Buddhism, Christianity and the question of creation: karmic or divine?

Buddhism, Christianity and the Question of Creation Karmic or Divine?

Edited by

PERRY SCHMIDT-LEUKEL UniverSi'ty of Glasgow, UK

ASHGATE

© Perry Schmidt-Leukel 2006

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or . otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Perry SchmidtcLeukel has asserted his moral right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the Editor of this work. Published by Ashgate Publishing Limited Gower House Croft Road Aldershot Hants GUll 3HR England . Ashgate Publishing Company Suite 420 101 Cherry Street Burlington, VT 05401-4405 USA Ashgate website: http://www.ashgate.com British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Buddhism, Christianity and the question of creation: karmic or di vine? 1. Creation - Comparative studies 2. Buddhism - Doctrines 3. Buddhism - Relations - Christianity 4. Christianity and other religions - Buddhism 5. Christianity and atheism 1. Schmidt-Leukel, Perry 294.3'424 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Buddhism, Christianity, and the question of creation: karmic or divine? / edited by Perry Schmidt-Leukel. p.cm. Includes index. ISBN 0-7546-5443-5 (hardcover: alk. paper) 1. Christianity-Relations-Buddhism. 2. Buddhism-Relations-Christianity. 3. Creation. 4. Karma. I. Title: Karmic or divine? II. Schmidt-Leukel, Perry. BR128.B8B8142006 202'.4-dc22 2005007948 ISBN-IO: 0754654435

Typeset by lLVIL Typographers, Birkenhead, Merseyside and printed and bound in Great Britain by MPG Books, Bodmin, Cornwall

Contents

List of Contributors Acknowledgements Introduction Perry Schmidt-Leukel

vzz xi

1

Part One: Buddhist and Christian Perspectives on the Issue of Creation 1 Hindu Doctrines of Creation and Their Buddhist Critiques Ernst Steinkellner

15

2 Three BuddhistViews of the Doctrines of Creation and Creator Jose Ignacio Cabez6n

33

3 Buddhist Forms of Belief in Creation Eva K. Neumaier

47

4

61

Creation and the Problem of Evil Armin Kreiner

5 Refuting Some Buddhist Arguments about Creation and Adopting

69

Buddhist Philosophy about Salvation History John P Keenan 6 Creation and Process Theology: A Question to Buddhism Aasulv Lande

81

7 Buddhists, Christians and Ecology John D 'Arcy May

93

Part Two: The Unbridgeable Gulf? Towards a Buddhist-Christian Theology of Creation Perry Schmidt-Leukel 8 Preparing the Ground

111

Contents

vi

9 Buddhist Criticism and Its Motives

123

10 Bridging the Gulf

143

11

177

Conclusion

Index

179

List of Contributors

Jose Ignacio Cabezon has a B.S. with an emphasis in physics from Caltech, and a Ph.D. in Buddhist Studies from the University of Wisconsin, Madison. Born in Cuba and raised in Boston, he spent ten years as a monk in the Tibetan Buddhist tradition. Six of those ten years he spent in the traditional curriculum of studies at the Byes College of Se ra Monastery in Bylakuppe, India. Professor Cabez6n has published extensively in the field of Buddhist and comparative thought. Among his published books are A Dose of Emptiness (Albany, NY: SUNY 1992), Buddhism, Sexuality and Gender (ed.) (Albany, NY: SUNY 1992), and Buddhism and Language (Albany, NY: SUNY 1994). His current research interests include Buddhist and comparative theology, medieval Tibetan philosophical polemics, and Buddhist sexual ethics. Jose Cabez6n taught at the Iliff School of Theology in Denver for twelve years. In 2001 he joined the Religious Studies faculty of the University of California Santa Barbara as XIVth Dalai Lama Professor of Tibetan Buddhism and Cultural Studies. John P. Keenan is a specialist in Yogacara Buddhism, Professor Emeritus of Religion at Middlebury College in Vermont, and priest of St Mark's Episcopal Church in Newport, Vermont. His publications include translations from the Chinese Buddhist canon and works on Christian scripture and theology as seen through the lens of Mahayana philosophy. He is author of The Meaning of Christ: A Mahayana Theology (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis 1989), The Wisdom of James: Parallels with Mahayana Buddhism (New York: Paulist Press 2005), and co-editor of Beside Still Waters: Jews, Christians, and the Way of the Buddha (Boston, MA: Wisdom Publications 2003), recipient of the 2004 Book of the Year Award from the (North American) Society for Buddhist-Christian Studies.

Armin Kreiner was Professor of Fundamental Theology and Philosophy of Religion at the University of Mainz (1995-2003) and joined the University of Munich in 2003 as Professor of Fundamental Theology. Among his numerous publications in the philosophy of religion are Ende der Wahrheit? Zum Wahrheitsverstandnis in Philosophie und Theologie (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder 1992), Gott und das Leid (Paderborn: Bonifatius 1994) and Gott im Leid. Zur Stichhaltigkeit der TheodizeeArgumente (Freiburg im Breissgau: Herder 1997). He co-edited (with S. Gratze1) Religionsphilosophie (Stuttgart: Metzler 1999), introducing philosophy of religion in a multi-religious perspective.

viii

List of Contributors

Aasulv Lande graduated from the Lutheran School of Theology in Oslo, Norway in 1962, and is an ordained minister of the Church of Norway. From 1965 to 1980 he studied Buddhism, Shinto and new religious movements in Japan, basically related to Doshisha University and Kansai Seminar House, and was involved in inter-religious dialogue. He received his Doctorate in Uppsala, Sweden in 1988 with a thesis on 'Japanese Protestantism in History and Historiography'. Subsequently, he worked as Japanese lecturer at Oslo University and as lecturer (Lutheran World Federation) of Ecumenism and Dialogue at Selly Oak Colleges, Birmingham University, England. In 1994 he became Professor for Missiology with Ecumenical Theology at Lund University, Sweden. Among his publications in the field of inter-religious dialogue and Japanese religion are Meiji Protestantism in History and Historiography (Frankfurt: Peter Lang 1990), Japans religionar (Oslo: Samlaget 1991), Mission in a Pluralist World (co-edited with W. Ustorf, Frankfurt: Lang Verlag 1996) and Sjdnna po. Elbursfjell. Alexander Seippel, mann en og verket (co-edited with S. Lomheim and G. Stubseid, Kristiansand: Hoyskoleforlaget 2001). He has been President of the European Network of Buddhist Christian Studies since its foundation in 1996.

John D' Arcy May is Associate Professor of Interfaith Dialogue, Trinity College Dublin. He holds a doctorate in theology (Munster 1975) and the history of religions (Frankfurt 1983). He taught at the University of Munster (1975-1982), was Ecumenical Research Officer with the Melanesian Council of Churches, Port Moresby, Research Associate at the Melanesian Institute, Goroka, Papua New Guinea (1983-87) and Director of the Irish School of Ecumenics in Dublin (1987-1990). He is the author of Meaning, Consensus and Dialogue in BuddhistChristian Communication: A Study in the Construction of Meaning (Berne: Peter Lang 1984), Christus Initiator: Theologie im Pazifik (Dusseldorf: Patmos 1990), After Pluralism: Towards an Interreligious Ethic (Munster-Hamburg-London: LIT Verlag 2000) and Transcendence and Violence: The Encounter of Buddhist, Christian and Primal Traditions (New York-London: Continuum 2003), and he edited Pluralism and the Religions: The Theological and Political Dimensions (London: Cassell 1998). Eva K. Neumaier is presently the Numata Professor of Buddhist Studies at the University of Calgary, Canada, and is Professor Emeritus and former Chair and Professor of the Department of East Asian Studies at the University of Alberta, Edmonton (Canada). She holds a Dr Phil. (1966) and Dr Phil. Habil. (1976, Ludwig Maximilians Universitat, Munich, Germany). Her specialization comprises the literature of rDzogs -chen (Great Perfection), the interpretation of sacred biographies, and the interaction between local religious traditions and the literary religion of Buddhism. She has published extensively in academic journals and authored or coauthored five books, among which are The Rise of Esoteric Buddhism (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2nd edn), The Sovereign All-Creating Mind - the Motherly Buddha:

List of Contributors

ix

A Translation of the Kun-byed rgyal-po'i mdo (Albany, NY: SUNY 1992) and Gender, Genre and Religion: Feminist Reflections (The Calgary Institute for the Humanities 1995). Perry Schmidt-Lenkel is Professor of Systematic Theology and Religious Studies, University of Glasgow, and Founding-Director of the Centre for Inter-Faith Studies. He has published widely in the areas of philosophy/theology of religions and Buddhist-Christian dialogue, for example 'Den Lowen briillen hOren': Zur Hemuneutik eines christlichen Verstandnisses der buddhistischen HeilsbotschaJt (Paderbom: SchOningh 1992), Theologie der Religionen: Probleme, Optionen, Argumente (Neuried: Ars Una 1997) and Gott ohne Grenzen: Eine christliche und pluralistische Theologie der Religionen (Gtitersloh: Gtitersloher Verlagshaus 2005). Among his edited books are Wer ist Buddha? Eine Gestalt und ihre Bedeutungfiirdie Menschheit (Munich: Diederichs Verlag 1998), Buddhist Perceptions of Jesus (St Ottilien: EOS 2001), War and Peace in World Religions (London: SCM 2004) and Buddhism and Christianity in Dialogue (London: SCM 2005). Ernst Stei.nkeilner, Member of the Austrian Academy of Sciences, is Professor of Buddhist and Tibetan Studies at Vienna University and Director of the Institute for Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia of the Austrian Academy of Sciences. His main scholarly aims are the philological improvement of the sources available for the study of Buddhist philosophical and spiritual traditions, context-orientated interpretations of Buddhist ideas and their developments, and the appreciation of original contributions of Tibetan philosophers to the Buddhist tradition. His present efforts are devoted to editing original Sanskrit texts of major importance from the Buddhist epistemological tradition. Among his translations and text editions are Dharmaklrti's Pramii!JaviniscayaJ;., Zweites Kapitel: Svarthiinumanam, Teil 1 (1973), Teil 2 (Vienna: Verlag der Osterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 1979); Santideva: Der Eintritt in das Leben zur Erleuchtung (Bodhicaryavatara) (Cologne: Diederichs Verlag 1981) and Nachweis del' Wiedergeburt. PrajT1asenas 'Jig rten pha rol sgrub pa, ein friiher tibetischer Text aus Dunhuang (two parts) Vienna: Verlag der Osterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 1988).

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank those people and institutions who helped to realize this book. First of all, the book is the fruit of the continuous work of the European Network of Buddhist-Christian Studies. The Network debated the issue of creation during its fifth conference, on which the contributions to Part One are based. This would not have been possible without the generous support from the W eisfeld-Foundation, to which, on behalf of the Network, I would like to express my sincere gratitude. Further, I would like to thank the members of the Centre for Inter-Faith Studies of the University of Glasgow, in particular Dr Kiyoshi Tsuchiya and Sr Isabel Smyth, who gave considerable support in organizing the conference. The Department of Theology and Religious Studies at Glasgow University has enabled the research on which Part Two is based by generously granting a study leave. Finally I want to say 'thank you' to Carolina Weening, who helped decisively with improving the various drafts of Part Two.

Introduction Perry Schmidt-Leukel

Buddhism - Atheistic or Non-theistic? ' ... the idea of a personal deity, a creator god, conceived to be eternal and omnipotent is incompatible with the Buddha's teachings'.1 This is the resume which Nyanaponika Mahilthera presents right at t.l-J.e beginning of the introduction to his little anthology Buddhism and the God-Idea, thereby resonating with a long Buddhist tradition which, in similar brevity, is already quoted by Buddhaghosa (fifth century CE), the Theravilda 'Church father', in his Visuddhi Magga (XIX 603): For there's no deva, no Brahmii, The maker of the round of life. . It's nothing but bare states that come to pass, The right conditions all fulfilled. 2

Again and again Christians have taken these and similar statements as evidence that Buddhism is atheism, as, for example, Paul Williams, formerly a practising Tibetan Buddhist, now a convert to Roman Catholicism, who is widely known and renowned for his introduction to Mahayana Buddhism: 3 Buddhists do not believe in the existence of God. There need be no debating about this. In practising Buddhism one never finds talk about God, there is no role for God, and it is not difficult to find in Buddhist texts attacks on the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent, all-good Creator of the universe. [... J From a Christian point of view Buddhism is clearly a form of atheism. 4

The statement of Pope John Paul II in his Crossing the Threshold of Hope that 'Buddhism is in large measure an "atheistic" system' became quite famous. s A number of the Buddhists who replied agreed. To be sure, there was a strong Buddhist

2 3 4 5

Buddhism and the God-Idea: Selected Texts, edited and introduced by Nyanaponika Thera, The Wheel Publication No. 47 (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 3rd repr. 1981), p. L Buddhaghosa cites this as a word 'the Ancients'! The Path of Purity: Being a Translation of Buddhaghosa's Visuddhimagga by Pe Maung Tin, Part ill (London: Pali Text Society 1931), p. 727. P. Williams, Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations (London-New York: Routledge 1989). P. Williams, The Unexpected Way: On Converting from Buddhism to Catholicism (Edinburgh-New York: T &T Clark 2002), pp. If. Pope John Paul II, Crossing the Threshold of Hope (New York: Alfred A. Knopf1994), p. 86.

of

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Buddhism, Christianity and the Question a/Creation

repudiation of the Pope's further characterization of Buddhism as having 'an almost exclusively negative soteriology,.6 But, to quote Bhikkhu Bodhi, they agreed that 'B uddhism is an atheistic system in the sense that it does not admit the existence of an all-powerful creator God ... '.1 However, this consent was in a number of cases not without further qualification. Bhikkhu Bodhi emphasizes that for 'Buddhism Nibbana is a supramundane reality, a reality which is utterly transcendent to the world ... '.8 And hence he reminds us that 'Buddhists themselves prefer to describe their religion as "non-theistic" rather than "atheistic".'9 From a Mahayana perspective, Masao Abe also admits that 'Buddhism is not a monotheism which is based on the belief in one absolute God who is creator, lawgiver, judge, and redeemer.' 10 But, according to Abe, Buddhism teaches 'that everyone and everything is respectively the manifestation ofthe absolute Reality. Buddhism is not an atheism, but a religious realism beyond monotheism..' II Already Nyanaponika had pointed out that the term 'atheism' might be misleading because of its frequent association 'with a materialistic doctrine that knows nothing higher than this world of the senses and the slight happiness it can bestow. Buddhism is nothing of that sort' .12 What these and similar qualifications show is that the usual contrast of atheistic Buddhism versus . theistic Christianity is too coarse. The obvious fact of a long tradition of Buddhist critique of creator-doctrines l3 does not automatically malce Buddhism a form of atheism. And the reverse is not less true: that is, the long tradition of Christian affirmation of creator- and creation-doctrines does not entail that Christianity is theism in an unqualified sense. Anyway, the Buddhist critique and the Christian affirmation of a creator-god are too often treated as part of a package. However, in order to address the issue adequately, it is first of all necessary to unpack the whole thing, to isolate and identify the different aspects involved and to disentangle them from a web of unintended associations. 6 7

8 9 10 11 12 13

Ibid. Ven. Bhikkhu Bodhi, 'Replies to Questions from "Source"', Dialogue (N.S.) 22, 1995,20-28, p. 24. This issue of Dialogue is dedicated to the topic of 'Pope and Buddhism' and contains a number of Buddhist and Christian Replies to the Pope's remarks on Buddhism. . Ibid., p. 21. Ibid., p. 24. M. Abe, 'On John Paul II's View of Buddhism', in B.L. Sherwin and H. Kasimow (eds),John Paull! and Interreligious Dialogue (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2nd print 2000),108-12, pp. 109f. Ibid., p. 110. Nyanaponika: Buddhism and the God-Idea, op. cit., p. 5. Overviews and summaries can be found in R. Jackson, 'Dharmakirti's refutation of theism', Philosophy East and West 36, 1986, 315-48; R. Hayes, 'Principled Atheism in the Buddhist Scholastic Tradition', loumal of Indian Philosophy 16, 1988, 5-28; G. Paul; 'Der Buddha aus atheistischer Sicht: Atheistische Positionen im Buddhismus', in P. Schmidt-Leukel (ed.), Wer ist Buddha? Eine Gestalt und ihre Bedeutung fiir die Menschheit (Munich: Diederichs Verlag 1998), pp. 211-24, and 264-5. H. Krasser, SQ]ikaranandanas isvariipiikarQ].1Qsmik/fepa, 2 vols (Vienna: Verlag der OstelTeichischen Akadernie der Wissenschaften 2002), Vol. 2, pp. 15-18. See also Ernst Steinkellner's chapter in this volume.

Introduction

3

A good example of such a helpful disentanglement are the distinctions recently proposed by Christopher Gowans: ... it is sometimes suggested that the Buddha's teaching contains nothing of the supernatural and is a form of naturalism. But this can be misleading. '" if, as is commonly the case, the term 'naturalism' implies that the only reality is that which is disclosed by the five senses (directly or by inference), then the Buddha did not teach naturalism ... 14 ... insofar as Nibbiina is portrayed as ultimate reality that is beyond change and conditioning, and that, when attained, enables us to overcome suffering, it might invite comparison with the God of the theistic traditions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. There are points of similarity. As we saw ... Nibbiina is transcendent reality in the broad sense of the term: it is beyond the ordinary world of sense-experience and may be approached only via meditation. But the differences are quite significant. The most important are that, unlike God, Nibblina is not the ultimate cause of the universe, and it is not a personal being, who is omnipotent, omniscient, and all-loving. Hence, it is not a reality on which human beings depend or with whom they could form a personal relationship. IS

What is crucial about this statement is the clear distinction between three different components of 'theism': (1) the affirmation of an ultimate, unconditioned reality, (2) its characterization as the 'ultimate cause', that is, creator, 'of the universe', and (3) its qualification as a 'personal being'. Insofar as 'atheism' is identified with the denial of all three components, it follows that Buddhism cannot be properly designated as being 'atheistic' as long as it denies only (2) and (3) while at the same time affirming (1).16 Moreover, this distinction enables Buddhist-Christian dialogue to discuss all three components separately. What are the reasons in both traditions for jointly affirming (1) but opting differently with regards to (2) and (3)7 Furthermore, meaningful questions can be raised concerning the relationship between the three components and its relevance for Buddhist-Christian understanding. For example, if Buddhism affirms (1) but denies (2), how does it then conceive the relation between the universe and transcendent reality? Or, if the reason for affirming (2) is to express precisely the world-transcending character of the ultimate as affirmed in (1), what are the alternative forms through which Buddhism can safeguard its own affirmation of (1)? And what does the joint affirmation of (1) by Buddhism and Christianity entail for their different options with regards to (3)? Over the last fifty years, Christian-Buddhist dialogue has moved forward considerably along those lines and a number of significant advancements have been 14 C. Gowans, Philosophy of the Buddha (London-New York: Routledge 2003), p. 53. 15 Ibid., p. lSI. 16 This view has already been held by Hsue-li Cheng: ' ... the Buddhist rejection of the existence of the creator, according to my judgement, does not really make Buddhism non-theistic or atheistic .... we should not define God only as the Creator in examining whether a certain religion is theistic or not.' H. Cheng, 'Buddha, Man and God', Dialogue (N.S.) 8, 1981,54-68, pp. 56f.

4·

Buddhism, Christianity and the Question of Creation

made.17 Based on the affirmation of an ultimate reality a...'1d its characterization as' 'unborn, unbecome,unmade, uncompounded,18 in Udiina VIII 3 and Itivuttaka 43, the Irish Buddhist Maurice Walshe stated a 'fundamental agreement at a very deep level ... that the terms "nirvana" and "God" both refer to the UNBORl'Twhich being incomprehensible to the ordinary mind, is differently interpreted', 19 schematically expressed as: 20

UNBOR1\l Buddhist NirvaI].a (Impersonal)

Christian God (Personal)

Concerning the difference between impersonal and personal verbalizations of the Ultimate, Buddhist-Christian dialogue has, over recent years, drawn the attention of both partners to a number of relativizing aspects on both sides: the strong tradition of negative and apophatic theology within the mainstream of traditional Christianity which significantly modifies and outbalances' any straightforward and literal understanding of personalistic God-talk, or the strong and influential tradition of the 'Three Buddha-Bodies' (trikiiya) and 'Buddha-Nature' (buddhatii or tathiigatagarbha) in Mahayana Buddhism which understands the Buddha as a cosmic reality expressing itself not only in the fully developed person of the Enlightened One, but to some extent in every sentient being or even in every being in general. Moving further on, partners in dialogue have set their feet on new ground. Startling admissions have been made, like the one by Keiji Nishitani, that the 'idea of man as person is without doubt the highest conception of man yet to appear. The same may be said of the idea of God as person.'21 Or, to mention another 17

18 19 20 21

Broad overviews are offered in J. Spae, Buddhist-Christian Empathy (Chicago, IL: The Chicago Institute of Theology and Culture 1980); P. Schmidt-Leukel, 'Den Lowen briillen horen': Zui Henneneutik eines christlichen Verstandnisses der buddhistischen HeilsbotschaJt (Paderbo.rn: Schoningh 1992); M. v. Bruck and W. Lai, Buddhismus und Christentum: Geschichte, Konfrontation, Dialog (Munich: C.H. Beck 1997), abbr. Eng!. trans!. as Christianity and Buddhism: A MultiCultural History of Their Dialogue (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis 2001); and - from a process-theological perspective - P. Ingram, The Modem Buddhist-Christian Dialogue: Two Universalistic Religions in Transformation (Lewiston/Queenston: Edwin Mellen Press 1988). ajatmil, abhiitaril, akatmil, asalilchatmiL. M. O. Walshe, 'Buddhism and Christianity: A Positive Approach', Dialogue (N.S.) 9, 1982,3-39, p.6. Ibid. K. Nishitani, Religion and Nothingness (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 1982), p. 69. For a profound Christian response to Nishitani's philosophy see H. Waldenfels, Absolute Nothingness: Foundations for a Buddhist-Christian Dialogue (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 1980).

Introduction

5

example, Masao Abe's view that 'in the completely keno tic God, personality and impersonality are paradoxically identical' .22 Theologians like Lynn de Silva and Aloysius Pieris have related the personal and impersonal ways of talking about the Ultimate to different categorial systems which in the end reflect and evoke different but. equally liberating and complementary experiences of transcendence. 23 Thus, while the question of the personal or impersonal characterization of the Ultimate has been at the centre of a number of ongoing constructive dialogues, the second component - the Christian affirmation and the Buddhist refutation of the Ultimate as creator - has attracted far less attention. 24 This might have to do with an unspoken feeling that this topic could be too thorny, that it would possibly lead the dialogue partners to the edges of a chasm which cannot be bridged, leaving them speechless in view of an irreconcilable contrast, and thereby eventually even endanger all those consensuses that have been achieved so far. 25 It was Winston King who in his pioneering study Buddhism and Christianity: Some Bridges of Understanding judged that, in face of all the parallels which may be detected between the Christian God and analogous elements in Buddhism, the 'essential difference' remains the one of 'creativity and noncreativity, and the implications flowing therefrom' .26 M. Abe, 'Kenotic God and Dynamic Sunyata', in J. Cobb and C. Ives (eds), The Emptying God: A Buddhist-jewish-Christian Conversation (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis 1990), 3-65, p. 18. See also the contributions in R. Corless and P. Knitter (eds), Buddhist Emptiness and Christian Trinity: Essays and Explorations (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press 1990). As a more recent contribution to the Buddhist-Christian discourse on kenosis, see A. MUnch, Dimension~n der Leere: Gatt als Nichts und Niclus als Gatt im christlich-buddhistischen Dialog (MUnster: LIT-Verlag 1998). 23 Cpo L. de Silva, 'Buddhism and Christianity Relativised', Dialogue (N.S.) 9, 1982,43-72; A. Pieris, Love Meets Wisdom: A Christian Experience of Buddhism (Maryknoll, NY: Orb is 1988). My own suggestion follows a similar approach, relating the impersonal talk of the Ultimate as the 'Deathless' (amata, amrta) to a categorial system which is marked by the experience of transitoriness and the personal talk of the Ultimate as a Divine Father to the experience of interpersonal rehltedness. Cpo Schmidt-Leukel, 'Den Lowen briillen horen', op. cit., pp. 434<-48 and 675-83. 24 There are of course some noteworthy exceptions. As early as 1964, Lynn de Silva dedicated his Sinclair Thompson Memorial Lectures to the topic Creation, Redemption, Consummation: In Christian and Buddhist Thought (Chiengmai, Thailand: Thailand Theological Seminary 1964), arguing for the convergence of Buddhist insight into the transitoriness of all beings and the Christian belief in their createdness. Paul Ingram has devoted a chapter to the issues of creator, creation and creativity in his The Modern Buddhist-Christian Dialogue (op. cit., pp. 309-45), where he demonstrates how a process understanding of God (that is, abandoning the ideas of creatio ex nihilo and of divine immutability) is more in line with Buddhist thinldng. 25 It is interesting that in the first cautious attempts of a Buddhist-Muslim dialogue, the issue of creation and creator seems to be carefully avoided. Cpo D. Ikeda and M. Tehranian, Global Civilization: A Buddhist-Islamic Dialogue (London-New York: British Academic Press 2003, repro 2004). 26 W. King, Buddhism and Christianity: Some Bridges of Understanding (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press 1962), p. 62. 22

6

Buddhism, Christianity and the Question of Creation

The Question of Creation - the Great Stumbling Block? Indeed, the topic of creation is accompanied by a considerable history of BuddhistChristian polemics. In the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the anti-Buddhist polemic of the Jesuit missionaries in China was essentially based on the Buddha's non-aclmowledgement of a creator-god. The Buddhist claim that Buddha was an enlightened saint was repudiated with the argument: If the Buddha does not know the omnipotence and grace of the 'Lord of Heaven' in heaven and on earth, this is greatest ignorance; but ifhe knows that such a Lord exists, but does not fear nor serve Him, this is greatest rebellion. 27

Conversely, the Chinese anti-Christian pamphlets of the same period were to a large extent targeting the Christian belief in a creator-god. 28 The Buddhist and Confucian Ouyi Zhixu, considered as one of the 'four great monks' of the later Ming Dynasty, ridiculedthe Cbiistian belief in a good creator with the words: If heaven and earth and all beings were created by the 'Lord of Heaven', he would have had to select, making only what is useful and avoiding what is harmful, or if the latter was already created, he would have had to eliminate it. ... If a good craftsman in this world creates a piece of handiwork, it must be beautiful; if it happens that his result is not nice, he needs to throw it away. Hence, the most praiseworthy, spiritual, holy, truest Lord is not even on a par with a craftsman!29

In seventeenth-century Japan, the Tokugawa shogunate not only carried out extremely sanguinary persecutions of Christianity, which finally led to its almost complete extermination, it also fought against Christianity with ideological weapons, particularly by using learned religious specialists - Buddhist monks, but also apostates like Fabian Fucan - to produce anti-Christian lampoons. These scriptures were again to a large extent directed against the Christian belief in a creator. 30 After 27

The quotation refers to a discussion between Yang Tingyun and two Jesuits in 1611 or 1612 and is based on Iso Kern's German translation of the Yang Qiyuan xiansheng chaoxing shiji, pp. 2a--3a, in I. Kern, 'Matteo Riccis Verhaltnis zum Buddhismus', Monumenta Serica 36, 1984-85,65-126, p. 97. Behind such judgements stood most likely the conviction, widespread within Christianity and based on Romans 1: 18-20, that the heathen could know the existence of a creator through contemplating the creation. 28 Cpo I. Kern, Buddhistische Kritik am Christentum im China des 17. Jahrhunderts (Berne: Peter Lang 1992). 29 Quotation based on the German translation in I. Kern, Buddhistische Kritik am Christentum, op. cit., p.227. 30 Cpo G. Elison, Deus Destroyed: The Image of Christianity in Early Modem Japan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1973) and pp. 298f, 345f and 349f, 377ff. Fabian Fucan's position, however, is more differentiated. While he attacks the idea of a personal, omnipotent and benevolent creator, primarily with recourse to the problem of evil, he nevertheless regards the dhannakiiya as the primordial source of all phenomena. But, in contrast to the Christian god (according to Fabian), the dharmakiiya is beyond all characterizations and qualifications. Cpo ibid., pp. 261-7.

Introduction

7

the gradual readmission of Christianity during the second half of the nineteenth century, the polemics were revived as well. The old anti-Christian writings from the Tokugawa period were newly published together with the Chinese anti-Christian pamphlets from the late Ming dynasty and new ones were produced. Again the belief in a divine creator and the biblical creation story were among the chief polemical . targets. 31 At the same time a number of public disputations between Buddhists and Christians were camed out in Sri Lanka, where Buddhism, after 350 years of Christian colonial presence, started to see the dawn of its own revival. 32 The most famous of these debates is the one carried out in Panadura in 1873. Here, the Venerable Mohogivatte GUI).ananda derided the Christians by quoting from the Bible: Further, in Gen. vi. 6 speaking of Jehovah, the Creator, it was declared 'And it repented the Lord that he had'made man on the earth and it grieved him at his heart.' Who do usually commit actions for which they have cause to regret afterwards? Was it not ignorant, foolish man alone? and how supremely ridiculous was it for a Creator who was declared to be omniscient, to commit any actions for which it was nessessary to repent and grieve? If he were omniscient, he ought surely to have seen the consequences of his creating man, on account of which it is said he afterwards repented, and his failing to foresee this result clearly proves that the Christians' God does not possess any such foreknowing power as is attributed to him. How improper was it then to believe on such a frail, repenting and grieving being as an omnipotent God, and Creator?33

GUI).ananda enlightened his audience who the true 'creator' is: These three, heat, air and water, by whatever name known, whether as Brahma, Vishnu and Iswara, or God, Son and Holy Ghost were the identical and the only origin of species. These were their only creator .. ,34

The last remark is typical of the late nineteenth-century climate, when apologetic Buddhists in their polemical attacks on Christian creation belief regarded the rapidly developing sciences, and in particular the evolution theory, as their strongest ally.35 To mention one last example, I quote Anagarika Dharmapala (1864-1933), the great renewer of Sri Lankan Buddhism: Cpo N,R. Theile, Buddhism and Christianity in Japan: From Conflict to Dialogue, 1854-1899 (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press 1987), pp. 26-36 and 78-94. 32 Cp, K. Malalgoda, Buddhism in Sinhalese Society, 1750-1900 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 1976), particularly pp. 213-3 L 33 J. Capper, A Full Account of the Buddhist Controversy Held at Pantura (Colombo 1873), pp. 19f. 34 Ibid, pp, 7lf, 35 See also Theile's remark on the situation in Japan: '". once the Buddhist scholars recovered from the traumatic confrontation with the heliocentric theory' - 'traumatic' because it had disproved the literal understanding of traditional Buddhist cosmology with Mt Meru at the centre - 'they discovered that rather than threatening Buddhism, modern science provided them with effective weapons against Christianity'. Thelle, Buddhism and Christianity, op. cit., p, 33, 31

8 .

Buddhism, Christianity and the Question of Creation The Creator myth is condemned by the Buddha. Creation connotes a beginning. In the Buddha Dharma there is no known beginning. Before the beginning what was the Creator doing, and where did he live? A condition of things where there is no water, earth, air, heat, light, and space is unthinkable. If God rested on the waters who created the water, and if God created the water, where did he live before? Uncultured people are always very credulous. [ ... J Neither the authors of the creator myths nor the people to whom these myths were proclaimed lmew anything of the formation of the earth by slow degrees. Geology and astronomy they knew not. Muddleheaded they were; and ignorant people were made victims of priestly selfishness. 36 Speaking of deity in the sense of a Supreme Creator, Buddha says that there is no such being. Accepting the doctline of evolution as the only true one, with its corollary, the law of cause and effect, he condemns the idea of a creator and strictly forbids inquiry into it as being useless. 37

For many Christians, these refutations of a creator and the created character of the universe implied that under Buddhist premises, the attitude towards the world and the life in it could not be other than entirely negative. According to Edmund Hardy, who published a brief comparison of Buddhism and Christianity in 1890,38 Buddhism offers a view' ... of worlds coming and passing away without any other purpose than the continuation of the painful states of life until in the last being of the world the last desire for life will be exterminated' .39

Re-opening the Debate Of course, the time of harsh Buddhist-Christian polemics is over - apart from sporadic recurrences. 40 And, hopefully, the time has now come When mutual respect 36

Anagarika Dharmapala, The Arya Dharma of Sakya Muni, Gautama Buddha: Or The Ethics of Self Discipline (Calcutta: Maha Bodhi Book Agency 1917, repr. 1989), pp. 68f and 76. 37 Anagarika Dharmapala, 'The World's Debt to Buddha', in R.H. Seager (ed.), The Dawn of Religious Pluralism: Voices from the World's Parliament of Religions, 1893 (LaSalle: The Open Court 1993), 410-20, p. 417. 38 See the final chapter in E. Hardy, Der Buddhismus nach alteren Pi'ili-Werken (1890; Neue Ausgabe Munster: Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung 1919). 39 ' ... das Bild von Welten, die kommen und vergehen, ohne einen anderen Zweck zu haben, als die leidvollen Zustande des Lebens so lange fortzusetzen, bis die letzte Begierde nach Leben im letzten Weltwesen vemichtedt ist'. Ibid., p. 198. 40 An example of a recent highly polemical (polemical not only against Buddhists, but also with regards to Christians who are interested in a more sympathetic and sensitive dialogue) is P. Williams, 'Aquinas Meets the Buddhists: Prolegomenon to an Authentically Thomas-ist Basis for Dialogue', Modern Theology 20, 2004, 91-121. Williams shows little interest in understanding the Buddhist motives behind their rejection of creator-doctrines, and - among other things - he suggests the following syllogism: The Buddhist neither knows God, nor loves God, nor realizes his own createdness. Without acknowledging one's createdness, there cannot be humility. 'And without humility there can be no charity. Without charity there is no true virtue. Thus [; .. J in not knowing God the Buddhist yet again fails in his own (this time, moral) terms. And charity on our part requires that we tell him so.' Ibid., p. 110.

Introduction

9

and understanding between Buddhism and Christianity are matured enough to take a fresh look at the controversies over creator- and creation-doctrines and to make it a topic of their ongoing dialogue. The way ahead seems to me to be the same as has proven successful with regards to the theism-atheism contrast, that is, the question of creation needs further unpacking and disentanglement in order to enable a fruitful and constructive discourse. The contributions to this book41 take some important steps into this direction. The first thing to be aware of is that the Buddhist arguments against a divine creator were originally not developed in face of the Abraharnic religions, .but in confrontation with various Hindu ideas. Therefore, the first chapter, written by Ernst Steinkellner, is dedicated to 'Hindu Doctrrnes of Creation and Their Buddhist Critiques'. Despite the fact that there existed a certain variety of creation concepts in Hinduism, the idea of a creatio ex nihilo was not 'part of an accepted creationtheory'. Moreover, creation was not regarded as 'a unique event, but an eternally repeated one'. Steinkellner identifies the centre of the Buddhist critique as the problematic relationship 'between a permanent entity and impermanent entities' problematic because, due to the absence of a creatio ex nihilo concept, both, creator and creation, were understood as being on the same level of reality. vVhile the earliest Buddhist objections are connected with the problem of evil and with human responsibility, the latter philosophical discussion - exemplified through Dharmaklrti (seventh century CE) - primarily revolves around the concept of causality. In Chapter 2 Jose Cabez6n deals with 'Three Buddhist Views of the Doctrines of Creation and Creator', and he does so not only by presenting and analysing Buddhist critiques, but also by introducing the respective Buddhist alternatives. Two of these views come from contemporary Buddhist thinkers, Gunapala Dharmasiri and the XIVth Dalai Lama, who at least in part developed their concepts in face of and in distinction from Christian ideas and with regards to contemporary scientific perspectives. But Cabez6n also draws the reader's attention to the traditional Mahayana view that Buddhas have - and, out of their compassion, indeed actualizethe power to create Buddha-fields, in which sentient beings find the best conditions for achieving enlightenment. Drawing on the Vimalaklrtinirdda S£itra, Cabez6n makes the exciting suggestion that Mahayanists could regard all worlds as Buddhafields whose essential purity is not perceived because it is veiled by karmic ignorance. What the three views presented have in common is their repudiation of a single 'first cause' of the universe. But this - as Cabez6n demonstrates - does not rule out various theories of 'localized creation'. What, then, about the Tantric theory that a 'primordial Buddha' (iidibuddha) is the creator of all phenomena? Cabez6n points out how the Dalai Lama interprets this doctrine as referring to the dharmakiiya, not in 41

The contributions to Part One are based on the presentations and discussions of the Fifth Conference of the European Network of Buddhist-Christian Studies (Samye Ling, 16-19 May 2003). For the history of the Network and a brief account of its former conferences see A. Lande, 'Interreligious Fellowship: A Kind of Pilgrimage?', SMT Swedish Missiological Themes 90, 2004, pp. 5-16.

Buddhism, Christianity and the Question of Creation

any unitary sense which would make it an independent, god-like entity, but as a creative element within each individual being, perhaps being co-creative together with some form of 'quantized' raw material. The topic of a primordial Buddha and his/her creative function is further pursued in Eva Neumaier's chapter on 'Buddhist Forms of Belief in Creation'. Beginning with Buddhist cosmological myths and their 'Sitz im Leben' of the ordinary Buddhist people, Neumaier asks how Buddhists explained the ontological ground of the universe. While it is true that questions like this were rejected as unanswerable, and hence futile, in the Piili tradition, they were nevertheless tackled in later developments of Buddhism, especially in the Tantric tradition. A particularly strong example for this is a Tibetan scripture from the fourteenth century, entailing some significantly older parts, named the All Creating Sovereign (Kun byed rgyal po). The 'all-creating sovereign' or 'king', the 'father' or 'mother' of all things, is here presented as the Buddha, but in the sense of the 'original mind' and ultimately as an ineffable, indescribable ground. Neumaier suggests not to understand this as 'some solid ontological base' , nor as a kind of personal creator-god, but as a symbolization of the universal emptiness (Hmyata) which in its original meaning is related to 'swollenlhollow' and thus carries the connotation of a fertile abdominal cavity 'releasing the universe from Its vacuity'. To see the phenomenal world as a manifestation of ultimate· reality prohibits its interpretation as merely a source of suffering, but enables its perception as 'the wonder of ceaseless creation'. Underlining the ineffability of the ultimate, Neumaier draws a parallel with the concept - or better, non-concept - of God in Nicholas of Cusa. In response to the question why the Ultimate is nevertheless presented as a 'sovereign' or 'king', Neumaier hypothetically suggests, with recourse to some impulses from 'Critical Buddhism', that this might reflect the political power structures of that time. The following chapters of Part One, dealing with Christian perspectives on the issue of creation, start with Armin Kreiner's reflection on 'Creation and the Problem of Evil'. The problem of evil- or better, the conviction that this problem cannot be solved on theistic grounds and therefore lends itself as a kind of counter-argument against the existence of a creator-god - has not only a long history in the West, where it served as the 'rock of atheism' (Georg Buchner), but has also played an important role in Buddhist critiques of creator-doctrines whether of Hindu or Christian provenance. Kreiner provides a sketch of the so-called 'free will defence', of which he is a well-known representative. This attempt to demonstrate the compatibility of an omnipotent and benevolent creator on the one hand and the reality of evil on the other takes recourse to the value of creatures who are supplied with significant and responsible free choice. The logical implication of free agents in any morally significant sense is that they have 'the option to cause pain and suffering to others' and 'cannot be controlled thoroughly' if they are really meant to be free. The value of such freedom is intrinsically connected with other crucial personal values, that is, the values of spiritual and human maturation in a world with real challenges and dangers to which humans must respond freely.

Introduction

11

Buddhist objections to the idea of a divine creator are directly addressed in John Keenan's chapter, 'Refuting Some Buddhist Arguments about Creation and Adopting Buddhist Philosophy about Salvation History'. As the title of his chapter suggests, Keenan takes a twofold approach. On the one hand, he refutes some of the Buddhist arguments as inadequate to the truly transcendent nature of the divine, which - according to Keenan - is not 'a being among beings', but 'the very act of existing itself' . On the other hand, Keenan adopts the Mahayana hermeneutics of the 'two truths' and applies it to the biblical salvation history to which the creation story .belongs as a kind of 'prequel'. Hence, salvation history is seen as 'the dependent arising of our human history'. In a similar vein, Keenan understands the Mahayana Buddhist worldview as a reinterpretation in which the world is no longer 'merely ... the realm of delusion and suffering, but ... the field of intelligent and compassionate bodhisattva action'. While Keenan is thus defending Buddhism against the overall critique of being a world-denying religion, Aasulv Lande is raising exactly the question whether Buddhism, despite rejecting the idea of a creator, might nevertheless be able to share 'the attitudes of creation theology', that is, 'a positive acceptance of the material dimension of life'. In 'Creation and Process Theology - a Question to Buddhism', Lande frames this question within the context of Scandinavian Grundtvigian theology and Whiteheadian process theology, a central category for both being 'creativity' in the sense of a process of divine creatio continua and human cocreativity. After discussing the Buddhist capacity for modernization, Lande suggests that the Buddhist notion of karma could be the closest functional parallel to 'creativity',' for in both cases 'there is an awareness of the human situation as basically conditioned, but also open to change'. However, this observation leads to another series of intriguing questions which Lande leaves open for further dialogue: Does the karmic process have an aim, an internal purpose? Is it oriented towards the establishment of nirvafJa, thereby constituting 'a kind of Buddhist salvation history'? And if so, would such a purpose be the 'deliverance from physical reality' or the 'fulfilment or transformation of physical reality'? The respective attitudes of Christianity and Buddhism towards 'creation' or 'nature' are also discussed in the next chapter, which focuses on the global challenge of the ecological crisis and the resulting call for an ecological awareness. Despite their differences regarding a creator and hence the 'creation', both of these religious visions can and do 'serve as the basis of similar or identical actions'. But, asks John D' Arcy May in his chapter on 'Buddhists, Christians and Ecology', is theoretical dissent paired with practical consent everything that we are left with? In his detailed discussion, May suggests that 'ethical action' is indeed 'the common basis for the inter-religious relationship'; however, at least part of the truth of different doctrinal statements can be seen precisely in their function to 'symbolize the "rightness" ofthe same actions'. While this conception draws the practical and doctrinal level of religious expression closer together, as appears at first sight, there still remains the difference between a Christian vision, which speaks about the liberation of nature,

Buddhism, Christianity and the Question of Creation

while Buddhism envisages a liberationji-omnature - a difference which is grounded and expressed in the respective attitudes towards the creator!creation-belief. Buddhism's and Christianity's capacity for jointly 'promoting ecological awareness' is thereby not jeopardized. But shortcomings on both sides and their comrilon need to be "'earthed" in "primal" religious traditions' may thus become clearer. The question of doctrinal incompatibility is taken up in Part Two. The numerous new aspects and innovative considerations presented by the Buddhist and Christian perspectives of Part One allow for, and indeed require, new theologicaVphilosophical considerations: Does Christian and Buddhist thinking on 'creation' really constitute an 'unbridgeable gulf' between the two traditions? Or is there some truth on both sides? Would it be possible to envisage something like a Buddhist-Christian theology of creation? The chapters of the second part present an attempt to explore this hitherto uncharted land. 42 The proposed theological venture rests on three pillars: first, the promising results of Buddhist-Christian dialogue; second, a thorough and serious appreciation of the motives behind the Buddhist critique of creator-doctrines; and third, the hermeneutical latitude provided by both traditions. That is, philosophicaltheological tradition in both religions indeed provides some ideas which can be seen as convergent and which may provide solid stones for a bridge over the doctrinal gulf. This presupposes and requires the liberty to engage with the doctrinal heritage of both traditions in a somewhat selective and creative manner. The justification for this does not come from the needs of inter-religious diplomacy, but from the joint quest for truth which cannot avoid loolting at traditions critically and selectively. Taking a detailed analysis of Buddhist arguments against a divine creator as a starting point, it is suggested that the Buddhist notion of karma, if understood in the context of a soteriological teleology, could be regarded as afunctional equivalent to the Christian claim that God is not only the redeemer, but also the creator of the world. Whether in the ancient Hindu-Buddhist or in the modern Christian-Buddhist controversies, the great alternative seemed to be: Is creation karmic or divine? But in the future, it is this alternative itself that might be questioned. At least, it must not necessarily be understood as the sort of exclusivist antagonism as which it was proposed again and again in the past.

42

I am very grateful to Carolina Weening, who helped considerably with improving the style and clarity of these chapters.

PART ONE BUDDHIST AND CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE ISSUE OF CREATION

Chapter 1

l-Iindu Doctrines of Creation and Their Buddhist Critiques Ernst Steinkellner

Some Preliminary Considerations At the very beginning of this chapter, a short note of apology seems to be appropriate. When the editor confirmed my positive answer to the invitation to write this contribution, I felt flattered by his words 'I am glad that you approach the area of Buddhist philosophy not only with a philological and historical interest, but also with a philosophical one - this, after all, makes it really interesting.' I felt flattered, because in my youth philosophy appeared to me to be the peak of human activities. Throughout my working life, I nonetheless never even came near these high ranges, and while facing the task of preparing this paper I had to admit to myself that my philosophical interest is actually quite minimal by now, and more and more my hopes focus rather on philology strictly speaking, especially when the questions to be addressed are within the framework of 'Buddhist-Christian Dialogue'. For 'philology', as I would like to understand it, is an area of exercise in the never-ending social process of understanding information which originates from human sources with the intention to be understood by another human being, thus providing a basis for a dialogue which aims at mutual understanding rather than at preparing for nonverbal application of sticks or bombs. The inter-linguistic and inter-cultural difficulties and impediments that are met with are well known.l Projects like the present one, however, testify to the fact that a possibility to overcome these difficulties in a meaningful way is still to be hoped for, and is certainly preferable to the alternatives of cultural solipsism and military monism which result from intellectual attitudes such as those of the recently fashionable hermeneutical despair. Intra-culturally, we are confronted with similar difficulties. Debates between different strands of Indian societies, too, are held in the same language and use roughly the same logical forms, and yet they often tend to end in irreconcilable differences. Precise conceptual clarity and neatness is therefore required in order to Cf. the 'Concluding Remarks' in R. Jackson, 'Dharmakrrti's refutation of theism', Philosophy East and West 36/4, 1986, 315-48, pp. 338-42.

16·

Buddhist and Christian Perspectives on Creation

discover the - mostly - silent presuppositions brought into such debates based on backgrounds of different social conditions, motivations, and aims. In my following attempt to fulfil the task requested in the title of my paper, I shall naturally stay within the borders of the Indian culture. And, in order not to be possibly misread in an inter-cultural discourse, I will try, as closely as possible, to identify the key concepts by their function in context. In addition, in order to do justice to those key concepts also within intra-cultural debates, we must take into account both the starting point and the direction of these debates. For, as a rule, a specific polemical argument tends to be selective and limitative from the beginning: it chooses targets and prepares them for easier destruction through weapons wielded in the owner's factory. Consequently, the theories and concepts of the party under polemical attack are always broader and more meaningful in their natural and homogeneous conceptual environment than when put up as isolated targets in polemics. I shall therefore structure my paper in the following way: before looking at the various arguments developed by Buddhist traditions and philosophers, I will introduce some examples of 'creation' concepts from the early brahmanical and Hindu context which the Buddhists respond to in their critiques. This should reveal at least the more important reasons for their polemical efforts and identify the specific types of their targets. Since the Buddhists were quite selective, targeting not even all the main Indian doctrines of creation, this survey will really be no more than a typological one, with no comprehensiveness intended. Subsequently, I will summarize the historical development of the Buddhist arguments, attempt to identify the Buddhists' reasons for their critical enterprise, and finally, I shall present inmore detail, but again only as an example, a particular argument which was elaborated by one of the most influential and differentiating Buddhist philosophers, Dharmakirti. It will remain to be seen whether any of these arguments can be transferred meaningfully to the Christian-Buddhist dialogue, and whether any objective can be seen in such an enterprise. Nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Buddhists tried to use their traditional polemical lore to confront Christian ideas in much the same way as it had been used against the concepts developed by Indian theistic traditions. This, however, is not my topic, and will be dealt with in a later chapter. 2

Creator and Creation in Traditional Hindu Thought 'Creation' together with its various explanations in India is an answer to the question of 'Why are we, here and now?' The question is searching for a first cause. By the time of the Buddha's appearance, many answers had already been given. Starting from the later parts of the J].gveda to the earlier Upani~ads, mythic notions of beginnings within a pre-existing set-up of the Vedic gods prevailed. 3 Some 2 3

Cf. Jose Cabezon's contribution in Chapter 3. Cf. Jackson, op. cit. (fn. 1), p. 317; H. von Stietencron, Der Hinduismus (Munich: C.H. Beck 2001), p.21.

Hindu Doctrines of Creation and Buddhist Critiques

17

cosmo gonic hymns of the ~gveda speak of a personal creator-god, Visvakarman ('Whose acting is the universe'), who as a priest carries out creation as a sacrifice, and who works with pre-existing unformed material in the manner of a craftsman. In the hymn to puru:;a ('man') (~gveda 10.90), we find the idea of an emanation of the universe, including the macro cosmos and our worldly surrounding with its social institutions, from a single entity, the puru:;a, as causa materialis. This is a clearly monistic tradition, identifying the cause as 'the One' (tad ekam), but naming it by the names of the great Vedic gods Indra, VaruI).a, or Agni. 4 The early Upani:;ads identified this Vedic 'One' with brahman, the truth of the Vedic word and reality of everything existent, the source and substance of the world in matter and consciousness, and finally identified this impersonal principle with the conscious core in living beings, the 'Self' (atman). Vedic polytheism thus gave way to Upani~adic monism, and the Vedic gods were relegated to the realm of the finite with their tasks. The absolute brahman does not necessarily require a creator of the universe. The created world could be seen as being only phenomenal, an illusion, and a falsely imagined transformation of the ultimate reality. Such ideas do not, however, exclude the assumption of a temporarily active creator-god as long as the impersonality of the absolute brahman is not associated with a function. Materialistic monism is known as wel~, in which creation is seen as an 'outflow' (sr:;,ti), or in a dualistic garb, in which an active undifferentiated primal matter (prakrti) creates by transforming itself for the purpose of inactive but observing units of consciousness (puru:;a).

Along with these atheistic ideas of creation we also find personalistic-theistic concepts developing from late-Vedic monism. The Vedic 'One' was assumed to exist, have a wish to create and a consciousness to know what is to be created in all its details. Such a wishful and conscious 'One', however, can hardly be a neutral principle, but must be a personal one. The alternative to an unfathomable brahman without form and qualities (nirgulJLl) is thus a personal God with qualities (sagulJLl), an agent of creation of the world, as well as its upkeep and destruction, the masculine god brahman (nom. brahmii) with only a shift oUhe .accent. He is not known in the Veda, but Vedic and early Upani~adic mythic notions, for example, the 'lord of creatures' (prajapati) or the 'golden (that is, eternal) germ' (hiraIJyagarbha) were seen as 'the One' that has subsequently taken form as a personal God, the Lord of creation, Prajapati or Puru~a in the Veda, later Bhagavan and Isvara, who designs the elements and laws of ~ature, and starts the process of creating all living beings beginning with the various gods. Theories of rebirth and a cyclic conception of the cosmos were also developed in this period and completed the notion of a highest personal God: at the end of a world-period, this God takes both the world and its creatures back into himself. Formless neuter brahman before creation, that is, the 4

Cf. K. Preisendanz, 'Die vedische Tradition als Hintergrund fur den fruhen Buddhismus: einige ausgewahlte philosophische Aspekte', in Buddhisl11us in Geschichte und Gegenwart, Band IV (Universitat Hamburg 2000), pp. 37-54.

18 .

Buddhist and Christian Perspectives on Creation

moment when the 'golden genn' is born, is god Brahman (brahman) as long as the world, space, time and creatures exist. Therefore, a relationship between the eternal creator and creatures is possible, and no alternative is left to this monotheistic option: he creates and supports, he is omniscient, omnipotent and eternal. The Vedic gods have now become part of the circle of finite existences, even if long-lasting. This highest personal and eternal God is subsequently identified by historically and socially different groups, the representatives of the developing Hindu religions, under the various names praised, loved and feared, for example by Vai?I).ava believers as Vi?I).u, Kg;I).a, Riirna, or by Saiva believers as Siva. s These early theistic tendencies, becoming monotheistic traditions and finally Hindu religions properly speaking, incorporate the inherited basic structure of identity or difference between transcendent and immanent aspects of the ultimate being in different ways. Roughly, it can be said that the Supreme Being brahman is personalized in the sense that a creative aspect is attributed to it: it is assumed to be responsible for the origin and order of the cosmos. The idea of a transcendent, allpervading; inactive and impersonal principle, the late-Vedic brahman, remains alive, however, for in many of the mythic accounts of the creation that are available, for example, in the Manu Smrti or in various Pural"!as, the actual creation of the world lies in the hands of a demiurge. Often, the god Brahman is given this special task, but the demiurge may also be seen as the creative power (maya, sakti) or a manifestation (vy£iha) of the ultimate reality. What these general myths and later theologies then present are elaborate variations on the answers to two main questions: How did God create the world? And why did God create the world? The general scarcity of written sources for centuries of oral tradition allows only for a hypothetical history of these developments: they begin already in the last parts of the ~gveda, and become stronger around the time of the Buddha's activity, the fifth to fourth centuries BCE, during the first North Indian empire of the Nandas, and the time of the Maurya dynasty. With the development of the classical Indian philosophical traditions from the last centuries BCE onwards, we can assume that the theistic conceptions, which so far were only asserted in the fonn of mythic accounts, finally begin to receive theoretical justifications. I cannot touch upon the question of why God created the world, and the direction of this chapter does not allow for a comprehensive survey of the variations in the manner of his creation. 6 I would offer, rather, a typology of concepts of creation, and exemplify the two types proposed respectively. Their main difference seems to consist in whether an all-pervading or only a limited function of God is assumed to be the cause of the world. For God may be seen as being both, the material and the instrumental or efficient cause of the world, or only its instrumental cause. 5 Cf. I. Gonda, Die Religionen Indiens. I: Veda und alterer Hinduismus; II: Der jungere Hinduismus (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer 1960, 1963). 6 Cf. M. Biardeau, Cosmogonies pUriil!iques: Etude de mythologie hindou, Tome 1 (Paris: Ecole Fran~aise D'Extreme Orient 1981); M. Pfeiffer, Indische My then vom Werden der Welt: Texte, Strukturen, Geschichte (Berlin: Reimer 1994).

Hindu Doctrines of Creation and Buddhist Critiques

19

The first type of creation theory can perhaps be characterized as evolutionary. It aims at harmonizing a monotheistic position with the ancient idea of an original transcendent unity of impersonal being. An example is the creation theory of the vi~I:lUitic Paficaratra tradition.? Here, two main stages of creation are distinguished, a higher or pure one (Suddhasarga), and a lower or gross one. Vi~I).u, the ultimate being, walcens Lak~mi, his Sakti ('Power'). Why remains a mystery, for even 'diversion' (lui!) given as an answer is not satisfying in the case of a perfect being. Vi~I).u's 'Power' is twofold as action and becoming, that is, as the instrumental and material cause of the world. This 'Power' , which is nothing but Vi~I).u' s will to create, is symbolized by God's discus-weapon (Sudarsana), and is understood to be the principle that supports and orders the world. 'Manifestations' (vy£iha) and 'appearances' (avatiira) of Vi~I).u as part of this pure creation enrich the possibilities of special kinds of divine support. The second stage of creation includes categories such as miiyii (,power of illusion'), the gur;as (,constituent qualities of primal matter'), the natural law of karman and its character of necessity, and kiila ('time'). In fact, the whole system of evolutionary products developed in the philosophical tradition of the Sankhya is included as a distinct kind of creation called 'creation from primal matter' (pradhiinasarga), to which the final step, 'creation by Brahman' (brahmasarga), is added in order to incorporate the traditional epic accounts. All this sets limitations for the evolving products and increasing estrangement of these products from their original perfection and purity. When the last essence (tattva), earth, is evolved, the activity of the Manus, the fathers of mankind, begins. According to the second type of creation theory, God is thought to be an eternal 'supreme soul' (paramiitman) or even a special substance separate from other eternal elements of being. The idea of creation by a 'creator-god' (zsvara) as developed in the philosophical traditions of Vaise~ika and Nyaya may serve as an example in this case, 8 for their conceptions are the main targets of the later Buddhist polemics. These brahmanical philosophical traditions, which eventually merged to a certain extent, seem to have been conceived in their beginnings as atheistic systems for explaining the modes of bondage into an unsatisfying worldly existence and the means of liberation from the same. It is generally agreed that, considered as a whole, there was no need in these systems to consider an Isvara as a necessary component in the cycles of cosmic formation, existence and dissolution. Material atom-shaped elements as well as souls existed without beginning, that is, eternally, and thus were not created. The movements of the atomic elements, resulting in various combinations of matter and souls at the beginning and their dissolution at the end of world-periods, is caused Cf. J. Gonda, op. cit. (fn. 5), Vol. II, pp. 121f.; for a new detailed explanation, cf. M. Rastelli, Philosophisch-theologische Grundanschauungen der Jayiikhyasmnhitii: Mit einer Darstellung des tiiglichen Rituals (Vienna: Verlag der Osterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 1999), pp. ' 39-94. 8 Cf. G. Chemparathy, 'Autkommen und Entwicklung der Lehre von einem hochsten Wesen im N yaya und Vaisesika (unpublished dissertation, University of Vienna 1963),

7

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Buddhist and Christian Perspectives on Creation

by an impersonal, unconscious, omnipotent force, called 'the invisible' (adr~.ta). This force is the product of both the good and bad activities (karman) ofliving beings, and is responsible for all phenomena not explainable by natural causes. At a certain stage, this explanation was no longer considered satisfactory. For how could an unconscious (acetana) 'Invisible' direct the process of building a universe and then even be responsible for keeping it in order?9 In addition, pressure from li'1e side of theistic movements - in this case from Saiva circles (Pasupata) - resulted in introducing the lSvara into these systems. IO Isvara, that is, Siva, now assumed the role of supervising (adhi~.thatr) the 'Invisible' in its activities of combining the elements and souls during the periods of creation and dissolution, as well as sustaining order during world-periods. Here, the concept of God is qualified by three main functions: God as creating (kartr) the world, God as supervising (adhi~.thatr) the fate and order of both living beings and the world, and God as pronouncing the Vedic scriptures (vedakartr), the concept of God as creator being the basic idea of the theology developing in these traditions. God, in this context, is understood, of course, only as being the instrumental cause (nimittakaraTJa) of the world, an aspect that is underlined by the introduction of an additional derniurge. I take as example a mythic account of creation that is found in the Pada rthadharmasaTigraha, a systematic commentary on the Vai§e~ikasiitras from the sixth century CE, although this account is probably older:!1 The dissolution of the world is followed by a period of Siva's repose of 'a hundred Brahman-years' (that is, 864000000000 human years). Following this, Siva desires to re-create the universe to provide a possibility for living beings to experience the fruits of their karman. Subsequently 'the Invisible' then starts its activity of combining the ultimate atoms into gross, that is, composite, elements. To quote: 12 When in this way the four composite elements have come into existence, a great egg comes into being solely because of God's (Mahdvara's) meditationvolition (abhidhyiina) out of atoms of fire mixed with atoms of earth. In this (egg) (God) causes Brahma to arise (utpiidya), with four faces ... , the grandfather of all the worlds, and with all the worlds. He then enjoins him with the duty of creating living beings (prajiisarga). That Brahma, thus enjoined by God and endowed with eminent knowledge, detachment and power, knows the effects of the (previous) deeds of living beings. He creates the Prajapatis, [etc.] ... and 9 Cf. Chemparathy , op. cit. (fn. 8), pp. 116f. 10 The recent discussion of this event in case of the Vaise~ika system is summarized in A Meutrath, 'Beobachtungen zur Komposition und Redaktionsgeschichte der Vaise~i1(asiitras 1.1', Wiener Zeitschriftfiirdie Kunde Siidasiens43, 1999, 109-37, pp.l09-14. 11 Cf. Chemparathy, op. cit. (fn. 8), pp. 8f.; J. Bronkhorst, 'God's Arrival in the Vaisesika System', Journal of Indian Philosophy 24, 1996, pp. 286f.; J. Bronkhorst, 'MimaIT,lsa versus Vaisesika: Parthasarathi and Kumarila on the Creation and Dissolution of the World', in R. Torella (ed.), Le parole e i marmi: Studi.in onore di Raniero Gnoli ne! suo 70° compleanno (Roma: Istituto Italiano per l' Africa e I'Oriente 2001), 171-81, pp. 176f. 12 From Bronkhorst, 'God's Arrival', op. cit. (fn. 11) p. 286 (with some deviations).

