‘This is an in-depth and comprehensive study of the nature and evolution of the close relationship between business and polity over the last two millenniums and a half. Ghosh’s lucid and fascinating account of this relation in different historical epochs and under diverse techno-economic and political set-ups, from Classical Greece to the modern-day United States, clearly brings out its crucial significance in making or marring fortunes of nations and provides an important perspective in understanding the ongoing interaction of business operations and government policies at both the national and the global level.’ — Mihir Rakshit Director, Monetary Research Project at ICRA, Calcutta Editor-in-Chief, Money and Finance
‘This book is a tour de force. In a lucid and engaging treatise, Dhruba Ghosh explores the nexus between business and politics, intertwined in history over a period that spans millenniums rather than centuries, to argue that the nature of this relationship shaped the rise and fall of civilisations and empires. The discussion is remarkable in its range and depth. And the story that it unfolds is fascinating. The glimpses of world history highlight how the evolution of business–politics dynamics exercised an enormous influence on outcomes in economy and society, from the past to the present. If anything, the essential hypothesis is even more relevant in our lives and times. This book should be of interest to people in the worlds of business and politics. It should also be of interest to readers in academia, media and civil society.’ —Deepak Nayyar Professor of Economics, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi Distinguished University Professor of Economics, New School for Social Research, New York
‘This book is unique in many ways. There is no shortage of books on India’s historical and political legacy, or its future prospects as the world’s largest democracy. Similarly, the socio-political and socio-economic order, as it has evolved over centuries, is well documented. However, I can think of no other book which brings all these together, and gives a new perspective on India and challenges that it faces in political as well as economic fields.
As the author puts it, “this book is an odyssey”, and an excursion to explore how the world has evolved through different epochs of history. I strongly recommend this book to all those who are interested in our country’s future. It is elegantly written and accessible to lay readers as well as academic researchers in different fields.’ —Bimal Jalan Former Member of Parliament (Rajya Sabha) Former Governor of the Reserve Bank of India
Business
and Polity
Business
and Polity
Dynamics of a Changing Relationship
D N Ghosh
Copyright © Dhruba Narayan Ghosh, 2011 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilised in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. First published in 2011 by SAGE Publications India Pvt Ltd B1/I-1 Mohan Cooperative Industrial Area Mathura Road, New Delhi 110 044, India www.sagepub.in SAGE Publications Inc 2455 Teller Road Thousand Oaks, California 91320, USA SAGE Publications Ltd 1 Oliver’s Yard, 55 City Road London EC1Y 1SP, United Kingdom SAGE Publications Asia-Pacific Pte Ltd 33 Pekin Street #02-01 Far East Square Singapore 048763 Published by Vivek Mehra for Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd, typeset in 11/16 Garamond by Tantla Composition Pvt Ltd, Chandigarh and printed at Chaman Enterprises, New Delhi. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Ghosh, Dhruba Narayan, 1928– â•… Business and polity: dynamics of a changing relationship/D.N. Ghosh. ╅╅╇ p. cm. â•… Includes bibliographical references and index. â•… 1. Economic history.â•… 2. Economic policy—History.â•… 3. Business and politics—History.â•… 4. Commerce—History.â•… I. Title. HC21.G49â•…â•…â•…â•…â•… 322’.3--dc22â•…â•…â•…â•…â•… 2011â•…â•…â•…â•…â•… 2011001400 ISBN: 978-81-321-0531-2 (HB)
The SAGE Team: Elina Majumdar, Sonalika Rellan, Mathew P. J. and Deepti Saxena
For Ranjan, Suparna and Annesha
Thank you for choosing a SAGE product! If you have any comment, observation or feedback, I would like to personally hear from you. Please write to me at
[email protected] —Vivek Mehra, Managing Director and CEO, SAGE Publications India Pvt Ltd, New Delhi
Bulk Sales SAGE India offers special discounts for purchase of books in bulk. We also make available special imprints and excerpts from our books on demand. For orders and enquiries, write to us at Marketing Department SAGE Publications India Pvt Ltd B1/I-1, Mohan Cooperative Industrial Area Mathura Road, Post Bag 7 New Delhi 110044, India E-mail us at
[email protected]
Get to know more about SAGE, be invited to SAGE events, get on our mailing list. Write today to
[email protected]
This book is also available as an e-book.
Contents
Foreword by Y. Venugopal Reddy • xi Preface • xxi Prologue • xxv Introduction • xxxv
Part I. The Making and Unmaking of Empires: Domination of Political Power Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5
Sagacity in Governance: The Greek Exemplar • 3 Governance Culture: Roman Mirror • 20 Tolerant Ambience: India • 39 Resource Raising: Uniqueness of China • 52 An Intimidating Colossus: The Arab Miracle • 68
Part II. The Medieval World: ad 1000–1500 Chapter 6 Chapter 7 Chapter 8 Chapter 9 Chapter 10
Trade and Politics in the Indian Ocean • 91 Business on Leash: Japan • 109 Emerging Out of the Shadows: Europe • 119 In the Limelight: Knights of Commerce • 132 Playing with Power: Merchant Republics • 148
ix
xâ•… Business and Polity
Part III. The Great Transition: Warfare Technology— The Catalytic Chapter 11 Sword and Purse: Beginnings of Collaboration • 175 Chapter 12 Fiscal Revolution: Grip of Financiers • 191 Chapter 13 Economic Nationalism: Fusion of the Sword and Purse • 208 Part IV. A Boiling Cauldron Chapter 14 Setting the Tone: The Portuguese • 225 Chapter 15 Weaving a Pattern: The Spanish Imperial Machine • 237 Chapter 16 Showing the Way: The Dutch Interlude • 254 Chapter 17 Not in a Fit of Absentmindedness: Britain’s Forays • 269 Part V. Towards Global Hegemony Chapter 18 Chinks in the Armour: Empires in the Eurasian Landmass • 295 Chapter 19 Pax Britannica: Rise and Fall of British Hegemony • 312 Chapter 20 Pillars of US Hegemony • 341 Epilogue • 364 Glossary • 378 Reference List and Select Bibliography • 384 Index • 414 About the Author • 423
Foreword
I have known Mr D. N. Ghosh for several years. As Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, I sought his counsel on several intricate issues, and he has been very generous with his time and attention. Mr Ghosh has been of great help to Reserve Bank of India, especially in the area of non-banking financial companies’ sector. Over the years, I have developed great respect for his intellect, insight, integrity and insistence on propriety while being pleasant, cheerful and firm. Mr Ghosh epitomises soft power. He is in many ways an innovator and an institution builder. I also heard of his work in the government, and read about his contributions to public policy during some of the turbulent times. His foray into academia may be news to the new generation, but both the compulsions that lead him there and his contributions are well known to us. His articles in the Economic and Political Weekly are constant reference materials. In this background, when Mr Ghosh suggested that I should write a foreword for this forthcoming book, I readily agreed in view of the honour involved. I read the manuscript that he sent for the purpose and reread it. Then I studied it carefully and was simply amazed at the scholarship, the depth of understanding and the breadth of his enquiry. The articulation is informative, impressive and convincing. On occasions, I wondered whether I was equal to the task of writing a foreword to such an erudite and unique piece of writing. However, I have benefited immensely from reading the manuscript carefully and being provoked to take up the xi
xiiâ•… Business and Polity
complex challenge of writing a foreword. This process of careful reading helped me explore the contemporary relevance of this book, in addition to its lasting contribution to the literature on the history of political economy of the world. In India, political economy has been a relatively unexplored area. More important, the relationship between business and government, as it evolved over the centuries is a somewhat neglected area of scholarship. In the hierarchy of the caste systems, the trader comes below the ruling caste as well as the priestly caste, but above the rest, viz., the Shudras. But the ruling class always had a close relationship with business. During the Independence movement also, there were observable links between indigenous business and politics. Till recently, politicians and businessmen were separate entities for most part of their avocations. The position seems to be changing rapidly in the recent years. First, many of the businessmen have joined active political life, while many politicians turned to business as an additional occupation. Some people comment that the regimes of gentlemen-politicians has been replaced by businessmen-politicians or politician-businessmen. There is a second more important factor after the onset of the process of economic reform. While there have been large elements of deregulation and liberalisation, the role of the government continues to be dominant in a significant way in the process of reform, particularly in the area of privatisation of public enterprises or disinvestment and public–private participation in physical infrastructure like highways, and possibly social infrastructure like education. More important, the public policy in India under the reform period seems to have created an atmosphere conducive for rapid growth by being business-friendly, but not necessarily market-friendly. The latter would involve rules of the game which would enhance competitive efficiency
Forewordâ•… xiii
and level playing fields based on respect for contracts rather than contacts. What would be the way forward in India? This book may provide clues to appreciating the dynamics of relationship between business and politics in India also. In any case I agree with the author that this dynamic is critical in understanding the current global financial crisis and in shaping the future of global economic and financial order. It is quite evident that the global financial crisis, and indeed, the global economic crisis has clearly been a turning point in the history of the world. Till a mere 300 years ago, China and India accounted for about half of the world output. They suffered a decline in their fortunes during the colonial era. While the second half of the 20th century saw an end to colonalisation and brought about division of the world into developed and developing economies; the developments in 21st century indicate a more diversified world. Different countries are at different levels of economic development and sophistication in the markets which seem to not only challenge the dominance of the United States, Europe and to some extent Japan, but also provide a spectrum of nation-states with diverse levels of economic development. As a consequence, it is possible that we will no longer have corner solutions (either this or that, but nothing else) but will increasingly have intermediate solutions to issues of economic policy. Globally the corporate sector seems to have developed a larger-than-life identity of its own, and has become powerful, but the sector is not necessarily maintaining continuous individual identities as corporates. The mergers, amalgamations and takeovers of corporates have become common, and thus the corporate identities are fast changing. However, the corporate sector as a whole has developed a global domination and a global presence. Their influence over politics is now no longer
xivâ•… Business and Polity
necessarily through one national government, but cuts across several countries. The managements of corporates, in particular in the financial sector, seem to have developed their own spheres of influence and interests that may not necessarily result in equitable distribution of surpluses among the stakeholders, in particular workers, shareholders and the management. In brief, in recent years the balance within the corporates between shareholders, board and management seems to have undergone significant change. The technological developments are constraining the capacity of the individual nation-state to exercise their power of intervention in the economic activity of individuals or corporates as they were able to do in the 20th century. Technological developments have a tendency to make cross-border movements very economical and hence can undermine the instruments of intervention available for the nation-states. At the same time, the consequences of cross-border movements on a nation’s population have to be managed by the state. As Governor Mervyn King is reported to have said, ‘Banks are global in life and national in death’. Is it possible that globalisation of business, especially finance, was premature relative to globalisation of public policy or globalised governance? It is not clear whether history provides clues on this, though Mr Ghosh alludes to premature globalisation of finance relative to globalisation of its regulation. Within the corporate world, finance as a sector has emerged as a force by itself and has begun to acquire the character of ends than means. As it evolved in human history, finance was critical to both political matters and economic life, but it was viewed as a powerful ally of politics for most part, and often as a facilitator of wars and of promoting growth in output, whereby employment was created. In recent years, the financial sector has
Forewordâ•… xv
acquired a life of its own, with greater capacity to influence the politics not only at a national level but also in terms of relations between the nations. Further, finance increased its hold over real sector. A possible disconnect in the growth of real sector relative to that in the financial sector is emerging. This is illustrated by the fact that at the current stage of crisis management (March 2010), the financial markets seem to have rebounded globally and thrived, but employment and growth appear to be lagging behind, particularly in developed countries. It is not clear whether the booming financial markets are in anticipation of a definitive surge in real output and employment globally. In this regard, it is instructive to note from the book that, historically politics tended to have very diverse links with finance, its relationship ranging from antagonism to dependence, and from surrender to support; but for the most part collusive. Thus, finance had a dominant role in what Mr Ghosh calls the fiscalmilitary phase and in the more recent phase of US hegemony in the context of dollar as the global reserve currency. Recent debates on public policy consequent upon the global financial crisis focus on the relationship between the state and the market. It is often argued that the ongoing financial crisis reflects excessive belief in the efficiency and self-correcting mechanisms of markets. It is, therefore, argued that the state should be empowered so that the balance between the state and the market is restored with appropriate roles to each. Various initiatives are being considered for strengthening financial regulation and establishing a new global economic order as well as appropriate international financial institutions that could provide public goods, conducive to global growth, welfare and stability. These are essentially in the nature of creating a strengthened role for state, broadly defined to include intervention in the functioning of markets by the public policy.
xviâ•… Business and Polity
However, it is possible to argue that the recent financial crisis represents the failure of both the market and the state within and across nation-states. The apparatus of the state, in particular the independent central banks and regulators in the financial sector seem to have failed to discharge the duties assigned and deliver the outcomes that they had assured. There are sufficient grounds to believe that the crisis is a result of the capture of the government by the markets, especially by the financial institutions and financial markets. In other words, it can be argued that the crisis was not caused by a mere failure of regulators but a capture of the regulators and the governments by the financial markets. This plausible explanation of the crisis warrants an entirely different dimension to the traditional debate on state versus market. Consequently, the debate will have to concentrate a lot more on the relationship between the state and the market in each country on one hand, and the relationship between the nation-states, national markets and international markets, on the other. This book touches on this aspect while presenting the dynamics of economic change in different historical periods. It explains the interaction of two forces: the techno-economic structure in any society that is controlled by business, and the polity that is controlled by their ruling regime. It recognises that the two forces are distinct but coexist. The common elements in the narration of events that lead to the current financial crisis indicate that there has been close cooperation between the financial conglomerates and the ruling elite, that there has been competition for resources among these constituents within each country and that these forces ensured contagion in different degrees to different countries. Thus, as the world was led into the crisis, there have been different strategic elements of cooperation, competition and coordination
Forewordâ•… xvii
between state and market, nations and supranations, financial and non-financial corporates. As a reaction to the efforts made to reduce the big government which led to the crisis, there now appears to be an effort to reduce the big business, in the financial sector, namely in big banks. The outcome of the current thinking is not obvious as of now since both desirability and feasibility are being discussed. In my view, the critical issue is not merely the bigness of the state or a corporate or a bank, but the quality of governance in both the state and the market. These obviously are products of several factors: cultural, institutional, technological and social. Often, it is recognised that cultural factors influence the behaviour of economic agents in the markets, but the markets also tend to influence the cultural factors. While these are not explicitly addressed in the book, the description of the events and the analysis of structure and dynamics of relationships between business and polity in the book do provide valuable clues to a better understanding of the current dilemmas. In terms of dominant values, the recent decades represent the height of respectability to market forces to an extent that is perhaps unprecedented in history. Historically, trade and finance were viewed with suspicion in general, though their useful role and indeed their attractiveness were not in doubt in most cultures, particularly in societies that valued material success. The recent heightened respectability to markets which was followed by the crisis now, has also resulted in, among other things, two sets of realisations. The first realisation is that economists and policy-analysts had underestimated the greed in human character. The second realisation has been that there has been a fundamental change in the human values globally which elevated markets to the status of God replacing traditional religion.
xviiiâ•… Business and Polity
The chapter on Fiscal Revolution and Grip of Financiers referring to 16th and 17th centuries is of great contemporary relevance in the context of the crisis management. Mr Ghosh in reflecting on that period of history mentions: ‘The fiscal apparatus within the state became little more than a front behind which the financiers carried on their affairs with studied indifference towards the damage they did to the government and contempt for the suffering of the taxpaying elements of the population.’ My question in the context of the current debates on public debt incurred in managing the crisis is: Will the surging public debt of many countries place the sovereigns at the mercy of financial markets that were bailed out by the sovereign in the first place? The chapter on ‘Pillars of US hegemony’ explains with great clarity the centrality of Washington in the support of world liquidity. That this has to change is recognised, but there is no clarity or consensus on the path towards change and destination of change. Mr Ghosh makes a brilliant summary of the masterly exposition made in the earlier chapters of the book in the chapter titled ‘Epilogue’ and the sections titled ‘Recapitulating’ and ‘Five Revolutions’ in the Epilogue deserve special mention here. He describes the globalisation of recent years as the Fifth Revolution ‘driven primarily by American hegemonic power, which is an amalgam of state and business power’. His contention is that there are clear signs that the United States is no longer in a position to offer ‘public good’ to global economy as it used to, mainly ‘through its failure to manage the global financial centre as a stable and responsible distributor of global liquidity’. Mr Ghosh sees need for change and speculates on signs of change. For a successful journey towards global stability, and by implication the process of global rebalancing, according to Mr Ghosh
Forewordâ•… xix
certain prerequisites have to be met by the United States. These include increasing productivity, acceptance that the margin of economic advantage that it enjoyed before is shrinking and willingness to concede that its capacity to use military power for political advantage is getting smaller. We need to speculate: Will that meeting of prerequisites in the United States happen and how will it happen? The narration of links between business and politics in the book gives several clues but understandably no answers. However, personally I found that the most common reason for collapse of civilisations as explained in the book was intolerable inequalities in wealth and income. Hence, in my view, it is necessary, particularly for the United States to recognise the need to contain and curb high inequalities in income and wealth as the most critical step for overall rebalancing that the world is in need of. A pertinent issue is the responsibilities of the major economies in the world, in facilitating, incentivising and persuading the United States to adopt the prerequisites mentioned by Mr Ghosh. These economies include the Euro area, Japan, China and India. A relevant issue is the sharing of burdens among these in the transition to a possible new global economic order, and here those economies which contributed more to imbalances so far have a harder task ahead. The history of nexus between business and politics analysed brilliantly in this book and the more recent apparent capture of public policy by financial sector shows that the path towards a new global economic order is not only a political process but one in which business, big business, especially the financial sector, will play a major role. I am afraid the ongoing public debates on new global financial architecture are yet to focus on the criticality of national and global businesses in this process.
xxâ•… Business and Polity
I thank Mr D. N. Ghosh for giving me the opportunity to write the foreword to this monumental work. Y. Venugopal Reddy Emeritus Professor, University of Hyderabad Former Governor—Reserve Bank of India Hyderabad, India
Preface
Time present and time past Are both perhaps present in time future, And time future contained in time past. If all time is eternally present All time is unredeemable (T.S. Eliot in Four Quartets) During the last two decades of the 20th century the world went through tumultuous changes. The global landscape was changing dramatically: the Berlin Wall was torn down, the mighty Soviet Union collapsed, China was taking the capitalist road to economic growth…It was, to all appearances, a victory for market capitalism and for the policies and institutions that the world’s most prosperous and powerful country stood for. Transnational corporations became the most visible instruments for the propagation of the capitalist message all across the globe. Market spirit came to be universally idealised and globalisation came to acquire a kind of quasi-religious sanctity. The tempest travelled over nations to sweep across our country as well, stirring in its wake spirited debates over how our policies and institutions could be restructured so that the maximum benefits could be drawn from the changing global environment. It was a theme that came to possess universities, think tanks, international seminars, business federations and various other forums. And underlying this theme was the unwritten premise that if an open and liberal market economy and ‘good policies and good institutions’ associated with it xxi
xxiiâ•… Business and Polity
were to be adopted and developed, politics must learn to keep its hands off business, restricting its role to ensuring the rule of law, providing basic regulation and putting in place a social safety net. It is my participation in many of these debates and discussions that this book has grown out of. There were some who argued for caution in adopting the policies and institutions of the developed countries, emphasizing, in particular, that the context in which these policies and institutions had evolved over time be studied and understood first. But this view had few takers in our country, the idea being dubbed a hangover from the decades past. The overwhelming majority appeared to have been persuaded by Henry Ford’s snappy verdict: ‘History is more or less bunk’. Listening to these debates and occasionally participating in them, I began to have the feeling that a kind of historical amnesia had gripped the elite of our society. It is this feeling that brought about the idea of exploring the ever-entwined relationship between business and politics. This relationship is always in a flux, being impacted by the continuous interaction between the two vital interest groups that create and redistribute wealth in society. The way historical circumstances have converged during different eras to deliver the next push to this evolving relationship should be a matter of interest to those who are involved in the political and economic affairs of today. Of course, that is not to say such a study would necessarily throw up lessons for emulation. As the Greek philosopher Heraclitus put it, ‘Everything flows, and you cannot bathe twice in the same river.’ Nevertheless, time does weed out the non-essentials and what remains can serve as a pathfinder for the current generation. I tossed the idea first with Amit Bhaduri. He encouraged me to explore the relationship between business and politics
Prefaceâ•… xxiii
and trace the behavioural patterns of these two interest groups through different epochs in history. Deepak Nayyar came to my aid and worked out a kind of periodisation that would be relevant to the subject. He volunteered, despite his multifarious commitments, to go through the first draft of this book, and pointed out many unnecessary departures and glaring gaps. I remain immensely grateful to him. I am also indebted to Bimal Jalan for readily agreeing to take a quick look at the draft in the final stages, and for offering many insightful comments on the epilogue. My gratitude to Mihir Rakshit for spotting areas that called for greater clarity of exposition. The deficiencies that remain are of course mine. It was so kind of Y. Venugopal Reddy to write the foreword. The piece is a masterly exposition of the political economy of the recent financial crisis, and of the contemporary relevance of the dynamics of the business–polity relationship—the theme of this book. For the completion of this book, I owe debts of gratitude to many. Two organisations, ICRA and Peerless, have been generous in providing logistical support whenever I needed it. I give my thanks to Patricia Sharpe and Promod Upadhya. Udayan Majumdar cheerfully bore the burden of giving some shape to the initial drafts of some of the chapters. I never felt I was working in isolation, that is, away from the University libraries, thanks to Akhtar Parvez, the librarian, who was always there to help me out in tracing reference material, books and journals. Without him and his excellent connections, I could not have dreamt of completing this project, as it involved extensive research into the works of specialists: economic historians, political scientists and sociologists. Somnath Dasgupta carefully and meticulously edited the final version: his sharp eye rescued me from many bloomers. Last, but
xxivâ•… Business and Polity
not the least, the persuasive persistence of Elina Majumdar, the commissioning editor of Sage, in completing the book within a time schedule; but for her, I would possibly have dragged on and on.
Prologue
Heritage of Antiquity: Roots of Political and Economic Power
Human society, in its evolution from hunter-gatherers to agriculture and domestication of animals and permanent settlements, gradually became stable, bounded and complex, giving rise to division of labour, social inequality and political centrality. This transition is a story of continuous cultural evolution, with local groups, spurred by their environmental needs, striking out on their own paths and transiting progressively to larger systems, shaping themselves through interaction and learning. The researches of anthropologists and sociologists bring out a wide array of factors and circumstances that influence the process of local evolution and diffusion of culture and the process of transition. Between the beginning of settled agriculture and the peak of the Roman Empire was a span of approximately eight thousand years. Archaeological findings allied with anthropological research tell a story of continuity in all known forms of human society: from relatively egalitarian, stateless societies to rank societies with political authority and eventually stratified civilised societies with states (Fried, 1967). The state is the final stage in the evolutionary process, the culmination of a slow, prolonged and connected growth process, precipitated at several stages by the somewhat random forces of population pressure xxv
xxviâ•… Business and Polity
and technological change.1 What gave it character was essentially the activities of loose associations transforming themselves into permanent centralised settlements and organising through political means their command over surpluses that accrue from economic activities within their territorial command. That this has been the general occurrence is confidently asserted by the sociologist Nisbet: ‘There is no historical instance of a political state not founded in circumstances of war, not rooted in the distinctive discipline of war’, though it subsequently diversified in peaceful activities or functions acceptable to the family or religious activities (Nisbet, 1976). There is little disagreement that these social and political complexes arose in river valleys where alluvial agriculture came to be practised. Agriculture had been the primary life-giving force driving these civilisations and its development was associated with property differentials and social stratification. In the small city-states that emerged in these complexes, propertied elites assumed political and associated control. In defining the civilisational complexes in terms of an extensive list of characteristics, Gordon Childe laid special emphasis on two: emergence of a ruling class and the means it deploys to have a say in the control and management of economic surplus that is generated through different forms, namely through agriculture and associated activities and through trade (Childe, 1951).
