wall”, Published in Daily Star, by Sarah Leah, Whitson Special to The Daily Star, Friday, July 9, 2004. http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/07/09/ isrlpa9050.htm).

This page intentionally left blank

Chapter 6

The Barrier in Jerusalem The city of Jerusalem poses a unique challenge to the development and application of Israel’s separation barrier project. Of all the final status issues that have yet to be resolved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the question of Jerusalem is perhaps the most sensitive. Jerusalem has occupied a central role in the Middle East with longstanding social, cultural, religious and economic significance to both the Israeli and Palestinian nations. Jerusalem is a city divided among large Jewish and Arab neighborhoods. Due to the particular demographic balance between Jews and Arabs in the city, Jerusalem represents a microcosm of the many difficult issues that policy makers face. Barrier construction in Jerusalem holds central importance to the project of separating Israelis and Palestinians into a two-state solution because the barrier’s Jerusalem trajectory is particularly complicated and contentious in that geographical area. The Jerusalem portion of the barrier stands to reshape the boundaries of a city that both Israelis and Palestinians see as crucial to their national identity and claim as their capital. Successive Israeli governments have maintained that Jerusalem is the “holy and undivided capital” of the State of Israel and Palestinians claim Jerusalem, which they refer to as “Al-Quds” (the holy) as the capital of a future Palestinian state. Any changes to the city’s boundaries can dramatically alter its demographic makeup and thus influence political claims to the city as a site of residence and national governance. As a result, Jerusalem requires separate consideration and analysis vis-à-vis the separation barrier and its possible ramifications for Israeli-Palestinian relations and prospects for a comprehensive settlement of the conflict. Significance of the Holy City Jerusalem, the so-called “holy city”, holds a significant place in the annals of world history, sought after and fought over by virtually all of the world’s major empires. The walled Old City of Jerusalem is home to the most sacred sites of the three monotheistic religions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam and the place where God’s presence is the most deeply felt by many of the world’s faithful. Within the walled Old City of Jerusalem, the Temple Mount is considered to be the holiest site of the Jewish religion, the place where the first and second Jewish Temples in Jerusalem stood and arguably the site of the third Temple expected by some streams of Judaism to arrive in the Messianic era. Jews have a particular connection to Jerusalem, which they often refer to by its biblical name, Zion. Jerusalem was established as the first capital of the Jewish nation under the rule of King David 1004-965 BCE and then by David’s son King Solomon who expanded the

90

Bridging the Barrier

city under his reign from 967-930 BCE. The last remaining Western Wall, which Jews refer to as the “Wailing Wall” with its connotations of mourning, serves as the central site of prayer, which many believe to be a direct channel to God. Since the destruction of the Second Temple, Jerusalem has constituted the focus of longing for Diaspora Jews who were forced by the Romans into exile and endured centuries of wandering in alien lands. Psalm 137 describes the captive Israelites who lamented the loss of Zion with the well-known ode, If I forget you, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget its cunning, let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth, if I remember you not; if I set not Jerusalem above my chiefest joy.1

The Jewish yearning for return to their ancestral homeland is repeated yearly in the ancient liturgical phrase “L’shanah haba’ah b’Yerushalayim!” (“Next Year in Jerusalem”), which ends the night’s service of the festive meal (Seder) of Passover, the Jewish holiday that celebrates the exodus of the Israelites from their bondage in ancient Egypt. The same section of Jerusalem’s Old City, referred to by Muslims as Haram al-Sharif (The Noble Holy Place) contains two places of worship central to the Muslim Faith.2 First is the Dome of the Rock constructed in 691 AD and considered by many to be the greatest monument in the Muslim world. The Dome houses the rock from which the Prophet Muhammad is believed to have ascended to heaven on his nocturnal journey with the Angel Gabriel (al-Mi’raj), mentioned in the first verse in Sura 17 of the Q’uran, Islam’s holy book. Second is the al-Aqsa Mosque, which together with the golden dome constitutes the third holiest site in Islam after Mecca and Medina. It is said that the Prophet Muhammad initially requested that his followers prostrate themselves in prayer facing the direction of Jerusalem but after seventeen months, reoriented the direction of prayer towards the Kaaba in Mecca. Arabs conquered Jerusalem in 638 AD and changed its name in the 10th Century from the Roman Aelia to Al-Quds (the holy), which has been used to refer to the city until the present time. Muslims refer to the Western Wall as the Al-Buraq Wall, which is considered to be a Muslim religious endowment (waqf ) to which Palestinians claim historic rights.3 Jerusalem is also significant to the many streams of the religion of Christianity. Jerusalem’s significance to Christians is marked by the Church of the Holy Sepulcher, the Byzantine church built where the New Testament situates the hill of crucifixion and the tomb of Jesus Christ. The Church of the Holy Sepulcher is an important destination for Christian pilgrims of all streams of Christianity. In addition, churches of the major Christian denominations, including Catholic, Armenian, Russian Orthodox, Protestant and others are situated throughout the city. Jerusalem’s Old City remains surrounded by the walls erected by the Ottoman Turkish sultan Suleiman the Magnificent in 1538, and is divided into four quarters: the Muslim Quarter, the 1 Book of Psalms, 137: 5-6. 2 Albert Hourani, 1991, A History of the Arab Peoples, Warner Books: New York: 54-55. 3 Nazmi al-Jubeh, “Bab al-Magharibah: Joha’s Nail in the Haram al-Sharif”, Jerusalem Quarterly File, 2003. http://www.jerusalemquarterly.org/2003/jqf18/bab.pdf#search=’Al%20 Buraq%20Wall’.

The Barrier in Jerusalem

91

Christian Quarter, the Armenian Quarter, and the Jewish Quarter. As a result of this religious context, Jerusalem is one of the most contested religious places worldwide. The city’s fate is of interest, therefore, not only to the people who reside there, but to Jews, Muslims and Christians everywhere. The demographic makeup of the city of Jerusalem has rendered problematic plans to separate Jewish and Arab populations because of their comprehensive intermingling. Since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War when Israel occupied the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem have been altered significantly by the State of Israel. In 1967, the municipal boundaries of Arab East Jerusalem, which comprised roughly 6.5 square kilometers were expanded through the annexation of an additional 70 square kilometers of East Jerusalem and some 28 additional villages in the surrounding area. These villages and their residents were all incorporated into the territory of the State of Israel although not all received citizenship rights. The new municipal boundaries of East and West Jerusalem, which comprised roughly 108 square kilometers achieved the goal of a Jewish majority in the city and excluded Arab population centers such as Ar-Ram, Abu-Dis, Izzariya, and the Qalandiya Camp.4 Successive Israeli governments invested in new Jewish neighborhoods in Jerusalem, in particular, Neve Yakov, Pisgat Ze’ev, Ramot, Ramat Eshkol and French Hill in the northern part of the city, Har Nof and Malcha in the west, East Talpiot in the centraleastern part, and Gilo and Har Homa in the south.5 Arab East Jerusalem as included within contemporary plans for “Greater Jerusalem” include the large neighborhoods of Beit Hanina, Shu’afat and Anata in the northern section, Isawiyya and At-Tur in the east, and Silwan, Ras Al-Amud, Mukabber, Beit Safafa and Sur Baher in the south.6 Palestinians have accused Israel of intentionally altering the demographic makeup of Jerusalem in ways that strengthen Israel’s position in relation to final status negotiations over the future of the city in the, as yet, indeterminable future. The barrier around Jerusalem is considered to form part of this overall plan. The future demographic composition of the city will ultimately be determined by where the barrier is placed and which side of the barrier Jews and Arabs end up on once all is said and done. Due to the contentious nature of holy sites in the city, the very notion of dividing Jerusalem with a barrier has held ramifications for access and movement that raise seemingly insurmountable ideological and practical problems. The Evolution of Separation in Jerusalem From the beginning of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the international community considered Jerusalem to be a distinct and separate political entity, according 4 “Jerusalem: Special Bulletin”, May 2002, PASSIA, Palestinian Academic Society for International Affairs: 1. http://www.passia.org/publications/bulletins/english-jerusalem/ pages/page3.pdf. 5 “Jerusalem Boundaries and Neighborhoods”, Jewish Virtual Library, A Division of the American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise. http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/ History/jerusalemmap.html. 6 “Arab East Jerusalem within ‘Greater Jerusalem’”, Palestine Facts. http://www. passia.org/palestine_facts/MAPS/images/jer_maps/GreaterJerusalem.html.

92

Bridging the Barrier

to the principle of “corpus separatum”, a term derived from the Latin, which is used to describe cities that are split. According to the UN Partition Plan of 1947, the Greater Jerusalem area, encompassing Bethlehem, Abu-Dis, Ein Karem and northern Shu’afat, was to be placed under international supervision. The idea of internationalizing the city of Jerusalem has garnered widespread support from the international community on account of the broad spectrum of interests in the city on the part of peoples worldwide. The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 of November 29, 1947 established that the City of Jerusalem would be managed by a Special International Regime. A governor would be appointed by the Trusteeship Council, which would then act on behalf of the United Nations. The concern of the international community was to protect and preserve the holy sites located in the city and foster the well-being and cooperation among its inhabitants. To ensure security, the Resolution intended Jerusalem to be a demilitarized and neutral city with paramilitary groups having been disarmed.7 According to this plan, a referendum was to be held within ten years to determine whether residents of the city wanted the arrangement to continue or to be changed. While reliable population statistics are difficult to obtain due to the controversial nature of demography in the city, it is estimated that in 1922, there were approximately 13,413 Muslims, 14,699 Christians and 33,971 Jews with a total population of 62,578 in Jerusalem.8 As a result of immigration during the period of the British Mandate, both legal and illegal, of Jews into Palestine, the proportion of the Jewish population relative to the Muslim and Christian populations in Jerusalem, grew tremendously. By 1948, there were roughly 40,000 Muslims, 25,000 Christians and 99,320 Jews (plus 110 others) with a total of 164,440 residents in Jerusalem.9 The percentage of Jews grew dramatically from 54.3% in 1922 to 60.4% in 1948, while the percentage of Muslims underwent a small change from 21.4% in 1922 to 24.3% in 1948. However, during the first Arab-Israeli War of 1948, the status of Jerusalem was decided militarily rather than diplomatically and the notion of corpus separatum was put to rest. The idea of an international presence was put on hold and Jerusalem was divided for the first time in its history. On May 28, 1948, Jordan’s Arab Legion took control of the Jewish Quarter of Jerusalem’s Old City and all of eastern Jerusalem (encompassing a total of 6 square kilometers), while the newly established State of Israel held on to the Jewish populated neighborhoods in the west part of the city (approximately 38 square kilometers). The armistice lines drawn at war’s end between the newly established State of Israel and Jordan recognized this division of the city. 7 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 181 (II). Future government of Palestine, A/RES/181(II)(A+B), November 29, 1947. http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798 adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/7f0af2bd897689b785256c330061d253!OpenDocument. 8 The statistics on the population of Jerusalem vary by source and are thus rough estimates. Manashe Harrel, 1974, “The Jewish Presence in Jerusalem through the Ages” in John Oesterreicher and Anne Sinai, eds., Jerusalem, John Day: New York. 9 Statistics were taken from two separate sources: “The Growth of the Western Communities, 1917-1948”, Rochelle Davis, October 1, 2002. http://www.jerusalemiloveyou. net/article.php3?id_article=20, and Sami Hadawi, “Palestinian Rights and Losses in 1948”, A Survey of Palestine, London, 1988.

The Barrier in Jerusalem

93

Eager to reinforce Israel’s claims on the beleaguered city, on December 13, 1949, Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion declared Jerusalem as the capital of the State of Israel. The government began to move its offices to Jerusalem and encouraged immigrants to relocate there as well. The properties vacated by Palestinians who fled or were involuntarily deported from their homes in Jerusalem and its environs were taken over by the Israeli government in 1950 with the passing of the Absentee Property Law. According to this law, the property of an “absentee”, any person who resided in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip or in other Arab states at any time in the period between November 29, 1947 and September 1, 1948, is transferred to the Custodian of Absentee Property, which is effectively under the jurisdiction of the State of Israel.10 Many Arab homes and neighborhoods were given over to Jewish immigrants newly arrived from Europe. Indeed, many Holocaust survivors took up residence in the newly vacated houses and their accompanying properties. In 1952, Israel enacted laws to regulate residence in Israel, particularly the Law of Entry to Israel. Palestinians claim that this legislation hinders the re-entry of Palestinians to the country that leave for any period of time. These policies were the beginnings of attempts by the State of Israel to control the demographic balance of the district of Jerusalem to encourage the growth of Jewish neighborhoods and limit the growth of Arab neighborhoods. Following the Six Day War, the city’s jurisdiction was enlarged by some 70 square kilometers in an accelerated legislative process on June 28, 1967. Israel proceeded to annex the eastern part of the city based on a rejection of the corpus separatum status for Jerusalem. “There has never been any agreement, treaty, or international understanding which applies the corpus separatum concept to Jerusalem.” For these reasons, Israel declared the corpus separatum solution as nothing more than “one of the many inappropriate historical attempts made to examine possible solutions for the status of the city”.11 On June 28, 1967, the Israeli Parliament amended the Law of 1950 which established Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and extended Israeli legal jurisdiction over the eastern section of the city. Since the reunification of the city in 1967, a national consensus has held by all successive Israeli governments that Jerusalem is, in fact, Israel’s eternal capital and one “indivisible city” under Israeli sovereignty. A further effort to formalize the status of Israel’s reunited capital city came with Israel’s ratification of the Basic Law for Jerusalem through the Knesset on July 30, 1980. The Basic Law for Jerusalem reiterates that “Jerusalem, complete and united, is the capital of Israel”. Jerusalem was given special priority in the activities of the state as “the seat of the President of the State, the Knesset, the Government and the Supreme Court”.12 On August 20, 1980, the United Nations Security Council expressed its opinion on the Jerusalem Law through UN Resolution 478, which stated that Israel’s actions on Jerusalem violated international law and threatened to alter 10 “East Jerusalem Land Confiscation Considered Anew”, Association for Civil Rights in Israel, January 31, 2005. http://www.acri.org.il/english-acri/engine/story.asp?id=199. 11 The Status of Jerusalem, March 14, 1999, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. http:// www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/1990_1999/1999/3/The%20Status%20of%20Jerusalem. 12 “Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel”, July 30, 1980. http://www.knesset.gov.il/ laws/special/eng/basic10_eng.htm.

94

Bridging the Barrier

the character and status of the holy city. UN Resolution 478 registered Israel’s annexation of Jerusalem “null and void” and stated it “must be rescinded forthwith”.13 Member states were directed to move their diplomatic missions out of Jerusalem and most, with the most notable exception of the United States, relocated to Tel Aviv, where they remain to this day. Nonetheless, in 1988, Jordan withdrew all its longstanding claims to east Jerusalem (and the entire West Bank) leaving Israel with exclusive jurisdiction over both the western and eastern sections of the city. Jerusalem and the Demographic Struggle Since 1967, Israel has enacted policies that have altered the demographic nature of the city in its favor. For example, immediately after the 1967 War, Israel forcefully expelled over 6,000 Palestinians from the Mughrabi Quarter of the Old City and destroyed over 135 houses to enlarge the area of worship facing the Western Wall. In addition to the confiscation of Arab lands in east Jerusalem, houses were destroyed, Jewish settlements were built and settler families moved into areas outside the Jewish quarter.14 Several controversial Jewish building projects have taken place within Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem. For example, American Jewish millionaire Irwin Moskowitz financed the construction of a Jewish neighborhood in the Ras al-Amud quarter and revealed plans in 2005 to establish another new Jewish neighborhood around the Shephard’s Hotel, which he acquired in 1985, within the Sheikh Jarrah quarter.15 These building plans have been opposed on account of their highly provocative nature and meddling in the demographic character of the Old City of Jerusalem. In 1967, the population of Jerusalem grew to 267,800, with 196,800 Jews, 58,100 Muslims and 12,900 Christians. Again, the relative size of the Jewish population grew from 60.4% in 1948 to 73.5% of the total population in Jerusalem in 1967.16 While the Muslim population grew as well, from 40,000 in 1948 to 58,100 in 1967, it actually dropped in its percentage share of the overall population, from 24.3% in 1948 to 21.7% in 1967. Aware of these demographic challenges in Jerusalem, the State of Israel sought to establish a Greater Jerusalem by building extensively in those Israeli settlements established in the broader Jerusalem vicinity. The goal of planning authorities was to obtain a demographic balance of 70% Jews and 30% Arabs. Four blocs of Jewish settlements have developed in the Greater Jerusalem region: Gi’von, Kokhav Ya’akovTel Zion, Ma’aleh Adumim, and the Etzion Bloc with a total population of close to 50,000 residents17 Migration trends within Jerusalem show increased movement of Jewish residents from the centre to such recently established outlying neighborhoods. 13 UN Security Council Resolution 478 (1980). http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/ RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/399/71/IMG/NR039971.pdf?OpenElement. 14 http://www.caabu.org/press/factsheets/jerusalem2.html. 15 “US millionaire finances Jewish settlement in east Jerusalem”, Haaretz.com, November 3, 2005. http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=640982. 16 Bernard Wasserstein, 2002, Divided Jerusalem: The Struggle for the Holy City. Yale University Press: New Haven & London: 46. 17 Klein, 2003: 17.

The Barrier in Jerusalem

95

Over the years, Jerusalem has experienced rapid growth both in geographic size and population as indicated by figures of Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics. Prior to 1967, the municipal jurisdiction of Jerusalem covered a total land area of 38,100 dunams.18 With the annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967, Jerusalem grew to 108,000 dunams and to 126,300 dunams after 1993. In 1987, the total population of Jerusalem was 475,000, divided between 340,000 Jews, 121,000 Muslims and 14,000 Christians. The relative percentages of the Jews and Christians remained roughly the same, with Jews comprising 71.6% and Muslims comprising 25.5% of the total population of the city. As of May 24, 2006, Jerusalem has become Israel’s largest city with a population of roughly 724,000. It is the first time in all of Israel’s history that the relative percentage of Jews in Jerusalem has declined. While the Jewish population grew from 340,000 in 1987 to 470,000 in 2006, the percentage of Jews dropped from 71.6% in 1987 to 65.0% in 2006. The Muslim population, which stands at 231,680 in 2006, increased its relative percentage from 25.5% in 1987 to 32.0% in 2006.19 The increase in the percentage of the Muslim population relative to the Jewish in Jerusalem has caused much controversy for city planners seeking to retain a Jewish majority in the city. The Municipality of Jerusalem attributes demographic growth in the city to two main factors: a high rate of natural increase and the absorption in Jerusalem of new Jewish immigrants.20 Natural increase of approximately 15,733 people is attributed to two major communities, the ultra-Orthodox Jewish community and the non-Jewish community. In the 1980s, the rate of natural increase constituted 80% or more of total population growth in the city. Between the years of 1990 and 1995, Jerusalem was the destination for approximately 51,605 Jewish immigrants. These figures take into consideration internal migration and the trend of residents of Jerusalem leaving the city for other communities within Israel at a rate of approximately 16,000 per year in the 1990s.21 However, demographic considerations have dominated political and policyoriented debates about Jerusalem. The relative breakdown of population among Israeli Jews and Arabs (Muslim and Christian) has been central to the debate about Jerusalem’s rapid growth rate and has influenced political solutions to and possible scenarios for the future status of the city. In principle, like Jews, Arab Israelis carry blue Israeli identity cards that identify them as permanent residents with rights to freedom of movement and eligibility for Israel’s network of social services. However, rights in Jerusalem are tainted by political objectives. Over the years, Jerusalem has undergone a dramatic transformation from city to metropolis, largely on account of out-going migration to newly built Jewish

18 4 dunams are the equivalent of 1 acre. 19 “Jerusalem Day”, Press Release, Central Bureau of Statistics, State of Israel, May 24, 2006, translated from the Hebrew. http://www.cbs.gov.il/hodaot2006n/11_06_106b.pdf. 20 “Population Size and Demographic Characteristics”. http://www.jerusalem.muni.il/ jer_main/f1_main.asp?lng=2. 21 Jerusalem: Urban Characteristics and Major Trends in the City’s Development”, January 5, 1997, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/1990_ 1999/1998/6/Jerusalem%20Urban%20Development%20-%20Population%20Size-%20Inc.

96

Bridging the Barrier

settlements in the West Bank and expansion of Jewish neighborhoods within East Jerusalem.22 Since 2006, all Muslims and roughly a quarter of Jews now live in East Jerusalem. Much of the Jewish expansion around Jerusalem has functioned on the basis of “eminent domain”, a common law legal principle that authorizes governments to expropriate land from private owners for purposes of public use. In the case of East Jerusalem however, the fact of having been acquired by war but not being mentioned specifically in UN Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967 confounds its status in international law. The demographic struggle around land expropriation in East Jerusalem was exemplified by the designation by Israel in 1997 of 6,500 new housing units for Har Homa, a housing project on a hill south of Jerusalem’s Old City but within Jerusalem’s municipal boundaries, and the violent demonstrations that followed.23 Israelis and Palestinians both hold Jerusalem as central to their economic, social and cultural identities. However, prior to 1967, Palestinians moved freely between Jerusalem and its surrounding environs in the West Bank where economic, cultural and familial bonds promoted fundamental continuities between the two geographical areas.24 Since 1967, Israel has established an array of town planning schemes and building laws that seek to restrict the building and expansion of Palestinian neighborhoods in Jerusalem in order to secure Jewish sovereignty over the city. The attempt to maintain and enlarge the Jewish population of Jerusalem has been a major problem for residents of Arab neighborhoods in the city, and is recognized as one of most severe violations by Israel of the social, economic, political and cultural rights of the Arab population of Jerusalem. On account of the difficulty in obtaining building permits and severe overcrowding in Palestinian neighborhoods, many Palestinians have elected to build illegally, which has often resulted in home demolitions by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). The Israeli Committee against House Demolitions (ICAHD),25 a direct-action group that campaigns against Israeli demolition of Palestinian houses in the Occupied Territories has indicated that destruction of Palestinian homes, property and infrastructure is contrary to the Fourth Geneva Convention whose Article 53 states: Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons…is prohibited.26

22 “Jerusalem: A City in Transition: Population and Spatial Relations”, Maya Choshen and Yair Asaf-Shapira, March 2005, Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies. http://www.jiis. org.il/jerusalem-in-transition.pdf#search=’Israel%20and%20population%20and%201967’. 23 Stephen Sosebee, “New Jewish Settlements in Jerusalem Destroying Fragile Oslo Accords”, Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, April/May, 1997: 8-9. http://www. washington-report.org/backissues/0497/9704008.htm. 24 “A Wall in Jerusalem: Obstacles to Human Rights in the Holy City”, B’Tselem, Summer, 2006, 6. 25 For more information see The Israeli Committee against House Demolitions Website. http://www.icahd.org/eng/. 26 “Frequently Asked Questions”, The Israeli Committee against House Demolitions Website. http://www.icahd.org/eng/faq.asp?menu=9&submenu=1.

