British Rule & Rebellion

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CONTENTS

PART II. IN PARTICULAR, PALESTINE, 1936-37. IX . PALESTINE

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X. RULERS AND RULED

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XI. AGENTS OF ORDER AND LAW

XII. REBELLION AND EXTREME MODERATION, MAY

1936

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XIII. REBELUON AND EXTREME MODERATION,

1936

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PRIII''''JlD III' GItJl4!l! BlU'J'Anr nIt BJliH'tl BJI~UV1lD

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REBEII.IOX AXD E."\'"TRE!\IE YODER.\TION, AUGUST

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XVI. REBEUION AND INTENSn'E ME.\SURES, SEPTEM-

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REBELLION

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OCTOBER

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ARMISTICE

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ARMED BANDS AND AMNESTY

XIX. ARMISTICE WITHOUT CONDITIONS XX. TIlE PURPOSE

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PART 1. IN GENERAL, RULE AND REBELLION

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CHAPTER RULE

A ND

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REBELLION.

THE story of rule and rebellion is as old as history and covers most of it. This book, however, deals with no more than a corner of the whole story, but a corner which concerns us and our history, since the Great War ended. During that period of twenty years, there has been encouragement of self-expression and a crop of rebellions, within the sphere of British rule. At the same time, there has been hesitation on the part of the ruler to apply force, in striking contrast to the lack of hesitation on the part of the ruled to appeal to force. The most recent example of this state of affaits was provided in 1936 by Palestine. The ruled clearly do not bar the use of force as an instrument of policy. The with which they have to force and the 'miJarity in the way th(."}, have tJ.Sed it, in

pJaces widely separated, ' J

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for:

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th \ 'hI.. I que~tioll n: ~Ii n and raise the " f rule in rul 11 S b m In l't' diffi" ltqu~::;tion Whether b II' . tu 01 le'~ :ffi. ' lOll IS £ann of 'War and e Clent. within th ~ ph I'! of Britisl~ Ire ?rt to force 1 ru e 1 viol ti f o peac where peace should b f a on T '. 1 e a e. wo prmclp es of peace are th t . ,

. d ' eCISlOn of the JU ges m ust be loyally obeyed. Succ . th Ii' ess In e app catIon o~ these two principles depends on redress of gnevance ,and on readiness to oppose force by force, on the part of the ruler. No alleged slowness to redress grievance should be allowed to excuse resort to force on the part of the ruled, or there must inevitably be a spate of excuses and not much peace. The Arabs in Palestine blandly claim that they had to stage a fifth rebellion before steps were taken to judge their dispute with the P alestine Government. Apart from the merits of that claim the fifth rebellion did produce the R oyal Commission, and t he Royal COmmISSIOn produced a r e omm enda,t ion in favour of partitibn. But the Palestine Goyernment had a hand in the rebellion because, without that gavel nment. there might have been 1

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no rebellion, or on so ~ hort that H.M. Govemm nt would not have been stirred to obtain th appointment of a Royal before it ended. Given a trong govermnent in Palestine the Arabs might never have been allowed to rebel, and H.lVL Government might never have been allowed t o go on ignoring their grievances. In fact, the whole case might then have been submitted to judgment without any resort to force. However, it is questionable whether modern methods of government as practised by Britain would allow the appointment, or the continuance in office, of a governor capable of making H.M. Government appoint judges to hear a dispute in time, and also capable of suppressing a rebellion. Ability to suppress a rebellion without the other ability would not be enough. That, as the Royal Commission makes quite clear, would merely be putting off the evil day. Improvement in the arrangements for disputes is one problem, j mprovement in the arrangements for dealing with resort to force is another. It is with the second of these two problems that thi~ book deals. It woold be difficult to pretend that the 5

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RULE

exist to-day in 1937 for hearing disputes are so bad that delay could be accepted as an excuse for resort to force. It would be no service to peace to make such an admission. To-day, thinking people are deeply concerned with the problem of peace, and practical people may find a solution where pacifists would fail. One direction in which practical people might direct their energies is towards improvement in the arrangements for hearing disputes. Another direction, the one with which we are here concerned, is towards improvement in the methods of dealing with resort to force. There are good reasons for directing attention in the latter direction first. To begin with, the a.rrangements for dealing with resort to force are worse than are those for hearing disputes, and they are more likely to be tested. Then there are in the world people who would resort to force in preference to submitting their case to judgment, if they thought that force would get them b tter terms. There are also people who would resort to force soon r than accept a judgm nt which they did not like. These two types hav given us plenty of rebellions inside the British Empir ~ince th end of the Great War, and there is r tl.!>Ol1 ()

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REBELLION

to expect them to give us more. Finally, inefficiency in dealing with resort to force encourages it. The inefficiency displayed in Palestine last year was alarming, but it was not the duty of the Royal Commission to investigate the manner in which rebellion was dealt with by the Palestine Government. The Report makes that point clear in the first paragraph of Chapter IV. There is no indication yet of any intention to hold an inquiry into the methods adopted to deal with rebellion, and that too is alarming, because it entails a regrettable loss of experience. H.M. Forces resist and fight rebels. The Army in particular gains wide experience in constant contact with rebellion. But the policy governing its action emanates on one occasion from one Government Office in Whitehall and on the next from another, with the result that the forces which have to deal practically with rebellion seem alwa's to be controlled by amateurs. Ther ap other good rea 'ons for inquiry into the 'vents of It\st v'ar in Pal 'stine. After all. • sam' thrce hundred peopl 'W 1'0 kill >d in fighting. 01' WCI ~ murdcl"d in th \ Holy Land. and about thirtt.'cn hundred w to wounded. These figu1' s 7

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~e probably an underestimate. It is stated m Cha er n. of the Report of the Ro-al . h' ) _ Lat It has been credibly e::.timated ~~ ~: _\.lam lost Olle thousand killed, mostly m ::g-~~. as lay few Arab~ were murdered. The Bnl !~h casualties in the tb,l ce Services we...-e at .lea -.. 2I OIDN>T'S and men killed and I04 u .-\mon the Je\,~. 2 were murdered an

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_u~ loss of life ~'IIS to require some inquiry wht:~ It. happelts m a cOllntry under British m~e m i lilies of inteInational peace. Had any~hlDg mu~ less serious in loss of life occu I red m a colliery disaster in this country, there would have been a searching inquiry. In one r espect there are stronger grounds for inquiry into failure to rule a country than there are fo!, inquiry into. failure to manage a colliery WIthout los~ of . life. In the case of a colliery, o~e wea~ link ill the security plan may bring disaster ill a flash without any warning, and often without indication that the link was weak. In the case of a country which has to ?~ ruled, that lack of warning is rarely a danger. 1 here are always indications of trouble brewing and t hey are 1lsu a lly spread over a long period: Even after resort to anued action has begun, the 8

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course of events usually resembles a slow bUllIing rather than a sudden and violent explosion. There is, in fact, still ample time to take steps to establish control. Failure on the part of those for' a and keeping order in a country is therefore relatively inexcusable . Inquiry into the root causes which brought about rebeUion is a thing quite distinct from inqui y into the manner in which rebellion was ' met. Unfortunately, there seems to be a tendency to gloss over the latter and focus attention on the results of the fonn er type of inquiry. There is something hardly straightforward about that policy of glossing things over. It seems likely, however, that it will succeed, because so much time has cdready elapsed since the events which demand in1uiry took place. As long ago as January 1937, 'The Times,' in a leading article dated the 25th of that month, expressed the hope that there might be some explanation of the many failures to preserve reasonable order in Palestine during 1936. The leading article, which was headed" The Palestine Inquiry," in conclusion, said ::" Granted that such uncompromising 9

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as ~he ~ionists and the Arabs were c rtain to colli~e,. It ~as surely the business of the local AdministratIOn, which represents the Mandatory Po~er, to anticipate and prevent or at least rest net the conflict. The members of the Royal COl~llnission have . doubtless made good use of theIr secret sessions to discover how jt was that a riot followed by a general Arab strike was ~f)t prc.v<:ntcd from dqjC'nerating into a T~h~J!J(m, wh~ 'h (mly ollav (:<1 wlwn two Hriti'lh dlvJ!wms, n:mforcl·d by thl:ir f(' ('IVj<;t!l, had bum OTl (mtrat('d in the Holy I"and. 'Hl<'y ma,y now 1lndl rstrmd tlll, moti VI''! wllic:h 1)1'('V,t lIf! d Hit: ckcJaratic)1J of 1II:tI tial law at a tilt\(, wllC'tl ttlllnh-r - of J~'ws, OJ" of Arabs who .,t (~od I> till (,OVe mHll'nt, WPIt of almost dar! (1IJ'1l'1lt:', wh~'Jl til tachnH'uts of British III ups W('J l ft l''JIll'utl nrnhusllt'd, aud when 1 'llls and 1,lih\.I'V:S Wllt' hI iug continually d, n, l L ,t l rtainl,' tht v mu t hI in a position { thn \\ l~ht on tllt 1 n -. t:Ulwn T failur of tb _\dmini~tmti n dthcr to di rm tht' COtUltr t 1. -t illtli t d t cnt on the • of unlicensed riB ; n the llotOriOU' confu t betW€f:D the Executh'e and a ection of the judicanlle; on the circum tancc' in ""h~ch alliled bands were able to enter Palestine 10

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from other countries, and, after being finally surrounded, were allowed to withdraw unscathed. It ic; to be hoped that an explanation of these and other mysteries will appear in their Report." We now know that none of these mysteries win be explained in the Report of the Royal Commission, for the good Teason that it wa.c; n()t the duty of the Commissioners to investigate th ·m. 'nil: probJem of rule in face of rebellion, hr)w 'v('r, remain a probl m which till fI·quircs dos' attf'ntion and lution, for th/! ~akc of U\C! n:plltatirJn of rul. l1wrc i'l no douht whatcv(!r that th r plitatioJl of that nile was torn to hr d by the l:vcnts of last Y('ar in the Holy Land. part from the COIlkmpt raim·d upon it rly Arabs, J ws, and {orl'iRlwrs in Pak -tin', ('count should be taken of the cit cl on the r lations between the of law .uld ordt'r and thl' civil power. It wouM be unfair to the Government of Pall!:'titll' to ~ug,.:: $t that it is solely to blame for tht' futilities displ ed so recently in the lanll whidl it has to rule. There are root causes underlying it' failure to deal with rebellion, jUi't a' there are root underlying the 'ucress with which the Arabs staged one, A 11

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disturbing feature of this most recent failur is that it is not an isolated case. There is no reason whatever to suppose that we have made any progress in the last sixt een years in ability t o deal with well-organi ed rebellion on modern lines. The lack of progress is in no way due to lack of force. One reason for this defect is perhaps due to lack of public interest in the art of ruling others, possibly in tum due to lack of information. We are mainly interest ed in how we are ruled ourselves. One of the principles of good government is good lInderstanding between rulers and ruled. Most people in Britain, knowing that principle by instinct, probably regard disturbance or rebellion as evidence of something the matter with the ruler, rather than with the ruled. Sympathy in this country is never bestowed on those who insist on ruling as they think fit, when that means the suppression of the reasonable aspirations of the ruled. Our sympathies, in such cases, invariably go to the rebels. Possibly, we have in the past had so many opportunities of expressing sympathy in that direction that we have formed a habit and have not yet had enough practice in distinguishing between the rebel, who is using force 12

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in desperation to secure a long-deferre.d asp~a­ tion, and the more modem rebel, who 1S stagmg an outrageous racket. Lack of interest in a dull and unpleasant bJ·ect which directly concerns very fe",: peop~e, su , lli . th unpenal the suppression of rebe on m e. here may be due to the demands whIch the on. our attensp , h international sphere to-day make s It is natural to direct attentIon to t e t· lOn. . t. 1 ce roblem of preservation of mte~a lo~a pea , In preference to the problem .of unpenal ~eace, when the consequences of failure ~ the mternational sphere affect us so direct.ly a~~ so dangerously, while failure. in the unpena sphere has no such immediately unpleasant consequences. h Whatever the reason, there appears to ave · e 191 a marked .contrast betweend deveI oped smc British action in the international sphere an British action in the imperial sphere. In the international sphere Britain has expended a in upport of the. League '0.' • f great deal of nero·v N· and in favour of the submISSIon 0 of ahon . t She has even promeasures all dispute. to ]udgmen . t t claimed her readiness to adopt s~ern .. to any Power which resor s 0 . 111 oPPosItIon. ·d d however . I·ts own mterest, proVl e , , f orce m 13

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III h'l' own imp('dnl spiteI" Oil Ill!' otJwr hmlti, .1 titain. has adopt, 1 ~ lwwild 'tin r1 t'a ?,-g01l1g attltude toward' factions or ra~!s

WlllC~ take up alIllS and appeal to force in their

?Wl1

mterests. So much is this the case th t It seems that she positively encourages reso~t to. force where she governs. One can hear it srud to-day, all the way from the Far East right home to t~e front door, that if you want to ge~ something out of the British, the best and qUlckest way to get it is to start shooting. The r cord of the past y a1' in Palestine must hav cncourag d bcli f in the truth of that st t me.l1~. In outll'm Ir land that theory \ a: put lllto procti ' with SU '55. In China, a tl n ba,-:cd n th~ sam\; th~\or got us out of 1bnk w, If not out of Wd·hai-wci. In India,

<1. E 'pt,

now ill 1 .\.1< tin~, I m('ll l 01 tho t flu f has pusht: I t in th di l ti n ill which bllil \. rs in \\.Ut l th 1 t . Tht.: .\rabs in :nl~ I Jaimif\!; t h ir 1 ~it { • t • :n rlh tIl i I , i Il r Uflll.l,

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It appear, lberciore, that in the international splten' Britain proclaims her r amncss to frustrate appeals to violence, in spite of the fact that. she still lacks the requisite force. As a result, her proclamation is unconvincing and sometimes irritating. In the imperial sphere where she has enough force, she emphasises conciliation and suppresses any mention of sanctions till it is long overdue. Then, when she has to use force to h IIstrate appeals to violence, she seems to be quite incapable of using it effectively. This is all the more bewildering when, to-day. the modern rebel is becoming more and more prone to stage a racket than to 'eek redr .. of wrongs when he resorts to force. One rea on for this weaknes has its roots dccp in the party ').tcm of ....on.:rnmcnt, which prevails in Britain. That is a fact which has to bt' taktn iuto (' unt in s eking a solution for t1tl~ diffi 'ult '. and it is not a fact which ClIo bt' t"t'tnowd. Wh llt \' r th rt' i' an outbreak of vio1tnt 1 'sist·:m to Towrnment in any 11.\\ undtt BritiM. rul. ray embanassment i~ '.\U~ 1 t) minist( .:: .md ~uPI rtt'f$ of the ~ \' rom llt t h )JUt. Report .:: ft ,- t the 1'1 . ml th ~ I I ,'tllIuw it and it,:; problem' l~

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into their headlines. Interested people begin to pull political strings. The give-everythingaway people shout their slogans and claim that aU the trouble is due to not having given the place away. The hold-aU-we-have people shout th ·ir slogans. Pro-]ews with political influence organise to make it effective. Pro-Arabs do tIl . same. In no time the point at issue, which should have priority over all others, the prompt topping (If rcwrt to force, is lost to sight cntirr-Jy. Tlj(' t troubles' in In·Jand in 1920-2I afforded a glorious exampJf' of th pandemonium which can be crealed jn political circles when it becomes nec ssnry t o Us 11.M. I'orces exten ively in opposition to munkr, intimidation, and ambush. Then- was a continual bombardment of questions in Parliament , and stn-am of mi representation an i accusation poun:d forth. P art of this political tro ub] S( III to be J ue to the system wlH'reby all politicians depend for political C bt('net on SUCC(SS in a competition for votes, while {hOSt' who hold office depend in a ddition on suell: in a competition for ,'otes in Parliament. Riot, insufft'Ction, and rebellion all open a fin fic ld for criticism of every kind , for b in we k as well as for being strong. 16

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Some of the criticism is made with an eye for t he main chance, votes. In general. the government is thrown on the defensive, and its store of votes becomes vulnerable. The opposition, in fact, stands to gain. As a result of this state of affairs local admini- . strations arc prone to avoid any clash which might attract undue attention in Britain, and, if it comes to a clash, do all they can to gloss it over. This they do, partly from a belief that the less a democracy knows about happenings in its distant possessions the better, and partly out of fear of reproof from an Cabinet at home. Palestine had the advantage over Ireland of being farther away from London, and questions were no doubt easier to parry. Most of the Arab accusations against the Palestine Government were made in the local press, and lllQIIt of their accusations against the troops were sent direct to the High Commissioner. Nevertheless, the troops were accused in the House of Commons of behaving in the best traditions of the Black and Tans, and, as the Report of the Royal Commission on page 104 states, the dropping of poisoned sweets from aeroplanes was one of the least outrageous charges made:' II

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1t'au t) th r'sul th, t wht:l\ ,l 1'. t dlion brc,tk' nt, th> c r'tar r f 'tate 011 'emt:d tend t be V r chary in th dclt:'yution of pow'rs to tho on the spot, pon:ible for dea ling directly with rebellion, 'while the local governor tends to follow his example and impose all manner of restriction on the action of the troops. From the point of view of the fighting man, this is all very bewildering. He is just the same man as may be seen any day walking about the streets at home in unifolm or in plain clothes. He is really a normal average inhabitant of Britain. He is also the being who is hailed as the ambassador of peace when he comes back from places like ilesia or the Saa.r. Yet, when he bas to go into action again t those who 'e up anus to gain th y want by force, Briu.b EmpiIe. e' lik to be a His natlltt', in some elta g , when l'c

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~phcr' und lolicy ill Uw imp'ri 1 sphere, and

th lack f public int 'rc~t in tht' s\lbject. It has mentioned the losses whih f('belJion entails, the politica.l repercussions, the re~trictions placed on the action of n.M. Forces, and the accusations made against them. It has suggested that our ability to deal with rebellion has made no progress in the last sixteen years in spite of practice ; in fact, that ability is lacking in that respect. It might go on to point out that we are perhaps the greatest world power which has ever existed. We pose as a protagonist of peace from altruistic motives and expose ourselves to the accusation that our motives are material, because we own so much and need peace to keep it without trouble. We seem unable to keep proce among those who live inside our rule, but keep on lecturing about peace to who live outside it. In fact, neither 'We nor our

ments are easy to understand. It' time, hf)Wever, to make an efiort to be . 'e cannot be that we not have to deal v.1th rebellion f'.IC ot of tOO5e part of the the .~ of the In . RebeUioilS in the too long and ttl have 100 1

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much in life and money. For the sake of the future there is, therefore, a case for the examination of the problem of rebellion, both from the point of view of the rebel and from that of the man who has to deal with him. Then it may be possible to discover what principles are involved and what lines of action lead quickly to a solution.

CHAPTER II. LIFE

AND

are rather dull and unattractive, perhaps because the solid rock is less decorative than the growth which obscures it. But principles, if correctly enunciated and applied, give a sound and solid foundation for both thought and action. It cannot be denied that we are living to-day in times of stirring interest, danger, and great confusion, both in the international sphere as well as in the imperial sphere, even if we limit attention to the rival claims of nationalism and internationalism, conciliation and sanctions. Something sound and solid seems desirable. As far as we ourselves are concerned within this island we seem sound and solid, and our peace contrasts with the unrest elsewhere. But we have rearmament to remind us that there is an outside world and, of late, our armed forces show a tendency to be less and PRINCIPLES

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Ie s able to stay in their home stations. In rec~nt years considerable ~ar.ts of the Army, WhICh would normally be mSlde Britain, have been drawn away to Silesia, the Saar, China, Egypt, and Palestine. Within the last eighteen months we have had to send one of our five divisions to Egypt on account of our relations with Italy, and two of them to Palestine on account of rebellion against our rule. In fact, the baJance between force at home and force abroad has broken down. To-day a brigade of the ISt Division and a battalion, in addition to the normal garrison, are gripped in Palestine, as a mere advanced guard, in there should be a refusal to accept the judgment which is soon to be delivered on the dispute of last year. In the statement of policy announcing general agreement with the conclusions of the R(Jyal Commission, H.M. vJVtrnment Itas said that jf serious disorders ~houJrl again }m-ak lJut, (If such a nature a'i to rCfJllirc military int ·rvention, the High Comm! ~ilJJ1(;r will ell ll~gatf· filII p()w(:n~ in re.'!pect 1,(

th( who}l,; (;/'Jlwtry to tile (dJ.C. tlte military

11)1 lA, •

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til PI',

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that till r

I.. INI'II ill till; IIIll1t)IIIIIJ ~~

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I,l, ml'flt I)f dangl:r '/rJI'tlt {)f a t/1'd!;jIJrJ,

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because interested parties dislike it and the changes which submission to it must involve. From past and present evidence it seems that the peoples and races of this earth want to get what suits them, more or less regardless of the interests of others. But there are many firm believers in peace, and what they want is progress without resort to force. Their difficulty is that it seems to be necessary to use force to get it. If one turns to principles for guidance through these confusions, two facts seem to stand out through all the history of human affairs, in every variety of circumstance. The first is, that everyone has a self, which has to be served. The better it is served and the fitter it is, the more use it is in general. The second is, that nobody has ever done much as an individual self. To get anywhere we have always had to band ourselves with others of like interest and purpose. It seems then reasonable to define the principl:s ()f life as service to self on the one hand, and service to something greater than IiCJf on the other. Aft II ual, t}H~rc i~ conflict between even these tW(' principles. Service to self indicates the Jlurpo!>(· (,f continued and, if Ie, bettcr 23 •

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life. But service to something greater than self may demand, as in war, service to the extent <>f the oomp1ete elimina.tion of self. That

latter service to the greater interest has lIsually dominated. The limit in scale of ihatgreau-r interest t<:.-nnina,tes as a rule at the boundarir;f; of thE; uatimt, TIw - ,,110ft!> h{JN~ boon mrujt;l 1:0 c-y.tclld the Hmjt~, tbc-r~ S(:(:.1m to be a mey to revert to normal. These two principle& of life coV(''T all conditions of life in peace and war. They are just as essential to the continued existence and cohesion of conquering killing hordes, like those of Genghis Khan or Tamerlanc, as they are to communities of Quakers. By themselves they are no guide to peace. What is required may be found in the evolution of order out of force and of law out of order. Order was created in the past by the strong commander, backed by a band of strong men, united in service to something greater than self, their common cause. As order endured, custom in the maintenance of it emerged, and out of custom there developed law. To-day, in Britain, our peace is based on the general acceptance of two principles, that disputes must be submitted to judgment and that the decision 24

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of the judge must be obeyed. As already suggested, these two principles are principles of peace. Tl1cse four principles, the two principles of

life and the two prindp~

of p~rk, 6ef.-1"tl to b~r (JJl the pr{Jh1f.:m of 1jf{~ with peace, Th~ difficulty i~ tv strike tb(; correct: balance b{.1wee.n

It is intcr(.'Sting to we the ways in which balances have b(:(,'fi struck by diff<.-rent peoples since t he Great War. aU Jour.

The League of Nations began by basing itself almost exclusively on the two principles of peace and ignoring the two principles of life. It is beginning to readjust itself. It is to be hoped that it may succeed because, when it does, it should exercise great influence as a buffer against war. Even should it fail to prevent war, it could continue to act as a vehicle for the expression of the general world public interest in the matter in dispute. In Britain there was at first, aiter the war, a revulsion against that disciplined co-operative service to something greater than self, which had been demanded in particular of young life, and seemed to end only in premature and useless death. At the same time there was a tendency to emphasise service to self alone, 26

combine>J with very suong snppon fOT the two ptincip1es of ptace. Everything to be designed to dodge the hated principle of service to something greater than self. 'Three principles seemed to be accepted and One discarded. In contrast to B ritain t hose countries which were still under stress and still exposed to danger, after the war had ended, followed ardently the principle of service to something greater than self. They ignored the principles of peace and pinned their faith on the principles of life, paying particular attention to the principle of service which had cast the greatest strain on them during the war. Strong movements, based on the belief that the true lifeinterests of the nation were in danger, set out to save these interests by organisation and force. These movements succeeded in gaining national control and continue to focus attention on the second principle of life, in the interests of t he nation . Japan was diverted from the be . s of interest in the principles of peace by the threat to what she regardoo as h<-'T Jife-interests in , 0huria. wl ere ill:: lwl ;nv{...'Sted heavily x . ,- (~I atJfj life, '1 he attiWde I)f th.~ ruler

LIFE

A_-n

PEACE

of )Ianchuria became increasingly hostile, and his activities with paper currency threatened Japan's economic interests. Further, the Chinese seemed to be relying on the security which League membership gave them to do what they did. The attitude adopted by the League after J apan resorted to force confinned her t endency. The League stuck to the t wo principles of peace, and Japan stuck to the two principles of life, and they parted. The Manchurian crisis shook Britain into a position of better balance between the four principles. The League machine began to move slowly, cog by cog, and it became all too clear that, if it managed to move far enough, Britain's navy would be the only available force which could reach, with difficulty, the required distance. Britain at once began to think of her life-interest. The Abyssinian crisis carried things further still, and showed how difficult it may be to get armed force for action in the public interest, when getting it means taking it from where it is required to guard the life-interest of the nation which owns it. France put France first, and such forces as Britain moved. she moved in her own interest. Life, it seems, is a perpetual effort to ba1anre !1

u

•

13 R I TIS II

R U L E,

AND

RE B EL L I ON

conflicting forces. The effort i-; perpetual because ~me cha?ge, in the fon~l of growth or expandmg expen ence, keeps on mtroducing new factors. Thus, when balance is very nearly attained, the whole perfolmance has to be begun all Over aga~n. Though principles help by providing fixed pomts, the problem of striking the correct balance is complicated by the irksome fact that a solution which proves right in one set of circumstances may be quite wrong in another. For example, when a man resorts to force and commits murder in Britain he is usually hanged, after the fact that he did commit murder has been established, and little attention is paid to the reasons he may produce to explain why he murdered. It is in the public interest that he should be hanged, and hanged he is, with no upset to anybody except his relations and those who have fixed ideas on the subject of capital punishment. But when a nation like Japan resorts to force, the circumstances are entirely different. In the first place, it is not possible to hang a nation. In the second place, no nation will stand being condemned without some attention being paid to its r 'awns for action. So the L('aguc, having no j)oJice and tiC) army, liaS to pay attention to 211

the circumstances of the case, and may find it wiser to take account of the reasons given for the action taken, agree if possible with some of them and, by tact, endeavour to mitigate the rigours of the use of force. The e must be based on the principles of life as well as on the principles of peace. It cannot behave like a British jury and judge for facts and law. The question arises, which line of action would be the more appropriate in dealing with rebellion within the British Empire, action on the lines of a British court, or action on the lines of the League's court? The case of Palestine brings this question into prominence, and it is right to concentrate attention on how we rule in our part of the world before inquiring how others rule in theirs. British rule is neither harsh nor selfish. It is in fact a new form of rule leading to free co-operation by unequals. Because some peoples are still being led in the hope that they may soon become free and willing co-operators, the accusation is often made that British rule . i<; dominating and imperialistic. That accusation ignores the purpose. It ignores the fact that on an international scale British rule is 211

cLE,

ASD

R EBELL I O

-

~" art,\"2.ro=: a;}
LIFE A.-D

PE AC E

sweets thereof, to ambitious politicians who have never been elected, though they may be

good orga.nisers, andsometimes good intimidators. If the great experiment deteriorates into giving office to the ambitious for the sake of peace, it is not worth an obituary notice. There are indications that the experiment is not very sure of itself. We seem to be producing rather an odd type of administrator. Some, especially among the junior ranks, seem to see so many points of view that their power of decision is apt to drown in their oceanic vision. They seem obsessed by the theory that it is impossible to rule without the consent of the ruled a belief which handicaps them in countries where self-government is not yet a fact. They have been known to urge that a firm and prompt stoppage of resort to force would not look well if, on inquiry, it came out that those who rebelled had a grievance when they appealed to force. There is idealism in the purpose of British rule, and it is a gentle rule. On that ground alone there is reason for firmness when firmness is necessary. The appropriate line of action in dealing with resort to force must be deterrnined with reference to the circumstances of 31

•

B R I TIS H

R U L E,

AND

REB ELL ION

the case. The e, for reasons given, has to exercise tact if it is to do good and not aggravate the situation. But the circumstances of the League and of Britain are totally different. In the Empire and in British Mandates there are local police and local garrisons, with behind them the armed forces of Great Britain. There are thus always two governments, the local government and the central government, each in a position to stop promptly resort to force, whereas the League has neither police nor army. When the circumstances make it possible to stop resort to force, as they do in the case of tIl British Empire, it is in the public interest that it should be stopped, and stopped promptly. om p ople may disagree with that conclu ion. It may b claimed that what has been aid. about principle shows that when a communit that its life-intere t is at stake it will tum from the principles of peace to the principle of life and will probably, in time, resort to force. It seems clear from the Report of the Roval Commission that the Arabs in • Palestine have felt for •vea.s that their lifejmerpsl as a community was at stake. They rehened. What made them feel as they did was done by the tellllS of the Iandate, not by 32

LIFE

AND

PEACE

Britain alone, but by the whole League, including the U.S.A. But that, surely, suggests investigation of the arrangements for redress of grievance and the use made of them. It does not alter the fact that the circumstances did make it possible to stop resort to force at once. Slowness in dealing with rebellion, whether due to lack of will to oppose it, or to inefficiency, lets loose other evils. The quick knock-out delivered on the party which seeks to gain its ends by force is inclined to eliminate all backers. Both the Jews and the Arabs had large bodies of backers outsi Ie Palestine in the rebellion of last year, just as there were large bodies of back rs outside Ireland seventeen years ago. The longer the fight goes on the more likely are the backers to get out of hand, as they did in the cases of Palestine and of Ireland. Prompt action silences the worst of the baektrs and leaves the be t of them free to concentrate on the grievance. Redre of grievance ought to be a road to peace, but it will never be a safe one if resort to force is to be regarded as a pel ntissible way of expressing the grievance . Finally, modern rebellion has assumed a forll1 which makes its prompt suppression 33

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VJlIOl'tUJ1o.tdy, uo quick cure hM y't b en iOllud Lor lh' Ioul discas" though it has xisted for 'ars. It is not lh' bu iness 01 th armed fore to find the cur , for in with tanding the eli ease the hav to act almost entirely in aid to the civil pow r. The civil power, howe,'er, eem to b tmaware that it has a new problem to face in sub-war, which is a danger to the purpo:se of British rule, !tee co-operation.. There '- little doubt that it could find the cure if it uied. But, in case it may not feel inclined to mme in the maner, it is propo....~ nu" to ex;uni7:e " b-\\ar 00- from the ooint of neW the oilier side and of (Vii si e, with paaicllJar means of ~

, u s - W .\ R

C

APTER III.

~A - TRE

OTHER

SIDE.

h h.RS".ATIO_·:.T. war people over forty k HOW from personal expCIience. Civil. war everycan read about in its modem fOi III , in the latest specimen from Spain. Sub-war, however, requires explanation. It is an organised use of force, partly u nder arms, designed to get som ething by force against the will of the properly constituted Government. Its leaders are invariably self-appointed and not regularly elected. Sub - war lies half - way between a political strike on a national scale and civil war. It differs radically from civil war. In civil war, rebels bear alms openly and fight in military units organised on much the same lines as those of the government forces which they attack. In sub-war, every effort is made to use force under cover of the laws of the Government which is being attacked. Organisation is secret. 36

THE

0 THE R I D E

:\Witary fonllations are avoided as much as possible. Conuol is maintained by intimidation. When illeual action begin~, it is conuolled a central authoritt but and co-ordjnated b,' -, the onus is cast "'"'on "'OVetllment of promO", if it can, the illegality of each act, as if each wet:e a diSCOllnected deed done by sollie di"{;lIIntled individual. The thing is, in fact, a . racket. It is very necessary for the British people to know the gelleral lines on which sulrwar is conducted. They ultimately, through their own Cabinet and ParHa ment, and thence through local govemments in places like Hong-Kong, Burma, Ceylon, India, and Palestine, rule many peoples which have not yet reached the stage of governing themselves. It is among these peoples that sub-war is most likely to arise. Since 1918, sub-wars have been rather common in territories under British rule. Perhaps the best example of all, and the one most skilfully managed by the other side, was the Sinn Fein campaign in Ireland in 1920-2I. The American rackets were a form of subwar, though designed for personal gain and not for nationalist ends. Their history shows what is bound to happen if sub-war is not 87

BRITISH

R U LE,

A ND

REBELLION

recognised by govemment for what it is and gripped fillllly and promptly. Most people may have heard of t G' men, an organised body of govelllment servants, armed and authorised to shoot, without trial, outlawed citizens. Something of that nature is the logical outcome of failure by government to deal in time with sub-war. It is just a question of balancing conflicting forces. It took about fifty divisions on one side to balance and hold about fifty divisions on the other in France in I9I4· It takes t G' men to balance gunmen if they are allowed, through neglect, to break through all the outer defences. SUb-war arises out of grievance, fairly well spread among a people. It is easy enough to sympathise with most of theso national grievances. Hut, if p'ac' is the aim, 110 grievunce flh01tld 1)(: :dlow('{l to jU)ltify .resort to fotcc. Th/; Id"b ... tif1 h:WIl :~ ",riOVu,ucc because of fll( "litJJI:di'Jn it. NII/tl. In·laml, HlJln thr/!o IHUfd,I'd 'y(~ilJ' II~'(), Ilf il/) int/iWHUbJ' WIld of 1}1'IJI~lll (Ii ft tfj(f('Il'lJf /'III'I! ilJIII elc'c'd f'OHl S(:(,t· J:Uld . 1 JH;Y nI fll l:dfw1.:J1 1'/'1.11,1,,11' IIf Uw H(:jr,lIr(l 11Y J~lIgJhlllfrl('n (If :t/trlil' f nil fhl: tlHfaf(~r; in S(,u LJJ Irelit 11 fj, I,{JTlf~ {jfLn,. tlH:!-lll C:V(:)1 tHI llXI);jndinf~ cxpI:ri(:nCl; 11$(/ 1lImn to fClalifw w.lIat 3R

SUB-WAR

,

THE

OTHER

SIDE

had happened. They then became nationalist, and for years tried to have their wrongs righted in Parliament. That method proved to be so maddeningly slow in producing the required result, home rule, that the foundations of taking by force were laid about 1906 and developed by 1920 into well- organised sub-war. The grievance stands out better if one stops to imagine how the English would enjoy having a plantation of South Irish in, say, Cornwall and Devon, or how the North Scots would welcome the infliction of a batch of Englishmen, with or without titles, as chiefs in the Highlands. The Arabs of Palestine have their grievance over the plantation in the plains of Palestine of hundreds of thousands of Jews. The Arabs are perhaps as much related to the Jews as were the Scots who w 'nt to Ireland related to the Irish, but in ('<\ell a c the cn~cds and views of lift' differ. Roughly peaking, the Jew!; likt! t (/WIl!;, bu~t1t.. work, IIwl ()fgllllisaUon. The J\llIb ... likl' till' (Clunlty (lIId «:fl!iu. '11w basis of IIh-war n'slll on gricvat1f: I :. Bill, IIII' gti. vailI'( hao.; to b(~ I~xpru;s(:d. This iii dOli!', (il tly. hy \' 'OpJl' of ~l'~·atr.r than average (Idll 'al hm aJl(l of gr{'att!r than awragc depth of ["\'Iing. 1'ht·y llHlllllly havo rather romantic 80

B R I TIS H

R U L E,

AND

REB ELL ION

poetical natures. They write and speak w II . e , and organISe not so welL They are useful but wo~ld never get a~ywhere by themselves. ' ProvIded th~t the gnevance is real, those who :first express It then manage to infect others wl10 have a direct grievance, lack of land lack of money, lack of employment, lack of som thing. W~len those who have a r al grievanc and not Just th second-hand cho of a gri vanc , b gin to b int r st cl, a new set of ] .ad r is thrown up. Th y ar of a type very dlffr nt from th original agitator, with whom tIl n 'N form a bond f union. Idealists are n w j in d by l' ali t to form 0. political roup, and rani 'o.tion impr . N P liti nl gr up 'onld, h w v r, advance 'o.u' any fo.ster tht:n tIl pa of normal legal political acthity without the help of a militant group. Though all may agree that the pace of DOHna! political activity is too slow, all ,....ill not agree about the next step. Man\' of the original idealists a nd some of the later joined political realists will shrink from the idea of direct action by force of all us, though quite wming to try a political strike. This hesitation will cause impatience to the verge of mutiny, and end by throwing up yet a 4()

SUB-WAR

THE

OTHER

SIDE

third group among the leaders, the militant realists. In between the idealists and the militant realists sit the political realists. Some of them may not like the idea of force, but there will be others fully conscious of their happy central position and ready to take advantage of it. The idealists can be relied upon never to admit to themselves that shootings and murders are the logical consequence of their own acts, done since their discovery and nationalisation of the grievance. They will always maintain that such 'disorders: as they will call them, are merely proof that the grievance is real, and so natural acts, though regrettable, on the part of the younger hot-heads. These idealists can therefore be trusted to stay in the movement. They will be most useful for misrepresenting facts. They will prove conclusively that it was the Government which first resorted to force by attacking the nationalists. They will use their skill to make the best use of these wellworn catchwords, imperialism and militarism. Meanwhile, the militant group will be useful in forcing the pace. Its first need will be alDIS, and money to buy anns. The money is not, as a rule, so difficult to raise as the allns. The n

B R I TIS II

R U L E,

AND

Ii E BEL L ION

polit~c~ realists will find little difficult

i

proVldmg good causes to which loyal nationru n

fu~d,

a fund for the dependants of political pn oners, or hunger - strikers, or a coloured cross or crescent fund. As long as the idealists ~o .not know .where all the money goes, no crisis IS likely to anse. Even when it becomes obvious that the militants are part of the organisatio and a drain on its funds, there is always ~ reserve the slogan of keeping the front united and not letting the enemy divide and rule. So, by virtue of their position in the middle the political reali'3ts control. It is, as a rule: from amongst them that the I 'ader of the whole mov m 'nt is hosen. If it. is possible to find :t 1 ad'r WllO looks lik> an idealist, but really is n. rmli 'i , so l11U h til· b'l ter. It is a great at[ ttlltug(' I( haw Ihl' doak of J"('ligioll or 111 sti i~1U to hidt' a ft'll) M"ftj or :t Gandhi. [II an ('. ~l" tlw I olit kal I('adt "s will normlllly prol l st I ha I till' abhur vioiton t' and (\ft doing Iht\r ntnh)st tt t' ntt'll thdr YOllJP mtn tUld tt't'mist•. Th. 1:1 f bh rring vi it'llC ran b~\ t't'liNi t die dl~ any Briti~l r Y mmlnt, \\hkh, r ~ 'll, \ill n "er all w d ti ct] n I.!