Emergence of Property Forms: Ceremonial Temples Permanent possession of land by a settled family group conferred fixed economic resource, and those who could control strategic positions at river junctions, river fords or crossroads
Prologueâ•… xxvii
could mobilise a disproportionate amount of collective social power to turn it to their own use if needed. Such stratification emerged throughout the late fourth millennium. Sumerian records after 3000 bc show that, unlike the situation in most prehistoric villages, irrigated land was in much larger parcels than could be worked by individual families. With such permanent inequalities in property distribution, the strategic owners of core land with or without unusual alluvial or irrigational potential could command a greater economic surplus than the peripheral alluvial-irrigating neighbours. Also, they could have additional advantages accruing from trade through control along particular trade and communication routes, especially navigable rivers, and location of market places and store houses. Apart from the surplus that came to be generated through a combination of fixed property rights in land, other kinds of surplusgenerating activities such as access to trade opportunities, came to be available to them. There were several alternative sources of creating wealth other than from land through a range of services from free persons, semi-free dependent labour and a few slaves. With the solidification of economic stratification embedded in wealth differentials, evident in all forms of social and economic activities, it was but inevitable that the dominant groups would come to acquire territorially centralised authority. This transition, as scholars have surmised on the basis of archaeological records, passed through a particular type of ceremonial centre, the temple, something that was fairly general among the earlier civilisations. Extensive social cooperation in irrigation agriculture was associated with a strong priesthood virtually everywhere (Steward, 1963). The main purposes of the temples were essentially mundane: to serve as an inter-village diplomatic service and to redistribute economic produce and encode public duties and private property rights. The priests
xxviiiâ•… Business and Polity
in earlier civilisations were more secular, more administrative and political, as a diplomatic corps, irrigation managers and redistributors. The temple was a kind of redistributive state à la the economist Karl Polanyi. With these religious institutions emerged a form of collective power that offered genuine diplomatic solutions to real social needs, in the regulation of trade, diffusion and exchange of tools and techniques, marriage regulation, migration and settlement and definition of just and unjust violence (Mann, 1986). Ceremonial temple complexes had also developed a role for themselves. Greek and Asian temples had been offering various kinds of services that must have been of great help to the traders; they would deposit gold and treasures in temples with the priests acting as caretakers and sometimes as judges. The Babylonian Shamash was one of the market gods; originally, Jehovah was the market god of the tribe of Levi, at whose yearly festivals men of all tribes gathered to barter; the temple of Jerusalem was the centre of a financial network in the east, somewhat similar to that controlled by the later Christian Church over Western Europe.
State and Property Rights: Intermixture State and private property rights were connected to and mutually supportive of one another. From the excavated tablets of the early city of Lagash, it is surmised that there was a complicated mixture of three property forms in land administered by the temple. There were fields owned by the city’s gods and administered by the temple officials, fields rented out by the temple to individual families on an annual basis and fields granted to individual families in perpetuity without rent. The first and third
Prologueâ•… xxix
forms were sizeable, denoting large-scale collective and private property, both employing dependent labour and a few slaves. The records show that collective and private property steadily merged, as stratification and state developed more extensively; a unified elite controlled the temples and large estates and held priestly, civil and military offices. The earliest urban civilisation appeared in Sumer, in the far southeast of Mesopotamia bordering the Persian Gulf, and Sumerians continued as the main dominant cultural force in southern Mesopotamia from before 3000 to about 2000 bc. The fundamental political unit was the city-state, with Ur, on the Gulf, being the most important of the Sumerian cities most of the time. From time to time, one city or another would establish a kind of hegemony over all or most of the river valleys nurturing the civilisational complexes. A clear hierarchy of social order seemed to have emerged and established itself in the cities.2 One of the earliest records discovered at Ashur, a city-state in the 20th century bc, brings out clearly the kind of social and economic functions in these early states. The ruler, also the principal judge, ruled with the concurrence of three distinct bodies of citizens: the elders, the ‘town’ and the karum, interpreted to mean the people of the market, that is, the body of merchants who administered the commercial centre of the city. The karum acted as the bank of deposit, a centre for export and import, a clearinghouse and a chamber of commerce all rolled into one (Curtin, 1984: 68). During the old Babylonian period, the most significant piece of evidence attributed to Hammurabi, lawgiver of Babylon from about 1792 to 1750 bc, points to the existence of a class of independent merchants, known as Tamkaru, dominant in trade, brokerage and money lending, replacing the role
xxxâ•… Business and Polity
of temples and royal monopolies as the source of capital. The House of Elgi, as recorded in inscriptions, carried out a wide variety of business activities combined with banking; they gave loans against securities and accepted a wide range of deposits. After having flourished for hundreds of years, this bank seemed to have faded from the scene some time during the 5th century bc. A similar but younger banking firm is that of the sons of Maraschu, which operated from the town of Nippur. Apart from the banking functions of the kind practiced by the House of Elgi, they specialised in what we would call renting and leasing arrangements. They administered—as agents of tax-farmers— the royal and larger private estates, they rented out fish ponds, financed and constructed irrigation canals and charged fees to farmers within their water networks, and they enjoyed partial monopoly on the sale and distribution of beer.3
Trade as a Source of Wealth The development and expansion of trade, internal and external, started creating an alternative source of wealth other than from land. The existence of illuminating patterns of long-distance trade in preliterate societies points to the possibility of a wide range of relationships subsisting between the trade community and the host polity and society. Trade communities of merchants living among aliens in associated networks, as are found today in every continent, can be traced back through time to the very beginning of urban life. Familiar examples that come to mind are the chains of Phoenician and Greek trading towns that spread westward from the Levant or the Aegean coasts. Or some two thousands later, the Hanseatic League of independent trading towns, where merchants from Cologne on the Rhine
Prologueâ•… xxxi
settled along the trade routes down the Rhine and then eastward along the coast of North Sea and the Baltic. The relationship between the trading community and the host society, taking on a complex variety of forms, has been an interesting field of study for sociologists, political scientists and economic historians. It was a kind of mixed economy in today’s parlance. Trade was carried out as a private enterprise with some form of commercial control by the government (Curtin, 1984: 67). While government participated directly in trade in food, it used primarily the independent merchants as its agents. From the rich collection of clay tablets discovered in Kultepe in Turkey, the site of Kamesh, a settlement of Assyrian merchants, and the settlement of at least 20 other Assyrian commercial settlements in central and western Anatolia, there is adequate evidence to show that while the merchants were free to do their trade, they had to pay protection costs as the inescapable price for doing business. The authorities who have studied the Kultepe tablets portray an economic order where political authorities interfered in trade as much as they could to suit their particular interests, but they were careful not to suppress the underlying play of supply and demand, though the traders had to pay protection money for doing business. The Assyrian commercial documents refer to local authorities as the ‘palace’, where the Assyrian traders were welcome guests. The ultimate authority of the palace was undisputed. The visiting merchants had their own corporate organisation to act for the group. It took the form of a network of Karu; at the head was karum, in Ashur itself, below that Karum in Kamesh, and still further down the line a number of other karu in other Anatolian towns. The kind of relationship interpreted from Egyptian records is substantively no different. Traders had to carry on their operations under
xxxiiâ•… Business and Polity
strict government control, though they were welcome to bring the special articles they needed (Curtin, 1984: 68–70). In the palace-centred economies, trading merchants were recognised as communities that rendered useful service, but they were never accepted as part of the ruling power complex. It was somewhat like how the Jewish merchants came to be treated in medieval Europe. In oral traditions embodied in literary sources from the Aegean age, we often find a clear distinction between fighting men and the cautious, anaemic businessmen worn down with the care of cargoes. According to the predominance of one type or other, there developed trader-communities and warriorcommunities and the hostility between them seemed to have been a fundamental fact of ancient history.
City-states The sack of Troy in about 1200 bc, symbolising the end of Aegean prosperity and of the Minoan–Mycenaean age, was the beginning of what is generally talked of as the Dark Ages in the Mediterranean world. Lasting down to about 750 bc this saw the end of the palace-centred state and the emergence of citystates in the Mediterranean, from the archaic period (8th to 6th centuries bc) to the classical period (5th to 4th centuries bc). Two decentralised civilisations around the Mediterranean dominated the first millennium bc—Phoenica and Greece. The Phoenician states of the Levant coast, entering a power vacuum along the eastern shores of the Mediterranean left by the collapse of the Hittites and the Mycenaeans and the retreat of Egypt to the Nile, emerged as a dominant power for about five centuries. It was exclusively a naval and trading power,
Prologueâ•… xxxiii
the ‘bride of the sea’, united by a loose federal, geopolitical alliance of city-states. In the 10th and 9th centuries, Tyre probably enjoyed some primacy over other cities of Phoenician and was ruled by kings whose power was limited by the merchant oligarchy. Phoenicians, as a rule, did not fight unless they had to. In Tyre and Sidon, they paid tribute to oriental monarchs instead of striking for independence. The Phoenicians, unlike the Greeks, were not looking for lands to settle but for anchorages and staging points on the trade route from Phoenicia to Spain, a source of silver and tin. The Phoenician coastal towns eventually lost their naval supremacy to the Greeks and their political independence first to Nebuchadnezzar II, and then to the Persians, all in the 6th century bc.
Emergence of Empires Though the multi-city structure in early civilisations continued for several centuries, the autonomy of city-states began to weaken as regional confederations emerged. Gradually, they were conquered by extensive empires, with large and hierarchical organisation of power. From the rise of the great world empire of Sargaon of Akkad (2500–2350 bc) to the fall of the Roman Empire in the West (ad 476), the historical record is filled with a bewildering profusion of empires and their rulers. How were the ruling regimes relating to the enterprisers of resource generating economic activities to realise their political objectives? We explore these relationships in five civilisations: Greek, Roman, Indian, Chinese and Arab, roughly covering about 15 centuries, from the five centuries before Christ to the end of the first millennium.
xxxivâ•… Business and Polity
Notes 1. The state forms—in embryo in the stratified society and the transition to the final form, as Oppenheimer argues in his classic sociological study of The State—are marked by six stages. The first stage, of continuous raiding and killing between groups, was followed by one in which a dominant group extended a protective cover to others for carrying out agricultural and connected economic activities, a critically important step ‘where the bear becomes the beekeeper’. The third stage arrives when the peasants regularly bring the surplus as tribute to the ruler. This tribute is found in many well-known instances in history: Huns, Magyars, Tartars and Turks have derived their largest income from this source. What follows is the union of warring groups in command of specific territories. Gradually, the territorial rulers acquire the right to arbitrate and the means to enforce it, marking the near completion of the evolution of the primitive state. 2. For a good summary based on archaeological evidence, see Philip D. Curtin, Cross-Cultural Trade in World History, Chapter 4. 3. See Heichelheim, 1958, as quoted in A History of Money, Glyn Davies, 1994, 50.
Introduction
Oh, do not ask, “What is it?” Let us go and make our visit. —T.S. Eliot1 This book is an odyssey undertaken to explore and understand the relationship between business and politics as it has evolved through different epochs in history to stand at where it does today. This intersection of politics, business/economics and sociology has always interested scholars from a range of disciplines with different perspectives. Pluralists like Robert A. Dahl and Erik Olson debate the impact of competing interest groups on policy processes. Sociologists like Charles Wright Mills and Michael Useem dissect the nature of influence exercised by large business corporations on political decision-makers and the channels that are used for this purpose. Then, Vernon, Caves and Dunning, among others, made the corporation itself an important subject of enquiry in international relations in the 1970s and 1980s, particularly because of the influence of the marketdriven global compass of corporate operations. Next to the pluralist and neo-corporatist perspectives, there is a clutch of methodological approaches (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962) that apply economic models to political processes. These studies characterise the political market as one in which interest groups invest resources to obtain favourable decisions or nondecisions from politicians, who in turn pursue their self-interest by gathering resources and support (Fuchs, 2008). xxxv
xxxviâ•… Business and Polity
Business corporations operating across geographies face complex operational issues involving the sovereign governments with which they have to interact. The host and the home states have large, though often conflicting, stakes in the ways the global business corporations function. These are not technical or legal issues that the corporations can resolve on their own; these can be sensitive issues that make the involvement of the home government critical. Global business corporations, located mostly in the developed countries, have their own equations with their home governments. The functional and geographical dispersion of these corporations over the past three centuries and the economic power that they have come to wield are linked inextricably with the gradual rise to the hegemony of these advanced countries. Little wonder that these hegemonies and the global business corporations, between themselves, have set the policies that govern the structure of geo-political and economic relations in today’s world. The journey on which we embark seeks to unravel how and why we have come to inherit the present configuration of power and thereby enhance our ability to make informed decisions to shape the future. A hegemonic power is a product of history. Joseph Schumpeter had once remarked that the compulsion of the insistent present makes us oblivious of the truth of the past sanctified by centuries. Human decisions taken at crucial stages have changed the course of history; these decisions, taken individually or collectively, may have been influenced by ideology or by technology or by a mere instinct of power or wealth grabbing. We are now at a turning point in global history. As we try to understand more of the past, we begin to make some sense of our times. We begin to see our times not as an everlasting present, but as a historical period. The contemporary world has come into existence through a very tortuous route. It has very
Introductionâ•… xxxvii
little in common with the road maps of history on which ideologues of every description draw their straight lines.
Dissecting the Dynamics The potential energy inherent in any society often expresses itself in changing profiles of material output, patterns of employment and class distribution of income. The single most important element residing deep within the system is the driving need to extract wealth through activities that a particular socioeconomic configuration may permit. This is, in a sense, the logic of a system that ‘expresses the potential energy created by its nature… What is logical about these movements is that they express the outcome of the system’s nature, as a released spring expresses the energy stored up within it’ (Heilbroner, 1985: 25). How does the inner nature express itself? In an abstract philosophical vein, each society in each period of history, as Hegel elaborates, is a structurally interrelated whole, unified by some inner principle. For Hegel, it is the Geist, or the inner spirit, the style of a period. For Marx, it is the mode of production that determines all other social relations; historical change occurs through a dialectical process, with the new mode negating the previous one while also preparing the way for the next to come. Many sociologists are not comfortable with the HegelianMarxist conception of society as an integral entity defined by its web of interconnectedness and one whose movement may be explained through the dialectical approach. The Marxist theory is perceived as having failed to predict the direction of historical development, let alone its timing. Politically, many see the culmination of Marxist dialectic not in universal freedom and prosperity with the withering away of the coercive state as predicted by Marx, but in an oppressive and grossly inefficient state capitalism.
xxxviiiâ•… Business and Polity
As against the holistic view of society, it may be more useful if we are to understand the dynamics of economic change through the interaction of two forces: the techno-economic structure in any society that is controlled by business in its own interest and the polity that is controlled by the ruling regime for purposes it considers to be for the collective good. The two forces are distinct, but co-exist in an unordered manner, each with a different axial principle. Each has, in a sense, its own realm and the two realms are not congruent with one another. They have different rhythms of change and follow different norms that legitimise different and even contrasting types of behaviour. But the way these two realms function and interact may create a dynamic that may become decisive in changing or even destroying societies. In any society—primitive, imperial or capitalist—the dynamic expresses itself through a continuous creative process that extracts wealth to generate a surplus over what is required for maintenance or reproduction. The way that surplus is generated, accumulated and redistributed holds the key to the relationship between business and polity. In a broad sense, business generates and accumulates surplus while it is polity that redistributes the surplus—and also has the responsibility to create conditions that facilitate the production of this surplus.
Two Realms: Business and Politics Business is imbued with a ‘restless Faustian spirit’ that takes as its motto ‘the endless frontier’, and as its goal ‘the complete transformation of nature’ (Bell, 1978). This acquisitive spirit, which is the central theme in Werner Sombart’s exposition of capitalism,2 respects no absolute limit.
Profits, no matter how large, can never reach a level sufficiently
♦
♦
Introductionâ•… xxxix
high to satisfy the economic agent.… Acquisition... becomes unconditional, absolute. Not only does it seize upon all phenomena within the economic realm, but it reaches over into other cultural fields and develops a tendency to proclaim (Sombart as quoted in Bell, 1978: 192)
♦
♦
the supremacy of business interests over all other values.
Acquisitive orientation is, however, not confined only to the Age of Capital; it was manifest in pre-capitalist formations as well. In Classical Greece, Medieval Europe and Japan, or in China during the course of its dynastic cycles, business as a calling did not enjoy the kind of social recognition that it does today, given the cultural and religious milieu then prevailing, but, nonetheless, its march continued unabated. Essentially, business signifies the single-minded pursuit of all those activities that contribute to the generation of surplus and its accumulation, in agriculture, industry, trade, finance or any associated ancillary and supportive services. It is the opportunity for generating more surplus that drives business forward; ‘the pursuit of profit, and forever renewed profit’, as Max Weber puts it (Weber, 1981: 17). The critical source of surplus is derived from the different kinds of activities undertaken by business, from a money sum to a larger money sum through commodities, as Marx’s M-C-M’ formula so brilliantly schematises the repetitive, expansive metamorphosis through which accumulated surplus manifests itself. M stands for money, C for commodity, and M’ for money plus an increment, equating surplus value. Surplus expands through the very logic of the process, one that Wallerstein describes as ‘network of commodity chains’ of commodities that link together more and more of the
xlâ•… Business and Polity
separate steps involved in the production of goods, beginning with the extraction of raw materials and ending with the sale of finished items. These commodity chains combine small, discrete M-C-M’ steps into longer strides, converting many small profits into fewer larger ones (Wallerstein, 1979). Marx’s M-C-M’ formula is a powerful tool that can be extended to the pre-capitalist circuit (C-M-C) where the commodity is the object and money merely the intermediary, or the new world of globalised finance where there can be a straight route from M to M’. Owners of business generate a surplus through various modes such as agriculture and related activities, trade, crafts, mechanised production or any other innovative combination of factors of production for meeting the needs of the society. Harvey captures the essence when he defines business in generic terms as ‘the molecular processes of capital accumulation in space and time’ that flows ‘through continuous space, towards or away from territorial entities, through the daily practices of production, trade, commerce, capital flows, money transfers, labour migration, technology transfer, currency speculation, flows of information, cultural impulses and the like’ (Harvey, 2003: 26–27). We use the term ‘business’ in this all-inclusive sense here.3 The opportunities for the generation of surplus from the pursuit of any of the activities that Harvey lists keep changing as an economy evolves and diversifies and depending on the context, this book uses the term trade, industry, plantation or any other species of productive activity as a proxy for business. Politics in a general sense is the activity to pursue and attain goals through the exercise of regulatory and coercive power, centrally administered and territorially bounded— that is, state power. A political regime may be motivated by a diverse range of interests beyond self-preservation, by objectives
Introductionâ•… xli
such as acquisition of territory, enhancement of coercive reach, acquisition of wealth through military exploits or spread of cultural, religious and ideological beliefs. Territorial boundaries— in a world never yet dominated by a single state—also give rise to regulated interstate relations where geo-political diplomacy assumes importance. A polity will require different kinds and orders of resources; through successive civilisations, political power holders had to necessarily turn to business, to actors who operate in the resource generating activities.
Structure of Relationships Business and polity have been closely interlinked at any given time—whether economic growth, stagnation or decline—since polity needs resources. While the focus of interest of the two power networks is different, they have come together for many common objectives. Through history, these objectives have been found to have been associated almost invariably with war or war-like activities such as conquest or plunder or with their direct fallout or unintended consequences. Polity may rightfully appropriate a part of the surplus that business generates, as the price for extending a protective umbrella over business, but ruling political regimes may be driven on occasion to adopt coercive measures for raising resources, for self-preservation or for greater glory and power and even try to expropriate the accumulated surplus or wealth of business communities. This imposes an unsustainable burden on business, stifling its incentives to grow; it also creates a fundamental dilemma for the polity. The polity has to be strong enough to enforce private property rights but wise enough to refrain from using its strength to expropriate private property. If business
xliiâ•… Business and Polity
does not get protective cover from the polity, it may be forced to move out and seek protection from other regimes, as happened, for example, during the religious persecution in Europe in the 16th century. Business has also been found to have demonstrated its capability to assert its bargaining power in relation to polities through capture of strategic functions such as financing of rulers (Heilbroner, 1985: 42). When the major European powers were venturing out in the Atlantic, they were prepared to share part of their sovereign powers in several areas with the companies set up by merchant communities to explore new trading opportunities. The two classes of actors have been accommodating when their interests have converged and even, on occasion, when they had nursed antagonistic opinions; we have also seen a fusion of two interests, when, for example, the wealth-creating business class takes upon itself the role and responsibilities of the ruling class or vice versa. This has been particularly visible at many turning points in history: the collapse of the Roman Empire; the withering away of the Islamic hegemony; the breakdown of the feudal system; maritime exploration into the Atlantic or the onset of the industrial revolution. When this happens, we may talk of a crisis or a revolution meaning a turning point so decisive that the system comes to an end and is replaced by one or more alternative successor systems or is changed completely beyond recognition. Such were the turning points at the time of the fall of the Western Roman Empire or of the Abbasid Arab Empire. This may not be a quick event but a ‘transition’, a long period lasting a few generations. This book presents a historical overview of the relationships between business and polity as they have come to evolve via numerous twists and turns at different periods in the past,
Introductionâ•… xliii
beginning from the ancient economy to the global capitalist economy of today. We will follow a chronological pattern, but as the canvas is broad, we will be selective. Outlining the heritage of our antiquity in the prologue, we start with the early civilisational complexes—Graeco-Roman, Chinese, Indian and Arab—and continue to the end of the 1st millennium ad. Then we deal with the explosion of maritime trade in the first five centuries of the 2nd millennium ad; trade that linked regions and polities from the Muslim Mediterranean in the west to China in the extreme east and anchored by India in the middle. During the same period, two feudal regions, Japan and Europe, were lying in obscurity; they were to flower later, but theirs is an exciting story during the incubation period. Our focus here will be on critical events and circumstances that brought about this change: the emergence of strong and independent business communities within medieval Europe, the rise of cities, guilds, communes and merchant republics, the establishment of powerful fiscal-military and mercantilist states, the age of the trading empires, the imperial phase of the 19th century and the post-World War II developments that led up to the current phase of a globalised world dominated by a super-power. As we go along, we will analyse the conjuncture of events and circumstances that had a significant influence on the business– polity dynamics, how these dynamics evolved within the political, economic and technological framework of each period. We will also focus on some core elements of this relationship—for instance, attitude towards property rights, the rule of law, business innovations, mobility of capital and such other aspects—the purpose being to gain a perspective on the origin and evolution of the capitalist ethic and culture that we find today.
xlivâ•… Business and Polity
Notes 1. ‘The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock’, T.S. Eliot, 1917. 2. Sombart identified greed and gold as the drivers of capitalism, as of all humans endeavour. Though his own exposition of the development of capitalism was unsystematic and contradictory (See New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Vol. 4), his emphasis on money making as the driver, is relevant. ‘The love of money is one of the founders of human society… no less than Columbus found out’ (Bell, 1978: 292). 3. The term the businessman was first used in the US in the 1830s to denote a type of merchant who traded not only in goods but also in land and whatever else could result in a profit (Swedberg, 2005: 16).
