‘This is an in-depth and comprehensive study of the nature and evolution of the close relationship between business and polity over the last two millenniums and a half. Ghosh’s lucid and fascinating account of this relation in different historical epochs and under diverse techno-economic and political set-ups, from Classical Greece to the modern-day United States, clearly brings out its crucial significance in making or marring fortunes of nations and provides an important perspective in understanding the ongoing interaction of business operations and government policies at both the national and the global level.’ — Mihir Rakshit Director, Monetary Research Project at ICRA, Calcutta Editor-in-Chief, Money and Finance
‘This book is a tour de force. In a lucid and engaging treatise, Dhruba Ghosh explores the nexus between business and politics, intertwined in history over a period that spans millenniums rather than centuries, to argue that the nature of this relationship shaped the rise and fall of civilisations and empires. The discussion is remarkable in its range and depth. And the story that it unfolds is fascinating. The glimpses of world history highlight how the evolution of business–politics dynamics exercised an enormous influence on outcomes in economy and society, from the past to the present. If anything, the essential hypothesis is even more relevant in our lives and times. This book should be of interest to people in the worlds of business and politics. It should also be of interest to readers in academia, media and civil society.’ —Deepak Nayyar Professor of Economics, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi Distinguished University Professor of Economics, New School for Social Research, New York
‘This book is unique in many ways. There is no shortage of books on India’s historical and political legacy, or its future prospects as the world’s largest democracy. Similarly, the socio-political and socio-economic order, as it has evolved over centuries, is well documented. However, I can think of no other book which brings all these together, and gives a new perspective on India and challenges that it faces in political as well as economic fields.
As the author puts it, “this book is an odyssey”, and an excursion to explore how the world has evolved through different epochs of history. I strongly recommend this book to all those who are interested in our country’s future. It is elegantly written and accessible to lay readers as well as academic researchers in different fields.’ —Bimal Jalan Former Member of Parliament (Rajya Sabha) Former Governor of the Reserve Bank of India
Business
and Polity
Business
and Polity
Dynamics of a Changing Relationship
D N Ghosh
Copyright © Dhruba Narayan Ghosh, 2011 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilised in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. First published in 2011 by SAGE Publications India Pvt Ltd B1/I-1 Mohan Cooperative Industrial Area Mathura Road, New Delhi 110 044, India www.sagepub.in SAGE Publications Inc 2455 Teller Road Thousand Oaks, California 91320, USA SAGE Publications Ltd 1 Oliver’s Yard, 55 City Road London EC1Y 1SP, United Kingdom SAGE Publications Asia-Pacific Pte Ltd 33 Pekin Street #02-01 Far East Square Singapore 048763 Published by Vivek Mehra for Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd, typeset in 11/16 Garamond by Tantla Composition Pvt Ltd, Chandigarh and printed at Chaman Enterprises, New Delhi. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Ghosh, Dhruba Narayan, 1928– â•… Business and polity: dynamics of a changing relationship/D.N. Ghosh. ╅╅╇ p. cm. â•… Includes bibliographical references and index. â•… 1. Economic history.â•… 2. Economic policy—History.â•… 3. Business and politics—History.â•… 4. Commerce—History.â•… I. Title. HC21.G49â•…â•…â•…â•…â•… 322’.3--dc22â•…â•…â•…â•…â•… 2011â•…â•…â•…â•…â•… 2011001400 ISBN: 978-81-321-0531-2 (HB)
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Contents
Foreword by Y. Venugopal Reddy • xi Preface • xxi Prologue • xxv Introduction • xxxv
Part I. The Making and Unmaking of Empires: Domination of Political Power Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5
Sagacity in Governance: The Greek Exemplar • 3 Governance Culture: Roman Mirror • 20 Tolerant Ambience: India • 39 Resource Raising: Uniqueness of China • 52 An Intimidating Colossus: The Arab Miracle • 68
Part II. The Medieval World: ad 1000–1500 Chapter 6 Chapter 7 Chapter 8 Chapter 9 Chapter 10
Trade and Politics in the Indian Ocean • 91 Business on Leash: Japan • 109 Emerging Out of the Shadows: Europe • 119 In the Limelight: Knights of Commerce • 132 Playing with Power: Merchant Republics • 148
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Part III. The Great Transition: Warfare Technology— The Catalytic Chapter 11 Sword and Purse: Beginnings of Collaboration • 175 Chapter 12 Fiscal Revolution: Grip of Financiers • 191 Chapter 13 Economic Nationalism: Fusion of the Sword and Purse • 208 Part IV. A Boiling Cauldron Chapter 14 Setting the Tone: The Portuguese • 225 Chapter 15 Weaving a Pattern: The Spanish Imperial Machine • 237 Chapter 16 Showing the Way: The Dutch Interlude • 254 Chapter 17 Not in a Fit of Absentmindedness: Britain’s Forays • 269 Part V. Towards Global Hegemony Chapter 18 Chinks in the Armour: Empires in the Eurasian Landmass • 295 Chapter 19 Pax Britannica: Rise and Fall of British Hegemony • 312 Chapter 20 Pillars of US Hegemony • 341 Epilogue • 364 Glossary • 378 Reference List and Select Bibliography • 384 Index • 414 About the Author • 423
Foreword
I have known Mr D. N. Ghosh for several years. As Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, I sought his counsel on several intricate issues, and he has been very generous with his time and attention. Mr Ghosh has been of great help to Reserve Bank of India, especially in the area of non-banking financial companies’ sector. Over the years, I have developed great respect for his intellect, insight, integrity and insistence on propriety while being pleasant, cheerful and firm. Mr Ghosh epitomises soft power. He is in many ways an innovator and an institution builder. I also heard of his work in the government, and read about his contributions to public policy during some of the turbulent times. His foray into academia may be news to the new generation, but both the compulsions that lead him there and his contributions are well known to us. His articles in the Economic and Political Weekly are constant reference materials. In this background, when Mr Ghosh suggested that I should write a foreword for this forthcoming book, I readily agreed in view of the honour involved. I read the manuscript that he sent for the purpose and reread it. Then I studied it carefully and was simply amazed at the scholarship, the depth of understanding and the breadth of his enquiry. The articulation is informative, impressive and convincing. On occasions, I wondered whether I was equal to the task of writing a foreword to such an erudite and unique piece of writing. However, I have benefited immensely from reading the manuscript carefully and being provoked to take up the xi
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complex challenge of writing a foreword. This process of careful reading helped me explore the contemporary relevance of this book, in addition to its lasting contribution to the literature on the history of political economy of the world. In India, political economy has been a relatively unexplored area. More important, the relationship between business and government, as it evolved over the centuries is a somewhat neglected area of scholarship. In the hierarchy of the caste systems, the trader comes below the ruling caste as well as the priestly caste, but above the rest, viz., the Shudras. But the ruling class always had a close relationship with business. During the Independence movement also, there were observable links between indigenous business and politics. Till recently, politicians and businessmen were separate entities for most part of their avocations. The position seems to be changing rapidly in the recent years. First, many of the businessmen have joined active political life, while many politicians turned to business as an additional occupation. Some people comment that the regimes of gentlemen-politicians has been replaced by businessmen-politicians or politician-businessmen. There is a second more important factor after the onset of the process of economic reform. While there have been large elements of deregulation and liberalisation, the role of the government continues to be dominant in a significant way in the process of reform, particularly in the area of privatisation of public enterprises or disinvestment and public–private participation in physical infrastructure like highways, and possibly social infrastructure like education. More important, the public policy in India under the reform period seems to have created an atmosphere conducive for rapid growth by being business-friendly, but not necessarily market-friendly. The latter would involve rules of the game which would enhance competitive efficiency
Forewordâ•… xiii
and level playing fields based on respect for contracts rather than contacts. What would be the way forward in India? This book may provide clues to appreciating the dynamics of relationship between business and politics in India also. In any case I agree with the author that this dynamic is critical in understanding the current global financial crisis and in shaping the future of global economic and financial order. It is quite evident that the global financial crisis, and indeed, the global economic crisis has clearly been a turning point in the history of the world. Till a mere 300 years ago, China and India accounted for about half of the world output. They suffered a decline in their fortunes during the colonial era. While the second half of the 20th century saw an end to colonalisation and brought about division of the world into developed and developing economies; the developments in 21st century indicate a more diversified world. Different countries are at different levels of economic development and sophistication in the markets which seem to not only challenge the dominance of the United States, Europe and to some extent Japan, but also provide a spectrum of nation-states with diverse levels of economic development. As a consequence, it is possible that we will no longer have corner solutions (either this or that, but nothing else) but will increasingly have intermediate solutions to issues of economic policy. Globally the corporate sector seems to have developed a larger-than-life identity of its own, and has become powerful, but the sector is not necessarily maintaining continuous individual identities as corporates. The mergers, amalgamations and takeovers of corporates have become common, and thus the corporate identities are fast changing. However, the corporate sector as a whole has developed a global domination and a global presence. Their influence over politics is now no longer
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necessarily through one national government, but cuts across several countries. The managements of corporates, in particular in the financial sector, seem to have developed their own spheres of influence and interests that may not necessarily result in equitable distribution of surpluses among the stakeholders, in particular workers, shareholders and the management. In brief, in recent years the balance within the corporates between shareholders, board and management seems to have undergone significant change. The technological developments are constraining the capacity of the individual nation-state to exercise their power of intervention in the economic activity of individuals or corporates as they were able to do in the 20th century. Technological developments have a tendency to make cross-border movements very economical and hence can undermine the instruments of intervention available for the nation-states. At the same time, the consequences of cross-border movements on a nation’s population have to be managed by the state. As Governor Mervyn King is reported to have said, ‘Banks are global in life and national in death’. Is it possible that globalisation of business, especially finance, was premature relative to globalisation of public policy or globalised governance? It is not clear whether history provides clues on this, though Mr Ghosh alludes to premature globalisation of finance relative to globalisation of its regulation. Within the corporate world, finance as a sector has emerged as a force by itself and has begun to acquire the character of ends than means. As it evolved in human history, finance was critical to both political matters and economic life, but it was viewed as a powerful ally of politics for most part, and often as a facilitator of wars and of promoting growth in output, whereby employment was created. In recent years, the financial sector has
Forewordâ•… xv
acquired a life of its own, with greater capacity to influence the politics not only at a national level but also in terms of relations between the nations. Further, finance increased its hold over real sector. A possible disconnect in the growth of real sector relative to that in the financial sector is emerging. This is illustrated by the fact that at the current stage of crisis management (March 2010), the financial markets seem to have rebounded globally and thrived, but employment and growth appear to be lagging behind, particularly in developed countries. It is not clear whether the booming financial markets are in anticipation of a definitive surge in real output and employment globally. In this regard, it is instructive to note from the book that, historically politics tended to have very diverse links with finance, its relationship ranging from antagonism to dependence, and from surrender to support; but for the most part collusive. Thus, finance had a dominant role in what Mr Ghosh calls the fiscalmilitary phase and in the more recent phase of US hegemony in the context of dollar as the global reserve currency. Recent debates on public policy consequent upon the global financial crisis focus on the relationship between the state and the market. It is often argued that the ongoing financial crisis reflects excessive belief in the efficiency and self-correcting mechanisms of markets. It is, therefore, argued that the state should be empowered so that the balance between the state and the market is restored with appropriate roles to each. Various initiatives are being considered for strengthening financial regulation and establishing a new global economic order as well as appropriate international financial institutions that could provide public goods, conducive to global growth, welfare and stability. These are essentially in the nature of creating a strengthened role for state, broadly defined to include intervention in the functioning of markets by the public policy.
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However, it is possible to argue that the recent financial crisis represents the failure of both the market and the state within and across nation-states. The apparatus of the state, in particular the independent central banks and regulators in the financial sector seem to have failed to discharge the duties assigned and deliver the outcomes that they had assured. There are sufficient grounds to believe that the crisis is a result of the capture of the government by the markets, especially by the financial institutions and financial markets. In other words, it can be argued that the crisis was not caused by a mere failure of regulators but a capture of the regulators and the governments by the financial markets. This plausible explanation of the crisis warrants an entirely different dimension to the traditional debate on state versus market. Consequently, the debate will have to concentrate a lot more on the relationship between the state and the market in each country on one hand, and the relationship between the nation-states, national markets and international markets, on the other. This book touches on this aspect while presenting the dynamics of economic change in different historical periods. It explains the interaction of two forces: the techno-economic structure in any society that is controlled by business, and the polity that is controlled by their ruling regime. It recognises that the two forces are distinct but coexist. The common elements in the narration of events that lead to the current financial crisis indicate that there has been close cooperation between the financial conglomerates and the ruling elite, that there has been competition for resources among these constituents within each country and that these forces ensured contagion in different degrees to different countries. Thus, as the world was led into the crisis, there have been different strategic elements of cooperation, competition and coordination
Forewordâ•… xvii
between state and market, nations and supranations, financial and non-financial corporates. As a reaction to the efforts made to reduce the big government which led to the crisis, there now appears to be an effort to reduce the big business, in the financial sector, namely in big banks. The outcome of the current thinking is not obvious as of now since both desirability and feasibility are being discussed. In my view, the critical issue is not merely the bigness of the state or a corporate or a bank, but the quality of governance in both the state and the market. These obviously are products of several factors: cultural, institutional, technological and social. Often, it is recognised that cultural factors influence the behaviour of economic agents in the markets, but the markets also tend to influence the cultural factors. While these are not explicitly addressed in the book, the description of the events and the analysis of structure and dynamics of relationships between business and polity in the book do provide valuable clues to a better understanding of the current dilemmas. In terms of dominant values, the recent decades represent the height of respectability to market forces to an extent that is perhaps unprecedented in history. Historically, trade and finance were viewed with suspicion in general, though their useful role and indeed their attractiveness were not in doubt in most cultures, particularly in societies that valued material success. The recent heightened respectability to markets which was followed by the crisis now, has also resulted in, among other things, two sets of realisations. The first realisation is that economists and policy-analysts had underestimated the greed in human character. The second realisation has been that there has been a fundamental change in the human values globally which elevated markets to the status of God replacing traditional religion.
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The chapter on Fiscal Revolution and Grip of Financiers referring to 16th and 17th centuries is of great contemporary relevance in the context of the crisis management. Mr Ghosh in reflecting on that period of history mentions: ‘The fiscal apparatus within the state became little more than a front behind which the financiers carried on their affairs with studied indifference towards the damage they did to the government and contempt for the suffering of the taxpaying elements of the population.’ My question in the context of the current debates on public debt incurred in managing the crisis is: Will the surging public debt of many countries place the sovereigns at the mercy of financial markets that were bailed out by the sovereign in the first place? The chapter on ‘Pillars of US hegemony’ explains with great clarity the centrality of Washington in the support of world liquidity. That this has to change is recognised, but there is no clarity or consensus on the path towards change and destination of change. Mr Ghosh makes a brilliant summary of the masterly exposition made in the earlier chapters of the book in the chapter titled ‘Epilogue’ and the sections titled ‘Recapitulating’ and ‘Five Revolutions’ in the Epilogue deserve special mention here. He describes the globalisation of recent years as the Fifth Revolution ‘driven primarily by American hegemonic power, which is an amalgam of state and business power’. His contention is that there are clear signs that the United States is no longer in a position to offer ‘public good’ to global economy as it used to, mainly ‘through its failure to manage the global financial centre as a stable and responsible distributor of global liquidity’. Mr Ghosh sees need for change and speculates on signs of change. For a successful journey towards global stability, and by implication the process of global rebalancing, according to Mr Ghosh
Forewordâ•… xix
certain prerequisites have to be met by the United States. These include increasing productivity, acceptance that the margin of economic advantage that it enjoyed before is shrinking and willingness to concede that its capacity to use military power for political advantage is getting smaller. We need to speculate: Will that meeting of prerequisites in the United States happen and how will it happen? The narration of links between business and politics in the book gives several clues but understandably no answers. However, personally I found that the most common reason for collapse of civilisations as explained in the book was intolerable inequalities in wealth and income. Hence, in my view, it is necessary, particularly for the United States to recognise the need to contain and curb high inequalities in income and wealth as the most critical step for overall rebalancing that the world is in need of. A pertinent issue is the responsibilities of the major economies in the world, in facilitating, incentivising and persuading the United States to adopt the prerequisites mentioned by Mr Ghosh. These economies include the Euro area, Japan, China and India. A relevant issue is the sharing of burdens among these in the transition to a possible new global economic order, and here those economies which contributed more to imbalances so far have a harder task ahead. The history of nexus between business and politics analysed brilliantly in this book and the more recent apparent capture of public policy by financial sector shows that the path towards a new global economic order is not only a political process but one in which business, big business, especially the financial sector, will play a major role. I am afraid the ongoing public debates on new global financial architecture are yet to focus on the criticality of national and global businesses in this process.