The Barrier in Jerusalem

97

A second challenge to Palestinian claims to Jerusalem is the loss by Arab residents of Jerusalem of their residency rights. Upon annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967, the State of Israel granted Palestinian residents the option of becoming Israeli citizens. However, due to conflicting loyalties and the obligation to pledge allegiance to Israel, most Palestinians declined citizenship and opted instead for permanent resident status. This status gives Palestinian residents of Jerusalem access to the Israeli labor force, health insurance and social welfare benefits such as disability, unemployment and pension payments. However, by way of comparison to citizenship, residency status is limited and expires once a resident is absent from Jerusalem for 7 years. Any Palestinian resident of Jerusalem, therefore, who decides, for whatever reason, to live outside of Jerusalem for 7 years is liable to lose their residency status and all its accompanying rights.27 For example, according to the current guideline set by the National Insurance Law, only residents of Israel living in Israel and citizens of Israel who are living in Israel or in the occupied territories are entitled to national insurance benefits. Arab permanent residents of Jerusalem forfeit these rights when they move outside Israel’s Jerusalem borders and cannot regain benefits until 2 years after they return.28 In 1974, Israel enacted Entry to Israel regulations, which provides the state further powers to limit the re-entry of Palestinians, particularly into Jerusalem, who had left for a period of time. According to Israel’s leading human rights organization, B’Tselem, over 3000 Palestinians lost their right to live in Jerusalem between 1995 and 1999. In what has been referred to as a “quiet deportation”, Israel has encouraged Palestinians to leave Jerusalem through a variety of methods including but not limited to, “withdrawal of residency permits and health insurance; expropriation of land; demolition of housing; denying family reunification; creating a severe housing shortage; and neglecting basic services”.29 A third challenge to Arab residents of Jerusalem is the viability of Palestinian families that are made up of members from Jerusalem and the West Bank or Gaza Strip. Since July 31, 2003, the Israeli Knesset passed the Nationality and Entry into Israel Law, which prohibits granting of any residency or citizenship status to Palestinians from the 1967 Occupied Palestinian Territories who are married to Israeli citizens.30 A petition and motion for injunction were submitted to the Israeli Supreme Court 27 “A Wall in Jerusalem: Obstacles to Human Rights in the Holy City”, B’Tselem, Summer, 2006: 7. 28 Anita Vitullo, “Feature: Israel’s Social Policy in Arab Jerusalem”, Jerusalem Quarterly File, Issue 2, 1998. http://www.jerusalemquarterly.org/1998/jqf2/policy2.html. 29 “Jerusalem”, Search for Justice and Equality in Palestine/Israel, SEARCH Fact Sheets, Jerusalem, October 2000. http://www.searchforjustice.org/faqs/jerusalem.html. 30 The Law, which was originally enacted for one year, was extended three times, and minor amendments were enacted to allow family unification between residents of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Israeli citizens. However, the amendments permit individuals to apply at most for temporary visit permits in Israel, while they continue to prohibit individuals from submitting applications for residency and citizenship, which leaves them ineligible for work permits and other social benefits. See “News Update, 14 May 2006, Adalah: 6-5 Majority of Supreme Court Approves Most Racist Law in State of Israel”. http://www.adalah. org/eng/famunif.php.

98

Bridging the Barrier

on August 3, 2003, which challenged the law on grounds that it violates the rights to equality and family life of Palestinian citizens and residents of Israel. However, the Israeli Supreme Court upheld the law and rejected the petition. As a result, the Law continues to produce hardship for thousands of families comprised of tens of thousands of individuals who are forced to live separately.31 Currently, the Jerusalem district is home to 18% of the Arab population of Israel.32 According to forecasts of the Central Bureau of Statistics, Israel’s Arab population is expected to represent between 21% and 24% of Jerusalem’s residents by 2020. Of that total growth of the Arab population in Israel, 97% is a result of natural increase (excess of births over deaths) and 3% from immigration balance, primarily family reunification.33 A study done by the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies claims that the Arab population in Jerusalem increased in the late 1990s at three times the pace of the Jewish population. According to Maya Choshen, editor of the institute’s statistical year book, the difference is attributed to a combination of a higher natural increase among Arabs and a rise in the number of Jews opting to leave the city. The study revealed that between the years 1967 and 1998, the Jewish population grew 121% while the Arab population grew 186%. As well, the birth rate among Jews in 1998 was 25.2 per 1,000 population compared with 34.7 per 1,000 Arabs.34 One of the ways the government of Israel has responded to the relatively higher growth rate of the Arab population in Jerusalem has been through the administration of housing policy. On April 19, 1999, an inter-ministerial committee on Jerusalem recommended that, in order to maintain a Jewish majority in Jerusalem, Israel needed 116,000 new housing units in the city for Jews by 2020, an annual rate of 5,500. The intermingling of Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem and the relative rates of growth of both communities has been the subject of virulent debate, which over the years has led to devising different options of governing the city. Sharing Jerusalem Until the late 1990s, calls to share the city of Jerusalem were limited to peace and human rights groups operating outside of the mainstream political consensus, both in

31 “Special Report: Ban on Family Unification, Challenging Israel’s discriminatory law and policies prohibiting the family unification of Palestinian citizens of Israel and Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip”, Adalah: The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel. http://www.adalah.org/eng/famunif.php. 32 This statistic is in relation to 46% of Israeli Arabs who live in the Northern district primarily and the rest being evenly distributed in the central, southern, Haifa and Tel Aviv districts. The Arab population of Israel comprises 19% of the total population of Israel. At the end of 2001, the Arab population of Israel reached approximately 1.2 million people. 33 Nurit Yaffe and Dorith Tal, “The Arab Population in Israel”, Statistilite No. 27, State of Israel, Prime Minister’s Office, Central Bureau of Statistics, Center for Statistical Information, 2. http://www.cbs.gov.il/statistical/arabju.pdf. 34 “Arab population growth outpaces Jews in Jerusalem”, CNN.com, copyrighted by Reuters, September 26, 2000. http://edition.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/meast/09/26/mideast. jerusalem.reut/.

The Barrier in Jerusalem

99

Israel and abroad. For example, a coalition of Middle East peace groups, including Churches for Middle East Peace, the Middle East Network of United Methodists, and the Washington Interfaith Alliance for Middle East Peace, launched the Sharing Jerusalem Campaign in Washington, DC.35 Another campaign supporting the concept of sharing Jerusalem was organized by a group of international academics, diplomats, retired military officers and other practitioners—including Israelis, Palestinians, Jordanians and Egyptians. This group of highly prestigious individuals signed on to a set of principles to share Jerusalem and presented their proposal to the Prime Minister of Israel and the Office of the Chairman of the Palestinian Authority on January 23, 2000. Among the main principles of this project was the view that “neither imposition of annexation nor the partition of Jerusalem could serve as a basis for the final status of the city”.36 The project established that as the capital of both Israel and a Palestinian state, Jerusalem would function on the principle of self-governance in which Jews and Arabs would be represented by two municipal councils, a coordination commission for the entire city and a situation of status quo in the administration of their respective holy places. Among those groups operating within Jerusalem, The Jerusalem Link was the most supportive of the idea of Sharing Jerusalem. A coordinating body of two women’s centers, the Israeli Bat Shalom (Daughters of Peace) in West Jerusalem, and the Palestinian Marcaz al-Quds la l’Nissah (The Jerusalem Center for Women) in East Jerusalem, The Jerusalem Link included in its joint Declaration the principal of sharing Jerusalem as the basis of two capitals for two sovereign states.37 With the deterioration of Israeli-Palestinian relations since 1995, however, the idea of sharing Jerusalem never obtained mainstream support. The concept of dividing rather than sharing Jerusalem developed as the key principal of Israel’s position on final status negotiations at the Camp David Summit, July 11-25, 2000. Camp David and the Status of Jerusalem The Summit at Camp David in 2000 was a last-ditch effort by the Clinton Administration to settle the final status issues between Israel and the Palestinians. The framework of the Summit was unique insofar as it was conducted as a largely hypothetical exercise38 expressed through unwritten communications among Israel and the Palestinians under the auspices of the United States. The predisposition to avoid written statements was intended to provide space for creative options to the final status issues in ways that would not bind the parties to decisions that were not supported by their respective constituencies. President William J. Clinton insisted on the operating rule 35 Sharing Jerusalem Campaign. http://www.wiamep.org/sharingjerusalem/SHARING_ JERUSALEM.html. 36 Principles for Sharing Jerusalem, US Interreligious Committee for Peace. http:// www.usicpme.org/principles.html. 37 Tami Amanda Jacoby, Women in Zones of Conflict: Power and Resistance in Israel, McGill-Queen’s University Press: Montreal & Kingston, 2006: 81. 38 Dore Gold, “Jerusalem in International Diplomacy: The 2000 Camp David Summit, The Clinton Plan, And Their Aftermath”, Jerusalem Letter/Viewpoints, No. 447, February 1, 2001: 8.

100

Bridging the Barrier

that “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”,39 which prevented the discussions at Camp David from becoming a point from which future negotiations would commence. Nonetheless, by floating the idea of dividing Jerusalem, Ehud Barak became the first Israeli Prime Minister to break the official taboo against putting Jerusalem on the negotiating table. As part of the final status talks at Camp David, Barak proposed to divide Jerusalem between its Jewish and Arab neighborhoods. Although during his electoral campaign Barak had committed himself to keeping Jerusalem united, his change of heart was revealed in an article published by Israel’s daily newspaper Ma’ariv on July 27, 2000. The article outlined Barak’s offer to divide Jerusalem into two separate cities, a Jewish city called Jerusalem to continue serving as the capital of the State of Israel, and Al-Quds, the Arabic name for Jerusalem to serve as the capital of a new Palestinian state. Israel’s proposal for a final status on Jerusalem was based on the premise of a population “swap” insofar as the jurisdiction of a Palestinian state would extend to Arab neighborhoods while the State of Israel would have authority over Jewish neighborhoods in Jerusalem. Jewish areas outside Jerusalem’s municipal boundaries would be annexed to Israel and Arab areas outside Jerusalem’s municipal boundaries would come under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority. Arab neighborhoods within Jerusalem would either be annexed to a Palestinian state or be granted a form of self-rule. Regarding the status of Jerusalem’s Old City, the Muslim and Christian quarters would be offered autonomy under formal Israeli sovereignty while the Jewish and Armenian quarters would remain completely subject to rule by Israel.40 The status of the Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif area was given special consideration during the Camp David talks. One US proposal suggested that the Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif would remain under Israeli sovereignty with custodianship for the Palestinians. According to this proposal, rule over the Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif would be transferred from Israel to the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (namely Britain, France, China, Russia and the United States), which would then devolve authority to the Palestinians over the Muslim holy sites situated there. Another US proposal referred to as the “upstairs-downstairs” solution to the Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif was to divide sovereignty according to vertical and horizontal planes with the Palestinians in control of everything above ground and Israel in control of everything underneath the ground. This second proposal proposed a Jewish place of prayer on the Temple Mount site as well as unimpeded access to a Palestinian sovereign compound through a tunnel, bridge or special road from the town of Abu Dis, east of the Jerusalem municipal border. Control above ground is very important because it involves preservation of holy sites and authority over which individuals or groups may pray or make pilgrimage to them. However, the importance of control underneath the ground should not be underestimated 39 “Transcript: Clinton Statement on Camp David Mideast Peace Talks (No agreement reached, but “significant progress” on core issues), July 25, 2000, American Embassy, Press Section. http://www.usembassy-israel.org.il/publish/peace/archives/2000/july/me0725c.html. 40 “Barak’s Proposal to Divide Jerusalem”, IRIS, Information Regarding Israel’s Security. http://www.iris.org.il/divided_jerusalem.htm.

The Barrier in Jerusalem

101

because it involves controversial archeological issues such as excavation and the discovery of ancient artifacts that can be used to either legitimize or de-legitimize historical and religious claims to the place. The riots41 that resulted from opening up a new exit from a tunnel running along the Western Wall complex in September 1996 demonstrated the intense emotional nature of the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif area, both above and under ground. The failure of the Camp David Summit has been subject to controversy due to the tendency to blame one side or another for the failure to achieve any concrete results. Although wide gaps characterized every negotiating issue, most commentators have attributed the summit’s failure to the differences between the parties over Jerusalem. Indeed, Clinton described Jerusalem as “the most difficult problem” because in his words “the questions around Jerusalem go to the core identity of both the Palestinians and the Israelis”.42 Ultimately, however, Clinton placed the burden of failure squarely on the shoulders of the Palestinians and Yasser Arafat in particular. Clinton accused Arafat of being intransigent and unwilling to come up with a counter offer to that presented by the Israeli negotiators. Arafat’s refusal to make historic concessions at Camp David has been attributed in part to his “explosive personality and unpredictable character”.43 As well, interpreting Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000 as a result of public pressure boosted Arafat’s revolutionary ambition to capitalize on Palestinian objectives through armed struggle rather than peaceful negotiations. A more meaningful explanation however, is that Arafat was not willing to make concessions on Jerusalem because of broader political and religious ramifications. Arguing before American negotiators, Arafat is purported to have claimed “Jerusalem is not a Palestinian city only, it is an Arab, Islamic, and Christian one. If I am going to take a decision on Jerusalem, I have to consult with the Sunnis and the Shi’as and all Arab countries.”44 As stated in an editorial from the Saudi Arabian newspaper Al-Madina, No one in the Islamic world will accept concessions on Jerusalem, which affects Arab and Islamic sovereignty over it….Arafat is negotiating at Camp David over an issue which concerns all Arabs and Muslims.45

In this sense, the broader significance of Jerusalem to the Arab and Islamic world tied Arafat’s hands and prevented him from achieving his goal of statehood at the expense of the religious and historic claims to the city. 41 Roughly 50 people died during the fierce fighting that characterized the so-called “Temple Mount riots”. 42 “Transcript: Clinton Statement on Camp David Mideast Peace Talks”, July 25, 2000, American Embassy. http://www.usembassy.it/file2000_07/alia/a0072503.htm. 43 Klein, 2003: 134. 44 Dore Gold, “Jerusalem in International Diplomacy: The 2000 Camp David Summit, The Clinton Plan, And Their Aftermath”, Jerusalem Letter/Viewpoints, No. 447, February 1, 2001. http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp447.htm. 45 Quote from Al Madina taken from “Camp David II: Everyone Wants a Piece of Jerusalem, Not The Peace of Jerusalem”, Global Security.org. http://www.globalsecurity.org/ military/library/news/2000/07/war-000725-mepp.htm.

102

Bridging the Barrier

For his part, Barak was also accused of contributing to the lack of success on the Jerusalem issue at Camp David. Having been elected on a platform in which he clearly supported the principle of a unified Jerusalem as the eternal capital of Israel and promised to “neither compromise nor forego this principle”,46 it is doubtful whether the Israeli public would have consented to the far-reaching compromises recommended at Camp David. Indeed, Barak had pledged to put the issue to a national referendum,47 thereby intending to circumvent the parliamentary process. However, on the eve of the Camp David summit, Barak’s governing coalition disintegrated and limited his maneuverability to begin with.48 Barak was perceived by Israelis as having offered the most generous concessions ever made to the Palestinians on the issue of Jerusalem at Camp David. The combination of Barak’s willingness to compromise along with Arafat’s intransigence painted an image of the Israeli leader as weak and desperate in the eyes of the Israeli public. The collapse of Barak’s parliamentary coalition and repute in Israeli public opinion was ultimately cemented by the outbreak of the second Palestinian Uprising on September 28, 2000. The absence of progress at Camp David and the subsequent relapse into protracted conditions of conflict demonstrated that the Jerusalem issue was far from being resolved and that both the Israeli and Palestinian peoples were not ready to make the kinds of concessions that resolving the status of Jerusalem would have entailed. The al-Aqsa Intifada Israeli-Palestinian relations deteriorated drastically with the onset of the second Palestinian Uprising. Even though many pundits identified the source of the riots as then-Opposition leader Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount on September 28, 2000, others acknowledge rising frustrations among Palestinians on account of the failed talks at Camp David, the absence of a peace dividend during the years of the Oslo Peace Process, and lack of progress towards Palestinian statehood as core factors for the breakdown. Whatever the immediate trigger for the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada, the violent outburst was clearly centered on the intractable issue of Jerusalem, based on the symbol of the al-Aqsa mosque complex where the violence began. The al-Aqsa Intifada differed fundamentally from the first Palestinian Uprising in 1987 in its goals, forms of mobilization, and, most importantly, methods of armed conflict. While the first Palestinian Uprising was considered a largely spontaneous outburst pitting Palestinian youth, shabab, armed with stones, grenades and Molotov cocktails against the formidable, but constrained, force of the Israeli military within the Occupied Territories, the second Palestinian Uprising was led by organized and well-trained Islamist organizations such as the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), the Islamic Jihad, and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades (the military branch of Fatah), which targeted civilians in Israeli urban metropolitan centers using the 46 “Ehud Barak’s Plan for a Better Israel”, Ehud Barak, Platform, 1999. http://www. knesset.gov.il/elections/pm/ematza_pm_0.htm. 47 “Barak ‘accepts’ Jerusalem plan”, BBC News, Friday, July 21, 2000. http://news.bbc. co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/844438.stm. 48 Klein, 2003: 149.

The Barrier in Jerusalem

103

principal weapon of the suicide bomber. Jerusalem was among the hardest hit of Israeli cities targeted by suicide bomb attacks, which also wrought havoc in Netanya, Haifa, Tel Aviv, Hadera, and Rishon Letzion. For example, on August 9, 2001, 15 people were killed and about 90 others were injured in a suicide attack claimed by Hamas on a crowded restaurant in downtown Jerusalem.49 On June 18, 2002, a suicide bomb attack killed 20 people on a commuter bus in Jerusalem. Another crowded bus in Jerusalem was the target of a suicide bomb attack on August 19, 2003, which resulted in 23 Israeli civilian deaths, including 7 children. The fear which accompanied these types of assault was exacerbated in Jerusalem. The demographic makeup of Jerusalem presented an additional complicating factor in the second Palestinian Uprising. That Arab-Israelis joined the al-Aqsa Intifada rendered Jewish-Arab relations all the more volatile. Although, in theory, the Arab population of Israel enjoys all the rights of citizenship of their Jewish counterparts, in practice, this has not been the case. Arab Israelis have consistently experienced higher unemployment rates, lower socioeconomic status, and lower levels of education compared to Jewish Israelis. Discrimination against Arab Israelis is sometimes intentional and explicit as when Jewish landlords do not consider requests from potential Arab tenants or when Jewish employers refuse to hire Arab labor. However, some elements of discrimination are inadvertent, as most Arab Israelis do not undergo compulsory conscription into the Israeli Defense Forces and thus do not receive the benefits given to Israeli soldiers undergoing active duty or upon retirement from the military. Also, the vast network of Jewish philanthropic organizations located in the Diaspora, such as the Jewish National Fund and the Jewish Agency for Israel, designate disproportionately—although not exclusively—their funds for Jewish neighborhoods, Jewish infrastructure and Jewish vulnerable groups. The result, whether explicit or implicit, is a lack of development, investment and attention to the needs of Arab communities in Israel. Therefore, while Arab residents of Israel pay taxes to the State of Israel, the state does not invest equally in Jewish and Arab neighborhoods. This has resulted in the transformation of Arab villages and neighborhoods into slums lacking the most basic infrastructure such as sidewalks, community centers and connection to a sewage system. The result of these basic inequalities between Jewish and Arab lives in Jerusalem has led to the proliferation of frustrations resulting in social agitation. The sense of identity confusion Arab Israelis experience—a sense of integration combined with separation—created increasing “frustration and hopelessness,” until they reached a level of “explosion.” The harsh crackdown by the Israeli military—using undercover troops, helicopter gunships, and live ammunition against Arab demonstrators with Israeli citizenship—served to further “erase” the Green Line between Israel and the West Bank.50

The intensification of Jewish-Arab relations during the al-Aqsa Intifada was based, therefore, on years of built-up grievances and distrust. The proximate position of Arab 49 “Al-Aqsa Intifada timeline”, BBC News, Wednesday, September 29, 2004. http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3677206.stm. 50 Basel Ghattas, quoted in Wendy Lehman, “Israel’s ‘Apartheid Policy’ Toward Palestinian Citizens”, Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, December 2000: 87-93. http://www.wrmea.com/archives/Dec_2000/0012087.html.