SUB-WAR

THE

OTHER

SIDE

to be taken against the political leaders of a rebellion conducted on sub-war lines. It will never adopt the attitude that those who lead a movement which results in murder are themselves liable to be tried and found guilty of murder. Even when political leaders went on the run, as in Ireland, government officials chased after them, not to arrest, but to keep in touch and discuss. In Palestine the political leaders never bothered to go on the run, there was no need. The Government was suffering from a fixed idea that they all abhorred violence, and said so for them. Meanwhile, the militant group should be forcing the pace. To keep its organisation and membership secret, it has to organise intimidation from th' beginning. Intimidation hclps ill th' collection of funds and cnSUf(~S the early isolation of 'traitors' ancl 'informers.' It

"Iso provhks OWl" for III(' difficult businl'ss of 'oIl' 'ting arllls. Thl' coli 'ction of arms shoultl Jlormally b' Ill' most dWicult ()f thc prohll'ms to he sl)lwd. In Irl'land, ven in 1920, the Sinn Fdners Wl'J"C still raiding country for an 'thing in the way of ann the ould find. In ludi , about 1931, large urn' had to hi; paid f r rcvoh'Crs smuggled in by (3

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I ~III , j,l ", /' ".,//1' 1 I II' /1''.1 /11//11/'/ 11111/ /11 V I 1",1/, 1 / 1/ 1t/'t1 It fJHlf 1/1//11111 fl y , /t/I //1 WIVI J IIIT1 ·td, /1" ,.. ft /I / I ( tlIII" uf , lTrrl l+, tJ t ilt; /(;(-, / ti" r 11' II 11(1 ItlT/l; I)II JrJ(/I . tn t o (,JV', O~ce u working minimum of arms has been obtmned, these can b used to gain more. Then, as a rule, the next step is to concentrate militant III'

1 ",1, I

l,t

I'I/I'

II

WI

acti:ity against the police, with the object of forcmg them out of the field as police, and, while that move is in progress, of gaining more allIlS. A police force depends for effect on ability to live dispersed in small groups among the people, in order to keep in close touch with them and gain infonnation. When a crime is committed the po1ice send individual men about tl) make in(]uirics, designed to lead to knowledge ~I!'I tf) ,.hlJ pNwn wh() did the df~ed and a~ to whi 1(: hlJ T!Jay /" , '1 ,. ' 11 as ~)(m a~ that know/· 1I1v. ;14 y,:11"u1 ti" J)(,/iq. 'l¥,itt';~H ti(", quickly (.!Iltl Ifl/ Itt II'~'''('' ftlll ':.t II, d · I~;vr IX/;lIt, /" 'It 111," I" fi l" Iml I, I ~ III t .,// II/II/tIll V' I"/1i1 WII'Y. 1111 11111' 1111,/,/1' wl'l/

II/'I'lftl 1/'~1I11 II Ilf"ljl/' I Il lId "/'1,1, IIIIIId l ll' I', /1/1 1 VI I kllllll", /,II I ,,, II kll' , /1 ' H, IlIlIf l,dl",1 "11/"' 81 ,II, It '1111 U/I 1,1,,,, "I Vii W Itl II" II' II 1/1 I"',f//I II/ ,II, Will, / WI/ U';I/I~" til HId 4

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bturt with an advantage, because the intensely political nature of the situation reduces the number of morally normal persons, and so reduces the risk of information reaching the police. The militant group then sets to work to outpolice the police, by concentrating superior force at the decisive point, the wanted policeman. It does not take very many shots to stop individual police movement over a wide area. In no time the police take to moving about in threes. An attack or two on isolated police barracks, cv(,'ll if not pressed home, will make them post more S<'l1tries on every barracks, and help to rcrlucc their cffcdive strength. At tt. ' lIam(, tim ', fme or twr) successful ambushes I,f I,
whit! II wml will /I III militunt flttuck J hi ,,1111, W 1/ /,,,,, 1" ~I/l 10 "'(IV ,"m"t In II II "',M 1,1, t" 1\/, '''Ilt tl/ 411

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I\\l'lh nd, , It l. oilvl(lu!41 1I111d , 1111\(\' \\I ~V I I I illlltllid 1(1' wit\lt'~~l'~ . Tltl' 1.\\\ ll\,h, tid db I with lut ,o.;, \ witn'~!4 lIlusl h- \\',\nwd t Il ,i\'t' l'\'i dl'H " dn\"$ ,t1\ ' II th' IMH\ '::; r wibw ·s s must bt' 'i\' '11 t tIl thl'r ~id~. t h' ~" id~ n " i the wihl " mu t b gi\\.'ll 1 nly pm ticull) in publi and p r b bl 1~~atM at Ie th in th press. Then the witn -
it i hy , lib

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411

No HOV 11111\1(11)1 ('()lIld !4uhlllit lo lit 1 ('limin, HOIl of il ~ pnl k', t!-l poli (', with out tnl ing aclion. Bul ; g OV\ rlltlWlIt ttl1not increali ' its poli e { r . '~ b , Un ,; Linw ' lhl' or' ' in, 1 numb r, and \.' rlninl 1'1. t b · si. ' time'. It would tal< 111 nth of to obtain Treasury san tion, ,"en if th thing w re possibl . So the government does the only thing which it can do: it calls in the soldiers. \Ve are not concerned at the moment with what should be done with the soldiers, but only with what is done, or is likely to be done. As a rule, a govemment which is being attacked by sub-war methods, concentrates its attention on getting its police back into working order as police. It first · seeks the advice of its chief of police as to how this may be done. He very naturally emphasises the importance of keeping the police network well spread over the country, in order that the police may regain their former close touch with the inhabitants and so obtain information. He urges that troops stlould be used in support of the police to free them from proh'ctive dtltil~S and patrols. This sounds per{('ctly reasonable and, accordingly, the troops are dispcrsed in lilllall detachments about thl' country. 01)('(' troops arc well scattl'red, they offer 47

BliHT!"EH

XULE,

A_-D

REBELLIOr

rmm l grrA ra.rgetS to the militant rebels. Being £I'...:!ttffr:d, they fui.ve to 00 moving h ~t ,v{:(:n thc-ir nllmemuo; rkta.chment!J, Care.. fjJIIy p}:-',rm::;(l ~tml/!Ifiht; ", MW anrt ~~~iri, }',7 wr:lr (JreH,rl/1:;(1 1J1f 1lr/ ~ WIJI mrd((; tfll~ ~Arli{;rf} nt/IV' Itl M (mf~ trj whl;/I 'flU)Y dft JW,V(J, ~rJ'fi /(I1I1I,/lIl)r/ wit It 1/,(;1 dli~" ' I :i{)n, will (:d{/f,(~ / II(' 1 l' /(I)(;I1VC'lIfMI fl lld 11" 111 III ' (lI/(UJI: rhh/11 /(J I (lW lt l , lilld '11111 It IlIlId / 11'ltV II I~ 11)( I 'fl t «)l11111 y [ , tl' 10 tll(' I ' I1I' /H.

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Ml'UIlWhtJ" lh ' 1(JlIUml 'roup will b·

flt on-

lctivilil'H ill ,J1 U1tll111'l' of ways. Us pl'l'~' ctepnl'tu1l'l1'L will b' busy kccpitlg the Hame of uati nail 111 tlliv > and muling the lllo~t of alleged outrag s committed by the poli e or the militar. The foreign department ",ill be active! extending contacts abroad, with the obj ct of ga.ining as much sympathetic publicit as possible for the cause, raising money and causing emba Ilassment to the enemy government. The parliamentary section will be kept hard at work raising questions and protests. The finance department will be dealing with the task not only of raising funds, but also of disguising accounts so that they are kept secret • and free from attack. An accusation department .is a useful adjunct. It can embroil the police til1lll11 g'

jl '

48

SUB-WAX

THE

OTHER SIDE

and the military in coplQUS CQrIi en.oo ~)Qflt claims fur daroo.ges w property, thclts vtb~n hmJ..l)l;'S a,re flI":archCll, jnterferer~ 'lith r{sJfJ}tjr,ufl, nb~rtl~, a,ruJ th(.-:: Ji~, It can ~lfJpfy witlJ ma,u;riJl,l },(,tft till: r*rli~m'mt~ry ',(>,(",tio:l1 ~lnd

tiJf£t roD',t imfl(Jrtftnt (1(;J~-I,rtm(,'1)tf the dt~ p iLI t l1/(tnt. fIf prrJpftgl1,ltri{,,, Flwdly, then} jli (J1Ie flTlwiWfJK ~tlly /f()m which Uf(' oLhcr ilid(; d(.;tive~ touch b<"'11(:fit in sub-war,

lll(; law. In the first place, Parliament will naturally hesitate to surrender its authority to the extent of giving to an individual, military or civil, full scope to deal with the situation • on its merits. Therefore, martial law is unlikely to be enforced, and if it ever is enforced, it will only be enforced very late in the day, after rebel strength has become well established. In the second place, the judges will be as reluctant as Parliament to surrender authority. They have the right to judge between the executive and the people, between the rulers and the ruled. They will insist on the usual procedure, the usual laws of evidence, and the usual proofs, and will regard with grave suspicion a.ny plea on the part of the executive that the situation is so abnormal as to justify drastic curtajlment of the usual safeguards to public liberty . 49

D

B R I TIS H

R U L E,

AND

REB ELL I 0 ~ SUB-WAR

THE

OTHER

SIDE

u -war must e rat er amusmg, beau th ' re uIt ar ~o tartling, provided of COUl' ee e t h 't" . tlle oppOSl Ion IS mana d a 1ll the pa t at in Ireland or a in Pale tin . Rouahl peah as five htllldred ad~9-uatel armed rebel, uppor~ by a goo.d politIcal group and provided with ~outs, Spies, message runners, misinfonners, and sIgnallers, can stop the police from functionin g as poIi ce over an area equal to three or four large counties, and can balance anything between five thousand and t en thousand soldiers for about a year. It will not do to end on a note of glee regarding sub-war, even after viewing it from the point of view of the other side. A brief explanation of the way in which it constructs itself and the lines of its action leaves out all that is underhand and brutal in its nature and makes it appear in the guise of some new game. It is necessary to see it in action in order to know it, but few can do that. Their nearest approach to the reality is when they watch a gangster film. It is difficult to imagine here, in this country, a political group in a minority judged by numbers, but very strong by organisation, strengthened further by secrecy. If such a

thing could be and come into action on sub-war lines, th n anyone who dismissed an employee for frequent absence without leave on what he called t duty,' might receive a letter advising him to take the fellow back. The first letter might be followed by another more precisely worded. The indignant recipient, having ignored the first, would probably send the second to the police. But before the police had finished tracing the sender of threatening letters they would be hunting for a murderer. The secret organisation has to make examples in order to • exerCIse power. Something of the same kind would happen again, and yet again, before letters of advice began to receive the respect which they deserved. Soon subscription lists with rather vague titles, like the relief of distressed Britannia, would come into circulation, and again refusal to subscribe would be followed by a letter of advice, and again refusal to be advised would be followed by a funeral. Soon the public would become excited and angry with the police for failure to provide protection and failure to find the criminals. At last the police would arrest someone, and someone, puffing out a chest in support of law,

50

51

B R I TIS H

R U L E,

AND

REB ELL ION SUB-W A R

order, and public security, would come forward proudly as a witness. The witness would probably disdain protection and refuse to be locked up safely in a cell close by the prisoner and so a day or two before the trial the key~ witness would be in the hands of the undertaker. One day Aldershot would wake up to find that numbers of rifles had vanished from the barrack-rooms during the dark early hours of the new day, when soldiers sleep like the dead. There would then be a spate of regulations and orders about the art of safeguarding arms. When that stable door had been locked, gun-shops would begin to receive as much attention from midrught visitors as fur stores sometimes receive in days of wrfe;ct pl·ac·. A flood of regulations (]V 'ril1f; the manufaciurt', storagC', rdail and wh(JI(!HH.I· traci(' and pdvate POSS('ssjOJ1 (If arms of : 11 ldnd«; w01lld f()J1c)w. TJWIl the police wOllld hav(' to 1)(' :11 HI/·d. By 11wrt it would 1>( possiIJlo for someone wa lking' along a I'Itl('('t to S('(~ a car driv('n by tl woman with two Jnt'JI jll it stop to ask a poliecm:lll 011 point-dllty the' way. While the lad y wn.~ ng, ging tlU' PoliC('Tlmll 011<.' of the m It would . hoot him through the head, and th oth r would quickly coll ct his revolver. 112

THE

OTHER

SIDE

The car would be off at full speed, leaving someone wondering whether he should mention the fact that he had noted the number and description of the car and its occupants, or just forget all about it. Deterioration continues till the public is coerced to boycott those who help the State directly in the maintenance of order. Some services, however, such as posts, telephones, and telegraphs, through which information may leak, would often be more useful in than out of action. The thing develops gradually, and with it there grows a deadening of the public conscience, till murder, arson, and intimidation come to be regarded as part of normal daily life. As a result, those who are not actively against the Government sink into a state of neutrality in which they try to have nothing to do with either f;icie. Soon there is no such thing as I'll bJic opinion. It sounds fantast ic; as if SlIch things could Jl!:vw' Iw within t II(: sphere of British rule. It is, how('vt'r, a fact. Two-thirds of our threcin-one bnpirc, Commonwealth, Colonial and Illdian, arc exposed to a new challenge from within. In a way, these parts are in the middle of til<' next war now. 63

SUB-WAR

H ~nl n - WA

'PTER TV.

" t 1 1. 1 ' .\RV All .

Tn; brkf d "cripti n giw,l1 in 1.11

pr'vious hapt r of th' linc of a lion followed by the other side in sub-war may have made it clear how a police force can be attacked and deprived of the support and co-operation of the public, on which it must depend for success. It may not be as clear why troops should be so ineffectual when called in by the civil power to support the police. There are rules in existence governing the employment of troops in aid of the civil power, part of which is the police. These rules, however, were framed to deal with riot and not with sub-war, and date from the time when there were no police. They fit well enough the case of a crowd standing shoulder to shoulder brandishing sticks or pitchforks and threatening violence unless something is done. Crowds have still to be dealt with occasionally, more 54

MILITARY

AID

particularly in India, during times of religious excitement. Use was made of crowds by sub - war experts in China at Shameen, anton, and at Hankow in 1927 to provoke in id nts. T11 rn1R v rning th u o{ troops in aid £ tIl ivil 1 W'1' a1' b< cl n th common law dut of all loyal subj cts to rally to lhe aid of the magistrates, when called upon to do so, in face of some crisis. The soldiers rally as loyal subjects. The fact that they constitute a disciplined body of men bearing arms is merely incidental, though useful. Those who neglect to rally commit an offence, as do also those on the other side who neglect to disperse peacefully when called upon to do so by a magistrate. If a crowd refuses to disperse at the call of the magistrate, he then reads the riot act, and if the crowd still refuses to disperse and still constitutes a menace to the peace, he may call on the officer commanding the troops to disperse the crowd by force. That, however, means using the troops as a disciplined body under arms and not as a crowd of loyal subjects, all dressed alike. The troops invariably will be weaker in 56

B R I T I S It R U L E,

AND

R EB E L L ION

numbers t han the crowd. Therefore the :ffi ress so · cIose t h at a sen es of tussles for posses . SIOn of ' , th e soldlers weapons can begin. Were that allowed to happen, the crowd could by f f orce o numbers annex the weapons belonging to the troops. So, once the magistrate h auth?rised the officer to act, and if the crow~ contI~ues to be a menace, there has to be shootmg. But the law insists that the officer may use on~y enough force to meet the object, the restoratIOn of order. If it turns out that he used more force than was necessary, he will have committed an offence. These COllunon law, common-sense rules do ~ery well for old-fashioned or primitively organIsed protests or riots on the part of the ruled. But something more up to date is required to deal with sub-war. In that fOim of riot or insurrection the perfOimers no longer stand in a . crowd, shoulder to shoulder, brandishing stIcks. or pitch~orks. They remain dispersed but. Just as notous, and though dispersed, retam ~ t~e cohesion of a crowd by virtue of orgamsahon. It is the cohesion of the thing that has to be brok('l1 in order t o restore "rOOT.

SUB - W AR

MILITARY

AID

While any part of H.M. Forces may be called upon to aid the civil power on land, including the Royal Navy, the burden of that duty falls naturally, in the main, upon the infant ry. It is not easy to hunt a lurking rebel out from under a bed with a tank, or with an armoured car. It is proposed therefore to follow the fortunes of an infantry battalion, acting in aid of the civil power, under conditions of sub-war. It is proposed also to assume that the civil power has decided to do what it almost always does decide to do, that is, use the troops in support of the police. The first thing that is likely to happen to a battalion is that it will be spread over a county, and remain spread till reinforcements eventually arrive. There have been cases of a battalion about five hundred strong finding as many as ten detachments. It may, however, be lucky and have to find only three or four. Now, a battalion, under conditions of international war, for which it normally trains, is a thing which has a width of one mile and a depth of one mile. A whole county is therefore rather a strain. In the first place, each detachment has to protect itself. That means that many more men have to be used up in protective duties 57

BRITISH

RULE,

AND

than would be the case were the battalion all together. in one billet. In the second place, the feeding arrangements cause complication. The tentacles of that great octopus, the Treasury, ev rywhere. Its control has greatly complicat d the feeding of troops. Part of th m n's food, bread and meat, is supplied to them by ontro.ct. 111. otll r part, which mak 's th' oniract part atab] " bu tt 1', ira, sugar, and vcgdabl 5, has to b' bought hy .m nus of :1.n allowance of money, wh i h v, nes from month to month with the cost of living. II: order to supply the contract part, military vehlcl s have to go daily from the battalion headquarters to each detachment and back. In order to supply th other part , little shops of the N.A.A.F.I. , an organisation with a monopoly for the supply of t hese things to all three Services, have to be set up at each det achm~nt. T~ese shops may buy locally and charge pnces which may not fit the regulation costs. Anyhow, this daily perfollnance entails movement on roads, and that, under conditions of sub-war, means protective escorts. Then there are such domestic accidents as courts-martial. If a soldier does something 68

SUB-WAR

REBELLION

MILITARY

tli

•

AID

at the other end of the county, he has st ar nbgought with all the witnesses, to head. Th to b e r , t for a summary of eVIdence. en, qualr ers week later a court is assembled for ' d' t t Per lapS. 1a and in come officers from IS an the t fla, . ' d back come all the Wltnesses agam. S th par t 5, an That all requires more escorts: 0 e mere business oC living scatter · d drams the strengt~ oC a uattal ion enormo usly, and not much 1S left t o provide striking forces to advance the cause, the restoration of order. . Meanwhile what of the police, whom tll troops arc s~pposed t o be suppo~ting. It soon becomes noticeable that they contmue to protect the stations in which they live, just as before. They continue to move about in patrol formations. In fact, they continue to behave ~s soldiers and not as police. The only gam appears to be that soldiers are close at hand to rescue the police if anything goes wrong, if, for example, their stations are attacke~. The two organisations remain quite distinct ~ respect of pay, living, and supplies. There lS, in fact, a great deal of overlap and waste of energy. A few examples may help to make clear what actually happens when troops are in support of 69

BRITISH

R U LE ,

AND

REBELLION

the police. In Ireland the O}' . Ice sometImes asked for military escorts const ables had to go rou d w en one or two to serve summonses for n a country district non-pa)11ne t f a popular form of defiance n 0 t axes, Th e first expedition would be r ~£ go:vernment. on t .he county and leavl'ng car(1s. ather hke calling The summonses IHwmg been delivered and th en would come a a thPause woul d ensue, . no er r ques t f escorts t o go aJl ro l ' or more . 'd un( agam and . IV I uals for not 01 . arrest md T ) yrng the summo as a rule produced ' nses. hat wanted persons w~o ~~su~t, £01' none of the aught. . S llj)l
h

t

. . So, next I imc, the militar hit . ldcn of taking em l't y on the bnght Iwoo Th y tool- " Sll e at a ch rry instead of

' " 'Par lorry 1 . cal~mg, In~( \ltd of 'U$l t ,. ,w len they went ortL '1cs of rumit lin' }.',' so vmg n. summomi, be I (t(l d jllto tI glO~sly ~ndcrvnlued, would 111 ' honse dtherl(,IV~~?' ~vhllc 11\ \ good-wife of hlridly. It waS I1U ! more oiLen, abused if tn tfnny hnlldhl JUs a gl~~1e r \~Jy, which, humour, always cnd~~~d, SPl( cd wlth ~ little the l"quirec1 Co. h th III III producllon of protested all alon~ tha~t1~~ lhe good-wife had man, absent somewhere, kept all tI1e money . rIhen the furniture ,

i

,t :

60

SUB - WAR

MILITARY

AID

would all come out of the lorry and on would go the party to the next house of call. Inst ead of gratitude, h owever, the inventor of this simple method of attaining results would be loaded with abuse for irregular methods. In the end, the police would be told to go and be silly by themselves as it seemed to mal<e no difference to the result, their way , whether they had escorts or not. A worse example of successful irregularity arose over illegal cattle grazing, Twice the police asked for military aid to remove cattle which had been driven on to the excellent grazing lands of an absentee landlord. Twice the military had ejected the cattle, though as cattle removers they were not very expert. One drive had certainly removed the cattle from the lands of Sir Michael Muchabsent, but had left half of them in the middle of some stancling crops belonging to a perfectly innocent third party. At the third request for help to remove the same cattle once more, the officer concerned look a,tine of his own. He sent for the agent, took h1m to a field where the rebel cattle were placidly grazing, put a Bible in his hand and heard him swear that the field belonged to Sir 61

B R I TIS H

R U L E,

AND

REB ELL ION SUB-WAR

Michael, that the cattle did not, and that the fences were in order. He then shot three b t

MILITARY

AID

under the noses of a patrol and converse in quite a normal way, but the soldiers would not know whether the Arabic noises meant, " Congratulations on your marriage. I hope her face and figure justify the price you paid," or "Pay fifty piastres to the Red Spear before curfew to-night for opening your sh~p yeste.rday, or the Red Spear will be repamted WIth your blood." These patrols in the heat of the sun, day after day, without any definite result, or indication of a result, wasted time and bored the troops to distraction. Frequently the Palestine police asked for military help to surround some village and arrest anned men known to be harboured by its inhabitants. Frequently the help was given, but always the villagers knew all about it in plenty of time. Once notices in English were found on the house doors, "Please do not disturb the contents more than is absolutely necessary." Inside every house the gear was all laid out as if for a kit inspection. The reception was immaculate. a perfect example of the thumb, with four fingers extended, applied to th(~ aquiline, . • . 'J ht! trouble alway. Wa!f that the CivIl a?!hontil anti the police, and wt (Ji all the mlhtary,

dead, and raIsed a pandemonium of corres A"d 1ik pond ence. n ~CI ent e that, if properly handled by the. parliamen~ary' section of the other side, can raIse a questIOn III the House. "Is it true that on the 20th of May last twenty valuable cow~, the prop~rt.Y of John Sweeny, James CaSSIdy, and William 0 Bn'en all fa ' , lIllers m a small w~y at Ballybluff in the' County of Hooey, which cattle had strayed into the fields of ~ certain Sir Michael Muchabsent, through negligence to keep fences in proper repair, were shot, wounded, maimed, and left to die by soldiers under the command of an officer? If true, what diSCiplinary action has been taken or is being taken ? " , In Palestine the police, backed by the government, dema~~ed, ~rge numbers of troops for duty as antr-IntImidation patrols. The Arab shop~ were then all shut as part of the ' strike, ' and 1t wa<; thought that the own fS were only pnvcntNj from O)II'ning tlJl·if ba.ck-doof'!. at 11':1<;1, If) trru/l., by irJlirlJidnUolJ . SII 1/11{)1'~ W( H~ t/l'WIl •.1 11m I ilit '.1/1'/ II; II) :"di illti/nit/utl' W/Hl1 1'VI J IbId JIHIY "" , "WI) I\J;"I'I lIlil)/d 1/11'1'/' Hli

01 I

JJ In '1' I <; II

It

[J

r, l~,

AN

J)

JU~.u ~ L 1. ! 0 N

SUB-WAR

(kaJ~ with Ole absolutely TcHablc information 1(;(.(;JVl;t! fJ(Jm b()m~ St:Crct source. Whi1e 11

MILITARY AID

police, or because part .of the police ~'S in ympathy with the (,ther SIde, and so unrelIable, for example, the bulk of the Arab part of l)alestine police. The i(~ea i'l f~n(~mentally unsound. Police only come mto ~Ion In normal time'S when some illegal act IS done.. They react to action. The initiative li~ wIth ~he law-breakers. But because the pollce reactlon is usually successful, as long as they have behind them the goodwill and support of the ublic and because the law-breakers are not p , . t 1 united in a common purpose, there IS con to over the law-breakers by the police. In w,ar, however, and sub-war is a form of war, re~C~I?n to action leads nowhere. It leaves the Imtlative to the other side and is purely defensive. It may prevail in the end by wearing t~e other side down, but that will take a long hme and is an expensive stupid way of restoring order; in fact, the way of attrition. That method callously disregards the neutral, the nOIln~ citizen, the majority, all in amongst whom thIS bewildering sub-war is waged. When at last the clash of ideas between dispersal of force to aid the police. and c~n­ centration of force to make it effectlve begIns • to go in favour of concentration, there arlses

:.s the

fyr",wrJtum Cfffn~prmll(:n(,;.(;, (Jr by confcr£..'llC(l M ArM" (;mp/r}y<:d in a dibtrict Of police "ff!C(;' wuu ld s-,jjp away and jnfoml the Jr}cal scout; Of 1~ bm,nc11 of the youHI movement, and the !,flb-waf tnachincry of warning would at once be S(:t in motion, The only hope was and

stj~I is, t~at the B: itish recipient of the absolutely relIable mformatIOn should take it straight to the local military commander, who should then take action without delay or reference to anyon~ else. The information must be kept in reliable hands. In countries like Palestine or India, where civil officials or police ' officers may be natives of the country, the only reliable hands under the conditions of sub-war are British. Action must then be prompt and based on a simple plan, or the other side will be warned in time, as always happened in Palestine. The truth is that the idea of using troops in sub-war to support the police does not lead anywhere. It never gets the police right back to duty as police, because the people are no longer supporting and co-operating with the

65

64

•

•

~

BRITISH

RULE,

AND

REBELLION

a new difficulty. The policy of the civil power is always to hold every district or every county, in spite of the fact that only centres of population and the main communications between them are really being held. All the rest of the country, the fields, the bills, the woods, and the villages, are really uncontrolled, except when columns of troops invade for brief periods. It is in these uncontrolled areas, most of the country in fact, that the armed rebels lurk. From them they emerge to shoot or ambush, on information supplied by their unarmed friends in the towns. The new clash of ideas is still between concentration of force and dispersal of force. On the one hand is the idea of giving up for a while what is of less importance and concentrating on a part in order to bring it street by street and parish by parish under really effective control. There were counties in Ireland and sub-districts in Palestine where it mattered little if the rebels were left for a while to play about among themselves as long as they were cut off from the rest of the country. The policy of holding on obstinately has always been followed in sub-war. It leads to am1istice and not to a clear decision in favour •

•

66

SUB-WAR

MILITARY

AID

ment The methodical re-establishn of gover· bIb t rule step by step would e s ow u . 'bl ment 0 f'th the advantage of VlS1 e progress, sure Wl . ht h ds But and with the initiative in the ng . an . . Id require considerable remforcements, 1t wou' t Id probably have to be combined beCause 1 wou . . with holding all centres and commumcahons for political reasons.

••

•

I

•

67

•

I

SU J3-WAR -

CHAP T ER V. THE C 1 V II.

P OW E

n.

THE authority responsible for co-ordinatinO' all t~e n:eans a~~IabIe for making war of b any kmd IS the CIVIl power. In international war the civil power normally delegates the fullest powers to a commander-in-chief in the war zone. But in the case of sub-war, a case where strife takes place in among the people of the country which the civil power itself is responsible for ruling, such delegation has disadvantages. However, as long as it retains all power in its own hands, the civil power alone is responsible for success or failure. The civil power then is responsible for arranging that its police and any part of H.M. Forces, charged with the duty of aiding it, act in harmony towards the attainment of the common object. The civil power is responsible for the plan. Last, but not least, it is responsible for ensuring that it itself moves in harmony with the police

ClVJT.

POW1:tR

unci 1.], military. Three ~)(~r1ies have. ~o move ill step logethe1', the CIvil . Ul11.h O.rItLCS, t~e poli 'C , and ILM. 11'01' ~s. J)~mc\llt though 1t is t o get real co-operatlOl.), wllhout was~~ and overlap, betweell the pO~lce and the .m~htary) they have features 111 common, 1t is sh11 l ant ., t th more difficult to weld three authon tles. oge cr. The civil power is particularly puzzllllg. The history of sub-war leaves it uncertain whet~er the civil power regards itself as a body whIch really takes part in the struggle to. restore complete order, or whether it regards ltself. as kind of referee between its own forces whIch ~ can control, and those of the other side which it cannot control. One or two examples may serve to show how puzzling is the attitude of the civil. power. The first example is taken from Ireland m 19~0, and deals, not with the heads of the three bodies, civil, police, and military, but with the extreme and relatively unimportant finger-tips. It shows what may happen if the three do not work together. It shows how the civil power can leave a whole county in a state of vagueness as to who represents it, if anyone. It shows also the attitude of the civil power when any other body takes action in its absence.

,

S UB - WA R

TIlE

,

68

60 ,

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REB ELL ION

In this case a state of sub-war existed in th . e county wIthout any doubt. The police had already lost a few isolated police stations which had been burnt to ensure that they not reoccupy them. An infantry battalion was scattered all over the county in support of the police, and the civil power was represented presumably, by one resident magistrate. Thi~ resident magistrate lived for safety with one of the infantry detachments at the far end of the county. All ~he other magistrates (].P.'s) but one had resIgned, voluntarily or under intimidation. The one who still held out was busy trying to recover his son, aged about seven, who had been kidnapped. The battalion never knew what the resident magistrate was doing, where he went, or when d .where he held his courts. The police likeWISe went about their own routine affairs in their own time and in their own way without any reference to those who possessed almost all the protective power in existence in that county. Then, suddenly, all in one day, the penalty for this lack of co-ordination in face of well-organised sub-war had to be paid. The proceedings began with the receipt at battalion headquarters of an anonymous warn-

did

c:n

70

SUB-WAR

THE

CIVIL

POWER

ing, misspelt and ill-written: "Let the one that goes in the little black box beware, the bad ones are out to murder him." This was taken to refer to the resident magistrate who went bout the county in a very old two-seater car, a . not unlike a box-Ford. The adjutant at once took the note to the local police inspector in the market town a mile from the workhouse which housed battalion headquarters and a company. On the way there ~e p~sse~ a car full of police going in the OppOSIte directlOn. The police inspector, lately transferred from Ulster and strange to the county, had had a similar warning. The adjutant then learnt from him for the first time that the resident magistrate was due there that very day at about eleven o'clock to hold a court. He also learnt that the police car, which he had passed, was on its way to take pay to another police detachment stationed in another market town about ten miles away on the road by which the resident magistrate was most likely to come. In addition, he was told that the police always took the pay on that particular day of the week and set out at that time in order to be back in time for their mid-day meal. • The adjutant's hair was beginning to nse 71

•

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REB ELL ION

by this time, so in all haste he sped back t the workhouse, and there it rose still high e 0 A corporal was .s~anding in the yard hOlding : horse and explallllllg to the commanding offic r that he had just received an urgent warni: from a young woman while down at the smith g getting the horse shod. The girl had seeme~ very agitated when she told him that she had seen a car pass up the road and thought it was T:d Scott that was driving it. She begged hIm to go back at once and get the soldiers out. "The boys are all out and there's an ambush on now between here and Dunbog, and Ted'll get. killed," she had said. The corporal explallled that Ted and the lady in question were on very good terms. The adjutant was for a moment puzzled when he noticed that the said Ted, a RA.S.C. driver, was seated in the military Crossley, into which soldiers were hurriedly climbing. Then he remembered that the driver of the police car, for some reason, also wore khaki. He also made a mental note of the fact that Dunbog was the place to which the police had gone with the pay. By this time all was ready, and two cars swung out of the gate and sped away westward, a 72

SUB-WAR

THE

CIVIL

POWER

-Ford with an officer, a Lewis-gun, and two b~ d t · · men, followed by a Crossley ten er can alllmg cer with six riflemen a total of two officers anaffi . d. and eight soldiers, not countmg the two Hvers. This feeble force was followed by a party of forty men on foot unde~ a third officer. . The business of findmg an ambush WIthout first being found by it is tricky. However, about half-way to Dunbog shots were heard ahead, and both cars accelerated to fu~l speed. Rounding a bend they almost dashed mto the police car halted in the mi~dle of the arro: v road. Its driver was hangmg out, trailing m the dust, with a foot caught in the clutch pedal. A policeman sat in the ba~k p~rt of the :ar leaning his elbow on the SIde-rail and restmg his chin in his hand. He too was dead, though he did not look it at first sight. Another dead policeman lay in the bottom of the tender, and the rest were strewn about the road beyond the car, some badly wounded. The rebels had almost been caught stripping their victims of their arms and ammunition, and were off in all directions. The soldiers reached the crest of the ridge to the south of the road in no time, leaving one man behind to tend the wounded police, and

.r:

73

B R I TIS H

R U L E,

AND

REB ELL ION SUB-WAR

Scott was ordered to turn his car and go back for a load of the. forty men on foot. Shots by now were commg from all directions b t there was little or nothing for the soldi~rs ~ shoot back at. Even the man on the road b I . . e Ow gl:,mg water to the wounded police was being smped. Then the Lewis-gun fired a burst or two at a group of three armed men in plain clothes dodging across a field, while the rifieme ~red hard into likely patches of Cover. SUddenly~ m less than five minutes, it was all over, the enemy had gone. .A rifle and some carbines were found, together WIth a good deal of ammunition, in the subsequent search. Many pairs of boots were also picked ~p, the other side apparently making better tIme across country without them. The ambush trench was examined, and found Jittered with haversacks, half - eaten rations , bottles , a~d greatcoats, the enemy obviously having lam there all night. But nowhere was there any sign of Scott, and his car remained still in the middle of the road, nose to nose against the riddled police car. Meanwhile, back at the workhouse messages had gone out along tho railway teicgraph, into which the military tel 'phones tapped, to stop 7i1.

•

•

•

THE

CIVIL

POWER

the resident magistrate and the police with t.he ay at Dunbog. Replies came that the police had already delivered the pay and gone, and that the magistrate had not ~assed throu~h. A h had not arrived to hold hIS court by mldd s ~atrols were sent out along all likely roads f::~ the other end. One of these patr.ols found his car by a level crossing fifteen miles :ho~t of Dunbog, with blood all 0:rer the dnver s but no sign of the magIstrate. Just as t sea, df this news was received an officer returne rom the scene of the ambush to say that Scott h.ad been found well wounded in among some whms and brambles. He had gone rushing off to join in the battle, and run full i~to a frightened rebel who shot him and fled, Just as he fired his revolver. So he, the man for whose sake the only lucid warning had been given by any of the inhabitants was the only military casualty. That evenin~ the question of punishment was considered. There was no hope for any of the wounded police, and the resident magistrate was probably dead alrf'ady. Ni~e good men were dead or dying. The pumshment was prompt and severe. Dwellings close by ~he scene of the ambush, the inhabitants of whIch had 11 'd, instead of bringing warning, had been 76

BRITISH

RULE

'

AND

R

EBELLION

an m eetmg-places in th

.

0 .

ing m arket to.vllS were burnt tha~ n~lghbour_ search was made for 5e'Y'et1 out £ mght. A rebel1earicI'S on tbe intdJi J~ twenty-one • t geru-.e 1&1: and fl", ' I VJW!(;$, lrml1 which they had fI~l' u t-1 r Ons~, t ( iWe.,(,"r was (.4" ,,1-.t h ' were burnt. • ' W f , Y ' anfl S (it. ~ ~t (Lj;Y a1) (Jt'l'~ W'''''' 1·"..... • 1 1 • . """'.n ..'X an' tel 5~lVlrtg 1Ju~ jntwJAt~tnb; j,m. . h P'''' r;<,

. . 1or ~dJVC, n famg

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rong r SIde, an I ther \Va peace for many weeks Band t . were c h ' S rymg to arrange ambushes S

they had if any ambush took 76

SUB-WAR

THE

CIVIL

POWER

place near their homes. Things went reasonably well till the civil power intervened again and published a decree allowing inhabitants to claim for injuries inflicted on them by the police or military maliciously, that is, illegally by the standards of nonnal times, 'That decree could wdl llave waited till the war was won, th€; GovernnKl1t paid in any case, l%uOO then, it was stupid and did much harm. Ambushes bc:camc fashionable again, bc:cause nobody who could get a nice new farm for a rotten old one took any further interest in his common law duty to give warning of intended murder, Iwcnts in Palestine in 1936 made the attitude of the civil power still more difficult to understand. The Government of that country seemed to be alwuyti trying to prevent the police and lLM, Forces from vet' doing more than just dl'fend themselves. It S 'nled to have no desire to ::itop sub-war and re-establish British authority in the country. Even after th armistice of October 1936 its attitude remained obscure. Judging from the way in which it changed its mind, it s emed to be uncertain about its purpose. One example arose out of the shooting of a loyal Arab police inspector who was on the 77

•

B R I TIS H

R U L E,

AND

REBELLION

SUB-WAR

gunmen's list because he had b . een so loy I H e arnved one morning by car at his ~. office and was about to step 0 t police u , when 0 or more gunmen opened fire wou d' .ne and his driver. A crowd im~ediatnl mg him d t e y surged 0 cover the escape of th roun was a small Arab town not difficult to control or search, so at once a twenty-two hour c f d' .. ur ew . was ~mpose., WIth nulitary help to make it effectIve, as It was believed that the till h'd' . gunmen were I mg m the place. s After being in force for a very short time the curfew was taken off. A curl . ' t" . eWIsa res nctIon, Imposed in the main on innocent persons. But, against that, must be set the fact of ~he existence of gunmen with their revenge lists and assassinations and the urgent need ~o :liminate them before they succeed in establishing terrorism. However, the attitude of the British Cabinet with regard to Palestine was equally difficult to understand. In September, after sub-war ~ad flourished for five months in the Holy Land, It announced that it reaffirmed its previous decision and was resolved to re-establish British authority in Palestine and resort to stern 78

•

THE

CIVIL

POWER

measures. It would be interesting to know when, if ever, it had made the decision described as previous. In any case, it never resorted to stern measures. The British Government's real object was to get a Royal Commission out to Palestine. The obstacle in the way was its own statement that no Commission would be sent till order had been restored. It seems that it never was the intention of the British Government to restore order in Palestine. Instead, that was to be done by the Arab leaders who had started and were still controlling the disorders, but the obstacle in their way was their statement that they would not stop the • strike' till all their demands had been met. So the Arab kings were brought into action to advise the Arab leaders to stop the • strike.' The stoppage of the • strike' then released the starting gate on the Royal Commission. In fact, the Arab kings saved the faces of the Arab leaders, and they in turn saved the faces of the British Cabinet. Thus an armistice was arranged, the Arab rebels retaining and maintaining still their organisation, arms, funds, boycott, and intimidation. It seems that the civil power in sub-war 711

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nev 'f hll ~ th£' e;; ame ob joct in vIew a~ its poliee and militnry iorccf>. The tlrmed forces aim at the restoration of order. The civil power aims at a compromise, beginning with an armistice. In I920 a very important British Cabinet minister in a speech likened the troubles in Ireland to a legal contest between two obstinate bone-headed litigants. They hammer away and hammer away, progressing from court to court, neither budging an inch, till, at last, the mounting costs cause first hesitation and then loss of nerve. Then the only sensible parties in the dispute, the lawyers, gain at last a hearing, and the case is settled by agreement, as it rrrlght have been settled from the very beginning wlth a ntUe (:'(flf'fTt}(jfi·senw give anrl take. 11 11at UfWitar' suTI rev ~ ls if" min' of the ~t1f :I ,a!Mt · lIitt, t gar 1 V, flIt! 1,"W~r

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the civil P{)wt.-'1' is wise. 1AJI,;, 1t ha.~ ~'n suggested, is a perpetual ("f iort to b~] ance con~ flicting forces, perpetual because of cons~ant change and moveme?t.. Th?se ~ho belie~e that the civil power IS nght m domg what It does in sub-war may well point out that just what the civil power in fact does, is to balance conflicting forces, and to do so it must stand back and adopt the attitude of a referee. Those who support that policy must t~en admit ~~at the civil power is following a policy of conc~lia­ tion and not one of sanctions in face of rebellious resort to force within its own sphere of rule. The question still arises whether that policy is wise. It seems to ignore the principles of peace. The long-drawn-out. sub-war strug~e in Sot-Ith Irdand did not nd Wlth the compromlse

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to . Lhlhk oJ: o:'~l' 'Hsing vi<~ws r: 'g'ardblg' the polIcy of the clvll power. BltL it is doubUul wisdom jl1Ht to usc tIt'm as a
distinction between just force and unjust force. It relegates the armed forces to the position of hired men, mercenaries, who bother not at all about the merits of the cause for which they fight. It removes that vital clement of the spirit so particularly vital in war of any kind, an clement which can almost turn a pound weight into a ton, moving with the velocity of light. It snggc!'lts that the civil power is not !'-iuro that its cause is a just canse ; that it us s the armed (or 'CS, noi to s n rc the right, but to snve it undowl" its retn at. The poll y of the civil power s '('illS cynicaJ rather than wis.

CHAPTER VI. SUll·wAn

· TUB

LAW.

S 110

82

THE facts of history, as far as sub-war is concerned, indicate that the civil power behaves as a conciliatory referee between the armed forces of the Crown on the one hand, and armed or unarmed rebels on the other. There is, however, another referee in the field the law. The civil referee has a tendency to rush about the field penalising in the main what are sometimes termed the forces of law and order. The legal referee, on the other hand, is a stationary body, which only gives a decision when someone, lIsually a member of the oth r side, appeals to it. TIles' two r '[(,fees arc generally at loggerheads, a fact which addfl to the confusion on 0111' side. Referencc} has already been made in Chapter 1. to 'The Times' leading article "The Palestine Inquiry," which contains the words, "the notorious conflict between the Executive and a section of the Judicature." 83

11 II I " J 1'1 I/'

A N Ij

II tt I, '".

I( "

II It, I, I, 'I <1 N

/£:l1 l1tpb1 till! I'l' glV\'1l of IJ Hl lltll(lI' Hl Hl( tl f nfl" I1I'H itl fl (,lll1ld n[tl'l'll t'll l'H ('"rill'('. OfUdllll " of: oursc, flub-war iH U 101'111 of pelleo; for e. ttmplc, :11'111 'd l'ebd:'l do J10t hnvc to amply with t he l:1ws and usages of war 0:1 ~tlnd. by ca~'rying their arms openly, wearing distinctIve uruforms to prevent confusion with th~ non-c~mbatant inh~bitants, or by treating pnsoners ill the recogrused manner. Militarily sub-war is a mixture. Soldiers are only on active service for death, wounds, and discipline. That means that if a man is killed his dependants may receive a pension; if a soldier is wounded and badly disabled he receives free treatment , and may also get a pension; if a soldier commits a military offence when engaged in sub-war he can be punished as severely as in international war, that is, more severely than in peace. But as the soldier is not on active service for wear and t('~r of clothing and gear he pays the difference between the strain of sulr-war and the normal w(~r of peace. LegaJIy sub-war is ~~(;nt. The law rernains the law. u..l1letirfle:'~ 1111: dvU VJwc1" which makes the Jaws dm.r,~ tf'J.-:tlJ tfJ fitui t1 . f'" ial df.-7DaJid'J

fA M11~ 'If~ 1 ~ it hl

iII

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wl II it made lliJUGI ilJt; a thvtitj' u j

IHI H W r. It

it. even susP 'lltiS 1110St of the law, Ui) it did in parts of lrelnnd when it declared martial law. It is when it docs either of t hese things that the judges, the lords of the law, are liable to fall out with the civil power. . In Ireland judges came into districts in which martial law was in force, presumably to deal only with cases which had no connection with sub-war, such as disputes regarding property or inheritance, or crimes in the ordinary course of life, such as burglary or theft. But quite often on arrival, after settling on the bench and adjusting robes, a judge would announce that because he was there and functioning there was no justification whatever for the suspension of the normal law by the thing called martial law, which is no law at all. A statement of that kind delivered from the bench amounted to a claim on the part of the judge to decide whether the civil power was justified in altering the normal laws in such a way as to give itself power to compete with sub-war. Whatever the merits of the claim a.~ a claim might be, th/~ practical died was, lJiJU, in frdaoo anfl in J'a1t~tincJ a battl~ m;(I It O,'dcr ill em UIeil.