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I thank Mr D. N. Ghosh for giving me the opportunity to write the foreword to this monumental work. Y. Venugopal Reddy Emeritus Professor, University of Hyderabad Former Governor—Reserve Bank of India Hyderabad, India
Preface
Time present and time past Are both perhaps present in time future, And time future contained in time past. If all time is eternally present All time is unredeemable (T.S. Eliot in Four Quartets) During the last two decades of the 20th century the world went through tumultuous changes. The global landscape was changing dramatically: the Berlin Wall was torn down, the mighty Soviet Union collapsed, China was taking the capitalist road to economic growth…It was, to all appearances, a victory for market capitalism and for the policies and institutions that the world’s most prosperous and powerful country stood for. Transnational corporations became the most visible instruments for the propagation of the capitalist message all across the globe. Market spirit came to be universally idealised and globalisation came to acquire a kind of quasi-religious sanctity. The tempest travelled over nations to sweep across our country as well, stirring in its wake spirited debates over how our policies and institutions could be restructured so that the maximum benefits could be drawn from the changing global environment. It was a theme that came to possess universities, think tanks, international seminars, business federations and various other forums. And underlying this theme was the unwritten premise that if an open and liberal market economy and ‘good policies and good institutions’ associated with it xxi
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were to be adopted and developed, politics must learn to keep its hands off business, restricting its role to ensuring the rule of law, providing basic regulation and putting in place a social safety net. It is my participation in many of these debates and discussions that this book has grown out of. There were some who argued for caution in adopting the policies and institutions of the developed countries, emphasizing, in particular, that the context in which these policies and institutions had evolved over time be studied and understood first. But this view had few takers in our country, the idea being dubbed a hangover from the decades past. The overwhelming majority appeared to have been persuaded by Henry Ford’s snappy verdict: ‘History is more or less bunk’. Listening to these debates and occasionally participating in them, I began to have the feeling that a kind of historical amnesia had gripped the elite of our society. It is this feeling that brought about the idea of exploring the ever-entwined relationship between business and politics. This relationship is always in a flux, being impacted by the continuous interaction between the two vital interest groups that create and redistribute wealth in society. The way historical circumstances have converged during different eras to deliver the next push to this evolving relationship should be a matter of interest to those who are involved in the political and economic affairs of today. Of course, that is not to say such a study would necessarily throw up lessons for emulation. As the Greek philosopher Heraclitus put it, ‘Everything flows, and you cannot bathe twice in the same river.’ Nevertheless, time does weed out the non-essentials and what remains can serve as a pathfinder for the current generation. I tossed the idea first with Amit Bhaduri. He encouraged me to explore the relationship between business and politics
Prefaceâ•… xxiii
and trace the behavioural patterns of these two interest groups through different epochs in history. Deepak Nayyar came to my aid and worked out a kind of periodisation that would be relevant to the subject. He volunteered, despite his multifarious commitments, to go through the first draft of this book, and pointed out many unnecessary departures and glaring gaps. I remain immensely grateful to him. I am also indebted to Bimal Jalan for readily agreeing to take a quick look at the draft in the final stages, and for offering many insightful comments on the epilogue. My gratitude to Mihir Rakshit for spotting areas that called for greater clarity of exposition. The deficiencies that remain are of course mine. It was so kind of Y. Venugopal Reddy to write the foreword. The piece is a masterly exposition of the political economy of the recent financial crisis, and of the contemporary relevance of the dynamics of the business–polity relationship—the theme of this book. For the completion of this book, I owe debts of gratitude to many. Two organisations, ICRA and Peerless, have been generous in providing logistical support whenever I needed it. I give my thanks to Patricia Sharpe and Promod Upadhya. Udayan Majumdar cheerfully bore the burden of giving some shape to the initial drafts of some of the chapters. I never felt I was working in isolation, that is, away from the University libraries, thanks to Akhtar Parvez, the librarian, who was always there to help me out in tracing reference material, books and journals. Without him and his excellent connections, I could not have dreamt of completing this project, as it involved extensive research into the works of specialists: economic historians, political scientists and sociologists. Somnath Dasgupta carefully and meticulously edited the final version: his sharp eye rescued me from many bloomers. Last, but
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not the least, the persuasive persistence of Elina Majumdar, the commissioning editor of Sage, in completing the book within a time schedule; but for her, I would possibly have dragged on and on.
Prologue
Heritage of Antiquity: Roots of Political and Economic Power
Human society, in its evolution from hunter-gatherers to agriculture and domestication of animals and permanent settlements, gradually became stable, bounded and complex, giving rise to division of labour, social inequality and political centrality. This transition is a story of continuous cultural evolution, with local groups, spurred by their environmental needs, striking out on their own paths and transiting progressively to larger systems, shaping themselves through interaction and learning. The researches of anthropologists and sociologists bring out a wide array of factors and circumstances that influence the process of local evolution and diffusion of culture and the process of transition. Between the beginning of settled agriculture and the peak of the Roman Empire was a span of approximately eight thousand years. Archaeological findings allied with anthropological research tell a story of continuity in all known forms of human society: from relatively egalitarian, stateless societies to rank societies with political authority and eventually stratified civilised societies with states (Fried, 1967). The state is the final stage in the evolutionary process, the culmination of a slow, prolonged and connected growth process, precipitated at several stages by the somewhat random forces of population pressure xxv
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and technological change.1 What gave it character was essentially the activities of loose associations transforming themselves into permanent centralised settlements and organising through political means their command over surpluses that accrue from economic activities within their territorial command. That this has been the general occurrence is confidently asserted by the sociologist Nisbet: ‘There is no historical instance of a political state not founded in circumstances of war, not rooted in the distinctive discipline of war’, though it subsequently diversified in peaceful activities or functions acceptable to the family or religious activities (Nisbet, 1976). There is little disagreement that these social and political complexes arose in river valleys where alluvial agriculture came to be practised. Agriculture had been the primary life-giving force driving these civilisations and its development was associated with property differentials and social stratification. In the small city-states that emerged in these complexes, propertied elites assumed political and associated control. In defining the civilisational complexes in terms of an extensive list of characteristics, Gordon Childe laid special emphasis on two: emergence of a ruling class and the means it deploys to have a say in the control and management of economic surplus that is generated through different forms, namely through agriculture and associated activities and through trade (Childe, 1951).
Emergence of Property Forms: Ceremonial Temples Permanent possession of land by a settled family group conferred fixed economic resource, and those who could control strategic positions at river junctions, river fords or crossroads
Prologueâ•… xxvii
could mobilise a disproportionate amount of collective social power to turn it to their own use if needed. Such stratification emerged throughout the late fourth millennium. Sumerian records after 3000 bc show that, unlike the situation in most prehistoric villages, irrigated land was in much larger parcels than could be worked by individual families. With such permanent inequalities in property distribution, the strategic owners of core land with or without unusual alluvial or irrigational potential could command a greater economic surplus than the peripheral alluvial-irrigating neighbours. Also, they could have additional advantages accruing from trade through control along particular trade and communication routes, especially navigable rivers, and location of market places and store houses. Apart from the surplus that came to be generated through a combination of fixed property rights in land, other kinds of surplusgenerating activities such as access to trade opportunities, came to be available to them. There were several alternative sources of creating wealth other than from land through a range of services from free persons, semi-free dependent labour and a few slaves. With the solidification of economic stratification embedded in wealth differentials, evident in all forms of social and economic activities, it was but inevitable that the dominant groups would come to acquire territorially centralised authority. This transition, as scholars have surmised on the basis of archaeological records, passed through a particular type of ceremonial centre, the temple, something that was fairly general among the earlier civilisations. Extensive social cooperation in irrigation agriculture was associated with a strong priesthood virtually everywhere (Steward, 1963). The main purposes of the temples were essentially mundane: to serve as an inter-village diplomatic service and to redistribute economic produce and encode public duties and private property rights. The priests
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in earlier civilisations were more secular, more administrative and political, as a diplomatic corps, irrigation managers and redistributors. The temple was a kind of redistributive state à la the economist Karl Polanyi. With these religious institutions emerged a form of collective power that offered genuine diplomatic solutions to real social needs, in the regulation of trade, diffusion and exchange of tools and techniques, marriage regulation, migration and settlement and definition of just and unjust violence (Mann, 1986). Ceremonial temple complexes had also developed a role for themselves. Greek and Asian temples had been offering various kinds of services that must have been of great help to the traders; they would deposit gold and treasures in temples with the priests acting as caretakers and sometimes as judges. The Babylonian Shamash was one of the market gods; originally, Jehovah was the market god of the tribe of Levi, at whose yearly festivals men of all tribes gathered to barter; the temple of Jerusalem was the centre of a financial network in the east, somewhat similar to that controlled by the later Christian Church over Western Europe.
State and Property Rights: Intermixture State and private property rights were connected to and mutually supportive of one another. From the excavated tablets of the early city of Lagash, it is surmised that there was a complicated mixture of three property forms in land administered by the temple. There were fields owned by the city’s gods and administered by the temple officials, fields rented out by the temple to individual families on an annual basis and fields granted to individual families in perpetuity without rent. The first and third
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forms were sizeable, denoting large-scale collective and private property, both employing dependent labour and a few slaves. The records show that collective and private property steadily merged, as stratification and state developed more extensively; a unified elite controlled the temples and large estates and held priestly, civil and military offices. The earliest urban civilisation appeared in Sumer, in the far southeast of Mesopotamia bordering the Persian Gulf, and Sumerians continued as the main dominant cultural force in southern Mesopotamia from before 3000 to about 2000 bc. The fundamental political unit was the city-state, with Ur, on the Gulf, being the most important of the Sumerian cities most of the time. From time to time, one city or another would establish a kind of hegemony over all or most of the river valleys nurturing the civilisational complexes. A clear hierarchy of social order seemed to have emerged and established itself in the cities.2 One of the earliest records discovered at Ashur, a city-state in the 20th century bc, brings out clearly the kind of social and economic functions in these early states. The ruler, also the principal judge, ruled with the concurrence of three distinct bodies of citizens: the elders, the ‘town’ and the karum, interpreted to mean the people of the market, that is, the body of merchants who administered the commercial centre of the city. The karum acted as the bank of deposit, a centre for export and import, a clearinghouse and a chamber of commerce all rolled into one (Curtin, 1984: 68). During the old Babylonian period, the most significant piece of evidence attributed to Hammurabi, lawgiver of Babylon from about 1792 to 1750 bc, points to the existence of a class of independent merchants, known as Tamkaru, dominant in trade, brokerage and money lending, replacing the role
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of temples and royal monopolies as the source of capital. The House of Elgi, as recorded in inscriptions, carried out a wide variety of business activities combined with banking; they gave loans against securities and accepted a wide range of deposits. After having flourished for hundreds of years, this bank seemed to have faded from the scene some time during the 5th century bc. A similar but younger banking firm is that of the sons of Maraschu, which operated from the town of Nippur. Apart from the banking functions of the kind practiced by the House of Elgi, they specialised in what we would call renting and leasing arrangements. They administered—as agents of tax-farmers— the royal and larger private estates, they rented out fish ponds, financed and constructed irrigation canals and charged fees to farmers within their water networks, and they enjoyed partial monopoly on the sale and distribution of beer.3
Trade as a Source of Wealth The development and expansion of trade, internal and external, started creating an alternative source of wealth other than from land. The existence of illuminating patterns of long-distance trade in preliterate societies points to the possibility of a wide range of relationships subsisting between the trade community and the host polity and society. Trade communities of merchants living among aliens in associated networks, as are found today in every continent, can be traced back through time to the very beginning of urban life. Familiar examples that come to mind are the chains of Phoenician and Greek trading towns that spread westward from the Levant or the Aegean coasts. Or some two thousands later, the Hanseatic League of independent trading towns, where merchants from Cologne on the Rhine
Prologueâ•… xxxi
settled along the trade routes down the Rhine and then eastward along the coast of North Sea and the Baltic. The relationship between the trading community and the host society, taking on a complex variety of forms, has been an interesting field of study for sociologists, political scientists and economic historians. It was a kind of mixed economy in today’s parlance. Trade was carried out as a private enterprise with some form of commercial control by the government (Curtin, 1984: 67). While government participated directly in trade in food, it used primarily the independent merchants as its agents. From the rich collection of clay tablets discovered in Kultepe in Turkey, the site of Kamesh, a settlement of Assyrian merchants, and the settlement of at least 20 other Assyrian commercial settlements in central and western Anatolia, there is adequate evidence to show that while the merchants were free to do their trade, they had to pay protection costs as the inescapable price for doing business. The authorities who have studied the Kultepe tablets portray an economic order where political authorities interfered in trade as much as they could to suit their particular interests, but they were careful not to suppress the underlying play of supply and demand, though the traders had to pay protection money for doing business. The Assyrian commercial documents refer to local authorities as the ‘palace’, where the Assyrian traders were welcome guests. The ultimate authority of the palace was undisputed. The visiting merchants had their own corporate organisation to act for the group. It took the form of a network of Karu; at the head was karum, in Ashur itself, below that Karum in Kamesh, and still further down the line a number of other karu in other Anatolian towns. The kind of relationship interpreted from Egyptian records is substantively no different. Traders had to carry on their operations under
xxxiiâ•… Business and Polity
strict government control, though they were welcome to bring the special articles they needed (Curtin, 1984: 68–70). In the palace-centred economies, trading merchants were recognised as communities that rendered useful service, but they were never accepted as part of the ruling power complex. It was somewhat like how the Jewish merchants came to be treated in medieval Europe. In oral traditions embodied in literary sources from the Aegean age, we often find a clear distinction between fighting men and the cautious, anaemic businessmen worn down with the care of cargoes. According to the predominance of one type or other, there developed trader-communities and warriorcommunities and the hostility between them seemed to have been a fundamental fact of ancient history.
City-states The sack of Troy in about 1200 bc, symbolising the end of Aegean prosperity and of the Minoan–Mycenaean age, was the beginning of what is generally talked of as the Dark Ages in the Mediterranean world. Lasting down to about 750 bc this saw the end of the palace-centred state and the emergence of citystates in the Mediterranean, from the archaic period (8th to 6th centuries bc) to the classical period (5th to 4th centuries bc). Two decentralised civilisations around the Mediterranean dominated the first millennium bc—Phoenica and Greece. The Phoenician states of the Levant coast, entering a power vacuum along the eastern shores of the Mediterranean left by the collapse of the Hittites and the Mycenaeans and the retreat of Egypt to the Nile, emerged as a dominant power for about five centuries. It was exclusively a naval and trading power,
Prologueâ•… xxxiii
the ‘bride of the sea’, united by a loose federal, geopolitical alliance of city-states. In the 10th and 9th centuries, Tyre probably enjoyed some primacy over other cities of Phoenician and was ruled by kings whose power was limited by the merchant oligarchy. Phoenicians, as a rule, did not fight unless they had to. In Tyre and Sidon, they paid tribute to oriental monarchs instead of striking for independence. The Phoenicians, unlike the Greeks, were not looking for lands to settle but for anchorages and staging points on the trade route from Phoenicia to Spain, a source of silver and tin. The Phoenician coastal towns eventually lost their naval supremacy to the Greeks and their political independence first to Nebuchadnezzar II, and then to the Persians, all in the 6th century bc.
Emergence of Empires Though the multi-city structure in early civilisations continued for several centuries, the autonomy of city-states began to weaken as regional confederations emerged. Gradually, they were conquered by extensive empires, with large and hierarchical organisation of power. From the rise of the great world empire of Sargaon of Akkad (2500–2350 bc) to the fall of the Roman Empire in the West (ad 476), the historical record is filled with a bewildering profusion of empires and their rulers. How were the ruling regimes relating to the enterprisers of resource generating economic activities to realise their political objectives? We explore these relationships in five civilisations: Greek, Roman, Indian, Chinese and Arab, roughly covering about 15 centuries, from the five centuries before Christ to the end of the first millennium.
xxxivâ•… Business and Polity
Notes 1. The state forms—in embryo in the stratified society and the transition to the final form, as Oppenheimer argues in his classic sociological study of The State—are marked by six stages. The first stage, of continuous raiding and killing between groups, was followed by one in which a dominant group extended a protective cover to others for carrying out agricultural and connected economic activities, a critically important step ‘where the bear becomes the beekeeper’. The third stage arrives when the peasants regularly bring the surplus as tribute to the ruler. This tribute is found in many well-known instances in history: Huns, Magyars, Tartars and Turks have derived their largest income from this source. What follows is the union of warring groups in command of specific territories. Gradually, the territorial rulers acquire the right to arbitrate and the means to enforce it, marking the near completion of the evolution of the primitive state. 2. For a good summary based on archaeological evidence, see Philip D. Curtin, Cross-Cultural Trade in World History, Chapter 4. 3. See Heichelheim, 1958, as quoted in A History of Money, Glyn Davies, 1994, 50.
