·British Submarines 1939-45
Illustr.ateo
CONTENTS INTRODUCTION
3
THE S-CLASS SUBMARINE
4
,. El~9 de sign (Group I...
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·British Submarines 1939-45
Illustr.ateo
CONTENTS INTRODUCTION
3
THE S-CLASS SUBMARINE
4
,. El~9 de sign (Group I ) ,. 193 1 des i ~n (Group II ) ,. 1939 a nd su bseq uent War Program m e d esigns (Group III ) INNES MCCARTNEY is an historian and nautical
THE T-CLASS SUBMARINE
8
lectures widely on a number of
· 1935 design (Group I) ,. 1939 Wa r Pro gram me d esig n (Grou p It) • 194 0 Wa r Pro gram m e d esi gn (Group III)
as sociated subjects. A passion for shipwrecks has le d t o
THE U-CLASS SUBMARINE
archaeologist, specializing in 20th-century naval vesse ls . He
some famous discoverie s, including the submarine M1 and the battlecruiser HMS In d efatigable. Hi s previous
,. 1936 d esign (Group I) ,. 1939 and subse quen t w ar ,. v-Class (Group III )
EJTl e r~e n cy
13 design (Gro up II )
book, Lost Patrols, detailed his uncovering the 121 submarines sunk in the English Channel. He lives and wori<s in Penzance, Cornwall.
OTHER BRITISH SUBMARINE CLASSES
17
,. I f-Class ,. LClass ,. I'm jmisp
,. Gra m pus-C lass ,. 0-, P- and Re-lasse s ,. River-Class
OPERATIONS, 1939-40
20
,. The 'p h o n ey' wa r ,. The No rwa y ca mpai gn
THE MEDITERRANEAN
23
,. war with Italv TONY BRYAN is
a freelance
illustrator of many years' experience. He initially
• The battle s o f Ma lta an d the convoys ,. Operatio n T orch to O peration lhHky ,. Sici ly to the end of the war in th e Med ite r ra n ean
qualified in Engineering and w ori<ed for a number of years in Military Research and Development , and ha s a keen interest in military h ar dware - armour, small arms, aircraft and ships . Tony has produced many
THE FAR EAST
BIBLIOGRAPHY
45
COLOUR PLATE COMMENTARY
46
INDEX
48
illustrations f or partwcrks, magazines and books, in clUding a number of titles in the New Van gu a r d series.
40
,. O utbreak of war with Japan to 1943 ,. T h e Far East in 1943 to March 1945 ,. T he final assau lt on J»pao
N e w Vanguard · 129
British Submarines
1939-45
Innes McCar tn ey . Illust rated by To ny Br yan
First p ut>isl1ed " Grea t Bfltai n ,, 2006 by Osp<ey Pctl i""ing,
Acknowledgements
M<Jlon<:l Hoo .., Wfit Way, So tley. O~ fOltl 0)(2 OPH. U K 44 3 P:¥k Aver>.Je Sooth, New Von<.NY l 00 1e. USA
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part"",""". Debbie Comer. Cura!1ilying sev
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Ospr"Y Ona UK, PO . 1 ol
BRITISH SUBMARINES
1939-45
INTRODUCTION the outbreak of hostilitie s in 1939. the British subma rine force numbered 57 boats. exactly th e same as th e Ge rma n lJbootwaffe. This w'as nO I a coincide nce, became British policy in the in ter-war yea rs had bee n a imed at lim iting: the growth of the Ge rm an fo rce by tre at)' - Ge r many co uld o nly buil d in parity to Brita in . Ye t the policy was no t a success, because Ge rm any had th e pote n tial to cause much dam age (as she d id ) to Britain's vita l merch ant marine. By co mparison Bri tish suhma rines, by d int of geography a nd strate gy, co u ld not do the same and had co m m itments ar o und the world in a va riety of roles. Int e rn a tio nal treat ies limi ted th e U~ of submari nes in case of war to th e ' prize regul ations' , whereby merchant ship p ing co uld not be attac ked ....-itho ut warning. In th e minds of th e Ad miralty a nd British submarine designe rs thi s placed a hig her em phasis on th e use of th e subma rine aga inst nava l targets, which influe nced the direction of British submari ne design . This focu s cu lminated in the T-Class subma rine being ab le to fire a n unprecedented ten to rpedoes in o ne salvo. A co nserva tive policy fo r the adoption of newer techno logies into submari ne design had both adva n tag es and drawbacks. In particu lar. th e slowe r sur face speed and shorte r ra nge of som e Briti sh sub marine classes ha.. been blamed on th e use of older diesel engine designs, selec te d for re liabi lity. Conversel y. by re tainin g- a simpler to rpedo-a im ing technique alo ngside a co ntact fuse, th e British to rpedo sysrem d id not suffer th e paralysing re liability pro bl e ms m a t affect ed both the United Sta tes a nd Ce r m an v a t the outse t of th e ir submarine ca mpaig ns. Th e tra ini ng of the all-volun tee r subm arine force also re flecte d th e for eseen operational rol e of th e submari ne. TIle Co mmanding Officers Qualifyi ng Course, known as th e ' Per ishe r ' course, focused la rgely on submerged atta cks o n la rger targe ts. Tra in ing in night surface attack was negligible. Com ma nders we re encouraged to fire large spreads of to rpedoes. in pan to co mpemate fo r the sim ple aiming tech nique. but a lso to e nsure the destruction of fast-moving and a rmou re d naval vessels. Such tra in ing proved to be e xce pt io nally usefu l in ho me ....-ate rs and in the Mediterra nean. British submari nes were to have sign ifica nt successes again st Axis naval sh ips. when they appeared. H oweve r, as the war progressed . the use of the KUn an d me employment of unrestricted subm ari ne wa rfar e extended th e su bma rine's role. By the tim e th e
A
The Wor1d War l -era m inel a yers L.26 and U 7 _re amon g the
earliest Bri t ish 5u b m ari nes to conduct war patrols. T hey are seen h er e tog et her in 1 940 .
t
3
campaign in th e Far East wa s prope rly underwa y, British submarine s had become fl illy capable multi-role ,,"eapons in the hands of h igh ly mo tiva ted and ex pe rienced operat ors.
THE S-CLASS SUBMARINE In the decade foll owing Wo rld Wa r I, Bri tish submarine desi gners ...-irh a " i de range o f co ncep ts. Larger 'Flee t' submarines were dl -v'elope d to o pe rate alongside the b aul cfl cct. Also, sub marine 'Cruisers' we re tes ted b y th e m aj o r n avies o f 111e worl d . all of whom were aucmptiug to fo llow th e Corman C-Cmise r d esigns o f 19 17-1 R. Ne ither th e Fleet nor C ruis e r con cep ts lived up to e xpecta tions. prima ri ly because top su rfaced sp eed. reliability and e n d u rance could not he b rough t up to specificat ion . Bri tain h ad ceaselessly called fo r the ba nning o f submari n es by all n ati o n s. \.\11ile so me re strictio n s wer e achieved at th e Washin gto n an d London n ava l con ferences . the wo rsenin g situation ill Eu ro pe in the 1 9~ Us and 19.'10s ca lled fo r th e d esign a n d construction of a m ed iumsized p atrol su b ma ri ne capab le o f ope rating in the North Sea a n d th e Medi terranean. The S-Class subma rin e was lilt' re sult. Init ial d esign p ro blems wert' co rre cte d th roughout th e 1 ~30s , so that by th e ou tbreak o f Wo rld War II, th e $-Class submari ne ...-as o n its way to being a ve l)' success ful weapon. It we nt 0 11 to beco m e th e m ost n umerou s class o f su bmarin e ncr made fO T th e Ro yal Navy, with 62 being m ade bet ween I ~:\ 1 a n d 19 -15 .
t~xl)(..riuu-n u-d
1929 d esign (Group I)
T he first two S-Class submarines, Swordfhh a nd Sturgeon. we re o rde red in 1929 . ,Y II/WrY and Slarfi.11I followed in 19.'10. SPECIFICATIONS
Length overall MaJlimum width Surface displac ement Subme rged displacem ent
Bhp engines Surla ce speed
Bhp motors SUbme rged speed Range
Fuel Submerged endurance Diving depth Armame nt
"
Complemoot
4
202ft 21n. (61.62m) 24ft (7.32m) 735 Ions (747 10nnes) 93 5 10ns (950lon n e~
1,550 (1,154KW) 13.75kt (25.45kmlh) 1.300 (969kW) 10kl (18.5km/h) 3,700 miles(5,954km) at 'i Okt (18.5km/h) Diesel 38 Ions (39 tonnes) 1 hour at 10KI (18.5Krnlh), 32 hours at a« (3.7KmIh) 300ft (91.44m); Sworctfish 250ft(762m ) 1 x 3·in. High Angle (HA) gun, 2 x machine guns. 6 )( 21-in. torpedo tubes with silt spare torpedoes 38
T h e uew S..C lass boats we re to replace the successfu l H-Cla~ s and improve on it~ pe rf o rmance. li e n ee . the S-Class was give n a h eavi e r to rpedo (2 I in.) and grea te r speed a n d end urance. both surface d an d submerg ed. Fuel was sto re d irn e rually, wit h ballast tan ks o n ly
The pre- war R- ClasB HMS Clyde 's hi gh speed m ade it u sef u l f or vary ing role" in all theatre s. It is most famou " for its f ig ht wit h thre e U-boata, but i t al so hit Gne-Jsenau with a torpedo.
HM S Safari re tu ms h om e In Octobe r 1943. It is flyi ng th e heavily embelli sh ed J oll y Roge r to denote it s hi gh succe"" r a t .. .
--
-
-
o n th e o ut e r side of th e rivet ed p res.~ure h u ll. 11w su b ma rin e was d ivided into six com pa rtme nts, th ree o f whic h were fitte-d with DSF_-\. (Davi s Submarine Es cape Apparatus ) equip ment. '1111;" provi sio n o f six fo rwa rd to rped o tubes m e-ant th at the prt>s.sll rt> h u ll o f th e bow compa rt ment ha d to be oval in stead o f the ideal circular sh ape , T h is weaker shape wo u ld im par t on maximu m di ving dt-plh . b ut ga"e the 5-Cla<;.~ a h eavier punch th a n its e n e my coulltt' rpan . rhe "';-Ilt' \'11 If-boat, which by re taining only four fo rward tu be s m ain tain ed a c ircu la r cross-section alon g its entire length . Th e early S'C lass submarines un derwent a n u m be r of ch a n ges to the gu n arrangemen t. Bo th Sturgn m an d SUJorrlft~h we re fitted with a di sappearin g moun tin g for th e 3--in. gun , T h is was fo u n d to offer no st re a mlin ing be nefit oyer a fixed mount ing and the late r submarines adopted th is ins te ad . In 19 36 , the Roya l :".\\,y ado p ted a specially d esign e d 3-in. su b ma rine gu n. T he 20("\\1 ( I,06 Ikg ) \-Ik I wire-wound 3--in . gun o n th e Mk 5 moun ting became ,,; d ('ly used on a ll sm all an d me di u m British submarines th ro n g hour the wa r an d p ro ved a relia ble weapon in servi ce . It co u ld e leva te 40 d eg rees. giving it lim ited a n ti-aircra ft (A:\) capa bili ty. T h e gu n could P l"(~('("t i l.~ 17 1;, lb (7.95kg) sh e ll to a maximu m ra n ge o f 12.:'>00 ya rds ( 11,42:'1 111) . The ~"'u n was used to sin k smaller craft (a n d to Iini ...h off larger one s) a n d against ta rg e ts 0 11 shore. The Ad mira lty had wo rked conrin uou...ly to improve the performance o f di esel e n gin es th ro ug h out th e post-war yea rs. By the time tl u- S-Cl ass was conce ived, th e imp roved e conomy a nd reliab ility of d iesel p rop ulsion was evident. The S-Class was filled with twin six-cylinder engines with 14 Y"-in . (36.8Rcm) d iameter cylinde rs, haling- all opt itrnuu run ning speed of 4ROrp m , A to tal o f 22·1 batteries stowed unde r the m ain deck power ed the ele ctric motors. T h ese formed a major pall of the overall weig-h t of sub iuariucs of this pe riod. In th e Glse of th e S-Class, th e batteri es wei~hed in at 96 tons (9 7.5 touncs). As was (:( llU IIlO Il with n e w designs . tee th ing- tro u b les occu rr ed with th ese bo ats. The in te rnal arraugcmcru s tended to be ove r-com plica te d a m i the m ai ntenan ce o f e q u ipme nt wa... a concern. La te r u pg rad e s eased th ese p ro b le m s somewhat. Di\;llg times o f th e S-C1ass were good, From full y buo ya nt to su b merge d to o k arou n d 9.5 sec o n ds. T his co uld ' be trim med to 50 secon d s if the bo a t wa s a t low buovancv.
5
1931 design (Group III
By 193 J, the basic 5-<..1a'>s design had proven irs worth. Ho wever; before more we re ordere d , th e oppornmitv was taken to modify and upgrade some aspects of th e des ign . Prima rily, in te rnal a mmge me nts were simplified and m aint e na nce proced u res and routine s were ma de easier. TIle supe rstructure forward ....<1... lowe red and m e bow buoyancy tank was rem oved ( 0 reduce pw (tem po ra ry de ..-iatio n fro m the sub marine's co urse ) when subm erged. The ove rall silho ue tte was re d uced 10 improve su rface sta bility, which abo im p roved diving times. The 1931 design inco rpo ra ted two escape cha mbers , stre ngth ened bu lkheads, an d a reduction in the number of ballast tanks. l Ienee, whe n Sealion was laun ch ed in 1 9 3~ , th e newer 5-Class particula rs we re as follows: SPECIFICATIONS Lengt h overall Maxim um width Surface displacement Submerged displacement Bnp engines sotece speed Bhp motors Submerged speed
Range Fuel Submerged endu rance Diving de pt h Armament Comp lement
208ft Sin. (60.6m) 24ft (7.32m) 760 tco s (772 toones) 960 tons (97 5 tcores) 1,550 (1,154k'N): Increased later to 1,900 (1,41Sk'N) 14.5kt (26.83 km1h) 1,300 (969k'N) 10kt (18.5km1h) 3,800 mi les (6,1 15km ) at 10kt (18.SkmIh) Diesel 40 tcos (40 .6 tannes ) 1 hour at 10kt (18 .5kmlh) , 32 hou rs at 2kt (3.7kmlh) 300ft (91,44m) 1 x 3-i n. HA gun, 2 x machine gun s, 6 x 2 ' -in. torped o tubes with six spare torpedoes
40
Shark, Sal man a nd Sn apper were lau nched in 1933, :v awolf in 19.3-:1. SfNarfuh and SunfISh in 1935 and Srf'rkl in 1936. From Su nru h o nwa rds , the diese l o ut put was increased to 1,900bhp (1.4 16kW) by the additio n of two extra cylinde rs to each engine . For Salmon and afte r, twin m ot or'> were fin ed to each shaft . which do ubled th e ra te of batte ry charging. Also th e HP com pressors were fitte d to w o rk off each shaft instead of ha..i llg: th e ir o w n ele ctric moto rs. Th is sim plifica tion increased space aft an d made fo r impro.. .ed accommoda tion facilities in the afte r e nd . 1939 and subsequ ent War Programme designs (Group
1111
The 1939 War Eme rgen cy Progra mm e a uthorized the co nsr ruc uo n ofa fu rthe r five S-Cla~s subm arines: Safari, Sa hib. Sa racen, Sat)'r a nd Sceptre. After nearly te n years of ex perience of the 5-Class subma rine, most of th e
6
The $uecessfu l HM5 S lonn , painted in camou f\age for Far East opet'ations. Under Lt Cdr E. P. Young , 050, it saw much ac tivit y inc lu d ing a gu n -acti on In which it sank four s h ip s .
we aknesses ill th e design h ad b een elimin a ted aw l a wo rt hy ami re-liable we ap o lls platf orm h a d evolved. During the- first mont hs of the war, the S boats proved th eir wo rt h ill the No rth Sea and we re 10 be-come the co r ucr s to uc o f British war time submarine consnucnou. with an o ther 45 being ordere d b y th e e nd of th e wa r. They \HTl" ; .Va ! JoK. Sea i\ )-mph. Sea Raver; Seraph. Sluw spmrl', Sib)'~ Si. kl". Sim omn, Sirdar. S/Ji/l'{ III, ,\ f!ll'II did, Sport sman am i P222 in 19 ,10; Scotsman..V)'lltia n, SI'll ! Jn.'iL Shalimar, Spark. Spiril. Statesma n. Stoic; SI(}nl'henge, Storm.. Sim taw m. SITrlIlf!!J01.I'. Stubborn .. Surf a nd S.:'irtis in 19 41; Sell Scout. Selent', Snlfscha ~ Sl'1/ itl'~ Sidon , Sleuth.. Salent; Spm rhrlld, Slll rdJ" S(ygia1/, Subtle aud SlIpmn" ill 19·12; and Sllf{ll. SlIIIKUilll', Scordur. SPrillK" a nd Spur in 1943. SPECIFICATIONS 217ft (66.14m) 28ft 8 'J.in. (8.76m) 865 tons i874 tomes) 1939 ordefs: Surface disPlacement 890 tons (904 tOtVle$) 194()-4 1 00'dln and Sfurt1y and Styg;an ; 854 tons l868torn!'S) 1942-43 ordefs Sutlmerged dJ~ acement 990 tons (t ,006 t~) Bhpengines 1,900 (t ,4 t 6kW) 14.5kt (26.83km1h) soetace """'" ere motors 1,300 (969 kW) Submerged speed 9Ict (t 6.65 km1h) 6,000 miles (9,656km) at r c« (t 8 .5km1h) 1939-41 orders: 7,500 miles (t 2,070krTl) at Hlkt (t 8.5kIT\hI) 1942-43 orders Diesel 57 tons {58 lonn8$) max t 939 orders, e~ceot Safari and SahIb at 44 tons (44,7 ton nes); 92 Ions (93 tonnes) max t 94()-4 t orders. except Scotsman and Sea Devil at 84 tons (85 tonnn); 84 tons (85 lonnes) max t 942-43 order s. except Sturdy and Styrpan at 92 tons i93 tomes) Submerged endurance 120 miles it 93.12km) al 3I<.t (5,55kmlt1) Diving depth 300ft (91.44m) t 939-4 t orders, except Scotsman and Sea Devil at 350ft (106.7m); 350ft (106.7m) t 942-43 orders. excep t Sturdy and Slyglan at 300ft (91 ,44m) Armament (1939-4 1 orders) 7 x 2t -in . torped o t ubes wlt P'l13 torpeooee or t 2 mines, t x s-in . gun, t x 20mm Oerlikon (oot nneo to Sahib and Saracen), 3 x machine guns: Safari and P222 , 5 x 21·l n, torpedo tubes w ith 12 to rpedoes or 12 mines, 1 x 3· in, gun, 3 x m aChine guns: Scotsman, Scythi an and SeaDevil, 6 x 2t- ln, to rpedo tub es w ith 12 torpedoes or 12 mines, 1 x 4-in, gun, t x 20mm Oerlikon. 3 x machine guns Armament (1942--43 ord ers) 6 x 21-in. to rped o tu be s w ith t 2 torpedoes or 12 mines, t x 4-in. gun, 1 x 20mm Derlikc n, 3 x machine guns: Sturdy , Stygian and Sub tle, 7 x 21-in, tcepeo c tubes w it h 13 tor pedoes or t2 mines, 1 x 3-ln, gun, t )\ 20rnm Oerlikon. 3 x mach ine guns Let'lgth overall Ma:
_.
