Bultmann Unlocked

Bultmann Unlocked

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Bultmann Unlocked

Tim Labron

Published by T&T Clark International A Continuum Imprint The Tower Building, 11 York Road, London SE1 7NX 80 Maiden Lane, Suite 704, New York, NY 10038 www.continuumbooks.com All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Copyright © Tim Labron, 2011 Tim Labron has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the Author of this work. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 13: 978-0-567-03153-2 (Hardback)

Typeset by Fakenham Photosetting Ltd, Fakenham, Norfolk Printed and bound in Great Britain by the MPG Books Group

Contents

Part I INTRODUCTION â•⁄ 1. Short Biography and Reception of Bultmann

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Part II BULTMANN AND THE LOCK â•⁄ 2. Paradigm and Paradox: John 1:14 â•⁄ 3. Flesh or Glory? â•⁄ 4. Historie or Geschichte

11 11 16 22

Part III BULTMANN’S KEYS RENEWED â•⁄ 5. Demythologizing and Justification by Faith â•⁄ 6. From Cartesian to Anti-Cartesian Thought â•⁄ 7. A Post-Structural Context â•⁄ 8. Wittgensteinian Parallels

33 33 42 58 75

Part IV BULTMANN UNLOCKED â•⁄ 9. Dissolving Locks and Philosophy 10. Implications for Theology and Religious Studies

107 107 113

Bibliography Index

121 129

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To Theresa, Kyleah and Jacob

PART I INTRODUCTION

Can Rudolf Bultmann be an important figure today? Surely, his significance has waned as we move beyond his era. Previous studies have investigated his thought, gleaned useful aspects and rejected questionable aspects. We have collectively moved past his thought as if it were an outdated scientific theory that is no longer applicable. In contrast to such assumptions, I want to show that Bultmann was a significant scholar and is still significant today. In order to clarify the significant and unique nature of his thought, this discussion will consider one of its mainstays; namely, John 1:14a (‘and the Word became flesh’). Not only is this verse important for Bultmann, it is the traditional verse by which the Christian tradition has affirmed a realistic incarnation in reaction to docetic claims. It is not surprising, then, that discussions of Bultmann often revolve around his exegesis and/or source criticism of 1:14a. However, such studies often reject his Gnostic source theory and exegesis, and then proceed to reject his entire thought on this basis. In contrast, the focus of this discussion will be Bultmann’s thought in general – not specifically his exegesis or source criticism. Bultmann states very well the intended aim of his task: ‘Our task is to discover the hermeneutical principle by which we understand what is said in the Bible.’1 Thus, the question of this discussion will not be ‘what is the source material behind 1:14a?’, or for that matter the source material

Bultmann, R. (1984) New Testament and Mythology, ed. and trans. Schubert M. Ogden Philadelphia: Fortress Press, p. 54.

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of the prologue itself. Rather, ‘what is the relation between 1:14a as it stands and Bultmann’s hermeneutic?’ If Bultmann’s foundational assumptions are flawed, that is, those dealing with his exegesis and source criticism, the question may well be raised whether it is credible to focus exclusively on his thought. A simple answer to this question is yes. If it is the case that Bultmann’s Gnostic source theory is faulty, it does not necessarily add or remove any weight from his interpretation of 1:14a and its focus on the ‘flesh.’ The critiques of Bultmann’s exegesis and source theory do not negate the viability of examining his thought and hermeneutic. In other words, it is legitimate to differentiate between the origins of Bultmann’s thought and its substance. Just as the text of John itself is often interpreted as it stands,2 so now Bultmann’s thought will be discussed as it stands. Yet it is not an easy task to delve into Bultmann’s thought. As Ashton notes, Bultmann’s work is difficult to access because it exemplifies the ‘hermeneutical circle’,3 that is, ‘we can understand the whole only in terms of its constituent parts and the parts only in terms of the whole.’4 To access this circle, Bultmann’s interpretation of 1:14a needs to be addressed; it is perhaps the key verse in the Gospel of John and as such it played a significant role in the formation of his thought. His interpretation of this verse is, in fact, paradigmatic for understanding his hermeneutical method. Yet the conventional understanding of his interpretation of this verse, and consequently his hermeneutical method, are beset with misunderstandings. In order to clarify and show the significance of 1:14a in Bultmann’s thought I will use Ernst Käsemann’s critique of Bultmann. For it is Käsemann, himself an outstanding student of Bultmann, who sees more clearly than most the significance of this verse for Bultmann’s thought. Käsemann deals with this verse explicitly in The Testament of Jesus, yet he diverges from Bultmann. The contrasting interpretation between Bultmann and Käsemann is specifically based on the interpretation of ‘the Word became flesh.’ For example, is it an unquestioned humanity – flesh





Hawkin, D. (1996) The Johannine World New York: State University of New York Press, p. 60. 3 Ashton, J. (1991) Understanding The Fourth Gospel New York: Oxford University Press, p. 45. 4 Hawkin, D. The Johannine World, p. 45. 2

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– that the Word becomes, or is it simply a manner of asserting that the Word entered the world? Bultmann maintains that the Word does indeed literally become flesh, while Käsemann considers flesh to be a figurative expression. The question to be raised first, then, is not what is the source behind 1:14a, but what is the interpretation of 1:14a as it now stands? What is the significance of this verse for Bultmann as a paradigm of his thought? Moreover, Bultmann’s understanding of 1:14a points to a paradigm of interpretation that carries beyond 1:14a itself to include his understanding of history, demythologizing and justification by faith. Many interpreters of Bultmann set their studies (perhaps unwittingly) within a Cartesian paradigm, such as Käsemann and Helmut Thielicke. However, Bultmann’s thought, like 1:14a itself, resists such Cartesian judgement and contextualization. Consequently, this is one reason these critics of Bultmann are often misguided. In a sense, Bultmann’s thought has been judged and locked in a Cartesian context, and its negative verdicts still haunt us today. What is required is a reading of Bultmann that does not try to fit him into a Cartesian box and consequently an ill-fitting interpretation. For instance, a post-structural context, which similarly rejects Cartesianism, is a better fit for understanding Bultmann. Moreover, a juxtaposition of a post-structural context with 1:14a and justification by faith can provide a renewed and more fruitful direction for discussions of Bultmann. These keys can unlock his thought from the Cartesian box. Additionally, and perhaps unconventionally, Ludwig Wittgenstein also provides an avenue of exploration to bring out interesting aspects of Bultmann’s thought to move us helpfully from the old criticisms and discussions to new ones. Wittgenstein’s thought is clearly opposed to Cartesianism and thus he provides an interesting parallel to Bultmann. Moreover, this aspect of his thought can provide an interesting philosophical alternative to the continual adaptations of Heidegger. I provide numerous quotations throughout as building blocks for discussion and, as Wittgenstein remarks, ‘problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known.’5 I want to provide their thoughts through their own voices. Obviously, my intent in the following is not to prove that

Wittgenstein, L. (1988) Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe Oxford: Basil Blackwell, §109.

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Bultmann is beyond criticism; rather, this discussion could provide a context for renewed and more insightful criticisms of Bultmann. Moreover, I am not trying to make Bultmann tolerable to the so-called post-modern reader. Just as, contrary to popular opinion, Bultmann is not trying make the Gospel palatable for contemporary readers, I am not trying to make him palatable for contemporary readers. Rather, Bultmann wants to show the clear and distinct offence of Christianity and a post-structural context may make the offence more clear; it may renew the offence.

1.╇ Short Biography and Reception of Bultmann Rudolf Karl Bultmann is one of the most influential theologians of the twentieth century, with a notorious reputation for his demythologizing in particular. Although there is no question that Bultmann was influential, the debate continues: is it a good influence or a bad influence, is he a defender of orthodoxy or is he a heretic? He was born 20 August 1884 in Wiefelstede, Germany and died 30 July 1976 in Marburg. His theological interests are evident in his extended family as well. His father was a Lutheran pastor and his grandfather and maternal grandfather were pastors. Bultmann’s own interest in theology included Greek and German literature studies and eventually culminated in theological studies at Tübingen University (1903), Berlin and Marburg. At Marburg, Johannes Weiss told Bultmann that he should continue with a doctoral degree in New Testament studies. He did continue and he was granted his degree in 1910, and then qualified as a lecturer in 1912. Bultmann married while he held an assistant professor post at Bresalasu between 1916 and 1920. He then became a full professor at Giessen (1920) and he began his turn away from liberal theology and towards dialectical theology but, importantly, he did not outright reject or accept either school. He says, ‘I try to combine the decisive insight of a “dialectical” theology with the heritage of “liberal” theology, though it goes without saying that my attitude to both alike is a critical one.’6 In 1921, he took a post at Marburg and remained there until 1951 when he became emeritus.

Bultmann, R. (1968) in An Introduction to the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, by Walter Schmithals, trans. John Bowden Minneapolis: Augsburg, p. 12.

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Clearly, the Second World War and the rise of the Third Reich influenced Bultmann’s life, and he did take a stand. He states, ‘Then came the Hitler regime with its coercion and corrupting methods. Life in the university and in society at large was poisoned by mistrust and denunciations. Only within a small circle of like-minded acquaintances could one enjoy the open and invigorating exchange of the intellectual world. Many Jewish friends were forced to emigrate. During the war, in the course of which my only surviving brother died in a concentration camp, came the worst pressure from the Nazi terror. .â•›.â•›. I belonged to the Confessing Church from the time of its founding in 1934 and, with my friend Hans von Soden, endeavoured to see that free scholarly work retained its proper place within it in spite of reactionary tendencies.’7 After 1945, the university at Marburg eventually regained its normal activities, and it was at Marburg that Bultmann met Rudolf Otto, Karl Barth, Friedrich Gogarten (the latter two were invited to give lectures and joined Bultmann’s move away from liberal to dialectical theology) and Heidegger. Much is made of Heidegger’s influence upon Bultmann, but it was largely a matter of expression and formation of thought, in contrast to new thought. In the words of Walter Schmithals (Bultmann’s student and identified by Bultmann as writing the best material about him), ‘Bultmann’s theology is independent, unmistakeable, and not to be explained as an addition to the words of his teachers; we may have uncovered its most important historical roots, but that does not mean that we have explained it as a combination of liberal and dialectical theology in the garb of Heideggerian conceptuality. It has not been our intention to explain it at all. Indeed, I do not believe that one can explain a theology, and if one can, the explanation is a quite useless undertaking.’8 Whatever is made of the influences on Bultmann’s thought throughout his academic career, it should be clear that he is a distinctive thinker. Schmithals, like this discussion, is not overly concerned with the historical development of Bultmann’s thought, but in understanding his thought as it stands.9





Bultmann, R. (1966) ‘Autobiographical Reflections of Rudolf Bultmann’, ed. Charles W. Kegley New York: Harper & Row, p. xxi. 8 Schmithals, W. (1968) An Introduction to the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, trans. John Bowden London: SCM Press, p. 19. 9 Schmithals, An Introduction to the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, p. 20. 7

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The nature of Bultmann’s influence on others, however, is an open and wide-ranging debate. For example, Schubert Ogden notes, ‘By common consent, Rudolf Bultmann is one of the most significant figures on the contemporary theological scene. By whatever criteria one judges such significance .â•›.â•›. his contribution is unchallengeably among the most important of our time.’10 Despite the general agreement that Bultmann has been extremely influential, he is sometimes overlooked or even dismissed. Norman Young notes that ‘we have been encouraged to go beyond Bultmann, or to bypass him altogether.’11 If he is not bypassed, then perhaps he needs to be treated with caution. When Bultmann lectured on demythologizing at Princeton Theological Seminary during his 1951 American lecture tour, his travel diary notes that ‘as a precaution, students were not invited, only faculty.’12 Likewise, John Macquarrie notes, ‘there is a certain fear of demythologizing, and this fear had usually outweighed the factors on the other side. Few theologians have been willing to go for a ride in Bultmann’s car.’13 Indeed, John Reumann notes that Bultmann’s thought can lead to ‘terrifying results’!14 Why is there a fear of Bultmann? Thielicke says Bultmann rejects objective reality and Christ, leaving us only ‘the shadows of our own consciousness.’15 Likewise, T. F. Torrance says Bultmann leaves us ‘flung back upon ourselves’.16 Helmut Gollwitzer thinks Ogden, S. M. (1966) ‘The Significance of Rudolf Bultmann for Contemporary Theology’, in The Theology of Rudolf Bultmann C. W. Kegley (ed.), p. 104. 11 Young, N. J. (1969) History and Existential Theology: The Role of History in the Thought of Rudolf Bultmann. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, p. 7. 12 Quoted in Bultmann Lemke, A. (1985) ‘Bultmann’s Papers,’ in Bultmann, Retrospect and Prospect: The Centenary Symposium at Wellesley, ed. Edward C. Hobbs, Harvard Theological Studies, no. 35 Philadelphia: Fortress Press, p. 3. 13 Macquarrie, J. (1960) The Scope of Demythologizing: Bultmann and his Critics London: SCM Press, p. 14. 14 Reumann, J. (1958) ‘The Relevant Gospel According to Rudolf Bultmann’, Lutheran Quarterly, 10, no. 3 (August), p. 226. 15 Thielicke, H. (1961) ‘The Restatement of New Testament Mythology’, in Kerygma and Myth, ed. Hans Werner Bartsch New York: Harper & Row, p. 147. 16 Torrance, T. F. (1969) Theological Science Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 327.

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that Bultmann makes the term ‘God’ designate ‘merely a state of man.’17 Donald Bloesch says Bultmann leaves us with ‘knowledge of the self’, not God.18 Paul Molnar thinks that Bultmann annihilates objectivity and equally annihilates the possibility of a ‘genuine saviour, creator, lord and redeemer.’19 David Hart regards Bultmann as ending with ‘inviolable subjectivity.’20 And Vincent Taylor notes, ‘Bultmann is radical to the point of scepticism.’21 Unsurprisingly, Bultmann is readily criticised for rejecting the resurrection of Jesus and denying all knowledge of the historical Jesus, but these are characterizations. John Painter rightly notes, ‘It is not unusual to read that Bultmann denies any knowledge of the historical Jesus or that he rejects the resurrection of Jesus. Both assertions are wrong and obscure the issues that are at stake in the debate.’22 If these misguided characterizations of Bultmann are accepted, then it is little wonder that he meets significant criticism or outright dismissal. Predictably, a circulated pamphlet in 1951 was of the opinion that demythologizing was a ‘poison.’23 On a more personal note, Hans Joachim Iwand ‘believed that he had detected “signs of senility” in the author [Bultmann].’24 There may be a consensus that Bultmann can be criticized, but there is no consensus on the aspect of his thought that needs to be criticized. Macquarrie makes an insightful and accurate observation regarding various interpretations of Bultmann: ‘On the right, Helmut Thielicke, who attaches great importance to the character of once-for-all-ness in the Christ event, accuses Bultmann of abandoning this character; but on the left Fritz Buri, Gollwitzer, H. (1965) The Existence of God as Confessed by Faith, trans. James W. Leitch London: SCM Press, p. 28. 18 Bloesch, D. (1994) Holy Scripture: Revelation, Inspiration and Interpretation Downers Grove: IVP, p. 254. 19 Molnar, P. D. (2007) Incarnation and Resurrection: Toward a Contemporary Understanding Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, p. 19. 20 Hart, D. B. (2003) The Beauty of the Infinite: The Aesthetics of Christian Truth Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, p. 22. 21 Taylor, V. (1933) The formation of the Gospel Tradition London: Macmillan, p. 14. 22 Painter, J. (1987) Theology as Hermeneutics: Rudolf Bultmann’s Interpretation of the History of Jesus Sheffield: Almond Press, p. 2. 23 Kuschel, K-J. (1992) Born Before All Time?: The Dispute over Christ’s Origins, trans. John Bowden London: SCM Press, p. 159. 24 Ibid., p. 154.

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who thinks it is time that the Church forgot about once-for-allness, lays at Bultmann’s door the precisely opposite charge of retaining this character. Again on the right, Karl Adam, who disapproves of radical theologians, accuses Bultmann of carrying the line of liberal theology to its very end; but here on the left Karl Jaspers, who equally disapproves of orthodox theologians, maintains that Bultmann is a most illiberal thinker.’25 From another perspective, Bultmann is often charged with either subjectivism or an ontological categorization similar to Tillich’s, as Macquarrie assumes.26 Yet Bultmann rejects the charge of subjectivism and of a metaphysical ontological basis.27 I would not hesitate to guess that many critics of Bultmann have not read his work, particularly contemporary critics. They only repeat the fashionable conceptions and resultant criticisms of his thought like news agencies repeating stories whether they are true or not. Dietrich Bonheoffer notes that the criticisms he has heard of Bultmann’s demythologizing are ‘idiotic’ and he ‘would like to know whether any of them [the critics] have worked through the John commentary.’28 Bultmann himself notes, ‘It is incredible how many people pass judgment on my work without having read a word of it .â•›.â•›. I have sometimes asked the grounds for a writer’s verdict, and which of my writings he has read. The answer has regularly been, without exception, that he has not read any of my writings; but he has learnt from a Sunday paper or a parish magazine that I am a heretic.’29 Bultmann needs to be read and discussed rather than regurgitated. What about the few positive remarks directed toward Bultmann? Do they typically grasp his thought? Unfortunately, they may also miss the mark. Bultmann is applauded for his attempt to make the Gospel more acceptable and comprehensible Macquarrie, J. (1960) The Scope of Demythologizing: Bultmann and his Critics, p. 30. 26 Macquarrie, J. (1966) ‘Philosophy and Theology in Bultmann’s Thought’, in C. W. Kegley (ed.) The Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, New York: Harper & Row, pp. 140–141. 27 Bultmann, R. (1966) ‘Reply’, in C. W. Kegley (ed.) The Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, New York: Harper & Row, p. 274. 28 Kuschel, K-J. (1992) Born Before All Time?, p. 158. 29 Bultmann, R. quoted in W. Schmithals (1968) An Introduction of the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, p. 21.

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for modern people. For example, Paul Leo and David Stanley say almost the same thing. Leo notes, ‘Bultmann has made valuable contributions by his .â•›.â•›. deep concern that the truth of the gospel should be stated in terms comprehensible to modern man.’30 And Stanley writes, ‘Bultmann is to be praised for his effort to re-present God’s message to modern man.’31 These authors may think they are doing Bultmann a service, but they actually confuse his task and divest him of his central concern; namely, to make the offensive nature of the gospel clear to modern people, but the offence, as will be shown, must be the right offence, not any offence. Perhaps today there is little fear of Bultmann, only a dismissal that in the end he is irrelevant. For instance, we read, ‘Our very summary of Bultmann’s 1941 program will only confirm for many his irrelevance for theology today. The positivistic assumptions of Bultmann’s mechanistic model of science are now challenged by theologians, such as Thomas F. Torrance, informed by post-Einsteinian developments in physics.’32 Our contemporary commentaries and reference sources foster this irrelevancy. For example, in Who’s Who of World Religions we find that Bultmann ‘adopted a radically sceptical view’; in A Concise Encyclopaedia of the Philosophy of Religion we read that ‘Bultmann’s positive aims are vitiated and flawed’. Alternatively, The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Modern Christian Thought states that Bultmann ‘represents the purest form of existentialism’, as if the ‘purest form’ makes it clear! As Young rightly notes, ‘it seems almost inevitable that any attempt to describe Bultmann’s approach to history will make use of the label “existentialist.” This is unfortunate in a way, because while there is some truth in saying Bultmann takes an existentialist view of history, this really tells us very little. In the first place, the label is used with such abandon these days that it is difficult to know in any given case what it is supposed to mean.’33 In light Leo P. (1953) ‘Kerygma and Mythos: The Theology of Rudolf Bultmann’, Lutheran Quarterly, 5, no. 4 (November), p. 368. 31 Stanley, D. (1957) ‘Rudolf Bultmann: A Contemporary Challenge to the Catholic Theologian’, Catholic Biblical Quarterly, 19, no 3 (July), p. 354. 32 James, K. (1991) ‘Theological Table-Talk: Myth or Narrative’ in Theology Today, 48, no. 30, p. 328. 33 Young, N. J. (1969) op. cit. p. 13.

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of these misgivings, it is not surprising to read in The Oxford Companion to Christian Thought that there is a ‘precipitous decline in Bultmann’s popularity.’ John Reumann, who is not enamoured of Bultmann, nonetheless notes, ‘While Bultmann may not be giving all the right answers, he is certainly asking significant questions.’34 Similarly, Herbert Wolf notes, ‘however one may evaluate Bultmann’s hermeneutic, it must be admitted that he has raised the question in inescapable fashion, and neither biblical studies nor theology can ignore it.’35 I suggest that despite the misunderÂ�standings of Bultmann’s contemporaries, they may have understood Bultmann better than many subsequent theologians. Why? Because there was a certain fear surrounding him, while now there is largely dismissal. Indeed, today few are fearful of a car ride with Bultmann; rather, they dismiss him and his old clunker as irrelevant. I intend to show that fear is essential for a renewed understanding and discussion of Bultmann. Just as Bultmann’s point is not to make the gospel tolerable, my point is not to make Bultmann tolerable; indeed, to understand him properly could possibly make him less tolerable. However many criticisms can be piled on Bultmann, I think it is clear that there is a parallel with Alfred North Whitehead in relation to Bertrand Russell. As Whitehead notes in conversation: ‘You know, there are two kinds of people in the world: the simple-minded and the muddleheaded. Bertie Russell says “I am muddleheaded. Well, I say he is simple-minded.”’36 The common critiques of Bultmann are simple-minded, while Bultmann may be muddleheaded. Although Bultmann is rightly described as a New Testament scholar, and has been criticized and relegated to historical archives in this regard, it is appropriate to bring his work back to life, to see how he speaks to theology today. We need to see the question rightly, we need to understand the fear, and we need to see that it is inescapable – even if it seems muddleheaded.

Reumann, J. (1958) op. cit. p. 226. Wolf, H. C. (1965) Kierkegaard and Bultmann: The Quest of the Historical Jesus Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing, p. 86. 36 Barrett, W. (1979) The Illusion of Technique Garden City, NY: Anchor Press /Doubleday, p. 17.

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2.╇ Paradigm and Paradox: John 1:14 Clark Pinnock writes, ‘because of his commitment to alien philosophical notions, Bultmann has had to abandon the saving events and revealed doctrines of Scripture, with the result that his theology is both inconsistent and irrational.’1 In contrast, I suggest that John 1:14a and justification by faith are his commitment, not an alien philosophy. Indeed, I also suggest that on the contrary, alien philosophy can fuel the response to Bultmann, namely Cartesianism. It is not my intent to argue directly against these critics of Bultmann; rather, I want to take the argument in a different direction, certainly not to prove that Bultmann is right on all accounts, but to show that his thought is insightful and that it should not be stepped around so casually. Rather than working through the outdated critics of Bultmann, it is useful to see the theological paradigm of his thought, that is 1:14a and justification by faith, in contrast to so-called alien philosophy such as Heidegger and existentialism. As a paradigm of his method, 1:14a is not, in any manner, underrated by Bultmann. He ranks 1:14a as the most significant verse of the Gospel; indeed, he says ‘the main theme of the Gospel is “the Word became flesh.”’2 More specifically, he states, ‘now the riddle is solved, the miracle is proclaimed:



Pinnock, C. H. (1971) ‘Theology and Myth: An Evangelical Response to Demythologizing’, in Bibliotheca Sacra, 128 no 511 (July), p. 218. 2 Bultmann, R. (1955) The Gospel of John: a Commentary, trans. G. R. Beasley-Murray (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press), 64. See 1

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the Logos became flesh!’3 The significance of this statement is conveyed most accurately through an examination of what he means by ‘flesh.’ The importance of the ‘flesh’ in particular, is demonstrated by contrasting it, for example, with Gnosticism. Bultmann understands the Revealer to be a particular body and flesh, not body and flesh in general. Hence, unlike the Gnostic redeemer, for whom place and time are of no importance, along with the historical tradition, the Revealer, as Bultmann understands him, is a particular body of flesh in space and time.4 He says, ‘revelation is an event with an other-worldly origin, but this event, if it is to have any significance for men, must take place in the human sphere.’5 In other words, Bultmann notes that if 1:14a does not take place in ‘the human sphere,’ or if it is only a general concept, then it is essentially of no importance or relevance to humans. However, since he considers 1:14a to point to a particular person and history, he maintains that ‘the Revealer appears not as man-in-general .â•›.â•›. but as a definite human being in history.’6 What is passed on through 1:14a is not a timeless idea, but a particular body/flesh and a historical event.7 The Revealer does not merely present an occasion for reflection after which the individual can do without it, as is the case in Gnosticism, but rather is a decisive eschatological situation.8 This ‘decisive eschatological situation’ will be shown to be an aspect of faith, in contrast to ratiocination; for now, the point is that it is historic and concrete. Despite being the main theme of the Gospel and its most significant verse, 1:14a incongruously reveals nothing more than ‘the word became flesh.’ It does seem peculiar that for all the emphasis on flesh, history, and particularity that Bultmann places on 1:14a, it reveals nothing more than the statement that ‘the word became flesh.’ Yet Bultmann insists that, ‘Jesus as the Revealer of God reveals nothing but that he is the revealer.’9 This



also Bultmann, Theology of The New Testament, vol. II, trans. Kendrick Grobel New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, p. 40. 3 Bultmann,R. The Gospel of John, p. 61. 4 Ibid., p. 65. 5 Ibid., p. 61. 6 Bultmann,R. Theology of the New Testament, p. 41. 7 Bultmann, R. The Gospel of John, p. 70. 8 Ibid., p. 66. 9 Bultmann, R. Theology of the New Testament, p. 66.

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insistence that what is revealed is only that Jesus is the Revealer raises the question, for example, of what has happened to the glory? Can it be seemingly dismissed so easily? Bultmann says the Revealer does not fill others with an awe of the glory, but rather, ‘according to John, the Divine is the very counter-pole to the human, with the result that it is a paradox, an offence, that the Word became flesh,’ he then continues by commenting that in fact the divinity of the Revealer is hidden.10 Despite the hiddenness of the glory, it is important to note that Bultmann is not negating the glory since he says that the Revealer ‘really’ possesses the glory.11 He shows that human reason and sight alone cannot grasp the glory. Consequently, the incarnation makes the Word visible (Deus revelatus), yet at the same time there is a covering of glory since we cannot bear the uncovered God (Deus nudus). Therefore, Bultmann points out that the hidden God (Deus absconditus) becomes the revealed God (Deus revelatus) in the flesh. He notes that it is in sheer humanity that the Revealer exists: ‘the logos is now present in the Incarnate, and indeed it is only as the Incarnate that it is present at all.’12 Thus, the glory, in conjunction with 1:14a, creates a paradox as noted by Bultmann: ‘this is the paradox which runs through the whole gospel: the [glory] is not seen alongside the [flesh], nor through the flesh as through a window; it is to be seen in the flesh and nowhere else.’13 If the glory is to be seen, Bultmann points, paradoxically, to the Passion, not a ‘heavenly luminosity.’14 In other words, it is a paradox that the revealed God shows us the hidden God, that the flesh is not the temporary container of glory, nor does it show the glory.15 This paradoxical nature of 1:14a drives the wrong-headed desire to separate the flesh and glory. Indeed, the paradox is muted and the offensive nature of 1:14a is dulled if the glory (incarnation) is denied or if the flesh is denied. Bultmann, for example, regards the offence of 1:14a – that the glory becomes the flesh – to be the main reason for the desire to place the Ibid., pp. 41–42. Bultmann, R. The Gospel of John, p. 68. 12 Ibid., p. 63. 13 Ibid., p. 63. 14 Bultmann, R. (1987) Faith and Understanding I, ed. Robert W. Funk, trans. Louise Pettibone Smith Philadelphia: Fortress Press, p. 281. 15 Bultmann, R. Theology of the New Testament, p. 50.