Introduction
Oh, do not ask, “What is it?” Let us go and make our visit. —T.S. Eliot1 This book is an odyssey undertaken to explore and understand the relationship between business and politics as it has evolved through different epochs in history to stand at where it does today. This intersection of politics, business/economics and sociology has always interested scholars from a range of disciplines with different perspectives. Pluralists like Robert A. Dahl and Erik Olson debate the impact of competing interest groups on policy processes. Sociologists like Charles Wright Mills and Michael Useem dissect the nature of influence exercised by large business corporations on political decision-makers and the channels that are used for this purpose. Then, Vernon, Caves and Dunning, among others, made the corporation itself an important subject of enquiry in international relations in the 1970s and 1980s, particularly because of the influence of the marketdriven global compass of corporate operations. Next to the pluralist and neo-corporatist perspectives, there is a clutch of methodological approaches (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962) that apply economic models to political processes. These studies characterise the political market as one in which interest groups invest resources to obtain favourable decisions or nondecisions from politicians, who in turn pursue their self-interest by gathering resources and support (Fuchs, 2008). xxxv
xxxviâ•… Business and Polity
Business corporations operating across geographies face complex operational issues involving the sovereign governments with which they have to interact. The host and the home states have large, though often conflicting, stakes in the ways the global business corporations function. These are not technical or legal issues that the corporations can resolve on their own; these can be sensitive issues that make the involvement of the home government critical. Global business corporations, located mostly in the developed countries, have their own equations with their home governments. The functional and geographical dispersion of these corporations over the past three centuries and the economic power that they have come to wield are linked inextricably with the gradual rise to the hegemony of these advanced countries. Little wonder that these hegemonies and the global business corporations, between themselves, have set the policies that govern the structure of geo-political and economic relations in today’s world. The journey on which we embark seeks to unravel how and why we have come to inherit the present configuration of power and thereby enhance our ability to make informed decisions to shape the future. A hegemonic power is a product of history. Joseph Schumpeter had once remarked that the compulsion of the insistent present makes us oblivious of the truth of the past sanctified by centuries. Human decisions taken at crucial stages have changed the course of history; these decisions, taken individually or collectively, may have been influenced by ideology or by technology or by a mere instinct of power or wealth grabbing. We are now at a turning point in global history. As we try to understand more of the past, we begin to make some sense of our times. We begin to see our times not as an everlasting present, but as a historical period. The contemporary world has come into existence through a very tortuous route. It has very
Introductionâ•… xxxvii
little in common with the road maps of history on which ideologues of every description draw their straight lines.
Dissecting the Dynamics The potential energy inherent in any society often expresses itself in changing profiles of material output, patterns of employment and class distribution of income. The single most important element residing deep within the system is the driving need to extract wealth through activities that a particular socioeconomic configuration may permit. This is, in a sense, the logic of a system that ‘expresses the potential energy created by its nature… What is logical about these movements is that they express the outcome of the system’s nature, as a released spring expresses the energy stored up within it’ (Heilbroner, 1985: 25). How does the inner nature express itself? In an abstract philosophical vein, each society in each period of history, as Hegel elaborates, is a structurally interrelated whole, unified by some inner principle. For Hegel, it is the Geist, or the inner spirit, the style of a period. For Marx, it is the mode of production that determines all other social relations; historical change occurs through a dialectical process, with the new mode negating the previous one while also preparing the way for the next to come. Many sociologists are not comfortable with the HegelianMarxist conception of society as an integral entity defined by its web of interconnectedness and one whose movement may be explained through the dialectical approach. The Marxist theory is perceived as having failed to predict the direction of historical development, let alone its timing. Politically, many see the culmination of Marxist dialectic not in universal freedom and prosperity with the withering away of the coercive state as predicted by Marx, but in an oppressive and grossly inefficient state capitalism.
xxxviiiâ•… Business and Polity
As against the holistic view of society, it may be more useful if we are to understand the dynamics of economic change through the interaction of two forces: the techno-economic structure in any society that is controlled by business in its own interest and the polity that is controlled by the ruling regime for purposes it considers to be for the collective good. The two forces are distinct, but co-exist in an unordered manner, each with a different axial principle. Each has, in a sense, its own realm and the two realms are not congruent with one another. They have different rhythms of change and follow different norms that legitimise different and even contrasting types of behaviour. But the way these two realms function and interact may create a dynamic that may become decisive in changing or even destroying societies. In any society—primitive, imperial or capitalist—the dynamic expresses itself through a continuous creative process that extracts wealth to generate a surplus over what is required for maintenance or reproduction. The way that surplus is generated, accumulated and redistributed holds the key to the relationship between business and polity. In a broad sense, business generates and accumulates surplus while it is polity that redistributes the surplus—and also has the responsibility to create conditions that facilitate the production of this surplus.
Two Realms: Business and Politics Business is imbued with a ‘restless Faustian spirit’ that takes as its motto ‘the endless frontier’, and as its goal ‘the complete transformation of nature’ (Bell, 1978). This acquisitive spirit, which is the central theme in Werner Sombart’s exposition of capitalism,2 respects no absolute limit.
Profits, no matter how large, can never reach a level sufficiently
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Introductionâ•… xxxix
high to satisfy the economic agent.… Acquisition... becomes unconditional, absolute. Not only does it seize upon all phenomena within the economic realm, but it reaches over into other cultural fields and develops a tendency to proclaim (Sombart as quoted in Bell, 1978: 192)
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the supremacy of business interests over all other values.
Acquisitive orientation is, however, not confined only to the Age of Capital; it was manifest in pre-capitalist formations as well. In Classical Greece, Medieval Europe and Japan, or in China during the course of its dynastic cycles, business as a calling did not enjoy the kind of social recognition that it does today, given the cultural and religious milieu then prevailing, but, nonetheless, its march continued unabated. Essentially, business signifies the single-minded pursuit of all those activities that contribute to the generation of surplus and its accumulation, in agriculture, industry, trade, finance or any associated ancillary and supportive services. It is the opportunity for generating more surplus that drives business forward; ‘the pursuit of profit, and forever renewed profit’, as Max Weber puts it (Weber, 1981: 17). The critical source of surplus is derived from the different kinds of activities undertaken by business, from a money sum to a larger money sum through commodities, as Marx’s M-C-M’ formula so brilliantly schematises the repetitive, expansive metamorphosis through which accumulated surplus manifests itself. M stands for money, C for commodity, and M’ for money plus an increment, equating surplus value. Surplus expands through the very logic of the process, one that Wallerstein describes as ‘network of commodity chains’ of commodities that link together more and more of the
xlâ•… Business and Polity
separate steps involved in the production of goods, beginning with the extraction of raw materials and ending with the sale of finished items. These commodity chains combine small, discrete M-C-M’ steps into longer strides, converting many small profits into fewer larger ones (Wallerstein, 1979). Marx’s M-C-M’ formula is a powerful tool that can be extended to the pre-capitalist circuit (C-M-C) where the commodity is the object and money merely the intermediary, or the new world of globalised finance where there can be a straight route from M to M’. Owners of business generate a surplus through various modes such as agriculture and related activities, trade, crafts, mechanised production or any other innovative combination of factors of production for meeting the needs of the society. Harvey captures the essence when he defines business in generic terms as ‘the molecular processes of capital accumulation in space and time’ that flows ‘through continuous space, towards or away from territorial entities, through the daily practices of production, trade, commerce, capital flows, money transfers, labour migration, technology transfer, currency speculation, flows of information, cultural impulses and the like’ (Harvey, 2003: 26–27). We use the term ‘business’ in this all-inclusive sense here.3 The opportunities for the generation of surplus from the pursuit of any of the activities that Harvey lists keep changing as an economy evolves and diversifies and depending on the context, this book uses the term trade, industry, plantation or any other species of productive activity as a proxy for business. Politics in a general sense is the activity to pursue and attain goals through the exercise of regulatory and coercive power, centrally administered and territorially bounded— that is, state power. A political regime may be motivated by a diverse range of interests beyond self-preservation, by objectives
Introductionâ•… xli
such as acquisition of territory, enhancement of coercive reach, acquisition of wealth through military exploits or spread of cultural, religious and ideological beliefs. Territorial boundaries— in a world never yet dominated by a single state—also give rise to regulated interstate relations where geo-political diplomacy assumes importance. A polity will require different kinds and orders of resources; through successive civilisations, political power holders had to necessarily turn to business, to actors who operate in the resource generating activities.
Structure of Relationships Business and polity have been closely interlinked at any given time—whether economic growth, stagnation or decline—since polity needs resources. While the focus of interest of the two power networks is different, they have come together for many common objectives. Through history, these objectives have been found to have been associated almost invariably with war or war-like activities such as conquest or plunder or with their direct fallout or unintended consequences. Polity may rightfully appropriate a part of the surplus that business generates, as the price for extending a protective umbrella over business, but ruling political regimes may be driven on occasion to adopt coercive measures for raising resources, for self-preservation or for greater glory and power and even try to expropriate the accumulated surplus or wealth of business communities. This imposes an unsustainable burden on business, stifling its incentives to grow; it also creates a fundamental dilemma for the polity. The polity has to be strong enough to enforce private property rights but wise enough to refrain from using its strength to expropriate private property. If business
xliiâ•… Business and Polity
does not get protective cover from the polity, it may be forced to move out and seek protection from other regimes, as happened, for example, during the religious persecution in Europe in the 16th century. Business has also been found to have demonstrated its capability to assert its bargaining power in relation to polities through capture of strategic functions such as financing of rulers (Heilbroner, 1985: 42). When the major European powers were venturing out in the Atlantic, they were prepared to share part of their sovereign powers in several areas with the companies set up by merchant communities to explore new trading opportunities. The two classes of actors have been accommodating when their interests have converged and even, on occasion, when they had nursed antagonistic opinions; we have also seen a fusion of two interests, when, for example, the wealth-creating business class takes upon itself the role and responsibilities of the ruling class or vice versa. This has been particularly visible at many turning points in history: the collapse of the Roman Empire; the withering away of the Islamic hegemony; the breakdown of the feudal system; maritime exploration into the Atlantic or the onset of the industrial revolution. When this happens, we may talk of a crisis or a revolution meaning a turning point so decisive that the system comes to an end and is replaced by one or more alternative successor systems or is changed completely beyond recognition. Such were the turning points at the time of the fall of the Western Roman Empire or of the Abbasid Arab Empire. This may not be a quick event but a ‘transition’, a long period lasting a few generations. This book presents a historical overview of the relationships between business and polity as they have come to evolve via numerous twists and turns at different periods in the past,
Introductionâ•… xliii
beginning from the ancient economy to the global capitalist economy of today. We will follow a chronological pattern, but as the canvas is broad, we will be selective. Outlining the heritage of our antiquity in the prologue, we start with the early civilisational complexes—Graeco-Roman, Chinese, Indian and Arab—and continue to the end of the 1st millennium ad. Then we deal with the explosion of maritime trade in the first five centuries of the 2nd millennium ad; trade that linked regions and polities from the Muslim Mediterranean in the west to China in the extreme east and anchored by India in the middle. During the same period, two feudal regions, Japan and Europe, were lying in obscurity; they were to flower later, but theirs is an exciting story during the incubation period. Our focus here will be on critical events and circumstances that brought about this change: the emergence of strong and independent business communities within medieval Europe, the rise of cities, guilds, communes and merchant republics, the establishment of powerful fiscal-military and mercantilist states, the age of the trading empires, the imperial phase of the 19th century and the post-World War II developments that led up to the current phase of a globalised world dominated by a super-power. As we go along, we will analyse the conjuncture of events and circumstances that had a significant influence on the business– polity dynamics, how these dynamics evolved within the political, economic and technological framework of each period. We will also focus on some core elements of this relationship—for instance, attitude towards property rights, the rule of law, business innovations, mobility of capital and such other aspects—the purpose being to gain a perspective on the origin and evolution of the capitalist ethic and culture that we find today.
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Notes 1. ‘The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock’, T.S. Eliot, 1917. 2. Sombart identified greed and gold as the drivers of capitalism, as of all humans endeavour. Though his own exposition of the development of capitalism was unsystematic and contradictory (See New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Vol. 4), his emphasis on money making as the driver, is relevant. ‘The love of money is one of the founders of human society… no less than Columbus found out’ (Bell, 1978: 292). 3. The term the businessman was first used in the US in the 1830s to denote a type of merchant who traded not only in goods but also in land and whatever else could result in a profit (Swedberg, 2005: 16).
Part I
The Making and Unmaking of Empires: Domination of Political Power
In the empires of antiquity of the first millennium bc with which our story begins, political regimes were constantly preoccupied with war and organising resources for its conduct and prosecution. Rulers wanted power, and power came from territorial acquisition, so their primary objective was to concentrate fighting power and build a strong war-making apparatus. Empire building thus hinged on the logistics of resource management, and the resources— whether men or materials—were drawn occasionally from military booty but mostly from the wealth-generating activities within the empire. The surplus available from land and other activities fed the requirement of not only the military aspect but also the civic machinery of the empire. The ordinary peasant farmers formed the bulk of the fighting force, while those with larger land holdings brought with them the expensive equipment and other resources needed for military campaigns. Polities that looked after the interest of this class survived. Those that did not, failed. We begin with the Athenian world and its famed land reforms, followed by Rome and its fall, the Mauryan Empire and its benevolence towards trade, China’s land-based structure and its parallels with Rome, and end with the story of how the Arabs created a colossal empire in a very short time, essentially by taking a pragmatic attitude towards trade. Land was the main source of wealth, and farmers were the generators of wealth for the political superstructure. Polities that failed to look after land and farmers and balance their resource needs against the surplus generated collapsed. As trade became an important source of wealth, vistas widened. 2
Chapter 1
Sagacity in Governance: The Greek Exemplar
T
â•… The polity and economy of ancient Greece over the centuries throws up a fascinating interplay of relationships among the different interest groups in society. When the great administrative centres of the Mycenaean world began to collapse around 1200 bc, the repercussions were felt throughout the mainland and the Aegean Islands. Agamemnon’s Mycenae, Menelaus’ Sparta, Nestor’s Pylos, Oedipus’ Thebes, Theseus’ Athens— all great centres of material prosperity for hundreds of years— went into a rapid decline1 and a Dark Age followed for several hundred years. Greek society’s evolution from the Archaic Period, covering roughly the 8th–6th centuries bc, to the Classical Period, the 5th–4th centuries bc, offers interesting insights into the process of economic change. For centuries, the economies of antiquity had remained ‘embedded’ in society. In the Dark Age, the Greeks kept to themselves; the little trade that did go on was performed by outsiders entering their communities. In the latter part of the 9th century bc, the population began to grow rather suddenly, transforming the way people lived and produced their livelihood (Tandy, 1997: Chapter 2). The first Greek settlements and new trade activities started assuming importance during the 8th century bc. Till the early 5th century bc, the basic 3
4â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
building block of Athenian society was the okios or household, which produced for its own consumption: production and consumption was governed not by other people’s money but by societal and familial relationships and motivations. By the 4th century bc, unrelated individuals, often in the city only transiently, sometimes operating from abroad, engaged themselves extensively in commercial exchange and profit-making activities. Propertied citizens started supporting market-oriented activities, agricultural produce began looking for cash sales and workshops began churning out consumer items. The conservative commentator Xenophon (430–354 bc) has noted this shift from an embedded to a market economy. Aristotle saw it as ‘the moneyed mode of acquisition’ or ‘making money from one another’. The emergence of wealth as a monetary asset began to adversely affect traditional values and methods, and Aristotle rued the replacement of the earlier system by impersonal coined money. The 5th and 4th centuries bc were the watershed between the Dark Ages and the flourishing Mediterranean Civilisation in the late first millennium bc. Development of maritime trade and extensive monetisation in the Classical Period, leading to the growth of banking and commercial enterprises, spurred the evolution from a household economy to a money economy. In this evolution, the inter-relationships between the polity and economy were guided by cultural beliefs and traditions, but underlying it all was a streak of pragmatism. The economy and polity evolved hand in hand, marked by power struggles among landed aristocrats and a reform of the Constitution. The basic institutions of the polity combined with the pragmatic attitude of the ruling regimes enabled business to flourish and laid the foundation of Greek prosperity, despite the cultural and ideological inhibitions against business.
Chapter 1â•…Sagacity in Governanceâ•… 5
Political Reforms and Constitutional Structure The Athenian economy would not have flourished without the support of a stable polity and the development of a collective consciousness among citizens. As it evolved over nearly two centuries, the Athenian polity struck a workable balance among the different interest groups involved in economic activities. The polity had evolved from the basileus that was the centre of institutionalised paramountcy during the Mycenaean Civilisation. When the Mycenaean Civilisation collapsed, power became decentralised and leaders of independent communities— charismatic leaders, as Max Weber would characterise them— assumed control. With land ownership being the foundation of the power structure in agrarian economies, the degree of access to land resources became the key. The wealthier elite separated themselves from the rest of the community to maintain their economic advantage (Fried, 1967). Though little is known of the formal Constitution of the Greek cities in the Archaic Age, unlike that of Rome at a comparable stage of development, it is clear that the land-owning hereditary nobility enjoyed a privileged rule over the urban population. This class consolidated its power through an institutionalised legal structure in the form of an aristocratic council. When the Greek communities reached this extent of organisation, leadership in Weberian terms became legal and a mature polis appeared on the scene (Tandy, 1997: 93). Those with large landed property came to rule the polis that originated during the Dark Age. In the second half of the 7th century, indebted farmers who had mortgaged their land to rich landlords became legally enslaved when they defaulted in paying the mandatory one-sixth of their produce to these landlords.