Com~ement
"
Furth er mod ific a tio n s we re made with twill tru nk escape a pparatus be ing fitted in th e to rped o roo m , engine room a nd afte r e nds. Earlier vessels of th e War Programm e con un ued 10 he hili" with the riveted h ull on weld ed T-ba r fra mi ng. Wilh the advent or a h ig h-qualirv steel (termed 'S q uality' ), whi ch p ossessed the necess ary quali ties fo r el ectrical weld in g, the late r Sboats we re con..rrnoed with a we lde d pressure
7
hu ll, Scotsman be ing th e first to be so co mpleted . T h e weld ing saved we igh t, en a bling the h ull thicknes s In be increased . whic h im proved the divi ng de pth to 3.j()ft (106 .7m). In reali ty. th e crush depth of the weld ed hull is th o ught to han " been around 600ft (18'2.RRm ). T h e use of all-welded p ressure hulls h ad an ad d ed be nefit. in th at th e submarines could now withsta nd a high e r leve l o f punish me nt whe-n sub me rged. The move to welded h ulls was by n o mea ns an eas y o ne hcca ll"t' o f the h i!-\h stand ard o f welding n eed ed , but its adoption was a gre at success for th e shipb u ilde rs a nd a ge n uin e lea p forward in su bmarin e construction, albei t several years behind Ocrmany Stubborn was d riven d eepe r than E',()()ft ( 152.4m) o fT Tro nd h eim ill I9·H and su rvived. a testament to th e q uality of'irs h u ll. In 1945 in the Malacca Straits, SlrrmgfxJw \\-..., 10 e nd u re one of the lo ngest dep th-charge attacks against a British subma rine. It was heavily damaged. hut survived,
In 19-t l. with fut ure o peratio ns in th e Far East in mind. th e endura nce o f th e s.cIa, .. began to be improved. By converting parts o f the m ain tan ks 10 fuel sto rage , 22 to ns (22.4 ronnes) of e xtra d iese l could he ca rried. In the riveted-h ull boats, further modificatio ns allowed for a total of 92 to ns ( !l~ tonnes) to be ca rrie d, h,--j\lug a ran ge of H.nOO m iles ( 12,H71km ) at lUkt ( IH.5 km/h). T h e ....-elded-h ull boats were m ore co mp lica ted to rework a nd h en ce to tal fuel stowage could only be in creased to 85 to ns (86 tonnes) , p;hlng a rJ.nge o f 7,500 miles (I2,070km ) at 10kt ( 18.5km / h) . Pa trols in lilt" Far East nece ssitated furt her m odifica tions d ue 10 th e heat a nd h umld iry enco untered. EXIra fresh wate r and lub rica tio n ha d 10 be carried. Also 1\\"0 freon atmosphe re control units were fitte d in place o f th e o lde r low-p res su re b lo wer. In j u lv 19·11. the ins tallation o f a n ex ternal ste rn torpedo tu be ....'as approved. T his could n o t be.' re loaded. From 1940 o nwa rds th e S-Class subm ari nes were ada p ted fo r the laying of mines via th e imoru al torpe d o tubes in a sim ilar a rrangement to th e 'l -Class. Eigh t m in es were ca rried instead o f the sp' lre to rpedoes, with four m in es be in g ca rr ied in the to rp ed o tubes. The a ll-weld ed ve...sels we re fitted with th e -l-in. su bmarin e "..u n tha t packed a greater punch tha n th e earlie r 3-in. vers io n. On these submarines. th e ste rn tu be h ad to be sac rificed in order to ma in ta in stability and to saw weigh t. Du ri ng war se rvice it was es ta blis hed th a t rhe closed b rid ge , wh ich h ad been a fea ture o f the peace time Sboae, a n d some uf the ea rlie r war b u ild s, was in fe rior 10 th e upe n b ridge . T herefore , all we re modified to th e open arran ge me n t and it was adop ted for all fu tu re co nstr uctio n. As the war p rogr essed , IK'W technologies were co n tinually inc o rporated int o ex isting bo ats. T he cram ped nat ure o f th e S-Cla'is in terior mad e the fining o f improved att ac k equip ment an d radar a difficult j ob. Bo th th e rad io room a nd con tro l room bad to be e xtensively modi fied to accnrnm odan- the latest eq u ip men t.
T H E T- C L A SS SUBMARINE
8
With the impo sitio n o f tonnage limi ta tio n s on patro l sub m arines laid down at the 193 0 Lo n d o n :'-J,wJ.l Con fe renc e , th e replacement design for the obsole te 0 -, p. a nd R
Th e success fu l HMS TOIbay in BarTY in 1945 , Note t he upwardfol ded forward hyd roplan es an d th e ab se nce of f orward ex temal torpedo doors,
HMS Tnta"' in Holy Loch i n 1943. Note thot forward-firing
external t orpedo l ube s. Truant was II s uccessfu l boat, serving in all three maj or theatres. Appropriat ely pemaps, it w as adopted by t he subma riners ' hom et own at Gosp ort.
co u ld not be expected to match that o f the 0-, p, an d R..C lass submarin es . Fu rthermore, because the 1930 co nfe rence imposed the prize rules of Wo rld War I o n su bma rine operations, the Admiralty loo ked 10 its future sub marines 10 be o perat ed as minelayers. in reconnaissance roles and as a nti-warship vessels. 111e future role of patrol submarines in the an ti-mercha nt-ship role was of sccondarv p riority. Th is pc rspc c nve had a profoun d effec t on th e way in which th e r..C1a ~ concept evolve d . The ongoing development o f be tte r anti-su bmari ne weapon ry, cou p led with the develo pm en t of Asdi c (a sonar device. n amed after the Ann-Submarine Detectio n In vcsdga uon Commiucc. who developed it) , meant that in th e a n ti-warsh ip role the sub marine wo u ld n eed to ex pe nd its to rpe d oes at grealer ra nges, lu o rd er 10 increase tb e p ossibility of a hit, th e 'l-Class came int o existe nce with le n Forward-facin g torped o tubes. Such a powerful atta ckin g- potential was un prece dented. Tilt' first T-Class subm ar-ines were ordered in 1935 . Simpl icity an d reliab ility in servi ce were give n h igh pri o rity, possibly as a res ult of wh at had been learnt durin g the d eve lopment of th e S-Clas'>. However, th e tragic sin king: of Thetis in Liverpool Bay in 19 39, in wh ic h 100 m CII d ied, poin ted to a Hum be r o f design defects wh ich , wh e n corre cted , honed th e ·1:t.1 ass su b ma ri ne into a fin e a nd reliable weapons syste m . Th e "f-Class served with gre a t di stinctio n in a ll thea tres of th e war a nd a to tal o f 53 were built. In rhe Mediterranean. where half o f the vessels d e ployed were sunk, th e h eroism d isplayed by co mmanders of the im pressive "l-boats wo n th em four Victo ria Crosses. Nam es like 1orba)', Thmshrr a n d Turbulent a rt" legendary ill th e sub m arin e service . Later, Tantalus was to make the longest British su bmarin e p atrol of th e war. 1935 d es ign (Group I)
A tot al of 15 T...(Jas..s su b ma rines were orde red before Wo rld War II: Triton in 1935 ; Thetis (later Tlllm dn voU) , Tribune; Trident an d Triu mp" in IIJ3G; Tok u. Tarpon, Thistle ; 'figlis. Triad, Truant an d Tuna in 1937; an d Talisman, Tetmch. and TorbrtJ in 1B3H.
9
SPECIFICATIONS Length overall
275 ft (83 .822rn);
Maximum width Surface displacement Submerged d isplacement Bhp engines Surface speed Bhp motors Submerged speed Range
26ft [l.92m)
Triton
277ft (84 .43 m)
1,300 Ions (1,32 1 ton nes) 1,595 tons (1,62 1 tonnes] 2 ,500 (1,863kW) , 5.25kt (28.22kmlh)
, ,450 (l ,080 kW) 9kt (16.66km/ h) 8,000 miles (12 ,8 74 km) a t l OkI (18 .5 kml h);
TOFbay a nd Trident la ter 1 1,000 m ile s (17 ,702 km) at l Oki (18 .5kmlh) Fuel Submerged endurance
Diesel 132 10ns (134 lennes); TorlJay and Trident later adapted t o 178 tons (181 tonnes) 1.5 hours at 91<1: (16.66krl'11'1), 55 hours at 2.5k.t
(4.63 km/h) Diving depth Armament
300ft (91.44m)
Com plement
56
10 x 2Hn. torpedo tubes (si x inter nal bow, t wo external bow, two ex ter nal am ids hips) with 16 torpedoes. , x 4- in. gun, 3 x machine guns; Thunderbolt and Triump h did not carry the tw o amidships to rpedo tubes ; In 1942 Taku , Thunderbolt , TigriS, Torbay , Tribun a, Trid ent, Truant and Tv na w ere mod ified to carry 1 x 21 - in. to rped o tube aft and 1 x 20 mm Oerlikon
TIle hull desig n was a welde d frame with riveted pre~"lI re hull. Saddleballast ranks sat o utside the press ure hull and all fuel wa s store d inte rn a lly. Tritknl and Torlxry were late r altered to ca~' fuel externally as we ll. increasing th eir ra nge [ 0 11,000 miles (17,'i02 km ) at lOki (18.5km / h ) . As pan of the 1938 bui ld p ro grd.m m e, TorbaJ" Talisman a nd 1ft rru h were adapted to ca rry m ines in vertical chutes fill ed thro ugh the external ballast ta nks, in a similar style to that used in the L-Class. The co nse q ue nt trials with th is desig n pr oved to be unsatis facto ry, Th e drag cause d by the c hutes re d uce d sur fa ce speed by 1.5kt (2.7 Bkm / h) . T he e mpty chutes could be b lanked when not in LL~e, but this required the submarine to be dry-d ocked . using up spa rse d ry-dock ing re so urces . The design was the re fo re abandoned and the three sub ma rines reverted ( 0 their origin al design s. However, the need for a minela vi ng capability re mained. This was solved d u ring 194 1 by th e adoption of a minelavin g svstem utilizing the inte rnal to rpedo tu bes. With two ex ternal to r pedo tubes on the bo w, the bo w wave when running o n th e sur face ~ave cause fo r co n cern , so Triumph. a nd Th underbolt we re modifie d by having- th e tu bes sh ifted 7ft (2.3-1rn) hack alo ng the uppe r casing. wh ich was also nar rowed. This modifi ca tion also assisted in im proved dep th kee pi ng a nd was adopte d by late r bu ilds during the war. As with th e S--Class, the enclosed bridge fitted to so me wa s re moved an d an open bri dge ....-as favoured, albei t with increased spray deflecti on .
HM S Tre nchant showing its aft- f ac i ng
e ~tema l
tube s
amidships an d on the st em. This su tKrnl r ln e c la imed the
10
c ru ise r A shfgara in 1945 .
An ea rfy T-elass, HMS Triumph,
luck ily escaped .......tructlon aft ef'
The fitt ing of te n forward-fa cing torpe do tubes 10 e nsu re greater success aga inst wars hi p targets was a remarkab le feat ure of th is class. Six of th e tubes were internal and co uld be reloade d. with one spare carried fo r eac h tu be. Two external tubes were situa ted o n the bow an d two amidships a t 7.5 degrees, o n set wi th the to rpedoes angle d to fire fo rwa rd. The prima ry wea kness of this design was the lack of a ste rn tu be to be used for defence whe n un de r pursuit. III 1942, the su rviving boa ts o f the pre-war programm e, Tak u. Th u ndnfult, Tigris. Torbay, 1rwu ne, Trident, Trua nt a nd Tuna, were re trofitted wi th a ste m tu be. Th ey we re a lso fitted wi th a 20m m O e rliko n gu n fo r bette r defe nce fro m air a ttack a nd we re m odified to ca rr)' m ines that were deployed through m e int ernal to rpedo ru bes. The sur face spe ed of all the 5-, T- an d If-classes in \'I'o rld Wa r II was poor in comparison to the ir Cerman co unterparts . This was in pan due to a conservative approach to ne w inno va tio ns a nd a delibe rat e stra tegy of choosing rel iability over per formanc e. TIle 0-, P- and Rclasses were faste r but proved to be too unrel iable. Ne ve rt heless, with th e construction of the T-C1ass th e Ad miralty e xperim ented .....-ith di ese l e ngines manufactured by Vickers, Ad m ir a lty pa tte rn, MA:\' a nd Sulze r. Th ree hund red and thi rty-six batter)' ce lls wcip;h inR in a t !.'>O tons ( 173 to nne s) provi ded u nderwa te r propulsion.
being mined in the North Sea in
December 1939 . It is thought to have been lost to a mine in the Mediterranean two yea... later,
1939 War Programme design (Group II) The sewn boats orde re d in 1939 funned a transitory design gro up before m e final specifica tio n fo r m e T-Cl
Com plemen t
274ft (83.52m) 26ft 7in. (8.1m) 1,327 tons (1,348 ton nes) 1,571 tons (1,596 to nnes) 2,500 (1,863 k:W) 15.25kt (28.22k:mJh) 1,450 (1,080kW) 8.75k t (16.19kmlh) 8,000 miles (12,874km/ h) at 1Okt (' 8.5kmlh) Diesel 132 tons (134 ton nes) 1.5 hours at 8J5kt (16.19k:mlh), 55 hours at 2.25kt (4.16km/h) 300ft (91.44m) 11 x 2Hn . torpedo tubes (six interna l bow, two externa l bow , two stern -po int ing external amidships, one external stern) w ith 17 torped oes or 12 mines. 1 x 4-in. gun. 3 x machine guns; Thrasher and TIl.JSty had 1 )( 20mm Oer1ikon added in 1943
61
The bo ws of this group o f submarines we re fi ned in m e same ma nner as Triumph a nd Thu n.drrboll. decr easing th e bo w wave a nd improvi ng unde rwate r: ha nd ling. Also , in o rd e r to pre ven t failure in usc , this woup had the ir exte rn al bow torpedo doors removed . T he loss of stream lin ing
11
th is ca used led to a d rop of O.25kt (0.46km / h ) in service, but this was conside re d accepta ble. T he m ost no tabl e change ill design otthc 1939 'f-Class was the in co rpo ra tion o f a viable ste r n salvo. Reversin g- th e two ami dsh ips torpe do tu bes as well as add ing- a n external tu be to th e ste rn a chieved th is, It now mea nt th at the subm a rine co uld fire a sp read o f th ree to rpedoes as it retired , wh ile maintaining the ability to tire ci gt nin one sp read fro m the bow. A m lnctayi ng capability was Inco rporat ed into all seve n boats afte r successful trials in Trusty in 19·11. T he m ines we re ca rr ied instead o r to rpedoes a nd re leased th ro ugh the to rpe do tubes. Tf llljml, Thorn an d Th rasher were fin ed wi th Su lze..-r engines, Trav eller an d 'Jruojlt'l"with Ad miralty paltern engines and TrwI)' an d 7urbulm t\\;th Vicke rs ones. 1940 War Progr amme d e sign IGroup III)
A further 3 1 l :(:la:o.s su bma rines were com pleted fro m th e 19-W specificatio n, They were Tan/urn, Tao,·-Ho, Tantalus; Jalltn,·, Taurus. Tt"/llplnr, Trrspat'tl"f, Tr uculent a nd P31 J ordered in 19·10; Truilurn, Talent (I) , Tapir, Tarn, Tasman (late r Talent [iill) , Trlnnllfhus, Ti-rlYio, 7m-apin. Thnrough, Thuli', Tiptoe, "J'i1l'1i'H. Token, Tmdennnd; Trencha nt: 7nlnlp and Tudor ordered in 1911 ; and Tabard. 'f hm noj'}'uu:" "fiJtrm. Tru ncheon a nd 1IITpin o rder ed in 1942, SPECIFICATIONS length overall Maximum w idth Surface di splacement Submerged d ispl acemen t 8 hp eng ines Surface spe ed Bhp mo tors Submerged speed Range
,,"
Submerged endurance
, ·_··ii.