Part I
The Making and Unmaking of Empires: Domination of Political Power
In the empires of antiquity of the first millennium bc with which our story begins, political regimes were constantly preoccupied with war and organising resources for its conduct and prosecution. Rulers wanted power, and power came from territorial acquisition, so their primary objective was to concentrate fighting power and build a strong war-making apparatus. Empire building thus hinged on the logistics of resource management, and the resources— whether men or materials—were drawn occasionally from military booty but mostly from the wealth-generating activities within the empire. The surplus available from land and other activities fed the requirement of not only the military aspect but also the civic machinery of the empire. The ordinary peasant farmers formed the bulk of the fighting force, while those with larger land holdings brought with them the expensive equipment and other resources needed for military campaigns. Polities that looked after the interest of this class survived. Those that did not, failed. We begin with the Athenian world and its famed land reforms, followed by Rome and its fall, the Mauryan Empire and its benevolence towards trade, China’s land-based structure and its parallels with Rome, and end with the story of how the Arabs created a colossal empire in a very short time, essentially by taking a pragmatic attitude towards trade. Land was the main source of wealth, and farmers were the generators of wealth for the political superstructure. Polities that failed to look after land and farmers and balance their resource needs against the surplus generated collapsed. As trade became an important source of wealth, vistas widened. 2
Chapter 1
Sagacity in Governance: The Greek Exemplar
T
â•… The polity and economy of ancient Greece over the centuries throws up a fascinating interplay of relationships among the different interest groups in society. When the great administrative centres of the Mycenaean world began to collapse around 1200 bc, the repercussions were felt throughout the mainland and the Aegean Islands. Agamemnon’s Mycenae, Menelaus’ Sparta, Nestor’s Pylos, Oedipus’ Thebes, Theseus’ Athens— all great centres of material prosperity for hundreds of years— went into a rapid decline1 and a Dark Age followed for several hundred years. Greek society’s evolution from the Archaic Period, covering roughly the 8th–6th centuries bc, to the Classical Period, the 5th–4th centuries bc, offers interesting insights into the process of economic change. For centuries, the economies of antiquity had remained ‘embedded’ in society. In the Dark Age, the Greeks kept to themselves; the little trade that did go on was performed by outsiders entering their communities. In the latter part of the 9th century bc, the population began to grow rather suddenly, transforming the way people lived and produced their livelihood (Tandy, 1997: Chapter 2). The first Greek settlements and new trade activities started assuming importance during the 8th century bc. Till the early 5th century bc, the basic 3
4â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
building block of Athenian society was the okios or household, which produced for its own consumption: production and consumption was governed not by other people’s money but by societal and familial relationships and motivations. By the 4th century bc, unrelated individuals, often in the city only transiently, sometimes operating from abroad, engaged themselves extensively in commercial exchange and profit-making activities. Propertied citizens started supporting market-oriented activities, agricultural produce began looking for cash sales and workshops began churning out consumer items. The conservative commentator Xenophon (430–354 bc) has noted this shift from an embedded to a market economy. Aristotle saw it as ‘the moneyed mode of acquisition’ or ‘making money from one another’. The emergence of wealth as a monetary asset began to adversely affect traditional values and methods, and Aristotle rued the replacement of the earlier system by impersonal coined money. The 5th and 4th centuries bc were the watershed between the Dark Ages and the flourishing Mediterranean Civilisation in the late first millennium bc. Development of maritime trade and extensive monetisation in the Classical Period, leading to the growth of banking and commercial enterprises, spurred the evolution from a household economy to a money economy. In this evolution, the inter-relationships between the polity and economy were guided by cultural beliefs and traditions, but underlying it all was a streak of pragmatism. The economy and polity evolved hand in hand, marked by power struggles among landed aristocrats and a reform of the Constitution. The basic institutions of the polity combined with the pragmatic attitude of the ruling regimes enabled business to flourish and laid the foundation of Greek prosperity, despite the cultural and ideological inhibitions against business.
Chapter 1â•…Sagacity in Governanceâ•… 5
Political Reforms and Constitutional Structure The Athenian economy would not have flourished without the support of a stable polity and the development of a collective consciousness among citizens. As it evolved over nearly two centuries, the Athenian polity struck a workable balance among the different interest groups involved in economic activities. The polity had evolved from the basileus that was the centre of institutionalised paramountcy during the Mycenaean Civilisation. When the Mycenaean Civilisation collapsed, power became decentralised and leaders of independent communities— charismatic leaders, as Max Weber would characterise them— assumed control. With land ownership being the foundation of the power structure in agrarian economies, the degree of access to land resources became the key. The wealthier elite separated themselves from the rest of the community to maintain their economic advantage (Fried, 1967). Though little is known of the formal Constitution of the Greek cities in the Archaic Age, unlike that of Rome at a comparable stage of development, it is clear that the land-owning hereditary nobility enjoyed a privileged rule over the urban population. This class consolidated its power through an institutionalised legal structure in the form of an aristocratic council. When the Greek communities reached this extent of organisation, leadership in Weberian terms became legal and a mature polis appeared on the scene (Tandy, 1997: 93). Those with large landed property came to rule the polis that originated during the Dark Age. In the second half of the 7th century, indebted farmers who had mortgaged their land to rich landlords became legally enslaved when they defaulted in paying the mandatory one-sixth of their produce to these landlords.
6â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
♦
♦
This led to the rise of ‘tyrants’ or unconstitutional rulers who secured control over the polity (Anderson, 1974: 30). It was through the celebrated reform programme of Solon, supplemented by Peisistratus (546–527 bc) and Cleisthenes (570–507 bc), that Athens found a way out of political chaos. Solon commanded the confidence of all classes for his fairmindedness and integrity; he was a person who claimed descent from the ancient kings, was only moderately rich, had seen the world as a merchant and was the author of patriotic verse as well as some outspoken poems condemning the rich for their greed. Installed in office towards the end of the 6th century bc, Solon reformed agrarian law as well as the Athenian Constitution comprehensively, stabilizing the polity and encouraging business. With his zeal for social justice, Solon set out to solve landrelated problems and bringing relief to the poor peasants. There would be no ‘unfree’ labour——labour that was in any way compulsory, involuntary, dependent, forced or coerced by non-economic factors. Solon sought to ensure that Athenian citizens did not have to suffer from any of the three kinds of bondages: debt-bondage and a fortiori, serfdom and chattel slavery. For, I gave to the people as much privilege as was sufficient, neither removing nor increasing what was their right. I made sure that those who had power and were admitted for their wealth suffered nothing unfair. I stood holding my mighty unjustly. (Buckley, 1996: 96)
♦
♦
shield over both parties, and allowed neither side to triumph
While Solon did enough to ensure that the poor enjoyed freedom as unburdened landowners, he was careful to strike a
Chapter 1â•…Sagacity in Governanceâ•… 7
balance between conflicting interests and did not attempt to redistribute privately-held land. Peisistratus gave further relief to the poor, making arrangements for lending to needy farmers and helping them in a number of practical ways. These reforms checked the growth of the estates of the nobility and stabilized the small and medium farms. Solon’s reform of the constitutional structure created an equitable balance between different interest groups, thus laying the foundation for a feeling of collective consciousness among the citizens. No longer would nobility of birth be the criterion for holding political power. This diminished the political dominance of the Eupatridai or the well-born. The old class divisions were based on military capabilities——the knights or those who could afford to keep horses, the zeugitae or those who could equip themselves to fight in the hoplite phalanx and the thetes or labourers. Solon proposed landholding criteria.2 So magistrates were drawn only from the wealthiest classes, while other offices were open to second and third classes but not to the thetes. A property census was established, not unlike that in China in the early empire days and what would happen much later in England, the United States of America (USA) and other Western countries in the 18th and 19th centuries. Though the thetes were denied participation in the executive running of the government, they were given full membership of the assemblies, with full freedom of discussion. Round about 507 bc, Athens instituted a form of government that would become known as democratia—a council chosen by lot from among citizens with some property. Cleisthenes’ reforms included a rural voice by creating regional units called demes, based on existing villages. The demes governed themselves and also sent representatives to the council, counterbalancing the power of the aristocratic class in policy-making.
8â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
The result was a participative democracy based on a free, selfsufficient peasantry. Several institutions that are today recognised as the foundations of economic growth were born in that era: the rule of law, land distribution, debtor-creditor relations based on sanctity of property and integrity of currency. The right to property was fundamental to the development of trade and private economic enterprise. We should note here that the ruling polity was not influenced in any way with the anti-property sentiments of the political philosophers of the Golden Age of Greece. Plato, in his Republic, regarded property and virtue incompatible, though later, in The Laws, he allowed private property but wanted the state to ensure that it did not lead to extremes of wealth and poverty. Aristotle, in his Politics, challenged Plato’s vision of the ideal society. Though Aristotle shared his teacher’s belief that extreme inequalities in the distribution of wealth led to social strife, he regarded the institution of property as indispensable and ultimately a positive force. A unique feature of the Greek polity was its stability. There were sharp inequalities generated by factors such as size and profitability of landholding, opportunities for trade, aristocratic birth, marriage fortunes and military and political opportunities, not dissimilar to what prevails in our capitalist democracies. In the 7th century and earlier, before the emergence of democracy, there was probably a great deal of the kind of exploitation of the poor that we find in Solon’s Attica. In a Greek democracy, however, decision-making was by majority vote——probably for the first time in human history——so the poor, because they were the majority, could protect themselves to a certain extent. At Athens and some other cities in the 5th and 4th centuries bc,
Chapter 1â•…Sagacity in Governanceâ•… 9
there was an astonishing development of real democracy, extending to some extent right down to the poorest citizens; this was a good example of exceptional political factors operating in such a way as to counter-balance economic forces (Ste Croix, 1981: 97). This did not appear to have created any significant tensions within the economy, for they were all active participants in the assembly of the polis. It was participatory democracy that provided the safety valve.3
From Agriculture to Trade The Greek settlements, unlike the Phoenician ones, were founded mainly for agriculture rather than commerce, but the Greek polity actively encouraged traders and other economic agents associated with food grain imports, simply to pre-empt any rural unrest. This trade in food grain, and the fact that agriculture was not very profitable, prompted the large land owners to turn to cash crops like olives. As their incomes grew, this class wanted metals, slaves and other luxuries that had to be imported from all over the world. The aristocratic class that controlled the Athenian polity came to depend on foreign traders to maintain their lifestyle.4 The foreigners or metics were excluded from agriculture and from credit relations based on land, but they developed their own way of dealing with money and credit. It was out of this part of the society of foreign merchants that cities like Athens developed the commercial tradition that made it possible for her to enter the broader world of Mediterranean commerce (Curtin, 1984: 75–76). Fernand Braudel compares this development with what took place in Holland in the 17th century:
♦
♦
10â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
(Holland) embarked on a golden age only when it started to
import Baltic grain in large quantities. This is why grain trade was revolutionary: it modified the structures of the Greek economy and subsequently those of society. Even a great ‘feudal lord’, as Louis Gernet would say, would become a markets. (Braudel, 2001: 232)
♦
♦
‘gentleman farmer’, watching commodity prices on foreign
Pragmatic Attitude towards Trade How is it that there was a radical transformation in the outlook towards trade, given the cultural antipathy against any kind of commercial calling? In Plato’s ‘Ideal State’, the merchant stood degraded in status, with property qualifications so fixed that he could never rise in influence within the Greek political hierarchy. Trade was kept at a distance from the citizen community and the propertied class, but it had to be allowed to be carried on by alien professional merchants and traders. The richer landowners played a crucial role in changing the outlook of the polity towards trade and in ensuring that there were no disruptions in trade routes and the economic agents, despite being foreigners, could run their business smoothly. A hard-core pragmatic attitude came to govern the policy towards traders. Most of the historical evidence in this regard comes from Athens, where foreigners were the mainstay of trade and industry; they were the source of what Marx would call ‘merchant capital’. Though politically degraded, these metics were given several institutional safeguards——their private contracts were honoured, they were immune from reprisal in the case of unpaid debts or unsettled disputes and their persons and goods were protected. It may not be unrealistic to conclude that
Chapter 1â•…Sagacity in Governanceâ•… 11
the merchants who conducted foreign trade belonged to an ‘international merchant class’—trading from place to place wherever they saw an opening, without concerning themselves entirely or even mainly, with the trade of the state in which they had citizenship or domicile (Reed, 2003: 33). The Greeks also pampered the foreign traders—with prominent seats at the theatre, meals at the public cost, priority in the business of law courts—so that they should come ‘not for gain but for honours, and as to friends’. In the 4th century bc, Athens developed facilities such as lodging houses, hotels and market places for foreign traders (Finley, 1966: 161). Plutarch (ad 46–120) says that, even as early as in the 6th century, Solon offered foreigners’ full citizenship rights if they came to Athens to ply their craft. Diodorus, a Greek historian of the 1st century bc, tells us that Themistocles (524–459 bc), the Athenian politician and general, prevailed upon the Athenians to abolish the tax on metics in order that they may immigrate in larger numbers from all parts and increase and extend Athenian manufacture. There was very little trace of xenophobia (CAH V: 298). State intervention in economic affairs was directed at steps to facilitate trade and ensure efficiency and integrity of transactions— enforcing the laws of contract, establishing standard weights and measures and building roads and harbours. The foreign policy was also oriented towards sustaining trade and economic prosperity. A network of nearly a thousand Greek settlements came up along the Mediterranean Coast, politically emancipated from their mother city but forming a loose confederation. The polity’s outlook towards these settlements was guided by the need to ensure steady supplies of grain. These settlements, usually established in thinly-populated territory, were controlled by agriculturists, with a few notable exceptions. In 477 bc, Athens masterminded the setting-up of a league of
12â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
states, the so-called Delian League, as a defensive and offensive alliance against Persia. Although the members had equal voice in the league’s council, none could possibly match the power of Athens, which used the league to further her own interests. Since Athens controlled the sea, she could not only secure her own supplies of food and other necessities but also those of the weaker powers to enforce her imperial supremacy. In later periods of European history, war has been the means of fostering trade; in ancient Greece it served to bring in tribute for distribution among its citizens, who were thus enabled to approach their ideal of economic independence. The Athenian Empire was a conservative and even defensive one with its main purpose being the control over trade routes. Despite the seizure of territories, there was no ruthless exploitation of resources on the scale shown by later trading states such as Venice. Athens never built up sizeable reserves and a single siege could soak up three years’ worth of tribute (Freeman, 1999: 213).
Monetisation and Banking One of the major factors responsible for the rapid growth of trade and business was the progressive monetisation of the economy and development of banking which gave the Greek economy a sophisticated financial infrastructure as it emerged out of the Dark Ages from the 7th to 5th centuries bc (Mitchell, 1957: 313). This happened throughout the Mediterranean, and expanded with the military conquests of Alexander during the Macedonian Period (Davies, 1994: 81–86). Many regard this development as one of the most durable contributions of the Greek polity (Peacock, 2006). Coins as means of exchange came into universal use during the Classical Period in Greece.5 The ‘owls’ first coined by
Chapter 1â•…Sagacity in Governanceâ•… 13
Peisistratus in 546 bc and stamped with the Athenian Emblem became famous throughout the ancient world. This acquired a ‘fiduciary character’—as a means of payment, coins were not weighed but counted. Also, like today’s money, its issuer, the state, stamped it; the stamp served as a sign of the coin’s redeemability. Acceptability came to be enshrined in law mandatorily; not only would the state accept payment in coin, such payments had to be made in coin. The availability of silver from the Laurian mines led to the striking of coinage throughout the Greek lands. The accelerated use of fiduciary coins had important social, economic and political consequences. The fact that various things could be exchanged with and measured with money created a pervasive psychology for its unlimited accumulation, a psychology that one does not find in the Homeric Period. Aristotle attributes to money-making the notion that wealth and prosperity have no limit. In a marked contrast to the Homeric Period, several literary works of the Classical Period are replete with references to the role of money in political power struggles and military exploits. The Athenian banks were proficient in the use of credit, (Cohen, 1992: 14) with bankers enjoying high esteem and credibility. They had wide networks of relationships and handled considerable sums of money. As in modern times, banks went out to help political leaders, to ransom friends and to aid military operations. Even foreign bankers found their place among the Athenian elite and established households of their own. As the borrowers were of high political and social status, routinely seeking and obtaining substantial loans, sometimes even without pledging assets, it is clear that the banks were not pawn shops, as many economic historians seem to think, but were a social and economic force.
14â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
All this would not have been possible without the polity’s positive but non-interfering role. Financial arrangements were subject to no control other than that of market conditions: commerce in Athens was never an affair of the state. Unregulated by oligopolistic or governmental controls, Athenian bankers were free to vary the conduct of their operations, to commingle bank and individual funds and to engage in speculative investments. The government did not proscribe or mandate any activity; nor were there any government charters permitting specific activities or limiting competition. Athenian law seems to have mandated the primacy of the contractual arrangements.
Economic Surplus from Slavery Athens’ economic prosperity was based on a unique socioeconomic structure: a class divide between citizen and slave or serf, in which the labour power of the slaves powered the polity’s prosperity. There is no escaping the sheer scale and the degree to which the Greek society was dependent on slavery; free labour was almost unknown. The idea of exploiting slave labour was an integral part of the classical Greek mindset and management of slave labour was the key to economic prosperity. Slaves accounted for nearly a third of the population of Athens. Slaves were found in every area of society, from the police force and workshops to estates and individual households (Ponting, 2000). But while Athens had nearly a 100,000 slaves, they enjoyed a status quite different from the common sense of the term. In banking, economic considerations provided the slave with a stature comparable with his business obligations. The Greek legal system was very accommodative to business needs,
Chapter 1â•…Sagacity in Governanceâ•… 15
including recognition of slaves’ responsibility for their own business debts, court appearance of slaves and so on. Like ordinary male citizens, many slaves could work in the public world of community and commerce without affronting social values. By contrast, even wealthy female citizens were restricted to the private sphere of the household. Slaves could even live and work away from the family residence. At Athens, slave craftsmen employed in the construction trades are known to have received wages in money; a group of nine or 10 slave leather workers are reported to have operated a workshop. The slave in charge paid their master a fixed sum of their obols per day, and the other slaves paid two obols.6 Milyas, who was responsible for the manufacturing businesses left by Demosthenes’ (384–322 bc) father, is said to have been entitled to keep the profits while paying the heirs a fixed sum. Meidas and his two sons ran a perfumery; their master received an accounting only monthly. The Laurian silver mines, on the strength of which Athens built her naval fleet and her monetised economy, were operated by large teams of slaves (Davies, 1994: 71–72). Mining underpinned the prosperity of Athens, making it partly a slave economy. In 431 bc, when the Peloponnesian War broke out, Sparta struck at this underpinning with a clever strategy: it set up a fortified base at Decelea, near Athens, to which slaves could flee. About 20,000 did so and this was considered by Thucydides to be a major blow to Athens’ economy. Demosthenes’ speeches give an insight into how the affluence of the trading class got built up. Many slaves though totally cut-off from the land and living in a rootless world, emerged as the ‘organisation men’ of the Athenian world. Phormion, Demosthenes’ client, had been a banker and a slave of Pasion, the former owner of the firm, who again had been the slave of two former owners (Burn, 1963: 323). Pasion began as a slave
16â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
of a banking firm but rose to eclipse his former masters and became the most famous and wealthy of Greek bankers, whom the Athenian polity rewarded with citizenship. Pasion directed the largest shield factory in Greece, at Athens, and owned ships, farms and a number of houses in Africa. He also conducted an embryonic hire-purchase business, lending domestic articles such as clothes, blankets, silver bowls, and so forth, for a lucrative fee. Some bankers such as Pythius were also foreigners. Pythius operated throughout western Asia Minor at the beginning of the 5th century bc and was said to have become a multi-millionaire. The earliest banker in Greece proper was Philostephanus of Corinth, who prospered in the first half of the 5th century. Among his many important customers was Themistocles (Davies, 1994: 70–73). Most slaves came from the well-organised slave-trade rather than from defeated enemies.7 They were from diverse areas and spoke diverse languages. In relation to slaves, citizens did not have to defend their position against any organised class consciousness. Citizen-slave dimension of class was not symmetrical: citizens were organised, slaves were not.8 Struggle was presumably continuous, but covert. It does not enter the historical record, despite its significance for life (Mann, 1986: 219). Sagacity and foresight were the hallmarks of the Athenian polity during the Classical Period. Solon’s reforms helped to crystallize a political community of free men based upon fairly diffused land ownership and access to political rights by the whole citizen body (Ste. Croix, 1981: 260). At the same time, her wise approach towards trade and other commercial activities laid the foundation of her economic prosperity and military efficiency. It was the free and fairly substantial peasantry in Greece that produced the armies of hoplites, the heavily-armed foot soldiers who frustrated the might of the Persian Empire
Chapter 1â•…Sagacity in Governanceâ•… 17
at Marathon and Plataea (490 and 479 bc). The Greeks could defeat the Persian fleets in a few decisive engagements because of the indomitable fighting spirit of their sailors and marines; this spirit was inseparably bound up with the polis. As we discuss in the next chapter, the irresistible military power of Rome in her great days was similarly founded upon a free peasantry, at first conscripted, then, especially during the Principate, furnishing recruits in large measures voluntarily to a standing army. Ironically, the democratic institutions that helped the Athenian polity support her economic development failed to help her retain her hegemony. It was Philip, King of Macedon, who coordinated and combined mercenaries and Macedonians, rewarded them with booty and entered into a pan-Hellenic upper-class alliance (Ellis, 1976). Macedonians turned the Constitution of Athens into an oligarchy, limiting the exercise of political rights by its citizens. The Greek cities were never again fully autonomous. The spirit of democracy had been partly broken before the end of the 4th century bc, and its institutions had been gradually stamped out by the combined efforts of the Greek propertied class. The Greek propertied class, with the assistance of their Macedonian overlords, gradually undermined Greek democracy. In Byzantium, writers from at least the early 5th century onwards, use the word demokratia to denote ‘mob violence’, ‘riot’ and ‘insurrection’. The democracy which revived in the moderneworld was something new, and owes little direct y to the Greek demokratia. But by the very name it bears, it pays a silent but well deserved tribute to its ancient predecessor.
Notes 1. While there is no agreement on the cause of collapse, there are a variety of theories ranging from invasion by the Dorians (the descendants of Heracles in the later Greek myth) to a climate change of catastrophic proportions.
18â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
2. Solon divided the citizen body into four classes according to the amount of produce that their land would yield. There were the producers of 500 bushels, of 300 bushels and 200 bushels, and the remainder called the thetes. Status was defined according to the contribution to community. 3. The thetes were not entitled to hold office, but they could speak in the assembly. Thetes at first formed the basis of the Athenian galley, with their influence in the Assembly growing as a result of their naval contribution. Aristotle noticed how the development of large galleys had led to rule by a ‘mob of oarsmen’. 4. ‘From Cyrene sylphium stalks and oxhides, from the Hellespont tunny and salt-fish, from Italy salt and ribs of beef… Syracuse offers port and cheese… from Egypt sailcloth and raw materials for ropes, from Syria frankincense. Fair Crete sends cypress wood for the gods, Libya plentiful ivory to buy, and Rhodes raisins and figs sweet as dreams; from Euboea come pears and big apples; slaves from Phrygia, mercenaries from Arcadia. Pagasae provides slaves with or without tattoos, and the Paphlagonians dates that come from Zeus and shiny almonds… Phoenicia supplies the fruit of datepalm and fine wheat-flour, Carthage rugs and cushions of many colours.’ (Mock-heroic dactyls from a comedy produced by the Hermippus in the 420s, quoted by M. Ostwald in his essay). 5. Though coins made of electrum, a mixture of gold and silver, appeared for the first time in about 685
bc
in Lydia, extensive use of coins started
in Athens, with silver mined from the Laurian ores. In the 6th century, Peisistratus used silver to hire troops to install himself and consolidate his regime. He also may have paid in coinage the workers on the building programme he had undertaken. 6. In ancient Greece, one silver obol was equivalent to 12 copper chalkoi (this was the smallest monetary unit), six obols were equivalent to one silver drachma (the main central standard monetary unit) and three drachmae could be exchanged for one silver slater. 7. Historians differ on this issue. Finley downplays internal wars and piracy as sources of supply and argues that after 600 bc most slaves in Greece were non-Greeks from the Danube Basin, the Black Sea region and Asia Minor. A large persistent demand for slaves used to provide steady work for slavetraders, some of whom combine slave-trade with other trades such as grain and timber. For the outlines of this controversy, see (Reed, 2003: 20–23).
Chapter 1â•…Sagacity in Governanceâ•… 19
8. There is an exception to this: the territorial imperialism of the Spartans who enslaved the adjacent population of Messenia and Laconia and had to face perpetual rebellion from them as they were capable of unity. This seems to have been also true of another serf people, the Penessati, who were enslaved by the Thessalians. The counter-strategy by many city-states was to recruit slave from diverse people to prevent any kind of organisation among them. This was also the strategy adopted by the Romans.