104

Bridging the Barrier

and Jewish neighborhoods in Jerusalem has presented difficult security challenges for the city. Gilo, a neighborhood in south Jerusalem, lies at a distance of only one half a kilometer from Beit Jala, a Christian Arab village near Bethlehem. Prior to the al-Aqsa Intifada, Jewish and Arab residents from both neighborhoods are reported to have intermingled peacefully. However, according to Raffi Berg, the transformation of Gilo into a “key battleground goes right to the heart of the most contentious issue of the conflict, the status of Jerusalem”.51 With the onset of the al-Aqsa Intifada, Beit Jala became a launching site for small arms fire by Palestinian militants against residents of Gilo. Gilo residents installed cement shields and bullet proof glass in their apartments to increase their security.52 The cycle of shootings on Gilo followed by retaliatory rocket and artillery bombardment53 on Palestinian homes in Beit Jala by the Israeli military characterized the unique security dilemma in Jerusalem. Gilo is situated in East Jerusalem within Jerusalem’s present municipal boundaries but on territory that Palestinians claim was expropriated illegally from residents of Beit Jala. The proximity of the two neighborhoods, and the disputed nature of the land upon which they are located, exemplifies the real challenges that complicate plans to divide Jerusalem and its residents and find the most amenable location for building a separation barrier within the city. The Jerusalem Envelope Demographic issues in Jerusalem have been deepened by the construction and routing of Israel’s separation barrier. In the case of the Jerusalem section of the barrier referred to as the “Jerusalem envelope”, there has been increased momentum to close the gaps in the barrier in response to infiltrations and suicide bomb attacks. In April, 2006, Ehud Olmert announced that all gaps would be closed immediately by means of temporary fences until the security barrier allows them to be closed permanently, and he ordered the Israel Police to increase its operational forces and technological means around the gaps to secure the Jerusalem envelope.54 Despite claims to security considerations, critics argue that the real goal of the Jerusalem Envelope is to “redraw Jerusalem’s borders unilaterally”.55

51 Raffi Berg, “Spotlight: Why is Gilo so important?”, BBC News, Thursday, August 16, 2001. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/world/middle_east/1492350.stm. 52 Mathew Brubacher, “A Reality Check for Jerusalem Settlements: The Case of Gilo”, Jerusalem Quarterly File, Issue 10, 2000. http://www.jerusalemquarterly.org/2000/jqf10/gilo. html. 53 “Al AQSA Intifada UPDATE”, October 27, 2000, Palestine National Information Center, Palestinian National Authority Website. http://www.pnic.gov.ps/arabic/quds/eng/ news/2000/2000_10/e_update_27.html. 54 “A Discussion on the Route of the Security Fence and the ‘Jerusalem Envelope’”, Prime Minister’s Office, April 26, 2006. http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMOEng/Communication/ Spokesman/2006/04/spokefen260406.htm. 55 Sarah Kreimer, “Opinion: Don’t Radicalize Palestinian Jerusalemites”, Middle East Times, April 5, 2005. http://www.metimes.com/print.php?StoryID=20050405-050605-6141r.

The Barrier in Jerusalem

105

The recent Convergence Plan announced by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert seeks to resolve the status of Jerusalem in ways that conform to the reality of unilateral separation and promote security of the city along with its surrounding neighborhoods. The security dilemma of Jewish settlers in the West Bank is to be alleviated through urban planning schemes. Convergence is intended to join Jewish settlements established in the West Bank with the State of Israel and thereby enlarge the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem to include outlying communities such as Ma’aleh Adumim, Givat Ze’ev, Betar and the Etzion settlement bloc, making them part of a Greater Jerusalem municipality.56 The Jewish settlement of Ma’ale Adumim, for example, which was constructed in 1975 and currently has a population of 30,000 residents, is at the heart of this plan. Currently, Israel has announced massive construction designs (the E1 plan) to connect Ma’aleh Adumim with Jerusalem to reinforce a “settlement belt”57 around the city. The plan seeks to extend Ma’aleh Adumim as part of a bloc of settlements from the Jerusalem municipal boundaries all the way to the outskirts of Jericho, a town in the West Bank near the Jordan River. The Convergence plan mirrors the Israeli position in the Camp David Summit to divide Jerusalem by giving most of Jerusalem’s Arab neighborhoods to the Palestinians while keeping the predominantly Jewish areas for Israel. Should peace efforts continue to falter, Israel would ensure that Jerusalem’s Old City, with its holy places and the adjacent neighborhoods, would become a “special region with special understandings”, but remain under Israeli sovereignty.58 The plan also calls for moving the barrier westward. As a result, residents of East Jerusalem would no longer be disconnected from the West Bank and most Arab neighborhoods of Jerusalem could become part of a future Palestinian state on the eastern side of the barrier.59 However, residents of Palestinian neighborhoods who hold Israel identity cards and would end up on the West Bank side of the barrier complain that they would be barred access to jobs, schools and social services they rely upon in Jerusalem. This plan is unacceptable to Palestinians, particularly if carried out unilaterally and in any case has been put on “indefinite hold”60 by the Israeli government after reorienting energies towards rebuilding the damage in northern Israel caused by the recent war in Lebanon and prospects for a second round. The guiding principle of barrier construction in Jerusalem is to follow the city’s municipal boundaries. The first section of the barrier in Jerusalem was approved in June 2002 as part of the entire barrier project. Stage A consisted of two sections 56 “Jerusalem’s boundaries may expand”, Naomi Segal, Jewish News of Greater Phoenix. http://www.jewishaz.com/jewishnews/970516/bound.shtml. 57 Hillel Fendel, “Olmert’s Speech: We’ll have to part with most of Yesha”, Arutz Sheva, Watcher Magazine, January 25, 2006. http://www.watchermagazine.com/?p=3243. 58 “Israel New Government Outlines Clearest Picture Yet of How It Plans to Divide Jerusalem”, May 6, 2006, Ramit Plushnick-Masti, Palestine Media Center. http://www. palestine-pmc.com/details.asp?cat=3&id=1149. 59 “Israel New Government Outlines Clearest Picture Yet of How It Plans to Divide Jerusalem”, May 6, 2006, Ramit Plushnick-Masti, Palestine Media Center. http://www. palestine-pmc.com/details.asp?cat=3&id=1149. 60 Jim Warren, “Israel and Palestine: The Forgotten War”, Directorate of Strategic Planning Background Paper, Department of National Defence, Canada. August 21, 2006: 3.

106

Bridging the Barrier

of barrier in the north and south parts of Jerusalem. The northern section consisted of roughly 10 kilometers from the Ofer army base on the west to the Qalandiya checkpoint on the east. The southern section, which also consisted of roughly 10 kilometers, ran from the Tunnels Road on the west to Beit Sahur on the east. These two sections were completed in July 2003. In September 2003, the next section of the barrier in Jerusalem was approved with the exception of the barrier near the Jewish settlement of Ma’aleh Adumim.61 In February 2005, following a decision of the Israeli Supreme Court, Israel gave conditional approval for an additional 40 kilometers of barrier surrounding Ma’aleh Adumim and the adjacent settlements of Kfar Adumim, Anatot, Nofei Prat and Qedar.62 The main problem with following Jerusalem’s municipal boundaries is that community life does not necessarily conform to those boundaries and thus barrier construction in Jerusalem exacerbates some of the most difficult problems of coexistence between Jews and Arabs in the city, and also between Jerusalem and its environs in the West Bank. The goal of the barrier is to physically separate warring populations within the ongoing objective of a two-state solution. One of the main problems is the differential civic and residential status represented by groups and individuals, which does not always conform to the barrier route. In Jerusalem the barrier roughly follows the municipal boundaries set in 1967. But the barrier route does not often coincide with urban planning considerations and the general fabric of life that has developed over generations, particularly between Israeli Arab citizens and residents of East Jerusalem and Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza. The barrier places approximately 60,000 Palestinians with Jerusalem ID cards on the West Bank side63 and approximately 200,000 Arabs who consider themselves part of the Palestinian nation on the Israeli side of the barrier and cut-off from their counterparts in the West Bank.64 This has resulted in the onset of cleavages between Jerusalem and the West Bank, and territorial fragmentation within the West Bank. Problems that have arisen depend upon the particular village or neighborhood, the status of those who live there, their relations with people, goods and services outside their area of residence and the segment of barrier construction in question. In some cases, the municipal boundary of Jerusalem excludes Palestinian towns 61 This section of Israel’s separation barrier has three subsections. The first subsection extends 17 kilometers from the eastern tip of Beit Sahur on the south to east part of al-’Eizariya on the north. The second subsection extends 14 kilometers from the south section of ’Anata to the Qalandiya checkpoint in the north. And the third subsection, which also consists of 14 kilometers, surrounds five villages located northwest of Jerusalem (Bir-Nabala, al-Judeireh, al-Jib, Beit Hanina and Nebi Samuel). 62 This section of information on the barrier’s routing was taken from “Separation Barrier: Route of the barrier around East Jerusalem”, B’Tselem. http://www.btselem.org/ english/Separation_Barrier/Jerusalem.asp. 63 “Special Focus: The Barrier and Access Points to Jerusalem”, Humanitarian Update, occupied Palestinian territory, OCHA, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, June 2005. http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/opt/docs/UN/OCHA/ochaHU0605_En.pdf#sear ch=’ArRam%20and%20barrier’. 64 “Separation Barrier: Route of the barrier around East Jerusalem”, B’Tselem. http:// www.bselem.org/english/Separation_Barrier/Jerusalem.asp.

The Barrier in Jerusalem

107

and villages whose residents nonetheless continue to rely on social, economic, and medical services and have extensive family relations in Jerusalem. An example of this scenario is the village of Ash-Sheikh Sa’d, situated on the eastern border of Jerusalem but officially outside the city according to the municipal boundary. Residents of Sheikh Sa’d have held longstanding relations with their counterparts in Jabal al Mukabbir, a neighborhood situated within Jerusalem’s municipal boundaries. In 2002, the IDF blocked access to the village by way of concrete blocks and earth mounds. This resulted in lack of access for residents of Sheikh Sa’d to Jabal al Mukabbir and the rest of Jerusalem except for those residents who obtain special permits. The result has been a virtual “siege” on Sheikh Sa’d and a deterioration of the standard of living there in all aspects of social, economic and familial life.65 Another problem resulting from barrier construction is in cases where the barrier literally cuts through Palestinian neighborhoods and villages. Altogether, construction has left roughly 220,000 Palestinian residents of Jerusalem on the Israeli side of the barrier but completely isolates Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank.66 The barrier also dissects territories within the West Bank impeding freedom of movement within the West Bank, particularly between the north and the south.67 Since September 2000, Palestinians traveling back and forth from the southern to the northern part of the West Bank have been barred from passing through Jerusalem. Traffic was diverted to an alternative route along the long and winding road known as “Wadi Nar”, which is patrolled by an Israeli checkpoint. However, public transit through Wadi Nar has been limited since 2002 to those holding valid permits. During periods of closure, when the checkpoint is closed, pedestrians are forced to abandon their vehicles and cross on foot.68 The barrier runs straight through Arab towns such as Anata, Ar-Ram and AbuDis. One part of Anata is annexed to Jerusalem while the other part is in the West Bank. Anata residents on the Jerusalem side of the barrier who carry West Bank identity cards, find themselves in the situation that they are considered by Israel to be “illegally present in Jerusalem” while residing in their own homes. The municipal boundary also runs between Anata and Shuafat in Jerusalem, in which sources of education, post-natal care and community life for Anata residents can only be accessed through a military checkpoint. In the case of Ar-Ram, the commercial and educational heart of Jerusalem’s northern metropolitan area with roughly 60,000 residents, the barrier runs down the main street and cuts the village off from Jerusalem. Ar-Ram has been disconnected from five neighboring villages by a system of fences and walls. This disconnection 65 “A Wall in Jerusalem: Obstacles to Human Rights in the Holy City”, B’Tselem, Summer, 2006: 23. 66 “A Wall in Jerusalem: Obstacles to Human Rights in the Holy City”, B’Tselem, Summer, 2006: 13. 67 “A Wall in Jerusalem: Obstacles to Human Rights in the Holy City”, B’Tselem, Summer, 2006: 29. 68 “Box Text: Separation Barrier Facts”, Jerusalem Special Report, Vol. SR No. 13, Summer 2006, By United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Foundation for Middle East Peace. http://www.fmep.org/reports/special_reports/no13summer2006/04-box_text_separation_barrier_facts.html.

108

Bridging the Barrier

is particularly difficult between Ar-Ram and neighboring Beit Hanina. Many Beit Hanina residents whose children attended schools in Ar-Ram will find themselves completely blocked off once the barrier is complete.69 Many Palestinian residents of Ar-Ram, on the other hand, who have Jerusalem IDs or attend educational institutions in Beit Hanina in Jerusalem are forced to make lengthy detours to reach their destinations. This predicament is illustrated in the personal testimonial of Suhair Abdi-Habib Allah who lives with her husband and two children in Ar-Ram: All four of us need to get to Jerusalem every morning, my husband and I to our jobs and my kids to their preschools. Since Ar-Ram was disconnected from Jerusalem by the wall, it has become extremely difficult to get to work on time, and you can never tell how long it will take. That’s why my husband and I split up every morning—one goes out early while the other stays home with the kids until the traffic jams are over.70

Abu-Dis presents another unique situation because the town is only partly included within Jerusalem’s municipal boundaries. Most of the town was not annexed in 1967 and is, therefore, considered part of the West Bank. Those residents of Abu-Dis who have Jerusalem resident status (about 1/3 of its 13,000 residents), have encountered increasing difficulties working, reaching hospitals or attending schools in Jerusalem due to barrier construction. Conversely, Jerusalem residents find it increasingly difficult to reach Abu-Dis and this has caused high unemployment in the village as shops have closed and many residents have moved away. Finally, in some places, the barrier has created enclaves, such as the Biddu enclave, which affects approximately 43,000 Palestinians and the Bir Nabala enclave, home to approximately 15,000 Palestinians.71 In 2003, the Israeli military ordered thousands of Palestinians living in the West Bank and in proximity of the separation barrier to obtain special permits to live in their own homes. The order immediately affected roughly 12,000 Palestinians in 15 villages squeezed between the barrier and the Green Line, while another 40,000 or more would be in a similar position once construction of the barrier was completed around the northern part of Jerusalem.72 Nu’man, a village located on the southeastern border of Jerusalem’s municipal boundaries is an example of the isolating effects of the separation barrier on a potential enclave. Nu’man was annexed to Jerusalem in 1967 but residents were not registered with Israel identity cards. Since August 20, 2003, the eastern section of the Jerusalem Envelope was approved. This portion of the barrier route places Nu’man between the Jerusalem municipal boundaries and the barrier, thereby 69 Yigal Bronner, “Wall in Ar-Ram”, Z-Net, September 17, 2004. http://www.zmag.org/ content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=22&ItemID=6247. 70 “A Wall in Jerusalem: Obstacles to Human Rights in the Holy City”, B’Tselem, Summer, 2006, 25. 71 “Special Focus: The Barrier and Access Points to Jerusalem”, Humanitarian Update, occupied Palestinian territory, June 2005, OCHA, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/opt/docs/UN/OCHA/ochaHU0605_En.pdf#search =’ArRam%20and%20barrier’. 72 Chris McGreal, “Permits ordered for Palestinians”, The Guardian Unlimited, October 27, 2003. http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/0,2763,1071768,00.html.

The Barrier in Jerusalem

109

imprisoning Nu’man residents in their village. Like the residents of Anata who find themselves on the Israeli side of the barrier, Nu’man residents face the impossible situation of being considered by Israel as living illegally in their own homes. This contradictory legal status presents residents of Nu’man with an ongoing threat of expulsion to the West Bank. The eastern barrier passes between Nu’man and Beit Sahour, a Palestinian town on the southern side of the barrier, which has provided many services to Nu’man residents, and blocks the only road left between Nu’man and the West Bank.73 The particular challenges faced by residents of Sheikh Sa’d, Anata, Ar-Ram, Abu-Dis and Nu’man are emblematic of the broader issues created and in some cases, exacerbated by the building of the separation barrier. The establishment of enclaves between the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem and the barrier stand to threaten the very fabric of life within Arab villages and towns and constrain ongoing relationships and movement between residents and families situated on opposite sides of the barrier, between Jerusalem and the West Bank and within areas of the West Bank. The holy city of Jerusalem, the source of longing for the three monotheistic religions and the pride of peoples around the world is on the threshold of a transformation that will have a fundamental and lasting impact on the city’s status. The changes brought about by the separation barrier will influence Israelis and Palestinians, their prospects for achievement of national goals, and the framework for resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. What was once a city destined for open access to all visitors under the supervision of the international community is on the verge of being divided up into the most acrimonious and estranged constituent components. In many ways, the fences and barriers currently being erected on the city’s topography hark back to the famous description of the marks left on Jerusalem by Collins and Lapierre in their famous “O Jerusalem” following the intense fighting of 1948: Battlements and barbed wire became a permanent part of Jerusalem; the great scars of no man’s land marred its center with ruins and uncharted minefields.74

If Jerusalem is a microcosm of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, strategies and prospects for separation in the holy city suggest that separation more broadly between the State of Israel and a future Palestinian state will be wrought with many difficult challenges that must be overcome through creative, albeit intense, negotiations and compromises on the part of all parties to the conflict. Just like in Jerusalem, the key to placing barriers and mitigating the consequences of lack of freedom of movement in the Israeli-Palestinian context is to find ways to bridge those barriers, either politically, economically, geographically or socially. The concluding chapter considers some bridging strategies and intractable issues of the conflict that cannot be resolved by erecting a barrier. 73 Yehezkel Lein, “Nu’man, East Jerusalem: Life under the Threat of Expulsion”, B’Tselem Status Report, September 2003: 21. 74 Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, 1972, O Jerusalem! Simon & Schuster of Canada, Ltd: Richmond Hill, Ontario: 655.

This page intentionally left blank

Chapter 7

Lessons From Lebanon This chapter draws parallels between Israel’s unilateral disengagement from southern Lebanon in 2000 and Israel’s unilateral construction of the separation barrier since 2002 in order to determine the feasibility and potential ramifications of the barrier project vis-à-vis Israel’s future relations with the Palestinians. The consequences of Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000 became clear six years later when, on July 12, 2006, a Hezbollah unit crossed the border into Israel, attacked two Israeli patrols on the Israeli side of the Israeli-Lebanese border, and kidnapped two Israeli soldiers.1 In response, Israel mounted a massive air campaign, directed at the Lebanese civilian infrastructure, hitting roads, bridges and utilities, and imposed an air and naval blockade. Israel’s justification for targeting of Lebanese infrastructure throughout the country, and not only in territories under the control of Hezbollah, was intended to prevent the movement of additional arms and supplies into southern Lebanon from neighboring Iran and Syria. However, failing to achieve its objectives in the initial stages of the war, Israel then launched a ground invasion of southern Lebanon. The Hezbollah proceeded to launch rockets into Israel as far south as the metropolitan centers of Haifa and Nahariya. The conflict was deescalated by a UN-negotiated cease fire that took effect on August 14, 2006. The conflict in Lebanon exacted massive casualties, with estimates of roughly 1500 Lebanese civilians and over a million Lebanese displaced persons. On August 13, 2006, Israel claimed to have killed 530 Hezbollah fighters.2 Israel suffered the deaths of 130 of its soldiers and 50 civilians. Over 500,000 Israelis were also displaced, mostly those fleeing targets of rocket attacks in northern Israel. Thousands of Israelis sat out the war in underground bunkers or in the homes of friends, families and even strangers who provided their hospitality during a time of crisis. The war had a devastating effect on the Israeli national psyche as citizens lost faith in Israel’s deterrent capability. The top echelons of the political leadership, particularly Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Defense Minister Amir Peretz, were subject to virulent criticism and calls for their resignation after the war abounded. As well, Israel’s military intelligence was lambasted for not taking seriously enough the threat posed by Hezbollah. Ultimately, the war ended in stalemate. Despite calls by the UN to disarm militia groups in Lebanon and to extend sovereignty of the 1 Hezbollah also killed three Israeli soldiers during its attack. 2 “Summary of IDF operations against Hizbullah in Lebanon”, August 13, 2006, (Communicated by the IDF Spokesman), Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. http://www.mfa. gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Terrorism+from+Lebanon-+Hizbullah/Summa ry%20of%20IDF%20operations%20against%20Hizbullah%20in%20Lebanon%2013-Aug2006.

112

Bridging the Barrier

Lebanese government over the entire country, Hezbollah came out of the war with the capability and motivation to prepare for a second round. Many pundits argue that it is only a matter of time until the next stage of fighting between Israel and Hezbollah commences. Since the recent military conflict between Israel and the Hezbollah in southern Lebanon between July 12 and August 14, 2006, the concept of unilateral disengagement has been subject to intense scrutiny in Israel. Many pundits have argued that the Lebanese war was a result of Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May, 2000. Criticism of unilateral withdrawal has ramifications, not only for Israel’s involvement in Lebanon for which the consequences are now clear, but also, and perhaps more importantly, for the ongoing barrier construction project between Israel and the West Bank. Until the recent conflict erupted on its northern border, Israeli policy and public opinion were near unanimous about the idea that without a partner for peace on the Palestinian side, Israeli national security concerns would be best addressed by separating from the Palestinians and erecting a barrier outside the framework of negotiations. Although a majority of Israelis would have preferred a comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement, the overwhelming victory of Hamas in Palestinian parliamentary elections in January 2006, with its unwillingness to recognize—and commitment to destroy—Israel signaled that negotiations were out of the question for the time being. In place of a negotiated settlement, Israel elected to simply withdraw itself from disputed territory and then close itself off behind the barrier from any subsequent problems on the Palestinian side. This “lock the door and throw away the key” strategy was employed in southern Lebanon back in 2000 and albeit more problematic in the Palestinian case, was seen as the least negative option available to promote Israeli national security on its eastern border. However, having recently faced a well-equipped and determined foe in Lebanon that manipulated territories from which Israel unilaterally withdrew to mobilize its armed campaign, Israel has had to rethink the concept of unilateral disengagement. The war demonstrated Israel’s vulnerability to guerrilla movements that build their power bases within civilian areas from which Israel has evacuated without security arrangements, and which strike at Israel with weapons smuggled in from regional allies across borders over which Israel has no direct control. The Lebanese case also prompted Israel to rethink its longstanding reluctance to accept peacekeepers stationed within areas that Israel deems threatening to its own security. The conflict in Lebanon provides a useful analogy against which to analyze Israeli unilateral disengagement from the Palestinians in the context of the barrier project. Not only is unilateral withdrawal an option either selected or considered in both cases, but south Lebanon and the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are connected in many ways, either through ideology, supporters such as Syria and Iran, and, increasingly, methods of armed warfare. To what extent does Israeli strategy in one context hold relevance for the other context? With the benefit of hindsight, it is eminently clear today that Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from southern Lebanon was highly problematic and the recent war in Lebanon between Israel and the Hezbollah is most probably a direct result of the way in which Israel extracted itself from its security zone in southern Lebanon.