Diving depth Arma ment
." ," 12
273ft (83.21m) 26ft 7in . (8.1m) 1.32 7 tons (1.348 toones) 1,57 1 tons (1.596 tan nes ) 2 ,500 (1,86J kW) 15.25kt (2B.22kmlh) 1,450 (1.0e OkW) 8.75k! (16,19kmlh) 11,000 miles (17,702km ) at lOkI (18 5km111) Diesel 230 tons (234 tOl'll'le5) max 1.5 hours at 8 75k! (16. 19k mlh). 55 houf$ at 2.25 kt (4 16km111) 300ft (91.44m) until we lded·hull bo ats. when increased to 350ft (106 .68m ) 11 x 21 - in. to rpedo t ubes (six internal bow, two external bow , t wo external ste rn-p oint ing amid ships ,on e exter nal st ern) w ith 17 tor pedo es or 12 m ines, 1 x 4-in. gun. 3 x machine gu ns Thrashe r and Trusty had 1 x 20mm OerIi kon can non added III 1943 63 {occaSlOOalty more)
HMS Trooper w as lost with all hands in OCto~ 194 3 in t he Aegea n. It w as pro ba bly mined .
with th e 22 o rdered befo re 1940, a to ta l of 53 T-C1a."s su bmarines we re co mpleted. T h is is th e la rgest n u mber o f a single class of pa trol subma ri n e (....'c r opera ted by the Royal Navy. Du rin g the constructio n o f the bo ats o rdered in 19-11. th e all-welded hull was int rod uced . Tacit ur n; Talent (iiI) , Tapi r, Tarn, Teredo; T iPIfJ' and Trump were so co m pleted, as Wt'TC all o f th e boats ordered in 1942. This in creased dhi n ~ d ep th ( 0 350ft (106.68m) . altho ugh in p ractice they co u ld go m uch d ee pe r. Fhe torped o a rra n geme n t wa s the sa me a." th e 19 39 lxJa t", bur by n ow it was re alized that e xterna l tu bes had th eir problems. To rped oes co uld n o t be se rviced and suff e red a higher th an average failure rate in usc . T he tu bes also affected th e str ea mlining o r lilt' boats. The)' we re a ban doned ill the followin g A-Cla ss, wh ich was a lre ad y bei ng d esign ed. The m ajority of the 'l-Class were fitted with th e Ad mi ra lty-pattern d iesel e n gine . whi ch had be e n se ttled upon as the optim u m d esign , a feat u re abo incorp o ra te d in to th e A-Class. A" with the s-c.lass , two freo n blowe rs were fitte d to deal with the hi gh tem pera tu res e xperie nc ed in the Far Lest. Radar also be came stan dard eq uipment. Ahho u gb la te into the wa r, th is last barch o f T-<"'l ass subma rines acco u n ted fo r six enemy submari n es and (W O cruisers . amo n g ma ny other suc cess..es, :\Iany w{'rt" still new wh en th e wa r e nde-d and we n t o n to become a ma jor pan of th e post-war su bmarine fle d . So me we re le n g th e ned ill an a tte m p t to increase th e ir ra ng e, which h ad be-e n ex posed as th ei r major limi tin g facto r in th e- Fa r East during ti lt' dosin g peri o d of till' war. T he last , TijJ{O(', was de com m ission ed in 1969.
THE U-CLASS SUBMARINE Originally in ten ded a." a n unarmed submari n e to he used to tra in crews a nd ann-submarine fo rces, the If-Class rapidly e...ol ved into a \ "(.'l'y successful subm ari n e d esign , he l)ing its small silt', low speed an d poor ra nge , The lj-Class submarine will always be as....o dar ed wit h the war in th e ' Ie d iterranean, the siege o f 'lalla a n d with th e Roya l Xa vy's mos t successful subma ri n e ca pt a in. l. t Cd r :\-1. D. W.m klr n , VC, DSa .
The c r a m p e d c o n t rol ro om Of II U-CI",!!;!!; !!;u b m " r in e, HMS Un seen ,
13
In all, 70 U-Chtss subma rines were comple ted, alth ough no t all of the m were to se rve in m e Roya l :\"avy- Th e Free Fre nch, Dutch , No rwegian. Gre ek, Danish , Polish and Russian navies we re all to operate U-Cla.'iS submarines at some time. 1936 d e s i 9 n ( G r ou p I .
The three in itial If-Class su bmarines o rde red in 1936 were Undi ne, Uni/)' and Ursula. Th ey were the onl y on es ready at the ou tbreak of the war. SPECIFICATIONS Length overal l Maxi mum width Surface displ ac emern Submerg ed displacement Bhp engines Surfac e speed Bnp mot ors Submerged speed Range Fuel Submerged endurance Diving depth Armam ent
Complement
14
19 1ft (582 2m) 16ft 1in . (4 .90 m) 630 tons (640 tonnes) 730 tons (742 ton nes) 615 (458kW) 11.25kt (20.8 2km1h) 825 (615kW) 9kt (16.66 kmlh) 3.600 mi les (6.115km) at lO kI (18.5km/h) Diesel 38 Ions (39 tco nes) 120 mi les (193 .12km} at 2kt (3.7kmlh)
200ft (60. 96 m) 6 x 21 -in. bow torpedo tubes with ten torpedoes; Ursula had six 21 - in. bow torpedo tubes with eight torpedoes (or tate- six m ines). 1 x 3- in. gun 31
Un ique am o ng the m ai n th ree classes of subma rine used by the Royal Xa,'Y in World War II. the It -Class was o f a sing le hull de sign , with all fuel an d ballast tanks held im id e the pr essure h ull. The hull was of a li ve ted constr uctio n th ro ugh o ut the war, with the U..Class never go ing over to all-welded h ulls, as the S- and T-d asses di d. In remallv. the su bm a rine ....'as divid ed by five bulkhead s an d was equippe d with fo ur hatches, two of which were fitte d with twill tr-un ks for esca pe . It was eq uipped wi th six ballast tanks and a qu ic k diving or 'Q' tank. Hyd ra ulic power was use d to open a nd dose the ballast tanks and to o perate the hydroplanes a nd ru dder. As with th e 5-C1as.<, and T-{] as.<" the higher mourned fo rwa rd hydroplan e co uld he folde d again st the h ull whe n coming alongsid e. The fitting of two external tor-pedo tubes gave this sma ll submarine a six-to rpedo spread - a big pu nch fo r its size. Howeve r, the external tubes ....'ere n ot a successfu l innovatio n. As with th e T'Class the ex te rnal tubes gave the submarine a bulbo us a ppearolnce at the bow and this ca used a large and highly visible bow wt..ave, even at periscope depth (a shallow I2ft/3.66m on lj-Class su bma ri nes) a n d also mad e th e sub ma r in e difficult to co n trol unde rwate r. O n the surface the bow was a hindrance in he avy seas. Even more ala rmingly it was difficult to prevent th e su bma rine fro m po pping to th e su rface whe n all six torpedoes were fired in a single spread , owing
The tonMtdo room of the T-e la" HMS Tribune. It was not Yet)'
spacious wt>en canying a tullload.
HMS lJnb,oke n struck two c ruisen. among o t h e r
suc cesses . It a lso turned lis g u n on sever a l largets, e .... n incl ud ing bridges.
to th e rapid loss of weigh t. Th e obvious solu tion was to remove the extern al t ubes, and th is was done o n all future boars, with the bow being a mo re strea mlined shape. Ursula ha d its bows reshaped in 1942. hut surpn smgly it re tai ned its ex ternal tu bes. TIle lack of a deck ~ un \\'.t~ rectified in Ursula with the fitting of a 3-in. gun. Two re load torp edoes ha d to be sacrificed 10 com pensate for the additional weig ht. Un ulawas later fitted to b.y mines fro m its torpedo tu bes . Undin, and Unity had already been lost by thi s time. A tru e first in I\ritish submarine design was the fining of the di eselele ctric drive I-: "'Iem for propulsion. Th is was a radical departure from the tradi tion al diesel-electric system used in all p revious boats. In es sence, the d iesel-elec tric drive system utilized the electric moto rs to rum the propellers a t all lim es. TIle diesel e ngines were only used to gen era te elec tricity for the motors and to charge the batteries. T his system offered benefits ove r the trad itional diesel-electric system because it di dn't need a series of complicated clutches ami a nti-vibration 1II001l1 ts an d da mp ers to allevia te vibration a nd to couple a nd de cou ple the engines. In wartime sc n i ce, it became clea r that someth ing was wronR wi th the de sign of th e pro pe lle rs a nd oute r hu ll - the p rope lle rs cavita ted badly and th e singing propellers we re a dange r. In la te r If-Class submarine s. the ste m was re modelled , b ut for the firsl th ree " l 'SSe!S the propellers were redes igned and th is partially quietened the source of noise. HMS Vampire at h ig h speed in 1 9. .. It was the first of the n e w V-Clas s 10 patrol from M al ta.
Vamp ire rammed ;1;$ first victi m. d isp layi ng tho aggressiv e appro ach a d o p t ed by
m any of t h e lat e r arr iv al s in t h e M edit erranean.
1 9 3 9 a n d s u bse q u e n t Wa r Em ergency d es ign (Group II ) Twelve (nearly half) o f th e submarines ord e red unde r the War Emt"rgell c)'
Program me in 1939 were C'('1 ass submarines. They were lImpirr, Una, Unbeaten, Undauntul, Union, Unique. Upholder, f.)pri~t, Urchin, Urge, lAk an d L'tmost. Nine of these sub ma rines were lost du rin!-\" the war. A further 34 If-Class subma rines were com plete r! under the 19·10 an d 1941 w ar
15
Program mes. 'I"he}' were Ultimatu m; lJltar, lJmhm , Unbending, Unbroken; Unison; United; Unriualled; Unruffled. Unruls, Unseen, Unshaken; C'l)lYJ(jT', P32, P33, P36, PJR, P3 1.), P41, ]>4 7, P48 an d P52 in 194D; an d Uniuersal, Umj mri ng, Untwf1l1i rlg. Ur/lirh/g, upstart, Usurper: Uther, vandal; H'm mgiml, l a nv ( I) , Filal it) (e x-l}nl a me({) and \ OXiIl 1941.
SPECIFICATIONS Length overall
B hp eng ines SI.M1ace speed B hp motors
191ft (58.22m) 192ft (58.52m) Undaunted, Union , Urchin and Urge ; 197ft (60.05m) Umpire, Una and (after modification) Unbea ten a nd Unique and all 1940--41 boats 16ft (4.88m) 630 tons (640 ton nes); 1940-41 boats 658 tons (669 tannes) 732 tons (744 lonr-.es); 1940-41 boats 740 Ion s (752 tonnes) 615 (458kW) 1125,,1 (20 .82 Km1h) 825 (615kW)
Ra"". """"""""""""
9kt (16 .66knv1'1) 3.800 m iles (6, 115 KW) at l Okt (18 .SKmrh); 5.000 miles (8.04 7krn) at 10kt (18-5krrvll) 1940-41 boats
F~'
Diesel 38 tons (39 lannes); 55 Io ns (56 tOl'lr'leS) max 1940-41 boats 120 miles (193 .12km) at 21ct(3.7km/h) 200ft (60 .96m) 4 x 21-io. bow to rpedo t ubes with eight torpedoes and later Six mines, 1 x 12pdr gun, 2 x (late r 3 xl machine g uns . Unbeaten and Unique later had t heir guns upg rad ed to 3i n, All boa ts ordered in 1940 and 1941 were eq uipped With th e 3 -in. gun as standard.
Maximum w ic:lttl Surface d isplacement
Submerged displac ement
Submetged eocwaoce Diving depl h Armament
Complement
1
,.
33m~
M uch had lx-cn lea rn ed fro m the G ro up I C-C....l a...s. and m odificat io ns were made: to the: \\'ar Eme rge ncy Program me orders. Of not e was the omissio n o f the externa l tu bes (altho ug h the firs t few still ret a ined a bulbous bow) and tilt" reshaping o f the bows and stern. An unpopular World Wa r l-ora 12pd r j..,11.1Il was fitted as standard, although it was la te r up gra de d to a :~i tl , g-un on l h l/;'l'alell and Un ique, and all boats o rde red in 1940 an d 194 1 wert' romplered with the larger g Ull . Also, the hydroplanes were enla rged to give bette r un derwate r handling. The 1940 a nd 194 1 boats we re: red esign ed to carry more fu el and this enh anced their ran ge , Fo rty-fo ur of th ese: submari nes we rt' built by Vickers, m ost of the m a t Barrow-in-FUII lt'SS, T he accide ntal los,~ of Vandal an d Untamed whi lst undergoing training led to --an inqui ry in to the likelihood of sabotage carried o u t by the s.. n et Se rvice . The iuquirv re port is still classified. In J uly W40, the Adm iralty ceased to hoi,'e new submarine'S individualnames, but el ecte d to n umber uwm only (as had been th e trad itio n in to the 19:!0s ). and h ence six U-Class, o ne S.Cla~~ an d one T'Class were su n k wi thout rt"<'e i'111g: a name. TIle po licy was reversed in HI42 a t till" command o f
In Februa ry 19 45 HMS Venturer became t he f ir st su bm
Winsto n Churc h ill. This gave th e Adm ira lty a problem uanung xn many bo ats begin n in g with the lette r U. It is th e-refore unders tandable th at so me o f th e la te r U-Class submari nes had some rather unique nam e s. It is u nhkelv that the Royal Naw will reu se suc h names as Upmar, Unruffled and UrtJjmringin th e futu re. Eve n when , by fo rce o f Ilt'ce ssit)', WOlds beginning with V were used. some idiosvncrauc n am es e m e rge d . Y·Clas s (Group 11I1 The final specification o f th e Ij-Clas..s a p pea red in th e War Em ergen ce Progra m m es o f 19 41-42. A further 2 1 su b m a rines we re completed to rhis d esig n . They were Upshot, Urtica; 1ngahond. l in im a , l rnfu1IT. \ 'ieorovs. l "iking, lamp,", l am ,. (i,) , l ;'ldi, Il nryard, l "irl w', ri..~ i~f/lh , \ 'it 'id, \ OT(lCiOllS, l oMry', \ ox (it), lImlml , volati le; 1'orin: and 1'1lIpi ll f'.
SPECIFICATIONS l ength ov erall Maximum width Surface displacement Subm erged d isplacement
Bhp engines Surface speed
Bhp motors Subm etg ed speed Range Fuel Submerqed endurance Diving depth
Armament Complement
205ft (62.48ft) 16ft (4.88m) 662 tons (673 tonnes) 740 tons {752 tonnes) 800 (596kW) 12.75kt (23.59knvh) 760 (566kW) 9kt (16.66km/h) 5,000 miles (8,047km) at 10kt (18.5km1h) 55 tons (56 tonnes) max 120 miles (193.12km) at 2kt (3.7km/h) 300ft (91.44m) 4 x 21-in. bow torpedo tubes with eight torpedoes and later six mines , 1 x 12pdr gun, 3 x machine guns 37 max
T hese sub m ari n es re p re se lll rhe fin a l re finement o f the If -Class concep t. H ulls we re le ngth ened fu rt h e r to re duce the still-p rese n t p rop el ler noise and fu rther to strea mli ne the bows. T h e hull frames were n ow ofa welded design, e n a nli ng a th icke r swel to h e used o n the still-ri ve ted pressure hull. An in crease in diving d ep th to 300ft (9 1A1 m ) res ulted. Ag ain, all of th ese vessel s were bu ilt by Vicke rs. Nu Vboa rs were lost d u rin g- the wa r, an d no t a ll saw act io n . H owever, \ FlI l uTf'T b eca me the firs t sub m arine in h isto ry to sin k
OTHER BRITISH SUBMARINE CLASSES A varie ty of earlier su bma rin e c lass es was ava ila ble for ac tio n in 1939 . T h e)' ra nged fro m smalle r patrol sub m ari nes to m inelay e rs an d overseas design s. Wh ile some served with greater succ ess th a n othe-rs, a combinati on o f age a nd obsolescence, coup led with th eir early deploymen t in th e da rkes t d ays o f the ....a r. mean t that m-er h a1f thosc de plo ye d were Slin k in anio n. As th e war p rogressed. Lend Lease and captured submarines b riefly served. wn h th e Roya l ~a\'r. Some of these too wert' lost in actio n .