6â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
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This led to the rise of ‘tyrants’ or unconstitutional rulers who secured control over the polity (Anderson, 1974: 30). It was through the celebrated reform programme of Solon, supplemented by Peisistratus (546–527 bc) and Cleisthenes (570–507 bc), that Athens found a way out of political chaos. Solon commanded the confidence of all classes for his fairmindedness and integrity; he was a person who claimed descent from the ancient kings, was only moderately rich, had seen the world as a merchant and was the author of patriotic verse as well as some outspoken poems condemning the rich for their greed. Installed in office towards the end of the 6th century bc, Solon reformed agrarian law as well as the Athenian Constitution comprehensively, stabilizing the polity and encouraging business. With his zeal for social justice, Solon set out to solve landrelated problems and bringing relief to the poor peasants. There would be no ‘unfree’ labour——labour that was in any way compulsory, involuntary, dependent, forced or coerced by non-economic factors. Solon sought to ensure that Athenian citizens did not have to suffer from any of the three kinds of bondages: debt-bondage and a fortiori, serfdom and chattel slavery. For, I gave to the people as much privilege as was sufficient, neither removing nor increasing what was their right. I made sure that those who had power and were admitted for their wealth suffered nothing unfair. I stood holding my mighty unjustly. (Buckley, 1996: 96)
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shield over both parties, and allowed neither side to triumph
While Solon did enough to ensure that the poor enjoyed freedom as unburdened landowners, he was careful to strike a
Chapter 1â•…Sagacity in Governanceâ•… 7
balance between conflicting interests and did not attempt to redistribute privately-held land. Peisistratus gave further relief to the poor, making arrangements for lending to needy farmers and helping them in a number of practical ways. These reforms checked the growth of the estates of the nobility and stabilized the small and medium farms. Solon’s reform of the constitutional structure created an equitable balance between different interest groups, thus laying the foundation for a feeling of collective consciousness among the citizens. No longer would nobility of birth be the criterion for holding political power. This diminished the political dominance of the Eupatridai or the well-born. The old class divisions were based on military capabilities——the knights or those who could afford to keep horses, the zeugitae or those who could equip themselves to fight in the hoplite phalanx and the thetes or labourers. Solon proposed landholding criteria.2 So magistrates were drawn only from the wealthiest classes, while other offices were open to second and third classes but not to the thetes. A property census was established, not unlike that in China in the early empire days and what would happen much later in England, the United States of America (USA) and other Western countries in the 18th and 19th centuries. Though the thetes were denied participation in the executive running of the government, they were given full membership of the assemblies, with full freedom of discussion. Round about 507 bc, Athens instituted a form of government that would become known as democratia—a council chosen by lot from among citizens with some property. Cleisthenes’ reforms included a rural voice by creating regional units called demes, based on existing villages. The demes governed themselves and also sent representatives to the council, counterbalancing the power of the aristocratic class in policy-making.
8â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
The result was a participative democracy based on a free, selfsufficient peasantry. Several institutions that are today recognised as the foundations of economic growth were born in that era: the rule of law, land distribution, debtor-creditor relations based on sanctity of property and integrity of currency. The right to property was fundamental to the development of trade and private economic enterprise. We should note here that the ruling polity was not influenced in any way with the anti-property sentiments of the political philosophers of the Golden Age of Greece. Plato, in his Republic, regarded property and virtue incompatible, though later, in The Laws, he allowed private property but wanted the state to ensure that it did not lead to extremes of wealth and poverty. Aristotle, in his Politics, challenged Plato’s vision of the ideal society. Though Aristotle shared his teacher’s belief that extreme inequalities in the distribution of wealth led to social strife, he regarded the institution of property as indispensable and ultimately a positive force. A unique feature of the Greek polity was its stability. There were sharp inequalities generated by factors such as size and profitability of landholding, opportunities for trade, aristocratic birth, marriage fortunes and military and political opportunities, not dissimilar to what prevails in our capitalist democracies. In the 7th century and earlier, before the emergence of democracy, there was probably a great deal of the kind of exploitation of the poor that we find in Solon’s Attica. In a Greek democracy, however, decision-making was by majority vote——probably for the first time in human history——so the poor, because they were the majority, could protect themselves to a certain extent. At Athens and some other cities in the 5th and 4th centuries bc,
Chapter 1â•…Sagacity in Governanceâ•… 9
there was an astonishing development of real democracy, extending to some extent right down to the poorest citizens; this was a good example of exceptional political factors operating in such a way as to counter-balance economic forces (Ste Croix, 1981: 97). This did not appear to have created any significant tensions within the economy, for they were all active participants in the assembly of the polis. It was participatory democracy that provided the safety valve.3
From Agriculture to Trade The Greek settlements, unlike the Phoenician ones, were founded mainly for agriculture rather than commerce, but the Greek polity actively encouraged traders and other economic agents associated with food grain imports, simply to pre-empt any rural unrest. This trade in food grain, and the fact that agriculture was not very profitable, prompted the large land owners to turn to cash crops like olives. As their incomes grew, this class wanted metals, slaves and other luxuries that had to be imported from all over the world. The aristocratic class that controlled the Athenian polity came to depend on foreign traders to maintain their lifestyle.4 The foreigners or metics were excluded from agriculture and from credit relations based on land, but they developed their own way of dealing with money and credit. It was out of this part of the society of foreign merchants that cities like Athens developed the commercial tradition that made it possible for her to enter the broader world of Mediterranean commerce (Curtin, 1984: 75–76). Fernand Braudel compares this development with what took place in Holland in the 17th century:
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10â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
(Holland) embarked on a golden age only when it started to
import Baltic grain in large quantities. This is why grain trade was revolutionary: it modified the structures of the Greek economy and subsequently those of society. Even a great ‘feudal lord’, as Louis Gernet would say, would become a markets. (Braudel, 2001: 232)
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♦
‘gentleman farmer’, watching commodity prices on foreign
Pragmatic Attitude towards Trade How is it that there was a radical transformation in the outlook towards trade, given the cultural antipathy against any kind of commercial calling? In Plato’s ‘Ideal State’, the merchant stood degraded in status, with property qualifications so fixed that he could never rise in influence within the Greek political hierarchy. Trade was kept at a distance from the citizen community and the propertied class, but it had to be allowed to be carried on by alien professional merchants and traders. The richer landowners played a crucial role in changing the outlook of the polity towards trade and in ensuring that there were no disruptions in trade routes and the economic agents, despite being foreigners, could run their business smoothly. A hard-core pragmatic attitude came to govern the policy towards traders. Most of the historical evidence in this regard comes from Athens, where foreigners were the mainstay of trade and industry; they were the source of what Marx would call ‘merchant capital’. Though politically degraded, these metics were given several institutional safeguards——their private contracts were honoured, they were immune from reprisal in the case of unpaid debts or unsettled disputes and their persons and goods were protected. It may not be unrealistic to conclude that
Chapter 1â•…Sagacity in Governanceâ•… 11
the merchants who conducted foreign trade belonged to an ‘international merchant class’—trading from place to place wherever they saw an opening, without concerning themselves entirely or even mainly, with the trade of the state in which they had citizenship or domicile (Reed, 2003: 33). The Greeks also pampered the foreign traders—with prominent seats at the theatre, meals at the public cost, priority in the business of law courts—so that they should come ‘not for gain but for honours, and as to friends’. In the 4th century bc, Athens developed facilities such as lodging houses, hotels and market places for foreign traders (Finley, 1966: 161). Plutarch (ad 46–120) says that, even as early as in the 6th century, Solon offered foreigners’ full citizenship rights if they came to Athens to ply their craft. Diodorus, a Greek historian of the 1st century bc, tells us that Themistocles (524–459 bc), the Athenian politician and general, prevailed upon the Athenians to abolish the tax on metics in order that they may immigrate in larger numbers from all parts and increase and extend Athenian manufacture. There was very little trace of xenophobia (CAH V: 298). State intervention in economic affairs was directed at steps to facilitate trade and ensure efficiency and integrity of transactions— enforcing the laws of contract, establishing standard weights and measures and building roads and harbours. The foreign policy was also oriented towards sustaining trade and economic prosperity. A network of nearly a thousand Greek settlements came up along the Mediterranean Coast, politically emancipated from their mother city but forming a loose confederation. The polity’s outlook towards these settlements was guided by the need to ensure steady supplies of grain. These settlements, usually established in thinly-populated territory, were controlled by agriculturists, with a few notable exceptions. In 477 bc, Athens masterminded the setting-up of a league of
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states, the so-called Delian League, as a defensive and offensive alliance against Persia. Although the members had equal voice in the league’s council, none could possibly match the power of Athens, which used the league to further her own interests. Since Athens controlled the sea, she could not only secure her own supplies of food and other necessities but also those of the weaker powers to enforce her imperial supremacy. In later periods of European history, war has been the means of fostering trade; in ancient Greece it served to bring in tribute for distribution among its citizens, who were thus enabled to approach their ideal of economic independence. The Athenian Empire was a conservative and even defensive one with its main purpose being the control over trade routes. Despite the seizure of territories, there was no ruthless exploitation of resources on the scale shown by later trading states such as Venice. Athens never built up sizeable reserves and a single siege could soak up three years’ worth of tribute (Freeman, 1999: 213).
Monetisation and Banking One of the major factors responsible for the rapid growth of trade and business was the progressive monetisation of the economy and development of banking which gave the Greek economy a sophisticated financial infrastructure as it emerged out of the Dark Ages from the 7th to 5th centuries bc (Mitchell, 1957: 313). This happened throughout the Mediterranean, and expanded with the military conquests of Alexander during the Macedonian Period (Davies, 1994: 81–86). Many regard this development as one of the most durable contributions of the Greek polity (Peacock, 2006). Coins as means of exchange came into universal use during the Classical Period in Greece.5 The ‘owls’ first coined by
Chapter 1â•…Sagacity in Governanceâ•… 13
Peisistratus in 546 bc and stamped with the Athenian Emblem became famous throughout the ancient world. This acquired a ‘fiduciary character’—as a means of payment, coins were not weighed but counted. Also, like today’s money, its issuer, the state, stamped it; the stamp served as a sign of the coin’s redeemability. Acceptability came to be enshrined in law mandatorily; not only would the state accept payment in coin, such payments had to be made in coin. The availability of silver from the Laurian mines led to the striking of coinage throughout the Greek lands. The accelerated use of fiduciary coins had important social, economic and political consequences. The fact that various things could be exchanged with and measured with money created a pervasive psychology for its unlimited accumulation, a psychology that one does not find in the Homeric Period. Aristotle attributes to money-making the notion that wealth and prosperity have no limit. In a marked contrast to the Homeric Period, several literary works of the Classical Period are replete with references to the role of money in political power struggles and military exploits. The Athenian banks were proficient in the use of credit, (Cohen, 1992: 14) with bankers enjoying high esteem and credibility. They had wide networks of relationships and handled considerable sums of money. As in modern times, banks went out to help political leaders, to ransom friends and to aid military operations. Even foreign bankers found their place among the Athenian elite and established households of their own. As the borrowers were of high political and social status, routinely seeking and obtaining substantial loans, sometimes even without pledging assets, it is clear that the banks were not pawn shops, as many economic historians seem to think, but were a social and economic force.
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All this would not have been possible without the polity’s positive but non-interfering role. Financial arrangements were subject to no control other than that of market conditions: commerce in Athens was never an affair of the state. Unregulated by oligopolistic or governmental controls, Athenian bankers were free to vary the conduct of their operations, to commingle bank and individual funds and to engage in speculative investments. The government did not proscribe or mandate any activity; nor were there any government charters permitting specific activities or limiting competition. Athenian law seems to have mandated the primacy of the contractual arrangements.
Economic Surplus from Slavery Athens’ economic prosperity was based on a unique socioeconomic structure: a class divide between citizen and slave or serf, in which the labour power of the slaves powered the polity’s prosperity. There is no escaping the sheer scale and the degree to which the Greek society was dependent on slavery; free labour was almost unknown. The idea of exploiting slave labour was an integral part of the classical Greek mindset and management of slave labour was the key to economic prosperity. Slaves accounted for nearly a third of the population of Athens. Slaves were found in every area of society, from the police force and workshops to estates and individual households (Ponting, 2000). But while Athens had nearly a 100,000 slaves, they enjoyed a status quite different from the common sense of the term. In banking, economic considerations provided the slave with a stature comparable with his business obligations. The Greek legal system was very accommodative to business needs,
Chapter 1â•…Sagacity in Governanceâ•… 15
including recognition of slaves’ responsibility for their own business debts, court appearance of slaves and so on. Like ordinary male citizens, many slaves could work in the public world of community and commerce without affronting social values. By contrast, even wealthy female citizens were restricted to the private sphere of the household. Slaves could even live and work away from the family residence. At Athens, slave craftsmen employed in the construction trades are known to have received wages in money; a group of nine or 10 slave leather workers are reported to have operated a workshop. The slave in charge paid their master a fixed sum of their obols per day, and the other slaves paid two obols.6 Milyas, who was responsible for the manufacturing businesses left by Demosthenes’ (384–322 bc) father, is said to have been entitled to keep the profits while paying the heirs a fixed sum. Meidas and his two sons ran a perfumery; their master received an accounting only monthly. The Laurian silver mines, on the strength of which Athens built her naval fleet and her monetised economy, were operated by large teams of slaves (Davies, 1994: 71–72). Mining underpinned the prosperity of Athens, making it partly a slave economy. In 431 bc, when the Peloponnesian War broke out, Sparta struck at this underpinning with a clever strategy: it set up a fortified base at Decelea, near Athens, to which slaves could flee. About 20,000 did so and this was considered by Thucydides to be a major blow to Athens’ economy. Demosthenes’ speeches give an insight into how the affluence of the trading class got built up. Many slaves though totally cut-off from the land and living in a rootless world, emerged as the ‘organisation men’ of the Athenian world. Phormion, Demosthenes’ client, had been a banker and a slave of Pasion, the former owner of the firm, who again had been the slave of two former owners (Burn, 1963: 323). Pasion began as a slave
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of a banking firm but rose to eclipse his former masters and became the most famous and wealthy of Greek bankers, whom the Athenian polity rewarded with citizenship. Pasion directed the largest shield factory in Greece, at Athens, and owned ships, farms and a number of houses in Africa. He also conducted an embryonic hire-purchase business, lending domestic articles such as clothes, blankets, silver bowls, and so forth, for a lucrative fee. Some bankers such as Pythius were also foreigners. Pythius operated throughout western Asia Minor at the beginning of the 5th century bc and was said to have become a multi-millionaire. The earliest banker in Greece proper was Philostephanus of Corinth, who prospered in the first half of the 5th century. Among his many important customers was Themistocles (Davies, 1994: 70–73). Most slaves came from the well-organised slave-trade rather than from defeated enemies.7 They were from diverse areas and spoke diverse languages. In relation to slaves, citizens did not have to defend their position against any organised class consciousness. Citizen-slave dimension of class was not symmetrical: citizens were organised, slaves were not.8 Struggle was presumably continuous, but covert. It does not enter the historical record, despite its significance for life (Mann, 1986: 219). Sagacity and foresight were the hallmarks of the Athenian polity during the Classical Period. Solon’s reforms helped to crystallize a political community of free men based upon fairly diffused land ownership and access to political rights by the whole citizen body (Ste. Croix, 1981: 260). At the same time, her wise approach towards trade and other commercial activities laid the foundation of her economic prosperity and military efficiency. It was the free and fairly substantial peasantry in Greece that produced the armies of hoplites, the heavily-armed foot soldiers who frustrated the might of the Persian Empire
Chapter 1â•…Sagacity in Governanceâ•… 17
at Marathon and Plataea (490 and 479 bc). The Greeks could defeat the Persian fleets in a few decisive engagements because of the indomitable fighting spirit of their sailors and marines; this spirit was inseparably bound up with the polis. As we discuss in the next chapter, the irresistible military power of Rome in her great days was similarly founded upon a free peasantry, at first conscripted, then, especially during the Principate, furnishing recruits in large measures voluntarily to a standing army. Ironically, the democratic institutions that helped the Athenian polity support her economic development failed to help her retain her hegemony. It was Philip, King of Macedon, who coordinated and combined mercenaries and Macedonians, rewarded them with booty and entered into a pan-Hellenic upper-class alliance (Ellis, 1976). Macedonians turned the Constitution of Athens into an oligarchy, limiting the exercise of political rights by its citizens. The Greek cities were never again fully autonomous. The spirit of democracy had been partly broken before the end of the 4th century bc, and its institutions had been gradually stamped out by the combined efforts of the Greek propertied class. The Greek propertied class, with the assistance of their Macedonian overlords, gradually undermined Greek democracy. In Byzantium, writers from at least the early 5th century onwards, use the word demokratia to denote ‘mob violence’, ‘riot’ and ‘insurrection’. The democracy which revived in the moderneworld was something new, and owes little direct y to the Greek demokratia. But by the very name it bears, it pays a silent but well deserved tribute to its ancient predecessor.
Notes 1. While there is no agreement on the cause of collapse, there are a variety of theories ranging from invasion by the Dorians (the descendants of Heracles in the later Greek myth) to a climate change of catastrophic proportions.