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Revealer in a costume: ‘His humanity must be no more than a disguise; it must be transparent. Men want to look away from the humanity, and see or sense the divinity, they want to penetrate the disguise – or they will expect the humanity to be no more than the visualization or the ‘form’ of the divine.’16 In effect, if the humanity is a ‘disguise’ then the paradox of 1:14a is solved with glory and conversely, if the glory is a sham, then the humanity is the solution. Bultmann, however, keeps the paradoxical relationship. The perplexing and paradoxical relationship between the flesh (human nature) and glory (divine nature) has long been debated. Nonetheless, the Church in principle holds to the Chalcedonian position, as does Bultmann. For example, given that the divine nature in the abstract does not suffer, can we nonetheless say the divine suffers in light of the communication of attributes? Can we say the glory is seen in the Passion? If we say Jesus the carpenter made a box with four sides and say that this carpenter is the Son of God in one person, then there could be agreement. However, if we say God made a box with four sides, then disagreement is more likely to follow since making a box is the attribute of the human nature, not the divine nature. Likewise, if we say God was crucified and suffered, the response would be that being crucified and suffering is the attribute of the human nature, not the divine nature. However, directly tied to the paradox is the full communication of attributes that allow us to say Christ has died and we can thereby also say God has died – but importantly not God isolated, but rather as paradoxically united with Christ. God suffers because of the substantial union of the divine and human natures in the one person of Christ. Luther, for example, also follows the Chalcedon view that what is attributed to one nature is attributed to the whole person: ‘since the divinity and humanity are one person in Christ, the Scriptures ascribe to the divinity, because of this personal union, all that happens to humanity, and vice versa. .â•›.â•›. Just as we say: the king’s son is wounded – when actually only his leg is wounded; Solomon is wise – though only his soul is wise; Absalom is handsome – though only his body is handsome; .â•›.â•›. For since the body and soul are one person, everything that pertains to the body or soul, yes, to the last member of the body, is correctly and properly 16

Bultmann, R. The Gospel of John, p. 63.

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ascribed to the whole person.’17 God dies and suffers because there is one person – Christ – who has the attributes of both natures. In other words, the flesh and glory are paradoxically united and, as Bultmann says, it is in the Passion that the glory is paradoxically seen. In contrast, Zwingli’s rhetorical alloeosis, for example, weakens the communication of attributes and separates the divine nature from the human Jesus. This position takes the ‘simple-minded’ approach in contrast to the paradoxical ‘muddleheaded’ approach. Zwingli holds that there is a nominal relation between the divine and human natures and thereby appears to support a Nestorian position. He notes, ‘it was only the man who felt the pangs of suffering, and not God, for God is invisible, and therefore is not subject to any pain, that is, suffering or passion.’18 We can see a move to a conception of, and protection of, the glory of God that creates a strict separation between the divine and the human. Granted, there is a great divide between the divine and the human; however, that is exactly why the incarnation is a paradox and so extraordinary: it would not be extraordinary if it were not a substantial union. Luther, like Bultmann, is against such abstract rationalism: ‘If I speak rightly saying that the divinity does not suffer, the humanity does not create, then I speak of something in the abstract and of a divinity that is separated. But one must not do that. Abstract concepts should not be cut loose, or our faith will become false. But one believes in a concrete sense (in concreto) saying that this man is God, etc. Then the properties are attributed.’19 Luther sees God as Christ in the concrete, not bound by Platonic categories and thereby transcending suffering. God is incarnate and is known in the flesh and blood rather than through abstract rationalizations. Therefore, the alleosis is rejected and the Passion of God as revelation is affirmed. Likewise, throughout John – not to mention interpreters of Luther, M. (1955–1986) Luther’s Works: American Edition, vol.37, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan and Helmut T. Lehmann (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House; Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress Press 37: pp. 210–11. 18 Zwingli, (1953) ‘Exposition of the Faith’, in The Library of Christian Classics, vol. 24, Zwingli and Bullinger Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, p. 252. 19 Luther, M. (1971) quoted in The Two Natures in Christ, by Martin Chemnitz St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, pp. 191–92.

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John – Bultmann considers any misunderstandings to be an expression, or direct consequence, of the offence of ‘the word became flesh.’20 There is a continual temptation to docetism and rationalism; that is, Christ is no particular man or Christ is only a man. The paradox of the hidden glory – which would not be a paradox at all if Bultmann negated the glory – arises from Bultmann’s interpretation of 1:14a and is directly connected to an offence. This and nothing else is what is meant by ‘the word became flesh’21 Furthermore, ‘to be confronted with the Revealer is not to be presented with a persuasive set of answers [or an overwhelming glory] but only to be faced with a question.’22 Moreover, ‘the event of the revelation is a question, is an offence. This and nothing else is what is meant by “the word became flesh”.’23 This question is not answered with didactic propositions or an overwhelming glory; or in other words, rationalism or docetism. Rather, it drives a faith that sees the glory in the flesh and Passion.

3.╇ Flesh or Glory? One example of attempting to rectify Bultmann’s thought by turning away from the paradox and offence of 1:14a is found in the work of Käsemann, a former devoted student of Bultmann who rightly considers this verse to be important in order to understand Bultmann’s interpretation of John. More specifically, he states: ‘The first thing to be said is that this interpretation [Bultmann’s interpretation of John] will still be studied and have influence when even the names of Bultmann’s contemporary opponents are scarcely remembered. It belongs to the line of classic interpretations even if the fourth-form mind of our time does not recognize this.’24 Nevertheless, Käsemann says, ‘according to my own analysis of the structure of the Prologue, I must first of all say that I can no longer accept Bultmann’s interpretation as correctly distributing the stresses.’25 Bultmann, R. Theology of the New Testament, p. 46. Bultmann, R. The Gospel of John, p. 62. 22 Ibid., p. 66. 23 Ibid., p. 62. 24 Käsemann, E. (1979) New Testament Questions of Today, trans. W. J. Montague Philadelphia: Fortress Press, p. 15–16. 25 Ibid., p. 154.

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This unacceptable stress makes, as Käsemann comments, 1:14a the ‘fulcrum of its exegesis’26 and eventually led to his break with Bultmann.27 Käsemann considers the flesh concept to be unable to justify Bultmann’s interpretation of, and emphasis upon, 1:14a. For Käsemann, flesh is nothing other than ‘the possibility for the Logos as the Creator and Revealer, to have communication with men.’28 In effect, he considers 1:14a to be a transitional point to the real theme of the Gospel, namely, 1:14c, ‘We beheld his glory.’29 It is because of the significance of the glory that Käsemann cannot understand why Bultmann places such a great emphasis on ‘pure and simple humanity.’30 Rather, Käsemann says, ‘the Evangelist allows the weight of his propositions to fall not on 14a but on 14c.’31 He writes, ‘For what reason is this statement [“The Word became flesh”] almost always made the centre, the proper theme of the Gospel? .â•›.â•›. we must also ask: In what sense is he flesh, who walks on the water and through closed doors .â•›.â•›. how does all this agree with the understanding of a realistic incarnation? .â•›.â•›. does the statement “The Word became flesh” really mean more than that he descended into the world of man and there came into contact with earthly existence, so that an encounter with him became possible? Is not this statement totally overshadowed by the confession “We beheld his glory”?’32 It is obvious that Käsemann’s interpretation of 1:14a is contrary to Bultmann’s since he regards the flesh as unintelligible and negligible when compared to the glory. These questions regarding the humanity of Jesus lead Käsemann – just as Bultmann stated would happen as a result of the offensive paradox – to allude to the body of Jesus as being a costume and not subject to earthly conditions.33 Thus, Käsemann Ibid., p. 153. Käsemann, E. (1988) ‘What I Have Unlearned in 50 Years as a German Theologian’ Currents in Theology and Mission 15 (August): p. 330. 28 Käsemann, E. New Testament Questions of Today, p. 159. 29 Ibid., p. 159. 30 Ibid., p. 161. 31 Ibid., p. 164. 32 Käsemann, E. (1968) The Testament of Jesus: a Study of the Gospel of John in the Light of Chapter 17, trans. Gerhard Krodel London: SCM Press, p. 9. 33 Ibid., p. 10.

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says, ‘the disguise, the hiding, of a divine being in lowliness may appear paradoxical, but it is not really paradoxical at all.’34 Käsemann continues by commenting that the ‘incarnation in John does not mean complete, total entry into the earth, into human existence, but rather the encounter between the heavenly and the earthly.’35 This brings to light another important point, namely, Käsemann’s emphasis on the ‘encounter between the heavenly and the earthly.’ This comment of Käsemann is in contrast to Bultmann who focuses on a particular person in history. Käsemann says the flesh is where the Word of God is recognized and, more specifically, is ‘creatureliness in the whole range of its possibilities.’36 However cryptic ‘creatureliness in the whole range of possibilities’ is, let it suffice to say that Käsemann is interested in a general humanity, not a particular person, when discussing the incarnation of 1:14a. Accordingly, Käsemann perceives Bultmann as incorrectly understanding the incarnation as a radical entry of the Logos into a ‘totally human life.’37 It is clear that Käsemann does not think that the incarnation is a ‘totally human life.’ Bornkamm aptly comments that according to Käsemann ‘there is no trace in John of a truly human Jesus .â•›.â•›. so in light of John 1:14 .â•›.â•›. it is meaningless to speak of a genuine paradox.’38 In contrast, Bultmann’s position is that the incarnation is a radical paradox and not an ‘eschatological occurrence as a process of nature by which the union of the essentially opposite natures .â•›.â•›. is dissolved.’39 Furthermore, Bultmann says, ‘according to John, the divine is the very counterpole to the human, with the result that it is a paradox, an offense, that the Word became flesh.’40 Thus, one could speak of Käsemann’s understanding as resolving the opposites but denying the paradox and, consequently, the offence. Since Käsemann does not understand the flesh literally, he then focuses on the glory and avoids the offensive nature of the Ibid., p. 12. Ibid., p. 65. 36 Käsemann, E. New Testament Questions of Today, p. 158. 37 Käsemann, E. The Testament of Jesus, p. 17. 38 Bornkamm, G. (1986) ‘Towards the Interpretation of John’s Gospel: A Discussion of the Testament of Jesus by Ernst Käsemann,’ in The Interpretation of John, ed. J. Ashton Philadelphia: Fortress Press, p. 80. 39 Bultmann, R. Theology of the New Testament, p. 40. 40 Ibid., pp. 41–2.

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paradox. He does so by avoiding the confrontation between the heavenly and the earthly. Käsemann states that ‘his [Jesus’] glory is perfected through his death, since his limitations cease and the realm of lowliness is left behind.’41 Furthermore, he says, ‘his death is rather the manifestation of divine self-giving love and his victorious return from the alien realm below to the Father who had sent him.’42 Käsemann notes that ‘John understands the incarnation as a projection of the glory of Jesus’ pre-existence and passion as a return to that glory ‘which was before the world began’.’43 It is obvious that he places the essential nature of Jesus, so to speak, within the glory and the flesh is simply a momentary privation – not unlike Gnosticism. Indeed, Käsemann, in contrast to Bultmann and the prevalent tradition,44 considers John to postulate a naive form of docetism.45 Bultmann rejects the claim that the essential Jesus, so to speak, is in the glory; rather, he notes that ‘the exalted Jesus is at the same time the earthly man Jesus; the ‘glorified one’ is still always he who ‘became flesh’ .â•›.â•›. Jesus’ life on earth does not become an item of the historical past, but constantly remains present reality.’46 Moreover, Bultmann says; ‘never can faith turn away from him, as if the ‘glory’ – or ‘truth’ and ‘life’ – could ever become directly visible, or as if the Revelation consisted of a certain thought-content, and the incarnation of the ‘Word’ were only a device, henceforth superfluous, for transmitting that content.’47 Once again, Bultmann insists on the necessity of a particular person and history found only in the flesh which is not a momentary sojourn into the ‘alien realm.’ Nevertheless, Käsemann disagrees with his former mentor Bultmann and says, ‘what is to be proclaimed and should be taken with utmost seriousness is the Nazarene’s path to world Käsemann, E. The Testament of Jesus, p. 20. Ibid., p. 10. 43 Käsemann, E. New Testament Questions of Today, p. 20. 44 This view of Käsemann has provoked considerable debate. Bornkamm, speaking for the ‘Old Marburgers’, notes that ‘even from the point of view of history the thesis that the Christology of John is naively docetic seems to me to be false.’ G. Bornkamm, ‘Towards the Interpretation of John’s Gospel,’ p. 92. 45 Käsemann, E. The Testament of Jesus, p. 26. 46 Bultmann, R. Theology of the New Testament, p. 49. 47 Ibid., p. 73.

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lordship.’48 According to Käsemann, 1:14a is insignificant when compared with 1:14c. Flesh is subsumed under the glory and the paradox and offence are eradicated. It is then odd, in light of Käsemann’s emphasis on the glory and lordship, in opposition to Bultmann’s flesh and passion, that Ashton says: ‘Bultmann’s severely uncompromising christology is not substantial enough to stand up to the attacks [of] Käsemann [since] the humanity of Jesus is itself altogether too scrawny and spindly to stand a fighting chance against the power and the glory of Käsemann’s ‘über die Erde schreitender Gott’ (God striding over the earth).’49 Is it not the very glory that Käsemann emphasizes that reduces the humanity of Jesus to a momentary disguise? The humanity of Jesus appears more spindly in Käsemann’s view than in Bultmann’s. It is likely that Bultmann would attribute this comment of Ashton’s to the paradoxical nature of 1:14a that has led, and will lead, to many misunderstandings and ill-shaped keys in interpreting the paradox. This distinction is important for continued study of Bultmann since 1:14a is the paradigm of his hermeneutical method. Indeed, the paradoxical and offence nature of his interpretation of 1:14a – and the misunderstandings that arise in response to the paradox – carry through into his historical thought. Note the similarity between Bultmann’s notions of 1:14a and his historical view. He says, ‘the community which speaks is not constituted by an idea and by eternal norms, but by a concrete history and its tradition.’50 For Bultmann both the Revealer and history are concrete, in contrast to Käsemann for whom the revealer is a general mode. Thus, ‘the paradox is that the word of Jesus does not find its substantiation by a backward movement from the attesting word to the thing attested – as it might if the thing itself were confirmable irrespective of the word – but finds it only in a faith-prompted acceptance of the word.’51 Furthermore, Bultmann defines the paradox thus: ‘Jesus is a human, historical person .â•›.â•›. his work and destiny happened within world-history and as such come under the scrutiny of the historian who can Käsemann, E. ‘What I have Unlearned in 50 Years as a German Theologian,’ p. 331. 49 Ashton, Understanding the Fourth Gospel, p. 66. 50 Bultmann, R. The Fourth Gospel, p. 70. 51 Bultmann, R. Theology of the New Testament, 69.

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understand them as part of the nexus of history. Nevertheless, such detached historical inquiry cannot become aware of what God has wrought in Christ, that is, of the eschatological event.’52 In contrast to Bultmann, Käsemann says, ‘I learned to regard the question of the meaning of universal history as the key to the problem of existence and as the centre of the New Testament.’53 This centre, for Käsemann, blends the universal history and the glory and lordship of Jesus. In fact, Käsemann’s view of the non-paradoxical nature of the flesh and glory leads to his understanding of a universal history, while Bultmann’s view of the paradoxical nature of the flesh and glory leads to his conception of the problem of historical investigation. Käsemann considers an understanding of history to be important to afford a better understanding of Bultmann.54 Yet just as Käsemann could not accept Bultmann’s paradoxical interpretation of 1:14a he also does not accept his historical view. He states, ‘I simply do not understand the extraordinary radical antithesis of historical and material continuity.â•›.â•›.â•›.’55 For example, in light of Bultmann’s insistence on the flesh, it is important to note that he comments, concerning historical investigations into the life of Jesus, that ‘I calmly let the fire burn, for I see that what is consumed is only the fanciful portraits of Life-of-Jesus theology, and that means nothing other than ‘Christ after the flesh’ .â•›.â•›. how things looked in the heart of Jesus I do not know and do not want to know.’56 This statement raises an interesting question: just what is the historical view of Bultmann if on the one hand he is intent on a definite historical person, yet on the other allows that very history to ‘burn’? It is evident that there is a radical antithesis in Bultmann’s interpretation of 1:14a which emphasizes the radical discontinuity between flesh and glory, and in his historical method. Consequently, Bultmann’s interpretation of 1:14a is paradoxical, offensive, does not provide didactic propositions or universal ideas to grasp, and is analogous to his historical view, in so far as both his interpretation of 1:14a and Bultmann, R. (1958) Jesus Christ and Mythology New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, p. 80. 53 Käsemann, E. ‘What I have Unlearned,’ pp. 329–330. 54 Käsemann, E. (1982) Essays on New Testament Themes, trans. W. J. Montague Philadelphia: Fortress Press, p. 16. 55 Käsemann, E. New Testament Questions of Today, p. 36. 56 Rudolf Bultmann, Faith and Understanding, p. 132.

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his historical view posit what Käsemann would call a ‘radical antithesis.’ The next question to be asked, then, is ‘what is Bultmann’s view of history?’ A discussion of Bultmann’s view of history not only follows the preliminary discussion of 1:14a as the paradigm of his thought, but continues to develop that very interpretation in his understanding of demythologizing and justification by faith.

4.╇ Historie or Geschichte? Bultmann’s interpretation of John 1:14a is based in the paradoxical identity of flesh and glory in spite of the radical discontinuity between the two. This paradoxical interpretation of 1:14a, as the paradigmatic basis of Bultmann’s thought, carries into his investigation of history. The paradox finds expression in his insistence on historical research while simultaneously rejecting the results of historical research. Bultmann states, ‘since the New Testament is a document of history, specifically of the history of religion, the interpretation of it requires the labor of historical investigation.’57 Yet he is not disturbed if the discoveries of historical investigations are ‘burned’ to the ground.58 This paradox in Bultmann’s conception of historical research, which affirms and negates historical study, follows from Bultmann’s understanding of 1:14a. Simply put, he thinks that the event of the Word becoming flesh is a historical fact, yet he is sceptical about the importance of the recovery of the past particulars of that history. More specifically, he considers 1:14a to be an actual event in history in which the Word became a man with a history, yet he also denies that 1:14a is simply an historical event that can be remembered.59 Indeed, Bultmann admits that he creates a paradox. He notes that ‘the paradox is the claim that a historical event [John 1:14a] is at the same time the eschatological event.’60 Just as Bultmann considers 1:14a to be a paradox by joining the divine and flesh, he also considers

Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, 251. Bultmann, R. Faith and Understanding, p. 132. 59 Bultmann, R. New Testament and Mythology, p. 162. 60 Ibid., p. 163.

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it a paradox to join eschatology (the ‘Wholly Other’) with a specific historic event. To understand Bultmann’s conception of the relationship between eschatology and history it is necessary to discuss his understanding of history in subjective and objective terms. His historical understanding is apparently complex; however, he says it is actually ‘extremely simple .â•›.â•›. of course the understanding of simple things can be difficult, but such difficulty is due not to the nature of things but to the fact that we have forgotten how to see directly, being too much burdened with presuppositions.’61 In addition, as we shall see, presuppositions are the important contingent factor – other than the historical fact – when investigating history, and they determine the historical understanding of Bultmann. The problem of historical studies, according to Bultmann, is the continual attempt to eliminate subjectivity in pursuit of assumed objectivity, and the avoidance of the question of what historical facts are.62 It is thereby apparent that Bultmann rejects a neutral standpoint from which history can be an object of study, and that any objective historical facts are not sufficient for understanding history. In fact, according to Bultmann, there is no neutral standpoint from which to determine history and guarantee an objective approach. He says, ‘the historian himself stands within history and partakes of it .â•›.â•›. he cannot take a stand outside history at an “Archimedean point”,’63 primarily because there is no universal world history which would require an ‘Archimedean point’ perspective.64 In other words, not only is an ‘Archimedean point’ impossible, there is no use for such a perspective since there is no universal world history either. Since there is no ‘Archimedean point’ from which to investigate history there is always a particular viewpoint, question, and/or methodology that the interpreter brings to historical investigation. Bultmann says ‘each interpretation is guided by a certain interest, by a certain putting of the question.’65 The Bultmann, R. (1958) Jesus and the Word, trans. Louise Pettibone Smith New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, p. 15. 62 Bultmann, R, (1957) The Presence of Eternity: History and Eschatology Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press Publishers, p. 78. 63 Ibid., p. 127. 64 Ibid., p. 128. 65 Ibid., p. 113.

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viewpoint, question, and/or methodology that the interpreter brings to interpretation is a result of the basic fact, as Bultmann says, that the ‘seeing of history is itself an historical event.’66 Moreover, Bultmann notes that one ‘cannot observe this complex [history] objectively .â•›.â•›. for in every word he says about history he is saying at the same time something about himself .â•›.â•›. there cannot be an impersonal observation of history.’67 Because there is no escape from history itself to enable one to take an Archimedean perspective, Bultmann remarks: ‘The demand that the interpreter has to silence his or her subjectivity and quench any individuality in order to achieve objective knowledge could not be more absurd. It makes sense and is justified only insofar as it means that the interpreter must silence his or her personal wishes with respect to the results of the interpretation .â•›.â•›.’68 Even if we could escape our own subjectivity, we would never be able to escape the subjectivity of method.69 Thus, Bultmann says ‘every interpretation of history presupposes a hermeneutic method.’70 The problem that Bultmann thus sees in historical studies is the forgetting of the impossibility of an ‘Archimedean point.’ Consequently, historical investigations often lead to problems of method such as ‘the historical pantheism of liberal theology [which is] a murky mixture of romantic and idealist motifs.’71 More specifically, he considers any method that posits data in such an Archimedean fashion to interpret or reconstruct eschatological history to lead to a number of errors – such as a Hegelian idealistic interpretation, a naturalistic (materialistic) interpretation or a psychological (history-of-religions school) interpretation.72 Bultmann considers such historical methods to be reductive systems which feign an ‘Archimedean point’ and make the assumption of knowing God through history into a Ibid., p. 143. Bultmann, R. Jesus and the Word, p. 3. 68 Bultmann, R. New Testament and Mythology, p. 85. 69 Bultmann, R. Jesus and the Word, p. 5. 70 Bultmann, R. The Presence of Eternity, p. 110. 71 Bultmann, R. (1997) What is Theology?, ed. Eberhard Jüngel and Klaus W. Müller, trans. Roy A. Harrisville Minneapolis: Fortress Press, p. 87. 72 Bultmann, R. (1991) ‘The Problem of a Theological Exegesis of the New Testament,’ in Rudolf Bultmann: Interpreting Faith for the Modern Era, ed. Roger A. Johnson Minneapolis: Fortress Press, p. 130.

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pantheism of history.73 These methods cannot grasp history, only their own questions, and this leads to the conclusion that they are essentially reductionist – they cannot go beyond the boundary of human reason and they are restricted to a completely human perspective. The prime tool used by Bultmann to critique the reduction of God to historical investigations – the pantheism of history – is the Logos, which he considers to be its stumbling block.74 Hence 1:14a is of prime importance to grasp his historical understanding. The underlying concept for Bultmann in regard to 1:14a as applied to history is the tension between eschatology and history. It is this tension and paradoxical union that delineates his historical understanding. Bultmann states, ‘The Christ occurrence means the eschatological occurrence through which God has put an end to the world and its history. Therefore, this paradox is the claim that a historical event is at the same time the eschatological event.’75 Furthermore, he notes that in John ‘eschatology as a time-perspective has dropped out because he has so radically transposed eschatological occurrence into the present .â•›.â•›. he sees the peculiar paradoxical tension.’76 More specifically, Bultmann adds that the paradox is that the Logos – as the eschatological event – is not capable of historical proof, yet the person Jesus is in the nexus of history.77 That is, ‘the eschatological now .â•›.â•›. is strictly bound to the “Word became flesh.”’78 Bultmann’s understanding of eschatology and history is analogous to the Word that is both flesh and divine at the same time. In other words, 1:14a is a paradox in the nature of the person Jesus (flesh in union with divine) and in reference to history (historic event in union with eschatology), the latter of each binary in the union being incapable of objective verification. It is thereby apparent that Bultmann understands and accepts the historic event of the ‘Word became flesh.’ Yet at the same time he notes that ‘for John, from beginning to end, Jesus is not meant to be the “historical Jesus”; he is the “Word”, and with this Bultmann, R. Faith and Understanding, 32f. See also: Bultmann Jesus and the Word, p. 5. 74 Bultmann, R. Faith and Understanding, p. 35. 75 Bultmann, R. New Testament and Mythology, p. 163. 76 Bultmann, R. Theology of the New Testament, p. 79. 77 Bultmann, R. Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 80. 78 Bultmann, R. Faith and Understanding, p. 175.

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“Word” history begins now.’79 Bultmann summarizes this tension between the historic event, the present, and eschatology: ‘the now of “the Word became flesh” is always present in the now of the proclamation, in the moment.’80 Thus, he says of the Word that it can be, and is, spoken of in the aorist and the perfect and therefore Jesus is present through proclamation, not reconstruction.81 The historic event of 1:14a is present in its eschatological union through proclamation. An example of the proclamation, according to Bultmann, is found in the words ‘we have beheld his glory’ by which the historic event is made contemporary; when the ‘Word’ is proclaimed the ‘eschatological now stands over every present.’82 The paradoxical union for Bultmann is that the Logos is the ‘once for all’ and also a historical event.83 Bultmann’s understanding of history is far from a basic reconstruction of historical facts. Since he is not using the building blocks of historical events, he criticizes the method of objective historical research, along with the human reason that assumes an ‘Archimedean point’, when trying to interpret ‘the Word became flesh.’ It is true, according to Bultmann, that the historical event can be viewed historically in the sense of chronology, but exclusive use of chronology is not an interpretation or the basis of meaning. John 1:14a can be interpreted solely as the historical birth of Jesus, but exclusive chronological data, according to Bultmann, misses the significance of the historical fact of the divine. Bultmann critiques objective historical inquiry by placing an emphasis on the nature and role of language, but the question remains: What is Bultmann’s historical method? He raises the question of the possibility of objective historical knowledge if interpretation is not objective or from an ‘Archimedean point’.84 From the above discussion it may appear that Bultmann is excessively critical of objective historical study and would deny the possibility of any objective historical knowledge. This would suggest that his method leads to scepticism and/ or confusion since he maintains that we cannot know history Ibid., pp. 310f. Ibid., p. 177. 81 Ibid., p. 177. 82 Ibid., p. 178. 83 Bultmann, R. Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 82. 84 Bultmann, R. The Presence of Eternity, p. 115.

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through objective chronological data. In fact, the question may be legitimately raised: Does Bultmann even have a historical method? However, we should not immediately reject Bultmann as a sceptic or confused philosopher. In spite of the lack of a neutral standpoint from which to study history there are chronological data of the life of Jesus, and these data are very significant for him. Bultmann is not sceptical simply in his rejection of historical methods; rather, his critique of history is a critique of the method of objective historical research more than historical data per se. He notes that ‘there can be no question of discarding historical criticism.’85 Also, ‘since the New Testament is a document of history, specifically of the history of religion, the interpretation of it requires the labour of historical investigation.’86 Such investigation necessitates an historical method.87 Hence, his whole study is based on understanding the historical context of the text within the historical-critical and history-of-religion schools.88 For Bultmann ‘God is the God of history.’89 This leaves a question that Bultmann raises, namely if objective historical knowledge is possible and necessary, then is this an adequate view of history?90 In other words, after discrediting history with all its inherent problems, as discussed earlier, then how should history be seen? Bultmann seems, on the one hand, to be very critical of history, and yet on the other to embrace it. To ease this dualistic tension between the problem of history and the use of history, or conversely between the observer of history and historical facts, he posits two modes of historical understanding: Historie and Geschichte. This distinction is the key to understanding his simultaneous rejection and use of historical investigation. Bultmann explains the distinction between Historie and Geschichte as follows: ‘The goal of history [Historie] is not an eschatological future but is the historical process itself.’91 Despite Bultmann, R. Faith and Understanding, p. 31. Bultmann, R. Theology of the New Testament, p. 251. 87 Bultmann, R. (1961) Existence and Faith, trans. Schubert M. Ogden London: Hodder and Stoughton, p. 291. 88 Bultmann, R. Theology of the New Testament, p. 250. 89 Bultmann, R. The Presence of Eternity, p. 96. 90 Ibid., p. 117. 91 Ibid., p. 68.

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the fact that the historical Jesus cannot be known through the text or objective data, he still states that ‘the revealer appears as a definite human being in history: Jesus of Nazareth.’92 Geschichte, however, unlike Historie, cannot be reduced to casual connections or psychologism; rather, it is the interpretation of the observer regarding natural events in relation to one’s life. Indeed, Bultmann states, ‘history [Geschichte] as the field of human actions cannot, however, be cut off from nature and natural events.’93 For example, ‘as the salvation occurrence, then, the cross of Christ is not a mythical event but an historical (geschichtliche) occurrence that has its origin in the historical (historische) event of the crucifixion of Jesus of Nazareth.’94 It follows that the chronological events of Jesus’ life, for example, are necessary, but not sufficient, for Geschichte – which itself requires the subjectivity of the observer. This is the difference between Bultmann and the traditional historical approach of the historical-critic and the history-of-religions school, since he emphasizes the subjectivity of the observer in contrast to the objective study itself. Consequently, Bultmann’s theory leads to the conclusion that Geschichte is dependent on Historie, but Historie alone can only yield objective idols and is the underlying problem of assumed objectivity in historical interpretation. Bultmann’s use of Geschichte and Historie leaves the tension of the subjective (interpreter’s subjectivity) and objective (historical facts), without siding with one or the other. This tension, however, is itself misplaced for Bultmann, since he considers the subject/object relation of classical science, which maintains a separation between the subject and object, to be of no value for historical science, since it must not hold this distinction between the subject and object.95 He writes, ‘it needs to become clear that the genuine relation of historians to history cannot be understood according to the traditional scheme of the relation of subject to object.’96 Since he emphasizes both the subjective interpretation and the objective data, he comments that ‘the most subjective interpretation is at the same time the most objective. Bultmann, R. Theology of the New Testament, p. 41. Ibid., p. 139. 94 Bultmann, R. New Testament and Mythology, p. 35. 95 Bultmann, R. The Presence of Eternity, p. 133. 96 Bultmann, R. New Testament and Mythology, p. 137.