17
H-Cla ss
Xinc o f these Wo rld War I re lics re main ed in servi ce in 19 39 . They we re: used opera tional ly in l ~Ho-- l l , d e-spite nume rous d efect';." uusrvand popula r su b m a rin e d esig n wh e n b ui lt . til t: I f-b oa ts we re somewh at ag ed by 1939 . 112S had th e di stin cti on o f being- the on ly su bm a rine to h ave m ad e war patrols in both wo rl d wa rs. Two were lOSl be fo re the remainde r were with drawn fo r tra ining ro les. L-Class
T h re e of th ese la te World War I p atrol su b ma ri nes \·..e re still in servi ce in 1939. Tbcv were used in opera tio ns in 1940 befo re bein g turned ove r fo r traini n g. Th ey were la ter se nt to Canada lo r the sa me purpose. \l O Il C we re lost in an io n.
The s.paeious (101" a su b ma ri ne) wardroom of th e larva H M S Prote us in 1941 .
N ot e the dep t h gauge.
Porpoi s e
O rde red ill 1930 , Porpoise was t he firstmi n e layer buil l spe cifically for th is task fo r the Roya l Navy. It ca rrie d 50 m in es ex te rn a lly o n its cas ing a n d coul d carry m o re inte rnally as a re pl acemen t fo r th e us ua l I z to rpedoes. It also ca rr ied a p owerfu l -I.7-in _g un. PorPfJ~ S design proved to be h ighly succ essful, making mine laying a safe r and simp le r task th an p reviously. Displaci n g over 2 ,000 tom (2,032 tonnes ) wh en submerged . it «as la rge a n d potentially cu m be rsome. Howeve r; J'QrjxJi v was pop ular with its experience..-d crew au d it led a charm ed lite in service in the Medit erranean a nd Fa r East , laying 465 m ines and sin kin g several shi ps, u ntil, in 1945, it be cam e th e last Royal Navy subm arin e sun k in actio n. Grampus-Class
" fur ther five mine laying su b ma rin es of improved Porpoise d esi gn we re bu ilt J LLst be fore hostilities bega n: u ulul/ot, Gra mpus, Narwhal, R(m'l 'w [ an d Seal: They were a good a n d co mfo rta b le d es ign a nd we re wi d e ly used d u ring th e wa r. Two we re lo st o n th ei r maid e n patrols and only Rorqlw l was 10 survive .
,•
, .
.-
The .... 1_ la ~er HM S Rorqual w as
the
onl~
one of the si. pre-wa r
minela~ers
o f its class t o su rv ive th e w ar. N o te the ope n s ler n
door t o t h e m ine compart....e n t in
18
t he u p per casing.
T he cap lll re o f Seat by the Germ an s ill HHO was a propagan da ro up for them . Re na me d L'R, the submar ine was used for tra ini ng- an d evalnatio n by th e Kriegsm a rine before ]X' ill!{ scrapped . Sm l-S commander su ffe re d th e o rdeal o f a co u rt ma rt ial on h is re nnn from captivity; bur he was exone ra te d o f a ll b lame for the loss.
0-. p. and n -etas see These ne-arly in d istingu ish able r-lasses of overseas pa trol sub ma rine were th e first su ch d esign s to emerge after Wo rld Wa r I. TI l(' su bmari nes were co nstr uc ted wi th lo ng p a trols in th e Fa r 1':a<;1 in mind an d we n.' simi lar in displacement to th e minela vere built d urin g the same time. TI le subma rines were we ll armed with eight torpedo tube.. and a -t.i· in . gun e ach, and all with a dece nt endura nce. However. in use n um erous problems em erged with th e ir overal l desig n , All suffe re d fro m lea ks a t di ving depth . Reliability problems con tin ually e merged. nOI least with th e engines. wh ich W C R' a constant so urce o f tr ouble. Several suffe red fro m lc:aking- fuel tanks. which ne eded e xpensive Tt'fitling with welded replacements. :'-Jonethek-ss, a to ta l of 18 were ready fOT se rvice in 1939. :-':0 fewer than 12 of these som ewhat nnlnc kv submarines would be sun1during- the \,-"'1' before the re m ainder were removed fro m front line service in 1942-13. River-Class The Rive r-Class represente d the only close-to -successful clesign of flee t subm a rine employed by the Ro yal Navy. The se subma rines. built 10 o pera te with the fleet un der diesel po we r, ma naged 10 reach rhe un precedented spe ed of 22kt (-to.i lL.m / h ) o n the surface. Sad ly. this co inci ded with a co nside ra ble inc rease in spee d o f th e ba nl e fleet• w ith severa l units ac hieving speeds in CX l ·CSS o f 30lt (5;").:;2km / h ). Ne vertheless, the ir h ig h speed was to p ro w a n asse t ill wartime. These subm arines were well a rm ed. with six in n-rnal bow to rp e doe s an d a -l-in. or -t.i -in" gu n . Th eir high spe ed a nd huge Glrg-o-<:ar '1i ng: capacity made th em exce llen t supply submarines, a ro le whit-It ."ln 'l'm an d Clyde playe d in the Medi terra nean. Of the p Ic-war designs, the Rive r-Class submari n es could justifiably have claimed to be the 1Il 0~ t successful in service , with only ThaHlI'I being SU li k d uring th e war. Clyde put a torpedo in to the Germa n ba ulecrutser G t/ l' i lF1UlU in 1940 and late r had a fight with thre e C-boats a t the sam e time . Severn la te r claime d th e Ita lia n subma rine Bianc hi.
The large pre,war HMS a_ley became the f irst British
s u b m ar in e t o be su n k in t he war. Tr agically, it wa s sun k
in error by HMS 7Hton.
~. l
...
~
_.
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.-- -' .....
I 19
OPERATIONS , 1939-40 Th e ' p h o n e y' w ar
The opening months o f th e wa r sa w Bri tish sub mari nes and th e ir Ge rman co u ll te rpa rts ta ke on m uc h th e same roles
Anson airc ra ft did nul POs.sc:-..s enough ra nge (0 pa trol off the :"Jon\'ay a t th is lime .
20
( 0;1-<; (
of
or p ri ma ry CO Il n.' H I \' -<1-<' th e ("lo s-sibilil}" o f 'b lu e 0 11 b lue' in cide nts between friend ly fo rce s. T his rema ined a p ro ble m ill home wate rs throughout the wa r, and Wi.IS si.H lly h ig hlig h te d on 10 September 19:\9 wln-u Triton, in its billet, albeit out o f position, enco untered a surface d submarine a nd mad e a challenge hy Ald is lam p. Th e r ep ly received was unsat isfact ory a nd Triton tired a spread o f th ree torpe does at th e n ow supposed Ll-bna t, one of whic h h it a nd sa n k Ox {ry. Co m ing: straig-h t fro m reser ve. it is u n like ly t hat Oxlf")' was p rope rly worked up a t the time o f th is inc iden t. Attacks hy the a irc raft 0 1" Coastal Co mma nd were also a major concern, with several rep o n ed in the o pe n ing m o nths o f the wa r. SeahnfSl' was.. a ttacked twice; Slninand Seall'oJi a bo re ported unwa nt ed incid ents with th e RAE Despi te th e designat io n o f submarin e exercise a reas , bomhiug-frcc a rea .. a ro und tra nsitin g submarines and the escornng o f outward-bound an d re tumiug submarines. inc idents still oc curred. T hey were p rimarily cine to poor navigation hy both sid(~ and a reluctance o n the p an o f subma rines to usc recognition nares, in case they attracted enemy aircraft. Lurk bega n to ...ving the way of the British in Xove mber when Sl u rgf'fJn became the first Brit ish sub m arine of the war to ..in k a n e ne my sh ip. On 20 September, ofT th e d e cla red German m in e fie ld 10 the west o f De n ma rk, it suc cessful ly to rpedoed the anti-submarine sh ip \'209. Two wee ks la te r, north o f the Oe rman-d od ared m ine fie ld, Salmon finally san k a U-boa t. U36 b e-ca rn e the firs t o f :\9 e ne my su b ma rines sunk o r damaged by British subma rines d urin g- the war. Dece mbe r also witucsssed Triumph's nc ar m iracu lo us escape wh en it struc k a m int" north of tile German-de clare d area. Th e bows wer e com ple tely blown on: b ut the internal torpedo doo rs held. t .egen ct has it that a rating slept in th e tore cuds th ro ugho u t the entire incide nt. Iujauua rv 1940, the lcgcndarv Vice Adm Max H orto n , KCI\, nsO''' ( the aste risk indi ca tes th a t a ba r was conferred) , to ok co m ma nd of Bri tish subma rme oper a tions. I ii.. a rriva l co in cided with the first th ree wa r losses to the C e rma ns . ,Yah()fSI' ,\~itS min ed in the Big-h t o f He hgoland, and became the first British submarine los t 10 th e e nemy during the war. Shortly the rea fte r, Cermau a nti-submarine shi ps ill the same a re a san k t 'ndine a nd 5ilfJrflSh. taking their entire cre ws pri soner. This came as a shoc k, because the Ge rman \t-·ssd.s were known not to have Asdic. The subma rines we re sunk in shall ow wate r, whe re the Cerman hydrophones were good e no ugh to d e tect th eir targets. Bot h subm arines had initially W'·t"n a"-ity th eir positions by makiTl/-t attacks. As a result, Ho rt o n ordered
Lt Cd r E. O. B ick fo rd , 0 5 0 ,
British submarine p a trols fa rt h er offshore into deeper waters, where the Gt:' rm an hydroph on es were t:'xpeCled n ot to he so t:'ll l·n in ' . T h roug hout th e 'phoney' wa r p e r iod . Iki lish sub m arines h ad cut th e-ir teeth in di fficu lt circums tan r-es an d while they h ad 110 1 ac hieved g rt' at thi ngs, th ey had p roved th a i th ey could Opt 'l
Ho rt o n fo resaw the in va sio n of Xorwa v, albei t fo r the " To nI{ reasons. IIc had plan n ed to force th e m erchant sh ipping: O UI into the oJX'n se a by la~; n g mincficlds by submari ne in coasta l waters. m ing neutra l Norway, Sweden an d Denmark. H e hOJX'd th is would enable Allied subm ari n es to interrupt the iron o re trade to Gcnnan y. still by pri ze rules. Th is action , h e concluded . would probabl y fort-e Ge ll ua n } to cltr.«.· the Skagerrak b} ~...irill g- Xo rway. So , on -1 April, Sanl'lwl laid the firs t subm a rin e-laid m inefield of th e war across the o n: trade route, wh ile the subma rine pr<-'X'IKl' in th e Skage rrak was increased. O n 8 April, most o f the German i nva sio n fle e t slipped pa« th e British sub marine Unity, on patrol o il' Ho rn s Reef in lh t' d ark. It wa s det ec ted by Coastal Co mman d. b ut b y th e tim e the H o m e Fle e t was read ied , Oerma n troo ps were 0 11 Norwegian soil . In th e k anega r, Trident and th e Po lish Or-. A did sin k two su p p ly shi ps by th e prize ru les, a lthough Tn tan missed a naval invasio n fo rce, led by llliid wT, at lo ng ra nge. A da y late r, Tltisllewa.s su nk by a If-boa t o ff Sravanger. 1100\'e\"e r, it wa s the British su b m a rines that we re In have th e m o re succ essful day. Tr uant W
The p re-war min el ayer H MS Seal b e came t h e only Bri tish su b ma r in e t o tall into German hand s, when it was mined o ff Denmark in May 1940,
T he su rvivo rs w e re interned until
1945, w hen the capt.lln and surviving o fficer lKl flered t he
. ,--,
.-----
a dded ind ig nity 01 a court
martial. The y w ere acqu itled.
21
were not de tected we rt' p O Ol surface visibi lity, coupled with excellent ra d io di rectio n find in g by shore-based elemen ts of th e Axi s. wh ich were able 10 pick up th e radio transmissio ns fro m m e su bmari nes an d p in po in t th ei r positio ns , then re lay this info rmation In th e Ge rm a n ships. Th is process had already thwa rted p re vious Allied at tem p ts to
Inte rcept valuable Ge rman su r face clem e n ts. O n 29 Apri l, Unit,V. outwa r d bou n d o n patrol. wa s ru n over and su n k by a Norwegian Freighte r shortly after It-,n i ng Blyt h: fou r were killed . A few da ys later Allied troops lx-g:a n 10 withdraw from ce n tral No rway. sig-na lling: the be gin ning of the e nd of the !\"orwl'g-ia n campaign. Coun rertng rh e in vasion of No rway cost Britain five subma rines: Thistle, Tarpon, Stertet• .Yol and Untty, O Ut ' to Ho rt o n 's fo resight tho ugh. the su b m a ri ne s h ad bee n well placed 10 re po rt th e pa ssin g o f the invasion forc e in the xaucgar. Two large wa rships were successfully a ttack ed in th e Skage r ra k a nd a moder ate ly suc cessfu l cam paign against su pply shipping had been cond ucte d . Ho we ve r, th e Royal :\Ia\')' had failed to p reve nt th e in va sio n. In reali ty, su bmarines were a ll th a t Britai n had to counte r th e invasion , bec au se th e Ho rne Flee t had e ffecti vely lost control o f the Skage rra k a nd so u th Xorwa v 10 the Luftwaffe . TIle lim ited nu mber of su b marines available a nd th e speed o f th e invasion. co u pled ....-irh the summer d aylig ht hours, e ll'iun..d tha t o nly a little o f the materiel and only " \'0 battalio ns of troops ship ped to in vade No rway were su n k b y submarine. This l a lly was still far mo re than any o ther British ann co u ld claim . If any th ing, British sub m a ri n es proved th ey co uld ope rate u n d e r Axis air co ver, whe re the flee-t co uld not . Such capabil ity was to inc rea se th eir pe rce ived importa nce as the ....-ar went o n . 011 10 \lar C.ennan)' attacked the Lo w Countries and th e for-us of the wa r moved away hu m Xorwav, Nevertheless, subm ari ne o pe ratio ns continued in tht' Korth Sea an d Skagerrak u n til AUl-.,'lm. It proved to be a w ry d ifficult lim e for Bri ush subma rin es. CIQM: patrols alo ng th e ;";orwq..n a n coast in summer were nca r impossible beca use o f the constan t daylight , Neverthe-less, UJM spotte d th e bank-cruiser GrwLwnflU a nd at a ran gl~ o f 4,000 yards (3,65 6m ) fired six to rpedoes :H it. One sco red a h it, which forced Gneisenau back into port. As the Ge rma ns now reverted to attac kin g m erchant ship ping ill the Atla ntic, e m-o uu ters with Ucboats bega n to in cre a se as they w e re seen rransitilll-:" rhroog h the Kort h Sea. No attack; mad e at this time were successful. This was fortunate fo r UJM. which miv...ed a sub m a rine with a sp read of six to rp e does - the ta rge t late-r turned oUI to be Truant: The If-boa ts we re mor e successfu l a nd the ta b les turned o n I August. whe n SJ]earji.lh was to rpedoe d by UJ,I wh ile passing a CIU~~ the North Sea. Ther e was o nly o ue su rvivor. T he hig-hest coucc ru ra rion o f I~ r i t i~h ..uhmarines in ho m e waters was
22
during th e fight fo r Norwa y, Fro m the n o n sub marines statio n ed home waters reverted to the roles of 19 39 and opera ted m a in ly su pport of the Admiralty's horne wa ters srrar egy as the war evolved.
III III
Vice Adm Sir M ax Hor1on,
050·, co m mand ed the submarine 'orce '01'" three )le an
KeB ,
0'
and ov ersaw the ~urgence the se rvic e , He w en t on t o defeat the U-boat$ as Admi ral We stern A p p roache s, T h is m o st bril lian t of le ader s ....a s also a su b m a r in e r of repute , being the fin t Britis h c om mander to .....k .. G erman nav
THE MEDITERRANEAN
An ea r ly S·Cla ss, HMS Sturgll On , st ruck th e f irst b low agai n st t he K rie-gsmarioe w h en it de-stroyed an esco rt in November 193~.
At the outbre-ak o f the war, rh e Hritisb Navy was twice as largt> as the Ital ian Xaw, a lth ou gh it had many other co m m itments. Th e British and French navies had local supcri o ri w in the western a nd easte rn 'vledite rranea n. b ut no t in the ce n tra l a rea. This situatio n exp lains wh y Britai n o p ted to send its su pply traffic aro u nd th e Cape instead o f th ro ug h th e Su ez Ca nal. T he central Mediterranean was co ntro lled hy the Italian Air Fort-e, supporte-d by its Hee l and irs subm arines. The- Ital ian str atc h'')' was focused o n m aintaining Ih is position. It gained lit tle fro m seekin g: anion because it could no t m ak e good its losses, wh ile- Britain . ill theory a t teasr, co u ld se nd in m o re fo rces fm m horne waters o r fro m th e Fa r Ea st. Fo r l ilt' Bri tish . th is stra tegic situa tio n was suited to submarines, whi ch coul d o pe rate in seas controlled hy ('T WIllYair elem e nts. British submarines wento p laya crucial rule in cumng supplies to Africa a nd fo n ing the Axis onto th e back foo t. TIle p rice paid \\~LS high . In 19..0, stra in ed Hritish rel a tio ns with Ita ly led to the tra nsfe r of t('11 su b m a rin es fro m th e Fa r East und India n O cean to Al e xa ndria , alo ng with the depot sh ip M l'dwny from Singapore. The First Submarin e Flo tilla was es ta bl ished a n d irs 12 submarines were Parthian, HUlI'n i,t, Prote1H, Pandora. Grampus. Rorqual. Odin, Orphe us. (J{y m/no , 0lU5 and th e two alread y in the Medi te rranean , Otway and Osiri s. Six , including- the two minelayers Gm mj!1ls and Rorounl, were based a t Malta. War with Italy
Ten days an e r war b roke ou t with Italy on 10 J Uli e HI40, 4,:) o ut o f ..6 o f th e Fre n ch submari n es in the eastern :\ktli tt'franean surre ndered and Britain stood virtually alo ne. Int er estingly, Pandora and Proteus were o rd ered 10 watc h the Fre n ch fleets at Algi ers a n d Oran rc specuvelv C..o n fusiou at comman d level over wh at these su b marin es were ac tuallv to d o if th ey sigh ted Fre n ch units led to Pa ndora ..inking the French sloo p Riga ull de .enouilie. The su bs eq ue nt apolo gie s seur b~ Bri ta in 10 Fran ce ri n g ho llow when th e su bseq u en t destruct ion of th e Frenc h battlc tle e t in O ra n fo ur days la te r is co nsidere d . T h e first patrols out from Alex andria were made 10 rove r the maj or Italian tle et bases. Phoenix an d Rorquol were ordered to screen a sup plv con\'oy headi ng- fo r Al exand ria fro m Malta. Phoe nix sighted the Italian bartlefle-e t a nd stll"cessfully m ade a con ract re po rt thai led to the in decisive battle of Ca lab ria . Phoenix d id not su rvive this p atrol. bei ng:Slin k on Iii J uly by anI ralian to rpedo boar a fte r m issin g it with a torpedo a tta ck.
r..