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2. Solon divided the citizen body into four classes according to the amount of produce that their land would yield. There were the producers of 500 bushels, of 300 bushels and 200 bushels, and the remainder called the thetes. Status was defined according to the contribution to community. 3. The thetes were not entitled to hold office, but they could speak in the assembly. Thetes at first formed the basis of the Athenian galley, with their influence in the Assembly growing as a result of their naval contribution. Aristotle noticed how the development of large galleys had led to rule by a ‘mob of oarsmen’. 4. ‘From Cyrene sylphium stalks and oxhides, from the Hellespont tunny and salt-fish, from Italy salt and ribs of beef… Syracuse offers port and cheese… from Egypt sailcloth and raw materials for ropes, from Syria frankincense. Fair Crete sends cypress wood for the gods, Libya plentiful ivory to buy, and Rhodes raisins and figs sweet as dreams; from Euboea come pears and big apples; slaves from Phrygia, mercenaries from Arcadia. Pagasae provides slaves with or without tattoos, and the Paphlagonians dates that come from Zeus and shiny almonds… Phoenicia supplies the fruit of datepalm and fine wheat-flour, Carthage rugs and cushions of many colours.’ (Mock-heroic dactyls from a comedy produced by the Hermippus in the 420s, quoted by M. Ostwald in his essay). 5. Though coins made of electrum, a mixture of gold and silver, appeared for the first time in about 685
bc
in Lydia, extensive use of coins started
in Athens, with silver mined from the Laurian ores. In the 6th century, Peisistratus used silver to hire troops to install himself and consolidate his regime. He also may have paid in coinage the workers on the building programme he had undertaken. 6. In ancient Greece, one silver obol was equivalent to 12 copper chalkoi (this was the smallest monetary unit), six obols were equivalent to one silver drachma (the main central standard monetary unit) and three drachmae could be exchanged for one silver slater. 7. Historians differ on this issue. Finley downplays internal wars and piracy as sources of supply and argues that after 600 bc most slaves in Greece were non-Greeks from the Danube Basin, the Black Sea region and Asia Minor. A large persistent demand for slaves used to provide steady work for slavetraders, some of whom combine slave-trade with other trades such as grain and timber. For the outlines of this controversy, see (Reed, 2003: 20–23).
Chapter 1â•…Sagacity in Governanceâ•… 19
8. There is an exception to this: the territorial imperialism of the Spartans who enslaved the adjacent population of Messenia and Laconia and had to face perpetual rebellion from them as they were capable of unity. This seems to have been also true of another serf people, the Penessati, who were enslaved by the Thessalians. The counter-strategy by many city-states was to recruit slave from diverse people to prevent any kind of organisation among them. This was also the strategy adopted by the Romans.
Chapter 2
Governance Culture: Roman Mirror
T
â•… The history of the Roman Republic and Empire, west and east, spans over 22 centuries, from 753 bc to ad 1453. A part of that immense period, from around 300 bc to the early 5th century bc, covers the rise and fall of the Western Roman Republic. Rome developed around 500 bc in Etruria as a small city-state and emerged as a Republic displacing the Etruscan Republic. It fought battles every year over the immediate area around the city and established its hegemony south of the Po Valley after her victory at the Battle of Sentinum in 295 bc. Having gained full control of southern Italy, she stepped out to involve herself with the outside world, ousting Carthage from her control of Sicily, and later conquering Sardinia and Corsica. Then followed a series of wars with Macedonia and later on with Carthage; by the middle of the 2nd century bc, Rome had gained full control of almost the whole of the Mediterranean. The Republic presided over the city’s growth from provincial obscurity to mastery of the whole Mediterranean. The process began with the election of the ruling consuls in 509 bc, ending 478 years later when Octavius established the first imperial dynasty. Territorial expansion reached its peak during the early stages of the imperial rule. The Age of Antonines (ad 86–161) 20
Chapter 2â•… Governance Cultureâ•… 21
described by Gibbon as the Golden Age of the Roman Empire, stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Euphrates and from the Carpathians to the Sahara, and was one of universal peace and widespread well-being. Peace, security and order provided the ideal conditions for economic growth. Peace and security was ensured by a disciplined army that owed its dominance as much to its training as to a strong and sophisticated economy, an impressive infrastructure of roads and harbours, access to sea routes across the Mediterranean and good logistics. Yet this empire, built on seemingly unshakeable foundations, started disintegrating within two centuries of reaching its peak. The Western Roman regime lasted for several centuries mainly because of its legions—the legion was not merely a military organisation, but a core institution around which the political regime could mobilize economic, political and for a time, ideological commitments. The Roman state could not keep the army large and disciplined enough to engage with the Germanic tribes and drive them away. This failure of the Western Roman regime was prima facie a crisis in resource raising, with deep historical roots. During the rise and fall of the Western Roman Empire, there were shifts in the relationship between the polity (the user of resources) and the resource providers (agriculture, trade and commerce). The early Republic’s growth was based on the resources raised from the farming community. The polity established its legitimacy and credibility by looking after the resource providers. But the equitable resource-raising policy had completely disintegrated by the late imperial phase. The crisis of resources that Rome experienced was fundamentally a crisis in political governance: the polity failed to keep an equitable balance between the different sections of resource providers within the citizen community.1
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Early Republican Phase Conventional accounts attribute the early Roman success to the greater cohesion and commitment of its farmer-soldiers as compared with the oligarchical traders and mercenaries of Carthage—a kind of partial replay of Greece versus Persia and Phoenicia. The army was formed with peasant farmers and reflected its social structure. Every soldier provided his own arms and equipment, which meant that every soldier had a farm or other property enabling him to acquire his outfit. The landless poor did not fight. The citizenry’s contribution to the army, graded according to wealth of the citizen, was equitable.2 There was thus a shared sense of ethnic involvement in the early years of the Republic (Hopkins, 1978: 30).3 Though there is scrappy evidence, the lower orders must have been largely satisfied with the leadership of the nobility and the rewards to be won under their command. Land acquired by conquest was used to satisfy the economic aspirations of the lower orders; they stood behind the patricians, as was evident from the fact that the Gallic sack of Rome in 390 bc had little effect either on the internal development of Rome or on the process of conquest. When the land acquired as a result of the capture of Veii (just across the Tiber) was distributed to Rome’s poor, an enormous new reserve of peasant soldiers was formed (Crawford, 1978: 26). In the early Roman Period, there was some commitment towards providing farmers with enough land for their sustenance. Pliny (ad 23–79) tells us all the people were given a plot of land of seven iugera each (the Roman measure of area equivalent to about 1.75 hectares or the area that could be circumscribed by two oxen in one day). The leadership emerging from the struggle of the orders gave Rome the strength and stability that enabled her to direct her energies towards military expansion.
Chapter 2â•… Governance Cultureâ•… 23
But increased militarism with its longer wars started creating serious distortions. As the senators became richer, the peasant class was becoming more impoverished. The historian Livy (bc 59–ad 17) tells us that, about 400 bc, when the soldiers were kept under arms throughout the year for the war with Veii, they returned to lands that had lain uncultivated. The same plight must have befallen the farmer-soldiers who spent six weary years in Spain in the 2nd century, those who fought in the Hannibalic War and those caught up in the civil wars later (Brunt, 1971: 16–17). The progressive impoverishment of the peasantry enabled the wealthier people to acquire agricultural land in a massive way. Outright land grabbing by the powerful, whether as a result of direct appropriation or of foreclosure, is a process that must have gone on throughout antiquity, except in Greek democracies, where the poor man could obtain effective protection from the courts of law (Croix, 1981: 225). On some occasions, when soldiers without land were finally disbanded, as when Sulla in 82 bc disbanded 23 of his legions, the problem was enormous: Sulla had to resettle nearly 100,000 troops. By about 25 bc, nearly 250,000 soldiers had been given land but most of them lost their land to the elite through sale or use of force (Ponting, 2000: 244). As society’s stratification widened, so did differentials in the army. About the 2nd century bc, centurions got twice as much booty as ordinary soldiers, but in the 1st century bc, under Pompey, they were getting 20 times as much and senior officers 500 times as much. Regular pay disparities widened, centurions receiving five times as much as soldiers, 19 by the end of the Republic and 16–60 times as much during the reign of Augustus (Mann, 1986: 255). The governing senatorial class was not affected: its pre-eminence was in fact enhanced by the changes taking place in the political structure of the Roman Empire.
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Rome at Her Peak: Deteriorating Governance Culture Territorial expansion through incessant military exploits brought out a radical transformation in the outlook and character of the governing class and its relationship with the masses. First, the ruling patrician class, which derived its power primarily from private property in land holdings, gained enormously from the fruits of the state’s conquests. The wealth of the Mediterranean that was pouring into Italy was in the hands of the generals, themselves drawn from members of the senatorial order who held magistracies. While some of the wealth was distributed among lower orders, much ended up in the hands of the governing elite. The administration of conquered provinces generated even more liquid wealth that flowed into the hands of the elite: the governors, quaestors and other magistrates, all drawn from the senatorial order and the tax farmers and army contractors, usually from the equestrian order.4 Second, despite the enormous wealth which poured into the treasury in the 2nd century, enabling the Senate to suspend the tributum for the propertied classes in 167 bc, nothing was done for the lower classes. Under the leadership of a few public spirited senators, Roman politics started polarising around two factions in the Senate: the Optimates, the people whose only interest lay in wealth and the senatorial class and the Populares, the champions of the depressed members, the citizenry. The Populares demanded the redistribution of land to dispossessed peasants who now flooded into Rome, as well as a reform of the voting procedure. Tiberius Gracchus, elected Tribune in 133 bc, proposed a land bill that would effectively divide the land, with individual limits, but this was far too revolutionary for the Senate. The factional struggle erupted into a Civil
Chapter 2â•… Governance Cultureâ•… 25
War and the Senate had Tiberius assassinated and 300 of his followers killed. The programme of Tiberius was taken up by his brother Gaius Tiberius. In 122 bc, much against the will of the Senate, he introduced subsidised grains for sections of the urban plebs. He also built storehouses and kept citizens at work with a road-building programme. The Senate would have nothing of it, and it declared martial law. In the riots that followed, 3,000 of the Populares were killed, and Gaius himself was beheaded (Crawford, 1978). Later, the Christian Church would play a big role in accentuating the rich-poor divide. From the time of Constantine (ad 274–337), the Christian Church had begun accumulating endowments in land and had to maintain an ever-increasing number of full-time stipendiary clergy to look after these properties. By the 6th century, the bishops and clergy had become far more numerous than the administrative officers and civil servants of the empire. Some rich senators and bishops had vast revenues. Even the humblest common soldiers, lower civil servants, the lesser clergy and the monks were often substantially better off than the peasantry. Third, the wealth acquired by the senatorial oligarchy was enormous by any standards.5 The rich oligarchy—thanks to the armature of influence, patterns of dependence, network of family connections and structure of obligations that it had been assiduously cultivating over decades—developed an autonomous structure of power, in many ways, a rival to the authority of the state itself. To a great extent, this was facilitated by the fact that officialdom occupied a very minor place in life. The state had just a handful of agents so it was not possible for it to reach out to all people and the rich oligarchy was able to extend its influence among the lower classes. Private power came to be joined with the public power. While the power originated in
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the palace, the ruling oligarchy helped maintain it throughout the empire, but the concentration of power in its hands proved dysfunctional and led to the disintegration of the state authority itself (MacMullen, 1988: 120). Fourth, the parallel authority entrenched itself through a web of venality and the spread of venality isolated the emperor; a substantial part of his authority was being sold independently by his servants. It was an utterly different world in which Marcus Aurelius (ad 161–80) had made himself accessible to his subjects, receiving those who approached him and preventing any guardsman around him from frightening away anyone whom they encountered. Fifth, emperor’s edicts aimed at forcing the rich oligarchy to attend to the affairs of civil society went unheeded. Senators rolling in wealth could spare little time for governance. During the late empire, the quality of governance became despicably low. The Greek historian Olympiodorus6 declared that ‘each of the great houses of Rome had in itself everything that a moderatesized town would be likely to possess—a hippodrome, forums, temples, fountains and numerous baths’. Sunk in leisure and frivolity, they were unworthy of their great traditions. The laws enforced by Valentinian I (ad 364–75), one of the most rigorous of emperors, had little impact on their behaviour. The law of ad 364 required the governors to pay more attention to the serious business of his office than to the pursuit of popularity by attending shows and entertainment. This had to be followed by another law in ad 369 reminding the governors of their duty to live in their official residences rather than pleasant retreats elsewhere; citizens who entertained governors on their private estates faced the prospect of confiscation (Matthews, 1990). A consul of the late imperial times enjoyed, as Gibbon remarked, ‘the undisturbed contemplation of his own dignity’.
Chapter 2â•… Governance Cultureâ•… 27
Sixth, the senators allied themselves with the business class in search of more wealth. It did not take long for the senators to set aside the traditional distaste for business. This traditional attitude in the early Roman Age is spelt out by Cicero7 in one of his best-known books, On Duty. In it, he condemned all incomes that could only be earned at the cost of public revulsion and dislike, mentioning tax gathering and money lending as examples. He shared with Plato and Aristotle, the opinion that labourers working for money are disreputable. ‘We are likewise to despise’, he goes on, ‘all who retail goods from merchants for prompt sale, for they would make no profits unless they lie abominably’. This aversion went back to the early republican days. Way back in 218 bc, the Roman people had agreed by a plebiscite to prohibit senators and their sons from owning cargo ships that allowed them to engage in foreign trade, and to take government contracts. Later, they were also barred from taking up contracts to collect taxes. As wealth opportunities grew, over the 1st century bc and the 2nd century ad, the Roman economy started becoming more sophisticated. This was particularly marked in the exchange of luxury goods and slaves, with which the state was little involved after the initial conquest. Seaborne trade continued to grow, leveling-off around 200 bc.8 This is also the period when there was a rapid monetisation. As the empire became a single monetary economy, enormous opportunities for generating wealth business and trade were thrown up and the senators, as the governing class, began adding to their riches. While the merchant class living within the margins of the Mediterranean urban society—‘obscure men of limited means’ as Cicero described them—evoked nothing but scorn, the ruling political class had little hesitation in cementing close ties with it.
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The non-senatorial members of the aristocratic families specialised in managing the business of the empire whereas the senatorial class saw risk purely in terms of the capital they invested in buying cargos, building ships and hiring crews. With the growth of business partnerships on the lines of joint stock companies, the activities of this oligarchy spread to many branches of economic life unconnected with public administration, such as foreign trade and house building (Andreau, 1991). The fact that the Republic possessed many income earning assets such as public forests, public aqueducts, a salt monopoly, public fisheries and metal mines but did not have a bureaucracy to operate these assets directly, made the oligarchy a dominating force in economic life as well. The careers of these men were in many ways as public as those of the senators. When their interests were at stake, they could be counted on to browbeat the senators at the voting assemblies. They first began to emerge as a separate force in around the middle of the 2nd century bc, and a number of them founded families from which the political or senatorial class was later recruited. Cicero’s father was one of them. While they stood outside politics, their prominence in society assured them of access to those in whose hands political power reposed.
Reining in the Governing Class: Failure How could the senators acquire this kind of culture when Rome boasted of a strong institutional back up for her republican tradition? Despite the republican origin, Rome evolved during that period into an aristocratic society, where the propertied elite monopolised public offices, as well as political, military and religious ones. A group of families known as patricians, who had
Chapter 2â•… Governance Cultureâ•… 29
existed under the monarchy, succeeded in the early years of the Republic in acquiring both a monopoly of secular and sacred office and almost complete control of the economic resources of the community (Crawford, 1986). During the five centuries of the Republic, the political centre of gravity was more often in the Senate than any where else, especially during the central period from about 300 bc to 130 bc. The consulate did not merely confer power upon its holder and dignity for life; it ennobled a family forever. Within the Senate, the descendants of consular houses, whether patrician or plebeian in origin, regarded the supreme magistracy as their birth right. The Roman voter could seldom be induced to elect any person to the supreme magistracy unless his family’s name was a part of the Republic’s history. By the end of the 2nd century bc, these noble families came to monopolise all the high offices, determining the history of the Republic and giving their names to its epochs (Syme, 1939: 18). They inter-married and shared the competitive ideals to enjoy abundant wealth and control the business of the state. As in its beginning, so in its last generation, the Roman Commonwealth was a name; it was the aristocratic oligarchy that governed the empire, using the family, money and political alliances. Not until the principate was there a separate central bureaucracy, and even then, its capacity to control the upper class administrators was extremely limited. Wealth looted and taxed by the state from conquered peoples was acquired by a decentralised class. Their rights over the surplus were derived from the private property rights guaranteed by the state and administered by a quasi-group of aristocratic jurists. The political structure was ineffective in controlling the activities of the rich oligarchy. With the growth of Rome, there developed a huge gap between the size of the citizen body and the capacity of political institutions for ensuring effective
30â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
participation. Only a tiny proportion of the citizens ever took part in politics, either in voting on legislation or in electing the lower magistrates. The contrast between Rome and in classical Athens is interesting: the popular institution in Athens existed on a different scale, even physically, with the assembly hall being considerably larger than the Roman Comitia Centuriata. In the Roman assembly, citizens voted in 193 ‘centuries’, with power loaded in favour of wealth and age. Although the citizen body increased dramatically, the people had little power to set the agenda and their involvement became almost entirely symbolic. There was thus a stark contradiction between the formal powers of the assembly and the structural framework, which discouraged mass participation. In Rome, the people’s institutions may have been powerful but that does not mean that the people as a whole were also powerful (Mouritsen, 2001: 32–43).
In the Declining Phase As an Empire of conquest,9 the Roman state had been used to meeting public expenses with the spoils won in the wars, apart from the acquisition of treasure, there had been a steady flow of tributes from the different regions. The Roman state achieved success by decentralising power to the provincial aristocracy. This had played, as in many other ancient economies, a strategic role in ensuring flow of treasures to the metropolis; this inflow is comparable in a way to what modern Europe absorbed from the New World. In the absence of forcible extraction of surplus through military exploits, political governance was not oriented in any way to explore the possibilities of economic surplus from wealth generating activities from within its own borders.