Chapter 2
Governance Culture: Roman Mirror
T
â•… The history of the Roman Republic and Empire, west and east, spans over 22 centuries, from 753 bc to ad 1453. A part of that immense period, from around 300 bc to the early 5th century bc, covers the rise and fall of the Western Roman Republic. Rome developed around 500 bc in Etruria as a small city-state and emerged as a Republic displacing the Etruscan Republic. It fought battles every year over the immediate area around the city and established its hegemony south of the Po Valley after her victory at the Battle of Sentinum in 295 bc. Having gained full control of southern Italy, she stepped out to involve herself with the outside world, ousting Carthage from her control of Sicily, and later conquering Sardinia and Corsica. Then followed a series of wars with Macedonia and later on with Carthage; by the middle of the 2nd century bc, Rome had gained full control of almost the whole of the Mediterranean. The Republic presided over the city’s growth from provincial obscurity to mastery of the whole Mediterranean. The process began with the election of the ruling consuls in 509 bc, ending 478 years later when Octavius established the first imperial dynasty. Territorial expansion reached its peak during the early stages of the imperial rule. The Age of Antonines (ad 86–161) 20
Chapter 2â•… Governance Cultureâ•… 21
described by Gibbon as the Golden Age of the Roman Empire, stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Euphrates and from the Carpathians to the Sahara, and was one of universal peace and widespread well-being. Peace, security and order provided the ideal conditions for economic growth. Peace and security was ensured by a disciplined army that owed its dominance as much to its training as to a strong and sophisticated economy, an impressive infrastructure of roads and harbours, access to sea routes across the Mediterranean and good logistics. Yet this empire, built on seemingly unshakeable foundations, started disintegrating within two centuries of reaching its peak. The Western Roman regime lasted for several centuries mainly because of its legions—the legion was not merely a military organisation, but a core institution around which the political regime could mobilize economic, political and for a time, ideological commitments. The Roman state could not keep the army large and disciplined enough to engage with the Germanic tribes and drive them away. This failure of the Western Roman regime was prima facie a crisis in resource raising, with deep historical roots. During the rise and fall of the Western Roman Empire, there were shifts in the relationship between the polity (the user of resources) and the resource providers (agriculture, trade and commerce). The early Republic’s growth was based on the resources raised from the farming community. The polity established its legitimacy and credibility by looking after the resource providers. But the equitable resource-raising policy had completely disintegrated by the late imperial phase. The crisis of resources that Rome experienced was fundamentally a crisis in political governance: the polity failed to keep an equitable balance between the different sections of resource providers within the citizen community.1
22â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
Early Republican Phase Conventional accounts attribute the early Roman success to the greater cohesion and commitment of its farmer-soldiers as compared with the oligarchical traders and mercenaries of Carthage—a kind of partial replay of Greece versus Persia and Phoenicia. The army was formed with peasant farmers and reflected its social structure. Every soldier provided his own arms and equipment, which meant that every soldier had a farm or other property enabling him to acquire his outfit. The landless poor did not fight. The citizenry’s contribution to the army, graded according to wealth of the citizen, was equitable.2 There was thus a shared sense of ethnic involvement in the early years of the Republic (Hopkins, 1978: 30).3 Though there is scrappy evidence, the lower orders must have been largely satisfied with the leadership of the nobility and the rewards to be won under their command. Land acquired by conquest was used to satisfy the economic aspirations of the lower orders; they stood behind the patricians, as was evident from the fact that the Gallic sack of Rome in 390 bc had little effect either on the internal development of Rome or on the process of conquest. When the land acquired as a result of the capture of Veii (just across the Tiber) was distributed to Rome’s poor, an enormous new reserve of peasant soldiers was formed (Crawford, 1978: 26). In the early Roman Period, there was some commitment towards providing farmers with enough land for their sustenance. Pliny (ad 23–79) tells us all the people were given a plot of land of seven iugera each (the Roman measure of area equivalent to about 1.75 hectares or the area that could be circumscribed by two oxen in one day). The leadership emerging from the struggle of the orders gave Rome the strength and stability that enabled her to direct her energies towards military expansion.
Chapter 2â•… Governance Cultureâ•… 23
But increased militarism with its longer wars started creating serious distortions. As the senators became richer, the peasant class was becoming more impoverished. The historian Livy (bc 59–ad 17) tells us that, about 400 bc, when the soldiers were kept under arms throughout the year for the war with Veii, they returned to lands that had lain uncultivated. The same plight must have befallen the farmer-soldiers who spent six weary years in Spain in the 2nd century, those who fought in the Hannibalic War and those caught up in the civil wars later (Brunt, 1971: 16–17). The progressive impoverishment of the peasantry enabled the wealthier people to acquire agricultural land in a massive way. Outright land grabbing by the powerful, whether as a result of direct appropriation or of foreclosure, is a process that must have gone on throughout antiquity, except in Greek democracies, where the poor man could obtain effective protection from the courts of law (Croix, 1981: 225). On some occasions, when soldiers without land were finally disbanded, as when Sulla in 82 bc disbanded 23 of his legions, the problem was enormous: Sulla had to resettle nearly 100,000 troops. By about 25 bc, nearly 250,000 soldiers had been given land but most of them lost their land to the elite through sale or use of force (Ponting, 2000: 244). As society’s stratification widened, so did differentials in the army. About the 2nd century bc, centurions got twice as much booty as ordinary soldiers, but in the 1st century bc, under Pompey, they were getting 20 times as much and senior officers 500 times as much. Regular pay disparities widened, centurions receiving five times as much as soldiers, 19 by the end of the Republic and 16–60 times as much during the reign of Augustus (Mann, 1986: 255). The governing senatorial class was not affected: its pre-eminence was in fact enhanced by the changes taking place in the political structure of the Roman Empire.
24â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
Rome at Her Peak: Deteriorating Governance Culture Territorial expansion through incessant military exploits brought out a radical transformation in the outlook and character of the governing class and its relationship with the masses. First, the ruling patrician class, which derived its power primarily from private property in land holdings, gained enormously from the fruits of the state’s conquests. The wealth of the Mediterranean that was pouring into Italy was in the hands of the generals, themselves drawn from members of the senatorial order who held magistracies. While some of the wealth was distributed among lower orders, much ended up in the hands of the governing elite. The administration of conquered provinces generated even more liquid wealth that flowed into the hands of the elite: the governors, quaestors and other magistrates, all drawn from the senatorial order and the tax farmers and army contractors, usually from the equestrian order.4 Second, despite the enormous wealth which poured into the treasury in the 2nd century, enabling the Senate to suspend the tributum for the propertied classes in 167 bc, nothing was done for the lower classes. Under the leadership of a few public spirited senators, Roman politics started polarising around two factions in the Senate: the Optimates, the people whose only interest lay in wealth and the senatorial class and the Populares, the champions of the depressed members, the citizenry. The Populares demanded the redistribution of land to dispossessed peasants who now flooded into Rome, as well as a reform of the voting procedure. Tiberius Gracchus, elected Tribune in 133 bc, proposed a land bill that would effectively divide the land, with individual limits, but this was far too revolutionary for the Senate. The factional struggle erupted into a Civil
Chapter 2â•… Governance Cultureâ•… 25
War and the Senate had Tiberius assassinated and 300 of his followers killed. The programme of Tiberius was taken up by his brother Gaius Tiberius. In 122 bc, much against the will of the Senate, he introduced subsidised grains for sections of the urban plebs. He also built storehouses and kept citizens at work with a road-building programme. The Senate would have nothing of it, and it declared martial law. In the riots that followed, 3,000 of the Populares were killed, and Gaius himself was beheaded (Crawford, 1978). Later, the Christian Church would play a big role in accentuating the rich-poor divide. From the time of Constantine (ad 274–337), the Christian Church had begun accumulating endowments in land and had to maintain an ever-increasing number of full-time stipendiary clergy to look after these properties. By the 6th century, the bishops and clergy had become far more numerous than the administrative officers and civil servants of the empire. Some rich senators and bishops had vast revenues. Even the humblest common soldiers, lower civil servants, the lesser clergy and the monks were often substantially better off than the peasantry. Third, the wealth acquired by the senatorial oligarchy was enormous by any standards.5 The rich oligarchy—thanks to the armature of influence, patterns of dependence, network of family connections and structure of obligations that it had been assiduously cultivating over decades—developed an autonomous structure of power, in many ways, a rival to the authority of the state itself. To a great extent, this was facilitated by the fact that officialdom occupied a very minor place in life. The state had just a handful of agents so it was not possible for it to reach out to all people and the rich oligarchy was able to extend its influence among the lower classes. Private power came to be joined with the public power. While the power originated in
26â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
the palace, the ruling oligarchy helped maintain it throughout the empire, but the concentration of power in its hands proved dysfunctional and led to the disintegration of the state authority itself (MacMullen, 1988: 120). Fourth, the parallel authority entrenched itself through a web of venality and the spread of venality isolated the emperor; a substantial part of his authority was being sold independently by his servants. It was an utterly different world in which Marcus Aurelius (ad 161–80) had made himself accessible to his subjects, receiving those who approached him and preventing any guardsman around him from frightening away anyone whom they encountered. Fifth, emperor’s edicts aimed at forcing the rich oligarchy to attend to the affairs of civil society went unheeded. Senators rolling in wealth could spare little time for governance. During the late empire, the quality of governance became despicably low. The Greek historian Olympiodorus6 declared that ‘each of the great houses of Rome had in itself everything that a moderatesized town would be likely to possess—a hippodrome, forums, temples, fountains and numerous baths’. Sunk in leisure and frivolity, they were unworthy of their great traditions. The laws enforced by Valentinian I (ad 364–75), one of the most rigorous of emperors, had little impact on their behaviour. The law of ad 364 required the governors to pay more attention to the serious business of his office than to the pursuit of popularity by attending shows and entertainment. This had to be followed by another law in ad 369 reminding the governors of their duty to live in their official residences rather than pleasant retreats elsewhere; citizens who entertained governors on their private estates faced the prospect of confiscation (Matthews, 1990). A consul of the late imperial times enjoyed, as Gibbon remarked, ‘the undisturbed contemplation of his own dignity’.
Chapter 2â•… Governance Cultureâ•… 27
Sixth, the senators allied themselves with the business class in search of more wealth. It did not take long for the senators to set aside the traditional distaste for business. This traditional attitude in the early Roman Age is spelt out by Cicero7 in one of his best-known books, On Duty. In it, he condemned all incomes that could only be earned at the cost of public revulsion and dislike, mentioning tax gathering and money lending as examples. He shared with Plato and Aristotle, the opinion that labourers working for money are disreputable. ‘We are likewise to despise’, he goes on, ‘all who retail goods from merchants for prompt sale, for they would make no profits unless they lie abominably’. This aversion went back to the early republican days. Way back in 218 bc, the Roman people had agreed by a plebiscite to prohibit senators and their sons from owning cargo ships that allowed them to engage in foreign trade, and to take government contracts. Later, they were also barred from taking up contracts to collect taxes. As wealth opportunities grew, over the 1st century bc and the 2nd century ad, the Roman economy started becoming more sophisticated. This was particularly marked in the exchange of luxury goods and slaves, with which the state was little involved after the initial conquest. Seaborne trade continued to grow, leveling-off around 200 bc.8 This is also the period when there was a rapid monetisation. As the empire became a single monetary economy, enormous opportunities for generating wealth business and trade were thrown up and the senators, as the governing class, began adding to their riches. While the merchant class living within the margins of the Mediterranean urban society—‘obscure men of limited means’ as Cicero described them—evoked nothing but scorn, the ruling political class had little hesitation in cementing close ties with it.
28â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
The non-senatorial members of the aristocratic families specialised in managing the business of the empire whereas the senatorial class saw risk purely in terms of the capital they invested in buying cargos, building ships and hiring crews. With the growth of business partnerships on the lines of joint stock companies, the activities of this oligarchy spread to many branches of economic life unconnected with public administration, such as foreign trade and house building (Andreau, 1991). The fact that the Republic possessed many income earning assets such as public forests, public aqueducts, a salt monopoly, public fisheries and metal mines but did not have a bureaucracy to operate these assets directly, made the oligarchy a dominating force in economic life as well. The careers of these men were in many ways as public as those of the senators. When their interests were at stake, they could be counted on to browbeat the senators at the voting assemblies. They first began to emerge as a separate force in around the middle of the 2nd century bc, and a number of them founded families from which the political or senatorial class was later recruited. Cicero’s father was one of them. While they stood outside politics, their prominence in society assured them of access to those in whose hands political power reposed.
Reining in the Governing Class: Failure How could the senators acquire this kind of culture when Rome boasted of a strong institutional back up for her republican tradition? Despite the republican origin, Rome evolved during that period into an aristocratic society, where the propertied elite monopolised public offices, as well as political, military and religious ones. A group of families known as patricians, who had
Chapter 2â•… Governance Cultureâ•… 29
existed under the monarchy, succeeded in the early years of the Republic in acquiring both a monopoly of secular and sacred office and almost complete control of the economic resources of the community (Crawford, 1986). During the five centuries of the Republic, the political centre of gravity was more often in the Senate than any where else, especially during the central period from about 300 bc to 130 bc. The consulate did not merely confer power upon its holder and dignity for life; it ennobled a family forever. Within the Senate, the descendants of consular houses, whether patrician or plebeian in origin, regarded the supreme magistracy as their birth right. The Roman voter could seldom be induced to elect any person to the supreme magistracy unless his family’s name was a part of the Republic’s history. By the end of the 2nd century bc, these noble families came to monopolise all the high offices, determining the history of the Republic and giving their names to its epochs (Syme, 1939: 18). They inter-married and shared the competitive ideals to enjoy abundant wealth and control the business of the state. As in its beginning, so in its last generation, the Roman Commonwealth was a name; it was the aristocratic oligarchy that governed the empire, using the family, money and political alliances. Not until the principate was there a separate central bureaucracy, and even then, its capacity to control the upper class administrators was extremely limited. Wealth looted and taxed by the state from conquered peoples was acquired by a decentralised class. Their rights over the surplus were derived from the private property rights guaranteed by the state and administered by a quasi-group of aristocratic jurists. The political structure was ineffective in controlling the activities of the rich oligarchy. With the growth of Rome, there developed a huge gap between the size of the citizen body and the capacity of political institutions for ensuring effective
30â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
participation. Only a tiny proportion of the citizens ever took part in politics, either in voting on legislation or in electing the lower magistrates. The contrast between Rome and in classical Athens is interesting: the popular institution in Athens existed on a different scale, even physically, with the assembly hall being considerably larger than the Roman Comitia Centuriata. In the Roman assembly, citizens voted in 193 ‘centuries’, with power loaded in favour of wealth and age. Although the citizen body increased dramatically, the people had little power to set the agenda and their involvement became almost entirely symbolic. There was thus a stark contradiction between the formal powers of the assembly and the structural framework, which discouraged mass participation. In Rome, the people’s institutions may have been powerful but that does not mean that the people as a whole were also powerful (Mouritsen, 2001: 32–43).
In the Declining Phase As an Empire of conquest,9 the Roman state had been used to meeting public expenses with the spoils won in the wars, apart from the acquisition of treasure, there had been a steady flow of tributes from the different regions. The Roman state achieved success by decentralising power to the provincial aristocracy. This had played, as in many other ancient economies, a strategic role in ensuring flow of treasures to the metropolis; this inflow is comparable in a way to what modern Europe absorbed from the New World. In the absence of forcible extraction of surplus through military exploits, political governance was not oriented in any way to explore the possibilities of economic surplus from wealth generating activities from within its own borders.
Chapter 2â•… Governance Cultureâ•… 31
The normal fiscal revenue consisted of the tributes of the provinces, the 5 per cent tax levied on inheritance and manumission of slaves, the 1 per cent or half per cent tax on commercial transactions, the internal and external customs, the income derived from the working of the mines and the rents on the public lands. While the availability of war booty became restricted, the cost of security went up substantially. The 4th century Roman army contained perhaps as many as 600,000 soldiers, all of whom had to be paid, equipped and supplied. What the state could spend was limited by the amount of cash that was available. The Emperor Hadrian’s attempt (ad 117–38) to consolidate the empire brought this inherent contradiction into sharp focus. Augustus (63 bc–ad 14) had managed to establish three new taxes10 that were quite low as a proportion of the gross product,11 but, together with the tributes from different regions, were adequate for more than two centuries. This state of affairs could have continued had the ruling regime developed a base of willing taxpayers. But it failed to do so, instead giving in to pressure from the rich aristocrats for several exemptions. Since the 1st century bc, inequalities of wealth had increased sharply, and the richer landowning classes, who were also allied with the traders and financiers, wielded considerable influence on the ruling emperors and warded-off attempts to raise resources from them. As a result, the tax base of the western empire shrank just when extra funds were urgently needed; the four-fifth’s tax relief that the imperial government was forced to grant to the provinces of central and southern Italy in 413 ad gives a clear indication of the scale of the loss (Ward-Perkins, 2005: 42). By ad 444, when Valentinian III instituted a new sales tax, matters had reached a parlous state as was evident from the preamble to the law; the emperor acknowledged here the urgent need to boost the strength of the
32â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
army through extra spending, but lamented the current position, where ‘neither for newly recruited troops, nor for the old army, can sufficient supplies be raised from the exhausted taxpayers, to provide food and clothing’ (Ward–Perkins, 2005: 41). The land tax on the poor reached over a third of his gross product by Justinian’s reign and the rent paid by the tenant farmer was, in Egypt, at least half. Poor parents were often driven to infanticide. The sale of new-born infants had become so common that, contrary to the principles of Roman law, it was officially permitted by Diocletian’s day (ad 284–305) and the poor, despite the law, commonly sold or pledged their older children. Cassiodorus12 states that there was a regular market for peasants’ children at a great fair in southern Italy. So ruthless and efficient was the collection of rents and taxes that, however poor the crop, the quantity due to the state and the landlords was carried off to town, and the peasants might be left with little or nothing for their own needs. The condition of the urban poor, though they were much more lightly taxed, was no better (Jones, A.H.M, 1964: 1043–44). The tax raising powers were seriously constrained by the obstructive stance of the aristocratic class, leading many historians to conclude that in the later empire rich landowners’ capacity to resist the central government’s attempts to raise taxes was the rock on which the western empire foundered (Hopkins, 1978). The ruling regime had thus no option but to resort to desperate measures to raise resources and the instrument that came to be deployed with increasing frequency was debasement of coinage leading to severe inflationary pressures, associated with intense social and economic misery. The debasement consisting in the gradual reduction of the silver denarius,13 started under Commodus (ad 180–192), and was practiced to a greater extent under Septimius Severus (ad 193–211) and
Chapter 2â•… Governance Cultureâ•… 33
Caracalla (ad 211–17), reaching its peak on the eve of Diocletian’s coming to power, when the silver content was no more than 5 per cent of the weight. Thereafter, despite a few desperate attempts to restore Augustan standards, debasement became gradually the accepted method by which emperors sought to make ends meet. Occasional reforms were doomed to failure.14 We can now recapitulate the essentials of governance culture as they evolved during the different phases of the rise and fall of the Western Roman Civilisation. The ruling oligarchic regime in the republican era could achieve spectacular military success because the instrument for its territorial expansion was an army of voluntary peasant citizens. In subsequent centuries, the increase of militarism disrupted this delicate governance balance even as the ruling class appropriated substantially the spoils of war. The checks and balances failed to rein in the governing oligarchy. With a possessive and self-centered rich ruling oligarchy, an autonomous power centre emerged, virtually undermining the authority of the state itself. Surplus from military exploits started declining with consolidation of the empire from Hadrian’s time, and extraction of surplus from the impoverished peasant community had reached its limit. The unconcern of the governing class with the grievances of the citizens made the citizens themselves indifferent to any call for public service and collective sacrifice in crises. The tradition of public service among senators and members of the equestrian order that was a remarkable feature in the early republican period became virtually extinct later; rank and wealth associated with office became their obsession. The preoccupation with self-interest had become so pervasive that the only way to secure honest provincial governors, as Marcian cynically declared, was to appoint men who did not wish to serve (Jones, 1964). While the upper classes were proud of being
34â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
Romans and valued Roman Civilisation, their loyalty was of a very passive character. In the face of the barbarian invasions, the propertied class took measures to protect their large estates that they had acquired over centuries and offered protection to tenant cultivators and the slave labour associated with their land. Gradually the church and the monasteries, with their immense possessions worked by tenant farmers and slaves, strengthened an autarchic system. This opened up the move towards selfsufficiency among large estates. Thus was born the main structure of the manorial economy of the Middle Ages, with the large estate-owner emerging as lord and patron, offering protection to those connected with his land, with bondage of loyalty that came to be characterised as serfdom.
Notes 1. Every generation has approached the Roman world differently and has found different things interesting. Shakespeare explored the dilemmas of power in his Roman tragedies. Kipling saw the Roman Empire as a paradigm of the British Raj. The trial of Warren Hastings was, to many, a replay of the celebrated trial of Verres (a notoriously rapacious Roman governor of Sicily) denounced by Cicero. As one surveys the rise and fall of Rome, one cannot but be struck by many uncanny similarities that arise from universality of basic human nature and motives. Today, in the globalising world, as we are confronted with several live issues of political governance and ruling class culture, the Roman past may as well be a mirror to us. The decline and fall of the Roman polity has been the subject of extensive research by historians and sociologists. Edward Gibbon, for example, inspired by the secularist thinking of the 18th century enlightenment, blamed it on the 4th century triumph of Christianity and the spread of monasticism —‘a large portion of public and private wealth was consecrated to the specious demands of charity and devotion; and the soldier’s pay was lavished on the useless multitudes of both sexes, who could only plead the merits of abstinence and chastity’. The evolutionist criteria,
Chapter 2â•… Governance Cultureâ•… 35
strengthened through Darwinism, the great fashion at the end of the 19th century, linked themselves with the ancients’ belief in periodic cycles; for them, civilisations come into being, grow and mature, but when the life cycle is completed, must decline and vanish. In the early 20th century, the fall of Rome tended to be explained in terms of the grand theories of racial degeneration or class conflict. The Marxist version, from Marx himself to Perry Anderson and Ste. Croix, has blamed slavery and the undermining of free peasantry. The ‘bourgeois-democratic’ version represented by M. Rostovtzeff has blamed the state for preventing the emergence of the middle class whereas the ‘bourgeois-industrial’ version has stressed the absence of technical inventiveness. The relative emphasis on the different factors has varied in response to shifts in the dominant intellectual fashions of the day (Bernardi, 1970). 2. The richest class (eventually the equestrian order) provided 18 centuries (a 100 men each) of cavalry; the next class, a 100 centuries of hoplites; the next, 20 centuries of infantry without coats of mail or shields; the next, 20 centuries without greaves; the next, 20 centuries equipped only with spear and javelin; the next, 30 centuries carrying slings were called assidui, because they provided financial assistance to the state. Each century had equal voting rights in the principal popular assembly, the comitia centuriata. 3. The Roman ability to sacrifice was displayed during the prolonged battle of attrition with Carthage. For nearly 200 years, about 13 per cent of citizens were under arms at any one time, and about half served for at least one period of seven years. Rome succeeded in consistently putting greater numbers into the field, replacing her dead and wounded more rapidly than did the Carthagians (Hopkins, 1978: 30 ff). 4. Concerning their activities, we have abundant cynical sources. For example, in the second half of the 2nd century bc, we have this lament: ‘As for me, I need a quaestor or supplier, who will supply me with gold from the state money-bags’. In the 1st century bc came the oft repeated saying that a provincial governor needed to make three fortunes: one to recoup his election expenses, another to bribe the jury at his expected trial for misgovernance and a third, to live off thereafter. Cicero summed it up: ‘one realises finally that everything is for sale’ (Mann, 1986: 268). 5. By any standards, the wealth owned by the senators was enormous. In 160 bc,
Senator Lucius Aemilius Paullus, who had conquered Macedonia, died
worth only 370,000 denarii. Polybus, the Greek historian, reckoned him
36â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
poor for a senator, yet his capital was 900 times that would be required of a legionary (Brunt, 1971: 17). In the next century, the lands of Marcus Crassus, a general and assassin of Caesar, alone were valued at 50,000 denarii; he used to say that no one could be counted rich unless he could maintain an army from his income. Pompey and Caesar were richer still (Ibid.). The income of Pliny (an equestrian administrator, historian and writer on natural phenomena, known as the Elder, to distinguish him from his nephew,
ad
23–79) was about 1,000 times higher than a reasonable es-
timate of income that would provide a decent standard of living, about 1,000 sesterces, a fifth of which is an absolute subsistence level with enough food to live on. His estates generated enough income to support about the fifth of a legion: he could maintain about 2,400 people at the subsistence level. Pliny was not one of the richest senators, but if we take his income as average of the senatorial elite, then the income of the senatorial elite could support about 1.2 million people at subsistence levels or 600,000 soldiers. By the middle of the 2nd century
bc,
the existence of only two classes in
Rome had come to be clearly differentiated—the senatorial class and the mass of the people (Alston, 1998: 217–19). One can do no better that quote from the classic study on Roman Republic by Ronald Syme: The fortunes of the great politicians were gross and scandalous. When the older Balbus died, he was able to bequeath to the populace of Rome a sum as large as Caesar had, 25 denarii a head. But Balbus began as a millionaire in his own right. Agrippa rose out of nothing: he came to own the whole of the peninsula of Gallipoli. Statilius Taurus possessed a variety of properties in Istria, whole armies of slaves at Rome. The successful military man of parsimonious tastes, L. Tarius Rufus, acquired a huge fortune from the bounty of Augustus, which he proceeded to dilapidate by grandiose land speculation in Picenum … Lollius, officially commended for integrity, left millions to his family, not the blameless possession of inherited wealth, but the spoil of the provinces. His grand-daughter, the beautiful Lollia Paulina, paraded like a princess. It was her habit to appear, not merely at state banquets, but on less exacting occasions, draped in all her pearls and little else: her attire was valued at a mere 40 million sesterces. (Syme, 1939: 381)
Chapter 2â•… Governance Cultureâ•… 37
╇ 6. Born at Thebes (Luxor, Egypt). Wrote history of memoirs from 407 to 425. ╇ 7. Cicero (430–106 bc), Roman jurist, orator and philosopher, wrote treatises on law, politics—the best known being On Duty—and rhetoric, and a large number of speeches which he delivered to the Roman Senate. Cicero was a staunch republican and was executed in 43 bc. ╇ 8. Taxes and Trade in the Roman Empire, in Journal of Roman Studies, 70, Quoted in (Mann, 1986: 271). ╇ 9. Seventy per cent of public treasury was spent on the army, for, as militarism was key to the prosperity of the Roman empire, it had to be properly maintained and kept satisfied. The second objective was pacification of people: about 15 per cent of treasury was utilised on corn distribution (bread and circuses). The remaining budget was spent on the maintenance of bureaucracy and senatorial and equestrian administrators. 10. First, a 1 per cent general sales tax; second, the tributum soli, a 1 per cent tax on the assessed value of land, and third, the tributum capitis, a flat rate of poll tax on adults, aged from 14 to 65. 11. Per capita taxes amounted to only 13 HS per person/year, or 28 kg wheat equivalent per person/year (11 per cent of the minimum subsistence level). Since many inhabitants of the empire produced and consumed significantly more than minimum subsistence, the actual rate of taxation was significantly less than 5 per cent. Of course the tax burden was not evenly distributed, and taxes transmitted to the central government were probably less than the total of taxes exacted by greedy and corrupt tax collectors. Peasants however did not see the taxes as low; there is significant evidence that many Egyptian peasants struggled to pay their poll tax in cash by splitting into several instalments (Hopkins, 1978). 12. Cassiodorus (ad 485–585) was a Roman statesman and writer, serving in the administration of Theodoric the Great, king of Ostrogoths. He kept copious records and letterbooks concerning public affairs. 13. For more than half a millennium, from the 3rd century 3rd century
ad,
bc
to the
the Roman monetary system was based on the silver de-
narius, with its fractions quinarius equivalent to half denarius and sestertius equivalent to one-fourth denarius. It became in imperial times the official monetary unit, numus. The state had also a gold coin, aureus, originally 8 g, gradually reduced to 7 g; this coin was equal to 25 denarii. Copper money had only a fractional function. See the section on Roman Finance, from Augustus to Aurelian, 14 bc–ad 275 in (Davies, 1994).