I

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i Wet: n t hi: tW(} fl:itt'(;(;5, with marked ill-(.1 lect ~(j

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nUT" E,

SOJ3-WAR

on tIle ahility oI anyone on our Hide to co

Slice '!;sfully with sub-war. mp(:tc If:(~ m tl1(! ,miHtary oint 0.( .view, the claim was a c1aun wInch took the rodIlary brealh ' .

n bnttn.holl had .to bo romovcd from pursuit of tho :-Val: t? pro~HI guards of honour, guards on th . Judgo s resld nco, and patrols in the streets

Tn TrCJ1anrL a man conil(:mncd to death by a military court could he taken out of the harul<; of the military authorities by the order of a judge. Here is a casco One day in 1921 a car patrol escorting a commanding officer on inI

all~ about the court hOUS6, in ord r to make qUlt.e sure that th judge reached his bench and havmg rea~hed it, staye~ there safely to jUdge. UnquestIonably, martlallaw or any less drastic change in the normal law should not be imposed ?nl~ss ~ state of affairs exists so grave as to JustIfy It. Assuming a grave state of affairs to exist, and even assuming that troops are available in numbers enough to ensure the safe sit~ing of any number of judges in the middle of It, no progress can be made without witnesses. Even with ~tnesses, difficulties remain. They may swear m scores that a man accused by the police or military was seen and spoken to by them at a place miles away from the scene of the alleged offence, at the very time it was said ~o ho.:o u:cn committed. The presence of a JIIdgo 1:-; J1elthcr proof that n I:!Huati{JJI i H lJJ)ntJaI, lWt' U CUI'C [or gub-war. tiO

'fHE I,AW

spection was ret urning to quarters. The patrol was moving in formation with about a quarter of a mile between cars nlong a winding country road in brilliant weather. An officer, sitting beside the driver in the leading car, noticed a cyclist some distance ahead, and noticed that when they rounded the next bend they had gained on him a little. He thought nothing of it, and his interest was not aroused till he saw the cyclist look over his shoulder and then bend over his handlebars and pedal for all he was worth. Round the next bend lay a stretch of straight road with the cyclist in full view. As the car gained on him he looked over his shoulder again, wobbled, and then threw something over the hedge on his right, and soon after something else went flying over a dry stone dyke on his left. A minute latcr the cyclist was overtaken and hclcl, while soldiers went mnning back to find what he had thrown away. They returned with two smull parcell) and JHtt1
I

BR I T I SH

RULE,

AND

REBE LLIO N

twel~e roun~s of ammunition to fit it. The pantmg cyclIst looked round a ring of f · h' b aces 11 t a s armg at 1m, ut no one spoke. Then h~ was bundled into the car and taken away. A~out t hree weeks lat er the cyclist, a nice] ookt~g ~o?th of . ~bout nineteen years of age, was 111 JaIl awmtmg execution, h aving been ondc'mnccl to d ath hy a m ilitary court. His cO ll.n~cl was in Dublin playing his las t card nn n.pp n.l for a. wIit of habeas corpus, This: he pleaded. is t he case of a young man, almost a boy, who set out one day on his bicycle to ...-isit friends in a m a rket town about fifteen miles dista nt from his home. A friend, another young man, h aving h eard that he was going, asked him to take two small parcels to deliver t o a third young man, known to both of them. The lad consented. Then, while cycling along in t he depth of the country about half-way to his destination, he h ear d t he w und of a car lJ(,ldm J hjm, ami looking ovet h i:, ~hollld er saw t h tLf it Wtf~ mjlili1fY j f'nd/'r , '/ J1<'11 V(,fY tl)fJ li', fdy II(, IOll l hb Tl/ 'r v /' lIlJ1l t';l:d II} Wt awny. r

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(Iud

THE

SUB-WAR

, I

LAW

he could not escape he made matters worse by t hrowing both packages away in full view of the approaching car. First, doubt, and then a t error of being searched, drove him blindly to incriminat e himself, That is his crime and his only crime, a foolish yielding to fear, excusable in one so young. There is no proof that he knew what he was carrying. He never knew nor even suspected that his friends had any connection with the secret societies which by force and the use of arms have been t errorising the country for years. All his short life he has behaved honourably, free from any stain whatever on his character, always well spoken of. And what good can it do to add one more death to a list too long already. The writ was granted and the youth was released, a free man. There are doubtless many people who would ask that same question, what good can it do to add one more death to the Jj ~ t, and be ready with the answer. DoubtI" 'OH tlw YOUtll'$ (;()un bcl was sincere. But pH)"ably ol :itJH!/' lll~ nor t1WHC who would a.-;k Ihi' qlH's titltl had c VI ' r 1;1'1'11 ltrHlUWr youth, aged ;"111111 HilJdl'l · tI, hilling df'ad ill ihn back of 11 11I ,lil I' II 'w/(-,', " '1'11 i"l~ Iii'! (-II )Ow 1111 th· mil , willi III l Id" ( 1/1 /IWd ill hili IHtllt!; 111/1' BVI; f HII

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f~ it a {( ',tfi r f,fo':rl>: tfiet() I1~J,& eat, I orl~ I1k~ f(.MI.fJ;'ffr4 f I~,t. h1tije J (It,Tie, ~/f,~t.. fl~W(} ( M'If:/ It /r~e U~r(j in ttl 11M t I~t 'l'iffl£.'TJ tf'0: )1(" thfi'J

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~Vd1~ '11M;· Uw@t snl>- M lJ~1/1 boon r ~®N~ 1M t h(} f) M NLT t (ff tW() ye~m~, ~1;tJd (,'V{:ry iTlh;,b;t~ TJt (If UI(} (;(mntry kMW (p ilte wd] 111 (: pCNllty f()r h '1ng flmnd in P()s~(;!isi()n (If ~trm~. The youth him!; ,jf knew it well enough whim he looked into t ho ,yC!; (Ii tll ' &()ld jeri; standing round him,

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~~;{'/hl':{r-V';"(,ft/t '" ': lUrAy" ~!t'~AA-~A... /1 ,:4~ it/; ;;rt;3. 11/A "j(fIP{.~VP:' ~;tJ r:.I'...;:' tt, J~L.§, {ff,.;..;r.i':t~., U, wfd (.)(".1"; rnore (It.At tfF tf~ ~u . ~, s.wfft J>f.()l~q: (;-1 trl~1, M;1',u;11(;l;f ;,tJ 0<'1 ext(;:Utk.>TJ rMal'i~ uJt n~vIn~ t6 wi ( 1J311 a, fl f ll,.<;n WIre, instl211 ( ) t 0fJf;., ('f£.

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just o.1L '1' the parcels hud beon opened. Had th '50 soldier!> been asked for th eir verdict ~llld sentence then, tho answers would have been unanimous, and the lad would have died. If they had been asked, months later, whether they wanted the fellow to be hanged, they would probably have said they were no longer interested, provided that he was kept safe till the war ended. There is a psychological period in such matters. If that period is missed, truth becomes overgrown and hidden by weeds, like false sentiment, special pleading and propaganda,

fn lre1~1 Jd the organhatlfJ!} wa.s bad , in Pakstine ftf~-n ycarl-l J~d£'1" it WM wor~, In l'afc.c;tine, in 19.36, evecytlling eonnected with t1I(; law seemed to suffer from something akin t o arthritis, mental and physical. Why the baWe hetween the civil referee and the legal referee orIginated, goodness knows. However, it not only originated but developed into a war. The Emergency H.egulations for some reason annoyed the legal referee, and, as a result, many of the acts done by the civil power or its agents under them were ruled to be ultra vires in a way which made them appear to be wanton abuse of power rather than illegal use of power. The machine just did not work; its component parts failed to fit . Not only did the law's delays become a byword, but the law's ways aroused ridicule. Some Arabs once threw a bomb into a military

90

91

B R I T IS H

R U L E,

AN D

REB E

LL10N

billet and were caught It tool- bet \. ween thre d f . an . our months to get the case heard b e m.agt trate . By that time, all the a wItnesses had left P alestine for service eIs hary ew ere so t h ese dangerous rebels were let loos I' t k h ' e. t 00 - mont s t o bnng rebels t o trial f th or e mur d er 0 f po li ce or soldiers . . The courts did not ~ppear to be organised at all for the administratIon of speedy justice. The law's peculiar ways gave rise to a story not a tru~ s~o~, but one which aptly illustrat~ the peculiantIes. An Arab, taking part in an engagement with troops, was captured and brought up on a charge of firing on H.M. Forces. The p~~cipal. witness was a corporal, who, after glvmg hIS evidence, was asked from the bench, "Did the prisoner fire at H.M. Forces? " At once the indignant answer rolled out in broad Scots, "No, sir, he was firing at the Cameron Highlanders." The Arab left the court a free man. The difficulties in the way of obtaining a conviction were serious. An Arab taken in a fight was found to be suffering from a wound on the right side of his face. Close by him was found a rifle with blood on the stock. But he was not found guilty of the charge of shooting

mili!

92

SUB-WAR

THE

LAW

at H.M. Forces, because nobody could swear that he saw that particular Arab shooting at him. It is, of course, a little difficult in battle with modern weapons, which have considerable range, to collect impressions of the personal appearance of opponents, the precise nature of the weapons they use, the direction of their aim and the instances of firing, with enough accuracy to satisfy a court of law, if circumstantial evidence is not taken into account. A police sergeant sitting in the front seat of a car was fired at by an Arab standing so close that he could be identified, without any doubt, by his intended victim. The sergeant thought the fellow was shooting at him and was, quite naturally, taking considerable interest. When the shot was fired the driver and not the sergeant was hit and killed. This all took place in a matter of seconds. The murderer fled, pursued by the police. After a hunt round a number of Arabs were collected, and the sergeant noticed among them the wanted man. Just then more police arrived, having with them a police dog. The dog was taken to the place from which the shot had been fired and took up the trail. It followed round in a half-circle and arrived eventually at the group of Arabs collected by 93

Ij III 'I f {f'H

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d/'" w(mt l

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I1/.1/ 1J1~ [IITIJp:tWf,) IfJl bitt hd. ItJl(~ dOl; pkkl;(/ (Jut ill/' ""' .... "' ~11,(tl "' "".Ll WJltr iJ1(; /.jI~rgeiil1t kru:w to bo ihl: murder'.... At rn "1 h . .. , ., the t Wt, oweVCf, the (,"V1dence of what the d{J had accept ""'l··t . duL1e WM not ,~. .Ll... redneedg eVlilence of fdentmcation to that of one . unsupported by anything else except a c man, 'fh 'd .' orpse. e eVl ence of one WItness was not considered "

"I

I

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.'

to be enough, and the Arab departed free. The difficulties were present also in th . f e preparatlOn 0 cases for trial and in the conduct of cases in court by prosecutors. There were in fact, three difficult fences to surmount; first, the preparation and the framing of the charge, which was liable to be on the light side; then the handling of the case by the prosecutor in court, which was liable to be on the light side also; and finally, the verdict and sentence, if any. The case of a relation of the Mufti illustrates the first difficulty. This individual had once been a Government servant, but he became bitten by Arab nationalism and went off to join the armed bands in the hills. One of these bands was known to be somewhere near Bethlehem, so aircraft went up to look for it. One machine 940

IHl H - W A /' 11j(;ftl;i~1

') Ent 1. A VI

ww-. lilt 1n ill(} f)[()(Ali'''', jl.l<;t a JJ(Jie in thl: fabrk. Next d~.y thlJ ~rdJ Vla~ curried on by infantry. 1?r011l the rnain lorce a dctaciJrnt:nt of a platoon was 1>£.1lt to :move along the crest of a ridge and act as flank-guard.

it

1.1,1'1(1

The ilank-guard platoon, through some slight error in navigation, found itself moving along a valley instead of on the crest of a ridge. In this valley was the armed band, and it saw the platoon coming. The Arab leader at once saw his advantage and quickly posted his men in concealed ambush positions. His orders were that when he gave the signal by opening fire himself, his men, from where they lay on either side of the platoon's line of advance, were to shoot hard and heartily into it. All went according to plan at first. The platoon moved slowly into the jaws of the ambush. The Arab leader fired his signal, and the jaws promptly beat it for home. The platoon then started shooting at the leader and the small party remaining with him. Almost the first shot killed the leader, whereupon the others thought it wise to go. However, the relative of the Mufti was caught. He had managed to get rid of his weapon, but still had several rounds of ammunition on his person. The relative 95

B R I TIS II

,

•

R U L E,

AND

REB ELL ION

proved to be a very voluble prisoner. He held forth on the glories of fighting for one's countr which he had been doing for his, just as ~~ captors were doing for theirs. That, he appeared to assume, created a bond between them. He thought the use of aircraft wa~ a little unfair and explained how h e and his friends had lai~ on their backs and shot at one, only the day before the unfortunate death of his beloved leader. The offence seemed to require a deterrent penalty. However, the prisoner was not charged with firing on the troops, nor with aiding those who had fir d on them, but with being in posses,ion of ammunition. The charge was not a particularly serious one in Palestine. In due curse the prisoner, by now in the hands of the police, was brought before a magistrate, who relea cd him on bail, and that was the last the law aw of him. Sub-war creates a situation which cannot be met by the laws and punishments of ordinary times. There can be no dispute about that fact. Always the civil authorities have to obta.in additional powers. The powers which the Government of Palestine obtained came from the King in Council, in the form of Orders 96

SUB-WAR

•

THE

LAW

in Council. The Emergency Regulations which the Government of Palestine issued were designed to meet the abnormal situation which rebellion had brought into existence. In September 1936 the Cabinet decided that the situation in Palestine was so bad that more troops were needed in the country, and that martial law should be declared at the appropriate moment. To give effect to these decisions and the necessary authority to the Government of Palestine another Order in Council was issued. This Order gave to the High Commissioner in Palestine authority to delegate to the G.O.C. power to make such regulations as necessary to secure public safety and re-establish order. That power was, however, never delegated. Early in 1937 the Courts in Palestine ruled that the September Order in Council had cancelled former Orders in Council, on the authority of which Palestine Emergency Regulations had been issued. Therefore they held that these Emergency Regulations were no longer law. As a result, about a score of rebels awaiting trial were released. Then, in March 1937, yet another Order in Council was issued, this time giving to the High Commissioner power to make regulations 97

G

BRITISH

RULE,

AND

REBELLION

necessary to secure public safety and set up military courts to try cases arising out of them By the March Order in Council the Emergenc; Regulations were reinstated. These facts reveal a considerable amount of confusion in the arrangements, the confusion having a tendency to reduce rather than reinforce power to deal with an abnormal situation. Finally, in March 1937, after the March Order in Council had been issued, the High Commissioner commuted some half - dozen death sentences to imprisonment for life, which in Palestine means something considerably less than a life sentence. The result is that not one Arab rebel captured in alms has suffered death, though some have killed police or soldiers, been tried for the crime, and sentenced to death. A year has not yet elapsed since they killed their victims, but those who killed still live.

98

CHAPTER VII. I

SUB-WAR

MARTIAL

martial law is not law. It is rule by the order of someone with enough force behind him to ensure that his orders will be obeyed. It does not require the issue of a long complicated list of regulations of the nature of D,O,R.A. for the benefit of those who have to obey. It does not even have to be consistent in its action as far as they are concerned. All that is required to start it is a simple decree by the martial law ruler. The shorter the decree the more likely it is to be read and understood by the people. It will inform them that certain persons in the country have banded themselves together to gain by force of anllS, or otherwise by force, what they want, or think that the Government should give them. It will infOI'Ill them also that all persons acting in the manner described, by force of anns, and all persons who assist them REAL

,

LAW.

99

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lJro pnlli . tlr{l j ancl ' l 1I1 i1i 1.\t ' (Hilt. 10 11 , \ Rl. 1risitW ClIII'of III \11 ~ 1 ) I " tIll , I \ t 11\ ~ :\ I'dl ( 1'( \ I' 11\ .0lll1 ' 11 Ill( l ~ lIl(" g '\I I tt'~ \ll l tiU t\1'l W\'\{ I -in tll tl <1 . ' I h tH\' r ' ( s n V(' ( 1 ,\ ( )n~id( 1 \hh till un r 'o llrllsiol\ in I II \11 ,m It'lH\ nt~, th l'fu !'1 io 1 h( ill l It nd 'n h t \ h1 \ I atht r l h Hl t 'ill I \ P \: r l thll " ilh nn al n 1'111t\.1 Hitutdi 11. tn

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iinull .. in March 1 7. o.fl ' r th Mar h rd r in oun il 11 d b n i ued, th High Commi sioner commuted som half - doz n death sentences to imprisonment for life, which in Palestine means something considerably less than a life sentence. The result is that not one Arab rebel captured in alms has suffered death, though some have killed police or soldiers, been tried for the crime, and sentenced to death. A year has not yet elapsed since they killed their victims, but those who killed still live.

el

' Jl A I' TE P VII. S UB - W A R

MA R 1' lAL

L AW .

martial law is nol law. It is rule by the order of someone with enough force behind him to ensure that his orders will be obeyed. It does not require the issue of a long complicated list of regulations of the nature of D.O.R.A. for the benefit of those who have to obey. It does not even have to be consistent in its action as far as they are concerned. All that is required to start it is a simple decree by the martial law ruler. The shorter the decree the more likely it is to be read and understood by the people. It will infonn them that certain persons in the country have banded themselves together to gain by force of anns, or otherwise by force, what they want, or think that the Government should give them. It will inform them also that all persons acting in the manner described, by forc(~ of arms, and all persons who assist them R EAL

1/1/

BRI T ISH

R U L E,

AND

REB ELL ION

in any way whatever, are rebels, and that the penalty for rebellion is death and the forfeiture of all property to the State. The decree may give those who are uneasy about their past two or three days' notice t o surrender themselves to the officers of the martial law ruler, and submit to whatever orders they may issue regarding their futu re. Any other regulations which the martial law ruler might issue would be regulations for the control of his subordinates to ensure a degree of uniformity in action and guide them in the task of bringing the inhabitants to absolute order. There is no need to disclose any of these regulations to the other side, members of which can be left to learn what they are by experience. Real martial law is the rule of a conqueror, like William the First. To hark away back to that kind of rule means putting into reverse, with a jerk, the text, "Out of the strong came forth sweetness," which is to be found on a well-known brand of golden syrup tin, or in Judges xiv. 14. It means switching from the sweet, the honey and the bees, back to the strong, no longer dead but very much alive. It means doing the switch in far less time than it took to progress from the strong to the 100

SU B- WA R

MARTIAL

L AW

sweet, from William the First and his orders, through cust om in the enforcement of orders, to law, and thence to modern law. Real martial law can be enforced, without a doubt, and something not unlike it has been enforced within recent years in some European countries. The question is whether real martial law is a feasible proposition within the British Empire. The crux of the matter is that the real martial law ruler must be in an unchallengeable position. If attention be confined to the Colonial Empire alone, for the sake of simplicity, British policy within that field is directed to educating subject peoples to self-government. That is a noble policy, and therefore Britain should be in an unchallengeable position to bring it to fruition in her own way. But the Cabinet is challengeable in Parliament, the Colonial Secretary is challengeable in the Cabinet, Governors are challengeable by the Colonial Secretary, and a senior officer of one of the Services, acting as local martial law ruler, would be challengeable all up the line. The system seems to make it almost impossible for unchallengeable authority to be delegated to a martial law ruler applying real martial law. In a Mandated Territory even 101

BRI TI

H

R l j L E,

.L· D

REB ELL l OX

Britain is challengeable by the of • aeons. There are signs that real ma I tial law is not regarded as a feasible proposition by H.M. Government. In September I 93 6 the Cabinet published its decision to ~nforce martial law in Palestine at the appropnate moment. Before the general who was to enforce it reached Palestine from London, second thoughts had reduced martial law to something else a fOlm of statutory martial law requiring detailed regulations like D.O.R.A. The Courts in Palestine were not to be allowed to challenge that weaker thing, but a wide field for challenging action under any regulations which might be made still remained open. Then, in March I937, third thoughts introduced yet one more variation. This variation is in some respects a cross between emergency rule by the civil power and military rule by a commander exercising statutory martial law powers. It enables the civil power to make w~atever r~gulations may be necessary to deal WIth. the SItuation, and set up military courts to dispose of those who offend aga.inst them. It also enables all or some of the powers to the head of the civil ad ministra-

SUB - WAR

tion to be pass.OO on by bi", to a lIIilital \' commander. Thus the whole procession of Ie Y>ays of d with sub-war resembles a rainbow, the shades of colour merging so gently that it is hard to say where one ends and the next begins. There is political pressure by the civil power, emergency rule by the civil power, semi-military rule by the civil power, statutory martial law by the military power, and last of all, real martial law. In the maintenance of public security in face of rebellion there will always be a natural temptation to try less stem measures first. A governor within the British Empire or in a British Mandate has to live among, and continue to rule, those whose resort to force he may have to stop. He will naturally try to stop it in a way which will not leave memories detrimental to that good understanding between ruler and ruled, which is a principle of good government. But there is danger in faillJle to develop full power of resistance from the very beginning to a thing as dangerous as subwar. Apal t from the danger of delay in having SO many ways of resisting attack, there is one disadvantage in moving step by step to the J

•

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MARTIAL LAW

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BRITISH

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d vc10pmcnt of full power, whj h d s rv s aU nl ion.

mi1ilnlY ('ommoncl{'r, to whom pow r may

h d III n. Th 11 f l.Itoou r tw w uld oun platoon' become m -~ all th~ d..irlerence. paDi~. and compani - become battalions. The head of the administration will also be rclucrant to admit failure by handing oyer to a military colllmander, and SO wi1l be inclined to order the military to help the police. This has all happened before, and there are still ma~y ~le, and sollle soldiers, who regard it as right to use every means before falling back em martial law. Martial law is still regarded as the last rCl:.Ort, a desperate remedy.

I"

1114

\

SUB-WAR

MARTIAL

LAW

M anwhile, the command r with a plan will b becoming mor and mor disturb d about 1'h h nUh of th plan. In giving aid to th polic h probably began by cl pI lj~)g hiH l'cs(!,v in the h p th ( he wou k1 get \t hn.ck ngnin. Tht'l1 mot'(' 0,[ his llan g('t~ )1ibbl d nw \. . S lillie Ptt~s/,.'s, tro()p~ \ l'tiJll' I (or one I l si, 1 (" nw dh 'It' I to I\oth 1', and pt dlapl' S(l l' )Inn it t '\ (11 I tlw (' \1111 t h' r l'll ('L't'(t. Th(' pi \it. in (ll'l, I ('UH\\t'~ Hl1WOr!' Ibll'. Tht' m I'd It) \:::k (or r'inC t ' 'Il\t llt ~ b~t'()\n '); pI '''sing. ,Uld all the tim' tIl r' is Ill' I o'sibilily h~U1g\t OWl' llw lwad f tIl' 'onmttU1d'1', that hl' ma' 'u id '111 htl.\" full pow ~rs handed OWl' to him. It app~ars it' m th recommendation f the Ro 'a1 Commi.:-ion l'12garding public -urity and it acceptance b . H.M. GO\"emment, that we have now leal Ilt from experience, at least as far as Palestine is concerned. But it is yery necessary to point out that the position in Palestine is most uDusual. There has been a rebellion, lasting six months, followed by an aUllistice lasting from the middle of October 1936. In this period of armistice a., Royal Commission has reported, and its recommendations are still under consideration. Meanwhile. the Opponents in the late rebe11ion are all back lOIS

SC"Z - W'AZ ~ }'Ifd ttp.. "~:dtlng • c 2ga';,j,t: U)T 41::l$-;. $ : L 'lh2a is somet!Iing very differcij t , ~" a S6:um · · -J.Lom I - ·e.t'.' i l COlin) I I to military :c"?; ~

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in the,

of a sub ""ar. -without a

pall5e :in wllir.1l to get stIaigllt. l be Rvyal CQmmission gives full weight to the reasons for regarding martial law as the last resort, bat nevertheless recommends its introduction, "when once it is recognised that the Civil Police and Magistracy cannot maintain

order." I n paragraph 57 of Chapter VII. of their Report, the Royal Commission has said ::" Our chief recommendation is this. Should disorders break out again of such a nature as to require the intervention of the military, there. should be no hesitation in enforcing martial law throughout the country under llndivid d military control. We are under no illusion as to what this meanS. Innocent people may be sacrificed whilst th !milty escape. Th miscrean who ambusbed onTO~- or laid . "" frequentl}· came hom distance a\\'ay from the scene of '1'"'1. _ , • •• u~ mqffllUon of mall ial Jaw nndoub edlv . III .... , t the 1 . .... a,gamst the MandatQ{v Po,;\et and. it is to be fr ". 1ane a 1ega(;y of in its

..

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rl ••. ".l...-<~;t."'e ba,.-ve aii£JV~ .J.-t'lC~.l-'O.! .... " ~ .. ':.r--*' '. i WIt: of terrorism. Frl)j:; We :5 . 6..)5 _ea. "m 1 ...J -~ •• of }{:uviatoIY wk t:bec dunuy "UI .x;t2m~l!g the $S 1:0 deal " ..1:11 ren:.on:;;u without recourse to • dFdStic " 1Il(:thods -w.as ~rent. With the introdncbou of martial yra:law . " of ' "lit extravagant den.unciatwn IIlI _a1y frightfuln ess ' will be widespread. A p'r~s which does not hesitate to state that Bribsh aeroplanes dropped poisoned sweetmeats would doubtless invent reports of the delIberate desecration of Holy Places. It is no wonder, therefore, that Your Maj esty's Government and the High Commissioner prefer to press conciliation to its utmost limit before adopting methods of repression. We are, however, definitely of the opinion that if these conciliatory efforts fail to achieve their object, martial law must be introduced.. When once it i recognised that the Civil Police and cannot maintain order the military should, in our opinion, be NtJ)ed. in. not to act as an additional foree-, but nnder Jaw. with all that it •

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It will be noted the Royal provides a for in the

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law. but

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SUB-WAR

r I ~ H R C L E. A X D R E B EL L I 0 •

MARTIAL

LAW

· ectionable. He can arrest leaders and to bcO bJ . em with incitement to rebellion, though th charge h elli . l·tement took place before t e reb on the lUC . . d the introductlOn of martlallaw. . anV def the conditions of statutory martIal nthe commander may make regulations, but Iaw lli b h· unless those who caused the rebe on y t elr incitement should contravene one o~ more of these regulations, after they were Issued, he could do nothing to them. They would be able to sit tight and safe, watching the consequences of their incitement. If the bright spirits on the other side invented some form of nuisance which he had not thought of, when he made his regulations, he could do nothing to them till he made a new r tion to cover the point, and even then he would have to wait till they contravened it. However, under conditions of statutory mal tial law the COlllmander is probably less challengeable than he would be nnder conditiOnS of lCaJ law. Real law to have became a al ...ost of the past. out b aDd ICiUved. prest hly• .b .....val the ""

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'fJH' )(,gtilu:Lion w0l11d In V(' (0 h( d r'ast i' h) b ' l'ffccliv', imposing 0. nnl' nt1(1 h tr pdsOJ1 lil 'li t for just 1I1td iug (111 n llS(llion. TIt(' m tldug of U'cuHations against troops is part of th' progr(].1lll11 ' of th' ot h r sid. It might appeal' to ~om

p oplc, who do not know th gam', dreadful tl1ing t mak it an ff nc to mal< an ac u 'uti n. Th fIen u ht t b making :fu1s' n u~ ti n. But ~iftil1O' n. u ation to they ar good or bad take tim and keeps people in offices. '''here th y an do no harm to the other ·de. The accusation racket was just as rife last year in Palestine as it was in Ireland. In on e case, about twenty complaints by Arab smallholders ani\-ed in a batch stating that British boops had wantonly da "'aged vineyards by marcbing up and down them and stamping on the grapes. Arab grapes do not grow like grapes on the Rhine. The Arab is not very g~ at propping anything up, SO he leaves his grapes to do their best to imitate a nd it is possible to walk: on them. But the British soldier has his peculjarities too He might go into a vineyard to eat grapes, or

ripe

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w 'st, coJrlP mo s .' wer' .qlluLly unconvwcmg. ., 1 b' Though extravagant d 'nuncHl,tlon . ?u d 'thin a country und r martml In.w, stoppcd WI . 'b l' it ould not be stopped b yond ltS. o nne anes. Ther , propaganda, nll rep" entatIon, and accu ation of frightfulness could and probably \ ould fionri h. It i all the more necessary, therefore, to think in term of the quick knockout in dealing with ub-,...·a r , if only to stop t he distraction and confusion which results when it is allowed to drag on and on. To gain a quick decision in sub-war it seems to achieve what produces a quick decision in other foulls of war. The decisive battle like Waterloo or Culloden goes through motious by a of -. '" defence

by attack, or by a of diaect to an (.lid, the attack, which ale' of and so the of to control by on the side. • m 01 war the

B R I TIS H

R U L E,

AND

REB ELL ION SUB-WAR

•

formations have to be broken in order to get at the leaders. But in the case of sub-war, the leaders have foreseen that line of approach and have devised a means of control which still works, in spite of the fact that leaders and followers are almost as scattered as if thcy had just lost a decisive battle. For some reason the two referees, thc civil power and the law, for once united, always object to any direct attack against leaders in sub-war. They say it would be useless to arrest leaders because their places would, at once, be taken by substitutes already nominated. They say it would seldom be possible to prove that a leader, when arrested, had broken a law. The first difficulty seems trivial. Even a board of directors of an industrial company might find control more difficult to exercise if it had constantly to be appointing new members and finding a new secretary. The second difficulty, the difficulty of proving anything against a leader when arrested, seems to indicate some flaw in the law. It ought to be possible to hold a person responsible for consequences of his own acts. rebellion ought to be a serious crime, easy to bring home if rebellion actually 112

•

MARTIAL

LAW

Membership of a so-called political organisation which has the same object in view as a militant organisation, active at the same time, should also be a serious crime. In fact, any activity which assists the object for which a militant organisation is working amounts to assisting rebels. The law stands in the way and seems to protect the leaders. It will not allow them to be tried under any emergency regulation for acts done before the regulation came into force, even though the logical consequence of the acts continues after. One argument which is invariably used against a policy of direct attack on leaders is that it would drive them underground. Apart from the question whether that matters very much, the argument has a weakness. We make it easy for leaders to go underground of their own accord, OC'C3use we have never yet made a resolute attempt to control the movement of the civil population in a sub-war. When the Irish troubles were at their worst it was still for anyone to move at will about the country without To go on leave the way, officers

to 10 to wait in a

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mo\-e . they , instructions, without

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Ireland the leadeIS t 5 ill maintained conbol. only did they continue to control. but • managed to publish, almost pi iutui

and

sheet

with the tactical in action of their mowing how to improve both h1 114

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I, I 11,1 III/ tIJ, ",,1/1/,' ',,,!,,ll"(,IIf(lrrrl " III /,11' II!" "", I III, ft,I,.1 "W,f/,,, IIm/I( ./, Ihl (,1111' 1 111/ 1 ,

fl .,

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1111 '11 II' 1'1 ''1 '' 11 111 WI' J,.II0 W

("."111,, //"HlI'Y.Ion,, " 11( ; '('d l'l!. Ill!>t 111 Ih ,1HIf'e~ lhlll! !If Ihl' 1"111' 1,, 111" WI' knflw wh tl tl dfl l' lIlt les IIlId tI"1 1'I' 1 [u(,l'd I hn.· w ho t I i 'II til v.HIt' III II'. poht Y IJf lI il ' l • It \ . on l 'I HIl'I'!'; woulu It.n 'C to 11l' Clll1lblll ,t! \\ ilh olll I 11lC.II\S o[ l'slabIi,hil full control by G \' 1Il11ll'lll ill any case. \ commandcr c 'crci:il '" undividcd military control with ' tatutory martial law powers conld not just wait till the leaders on the other ide chose to contravene . regulations, He would have to be acti e in other His greatest difficulty would be to gain the initiative and escape from having to to action by the other side. 1be to from that unsatisfactory Ilftdicament is the T

to hold the whole country for poli&a.1 We have never yet. in sub-war, aDd Clare. 01' the trict, ill to CCD)eDtrate

for

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(ull (;()ntr(,1 ()F th(; I(~~ imp()f t,i,tJt, Wi: hi'V!: ~lwILY" /J(·ld t hI: wll(,J(: (;/)I/ntry, thfJUfth, (1(4 :drN,dy (:xp/[dnNl, th;,l tTle~n<, h~ldjn~~ (mJy tf)

titit'l nnd t(JWO'l [Iod th· m,l,lTl ralJway~ ,mil loadl; b .(W('(:D lhwl. 'fh· rcst ()f th' CounLry i<; almost invadably fn" Lo the oth'r ~i(l>, except wh 'n strikuIg lorccs invad' it for bri·f period!'!. The military problem of defeating sub-war r'quires sonFthing more than just holding and main communications. It requires a carefully planned and methodically executed combing of the country area by area. That is a slow process, as the history of the South African War of I 99-1902 shmvs. In that war, while it took one-third of the period of its dmatioil: to defeat the hostile forces in the field, two-thirds. or twenty months, were spent - riea.Ina5. -th the enilla. warfare phase. rrn' llY pr.xess • b I. it -es ,~

f,1I ~.Y

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tdegraph">, railwiW'I-, thf; I'n;&~, J(X)t! !« P" plil;: I m(W(,ml;nt ()f j nhabitant'l, including f:flCh things a') immigration and tourist traffic -he iWr/

w()uki have to prepare plans for the ("'Xercise of his control. It it, easy just to say that instead of the military aiding the civil power, the weight is just placed on the other foot and the civil power aids the military. There are, however, all manner of rules for military aid to the civil power, but none yet exist for civil aid to a commander exercising undivided military control. There is a big difference between leaving it to one man to co-ordinate the action of the four parts of rule, \vhen the occasion arises, and having all the main points and difficulties settled before the occasion arises. There is, in fact, a difference this somewhat vague idea of ndivided control with statutotv' ~

J

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•

OW

parfll

............. ...

SUB-WAR

CONCLUSION

Do~inion ma~dates, within the Indian Empire,

CHAPTER VIII. SUB-WAR

CONCLUSION.

it is easy enough to criticise, it is not so easy to make u eful uggestions about what should be done to meet the evil of ub-war. The e\il of the thing is that it is a violation of peace. The e,il in dealin cr with it i that we peImit armistice. then compromi e. In fact, we make con 'on to agglession, and thereby £e .:; rt -0 force. R - rt t f ICe -0 ~vain an end is ~3inst tht' the world, "hich • Bri:iM in~er; .::t. in th t th • "J: t e ent to J WHILE

3lrnS ..

•

•

or ill Burma, 15 surely rebellion against British rule. Once rebellion has begun, the grievance, even though Britain may have been slow in redressing it, must await consideration till resort to force has been dealt with decisively, and that means dealt with victoriously without concession of any kind. It is better to win first and then give, as we did in uth Africa, than do a we did in Ireland in 1921 and are doing now in Palestine. The evil on our ide i- not onlv due to our • yieldin a attitude, but also to our inability to co-ordinate the four part: of British rule most directly - concerned "~th ht' roblem tht' civil.. the police. the It', . :m th military l' " The n-sponsibility hI' ' ring tht' ri f th.:; four ' \dh tht' "i.il po r. Th i ill \\"er t

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part nor th e military pad. oC HI i Li'lll J 111(\ will

)JrollkJrl of 'I II/)wltr WI)!'/) (;flfl /iil/I:rl:d (l'liil; rq,iuL 110m allY partiwlill (;1.'1: fwd Itdlll;d for W;)II;r;J I il.J!jIHcn.LiIJII in l:tlld hll}lld I!I;I.WHWI rr:!Ji; llillll'i, H WI)I"" III! id(:ld if It (t,IIV(;) tlllr, It chll;f (If III,li r;.':, It jwlW:1 fl,wl It WlJl(;rn,'/, wil,h Tl:Pri!lY:fltlltiw;" lit till; ClAim/ILl O{(i(:<: 11 lId {If illl; Itlilift ()iflOO, (((Juld 1)1: 1I,1l';(Jrllllll!d ()I,!I ;II;Olrlil jf tJl(l

wiJIiJl~Jy he 11ACd nr; clogs ill a do({~ (jgld., l/O( to win, hut 1.0 pl'Od~lCC on .efl!; io)l to (ilolio who

ldll llJ(lir friendA.

'rhem

WrtA r,xco/1rHt co·onlinn,( iOIl /}flI.WIl(lJ) Ih w(J rldJl~ pftl'Ll", 1,1W/1 ollly llllw niv!l, J(\f{fl.I, (lWllldll'l n.l'Y In J7~(J, IJ('Clrl.lJ ~Il I(\ I)( '"oll, wn,H'IlI Cl)1 m!J(ll1 lon 10 (1./1, (lnd In n,ll ft, Ildlll( In lJo d(\( d~

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drLY,

II WM Jlbll:io uul bc L~ li :; 'l3ritaiu \l'llK hl'twil hlvolvl:!d in WOJ' 011 til Ul1ti:ncut when ih r 'be11ian broke out. Britain W(J.S hen i1 iavol ed in wur on th, o11tinent)n 19X6, and in the defence of the Mediterranean and the frontier of Egypt in 1936. It was so because there was unity of purpose. Real co-operation and effective co-ordination of working parts depends on unity of purpose. Given unity of purpose, there still remain difficulties in co-ordination on the physical side. The difficulties, it is suggested, might be 120 •

p,c,I,11 rn

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l\ 11111(1.

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till;

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Mlllly (I( 01' 1"lirti lt wil" Wllil;]l tl H'Y wllll ilf 1iii V ' III dl,ltf ({,uld 1I(,f lw,,·tt/r:d by 1\ IldJlI al y (;llInItJ:lfllJI r IJI(1IIIi ,1·d (Ir I,,,(;rc;j.. ill~~

WIt!'!

Il (OP/( I(JIII Ih( "tiddl(l ur I r(\hl'l l (~J'Y 1111 Ibo tIlltldlt' (1f . I'd I to 1!l(iV( IltiUH1, rW"('H fnltll qlJJlI uq~ll tt) IllVl'llI()l4fl wlLhou1' oppoHi.

(,II/I "Ild,'r

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. I

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,t di"Uul(,(;,

}I.. ~lll rljn r: thai tlJi<; ctJ/rIlTIitt(·, would IJ.l;r(;(; 1!I(tL f('SOI L to fmc' mn t Ii, Ml'Jpp(:d (luickly. L1J(~ Ill'bL point to d· ide in principle would be

wh'Jl lh, chang' (rom normal civil control to cllwrg'l!cy rulc, under a supreme head, should bc made. The point is really the diagnosis of the disease. If the thing is just a local riot over some religious dispute, a cold in the head, there is no need to apply the cure for malignant malaria. But as soon as the movement of the other side is seen to be directed against government, with signs of central control, it is time to think of curing sub-war. As soon as intimidation and the use of altus appear it is time to apply the cure. 121

--

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ibef re th

.

P:-:'.

,

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-

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There is a difficulty here \II] lich requires to be met. It is for the governor to decide when to apply emergellCY rule. If a general is to have power to say "No" at a certain point namely, the extension of military aid to the police he virtually decides, and not the governor. That is where trouble has always arisen in the past. In case of disagreement the solution seems to be to refer to a higher authority. But the general should have the right to ask for reinforcements if military aid to the civil power is to go on, so that" he can keep his plan intact. Then, if reinforcements cannot be provided, the change to emergency rule should be made. The next point i<; wI/ether, on the introduction of emergency Lu1 .. Clmtr()1 h()uld Lc by a military command -r. 'n ('r' ar in tli (if umtrfil J y a man lree from {ioti U.dJ and OItiJ only with th of nlJUmt,

.M

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exercisjDo- undj -

cornTo} •- 1IIp5e

5CB-

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PO" er- to exercise deme,,, Y. comr: be undi, ided. If control is to be by a milital y commander he should not also command the military forces directly, because his main task will be to rule a country under abnOIlllal conditions. A new . commander of the forces will be The military staff of the headquarters of any garrison is designed to manage that garrison and not to co-ordinate and control the four parts of rule in action. Therefore, the commander exercising undivided control requires a new staff. On that staff there will have to be representatives of the civil administration, the police, and the law, all three of which will have to split into two parts, one part concerned with emergency rule and the other with normal administration. These points couJd DOt be settled bY a CQDI. to I'ower be He would bave to refer to

aM move

to .,.,.,.,'

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1<)3U, wllt·Jl )('Il( JJIC)JJ III P;I/I .... U/ll. wa'S i!l its flUII month, ~h n' wa<; talk of illlpo<;ing

()

St'plt'lu/)u

malllal law, and I emforc('1ll nt" W('f(' h<:illg rushed out from England. Bllt it took all eptemb rand haH October to d cide the form which martial law was to aSSume and the powers which might be delegated to the commander. In the end, the question was not decided till four days after the rebellion had degenerated into armistice. The four parts of rule require some adjustment if they arc to work well together to defeat sub-war. Though a commander wou leI have powe~ to ~a.ke regulations 10 rc-c'itabli'ih public ~ecunty, It J not yd Il'ar wll£'thl'1 11(' wOII I£! hav~ )J<)';"I tI) 1"01 ';wb,' [Ill' f()UI 1).1) hIli 1'111(. iI) UII.JJf 1/111 Jill', '1 JJI'/f' h IIIllIJI 11)) 1lI)1'IIN" lJjll/l In IJiI' llltf'//iW /l1:t I I viI I 'I JII J)lllil I 1 11 .jJJ '111 tj). ... XI JJlIUItl J I/IIW 1/)1 (1)1/1111 Y )11 j i)1 1,, /1,11 J',HI :1 II Y'IJlI IJ , I

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polio!, 1 jJl. bi)Jrlil-rs r<:quin~ guidI'S and intpr. prc·tt-rs, and the I.il)liC(! can supply both. Very often the most usdul m(''Il1bers of the police become marked down for assassination by the other side. This danger could be overcome if men required for special duty by the military could fade into military units and military uniform for the duration of the rebellion. In general, duties under alIliS should be carried out by one body under one control. If all the police have to be armed, they might as well be merged into the military force'S for the time being. , On t Ill' 11'~~a 1 I. 100m fl)1 t'/,0J10ll1y of tJwrry. /I 'aSI)1l wily wilit I 01 I

awuy II)

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13 III TIS H It U L E,

A~ D

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The first of these is the que.<;tion of cl 'aHng with leaders on the other side. Some adju!;tment of tht: law seems necessary to ena ble immediat<: action to be taken against leaders, on acco unt of the consequences of their acts. Chasing after followers who ambush, or lay land-mines, is very necessary, but it does not lead quickly to decisive results. Chasing a fter leaders we make difficult for ourselves. It is merely dodging the issue to intern them without trial. There are also the questions of cutting off parts of the country in order to economise force, of restriction on the movement of the people, of restrictions on t rade, of control of all subscriptions to causes of all kinds, of control of banks, and payments from abroad. There remains the important problem of dealing with intimidation of witnesses. The intimidation of inhabitant , and sometime even of police, is based on the UTe followed at trial. To defeat the < fonI disease: drastic chan e in procedure SC'I":rns necessary, even to the e."\.-tent of aIIow i Ig the Court to ~ tisI;' itself that to" ;de-nee '- good, a::::.d ailO" jug- the prosecutor tl:e e~de' !Ce without . the Finanv t here is the - tiring should not be caDed

-.