Hindu Doctrines of Creation and Buddhist Critiques

21

the other living beings, high and low. He then connects them with Dharma, knowledge, detachment and power in accordance with their residue of past deeds.

What is common to both types of creation theories is the assumption of an eternal, either impersonally or personally interpreted cause of the world, to which possibilities of considerable further variations are added by different conceptions of causality, such that the eternal cause may either be seen as transforming itself into its products, or as causing new ones. 'Creation' in this context, therefore, is either the beginning of an evolutionary process within an ultimate being, or the beginning of a generative process in which a sovereign consciousness combines independent elements of similar eternity. In all Indian traditions, 'creation' is also not a unique event, but an eternally repeated one. And this cyclic perception of world-periods is the reason for the fact that the concept of a creation 'without a cause' (ahetuka) or 'from nothing', although theoretically known, has never become part of an accepted creation theory.

Presuppositions ofthe Buddhist Anti-theistic Critique All this forms part of the background of ideas in front of which and - as I prefer to think - against which the Buddha shaped his analysis of worldly existence. The so-called 'three characteristics' (trilakijal'}a) of existence, for example, which constitute the framework of all later Buddhist ontologies are clearly formulated as contradictory to those of the highest being in the monistic and early monotheistic traditions. These characteristics of existence (bhiiva) are all negations: 'non-eternal' (anitya), 'non-self' (aniitman) and 'suffering', or better: 'non-satisfactory, distressful'13 (duJ;kha), and negate the essential characteristics of the ultimate being, brahman, as eternal, as personal, and as blissful. The Buddha's characteristics mutually support each other, but 'suffering' is, as a rule, directly derived from 'non-eternal'. 'Non-eternal' together with 'non-self', therefore, can be considered to be the core concepts of every Buddhist analysis of existence. It is because of this analysis as a fundamental condition of the Buddhist tradition that it was always strongly opposed to the idea of an eternal and personal god as creator (kartr) and supervisor (adhiij,thatr) of the universe. With the historical and religious transformations of the Buddha's traditi?p - from the origins and early Buddhism to the various developments within Mahayana Buddhism and Buddhist Tantrism up to the modern forms of Buddhism in our timeswe encounter ideas, side by side, that seem to contradict these basic notions: e.g., the idea of an eternal Buddha in the second part of the Lotus SUtra and with Nichiren in thirteenth-century Japan, or the theologies developed around the supreme sovereignty of the Buddha Amitabha. 14 A certain tension between the efforts to refute 13

14

The term dU!lkha is to be taken as an adjective meaning 'that which causes suffering'. Cf. T. Vetter, 'Atheistic and Theistic Tendencies in Buddhism', Studies in Interreligious Dialogue 6, 1996, pp. 76-85.

·22

Buddhist and Christian Perspectives on Creation

the existence of God as a perfect supreme being and the cause and holder of the universe on the one hand, and their own ideas about the nature of the ultimate, Nirval).a or Buddha, which often are expressed in terms appropriate to God as well on the other, seems to accompany later Buddhism, especiallY in its various Mahayanist forms.15 Occasionally, this tension seems to coagulate into a veritable selfcontradiction. In order to overcome this apparent contradiction, we best resort to the Mahayanist notion of 'two realities' (satyadvaya): a relative or finite one, and an absolute or real one. If we may apply this distinction to interpret the early heritage, we can say that 'the Buddha', when he proposed an intellectual method for release from the eternal unsatisfying circle of existences, namely by analysing its different constituents body, feeling, notions, dispositions, and perceptions - was referring conceptually to the Upani;;adic idea of a truly existing, eternal, unchanging and therefore blissfully satisfying Self. But he does not mention such a Self. He states merely that what we normally consider to be a Self - that is, any of the named constituents or their combination - cannot be a Self, because such a Self could not be harmed or diminished. Admittedly, in general terms, this means that the Buddha, in his analysis, .keeps to the realm of the finite, the world in which we find ourselves. The other realm is not of his immediate concern. Silence and occasional metaphors seem to have been his answers to insistent inquiries in this direction. There is, however, also no outright . negation. 16 Any discourse on 'creation' refers to the finite realm of existences here and now. Buddhist polemics against Hindu concepts of creation, but also against an eternal God in his function as creator, therefore refer to the same realm of reality. The Buddhists assume worldly existence to be caused by previous deeds (karman).17 In order to explain this in detail, the Buddha proposed the concept of 'origination in dependence' (pratztyasamutpiida).18 This 'sentence', which, in its classical form, distinguishes a causally connected series (upanibandha) of twelve members as the main causes and conditions of rebirth, offers, like a flashlight illuminating a certain section of the cycle of existence, an explanation of the cycle's origin (samudaya), and at the same time provides the structure of its possible ending (nirodha). It is not to be understood as the Buddha's 'theory of causality'. Since the members of this origination are causally connected, however, in the form 'when this is the case, that arises' (asmin satzdalrJ bhavati), causality as such is an undisputed presupposition. Existence, then, is an interplay without beginning of the 'groups' or 'branches' Cf. R. Jackson, 'Atheology and Buddhalogy in DharmakIrti's Pramiinaviirttika', Faith and Philosophy 1614, 1999, pp. 472-505. 16 Cf.. E. Steinkellner, 'Lamotte and the Concept of anupalabdhi', Asiatische Studien 46,1, 1992, pp. 388-410. 17 Cf. Abhidharmakosa 4.1a: karmaja l11 lokavaicitryam. 18 Cf. L Schmithausen, 'Zur zWiilfgliedrigen Formel des Entstehens in Abhangigkeit', Horin 7, 2000, pp.41-76. 15

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23

(skandha) - body/matter, feeling, and so on - perpetuated by the likewise beginningless main binding causes of 'misconception' or 'wrong orientations' (avidyii) and craving for life and lust (tr~l'}ii). Because of the experience of change in everything existent, the reality at hand can only be impermanent, .non-eternal. In discussing creation theories that involve an eternal principle in order to explain continuity and the order of the cosmos, the relationship between a permanent entity and impermanent entities, therefore, is a major point for developing Buddhist arguments. The other main point is the assumption of a conscious agent in causal processes, especially identified in acts of creation. The Buddha understands causal processes, material as well as emotional and mental ones, as taking place among the constituents of existence that are, as such, not a Self, that is, impersonal. This is because they do not last; or stated inversely: therefore, they do not last Such basic notions resulting from the Buddha's analysis of existence - to be equated roughly with the first and second of the four Noble Truths - have to be considered as silent presuppositions in all Buddhist refutations of concepts of creation that involve an eternal and conscious personal creator. 19 Buddhist critiques of Hindu doctrines of creation are focused on the impossibility of such a creation because of the impossibility of an eternal, omniscient and omnipotent Master of the universe. However, presuppositions of this kind do not prevent the Buddhist tradition from occasionally transporting veritable accounts of creation as part of their own mythic lore. A striking example is the Aggafifia Sutta (Dlghanikiiya 27) which T.W. Rhys Davids, its first translator, called 'A Book of Genesis'. This account has always been taken by all Buddhists 'as being a more or less straight-faced account of how the universe, and in particular society, originated' .20 The god Brahman, the creator-god in this story, seems to have been always acceptable to all Buddhists on the silent (!) assumption that he is presented here as a demiurge of impermanent nature. Thus, Brahman functions just like any of the other gods in the Indian pantheons who are considered useful for a specific task for the world and-its beings which is assigned to them, and in the realization of which they are consuming the fruits of their own specific karmic heritage. However, that this story came to be regarded as 'the Buddha's' account of creation in the canonical tradition and even later is evidently due to the fact that the real purpose and style of this Sutta and its various allusions were not properly understood from very early on in the formation of the canonical literature, Richard Gombrich recently and convincingly found that, in fact, it is to be read as a mockery of Brahmin conceptions,21 and he was able to show that 'the Buddha' in this discourse was 'setting out both to deny the Brahmin view of the origin of society and to make fun of it' ,22 19 Cf. Jackson, op, cit. (fn, 1), pp, 339f. 20 R. Gombrich, 'The Buddha's Book of Genesis?' ,Indo-Iranian loumaI3512-3, 1992,159-78, p. 161. 21 Cf. ibid, 22 Ibid., p. 163,

· 24

Buddhist and Christian Perspectives on Creation

An Outline of the Buddhist Arguments The Buddhist refutations differ to some extent in their forms of expression according to the general development of the culture of debate and the formulation of arguments on the one hand, and, on the other, as conditioned by the specific aims of the types of literature conveying them. In terms of their contents, the arguments propounded are rather limited. They were developed in refutations coming from the early Madhyamalca school or, more importantly, from the dogmatic treatises of the SarvastiVada school, prominently represented in the writings of Vasubandhu, the author of the classical dogmatic treatise the Abhidharrnakosa and its commentary. After the middle of the first millennium CE, the Buddhist philosopher Dignaga (c. 480-540 CE) finally succeeded in being broadly accepted by Indian intellectuals in the essential points of his logic. Subsequently, proof as well as refutation of God as creator of the world were now subject to more formal rules of logic, presented and discussed accordingly, and became the task of specialists. Simplified, it can be said of this period that on the side of the theistic traditions, the brahmanical Nyaya school, and on the side of the Buddhist, the tradition of Dignaga, and from the seventh century of Dharmaklrti and his followers, represented opposing parties on the battlefield. Up to the time ofthe disappearance of the Buddhist 'atheists' from Indian soil under the onslaught of the Muslims, the new and less tolerant theists in India, this contest flourished richly both philosophically and logically, in which the problem of God's existence and activity was developed in all its logical perspectives. 23 As an early stage in the development of Buddhist refutations, the Nikiiyas of the Fali canon seem to represent a period in which the idea of a creator-god was mainly mocked and ridiculed. As a rule, the god Brahma - in fact, he is better known from such Buddhist travesties then from early Indian monotheistic circles - is the victim24 as, for example, in the Brahrnajiilasutta: 25 Brahma is the first being to arise at the beginning of a new cycle. Lonely, he wishes for companions. When they appear, he wrongly thinks they were created by his wish, instead of realizing that, in fact, they had arisen because of their own karmic causes. Real arguments are still rare in this literature. Rejection on the grounds of the adicy, however, already occurs on various occasions: 26 If God created the universe and conducted its order, man would not be morally responsible and God would not be benevolent, since evils and suffering are his creation too. The argument of human morality's depreciation is also repeated -in the Buddhacarita of the poet Asvagho~a 23

For a comprehensive survey of this dispute and its logical topics over roughly half a millennium, cf. R. Krasser, Sai1karanandanas Isvariipakarm.wsai1k1epa mit einem anonymen Kommentar und weiteren Materialien zur buddhistischen Cottespolemik. Tei! 2: Annotierte Ubersetzungen mit einer Studie zur Auseinandersetzung iiber die Existenz Cottes (Vienna: Verlag der Osterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 2002), pp. 15-142. 24 Cf. Aitguttaranikiiya I, p. 174; Dlghanikaya I, pp. 235ff. 25 Cf.DzghanikiiyaI,pp.17-19. 26 Cf. Aizguttaranikiiya I, p. 174; liitaka V, p. 238.

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25

(first century CE).27 In general, however, the Suttas prefer rather to compare the certainty in the Buddha's proposals for a goal of spiritual efforts with the aims of theistic devotees, for example, 'companionship. with God' (brahma-sahavyatCi), which are dismissed.as being ridiculous (hassaka) and vain (rittaka), for these devotees are striving towards something of which no one has anyevidence. 28 The founder of the Madhyamaka philosophical school of Mahayana Buddhism, Nagarjuna (c. 200 CE), aimed at establishing the truth of 'dependent origination' on the level of relative reality. To this end, he used traditional lists of alternatives proposed as causes for worldly existence, God among them. 29 Such alternatives, or God alone, are also discussed in a number of works of questionable origin, but attributed to Nagarjuna. 30 God as cause is also a target of Bhavya, a major polemic of this school,3! as well as of the didactic poet Santideva. 32 Similarly, the arguments derived from theodicy are presented here in many variations, but also an argument from causality is elaborated which refutes God on the grounds that as he is only one - that is, single and permanent - it cannot be explained how he could be active at all. The historical origin and development of this argument is still unclear to me. It provides for the main argumentation in Vasubandhu's Abhidhannakosabha.:jYa,33 and its essential parts are already found in the first great dogmatic summa of the Sarvastivada school, the Maha.vibha.~a.:34 (a) If Isvara is the cause of everything, then he must create everything at once (since efficiency implies immediate causation); (b) if he requires help, then he is not the sole cause; (c) if he is undifferentiated and eternal, so must be his effects (since effect must resemble cause); (d) since effects are known to be impermanent, their alleged permanent cause has no more 'existence' than other inexistent entities.

27

28 29 30

31

32 33

34

Buddhacarita IX, 63 (L,(, 53 according to the numeration ofE.B. Cowell in Sacred Books of the East 49). Cf. Dzghanikaya I, p. 240. Suhrllekha 50. Cf. Golden Zephyr, transl. by L. Kawamura .(Emeryville, CA: Dharma Publishing 1975), p. 46. For example, the Siilistambha(ka).f/Kii (cf. C. Lindtner, 'Madhyamaka Causality', Hi5rin 6, 1999, pp. 55-63), the VisIJorekakartrtvanirakarGl.!a (cf. G. Chemparathy, 'Two Early Buddhist Refutations of the Existence of Isvara as the Creator of the Universe', Wiener ZeitschriJt flir die Kunde Siidasiens 12-13, 1968-69, pp. 87ff.), or the BodhicittavivarOl.!a 7-9 (cf. C. Lindtner, Nagarjuniana, Copenhagen 1982, pp. 186-9). Madhyamakahrdaya III, vv. 215-23 and IX, vv. 95-119, translated in Lindtner, 'Madhyamaka Causality', op. cit. (fn. 30) pp. 65-74. Cf. Bodhicaryavatara IX, 119-26 (transl. by K. Crosby and A. Skilton, Santideva: The Bodhicaryavatara, Oxford-New Yark: Oxford University Press 1995). Cf. Lindtner, 'Madhyamaka Causality', op. cit. (fn. 30), pp. 63f; S. Katsura, 'Some Cases of Doctrinal Proofs in the Abhidharma-Kosa-Bhasya', Journal of Indian Philosophy 31, 2003, 105-120, pp. 112-16. Following the summary of Hajime Nakamura, A History of Early Vedanta Philosophy, translated into English by T. Leggett et aI., Part 1, Delhi 1983, pp. 147-51, in Jackson, op. cit. (fn. 1) p. 321.

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Buddhist and Christian Perspectives on Creation

Dharmakirti'sArgument from Ontology In order to properly understand this Buddhist line of argumentation against a permanent being such as the omniscient God (lsvara), we have to look at the Buddhist concept of being, existence (sattva). The Buddhist concept of being is determined by the Buddha's assessment of all worldly existence as 'non-eternal' (anitya). This assessment is then further developed and sharpened into the concept of existence being only 'momentary' (k~ar;,ika). The ontology of momentariness is supported by proofs,35 and Dharmaklrti finally proposes a proof of momentariness from the logical reason of 'existence' (sattva).36 The tautological character ofsuch a proof is intentional, because its aim is to demonstrate that only where the concept of momentariness is applicable is the concept of existence also justified. In other words: only momentary, impermanent, non-eternal entities can be considered to be existing (sat). A classical proof-formula of Dharmakirti reads like this: 'Whatever is existent is exclusively momentary, since, if it were non-momentary, it would be excluded from being a real entity because of its contradiction to causal efficacy (arthakriyCi), (fora real entity) is characterized by having this (causal efficacy).,37 Here, the linle to refutations of permanently existing entities becomes evident, if we further take into account that the concept of existence is defined by causal efficacy (arthakriyii), that is, by a capacity to produce an effect, for example in creating a universe. In fact, the negation of the existence of eternal entities becomes a logically necessary part of Dharmakirti's proof ofthe momentariness of being. In his second main work, the Pramiilfaviniscaya, this proof takes the following more explicit form by including a secondary proof to demonstrate that the proving property, 'existence', does not occur in a locus that lacks the property to be proven, 'momentariness' : Such a non-momentary (entity) is not in a position to produce an effect, since it contradicts graduality as well as simultaneity (implied by causal efficacy). Gradually it is not (efficacious), for, (if) it becomes an agent (as that which produces an effect) independently (of cooperative causes) on the strength of (its) mere existence, it is not possible for (it) to remain (inefficacious). For that which was not an agent earlier cannot be (an agent) later either, since no change occurs to its own nature. Also if it depends (on other cooperative causes), [it would not be efficacious, for as an eternal unchanging entity it would depend on such other causes that cannot causally influence tbis entity]. Nor is. (this non-momentary entity efficacious) simultaneously, since it is not possible that its own nature (of being efficacious) remains inefficacious later. Therefore, that which is void of any capacity (for producing an effect) exceeds the characteristic of existence. 38 35

Cf. A. von Rospatt, The Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness: A Survey of the Origin and Early Phase of this Doctrine up to Vasubandhu (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag 1995). 36 Cf. E. Steinkellner, 'Die Entwicklung des k~al).ikatvanumanam bei Dharmakllti', Wiener Zeitschrift for die Kunde Siidasiens 12/13, 1968,361-77; C. Yoshimizu, 'The Development of sattvanumana From the Refutation of a Permanent Existent in the Sautrantika Tradition', Wiener Zeitschrift for die Kunde Siidasiens 43, 1999,231-54. 37 Hetubindu 4,6[, as translated in Yoshimizu, op. cit. (fn. 36), p. 234. 38 Pramar;aviniscaya 2. 29,15-24, as translated in Yoshimizu, op. cit. (fn. 36), pp. 234f.

Hindu Doctrines of Creation and Buddhist Critiques

27

This proof contains all the ingredients used in the polemics against a creator-god brought forward by Dharrnakirti and his school against the proofs of the existence of God developed in the Nyaya school and in related Sivaitic circles. 39 These proofs of God as. creator of the universe that were attacked by Dharrnakirti in the second chapter of his first work, the PramalJavarttika,40 were formulated by different Nyaya philosophers of the sixth century CE, for example by Uddyotakara, who may have been a believer in Siva. The context and reason for Dharrnaklrti's efforts to destroy these proofs of God must be indicated briefly: the second chapter is a 'religious treatise' written as an elaborate commentary on the benedictory stanza of Dignaga' s PramalJasamuccaya which marks the spiritual and historical beginning of the Buddhist epistemological tradition as a cultural phenomenon. Dharrnakirti demonstrates that it is possible to rely on the Buddha as a 'person of authority' (pramalJapuru~a) in the sense that he 'has become a (means of) valid cognition'41 (pramalJabhLlta) , metaphorically speaking, because he shares with ordinary, everyday kinds of valid cognitions, perception and inference, the characteristic that he is non-belying, reliable, trustworthy (avisal1Jvadin), and the characteristic that he makes hitherto unknown states of affairs known (ajfiatarthaprakasa). At the same time, Dharrnakirti explains that the Buddha has developed this double capacity during innumerable existences as is implied by the term 'become' (bhuta) used by Dignaga. This progress of becoming an authority is then accounted for in the rest of the chapter by explaining the necessary causes. After giving a definition of what can be considered to be this kind of 'valid cognition' (PramalJavarttika = PV 2: 1-6), stanza 7 identifies the Buddha as sharing these defining characteristics because of his appropriate efforts. This introduction, a rational foundation of Buddhism, is followed by a refutation of the idea that a permanent lSvara could fulfil the requirements of this definition in the same way, a refutation that 'may be the most important single anti-theistic passage in all of Buddhist literature' .42 It begins with the statement, 'A permanent authority does certainly not exist' (nityal1J pramanal1J naivasti, PV 2:8a). In the following stanzas (PV 2:8-28), Dharrnaklrti first demonstrates the impossibility of a permanent kind of epistemic source (PV 2:8-9), following which he refutes the proofs of God propounded by the Nyaya school (PV 2: 10-16), applies this refutation also to other schools' proofs (PV 2: 17-20), and concludes by pointing out some contradictions in the Nyaya conception of God (PV 2:21-8). 39

Cf. G. Oberhammer, 'Zum Problem des Gottesbeweises in der indischen Philosophie', Numen 12, 1965,1-34. 40 Cf. Jackson, op. cit. (fn. 15) and Krasser, op. cit. (fn. 23), pp. 19-55. 41 This translation I understand as conveying the same meaning as Krasser's literal rendering of the karmadhiiraya-compound by 'one who has come into existence being a pramiil'}a'. Cf. H. Krasser, 'On DhamakIrti's Understanding of pramiil'}abh!lta and His Definition of pramiina', Wiener Zeitschrift flir die Kunde Siidasiens 45, 2001, 173-99, p. 184. 42 R. Jackson, 'Atheology and Buddhalogy ... ', op. cit. (fn. 15), p. 477.

28

Buddhist and Christian Perspectives on Creation

The last section reformulates some of the traditional arguments in new aITangements, for example the argument of incompatibility between the idea of God's eternal nature and his creating the universe. For such an idea would imply, he says, that God has a nature before creation which is not a cause, whereas - in the moment of creation - his nature is capable of being a cause. However, both concepts, permanence and being a cause, cannot be attributed to the same entity (PV 2:21). But if God is assumed to create when he is not a cause, then there is no relationship between God and his creation - instead of attributing an effect (for example, the healing of a person) to its proper cause (medicine), it could then be attributed to anything (such as a wooden post) (PV 2:22). Further: since to a Buddhist all causal phenomena can be explained, or at least should be able to be explained, by referring to conventional, finite causes, there is no need to propose a permanent necessary condition behind these available causes. A transcendent God is especially inappropriate for this purpose, because any activity would imply a change in his permanent nature (PV 2:23). If such a God is nevertheless assumed to be the cause, that is, if a different cause is thought to be responsible for a particular effect than the cause that can be determined, then there is no end of causes, and causality becomes inexplicable (PV 2:24-8). Dharmakirti's refutation of the Nyaya proofs 43 introduces a new stage in these discussions: it is part of his argumentation against God as being the permanent cause of an impermanent universe along traditional lines. This argumentation was provoked by the fact that such proofs had recently been proposed - after earlier proposals mainly from theistic Sarikhya circles - by proponents of the leading brahmanicai tradition of logic and dialectics, the Nyaya school, that about this time seems to have sided with Sivaitic groups. The essential point of Dharmakrrti's refutation is that such proofs of God are logically impossible. A few words on the logical foundation upon which this tum of the argumentation has been built: Dignaga, Dharmakirti's predecessor, had refined earlier propositions for controllable logical forms and rules in his theory of 'the logical reason with three characteristics' (trilak:jalJo hetuf;). What this means is basically: (1) that a proving property, the reason, must occur in the proof's subject, that is, the locus where the property to be proven, the problematic property, occurs; (2) that the proving property, besides the subject, must occur only in similar cases, that is, cases where the problematic property is known to occur, and (3) that the proving property must never occur in dissimilar cases, that is, cases where the problematic property does not occur. Thus the occurrence of the problematic property in the proof's subject is ascertained by controlling the positive and negative concomitance between the two properties. These logical principles in Dignaga's version were also accepted by the Nyaya logicians for their proofs, and we can assume that by the end of the sixth century all 43

Cf. G. Chemparathy, Aujkommen und Entwicklung (fn. 8), pp. 78-85; R. Jackson, 'Atheologyand Buddhalogy' (fn. 15), pp. 479-83; H. Krasser, Sahkaranandanas jsvarapakaranasQlik~epa, Teil 2, op. cit. (fn. 23), pp. 19-55.

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29

contesting part{es were claiming a more or less common ground of logic. It is on this ground that the participants in sixth- and seventh-century polemics sought to reformulate their traditional arguments for their philosophical positions in accordance with the. formal principles obligatory since Dignaga's breakthrough. Only after Dharmakirti's further developments in logic in the direction of an ontologically bound logic did the orthodox schools also feel free to adapt Dignaga's principles to the requirements of their own background of beliefs and ontological assumptions. The Nyaya proofs refuted by Dharmaldrti and his subsequent school are intended to ascertain the activity of God, Isvara, as being the 'efficient cause' (nimittakaraf'!a) of the universe. This is reflected in the structure of these proofs. Their subject is not God, but various cosmological principles - atoms, souls, karma - of which it must be established whether they are 'directed by a conscious cause' Cbuddhimatkaraf'!adhi:;.thita). The Nyaya logicians proposed various reasons to prove this property. The two most prominent reasons chosen by Dharmakirti to refute are 'because they are active after a period of rest' (sthitva pravrtteJ;), and 'because they have particular shapes' (sarr;sthanavise:;a). 44 Dharmaklrti's answer is threefold: he states that these proofs are acceptable as long as they intend to prove nothing but the fact that the world is caused by something conscious (i:;,tasiddhiJ; PV 2: lOc'). For Buddhists, too, think that the manifold world is caused by karman, which they take as being something conscious: 'Doing is intending.' But if a specific single, permanent and omniscient being is meant to be this cause, the proving reasons cannot be conclusive, because - in all such proofs of God - their concomitance with the problematic property is not established in similar cases which provide this knowledge of a necessary relationship between the two ' properties involved Casiddhirva dr:;,tante, PV 2:10'c-d'). Dharmakirti, as an example, demonstrates this logical fault for the 'design argument' which was proposed by the Naiyayika Aviddhakan;ta: the reason 'because of their particular shape' (sarf'!sthanavise:;a) only allows the inference of that entity as its cause with which such a causal relationship can be ascertained by observing the occurrence or non-occurrence of 'particular shape' to follow the occurrence or nonoccurrence of a directing agent CPV 2: 11). This relationship, however, cannot be generalizedjn order to infer an entity that is the cause of another entity with a 'particular shape'. To illustrate: in the case of a pot, its 'particular shape' means 'potter-created shape'. This property is specific and can be used in an inference. But 'shape' as such, as a generic term, does not referto aconcrete entity. The term used in Nyaya proofs has only a verbal likeness (sabdasamya), but no concrete referent to which something else could be related. If such an inference were acceptable, we should be able to infer fire from anything grey, since fire can be inferred from something grey, namely smoke (PV 2:12-13). 44

Jackson terms the former an 'Intermittence Argument', and the latter a 'Design Argument' (cf. op. cit., fn. 15), pp. 480f.

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In other words, the logical concomitance between proving and problematic property cannot be ascertained by dernonstrating examples, since the causal relationship between the properties 'having a particular shape' and 'having a conscious cause' is specific and cannot be generalized, and the proving property used is therefore not established in any example. Thus, we can infer the activity of a conscious potter from the shape of a pot, but not from the shape of a termite hill with its many makers, and not from the shape of mountains and oceans, which may also have a conscious cause, but that this cause is an lSvara with all his specific qualities and attributes cannot be ascertained by inference. DharmakIrti's critique is followed by a centuries-long dispute in which all major figures of the two leading logical schools participate. On the side of the Nyaya, the problems indicated by Dharmakirti provoked some special developments in their logic. 45 Their main focus also shifted from proposing new logical reasons beside the main ones, to wit that a conscious cause must be assumed because unconscious elements cannot organize themselves and because they are effects, to establishing, by additional methods, that the acceptance of a conscious cause implies a specificity consisting in God with his specific qualities. Most prominent among these methods is a proof proposed by Vacaspatimisra (ninth century) through the exclusion of other possibilities (parise:fiit). He says, for example, that the specificity of God being this conscious cause can be derived from the fact that the generic proving property is a property of the subject (pak:fadharmatii), and that the specific characteristics of the problematic property must be present in the subject, because they are contained in the generic property, since there is no generic property without something specific. This specific entity is God or any of his qualities, such as omniscience and so on, which he demonstrates by excluding other altematives. 46

Concluding Remarks To summarize this highly elliptic and imperfect survey in the light of ChristianBuddhist dialogue: What can an acquaintance with Indian ideas on creation, a creating God, and the anti-theistic criticism of the Buddhists tell us in comparison with those of the Mesopotamian and Christian traditions? I think, mainly, that such ideas are referring to a finite realm of discourse within which they cannot be hannonized because of pre-dialogue decisions that have not been put at disposal in any of these discussions. All participating Indian positions share the acceptance of causality as a red thread in understanding the world and existence. Whereas the Hindu partners see the continuity in the flow of impermanent entities as the basis of cosmic order to be provided by a permanent factor, the Buddhists focus on the change of the same impermanent entities as only explicable by their essential impermanence 45 46

Cf. Krasser. op. cit. (fn. 23), pp. 56-142. Cf. ibid., pp. 97-101.

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in the form of momentariness. 47 They therefore argue against the possibility of any causal interaction between a permanent factor and impermanent entities: not only because it is impossible, but also because it is unnecessary, meaningless. Moreover, Hindu concepts of a permanent creating factor are modelled on an analogy to human activity: change in everything thus also presupposes a planning consciousness. 48 Theologically speaking, it may then be worth considering the questions of whether the focus on continuity and the human analogy of causal activity - both referring to the finite realm - are necessary to a discourse on God.

47 48

Cf. Jackson, op. cit. (fn. 1), p. 339. Cf. ibid., pp. 339f.

Chapter 2

Three Buddhist Views of the Doctrines of Creation and Creator Jose Ignacio Cabez6n

Introduction In his renowned Encyclopedia of Buddhism, 1 the great nineteenth-century Tibetan scholar Kong sprul yon tan rgya mtsho uses the well-known Buddhist 'three-vehicle' scheme to structure his discussion of Buddhist cosmology - discussing sravaka, Mahayana and Vajrayana views of the formation and de/evolution of the universe. I propose to follow Kong sprul's example in this essay with one exception: my remarks will focus principally on the writings of contemporary Buddhist scholars. I say 'principally' because there is one aspect of this issue - the Mahayana doctrine of the creation of pure fields (dag shing) or buddha fields (sangs rgyas kyi shing) - that is not found in any extensive fashion in the writings of contemporary Buddhist theologians. So I will take the liberty of resorting to more classical sources at that point in the discussion. My main concern, however, will be with the analysis of what a sampling of contemporary Buddhist thinkers have to say about the doctrine of creation and creator. Yet I must warn the reader at the outset that I am not sure that contemporary Buddhist views end up at a radically different place from that of the more classical scholars who treat this issue. To say that contemporary Buddhist theological discourse on this issue does not diverge radically from the positions found in the ancient texts, is, of course to ·say that contemporary Buddhist theology (at least on this issue) is relatively conservative. So what can be read in this essay about the contemporary Buddhist take on creation/creator will not vary radically from what one will read in the essays by Steinkellner and Neumaier in this volume. Still, this in itself is an interesting fact: that contemporary Buddhists remain relatively close to their scripturaVtextual tradition in this regard. Let me begin with a few general remarks by way of preamble. What do the Buddhist thinkers examined here have in common? First of all, they hold that the Kong sprul yon tan rgya mtsho (a.k.a. bLo gros mtha' yas), Shes bya kUIl khyab, edited by rDo rje rgyal po and Thub bstan nyi rna (Mi rigs dpe skrnn kbang, 1982),2 vols. The portion on cosmology has been translated in Jamgon Kongtrul Lodro Taye, Myriad Worlds: Buddhist Cosmology ill Abhidharrna, Kiilacakra alld Dzog-chel!, translated and edited by the International Translation Committee founded by V.V. Kalu Rinpoche (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion 1995).

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universe is more diverse or heterogeneous than the data of the senses indicates. It is multiple from at least two vantage points: (1) our known universe is only one of a very large number of world systems, and (2) within each world system, the physical portion that is accessible to humans represents only a small part of the cosmos. Hence, to rely on a spatial metaphor that mayor may not be totally appropriate, both 'vertically' (within a universe) and 'horizontally' (across universes), we are, to quote Jody Foster, 'not alone'. Each of the thinkers examined here also repudiates the notion that the universe as a whole (the totality or collection of all of the world systems) has a first cause. Although they believe that anyone world system goes through a process of creation and destruction, they share the view that the universe as a whole extends infinitely back in time. Put another way, there is no point before which there was nothing. Because there is no absolute origin, there is no first cause, and it follows, of course, that no one being (for example, God) could therefore have been that first cause. This does not mean that Buddhists repudiate what I will call 'localized' creation: the notion that - cyclically and endlessly - entire world systems come into being, abide and are destroyed. 2 Nor do they deny that there is intelligent agency involved in the creation, abiding and destruction of these localized world systems (even if that agency is the joint agency of the vast number of beings who reside in that world, and not, as has already been stated, the agency of a single creator, omnipotent or otherwise). Finally, these thinkers evince in their views a general Buddhist antipathy to the notion of a being that has, beginninglessly, been immune from the cycle of suffering: a primordially pure being who has never been subject to karma, rebirth, and who has always and forever been exempt from the tragedies that are a part of his/her creation. That is, they object to the notion that there exists a being - a creator, God - who, because s/he is the creator, stands in a position of privilege, antecedent to or outside of the creation that s/he has wrought: where' standing outside' means precisely being, from the very start, exempt from the laws - both physical and metaphysical - that 2 The fact that from the earliest times Buddhists found problematic the notion that the universe is the creation of a single, alI-powerful, inteIligent creator, however, does not appear to have prevented Buddhists from propounding a doctrine of cyclical creation and destruction driven not by the wiII of a single deity, but by the coIlective force of the karma of alI living beings. These cycles have endlessly repeated themselves since beginningless time, fueIled by the karma of living beings: by their need, as it were, to have an environment in which to experience the fruits of their past actions. Be that as it may, it iS'interesting that, for all of its scepticism concerning the notion of creation and creators, Buddhist texts from the earliest times - texts like the Agaiiiia SUlla, for example - should have seen it as both desirable, and perhaps even compulsory, given the doctrinal milieu of their day, to propound narratives of (albeit cyclical) creation: that is, accounts of what happened not once and for all, but of what continues to happen within each cycle of destruction and creation. The details of the Agaiiiia narrative, and its historical and rhetorical relationship to other competing narratives of creation prevalent among, for example, the Brahmanical schools, are, of course, important issues, but they faIl outside of the purview of this paper. See R. Gombrich, 'The Buddha's Book of Genesis', IndoIranian Joumal35, 1992, 159-78, who argues for the fact that this text is a parody of Brahmanical views.

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seem to govern the rest of the universe, and that govern especially the rise of suffering. So it is tme that Buddhists reject a creator on the grounds that there is no need to posit a first cause, but they also reject the notion of a creator because of the position of privilege that would have to be afforded such a being: the privilege of never having had to suffer, or of having had to work out one's own salvation. Taking these various views as a whole, we might say that we find here is a general aversion to cosmological uniqueness: (1) spatial uniqueness (our known universe is the only one there is), (2) temporal uniqueness (our history is the only history), (3) causal uniqueness (our known universe has a single causal origin), and (4) personal uniqueness (one being who was from the beginning different from all the rest). To say that Buddhists have this antipathy to cosmological uniqueness is to say that they find cosmological mUltiplicity and complexity to be more compelling: multiple universes, each caused/created by a huge, complex array of causes (including sentient ones), and as a whole, extending infinitely back in time, with all of us in the same boat from the start (or non-start). These views, shared in common between the Buddhist views analysed below, and between them and a good deal of the rest of the Buddhist tradition, does not mean that there is complete unanimity between all of the sources. But rather than saying any more on this issue, perhaps it is best simply to launch in so that the reader may see for herself how these issues play themselves out.

A Contemporary Theravada Perspective We begin with Gunapala Dharmasiri' s A Buddhist Critique of the Christian Concept ofGod,3 not so much because it is representative of contemporary Buddhist views on this issue of creation, but precisely because it represents a departure from much contemporary speculation on this topic. The work is, as the title implies, polemical, although it is not this that makes the work unique. Dharmasiri is heir to a tradition of Theravilda philosophical/theological speculation that originates in Victorian times and can be traced through the British-trained Sri Lankan scholar K. N. Jayatilleke, whose influential Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, first published in 1963, is a sophisticated reading of the Filii tradition through the lens of the British analytical philosophy of his day (that is, positivism and empiricism).4 For our purposes, Gunapala Dhannasiri, A Buddhist Critique of the Christian Concept of God: A Critique of the Concept of God in Contemporary Christian Theology and Philosophy of Religion from the Point of View of Early Buddhism (Colombo: Lake House Investments 1974). 4 While most directly connected to the views of Jayatilleke, Gunapala Dhannasiri's views have a genealogical relationship to the much earlier views of the Sri Lankan scholar Anagarika Dharmapala (1864-1933). See his Return to Righteousness: A Collection of Speeches, Essays and Letters afthe Anagarika Dhannapala (Ceylon: Government Press 1965); . Also, Jose r. Cabez6n, 'Buddhism and Science: On the Nature of the Dialogue', in B. Alan Wallace (ed.), Buddhism and Science: Breaking New Ground (New York: Columbia University Press 2003).

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Gunapala Dharrnasiri's work is an interesting and appropriate work to consider because it takes not the classical Indian conceptions of God as its polemical object of engagement, but rather, as the subtitle of the work informs us, 'the concept of God in contemporary Christian theology and philosophy of religion.' The author devotes the second chapter of that work to an analysis of 'God as the Creator and the Designer'. Dharrnasiri begins his discussion with the observation that the Christian doctrine of creation - unlike that of some classical Indian schools, for example - links God's creator-status to God's ability to effectuate the salvation of creatures: that is, to soteriology. Whether- and if so, the extent to which - this is still true today remains for Christian theologians themselves to decide. Still, it can hardly be denied that these two things - creation and soteriology - have been intimately linked in many forms of theism. God's ability to save is at least partly the result of the fact that God has wrought this creation. Who better to fix the broken watch than the watchmaker - and a pretty powerful watchmaker at that! Dharrnasiri believes that 'in Christianity the ideas of creation and salvation are inevitably bound together, or rather entail each other'.5 And though he considers examples of Christian theology in which the two ideas - divine creatorship and divinely mediated salvation - are not seen as mutually implicative, he believes these to be self-refuting, for 'without ... the idea of absolute creator, one cannot keep an unconditional faith in the salvific power of an absolutely omnipotent God' .6 1 am not interested here in whether Dharrnasiri' s claim about the relationship of the doctrines of creation and salvation in Christianity is right. What interests me is the fact that he uses this as a way of distinguishing Buddhismfrom Christianity. Dharrnasiri believes that one of the things that makes Buddhism different from Christianity is precisely its uncoupling of cosmological speculation and soteriology. Citing one of the famous passages in the Pali scriptures in which the Buddha rejects cosmological speculation, he goes on to portray Buddhism almost as an empirical science in which metaphysical speculation is not only irrelevant to, but actually impedes, salvation: '[For the Buddha] the main concern of religion is salvation and he discovered that it could be found without delving into all of the mysteries of the world. A Christian cannot give this form of answer ... Though the Buddhist can hold that creation is not necessary for salvation, the Christian cannot claim SO.'7 But, of course, Dharmasiri is all too aware that the Pali texts are not immune from speculating about the universe and its origins, or lack thereof, and this represents an obstacle to his theory. He gets around this by portraying Buddhist cosmological speculation as mere empirical observation: 'What distinguishes the Buddha from the theist is that the former strongly believed the world to be explainable in its own terms ... Buddhism maintains that one can give a self-sufficient causal account in empirical terms of the physical and mental aspects of the world.' 8 'The Buddha believed that an 5 6 7 8

GunapalaDharmasiri, op. cit., p. 47. Ibid. Ibid., pp" 47-8. See also pp. 116-17. Ibid., pp. 33-4.

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empirical theory of causation and the regularity of the laws of nature etc., within the world could fully account for causation '" that one has to stop at the fundamental laws of nature and regularities of causation. To go beyond them would be both unnecessary and wrong. '9 But of course, such a pIcture of Buddhism as tantamount to empiricism - and of 1;he Buddha as a proto-scientist - is at best incomplete, and at worst downright misleading. Why? Dharmasiri is quite right in claiming that the Pali texts see the doctrine of a creatorGod as incompatible with the Buddhist theory of causation. 10 What he fails to mention is that imbedded within the Buddhist theory of causation are major metaphysical presuppositions: to wit, karma and rebirth. Hence, the Buddhist theory of causality is situated more in the realm of metaphysics than it is in the realm of the natural sciences. And the polemic between Buddhism and Christianity on this issue is a polemic between two religions, not a polemic between a science (Buddhism) and a religion (Christianity). Such an admission, however, is an obstacle to Dharmasiri's positivistic interpretation of Buddhism, and so the metaphysics of Buddhism - its own set of presuppositions - is subsumed within 'science' ,11 and as a result, an opportunity to present a rich Buddhist engagement with the doctrine of divine creation is missed. To his credit, Dharmasiri does engage a variety of positions in Christian theology and the philosophy of religion that attempt to argue for the consistency and/or plausibility of a creator-God. His is one of the few contemporary works to do so, in fact, and for this it must be commended. For example, he considers the Cosmological Argument, wherein the claim is that the existence of a creator-God is said to be adduced on the basis of the fact that the world is a contingent entity in need of a necessary cause (God). For the most part, Dharmasiri simply relies on Western philosophical critiques of this (and other) 'proofs' (for example, that of A. Flew) to challenge these classical Christian arguments. There are a few instances in which he does consider what specifically Buddhist responses (for example, to notions of 'contingent' and 'necessary') might look like. But these are few and far between, and in the end they fall flat, ending up as little more than dogmatic quips against what are quite sophisticated arguments and theories on the part of Christian philosophers and theologians. And the reason for this, it seems clear to me, is Dharmasiri' s positivism. When Buddhism is denuded of its religious-metaphysical presuppositions, when it is reduced to science, then there is little that can be said to the metaphysical claims of theists apart from the dogmatic ones made by science, for example, that 'because of their attachment to Christian teachings they again try to posit superfluous entities like God over and above the causal mechanism' (Dharmasiri's response to the Process thinkers Hartshorne and Cobb ).12 9 Ibid., pp. 42 and 44. 10 See, for example, the citation from Buddhaghosa, in ibid., pp. 26 and 44. 11 Wberein 'science' now comes to have a broader semantic range that includes notions like karma and rebirth, a move that undoubtedly would be opposed by most scientists, and indeed by most ~peakers of the English language. 12 Dharmasiri, op. cit., p. 27.

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The lesson here, I think, is a simple one. Contemporary Buddhist critiques of the doctrine of creation fall flat when they attempt to portray Buddhism as something that it is not: when they attempt to mask the religio-metaphysical dimensions of Buddhism. Buddhism is not science, nor is it empiricism. It is as heavily laden with metaphysical presuppositions as is Christianity, and the conversation between the two is going to have to proceed with this acknowledgment on the part of Buddhists. This does not mean that science, as a third voice, cannot or should not be brought into the discussion. Nor does it mean that empirical or rational arguments are irrelevant to this discussion. Nor should we think that the fact that both Buddhism and Christianity are metaphysically laden systems with radically different presuppositions necessarily implies some kind of incommensurability between the two - an inability to engage in dialogue or to mutually challenge one another. But it does mean that both Buddhism and Christianity must come to the table with the recognition that neither occupies a position of privilege (for example, the. privileged position that science - with its rhetoric of objectivity - holds in our society). So here, in any case, is one contemporary Buddhist treatment of the question of creation and creator - a not very successful one, I'm afraid. But let us now tum to a more fruitful area for dialogue.

The Construction of Pure Universes in the Mahayana Since Buddhists (both contemporary and classical) are allergic to the notion that there is a single, first cause to the universe, no being can therefore create in this sense. Nonetheless, the Mahayana is replete with references to the creative powers of buddhas and bodhisattvas, to the point where the so-called 'purification of the Buddha field' (sangs rgyas !eyi shing yongs su dag pa) comes to be conceived of as an indispensable part of the bodhisattva path. Part of what it means to be enlightened, then, is to have engaged in an act of creation. Buddhist writers repudiate the notion of a single, divine creator, as we have seen, in large part because they wish to insist on the co-creativity of all beings in the construction of the universe that is their place of dwelling. But for Buddhists, the fact that sentient beings co-create their universe is not, of course, a reason to rejoice, since the universe that is so created is the site for the experience of suffering. True, it is also the site wherein liberation can unfold, but it is by no means a given that the drama of a particular life will necessarily end felicitously. Thus, the life lived in a universe cocreated by the karma of living beings is for the most part a tragic thing. But now the question arises, as it must have in the history of Buddhist doctrinal speculation: Are there abodes - universes - more conducive to enlightenment, where beings stand a better chance of making spiritual progress? If so, how do such universes come about? And how do beings get access to these worlds? A variety of Mahayana texts - from early sLltras up through later scholastic sources - answer these questions by proffering a theory of 'pure fields' (dag shing). Such

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pure worlds do hot, of course, simply exist from the very beginning (uncaused), nor do they come about spontaneously, or from strictly material causes. The Mahayana s£itras insist that they come about as the result of the merit cultivated by bodhisattvas as part of the Mahayana path. While the sutras are not univocal on this, certainly the Prajiiapiiramitii sutras (and their later systematization in such works as the Abhisamayiilamkiira, the Mahiiyiinasamgraha, and their commentaries) come to depict this act of pure field creation as a necessary part of the bodhisattva path, incumbent upon all bodhisattvas. Just asbodhisattvas purify themselves, so too must they purify the field in which they will later purify beings, creating a pure, physical abode wherein their enlightened activities can unfold. This is an important part of the Buddhist theory of creation that is sometimes overlooked. While the Mahayana texts depict the pure Buddha fields in different ways, generally speaking we can say that they are places free of coarse suffering, places wherein enlightenment is guaranteed to those born there. 13 Access to - that is, rebirth in - these pure lands is relatively easy, the idea being that the bodhisattva has created, as it were, an endowment of merit that makes up for the impoverished karmic bank accounts of sentient beings. Some initiative is usually required on the part of those who would gain rebirth in these pure lands, although once again the sources (both scriptural and commentarial) are inconsistent regarding what type of (and how much) effort is necessary. Once rebirth in a pure land has been achieved, one finds oneself in an atmosphere maximally suited to the attairunent of enlightenment, where everything reminds one of the doctrine, to the point where even the wind passing through the trees causes the sound of the Dharma to be heard. The most famous of these pure lands is probably Sukhavat! - 'the Blissful' - the world created by the Buddha Amitiibha, but the Mahayana literature is replete with references to the creation of other pure fields, to the point where the ritual prediction of a bodhisattva's future attainment of buddhahood comes to include the naming of his or her future pure land as part of the formula. Now I think it important to bring up the notion of pure lands in this discussion for two reasons: (1) it paints a less tragic picture of the world than we find in other forms of Buddhist literature. Even if pure lands are still part of the conditioned world of san:tsara, as idealized Dharma realms they offer sentient beings the opportunity to cultivate the path in an environment of minimal suffering. The point here is that while creation is usually tragic in Buddhism, it is not invariably so. (2) Because the creation of pure lands is an expression of compassion - the compassion of the bodhisattvas who spend eons creating the causes for their particular world - there are universes whose fabric, whose very warp and woof, is altruistic love. There is even reason to believe that the entire cosmos may be this - the expression of a Buddha's love. In the Vimalakirtinirdda S~ltra, one of the most beloved of Mahayana scriptures, the 13

The most sophisticated, scholarly treatment of the pure lands in a Western language (with emphasis on the pure land of Amitabha) is Luis O. G6mez, The Land of Bliss: The Paradise of the Buddha of Measureless Light (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press 1996).

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Buddha is asked why his world (that is, our world) is not a pure land. He responds that it is, but that the karma of most of the beings living in this world does not permit them to perceive it as a pure land. Given the omnipresence and omnicompassion ascribed to bodhisattvas in the Mahayana sutras, it is not implausible for Mahayanists to argue that all universes everywhere are the pure fields of enlightened beings. And it may well be thoughts such as this that caused later tantric adepts, both in India and Tibet, to develop immanentist theories of the purity of the world, as we find, for example, in the Mahamudra and rDzogs chen texts. And here, perhaps, Buddhists may have a point for dialogue with Christians and Jews, for whom the creation of the world has always been conceived of as an act of love.

A Contemporary Tibetan Perspective We now tum from classical sources once again to the contemporary scene to see how a tantric perspective is adumbrated in the writings of His Holiness the XIVth Dalai Lama. While much more irenic in tone than, say, Gunapala Dharrnasiri, the Dalai Lama is nonetheless quite insistent regarding the Buddhist repudiation of the notion of a creator God: ... the theory that God is the creator, is almighty, and permanent is in contradiction to Buddhist teachings ... For Buddhists the universe has no first cause, and hence no creator, nor can there be such a thing as a permanent, primordially pure being. So, of course, doctrinally there is a conflict [between Buddhists and theists]. 14

And yet this doctrinal diversity, according to the Dalai Lama, is, in the end, a good thing because it provides options for different types of people with different religious sensibilities: ... for some people, the Christian traditions, which are based on a belief in a Creator, have the most powerful effect on their ethical life, and serve to motivate them to act in an ethical and sound way. However, this might not be the same for every person. For others, the Buddhist tradition, which does not emphasize belief in a Creator, may be more effective. In the Buddhist tradition, there is an emphasis on a sense of personal responsibility rather than on a transcendent being. IS

In this passage, the doctrine of creation is couched within a discussion of ethics. What grounds ethics? Goodness or virtue can be grounded, as it is in much of theism, in the fact that certain actions are pleasing to the Creator; or it can be grounded, as it is in 14 The Dalai Lama, Answers: Discussions with Westem Buddhists, edited by Jose Ignacio Cabezon (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion 2001), p. 13, my insertion. 15 His Holiness the Dalai Lama, The Good Heart: A Buddhist Perspective on the Teachings of Jesus (Boston, MA: Wisdom Publications 1996), translated and annotated by Geshe Thupten Jinpa, p. 80. A similar point is made in Answers, op. cit., p. 14.

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Buddhism, causillly and pragmatically (in the fact that certain actions bring about positive or negative results). That doctrinal diversity in general- and that different views of creation and ethics in particular - is a good thing is, of course, a fairly recent phenomenon in the history of Buddhism. 16 But the Dalai Lama's pluralism - a response to the theological diversity of our times - is a meta-theory about how to treat theological diversity. It is a view about the disparity of views. It is not a relativism, and in the end it is clear that the Dalai Lama's pluralism does not prevent him from maintaining a rather classical position in regard to creation. In Beyond Dogma, His Holiness references many of the classical arguments against theistic creationism: Why is there no creation possible in Buddhism? It has been said that one cannot find living beings at the beginning of the universe for the essential reason that causes have no beginning ... As causes have no beginning and stretch back to infinity, the same thing must apply for living beings. Creation is therefore not possible ... The outside world appears as a result of the acts of sentient beings who use this world. These acts, or karmas, in tum originate in the intentions and motivations of those beings who have not yet taken control of their minds. The 'creator of the world,' basically, is the mind. In the Sutras, the mind is described as an agent. It is said that consciousness has no beginning, but we must distinguish here between gross consciousness and subtle consciousness ... The subtle mind can have no beginning. If it had one, the mind would have to be born of something that is not the mind.!7 As inheritors of the Indian Buddhist tradition, Tibetan Buddhists assimilated many of the Indian Buddhist views concerning the doctrines ofcreationlcreator. We find the Indian Buddhist critique of such doctrines simply reiterated throughout a good deal of Tibetan scholastic literature up to the present day. The Dalai Lama's concise formulation of the argument is a fine example of this. And yet, as a 'theologian', His Holiness is also an original thinker, and this can be seen from the way in which elsewhere he synthesizes three strands of thought - an exoteric sutra perspective, a pan-tantric perspective, and a uniquely Kalacakra Tantric perspective - regarding the Buddhist doctrine of creation. The relevant passages are worth citing in extenso: I understand the Primordial Buddha, also known as Buddha Samantabhadra, to be the ultimate reality, the realm of the Dharmalcaya - the space of emptiness where all phenomena, pure and impure, are dissolved. This is the explanation taught by the Sutras and Tantras. 16 That other contemporary Tibetan thinkers are less sanguine about the positive effects of belief in a creator should, of course, come as no surprise. See, for example, Lama Thubten Zopa's remarks on this issue at : 'The psychological effects of believing in a creator God are here seen as negative. It serves as a means to blame an Other for the problems that exist, rather than taking personal self-responsibility. So here, karma, and the repudiation of a creator God, is seen as the distinguishing aspect of Buddhism, leading to radical self-responsibility.' 17 His.Holiness the Dalai Lama, Beyond Dogma: Dialogues and Discourses (Berkeley, CA: North Atlantic Books 1996), pp. 191-2; see also .

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Buddhist and Christian Perspectives on Creation

However ... the tantric tradition is the only one which explains the Dharrnakaya in tenTIS of inherent clear light, the essential nature of the mind; this would seem to imply that all phenomena, sarnsara and nirvana, arise from this clear and luminous source ... We can say, therefore, that this ultimate sQurce, clear light, is close to the notion of a Creator, since all phenomena, whether they belong to samsara or nirvana, originate therein. But we must be careful in speaking of this source; we must not be led into error. I do not mean that there exists somewhere, [out] there, a sort of collective clear light, analogous to the non-Buddhist concept of Brahman as a substratum. We must not be inclined to deify this luminous space. We must understand that when we speak of ultimate or inherent clear light, we are speaking on an individual level .... When, in the tantric context, we say that all worlds appear out of clear light, we do not visualize this source as a unique entity, but as the ultimate clear light of each being. We can also, on the basis of its pure essence, understand this clear light to be the Primordial Buddha ... This is how I understand the concept of the Primordial Buddha. It would be a grave error to conceive of it as an independent and autonomous existence from beginningless time. If we had to accept the idea of an independent creator, the explanations given in the Pramanavartika, the 'Compendium of Valid Knowledge' written by Dharmakirti, and in the ninth chapter of the text by Shantideva, which completely refutes the existence per se of all phenomena, would be negated. This, in turn, would refute the notion of the Primordial Buddha. The Buddhist point of view does not accept the validity of affirmations which do not stand up to logical examination. If a sutra describes the Primordial Buddha as an autonomous entity, we must be able to interpret this assertion without taking it literally. We call this type of sutra an 'interpretable' sutra.1 8

This very rich passage is representative of the way in which the Dalai Lama attempts to reconcile the exoteric/sutra doctrine of no-creator with the notion, found in the esoteric/tantric tradition, that it is not just generic mind, but the empty/luminous aspect of mind - sometimes called primordial mind, subtlemost mind, or clear lightthat serves as the basis for the arising of the universe. Neumaier's essay touches on this subject, and so I will refrain from giving any more details at this point. I do, however, want to note the Dalai Lama's efforts in this passage to distinguish this doctrine of tantric creation from a doctrine of theistic creation. His Holiness, for example, takes great pains to explain that this view is different from the monism of Advaita Vedanta - the idea that all things are indivisibly one with the only thing that truly exists, namely the godhead (Brahman). The Dalai Lama distinguishes the Buddhist view from the monistic view by insisting that the clear light mind is not a deity, has no personhood, and, most important, that it is not unitary (or unique), but multiple. The clear light mind retains its individuality within each person. It is then 18

Ibid., pp. 153-5. Also, compare the notion of the Primordial Buddha to the notion of Irwon in Won Buddhism: 'The object of Won Buddhist faith is Dharmakaya Buddha, the Truth of Irwon - the transliteration of the Korean word meaning one circle. The truth of Irwon is symbolized by the form of a circle, "0". The symhol of Irwon represents the source of all heings, the original mind of all sentient beings, and the enlightened mind of all Buddhas and saints'; .

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the individual contributions of each person's mind - the world being projected out of the empty, lumionous clarity of each person's mind - that brings about the universe of shared experiences.1 9 If some scriptures speak of a Primordial Buddha who is the creator of the universe, he continues, this should be understood as refering to the individual clear light mind of beings, and not to some independently existing, single creator deity, In this way, the Dalai Lama reconciles a tantric doctrine of creation with the various exoteric philosophical works that repudiate theistic creationism, As an aside, it may be of interest to note that the Dalai Lama is not alone in this view that the Buddha Samantabhadra - the iidi-, or original/primordial, buddha should not be confused with a creator-God, In an epilogue to his (partial) translation of the Kun byed rgyal po 'i mdo, the contemporary Tibetan scholar Namkhai Norbu Rinpoche states: Reading certain tantras it would seem that Oliginally, by the magic of know ledge and of ignorance, on the one side there arose Samantabhadra, the first Buddha, and on the other side beings who transmigrate, However, this should be mainly understood as a metaphor to enable us to discover our real condition, If we deem Samantabhadra an individual being, we are far from the true meaning. In reality, he denotes our potentiality ... [he] is only a metaphor for our true condition ... Samantabhadra means our state, and should not be interpreted as God in the sense of a supreme entity who is the only creator ... [W]e ourselves are Samantabhadra, but because we don't understand it, we are ignorant of it ... We could also think that there are infinite Samantabhadras .,.20

N orbu Rinpoche is here making the same point as the Dalai Lama: the doctrine of the iidibuddha as creator cannot be taken literally. It must be understood allegoricallyas a metaphor for our own self-nature. Now there is one final element of the Dalai Lama's views on the issue of creation that I think is worth noting. As is widely known, His Holiness has been interested in the dialogue between science and Buddhism for many years. In at least one instance, he has broached the topic of Buddhist theories of creation and of their possible parallel to scientific cosmology. From the passage that follows, it is clear that His Holiness believes that it is the Kiilacakra Tantra that, from the Buddhist side, offers the most fruitful point of contact for the conversation with the Western physical sciences. In order for a perception which will have the faculty to reflect and know an object to arise, it must have a consubstantial cause, The fundamental consubstantial cause, of the same substance as its result, will in this case be the subtle consciousness .. , The subtle mind can have no beginning. If it had one, the mind 19 20

The same, he says, is true of karma. The fact that karma brings about a shared universe does not imply that there is a single, person-like, collective karma source or substance that creates the shared universe. ChOgyal Namkhai Norbu and Adriano Clemente, The Supreme Source: The Fundamental Tantra of the Dzogchen Semde Kunjed Gyalpo (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion 1999), pp, 233-4.