Lessons From Lebanon

113

The most challenging problem Israel left in southern Lebanon was the creation of a power vacuum, which Hezbollah used to pursue and escalate its military campaign against Israel. What are the differences and similarities between the contexts of Israeli unilateral disengagement from Lebanon as compared to the Palestinian areas? What lessons can be extrapolated from the actions of the Hezbollah in Lebanon? To what extent are Hezbollah and Hamas comparable case studies in relation to understanding the ramifications of Israeli unilateral disengagement from Arab territories? Is unilateral disengagement a propitious course of action for Israeli national security or a recipe for future wars? Now that a multilateral peacekeeping force has deployed to southern Lebanon, will Israel be more open to the idea of a peacekeeping force between itself and the Palestinian areas? This chapter seeks to draw out the lessons of the Israeli-Lebanese context to determine whether or not unilateral disengagement from the Palestinians will prove successful in the long run in terms of providing Israel with security, while promoting peace, stability and good governance in the Palestinian authority areas. If the recent war between Israel and the Hezbollah is a relevant indicator, Israeli national security planners will have to put much thought into the prospects for escalation that may result from unilaterally disengaging from the Palestinians without a comprehensive peace agreement and without promoting an effective governing structure in its place. Israeli Unilateral Disengagement from Lebanon Israel completed its unilateral disengagement from Lebanon on May 24, 2000 after occupying a security zone in southern Lebanon for fifteen years. Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982 was intended to destroy the infrastructure of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) there. In this regard, it was successful. The leadership and fighters of the PLO were escorted out of the country and relocated to Tunisia. However, the war produced a new threat environment in southern Lebanon that persuaded the Israeli military to establish a buffer zone on its northern border. Israel has always considered Lebanon as something of a “quagmire”. A weak and ungovernable entity, Lebanese politics has been prey to the encroachment of external forces and their interests, such as Iran, Syria, Israel and a multitude of armed ideological groups. Also, the fractious nature of Lebanese ethnic and religious groups, namely, Christians, Druze, Sunnis and Shi’as, and their many sub-groupings, has plunged the state into an ongoing and protracted war of attrition, punctuated by peaks of violent conflict, particularly since the 1970s.3 The Lebanese arena has been characterized by a high cost in human bloodshed. Lebanon underwent a civil war from 1975 to 1990 due, in large part, to the changing demographic balance of the country’s Christian and Muslim communities. Growing inter-religious factionalism prompted the mobilization of religious-based militias who initially focused on self-defence. However, as the conflict progressed, militia groups grew and increasingly resorted to criminal tactics to raise funds and procure weapons whether through extortion, theft, money laundering or the 3

David Gilmour, Lebanon: The Fractured Country, London: Sphere Books Ltd, 1983.

114

Bridging the Barrier

large narcotics industry upon which the country came to depend. In their actions towards civilian elements, militias showed blatant disregard for human rights as they raped, tortured and murdered innocents, disregarded the authority of the Lebanese government, and instilled fear on a massive scale. As the spiral of sectarian violence escalated in 1975, civilian massacres and large-scale destruction of property came to define the Lebanese context. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) moved its center of operations from Jordan to Lebanon after having failed to topple the Hashemite Monarchy and being thrown out of Jordan in a bloody Civil War known as Black September. From 1970 onward, the Israeli-Lebanese border became a flashpoint for PLO ground raids against Israel and reprisals by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) using shelling, aerial and naval bombardment.4 Israel responded to PLO attacks from Lebanon by invading the country in 1978, a mission referred to as “Operation Litani”, which intended to occupy and evacuate areas south of the Litani River, a crucial waterway in southern Lebanon. Then on June 6, 1982, Israel launched “Operation Peace for Galilee”, which involved not only battling PLO strongholds in southern Lebanon but eventually culminated in a siege on Beirut. Israel’s operations in Lebanon provoked substantial and serious public dissent within Israel, particularly after the Sabra and Shatilla massacres.5 The perpetrators of the massacres were the Phalange, Lebanese Maronite Christian militias under the leadership of Elie Khobeika, believed to have been acting out of revenge for the assassination of their leader Bashir Gemayal, in a car bomb two days before. Although no Israeli soldiers took part in the massacre, the extent of responsibility of Israeli forces in an incident within areas under Israel’s jurisdiction continues to be a matter of controversy. The Israeli Cabinet appointed a judicial inquiry to investigate responsibility for the Sabra and Shatilla massacres on September 28, 1982. The so-called Kahan Commission released its report on February 8, 1983,6 the findings of which held Israel “indirectly” responsible, having provided illumination for the Phalange during the night and controlling points of entry and exit to and from the refugee camps. The top Israeli leaders, namely Prime Minister Menachem Begin and particularly Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, were discredited by their indirect responsibility for Sabra and Shatilla and calls for their resignation proliferated throughout Israel. Media coverage of the massacres caused public outrage around the world and for many Israelis, “came to symbolize the war itself”.7 4 Morris, 2001: 501. 5 For two separate sources on the massacres in Sabra and Shatilla, see Tomis Kapitan, “Sabra and Shatilla Massacre, 1982”, Encyclopedia of War and Ethics, 1996, Global Policy Forum, http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/general/2001/sab&shat.htm, and “Sabra & Shatilla, The Kahan Commission And Belgium”, The Jewish Agency for Israel, Department for Jewish Zionist Education. http://www.jafi.org.il/education/actual/sabra-shatilla/. 6 For two separate sources on the Kahan Commission, see “104 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the events at the refugee camps in Beirut—8 February 1983, Vol. 8: 1982-1984”, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, and “The Kahan Commission Report, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the events at the refugee camps in Beirut, 8 February 1983”, The Council for the Advancement of Arab-British Understanding (CAABU). http://www.caabu.org/press/documents/kahan-commission-contents.html. 7 Morris, 2001: 547.

Lessons From Lebanon

115

The War in Lebanon, which lasted from 1982 to 1985, was considered to be the first “war of choice”8 in Israeli history as the primary objective was not to defend against existential threat as in previous wars, but to destroy the infrastructure of the PLO in the southern part of Lebanon. While having rooted out Palestinian militias, Israeli army actions, performance, and, arguably, excesses in Lebanon broke the national consensus within Israel that traditionally held the Israeli military in high esteem and above the realm of public criticism. The Lebanon War in 1982 cost Israel “660 dead, exacerbated its economic difficulties, subverted the national consensus on security, and tarnished Israel’s image abroad”.9 Many Zionist leaders held longstanding aspirations of restoring Christian dominance in Lebanon to serve as a wedge between the State of Israel and the Muslim-dominated Middle East.10 However, after the controversies and challenges of the Lebanon War, Israel set aside its more ambitious goals of a pro-Israeli Christian government in Lebanon. In any case, Christian military power in the country was seriously weakened and Syrian military power moved in to fill the void. Instead, Israel settled for narrow security arrangements in the form of a security zone on its northern border and withdrew the majority of its troops. In 1985, a “security zone” was established in southern Lebanon to protect civilians living in northern Israel from cross-border incursions and bombardments. On January 14, 1985, Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin announced that the Israeli Cabinet would deploy the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) in southern Lebanon in a 328-square mile security zone. The Lebanon Liaison Unit (LLU) was established in 1985 as a mechanism for coordinating Israeli actions with the South Lebanese Region. The objectives of the LLU were to train and equip the South Lebanese Army (SLA), a loosely knit grouping of Christian militias which served as Israel’s ally and proxy force in Southern Lebanon. The SLA was born amid Israel’s first invasion of Lebanon in 1978—a force led by Lebanese Christians, whose membership had been recruited from Druze and Shi’a Muslim villages in Israel’s occupation zone. Originally a Lebanese militia during the Lebanese Civil War, the SLA operated after 1979 under the authority of the internationally unrecognized government of Free Lebanon. Under the command of General Antoine Lahad, the SLA aided the Israelis in combating the PLO in the strip of Southern Lebanon until the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. After that, SLA support for the Israelis was mainly by fighting against other Lebanese guerilla forces led by Hezbollah until 2000 in the Security Zone, the area of the South kept under occupation after the partial Israeli withdrawal in 1985. In return, Israel supplied the organization with arms, uniforms, and other logistical equipment. The LLU was responsible for coordinating relations between the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and the SLA. The intelligence component of the LLU was relatively 8 Martin van Creveld, The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense Forces, New York: Public Affairs, 2002: 296. 9 Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World, W.W. Norton & Company: New York, 2001: 427. 10 Morris, 2001: 494.

116

Bridging the Barrier

well developed and liaison activities were assigned to senior intelligence officers who had a strong understanding of the Lebanese context. It was always the intention however, that the IDF would play a supportive role while the SLA would shoulder the majority of operational responsibilities. The deployment of Israeli soldiers to southern Lebanon numbered between 1000 and 1500, and the SLA consisted of roughly 2500. On May 10, 1985, then Chief of General Staff, Lieutenant General Moshe Levi explained the objective of the security zone as serving as a buffer, “to prevent the firing of weapons directly at our territory, to prevent the movement of terrorists into our territory, and to serve as a base for activating the troops and artillery fire of the IDF”.11 At the time, there was little public mention from the military of the indirect threat of missiles aimed at Israel’s northern communities on account of the narrow width of many significant portions of the security zone. Nevertheless, almost immediately the security zone became a dangerous theatre of operations with sustained incidents of kidnappings of Israeli soldiers, mortar shells, anti-tank missiles and small arms fire towards IDF posts and patrols, shootings, roadside charges, anti-aircraft fire, Katyusha rockets and attempted infiltrations and penetrations through the border.12 The intensification of guerrilla warfare against Israel in the security zone was motivated by the growth of radical Islamist groups, particularly the newly established Hezbollah, Party of God. After eradicating the Palestinian threat from southern Lebanon, the Israelis withdrew, according to Benny Morris, “only to find that they had installed in its place a far more fanatical and efficient foe in the form of the ’Amal and, particularly, the Hizbulluh military organizations”.13 The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 is widely perceived as the principal catalyst for the establishment of the Hezbollah, the Iranian and Syrian backed proxy organization, which replaced the vanquished Palestine Liberation Organization as the governing power in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah was established in 1982 by a group of clerics from the Shi’a Lebanese community to offer resistance to Israeli soldiers in southern Lebanon. The Lebanese resistance to Israel is part and parcel of the sustained and broader sentiment in the Arab world that perceives Israel’s presence in the Middle East as the last Western imperialist conquest of Arab territory.14 In this respect, the culture of resistance in the Arab world, of which Hezbollah forms a part, is considered a legitimate form of struggle against occupation and foreign domination. 11 Lexicon with Commentary about the Security Zone in South Lebanon (updated to September 1999), Four Mothers. http://www.4mothers.org.il/englex.htm#16. 12 For chronological list of incidents in the Israeli security zone in southern Lebanon see, “Main Events on the Israel-Lebanese Border since the IDF Withdrawal—10-Aug2003”, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 10, 2003. http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/ MFAArchive/2000_2009/2003/8/Main+Events+on+the+Israel-Lebanese+Border+since+th. htm. 13 Morris, 2001: 559. Amal, which is short for the Lebanese Resistance Detachments, refers to the Shi’a militia group in southern Lebanon operating for the most part, under the tutelage of Iran. 14 Richard H. Curtis, “After Israeli Elections, Balance Must Be Returned to Peace Process”, Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, April 1996: 15-16. http://www. washington-report.org/backissues/0496/9604015.htm.

Lessons From Lebanon

117

In the early years, Hezbollah was an amateurish guerilla group consisting of small armed units, dispersed in the east and the south of Lebanon, and assisted by roughly 2000 Iranian Revolutionary guards positioned in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley. Over time, Hezbollah evolved into a tightly structured organization with military capabilities, a political wing with representatives in the Lebanese Parliament, and an extensive network of social programs and charitable organizations servicing the Shi’a community. While considered a crazy and fanatical terrorist group15 in much of the West, its legitimate platform within Lebanon was reaffirmed by official government references to the Hezbollah as a national resistance movement.16 In February, 1985, Hezbollah released an official political program called The Open Letter Addressed by Hizbollah to the Downtrodden in Lebanon and the World.17 In its program, Hezbollah articulates their “fight” against the United States, its proxy Israel and Western ideology as follows: We declare openly and loudly that we are an umma which fears God only and is by no means ready to tolerate injustice, aggression and humiliation. America, its Atlantic Pact allies, and the Zionist entity in the holy land of Palestine, attacked us and continue to do so without respite. Their aim is to make us eat dust continually. This is why we are, more and more, in a state of permanent alert in order to repel aggression and defend our religion, our existence, our dignity. They invaded our country, destroyed our villages, slit the throats of our children, violated our sanctuaries and appointed masters over our people who committed the worst massacres against our umma. They do not cease to give support to these allies of Israel, and do not enable us to decide our future according to our own wishes.18

Hezbollah funnels into a broader Islamist revival beginning in the 1980s throughout the world reinforced by the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and sustained by Shi’a interpretations of the faith, which gave disproportionate emphasis to an activist role for martyrdom in Islam and the duty of resisting aggression.19 Hezbollah’s ideology is rooted in the Sunni-Shi’a split over succession to the Prophet Muhammad. Central to Shi’a Muslim faith is the battle of Karbala in 680 when the Prophet Muhammad’s grandson Husayn ibn Ali, along with 72 of his companions, faced 15 David J. Whittaker, The Terrorism Reader, London & New York: Routledge, 2001:49. 16 Kathryn Wescott, “Who are Hezbollah?”, BBC News World Edition, April 4, 2002. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1908671.stm. 17 “An Open Letter: The Hizballah Program”, The Jerusalem Quarterly, No. 48, Fall 1988. This is a slightly abridged translation of “Nass al-Risala al-Maftuha allati wajahaha Hizballah ila-l-Mustad’afin fi Lubnan wa-l-Alam”, published February 16, 1985 in alSafir (Beirut), and also in a separate brochure. It carries the unmistakable imprint of Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, the Hezbollah mentor, and is inspired by his book Ma’maalQuwma fi-l-Islam (Beirut, 1979). See also his article in al-Muntalak (Beirut), October 1986. http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/Hiz_letter.htm. 18 “An Open Letter: The Hizballah Program”, The Jerusalem Quarterly, No. 48, Fall 1988. 19 Farhad Khosrokhavar, Suicide Bombers: Allah’s New Martyrs, London: Pluto Press, 2005: 37.

118

Bridging the Barrier 20

definite and devastating defeat. The story of Ali gave the Shi’a stream of Islam a model for venerating the vanquished. Shi’a inspired radical Islam also provided solace in modern times against the grievous failure of Arab nationalism and PanArabist ideology of the 1950s and 1960s and the ultimate defeat of Arab states in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.21 Hezbollah ideology divides the world into two main camps, the exploited and the exploiters.22 The phenomenon of self-sacrifice as resurrected by the Hezbollah out of the legend of Karbala, appeals to many disenfranchised, disillusioned and impoverished segments of the Arab world that increasingly looked to Islam to fill the void established by repressive, tyrannical, economically impractical, secular Arab regimes. From that point on, Hezbollah became a complex political movement with different agenda depending upon the internal versus external constituency.23 Hezbollah’s manifesto, as publicized on February 16, 1985, articulated the movement’s three main goals: eradication of western presence in Lebanon, transformation of Lebanon into an Islamic state, and the destruction of the State of Israel. Hezbollah has since abandoned the goal of transforming Lebanon into an Islamic republic and has focused its efforts instead on what is ostensibly its main goal: the elimination of the so-called “Zionist entity”. In an interview published on June 21, 1999 in the Syrian government-affiliated daily Thisreen, Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah stated, Israel is an illegal usurper entity, which is based on falsehood, massacres, and illusions, and there is no chance for its survival. This is the historical rule that governs human societies. It goes back to its [Israel’s] hostile and exploiting nature.24

Flouting the fear of death through intense socialization and indoctrination, the Hezbollah promoted its goal of destroying Israel and Israelis, through development and perfection of its most controversial weapon, the suicide bomber. This is the nature of the enemy Israel faced along its northern border when it made the decision to withdraw from the southern Lebanon security zone. The ideology and military tactics of the Hezbollah rendered the security zone an untenable territorial enterprise from the perspective of Israeli society. Most importantly, the Hezbollah made Israeli military presence in the security zone unbearable. Avi Shachar held the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, and served as Head of the Research and Analysis Branch within the Lebanese Contingency, the Israeli division based in Lebanon which was responsible for the security zone between 1994 and 1998. Instead of serving to 20 Christopher Reuter, My Life is a Weapon: A Modern History of Suicide Bombing, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002: 37-38. 21 Dilip Hiro, War Without End: The Rise of Islamist Terrorism and Global Response, London: Routledge, 2002: 68. 22 Whittaker, 2001: 46. 23 Mats Wärn, “Staying the Course: The ‘Lebanonization’ of Hizbullah”. http://almashriq. hiof.no/lebanon/300/320/324/324.2/hizballah/warn2/transformation.html. 24 “Secretary General of Hizbullah discusses the new Israeli Government and Hizbullah’s Struggle against Israel”, Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), Special Dispatch Series, No. 36, June 23, 1999. http://memri.org/bin/opener.cgi?Page=archives&ID=SP3699.

Lessons From Lebanon

119

protect Israeli settlements and villages in the north, Israeli actions, in his view, were directed towards protecting Israeli targets within the security zone. He explains the dilemmas of Israel’s predicament in southern Lebanon: There was a lot of terrorist activity in the security zone. But most of the terrorist activity was against the Israeli forces and the South Lebanese Army. We were there to take the hit. Official explanation was that we were there to protect Israeli settlements but we were there to protect ourselves. That is exactly why I felt that being there was getting us nowhere. We were not an efficient buffer zone. I felt we could do our job better by withdrawing to the international border and securing the border without having our forces in southern Lebanon.25

As a result of mounting Israeli military casualties and no apparent respite in Hezbollah violence in the security zone, debates over withdrawal began to dominate the Israeli political agenda. The question was not whether or not to withdraw, but in what way and according to what time framework. Debates about Unilateral Withdrawal From the very beginning of the establishment of Israel’s security zone in southern Lebanon, there was widespread criticism of its effectiveness and legitimacy within Israel. Among those who supported Israel’s withdrawal from the zone, there was virulent debate about how the withdrawal should be conducted and what the ramifications of any particular strategy would be. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was one of the first to propose that Israel withdraw unilaterally from the security zone in southern Lebanon. Rabin expected that this could take place six months after Lebanon would reassert its control in the areas bordering the zone, while Hezbollah would be disarmed and total quiet would be brought to the northern border. However, under heavy pressure by Syria, which from 1985 onward inserted itself as a key influence over Lebanese politics, the Lebanese Government rejected the offer.26 Following the assassination of Rabin in 1995, Israel’s Lebanon policy became a key factor in Israeli domestic politics. In particular, the future of Israel’s presence in southern Lebanon and the possibility of disarmament in the security zone became a key component of the electoral campaign of Benjamin Netanyahu for Prime Minister in the May 1996 national elections. 25 Personal telephone interview with Avi Shachar, CEO of Sprylogics International Inc. and former Head of the Research and Analysis Branch within the Lebanese Contingency of Israeli Intelligence, from 1994 to 1998, on September 15, 2006. The headquarters of this division was based in the Christian town of Marjayun in southern Lebanon, 10 kilometers north of Metullah, a Jewish town in northern Israel. 26 Chemi Shalev, “Analysis”, Ma’ariv, Shabbat Supplement, July 19, 1996: 12, quoted in “Lebanon First”, July 19, 1996, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, electoral campaign of Benjamin Netanyahu: “Withdrawing from the zone has become a key issue in Israel’s campaign for prime minister, following recent killings of seven Israelis, including a brigadier general, by Hizbullah terrorists in the occupied zone”. http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/MFA/ Archive/Articles/1996/LEBANON+FIRST+-+19-Jul-96.htm?DisplayMode=print.

120

Bridging the Barrier

The prospect of unilateral withdrawal sparked an ideologically charged debate throughout Israel that nonetheless exceeded the boundaries of conventional party politics across the Israeli political spectrum. Leading the campaign to withdraw unilaterally was the “Kochav Yair” group, a bipartisan association of parliamentarians and former intelligence officers (including Labor leader Yossi Beilin, Michael Eitan of the Likud Party, Avigdor Kahalani from the Third Way Party and Gideon Ezra, former deputy head of the Shin Bet). The main argument in support of unilateral withdrawal was that because the Hezbollah arose in response to “Israel’s lingering presence in southern Lebanon”,27 Israeli withdrawal would deprive Hezbollah of its reason for existence. Another argument in support of unilateral withdrawal was a response to Hezbollah’s adoption of deadlier warfare tactics against Israeli military targets in the zone. Initially, Hezbollah relied on the use of sniper and rocket fire, machine gunning, bombing and kidnapping of Israeli targets and Israeli military strategists believed that the security zone covered the range in which Hezbollah’s Katyusha rocket would be accurate, roughly 12 kilometers.28 However, while the Hezbollah grew, it procured more sophisticated rocket artillery including multiple launch artillery rockets such as the Fajr-3 and Fajr-5 and improved Katyusha rockets ranging 25 kilometers. The capacity of Hezbollah to launch medium-range missiles up to roughly 70 kilometers effectively diminished the deterrent force of the security zone as a buffer against attacks on Israel’s northern communities. The equally bipartisan camp opposed to unilateral withdrawal was led by then Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and consisted of a coalition of Army Intelligence chiefs including Moshe Ya’alon, Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai, Lebanon coordinator Uri Lubrani, Meretz dove Yossi Sarid and Labor MK Ephraim Sneh.29 Many critics of unilateral withdrawal came from the ranks of the IDF General Staff and intelligence services that were vehemently opposed to the idea. Their major concern with unilateral withdrawal was that without control over the security zone, Israel would be unable to monitor or preempt Lebanese-based terror building up in the vicinity. A second argument presented by the Israeli military against unilateral withdrawal was that it contradicted Israel’s traditional doctrine of strategic depth which entailed a dynamic defence posture espousing as much distance as possible between the battlefield and Israel’s industrial core areas, capital cities, and heartland. In other words, without a security zone, the close proximity of Lebanese militias to Israeli northern towns and villages would, of course, contradict the IDF’s traditional doctrine of conducting all military operations on enemy territory. The prospect of UN intervention in the region did little to alleviate Israeli concerns about the security of its northern community. The Israeli military has been consistently skeptical of the capacity of the United Nations peacekeeping force to take its place. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) had been 27 Laura Zittrain Eisenberg, “Israel’s Lebanon Policy”, Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal (MERIA), Vol. 1, No. 3, September 1997: 6. 28 Ronen Sebag, “Lebanon: The Intifada’s False Premise”, Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2002: 13-22. 29 Laura Zittrain Eisenberg, “Israel’s Lebanon Policy”, Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal (MERIA), Vol. 1, No. 3, September 1997: 6.