IN

S UH - WAr,

CO N'C L tJS l O N'

em urgency rule instead of martial law, which it i!l not. Objection'! would ntJ doubt be ruis~d against examination of the probk1'l1 of rule m . £a(;(~ of sub-war, as suggested. 1h(;re would bE;: t he obj ection that situations vary so mUCh, that each should be dealt with on its merits as it arises. To yield to that objection would mean throwing all the experience of I reland, P alestine, and elsewhere into the sea and st arting afresh on the next occasion. The other side gains if we keep on losing or mislaying all our past experience of a danger t o our rule. We only preserve tactical h ow t o move in convoy and how to fight when attacked in convoy. experience of u e to one part of rule only. In September 1936 the imposition of martial law in Pale tine was imminent. But tho e time to have everywho were working thing ready. had nothing from the past to guide them. They had to ~n all over again from the beginning. as if rebdJjOll had never before troubled the British R They could not get the of hom a Government office as one get the (Illes of golf from the Royal and GoM emb of It had DOt what came was lit

/I It I 'I I "' ''

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A N I)

1/ I'. II " I, I, I () N

III Ill ' pIIlYI ''' : 1l1(1 d irti hl,w, wil l, II 11I'1'1i 'l (I'W ,,"I" , III 'H II~IIII/lly IIIIIllill 1 lliw, willI h 11I'I'tI, 111.1 Il y

' , 110, 11

Wlill In VII 11111 (wlllll l "'III,llioI\OI

1111

WI\I ~w l (ltd Oil It l-t1I1H'w it d 11, 1 (" II (I IIIII Nt. " 111'1(1 Iii gO(lti IUI SOI\ to . 1I 1' p (lH·, rU11i1 th l

tVltllnh l\' t" llIt'l\('(', th.ll (hey ~ tlitl y (I )(' il' p" oil bH~ t'ln'full: hdoldlll llli li nd (Ill t' l'tl l'(' ltl knllt fn>lll (hO!;l' who hlLVI' Imll C''- PI'!'! 'ut'e, TIII'I't, i~ a l't'UiW'hubl' similaril ,in reC'l1t ' n 1'S, ill the [ann Olld pro edul" of nltn. }{ b fore ' on gOYI:l"l1mel1t, Th ondu t of sub-war by the other side is a new te hnique which does not yary in principle, but anI in details of

•

P

RT II.

IN PARTICULAR, PALESTIl E, 1936-37

application, between place and place. The lID!e of impatient nationalism should not be allowed to produce better staff work than the m ae to flltfil the purpose of British rule. ub-war is an e.;I, a nuisance, and a danger. ThOUGh it may seem to lack power to overthrow a British Go'rernment anp'lhere, even if met in the present «IsBal way, it has power to diveIt H. L Forre; to places in which it "-' mc.st inu..mverofmt (.JT even dangerous to

have t;.~':< griyy-A, Sbould forces haft tlJ k divuv-A in a war, it wau1d be tb ~JW IV')W tfJ delta!. StIb-war quickly. Ja

•

•

CHAPTER IX. PALE STI N E.

•

THE events of I936 in Palestine provide the most recent example of British rule in face of a rebellion conducted on sub-war lines. There is reason to record some of the lessons of that six months of confusion in case they may be forgotten. There is also reason to turn from a general consideration of rule a.nd rebellion, under modern conditions, to the study of a particular case. The difference between the one and the other resembles the difference between reading and seeing a play. Generalities lack the personal element, which counts for 0 much. In generalities one does not feel the moment when the future bangs on a decision. nor long to warn one player that all his mountains are &Del bee him to

stop wringing lUI another calmly and long call hit

One does not see 1lu not sown

at the 111M 111

B R I TIS H

R U L E,

AND

REB ELL ION P ALESTINE

•

admiring the impertinent use he makes of aU his opportunities. However, it is necessary first of aU to take a quick tour round Palestine to see it as it was in early I936, and is, in all essentials, still. Fortunately, there is not much of it, and we need not bother about that long narrow t riangle of almost empty desert stretching away south for a hundred miles to its apex at t he head of the Gulf of Aqaba. What matters is only I3 0 miles long by 70 wide at the south, bet ween the Dead Sea and the Mediterranean, narrowing t o just over thirty miles wide along t he northern frontier. The points of importance are t he t owns and the communications, particularly those which serve as ways in for us, t he main line from Kantara on the Suez Canal along the coast to Haifa, and H aifa itself, the only suitable port of entry . Another point of importance in t he circumstances is t he distribution of the J ewish settlements. With a hu ndred thousand times ten Arabs competing with as many times four Jews for the same country, the ruler had every prospect of doing a deal of ruling. One normally arrives in Palestine from Port Said via Kantara, the journey taking jute

•

•

•

about twelve hours to either Haifa or Jerusalem. After covering more t han half the distance through Egyptian desert comes the frontier, and twenty miles inside Palestine, Gaza. Gaza has an aerodrome, one of the chain to the Far East, but is otherwise a secondary Arab town in a completely Arab area stretching away east to the Dead Sea. All the south of Palestine, in the area Bethlehem, Hebron, Beersheba, Gaza, is Arab, but for two small Jewish settlements, one fifteen miles east of Gaza and the other just south of Bethlehem. It is an extensive area for Palestine, but relatively unimportant. In it desert merges into cultivation and the plain into hills. The communications are poor, all t racks, but for the railway and road leading north along the coast from Gaza, and the road from Beersheba through Hebron to Jemsalem . Soon after passing Gaza northward the country becomes more fertile, and the area of Jewish settlement and orange groves By the time Lydda is an hour and a half by train and about the same by from road, one is in the midst of Jewish settlements, and can see the contrast the squat, solid, grouped stone houses of an Arab 10

132

•

B R I TIS H

R U L E,

AND

REB ELL ION

village and the ramsh~ckle. wooden bungalows of a Jewish one, lookmg like some new place in the once wild West, deserving a name like Medicine Hat. One can see also the contrast between the picturesque flowing garments of the Arabs, capped by the thing like a duster, trailing to three points over the shoulders, which they wear on their heads, held there by what looks like a couple of turns of thin black rope, and the comparative nakedness of the Jews in shirts and shorts, and, as often as not, bare - headed. However, we are just as bad ourselves in most hot countries. Lydda, an Arab town, is surrounded by Jewish settlements; an eight-mile half-moon lies all round the south of it; a ten by five mile egg five miles to the west of it, and south of that again a V with eight-mile legs and a detached egg. Ten miles north-west of Lydda lie the cities and ports of controversy, Jaffa a.nd Tel Aviv, side by side. It takes no time to get there by a first-class road, and there lies contrast that shouts. Jaffa is all Arab, with good streets mixed with warrens, open shop fronts, much sitting about, and not much traffic. Tel Aviv invisibly darned to the north of JaBa, but there is no mistaking it. It witb lU

•

PALESTINE

life, traffic like Hammersmith Broadway, cafes, streets full of people buying from each other's shops, and houses in every stage of construction and of every ultra-modern shape. It looks like the site of a competition, open to architects and builders in concrete. On the northern edge of Tel Aviv, with its back to the sea-front, stands the Levant Fair, a jerry-built White City, and just behind it across the sands is the famous Tel Aviv jetty. The coast of Palestine being a straight line all the way to Haifa, there are no harbours but Haifa. At Jaffa, ships anchored a mile or so offshore and took in and discharged cargo from lighters. The Arabs owned and worked the lighters, employincr lightelIllen expert in handling them in spite of the surf. The lighters were kept in a harbour constructed for them at Jaffa. The Jews of Tel Aviv and the neighbourhood had most of the trade, so when fighting broke out in April 1936 between Arabs and Jews, or, in other words, Jaffa and Tel Aviv, the Arab lighteullen wwt on strike. Furthermore, they stayed on strike throughout the 1936 that tbeir contribution to the cause. "[he then built a jetty Aviv from can be 111

B R I TIS H

R U L E,

AND

REB ELL ION

loaded into or unloaded from lighters. They also built a lighter anchorage, and seem to have been able to blow the bluff off the word expert, as far as lightermen are concerned. They will no doubt, soon have transit sheds on the spot instead of a Levant Fair, and that will be that. Continuing the journey northward from Lydda by train one notices at once that the hills to the east seem to be edging nearer and nearer to the sea, lying somewhere close to the west, hidden by a low ridge covered by orange groves. The train runs on through a wide plain with unfenced fields. Soon fingers from the hills extend closer to the line, with here and there Arab villages of dumpy, solid, flat-roofed, stone houses clustered on their knuckles. Fifteen miles north of Lydda is Qalqilya, an Arab village, and ten miles farther on Tulkarm, another. Up to there all on the right of the line has been Arab, Arab for miles, up into the hills and beyond; all to the left has been Jew, Jew to the sea, four great fat eggs of Jewish settlements, almost continuous, filling the plain. At Tulkarm the bills come right down to the railway line, which retaliates by edging away from them and making for the sea. TweDt, miles north of Tulkarrn the line u .""

..

136

".

PALESTINE

arrives at the sea, but the hills keep chasing after it. Ten miles farther on another nest of three Jewish settlements has been passed, the first two small, only three or four miles across, the third, a regular cuckoo's egg fifteen miles in length. On the left lie sand-dunes, the sea obviously close, then a ruined castle on a knob, and soon the line is almost jostled on to the beach by Mount Carmel. For five miles north of the cuckoo's egg there is nothing but the steep scrub-covered slopes of Mount Carmel on the right and the twinkling Mediterranean, breaking languidly on a straight line of sand, on the left. Then, suddenly, the train finds itself running into the sea, dead ahead, and saves itself by turning east round the curve of another Jewish egg, number thirteen settlement, and so into Haifa. The smokestac~s and masts of ships show over the tops of lines of sheds, on the left the houses thicken and close in, while close and high on the right, Mount Carmel to have allowed itself to be crowned with a kind of Hindhead. If one did not enter Palestine . Gau by train the altUllative would nOllnally be to arrive by sea at Haifa. is a AU the down by the is Arab, lit

B R I TIS H

R U L E,

AND

REB ELL rON PALESTINE

except a neat little Gelman corner . The upper part and the crown on the top of Mount Cann 1 is Jewish. The crown resembles a half-finish ~ hill station, with roads twisting about in 100;s and curves, all ready for more houses to spri up. The price of land up there rivals the pring in the middle of London. The shapes of t~e houses, each one standing in its own plot var; as much as in Tel Aviv. They are of st~ne or concrete, and almost all are new, except for an occasional copper-roofed German bungalow. In the evening the central Jewish part of Haifa is thronged, dense crowds bustling round the cinemas, while below, on the flat, the streets are almost deserted. From Haifa one can go to Syria, <'ithcr by toy train to J)ama')Cus, or by car along the coast road through Acr , which lies white in th - flun ight milf!~ away acm';s tll(; ('r{'scent. shaped ba'y. '(JJe fronti('r is quite· J()'l(', only tW(.Jv· mjJ/·~ Iwynnd /1( r(~, t,(1 OJI(' :tn be} in Syria withitJ til(' hour. H 'Ller perhaps to take tlu' toy train and he' mor . J wish colonies. 'Illc trnin tUrJ1S it!; back 011 tlw sea and hew inland towards the south-cast. Once more the

bte'r scrub-covered slopes of Mount Carmel lit close on the right, and again the pJai.n OIl 188

left is colonised by Jews. The plain narrows about ten miles from Haifa, and then gradually widens. Finding more room, the line edges away from Mount Carmel, stretched out seaard like a great thumb from the mountain ~and of Palestine. Mount Carmel is all Arab, but for the little nail at the tip, the Jewish Hindhead. The plain looks extremely fertile, and has now widened to five miles, and soon widens to ten. About twenty-five miles from Haifa, soon after Affula, the line begins to go downhill. The town, perched high on the top of a hill away across the plain on the lelt, is Nazareth. Ii fades from sight as th toy train trundl s down and down to B isan, fifteen mileR farther on. 1110 line did not Boem to climb at all from Rca-Iewl at Haifa, but it ha.'1 definitely descended to Hcisan, only three mile!! from th(! Jordan, d(~ep in that great trench which hold!! the Sea of Galilee, the winding Jordan, and the fifty mile by ten Dead Sea. or miles and miles across the front atretches the trench wall on

the farther aide, the )fountains of Moab. And all the way to which is Arab, there ha~e colonia malding over the plain,

ave

••

aDd

B R I T r S II

R U L E,

AND

REB ELL ION

for all the forty miles, not far after all, but all the width of Palestine. What a little place is Palestine, only three miles of it left, and then beyond the river lies Transjordan, an Arab state with an Arab ruler, but in the mandate. There are no J ews there, where the inhabitants may waile about with rifles over their shoulders , and do. The toy line does not seem to like the look of Transjordan and turns abruptly north, still swinging down among the rounded spurs of reasonable hills. Just after crossing the pipeline, pushing Iraq oil to Haifa, it crosses the Jordan, enters another Jewish settlement, and passes close by the hydro-electric station, from which pylons bearing high tension cables radiate away westward to illuminate the chosen. Five miles on lies the Sea of Galilee, or Lake Tiberias, lookin'" rather like a loch in Scotland if the clouds hang low. The toy train seems to hate water for it tutllS aO'ain awav this time hack ' to east and depans into ytia. En gb of tan be . ! its toy train. FIOIJI . Ii i' an ho ~ bv car an -

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Tiberias it takes only about four. hours to run by car right up the Sp?ut of Palestme to Metulla, on the Syrian fronber, and back. The. road . along the lakeside then turns mland begdmsl · bs out of the tre;ch back to sea-level, an c 1m . . and on a little higher. Soon It comes to a Wide plateau stretching northward, border:d on ~he left by a line of high, stee-f' rocky hIlls, Whl~h keep on edging closer, whIle acr?ss the pla~, on the far side, run the never-ending Mountams of Moab. About three-quarters of an hour after leaving Tiberias one comes to another large egg-shaped Jewish settlement, number three on the list. They are all numbered. The one level with Gaza and out of sight fifteen miles to the east of it was number twenty-six. Five miles up to the left, on the top of a high and very rocky hill, lies Safad and another Jewish settlemellt_ Safad, the town, is maiuly AIab, but has in it tlln of Jews of the orthodox variehPty. tbe'e 100g before was is not a A up to •

•,

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A ~· D

B.ITISH Rt'"LE,

REBEL L IO-

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lon!!ef un iliac. The plain on the right k"OOmes rlatter and werter as the . hallow "a~ of 1 ,31<:. Rule. come into' T bis plam IS sometbIDO" qmle unusual for arid PalJ, and there are cattle esti~e; its gI~SS looks °13zmg out m the distance and even waterbuffaloes. North of Hule lies a wide strekh of marshy delta land, then comes a knob with -,

0

to Gn.a, All the south and all the no}lb, so also all the cenlle of sixty miles by forty, is Arab. In fact, all the land the Je~i"h zags a nd 7.ag is Arab and almost all highland. ZionislII, an idea, put the Jews there in that zigzag, all busy creating national homes for themselves, though not all by themselves. We defend them, more or less. Ideas are odd things, and some a nuisance. An idea, worked up, can end by filling a theatre night after night for a year or more, pulling people away from their homes, all dressed up and full of early dinner, or make them sit for hours on stools in drafty street s sustained by sandwiches. The Zion idea began probably because somebody refused to forget the past. Somehow Britain asked the author whether he would like to stage it in Kenya, or some such place. Instead of arguing whether the idea was any good at all, the debate raged round the proper place to stage it. The author of course chose Palestine, and Britain agreed. So it is, and it: is no use not facing facts. on the 8at and all So far, our tour bas all

:ea

an ~b ~age on it, then another; the ground begms to n se, t he plain is ending. The steep craggy hills close on the left keep on and on but now hills like them lie ahead. The road enters a valley and climbs. Suddenly, up at the top, one enters a J ewish village in settle. ment number two, and a mile or so on lies number one, :ight on the Syrian frontier, both miles deep m t he midst of Arab country. All the north of Palestine is Arab an area of jumbled hills forty miles by twenty: E xcept {~r these ~wo odd little colonies perched on the hill-tops I1I;'ht at the tip of the spout of Palestine, and the one at Safad, the settlements lie almost entirely in the plains, in a zigzag line like the ~entionaI sign {or a flash of lightning. They ZIg SfJUth down the J ordan va Hey to Arab t~ zaf? north-west to Haifa and the lea, ZIg agam all down the coastal

the Ieft,bat

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1:< t) \\, Ik ,\ l)t t \ 'd .It nil'" \ ill, ~\'~. ~<)UW '1 "\1lin,~ th,' 114'1h'::;( hill top som, haugiJ ~ sOll1('how h'n~\('t'd 011 u slopl', .: fel IllO!''''' ('omfol'tabl' and naturally pltUlt d in a valley. One needs to talk a lot and sit a lot to know the people, and even then the knowledge will be superficial, because the Arab talks so easily and so much himself, yet keeps back more than he expresses. Back to Tiberias, bound thence for Jerusalem by car. The road is excellent, but narrow for the way the people drive, furiously and in the middle of the road. That would not matter so much if the road were only straight, but hairpin bends and blind bends and every kind of bend flourishes in such a hilly country. From Tiberias one climbs straight out of the trench, and soon, down on a spur on the right, appears a village in a J ewish settlement, built like a ringed camp to be defended. All the twenty miles to Xazareth the country is hilly, but wide and open, good spacy land. From - -azareth one could go on to Haifa, but that would me;m running back a mile or two nonh of the toy railway line again, and there is no road on from Haifa; it stops just round the poi!!t of Mount Cannel. So from ~azareth "

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rabs, the road begin to twist and swing and hairpin abruptly downward to the plain among young plantations of fir grouped among the rocks. As soon as it reaches level ground the road runs straight with a line of blue gums on either hand , crosses the pipe-line, then the toy railway at Affula, and begins to rise and swing over open rolling country. To the right the ground falls almost imperceptibly, with the long ridge of Monnt Carlllel in the distance. To the left it falls nnmistakably for some miles, and then drops steeply into the great trench towards Beisan. Up we go gently, over a low rounded shoulder. The hills ahead, where the thumb, M01mt Carmel, joins the mountain hand, come rapidly closer, then gently down we go and into Jenin, a small town extended in a curve. The next lap to Nablus takes an hour. Soon after Jenin, we enter the land of olive groves and goats, of villages on the tops and on the steep sides of hilJs and low in terraced valleys. The road twists and turns, climbs and drops. Sometimes there is open ground and a wide view to the right, but on the left the hjJJs are high and 1~5

E

B R I TIS H

R U L E,

AND

REB ELL ION

close. Anoth:r toy ~ailway keeps company with us, but IS very little used and does not pay. After a narrow t wisty bit among a tangled group of hills one comes suddenly into a wide valley branching right and left. We go up it to the left; the toy railway goes both ways, down to the right to Tulkarm, twelve miles away on the main Gaza-Haifa line, and up t o the left to Nablus with us. The valley is pretty, with terraced flelds on either side and high hills rising abruptly above them . It curves left and right gently, and gently rises. Th en the hill, close in and in tbe narrow !>pace between their d{Jmhro,tin~ shoulders, chidly famvu~ fvr tJJ(~

H(:!; Nablus. Nablus is trucuk'l1CC (.If its inhabi-

tant!; and a soap facuJry. Qukkly IJi:l.f;sing tlJrough a cc)mer of this I,{;'d..fJtifuI 1)ut jJJ-mann<::red pJ~, WI~ {mJ<;rge {wm t;(:tw(;;en the j(M:1ing MUs to find a wide plain faGing us. 'l11t: T(j"dI ] turns sharp right the 1(j(;t fJf the hill'J with the plain on the left, and Mads for J erusalem, just over an hour away. The road .is bewilderingly It tUns either in the bottom of a valley or the crest of a ridge, selecting whichever suite best its southward direction. When deep ia valley the mouth of any or 1"

PALESTI N E

must water freely with such a wealth of choice spots for an ambush, The hills are steep and all along their sides, in horizontal lines, runs steps of rock t he height of a man, while under them or in among the clefts of larger cliffs are caves. It requires an athlet e to pursue a bandit in that land, with the eyes of a hawk and the nose of a dog t o see or find where t he quarry has vanished into the earth. When the road is up on a crest, however, the country is much more open, The last lap of the run to J erusalem is mainly open, the ground falling away steeply to the Jordan valley from close on the l€:ft, while on th· right the valleys screw Ii path d()wn through the crowded hills toward~ the coaJ;taJ plain. Ab(Jllt nve miles 1>hort of Jerusalem the rood run., throu~ the middle of the landing ground whitl. &et'ves the capital, and enterl5 another (:~g-shaped Jewish 'lhere is a little detached nest 01 five of about numbered to largest, a Holy City. • nse,

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1,.-eep, F ing David's Tower. But 'ven they look surprisingly new, except in shape, and everything in sight beyond them, rising high out of the hidden old city, looks churchy and extremely new. To complete this cursory run round Palestine requires but two short expeditions, each of an hour by road and each downhill. To the west the road runs down to Jaffa on the sea, or to Lydda on the railway. For half the way it twists and turns among the rocky barren hiIls, down to terraces and cultivation, then out through a Darrow curving valley on to the open gentle slopes of the plajn. The run by trajn to Lydda. from Jelllsa1em takes twice as long and offels even better scope to ambushers. The nae rlrops at an even grade, keeping always ffiy fret 9r so above a dry and rocky water· c..":rst;. It: swing;; arc 011 ves «vd through 14.11

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ltj Iht' WI t l rum J ct usat Itl lhc!'o arc lrroll tllul 1ichl~1 but down to the cast thuro is v IJ soon nothing but increasing desert us one goes down and down to thirteen hundred feet below sea-level. Then in a wilderness like a landscape on the moon, the road forks. To the left lies J ericho, an oasis watered by clear streams gushing from the ugly broken face of the barren hiils, a face like that of a colossal crumbling bunker. On beyond Jericho, famous for its bananas and grape fruit, the road runs gently down the slope towards the Jordan into a jumbled mess of SliD-baked mud and sand the moon might blush to own. Here there are a few things green, keeping as close to the river as possible, and here, on either side of Alienby Bridge, are the customs posts of Palestine and Transjordan. The road leads on into better country, up a long valley beside water, up to the tops of the hills and rolling open country to Arnan, the capital of Transjordan, about two hours beyond Jericho. Back in the wilderness where the road forked, J) U\ \I

1'9

BR

I TIS H

RU

L E, AND

REB

ELL ION

the right branch leads to the Dead Sea, five miles away at the foot of a slowly descendin slope. There, at Kallia,. the last of the Jewis~ settlements, number thirty-two, the Palestine Potash Company sucks chemicals out of the heavy waters of the Dead Sea, with the help of Arab labour.

CHAPTER X. RU

L E R SAN D

RU

LED.

TWICE the Army of Britain, the Dominions, and India tried to enter Palestine in the spring of 1917 by Gaza from Egypt, once in March and once again in April. Twice it failed. Not till November of that same year, 1917, did it try again, and by the 7th it succeeded. On the 2nd of November I9I7, before that third attempt had reached success, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs published a statement of policy: "His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of that object. it being clearly understood that notbing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of ' non-Jewish mnnities in or the rights and status enjoyed by Jews in any other 150

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r ?., . T, ~.' -

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by a people of a different race a.nd creed. The DecIaration ~-as made in the year which followed the f9I6 rebellion in that same Ireland. It was made before Palestine had been conquered, and before the war had been won in the main theatre of operations on the Continent of Europe. It does not matter much now whether the Balfour Declaration was meant to mean anything, or what it means; or whether the British Cabinet dehoerately intended to create a second Ireland in Palestine, before it had solved the problem of the first in Ireland. What docs matter now, in determining the course of the .I'dI'! !l~:. is wbat hM been done Sf tlee in 't:;-;e fhc.e WEer:::: statlC am the tJ'fUP f:ave Core r.:p' tII:lW in . ,.. .t... - if it '.t:"'iii LJ:"" i ....:£- ";;'t ,fe::tJo ~ COIrerSl'!",·

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wok it fji;"ff;:- WIt (0" I!I!( s,.:0: f:, l1; :r:a~ . COfliU'tLES!:.. of pcrks.-joe we \i,II}.J c a5:1--T:..;ta! by Arab limIer Arah k2dBs. wna hed rebelled against their rule. , Ow eLlA !ly. the Turk. The assistance of these Arabs helped us a great deal, but we would have succee~ed in the end without it. The Arabs of Palestine did not help us. They were voluntarily or forcibly serving the Turk. However, in November I9I8, in agreement with the French, we published a declaration to the Arabs that we were only concerned to ensure, "by their support and by adequate assistance, the regular working of govenoments and administrations freely chosen by the populations themselves." We suffer from too many declarations. They tend to hamper rather than to help nde. In onT of Palest iue we were also by Jews in and by otbc·s from and four' took

part iD

Blltapiawe...ad1lilR

B R 1 TIS H

R U L E,

AND

REB ELL ION RULERS

administration on the correct path regardin questions Jewish. A military administration i~ fair and indeed inevitable, just after a conquest when the country is more or less in balk and it~ future still remains to be determined. But it is quite another matter to let protagonists of a m re fra tion of th whol population of the invad d Stat ,loos t organis \ and urrang' th i-utur of th ir ioll, befof' mOl' lhall half

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AND

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from its bag; war debts; the tail end of demobilisation; the peace treaties and ~ll t~e conferences connected with them; stnkes 111 Britain and rebellion in Ireland. When one whole nation was almost (orgollen, th' Tu!,k, Pal'stin ould hardly exp' t l1l1lch oH 'n,tJOJ1 from lIt \ lilll , Ilgl1l , lL II Ml, howcvel', I' 'rcl,veo lIl' uJl 'Illion of a (OIJ1 111j , 1011 fl'O)l! till' Illll'd Sllll'H , wlti " I)1VI"-i lHUll'tI II 11 10111 ('(11 14 I" I 'JI , III U"l ' \ [HII IU I'III ' " IV!' 11 '\ (1]111111 ' 1111111, \/" \/111 ' lilK 111\1 lid Iir' Itl itlliliril HYI II 111111 111 11'

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c cr-changing needs of the moment. The head of the new War Cabinet had a flair for balancing the needs of the moment, and could even accept new contributions, varying, one might say, from tandard lamps to billiard balls, without upetting anything or becoming upset himself. When the war ended he continued to juggle. In fact, a usual tendency in history was much in evidence, to go on doing to-day and planning to do to-morrow what did very well for yesterday_ situations requiring sedate thought "ere juggled in accordance with habit acquired e Dl.,h of war. league of Nations had been in existence ""l"Ir"O vears before the mandate for Palestine granteA to Britain in 1922. Two years be.eJ1 spent in haggling over the terms of ~ - !t:a<,:. In the end, Britain had her way and ' - Jt;a<;e, wl)rded a.<; she wi<;hed to and uJntaining the hw_ tin.e Ii ·jIlt{ a firf>t ..das w , and ill is, that

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inhabitants shall be capable of working together ; and secondly, that the Government shall be capable of teaching them how t.o rule. 'foh~re has never been much sign of either conditIon in Palestine. Even by 1922 Britain had done quite a lot to ensure that Jews and Arabs would not work together. They loathed each other to begin with. The casual wording of ~he B~lfour Declaration, with its division of the inhabitants of Palestine into Jews and non-Jews, the ~tter at the time being almost all Arabs and ill a majority of about. ten to on~ ;. the flying start given to the JeWISh CorrumsslOn and the appointment of a Jew, t~o~gh a ve~ fine ~ne, as the first High CommtsSlOner, did nothing to make them loathe each other less. It is quite impossible to educate inhabitants to if they bate other so Jiiucb that a of ODe is ODe kind of whm deal' g with thore of bit own aad whm with those who are DOt. TIle GIlly hope dIea . . . . a to rule, _Ir.eep ..

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acc.ou!,t fur her govemment of Palestine to tlie J ~gue ()~ _-at~ns# 5<> it is odd to find a country, which prides itse1f on the excellence of its rule in every variety of circumstance, being so unsuccessful in such a public place as Palestiue. From the point of view of the ruler, there was no vital difference between the problem presented by Palestine in 1920, when the civil administration took it over, and in the early months of 1936 before the rebellion. There were two peoples, distantly related but of different culture and language, to be ruled. Both were competing for one country. The Arabs said that they had been promised the land when we won the war, and were 111Sl$tmg that it wa.~ theirs in 1be J~ ~:id that the country was

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:-.:.e f.~a·'eo ~" :;'<.;t';t (",1 -:' oX"H ~ ", , , -e "' ttJ u> ft, ..~t ~ a.. pilty, Vf~t.,~ U".e g&.ret'~..iet;~ tJt &~,!tstir.e ;~~ to b6 (/f;1 tJ1 hi f ., ...,. 11'/ (.! fI') -A

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til;:'.. W'0 t'd.. There was nO't rr::ndi. e.ii!e-OC£ of t'<'c:t h .1-.e m1er who gave a flying sra! t to the Jews. m"de a Jew first High Commissioner, and sent Lord Balfour to open the new Hebrew Unive.sity in 1920. There was no evidence of tact regarding t he rate of J ewish immigration in the years 1 933 to 1936. For six years before 1933 the

average rate of immigration had been just under 5000 a year. In 1933 it jumped to 30 ,000, in 1934 to 42,000, and in 1935 to 62,000 .. If one asked the civil administration in Palestme what they thought they were doing, they just and put the blame shrugged their on a thing " capacity to , " It wu rather like a dover the and I the reply. "It'. not , If" me, it's the throttle. It : _ JtI(;. lit

B R I TIS H

R U L E,

AND

REB ELL ION

Before I 936 the~~ had neve~ , bee~, much sign in the ruler of ability to say No. In April I920 there were serious attacks by Arabs on Jev. in J eIllsa lem . In May I92I there were more serious attacks by Arabs on J ews in Jaffa and on J ev.-ish settlements. T here were worse attacks in August I929 at Hebron and at Safad , due to failure to stop incitement by the President of the Supreille Moslem Council or stop provocath-e processions by both Arabs and J ews. In October 1933 there was a serious Arab rising all over the coun try, directed against the GovellllIlent, because it would not stop Jewish immigration. When the rising was stopped, immigration was increased to reach record figures in 1935. After each of these revolts against rule, there were long inquiries, each of which found the root causes to be Arab objection to having a mandate instead of independence and Arab objection to Jewish immigration. There was nothing new about these discoveries. In any case, both Arab objections were well knowa to the League of Nations when it. the • apprOVIng, gave the mandate to to Great Britain in July 1922. The probably put it the

J.

R UL ER S

AND

R U LED

the investigators to find that the ruler was not ruling as requ ired by the facts of the situation. There was no control of the Press, of frontiers, of arms, of propaganda, of Jewish immigration, or of leaders on either side. Whenever the ruled protested or made t rouble, attempts w~re made to conciliate them. The mandate which gave the ruler his charter wa:' in some respects vague and in others contradictory: But when a ruler receives orders of that kind he takes freedom to interpret them, or get them changed, if he is strong, whereas, if he is weak, he.fiddles about with the precise meaning of words lDstead of doing what has to be done, and ends by blaming the orders and not himself. The form of the government of Palestine seemed ideal for the purpose of ruling under difficult conditions. It looked like a dictatorship. The High Commissioner was paramount. In I936 he held executive co and over the a I med forces. The judges and all other . ~ held office at his pleasure. Though he an Eucutive Council of four 01' five uad an Advisory Conncil of about .. 1. he was 'DOlt to the I L

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with a seCletariat and three districts, each under a District Commissioner. The head of the SCct:tariat is the Chief Secretary, usually an officlal from the Colonial Office. In the absence of the High Commissioner, the Chief Secretary acts as head of the administration, with the title Officer Administering the Government. The Chief Secretary is usually so burdened with paper, and certainly was in 193 6, that he can mrely le~l.\"' office and go abont the lmtry to . ~ thin,..,s for him df. Thnt is a us, th-J.nt"l": in the l'a~t of ,\11 ofikial who i 111.tit f r b )It tim (n1\", t I \ i u, \ f th ,

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....ithin tbe government of Palestine, and the A;abs, had, thw.-;, The ]w,..if-lh COmmuTlity, :mtb Ju; Oymg start, {(w,n.aw~j tf; fJ(~1 ;JJ'(~wj (ff th. And). In, ~mmgillg /.I; 11;rJl~ Mlfl ;t"Al( . , it 1/;1.11 t:N(} 'Nlflf!.~ f,,(J II ( gINtll/fIl/:1I1 (ltll , 'l/il//~ riNd/. wlt{, '/I;d'u~ 1(;1ij.~f(ll/!} flf1{l fA11I 111;,1, "111/ '/fI~ I", f'(/ ('(I 1/1(~ f(l/'/J/f) fl'!" fill (.'/I(,II:tI ilflhllll l ,/I/J Wldl I, 1!",tW (.f! II. (·("IiIU{ l,fj l(l"l~ '1 II !I,f,til V I" fi,," W f/I 11111 F:I' II ifill/I,d I,f htll Ii /w, 'II/ll (·1 11ft/ Wirl! Wi,q l(ll11/'/lIt,rl IiI,,;illv wil I I III " '1/ 11I1I1i'"1 1./ 1/" Il rdifql/li ""111 , ,llId 1",,1 11 m l/jllli I" " /1 '111, (1/11', II" II '1/1 /1 11,1/ /' II II I til II ,II 1111/ Ilfll/l /III • 1/111 d"11 HI 111" f / III I ""11111111/ I I II/ r/ '11"1' 11/ III, II 1/ /11 1/, /" ' / "Ill' )",1, 11/"1 III " /1 1/<1/1111111/ 1,,,,/11 I" , p"lln/l",1 II I I,. Y,'IIIII/I,/ 11111 1111 1/" wl"II, 11/1 IlIlIII '1 Ir I I I" I" Ily , II lil"I.1/ III 111/ IIIIIWlld III'jrllll/llfll~1 11" 11/11(, 1 I"' WI / II/I

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Mr;l)lems, Llm,L if; trl 'la.y thc. Ar!iJ~, h~1 :t. ')U/JU-WP, M.()~II;IJI {.II l llld', "(/III~ljt fnt.o ltdllY, /,/ I,rl/I'r r,f t1,,~ l':1'~Ii"1 '~(I/ti/Ill/llnt I1t, th!1 llltl (,f I li,l, 'J /,1'$ 1,1;1:1 !hllllilk tJ,1+. MI,,,II'III Idi{(ll fll~ I(/ ,I/tl ""I

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II 1'/1 liI,rtl f/Jld /11111 JI/I/lIIIII H, V/III " , 1'11/1 1",11 /Ill i ~, d,"I{. J/li/II 1/1 1 I lid/MUll /II 1111'/ 1//11 I,ofl/ Ilv /I, W'~' 11111/ "I /if fli,J, JI" Mlllllltl 1'111 '/'1,1,11 '1/,1 III' 1111/111 ,II"d ,,, /III /III/III/ I I/Id IIH jll/ 1111 III I II/IUIII 111'/'1 ,1'"111111 /11 1//1 11/11 111/1111 JIV Wlt" II II II/lId "1111/ 1111 Mill/I, II,q AII/I" I I 11'1 , /II, I 1111 111 1111 111I I ,1111/1 1111/ /1, iii' Il/lflllI It 1// J,y Willi II II III,/,{ 11III I ,"il " W1f4 ,l ilt I I" I IV 11i1/II II II''', I,dlll' '/1" t WI lli /I II 11I'11t1 I,IIW dill Al l/, 111,ffllljl l/ IiI/ IV, II I! l'jl l. 11111 A"I, P/II IV, 1," II Ii "1// II, Itl il lf /II " II I 11 1 111.l y til l " 111,, ,I,I " lil li/,," I/I, iI /' !llllIn~ II IIII I I II tI Ilf 1" " ' t! t" II II//d lu' t tI/" , H /,, /I VI Iv

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RULERS AND RULED appear ll,m01lg the ihT.'(~ aJ the inp, {r(lff! wbkh

h!lll to he dJlJfI;JJ, ffc,w{wlJr, Ihi~ ~Htlk;llJty WIl,.' I OycrcmrJP. hy ~he wHJv{rft,Wftl (tf 1m!: c,( tlj{$ jJlrrlH, {I,nd Ifni Amin Wfl,# I/rr!lft(llI~d Inti! 1h{l 7l!llil (Ir !YllllfJif,'1 fUttl ({lily 11,/lIII,;/l1,W{ ,¥flirt,! fly 1'/11: 1111(;1, I'll fH/,!" ¥I'l Irl/L 111111 JI/, 11/ ~~ '1111,'/ wltfil l Ii'fll~'l(/ VI}IY HUll 11111,1"11 llillt WWI ('({/I;/I III 11(' If, f'.iI/fri fIlly 1" 11,1' 1'/11111'11, And "'1WIH~ It I)IIY, Itl'" III h !t~ /Wlllllf'/4, wlj(w III} t)1I1f1~l'td Utf6f ()TIp.

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llil ' \,u il II II ,V. 111(111 I l'l\'\tl /lollI/ tid 1\ 1\'lf,11 1 Id 111,1 Mufti fIll ' 111'/"111'\1, IIIi'll \11111'111 , hili 111\1 Mllrll I'li lllldl\llt\ ~ltll' lt t IlllI\1l1 hil'\' 1I",'II"I\I4.\'. IIt\II\,rlll\'j lll 1\11\'11'11 II ~ \\\\!lllll" \I Ill.\lI. wll\'l1 It\l\\bh' \11\11,\' \1\11 I\~ till , A ~ will ht, b\'\'11 hdl'l" h\' 1'1111 til "\WI!i\lll \11' lhlt ,\'\'11' ,llld l'uII~olhli\t\'f1 the ~ 11\11\~ 11\11d , whkh \11' 1I11'lUI h ItI, OYel' the .\1' \\1~ IIC Pltll'~lh\t', 1'11, frt'qul'llt Itt\.'mpls I)! Arab syll1pathiscrs to wring from the Mufti ::I. declaration that he abhorred violence, as if he objected to the 0\'('1

'

167

B R I TIS H

R U L E,

AND REBELL ION

action of those who bore arms. . · the fact that he In hIS cause, canno tdiSgUlse rebellion. He probably did abh c~nt.r011ed the OI vIolence h muc as those who had to fight a . as but none the less he ran the 1936 r ~a:~st him, v~ry. w 11 too. H brought the l{oya~nC and mi S10n to Pal stin and has made 13 .. nth Mandatory Power, parade b fore 11 ·r Xl am, lord the L agu , to answer for 11 r . Over_

t

Th honours go to 1.11 Mufti, the fuled, and not to th gov mm nt of Pal tin , the rul r. Both th J .ws and th Arabs had in fact u~c d d, before I936, in growina crocodile ' klll round th ir r sp ctiv o~lmunities throu~h which th rule of th go emm nt of P I stll1e hardly p net rat . d at all. A a result th inhabitant of Pal tine were in two bodie~ an~ ould only be fu cd into one, if that was desIrable, by the destruction of their skins and the complete penetration of British rule thlough every particle within. We had, by 1936, created in Palestine an Ireland number t VO, "ithout the geographical and economic pull we have over the larger body in Ireland,

n mber one.

The ruler hM fai1t-d t1) laolr) true to tft facts ()f t ' :tuatUJ, 2.1 d l,y 1li (JWII act had 11;.,

RULERS

AND

RULED

arranged to lose control. Apart from basing his rule on common-sense, the ruler failed to base it on the mandate, which gave him full power of legislation and administration. Though th 'ro were pl 'nty 01 repr ficntaliv 'fi of thl' civil pow r thr ~Ighou t the COU1~ try, tI.1 CY dealt, in all as '5, With on , or pOSSIbly WIth two communiti', ach having o.n organisation of its own, an l a h with n voie speaking in J ·rusal m. Til voie's wer s Id m silent, and wcr >usually omplaining of or objecting to sOU1('thing .. As a r suIt, rule in Palcstin was v r-centrahs d, the voices in J eHlsal 'm w re heard too often, and ollciiiation took tll plo.ce of rule. 0 tIl're was order, f Hawed by counter-order, and, in onsequcnce, disorder. Through all the clamour of cOllfli:ting cl~ms, Jewish and Arab, it may seem vam to rals: a feeble bleat. But we did conquer Palestine. The Turk was beaten by two great Commonwealth and Indian Armies, one moving up from Egypt, the other threatening from Mesopotamia, with a romantic flutter in the deserts in Letween. We gave Palestine to the League, and the League returned it to us, by mandate,

to rule. HI\!

AGENTS

OF

ORDER

AGENTS

OF

ORDER

AND

LA

W.