Chapter 2â•… Governance Cultureâ•… 31
The normal fiscal revenue consisted of the tributes of the provinces, the 5 per cent tax levied on inheritance and manumission of slaves, the 1 per cent or half per cent tax on commercial transactions, the internal and external customs, the income derived from the working of the mines and the rents on the public lands. While the availability of war booty became restricted, the cost of security went up substantially. The 4th century Roman army contained perhaps as many as 600,000 soldiers, all of whom had to be paid, equipped and supplied. What the state could spend was limited by the amount of cash that was available. The Emperor Hadrian’s attempt (ad 117–38) to consolidate the empire brought this inherent contradiction into sharp focus. Augustus (63 bc–ad 14) had managed to establish three new taxes10 that were quite low as a proportion of the gross product,11 but, together with the tributes from different regions, were adequate for more than two centuries. This state of affairs could have continued had the ruling regime developed a base of willing taxpayers. But it failed to do so, instead giving in to pressure from the rich aristocrats for several exemptions. Since the 1st century bc, inequalities of wealth had increased sharply, and the richer landowning classes, who were also allied with the traders and financiers, wielded considerable influence on the ruling emperors and warded-off attempts to raise resources from them. As a result, the tax base of the western empire shrank just when extra funds were urgently needed; the four-fifth’s tax relief that the imperial government was forced to grant to the provinces of central and southern Italy in 413 ad gives a clear indication of the scale of the loss (Ward-Perkins, 2005: 42). By ad 444, when Valentinian III instituted a new sales tax, matters had reached a parlous state as was evident from the preamble to the law; the emperor acknowledged here the urgent need to boost the strength of the
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army through extra spending, but lamented the current position, where ‘neither for newly recruited troops, nor for the old army, can sufficient supplies be raised from the exhausted taxpayers, to provide food and clothing’ (Ward–Perkins, 2005: 41). The land tax on the poor reached over a third of his gross product by Justinian’s reign and the rent paid by the tenant farmer was, in Egypt, at least half. Poor parents were often driven to infanticide. The sale of new-born infants had become so common that, contrary to the principles of Roman law, it was officially permitted by Diocletian’s day (ad 284–305) and the poor, despite the law, commonly sold or pledged their older children. Cassiodorus12 states that there was a regular market for peasants’ children at a great fair in southern Italy. So ruthless and efficient was the collection of rents and taxes that, however poor the crop, the quantity due to the state and the landlords was carried off to town, and the peasants might be left with little or nothing for their own needs. The condition of the urban poor, though they were much more lightly taxed, was no better (Jones, A.H.M, 1964: 1043–44). The tax raising powers were seriously constrained by the obstructive stance of the aristocratic class, leading many historians to conclude that in the later empire rich landowners’ capacity to resist the central government’s attempts to raise taxes was the rock on which the western empire foundered (Hopkins, 1978). The ruling regime had thus no option but to resort to desperate measures to raise resources and the instrument that came to be deployed with increasing frequency was debasement of coinage leading to severe inflationary pressures, associated with intense social and economic misery. The debasement consisting in the gradual reduction of the silver denarius,13 started under Commodus (ad 180–192), and was practiced to a greater extent under Septimius Severus (ad 193–211) and
Chapter 2â•… Governance Cultureâ•… 33
Caracalla (ad 211–17), reaching its peak on the eve of Diocletian’s coming to power, when the silver content was no more than 5 per cent of the weight. Thereafter, despite a few desperate attempts to restore Augustan standards, debasement became gradually the accepted method by which emperors sought to make ends meet. Occasional reforms were doomed to failure.14 We can now recapitulate the essentials of governance culture as they evolved during the different phases of the rise and fall of the Western Roman Civilisation. The ruling oligarchic regime in the republican era could achieve spectacular military success because the instrument for its territorial expansion was an army of voluntary peasant citizens. In subsequent centuries, the increase of militarism disrupted this delicate governance balance even as the ruling class appropriated substantially the spoils of war. The checks and balances failed to rein in the governing oligarchy. With a possessive and self-centered rich ruling oligarchy, an autonomous power centre emerged, virtually undermining the authority of the state itself. Surplus from military exploits started declining with consolidation of the empire from Hadrian’s time, and extraction of surplus from the impoverished peasant community had reached its limit. The unconcern of the governing class with the grievances of the citizens made the citizens themselves indifferent to any call for public service and collective sacrifice in crises. The tradition of public service among senators and members of the equestrian order that was a remarkable feature in the early republican period became virtually extinct later; rank and wealth associated with office became their obsession. The preoccupation with self-interest had become so pervasive that the only way to secure honest provincial governors, as Marcian cynically declared, was to appoint men who did not wish to serve (Jones, 1964). While the upper classes were proud of being
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Romans and valued Roman Civilisation, their loyalty was of a very passive character. In the face of the barbarian invasions, the propertied class took measures to protect their large estates that they had acquired over centuries and offered protection to tenant cultivators and the slave labour associated with their land. Gradually the church and the monasteries, with their immense possessions worked by tenant farmers and slaves, strengthened an autarchic system. This opened up the move towards selfsufficiency among large estates. Thus was born the main structure of the manorial economy of the Middle Ages, with the large estate-owner emerging as lord and patron, offering protection to those connected with his land, with bondage of loyalty that came to be characterised as serfdom.
Notes 1. Every generation has approached the Roman world differently and has found different things interesting. Shakespeare explored the dilemmas of power in his Roman tragedies. Kipling saw the Roman Empire as a paradigm of the British Raj. The trial of Warren Hastings was, to many, a replay of the celebrated trial of Verres (a notoriously rapacious Roman governor of Sicily) denounced by Cicero. As one surveys the rise and fall of Rome, one cannot but be struck by many uncanny similarities that arise from universality of basic human nature and motives. Today, in the globalising world, as we are confronted with several live issues of political governance and ruling class culture, the Roman past may as well be a mirror to us. The decline and fall of the Roman polity has been the subject of extensive research by historians and sociologists. Edward Gibbon, for example, inspired by the secularist thinking of the 18th century enlightenment, blamed it on the 4th century triumph of Christianity and the spread of monasticism —‘a large portion of public and private wealth was consecrated to the specious demands of charity and devotion; and the soldier’s pay was lavished on the useless multitudes of both sexes, who could only plead the merits of abstinence and chastity’. The evolutionist criteria,
Chapter 2â•… Governance Cultureâ•… 35
strengthened through Darwinism, the great fashion at the end of the 19th century, linked themselves with the ancients’ belief in periodic cycles; for them, civilisations come into being, grow and mature, but when the life cycle is completed, must decline and vanish. In the early 20th century, the fall of Rome tended to be explained in terms of the grand theories of racial degeneration or class conflict. The Marxist version, from Marx himself to Perry Anderson and Ste. Croix, has blamed slavery and the undermining of free peasantry. The ‘bourgeois-democratic’ version represented by M. Rostovtzeff has blamed the state for preventing the emergence of the middle class whereas the ‘bourgeois-industrial’ version has stressed the absence of technical inventiveness. The relative emphasis on the different factors has varied in response to shifts in the dominant intellectual fashions of the day (Bernardi, 1970). 2. The richest class (eventually the equestrian order) provided 18 centuries (a 100 men each) of cavalry; the next class, a 100 centuries of hoplites; the next, 20 centuries of infantry without coats of mail or shields; the next, 20 centuries without greaves; the next, 20 centuries equipped only with spear and javelin; the next, 30 centuries carrying slings were called assidui, because they provided financial assistance to the state. Each century had equal voting rights in the principal popular assembly, the comitia centuriata. 3. The Roman ability to sacrifice was displayed during the prolonged battle of attrition with Carthage. For nearly 200 years, about 13 per cent of citizens were under arms at any one time, and about half served for at least one period of seven years. Rome succeeded in consistently putting greater numbers into the field, replacing her dead and wounded more rapidly than did the Carthagians (Hopkins, 1978: 30 ff). 4. Concerning their activities, we have abundant cynical sources. For example, in the second half of the 2nd century bc, we have this lament: ‘As for me, I need a quaestor or supplier, who will supply me with gold from the state money-bags’. In the 1st century bc came the oft repeated saying that a provincial governor needed to make three fortunes: one to recoup his election expenses, another to bribe the jury at his expected trial for misgovernance and a third, to live off thereafter. Cicero summed it up: ‘one realises finally that everything is for sale’ (Mann, 1986: 268). 5. By any standards, the wealth owned by the senators was enormous. In 160 bc,
Senator Lucius Aemilius Paullus, who had conquered Macedonia, died
worth only 370,000 denarii. Polybus, the Greek historian, reckoned him
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poor for a senator, yet his capital was 900 times that would be required of a legionary (Brunt, 1971: 17). In the next century, the lands of Marcus Crassus, a general and assassin of Caesar, alone were valued at 50,000 denarii; he used to say that no one could be counted rich unless he could maintain an army from his income. Pompey and Caesar were richer still (Ibid.). The income of Pliny (an equestrian administrator, historian and writer on natural phenomena, known as the Elder, to distinguish him from his nephew,
ad
23–79) was about 1,000 times higher than a reasonable es-
timate of income that would provide a decent standard of living, about 1,000 sesterces, a fifth of which is an absolute subsistence level with enough food to live on. His estates generated enough income to support about the fifth of a legion: he could maintain about 2,400 people at the subsistence level. Pliny was not one of the richest senators, but if we take his income as average of the senatorial elite, then the income of the senatorial elite could support about 1.2 million people at subsistence levels or 600,000 soldiers. By the middle of the 2nd century
bc,
the existence of only two classes in
Rome had come to be clearly differentiated—the senatorial class and the mass of the people (Alston, 1998: 217–19). One can do no better that quote from the classic study on Roman Republic by Ronald Syme: The fortunes of the great politicians were gross and scandalous. When the older Balbus died, he was able to bequeath to the populace of Rome a sum as large as Caesar had, 25 denarii a head. But Balbus began as a millionaire in his own right. Agrippa rose out of nothing: he came to own the whole of the peninsula of Gallipoli. Statilius Taurus possessed a variety of properties in Istria, whole armies of slaves at Rome. The successful military man of parsimonious tastes, L. Tarius Rufus, acquired a huge fortune from the bounty of Augustus, which he proceeded to dilapidate by grandiose land speculation in Picenum … Lollius, officially commended for integrity, left millions to his family, not the blameless possession of inherited wealth, but the spoil of the provinces. His grand-daughter, the beautiful Lollia Paulina, paraded like a princess. It was her habit to appear, not merely at state banquets, but on less exacting occasions, draped in all her pearls and little else: her attire was valued at a mere 40 million sesterces. (Syme, 1939: 381)
Chapter 2â•… Governance Cultureâ•… 37
╇ 6. Born at Thebes (Luxor, Egypt). Wrote history of memoirs from 407 to 425. ╇ 7. Cicero (430–106 bc), Roman jurist, orator and philosopher, wrote treatises on law, politics—the best known being On Duty—and rhetoric, and a large number of speeches which he delivered to the Roman Senate. Cicero was a staunch republican and was executed in 43 bc. ╇ 8. Taxes and Trade in the Roman Empire, in Journal of Roman Studies, 70, Quoted in (Mann, 1986: 271). ╇ 9. Seventy per cent of public treasury was spent on the army, for, as militarism was key to the prosperity of the Roman empire, it had to be properly maintained and kept satisfied. The second objective was pacification of people: about 15 per cent of treasury was utilised on corn distribution (bread and circuses). The remaining budget was spent on the maintenance of bureaucracy and senatorial and equestrian administrators. 10. First, a 1 per cent general sales tax; second, the tributum soli, a 1 per cent tax on the assessed value of land, and third, the tributum capitis, a flat rate of poll tax on adults, aged from 14 to 65. 11. Per capita taxes amounted to only 13 HS per person/year, or 28 kg wheat equivalent per person/year (11 per cent of the minimum subsistence level). Since many inhabitants of the empire produced and consumed significantly more than minimum subsistence, the actual rate of taxation was significantly less than 5 per cent. Of course the tax burden was not evenly distributed, and taxes transmitted to the central government were probably less than the total of taxes exacted by greedy and corrupt tax collectors. Peasants however did not see the taxes as low; there is significant evidence that many Egyptian peasants struggled to pay their poll tax in cash by splitting into several instalments (Hopkins, 1978). 12. Cassiodorus (ad 485–585) was a Roman statesman and writer, serving in the administration of Theodoric the Great, king of Ostrogoths. He kept copious records and letterbooks concerning public affairs. 13. For more than half a millennium, from the 3rd century 3rd century
ad,
bc
to the
the Roman monetary system was based on the silver de-
narius, with its fractions quinarius equivalent to half denarius and sestertius equivalent to one-fourth denarius. It became in imperial times the official monetary unit, numus. The state had also a gold coin, aureus, originally 8 g, gradually reduced to 7 g; this coin was equal to 25 denarii. Copper money had only a fractional function. See the section on Roman Finance, from Augustus to Aurelian, 14 bc–ad 275 in (Davies, 1994).
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14. Note the following observation of Ste. Croix: Given that the Roman Empire was to be stabilised and strengthened, without any fundamental change in its nature, it was fortunate indeed in most of its rulers from Diocletian to Theodosius I (284–395). What men could do, within their rights they did. Sometimes they appear in quite a heroic role. But, ironically enough, the very measures they took, necessary as they were if the system was to be maintained, helped to break up the empire, for the increases in the army and civil service involved the extraction of an increased surplus from the already overburdened peasantry. (Croix, 1981)
Chapter 3
Tolerant Ambience: India
S
â•… South Asia is topographically diverse, containing a range of economies which produce an astonishing variety of raw materials and manufactured items. During the 1st millennium bc, there was an increase in traffic and maritime trade across the Indian Ocean. Peninsular India, Sri Lanka and the Maldives were linked into an extensive coastal trading network that used ports along India’s west coast from Gujarat to the Malabar Coast.
Early Trade Contacts This trade led to a dramatic increase1 in the range of contacts among peoples across the ocean between the Middle East, South Asia and South East Asia from at least the 7th century bc. In part, this was due to the establishment of new states and empires, underpinned by large-scale agricultural systems in India and the Mesopotamian heartland of the Middle East. In the 6th century bc, under the Achaemenid Dynasty, the Persians extended the boundaries of the earlier Assyrian Period to incorporate new trade frontiers in Thrace on the eastern fringe of Europe, Anatolia, central Asia and the Indus Valley. During this period, the market places of the Indo-Gangetic plain and Sri Lanka were linked to those of the Middle East by merchants from the Persian heartland and from the Mediterranean. 39
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A complex network of overland and maritime trade routes linked previously isolated parts of India into a greater subcontinental economy, in which the agricultural wealth of the Indo-Gangetic plain and the tropical South and Sri Lanka were linked via the mineral-rich Deccan. In the Indo-Gangetic plain, urban life and long distance trade had flourished during the centuries of Persian power and Greek influence in the west, even as the centre of population and economic activity moved from the Indus Valley to the Ganges Valley. Trade links with the Persian Empire and central Asia were also consolidated during these centuries, as were maritime links with insular South East Asia. Political consolidation in South Asia and the Middle East went hand-in-hand with increasing economic activity and technological innovation (McPherson, 1993: 37). There is a consensus from archaeological findings that the period from the 7th to 5th century bc was a very decisive phase in the development of Indian trade and economy (Kulke and Rothermund, 1998: 49).
Urbanisation With the establishment of republics and kingdoms in northern India by about 600 bc, the details of Indian history began to emerge with greater certainty. From the numerous small tribal kingdoms ( janapada), 16 major ones (mahajanapada) emerged in the 5th century bc (Majumdar, 1951: Chapter 1). The rise of the mahajanapadas was directly connected with the emergence of the early urban centres of the Gangetic plains in the period after 600 bc. These urban centres grew around what had been villages specialising in particular crafts such as pottery, carpentry and cloth-weaving. Among the important indicators of the urban economy’s importance are the punch-marked coins
Chapter 3â•…Tolerant Ambienceâ•… 41
found in the Gangetic cities and the existence of standardised weights from the 5th century bc. Five of the six major cities in the central Gangetic plains were capitals of mahajanapadas: Rajagriha, (Maghada), Varanasi (Kasi), Kausambi (Vatsa) and Champa (Anga) (Kulke and Rothermund, 1998: 50). Growing urbanisation threw up new groups such as merchants and artisans who organised themselves into guilds, with each guild occupying a particular section of the town. The guilds at this stage were not the highly developed mercantile system that they were to become in the early centuries of the Christian Era (Thapar, 1966: Chapter 3). The services they provided were important to the ruling groups, whose aim was to gain access to the profits of trade and to the marketplace as a means of converting the agricultural produce that they gathered as taxes into luxury commodities and precious metals.