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Buddhist and Christian Perspectives on Creation would have to be born of something that is not the mind. According to the Kalacakra Tantra; one would have to tum to the particles of space to find the fundamental consubstantial causes of the external physical world as well as of the bodies of sentient beings. Buddhist cosmology establishes the cycle of a universe in the following way: first there is a period of formation, then a period where the universe endures, then another during which it is destroyed, followed by a period of void before the formation of a new universe. DUling this void, the particles of space subsist, and from these particles the new universe will be formed. It is in these particles of space that we find the fundamental consubstantial cause of the entire physical world. If we wish to describe the formation of the universe and the physical bodies of beings, all we need do is analyse and comprehend the way in which the natural potential of different chemical and other elements constituting that universe was able to take shape from these space particles. It is on the basis of the specific potential of those particles that the structure of this universe and of the bodies of the beings present therein have come about. But from the moment the elements making up the world begin to set off different experiences of suffering and happiness among sentient beings, we must introduce the notion of kalIDa thatis, positive and negative acts committed and accumulated in the past. It is difficult to determine where the natural expression of the potential of physical elements ends and the effect of karma - in other words, the result of our past acts - begins. If you wonder what the relation might be between karma and this external environment formed by natural laws ... the material world, we must refer to the tantric texts. The Kalacakra Tantra in particular explains that in our bodies there are to be found, at gross, subtle, and extremely subtle levels, the five elements which make up the substance of the external world. It is therefore in this context, I believe, that we must envision the connection between our physical, oral, and mental karmas, and the external elements. 21

In this difficult passage, the Dalai Lama appears to be arguing for the fact that the Kalacakra tantric tradition may provide a link between the physical/material processes involved in creation and the metaphysical theories of Buddhism. Specifically, the Kalacakra, more than any other Buddhist tradition - while not denying the role that consciousness and karma (nonmaterial factors) play in the process of creation - also realizes that any theory of creation must explain the emergence of matter. In the Kalacakra, matter is seen as evolving from a more fundamental 'element', space. Here, space is conceived not as a smooth continuum, but as discrete (or, in scientific jargon, as 'quantized'). Hence, in the Kalacakra, space is made up of particles, and these space particles are the link between the material world-to-be and the non-material causes of creation (mindJk:arma). I bring this up not to argue for the validity of this interpretation. 22 Whether this ultimately pans out as a fruitful arena for a Buddhist-Physics dialogue remains to be 21 22

Dalai Lama, Beyond Dogma, op. cit., pp. 192-3. Although, as the physicist Anthony Zee states, 'We intuitively know space to be a smooth continuum, an arena in which fundamental particles move and interact ... However, the possibility that space may not be smooth cannot be excluded ... Our experimental probes simply may not have been fine enough to detect any graininess to space itself.' Fearful Symmetry: The Search/or Beauty in Modem Physics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1999), p. 13.

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seen. For our purposes, the passage is interesting not so much for its content - which in many ways is impressionistic - as it is for its methodological implications. For we find in these reflections several properties that I believe to be salutary to discussions of the type we are engaged in here. First, the passage is transparent about the diversity of views regarding creation in the Buddhist tradition. There are purely mentalistic theories, and then there are materialist (or quasi-materialist) theories, as represented by the Kalacakra. Second, even if the Dalai Lama in this passage does not specifically mention science, nonetheless, the fact that His Holiness tal(esnote of the existence of materialist theories of mind and creation means that his is at the very least an overture to science, and this too is salutary. Finally, there is forthrightness about the metaphysical assumptions of Buddhism that I find refreshing. Unlike Dharmasiri, the Dalai Lama does not consider the notions of karma and rebirth, disingenuously, to be already contained within science. Given everything that I have said, it should not now come as a surprise when I claim that I find the Dalai Lama's engagement with this issue to be mature and sophisticated - even exemplary. While cognizant of competing options (both internal and external to Buddhism) His Holiness's is a creative, synthetic, comparative perspective that attempts to create a coherent whole out of a wide array of sources. It is in conversation with a variety of discourses outside of the tradition - religious to scientific. Finally, it is unapologetic about its presuppositions and commitments, wearing its metaphysics on its sleeve, as it were. All of these things, I take it, are good things. And on this auspicious note I will close, with the hope that these remarks may become a source for a more holistic, honest and polyphonic dialogue between Buddhists and Christians on the topic of creation.

Chapter 3

Buddhist Forms of Belief in Creation Eva K. Neumaier

Creation as the making of the divine or as its outflow and manifestation is a concept alien to early Buddhism. Buddhist Fali texts criticized contemporary Indian religions for embracing the conceptof creation and a creator god. The focus of the Buddhist critique has two prongs: first, the concept of an eternal supernatural god is strongly denied in many FaIi texts. For instance, the Anguttara Nikiiya records the following statement: It is impossible, monks, it cannot corne to pass, that one who is possessed of right view should regard anything as permanent. It is impossible. Yet, monks, it is possible that a worldling may do so. 1

At the same time, the entirety of the Buddhist traditions affirms the existence of devas, that is, impermanent gods who are of 'a shining, supernatural body and spend their existence in sensual pleasures'.2 These impermanent gods lack the power to create the universe or to govern its laws. Nagfujuna has some harsh words for them: The gods are all eternal scoundrels, Incapable of dissolving the suffering of impermanence. Those who serve them and venerate them May even in this world sink into a sea of sorrow. 3

Impersonal laws that are beyond the reach of all sentient beings determine the course of the universe. Second, the Buddhist critique attacked god's qualities of omnipotence and omniscience. If he truly had these qualities, he created the universe as a complete and perfect entity, which excluded any change. Experience, however, contradicts this assumption. Thus, so the texts conclude, the concept of a creation by a god contravenes logic. Santideva elaborates this thought in his famous Bodhicaryiivatiira (IX 124): AnguttaraNikiiya, The Book a/Gradual Sayings, vol. 1, ch. 15, quoted from von Helmuth Glasenapp, Buddhism: A Non-theistic Religion, edited by H. Bechert, translated from German by Irmgard Schloegel (New York: George Braziller 1966), p. 135. 2 Ibid., p. 20. 3 Ibid., p. 31.

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Buddhist and Christian Perspectives on Creation Why does God not accomplish in one (the creation, continuance, and destruction of the universe)? He is responsible to nobody except himself. He has created all else. Then why does he hesitate to act?4

Thus, we might conclude that L1}ere is no such thing as a Buddhist belief in creation. Such assumption, however, is true ollJ.y if we adopted a literal and materialistic connotation of creation. After all, the texts I quoted above speili~ to an Indian audience that embraced creation stories where god/s make/s the world similar to' a potter creating some pieces of earthenware. Despite this skepticism vis-a-vis creation, Buddhist thinkers still had to explain how the universe is organized and how it functions. Most of their creative skills were devoted to this project. Ancient India produced its own cosmological narnitive that described a cycle of evolution and devolution of the cosmos followed by another evolution and devolution. These cycles regenerate themselves without end. Buddhist cosmology adopted some of the pre-existing cosmological ideas and modified others before amalgamating them with its very own concepts. In the following, I shall first address how early Buddhist texts dealt with the question of the origin of the universe and its layout (a creation without a creator). Second, I shall illustrate how this abstract template was brought into life for some Buddhist communities by examining some documents from Zanskar (Ladakh). Third, I shall address the issue whether some Buddhist texts, noticeably the Kun-byed rgyal po'i mdo, advocate belief in a creator-god, and if not, how should the term 'All Creating Sovereign' be understood. Fourth, I discuss the concept of the ontological ground (Tib. gzhi) as used in this and similar texts of the tathagatagarbha movement and of the rDzogs chen tradition of Tibet. I shall then contrast these Buddhist texts against a background of the theology of Nicholas of Cusa. The discussion of the ground and its almost totemistic representation in some later rDzogs chen texts will lead me to some of the statements made by the Japanese scholars of so-called Critical Buddhism. Finally, I shall use some of their arguments to create a hypothesis as to how we could understand such terms as 'All Creating Sovereign' or 'King' within the historical context from which these texts came.

The Layout of the Universe in Buddhism Buddhism emerged within the intellectual and religious speculations of the early Upani-?ads, which promoted the idea of a universal primordial man, pUTL1-?a, who defines the boundaries of the cosmos and its cycle of evolution and devolution. Early Buddhist texts classified the search for the origin of the cosmos as acinteyya, that is, as something that ought not to be pondered, or that is unthinkable (Anguttara Nikaya IV, 77). Thus, the Buddha is reported in the Samyutta Nikaya (LVI, 41) to have admonished his disciples not to reflect on whether the world is eternal or finite as such 4

Ibid., p. 177.

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pondering is usdess in achieving enlightenment. Consequently the quest for the origin of the universe remained marginal within Buddhist thinking, although - as we shall see later on - some traditions queried whether there is an ontological ground or base of the universe. Nevertheless, Buddhist thinkers devoted their main attention to the structure of the universe, rather than its origin and whether a personal being were involved in its creation. Pre- and non-Mahayana texts describe one integrated and hierarchically organized world. At its centre is Mt Meru as an axis mundi that is sometimes identified with Mt Kailash in the Westem Himalayas. Seven mountain rings surround Mt Meru, and between it and the first of the rings float four island-continents in a vast ocean. One of them is the Rose Apple Continent, which is our human world; more often, however, it is understood as the Indian Subcontinent only. Upon this horizontal structure is imposed a vertical structure that houses the various categories of sentient beings: the various denizens of hell at the bottom, above them the realm of the hungry ghosts, followed by the realms of animals; these three layers are the realms of suffering. Above them is located the human world, which entails happiness as well as suffering. Above the human world, one finds the realms of the derni-gods and that of the gods. Mahayana texts adopted this image of the world and condensed it into the "Wheel of Life', which is frequently found as a mural near the entrance of Tibetan temples. The spokes of the wheel divide the six worlds from each other. The three lower existences (denizens of hell, hungry ghosts and animals) occupy the lower part of the wheel and the three higher existences (humans, derni-gods and gods) occupy its upper part. With the Mahayana concept of numerous Buddhas appearing over the endless stretch of time, the unified vision of one world expanded into a vision of numerous, if not innumerable, worlds that exist simultaneously. Each world is the domain of one Buddha who embraces it as his Buddha field (buddhak:jetra). The Buddha of our world is Sakyamuni, the historical Buddha. The path to enlightenment is mapped within these cosmological speculations in different ways. In the single integrated cosmology, the Buddhist will gradually advance toward enlightenment by shedding the misguided perception of reality, aversion and desire, which will result in rebirth in ever-higher realms that eventually lead to enlightenment. In the multiple-world cosmology, the Buddhist will strive to be rebom in one of the Buddha fields from where enlightenment will be realized. In order to explicate how these multiple worlds are populated, the stages of life and rebirth, technically known as the twelve links of dependent origination, are often depicted at the circumference of the 'Wheel of Life'.

People's Place Within the Universe Images of the structure and layout of the universe are created not only to satisfy intellectual curiosity, but also to give people a sense of place within the vastness of the universe. Thus, each cosmology provides us with a sense of home and belonging

50 .

Buddhist and Christian Perspectives on Creation

within the endlessness of the universe. This place that people find within the cosmological narratives provides them with a sense of uniqueness and of cultural and historical identity. In order to address this issue and to bring the cosmological narratives to life, I shall now turn to some Tibetan documents, which I had photographed in Zanskar in the late 1970s. These documents are kind of appendices to copies of well-known Buddhist scriptures. In all regularity, these appendices record a variation of the Buddhist cosmology before they proceed to locate the Buddha, his teaching and the faithful kings who promote the Buddhist teaching place within this cosmology. Within the first few lines of each document, the land of Zanskar is described as geographically located west of Mt Kailash and south of the river Indus. That means that the document situates Zanskar within the cosmographic mar;J.(;iala whose pivot is Mt Kailash!Mt Meru, the abode of the gods, which is seen as 'an enormous mchod rten' or Stiipa5 and from which the River Indus, as one of four sacred rivers emerges. In the Buddhist cosmology, Mt KailashlMt Meru is the axis of the entire cosmos. A document from Karcha specifies Mt Meru as being more brilliantly white than the whitest clouds, the residence of CakrasarI).vara (one of the tantric Buddhas), and as being in its most secret essence a buddha-mal)q.ala. 6 Thus, the Zanskari documents deviate from the standard Buddhist narrative, which considers Mt Meru to be the pivot and axis of the entire universe. Instead, the Zanskari documents identify Mt Meru with a concrete geographical feature on this earth, that is, Mt Kailash. Thus, the ideas of the mountain rings and of the four island-continents seem forgotten, while the tiny valley of Zanskar receives symbolic significance. To enhance the symbolic importance of this localization, some of the documents call Zanskar 'the land of [the Buddhist] religion' which has 'arisen from auspiciousness'.7 After establishing Zanskar within a sacred cosmos, some texts describe it as being of triangular shape (which corresponds to the geographic reality) and with the Kanika Stiipa at Sani mkhar as its symbolic centre. In the standard narrative, the Rose Apple Continent is of triangular shape and at its centre is Bodhgaya in Bihar (India), the place of Buddha's enlightenment. s This means that the grand vision of the universe 5 The belief that the mountain that is the axis mundi is also a cosmic Stilpa is well documented in Bon texts. Cf. G. Tucci, The Religions of Tibet, translated from German and Italian by G. Samuel (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 1980), 219. 6 Chab brjod (Za 3.5, unpublished document) was issued under the rule of Tshe-brtan rnam-rgyal and Seng-ge rnam-rgyal and is in the possession of bSod-nams dbang-phyug, bLon-po of Karcha: chu 'dsin dkar po'i mdangs 'phrog dpaZ gyi ril skyabs gnas mthar thug 'khor Zo sdom pa'l gnasl dag shel gyi cod pan 'phyang ba 'dilnang ltar rtsa rlung khams kyi rten 'brel ... sindhi 'grug pa'i g-yol1lyulla g-yang chags zangs dkar ehos kyi yull (fol. la, lines 9-11). 7 Chab brjod (Za 3.1, unpublished document), issued under bSod-nams dpal-lde, and in the possession of Emchi bLo-bzang tshe-ring of Karcha: Zangs dkardkar po'i dge beu 'dzoml (fol. la, line 12). Chab brjod (Za 3.3), issued under the rule ofBrug bsTan-' dzin rnam-rgyal, in the possession of Emchi bLobzang tshe-ring of Karcha: YulZa g-yang chags zongs dkarchos kyi yull(fol. la, line 9). Chab brjod (Za 7.1, unpublished document), issued under King bSod-nams don-grub rnam-rgyal and Queen Phun-tshogs dbang-mo, in possession of Shag-rna rnam-dkyil of the Zangla village: Phun

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embedded in the authoritative Buddhist texts has been downscaled to a tangible perspective. The Rose Apple Continent is displaced by the valley of Zanskar, and Bodhgaya by the sacred site of the Kanika Stupa. This modified cosmogony empowers the people of Zanskar by imposing the template of an abstract cosmology on to a concrete and familiar geographical situation of their own valley.

The Malting of the Human Wodd The transition from the raw materiality of the universe to a human world is expressed in various accounts. When the world emerges out of the stillness following its prior devolution, the gods of clear light begin to emerge. They are creatures of transparency that have neither body nor any characteristics or functions of embodied creatures. Over the course of time, they become coarser and have a need for nourishment, which leads to the discovery of wild rice. Eating leads not only to digestion and defecation, but also to greed and desire, and eventually to procreation and death. By now, these creatures are human-like. Some of these creatures hoard the wild rice, and even steal it from their fellow beings. Chaos results, and the cry for a ruler emerges from the people. Thus, the justification for governance is utilitarian. Ensuring law and order is the raison d'etre of any ruler according to this scheme. The Tibetans modified this narrative somewhat to bring it in line with their own local narratives. According to their sources, the first creatures to populate the world were demons (srin po), cannibalistic creatures that did not know of any morality. A female demon felt camallust for what appeared to her as a monkey, but who was in reality a bodhisattva. First, the monkeylbodhisattva rejected her approaches, but when she told him that she would turn toward a male demon to beget many little demons, he gave in and became her mate. Their offspring, half monkey half demon, lived in the trees -like monkeys. Over time, they would descend from the treetops and cultivate grain. Eating grain, they shed their tails and body hair; they became humans and the ancestors of the Tibetans. 9 The monastic narratives adopted the main Indian and Buddhist justification for governance, while a more indigenous tradition saw the ruler as descending from the realms of gods to establish order among humanity. A wonderfully humorous account is preserved in the Ladakhi version of the Gesar Epic. 10 There, at the beginning of the world, a black and a white bird fight for supremacy. During the morning hours, the white bird is superior, but toward the hours of dusk, the black bird is more powerful.· tshogs dge ba'] 'byung gnas zangs dkar dkar chos 'byung gzhung/ dbus na rang rkang bzhi phyugs mams dus der skyongb 'dis/ byang chu[b] mchod rten gru mang cha cig yod/ (fol. 4, line 7-fol. 5, line 1). 9 E. Dargyay, 'Zur Interpretation der mythischen Urgeschichte in den tibetischen Historikern', Central Asiatic loumal XVI, 1972,pp. 161-77. 10 Cf. A.H. Francke, Del' Friihlings- und Wintermythus der Kesarsage: Beitriige zur Kenntnis del' vorbuddhistischen Religion Tibets undLadakhs (Osnabrlick: Otto Zeller 1968), pp. 1-2.

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Neither one can establish lasting dominance over the other. Then, a goat herder vvalks by and kills the black bird. At this momel~t, the white bird transforms itself into a white old man who reveals himself as the god of heavens. He thanks the goat herder for killing his arch-rival, and promises to give him whatever the man desires. After a while of pondering, the goat herder confesses' that he and his fellow human beings have all they need except a ruler to keep order. Thus, the sky god promises the man to send one of his sons down to earth to rule over humanity. The sky god retreats to.his heavenly abode, but finds it impossible to persuade anyone of his three sons to become the ruler over humanity. Eventually, the youngest son agrees to descend to earth and become humanity's first Icing. He will be born as King Gesar, who defeats all demons and evildoers. Again, the utilitarian argument prevails while maintaining its Tibetan flavour. Let me summarize what I discussed so far. The world is built around an axis mundi, Mt Meru, surrounded by a vast ocean together with four island-continents, which in turn are surrounded by seven gigantic mountain-rings marking the outer boundary of the universe. Humans gradually evolve from either ethereal creatures or from a monkey/demon combination. Rulers are called into existence in order to establish law and order. What I have not addressed so far is how and why this universe came into existence in the first place. It is true that Piili texts reject such questions as unanswerable and therefore as a moot pursuit, but later Buddhist traditions were certainly interested in pondering these issues. I shall now turn to this question.

Is There an Ontological Ground of the Universe? Before addressing this question, I need to reflect on what the general Indian perception is with regard to this issue. The Upani:;ads confess that only one part of the primordial puru:;a becomes manifest in the universe, while its other part remains beyond comprehension and beyond manifestation. Thus, the universe is a part of punl~a, and not its creation. Hinduism sees the ground of the universe as brahman (in Sanskrit, of neuter grammatical gender, to be distinguished from the god Brahma). Brahman is a-gur;avat, 'ultimately quality-Iess'Il; it is pure sat, being. When in Hindu myths the gods create the universe, for instance by churning the milk-ocean, nature is already a pre-given material with which they work. Nature pre-dates any creation. The craftsman needs his material before he can shape it. Consequently, the concept of creatio ex nihilo as professed by Christianity is unthinkable within the Indian context. Buddhism challenged some of these assumptions, which I just briefly outlined. The idea of an immutable and independently existing substance as well as that of a mythic puru:;a were alien to Buddhist thinkers. To the contrary, they saw the world in constant flux, ever changing and never resting. Its very nature they described with the 11

B. Heimann, Facets of Indian Thought (London: Allen & Unwin 1964), p. 108.

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term Hinya, which is often translated as 'empty' or 'void' and is understood as saying the world is by nature void of inherent being. The only true statement about the world is that it is void; no other philosophically valid assessment can be made. The term s~lnya, however, is related to s~lna, meaning both 'swollen', 'budding' as well as 'empty'. Thus, absolute emptiness is also absolute potential. A state empty of inherent being can adopt all shapes and forms of existence; a place empty of all can hold everything possible. In contrast to common nihilistic understandings of emptiness, the actual meaning of the term implies a very positive, albeit undefined one. Thus, the concept of emptiness became a fertile ground for Buddhists pondering the true nature of the world. In the following section, I shall tum to a Tibetan text of spurious origin, the Kun byed rgyal po 'i mdo, which one may very well consider an apocryphal text. The text is incorporated in the Tibetan Canon (at least in some editions), and claims to be the translation of an Indian original that preserves 'the word of the Buddha'. These are, of course, unsubstantiated claims. The text is organized in 57 chapters, some of which are, however, short texts which are also transmitted as independent texts. Thus, one may assume that the text is a later compilation of already existing texts and of some oral transmission that brought the disparate texts together to form something similar to a coherent whole. Some of the independently transmitted texts which then became incorporated in the Kun byed rgyal po'i mdo are documented before the middle of the eleventh century as part of the so-called Dunhuang documents.1 2 By the fourteenth century, the text exists to some degree in its present form. Minor modifications, however, happened throughout its existence. 13 Given this situation, we may reasonably assume that the text repeats ideas and concepts that were popular in Tibet from the late eighth century up to the fourteenth century. During these centuries, the various Schools of Tibetan Buddhism took shape, among them the rNying-ma School or Old School of Tibetan Buddhism, which claims the Kun byed rgyal po 'i mdo as one of its key texts. In its formal presentation the text is a sLltra, that is, a dialogue between the Buddha and an interlocutor, in this case the bodhisattva Sems-pa rdo-rje. A few words introduce the individual dialogues, which are the main bulk of each chapter. The text is unusual in so far as the Buddha has here the title Kun byed rgyal po, the 'All Creating Sovereign'. Given this situation, one may be tempted to say, 'See, there is a Buddhist text affirming a creator god as sole cause of the universe.' While it is true that the Tibetan word rgyal po means 'king', the text in itself is very clear that the term here is meant as gender-neutral. This sovereign is called 'mother' as well as 'father' , and the text asserts that only if one understands the ultimate in its femininity has one an appropriate understanding. Thus, the Kun byed rgyal po is much more an 12 13

Cf. S.G. Kannay, The Great Perfection: A Philosophical and Meditative Teaching of Tibetan Buddhism (Leiden: EJ. Brill 1988), pp. 41-85. Cf. E. Neumaier, 'The bSam gtan mig sgron and its rDzogs chen Quotations: A Study in the production of Tibetan Texts', Proceedings of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, in press.

Buddhist and Christian Perspectives on Creation

It than a He or She. This It is said to be t.~e cause of all that exists; even the Buddhas of the past, present and future Oliginatefrom It. Reality-as-it is (chos nyid) is made by It, and so are all articulations of this primary Reality. In a previous article, I interpreted the relevant passages as indicating a belief in a creator-God. 14 After many years of further studies, I now have to distance myself from this interpretation. I think I was misled by the term rgyal po, which I had discussed before, to assume that the text talks about a creator-god, regardless how unusual this would be for a Buddhist text. In my striving to understand the text better, I had asked the Dalai Lama in 1987 how he interpreted the text and its main concept of a kun byed rgyal po. I have to insert here that I was amazed when he said that he himself had read the text, as he found it unusual, while most erudite Tibetan monks even of the rNying rna tradition have either never heard of the text or know about it only from hearsay. The Dalai Lama very clearly understood Kun byed rgyal po as a symbolic expression for stong pa nyid, that is, emptiness - the concept we have encountered earlier with its ambiguous meaning of 'empty' and 'swollen' or 'pregnant'. Given this interpretation, we have to understand the term as meaning a potentiality that is the base of all that exists. Figuratively spealdng, it is a pregnant sovereign releasing the universe from Its vacuity, that is, abdominal cavity. To express this context, the text introduces the term gzhi, meaning 'ground' or 'base', which I shall discuss now.

The Ground Samten Karrnay translates the term gzhi as 'Primordial Basis',15 and claims that 'the recognition of the theory of this basic principle [is] common to all Buddhist schools' .16 To clarify the issue, Karrnay cites from the eleventh century work bSamgtan mig-sgron, which asserts that while concepts of no-action and of no-searching are common to the rDzogs-chen tradition as well as to the Cig-car-pa, that is, those who propose a sudden enlightenment, only the rDzogs-chen hold on to the concept of Primordial Base.17 The Kun byed rgyal po'i mdo devotes the entire Chapter 48 to elaborate that the ground of all things is the sovereign mind itself. The text argues that the mind of perfect purity underlies and permeates all that exists; thus, it is the ground of existence, and furthermore, the mind of perfect purity is the All Creating Sovereign. Consequently, the ground of existence is identical with the All Creating Sovereign. The All Creating Sovereign says: Cf. E. Dargyay, 'The Concept of a "Creator God" in Tantric Buddhism', Joumal of the Intemational Association of Buddhist Studies 8, 1985,31-47, p. 43. 15 S. Karmay, The Great Perfection, op. cit (fn. 12), p. 50, fn. 40. 16 Ibid., p. 88. 17 Cf. ibid., p. 105. 14

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My own being is the sole Reality. I am the wonder of creatiowfrom which arise the three retinues due to the teacher's ceaseless three forms of manifestation. I am one in Reality and suchness, and pertinent to [this truth] there are six [aspects] of the ground. 18

Other statements say 'the ground of all existence' (chos thams cad kyi gzhi ma),19 while in other cases the ground is identified with rang sems, the mind in its own being. 2o In another statement it is said that, 'From the ground, i.e. the pure nature of Reality, the nature of secret generations [stems].,21 These few quotes make it already clear that the ground mentioned here can be understood as the ontological ground of existence. This ground is free of any activity, and cannot be disturbed through any activity or defilement. It is beyond all comprehension. While this ground is still in itself, it is the basis from which all activity and all phenomena arise. The ground can be understood as sheer potentiality that is void of all characteristics, because any characteristic can arise from it. It is void of all concrete characteristics, but pregnant with the potentiality to produce anyone of them. The creation of which this text speaks comes into existence because the ground is a primary given. Having said this, one may infer that the ground is some solid ontological base upon which the universe solidly rests. This, however, would be a false interpretation. The Kun byed rgyal po' i mdo consistently and repeatedly affirms that aLuibuting any characteristic to the nature of things, or the ground, is erroneous. For instance, in Chapter 5 we read 'My own being is like this: Its intrinsic being is nothing but one',22 or in Chapter 34, 'The quintessence of Me is Reality ... I am without obscuration, but unknowable. The unknowable is the sky-like truth manifestation. I am not to be lmown, .and there is no acquiring or rejecting.'23 In attempting to actualize the mind of perfect purity or the ground, the traditional stages of the path to enlightenment, such as vows, morality, abhidharmic studies, veneration of the Buddha and so, on are only obstacles. All the traditional Buddhist practices are nothing but hindrances in actualizing the all-creating sovereign mind, which is Reality. The creation the text talks about is not a creatio ex nihilo, nor is it the forming and shaping of a given primal matter - like in some of the tribal myths of India. The creation the text talks about is rather an affirmation of the potentiality of the ground. Earlier, I said that the term siinya means 'empty' but also 'swollen' or 'pregnant'. Thus, the ground, which on some occasions is identified with thig le (Skr. bindu), the representation of zero, is void of all characteristics and attributes. At the same time, it Kun byed rgyaJ po'I rndo, rNying rna rgyud 'bum, Vol. 1, 139. E.K. Neurnaier-Dargyay, The Sovereign All-Creating Mind: the Motherly Buddha. A translation of the Kun byed rgyal po'! mdo (Albany, NY: State University of New York 1992), p. 157. 19 Kun byed ... 139; ibid., p. 157. 20 Kun byed ... 141; ibid., p. 158. 21 Kun byed ... 37; ibid., p. 77. 22 Ibid., p. 59. 23 Ibid., p. 127. 18

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is swollen or pregnant with the potentiality to bring forth all characteristics and attributes that make up the universe. In this way, the text stands finrJy on the ground of Mahayana thinking. What sets the text apart from other Buddhist texts is its language, which employs what could be misunderstood as theistic terminology. In its tendency to use words that could imply that the ground of existence - that is, emptiness - is a solid ontological substance and that the appearance of the universe is due to a making by a supernatural being, the text is not alone. The tathiigatagarbha literature and the Ratnagotravibhaga in particular embraced a language that described the ultimate (dharmakaya or whatever other term may be used) as tranquil, permanent and stable. 24 For instance, the identity between the ultimate and the phenomenal and transitory world is well expressed in the following passage:

o Siiriputra, the ultimate truth is a synonym of the mass of living beings (sattvadhiitu). The mass of living beings is, a Siiriputra, nothing but a synonym of the Matrix of the Tathiigata (tathiigatagarbha). The Matrix of the Tathiigata is, Siiriputra, nothing but a synonym of the Absolute Body (dharmakiiya).25 If we understand the phrase 'the mass of living beings' as the sum of creation, then this quote suggests that the matrix of the Buddha is co-existent with all that results from its potency, that is, the phenomenal world. In his introductory discussion, Takasaki makes it clear that the term for 'matrix' (Skr. gotra) is explained with a list of other terms, among them 'ground' (Skr. sthana), which is the one preferred in rDzogs-chen texts such as the Kun-byed rgyal-po'i mdo. This text states that the ground (gzhi) is the secret of the ultimate truth manifestation (dharmakiiya) from which all creation originates. 26 In a later chapter the All-Creating Sovereign professes: I, the all-Creating Sovereign, mind of perfect purity, am the central vigor of all things. I am the seed of all things. I am also the cause of all things. I am the stem of all things. I am the ground (gzhi rna) of all things. I am the root of all things.27

In Chapter 48 of the same text, we read: 'I, the All-Creating [Sovereign], am the mind of perfect purity of everything. This mind of perfect purity is the ground of all things. '28 The Sovereign further elucidates his own nature as 'unborn' (skyes ba med pal, 'without termination' ('gag pa med pal, and as 'the source for the wonder of ceaseless creation' (mi 'gag skye bo'i cho 'phrul).29 The latter description is rare, as 24 25

26 27 28 29

Cf. F.R. Cook, Hua-yen Buddhism: The fewel Net of Indra (University Park, PA - London: The Pennsylvania State University Press 1977), p. 127, fn.lO. J. Takasaki, A Study on the Ratnagotravibhaga (Ullaratantra): Being a Treatise on the Tathagatagarbha Theory of Mahayana Buddhism (Rome: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente 1966), p. 143. Ch. 10. Cf. Neumaier-Dargyay. The Sovereign All-Creating Mind, op. cit. (fn. 18), p. 77. Ibid., p. 10 1. Ibid., p. 157. Ibid., p. 157.

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Buddhist doctrine sees the manifest world (saTlJsiira) as source of suffering, thus it is seen as everything but a 'wonder'. Unusual as this statement may be, it is a logical consequence of the tathagiitagarbha concept. Once the phenomenal world is equated with the ultimate Reality of Buddha-mind, which is described as luminous, without beginning or end, then it is only one more step to assign these same attributes to the phenomenal world. In the light of these texts, one may come to the conclusion that certain strands of Mahayana Buddhism affirmed a 'creation' as manifestation of the ultimate Reality whereby the two, manifestation and 'ground', are syn-existential. The enlightened mind will not discern any difference while at the same time acknowledging that to the un-enlightened mind they constitute a pair of opposites. The concept of tathiigatagarbha, which one may loosely paraphrase as the matrix of that which has come into existence rather than the more conventional translation of the matrix of one who has thus come, that is, the Buddha, echoes somewhat ideas of Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464), who described God as quidditas, which is the Latin equivalent of 'suchness', the common translation of Sanskrit tathatii. To Nicholas, the visible world is nothing else but the apparent manifestation of God. The ineffable God reveals himself in the enigma of the visible world; whatever one recognizes is cognition of God. 3D God, in Nicholas's thinking, is idem, Latin for 'one self' or 'selfidentical' and non aliud, 'not other'. Building a speculative bridge between the theological thinking of Nicholas of Cusa and that of the tathiigatagarbha tradition of Buddhism is an intriguing project. Some of the terms exhibit a surprising proximity: Tathatii vis-a-vis quidditas, idem vis-a-vis Tibetan rang bzhin ('own nature'), and non aliud vis-a-vis Tibetan gnyis su med pa ('not two', that is, 'not other'). Cusanus calls the ultimate unum principium, which we may understand as 'the one that is the beginning'. Only the absolute identical is beginning, centre and end of all phenomena, the absolute reality of all potentiality.3l Coming back to our initial question of whether Buddhist traditions have a concept of creation, we have to say that some Buddhist traditions seem to have a concept of the ontological grounding of the visible world that shows remarkable similarities with that of Nicholas of Cusa. One must, however, keep in mind that neither Nicholas of Cusa nor the tathiigatagarbha tradition stand for the mainstream Christian or Buddhist thinking. The next issue to be addressed is whether some rDzogs chen texts were seeing the ground as a person-like being, or whether any physical or organic form can be ascribed to it. The oldest extant texts, those recovered from the Dunhuang caves, which were closed by the middle of the eleventh century, present the ground as an impersonal universal force which is spontaneous, pure from its beginning-less 30

31

S. Dangelmayr, Gotteserkenntnis und Gottesbegrijf in den philosophischen Schriften des Nikolaus von Kues, Monographien zur philosophischen Forschung, VoL 54 (Meisenhaim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain 1969), p. 109. 'Nur das absolut Dasselbe ist daher Anfang, Mitte und Ende jeder Gestaltung, die absolute Wirklichkeit aller Moglichkeit.' FA. Scharpff, Nicolaus von eusa wichtigste Schriften in deLltscher Ubersetzung (Freiburg in Breisgau: Herder'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung 1862), p. 160.

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beginning and which is gnosis. Sometimes this ground is referred to as Kun-tu bzangpo or Kun-tu bzang-mo. 32 The problem that arises here is that on the one hand these terms can be translated as 'All Good', whereby the first term is masculine and the second feminine, and on the other hand these terms have became mimes of an allegorical Buddha. The reader of these texts has to be very careful in his or her analysis and listen to the tone of the entire text in order to decide whether these words refer to the ground as an impersonal force that is all good, or whether there is a reference made to the Buddha Kun-tu bzang-po/mo. In later texts of the same tradition, rDzogs chen, the ultimate is sometimes said to be of the form of a vase: its gnosis is like a butter-lamp, and its luminosity like a ball of light; these three things are stacked on top of each other like a pagoda. In this form it is said it resides in all sentient beings. Karmay argues that these texts, which are classified as tantras, were compiled between the late eleventh and fourteenth centuries and belong to hidden and re-discovered texts (yang gter).33 We are confronted here with the fact that the same tradition contains texts that insist on the ineffability of the ultimate while at the same time giving it some bizarre, and one is temped to say primitive, appearance. How can we explain this? Japanese scholars advocating what they call Critical Buddhism provide us with some insights that may bear relevance to this question. Let me elaborate. The Critique of Tathiigatagarbha by Proponents of Critical Buddhi.sm I like to elucidate Critical Buddhism with the following quote taken from the Introduction by Jamie Hubbard to Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm over Critical Buddhism: Rumors of major controversies within the normally staid world of Japanese Buddhist studies have been reaching the West for a number of years, largely centering on the claims of the well-known scholars Hakamaya Noriaki and Matsumoto Shiro with regard to what Buddhism is and what it most definitely is not. To wit, the teachings of Buddha-nature, original enlightenment and the Kyoto school of philosophy are not Buddhist; the non-duality taught in the Vimalakirti S£itra is unacceptable, as well as the ideas of thathatii or 'suchness,' most of Ch'an and Zen Buddhism, and more. What, then, is Buddhism? 'Criticism alone is Buddhism.' So states Hakayama, in characteristically confrontational style. 34

Critical Buddhism is brought into contrast with Topical Buddhism, which refers to 'an aesthetic mysticism unconcerned with critical differentiation between truth and falsity and not in need of rational demonstration between truth and falsity and not in need of 32 C[ Karmay, op. cit. (fn. 12), p. 185. 33 C[ ibid., p. 188. 34 1. Hubbard and P.L. Swanson (eds), Pruning the Badhi Tree: The Stann over Critical Buddhism (Honululu: University ofHawai'i Press 1997), vii.

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rational demonstration, a kind of thinking that he (i.e. Hakamaya) feels actually dominates the Buddhist tradition' .35 Topical Buddhism is most clearly present in the tathiigatagarbha tradition and its pertinent literature, as well as in the claim, widely found among rDzogs chen texts and other Central and East Asian Buddhist traditions, that all sentient beings by nature are primordially endowed with enlightenment. 36 By not-thinking and not-doing one becomes aware of the pristine nature of the mind. In short, Topical Buddhism is what we have in the Tibetan rDzogs chen tradition. The Kun-byed rgyal po'i mdo repeats many times that one cannot and ought not to strive for buddhahood, as one is already a Buddha since primordial times. Matsumoto ridicules this position by saying: 'If "not thinking" were the ideal for humanity, as proposed in the idea of tathiigata-garbha propagated by a certain celebrated Chinese Ch'an master called Mo-ho-yen at the bSam-yas debate in ninth century Tibet, we should all suspend life and rush to become plants and stones and relics.'37 He, then, calls the ideas of tathiigatagarbha 'an animistic polytheism' .38 In a more serious vein, Ruben L.F. Habito argues that by affirming 'that this very selfis Buddha, that there is nothing that is not Buddha' (original emphasis), 'this doctrine of originary enlightenment served to provide religious legitimation to the political and economic structure of the time, bolstering an "orthodoxy" based on the convergence of political, economic, and religious interests of the ruling elite' .39 The Japanese proponents of Critical Buddhism argue that the ideas of tathiigatagarbha and its concomitant concepts of sudden and original enlightenment are a Buddhist adaptation of preBuddhist local ideas (for example, tao), and are therefore alien to original Buddhism. Given this argumentation, I propose that the ideas of non-duality and the ground as found in early rDzogs chen texts lend themselves easily for an amalgamation with pre-Buddhist indigenous Tibetan religious ideas. If the totality of existence is the primordial Buddha-mind, then it follows that also the sky god of the Gesar epic as well as the ruler, the King of Tibet (btsan po) is Buddha-mind. If all difference is collapsed in the non-duality of the ultimate, then all non- and pre-Buddhist ideas and symbols can be absorbed into a Buddhist frame of thinking. In later rDzogs chen texts, this trend toward an all-inclusiveness resulted in giving the ground an almost totemistic appearance.

Final Reflections Where does this all lead us in our search for creation and a creator-god within Buddhism, and Tibetan Buddhism in particular? It is true, the Kun-byed rgyal-po'i 35 Ibid., p. vii. 36 Cf. N. Hakamaya, 'Thoughts on the Idological Background of Social Discrimination', in ibid, 339-55, p. 344. 37 S. Matsumoto, 'The Lotus Sutra and Japanese Culture', in ibid., 388-403, p. 403. 38 Ibid., p. 402. 39 R. Habito, 'Tendai HongakuDoctrine and Japan's Ethnocentric Turn', in ibid., 374-87, pp. 376-7.

Buddhist and Christian Perspectives on Creation

mdo uses terms and expressions that could easily be seen as affirming the idea of a creator-god. But it does so only if we exclude it from its ideological and cultural context - Mahayana Buddhism in eighth or ninth-century Tibet. 'When placed against the background of the tathiigatagarbha literature, then, the pertinent passages of the Kun-byed rgyal-po' i mdo seem to promote the idea that the visible world is in its true nature nothing else but a manifestation of its own cause, the all-creating pure mind. Thus, creation and the cause of creation are collapsed into one syn-existential force. In this aspect, the tathiigatagarbha ideology reveals significant similarities with the theology of Nicholas of Cusa. But one has to keep in mind that neither movement represented the mainstream thinking of their respective faith. It is also true that the Kun-byed rgyal-po, along with some tathiigatagarbha texts, affirms those concepts the Japanese proponents of Critical Buddhismdismissed as alien to Buddhism. Early rDzogs chen literature certainly reflects the cultural interaction between very erudite meditation masters sympathetic to the tathiigatagarbha ideology and a Tibetan nobility steeped in local religious perceptions that centred around the ruler, his descent from the heavens, his connection with the land and its fertility. Is it too adventurous to put forward the hypothesis that whoever compiled the Kun-byed rgyal-po'i mdo tried to bring together ideas of original enlightenment and tathiigatagarbha ideology, here presented as the ground, with the self-confidence of a new dynasty that has just become the military superpower of Central Asia? If this hypothesis has any trace of veracity, then, we would need to admit that rendering the concept of tathiigatagarbha as 'All Creating Sovereign' or 'King' and making him the main speaker in the Kun-byed rgyal po 'i mdo is much more the adulation of a newly established monarchy rather than a manifestation of a belief in a creator-god.

Chapter 4

Creation and the Problem of Evil Annin Kreiner

The Nature ofthe Problem What is the 'problem of evil'? For many theologians, this problem has exclusively to do with the question: How can or should Christians cope with evil and suffering? Sometimes it is said: 'The problem of evil is not how to understand evil, but how to stand against evil, not "verstehen" but "bestehen".' I do not agree with this proposal. At least in a theistic context, the problem of evil is not only the problem how to cope with suffering or hoI'.' to fight evil, or how to stand against it. The problem of evil is the problem of theodicy, and that is a theoretical or conceptual problem; the other ones are practical problems. I do not want to decide which kind of problems are the more important ones. And I am not even sure whether this distinction is really tenable, because what we believe and the way we deal with our beliefs seem to be rather practical affairs. Nevertheless, the problem of theodicy consists in an obvious incoherence between certain propositions:

o On the one hand, there is the proposition that there is a God, who is omnipotent

•

and benevolent, who created this universe ex nihilo. That means God is ultimately responsible for the existence and basic nature of the universe. An omnipotent God is, by definition, also responsible for everything that happens in the world, because s/he either permits or causes what is happening. On the other hand, we face an enormous amount of evil in the world. The most comprehensive definition of evil is found in the First Noble Truth.! The term dukkha denotes the whole range, from unpleasant to painful feelings and conditions. The concept of evil is thoroughly dependent on the existence of consciousness. In a universe devoid of any consciousness, there would be no evil at all. By 'evil', I mean everything that is painful in some degree. In a broader sense, 'evil' denotes everything that causes suffering or pain to sentient beings. 'Birth is dukkha, aging is dukkha, sickness is dukkha, death is dukkha; sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief and despair are dukkha; association with what one dislikes is dukkha, separation from what one likes is dukkha, not to get what one wants is dukkha .. .'. Quoted from: P. Harvey, An Introduction to Buddhism: Teachings, History, and Practices (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, repr. 1998), pp.47f.

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Obviously, both propositions cannot be true. If there were an omnipotent God, slhe would have the power to prevent some or ail evil, and if God were benevolent, slhe would be morally obliged to do so. The problem of theodicy is the problem of the apparent incoherence between these propositions, and a solution to the problem of theodicy would be a theory that could explain why it is only an apparent incoherence. Often, such a solution is simply called a 'theodicy'. There are at least two reasons why the problem of theodicy has become the major objection against theistic belief since the Enlightenment. The first reason has to do with the critique of the proofs for the existence of God. The problem of theodicy had been a problem long before the times of Bume and Kant. But since then, it has grown from a minor theological problem to a major challenge, that has shaken the foundations of theistic belief. Bume, Kant and others showed that the traditional arguments for the existence of God were no evident proofs. That means there are no phenomena that malce it inevitable to assume that there is a God to explain them. Neither the existence of a universe nor its order or fine tuning nor the emergence of consciousness and morality make it inevitable to postulate the existence of God. Bume stated in his 'Dialogues on Natural Religion' that the evils present in our universe make it difficult to demonstrate that there is a divine creator. Given that the arguments for the existence of God are no proofs, it follows that there is no overwhelming evidence that there is a God. As soon as this insight was reached the problem of evil changed its character: it char,ged from an obstacle to demonstrating conclusively the existence of God to a serious objection against the belief that there is a God. Since the Enlightenment, the seriousness of this objection has been increasing while the evidence for the existence of God has been decreasing. That is the first reason why the problem of theodicy has become the major problem of theistic belief, especially in its Christian form. The other reason is that the traditional Christian solution to this problem has lost much of its credibility. By the traditional solution, I mean mainly the Augustinian doctrine of original sin. This doctrine states that God initially created a paradise without any suffering. A paradise is a world that actually might be expected from a perfect creator. According to the Augustinian solution, we humans are to blame for all the evils in the world. Evil is God's just punishment for human disobedience and sin. The shortcomings of this doctrine are obvious: the evidence that there were creatures on our planet that experienced pain and death long before the advent of humankind is overwhelming. Therefore, human sin cannot be the reason why evil arose in a world that initially had been created without pain and death. From the beginning of life there has been death, and from the beginning of consciousness there has been suffering and pain. Moreover, it must be doubted whether punishing countless generations of people because of the trespasses of their ancestors deserves to be called 'just measures'. There are several options for a theistic believer to cope with the problem of theodicy. In what follows, I will present and discuss some of these options.

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The No-solution Solution The first option admits that there does seem to be an incoherence, but maintains that there is no solution toit, at least no solution we can now conceive of. God may have his or her reasons for permitting or causing evil, but these reasons are unknown to us. Some maintain that we are not in need of a solution to the problem of theodicy, and Christians should continue to believe and trust in God regardless of all the apparent evidence that seems to count against their belief. I do not think this is a viable position. This option inevitably leads to a situation in which theistic belief has to be suspected as irrational. It seems to be irrational to believe something when there is no convincing evidence for it, but at least one grave objection against it. Robert Nozick has stated that rationality 'involves taking account of reasons for and against'.2 Theistic believers who claim that there is no solution to the problem of theodicy can hardly claim to be very rational. Therefore, it seems to be irrational to believe in God without any solution to the problem oftheodicy. Some argue that this might be the case, but that any solution to the problem of theodicy would be far worse than being irrational. They argue that a solution must consist of giving reasons why God permits suffering. And if God really had reasons to permit or even cause suffering, then suffering would finally tum out to be a good thing. That is exactly what some suspect a theodicy to be: not just an innocuous explanation of suffering, but an outrageous legitimization. Justifying God in the end allegedly turns out to be justifying suffering, perhaps even justifying the ones who inflict suffering on their fellow human beings. And that, for many, would be even worse than being irrational; it would be logically absurd and morally perverted. It would be 'logically absurd' because evil is, by definition, something that should not be. And it would be 'morally perverted' because it is appalling to tell people who are suffering terribly that everything that happens is part of God's plan or creation, and therefore good. I think this critique would be convincing if every theological explanation of evil, in the end, really turned out to be a moral justification of.either evil or evildoers. But I do not believe that this is indeed the case. A viable theodicy has to admit that there is what David Griffin called 'genuine evil' .3 That means, it has to be admitted, that there is evil without which the world would be better. There is evil that definitely should not be. To ignore the existence of 'genuine evil' is almost as strange as to deny the existence of evil at all. One Christian denomination teaches that there is really no . evil, but just the illusion of evil. Ironically, it is called Christian Science. There is the story of the son of Christian Scientist parents who asked his minister to pray for his father, who was seriously ill. The minister blamed the boy, and told him his father only thought he was sick. He said that his sickness was an illusion based on his lack of 2 R. Nozick, The Nature a/Rationality (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1993), p. 72. 3 Cf. D.R. Griffin, God, Power and Evil: A Process Theodicy (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press 1976).

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faith. He told the boy: 'Tell your father to pray for faith.' Some days later the minister met the boy again and asked him: 'Does your father still think he's sick?' The boy replied: 'No, now he thinks he's dead.'4 There is no doubt: evil is real, and there is some genuine evil that does not serve any higher good. A solution to the problem oftheodicy would have to show why God either causes or permits evil. If this could be shown, the obvious incoherence would vanish. It would become coherent and therefore rational to believe in God, despite all the suffering in the world. But how could this be shown without thereby justifying evil?

An Outline of the 'Free Win Defence' Any solution has to start with the concept of creation. If there is a God who created this universe, slhe created it in order to bring about something good and valuable. A viable theodicy would have to show that there is a certain connection or link between the goodness of God's creation and the evils in it. Of course, not just any kind of value and not just any kind of link would do. The link between value and evil has to be of a certain kind, and this kind depends on the presupposed nature of God. If God is believed to be omnipotent and benevolent, then it must be shown that the values slhe wants to be actualized in the universe cannot logically be actualized in 1 universe without any suffering at all or with a significantly lesser amount of suffering. A theodicy that permits the logical possibility of actualizing approximately the same values in a significantly less harmful way would ultimately fail because it would not answer the question why God did not choose the less harmful option. Whatever these values may be, even God can only realize them by at least running the risk of admitting evil, including genuine evil. Even for an omnipotent God, it might be true that 'to have the good is necessarily to risk the chance of the bad'.5 I believe a solution to the problem of theodicy will be convincing insofar as it succeeds in showing that there is such a good or value. What would count as such a value? Some theodicists maintain that it is free will. They argue that it is good that some creatures are able to decide deliberately how to act, at least sometimes, and that it is good that they have the opportunity to choose between different courses of action. Their range of options often includes the option to cause pain and suffering to others. This is the price that has to be paid in a world with significantly free agents, a price that even an omnipotent creator cannot avoid. Creating free agents means creating agents that cannot be controlled thoroughly. Now, there are many problems with the 'free will defence'. I cannot discuss all of them in detail, so I have to concentrate on what I think are the most important ones. 4

Cf. W.J. Bausch, Catholics in Crisis? The Church Con/ranIS Contemporary Challenges (Mystic, CT: Twenty-Third Publications 1999), p. 27. 5 D.R. Griffin, 'Creation out of Chaos and the Problem of Evil' , in S.T. Davis (ed.), Encountering Evil: Live Options in Theodicy (Atlanta, GA: John Knox Press 1981), 101-19, p. 107.

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The first question is: What is so valuable about free will, so valuable that it could justify the horrendous amount of suffering and pain that free agents have inflicted on one another so far, and that they likely are going to inflict in the future. Perhaps what we have seen up to now might only be the prelude to an even more horrifying future. The emergence ,of free will was the breakthrough of a new kind of reality or quality in the universe, namely morality. Being a moral agent presupposes not just consciousness and the capacity to act intentionally. It presupposes the capacity to act responsibly, that is, to act in a way that is morally assessable. An action counts as morally assessable if the agent can legitimately be praised or blamed, rewarded or punished for her action. And this does not malce sense unless she acted freely, which means that her action was ultimately caused by herself, not necessitated by the circumstances of her action or her character. Usually, and rightly, an action is called free if the agent could have done otherwise. The concept of free will hinges on the possibility of having done otherwise. An agent who has the capacity to act in such a way is called a person. Free will constitutes personhood, And persons are the most valuable creatures in the universe. (When I recently gave a lecture at Glasgow University, someone replied that cockroaches might possibly think the same of themselves. Well, I believe cockroaches do not think at all, and if they did, they would simply be wrong.) The next question is, of course: Are we really free in the sense just mentioned? Are there really situations in which we could have done otherwise? Several versions of determinism doubt whether this is the case. They maintain that our actions are necessitated by the past and the natural laws that will be uncovered by and by in the near or distant future. I cannot presently exclude that one version of determinism might be true. In this case, the belief in free will would be illusionary and the 'free will defence' would, of course, be a complete failure. But it is not the point whether free will might one day turn out to be an illusionary concept. Every belief may one day turn out to be false. It is important whether we now have any viable reasons to conclude that determinism is true. And, of course, it is important what the evidence in favour of free will is. I think the best evidence in favour of free will is the awareness of ourselves, 'unsere Selbsterfahrung': we have the impression that there are situations in which we could have and should have done otherwise. This impression is so firm that there are no overriding reasons to think it is illusionary. There is a final problem for the 'free will defence' that I would like to discuss. Some have claimed that God could have created free persons without risking evil, or sinful decisions, or actions. In a famous paper, John Leslie Mackie has argued that it is logically possible that a person will always act both freely and be morally good. 6 If this is logically possible, then it is also logically possible to have a world in which all persons act both freely and are morally good. And if this is logically possible, God could have created such a world with free agents, but without suffering caused by their free decisions. Obviously, this is not our world, which for Mackie means that there is no divine creator and so no God at all. 6

Cf. J,L. Mackie, 'Evil and Omnipotence', Mind 64, 1955, pp. 206-10.

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I can only outline why I do not h'llnlc Mackie's objection is convincing. The central issue is the following problem: How could God manage to ensure that no free agent will misuse her freedom to inflict pain on someone else? Obviously, God cannot manage this by causing the agent to act in a certain way. God cannot do this, because a free action is, by definition, caused by the agent, and not by God. Now, it might be replied that God could know in advance how any possible agent would act in any possible situation. And so God could decide to create only those persons who will act freely and morally good. This is a serious objection against the 'free will defence'. It presupposes that God is omniscient, and that God's omniscience embraces the knowledge of what might be called future contingent propositions. I have to admit that Mackie's objection would be inevitable given these conditions. But I doubt whether these conditions really hold. I do not want to enter the discussion on the compatibility of divine omniscience and human freedom. I just want to mention that I think there is no compatibility. A world that contains free agents has to be a world with an open future, which means a future that is not fixed by the past An omniscient God might know what will possibly happen in the future, but he cannot know what will actually happen. Otherwise, the future would not be open. A future that could be known by anyone, either by angels or God, would not be an open future. In order to be known, future events have to be fixed, and a 'fixed future' precludes the possibility of doing otherwise. The famous traditional solution to this problem proposed by Boethius precludes an open future, too.?

The Problem of Natural Evil Let me summarize what I have said so far. The 'free will defence' is a viable solution to the problem of theodicy. But it covers only those evils that are caused by free agents. It covers only what is traditionally called 'moral evil'. There is also natural evil, which apparently has nothing to do with sinful choices of free agents: there are earthquakes, hurricanes, floods, diseases of all kinds, and so on. Some have suggested that another free agent might cause these evils - the devil. 8 This does not seem to be very convincing. Why in the world would the devil bring about earthquakes chiefly in California and Japan? Natural evils do not seem to be caused by non-human agents, but by natural laws. And this raises another problem: Why did God create a world with just these natural laws? Why did God not create a better natural world with less pain and suffering? At this point there is a division among Christian scholars and believers. 9 Those who favour a Process approach to creation lO maintain that God did not create the 7 8 9 10

Cf. Boethius, De Consolatione Philosophiae, V. Cf. A. Plantinga, God, Freedom and Evil (London: Allen & Unwin 1975), p. 58. Cf. J.B. Cobb and c.H. Pinnock, Searching for an Adequate God (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans 2000). See also the contribution by Aasulv Lande in this volume (Chapter 6). Cf. D.R. Griffin, God, Power and Evil: A Process Theodicy (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press 1976), pp. 275-310.

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universe out of nothing. Creation is rather the process by which God permanently creates order out of chaos or higher order out of lower. In a Process perspective, God is not unilaterally responsible for the basic structures of the universe. God somehow does the best he can with a material he did not create. The traditional view states that· God did create the universe ex nihilo. Therefore, God is responsible for the nature of the universe. Against the traditional view, atheists often argue that the natural world would be far better if there really were a divine Creator. 'Far better' means 'less harmful'. Some atheists might admit that a divinely created world would not have to be a paradise without any suffering at alL But anyhow they insist that a divinely created univerE~ would contain at least a distinctly smaller amount of suffering. If God really had created this universe, s/he would have spared the creatures at least the worst and most horrendous evils. And an omnipotent God could easily have arranged things in a less harmful and painful way without any loss regarding the created values. Would anybody really create a universe like ours if she had the power to create every logically possible world? I believe this question is at the centre of the problem of theodicy. I will try to answer these objections, or at least to indicate in which direction an answer might be found. There are two points I would like to stress. The first point is this. The question 'Why did God not prevent the worst evils?' could be asked in every possible world that contains at least some forms of eviL Given different kinds of evil, a certain kind has to be the worst. That means the problem of theodicy would arise in almost every possible world containing some forms of evil. And even in a paradise without any suffering at all, someone might ask why life is so terribly boring. The second point is the most speculative one. The critique is based on the assumption that an omnipotent God could optimize some parts of the natural world without changing the whole physical nature of the world. This assumption is not obvious at alL It takes for granted that God could combine the natural laws in every way we can imagine. But there might be logical restrictions to the combination of physical laws. The natural laws of our world might. build a coherent or fine-tuned system, in which changing one component (for example, the speed of light) would imply changing the whole structure. Obviously, the same laws that enabled the emergence of life, consciousness and morality may also sometimes cause terrible suffering.

Conduding Thoughts I have tried to outline a solution to the problem of theodicy. If I were right, a solution to the theoretical problem of theodicy would exist. Now, it might be replied that theistic belief is a logically coherent position. But this has no practical implications at alL Still there is evil in the world. After all, theodicy seems to be a pretty useless affair.

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This objection is partly true and partly false. A theoretical theodicy has practical implications. That is the reason why some critics of theodicy reject all attempts to explain evil. What are the practical implications of the outlined theodicy? I mentioned the value of free will. There are other values, co=ected to,free will, that can only be realized in a world containing some form of evil. John Hick has stressed that there are important personal values that could only be realized in a world with challenges and dangers. Only a world with challenges and dangers could be a place of 'soul making'. Hick concludes that sin lliid suffering might have a 'place within the divine providence. Their place, however, is not that of something that ought to exist but of something that ought to be overcome. The contribution which sin and its attendant suffering mal(e to God's plan does not consist in any value intrinsic to themselves but, on the contrary, in the activities whereby they are overcome, namely redemption from sin, and men's mutual service amid suffering.' 11 Given that the problem of evil plays a significant part in the anti-theistic Buddhist critique 12 it needs to be seen what contribution the theodicy that I propose can make to the Buddhist-Christian discourse on creation.

11 J. Hick, Evil and the God ofLove (Houndmills: Macmillan, repr. 1985), p. 323. 12 Cf. Chapters 1,2 and 9 in this volume.

Chapter 5

Refuting Some Buddhist Arguments about Creation and Adopting Buddhist Philosophy about Salvation History Jo1m P. Keenan

Creation and Salvation History In the beginning, God created heaven and earth. At the close of each of the first six days he looked over what he had made and declared it to be good, but on the seventh day God rested, observing a sabbath. So teach the opening lines of the Book of Genesis. The point of the Genesis account is not so much that God created the heavens and the earth - the cosmos. Rather, it is that what was created is indeed good, and further, because we are to imitate the activity of God, we humans are to work only six days and then to observe the sabbath on the seventh - so that we might stop and once a week attend to the source of all. The Genesis story of creation, however, is not the founding account of the Hebrew Bible. The foundational account, which was written well before the creation story and which remained central to the narrative, is the exodus of the ancestors from bondage in Egypt. It is the history of the salvation of Israel. This liberation is the overarching theme of the Hebrew Bible and the metaphor for later human lives lived in harmony with the unfathomable mystery that we call God. This narrative of the mighty deliverance of the people from bondage in Egypt is an account of events in human history, in all their ambiguity and all their pathos.l Often those events were not as good as promised and this elicited doubt and scepticism - from earliest times. Yet the teachers and prophets of Israel declared again and again that Yahweh took notice of the sufferings of his people, guided them through the wilderness of Sinai, provided them with water to drink and manna to eat, and directed Moses to come to the mountaintop, where he encountered Yahweh himself, received the tablets of Torah, and thereafter taught the people and led them to the land of Canaan, flowing with milk and honey. The narrative continues with the history of Israel and its fortunes among the powers of the Fertile Crescent, from the confederacy of the twelve tribes on to the B.W. Anderson, Creation versus Chaos (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress 1987 edn; original edn 1967), pp.36-42.