THE agents of order, in the first instance, in Palestine are the Palestine police. At the beginning of 1936 this police force was composed of British, Arab, and Jewish personnel, the strength being just over three thousand all ranks, about nine hundred- of whom were British and two thousand Arab. But the number of Arab police inspectors in the force was approximately three times the number of British inspectors, with the result that British constables, in some cases, were under the orders of Arabs. There were six police districts in Palestine': three in the Northern District , two in the Southern, and one in the Jerusalem District. The police organisation was not flexible enough to make it possible to reinforce police in one district by police drawn from another, except to a very limited extent. The octopus tentacle 170

LAW

Cl' al control seems to have insisted on of lman .. h di t . t . nly J'ust enough police 1ll eac s nc havlllg 0 f d . e with the maintenance 0 or er 1ll et to comp uli'f f that particular district. The pec analleslio Palestine before 1936 demanded .a centr po ce the lack of one 1ll 1936 was a and reserve, disadvantage. Although the t op of the police structure was British, it soon became very mLxed lower down, d British personnel did not command through~~t, wherever police were stationed. The Ar.ab police functioned in Arab areas and the J eWlsh police in J ewish areas. As these two communities were in a perpetual state of latent or open conflict, there "as alway.s a tendency among their police representatIves to suffer from a conflict of loyalties loyalty to the government pulling against loyalty to racial interests. That peculiarity was, however, by no means confined to the police. It seemed to permeate all service in Palestine and even affected British officials, who tended to develop a passion for one side or the other, usually the Arab. In fact, anyone making a brief stay in Pale tine would soon be wondering whether the British interests in the country had any supporters at all. r.

CHAPTER XI.

AND

171

F R I 1'r - H

AND

.:tin~ ~ TV>1;. ~ was.

P~

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R l' L E,

REB

ELLIO~

AG

an ax H I ed. f On:::e .

ENTS

OF

ORDER

AND

LAW

ought to be a gellda fi oerie wing in the force or e~en a genda lJ llerie unit distinct from 't' Ot~ers urged that the protection of ro~ aga~nst armed highwaymen and all oper~tions ag~l~t armed gangs should be carried out by Bntrsh troops stationed in t he country. The police force in Palestine has had an un~ettled history. It was not till I926 that p olicy regarding its organisation became defined and the idea of a gendarmerie was discarded, The t rouble with the gendarmerie had been that it was difficult to find enough for it to do in normal times. I n fact, it sat down between t wo stools, in doubt whether it was a police force or a military one. \\11en a t last the authorities made up their min ds what kind of

, f rce to have they made the mistake police 0 ' . t f \\eakt'mng British control by havrug .00 o anV palest inian inspectors, The P atestme :,&e. in I936 before the rebellion__ did nordfit ± e C2se. and it De, eI LO ha~ e, snccee ed , :: ' '0' bec2nse aite, eye-r y CJ" rurbance, !:1 ,Uo..Ht!, _ , . , • thoe ',-~.ll,,;,e bee n l eoJmIPe!lrlarioos for , con ee! . mg . . ,5 OIoa rnsa ' u 'OlL 'l'be fa c eS of the SJlII3UOn• ill 1" Palestine d emanded Briri"b conu ol as deep mto the force as possible, though naturally PalI inians were essential in the lower ranks to the British control in t ouch with the people. However, the d~ire to please once again pushed t he facts aSlde. . . Police work in P alestine, dlfficult enough ill any case, was complicat ed by th~ problem of auxiliary police. The J ews h ad nghts of selfprotection. They were allowed t o hav~ a few shot-guns in each settlem ent, lock ed ill local arIllouries, which might b e open ed and the arms issued to meet attack. The situation was, and indeed still is, like the Wild W est in the days .when the west was wild and Indians might come rushing out of the wilder wild at any moment. In Palestine the Arab plays the part of Indian still. The P alestine police has to look after the

172

173

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f1dlure in (llIminl'l l rn,lioJl lw' I ," t11Jlolitld 1 b 1 1\ 1(,(l,V,Y , 11rc ~n on 1h . Puli'si inc poliee. Con~ i roJ of 3,J IUS In PalestIne hus n vcr be on at, · t cmp t ed I b ecause It was considered too difficult to enforce. The argument has always been that, as fast as arms are seized, arms probably newer and better would pour in to repl . ace · t11em. D IS~rml11~ ~alestine h as been compared by responsIble cIvil officials to baling a very leaky boat. But the comparison is not a very good one, because the boat Palestine has no sides to it. No attempt ever has been made to control the frontiers of the country properly. In tLct, Palestine was, before I936. and still i!'!, more like a raft sunk an inch or two beneath tlle ABOi 111'1'

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bi;lng rdloll'i nine miles wide. but there if) an area to the south of it which lies quite open. The Jordan valley is very malarial. except in the winter months, a fact which made control along that line more difficult. But Transjordan was not a foreign country like Syria, it was part of the mandate. The French controlled their side of the Syrian frontier with Palestine, but the government of Palestine did next to nothing on its side. As a result of this neglect, there was a good trade in contraband as weJl as in arm.., across the Palestinian frontiers. Even Jews were incillded in the contraband. being "muglj]ed in by Arab., at a price, TIle Jew who (,It impel1wl ttJ Ci)mll in that way w. fI' tl (,'.Ie whl) bad l11)t JIIli'Tl f~I!II' VI I{l't IrJI the iuulliW:d illn 'lML'l, l)f J/~tJj f~l,jJNI U, JuWJ Ht t:f/'W ti(fIllt. 'NJ.i;/l thN'~

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WII'l1 hailed b th' PalesUn' police. Though tIl ' 111a11 quite clearly intended to st 'P ashore in Palestine unobserved, the doubt about the country in which he was standing when summoned, and the fact that he declared that he was just looking for a cow, saved him from punishment. The state of Palestine being what it was, better control of the inhabitants might have resulted by means of residence permits, like a driving licence in this country, but containing a description of the bearer and a reference to some person of moderate standing, in case it 17H

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All' Fm <', Pu lest/ne had COJlW nl1c](>r Lh 1ctli'('t, 011(1 tht' mmnnder of 1h(' forces was nn Air ice-Mru h.!. But the High ommiRsioncr, who was a Lieutenant-Gen· ral on the active list, had e.xt nded powers as if he were commanding a fortress, and exercised command as Commander-in-Chief. The garrison consisted of two squadrons and four sections of armoured cars of the Royal Air

Thel'o wa." llothmg in haml but the armoured car~ to guanl ommunications. and the situation was complicated by the Jack of a through main road in the maritime plain between Jaffa and Haifa. This defect appears to have been due to fear that a through road might compete with the ma.in line of the govelllment owned Palestine railways. In consequence. the only through road from south to north ran from Jemsa1em

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CHAPTER XII. JlEDELLtON AND EXTRIME MOI)ERATtON, APRIL-MAY' 1936.

IT is time now to e.xamine the particular case of sub-war which distracted Palestine for ix months from April to October 1936. It offers a better example of the foul disease tha.n any of its predecessors,becau se it mo\"ed more quickly an . its stages v e.""e rcore clearly marked. As . t_.1 a prob1etn of tf£"re: rrT'r~ CO_ClilOTIS 0 Hluu6 n Tebellio.....:., it p-ro\iides a glf2! :-:IaDf lf5-.~'~ y;lrid:. "h",-tld be :;::.otro in rnse y;e !id om seh(s fare w f'aL-e with rl~~·:t~Jries cd ~he 52IDe -r.: pe - ~-u.orr,; .. • . 1,he B au"".: .. " ~ -_.\'._-e 0 ...zlttx=: · 1ag;:m .. T::.e g'etlCl
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of deleaation, and certainly no idea of d 1 . t o th e extent of full self-government Ae egahon . . . peCuliar . B' " f eat ure In ntaIn s experunent is the un . graCIOUS . . way In whIch the ruled receive from the I Th h d t· rtl er. ose ~ 0 0 n~ receIve as quickly as they would like seem Inclined to resort to force in order to. a~celerate the pace. The factor of ?orrect hmmg by the ruler is a factor of great unportance, but the timing must be done by Britain.

~ereas, in the case of the British Empire, Bntam put herself where she is as ruler, in the case of Palestine, she was put there by the great majority of the nations of the world as the jud
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Between December 1935 and April 1936, when the rebellion broke out in Palestine, the proposal regarding a legislative council was under consideration, and the Jews, the Arabs, and the British Parliament were all thinking it over. There were also proposals regarding the control and limitation of the sale of Arab lands to Jews. It was not intended to stop Jewish immigration, which w.as to contin~e to be controlled in accordance WIth the econorruc capacity of the country to absorb new arrivals. These proposals were definitely of the nature of giving more power to the ruled, when giving appeared to be justified. It will be recalled that the shape of the govemment of Palestine, at the time when the proposal was made, \\as, and . still is, personal rule by the High Commi.;sioner. Therefore the proposal \\as to take a step al or the evolutionary path, a step a\tav from direct tlile. The Arab . were asked to cOllsider the their views to the GO"CIItU*£nt; in Dere .her 1935,• ,..... Arab 19.}6. the\> toe m • • , m Ar.ab • .m _}"1'2 . . In ~

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'{lit l [jlm \\ \ '('tllt'l tlut ill llw lI \O::\t,tll ' \~' liut'l this ~ \. III l oloni:-. H It s ~tct11 uid U~ltil\s t lkilh:il ttlit' i ii. 1;11 , 'tinc) mtd til\) t ' cHtlh l'nl'ly wus l'QU 'ht into :i't/on to d' dtlp intimidu.tioll ::lnd help to keep the strike going, T hen t he strike in Syria fizzled out, and the Arabs in Palestine were left without a red h erring, However, they soon found a new one, At the end of March, debates in t he H ouse of Commons led the Arabs to say that t hey b elieved that there was little hope of support there, either for a legislative council, for restrict

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witl "ut reit:rence f:(, the gov,:rnment t and manage the strike of Arahs ;:afJli~r('l cJrganiS<:d on the pretext of the Til 18 ~ estlTle, l and Tel Aviv. The president (f) in? Jaffa {' • J 15 n(.ow ...onuntttee.was the }l ufti. On tIl" 25t h fA' th r 't~-- . • () pnl e \..A~ ~ ISSued a declaTation Matin f tll' the stoke would continue till all t he gAr'~ oc"11lands were granted by t he governme:t. ~e d:m lands were : stoppage of J ewish immIgration; ~toppage of sales of land to J ews ; and the setting up of a representative national govewment in Palestine. So the Arab lead . d' . ers reJecte , ill t~ tor::uous manner, the proposal to set up a lef51slahve council, and resorted to force to gain a representative national government, as the first step to Arab rule in Palestine. On the ~5th .of April, t herefore, rebellion began. The nots ill J affa and Tel Aviv were serious eno~gh. On the I7th of April the funeral proceSSIOn of a murdered J ew in Tel Aviv got into ~roubl.e with t he police, and rioting broke out, ill whlch Arabs in the J ewish city of Tel Aviv were attacked. Then on the I9th of April, after a brief pause of apparent peace, the return match was played in the Arab city of Jaffa. Suddenly Arabs began rushing about the street s shouting out t hat their fellow country-

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188

EXTREME MODERATION, APRIL-MAY

r936

men were bdng murdered by J ews in Tel Aviv. Before the J("'V/S vi'>iting Jaffa i()r the day could scuttle to safety they were having thdr throats cut and lying grinning and dead about the str(:('{ s. P(JIice rushed to restore oroc't, anlI troops were moved to support them. By the time they had all fini'!hed the score was r6 J ews killed and 75 wounded, against 6 Arabs killed and 7r wounded. A person of n Otillal sense would expect to find the responsible head of the Moslem religion in Palestine exercising all his great powers in the direction of moderation and calm after such an outburst of insanity ; instead, he the occasion to raise rebellion against the government by all t he Arabs in Palestine. Looking at the situation up to the 25th of April from the British side, the question of interest is the amount of warning of rebellion available to the government of Palestine. Those who know Palestine well say that it is seldom possible to have wawing of riot. There appears to have been no watning of riot in Tel Aviv, but that riot was in itself a warning of riot in Jaffa. However, . of riot is one thing, warning of rebellion is something very different. The past records and general tendencies of the 18Q

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of 11)(1 olher purtle:;, but it d ,'pw its rhid inHpirnli(J1l f10m rivoJry with th j)n!elitin' Amb Party find Lhp J1usscinis,

Assuming lllf'n that the offer of n legislative ounei! WfL'i not made just to start strife among the Arab parties and bring out a regrouping more likely to co-operate, the government could e;\.-pect the answer that its proposals did not go far enough, In fact, DO proposal short of handing over the govemment of the cOllntry to the stronger group of _-Uab leaders would go far enough. That, hOl;\ ever, in itself would not be ellough to kad the gOVel ",,,ent to expect rebellion, though the action of the Palestine Arab leaders in a strike in sympathy with the Arabs in Syria showed that they were inclined to direct actinD.

The attitude and pa~t record of the Mufti were, of cour%, known to the govemnu.\:nt, which p()s!!ihly knew al ) of the vi'lits to J eroIIftlcm of one F,wzi-cd-Din Kawukj i, wh(J quite f(:CI'lllly Ita<; hcun making raUwl' tactlcllfl eli'!CIO"ll nJlI in Uj(' l~syptian Pr ·S!!, Fauzi rc:bcl1cd a(;aill!!1 t ht, FH'lI1'h in Syria in I925. and has 1I(~ Itas

always been r~ V()J'Y adiVl' AmI> nntionnliflt, devoted to the illm of a III'!' ilnd int\I'IH:nrknt Arab State

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q ,fn', f.( , J' J t '011 l m ,1UttlvTI Ill! A r~tl 'J,'lllt IA 'J'1.. , " " "~t' l~fI 1/ fJ~lr t wt ldl h· W: t() 1,1: Y W'I" I, t • • . ' " , ) "Tin!; !Tl M M Id JOI'n hr,m t1) 'IIM n( ro<;,", thl: d('R('rt r h~ pJI)t! 'rs h",l plang for reb 'Ilion in tithl'; S!,rla. or In 'palestine, and were prepared to put ,tther pJa~ Into operation as opportunity offered . At first It seemed that Syria, early in 1936,

*

f,

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presented the better target of the two but ~nexpectedly Syria relapsed into slumber. 'Then ill April 1936, just as unexpectedly, Palestine woke up. Fauzi then collected his arms and his m en and did invade Palestine, wh ere he became a national hero and the local Michael Collins. Account must also be taken of the situation outside Palestine in the early months of 1936 . The I talians were well committed to their assault on Abyssinia, and their relations with Britain verged (m war. A British division from home wa s .. itting in tlw w(:si('rn desert of Egypt (JV( ' r again~t ltnl;an force!! in Libya. 'J h ' bnlk of tll ' UJitish Navy was in the Meditpn am'an and a larw· pal t of it at tll(' ('ast rn

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to a currant or two in the cake th cy . .. swallow. The J affa riots they USCd wIshed to as to rouse the people Without th O A a pretext . e rab lead there would have been no spontan .. crs nS lng eous I n f act, the r esponse was not spont . aneous at all d th A b , ~n e ra p eople took a good deal of rousmg.

It w~s not till eight days after the end of the

J affa ~lOtS and four days after the Higher Arab ~omm1ttee h~d announced its self-appointed exIstence and Its demands on the governmentnamely, the 29th of April that disorder became spread over all the country. On that day a convoy of cars escorted by police was stopped near J enin by Arabs and forced to go back to Nablus for military aid, after losing one car which was set on fire. At Nazareth a crowd of about two thousand Arabs collected , and could not be dispersed till after the police had opened fire. At Nablus, Jaffa, and Haifa police patrols were fired at, and there were cases of arson. At Acre some railway stores were set on fire. At Tulkanll another crowd of about two thousand had to be forcibly dispersed by the police. At Beisan a police patrol was fired at, and in J'rll alem there were ca~e~ of arson, and a J w was stabb d. In addition to these J04

•

EXTREME MODERATION, APRIL-MAY

193 6

activities, several attacks were made on J ewish colonies. That was the position at the end of April. All the Arab shops were shut, Arab buses and taxis were laid up, the Arab lightermen in Jaffa were on strike, the Arab leaders were agitating and urging; but for some reason Arab government servants, including the railwaymen, who in Palestine are government employees, remained at duty. During May the Arab leaders took effective steps to spread the revolt more thoroughly throughout the country. Their object was to ensure that resistance to government should not be confined to centres such as Jerusalem, Nablus, or Jaffa, where the more educated, politically minded Arabs were gathered as residents. Had they allowed that to happen, there might have developed a cleavage between town and country which would have left the government free to concentrate force in the centres, where living conditions were at their best for the police and troops and where communications wero good. The object was to nsurc that the rebellion was a Palestinian Arab rebellion and l\ot jnst vigorous resistance to gowllIllwnl h town-dwelling effendis. shop·

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EXTREME

'ODERATlO .-, APRIL-

AY

193 6

patHJJJed , in an attt-mpt to pr<.'Vcnt
early in, ' th Hi liI'r AralJ Comffli1~, 11 fufti 10 thl v ' n, tIJIJf(;d tlu; U)u~11ry II' Jr;;a!'i i" ,am] gjnl~1 rillS; up till' :dlIJ1l;tl (..,tITflTIII{1 I I IrI till) fJllt Iyirw ifi /rill" witj, tIll' I)lijl d I)j 11"(."'11 I ali i1l11 VitI/'T/W lld :;'lIi I

('/1 '> 111

illl; tlm1 ('a(" CIJlTHllill(1 ~JJlil dti JHIVIJ it H

;t~)tJ/ ' of :111 IVlf y awl

IHll de! 111'11(.1iVI' ill il . At Ill!' aulI' tlllH, /)Jcit-r Wt't/ h~lf('d hy 011 ' l/i~llI~r Arah ' oJOnllti('( I h:~1 /IOIl paYHH'ut IIf l itxl'~ nnd dvil dj..,ob('dil'1l weI(' t o hl'f-li n II (JIll the 15th of M. y. Th ''''C' movemenls Wl'n' l':uJi('d O il t until r th nose of lb gov('/nnwllt , which must hay known what was going' 0 11 . A. a r sult of tIl s a tiviti s, 01<'1' was a noli abl t nd ncy for rebel activity to spread from t h towns into t h country districts during May. Th re, the polic w re much more cattered and tationed in weaker detachments, while were not as yet pre ent at all. It became necessary for roads to be patrolled by police or soWiers, and mO\-ement of baffic on them had to be organised and CODtrolled by means of a sy tem of convoys. At the same tillie, acts of sabotage and on the railways began, and they too bad to be

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Activity in tli!; tm

was

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allowed tJ) f il;

J,() Wf;VtT, 'DI!,,'TC W' t'.IIJ11IIJ. ;ral"c T(,'w,lve:J' W(Ilk in J'·l U,'lI<.-rrI, III Jaffa " th"l1/, I" NaiJ/lJ!! "ill/iqdl W"r rlt,;" ti, and :t ballt! of :IJ/wd Ar:d, 1)(;(;IJJ)i'd tlJe hill ()VI·r1I)()kjll~ 1III' tC)Wt1, whi(" Jil d ' P ill It Harrow valll'Y. l'rtHti P,/illt (If vanl. 'e and :lfe 1J(')lind I{ol)d COVI'r, tli(:y arnu cd Uwrn Iv hy fu illl{ a t the old 'fill kj~h uallack and thl: military limp down helow. both of which l. y cl al of their d lJwn I

I ri C'J1 d~, At J affa the Arab continued to strike, and it was not till the 15th of May that sl ps were taken under the protection of a destroyer to discharge cargo at Tel Aviv, the J ewish member of the twin cities. Later, another hip coming to discharge at Tel Aviv was grccted by Arabs in launches from Jaffa, who suddenly took to throwing bombs at it, a curiQUS fOlm of attack on a ship. Towards the end of May rebel activity had into the southern area around Hebron, Beersheba, and Gaz.a, where it took the fOlm of. on un

IN

•

BRITI

H

R U L E,

AND

REB ELL ION

keepers, bu a.nd taxi driv~, and municipal employees. Therefore, early in May, the. High r Arab Committee, the Mufti in the van, toured the country, reorganising and gingering up the National Committees in the outlying districts , with the object of decentralising command and ensuring that each Committee should have its zone of activity and should be active in it. At the same time, orders were issued by the Higher Arab Committee that non-payment of taxes and civil disobedience were to begin from the 15th of May. These movements were carried out under the nose of the government, which must have known what was going on. As a result of these activities, there was a noticeable tendency for rebel activity to spread from the towns into the country districts during May. There, the police were much more scattered and stationed in weaker detachments, while troops were not as yet present at all. It became necessary for roads to be patrolled by police or soldiers, and movement of civilian traffic on tl1cm had to be org.mist'
no

EXTREME MODERATIO ." APRIL-MAY

1936

patrolled, in an attempt to prevent derailments of trains. . Activity in the towns was not allowed to die down however. There was considerable revolver work' in J erusalem. In Jaffa and in H~fa large crowds assembled in defiance of the police, and fire had to be opened to disperse them. In Nablus barricades were erected, and a band of anned Arabs occupied the hills overlooking the town, which lies deep in a narrow valley. From points of vantage and safe behind good cover, they amused themselves by firing at the old Turkish banacks and the military camp down below, both of which lay clear of their friends. At Jaffa the Arab lightennen continued to strike, and it was not till the 15th of May that steps were taken under the protection of a destroyer to di charge cargo at Tel Aviv, the Je.wi h member of the twin cities. Later. another coming to discharge at Tel Aviv was greet d by in launches from Jaffa. who took to throwing bombs at it,

fonn nd

on

B R I TIS H

R U L E,

AND

REB ELL ION

communications by me2ns of road blocks and ambushes. As lIIay be imagined, .the strain on the police and on ~_M. FOlces dunng these first six weeks of rebelbon "as ,·ery great. Wben trouble ~an the Air OffireJ Commanding bad aYajiable 0; 'ry- .wo j7ifann S- ~=-talions. in addition to .be sq"2GW;GS and 3! IIIonroo cars of the Royal 0"" - Foae. Tne amroured cars were im-aluable :0:- ;u"d Ie;; ok and convoy protection. but dm it'S in aid of the civill'ower demand infantry, and milch infaol!y was available. Probablv not more than a thousand soldieIs were available for effective duty over the whole country. after allowing for guards and such domestic details as cooking food. H owever, on the lIth of May, one battalion of reinforcements arrived, and on the 22nd another, while on the same date naval detachments were landed to help in running and maintaining traffic on the main line of railway. Thus, by the end of the third week in May, a month after the outbreak of organised rebellion, the garrison in Palestine had been doubled. The events of that first month of rebellion in Palestine, from the point of view of a study of sub-war, were of primary importance. Look-

EXTRE:lfE MODERATION, APRIL-MAY

.

6 I93

t the position from the other side, some

Ii .cal curious features stand out. The . po tl 'F bs did not summarily reject the proposal to IUa il Th to set up a · conDe .. ey

Ulg a

. m·th the idea till a secnon of them faced to} .. . h dir t the others, probably the ma}onty. WIt ~ adion against govemmeut and the al~elllative of supporting that action or taking "the CQDSeqllences.

-

. -

There had been, yoithout doubt, a great ~eal of talk of rebelHon and a great deal of pIottmg. with the usual effect of both on the minds of those concerned. But the staff work does not seem to have kept pace with the t alk. The organisations required t o conduct rebellion , t he Higher Arab Committee and the v arious District Committees, were not set up before, but after action had b een taken. Fallz1 and the foreign Arabs were even less ready for action. They were talking and plotting in April, but it took them till August to convert promise into perfonnance. The way the rebellion began, or was allowed to begin, gives rise to three questions: how many of the ' million Arabs in Palestine had a genuine grievance against government, how much truth was there in the idea that the rebellion was a

198

199

I

B R 11 IS H

R U LE,

AND

kEn ELL 10 Ii'

communications by means of road blocks

amb~h~.

EXTRE~IE

~d

As may be imagjned, the strain on the l' . po ICe H and on .M. Forces dunng these first six w k of rebellion. was very great. When tro~~l: began the AIr Officer Commanding had avail bl only two infantry battalions, in additiona t~ t~e squadrons and arnl0ured cars of the Royal Air Force. The armoured cars were invaluable for road patrol and convoy protection, but dutie in aid of the civil power demand inf~try and not much infantry was available. Prob~ ably not more than a thou and oldiers were anUlable for e:ifectiYe duty over the whole country, after allO\\ iug for guards and Such domestic details as cooking food. However, on the nth of May, one battalion of reinforcements arrived, and on the 22nd another, while on the same date naval detachments were landed to help in running and maintaining traffic on the main line of railway. Thus, by the end of the third week in May, a month after the outbreak of organised rebellion, the garrison in Palestine had been doubled. The events of that first month of rebellion in Palestine, from the point of view of a study of sub-war, were of primary importance. Look198

•

MODERATION, APRIL-MAY

193 6

iug at the position from the other side, some curious featur~ stand out. The leading political Arabs did not summarily reject the proposal to set up a legjslative council. They seemed to toy with the idea till a section of them faced the others, probably the majority, with direct action against government and the alternative of supporting that action or taking the consequences. There had been, without doubt, a great deal of talk of rebellion and a great deal of plotting, with the usual effect of both on the minds of those concerned. But the staff work do~ not seem to have kept pace with the talk. The organisations required to conduct rebellion, the Higher Arab Committee and the various District were not set up before, but after action had been taken. Fauzi and the foreign Arabs were even less ready for action. They were talking and plotting in April, but it took them till August to convert promise into perfonnance. The way the rebellion began, or was allowed to begin, giv~ rise to three questions: how many of the million Arabs in Palestine had a genuine grievance against government, how much truth was there in the idea that the rebellion was a 199

B R 1 r 1 $ It N.

L E,

AND

R E II E L 1. 1 0 "

spont311COUS national outburst, why was there such a marked pause between the Jaffa riots and the rebellion proper? Turning to our side, and the point of view of the ruler, there was, of course, warning of trouble, the source of which was known. The Jaffa riots could be regarded as a cold in the head and not malignant malaria, but precautions were necessary and were taken by the police and military authorities. What was incomprehensible wa that a few Arab leaders were allo" 'ed with impwlit t o p roclaim a political . trike and present an ultimatum to the government at a tim' f tensiou. TIt 'll on the top of that, the 11 \ High r rab mll1itt~c, s't up b~ :df~appoil1tnl It ad rl5 in dc.liml

t'

200

£. ' n W ME MOD E RATIO N, APRIL - MA Y

)

)

of 6 o\'(,~rn­

allo\\ L'tl h , th \ l'ukr lo l Oti r the {uuity to Ol"g"lli~ th t' sttikt' and lllakl' it d I'd l\"\\ nit' I')t'p( 1"1 of till' PO\',ll rom. • • • lll!- 'sl\)1\, till f',~ , liS. ~;j,ll\'s: ".\t lm ,'ad' ~li\~\ in it:; \'ou l,'Se t lit' I uftl ,\J\d tilt' l\ klll\Wl's \ tlw ~ \)t l\1\l i (h ' \n", ,tll\I\\\'d tIl 1l1.lk, ,\ !\Iur thllllt ll \\\lt 1',lkslilh . WI' \\\'1 ' illl(III'lI'd tInt \~l\\, di~trk t h.ld [\t'\'{l f.lirly quit I Ulllil tht Mofti \\ ,I~ ~h'\'n thi~ pIlI'ni..,siIHI md hdd ('t,)nk l ' n \\~ \t ",hid) ndllwi l)\)lkt· Ilt)r ollkil\ls "'~\l\\ ,)lIoWt'd to hl' I }'('St'llt. );rom lllt'ut. Wt\:)

J

\

I936

the date of the tour, the strike had spread and stiffened." The district referred to was, without doubt, the Northern District, more than half the country, covering the less accessible parts and the parts which it was most important to keep quiet. Rule of that kind is. a mena?e to peace and the British Empire. It IS one thmg to hope that a riot will not degenerate into rebellion, it is another to make sure that it does not, and yet another to make sure that it does. T~le delay in obtaining reinforcements, the restrICtions pIn U 011 the a tion of troop , from the ouls t, and th latitude n.Uowcd to the other side to obslru t Ut 'ir l1'1.o,'cl11ent, b 'com of s 'condnr import an e, in vil;'w f Up fr edom

nHo\: ('d lo n'bd kad~I'S . wcr' nol IlloW\'d l) 111'(' when ob~tnt ,t.Nl 1> , road bl cks ami thl't'Utt'lIill!o\ ('ro\\'d~, in nnkr to mt\kc .nu , l' Ir\' l' . ·nlllpk. In rOlll'l'qm'llrl', oh~ll'uchol\ Iwr HlH.' \ h Ihit am\ Inl til displ'l~al of {(m'l' ily til\' ddl PIlWl"" 01\ HI\' ~rollnd t hat b('~'l\U);l' 1Il\1\,\'lIl1'lIt tlltlk l'O Illl\~, tlt'l wlmwnts llllll't I . pl.II'I'd \11 or "l'r m \1" pllll'l\ whkh might giw ( 1"\1111111'.

Tht'l'\' is littlt' Illmbt th \t, IUlIl tlwrt b n s 'stt'tlI of mIt', h \);t'(1 un pI' iou ' kn wi dg lIUl

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-

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H.\ P T ER XIII. REBELL I ON AND EXTRE ME MOD E HA T ION. J U . ' E I 9 .) 6.

tn t co 1 nve

1

•

•

Tnmm was no my tery whatever about the p Hcy of th Arab leaders during the first month of the rebellion. They had called on the Arab people of Palestine to band themselves together to resist government. They had openly declared that they would continue to resist the government till a representative national government was set up in place of the British dictatorship. Their other demands about Jewish immigration and the sale of land to Jews were incidental, because it was quite obvious that a representative national government, with Arabs in a two to one majority over Jews, would soon put an end to both immigration and sales of land, if it felt inclined, There was no mystery about the identity of those who weTe leading the resistance to government. The leaders who set the pace 203 •

BRITISH .

RULE

AND 'REBELLION

EXTREME

and dIctated the olic

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tw 'l11\' Y~'Jt' l ~ful 1,} 'I'le ',11 tlP~'ll to Ull'lU ~lllly . ' .. ' reo lnt I!nt'V,UIl''' \'"1" to' ~ rt'th l\. t c.nt ~.

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Then:> \\~ no m

. bo lead",},,;'" ~ .t~ef}, ut, the method of =upThe resistance WhICh the leaders could hardly be described as just to government. TIle shutting 20(

JUNE

I93 6

of Arab shops, the boycott of Jews, and the strike of the lighter men in Jaffa were not very serious matters, though as strikes they suffered from the objection that they werc political and not industrial. But attacks on communications, /Joth road and rail, shooting at police. and sniping of military posts, were acts of rebeUion. The my<;tcry, which had deepcned considerably by the cnd of May, was the attituuc of the govcrnm ont of Pal tine towards its duty to mnintrlin order. It Illay hav' considered that it would ha v b '0 u eless j usl to stand in til

been elected by a free vote b U t' ey had not whereby they could b l' t no system exL<;tcd ee ec ed to re . , A.rab s of Palestine Th . present the I ' , e y were not c ass WblCh had ever boLhcre<1 ' men of a ab01J t, th wcHnrc of the rm~ch J~ t llc past l~en of It Tilling clas!!, !!01l1t~)(;)1k, . 1 hey were lngl, office j'l ill d' f Whom lInd 11(;ld 'W!! 0 tlw T . J ' I not li .... " ,A ' . ' lJ r <.I S I Em pi r'c .. llt \1 10 P'l l('stmc ' {f(NCI'Hor "f r . " ,SO IlI (' Imd b('/'Jl ('\ , , , ) ) (lVll1C('S .

subdhiflioll of

MODERATION,

J'lliddl or Ole to' d, with o.rms Qutstrrt'11 d, in nil'. to lop a run way hon;. hl.r b'tt r to run b sltk it, catch hold of S ul.elhing o.l tho Iltsl opp rtuilit " CUld gent! bring the nortiltg beast to a halt, If that u'scribes th policy of III \'('l'lmlent i.n the opening phas , its per~ {Ol'llltulC'e looked like tllat t a figure in a dressinggown tuld bedroom slippers patheticall padding along in the du'ty wake of the Higher Arab oll1uuth:. It may have been that the government had orders to deal vtith the situation without drawing more troops out of England, there being already one division on the western frontier of Egypt. If that was the case, the question still remains whether it would not have been 205

BRITI

H

R U L E,

A _r D

R E B ELL lOX

J U~ E 1936

defensive, it left the initiative to the rebels T here was no plan for r estoring order; ther~ wer e only m easures for checking or stop . t~e spread of disorder. As a result, decentra1:~ tion of control m erely tended to dissipate energy without producing any marked result. Without a plan, there was no means of telling at the end of a fortnight whether any progress had been made towards objective A, B, or C, because there were no defined objectives. For example, objective A might have been to establish a strangle-hold on the rebel leaders, objective B to gajn control of arms, and objectiv e C to inflict deterrent penalties for any act of r eb ellion or act calculated to assist r eb ellion. Given a plan, it would have been possible to allot force to duties and make a clear distinction between strength used passively on guards, escorts, convoys, and road or railway patrols, and strength used objectively towards the attainment of a part of the general plan. That would tend to prevent too much strength from being used up on the passive side of the task, and, in tum, tend to make it less to use strength passively, as progress towards the objective side developed. It h as to be remembered that the Air Officer

which were entirely in the hands of the civil power. He was only the military adviser and not even the supreme military commander in Palestine. He had not always a free hand regarding t~e method of executing a military plan of actIon approved in principle by the civil power. The civil power kept to itself, not only the right of saying what was to be done, but also the right of saying how it was to be done. It may seem right in principle that the civil power should control in foul weather as well as in fair, but it is not right that the body responsible for policy and co-ordination of the four parts of rule, civil, police, military, and legal, should direct the detailed working of any one of the parts. The arrangement whereby the head of the civil part was also head of the military part of rule in Palestine was unsound. Tell a man what you want done, but leave him a free hand to do it, is a good maxim. The first serious break-down in co-operation between the various parts of rule took place in June in the form of a clash the civil and legal parts. It was not till the nth of June that the civil power ~ued . regulations. In these regulations It

208

108

EXT R E M E

M O DERA TION,

Co~manding was not responsible for plans

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.:.1-'.... .- . :.&.' o~¥ 'to p;:blic order, such as .s;5..' .?,~,;! '6 2. \1t~"i ,:~-i:~g Gi the appIooch of troops W c;r, a:l me<;! b:a:-:-A. At the same time, it took: 4 ·., . '" .. .. ... ..1'" , yfiif:T "" m.pr..r...e 1'~'-tnCt1r.J1lS un lt1ulYid1.lah, jJlflk't i:lJIb:.ti-v~ p'ttrm.hm~.rts, control C(JJ'll~ ifIU1~t1m~ ~fl dJe Pr~jfji, t<~..tI ki fft(1Vet'rltmt, VJh~ 01/<;1' (Jr d(;: tJif'j" fA"JJArty, Wl'J irJt(;nt mIHyj;1tl~.tl~ w;iJ"J!Jt h'iaL Ai vn! ,dfl l "(, J'1;I)"J1iiif)fjij w' /'I, "kdl,tJW,d iii HI'~ vjflil " , ~IJJd :, ,ldi<)j}'nlit ..;j IIrtl1c!Jj d, Y' I()",d III Wll k ll IIw " Xt >I, I11)YIJ W)Y ' >fJJtIJ"11i lI))d jlld
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oency .fef'ulations to deal with the situation. In six weeks it shonld have been to ellsnre that friction did Dot arise between who had to govetn and those who had to punish re:,-istance to gOVeIlllilent. Steps have si.nce been taken to prevent a recurrence of the dbput:e, but not till :19.17 fJY Tllf::an.; ui an Order in Council, To take f1u1~ ttve nwnt~ after the end of a rebellion, whkJl l~wl fljf Mx rJ'/rmit.l$, dOO!l> nut rw~l evitll;DW fA fllUl;;h

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md III~tI ill .lilliI'. ;\ (',1111',,\ h'd lIIt)\'I' \\;t~ \11,11 '" II\' 1Itt li'"{'\1' At.l h 'Itlkl I t", h\l'hl.lh~ ,'\ .'11 ind,','". l.\ .\<1\ i,,' I1l1' ~,)\ \'1 111111'1\1, V'''I\lhli{ H:llltr.

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a suggestion that the govelllment should the Arab point of new, and act on what it saw, stopping Jewish immigration pending negotiatIons. The example of the senior officials was later t o be followed by the junior officials. When goverllment servants, as a body, take to memorialising the government on questions of policy, the situation may be regarded as serious, particularly during a rebellion. Nevertheless, the appeal was accepted, and passed on its way, through the usual channels, to the Colonial Office. In addition to that crack there was another flaw in the same part of the machine. The Higher Arab Committee had organised not only a strike, but also a fund for its financial support, which might mean anything from the of arms to the paynu:.'1lt of some fm ill ~Jf oo1e to truJl\C imP(Jveri Jj through to • C:'''!\e. 'fl e contributirm (}f money to f d ,a~ f~ar(ted the d ty f,f all sound in ' tine, he 1 uninde4 of that

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:MODERATION,

JU_'E

1936

cold .. An arrangement was made whereby they contributed a part of their salaries, said to be as much as ten per cent. The government, however, never proclaimed the Higher Arab Committee, and never made the collection of money for the strike illegal, so a crack or two was only to be expected. During June a crack also began to develop in the police force, the bulk of which was Arab. The force had, by then, ceased to be able to function in the normal way. It required two or three men to do what had been the task of one, and, in general, the duties of the force had become military duties under arms. The crack only affected a part of the Arab section of the force, and, at first, only took the fOlm of loss of keenness, though later it developed further. The Arab police, in the circumstances, had no easy part to play. Tbeir lot was not improved by the failure of the g""aoment to provide quarters in police stations for marrieA who, conseq uently, had to OOooJlle single, or live in the of who w..e actively lJwJSing and their H.M. Forces. the only sound part of the whole machine, 'Chey luckily do DOt crack, though they do functioD better if they SIJ

,

B R I TIS H

R U L E,

AND

REB ELL ION EXTREME

can see some point in the performance f abnormal duties and see some progress towar~s a result. The progress of the other side during June was more noticeable than that of the government. The leaders remained free to carryon their control of the strike. The government had, qnite ad ,imp ('d r' tri lion On th' acti itics 1 s m <.: 'ti"t'llll't b m Hi
MODERATIO N,

JUNE

193 6

under guard, but unfortunately they were not the leaders of the rebellion. During June the organisation of the other side improved, and there was ample evidence that they were becoming better armed and better led in action. As proof of their increasing confidence, lhey took to staging al11bu hl's in daylig-hl. At fm,t, they had just a' 'nlbl 'd in rowrl~ and put blo ks across the Ill' battalion roads. That had ~on\l' cfkct. of rl'inforcl'mcnts took 'l'n'Jl hours to moy' 1'1' 11\ Tulk.U'lll to ~ .\hlu~ by lorry, oyer di'(,\1l l \\ hkh norllully \h uld hl' OY,:1\'{i ill I $.~ (h,m ,-))', Th I r '\' )f ,)b$truch 1l l( i t " I f i, . 'lyil I' :r i<: it I \ ~t 1 l, I d, ' • • ,m

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~t P prote ted tJ:3.A1c on the ma.in road fr J cru&'llem to Jaffa, thereby brinlring am . . c on an action wInch lasted for two hours with a f . f· company 0 m aJ~try, WIth police and armoured cars co-operatmg. In the second week of the month, att~cks on the main railway line increased. SIxteen casualties, mostly Jewish were caused by the throwing of a bomb into ~ railway carriage. Two days later two trains were derailed and considerable damage done to the line by sabotage. On one day during the week, troops had to open fire on sixteen distinct occasions. In the third week attacks on the railway continued and a goods train was derailed and wrecked, and soon after a patrol engine and truck were derailed near Tulkarlll. Within a day or two of these attacks a strong party of at lIIed Arabs attacked a military patrol moving on the line by trolley. "Cnder heavy fire they tried to hem the trolley in blocks of boulders tbro" n on the line, but bf-fore tlie.' rould complete the block behind the . .~ tl1auago.! to back out. three soktius On run, another

EXTREME

t

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I

MODERATION,

JUNE

193 6

In the last week of the month there took place the first engagement which might be described as a battle. An escorted convoy of assorted cars was moving on its normal run from Jerusalem to Nablus and Tulkann, and thence back by Jaffa. Anyone could join these convoys. They started at a given place and time. Instructions were then issued to the drivers as to what they were to do if attacked. The armoured cars and military trucks with their load of infantry then stationed themselves suitably, and the procession started. Anyone wishing to go on to Haifa would find another convoy and escort at the road junction halfway between Nablus and Jenin. There, alter a good deal of shunting and reshuffling to suit destinations, the various columns would proceed. On this occasion a large party of armed Arabs opened fire on the convoy from ambush some miles east of Tulkarm, at a place where the road twists and tutus in a narrow valley among hills. The promptly engaged the enemy and pushed the assorted . on to Tl1lk3im to get out of the way. At 1~ ,t,. lUI • it the sallie Infantry in tn.cls at set out m.a both .-ablus and T""Qnm, wbOO lew to the %11

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July. tIP InJ"'tery r garding British policy

Pal:shn' was ·olyed. At any rate the policy wa dlarnoscd, though the reasons for it remained in doubt. The cryptic remarks of people, who probably knew what was the goveming policy, proyided clues to a solution of the mystery. Besides these clues, there was the experience of two months of rebellion, providing a basis on which to infer intention from the facts of the case. It still remained uncertain, however, whether the policy was evolved by the government of Palestine, the Colonial Office, or the British Cabinet. One clue, with little comfort in it, lay in the IAt-n jJf'atr'd H lOin(l!'r of (JII](! th orists that tlJf~ AfillJ WI t, not If'ally ~hfJoting at the tll}lIjJ I bllt fltdy at til' gflV( rnnll'ut', policy. "Il" J( IIJi"d. I' I,d I'd II pi! iUII tli it it might ill

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A nJi, Mif.:ill, (wd t 111' flld 1.1'[ l1!1rli d r,n t hid 11 pll·a .1) (atlll,"'1 ((I"It! (lilly J,,: r '/"'fllt.d b'y Ara b liyrn Pitt! ti<;(·,.'I. Th"re wa :11<;(1 !l1)1I1 ,_ thing in it of JlIJp' tJHLt tJlf' tr(j(lp wll1dd nol ltt1-c 10 thinking, as Arn,],s lhink when Arnb~ ar' shol, in t'rlllS of a blood - feud. The r'minder also raised the old q llcstion, what was the government's policy? If Arabs could shoot al it, perhaps theorists could explain it. Theorists never did explain the government's policy. They did, however, explain that it would be utterly wrong to adopt stern measures against the Arabs and quell the rebellion by force, and then find, when some commission of inquiry examined the root causes of the rebellion, t hat the Arabs had had a grievance when they rebelled. That argument seemed to have quite a number of flaws in it. It suggested that the odds were on a verdict in favour of the Arabs. It ignored the distinction between ways and means of redressing a grievance and ways anti means of stopping a deliberate resort to force. It tied two distinct consideration into one insoluble knot. If that 'x . Britillh policy. it explains also its w.. nkmsFI, WorKt of all, it suggested that n 01 t to forc!) wu quit ju"tlfaab'" in certain )1;1 V(. 1111

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1111

B R I TIS H

R U L E,

AND

REB ELL ION

circumstances. Should those who control tl Ie forces of order take to thinking, even a litU that rebellion is justified, the control is liable t~ puzzle those who are controlled. The controlled then do bec~me just dogs in a dog-fight, but dogs on a cham, charged with the task of keepin the other man's dog away from their master'~ leas, till it tires of its attack. Another theory which may ha,-e aoyerned policy was that it ''!ould not do to ~uell the reb llion by force. becau e that would lea,'e the Arab part of the population cowed and sullen , \nth tht;, ed - of future rebellion deeply planted in their bruised and batt r d ,ouIs_ Therefore, rr t "\:a to m t r bellion wa by a poli of paticllc and xtreme moderation. Th' task of th t might be rendered more diffi nIt during tll pursuit of that policy. Reinior em 'nt might becom n cessary, but increas d numerical strength should not be an excuse for a. more drastic use of force. The policy o( exlreme moderation should continue. That theory hardly stands the test of Ireland. There, we did not quell rebellion in 192I by force. We used force with as much moderation as the excC'ss s of the other side allowed. We aimed at a settlement out of court, away from the 222

EXTREME

MODERATION,

JULY

I93 6

grim judgment of superior force. We got a settlement out of court. But, to judge from the events of I937, that exercise of moderation seems to have been a failure. Perhaps more time is required before success or failure can be established. Perhaps our policy aims at a detachment comparable to that exercised by archreologi ts e.,'{amining the ideographic records of r belli on on relics dug up from the sands of Egypt. An how, intention i difficult to prove. Short of a fr e conf sion, it can only be inferred from the fact of the ca e. On the basi of the facts it appear d that the policy of the government was to meet rebellion by means of extreme mod ration, no matter how many troops might be requir d in the process. The exact reason for that policy, however, remained obscure. It might have been adopted in the expectation that a commission of inquiry would find that the Arabs had been badly treated. At all events, in July, it was announced that a Royal Commission would investigate the root causes of unrest in Palestine, but would not leave England to begin its labours on the troubled spot till disorder ended. The announcement of the setting up of a Royal 223

BRITISH

R U LE.