38â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
14. Note the following observation of Ste. Croix: Given that the Roman Empire was to be stabilised and strengthened, without any fundamental change in its nature, it was fortunate indeed in most of its rulers from Diocletian to Theodosius I (284–395). What men could do, within their rights they did. Sometimes they appear in quite a heroic role. But, ironically enough, the very measures they took, necessary as they were if the system was to be maintained, helped to break up the empire, for the increases in the army and civil service involved the extraction of an increased surplus from the already overburdened peasantry. (Croix, 1981)
Chapter 3
Tolerant Ambience: India
S
â•… South Asia is topographically diverse, containing a range of economies which produce an astonishing variety of raw materials and manufactured items. During the 1st millennium bc, there was an increase in traffic and maritime trade across the Indian Ocean. Peninsular India, Sri Lanka and the Maldives were linked into an extensive coastal trading network that used ports along India’s west coast from Gujarat to the Malabar Coast.
Early Trade Contacts This trade led to a dramatic increase1 in the range of contacts among peoples across the ocean between the Middle East, South Asia and South East Asia from at least the 7th century bc. In part, this was due to the establishment of new states and empires, underpinned by large-scale agricultural systems in India and the Mesopotamian heartland of the Middle East. In the 6th century bc, under the Achaemenid Dynasty, the Persians extended the boundaries of the earlier Assyrian Period to incorporate new trade frontiers in Thrace on the eastern fringe of Europe, Anatolia, central Asia and the Indus Valley. During this period, the market places of the Indo-Gangetic plain and Sri Lanka were linked to those of the Middle East by merchants from the Persian heartland and from the Mediterranean. 39
40â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
A complex network of overland and maritime trade routes linked previously isolated parts of India into a greater subcontinental economy, in which the agricultural wealth of the Indo-Gangetic plain and the tropical South and Sri Lanka were linked via the mineral-rich Deccan. In the Indo-Gangetic plain, urban life and long distance trade had flourished during the centuries of Persian power and Greek influence in the west, even as the centre of population and economic activity moved from the Indus Valley to the Ganges Valley. Trade links with the Persian Empire and central Asia were also consolidated during these centuries, as were maritime links with insular South East Asia. Political consolidation in South Asia and the Middle East went hand-in-hand with increasing economic activity and technological innovation (McPherson, 1993: 37). There is a consensus from archaeological findings that the period from the 7th to 5th century bc was a very decisive phase in the development of Indian trade and economy (Kulke and Rothermund, 1998: 49).
Urbanisation With the establishment of republics and kingdoms in northern India by about 600 bc, the details of Indian history began to emerge with greater certainty. From the numerous small tribal kingdoms ( janapada), 16 major ones (mahajanapada) emerged in the 5th century bc (Majumdar, 1951: Chapter 1). The rise of the mahajanapadas was directly connected with the emergence of the early urban centres of the Gangetic plains in the period after 600 bc. These urban centres grew around what had been villages specialising in particular crafts such as pottery, carpentry and cloth-weaving. Among the important indicators of the urban economy’s importance are the punch-marked coins
Chapter 3â•…Tolerant Ambienceâ•… 41
found in the Gangetic cities and the existence of standardised weights from the 5th century bc. Five of the six major cities in the central Gangetic plains were capitals of mahajanapadas: Rajagriha, (Maghada), Varanasi (Kasi), Kausambi (Vatsa) and Champa (Anga) (Kulke and Rothermund, 1998: 50). Growing urbanisation threw up new groups such as merchants and artisans who organised themselves into guilds, with each guild occupying a particular section of the town. The guilds at this stage were not the highly developed mercantile system that they were to become in the early centuries of the Christian Era (Thapar, 1966: Chapter 3). The services they provided were important to the ruling groups, whose aim was to gain access to the profits of trade and to the marketplace as a means of converting the agricultural produce that they gathered as taxes into luxury commodities and precious metals.
The Mauryas With the coming of the Mauryas at the end of the 4th century bc, the political complexity was simplified. Within the first 90 years of the dynasty, by the 3rd century bc, the largely diverse elements of the subcontinent were welded into an empire with an imperial vision that was to dominate the succeeding centuries of Indian political life. Land revenue was organised as the accepted source of revenue whose predictability through efficient collection created a feeling of fiscal security. Kautilya, who may be regarded as the theorist of the system, refers at length to the methods of tax collection and related problems. As in China during the later Han Dynasty (ad 25–220), the state attached great importance to irrigation, making arrangements for measuring and distributing it. Commercial enterprises, particularly in the coastal regions, came under government
42â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
supervision and taxes were collected regularly. But economic activities other than agriculture were never discouraged. Arthasastra, Kautilya’s treatise on statecraft, describes in general terms the trade transacted in the international markets found on the coasts during these times and makes a distinction between internal and external commerce. For external commerce, a focal point was the Pattana, an emporium designated by local rulers as a legal centre for the exchange of goods that arrived by boat or caravan. It was administered by royal officials, coordinated by a supervisor whose chief function was to keep an eye on merchants and artisans so that they did not cheat their customers. The supervisor, who also set a fair price, was subordinate to a ‘commissioner of ports’, who framed regulations for the port town (Hall, 1985: 33). A Chinese record, a Han history text dating from ad 125, describes that profit from trade with the north-west coast of India was tenfold of what could be earned elsewhere, but honest (Ibid.: 36). The Mauryan economy came under considerable stress because of the need for vast revenues to maintain the army and pay the salaries of officials and settlements on newly cleared land. Although it was a flourishing and expanding economy in its early stages, its revenue stream soon became insufficient to sustain the empire. There is evidence that the later Mauryan kings debased the silver coinage, indicating the pressure on normal channels of revenue that was required for the maintenance of the empire (Thapar, 1996: 89). The bureaucracy was organised on the basis of personal loyalty to the king and a change of king meant a realignment of loyalty or a change of officials. This was completely different from what had come to prevail in China. A well organised and formal bureaucratic structure that came to be established there possibly explains the longer survival of the Chinese dynasties during the same period (Ibid.).
Chapter 3â•…Tolerant Ambienceâ•… 43
By 180 bc, the first experiment in imperial government had ended. The future patterns of imperial governments were different. In later periods, officials and landowners became intermediaries between the king and his subjects, with much of the power of the kings delegated to them, making it increasingly difficult to collect revenue to support a vast administrative apparatus.
Extension of Maritime Links Underlying the complex political events, there was one factor that gave continuity and consistency to this period, and that was trade. There was life beyond politics and powerful economic forces created an expanding economic trade network of the Indian Ocean. Indian merchants and seafarers responded to the rise in domestic and foreign interest by establishing communities in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Westward from India, they provided an economic link between great sophisticated civilisations, whereas, eastward from India they provided a link for both economic and cultural interaction between an established civilisation and a range of societies undergoing rapid economic and social change. Throughout South East Asia, societies moving towards the formation of their first urban centers and states were continuously exposed to merchants drawn from the sophisticated civilisation of India. Such merchants were not the vanguard of a great Indian migration into Southeast Asia, but were the precursors of a movement of literate and skilled Indians to ports and royal cities in Southeast Asia in search of profit and employment. In this period, the seas of South East Asia became an extension of the maritime world of the Indian Ocean and not a half
44â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
way house to China.2 (Chinese maritime contact with South East Asia, as distinct from Chinese maritime exploration, was relatively limited until the 10th century ad, and the first substantial external contacts the peoples of South East Asia had, were with India.3) Maritime trade was a significant factor in political life in central and southern India and Sri Lanka. While agriculture was the main prop underpinning all states in South Asia, in parts of the subcontinent and Sri Lanka, maritime trade generated revenue through levies and duties on markets and harbours. New coastal urban centers such as Broach (Barugaza), Cragnanore (Mouziris) and Arikamedu (Podouke) developed during the last centuries of the first millennium bc. The fortunes of these towns depended on maritime trade, not on agricultural and craft activities (McPherson, 1993: 54). The sea links were a stimulus to trade, with local chiefs in South India and South East Asia developing their coastal ports to serve the needs of the international trading community. They generated income from various port cesses and were able to transform this income into political advantage. For instance, a local leader with an income sufficiently higher than that of his fellow chiefs could expand his base by enlisting the support of rival chiefs and their followers. This support could then be used to protect or provision of the port, to police the sea channels against piracy, stabilise the hinterland, guarantee the flow of food to visiting merchants or assure the delivery of local products desired by traders. Followers thus became the facilitators of international trade through direct redistribution of profits (Hall, 1985: 47). In this way, access to the sea and the creation of coastal markets and harbours was one of the determining factors in the formation of many coastal states in India, most particularly along the Malabar, Coromandel and Orissa coasts
Chapter 3â•…Tolerant Ambienceâ•… 45
and in Sri Lanka, where the prosperity of the great state of Anuradhapura was dependent upon trade through the port at Mantai and control of irrigation systems across northern Sri Lanka.
Trade Unifies the Sub-continental Economy Following the decline of the Mauryan Empire in the 2nd century bc, several powerful states emerged in the Deccan, the most notable being that ruled by the Satavahana Dynasty (50 bc–ad 225), which took a keen interest in maritime trade via the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal from ports in the east and west coast of India. (These ports were listed in The Periplus4 and were visited by ships from Egypt and the Persian Gulf). During this period, the early Chola kings (1st to 4th centuries ad) gained access to both the east and the west coasts of the Southern tip of the peninsula. This proved to be remarkably useful, connecting ports on both coasts, the overland route and the sea coasts as well from the east and west, as was the case with Roman trade (Thapar, 1966: 104). The discovery and excavation of the Arikamedu site near Pondicherry on the South Eastern coast of India gives proof of the existence of an expanding maritime trade network connecting east and west. Reaching its zenith during ad 23–96, Arikamedu was an entrepoint, complete with harbour, warehouses and merchant residences (Hall, 1985: 28). For the Tamils, this was the period of evolution from tribal chieftainships to kingdoms and to a more complex politico-economic structure, impacted significantly by the Aryan culture, which brought with it the familiar pattern of hereditary kings, taxation systems and an administrative culture.
46â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
The emergence of Satavahana power, straddling the north-
♦
♦
This absorption of South India into the commercial development of the subcontinent has been recognised by historians as a very significant development towards the formation and functioning of the subcontinent as a single economic unity.
ern Deccan, provided lines of communication between the north and the South, and trade within the subcontinent increased. Roman trade with the east and the west coasts and its concentration in the South helped in ending the isolation of the Southern kingdoms. The word used in the Tamil records for a citizen of the Roman empire is yavana, the iden(Thapar, 1966: 105)
♦
♦
tical world which early Sanskrit sources use for the Greeks.
The whole of India was by now criss-crossed by trade routes, some of which continued further into central Asia and western Asia. Indian traders were establishing trading stations and merchant colonies in places like Kashgar, Yarkand, Khotan, Miran, Kuchi, Qara-shahr and Turfan, remote regions that were opened up not only by Indian merchants but also by Buddhist missionaries (Thapar, 1966: 107). Across the seas also, it was the merchant communities from the South Indian coastal towns who explored the Golden Islands (Java, Sumatra and Bali) to make profits on spices sold to the Romans. Through all the political vicissitudes of the different political dynasties—the Sungas, Satavahanas, Indo-Greeks, Sakas, Kushans, Cheras and Cholas—the merchant continued to grow from strength to strength. We can do no better than give the following quote from the historian Romila Thapar (p. 109) capturing the extensive trading activities that marked this period of Indian civilisation:
The Mauryan empire had opened up the sub-continent by
♦
♦
Chapter 3â•…Tolerant Ambienceâ•… 47
building roads and attempting to develop a uniform system of administration. The occupation of northwest India by nonIndian peoples was advantageous to the merchant, since it led to trade with regions which had as yet been untapped. The Indo-Greek kings encouraged contact with western Asia and the Mediterranean world. The Sakas, Parthians and the Kushans brought central Asia into the orbit of the Indian merchant and this in turn led to trade with China. The Roman demand for spices and similar luxuries took Indian traders to South East Asia and brought Roman traders to Southern and western India. Through all India, the merchant community prospered, as is evident from inscriptions, from their donations and charities, and from the literature of the time. Not surprisingly, the religions supported by the merchants, Buddhism and Jainism, saw their heyday during these centuries. However this is not to suggest that economic activity was limited to trade, or that agriculture had decreased; the latter continbrought those associated with commerce to the fore.
♦
♦
ued to yield revenue. But the boom in mercantile activity had
Religion and Trade Buddhism and Jainism evolved in a period of tremendous economic and intellectual ferment in India. In the Ganges valley, the emergence of cities and the first states, challenges to old forms of religion and social organisation by new elites and newly emerging social groups such as merchants, led to a questioning of traditional beliefs and social organisation. In response to the perceived shortcomings of early Hinduism, new
48â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
philosophies proposed new ideas and means for sustaining intellectual, spiritual and social life, particularly in the urban areas. Within Hinduism there were movements to develop traditional beliefs and practices, but for many the answer was to seek new forms of salvation. The 1st century ad or bc marked a great age of Buddhism in South Asia. Buddhism did not view commercial activity as negatively, as did Hindu tradition. Its spread during this time was tied to the evolution of the new Mahayana Buddhist School, which can be viewed as a response to a dynamic and expanding world—a world intimately connected to commerce. Under the patronage of rich Indian merchants, Buddhist monks who instructed the lay community split with the monks of the Teravada School, who practised religion in the seclusion of monasteries (Hall, 1985: 37). In Buddhist tales ( Jatakas), the pursuit of wealth, as long as it was not accomplished at the expense of others, was not seen as evil but was considered natural to man. Indian Ocean seamen were particularly devoted to Buddha Dipankara, the Calmer of the Waters. Jainism spread rapidly among the trading community. The emphasis on non-violence prevented Jains from becoming farmers, since cultivation involved killing of insects and pests; it also excluded crafts endangering the life of other creatures. Trade and commerce were possible occupations and the encouragement of frugality in Jainism coincided with a similar sentiment in commercial activity. The strict limitation of private property enforced by the Jains was interpreted to mean landed property. The Jains specialised in conducting the exchange of manufactured goods and acting as middlemen, confining themselves to financial transactions. Thus, Jainism came to be associated with the spread of urban culture. The west coast provided maritime commerce, with the Jains playing money-lenders while others voyaged overseas with the merchandise.
Chapter 3â•…Tolerant Ambienceâ•… 49
Gupta Dynasty After the collapse of the Mauryan Empire and throughout the period from 200 bc to ad 200, India was politically fragmented till the rise of the Gupta Empire which dominated northern India between about ad 320 and ad 550. This was always a powerful state because of its control over important mineral resources, especially iron, and its ability to dominate the key trade routes along the valley, especially those to northwest India and thereafter into central Asia. Indian ships were now regularly traversing the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean and China Seas. Guilds continued as the major institution in the manufacture of goods and in commercial enterprise. They remained almost autonomous in their internal organisation, the government respecting their laws (Thapar, 1966: 147). The laws were generally drafted by a larger body, the corporation of guilds, of which each guild was a member. The Buddhist Church or the Sangha was by now rich enough to participate in commercial activities. The close association of Buddhism with the mercantile community must have encouraged the Sangha to invest in commerce. In certain cases, the Sangha acted as a banker and loaned money on interest (Ibid.). Jainism remained unchanged and continued to be supported by the merchant communities of western India. The Guptas faced a similar crisis in resources as the Mauryas. The maintenance of an imperial façade must have resulted in a pressure on the economy. The later Gupta coinage indicates an economic crisis. Revenue came mainly from the land, commercial activities no longer providing as large an income as they had done earlier. Roman trade declined after the 3rd century ad and with the Hun Invasion of the Roman Empire, it came to an end. Indian merchants meanwhile had begun to rely more heavily on the South East Asian trade. The commercial prosperity of the
50â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
Gupta era was the concluding phase of the economic momentum which began in the preceding period (Thapar, 1966: 147). With the passing of the power and influence of the Guptas and their immediate successors in northern India, the centre of interest shifts Southwards again to the western Deccan and even further South to Tamilnadu. The Pallava Period in South India saw the culmination of what had been a gradual process of assimilation of Aryan institutions. Since there were no large areas under cultivation on a scale as vast as in the Ganges plain, the Pallavas and the Chalukyas had a limited income from land. Mercantile activity had not developed sufficiently to make a substantial contribution to the economy. Nonetheless, the Pallavas maintained a navy to assist in the maritime trade with South East Asia, where by now there were three major kingdoms: Kambuja (Cambodia), Champa (Annam) and Shrivijay (the Southern Malay Peninsula and Sumatra) which were in close contact with India, with South Indian merchants in particular travelling out in search of trade. On the west coast, the initiative in the trade with the Occident was gradually passing into the hands of the foreign traders settled along the coast, mainly the Arabs. Indian traders were becoming suppliers of goods to foreign countries, and communication with the West became indirect, via the Arabs and limited to trade alone. With South East Asia, the continuity of cultural contacts increased, with Pallava architectural styles and Tamil script extensively used among the local royalty (Thapar, 1966: 179–80).
A Tradition Set During the centuries immediately preceding and following the beginning of the Christian Era, India set a tradition of unique relationships between polity and the different actors involved in
Chapter 3â•…Tolerant Ambienceâ•… 51
the creation of wealth. Being mainly a land-based region with a long coastal line, the different polities, empires or local rulers, had been always pragmatic in tapping both these sources for their revenue needs. Principles and methods of land revenue collection were clearly set out and institutionalised. The traditions set in this regard by the Mauryan and Gupta dynasties were followed by the polities in the successive centuries. Autonomy of trade was respected and foreign merchants given safeguards. Trade expanded through a culture of tolerance but never by means of warfare.
Notes 1. It was round about this time that the secrets of the monsoon winds were unravelled in the Indian Ocean. The cycles of the monsoons provided the basic rhythms of long distance voyaging across the Indian Ocean. 2. Once trade along the Silk Road became more dangerous and expensive in the 5th and 6th centuries
ad,
then the sea route to China via South
East Asia became an attraction in itself and the seas of the South East Asia assumed the role of linkage point between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. 3. It was not until the 6th century, under the Sui Dynasty (581–618 ad) that the Chinese began to explore the South China Sea systematically, and not until three centuries later that they became a major maritime mercantile force in the area. 4. The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea is an Egyptian Romano-Greek merchants’ guide to the western Indian Ocean compiled between
ad
40 and 75 by an
anonymous sailor who had actually made the voyage from Rome to the ports of western India.
Chapter 4
Resource Raising: Uniqueness of China
I
â•… Imperial dynasts through history have been generally skilled in the use of war in state formation and maintenance. Empires were not created by the cultivation of virtue, any cultural orientation to political order or ideological pleas for ethnic unity; they were created by decades of war and political strife.1 Chinese history was, among other things, a long struggle to attain—and recurring to regain—political unity; the classic cycle as for a strong man to win control of all China by military means and to pass his leadership on to his eldest son. The vigour of the founding emperor and often the consolidating successes of his son, established a pattern of dynastic institutions that stabilised the nation and perpetuated peace and prosperity for generations after them. In setting up new institutions and strengthening the existing ones, Chinese rulers had to address two basic issues of governance. One—and this was a recurrent issue—the tension between the centralisation of authority and the forces of regional autonomy. There was nothing like the feudal European nobility, who, at least originally, owed their king military service (Lorge, 2005: 2). What Chinese dynasts did better than any south Asian, Middle Eastern or (would be) European conquerors was to 52
Chapter 4â•…Resource Raisingâ•… 53
centralise the control of military means under a single ruler, shutting out local strongmen. To do this, the dynasts had to have, at their command instruments of organised violence that could be applied towards political goals. The targets of violence were almost exclusively the power elite. Second, the logistics of resource-raising for supporting military ambitions demanded a high order of governance. The main wealth-generating sector that the empire could draw upon was agriculture. Commerce as a powerful wealth-generating sector was left virtually untapped because of a mix of cultural inhibition and a fear that it could develop into an autonomous power centre. However, successive dynasties remained far too pre-occupied with their military ventures to ensure that their bureaucratic institutions were delivering what was expected of them and a series of disastrous socio-economic events affecting the peasant community would invariably weaken the central authority towards the end of each cycle. Domestic rebels or invaders from the north fragmented the state and sparked chaotic civil wars. Eventually one contender would put down all others and establish a successor dynasty. This chapter discusses how two dynasties, stretching for about 1,200 years beginning with the rise of the first empire in 221 bc (roughly from the later phase of Republican Rome to the fall of the Roman Empire and the rise and decline of the Arab Empire) struggled to extract surplus from agriculture and commerce. Though they failed to keep a balance between the resources required for their military ventures and the resources that could be raised from agriculture and commerce, their policies brought about certain fundamental institutional changes that had a permanent impact.