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kingdom of our father, David. Yahweh swears an eternal covenant with David, as he had with Abraham - that He would always be their God and they would always be His people. 2 Throughout Israel's struggles with foreign cultures and alien gods, Yahweh sends prophets and soldiers, to teach his people and to protect them in battle. He is the ruler of the universe. He alone is God above the storm and above the tumult. Thus, from very early on, the faith of Israel is embedded in its history. According to Old Testament scholar Bernhard W. Anderson, 'Israel's oldest confession of faith was a "historical credo".,3 Its content is found in Deuteronomy 26:5-10: A wandering Aramean was my father; and he went down into Egypt and sojourned there, few in number; and there he became a nation, great, mighty, and populous. And the Egyptians treated us harshly, and afflicted us, and laid upon us hard bondage. Then we cried to Yahweh the God of our fathers, and Yahweh heard our voice, and saw our affliction, our toil, and our oppression; and Yahweh brought us out of Egypt with a mighty hand and an outstretched arm, with great terror, with signs and wonders; and he brought us into this place and gave us this land, a land flowing with milk and honey. And behold, now I bring the first of the fruit of the ground, which thou, 0 Yahweh, hast given me.

This is indeed a mythic history, a theological story of family origins. Yahweh is our God, perceived at first as a tribal god who conquers other gods for his beloved people. Little compassion is shown, either to the Egyptian children slain by the Passover angel or to the Canaanites, who thought they already possessed that land of milk and honey. The point is that the Bible narrative was originally formed of historical events interpreted theologically. It did not begin at the creation of the world; it went back only so far as the pre-Israelite ancestors, the patriarchs Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. However, once the Israelite people came to see Yahweh as the ruler of the universe, He could no longer be depicted as merely the tribal God of Israel, fighting other gods and other peoples. He is lord over all. So the book of Genesis and the first part of Exodus were inserted to precede this historical account of human events, to demonstrate that not only did Yahweh call Abraham from Ur in Mesopotamia, buteven before Abraham - He created everything that is. According to Anderson, the Genesis creation accounts (there are two) were composed to fill in the beginning of history, the beginning of our story. So in the Genesis accounts we are told not only how the people came to Egypt in the first place, but, prior to that, how they and everything else first came into being. In modem movie parlance, the creation stories constitute a 'prequel' to the history of the descendants of Abraham --:- Jewish, Christian and Islamic. As prequel, these accounts are incorporated into the foundational story of the people as the beginning point of their theological history. The intent of the biblical creation stories is to show that God's creative action pre-dates our common father, Abraham, with whom Yahweh swore the very first 2 See B.W. Anderson, Contours of Old Testament Theology (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press 1999), especially Part II, 'Yahweh's Covenants with the People', pp. 79-236. 3 Anderson, Creation versus Chaos, op. cit. (fn. 1), p. 36.

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covenant and to whom Yahweh pledged his unswerving commitment. Their intent was never to provide cosmological information about how the world or the universe came into being. They have no cosmological information to provide. 4 The two creation accounts that appear in the Book of Genesis borrow much material from earlier Canaanite, Assyrian, and especially Babylonian creation myths. The Mesopotamian creation epic Enuma elish and the struggles of the Canaanite God Baal to subdue the monsters of chaos both figure in the account. But all these creation myths are transformed in the Hebrew scripture through the assertion that Yahweh alone is the source of everything. Here, there is no competition between opposing primal forces. The earlier myths depict a struggle between the deity's ordering power and the chaos of formless matter, with the pre-historical God forming the earth and subduing chaos; they depict the conquest of sea dragons, and the setting of limits on the waters above and below. Israel adopts many of these mythic themes, but not to illustrate how God's order wins out over an equally primal and threatening chaos, for nowhere are there any forces that are co-equal with God. The waters do not co-exist with God from the beginning, and so he has no need to worry whether they might engulf the world. Noah's flood happened once because God allowed the waters to flow freely to punish human unfaithfulness. And Yahweh made his rainbow promise that he will never again allow that to happen - for he does indeed have control over the waters, and assigns their limits. So the Genesis 'prequel', or prologue, to Israel's sacred salvation history (Heilsgeschichte) constitutes an early creedal confession that we are a people created by an intelligent and compassionate God and immersed in human history, guided therein toward a happy end, a final recapturing of the yet unexperienced realities of all our Eden images. The myth presents the truth about the past, and points to the truth about the future. Christians know all this, and accept the biblical creation account as their own, adding that, as transcendent to all creatures, God brings about the cosmos by a sheer act of his speaking, ex nihilo, out of nothingness. He speaks, and all beings - spiritual and material- come into being. But even in the view of these Christian theologies, the creation accounts are not meant to provide cosmological explanations of how it all came to be. That God created everything is again simply assumed as a cultural given, and the point is that the world is good, in no wise the 'barbarous mud' described by Plato. We are immersed in our quite human history and need to fulfil the covenant, observing sabbath and keeping God and his demand for justice in the forefront of our attention. All is only history, from creative beginning to eschatological end, but the world we are given - both spirit and matter - is pronounced by Yahweh, after each day of creative endeavour, to be good indeed. 4

See S. McFague, 'A Square in the Quilt: One Theologian's Contribution to the Planetary Agenda', in S.c. Rockefeller and J.C. Elder (eds), Spirit and Nature: Why the Environment is a Religious Issue (Boston, MA: Beacon Press 1992), pp. 39-58.

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That goodness is a faith declaration, and not a matter of human adjudication, for Adam and Eve's taste of the lmowledge of good and evil did not elevate them to the status of God, but resulted instead in their expulsion from the garden of childhood delight. We are not like God, in control of the course of our world,' but simply contingent creatures struggling within the created world.

Buddhist Critiques of Creation and a Creator-god Buddhists have long criticized the thesis that the Indian deity Mahesvara (The Almighty) created the world. They consistently profess disbelief in any creator god. The medieval Chinese text Ch'eng wei-shih lun, a compendium of Yogiicara philosophy, summarizes the common argument: Some claim that there is one almighty god, whose nature is real, omnipresent, and eternal, and who can create all things. But this opinion is illogical for the following reasons: 1) if he creates all things, he cannot be eternal, and thus, not being eternal, he would not be omnipresent, 2) if his nature were eternal, omnipresent, and endowed with all capabilities, then at all times he would instantaneously create all things, and 3) if he is able to create only by relying on desire or on other conditions, then that contradicts the teaching of a single cause, for then that desire ·or those conditions would also have to arise simultaneously, because they would be eternal [also]5

Modem Buddhist thinkers, for the most part, accept the Ch' eng wei-shih lun argument as having settled the question of a creator-god, indeed, as having put to rest the issue of theism altogether. As a result, few if any Buddhist thinkers show an interest in engaging Christian concepts of God or theologies of creation at any serious leve1. A common attitude is expressed by the well-known North American Buddhist teacher Perna Chadron in her book When Things Fall Apart: HeartAdvicefor Difficult Times: Theism is a deep-seated conviction that there's some hand to hold: if we just do the right things, someone will appreciate us and take care of us. It means thinking there's always going to be a babysitter available when we need one. We all are inclined to abdicate our responsibilities and delegate our authority to something outside ourselves. Nontheism is relaxing with the ambiguity and uncertainty of the present moment without reaching for anything to protect ourselves ... [D]harma was never meant to be a belief that we blindly follow. Dharma gives us nothing to hold on to at all. Nontheism is finally realizing that there's no babysitter that you can count on ... From this point of view, theism is an addiction. 6 5 L. de la Vallee Poussin (trans!.), Dlwrmapiila's Vijiiaptimiitratiisiddhi, La Siddhi de Huien-Tsang (Paris: P. Geuthner 1928--48), p. 30. 6 Perna Chadron, When Things Fall Apart: Heart Advice/or Difficult Times (Boston, MA: Sharnbala 2000), pp. 39--40.

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Perna Chadron IS a wise and effective teacher of Buddhism. But like those otherwise sophisticated Christian thinkers who casually dismiss 'world-negating' Buddhists, her caricature of theists as depending upon a babysitter-God reveals little effort to understand the theology of the 'other' in any depth or detail. It would seem that both Christians and Buddhists have a tendency to ta.l(e the easy road of caricaturing the others' beliefs in contrast to their own. That strategy is easy because it excuses one from seriously reading and studying the texts of other peoples' religions. In a classical culture wherein one's own tradition is accepted as normative, such a practice is perhaps understandable, but not in the contemporary culture of religious pluralism, no matter the quarter from which it arises. Still, I would concur that some Buddhist critiques of the creator-god are indeed salutary and make their points cogently. Indeed, some conceptions of God are clearly harmful to human health. Apocalyptic notions of God-on-our-side are often injurious to those on the other side: Egyptians are not well treated in the Exodus account - all those plagues and slain first sons. It is not acceptable to make God take sides: in Acts 10:34-5, Peter declares to Cornelius and his companions that God shows no partiality at all. Even less militaristic versions of God as Creator can be harmful to human wellbeing, lulling people into deluded forgetfulness about our own responsibility for this world. Some Christian reactions to Darwin's philosophy of how species mutate and evolve surely signal a truncated and mutated theology. Furthermore, some do regard God as a sop for human whining, a deus ex machina, and that also should indeed be rejected. One has but to note for Christians that nobody came to save Jesus from his passion and death. He died forsaken on the cross, and even the resurrection is no empirical reversal of that event. Nevertheless, theist that I confess to be, I do not think that the Buddhist critiques score a knock-down victory, for very often their target is a naive and atheological notion of God. Moreover, I would maintain that Buddhist objections to a creator god have little application to the Genesis myths, or to the later Christian theology of creation ex nihilo, for neither the Hebrew scriptures nor the Christian theologians are in fact even attempting to demonstrate that the world is created by God. That is simply and without argument assumed. The later creation theologies of Jews, Muslims and Christians do not understand God as 'a great being among beings' who at a certain point comes to create the universe - such a concept of God would entail that God is temporal and moved to create by some external factor. Quite the contrary, they insist that - in creating - God is neither altered nor drawn into the created world? Jewish and Christian 7 From the many-references on classical and modern theology and philosophy that could be given see, for instance: the entirety of Question Two of St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Part 1, the first II questions in all their discussions, Summa Theologica, Cura et Studio Sac. Petri Caramello (Rome: Taurini 1952): R. Garrigou-Lagrange, God: His Existence and His Nature, 2 vols (New York: Herder 1955), pp. 135-40. E. Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas (New York: Random House 1956), pp. 120-29; I. Pelikan, The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine. Volume 1: The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press 1971), pp. 36-7; Volume 2: The Spirit of Eastern Christendom (Chicago, IL: University of

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philosophers were provoked into engaging the issue of creation by pagan critics who mocked the mythic accounts of the Bible, answering those interlocutors by arguing: (1) creation in time does not militate against the eternity of the creator because God remains totally unchanged, transcending both time and space (acting ad extra, that is, without any before or after); (2) that God indeed creates continually, holding beings in being at each and every moment; (3) that God creates ex nihilo, without any prior condition or cause, and (4) that, as agent, God does not pass from potency to act, since God is the unconditioned act to be. Medieval and modem Christian philosophers do not describe what creation might be like, but insist that it is not like anything else one might describe. In fact, they often do not attempt to demonstrate creation at all, only that the universe has a first cause .. Even if the universe is eternal, it still stands in need of the unmoved mover, the uncaused cause of the medieval Muslims, Jews and Christians. A footprint eternally impressed on some abiding shore still has to have been made by some foot. A God who is simple, who is pure act, 'moves' to create without moving, and shares the goodness of his nature 'beyond goodness' by bringing into being a world that is permeated with a goodness and' love that is experienced as unambiguous. God remains God transcendent, and we human creatures are charged to observe sabbath and regard the world as good, despite busy Sunday schedules and experiences that are not uniformly positive. This Jewish/Christian creation account teaches that God is not 'a being among beings', as envisaged in the Buddhist critique, but the very act of existing itself (ipsum esse subsistens); not an all-powerful being within the processes of being, because he is not a being at all, but rather an act. Not a noun, but a verb. 8 Thus, ·neither the early Genesis myths nor modem creation theologies teach creation cosmology. Rather, the Genesis myths offer clear-eyed mythic history, flowing into a faith in an unfolding of God's plan for humans for the future of the entire world, and the theologies argue that there is no linear overflow from a supernatural deity into the empirical world,9 precisely because such a concept of God would make God part and parcel of the world thus created. For a starting point, and how we might conceive it, one might better consult modem physics, even with all its imperceptible dimensions and belief-demanding unified field theories. Our scriptures and theologies cannot offer better descriptions than that, but we do insist that, in virtue of creation, the world is good, and not to be despised or rejected. We affirm some end-time fulfilment, and negate the idea that all the cosmos is the result merely of deluded actions of beings. We further affirm the commandment -having read it in the Bible - that we are to observe the Sabbath, to come together as a people to recognize that mystery we understand ever more deeply and ever more fully, forever

9

Chicago Press 1974), pp. 220-21; Volume 3: The Growth of Medieval Theology (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press 1978), pp. 101-2; B. Lonergan's multi-stepped demonstration of the existence of God in Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, Volume 3 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1997), pp. 680-708. Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, op. cit. (fn. 7), pp. 32-44. Pelikan, The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition, op. cit. (fn. 7), p. 137.

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both in this body and later without this body. Faith is never the negation of understanding, but its prod and moving force. But we theists do have a problem, and we have had it from the very beginning. Not only are sabbaths sometimes better spent in leisurely non-observance, but, much more troubling to us, the world often does not seem to be very good. And so doubt seeps in - perhaps rushes in - when rosy images of an unfolding salvation history appear empty and false. Even if the consummation of the divine plan lies in the future, how do welmow that counting on an eschatological and future truth is not simply a deluded escape from being human? The traditional eschatological and apocalyptic myths about the end-time rapture do often strike one as so far removed from the felt realities of our geopolitical lives that they are nothing more than a pious overlay of false hopes and religious delusions. And false hopes and religious delusions bring to mind images of fundamentalist prophets with serious mental problems: rude Christians who assume that God is on their side now and in the day of reckoning, Muslims who expect the great God to assist them in the slaughter of the infidel, Jews who insist that God remain a real-estate broker for all future time. Here, thinking theology fades, and screaming about God on daytime radio prevails. Delusions like these transmute eschatology into some privileged divine viewpoint and metahistory from which one might tal<e some spurious comfort in driveling hopes of our eventual victory. All too human, indeed, thoughtful theists remain sceptical, not because of the philosophical weakness of the theological argument for God's creative act, but because of the absence of any sense of ongoing divine guidance in the course of our achlal history - because we remain troubled and doubt that the world is really good. We are told in Genesis that the world God created is good, but we see non-goodness all about us. And so we wrestle with 'the problem of evil', with our own histories. Still, there remains such goodness and beauty and intelligence in our world that we engage in it again and again, in trust and in hope. Here, we Christians (and Jews, perhaps) are in need of some assistance in understanding our own doctrine of salvation history and its beginning in the creation of the world. Specifically, we need to consider, reconsider, our concept of God as the guarantor of concrete events in imagined salvation histories. vVe need to abandon shallow concepts of God in order to experience God in silence, as ultimate, and in order to think of God in terms less fraught with excess theological baggage. And so I turn to Buddhist thinkers, who, speaking a different language, have different thoughts. First let us consider the basic Buddhist account of the genesis of this world, so we might put to rest some Christian caricatures of Buddhism as totally negative and world-denying. Then we may appropriate Buddhist ideas about history to elucidate Christian accounts of the course of our salvation.

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A Mahayana Evaluation ofthe World Buddhists are well attuned to causes and conditions. The earliest accounts of the dependent arising of this great mass of suffering demonstrate again and again a cycle of causes - primal ignorance, craving, and so on - all leading to repeated rebirth in this world of suffering. Buddhists have nd need to explain the 'problem of evil' in the world, for from their earliest accounts the world is described as the karrnically unfortunate result of blind actions of greed, anger and delusion. Indeed, in the tradition, Buddha Sakyamuni himself first realized the four truths that this great mass of suffering and pain (duJ;kha) has an originating cause (samudaya), and that such a cause can be extinguished (nirodha) by the practice ofthe path (miirga). The origin of suffering was taught in the early texts of the Pali Nikayas and the Chinese Agamas to be the linked concatenation of conditions from ignorance and existential thirst to rebirth into endless suffering over many lifetimes (san.7siira). Thus, the Buddha taught the dependent arising (pratztya-samutpiida) of this experience of suffering, and how that might be countered step by step by the practice of the path. In this process, the world and its history are of no particular value. In these earliest texts, this world is regarded merely as the neutral scene (that is, 'the container world' for human endeavours) of our karmic delusion and suffering, itself created by such actions (karma), and to be left behind upon realization of cessation (nirvar;aJ' This, however, seems a particularly pessimistic view of the world, and has become one of the stock critiques of Buddhism itself. Buddhism, it is argued by its critics, is world-denying. And there are texts to support such a notion, for the world in its entirety is the karmic result of delusion. When that delusion ends, so ends the world in its entirety. 10 Buddhists themselves saw the same problem,and addressed it in the classical commentaries. 11 In due course, Buddhist thinkers have come to the defence of their tradition, for they too appreciate the beauty we experience and, like Aristotle, are rapt in wonder at the very being of our being here. Despite the South Asian cosmological assumptions about the eternal formation and destruction of an always-abiding primal matter, Buddhism in East Asia was grafted onto the earliest culture to keep detailed history books and to see the course of its people in terms of a historical flow. East Asian Buddhists, as a result of their cultural focus on the past as model for the future, have been forced to live in real-time history, to be concerned for the future of their children, and to try to build a world of justice and compassion. Just as Jews and Christians have been compelled to address the unwanted implications of evil - How can such evil occur if God is both all10 11

Cf. P.J. Griffiths, 'Notes Toward a Critique of Buddhist Karmic Theory', Religious Studies 18, 1982, pp. 227-91, for the texts upon which such a critique is easily founded. See J.P. Keenan (trans.), The Interpretation of the Buddha Land (Buddhabhumyupadesa) by Bandhuprabha (Berkeley, CA: Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research 2003), pp. 47-9, for a discussion of the unwanted possibility that, when all are enlightened, even Buddhas and all their qualities will disappear. Reasons are offered why this will never happen, for although the world of suffering is unpleasant and deluded, the world of awakened persons, buddhas, is not.

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powerfully in control and benevolently good? - without simply abandoning the myth about God's salvific plan for our protected history, so Buddhists have had to rethink a world evolved from deluded actions (karma) of sentient beings and destined to cease (nirviilJa) upon the eventual, far-off but inevitable, awakening of all those beings. If the world is really eternally repeated suffering and meaninglessness, then it is of no value at all, and we are well advised to withdraw. Not being content with such withdrawal in the face of human suffering, Buddhists have addressed the issue, both practically by engaged social action and doctrinally by rethinking the implications of emptiness and dependent arising. There are many socially engaged Buddhists, from Theravada practitioners Sulal\: Sivaraksa in Thailand and A.T. Ariyaratne in Sri Lanka, to the Pure Land Mahayanists in the peace movements of Japan. 12 But these engaged Buddhists did not develop in a vacuum, and they are doing much more than simply imitating engaged Christians. For a long time now, Buddhist thinkers, especially in East Asia, have laid the foundation for world-engagement. One such thinker is Gadjin M. Nagao, whose writings show that long ago, Buddhist philosophers came to terms with the world, not merely as the realm of delusion and suffering, but as the field of intelligent and compassionate bodhisattva action. This indeed is the central import of Mahayana, for its foundational teaching of emptiness means that all viewpoints and all images are empty of any stable and abiding reality. This applies even to the Buddhist teachings, so the world cannot simply be defined as deluded, for no definition -holds fixed in the field of Mahayana thinldng. The suffering that constitutes san.1siira and the peace that defines nirviil'}G are both empty of any final reality, and thus the bodhisattva (,wisdom-being') is committed to achieving anon-abiding awakening. The goal of final cessation is then replaced by the state of awakening (sambodhi) that abides neither in final rest nor in the world of delusion. Such emptiness is, however, but one side of a teaching that also embraces dependent arising. In its early and first sense, dependent arising is the arising of the saIJ:.1Saric delusion and suffering that lead to the world of meaninglessness. But in a second and deeper sense, the classical Mahayana thinkers taught that dependent arising is the course of this world in which an awakened person is meant to practise the deeds of intelligent compassion - to be socially engaged and immersed in history. 13 In this sense, an awakened person understands the causes and conditions that lead to suffering, injustice, war and death, and takes appropriate action to reverse the process and bring about peace and gladness for all sentient beings. That understanding of dependent arising is an understanding of human history that is hardly world-negating. It is every bit as engaged as Christian doctrine and practice. 12

13

Cf. Socially Engaged Buddhism for the New Millennium: Essays in Honor of The Ven. Phra Dhammapitaka (Bhikku P. A. Payutto) on his 60th Birthday Anniversary (Bangkok: SathirakosesNagapradipa Foundation 1999). Also see S.B. King and C.S. Queen (eds), Engaged Buddhism: Buddhist Liberation Movements in Asia (Albany, NY: SUNY Press 1996). Cf. G. Nagao, The Foundational Standpoint of Miidhyamika Philosophy, translated by J.P. Keenan (Albany, NY: SUNY Press 1989), pp. 51-60 and 109-20.

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In addition to its basic insight into emptiness and dependent arising, the other main doctrine of Mahayana -- also of help here - is that of the two truths, which reflect this dynamic of emptiness and dependent arising in terms of our experience, insight and judgement. Since all viewpoints are empty of fixed and unchanging reality, the ultimate truth is quiescent of all verbal fabrication - the silence of the saints and the bliss of cessation, experienced in deep concentrated states of prayer, not mediated by word or image, by insight or judgement. The truth of worldly convention is just as truly a truth, but it is mediated in words, culturally conditioned by languaged insight and conventionally expressed in reasoned judgements - driving one's practice in the world to better the conditions under which people live their lives. It is a mediated 'outflow' from the primal realm of Buddhahood, of awakening. 14 Such conventional truth remains always historical, cultured in the terms of some particular place and time, encoded in some particular language and symbols. Perhaps in the near future we can develop a universal language for justice and peace, a universal earth charter for world justice and peace, that can function for all humans. Many are working onjust such a charter today, and I support their efforts. But even such a world agreement would remain historical and human, embedded in much-to-be-desired negotiations and treaties. To call a truth conventional is to negate its finality and to reject any attempt to usurp its historical status by some falsely imagined ultimate that pretends to espy the really real from some higher viewpoint. All viewpoints are conventional, and true or false on conventional terms. Such conventional truth is the Mahayana analogue for Judeo-Christian ideas about salvation history, and it offers Christian theists a helping hand in understanding more deeply the histories in which our salvation occurs. Theists though we be, our belief in God affords no privileged viewpoint on human history and no absolute stance for delineating the future. Conventional understandings are conditioned by limited human insight and judgement. Absolutes remain silent in the bosom of God. In this theistic understanding, belief in the encompassing mystery of God need not entail a literalistic reading of our mythic histories about God sometimes intervening in the world, and sometimes not. A mostly absent God is hardly the God of our very own philosophers and theologians. Frozen images of God acting in history and misplaced concrete ideas about apocalyptic futures of battle-won glory ill serve Christian faith and practice. God does not rush to the rescue, and self-serving fantasies of such imagined parental care and protection are bound to be disappointed. Like Adam and Eve, we too must grow up and out of the gardens of our innocent childhood and take responsibility for the course of our histories, of our shared world. Such a chastened understanding of history is the help we Christians can receive from the masters of the Buddhist traditions. C

14 Cf. The Summary of the Great Vehicle by Bodhisattva Asanga Translated from the Chinese of Paramiirtha, translated by J.P. Keenan (Berkeley, CA: Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research 1992), p. 52.

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A Mahayana Understanding of Creation and Salvation History Christian salvation history is then, in this Mahayana understanding, a conventional history about the deepest things we experience. It hovers around unmediated experiences - Moses on Sinai face to face with Yahweh, Jesus transfigured before his chosen disciples, saints and sinners struck by experiences too deep to analyse. Still, one cannot even point to silence by words, and nothing can be warranted by appeals to experiences that remain silent Conventional truth is a matter of culture and language, of a re-engagement into human realms to think and adjudicate things according to the criteria·of such realms. Even when we deal with revealed truth, it comes always through language and culture, reflected in our thoughts and our biases. In Mahayana terms, revelation is an 'outflow' from the silence of the pure realm of truth. Yet it does not flow out in linear directness, but obliquely, skilfully, embodied in ever-renewed teachings, theologies, symbols and lives lived concretely as authentic humans, in human terms. There are no other terms - language is a human feature and there are no divine semantics, no divine grammar. So our stories theologically so true that they are mythic - and our symbols - so potent that they are sacraments - are creative and authentic expressions of insights into llut.~ and executions of deep experiences of life-meaning. Myth signals not a paucity of truth, but truths so rich they cannot be stated otherwise and have to be shared in effective signs of the grace of God in every aspect and moment of our lives, both living and dying. Salvation history, starting at the beginning with God creating the universe, is not a metahistory, a supernatural viewpoint of a divine plan with identifiable benchmarks. Rather, it is the dependently arisen course of persons awakened to the progression of the actual lives we live and through which we cause and endure suffering and meaninglessness. It is not a history to which God is sometimes present and sometimes absent, so that we need complain of the lack of divine attention. It is simply the working out of a world declared good and yet experienced ambiguously as both light and darkness. Only half of the world is light at any given time, and we should remember that meanwhile the other half is only haphazardly illumined by electric lights and fired torches. The cry of the Psalmist (Psalm 44) for God to awaken and defend his people echoes with heart-rending pathos, but it does suppose that God is asleep. Such a notion functions within an enclosed idea of a God as 'a being among beings', able to act as a parent caring for children. Expecting literally that God will act in this way is to take such metaphors - so rich and so moving in their context and content - and reduce them so that they become unacceptable, for God is not in fact a very good parent The perennial problem of evil (How can good people suffer if God is allloving and all-powerful?) errs in literalizing God into such a Big Being. God, the theologians insist, is the very act of existing, not a doting parent, even a very good parent. God is not even a very attentive babysitter. Perna ChOdr6n is right on the mark: God is not a babysitter. But she veers wide of the target by supposing that such

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an idea is normative among all theists - medieval or modem, Jew, Christian or Muslim. Martyrs of all theistic faiths have a more nuanced notion of God. The Macabees died by the sword in front of their parents rather than abandon their Jewish faith; Christians fought their unequal battles with the Colosseum lions; Catholics and Protestants alike sacrificed their lives to one another on the English scaffold in battles over liturgy and doctrine; and Muslim martyrs give their lives in the struggle for justice. Right or wrong, wise or foolish, none of them ever thought of God as a babysitter. With the assistance of a Mahayana understanding, then, we Christians can see that salvation history is our history, this history we live - and for which we are responsible. This is perhaps a frightening thought, for it removes the support of an over-arching and all-embracing God who might save us from being human. Such support is illusion. Salvation history, understood as the dependent arising of our human history, removes from us all false certitude that God's plan will in fact be fulfilled, for our history in some large measure does depend on us. Eschatology and apocalyptic images - expressed in their ancient 'science-fiction' genres - are to be received as grace-driven images of our human hopes and dreams for a just and peaceful future, and not histories written backwards from some imagined point at the future end of all time. There is no assured human future beyond our grace-driven human endeavours. We are the actors in human history, and we can direct it to ajoy and gladness shared by all, or act from narrow Realpolitik and follow the practices of terror and the logic of war. We can enhance life on earth, or aid and abet its destruction, reversing Yahweh's creative six days of work and bringing on only a final sabbath of silent devastation all across a barren earth. As we delve into Mahayana philosophy to appropriate dependent arising as a lens to interpret our salvation histories, so we invite Buddhists to delve into our theistic theologies, apophatic and kataphatic, theologies of light and theologies of darkness, to do so in depth and detail that they might see both how our Western ancestors reflect the object of Buddhist critique - clinging to false images of projected self-power and how they do not - for our faith ancestors also regarded God as cloaked in mystery, beyond conventional terms in the silence of ultimate meaning, and no support at all for any deluded quest to establish a self that might stand alone in a frightening cosmos where all things change at every moment. Let us engage in wisdom, and study one another's texts, traditions and practices.

Chapter 6

Creation and Process Theology: A Question to Buddhism Aasulv Lande

Christian Doctrine of Creation - and Buddhism Christian inter-religious dialogue with Buddhism has largely focused on other issues and terms than 'creation'. In A Bridge to Buddhist-Christian Dialogue, Leonard Swidler outlines 11 topics in the dialogue: (1) 'Gautama, the Buddha's. Basic Teaching'; (2) 'Theism, A-Theism, Non-Theism'; (3) 'Relational Process Thinking'; (4) 'Ultimate Reality'; (5) 'Imago Dei and Anatta' ; (6) 'Yeshua and Gautama: "Actionoriented," Soteriocentric'; (7) 'The Christ-The Buddha'; (8) 'Prophet-Monk'; (9) 'Faith-Works: Tariki-Jiriki'; (10) 'Creed-Code-Cult'; (11) 'Ethics: Individual-Social'.1 Among these issues, the question of personhood has been a popular subject for dialogue. There certainly are questions to face when the problem of individual identity is raised in the two religions. One has also raised metaphysical issues like 'nothingness' and 'being'. Such issues were crucial themes in Japan as well as in Sri Lanka in the early 1960s when the contemporary inter-religious dialogue with Buddhism was formed. Pioneer dialogues took place between Lynn de Silva and Buddhist leaders in Sri Lanka. 2 In early, post-war dialogues in Japan, Western theologians such as Paul Tillich and Emil Brunner similarly involved themselves in creative and fresh inter-religious encounters. The first evident observation is that Buddhist theology - if the word is permitted3 does not contain the idea of a creator. On the contrary, the term 'creator' illustrates one of the main differences between the two religions. But does Buddhism share the attitudes of creation theology as illustrated by Scandinavian theologians in the Grundtvigian tradition?4 'Creation' mediated here a positive acceptance of the S. Yagi and L. Swidler, A Bridge to Buddhist-Christian Dialogue (Mahwah, NY: Paulist Press 1990), pp.11-37. 2 De Silva made 'creation' a topic of one of his early publications. However, in his later work the issue of creation played a more marginal role. Cf. L. de Silva, Creation, Redemption, Consummation in Christian and Buddhist Thought (Chiengmai: Thailand Theological Seminary 1964) 3 Roger Jackson and John Makansky (eds), Buddhist Theology: Critical Reflections by Contemporary Buddhist Scholars (London: Curzon 2000) does not discuss any explicit concept of creation. 4 N.F.S. Grundtvig (1783-1872). This Danish, Lutheran hymn writer and Church leader focused on the value of ordinary, human life. He left a strong impact in Denmark particularly, but also in other Scandinavian countries.

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material dimension of life. In the Scandinavian context, the doctrine of creation countered a pietist dualism of spirit and matter. Another dimension of the question Stfu'1:S from the concept of creativity, a term highlighted by 'process theology'. Does Buddhist karma actually express similar ideas? Is it, in other words, possible for Buddhism to. accept material values and creativity - without any notion of a creator?

'Creation' in a Christian (Scandinavian) Context It is natural for the present writer, who comes from Scandinavia, to look at an understanding of creation in Scandinavian theological thought. Two post-war Danish theologians, Regin Prenter and Lpgstrup, both emerged from Grundtvigian soiL To ethical thinker Lpgstrup, 'creation' implied a spontaneously good human relationship with Nature and society. No extra revelation was needed for humans as ethical beings confronted by 'the silent demand' (den tause fordring), emerging from human 'createdness'. The dogmatic theologian Regin Prenter developed the idea of creation in conjunction with classical Greek theology (Ireneus), where salvation actually completes or fulfils creation. The world with all her wonders is accordingly good. In spite of her 'fall' into decay and destruction, she still is a good world, in principle happily restituted by the divine intervention of Jesus Christ. 'Creation' implies in such an enviror..ment an appreciation of a homocentric cosmos. Both these two theologians - and others - from the last generation thus make creation a fundamental presupposition for affirming and even appreciating human life. In a Swedish context, the late Gustaf Wingren (1910-2000) might be mentioned in the same connection. These theologies of creation basically and radically criticize any dualism between spirit and matter by which the economic, social and secular life is subordinated to spiritual life (prayer, idealist thought, contemplation, and so on). The joy of life - in its work, laughter, fellowship and culture, sexuality and love - should be affirmed for creation's sake. Related to a Lutheran ethics of calling (kallsetikk), such a positive cultural affirmation is also traced to N.F.S. Grundtvig, who coined the phrase: 'Human first - Christian next' (Menneskef¢rst - kristen sa). This understanding of 'creation' presupposes a process of creativity by which God as the opponent of destruction and evil breaks and crushes these adversaries. The creativity continuously brings this already existing cosmos to its completion. Theologians in this tradition consider creativity a divine activity by which our human existence is confirmed and secured in its contextual and cosmic context. Lpgstrup, on his part, draws ethical consequences, based on interpretations of creation. 5 Human beings are thrown into a situation where we are challenged by fellow humans to cooperate and support each other for the sfu~e of life. One should notice the priority of God in this web of creativity. Humans do not primarily produce themselves, they just find themselves in a context already present, 5 L¢gstrup, Den etiskefordring (Copenhagen: GyldendaI1966).

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and they find themselves as human beings already there. Creation thus implies the acceptance of love and grace of God - to whom humans already when their existence starts, are related as dependents. The inter-relationship between God and creation demonstrates the priority of God, to whom humans are subordinated. There is, however, an additional dimension present in the idea of creation in this Scandinavian Christian context: the idea of human freedom. 6 Creation invites human beings into co-creativity with God, partakers of divine love and action. How far the human freedom of creativity actually extends in its dialectical relation to the sovereignty of God is a matter for discussion. One might actually, under certain conditions, find an openness towards acknowledging divine and human equivalence. By such a human-oriented theology, God cannot be thought of in isolation and without hislher creation. One might therefore emphasize an important dimension underlying the Christian idea of creation: relationship. Fellowship between human beings, between humans and Nature and between God and his creation underlies this understanding of creation, seen as human-divine partnership against a background of divine primacy.

What is Process Theology? Several persons have been searching for a Christian theology to unfold such thoughts and positively bring out Christian understanding of life in relationships. I have pointed at Christian theologies of the Grundtvigian type as one way to go. Process theology might, however, take us further and provide a fruitful dialogue with Buddhist insights. Its main ideas are traced to the metaphysics of the British mathematician Alfred North Whitehead, who in 1910-13 published the comprehensive study Principia Mathematica. In 1929 he published the book Process and Reality, where he wanted' to integrate esthetic, religious and moral concepts within the framework of natural science. A basic idea is the dynamic character of reality, which is therefore described as process. There is a parallel between VVllltehead and Teilhard de Chardin (1881-1955), who was also deeply concerned with cosmos as a process encompassing religion as well as phenomena in nature. Darwinist images of evolution doubtless provide basic presuppositions for the process thought. Whitehead struggles intensively to understand reality as a unity of consciousness and matter. Every event has a bipolar character - with a 'physical' pole and a 'mental pole'. The physical pole connects to the 'past', whereas the mental pole refers to the new creations of the process. Behind the 'actual entities' built up in this way, there are so-called eternal objects - which actually consist of structures such as geometric relationships, colours, emotions, experiences of pain and pleasure. He also gives room for 'creativity', a metaphysical reality which drives the whole process of creation forward. 6

Compare Martin Luther's pamphlet, Die Freiheit eines Christenmenschen.

Buddhist and Christian Perspectives on Creation

It is indeed interesting to note that WPitehead considers God an actual entity of a dipolar character, containing an abstraCt and a concrete dimension. He differentiates between God's 'primordial nature' and God's 'consequent nature'. The 'primordial nature' of God refers to God as the principle of reality as process. But God is also deeply involved in the concrete process of the world. This makes God changeable and subject to influences from worldly factors. 'What is done in the world is transformed into a reality in heaven, and the reality in heaven passes back into the world. By reason of the reciprocal relation, the love in the world passes into the love in heaven, and floods back again into the world. In this sense God is the great companion - the fellow sufferer who understands.' 7 According to Whitehead, 'It is as true to say that "God creates World" as "The World creates God.'" 8 As to process theology related to Buddhist-Christian dialogue, John Cobb is the name par excellence. He and other process theologians base their theological thinking on the metaphysics of Whitehead and try to combine theology and natural science. The awareness of an aggravating milieu crisis furthermore strengthens the concern for a combination of natural science, religion and humanities. The ecological insight that life is a web of mutual inter-relationships also points towards Whitehead's process metaphysics. Against this background, one might further, with John Cobb, explore images of a 'changing' God and develop feminist, democratic and egalitarian theologies. To Cobb, God is 'creative change'. He develops this concept particularly in his book Christ in a Pluralist Age,9 and this concept is crucial in his dialogue with Buddhism. God is Creative Responsive Love, and by this term he relates to New Testament ideas of love (agape) as the best available word for the divine reality. God's primordial nature consists of creative love. The power of God is not like the patriarchal, controlling power, it is rather a power to convince and to influence. Cobb says that 'as God's creative activity is persuasive, not controlling, it is a love that takes risks. Hence, each divine creative impulse into the world is adventurous, in that God does not know what the result will be' .10 It does not take much effort to see how close this idea comes to Buddhist understanding of reality. The process theology of John Cobb has no interest in the creatio ex nihi/o. As creation is seen as a process, it is more relevant to imagine a creation from chaos.

Logos - the Word Active in Creation What about the whole concept of a logos-christology? 'Logos' is a concept basically related to Christian doctrine of creation, having entered during the early patristic 7

A.N. Whitehead, Process and Reality (Houndmills:Macmillan 1929), p. 497. Ibid., p. 492. 9 J.B. Cobb, Christ in a Pluralist Age (Philadelphia, PA: The Westminster Press 1975). 10 J.B. Cobb and D.R Griffin, Process Theology: An Introductory Exposition (Philadelphia, PA: The Westminster Press 1976), p. 57. 8

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period, especially by Justinius Martyr and the early apologets. The concept itself is founded in New Testament writings (John 1). According to the Gospel of John, the whole cosmos was created by the logos. In his development of a christology, Cobb makes use of the classical logos-christology. Cobb understands the word logos as 'the cosmic principle oforder, the ground of meaning, and the source of purpose' .11 It is a crucial question here whether this logos exclusively connects with Christ or whether one also can find other concretizations of the logos. The latter see)JlS to be the case,12 although Cobb also states that 'As a Christian I believe that Christ is the way, the truth and the life and that no one comes to know God except through Christ ... I believe that what Christians understand by "the way the truth and the life" is bound up with creative transfo=ation.' 13 In other words, the creative transformation is the logos, which for the Christian is always Christ, but which can take other fo=s and shapes in other religious groups. As the idea of the logos has played an important role in Buddhist-Christian dialogue in many contexts, I will add a few observations. Logos is used by John Cobb and others in process theology - and in this respect it is found to mediate between Christianity and Buddhism. His logos-concept has, however, undoubtedly a Christian accent. Of other people who have used a similar concept of logos to mediate between the two religions, I mention the Japanese Roman Catholic Ichiro Okumura (b. 1923). He is particularly involved with Zen meditation and Zen studies. Primarily, he considers himself a Christian, but Zen is his 'other religion'. Okumura sees christology as the key to dialogue with non-Christian faiths. As a contemplative person, the mystical encounter between Christ and humankind occupies the centre of his theological concept. Zen actually becomes a central approach in his theology of religion. What John Cobb says of dynamic processes, Okumura says of Zen. The dynamic of Zen helps humans to transcend themselves. He has himself, he says, read the Bible through the eyes of Dagen. The Zen master Dagen deepens his understanding of Zen, and also talks about silence. Darkness and silence contain knowledge of God, he says. He interprets Eastern culture by means of the te= 'silence', whereas the Western basic cOllCept is 'word'. In the West, he says, logos is connected to the verbal culture of West. In the East, however, logos has no verbal character; it is connected with silence. Logos is 'the soil of silence', the 'wordless word'. In Christian spirituality, he sees a listening to the silence of logos in negative theology, culminating in John of the Cross. The latter ends up in silence, which is where Asian spirituality actually starts! Okumura's concept of logos is thus East-oriented. It has an Eastern accent. Western cultural categories actually provide a different fo= or expression of the fundamental logos. 11 J.B. Cobb, Christ in a Pluralist Age (Philadelphia, PA: The Westminster Press 1975), p 71. 12 Cf. J.O. Fors, Omsesidig Forvandling (Uppsala Universitet 2003), p. 42. 13 J. Cobb, 'The Meaning of Pluralism for Christian Self-understanding', in L.S Rouner (ed.), Religious Pluralism (Notre Dame, IN 1984), 161-79, p. 176.

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How does logos relate to Buddhism? It definitely works well with Zen-Buddhism as a concrete expression. Zen provides the 'eyes', the hermeneutical tradition, the presuppositions. Zen is not, however, more important than the Christianity to which it relates itself. Zen functions as a 'prophet'. Zen does not find fulfilment in itself, but as a pointer to Jesus Christ in whom the silent logos reaches its complction.1 4 Summarizing the Christian concept of 'creation' referred to here, one notes that the image of a creator is not dominant. It is rather the value attached to 'createdness' and the emphasis on holistic concepts of humans and environment. To this comes an emphasis on creativity, a continuous creation (creatio continua) which tends towards a relational understanding of reality, already in Grundtvigian, but even more in process theology. It is also important to note the concept of logos, which in Christian theology is closely related to creation as process and 'createdness', mediating universal creation and Christocentric salvation.

Social Defect of Buddhism: No Creation? In a critical essay 'Bukkyo tanomu ni tarazu' (,Buddhism cannot quite be trusted'),15 Congregationalist missionary M.L. Gordon levied in the 1890s a sharp attack on deficiencies of Japanese Buddhism. In particular, he pinpointed the problems of a religion lacking a doctrine of creation. He expressed and underlined an insufficient capacity in Buddhism for modernization and social renewal - burning issues during the Meiji period (1868-1912). Rev. Gordon argued that the technical and organizational progress of the West and the Japanese prospects for a successful, modern development, rested with a firm faith in a creator. In the Japanese modernizing process during the latter part of the nineteenth century, such views had a powerful impact. The powerful transformation of society and world had then continued for some time after the industrial and scientific revolution -largely in the wake of Western modernization, where Christian concepts were considered crucial. The concept of creation was particularly meaningful as it undergirded human domination of nature and thus provided a base for scientific thought and technical transformation of the world. 16 14 Cf. Katrin Amell, Katolsk Zen (Licentiatavhandling, Uppsala Universitet 17 Sept. 1990), and Contemplation et dialogue (UppsaJa: The Swedish Institute of Missionary Research 1998), pp. . 151-61. 15 M.L. Gordon, Bukkyo tanomu ni taraZLI (Tokyo 1892). 16 After the 1960s, however, the escalating ecological crisis has seriously questioned the faith in a creator. To ecologically concerned people, the idea of 'creation' has become a liability, and a quest for reinterpretation has arisen. The doctrine provides a main reason for discontent among Western Buddhist converts, who find the implied idea of domination untenable. The concept of a creator is subsequently losing its previous popularity. It appears authoritarian and absolutist to numerous Westerners, who experience cultural and religious fatigue in the shadow of dominant and patriarchal Christianity. Cf. T.R. Wagner, Tibetan Buddhism: Impetus and Attraction Inspiring Practitioners in the Western World (Graduation Essay, Lund 2002).

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Does Buddhism Contain a 'Hidden' Doctrine of Creation? To claim that the Western modernization project was carried by a Christian concept of creation is a controversial statement. Not all Christian cultures have led to modernization. Cultures generated by North African Christianity and Thomas Christians in India seem to follow patterns of the near environment rather than patterns of Western modernization. One might thus be led to question any substantial Christian influence on the emerging modernization of Western countries. It might be more appropriate to see empiricist Greek philosophy in interaction with Roman organization as the chief force of modernization. One is, however, still left with the option that Christianity might have been a necessary if not sufficient cause for the modernization breakthrough. As argued by secular thinkers li..~e Harvey Cox in the 1960s,17 the link between Christian ideas of creation and the secularizing view of nature might have made modernization possible. Sociologists like Max Weber 18 have convincingly pointed at connections between a 'Protestant ethos' and the development of capitalist entrepreneurship. It has subsequently been argued by Robert Bellah that a condition for the successful Japanese modernization rested in its 'Protestant ethic' .19 This ethic is a combination of motivation, creativity and thisworldly orientation - apparent in Zen as well as in Shinto and Confucian ideas. It is anyhow worth noting that the modernizing process in Japan has worked successfully, apparently without a Judeo-Christian concept of creation. Is the Japanese 'Protestant ethic' thus an equivalent to 'creation' as a cultural foundation? One might search in Confucianism or Shintoism for such models - but what about Buddhism? Does Japanese Buddhism contain a 'Protestant ethic'? Could Japanese Buddhism possibly adapt such an ethic? Has the impact of Western Christian concepts of 'creation' mobilized substitute thoughts and ideas in the East Asian cultural environment - even in Buddhism? The presence of Buddhist concepts akin to Christian 'creation' might not have been sufficiently highlighted. Looking back at the history of BuddhistChristian dialogue, the absence of dialogue on creation is apparent. In the magnificent book on Buddhist-Christian dialogue by Michael von Bruck and Whalen Lai, there is no direct reference to 'creation' in the index. The closest Buddhist term appears to be karma, which is seen as a possible parallel to creation, while also containing contrary features. 2o Perry Schrnidt-Leukel's work 'Den Lowen 17

18 19 20

Cf. H. Cox, The Secular City (Houndmills: Macmillan, Rev. edn. 1965). Harvey Cox changed his position radically three decades later. Cf. H. Cox, Fire From Heaven: The Rise of Pentecostal Spirituality and the Reshaping of Religion in the Twenty-first Century (Reading: Addison-Wesley 1994). M. Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, translated by Talcott Parsons (London: Allen and Unwin 1930). R. Bellah, Tokugawa Religion: The Cultural Roots of Modem Japan (1st edn. 1957, New York: The Free Press 1985), pp. 2ff. Cf. M. von BrUck and W. Lai, Buddhismus und Christentum: Geschichte, Konfrolltation, Dialog (Munich: C.H. Beck Verlag 1997), pp. 53f, 473ff.

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briillen horen' provides a few references - but 'creation' is in no way a central concern. 21 Still, creational thought and images might connect and relate the two religions in a fruitful way. As to modernization processes in Buddhist lands, one rhight ask if Buddhism actually came to adopt (creator-based) Christian Western culture in order to support its social legitimacy. The Western presence in Japan since the midsixeenth century, originally info=ed by Roman Catholic Christianity and later mediated by Dutch scholarship, might have influenced Buddhism as well. There was also a strong Japanese Buddhist interest in Western scholarship during the period of modernization, when numerous Buddhist scholars eagerly approached Western thought. 22 I am inclined, however, to emphasize Buddhist interaction with Shinto and Confucianism; a process which began by Buddhist introduction in Japan in the sixth century under the royal nation-building scheme of Prince Shotoku. A special ethos called Bushido, the 'Way of the warrior', gradually emerged from this interaction. This Bushido ethos, based on instrumentality, loyalty and setting of goals, is, however, markedly influenced by Zen Buddhism. Bushido provided the ethos of the Japanese samurai class, which fostered intellectuals and political leaders during the early modernization period. Buddhist, Shinto, Confucian interaction has continued in the Japanese modernization process from the Meiji period onwards. Referring to Max Weber's te= 'Protestant ethic', there are reasons to argue that Buddhism during centuries of interaction with Japanese spirituality had developed a 'Protestant ethic' , capable of supporting modernization. 23 Defying any 'doctrine of creation', Buddhism thus provided an alternative ethos of instrumentality, loyalty and goalsetting. There is no reason to postulate a hidden Buddhist concept of creation. One might rather, with Robert Bellah and others, argue that a 'Protestant ethic' has emerged in the Buddhist environment. Contrary to the convictions of M.L. Gordon, this Japanese 'ethic' has apparently provided the spiritual base for Japanese modernization.

Joy of Life and Dualism Let me return to the question of 'joy in creation', in other words acceptance of holistic life with its material dimension, so important in Christian theology of creation. Does not Buddhist spirituality rather promote a dualist attitude to life where desire and greed are defined as part of the human being? I cannot forget my visit to a Buddhist Thai monastery in 1994 - well planned and guided by the founder 21 22 23

Cf. P. Schmidt-Leukel, 'Den Lowen brallen hOre,,': Zur Hermeneutik eines Christlichen Verst andnisser der buddhistischen HeilsbotschaJt (Paderbom: Schiiningh 1992). Cf. I.M Kitagawa, On Understanding Japanese Religion (Princeton, NI: Princeton University Press 1987), pp. 226ff. Cf. R. Bellah, op. cit. (fn. 19), pp. 3ff and 178ff.

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of the Europeari Network of Buddhist-Christian Studies, Gerhard Koberlin, and his wife. The monastery contained a number of houses where wives, having left their spouses, devoted themselves to spiritual pursuits. They were proud of it. Their arguments and thoughts reflected a derogatory view of sexual life - thus relegating carnal desires to the lower strata of the human being. They were now liberated. In the enriching encounters with Thai Buddhism, this particular visit remained a problem. Is not this duality contrary to a holistic understanding of human beings? Is humanity here degraded? In the Thai Theravada tradition, I also had the pleasure in 1994 of visiting Sulak Sivaraksa and the centre of his work in Thailand. The 'engaged Buddhism' of Sivaraksa reflected a strong awareness of social reality which can in no way be termed 'dualist', discarding or reducing the value of social reality. A fascinating illustration of appreciated social reality is, of course, provided in the Mahayana tradition by the 'Oxherd pictures' which demonstrate how the fulness of ordinary life is returned beyond the expelience of nothingness. Buddhist spirituality might thus lead to holistic appreciation of material life as well as to a denial of material values. Are both genuinely Buddhist? Is the devaluation of material values misunderstood Buddhism? Is the high regard for human realities really 'Buddhist' - or is it rather what in Mahayana Buddhism is named a 'skilful means'24 by which Buddhism meets popular demands and possibly the challenges of modernization?

Creativity and Karma One might now introduce a Buddhist term which also compares to Christian understanding of creation. Karma might be seen as a net of potential interrelationships and implies the explanation and reason for all events which take place in reality. The question of how karma should be interpreted needs extensive interreligious dialogue. I see two or three basic ways of interpretation: (1) One might operate with a dynamic karma open for change and creativity. This might be justified by the space offered for humans to change their karma during one or more lifetimes. It represents an open human type of interpretation, where karma is a dynamic life force. (2) But it is also possible to interpret karma as a strict system of causal relationships into which the whole reality is subsumed. If not theoretically, at least in praxis, this implies a system coming close to determinism. One has not much chance for a good life against inherited bad karma. However, (3) a tension exists between karma on the one hand and other forces in the Buddhist universe. Karma rests in itself, and there is no beyond. But the limit to the world of karma is defined by 24

'Skilful means', upaya (Japanese hoben) is, broadly speaking, a pedagogical way of transmitting truth. It first came into extended usage in the Lotus Siltra. Cf. M. Pye, Skilful Means: A Concept in Mahayana Buddhism (London: Duckworth 1978).

c

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ultimate terms such as buddha nature (buddhata, buddhatva), thusness (tathata) or emptiness (s£inyata). In particular, the latter term is relevant. It points at creativity or renewal as a dynamics by which it (sLlnyata) breaks through the laws of karma. The interplay between karma and other powers of the Buddhist universe affirms a spontaneous creativity. The given structure (karma) is thus dialectically connected to a spontaneous creativity of the universe. 25

Karma and Christian CreatiYity Could these ideas of a dynamic karma be related to Christian ideas of creation? I think that it is possible, particularly if karma is interpreted in the first (open) or third (relational) meaning of karma. Although there is no or little room in Buddhist thought for creation as an original act by God, karmic processes might function as creatio continua, a continuous creativity. If, in other words, the Christian idea of creation is seen as a 'continued creativity', there are clear parallels between karmic and Christian creativity. From a Christian point of view, one will have to understand the world in terms of God's world, a world where God is present as a creative force. The priority of God in the Christian discourse, then, is paralleled by the priority ~of the karmic system. In both situations there is an awareness of the human situation as basically conditioned, but also open to change. It is furthermore possible to understand creation as an ongoing creativity where God is acting and where humans also are active as co-creators. The relationships need consideration - how 'equal' are God and humans in this respect? Are God and humans equal 'partners' when they interact in dynamics of creativity? Also, karmic relationships are open to creativity; whether this creativity is a residuent nature of karma or whether it rather should be seen as an interplay with ultimate realities such as sLlnyatii ('emptiness') remains a matter for discussion on the Buddhist side. It implies a deeper analysis of the nature of karma and karmic causations. There are in any case similar dynamics of creativity to explore in Buddhist and Christian contexts. One runs, however, into an intricate problem: May one see an aim, a purpose, of Buddhist karma? Does karma point towards some ultimate relation or state of affairs? Does karma work towards establishment of nirviilJCl - a kind of Buddhist salvation history? Or is karma a neutral and colourless structure which in no way leads to salvation for humankind? Or might one, in Buddhism, be allowed to argue for an aim of karma - possibly in an interaction with the power of sLlnyatii? Refening to Mahayana ideas of Pure Land Buddhism as well as to the conception of Buddha as eternal compassion, one is led on to ideas of a purpose-oriented sunyatii. The question remains, however, whether this purpose is a deliverance from physical reality into a soteriological otherness rather than a fulfilment or transformation of 25

Bruck and Lai, op. cit. (fn. 20), p. 474.

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physical reality. In Christianity, creativity is directect towards a renewal of humankind leading towards the establishment of God's reign. Do karma or karmic relationships contain a hidden possibility parallel to the divine purpose of salvation in Christian terms? A point of marked difference remains in the very relationship between God and humans in Christian terms of creation - a relationship not apparent in karma. Whereas the fulfilment of Buddhist concerns appears in a nirviiI).a where human relationships are dissolved, the relationships between God, humans and creation are confirmed and elevated in Christian understanding offulfilment.

Conclusion The term 'creation' is- not among the most frequent themes of Buddhist-Christian dialogue. Referring to Scandinavian, Grundtvigian traditions of creation theology as well as to tenets of process theology, two aspects of 'creation' might be singled out: the value of created reality (a holistic view of spirit and matter), and creatio continua. From both these aspects there is a linkage to logos - the word of creation according to classical Christian thought. Logos meiliates between Christ (soteriology) and all reality. The concept of a creator has been absent in Buddhism, and the term 'creation' is not used. For that reason, one has questioned Buddhist capacity as a base of modernization. When such a capacity is after all demonstrated ('Protestant ethic'), the problem turns into a question of how genuine a 'Protestant ethic' actually is in organic Buddhism. Is the 'Protestant ethic' of Japanese Buddhism rather a 'skilful means'? A further problem is the Buddhist attitude to 'material reality'. Is matter considered a part of a holistic totality, worthy of appreciation, or is it a lower type of reality - thereby underlining the dualism between spirit and matter. Is Buddhist appreciation of holistic totality also a 'skilful means'? The closest resemblance between Buddhism and Christianity in their attitude to creation comes out when process creativity is related to karma. The purposes of karma and process creativity thereby enter into a fruitful relationship and inspire continued reflection. So do the relationships between creativity in process theological context and dynamic karma. The Buddhist-Christian dialogue on 'creation' might thus contain surprising perspectives for a fruitful search for truth and for deeper selfunderstanding.

Chapter 7

Buddhists, Christians and Ecology John D' Arcy May

'Ecology' has only become conceivable in the context of what we now call 'postmodem' science; indeed, it was the development of ecology, alongside the new physics (relativity, indeterminacy, quantum mechanics), evolutionary biology and more recent developments such as chaos theory, that brought about this profound realignment of science in the first place. In Europe, science in the Renaissance period was inductive and expelimental, and there was a healthy scepticism about the capacity of human reason, epitomized in the work of Michel de Montaigne or Francis Bacon in the late sixteenth century.l But the religious tensions that erupted in the Reformation and the political upheavals they brought in their train profoundly altered the intellectual climate, so that in a relatively short time, by about 1630, sceptical humanism no longer satisfied the needs of the age. Within the lifetimes of Galileo and Descartes, and culminating in the Peace of Westphalia (1648), which ended the Thirty Years' War, thinkers began to repudiate frank description of 'natural' - especially sexual- human foibles and to seek indubitable foundations for knowledge. In a time of seemingly uncontrollable change, what people craved was not a wealth of description, but certainty. The defining philosophy of the Enlightenment was rationalism, and in science it took the form of a dualistic (subject/object) and mechanistic (mind/matter) view of the world which provided the setting for both political nationalism and religious dogmatism. But, as Toulmin remarks, what is rational in this abstract sense is not necessarily what is reasonable in contexts of life and use. 2 In the words of the Australian biologist Charles Birch: 'It is only a short step from envisaging the world as machinery to tum it into a factory. And that we have done.' 3

2

3

In this and what follows, I refer to the reassessment of modernity by S. Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modemity (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press 1990); idem, The Retum to Cosmology: Postmodem Science and the Theology ofNature (Berkeley, CA: University of Califomi a Press 1985), and a complementary Buddhist essay by D. Loy, A Buddhist Histmy of the West: Studies in Lack (Albany, NY: SUNY Press 2002). On the contrast between Montaigne and Descartes, see Toulmin, Cosmopolis, op. cit., pp. 36-42. Cf. Toulrnin, Cosmopolis, op. cit., pp. 198-9. Toulrnin's earlier books, The Uses of Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1969) andAn Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1970), studied the 'pragmatic logics' which structure reasoning processes, such as the reaching of moral judgements or judicial decisions. Charles Birch in his speech accepting the Templeton Prize for Progress in Religion, London, 8 May 1990.