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Only the historian who is excited by his own historical existence will be able to hear the claim of history.’97 This paradoxical statement is amplified by his comment that objective history is only understood subjectively.98 This assertion of Bultmann is seemingly contradictory, but it is only contradictory if one interprets it through the traditional schema of the subject/ object relation. Thus, the only way to understand Bultmann is to investigate his pre-understanding. Bultmann states: ‘The point then is not to eliminate the pre-understanding but to risk it, to raise it to the level of consciousness, and to test it critically in understanding the text. In short, in questioning the text one must allow oneself to be questioned by the text and to give heed to its claim.’99 He comments in another context that being ‘deeply disturbed by the problem of our own life is therefore the indispensable condition of our inquiry. Then the examination of history will lead not to the enrichment of timeless wisdom, but to an encounter with history which itself is an event in time. This is dialogue with history.’100 Objective historical research necessarily entails historical data, but it is through subjectivity that questions are asked, and it is through these questions that history is seen as Geschichte.101 Thus, Bultmann maintains that if one is aware of one’s own pre-understanding (subjectivity) then objectivity is possible.102 Nevertheless, the question will be raised: Does Bultmann’s method really end with objectivity through subjectivity? If he rejects assumed objective historical research as Historie alone, but uses historical research through Geschichte, which places a great emphasis upon the interpreter’s subjectivity, then it must be the case that his method leads to solipsism or subjectivism. His method must be one of subjectivism since pre-understanding is so important. Bultmann’s dialogue with history must only be a dialogue with himself. Bultmann, however, reacts as strongly against unfettered subjectivism as he does against assumed objectivity. He writes, Bultmann, R. The Presence of Eternity, 122. See also: Bultmann, R. New Testament and Mythology, pp. 138f. 98 Bultmann, R. Existence and Faith, p. 294. 99 Bultmann, R. New Testament and Mythology, p. 84. 100 Bultmann, R. Jesus and the Word, pp. 11–12. 101 Bultmann, R. The Presence of Eternity, p. 119. 102 Bultmann, R. Existence and Faith, p. 64. 97

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‘genuine freedom is not subjective arbitrariness .â•›.â•›. the freedom of subjective arbitrariness is a delusion.’103 He considers such subjective arbitrariness to lead nowhere but relativism and nihilism.104 Moreover, he remarks, regarding the interpreter’s decision, that ‘it does not arise by a man’s wavering in his security and getting bewildered at the world and so turning away from it to waft himself up into a world beyond by speculative thought or devout silence.’105 It should be clear that Bultmann does not accept the label of subjectivist. His method is not intent on a radical scepticism of silence or a thought project of subjectivism taking comfort in a solipsistic world; nor is he a historicist or an objectivist. He is not intent on negating the objectification of history, but rather wants to negate any exclusive claim for the objectification of history that excludes the subjectivity of the interpreter and consequently Geschichte. The guiding question of the problem of history and the use of history in Bultmann’s method ends in contradictory confusion if it is interpreted within a traditional schema of the subject/ object relation, but if Bultmann’s understanding of history is investigated further, it leads to a mutual and necessary dialectical relationship between subject and object.106 Moreover, this relationship is analogous to the initial investigation of 1:14a. As Bultmann notes, ‘the statement contains a “paradox.” It asserts the paradoxical identity of an occurrence within the world with the act of the God who stands beyond the world. Indeed, faith asserts that it sees an act of God in an event or in a process that at the same time, for an objectifying view, can be established as processes within the continuum of natural and historical happenings.’107 The contradiction of 1:14, the Word and human flesh, and the contradiction between Geschichte and Historie, is not resolved – is a paradox ever resolved? Bultmann notes, ‘Faith stresses the paradoxical identity of an historical event and the eschatological event. If the historical Jesus were eliminated, then the paradox would be destroyed and the kerygmatic Christ would be reduced to a mythological figure.’108 Moreover, Bultmann, R. Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 41. Ibid., p. 42. 105 Bultmann, R. Theology of the New Testament, p. 76. 106 Bultmann, R. New Testament and Mythology, p. 158. 107 Ibid., p. 162. 108 Bultmann, R. ‘Reply’ in The Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, p. 260. 103 104

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‘I do not regard the factual character of history and of Jesus as in any way irrelevant for faith and for theology. I say, rather, Christian faith declares the paradox that an historical event (precisely, Jesus and his history) is at the same time the eschatological occurrence. If the historical fact were stricken out, then the paradox would be abandoned.’109 Faith sees that the finite is capable of the infinite and that history can receive eternity – in Christ who is not merely a historical figure, but is resurrected.

Ibid., pp. 274–5.

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5.╇ Demythologizing and Justification by Faith Bultmann’s historical method naturally leads to a discussion of demythologizing. Indeed, the term itself does not arise out of thin air; rather, it is the synthetic composite of Bultmann’s historical study and theological understanding. He states, ‘This method of interpretation of the New Testament which tries to recover the deeper meaning behind the mythological conceptions I call de-mythologizing – an unsatisfactory word, to be sure. Its aim is not to eliminate the mythological statements but to interpret them. It is a method of hermeneutics.’1 This ‘unsatisfactory word’, ‘demythologizing’, is the summation of Bultmann’s method, that is, his way of bringing out the nature of 1:14a and his historical understanding. Demythologizing is not a new theory – Bultmann’s method predates the term – and it is not a trendy philosophical principle or a creative hermeneutic. Instead, he considers the method of demythologizing to be an imperative hermeneutic today and justifies its use on the basis that it was also necessary for the writing of John. He says, ‘demythologizing has its beginning in the New Testament itself, and therefore our task of demythologizing today is justified.’2 A way of expressing the other-worldly is through myth; consequently, Bultmann, R. Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 18. Ibid., p. 34.



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‘the eschatological preaching of Jesus is retained and continued by the early Christian community in mythological form’ but is demythologized by John.3 For instance, according to Bultmann, John demythologizes the anti-Christ from a mythological figure to false teachers.4 This is, of course, not exclusive to Bultmann; Luther also identifies false teachers with the Anti Christ. It is wrong to assume that Bultmann’s demythologizing is meant to be a rational destruction of the Christian message, although this is certainly a common assumption. It is important to note in contrast to such assumptions that Bultmann says, ‘to demythologize is not to reject Scripture or the Christian message as a whole, but the world-view of Scripture.â•›.â•›.â•›.’5 As such, he notes that ‘the salvation occurrence, then, the cross of Christ, is not a mythical event but a historical occurrence that has its origin in the historical event of the crucifixion of Jesus of Nazareth.’6 Demythologizing is not emptying scripture; rather, as Bultmann writes, ‘its [demythologizing] criticism of the biblical writings lies not in eliminating mythological statements but in interpreting them; it is not a process of subtraction but a hermeneutical method.’7 Indeed, Bultmann notes that by ‘stripping away the mythological garments, we have intended to follow the intention of the New Testament itself and to do full justice to the paradox of its proclamation – the paradox, namely, that God’s eschatological emissary is a concrete historical person, that God’s eschatological act takes place in a human destiny, that it is an occurrence, therefore, that cannot be proved to be eschatological in any worldly way. It is the paradox formulated in the words .â•›.â•›. the word became flesh.’8 Demythologizing clears the way, so to speak, for the significance of 1:14a. Thus, Bultmann is not originating a rational viewpoint that destroys the mystery of God, but rather he considers his method to maintain the mystery of God.9 What does Bultmann mean by myth? Myth is not simply a falsehood that needs to be rejected; rather, it needs to be interpreted. He notes, ‘myth indeed talks about a reality, but in an Ibid., p. 32. Ibid., p. 34. 5 Bultmann, R. Theology of the New Testament, p. 35. 6 Bultmann, R. New Testament and Mythology, p. 35. 7 Ibid., p. 99. 8 Ibid., p. 41. 9 Bultmann, R. Theology of the New Testament, p. 43.



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inadequate way.’10 Thus, ‘myth is spoken of here in the sense in which it is understood by research in the history of religions. That mode of representation is mythology in which what is unworldly and divine appears as what is worldly and human, or what is transcendent appears as what is immanent, as when, for example, God’s transcendence is thought of as spatial distance. Mythology is a mode of representation in consequence of which cult is understood as action in which nonmaterial forces are mediated by material means. “Myth” is not used here, then, in that modern sense in which it means nothing more than ideology.’11 For example, a world-view that posits a three-tiered universe is a myth, that Heaven is above us and Hell is below us. Perhaps an astronaut venturing above the earth could claim that he or she did not discover God in the upper tier. Perhaps we could discover Hell if we drill a deep enough hole in the earth. In a sense, we can say demythologizing does not reject God; rather, it rejects claims that God must not exist because astronauts have not seen any proof of God. Moreover, the problem is not that the astronaut was unable to show that God exists, but we could not possibly understand what it would mean to show that God does exist in such a context. Mythology can also apply to our conception of God. Bultmann says, ‘in short, myth objectifies the transcendent into the immanent, and thus also into the disposable .â•›.â•›. [whereas] demythologizing seeks to bring out the real intention of myth, namely, its intention to talk about human existence as grounded in and limited by a transcendent, unworldly power, which is not visible to objectifying thinking.’12 In other words, myth objectifies the deus absconditus. Demythologizing is thereby necessary since ‘the transcendence of God is not made immanent as it is in myth; rather, the paradox of the presence of the transcendent God in history is affirmed: “the word became flesh”.’13 Bultmann says demythologizing, ‘sees that we cannot talk about God or what transcends the world as it is “in itself,” because in doing so we would objectify God or the transcendent into an immanent, worldly phenomenon. The problem is that ‘myths give worldly Bultmann, R. New Testament and Mythology, p. 155. Ibid., p. 42, fn. 5. 12 Ibid., p. 99. 13 Ibid., p. 42.

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objectivity to that which is unworldly.’14 Talking about God in an objectified manner, or as caught in a particular world-view is, according to Bultmann, bound to lead to confusion. Interestingly, Luther likewise notes, ‘That person does not deserve to be called a theologian who looks upon the invisible things of God as though they were clearly perceptible’; rather, ‘he deserves to be called a theologian, however, who comprehends the visible and manifest things of God seen through suffering and the cross’.15 It is a mistake to look for God in the third-tier or, more generally, outside the Passion. The problem with myths is the reduction to objectivity;16 it is not that myths are unacceptable to modern people. Bultmann is not trying to tie the kerygma to science or any one perspective to make it more acceptable; rather, as he says, ‘the truth of the Gospel .â•›.â•›. is independent of every picture of the world.’17 The Christ event happened in a particular time and world-view, but it is not limited to that time or world-view, and demythologizing makes this clear – it is not rejecting the Christian message, it is rejecting the reduction of the Christian message to a particular time and world-view. On the other hand, to reject demythologizing is either to deny relativistic world-views or to deny meaning to mythological elements in the Bible, whereas to accept it is to say that revelation in the Bible is not historically determined by a world-view, but applies to many world-views. In addition, if it applies to many world-views it is important that revelation not be lost in the archaic myths of any one world-view. Demythologizing frees scripture from every objectified world picture, whether it is that of myth or that of science.18 Demythologizing does not take the modern view as the benchmark to fit into; rather, it rejects all world-views that are taken as absolute determinations of the Biblical message. Bultmann does not want to make the Bible respectable to reason and the world-view or science du jour; rather, he wants to get beyond the paltry scandal of a three-tiered universe to the Bultmann, R. Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 19. Luther, M. Luther’s Works, p. 31:40. 16 Bultmann, R. New Testament and Mythology, p. 161. 17 Bultmann, R. (1979) Modern Theology: Selections from twentieth century theologians, ed with introduction and notes by E. J. Tinsley London: Epworth Press, p. 136. 18 Bultmann, R. New Testament and Mythology, p. 102.

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pertinent scandal of the cross. As Paul writes in I Cor. 1:18–29: ‘the message of the cross is foolishness .â•›.â•›. For it is written “I will destroy the wisdom of the wise; the intelligence of the intelligent I will frustrate.”’ Bultmann notes, ‘If demythologizing is to make comprehensible the biblical truth which has become incomprehensible in its mythological garments, does that mean that the truth is rationalized in the sense of being reduced to a product of rational thought? Certainly not. But the Christian truth and mystery of God are meant to be understood; and understanding is not identical with rational explanation. .â•›.â•›. I can understand what the grace of God means, otherwise I could not speak about it as I do. But the fact that this grace meets me is a mystery which has no rational explanation.’19 He notes that this claim is a ‘“scandal” .â•›.â•›. that is not to be overcome in philosophical dialogue but only in obedient faith .â•›.â•›. It is precisely the fact that they cannot be proved that secures the Christian proclamation against the charge that it is mythology. The transcendence of God is not made immanent as it is in myth; rather, the paradox of the presence of the transcendent God in history is affirmed: “the world became flesh.”’20 For Bultmann, this is not simply a matter of interpreting theology today; it is what faith itself demands. In other words, he wants to bring out the real stumbling block and make the text an offence to all-ages and world-views! The point of demythologizing is not to make the Christian faith palatable; it is to make it rightly offensive. Bultmann says, ‘The purpose of demythologization is not to make religion more acceptable to modern man by trimming the traditional Biblical texts, but to make clearer to modern man what the Christian faith is.’21 Moreover, ‘De-mythologizing will .â•›.â•›. eliminate a false stumbling-block and bring into sharp focus the real stumbling block, the word of the cross.’22 Likewise, the point of the New Testament is not simply the historical details of the life of Bultmann, R. Modern Theology: Selections from twentieth century theologians, p. 136. 20 Bultmann, R. New Testament and Mythology, p. 42. 21 Bultmann, R. (2005) ‘The Case for Demythologization’, in Myth and Christianity: An Inquiry into the Possibility of Religion without Myth, trans. Norbert Guterman Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, pp. 64–5. 22 Bultmann, R. Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 36.

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Jesus, or a world-view, it is the salvation event. Bultmann is not denying the historic event – it is essential – but the scandal is not merely remembered as a historic event, it is realized by faith. This event is ‘unlike other historical events, it cannot be made present through “remembrance.” Rather, it becomes present in the proclamation (of the kerygma), which has its origin in the event itself and without which the event is not at all what it is.’23 Thus, as Bultmann notes, ‘its decisive, history-transforming meaning is expressed by representing it as the eschatological event, that is, it is not an event of the past to which one looks back, but it is the eschatological event in time and beyond time insofar as it is constantly present wherever it is understood in its significance, that is, for faith.’24 Although it is clearly impossible, assume for the sake of argument that it could be proven that Jesus existed, was crucified, died and was resurrected, and everyone agreed that these are facts – then would everyone be Christian? Bultmann writes, ‘one cannot first believe in Christ and then on that ground believe in his cross. Rather, to believe in Christ means to believe in the cross as Christ’s cross.’25 Hence, ‘an event of the past it is no longer an event of our own lives, and we know about it as a historical event only through historical reports. But this is not at all the way in which the crucified one is proclaimed in the New Testament, so that the point of the cross would be disclosed by his historical life, which is to be reproduced by historical research. On the contrary, he is proclaimed as the crucified one who is at the same time the risen one.’26 In this way, Bultmann shows that the cross is not simply a past and mythical legal declaration, but is what we participate in now, through Christ’s death and resurrection. Thus, ‘In its redemptive aspect the cross of Christ is no mere mythical event, but a permanent historical fact originating in the past historic event which is the crucifixion of Jesus.’27 As Fuller comments, for Bultmann, 1:14a is not immersed in mythological language, but is a ‘concrete piece of history,’ that Bultmann, R. New Testament and Mythology, p. 163. Ibid., pp. 34–5. 25 Ibid., p. 39. 26 Ibid., p. 36. 27 Bultmann, R. Modern Theology: Selections from twentieth century theologians, p. 140.

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cannot be determined through historical investigation, and as such reveals the ‘real stumbling block with brutal clarity.’28 Given Bultmann’s connection between the cross and the Christian, he rightly connects this ‘eschatological happening’ with the sacraments of baptism (Rom. 6:3) and the Lord’s Supper (Rom. 6:6).29 The Word of the eschatological happening is intimately tied to a present action through the elements, not to mere historical recollection. Indeed, Bultmann also notes that demythologizing seeks to proceed according to Phillip Melanchthon’s dictum, ‘To know Christ is to know his benefits, not to contemplate his natures and the mode of his incarnation,’30 and he recalls Wilhelm Herrmann saying, ‘We cannot say of God how he is in himself but only what he does to us.’31 Reason can look for historical facts and can remember these, but faith sees the historical facts as alive. Likewise, Luther notes, ‘that is why the evangelists wrote the history poorly and gave little attention to the words, in order that they might tear us away from the history and lead us to the benefit. We want, however, to set it into an order of events.’ However, ‘Paul, Peter and the other apostles did not bother themselves much with the order and history of the Resurrection, but emphasized much more their power and benefit.’32 We are not remembering a sacrifice; the Word calls us now, and it is faith that sees the immediacy of the words of forgiveness. Consequently, Bultmann says, ‘to believe in the cross of Christ does not mean to look to some mythical process that has taken place outside of us and our world or at an objectively visible event that God has somehow reckoned to our credit; rather, to believe in the cross of Christ means to accept the cross as one’s own and to allow oneself to be crucified with Christ.’33 Being crucified with Christ is not mere remembrance; it is a present ‘eschatological happening.’34 An understanding of history and demythologizing leads to justification by faith, as Perrin rightly notes that any discussion Fuller, R. H. The New Testament in Current Study, p. 11. Bultmann, R. New Testament and Mythology, p. 35. 30 Bultmann, R. New Testament and Mythology, p. 99. 31 Ibid., p. 99. 32 Luther, M. (1883) D. Martin Luthers Werke; kritische Gesamtausgabe. Weimar: H. Bohlau, 17:183: p. 37. 33 Bultmann, R. New Testament and Mythology, p. 34. 34 Bultmann, R. ‘The Case for Demythologization’, p. 72.

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of Bultmann’s demythologizing can quickly become a discussion of Bultmannian theology.35 Bultmann himself notes: ‘In point of fact, radical demythologizing is the parallel to the Pauline-Lutheran doctrine of justification through faith alone without works of the law. Or, rather, it is the consistent application of this doctrine to the field of knowledge. Like the doctrine of justification, it destroys every false security and every false demand for security, whether it is grounded on our good action or on our certain knowledge. Those who believe in God as their God need to know that they have nothing in hand on the basis of which they could believe, that they are poised, so to speak, in midair and cannot ask for any proof of the truth of the word that addresses them.â•›.â•›.â•›.’36 To distance demythologizing from human abilities and reason Bultmann makes use of the theological principle of justification by faith, which is a consistent continuation of his thought. What is justification by faith? Bultmann notes, ‘Moral transgressions are not his fundamental sin .â•›.â•›. Man’s fundamental sin is his will to justify himself as man, for thereby he makes himself God.’37 Luther similarly says, ‘the whole exodus of the people Israel formerly symbolized that exodus which they interpret as one from faults to virtues. But it would be better to understand it as an exodus from virtues to the grace of Christ.’38 Moreover, Luther notes in thesis 26 of the Heidelberg Disputation, ‘The law says, “do this,” and it is never done. Grace says, “believe in this,” and everything is already done.’ Bultmann and Luther see that the opposite of sin is not virtue, but faith, and faith receives justification, that is, the work of Christ. Just as history alone cannot lead to what it points to (as Bultmann points out regarding Historie), so the law alone cannot lead to what it points to either. Bultmann says, ‘God eludes the objectifying view and can be believed in only against appearances – just as the justification of the sinner can be

Perrin, N. The Promise of Bultmann, p. 78. Bultmann, R. New Testament and Mythology, p. 122. 37 Bultmann, R. Faith and Understanding, p. 46. 38 Luther, M. Luther’s Works, 25: p. 136.

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believed in only against the accusing conscience.’39 Human reason looks to virtue and says the justified are the ones who earn it, whereas God justifies those who are sinners and should die. This paradoxical character is noted by Luther, ‘when God makes alive, he does it by killing; when he justifies, he does it by making men guilty; when he exalts to heaven, he does it by bringing down to hell.’40 The entry of God into time and the salvation event cannot be understood though historical terms and objectively gathered evidence alone, and justification cannot be understood through virtues. Consequently, demythologizing and justification by faith are radical – they cause alarm. What can we do? Nonetheless, according to Bultmann, the only way to find security is, paradoxically, to let all security go.41 It is not surprising then, as Macquarrie notes, that the mere mention of demythologizing results in the arousal of fear,42 particularly for those who adhere to a hermeneutic that revolves around the building of security and foundations. Surely, demythologizing and justification by faith will lead to a loss of history, of truth, of morals! Once again, Bultmann notes the resultant anxiety of his contemporaries, ‘They want to know how I rescue myself from the situation created by my critical radicalism; how much I can save from the fire .â•›.â•›. I have never yet felt uncomfortable with my critical radicalism; on the contrary, I have been entirely comfortable. But I often have the impression that my conservative New Testament colleagues feel very uncomfortable, for I see them perpetually engaged in salvage operations. I calmly let the fire burn.â•›.â•›.â•›.’43 What demythologizing and justification by faith do is change our understanding of history and works; they do not destroy them. For example, does demythologizing effectively reject history and the concrete act of salvation? Does justification by faith reject good works? These questions and worries show a lack of understanding from Bultmann’s and Luther’s points of view. The outcome of demythologizing is an understating of the necessity of the historic event, but not understood as objective history and remembrance alone. The Bultmann, R. New Testament and Mythology, p. 122. Luther, M. Luther’s Works, 33: p. 62. 41 Bultmann, R. New Testament and Mythology, p. 122. 42 Macquarrie, J. The Scope of Demythologizing, p. 14. 43 Bultmann, R. Faith and Understanding, p. 132.

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outcome of justification by faith is good works, but not works that justify. It is worthwhile, in summation, to quote Bultmann at length: ‘The “demythologized” sense of the Christian doctrine of incarnation, of the word that “was made flesh” is precisely this, that God manifests himself not merely as the idea of God – however true this idea may be – but as “my” God, who speaks to me here and now, through a human mouth. And the Christian message is bound to a historical tradition and looks back to a historical figure as evidence of the word of God. The “demythologized” sense of the assertion that Jesus Christ is the eschatological phenomenon that brings the world to its end is precisely this, that Christ is not merely a past phenomenon, but the ever-present word of God, expressing not a general truth, but a concrete message, that word that destroys and in destruction gives life. The paradox of the Christian faith is precisely this, that the eschatological process which sets an end to the world became an event in the history of the world, and becomes an event in every true sermon, and in every Christian utterance. And the paradox of theology is precisely this, that it must speak of faith in objective terms, like any science, while fully realizing that its speaking becomes meaningful only if it goes beyond the “objective” formulation.’44 This is the point of demythologizing – revealing the intimate tie between the paradox of the Word and the flesh, history and eschatology, subjective and objective, justification and sin, and life and death in the kerygma. If this arouses fear and is an offence, then perhaps we are on the right track towards understanding Bultmann.

6.╇ From Cartesian to Anti-Cartesian Thought Many discussions of Bultmann and philosophy centre on Heidegger. For example, Thielicke focuses on what he considers to be Bultmann’s inappropriate adoption of Heidegger’s

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philosophy and its fatal results.45 Yet as Schmithals notes, ‘Various statements which claim – sometimes in triumph – to have refuted Bultmann, because here and there or basically or altogether his theology fails to agree with the philosophy of Heidegger, or because Bultmann has misunderstood Heidegger’s philosophizing, or because he does not come up to Heidegger or has used Heidegger’s analyses in a way which the latter did not intend, do not affect Bultmann’s theology even if they are right; for it is not Bultmann’s intention to take over the philosophy of Heidegger.’46 Moreover, Butlmann himself says, ‘I do not thereby make myself dependent on the philosophy of Heidegger.’47 The fact that Bultmann and Heidegger see a similar problem, namely, the traditional subject/object schema, and that Bultmann uses some of Heidegger’s conceptions for clarification, does not necessitate an inherent link between Heidegger and Bultmann. Bultmann himself best explains this: ‘I can refer to Friedreich Gogarten’s work Demythologization and the Church, which makes it clear that we do not necessarily subscribe to Heidegger’s philosophical theories when we learn something from his analysis. The fact is that Heidegger attacks a problem with which theologians have grappled since Ernest Troeltsch, namely the problem of history .â•›.â•›. and the subjectâ•‚object schema .â•›.â•›. needless to say, we may learn from others besides Heidegger. If we learn those things better elsewhere, it is all to the good. But they have to be learned.’48 Furthermore, Cassedy notes, concerning post-structuralism and the thought of Heidegger, that ‘it would be simplistic to say that all the latest postmodern, deconstructionist and leftist theories ‘come from’ Heidegger.’49 Bultmann is a unique and independent thinker as acknowledged by Schmithals as well, ‘His theology Thielicke, H. (1990) Modern Faith and Thought, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, p. 12. 46 Schmithals, W. An Introduction to the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, p. 18. 47 Bultmann, R. ‘Reply’ in The Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, p. 259. 48 Bultmann, R. ‘The Case for Demythologization’, p. 58. 49 Cassedy, S. (1990) Flight from Eden: The Origins of Modern Literary Criticism and Theory Los Angeles: University of California Press, p. 193.

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is independent, unmistakable, and not to be explained as an addition to the works of his teachers; we may have uncovered its most important historical roots, but that does not mean that we have explained it as a combination of liberal and dialectical theology in the garb of Heideggerian conceptuality.’50 Therefore although there is an undeniable Heideggerian influence on Bultmann and post-structuralism, it is not legitimate to reduce Bultmann’s thought to Heidegger or post-structuralism. More specifically, Bultmann, in response to such attempts to reduce his thought to Heideggerian categories, says ‘the New Testament is not a doctrine about our nature, about our authentic existence as human beings, but rather is the proclamation of this liberating act of God, of the salvation occurrence that is realized in Christ.’51 Perrin rightly sees that the distinction between Bultmann and Heidegger is ‘to be found in the view of the possibility for authentic existence: for Heidegger it arises “spontaneously out of human existence,” for Bultmann it is “made possible by God.”’52 Bultmann’s thought is bound to the New Testament and its theology, not speculations on being. To focus exclusively on Heidegger would turn the discussion of Bultmann to abstract conceptions of ‘being’ and ‘existence’, while the intent of the discussion is, in contrast, to focus on John 1:14a and history. Bultmann realizes that he is nonetheless often misrepresented when his thought is reduced to a particular philosophy (especially Heidegger), ‘Over and over again I hear the objection that demythologizing transforms Christian faith into philosophy. This objection arises from the fact that I .â•›.â•›. make use of conceptions developed especially by Heidegger in existentialist philosophy. We can understand the problem best when we remember that demythologizing is an hermeneutic method, that is, a method of interpretation, of exegesis. Hermeneutics means the art of exegesis.’53 In contrast to an emphasis on a philosophical basis, Bultmann says, ‘When critics have occasionally objected that I interpret the New Testament with the categories of Heidegger’s philosophy of existence, I Schmithals, W. An Introduction to the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, p. 19. 51 Bultmann, R. New Testament and Mythology, p. 26. 52 Perrin, N. The Promise of Bultmann, p. 61. 53 Bultmann, R. Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 45.