The Mauryas With the coming of the Mauryas at the end of the 4th century bc, the political complexity was simplified. Within the first 90 years of the dynasty, by the 3rd century bc, the largely diverse elements of the subcontinent were welded into an empire with an imperial vision that was to dominate the succeeding centuries of Indian political life. Land revenue was organised as the accepted source of revenue whose predictability through efficient collection created a feeling of fiscal security. Kautilya, who may be regarded as the theorist of the system, refers at length to the methods of tax collection and related problems. As in China during the later Han Dynasty (ad 25–220), the state attached great importance to irrigation, making arrangements for measuring and distributing it. Commercial enterprises, particularly in the coastal regions, came under government
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supervision and taxes were collected regularly. But economic activities other than agriculture were never discouraged. Arthasastra, Kautilya’s treatise on statecraft, describes in general terms the trade transacted in the international markets found on the coasts during these times and makes a distinction between internal and external commerce. For external commerce, a focal point was the Pattana, an emporium designated by local rulers as a legal centre for the exchange of goods that arrived by boat or caravan. It was administered by royal officials, coordinated by a supervisor whose chief function was to keep an eye on merchants and artisans so that they did not cheat their customers. The supervisor, who also set a fair price, was subordinate to a ‘commissioner of ports’, who framed regulations for the port town (Hall, 1985: 33). A Chinese record, a Han history text dating from ad 125, describes that profit from trade with the north-west coast of India was tenfold of what could be earned elsewhere, but honest (Ibid.: 36). The Mauryan economy came under considerable stress because of the need for vast revenues to maintain the army and pay the salaries of officials and settlements on newly cleared land. Although it was a flourishing and expanding economy in its early stages, its revenue stream soon became insufficient to sustain the empire. There is evidence that the later Mauryan kings debased the silver coinage, indicating the pressure on normal channels of revenue that was required for the maintenance of the empire (Thapar, 1996: 89). The bureaucracy was organised on the basis of personal loyalty to the king and a change of king meant a realignment of loyalty or a change of officials. This was completely different from what had come to prevail in China. A well organised and formal bureaucratic structure that came to be established there possibly explains the longer survival of the Chinese dynasties during the same period (Ibid.).
Chapter 3â•…Tolerant Ambienceâ•… 43
By 180 bc, the first experiment in imperial government had ended. The future patterns of imperial governments were different. In later periods, officials and landowners became intermediaries between the king and his subjects, with much of the power of the kings delegated to them, making it increasingly difficult to collect revenue to support a vast administrative apparatus.
Extension of Maritime Links Underlying the complex political events, there was one factor that gave continuity and consistency to this period, and that was trade. There was life beyond politics and powerful economic forces created an expanding economic trade network of the Indian Ocean. Indian merchants and seafarers responded to the rise in domestic and foreign interest by establishing communities in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Westward from India, they provided an economic link between great sophisticated civilisations, whereas, eastward from India they provided a link for both economic and cultural interaction between an established civilisation and a range of societies undergoing rapid economic and social change. Throughout South East Asia, societies moving towards the formation of their first urban centers and states were continuously exposed to merchants drawn from the sophisticated civilisation of India. Such merchants were not the vanguard of a great Indian migration into Southeast Asia, but were the precursors of a movement of literate and skilled Indians to ports and royal cities in Southeast Asia in search of profit and employment. In this period, the seas of South East Asia became an extension of the maritime world of the Indian Ocean and not a half
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way house to China.2 (Chinese maritime contact with South East Asia, as distinct from Chinese maritime exploration, was relatively limited until the 10th century ad, and the first substantial external contacts the peoples of South East Asia had, were with India.3) Maritime trade was a significant factor in political life in central and southern India and Sri Lanka. While agriculture was the main prop underpinning all states in South Asia, in parts of the subcontinent and Sri Lanka, maritime trade generated revenue through levies and duties on markets and harbours. New coastal urban centers such as Broach (Barugaza), Cragnanore (Mouziris) and Arikamedu (Podouke) developed during the last centuries of the first millennium bc. The fortunes of these towns depended on maritime trade, not on agricultural and craft activities (McPherson, 1993: 54). The sea links were a stimulus to trade, with local chiefs in South India and South East Asia developing their coastal ports to serve the needs of the international trading community. They generated income from various port cesses and were able to transform this income into political advantage. For instance, a local leader with an income sufficiently higher than that of his fellow chiefs could expand his base by enlisting the support of rival chiefs and their followers. This support could then be used to protect or provision of the port, to police the sea channels against piracy, stabilise the hinterland, guarantee the flow of food to visiting merchants or assure the delivery of local products desired by traders. Followers thus became the facilitators of international trade through direct redistribution of profits (Hall, 1985: 47). In this way, access to the sea and the creation of coastal markets and harbours was one of the determining factors in the formation of many coastal states in India, most particularly along the Malabar, Coromandel and Orissa coasts
Chapter 3â•…Tolerant Ambienceâ•… 45
and in Sri Lanka, where the prosperity of the great state of Anuradhapura was dependent upon trade through the port at Mantai and control of irrigation systems across northern Sri Lanka.
Trade Unifies the Sub-continental Economy Following the decline of the Mauryan Empire in the 2nd century bc, several powerful states emerged in the Deccan, the most notable being that ruled by the Satavahana Dynasty (50 bc–ad 225), which took a keen interest in maritime trade via the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal from ports in the east and west coast of India. (These ports were listed in The Periplus4 and were visited by ships from Egypt and the Persian Gulf). During this period, the early Chola kings (1st to 4th centuries ad) gained access to both the east and the west coasts of the Southern tip of the peninsula. This proved to be remarkably useful, connecting ports on both coasts, the overland route and the sea coasts as well from the east and west, as was the case with Roman trade (Thapar, 1966: 104). The discovery and excavation of the Arikamedu site near Pondicherry on the South Eastern coast of India gives proof of the existence of an expanding maritime trade network connecting east and west. Reaching its zenith during ad 23–96, Arikamedu was an entrepoint, complete with harbour, warehouses and merchant residences (Hall, 1985: 28). For the Tamils, this was the period of evolution from tribal chieftainships to kingdoms and to a more complex politico-economic structure, impacted significantly by the Aryan culture, which brought with it the familiar pattern of hereditary kings, taxation systems and an administrative culture.
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The emergence of Satavahana power, straddling the north-
♦
♦
This absorption of South India into the commercial development of the subcontinent has been recognised by historians as a very significant development towards the formation and functioning of the subcontinent as a single economic unity.
ern Deccan, provided lines of communication between the north and the South, and trade within the subcontinent increased. Roman trade with the east and the west coasts and its concentration in the South helped in ending the isolation of the Southern kingdoms. The word used in the Tamil records for a citizen of the Roman empire is yavana, the iden(Thapar, 1966: 105)
♦
♦
tical world which early Sanskrit sources use for the Greeks.
The whole of India was by now criss-crossed by trade routes, some of which continued further into central Asia and western Asia. Indian traders were establishing trading stations and merchant colonies in places like Kashgar, Yarkand, Khotan, Miran, Kuchi, Qara-shahr and Turfan, remote regions that were opened up not only by Indian merchants but also by Buddhist missionaries (Thapar, 1966: 107). Across the seas also, it was the merchant communities from the South Indian coastal towns who explored the Golden Islands (Java, Sumatra and Bali) to make profits on spices sold to the Romans. Through all the political vicissitudes of the different political dynasties—the Sungas, Satavahanas, Indo-Greeks, Sakas, Kushans, Cheras and Cholas—the merchant continued to grow from strength to strength. We can do no better than give the following quote from the historian Romila Thapar (p. 109) capturing the extensive trading activities that marked this period of Indian civilisation:
The Mauryan empire had opened up the sub-continent by
♦
♦
Chapter 3â•…Tolerant Ambienceâ•… 47
building roads and attempting to develop a uniform system of administration. The occupation of northwest India by nonIndian peoples was advantageous to the merchant, since it led to trade with regions which had as yet been untapped. The Indo-Greek kings encouraged contact with western Asia and the Mediterranean world. The Sakas, Parthians and the Kushans brought central Asia into the orbit of the Indian merchant and this in turn led to trade with China. The Roman demand for spices and similar luxuries took Indian traders to South East Asia and brought Roman traders to Southern and western India. Through all India, the merchant community prospered, as is evident from inscriptions, from their donations and charities, and from the literature of the time. Not surprisingly, the religions supported by the merchants, Buddhism and Jainism, saw their heyday during these centuries. However this is not to suggest that economic activity was limited to trade, or that agriculture had decreased; the latter continbrought those associated with commerce to the fore.
♦
♦
ued to yield revenue. But the boom in mercantile activity had
Religion and Trade Buddhism and Jainism evolved in a period of tremendous economic and intellectual ferment in India. In the Ganges valley, the emergence of cities and the first states, challenges to old forms of religion and social organisation by new elites and newly emerging social groups such as merchants, led to a questioning of traditional beliefs and social organisation. In response to the perceived shortcomings of early Hinduism, new
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philosophies proposed new ideas and means for sustaining intellectual, spiritual and social life, particularly in the urban areas. Within Hinduism there were movements to develop traditional beliefs and practices, but for many the answer was to seek new forms of salvation. The 1st century ad or bc marked a great age of Buddhism in South Asia. Buddhism did not view commercial activity as negatively, as did Hindu tradition. Its spread during this time was tied to the evolution of the new Mahayana Buddhist School, which can be viewed as a response to a dynamic and expanding world—a world intimately connected to commerce. Under the patronage of rich Indian merchants, Buddhist monks who instructed the lay community split with the monks of the Teravada School, who practised religion in the seclusion of monasteries (Hall, 1985: 37). In Buddhist tales ( Jatakas), the pursuit of wealth, as long as it was not accomplished at the expense of others, was not seen as evil but was considered natural to man. Indian Ocean seamen were particularly devoted to Buddha Dipankara, the Calmer of the Waters. Jainism spread rapidly among the trading community. The emphasis on non-violence prevented Jains from becoming farmers, since cultivation involved killing of insects and pests; it also excluded crafts endangering the life of other creatures. Trade and commerce were possible occupations and the encouragement of frugality in Jainism coincided with a similar sentiment in commercial activity. The strict limitation of private property enforced by the Jains was interpreted to mean landed property. The Jains specialised in conducting the exchange of manufactured goods and acting as middlemen, confining themselves to financial transactions. Thus, Jainism came to be associated with the spread of urban culture. The west coast provided maritime commerce, with the Jains playing money-lenders while others voyaged overseas with the merchandise.
Chapter 3â•…Tolerant Ambienceâ•… 49
Gupta Dynasty After the collapse of the Mauryan Empire and throughout the period from 200 bc to ad 200, India was politically fragmented till the rise of the Gupta Empire which dominated northern India between about ad 320 and ad 550. This was always a powerful state because of its control over important mineral resources, especially iron, and its ability to dominate the key trade routes along the valley, especially those to northwest India and thereafter into central Asia. Indian ships were now regularly traversing the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean and China Seas. Guilds continued as the major institution in the manufacture of goods and in commercial enterprise. They remained almost autonomous in their internal organisation, the government respecting their laws (Thapar, 1966: 147). The laws were generally drafted by a larger body, the corporation of guilds, of which each guild was a member. The Buddhist Church or the Sangha was by now rich enough to participate in commercial activities. The close association of Buddhism with the mercantile community must have encouraged the Sangha to invest in commerce. In certain cases, the Sangha acted as a banker and loaned money on interest (Ibid.). Jainism remained unchanged and continued to be supported by the merchant communities of western India. The Guptas faced a similar crisis in resources as the Mauryas. The maintenance of an imperial façade must have resulted in a pressure on the economy. The later Gupta coinage indicates an economic crisis. Revenue came mainly from the land, commercial activities no longer providing as large an income as they had done earlier. Roman trade declined after the 3rd century ad and with the Hun Invasion of the Roman Empire, it came to an end. Indian merchants meanwhile had begun to rely more heavily on the South East Asian trade. The commercial prosperity of the
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Gupta era was the concluding phase of the economic momentum which began in the preceding period (Thapar, 1966: 147). With the passing of the power and influence of the Guptas and their immediate successors in northern India, the centre of interest shifts Southwards again to the western Deccan and even further South to Tamilnadu. The Pallava Period in South India saw the culmination of what had been a gradual process of assimilation of Aryan institutions. Since there were no large areas under cultivation on a scale as vast as in the Ganges plain, the Pallavas and the Chalukyas had a limited income from land. Mercantile activity had not developed sufficiently to make a substantial contribution to the economy. Nonetheless, the Pallavas maintained a navy to assist in the maritime trade with South East Asia, where by now there were three major kingdoms: Kambuja (Cambodia), Champa (Annam) and Shrivijay (the Southern Malay Peninsula and Sumatra) which were in close contact with India, with South Indian merchants in particular travelling out in search of trade. On the west coast, the initiative in the trade with the Occident was gradually passing into the hands of the foreign traders settled along the coast, mainly the Arabs. Indian traders were becoming suppliers of goods to foreign countries, and communication with the West became indirect, via the Arabs and limited to trade alone. With South East Asia, the continuity of cultural contacts increased, with Pallava architectural styles and Tamil script extensively used among the local royalty (Thapar, 1966: 179–80).
A Tradition Set During the centuries immediately preceding and following the beginning of the Christian Era, India set a tradition of unique relationships between polity and the different actors involved in
Chapter 3â•…Tolerant Ambienceâ•… 51
the creation of wealth. Being mainly a land-based region with a long coastal line, the different polities, empires or local rulers, had been always pragmatic in tapping both these sources for their revenue needs. Principles and methods of land revenue collection were clearly set out and institutionalised. The traditions set in this regard by the Mauryan and Gupta dynasties were followed by the polities in the successive centuries. Autonomy of trade was respected and foreign merchants given safeguards. Trade expanded through a culture of tolerance but never by means of warfare.
Notes 1. It was round about this time that the secrets of the monsoon winds were unravelled in the Indian Ocean. The cycles of the monsoons provided the basic rhythms of long distance voyaging across the Indian Ocean. 2. Once trade along the Silk Road became more dangerous and expensive in the 5th and 6th centuries
ad,
then the sea route to China via South
East Asia became an attraction in itself and the seas of the South East Asia assumed the role of linkage point between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. 3. It was not until the 6th century, under the Sui Dynasty (581–618 ad) that the Chinese began to explore the South China Sea systematically, and not until three centuries later that they became a major maritime mercantile force in the area. 4. The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea is an Egyptian Romano-Greek merchants’ guide to the western Indian Ocean compiled between
ad
40 and 75 by an
anonymous sailor who had actually made the voyage from Rome to the ports of western India.
Chapter 4
Resource Raising: Uniqueness of China
I
â•… Imperial dynasts through history have been generally skilled in the use of war in state formation and maintenance. Empires were not created by the cultivation of virtue, any cultural orientation to political order or ideological pleas for ethnic unity; they were created by decades of war and political strife.1 Chinese history was, among other things, a long struggle to attain—and recurring to regain—political unity; the classic cycle as for a strong man to win control of all China by military means and to pass his leadership on to his eldest son. The vigour of the founding emperor and often the consolidating successes of his son, established a pattern of dynastic institutions that stabilised the nation and perpetuated peace and prosperity for generations after them. In setting up new institutions and strengthening the existing ones, Chinese rulers had to address two basic issues of governance. One—and this was a recurrent issue—the tension between the centralisation of authority and the forces of regional autonomy. There was nothing like the feudal European nobility, who, at least originally, owed their king military service (Lorge, 2005: 2). What Chinese dynasts did better than any south Asian, Middle Eastern or (would be) European conquerors was to 52
Chapter 4â•…Resource Raisingâ•… 53
centralise the control of military means under a single ruler, shutting out local strongmen. To do this, the dynasts had to have, at their command instruments of organised violence that could be applied towards political goals. The targets of violence were almost exclusively the power elite. Second, the logistics of resource-raising for supporting military ambitions demanded a high order of governance. The main wealth-generating sector that the empire could draw upon was agriculture. Commerce as a powerful wealth-generating sector was left virtually untapped because of a mix of cultural inhibition and a fear that it could develop into an autonomous power centre. However, successive dynasties remained far too pre-occupied with their military ventures to ensure that their bureaucratic institutions were delivering what was expected of them and a series of disastrous socio-economic events affecting the peasant community would invariably weaken the central authority towards the end of each cycle. Domestic rebels or invaders from the north fragmented the state and sparked chaotic civil wars. Eventually one contender would put down all others and establish a successor dynasty. This chapter discusses how two dynasties, stretching for about 1,200 years beginning with the rise of the first empire in 221 bc (roughly from the later phase of Republican Rome to the fall of the Roman Empire and the rise and decline of the Arab Empire) struggled to extract surplus from agriculture and commerce. Though they failed to keep a balance between the resources required for their military ventures and the resources that could be raised from agriculture and commerce, their policies brought about certain fundamental institutional changes that had a permanent impact.