54â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
Society and Economy The first empire came to be formally proclaimed in 221 bc, with King Zeng unifying the former Zhou kingdoms (giving it the name of Qin) and embarking on a series of changes that were to set the character of the Chinese society. Early agricultural villages and communities of the central plain of China, around the Wei and Yellow rivers, had by then evolved into a complex civilisation. The process of evolution over the previous millennium or so was remarkably similar to that elsewhere in the world—growing appropriation of agricultural surplus by a religious, military and power elite that was capable of mobilising and directing the rest of society. In the regions brought under control, the first empire broke the power of indigenous aristocracies by removing the peasants from their communities and setting them up as individual farmers. A free peasantry that owed taxes and military service to the state became the foundation of the empire, the source of the state’s money and manpower.2 Although large estates and landlords survived, China developed in a completely different way from south-west Asia, the Mediterranean and Europe. Most land was privately owned and could be freely transferred. By the 2nd century bc, property rights were firmly established (Ponting, 2000: 19). China became a country of free peasants working independently on their own land and with a high degree of mobility. At no time did the Chinese peasants become serfs bound to the land and to their owners who could sell them as happened in Europe. China had also emerged as a highly dynamic society and economy. The first great Chinese historian, Ssu-ma-Ch’en, gives this picture of the Chinese state and economy:
There must be farmers to produce food, men to extract the
♦
♦
Chapter 4â•…Resource Raisingâ•… 55
wealth of mountains and marshes, artisans to produce these things, and merchants to circulate them. There is no need to wait for government orders; each man will play his part, doing his best to get what he desires. So cheap goods will go where they fetch more, expensive goods will make men search for cheap ones. When all work willingly at their trades, just as water flows ceaselessly down hill day and night, things will appear unsought and people will produce them without being with nature. (Quoted by Ponting, 2000: 199)
♦
♦
asked. For clearly this accords with the way and is in keeping
Written about 2,000 years before Adam Smith, it is a description of a market economy: the metaphor of water flowing is like Smith’s ‘invisible hand’. Amid a multitude of prevailing views and ideas, the first ruler, to rid the country of all alternative viewpoints, came down firmly on the side of the legalists, who believed that a society had to be governed by strong laws and a clear system of rewards and punishment. The ruler had to be absolute and his subordinates and officials must have their functions defined through objectives and binding rules. Other intellectual pursuits were of no value to him. Confucius (551–479 bc) and other scholars of his day, living in a period of dynastic decline and disorder, were concerned primarily with the means by which societal stability and order could be restored; the ideas of Confucius collected by his disciples called for a return to past structures and practices of ideal governance: ethical behaviour and a strict observance of traditional rules and ceremonies. Another school of Taoism (whose philosophy is derived from statements ascribed to Lao Tzu, an older contemporary of Confucius) asserted that the key
56â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
to all meaning was to be found in the workings of the natural world; its aim was simplicity, a closeness to the rhythm of natural life and a concentration of direct experience rather than thought or the written word. These intellectual duels of the time form an important philosophical base for the next 2,000 years of Chinese ideas about society and nature.
Surplus from Land The state was proactive in the creation of facilities like irrigation that would improve farm productivity. From the later Han times, (ad 25–220) large valley-irrigation schemes were brought under the control of state officials. The canal network, especially the Great Canal linking the Yangtze and Hwang Ho Rivers, was built and administered by the state. Flood defense systems were often extensive, and were built and maintained by the state. These state interventions, managed by a bureaucracy concerned with tolls and taxes, enlarged the resource raising capacity of the state from land and waterways (Mann, 1986: 95). But exclusive reliance on land had its limitations. Improvements in military techniques, particularly the introduction of the crossbow and mounted archery, increased the cost of warfare substantially (Elvin, 1973: 27). The conscription of peasants for training and service for establishing military colonies for dealing with frontier defenses and the financing of the imperial administration could not go on indefinitely: they were left exhausted and this affected farming. Food production was becoming inadequate for the subsistence needs of the population. The pressure of taxation on the independent peasants became extremely heavy following the expansionary policy adopted during the reign of Emperor Wu of the Han (140–85 bc).3 They were driven to seek the protection of patrons, the owners of
Chapter 4â•…Resource Raisingâ•… 57
huge properties, as they were able to resist most of the demands made on them by local government authority. (The phenomenon of latifundia or landed estates arose in Rome under more or less similar circumstances.) These problems faced by the empire in extracting surplus from the land without affecting the morale of the peasantry forced it to look for surplus from other wealth-generating activities. From a remarkably early time, the Chinese traded on some basis with the other developing peoples of continental east Asia. Money became a significant factor in the expanding Chinese economy. By the late Zhou years (770–256 bc), money was the basis on which large-scale interregional commerce developed. During the Han Period, China had developed increasing maritime and overland trade with India and Roman Orient. The caravan route across central Asia came to be known as the ‘Silk Route’.
Surplus from Commerce Commerce flourished in these times in spite of, not because of, government policies. The combination of Confucian and Legalistic attitudes that served as the dominant state ideology throughout the early imperial age was overwhelmingly anticommercial. To Confucians, the profit motive of merchant life corroded personal morality and impeded social harmony. To Legalists, mercantile activities were basically non-productive, if not counter-productive, did not increase state wealth and power and drained into private hands the economic surpluses that the state should rightfully control. Governments of the early imperial age therefore considered private commerce something to be watched with care, discouraged and suppressed, if it thrived too flagrantly (Hucker, 1975: 187). The Han rulers were distrustful
58â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
of independent merchants. Although a unified polity existed in the rhetorical sense, the ruler was always concerned about the fragmentation of the empire. Commercial networks operated independently; they did not get involved with any political ties in their dealings with other kingdoms and states in South Asia, Europe or the Middle East. They associated themselves with dynasties and concepts of transcendent ‘Chineseness’, but this did not prevent the majority of them from abandoning one dynasty for another and placing their own interests above their government’s (Lorge, 2005: 182). From the beginning of the early imperial age, merchants came to be subjected to heavy direct and indirect taxes. New taxes were imposed on business and on the strings of copper cash held by the merchants. Violators were thrown into prison or had their property impounded. In this way merchants of the middle grade and above were ruined. By the end of the 2nd century bc, the state had itself become the largest landowner (Elvin). (Something similar had happened in Rome with the confiscation of the Julio-Claudian emperors in the 1st century ad.) On many special occasions, wealthy merchants were called upon to make large contributions to the state coffers. During the 2nd century bc, in the reign of Han Wu-ti, the laws were enforced so stringently that the imperial treasury was enriched and the merchant class all but ruined (Hucker, 1975: 189). Second, in a more fundamental manifestation of antimercantile attitudes, merchants were barred from certain money-making ventures including shipyards, armories and armament works, military equipment and weapons. Salt, iron and wine became state monopolies to shut out the merchant class from some of the main avenues of wealth. Third, the empire imposed controls on trade. One was a granary system intended to stabilise supplies and prices of market
Chapter 4â•…Resource Raisingâ•… 59
commodities, particularly grain, by buying up surplus whenever available and releasing them when market supply was inadequate, making private speculation unprofitable. The public outrage against flagrant profiteering in these products happened to coincide with the state’s need for revenues. The emperor’s fiscal administrators—themselves recruited from the mercantile class despite the dynasty’s prohibitions against merchants holding official positions—brought together isolated precedents from pre-Han experiments into a sophisticated complex of market controls that had no counterparts outside China until state socialism and welfare state practices developed in recent times (Hucker, 1975: 188).
Reliance on Local Oligarchies for War Resources Resource-raising from the commercial class had nearly reached its limit. But while the empire did all it could to help raise agricultural productivity, it had no proactive policy to encourage commerce. On the contrary, the empire did all it could to stifle commerce within the empire. With the peasantry drying up as a source of troops, the later Hans had to rely more or less on voluntary troops recruited locally by the magnate through personal influence. Public land was redistributed among peasants with the aim of creating support bases among small peasants and loyal officials, but a series of famines and a change in the course of Yellow River upset this strategy. At the same time, tax revenues became increasingly difficult to exact from the powerful land holding families. With the connivance of the agricultural officials, they kept evading their obligations to the state. But it is to these magnates that the Han Dynasty had to turn; a coalition
60â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
The houses of the powerful are compounds where several
♦
♦
of magnates under a collateral member of the imperial house (who had formerly been a landowner) rescued the regime. The debt which the Han Dynasty owed to the proprietors of the great estates made it all but impossible for the state to assert its will. These internal developments had a disastrous effect on the defense of the empire, starved as it was of money and manpower. Most of the free peasantry gradually fell into a state of dependency and a quasi-feudal system emerged in which local strongmen controlled most of the economic and military power (Elvin, 1973: 32–33). The classic description of the new social order, at the beginning of the 3rd century ad, as given by Ghung- ch’ang Tung, has been quoted by Mark Elvin (1973: 33):
hundreds of ridgebeams are linked together. Their fertile fields fill the countryside. Their slaves throng in thousands and their military dependents can be counted in tens of thousands. Their boats, carts, and merchants are spread throughout the four quarters. Their stocks of goods held back for speculation fill up the principal cities. Their great mansions cannot contain their precious stones and treasures. The upland valleys cannot hold their horses, cattle, sheep and swine. Their elegant Singing girls and courtesans are lined up in their deep halls.
♦
♦
apartments are full of seductive lads and lovely concubines.
An obvious and important parallel with the roughly contemporary appearance of a similar class in Rome. From these independent economic bases, emerged generals who became virtual war-lords. Eventually a power sharing arrangement emerged among three generals who commanded the north, Sichuan and south, with each region becoming a common
Chapter 4â•…Resource Raisingâ•… 61
focus of power throughout China’s history. This era, known as the Three Kingdoms, among whom there was constant warfare, was followed by another called the Six Dynasties (ad 222–589). During this time not only was China seriously divided internally, but it also faced an increased military threat from northern nomadic peoples whom it had earlier conquered. Defeated and incorporated at times into the Chinese military system, these tribes were quick to perceive the weaknesses of the Northern Kingdom, and by ad 316 they over-ran it. In response, the south became more militarised under local defense family groups, the most powerful of which attempted to rule a ‘Southern Kingdom’ from Nanjing. The great Han Dynasty, representing the early flowering of Chinese civilisation, proved unable to adjust to the structural changes and emergent centers of power that its own development had fostered (Borthwick, 1992: 29).
Rise of the Tang Dynasty Unlike what happened in the Imperial Rome where decay of the empire began to accelerate, China began to reconstitute itself as a resurgent and unified society. The ‘barbarians’ who had invaded the northern region were gradually absorbed into Chinese culture and little was left to distinguish them from it. By ad 589, during the reign of Emperor Wen of the Sui, a general of mixed ‘barbarian’ and Chinese blood, China had become re-unified under a single administration, the process taking almost two-and-a-half centuries. Wen made a remarkable contribution to social cohesiveness and started building a fortification system, providing the successor Tangs with most of the institutional foundation for their supremely successful dynasty.
62â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
…long period of Sino-barbarian synthesis [that brought with
♦
♦
The Tang Dynasty (ad 618–907) was to last for nearly three centuries, marking the beginning, as Mark Elvin observes:
it] institutions in the equitable field system and the divisional militia which were designed to de-feudalise society, in the sense of ending the fragmentation of authority, controlling the of free peasant small holders. (Elvin, 1973: 54)
♦
♦
aristocracy and replacing the great estates with communities
The period from ad 626 to 683 marks the greatest period of military expansion in Chinese history; the regime was successful in the conduct and prosecution of war as the free peasantry was the backbone of the army. The Tang modelled their system on that of the Northern Zhou (who had militia units defending the frontier) and extended it to the whole empire, mobilising the peasants as required. In the first Tang Period, the tenure system was the equalfield system that was continued down from the Sui Period. Big estates were divided into plots and linked to the tax systems, which was assessed not on land via the landlord but on the individual peasant, again reinforcing the cause of a free peasantry. The exact area given to each peasant varied according to intensity of agriculture. This was possible because a highly efficient bureaucracy was in place4 to carry out an exact census of population and survey the productivity of land. The peasant had to pay three taxes—tsu on cereals, tiao on silk and hemp and yung or labour for the state. The problem with this taxation system was that the property rights of the gentry and officials were less restricted than that of the peasantry. The gentry acquired its property either as a gift from an emperor (in which case it was hereditary and tax-free) or as a benefice, tax-free as well together
Chapter 4â•…Resource Raisingâ•… 63
with the office (Eisenstadt, 1969: 37). Also, the equal holdings system broke down because of administrative faults and the rapacity of officials who wanted to extend their own ownership and privileges and so were lukewarm to enforce laws limiting their own privileges. The level of exemptions for the aristocracy, bureaucracy and religious institutions meant that the bulk of the burden fell on the peasantry (Ponting, 2000: 318). In consequence, in the 8th century, peasants started leaving their land and migrating from province to province. The government made several attempts to restore their control over population registration and disposal of lands, but the process of migration was irreversible (Smith, 1976: 9). The breakdown of the household registration system and equitable field arrangements led to the disappearance of the divisional militia that was drawn from the peasantry. Sometime around ad 674, the militia-men lost their immunity from taxation and the creation of new forces of palace guards reduced their social status. In consequence, important persons who were liable for enrolment acquired forged ordination certificates and passed themselves off as Buddhist monks or Taoist priests. Sometimes they paid heavily for substitutes to take their places. The militia lost elite character, and most militia-men came to be listed as mercenaries. With the formal winding up of the whole system in ad 749, there was a rapid growth of frontier armies under personal commanders, putting the central government in a vulnerable position.5 China entered into a resource raising crisis as the state struggled with its more powerful subjects over the revenues required for the conduct and prosecution of war. Many of the poor peasants who had managed to cling on to their lands were now forced, either by economic pressures or by the desire for the protection of a powerful patron, to accept a subordinate
64â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
Our institutions have now become ineffective and confused.
♦
♦
position as a tenant of a local landlord. Thus anyone with money or power could build up estates for himself; great landholdings became a normal feature of rural society (Smith, 1976: 8–12). Towards the end of the 8th century ad, the famous statesman Lu Chih wrote:
The drawing of boundaries between landholdings has fallen into decay. ... There are no longer limits placed on the holdings of land. ...The poor do not have enough land to stand dependents. (Elvin, 1973: 67)
♦
♦
on, but depend on the powerful, serving them as their private
The weakening of the central authority had an unintended impact: commerce grew and became progressively acceptable to the government. With the fragmentation and dispersal of political authority among the Tang provinces, their capitals grew into regional metropolises, with a great concentration of officials and with a high level of commercial activity. Chinese settlements in the south, which had gone on steadily during the Hun Period, were now accelerated by a great number of refugees, both dispossessed peasants looking for land and members of the official classes and wealthy members of great families who fled to the south with their retainers and clients in search of a new territorial base. The great city of Yangchow, where the canal joined the Yangtze, became the commercial metropolis of the South and other cities also boomed. Unlike the vast capital cities of the former times, they were not predominantly administrative centers, although each was in fact a provincial capital. They were primarily commercial cities at the centre of a network of trade and commerce that spread out through the country towns, with their official markets, to the ever-increasing number of small
Chapter 4â•…Resource Raisingâ•… 65
rural market centers and periodical markets into which China was broken up. Until Tang times, there had been very few urban settlements, but now they grew up great numbers. While villages were dependent on local administrative centers, they also became a part of an economic district centered on a local market town. These units proved remarkably long lived. The repressive measures on commercial community by which the successive earlier regimes had attempted to control the merchants now broke down. In the capital cities, old enclosed markets and walls could no longer be maintained. The government’s attitude that merchants were a potential source of mischief changed to a realisation that they were a source of revenue (Twitchett, 1973: 14). In the years following An Lu-shan’s rebellion (ad 755), the government had adopted the monopoly of salt production as a major source of revenue. By strictly controlling salt production and selling salt to merchant distributors with the addition of a high surcharge on the costs of production, the government was able to collect tax indirectly, through merchants, even from the provinces, where its authority was at best nominal. The policy led on to attempts by government to monopolise or control directly a wide variety of profitable trades and industries. Salt, wine, tea, alum and building timber were all at one time or other subject to such government intervention. In later times, mining was also placed frequently under government monopoly or control. The government also began to devise taxes for deriving revenue from the wealthy commercial community, which under the old tax and labour service system had escaped very lightly. Ad valorem taxes on sales, transit taxes and percentage levies on all transactions became important sources of revenue. At the same time, the merchant community began to develop institutions and an identity of its own. The existing associations
66â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
of merchants dealing in the same trade and interacting with the local authorities had little power. But these associations gradually became more and more powerful. Although they came to play an important part in the organisation of urban life, they remained politically powerless. No Chinese government ever granted the guild any charter or freedom. It was used as an agent of government, to collect taxes and help regulate trade. But it was accorded no privileges in return. A new sophisticated urban class grew up, without any sense of egalitarianism that made it blind to the rot that had set in. Wealth and political privilege remained the monopolies of a small group of estate-owning lineages or clans. The Tang Empire split up in ad 906. North of the Yangtze, five dynasties came and went. To its south, separate states were formed. China seemed to be taking a direction taken by western Europe after the fall of the Rome— but there was a difference. By this point in China’s history, its preceding achievements in culture, governance and technology stood like a mountain absorbing the force of a storm. Within a few short decades, chaos subsided, and the Chinese Empire was largely reunited under the stable, relatively gentle, centralised authority of the Sung Dynasty (ad 960–1280).
Notes 1. Chronology of the major dynasties in Chinese history: Zhou, 1122–256 bc;
Han, 202
bc–ad
220–280; Chin, Sui
ad
ad
9; Later Han,
ad
25–220; Three Kingdoms Era,
226–316; Era of North-South Division,
518–618; T’ang
ad
960–1127; Southern Sung
618–907; Five Dynasties ad
1368–1644; Ch’ing (Manchu)
1127–1279; Yüan ad
ad
ad
ad
316–589;
907–979; Sung
ad
1264–1368; Ming
ad
ad
1644–1912; Republic of Chiba,
ad
1912–
1949; People’s Republic of China 1949–(Hucker, Appendix A, 434–35). 2. Every peasant family had to pay four taxes. A land tax paid at a very low level of one-thirtieth of the notional crop, a poll tax paid by men and
Chapter 4â•…Resource Raisingâ•… 67
women, a property tax (instituted in 142
bc)
levied at 1.2 per cent of all
property and all trading profits and a tax for exemption from military duty (Ponting, 2000: 234). All taxes had to be paid in cash. 3. In the north and north east, Manchuria came under occupation in 128 bc, in three years thereafter, most of the Korean Peninsula was conquered and the north, together with the eastern coast, was controlled for the next 400 years. To settle in these regions, the Han operated a system of state sponsored colonisation (Borthwick, 1992). 4. The Sui had already established, though on a limited scale, a system of state examination based on a curriculum consisting largely of Confucian learning. The Tang greatly expanded the system and began increasingly to use the examinations as a means of recruiting an elite within the bureaucracy. One of the major aims of this system of recruitment was to offset the dominance that aristocratic families exercised in the imperial court (Twitchett, 1973: 7). 5. From the beginning of the Tang dynasty there were cases of Turkish chieftains surrendering to the Tang and becoming generals in its armies. With the formal abolition in ad 737 of the practice of sending militiamen on tours of duty and the enlistment of permanent frontier armies in the Chinese defence forces, the frontier armies became very numerous. At first the overall command of these armies was kept in Chinese hands, but in ad
742 An Lu-shan was given an independent command in southern
Manchuria and in ad 747 the emperor was persuaded to adopt a deliberate policy of using non-Chinese as Military Governors on grounds that they were better soldiers and had no political ambitions or factional connections at court. It was this disastrous policy more than anything else that set the stage for rebellion by An Lu-shan. This was the beginning of chronic militarism in late Tang China (Pulleyblank et al. 1976: 33–60; Smith, 1976).
Chapter 5
An Intimidating Colossus: The Arab Miracle
I
â•… If the ancient world was dominated by the Greeks, Romans, Indians and the Chinese, the Middle Ages were dominated by the Arabs. They made a part of the world map—most of the Middle East and the whole of north Africa—indelibly their own. Most of the people living in this region today speak Arabic and call themselves Arab in one sense or another. At its peak in the second half of the first millennium, the Arab Empire stretched from Spain to China and was twice as large as the Roman Empire had been; through trade and cultural expansion, the Arabs carried their Muslim faith far beyond their borders, into the heart of Asia, down into the South Eastern tip of Malaysia and into the islands of Indonesia. If we look at the sweep of history covering the great civilisations of the world, the Arab Empire served as the bridge between classical antiquity and the European Renaissance. What made it all happen? How could a group of Arabs with no skills, experience or tradition of institutional governance succeed in creating an empire in just over a hundred years? Was it the messianic vision to spread the new religion beyond the homeland, or was it an odyssey to search for material opportunities beyond their desert? Whatever may have motivated them, they displayed a pragmatic grasp of ground realities as conquerors. 68
Chapter 5â•…An Intimidating Colossusâ•… 69
Beginnings At the time when the Arab Muslims were appearing on the scene, the Middle East was divided between the two great empires of Byzantium and Persia, which had been at odds with each other for three centuries. The series of wars in the first quarter of the 7th century ended in a Byzantine victory, with both parties exhausted and weakened: the Persians by feudal disintegration and the Byzantine Empire by strife between the Eastern churches. The Arabs, setting their sights on the countries of the Fertile Crescent—Mesopotamia, Syria and Egypt—embarked on their great campaign of conquest, a new stage in a series of migratory movements by Arab tribes.1 The leaders of the first group of invaders, the Qurayshites from Mecca, were not out to propagate the new religion. By profession, they were traders of the southern ports of Yemen and Oman as well as the masters of the caravan trade. Expansion of trade was their primary interest; the new religion came in handy as a great unifying and psychological force welding a group of temperamental tribes into a disciplined force. The new religion became the symbol of unity and victory, though the driving force of conquest was worldly rather than religious, the leaders of the troops were men with a perfunctory and utilitarian interest in religion. The armies of Islam started with the Arab element but, over a century from mid-7th to mid-8th, with contingents raised by them from subject peoples, they swept across central Asia, north Africa, Spain and Sicily. Running from the middle of the 7th to the middle of the 11th century was the Golden Age of the Muslim World. Over this span of 300 years (ad 642–969), two political regimes held sway successively over the vast empire. The political governance structure under both was a kind of loose federation
70â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
of disparate regimes held together by religion and economic interests. The Arab Umayyad tribe quickly consolidated their territorial gains and established their legitimacy as the ruling class among alien peoples with diverse cultures. But, after about a century, the Umayyads succumbed to mis-governance (ad 661–750), and were displaced by another Arab tribe, the Abbasids, under whose governance Muslim civilisation reached its pinnacle.
Process of Consolidation Umayyad rule was a kind of military occupation by Arab tribal kings superimposed upon the Byzantine and the Persian administration. The Umayyads behaved ‘like the barbarian kings of the western Roman Empire, uneasy settlers in an alien world whose life continued beneath the protection of their power’ (Hourani, 1991: 27). The process of acquiring legitimacy and establishing itself in a completely alien territory, so different culturally, socially and economically, was a remarkable display of political foresight and administrative acumen. An invading force would normally leave behind a trail of destruction with disruptive consequences on civil, political and economic life of the occupied territories. The initial Arab invasion was somewhat of an exception. The conquest did not leave any trail of destruction nor were cities burned down or sacked as a measure of revenge.2 The Arab invaders came to be accepted as liberators for their message of peace and stability and the democratic, egalitarian and the cosmopolitan outlook of the new religion (Ashtor, 1976: 10). There was not much disruption in the lives of the subject peoples. The Armenians, Persians and Egyptians maintained their
Chapter 5â•…An Intimidating Colossusâ•… 71
identities throughout the Arab invasion. Things were allowed to go on as they had before in every sphere and the peoples won over—the Christians, Jews or Persian converts—provided the administrative framework. The first Caliphs felt no need to define principles of governance and the nearest they came to this was indicated by Umar (ad 640): ‘the whole empire was put in trust for the Muslim community, with the Caliph as the trustee’ (Lewis, 1950: 57). In this phase of conquest, the Arabs created an empire and a state and not yet a civilisation. The cities and commercial networks were left unchanged, as were the two main currencies, the dirhem of Sassanid silver and the denarius of Byzantine gold, till the entire currency system was improved and reformed towards the end of the 7th century. The system of financial administration continued as before, run by people drawn from the same groups that had served the previous rulers. In the countryside, the new rulers maintained the systems of irrigation and cultivation which they found there.