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fear they have missed the real problem. What ought to alarm them is that philosophy all by itself already sees what the New Testament says.’54 Demythologizing is not a matter of philosophical speculation; rather, it is a tool of New Testament study. In other words, Heidegger does not create Bultmann’s thought; it was already in the New Testament, just as Bultmann clearly states that demythologizing began in the New Testament.55 Thus, as Macquarrie notes, Bultmann’s use of Heidegger is a matter of clarification of conceptual matters, but is not foundational, ‘the existential analytic [of Heidegger] is not the source of Bultmann’s theology. The New Testament is the source.’56 The source, in the present study, is found specifically in John 1:14a and justification by faith. Bultmann’s interpretation of John 1:14a rests in a paradox. His affirmation of the paradoxical and substantial union of the opposites flesh and glory is in contrast to his best-known student Käsemann, who sees the emphasis fall upon the glory, and who thus diminishes the paradox. Bultmann, moreover, asserts that the Revealer only reveals that he is the Revealer. Once again, he states that ‘Jesus as the Revealer of God reveals nothing but that he is the Revealer.’57 Hence, 1:14a leads Bultmann to his paradoxical interpretation of the union of opposites in the Revealer, and to the paradox of the Revealer not revealing any specific knowledge or wisdom other than that he is the Revealer. Since nothing other than the event of 1:14a (‘the Word became flesh’) is revealed, it would seem that historical research on that definite person would be of paramount importance for Bultmann. To this end, Bultmann does make use of the historicalcritical method, the method of liberal theology. He writes, ‘since the New Testament is a document of history .â•›.â•›. the interpretation of it requires the labour of historical investigation.’58 In fact, Bultmann is sometimes considered (mistakenly) to be a liberal theologian.59 Bultmann, R. New Testament and Mythology, p. 23. Bultmann, R. Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 32. 56 Macquarrie, J. The Scope of Demythologizing: Bultmann and his Critics, p. 168. 57 Bultmann, R. Theology of the New Testament, p. 66. 58 Ibid., p. 251. 59 Fuller, R. H. (1962) The New Testament in Current Study New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, p. 11.

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However, despite the value Bultmann places on the historicalcritical method he renounces any foundational claim derived from the historical-critical method. He acknowledges that liberal theology does offer certain insights, yet he remains critical of its methods, such as historical-critical investigations.60 For example, Bultmann rejects the liberal theologians search for the personality of Jesus through historical criticism to ground faith. Despite the fact that Bultmann insists on a definite human being in history, and that no knowledge other than 1:14a (that the Word became flesh) is given, he nevertheless lets history ‘burn.’61 Thus, not only is the element of paradox of paramount importance for Bultmann in the interpretation of 1:14a with respect to the union of flesh and divinity, it is also inherent in his simultaneous confirmation and rejection of historical interpretation. Bultmann posits a historical event and definite person, but allows that history – of the historical Jesus – to ‘burn.’ He maintains that ‘historical research can never lead to any result which could serve as a basis for faith, for all its results have only relative validity .â•›.â•›. here research ends with a large question mark – and here it ought to end.’62 It is not surprising, then, with a paradox being of such primary importance in Bultmann’s thought and his seemingly negative view of history and interpretation that constitutes demythologizing, that he has many critics and is often misunderstood. If 1:14a reveals nothing other than that the Word became flesh, and the historical element that this entails is inaccessible or ‘burned,’ then negation seems the only alternative, apparently leaving the interpreter with subjectivism. Thielicke, for instance, regards Bultmann’s use of demythologizing as a project of negation and subjectivism.63 However, although demythologizing does not produce any concept or knowledge, it does not therefore follow that demythologizing is nothing other than a method ending in nihilism and/or subjectivism. It is the ingrained influence of Cartesian thought that, in part, Schmithals, W. An Introduction to the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, pp. 12f. 61 Bultmann, R. Faith and Understanding, p. 132. 62 Ibid., p. 30. 63 Thielicke, H. (1953) ‘The Restatement of New Testament Mythology,’ in Kerygma and Myth: a Theological Debate, ed. Hans Werner Bartsch, trans. Reginald H. Fuller London: S.P.C.K, p. 147.

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forces this illusory choice between Bultmann the historical-critic or Bultmann the subjectivist, and thereby misrepresents his thought entirely. Here it is instructive to compare Bultmann’s paradoxical interpretation of 1:14a, which has forced many to this false dichotomy, with a perspective other than Cartesianism; namely, post-structuralism. Yet it is an uneasy comparison. The principle working within demythologizing is not a variant of post-structuralism, but is the theological principle of justification by faith. Indeed, Bultmann’s anti-Cartesian thought is rooted primarily in the theology of the New Testament. Nevertheless, we will venture into Cartesianism and post-structuralism. It would be exceedingly naive to equate Bultmann with post-structuralism, yet it would be negligent not to note the distinct similarity and effective dialogue that may proceed from such a comparison. One argument that would suggest a dissociation of Bultmann from post-structuralism would be that post-structuralism entails an entirely open ended interpretation that is incompatible with Bultmann’s hermeneutic. Conversely, some may think that Bultmann’s demythologizing and post-structuralism are similar in that both are subjectivist and negating. However, neither of these criticisms stands up to close scrutiny. A discussion of Derrida and deconstruction (as a particular example of poststructuralism) reveals the inaccuracy of attributing an antithesis, or synthesis, between Bultmann and deconstruction based on negation and indeterminacy. It will be argued that neither Bultmann through demythologizing, nor Derrida through deconstruction, necessarily lead to negation and indeterminacy. In fact, the argument that both Bultmann and deconstruction are nihilistic is a misleading characterization. Once demythologizing and deconstruction are free from the categorical charge of nihilism and subjectivism, then they can be fruitfully contrasted with Cartesian-based interpretation. Cartesian interpretation is, in fact, the stance against which both Bultmann and Derrida are reacting. Moreover, as will be discussed later, Wittgenstein also reacts against Cartesianism. This parallel anti-Cartesian thought of these thinkers can point to a renewed possibility for dialogue with Bultmann, in particular by avoiding the Cartesian error of positing the false choice between Bultmann the historical-critic and Bultmann the subjectivist. It is time to unlock Bultmann from modern criticism and to revisit his thought from a perspective that is not based 47

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on the prevalent tradition of Cartesian thought. As Kuschel already noted over two decades ago, ‘Bultmann’s demythologizing programme must be thought through again today.’64 The time for a new perspective is long overdue, it can be found in post-structuralism and is a promising path to a renewed understanding of Bultmann and demythologizing. There is no question that Heidegger was influential for Bultmann; however, a more helpful and comprehensive discussion point is that Bultmann was anti-Cartesian. Rather than rushing to the defence of Bultmann, or his critics, it is useful to examine the root of the problem behind the majority of Bultmann’s critics, and the presuppositions of those very criticisms. If the negative accounts of Bultmann’s hermeneutical method – demythologizing – arise, at least in part, because demythologizing is typically judged from a Cartesian perspective, then we need to understand Descartes. It is important to note that what has come to be known as Cartesianism is often dissociated from Descartes himself. Nevertheless, it is Descartes’ thought that leads to Cartesianism, and it is thereby useful to review briefly his thought to better understand the traditional subject-object schema and the basis of many misunderstandings of Bultmann. According to Descartes, God gave humans reason, and therefore truths reached by reason are reconcilable with theology. However, Descartes begins to question the tradition and certainty of truths and knowledge. Consequently, he turns from what he regards as the jargon and overly technical arguments of the scholastic tradition to search for certainty. He notes, ‘Regarding philosophy, I shall say only this: it has been cultivated for many centuries by the most excellent minds and yet there is still no point in it which is not disputed and hence doubtful.’65 Descartes wants to replace the scholastic method with one that assures every assertion will rest on its proof and no proof will rest on assumptions. He tears down the traditional scholastic structure to build from a new foundation of clear and distinct ideas with the tools of reason alone. Descartes is thereby regarded as the founder of modern 64 65

Kuschel, K.-J. Born Before All Time?, p. 161. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, trans. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff and D. Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 1: pp. 114–5.

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philosophy in general and of a method in particular. He argues for a method of doubting everything in his classic work Meditations on First Philosophy (1641). He begins his quest for certain knowledge with a rejection of the senses since they ‘deceive, and it is prudent never to trust completely those who have deceived us even once.’66 Descartes applies the sceptic’s doubt to the greatest extent, even denying the certainty of mathematical and logical truths. Perhaps an invisible demon is deceiving you to believe that 1 1 1 5 2. He notes that a ‘malicious demon of the utmost power and cunning’ could deceive him. Moreover, it is possible that ‘the sky, the earth, colours, shapes, sounds and all external things are merely the delusions of dreams which he has devised to ensnare my judgement.’67 Descartes’ rejection of the senses leaves only his mind standing, and what he discovers is that not even an evil demon can remove this last standing item on his list. He notes, ‘Let the demon deceive me as much as he may .â•›.â•›. I am, I exist is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind.’68 Even if the evil demon deceives him, he is still thinking about being deceived! It is useful to quote Descartes in full: ‘Since I now wish to devote myself solely to the search for truth, I thought it necessary to .â•›.â•›. reject as if absolutely false everything in which I could imagine the least doubt, in order to see if I was left believing anything that was entirely indubitable. Thus because our senses sometimes deceive us, I decided to suppose that nothing was such as they led us to imagine. And since there are men who make mistakes in reasoning, committing logical fallacies concerning the simplest questions in geometry, and because I judged that I was as prone to error as anyone else, I rejected as unsound all the arguments I had previously taken as demonstrative proofs. Lastly, considering that the very thoughts we have while awake may also occur while we sleep without any of them being at that time true, I resolved to pretend that all the things that had ever entered my mind were no more true than the illusions of my dreams. But immediately I noticed that while I was trying thus to think everything false, it was necessary that I, who was thinking this, was something. And Ibid., 2: p. 12. Ibid., 2: p. 15. 68 Ibid., 2: p. 17.

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observing that this truth “I am thinking, therefore I exist” was so firm and sure that all the most extravagant suppositions of the sceptics were incapable of shaking it, I decided that I could accept it without scruple as the first principle of the philosophy I was seeking.’69 This culminates with the infamous ‘cogito ergo sum’, that is, ‘I am thinking, therefore I exist.’ In other words, you cannot doubt doubt. This is Descartes’ ‘Archimedean point’ – the foundation that he can now build upon from the inside out. Adam states that, ‘One of the pivotal moments of modernity came when René Descartes realized that he could not doubt his own existence; from this, he rebuilt the whole metaphysical superstructure of Western philosophy with this one axiom as his foundation. Whatever one’s foundation, the philosophical tradition has customarily assumed that one needed to have some undoubtable, unshakeable truth which to back up one’s theoretical claims.’70 The thought of Descartes explicitly reveals the essential foundation which is undoubtable, namely, the self as separate from the body. Descartes uses his ‘clear and distinct’ rule to build upon this one foundation of the cogito ergo sum. However, he needs to avoid the invisible demon that may place deceiving ideas in his mind, so he brings in God, and he is certain that there is a God since something causes the idea of God to be in his mind. In other words, a cause must be as real as is its effect, and his idea of God did not come from nowhere; therefore, God exists. Descartes writes, ‘I see plainly that the certainty and truth of all knowledge depends uniquely on my awareness of the true God, to such an extent that I was incapable of perfect knowledge about anything else until I became aware of him. And now it is possible for me to achieve full and certain knowledge of countless matters, both concerning God himself and other things whose nature is intellectual, and also concerning the whole of that corporeal nature which is the subject-matter of pure mathematics.’71 Moreover, the cause of a perfect idea (in an imperfect mind) must itself be perfect (Third Meditation). With God securing knowledge, that is the mind, he continues, Ibid., 1: pp. 126–7. Adam, A. K. M. (1995) What is Postmodern Biblical Criticism? Minneapolis, Fortress Press, pp. 5f. 71 The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 2: p. 49.

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‘by “intuition” I do not mean the fluctuating testimony of the senses or the deceptive judgment of the imagination as it botches things together, but the conception of a clear and attentive mind, which is so easy and distinct that there can be no room for doubt about what we are understanding .â•›.â•›. intuition is the indubitable conception of a clear and attentive mind which proceeds solely from the light of reason .â•›.â•›. thus everyone can mentally intuit that he exists, that he is thinking, that a triangle is bounded by just three sides and a sphere is a single surface, and the like.’72 Descartes’ method depends on the lux naturae, the light of nature that enables the individual to reject the misleading senses and discover the essential structure of reality. His method rests on a denial of flesh and blood humans, ‘this “I” .â•›.â•›. is entirely distinct from the body, and indeed is easier to know than the body, and would not fail to be whatever it is, even if the body did not exist.’73 Given the focus on innate knowledge we should ask: can a new born baby reflect on metaphysics? If the senses are not what provide knowledge, then surely the infant’s mind has this innate knowledge. Descartes apparently accepts this consequence of his theory, albeit admitting, as Plato did, that the infant’s body is so overwhelmed by stimuli that it may not find the time to concentrate on metaphysics. Descartes notes, ‘It seems reasonable to think that a mind newly united to an infant’s body is wholly occupied in perceiving or feeling the ideas of pain, pleasure, heat, cold and other similar ideas which arise from its union and intermingling with the body.’ Moreover, ‘I have no doubt that if it were released from the prison of the body, it would find them within itself’.74 We do not acquire these ideas later on, as we grow older. Whatever the status of the newborn is, Descartes clearly notes, ‘The body is always a hindrance to the mind in its thinking, and this was especially true in youth.’75 Consequently, Descartes provides the basis for a dualistic conception of humans – the body and the mind. Since the thinking self is the foundation of Cartesianism, it follows that there are separate objects that are thought about. Thiselton notes this distinction by defining Cartesianism in terms of an ‘active subject Ibid, 1: p. 14. Ibid., 1: p. 127. 74 Ibid., 3: p. 190. 75 Ibid., 3: p. 336.

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[who] scrutinizes the things around him as passive objects.’76 Madison continues this distinction between the thinking subject and the objects thought about in his description of the dualistic nature of Cartesianism, and the result of this dualism is the alienation of subject and object.77 This Cartesian distinction between the self and the object of study develops into a hermeneutic of its own, as Bernstein notes, ‘Basic dichotomies between the subjective and the objective; the conception of knowledge as being a correct representation of what is objective; the conviction that human reason can completely free itself of bias, prejudice, and tradition; the ideal of a universal method by which we can first secure firm foundations of knowledge and then build the edifice of a universal science; the belief that by the power of self-reflection we can transcend our historical context and horizon and know things as they really are in themselves.’78 Descartes does admit that ‘I am not merely present in the body as a sailor is present in a ship; but that I am very closely joined and, as it were, intermingled with it, so that I and the body form a unit.’79 Nevertheless, the dualism between the physical senses and the mind in Descartes’ work leads him to devalue the former as animated machines (i.e. not conscious, but mechanical automata without sensory awareness) to the extreme point of regarding dissected animals making painful cries as nothing other than the inevitable sounds made by a machine being dismantled – not the sounds of pain. At best, he posited the pineal gland as the location or nexus of the body and mind unit, but simply describing a mysterious body part does not guarantee that a mind has knowledge of the external world. The relation between the incorporeal self and the mechanical body remains a quagmire, and does not seem to provide the guarantees sought – at least not without God. The well-known problem with Descartes’ method is the ‘Cartesian Circle’. Descartes needs God to guarantee his method and the method to guarantee God. For example, I have the Thiselton, A. C. (1980) The Two Horizons Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmanns Publishing Company, p. 299. 77 Madison, G. B. (1990) The Hermeneutics of Postmodernity: Figures and Themes Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, p. 58. 78 Bernstein, R. J. (1983) Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and Praxis Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, p. 36. 79 The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 2: p. 56.

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clear and distinct idea of God, therefore God exists, and God guarantees the clear and distinct idea, ad nauseam in a circle. If the existence of God is required to guarantee the reliability of clear and distinct ideas, then how can the idea of God be reliable in the first place? Ultimately, it is a bit of a paradox that Descartes aims to arrive at a clear understanding of the physical world, but to do so he retreats from the physical world. In other words, he ends up opening the door to further scepticism as he opens the epistemological chasm between the mind and the external world, and actually provides a foundation that is a metaphysical quicksand that only God can pull him out of. Descartes, like Plato before him, sees true knowledge as residing in an abstract and intellectual realm, in contrast to the secondary fleeting material world. He appears to turn from the Aristotelian tradition back to the earlier Platonic conception of philosophy. This perplexing theory of knowledge translates into a Cartesian hermeneutic. As Bruns describes it, ‘Since the power of reason is equally distributed in all human beings, interpretative authority belongs to everyone – so long as he or she approaches the text in a careful, impartial, and unfettered spirit, making no assumptions concerning it, and attributing to it no doctrines except those which can be perceived clearly and distinctly in the light of natural reason. Call this Cartesian hermeneutics .â•›.â•›. in which the text comes under the control of the reader as disengaged rational subject, unresponsive except to its own self-certitude.’80 Martin Rumscheidt considers a Cartesian hermeneutic to be analogous to liberal theology and comments that ‘“liberal theology,” as a scholarly discipline, and “liberal” faith, as a faith that knows, are “modern” since they embrace the Cartesian assertion that to be human at all is to be about the enterprise of cognitive appropriation of reality.’81 Harnack, for whom the picture of the historical Jesus is essential to the Christian faith as an objective ‘Archimedean point,’ is an example of the problem of liberal theology. Harnack sought the timeless truth (the ethical life) of Christianity through historical criticism in What is Christianity? For example, he was concerned with cognitive constructions of Bruns, G. L. (1992) Hermeneutics Ancient and Modern New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 149. 81 Rumscheidt, M. ed. (1989) Adolf Von Harnack: Liberal Theology at its Height London: Collins, p. 34.

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God in contrast to the ‘wholly other’ stumbling block of God epitomized in John 1:14a.82 The main concern in Bultmann’s hermeneutic, as in Cartesianism, is the understanding of the subject/object relationship and the differentiation between the text as object and the interpreter as subject. Bultmann himself admits that his hermeneutical investigation is motivated by the subject/object relation.83 However, he rejects the traditional Cartesian subject/ object schema of the Cartesian hermeneutic. Indeed, Bultmann states, ‘it needs to become clear that the genuine relation of historians to history cannot be understood according to the traditional [Cartesian] schema of the relation of subject to object.’84 This is a direct reference to the ideal posited by liberal theology, to know history through historical-criticism, just as the subject thinks it possible to know objective history. Consequently, he remarks, ‘A young man who wants to find out about his (future) bride by means of a detective agency will not get to know her at all as she is, because that does not disclose itself to objective inspection, but only to existential encounter.’85 If traditional methods of interpreting Bultmann are rooted in a Cartesian hermeneutic (e.g., liberal theology), then they will have difficulty assessing his demythologizing since it stands outside of a Cartesian evaluative framework, for example, liberal theology. As we have seen, Bultmann notes that ‘the historian himself stands within history and partakes of it. .â•›.â•›. he cannot take a stand outside history at an “Archimedean point.”’86 In contrast to a Cartesian hermeneutic Bultmann denies a subject’s ability to analyze an object objectively. Instead of separating the subject and object Bultmann sees an intimate relationship between the subject and object (not unlike the flesh and glory, and history and eschatology), and remarks, ‘the most subjective interpretation is the most objective.’87 Bultmann thereby dissolves the clear subject/object dualism of a Cartesian hermeneutic, and Perrin, N. The Promise of Bultmann, p. 45. Bultmann, R. ‘The Case for Demythologizing’, p. 64. 84 Bultmann, R. New Testament and Mythology, p. 137. 85 Bultmann, R. as quoted in An Introduction to the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, p. 31. 86 Bultmann, R. The Presence of Eternity, p. 127. 87 Ibid., p. 122. See also, Bultmann, New Testament and Mythology, pp. 138f.

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his hermeneutic is therefore better discussed in a post-structural context. Moreover, Schmithals likewise notes, ‘Anyone who, as a Christian theologian, thinks and speaks within the subject-object pattern is no longer in harmony with what is meant in the Bible. Christian theology thus has the urgent task of overcoming the subject-object pattern.’88 However, as Friedrich Gogarten notes, ‘Since our thinking, especially in the sciences, has been conducted in accordance with this pattern for the past three hundred years or so, the subject-object pattern cannot be overcome except by a very considerable effort, an effort which requires time.’89 It is interesting to step back in history to Giambattista Vico (1668–1744) since he can provide another interesting point of view. Vico saw the problem of Cartesianism long before both Bultmann and Heidegger, and thereby affords an interesting perspective on a common difficulty with Cartesianism. In fact, on the basis of their anti-Cartesianism, Paparella has noticed a link between Vico and Bultmann’s demythologizing.90 Paparella notes that ‘properly speaking, Vico is the grandfather of modern hermeneutics even though little credit is accorded to him. [Nevertheless] this approach of Vico is later followed up in Bultmann’s attempt at demythologizing.’91 Levine maintains that the thought of Vico also runs into the thought of Collingwood,92 and it can be said that it is Vico who influenced Collingwood more than anyone else.93 It is interesting, then, to note that Bultmann considers Collingwood to have the most accurate understanding of history, while he only refers to Heidegger in passing in the Gifford lectures.94 Yet there is no intent to equate the two, or to reduce Bultmann Schmithals, W. An Introduction to the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, p. 29. 89 Gogarten, F. (1955) Demythologizing and History London: SCM, p. 51. 90 Paparella, E. L. (1993) Hermeneutics in the Philosophy of Giambattista Vico: Vico’s Paradox San Francisco: EMText, p. 47. A case can be made, as noted by Bultmann himself, that Johann Gottfried Herder ‘s (1784–91) thought parallels Vico’s; yet Bultmann does not decide if Herder was, or was not, influenced by Vico. See Bultmann, The Presence of Eternity, p. 80. 91 Paparella, E. L. p. 47. 92 Levine, J. M. (1992) ‘Objectivity in History’ Clio 21:2 p. 127. 93 Collingwood, R. G. (1946) The Idea of History Oxford: University Press, p. viii. 94 Bultmann, R. The Presence of Eternity, p. 130, p. 136.

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to a Vicoian influence. Rather, Vico may help to clarify further the Cartesian problem seen by Bultmann, and make it evident that Bultmann did not simply adopt a contemporary philosophy but was dealing with an ingrained Cartesian perspective. Paparella states that ‘it was Vico (1668–1744) who first proposed it [history as a paradigm of reality] to his contemporaries as an antidote to the, by then, rampant abstract, rationalistic philosophy of René Descartes.’95 Collingwood also states that Vico reacted against the Cartesian claim to rational truths96 and the idea of history being composed of distinct historical facts known once and for all.97 In contrast to clear and distinct ideas, Paparella notes, ‘As an antidote to rampant Cartesian rationalism, Vico, way back in 1725 .â•›.â•›. perceived that the whole of reality operates on two paradoxically related and complementary poles .â•›.â•›. for example .â•›.â•›. objective/subjective. This complementarity issues forth not from rationalistic pseudo-unity of intellectual categories but rather from an organic unity derived from the phenomenon of its very origins.’98 Vico clearly states that the subject and object are complementary in a fashion similar to Bultmann.99 This complementary relationship contrasts with Cartesianism. Likewise, Derrida remarks: ‘in classical philosophical opposition we are not dealing with the peaceful coexistence of a vis-a-vis but rather with a violent hierarchy. One of the two terms governs the other .â•›.â•›. or has the upper hand.’100 The Cartesian hermeneutic attempts to gain the ‘upper hand’ through a separation of subject and object in an attempt to gain the ‘Archimedean point.’ Cartesianism seeks to distance itself from tradition and the myths therein which are seen as sources of deception en route to the clear and distinct ‘Archimedean point.’101 In contrast to the Cartesian hermeneutic, Bultmann maintains a peaceful coexistence between the subject and object since they cannot exist independently,102 they are not in a ‘violent Paparella, E. L. p. 29. Collingwood, R. G. The Idea of History, p. 64. 97 Paparella, E. L. p. 34. 98 Ibid., p. 177. 99 Levine, J. M. ‘Objectivity in History,’ p. 116. 100 Derrida, J. (1972) Positions, trans. Alan Bass Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, p. 41. 101 Paparella, E. L. p. 42. 102 Bultmann, R. The Presence of Eternity, p. 133. 95 96

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hierarchy.’ Instead of seeking an ‘upper hand’, it is necessary and sufficient to look at 1:14a itself as a paradox and stumbling block without the flesh or glory being assumed under the other. Vico maintains that we ‘must transcend the subject/object dichotomy of Cartesianism; however, this approach, with its ambiguities and unresolved contradictions, paradoxes, conflicts and suffering, may not be a neat, clear, clean world of scientific concepts, but it is certainly less sterile and more authentically true to existence and human experience.’103 Bultmann also insists that his hermeneutic is not a matter of human wisdom that can be drawn into a concise logical conclusion through a Cartesian hermeneutic, but is an event encountered in history that is accountable to human experience.104 Madison continues this point by noting that this anti-Cartesian hermeneutic and the resultant undermining of traditional oppositions of subject and object, leads to an understanding of ‘how the imagination is the very heart of understanding, which is not merely a matter, as the traditional metaphor has it, of “facing the facts”.’105 Thus, rather than attempting to justify demythologizing through a Cartesian hermeneutic, Bultmann lets it stand on its own, including the paradoxes and its offence to reason. As realized by Douglas Cremer, Bultmann’s hermeneutic must be accepted ‘as paradoxical, unresolved, always subject to critique, and always open to new possibilities, a frightening and insecure position.’106 Paparella concludes that Vico’s thought was ahead of its time, but thinks that now we are better able to see the value of his thought in light of becoming aware of the Cartesianism paradigm of reality which still pervades our culture.107 Collingwood also considers Vico’s critique of Cartesianism to be ‘too far ahead of his time to have very much immediate influence.’108 Likewise, Bultmann was misrepresented in his time due to the prevalent Cartesian hermeneutic and its associated epistemological habits. Funk observes that Bultmann has been distorted by reading him through liberal and/or orthodox eyes as though twentieth Paparella, E. L. p. 89. Bultmann, R. Kerygma and Myth, p. 207. 105 Madison, G. B. The Hermeneutics of Postmodernity, p. 190. 106 Douglas, C. J. (1995) ‘Protestant Theology in Weimar Germany,’ Journal of the History of Ideas, 56:2 p. 308. 107 Paparella, E. L. p. 41. 108 Collingwood, R. G. The Idea of History, p. 71. 103 104

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century theology were merely an extension of the nineteenth. Moreover, he notes that if Bultmann had been seen as turning a new corner in theology, he may have been better understood.109 Both Vico and Bultmann met general disregard in part due to their rejection of Cartesianism, the accepted hermeneutic of their time. Now, with the advent of post-structuralism, we are better situated to discuss an anti-Cartesian hermeneutic such as those found in Bultmann and Vico. Vico had already discovered in the eighteenth century that myths transcend the Cartesian dualism of subject and object, and that interpretation is not simply to reject history and myths, but to overcome the reader’s estrangement from myths.110 His thought is similar to Bultmann, but cannot be equated to Bultmann. Yet an interesting discussion could ensue with Vico, a figure silenced though the ages but who, as with Bultmann, can be heard more clearly in post modernity than in his own time. Faith is not simply a blind agreement with a transcendent system of thought; the transcendent can only be found in the world, and faith in the world places the objective and subjective together, without giving the one a priori status over the other. Likewise, deconstruction does not accept the emphasis on the thinking subject as a reference point; instead, it points to the other, the impossible. Deconstruction admits to human fallibility and the need of the other. The epistemological problem that Descartes opens is the idea that solitary reason can start from scratch and rebuild knowledge; instead, human knowledge is by necessity bound to language and social conditions and we cannot step outside these to reach an ‘Archimedean point.’