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The wars and revolutions of the twentieth century left this specifically 'modem' picture of the world in tatters, and in many different fields - not least in architecture and the arts - it has long since been superseded. 4 In philosophy, something more adequate to the changed situation than phenomenology, logical empiricism and structuralism was needed, but apart from existentialism, what we got were the irrationalism and relativism which are now unfortunately associated with the term 'post-modem'. But ecology as a science, though it contributed to this new intellectual environment, is much more than a passing fashion. s It arose from the study of open self-sustaining systems, such as ponds and forests, and their environments. The stability of the inter-relationships established within and between such systems cannot be explained by the type of linear or mechanical causality appropriate to classical chemistry or physics; we need to have recourse to the reciprocal causality of feedback loops explored by unorthodox pioneers like Gregory Bateson and the creators of chaos theory.6 It is an open question, however - though undoubtedly an_ extremely important one - whether ethics and religion have made the same transition to recognizably post-modem ways of conceiving the world as itself an ecological system, an all-encompassing organism of which human societies and their ways of giving meaning to the world are integral parts.? This is the context in which I wish to explore the contributions that Buddhism and Christianity could make to what might be called the 'deep ecumenism' that is required by the 'deep ecology' which has become increasingly influential in our time. Is the 'globalization of ethics' a purely rational enterprise, or is it only conceivable as part of the greater task of learning to share the radically different ways in which we symbolize transcendence by drawing metaphors from the world, making self and 4 See lB. Callicott, Earth's Insights: A Survey of Ecological Ethicsfrom the Mediterranean Bas;n to the Australian Outback (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 1994), especially Chapter 9, 'A Postmodern Evolutionary-Ecological Environmental Ethic', pp. 185-210. 5 Again, the transition to ecological awareness, though belated, was sudden and profound; see Toulmin, Cosmopolis, op. cit., p. 163, on the impact of Rachel Carson's Silent Spring (1962); for a fuller account, see R.F. Nash, The Rights of Nature: A History of Environmental Ethics (Madison, WI: University of Wisconson Press 1989), pp. 8 and 47; see also the sketches of John Ruskin (1819-1900) and Henry David Thoreau (1817-1862), precursors of modern ecologists such as Aldo Leopold and James Lovelock, in J.D. May, After Pluralism: Towards an Interreligious Ethic (Mtinster-Hamburg-London: LIT Verlag 2000), pp. 134-7. 6 Cf. G. Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind: Collected Essays ;n Anthropology, Psychiatry, Evolution and Epistemology (London: Granada 1973). For a critical assessment of Bateson's work see S. Toulmin, The Return to Cosmology, op. cit., pp. 201-13. For an introductory overview of chaos theory, see J. Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science (London: Sphere 1988). 7 Some attempts to accomplish this from Buddhist and Christian feminist points of view are: l Macy, World as Lover, World ,,!S Self (Berkeley, CA: Parallax Press 1991); AH. Badiner (ed.), Dharma Gaia: A Harvest of Essays in Buddhism and Ecology (Berkeley, CA: Parallax Press 1990); R. Radford Ruether, Gaia and God: An Ecofeminist Theology of Earth HeC!ling (San Francisco, CA: HarperCollins 1992); A. Primavesi, From Apocalypse to Genesis: Ecology, Feminism and Christianity (London: Burns & Oates 1991); idem, Sacred Gaia: Holistic Theology and Earth System Science (London-New York: Routledge 2000).

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world themselves into metaphors for our present belonging and future destiny? I shall look first at characteristically Buddhist and Christian ways of doing this and their implications for ethics, then at the methodological problems to which they give rise, and finally at ways in which Buddhism and Christianity might contribute to a truly ecological ethic, rooted in practices and conceptions of transcendence yet 'earthed' in the irnmaIlence of the sacred in nature.

Symbolizing Transcendence and Attitudes towards 'Nature' In discussing Buddhist and Christian attitudes to 'nature', we first need to clarify what this term can and ca=ot mean. As we in the West use the word today, it is a product of modernity: it means the realm to which the laws of science apply, but it also means the world of intact environments unspoilt by modernity in which we can take aesthetic delight. The idea of nature as 'landscape' and 'scenery' to be enjoyed for its beauty is a product of the early Renaissance, which can probably be dated to Petrarch's ascent of Mt Ventoux in the fourteenth century. 'Nature' thus has both rationalistic and romantic aspects which are in considerable tension. In the formative period of modem science, Kant envisaged Nature (as a female!) being brought before the tribunal of (obviously male!) Reason to be interrogated, while for Bacon, 'she' was to be tortured on the rack until she yielded up her secrets. 8. But the interrogation was to take place entirely on terms dictated by Reason: anything that could be reduced to mathematical structures recognizable by Reason as rational was to count as Nature. The world, in other words, was a machine whose workings could be reconstructed by Reason just as the workings of machines such as the steam engine were to demand scientific explanations of chemistry and physics. Once the new scientific knowledge took the form of industrial technology, however, the ensuing transformation of both the natural world and human society was deplored by the Romantic movement, which reaffirmed the aesthetic integrity of Nature as a necessary metaphor for human yearnings and aspirations. In the ancient world, however, whether in Europe or Asia, none of this applied, nor was there any concept that even approximated to what we mean by 'nature'. The Greeks spoke of the phusis of individual things, that which defined what they were; Aristotle supplied the concept of morphe, that which gave 'form' or individuation to the potentiality of 'matter'; Plato postulated the eternal eidos or ideal exemplar of each being, and the Stoics believed that human reason corresponded to the universal logos or principle of rationality. But none of these corresponds to the peculiarly empirical yet universalizable concept of 'nature' for us, quite apart from its aesthetic connotations. In Buddhism, similarly, the encounter with modem science and the ecological problem has stimulated discussion about traditional equivalents to For these and other examples, see R. Sheldrake, The Rebirth of Nature: The Greening of Science and God (London: Rider 1990), pp. 31-2.

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'nature'. But neither kannan-san:zsara, the perpetual cycle of rebirth which embraces the entire hierarchy of living beings from gods and humans to animals and demons, nor dharma, the transcendent Law on which cosmic and social order depend, nor its derivatives such as dharmadhatu, the 'dharma realm', or dharmata, the 'orderedness' or 'facticity' of things, nor tenns such as yathiibhuta, 'things as they really are', or tathata, 'suchness', quite'capture what 'nature' was to mean in the modern era. The same applies to the religious connotations of the words for 'this world' in New Testament Greek (kasmas) and in the Hili canon (laka): both imply that the world of nature is dark and dangerous to the spiritual seeker. 9 This makes it difficult to apply anything drawn from our scriptures or traditional sources directly to contemporary ecological problems inasmuch as these involve nature. But we could never have imagined that the henneneutical problems involved in speaking theologically or buddhologically about nature would be simple. The impact of great complexes of tradition like Buddhism and Christianity on the issues contemporary to any period of history takes place at a much deeper level than the merely terminological. In each tradition, when speaking religiously about the world, including what modernity has designated as nature, we use powerful, central symbols such as 'creation' (ktisis, suggesting a piece of handiwork) and 'emptiness' (Stlnyatii, the hollow inside of a vessel, connoting 'fulness' as well) to express convictions which go far beyond experimental observation and theory. These symbols are generative: they are not simply archaic remnants of distant pasts, nor are they static ciphers. They continually recontextualize contemporary concerns, laying bare their wider relevance and transcendent dimensions. Indeed, experience itself is predetermined by the presence of such symbols as a 'worldview' encoded in the language of culture: it makes a difference whether we perceive nature as creation, the work of God's hands, or as pratltyasamutpiida (paIi: pa.ticcasamuppiida), the mutually conditioned co-becoming of all things without beginning or end or external cause, or whether we see in history the arena of krisis, uniquely individual decision and its irrevocable consequences in an unfolding teleological plan leading to a final outcome, or of dharma, an eternal order transcending the flux of change and the cycle of rebirths. Each is a vision of reality, the one structured as a narrative of the salvation afthe world in history (protology-eschatology), the other as a phenomenology which declares the world itself to be insubstantial, and they are equally important, indeed 9 For more detail, see P. Gregorios, The Human Presence: An Orthodox View of Nature (Geneva: World Council of Churches 1978), pp. 17-27; Lily de Silva, 'Psychological and Ethical Dimensions in Humanity's Relation to Nature', Dialogue (N.S.) 5, 1978, pp. 5-12; L. Schmithausen, 'Buddhisml1s und Natur', in R Panikkar and W. Strolz (eds), Die Verantwortung des Menschenfiir eine bewohnbare Welt im Christentum, Hinduismus und Buddhismus (Freiburg-Basle-Vienna: Herder 1985), pp. 100-133, who points out how terrifying the primaeval forest must have appeared to the early spiritual seekers of India, and a number of contributors to ME Tucker and D.R. Williams (eds), Buddhism and Ecology: The Interconnection ofDharma Clnd Deeds (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1997), especially 8". Odin on the Japanese concepts offido (climate) andjinen (what is of itself), pp. 94-6; M.D. Eckel contrasting Indian and Chinese concepts, pp. 327-49, and L Harris on the 's~pernatural' aspects of samsiira and dharmakiiya, pp. 377-402.

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decisive, in their respective contexts. Our task is to show not only how these symbolic recontextualizations work - how each opens us to transcendence while motivating us to act ethically - but how different ones may be compared and correlated so that both Buddhism and Christianity can contribute together, in mutually enhancing ways, to the solution of fundamental problems such as those posed by ecology. It will help if we try to do this in a systematic way in order to bring out more clearly some of the formal characteristics of such religious language and the structural problems involved in its actual use. Let us take two doctrinal statements which crop up quite frequently in contemporary discussions about the bearing of Buddhist and Christian doctrines on ecology: 10

2

The world is God's body. The world is V airocana' s body.

Taken as statements of fact, both may well be untrue, but both caIfnot simultaneously be true. But, of course, they are not statements of fact as modem science has conditioned us to understand such statements; they are symbolic expressions of two distinct visions of reality which are meant to have ethical implications. If (1) can be made plausible in this sense, then the consequences for the human relationship to nature are evident: the world of animate and inanimate fellow-beings is not just an 'object' put at our disposal to do what we like with, but something sacred, participation in which makes us human in the first place. Buddhists would like to draw their own conclusions about nature from (2): the universe is a 'nondualidentity-in-difference, in which there is total interdependence', without hierarchy or centre, an 'aesthetic order' not unlike that of post-modem physics. 11 Are the symbols, then, simply functionally equivalent, substitutable for one another at will? The standpoint from which one could even conceive such an idea is not a religious one and is certainly neither Buddhist nor Christian. Whether or not it is consonant with Buddhist tradition to interpret Vairocana (J ap. Dainichi) as the eternal Buddha nature symbolized as a sun deity, we are not talking about the God of Christian theism. Statements (1) and (2) are 'generated' by doctrines equally fundamental to Christianity and Buddhism; in terms of transformational grammar: the 'surface 10 According to S. Bergmann, Geist, der Natur be/reit: Die trinitarische Kosmologie Gregors von Nanzianz im Horizont einer okologischen Theologie der Be/reiung (Mainz: Matthias Glinewald 1995), pp. 243, 251-2, Sallie McFague determines God as body of the world and the world as body of . God; God indwells the world panentheistically as its 'soul'. P.O. Ingram, 'The Jeweled Net of Nature', in Tucker and Williams, Buddhism and Ecology, op. cit., pp. 71-88, shows how Kilkai envisaged the world as the dharmakaya or transcendent dharma-body of Dainichi Nyorai or 'Great Sun', the transcendent Buddha Vairocana, rather than the more usual sal1}bhogakaya, so that 'Dainichi and the universe coexist in a state of timeless nondual harmony', p. 75; see also, in the same volume, I. Harris on the things ofthe world as not 'natural' but parts of the body of the cosmic Buddha Vairocana, that is, the dharmakaya, p. 385. 11 Ingram, 'Jeweled Net', op. cit., pp. 80-81.

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structures' manifested in statements (1) and (2) are generated by two entirely different and incommensurable sets of 'deep structures' , each of which gives rise to a distinct 'religious language' in which to fo=ulate attitudes to the world. It would thus seem that there is no real possibility of correlating fruitfully statements about the world arising from the doctrinal systems of theology and buddhology respectively. But such. doctrinal correlations, of course, are not the whole story of BuddhistChristian relations in this or any other context. Before going on to show how Buddhist and Christian responses to the problems posed by ecology might be both possible and co-ordinated, however, we need to prepare a methodological toolkit, which will be the purpose of the next section.

Action-consensus without Meaning-consensus? As Buddhists and Christians become aware of the challenge posed by ecology - not just in the sense of environmental degradation, but as a new, post-modern science or even a kind of quasi-religion 12 - the sequence of their responses might be reconstructed as follows. First, there is the urgent need to do something, and activists in both traditions have taken many initiatives separately and together, such as protesting against nuclear waste disposal in Europe and Japan or defending forests against loggers in Thailand and Papua New Guinea. In many cases, anybody with a sufficiently 'green' motivation is welcome at such protests; but ultimately, believing Buddhists and Christians take part for their own specific religious reasons. It is when circumstances make it necessary to make these reasons explicit that questions of meaning begin to emerge: it is because the world and our human situation in it are seen to be such rather than otherwise that it makes sense to embark on actions which may have serious consequences: social isolation, political controversy, arrest and prosecution. In the end, such motivation can only be sustained when we are convinced of the truth of our fundamental convictions in the sense of Gandhi's satyiigraha: 'living the truth' by 'dwelling in God'. But these convictions are formed as convictions about the meaningfulness of our commitments and the reasonableness and religious 'rightness' of our actions, especially when these involve suffering or confront evil. Does this mean, then, that we are left regarding statements (1) and (2) above as rival and ultimately incompatible versions of religious truth, when they nevertheless serve as the basis of similar or identical actions? Our starting point, then, is the fact that Buddhists and Christians can agree that it is right to embark on certain courses of action, despite the further fact that, when pressed, their ultimate reasons for doing so seem incompatible. To fo=alize this observation: action-consensus, the agreement to act in a certain way, bears an immediate relationship to meaning-consensus, the agreement that it makes sense so to act. This relationship is complex: though agreed meanings are presuppositions of 12

See J.D. May, 'Ecology: Our Newest Religion?' ,Doctrine and Life 46, 1996, pp. 578-85.

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action - most of what we do, we do because 'that is what is done', that is, is regarded as 'right' and 'sensible', in our social milieu. - it is actions that create the need for meanings in the first place.I 3 Intentional actions (Handlungen) in societies generate meanings: in social contexts, actions become signs, from gestures of greeting or expressions of disapproval right through to the complexities of language, which is a way of carrying out actions by other - highly formalized and conventional- means. We must therefore be somewhat reticent about raising the question of truth with regard to statements such as (1) and (2) until we are clearer about the linguistic 'deep structures' - not just syntactic, but semantic and pragmatic as well- which determine whether and under what conditions it makes sense to ask about their truth in the first place. The 'truth' of (1) and (2) may well consist in the ways in which they differently symbolize the 'rightness' of the same actions. Another way of saying this might be to suggest that the dimension of transcendence to which religious symbols such as 'body of God' or 'body of Vairocana' point is initially disclosed by ethics, not doctrine, though this happens differently in each case because of the different ways in which transcendence is symbolized. Transcendence, as used here, is a term in an artificially constructed 'meta-language' which is thus neither Buddhist nor Christian, a purely formal concept without determinate content, which might be conceived radically differently in the respective religious discourses of Buddhism and Christianity (that is, when language is being 'used' as part of religious 'performance' as distinct from merely being 'mentioned' descriptively as an element in religious 'competence'). But if we identify transcendence as that aspect of ethics which makes moral obligation categorical, then we have made a start in finding a way to correlate Buddhist and Christian statements of belief. They are not, in the first instance, assertions of abstract truth divorced from all contexts of use, but they qualify symbolic contexts-for-action as meaningfuL In this sense, ethical action becomes the common basis for the interreligious relationship. In the abstract terms of philosophy, ethical action 'malces sense' in its own right as a response to a given situation (the socalled 'autonomy of ethics'), but in contexts of use it is 'made meaningful' by being contextualized in religious narratives and worldviews in such a way as to motivate us and reassure us that what we are doing does have a meaning that transcends mere pragmatism and utilitarianism. 14 Ethics, in short, contains not only norms but an element of 'vision' which is typically 'religious'.I 5 13

I have discl,lssed these relationships more fully and formally in J.D. May, 'Consensus in Religion: An Essay in Fundamental Ecumenics', Journal of Ecumenical Studies 17, 1980, pp. 407-31; idem, Meaning, Consensus and Dialogue in Buddhist-Christian Communication: A Study in the Construction ofMeaning (Berne: Peter Lang 1984), Chapters 6 and 7. 14 I discuss these issues more fully with reference to the debate about 'autonomous ethics' in Roman Catholic moral theology in J.D. May, 'Verantwortung Coram Deo? Europa zwischen sakularer und interreligioser Ethik', in K-W. Merks (ed.), Verantwortung - Ende oder Wandlullgen einer Vorstellung? Orte und Funktionen deT Ethik in unserer Gesellschaft (Miinster-Hamburg-London: LIT Verlag 2001), pp. 193-207. 15 This topic is developed by R Gascoigne, The Public Forum and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001).

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We can now test our sample statements further to see whether, despite appearances, they might be compatible with one another. Behind statement (1) stands the Christian doctrine of creation, 'the presence of God in the very fact of the world', 16 the production of all that exists ex nihilo by the unfathomable free act of a personal Creator who utterly transcends existence itself as we can know it and can be said to be ipsum esse only per analogiam. This conviction seems to have matured only gradually as the people of Israel came to realize that the god who had led them out of slavery in Egypt and exile in Babylon was not just one of the gods, albeit superior in strength, but God, the One whose covenant with the patriarchs extends to the whole universe, which as the work of his hands is the primary sign of that covenant (Genesis 9:8-11, the 'Noachite' covenant with the earth and all its creatures; Isaiah 40:28, 'The LORD is the everlasting God, the creator of the ends of the earth'; 45: 18, 'For thus says the LORD, who created the heavens (he is God!), who formed the earth and made it ... "I am the LORD, and there is no other ... "'; Deuteronomy 6:4, 'The LORD our God is one LORD'). That this breakthrough to monotheism produces a most powerful symbol which contextualizes both our consciousness of ourselves as beings called forth out of nothingness and our attitude to all creatures - to 'nature' - as God's handiwork is as obvious as it is problematic in the new context created by empirical science and rationalist philosophy. The whole painful process of learning to distinguish between biblical symbolism and scientific 'fact' is too well known to be recounted here. Questions of truth now had to be confronted that did not arise from within the Christian tradition itself, but represented the emancipation of reason from that tradition. The alternative context of science was constructed by reason and regarded as self-evidently 'reasonable' in a way that religion - in its Christian and biblical forms, at any rate - was not. The value of creation as a context for ecology thus seems to be compromised by the theistic assumptions on which it is based. Buddhism, on the other hand, has usually prided itself throughout the modern period on being just as rational as Western science and philosophy, differing from them only in its comprehensiveness and its relevance' to the human predicament. Behind statement (2), however, stands a considerable process of doctrinal development which must also be scrutinized more closely. Vairocana represents the universal and transcendent Buddha-nature, which in turn is predicated on the dharmakiiya or 'truth-body' of the Buddha, as distinct from the sal1Jbhogakiiya or 'body of bliss', in which he is manifested as the transcendent Buddha of the Mahayana siaras, and the nirmiilJakiiya or human body of his earthly existence. Once this notion took hold, it became possible to conceive of everything in the world as the 'womb' or 'seed' of the Thus Gone (tathiigatagarbha). Not only humans, but animals and trees and stones could thus be seen as already possessing 'original enlightenment' (known in Japanese Tendai Buddhism, where the doctrine became 16

Erazin Kohak, cited by M.D. Eckel, 'Is There a Buddhist Philosophy of Nature?', in Tucker and Williams (eds), Buddhism and Ecology, op. cit. (fn. 9), 327-49, p. 346.

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fully developed, 'as hongaku shisO), only needing to be fully awakened to their innate Buddha nature in order to attain their true reality. 17 The implications for transforming our attitude to 'nature' are obvious and are reflected in Chinese and Japanese art and poetry down the centuries, such that "'Nature" in the Indian tradition was a world to be transcended, while in. East Asia it took on the capacity to symbolize transcendence itself' .18 But as a statement capable of contextualizing an approach to environmental questions, (2) is at least as problematic as (1).19 If babbling brooks and splendid sunsets have Buddha nature just as much as mangy dogs and wicked people, what about nuclear waste and poisonous emissions? Why is it that precisely China and Japan have such appalling records of environmental pollution and cruelty to animals?2o May the concept be extended from individuals to species? And is it even authentically Buddhist in the first place? If it is not, as Critical Buddhists would hold, its plausibility is impugned, not so much from outside, by a purportedly 'neutral' science, but from inside the tradition itself. Are 'green' or ecoBuddhists who make use of this conception of the world as the body of the Buddha succumbing to 'etemalism' (the sasvatavada repudiated by the Buddha along with the 'nihilism' of· the ucchedavada)? Has Buddhism here not fallen into the same trap as Christian creationism by attempting to occupy the same ground as science? Buddhists and Christians engaged in common ecological projects, we have learned, might find themselves in considerable difficulties if they seriously examined the legitimation of their actions in terms of their basic beliefs and ultimate motivations. Though we can envisage them agreeing to act together nonetheless without compromising their convictions and commitments, a seed of doubt has been sown: though the type of ideological certainty that once sustained Marxists in their struggle and now seems to motivate militant Muslims and Hindus is not the issue, doctrinal difficulties are important and may come back to haunt activists if they are ignored or repressed. Having become more aware of the ways in which such differences can be handled, let us see whether sense can still be made of Buddhist and Christian rationales for ecological commitment.

Exploring Complementarities An influential aspect of the conventional post-modem worldview has been the decline of 'grand narratives', such as Marxism or scientism, but also the universalist 17

On Buddha nature, see the illuminating study by S.B. King, Buddha Nature (New York: SUNY Press 1991), where she shows that traditionally Buddha nature was seen as 'practice' and 'promise' rather than 'entity' or 'existent'. 18 Eckel, 'Buddhist Philosophy of Nature', op. cit., p. 339, comparing the poetry of Dharmaklrti and Li Po. 19 There is no space here to go into the considerable controversy over 'Critical Buddhism' in Japan and beyond, see 1. Hubbard and P.L. Swanson (eds), Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The. Storm Over Critical Buddhism (Honolulu: University ofHawai'i Press 1997). 20 For comparative figures, see Eckel, 'Buddhist Philosophy of Natme' , op. cit., pp. 332-3.

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religions, wr,ich purport to explain everything by a totalizing theory. Such theoriesof-everything fail to take account of their own relativity and the intrinsic impossibility of explanatory closure. 21 But a moment's reflection suffices to remind us that ecology itself, while not providing us with a new religion or total worldview, takes as its theme the interweaving of myriad different natural histories and species stories into one 'universe story' which science now enables us to tell in a context where environmental pollution and genetic interference alert us to the possibility of destroying all life on earth. 22 The presence of the human species - surely Homo demens as much as Homo sapiens - and the behaviour of human beings become the greatest threat to life itself. Rather than blaming particular traditions - Greek dualism, Jewish monotheism, Christian individualism, rationalist empiricism - for our environmental crisis, we are now in a position to explore the complementarity of traditions in the context of real and urgent problems which know no borders, either territorial or ideological. It may help to clarify this if we take a closer look at two short but central excerpts from the Buddhist and Christian 'universe stories' as examples of how what we now call nature has been made a key metaphor in creation and liberation narratives. The first is one of the most striking texts in the entire New Testament, which stands out because of its uniqueness. It speaks of 'creation' not as subordinate to Christ as 'Head' (Colossians 1:15) or 'Word' (John 1:1-5), not even as evidence of God's existence (Romans 1:19-21), nor as an insubstantial fabric which will be swept away at the Day of Judgement (Matthew 24, Revelation 21:1), but in its own right as eschatological subject of salvation: 3

21

181 consider that the sufferings of this present time are not worth comparing with the glory that is to be revealed to us. 19For the creation waits with eager longing for the revealing of the children of God; 2ofor the creation was subjected to futility, not of its own will but by the will of him who subjected it in hope; 21because the creation itself will be set free from its bondage to decay and obtain the glorious liberty of the children of God. 22We know that the whole creation has been groaning in travail together until now; 23and not only the creation, but we ourselves, who have the first fruits of the Spirit, groan

R. Panikkar, Invisible Hannony: Essays on Contemplation and Responsibility (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1995), in his essay 'The Pluralism of Truth', pp. 92-101, demonstrates that 'The incommensurability of ultimate systems is unbridgeable' (p. 96) and remarks that no one has 360-degree vision (p. 101). 22 See P. Knitter, 'A Common Creation Story? IntelTeligious Dialogue and Ecology', foumal of Ecumenical Studies 37, 2000, pp. 285-300; B. Swimme and T. BelTY, The Universe Story: From the Primordial Flaring Forth to the Ecozoic Era (Harmondsworth: Penguin 1994); C. Birch and J.B. Cobb, The Liberation of Life: From the Cell to the Community (Denton, TX: Environmental Ethics Books 1990); P. Collins, God's Earth: Religion as if Matter Really Mattered (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan 1995), and my discussion of P. Collins and P. Knitter, One Earth, Many Religions: Multifaith _pialogue and Global Responsibility (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books 1995), in May, 'Ecology: Our Newest Religion?', op. cit. (fn. 12). I am indebted to an unpublished research report by Anders Melin, 'A Comparative Study of Some Contemporary Versions of Christian and Buddhist Environmental Ethics', for an overview and analysis of religious approaches to ecology.

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inwardly as we wait for adoption, the redemption of am bodies. 24For in this hope we were saved. Now hope that is seen is not hope. For who hopes for what he sees? 25But if we hope for what we do not see, we wait for it with patience. (Romans 8:18-25)

In this text we find perhaps the clearest reference in the whole New Testament to the non-human creation (ktisis) as the object of God's activity and the subject of ultimate' liberation (v. 23: ' ... and not only the creation, but we ourselves ... ', who await 'the redemption of our bodies'). The creation, which 'waits with eager longing' (v. 19) and 'has been groaning in travail together' (v. 22), has been 'subjected to futility' (mataiotes, v. 20) by God and is in 'bondage to decay' (phthora, v. 21), so that the outcome of this cosmic process of redemption is not yet seen but hoped for ('in this hope we were saved', v. 24). The text is thus built up around a pair of structural oppositions: SUFFERING/GLORY (vv. 18-23); HOPE/SEE (vv. 24--5), in a context already established by the opposition FLESH/SPIRIT (vv. 2-11), The creation thus becomes a dramatic metaphor for the liberation of all creatures. 23 The second text is surely one of the most beautiful statements of the Buddhist ideal of liberation through meditation practice in the entire Pali canon, the Discourse on Lovingkindness or Metta-Sutta: 4

[What should be done by one with skill in good The state of peace to have attained is this. He would be able, right, upright, And meek and gentle and not proud, 2Contented, easy to support, Unbusy, frugal, and serene In faculties, prudent, modest, Not fawning upon families. 3He would no slight thing do at all That other wise ones might deplore. Then he would think, 'Joyful and safe Let every being's heart rejoice. 4Whatever breathing beings there are, No matter whether frail or firm, With none excepted, long or big Or middle-sized or short or small 50r thick, or those seen or unseen, Or whether dwelling far or near, That are or that yet seek to be, Let every being's heart rejoice.

23

Some years ago, I analysed this text using the full apparatus of theoretical text linguistics, which, of course, can only be hinted at here; see J.D. May, 'Religious Symbolisations of Nature in Ethical Argumentation: A "Pragmasemantic" Analysis of Romans 8:18-25 and a Buddhist Comparison', Linguistiea Bibliea 48,1980, pp. 19-48.

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will

The text could scarcely provide a greater contrast to (3). Here the meditator, 'one with skill in good' (atthakusalena, v. 1), in order to attain the 'state of peace' doubtless a reference to nibbal}a - cultivates an 'all-embracing mind unto all beings' and is thus able to project or radiate 'boundless goodwill for all the world' (Mettafi ca sabbalokasmirh, v. 8). It is significant that the meditator's ethical disposition (vv. 1a_3 a) is immediately linked with this mindfulness (etam satim, v. 9) towards all conceivable beings (vv. 3b-6) in ti'1e illimitable virtue (Divine Abiding, brahmam etam viharam, v. 9) of lovingldndness. The presupposition for the exercise of metta is to have attained complete detachment from all social entanglements (vv. 2,-3) and selfish desires (v. 10); its fruit is ultimate liberation from the entire process of successive rebirths in which 'nature' consists. The structural opposition SELF/NOTSELF is thus correlated with that of REBIRTHiRELEASE. In a sense entirely different from text (3), the world once again becomes a metaphor for an ultimate outcome which transcends natural and historical processes. For Paul, however, the world of nature has a history which is in fact the liberation of all creatures together from their bondage to decay; for the M etta-Sutta, on the other hand, liberation transcends nature and occurs outside history. Whereas St Paul plays on the dualism of flesh and spirit, suffering and glory, decay and redemption, the Buddhist solution is non-dual, but for that very reason unavailable for historical existence. Each text, it will be noted, has immediate - indeed, urgent - ethical implications. The drama of the world's existence is itself ethical, and humans are caught up in it along with all other beings. Paul's text follows immediately upon his vivid description of the struggle between flesh and spirit (Romans 8:2-11), which in Buddhist eyes may

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appear to be dualistic, but which in biblical tenus is a way of describing two aspects of the one human reality. Here it is the setting for the promise that the suffering we share with the whole of creation is the necessary prelude to the glory to be revealed. Yet Paul's categories 'flesh:, 'suffering', 'futility', 'bondage' and 'decay' are not at all dissimilar in content and, function to their Buddhist counterparts 'unsatisfactoriness' (dukkha), 'transitoriness' (anicca) and 'insubstantiality' (or 'not-self', anattii); in each case, they characterize 'nature', not as the object of rational knowledge, but as the existential predicament of humans aware of their condition. To this extent, as anticipated in our analysis of the relationship between (1) and (2) in the section on 'Symbolizing Transcendence and Attitudes towards "Nature'" , the starting points for Christian and Buddhist concern for nature are comparable. But the wider doctrinal settings of each text could scarcely be more different. As a quite tentative 'thought experiment' - no more! - I should like to characterize these as follows: 5

Perichoresis: though we know nothing of G6d in Godself, the outworking of the divine love in creation and redemption (the oikonomia) is the revelation of a movement of love - including, through Christ, the suffering to which all love is subject - in Godself (the theologia); this movement of love (the perichoresis or 'dance' of the divine persons) indwells and 'moves' the whole of creation in the person of the Spirit, who carries out the Trinitarian work of human redemption, of which the liberation of nature is an integral part 24

6

Paticcasamuppada: the locus of liberation is the mind, which in realizing the uncaused inter-relatedness of all reality grasps the transitoriness of all compounded things (sabbe sanikhara anicca) and the insubstantiality of all states of being (sabbe dhamma anatta; Dhammapada 277-9); this not only explains the all-pervasiveness of suffering (dukkha) but discloses the emptiness at the heart of all that the desire-filled self takes to be reality. Though suffering nature is the object of care (metta-karul'}a, lovingkindness and compassion), it has no significance in itself and is not subject to liberation;

Thus (5) could fonu the basis of an 'ecological theology' along the lines suggested by (3) without committing us to the dubious identification expressed in (1). Similarly, (6) does not entail the quasi-deification of the Buddha-nature suggested by (2), yet it lays the basis for a universal ethic of care as portrayed in (4). Each doctrinal statement says something about 'nature', yet each does so dialectically. In neither case is nature independently available as an object constructed by human rationality such that humans neither affect it nor are affected by it; rather, nature is the subject of a world-process in which humans are caught up. In the case of (5), however, nature itself is liberated; in (6), nature is what we are liberated from; indeed, if all were enlightened, nature would cease to exist. 25 Yet subsequent Christian understandings 24 25

This is my attempt to synthesize the ,conclusions of Sigurd Bergmann's 'ecological theology of liberation'. Cf. Bergmann, Geist, deT Natllr befreit, op. cit. (fn. 10), pp. 382-7. An interjection by Perry Schmidt-Leuke!.

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of redemption virtually eliminated nature from the purview of theology, even trying to explain away the patent meaning of Romans 8:23, so that '[a]fter the decline of Greece and Rome and the advent of Christianity, nature did not fare well in Christian ethics';26 and in later Buddhism, the Bodhisattva ideal hinted at in the Metta-Sutta made universal compassion the basis for an ethic that can now rightly be called ecological. 27 It is in the questions of history and responsibility that both the difficulties and the possibilities of Buddhist-Christian complementarity in ecological ethics become fully apparent. If it is true that 'in Buddhist culture at large the cultivation of the self takes the form of a dec entering of the self and concern for a wider network of life' ,28 such that moral exhortation becomes irrelevant29 and etllics is neither theocentric nor anthropocentric but acentric,30 the questions of historical teleology and moral responsibility remain and may not simply be dismissed by claiming that the dualism of the subject/object dichotomy has been overcome. If Christianity lacks the Buddhist sense of human participation in the 'recycling process' of nature (sarr;siira), Buddhism's 'pure, nature-transcending subjectivity'31 lacks the Christian sense of acting out a drama in which the whole of nature is involved and whose outcome is codetermined by every human action.. Both Buddhism and Christianity have benefited from the assimilation of elements from the so-called 'nature religions', the 'primal' traditions of indigenous peoples for whom land is the 'place' where biological and social life assume religious significance. Each has reacted to these 'cosmic' religions in characteristically different ways: Christianity by dualistic philosophies and condemnations of idolatry, Buddhism by tolerant detachment and forms of symbiosis. 32 Both, as traditions of transcendence, need to be 'earthed' in 'primal' religious traditions which preserve the homology between the cosmic and the social, nature and history, not only in order to re-establish human relationships with nature but to provide a narrative and symbolic context for the 'land ethic' which is implicit in the science of ecology. Indeed, the relationship of 'metacosmic' religions such as Buddhism and Christianity to 26 Nash, Rights o/Nature, op. cit. (fn. 5), p. 17. 27 I tried to develop this theme in J.D. May, '''Rights of the Earth" and "Care for the Earth": Two Paradigms for a Buddhist-Christian Ecological Ethic', Horizons 21,1994, pp. 48-61. 28 Eckel, 'Buddhist Philosophy of Nature', op. cit. (fn. 16), p. 342, paraphrasing a remark by Allan Grapard that' ... the love of culture takes in Japan the form of a love of nature', p. 340. 29 Cf. J. Macy, in Badiner (ed.), Dharma Gaia, op. cit. (fn. 7), p. 61. 30 Cf. S. Batchelor, ibid., p. 180. 31 I am grateful to 1. Harris, 'Buddhism and the Discourse of Environmental Concern: Some Methodological Problems Considered', in Tucker and Willians, Buddhism and Ecology, op. cit. (fn. 9), 377-402, pp. 383-5, for making explicit this criticism of attempts by ecoBuddhists to derive ecological ethics directly from Buddhist teachings, which I was inclined to do in my own article, '''Rights of the Earth" and "Care for the Earth''', under the influence of the contributors to Dharma Gaia. 32 This question is raised in J.D. May, Transcendence and Violence: The Encounter 0/ Buddhist, Christian and Primal Traditions (New York-London: Continuum 2003), Chapter 5, but it needs further development.

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'biocosmic' primal religions is itself part of ecological ethics: 'Since the life-ways of foragers and vernacular agriculturalists are so thoroughly integrated into their local biotic communities, culture conservation is tantamount to biological conservation. '33 In the perspective opened up by Bateson's 'ecology of mind', Buddhism and Christianity, despite their differences and the difficulties of communication across centuries and between cultures, should be natural partners in promoting ecological awareness in the emerging post-modern world.

33

Callicott, Earth's Insights, op. cit. (fn. 4), p. 186. For the sources and use of the terminology 'metacosmic' and 'biocosmic' see J.D. May, Christ"s Initiator: Theologie im Pazifik (Dusseldorf: Patmos 1990), 'Chapter 7; idem, Transcendence and Violence, op. cit. (fn. 32), pp. 57-60 and Conclusion.

PART TWO THE UNBRIDGEABLE GULF? TOWARDS A BUDDHIST-CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY OF CREATION Perry Schmidt-Leukel

Chapter 8

Preparing the Ground

In view of the theistic character of Christianity and a 'very strong non-theistic emphasis' within Buddhism, Ninian Smart, well-meaning observer of and committed participant in Buddhist-Christian dialogue, declares: 'there is a gulf ... andit cannot I believe be bridged'.l Smart does not elaborate upon this opinion, but apparently he sees the major difference, the unbridgeable gulf, primarily in the opposed answers of both religions to the question as to whether ultimate reality can be understood as the creator of the universe. 2 Smart's view exemplifies a rather widespread opinion among both Christians and Buddhists. In consequence, those who are involved in Buddhist-Christian encounter and who subscribe to this view tend to avoid this troublesome issue, not necessarily by repressing it, but rather by circumventing it and focusing instead on other, seemingly more promising, points of contact which appear to exhibit a greater affinity between the two traditions. But is the gulf really unbridgeable? The twentieth century, all extraordinary century in many reg~ds, bears witness to how another religious gulf, regarded as similarly unbridgeable for more than 400 years, was successfully bridged. I am referring to the opposing positions on the question of justification taken by Protestant traditions, primarily the Lutheran, on the one hand and the Roman Catholic Church on the other. Towards the end of the twentieth century, after years of intensive theological efforts and detailed studies, something happened which hardly anyone had held possible: official representatives from both traditions signed a joint declaration stating that their views on the doctrine of justification, regarded for centuries as flatly contradictory, are in fact compatible, because they can be understood as emphasizing different, but not strictly opposed, aspects: 3 Could something similar happen in Buddhist-Christian dialogue? Do their apparently contradictory views on the question of creation necessarily constitute an unbridgeable gulf? What would it mean to postulate that this particular gulf can be bridged? And why should such a bridge be important? Would it not be more

2 3

N. Smart, Buddhism and Christianity: Rivals and Allies (Houndmills: Macmillan 1993), p. 25. Cf. ibid., pp. 62--4. For the English version of the text, see The Lutheran World Federation and the Catholic Church, Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification (London: Catholic Truth Society. Publishers to the Holy See 2001). For the study leading up to the declaration, see: K. Lehmann and W. Pannenberg (eds), Lehrverurteilungen - kirchentrennend? Vol. I: Rechtfertigung, Sakrtzmente und Amt im Zeitalter der Reformation lind hellte (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder; Giittingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1986).

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honest and fair to allow opposites to remain what they are, and to see how the two sides can get along with one other despite such irreconcilable doctrinal conflicts? Indeed, this would be advisable if the underlying assumption were correct that the alleged opposites are really contradictory. 'Bridging the gulf', on the 6ther hand, would mean first of all that this assumption is wrong; that the claims made on both sides of the gulf are not (or at least not inevitably) contradictory but compatible. Hence, any attempt to construct a bridge is fuelled by the confidence that there is truth on both sides. This would mean that the Buddhist critique of creator and creation doctrines and the Christian affirmation thereof do not place us in a simple either/or situation such that only one can be right and the other must be wrong; it would mean that a closer analysis might uncover intentions which have far more in common than is visible at first sight. If this were the case, the result would be not only a much better mutual understanding but a deeper appreciation as well. The attempt to discern the truth of the other and relate it to one's own - that is what makes the bridge important and the effort of constructing it worthwhile. In these chapters I hope to collect some building stones with which the construction of just such a bridge might begin. However, before addressing the issue of creator and creation, I shall clarify the presuppositions upon which my further considerations rest.

Transcendent Reality First of all, Buddhism is not 'atheism' in the sense of Western or Eastern materialism or naturalism. Let me draw attention to the fact that the first materialists in human history, or at least the first of whose existence we have indubitable evidence, were probably earlier contemporaries of the Buddha, the Indian Carvakas. 4 It is uncontroversially clear that the Buddha was not a Carvaka, but on the contrary, was quite opposed to them. 5 In contrast to the Carvakas, early Buddhists affirmed not only life after death, but also the principle of moral and/or spiritual compensation which underlies their understanding of karma. Moreover, and most importantly, nirvalJa was affirmed as an ultimate, 'unconditioned' (asal1Jskrta) reality, which is unborn, undying and unchanging. 6 NirvalJa is therefore far from being simply and merely the state of an enlightened person. If it were, it would be conditioned: it would arise as the 4

5 6

The Carviikas go back perhaps to the sixth century BCE and are definitely older than Buddhism. A major representative at the time of the Buddha was Ajita KeSakambala. Cf. E. Frauwallner, Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, Vol. 2 (Salzburg: Otto MUller Verlag 1956), pp. 295-309. For a sample of texts from the Carvakas or lokayata, see A Source Book in Indian Philosophy, edited by S. Radhalcrishnan and C. A. Moore (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, ppb. repro 1989), pp. 227-49. Cf. Dfgha Nikaya 2. Cf. Mati Lal Pandit, 'Nirvar,m as the Unconditioned', in idem, Being as Becoming: Studies in Early Buddhism (New Delhi: Intercultural Publication 1993), pp. 312-39; S. Collins, Nirvana and Other Buddhist Felicities: Utopias of the Pali Imaginaire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998), pp. 135-90. Revealingly, when discussing the comparability of nirvaqa and god, Collins points to creation as the major difference (cf. ibid., pp. 176f).

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fruit of the successful completion of the Buddhist path and thus be dependent on it. But according to a fundfullental Buddhist conviction, everything dependently arisen will inevitably decay. Nirvar;ta, on the other hand, is deathless and imperishable reality, and thus cannot come into existence by dependent origination. As deathless, it must be unborn. As. unconditioned, it cannot be a state. Classical Theravada treatises like Buddhaghosa's Visuddhi Magga and the fairly old Milinda Panha7 therefore emphasize that nirvaI).a is not the state of the enlightened one. Rather, the state of the enlightened one consists in having reached nirvaI).a, while nirvaI).a itself exists independently of such an achievement. The completion of the path is not a condition which would bring about nirvaI).a. On the contrary, the existence of nirvaI).a as an unconditioned reality is the precondition that makes enlightenment and final liberation, as the fruit of the accomplished path, possible. In the Milinda Panha, Nagasena explains to King Milinda: ' ... (S)ire, it is possible to point out the way to the realization of Nirvana, but impossible to show a cause for the production of Nirvana. For what reason? It is because of the uncompounded 8 nature of the thing. [... J it is made by nothing at all. Sire, one cannot say of Nirvana that it arises or that it does not arise or that it is to be produced or that it is past or future or present, or that it is cognizable by the eye, ear, nose, tongue or body.' 'If, reverend Nagasena, Nirvana neither arises nor does not ar'ise and so on, as you say, well then, reverend Nagasena, you indicate Nirvana as a thing that is not: Nirvana is not.' 'Sire, Nirvana is; Nirvana is cognizable by mind; an ariyan disciple, faring along rightly with a mind that is purified, lofty, straight, without obstructions, without temporal desires, sees Nirvana. '9

And: Nirvana itself is bliss pure and simple, there is no pain mixed with it. 10

Buddhaghosa, too, emphasizes that nirvaI).a is 'not extinction', but 'has existence in the ultimate meaning' and 'is not non-existent' .11 Presumably originally a scripture of the Millasarvastivadins, the Milinda Paiiha has acquired sernicanonical (and in some cases even full canonical status) in the various Theravada branches. 8 Or: 'unconditioned' (asankhata). 9 Milinda Paiiha IV 7:15f, translation from Buddhist Texts Through the Ages, translated and edited by E. Conze, in collaboration with LB. Horner, D. Snellgrove and A. Waley (Oxford: Oneworld, repr. 2000), p. 99. 10 Milinda Paiiha IV 8:59, The Questions of King Milinda, translated from the Pali by T.W. Rbys Davids, Part II, SBE 36 (1894, repro New York: Dover 1963), p. 183. For entering into nirvana, the Milinda Paiiha can even use the well-known Upani~adic parable of the rivers flowing into the ocean (though the gist of the comparison is that nirvana does not undergo any change by this). Cf. Milinda PaiihaIV 8:69 (p. 319). 11 Visuddhi Magga 508-9. In theAbhidhannakoSabhii~yam (2:55d), Vasubandhu renders the view of the Sarvastivadins regarding nirvaIfa as: 'This ... , in its nature, is real, but indescribable; only the Aryans "realize" it internally, each for himself. It is only possible to indicate its general characteristics, by saying that there is a real entity (dravya), distinct from others, which is good and 7

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Towards a Buddhist-Christian Theology of Creation It is only attainable by means of the Way - it cannot be produced by it. Therefore

it is precisely without source. Because it is without source it is un ageing and undying. Because there is no source, no ageing or dying, it is pelmanent. 12

Thus, says Buddhaghosa, nirva1).a is the 'sufficient condition' of liberation.-13 And this is in line with the following famous passage from the Pali-canon (Udana 8:3; Itivuttaka 43) to which Buddhaghosa himself refers: 14 There is, 0 monks, a not-born (ajiitmi7), a not-brought-to-beixlg (abhiitani), a notmade (akatarn), a not-conditioned (asahkhatani). If, 0 monks, there were no n6tborn, not-brought-to-being, not-made, not-conditioned, no escape would be discerned from what is born, brought-to-being, made, conditioned. But since there is a not-born, a not-brought-to-being, a not-made, a not-conditioned, therefore an escape is discerned from what is born, brought-to-being, made, conditioned.

Here the existence of a transcendent reality ('transcendent' as beyond the realm of conditioned, that is dependently arising and decaying, reality) is affirmed as the precondition of salvation. And salvation is what the Buddha was primarily, if not exclusively, interested in. It is not the case, as a widespread opinion holds, that Buddha was not interested in metaphysical questions at all. Rather, his interest in metaphysical issues depended on the primary question as to whether these issues had any impact on the goal of ultimate salvation and the path leading to it. The Buddha was not interested in metaphysical speculation if it seemed IO be irrelevant for the path or for the goal IS (and among those issues is also the question of whether the world is eternal or not I6 ). Speculation about irrelevant issues was regarded as a useless distraction from the path. But the Buddha displayed a clear interest whenever a metaphysical issue had an obvious implication for the path of salvation which he preached. For this reason, the Buddha affirme-d the existence of nirva1).a as the unconditioned, deathless reality which alone makes salvation from conditioned

12 13 14 15

16

eternal .. .'. Abhidharmakosabha~yam by L. de La Vallee Poussin, English translation by L.M. Pruden, Vol. I (Berkeley, CA: Asian Humanities Press 1988), p. 280. The subsequent discussion between a Sautrantika and a Sarvastivadin presents the view of the Sautrantikas as implying a nihilistic understanding of nirval)a (it is not an existing reality, but the complete cessation of all existence). Moti Lal Pandit, however, suggests that the position of the Sautrantikas should be understood as radical mysticism: 'We can only speak of nirvaIJa in terms of not this, not this (neti, neti) . ... It is not a negation of mere absence; rather it transcends all that which is of the nature of thought.' Moti Lal Pandit, Being as Becoming, op. cit. (fn. 6), p. 323. Visuddhi Magga 508. Translations taken from Buddhist Texts Through the Ages (fn. 9), pp. IOlf. Visuddhi Magga 508. VisuddhiMagga509. But what, then, about the Buddha's refusal to address the question whether the tathagata exists after death or not, or both, or neither? Is this not of immediate relevance to the Buddhist goal? Well, it is not the case that the Buddha has not addressed this issue. He refused to accept one of the four positions because he declared that the tathagata is 'incomprehensible like the great ocean' (Majjhima Nikaya 72). Hence the Buddha did take a position on this particular issue, and this position was to defend the mystical ineffability of nirvana and of the one who has finally entered it. For example, Majjhima Nikaya 63 and 72.

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reality possible. And for the same reason, he affirmed reincarnation not only as part of the human predicament, but also as providing the opportunity for further spiritual progress beyond death,17 together with the law of karma as ensuring the ultimate meaningfulness of right conduct - all this against the radically opposed premises of the Carvakas, the materialists. Motivated by the same soteriological concern, the Buddha also engaged in critical dispute or polemic, if he felt that certain metaphysical theories would be incompatible with or jeopardize the path to salvation. For this reason, he rejected not only the materialistic views, but also any deterministic interpretation of karma, and likewise the idea of a creator-god. All this, he argued, would contradict the ideas of human freedom and self-responsibility indispensable for the Buddhist path. The importance of the Buddha's soteriological interest as essentially determinative of his attitude to metaphysical issues in general and to the question of a creator-god in particular can hardly be overestimated. It will playa significant role in my subsequent argument. Soteriological Teleology My second presupposition is that in Buddhism, transcendent reality is not usually related to the world as a cosmogonic power, but rather is related soteriologically, as that reality which enables salvation. (There are exceptions, as will be seen later.) This is well reflected in an astonishing statement made by Bhavaviveka (sixth century CE), one of the great exponents of the Madhyamaka school of Mahayana Buddhist philosophy. About the dharmakiiya, the 'dharma-body' of the Buddha, a Mahayanist symbol of ultimate reality, 18 Bhavaviveka says: l7

Cf. P. Schmidt-Leukel, 'Reinkamation und spiritueller Fortschritt im traditionellen Buddhismus', in idem (ed.), Die Idee der Reinkamation in Ost und West (Munich: Diederichs Verlag 1996), 'pp, 29-56,205-12. 18 Paul Harrison (,Is the Dharma-kaya the Real "Phantom Body" of the Buddha?', loumal of the Intemational Association of Buddhist Studies 15, 1992, pp. 44;-94), has warned strongly against an understanding or - as he sees it - misunderstanding of the dharmakaya as 'a kind of Buddhist absolute' (p. 44). Harrison has produced impressive philological evidence that at least in preMahayana, early Mahayana and partly middle Mahayana usage, 'dharmakaya' should be understood as either the Buddha's embodiment in his teaching or as the Buddha's equipment with a 'body', that is with the full range of those attributes and features which are particular to a Buddha. I am not competent to assess Harrison's philological arguments. But I wonder whether he has not tacitly assumed a rather modern understanding of 'teaching' and 'truth'. Satya has the double meaning of 'truth' and 'reality', such that if a teaching is true, it reflects a reality, Hence, dharma may not only denote the Buddha's teachings, which are, according to a strong Buddhist tradition, subject to corruption and decay, but also - and primarily - the reality which is expressed in the Buddha's dharma and which is eternaL In this context, it is also surprising that Harrison quotes the Ekottaragama as saying that the dharmakaya is 'indestructible' and 'abides in the world forever', and subsequently suggests that this be understood in the light of another paragraph saying that the taught dharma 'will remain for a long time' - without any reflection on the crucial difference between these two affirmations (p, 53). Similarly, no consideration is given in Harrison's argument to the possibility that the particular attributes of a Buddha may as such precisely reflect his status as someone who can

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Towards a Buddhist-Christian Theology o/Creation It is the Supreme Brahman that even (gods) such as Brahma do not grasp. The Sage who spoke the truth said that this (Dharma Body) is the ultimate truth. 19

And Bhavaviveka comments: The word Brahman can refer to the Lord of Creatures (prajapati) or to nirvaI:ta. Here it refers to nirvaI)a. 20

No doubt that Bhavya (as he is also called) uses the term brahman in the Upani~adic sense of referring to ultimate reality, and he is well aware that the Ultimate can be understood either as the world's ultimate source, the creator, or as the world's ultimate redemption, nirviir;a. 21 This soteriological relationship between the world and the Ultimate implies a kind of teleology, according to some texts. Ahguttara-Nikiiya 10:58, for example, can state: ... all things have release for their essence, plunge into the deathless, with nibbaI)a for their conclusion.22

The Ahguttara Nikiiya (4: 113) expresses the same in allegorical form: as a good horse is stirred and agitated by the goad stick, the good monk is stirred and agitated by the sight of sickness and death and strives to attain the save goal of nirvaI).a. This is of course'reminiscent of the Buddha's own spiritual quest: I, too, monks, before awakening, being liable to birth, ageing, disease, dying, sorrow, stain, sought what was likewise liable to birth, ageing, disease, dying, sorrow, stain. Then it occurred to me, monks: Why do I, liable to birth, ... dying, sorrow, stain, seek what is likewise liable to birth, ... dying, sorrow, stain? Suppose that I, (although) being liable to birth, ... dying, sorrow, stain, having known the peril in what is likewise liable to birth, ... dying, sorrow, stain, should seek the unborn, be identified with the dharma, so that not only the Buddha is embodied in the dharma, but also the dharma in the Buddha (cf. the talk of an enlightened one as the 'visible dharma' in Anguttara Nikiiya 3:56). I suggest that it is the neglect of these two Important aspects which accounts for the impression that a later Mahayanist understanding of the dharmakaya as an expression for ultimate reality either radically diverges from the Buddhist tradition (rather than representing the outcome of a consistent development) or has been based upon a Western misreading. For a comprehensive treatment of the various aspects of dharmakaya, cf. J. Makransky, Buddhahood Embodied (New York: SUNY 1997). For Makransky, the 'study of.Buddhist understanding of dhannakiiya could instigate rewarding new lines of inquiry into the nature of God; and I believe the reverse to be equally rewarding' (ibid., p. 370, n.B).

19 20 21 22

Madhyamakahrdaya 3:289, translated in M.D. Eckel, To See the Buddha: A Philosopher's Questfor the Meaning of Emptiness (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1994), p. 169. Madhyamakahrdayavrtti (Tarkajviilii), ibid. p. 169. Eckel reminds that the compound brahma-nirviil}a can be found in Bhagavadgftii 2:72. Cf. ibid., n. 66, p. 229. The Book of the Gradual Sayings, Vol IV, translated by E.M. Hare (London: Pali Text Society, repr. 1978), p. 73.

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the unageing, the undecaying, the undying, the unsorrowing, the stainless, the uttermost security from bonds - nibbana ?23

The spiritual search for the unconditioned ultimate reality accompanies the insight into the 'peril' of transitory existence, which is to say, the insight into its unsatisfactory character. Perishable existence is experienced as deeply unsatisfactory (dulJkhaidukkha) - even, or particularly, if this transitoriness might be endlessly perpetuated. The deepest human longing is for the 'deathless' (the imperishable, in contrast to the never-ending perishableness of sal1'}siira), for nirviiI;1a. Once it becomes clear that one's deepest longing is for the deathless, then further striving after the perishable goods of this world seems utterly pointless. Thereafter, the 'ariyan quest' - the search for the transcendent goal of nirviir;\a - can be consciously pursued. This seems to be the sense in which the early Buddhist texts develop the idea of a teleological relationship between the world and the transcendent as its true goal. Nevertheless, it is striking to find the statement that nirviiI;1a is the 'essence' and 'conclusion' of 'all things' already in the Piili canon. An important clue is given in the same place with the declaration that all things are rooted in 'will' (chanda). Now in the Buddhist context, volition is generally understood as the essence of karma (cf. Ailguttara Nikiiya 6:63). And according to the traditional Buddhist cosmogonic myth, karma is the reason for the evolution and destruction of each world within the immeasurable chains of successively and parallely arising and decaying worlds. According to the Abhidharmakosa (4: 1): The variety ofthe world arises from action (karma). It is volition and that which is produced through volition. Volition is mental action ... 24

More precisely, a new world appears 'by reason of the collective action of beings' .25 If such ideas are old, this would explain why the Ailguttara Nikiiya (10:58) declares that 'all thing are rooted in will'. This seems to imply that if all beings would 23

Majjhima Nikaya 26. Translation abbreviated, following The Collection of the Middle Length Sayings, VoL I, translated by LB. Horner (London: Pali Text Society, repr. 1976), p. 207. My emphasis. 24 Abhidharmakosabhii~yam (fn. 11), voL II, p. 551. 25 Ibid., p. 477. The Yogiiciirabhiimi similarly states that 'the age of regeneration (vivarta-kalpa) [of the world] begins because of the influence (adhipatyat) of sentient beings' karma [conducive to] the regeneration [of the world]'. Y. KajiY,ama, 'Buddhist Cosmology as Presented in the Y ogacarabhilmi' , in Wisdom, Compassion, and the Search for Understanding: The Buddhist Studies Legacy of Gaidjin M. Nagao, edited by J.A. Silk (Honululu: University of Hawai'i Press 2000), pp. 183-99, here p. 190. Or ibid., p. 184: 'How then do the destructi'on (samvarta) and regeneration (vivarta) of the external objects occur? [They occur] because of sentient beings' karma conducive to the destruction or regeneration [of the world].' The Abhidharmakosabhiieya seems to hold that the karma of an individual is responsible for the particular form of rebirth of that individual, while the fact that the various realms of rebirth redevelop is not the retributive result of an individual's karma but of the collective karma. That is the non-sentient, material aspect of the world originates karmic ally as the collective setting in which individual retribution becomes possible. Cf. Abhidharmakosabhiieyam (fn.

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Towards a Buddhist-Christian Theology of Creation

eventually attain nirvaI).a, karmic volitions would cease; hence no more worlds would be generated. Thus it also makes sense to say that 'all things' have nirvaI).a as their 'conclusion'. But in what sense is it the essence of all things to 'plunge into the deathless'? I believe that a possible answer to this can be found once again in the view that karma, as volition, is basically a mental act. 'Plunging into nirvaI).a' can be understood as the essence or nature of all things iffirstly all things are the product of mental (karmic) activity, and secondly the essence or nature of mind is to be driven towards nirvaI).a. That this is indeed the nature of mind seems to be supported by another central Buddhist idea,. also to be found already in the Ahguttara Nikiiya (1: 11): This mind, monks, is luminous, but it is defiled by taints that come from without. [... J That mind, monks, is luminous, but it is cleansed of taints that come from without. This the educated Ariyan disciple understands as it really is. Wherefore for the educated Ariyan disciple there is cultivation of the mind, I declare. 26

If the taints (upakkilesa) 'come from without', they are obviously not regarded as genuine offspring of the original mind (dtta) which is presented as 'luminous' (pabhassara). Consequently, the process of spiritual cultivation which aims at II), Vol. 1, p. 287: 'the collective action of living beings is predominant with regard to the physical world.' AndAbhidharmakosabhiisyam (fn. 11), Vol. I, p. 289: 'Why not consider the dharmas that do not fonn part ofliving beings, - mountains, rivers, etc., - as retributive results? Do they not arise from good or bad actions? The dharmas that do not fonn part of living beings are, by nature, common in that everyone may partake of them. Now retributive results, by definition, are unique: another person never experiences the retributive results of actions that I accomplish. Action produces a "predominating result" (adhipatiphala) in addition to a retributive result: all beings experience this result in common, because the collectivity of their actions cooperates in their creation ... '. See also H. Krasser, Smikaranandas Isvariipiikaralfasank,!epa, Tei! 2: Annotierte Ubersetzung und Studie zur Auseinandersetzung iiber die Existenz Golles (Vienna: Verlag der Osterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 2002), p. 27lf, n. 443, p. 275f, n. 451. The same position is taken by Candrakirti in his Madhyamakiivatiira 6:89: 'Mind alone fabricates all the diversity of sentient and insentient worlds. [The buddha1 declared that the entire universe is produced from volitional action, but there can be no such action without mind.' In his commentary, Candraklrti explains - in just the same manner as Vasubhandu - how the individual karma is responsible for the future course and 'shape' of each individual, while insentient things 'are produced from the common action of all sentient beings'. C.W. Huntington, The Emptiness of Emptiness: An Introduction to Early Indian Miidhyamika (Honululu: University of Hawai'i Press 1989), pp. 167, 248f. Obviously, Vasubhandu and others are thereby presenting a solution to a problem which was regarded as a controversial point in the KathiiVatthu (VII 7). The view that even insentient beings - like the earth - are the result of kanna (here associated with the Andhakas) is refuted by several arguments, among them by the argument that karmic retribution must always be unique to the particular individual, whereas the earth is an object common to everyone (VII 7:3-5). On the role ofkanna in various Indian systems see W. Halbfass, Tradition and Reflection: Explorations in Indian Thought (New York: SUNY 1991), pp. 291-345. Idem., Karma und Wiedergeburt im indischen Denken (Kreuzlingen: Hugendubel Verlag 2000). 26 Anguttara Nikiiya 1: II (I, p. 10). Translation taken from: The Book of the Gradual Sayings, Vol. I, translated by F.L. Woodward (London: Pali Text Society, repr. 1979), p. 8. On the concept of the 'luminous' or 'shining mind' in Theravada Buddhism and its relation to the Mahayana concept of Buddha-Nature, see: P. Harvey, The Selfless Mind: Personality, Consciousness and Nirvana in Early Buddhism (London-New York: Routledge Cnrzon, repr. 2004), pp. 166-79.