The Fall of the Umayyads What brought about the downfall of the Umayyad Dynasty was not its failure to govern the vast territories, but its inability to grapple with the social tensions that sowed the seeds of revolt. The business of running an empire led to the emergence of a new class, the Mawali, who were non-Arab converts to Islam. From the Mawali came the workmen, shopkeepers, merchants and others required to serve the Arab rulers. The division between the dominant caste and the Mawali was more economic and social than racial (Lewis, 1950: 71). The Mawali settlements in the garrison towns very soon outnumbered the Arabs, and developed into a discontented population that understood its
72â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
political and military significance. Their economic grievances found religious expression in a movement known as Shia’ism, defined as opposition to the established Order, the Sunni or orthodox Islamic doctrine. It was a social revolt against the Arab aristocracy and their state. The replacement of the Umayyads by the Abbasids in the leadership of the Islamic community was more than a mere change of dynasty, not the result of any palace conspiracy but the action of successful revolutionary propaganda and organisation. Fundamentally, it was a revolutionary turning point in the history of Islam. With the Abbasids, we enter a more structured form of governance, with legitimacy of the ruling class enunciated, and the hierarchy of power and authority clearly defined. Under the Umayyads the various countries run over by the Arabs had continued to be diverse cultural and economic regions; the Abbasids welded them into a great Muslim Empire. Their tool was a bureaucracy consisting of a hierarchy designed to connect each of the tiny communities of the Middle East to some provincial, regional and ultimately imperial centre. To create this organisation, the Caliphs drew upon the socially powerful and technically skilled families of the realm—the landowning families, the secretarial and administrative dynasties of both the Byzantian and Sassanian ancestor empires, Arab tribal chieftains and Muslim religious leaders (Lapidus, 1984). Abbasid polity and society were vertically organised. Its communities had no ties to each other, but were bound directly to some higher centre of co-ordination. Even when the power of the Caliphate was at its height, its effective role was confined mainly to the cities and the productive areas around them. Ultimately, the Caliphate administration was caught—as the later Chinese were—in the contradictions of centralised bureaucratic systems of government. To rule over his far-flung empires,
Chapter 5â•…An Intimidating Colossusâ•… 73
the caliph had to give his governors the power to collect taxes and use part of the proceeds to maintain a local force. The local governments started building up their own power base, though they remained in principle loyal to the major interests of their suzerain.3 Economically, however, it was a strong and cohesive Muslim Empire, and, by the 9th century, a gigantic economic unit came into being, a unit never before equalled in the old world. The economic ascendancy of the Abbasid Empire over other regions of Asia and Africa, and even more over Western Europe, was overwhelming and it lasted about 200 years. The Abbasids nursed this economic empire, realising the great potential for trade in the conquered territories, the scope for expansion of this trade, the importance of giving merchants the freedom to operate and the benefits to the regime of allowing merchants from different nationalities to trade in its territories. A stark contrast to what was happening in China during the same period.
Orientation towards Trade: Four Positives Trade network and common market Given the fact that there was no significant break in continuity during the period of conquest, trade continued to flourish as before.4 It was a huge common market stretching from central Asia to the Indian Ocean, from the Sudan to the west and the Russian rivers. The centre of this world was in the isthmus bounded by the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, at the intersection of two major economic units: the Indian Ocean area and the Mediterranean area. These two territories, united in Hellenistic times but later split into two rival worlds, the Roman-Byzantine and the
74â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
Parthico-Sassanian, were now reunited by the Muslim conquest into one economic unit. This large unit enjoyed an influx of gold, a plentiful supply of slaves and a network of major trade routes that stretched from China to Spain and from black Africa to central Asia and encouraged tremendous urban expansion. Baghdad and Samarra in the former Sassanid territories, Damascus and Fustat Cairo in the former Byzantine territories and Kairouan, Fez and Cordoba in north Africa and Spain—this vast network linking one town with another formed the material framework of the Muslim world as well as a circuit carrying the main currents of civilisation. This trend to urbanisation was far greater in scope and effect than during the Roman Empire; it ranks equally with the great period of urban development in the Hellenistic area or the growth of cities in western Europe in its early stage of development (Lombard, 1975: Chapter 6). The Islamic economy was not confined to an exchange of finished products through trade; it had developed all the characteristics of an integrated network of manufacturing processes. The Muslims improved methods of production in the industrial enterprises which they had inherited from the former rulers, the Persians and the Byzantines. They developed new branches of old industries and created new ones. The textile industry, as everywhere in the Middle Ages, was most important. Syria and Iraq had been renowned for silk manufactures, Aleppo for cotton garments, Tiberias for carpets and Galilee various kinds of textile fabrics.
Urban centres of consumption This extensive area came to be dotted with centres of urban consumption and bases of growing economic activities. Basra,
Chapter 5â•…An Intimidating Colossusâ•… 75
starting as a collection of military camps after the conquest of Iraq, reached its zenith after the accession of Abbasids at the end of the 8th century. Among the towns founded in the first century of Abbasid rule, Baghdad, the new capital built in 762, was the foremost. Two years later the Caliph al-Mansur founded near ar-Rakka a town that became an important commercial and industrial centre. In 836, al-Mutasim founded Samarra on the Tigris, which replaced Baghdad as the residence of the caliphs for more than half a century. There were also many smaller towns such as Ramla in southern Palestine that became centres of lively trade. The towns in turn attracted people from distant countries. This demographic development that characterised the Muslim world was in sharp contrast to that seen in Europe during the early Middle Ages, when towns mostly disappeared. When the towns grew, the money economy spread into the countryside and this alone made life in the Muslim world very different from that of Medieval Europe.
Unification of the currency system5 The integrated economy of the vast region came to be supported by a unified currency system. In the early days, two coins were in circulation: Sassanid dirhems in the eastern provinces and Byzantine denarii in the western provinces. The Umayyads had continued with these earlier currencies, as, otherwise, the world of trade would have reacted with instinctive mistrust to any sudden innovation in the monetary field. In fact, an attempt at introduction of a Muslim dirhem at Basra in 660 failed, but it succeeded 40 years later. This success was partly due to the imaginative reform6 (carried out by the Caliphate of Umar during ad 634–644 of standardisation of the weight of three
76â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
different systems of silver currencies in vogue and a significant change in the money situation reflecting an upsurge in economic activities. The Muslim area was rich not only in gold but in silver as well. Great quantities of gold, so far hoarded or used in jewellery, were confiscated from the palaces of the Persians kings and nobles and from the tombs of the Pharaohs. The rulers also compelled the Church to hand over their great hoards of gold in Syria and Egypt. To this was added the steady streams of gold arriving from mines in the empire. The major silver bearing areas of the Muslim world were the same as in the ancient world, primarily southern Spain, the ancient Tartesssos region, visited by Phoenicians, the Carthaginians and the Romans. The Muslims activated the mines left inactive after the fall of the Western Roman Empire. A more important group of mines existed in Armenia, northern Iran and central Asia. Also, in the west, there were two major silver bearing zones, the western tip of Spain and central Asia, together with the eastern point of northern Iran. The steady flow of gold and the abundant supplies of silver and to a lesser degree of copper and tin spawned an immense business of coining and minting. The minting of gold became decentralised and took place in all important towns. Quality went hand in hand with quantity, and the dinar, like every dominant currency was minted with extreme care. All this had tremendous consequences for economic life. With so many gold coins put into circulation, the propensity to hoard diminished. But it also led to a steep rise in prices,7 creating opportunities of ever-expanding profits for the merchants and also at a low rate of interest.8 The Muslims created a vigorous monetary economy based on expanding levels of circulation of a stable high-value coinage (the dinar) and the renewed
Chapter 5â•…An Intimidating Colossusâ•… 77
integration of monetary areas that had been distinct and indifferent to each other.
Religious stance The merchants were the prime movers of the new integrated economy. According to an 11th century manual of commerce defining the activities of merchants, a typical merchant was one who strove, everywhere and all the time, and by any and every means, to get money (Rodinson, 1974: 31). The flourishing commercial life of the time was reflected in its thought and literature, where we find the upright merchant held up as an ideal ethical type. The leaders of Muslim expansion were traders even before their conversion, and they had conquered societies in which trade was very highly developed already before conquest. No wonder that the full-fledged religion of Islam came to be pervaded by the spirit and ideas of the rising merchant class. The merchant class attained a social position and self-esteem that it could secure in Europe only much later. Unlike in other civilisations, the merchant class in the Arab world derived great moral strength from Islam. There are religions whose sacred texts discourage economic activity in general, counselling their followers to rely on God to provide them with their daily bread, or more particularly, looking askance at any striving for profit. The Koran looks with favour upon commercial activity, confining itself to condemning fraudulent practices and requiring abstention from trade during certain religious festivals.9 The Koran emphasises that it is proper to combine the practice of religion and material life, carrying on trade even during pilgrimages, and goes so far as to mention commercial profit under the name of ‘God’s bounty’ (Ibid.: 24). Also, the Koran’s ideal did not challenge the right
78â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
of ownership in any form, even though, as is true of all lawgiving, it is possible to deduce restrictions upon the use and abuse of property in certain cases. The right to property is not necessarily incompatible with justice; justice in economic matters means in Koran forbidding a type of gain that is particularly excessive (Rodinson, 1974: 21).10 The Islamic legal system was not codified like the Roman, but provided an element of commonality that was present throughout the Muslim world. The Koran itself contained a good deal of guidance on practical matters. More detailed jurisprudence, precedents, rules of family and property law, codes of social and religious behaviour were incorporated in hadith— records of tradition whose authority derived ultimately from sayings ascribed to the Prophet. Most theologians of this period belonged to the merchant class, as did most of the Muslim juri-consuls. Some of the prohibitions under Muslim law were prima-facie hindrances to development of a free market. For example, in the Koran, there is a specific prohibition of riba, which is interpreted as usury. The general perception is that this prohibition prevented any economic activity of the modern type from occurring among the Muslims. The historical records show that this prohibition had little practical effect as the legal scholars’ devised great practical ingenuity in getting round ence the theoretical prohibitions.11 There nre books of jurisp toaexpound what the Arabs call hiyal, meaning ruses or wiles. What these practices amount to is simply the authorising of loans at interest, provided that some additional legal formalities are observed. This is the conclusion that the scholars have drawn from the study of the law books and is borne out by the consistency between these rules and the merchants’ customs, as borne out by the letters found in the Cairo geniza12 (Goitien, 1968: 218–219).
Chapter 5â•…An Intimidating Colossusâ•… 79
Merchants in Politics In the beginning, the relationship between business and polity was mutually supportive, but, within a century of the establishment of Abbasid regime, the rich mercantile class started to nurse political ambitions. Even earlier, under the Umayyad rule, the Persian gentry had situated itself in prominent positions in caliphal administration. This continued with the first Abbasid caliphs. Rich merchants began to play a conspicuous role in the civic administration, sometimes getting appointed even to the post of vizier. Acquisition of wealth through tax farming was the standard method for raising revenue that prevailed everywhere, in Iraq, Persia, Syria and Egypt. Land tax being the main source of revenue, the tax farming contract included very often the responsibility of managing royal estates. Most tax farmers were wealthy businessmen who had enriched themselves in other fields of economic activity and could afford to shoulder these responsibilities. The lure of profits through tax farming enticed the commanders of the army also to engage in this business. The administration of a province was usually conferred on the person who had farmed its taxes and the job became his stepping stone to a prosperous political life (Ashtor, 1976: 132–38). Tax farmers shared power with the ministers, the heads of administration, who belonged mostly to the class of rich landowners. They would cast their nets wider to engage in profitable commercial ventures. Indeed, this age of flourishing prosperity became an age of endemic corruption in administration.
Disintegration An internal revolt sprung up from the swamps of southern Iraq.13 The rebellion, which lasted till ad 883, had particularly
80â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
disastrous economic consequences for the empire. It put an end to the highly profitable sea trade from India and South East Asia that came up the Persian Gulf to Basra, which had formed the basis for much of the legendary wealth of Bagdad. This maritime trade began to be diverted to the Red Sea and Egypt, where Ahmed ibn Tulun (ad 868–884), a young Turkish officer designated by the Caliph as the governor of Egypt, used the wealth to make Egypt effectively independent of the central government at Bagdad, to which it merely paid tribute. The Caliph, being fully preoccupied with a slave revolt, could do little to prevent Ahmed from consolidating his power in Egypt (Sicker, 2000: 35). Soon, taking advantage of the power vacuum along the Mediterranean littoral, Ahmed ibn Tulun established himself as an overlord, linking Syria, Palestine and Egypt, in a common constellation comparable to that which existed repeatedly in earlier times. Then, in ad 879, a Byzantine army, during the regime of a new and aggressive ruler, Basil I (ad 867–886) swept down from the mountains into the Jazira and laid waste the countryside, re-establishing a Graceo-Roman presence there for the first time in 200 years.
Lapse into Feudalism The loss of revenue from these developments further destabilised the Abbasid state itself, since it now had difficulty in paying the mercenary troops that were critical to its continued viability (Ibid.). From the early 10th century, the control of the Abbasids over the core of the empire in Mesopotamia was minimal. In ad 945, the region was conquered by the Iranian mercenaries, the Byyuids. The rule of this dynasty lasting 110 years marked the beginning of a process by which local landowners, the military and provincial rulers took power and set up their own smaller
Chapter 5â•…An Intimidating Colossusâ•… 81
states opposed to central control from Baghdad. These feudal aristocrats created a new kind of social order in which estates were granted to the army together with the fiscal rights. The princes of this dynasty began to encroach upon the activities of the merchants, who suffered from the extortions of governors and the army. The military engaged in commercial activities and enjoyed the privilege of carrying their merchandise duty free along the roads. The regime instituted monopolies for manufactures such as silk, the manufacture and sale of which had previously been free to everyone (Ashtor, 1976: 177–83). The feudal system as established by the Byyuids came to form the core of Turkish feudalism, and led to the absolute supremacy of the army and the decline of the bourgeoisie14 (We follow it up in Chapter 9).
Business–politics Dynamics The Muslim world, as it evolved in from the 7th to the 11th century, drew its main sustenance from the far-flung trade network spreading from China to the western Mediterranean. Also it demonstrated considerable assimilative and absorptive power. Unlike the Roman world, which had made a sharp distinction between civilisation and barbarism, conversion to Islam was a simpler process than acquisition of Roman citizenship. Thus the new religion managed to bring the Berbers of the Maghreb into its fold, assimilated a large portion of Africa, and absorbed the barbarian Seljuk Turk and Mongol invaders from east Asia. Also, importantly, it had a strong domestic base, with its large urban and semi-urban centres for consumption and flourishing agriculture. The members of the merchant community were more than mere traders; they turned out to be manufacturers as well,
82â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
developing centers of manufacture in several industries, in particular, textiles and glass that were already existing and creating a new industrial base in paper. This vast network of industry and trade, supported by a monetised economy, a stable currency and a sophisticated banking network became by far the predominant driving force of the economy of that period. However we characterise that economy, it was certainly not just some loose ensemble of feudal regimes. Trade was fundamental to its structure. The growth of cities and expanding urban markets, the spread of new crops, and sudden rise in cash crops indicated that the Muslim world, in a sense, had all the structural features of what Max Weber would characterise as a pre-capitalist economy, ahead of the Western world, by about three centuries. Thus, Islam made a powerful contribution to the growth of capitalism in the Mediterranean, in part because it preservedb ti expanded the monetary economy of late a quity and innovated business techniques that became the staple of Mediterranean commerce (in particular, partnerships and commenda agreements), and also because the seaports of the Muslim world became a rich source of the plundered money-capital which largely financed the growth of maritime capitalism in Europe. Indeed, Mandel stated this with unabashed bluntness when he wrote: ‘The accumulation of money capital by the Italian merchants who dominated European economic life from the 11th to the 15th centuries originated directly from the Crusades, an enormous plundering enterprise if ever there was one’ (Mandel, 1968: 103). The history of this empire, through the rise and fall of different dynasties, offers us rich insights into the dynamics of business-polity relationships. As the Umayyad Dynasty was expanding its territorial empire, it allowed business in the acquired territories to continue to operate as before, for it knew that it
Chapter 5â•…An Intimidating Colossusâ•… 83
was the creator of wealth. The successor dynasty, the Abbasids, also understood that the stability and continuity of a political regime cannot be ensured unless business enjoys freedom and autonomy in economic affairs, with some obln rolon, of coums , tos contribute a portion of their wealth for the affairs of the polity. But, as the empire reached its peak, the orientation of political power holders—civil administrators and the military—started changing: wealth became for them an object to be grabbed for personal benefit and not a source of strength to be nursed for the interests of the polity. This led to a complete metamorphosis in business–polity relationships, spelling doom for the empire: a kind of replay, if you like, of the decline and fall of the Western Roman Empire. Strangely, when Europe was emerging out of the shadows of feudalism and moving slowly towards a capitalist regime, the Arab Empire, already in a stage of pre capitalist maturity, went into a reverse direction. It lapsed into feudalism. If the Arab polity had been as sagacious as they were during the early period of their empire and had succeeded in maintaining a proper balance between the two vital interest groups of business and polity, the geo-politics of the region would possibly had taken a different complexion.
Notes 1. Arab tribes had founded principalities before Islam, of which the strongest was the kingdom of Palmyra in the lands of the Fertile Crescent. There was also al-Hira, a principality established with the help of Persian kings as a buffer to defend the Persian dominions against the Byzantines. A similar Arab buffer state was created by Byzantines against Persians, the principality of Ghassanids controlling Hauran, Phoenicia, northern Transjordan and Palestine. Egypt also had numerous Arab peoples long before the Muslim conquests.
84â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
2. The exception was the pillaging of Sassanid palaces for the looting of gold. There were many instances of confiscation of hoarded gold that was used for coinage and put into circulation. 3. The local dynasties that grew up were those of the Saffarids in eastern Iran (ad 867–1495), the Samanids in Khurasan (ad 819–1005), the Tulunids in Egypt (ad 868–905) and the Aghlabids in Tunisia (ad 800–909) (Hourani, 1991: 38). After the breakup of the empire, the centralised rule by the caliphs never revived. The new rulers were successful in giving their subjects security, gave them a stable government and improved their economic situation. 4. The territories that were involved in trade were the most important territories, in economic terms, because of their agricultural, industrial and mining output, their transport and caravan networks. These included countries with the most fertile soils, such as Mesopotamia and Egypt with their oases and long tradition of irrigation and the north African plains, which produced corn and oil. There were also the mining countries, the Caucasian-Armenian group, north Africa and Spain. There were also highly developed craft industries in Iran, Mesopotamia, Syria and Egyptian delta. Shipping was also well developed. 5. This section is mainly drawn from Lombard, Chapter 5 titled ‘Monetary Problems’. 6. The gold currency was based on a single system, the nomisma, but a truly Muslim currency was first created by the striking of a gold dinar at Damascus in 696. Two years later new Muslim silver coins dirhems were minted. From this time onwards these two coins were accepted as the legal Muslim currency, remaining unchanged in the Muslim world for many centuries. This gave the necessary impetus for the striking of silver dirhems on the Muslim pattern in
l the provinces. Thus the Musl
m
dinar and dirhem,
derived from the Byzantine nomisma and the Sassanid drachma, unified the two watertight monetary systems. 7. An Arabic source quotes the Caliph Harun ar-Rasid as saying that in his days the dinar had less value than a dirham in the days of al-Mansur (ad 754–75) (Ashtor, 1976: 86). 8. An interest of 20 per cent was customary at that time in wealthy European towns whereas in the Middle East the rate, till the time of Crusades, was 4–10 per cent on the average (Ibid.).
Chapter 5â•…An Intimidating Colossusâ•… 85
╇ 9. Tradition attributed to the Prophet such statements as ‘In the day of judgment the honest truthful Muslim merchant will take rank with the martyrs of faith’ … ‘The truthful merchant will sit under the shadow of the throne of God on the day of judgment’ … ‘Merchants are the couriers of the world and the trusted servants of God upon earth’ (Lewis, 1950: 91). With commercial activities becoming widespread among all sections of the population after the Abbasid revolution of 750, merchants appeared as the bearer of a culture that considered money as the only real thing of value in the universe. 10. When Muhammad started preaching, there was undoubtedly much talk in Arabia about the communistic experiment that was carried out in the powerful neighbouring empire of Persia. Over two centuries before him, theoreticians had appeared in Iran who preached the abolition of private property through the collectivisation of all goods. To some extent this was accepted by the Persian ruler Kawadh I (ad 448–531), though the full right to property was again restored by Kawadh’s son and successor Anosharwan (ad 531–579). In his precepts Mohammad does not attack private property, though he condemns riches and the rich. 11. However it also seemed to have been the practice that where non-Muslim communities were present in considerable number, the Muslim merchants let them fulfill the function of money lenders operating without any camouflage, praising the trade in credit openly and publicly. In Morocco, Jews, though a small minority, were very willing to relieve the Muslims of the burden of their order. Thus usurious loans became the speciality of the Jews in Morocco and elsewhere, of the Greeks and other foreigners in Egypt, of Hindu merchants in India, just as in Medieval Europe, the Jews and Lombards fulfilled this role or as in China, the bankers of Shansi held from very ancient times a sort of monopoly in this field. Clearly, at the very moment when capitalist practices implying the need for interest were developing, the theologians and religious lawyers took the greatest trouble to theorise about the prohibition of interest, justifying it and also allowing for cases and exceptions. All these books apply the principle that necessity renders legitimate that which is, strictly, speaking, forbidden. This has been followed in all subsequent political regimes, including the Ottoman Empire. As is well known (we will be discussing this in a later chapter) this practice became so widespread that it was taken over, along with its
86â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
Arabic name, by the western Europe and of the Middle Ages (Rodinson, 1974, Chapter 3). 12. Geniza (pronounced Gheneeeza) denotes the store room of a synagogue or any other place in which papers covered with Hebrew letters were discarded. For, according to Jewish belief, which has its parallels in Muslim and Coptic customs, no papers on which the name of God is found should – (old Cairo) be destroyed. So far, only the Genizas of a synagogue in Fustat and of the nearby cemetery of al-Basatin have been found. These two are called by a common designation ‘The Cairo Geniza’. 13. It was a region intersected by numerous canals and exposed to tidal fluctuations, where, in consequence, land gets covered in nitrates, making cultivation impossible. A project for reclamation of land was started by several enterprising businessmen of Basra; this involved removing nitrates from the soil. A large number of negro slaves (called in Arabic Zindj) from east Africa, deployed to work here under inhuman conditions, embraced Islam, developed a consciousness of their rights under the leadership of one al-Mahdi and organised revolt against their exploitation. Within 10 years of their rising, they established themselves in a new town, ‘alMukhtara’, occupied Abbadan, cut off Baghdad’s supplies from the south, captured Basra in 871 and became a state consisting of large parts of Iraq and Khuzistan. 14. European feudalism sprang up from personal dependence and subordination, the Oriental form of feudalism was a means of securing regular payment of the soldiery. The feudal regime in Western Europe was the concomitant of a contracting economy sunk to the lowest ebb of primitive self-sufficient economic units, the feudal regime in this region was established in a period of a highly developed pre-capitalist society.
Part II
The Medieval World: ad 1000–1500
By the beginning of the second millennium ad, maritime trade had started acquiring a long-distance global character, bringing previously isolated peoples into closer contact, from the Mediterranean and African civilisations to Asia. Trade evolved into regular movements of thousands of small vessels carrying everything from luxuries to daily necessities. But it was not trade between nations; merchants and their goods circulated through a generally frictionless ‘archipelago of towns’ in which not only did the units trade with each other and handle transit trade, but they even aligned their internal economies to suit this trade. At one end of the long trading network was China; at the other the Islamic regions of the Mediterranean. In the middle was south India. China, despite its aversion to business in general, had the potential to emerge as the undisputed hegemonic power of the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, but domestic concerns made it withdraw into a shell. At the other end, the Muslim Mediterranean had a strong business base but it failed to fill the vacuum created by China’s withdrawal because its polity became weak and inefficient. That left south India—but the political powers here were not interested in stepping out with military ventures to establish a hegemonic presence. They were content with peaceful trade. At the extreme ends were Japan and northwest Europe, developing into feudal economies. In Japan, the breakup of the monopoly of power held by the court-based aristocracy and central monasteries, and the appearance of new institutions of political authority and land control like the 88
samurai and the shogunates led to the rise of a military aristocracy. In Europe, barbarian kings evolved from tribal leaders into kings controlling the allegiance of magnates who were generally granted land in return for their allegiance; the power of the Church grew, and new arrangements described as feudal emerged. The business–polity partnership that started developing would become the core of what is known as a European hegemony. And this would later invade and occupy the vacuum in the Indian Ocean.
89
Chapter 6
Trade and Politics in the Indian Ocean
T
â•… The Indian Ocean connected a great variety of peoples, cultures and economies, being almost linked to the Mediterranean through the Red Sea, penetrating the central lands of West Asia via the Persian Gulf, washing both shores of the Indian subcontinent and linking up with the South China Sea, beyond which lay the Pacific. The sea routes were linked to over-land trade routes, creating a tight economic relationship. In the 10th and 11th centuries ad, economies throughout Asia expanded markedly and new powers emerged, such as the Cholas in southern India, the Khmers in Angkor, the Burmese at Pagan and the Song in China. These political consolidations stimulated Asia’s maritime commerce and the international traders who travelled the seas connecting eastern and western Asia.1 Before the arrival of the Europeans, the cultures and economies of the Indian Ocean were essentially self-sufficient within the geographical boundaries of the Indian Ocean and were only marginally determined by influences from outside the region (McPherson, 1993: 5).