7.╇ A Post-Structural Context If Bultmann’s hermeneutic is anti-Cartesian and not based on a foundational epistemology, then is he a subjectivist? A common and unfortunate conclusion is that he is, and it is the conclusion of one of Bultmann’s most trenchant critics.111 Thielicke provides an example of the interpretative error of placing Bultmann in the Funk, R. W. ‘Introduction’, in Faith and Understanding, p. 12. Paparella, E. L. p. 88. 111 Fuller, R., for example, in The New Testament in Current Study, makes use of Thielicke as one of the main critics of Bultmann’s work. 109 110

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Cartesian dilemma of the either/or dichotomy: either Bultmann is a historical-critical proponent or a subjectivist. This shows how hermeneutics can be dominated by Cartesianism and how important it is to acknowledge the problem, which is not simply the problem of liberal theology or evangelical theology, but is the common approach of many interpretative methods. Thielicke’s focus upon Cartesian dualism leads him to label Bultmann a subjectivist and he completely ignores Bultmann’s insistence on history and the use of the historical method. He is wrong to think that Bultmann rejects an objective reality and endorses subjectivism. Oddly, Thielicke writes that ‘Bultmann’s theology is the climax of the Cartesian inquiry .â•›.â•›.’ and he concludes that Bultmann’s method is only ‘a variant of the principle of Descartes: cogito ergo sum.’112 Thielicke describes this notion of ‘Cartesian inquiry’ as ‘self-conscious existential’ since Bultmann’s method is founded in the ‘subjective element.’113 It follows, at least for Thielicke, that Bultmann’s thought is Cartesian since he incorporates the subjective as the defining category of understanding.114 Clark Pinnock agrees and remarks that Bultmann ends in a ‘complete subjectivising of the gospel.’115 Since Thielicke considers Bultmann to operate exclusively on the subjective side of the subjective/objective dualism, he concludes that Bultmann is unable to maintain any form of objective knowledge. All Bultmann has, according to Thielicke, is a subjective consciousness, an example of being Thielicke, H. (1974) The Evangelical Faith, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, pp. 45–6. 113 Thielicke, H. ‘The Restatement of New Testament Mythology,’ in Kerygma and Myth, p. 146. 114 Thielicke uses the term Cartesian to describe a subjective hermeneutic, and non-Cartesian to describe an objective hermeneutic. It is evident that Thielicke considers an objective method to be of great value, while a subjective method to be wrong-headed. Thus, what Thielicke calls Cartesian would be in agreement with what Bultmann calls Cartesian, but what Thielicke calls non-Cartesian would still be called Cartesian by Bultmann. It is important, then, to understand that from a Bultmannian perspective Thielicke, despite using the term non-Cartesian, never leaves Cartesian dualism. 115 Pinnock, C. H. (1971) ‘Theology and Myth: An Evangelical Response to Demythologizing’, in Bibiotheca Sacra (July), p. 218. 112

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caught in the ‘shadows of our own consciousness.’116 More specifically, Thielicke states that Bultmann’s pre-understanding is the ‘exclusive listening to the voice of one’s own existence prior to the text [which] surreptitiously gives rise to a very problematic, sharply delineated, and rigid self-understanding which also becomes an arbitrary schema.’117 Thielicke’s conclusion that Bultmann’s hermeneutic is problematic and arbitrary is actually a direct consequence of his own Cartesian perspective which necessitates a foundation; and his assumption that Bultmann’s foundation rests on the subjective side of the Cartesian dualism – the pre-understanding and the self. Thielicke thereby concludes Bultmann’s foundation must be arbitrary in contrast to a certain objective foundation. In an attempt to clarify the objective side of the Cartesian dualism, Thielicke actually furthers the confusion: ‘while the present situation and its questions have to be considered, they must not become a normative principle nor must they be allowed to prejudice the answer; they must be constantly recast and transcended in encounter with the text.’118 Thus, Thielicke’s example of good interpretation – the objective side – is what Bultmann would still call Cartesian and an illusion since it is impossible to transcend all prejudice; indeed, if one actually could there would be no interpretation. Yet he is blind to this point, and simply states that ‘Bultmann is not objective but is prejudiced by his self-understanding.’119 Hence, Thielicke understands Bultmann’s hermeneutic principle – demythologizing – as abandoning objectivity and instead finding a home in the arbitrary subjective.120 Although Thielicke notes that Bultmann refuses to be labelled a subjectivist,121 he cannot see Bultmann in any other manner. In the ‘violent hierarchy’ of Cartesianism, he must choose the subjective or objective as the proper mode of hermeneutics, and he chooses the latter on the grounds that it is less arbitrary. Thus Thielicke, H. ‘The Restatement of New Testament Mythology,’ p. 147. Thielicke, H. The Evangelical Faith, p. 58. 118 Ibid., p. 127. Compare this to Bultmann’s comment that to silence subjectivity to gain objectivity is ‘the most absurd [thing] that can be imagined.’ New Testament and Mythology, p. 85. 119 Thielicke, H. The Evangelical Faith, p. 59. 120 Thielicke, H. ‘The Restatement of New Testament Mythology,’ p. 159. 121 Thielicke, H. The Evangelical Faith, p. 60. 116 117

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Thielicke is left discrediting any notion of subjectivity: ‘when theology focuses so exclusively on man’s self-consciousness and proclaims so exclusively what in the resultant pre-judgement he can regard as significant for him, the past and the contingent are banished to the realm of the irrelevant .â•›.â•›. all that is left is the Cartesian I.’122 For Thielicke, the ‘Cartesian I’ must be ‘given up to death’ along with Bultmann’s hermeneutic.123 Despite Thielicke’s critique of Bultmann, he fabricates a weak attempt to give Bultmann a bit of credit, but in so doing does a great disservice to Bultmann and ends up constructing a naive view of Bultmann’s method, as is demonstrated in his statement that ‘it is important to keep in view Bultmann’s ultimate objective, which is to secure a firm basis.’124 Bultmann is far from wanting to secure a ‘firm basis’; rather, Thielicke is simply projecting his own need for a hermeneutic based on a foundational epistemology. This ultimately leads Thielicke to reject Bultmann’s hermeneutic as based in ‘secular philosophy’; the logical conclusion being anti-religion with ‘fatal results.’125 There is a real question regarding whose method produces ‘fatal results’; as Thielicke says, the ‘Cartesian I’ must ‘be given up to death.’ The implication of Thielicke’s Cartesian hermeneutic is revealed in his statement; ‘the implication [of Bultmann’s hermeneutic] is that it would be nearer to the truth to say: “The Word did not become flesh”.’126 The above illustrates how confusion tends to reign in critiques of Bultmann, as a result of the critics themselves being mired in a Cartesian hermeneutic. Macquarrie sees the confusion involved in the interpretation of Bultmann and states, ‘The result [of numerous critiques of Bultmann] is bewildering in the extreme, not only because one set of critics regards as a virtue what the other set abhors as a vice, but also because it frequently happens that contradictory charges are made against Bultmann and he could not possibly be guilty on both counts at once.’127 Once again, these contradictory charges arise from the forced bipolar decision posited by Cartesianism between the subjective and the Ibid., p. 111. Ibid., p. 159. 124 Thielicke, H. ‘The Restatement of New Testament Mythology,’ p. 174. 125 Ibid., p. 149. 126 Ibid., p. 148. 127 Macquarrie, J. The Scope of Demythologizing, p. 30. 122 123

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objective. The interpreter could as easily slide to one side as to the other. Since it is difficult to categorize Bultmann, particularly for the more insightful interpreter, it follows, as noted by Ogden, that ‘from both the right and left responsible critics have repeatedly charged that Bultmann’s view is, strictly speaking, not a view at all, but an uneasy synthesis of two different and ultimately incompatible standpoints.’128 Thielicke, as a responsible critic, has missed Bultmann’s hermeneutic entirely, since he pries into his thought with a Cartesian perspective. Ott rightly sees this problem: in ‘their rigid adherence to the subjectobject pattern Bultmann’s critics are blinding themselves to the real purport of his theology .â•›.â•›. it becomes a “subjectivist phenomenon” or an “immanent experience”. This is because they are either unable or unwilling to realize that Bultmann is seeking to banish the complementary terms ‘subject’ and ‘object’ from the theological scene.’129 In fact, Bultmann calls any objective or subjective thought Cartesian since his hermeneutic is a synthesis of the two rather than one or the other. Yet Thielicke cannot function outside of those very terms since he cannot even consider giving any credence to the subjective side of the dualism since that, he fears, would end in chaos. Bernstein sees that this fear of the subjective chaos is the inherent anxiety of Cartesianism that, ‘leads us to an apparent and ineluctable necessity, to a grand and seductive Either/Or. Either there is .â•›.â•›. a fixed foundation .â•›.â•›. or we cannot escape the forces of darkness that envelop us with madness, with intellectual and moral chaos.’130 The Cartesian hermeneutic necessitates reality as an either/or.131 Hence Thielicke is stuck in the either/or dualism of the subject and object, and is thereby unable to understand Bultmann’s hermeneutic, since it rejects this Cartesian antithesis between the subject and object relation, and instead accepts a synthesis of the subject and object. However, the Cartesian habits are so ingrained in Western thought that they are consequently difficult to ascertain and even more difficult to remove. Paparella states that ‘the sheer Ogden, S. (1961) Christ without Myth New York: Harper and Brothers, p. 99. 129 Ott, H. ‘Objectification and Existentialism,’ in Kerygma and Myth: A Theological Debate vol. II, pp. 313f. 130 Bernstein, R. J. Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, p. 18. 131 Paparella, E. L. p. 150. 128

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arrogance of the Cartesian mind-set is exhibited by the insistence that it is the only valid “objective” view of what constitutes reality, while other views or paradigms can only proceed out of ignorance and have therefore little, if any, intellectual value.’132 In other words, to accept any perspective other than Cartesianism and side with the objective would be seen as madness. Yet Bernstein maintains that the concern should not be to choose the better side in the Cartesian either/or dichotomy, as if one fact or another offers more security (as Thielicke chooses the objective side for security), but to ‘exorcize the Cartesian anxiety and liberate ourselves from its seductive appeal.’133 The problem with Thielicke’s discussion of Bultmann lies in Thielicke’s normative appraisal of the objective side of the Cartesian dualism and his inability even to imagine the possibility of locating the discussion in an anti-Cartesian context. Post-structuralism is, however, a contrast to liberal and evangelical theology and is thereby willing to enter discussions that ‘exorcize the Cartesian anxiety’ and leave the Cartesian hermeneutic behind. It is apparent that the difficult communication between Thielicke and Bultmann is analogous to that between Cartesianism (modernity) and anti-Cartesianism (postmodernity). Therefore, a post-structuralist context is a real possibility for continued discussions of Bultmann. It will not suffice to label Bultmann simply a historist or subjectivist just because a Cartesian hermeneutic necessitates such a decision. Yet once again, we should be careful not to reduce him to post-structuralism; rather, this simply provides an interesting context within which to discuss his thought. Moreover, whereas Bultmann is labelled a subjectivist and existentialist, the reality is that the historic and concrete event of Christ, and the eschatological decisiveness, is by no means in the grasp of human ability or decision; rather, it is an act of God. Bultmann’s contemporaries, entrenched in Cartesianism, naturally felt uncomfortable with Bultmann’s demythologizing, as it did little to contribute to their task of seeking a ground through human wisdom. In fact, it presents a threat to such a project. In contrast to a Cartesian hermeneutic, Bultmann’s hermeneutic, in a manner similar to post-structuralism, questions Paparella, E. L. p. 33. Bernstein, R. J. Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, p. 19.

132 133

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the ability of human wisdom to establish a foundation. In other words, just as justification by faith negates the security of works, so demythologizing undermines the epistemological security sought by the Cartesian hermeneutic. Yet the fire that Bultmann allows to burn is not an annihilating fire that burns all to the ground as the Cartesian hermeneutic would insist; rather, what are burned are the false objectifications and illusory foundations of Cartesianism. Indeed, it is liberal theology and the historyof-religions school which, according to Bultmann, ‘burn’ the kerygma to the ground by reducing it to an absolute idea or timeless truth, and consequently dismiss the essential paradox and stumbling block of 1:14a.134 Bultmann himself states that his hermeneutic ‘stands, on the one hand, within the tradition of the historical-critical and the history-of-religion schools and seeks, on the other hand, to avoid their mistake, which consists of the tearing apart of the act of thinking from the act of living and hence a failure to recognize the intent of theological utterances.’135 Thus there is an inverse relationship between Bultmann’s demythologizing and the Cartesian hermeneutic: the former burns human wisdom and the latter burns the paradox of 1:14a itself. What is post-structuralism? It is, of course, to be understood as differentiated from structuralism. While structuralism bases itself on the Cartesian subject/object dichotomy136 and on the project of gaining an objective description,137 post-structuralism provides a critique of the Cartesian subject-object dualism and the resultant illusion of ‘a self-foundation and self-justification of philosophy.’138 Moreover, Sarup defines post-structuralism thus: ‘reading has lost its status as a passive consumption of a product .â•›.â•›. post-structuralists have produced critiques of the classical Cartesian conception of the unitary subject – the subject/author as originating consciousness, authority for meaning and truth.’139 Schmithals, W. An Introduction to the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, p. 262. 135 Bultmann, R. Theology of the New Testament, p. 250. 136 Spivak, G. C. (1976) in Of Grammatology (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, p. lvii. 137 Sarup, M. Post-Structuralism and Postmodernism, pp. 39f. 138 Gasché, R. (1986) The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, p. 176. 139 Sarup, M. Post-Structuralism and Postmodernism, p. 3. 134

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Post-structuralism does not place our ideas as the foundation of language; rather, our ideas result from the language we learn. While the Cartesian system makes the self foundational, post-structuralism – like justification by faith – removes the subject’s ability to create their own meaning or justification independently. Post-structuralism need not be equated with subjectivism; rather, it opens the door from the individual to the text. Post-structuralism reacts against Cartesianism and it is this aspect that is of interest for our inquiry. However, an objection may be raised. Surely Bultmann is too dogmatic to be compared with the indeterminacy of poststructuralism. Alternatively, placing Bultmann in the melting pot of post-structuralism’s subjective chaos may seem apt. However, neither Bultmann nor Derrida (as a representative of post-structuralism) are as indeterminate and negating as is commonly assumed. The comparison between Bultmann and post-structuralism need not simply be rejected on the basis of indeterminacy; rather, the comparison must be discussed in light of their common anti-Cartesian perspective. Importantly, this does not mean that Bultmann’s thought is to be equated with post-structuralism; rather, there are interesting similarities between the two that can be a catalyst for further discussions of Bultmann. For example, just as Bultmann had difficulties with Cartesianism, so did Derrida. Gasché notes that ‘in order to come to grips with Derrida’s thought, one must reject the temptation [a Cartesian temptation] .â•›.â•›. simply to determine it as antisystematic .â•›.â•›. [because] philosophy has contained two absolutely symmetrical alternatives of a systematic and a nonsystematic thought.’140 In other words, since Derrida critiques systematic thought, it is assumed that it must be the case that he is nonsystematic. Moreover, nonsystematic is a pejorative term, as is subjectivism. Yet, as Norris states, ‘deconstruction is not just a species of deconstructive or all-purpose nihilistic rhetoric.’141 To interpret Bultmann and Derrida, it is necessary to break the habit of Cartesian thought and its associated anxiety that too easily reduces any seeming attack on meaning and objectivity to Gasché, R. The Taint of the Mirror, p. 178. Norris, C. (1990) What’s Wrong with Postmodernism: Critical Theory and the ends of Philosophy Toronto: Harvester/Wheatsheaf, p. 150.

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nihilism or indeterminacy. Yet criticisms of Bultmann often stem from such anxiety rather than understanding. An analogy to the problem of interpreting Bultmann and Derrida can be made with a technician looking at a slide under a microscope, knowing that the slide is labelled as blue, but seeing it as green. Then, rather than thinking it through and realizing that the eyepiece has been coloured yellow, the technician suspects that the slide must be wrongly labelled, just as Bultmann and Derrida must be wrong since their thought seems contradictory. However, the contradiction, as a problem, is a result of the viewpoint (eyepiece) of the interpreter, not necessarily the thought itself of either Bultmann or Derrida. For example, Thielicke, among others, has not seen Bultmann’s thought accurately and thereby labels him a subjectivist intent on the negation of history.142 Bultmann says, ‘my critics have objected that my demythologizing of the New Testament results in elimination .â•›.â•›. on the contrary, I am convinced that my interpretation exposes its meaning.’143 The intent of Bultmann’s demythologizing, in contrast to assumed negation on behalf of the Cartesian interpreter, is not to negate or subtract, but to interpret.144 Bultmann states that ‘demythologizing is an hermeneutic method, that is, a method of interpretation, of exegesis [and] hermeneutics is the art of exegesis.’145 The point of demythologizing is interpreting, not negating. Furthermore, it is significant that Bultmann’s interpretation makes use of the historical-critical method, even if he does renounce any foundational claim for it. Perhaps even worse than mislabelling Bultmann is the fact that many critical commentators do not even look at his work. Once again, Bultmann notes, ‘It is incredible how many people pass judgment on my work without ever having read a word of it .â•›.â•›. I have sometimes asked the grounds for a writer’s verdict, and which of my writings he has read. The answer has regularly been, without exception, that he has never read any of my writings; but he has learnt from a Sunday paper or a parish magazine that I am a heretic.’146 And Bonheoffer comments that the critique he has Thielicke, H. ‘The Restatement of New Testament Mythology,’ p. 159. Bultmann, R. Kerygma and Myth, p. 205. 144 Bultmann, R. Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 18. 145 Ibid., p. 145. 146 Bultmann, R. quoted in An Introduction of the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, p. 21. 142 143

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heard of Bultmann’s demythologizing is ‘idiotic’ and he ‘would like to know whether any of them [the critics] have worked through the John commentary.’147 Derrida, according to Norris, runs into similar problems, ‘The whole charge-sheet [against Derrida] falls to shreds if one only takes the trouble to read what Derrida has written, instead of relying on a handful of simplified slogans (“all reading is misreading”, “there is nothing outside of the text”, “meaning is always indeterminate” and so forth) which are no doubt well suited to the purpose of knock-about polemics, but which just do not begin to engage deconstruction at anything like an adequate level.’148 One needs to work through Derrida’s deconstruction and not rely on ‘simplified slogans’ if he is not to be unfairly dismissed as ‘an absurd nihilist.’149 As Norris notes, ‘One could cite many passages from Derrida’s work where he asserts that deconstruction is not, as his opponents would have it, a discourse with no further use for criteria of reference, validity, or truth; that it squarely repudiates the “anything goes” school of postmodern hermeneutic thought; and that to deconstruct naive or common sense ideas of how language hooks up with reality is not to suggest that it should henceforth be seen as a realm of open-ended textual “freeplay” or floating signifiers devoid of referential content.’150 Because of this problem, Derrida, like Bultmann, has had the difficulty of dissociating his work from irrationalist and nihilistic views that assume truth and reason are obsolete.151 The deconstruction emphasis should not be on the negative aspect, but on the production of meaning. As Spivak notes, ‘deconstruction does not say there is no subject, there is no truth, there is no history .â•›.â•›. It is not the exposure of error. It is constantly and persistently looking into how truths are produced.’152 Once again, deconstruction does not annihilate meaning, but rather is very concerned with meaning. Derrida himself comments that deconstruction Kuschel, K.-J. Born Before All Time?, p. 158. Norris, C. What’s Wrong with Postmodernism, p. 148. 149 Spivak, G. C. (1996) The Spivak Reader, ed. Donna Landry and Gerald MacLean New York: Routledge, p. 81. 150 Norris, C. (1992) Uncritical Theory London: Lawrence and Wishart, p. 17. 151 Ibid., p. 17. 152 Spivak, G. C. The Spivak Reader, p. 27. 147 148

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is affirmative interpretation.153 Hence, Derrida’s deconstruction, as noted by Bruns, does not aim at nihilism, ‘Derrida himself insists on this .â•›.â•›. deconstruction is comic not tragic. It aims at emancipation, not tragic divestiture .â•›.â•›. so it is not as cold as cold can be.’154 In contrast to a Cartesian perspective, which focuses on the negative and negating properties of demythologizing, it is valuable to look at post-structuralism to facilitate a discussion of Bultmann. Perhaps Descartes deconstructs knowledge, and consequently some believe that this is similar to deconstruction, just as some may wrongly claim that Bultmann, like Descartes, strips away outer layers to arrive at the inner truth. However, Descartes removes what is essential for Derrida and Bultmann, namely the text and word, and he consequently ends with a solitary subject. Bultmann strips away myths such as the three-tiered universe, but Descartes strips away everything. For Derrida, Descartes’ cogito is a consequence of madness, not actually being insane, but the madness of universal doubt, and as such is ‘metaphysical’ and ‘demonic.’155 Derrida’s critique of western philosophy certainly includes the rejection of radical doubt. We have the given, the gift, the text – the word. Does Derrida think that there is only the text? This is often attributed to him, given his remark: ‘There is nothing outside the text.’156 However, Derrida himself notes, ‘If deconstruction really consisted in saying that everything happens in books, it wouldn’t deserve five minutes of anybody’s attention. When these people pretend .â•›.â•›. to believe that that’s what deconstruction means, then I say that if the academy were still governed by ethics, such a thing ought to be .â•›.â•›. severely punished!’157 What Derrida classifies as ‘text’ is not limited to written words; it includes many things, even God. Derrida notes, ‘To say for example, “deconstruction suspends reference,” that deconstruction is a way of enclosing oneself in the sign, in the “signifier,” is an enormous naiveté stated in that form. .â•›.â•›. from the very beginning Derrida, J. (1978) Spurs Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, p. 37. Bruns, G. L. Hermeneutics Ancient and Modern, p. 219. 155 Derrida, J. (1978) Writing and Difference Chicago, University of Chicago Press, pp. 55–7. 156 Derrida, J. Of Grammatology, p. 158. 157 Derrida, J. (1985) ‘Deconstruction in America: An Interview with Jacques Derrida’, Critical Exchange, no. 17 (Winter), p. 15. 153 154

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my deconstructive propositions began by calling signification, the pair signifier / signified, into question. So, to say deconstruction consists in giving the signifier such a predominant place that the referent gets tossed out is already an unacceptable formulation.’158 When Derrida says ‘there is nothing outside of the text’, this is not a stark reductionism; rather, it gives immense importance to the text we have. There is no pure ‘Archimedean point’ or ontological handle to hang on to, there is only the text – the Word. According to Caputo, ‘It is not as if we are seeking some sort of invariant transcendental, some uncircumcised Hellenistic eidos, some essentia sans circumcision. Even if it is borne on the wings of repetition, this “religion” cannot circle high above us in an essentialistic, Hellenistic sky, like the aigle of savoir absolue, some bloodless transcendens soaring beyond us bloodied mortals below. For then this Jewish bird would be cooked (cuit).’159 This is in accord with, for instance, the Lutheran focus on the revealed Word; there is nothing outside the text and Word but idols of our own making, interpretations of our own musing, and the hidden god. Instead, we have the Word in the flesh in the world. It may be allowed by some critics of deconstruction that it can hold meaning, but they still might insist that that very meaning is bound to indeterminacy. Yet Eco rightly states, ‘Even the most radical deconstructionists accept the idea that there are interpretations which are blatantly unacceptable. This means that the interpreted text imposes some constraints upon its interpreters. The limits of interpretation coincide with the rights of the text (which does not mean with the rights of its author).’160 Derrida’s deconstruction is not ‘a species of all-licensing sophistical freeplay,’161 but rather, subscribes to a certain rigour.162 Deconstruction cannot be written off as engendering interpretative chaos. Derrida himself states that deconstruction is ‘subject to a certain historical necessity.’163 In reference to critical reading, he notes that ‘to recognize and respect all its classical exigencies is Ibid., p. 19. Caputo, J. D. (1997) The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, p. xxv. 160 Eco, U. (1990) The Limits of Interpretation Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, p. 6. 161 Norris, C. What’s Wrong with Postmodernism, p. 151. 162 Gasché, R. The Taint of the Mirror, p. 178. 163 Derrida, J. Of Grammatology, p. 162. 158 159

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not easy and requires all the instruments of traditional criticism. Without this recognition and this respect, critical production would risk developing in any direction at all and authorize itself to say almost anything.’164 Moreover, deconstruction, like demythologizing and the principle of scripture interprets scripture, is not a method applied from the outside; rather, it happens inside. Hence, Norris comments on deconstruction, that ‘it specifically disowns the attitude of free-for-all hermeneutic licence – or the downright anti-intentionalist stance – that Ellis [among others] so persistently attributes to Derrida. And of course it must also create problems for those among the deconstructionist adepts who likewise take him to have broken altogether with values of truth and falsehood, right reading, intentionality, authorial “presence” and so forth.’165 It is only a general and naive view of deconstruction that assumes an ‘anything goes’ mentality. Eco states that ‘Derrida would be – and indeed he was – the first to deny that we can always use language as an instance of drift and the first to refuse the objection that there are no criteria for verifying the reasonableness of a textual interpretation.’166 Derrida himself says ‘truth is not a value one can renounce. The deconstruction of philosophy does not renounce truth, any more, for that matter, than literature does.’167 Although there is no reasoned anchor point for meaning, this does not mean that there is no anchor point and that all is relative; just as there are no works that lead to justification, but this does not mean that there are no good works. Derrida rejects meaning and knowledge about as much as Bultmann rejects history and Luther rejects good works – not at all. Luther does not side with antinomianism and Derrida does not side with absolute indeterminacy. Bultmann would concur with Derrida that if a norm is not acknowledged, then relativism and nihilism could follow.168 He states that ‘since the New Testament is a document of history, specifically the history of religion, the interpretation of it requires the labour of historical investigation.’169 Bultmann does not Ibid., p. 158. Norris, C. What’s Wrong with Postmodernism, p. 162. 166 Eco, U. The Limits of Interpretation, p. 37. 167 Derrida, J. (2001) in A Taste for the Secret, trans. Giacomo Donis, ed. Giacomo Donis and David Webb Malden MA: Blackwell, p. 10. 168 Bultmann, R. Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 42. 169 Bultmann, R. Theology of the New Testament, p. 251. 164 165

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reject historical criticism.170 Moreover, ‘Genuine freedom is not subjective arbitrariness. It is freedom in obedience. The freedom of subjective arbitrariness is a delusion.’171 The naive view of post-structuralism, however, may have the ‘illusory idea of freedom as subjective arbitrariness which does not acknowledge a norm, a law beyond. This ensures relativism .â•›.â•›. [and] the end of this development is nihilism.’172 In contrast, Bultmann insists that history and tradition are essential. Likewise, Derrida denies that deconstruction will ‘betray’ or ‘deform’ tradition and religion.173 Indeed, he says, ‘I feel very “traditionalist” in a certain way because I am for memory, history, and in sum, everything of which the university is the guardian. .â•›.â•›. What’s more, I’d even go so far as to say that the university’s mission will be all the better protected if we don’t place limits on questioning, even if it may seem destructive or tiresome or subversive.’174 Derrida does not reduce meaning to a signifier and Bultmann does not reduce theology to subjectivism. To fear these aspects of their thought is a misplaced fear. Rather, they open the door to the scandal of the other. In this sense, deconstruction opens the kerygma. Derrida notes that deconstruction can ‘liberate theology from what has been grafted on to it, to free it from its metaphysical-philosophical superego, so as to uncover an authenticity of the “gospel,” of the evangelical message. And thus, from the perspective of faith, deconstruction can at least be a very useful technique when Aristotelian of Thomism are to be criticized or, even from an institutional perspective, when what needs to be criticized is a whole theological institution which supposedly has to cover over, dissimulated, an authentic Christian message. .â•›.â•›. a real possibility for faith at the margins and very close to Scripture, a faith lived in a venturous, dangerous, free way.’175

Bultmann, R. Faith and Understanding, p. 31. Bultmann, R. Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 41. 172 Ibid., p. 42. 173 Derrida and Religion, (2004) ed. Yvonne Sherwood and Kevin Hart New York: Routledge, p. 32. 174 Derrida, J. Critical Exchange, p. 7. 175 Ibid., p. 12. 170 171

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Even though Derrida can justifiably be called an atheist, it would be entirely wrong-headed to say he argues for atheism or against belief in God. Rather, deconstruction shows the weakness of metaphysics and mystical abstractions in religion and points to the affirmation of concrete traditions and practices within a religion. Just as it is a mistake to equate Bultmann with subjectivism and rationalism, it is a mistake to associate Derrida with atheism or negative theology, as Derrida says, ‘What I write is not “negative theology.”’176 For example, according to Caputo, ‘What we will not have understood about deconstruction, and this causes us to read it less and less well, is that deconstruction is set in motion by an overarching aspiration, which on a certain analysis can be called religious or prophetic aspiration.’177 Indeed, Derrida says he seriously considers the following possibility: ‘the events of the revelation, the biblical traditions, the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic traditions, have been absolute events, irreducible events which have unveiled this messianicity. We would not know what messianicity is without messianism, without these events which were Abraham, Moses, and Jesus Christ, and so on. In that case singular events would have unveiled these universal possibilities, and it is only on that condition that we can describe messianicity.’178 Derrida is caught between these specific singular events and a universal view, where the Messianic is an a priori structure and ontological priority. Interestingly, it is both at the same time; there is not an either-or, just as Bultmann points out that the historic event and the eschatological event are one.179 Moreover, Derrida’s use of difference shows that the messianic cannot simply be transcendental since difference implies differences, not one ontological and universal structure; this then requires messianism, history and revelation. Consequently, as Caputo rightly notes, ‘it is important to see that Derrida’s religion is more prophetic than apophatic, more in touch with the Jewish prophets than with Christian Neoplatonists, more messianic and more eschatological than mystical. His writing is more Derrida, J. (1992) ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’ in Derrida and Negative Theology, eds Harold Coward and Toby Foshay Albany: State University of New York Press, p. 77. 177 Caputo, J. D. The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida, p. xix. 178 Derrida, J. in Deconstruction in a Nutshell, pp. 23–4. 179 Bultmann, R. New Testament and Mythology, p. 163. 176