A_-D

REBELLIO __

Commission did not seem t o either the J ews or the Arabs. The .J~ws felt SUre that the result would be restnchon of J ewish . . t' Th 1m· mlgra. Ion. e~ were optimists ; TC..-strictions were unpos.ed tWIce before th<.l Commission had c?mpletcc1 lts repor~. The half yearly immigra_ bon quota of Apnl 1936 had been 4500. In Nf)v(lmh 'r l:936 it sank lo r 800, and in May 1937 to 770. l'h~ Ara.b. t k lh lin ' that they had b n k l clown b ommi si ns of inquiry br10re.

Th \ contt'nd d that no mn,tter how excellent an d di ' tin~llisl)('J thE' individnoJ who omposed it, ud n mattE'r how fair nnd impartial its finding, tIle decision la , D t with the commission, but with the Cabinet and Parliament in London. And both these bodies, a ccording to the Arabs, were under the influence of the J ews. So, in }lite of the fact that aircraft were sent up to dmp brief life histOlies of the members of the Ron!.l Commission oYer the Arab parts of the rebellion went on and the Commission stayed at home. On the other hand, the policy was perhaps adopted not out of fear of a :finding that the

Arab had been injured already, but out of a desire to avoid bruising his soul, combined 22'

E XT R EME

MODERATIO . l,

J U LY

I936

perhaps with a hope that he would be grateful afterwards. In . J uly the Mufti was being

•

protected . from bruises in ParJia:tnent , where questions had been raised regarding his activiti.es. The government spokesman, in &1ending bun, contended that it was ab!;urd to regard llim as a civil servant; that it wa.'; a point which made trouble, not only amoDg the Arabs, but among the whole Moslem world, when a religious 1'ad 'r was misrepresented as being in a position from which the govcrnment could tum him out because he freely expressed his views on poliLical matters. That defence might do for the Mufti in his capacit y as head of the Supreme Moslem Council, in which capacity he received half his salary from the government and half from the religious endowments, but it seemed rather inadequate for the Mufti as president of the Higher Arab Committee, the body set up on the initiative of himself and his party to manage the strike. Even in his capacity as head of the Supreme Moslem Council the defence was vulnerable. That Council is responsible for the control of the mosques. It is said that the preaching. of politics in mosques is not in accor?ance ~th the t (''aching of the Koran. Preaching polittes 226

,

•

BR I Tr

H

R U L E,

A~D

REB ELL ION

in mosque , temple , or churches in a way cal~ culated to incite the people to ri e against the established goyemment of the country is wrong. History bears witness to the inevitable con~ sequence, a clash between Church and State. No man can serve two hostile masters, and no people can live in peace under two competing rulers. Yet, in that same July, when the Mufti was being defended in the House of Commons, incitement of an unusual kind was taking place in the mosques of Palestine. Men assembled to perforlll their religious duties were harangued from the steps of the pulpit and urged to join the ranks of the religious warriors in the fight against the forces of the government. The anxiety of those responsilJlc for governing Palestine to gloss things over was hcwi ldering, ancl is still bewildering. They s('cmed to be partieubrly an -iolls that 1h(' Mufti should make a pHillie aIl11011I1C'l11cnt that h was opposed to violcJlCl! and the l1S(, o( arms. 11(' never did ma k ' any JIll blic an1l01lIlC'('11Il'llt of tIll' kind, and it is difftclIll to S('c how or why Il<' should, in the j rcumstallccs. '1'11 > policy oC cxtreme 11Ioclt'ratioll, which was in practice a policy of glossing things over, naturally entailed thl' ilJljlositioll of r('~trictions 22U

EXT REM E

MOD ERA T ION,

J U L Y 1936

on the action of both police and troops. At first, the police had to do most of the searching of villages for arms. These arms were usually well hidden at some distance from the houses. On one occasion, a group of women were seen seated on a rug near a village, apparently refreshing themselves during a pause in their agricultural labours. Someone had the bright idea of looking under the rug. The ladies at first failed to understand, and then combined protest with loud lamentation when they saw that bluff wac; useless. Under the rug the earth had been newly dug. The earth was dug up again, and in a narrow trench was found a little arsenal of anl1~ and ammunition. The Arab of course protested again~t these searches, which as a rule produced very little result. 1 h 100'ng of protests is part of the drill of sub-war. R trictions were then placed on tht. action of the police. But, by then, the Arab section of the police, with notable exceptiOlls, had Cl \ckr
B R I TIS H

R U L E,

AND

REB ELL ION

trick, traps were laid for the unwary s archer. On one occasion, troops were accu cd of tearing up a Koran in a small village mosque. What actually happened was that the officer in command examined the mosque himself, knowing how tricky the business was and that the word of an Arab would always be believed in preference to that of a British soldier. Unfortunately, the officer had everyone cleared out of the mosque and then looked over it alone. A minute or two after he came out an Arab came rushing forth, frantic \\-ith excitement, yelling the news of his awful discovery. There was a rush for the mosque, and when the officer with one or two men managed to force their way in, there, strewn about the floor, were torn pages of the sacr d book. Every form of accusation was made against the troops. Restrictions were then placed by the civil n.ulhoriti(;s on their action, and soon searches for arms (irop1) d more and more out of the

EXT REM E

MOD ERA T ION,

J U L Y 193 6

prognnnmc:. /)lJtiuf.{ .J Illy :Ictilms and 1m! til'S jJl(;rca.~ed in numbu ;t1111 cW, lwl!i(;l; WIllIlI!l:d 111' Oll both it! ·K. All mi ,ill, b(J (''']IN'lt'd, f he wnJllf{ people Wml :1 iml;f{ gilt shill. At eidellts 1,( that kind M' ,,11ft I,f :ory H:bllif,TI nltl (111 lllill waf HnCl,

when the armed forces of the other side try to resemble peac('ful inhabitants as much as possible. These incidents of Course gave rise to more complaints. As a result of these complaints, more restrictions were placed on the action of the troops in a laudable attempt to avoid the infliction of casualties on innocent persons. Unfortunately, the nature of sub-war makes it impossible to prevent accidents, especially when troops are widely dispersed. Junior corporals frequently have to command guards, and sentries have to keep their weapons loaded. The difficulty in avoiding mistakes arises from the fact that those active in rebellion do not wear distinctive uniform, but hide their weapons under civilian clothes, with the intention of confusing those whom they attack. The solution of the difficulty seems to lie along the lines of making junior N.C.O. 's face their increased responsibilities in a way which will not curb their initiative. Mcanwhilc, what of the other side? During .lilly the Ar.1b celebrated the hundredth d.ay of th(' slrik '. That gave th m an opporturuty to tak' tcwk of th po ition. Most of the rank and hi who had suffered loss through the do illg and the general upheaval in the ClJlIlJllY. c 'med to come to the conclusion that

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• n R r TIS H

R U L E,

AND

R EnE L LJ 0 N

it would b better to carryon to some (lccision

r~the.r than waste the losses inctlrrcc! already h ' YlCJdmg to compromis~. The majority wer~ rather proud and not a lItU . snrprised that tlley had been able to carryon for so long and fight th Ma~datory l:~wer so Sl1ccl'ssfully. The contrast wIth the nSll1g of 1929 was most marked Th • Mandatory Pow r em d to be much weake; and Ie- l' 'oIut and it was now tIl main enemy , the Jew had slmk to cond place. Th~ leaders f the pvolt w'ro, no doubt, snrpn ed at the latitude allowed them, and as surpri ed as thei r followers at the success of their r i tance to goyernment. By t he hundredth day of the strike the Mufti and the Palestine Arab Party were till dominant. They had consolidated their grip on the country t h rough the machinery of the Higher Arab Committee and the District Committees working under it. The strike part of the programmeefor example, the closing of shops had perhaps been a mistake, rather like cutting off noses to spit e faces. But, even if it was imposing some st rain on the followers, they were still solid enough and t he stat e of the funds robust enough t o provide compensation where necessary. The Arab parties in opposition were weak 230

EXTREME

MODERATION,

JULY

I936

and lacked a pr?gramme, whereas the programme of the leaders III control was quite clear. They were out for a representative national government, and that meant Arab domination. The political pressure exerted by the government of Palestine was not difficult to parry, because resistance to it seemed always to make those who exerted it weaken and reduce their pressure, as if they were afraid that they might make stiff r the attitude of the Arab leaders. the public announcement by the leaders that the 'trike would continue till all their demands on the government were conceded, tended to leave them little room for political manceuvre, but already something had been gained, the etting up of a Royal ComThat, whatever might have to be said about it in public, was likely to bring them closer to the first objecth-e, the representative national gO\·emment . The pressure exerted by the government on the leaders to stop the disorders and so let the Royal Commission come • to Palestine could be used against the government in the form of a request to stop Jewish immigration first, thereby opening the way to the second objective. The third objective, thl' stoppage of sales of land to Jews, they could 231

B R I TIS H

R U L E,

AND

RE B EL L ION

reach thernseh-es, by the use of per uasl'on . , on theIr Own people. :"h thel' all the leaders desired it or not, to aovemment by ob truction had proal' d to resi tall by armed force. The armed bands were ke ping th troops busy, though they were suffering rather severely. ~ut some of the leaders weI' certainly believers In the use of armed force. Their arrangements however, had not worked out too well. It w~ probably a mistake to have two plans, one for Syria and another for Palestine. The man who chases two hares catches neither, according to an old Chinese proverb. The sudden switch from the Syrian hare to the Palestinian hare had caused delay. It had taken the best part of a month of strike action to reveal the fact that Palestine was ripe for the Palestine plan. It took the best part of another month to organise external armed assistance, and the best part of a third to mobilise it and move it to Palestine. That was very slow, and the leaders were lucky to be still leading on the hundredth day. It is not quite clear when Fauzi and his armed bands did invade Palestine. They were certainly there in the first part of August, 7

232

EXTRE ME

MODERATION,

JULY

1936

and may have arrived by the end of July. The connection between the Arab leaders in Palestine and the armed bands raised in Palestine, as well as those brought in from abroad, seems to be established. The civil authorities persisted in maintaining that there was no connection, and persisted in trying to squeeze a public pronouncement against the use of aImed force out of the Mufti to support their charitable theory. With that theory fixed in their minds, they refused to act vigol'ously against the Arab leaders. \\'hy that theory was fixed in their minds remains a mystery, one of many surrounding the exercise of British rule in Palestine. The evidence hardly supports the civil authorities. In the first place, the Arab leaders in Palestine were not thinking in terms of Palestine alone. They had called a strike in Palestine early in 1936, before the rebellion began, to help their Arab brethren in Syria. If they had the mind to do that, they had the mind to accept help from Syria and Iraq. A mere strike in either of these countries would not help Palestine much', something more practical would . be required. There had been conversations about mutual armed assistance, and there were 233

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p 1· H )( 1 I 1 0 N

EXTREME

and allnul band~ in Pall-sliJ\(' S(l II • , ' ,' ll' con. \\'1 1\\ll1S \\\'n' 1\ t .Illst air t.III,"'10 ('·111' • ... ~ I.l t 1'( it \• \)llu thIs 1\\\On (rom S,. tia l'11'111(111 ' ,' . . 11ll' I , ,nUlSJm(\,lll, .\lId haq, ,\Ill dill 11 ill" l1ll'lU . :)] rill.

· 1 ) ' C " > , \H :lrtl\\'( I • mtn ,lk:;tl11t'. llw t"b\Hlt~, list hlH" \\'itn'~~ to Ih\ . tall' )f pnor .. 1 ,I ksttnt, in '1.n.Iv It)...)\. ,I} (' 111 t' t\llt1 • ~

of tIll in:t \\ \ k of tIlt' monlh lour ml'mbl'rs ~f H.~l. }·01'l.'\ h,ld bt'l'l1 killed and twentyfi,Yt' \\ un lcd. • month later th figure had n en to tt'll killed and L\:ty-three wounded. By the nd of the first week of July troop had had to open fire on more than three hundred occasions that is, on an ayerage, four times a day the rebellion began on the 25th of April. During July actions, large and small, took place almost daily, and the nOImal procedure of aid to the civil power had been replaced, unnoticed, by practice based on necessity. There were so many attacks on patrols and conyoys that action to reinforce the detachments attacked and then engage in strength the attacker had te, be taY.L'll Vl7th()ut reference to tll!; civiJ pc,wr..'J'. ~ar1y in th~ numtJI a. f(,n;~ (Jf (JV(;f a brigade j~ ~trL-ngtll was flq,]()y·t} i1l HI lliJIs between ~ aUw, an( HI'; (;()a~t~d J,/:tin tf) II mt {Jut two ~:H

•

MODERATION,

JULY

I936

large :trtlwd bands, nch about a hundr d strong, "his Opl rati()n had the ffect of showing the Arahs that troops wcr not confined to the roads, bllt conld ancI would hunt them deep in tll( hills. The bands, however, were too wily to become 'ngaged with such strong forccs. They broke into small parties and vanished, to hide ill caves or play the part of peaceful illager. Only a few were brought to action and about tcn casualties inflicted, while our los es were one soldier killed and one wounded, Those who know hill warfare will realise how difficult it is to pin down a band of hillmen and keep them pinned so that heavy casualties can be inflicted. The hillman knows the ground intimately, is lightly clad, and can move much faster on the hill than any infantryman in boots, In Palestine the hills were difficult. Only aircraft could move faster than the Arabs. A combination of their and striking power with the slow but sure hunting and hanying power of infantry was the ideal arrangeJIlen~. But, as soon as things became too hot for t~ , the Arabs would scatter, hide thetr arm , and if they could not get clear away, . as innuc nt hephcrds unavoida;bly entang~ ill a battle, of whi h they had receIVed no nobce. 216

• •

•

•

j

B R I TIS H

R U L E,

AND

REB ELL ION

It was found that about five or six miles across steep hilly country, in the heat, was about all that could be expected of infantry if the ground was to be properly swept and n~ parties of Arabs left hidden in cover, or in caves, to bob up at some inconvenient moment. It was a disadvantage that troops had usually to return to their camps or billets, instead of staying out on the ground for several days. When the Arabs saw them withdrawing to their transport to go home, they naturally felt that they were being left victorious in possession of the battlefield, no matter how many casualties they might have suffered. This habit of going home to bed was due to three difficulties : lack of pack-transport, lack of suitable food, and difficulty over water. Mechanisation had its disadvantages : there were no pack-animals. The solution was to hire donkeys, but there were objections to hiring the Arab donkey-boys as well. They were rather young for battles. Suitable hardtack rations exist, though not suitably made up for carrying on the man. But they seem to be going out of use, perhaps because they cost about a penny a man a day more than the normal stew. However, the South African 236

EXT REM E

MOD ERA T ION,

J U L Y 1936

War, which lasted more than a few days, was fought mainly on a basis of bully-beef and biscuit. The water difficulty was partly medical, partly civil, and partly a ~roblem of p~ck­ transport. Water in the hills came mamly from wells, and the Arabs needed all there was. H seems sad but true that, in spite of improvements in modern soldiering and efforts to dodge the fact, the soldier must still be able to carry his food for a cou~le of. day~ and the means of keeping warm at mght If.he IS to stay out on ground like that of Palestine. Though he will never move as fast as a hillman, the~e ·s no point in making him slower than he IS ~y being too particular about inhabit~ts. He should be able to take their sh.elter, the~ water, and their food, if necessary, gIVe a receIpt, and leave them to square accounts later. In spite of all the difficulties, the troops .~ad many successeS in July . The most deCISIve of the month was fought close to t engagemen . A all Arab the main Jerusalem-Jaffa road. sm band elected to raid just where the road l~~v~ the hills to cnter the plain. At that porn. 1 runs through a deep crescent-shaped glen, WIth scraggy trees adorning the steep rocky slopes on 237

II

,{I-, If,

t, i{if

'n" } T't}""

H,I f/,:ul ~m" l,,·low thl"'rfl ,

I' P. H • (,1.1 {,

p:tfd t.!i{,

W'1" J, I

Y

mIll "

hUll

:

it

7) .

nl{ rlt II

1 ( ,f' (," I r /'J II/ till TJ/'E{"" t·" II, fell''' '' III Il/f'" fW "llId 111·',/"" M ,d WN' it.lIl{fll f,y :r ll'II" '1 1}I,dy 1,( t " }I'Ji'i tII,d /,i ld

III'/W~'I'"

tI" 'I ;'

'I'lld trJi",I;t/1.I' ((mt I· II ·VI·II Ii VI , :' /11/ :dll}II ' 'J"

t WI, 111 8.

ti'/ ill I I"VI If 11111 hll"drt·(/ /(111111/ ,. (If : IlIllJJlIlltf j'JJl . Oldy f 1" "1' Ilr (1111 1 I ' ( Hpi d . . n"f')(I' jll/' ill/mi ll ('oel('11 (1 )(' I'rt ni..,oll wa~ 111 1' )'( '(1" "(1 by ;1 h,igad . h<'f d q llHl' f 1'1II ; llId IWI! 11101(' h.. ll ;l1io l1 ,a11d I ('orgall ist'd iIlIJII ('(' III igad, a ' ('as. But t h(' g:lin W(tS mCn ' [ha ll o/fS('t hy 1I1l' t'l11ploYIl1l'nt (If larg' 11umh 'rs of troops as a nli-inlimidatioll patrols in th ' strt'l'l s of the t ow11S. It was to Ih' passive side of the task I

rather than to the objective side that force was divert d. The policy of e..... tr mc moderation still prc\'ail ·d.

t, If A l"1 I',

M il

'I g HA ', ' () N,

I

XV,

A (1(;

v H',

., .

I I) " (,

'J II g tivi l f,llw/'r in Pall tinl 6('1 m(~d to require a gl'l':d cif;d (,f rdd. By tiff' hf ginn ing (,f Au gust

it lwd drawn in to t il ' (Juntry 1II0re than th' ('CJlliva lt'nt of a clivi ion. Tn fael , all three s('rvic('s W('I'C repr" nt d • 'avy, Army, and Air Force-and cvery branch of th e Army was concern cd in giving it aid. E vcn thongh the numbers available to aid were si.x or seven times what they had been in April, the effect on the Arabs was not very noticeable. But it has to be remembered that the civil power not only demanded aid but commanded how aid was to be given. It said what was to be done and what was not to be done, with particular cmphasi on what was not to be done. In Aurust the Arabs till fonnd ample opportunity for waging war against the goveulln~mt of the Mandatory Power. They were defy m 8

•

B R I TIS II

R U L E,

AN D

R EB E L L ION

not only the government of Palest ine b ut Britain as well. They had appealed to 'forc In the towns the opportunities were few, becau:~ there were too many troops concentrat ed there Along the communications by road and by rail' between the main centres of population, how~ ever, there ~as a~ple opening for surprise attack, combmed With good lines of escape. The threat of attack, combined with an occasional attack, had made the government resort t o a convoy system for prot ection. In fact , the Arabs commanded the communications in Palestine, except when movement on them was carried out in strength. In t he rest of the count ry, the more remote hill areas which cover the greater part of Arab P alestine, Arab rule prevailed almost unchallenged. There the armed bands lived and moved as they pleased, dominating the villages and often taking their supplies. From these strongholds t hey went forth to attack the agents of British rule, or the Jews in their scattered colonies. To these strongholds they returned to rest in safety, undisturbed unless a temporary military invasion burst suddenly up'tm them. As a rule, they had ample warning and could move out of the way till the activity 240

EX TRE ME MODERATION, AUGUST

193 6

died down and the troop~ went back to their camps. Fro~ the Arab point of view it must have been a cunous war, ~hough they probably thought that we were domg our best. They were fairly safe as long as they watched their lines of escape when in action, and did not get caught by lowflying aircraft when they thought that they were catching some sma ll party of infantry. They were perfectly safe in their villages, close by their women and children, as long as they hid their arms. They could move about as they pleased, to spy out the land and arrange the next ambush, as long as they did not walk about openly with their rifles over their shoulders. No matter what evil reputation the village might earn through the performance of its band, nobody in authority ever came to seize the young men and take them away to a prison camp for work on the roads. From the British point of view it was also a curious war. There was aid and aid, but the junior commanders probably had the best time, because there was often something definite and practical about the aid they gave, even if it was just passively defensive. It must have been exciting to ride on a trolley on the railway 2'1

Q

,

, ,

\\

\

, ,.

, ,. , \., , \

\

, " "n"

'

R (,\l' \ ' I \ 'hl hI th \,\\1 t\\ n phI \ \th NIl \ ,"" \ l'l" ,,\\ ,t t,\\ 111\ I. ",;\\ h.h~ HI stllk'l' d ,\ hmil \ ~ll\'ll. nil' \\[\tdh'l"S \11 1 oh.cd ttl\' ~u('h nlhW- 11.\1\ hI I "I'll I.'lInllglllH OWl' ill VCl'Y 1:ll\mt $hift~, {"t' lk rlln of lIlt' rail under the tt\)lk $0011 made Uwir ' es go queer. Part of t11' cxcit'mel1t lay in k cping '\

\,).),,11

I

just the right. ahead of t.he t.rain, which the trolley was protecting so kindly, by offering to go off the rails or be blown up first. If the distance ahead was not enough and anything happened, the train was liable to charge into what was left of its advanced guard. If the distance was too great, the expert Arabs couW spread or lift a rail between the trolley and the traill. There was no donbt about the Arabs expea. Once, lriddcn beside a damaged p;~ of Tbe, were found, neady laid ont. all ., , ' ID , ".:s. :mc 50 ev;s, the things required u; ;-.:r;. ~ ~ "~.e 021e,:aY6!"5 were .A.rnb5. and -;'~t;"7:::

~'=-,':6 ;:00 i!-1areJaS'd~

i~":c r,e";:"?!l'";-:--t ~\.;l\__:: ...

:·_e

Jewrn~ how!:
..~. do Llf.)t pay..

....1.1.+=-:6 a . . .. - like a uam which 00 n,: .~ .2.. d.3;1;j~ mn:ciio at a definite lillte.

m

.'~ U"" '" Go,;::

.........::..

f

('-orJl<;.e ea5\r COlD-

a.idinti

-

-..

...

the policy of. the

,

I\\c' \ l· , \ ' I"~~N.

\\lIllt 1,'

II)

()

d II \l{\\ cll, 1 III H~ All m;t {hut pt\lk :l '(,oll'II I" h, ,till \lmhling ,dong' lllt' path of c.1 H'lllll 111 Oc i<'r:l t lOll, s!IInt ' \ itU\)$ :tpPt'ltl'iUg' and mOl I o£l,'n d' ,1 pp'',It in ' in fog. For llio~t of th' month th' fog was unusually thick. For exnmple, th) memorial of the senior Arab officials, after its arrival in England, drew forth a pronouncement which tended to decrease visibility. It declared that consideration might be given to a temporary suspension of Jewish immigration, but that the domination of any one community in Palestine over any other would not be tolerated. That statement meant that the government might consider'giying to who had rebelled, SOlilething which could only be given at the expense of who had not. 'Ibat was indeed mooeIation in face of an appeal to force, t a fOlln of modelatWn likely to encourage Te hellion and to force moTe tban loyalty and of the pE"ice. The has sj ..ce gone beyond mere consideration and has drastically reduced Je",isb without waiting . for Report of the Royal

r_

"

UJi'IIDISSlon ..

The part of the statemellt that domination by one communjty would not be

B R I TIS H

R U L E,

AND

REB E L J. ION

seemed to suggest that n(1) representative national government would be set up on any account in Palestine, because there must be domination if it were set up. That, in tum, raised the question whether the government had decided to give up the idea of leading the people of Palestine along the road to self-government, and intended, instead, to go on mling the country autocratically. Alternatively, the question was whether the government had some idea of setting up a Pa.l~tinian Ulster side by side with a Palestinian ree State. The :Rriti~rl government Roomed 1;0 be getting very Inv(ilvr,(j (}yr'r JJal1!fliine, even 1.0 the m(f (mt flf br,cr.minl{ ltnmqm!. flJ1 W(,11 fl,II in~ {;(lllf'l nl. 11 f~ d/(IJ( uH jll UI/!lr'flltfmd wlly 1iI1I/11. fl(/rly 1 ,!lfll,j" (:,lIlI ld 1/1/1 IH i,Vlj ))('(' 11 wnl. /Ill I frf/III I' ll/{lfilid It I JlJll/( 11.1 IIJI' ,,111 11 ./ wit !I'I I 1;0 )) Iii' I(fl,cflld Jlllltl,· fI, wl· .. h, IJlll lflndllf JlIII,11 tv t. } yfhllJl-\

/lllIr''llilIJldl'J)li' flud J /Ill' 1ml VIII,Il,1 I-,jfIJ'lIIllIl~ 1I ·~jilll ·d, wd)Jjjlli )11 AU /' III/ jllil JlIWIiII 'III' (1I1{111 11<' JlI' lillI/LI" 'A HilI j{JlyuJ I ,IIJljI1J1~)IIII 'lilt HI I t,1J WJl/I'II' 11" JlI t.' / Jljt 'f II/ I" ,111i"'lII'~ j'lfll IIH/I'" III JlII//', Willi

dill/I' fly

IJltyJIIU 1/111/1 tlll.,,/II,II 1111/11 dl",//oll Jill 1//1' ;I I'~JjH/I' 1/11111 1'1 H" 1/111111 t/jJjJl 1111/11/1/1/ ItI

til/II

It lill/# lit IJ / II JIll 11/,

;i44

EXTREME

MODERATION,

AUGUST

I936

It had taken two months for the senior Arab officiaLe; to draw the vague promise of a concession out , of the British government, when they might instead have been reminded of their duty as officials. It had taken about the same time for the junior Arab officials to load the second barrel of the memorial gun, By early August the task was completed and about two thousand signatures having been appended, the thing was presented at the government. Then Nuri Pasha arrived from Baghdad on a peaceful mission, and about the same time al'iO from Baghdad came Fauzi with his armed hand'! on a warlike one. In fact, by the middle of Ailgiisi Ow plQt was a incomprchcJ"ihible as l/Jf~L uf fin fiV('raW: rnu.i at C!jwl·cly. Nlid Pfl lilm W((fl lIw fordgIl ltlinL'!tllr of an ill/"d [(III/gil IlIlwrr, It ltl. a P,,~d(ll11jnlLlltly t\1'1~j, iii 'LIIl, II" qllJU to I'.tlt· tine to so(J what III Inold dll III hlilll5 1I1i"ut P' :11'11 IJI~LWPI'H th W'VI (111111'01 Ilf Pidl 'lilll' IIId it *, Am" foilllJll'tltH,

hl lil Iii t 1I~!,,,tI 1111, PIIIIIII'1II willI III' WIV' IIJIIII'III, ,lIld lukl Hltli 11,11 JIl/{hl~1' Allil, 11/11111111 h, 1\ 1111 II ""l'll' Ilf Ihl I'fl:llitll'tlt, II,. Milili. '1111 III/ltlli If I''', IIft/'f tllI1 IIrlit I,,<'!'fIItH, WII~ JlI'II'lI'1I If) 11II1I11"JlI.~ that it wlluld ltlJuw JjI'H,,1 hllltJII~ III WJllIllUC, uut Ora 111(1 Jll/ ' /j IIJ

/1'1" 111 •• 11

III

II-d

III I I I

II

II I I I.

It, 1\

N "

II I( II

II,

I,

I

I f) N

III,d' l 1., "tl i IIK 111 11 llil' 1,ll i", wI/"ld IIIIllillll! ili ',ll , II WI!, Il O dOlihl , VI" Y killd of NIIl'l P.I Ii I, I t) iIlI I'I Vl' lI~' ill Ih.· illl l'll111) nlillit tl f IIII It':.IIlW, ' •I'IIII I" n ~Id 11 i nf,\ I() .Ih Ilw plicil ' IJ III hI pllitl b Hll llll1 fll!' bll illl-\' off Ilw HlriJw \ l' l't' whn.1 11(' \ nl', in In ' I , doing, The pdc~

;~h t' HI , ,nITen' c\ b , B rit ain wn s on ' Royal (OITIlmSSlOn nml 110 hn,l{-pr mi s t' regarding JCWUl immigmti n. Bu t, a' far as the Mufti and his pari , \\' r con ern el, tha t price \Vas quite in d quat . Th Mufti, at the time, was bing heavily . Th National Defence Party, in oppo ition to him and hi e:...:neme policy on points of detail, endea\'oured t o score advantage and a m easure of popular approval by playing more on ... ar weariness than on anything of higher moral value. It did succeed in per uading the Higher Arab Committee to agree to conversations with t he Amir of Transjordan. But the Amir was h ardly in a position to persuade the government to make any offer more nearly approaching the price of peace for which the Palestinian Arab Party was holding out. The AmiI' had no desire to become directly involved in the troubles of Palestine at that time. Transjordan was quiet and free from intoxicating politics. 246

1\ X 'II I I( M 1\

M ()

f)

n It A 'I I ON,

"!i

A [J • [J

'J

J

9.3 6

a '" I('r I)f mol' thnn hal( tho manda ted /1', rit ( II y, tl t'I. ehe(l fwm though nominally II"dl 'r ti ll) High ommissiol1Cl' in Pales tine, he wn ~ iJollnd to regard rebels from the point of vi('w of a r uler, ven though they were Arabs. Ther was, at no time, much hope of any advance along the lines proposed by the National Defence P arty, and all hope vanished when the British government p ublicly declared that the Royal Commission would not move from England till the disorders stopped unconditionally. The fog, for the moment, had lifted. The relatively moderate ational Defence Party had not done itself or the cause of relative moderation any good. Those in power had ~ean~ of checking tendencies to stray in the directIon of moderation , or along any other path not approved by them. The editor of a relatively moderate Arab paper found it to give up his moderate editorials when a party of armed men visited his house to discuss the matter. He happened to be out at the time of the visit, but the news of it was enough to make him change his opinions. Whether the Mufti himself approved the acts of persuasion done in support of the cause, or not, he and the Higher Arab Committee benefited 2'7

B RITI SH

RULE,

AND

RE BELLI ON

in that opposition was stifled. At all events he ne,:er stated publicly th.at he disapproved. ' Nun Pasha left Palestme to continue his bargaining in Geneva and in London. The deadlock seemed to be complete. Beyond the possib~ty that it might consider the temporary suspenslOn of Jewish immigration, the government would do nothing, and would not send out the Royal Commission to advise it till disorders stopped. On the Arab side the declared policy of the Higher Arab Committee, tho body in unchallengeable control, remained unshaken in determination to go on with the ::;trikc till J 'wish inunigration und sales 01

EXTREME MODERATION,

I

I

luntl 10 } IWS sltJPp~tl, und till i ho gowrJ1lnullt :l·t tIp It J' presl'nl allv' llaliol1ltl g'ovetllllwuL ill

I

Vllkslbw.

,

DlIl'hlH AllHllHI tllt 1'1'hdf!OIl 1'1I1cf'cd thll fHlh .tnOl\(!t of 'its Cllll'i't ' 01' ('limc, \\1111 \lItl\ 1Ili!{h! wi'll Klull hI nsl • WIHII Plil111 WtI t1H'JII in lit UWlll\ III'Hotin tii1H, lind (k!'l,II.,thul~? They i!l\" l!t:ll I' d\l lit Il\ hut. distJ wI nl kUntlll {I(lln tlw htll'h\\'~s in. l)lllld. 111\' HII~,,1 :Iud It'lIlll III Ih~"l' who had l 'SOlI('d to f\>ln', 'J'hl tldlY in f \clN~ UlI' I>U&1\(':-;'" in hand Ht l'IllI'(l to be producing tIl' dl.L'Ct whkh PWl(lll~l'd strif nlw,Ws does produ c. ThoS<.~ illvoln.;u in it

ur

114S

I

AUGUST

1936

grow accustomed to it and lose their sense of proportion. They begin to see nothing odd in intimidation, ambushes, curfews, and battles. If a gang of hooligans indulged in a rough-andtumble with the clergy and choir in the middle of a cathedral, the thing ' would be called an outrage. But in Palestine, with Britain responsible for law and order, things more deplorable had come to be regarded as part of the daily service. By the end of the month casualties in H.M, Forces had risen to eleven killed and scventythree wOlmdcd. The rebellion had become markedly more serious. In lhe last week of the monlh the urnount of mnmlluitiol1 fired by Lho lroopH roached 0. l'cconl. III fact, thu lmlll disortil'l' 110 lungol' dosedb 'ct UIO stute or affllil'H, lhOllf.;'h rot' SOl1le rcasoll ('hu civil (ttlLhoriUI'" :1l0V('t' ~~aUI\d 11 whu.t: il wo.~. n l'l)lwllioll. , 'I'll\) 1'\'lwls Wl'nl IUldollbtodly hir'()lIling holdl'r, 1l\'lkl' h't!, nnd h til-I" 01'\1I()
suspected for some tinle, waS confirmed. Among U9

BRITISII RULE ,

AN'" .v '''7n"" ",,"DJ!.LLION

1!Xl'ltllME MO'D1!RATlON,

'ht th~~ ' of, Syrj~l1s, Druscs, or Iraqis, Ig P r~:ro thur ,trlJval (hd more to 110,1'(1('11 t l'., "Ll'l ,I pa tJ l' II'II:(1H.:r Aru,b COll1tnitLu(.J tltU)1 tJl' 1 tlfiC o! "t 'N1I1'j I'ILHIHL did to so(Um iL. . (. VUH of '1'1t('~' iJ1Vll,(tCl'fj hud CI'OHH(:d HlO .fl'Onti rli i 1t th rebel bodies left on the ground >

' ",

!cllr:W

l~~d /J~\(\JI

I'll

I lIl(;H /J)JJ III)

,,

how I{).Ill; 1I.w L11() COl 111 try. T llu 1)I'obILHl1 of ~hY

lww , UUlY kid 'Ill l'od

tIM

r)'oJll'i 'rfj s1il1 'aliI;

1'01'

Holulioll 'M

of (lrlllH 'lU~d (I )( l'loHiv(1H, . 011 r 'ahll" uI lhi'l I:wic of ('olllwi waH 1'('H j>l)ll lilbh I'llI' ::loVi'frd t. slI(l1(i os rll)1011g the

IitH"1

1110

ji'OIJII'J11

or

[h ,

,OliVO]

Itl'Jlwd f()I '(·(OH. Irnf HOll1t

I " $ (nI,

no t

111l1l'11

I>l'\'l1 dono M\Jdit~'ll'nm'an

had

ill 1'(1l!1()V\' lHl drop into tho tt\~ hift;tO
fr01l1 tho

find these shell:>. t 11 Afnbs did. heco.uSt' they mallco skilful use of them on ronds as well, s on th roilv...·dy. As a rule, land mines were laid on soft road where they were more easy to conceal than on tarmac. The usual method employed was to set them for contact by borin a into the side of the shell-ca.se and fittina a pin with a percussion cap. Sometimes obstructions were put down to make vehicles go where the traps 200

L93 6

ho,d h 'ell /:let. It 1.'1 remarkahl0 t11M th' damage dolt' I)y these lJ'1.iues, som ° of which were in the form of PJ'clty sturdy hjgh-cxJJ losivc silcJlJl, was ]Jot much g,·cat 'r. 13L1 t f.\,l'par 'n'tly the Lyres of thc carl! 1>y hursting, jn 80mc way mitigatc(J. the effect oJ the 'xpJodillg flh H. So Lh trOl)p!; went on with thc war, which 'by tho end of August se'med to have h como :L nl~ht Lo a finish between tho government on lhc 0 11 ' Imud, f1.l1(l tIt· Hjgher Arab Committee lind LII.os!) who [tdh l' d lo it 011 the oth r. BLlt tho war phm of the aulhority in ontl'ol of the fMc's o( gov orJ1lncnL. tll ° civil pow 1', did not g'tl tl\\L 'h Iwyoml 1 (wing Lb ' troops to :fight the ban.ds wh '1\ 'vel' th ' two hnppcned to meet,

roliabla ol1i~ja1

P ld(JH11'1 () l'Ill'tllol 'lited, tt11d 11()

AUGUST

,

251

INTENSIVE

MEA SUR E S,

AND

INTENSIVE

S E PTE M B E R

SEPTEMBER

1936

first sight, and no time was wasted in giving effect to some of them. Ships were chartered and a movement programme drawn up whereby the 1st Division from Aldershot would be in Palestine by the end of the month, except for two or three battalions due there in the first days of October. Not only was the 1st Division to go, but it was to go fat. The Section A reservists were called up to bring its units up to working strength. Section A of the Army Reserve is a select reserve, which can be called up without Parliamentary sanction. Every year in every unit of the Army, a number of men come to the end of their seven or eight years of active service and enter their five or four years of reserve service. Of these men, a few in each unit are offered vacancies in Section A of the reserve. In exchange for the liabilities which they undertake they receive a small increase in their reserve pay. The liabilities have increased with the increased liability of Britain to become involved in subwars. The original idea was that these Section A reservists would be called up to serve in their old units if these units had to take an active part in some imperial commitment. In practice,

CHAPTER XVI. REBELLION

MEASURES.

193 6.

was not three days old when sudd~nly, in ~ondon, the Cabinet lost patience Wlth Palestme, at least so it seemed. Telegrams whizzed , about the country, manreuvres were can?elled, and a few days later the purpose behind these unexpected orders and comings and goings was explained in the Press. His Majesty's government reaffirmed their previous decisions that order must be restored in Palestine and British authority re-established in the country, and further resolved that intensive measures to crush resistance should be taken, and with that object the troops in Palestine should be reinforced by a division, less artillery, and at the appropriate moment martial law should be applied either to the whole country or to scI ctetl parts, There was 110 doubt about these decisions at SEPTEMBER

263

2GlI

• •

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AN D

REB ELL ION

how 'ycr, th men may find them 1 serving in an ~Cgi.l~l nt. . I n 1927 they were called up for crV1C III hma. Then, so m any were required th at m n f u nit not r presented in the force had to be called up to complet e the numbers needed. But then they were put into units of like kind . F or example, light infantrymen served in light infantry reginlents, which are just like any other infantry of the line, except that they h ave to march in a rather unnatural manner. But in t he case of Palestine last year they were all mixed up, and even Highlanders found themselves wearing English trousers. More mixing might do the AImy no harm in general, but it is not so good when only done • III an emergency. These Section A men are the best of soldiers. Both in China and in Palestine they served strange units just as well as they would have served their own. Whcther they got the legwear to which they were accustomed as soldiers when called back to acth'e service is a matter of minor importance. What does matter is that they ld get back their employment w~en the emergency i: oyer. Too many rcseIVISts who \WIlt to i all'stinl' la"t S('ptembt'r are still. in the middl . f 19.31, )lIt ,)f emlloyment .