Lessons From Lebanon

121

established by the UN Security Council in 1978 and deployed on the Lebanese side of the border to monitor the cessation of hostilities along the Israeli-Lebanese border. Israel has long bemoaned the performance of UNIFIL soldiers who are believed to have failed in either promoting Israeli security or neutralizing the threat from armed militant factions operating in the zone. Israel even accused UNIFIL forces of collaborating with Hezbollah.30 One of the strongest arguments against unilateral withdrawal stemmed from the very nature of Hezbollah and its ideology against the very existence of the State of Israel. Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon would not, in the eyes of Hezbollah, constitute sufficient reason to put down its arms and redirect its attentions away from the fact that Israel continues to survive in the Middle East. The rationale is that equipped with fanatically driven suicide bombers, and Hezbollah’s entire raison d’être to destroy the State of Israel through armed struggle, it does not matter whether Israeli soldiers happen to be positioned on Lebanese soil or not. Hezbollah will continue to fight Israel over the Lebanese border and be in the position to benefit from closer proximity to Israel’s northern region, regardless of how or in what ways Israeli forces choose to withdraw. Arguments against unilateral withdrawal point to the overwhelming influence of Syria in Lebanon and the weakness of the Lebanese government. Since intervening to end the first phase of the Lebanese civil war back in 1976, Syria entrenched itself as a military power in Lebanon and became a major power broker, holding crucial sway over all major policy decisions and actions and backed up militarily with roughly 40,000 of its troops stationed there. Since then, Syria has been reluctant to give up the Lebanon as a tool for pressuring Israel to return the Golan Heights, taken from Syria in the 1967 War. Conventional wisdom in Israel was that troop withdrawal from Lebanon could only follow a formal peace treaty with Syria. “Some observers suggest that the unilateral withdrawal debate reflects less about Israeli attitudes toward Lebanon and more about perceptions of the prospect for a deal with Syria.”31 Unilateral withdrawal would deprive the Syrians of their “Lebanese card” but would also dim the prospects for negotiating with Syria over the Golan Heights through the issue of Lebanon. In any case, Israeli public opinion was divided over the issue of the Golan Heights. Massive demonstrations by settlers and their supporters before the Israeli Parliament and at intersections throughout the State of Israel were represented 30 Aluf Ben, “Israel accuses UN of collaborating with Hezbollah”, Haaretz. http://www. haaretz.com/hasen/objects/pages/PrintArticleEn.jhtml?itemNo=623427. 31 Laura Zittrain Eisenberg, “Israel’s Lebanon Policy”, Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal (MERIA), Vol. 1, No. 3, September 1997: 6. In September 2004, the Security Council voted to end Syrian control over Lebanese politics. The trigger was a Syrian-influenced decision by the Lebanese Parliament to extend the term of pro-Syrian President Emile Lahoud by three years, thereby aborting the electoral process. UN Security Council Resolution 1559 called upon all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon, for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, the extension of the control of the government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory; and a free and fair electoral process in Lebanon. See April 2006: Lebanon, United Nations Security Council. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.1510169/k.BFF9/april_2006 brlebanon.htm.

122

Bridging the Barrier

by the slogan “The Nation with the Golan”, which articulated the strong sentiment against any attempt to withdraw from or cede control over the Golan Heights. Public Protest Despite debates about unilateral withdrawal at the highest political levels, it was ultimately the February 4, 1997 collision between two air force helicopters that determined Israel’s Lebanon policy. Public protest regarding Israel’s security zone in Lebanon culminated in a decisive transformation of Israeli public opinion. Mounting casualties in the zone turned public opinion against Israel’s “long and messy involvement”32 in Lebanon and calls for withdrawal from southern Lebanon proliferated. Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon was not a result of a cost-benefit calculation but rather a reaction to immense public pressure built on emotions and outrage. Israel’s occupation of the security zone in southern Lebanon ignited fierce debate within Israel largely on account of the substantial number of Lebanese civilian and Israeli military casualties there. Since 1982, Israel lost 1,200 soldiers in Lebanon, and every year the number of casualties among Israeli soldiers increased. During the years of the security zone between 1985 and Israel’s withdrawal in 2000, 256 Israeli soldiers died in combat and another 840 were injured. In 1997, 39 Israeli soldiers and 54 guerrillas were killed in Lebanon.33 The positioning of Israeli soldiers in the security zone was likened to that of “virtual sitting ducks in a guerrilla war that many say is impossible to win”.34 In the end, growing public perceptions of Israel’s presence in Lebanon as a liability with its overwhelming influence on Israel’s Lebanon policy resulted from the demands of domestic politics.35 Antiwar groups sprang up in Israel immediately after the 1982 War in Lebanon. Yesh Gvul, Soldiers against Silence, the Committee against the War in Lebanon, Parents against Silence, and the Movement for a Peaceful Withdrawal from Lebanon. Among the Israeli groups protesting Israel’s Lebanon policy, Yesh Gvul36 (literally “there is a limit”) was among the most prominent. Yesh Gvul was established in 1982 at the start of the Lebanon War. The movement consisted of army reservists who refused to serve in Lebanon and who delivered a petition to Prime Minister 32 “Why is Israel pulling out?”, Q&A Leaving Lebanon, BBC News, Tuesday, May 23, 2000. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/636594.stm. 33 Shin Haniuda, “Current and Future Analysis of the Israeli Peace Process”, referenced from Howard Goller, (1998, March 2). “Israel Seeks Terms for Pulling out of Lebanon.” Reuters. http://www-personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/W98PS353498PAPERS/HANIUDA.SHIN.HTML. 34 Deborah Horan, “Israeli debate heats up on security zone status Casualties rise along border with Lebanon”, The Chronicle. http://www.chron.com/content/chronicle/ world/97/12/06/israel-lebanon.2-1.html. 35 Gal Luft, “Israel’s Security Zone in Lebanon—A Tragedy?”, Middle East Quarterly, September 2000. http://www.meforum.org/article/70. 36 Yesh Gvul website. http://www.yeshgvul.org.

Lessons From Lebanon

123

Menachem Begin, signed by 3000 reservists, many of whom were court marshaled and sent to military prison for refusing to obey orders. Yesh Gvul described its motivation for conscientious refusal to serve in Lebanon as resulting from the fact that: growing numbers of soldiers grasped that the campaign, with its bloodshed and havoc, was an act of naked and futile aggression in which they wanted no part.37

Another Israeli protest group that influenced public debate about the security zone was Parents against Silence. Originally organized by some fifty women, and a few men, Parents against Silence mobilized on a campaign to collect signatures and sign petitions calling for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon. The movement’s slogan “Bring The Sons Back Home” banked on the symbol of parental concern for soldiers who they thought were being sacrificed in a superfluous and dangerous war.38 Other groups from various sectors of the Israeli political spectrum organized against the Lebanon War such as Women against the Invasion of Lebanon. This was a distinctly feminist anti-war group composed mainly of women affiliated with the 1970s Israeli feminist movement who demanded the immediate withdrawal of the troops from Lebanon. On account of its feminist underpinnings, Women against the Invasion of Lebanon operated outside the mainstream political spectrum. Indeed, after the Lebanon War ended, this group continued to operate under the name “Women against the Occupation” in reference to Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Drawing connections between the oppression of Israeli women and the oppressions suffered by Palestinians as a result of Israeli military rule in Lebanon, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip, the group’s message exceeded the boundaries of mainstream nationalist consensus. The hostile public reaction resulted, according to Simona Sharoni, from the fact that “Israeli society was not able to address the oppression of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories nor the subordination of Israeli women, and especially not the links between the two”.39 These groups represented the underlying opposition to Israel’s war in Lebanon.40 Other groups organized specifically for a withdrawal from Israel’s security zone in the 1990s. Perhaps the most dynamic protest group against Israel’s security zone was the Four Mothers. Rachel Ben-Dor, Miri Sela, Ronit Nachmias, and Zahara Antavi had sons serving in Lebanon and resided in Kibbutzim (cooperative settlements) and towns in northern Israel. In reaction to the collision of two transport helicopters ferrying Israeli troops into southern Lebanon, which killed all 73 soldiers on board, the four mothers organized a demonstration at Machaniyan Junction. Their 37 Yesh Gvul website. http://www.yeshgvul.org. 38 Yael Azmon, “Women and Politics: The Case of Israel”, in Yael Azmon and Dafna N. Izraeli (eds). Women in Israel, New Brunswick & London: Transaction Publishers, 1993: 112. 39 Simona Sharoni, Gender and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1995: 108. 40 This section is informed by chapter 5 of Tami Amanda Jacoby, Women in Zones of Conflict: Power and Resistance in Israel, Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005: 68-89.

Bridging the Barrier

124

protest expressed anger and frustration with the Government of Israel for indicating its readiness to withdraw from Lebanon in 1985 but did nothing in the subsequent twelve years to remedy the situation. During this period hundreds of Israeli soldiers and untold Lebanese have been killed in this “silent war” which nobody in the government has been ready to acknowledge or to end. These women, who took the name The Four Mothers Movement, gained immediate media attention and their numbers quickly swelled, indicating the widespread dissatisfaction and frustration of a large cross-section of the country with the present status quo.41

The stated objective of the Fourth Mothers was Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from its self-declared security zone in Southern Lebanon. The Four Mothers became the most visible and dynamic protest movement within the Israeli peace movement. Its members organized across the country at road junctions, in demonstrations, and public forums and appeared frequently on the media. As parents of combat soldiers, the group was embraced by the top-ranking political leadership and offered a legitimate platform to speak as “concerned mothers” within the mainstream national security arena.42 Operation Grapes of Wrath Prior to the decision to withdraw from its security zone, Israel attempted to employ a military option to neutralize the threat from Southern Lebanon. Speaking from the perspective of Israeli intelligence in the security zone, Avi Shachar explains the rationale behind Israeli withdrawal: We were split about whether we should stay or move back. Even those who thought we should withdraw always stressed that if we do withdraw, at least we have the option to hit Hezbollah back if they try to establish themselves. We’ll sit on the international border, but if Hezbollah tries to fight, we’ll have the means and the legitimacy to go in and drive them back. That is exactly what didn’t happen. For six years we didn’t do much. We let them establish themselves in southern Lebanon in a way that allowed them to come back and bite us two months ago. We failed in a miserable way.43

To address the threats from Hezbollah, Israel embarked upon Operation Grapes of Wrath44 in April 1996, a military campaign lasting a little over two weeks that consisted of over 1100 air raids and extensive shelling intended to crush the Hezbollah infrastructure. Hezbollah fighters responded with their own shelling and targeting of Israeli soldiers and military posts.

41 Four Mothers website. http://www.4mothers.org.il/mothers.htm. 42 Four Mothers website. http://www.4mothers.org.il/mothers.htm. 43 Personal telephone interview with Avi Shachar, CEO of Sprylogics International Inc. and former Head of the Research and Analysis Branch within the Lebanese Contingency of Israeli Intelligence from 1994 to 1998, on September 15, 2006. 44 Hezbollah and other parties refer to Israel’s Operation Grapes of Wrath as the April War.

Lessons From Lebanon

125

After mounting civilian casualties in southern Lebanon and massive destruction of property, the conflict ended with the negotiation of the Israeli-Lebanese Ceasefire Understanding known as the Grapes of Wrath Understandings, reached on April 26, 1996. The cease-fire agreement was an informal written agreement between Israel and Hezbollah, achieved through the diplomatic auspices of the United States, and subsequently supervised by a joint oversight committee, the Monitoring Committee for the Implementation of the Grapes of Wrath Understandings consisting of delegates from Israel, Lebanon, Syria, France and the United States. The cease-fire called for an end to cross-border attacks on civilians and from using civilian villages as a base from which to launch attacks. Since 1985, the Monitoring Committee dealt with grievances lodged by both Israel and Lebanon concerning violations of the cease-fire understandings.45 However, the cease-fire agreement was highly problematic from an Israeli perspective because its frame of reference was limited to civilian casualties. The agreement did not call for the dismantling of Hezbollah and even permitted the continued military activities by Hezbollah against Israeli military targets inside Lebanon. As a result, Israel proclaimed the agreement null and void.46 An intense campaign by Israel to convince the Lebanese that continued operations by Hezbollah were not in their interest failed, largely on account of the immense popularity Hezbollah enjoyed throughout the Lebanese political system. As a result, Israel failed to achieve its military objectives in Operation Grapes of Wrath as well as in subsequent diplomatic negotiations. From 1996 to 2000, Israel’s security zone in Lebanon continued to be a hotbed for violence. Israeli domestic politics were also negatively affected. The killing of so many Arab civilians, albeit unintentional (and many Arabs believed it was intentional), soured Israel’s Arab minority, and Israelis were wary of the growing military arsenal of Hezbollah, the hail of Katyusha rockets over northern Israel, and the inability of the IDF to stop them.47 The Process of Unilateral Withdrawal The withdrawal from Israel’s security zone ultimately took place under the leadership of Ehud Barak, Israel’s 10th Prime Minister who governed from May 17, 1999 to March 7, 2001. Barak campaigned on a specific timetable towards peace negotiations with Syria and the Palestinians. However, having made no progress on the Israeli-Palestinian track, he desperately wanted to be seen as making progress in some vital area of Israeli national security. In his campaign for the 1999 Israeli elections, he had promised a withdrawal from Lebanon to the 1949 armistice lines as part of a general peace agreement with Syria and Lebanon “within one year”. Driven by a desire to restart negotiations with 45 “Lebanon Monitoring Committee (Communicated by the IDF Spokesman)”, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 7, 1997. http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism%20Obstacle%20to%20Peace/Terrorism%20from%20Lebanon-%20Hizbullah/LEBANON %20MONITORING%20COMMITTEE%20-%2012-Jan-97. 46 Ze’ev Schiff, “Where have all the agreements gone?”, Haaretz, June 4, 2000. http:// jnul.huji.ac.il/IA/ArchivedSites/4mothers150204/www.4mothers.org.il/lebanon/where.htm. 47 Morris, 2001: 640.

126

Bridging the Barrier

Syria, which had for all intents and purposes been suspended since 1996, Barak was willing to give up the Golan Heights in return for peace and an assurance from Syrian President Assad that Syria would rein in Hezbollah in Lebanon.48 Barak had high hopes for Syria and many believe that the Syrian track was Barak’s “top priority”.49 However, the negotiating track with Syria ended in stalemate. Efforts by US President Bill Clinton to act as interlocutor were unsuccessful as were attempts to agree on an agenda, the precise border to be delineated and the content of previous negotiations. Facing an impasse at the negotiating level, Barak became more receptive to agitation against Israel’s security zone in Lebanon emanating from the grassroots level. Israelis demonstrated en masse against the return of the Golan Heights and the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz published a draft of a proposed Israeli-Syrian treaty, allegedly showing Syria’s acceptance of Israel’s conditions.50 These events culminated in an end to the Israeli-Syrian channel. The IDF was instructed to “withdraw without agreement” and promptly began preparations for vacating its positions in the security zone in Lebanon. Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon began on May 16, much sooner than anticipated. The circumstances of the withdrawal and the seemingly disorganized manner in which it was accomplished were subject to intense scrutiny. However, Barak bowed to populist demands for a quick withdrawal and did not heed the warnings of the military brass. Israeli forces began vacating their front line positions and handing them over to the South Lebanese Army, at times amid exchange of fire. The transition of power over vacated Israeli military posts was disorganized and chaotic. Beginning on May 21, columns of Lebanese civilians, accompanied by armed groups, entered villages in the Israeli-controlled area. On May 25, 2000 the Government of Israel notified the Secretary-General of the United Nations that Israel had redeployed its forces in compliance with UN Security Council resolutions. UN Security Council Resolution 425 Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 was considered to have fulfilled the demands of United Nations Security Council Resolution 425 of March 19, 1978.51 UN Security Council Resolution 425, adopted at the 2074th meeting by 12 votes to none, called for the immediate cessation of Israeli military activities and withdrawal of Israeli forces from “all Lebanese territory”.52 On June 16, 2000, the UN SecretaryGeneral reported to the Security Council that Israel had withdrawn its forces from 48 Benny Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001, Vintage Books: New York, 2001: 655. 49 Ian J. Bickerton and Carla L. Klausner, A History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 5th Edition, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson, 2007: 318. 50 Ian J. Bickerton and Carla L. Klausner, A History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 5th Edition, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson, 2007: 320. 51 However, the Hezbollah always maintained that continued Israeli control over the She’ba farms violated the UN Resolutions, to be discussed. 52 Resolution 425 (1978) of 19 March 1978, United Nations Security Council. http:// daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/368/70/IMG/NR036870.pdf?OpenElement.

Lessons From Lebanon

127

Lebanon in accordance with resolution 425 (1978) and met the requirements defined in his report of May 22, 2000. The report stated that Israel had completed its withdrawal in conformity with the line identified by the United Nations, the South Lebanese Army had been dismantled, and all detainees held at Al-Khiam prison had been released.53 Upon withdrawal, the UN established an interim force for southern Lebanon (UNIFIL), a peacekeeping force designed to accomplish three broadly defined tasks: to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces; restore international peace and security; and assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area. Consisting of 2000 troops and 50 unarmed military observers, UNIFIL’s mandate was to maintain the ceasefire along the 70-mile (121 kilometers) United Nations “Blue Line” between Israel and Lebanon. UNIFIL’s activities included observing from fixed positions and contact with the parties, patrolling the border, reporting on violations, clearing mines and unexploded ordinances as well as providing humanitarian assistance to the civilian population.54 UNIFIL’s performance in southern Lebanon has been heavily criticized by Israel and its allies, who claim that the force turned a blind eye to the mobilization, accumulation of weapons, and political activities of the Hezbollah in areas subject to its mandate. These criticisms became particularly acute during the recent war between Israel and Lebanon in 2006, to be discussed. The third, more long-term goal of the resolution, which called for “strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon”, involved assisting the Government of Lebanon in developing effective authority over territory under its official jurisdiction. The extension of Lebanese sovereignty was the most arduous and, perhaps, unattainable goal of the mission considering the widespread strength in popularity of Hezbollah and the proliferation of armed factions rivaling the Lebanese government throughout the southern part of the country. From an Israeli perspective, the removal of its troops from southern Lebanon eradicated any alleged justification on the part of armed Lebanese groups that their attacks against Israel were motivated by the goal of liberating Lebanon.55 Aware that various parties would continue to engage in aggressive acts even after Israel’s withdrawal, Israel vowed to “react forcefully” to defend itself within the framework of international law.56

53 United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, Lebanon, UNIFIL, Background, United Nations. http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unifil/background.html. 54 United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), Fact Sheet, United Nations. http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unifil/index.html. 55 Eytan Bentsur, Director-Geneal, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Op-ed article on Israel’s Withdrawal from Lebanon”, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 25, 2000. http://www. mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/2000/Op-ed+Article+on+Israels+Withdrawal+from+Lebanon.htm. 56 “The Israeli Withdrawal from Southern Lebanon: Background Points”, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 24, 2000. http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20t o%20the%20Peace%20Process/The%20Israeli%20Withdrawal%20from%20Southern%20L ebanon-%20Back.

128

Bridging the Barrier

Problems with Israel’s Unilateral Withdrawal One of the main problems that resulted from Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon was the creation and perpetuation of a myth of Hezbollah victory. Much can be gained or lost in the propaganda war conducted during and after war on the battlefield. In the case of Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon, Arab propaganda spun a story that contributed to Hezbollah’s esteem and reputation. Even though the Hezbollah did not break the IDF militarily, it gained a diplomatic victory when the Arab world erroneously attributed Israel’s withdrawal to the courage and steadfastness of Hezbollah’s fighting machine under the leadership of Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah. From a security standpoint, Israel’s vacation of its positions in southern Lebanon seemed to project weakness. This image was picked up and glorified in the Arab media and throughout the world. Upon Israel’s withdrawal from the security zone, armed Muslim radicals in Lebanon had never been so close to the Israeli border.57 In the broadcasts of the popular media outlet Al Jazeera, the war between Israel and the Hezbollah in Lebanon came to be known as the “Sixth War” of the Arabs against Israel. The popularity of Nasrallah and the Hezbollah has penetrated the Palestinian territories. A Palestinian customer in a mini-market in East Jerusalem’s Beit Hanina neighborhood stated proudly, “For the first time an Arab leader, Hassan Nasrallah, is teaching Israel a lesson with his small organization”.58 Nasrallah’s popularity reaches the level of culture, media and art as he has attained an instant celebrity status in the Arab world, around whom a cult of personality has developed, an idealized leader who evokes an aura of invincibility and charisma. A recent Internet blog describes the proliferation of “sexed-up” images of Nasrallah, which follow the circulation of a young photo of him, resembling a not so subtle “revolutionary glamour pose”. Much like the fervor around Western Hollywood celebrities, the equivalent top-ten of the Arab world has Nasrallah as the “top date brand” of the year 2006, rendering him something of an Arab icon given to idolization and emulation by Arab youth and masses.59 “The Hawk of Lebanon”, an ode to Nasrallah written and sung by the El Haija Brothers has become the most popular hit in the Arab world and particularly in the Palestinian territories, where it is played at weddings, graduation ceremonies and is one of the most popular cell phone ring tones. Palestinians identify with the victims of Israel’s war in Lebanon as exemplified in the song’s lyrics: Nasrallah responded to the calls to take vengeance as the Arab blood became hotter and hotter. The boldness and the courage that characterizes Nasrallah’s battle is an Islamic courage. Our people are used to welcoming death.60 57 “Analysis: Lebanon’s Fragile Peace”, BBC News, Friday, May 26, 2000. http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/765912.stm. 58 Danny Rubinstein, “Lebanon as a ‘Metastasis’”, August 7, 2006, Haaretz. http://www. geneva-accord.org/Articles.aspx?docID=1454&FolderID=43&lang=en. 59 “Hassan Nasrallah Superstar”, Blog posted by Nisrine, Thursday, September 28, 2006, July06, War on Lebanon and Beyond. http://july2006waronlebanon.blogspot.com/. 60 “The Hawk of Lebanon”, BBC News, The World. http://www.theworld.org/ ?q=node/3624, accessed on Friday, October 6, 2006.