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nirviilJa is understood as a process of cleansing the mind so that its original or essential purity is laid bare. This idea exerted a powerful influence upon later Buddhist developments and was gradually but continually expanded and elaborated upon. The notion of the mind's original purity developed first into the idea of the Buddha nature of all sentient beings, then into the conviction of a universal BuddhaNature which encompasses all beings whether sentient or non-sentient, until finally it could even take the form of a 'sovereign all-creating mind'.27 But how.was this original purity or luminosity of the mind understood at first? It seems clear that 'original' must not be taken in any chronological sense. To be sure, the cosmo gonic myth told in the Aganna-Sutta (Dzgha-Nikiiya 27) does explain that in the beginning of each world-period the sentient beings are 'made of mind, feeding on rapture, providing their own light, moving about in the air, glorious' .28 However, these beings are not entirely free from karmic stains. The 'luminous' beings popUlating each new world at its initial stage stem from a preceding world, having 'survived' its destruction in the higher spheres of the many-layered Buddhist heavens. The greed which will then re-manifest among them stems likewise from the karmic tendencies still active in them. And since all worlds come into existence as a result of karmic formations rooted in ignorance (avijjiilavidyii), there never was a chronologically 'first' state which would have been free from any form of ignorance - a conclusion explicitly drawn in the Milinda Pafiha. 29 It is apparently safe to assume then that any 'original' purity of the mind from all stains (kleia) is not intended chronologically. In traditional Buddhist cosmology, we find no idea of a primordial purity which only later becomes stained through some cosmic 'fall'. But the question remains: how then should the 'original purity of the mind' be understood? The answer, I suggest, might have to do with the Buddhist soteriological framework in general and its teleological concretization in particular. The view that transitory existence in a transitory world is experienced as unsatisfactory (dulJkhaldukkha) may indicate that Buddhism presupposes a kind of natural, innate, or 'original' affinity towards nirvaIfa, which alone can eternally quench the otherwise everlasting 'thirst'. For Buddhism it is axiomatic that 'all beings are yearning for happiness and recoiling from pain' (Majjhima Nikiiya 94). And it seems to regard as similarly axiomatic the view that what beings are thereby really though unconsciously striving for is the true and deathless happiness of nirvaIfa. The 'original purity' of the mind could thus signify not only an inherent potential to attain nirvaIfa,30 but even more a sort of inbuilt or natural inclination 27

28 29 30

Thus the title of a Tibetan text translated in: E.K. Neumaier-Dargyay, The Sovereign All-Creating Mind: The Motherly Buddha. A Translation of the Kun byed rgyal po'i mdo (Albany, NY: SUNY 1992). See also Neumaier's essay (Chapter 3) in this book. See the recent translation provided in S. Collins, Nirvana and Other Buddhist Felicities, op. cit. (fn. 6), pp. 627-34, here p. 629. Cf. MilindaPaiiha II 3:1-3 (pp. 50-52). See in this connection the interesting discussion of a 'liberated dimension' in every sentient being as a precondition for the possibility to attain and enjoy nirval)a in C. Gowans, Philosophy of the Buddha (London-New York: Routledge 2003), pp. 154-6.

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towards nirvalfa. As long as nirvalfa is not attained, sentient beings will be roaIning about in smr}sara, Ci"eating by .their karmic impulses one san).saric universe after another. But the essence or true nature of their mind is to 'plunge into nirvalfa'. The karmic stains are therefore something 'exterior' or adventitious. To remove these and 'purify' the mind would stand for the gradual realization of one's true destination. The' originality' of the pure mind, I suggest, does not lie in the past, however remote, but in the future. Its meaning is radically teleological. The impact of this interpretation on the whole issue of how to understand 'creation' will be addressed explicitly later.

Transcategoriality My third and final presupposItIon regards the question of whetlIer ultimate transcendent reality is to be understood as being personal or non-personal. The more serious forms of Buddhist-Christian dialogue, from their beginnings in the midtwentieth century up until today, have repeatedly centred upon this question, and significant progress has been made. I take it for granted, then, that for both traditions transcendent reality is ultimately ineffable or, to take up a terminological suggestion from John Hick, 'transcategorial' .31 It is neither personal nor non-personal, in the sense that personal and impersonal concepts of the ultimate have only metaphorical value and should not be misunderstood as immediate descriptions or definitions. 'Nirvana,' says Nagasena in the Milinda Paiiha, 'has nothing similar to it. By no metaphor, or explanation, or reason, or argument can its form, or figure, or duration, or measure be made clear.'32 Or - to pick but one other random eXaIDple out of a multitude of possible quotations - the dharmakaya is - according to Asariga 'characterized by inconceivability, [ ... J because it cannot be compared to anything, and because it is beyond the scope of intelligent knowing' .33 At the SaIDe time, however, 'nirvana ... is perceptible to the mind'34 or 'the purity of suchness is to be known by a personal realization', as Nagasena and Asariga say.35 Thus the ultimate has qualities which can indeed be expressed, but these qualities refer to the human experience of the ultimate, and therefore only indirectly or metaphorically to the ultimate in itself. The metaphors employed by Buddhism are primarily of an impersonal kind. According to the Milinda Paiiha, for example, nirvalfa is pure like a lotus, cooling and thirst-quenching like water, healing like medicine, mighty and boundless like the great ocean, life-giving like food, immovable and 31 Cf. J. Hick, Dialogues in the Philosophy ofReligion (Houndmills: Palgrave 2001), pp. 76-89. 32 Milinda Paiiha IV 8:61 (p. 316). The Questions of King Milillda, Part II (fn. 10), p. 186. 33 Mahiiyiinasa l71 graha X, in The Summary of the Great Vehicle by Bodhisattva Asaitga, translated by J.P. Keenan, BDK English Tripitaka 46-IIl (Berkeley, CA.: Numata Centre for Buddhist Translation and Research 1992), p. 107. 34 Milinda Paiiha IV 7:16 (p. 270). The Questions of King Milinda, Part II (fn. 10), p. 106. 35 The Summary a/the Great Vehicle (fn: 33), p. 107.

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incomprehensible like space, satisfying every desire like a wish-fulfilling gem, and so on. 36 Christianity harbours a great tradition of negative theology, affirming that it is impossible for literally true propositions to express what god is, but only what god is not. Thomas Aquinas (1225-74), for example, asserts: Now, in considering the divine substance, we should especially make use of the method of remotion. Por, by its immensity, the divine substance surpasses every form that our intellect reaches. Thus we are unable to apprehend it by knowing what it is. Yet we are able to have some knowledge by knowing what it is notY

God, says Aquinas, cannot be defined38 and all our positive descriptions of god must be understood as having only analogical validity.39 I do not want to say that 'nirval).a', 'dharmakaya' and 'god' are all the same. They are not. They are different concepts whose meaning derives from their respective contexts, which are themselves no less different. But their difference inheres in their different ways of indicating, and their different forms of experiencing, the same ultimate reality. While this ultimate reality is in itself ineffable - and is affirmed as such in both Buddhism and Christianity - the different 'names' and 'descriptions' are 36

Cf. Milinda PaRha IV 8:65-75. For a comprehensive overview on the attributes of nirvana in the PiiliCanon, cf. C. Chandrkaew, Nibbana: The Ultimate Truth of Buddhism (Bangkok: Mahachula Buddhist University 1982). 37 Summa contra Gentiles I 14. 5t Thomas Aquinas, On the Truth of the Catholic Faith: Summa contra Gentiles, Book One: God, translated by A. Pegis (New York: Image Books, repr. 1961), p. 96. 38 Cf. Summa Theologiae I 3:5; Summa contra Gentiles I 24 and 25. 39 Cf. Summa Theologiae 113: 1-5; Summa contra Gentiles I 32-4. Paul Williams is thoroughly off track when he renders Aquinas's approach to God as 'apophatic as regards our natural reasoning, but firmly cataphatic when God is seen by means of the revelation that comes through Christ, who is God Himself. Thus while we know God exists, we know of God's nature (as Trinitarian, for example) through God actually corning to us, not through our natural reasoning.' P. Williams, 'Aquinas Meets the Buddhists: Prolegomenon to an Authentically Thomas-ist Basis for Dialogue', Modern Theology 20, 2004, 91-121, p. 99. Aquinas does indeed hold that through revelation we receive more propositional information about god than can be acquired by reason alone. But the revealed 'information' is nevertheless still expressed in human words and concepts, and is therefore by no means exempt from the limitations due to the fact that all human concepts are framed in relation to created realities and can therefore only apply analogically to the creator. Revelation therefore does not obviate negative or apophatic theology Which, according to the theological tradition, surpasses cataphatic or 'positive' theology and not, as Williams thinks, the other way round. Hence Aquinas explicitly states that 'by the revelation of grace in this life we do not know of God what He is, and thus are united to Him as to one unknown' ('per revelationem gratiae in hac vita non cognoscamus de Deo quid est, et sic ei quasi ignoto conjungamur', Summa Theologiae I 12,13 ad I), or 'in this. life, we cannot know the essence of God as it is in itself, but we know it according as it is represented in the perfections of creatures; and it is thus that the names imposed by us signify it' (,essentiam Dei in haec vita cognoscere non possumus secundum quod in se est: sed cognoscimus earn secundum quod repraesentatur in perfectionibus craturam. Et sic nomina a nobis imposita earn significant.' Summa Theologiae I 13, 2 and 3). English translations from A. Pegis, Introduction to St. Thomas Aquinas (New York: Random House 1948), pp. 95, 102.

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to be taken as metaphors or analogies reflecting the different forms under which the ultimate is experienced. While in Christianity this experience is primarily undergone and expressed in personal terms, Buddhist forms of experiencing the ultimate are primarily undergone and expressed in impersonal terms. But there are 'impersonal expressions in Christianity also, as there are personal expressions in Buddhism. While the most influential impersonal term for god in Christianity is Being itself (= ipsum esse, thus not: a being), the most powerful personal expression of the ultimate in Buddhism is the Buddha, the perfected person of the fully enlightened one, To take the Buddha as an expression of the ultimate is perhaps most developed in the doctrine of the 'Three Buddha Bodies' (trikiiya), which understands the human and celestial Buddhas (that is the Buddhas of nirmiilJakaya and sal1Jbhogakiiya) as manifestations of the dharmakaya. And already the Pali canon declares nirval).a to be 'visible' in and through the life of an enlightened one. 40 Thus, there is a certain complementarity of personal and impersonal representations of ultimate reality, and as long as it is clear that the ultimate in itself transcends both forms of representation, its characterization either in personal or in impersonal terms does not constitute an irreconcilable contradiction. If Buddhism shares with Christianity the belief in a transcendent reality and, of course, the belief in that reality's soteriological relevance, and if, further, the question of its personal or impersonal nature can be resolved along the lines I have suggested, have we then isolated the idea of ultimate reality as the creator of the universe as the real obstacle? Is this the final, decisive barrier between Buddhism and Christianity, the one true point of controversy, where they irretrievably drift apart? According to Christian Lindtner Buddhism and the belief in a creator are mutually exclusive: The acceptance of engi [= pratz-tyasamutpiidal excludes the notion of a Creator of any kind - in any kind of Buddhism. 41

As a first step of tackling this question let us look once again at the major Buddhist criticism of belief in a divine creator.

40

41

Cf. Anguttara Nikiiya 3:56. C. Lindtner, 'Madhyamaka Causality', Borin: Vergleichellde Studien zur japanischen Kultur 6, 1999,

37-77,p.54.

Chapter 9

Buddhist Criticism and Its Motives

Within the context of Western criticism of religion, it has become common to distinguish various types of anti-theistic arguments. This can also be useful in structuring the various forms of Buddhist critique of creator-beliefs.! Basically, there are three groups of arguments: a first group endeavours to show that the existence of a creator-god cannot be proven, that is, it criticizes pro-theistic arguments. A second group tries to refute the assumption that there is a divine creator, arguing that a creator's existence is incompatible with various features of the world as we experience it. Finally, a third group of arguments adopts a pragmatic approach, pointing out that belief in a divine ·creator is dysfunctional, that it is either irrelevant and superfluous or even harrnfu1. 2 I will now examine each of these three groups.

Refutation of Pro Arguments If one intends to disprove the existence of a creator-god, the first step will be to engage in critical discussion with those who claim the contrary, namely that the existence of a creator can be demonstrated by conclusive proofs. India, like the West, has a considerable record of developing arguments for the existence of god,3 and thus The following survey is obviously still highly eclectic and by no means comprehensive. However, it shows that there are some major types of arguments which continually reappear in Buddhist critiques. See also Steinkellner' s essay in Chapter 1 of this book. 2 In the West during the last century, a fourth group of arguments has arisen as well. Here, the effort is to show that the concept of 'god' is meaningless because, as the criticism claims, it is impossible to define either the conditions of an empirical verification or those of a falsification. Hence, the concept lacks factual meaning and becomes unintelligible, and is thns incapable of being either true or false. I am not aware·of any traditional Buddhist critique of a divine creator which involves a similar type of argument. However, Gunapala Dharmasiri has employed this type of criticism, applying it to the interpretation of certain canonical statements. Cf. G. Dharmasiri, A Buddhist Critique of the Christian Concept of God (Antioch, CA: Golden Leaves, rev. edn 1988), pp. 184-234. 3 However, apart from a few exceptions, formal arguments for the existence of god have been developed only in the Nyaya- or Nyaya-Vaise?ika-school. Cf. G. Oberhammer, 'Zum Problem des Gottesbeweises in der Indischen Philosophie', Numen 12, 1965, pp. 1-34; G. Chemparathy, 'The Isvara doctrine of Prasastapada', Vishveshvaranand lndological Journal 6, 1968, pp. 65-87; E. Steinkellner, 'Die Literatur des tilteren Nyaya', Wiener Zeitschrijt flir die Kunde SUd- und Ostasiens 5, 1961, pp. 149-62. For the later, more elaborate arguments of Udayana, see G. Chemparathy, An Indian Rational Theology: Introduction to Udayana's Nyiiyakusumiiiijali (Vienna: Indologisches Institut der Universittit Wien 1972). For immediate reactions of Nyaya philosophers to Dharmaklrti's critique, see H. Krasser, Sankaranandas jsvariipiikarGl.!Gsank~epa. Tea 2: Annotierte Ubersetzung und Studie zur Auseinandersetzung Uber die Existenz Gottes (Vienna: Verlag der Osterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 2002), pp. 56-142.

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a number of Buddhist writers were engaged in counter-argumentation. Today, however, Christian theologians have to a large extent abandoned the fonner claim that the existence of god can be established beyond rational doubt. Yet to concede that god's existence cannot be proven does not entail the conclusion that' god would not exist. It only entails that if god exists, god's existence is not such that we could attain infallible knowledge of it. The Buddhist insistence that the existence of a divine creator cannot be demonstrated will therefore meet with considerable consent from Christians, and does not constitute a major disagreement. Nevertheless, it is rewarding to look at the Buddhist critique of pro arguments because this reveals how, why and what land of creator-concept was opposed. Perhaps the most famous and influential refutations of the existence of a divine creator were fonnulated by Dharmakirti (seventh century CE).4 Among his targets is the so-called 'argument from design', whereby it is argued that human artifacts (pots, for instance) exhibit a design, and thus a designer can be inferred as their creator (in this case, a potter); similarly, the world exhibits a design, and thus god can be inferred as its designer/creator. Dharmaklrti objects that it is not established that the world is designed in a fashion similar to that employed in the making of human artifacts. The imputed similarity is simply too vague, and therefore insufficient. Fire can be inferred from smoke, but not from any kind of grey substance. Or from the fact that both an anthill and a pot result from some manipulation of mud, it does not follow that the anthill is created by a potter. 5 On the other hand, admits Dharmaklrti, Buddhists do not dispute that the world has an intelligent or mental origin. Dharmaklrti's commentators have taken this admission to mean that the world is the product of karma, and therefore the result of mental activity.6 Thus, the real dispute regarding the 'argument from design' is not whether the world is created by mind, but whether it is the product of a single divine mind, or of the mental karmic activity attributable to many individuals, both singly and collectively. A similar refutation of the 'argument from design' had already been presented by Bhavaviveka (sixth century). Bhavya also admits an 'intelligent' source of the world. However, this cannot be the pennanent, immutable god of the theists, but only the karmic fonnations (sal1}skiiras) of the sentient beings, the origin of which lies in ignorance (avidyii): 4

Dharmaklrti's arguments were frequently quoted, commented on and further developed by later Buddhist thinkers, as for example by SUbhagupta (eighth century), Devendrabuddhi (seventh century), Dharmottara (eighth century), Santaraksita (eighth century), Kamalasila (eighth century),. Sarikaranandana (tenth/eleventh century), Jiiinasrimitra (tenth/eleventh century), Ratnak1rti (tenth/eleventh century), Prajiiakaragupta (tenth century?), Manorathanandin (?, before 1200), Mok~iikaragupta (eleventh/twelfth century), and so on. 5 Prama'!avarttika II 10-13. Text and (some) commentaries in R. Jackson, Is Enlightenment Possible? Dharmakirti and rGyal tshab rje on Knowledge, Rebirth, No-Self and Liberation (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion 1993), pp. 198-202; H. Krasser, Sa,!karanandas jsvariipiikara,!asa;,k~epa, Teil II, op. cit. (fn. 3), pp. 33-4l. See also R. Jackson, 'Atheology and Buddhalogy in Dharmakirti's Pramanavarttika', Faith and Philosophy 16, 1999, pp. 472-505. . 6 See Jackson, Is Enlightenment Possible?, op. cit. (fn. 5), p. 199; H. Krasser, Sankaranandas jsvariipiikaranasa;,k~epa, Teil II, op. cit. (fn. 3), pp. 37f, 246 and 271f.

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Therefore we maintain that avidya is the 'God' that creates the karma of the san,skaras, and the sal1!skaras are the 'God' that establishes the world. 7 Moreover, argues Bhavya, the production of worlds is always the result of preceding karma, and thus sal1Jsiira is without beginning in time. This excludes the possibility of any initial creation by a divine creator at some first moment. 8 Further, if a god is thought to be an excellent being, then god's very existence must itself be the result of karmic merit, for in what sense could we otherwise speal< of god's perlections? Hence, a being of such an excellent state and moral perfection, as it is assumed for god, cannot be regarded as an independent or uncreated being. 9 A further target of the Buddhist critics is the so-called 'cosmological argument', or certain versions of it. According to one such version, the world has a divine creator precisely because the things of the world do not exist and act continuously. Thus, it can be inferred that the principles which govern the world (like karma) and the primordial matter from which the world is made (according to some Hindu conceptions, in particular Nyaya) need a divine agent who activates them. lo (One could see this argument as an Indian version of the well-known Western argument from movement.) Dharmakirti replies that this would inevitably presuppose a change in god's nature. For as long as a thing does not exist, or is in a state of latency, god would be a non-cause with regards to that thing, and god would change into a cause as soon as the respective thing is brought into existence. Such a change would contradict the presupposed permanence or immutability of the divine creator. Moreover, a cause is identified as a cause of a given effect only because of the presence of the cause when the effect is brought about and because of its absence when the effect is absent. This again cannot pertain to god, for it follows from the idea of god's permanence that god is never absent, and hence cannot be designated as a cause.!l The premise and conclusion of Dharmaklrti' s refutation is therefore that: ... things that arise successively cannot be accepted to arise from a permanent [entity]. [.. ] God ... is not [a cause], because He does not change ... 12 But what if god is postulated not as the cause of particular changes or movements, but of the general fact that things have their own efficacy? Dharmaklrti' s response to this mixture of cosmological and teleological argumentation is that this would involve an Madhyamakahrdayavrtti (3:222). Translation from C. Lindtner, 'Madhyamaka Causality', Horin: Vergleichende Studien zur japanischen Kultur 6,1999,37-77, p. 67. 8 Madhyamakahrdayavrtti (9:96-8). Cf. Lindtner, 'Madhyamaka Causality', op. cit. (fn. 7), p. 69. 9 Madhyamakahrdayavrtti (9:99-101). Cf. Lindtner, 'Madhyamaka Causality', op. cit. (fn. 7), pp. 69f. 10 Cf. R. Jackson, 'Atheology and Buddhalogy', op. cit. (fn. 5), pp. 480ff; H. Krasser, Sankaranandas Isvariipiikarm.1Gsahkeepa, Teil II, op. cit. (fn. 3), pp. 33ff. II Cf. Pramiinaviirttika II 21 and 23. 12 Pramiil.1Gviirttika II 8e-9a, 28ab. R. Jackson, Is Enlightenment Possible?, op. cit. (fn. 5), pp. 195 and 212. Cf. R. Jackson, 'Atheology and Buddhalogy', op. cit. (fn. 5), pp. 48lf. 7

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unnecessary and illegitimate multiplication of causes. It would be entirely arbitrary to postulate a further cause in addition to those causes which already provide a sufficient explanation of a certain effect. If it were admissible to postulate further causes, says Dharmakirti, then a wound and its healing would not only be explained by the weapon which caused the wound and by the medicine which caused the healing, but in addition by some 'unconnected post' which could be claimed to be another cause for both. Consequently: There would be an infinity of causes For every [result], because then [it would be acceptable] to think That when some [causes] are [the cause] of some [result] [Some things] other than those are the causes of that. 13

As a further consequence of such an illegitimate multiplication of causes, it could not be determined when and where the infinite regress of causes should end - why should it stop with god? Already the Siilistamba,fikii, a scripture ascribed to Niigiirjuna (second/third century CE), argues: If God is [seen] as the cause (hetu) ofthe Creation, duration and destruction of the world, Then it is also necessary to mention the cause Of his birth, duration and destruction. l4

Or, more simply, in the Shih-erh-men-Iun (Dviidiisadviirusiistra X): .. , if God created all living beings, who created Him? [., ,J If God is self-existent without causal conditions, then all sentient beings should [in principle] be self-existent. l5

In other words, if god's existence does not require any further causal explanation, why then should it not be acceptable that the causal chain which constitutes the world does not require any further causal explanation? The objection that the cosmological argument leads to an unnecessary replication of causes is also found in Vasubandhu' s (fourthJfifth century) famous and influential Abhidharmakosabhii~ya (commentary following 2:64). Vasubandhu gives the argument an illuminating twist. If, says Vasubandhu, a theist admits that the causes of the world have their own genuine efficacy, but would further: pretend that these causes serve God as auxiliaries, this then is no more than a piolls affirmation, for we do not maintain any activity of a cause besides the activity of the so-called secondary causes, Furthermore, God would not be 13

Pramal,1Qvarttika II 24, Jackson, Is Enlightenment Possible?, op, cit. (fn, 5), pp, 21Of, Cf. Jackson, 'Atheologyand Buddhalogy', op, cit. (fn, 5), pp, 482f. 14 Translated in Lindtner, 'Madhyamaka Causality', op, cit. (fn, 7), p, 59. 15 Hsueh-li Cheng, Nagarjuna's Twelve Gate Treatise (Shih-erh-men-lun) (Dordrecht: D, Reidel 1982), pp, 97 and 99.

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sovereign with regard to auxiliary causes, since these cooperate in the production of the effect through their own efficacy.!6

This objection implies not only that a divine creator must be absolutely sovereign, but further, and more importantly, that god's sovereignty would be incompatible with a genuine efficacy of the 'auxiliary' or 'secondary causes'. Ifwe keep in mind that in a Buddhist context these 'secondary causes' are not only insentient beings but above all sentient ones, then the point behind Vasubandhu's objection is that any postulation of a divine meta-cause would seriously jeopardize the genuine efficacy and responsibility of human agents. Thus, through this prima facie ontologically reasoned argument shines the fundamental soteriological interest of Buddhism which demands that human agents have real (even though limited) freedom and are themselves responsible for their deeds and the respective results. This motive reappears in a decisive way in the next group of Buddhist arguments.

Arguments Against the Existence of a Divine Creator This group of arguments does not seek to invalidate theistic pro arguments as such, but tries instead to show that the existence of a divine creator is unlikely or even impossible because it is incompatible with the world as we experience it. Basically, there are three types of arguments which repeatedly appear in Buddhist scriptures and in the treatises of classical Buddhist thinkers: the argument from the problem of evil, the argumentfrom human responsibility, and the argumentfrom ontology. The Argumentfrom the Problem of Evil He who has eyes can see the sickening sight; Why does not Brahma set his creatures right? If his wide power no limit can restrain, Why is his hand so rarely spread to bless? Why are his creatures all condemned to pain? Why does he not to all give happiness? Why do fraud, lies, and ignorance prevail? Why triumphs falsehood - truth and justice fail? I count your Brahma one th 'unjust among. Who made a world in which to shelter wrong.!7

Outcries like this one from the Piili canon not only articulate a major reason for the Buddhist rejection of belief in a divine creator, but reverberate countless times throughout the Western history of mind as well. Like their Western counterparts, Buddhists have argued that if there is a morally perfect creator with unrestricted 16 Abhidharmakosabhasyam (fn. 11), Vol. I, pp. 307f. 17 lataka No. 543. Ny~naponika: Buddhism and the God-Idea, The Wheel Publication 47 (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society 1981), p. 24.

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power, the alleged creation should reflect the creator's goodness. If it does not, god is either not good or not almighty, and thus, lacking essential divine attributes, cannot be the god the theists believe in. Alternatively, there could simply be no god at all. The first requirement - that the creation should mirror god's goodness - is argued on the basis of the Buddhist principle that in every causal relationship there must be some similarity between cause and effect. 18 But a similarity between the alleged goodness of god and the state of the world cannot be discerned. Thus, if the effect (the world) is not similar to the cause (a supposedly good creator), then it might be the other way round: the cause might be similar to the effect, the creator being as evil as the world. Hence, Vasubandhu can exclaim with sarcastic bitterness: ... do you say that God finds satisfaction in seeing the creatures that he has created in the prey of all the sufferings of existence, including the tortures of the hells? Homage to this God! Well said, in truth, is the popular stanza, 'He is called Rudra because he burns, becallse he is excited, ferociolls, terrible, an eater of flesh, blood and marrow.' 19

Such a god, says Bhavaviveka, would himself deserve to be 'roasted ... in hell' .20 The typically Buddhist soteriological concern can be felt behind the statement of the Siilistamba S~ltra, that the adoration of a god, who is responsible for a world like this, would in fact be the adoration of an evil being, and would thus be in serious conflict with basic ethical norms. As a result, adorers of such a highly suspect god might themselves be transformed into similarly morally suspect people. More bluntly, they might become 'even more beastly than beasts' .21 The Argument from Human Responsibility The evils of this world, which Buddhists claim to be incompatible with the goodness of a divine creator, not only encompass 'plague, poison, disease', but also 'robbers, fornicators, thieves, adulterers, murderers, liars, drunkards' and so on. 22 ,If there really were such a being as a divine creator, all responsibility - including the responsibility for human moral failure - would rest with god alone: If there exists some lord all-powerful to fulfill In every creature bliss or woe, and action good or ill, That lord is stained with sin. Man does but work his will 23 18

For example Shih-erh-men-Iun X. Cf. Cheng, Niigiirjuna's Twelve Gate Treatise, op. cit. (fn. 15), pp. 96f; Madhyamakahrdayavrtti 9:101-13. Cf. Lindtner, 'Madhyamaka Causality', op. cit. (fn. 7), pp.

19

Abhidhannakosabhii~ya

70-73.

20 21 22 23

..

following 2:64d (as fn. 11, p. 307). Vasubandhu is alluding to the literal meaning of 'Rudra' (the 'terrific') and quoting the Satarudriya. The same is repeated by Bhavaviveka in Madhyamakahrdayavrtti 9: 109. Cf. Lindtner, 'Madhyamaka Causality' (fn. 7), p. 72. Madhyamakahrd~yavrtt; 9: 103. Cf. Lindtner, 'Madhyamaka Causality', op. cit. (fn. 7), p. 70. Cf. Siilistambatlkii. d. Lindtner, 'Madhyamaka Causality', op. cit. (fn. 7), p. 59. Ibid. liitaka No. 528. Nyanaponika, Buddhism and the God-Idea, op. cit. (fn. 17), p. 23.

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This critique is llot meant to be merely negative. Its primary point is not to cast blame upon an alleged creator, but rather to defend human freedom and responsibility against the idea of divine determination regarded as a more or less inevitable implication of the creator doctrine. 24 This is well expressed in an important passage from Anguttara Nikaya 3:61, which is worth quoting in full: Monks, there are these three grounds of sectarian tenets, which, though strictly questioned, investigated, and discussed by wise men, persist in a traditional doctrine of inaction. What three? There are certain recluses and brahmins who teach thus, who hold this view: Whatsoever weal or woe or neutral feeling is experienced, all that is due to some previous action. There are other who teach: - Whatsoever weal or woe or neutral feeling is expelienced, all that is due to the creation of a Supreme Deity. Others teach that all such are uncaused and unconditioned. Now, monIcs, as to those recluses and brahmins who hold and teach the first of these views, I approach them and say: 'Is it true, as they say, that you worthy sirs teach that ... all is due to former action?' Thus questioned by me they reply: 'Yes, we do.' Then I say to them: 'So then, owing to a previous action, men will become murderers, thieves, unchaste, liars, slanderers, abusive, babblers, covetous, malicious, and perverse in view. Thus for those who fall back on the former deed as the essential reason there is neither desire to do, nor effort to do, nor necessity to do this deed or abstain from that deed. So then, the necessity for action or inaction not being found to exist in truth and verity, the term "recluse" cannot reasonably be applied to yourselves, since you live in a state of bewilderment with faculties unwarded.' Such, monlcs, is my first reasonable rebuke to those recluses and brahmins who thus teach, who hold such views. Again, monlcs, as to those recluses and brahmins who hold and teach the second of these views, I approach them and say: 'Is it true, as they say, that you worthy sirs teach that ... all this due to the creation of a Supreme Deity?' Thus questioned by me they reply: 'Yes, we do.' . Then I say to them: 'So then, owing to the creation of a Supreme Deity, men will become murderers, ... and perverse in view. Thus for those who fall back on the creation of a Supreme Deity as the essential reason there is neither desire to do, nor effort to do, nor necessity to do this deed or abstain from that deed. So then, the necessity for action or inaction not being found ... with faculties unwarded.' Such, monks, is my second reasonable rebuke to those recluses and brahmins who thus teach, who hold such views. Again, monlcs, as to those recluses and brahmins who hold and teach thus: Whatsoever weal or woe or neutral feeling is experienced, all that is uncaused 24

In his discussion of this verse from the liitakas, Arthur Herman has pointed out that the idea of an omnipotent creator-god excludes human free will, and thus moral responsibility. if 'God has preplanned all events in the world', as seems to be implied by the quotation. Cf. A.L. Herman, An Introduction to Buddhist Thought: A Philosophic History of Indian Buddhism (Lanham, MD: University Press of America 1983), pp. 219-21.

Towards a Buddhist-Christian Theology a/Creation

and unconditioned, - I approach them and say: 'Is it true, as they say, that you worthy sirs teach that ... all this is uncaused and unconditioned?' Thus questioned by me they reply: 'Yes, we do.' Then I say to them: 'So then, owing to no cause or condition at all, m"n will b"come murder"rs, ... and p"rverse in view. Thus for those who fall back on the uncaused and unconditioned as the essential, there is neither desire to do, nor effort to do, nor necessity to do this deed or abstain from that deed. So then, the necessity for action or inaction not being found ... with faculties unwarded.' Such, monks, is my third reasonable rebuke to those recluses and brahmins who hold and teach these views. And these are these three grounds of sectarian tenets which, though strictly questioned, investigated, and discussed by wise men, persist in a traditional doctrine of inaction. 25

Four things are important about this passage: first, the Buddha rejects belief in a creator-god because (or perhaps only 'insofar as', or merely 'if?) it is at variance with the idea of human freedom and responsibility.26 Second, the affirmation of freedom with respect to human actions and hence of responsibility for their results is essential for the path of salvation, thus those who do not affirm these cannot be rightly regarded as 'recluses'. Third, if freedom and responsibility are denied, even if only by implication, such a doctrine is spiritually harmful. And fourth, this critique is advanced not only against belief in a creator-god, but equally so against belief in a deterministic efficacy of karma?7 as distinct from a conception of karma as a dispositional mechanism, allowing for future free and responsible action, and thus for spiritual change. Also targeted here are positions which would deny any connection or consistent relationship between deeds and their karmic results (a critique presumably directed against the materialists, the Carvakas). The three rejected worldviews can thus be reduced to two - more precisely, two forms of determinism and one form of nihilism. Common to all three is the defence of a worldview which guarantees human freedom and, by means of a moral world order, human responsibility for one's own future development. Clearly, the aim is to remind human beings of their responsibility, encourage them to take it up, and to refute any world view that would entail the opposite. 25

26 27

Ahguttara Nikaya 3:61. The Book of Gradual Sayings (Aizguttara Nikaya), Vol. 1, translated by F.L. Woodward (London: Pali Text Society, repr. 1979), pp. 157-9. The whole passage reappears in a poetical adaptation in Asvagosa' s Buddhacarita 16: 16-24. See also Buddhacarita 9:53: 'If God is the cause of all that happens, what is the use of man's striving?' Nyanaponika, Buddhism and the God-Idea, op. cit. (fn. 17), p. 21. 'Das Zentrum der Tat und die Grundlage ihrer moralischen Wertigkeit ist [ ... J der bewuBte Wille, die Intention oder Absicht (cetana) . ... Dies impliziert, daB die Handlung als ein freier, vom Menschen zu verantwortender Akt verstanden wird. Der Buddha weist deterministische Versionen der Karmalehre, namentlich die der AjIvikas, mit allem Nachdruck zurUck. Die Lehre, daB die im Sinne von Cetana bewuBt gewollte und intendierte Tat nicht ihrerseits eine karmische Folge friiherer Taten oder, in buddhistischer Terminologie, nicht ein bloBes resultat "karmischer Reifung" (kammavipaka) sein konne, erlangt im Theravada-Buddhismus geradezu kanonische Geltung. Der Buddha postuliert die Moglichkeit der freien Entscheidung als Voraussetzung religiosen und sittlichen Strebens und speziell als Bedingung der Moglichkeit des von ihm gelehrten Weges.' W. Halbfass, Kanna und Wiedergeburt im indischen Denken, op. cit. (fn. 3), pp. 102f.

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The Buddhist contention that the existence of a divine creator would preclude human responsibility and a just moral order, hence making the path to salvation futile, is explicitly stated in Shih-erh-men-lun X: ... if God were the maker, good, evil, suffering and happiness would come without being made [by man]. But this would destroy the principle of the world [that men do good and obtain reward, and do evil and receive punishment]. The practice of an ascetic life and Brahmanic deeds would be in vain. 2s

Creation by god, so the Buddhist critique, would entail that humans are determined in everything they do. They could not influence their own spiritual development, and their deeds would have no impact on their eventual salvation or on the continuation of suffering in sarI).sara. Both suffering and salvation would be caused by god alone, and would be inflicted or bestowed as god pleases and on whom god pleases. 29 This view is rooted in the Buddhist understanding of san;tsara and karma. As has been pointed out in connection with traditional Buddhist cosmology, the karma of each individual is not only the reason for the particular form of its rebirth (whether that individual is reborn in one of the hells, or as a demon, an animal, a human or a celestial being), but is also the cause that leads to the re-evolution of the respective san;tsaric realms after the destruction of the preceding world. The idea of the world and of the particular state of each individual in it as the result of divine creation was thus understood by Buddhists as being inevitably at variance with their own idea of the world as a creation of just karmic. retribution. For if divine creation would be in accordance with the law of karma, then 'god' would either be only another word for karma (a possibility which Bhavya repeatedly mentions 30 ), or god would function as a kind of redundant and superfluous cause unconnected to the effect, since the effect had already been sufficiently explained by karma - a further example of the unnecessary and arbitrary multiplication of causes criticized by Dharmakirti and others. Moreover, if divine creation is understood as an alternative to creation through karma, then the creator would directly interfere with, violate, overrule or simply annul the law of karma, along with the implications of freedom, responsibility . and justice the law carries. 31 28 29

Cheng, Nagarjul1a's Twelve Gate Treatise, op. cit. (fn. 15), pp. 98f. Cf. Salistamba Siitra: 'beautiful and ugly, ... , demons, goblins, sky-goers and the like; all those who kill others, good and evil, etc., and heaven (svarga) and liberation (apavarga), would all be 'created by the mere production of his will'. Lindtner, 'Madhyamalca Causality', op. cit. (fn. 7), pp. 58f; similarly Madhyamakahrdayavrtti 9:103: If god creates the evil-doer and the evil-doer would go to hell, 'then one would 'experi~nce the effect of something that one had not done!' Lindtner, 'Madhyamaka Causality', op. cit. (fn. 7), p. 70. 30 Cf. Madhyamakahrdayavrtti 3:222; 9:96. 31 The Buddhist Yogacarabhiimi and the theistic Nyaya S!ltra (IV 19ff) are both citing an argument for the existence of god based on the experience that people do not always seem to earn the results which they would karmic ally deserve, and thus the results are not due to karma but to god. Cf. G. Chemparathy, 'Two Early Buddhist Refutations of the Existence of lSvara as the Creator of the Universe', Wiener Zeitschriftfiir die Kunde S(id- und Ostasiel1s 12-13, 1968/69, 85-100, pp. SSf and 94f. The response given in the Nyaya S!ltra, however, is that god functions as the one who cooperates with the law of karma and thereby guarantees its efficiency which otherwise could not be expected.

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All this has a massive impact on the problem of evil as seen by traditional Buddhist thinkers. Bhavya claims that under theistic premises, the world would be deeply unjust. For either the world would be unjust because the varieties of existence and the inequality of individual fates are simply the product of divine creation, regardless of whether the particular fate and form of existence is morally deserved or not, such that some beings are unjustly rewarded and others unjustly punished,32 or some beings would suffer the results of their evil karma and others enjoy the fruits of their good karma - but still unjustly so, because tl}e actions which led to either good or bad results had been determined by god, and the beings were only acting out god's wil!.33 On Buddhist premises, however, the world is not unjust because humans are themselves responsible for their acts, and the fact that they exist in this or that saII).saric state or form is always, without beginning, the karmic result of their own former deeds, rather than being the result of a divine decree. If everything and everyone were created by god, one's situation would not be the fruit of what one has earned, but the result of what god has ordered. 34 Consequently, there would be neither any chance to strive for salvation, nor any motivation to do so, for everything would be in the hands of god, and not in the hands of responsible human agents. 35 Moreover, god's decrees could not be expected to be just, for otherwise god would follow the law of karma and thereby lose his sovereignty and independence by being subject to the law of karma. In that case, either the priority of karma over god would have to be admitted (and u'1ence karma be acknowledged as the real creator), or 'god' would once again become just another name for karmic creativity.36 Thus, on Buddhist premises, the world as it is - or better, as Buddhists think it is - is not unjust. Unjust would be a world which was produced and governed by divine decree instead of karma; this god would then automatically be the creator of an evil world! It follows that the Buddhist critique of a divine creator in the light of the problem of evil rests decisively on the Buddhist defence of human responsibility. This is the reason why Buddhists insist on a tertium non datur: the world and each individual's position in it are either the product of a divine creator or the result of karma. 37 Human 32 33

34 35 36 37

And this, says Bhavaviveka, is what the world looks like if karma is not taken into account (cf. M adhyamakahrdayav rtti 9: Ill). Cf. Madhyamakahrdayavrtti 9: 112. Lindtner, 'Madhyamaka Causality', op. cit. (fn. 7), 'pp. 72f. It seems to be the case that from a Buddhist perspective one of these two possibilities, or even both, are the inevitable result of any creation with a beginning in time. For this would probably already include differences in the beings or in their spiritual inclinations which are based neither on their own actual decisions, nor on former karma, and would therefore result from a divine decree which provides the beings with different starting situations. Cf. Madhyamakahrdayavrtti 9:98. Cf. Madhyamakahrdayavrtti 9:96-8, 113. Lindtner, 'Madhyamaka Causality', op. cit. (fn. 7), pp. 69 and 73. 'Cf. Salistamba S,ltra. Lindtner, 'Madhyamaka Causality', op. cit. (fn. 7), pp. 59f. Cf. Madhyamakahrdayavrtti 9:99-103. Lindtner, 'Madhyamaka Causality', op. cit. (fn. 7), pp. 70-72. These alternatives are particularly evident if - as is usually the case in Indian theistic thinking creation is not understood as being ex nihilo. Hence, if 'creation' primarily means the creation of diversity and its ordering, then the prior question is whether this ordering is of a karmic, that is, just, nature or not.

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freedom, responsibility, a just moral order of the universe and a salvation which is not arbitrarily granted or refused but worked out by free and responsible beings themselves, and hence in the reach of all, are possible only in a world which is the result of karma and not the product of a sovereign god - provided that the creative efficacy of karma is not itself misconstrued as a deterministic mechanism. The Argumentfrom Ontology

A further subset of Buddhist arguments against the existence of a creator denies the possibility that a god could create a world like ours, not because of its evils, nor to safeguard human responsibility, but rather in view of certain ontological features, these being its impermanence or temporal structure and its diversity. These features are held to be incompatible with the claim of creation by an immutable, eternal, omnipresent, omnipotent, simple and perfect creator. The major steps of the argument are neatly listed in Hsiian-tsang's (seventh ccentury CE) Ch' eng-wei-shilun 1:4 (Vijiiaptimatratasiddhiastra): A certain school holds that there is a Mahesvara God who is absolute, omnipresent, and eternal; and that he is the creator of all dharmas (i.e. phenomena). This theory is illogical. And why? (a) That which creates is not eternal; that which is not eternal is not omnipresent; that which is not omnipresent is not absolute. (b) If he is eternal and omnipresent, and complete with all kinds of capacities, he should, in all times and at all places, produce all of a sudden all dharmas (phenomena). (c) (If they say) that his creation depends upon desire and conditions, then they contradict their own doctrine of 'unique cause' .38

Clearly, the argument turns upon point (b), which appears in major early works of Buddhist scholasticism, as in the Mahavibha~a39, the Yogacarabhiirni 40 and the Abhidharmakoiabha~ya,41 and in a number of smaller writings. 42 It is repeated by Bhavaviveka43 as well as by Dharmakirti,44 in whose.::ritique of theistic arguments it plays a central role, as we have seen above, and was further developed by a number of 38

Translation taken from Nyanaponika, Buddhism and the God-Idea, op. cit. (fn. 17), pp. 24f. See also the slightly different translation in Three Texts on Consciouslless Only, translated by Francis H. Cook, BDK English Tripitaka 60-1, II, III (Berkeley, CA: Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research 1999), p. 20. 39 See the chapter by Ernst Steinkellner on 'Hindu Doctrines of Creation and Their Buddhist Critiques' in this volume. 40 Text in G. Chemparathy, 'Two Early Buddhist Refutations' ,op. cit. (fn. 31), p. 96. 41 Cf. Abhidhannakosabhiisya 2:64d. 42 For example, in the Siilistamba Siitra (cf. Undtner, 'Madhyamaka Causality', op. cit. (fn. 7), pp. 57-9), in the Bodhicittavivarana 6-9 (text in C. Undtner, Nagarjuniana. Studies ill the Writings and Philosophy of Niigiirjuna (Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag 1982), 184-217, pp. 187f), in the Shiherh-men-Iull X (cf. Cheng, Niigiirjul1as Twelve Gate Treatise, op. cit., fn. 15, pp. 97f). 43 Madhyamakahrdayavrtti 9: 106. Cf. Lindtner, 'Madhyamaka Causality', op. cit. (fn. 7), p. 71. 44 PramiilJaviirttika II 8e-9a, 28ab.

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subsequent Buddhist thinkers.45 The argument is complex: if the world has a beginning in time, then the creator would have changed from being a non-cause into a cause - and such a change contradicts divine immutability. The same holds with regard to the temporally finite existence of every single item in the world, for in the case of each entity which has a beginning and an end, the creator would change from 'not being its.creator' into 'being its creator' and into 'no longer being its creator'. Hence, the successive appearance and disappearance of all phenomena seems to be incompatible with the immutability of a divine creator. Similarly, if it is supposed that the creator has full knowledge of all events,then the temporal structure of events, their discontinuity and successiveness, would correspond to changes in the creator's awareness, which again contradicts his alleged immutability.46 So what would be the alternatives? From purely logical considerations, one would have to expect that if there were an eternal, immutable and simple cause of everything, the effect would be similar to the cause, that is, the creation should also be permanent, without beginning or end, without any change, and without internal diversification. Everything should be created 'in all times and at all places ... all of a sudden' . This is, of course, an absurd idea, which does not conform to the real world. Hence, if 'creation' means the making of a world like ours, one has to conclude that it cannot be the product of an immutable creator. To quote Dharmalillti once more: ... things that arise successively cannot be accepted to arise from a permanent [entity]. [ ... ] God ... is not [a cause], because He does not change ... 47

Most of the Buddhist thinkers discuss potential strategies as to how theists might reply to this objection. If the theist tries to abandon or modify the divine attribute of immutability, tlns would have disastrous consequences for other divine attributes usually regarded as indispensable, so that in the end the resulting god would no longer be identifiable as the single source and sovereign creator as conceived by theists. For one thing, any abandonment or modification of divine immutability would negatively affect divine permanence, insofar as permanence is understood as the unchanged and unchangeable self-identity of a simple divine being. Second, any lack of permanence would also affect divine omnipresence, for if god is not entirely the same at any time, he will neither be the same at any place. Third, a lack of divine immutability would nullify divine simplicity.48 Fourth, and most important, it would undermine god'.s absoluteness or independence, that is god's unconditionedness, 45 46 47 48

For example, in Siintideva's Bodhicaryiivatiira 9:122-6; Siintaraksita's Tattva-Samgraha 2:76ff Cf. Pramiil!aviirttika II 8. . . Pramiinaviirttika II8e-9a, 28ab. R. Jackson, Is Enlightenment Possible?, op. cit. (fn. 5), pp. 195 and 212. Cf. Madhyamakahrdayavrtti 9: 105f.

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sovereignty and omnipotence, because god would be dependent on those factors which account for the changes in god. 49 Some Buddhist clitics assume that theists might be inclined to modify their claims concerning divine immutability. Bhavya suggests it might be understood not as total changelessness, but instead as an immutability or pennanence of god's nature. 50 Further, god's reason for creating a diversified, temporally structured world with some sort of causal autonomy, including particularly the karmic causality of sentient beings,5l might simply have been that god wished to do so. But then why should god have such a wish? What could be god's motives or reasons? Hardly ontological ones, for an omnipotent god, by definition, cannot be dependent on any causes or conditions which are not his own creation; otherwise god would not be the single cause of everything. 52 But if god himself gives his creatures their causal autonomy, thereby making himself dependent on the secondary or auxiliary causes and conditions which he created, what reason could he have for this? If god would create for the satisfaction of some desires of his own, which could not be satisfied otherwise, god would be subject to his own desires and thus neither be perfect nor sovereign. 53 Hence, according to Santideva (eighth century CE), the theist has to face the following dilemma: If he depends on a combination [of causes and conditions] then, again, God cannot be the [sole] cause .... If God acts against his will it [absurdly] follows that he is under the sway of another. But even if he acts as he likes he is still subject to [the whims and limitations of his] will!54

The Buddhist argument that a creator could have no meaningful reason for creating a chronologically ordered, a diversified and a causally autonomous world particularly as this argument is developed in Bhavaviveka' s Madhyamakahrdayavrtti 49

See, for example, Abhidharmakosabha'!ya 2:64d; Madhyamakahrdayavrtti 3:218; Bodhicmyavatara 9: 124-6; Tattva-Samgraha 6: 156. 50 Cf. Madhyamakahrdayavrtti 9: 107. 51 'The following argument 'might be urged: "God is not the only cause (of all things); in fact, what he does he does through the help of such auxiliary causes as merit and the rest God himself only being the efficient (controlling cause) cause. So that so long as merit and the rest are not there, the cause of things cannot be said to be present there in its efficient form".' Kamalasila's commentary on TattvaSai11graha 81-7. Nyanaponika, Buddhism and the God-Idea, op. cit. (fn. 17), p. 29. Similarly, already Abhidhannakosabhasya 2:64d. 52 Cf. Madhyamakahrdayavrtti 3:218; Bodhicaryavatara 9:124-6; or Kamalasila's Commentary on Tattva-Sm1Jgraha 2:81-7 (cf. Nyanaponika, Buddhism mId the God-Idea, op. cit. (fn. 17), pp. 28-31). Similarly, also in the Yogacarab/nlmi (cf. Chemparathy, 'Two Early Buddhist Refutations', op. cit., fn. 31, p. 96). 53 Cf. Abhidharmakosabhasya 2:64d. See also the formulation of this argument in A. Herman, The Problem of Evil and Indian Thought (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1976), pp. 265f: ' ... if God created the world, He did it for a purpose. If He had a purpose then He desired some goaL But if He desired something, then He was lacking something. But if He lacked something, then He's not perfect, i.e., wholly fulfilled.' 54 Bodhicaryavatara 9: 125f. Translation from Lindtner, 'Madhyamaka Causality', op. cit. (fn, 7), p. 76,

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(9:107-9)55 - seems to be a response to the well-known verses of Badarayalfa's Brahma SL"itra (II 1:32-6). Anticipating or perhaps citing Buddhist arguments these verses address the same problem: (32) [Objection] Brahman cannot be the cause of the world because to cause or create involves motives or purposes (and if Brahman has either He is imperfect). (33) [Reply] But as with men at times, so with God, creation is a mere 'sport' (filii). (34) Discrimination (treating beings unequally) and cmelty cannot be attributed to God, for He is aware of beings' Kalma; and the Scriptures say so. (35) If it is objected, that in the beginning there could have been no differences, and the Lord must then be responsible for the differences (good and evil) that came, then we counter, there is no beginning. (36) The beginninglessness of sallfsara is proven by reason, and found in Scripture. 56

The objection that any motive to create would contradict god's perfection (verse 32) is here given the famous answer that creation is undertaken as a kind of divine' sport' or 'play' (llIii). God is not seeking the fulfilment of any unsatisfied desires in this view, but his creative activity is rather a joyful expression of his overflowing goodness and fulness. 57 Bhavaviveka's disapproving reaction to this argument amounts to sarcastic mockery.58 First, Bhavya doubts if the lllii-argument would indeed make god independent. It would still seem that god 'depends on something else for having this sort of 'Joy'" .59 Then Bhavya makes a perhaps stronger point: Even though he plays he still ought to be responsible for the happiness of himself and others. A play that only pleases oneself is very hatmful to others. 60 And perhaps in Vasubandhu' s Abhidharmakosabhii~ya. Bhavya and Vasubandhu follow the same argumentational structure as Brahma S!ltra II 1:32-6: the objection that a creator cannot have a meaningful purpose; the idea of divine 'play' (li1il) or 'pleasure' (prlti); the objection that god would then have pleasure from the suffering of his creatures; the discussion of a possible defence through the ideas of karma and samsara under theistic premises. However, Vasubandhu, unlike Bhavya, does not mention the term "filii" and assumes that theists reject the idea of a beginningless world, which contradicts Brahma S!ltra II 1:35--6. A brief reference to the idea of divine li1ii is also made in the Shih-erh-men-lu/J X: ' ... if God is self-existent, He should need nothing. If He needs something, He should not be called self-existent. If He does not need anything, why did He [cause] change, like a small boy who plays a game, to make all creatures?' Cheng, Niigiirjuna's Twelve Gate Treatise, op. cit. (fn. 15), p. 97. 56 Translation from Herman, The Problem ofEvil and Indian Thought, op. cit. (fn. 53), pp. 265-80. 57 For Sankara' sand Ramanuja' s interpretation of creation as divine lilii, see ibid., pp. 267f. 58 Bhavaviveka follows closely the steps of the argument in theAbhidhamwkosabhii~ya. 59 Madhyamakahrdayavrtti 9: 107. Lindtner, 'Madhyamaka Causality', op. cit. (fn. 7), p. 7l. 60 Madhyamakahrdayav~tti 9:109. Lindtner, 'Madhyamaka Causality', op. cit. (fn. 7), p. 72. The same objection has been powerfully advanced by Arthur Herman: 'I am not responsible for the purposes in li1ii, for there are none. But I am responsible for the act that brings lilii about. ... I pull the wings and legs off a baby bird, as RICHARD BRANDT has said Navajo children do in their play. Someone says, What are you doing? and I say, playing. I haven't excused my act, only described it. ... Thus to describe God:s activity as li1ii is"to describe the play act from two possible points of view. From God's point of view, it is a description of a purposeless, aimless, play, without motives, without intentions. But from the. neighbor's point of view, from the suffering bird's point of view, lilii is fraught with 55

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Bhavya recalls that in god's creation animals spend thei! lives in fear of being devoured by others, inhabitants of hell are tortured in most cruel ways, and humans 'suffer through birth, old age, illness, death, sorrow, lamentations, pain and mental dissatisfaction' .61 Obviously then, the theist is suggesting that god 'becomes joyful' when he sees his creatures suffer. And Bhavya scoffs: 'Homage to the [God] without compassion who creates suffering for the world! It's blasphemy!'62 Thus, Bhavya's mockery of the Wel-argument is based on the problem ·of evil. However, if Bhavya is indeed reacting to the Brahma SLltra II 1:33, he must have been aware of verses 34--6, which defend god against the accusation of cruelty and injustice by explaining evils and differences through the law of karma. They even acknowledge the Buddhist claim that an explanation which rests upon the concept of karma requires the beginninglessness of sarJ.).sara to be consistent; otherwise the inequalities between beings at the beginning of the creation would not be the result of their own former deeds but would fall back on god's responsibility. The Buddhist reaction to this type of defence is threefold. First, they doubt that theists can indeed accept the idea of a beginnirrgless world, since creation would necessarily imply some chronologically first act by which the world was brought into being. 63 Second, they argue that a theistic admission of karma as the sufficient explanation for both the unequal fate of beings in the world and the existence of the world with its different sarJ.).siiric realms makes the assumption of a further cause, namely a creator-god, superfluous and arbitrary.64 Third, the way in which the theist would need to modify the god-idea thereby makes 'god' into just another name for karma. 65 But Bhavya also admits that if a theist does accept the karmic explanation of good and evil and still insists on a creator, the refutation may become difficult. 66 However, is Wei the only type of motivation which can be seen as compatible with a perfect creator? The Buddhists had to face a structurally similar objection regarding the activity of the Buddha, who after attaining enlightenment - a goal characterized by the canonical phrase 'done is what was to be done' - did not disappear from the world, as Mara the tempter tried to persuade him to do, but instead spent the remaining 45 years of his life actively proclaiming his teachings and establishing the community of his lay and monastic followers. Thus, Dharmakirti had to address the

61 62 63

64 65 66

effects and consequences that are undesirable, to say the least. lllii cannot be used to justify the results that follow from the act; lilii merely describes the act. The Vediintists have mistaken the description of llliifor ajustification of lilii.' A. Herman, The Problem ofEvil, op. cit. (fn. 53), pp. 268f. lvIadhyamakahrdayavrtti 9: 109. Lindtner, 'Madhyamaka Causality', op. cit. (fn. 7), p. 72. Ibid. This doubt is expressed by Vasubandhu (AbhidharmakosabhCi{ya 2:64d) and by Bhavya (lvIadhyamakahrdayavrtti 9:98). This is the answ~r give~ by Vasubandhu. This is suggested by Bhavya (lvIadhyamakahrdayavrtti 3:222, 9:96). lvIadhyamakahrdayavrtti 9:113. Perhaps a good example of this is furnished by the Nyaya thinker Udayana (tenth/eleventh century CE), who accepted the beginninglessness of san)sara and the uncreatedness of karma, and admitted further that the divine creator or demiurge orders every new world according to the karmic necessities of the souls. Cf. C. Chemparathy, An Indian Rational Theology (Vienna: Indologisches Institut der Universitat Wien 1972), pp. 138-40, 159-60.

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objection that the activities of the Buddha, his preaching and so on, demonstrate that the Buddha was not perfect (cf. Pramii~tavarttika II 142d).Dharmakirti responds that, first, the underlying assumption that silence or inactivity is a necessary sign of perfection is far from self-evident, and second, that the Buddha acted not out of any self-centred interest, which would indeed indicate a lack of perfection, but solely out of his perfect compassion for others (cf. Prainiir;aviirttika II 146, 281d-283). Could not Buddhists have similarly regarded compassion as an acceptable motive for t.'1e creation of the universe? The Siilistamba!ikii emphasizes that a creator-god should indeed be perfect in compassion;67 the reality of suffering in this world contradicts however the postulation that it was created out of compassion. 68 And Bhavya, as we have seen, accuses god of being without compassion if he created suffering. In a somewhat more expanded fOrID the topic is taken up by Santarak~ita (eighth century CE): If he 69 does it7° through compassion, then he should make the world absolutely

happy. When he is found to have created people beset with misery, poverty, sorrow and other troubles, where can his compassion be perceived? Further, inasmuch as, prior to creation, the objects of compassion would not be there, there could not be even that compassion ... 71

And Kamalaslla (eighth century CE) comments: Merciful persons do not seek for such causes as bring about suffering, because the sole motive behind their actions consists in the desire to remove the suffering of others 72

If, however, says Kamalaslla, god 'makes people happy or unhappy in accordance with their destiny, in the shape of merit and demerit' , god would depend on the law of karma, so that 'the creation of the world itself might be attributed to that on which he is dependent; and in that case he would cease to be the cause' .73 Once again it can be seen how the problem of evil and the conviction that the problem of evil will vanish only if the creator of the universe is karma rather than god co-operate in the Buddhist refutation of the belief in divine creation. So when it comes to the question of whether a divine creator could have a meaningful purpose for creatirig a world like ours, a world of chronological sequence and internal diversification rather than something immutable and homogeneous, the Buddhists' argument from ontology falls back upon their fundamental interest in soteriology! This is true also for another aspect of this argument. If the world were 67 68 69 70 71 72 73

Cf. Lindtner, 'Madhyamaka Causality', op. cit. (fn. 7), p. 60. Cf. ibid. pp. 59f. The pUn/sa, but - as Santaraksita says - the critique is equally applicable to god. Creating the world. . Tattva-Samgraha 6: 157ff. Nyanaponika, Buddhism and the God-Idea, op. cit. (fn. 17), pp. 3lf. Ibid., p. 32. Ibid.