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inscribed by the promise, by circumcision, and by the mark of the father Abraham than by mystical transports, more like Amos and Isaiah than Pseudo-Dionysius, moved more by propheticoethico-political aspiration than by aspiring to be one with the One.’180 This concrete perspective fits well with Bultmann’s Lutheran background; as Forde writes, ‘Luther rejected the old idea of the heaven “above,” in favour of the more biblical idea of the world “to come,” the future world.’181 God comes to humans in a physical and concrete manner, where the Word becomes flesh, and where there will be a new heaven and earth. Bultmann states, ‘The Messiah is the king of the last age and as such he brings the salvation given by God. Hence, the Messiah is certainly expected as a fact, as an event which will actually happen. For Paul, the Messiah is in no way different. But the Jewish figure of the Messiah can remain an imaginary figure so long as the expectation of the event is not taken seriously, so long as men expect merely the fulfillment of their own desires and are not ready to recognize a contingent fact, a historic person as Messiah. .â•›.â•›. a pure fact.’182 Indeed, ‘the Revealer appears not as man-in-general .â•›.â•›. but as a definite human being in history.’183 Bultmann maintains that the significance of the verse is directly related to its concrete history, since without the distinct nature of the verse it would have little significance for humanity.184 In contrast to abstract principles or timeless truths of endless indeterminate speculations, 1:14a points to the singular distinctiveness of a particular body/flesh and a radical historical event that leaves the subject/object dichotomy behind.185 It is thereby evident that 1:14a is, for Bultmann, not a matter of human reason, which would speculate upon what is revealed and what knowledge is gained, but rather is a radical paradox. Eschatology has been inaugurated, perhaps not fully realized, but nonetheless is here now. This includes Bultmann’s ‘paradox that Christian existence is at the same time an eschatological unworldly being and an historical being .â•›.â•›. analogous with the Caputo, J. D. The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida, p. xxiv. Forde, G. O. (1972) Where God Meets Man Minneapolis: Augsburg, p. 90. 182 Bultmann, R. Faith and Understanding, p. 243. 183 Bultmann, R. The Theology of the New Testament, p. 41. 184 Bultmann, R. The Gospel of John, p. 61. 185 Ibid., p. 70. 180 181

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Lutheran statement simul iustus, simul peccator.’186 The flesh and glory, history and eschatology, saint and sinner, and justification by faith are impossible and radical paradoxes. Here, as Caputo notes, ‘Deconstruction is called for in response to the unrepresentable, is large with expectation, astir with excess, provoked by the promise of the impossible.’187 Derrida himself says deconstruction can be summed up as ‘the experience of the impossible.’188 Thus, as Derrida points to the messianic and the impossible, he notes: ‘As soon as you address the other, as soon as you are open to the future, as soon as you have a temporal experience of waiting for the future, of waiting for someone to come: that is the opening of experience. Someone is to come, is now to come.’189 Despite the expectation he says, ‘I would like him to come, I hope that he will come .â•›.â•›. and, at the same time, I am scared. I do not want what I want, and I would like the coming of the Messiah to be indefinitely postponed. .â•›.â•›. as long as I ask you the question, “When will you come?”, at least you are not coming. .â•›.â•›. So there is some ambiguity in the messianic structure. We wait for something we would not like to wait for. That is another name for death.’190 This is the real fear that should be found in Derrida’s thought, the Feu la Cendre, that is, in a sense, our death. However, this fire burns death itself, and paradoxically death brings life. Interestingly, and from another angle, Derrida’s death of the author of the text is exactly what brings life to the word – and the reader. In summary, Bultmann writes: ‘Are there still any surviving traces of mythology? There certainly are for those who regard all language about an act of God or of a decisive, eschatological event as mythological. But this is not mythology in the traditional sense, not the kind of mythology which has become antiquated with the decay of the mythical world view. For the redemption of which we have spoken is not a miraculous supernatural event, but an historic event wrought out in time and space. Bultmann, R. The Presence of Eternity: History and Eschatology, p. 154. Caputo, J. D. The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida, p. xix. 188 Derrida, J. (1992) Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, ed. Drucilla Cornell New York: Routledge, p. 15. 189 Derrida, J. in Deconstruction in a Nutshell, p. 22. 190 Ibid., pp. 24–5. 186 187

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We are convinced that this restatement does better justice to the real meaning of the New Testament and to the paradox of the kerygma. For the kerygma maintains that the eschatological emissary of God is a concrete figure of a particular historical past, that this eschatological activity was wrought out in a human fate, and that therefore it is an event whose eschatological character does not admit of a secular proof. Here we have the paradox of .â•›.â•›. the classic formula of John 1:14: “The Word became flesh”.’191 Derrida’s deconstruction and Bultmann’s demythologizing point toward the expectation of the ‘impossible’, but for Bultmann the impossible is realized, becomes the possible, and is thereby the greatest of all paradoxes.

8.╇ Wittgensteinian Parallels Bultmann has anti-Cartesian affinities that distance him from his contemporary critics, such as Thielicke, and place him within a conceptual framework that has closer ties to post-structuralist thought. Bultmann can also be favorably compared with Ludwig Wittgenstein. Once again, many discussions of Bultmann and philosophy tend to focus on Heidegger; however, it is useful to turn to Wittgenstein instead of a convenient Heidegger. Bultmann says, ‘In fact I base no theology on Heidegger’s philosophy,’ and Heidegger says, ‘Bultmann builds no theology upon my philosophy.’192 Bultmann himself is open to stepping outside the use of Heidegger; he notes that ‘Heidegger’s analysis of existence has become for me fruitful for hermeneutics, that is, for interpretation of the New Testament and of the Christian faith. I am willing to be shown whether other theologians can make fruitful use of other philosophies for hermeneutics, and I will gladly learn from them.’193 I think Wittgenstein’s anti-Cartesian philosophy can usefully illuminate Bultmann’s thought. Although there are some interesting similarities between Bultmann and Wittgenstein, it is important to realize, as is the case when comparing Bultmann to post-structuralism, that he is Bultmann, R. Kerygma and Myth, pp. 43–4. Malet, A. (1971) The Thought of Rudolf Bultmann, trans. Richard Strachan Garden City, NY: Doubleday, p. 333. 193 Bultmann, R. ‘Reply’ in The Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, p. 275. 191 192

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neither simply a post-structuralist nor is he a Wittgensteinian. Nonetheless, it is useful to make these comparisons to bring out interesting points – all the while realizing that there are, of course, disjunctions as well. A summary of Wittgenstein’s thought is a necessary background to make these unique comparisons with Bultmann. Wittgenstein moves from an atomistic and foundational structure for language and meaning to a more fluid and practice-based conception of language. The former conception is more closely related to structuralism while the later thought is more closely related to post-structuralism, anti-Cartesianism and Bultmann. Thus the shift in Wittgenstein’s thought from early to later can help bring out nuances of Bultmann’s thought. For instance, Wittgenstein turns from a separation between an underlying logical syntax and our use of language to logic being shown in our use of language, and this later understanding of logic as shown in human activity is similar to Bultmann’s understanding of the Word revealed in the flesh. This similarity between Bultmann and Wittgenstein includes the rejection of a solitary creation of meaning (Cartesianism), the building of ladders to metaphysical heights (rationalism and docetism), and instead returns us to the flesh and ground. In order to see how Wittgenstein’s philosophy can provide an avenue for discussions of Bultmann it is necessary to begin with a summary of his early to later work. Wittgenstein himself says, ‘It suddenly seemed to me that I should publish those old thoughts and the new ones together: that the latter could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking.’194 Wittgenstein began his work (his ‘old way of thinking’) by trying to work out the relation between language and the world, or more specifically, the relation between logic and the proposition. The emphasis was to discern what can be logically said in the world, in contrast to falling into the confusion of saying what can only be shown. What can be said is discussed by Wittgenstein through what has been called the picture theory of meaning, that language works by picturing actual or possible states of affairs in the world. An example is found, according to Wittgenstein, in hieroglyphic writing ‘which Wittgenstein, L. (1988) Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe Oxford: Basil Blackwell, p. viii.

194

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pictures the facts it describes.’195 Just as a hieroglyph pictures the world, so a proposition pictures the world, and is ‘a picture of reality.’196 Take, for example, a proposition such as ‘My dog is on my desk.’ This proposition makes sense because it pictures a possible state of affairs; that is, the structure of the proposition is related to the structure of the world. For example, we can change the construction of the proposition (or hieroglyph) and end up with an entirely different picture: ‘The desk is on my dog!’ The proposition and the hieroglyph must have a structure that conforms to the world to provide a meaning that we can comprehend. Thus a proposition pictures reality because it is a logical map of a possible state of affairs, and the proposition can be verified by comparing the picture with reality. An artist can paint a picture of a tree with a bench beside it and we can know that this is a possible structure by checking the world; we can confirm that indeed there is a tree with a bench beside it just like the one in the picture. That a proposition can be said, and the fact that it has sense, go hand in hand – there is a link between the proposition and reality. Note, however, that the above proposition makes sense without checking the actual state of affairs in the world to see if it is true or false, that its sense is independent of its truth or falsehood, yet it must be either true or false. An artist can add or subtract from a painting, but even if there are additions or subtractions to a scene, that is to say even if it is a false picture, we can still make sense of it. If a proposition is not capable of being true or false, if it does not express something that can be pictured in the world, then it is either senseless or it is nonsense. We can picture a tree with a bench beside it whether there is actually a bench beside it or not, but it is hard to imagine the picture and truth or falsity of the proposition ‘Red extensions are on vacation,’ which is not simply false, but is nonsense. The above is set within a context known as ordinary language. However, the actual relation of language to the world is, according to Wittgenstein’s early Tractarian view, much deeper. Wittgenstein, L. (1986) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. C. K. Ogden, with an Introduction by Bertrand Russell London: Routeledge & Kegan Paul, p. 4.016. 196 Ibid., p. 4.01. 195

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Propositions can be broken down into basic building blocks, namely elementary propositions. Indeed, complex propositions are, according to the Tractarian view, truth functions of elementary propositions (which are truth functions of themselves),197 and are thereby determined in sense by elementary propositions that are dependent on the functions of their constituent names.198 In other words, propositions can be broken down into elementary propositions that are composed of names, not further propositions, and a name comes into direct contact with reality when it is linked with the world, at which point ‘a name means an object. The object is its meaning.’199 The name stands for an external object and only has meaning when tied to this external object. The name substitutes, or takes the place of, a simple object. The idea here is that complex propositions can be true or false and need to be compared to the world. If one complex proposition is true, ‘My computer is black,’ then the complex proposition, ‘My computer is red,’ is false. However, elementary propositions, which are concatenations of names for simple objects, result in a different order of logic since names must name something or they have no meaning. While we still understand the meaning of ‘My computer is red,’ even if it is false, there are no false names that we could understand. A name is the base of the proposition and the contact with the world, while the proposition is a combination of parts that point to its sense and maintain meaning whether it is true or false. There is, then, a move from the picture of a proposition to logically simple names, at which point the picture, via the name, links with reality.200 When this connection between the structure of the picture and reality hold, that is, when the general proposition pictures a possible state of affairs and the elementary propositions which compose the general proposition are true, then they link with reality – the name has an object – and the picture is a fact. What this indicates, then, is that the general proposition has meaning in terms of its internal sense being a possible state of affairs, and that it is a possible state of affairs since a name links directly

Ibid., p. 5, p. 5.01. Ibid., p. 5.3. 199 Ibid., p. 3.203. 200 Ibid., p. 3.22. 197 198

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with its object yielding an external meaning. There are no further propositions; instead, there are the simple object and name. What is a simple object? What is a simple name? It should be obvious now that the word ‘dog,’ from the initial proposition ‘My dog is on my desk,’ is not a name of a simple object. Instead, it is part of ordinary language, which is composite and divisible through logical analysis, as Wittgenstein thought by working through to the name and simple object. Moreover, the dog can be simplified into a paw, a tail, a whisker, etc .â•›.â•›., in which case the resulting proposition would describe the relation of each part of the dog and then its relation to being on my desk in an incredibly detailed and complex dismantling. Unsurprisingly, Wittgenstein never did give an example of a simple object or name due to the considerably difficult and lengthy task of working through language to the underlying logical syntax. Since there is no example of a name for a simple object, it follows that there are no examples of an elementary proposition either. The simple object and elementary proposition are assumed; there is no analysis that has been completed to the end of either. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein writes: ‘It does not go against our feeling, that we cannot analyse propositions so far to mention the elements by name; no, we feel that the world must consist of elements.’201 The use of the word ‘dog’ necessarily requires, through Wittgenstein’s early understanding of logical syntax, the existence of elementary propositions and simple objects. The statement, ‘My dog is on my desk,’ is simply ordinary language, while beneath this ordinary language is the logical syntax culminating in the simple object. At this point, the logical syntax of the proposition is thought to be worked out – at least in theory – with no further steps being required. The independent simple name, as the final step of working out the logical syntax, is necessary in order to get around the idea that further propositions are required to complete the analysis of the proposition to secure understanding. Wittgenstein needs the simple name to connect with the simple object in order to maintain a determined sense and to side step the problem of relativism since, if a name does not stand directly for an object, then further propositions are required entailing Wittgenstein, L. (1979) Notebooks, ed. G. H. Von Wright and G. E. M. Anscombe, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe Oxford: Blackwell, p. 62.

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an infinite regress.202 The simple object provides a structural foundation for meaning. To avoid an infinite regress of the possible facts that can be pictured, Wittgenstein posits the limit of names and objects within the world: The world is the totality of facts, not things. The world is determined by the facts, and by these being all the facts. For the totality of facts determines both what is the case, and also all that is not the case.203 It then follows that ‘the specification of all true elementary propositions describes the world completely,’204 and ‘the totality of propositions is the language.’205 The possible configurations of the simple objects are the boundary of language. In the Tractatus, facts, propositions, language and the world are limited to ‘what is the case.’ This is what can be said. It is the limit of language, and beyond this limit there is nothing for the name to link with. Accordingly, in contrast to what can be said is what can only be shown. That which is shown is beyond propositions (what can be said) and is transcendental. Since a proposition must be a possible state of affairs in the world, and the transcendental is obviously not a structure in the world, it follows that it is not sayable. Therefore, to cross into the transcendental with names in an attempt to say that which can only be shown is to cross the limit of language into metaphysics, nonsense, and confusion. Hence, Wittgenstein writes, ‘What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.’206 We must respect the fundamental limits of language and not cross the limit into philosophical confusion. Wittgenstein, however, considered what we cannot speak about to be very significant, in fact, the most significant.207 There is a category other than that which can be said and has sense, namely, that which is shown and is senseless, but not nonsense Wittgenstein, L. Tractatus, p. 2.0211. Ibid., pp. 1.1–1.12. 204 Ibid., p. 4.26. 205 Ibid., p. 4.001. 206 Ibid., p. 7. 207 Engelmann, P. (1967) Letters From Ludwig Wittgenstein, with a Memoir, ed. B. F. McGuiness, trans. L. Furtmüler Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 143–4. 202 203

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such as ‘The red extensions are on vacation.’ As has been shown, if a proposition has meaning independent of its truth or falsity (i.e. if the proposition ‘My dog is on my desk’ makes sense, whether there is or is not a dog on my desk), then this shows that there is a link between language and reality due to the common structure between the proposition and the world. Propositions do represent reality, but they do not explain how they represent reality; to do so we would need to stand outside logic and the world with our propositions.208 Wittgenstein calls this link between propositions and reality ‘logical form;’209 it cannot be said and is thereby senseless and only shown. It is not part of the content of a proposition and cannot be stated; rather, it is the eternal form of the world and of what is logically possible. In order to see why this is the case, it must be understood that logical form is not an extra substance, in addition to propositions and the world, that binds them together with some sort of glue as if it is also something that can be said; instead, it is only shown in the common structure of propositions and the world. What is shown, then, is the fact that ‘what any picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it – correctly or incorrectly – in any way at all, is logical form, i.e. the form of reality.’210 Yet once again, although the representation of facts through pictures involves two factors, the proposition and the fact, there is no third factor called logical form to be expressed by language: ‘What can be shown, cannot be said.’211 Instead of being asserted by language, logical form is shown through language.212 As Wittgenstein states: ‘Propositions cannot represent the logical form: this mirrors itself in the propositions. That which expresses itself in language, we cannot express by language; rather, the propositions show the logical form of reality, they exhibit it.’213 The fact that there is a connection between the proposition and the world (logical form), that we can check the proposition against reality, cannot be stated, for language would need to go beyond itself in order to state this relation. Wittgenstein, L. Tractatus, p. 4.12. Ibid., p. 4.12. 210 Ibid., p. 2.18. 211 Ibid., p. 4.1212. 212 Ibid., p. 2.172. 213 Ibid., p. 4.1212. 208 209

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To say that logic, for instance, says nothing,214 does not mean that it has little significance; rather, as previously stated, it enables propositions to picture reality. Moreover, the transcendental is not accidental, and it is not a possible state of affairs as propositions are; instead, if it is to be of value it must be beyond the world, which then implies beyond the limit of language. Wittgenstein writes: ‘There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical.’215 ‘The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is and happens as it does happen. In it there is no value – and if there were, it would be of no value. If there is a value which is of value, it must lie outside all happening and being-so. For all happening and being-so is accidental. It must lie outside the world.’216 Hence, for logic to say nothing is, in fact, crediting logic with more value and significance than if it did say something. Paul Engelmann accurately discerns: ‘A whole generation of disciples was able to take Wittgenstein for a positivist because he has something of enormous importance in common with the positivists: he draws the line between what we can speak about and what we must be silent about just as they do. The difference is only that they have nothing to be silent about. Positivism holds – and this is its essence – that what we can speak about is all that matters in life. Whereas Wittgenstein passionately believes that all that really matters in human life is precisely what, in his view, we must be silent about. When he nevertheless takes immense pains to delimit the unimportant, it is not the coastline of that island which he is bent on surveying with such meticulous accuracy, but the boundary of the ocean.’217 Within the category of the transcendental is the positive content of logic and value, including religion. Like logic, religion is shown, but cannot be said, since neither can be reduced to a possible state of affairs and must remain independent of the Ibid., p. 5.43. Ibid., p. 6.522. 216 Ibid., p. 6.41. 217 Engelmann, P. Letters From Ludwig Wittgenstein, p. 97. 214 215

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measure; that is, since propositions cannot say anything more than the state of affairs,218 they cannot speak of the transcendental. Yet, once again, even though the positive content beyond the limit cannot be said, it is shown formally in the structure of what can be said. Logical form enables propositions to be stated – true or false – and while it permeates everything that is sayable since it is the one logic of language, it says nothing itself of what is in the world (possibilities), while what can be said, as found in science, does speak of what is in the world. There is an a priori order in the world and it is a logical form that says nothing; it is independent of the empirical, yet it is necessary for anything to be said of the empirical. Wittgenstein turns from the above self-labelled ‘old thoughts’ to the ‘new’. In a sense, he deconstructs his previous atomism and foundationalism and he argues – at least implicitly – against Cartesianism. Consequently, it is his later thought that is closely associated with Bultmann. Although the principal shift in Wittgenstein’s understanding of language occurs after the Tractatus, we nevertheless find hints in the Tractatus itself that Wittgenstein begins to explore the relation between logic and its application. Wittgenstein remarks: ‘a sign does not determine a logical form unless it is taken together with its logical-symbolical employment.’219 If there is no use for a sign then there is no meaning.220 The sign in the proposition must be understood as employed in order to see the connection between the proposition and the world. In other words, employment cannot be understood as logical form or syntax alone since the actual application is necessary for meaning: ‘logic must have contact with its application.’221 Logic does not operate alone; the use of a proposition is its application, and it is a picture that corresponds to a state of affairs. Nevertheless, the Tractarian picture is based on a conception of truth and falsity in which a system of complete analysis can determine what is and is not a proposition, as if there is no need to pay attention to the actual use and purpose of the proposition. Wittgenstein comments on his former perception Wittgenstein, L. Tractatus, p. 6.42. Ibid., p. 3.327. 220 Ibid., p. 3.328. 221 Ibid., p. 5.557. 218 219

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of logic, ‘There seemed to pertain to logic a peculiar depth – a universal significance. Logic lay, it seemed, at the bottom of all the sciences. For logical investigation explores the nature of all things. It seeks to see the bottom of all things and is not meant to concern itself whether what actually happens is this or that.’222 In contrast to an explanation of atomic principles, the later Wittgenstein points out that it is inappropriate to say that a proposition is whatever can be true or false, as if what is true or false determines what is or is not a proposition.223 Indeed, Wittgenstein became dissatisfied with the idea of any theory to explain language, ‘Formerly, I myself spoke of a “complete analysis”, and I used to believe that philosophy had to give a definite dissection of propositions so as to set out clearly all their connections and remove all possibility of misunderstanding. I spoke as if there were a calculus in which such a dissection would be possible. .â•›.â•›. At the root of all this there was a false and idealized picture of the use of language.’224 The world and language do not connect via the Tractarian view of independent elementary propositions, which are either true or false; rather, propositions are internally related, and they reflect the logic of language through use, not that which underlies language. It is no longer the truth functions of elementary propositions that reflect the logical undergirding of language to the end of an explanation that are significant, it is the actual use of language toward description that becomes prominent. The conceptual framework of logical positivism, and in general an exclusively scientific worldview, fell into the background as the actual nature of language became prominent: ‘that which can be said in the world that logic can have a foothold. Thus, as Peter Winch rightly notes, that which can be said is limited by certain formal requirements centring around the demand for consistency. But these formal requirements tell us nothing about what in particular is to count as consistency, just as the rules of the predicate calculus limit but do not determine what are to

Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Investigations, § 89. Ibid., §136. 224 Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Grammar, p. 211. 222 223

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be the proper values of p, q, etc. We can only determine this by investigating the wider context of the life in which the activities in question are carried on.’225 The distinction between understanding language through external connections, in contrast to the language-games, can be illustrated as follows: take, for example, p . – p, which is a contradiction, but when related to the world may be ‘true’. For instance, it is snowing and it is not snowing, a type of precipitation that is best defined as rain-snow (sleet). Logic may remain independent in a textbook or in rationalizations, but when applied to the world, it is put to work and cannot remain as a strict binary in abstraction. Indeed, this is why Bertrand Russell, in conversation with Wittgenstein, often exclaimed: ‘Logic is Hell!’226 When we look to see what is actually happening with our use of language, when we describe language rather than explain it, we must look at language comprehensively instead of reflecting upon the truth or falsity of a proposition. Take, for example, Wittgenstein’s comment to Waismann, ‘I once wrote “A proposition is like a ruler laid against reality.” Only the outermost graduating marks touch the object to be measured. I would now rather say: a system of propositions is laid against reality like a ruler. What I mean is this: when I lay a ruler against a spatial object, I lay all the graduating lines against it at the same time. It is not individual graduating lines that are laid beside it, but the whole scale.’227 It was this turning to the internal relationships between propositions, in contrast to independent truth and falsity, that made Wittgenstein aware of the truth-values as interdependent and forming a whole, namely the use of language. Accordingly, we do not start with a single independent proposition and then build our system; rather, we start with a system

Winch, P. (1972) Ethics and Action London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, p. 35. 226 Wittgenstein, L. Culture and Value, p. 30e. 227 Wittgenstein, L. (1979) in Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, Conversations recorded by Friedrich Waismann, ed. Brian McGuiness, trans. Joachim Schulte and Brian McGuiness Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 63–4. 225

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of propositions.228 ‘Philosophy is not laid down in sentences, but in language.’229 The early Wittgenstein sees a certain unity in language as based on the underlying structure of simple objects, but in his later writings, he regards this as mistaken: there is no ‘preconceived idea of crystalline purity.’230 In the Tractatus that which underlies language is significant, with logical form as the absolute measure for unity, but Wittgenstein’s later thought points to the significance of that which is found through the use of language, still logical form, but now unity is found through the use of language in the language-games. In other words, logical form changes; formerly it was the underpinning of language, which enables the name to link with the object, but later it became that which is known through the use of language. No longer does an atomistic structure built from a simple object to complex propositions seem plausible for Wittgenstein; he critiques the idea of simplicity in the Tractatus, where the simple object is regarded as a necessary element for meaning, while his later thought sees meaning to reside in the complex ordinary language. Just as we do not talk about the parts of a dog, we talk about the dog, so meaning is found in ordinary language, not the simple elements. Hence, there is an entire system of language right before us, and that is our starting-point. The change in Wittgenstein’s thought conflicts with a foundational viewpoint. His understanding of logic and language changes from a strict Tractarian system to a more fluid notion of language as used in varying contexts. He notes, ‘The grammar of a language isn’t recorded and doesn’t come into existence until language has already been spoken by humans being for a long time. Similarly, primitive games are played without their rules being codified, and even without a single rule being formulated.’231 Wittgenstein makes it clear that language forms through human activity. This changes the view of philosophical Wittgenstein, L. (1979) On Certainty, ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and G. H. Von Wright, trans. Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe Oxford: Basil Blackwell, p. 105. 229 Wittgenstein, L. (1991) ‘Sections 86–93 (pp 405–35) of the so-called “Big Typescript”’, ed. Heikki Nyman, trans. C. G. Luckhardt adn M. A. E. Aue, Synthese, 87, 1 (April), p. 6. 230 Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Investigations, §108. 231 Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Grammar, pp. 62–3. 228

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confusion simply to using language outside its particular context. Granted, there are rules for our use of language in a particular context, but that very use of language formed the rules, the rules did not predetermine language. Trying to determine which is first – logic and grammatical rules or language, or the knowledge of God or worship – is futile. As D. Z. Phillips observes, ‘The argument appears circular and contradictory if one thinks of either logic or language as being prior to the other. But as in the case of the child’s stories and the concept of God, to ask which came first is to ask a senseless question. As soon as one has language one has logic which determines what can and what cannot be said in that language without being prior to it.’232 To ask which is first, logic or language, is pointless. Instead, we only have the language we use. We can only understand logical grammar through our use of language, and we can only understand religion through worship. Do we first ascertain that God exists, and then worship God and practise a particular religion, or is God instead found in that very language of worship and practice? Likewise, how can we know the rules of grammar before using language? One way to implement foundational theories is to apply them to learning a second language, in which case we do know a logical grammar before saying anything in the second language. Alternatively, if we practise a particular religion, we could then compare another religion’s conception of God with our own. Yet we learn logical grammar (or about God) by ‘doing’ and ‘saying’ within the language. What becomes important in Wittgenstein’s later understanding of language is the form of life for language in contrast to a rulegoverned logical form. Wittgenstein’s comment regarding a machine can be aptly applied to foundational theories, ‘We talk as if these parts could only move in this way, as if they could not do anything else. How is this – do we forget the possibility of their bending, breaking off, melting, and so on? Yes; in many cases we don’t think of that at all.’233 Although it is correct to note that the language-games, in a sense, determine (grammatical) forms, it is because of the ‘everyday use’ and ‘ordinary meaning’ (which can change) that this is so, not because of some underlying structure. Phillps, D. Z. (1993) Wittgenstein and Religion London: Macmillan, p. 4. Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Investigations, §193.