INTENSIVE

MEASURES,

SEPTEMBER

1936

The calling up of some reservists last September was but one feature of the general rush which put, not Palestine, but those caught up in it in the news for a few short days. Cinema news reels were full of pictures of troops in sun-helmets going up gangways into ships, while bands played and people waved. The sun-helmets, or rather the problem of who should pay for them, the wearer or the State, raised almost as many questions in the House of Commons as the whole Palestinian episode. The new G.O.C. in Palestine was rushing eastward through the Mediterranean in H.M.S. Douglas with what the Norsemen call the oldest and the strongest of all the winds, the north wind, blowing a good stiff soldier's breeze under a bright blue sky. Ten days behind came the Generals commanding the 1st and 5th Divisions, with their staffs and the first flight of the reinforcements. So great was the rush that soldiers found themselves seated in the great dining saloon of a summer cruise liner, to be waited on by stewards. And then came Palestine. Palestine has an atmosphere of its own, and Jeru~lcm ho.' another. but the clement of rush • t.~ not a omponent part of either. The new :1M

•

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if tl"y J,M t'1l h,· I mto :~ club rnrJkml~ [()11m {JlI a !'{It Mt rnr)iJJJ , f}f lflvad(;(J MwlMfII.: 'l uM;;wrl un an (jff-day to pau!\(; f>urpri!>C(1 before roWg of silent figures and fcd the stigma of not bdng a waxwork. The atrnosph£:re of Palestine seemed lI'f

silently to pose the question, what are you doing here ? this is where we live. That at once induced reference to the contract. The contract spoke of r eaffimring a previous decision that order must be restored in Palestine and British authority re-established in the country. That sounded clear, except that nobody seemed ever to have heard of the previous decision, and it did not say definitely that we were to restore order and re-establish British authority. Possibly the Arabs were to do both of these things by stopping their rebellion. It also s emed a little weak to talk of re- 'stablishing British authority. That called aUI'J1t iot to til ' fact that it was not l':-.tabJished, ('Vl'll though t1l' Il' b 'Ilion was ahout to complete III ' Jlft" Jtlonth of its lUll. lJowt'v 'r, til(' contract nl ...o poko of inlt'IJsiv til crush resis111111 I' ;llltl of 111111 till I IlIw lit til( lIJ>propriat l\lnllll'lIt. ~o It did II" HI" if tl1I' illl rrlion w lIlId WI' hUilld IIII \ .d loll , '1111 " ' Illciun th t untl

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intl·TJ ,IV(' m~'11r';1i mi~ht mean nr) Tflr,re than rdnffJrcing the garri1lQIl by a divi.'11 rJn dill Mt 1I(;(.'1ll justjfwj after reading the whtAe

statc.:n1ent, Then, just as t he first reinforcements began to arrive, there arrived also news of a change. in the contract. Martial law was off. In its place there was to be statutory martial law. An Order in Council defining the fOIIIl which this was to take was due to be signed by the King on the 26th of September. That date was just a fortnight after the new G.O.c. had arrived and taken over command in Palestine. The relative merits of martial law and statutory martial law are not the points of importance, and it has been suggested in an earlier chapter that there are objections to pla.in martial law under the British system of rule. The point of importance was, and still is, the extraordinary delay in deciding what form emergency rule was to take in Palestine. The delay arose because the problem of emergency rule has IH!VI'I b('('n tackled as a problem. 'I II(' pi C)c(!c1u1'(' for ddc~atil1g authority to adopt (·IlIl·..,.;t·ll('y rult, is deflllcd and must follow Idollg ('ollsl it \I IjOlla) JiJW!I, from the (1I11I11I't to t ht' (;OVl'nIllH'llt Ollie!' concerned, ¥~7

•

•

BRITJ

II

RULE,

A

D REBELLION

in tlli' cas' tIl olanial ffi ,thenc to the he. d of the 10 al gov rnment, and so to a senior officer of the rumed forces, if deemed necessary to delegate so far. The authority in the first instance must originate from the King. But, as long as the detailed nature of the authority remained undefined, it was impossible to apply either martial law or statutory martial law in Palestine, unless the state of the country made it necessary for the commander on the spot to take action on his own responsibility. The state of Palestine in September I936 was much the same as it has been for months, bad enough to justify local and temporary assumptions of control by military comm~nd~rs in battles with bands, bad enough to Jus~ify intensive measures by the civil power, but J~st not bad cnough to n cessitate an assumptl~n of control 0 er the whole country by the senlor military commander. The civil ?o~er was till in control, and it was consldenng the lltltnr' of 1hI' proposed inten:::i\ e ll~easures. The (ll 'i~i(ln to fl'sort to intt'll. IY~ measures \\,\:; Jlwdl' ()It the Jrd of St'ptembt'r \II London. 'I'll, Pukr ill Cl\l11\dl ,Jefining . tJ~l' POW('rs to b' '\ill\tt'llt(\ Ow lli~h (OlllllllS:lI1!iI'l', all, or ~~~

INTENSIVE MEASURES, SEPTEMBER 1 93 6

part, of which he might delegate to the G.O.C., was signed on the 26th of the month. The Order in Council reached Palestine in the first days of October. The moment of arrival of an order at any headquarters can never be the moment of action on its contents. The order has to be studied and then orders based on it have to be issued. There must be some delay. It was during this period of delay that the Mufti called off the strike. It had taken the civil authorities seven weeks to put a decision into a form which would make it possible for those on the spot to give practical effect to it. Even then the task was not complete. Had it still been necessary to do so, the military authorities would have then had to begin to frame statutory martial law regulations. While martial law orders require only three or four general paragraphs, statutory martial law regulations have to be drawn up article by article, like a long code of rules. That requires time to prepare and print, especially when the printing has to be done in three official languages. as in PHh~stine. The civil authorities cannot b~ cnngr.ltulatc(l on thdl' staH work. TlH' t'flt,(,t 011 the military authorities of the itl\t(ltillc\ inn of ~l:\tHlo\'• Jllorti!\1 law in the #6Q

•

B R I TIS H

R U L E,

AND

REB ELL ION

INTENSIVE

middl of a rebellion. or sub-war is that lhey arc unr ady for actloll for a p riod. That period InstR until tIl y know xactly what they 111n ho.v' to do under th n w rul s and have h:\d tim' to mak' r ady the in~t ructions. Th re was cv ry reason to be ready. Though the d cision of the British govenm1ent did have the effect of reducing the intensity of the rebellion for a brief period about the second week in September, the lull was short-lived. The intensity may be judged from the casualties inflicted on the armed forces of the Crown. In the last two months of the rebellion they equalled the number inflicted during the first four months. Thus the intensity increased towards the end, while the activities of armed bands increased also, and their distribution about the country became wider. In fact, an appropriate moment to take energetic action in the interests of peace and good order seemed to be passing almost once a minute throughout every day. During the first few days of the new G.O.C.'s command, things were comparatively quiet, but as the following brief day to day acco?ot shows , that quietness would hardly satISfy d anyone with a normal regard for order an

•

MEASURES,

I

193 6

law, and the reputation of Britain as a ruling power. The 14th of September was a quiet day, but there was considerable sniping, and the telegraph lines were Cllt in several places. In the Jewish settlements a number of trees were destroyed. On the road between J erusalem and J erieho a bridge was blown up, and in the north the presence of a band of about two hundred strong with some Syrians was reported. On the 15th a small battle took place near Tiberias, in which three Arabs were killed. On the main railway line there was a bad derailment north of Lydda, and a patrol trolley was also derailed near Haifa. Sniping and cutting of telegraph lines became worse, and a further two thousand trees. were destroyed. The I.P.C. pipe-line, runmng across the country from north of Beisan to Haifa, was punctured and set on fire. T~is of~en. happened. The 16th was a day of mmor mCldents among which an annoured car patrol was ambushed near Gaza and the pipe-line was punctured and fired in three places. On the 17th two cavalry cars were damaged by land mines in the Gaza area while ~t the opposite end of the country the TransJordan Frontier Force put in a mounted charge 261

260

SEPTEMBER

B R I TIS H

R U L E,

AND

REB ELL ION

against a party of armed men near Beis The pipe-line was again in trouble while an . . ,n o the railway the total number of bombs or 1T1ll1ines which had gone off during the week amounted to sixteen. The 18th was a very quiet day, with nothing of note beyond the usual sniping and a little bomb-throwing, The 19th was much the same, though the pipe-line was damaged again. On the 20th a small action in the Mount Carmel area resulted in one Arab being killed and one wounded, while a rifle and ammunition were captured. The 21st was also quiet, but for sniping and some bomb-throwing. Between the 22nd of September and the end of the month the situation became more interesting, because, in that period, the bulk of the r inforcem nts, the units of the 1st Division, w ro due to move by road and rail through the 5th Di ision t th ir stations in the Southern Di tri t. That had to happen because the port of di cl'nbarko.tion was Haifa in the north. :l.Dd be ems' it had b n decided to keep the troops which kn w tIl country in the more disturbod po.rt of it, und stat ion the new arrivals in th Jafia-Jerusal'm-llebron area. The 5,th Di ision was to have it:> headquarters at Haifa 262

INTENSIVE

•

MEASURES,

SEPTEMBER

193 6

when it arrived, and already two of its brigades were in the north, one with headquarters in Haifa and the other at Nazareth. The third brigade of that division was being organised and was to have its headquarters in Nablus, the ill-mannered. When the 1st Division arrived it was to have its headquarters in Jerusalem, with one brigade allotted to that area and another to the Jaffa area, while the third of its brigades formed the force reserve in Jerusalem. The problem of stuffing little Palestine so full of troops had been solved as well as circumstances permitted. There were barracks for only two battalions in the whole country, which was now faced with the problem of accommodating twenty-two, not to mention two cavalry regiments and various engineer, signal, supply, and medical units. Educational institutions provided a good deal of the required accommodation, much to the indignation of some people. Protests poured in, and the Arabs helpfully suggested that the troops should live in the open in order to harden them, instead of starving the intellectual development of their young by usurping their schools. The stage was set to test the military ability ,

263

B R I TIS H

R U L E,

AND

REB ELL ION

of the famous Fauzi and his bands of arliled warriors from within and without Palestin There was no secrecy about the move of t:~ 1st Division it had been well advertised in the papers and there was nothing secret about the. port of Haifa. .The troops were to move by tram ~ong that railway from Haifa to Lydda, on which bombs were constantly exploding and rails failing to stay parallel. Their transport, in long columns of new vehicles, with new drivers who had never driven on the right-hand side of narrow roads round hairpin bends, was to snake its way all in among the stronghold hills of the rebels, through Jenin and Nablus, or TulkalIll, on its way to Jerusalem or Jaffa. "What a chance for an Arabian Lawrence! But remarkably little happened. Protective detachments were increased and strengthened along the main railway line. That proved enough to scare away saboteurs and ambushers. Every train passed through with no more incident than might be expected on a run from London to York, the time of the exposure being about the same, though the distance was not more than a third. The defence of the road was more difficult than the defence of the railway, because the 264

INTENSIVE

,

I

MEASURES,

SEPTEMBER

193 6

country was more difficult, but the road was less important. Whereas, on the railway, humanity would be moving massed in trains, and therefore be in a vulnerable situation, on the roads the movement would be more spread out and more in the form of material than of men. At the time it was not possible to say whether the enemy would go for the road or the railway. There was no reason why he should not attack both, though the railway lay farther away from the hills and would be more difficult to approach secretly with a strong armed band. Preparations had to be made to protect both. Then on the 22nd of September reports began to come in that there were strong parties of armed Arabs in the N ablus area. As usual when reports of that kind arrive events seemed to belie them, for on that same day there was an action with a strong at med band in the far north between Acre and Safad, in which the Arabs suffered heavy casualties and one soldier was killed, ~hile about the same time troops were engaged ill a skirmish with another band nea.r Mount Tabor, in the Nazareth area. Then on the 23rd the main activities of the day took place in the north-east around Beisan. 266

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find side, and mana~ed to make succes...~ forced landing dose by a party of boops. In the shortest possible .pace of 1illle air reimOI'Cemell1s were our, and a complicated series of aClioIE .... enr on rill dn. k oyer an area of se.;eral miles, noops and ailclaft gaming, tIren !asing, and then regaining contact with the . On the western l~rt of this area of figtuiJlg the Arabs <:anied nut a r~..r~ard acticm, grrrond only ff"M## W

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A.' D

REB ELL ION INTENSIVE

day the hunting of the bands went on, and only stopped when the light failed . Next day, the 25th, the troops were out again searching for any sign of en emy activity, but only one sm all party of armed rebels was brought t o action , and only three casualties were inflicted on them b efore they dispersed. T he Arabs were lying low, and continued to lie low for several days. It was not till the 29th that they approached t he main road again, and then they did almost exactly what they had done before. Again they were discovered and engaged in plenty of time. The action took place in the same area as before and followed a very sill1ilar course, but t his time the striking forces of four battalions were out. T ..vo managed to gain contact with the dnsi ...e enemy, and with the help of the Royal 6' -~ Farce kept them engaged. Whenever that (.{ftlld be &me, the results -ere decisive. In (;--}o/.I1>:1 -:; the trlf.¥ the Arabs offered good to t1~ aircraft, a as a result suffered -;;:;..r.1 (,:wl' .. lw jr:;f(Jw tl -:y (;/) 1d break up nJU, .i aU gr(Jt,.l~ W';(J tJ(;a.tkt into UJV(''T among t:Je f /, It: ItAive ~Wv~. .. ' -, !at ~ I 1lallJA::f . 1. jl; U%J, WIth hlS 1m . t9 JUV",jtl Iml ) ~ 11 tJw l'ab,ti1lfall J/4ndf

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•

•

MEASURES,

SEP T EMBER

193 6

co-operating with him, did next to nothing but suffer casualt ies. Whenever he t ried to come where he was not welcome the initiative was taken out of his hands, and he and his men were hunted and harried till darkness saved them. The long vulnerable columns of motor transport passed through his strongholds to their destinations without a hitch, except when one turned back to H aifa for repairs. Yet, when the rebellion ended, the Arabs made a national hero of t his somewhat ineffectual F auzi and took to selling post-card phot ographs of him throughout t he country for relatively large sums, the excess profits going to the fund for 'distressed Palestine,' which became the new title of the Mufti's famous ' strike f1Jn d.' These operations against a.,.,u.....ned bands werea form of military aid t o the civil power, but it is to be noted that the aid was nOllllally given without reference to the aided. That is inevitable when a country is beset by gangs of armed men, who sit in forcib1e of parts (J{ it, and thence d(.~-nd to attack the 1\(;rvant" (If the State and th(JSe who remain jt}yal t t ) it!; WJVemrnf..-nt. Wb(.'fi a country falls I,.t(, fh:lt d{'pJ()rab]f~ wnditj(JJl, it just . to pa !> flJItt the milit:,ry IXJwcr assumes a duty IWJ

,

B R I TIS H

R U L E,

A ~'D

REB ELL I 0 ~

~ith regard

to the a. med enemies of the State in the tactical sphere. In all other spheres however, the civil power retains control, and with it rests the initiative in taking action against those, who make use of armed bands out d() n()t take the field with th(;To, whl) pay tll"m and arrange for their armam(;nt and ·mbsi'iiencc. It T(,-sts ~d~() with the civil power tQ d(lal witlJ prisoners captured in action or wl)('Jl h aring arms. If, ,ill in P.ilc,!;tinp, Lhe civil pCJw('r takeR no action within it~ sphere :tnd r. if') to f,(" n. Ollll ctioJ\ b( LW('('n baWes :lnd t hose who support nrnwd rcbrls with words, mOl1l'Y, nrms, r food, then the baWcs jn~ i'vitnbl n1imll'. In fa. t, militnry aid to the iyil power lx'coml' a long and co -tly business if there is inadequate or no i\'il aid to the military power. The two hould a t in close hannony, with one object in "iew. Late one {'yening. after battlin'" all day, the . " _ epped on of the tactical sphere into ~ On :mival in _-ablus ri.. fire b - the o SlIII"'! . com '"a rv1 ing •

-t

•

-

INTENSIVE

MEASURES,

SEPTEMBER

1936

from the roofs of houses in the town. Even if every male inhabitant deserved a bullet , there were women and children to consider. The local representative of the civil power happened to be away fulfilling a social engagement, so the officer commanding sent a polite invitation to the Mayor to come and visit his headq Ilarters to sec how hi!! burg ,Hlier; were lJolmving. lIe was no stranger to Lite Arabs; he know tJlCi r cust.oms and ::;pok til ir language. 111 Mayor Lhought an e::;cort was desirable in case SOI11 • sentry shot him, so an escort was provided, and t.he Mayor arrived. As soon as he arrived all the sniping stopped. He was politely entertained, and informed that it would be perhaps better if he stayed the night. The gue t was then given a bed on the flat roof. Next day, soon after the Mayor had returned to his own house, the sub-war counter-attack began. The local National Committee met and resolutions, telegrams of protest were sent off to the authorities in Jemsalem. and the favor is said to have threatened to band ba - his O~B.E . se ~ 'ho have the unpleasant duty of - orin... order when the authority of the • ci il po«er breaK;; dowIl han', bv law, to 11

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'UI' o/flc(lr commanding ill Nal>l lI'> JILtd n,.,loJ'(·d orO'r with the J 'a,.,t possible use of

Core " whereas the inhabitants of the town had behaved in an outrageous manner. But, by skilful agitation, extending in a remarkably short space of time as far as the House of Commons, they managed to throw a cloak over their own misdeeds and create the impression that the only villain was the officer commanding the troops. That particular attempt to put the military in the wrong failed. However, it affords an example of what frequently happens when H.M. Forces have to deal with insurrection or rebellion. The immediate result is that those who are trying to maintain or restore ord~r have to divert all their energies to expJa.m and justify their action. It is a question whether we do not allow too much latitude to those who challenge t he action of H.M. Forces. ill By the end of September there w~s st no sign of action on the decisions made m London on the 3rd of the month and no trace whatever in Palestine of intensive measures. The state 27Z

I W I' 1t N Rl V n

M gA S (J lueS,

!; Ii JlTgM Jl hI(

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of tJJC .IJ1lntry was, if aJlything, ratller worse. J£very day told the !lamc talc of bombing sniping, cutting of telegraphs, punctures in th~ pipe-linc, explosions of land mines, ambushc.'S, arson, and murder. and almost every other day the troops managed to have a fight with an armed band in some part of the country.

•

273

•

THE

ART

OF

YIELDL-G

one month after the decisions of the British government to reinforce the garrison in Palestine and resort to intensive measures to re-establish its authority in the conntry at the appropriate moment, the situation became interesting, though bewildering. On the 3rd of October there were strong rumours that the strike would soon end. The Arab kings, that is to say the rulers of the Yemen, of Saudi Arabia, of Iraq and of Transjordan had been persuaded, invited, or allowed, it is not. clear which to intervene in the internal affaIrS of Palestine in order to advise the president of the Higher Arab Committee, the Mufti. Th«:y were to advise him about restoring peace JJl the country. He was to restore peace by not doing something, instead of the gove~ent of the country restoring it by doing something.

One of .~ers, the Amir of Transjordan, was a ruler \uthin the mandate. The other three were rulers of foreign Arab States, one of which, Iraq, was allied to Britain and a member of the e of ... T ations. They were then in process of deciding among themselves how to intervene. As they did eventually deliver an agreed letter of advice to the Higher Arab Committee, there must have been negotiations first, among them, regarding the wording of the letter. On that same date, the 3rd of October, the military authorities were ready to apply intensive measures, and by then the reinforcing units had all arrived in the country, except two or three battalions still on their way. The text of the September Order in Council, defining the fmIll which emergency rule was to take should the moment ever become appropriate, had just reached Palestine. Somewhere about this date there began the period of delay due to the decision that, if it became necessary, statutory martial law was to be enforced and not plain martial law. The Order in Council was a complicated document reqniring close study. No doubt some of its . : elucidation. Meanwhile, the Arab appear

274

276

CH_\'PTER XYII. REBELLIO_Y I E L D I ~ G,

A_-D

THE

0 CT0 BE R

JUST

ART

I

OF

9 3 6.

n R I TIS II R U L E, AND RED E L J. ION

TIlE ART OF YIELDING

to have been arranging among themselves the form which their advice to the Higher Arab Committee should take. By that date, the 3rd of October, a confusing medley of forces were in operation, pulling in all directions. Political pressure was, without doubt, being exerted on the Mufti and on members of the Higher Arab Committee. Surely use was made of the threat of military force, and no doubt the horrible consequences which must folJow the imposition of martial law as defined in the Order in Council, which had been p~lbli f\h 'eI , were in no way minir~i s d. To the lIninil in,Lcd, it mi ght s 'cm that It W01,1~d havc h 1, -)) lll()J'll fl trni gl1lfc)I'wnrd jnsi 10 glvc the

correctly. For some reason, British policy seeme -.._-....... to have changed completely between the 3rd of September and the 3rd of October. It was no longer thinking of intensive measures to crush resistance, but of ways and means of avoiding action on its previous decision. There was one factor which did not seem to enter very much into the official calculations, the economic factor, which must have been pulling its weight with the Arab leaders, The time was rapidly approaching when the oranges would be ripening, and it was already almost time to begin ploughing. Soon the normal citizen would be too busy with his Own affairs for practical l1ationalism, and the shopkeepers were sick oL their strike, Nevertheless, the Highcr Arab Committee was Htill holding out Lor a stoppage of jewish illll1lig r atioll a~ a condition of peace. rt aho

Mufti lW( ll1ly fUIII· lW\lI'R or flO, in which to call oH lJi/'l HI dk( or 1nk \ 1.11<\ «()Jl·-W(J.lH'lIC(~fI. Ht~t ,,jlji ' lion 10 thld' ftJlllpl(' id(\:_~ waf! LlIII,t ,1t WOlild 1)(1 V(I,y "Idl' Ii) nil' Am/) J(J)lI{fl, l)(}W that

11l(

LII('Y hilt!

,r I'

III

'0 ,11 '1(1111( '<1 in illll ' l VI'IH', IlI'I' ] P!I 'i()/l ii , I lit IlHII)]"111

I)

"('

I II

,

wtlllkd an mUTlel;ty for alJ internees aud for

. '11 wa,;. stl " llIciwllS,

all. priS()l101'H already tried and sentenced or awallhll{ trial, for offences connected with the l'(·bdJion. 1t a) so wanteci to be pressed by the \ AntI> JdJlgs, 1101. lfi(~rcly to have its face saved, II the Arab kings were allowed to advise, that meant an admission by Britain that the problem, of the Arabs of Palestine was one which con- \

jllf\IJlltfJpri, 1(' -rot ;III npp I ' lL Iml t;"., .'11wl \\ Wi'l (' b ll'11 011'" I t,,Ill( I'U(1 K Uws' (1IH'stIOIlS ' . , , ' I ' (If 1IH' (>rder In t'('galcliJw lit· Il1lpWn IOJlS ' 'mary • " J 'I j'IJ Ilwy wet(· ckan·d Ill', tbe 1Il1 {Junci , If ' lIy to alllbbti Lh~~ COil IlL not IJl~ (\1'('1I1C([ () loa, rs be I'cady, '\fcn 1£ thcy had gil I!;scd the answe

277

276

•

,

,-

,

BRITISH

RULE,

AND

---, ,

REBE LLION

TH E

cemecl all the Arabs of Arabia, That amounted to a. step on the way to natiollalism, whilo the nov 'nt 01 the Royal Comlll.issi.oll was likely ill tim ' to bring things a step ncn.r r rcpres nta.tivc

go 'rnm nt.

.

So t1wl"() wet'(' tl'u,11

only two qu('stlOl1S onto

st i1It lill~~. lhe immigrn.t:iol\ Q\l\\t4tiO)) , t\,11d ihq ~1ilm't4 1 tl\ll'~t.hm. Sn k' f; or lnnd .hn.d Iw ',011100. til\' iplino, 1It1l\tlltg'I\l1(1 1H\I'I'Y· in.v ('\ft'l' ·thitlg \0 t~n '(\J'ly ~() I lltt(\.n was tho i'(.~ UOlllt · silun.liOlt lIml lilu t\,Pl.lI'()ltch of t~l mill~. whil\\ b 'hill~l a ll tIl ' '()~lrU:-:IOl\ of m'~o ll,~' HOIl \ llH Ih\' wililllr bit-\' Httt'k, r'l~dy £Ol. t1~~ , if till' lligh 't' Arab COll\J1~i~tl'(' .I1t'hcr tll Arab k1l1f;S 11.01' , High '1' Amh COlIDnitic' sccm'd t o b ' 1ll ~y patti 'ulo.r lJUfl'Y, rod ih' slate of the C~1:1~!t showed 110 improvcment whatever. on 't~em th're were {our smail actions ill the N01 () . . r t were up to coDistrict and several aucra~ t' , One of these ac lODS operat e with the tro~ps. d resulted was merely a brush wlth smugglers, all uni'lk t bacco arms and amm f in captures 0 S1 , 0 . ' 'th little more t ion. The 2nd. wa~ qUlet, WI On the 3l'd than th e pipe - hne ill the news.

1)) \1'\('1:

or

I'f\,\)

10

278

ART OF YIELDI N G

an isolated police post was attacked by about twenty armed men, who shot the police sergeant. The 4th and 5th were reasonably quiet, except that a cavalry car on patrol was blown up by a land min - south of Gaza and a railway patrol ' n.111 into action near Tel Aviv on finding the line had b '11 damag d. Otherwise there was j Il~t th ll~l1al sniping and c~ltt:lng telegraph HlIos. On the 6th u. Roynl Air Fore machine S '0.1' '11 iug for an ann d band l'umonr
or

279

HRIT

r !i n

R U L E,

AND

R R BE L L IO N

THE ART OF Y I ELD I N G

lr~I,(J

/(1

#

,

maintain rr:a.ilinr:l!s, watch ing th r·jr gur;s" fd ttt:1/ II i (If Y 1O~~rli:l,J Ja,w f/ tflU J:d j(j) 1<; ' I. tl(l '1m J " ( . n( •

WI H ' I J('~('r J': ;l,CNI willi ;~ d /:/ i.,i(1/I 011 a POlll f ( If d ·[rlll , III CH"(l 111 · I ivil pI)W('1' mi/{lit f.II ddl" tly iI)/-" pr I j ' /1 (;(' alld "wit ( h fmtr1 i( !-I }lto10 11(,(' ([ 1l()Ii('Y of. 'ond liat iOI1 ill f(tC · or 1 ' bdliOll l/I~

It

,

T he text of the letter CJf appeaJ from the Anti> kings was: " '1 hrougll HIe Pr(!si(]{'nt of the fIj~j(:r Arab ' (JI nI tl it t(,/· to (j U r bOn'l tIle A rabf.j of PaJ(:stinr'. 1/ Wo arc gn'ully con cI: In C([ OIl account of the

o.tiono.l omInitt cs wer brought into consultation, and on the nth the Arab leaders published t heir decision : "The High er Arab Committee has decided, after consideration and consultation with members of the Local Committees from whom agreement was received, to publish the text of the Arab kings' appeaL We call upon the noble Arab people to remain steadfast and quiet in ending this period of strike and unrest on Monday morning. The Higher Arab Committee calls upon the Arab people to arise early on Monday morning for prayers in the Mosques for those who have fallen in our struggle. Following the prayers, the Arab people should return to their stores places of business, and their regular work."

situation in Pales tinc. For this rcason, w ' have agreed wilh our brothers the King!> and Emir to call upon you to re-establish p 'ace and order to save further shedding of blood. In doing this, we rely on the good intentions of our friend, Great Britain, which has declared that it will do justice. You may rely on us to continue our efforts to assist you." A perusal of these two appeals will arouse wrath or admiration according to taste. They speak for themselves. Apart from them, a situation of interest now developed in Palestine. Everyone was wondering what would happen after the strike had been called off. There were two schools of thought. One maintained that the Higher Arab Committee was in full control of the rebellion from top to bottom in all its branches, including the armed bands, and that therC£ore, if it ever came to an ultimatum, forty-eight hours' notice to stop or take the consequences would be perfectly fair. The other school maintained that the

280

281

to

policy of Hltll lionH. 11 lh ' 8lb of () tobct" lh ' Higher Arab 0111mill " r 'C 'iwd lll ' ad, i ' oI th Arab kings, unO. at on b 'C< In' ry acliv '. 111 Di trict II

pr

S('HL

•

B

I

ISIt

llLE,

AXD

REBELLIo.r

High r ~~ ~onmrittee was a purely political bod:. wlth no control whatever OYer the anned bands in the hills. It held that it was quite PO' ible that military action against the band would have to continue, as a distinct i' ' ue, after the rest of the country reverted to normal. It also held that much more than f rty-cight hours in fact, some period like ten daY" , would have to be allowed to the Mufti b '{ore it would be fair to decide that he was failing to control his followers. It was thereIore interesting to see how the reb'lJion was called off, even though the policy of couciliation had taken things beyond splitting hairs over a triOe such as the difference between forty-eight hours and ten days. The staff work of the Arab leaders seemed to he excellent. Cars conveying p<..-tsonages of importance in the movement radiater! in all directions from the headquarter!'! of the Higher Arab Committee. !imilar rarliai" on tbt.:n extended in ,direct' from the headqnarters of the v-m;mittees. Whw cars rou1d • J the ' took

THE ART OF YIELDING

within forty-eight hours, the strike was effectively off. Nonnal traffic was resumed on the roads and all the shops opened. There was only one hitch in the proceedings. On the I6th in the far north of the country, within a few miles of the Syrian frontier, some troops were attacked by a band. An action developed with aircraft co-operating, and the band was driven north with casualties, the troops having an officer and a soldier wounded. The band in question was probably composed of Syrians and Druses returning to their own country. The Commander-in-Chief of the Arab armed forces, presumably Fauzi, was not behindhand with his special order, which was issued on the 12th, the day on which the rebellion ended. It was addressed to the holy warriors in the districts and on the battle fronts of Palestine. It requestw them to stop acts of violence comp1etdy, but also requested them to keep their anus safe and sollnd and be ready in case calIed upon to use them again. It a threat that anyone who failed to with tw; r!:qUest wonld be regarded as a baitor to the cause aoo loocome liable to ~ It r.r.mcbtded by peace awl pr .Q g

\1\

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'\1 1 ,

,' l\

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I l\ I ' \ I \

" 11 11 (

' ( II, 11U "

I

Ih

1\1\1

'1IIkll \\ ,(h 1'1,\\"1

"\ \\ h l 11,\ 1 {\Ilt" hI tlll'

b:\iU's, t'ht G, ,'.'s Spfyial OrJer h) the troops wa not S~) £ort11nnto, It nlso was is ' 11ed on th 12th, and n. copy was sent to t h e Press Bureau in the Secretariat, through which communications to the Press were issued. The Order r ead :_ "The strike and armed reb ellion have been called off unconditionally by the Higher Arab Committee as from to-day . This result is in great measure due to the resolute and energetic action of the three Services, in spite of hampering and difficult circumstances. Cordial coop ration b etween them has enabled many severe blows to be inflict d on the rebels, and mn
1\

H

r () 11 Y n T. l) T G

\,,'put tin ",hi 'h the how [\In"~lly st, blished, n I. b ' th urh' y null consideration tIll'v . show to the inhnbitnut of Palestine, assist in the r storation of more normal conditions. " As Press correspondents were given every facility to visit troops, they were bound to come in contact with the Order. It was therefore considered better to let them all have it from the Press Bureau rather than leave its discovery to the quickest off the mark in the everlasting competition that goes on among them. But that afternoon the civil authorities banned publication of the Order in Palestine. That evening it was being aired all over Palestine in the Empire broadcast. A reporter of a local paper, who was also correspondent with some ngl'ncy in England, ha(1 applied the ban to one part of hims('lf and telegraphed the Order to London with tIll' other, and back it came in 11 H'nmrkably short space of time on the air . A Wt'('k Jatt'\" it arri cd again with th English

papt'rs. SOlllt of which had leading articles w;ul11Iy snpporting th theory that th troops ha(1 had, onwthing to do with the of tI\(' n Iwllion, It must be admitted that th alling off of

11 I' f ' \' )

R 11

nU

Nn

,

l' Tt Il 'It t t t

N

THE ART OF YIELDING

,It n b('\ Ii 01 W!-l 'ffi icn tI m ltnng 'd by ill j ht' r \b h 0,<1 'TS and w 1l p{ Y d by th Arabs. Tlwn 1,11 y gp ilt it all. 1'h ''1 s . 111 d quite ~(\ti~n d thn.t th y had won lh 'ir war; that tIl int I've] tion of I'l'l An1.b lings lU ant that th y would intcrv ne agn.in if n cessary, and that, th rcfor • Arab nationalism in the wider s nsc was an stablished fact. They could feel rasonably sure that J ewish immigration was likely to be much restricted, if not stopped. But still they were not satisfied. At once the full force of political activity was directed to a boycott of the J ews, in order to benefit Arab trade. The Jews then followed suit and boycotted the Arabs. It must also be admitted that the Arabs had had a remarkably free run for their rebellion. The conciliation policy of the British and Palestinian governments had been carried to extreme lengths. The rebellion had been given a six months' run without the imposition of any intensive measures of repression. In that time the Arabs had killed twenty - five and wounded one hundred and twenty members of H.M. Forces, killed seven and wounded forty British poJice, and killed nine and woun~ed sixty - four Palestinian members of the police

I I I I

I

lore ; whil the whole rebellion had cost at J ast th1'e hundred dead and thirteen hundred m n and women wounded. Yet there are large numbers of people who call Britain imperialist, the Mufti among them. There are others who would like to find some other tit!c for the British Empire, in order to dodge the tainted noun. They seem to ignore the power of the adjective before that noun. But the question which arises out of the events which have taken place in Palestine during the last year, is whether that adjective British denotes strength or weakness. There is strength in yielding. In physical contest between one man and another, the strength which lies in yielding has been developed into the art of ju-jitsu. The word ju means yield and the word jitsu means art. In political contest between nations Britain has applied the principles of the art of ju-jitsu, in a wider field, with a success which has earned for her the nickname ' pedide Albion.' However, it is less a question of strength or weakness than a question of right or wrong. To strike the exact balance between strength and weakness or the exact balance between conciliation an'd sanctions, would be right, while 287

2110

,

IHUtlSl

Rt t1". A t' ]

nF:U)H. l.I

(

\ \\ ~lld b' wroug t b' t w~nk or too hong too l' l1cilbtor r r t for 'ibl'. ' The PI' ble:m i ' Brit:lln's grea.t e.'tperill1 nt in kading p~plc along the way to governing thenlsel es. Th key to judgment between right and wrong lies in the answer to the question whether the methods adopted by Britain tend towards peace. It is not only a question of balancing conflicting forces . It will not do to balance forces in a way which tides things over for the moment, regardless of moral standards and respect for order and law. It is a question of balancing forces in such a way that sound standards of conduct, the foundations of peace, shall be maintained as a basis throughout the process of achieving the object.

CHAPTER XVIII. ARMISTICE

ARMED

BANDS

AND

AMNESTY. •

armistice began on the 12th of October 1936, and will continue till the Arabs either accept the decisions of the British Government on the findings of the Royal Commission, or appeal to force again. If they accept, that will be the end of that particular rebellion, and presumably it will become the turn of the Jews to THE

•

•

B R I TIS H

R U L E,

AXD

REB ELL lOX

were ju t wa~chi.ng and waiting, ready to take up allns aaam, If the Briti b Goyernment did not. come to an acceptable 3. rangement with thAr leaders. They also maintained the' . t' 'd ti' . .3'" IT mIIDI a on ill llnUlmlDlshed intensity, to enSlITe that no Arab had dealings with a Jew. Th service. of intimidation was useful also in thee coIIechon of funds. It is true that the label on the money-box had been altered from 'strike fund' to 'distressed Palestine,' but otherwise there was no change. H.M. Forces, after a few days of precautionary activity, reverted to the procedure which is normal in giving aid to the civil power. Instructions were issued that aid was not to be given, except in cases of obvious necessity, without the approval of the G.O.C. No action was to be taken against any inhabitants, except to resist and overcome aggression and make arrests. A few road picquets were, however, still maintained to protect vulnerable stretches of the main Jerusalem-Haifa road. The task of dealino- with minor disorder and breaches of the law thu~ reyerted to the police, while the troops resumed their nOllnallife. But for intimidation, bo"cott, and the 'tuation was ~bout normal foe

ARMISTICE

AR)1ED BANDS AXD AMXESTY

Palestine. The intimidation and boycott could only be dealt with by action against the organisers at one end of the process, and by the laying of infOlmation by those intimidated at the other. Nothing was done at either end, so intimidation and boycott went on. The armed bands were perhaps rather a peculiar feature of the local scenery, still armed and still banded, but then the scenery was odd. Two or three officers, with a few men, out shooting chikor met a band on the move, and both parties regarded one another with interest, wondering what was going to happen, but there was no incident. On another occasion a brigadier, paying a visit to the headman of a village in the hills, was met by the Arab in question, when short of his destination, and tactfully persuaded to take another, much better and more suitable, road. The village obviously had visitors. After about ten days of that kind of armistice the civil power decided that it wanted some military aid, and asked for it. By then it was clear that ,"arious armed bands were still sitting virtually in armed occupation of parts of the country, particularly those round TuIka.tlll. Tablu , and Jenin. They seemed to be more or HI

BRITISH

RULE,

AND

REBELLI O N

less openly training for the next war th h . b . , oug th rWise .ehavmg c~rrectly, in that they were o not aggr SSlve. Fauzi and some of his invad . ers m d ~o b ru.nl1lng a kind of training school ~ r t.h' ill tru bon of s i t d Pal stine Arabs 1ll t.h' art of Qrmcd r bellion. o d \lhl it wa.s dllriu/Z 1 'riorl that phot ,'h\pl~" 'H'l{' t tl '11 of F ttlzi io::'pl' ling hi, h '\ll~, t Illtl' t h ' :- dill ' l\~ tIwv 1I1Itr 'lwd pust, \\ ,11\'1\11\' UII )\1,,11 h 'hI " I I ~~I'~ tlw ti'llt',-\I I)f th' I rttL It 1'1 111'1'.'. {,f ,\I,lils in Idhlll. ~hn(llillR ,1\ ,1\1 'I,dl \\ it II ,\\lIIHl\,llk \\\ :q (\11 ~, 01' ti ll ill~ It 'l\\'h l~ III IlIIII ,Ill :111 ,1\'1 . \ ally• 11111' I " I'ry • ~\\lll\ 11' 11'1" l'idllll' po~ 1 ( lid , "ilb Mlitn\lJ' lil li'S in lnllie, " ' II' IHI , oil' .tll 0"1'1 I'IIh-slilll' lOti '1'''"~ll' ld 1\1 , ~ hO\Ii1l!-: how WI did !lui will tht' "'.II . \\hill' 1<';\lI/i did. I'll\' \·h il ,lItllllll il itos 11 , \'1\11\\ hih' hild (,Oll\(' to Ihl' 1' llIII'IU:-;i\lll Iltill all tillS ",IS a iii III too lit I l.l'll , \Uti 1I,lld Ihl' lIIilil II\, , alllhoritil'S to t \kl' skp~ I) anl'sl, dispu.' , \1Id disl\11ll tb 1 all(k h pl'l'imt't had pro\'l d th\' flltilit of ll'ration, 1>1'1 pan d in ooopI' mtiou witb th polk ' and h'i} alltllOritk... and then carried out in njulI 'tion. with tbt'lll, lw ansc m\\, of "hat \\, ~ intended im'ariably kakul out. It had also alcd the dlsadY'mtagc of just

rt',-

ARMISTICE

ARMED BANDS AND AMNESTY

going out for the day. So the military authorities agreed to deal with the situation, but in a way of their own, which seemed likely to lead to r esults. On the 22nd of October troops made some prelimina ry movements to block the exits from Palestine leading inlo Trnnsjordan. Fauzi and llis IOl cign legionaries werl' nol likely lo make fol' S rht, as h (' and n doubt som of them W('I(' \VII nl I'd b the Fn'nch. Thl' main operaliollS, ;m'o"'ing till' hulk o( Olt' lroops to b l'lllp lo)"l'd , w('n' nlll dill' to lll'gin till th' 26th. TIII'II l ilt' l>tlsh\l's~ IIC gaining contact with t hI' hands, displ'rsillg tlll'lIl, lIlId, jf poss iblo, It I'('s l illg and disalllliIlg tlll'llI, was io b('gin in

l'a n H'st. Oil 1I1l' ('w ning of t hI' 2211<1 some I"el~On­ llnissiItH'l' }lilliit's \\'\'11 to lIlt' wl'slwanl of the lim' of st ops C
Ii 1< 1 ' I' 1 H IT

H l1 t F"

AN I

HE13U L L IO N

ARMISTI CE

A RMED BANDS AND AMNESTY

•

•

11,ga III

(oll wed

1\10l't\t1\g .