On 18 JlIly unrestricted submarine warfare \\'L" pcrmiued within 30 m iles (4 Rkm ) o f the Italia n coastline, thus a lhmi n g: attacks upon th e libyan supply route. O n 3 1 J llly Oswald was sunk hy Italian destroyers off Messina . II had made a contact report the precio us da y and had been located by rad io direction Iind ing:. A sweep at n igh t by five Italia n destr oyers loc ated the submarine o n the su rface. All bu t three o f its crew we re rescued and taken in to cap tivity, The locating of Ih is su bmarine by d irec tio n fiudiug bears simil arity to the No rwegian campaign and would lead in clue (·O Ill'M.' to a much more judicious usc of the ra dio by submarines on patr ol.
23
The de pot ~ftH
~ ip
Afl:dw ay si nk s
being torpedoed by
~
s u b m a ri n e, U372 , whil e being
transf erred to Haila from Al exandr ia in J un e 194 2 . The k>s$ 01 tho,; viU l sa un;:e 0 1 repleni$l'lment dean II t ough blow to the British su bmarine Ion;:e in too Me d ite rra nean at a c ruc ial ti me.
The loss of Uswald was the 10\\' water ma rk for the Bri tish sub marine force in the Med iterranean th ea tre. FiR' submarines had b een su nk and with tWO under repair in Malta, the number of ava ilable boats fell to just five, alt hough reinforcements fro m th e Fa r East a nd ho me wa ters we n" bei ng organ ized . •Against this. th e on ly vessels that had bee n su n k were an Italian submarine, a French sloo p and a troo pship (wh ich fell victim to a mine la id by Rorquul) . Duri ng the next five months to the e nd o f 1910, Britain lost a nother four submarines, a bleak um c for the Bri tish submarine fo rce. Altho ugh the lifting o f the pri ze rules led 10 a rist' in SUCCl'S.'WS, it only equated to nine ships sunk in th e next five mouths. This repi csemed less than 1 pl"r cen t of shi ppi ng tx-ing sen t to reinforce the Italian forc es in Libya. By compariso n , Britain lost ni ne suhmariues in th e same peri od , represen ting half of the ava ilable force. TIll' first five had falle n victim to Italian sur face forces, but afte r th is the Axis min eficlds began to ta ke a steadv toll of Allied subma rines. TIle Italia n l\a\) ', like th e ir Germa n r o uurerparts in the Xonh Sea , did n o t han- Asdic, but possessed only hydro phones. Their success in ,~ i nki ll V; five submarines is in Il O small measure d ue to th e silt: of fb e British submarines a nd th e lack of realistic war tra ining in th e Fa r East bases. from whe re they had been transferred. Undoubtedly, ac cu ra te p in point ing of sub marin e loc a tions by ra di o di rectio n finding had made np fu r th e absence o f Asdic. Th e pe r forma nce British submari ne s agai Il ,~t Ita ly in 19·10 can o n ly he conside re d to have been Ia r<,{e1y unsuccessful. Disa ppointingly. the cha nces to atta ck heal)' Italia n warshi ps had not be-en ta ke n . Losses were h igh and succ esses few, Su pply ch annel s to Greece an d Africa were largel y untouched. In miti gat ion . it sho uld be po inted o u t tha t no other arm achieved even th is level o f sill kings at rhe time. T he first few months of 194 1 saw fo rtun es begi n to cha nge fo r the British. Ten new C-ChLs..~ submari nes arrived and wert- based al Malta. This coin cided with the arrival of Cdr G. W, G. 'Shrimp ' Simpson to ra ke co mma nd or submarine ope ration s from the island. T he larg:e r submarines still survivin g were sent ( 0 o pe rate from Alexand ria and thc v received a minelayer and th re e Tbo ats as reinforcements. TI lt' Malta-based C-CIa...s sub mari nes were IN,'d pri mari ly to patrol the Tunisian coast. Pa trols, also covered the Messina Straits and 10 n i,1Il Sea. In Feb r ua ry; the newlyarrived qJrighlmad e its p reosl: tlCe felt by ca rrying Oil! a n ight sur face att ack o n the Italian cruiser Armando Diaz. wh ich sank after be ing struck by out" to rp edo. This W,LS the m ost spectacular SU Cf l.-'S.S so ta r ach ic...e-d by the British submarine fo rce ill the Meditern•m ean. In lhe
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24
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D: GROUP III DESIGN, T-CLASS SUBMARINE OF 1944
1 Rudder 2 Aux iliary tank 3 Aft er hydro plane
17 Radar office 18 Conn ing to wer
4 Stabilizing fin and hydroplane guard
19 20mm Oerli kon
5 Steeri ng gear
20 tcoc out platforms
6 Torpedo tube
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
7 Torpedo davit 8 Stokers' mess 9 5th watertight bulkhead 10 Engine exhaust trun k 11 M F OF coi l
12 Jum pin g wire 13 To rpedo tu bes 14 Asdic type 138 B 15 4t h watertight bul khead
D
16 Watertig ht office
Type 268W SW ADF 7.S-in. low power periscope
9.S-in. high power p eriscope Type 291W AW RDF Voice pipe to bridge Main WT aerial 4-in . Mk XII gun Ward room Passage Main ta nk
31 Jumpi ng wire
45 Fresh water tank
32 Torpedo derric k
4. Batteries
33 Seamen's mess 34 w.e. 35 2nd watertight bulkhead
47 Bunks and loc kers 48 Cold cupboa rd 4' Magazine 50 aro w atert ight bu lkhe ad 51 Command ing off icer's cab in 52 Batte ries 53 Oil fuel tanks 54 Main tank no. G 55 Main engines 5. Main motors 57 Hyd ropla ne gear 58 Obstruction w ire
3. Torpedo loadi ng hatc h 37 Torpedo sto wage co mpartm ent (5 Iorpedoes) 38 1 st w at ert ight b ulkhead 3. Fore hydroplane (turned in) 40 To rpedo lubes 41 Obstruct ion rod 42 Asd ic type 129 43 Oil fuel tanks
44 Bilge pum p
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The hole In H M S Thra she-r'$
conning- towe r was ca .... sed by a bomb tha t failed t o detonate (a nothe r wa s fo u n d in the c asi ng ). Their removal b y
Lt P. W. S . Ro b erts and
PO T. W. Go u ld won t he pair Vic t o ri a C ro s s e s.
sam e mon th . th e British gon~ rn rne n t e-xpanded the sink-on-sig h t zone so th a t it be came possib le to 0IX-Tate agai m,t th e entire libyan su pply ro ut e . An othe r n otable SlI CCl-"SS cam e at th e end of Marc h when the ever-re lia ble Rortpml sank th e Italian submarine Coppom; wi th a d ou b le hit from five to rped oes fired . In th e previ ous five da ys. it had additionally su n k two frei ghters and successfullv laid a minefield in which another sh ip had been destroyed. P3J also ca rried om an atta ck d u rin g the month, which is re markable because the sea was so calm that the p e risco pe co uld not be used safely. The re fo re , using Asctie alone, P31 d osed. it" ta rge t to ROO yards (73 I m) and h it with all fo ur to rpedoes, sinking the f),OUO-tOIl (f' ,fh'lO tonne) fre igh te r. This is an almos t u n ique L"\ 'CIll a nd won LtJ. B. d e B. Ke rsh aw the DSO. O n 2f, April Upholder; und er th e co m mand of Lt Cdr wanklyn , sa n k a S,400-ton (5.486-ton n c ) fr ei ghter o rr Tu n isia. Two mo rc were su n k on I May, ad d ing 9 ,300 ton s (9,44 9 ronnes) to Upholder's to n n age tally. T h is was the b eginning of a succ essfu l run of sinkin g" by what beca me Brita in 's most successful subm arine o f the wa r. To su m ma rize , in the first six mo nt h " of 19--11 . only two British su bma rines were lost. bo th [ 0 m in es. B~' co n tra st. th e Italian s lost aro u n d IW ,OOO l O llS (132 ,080 t OUlR 'S ) o f shi pping. The rate o f sin king o n the Africa n sup ply ro ute was low, however, with fewer th an two sh ips a mo nt h being sun k - the Afrika Ko rps "'.., SIlCc('~<;fully transported to Africa (hi rin g this time . Less tha n 5 per ccut o f this sh ip pi ng was su n k by submarine. Cermanv's a ttack o n [he 50\1l-t Union in June 1941 chan ged th e stra tegic balance in th e central zone. With th e Luftwaffe larg ely ~(J IU" the Allies were able to build up thei r .. ir stren gth in \ Iaha and to bring surface forces into the ce n tra l Me d iterr anean. Xeve rrh e less, Ro m mel rec a pt u red Cyrenaica a n d th e supply rou te lx-twee n Ita ly and Beng hazi opene d , This r oute received th e a tte nt io n o f British su b marines, as d id Tri poli. th e Tyrrhe ni a n Sea a nd th e Aege an. Pat rols were backed up by m uc-h-im proved in telligence d il l " to th e re ad ing o f th e Italia n naval cipher an d th e d eCIJ'Pl io n of En igma sigll als being achieved in as litt le as a few days. Cauti on was take n n o t to give away th e true extent of th e intelligence b reakthrough an d ai rcra ft were always sta tio n ed over ent"llIY con n >y" before: the subma rin es arrived . In this way, it made eac h int erccpuou look as if air reconnaissa n r -e had d e tected th e con voys. A notable in tell ige nce- led suc cess involve d the "ink ing o f th e 11,40(}·to n ( 11,582-10 IllW) tro op shi p l-s perio: by Uniq ue off Tripoli in AUg"ust. 111e size and COU ThC o f (h e C()llYo y , be ing: mustere d fo r a n m to Tripol i, wa s discove red by int ellige n ce wo rk an d severa l subm a rin es we re dive rted to in tercept it. Th e convovwas well protected by aircraft and escorts a nd it was with conside rable skill th a t Vll UPH'\\~ able to acq ui re a firing position . Two esc orts actually pas..sed rig h t over the subm a ri ne d u ri ng the att ack. The battles of Malta and the convoys O n I September 1941 , th e ~I a lt a su b m ari n es wc rc organi zed in to th e ir o wn com m an d , n amed th e Tenth Flo tilla . under th e newly promot ed
Ca pt Simpson . The Te nth Flot illa wa s to beco m e th e most fam o us in the
33
34
h istory o f British sub marines. It is so beri n g lO co ns id e r th at it suffered th e h ig-lH:st rate of lo sses. T h e successes of the leg endary ' Figh Ling Te n th' we re in no sma ll pan d o wn to th e e xce lle nt wo rk of ..h e in telligence ann , which again d iscovered the sa iling time, co m positio n and rou te of an o th e r importa nt COll\u y in Septem ber, After confirma tion of th e departure ha d be e n received by a ir, Simpson sta tio n ed Uplwld" , Upright. Un1JffI.(nl a nd Ursula across th e likely track o f the (Oll\u y. It co n tained th ree la rge troo pships. Oceania; Sepl ullw a nd \ 'u/.c(m ia, pa cked with sold iers, a nd wa s escorted by six d estroyers. Unbrolm fo u nd the eOll\u~' a nd mad e- a coruact report, be fo re fol1 O\~i ng the eon\'o~' in a n attemp t to close ra nge . Uphoidh wa s beuer situa ted and with a torpedo each fro m a full sp rea d o f four. h it the overlap p ing O( I'(I1I;a and S rpl ll ll in, the lauer sh ip sin king at once wh ile the othe r sto pped. t iplwldn' reloaded an d finished off OOXl1Iia jmt be fo re Unbf'alm arrived to do th e same jo b. \ ulmnia was m i<;.<;e well . Im porta n tly, in Dece m be r the new battleship \ 'jUo";a \I'l/el0 was damaged by £.!rgf. The a ttack wa s carried o ut a t the ra nge of 3.000 yards (3 .048m) by four torpe does . one of which hit under the forwa rd turre t, puuing Ihi" new a nd most da ngero us shi p our o f action fo r over th re e mon ths . In the se-cond six mo n ths o f 1941, Britain lo st six submarines . Four were m ined a nd two sun k hy a n n-su bma ri n e shi ps a fte r revealing their po sitio ns by ma king-attacks. l Ioweve r. during th is time 13 n ew submari nes had a rrived in the .\lcd itemm ea n, b rin ging the ove ra ll net stre n gt h 10 2R. TIIC second ha lf o f 194 1 had be e n suc cessful for th e Brit ish subma rin e forc e . It had mort' th an compensated for its slow start a nd h ad clearly demo ns trated that it was an efficient means of cn u ing off su pp lies 10 the Axis ill Africa . TI le Mediterranean was to contin ue to u tilize the m,YOI; ty of the new submarines availabl e to th e British. For th e Axis a rmy in Korth Afri ca to perfo rm at its optimal level, it Heed ed a ro und ;')0 ,000 tons (:,)O,ROO tonnes ) o f supplies pe r month . By th e mi ddle o f 19·11, the Allies had seriously co m p ro m ised its sn p ply chain . The Ocrmans beg-an to react to th e loss o f su p plie s to Africa in la w 1941. III September, the first of th e U-boats arrived in th e Mediterranean . T h eil' im pact was immediate and d eci sive . In Xovcmbcr Ark HI.l)'a {, th e ollly Allied ai rc raft ca rrier in th e Me d iterranean . was su n k. The Axis light -back in th e Mediterranean re ach ed its peak in 19 ·12 an d it b e-came tlw pivotal yea r of th e war in this theatre. Italia n an ti-subm arine forces lx-g au re cei ving- Ccrmau sonar sets ill Feb ruary a n d sta rted a rapid co nstr u ctio n p rog:ra n ll ne o f anti-subma rine cOI-venes. Ge rm an l';"boalS were sh ip pe d ove rland for o pera tions ill the Medi te rran ean . T he [ · boa ts appea re d in Fe bruary and ra pidly laid over :,on mines a ro und the island . n il" effec t o f th is, combin ed \\1Ih Luftwaffe h ea vy hom h ing o n th e Allies' only base o f o pera tions in th e ce n tral vredlre rran e an . was ca tastrop h ic. B~ )'larch th e air fo rce based in Mal ta had b e-e n crushed . th ree sub ma ri n es h ad be e n d a maged and the cruisers a n d d esrrow rs had bee-n with d rawn.
The Royal N;wy's m()$t successfu l sub.....rine com ma nder, M . D. Wanklyn, v e , 050 lcentrel. with so m e of the c:rew 01 HM S Upholder. Wanklyn 's de",th at the height 01 the MeditelTa n ee n submarine ca mP
HM S Upholder (left) and lkge (rig ht) in Moolta. I"ot e the f ,n .,. bow of Urge , ;I m odific: .. t ion in "'ter c onst ructi Dn b;osed o n wa rtime e;o:perienee. Bo t h 0'
these subm.ari nes w ere lost.