India: A Strategic Location From the time of the Mauryan Dynasty to the 7th and 8th centuries ad, south India enjoyed remarkable political and 91
92â•… Part IIâ•… The Medieval World
economic stability. Although it had a multitude of contending kingdoms and would-be empires, it was generally free from the wide-ranging wars and invasions that characterised West Asia, north Africa, China and Europe (McPherson, 1993: 89–90). During the first three centuries of the 2nd millennium, south India was the bridge connecting the Mediterranean and West Asia with China.2 The Asian sea trade was sub-divided into three interlocking circuits—the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the South China Sea—each with its distinctive cultural characteristics. The middle circuit connected the south Indian coasts— Malabar on the west and Coromandel on the east—with Sumatra and Malaya on the Strait of Malacca, and with Java and the islands of Indonesia. The eastern-most circuit was Chinese space. Within the three circuits there were several sub systems shared by numerous groups. No single power ever exercised dominance over the entire system; the local hegemonic powers co-existed with each other (Chaudhuri, 1985: 15). On the western coast of India, Gujarati merchants traditionally maintained contacts with ports in the Persian Gulf and along the Arabian Coast. By the early days of Islam, the ports of Cambay and Saymur had already absorbed resident colonies of Arab merchants, some extremely wealthy, as well as sailors from Oman, Basra, Baghdad (Ibid.: 98). The merchants of the Malabar Coast, though of a slightly later vintage, were as wealthy, powerful, astute and foreign as those of Gujarat. In the second half of the 13th century, Samudri Raja (later distorted to Zamorin) came to prominence when Muslim merchants from the Red Sea flocked to his port because the political regime offered them attractive trading terms in return for their political and financial support. The Arabs made Calicut their home, assisted the Samudri Raja in his territorial expansion and drew his support for their commercial ambition. The Chinese watched
Chapter 6â•…Trade and Politics in the Indian Oceanâ•… 93
their long-standing trade in the Arabian Sea shrink in the face of this Arab-Indian combination (Dasgupta, 2001: 5–6). On the eastern plains, the Pallavas, Cholas, Pandyas and eventually even Vijaynagar participated in the great revival of commerce that began in the 8th and 9th centuries. Indian merchants from the Coromandel Coast were journeying actively eastward in the 10th, 11th and 12th centuries. Trading towns had been established in each of the administrative districts of the Pallava kingdom, in which local and long distance trade could be conducted with relative freedom in return for certain taxes to the ruling power. The pattern continued into the Chola era (Hall, 1980: 93). The trading towns were allowed such autonomy because they fetched the royal treasury considerable tax revenues from their vast regional commercial network. By the late 12th century, international traders were calling regularly on the Coromandel ports, to pick up pearls, betel nuts, spices and cotton products from local merchants linked to the hinterland. Tamil civilisation was marked by its first major period of urban growth, and various dynasties lavishly endowed shrines and priests out of piety and for the pragmatic reason of reinforcing their legitimacy. Rulers viewed temples not only as symbols of royal legitimacy, but also as centres of commerce, for most were associated with fairs and marketplaces and were the key to the economic integration of southern India with both land and sea trade routes (McPherson, 1993: 83–84). The Chola rulers took a positive stand on trade because they derived considerable financial benefits from it. State support was not a condition for merchants venturing into foreign trade, but the state came to their assistance wherever it felt it could intervene effectively. Even in such cases, the state did not interfere to acquire centres of raw materials or markets but to remove the obstructions placed by another country on the trade
94â•… Part IIâ•… The Medieval World
(Thapar, 1966: 209). Overseas trade was the strength of the Chola merchants and towns such as Mahabalipuram and Kaveripattinam on the east coast and Quilon on the Malabar Coast controlled the south Indian trade. Trade with China reached an unprecedented volume during these centuries, which led to its becoming a state monopoly in China, the Chinese government not wishing to lose the income from it (Ibid.: 207). With Mongols controlling central Asia, Chinese merchandise destined for western Asia and Europe was carried almost exclusively by sea. The 11th century Tamil traders were organised into commercial corporations supported by the Chola state. The south Indian kingdoms were neither highly centralised nor despotic. Just as the government was not in full control of agricultural production, it was unable to fully exploit the foreign trade that tied its domains to the world market. Local merchant organisations helped administer the Chola ports and also ran the major trade emporia of the hinterlands (Hall, 1980: 165). They also controlled the activities of foreign merchants and their contacts with local commercial networks. During the first few centuries of the 2nd millennium, maritime trade was sufficiently important to prompt various south Asian states to intervene politically when required, but it was in the south and in Sri Lanka that maritime trade and politics intersected to the greatest effect (McPherson, 1993: 88). On the Coromandel and Malabar Coasts, many dynasties and kingdoms, while drawing most of their power from control of agricultural surplus, watched maritime trade closely, even forging state policy by warfare and diplomacy. Rulers otherwise dependent on resources raised through local land-holding intermediaries welcomed the revenues from trade, since such intermediaries were not always willing to give up their surpluses
Chapter 6â•…Trade and Politics in the Indian Oceanâ•… 95
without concessions from the central authorities. Also, an increasing amount of land revenue was going to temples and Brahmins by way of grants, reducing royal revenues further. So the profits of trade helped the rulers chance to decrease their dependency upon subordinates who were to compensate them for their piety (McPherson, 1993: 89). For dynasties such as the Pandyas, Pallavas and Cholas, control of trade routes and ports was vital for political life. South Indian and Sri Lankan dynasties were, on many occasions, engaged, in the interests of trade, in naval campaigns for control of the pearl- and shell-rich Palk Strait, the Gulf of Munnar, at the junction of trade routes between the western and eastern Indian Ocean. Gradually, however, they lost power to the growing strength of the merchant class, who, as the Chola state decayed, became more assertive and formed the nucleus of new centers of political authority (Hall, 1980: 4). Economic power gave the merchant guild a position of political importance that translated into influence at the royal court. The guild leaders ensured that they had a say in taxation and related matters, and very soon their power counterbalanced that of the landowners and officials at the court (Thapar, 1966: 331). The Vijaynagar military-feudal state that succeeded the Cholas in about ad 1350 continued the Chola pattern, obtaining its income from agriculture and trade. The administrative structure had become more stratified and more closely connected with the economy. The pattern was broadly similar to that of northern India and was oriented more towards the extraction of agricultural surplus than to long-distance trade. The new Vijaynagar kingdom had conquered not only the small Muslim sultanates along the coast, but much of the former domain of the Cholas. Vijaynagar lay in the interior of the Deccan plateau and was oriented toward neither agrarian pursuits nor
96â•… Part IIâ•… The Medieval World
international trade. For the first time in south Indian history, the region came to be ruled by a centralised system of feudalism, and the pattern that evolved was broadly in alignment with that of northern India.
North India After the fall of the Gupta Empire in the 6th century ad, India remained politically fragmented. Islam had an impact from the first era of expansion when, in ad 711–713, Arab forces reached Sind. The main impact of Muslims on India did not come until the post-Abbasid military regimes emerged in eastern Iran and Afghanistan. In ad 1030, the Ghaznavids captured Lahore just as they were losing control of their core territory to the Seljuks, and continued to rule the northern part of the Indus Valley and Afghanistan. They were replaced in the 12th century by the Ghurids who began the conquest of north-west India by capturing Peshawar, Lahore and Delhi. In ad 1206 one of their generals, Qutb al-Din Aybek, declared himself independent and founded the Aybek Dynasty, the first of the Delhi Sultanates that were to rule much of India until ad 1526. The Afghan-Turkish elites were very much like the Arabs in early Islam—hostile to conversion and content to rule as military elite with their own special religion (see Chapter 5). The sultanate period was one of great prosperity; it was central to much of east-west Eurasian trade and agriculture, and was highly productive. India and China were then the richest areas of Eurasia (Chandra, 2009). The establishment of a strong centralised empire in north India, a sound currency system and security in communications led to the growth of over-land trade to West and Central Asia as well as overseas trade, mainly from Gujarat. Multan was an important trading centre, linked directly across the Bolan Pass
Chapter 6â•…Trade and Politics in the Indian Oceanâ•… 97
to Kandahar, Herat and Bokhara, which was the junction of the Silk Route from China to Constantinople and Lebanon. Multan was also linked via the Indus to the western sea ports. The trading networks in the Indian Ocean world were complex but cosmopolitan. No one power dominated and none made any attempt to use force to gain trade advantages or control routes. Among the intermediate port-cities along the eastwest trade routes, the most important ports were those of India. The major Indian states were land-based and were usually quite content to let the coastal trading towns be independent and prosperous as long as they provided some revenue in return. Overall, India remained highly prosperous because of its strong agricultural base, the ability of its industries to meet nearly all domestic demand and the generally peaceful and flourishing external trade.
China: Missed Opportunity China was the most extensive and technologically advanced region of the medieval world and, in the 150 years following the foundation of the Song Dynasty (ad 960), China experienced a period of unprecedented economic growth. As in Europe, this prosperity was powered by a revolution in agriculture intensified by industry and long-distance trade. The spread of highyielding wet rice cultivation and guaranteed surpluses of food enabled farmers to cultivate and market a wider range of products. Mark Elvin claims that, by the 13th century, China had the ‘most sophisticated agriculture in the world, India being the only conceivable rival’ (Elvin, 1973: 128). Sustained by a large internal market,3 an effective transportation network through the Hwang Ho and Yangtze Rivers, and the benefits of technological advances in iron and steel, merchants took the sea routes to South East Asia, exporting silk,
98â•… Part IIâ•… The Medieval World
lacquer-ware and some iron and steel in return for spices and other tropical products. China’s prosperity grew on the back of the reactivated Silk Route across Central Asia and the Indian Ocean sea route. Chinese settlements throughout South East Asia boosted private sea trade, which soon overtook the official tributary trade with the region. With the state supporting private sea trade and many Chinese migrating to South East Asia under the Yuan Dynasty (ad 1127–1368), the Chinese trading networks across the southern seas and the Indian Ocean became as extensive as any contemporaneous European network (Arrighi, 2007: 322). China became a formidable power in a gradually integrating world system; the mature combination of agricultural productivity, commercialisation, urbanisation and industrialisation that emerged would flower much later in Europe. Under the southern Song Period (ad 1127–1276), the polity took a pragmatic view on trade: it needed the extra revenues to meet the heavy expenditure on the wars with the Mongols to the north and the weakening of profitable government monopolies in salt, iron and wine production (Borthwick, 1992). Particularly significant was the state’s support for navigation technology; shipbuilders pioneered the use of a compass in navigation and also designed a new ship that could cross turbulent seas at high speed. The Mongol Yuan Dynasty (ad 1277–1368), following the conquest of the southern Song by Kublai Khan, the grandson of Genghis Khan, had adopted and expanded the system of private trade and government finance that, in the late 13th and early 14th centuries, spurred industry and maritime trade. Most foreign trade was private, though under government control and restricted to a few ports. Chinese ships also began to sail into the Indian Ocean as early as Sriviyaya’s decline in the 12th century, but commercial voyages rarely went beyond India.
Chapter 6â•…Trade and Politics in the Indian Oceanâ•… 99
Inward Turn
Why did [China] turn her back, withdraw her fleet and thus
♦
♦
Towards the end of the 14th century, the Ming navy consisted of 3,500 ocean-going ships, including over 1,700 warships, and 500 armed transports for grain. No naval force in the world at that time came close to the formidable armada. The Ming made a bid for maritime dominance for Asian waters; between ad 1405 and ad 1433, the Chinese court sent a series of seven major naval expeditions into the Indian Ocean, not for conquest and plunder but for commerce and trade. Several times, they reached as far as Aden and occasionally passed on to the east African Coast (Curtin, 1984: 135). Suddenly, there was a sharp shift in policy, and the Ming navy under Admiral Cheng Ho withdrew its fleet in ad 1405. In speculating on the consequences of withdrawal, Janet Abu-Lughod makes an interesting observation, one of the ‘Great Ifs’ of history:
leave an enormous vacuum of power that Muslim merchantmen, unbacked by state sea power, were totally unprepared to fill, but which their European counterparts would be more (Abu-Lughod, 1989)
♦
♦
than willing and able to — after a hiatus of some 70 years.
Unwittingly, China ceded to future foreign navies the control of the seas that would one day determine the fate of Asia. It did so perhaps in response to its own domestic priorities: the defence of the north, which meant the completion of the Great Wall. This dynasty’s survival was at stake, and there was no money to fund the maritime expansion (Darwin, 2007: 44). After this inward turn, the ports came to be seen as dens of foreigners and their crass commercial pursuits. China’s rulers
100â•… Part IIâ•… The Medieval World
concentrated on rebuilding the agrarian base and internal production and marketing. In deference to Confucian beliefs, the Ming emperors embraced an agrarian ideology in which land was the true wealth. This dependence on a narrow tax base and the refusal to allow government agencies to engage in trade precipitated a fiscal crisis. By the late 16th century, the model of defense based on an army that paid itself from its own agrarian estates had also broken down, and rural disorder, relatively low during much of the Ming era, had begun rising sharply (Darwin, 2007: 87–88). In the Chinese attitude to merchants, official ideology and popular psychology seemed to reinforce each other. Confucian scholars viewed merchants as parasites and it was virtually impossible for wealthy merchants to gain social status without giving up commercial activities. For the ruling regimes, giving merchants and manufacturers too much power or allowing them to accumulate too much capital was just as bad as allowing a military commander too many armed men. Wealth was contingent on its value to the Court. Confucian officials were always trying to balance one disturbing element (professionalised violence) against another equally disturbing element (professionalised pursuit of profit) (McNeill, 1983: 40). They would relent only when their activities served official ends. To increase revenue, they would sometimes promote overseas trade and even invest government funds in related ventures. ‘The profits from maritime commerce are very great. If properly managed they can be millions. Is it not better than taxing the people?’ (Ibid.: 41). Mercantile prosperity as a source of revenue was fully recognised later by the Yuan Dynasty, which did not share the Confucian disdain for merchants. Indeed, Marco Polo’s reception at Kublai’s court illustrates this fact.
Chapter 6â•…Trade and Politics in the Indian Oceanâ•… 101
But, as has happened so often in the Chinese dynastic cycles, the Ming (ad 1368–1644) reversed this accommodating stance towards merchants and, in ad 1371, banned foreign trade by private persons. Chinese ships could sail to foreign lands under suitable regulation and with official permission. With the reinvigoration of the bureaucratic state under the Ming, there developed a social bifurcation in Chinese elite: a bureaucratic or Mandarin class that controlled the state apparatus, and a wealthy merchant class that had no access to state power. In Medieval Christendom in Europe, business had succeeded by the 15th century in carving out an autonomous path of its own, notwithstanding canonical prohibitions against business as a respectable calling. Also, equally important, it started demonstrating that, given the backing of state power, it could effectively hold its own in a competitive market situation. Unlike their European counterparts, business in China at this period could not use the state to advance their interests. The European states had come to regard control over trade as a critical resource in their pursuit of wealth and power; for China, because of geo-political compulsions, control over trade routes at that period was far less important than peaceful relations with neighbouring states and the integration of their populous domains into an agricultural economy. In a society in which merchants were not accorded as much honour as government functionaries and in which a centralised state set the terms for money and credit, conditions were not conducive for the development of an independent and powerful bourgeoisie. The state was far more penetrative than its Indian and Ottoman peers (Tracy, 1991: 68). By Song and Yuan times, virtually all institutions required to facilitate state and private capitalism were in place: a system to organise production and distribution, a system of
102â•… Part IIâ•… The Medieval World
money and credit and a system to regulate imports and exports (Abu-Lughod, 1989: 331–340). China could have chosen a path to a strong state capitalism or could have actively supported the mercantile community in their trade and settlements abroad. It did neither. It is this insularity of the polity, its failure to exploit trade and industry for the pursuit of power and plenty, as European powers had been striving to do during that period, that created a ‘trap’, as Mark Elvin has argued. Though preindustrial China had reached ‘high level equilibrium’, it did not show any incentive to climb higher.
Muslim Mediterranean The first three centuries of the 2nd millennium were very different from that of the early caliphates, the Umayyads and the Abbasids. That period set the main outlines of Islam and the societies it created. The subsequent period was one of increasing differentiation within the existing framework. With the decline of the Abbasid caliphate, Baghdad no longer dominated the Islamic world.4 Instead there was a multitude of centres—Samarkand, Bukhara, Nishapur, Isphahan, Cairo and Fez. Though the Muslim Mediterranean remained under constant threat of foreign invasions—the Crusades, Mongol invasion from Central Asia and a series of nomadic incursions from the Sahara—it continued to enjoy pronounced prosperity from about ad 970 to 1250. With the gradual disintegration of the Muslim world, a powerful political base emerged in Egypt under the Fatimid Dynasty. The Fatimids had begun as a Berber Dynasty ruling over Tunisia. In ad 969, they conquered Egypt and moved their capital to Cairo, taking away the major province of Baghdad from the Abbasids. In ad 1171, the Fatimids gave way
Chapter 6â•…Trade and Politics in the Indian Oceanâ•… 103
to the Ayyubid Dynasty, and in ad 1250, they, in turn, gave way to Mamluks, the slave soldiers who had made up the major part of the Ayyubid army. The Mamluks ruled over declining Egypt until the Ottoman Turks conquered them in ad 1517. The Fatimid administration was friendly to the merchants and gave free rein to their capitalist tendencies. All sectors of the economic life were free—crafts, industry and trade. The government interfered in the trade in victuals only insofar it had to, for guaranteeing the supply of wheat to the big towns. In the relatively open trade of the Fatimid and Ayyubid periods, Jews and Muslims were part of a single trading community. The Fatimid Empire was organised by a Jewish businessman of outstanding capacity, Ibn Killis, who later adopted Islam and became the first vizier of the new state (Goitein, 1968: 239). Jews were competent in trade, but they were not only traders; they were free to practise any other profession on an equal basis with the Muslims, cutting across religious communities and encouraging practices that were very conducive to a kind of international business culture. For example, the office of wakil al-tujjar served as a legal representative for foreign merchants in much the same way as an English commission agent was to do in the 16th century and later (Curtin, 1984: 113). In Cairo, if a foreign merchant needed to collect a debt, he could apply to a wakil for help. Banking instruments were well developed so that money could be easily transferred without necessarily moving coins from one place to another. A 10th century writer pointed to the fact that a bill of exchange was accepted with greater readiness than an allocation of income from taxes, and then commented, ‘Merchants are more powerful than viziers’ (Goitein, 1968: 239). A rich class of industrialists succeeded, in spite of heavy taxation, in building up new enterprises and conquering new markets for their products. Although the regime maintained royal factories, it abstained from establishing industrial monopolies.
104â•… Part IIâ•… The Medieval World
The connection between commerce and government was particularly evident in the Mediterranean trade, increasingly threatened by European vessels. Arab boats plying in the Mediterranean needed military protection and the owners had to depend on government. On the India route, protection needs were less pressing and merchants ran their show (Abu-Lughod, 1989: 227). The conquest of Iraq by the Mongols had far reaching consequences on the entire Muslim Mediterranean region. One of them was the establishment of Mamluk rule in Egypt and in Syria. The regiments of military slaves who succeeded in expelling the Mongol invaders set up a government of their own, eliminating the civilians. Medieval feudalism received its final shape from the former slaves. The Mamluks, by establishing the economic and political superiority of the military, swept away the last remnants of self administration. The Karimi merchants, who had become very important in the last decades of the 13th and the first few decades of the 14th century, captured most of the spice trade in the Indian Ocean, displacing the small merchants. The Karimis accumulated great wealth as the Mamluks oppressed the small traders with taxes and monopolies. The merchant notables were a rich, powerful and socially honoured class, the wholesalers, brokers, international traders and dealers in luxury goods and intimately linked to the Mamluk state. The Mamluks also invested in commerce, either by employing merchants or forging partnerships with them. The emirs also invested in a wide range of routine commercial activities, possibly taking advantage of their status to avoid market taxes or cover illegal affairs. The merchants also acted as bankers to the regime. The Karimi spice merchants, who controlled the money lending business, could make large loans,
Chapter 6â•…Trade and Politics in the Indian Oceanâ•… 105
not as individuals but as consortia represented by a few of their leading members. The state and sultan’s household gave direct employment to the merchants because of their extensive manufacturing and trading activities. Merchants were also employed in the slave trade. In the Mamluk Empire, while the merchants could not function without state protection and co-operation, the political regime could not dispense with the services of the merchant elites. Trade, apart from international trade and large-scale international wholesaling, remained private and independent, except for taxation. The state went to great lengths to support the merchants in their trading activities, from using diplomacy to providing armed escorts to ships with valuable cargos. The Karimi disappeared in the first decades of the 15th century, and this marked a turning point in the relations between the merchant class and the state. Out went the Karimi heritage of state protection, fiscal supervision, close banking and merchandising relations and a degree of official employment. The status of merchants as an independent class was lowered, and merchants were more fully assimilated into the state (Lapidus, 1984: 126). When incessant warfare began draining the resources of the Mamluk state, it sought to control, absorb and monopolise large chunks of the private economy. The government started to debase the currency in ad 1424. At the same time, it confiscated private sugar plantations and refineries and raised prices to increase the profit margin, but domestic consumption and exports fell. Venetian merchants began to develop competitive sugar production in Crete and Cyprus (Maddison, 2007: 199). In ad 1429, the government banned Egyptian traders from selling imported spices to foreigners until the sultan had completed his transactions. The Karimis moved a significant amount of capital elsewhere, and a state monopoly replaced them (Lapidus, 1984: 126). In the
106â•… Part IIâ•… The Medieval World
traditional Mediterranean form of trading and investment, the commenda, the merchants became regular officials of the state, handling spice trade on behalf of the sultan. This became the norm in the case of the other flourishing trades as well (Lapidus, 1984: 127). As the state’s participation in the economy intensified, the number of merchants serving as agents and regular employees of the sultan increased to keep pace with the proliferation of state offices and functionaries for trading. This rise of the mercantile community in the Muslim Mediterranean, from the 10th to the 11th century, gave the Middle Eastern bourgeoisie a social position and self-esteem that it secured far later in Europe. But it could never become an organised body and, as a class, never obtained political power, although many of its members occupied the first and second echelons of the state. Their status and power was undermined by two developments. One, the monetary and the mercantile economy gave way to one in which feudalistic trend became dominant and, two the bourgeois came to be overshadowed by castes of slave soldiers, mostly of Turkish extraction, which started dominated the history of that part of the world for the following 800 years.
Power Vacuum in the Indian Ocean During the early Song Period, Chinese ships preferred to meet Indian traders in the Strait of Malacca, but from time to time, China allowed Persian, Arab, Malaysian and Indian ships to enter a few selected harbours in which their transactions were closely supervised by state officials. By the late Song and Yuan Periods, not only did the Chinese open more ports to foreign ships but Chinese junks were foraying to Indian ports to meet Arab vessels there. During the early Ming times, the Chinese
Chapter 6â•…Trade and Politics in the Indian Oceanâ•… 107
continued to maintain an impressive navy, a fact demonstrated in the opening decades of the 15th century by the wide-ranging fleet of Admiral Cheng Ho. But, by the mid-1430s, the Chinese withdrawal from the Indian Ocean had become permanent. The vacuum created left only the small Mamluk fleet with their Gujarat allies standing in the way of the Portuguese intruders. Viewed from the perspective of the Mediterranean, this vacuum was certainly unusual. In the Mediterranean, a perpetual state of naval warfare existed from the 9th century onwards, and commercial ships always moved in military convoys. But, in the Indian Ocean, commerce was not threatened by sea warfare and merchants did not depend, as did the Italians, on armed ships from the state to guard their passage. This system of laissez-faire and multi-ethnic shipping established over centuries of relative peace and tolerance was clearly unprepared for intrusion by the Portuguese following very different ‘rules of the game’. ‘The Arab merchants of Calicut were convinced that the Portuguese were not traders but pirates. Their apprehensions by and large came to be true. The Portuguese gradually elaborated a complex system of compulsion’ (Dasgupta, 2001: 8–9). On land, they forced a series of treaties that essentially gave them the right to buy products at below market prices and at sea they instituted a violently enforced pass system that required Asian vessels to purchase Portuguese permits. Through their military force, the Portuguese thus caused a radical restructuring of the ports of trade throughout the Indian Ocean that undermined Calicut. We would be discussing these developments in Part 4.
Notes 1. Major changes in maritime trade took place after 1200
ad.
By then the
carrying capacity and the trading capacity of the great maritime routes
108â•… Part IIâ•… The Medieval World
had enlarged from the norm in late antiquity. By the 13th century, bulk commodities to meet