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created by god,· one would not only have to conclude that god created suffering (if 'god' is not just a different word for karma), but also that, due to the principle of similarity between cause and effect, suffering would be as permanent and unchangeable as its divine creator. But if suffering were permanent, there would be no hope of ever overcoming it. Liberation would be impossible.7 4

Pragmatic Arguments A third group of arguments discernible in the Buddhist critiques of belief in divine creation is of a pragmatic nature. However, it is important to note that these pragmatic arguments do not introduce any substantially new ideas. Rather, they draw the practical consequences from the theoretical discussions, and are therefore intrinsically dependent on these. Hence, it will be sufficient to point out briefly this relationship. The first and milder reproach is that god is irrelevant, and belief in god redundant. This accusation presupposes that the theist accepts an autonomous causality of the things in the world - particularly a karmic causality as a valid explanation of the differences between sentient beings, of the differences between the sarqsiiric plains of existence and of the origination of every successive cosmic system. To then postulate god as an additional cause would be, as Vasubandhu says, 'no more than a pious affirmation',7s This is regarded as more than only an intellectual flaw, however. Dharmaklrti's refutation of the arguments for the existence of a divine creator, for example, is embedded within his effort to establish the authority of the Buddha above and against the authority of ostensible divine revelation, and to establish the authority of the Buddhist path against theistic ritualistic practices (cf. Pramal'!avarttika 2: 1-2, 8-9, 257c-258). To show, then, that the theist has, at the very best, no better explanation for the origin of suffering than the Buddha, and frequently one that is much worse, constitutes a crucial move. Siintideva adds an interesting twist. Apparently assuming (and quite correctly) that a number of theists mighfrejoin that the divine act of creating is as inconceivable as the divine reality itself, he regards this as only one more demonstration of the irrelevance of the theistic claims: 74

75

Cf. Bhavya's Madhyamakahrdayavrtti 9: 104 and 118; this also seems to be underlying Dharmaklrti' s argument in Pramiil.Javiirttika II: 17'6c-179b, 183, 190c. The model for this argument is apparently Nagarjuna's Madhyamakakiirikii 24, where Nagarjuna argues that liberation is only possible if suffering is impermanent. But suffering is only impermanent if the phenomena are empty of any inherent svabhiiva. What seems to be. implied is that svabhiiva, as an uncaused essence, would be immutable, and hence exclude change. So only the causally interdependent nature ofthe world allows for liberation, while a world based on an immutable cause would itself be immutable; and thereby preclude the destruction of suffering. Abhidharmakosabhiieyam, Vol. I (fn. 11), p. 307. A similar argument is made, as shown above, in Dharmaklrti:s Pramiinaviirttika 2:22-8.

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Towards a Buddhist-Christian Theology o/Creation Even if [you assume] that an inconceivable [god] is the creator - what is the point of speaking about something inconceivable [that cannot be spoken about] 176

But perhaps Santideva's remark could also be understood quite differently - as a necessary reminder from a fellow mystic that (to borrow from Wittgenstein) 'whereof one cannot speak, thereof one mustbe silent' .77 The second, far more severe accusation is that belief in a divine creator has, or at . least might have, negative ethical and spiritual effects. If the divine creator is understood by the theist as a genuine rival to the karmic explanation of the world, then, from a Buddhist point of view, belief in a creator would become spiritually dangerous. If god's arrangement of the world does not follow the law of karma, it will - by definition - be unjust, arbitrary, despotic. To adore such a god would conflict with basic ethical standards and negatively affect the worshipper in question. 78 Further, and most importantly, it would explicitly or implicitly deny human freedom and responsibility, and in the end salvation or liberation would become entirely a divine favour, arbitrarily distributed or denied by god, and would no longer lie within the responsibility and, at least in principle, in the reach of each and every individual. As a consequence, the path of salvation, as seen by Buddhists, would be thoroughly invalidated and defeated. Belief in a divine creator of that type is regarded as ethically and spiritually harmful and, no doubt, as incompatible with Buddhist belief and practice. Thus, it is not surprising that Bhavya rejects the notion of such an unjust and partial creator-god even in the sense of conventional or relative truth (sal1Jvrti satya),79 whereas he was quite generous in other cases, holding that the transcendent Buddha, by'means of the sal1Jbhoga-kiiya and nirmiir;a-kiiya 'assumes the universal form of all the gods to help those who are ready to be taught' .80 The idea that a divine creator stands in direct conflict with human freedom and responsibility continues to animate much contemporary Buddhist criticism. This can easily be seen, for example, in the essays of the earlier Masao Abe 81 or in the writings 76 77

78 79 80 81

Bodhicaryavatara 9:121. Translation from Lindtner, 'Madhyamaka Causality', op. cit. (fn. 7), p. 75. Tractatus logico-philosophicus 7. It is significant that in some of those Buddhist texts whose authors, like Santideva, belong to the Madhyamaka school, the critique of the creator is just one part of their overarching critique of any form of causes and causality, and that, by taking the form of the reductio ad absurdum, it usually ends in a mystical consent to the ineffability of ultimate reality. Good examples are the relevant passages in Acintyastava II (34-9), Bodhicittavivarmw II (6-9) (both in Lin~tner, Nagarjuniana, op. cit. (fn. 42), pp. 15lff and 187ff) and also Vi~l.lOrekakartrtvanirakarm.w (or ]svarakartrtvanirakrtih) (cf. Chemparathy, 'Two Early Buddhist Refutations', op. cit, fn. 31, pp. 97-9) and Chapter 10 of the Shih-erh-men-lull. All four texts are ascribed to Nagarjuna, but, at least in the case of the last two, presumably falsely so. Cf S. Ruegg, The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India(Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz 1981), pp. 27f 30 n. 73a, 31 and 104f E.g. Salistamba Sutra. Cf Lindtner, 'Madhyamaka Causality', op. cit. (fn. 7), p. 59. Cf Madhyamakahrdayavrtti 3:215. Lindtner, 'Madhyamaka Causality', op. cit. (fn. 7), p. 65. Madhyamakahrdaya 3:359. Translation in M.D. Eckel, To See the Buddha, op. cit. (fn. 19), p. 193. See, for example, M. Abe, 'Buddhism and Christianity as a Problem of Today' ,Japanese Religions 3, 1963, No.2, pp. 11-22, No.3, pp. 8-13; idem., 'Answer to Comment and Criticism', Japanese Religions 4, 1966, No.2, pp. 26-57.

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of his teacher, Shin-ichi Hisamatsu. 82 A very forceful example is, of course, Gunapala Dharmasiri's A Buddhist Critique of the Christian Concept of God. 83 According to Dharmasiri, the Buddha: meant that the idea of.an omniscient creator-god was essentially harmful for the facts of morality in the world. The ideas of morality and morally responsible beings could not, according to him, at all be made meaningful in a world created by an omniscient creator-god .... When the implications of theism are fully drawn, with the doctrines of predestination and grace etc., the ideas of finding means of salvation and spiritual struggle and therefore the idea of religion as a way of salvation loses all its meaning.... The Buddha's arguments ... were directed to point out that theism could be positively harmful to moral and religious ideals. 84

As far as the views of the Buddha are concerned, at least as presented in the Pili canon, this might be overstated. But Dharmasiri's statement is without doubt a clear summary of the central themes of traditional Buddhist critics of belief in a divine creator. A defence of human freedom and responsibility and of a cosmic order which guarantees both, a just karmic retribution and the possibility for everyone to put an end to suffering by reaching the final goal of nirvaI).a - these constitute the leitmotif running through almost all Buddhist arguments. Belief in a divine creator is perceived either as simply redundant or, in most cases, as a threat. Thus, the critical choice regarding the origin of the world: Karma or GOd!85

82 For example: S. Hisamatsu, 'Atheismus', Zeitschrift flir Missions- Lind Religionswissenschajt 62, 1978, pp. 268-96. 83 G. Dharrnasiri, A Buddhist Critique of the Christian Concept of God (Colombo: Lake House Investments 1974). See also the US edition (Antioch, CA: Golden Leaves 1988) with the newly added ninth chapter. 84 Ibid., US edition, pp. 56f. 85 For example" Madhyamakah!"dayavrtti 3:222, 9:113; Abhidharmapradipa 4.1:155; Abhidharmakosabhii:;ya 2:64d, Madhyamakiivatiira 86, 89, and so on (see also: H. Krasser, SaJ.7karanandas isvariipiikaraJ.7asaizk'jepa, Teil II, op. cit. (fn. 3), pp. 27lf, n. 443). This seems also to be the point in Buddhaghosa's brief remark that understanding the second noble truth (on 'thirst' as the origin of suffering) removes the wrong view that the creator is the cause of suffering. Cf. VisLiddhimagga 511. And it is no surprise to find the same choice in one of the earliest Sinhalese Theravada Buddhist tracts against the Christian doctrine of creation: ' ... we cannot see that there is any author of being except Karmaya'. R.F. Young, 'An Early Sinhalese Buddhist Tract Against the Christian Doctrine of Creation' ,Zeitschriftflir Missions- LInd Religionswissenschajt 69, 1985,44-53,

Chapter 10

Bridging the Gulf

As pointed out earlier,l there are basically two ways of introducing the idea of an ultimate (or divine) reality: either as that which guarantees salvation, that is, as the ultimate goal of everything, or as the divine creator, that is the ultimate source of everything. 'While Christians affirm ultimate reality in both senses, Buddhists seem to do so only in the first, denying it in the second. 2 The analysis of the traditional Buddhist arguments against .the existence of a divine creator has shown that the major motive behind their criticism is the defence of human freedom and responsibility within a soteriological context that encompasses the cosmic moral order of just karmic retribution, together with a non-deterministic understanding of karma which brings salvationlliberation into the reach of everyone. Laying these motives bare enables us, from a Christian perspective, to identify the truth behind the Buddhist rejection of a divine creator. It is intrinsically connected to the problem of evil.

Theodicy 'Free Will Defence' and 'Person-making Theodicy'

While there is no doubt that ultimate reality has been frequently experienced as both fascinating and terrifying,3 the more reflective and elaborate forms of theological and philosophical reflection, whether in Eastern or in Western thought, have insisted on the ultimate goodness of the diviI).e. According to Udayana (tenth/eleventh century CE), one of the later theists of the Nyaya school, the only See above pp. 11Sf, 2 To be aware of this differentiation is quite essential for the discussion of the most recent assessment of the relationship between Buddhism and Christianity by Paul Williams. In his The Unexpected Way: On Converting from Buddhism to Catholicism (Edinburgh: T&T Clark 2002, pp. 2St), Williams argued, that Buddhism denies, at least implicitly, the Christian god, because god, as understood by Christianity, is essential for ultimate fulfilment, whereas god, as seen by Buddhism, is irrelevant for ultimate fulfilment. But given the fact that Buddhism teaches nirv3I)a as an ultimate, unconditioned reality precisely as the precondition of any possible salvation, Williams's claim is rather debatable. Hence it does not come as a surprise that in a newer publication he has now chosen the creative aspect as the sale (or at least decisive) aspect in referring to god (cf. P. Williams, 'Aquinas Meets the Buddhists: Prolegomenon to an Authentically Thomas-ist Basis for Dialogue', Modem Theology 20, 2004, 91-121, p. 93). 3 See the classical study ofR. Otto, The Idea of the Holy (London: Oxford University Press 1959).

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purposeful motive for creation that a perfect creator could have is entirely selfless 'compassion' (lcrpii), which is to say, ~1.e creator would have to be motivated exclusively by the well-being of his creatures. 4 As we have seen, Buddhist thir,kers such as Bhavaviveka (sixth century CE), Santarak$ita (eighth century CE) and Kamalasila (eighth century CE) accepted this in principle. But they turned it into a counter-argument, contending that a compassionate creator should have made 'the world absolutely happy' without any traces of suffering, either real or imagined. s Moreover, if suffering, as Buddhists as well as a number of their fellow Indian theistic thinkers hold, must be explained as the karmic result of human craving, greed and hatred, 'thirst' and delusion, then why should a compassionate, benevolent creator have made himself dependent on a karmic order 'which is conducive to suffering and pain', asks Santarak$ita?6 And how should compassion be the creator's motive for creation if prior to creation (whether in a chronological or logical sense), the 'objects' of compassion were not yet there?7 In response, Udayana argued that compassion, in the broad sense of seeking nothing but the good of others, might very well imply an allowance for pain and suffering provided they serve a higher or future good which exceeds or outweighs their negative effects. In this sense, god or lSvara: creates the milieu or conditions in which the souls are enabled to experience the fruit of their actions. In doing s(), Isvara helps the souls on their path to liberation, and consequently the sufferings in this world not only do not contradict the attributes of compassion or love or justice of Isvara, but even positively reveal his goodness or compassion towards the living beings. 8

The point here is that the compassionate or benevolent motive of the creator must be understood as bringing about particular goods or values which cannot be produced without permitting the possibility, and hence reality, of suffering, but which are in the end well worth the price. The value Udayana speaks of accords with Buddhist standards and consists in the achievement of ultimate salvation or liberation by freely and responsibly acting beings in a process wherein these beings experience the good or bad fruits of their own actions, though they may also receive divine help towards their liberation. (Udayana understands this help as divine instructionlrevelation,9 which for Buddhists would be the compassionate teachings and other skilful means of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas.) 4 5 .6 7 8 9

Cf. G. Chemparathy, An Indian Rational Theology (Vienna: Indologisches Institut der Universitat Wien 1972), pp. 158-62. Cf. Tattvasan.lgrahapaiijikii 6: 156-60. Nyanaponika, Buddhism and the God-Idea, The Wheel Publication 47 (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society 1981), pp. 3lf. Tattvasa l7l grahapaiijikii 6: 160. Ibid., p. 32. Cf. Tattvasan!grahapaiijikii 6:158. Chemparathy, An Indian Rational Theology, op. cit. (fn. 4), p. 159, summarizing Udayana. Cf. ibid., p. 161.

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These considerations tally with a certain Christian form of theodicy which has become known as the free will defence,lo and which might well be the most cogent and promising one of all. Its cornerstone is the conviction Ll:!at the existence of conscious agents who are free to make morally significant choices (and not merely choices among various goods) implies that they will be free to make morally wrong choices, choices causing unnecessary and unjust suffering. This conviction rests upon the intuition that this freedom for good and for evil is a value that outweighs the particular evils which are inevitably connected with it. But why should genuine, morally significant freedom be such a value? There are basically two answers. First, this kind of freedom is, as Kreiner says, the essential mark of a new quality in the universe. It signals a higher level of being, surpassing unconscious as well as merely conscio.us existence by adding self-determination and responsibility to consciousness - and thus constitutes personhood. II Second, genuine freedom is the basis for the development of all the other values linked to personhood, that is, the whole range of moral; social and spiritual virtues which can be developed into the qualities and features making up the character of a given individual. This takes place through a 'person-making process,12 consisting in the free choices made in response to the challenges arising from the existence of other free agents and of a natural environment whose structure makes those choices significant because it allows for the experience of pain and happiness. A theodicy based on 'free will' - not only as signifying free and responsible choice, but also as expressing the necessary condition for a 'soul-making' or 'personmaking' process - has been developed by John Hick.B From Irenaeus of Lyon (second century CE), Hick adopts the distinction between imago dei, the" image of god, and similitudo dei, the likeness of god. That humans were created as god's image should be understood as their potential to strive after that kind of personal perfection which would make them similar to god. One reason for establishing a theodicy on this distinction is that the biblical record of the initial creation of the world as a paradise without death or suffering, and the subsequent destruction of the paradise due to the human Fall, must be understood as a myth because thereis no evidence (but plenty of counter-evidence) that such a paradise ever existed. A valid theodicy must make Cf. A. Kreiner, 'Creation and the Problem of Evil', in this volume. For more extensive accounts of the free will defence see A. Kreiner, Gatt im Leid: Zur Stichhaltigkeit der Theodizee-Argul11ente, Quaestiones disputatae 168 (Freiburg: Herder 1997); R. Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1998). 11 Cf. Kreiner, 'Creation and the Problem of Evil' , p. 65. 12 This particular aspect of the free will defence is at the heart of IohnHick's theodicy. Cf. I. Hick, Evil and the God of Love (Houndmills: Macmillan, repr. 1990). For a brief account of this 'soul-making' or 'person-making' theodicy, see I. Hick, 'An Irenaean Theodicy', in idem, A lohn Hick Reader, edited by Paul Badham (Houndmills: Macmillan 1990), pp. 88-105. 13 For the explanation of so-called 'natural evil', that is, evils not caused by free agents but as effects of natural laws, within the overall framework of a free will defence, see A. Kreiner, Gatt im Leid, op. cit. (fn. 10), pp. 321-93; idem, 'Das Problem der natiirlichen Ubel', Horin: Vergleichende Studien zurjapanischen Kultur4, 1997, pp. 65-79. 10

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sense of the fact that creation never was a paxadisiacal environment, but instead was from the beginning a place oCserious and harsh challenges to the free agents who inhabit it. The perfect state did not exist in the past, but can be regarded rather as a symbol for the eschatological fulfilment towards which human beings' should develop. 14 Hick later understoo,d this process as the essential structure of salvation or liberation, and defined it as the 'transformation from self-centredness to Realitycentredness' - 'Reality' thereby signifying ultimate, transcendent reality.15 The, world in which we live constitutes an appropriate environment for this salvific process because in a paradisiacal world free from any genuine challenges, such a transformation could hardly ever take place. However, as an inevitable consequence of human freedom and of the type of natural environment in which we live, many human beiugs never have a real chance to develop their own potential. They may be victimized by the brutal misuse of freedom on the part of their fellow humans, or they may be crushed by the brutal forces of natural evil. In addition, the transformational process knows its own ups and downs and is by no means a,constant upward movement. If, nevertheless, no one should be excluded from the process of salvation and its ultimate goal, then one needs to postulate the possibility of a continuation of the salvific process in another life, or . perhaps in a long series of future lives. For this reason, Hick complemented his theodicy by an eschatology which reckons with a sort of reincarnation. While this was first conceived as a series of lives in other worlds of different spheres, thereby reshaping the traditional Christian idea of post-mortal purgation, Hick has recently become more hospitable to the idea that a postmortal, ongoing person-making process could also take place through repeated lives on earth. 16 There is neither space nor need to enter here upon a more detailed discussion of the. free defence and its further development within the person-making theodicy. But what needs to be stressed is that this type of Christian theological thinking is based on precisely those values defended by classical Buddhist thinkers in their criticism of divine creation: human freedom and responsibility as necessary conditions of a salvation process! It may seeill striking and surprising, but our first stone for the bridge which is to span the gulf between Buddhism and Christianity on the issue of creation lies exactly at the centre of the Buddhist arguments against a divine creator.

will

14

'Man exists at a distance from God's goal for him, however, not because he has fallen from that goal but because he has yet to arrive at it.' Hick, Evil and the God ofLove, op. cit. (fn. 12), p. 283. 15 Cf. J. Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Resonses to the Transcendent (Houndmills: Macmillan 1989), pp. 36-55. 16 For a brief account of Hick's eschatology, see J. Hick, 'Present and Future Life', in idem, A John Hick Reader, op. cit. (fn. 12), pp. 145-60, or 1. Hick, 'A Possible Conception of Life After Death', in idem, Disputed Questions in Theology and the Philosophy of Religi01l (Houndmills: Macmillan 1993), pp. 183-96. For a comprehensive treatment, see J. Hick, Death and Eternal Life (Houndmills: Macmillan, repro 1990). For a recent treatment which is more open to the idea of reincarnation in this world (rather than in other worlds of different spheres), see J. Hick, The Fifth Dimension, An Exploration of the Spiritual Realm (Oxford: Oneworld 1999), pp. 241-52.

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Karma and the Salvijic Process

How does this insight relate to the Buddhist set of alternatives that the world is either created by god or by karma? Before we embark on a final approach to this question, we need to discuss some preliminary issues which arise from a theistic perspective in general and a free will defence and person-making theodicy in particular in connection with the Buddhist karma doctrine. Three functions of that doctrine can be discernedY (1) Karmic causality entails that morally good and bad deeds will generate their good or bad consequences for the responsible agent either in this or in one of his future lives. Therefore, belief in karma serves as an inspiration and motivation for morally good actions. A deterministic interpretation of karmic causality is thus implicitly ruled out, for such an interpretation would undermine the ideas of freedom and responsibility as the presupposed basis of karma. (2) By guaranteeing a just and adequate recompense for one's actions, karmic causality is expressive of ajust cosmic order.18 Seemingly unjust inequalities among the various sentient beings and their fates can therefore be explained - at least in part - as the just effects of their deeds in former lives. Moreover, the mechanism which generates karmic results is also the cause of the origination and destruction of those cosmic systems which furnish the necessary and adequate environment for the respective karmic recompense. Creation is therefore part of the efficacy of karmic causality. (3) Karmic causality is related to the striving after ultimate salvation in providing one of its metaphysical preconditions. The exact relationship between karmic causality and the Buddhist path of salvation is however a 'complicated problem', as Schrnithausen points out. 19 How is good or bad karma related to soteriologically wholesome or unwholesome factors? Is bad karma connected to or even somehow identical with the stains or defilements (klda)? Conversely, is good karma connected to or somehow identical with the overcoming of the defilements? Or framed differently, is good karma, which results ill good forms of rebirth, at the same time also conducive to salvation, that is the liberation from all forms of rebirth? The Buddhist texts touching on this question are neither unanimous nor always 17 This is more or less in accord with the three functions which Wilhelm Ha1bfass has stated as general features of the karma-idea in its various Indian contexts. Cf. W. Halbfass, Kanna lind Wiedergeburt im indischen Denken (Kreuz1ingen: Hugendube1 Verlag 2000), pp. 28 and 210. Apart from Ha1bfass's study, see the two basic volumes: W.D. O'F1aherty (ed.), Kanna and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 1980); R.W. Neufeldt (ed.), Karma and Rebirth: Post Classical Developments (Albany, NY: SUNY 1986). A broader perspective which integrates western developments as well can be found in P. Schmidt-Leukel (ed.), Die Idee der Reinkamation in Ost und West (Munich: Diederichs Verlag 1996). 18 According to Halbfass, a just cosmic order is the basic postulate of the karma teaching. C[ Halbfass, Karma und Wiedergeburt, op. cit. (fn. 17), pp. 25 If. 19 L. Schmithausen, 'Critical Response', in R. Neufeld (ed.), Karma and Rebirth: Post Classical Developments, op. cit. (fn. 17),203-30, here p. 205.

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unambiguous. 20 Nevertheless, I think that there is an overwhelmingly strong evidence in favour of a close relationship between karmic causality and the soteriologicalLy unwholesome or wholesome factors. The crucial point is that both the defilements and bad karma are characterized by the strong presence o(the 'three roots of evil' Cm£ila) - greed, hatred, delusion - while good karma or karmic merit is the result of actions (in thought, word, and deed) in which greed, hatred and delusion are considerably weaker, that is, present only in their more subtle fonus. The achievement of salvation is marked by the complete and lasting eradication of all three m£ilas, so that no further karma is produced, neither bad nor good, while good acts, or now indeed perfect acts, are still carried out. Strictly speaking, this would mean that it is not the 'goodness' of the good karma which leads to rebirth, but rather those subtle fonus of defilements, as basic manifestations of 'thirst' (tr~rJii), which are still present even in 'good' kanua. 21 These three functions of the Buddhist karma doctrine give rise to the following further questions:

2

3

20 21

Does the principle of karmic responsibility leave any room for grace? Can a karmic ally based world order really guarantee comprehensive justice without becoming thoroughly deterministic and thereby undermining its own foundation? How closely are the metaphysical implications of karma linked to the original cosmological framework within which they were initially expressed? Cf. the texts mentioned by Schmithausen, ibid., 205-8 and notes. See, for example, Ahguttara Nikiiya 3:34 and 3:70, where the three millas are strongly associated with bad karma and its negative results. while it is also stated that any action entirely free from the three miilas will not lead to further rebirth. Moreover, Ahguttara Nikiiya 3:70 identifies greed, hatred and delusion as the roots of 'unwholesome' karma and the freedom from all three as the root of 'wholesome' karma. The Netti-Pakarm.w 113 calls karma and defilements (kammakilesii) the cause of saI1)sara. (For the connection between karma and salvation in Indian Buddhism see also Halbfass, Karma und Wiedergeburt, op. cit, fn. 17, pp. 117-21.) The doctrine of the ariya pudgalas makes it clear that those who have achieved one of the first three degrees of saintliness but die before achieving arhatship will have to face a limited number of further rebirths because of the remaining subtler 'bonds' (samyojana) which are clearly variants of slight forms of greed, hatred and delusion (cf. Schmidt-Leukel, ed., Die Idee der Reinkarnation, op. cit., fn. 17, pp. 29-56). A close association of karma and defilements is further substantiated in the Buddhist view that the essence of karma is volition together with the identification of 'thirst' (tm!hii, trl!'!iiJ as the cause of rebirth in the second noble truth. Additional evidence that the accumulation of good karma is conducive to liberation might be the fact that members 2-4 of the noble eightfold path are in fact identical with the three tracks of wholesome karmic activity. Moreover, the bodhisattva acquires the perfection of the bodhisattva virtues over a long line of successive lives, obviously by accumlllating good karma or merit (punya), and it is the very same process that brings the bodhisattva closer towards enlightenment. Finally, the bodhisattva is expected to transfer his own karmic merit to other persons in order thereby to help them towards their own liberation, which, of course, presupposes that the accumulation of good karma is conducive towards final salvation.

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Let us begin with question (2). If all events giving rise to pleasant or unpleasant sensations were regarded as caused by karma, h'1e world would be thoroughly determiued. For example, if an act of deliberate violence carried out by person A against person E were the result of E' s karma, h'1en A would not have been free to choose either to cornm.i.t the deed or refrain from it. This issue is explicitly discussed in the Milinda Paiiha with regard to the canonical account of Devadatta' s attempted assault on the Buddha (Cullavagga VII 3:9). Devadatta had tried to kill the Buddha by throwing a massive rock at him. The attack failed, but the Buddha was injured by a flying splinter. Were karmic remnants still adhering to the Buddha at work here? No, says the Milinda Paiiha, because karma is just one factor among several potential causes of events, painful or otherwise. Apart from karma, events can also have purely natural causes or they can be caused by other free agents. 22 In the case of Buddha's injury t?e primary cause was Devadatta's 'sorrow-bringing' deed motivated by hatred, and the additional cause was the purely natural and accidental course taken by the flying splinter (cf. Milinda Paiiha 134-8, 179-81). Another proviso is introduced in Ahguttara Nikaya 3: 101 (pp. 249-53), where the belief that every deed will inevitably have an exactly corresponding result is refuted, as this would make the path of salvation and the final elimination of suffering impossible.23 The suggested alternative is that the karmic results do not correspond exactly to the respective deeds, but to the spiritual state of the responsible agent. That is, the same deed can have very different karmic consequences depending on the degree of spiritual perfection already achieved by the agent. For one person, a transgression can result in a rebirth in hell, while for another person, the same transgression may karmic ally 'ripen' in the present life and not leave any further effects - similar to the way in which a few grains of salt can make a cup of water undrinkable but would have no effect whatsoever on the taste of the water of the Ganges. This suggests that a non-deterministic karma theory understands karmic efficacy primarily in a dispositional sense, that is, as creating 'tendencies rather than inevitable consequences' ,24 22 This response is based on canonical texts like San.lyutta Nikiiya 26:21, Ahguttara Nikiiya 4:87 and 5:104. 23 In a more recent philosophical debate, snch an understanding of karmic efficacy has been used by Ariel Glucklich as a principle objection against' an understanding of karma which is more than purely metaphorical: 'Imagine that for habitually kicking your dog you are reborn as a leper. Not once but ten times. Each life you lead as a leper you acquire additional merit (good kanna) and additional demerit. Hence, each of these ten lives produces yet additional births. Even if through remorse you tend to act morally as a leper, you are still producing additional births that must be lived before you can resume the second then third lives as a leper, and so forth. Regardless of the precise sequence of lives, and regardless of the moral qualities of life, the process, like nuclear fission, is nearly endless. Karma becomes a horrifying mechanism to perpetuate an unending lateral movement ... '. A. Glucklich, 'Karma and Rebirth in India: A Pessimistic Interpretation', in S. Davis (ed.), Death and Afterlife (Houndmills: Macmillan 1989), 81-7, p. 84. 24 ]. Prabhu, 'The Idea of Reincarnation' , in S. Davis (ed.), Death and Afterlife, op. cit. (fn. 23), 65-80, p.70.

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These qualifications have a crucial impact on the problem of evil, for they imply that autonomously operating natural laws and freely operating agents make a perfectly just world impossible. Neither a divine creator nor karmic order can alter that state of affairs. However, if one accepts the notion of a kind of karmic causality in conjunction with reincarnation and with the idea that the type and strength of karmic results depend on the spiritual state of the agent, then the possibility for some kind of just recompense opens up - precisely because such a notion is compatible. with the person-making theodicy, namely that our conscious and deliberate actions will not only affect our environment and our fellow beings, but also our own future spiritual development. Moreover, it further implies that evil is never the end of the story for its victims, regardless of whether the evil was brought about by natural causes or through the misuse of freedom on the part of the victims' fellow beings. In this sense, the origins of the world could indeed be understood as linked to karma -:even on theistic grounds, inasmuch as the world has been created as the kind of environment in which responsible and significant free choices are possible together with the spiritual development shaped and governed by those choices. This leads us to question (3). The traditional Buddhist karma doctrine is expressed within a cosmological framework which might be seen, at least partly, as outdated. But to what extent, then, do the Buddhist karma doctrine and its metaphysical implications depend on such a cosmology? In other words, how much of this cosmological framework can be regarded as mythological without throwing the baby out with the bathwater - that is, without depriving it of its soteriological significance? This is, of course, a far-reaching question, and only a few sketchy remarks can be made here. Some Buddhists might be inclined to abandon the idea of rebirth in other planes or forms of existence but retain the idea of repeated human lives. Others go further and see the whole idea of sal1).sara or rebirth as a myth which should not be understood literally.25 But what would this imply for the understanding of karma and of nirval).a? The idea of karma as creating spiritual tendencies could still be retained within the dynamics of one single life only. But the aspect of a just cosmic order would vanish completely, together with any hope for those who were unable to attain 25

For example, K. Nishitani, Religion and Nothingness (Berkeley, CA: University of California 1982), p. 173, F. Cook, 'Memento Mori: The Buddhist Thinks about Death', in Davis (ed.), Death and Afterlife, op. cit. (fn. 23), pp. 154-76, or W. Lai, 'A Renewal of Samsara (Rebirth) -New Heaven, New Earth, and New Hell in Buddhist China', in W. Schweidler (ed.), Wiedergeburt und kulturelles Erbe: Reincarnation and Cultural Heritage (Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag 2001), pp. 133-53. It seems, however, a massive exaggeration when Whalen Lai, discussing the belief in rebirth, claims: 'Except for a minority of true believers and some in the forefront of a new age spirituality, it is true today, not as a literal reality, but as a metaphor, a fiction, a function of a religious imagination' (ibid., p. 151). Such a statement neglects the bulk of faithful Buddhist believers in the traditional Buddhist countries, and could, at best, only apply to the minority of highly Westernized Bl,lddhist intellectuals. Ambivalent is the case of Buddhadasa, who on the one hand tends to interpret sallfsara mythologically but on the other hand leaves the question of life after death open. Cf. Me and Mine: Selected Essays of Bhikkhu Buddhadiisa, edited by D.K. Swearer (Albany, NY: SUNY 1989), pp. 132-5.

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the salvific goal within this single life. Nirvalfa would presumably lose any metaphysical status as an unconditioned reality as well, and the idea of salvation would be reduced to the achievement of a relatively good but thoroughly conditioned state of p~rsonal development available, ultimately, only to a small elite?6 Besides, if some contemporary Buddhists understand their refutation of a belief in karma and rebirth as being in line with the traditional Buddhist refutation of the belief in a divine creator, arguing that both refutations express the fundamentally antimetaphysical stance of Buddhism, they should be aware that traditional Buddhist philosophers based their rejection of a divine creator not on any alleged antimetaphysical attitude, but precisely on their metaphysical understanding of karma, saJY.lsara and nirvalfa. Hence, in denying the latter, the basis for the former is undermined as well. A final remark concerns the issue of the beginninglessness of the universe or of the cycle of successive worlds. While the Buddha himself, according to the canonical record,27 insisted that the question as to whether the world is eternal or not is unanswerable (avyiikata = 'undetermined'),28 the majority of post-canonical Buddhist thinkers have clearly supported the view that the world is without beginning in time. One, and presumably the decisive, reason for this, as can be seen in their critiques of divine creation, is the motive to explain every inequality between beings by karmic causality - and that requires the possibility of going back in time infinitely. But this motive may collapse when it is admitted that even within the framework of a just karmic order, the world still entails unjust inequalities as the inevitable consequence of autonomous natural laws and free agents. It might therefore be advisable, and perhaps acceptable, to insist no longer on the beginninglessness of the universe, but rather to revert to the Buddha's position of leaving this among other apparently unanswerable questions. 29 26

Cf. John Hick's critique of Francis Cook: ' ... if, as Cook asserts, the spiritual project which is taking place in each individual life ends at death and becomes as though it had never been, then only those few who attain to nirvana in this life ever attain to it at all. This means:'" does it not - that only a very small proportion of human beings have ever attained or (in all likelihood) will ever attain this fulfilment. And that, I suggest, constitutes bad news for the human race as a whole. Now in contrast to this the Buddha's teaching, as reflected in the Pali canon, affirms the idea of repeated rebirths, so that each individual spiritual project will continue through life after life until nirvana is attained. [ ... J But this whole dimension of Buddhism is omitted from Cook's version. He has taken from the tradition only what fits the presuppositions of contemporary western naturalism. But in doing so he has transformed the Buddha's teaching from good to bad news, and from a universal to an elitist gospel.' J. Hick, 'Response to Cook', in Davis (ed.), Death and Afterlife, op. cit. (fn. 23), 177-9, pp.l78f. 27 See, for example, Majjhima Nikiiya 63, 72. 28 While it is not entirely clear whether 'eternal' (sassata) is meant in both ways, without beginning and without end, or only in the sense of being endless, it is said in the San!yutta Nikiiya (15:2) that a beginning of the sallfsara is 'inconceivable' or 'not known'. 29 The idea of a beginningless series of universes can also create unwelcome problems for a Buddhist cosmology if, as it is the case in the traditional treatises, this beginninglessness implies (and is even required by) the beginninglessness of the karmic streams constituting individual beings. For if time

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Question (1) refers to the first function of the Buddhist karma doctrine: the motivation and exhortation to take responsibility for one's own ethical-spiritual development. Within a theistic framework, this will meet with considerable consent, particularly on t.h.e part of those who are convinced that belief in a creator-god requires something like the free will defence. But it will also naturally provoke the question whether there is any room for grace. It might make sense in this context to recall that also within the various theistic religions, the issue of whether and how divine grace and genuine human freedom are compatible has generated intensive and persistent debates, without producing anything like uncontroversial results (which is indeed also true regarding Christian theology). But given the role played by the karma doctrine in the Buddhist critique of a sovereign divine creator and world ruler, the question here is not whether Buddhism might acknowledge a similar - and perhaps similarly unsolvabletension between human freedom and divine grace, but whether the Buddhist karma doctrine leaves any room at all for something that might be an equivalent to the idea of grace as found in a theistic framework. Once again, only a few sketchy remarks are possible. The first thing to emphasize in this connection is that the ultimate ground of salvation is not man-made. As we have seen, nirvaIfa, as an unconditioned reality, cannot be regarded as the product of human effort; rat.~er, its existence is what malces liberation from the conditioned world of sa.n::tsiira possible. Therefore, as Palihawadana pointed out in a well-known essay, it is true even within the context of Theravada orthodoxy that all human effort on the Buddhist path cannot in any technical sense force or compel liberation, but can only bring about a suitable disposition or openness for the experience of enlightenment. 3o Even this possibility was questioned by later Buddhist thinlcers like Shinran Sh6nin, who argued that every moral or religious effort understood as our 'own' work ('self power' - jiriki) would only strengthen our self-centredness, instead of contributing to the liberation from the 'self' as the key evil. The only way out is to rely entirely on the salvific sufficiency of Amida Buddha's all-encompassing compassion, and even this act of faith should be understood not as one's own work but as the result of the 'other power' (tariki) of Amida brought about by one's hearing the liberating message of Amida's boundless love. 3 ! stretches back infinitely and a certain percentage of beings achieve ultimate salvation, then however small that percentage is - all beings should have achieved salvation by now, and this 'now' has always been the case. It could, however, be postulated that the number of beings is also infinite, such that both would be true: an infinite number of beings have always already achieved salvation, while an infinite number are always waiting for this as something still to come. Another possibility would be to assume that while the series of universes might be without beginning in time, the different individuals may nevertheless have a beginning. But then the major reason for postulating a beginninglessness of the series of universes would disappear. 30 Cf. M. Palihawadana, 'Is There a Theraviida Buddhist Idea of Grace?', in D.G. Dawe and J.B. Carman (eds), Christian Faith in a Religiously Plural World (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis 1978), pp.181-95. 31 Cf. P. Schmidt-Leukel, 'Gautama und Amida-Buddha: Das Buddha-Bild bei Shinran Shonin', in idem (ed.), Wer ist Buddha? Eine Gestalt und ihre Bedeutung flir die Menschheit (Munich: Diederichs Verlag 1998), pp. 119-39 and 252-9.

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Yet even radical developments like these remain within the general framework of a karmic concept. The 'pure land', which for Shinran became more or less identical with salvation and where all who entrust themselves to Amida's power are reborn, was·created by Amida out of his immeasurable karmic merit The idea that Buddhas create 'Buddha lands' which constitute an optimal environment for the achievement of salvation is clearly grounded in the idea that karma is creative, or more precisely, that karma creates the requisite spheres or planes of existence. Therefore, the infinitely good karma accumulated by the Buddhas during their career as bodhisattvas can be used by them to produce the Buddha lands. And the idea that they do this for the sake of other beings is grounded in the idea that karmic merit can be tra...'1sferred - an idea which is widespread and by no means confined to Mahayana. I would suggest that in some sense it is already rooted in the idea that the Buddha's activity after his enlightenment, the proclamation of his teaching and the establishment of the lay and monastic sallgha, was exclusively motivated by selfless compassion, for this entails that the Buddha made the fruit of his own long and hard spiritual search - his enlightenment - available to others by teaching and guiding them so that his achievements could benefit them in their own spiritual struggle. Is this not already a type of 'merit-transfer', and perhaps the most basic one? In any event, it seems to be uncontroversial that the idea of 'merit-transfer' is just a special case of the more fundamental idea of the spiritual efficacy of compassion. This means that through the compassionate, wisdom-infused activity of Buddhas and bodhisattvas, other sentient beings can receive genuine and vital help for their own spiritual progress. I believe this to be a strong equivalent to the notion of grace. Even if there are numerous efforts within Buddhism to provide karmic explanations for the inequality that some beings had the lucky opportunity to meet the Buddha dharma and others not, none of these explanations seems to deny that the encounter with the Buddha dhmma is nevertheless a most precious gift (the 'best of all gifts', as the Buddhist scriptures unanimously affirm), and not simply one's own product. 32 If the compassion of the enlightened ones is that which genuinely corresponds to the spiritual needs of the unenlightened masses, and if this compassion reflects the salvific experience of transcendent reality, then the conclusion is near at hand that compassion is a kind of outflow from transcendent reality itself and, together with wisdom, presumably the major one. Referring to T'an Luan, Shinran distinguished between the dharmakaya as tathata ('thusness') (hossho hosshin) - that is, the dharmakaya in its ineffable ultimacy - and the dharmal(aya as upaya (,skilful means') (hob en hosshin) - that is, the dharmakaya as it makes itself accessible and conceivable to our inevitably limited and conditioned forms of understanding. 33 32

Cf. Khuddaka-Pa.tha 6:7, saying that the arhats have taken the 'deathless' (= nirvalfa) for free (te pattipattii amatam vigaya laddhii mudhii, nibbutim bhuiijamiinii). 33 Cf. Kyogyoshinsho IV, 17. The Collected Works of Shinran, Vol. I (Kyoto: Jodo ShinshU Hongwanji-ha 1997), p. 165.

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Shinran identified Amida Buddha, perceived as the paramount embodiment of limitless compassion, with the dhatmakaya as upaya. 34 Hence, according to Shinran, the utmost that we can say about ultimate reality before admitting its ultimate ineffability is that, for us, the ultimate is like an infinitely compassionate father! mother (oya). But let us come back to the issue of katmic creation. What type of world would a Buddha have to create through his merit in order for it to provide the ideal environment for the realization of enlightenment? Undoubtedly, the Buddha fields as they are usually described in Mahayana literature are paradisiacal worlds - 'pure lands' in the sense of being purified from all forms of suffering and evil. But would this really be the type of environment most conducive to liberation? In ancient Buddhism, we find the belief that existence in the celestial realms is simply too pleasant and too unchallenging to be an optimal environment for starting out on the path of salvation. 35 In this regard, the human world with all its suffering was seen as far more ideal than these 'ideal' paradises. A similar conviction seems to lie behind a remarkable passage from the Vimalakzrti-Nirdda (Ch. X): Once Vimalakfrti had visitors from the very distant and exalted Buddha land Sarvagandhasugandha, where the local Buddha SugandhakiiJa teaches the dharma 'only by means of perfumes'. Hearing about the world of humans, Vimalakirti' s celestial guests were quite shocked about the harsh realities of this Saha-world. And when they expressed their surprise and their admiration for Sakyamuni Buddha and those bodhisattvas who had chosen to live among the 'poor and inferior' and to 'settle in a buddha-field of such intense hardships', Vimalakirti explained: Good sirs, in this Saha universe, there are ten virtuous practices which do not exist in any other buddha-field. What are these ten? Here they are: to win the poor by generosity; to win the immoral by morality; to win the hateful by means of tolerance; to win the lazy by means of effort; to win the mentally troubled by means of concentration; to win the falsely wise by means of true wisdom ... 36

If, as Vimalakirti says, all ten bodhisattva-virtues cannot be attained in any Buddha field apart fromour own world, does this not mean that the real Buddha land, the one 34 Cf. The Collected Works of Shinran, op. cit. (fn. 33). Vol. I, pp. 461, 486 and 530. 35 See, for example Itivuttaka 83, Ahguttara Nikaya 4:33, 7:53. See also P. Harvey, An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics: Foundations, Values and Issues (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000), p. 30: 'In the lower realms, there is much suffering and little freedom of action. In the heavenly realms, life is blissful in comparison with human life, but this tends to make gods complacent, particularly those in the highest heavens, so that they may also think that they are eternal, without need of liberation. The human realm is a middle realm, in which there is enough suffering to motivate humans to seek to transcend it by spiritual development, and enough freedom to be able to act on this aspiration. It is thus the most favourable realm for spiritual development.' 36 The Holy Teaching ofVimalaklrti:A Mahayana Scripture, translated by R. Thurman (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1991), p. 83.

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most suitable for the achievement of the r,ighest goal, is precisely here?37 This would mean that underlying the creative mechanism of karma, from which each saII).saric universe is said to arise, is another, second-order karmic mechanism (or simply: a deeper understanding) according to which the saII).saric world, including its karmic structure, is created by a Buddha as a Buddha land. Can Buddhists acknowledge this world as a - or perhaps better, as the - true Buddha land, created out of the compassion of a Buddha who is a manifestation of the ultimate reality of the dharmakaya? Jose Cabez6n seems to suggest just this.38 In any event, early Buddhism's view that the human world is most conducive to enlightenment, al1d the Vimalaklrti Nirdesa' s conviction that the bodhisattva virtues can be developed only in a world like ours, are entirely compatible with the central intuition of the personmaking theodicy. This seems to indicate a far-reaching compatibility with the Christian idea of god as creator and redeemer. Would it therefore be possible, on the basis of Buddhist tradition and its ongoing elaboration, to conclude that this world is somehow caused or created by ultimate reality? An answer to this question will be attempted in the next section.

Creative Causality and Teleology Does the Ultimate Act?

Let me begin by turning once more to two of the most outspoken Buddhist critics of a creator-god, Vasubandhu and Bhavaviveka. In the Abhidharmakosa (2:55d), Vasubandhu states: The unconditioned has neither cause nor result. 39

This statement is followed by a relatively extensive discussion, developing into a debate as to whether this implies that nirval).a is non-existent. The conclusion finally reached is the Sarvastivada view that '(u)nconditioned things, although real, always lack activity, have no cause which produces them, and produce no effects' .40 Midway through the discussion, however, it is pointed out that from a Sarvastivada perspective, the possibility of designating the unconditioned as a 'cause' should be The idea that the 'pure land' is 'here' or signifies a state of mind that is to be realized in this world can also be found in Zen and Jado-Shin-Shu. Cf. The Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch, the text of the Tun-Huang Manuscript with translation, introduction, and notes by Philip B. Yampolsky (New York-London: Columbia University Press 1967), pp. 157-9, and H.-S. Keel, Understanding Shim"an: A Dialogueical Approach (Berkeley, CA: Asian Humanities Press 1995), pp. 154-82. 38 See above, p. 40. 39 Abhidharmakosabhii~yam by Louis de La Vallee POllssin, English translation by Leo M. Pruden, Vol. 1 (Berkeley, CA: Asian Humanities Press 1988), p. 278. 40 Ibid., p. 286. 37

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left open.41 While it is true that an unconditioned reality is 'out$ide of time' and 'can therefore neither project nor produce a result' in time,42 this unconditioned reality is nevertheless not entirely bereft of causal effectiveness. First, nirvaf.la can be the object of consciousness and hence a kind of causal condition for cognition. 43 'Second, as an object of cognition, it 'causes an obstacle to the vices' - 'as the stars are not visible when the sun shines'.44 That is to say; the realization of nirvaf.la puts a lasting end to all the defilements, and is thus the cause of their final cessation. For the Madhyamaka philosopher Bhavaviveka, there are no objects of knowledge at all in the ultimate sense. 45 The Buddha 'is unthinkable because he cannot be an object of thought' .46 He 'cannot be conceptualized in any way' .47 And the type of cognition which makes a Buddha a Buddha is a 'no-arising of cognition'48 - that is, 'the blissful appeasement of conceptual diversity (prapafica)' .49 In contradistinction to the Hindu concept of the divine pUrLl-!a who is also regarded as being 'nonconceptual' but is nevertheless seen as 'the cause of the origin of the world' Bhavya affirms about the dharmakaya that: (n)othing is born or manifested from it in any way ... it cannot cause [the origin of the world] and bring about [its] manifestation 50

However, Bhavaviveka holds that some sort of 'seeing' of the dharmakaya51 is nevertheless attained by following the Buddhist path, or more specifically, by following the bodhisattva path. 52 From the power of the dharmakaya and through the bodhisattva's vow to act for the salvation of all sentient beings, the bodhisattva will eventually generate the form-bodies (nlpakiiya, that is, sarr;bhogakiiya and 41

42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49

50 51

52

'[The Sarvastivadins:] In fact, the Sutra does not say that that which does not create an obstacle is a cause; but it does not contradict this. Many Sutras have disappeared. How can you be sure that some SUtra does not attribute the quality of kara'!ahetu to unconditioned things?' Ibid., pp. 279f. Ibid., p. 279. Cf. ibid., pp. 256f, 279 and 302. Ibid., 255. Cf. Madhyamakahrdaya 3:266. Madhyamakahrdaya 3:273, translation from M.D. Eckel, To See the Buddha: A Philosopher's Quest for the Meaning of Emptiness (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1994), p. 161. Madhyamakahrdaya 3:282, translation from Eckel, To See the Buddha, op. cit. (fn. 46), p. 165. Madhyamakahrdaya 3:267, ibid., p. 158. Madhyamakahrdaya 3:284; prapaiicopasam!lh siva~ - a formula which Bhiivya quotes from Niigiirjuna's Miilamadhyamakakarika, where it plays a crucial role, and which has significant roots in the Piili tradition and in the Upani~ads. See on this P. Schmidt-Leukel, 'Mystische Erfahrung und logische Kritik bei Niigiiljuna', in A. Kreiner and P. Schmidt-Leukel (eds), ReligiOse Eifahrung und Theologische Refiexion (Paderborn: Bonifatius 1993), pp. 371-94. Madhyamakahrdayavrtti 3:288ab. Eckel, To See the Buddha, op. cit. (fn. 46), p. 168. '00. in a single moment of spontaneous insight, without concepts, without obstructions (avara'!a), and without error.' Madhyamakahrdayavrtti 3:268. Eckel, To See the Buddha, op. cit. (fn. 46), p.160. Cf. Madhyamakahrdayavrtti 3:292-345. Ibid., pp. 172-88.

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nirmaTJakaya) of a Buddha. 53 This involves countless forms of activity on all three karmic tracks - thought, word and deed54 - assuming even cosmic dimensions. In the end, the bodhisattva, as a manifestation of the ultimate dharmakaya, functions indeed as a creator - a creator who is immanent at the same time as transcendent to his creations. According to Bhavya: [The bodhisattva] manifests endless world systems entering into [the bodhisattva's] own body or into an atom without any harm to sentient beings. [ ... ] [At will, the bodhisattva] sustains innumerable past, present, and future bodies, the completion of Buddha-fields, and the destruction and creation of innumerable world systems. Also at will, [the bodhisattva sustains] a Buddha-field in [the bodhisattva's] own body, [the bodhisattva's] own body in that [Buddha-field], and a Buddha Body in [the bodhisattva's] own field. 55

Similar statements are found in influential Sutras on the bodhisattva-ideal, as, for example, in the AvatanJsaka Stitra or in the KaraTJtjavyuha Sutra,56 where Bodhisattva Avalokitesvara is even portrayed along the lines of the puru'ja myth. 57 53 Cf. Madhyamakahrdayavrtti 3:291, 3:356-7. Ibid., pp. 172 and 192. 54 Cf. Madhyamakahrdayavrtti 3:360. Ibid., p. 194. 55 Madhyamakahrdaya 3:318, 325-6. Ibid., pp. 182f. 56 Concerning the body of Samantabhadra, the Avata"!saka Siitra says that there are 'in each and every pore [... J untold multitudes of buddhalands filled with buddhas'. Quoted in A. Studholme, The Origins ofO~ Manipadme Hii~. A Study in the Kiira!)slavyiiha Siitra (Albany, NY: SUNY 2002), p. 48. For similar statements about Avalokitesvara in the KaralJcJ.avyiiha Siitra, see ibid., pp. 47ff and 137ff. 57 Though the KaralJcJ.av}'L7ha Siitra has obviously been a rather influential text, it has been largely neglected by buddhological research. There are two extant versions: a short prose form, and a much longer one in verse. According to the analysis recently undertaken by Alexander Studholme, the prose version probably originates from the end of the fourth or beginning of the fifth century CE, while the verse version seems to be considerably younger, dating perhaps from the fifteenth century (cf. Studholme, The Origins, op. cit., fn. 56, pp. 9-17). In both versions, the Bodhisattva AvalokiteSvara is presented as a Buddhist Hvara, shaped very much after the model of puranic and vedic ideas. Echoing the famous puru~as!7kta from ~gveda X, 90:12-14 and various pura!)ic parallels, it is A valokitesvara who is here presented as the cosmic puru~a: 'From his eyes arose the moon and sun, from his forehead Mahesvara (Siva), from his shoulders Brahmii, from his heart Niiriiya!)a, from his teeth Sarasvatl, from his mouth the winds, from his feet the earth, and from his belly Varu!)a. When these gods were born from the body of AvalokiteSvara, then he said to the god Mahesvara, "Thou shalt be Mahdvara in the Kali age, when the world of evil creatures arises. Thou shalt be called Adideva (the primal god), the creator, the maker. All beings shall be deprived of the way of enlightenment who give such an account among the common people.'" (Translation of this passage in E.J. Thomas, The Perfection of Wisdom: The Career of the Predestined Buddhas, London: John Murray 1952, pp. 76f. See also the rendering and discussion of this passage in Studholme, The Origins, op. cit., fn. 56, pp. 123f, 38ff aod 44f.) The younger verse versiou adds that Avalokitesvara himself 'is an emanation of the Adibuddha, or "primordial Buddha'" (ibid., p. 12).

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Sections of the Avatarr;saka present the well-known identification of the whole of reality as the body of M3hilvairocana in the sense of the primordial Buddha. 58 Some Tantric texts have openly expressed the view that ultimate reality, symbolized as the cosmic Buddha or Adi-Buddha, is the final source and creator of everytning. The famous Hevajra Tantra, a text perhaps dating from the eighth century, has the Buddha say (I 8:41): The whole of existence arises in me, In me arises the threefold world, By me pervaded is this all, Of naught else does this world consist. 59 Studholme acknowledges that the verse version endorses the idea of a primordial creator, the iidibuddha (ibid., p. 45), while he finds that the presentation of AvalokiteSvara as cosmic puru~a in the earlier pros~ version 'tiptoes carefully around what might be considered the Buddhist heresy of depicting the bodhisattva as a creator-god in the fullest sense' (ibid., p. 44). Studholme's major arguments are, first, that the Sanskrit words for 'sun', 'moon', 'winds', 'earth' and 'sky' are the names of the respective gods, such that 'only the gods are seen to emanate from the bodhisattva's body and not the created order itself' (ibid., p. 44); and second, the subsequent attack on the belief in Siva as the Mahesvara and creator. According to C. Regamey, the latter could be understood as a refutation not of the belief in a creator, but of the wrong identification of this creator-god with Siva instead of with Avalokitesvara. Studholme rejects Regamey's interpretation on the basis of his own first argument and of a possible reminiscence to a similar polemic in Di'gha Nikiiya 1 (cf. ibid., p. 170, n. 58). Though the latter seems to have some probability, this would still not exclude the possibility that the major target is the wrong identification of the creator-lsvara. Perhaps the passage in question is reminiscent not only of Digha-Nikiiya 1, where the polemic is directed against Brahma, but also of !be widespread pural)ic theory that the Buddha was an avatara ofVisl)u who appeared in order to delude those who deserved it (cf. W. Halbfass, 'Der Buddha und seine Lehre im Urteil des Hinduismus', in P. SchmidtLeukel (ed.), Wer ist Buddha?, op. cit., fn. 31, pp. 176-94 and 260-62). Hence, the polemical point would be that not the Buddhists, but the followers of Hindu deities are deluded. As far as Studholm's first argument is concerned, it does not seem to make a huge difference whether AvalokiteSvara emanates the various gods or 'the created order itself. For within the traditional Buddhist context, the gods are seen as a kind of 'posts' which are held by sallfsaric beings reborn as these gods. Presumably, then, it would go even more against the Buddhist tradition to assume that these gods have their origin in A valokitesvara rather than in their own karmic merit. Alternatively, Avalokitesvara is seen as the one who does not emanate the gods in the sense of emanating the beings who serve as these gods, but rather emanates precisely the celestial order which is established through these various god-posts. This, again, would put him in the rank of a divine creator. 58 Cf. L. Schmithausen, 'Heilsvermittelnde Aspekte der Natur im Buddhismus', in G. Oberhammer and M. Schmucker (eds), Raum-zeitliche Vermittlung der Transzendenz (Vienna: Verlag der Osterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 1999),229-62, pp. 251-9. 59 D.L. Snellgrove, The Hevajra Tantra. A Critical Study. Part I: Introduction and Translation (London: Oxford University Press 1959), p. 77. The Hevajra Tantra seems to acknowledge a sort of mediatory role of karma in this process of creation (cf. ibid., I 8:47).

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In the Tibetan Kim byed rgyal po 'i mdo, a fourteenth-century text though with some considerably older sections 60 , it is the 'mind of perfect purity' who/which is designated as the original Buddha and as the 'All-Creating Sovereign' : I am the central vigor of all the Buddhas of the three times. I am father and mother to all sentient beings of the three-fold world. Also, I am the cause for all that exists as animated and inanimated. Not one thing is that does not emanate from Me. [ ... ] Because I am dwelling in imperceptible stillness I am the primordial Buddha .. 61

The tendency to discern something like a Primordial Buddha as the final source and ultimate nature of everything is accompanied by a progressive identification of the dharmakaya with siinyata ('emptiness') or tathata ('thusness'), and hence with the dharmadhatu ('true nature/ground of phenomena')62 and further with the tathagatagarbha (,Buddha-germ').63 If the true nature of everything exceeds conceptual reach - which is to say, if the 'true nature' of things is 'empty' or just 'thus', and ifBuddhahood, or the dharmakaya, is achieved by gaining full insight into the true nature of reality, then an identification of the dharmakaya with the dharmadhatu clearly suggests itself. Indeed, a number of Buddhist scriptures and thinkers have drawn this very conclusion. This carries a further consequence of importance: if all things participate in the dharmakaya as their ultimate nature,then all things have Buddha-nature, the 'Germ of Buddhahood' (tathagatagarbha). This in tum has an enormous impact on the Buddhist understanding of causality with regard to the dharmakaya. It is obvious that various classical Buddhist authors and thinkers felt a strong tension between two tendencies: on the one hand their wish to deny any form of causal activity on the part of the ultimate since this might endanger its status as an unconditioned, timeless, changeless, unfathomable reality; on the other hand their interest in affirming transcendent reality as the basis of salvation, that is, as the source underlying karmic causality - particularly that form of karmic causality through which the bodhisattva accumulates the immeasurable merit allowing him to become a Buddha and to act for the sake of all sentient beings in numerous ways, including the creations of innumerable world systems and Buddha lands. 64 This tension is 60

See E. Neumaier, 'Buddhist Forms of Belief in Creation', in this volume. A full translation of the text can be found in E.K. Neumaier-Dargyay, The Sovereign All-Creating Mind: The Motherly Buddha (Albany, NY: SUNY 1992). 61 Kun byed rgyal po'i mdo 41. Neumaier-Dargyay, The Sovereign All-Creating Mind, op. cit. (fn. 60), p.141. 62 Cf. J. Makransky, Buddhahood Embodied (Albany, NY: SUNY 1997), pp. 41-9, 345-62. 63 Cf. G.M. Nagao, 'On the Theory of Buddha Body (Buddha-kaya)" in idem, Madhyamika and Yogacara: A Study of Mahayana Philosophies (Albany, NY: SUNY 1991), pp. 103-22. H. Tauscher, 'Die Buddha-Wirklichkeit in den spateren Formen des mahayanistischen Buddhismus', in P. Schmidt-Leukel (ed.), Wer ist Buddha?, op. cit. (fn. 31), pp. 93-118 and 247-51. 64 Makransky's important study Buddhahood Embodied (fn. 62) is entirely dedicated to this problem.