Howeve r, till" British submari n es p u t up a brave figh t a t sea. Oil 5 J anuary 1 9~ ::! Upholder was in actio n again . On thi s o(Ta~ i on , with its last to rped o il clai med th e Ita lian sub mari n e St. Bon. Re markably th is sh ot \'~.J.S fired by eye only at th e o n ru sh ing: submarine as it o pe ned fire with its d ec k gUll. Axis submari ne I.:illing co ntinued on the l ::!th when Unbeaten sank U374 so ut h-east o f Mes sina with t W O hi ts fro m a fu ll sp read o f fo ur torped oes. TI ICS(." successes, pl us six other vessels su n k an d d a maged, we re te m pered by th e loss o f Triumph to a m ine o ff Ath e ns so me timl' after th e 9th . It \,111 be re me mbere d th at 0 11 23 Dece m be r 19 39 it had struck a mine in the North Sea a nd m iracu lously (fo r a su b marine) su rvived and returned to base . In Fe b ruary, lJpluw u n ..-as res ponsib le for two of th e six su p ply sh ips sun k that m o n th . Alarmin gly, h owever, the Oerman-manufacrured A~dic sets began to make their appearance at sea. T h ey we re respo nsib le for the destruc tion o f two British su b ma ri n es. 'Ille Asdi c-cquippcd Italia n torpedo boat Circe h ad been involved in both th ese siuki n gs, boding badly fo r Allied sub mari nes in th e fut u re . In xt ar ch . British submari nes achieved mo re no tab le .sll CCl'S."CS . Of note ','as Torlmi s, penetratio n o f th e anchorage at Co rfu. whe re for 20 ho urs it hun ted for targets and san k a S,()()()..\on (5,OBl.>-to n n e ) fre igh ter, In th e same mo nth , Upholder"..a s successful aga in , ~i n l;i ng its second sub marin e in th ree months wh en Tncheco was hi t o ff Brin d isi by two o ut of four to rpedoes fired, :\ major success was ac hi eved by Urgr at the beg in n ing o f Ap ril, wh en it hit the cru iser Bande X ere" i th two to rped o es from lo ng ra nge , ca using it to sink , Ho weve r; this suc cess was tem pe-red by the 10s,3 o f Upholdtro n its 2[lIb pa trol. It was d e tected subme rged by a nying bo a t covering a co n voy o ff T ripo li and d e p th charge-d by the esc ort Pt'guso, T h is was a foul b low to th e Ten th Flo tilla a n d the Ro yal :\la\'y in ge n e ra l, co ming a t a mo st d ifficu lt time , It was th e Ecboat-laid mincfic lds an d the gradual e ro sio n o f the isla nd's ai r d efenc es that p roved to be the d ecid in g facto rs . \Vith all o f The min eswe epe rs sunk, th e islan d had 10 be aban d o n ed as a bas e of o pe ra tio ns in Ap ril, wit h two sub m ari n es mi lled as they withdrew, U rf,'f! was su nk o n 27 Ap ril. It h ad j ust be en respons ib le fo r th e sin king of a r-ruise r a n d had been a su ccessful boat. Olymplls was sunk o n H May. Una "~AS th e last to leave . Overall su b ma rin e str e n g th fe ll in Ap ril to only 12 bOalS, eve n th o ugh 11 new It-Class su b marines arrived from h o me waters. Olde r boa ts h ad to be refined in Britain an d th re e submari nes o f th e Du tch force ba sed at Gib ralta r we re se nt to tbe Fa r EaM. Never theless Bri tish su b marines still manage d to sin k 117,000 to ns (11 8,872 to n n es) o f shippi ng, th e Bande NI'r(" a d es troye r a n d six submari ne s. T h e tru e p ict u re , though, was th a t th e depleted su b ma rine fo rce o n ly ma n ag ed to p reven t arou n d 6 pe r ce nt o f th e Africa KOlP S' su p plies fro m rea ch in g them, T h is was much h igher rh a n th e ach ieve me n ts o f air o r sur face fo rce s. fo r wh ich th e lo ss of Ma lta was more se rious. La rge r su bma ri nes we re still being used to co nvey d e speratel y needed su p plies 10 Malta .
35
With the Mediterranean baulefleet o u t of act io n , the suppl y co nvoys to Malta n eeded advan ce n o tice of any in cu rsion by the Itali an ma in flee t, so submarin es we re po sted o utside th e Italia n Navy's main anchorages. In March , this stra tegy worked when P36 wa rned tha t the Itali an b anleflee t ha d se t out from Taranto a nd g<we th e first ind icatio n of iL<; move ments be fo re th e ba ttle of Sirre . In J u ne , a Ik itish convoy a tte m p te d to fo rce its wa y to Ma lta fro m Gibralta r; Nine Hrui sh su b ma rines (n ea rly a ll those availa ble ) scree ne d its north flan k. Disappoin tingly, when the Ital ia n banl eflee r was sigh ted by P35, its a rrac k misse d. p rima rily beca u se th e lin e o f ships vee re d o ff co u rse sh a rp ly d ue to a ir a ttac k at th e c rucial mome n t. La te r, P35 h ad succ ess, lin ish ing nff the da m aged c rui se r Trento, but t he C OIl\"O)" had n o option bUI to TUm away a nd stea m har k to G ibralta r. C -ooats a im re main ed a menace at t h is time . sin kin g two British cru i.se rs, Naiad a nd Herm io ne: From July, th e ir attentions we re focused on d i.s m p ti ng th e vlalra su p p ly lin e . lWlie\i ng Malta h ad been d es tro yed as a base- of o perations, a n d de,id ing against invasion , rhe Luftwaffe retur ned to Ru ssia in \ lay, h aling pulverized the b land fo r live months. This p roved a der-isjve m o ment. Malta W; L'i far frum Finished a nd by J llly, wit h ai rcraft llyin g off aircraft carri e rs, its a ir force had become strong enou gh 10 be at o ff a n a rra ck by the remaining Axis aircraft. The vic tory ga\"e th e Allies rhe co nfide nce th ey needed to re-es tablish su b mari n e o perations from rh e island. \\l lh n ew su b marin es corning online and others re turni n g fro m re fit. Allied submarine strengt h had passed its low p o int o f th e yea r and by J u ly had reac he-d 23 opera tiona l su bmari n es. T h e n u m be rs inc reased further la ter in the ~'l'ar a n d th e Gibralta r Flo tilla was SOO Il operalill~ its OWII submarin es. TI le eastern base was re-esta bl ish e d in the o ld Fre n ch submari ne b ase a t Beirut. So. in as little as t h re e mon ths afrc r the Te nth Flo tilla had bee n fo rced from its h ome in Malta. British submarines W( 'fC ag-ain resurg e nt. Allied torpedo bo m b ers were also a rrivin g: in increasing numbers and began to deple te th e Axis su p p ly c onvo~"S to Africa . In Aug ust, a major ( OIIVo y move me n t to Malt a , O peratio n Pedestal; W;lS lau n ch ed . Eigh t British submarines prot ec ted this vel)' important co nvoy. p.J2 m anaged to a ttack an d damage the cruisers Balzano an d /i llm aoin. puu ing them permanently out of th e war. They were, in fact. re tiri n g: for lack of air sup po rt. \ Vith th e Italian b aulcflcct m oored u p d ue to lack of fuel, th e attack Oil O peration Pedestal wa s carried out by Ax is sub mari nes, whi ch took a h eavy lo ll of tile co nvoy. sin king or da m agin g several fre igh te rs , a tan h']' and thre-e cruisers, and dcstroving the airc raft ca r rie r l~ag!R. While I'n li's/a ( to ok up m uch of the availa ble submarine force , so me we re ab le to su p p o rt th e air attacks on th e Nor th Afric a COll\uys and ill AugllSt suc ce sses ro se sh a rply with British su b marines sin kin g: t·igh t ship s. compare d to one ill J uly. By Septe m be r. the su b mari n es were b ack ill force on the ("o nvoy la ne s and their sh are of sin kiugs (a noth er six shi ps ) o utstrip pe d th ose o f the }{,\ E
36
Op era tion To rc h to Op eration Husky Bri tish su bmari n es heg-.tn pre pa ring fo r Ope ra tio n Torch, th e Amer i can la n d in gs in Xo rt h Africa . in O cto ber 19-1:2, yet st ill they sa n k 12 sh ips a n d a dcsrrocer. In th e months from J u ly. ho....'ever; th ey had suffe red o nly two losses .
It Cdr A. e . e . M iers, v e . In eomm and of HM S TortJay, he ~ 2 0 hou rs In Corfu harbour Onelud ing a rec h a rge) and c lai m ed two s h ips. For th is feat and his overall aggressive pet10rmance hoe ....on the Victoria e~S.
In recent ~ars he h as beco m e a controversi
II A. C . G . Ma rs (left) In HMS Un bn>l<e n 's <;<>ntrol room
in 1943. His attack on the ltal... n c ru isers AttendoJ o and BolUtno.
in which bo t h w e re da ma ged , is no teworthy. Mars became a pmI if"1C w rite<' a fte<' the war,
Mon tgo me ry retook Cyrenaica ill :-.Jo\'f: m lx·r, wh ile th e Americans mad e th eir 'lim'}, landings in Mo rocco on 8 November, whic h were CO\{' J('
37
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Sicily to th e end of th e war in the Mediterranean Wilh th e d estruction o f th e Axis in North Africa, th e Mediterranean central zone fell int o to tal Allied control fo r th e first tim e in the wa r. Convoys co uld n ow he rou ted th rou gh th e Suez Canal. easin g the sup p ly chain to the Far E.a.~L Th i... e nabled the subma rine force in the Medi terranean to prepare fo r O pe ra tio n 11r'-Ik)', [he inva sion o f Sicily. With [he Axis in full retrea t at sea, the subma rines co uld fulfil a valuable strategic role as th eir p rimal')' task, wh ile still a ttac king sh ip p ing.
38
' _ "__
On 10 J uly 1 9 "'~ , the la rge"1 amphibious o pe ratio n unde rta ken up 10 that da le wac; lau nched u pon Sicily. Th e maj o rity o f the combined Allied su bma rine force sup ported the landing>. The ro le o f submarin es in this operation took several guises. O ne , wh ich h ad be en go ing on fo r severa l weeks p reced ing the land ings, was the reco n n aissan ce a nd survey o f me landi ng area . This oft e n involved not only su r vey by periscope. but abo m e landing o f e nginee rs to test th e softn ess o f sand , g rad ient o f be ac h, location of obstacles e tc. A" ....-ith Operatio n Tmrh, th e su bma rines we re ad d itionally used as beacons TO guide the landing craft to the rig ht beach objectives. Suc h was rh c d o m in atio n o f th e sea by Allie d su b ma rines at th is lime , th a t th ey no t o n ly accomplished th e tasks re q u ired fo r Hu~ky, bu t th ey also in creased the rate of . .in kings o f Axis sh ip p ing , In J u ly th ree Ital ian subm arines we re su nk, along with so me smaller naval cra ft and seve n m erchant sh ips. After th e capture of Sicily, lhe British su b mar ine presence in th e Medi terr a ne a n went into decli ne . Pla ns were alread y afo ot to transfer SUIne of the for t-e to rhe Fa r East. In July, eight su bmarines were so moved . When Italy surrende re d in Se p te mber, th e Algiers Flo tilla was sent to th e Far East. T hi s le ft two small Fl otillas of subm a rines 10 m o p u p the re main ing Axis sh ip p in g off France a n d in the Aegean. Fro m Opcrauou /lusk} until th e e nd of 1943, five British su b mari nes were su n k. T h e sub mari ne campaign in the Mediterran ean effec uvelv e nded ill Oc tober 19 -14 . During the late r- phase, the su b marines th at took pall WtTC fo r th e most p art n ewer (0 th e M editerranean a nd were co mmanded by m o r t.' recently co m missio n ed officers. T h ey proved n uh lesslv successful ill o pe ration , sin kin g a r le ast 53 .000 to ns (53,8--1-8 to n nes) ofAxis sh ip p ing and severa l sma lle r nava l vessels. Mo reover; they subj ected man y shore-based ta rge ts to th e dec k h'1.lll. This level o f suc cess came at th e 10 <;.5 o r o n ly o ne submarine - Sirkln>{"a... mined off ljvadia Islan d in th e G re ek Isles in June .
In J anuary 1943. HM S Un ited ~
pa ;cj for sinking the by be ing
~tl'O)'ff 80mbardieri
hunted for 36 ho urs. Ne ar t o sul'foeat ion. many of the c rew _ slc k when the hatch was
f inall t opened t o fresh ai r.
Loo king at the Medite rra nea n cam paign owrull. some interesting points co me to light. T he Allies lost 49 submarines , of which aro und 2:{ were lost to surface forces, 21 to mines an d one to a submarine . Aircraft. sank possibly o ne a t sea, and destroyed three in ha rbo ur at Malta. Loss sta tistics rem ain fluid , because so few of the wrecks h ~ln_' been fo un d and large portio ns of the Axis a nti-sub marine rcconls a pJX'ar inacc ura te or simply do not e xist. Post-war rese a rch has added gr cawr accuracy to some 10000es, especia lly whe re details of th e loc a tions of mineficlds have co me to lig-hl, bu t the possibility of submarine accidents and unrepor ted events ca n no t be ru led out. Xecenheless. some broad co nclusions can be drawn. 111e Axis is thought to have laid aro und 55,000 m in es in the Mediterranean . The successes a g-.l.in st Allied submarines by this effort m ade it certainly wo rt hwh ile. It compan's \ '('11' favo urabl y with Allied m in ing stat istics in home wate rs. An } co mparison sho uld be trea ted with ca ution, ho....'eve r; because th ere was compara tively littl e Axis subm a rine activi ty around British sho r es until late 19-14 . T he Italia n surface forces claimed around 23 Allied subma rines. Ea rle o n , som e we re caught on the su rface. H yd rophone-eq uipped escort" sank ei ght, but the majority were hunted to d estru ctio n using Asdic and de pth charge-s, with which the Italians became mo re ex pert as the war pro gressed. Germa n uni ts ah lv ass isted th e m la te r. Wh ile Allied su bmarine" sa nk 19 Axis submarines . th e :\xi" U-boats san k only o ne Allied submarine. All of th e Axis subma rines Slink were to rped oed while n mning o n th e surface, mostly in daylig ht. Th e way in whic h British subma rines were opera ted in th is theatre e xplain s wh~' the losses were <;0 different. British subma rine str.l.tCj...'y and tactics in the .\-Ie d iterra nea n had some fairly u nique fea tu res. The ('nem>, W
Aft er t ran sl lNTi ng f rom th e Med iterranean, HM S Toturu s made a n immediate I m pa ct in the Far East b y sln klng a .Japane se subm ari n e. Brillsh
s Ubma rines g rew In s tr eng t h a nd confidence from this p oint on .
3
da ngerous. axsubmarines co uld be spotted fro m th e air even whe n submerged. So a ' porpoising' stra tegy was said to ha ve been developed. whe reby e\'ery q uarte r of a n hour th e sub ma rine ca me up fo r a n all-round \1eW (especially for ai rcraft) through the perisco pe before sub mcn..,>iUl-{ into the depth s aga in . British submari nes in the .\lcd itnrdllcan were initially pa inted dark blue to camouflage the m when submerged. Th is had a bad side effec t >- they were more visible at nigh t. TIle British tactics worked bec ause the d istances fro m ba se to patrol a rea we re relauvelv sho rt and choke poin ts a lo ng shipping lan es rclauvclv co mmon, Hence ove r two-thirds of a ttacks ca rri ed out by British submarines were in dayligh t wh ile submerged. It was a n unconven tional. hut a win ning, SlrdlCl-,'Y. For th ree years, th e Mediterranea n was the mos t important a nd biggesl theatre o f British subma rine o pera tion s. J list o ver 100 British submari nes were sent there and 24 subma rin es of o ther Al lied na tions sup ported th e m . Although ai rcraft e nded lip sinking m ore of the Italy- No rth Africa supply shi ps towards the end of th e campaign, they did this when Malta W;Ls sec ured. I t was the submari nes that conun uallv harassed shipping throughout the cam paign ; h e n ce , by its e nd. Bri tish and Allied submari nes had sunk around h alf o f th e Axis lo"'''t'~ in the Me di rerrancau. Th is fij.,'l.lre co u ld have been higher if submari nes had no t been diverted fro m th e main stra tegy to deliver supplies and carry o ut clan desti ne operations.
THE FAR EAST Outbreak of war with Jap an to 1943
British subma rines h ad been statio ned in the Far LaMduring the inte r-war yean; as a coun termeasure to possible Japanese aggression against British in terests in the regio n . After th e 1922 Naval Agreemen t, neither the United Stat es no r Bri tain had e nough ca pital ships (0 station a squadron nearby, sn su b ma rines and ligh ter fo rces ha d to suffice. TIle e nti re British submarine presence in the Fa r E.L... t had bee n withdrawn by,lilly 1940. T his iro nically coin cided wi th a co oling o f d ip lomatic relatio ns wi th J apan. Wh ile Britain was able 10 rein fo rce its defe nces in some a reas with troops fro m India and Australia. there was no t any rea listic possibili ty of sending' (lilt any submarin es because of the heavy dem and o n th e m ill th e ho me wate rs a nd the Medi terranean. Unti l late 1 94~{, Britain's submarin e presence in the region W'LS IlCl.{ligihIe, wi th on ly Tru an t, Tn ut)' and Tridnlt making brief appca nul(:es. The F ar Ea st in 1943 to March 1945
40
In Aug us t 19043, th e Ad miralty had sent Five su bma rines to the Fa r List. TIl e lirst, Tnllp/ar, arrived in Colo m bo in la te September, followe d hy Tactician, Taurus.. Ta/(r HQ and T I'I'Spa.H f'T. AAama1/1 also re turned and e-in -C Easte rn Fle e t mo ve d to Co lo mbo as well, fonnlng the Fo u rt h Flo tilla. Finall y, a genuin e and hs ti ll ~ prese nce by the British submarine service hMI been established . The m aj or a rea of o peratio ns fo r th e Fourt h Floti lla remained rbe Malacca Straus. Reconnaissance \ \ -.1-S o f key im portan ce, as was th e
The succ essful T-C LHs HMS Tu rbule n f WiIO$ lost with a U
h ands in Ma rc h 1943, the dead incl uding it s famous com mande r J , W. ' Tu b by ' Unloro, VC. Nole the a n-pointing e Jden>a1 tube behind the c onni ng t ower,
Lt Cd r L. W. A . Be n n in g t on, OS O·, esc (t he asteris k in dicates th ai a bar was c onf er r ed), ac h ie ve d not ab le s ucc e sses in com mand o f HMS
Porpoise and Talty - Ho . Hi s final acco unt l ist ed a li ght c ruiser, a destroyer an d a U-boat alongside over 20 ,000 tons 120.320 t onnesl o f obis sh ippin g.