Lessons From Lebanon

129

Hezbollah gained tremendous popularity among the majority Muslim community and even to an extent among the minority Christians in the Middle East for being the only leader to continue the struggle against Israel. The media in Israel’s neighboring states and the wider Middle East interpreted the withdrawal from Lebanon as a clear defeat for the Israelis, while warning of unfinished business. In Iran, Hezbollah’s chief backer, the Iran News proclaimed that the myth of Israeli invincibility had been “totally shattered”.61 Jordan’s semi-official Al-Dustur newspaper ran an article which stated that “the end of the ‘odious occupation’ was a ‘day of glory’” for all Arabs as it marked Israel’s first unconditional retreat: This is the first military withdrawal in Israel’s history that it is making under pressure of resistance, without imposing any of the conditions that it used to impose on the neighbouring Arab countries.62

The popular interpretation of Israeli withdrawal in the Arab world was that the Israeli occupation of Lebanon “crumbled” and the Israeli soldiers were “driven out”. Israel’s withdrawal was a unifying force for the Arab states whose populations strongly believed that the lesson to be drawn from the episode was that their “spirit of resistance” was stronger than “the greatest war machine in the region”.63 These views represented a widespread euphoria in the Arab world that fed on its own mythology. Despite the political and security advantages gained by Israel from withdrawing from the zone, the clearly projected weakness of Israel, as generally construed in the Arab world was an obvious disadvantage. Any army that is seen to be withdrawing under fire does not bode well in public relations campaigns. The pictures of looted Israeli equipment left behind and of the Lebanese insulting IDF soldiers on the Israeli side of the border also do not constitute a sign of military triumph. The general perception of Israel’s record on Lebanon is failure. This does not bode well for deterrence, particularly at a time when it is needed to neutralize the looming threats to Israel’s north.64

Therefore, although no effective military campaign was mounted against the retreating Israelis, the fact that Israel’s withdrawal took place without any political or military agreement to its advantage allowed Hezbollah to claim itself victorious. Hezbollah established itself as the movement that single handedly “forced” the Israeli occupier out of Arab lands, a victory that no Arab state could claim after persistent losses on the battlefields in 1967, 1973 and 1982. As a result, from 2000

61 “Mideast Press Crows over Israel ‘defeat’”, BBC News, May 24, 2000. http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/monitoring/media_reports/762079.stm. 62 “Mideast Press Crows over Israel ‘defeat’”, BBC News, May 24, 2000. http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/monitoring/media_reports/762079.stm. 63 “Mideast Press Crows over Israel ‘defeat’”, BBC News, May 24, 2000. http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/monitoring/media_reports/762079.stm. 64 Efraim Inbar, “Saving face in Lebanon”, Jerusalem Post, June 13, 2000, accessed at: http://www.4mothers.org.il/articles/saving.htm.

130

Bridging the Barrier

on, Hezbollah’s standing in the Arab world as a leader in the struggle against Israel, rose tremendously. She’ba Farms One of the key sticking points of Israel’s withdrawal was that the Hezbollah never accepted the notion that Israel fulfilled all the demands of the UN Security Council Resolution. In particular, Hezbollah maintained that Israeli withdrawal would only be completed once it vacated the Sheb’a Farms, a small piece of land consisting of fourteen farms named after the village of Sheb’a, on the western slopes of Mount Hermon. The farms are located to the south of the village, at altitudes ranging from 400 to 2000 meters (1300 and 6500 feet). Sheb’a farms are considered as part of Syria under the UN demarcation. However, they are claimed as Lebanese territory by many in Lebanon, including the Hezbollah. Israel claims that the Sheb’a farms belong to Syria as it occupied the territory from Syria in the 1967 war, a war in which Lebanon did not participate. Nevertheless, and despite Israel’s vacation of the southern Lebanese security zone, Hezbollah has used Israel’s annexation of the Sheb’a Farms as justification for its continued military campaign against Israel. Hezbollah has publicly stated that it will continue to fight Israel through armed struggle if Israel does not release Lebanese detainees in Israeli prisons and withdraw from the Sheba’a Farms. South Lebanese Christian Allies Another problem with Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from southern Lebanon was future relations with its Lebanese allies. Israel could not have avoided the sense of betrayal that would be felt by Christians living in southern Lebanon.65 Israeli civilians did not have any strong sense of commitment to, or fraternity with, Israel’s Lebanese partners because relations in the security zone were strictly among military actors. In general, the SLA did not have social contacts with Israelis outside of active duty in the Israeli Defense Forces. However, leaving one’s chief allies vulnerable to retribution or revenge would have been considered a morally repugnant option which would deprive Israel of legitimacy in the eyes of potential Arab allies in the future who would be well aware of Israel’s decision to abandon ship in Lebanon. Lebanese Christians in southern Lebanon were fearful that Israeli withdrawal would bring catastrophe. Colonel Sharbel Barakat, the SLA’s director for foreign affairs concluded that if Israel withdrew unilaterally, “the Christians will be either massacred or expelled, leaving the northern Galilee naked to a million Shi’as, mobilized by radical pro-Iranian militias”.66 The catastrophe did not come to pass. However, the political strength and wellbeing of the Christian population of southern 65 Gal Luft, “Israel’s Security Zone in Lebanon—A Tragedy?”, Middle East Quarterly, September, 2000. 66 Walid Phares, “Liberating Lebanon”, Middle East Quarterly, December 1996. http:// www.meforum.org/article/418.

Lessons From Lebanon

131

Lebanon and Israel’s former allies has deteriorated dramatically since Israel’s withdrawal. When Israel began to withdraw, IDF forces handed over some forward positions in the occupied zone to the SLA. As news of the withdrawal spread, civilians from the occupied zone overran SLA positions to return to their villages, while Hezbollah members quickly took control of the areas the SLA had previously controlled. Thousands of others returned to reclaim their villages and capture possessions held by the retreating pro-Israeli militiamen. Crowds opened up a notorious prison camp to release roughly 140 prisoners.67 Without prior awareness of Israeli intentions, the SLA was in an ominous position. What was envisioned as an orderly withdrawal turned chaotic when SLA soldiers abandoned their posts and were replaced by columns of civilians backed by Hezbollah guerrillas. As Benny Morris describes: the slapdash IDF withdrawal to the frontier and the mad scramble of SLA men and families at the crossing points looked embarrassingly like a hasty retreat, and right-wing Israeli politicians immediately predicted that Hizbullah would soon renew its military campaign—but this time against the Galilee settlements and from the border itself.68

Barring the fate of Israel’s allies in southern Lebanon and Hezbollah’s takeover of IDF positions up to the border, the IDF pullback was considered a success. Although punctuated by frequent ceasefire violations and occasional incidents from both sides of the Blue Line, relative calm prevailed over the Israeli-Lebanese border until July 12, 2006.69 The relative security of Israel’s northern border for close to six years removed the issue of Lebanon from Israel’s political agenda and may have caused complacency on the part of the Israeli public and decision makers about the possibility of fighting on two fronts, Lebanon and the Palestinian areas.70 Indeed, removing Lebanon from the political agenda was a convenient political move so long as the northern border was relatively quiet. However, this proved an intelligence failure as Avi Shachar explains, the military build up in the zone should not have gone unnoticed by Israel. A combination of events created a situation in which we didn’t do anything. The politicians said that if it’s quiet, we’ll leave it and deal with the problem when it arises. The fact that Ariel Sharon was Prime Minister during part of this time explains that he didn’t want to get involved in another Lebanese War. The big question is, did we know what Hezbollah was doing? If we did know why didn’t we act? And if we didn’t know, why didn’t we 67 Zeina Karam, “Israeli backed militia crumbles in Lebanon”, Ashland Daily Tidings. http://www.dailytidings.com/2000/news0523/headline/dt_news-03.html. 68 Morris, 2001: 657. 69 United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), Fact Sheet, United Nations. http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unifil/index.html. 70 The ominous position of SLA soldiers and their families who had collaborated with Israel for fifteen years was a dark stain on Israel’s withdrawal process from Lebanon. However, this was partly mitigated as about 6500 SLA men and South Lebanese officials and their families were given entrance into Israel (Morris, 2001: 656). Others gave themselves up to the Lebanese authorities and although were tried in mass trials, most ended up with light sentences.

132

Bridging the Barrier know? From an intelligence point of view, we have a very big problem. I don’t believe they didn’t know, or at least they had to know something. I don’t know whether Israeli intelligence was aware exactly of the extent of what Hezbollah was doing. But why wasn’t anything done about it?71

The predictions of Israel’s right wing seemed to have culminated as the Hezbollah did, in fact, use its positioning in south Lebanon to gain support and strengthen its military capabilities with weapons and funds funneled in from Syria and Iran. Iran provided a steady flow of arms, ammunition, logistical support, financing and training to Hezbollah terrorists, and Syria allowed and even encouraged these groups to operate freely in Lebanese areas under Syrian military control.72 Implications for Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian lands Since the eruption of armed conflict between Israel and the Hezbollah on Israel’s northern border, the Palestinian context has taken somewhat of a backstage, particularly in international news media and in discussions among the major extraregional powers. What has been termed “the forgotten war”73 between Israel and the Palestinians, however, continues to rage. On June 30, 2006, the Israeli Defense Forces launched Operation Summer Rains, a calculated series of pinpoint raids by IDF infantry and armored forces, directed against militant training camps, weapons storage sites and other Hamas institutions, particularly those supporting the development and launching of Qassam rockets against Israel.74 IDF security forces also carried out assassinations of individual militants and arrested most of Hamas’s West Bank leadership, including 49 Cabinet ministers, the Speaker and SecretaryGeneral of the Palestinian Legislative Council, and the Deputy Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority.75 Although Israeli defense planners continue to focus on problems resulting from the absence of a final status resolution on territories of the West Bank and Gaza and thwart Palestinian suicide bomb attacks, Palestinian armed resistance has been largely ineffective. Palestinians continue to struggle against the negative repercussions of the barrier on their right to freedom of movement, well being and political aspirations 71 Personal telephone interview with Avi Shachar, CEO of Sprylogics International Inc. and former Head of the Research and Analysis Branch within the Lebanese Contingency of Israeli Intelligence from 1994 to 1998, on September 15, 2006. 72 Eytan Bentsur, Director-General, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Op-ed article on Israel’s Withdrawal from Lebanon”, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 25, 2000. http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/2000/Op-ed+ Article+on+Israel-s+Withdrawal+from+Lebanon.htm. 73 The term “forgotten war” was coined by Jim Warren, “Israel and Palestine: The Forgotten War”, Directorate of Strategic Planning Background Paper, Department of National Defence, Canada, August 21, 2006: 3. 74 “Operation Summer Rains, Update No. 6, July 6, 12 noon”, Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (CSS), July 9, 2006. 75 “IDF plans to arrest more Hamas leaders”, Al Mubadara, Palestinian National Initiative, June 30, 2006. http://www.almubadara.org/new/edetails.php?id=1675.

Lessons From Lebanon

133

for a Palestinian state. Palestinians learnt the conceivably erroneous lesson that Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon was a result of Hezbollah’s military strength. A popular view among Palestinians in particular, and the Arab world as a whole is that as the Hezbollah drove Israel to withdraw from Lebanon, Palestinian military fighting will also drive Israel out of the West Bank and Gaza.76 In other words, the Palestinians learnt that the road to realizing their territorial and national aspirations led not through diplomacy, but through their particular brand of armed struggle.77 As a result, there has been increased incentive on the part of Palestinian militant organizations to emulate Hezbollah strategies and smuggle long-and-short range rockets and anti-tank weapons into Gaza over the poorly-secured Egyptian border.78 The Hezbollah may have claimed itself victorious in their conflict with the Israeli Defense Forces and its leader Hassan Nasrallah may have gained appeal in the Arab world. However, Hezbollah did not break the IDF militarily and probably lost much of its military capacity due to IDF air and ground strikes against its bases of operations. Probably the most important victory of the Hezbollah was in the lack of will at war’s end on the part of all actors involved, including the United Nations, international public opinion, the Lebanese government, and neighboring Arab states, to provide the means to disarm the Hezbollah and extend the sovereignty of the Lebanese government and military over southern Lebanon. The revised instructions given to the newly constituted UNIFIL lacked broad international support, a clear mandate, unity of command and a strong information campaign. Support for the mission has to come not only from the warring parties but also from neighbours and the broader international community. Stakeholders need to be brought into the process, and provided with motivation to contribute to success.79

One important lesson to be drawn from the conflict in Lebanon is that without a broader peace effort, which includes support from abroad and reform and strengthening of the Lebanese state along with the extension of its jurisdiction over all of Lebanon, there will be neither regional stability nor a return to the negotiating table with Israel. This is the lesson that should be propagated regarding Israel’s relations with the Palestinians. The question is, to what extent are the situations of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza compatible? Until recently, Hezbollah violence was directly largely against Israeli soldiers in the security zone. The recent war in Lebanon demonstrated that the Hezbollah’s goal 76 Ronen Sebag, “Lebanon: The Intifada’s False Premise”, Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2002. http://www.meforum.org/article/173. 77 Ronen Sebag, “Lebanon: The Intifada’s False Premise”, Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2002. http://www.meforum.org/article/173. 78 Jim Warren, “Israel and Palestine: The Forgotten War”, Directorate of Strategic Analysis Background Paper, Department of National Defence Canada, August 21, 2006: 45. 79 Beth Cole DeGrasse and Christina Parajon, “Crisis in Lebanon: Is Peacekeeping Possible?”, USIPeace Briefing, United State Institute of Peace, August 2006. http://www. usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2006/0823_lebanon_peacekeeping.html.

134

Bridging the Barrier

was to also embark upon indiscriminate rocket and missile attacks against Israeli urban centres, thereby targeting Israeli civilians and creating fear in all of Israeli society. This change in Hezbollah tactics demonstrates an escalation of the conflict and more serious use of its military capabilities. Palestinian attacks against Israel have also undergone a transformation since the first Intifada in 1987. Attacks largely directed against Israeli soldiers in the occupied territories during the late 1980s and early 1990s using largely unsophisticated weapons such as stones, Molotov cocktails and small arms fire has been replaced since the al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000 with suicide bombers who blow themselves up in major Israeli urban centers. Like rockets and missiles, suicide bomb attacks represent a more lethal and indiscriminate use of weaponry against civilians rather than soldiers and military targets. Therefore, the Hezbollah and Palestinian contexts are similar to the extent that they have both undergone an escalation of weapons, targets and levels of violence as a means to pursue armed struggle against Israel. However, there are major differences between the Palestinian and Lebanese contexts as they relate to Israel. The first major difference between the Hezbollah and the Palestinians is that while Israel does not have a territorial dispute with Lebanon (with the arguable exception of the Sheb’a Farms), the status of Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem remains highly disputed. Israelis and Palestinians generally agree that the West Bank and Gaza form the basis of a future Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital. However, the precise contours and borders of that state are yet to be negotiated. Therefore, the armed struggle of the Palestinians is directed against Israel’s settlement on and use of disputed territories. On the issue of territories occupied by Israel since 1967, the Palestinian cause for territorial withdrawal by Israel is widely supported by the international community, as articulated in UN Security Council Resolutions 242 of November 22, 196780 and 338 of October 22, 1973. Israel’s building of the separation barrier on territory that Palestinians claim as their own is, as witnessed in previous chapters, widely rejected by Palestinians, their supporters and much of international public opinion. Yet, the more Palestinians express their demands for territory through armed struggle, the more Israelis are united on the perceived necessity to halt suicide bomb attacks in Israel through building the barrier. This vicious cycle between Palestinian struggles for political independence and Israeli struggles for national security is the core dynamic driving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The more each side perceives the other as challenging their basic rights, either to independence or security, the greater possibilities for mobilizing around radical elements in the political spectrum and the greater the tendency to unify around their respective leaders. Breaks in this pattern, such as the recent war in Lebanon, serve as opportunities for the sides to reassess their political perspectives and consider whether or not it is the right time to return to the negotiating table and revive the diplomatic channel. The territorial component therefore, distinguishes the Palestinian struggle from the Lebanese context. 80 There have been ongoing semantic disputes over the definition of “territory”, which differs in the French and English versions of Operative Clause 1(i) of UN Resolution 242. While the English version refers to “territories”, which could mean some part or parts of territories occupied in 1967, the French version refers to “des territoires”, translated as “the territories”, which has been interpreted as “all” the territories occupied.

Lessons From Lebanon

135

A second distinguishing factor of the Palestinian context as opposed to the Lebanese context is the intricate integration of Israeli and Palestinian communities, particularly in the West Bank and East Jerusalem since Israel’s withdrawal of settlements from Gaza. In many places in the West Bank, Jewish settlements encircle and cut off Palestinian villages from each other and thereby obstruct the development of a contiguous territory upon which a Palestinian state can be built. The proximity of Israeli and Palestinian peoples in disputed territory represents a situation in which the people fighting are those who know one other, or at least knew each other during less turbulent times. Prior to the first Palestinian Uprising in 1987, Jewish settlers bought produce and other commodities from neighboring Arab villages and Palestinians provided sources of labor for Jewish settlements. This situation was by no means ideal but it was relatively quiet from 1967 and for twenty years onward. By way of contrast, Israeli and Lebanese populations are completely separate and have not had the least opportunity to become familiar with each other’s culture or society. The only Israelis that know the Lebanese people are those soldiers who served in Lebanon during the war in 1982 or in the security zone in southern Lebanon until the year 2000. A third distinguishing feature of the Palestinian context is the positioning of the Hamas as a governing body. Even though the Hamas government does not officially recognize the existence of the State of Israel and its ideology supports Israel’s destruction, the Palestinians have much more to gain from negotiating with Israel than does the Hezbollah because neither Israel nor the Palestinians can achieve their respective goals without agreement from the other. The lessons of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon show that Israel cannot achieve its strategic goals without the assistance of a local ally.81 Since the election of a Hamas government in the Palestinian areas, Israel has lost much of its smooth functioning relationship with the former Fatah-led government whose officials were much more closely involved with Israelis throughout the history of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. The Hamas movement, unlike the Hezbollah, currently—at least in theory—occupies a governmental position in the Palestinian Authority. The elections rendered Hamas responsible for official policy, the national economy, and foreign relations with key extra-regional players. From that point on, Hamas had to reconcile its more amorphous ideologies with the day-to-day needs of governing a society. The position of political responsibility has caused Hamas leaders to pursue more pragmatic policies in regards to Israel. Indeed, in a report released on Al Jazeera, the Hamas government claimed that it would recognize Israel if Israel withdrew to the 1967 borders. There have been signs of attrition from the Palestinian territories as PA President Mahmoud Abbas called on all militant groups to agree to a tahdiyah, a respite in the armed struggle against Israel, and Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh requested that the military wing of Hamas suspend rocket attacks against Israel.82

81 Walid Phares, “Liberating Lebanon”, Middle East Quarterly, December 1996. http:// www.meforum.org/article/418. 82 Jim Warren, “Israel and Palestine: The Forgotten War”, Directorate of Strategic Analysis Background Paper, Department of National Defence, Canada, August 21, 2006: 2.

136

Bridging the Barrier

Finally, The National Conciliation Document of the Palestinian Prisoners83 makes numerous references to Israel and the Israeli government and thereby, arguably, entails an implicit recognition of Israel. Recognizing Israel negates the very core of Hamas ideology, which seeks to establish an Islamic state over all of historic Palestine. Changes in the rhetoric and organizational platform of Hamas has resulted from immense pressure from the international community, freezing of funds (with the exception of humanitarian assistance) to the Palestinian Authority from the United States and the European Community and growing tensions within Palestinian society between Hamas and Fatah supporters who have clashed to a point short of civil war. The Hezbollah, on the other hand, does not hesitate to hold the entire Lebanese state hostage to pursue its own agenda. And while Lebanese civilians may not support Hezbollah’s political agenda, they nonetheless begrudgingly tolerate Hezbollah’s presence in the country. The reality, however, is that apart from its grand public relations campaign, the Hezbollah only represents its constituency in southern Lebanon and is not responsible for the population of Lebanon as a whole. These arguments have suggested that the Israeli-Palestinian context differs considerably from the Israeli-Hezbollah theatre in three respects: the centrality of the territorial dimension of Gaza and particularly the West Bank and East Jerusalem; the intermingling of Israeli and Palestinian communities within disputed territories, and the role of Hamas in the position of governmental authority with concrete responsibilities to all Palestinians, not only those in its constituency. These three issues must be taken into consideration when investigating those issues that must be resolved for the achievement of a comprehensive peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. A definite lesson to be drawn from the Lebanese context is that military actions alone cannot satisfy either Israel’s need for security and peace or the desire of Palestinians for national self-determination and statehood. To what extent does unilateral withdrawal satisfy the non-military aspects of reconciliation between Israel and the Palestinians? Unilateral departure by Israel from Lebanon was not desirable, according to Shlomo Ben-Ami, for the same reason that unilateral departure from Palestinian territories is not recommended without a framework of future agreement with the Palestinians, as it would only give rise to anarchy.84 Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon merely intensified anti-Israeli activities in areas from which the Israeli Defense Forces disengaged. If by building a separation barrier between Israel and the West Bank, the result is a similar intensification of antiIsrael armed struggle and sentiment on the part of the Palestinians, learning from the mistakes of Israel’s experience in Lebanon can point to alternative methods of disengagement that are combined with diplomatic negotiations, as well as political, social and economic programs aimed at strengthening governing structures in the emergent Palestinian state. 83 “The Full Text of the National Conciliation Document of the Palestinian Prisoners (and revisions), May 11, 2006 and June 28, 2006”, Mid-East Web. http://www.mideastweb. org/prisoners_letter.htm. 84 Shlomo Ben-Ami, “‘Lebanon First’ and Afterwards?”, Yediot Ahronot, August 4, 1996: 5.

Chapter 8

Concluding Remarks Former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres once said that “violence creates walls, peace creates bridges”.1 Considering as highly disputed and volatile conflict as that between Israel and the Palestinians, what—if any—strategies can be employed to bridge the barrier, to promote peace simultaneously with the development of two separate and distinct national entities within the context of a two-state solution, the State of Israel living alongside a future State of Palestine. This book has examined the many divergent perspectives on the barrier as expressed by Israelis, Palestinians and their respective constituencies throughout the world. It is crucial to acknowledge that the construction and routing of Israel’s separation barrier are of immense consequence to the future of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and prospects for its resolution. The barrier is a newly established fact on the ground that will undoubtedly influence the course of both nations and their capacity to achieve their goals upon return to the negotiating table in the, as yet, undetermined future. The fact that Israelis and Palestinians have incongruent perceptions of the barrier renders it a serious point of dispute concerning the future of borders, access to and distribution of resources, the status of Jerusalem, the territory upon which a Palestinian state will be established and the demographic balance between the two nations within the region. Israelis and Palestinians hold very different perceptions of how the barrier influences their lives and what prospects it holds for the future of their existence in the region. Divergent perceptions of the barrier reach, therefore, to the very core of Israeli and Palestinian identities, insofar as they view the barrier as either a major impediment, or catalyst, to the realization of their individual aspirations and national goals. For the most part,2 Israelis perceive the barrier as necessary for peace. Israelis claim that security and calm are indispensable conditions for resumption of negotiations towards a final status agreement.3 In the absence of peace and calm, and the rise to power of the Hamas government, Israel argues that there is currently no partner for peace on the Palestinian side and thus no other option but to pursue unilateral policies. For them, unilateral actions such as disengagement and building the barrier are the only ways to bring peace and calm during such turbulent times and when peace negotiations have reached a stalemate. The decision to build the barrier 1 Scott Wilson, “Israel Upgrades, Fortifies Crossings From West Bank”, Washington Post, July 30, 2005. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/29/ AR2005072901851_pf.html. 2 With the exception of Israeli groups such as B’Tselem and Machsom Watch and their supporters who are critical of the barrier and its routing. 3 “Saving Lives—Israel’s Security Fence”, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 2003. http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2003/22/Saving+Lives+Israel.