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Wittgenstein’s point is that language is intimately tied to human convention. He says, ‘the rules of grammar are arbitrary in the same sense as the choice of a unit of measurement. But that means no more than that the choice is independent of the length of the objects to be measured and that the choice of one unit is not ‘true’ and another ‘false’ in the way that a statement of length is true or false.’234 The choice to use a particular unit of measurement is a matter of human convention, but not in the sense of foundational strictures (i.e. the simple object). Logic and meaning are beyond our personal control, but they are not beyond humanity; rather, we develop language as we go along. Exactness is what we have when we understand each other in ordinary conversation; for instance, when in our everyday conversation we ask for five apples and the shopkeeper simply gives us five apples. How could we accept or reject meaning when it is what arises from our social life; for example, how can we accept the use of the word ‘five’? Perhaps we could reject the use of the word ‘five,’ but that could only happen after it has been used correctly. And if we use the word ‘five’ correctly, then at what point did we accept the correct use? Language is not subsequent to accepting logical grammar; rather, Wittgenstein sees logical grammar in the language we use: ‘It is what humans beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life.’235 What lies at the bottom of language, as it were, is not the simple object or prescriptive rules, but our acting in life. Wittgenstein writes, ‘What counts as a test? ‘But is this an adequate test? And, if so, must it not be recognizable as such in logic? – as if giving grounds did not come to an end sometime. But the end is not an ungrounded presupposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting.’236 Furthermore, ‘Giving grounds, however justifying the evidence, comes to an end; but the end is not certain propositions striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting which lies at the bottom of the language-game.’237 Wittgenstein clearly continues the move away from the idea that the intelligibility of Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Grammar, p. 185. Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Investigations, § 241. 236 Wittgenstein, L. On Certainty, p. 110. 237 Ibid., p. 204. 234 235

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language depends on some metaphysical foundation, and that there is a general form of the proposition and a general structure of language. He is not searching for an epistemological relation that gives certitude to our knowledge or belief. In other words, to say you know that there is a tree in your yard is nothing more than reacting and acting in a certain way, to sit under it, walk around it, prune it, and this certainty is based in action instead of a rational decision. For example, ‘Children do not learn that books exist, that armchairs exist, etc., etc., – they learn to fetch books, sit in arm chairs, etc., etc.,’238 There is no underlying logic here, ‘it is part of the grammar of the word “chair” that this is what we call “to sit in a chair”.’239 Moreover, the child ‘doesn’t learn at all that that mountain has existed for a long time: that is, the question whether it is so doesn’t even arise. It swallows this consequence down, so to speak, together with what it learns. The child learns to believe a host of things. That is, it learns to act according to these beliefs. Bit by bit there forms a system of what is believed, and in that system some things stand unshakeably fast and some are more or less liable to shift. What stands fast does so, not because it is intrinsically obvious or convincing; it is rather held fast by what lies around it.’240 We do not know these things, we live them. Wittgenstein notes, ‘You must bear in mind that that the language-game is so to say something unpredictable. I mean: it is not based on grounds. It is not reasonable (or unreasonable). It is there – like our life.’241 These actions and tools bring to light the idea of the language-game where, according to Wittgenstein, “the term ‘language-game’ is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of a language is part of an activity or a form of life.’242 Indeed, we can only think of language if we can think of a form of life. Imagine, for example, a tree. Its roots are indeed ‘below’ the surface, but no tree can remain unaffected by the environment (e.g. wind, sun, rain, temperature). We can take two identical spruce seeds, plant them in different environments – for instance on the wind-swept west coast, or in a sheltered Ibid., p. 476. Wittgenstein, L. (1972) The Blue and Brown Books Oxford: Basil Blackwell, p. 24. 240 Wittgenstein, L. On Certainty, pp. 143–4. 241 Ibid., p. 559. 242 Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Investigations, §23. 238 239

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inland habitat – and the result will be two trees that do not grow the same. It is important to note that even if we say there is a prescriptive rule in the genetic code of the seed that will form the trees (the two identical seeds), the trees may nonetheless change through time by their interaction in the environment, just as language can change through developing uses of language. We interact with the trees, not simply with some ideal understanding of the seed. Indeed, the seed has taken on life in the world (bending and breaking) and cannot even be pointed to. The use of the tree resides in the tree itself, not the seed. Therefore, when there is a confusion in language, it is a confusion within a particular use of language in life rather than a violation against ‘language itself’ (as if there is one absolute language). The language we use is not determined by an a priori structure, but by our acting, and it follows that language can have various forms. Colin Lyas makes an interesting comment on this point: ‘To use a language is necessarily to be creative in projecting what we have learned into ever new contexts. This is something we have to do and is not something, as some structuralists believed, that language does to us.’243 Consequently, there can be multiple confusions by using words outside their contexts, like using a tool made for a different fitting or size, or by not taking into account that a certain word has become, so to speak, broken or bent. We understand language through using language; likewise, language develops through that very use. Wittgenstein notes this change in his thought: ‘It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and of the ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of word and sentence, with what logicians have said about the structure of language. (Including the author of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus).’244 Wittgenstein’s point is that there is no general theory, that the variety in life of different applications for language does not allow any strict system to determine language outside of life. He sees that he has not given the essence of the language-game that is common to all language-games either. Instead, they are like the many strands of a rope with no one strand being the essence of the rope. The language-games are diverse and related to each other in many different ways, ‘Our language can be seen as an Lyas, C. (1999) Peter Winch Teddington: Acumen, p. 33. Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Investigations, §23.

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ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses.’245 Language is a labyrinth of paths; it emerges through the multiple paths of life, not from logical syntax. In the light of Wittgenstein’s continual insistence on the heterogeneity of language and its dependence on our use, it is difficult to accept a formal unity. To posit foundational strictures clearly underestimates the value of understanding developed through our use of language, as Winch sees: “The criteria of logic are not a direct gift of God, but arise out of, and are only intelligible in the context of, ways of living and modes of social life.’246 Consequently, Wittgenstein rejects epistemology when he says, ‘why should the language-game rest on some kind of knowledge.’247 The point here is that a proposition such as ‘the earth exists’ is not empirical or epistemological, and does not need justification; it is instead the given. That we know something is not dependent upon the solitary subjective thinker, or something going on in your head; rather, it is a matter of grasping what others have at hand as well in the form of life. Our surroundings, our way of acting and reacting, is part of what Wittgenstein calls our ‘world-picture’. He says, ‘I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false.’248 Language is obviously not known a priori; it is only through our practice of language in the world that we can grasp any sense of language, and make any subsequent judgements as to whether we are using language correctly or not. Rather than language being understood through connections with additional elements (the simple object) and confused by not attaching to these elements, language is brought down to our worldly affairs where it is used, created, and misused within language-games. When language is abstracted from the language-games, it is out of work and Ibid., §18. Winch, P. (1958) The Idea of a Social Science London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 100–1. 247 Wittgenstein, L. On Certainty, p. 477. 248 Ibid., p. 94. 245 246

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confusion is the result: ‘the confusions which occupy us arise when language is like an engine idling, not when it is doing work.’249 The relationship between a state of affairs and our propositions is found in the language-games, not in an external structure. Wittgenstein says, ‘Am I not getting closer and closer to saying that in the end logic cannot be described? You must look at the practice of language, then you will see it.’250 What he sees is that what we can and cannot say, as found in the Tractatus and based on underlying logical syntax, is not as important as what we do say. The latter does not require justification or epistemological verification, it is the given that is tied to our everyday practices through which logic is shown. This logic that is shown in practices makes it clear that when I am typing it is nonsense to ask, ‘Are you typing?’ How could I reply to such a question? Wittgenstein retains the idea that there is some general unity, as found in the Tractatus, but this unity is not that of a logical underlying syntax, it is life itself! He writes, ‘All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place already within a system. And this system is not a more or less arbitrary and doubtful point of departure for all our arguments: no, it belongs to the essence of what we call an argument. The system is not so much the point of departure, as the element in which arguments have their life.’251 Consequently, logical form changes; formerly it was the underpinning of language, later it is that which is shown in language and practices. Wittgenstein notes that there are words that are not names but have meaning, such as the exclamation ‘Ow!’ which cannot be understood through a name-object relation.252 This is similar to Bultmann’s note that ‘Anxiety about demythologizing may be due in part to the unquestioned assumption that there is an either/or between mythology and science, where by “science” is understood the science that objectifies existence into being within the world. But is there no other language than the language of science and of myth? Are statements like “I love you” or “pardon me” expressed in the language of science? Or if they are not, is Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Investigations, §132. Wittgenstein, L. On Certainty, p. 51. 251 Ibid., p. 105. 252 Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Investigations, §27. 249 250

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the language in which they are expressed mythological?’253 It should be clear that science, structuralism and the name-object relation are not the limit of meaning. Wittgenstein’s emphasis on language-game activities may appear to result in a less rigorous role for philosophy than one that tends to the details of an underlying logical syntax. However, the philosophical confusion that results from language not functioning within a language-game, and instead being abstracted to a metaphysical realm, is a serious concern for Wittgenstein. He writes: ‘the problems arising through a misinterpretation of our forms of language have the character of depth. They are deep disquietudes; their roots are as deep in us as the forms of our language and their significance is as great as the importance of our language.’254 The depth of philosophical confusion is tied to the fact that it is not like a scientific problem. That is, it will not be answered by a hypothetical discovery (as is the case for a scientific problem), nor can it be. He says, ‘what we find out in philosophy is trivial; it does not teach us new facts, only science does that. But the proper synopsis of these trivialities is enormously difficult, and has immense importance. Philosophy is in fact the synopsis of the trivialities.’255 His later conception of philosophy may seem to be modest, in that it deals with trivialities and is not scientific, but its ‘therapeutic’ nature is far from subtle. Wittgenstein writes, ‘where does our investigation get its importance from, since it seems only to destroy everything interesting, that is, all that is great and important? (As it were all the buildings, leaving behind only bits of stone and rubble.) What we are destroying is nothing but houses of cards and we are clearing up the ground of language on which they stand.’256 Wittgenstein’s later philosophy actively destroys ‘houses of cards,’ that is, superficial theories and explanations that separate logic, language and meaning from humanity. Consequently, Wittgenstein shifts the discussion from one of separation – that we and logic are independently related to the world – and the resultant theories that try to tie back together Bultmann, R. New Testament and Mythology, p. 101. Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Investigations, §111. 255 Wittgenstein, L. (1989) Wittgenstein’s Lectures: 1930–1932, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, ed. Desmond Lee Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 26. 256 Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Investigations, §118. 253 254

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what has been torn asunder, to a discussion that shows how we and logic are in the world. To think otherwise leads Wittgenstein to remark on the consequence, ‘We have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions are ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need friction. Back to the rough ground!’257 Indeed, Wittgenstein says, ‘I might say: if a place I want to get to could only be reached by way of a ladder, I would give up trying to get there. For the place I really have to get to is a place I must already be now. Anything that I might reach by climbing a ladder does not interest me.’258 There is no place to reach outside the language-games to secure knowledge, such as a Cartesian ‘Archimedean point’. Likewise, in theology, there is no place to find God outside of Christ. Wittgenstein’s move from a structural basis that abstracts human life to a more holistic understanding of meaning can help elucidate Bultmann’s thought. In particular, Wittgenstein’s later understanding of language and logic is analogical to Bultmann’s understanding of 1:14a – they both see the temptation to transcend language and the flesh, respectively. For example, in the Tractatus Wittgenstein regards our ordinary language as a disguise. He says, ‘language disguises thought; so that from the external form of the clothes one cannot infer the form of thought they clothe, because the external form of the clothes is constructed with quite another object than to let the form of the body be recognized.’259 Likewise, Bultmann writes, ‘His humanity must be no more than a disguise; it must be transparent. Men want to look away from the humanity, and see or sense the divinity, they want to penetrate the disguise – or they will expect the humanity to be no more than the visualization or the “form” of the divine.’260 Just as some see language as a disguise (including the early Wittgenstein), some see the flesh of Christ as a disguise (docetism). The desire to go beyond the ordinary clothes and the flesh and relegate the world under the spiritual and other transcendental categories is noted by Wittgenstein: ‘It is very remarkable that we should be inclined to Ibid., §107. Wittgenstein, L. Culture and Value, p. 7e. 259 Wittgenstein, L. Tractatus, p. 4.002. 260 Bultmann, R. The Gospel of John, p. 63. 257 258

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think of civilization – houses trees, cars, etc. – as separating man from his origins, from what is lofty and eternal, etc. Our civilized environment, along with its trees and plants, strikes us then as though it were cheaply wrapped in cellophane and isolated from everything great, from God, as it were. That is a remarkable picture that intrudes on us.’261 Likewise, Forde writes, ‘The idea seems to be that this “heaven” is a kind of necessary, permanent, and eternal superstructure to the earth where we live, like the superstructure or top-side of a ship. On this earth we are in the bowels of the ship, down in the darkness shovelling coal in the furnaces or some such drudgery, hoping that if we work hard enough we will someday be promoted up above where all is light and enjoyment. The most sophisticated form of this eternal superstructure idea is the heaven of the philosophers – the heaven of pure ideas, pure “spirit,” from which all the dross of the earth has been purged.’262 Wittgenstein and Bultmann reject rationalism and docetism, the dualism of separating the material from the spiritual, and the body from the mind. Perhaps this is similar to Paul’s remark, when he tells the Romans that Christ is not in Heaven to be called down, nor is he in the deep to be called up, but is contemporarily in the Word in your heart and mouth (Romans 10: 6–8). Once again, Wittgenstein remarks on the problematic consequence of turning away from the world and its concrete history and traditions, as in such cases we are on ice while what we need is the rough ground, and a ladder does not lead us to the rough ground; rather, it removes us from the rough ground – our language use and God in the flesh – to metaphysical speculations. For example, Phillip tries to climb this ladder when he says to Jesus, ‘Show us the Father.’ Jesus’ reply rejects this looking elsewhere and turns Phillip back to him, ‘He who has seen me has seen the Father’ (John 14:8). Dietrich Bonheoffer insightfully observes that we understand the ‘Divine, not in absolutes, but in the natural form of man.’263 We are not in a position to build ladders to God or to metaphysical foundations and then Wittgenstein, L. Culture and Value, p. 50e. Forde, G. O. (1972) Where God Meets Man: Luther’s Down-To-Earth Approach to the Gospel Minneapolis: Augsburg, p. 91. 263 Bonheoffer, D. (1971) Letter and Papers from Prison London: SCM Press, p. 376. 261 262

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debate the best explanatory ladder. This does not simply reduce God to the world, it shows where we meet and understand God. As Bultmann notes, ‘Demythologising rests upon the insight that we are unable to speak of transcendence and God as they really are .â•›.â•›. it lays bare our illusions and our flight from God.’264 This points to the paradox of God in the world, eschatology in history, and the hidden God (Deus absconditus) becoming the revealed God (Deus revelatus). Wittgenstein formerly wanted to uncover the form of thought behind ordinary language. However, later he considers it wrongheaded to regard language as a disguise behind which logical syntax resides. He continually wants to understand the relation between logic and reality but, in contrast to earlier attempts that posit the elementary proposition, he gives up the idea of formal concepts. He turns from his earlier view that logic is a formal structure underlying language to sustain meaning, to logic being formed through our use of language. In a sense, he formerly sought the hidden god of the underlying logical syntax, but later turns to the revealed god in logic. Wittgenstein’s shift in understanding logic is thereby analogical to the shift in God’s relation to the world from the Old Testament to the New Testament. When this understanding is tied to Wittgenstein’s remark to Drury – ‘our religious ideas have always seemed to me more Greek than biblical. Whereas my thoughts are one hundred percent Hebraic’265 – the result, I suggest, is that we can see how Wittgenstein’s thought moves from holding some aspects of Platonic realism in the Tractatus, to a more worldly and concrete Hebraic point of view, and ultimately his conception of logic shows similarities with the Word revealed. This does not negate logic – it shows it. In a sense, logic is in language use and shown through language. Likewise, God, in Bultmann’s thought, is in the flesh and shown through Christ. We see logic in the life of words and we see God in the life of the Word. There is, in a sense, an incarnational understanding in both. Bultmann rejects a turn away from the flesh of Christ to the glory, and Wittgenstein rejects a turn away from practical language to an underlying logical syntax – yet neither glory nor logic is rejected. However, if Wittgenstein emphasizes Bultmann, R. in Modern Theology, pp. 134–5. Drury, ‘Conversations with Wittgenstein’, p. 161.

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language-games and not a predetermined, independent and external logical foundation, then does it follow that he is an idealist just as Bultmann is thought to be a subjectivist? Do they base knowledge and reality upon their own minds? The mistaken assumption that Bultmann and Wittgenstein are more subjective than objective is, in part, a consequence of a Cartesian viewpoint being applied to them. Paul Holmer, who effectively uses Wittgenstein’s philosophy, rightly notes that the emphasis on forms of life makes it seem ‘as though fideism is more crucial than theology. So it is that followers of Wittgenstein and Wittgenstein himself are assumed to be of the mind that denies that there is a recognizable kind of knowledge of God and that therefore theology is not truly cognitive, objective, and rational.’266 Additionally, there is a tendency among philosophers and theologians towards realism, and it is therefore thought that Wittgenstein’s apparent rejection of realism must lead to idealism. For example, Bernard Williams notes, ‘The way Wittgenstein conceives of this relation makes what its speakers call reality relative to and dependent on their language. He thus denies the existence, indeed, the very possibility of a reality outside the language a people speak and live with – that is a reality independent of that language. He rejects, that is, an absolute conception of reality as unintelligible. Consequently, the objects that constitute what is ultimately real are denied an existence independent of the speakers of the language.’267 The linguistic idealist denies that there is anything independent of language; instead, what we regard as reality is dependent on our language, that is, reality mirrors our language. This is the inverse of the Tractatus, where language mirrors the logical structure of the world. Linguistic idealism seems to leave language in an arbitrary position, with no anchor – which is exactly what the realist fears. However, Wittgenstein notes, we ‘could not apply any rules to a private transition from what is seen to words. Here the rules really would hang in the air; for the institution of their use is lacking.’268 Wittgenstein never says that language use Holmer, P. (1978) The Grammar of Faith San Francisco: Harper & Row, p. 184. 267 Williams, B. (1972–3) ‘Wittgenstein and Idealism’, in Understanding Wittgenstein, Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, ed. Godfrey Vesey, vol. 7 London: Macmillian, p. 95. 268 Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Investigations, §380. 266

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or our private musings create reality; he is not an idealist, just as Bultmann is not a subjectivist. It is very odd that Bultmann’s and Wittgenstein’s rejection of a subjective Cartesian viewpoint is so readily assumed to be their viewpoint! Wittgenstein is misunderstood if it is thought that he reduces meaning to mere language-games. Likewise, Derrida is misunderstood when, as he notes, ‘they present deconstruction as an enclosure “in the prison house of language,” which is .â•›.â•›. blindness, bad faith, a stubborn refusal to read, which is an enormous symptom.’269 Wittgenstein knows that he will be wrongly criticised for idealism and relativism, so he notes, ‘“So are you saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?” It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in the form of life.’270 We are not passive recipients (against realism), nor do we impose whatever we like on data (against idealism). This is similar to Wittgenstein’s understanding of mathematics, where he rejects the realist idea that numbers mirror reality, and he rejects the formalist view that numbers are merely marks we play with; instead, it is in application that numbers become mathematics.271 Reality is larger, in a sense, than language and mathematical notations. The whole, our history, places us in a physical world where our traditions and customs play a role in the development of language. Perhaps there are no external explanations for language itself, but there are explanations within the language-games. In other words, there may not be an absolute external measure to set the limits and definitions for language and meaning, but there are contextual measures. Wittgenstein writes: ‘The stream of life, or the stream of the world, flows on and our propositions are only verified by the present. And so in some way they must be commensurable with the present; and they cannot be so in spite of their spatio-temporal nature; on the contrary this must be related to their commensurability as the corporeality of a ruler to its being extended – which is what enables it to measure.’272 Additionally, Monk insightfully notes: Derrida, J. Critical Exchange, p. 16. Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Investigations, § 241. 271 Wittgenstein, L. Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, iv. 272 Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Remarks, p. 81. 269 270

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‘Wittgenstein had many ways of characterizing grammatical propositions – “self-evident propositions”, “conceptforming propositions”, etc. – but one of the most important was in describing them as rules. In emphasizing the fluidity of the grammatical/material distinction, he was drawing attention to the fact that concept-formation – and thus the establishing of rules for what it does and does not make sense to say – is not something fixed by immutable laws of logical form (as he held in the Tractatus) but is something that is always linked with a custom, a practice.’273 Wittgenstein does not subscribe to prescriptive rules, such as those found in formal calculations, but he does hold to the rules of the language-games. There is no point outside of customs and practices from which to determine meaning. In contrast to Descartes’ dichotomy between language and reality, and ideas and reality, Wittgenstein’s Investigations show that these terms cannot be separated. Wittgenstein shifts the discussion from one of separation to a discussion that shows the intimate tie between language, logic, God and our lives. Painter’s remark on Bultmann is apt for Wittgenstein as well; he notes that Bultmann is at times wrongly accused of separating fact from interpretation: ‘This is a misunderstanding of Bultmann for whom event and meaning are inseparable .â•›.â•›. However, the meaning of an event is not something that is fixed. It has different meanings from different perspectives, times and places and the meaning has to be discovered afresh by each new generation. If the question is raised concerning the ultimate or complete meaning of an event, Bultmann does not deny that there is such a meaning. He raises the question of how man, who stands within the flow of history, can achieve such knowledge which presupposes a perspective outside or beyond history.’274 The text, for Bultmann and Wittgenstein, is not reduced to the author or reader, but is mediating in a tradition. Bultmann notes that our own ‘life relation’ is grounds for our

Monk, R. (1990) Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius London: Jonathan Cape, p. 468. 274 Painter, J. p. 22. 273

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understanding.275 That is, language mediates our contact with a reality that is not reduced to language; however, that reality so mediated is not independent of language. The context limits any hold of indeterminacy, primarily because any thought will necessarily be found in practice and context. Yet at the same time, our grasp of that history, tradition and custom is mediated by language. Is this a contradiction? Are the religious language-games both independent and dependent? The independence rests on the fact that there is no one game or unity that sustains language and determines it. The dependence rests on the fact that just as we cannot have a private language, we cannot have a private language-game. Importantly, this dependence is not one of justification, epistemology, or foundations, but our acting – and God’s acting. Bultmann notes, ‘If we know in our own existence that we ourselves are called into life and upheld by God’s omnipotent power, we also know that the nature and history within which our life takes place are governed by God’s act. But this knowledge can be expressed only as a confession and never as a general truth, like a theory in natural science or in philosophy of history. Otherwise God’s act would be objectified into a process within the world.’ Furthermore, ‘So understood, however, the statement contains a “paradox.” It asserts the paradoxical identity of an occurrence within the world with the act of the God who stands beyond the world. Indeed, faith asserts that it sees an act of God in an event or in a process that at the same time, for an objectifying view, can be established as processes within the continuum of natural and historical happenings.’276 Neither Bultmann nor Wittgenstein reduces God or language to the human domain, or to an idealist or subjectivist account; rather, they show how we understand God and logic in action. There is a parallel between understanding God’s Word and our everyday lives, as Bultmann says, ‘God’s Word is not a mystery to my understanding. On the contrary, I cannot truly believe in the Word without understanding it. But to understand does not mean to explain rationally. I can understand, for Bultmann, R. (1991) ‘The Problem of Hermeneutics’ in Rudolf Bultmann: Interpreting Faith for the Modern Era Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress pp. 142–3. 276 Bultmann, R. New Testament and Mythology, p. 162. 275

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example .â•›.â•›. friendship, love, faithfulness .â•›.â•›.’277 What Bultmann is pointing towards, like Wittgenstein, is a different way of viewing facts of the world – one that is not only scientific or Cartesian. Bonheoffer rightly notes, ‘God’s “beyond” is not the beyond of our cognitive faculties. The transcendence of epistemological theory has nothing to do with the transcendence of God. God is beyond in the midst of our life. The church stands, not at the boundaries where human powers give out, but in the middle of the village. That is how it is in the Old Testament, and in this sense we still read the New Testament far too little in the light of the Old.’278 It is erroneous to think that there is a foundational unity back in history, and that through historical analysis we can restore people to belief, just as it is erroneous to think that there is a foundational underlying logical syntax to secure our language. Rather, tradition and the kerygma speak in our time – ‘in the middle of the village.’ However, Bultmann notes that ‘Understanding does not mean the ability to deduce from it an explanation for fitting what is proclaimed into the previously held world picture. That is exactly what cannot be done. The proclamation is a “stumbling-block” and “folly”; but “so it please God” (I Cor. 1.21).’279 The significance of understanding by faith in Bultmann’s thought can be linked to Wittgenstein’s observation regarding the Gospels: ‘Here you have a narrative – don’t take the same attitude to it as you take to other historical narratives! Make a quite different place in your life for it.’280 Moreover, ‘the historical accounts of the Gospels might, historically speaking, be demonstrably false and yet belief would lose nothing by this: not, however, because it concerns “universal truths of reason”! Rather, because historical proof (the historical proof-game) is irrelevant to belief. This message (the Gospels) is seized on by men believingly (i.e. lovingly). That is the certainty characterizing this particular acceptance-as-true, not something else.’281 This must be understood correctly; Wittgenstein does not say this history is false, just as Bultmann does not reject history. Bultmann, R. ‘The Case for Demythologizing’, p. 44. Bonheoffer, D. (2002) Letters and Papers from Prison, London: SCM, p. 94 Bonheoffer, Letter to Eberhard Bethge, 30 April 1944 279 Bultmann, R. Faith and Understanding, p. 209. 280 Wittgenstein, L. Culture and Value, p. 32e. 281 Ibid., p. 32e. 277 278

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What he says, like Bultmann, is that the exact details of history do not help us, yet at the same time, the history is important in contrast to transcendent truths. Painter likewise notes, ‘historical research can only lead to the recognition of probabilities, even if some have such a high degree of probability that they can scarcely be doubted. Bultmann thought it to be intolerable that faith should be based on such probability. For him faith is a paradoxical affirmation in the face of the crucifixion. It is faith in spite of the evidence.’282 In contrast to devaluing history, Bultmann and Wittgenstein are arguing that history, in the form of the Gospel, is significant not because it is highly probable, but because it is not probable. Wittgenstein also had an unfavourable view of probability in terms of faith. In conversation, Drury says, ‘Tennnant is fond of repeating Butler’s aphorism, “Probability is the guide of life”’, and Wittgenstein replies, ‘Can you imagine St Augustine saying that the existence of God was “highly probable”!’283 Once probabilities are mentioned it is clear that someone did not know when to stop. Wittgenstein rightly observes, ‘We are misled by this way of putting it: “This is good grounds for it makes the occurrence of the event probable.” That is as if we had asserted something further about the grounds, which justified them as grounds; whereas to say that these grounds makes the occurrence probable is to say nothing except that these grounds come up to a particular standard of good grounds – but the standard has no grounds!’284 Faith is not bolstered by good or probable grounds; rather, as Bultmann notes, ‘Faith is not an achievement but a gift .â•›.â•›. for “faith” as true decision, as new self-understanding, is not simply “having been convinced” or “having accepted”, so that a man at some time or another is “converted to Christianity.”’285 All of the explanations and resultant probabilities devalue the Christian faith. Once again, Bultmann says, ‘all of these claims are a “scandal” .â•›.â•›. that is not to be overcome in philosophical dialogue but only in obedient faith .â•›.â•›. It is precisely the fact that they cannot be proved that secures the Christian proclamation against the charge that it is mythology. The transcendence of Painter, J. p. 73. Drury, ‘Some Notes on Conversations’, p. 90. 284 Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Investigations, § 482. 285 Bultmann, R. Faith and Understanding, p. 245. 282 283

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God is not made immanent as it is in myth; rather, the paradox of the presence of the transcendent God in history is affirmed: ‘the world became flesh.’286 Wittgenstein notes, in contrast to probabilities and rationalization, that ‘Anyone who reads the Epistles will find it said: not only that it is not reasonable, but that it is folly. Not only is it not reasonable, but it doesn’t pretend to be. What seems to me ludicrous about O’Hara is his making it appear to be reasonable.’287 Indeed, Wittgenstein notes, ‘If Christianity is the truth then all the philosophy that is written about it is false.’288 Likewise, Bultmann notes, ‘Pauline theology is not a speculative system. It deals with God not as He is in Himself but only with God as He is significant for man, for man’s responsibility and man’s salvation. .â•›.â•›. Paul does not speculatively discuss the metaphysical essence of Christ, or his relation to God, or his “natures,” but speaks of him as the one through whom God is working for the salvation of the world and man.’289 And Wittgenstein notes in kind, ‘Christianity is not a doctrine, not, I mean, a theory about what has happened and will happen to the human soul, but a description of something that actually takes place in human life. For “consciousness of sin” is a real event and so are despair and salvation through faith.’290 The point of demythologizing is not rationalization; it is the kerygma, ‘the objection that de-mythologizing means rationalizing the Christian message, that de-mythologizing dissolves the message into a product of human rational thinking, and that the mystery of God is destroyed by de-mythologizing. Not at all! On the contrary, de-mythologizing makes clear the true meaning of God’s mystery. The incomprehensibility of God lies not in the sphere of theoretical thought .â•›.â•›. Not what God is in Himself, but how he acts with men, is the mystery in which faith is interested.’291 Thus, as Bultmann notes, faith is ‘our turning away from ourselves, our surrendering all security, our resolving Bultmann, R. New Testament and Mythology, p. 42. Wittgenstein, L. Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief, ed. Cyril Barret Berkeley: University of California Press, p. 58. 288 Wittgenstein, L. Culture and Value, p. 83e. 289 Bultmann, R. The Theology of the New Testament, pp. 190–1. 290 Wittgenstein, L. Culture and Value, p. 28e 291 Bultmann, R. ‘The Case for Demythologizing’, p. 43. 286 287

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to trust solely in God who raises the dead.’292 Wittgenstein sees this possibility and remarks: ‘What inclines even me to believe in Christ’s Resurrection? It is as though I play with the thought: If he did not rise from the dead, then he is decomposed in the grave like any other man. He is dead and decomposed. In that case he is a teacher like any other and can no longer help; and once more we are orphaned and alone. So we have to content ourselves with wisdom and speculation. We are in a sort of hell where we can do nothing but dream, roofed in, as it were, and cut off from heaven.’293 Painter rightly notes, ‘Here we are the heart of Bultmann’s hermeneutical theology. Understanding the Word is only possible by understanding the believer who has been encountered by the Word. .â•›.â•›. The past is only accessible through the present and the Word through the believer.’294 If reason cannot get beyond probabilities and speculation, then what does? According to Wittgenstein, ‘What combats doubts is, as it were, redemption. Holding fast to this must be holding fast to belief.’295 Hence, he says, ‘if I am to be REALLY saved, what I need is certainty – not wisdom, dreams or speculation – and this certainty is faith. And faith is faith in what is needed by my heart, my soul, not my speculative intelligence. For it is my soul with its passions, as it were with its flesh and blood, that has to be saved, not my abstract mind.’296 Bultmann also sees this significance, ‘When we encounter the words of Jesus in history, we do not judge them by a philosophical system with reference to their rational validity; they meet us with the question of how we are to interpret our existence. That we be ourselves deeply disturbed by the problem of our own life is therefore the indispensible condition of this inquiry.’297 Consequently, he says, ‘faith accepts the incredible on authority! .â•›.â•›. Man does not live by the idea of God’s grace, but by the grace actually granted him.’298 Wittgenstein likewise says, ‘Believing means submitting to authority.’299 This submitting to Bultmann, R. New Testament and Mythology, p. 18. Wittgenstein, L. Culture and Value, p. 33e. 294 Painter, J. pp. 3–4. 295 Wittgenstein, L. Culture and Value, p. 33e. 296 Ibid., p. 33e. 297 Bultmann, R. Jesus and the Word, p. 11. 298 Bultmann, R. ‘The Case for Demythologizing’, p. 73. 299 Wittgenstein, L. Culture and Value, p. 45e. 292 293

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authority is not the authority of reason alone or logical foundations, it is submitting to the gift. Contrary to popular opinion, Wittgenstein and Bultmann dismantle subjectivism and idealism and submit to an outside authority. What makes people nervous about Bultmann’s demythologizing (subjectivism) and Luther’s justification by faith (antinomianism), is parallel to what makes people nervous about Derrida’s deconstruction (indeterminacy) and Wittgenstein’s philosophy (idealism and fideism). However, these thinkers clearly reject any notion of us independently forming the text, language or law; rather, these aspects form us.