H M S Talty-Ho bears too scars o f a scra l>6 with a Japar>ese
torpedo boa t . It had already sunk t he light c r u i....r Ku ma by th is t ime and w a s On e of the le a ding su b m ari n e s in the
F". E",t ca m p aign .
in te rdiction of supply shipping to Burma. Pa trols were abo to take place 011 Pena ug . beca use apart fro m the J ap.anese su bmari n e>, If-boats ha d be gun to menace the area. T he first success 0 11 patrol fell to Tally-flo, which sank a small tan kc-r in November, ahhough defecti ve to rpedoes dogged this patrol. Howeve r, the majo r SllCCe>S of this period went to Ta urus; wh ich sank th e large Japa n ese subm ari ne /34 outside Penang in November and late r fou gh t a gun d ud wid I a sub-chase r before be ing force-d to dive by a ircraft. By the e nd of 19 43, British subma rines had made th eir mark ill the Far East a nd began to set tip a permanent presenc e off the en em y's coast. Ina usp icio us i t m ay h ave been , but it was far m o rt' success fu l th an an ything- tha t had go ne before. Byj an uary 1944, th e Easte rn Hee l had be en rebuilt around three heavy warships and two aircraft ca rrie rs and th e fo rce ha d m oved, with the Fo urth Flotilla, to T rin r om alee. The depo t ship M aidstonewas on its way, along wi th six mo re sub marin es: 'slaaellengr, Tr uculent. Sea Rouer, SUif. Tlll1tiry' and SlrJn1l. TI It~ rt~a r gO!off to a ve ry good stan . O n l ljanuary, TnJl;rl l o W"IS patrolling ofT Pe nang whe n it came ac ross the light cruise r Ku ma; esco rted by a des troyer. Tali)'-Ho, whic h was comm anded by o ne of the bes t shots in the su bma rin e servic e, l.t Cd r L. W. A. Beuningtou. DSO , DSC , d osed to 1,900 varrls (I ,737m) and fired seven torpedoes, g"d illi ng two hits and ~;l1dillg K UIIIIl to the bottom. In only 15 fathoms of wat er, Tally-Uo made guod its escape , despite haling been bo mbed and depth cha rged. Sadly, in Ma rch , th e British lost their first sub m ari ne ill the Fa r East theatre when SIOlu hm f? failed to re turn from patrol. Its loss has never been ex plained and no evidence can be fo und to acco unt fo r it. It is thought to lie otTth e north coast o f Sumatra. A di vi ng accident, collisio n or m ine wo uld see m th e most likely ca use. Mn id.~ton, arrived in Ma rch a nd establishe d th e Eighth Flotilla, compri sing the Sboats, while A drm ulfI { re tained the Tboats as the Fourth Flotilla. Sinkings continued in Ap ril, by gun and torped o. Of not e \\-"'S th e rescue of an Ame ri can airman From CSS Saratoga (briefly under British command ) off Sahang while u nde r lire from sh ore batte ries and ill view of a Japanese to rpedo boat. Fo r this exploit, Lt (', (11'Co llet of 'lilt/irian rec eived the American 1.egio n o f Merit. In May, th e Adm iralty authorized th e
sinking of smal l "esse-Is and j unks. h er) pa trol now had the po ssibility of gu n actio n against targe t" no t worth a torpedo. Also sub mari ne stre ngth "'' a nd the older CJy
41
42
to spread ing the area o f operatio ns. Therefore , with the ar rival of a thi rd depot ship, Walp, the now 27-strong submarin e fa rce was d ivided in to th ree flo tillas, wi th the Second Flo tilla being fa nned a ro und H'O l{f. T he Eig h th Floti lla was moved to Fre m an tle in Australia and came: unde r overal l co mm a nd o f the American Seventh Flee t. \ Vith it we nt Telnnar hus , '/o.nli1l), Tant alu s, Spilryul, Sea RQ1.It'1", Stun!;''!, Stoic. Sirdar. Storm and the Dut ch () 19 an d f-Class 1.«'(/(mh'i~ch (ex-1(dm1). By the e nd o f Octo be r 1944, the British sub marines were becom ing: a th o rn in th e J apa ne-se side . T hey ha d , by that d ate , Slin k a cruiser, three su bm a rines, ..ix ..maile r nava l vessels, 40.000 tons (40,060 IOnIlt'S) of me rcha n t ships a nd nea rly 100 sma ller vessels. On to p of th is, 32 special operations had be en lau nched, a b rid ge blown u p, two aircrew resc ue d a nd nine ..hare installations shelled. T he Eigluh Flo tilla was \IS("d to sin k ships in the J ava Sea aud surrounrJin g a rea... Th is relatively sh allow stretch o f wa te r was di flicuh for th e la rger Ame rican subma rin es to o perate safel y in au d became th e zone o f British operations. T he fan re mained that, so suc ce ssfu l had th e America n submarine ca mpaign against J apan been , targets o f an} size O f im port were be co ming ever more difficult to fin d . Ne\'t~ rtheless , the British made an im pact when they co uld locate the enemy. The two Ce ylon-base-d Flotilla s we re al so find ing targ e ts diffic ul t to locate. Fro m October 194 4 to Ma rch 1945" the m os t im portant ta rge ts su n k were th ust' d estr oyed in a chariot operation la u nc hed by Trencha nt in Phuket harbour. " c hariot operation comprised a two-m an rid e able to rped o, lau nched fro m a su b ma rine , which was ridden to an t'U c lllY ship, where a lim pe t m ine wo uld be a ttac hed to the h ull. Th e y we re genera lly considered to o d a nge ro us to und e rtak e , b ut in th is inst a nc e it was a succ ess, with one sh ip Sli n k a nd o ne heavily da m aged . O u 13 Jallua '1', a st ro ll~ ann-subm a rine force in the so uthern Malac r a Straits detec ted Stmnf!pollJ. The de p th-eha rge attack that foll owed is co nsid er ed to be ( Hi e of the most violent a nd sustained attacks from which an r Bri tish submarine wa s luc ky e nough to escape. In relatively shallo w water; the submari ne was ex tre mely fortunate not to have been lost. Damaged a ud bonomcd, Stnmgb(flI) survived the a ttack, b ut the d amage sustai ne d W, IS so ext ensive that it had to retu rn to Trm comale e and then to Bri tain for repair. Stmngfmw was built with a n all-welde d p re ssure hull. It is in terestin g' to speculate whe ther this in novation is what saved it fro m de struction . Around the sam e time , Britain los t its last submarine of th e war when th e veteran flOl! )()iI f failed 10 re turn fro m pa tro l. It had be en sen t to the Pe nang area to lay mines an d re ported so doing o n 9 J anu ary. Ko thillg' more was ever he ard fro m the vesse l. At th e tim e it was though t th a t it was p ro babl y sunk by the am i-sub ma rine force that attacked S[wnKuuw. It has also been sugges ted it W;L~ sun k by a Japan ese aircraft. Post-war re sea rch shows there is no th ing in the J apane se reco rd s to support e ither conte n tion . T he most likely expl anatio n was tha t POrj.JoiSi' ei ther succ u mbed to a dhi ug' acc iden t o r was m ined . It had la id a mi nefi eld 011' Pe na ug in December a nd th ejapa nese had a lso mine d the a rea. By Ma rch 19·13 the Malac ca Straits we re totally in th e command o f the subma rines, and su p ply tra ffic rb rongh this a rea, even byjunk, had vi rtually sto p ped. T he J a pa nese Army in Bu rma was b rought to sta rva rio n by the S U CC t~ o f the subma rin es in this area.
Th e f in al assault on Japan
In Ap ri l, th e Bri tish su bmarin e fo rce WdS readjusted. T h e Fourth Flo tilla we n t to Frc mantlc a n d the Eig-hth moved to Snbic n ay in the Ph ilipp ine s. T h ere we re now 38 o perational Bri tish a nd Du tch submarines in theat re , wit h anothe r five o n their way o ut. TIle Fourteenth Flo tilla, mad e lip o f XE-Craft (smal l submarin es designed fo r special missions}, had a rrived . Ta rge ts re m ain ed as scarce as ever; with most o f th e action ta kin g p lace aga inst sm aller ta rg-ets by gunfire . No fewe-r than 150 small vessels were su n k th is wa)~ up to the su rren d er o fJ a pan in August. H oweve r; th e submari nes were to h ave o ne last m ajo r su ccess a n d so we re th e XE-Craft. O n 8 J une Trench ant; under Cdr A. R. Hc zlc t. was co n fron ted with a m ajor p ri ze . It spotted th e cruiser i h hignm an d wo rked u p an attack at th e r.tng-e of 4.800 yard s (-1,387m) . A fu ll sp read o f ei ght to rpedoes wa s fired an d . rem a rkab ly, five h it h o m e . T h e cruise r se ttl ed an d Trencha nt tu rned. to fire th e stern torped oes . These m issed. but it di d not ma tt er as sh o rtly thereafte r th e cruise r ro lle d over a n d san k, ta kin g- 800 CR'W wi th her. This sin king helped to make up for so many fru itless patrols by Bri tish subm ari n es in tile re gion. T h e XE-Crdft o f th c Fo urtee nth flo ti lla were used 011 a d aring r'aid. into Sing apore . whe-re charges laid by' XEJ and XEJ sa n k the cruise r Takaa. }(E4 and XE5 wcre u sed to c u t the telephon e cables betwee n Saigon , Ho n g- Ko ng and Sin gapore. On 9 AUJ..,'1.lst, Statesma n left Trinc o malec for a patrol. in d ica tive of th is pe riod o f th e war; It sa n k five j u n ks by gunfi re an d fin ishe d off a d e relict with to rped o es. In so doi ng" it fire d th e las t to rp edo lau nch ed by a Brit ish sub m ari n e in World War II. TI ll' British sub marin e campaign iu th e Fa r Eai...t had been co m pleted with the loss of only th ree boats. This is a rema rkably low figu re given the sh allo w waters n aviga ted du rin g man y o f the o pera tio ns. TIle fo rce had o n ly reached a cri tical size la te ill tile wa r. when th e Am e rican :-\a\) h ad d estroyed much of tile J apa n ese mercha nt ma rine. Ne vertheless. Bri tish sub mari n es perfo rmed we ll. Thei r maj o r success was u ndoub ted ly closing th e Malacca Strai ts an d th e port of Rangoon . there by d en ud ing the J apan ese Arm y in Bu rm a o f supplies. ROYAL NAVY SUBMARINE LOSSES Fat e s of th e S -Cl a s s bo ats Seaho rse December 1939: probably mined in the Heligoland Bight Starfish 9 January 1940: attac ked by German surface forces and scutt led off Heligoland , 8 April 1940: probab ly sunk by German surface forces in the Skaqer rak Sterle t 6 July 1940: atta cked by aircraft off Skudenses and scuttled Shark 9 July 1940 (approx .): mined off Norway Salm on , August 1940: torped oed in the North Sea by U34 Spearfish 7 November 1940: m ined off th e Isle of Wight Swordfish 11 February 1941: sunk by German surface forces off Ushant P222 12 Decem ber 1942: sunk by Italian surface forces off Naples 2 1 April 1943: attacked by Germ an surface forces alld scuttled off Corsica Splendid Sahib 24 April 1943: attacked by neuan surface forces and scu ttled off Sicily Sam~ 14 August 1943 : attacked by Ita lian surface forces and scuttled off Baslia Simoom November 1943: mined in the Aeqean Stonehenge March 1944: unknown loss nort h of Sumatra 28 March 1944: mined off Bodo Syrtis Sid<Je June 1944: p robably mined east of leviIhia Stratagem 22 November 194-4: sunk by Japanese surface forces off Malacca
S_
•
Fates of th e T.el ess boats Tarpon This tle
Triad Triton
Tetrach Triumph
T,mpe," Thorn Talisman
Travel1e£
0377 r ,.." TurtJulent ThetislThunderl:>oJt
T""""" F at e s of t he 1Jndi~
Unity
U>k Undaumed Ump«e Union
032 P33 P38 P39
U _ P36
U "'" Unique
Un beaten
Utmos t
P4' Vandal UntamedMtality Uw_
, 0 April 1940: sun k by German surface forces off Norway 10 Apri l 1940: sun k by German submarine U4 off Skudenses 15 OCtober 1940 : sunk by the Italian submarine Enrico Tori off Cape CoIonne 18 Dece mber 1940: sunk by lta lian sortace forces off Taranto OCtober 1941: mined off Sicily or Cavo li January 1942: probably rraneo off Cape Souni on 13 Feb ruary 1942 : sunk by Italian surface forces off Taranto 7 August 1942: sunk by Italian surface forces off Tobru k 17 Sept ember 194 2: mi ned off Sicily 4 December 1942: p robably min ed off Taranto January 1943: probably m ined off Madda lena 27 February 1943 : sunk by German surface forces off Naples March 1943 : probably mined off Sard inia raiSed after 1939 acciden t, rena med and sunk by Italian surface forces 011 Messina Strail., 14 March 1943 October 1943: unknown loss , probably mined in Aegean
u-ct e e s boats 7 January 1940: attacked by German surface forces and sc vttied 011 Heilgoland 29 ApliI 1940 : col lision off the Tyne April 1941 : mined off Cape Bon 13 May 194 1: mined off Tripol i 19 July 194 1: col lision off the Wash 20 July 1941 : sunk by Italian surtace forces off Pantellaria August 1941: mined off Tripol i 18 August 1941 : sunk by It alian surface foeces 011 Pantellaria 23 Februa ry 1942 : sunk by ltaJian surface forces 011 Tripoli 26 March 1942: sunk b y enemy aircraft in Malta 1 ApliI1942: sunk by enem y aircraft in Malt a 14 Apri l 1942: sunk by Italian surface fo rces 011 Tripo li 28 Apri l 1942: mined east of Malta October 1942: loss unknown in the Atlantic 11 November 1942 : acciderrtal ly SUflk by Alli ed airc raft in BISCay 25 November 1942 : sunk by Italian surface forc es west of Sic ily 25 Dece mber 1942 : sunk by Italian su rrace forc es off Tunis 24 Feb ruary 1943: fou ndered due to unknown cause 011 the C lyde 30 May 1943 : fou ndered off the Clyde, salvaged and refitted as Vita/ity, sold for sc rap 1946 3 October 1943: sunk by German surface forces off La Sp ez.a
Fate s of oth er cla s s e s Oxley
5 ea, Odin Gram pu s Orp heus Phoenix
NaIWhal Tham es Oswald Rainbow H49 Regulus
Cachalot H31
"'~, P""",,", Olympus
R_,
PS14
PS15 Pwthian P
44
10 Septem ber 1939: torpedoed in acc ident by Triton 011 NOf\Nay 5 May 1940: captured by German surface forces 011 the Skaw 14 June 1940: sunk by Italian surface fo rces off Taranto 16 June 1940: sunk by It alian surface forces off Syracus e 19 Jun e 1940: mined off Benghazi 16 Ju ly 1940: sunk by Italian surface force s off Augusta 23 Ju ly 1940: sunk by Gennan aircraft in the North Sea 23 J uly 1940: mined off Stavanqar 1 Augus t 1940: rammed by Ita lian surface forces off Cape Spartfvento 4 October 1940: run down by an Italian st eamship in the Gulf of Otranto 18 October 1940: sunk by German surtece forces off Holland December 194 0: m ined in the Ad riatic 30 July 1941 : rammed by Italian surfac e forces off Benghazi December 194 1: unknown los s (mined? ) Atlantic/Biscay 6 December 1941: m ined off Zakinthos 1 Apri l 1942: sunk by eoerny aircraft at Malta, raised and scrapped 8 May 1942 : m ined off Malta 21 June 1942: rammed m istakeoly by a minesweeper 011 Ganada 18 Apri l 1943 : mined in the Southern Ad riatic 18 Apri l 1943 : sunk by U123 off Freetown August 1943: m ined in the Adri atic Jan uary 194 5: un known loss (mined ?) off Penang
BIBLIOGRAPHY Aker man n , Paul, bu)'{uljml'dia oj Bn:tish Submarines 190 1- 1955 . Pe risco pe Pu blishing (20( 2) Allaway, J im , Hero oj Ihf' Upholde r, Pe riscope Publ ish ing (2004) Blarn ey,J o e l, A Sulll/ulri1/rr ~~ Slor)'. Perisco pe Pu b lish in g (200 2) Bro wn, D. K. (ed. ). n " J)I'.~iC!1 and Canstructian oj Brius h Warships, Conwa y (l!Y.lo ) Ch ap man. Paul , Suhmll ri llf'To rbay. Hale (1989) Co m pt on-Hall. Richard . S llhmarln,.s aJ \laT 1939--45. Pe risco pe Publishing (2004) Coote, Jo hn , Submariner; Le o Cooper ( 1991) Cowie, Ca pt ] . S.• M inn , .\Ji,u·lttyrs m id .\Jill.Rw; lng, Oxford Un ive rs,i1y Press ( 1949) I)""i ("<" Roy, Xa u rilu..., Th, Slory' oj Ma n UT/Mr the Sea: Im e ( I !~J!'"} ) nickiMlll , A rthur P., em.llt /)" If'. In :\ a ion wilh HMSSafari 1942- 43, SUl1 0n ( 1999)
.s., l inlM ll1Iii, !\'ill'!"!, .-\ H istory of Hilt S!dmwn nt' 1904-/ 9il , Wi lliam Kim ber ( 1986) Gray, Edwvn , Fn v .'l,H"Vnlf'd, A H ;j lary of .'luhman /It' / fi.saslrrs, Evans, A . 1.l).~5('$
Leo Cooper ( 1986) Ha n , Sydney, S ubma rine Up ho lde r. O ld bo um e ( 1960 ) Hezle t, Vice Ad m Sir Arth u r, Brit;jh and Allied Su/nrwri/u' O/'"ati01H ill Hndd \l'i1r Tioa; Roya l Naw Su bm a rine M useum (200 1) Hi ll, Roge r, /H~ l mYT ( -aplai", Pe riscope Publishing (200 4) J a meso n, Rea r Adm Sir \\1l1ia m , Submariners n;, Pe risco pe Pnbllshin g (2004) Jo n e~ , Ceoffrey, SIJ,ma ri nl'_~ l!1"n JU U..Hoa ts. Willia m Kim ber ( 19S6) Kemp, Paul ] '. , 'flu '/: Cla.H S nh mari ne, The C/fmi r Bri ush lJI'sigJl , Arm ",am i A r mour ( 1990)
Lip sco mb. Cd r F. \V., TIll' Bruish: Sub marine. A&C Blac k ( 1954) Mar s, Alastair. IlMS Thule Intercepts, Elel (l9?i6) - TIll' Stm)' oj n Submarinl', Fredrick Muller; 1953 - British Subma rines al l1ilr / 939-4 5, William Kim b er (19 71) \ teCanney, Inn es. Lost !'a l m l~, Submarine H'rrrks of thr English Chml1lf l, Pe r iscope Publishing (2003) Rohwer.jurg en . Allied Submarine ,1ttarks of llnrU War Two, Greenhill Boo ks ( 1997) Roskill, Capt S. W., Tne IH'Ir at Sea 1939- 45, 1[\150 (l 96l) Simpson. Rear Adm G. W. G., Periscope l'it'Jt', Macmillan ( 19 i 2) Tr cnowdcn, Ian , TIlt' Hunting Submarine, The Fighting Lift' of llMS Tally-I1o , Crccy (197 -1) Win g"ate ,,,()hll , 11u' Fighting Tenth, The Tenth S ubmari ne FWlilla and the SiW oJM fllia, Periscope Publishi ng(200 3) Yo u n g:, Ed wa rd , On' of Our Submarino . Rupert Hart-Davis (1962)
HMS S t ro ngbo w was badly d apth -e h argad In t h e Malacca St ra it s in 194 5 but did n ot s in k . It w a s so ba d ly d amaged that It h ad t o b e wrlnen off. 01 the n a w a il · w eld e d hull series , Slro ngb o w '8 e d r a t oug h n e ss
m a y h a ve b e en its salva tion.