138

Bridging the Barrier

was driven by the intense desire for security in Israel, which Israelis see as a result of suicide bomb attacks and not the cause. Israelis generally reject the notion that Israel would negotiate with terrorists or under fire. From a purely military perspective, the barrier has successfully reduced the number of suicide bombers able to infiltrate into Israeli territory. Whether the reduction in the number of suicide bomb attacks is a result of the barrier alone, or is the product of the barrier in conjunction with other policies such as intelligence operations, military control in the West Bank, diplomacy, lack of ability or willingness on the Palestinian side to mount such operations does not seem to sway Israeli public opinion regarding the need for a barrier. The shortterm benefits of the barrier are sufficient to sustain public support for the barrier across a wide spectrum of political constituencies in Israel. Therefore, from an Israeli perspective, the barrier brings peace and security. This situation will allow Israel to negotiate with the Palestinians at a time in the future when the public generally feels safe, supports and expresses faith in governmental institutions and policy, and thus, it is believed, will be more willing to make painful concessions for peace. Palestinians perceive the barrier in diametrically opposed terms to those expressed by Israelis. For Palestinians, the barrier precludes peace. The barrier is seen by Palestinians as an obstacle to the achievement of national goals and is a major negative force in their lives. Also, Palestinians argue that the barrier creates facts on the ground in manipulative ways that will have a negative impact on the future negotiating positions of Palestinians upon resumption of peace talks. This skepticism towards the barrier is part of a broader perspective expressed by Palestinians and others that Israel is seeking through a variety of means to fulfill its imperialist goals by dominating and expanding its sovereignty in the Middle Eastern region. The negative impact of the barrier on Palestinian lives has served to enflame Palestinian public opinion and attitudes towards Israel. Feelings of frustration, anger and hopelessness the barrier creates and recreates are seen by Palestinians as a catalyst for mobilization of more suicide bombers willing to give their lives in armed struggle against Israel. Palestinians argue that they will not shake hands with the Israelis from behind the bars of the prison they are creating.4 These divergent perspectives reinforce a vicious cycle around the barrier with critics determined to fight it and proponents determined to prevent them from fighting. To be sure, the Israeli-Palestinian relationship is one of asymmetry. Some parties to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict suffer more than others. Since the barrier was erected, it has decreased Israel’s vulnerability to suicide bomb attacks but simultaneously increased the precariousness of Palestinians in terms of their rights, freedoms and standards of living. Nevertheless, in the long term, the barrier and its effects are relevant to every segment of the Israeli and Palestinian general publics. On one hand, while suicide bomb attacks have resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Israeli citizens and injured many more, they generate pervasive and chronic fear throughout all of Israeli society. On the other hand, while the barrier negatively impacts the rights of thousands of Palestinians, it reinforces the sense of injustice felt by all segments of Palestinian society. The hardships imposed on Palestinians by the barrier breed 4 Personal Interview with Jamal Juma, Grassroots Campaign to Stop the Wall, July 11, 2005, Al-Bireh, Palestinian Territories.

Concluding Remarks

139

further discontent amongst the affected population and add to the security problem rather than solving it by radicalizing Palestinians and perpetuating the culture of armed struggle. Ultimately, what these conflicting narratives of the barrier demonstrate is a lack of understanding of the other’s most basic fears and concerns, and a lack of empathy for the other’s victimization. Those who count their own dead and wounded while remaining indifferent to the huge number of dead and wounded on the other side, are making no attempt to understand the meaning of the experiment that began in the last decade of the 20th Century.5

Amira Hass’s warnings ring true in the case of Israel’s separation barrier. The erection of a barrier has allowed most Israelis to ignore the harmful effects of policies that are conducted for their own security because they simply no longer see Palestinians in their field of vision. So goes the saying “out of sight, out of mind”. The fact that Israelis do not see Palestinian victims does not mean, however, that they do not exist. For their part, trapped on the other side of the barrier, Palestinians do not fully appreciate the devastating effects on the national psyche of armed conflict perpetrated against civilians on the Israeli side. In short, by separating the two populations in the name of security, the barrier also decreases the ability of either party to the conflict to develop a clear understanding of what the other side is going through. It is crucial to note that there are many issues the separation barrier will not solve such as propaganda, extremism, and a history of increasingly deep-seated hatreds. However, it is the very resolution of these issues that will help to establish more propitious conditions for Israel and the Palestinians to separate and coexist peacefully in the future. The Israeli-Palestinian and Arab-Israeli conflicts existed long before the barrier was erected and have been characterized by an extensive array of political, social, economic, psychological and other components. A crucial exercise for both Israelis and Palestinians is to come to terms with the fact that their destinies are irrevocably intertwined. Israelis and Palestinians live in close proximity, particularly around the Jerusalem area, and lay claim to some of the same territories. This means that a viable Palestinian state will not arise if Israelis lock the doors to the barrier and throw away the key. This also means that a viable State of Israel cannot continue to survive so long as Palestinians see violent struggle as their only way to “stop the wall”. These perceptions of the other can only be changed at the cultural and psychological levels, where people come to know each other and realize that the other’s existence, grievances and aspirations are meaningful and worthy of attention. In order to bridge these diametrically opposed perspectives, it is useful to make a distinction between short versus long-term solutions. At this historical juncture, a physical structure separating Israelis and Palestinians can be a positive force in the development of a two-state solution to the conflict. Two states must have some type of demarcation line between them. Israel and Palestine are no exception. In the shortterm, not only can a physical structure separate Israelis from the suicide bombers that target them, it can also reduce the influence of the Israeli bureaucracy of occupation 5 Amira Hass, “The Revolt of the Guinea-Pigs”, Ha’aretz, February 21, 2001, quoted in Rubenberg, 2003: 335.

140

Bridging the Barrier

on Palestinian lives. Altogether, a barrier can reduce points of friction between Israeli and Palestinian communities. Palestinians can appreciate the fact that being separated from Jewish settlements can also reduce their victimization by extremist groups and hooligans that have perpetrated violent acts in Palestinian villages. The longer-term issue behind separation however, is the future of a two-state solution. In order to promote two states, the State of Israel living side by side with a Palestinian state, Palestinians will ultimately have to end their historical struggle against Israel. For the State of Israel to exist, Palestinians will have to give up the right of return of Palestinian refugees, except perhaps those who were born within Israel’s borders and who fled their homes either in 1948 or 1967. Their absorption into the State of Israel has been offered by successive Israeli governments. However, the remainder of the Palestinian refugee population which is currently estimated at roughly 3.5 million will have to renounce their claims to return to Israel and be absorbed elsewhere, with equitable compensation packages. This will allow for Israel to retain a Jewish majority in its governing institutions and thus sustain its democratic foundations. It will also allow for generations of Palestinians to live a better life in a state of their own, a life better than that provided for in the overcrowded and squalid refugee camps of the overburdened United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNWRA). For two states to exist side by side, they must have positioned between them an internationally recognized border. A viable border would alleviate Israel’s security concerns by recognizing its right to protect its citizens from terrorist attacks and control the flow of people in and out of its territory. To do this, Israel, like any other state, may restrict access to territory within its borders. For this purpose, Israel’s entitlement to build a barrier on its own territory is upheld for security reasons. However, the barrier should be built on the Green Line and not inside the West Bank, Gaza or in East Jerusalem where territory is intended for a Palestinian state. Building a border on the Green Line has significant ramifications for the future of Jewish settlement activity in the West Bank. Ultimately, this is the area in which Israel must compromise the most extensively. Jewish settlements in disputed territory must be evacuated to the greatest extent possible in order to facilitate the development of a viable Palestinian state. To vacate the settlements, Israel must abandon the experiment initiated after the 1967 War to promote the notion of a “Land of Israel” and populate so-called liberated territories. However, it is crucial to take into consideration current facts on the ground. Certain large Jewish settlements in the West Bank should be merged into the Jerusalem municipal boundaries. But this must be accomplished in exchange for Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem that would be placed under the authority of a future Palestinian state, if they agree to such an eventuality. This exchange of territory must only be accomplished through negotiations and not through unilateral strategies such as the barrier or armed struggle. A barrier on the Green Line is an important point of potential convergence between the Israeli need for security and the Palestinian need for contiguous territory. Without the need to settle and occupy land for Jews in the West Bank, such a policy would preclude, therefore, such divisive measures as the expropriation of Palestinian lands, demolition of Palestinian homes, checkpoints within Palestinian territories, two-tiered systems for Jewish settlers versus Arab residents and Israeli

Concluding Remarks

141

interference in the daily affairs of Palestinians. A barrier situated on the Green Line would also alleviate the concerns expressed by the international community, which views Jewish settlements east of the barrier and in East Jerusalem as illegal. Crossing the Barrier The question is if the ultimate goal is to build a two-state solution with an internationally recognized border, what kind of barrier should there be between the two states? It is generally agreed that the border between Israel and a future Palestinian state cannot be open for the time being. Considering the current state of armed conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, it is necessary to have some form of physical architecture separating the two populations. However, must the barrier be so massive and imposing? Must the points of crossing be so arbitrary and thus controlling of Palestinian freedom of movement? How can some of the barrier’s most negative effects be alleviated? One of the most crucial aspects of the barrier project is the viability of movement between Israel and the Palestinian territories. Since the establishment of the barrier, an additional layer of transit has been added, permits for crossing the “Seam Zone”. On account of building the barrier east of the Green Line, entire areas have become enclaves, caught between the barrier and the State of Israel and rendering them highly problematic in all areas of existence. Removing the stranglehold around the enclaves will promote greater integration for Palestinians within the West Bank. The most important consideration for freedom of movement is the smooth functioning of crossing points to facilitate rather than impede transit between the two territories. Israel has, indeed, opened up a series of terminal crossings, agricultural gates and checkpoints along the barrier through which it is possible to travel from one side to the other. However, to date, these crossings have been condemned for their inadequacies and controlling aspects, for causing unnecessary delays and humiliations on the part of Palestinians in transit. One of the most significant criticisms is that decisions about whether to allow crossing are arbitrary and it is clear from this context that “authority only gets stronger the more arbitrary it is”.6 The solution to the current crossings regime is to promote a more effective system of passage through and across the barrier. Studies conducted by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have discovered that some Palestinians wait an average of four hours per day at the point at which they cross the barrier. This is “an often humiliating experience that Israeli officers have said inspires animosity toward the government”.7 To alleviate these concerns, not only should there be more crossing points, but the crossing points should be open for longer hours and manned by more professional and experienced staff to ensure a maximum number of people can cross in a more leisurely way when they need to at a maximum duration of time. 6 “The Bureaucracy of Occupation: The District Civil Liaison Offices, Joint report of MachsomWatch and Physicians for Human Rights-Israel, May 2004: 50. 7 Scott Wilson, “Israel Upgrades, Fortifies Crossings From West Bank”, Washington Post, July 30, 2005. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/29/ AR2005072901851_pf.html.

142

Bridging the Barrier

The barrier system must have a more effective and humane way of distinguishing between innocents and terrorists. Thus far, the designation of security threats has been directed by a system of permits. There are a variety of different permits for different categories of transit. For example, there are magnetic cards, entry permits to Israel, exit permits to Jordan, exit permits from the West Bank to the Gaza Strip, permits to travel during blockade, permits for crossing the “Seam Zone”, permits for cars and permits for medical needs.8 As a result of difficulties in obtaining permits and the degree of control the permit system lends Israeli authorities, critics have called this a system of “hidden violence” or “bureaucratic violence”.9 The major problem is the non-bureaucratic aspects of this bureaucracy, particularly in cases where Palestinians who are rejected a permit based on “prohibition for reasons of security”, have no possibility of determining the reason for the security prohibition. Also, the reason for rejection is never given in writing and never explained so it prevents an effective appeal.10 The barrier project has exacerbated the permit bureaucracy on account of the need for even more permits, particularly around the area of Jerusalem, which cuts off residents of Abu Dis, Sawahreh, Azariya and a-Zaim from the city.11 Ultimately, the separation barrier should serve the security function of preventing infiltration by terrorists, but it should do so in a way that does not collectively punish the rest of the Palestinian population, which crosses for legitimate reasons, either for work, education, family visits or access to goods and services. In order to accomplish this goal, Israel must ensure systematic crossing procedures that are reliable and effective. Either more crossing points should be opened or the crossing points that are now open should function in a way that allows for orderly passage of a maximum number of people on a daily basis. A study of the district liaison offices in 2003 estimated that only 4% of West Bank residents were granted a blockade permit, 5.3% received a permit into Israel, and 0.6% received a permit to cross the “Seam Zone”. These statistics show that in 2003 only 10% of the Palestinian population of the West Bank received a movement permit. The barrier and the current system of security in the West Bank must ultimately grant more Palestinians greater freedom of movement. Israel’s seam zone administration is tasked with the responsibility of making sure that crossing points are the focus of the barrier project so that the concept of separation is accomplished in conjunction with the prospect of association, when and where it is deemed necessary and useful. Israel has sought recently to develop and facilitate the movement of Palestinians, by upgrading passages and creating modern terminal buildings such as Terminal 300 between Jerusalem and Bethlehem. The project of establishing 14 terminals and 6 cargo hugs along the barrier is estimated to cost roughly $333 million out of which

8 “The Bureaucracy of Occupation: The District Civil Liaison Offices, MachsomWatch and Physicians for Human Rights-Israel, May 2004: 27-30. 9 “The Bureaucracy of Occupation: The District Civil Liaison Offices, MachsomWatch and Physicians for Human Rights-Israel, May 2004: 50. 10 “The Bureaucracy of Occupation: The District Civil Liaison Offices, MachsomWatch and Physicians for Human Rights-Israel, May 2004: 19. 11 “The Bureaucracy of Occupation: The District Civil Liaison Offices, MachsomWatch and Physicians for Human Rights-Israel, May 2004: 44.

Joint report of Joint report of Joint report of Joint report of

Concluding Remarks

143 12

the US Agency for International Development is contributing $50 million. This may be a step in the right direction if the terminal can function effectively and reduce the negative characteristics hitherto associated with most Israeli checkpoints. However, the most important point is that the barrier and all its crossing points must be located on the Green Line or as close to it as possible as determined by negotiations. This way, Palestinians will not find their own territory expropriated to ensure the development of such an infrastructure. A barrier on the Green Line is a potential point of concurrence between Israel and the Palestinians in the context of a comprehensive peace settlement. Also, the crossings should decrease the distinctions between Jewish settlers and Palestinians, which has thus far functioned on the basis of a discriminatory, two-tiered system of transit. Once a two-state solution is secured, and the infrastructure of Palestinian governing institutions and economy is firmly established, a physical barrier between Israel and a Palestinian state may eventually become redundant. The barrier should not remain a permanent scar on the long-term prospects for political, social, economic and psychological reconciliation of both national communities. If a two-state solution is to be viable, there is a need for mutual recognition between Israel and the Palestinians and a massive education campaign for peace and coexistence in both communities. Role of the International Community It has become evident over 50 years of protracted conflict that Israel and the Palestinians are unable to reduce the level of violence only by themselves and that a third party is required to facilitate coordination and cooperation.13 The international community can play a more productive role in the conflict by promoting peace, moderation and good governance. Extra-regional states and international organizations should not side with one of the parties against the other; this type of participation only fuels hatred and negative attitudes. One important lesson learnt from the recent conflict in Lebanon is that the international community can participate in conflict resolution in the Middle East through carefully crafted peacekeeping operations. It is worthwhile to consider options already under discussion about a possible peacekeeping force to be stationed between Israel and the West Bank as a precautionary and mitigating supplement to the barrier project. International Peacekeeping Force between Israel and Palestine An important lesson learnt from the Lebanese context is that the unilateral withdrawal of Israeli forces from an Arab land creates a power vacuum that must be filled by 12 Scott Wilson, “Israel Upgrades, Fortifies Crossings From West Bank”, Washington Post, July 30, 2005. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/29/ AR2005072901851_pf.html. 13 Kobi Michael and Eyal Ben-Ari, “International Involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian Arena”, 2006: 45.

144

Bridging the Barrier

a viable and effective governing structure. In the absence of such, the UN is not sufficiently equipped to fill that vacuum, unless it has a robust mandate to challenge the mobilization of armed militant groups vying against the ruling authorities for power. UNIFIL in Lebanon was largely considered a failure. The border between Israel and Lebanon neither fulfilled the needs of Israeli security nor the aspirations of south Lebanese governance. The international community should have placed stronger emphasis on the capacity of the Government of Lebanon to extend its authority over all territory under its official jurisdiction. This would have entailed investing in programs that promote reform and good governance. A peacekeeping force under the auspices of NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), with a more robust mandate to disarm militants operating against peace in southern Lebanon may have been more successful in promoting a peaceful resolution of the conflict between Israel and the Hezbollah. However, and despite the best of intentions, such initiatives that stem from external parties can be tinged with “imperialism” and may eventually become another target for liberation and anti-colonialist movements such as is the case in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nevertheless, discussions about a possible peacekeeping force and the framework of its operations should remain an open debate in the Israeli-Palestinian context. On the Palestinian side, democratic reform is vital to prevent armed militia groups from filling the void in governance. To date, Hamas has successfully filled such a void. However, a more acceptable alternative that would ease the transition towards negotiations would be a democratically elected secular government with a moderate and progressive agenda, both internally and externally. Such a government in the Palestinian areas would mitigate fears on the Israeli side about terrorism and insecurity and thus potentially reinvigorate the peace camp. In conclusion, a physical structure such as a barrier may provide a short-term response to insecurity dilemmas but does not provide a long-term solution to societies undergoing protracted conflict. However, a more user-friendly barrier on the Green Line in combination with programs designed to reform governing structures, promote confidence building measures through public, educational and media campaigns, integrate the international community through diplomacy and humanitarian efforts, can help to bridge the barrier so that eventually it may no longer be necessary. Ultimately, Without a deeper process of understanding each side’s needs and fears, no wall would separate us from our existential questions. Lone and painful processes—political, social, psychological—are the only way to turn the fence into a viable border.14

So long as both sides pursue hard-line, unilateral, rejectionist and all-or nothing approaches, there will be no return to the negotiating table. Negotiations require compromise and flexibility. In the long-run, Palestinians will have to come to terms with the right of Israel to exist as a Jewish state and pronounce an end to their struggle for Israel’s destruction. For their part, Israelis must recognize that Palestinians have 14 Michal Levertov, “Another Brick in the Wall: Israel’s ‘security fence’ is no solution to its problems”, TimeEurope.com, Tuesday, August 5, 2003. http://www.time.com/time/europe/ me/article/0,13716,473294,00.html.

Concluding Remarks

145

a right to statehood in the lands in which they reside and must be freed from the harmful effects of Jewish settlement activity in the West Bank and Israel’s complex political and military administration that sustains them. The hatred and acrimony produced and reproduced daily by international and local media outlets must be softened to promote more constructive messages. The findings presented in this book suggest that there are deep divisions between parties to this conflict and that visions of a more peaceful region face serious constraints. However, it is the responsibility of Israelis, Palestinians and all people who care about the Middle East to promote separation in the most humane and effective manner possible to ensure that future generations are better equipped to manage the crises they encounter through methods of peaceful conflict resolution rather than domination and armed conflict. Perhaps one day, Israelis and Palestinians will attain their national objectives in ways that infuse that point, or corner, where their converging lives meet with positive elements of coexistence and peace.