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9.╇ Dissolving Locks and Philosophy Wittgenstein’s conception of the role of philosophy changes in his later thought. For example, in the Tractatus Wittgenstein notes that the method of the philosopher is to ‘give meaning to certain signs in his propositions.’1 The meaning of a proposition is displayed once it is analysed into elementary propositions with specific signs. However, in his later thought he says: ‘What is your aim in philosophy? To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle.’2 The fly-bottle can represent the philosophical confusion of misleading theories and explanations, such as the scientific method or logical positivism applied to philosophy and religion. The way out of the fly-bottle is not discovered with ‘new information, but by arranging what we have always known.’3 Philosophical confusion is not corrected by mending one theory with another theory; rather, the confusion requires a therapy to eradicate it. Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is not offering a patch for an unsatisfactory theory; rather, by discerning the illness he tries to show the way out of the fly-bottle. This Wittgensteinian approach is well suited to Bultmann’s work. The keys of 1:14a and justification by faith are not opening one theory among many theories. As Wittgenstein notes, ‘all that philosophy can do is destroy idols’; and importantly, Wittgenstein, L. Tractatus, p. 6.53. Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Investigations, §309. 3 Ibid., §109.



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‘that means not creating a new one.’4 A treatment must not be another disease in disguise – the treatment is not to construct further idols in an attempt to resolve the problem of idols. A therapy must not advance further philosophical idols such as an underlying foundation for language (e.g. simple object) or follow the idolization of the scientific method as the only proper technique for philosophy (e.g. logical positivism). Bultmann and Wittgenstein leave the fly-bottle. Is this too simple? Surely, resolving locks or, in other words, picking them, within the fly-bottle is a more serious and important task than dissolving them. We are so accustomed to creating and picking locks that stopping these activities is very difficult. Again, as Wittgenstein notes, ‘Our illness is this, to want to explain.’5 Likewise, Norman Malcolm rightly notes that the drive to justify belief and to ground it in an ontology is ‘one of the primary pathologies of philosophy.’6 Despite the fact that Wittgenstein wants, in a sense, to stop philosophy, he is realistic and sees that the knotted questions and pathologies will never be completely dissolved, and therefore philosophy will not cease in its clarifying role. Likewise, there will always be theological knots requiring clarification. In contrast to excessive explanations, knots and complicated theories, Bultmann notes that his thought is ‘extremely simple .â•›.â•›. [but] of course the understanding of simple things can be difficult, but such difficulty is due not to the nature of things but to the fact that we have forgotten how to see directly, being too much burdened with presuppositions.’7 Similarly, Wittgenstein says the difficulty with understanding his thought does not reside in intellectual capacity. Rather, as he says, ‘What makes a subject hard to understand – if it’s something significant and important – is not that before you can understand it you need to be specially trained in abstruse matters, but the contrast between understanding the subject and what most people want to see. Because of this the very things which are most obvious may become the hardest of all to understand. What has to be overcome is





Wittgenstein, L. “Sections 86–93 (pp. 405–35) of the so-called ‘Big Typescript’,” p. 9. 5 Wittgenstein, L. Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, p. 333. 6 Malcolm, N. (1977) ‘The groundlessness of religious belief’ in Thought and Knowledge Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, p. 208. 7 Bultmann, R. Jesus and the Word, p. 15. 4

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a difficulty having to do with the will, rather than with the intellect.’8 In particular, western philosophy and theology are so ingrained with a Cartesian perspective they commonly have great difficulty seeing Bultmann’s and Wittgenstein’s insights. In other words, understanding Bultmann and Wittgenstein may have more to do with us than any particular confusion or difficulty in their thought. Paul Holmer insightfully observes, ‘Why is theology so complicated? It ought to be completely simple. Theology unties those knots in our thinking which we have so unwisely put there; but its ways in untying must be as complicated as the knots are in tying .â•›.â•›. The complexity of theology is not in its subject matter but rather in our knotted understanding and personality.’9 In other words, the difficulty resides with our perspective and the problematic will and personality that continually create theories and new locks. Of course, it is easier simply to trade on theories and locks than to see faults in our will and personality. Bultmann not only demythologizes theology, he demythologizes us, that is, our mythical (Cartesian) quest to find foundational knowledge and earn justification. Likewise, Derrida notes that there is an apparent link between deconstruction and Christianity, and in particular Luther’s destruuntur, ‘Through the cross works are dethroned [destruuntur] and the old Adam is crucified, who is especially edified by works, is crucified.’10 Our false sense of security and pride in our building and systems needs to be deconstructed – whether it is pride in our reason or in our works. This deconstruction is not enabling us to build a better system; rather, it exposes the will and personality that ambitiously builds systems. Derrida rightly notes, ‘Abraham remains a criminal: on the level of ethics it’s a crime to obey God’s order. Abraham accepts that the relation with God is wholly asymmetrical .â•›.â•›. To act in obedience to God you must give up any justification, any humanly intelligible justification.’11 In contrast to this acceptance, Job’s friends are an example of turning to ‘human intelligibility’, rationalizations and trying to



Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, p. 17e. Holmer, P. (1969) “Wittgenstein and Theology”, in New Essays on Religious Language New York: Oxford, p. 27. 10 Luther’s Work’s, 31:53. Derrida, in Derrida and Religion, p. 33. 11 Derrida, in Derrida and Religion, p. 35. 8 9

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work our own way out of the dark, where the pathology is to want to explain, and consequently leads God to say, ‘Who is this that darkens my counsel with words without knowledge?’ (Job 38:2). Caputo rightly sees that ‘Derrida is not thinking in Greco-ontological terms of a paradigm shift in understanding, but of a more Jewish, more Levinasian ethico-political alterity that shatters understanding, that underlines the saliency of the incomprehensible, something we confess we do not understand – Je ne sais pas. Il faut croire – before which we can only say viens, oui, oui. The tout autre is not a new way of seeing things, a new way to envision, but a blindness, a confession that we are up against something, sans savoir, sans avoir, sans voir (Parages, 25), to which we can only bear witness.’12 Do we make the exodus from our securities back in the Egyptian fly-bottle or do we let the fire burn? Job, for one, lets the fire burn and confesses, ‘I am unworthy – how can I reply to you? I put my hand over my mouth’ (Job 40:4). This confession and deconstruction is devoid of rationalization and hubris. As Caputo says, ‘deconstruction proceeds in the dark, like a blind man feeling his way with a stick, devoid of sight and savvy, of vision and verity, sans savoir, sans avoir, sans voir (Parages, 25), where it is necessary to believe, where the passion of faith, la passion du non-savoir (Cinders, 75) is all you have to go on.’13 Then, maybe, just as Abraham receives Isaac back from death, so we receive meaning, the world, and our sight back from blindness. From Bultmann’s point of view, there are not simply better and worse interpretations that we make; rather, we are brought through death to life, and this is not an interpretation or a theory but an action. As Wittgenstein says, ‘Every sign by itself seems dead. What gives if life? In use it is alive.’14 In other words, rather than focusing on speculative wisdom and systems about the word, we need to see how the Word acts on us. For example, in theology Forde notes that, ‘The letter kills but the spirit gives life; what the passage describes is an action – not a more or less esoteric method of interpretation. The letter, the written code, kills and through it the spirit gives life. The letter is not something obscure or weak or insufficient. It is not dead because Caputo, J. D. in Prayers and Tears, p. 74. Ibid., p. xxvi. 14 Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Investigations, §432.

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it belongs to the sensible world. Rather it is deadly, it kills .â•›.â•›. the hermeneutic itself is shaped by the death-life language. It takes the shape of the cross.’15 Forgiveness and justification are whole, the words are operative and in use, they do not simply point to an object like an ostensive definition – the Word does not simply signify, it does what it says. Forgiveness is not simply a legal declaration and it is not simply a human creation. We do not create private meaning or forgiveness. Indeed, reason cannot even grasp the depth of sin and thereby may wrongly assume that we can justify ourselves, or that we have no need of justification. However, Derrida rightly remarks: ‘There is only forgiveness, if there is such a thing, of the un-forgivable. Thus forgiveness, if it is possible, if there is such a thing, is not possible, it does not exist as possible, it exists only by exempting itself from the law of the possible, by impossibilizing itself, so to speak, and in the infinite endurance of the im-possible as impossible.’16 Deconstruction and demythologizing can helpfully dismantle human creations and leave a space where the gift of forgiveness enters. This is the impossible and the scandal; we understand forgiveness through sin and life through death. This is grace – forgiveness in sin and life in death. Derrida aptly says, ‘On or about “grace given by God,” deconstruction, as such, has nothing to say or to do. .â•›.â•›. In relation to this experience of faith, deconstruction is totally, totally useless and disarmed. And perhaps it is not simply a weakness of deconstruction. Perhaps it is because deconstruction starts from the possibility of [grace] .â•›.â•›. That’s the starting point of any deconstruction. That is why deconstruction is totally disarmed. Totally useless when it reaches this point.’17 Just as death on the cross is paradoxically life, perhaps deconstruction is paradoxically meaning. This point is where reason and human creations are of no merit, and instead the passion of faith breathes. Human reason and pride are dismantled leaving faith and grace, but they are not abstract concepts, they do not turn analogically back to an emptying docetism. Faith is not working Forde, G. O. (1982) Justification by Faith – A Matter of Death and Life Philadelphia: Fortress Press, p. 15. 16 Derrida, J. (2001) in, John Caputo, eds Mark Dooley and Michael Scanlon, Questioning God Bloomington: Indiana University Press, p. 48. 17 Derrida, J. in Derrida and Religion, p. 39.

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in a nebulous vacuum; rather, it is tied to concrete actions – God’s actions and our actions through word, history and tradition. The problem with docetism and rationalism, that Christ is no man in particular, or is only a man, translates into practices. It is wrongheaded to assume that practices are nothing in particular, or are only naturalistic and emotive. Luther points to the importance of practices, ‘he who wants to find Christ, must first find the church. How would one know Christ and faith in him if one did not know where they are who believe in him? He who would know something concerning Christ, must neither trust in himself nor build his bridge into heaven by means of his own reason, but he should go to the church. .â•›.â•›. The church is not wood and stone but the assembly of people who believe in Christ. With this church one should be connected and see how the people believe, live, and teach.’18 Bultmann similarly places an emphasis on the action of the word in concrete life, in contrast to docetic or rationalistic conceptions, and notes, ‘Even if I were to say that the Word of God can encounter me in the Bible apart from its actualization in the empirical church, I would still have to add that the Bible is given to me only through the church tradition.’19 It is the text, language and the Word in practice that show us meaning, logic and God in action, not simply as pointers to a past foundational unity, but alive today. Bultmann, because of the paradox of the historical event of Christ and eschatology, notes that proclamation is clearly more significant than mere remembrance, and that the ‘bearer of the proclamation is the church, and here the paradox is repeated. For under one aspect the church is a phenomenon at the disposal of an objectifying view, while in its real nature it is an eschatological phenomenon – or, better, an eschatological event that occurs ever anew in every new moment.’20 Religious tradition and practice is the context in which belief has its sense; therefore, if theological meaning is lost it means that the tradition and practices are lost, not the definition or transcendent referent. To reject Bultmann’s and Wittgenstein’s insights is to accept the search for metaphysical connections to the transcendent and the drive to fulfil the law, or to deny the transcendent Luther, M. Luther’s Works, 52: pp. 39–40. Bultmann, R. ‘Reply’ in The Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, p. 260. 20 Bultmann, R. New Testament and Mythology, p. 163.

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and reject the possibility of fulfilling the law (or even the law itself). This leads to an interesting parallel between nihilism and modern philosophy on the one hand, and despair and pride in theology on the other. These pairings – nihilism-despair and modern philosophy-pride – represent two sides of the same coin; namely, a focus on the self and one’s abilities or lack thereof. In nihilism and despair, the individual says, ‘I cannot secure any meaning’ or ‘I cannot fulfil the demands of the law.’ In modern philosophy and pride, the individual says, ‘I can determine meaning independently’ (e.g. rationalism or empiricism) or ‘I can fulfil the works required by the law.’ Bultmann and Wittgenstein want to dissolve this bipolar lock. The real problem is not an epistemological one, whereby we need to discover the historic record in detail, the personality of Jesus, or epistemological or logical factors to secure our knowledge; nor is the problem one of working out how closely we can or cannot fulfil the law. Rather, the problem is one of accepting the fact that we are given meaning and justification without our theories or works.

10.╇ Implications for Theology and Religious Studies Wittgenstein writes in the Foreword of Philosophical Remarks: ‘This book is written for such men as are in sympathy with its spirit. This spirit is different from the one which informs the vast stream of European and American civilization in which all of us stand. That spirit expresses itself in an onward movement, in building ever larger and more complicated structures; the other in striving after clarity and perspicuity in no manner what structure. The first tries to grasp the world by way of its periphery – in its variety; the second at its centre – its essence. And so the first adds one construction to another, moving on and up, as it were, from one stage to the next, while the other remains where it is and what it tries to grasp is always the same.’21 He wants to clarify the basics; he is not interested in continual building away from the core. Bultmann is also interested in the core; namely, the kerygma – and it is always the same. In a sense, 21

Wittgenstein, L. (1975) Philosophical Remarks, ed. Rush Rhees, trans. Raymond Hargreaves and Roger White Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Foreword.

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he wants to avoid the problem of objectifying the periphery to ensure the clarity of the core kerygma. He says, ‘If the task of demythologizing was originally called for by the conflict between the mythological world picture of the Bible and the world picture formed by scientific thinking, it soon became evident that demythologizing is a demand of faith itself. For faith insists on being freed from bondage to every world picture projected by objectifying thinking, whether it is the thinking of myth or the thinking of science.’22 When we turn to the periphery, we lose clarity. Can religious studies as a discipline objectively step out of the theological mire to analyse religion clearly to get to the core? Perhaps an objective study of religion is the best study in order to avoid a potential subjective bias. Of course, the study of religion should be objective, as far as that is possible, but it is wrong-headed to assume that there is the objective stance and it is rarely reached by religious observers. It is very odd to imagine that the best study of any one religious tradition is by a so-called objective observer of religions, while those within any one tradition are biased and less suitable to such studies. Would anyone claim that the best study of Women’s Studies is accomplished by men since they are objective outside observers? There is no doubt that anthropology, psychology, sociology, etc., can add informative dimensions to the study of religion, but a reductionist account of religion based on any one of these disciplines is far from reaching the so-called objective stance. Explanatory theories of religions are caught in their own mythology of progression and ideology. These perspectives are peripheral and do not reach the core of religion. If Bultmann and Wittgenstein dismantle these peripheral structures, then what use is their thought? What are we left with? Indeed, Forde rightly notes that people will naturally ask, ‘Is a theology that proceeds by negation rather than by a direct positive synthesis, with given human agendas and quests, viable today?’23 However, to ask what method or theory is viable and relevant today betrays the very problem; if something is important, then it is not viable and relevant for today, it is always 22 23

Bultmann, R. New Testament and Mythology, p. 121. Forde, G. O. (1987) ‘The Viability of Luther Today’ in Word & World 7 no. 1 (Winter), p. 24.

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viable and relevant. Bultmann went to great lengths to show that the kerygma is often obscured by the plethora of myths, old and new. However, we want progress and advancement, in accord with the scientific achievements of the age, so we seek new and better peripherals. However, as Bultmann notes, ‘we should not forget that two thousand years ago people lived to whom we are related. The differences are usually exaggerated. They are aspects of the individual human being that never change, that are today as they will be tomorrow.’24 This core of the kerygma is not dependent upon any age, so if we tie it too closely to a particular age and its ideals we may lose its radical nature, as Forde notes: ‘Where the eschatological gospel is compromised by entering into cosy syntheses with the aspirations and projects of this age, however religious or just, it is either domesticated or lost altogether at the same time as those projects themselves are enervated.’25 Bultmann is also clearly against reducing the kerygma to a ‘so-called social gospel.’26 As he notes, ‘The subject of theology is God, and the trouble with liberal theology is that it has not dealt with God, but with man. God represents the radical negation and sublimation of man; therefore theology, whose subject is God, can only have as its content the word of the cross. This, however, is a scandal for man. So the trouble with liberal theology is that it sought to avoid this scandal or at least to lessen it.’27 Once again, Bultmann is intent on making the offence of the kerygma clear, and to do so he rejects easing it into contemporary agendas. Forde provides an example of minimizing the radical nature of the kerygma through an example of sin, ‘A sentimentalized theology gives the impression that God in Christ comes to join us in our battle against some unknown enemy, is victimized, and suffers just like us.’ This ‘is a serious erosion or slippage in the language of theology today. Sentimentality leads to a shift in focus, and the language slips out of place. To take a common Quoted in Antje Bultmann Lemke, (1985) ‘Bultmann’s Papers,’ in Bultmann, Retrospect and Prospect: The Centenary Symposium at Wellesley, ed. Edward C. Hobbs, Harvard Theological Studies, no. 35 Philadelphia: Fortress Press, p. 7. 25 Forde, G. O. ‘The Viability of Luther Today’, p. 28. 26 Bultmann, R. Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 18. 27 Bultmann, R. quoted in An Introduction to the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, p. 7.

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example, we apparently are no longer sinners, but rather victims, oppressed by sinister victimizers whom we relentlessly seek to track down and accuse. .â•›.â•›. Sin, if it enters our consciousness at all, is generally something that “they” did to us.’28 In this case, the focus is on the sin outside of us, but the point Bultmann wants to enforce is that justification is what is done to us because sin is ours already. When we simply consider ourselves the victim of others’ sin, we misunderstand sin and are actually even more possessed by it. Likewise, Bultmann insightfully observes, ‘By means of science men try to take possession of the world, but in fact the world gets possession of man.’29 In other words, when we focus on the peripherals we objectify them and once again we lose the core kerygma. Given the great variety of peripherals, theories and methods, Paul Holmer rightly notes, ‘In such places, the sheer opulence of points of view and the thick harvest of historical antecedents give a revivification by scholarship and cause dim overviews to develop about the development of doctrine and the necessity that one succeed another. After a while, it becomes a lot easier to believe this vague metaview that makes one sceptical about any particular theology of an individual or church that it is to be a lively believer and hearty participant in any one theology and its related practices. The point that seems so disturbing here is that these chaotic developmental views are so easy to teach and that they are no longer linked up with anything save the most obvious accommodation to the Zeitgeist. They serve also to divorce most people from the practice of religion itself, and instead create a sophisticated clientele that is interested in theology as one more artefact cast up in the course of time.’30 Bultmann and Wittgenstein would see the multiple theoretical and social approaches to religion as a step away from what is essential and towards what is perhaps a chimera. Indeed, Forde, G. (1997) ‘On Being a Theologian of the Cross’, The Christian Century, Chicago, vol. 114, 29 (October), p. 947. 29 Bultmann, R. Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 40. 30 Homer, P. (1978) The Grammar of Faith San Francisco: Harper & Row, p. 3.

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Bultmann writes, ‘The old orthodoxy had a fine, firm structure, and was easily able to satisfy those in need of faith. The structure has collapsed and nothing new is there to take its place. What is passed off as new is, in my view, not able to withstand any storm.’31 Consequently, Bultmann wants to dismantle the idols and towers of Babel that are only houses of cards. Bultmann did not attempt to make theology relevant or acceptable for the times; rather, he tried to show the radical nature of theology for all time. In other words, it is always relevant, not because it is viable or palatable – it is never palatable. The way to show this is not by means of a theory about theology, but to let the kerygma speak for itself. Likewise, Derrida notes the usefulness of deconstruction when ‘what needs to be criticized is a whole theological institution which supposedly has covered over, dissimulated an authentic Christian message.’32 This dismantling, however, like demythologizing, creates hesitation. Forde rightly says, ‘The problem with a theology of justification by faith alone that proceeds by way of negation on the one hand is that it propounds a judgement that is absolute and total [it burns our agendas to the ground]. In the first instance, it does what many liberation theologians abhor: it universalizes. It places all human ventures universally under judgement. Nothing escapes. .â•›.â•›. Such universal judgement appears to take the wind out of the sails of just as well as unjust causes. We would always prefer, of course, that our favoured and just causes would escape the judgement at least relatively unscathed.’33 Moreover, ‘If the negation is complete, one is in the first instance set free from the tyranny of all universalisms and absolutisms and placed back in time to become a truly historical being, to wait and hope for the coming of the promised kingdom. .â•›.â•›. One wonders whether those who strive for concreteness by seeking ideological privilege for their own particular causes are not, in fact, striving after the lost power of the universal.’34 Yet this complete negation must be understood rightly. To negate historic data alone (as Historie) does not negate history, to Bultmann, R. quoted in Antje Bultmann Lemke, ‘Bultmann’s Papers,’ p. 6. 32 Derrida, J. Critical Exchange, p. 12. 33 Forde, G. O. ‘The Viability of Luther Today’, p. 25. 34 Ibid., p. 30.

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negate justification by works does not negate works, to negate an underlying logical syntax does not negate logic, and to negate social agendas does not negate social assistance. Forde rightly remarks, ‘The enthusiasm of the Christian, it would seem, should stem from other than ideological or even mythological sources. Luther, for one, was convinced that if the gospel of justification by faith was preached in all its unconditional radicality, we would actually begin, at least, to love God for God’s sake alone and love our neighbour as ourselves.’35 Thus, Bultmann says, ‘When we become aware of this transcendent reality, we lose our anxiety about the future. We become independent of all ideologies that try to offer us blueprints of the future .â•›.â•›.’36 and instead we see that the ‘word of God is Word of God only as it happens here and now. The paradox is that the word which is always happening here and now is one and the same with the first word of the apostolic preaching crystallized in the Scriptures of the New Testament and delivered by men again and again, the word whose content may be formulated in general statement. It cannot be one without the other. This is the sense of the “once-for-all.” It is the eschatological once-for-all because the word becomes event here and now in the living voice of the preaching.’37 In the end, Bultmann, Luther, Derrida and Wittgenstein often seem unsatisfactory to many. What is the answer? What is the explanation? How can I determine meaning? What do I need to do to be justified? John Bowden rightly notes, ‘paradoxically, if after granting the immense amount that can be learnt from Bultmann, his work is not seen to provide all the answers for which we are looking, it is not because it is too radical, but because it is still too conservative: we cannot be content to stand just where Bultmann does in the firm conviction that that is where God wants us to stand. We must go on asking questions.’38 If we are not provided with answers, then we need to dissect these apparently confused thinkers. If we could dissect them, show their flaws, explain them away and pin them with Ibid., p. 31. Bultmann, R. quoted in Antje Bultmann Lemke, ‘Bultmann’s Papers,’ p. 11. 37 Bultmann, R. Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 82. 38 Bowden, J. (1968) ‘Translator’s Preface’ in An Introduction to the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann by Walter Schmithals Minneapolis: Augsburg, pp. xiv–xv.

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a label, then we are safe. However, they seem to squirm continually around making it impossible to dissect them properly and, consequently, they place us in an uncomfortable position. That is, we are the ones being dissected – our pathologies of explanations, knotted understanding, will and personality. In other words, unlocking Bultmann unlocks us. If we see this offence of the kerygma, in particular, then we might understand Bultmann who writes, ‘to be confronted with the revealer is not to be presented with a persuasive set of answers but only to be faced with a question.’39 This is where Bultmann wants to end, ‘here research ends with a large question mark—and it ought to end.’40 Additionally, as Wittgenstein notes, there comes a point where ‘I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned.’41 The question and bedrock are not explanations; they are a gift seen in our life and practices. Indeed, as Luther writes, ‘living, or rather dying and being damned make a theologian, not understanding, reading or speculating.’42

39 40 41 42

Bultmann, R. The Gospel of John, p. 66. Bultmann, R. Faith and Understanding, p. 30. Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Investigations, §217 Luther, M. Luther’s Works, ‘Introduction to Volume 41’, 41: p. xi.

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Index

exegesis╇ 1–2, 17, 44, 66 existentialist╇ 9, 44, 63

anxiety╇ 41, 62–6, 92 Archimedean point╇ 23–6, 50–8, 69, 94

Forde, G. O.╇ 73, 95, 110, 114–15, 117–18 forgiveness╇ 39, 111 foundations Bultmann╇ 46, 58, 60–6, 109 Descartes╇ 48–55 good works╇ 40–2, 64, 109 historical╇ 46, 61–2, 64, 101, 112 logical╇ 101, 105, 108 post-structuralism╇ 65 Wittgenstein╇ 76, 83, 86–91, 95, 97, 100–1 Funk, R. W.╇ 57

Bernstein, R. J.╇ 52, 62–3 body╇ 12–17, 50–2, 73, 94–5 Bonheoffer, D.╇ 8, 66, 95, 101 Bowden, J.╇ 118 Bruns, G.╇ 53, 68, Caputo, J.╇ 69, 72, 74, 110 Cartesian╇ 3, 11, 46–8, 51–68, 76, 83, 94, 97–8, 101, 109 anti-Cartesian╇ 47–58, 63–5, 75–6 Cassedy, S.╇ 43 Collingwood, R. G.╇ 55–7 cross╇ 28, 34, 36–9, 80, 109, 111, 115 deconstruction╇ 43, 47, 58, 65, 67–75, 98, 105 Deus absconditus╇ 13, 35, 96 Deus revelatus╇ 13, 96 disguise body of Jesus, as╇ 14, 18, 20, 94 ordinary language, as╇ 94, 96 divine╇ 14–15, 18–19, 22, 25–6, 35, 94–5 docetism╇ 16, 19, 76, 94–5, 111–12 dualism╇ 52, 54, 58–60, 62–4, 95 Eco, U.╇ 69–70 epistemology╇ 58, 61, 91, 100

Gasché, R.╇ 65 gnostic╇ 1–2, 12, 19 Gogarten, F.╇ 5, 43, 55 Harnack, A. V.╇ 53 Heidegger, M.╇ 3, 5, 11, 42–5, 48, 55, 75 history of religions╇ 24, 28 Holmer, P.╇ 97, 109, 116 idealism╇ 97–8, 105 impossible, the╇ 58, 74–5, 111 Macquarrie, J.╇ 6–8, 41, 45, 61 Madison, G. B.╇ 52, 57 Malcolm, N.╇ 108 messiah╇ 73–4

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index Norris, C.╇ 65, 67, 70

relativism╇ 30, 70–1, 79, 98 resurrection╇ 7, 38–9, 104

Ogden, S.╇ 6, 62 Painter, J.╇ 7, 99, 102, 104 Paparella, E. L.╇ 55–7 Perrin, N.╇ 39, 44 Pinnock, C. H.╇ 11, 59 Plato╇ 15, 51, 53

sacraments╇ 39 scandal╇ 36–8, 71, 102, 111, 115 Schmithals, W.╇ 5, 43, 55 science╇ 9, 28, 36, 42, 52, 55, 83–4, 92, 93, 100, 114, 116 Spivak, G. C.╇ 67

realism╇ 96–8

Vico, G.╇ 55–8

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