11p

n 'xt

roused lh(' lligher Arnb C nli.tl(,~ to its full st < l iv ity. It h~d bOl~ ngllo.tll rr :f r an a.mnc "t for what it ailed tl " .111 ' 11 11 . 1 tll ' 1'11" f 1e II S r om t im , mixed u \nth pl 0. on behalf of th light rmen of Jaff P :\lhos strik ~ h~d done 0 much for the Jewis~ Jetty at Tel AVlv. By t he 24th, spurred on by n~ws a~d protests from the District Comnuttees m the hill areas, it was in full gallop to the rescue of the bands, particularly Fauzi and party . While st outly maintaining that it had no control over the armed bands, it ann?unced t hat the strike would begin all over agam on the 26th unless the military operations in the hills were stopped. The armistice, it claimed, was being broken. The Arabs in the hills certainly were becoming excited and threatening to take up arms and rally to the rescue of those invaders from abroad, whom they regarded as their guests. The attitude of the Higher Arab Committee suggest ed a pretty close connection between the political wing and the militant wing in the movement, in which both had a common aim. By thr atening to renew the strike a ll t he T]1('l't, l '\l'nt l'

I

I

J

26th the JIjgher Arab Committee showed itself 1' 5S squeamish about an ultimatum than the go VCl'llment of Palestine had ever been. It had ncver given t he Mufti twenty-four hours in which to call off his strike. Now the government had twenty-four hours in which to call off its troops or take the consequences, one of which would be that the Royal Commission would have to unpack its bags and cancel its passages to Palestine. Both the armed bands and t he government of Palestine were in a fix . The government of Palestine seemed to be faced by a choice of evils. On the one hand, was the evil of letting the bands of armed invaders from abroad leave Palestine unscathed. They were clearly showing signs of a desire to go. On the other hand, was the evil of seeing the departure of the Royal Commission postponed once again by another outbreak of disorder. Presumably the first essential was that the Commission should come to Palestine without more delay and that all other considerations should stand aside. The situation seemed to leave no room for compromise. Either the troops had to be left free to arrest and disarm the bands, in which case Palestinian Arabs would have resisted, or the 295

294 •

•

BRITISH

RULE,

AXD

REBELLION ,\RliIsnCE

~.::S from abroad h:"d .to be .~ft free to depart.

•

EaJf " 'e2f'- ures 2nd HIe Imposltlon of bamperin resuktions on the action of the trOOn
• •

TIlfJUgh the civil attthmitits had ashd fur mfJit:i.ry aid, toc-y clearly did nr..t w,mt it!! C01l!roQU(:1lCCS, Then:f-Ore, on the atu.-rno(m (,t the Z5 Lh, f1;t; soon as that fact became apparent, the operatlOns were cancelled. The troops al. ready out returned to their stations and those due to move on the 26th never went forth. The news that the way was clear soon reached Fauzi. On the night of the 25th, with a large party of armed men and escorted by Palestinian Arabs, he crossed the Jordan, south of Beisan, into Transjordan. On the 26th the Arab Press was full of protests and veiled threats of a renewal of disorders. The papers announced that the Higher Arab Committee had lodged protests wilh the govemment and warned it ()f the state of Arab feeling. But by that time t;-...t;: troops were all back in their quarters and F.mzi aoo Gis ",en were in Trar.L:>"'jordan. Ihere t;;('y m:t"!net:! fq,;- aboHt ten days, ~till in ~ .... CSTrltrlf:t! rt'i~j~iJC". a;t.rl" becart;
-

I

,

ARMED BANDS AND

AM~ESTY

their own good time they moved eastward across the desert and entered Iraq whence they had come. The amlistice then reverted to nOIlllal and the Royal Commission sailed for Palestine. In support of such methods of government, it can be said that conciliation having gone so far already, the only thing to do was to see it through to the bitter end. But the end was more than bitter, it was illegal. These bands from abroad had come into Palestine for a purpose. In attempting to achieve the purpose for which they had banded themselves together, some members of the bands killed servants of the British Government. That was murder, so all, being banded together, were liable to be tried for murder if caught. To let murderers escape, when it is known that they are .murderers and when they can be stopped, IS 3n offence. It may sound illogical to suggest that it "as UTOU<7 to let F anti a nd his men and till: II <> go on to suggest tbat it would have 00'11 bet~er to 1t:t tloul! off by making 3n agm: lit ,,~h tbe Arab leaden; equivalent to an :
I n \~ \ 'I' 't S n H

hi \'1) in

~

• • l\N'n

'R.l~nwr.l.TON

' I' f01' I)lOntllfl 'I'lw l'tl) I(I ' ' I I , .' . ', II l'll( t'd I) , tilt' lnh Itll\lIl' l li !'llltil/" Oil t Iwi!' r ,,'I I ' , I OW(lr~ n , lop hl'lll1 klllK I hll In,w'i. II 11I :~y 1>0 HII111 Ihll lit) ngl{\~\ llltllj 01' Il l'/I,jy of 1IIIII/i41il'l Wtl IlI'('( \I , SlI llInl· , jtlll In ';I)VL'IIlIlWill~ nlld Ih:~ lowt It~ 1111 JlIllll WIU IIf I hill WitH 1('(./1111 '1'(1 of 1111 J\l/th~, Bid 1111' 1'11 WI' I! lilly 1I1111Ihl'l ' rtf pllill 11111 .. 111 11111 1}' Iwlwi 'I'/I 11 1/\ 1IIIIItiI ,1I1f! lilt, A/lII" 'Ilf l l n dlhliltl IUIIII 1111 ' (11111//1'111 '1 Id!lillf~ 1111' I ~f)y/l ' (,illlllI\ t.,iio ll wlIl '" 1111' V,I~~I II ' 111111(. 1I11(11! 11 111.1 141 t't l)l 'glltl I,ll 1/1(' 1',111 01 <)(olnhlJ, All IIHI I'I'IIII ' II(, wOli ld how 1/"(11('11 tlii 'llI all lip, Ilild ('V"I ' 0111' wtlldd lill Y, kJlllWIl wllt'n' he Hluod. IIJ'llt'i ld, [!I (l gov0 l1Jlnl' lIl Klii I' to all H~ I'iphlH. Wl·tt1 lHtlr-wt~y lo lI Ki llg' l11 '111, and lIt 'l1 bat'! <:d Ollt", "pn'tt
I Al{Ml::;'j'T It ' AHMUD HA NJ S AND AMNESTY

(l)lllli

298

I

I I

ft l'Hll'd nwn fl'Om abrOltd Il11ls1 Goll 'ct al n given pln,c(' awl slo.y Ill!'],l', till aW\l1gem('nls were (·/) /llpJ(·f ·d for Uwil' d('pallll1" from 111 COlln1.t'y wiflt I11 0 ir' (t1111H; '111 n,1, th e AmI> leaders rnn ~ L rtflr('(' 10 Ln.k I n.cl ion in con£: 'It w.iLh 1110 govcmil1l' 11 1, 10 lJnlilIr<: co ntrol of antlA in 'the Arn,b flll,I'/ H of JlIt,lnH IIIIt!. WiLlJ regn,l'd to Ut i 1rI,1iL 1'/1 III " . j/1YI:bllgll,l(·rJ IIY lltn I
BRITISH

RULE

,

AND

REBELLION

ARMISTICE

captured in armed action a g ain t Arabs who had been condemn , dSt them. The th all e 0 death en owed to appeal to th J " were 'tt . e UdiClal C nu ee ill London which in d omto intervene Then ill' 'M hue Course, refused .' arc I937 th H" CommIssioner reprieved them n d e Igh !heir sentences to imprisonment Thcommuted III . f . en Arabs p:-lson or offences connected with the rebellion went on hunger strike, and in Ma I937 about a hundred were released. ManY l~ad already released themselves by escapini etther from pri on or from their euards whil~ at work. 0 \ hil. these :vents \ ere taking place the ourt III Pale tme released another body of Arabs, up for trial on charges connected with th rebellion. The judg s held that the Sept mber Order in ouncil had cancelled the ~uthorit, und r whi h thmergency regulations had b n made. The Arabs in question wer , ho\\'('\'&, cbarged under the emergency regulations, which were now deemed to have no legal tanding. 0 they were released. Then the March I937 Order in Council put the emergency regulations back into force again. It is not surprising that these very peculiar methods of govelIling should be glossed over 300

I I I

ARMED

BANDS AND AMNESTY

rather than frankly confessed. On the 24th of May I937 the Secretary of State for the Colonies referred to the Arab prisoners who had gone on hunger strike. He said: "There has been no case of major disorder in recent weeks, and the only other important incident to be reported is that, on May the nth, I96 persons detained in the Farm Labour Camp at Acre, under the Crime (Prevention) Ordinance and the Emergency Regulations, declared a hunger strike as a protest against their preventive detention. The hunger strike ended on May the 15th, and was not attended by any disorder." It required a question to get a little nearer to the truth. The question was: "Was the hunger strike terminated because the prisoners were released according to the news given in • The Times' three or four days ago, or are they still in detention?" To that question the reply was: "I understand that some of them are still in detention. They were in preventive detention under the Prevention of Crime Order. I tmderstand that some of them have been released. " In fact, about a hundred prisoners had been released, as reported in • The Times: But that did not satisfy the Arabs. On the 4th of June 301

B R I TIS H

R U L E,

AND

REB ELL 10 N

ARMISTICE

t he Arabs organised a strike in the N rth · tri t · t h · 0 ern D IS C, WI the object of bringing pressure t o bear on the govelllment to release th e remainder of the prisoners. There is little proof that the policy of c _ · . on ili c atIon has succeeded in conciliating. It seems instead to have induced among the Arabs a feeling of arrogance and complete contempt for the govelllment of Palestine. There is little evidence that the art of yielding has been applied in accordance with the principles of that art, which requires that the energy and strength of the adversary should be turned against him. The yielding of the government of Palestine has been just plain yielding. There is nothing to show that the exercise of political pressure by the government on the Arab leaders has been as effective as the exercise of p olitical pressure by the leaders on it. They have forced the government grudgingly to give an almistice and an amnesty. It has taken the Arab leaders nearly nine months to get the Arab prisoners out of prison. It would surely have been cleaner, clearer, more magnanimous, and more dignified to have made an agreement on the 12th of October 1936, amounting to an armistice and amnesty. 302

ARMED BANDS AND AMNESTY

with conditions. It is common-sense to have something in writing when two parties have been in fierce dispute for months, and both agree to pause, pending submi~ion ?f the ma~ issues to judgment. If nothmg IS made m writing, each party will accuse the other of not pausmg. The question, what should be done b~ a government at the end of a sub-war, regmres consideration, just as much as the use by a government of the four parts of rule, in face of sub-war, needs examination in order to make it more effective than it is. One thing stands out that the methods adopted by the governme~t of Palestine since the middle of last October were wrong methods, which have achieved little beyond undermining respect for government. •

•

303

AllMlSTJCH

II APT E R .,' IX. ARMISTICE

WITHOUT

CONDIT IO N S.

Royal Commission arrived in Jerusalem on ~he lIth ~f November 1936 and left Palestine ~ the ffild~e of January 1937, to complete Its . labours In London. By the t ime that it arrIved troop~ were a lready leaving the country, a nd by the tIme t h at it left a ll h ad gone but five battalions of the reinforcements from Eng~ land, in addition to t h e normal garrison of two battalions and t he squadrons and armoured cars of t h e Royal Air Force. Command of this new garrison remained in the h ands of a general officer of the Army. Thus, by t he 1st of J anuary 1937, the state of affairs produced by the rebellion h ad made it necessary for Britain to deplete t h e garrison of England by five batto.li ns and put them in P alestine, where THE

,

the · still r'main. 1'h' )n t the reinforcing troops sent out from E ngland in tIl cpt ml> 'r r ush, when the

ox

SOd-

WIT H OUT CONDIT IO NS

~bin t s~~ld nl~ rca:ffirmed ils mysterious preVlons d e l ~lon, dld not reach Palestine till after t h r 'b lhon was ov r. Til fi r t of them to len. c for home, including all the reservists began the return journey just before Christmas: The business of pouring troops into Palestine, and t he final effort of rushing a division there frorh E ngland and t hen rushing it back again, cost a lot of money, and the British taxpayer will h ave to pay most of it. The comfortable balance of some £5,000,000, which the Government of Palestine had piled up over a period of years, had vanished by 1937 in paying the price of rebellion, by providing accommodation for the troops, hiring transport for their use, repairing damage to railways and roads, and compensating owners for loss, damage, or hire of their property. There was just enough money left in the country to meet the normal liabilities of the year to come. The battle to decide how much Palestine will pay and how much the British taxpayer will pay is no doubt now in full swing. A curious feature. of t~e situation is, that most of what Pa1estm~ will pay will be paid by the Jews. . It will always remain a debatable pomt whether the policy of rushing troops about as a 306

v

T} I~

J T J ~ 11

n. tJ T. ~,

AN:O

H It

n It• 1,. 1 rO N

blLlff w~~ n. I)OOU em;, It il} :l,!wn.YI-l wj~Clr tQ wi W:t/K wllhmiDJ)hLmu /)Id j I<'fi if ) 1'''''1'1 I Il " f I' ,n I m., )', It I (ill/~h It) J(I, ,t~ lwmy 1{I}l}d Hit)) J'III, I I 'f I ' • i.( {l,Jld j WI,lfll'lh I t II~ obJ' ~t I .HH III', .'Itl'I/"jl'll '., ,'j,Jj' nIJ )1'1 wn,y, H"I" till; ,obj':JA, "m itt /JI H/1;dlll:d, "U;j, fJItJI;I,.1" '!II ItI~:j'~"fJ1~ wl/I;Jl iltl; (,ff,t;/ ttitl/l JI:'ihff; ill fJtf(;f; til 1l1ifu, t ttn Vll}1 /l1j W, , lit LI ) 111'(I~.(, k' I'f '

/1,1/ , ,mIt tf)

(JIll

will.

I t h /lot yci <;I'af wlw,t (jHf wiJJ Wit~ ill O<;t(,b(.1' I lj,,/J, wh/"n thf.!, rcb(;1JjIJtJ wa!; ",(tlppcd by t be Ant" }1: a,d(:l 14. It i-;(;:tr1fl. that it wa~ first ly to Wrt Imotlgh pl;fU;:C in PaJf;!;Linu to make it pObsib)e

the Royal ornmi!;::,ion to work in thc ountry; HI:n to get t h e; l<.oyal Commission out tJwr' to bcgiH its work; t b e;n to wait till Uw Commission advised the Cabinet as to wh at our will sh ould b e regarding the future flJl'

government of the count ry. W e attained the first , and so also the second, of these objects when the Arab leaders st opped the rebellion unconditionally. But no conditions were imposed by u s on the Higher Arab Committee, and no agreement was signed and no pledges were made for peace and good behaviour during the long wait for the report of the Royal Commission. In fact, our will was not what the Cabinet said it was in early September 1936S06

A IUlIST TCE W IT H OU T C O N OI T IO NS

llamely, L0 rc-cBLahli"h 'Sri Ush authority in

J'a.! 'r;1ine, We haVi) Twt Yilt done that, ~Uld II1lNI: lwL J/~:.I!II;ffl.

yet

itrJ})()fAd

w(!

our wilJ on tJi<.1 Arab

H {Jut 1tlltfJI:dkt.w olJject 111 S!;ptcmb(,,1' 193(; wa14 to /Silt thf; strike and diH(ml.<:r~ !It(JPfJfxl, it i~ uJ1cn to qucsti l J1'l whctfu;r tlJlt ru~h of reinfOfClrtnunts which bega.n ;n that month impdl(;d the; Arab lead,,'!s to a decision in October. It becms probable that the natural desire of the Arabs to provide for the immediate future had a great deal to do with t he ending of the strike, They arc an agricult ural people and so influ cnced by the seasons. They wished to till th eir fields in time for the rains and wished to make money by picking and packing their citru s crops. At that time they expected to make money because they thought that Spain would be out of the citrus market. In fact, by October the season for rebellion had come to an end. It is difficult to see much point in the rush of the 1st Division to Palestine and difficult to see any point in dragging the reservists away from their employments. The rebellion w~ ~~er . f . diVlSlon before the last units of the rem orcmg . reached Palestine. The fighting and defending 307

BRITISH

RULE

'

AND

REBE

LLION

ARMISTICE

done in September was done by th t . e roops a I rea d y III the country. During the t d . h' h en ays m w IC the rebellion extended into Octob the tr?ops of ~he. 1st Division were only e~~ gaged III one sInrmIsh. Their occupation f th ?IvIslOn to be more concentrated and effective m the northern half of the country. If the object was to bluff, the method employed was clumsy and expensive. The bluffing would have been done just as well and much more c~eaply by threatening to impose martial law wIth t~e troops already in the country, unless the HIgher Arab Committee accepted given terms by a given date. The trouble about the bluff which was employed was that it was vague in purpose. There seems to have been no clear idea why the 1st Division was rushed to Palestine, whether it was to re-establish British authority or to bluff the Arab leaders into stopping their strike. The British Government had not even made up its mind regarding the form which emergency rule was to take till a fortnight after the bulk of the rushed reinforcements had reached their destinations. If the object was to get Palestine peaceful enough for the Royal Commission and not to bother 308

I I

I I

I J

WITHOUT

CONDITIONS

about re-establishing British authority, then the ripening oranges, the Arab kings, the threat of martial law, and the troops on the spot should have been good enough cards with which to win that trick. The failure to arrive at any form' of agreement in October 1936 with the Arab leaders regarding the peace of Palestine, pending the Report of the Royal Commission, has proved bad for Britain. The period of suspense or armistice has lasted months. During all that time nothing has been done about disarming the country, because the Arab leaders would have claimed a breach of the armistice had an attempt been made by the government to secure even reasonable control of arms. By letting the rebellion end in a negative way, the Arabs agreeing not to do something, instead of making it end in a positive way, Britain insisting on agreement to her terIlls, two valuable bargaining points for future good behaviour have been lost. The fate of Fauzi and his men was one point, and the fate of the Arab prisoners was another. Use might have been made of these points to secure better control of Arab activities, which have gone sadly out of control sjnce temporarily 309

11 'f I 'I , cll e

t

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H It I) 11 L L'I u 111 A It M 1 i; 't 1 C J~

il1cHng oI Lh , t ·bdll ol1 . 111s tcacl

iL waS the Arab leader s who got FatIzi and hi~ m 11 .out oI Pa.l e.stine unscathed, and, by the exerClse of politIcal pressure, have got most of the prisoners of the rebellion out of jail as well. The government has never gained control of arms, of intimidation, of funds collected by methods of intimidation, or of propaganda by the Arabs and their foreign advisers. In fact, the armistice has been used successfully by the Arabs to consolidate their position, exercise political pressure on the government of Palestine, und present a more formidable front to Britain should she ever d 'aid to rule the Olll1try. . . jL H!!ntl Hll1.:JI1ld Ilnll'l'(lulltl !l l'oyuJr'tJllll1llflHICm (t) {(· 11 till y f{tJVI ' 1 JIIIII' JiI Illl wll!'l'(t II IJII" 1£111(1/1'('

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But no ~cten?ined effort h~ been made to disarm the mhabltants of Palestme who hold arms illegally, whether Jews or Arabs or anyone else. It is possible that the view o~ the gove~nment that it would be more fair to contmue to as before the rebellion, till after the Report of the Royal Commission was out and the decisions on it made known. It. may. have conSl'der ed that if it took steps IDlmedlately h f after the rebellion to control arms, t e use 0 and the f orce w. ould have become necessary disb state of the country would have e~ome . As no action regarding stnct l ut bcd ··gam· '" < • d' the L 1 f " rms hatl heen taken urIng COlh] 0 0 '" • 't . ht have r th' rebellIOn, 1 111lg yotlnj prc 'ct 1l1g' • 'l~ il1lended us t\ punishapi'\'tu:(ld lhal c()J~ll <11 " I • rl',. H that waH

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1' 111 ,

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CO N D IT ION S

rebellion.

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,t Till pn It' ( 0 I I \\'11 IHlt I'tlll , I II , \ \ I 11"VI' \WI'II • t I I If I II 1(1 • 1(\11 t .. I' IIIIII/iltl III IIII' lIlt I , ' I t hI' 1l1'I'Ctctl , II I t 'I' Willi'll 1I1If.{ I II pplll'.! hI I 1\1 ,1 I • \ • 1 ('tIlIIlUisi'itm. Om' h ' t hI' I '\'llI\I t III IIII' 1 11\ 1\ • \tl'tllI '\ i h i\lllll~1 • , I II( I h.' I' 1\I,IIIt'" \\ II , • I , , \' \It tlw lmilc , 'I 'I Y I'~ \I \ II", • \'111'11' I. ,11\1\1' 1\1 , I, "'~I immlgl Hun SlR "hIt'll hI, t\t\\'I'11I1 1,\\\\1. :Ill

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J 'llll'u t ' l ' I 1 ).y , ' ,'> Ill . If) (1, IHI,rlJ lHlw nil /val:·. J t III IblJi 'till to I) 11' , '1 ~ V lr lut OCOUU lI ll capu ILy Lo abl:loeb llu,u 8' In1 • , " I ( 111 one yeu,1' Lo 011 -slx,il; of what it WUl:> in April 1936, 111Ct'C are no V1S1blc signs in F alestine of such a sudden ch ange. The J ews asked that the half!,ear~y quota for May 1937 should be II,5 0 0 nnmlgrants, but as a race they are not shy ab out asking for t hings. The matter h as been raised by question in t he House of Commons in May I937, but the answers of the Secretary of State for the Colonies leave it still in doubt whether the economic capacity of the country to absorb remains the det m1ining factor, or whether the will of th ' H ig'h oIlll11i:"ioner !lOW (kcides the half- 'earl ' q uota, In rt' plks to a number of questions on the snbjt'd 111\' St't'l dary , . of State 8tud \)1\ t h ' ' (It It of . lilY , ! .. '1'11\'H' has h( n no \ h,\ I I"~' \\\' polit'S, mId ill Ii. jllg th" Sd\, thL IIr ltl ~' thl' I t 'II ~ \ \t\lll1i" hull'!' lH111 h It (ICllI)O Jl lk CII pn

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'Ollntl y." Til '11, arl J' rtn yw 'ring t wo more II IH'H ion'l, IIC Hair! : /I was clearl y laid down ill f IH' Mrtc lJ()J1(Lld Id l l' of '930 1I1n,L cv>ry six nWI1LJI'l i, t 'iH til r 'spOJlsiblliLy of Lhe IJjgh 'OllltlJil:!HiOJ.wr to fi x tlw rJltml) 'f undef the S 'hcdulc," It Il 'ems that t h() policy was to keep Palestine quiet at all cost s till after the Report of the Royal Commission is out. If that assumption is correct, then it is a pity that the question of J ewish immigration was not made a third bargaining point last October in order to screw pledges of good behaviour out of the Arabs. As things have turned out, it looks as if they, by bad behaviour, have screwed concessions ' out of the government of Palestine. The Arabs have behaved badly since October 1936 , when they called off their strike unconditionally, The policy of keeping Palestine quiet at all costs and glossing things over to lllll.kc it aplx'o.l' quieter than it really is. has pitt ('II into their hands ami cncouraged them I l) I' ·trt PI'C1'S\II'\, on t1w go rnment by dist urhillf.( till' t'OIlIltl', Wlwn mnttel's in tiisput \\'" Ilt"hol jlltlBlI\1 nt, 1'1 linin IItnmiard!l of onuuct 1\\11 I' ' \\('1'11'11 of II thtl and ~1I111'\ hll\'ll tllt'lIl' IoIhU1ti", ( rn n{orcC!ti by

n

III

BRITISH

RULE

'

AND

REBE

I

LLION

punishment for contempt of Court. The Ara l~d~rs beg~n by boycotting the Royal Com~ ffilSSlOn mamly because the gove ' . rnment of Palestme m November I936 admitted 8 ' h ' . IOO J eWIS ull1mgrants in the second half-yearIy quota of that year of rebellion A I . '. . comp ete s toppage of J eWlSh ImmIgration had been one of th.e Arab ~emands, and they were annoyed at this advertISement of their failure. It w~ not till the Royal Commission was on th~ p omt of 1e~ving the country in January I9J7 that the H igher Arab Committee decided ~ce m~re on the advice of the Arab kings, t~ g l W! ev.J(!(;ncc. I1ICrc is not much point in (ltnphawimg the I:xtrem(' llf.l.iurc {)f the Arab chtinl'l m:u/ ' in 111)'11 <'(.1;sir,n. '1 JlCy wem addrr'(M:cI to a)l :wdi/:Jjl;(' JarW;1 tlHln thll J{oyal (IJr1tn;'1 ill/l . 'J hI; .JIMfi lJ:ul (j1)JII: jU'It the

ARMISTICE

•

fiarrJl: WJHI1 it ww; 1lwir fUIII, and ill/·i1 t;/uimll

,I.,

had /H' /'ll (·xLn'TfI/ ! . Wldl· I Ill' Aral,14 dcrrw nd·d tJ II! IN In i nil Lion of tlH' period of mandat()ry rule, tL treaty Iwtw('('l1 Great Britain amI I'alestin' and tIl(: cs tablishment of an • lIHI('p 'ndcnt national governmcnt, constitutiona lly elect ed, the J ews seemed to think that the field for the Zionist experiment should be extended to include Transjordan. 314

I

WITHOUT

CONDITIONS

While extreme claims in a competition of such importance to each side were only to be expected and were quite in order, the Arabs overstepped the mark in three directions by their actions e the dispute was under judgment. The hil W I ' , collection of funds for 'distressed Pa estme was carried out by methods similar to those employed by the racketeer. Large sums were collected under pressure from firms as well as from individuals. There was always the threat of the gun. At the same time pr~ssure was exerted on individuals, and sometunes there was the use of the gun. Lists were prepared locally of officials, particularly Arab police, who had been active in support of order and law, :tn(] of individuals who hacj not been noticeably ac;ti vc in Ii II ppori of the Aral) cause. S?me of tlwf;(l individu,ds w(~re notified from tlme to lime how Hwy stood (JIl the list. It was not all j list llH·alrical hluff. Jn the first three mo~ths of 1937 there were 162 cases of serious ~me, . mostly political, in that small country Wlth a . populahon 0 f 'JUst over 0 ne and a quarter million. . . . In the first quarter of 1937 the slt~abon m the Northern District, where terronsm wkas e Arab attac s most rampant, had become grav . 31lS

1 B R I TIS H

R U L E,

AN D

REB ELL ION

on Jews increased, and in one or t wo pI " aces Ab ra orgamsatlOns, by methods of terrorism, extended the boycott of J ews t o Such length that they. ~rtually ruled by t he power of thS~ gu~, restnct~ng m~vement and levying taxes of theIr own mvenh on. Then disorder spread south, and there was an outbreak of bombthrowing in J erusalem. In the second half of March t he Mufti, who had been visiting Mecca, returned somewhat mysteriously to Jerusalem, and the High Commissioner arrived back from London. The situation, then at its worst, Soon improved, and has remained just bearable since. The price which Britain has had to pay for a pause, though one hardly peaceful enough to deserve the description, has been heavy. Many of the difficulties which have arisen have been due to failure to make the Arab leaders sign terms last October. As a result, t here has been lack of control over them, and the departure of the invaders under Fauzi, the release of the Arab prisoners and the reductions in t he number of Jewish immigrants, and other acts and omissions, have all given the impression of yielding by Britain to threats of violence. The Higher Arab Committee has not confined 316

I

I

I

A R M I S TI C E

WITHOUT

CO N DITIONS

its activities to the narrow limits of Palestine. It has t ried to extend the area of pressure on Britain . On the 8th of F ebruary 1937 the nt given below, a foreword t o a Memome docu C .. mitted to the Royal ommiSSlOn, sub ran durn .' 11 printed in Arabic and m EnglIsh, was sent. a over the world as well as throughout Palestme. The document speaks for itself ~nd shows what difficulties face an umpire, predISp?sed to :onciliation rather than to sanctions, m purSUIt of peace with justice. To

THE A RAB P EOPLE AND

THE MOSLEM AND CHRISTIAN WORLDS.

I

"The Arab Higher Committee makes public through this pamphlet the text of the Me~o­ randum submitted by the Arabs of Palest me to the British Royal Commission, which came here to investigate the fundamental causes of the 1936 disturbances and the Palestine problem in general. . " In making this statement, the Arab HIgher Committee calls the attention of the whole world, and particularly the Moslem and Ara~ peoples, to the dangers of the tragedy that IS 317

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being inflicted .on the. Arabs of Palestine to-da !he ~~nt,ry IS subJccted to every n!'lpcct ~f nnpcnall'!t1c rule, Jews fmm the (()11r ' cornurs ' {J f, th cfl,rth arc hemg crowded into ' t 1

, '"

, , anc '. l ' 1 l ' . or ltH (}r1g1111l. 111 IOl tants, The J.,cgiflJaLivc Ad1:nill' 1'f " L{/VC' I P lit' 1 1 ' . If!" I ani , () I IOf]' ( 'pitrl, fl on bl oj (J ttl' COHn { r~ II • J:l ll(l, C!?n1~nry to (J 11 In.wll oflo/{fc aud

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Nothing coulj] beLt

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provo how


('Xp](il(

318

WITHOUT CONDrTrONs

Arabs of all ranks, in city and village alike, declared their remonstrance in a strike which la~ tcd for half a ycar, Every Hpherc of activity waR affoctcd therehy, and 1ho country was Hnbj elcd to hloodf;hcd, (icfl.'th, and imprisonment. The Arahs :Cac d th()f;c tragc;liicfI litfJ,vcly, wiLIl 11 'arts In11, of faith (l,nd 111inds Hlmme with P1~Li.(lIlCC,

PI'tll cl,p!nA ~I r j1111 (1(; it l1 (l llrW CI ('(1(!11(Jlny, n,I'O '!,('ing

d III ,Ul(: 111(,('!'(lfllll (If 11l(~ ~io1l1 H i' poli(1Y. Al llldHif{ 11' nl~ fOfC'<1 111 Oil li S l11Ull(·!' dhH'ogcu'd of lh Arttb tight to U 11n.licnlal (' 'iHlen", (j,l1U cllrl'it'd bllt'- with t'l"l'orisnlioll tllld thr 'nts lo our vel" 111 ans of 1i{o. " Tho Aro,bs h:w £01' the pust eighteen yeo.rs d 1101lnced this policy of despotism, :ll1d protested th~reaguinst by every peaceful method at their command. They demanded no more than justice. But the British Government has consistently and resolutely turned a deaf ear to their petitions, wholly ignoring their grievances and their rightful demands. It has unbrokenly pursued a policy in which ignorance and despotism are enshrined. This inevitably has led to the series of riots and disturbances which culminated in the widespread outbreak in the summer of 1936. Then it was that the

ARMISTICE

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gl'iovo\l!ily l iloy w r' awul'(j oj' n. davgcr whi It llll'('(\.toilm i not only til ir l1tLtitmulli£" bUl their bodily 'xist l'l.C, ev 'n in ill' ~hatlow of a l'uthle!;s d >spotlsm. /I Th Ar(1bs of Palestine Wi'll' made to lace the mobilised forces of Imperial Britain anu the insatiable ambitions of World J ewry. Nevertheless, though a mere handful, ttley have courageously stood their ground, and with unflinching hearts they have neither weakened nor let themselves be crushed. In spite of all this, however, being few in number and illequipped in the modern means of self-defence, they can never keep up their resistance if left to face these gigantic powers alone. " Therefore they send out anew their call for aid to the Arab people, and to the whole world of Moslems and Christians. They must defend 319

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their integrity against the imperi<>l' t' . ~ 1S Ie net Ret out f·or them, and save thcm'!cJv " f J J .. rom, the )arms aTle. dang rs that hanl>' "bov - tl . J TJ , ' " (" ) I r leads

l:~. all Ul~()n 111 Jf brcihr 11 to Hec tlJat Great ir tL. In 1 d d',J{;L iI'Ol j)1J rSldlllf tl)') ' } M !oj III 1I1rtlMI C)1 cr()~ Il ln~ttt U11rl (Jppr'SS!M wlJicll denies them all thIngs.' that Gr -at Brllaill grant to the Arabs theIr natural and political rights' that W.orld J ewry shall learn that Palestine'is not

~nen~less and alone in this world struggle, but IS stIll the centre of hope and aspiration of Arabs, Moslems, and Christians from all the corners of the earth; that the Arab people and the Moslem world shall take no rest until they are assured that Palestine shall maintain for ever its Arab character and blood," HEADQUARTERS.

ARAB

HIGHER

eo"ulI'T'MInEB.

J IUIUSA1.:&III, Felduary 8. 1937,

CfTAPT t.R XX. 'I II:E P U J{ l' 0 S ft.

TmJ: decisions of the Royal Commission on Palestine have now been issued. Soon the final judgment on the future of the country will have been delivered. Deliveries of judgment create situations no sooner created than reactions to them begin to take shape. Some people dislike a judgment, some loathe it, and some regard it as an outrage?us breac~ of promise. Then comes the questIOn, what l~ to be done: submit to the judgment, submIt a new grievance to judgment if there is a new grievance, or appeal to force? In the c~e of India judgment has been delivered, and m t~e case of Palestine it soon will be, The answer m each case should be submission to the decision of the judges. No other answer fits the purpose of British rule, which requires that disputes shall be submitted to judgment and that the decision of the judges shall be loyally accepted. 321

320

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Th British Empir is too oft n praised as a wonderfully vag~e, indefinit , Successful thing, a puzzle to forelgners, who fail to understand why it works. It is high time that the emphasis on the vague and on the indefinite aspects of its nature stopped. It is neither vague nor indefinite. To go On emphasising vagueness only does the Empire harm by surrounding its purpose with fog. Without a clear purpose there can be no impulse in a definite direction and no cohesion among those who should work together. There are three Empires: the Commonwealth Empire, the Colonial Empire, and the Indian Empire and Burma. The spirit which animates the Commonwealth Empire is the spirit of free and loyal co-operation by un equals in service to something greater than self. The States of that Empire are free and self-gov rning. The States in the other two Empires are not yet freely self-governing, but the aim is that they should progress to that degree and then be aninlated by the spirit which animates the Commonwealth Empire. The spirit requires in practice that disputes be submitted to judgment, and that the decision of the judges be loyally accepted. It is a tall order, but the higher the 322

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aim the greater the effort to reach up. It is only natural that, with so many people~ in so many different stages of development ~n one organisation, there should be great vanety ~f constitutions and forms of rule, but there IS nothing vague about the purpose. There is nothing new in free and loyal ~oo eration by unequals in service to s?methmg ;eater than self. But the co-operatIon. must ~e free to accord with the spirit which aUlll1a~es co-operatIon the B n't'IS h prpose u . Regimented . . t the same thing. In natIOns governed by IS no . .. d l ' the the regimental system the IlldIVI ua .Ill. . ranks may wish to speak, to assert his ~ndi­ vidual view of truth, to point wha~ he belIeves a better way. But, being regImented, ~e thinks that he alone wishes to step out ofb t e t . . . All the others a ou ranks to raIse hlS VOlce. . . the him seem to be doing the same thmgs, m . same way, at the word of c~mmand. There ~~ no sign among them of deSIre for. chan?e. the same things in the s~me .wa~: of ~esire for command, and n? SIgn III t tep out of the o he Just canno s . s h c ange. . co-operatmg, ranks, and in the ranks he remams, but not freely. 323

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D mo racy allows free co-operation, other v ry efficient yst ms do not. Those Who beli ve in the ot~ler. syst ems dislike democracy, because they see In It an almost chaotic freedom and very little sign of co-operation. That is a point which requires attention on our part, to ensure that there is balance between freedom and co-operation. The freedom is a means to a better type of co-operation and not an end in itself. What is new in the British system of free and loyal co-operation is the spirit which animates the purpose, obedience to the principles of peace, as well as its international scale. Too often the size of the thing rather than the spirit receives the emphasis. Britain and other States in the Empire have between them hoist civilisation one step higher. The problem is to stay there, and the longer we stay, the more hope there is that others may come up too. We have a high purpose and a very long way to go to reach it in a field, in the Empire alone, wide enough to engage all our energies for generations. The difficulties are enormous. The first difficulty is to get the purpose properly understood. The purpose is peace in a practical form, based on the principles of life and on the principles of peace; in fact, life with peace. 324

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Yet there are thousands of people in Britain who spend their time obscuring the purpose for political reasons. They say that the Empire is governed by me~~ods. which are im~erialist, capitalist, and militanst. They say, In fact, that some of us dominate other peoples by force in order to make money out of them. Yet their own purpose is to divide peoples everywhere into two opposed groups, one consisting of few who possess much, ~nd the oth~r of many who possess little. TheIr purpose IS to divide and rule, and that is not the way to peace. In fact, they are imperialists of the old dominating type, and dwell a step below us on civilisation's staircase. . . There is difficulty also regarding the SUbrr.lIssl~n of disputes to judgment. We still have strikes In 't . d trikes are a fOIm of appeal to force. B n am, an s d 'd In spite of those who say that force eCl es nothing, that form of force .has ~on~ a .grea~ deal of good by securing a farrer distnbution. 0 wealth. But now the arrangements f~r hea.ru: e p both sides in dispute are so mUCh. un : , that it is time to make a clear distinCt~~be b i~~ , 'k ' Some so-ca s strikes and stn es. f . d which reveal the existence of a type ~ ;ent if it would not submit a dispute to )U 825

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lo J 11{\'TrIH ' IlL 'I J, ' ( r ' y l ' M' I J( 'S () 1/ allt! l III ( (s (,11(' iJull ,of il, wus all all 'Illpt ~1Ud ' at an ~J (,ol1:(,l11enl lime lo for e Britain ?tlt of 1 aks tlll ) and kav the Arabs there In ~ontrol Lo dominate ih· popUlation. The Itahan ~l1q uest of Abyssinia was another racke L Jlls L ~he Same type on a still greater seal. I he attItude of mind was similar in all three cases. That attitude of mind cannot be a~ow~d to translate its thoughts into deeds W1t~ Impunity if the British purpose is to be achieved. The science of racketeering has made great strides since 1918, and has taken full advantage of the British predilection for conciliation. Conciliation is useless in dealing with certain types of mind, which are only influenced by a

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of 1' 0 Ofll'l atlon IIIHI ('ornpJlJl11isl', bel'lun(' domi Jlidl'ti by I'llrkl'tl'erillg II'udl'rs who are capabJ,' of lll'ithl'l'. If we In' have as we
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'l uI itt'V W!'I(, IIltkNI II t IJ t ,. t'l II t(1lUllllJl1 lk~ t't In U1 (] p N ~ I t !"t'cl \ud ttl\ ,til\' ro t l' l~Ct'. r hl' 1 l U~l : . , i 1 .1111) rtlu l'llll'O!:'t' .1:' no!. to 'reate ullinncc· i ll tdl:r t o b, ~tt .1 ~t'r 111 1l1peHti .n, but to reat U 51 idt ill rd'r to be tronger ill co-operation. In, rder t? a 'oid having to compromise "ith publi enemIes, a closer stud of the methods of the racketeer is required. Then British rule /1

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may be brought up to date and a system of emerge~cy rule ?evised, capable of bringing the extremlst up WIth a jerk should he venture to resort to force. It is curious that sanctions should be so promjnently displayed to lawabiding citizens on the back of an income-tax declaration, with threats of six months' hard labour for keeping what the State claims as due to it, when citizens in States under our luI , an organise and cxe~tJtc a rmed rebellion

wii}je)ui any sllggf!stiorJ of sand jems at all. It j~ Lim) th at W'l dl'rtl1uJe/ pcl JJig her standards of poIi t iC:lJ 'ol1elll 1 from some of those whom wt' art' It'n ding alc)JIg i 1)(' road 10 S( If-goy( rtllllent, and 1iml' Iha t w' took t'ffl' tiw litl'}>1i to get UWtn.

1n t h<\1' rc spt' t Wt' ha l ' iailNI in Pall'stint" <1.,nd SlCm to b · doing little bdtl'r ill India.

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W h(lv' 11 (l W ItdmlL h l till L J ('W~ lWcl Atubs will rwt OOP CfU t . W 11UYb admItted that we hove Inned as 0. link between them in spite of all our sw ct reasona bleness o.nd pa tience in trying to petsuade each community t o cooperat e with us. We have now admitted that sweet reasonableness is not enough in the international sphere a.nd are at last rearming at a pace set to ensure that rearmament shall not upset industry. That is not unlike setting out from a bad start in an important race under strict instructions to breathe only through the nose. We have not yet admitted that there was anything wrong with our administration in Palestine, nor have we reached the threshold of admission that our methods of dealing with modern rebellion are comic. But, just as foreign nations have rearmed and made us divert money, reluct an tly , from social services to defence services , so have extremists under our rule . rearmed themselves with new methods of resISting it. It is time that we reaoned ourselves with new m thOOs of ruling. It is quit clear now that in Palestine neither Arabs nor Jews will get all of their extreme claims, whatever happens. Wheth r the de32B

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REB ELL rON

cision be partition or something else th . b 1 lin' , ere WIll ~ a genera . mg up for a fresh start. We might as well Join the party and line up t It looks as if we might have to do somethi °to. enf d" ngo or~ a ec~10n. ~ossibly, in a pause in the shout~ of nval claims, we might venture the suggesilon that we have interests in Palestine suc~ as the port of Haifa, with enough la ~m,nd ~t to make it safe, and the line of railw~y JOlmng It to the Suez Canal. Possibly we might manage to keep clear of that centre of discord the l!0ly City, by controlling its food, water: and light from a distance. Now is the time for us to make up our minds what we propose to do after we line up for a fresh start. Are we going to continue to shut ourselves up in an island sanctuary, walled in behind theories, blushing at the thought of force in any form, or are we about to step out and face realities in our own wide sphere of rule? Though we live in an island, half of those in it depend on overseas connections for food. Our industrial heart-beat just manages to supply them; an agricllltural heart-beat would leave about twenty million uofed. All the work we have done in improving social conditions inside the island depends on ability to go on defending

d

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those vital overseas connections. We have no intention of using force to attack and get more, because we have more than enough to manage already. We cannot let foreigners attack the outlying parts of the Empire, because of the effect on our stomachs. It seems equally reasonable to resist attack from within by extremists. We forget and forgive readily. But surely two lessons stand out to be remembered from the history of rebellion against our rule since I9I8. The first is the need to deal promptly with resort to force in the interests of peace and of the submission of disputes to judgment. The second is the need for better co-ordination of the four parts of rule to ensure swift and effective action. The author, in conclusion, acknowledges with gratitude the kind permission of the Controller, H.M. Stationery Office, to quote from the Palestine Royal Commission Report, and of the Management of • The Times: to quote from the leading article of the 25th January I937, .. The Palestine Inquiry."

331