This page intentionally left blank

Bibliography Azmon, Yael. 1993. “Women and Politics: The Case of Israel”, in Yael Azmon and Dafna N. Izraeli (eds), Women in Israel. Transaction Publishers: New Brunswick & London. Ben-Ari, Eyal, Meirav Maymon, Nir Gazit and Ron Shatzberg. From Checkpoints to Flow-Points: Sites of Friction between the Israeli Defense Forces and Palestinians, The Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Vol. 31, November 2005. Bickerton, Ian J. and Carka L. Klausner. 2005. A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. 4th Ed., Upper Saddle River: New Jersey. Collins, Larry and Dominique Lapierre. 1972. O Jerusalem! Simon & Schuster of Canada, Ltd: Richmond Hill, Ontario. Dershowitz, Alan. 2003. The Case for Israel. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.: New Jersey. Feinstein, Barry A. and Justis Reid Weiner, “Israel’s Security Barrier: An International Comparative Analysis and Legal Evaluation”, George Washington International Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 2, 2005. Gilmour, David. 1983. Lebanon: The Fractured Country. Sphere Books Ltd: London. Goldschmidt Arthur, Jr. 2002. A Concise History of the Middle East. 7th Ed., Westview Press: Boulder, CO. Hadawi, Sami. 1988. “Palestinian Rights and Losses in 1948”, A Survey of Palestine, London. Harrel, Manashe. 1974. “The Jewish Presence in Jerusalem through the Ages” in John Oesterreicher and Anne Sinai (eds), Jerusalem. John Day: New York. Hermann, Tamar. “The Impermeable Identity Wall: The Study of Violent Conflict by ‘Insiders’ and ‘Outsiders’” (77-91), in Marie Smith and Gillian Robinson (eds), Researching Violently Divided Societies: Ethical and Methodological Issues. United Nations University Press: Tokyo & New York. Hilal, Jamil. 2002. “Separation as a Form of Apartheid”, Palestine-Israel Journal, Vol. 9, No. 3: 40-44. Hiro, Dilip. 2002. War Without End: The Rise of Islamist Terrorism and Global Response. Routledge: London. Horovitz, David. 2004. Still Life with Bombers: Israel in the Age of Terrorism. Alfred A. Knopf: New York. Hourani, Albert. A History of the Arab Peoples. Warner Books: New York. Jacoby, Tami Amanda. 2005. Women in Zones of Conflict: Power and Resistance in Israel. McGill-Queen’s University Press: Montreal & Kingston. Jacoby, Tami Amanda. 2006. “From the Trenches: Dilemmas of Feminist IR Fieldwork” (153-173), in Brooke A. Ackerly, Maria Stern and Jacqui True (eds),

148

Bridging the Barrier

Feminist Methodologies for International Relations. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. Kershner, Isabel. 2005. Barrier: The Seam of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Palgrave-Macmillan: New York. Khosrokhavar, Farhad. 2005. Suicide Bombers: Allah’s New Martyrs. Pluto Press: London. Klein, Menachem. 2003. The Jerusalem Problem: The Struggle for Permanent Status. University Press of Florida: Gainesville, FL. Laclau, Ernesto and Chantal Mouffe. 1985. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards A Radical Democratic Politics. Verso: London & New York. Lochery, Neill. 2005. The View From the Fence: The Arab-Israeli Conflict From the Present to Its Roots. Continuum: London & New York. Lukacs, Yehuda. 1992. The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: a documentary record 19671990. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. Lustick, Ian. 1988. For the Land and the Lord: Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel. State University of New York Press: Albany, New York. Malki, Riad. 2002. “The Depths of the Wall”, Palestine-Israel Journal, Vol. 9, No. 3: 45-50. Michael, Kobi and Amnon Ramon. 2004. A Fence Around Jerusalem. The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies: Jerusalem. Michael, Kobi and Eyal Ben-Ari. 2006. “International Involvement in the IsraeliPalestinian Arena: From an International Force to a Monitoring Mechanism for Regional Stabilization”, (45-63), in Sean Byrne, James Fergusson, Eyal BenAri and Kobi Michael (eds), Old Conflicts, New Challenges: Peace-building in Israeli-Palestinian Relations, Bison Paper 8, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba: Winnipeg, Canada. Mohanty, Chandra Talpade, Ann Russo and Lourdes Torres. 1991. Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism. Indiana University Press: Bloomington & Indianapolis. Morris, Benny. 2001. Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001. Vintage Books: New York. Nadler, Arie. 2002. “Separation, Integration and Conciliation: Preliminary Thoughts”, Palestine-Israel Journal, Vol. 9, No. 3: 51-56. Nakhleh, Issa. 1991. Encyclopedia of the Palestine Problem, Volume I. Intercontinental Books: New York. Peres, Shimon. 1993. The New Middle East. Henry Holt & Company: New York. Peri, Yoram. 2006. Generals in the Cabinet Room: How the Military Shapes Israeli Policy. United States Institute of Peace Press: Washington, DC. Rein, Natalie. 1980. Daughters of Rachel: Women in Israel. Penguin Books: New York. Reuter, Christopher. 2002. My Life is a Weapon: A Modern History of Suicide Bombing. Princeteon University Press: Princeton. Rubin, Barry. 1999. The Transformation of Palestinian Politics: From Revolution to State-Building. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts. Rubenberg, Cheryl A. 2003. The Palestinians: In Search of A Just Peace. Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder & London.

Bibliography

149

Sela, Avraham. 1998. The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Middle East Politics and the Quest for Regional Order. State University of New York Press: New York. Sharoni, Simona. 1995. Gender and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Syracuse University Press: New York. Shlaim, Avi. 2001. The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World. W.W. Norton & Company: New York. Sprinzak, Ehud. 1991. The Ascendence of Israel’s Radical Right. Oxford University Press: New York and Oxford. Troen, Ilan S. and Noah Lucas. 1995. Israel: The First Decade of Independence. State University of New York Press: New York. Van Creveld, Martin. 2002. The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense Forces. Public Affairs: New York. Warschawski, Michel. 2002. On the Border. Pluto Press: London. Wasserstein, Bernard. 2002. Divided Jerusalem: The Struggle for the Holy City. Yale University Press: New Haven & London. Whittaker, David J. 2002. The Terrorism Reader. Routledge: London. Wolf, Diane, L. 1996. Feminist Dilemmas in Fieldwork. Westview Press: Boulder, CO. Yuval-Davis, Nira. 1997. Gender and Nation. Sage Publications: London.

This page intentionally left blank

Index

Abbas, Mahmoud 47, 72, 135 Abdi-Habib Allah, Suhair 108 Abdullah, King, Transjordan 15 Absentee Property Law 93 Abu Dahim, Farid ’Omar 66 Abu-Dis 108, 109 Abu Rukun, Kamil 44 Ahad Ha’am 10 Al-’Aqed, Masbah Tamim 62-63 al-Aqsa Intifada 21, 23, 59, 79, 102-104, 134 Second Intifada 3, 35, 49 Second Palestinian Uprising 64, 74 al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades 51, 102 al-Aqsa Mosque 90 Al-Dustur 129 Al Jazeera 135 Al-Jundi, Khaled 61 Al-Khiam Prison 127 Al-Kidwa, Nasser 73 Al-Madina 101 Al-Mawasi 62 Al-Quds 89, 100 Al-Quds newspaper 79 Alexander, Dana 31 Alfei Menashe 31-32, 63, 87 Aliyah 9 First wave 9 Second wave 10 see also Jewish immigration to Palestine Amal 116 Amona 43 Disengagement from 43-44 American-Israel Public Affairs Committee 35 Americans for Peace Now 35 Anata 91, 106, 107, 109 Angel Gabriel 90 An-Najah National University Centre for Opinion Polls and Survey Studies 69 Antavi, Zahara 123 Anti-Defamation League 35 Apartheid Wall 67-69 Ar-Ram 107-108, 109 Arab High Committee 14 Arab Israelis 95 Discrimination against 103

Arab Revolt 13 Arafat, Yasser 17, 20, 76, 101 Death in Paris 24 Speech at UN General Assembly 18 Ariel 27, 37, 45-46, 48 Ariel Finger 45 Arieli, Shaul 53 Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) 31, 51-52 Balfour, Arthur J. 11 Balfour Declaration 11-12 Bantustanization 68 Barak, Aharon 81, 87 Barak, Ehud 22-23, 100, 102, Withdrawal from Lebanon and 124-126 Barakat, Sharbel 130 Barrier also Wall 60-72 Collective punishment and 67 Confiscation of land and 64 Decision-making regime 28-30 Definition of 3 First phase of construction 25 Food crisis and 66 Freedom of movement and 64-65 Infrastructural elements of 25-26 International Court of Justice opinion on 81-88 Israeli government position on 35 Israeli Ministry of Defense 36 Israeli party politics 36-38 Israeli perspectives on 33-58 Israeli public opinion and 36-38 Israeli Supreme Court decisions 30-32 Length of 26 National Action Plan against 73 Negative influence on Palestinians 2930, 64-67, 107 Opposition from Israeli Right 22 Palestinian Perspectives on 59-80 Palestinian Public Opinion and 69-71 Palestinians and 56 Parliament 93 see also Knesset

152

Bridging the Barrier

Route 26-30, 54 Second phase of construction 26 Bat Shalom (Daughters of Peace) 99 Begin, Menachem 18, 114, 123 Beilin, Yossi 120 Beit Jala 104 Beit Sourik 30 Supreme Court decision about 30-32 Belzberg, Michal 50 Ben-Dor, Rachel 123 Ben-Gurion, David 10, 13, 33, 40, 93 Bias 1-2 Bi’lin 71 Bilu 9 Bimkom 51 Black September 18, 114 Blue Line 127 Board of Aldermen 75-76 British Mandate for Palestine 11 also British Mandate 92 B’Tselem (Israeli Information Center for Human Rights) 42, 51, 52-56, 62, 97 Buergenthal, Thomas 83-84 Bush, George W. 47 Cairo Agreement 20 also Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area 20 Camp David Accords 18, 46 Article on Palestinian statehood 18-19 Camp David Summit (2000) 23, 99-102, 105 Campaign to Stop the Wall 60 Canada 73, 77 Caterpillar D9 bulldozer 76 Chomsky, Noam 60 Choshen, Maya 98 Church of the Holy Sepulcher 90 Churches for Middle East Peace 99 Clinton, William J. 99, 101 also Clinton Administration 99 Committee against the War in Lebanon 122 Convergence 44-46 Convergence Plan 44, 105-106 Corcos, Gilles 74 Corner vii Corpus separatum 92, 93 Corrie, Rachel 76 Cotler, Irwin 86-87 Council for Peace and Security 51, 52-53, 54

Dahleh, Mohammad 31 Dayan, Moshe 16 Dayan, Uzi 41, 57 Demography 38-42 Disengagement Plan 42-43 also Israeli Unilateral Disengagement 42-44 Divestment Campaign 73-76 also Divest from Israel Campaign 74 Dome of the Rock 90 Dugard, John 67 East Jerusalem x, 16, 39, 82, 83, 91, 94, 95, 96, 97, 99, 104, 105, 106, 128, 134, 135, 136, 140, 141 Eitan, Michael 120 El Haija Brothers 128 Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act 48 Eminent domain 96 Enclaves 27, 62-67, 108 Erekat, Saeb 61 Etzel (National Military Organization) 15 Etzion Bloc 94 also Etzion settlement bloc 105 European Union 24, 34, 78 Ezra, Gideon 120 Faisal, King, Syria 14 Fatah 17, 76-77, 135, 136 Fellaheen 11 Final Status Issues 20 also Final status talks 22 Forum hagader (fence forum) 51 Four Mothers 123-124 Fourth Geneva Convention 32, 64, 82, 84, 96 also Geneva Convention, 82 Fourth Herzliya Conference 42 Gaza (Gaza Strip) 6, 14, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 24, 28, 34, 35, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43, 52, 53, 54, 55, 59, 62, 64, 65, 66, 74, 76, 78, 93, 97, 106, 112, 123, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 140, 142 Israel’s disengagement from 6, 43 Gemayal, Bashir 114 Geneva Convention, 82 also Fourth Geneva Convention 32, 64, 82, 84, 96 Ghetto mentality 41

Index Gilo 104 Gissin, Ra’anan 87 Grapes of Wrath Understandings 125 also Israeli-Lebanese Ceasefire Understanding 125 Greater Jerusalem 91, 92, 94, 105 Greater Syria 14 Green Line 26-27, 41, 42, 44, 55, 62, 83, 103, 140, 143, 144 Gulf War 19 Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful) 17, 39 Hajj Amin al-Husseini 12, 14 Hamas viii, x, 51, 59, 102, 112, 113, 132, 135, 136, 137, 144 Charter 24 Continuation of armed struggle 76-78, 80 Election of 24, 76 Hamoked 51, 52 Haniyeh, Ismail 135 Har Homa 96 Haram al-Sharif 23, 90, 100-101 Harry S. Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace 70 Hashemite Monarchy 114 Hashomer 10 Hass Amira 139 Hasson-Moss, Niki 49 Hawk of Lebanon 128 Hezbollah viii, 111, 112, 113, 115, 120-121, 124-127, 130-132, 135, 136, 144 Myth of victory in Lebanon 128-130 Political program of 117-118 Hilal, Jamil 68 Horovitz, David 49 Human Rights Watch 50 Husayn ibn Ali 117 Hussein, Saddam 19, 59 Hussein-McMahon Correspondences 12 ICJ Advisory Opinion 72 Independent Media Review Analysis 79 Ingathering of the Exiles 40 International Court of Justice 5, 81, 83 also World Court 81 Condemnation of the wall 83-84 Israel’s boycott of 85 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 84

153

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 84 International Solidarity Movement 76 Intifada 19, 78-79 also Palestinian Uprising 19, 59, 134 Ir Amim 51 Iran 15, 77, 111, 112, 129, 132 Iran News 129 Iranian Revolution 117 Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait 19 Irgun 10 Iron Wall 12-13, 18 Islamic Jihad 102 see also Palestinian Islamic Jihad Israel Central Bureau of Statistics 95, 98 Law of Citizenship 39 Law of Return 39-40 Occupation of West Bank and Gaza Strip 16, 38, 40, 55 also Occupation 63 Parliament 39, 93 also Knesset 40, 43, 45, 93, 97 Population statistics 40-41 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 34 National Demographic Policies 40 Relations with United States 46-49 also United States 46-49 Supreme Court 30-32, 81, 98, 106 also High Court of Justice 81 Unilateral Disengagement 42-44 also Disengagement Plan 42-43 Unilateral Withdrawal from Lebanon 101, 112-119 also Unilateral Disengagement from Lebanon 113-132 Debates about 119-122 Public protest 122-124 Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions (ICAHD) 96 Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) 17, 21, 25, 28, 30, 31, 35, 43, 45, 52, 55, 56, 60, 62, 64, 80, 96, 103, 107, 114-115, 116, 120, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 136, 141 Israeli-Lebanese Ceasefire Understanding 125 also Grapes of Wrath Understandings 125 Jabal al Mukabbir 107 Jabotinsky, Ze’ev 12, 18, 42

154

Bridging the Barrier

Jerusalem 89-109 Basic Law of 93 Demographic makeup and 91-92 also demographic struggle and 94-98 Loss of Arab residency rights 97 Jerusalem Defense Plan 26 Jerusalem Envelope 104-109 Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies 98 Jerusalem Link 99 Jerusalem Media and Communication Center 69, 78-79 Jewish Agency for Israel 35, 103 Jewish demographic concern 40 Jewish National Fund 103 Jewish settlement 38, 41, 140 also Zionist settlement 39 During the Oslo years 59, 63-64 Jordan 9, 14, 17, 18, 21, 46, 53, 65, 69, 72, 73, 91, 92, 94, 114, 142 Jordan River 17, 42, 105 Juma, Jamal 67, 70-71 Kaaba 90 Kadima Party 35, 37 Kahalani, Avigdor 120 Kahan Commission 114 Karameh 17-18 Katyusha rocket 116, 120, 125 Khartoum Arab Summit meeting at 16 Khobeika, Elie 114 King David 89 King David Hotel Attack on 15 also King David bombing 15 King Solomon 89 Knesset 40, 43, 45, 93, 97 also Israel Parliament 39, 93 Kook, Rabbi Abraham 39 Kook, Rabbi Tzvi Yehuda 39 Labor Party 17, 37 Lahad, Antoine 115 Land for Peace 17, 20 Land of Israel 42, 46 Land of Israel Movement 17 also Movement for the Whole Land of Israel 39 Land Research Center (LRC) 71 LAW – The Applied Research Institute – Jerusalem (ARIJ) 71

Law of Entry to Israel 93 also Entry to Israel regulations 97 Lebanon viii, 7, 14, 18, 73, 101, 105, 111-136 Civil War 115 Conflict in 111-136 Security Zone 115, 116, 125, 133 Lebanon Liaison Unit (LLU) 115 Leggett, Karby 44 Lehi (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel) 15 Levi, Moshe 116 Likud 18, 37, 120 Party rule 19 Lubrani, Uri 120 Luria, Marc 57, 58 Ma’aleh Adumim 105 Ma’ariv 100 Madrid Peace Conference 19 Magen David Adom 50 Malki, Mustafa 60 Malki, Riad 72 Marcaz al-Quds la l’Nissah (The Jerusalem Center for Women) 99 Medicins du Monde 66 Meir, Gideon 57 Meir, Golda 17 Meretz 37-38 Methodology 6 Dilemmas of 2-3 Middle East Network of United Methodists 99 Middle East Peace Process 3 Mitchell Committee 47 Mizrahi, Moti 50 Moezet Yesha 22 Moment Café 50 Attack on 50 Mordechai, Yitzhak 22, 120 Morris, Benny 116, 131 Moskowitz, Irwin 94 Mossad 52 Movement for a Peaceful Withdrawal from Lebanon 122 Mughrabi Quarter 94 Nachman, Ron 45-46 Nachmias, Ronit 123 Nakbha (catastrophe) 59 Nasser, Gamal Abdel 17, 59 Nasrallah, Hassan 118, 128, 133

Index National Conciliation Document of the Palestinian Prisoners 136 National Insurance Law 97 National Religious Party (NRP) 37 National Union 37 Netanyahu, Benjamin 22, 37, 87, 119, 120 New Israel Fund 51 1948 War 15, 59, 92 1967 War 16, 38, 59, 91, 94 also Six Day War 55, 93 And Palestinians 17 1973 War 18 1982 War in Lebanon 122 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 144 Nu’man 108, 109 Olmert, Ehud 35, 44, 60, 104-105, 111 OneFamily 50 Operation Grapes of Wrath 124-125 Operation Litani 114 Operation Peace for Galilee 114 Operation Summer Rains 132 Oslo Accords 20 also Oslo Agreements 55 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements 20 Oslo I 21 Oslo II 21 also Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 21 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 17, 83, 113, 114, 116 Palestinian Nationalism 14, 17 Refugee Problem 15 Self rule 20 Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees (PARC) 71 Palestinian Authority 55, 72, 76, 100, 135 also Palestinian National Authority 20 Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research 69, 70 Palestinian Center for Public Opinion 69 Palestinian Center for Research and Cultural Dialogue 69, 79 Palestinian Grassroots Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign (AAWC) 67, 71

155

Palestinian Hydrology Group (PHG) 71 Palestinian Islamic Jihad 51 also Islamic Jihad 102 Palestinian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 72 Palestinian National Authority 20 also Palestinian Authority 55, 72, 76, 100 Corruption in 76 Disappointment in 21 Palestinian National Congress 17 Palestinian National Council 68 Palestinian National Covenant 17 Palestinian Red Crescent Society 66 Palestinian Uprising 19, 59, 135 also Intifada 19, 78, 134 Panorama, the Center for the Dissemination of Democracy and Community Development 72 Parents against Silence 122-123 Partition 13 Partition Plan 14 Arab rejection of 14 Passover 90 Passover Seder 50 Massacre 50 Peace Index 38, 41, 56 Peace Now 45 Peel, Lord Robert 13 Royal Commission of Inquiry 13 also Peel Commission 13, 15 Peel Plan 14 Pensioners’ Party 38 Peres, Shimon 22, 37, 137 Peretz, Amir 111 Physicians for Human Rights 66 also Physicians for Human Rights-Israel 51 Pogroms 10 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) 51 Popular Resistance Committees 51 Powell, Colin 48-49 Presbyterian Church 74-75 Prophet Muhammad 90 Qalandiya checkpoint 106 Qassam rockets 132 Quartet 24, 34 And road map 24, 34 also Road Map for Peace 47-48, 55 Qu’ran 90

156

Bridging the Barrier

Rabat Arab Summit in 18 Rabbis for Human Rights 51 Rabin, Yitzhak 19, 20, 21, 115, 119 Assassination of 22 Ramon, Haim 42 Ras al-Amud 94 Road Map for Peace 47-48, 55 also Quartet and road map 24, 34 Rothschild, Lord 12 Sabra and Shatilla massacres 114 San Remo Conference 14 Sapir, Pinchas 16 Sarid, Yossi 120 Sbarro attack 50 also Sbarro bombing 57 Seam Zone 1, 53, 56, 61, 67, 141, 142 Seam Zone Administration 27 also “Rainbow Operation administration” 27 Second Temple 90 Security Fence for Israel 57, 58 Sela, Miri 123 Shabab 102 Shachal, Moshe 21 also Shachal proposal 21 Shachar, Avi 118, 124, 131 Shalom, Silvan 87 Shamir, Yitzhak 19 Sharett, Moshe 13-14, 33 Sharing Jerusalem 98-99 Sharing Jerusalem Campaign 99 Sharm el-Sheikh Summit 42 Sharon, Ariel 23, 37, 42, 53, 57, 60, 61, 86, 87, 114, 131 As Prime Minister of Israel 23 Walk-about on Temple Mount 23, 102 Shatil 51 She’ba Farms 130, 134 Sheikh Sa’d 107, 109 Shephard’s Hotel 94 Shin Bet 52, 120 Shinui (Change) Party 37 Sir Henry McMahon 12 Six Day War 55, 93 also 1967 War 16, 38, 59, 91 Sneh, Efraim 120 Society for the Development and Protection of the Environment 71 Soldiers Against Silence 122

South Lebanese Army (SLA) 115, 126, 130-132 State of Israel 15 Stockade and Watchtower 60 also Stockade and Watchtower campaign 60 Suicide bomber 21, 31, 35, 36, 49, 55, 57, 85, 86, 103, 118, 121, 134, 138, 139 Suleiman the Magnificent 90 Syria 14, 15, 111, 112, 113, 115, 116, 119, 121, 125, 126, 130, 132 TAFNIT (Turning the Corner) 57 Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research 38 Temple Mount 23, 89, 100-101 Terminal 300 142 Third Way Party 120 Tirza, Dany 27 Tutu, Desmond 74 Twentieth Zionist Congress 13 Two-state solution 18, 47, 80, 143 Unilateral Withdrawal from Lebanon 112119 Debates about 119-122 Public protest 122-124 Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees (UPMRC) 71 United Nations 5, 81, 133 Charter 85 Article 51 85 Relegation of problem of pre-state Palestine to 15 Resolution ES-10/2 82 Resolution 181 92 Resolution 3236 18 Resolution 3379 86 Special Commission on Palestine (UNSCOP) 9, 15 World Conference against Racism 86 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 84 United Nations General Assembly 82 United Nations Human Rights Commission’s Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food 66 United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 120-121, 127, 133, 144

Index United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) 140 United Nations Security Council 64, 100, 126 Resolution 242 16-17, 81, 96, 134 Resolution 338 48,134 Resolution 425 126-127 Resolution 478 93-94 United Nations World Food Program Assistance in the Occupied Territories (WFP) 66 United States 19, 21, 23, 24, 33, 34, 40, 43, 46-49, 73, 74, 75, 77, 78, 94, 99, 100, 117, 125, 136 also Israeli relations with United States 46-49 Loan guarantees to Israel 48 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 64 Waqf 90 War in Lebanon (1982-1985) 115 also Lebanon War 115 Warschawski, Michel 33 Washington Interfaith Alliance for Middle East Peace 99 Weizmann, Chaim 10, 11, 13

157

West Bank 1, 6, 14, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 52, 54, 55, 56, 58, 59, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71, 74, 78, 80, 83, 84, 91, 93, 94, 96, 97, 103, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109 112, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 138, 140, 141, 142, 143, 145 Western Wall 90 also al-Buraq Wall 90 White Paper 12 Women against the Invasion of Lebanon 123 Women against the Occupation 123 Wye River Memorandum 21 Ya’alon, Moshe 120 Yariv, Aharon 52 Yesh Gvul 122-123 Zion 89 Zionist movement Divisions within 12 Maximalists 14 Minimalists 14