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reflected, for example, in the fact that eternity (nitya), as a primary feature of nirvaI}.a (amrta = deathless), now acquires the· double meaning of, firstly, the eternal, immutable stillness of the unconditioned, and secondly, the eternal activity of the Buddha in relation to the conditioned world. The Buddha, says Bliavya: is called eternal for two reasons. He is eternally free from appearance and thus is completely free from concepts, and he eternally accomplishes what is good. [... l he constantly accomplishes great vows and acts for the welfare of sentient beings as long as there is saIl).sara. 65

Or to quote the Yogacara philosopher Sthiramati (sixth century): although [Buddha] does not move, does not budge, does not waver from the undefiled realm, he carries out all the activities whose characteristic· is movement. 66

How is this paradox resolved? Before pursuing the issue further, let us recall that Buddhists are here facing the very same problem that plays such a major role in their critiques of a divine creator: the question of how an unconditioned, permanent, immutable, simple god could create a world which is conditioned, temporally structured, changing and internally diversified. Any act of bringing about or sustaining or interacting with such a world, they argue, would imply change. and conditionedness on the side of the creator. Similarly, any supposed divine knowledge of the ever-changing events of the world would imply changes in the creator's cognition. And now all these problems fall back on the Buddha. How, within the context of Buddhist thinking, is it possible for the Buddha to accomplish what is allegedly impossible for a divine creator to accomplish? A first solution would be, as Paul Griffiths has pointed out, to argue that the real Buddha,67 identified with the dharmak~ya, 'does not act in time'; rather, through the two form-bodies (san-;bhogakiiya and nirmii1'Jakiiya - the manifestations of the dharmakaya), the 'Buddha seems to non-Buddhas to act in time' .68This is to say that 65 Madhyamakahrdaya 3:275 and vrtti. Eckel, To See the Buddha, op. cit (fn. 46), p. 162f. 66 Vrttibhii~ya, as quoted in Makransky, Buddhahood Embodied (fn. 62), p. 93. 67 Cf. P. Griffiths, On Being Buddha: The Classical Doctrine of Buddhahood (Albany, NY: SUNY 1994), pp. 147-50. 68 Ibid., p. 189. See also ibid., pp. 79ff, 93 and 138. S}milarly, Makransky, Buddhahood Embodied, op. cit. (fn. 62), p. 93: 'Conventionally, in the phenomenal world of beings, its activites "appear", while ultimately within the purified realm of dharma, there is no activity, no change.' Griffiths (On Being Buddha, op. cit., fn. 67, pp. 181-202) has taken this observation as the starting point for, as he believes, a devastating critique of Mahayana Buddhology and epistemology, not entirely free from Christian apologetical interests (cf. Griffiths, An Apology for Apologetics, Maryknoll: Orbis 1991). It is questionable whether Griffiths' treatment of Buddhist 'docetism' and illusionism sufficiently considers the respective logical and epistemological background on the one hand (see, for this the adequate remark ofM. Eckel, below, fn. 69) and the spiritual-practical context on the other (see, for the latter, the remarks of Makransky. in his Buddhahood Embodied, fn. 62, p. 447f, n. 79). I would suggest that these two points clearly mark out the lines of future fruitful debates with Griffiths which cannot be further pursued in this volume.

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the activity of the two form-bodies is only apparitional or illusory, but, as such, salvifically effective for the unenlightened beings. 69 However, taken on its own, this solution is hardly satisfactory. For if the three Buddha-bodies are not to fall apart entirely, and particularly if the dharmakaya is to be regarded as the 'basis and support (asraya) of the other two',7o it must still be explained through what kind of activity the dharmakaya is capable of manifesting the apparitional bodies.71 A second solution therefore suggests that the efficient cause of a Buddha's two form-bodies and their activities is to be found in the pre-history of that Buddha, brought about through the karmic merits of the former bodhisattava, and in particular through the bodhisattva vow - the vow to strive after Buddhahood in order to act for the salvation of all beings.72 Hence, the dharmakaya is said to manifest itself in the two form-bodies by means of the bodhisattva vow which has both the two formbodies and the attainment of the dharmakaya as its final result. In startling conformity, Asanga (fourth century),73 Bhavaviveka (sixth century)74 and 69

70 71

72 73

74

' ... the truth is that all actions of the Buddha, whether they appear to occur in a four-continent world like this one or in a golden Buddha-field .,., are representations in the minds ofliving beings whose occurrence is explicable without remainder in terms of the needs of those beings.' Griffiths, On Being Buddha, op. cit. (fn. 67), p. 138. See also J. Cabez6n, 'Incarnation: A Buddhist View', Faith and Philosophy 16, 1999,449-71, p. 453. However, some caution is in place concerning the proper understanding of the terms 'real' and 'apparitional'. From a Mahayana perspective, the attribute 'apparitional' or 'illusory' qualifies the world as it is constructed on the basis of conceptual perception, whereas the ultimately 'real' is precisely that which is beyond all our conceptions and sense experiences. Hence I agree with Eckel's remark: 'From one point of view, the manifestation is an illusion, but, in a world where everything finally is an illusion, a manifestation can work just as efficiently as anything else to bring about a 'real' effect.' Eckel, To See the Buddha, op. cit. (fn. 46), p. 85. Moreover, the idea that the Buddha destroys the illusion (avidyii) of the beings precisely by acting on their own epistemic level - through a kind of phantom body that appears in their own phantom-like (illusory) world - follows the basic pattern established by Nagiirjuna in his Vigrahavyavartanl 23, such that one magically produced phantom is able to destroy another phantom. In other words, the Buddha is 'acting' exactly on that level where the problem lies - the level of avidya or 'delusion'. Griffiths, On Being Buddha, op. cit. (fn. 67), p. 81. A further question is how such a view would account for the Buddha's epistemological connection with the world of phenomena, that is, his omniscience. On the various solutions offered for this question, see Makransky, Buddhahood Embodied, op. cit. (fn. 62), pp. 352ff. See Cabez6n, 'Incarnation: A Buddhist View', op. cit. (fn. 69), pp. 454f; Eckel, To See the Buddha, op. cit. (fn. 46), pp. I11ff; Makransky, Buddhahood Embodied, op. cit. (fn. 62), pp. 328 and 361. Cf Mahayanasamgraha 10:3: 'The Dharma body is ... under the impulse of former vows, ... its activity and action are unending.' In 10:36-7 this activity is related to the two form-bodies. The Summary of the Great Vehicle by Bodhisattva Asaizga, translated by J.P. Keenan, BDK English Tripitaka 46-ill (Berkeley, CA: Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research 1992), pp. 107 and 119f. 'From the nonconceptual Tathagata Body, through the power of a previous vow (p!7rva pra'!idhana) that has been nurtured (paribhavita) by a mode of conduct (slla) that brings benefit to others, there arises a Manifestation Body that benefits alL In hundres of kotis of continents, it displays the actions of a Buddha .. .'. Madhyamakahrdayavrtti 3:291. Bhavya is quoting here a so far unidentified source. Eckel, To See the Buddha, op. cit. (fn. 46), p. 170.

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CandrakIrti (seventh century) all affiml that the dharmakaya manifests the formbodies through the impulse of the Bodhisattva vow. Once set in motion, it will accomplish its work like a potter's wheel, without any additional activity of the potter, says CandrakIrti. 75 This solution, however, still begs the question: if the formbodies are the result of the bodhisattva vow and not of any activity of the dharmakaya itself, in what sense can they then be regarded as manifestations of the dharmakaya, rather than being merely manifestations of the vow? And what is it that brings the. bodhisattva vow about? The latter can be explained by the assumption, widespread within the Buddhist tradition, that every bodhisattva is inspired to his/her vows through the teaching and example of a previous Buddha who, of course, had a similar bodhisattva career with a similar inspiration from a preceding Buddha. This explanation would thus regress into a possibly beginningless past. Still it does not clarify the connection between the 'inactive' dharmakaya and its manifestation as Buddhas and bodhisattvas through the dynamics of the vow. A third solution offers help insofar as it suggests an essential connection between the entrance upon the Buddhist path (and the bodhisattva path in particular) and the presence of the dharmakaya: the dharmakaya's presence within, or to, every sentient being is ultimately responsible for that being's experience of sa.rI).sara as unsatisfactory and thus for its aspiration for nirvaI).a. The word heard by a bodhisattva-to-be from a previous Buddha could not be effective if it did not somehow resonate with a voice arising within the listener. The Ratnagotravibhiiga, an influential scripture of the Buddha-nature (or tathiigatagarbha) tradition, and dating perhaps from the third or fourth century CE,76 makes the point (1:40-41): If there were no Buddha Element one would not be sick of suffering and want to seek after or aspire for nirvana. Seeing the fault with existence, suffering, and the virtue of nirvana bliss, happens because of having the gotra ... 77

It is their 'natural tendency to seek for happiness'78 which makes sentient beings aware of the unsatisfying nature of saTI).saric existence and motivates them to take up 75

76 77

78

'The body of bliss of (the buddhas) is made complete through meritorious action. [ ... J Here (in the context of everyday experience), a potter's wheel is (initially spun through the extended efforts of a strong potter. Once turning, though, it continues to spin even without the benefit of any additional effort from the potter, and in this way it furnishes the cause for the production of jugs and other kinds of pottery. Similarly, (the buddha) puts forth no effort whatsoever as he abides in his body of the Dharma, and yet his totally inconceivable deeds are accomplished through the virtue he acquired (previously) as a living being, and in particular through his vow (to lead all living beings to awakening).' Madhyamakiivatiira 8:5-7. C.W. Huntington, The Emptiness of Emptiness: An Introduction to Early Indian Miidhyamika (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press 1989), pp. 190f. S.K. Hookham, The Buddha Within (Albany, NY: SUNY 1991), p. 165. Quoted from ibid., p. 209. 'Gotra', meaning 'lineage in the sense of a family of species' (ibid., p. 105), is frequently translated as 'seed', 'source' or 'cause', and signifies here the 'seed' of future . Buddhahood, the tathiigatagarbha. Ibid., p. 209.

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the 'noble search' for nirvaI).a. The teaching of the Buddhas can be effective only because L'1e beings already harbour some form of inherent, albeit obscured, familiarity with their real destination.7 9 Hence, their own Buddha-nature is the real cause oiall the progressively evolving activity - the pursuit of the path, the taking of the bodhisattva vows, the fruition of the vows in the emergence of the form-bodies of a Buddha coincident with the realization of the dharmakaya, and all the activities carried out by the form-bodies including the creation of Buddha lands. However, because the Buddha-nature of all sentient beings (and, in a broader sense, of all beings) is grounded in the all-pervasiveness of the dharmakaya, that is, in the identity of dharmakaya and dharmadhiitu, the whole process of bodhisattva and Buddha activity is in the end a result or manifestation of the dharrnakaya, simply flowing from its presence and not from any active motion or change on the part of the dharmalciiya. 8o This idea - that the presence of the dharmakaya as tathiigatagharba, the Buddhanature or originally pure mind of sentient beings, is the final and real inspirational force which leads beings towards enlightenment and gives rise to the activities of the bodhisattvas and Buddhas - is not a form of determinism. It does not undermine or violate the basic ideas. of human freedom and responsibility as associated with the Buddhist karma teaching. The inspiration flowing from the Buddha-nature and the manifestations arising therefrom are always appropriate to the spiritual state or karmic development of the beings. 81 Though a constant impulse, so to speak, draws sentient beings towards the full realization of their Buddha-nature, their response to this impulse is free, continually renewed and reaffirmed until the final destination is reached. This ties in well with the basic concept of a person-making theodicy and, indeed, John Hick once suggested a somewhat similar scenario as a way of combining divine grace and human freedom. 82 It expresses further the overall teleological nature of the Buddhist idea of original purity. Now, to speak of an originally pure mind is to ascribe to the defilements eo ipso the status of something alien to our true nature·. And in light of the impossibility of any chronological understanding of this 'originality' , it must be understood as a natural inclination towards the realization of nirvaI).a or Buddhahood. 83 If we keep in mind the Buddhist view that the world is created by karma - either in the sense of the karma of ordinary sentient beings which creates the synchronically and diachronically innumerable world systems and their saII).siiric realms, or as the karmic merit of Buddhas and bodhisattvas out of which they create innumerable pure lands existing not only alongside the SaII).siiric worlds, but also (at least according to some lines of understanding) as their true deep structure - then all this karmic creativity would ultimately be evoked and governed by the teleological 79 80 81 82 83

Cf. ibid., pp. 53ff. Cf. Makransky, Buddhahood Embodied, op. cit. (fn. 62), p. 93. Cf. ibid. 95f; Rookham, The Buddha Within, op. cit. (fn. 76), pp. 53 and 253. Cf. J. Rick, Death and Eternal Life, op. cit. (fn. 16), pp. 250-59. See above, page pp. 118ff.

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pull or 'undertow' emanating from the eternal presence of the dharmakiiya, the ultimate reality. Creati~n is occurring permanently - and perhaps without any beginning in time - through the attracting power of the ultimate as the final soteriological goal of everything that there is. Thus, we have something like the following multi-layered scenario of creation: Karma of ordinary beings creates sarr;tsaric worlds. Sarr;tsaric worlds are pure lands created by karmic merits ofbodhisattvaslBuddhas. BodhisattvaslBuddhas are creations/manifestations of the dharrnkayaldharmandhatu.

Ultimate Reality is therefore a first or final cause in a logical or even ontological sense, but not in a chronological one. Temporally effective causes are part of conditioned reality, and not an attribute of the unconditioned. Instead, the unconditioned 'operates' as a causa finalis through the permanent and pervasive attraction emerging from it, while (and because) in itself remaining unchanged and peaceful. The structural similarity with Aristotle's 'unmoved mover' is obvious. 84 But how far is all tJ:lis compatible with Christian concepts of creator and creation? A Christian Correlate

The XIVth Dalai Lama has admitted that the notion of dharmakiiya, identified as the 'Primordial Buddha' and as the 'inherent clear light, the essential nature of the mind '" is close to the notion of a Creator, since all phenomena, whether they belong to saIl).siira or nirvaI).a, originate therein' .85 However, the Dalai Lama continues, the dharmakiiya should not be misunderstood as a kind of divine 'substratum', 'as an independent and autonomous existence from beginningless time'. 86 It should not be seen 'as a unique entity, but as the ultimate clear light of each being.'87 As with the karma that causes the universe to exist, so with the 'inherent clear light'. It has its reality 'on an individual level' .88 This leads directly to the important question as to whether the dharmakiiya is a single, unique reality, or a multiple, plural one. The latter would - at best - allow only for what Cabez6n has appropriately termed 'localized creation' ,89 or would - at worst - entail a plurality of unconnected minds, each of which creates its own solipsistic world. 9o 84 Cf. Metaphysics 12:7. See once more the quotation from Sthiramati, above, atfn. 66. 85 Dalai Lama, Beyond Dogma. Dialogues and Discourses (Berkeley, CA: North Atlantic Books 1996), pp. 153f. See also J. Cabez6n, 'Three Buddhist Views of the Doctrines of Creation and Creator' in this volume. 86 Dalai Lama, Beyond Dogma, op. cit. (fn. 85), p. 154. 87 Ibid., p. 154. 88 Ibid. 89 Cf. Cabez6n, 'Three Buddhist Views ... ' in this volume, p. 34. 90 An option which is, of course, rejected by Cabez6n, as well as by classical Yogacara philosophers.

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Traditionally; the question of the multiplicity or singularity of the dharmakaya is a disputed one. While it is uncontroversial that the nirmiil'}akiiya and sal1J.bhogakiiya are multiple, Griffiths maintains that the dharmakaya is 'single' and 'indivisible', and 'all specific Buddhas are related identically to it' .91 And, according to Cabez6n, the 'claim that the dharma-body of all the buddhas is identical can be found in a variety of sources', However, as he also points out, others have held 'that such statements could . not be taken literally' ,92 But is the setting up of singularity v. multiplicity, of one v. many, really appropriate? As Cabez6n admits, even those who are opposed to the identity or singularity view agree that the various Buddhas 'have "the same" ultimate nature (emptiness),.93 Framed in Yogacara terminology, Asanga writes in the MahiiyiinasanJgraha (10:3) that the dharmakaya is 'suchness', and that '(b)ecause of the absence of differentiation in ... suchness, there is no multiplicity' .94 Given that 'emptiness' or 'suchness' refer to reality as it is beyond the operation of the prapafica, that is, conceptual differentiation and proliferation, it is perhaps inappropriate to refer to it through quantitative categories such as 'one' or 'many' .95 Perhaps the dharmakaya can be called 'unique' precisely in the sense of being 'neither one nor many' - unique as the 'one without a second' (to borrow from the Chandogya-Upani~ad). In any event, a god who would seem to be one subsistent being alongside others, a countable being or reality, is clearly not what some of the more reflective Christian thinkers had in mind. 96 Another question, arising from a Christian perspective, is whether teleological causality can be understood as creative causality. Would we not have to conclude that a beginningless chain of successive and parallel creations is itself uncreated, even if it has a teleological cause? Does the beginninglessness of saII).sara oppose the idea of its being created? Buddhists have' frequently affirmed this opposition. 97 However, neither all traditional Hindu thinkers nor all Christian theologians have Griffiths, On Being Buddha, op. cit. (fn. 67), p. 81. Cabez6n, 'Incarnation: A Buddhist View', op. cit. (fn. 69), p. 466, n, 18. Ibid. The Summary of the Great Vehicle, op. cit. (fn. 73), p. 107. See also Nagarjuna's dedicatory verse of the Miilamadhyamakakarikas, where he rejects oneness and multiplicity (anekiirtham aniiniirtham). 96 See, for example, Dionysios Areopagita, De divinibus nominibus 13:3: 'Neither one, nor three, nor any number... .', Or Nicholas of Cusa, De docta ignorantia 1:88: ' ... under the aspect of infinity God is neither one nor many' . 97 Cf. Cabez6n, 'Three Buddhist Views .. .', above p. 34: ' ... there is no point before which there was nothing. Because there is no absolute origin, there is no first cause, and it follows, of course, that no one being (for example, God) could therefore have been that first cause.' To give three further random examples from the sixth, the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries: (1) Bhavya in Mahyamakahrdayavrtti 9:98: 'Even if embodied beings obtained their body in the [beginning of] the first kalpa, the cause [of this body] must still be the dharma and adharma done previously by them from [the time of] saIlfsiira without beginning [in time] ... And so it cannot have been created by God.' C. Lindtner, 'Madhyamaka Causality', Horin: Vergleichende Studien zur japanischen Kultur 6, 1999, 37-77, p. 69. (2) An anonymous Sinhalese Buddhist tract against the Christian creator doctrine (from 1846-47): ' ... if the world is eternal, the Jehova is not the Creator of the world ... '. 91 92 93 94 95

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concluded irreconcilability here. As vve saw. above, the Vedantist Brahma S£itra accepts both: the beginninglessness of s:llI,lsara and a divine creator as its ultimate source. Similarly, the Nyaya philosopher Udayana accepted the eternity of elementary atoms, of logical categories (generality, particularity, inherence) along with ontological categories (time, space), of individual souls and of karma. Udayana, however, admitted that what is eternal is. not created, and hence understood the divine creator as a cosmic demiurge who brings forth each of the newly originating worlds within a beginningless chain, forming them according to the karmic necessities of the souls. 98 The creator is not chronologically prior to the whole of creation, because this is beginningless, but he is chronologically prior to every single, newly originating world system within this beginningless chain. 99 As we saw, however, ideas like these were met with the Buddhist objection that such a creator would be entirely dispensable, or simply another name for the creative power of karma. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) treated the question as to the compatibility of the idea of a beginningless world with the idea of its createdness in several prominent places. loo His position on this question is (1) that both ideas are indeed compatible, (2) that it cannot be decisively proven or disproven whether the world has a beginning or not, and (3) that on the basis of revealed scripture, the Church believes in the beginning of the world. For our purposes, it will be quite rewarding to look more closely at some of Aquinas's considerations. In connection with (1) and (2), Aquinas makes clear that the designation of god as 'first cause' (causa prima) need not and should not be misunderstood in a chronological sense. It designates a metaphysically 'first' principle in the sense of logical or ontological priority, as the ultimate source from which the whole of creation has its being. lol To be the 'first cause' here does not require that 'god must be prior to the world in duration'. 102 Accordingly, 'creation out of nothing' (creatio

98 99

100

101 102

R.F. Young, 'An Early Sinhalese Buddhist Tract Against the Christian Doctrine of Creation', Zeitschriftfor Missions- und Religionswissenschaft 69,1985,44-53, p. 49. (3) 'As causes have no beginning and stretch back to infinity, the same thing must apply for living beings. Creation is therefore not possible.' The XIVth Dalai Lama, Beyond Dogma, op. cit. (fn. 85), p. 192. Cf. Chemparathy,An Indian Rational Theology, op. cit. (fn. 4), pp. 138-40, 159-60. Udayana states explicitly that the cause-effect relationship between creator and creation requires a temporal priority of the cause and a temporal posteriority of the effect. Cf. Chemparathy, An Indian Rational Theology, ibid., p. 86. For example, in his Summa theologiae (= STh) 146: 1-3, in Summa contra gentiles (= ScG) II:31-9, in the commentary on Aristotle's Physics In octo libros Physico rum Aristotelis expositio, lib. 8, in a brief work specially dedicated to this question, De aeternitate mundi, and in a number of his other writings. Cf. J. Schneider, 'The Eternity of the World: Thomas Aquinas and Boethius of Dacia', Archives D'Histoire Doctrinale et Litteraire du Moyen Age 66, 1999, pp. 121-41. On Aquinas's concept of creation, see also O.H. Pesch, 'Schiipfungslehre und Schiipfungsperspektive in der Theologie des Thomas von Aquin', Kerygma und Dogma 49, 2003, pp. 2-23; B. Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1993). Cf. SThI44:1. STh I 46:2 ad 1.

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ex nihilo) does not necessarily imply 'creation after nothing' (post nihilum).I03 The divine creation of the world should not be seen as a temporal act at all. It is not in itself a motion (motus)104 or a successive change (mutatio successiva).105 A term like 'making' (jacere) can therefore be applied only equivocally (not even analogically!).106 In principle, then, both could be possible: the creation could be beginningless, or it could have a beginning. Which of the two possibilities is actualized depends solely on the will of god, which could just as well have gone the other way.107 Aquinas maintains, however, that god's 'will' is an eternal, or better, timeless will. It does not undergo any changes or spontaneous realizations. !Os And Aquinas adds two further important qualifications: even if the created world were beginningless, such that the creation would be somehow contemporaneous with god, the world would not be eternal in the same sense as god, for the world's eternity would be temporal (it would be everlasting), while god is beyond time. 109 And if the world has a beginning, as Aquinas indeed assumes, this is not a beginning in time, but the beginning of time, for time is co-created together with the world. 110 Aquinas vehemently defends the view that the causes within this world and within time- the so-called 'secondary causes' - have their own genuine causal power; however, they obtain this through their ontological dependence on god. l11 The kind of causality which Aquinas has in mind when he speaks of creation is therefore quite different from the type of causality we know from inner-worldly effective causes. Because of that difference, it is impossible to refute conclusively the assumption that the chain of secondary causes could go back in time infinitely. The argument for the existence of god which proceeds from effects to a first cause must therefore be understood in the sense of a metaphysically necessary source of being, and not in the sense of chronologically preceding effective causes. 112 Aquinas leaves no doubt that the world as a whole (whether beginningless or not) exists because of god. But ultimately, this 'because of' needs to be understood as a 'final cause' (causefinalis), that is, as a telos. The first and the last of Aquinas's socalled 'five ways' (five arguments leading to the idea of god as the first metaphysical principle) assume a teleological form: everything moved is moved towards something (ad illud ad quod movetur), and all things, even natural things, act for an end. ll3 Everything is moved by attraction, or - as Aquinas says - by its 'appetite' 103 104 105 106 107 108

Cf STh I 46:2 ad 2. STh I 45:2 ad 3. STh I 46:2 ad 1. See references in Schneider, 'The Eternity of the World', op. cit. (fn. 100), pp. 133f, n. 46. Cf. STh I 46:2. See also Schneider, 'The Eternity of the World', op. cit. (fn. 100), pp. 135f. On Aquinas's concept of divine will, see Davies, The Thought of Aquinas, op. cit. (fn. 100), pp.140-49. 109 Cf. STh I 46:2 ad 5. 110 Cf. STh I 46:1 ad 6 and ad 8, 46:3 ad 1. 111 ScG ill §§ 67,69,70. 112 Cf. STh I 46:2 ad 7. 113 STh I 2:3.

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(appetitus) for something attractive. 114 The ultimate focus of all attraction is the perfect reality of god. All natural beings, insofar as they strive towards something good, are thereby striving for god. lIS And insofar as all human beings naturally strive for happiness, they thereby already have a deep, albeit obscured, familiarity with god, their true beatitude. 116 As the highest good and the true beatitude, god is the 'unmoved mover' causing everything to exist through 'moving' or 'attracting' everything towards god-self. l17 The causa fmalis, the teleological cause, is,· according to Aquinas, the basis of all other causes, the primary cause of all causes. 118 Aquinas's conception of creation does more than show that the createdness of the world is compatible with its possible beginninglessness. It also elucidates how the idea of divine creative causality is very different from any this-worldly causal efficacy, which is necessarily characterized by temporality, movement and charige. Further, Aquinas's conception makes clear the need to talee a teleological approach to divine creative causality - of seeing it as the attraction emanating from the presence of a timeless, unmoved and changeless ultimate reality. With this view of creation Aquinas provides us with further significant stones for our projected bridge. First, it is unmistakably clear that the creatures are provided with their own genuine sphere of causal activity and - in the case of humans - freedom and responsibility. Second, Aquinas's teleological understanding of creative causality along the lines of Aristotle's unmoved mover fits particularly well with the assumption shared by Aristotle of a beginningless world, as Aquinas explicitly admits. 119 Third, his teleological concept integrates creation into the concept of salvation, inasmuch as salvation accomplishes what is already the original goal of creation: the final and unobstructed recognition of ultimate reality as the highest bliss. Redemption is thus not understood as a kind of emergency treatment after the 'fall' - after some unforeseen accident which spoiled the creation. Salvation is, rather, continuous with the original dynamics of creation itself. Creation is, so to speak, an implicit aspect of the overarching process of salvation. The consequences of this account of the doctrine of creation for the Buddhist-Christian dialogue are as follows: (1) Aquinas's insistence on the causal autonomy of created beings (which they obtain from the creator) is fully compatible with the basic assumptions of afree will defence and a person-making theodicy, regardless of the fact that Aquinas himself pursues other lines in his own theodicy. As we have seen, these assumptions coincide with those ideas and values which Buddhist critics sought and seek to defend against the threat potentially implicit in creator doctrines. 114 115 116 117

118 119

SeG I 13. STh I 44:4 ad 3. SThI2:1 ad 1. Cf. SeG I 37. Cf. STh I-II 1:2. Cf. SeG I 13.

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(2) Buddhists and Christians have no grounds for assuming an automatic relationship either between a supposed beginning of the world and the belief in a divine creator on the one hand, or between a suppo'sed beginninglessness of the world and the denial of a divine creator on the other hand, The question of whether or not the world has a beginning has no immediate repercussions upon the question of whether or not there is a divine creator, Aquinas's argument that the beginning of the world was revealed through scripture presupposes a pre-critical and un-historical understanding of the Bible as well as a propositional concept of revelation, Both are rejected nowadays by the vast majority of academic theologians, such that arguments of this kind are no longer prevalent. Perhaps it would be advisable to regard the question of the beginning or beginninglessness of the world as falling under the competence of physicists, and reserve for theologians and their Buddhist counterparts the contemplation of the relation between that which is in and that which is beyond movement and time. 120 In any event, neither of the models in question provides an entirely satisfactory or intellectually accessible solution, as not only shown by Immanuel Kant in his well-known first antinomy, 121 but also pointed at by the Buddha when he numbered it among the questions which remain 'unanswerable' (avyakata).122 (3) Paul Williams accuses Buddhism of never posing the question, 'Why is there something rather than nothing?' , despite its interest in causality .123 Though Williams is aware that, from a Thomist perspective, this question is not asking for a chronological 'first cause', he nevertheless seems to miss the teleological point so crucial to Aquinas' thinking on causality. If the question 'Why is there something rather than nothing?' is raised without any further qualification, it can be raised about everything - and, of course, also about god. Williams acknowledges this difficulty, but suggests that if god is understood as a necessary being, the question becomes absurd. 124 But Williams's postulation here is far from self-evident. Would it not be equally astonishing (or even more so) if not only a contingent world but also a necessary125 being exists? It could then just as well be asked, 'Why is there a necessary being rather than nothing?' And the answer would have to be that there could be no further explanation for this. If there is a necessary being, then it is simply there, without further explanation. 126 And the same could, of course, also be claimed 120 Cf. ScG II 37 EI hanc quidem , .. , which perhaps might be interpreted as suggesting a similar distinction, 121 Krilik der reinen Vemunft B 454/A 426-B 4611A 433, See also K Ward, Religion and Creation (Oxford: Clarendon 1996), p, 279. 122 For example Majjhima Nikaya 63, 72, and so on. 123 Cf. Williams, 'Aquinas meets the Buddhists', op, cit. (fn, 2), pp. 109ff; idem, The Unexpected Way (fn, 2), pp, 27ff. 124 Cf. Williams, The Unexpected Way, op, cit. (fn. 126), pp, 30f. 125 'Necessary', of course, not in the sense of logical necessity, but in the sense that if god exists, god cannot not exist (for example, cannot begin nor cease to exist), 126 Consider the following statement from the Dalai Lama (Beyond Dogma, op, cit., fn. 85, p, 230): 'When someone asks me why virtuous acts result in beneficial effects and negative acts lead to

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for the world. The problem is that Williams formulates his question too generally. In line with the thought of Aquinas, the question needs to be asked specifically about this world, and it needs to be asked in a teleological sense, that is, 'Why?' in the sense of 'What forTIs the world self-sufficient? Or is there a purpose for which it'is there? And is the world confined to the limits of its own all too obvious finite and transitory possibilities? Or are there certain experiences in this world which can be understood as pointing towards something beyond, towards an unconditioned reality, which 'all things have ... for their conclusion' (Anguttara Nikiiya 1O:58)? This question is as much the question of Aquinas as it has always been the question of Buddhism! (4) As we have seen, Aquinas's teleological understanding of creative causality implies the integration of creation into the wider framework of salvation, and this makes possible an understanding of god's inunanence in the creation in a sense even stronger than is possible under the aspect of creation alone. Because god is the source of being of every creature, god 'exists intimately in everything', says Aquinas. 127 This most intimate presence of god has decisive soteriological implications which are explicated in the salvific role of the divine 'persons' , in particular in the ideas thatthe whole world is created in and through the etemallogos, the son, and is filled with the life-giving and grace-mediating presence of the divine spirit. 128 A particularly fruitful task for future Buddhist-Christian dialogue might well be a closer and comparative consideration of the work of the spirit and the work of the tathiigatagarbha in the process of salvation. 129 So where do we now find ourselves? Christianity understands the world as a created reality, and the ultimate (God) as an uncreated reality. And Buddhism makes a similar distinction, seeing the world of sa1I).sara as a conditioned and compounded reality while the ultimate (nirval).a) is unconditioned and uncompounded. But whereas god is related to the world as its saviour and creator, nirval).a - or, in Mahayana terms, the dharmakaya - seems to be related to the world only as the precondition of salvation, but not as the precondition of creation. This prima facie impression requires modification since Buddhism too, whether Mahayana or nonMahayana, understands the world as being created - but as being created by karma. unpleasant consequences, I can only answer: "That's the way it is; it's natura!." There is no logical explanation.' Primafcicie, this seems to confirm Williams's point. But the Dalai Lama is saying that the karmic law is part of the eternal dharma. And the fact that the dhanna is 'there', and is as it is, cannot be explained any more than the fact that god exists and is as god is. 127 'Unde opportet quod Deus sit in omnibus rebus et intime'; STh 18:1. 128 The Christian teaching on divine immanence can modify the impression that Christianity is confined to a dualistic worldview. This is particularly important with regard to any Christian reflection on the Mahayana idea that ultimate reality constitutes ultimately the nature of all reality. 129 Amos Yong has announced the publication of a research project, Does the Wind Blow through the Middle Way? Pneumatology and the Christian-Buddhist Dialogue, and Sallie King is exploring the role of the Buddha nature and the Spirit according to Quakerism in her contribution to P. Knitter (ed.), The Myth of Religious Superiority: A Multi-Faith Exploration (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis 2005), pp.88-101.

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Hence, the crucial question is whether there exists a constitutive relation between the world-producing karma of ordinary sentient beings on the one hand and the salvific impact of the ultimate on the other. As we have seen, in Buddhism such a relation has been conceived - not only in the sense that the dharmakaya is the ultimate nature of all reality, but more specifically, in the teleological sense that nirval).a is the true goal towards which sentient beings have a natural inclination, expressed by the metaphor of the original purity of mind. Through the process of removing the karmic defilements, then, they are approaching the ultimate as their true goal. This teleological relationship is further elucidated in significant strands of Mahayana Buddhism. Here, the presence of the ultimate is understood not only as an inspirational force which draws beings towarcis their true goal, but also as that which inspires them to enter upon the Bodhisattva Path. The bodhisattva vow of striving for Buddhahood for the sake of all beings is a powerful force generating innumerable karmic merits through which the bodhisattvas, andlor the Buddhas which they become, create 'Buddha lands' - worlds in which sentient beings find the optimal conditions for achieving salvation. Sometimes these 'pure lands' are seen as San;tSaric worlds existing alongside the usual saTl).saric realms. But there are also strands of Mahayana thought according to which these best conditions are already found in the San;tSaric worlds as they are, so that in reality every world is a 'pure land' - the creation of a bodhisattvalBuddha. And since the bodhisattvaslBuddhas come into being through the teleological attraction or inspiration emanating from the presence of the ultimate reality, the world in the final sense is the creation of the ultimate - a conclusion explicitly drawn, as we saw, in some Tantric texts. 130 Thus the ultimate is the first or - given the teleological structure, better - final cause of the world in a logical and ontological, not in a chronological sense. The beginningless world is its manifestation, while in itself the ultimate remains entirely unmoved or unchanged. The cosmo gonic process in no way violates the karmic principles of freedom and responsibility, but operates precisely on their basis. So the world-creating factors are integrated into the overall soteriological structure of Buddhism, and the fact that ultimate reality is primarily related to the world as the sine qua non of salvation is well preserved in the Buddhist understanding of creation. As we have seen from.Aquinas, creation can be similarly well integrated into an ultimately soteriological structure within the Christian tradition. 'Grace presupposes and completes nature,' as the Scholastic axiom has it. l3l Here, too, god is seen as the first cause of the world in a logical and ontological sense, but not necessarily in a chronological one. As the source of the world's being, god is most interior to everything, and 'moves' or 'creates' the world as an unmoved mover by being the ultimate goal towards which everything strives. Nevertheless, the created beings have their own genuine causal power, and humans their genuine freedom and responsibility. 130 See again above, pp. 158f. 131 Gratia praesupponit naturam et perficit earn.

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Admittedly, while both religions exhibit a strikingly similar teleological structure which makes possible the integration of creation into salvation, the precise way in which this integration takes place is quite different. This is clearly due to idiomatic differences within the two traditions. The Christian account of creation speaks primarily a personalistic language, designating the divine will as the crucial factor, even if - as in Aquinas's conception - this 'will' is beyond time, has no origin, and knows no change, and is hence quite different from what is usually associated with a person's 'will'. Buddhism, on the other hand, speaks primarily an impersonal language, designating karma as the crucial factor in understanding creation, even if karma is mediated by persons - persons as diverse as deluded saII).saric beings, highly developed bodhisattvas or perfected Buddhas. Does this imply that, at the end of the day, our effort to construct a bridge will fail? Is there still a gap left in the middle of our unfinished bridge, the gap between creation/causation by a personal god and creation/causation by impersonal karma? To answer this question, we need to look at the connection between hermeneutics and pragmatics in both traditions.

The Pragmatics of Salvation It is sometimes overlooked that the Mahayana Buddhist critique of a divine creator,

particularly as formulated by representatives of the Madhyamaka school, is only part of the overall critique of the idea of any causal origination whatsoever.I 32 '[IJn the ultimate sense (paramarthataJ;) there is no origination at all,' says Bhavaviveka. 133 And Santideva chimes in, saying that 'there is no cessation and there is no coming into existence at any time' .134 Or, to quote from the Shih-erh-men-lun (Dvadasadvarasastra), one of the three basic scriptures of the Chinese Madhyamaka (Sanfun); Since production as such cannot be established, ongmation, duration and destruction cannot be established either. ... Therefore you should know all things have no production; they are ultimately empty and tranquil. 135

The fundamental critique of causal origination goes back to Nagarjuna's Miilamadhyamakakarikas, where in the very first verse he rejects all possible forms 132 Sometimes this is even true in a very formal sense. That is, the critique of causality follows the established scheme of the fourfold negation and criticizes (1) self-causation, (2) causation by something else, (3) causation by both, (4) causation by neither. The idea of a divine creator is criticized as a variant of (2), as, for example, in the Bodhicaryiivatiira 9: 117--43 and in Shih-erhmen-it",IO. 133 Madhyama/cahrdayavrtti 3:225. Lindtner, 'Madhyamaka Causality', op. cit. (fn. 97), p. 68. 134 Bodhicaryiivatiira 9:149 (according to a different numeration, 9:150). Translation taken from Santideva, The Bodhicaryiivatiira, translated by K. Crosby and A. Skilton (Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press 1995), p. 130. 135 Hsueh-li Cheng, Niigiirjul1a's Twelve Gate Treatise (Shih-erh-mel1-lun) (Dordrecht: D. Reidel 1982), p. 107.

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of origination: self-origination, origination from something else, from both or from no cause. 136 Simply stated, Niigiirjuna argues that if there is dependent origination (pratltyasamutpada), that is, if things originate in dependence on certain causes and conditions, they - as well as their causes and conditions - must be empty of svabhava (,self-existence' or 'own being'). For if there were something like a svabhava, this would be without any change, origination or destruction, and hence it would not be caused. Thus, in the first instance, the pratltyasamutpada shows that things are lacking svabhava. But if things are lacking svabhava, they cannot have any real relationships either, including any causal relationships. Lacking svabhava of any kind, they are neither causes nor conditions nor effects nor anything else. Their interdependence is at best only a logical, mentally fabricated one: sorriething is a 'cause' only by its logical relation to the 'effect', and vice versa. The son procreates the father no less than the father the son, for the 'father' is a 'father' only in relation to the 'son', and vice versa. And the relations are as fabricated as the related things. For the relation depends on the relata, and vice versa. Therefore, the principle of dependent origination leads first to the insight that all things are empty, and second to the insight of its own emptiness (cf. MK 1:1O!). It is like a medicine which must be taken in order to be discharged together with the contagious matter. 137 According to Niigiirjuna, our usual apprehension of reality as an inter-related network of substantial beings resembles 'a dream' or 'an illusion' (maya). 138 The true nature of things is beyond any conceptual understanding, including the Buddhist theory of dependent origination: 'Not caused by something else', 'peaceful', 'not elaborated by discursive thought', 'Indeterminate', 'undifferentiated': such are the characteristics of true reality (tattva) 139

If the true nature of all things is beyond dependent origination, if it is unconditioned, inconceivable and ineffable, then it is indistinguishable from ultimate reality: When the domain of thought has been dissipated, 'that which can be stated' is dissipated. 140 The essence of things is, like nirvaI,la, unoriginated and not terrninated. 141 136 M!71amadhyamakakiirikii (hereafter: MK) 1: l. 137 This image is used in Ratnak!(ta 54, a passage which Nagarjuna alludes to at MK 13:8. Cf. E. Frauwallner, Die Philosophie des BuddhisJnus (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 4th edn 1994), p. 165. 138 Cf. MK 7:34; 17:33. Alluding to Sal1!yutta-Nikiiya 22:95. 139 MK 18:9, translation following F. Streng, Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning (NashvilleNew Yorlc Abingdon Press 1967), p. 204. 140 Probably an allusion to Sutta Nipiita 1076. 141 MK 18:7. The translation follows Streng, Emptiness, op. cit. (fn. 139), p. 204, but 7b is amended. It needs to be emphasized that, according to Niigiirjuna, nirvaI)a and safI)siira are indistinguishable since penetrating analysis reveals safI)siira to be as equally unoriginated and unconditioned as nirvaI)a (see also RiitnavaI164). SafI)siira is lifted up to the level of nirvaI)a, so to speak, and not the

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From the standpoint of ultimate truth, then, there is no difference between san;tsara and nirviiI).a (MK 25:19-20). BOIi'! are inexpressible (MK 25:22--4). But what ramifications does such a radically apophatic view have for the Buddhist doctrine? According to Niigiirjuna, this must be understood in the same sense as the pratztyasamutpiida, which, pars pro toto, represents the Buddha dharma. The doctrine is an instrument leading to the highest, ineffable insight. It is a conventional, relative truth (taka sarjJvrti satya) without which truth in the ultimate or absolute sense (paramiirtha satya) cannot be shown and nirviiI).a not be reached (MK 24:8-10).142 On the level of relative truth, Niigiirjuna seems to have been a rather conservative Buddhist who did not see much reason to alter the traditional doctrine. 143 And obviously, he also understood his hermeneutical interpretation of the Buddhist doctrine as relative truth, not as an innovation, but as a restoration of its true purpose, as indicated by the reference he makes in connection with the two truths to the Alagaddiipamasutta l44 (cf. MK 24: 11). Therefore, despite the fact that the Buddhist doctrine of causality is thoroughly and comprehensively criticized by the Miidhyamikas, it is nevertheless equally thoroughly accepted as conventional or relative truth - as a means which provides indispensable day-to-day guidance and leads finally to insight into ultimate truth. Now if, at least as far as Madhyamaka is concerned, the Buddhist critique of a divine creator is part of its overall critique of causation, why then could Buddhists not accept the idea of divine creation or causation in i similar way as they accepted the pratztyasamutpiida or karmic causation - which is to say, as 'relative truth' (samvrti satya)? Bhiivaviveka designates the idea that karma is the creative cause of the world as a relative truth; 145 at the same time, he explicitly rejects the idea of a divine creator as being a relative truth, as we noted earlier. 146 For Bhiivya, the reason is to be found

142

143

144

145 146

other way around. In other words, nirvaI)a is not reduced from an unoriginated, unconditioned, imperishable reality to the status of the originated, conditioned, perishable reality of saII)sara! The latter interpretation would hardly be acceptable to traditional Buddhism, although it can be found in some modern accounts of the non-difference between nirvaI)a and saII)sara. On the doctrine of 'two truths', see: J. Cabez6n, Buddhism and Language: A Study of Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism (Albany, NY: SUNY 1994); M.D. Eckel, Jiianagarbha's Commentary on the Distinction Between the Two Truths (Albany, NY: SUNY 1987); M. Sprung (ed.), The Problem of Two Truths in Buddhism and Vedanta (Dordrecht-Boston: Reidel 1973); C. Lindtner, 'Atisa's Introduction to the Two Truths, and Its Sourc'es', Journal of Indian Philosophy 9, 1981, pp. 161-214. On the related doctrine of upaya see: M. Pye, Skilfitl Means: A Concept in Mahiiyana Buddhism (London: Duckworth 1978). See, for example, Suhrllekha, usually regarded as authentic, which has some Mahayana specific references to the six paramitas (8) and to Avalokitesvara and Amitabha (174f), but presents otherwise solid 'mainstream' Buddhism. The 'Discourse on the Parable of the Water-Snake' (= Majjhima Nikaya 22). Nagiirjuna refers to this parable, or more likely to the whole SUlra, in verse 11. It is this text which contains the famous parable of the raft, thereby illustrating the pragmatic, soteriological character of the Buddha's teaching. Cf. Madhyamakahrdayavrtti 3:222. Lindtner, 'Madhyamaka Causality', op. cit. (fn. 97), p. 67. Cf. Madhyamakahrdayavrtti 3:215. Lindtner, 'Madhyamaka Causality', op. cit., p. 65.

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in all the immoral implications and negative practical effects which, according to his view, accompany the idea of a divine creator if that creator is not identified with karma. But what if the ethical and soteriological concerns of Buddhists could be met? Could present-day Buddhists who are aware that the idea of a divine creator does not necessarily jeopardize human freedom and responsibility and who can go along with a person-making process having much in common with the intentions underlying the Buddhist karma doctrine - could these Buddhists accept the idea of divine creation as sanJvrti satya, that is, as a functional equivalent, expressed in a personalistic idiom, of their own idea of karmic creativity? Conversely, can Christians relativize their understanding of sacred doctrine in such a way as to render it comparable to the Buddhist understanding of sal1'}vrti satya? I believe they can, and even must if they are to remain faithful to the long tradition of negative or apophatic theology which was intended from the beginning as a strong relativization of all human talk about god,147 It would be rewarding for the future Buddhist-Christian dialogue to explore and compare hermeneutical concepts such as, for example, the Christian notion of analogy and Buddhist notions like sal1'}vrti satya or 'skilful means' (upaya).148 If I am right - that is, if Christians can indeed relativize their talk about god as Buddhists relativize their own doctrine - might Christians then accept the Buddhist notion of karmic causality as a functional equivalent, expressed in a nonpersonalistic idiom, of their own idea of a creator-god? As for Buddhists, so too for Christians, the decisive factor in this question might well hinge on soteriological aspects - this time with respect to Christian concerns over the ethical and practical implications of the Buddhist understanding of creation. 149 Here, it may well lie with the Christians to learn that Buddhism need not necessarily lead to that kind of world-denial and escapism which Christians are inclined to associate with a system that does not acknowledge a divine creator. For Buddhists, the world has never been simply and exclusively a place of mischief, but was always also the place where the liberating message of the Buddha can be heard and the appropriate environment for following his message and making spiritual progress. It has always been regarded as a place for practising loving-kindness, compassion and sympathy with all fellow sentient beings, and for preserving nature 147 Not an overview, but some important examples of the apophatic tradition can be found in: D. Turner, The Darkness of God: Negativity in Christian Mysticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, repro 1999). 148 Important first steps in this direction are taken by: J. Keenan, The Meaning of Christ: A Mahayana Theology (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis 1989); see also Keenan's contribution to this volume; J.P. Williams, Denying Divinity. Apophasis in the Patristic Tradition and Sota Zen Buddhist Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000); H.P. Sturm, Weder Sein noch Nichtsein: Der Urteilsvierkant (catu~ko,tiJ und seine Korollarien im ostlichen und westlichen Denken (Wlirzburg: Ergon 1996). See also J. Hick, 'Religion as "Skilful Means"', in idem, Disputed Questions in Theology and the Philosophy ofReligion (Houndmills: Macmillan 1993), pp. 119-36. 149 Cf. the essays of Lande and May in this volume.

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as their necessary Lebensraum. 150 Christians, on the other hand, in their praise of god's good creation, should not forget that it is not 'good' in any sentimental sense; god's good creation is sometimes an extremely harsh and demanding place, crushing people, but also giving rise to the person-making process. Both Christians and Buddhists could challenge and encourage one another to practice an attitude which combines loving involvement with selfless detachment. Buddhists may remind Christians that creation is not an aim in itself, but has its goal in redemption, and Christians may remind Buddhists that the path to salvation and the existence in salvation is acted out here, in communion with all others, and nowhere else. With these implications in mind, I think that Christians can indeed accept the idea of karmic creativity in Buddhism - particularly in the sense of the cosmogonic activity of bodhisattvas and Buddhas - as a functional equivalent to their own teaching of divine creation, and it remains to be seen whether contemporary Buddhists are able to make a corresponding move.

150 According to the basic instructions for the ideal king, as given in Dlgha Nikaya 26, it is part of his duties to grant protection also to the animals in his kingdom. This has been repeatedly reaffirmed throughout Buddhist tradition (see, for example, Suhrllekha 124). See also L. Schmithausen, Buddhism and Nature: The Lecture Delivered on the Occasion of the EXPO 1990. An Enlarged Version with Notes (Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies 1991); idem, 'The Early Buddhist Tradition and Ecological Ethics' , J oumal ofBuddhist Ethics 4, 1997, pp. 1-74.

Chapter 11

Conclusion

A crucial step leading to the Protestant-Roman Catholic joint declaration on 'justification' mentioned earlier, 1 rested upon the insight that the mutual accusations and refutations of the sixteenth century were not exactly, or at least not necessarily, addressing what the other in each case had wanted to express. I hope that as a result of what I have attempted to show here, something similar can be said about Buddhism and Christianity. The atheism which Christians criticize and reject is equivalent to materialism and nihilism, and is therefore not identical with the 'a-theism' or 'nontheism' advocated by most Buddhists, even if the latter explicitly reject the notion of a divine creator. Conversely, the kind of theism and creator-concepts which many Buddhists oppose are not (at least not necessarily) identical with the theodicysensitive and apophatically modified tt'1eism confessed by a major stream of the Christian tradition. But bridging the gulf does not mean removing the gulf. To. build a bridge is to offer a way, even if but a small way, of crossing the gulf. It is not the same as filling up the gulf. Even with a bridge, the gulf remains, but it no longer presents an insunnountable obstacle, Metaphor aside, there is no doubt that Buddhist thinking and Christian thinking about creation are very different, and the difference may still be interpreted as irreconcilable. But not necessarily so. There are lines of thought in both Buddhism and Christianity which allow the different approaches to creation to be viewed as compatible. What we would have then are different but noncontradictory expressions of the teleological structure of this world - expressions which can be correlated with a compatible understanding of salvationlliberation along the lines of a person-making process or, to use a later and more adequate phrase from John Hick, a process of 'transformation from self-centredness to Realitycentredness'. The doctrine of creation, whether creation by god or creation by karma, offers an answer to the question 'Why is there this universe?', but in both cases this 'Why?' and the respective answers do not refer to a chronologically first cause of the universe but rather to its teleological raison d'etre. The 'Why' is a 'Why?' in the sense of 'What for?'. And in both cases, the answer is that the universe exists as the appropriate environment for the realization of salvation. This understanding rests on a consciously selective, but (hopefully) not too eclectic reading of both traditions. It emphasizes certain Mahayana themes, like the creation of Buddha lands (and, most importantly, the identification of this world as a 1 See above p. 11 L

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or the 'pure land'), the trikiiya doctrine and tathiigatagarbha-thinking. But as regards the creative potential of karma and the teleological structure of the world, this interpretation has deep roots in pre- and non-Mahayana thought. On the Christian side, the interpretation emphasizes a specific fonn of theodicy and a corresponding concept of salvation, a Thomistic type of teleology with specific implications for the relation between grace and creation (natura), and - perhaps most unpopular today 2the understanding of god as immutable, as an 'unmoved mover'. Moreover, it presupposes in both traditions the firm conviction that ultimate reality necessarily transcends the range of human intellectual and verbal capacities - a conviction widely affinned in both Buddhism and Christianity, bilt which is now under fire in both traditions. Whereas in Buddhism (under Western influence), the threat to this conviction consists in the denial of an ultimate reality, the threat on the Christian side consists in the denial of the ultimate's ineffability.3 Perhaps the bridge sketched here is not the only one. There may be other resources in both traditions, still widely unexplored, which might reveal more and different fonns of complementarity, as for example the perspective of process theology which affinns the uncreatedness of matter and thus seems much closer to some forms of Hindu theism from the outset, or a Berkeleyan understanding of creation which might have the potential to deal more constructively with Mahayana illusionism than is possible from a largely Thomistic perspective. All this is only to indicate that much promising work lies before us in our efforts to discern the truth on both sides of the gulf.

2

3

See, for example, C Pinnock, Most Moved Mover: A Theology of God's Openness (Carlisle: Paternoster; Grand Rapids, MI, Baker 2001), pp. 65-lll; R. Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism (Oxford: Clarendon, repr. 1989), pp. 210-29. Unfortunately, there are currently efforts by SOme guardians of alleged orthodoxy to abandon this form of humility. Cf. the statement Dominus Jesus, No.6, issued by the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith of the Roman Catholic Church in 2000.

Index Abe, Masao 2, 5,140 Abraham 70-71 action-consensus without meaningconsensus 98-101 Anagarika Dharmapala 7-8 Anderson, Bernhard W. 70 Aquinas, Thomas 121, 166-70, 171 Aristotle 76,95,164 Ariyaratne, A. T. 77 Asanga 161,165 Asvagho~a 24-5 atheism see non-theism A viddhakarl!a 29 Bacon, Francis 93, 95 Badarayal!a 136 Bellah, Robert 87, 88 Bhavaviveka (Bhavya) 25,115-16,124-5, 128,131,133,135-7,138,144,155, 156-7,160,161,174 Bhikkhu Bodhi 2 Birch, Charles 93 Boethius 66 Briick, Michael von 87 Briinner, Emil 81 Buddhaghosa 1, 113 Bushido 88 Cabez6n, Jose 155, 164, 165 Candraklrti 162 Carvakas 112, 130 Chadron, Pema 72-3,79 Christian Science 63-4 . Cobb, John 84, 85 compassion 144, 152 Confucianism 88 Cox, Harvey 87 creation and cosmology arguments against 24-5,28,29-30, 127-39 human responsibility 128-33 ontology 26-30, 133-9

pragmatic arguments 139-41 problem ofevil24, 61-2, 67-8, 79, 127-8, 132, 137, 150 arguments for Cosmological Argument 37,125,126 design 124 Buddhism and 2,22-3,33-5,47-9,59-60, 81, 91, 119, 155-64 absence of creation as social defect of Buddhism 86 arguments against creation 24-5, 28, 29-30, 127-39 construction of pure universes in the Mahayana 38-40 contemporary Theravada perspective 35-8 contemporary Tibetan perspective 40-45 Clitical Buddhism 48, 58-9 critique of creation and creator-god 72-5, 123-41 ground of the Universe 52-8 'hidden' doctrine of creation 87-8 layout of the universe 48-9 Mahayana evaluation of the world 76-8 Mahayana understanding of creation and salvation history 79-80 making of the human world 51-2 people's place within the universe 49-51 Buddhist-Christian dialogue 177-8 preparing ground 111-12 Christianity 2, 6-8, 36, 69-72,73-4, 100, 102-3, 145-6, 164-72 logos concept 84-6 Process approach 66-7, 84 salvation and 36, 79-80, 82 Scandinavian Grundtvigian context 81, 82-3 creative causality and teleology 155-72 Christian con-elate 164-72 does the Ultimate act? 155-64 Hinduism and 16-21, 52,72

180

Index

Buddhist arguments against 24-5,28, 29-30 joy in 88-9 Mesopotamian 71 problemofeviI24,61-2,67-8, 79,127-8, 132, 137, 150 free will defence 64-6 natural evil 66-7 no-solution solution 63-4 creativity, karma and 89-91 Critical Buddhism 48,58-9,101 Dalai Lama, XIVth 40-45,54, 164 Darwin, Charles 73 de Silva, Lynn 5,81 deity see God/deity design, argument from 124 determinism 65, 131, 149 Devadatta 149 Dharmaklrti 26-30,124,125-6,131,133, 137-8,139 Dharmasiri, Gunapala 35-7,141 Dignaga 24, 27, 28-9 disasters 66-7 dualism 88-9 ecology 93-5 action-consensus without meaningconsensus 98-101 exploring complementarities 101-7 symbolizing transcendence and attitudes to nature 95-8 empiricism38 Buddhism and 36-7 enlightenment, Buddhism and 49 ethics Buddhism and 40-41 Christianity and 40 evil definition 61 genuine 63 problem of 24, 61-2, 67-8, 79,127-8, 132,137,150 free will defence 64-6 natural evil 66-7 no-solution solution 63-4 evolutionary theory 7,73 existence, Buddhist concept of26 Flew, A. 37 free will 64-6, 131-3, 143-6, 152, 168 Fucan, Fabian 6

God/deity 2,75,79-80 Buddhism and 1-5 goodness of 143-4 Process theology view 84 proofs for existence 62, 123-4; see also creation and cosmology, non-theism Gombrich, Richard 23 Gordon, M. L. 86, 88 Gowans, Christopher 3 Griffin, David 63 Griffiths, Paul 160 Grundtvig, N. F. S. 82 Grundtvigian tradition 81,82-3 GUl!ananda, Moho.q:ivate 7 Habito, Ruben L. F. 59 Hakamaya, Noriaki 58 Hardy, Edmund 8 Hick,John68, 145-6, 163, 177 Hinduism, creation in 16-21, 72 Buddhist arguments against 24-5,28, 29-30 Hisamatsu, Shin-ichi 141 Hsiian-tsang 133 Hubbard, Jamie 58 human responsibility 128-33 Hume, David 62 individual identity 81 Ireneus 82, 145 irrationalism 93-4 Japan Buddhist-Christian disputes in 6-7 modernization in 86, 87, 88 Jayatilleke, K. N. 35 John Paul II, Pope I joy in life 88-9 justice 147, 177 justification, doctrine of 111 J ustinius Martyr 85 Kamalasila 138, 144 Kant, Immanuel 62, 95,169 karma 37,38,41,44,76,77,82,87, 112, 118,124,125,130,131-3,137,144, 147-55 creativity and 89-91 Karmay, Samten 54 King, Winston 5 Kiiberlin, Gerhard 89

Index

Kong sprul yon tan rgya mtsho 33 Kreiner, A. 145 Lai, Whalen 87 Lindtner, Christian 122 logos concept 84-6 Ly;gstrup, K. E. 82 love 84,152 Mackie, John Leslie 65-6 martyrdom 80 materialism 112 Matsumoto, Shiro 58, 59 modernization 86, 87, 88, 93-4 Mo-ho-yen 59 Montaigne, Michel de 93 morality 147 free will and 65 Nagao, GadjinM. 77 Nagarjuna 25, 126, 172-3 natural evil 66-7 naturalism, Buddhism and 3 nature 95-8 nature religions 106-7; see also ecology Nicholas of Cusa 48,57,60 nirvana 112-14, 117-18, 119-20, 141, 151, 152,173-4 Nishitani, Keiji 4 non-theism (atheism) 111-15, 177 arguments for 123-41 Buddhism and 1-2,21-3 argument from ontology 26-30, 133-9 Nozick, Robert 63 Nyanaponika Mahathera 1,2 Nyaya27-30, 143-4, 166 Okumura, rchiro 85 ontological arguments 26-30, 133-9 original sin 62 OuyiZhixu 6 Palihawadana, M. 152 paradise 145-6 pure fields/pure lands theory 38-40, 90, 154,163-4,177 personhood 81 Petrarch, Francesco 95 Pieris, Aloysius 5 Plato 71, 95 pluralism 41

181

pragmatic arguments against creation 139-41 pragmatics of salvation 172-6 Prenter, Regin 82 Process theology 83-4 creation in 66-7, 84 logos concept 84-6 Protestantism 111, 177 modernization and 87, 88 rapture 75 reality, transcendent 112-15 transcategoriality 120-22 reason 95 reincarnation 115, 150-51 Buddhism and 37 relativism 41, 93-4 Rhys Davids, T. W. 23 Rinpoche, Namkhai Norbu 43 Roman Catholicism 111, 177 salvation 69-72,75,131,152 Buddhism and 36 Mahayana understanding of creation and salvation history 79-80 creation and 36, 79-80, 82 karma and 147-8 nirvana 112-14,117-18,119-20,141, 151,152,173-4 pragmatics of 172-6 soteriological teleology 115-20 Siintaraksita 138, 144 Siintidev~ 25, 135, 139-40 Schmidt-Leukel, Perry 87-8 Schmithausen,L.147 science 38,93 Buddhism and 7,36-7,43-5 evolutionary theory 7, 73; see also ecology sexuality 89 Shinran Shonin 152, 153-4 Shinto 88 sin, original 62 Sivaraksa, Sulak 77,89 Smart, Ninian 111 social action 86, 87 Buddhism and 77 soteriological teleology 115-20 Sri Lanka, Buddhist-Christian disputes in 7-8 Sthiramati 160 suffering 76, 144 Swidler, Leonard 81

182 tantric tradition, creation and 41-4,158 Teilhard de Chardin, PietTe 83 Tendai Buddhism 100-101 theism Buddhism and 1-5 refuation of pro arguments 123-41 theodicy person-making 143-6, 150, 168 problem of 61,62,63,67-8 Tillich, Paul 81 transcendent reality 112-15 transcategoriality 120-22 Udayana 143-4,166 Uddyotakara 27 universal theories 10 1-2

Index

Vacaspatimisra 30 Vasubandhu24, 25,126-7,128,155 Vimalakirti 39, 154 Walshe, Maurice 4 Weber, Max 87,88 Wheel of Life 49 Whitehead, Alfred North 83-4 Williams, Paull, 169-70 Wingren, Gustaf 82 world-denial 76-7 Zanskar valley 50 Zen 85-6