. ':-
4
COLOUR PLATE COMMENTARY
A : T HE EVOLUTION O F T HE T-CLASS SUBMARINE 1) HMS Triton Group I design as com plet ed in 1935. Triton w as the longest of this design, measunng 277ft (84. 43m) in le ngth , compared to the standard 275ft (53.82 m). On 10 April 1940 Tmon was among the first submarines t o be able t o take advantage 01 coresecteo submarir1e warlare during the Norway campaign and sank two freighter.'! and an escort with a spread 01 six torpedoes . 2) HMS Traveller Group II design as completed in 1942. rraveller was one 01 only two submarines of th is design to be fitted with the Ad mir alty-pa ttern eng ines. Sadly it w as 1os1 during Operation Torch , mined off Taran to . 3) HMS Te/emach us Grou p III design as completed in 1943. Telemachus eevec in the Far East wit h the Bghth Flotilla under t he overal l com mand of the Ameri can Seventh Root. It was scrapped in 1961 . B : THE EV OLU TI O N OF TH E S-C LASS S UBMAR IN E 1) HM$ Swordfish Group I design as com pleted in 1932 . Swordfish was one of the first S-Class submarines ordered in 1929 2) HMS Sea/ion Grou p II design as completed in 1934. Sealion' s desig n benefited from the lessons learnt by the Group I des ign and was enhanced by a number of rrccitcatons. including tw o escape c hambers, strengthened bu lkhead s, and a reduction in the numbe r of ballast t anks. 3) HMS Safari Grou p III design as complet ed in 1942 . Safari was respo nsible fo r the sinking of 11 ships betw een February and May 194 3 unde r its c harismatic co mmander Ben Bryant (who wo n a seco nd bar t o his DSO at t his time) and his replacement Lt R. B , Lakin, This submarine was one of th e most succes sf ul w ith gu n as w ell as t orped o.
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C : TH E EVO L U T I O N OF TH E U- CLASS S UB M A RI N E 1) HMS Unity GrOO p I design as com pleted in 1938 . Unity was among the first three of this design ordered in 1936, the on ly three to be read y fO( the war 's outbrea k. Its war career was short -lived as it suffered a collision off me Tyne on 29 April 1940. 2) HMS Upholder Group II design as completed In 1940. On 25 Ap ril 194 1, Upholder, und er the leadership of Lt Cd r M . D. Wanklyn , san k a 5,4OO-ton (5A68·tonne) fre ighl er off Tunisia, Two more were sun k on 1 Ma y. adding 9.300 t ons
The large p ......Waf' m inel ayer H M $ Porpoise had a s uccess ful career in al l three thea t "," unlil J anuary 1945, when it became the last BritIsh su b marin e aunt< in action.
(9,449 ton nes) t o Uphokjer's ton nage tally. Its succes ses continued on the 24ttl when , partially damaged aft er a depttl-chaJ'ge attack on the 20th reo knocked out its Asd c se t, it ma de a dusk ao oeoecn on a heavily escorted convoy and put its las t two torpedoes into the 17 ,88G-ton (18 ,166tonne) troopship Conte Rosso , wh ict1 sank with the loss of ov er 1,500 Italian troops. Upholder SlJbsequently surv ived a heavy coenter-attack of ov er 40 depth charges. Upholder's run of successes against freighte rs , troopships and naval vess els , won Wank lyn the VICtori a Cross. It is difficult to conceive of on e more deserved. The c ilation mad e speci al note of Ih e attack on Conte Rosso, which was carri ed out: inside the escort scree n wrthout Asdic and in failing lighl, making the spotting of the escort ships very difficult. Th is exc ep tional submarine command er w as al ready th e recip ient of the DSO. Upholder was sun k by ttanan surface forces off Tripol i on 14 April 1942.
Cd r A . R. He zlet 0 5 0' ....c " i" in 'i! th e Ame ri c an Legion 01 M erit lo r si n k ing t h e Ja pa n e se h e avy c r u is e r A shigara . This sign if ic a nt euceees m a d e up for th e gen era l paucity o f ta rg e ts in t he latte r s t a g e s o t the Fa r Ea s t ca m p a ig n.
LEFT Lt Cdr E. P. Young, DSO, became the 'irsl Ro~al Naval Vol unte er Re $e nl. {RNVR) officer 10 command a Ro~a l Navy subm;>,;ne when comm issioned to HM S Slorm. He h ad an out$landing career. After the WM he wrote 0 ... ot Our Submarines about his e_perienc es.. It is wid
3) HMS Venturer Grou p III design as completed in 1943. She became the first submarine in histO!')' to sink another subm8line ...mile both were submerged. The hydrophone p layed a key rol e. The d iffic ulty with such an attack is to judge the depth of the ta rget. From the noise it was making the U-boat was probably us ing its Schnorchel (snorkel) to transit submerged. The to rpedoes fired were set to 30 and 36ft (9.1 and 11m) and one hit resu" ed . The unlucky ta rget was U864. D : GROUP I II DES IGN , T- CL A SS S U B M A RI N E
OF 19 44 The classic type III 'r-crass design is depicted here. This is w idely considered to be the finest British submarine design of the war.
E: OTHE R SU B M A R I N E DE S IG N S TH AT FO U GHT I N W OR LD W AR II
1) HMS Seal. a minelayer. as completed In 1939 . This WaS among the five m inelayers in the Grampus-Class that were built before the out break of hostilities . 2) HM S Olym pus of the O-Class , as co mpleted in 1930. Olympu s form ed part of th e First Submarin e Flotilla during the cam paig o in the Mediterranean. h was damaged by a bomb ...mile io dry-dock in Malta and eventually sank due to a m ine off Malta on 8 M ay 1942. 3) HM S Rover'of the g -eese, as completed in 1931. Rc'Nffwas theorly British submarine in the Far East at the outbreak of war wrttI Japan. It was lXldergoing a major repair prograrrme in Singapore . having been damaged in the MedllerraneaJ1. and eventually it was tow ed to Bombay for com plet ion of these repairs. Rover was scrapped in 1946.
BELOW Cdr a.". Bryant 0 5 0 '" (foregro und). In command of HM S s.,tari. his ed ensive use 0' th e deck gun was not able. as is his claim to have sunken a tank on Ras All pier by torpedo _ .. .....iq u e achievement. Bry ant W9fl1 on
to
~
a successful " ot illa commander in 1943.
F: SA FA RI ATTACKS COAS TA L S H I P PI N G Safari was OI1e of the more successfu l submarines of World War 11 and played a CI1.Jo al role during the war in the Mediterranean, where the British strategy of intercept ing the supply lines for the Axis forc es resulted in over 47 merchant vessels and many smaller craft of vario us sizes being sunk. Safari was eventually sold for scrap in 1946, but sank on tow: the wreck is now privately ow ned. G : U -C LASS RETURNS T O MALTA The u -cese submari ne will always be assoc iated w ith the war in the Mediterranean. the siege of Malta and witll the Royal Navy's most successfu l submarine captain, U Cdr M. D. Wanktyn, VC, DSO. The u-Oass vessels arriv«l at Malta during the first few mon ths of 194 1 and were used primarily to pa trol the Tunisian coast. However, shortly after their arrival they launched a oombef of extremely successfIJ attacks against Italian ships and SlJbrnar'fles. openng up the North Afncan supply routes 10 the British ioces. Most famous during this campaign are the exploit:s of the FIQhIiOg Tenth (the Tenth Flotilla) formed from these Malta submarines .
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INDEX References 10 illusuauo ns are sh m. l1 in bold . Pl..tes a TC sh own with page a nd cap tion (" c a to p; in b rackets.
Benning ton.d.t Cdr L, W. A. -11. 4 1 Bid Jom . LI Cdr E. 0. 20 ' blue o n hl lIt,' incide nts 20 8 ~-
camouflage 6. .ro Colle t, 1.1 Cd r 41
dep th
~alll\""
18
Eigh th Flo liliOl 4 1, 42, -1:1, 'Ill e ngines 3. :). II , ]2, 13, 15 Far East -I~ I:\ Fighl in gTt"Ilt h. JN TCnl h ~'I"li lla r io t Submarine nOlilia 23 Fo u n t'l:"llt h .1o lilla ·13 Fourth Flo tilla -IO- H,43
H\IS Trol.,u". 12. A (2:>. -Hl) II MS r....flcha>ll 10. 42,.f3 HMS Tribut ll' 11, 1-1 II MS Triton 20. 2 1, .'\ (2:, . 46) , 4 2 H MS Tn uII//';' 11, 20. ~ :i 1I/1.IS Trooper 12 H:-'IS TrufmI 9. 11. 21. 22 H \ IS Turbulml 9. 12. 40 H:-.tS U"bmkcfl 15. 37 H \ IS Vn;IM ( I'#) 37. 38 il \l'i Uniry C (27. 46 ) H\ IS L'flSl't"ll 13 II MS (~,holtln- C (27, 46 ), 3 3, 3-1. 35, 35 lI MS {r,.~r 34, 35, 35 Ht.l S HlIllpiw 15 lIMS \ " !Il um-- 17, C (2 7,17) H o rt o n . Vice A. l", Max 20-2 1. 22. 2:!
L-Ch~ ,
m h m a rine 18
g Ulls 5, 8 , 1 J. Hi, 18
10,' '>(.' & ·\3-44
H-<"l ass submari ne -I. 18 IIc zlet, Cdr A. R. 43 , 46 H ~[S C.I)'tU 5 . 19 . 2'2 ,4 1 1I.\15 0 iyrnpw E (30 , 47) H .\IS Oxl"] 19. 2U H\I5 />urpoi~ IR, 11. 42, 46 H\ IS ['min " IS, 2 3 I1\l S /{o cq lll'li lR, 18, 2:1. 33 H .\IS Rmwr 1-: (:'10, 4i) 11.\15 ,'itl{flri 6 , B (26, 40),
\ Ia ha 21 .33-36. -1 7 \ laD. II A. C. G . 37 \lcdi [c rra rtea ll 23-24, 3:>.--10
ee.
h aly 23-2" Malta 33-36 Skity 38 (d e po t ship) 24 Mie-rs . Lt Cdr A. C . C. 36 rninr-lnving su bmarincs 3 , 18, 18 ,2 1
,u,,,,,,,,,,
na ming of subma rmcs 16- 17 :'\OlWay campaign 2 1-23
48
R-Clas~ submarine 5. I I , 19, ·)7 rec unnais...m cc 9. 20.31'1,40--11 Rivc r-Cla, . submarine 19 Roy».1 ~;I\'Y mhmArin e I",.",", -J 3--H
S-Class su bmarine- -f--...8, %3. B (26. 4(i). -I3 1929 de-sign «( ; n.,u p I) 4-:, 193 1 d t"si);n (G rou p II ) (1 1939 ant! W,lr Prog ramme dl' sil{llS (G roup III) 6-R Se co nd F1 0l illa 42 Sicil~ 38--:10 Simpson , Cdr ( ;. W. G . 'Sh ri m p' 2-1.33-3-4
A (25, .1(1). 40 . 44. 46 19 35 d es iA"1l «( ; rou p I) ~1-11 19 39 W"I Programm e d. 's igll (Gro u p II) 11-1 2 19-10 \V;ll' Progra mm e d" s ig n (Grou p III ) 12- 13. n (28-2'J. 47) Te nth n Olilla :\ 3-3-1. 3:;. 36, ·17 Wrpt'd" IUh.:s 8,9.10. I I , 13, 14. 16 to rpedoes -1. 13, 14 tr.li "i n~ 3 , 13. J 6, IR I:-Cla.~qu hm a ri n c
13. 13-17. ~4 , C (27, \(;). G (32 , 47 ). H 19 ,\6 dt·sign (G ro llI' I) 14- 1:> 1939 and W.1f EUll' r.';ellC)' .I.·sigu (Gro u p II) 15----17 Y-Cla.~s (G rou p Ill ) 17
numbering of submarines 16
11\15 Sml i(m 6. 19 , R (26, -Hl)
H\IS S/OOfl 6 IIM S Slu~" 5. 20. :!3 H\IS SWQrrljilh 5. R (26. '16 ) H \ 15 Tall.~-ll() '10, 4 1, 4 1 H \ IS Trwm,\ 39,40,41 II \IS "letrmad w s A (25. 46) . 42 H\ IS TI""/l III'T 9, 12, 33 II \ IS '/ Qrl>a.y 9.35
quick diving l,m k (Q ta n k) 1·1
T'Classsubm arin r- R----13. I I. 14, Ke rsh aw, 1.1J- R. d e B. 33
Linton, Cd r j , W. 'Tuh by' :'>7
F (31. -17). 47
patrolsubmarines -1, 9 , 13. 1i. HI, 19 p ho ney war 20-2 1
Japan -10- 13
Gibraltar F1 o ti11" 36 Gram plL.,.( :I;ISS sub marine IH- 19
11.\IS .'5tflmon 21) H .\IS .V al 21, E (30 , -17 )
1'44 .st't' I1\ IS Un iW
\'-Cla.~~
o-o.c. subm a ri n e
I I , 19 O pera tio n IlwJry 36-37. 38 O p e ra tio n Pl'fk.sla { 36 Operation Tm,h 3fi.-37,3R op..rations 1939-10 2 0-~2 other sub ma ri ne classes 17- [9 , E (:\11. 47) p..Cl ass suh m.u;ne I I . 19
( U..(J ass G ro up III ) 17 vic toria Cms~,<; 9 , 37 Wankl~n ,
1.1 (,..-I r 1-.1. D. 13. 33. 34.
-\6. 47 XE-Cl afl 43 Yo u ng, 1.1 Cd r E.
r.
47
The de sign. develo pment. operat ion and hist ory of t he mach ine ry of wa rfare t hro ugh th e ages
British Submarines
1939-45
,
Th e subma rine was th e invisible but formidabl e weapon of th e Royal Navy du ring World War II. Thi s book exami nes th e three major classes - '5', 'T' and 'U' - detailin g thei r design,
deve lopment and modifi cation. The major submarine Full colour artwork
engage m ent s of the war are recounted, including th e
Unrivalled detail
Norwegian campai gn, th e battl e o f Malta, Operatio n Pedestal,
and many other enga gem ents in all th eatres between the British subma rine s, German
U-Boats and Japan ese submarines. Using previously
un pu blished sources and his own extensive underwater
explorations, Innes McCartney gives a highly detailed acco un t Cutaway artwork
Photographs
of the British sub ma rine.
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