54â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
Society and Economy The first empire came to be formally proclaimed in 221 bc, with King Zeng unifying the former Zhou kingdoms (giving it the name of Qin) and embarking on a series of changes that were to set the character of the Chinese society. Early agricultural villages and communities of the central plain of China, around the Wei and Yellow rivers, had by then evolved into a complex civilisation. The process of evolution over the previous millennium or so was remarkably similar to that elsewhere in the world—growing appropriation of agricultural surplus by a religious, military and power elite that was capable of mobilising and directing the rest of society. In the regions brought under control, the first empire broke the power of indigenous aristocracies by removing the peasants from their communities and setting them up as individual farmers. A free peasantry that owed taxes and military service to the state became the foundation of the empire, the source of the state’s money and manpower.2 Although large estates and landlords survived, China developed in a completely different way from south-west Asia, the Mediterranean and Europe. Most land was privately owned and could be freely transferred. By the 2nd century bc, property rights were firmly established (Ponting, 2000: 19). China became a country of free peasants working independently on their own land and with a high degree of mobility. At no time did the Chinese peasants become serfs bound to the land and to their owners who could sell them as happened in Europe. China had also emerged as a highly dynamic society and economy. The first great Chinese historian, Ssu-ma-Ch’en, gives this picture of the Chinese state and economy:
There must be farmers to produce food, men to extract the
♦
♦
Chapter 4â•…Resource Raisingâ•… 55
wealth of mountains and marshes, artisans to produce these things, and merchants to circulate them. There is no need to wait for government orders; each man will play his part, doing his best to get what he desires. So cheap goods will go where they fetch more, expensive goods will make men search for cheap ones. When all work willingly at their trades, just as water flows ceaselessly down hill day and night, things will appear unsought and people will produce them without being with nature. (Quoted by Ponting, 2000: 199)
♦
♦
asked. For clearly this accords with the way and is in keeping
Written about 2,000 years before Adam Smith, it is a description of a market economy: the metaphor of water flowing is like Smith’s ‘invisible hand’. Amid a multitude of prevailing views and ideas, the first ruler, to rid the country of all alternative viewpoints, came down firmly on the side of the legalists, who believed that a society had to be governed by strong laws and a clear system of rewards and punishment. The ruler had to be absolute and his subordinates and officials must have their functions defined through objectives and binding rules. Other intellectual pursuits were of no value to him. Confucius (551–479 bc) and other scholars of his day, living in a period of dynastic decline and disorder, were concerned primarily with the means by which societal stability and order could be restored; the ideas of Confucius collected by his disciples called for a return to past structures and practices of ideal governance: ethical behaviour and a strict observance of traditional rules and ceremonies. Another school of Taoism (whose philosophy is derived from statements ascribed to Lao Tzu, an older contemporary of Confucius) asserted that the key
56â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
to all meaning was to be found in the workings of the natural world; its aim was simplicity, a closeness to the rhythm of natural life and a concentration of direct experience rather than thought or the written word. These intellectual duels of the time form an important philosophical base for the next 2,000 years of Chinese ideas about society and nature.
Surplus from Land The state was proactive in the creation of facilities like irrigation that would improve farm productivity. From the later Han times, (ad 25–220) large valley-irrigation schemes were brought under the control of state officials. The canal network, especially the Great Canal linking the Yangtze and Hwang Ho Rivers, was built and administered by the state. Flood defense systems were often extensive, and were built and maintained by the state. These state interventions, managed by a bureaucracy concerned with tolls and taxes, enlarged the resource raising capacity of the state from land and waterways (Mann, 1986: 95). But exclusive reliance on land had its limitations. Improvements in military techniques, particularly the introduction of the crossbow and mounted archery, increased the cost of warfare substantially (Elvin, 1973: 27). The conscription of peasants for training and service for establishing military colonies for dealing with frontier defenses and the financing of the imperial administration could not go on indefinitely: they were left exhausted and this affected farming. Food production was becoming inadequate for the subsistence needs of the population. The pressure of taxation on the independent peasants became extremely heavy following the expansionary policy adopted during the reign of Emperor Wu of the Han (140–85 bc).3 They were driven to seek the protection of patrons, the owners of
Chapter 4â•…Resource Raisingâ•… 57
huge properties, as they were able to resist most of the demands made on them by local government authority. (The phenomenon of latifundia or landed estates arose in Rome under more or less similar circumstances.) These problems faced by the empire in extracting surplus from the land without affecting the morale of the peasantry forced it to look for surplus from other wealth-generating activities. From a remarkably early time, the Chinese traded on some basis with the other developing peoples of continental east Asia. Money became a significant factor in the expanding Chinese economy. By the late Zhou years (770–256 bc), money was the basis on which large-scale interregional commerce developed. During the Han Period, China had developed increasing maritime and overland trade with India and Roman Orient. The caravan route across central Asia came to be known as the ‘Silk Route’.
Surplus from Commerce Commerce flourished in these times in spite of, not because of, government policies. The combination of Confucian and Legalistic attitudes that served as the dominant state ideology throughout the early imperial age was overwhelmingly anticommercial. To Confucians, the profit motive of merchant life corroded personal morality and impeded social harmony. To Legalists, mercantile activities were basically non-productive, if not counter-productive, did not increase state wealth and power and drained into private hands the economic surpluses that the state should rightfully control. Governments of the early imperial age therefore considered private commerce something to be watched with care, discouraged and suppressed, if it thrived too flagrantly (Hucker, 1975: 187). The Han rulers were distrustful
58â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
of independent merchants. Although a unified polity existed in the rhetorical sense, the ruler was always concerned about the fragmentation of the empire. Commercial networks operated independently; they did not get involved with any political ties in their dealings with other kingdoms and states in South Asia, Europe or the Middle East. They associated themselves with dynasties and concepts of transcendent ‘Chineseness’, but this did not prevent the majority of them from abandoning one dynasty for another and placing their own interests above their government’s (Lorge, 2005: 182). From the beginning of the early imperial age, merchants came to be subjected to heavy direct and indirect taxes. New taxes were imposed on business and on the strings of copper cash held by the merchants. Violators were thrown into prison or had their property impounded. In this way merchants of the middle grade and above were ruined. By the end of the 2nd century bc, the state had itself become the largest landowner (Elvin). (Something similar had happened in Rome with the confiscation of the Julio-Claudian emperors in the 1st century ad.) On many special occasions, wealthy merchants were called upon to make large contributions to the state coffers. During the 2nd century bc, in the reign of Han Wu-ti, the laws were enforced so stringently that the imperial treasury was enriched and the merchant class all but ruined (Hucker, 1975: 189). Second, in a more fundamental manifestation of antimercantile attitudes, merchants were barred from certain money-making ventures including shipyards, armories and armament works, military equipment and weapons. Salt, iron and wine became state monopolies to shut out the merchant class from some of the main avenues of wealth. Third, the empire imposed controls on trade. One was a granary system intended to stabilise supplies and prices of market
Chapter 4â•…Resource Raisingâ•… 59
commodities, particularly grain, by buying up surplus whenever available and releasing them when market supply was inadequate, making private speculation unprofitable. The public outrage against flagrant profiteering in these products happened to coincide with the state’s need for revenues. The emperor’s fiscal administrators—themselves recruited from the mercantile class despite the dynasty’s prohibitions against merchants holding official positions—brought together isolated precedents from pre-Han experiments into a sophisticated complex of market controls that had no counterparts outside China until state socialism and welfare state practices developed in recent times (Hucker, 1975: 188).
Reliance on Local Oligarchies for War Resources Resource-raising from the commercial class had nearly reached its limit. But while the empire did all it could to help raise agricultural productivity, it had no proactive policy to encourage commerce. On the contrary, the empire did all it could to stifle commerce within the empire. With the peasantry drying up as a source of troops, the later Hans had to rely more or less on voluntary troops recruited locally by the magnate through personal influence. Public land was redistributed among peasants with the aim of creating support bases among small peasants and loyal officials, but a series of famines and a change in the course of Yellow River upset this strategy. At the same time, tax revenues became increasingly difficult to exact from the powerful land holding families. With the connivance of the agricultural officials, they kept evading their obligations to the state. But it is to these magnates that the Han Dynasty had to turn; a coalition
60â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
The houses of the powerful are compounds where several
♦
♦
of magnates under a collateral member of the imperial house (who had formerly been a landowner) rescued the regime. The debt which the Han Dynasty owed to the proprietors of the great estates made it all but impossible for the state to assert its will. These internal developments had a disastrous effect on the defense of the empire, starved as it was of money and manpower. Most of the free peasantry gradually fell into a state of dependency and a quasi-feudal system emerged in which local strongmen controlled most of the economic and military power (Elvin, 1973: 32–33). The classic description of the new social order, at the beginning of the 3rd century ad, as given by Ghung- ch’ang Tung, has been quoted by Mark Elvin (1973: 33):
hundreds of ridgebeams are linked together. Their fertile fields fill the countryside. Their slaves throng in thousands and their military dependents can be counted in tens of thousands. Their boats, carts, and merchants are spread throughout the four quarters. Their stocks of goods held back for speculation fill up the principal cities. Their great mansions cannot contain their precious stones and treasures. The upland valleys cannot hold their horses, cattle, sheep and swine. Their elegant Singing girls and courtesans are lined up in their deep halls.
♦
♦
apartments are full of seductive lads and lovely concubines.
An obvious and important parallel with the roughly contemporary appearance of a similar class in Rome. From these independent economic bases, emerged generals who became virtual war-lords. Eventually a power sharing arrangement emerged among three generals who commanded the north, Sichuan and south, with each region becoming a common
Chapter 4â•…Resource Raisingâ•… 61
focus of power throughout China’s history. This era, known as the Three Kingdoms, among whom there was constant warfare, was followed by another called the Six Dynasties (ad 222–589). During this time not only was China seriously divided internally, but it also faced an increased military threat from northern nomadic peoples whom it had earlier conquered. Defeated and incorporated at times into the Chinese military system, these tribes were quick to perceive the weaknesses of the Northern Kingdom, and by ad 316 they over-ran it. In response, the south became more militarised under local defense family groups, the most powerful of which attempted to rule a ‘Southern Kingdom’ from Nanjing. The great Han Dynasty, representing the early flowering of Chinese civilisation, proved unable to adjust to the structural changes and emergent centers of power that its own development had fostered (Borthwick, 1992: 29).
Rise of the Tang Dynasty Unlike what happened in the Imperial Rome where decay of the empire began to accelerate, China began to reconstitute itself as a resurgent and unified society. The ‘barbarians’ who had invaded the northern region were gradually absorbed into Chinese culture and little was left to distinguish them from it. By ad 589, during the reign of Emperor Wen of the Sui, a general of mixed ‘barbarian’ and Chinese blood, China had become re-unified under a single administration, the process taking almost two-and-a-half centuries. Wen made a remarkable contribution to social cohesiveness and started building a fortification system, providing the successor Tangs with most of the institutional foundation for their supremely successful dynasty.
62â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
…long period of Sino-barbarian synthesis [that brought with
♦
♦
The Tang Dynasty (ad 618–907) was to last for nearly three centuries, marking the beginning, as Mark Elvin observes:
it] institutions in the equitable field system and the divisional militia which were designed to de-feudalise society, in the sense of ending the fragmentation of authority, controlling the of free peasant small holders. (Elvin, 1973: 54)
♦
♦
aristocracy and replacing the great estates with communities
The period from ad 626 to 683 marks the greatest period of military expansion in Chinese history; the regime was successful in the conduct and prosecution of war as the free peasantry was the backbone of the army. The Tang modelled their system on that of the Northern Zhou (who had militia units defending the frontier) and extended it to the whole empire, mobilising the peasants as required. In the first Tang Period, the tenure system was the equalfield system that was continued down from the Sui Period. Big estates were divided into plots and linked to the tax systems, which was assessed not on land via the landlord but on the individual peasant, again reinforcing the cause of a free peasantry. The exact area given to each peasant varied according to intensity of agriculture. This was possible because a highly efficient bureaucracy was in place4 to carry out an exact census of population and survey the productivity of land. The peasant had to pay three taxes—tsu on cereals, tiao on silk and hemp and yung or labour for the state. The problem with this taxation system was that the property rights of the gentry and officials were less restricted than that of the peasantry. The gentry acquired its property either as a gift from an emperor (in which case it was hereditary and tax-free) or as a benefice, tax-free as well together
Chapter 4â•…Resource Raisingâ•… 63
with the office (Eisenstadt, 1969: 37). Also, the equal holdings system broke down because of administrative faults and the rapacity of officials who wanted to extend their own ownership and privileges and so were lukewarm to enforce laws limiting their own privileges. The level of exemptions for the aristocracy, bureaucracy and religious institutions meant that the bulk of the burden fell on the peasantry (Ponting, 2000: 318). In consequence, in the 8th century, peasants started leaving their land and migrating from province to province. The government made several attempts to restore their control over population registration and disposal of lands, but the process of migration was irreversible (Smith, 1976: 9). The breakdown of the household registration system and equitable field arrangements led to the disappearance of the divisional militia that was drawn from the peasantry. Sometime around ad 674, the militia-men lost their immunity from taxation and the creation of new forces of palace guards reduced their social status. In consequence, important persons who were liable for enrolment acquired forged ordination certificates and passed themselves off as Buddhist monks or Taoist priests. Sometimes they paid heavily for substitutes to take their places. The militia lost elite character, and most militia-men came to be listed as mercenaries. With the formal winding up of the whole system in ad 749, there was a rapid growth of frontier armies under personal commanders, putting the central government in a vulnerable position.5 China entered into a resource raising crisis as the state struggled with its more powerful subjects over the revenues required for the conduct and prosecution of war. Many of the poor peasants who had managed to cling on to their lands were now forced, either by economic pressures or by the desire for the protection of a powerful patron, to accept a subordinate
64â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
Our institutions have now become ineffective and confused.
♦
♦
position as a tenant of a local landlord. Thus anyone with money or power could build up estates for himself; great landholdings became a normal feature of rural society (Smith, 1976: 8–12). Towards the end of the 8th century ad, the famous statesman Lu Chih wrote:
The drawing of boundaries between landholdings has fallen into decay. ... There are no longer limits placed on the holdings of land. ...The poor do not have enough land to stand dependents. (Elvin, 1973: 67)
♦
♦
on, but depend on the powerful, serving them as their private
The weakening of the central authority had an unintended impact: commerce grew and became progressively acceptable to the government. With the fragmentation and dispersal of political authority among the Tang provinces, their capitals grew into regional metropolises, with a great concentration of officials and with a high level of commercial activity. Chinese settlements in the south, which had gone on steadily during the Hun Period, were now accelerated by a great number of refugees, both dispossessed peasants looking for land and members of the official classes and wealthy members of great families who fled to the south with their retainers and clients in search of a new territorial base. The great city of Yangchow, where the canal joined the Yangtze, became the commercial metropolis of the South and other cities also boomed. Unlike the vast capital cities of the former times, they were not predominantly administrative centers, although each was in fact a provincial capital. They were primarily commercial cities at the centre of a network of trade and commerce that spread out through the country towns, with their official markets, to the ever-increasing number of small
Chapter 4â•…Resource Raisingâ•… 65
rural market centers and periodical markets into which China was broken up. Until Tang times, there had been very few urban settlements, but now they grew up great numbers. While villages were dependent on local administrative centers, they also became a part of an economic district centered on a local market town. These units proved remarkably long lived. The repressive measures on commercial community by which the successive earlier regimes had attempted to control the merchants now broke down. In the capital cities, old enclosed markets and walls could no longer be maintained. The government’s attitude that merchants were a potential source of mischief changed to a realisation that they were a source of revenue (Twitchett, 1973: 14). In the years following An Lu-shan’s rebellion (ad 755), the government had adopted the monopoly of salt production as a major source of revenue. By strictly controlling salt production and selling salt to merchant distributors with the addition of a high surcharge on the costs of production, the government was able to collect tax indirectly, through merchants, even from the provinces, where its authority was at best nominal. The policy led on to attempts by government to monopolise or control directly a wide variety of profitable trades and industries. Salt, wine, tea, alum and building timber were all at one time or other subject to such government intervention. In later times, mining was also placed frequently under government monopoly or control. The government also began to devise taxes for deriving revenue from the wealthy commercial community, which under the old tax and labour service system had escaped very lightly. Ad valorem taxes on sales, transit taxes and percentage levies on all transactions became important sources of revenue. At the same time, the merchant community began to develop institutions and an identity of its own. The existing associations
66â•… Part Iâ•… The Making and Unmaking of Empires
of merchants dealing in the same trade and interacting with the local authorities had little power. But these associations gradually became more and more powerful. Although they came to play an important part in the organisation of urban life, they remained politically powerless. No Chinese government ever granted the guild any charter or freedom. It was used as an agent of government, to collect taxes and help regulate trade. But it was accorded no privileges in return. A new sophisticated urban class grew up, without any sense of egalitarianism that made it blind to the rot that had set in. Wealth and political privilege remained the monopolies of a small group of estate-owning lineages or clans. The Tang Empire split up in ad 906. North of the Yangtze, five dynasties came and went. To its south, separate states were formed. China seemed to be taking a direction taken by western Europe after the fall of the Rome— but there was a difference. By this point in China’s history, its preceding achievements in culture, governance and technology stood like a mountain absorbing the force of a storm. Within a few short decades, chaos subsided, and the Chinese Empire was largely reunited under the stable, relatively gentle, centralised authority of the Sung Dynasty (ad 960–1280).
Notes 1. Chronology of the major dynasties in Chinese history: Zhou, 1122–256 bc;
Han, 202
bc–ad
220–280; Chin, Sui
ad
ad
9; Later Han,
ad
25–220; Three Kingdoms Era,
226–316; Era of North-South Division,
518–618; T’ang
ad
960–1127; Southern Sung
618–907; Five Dynasties ad
1368–1644; Ch’ing (Manchu)
1127–1279; Yüan ad
ad
ad
ad
316–589;
907–979; Sung
ad
1264–1368; Ming
ad
ad
1644–1912; Republic of Chiba,
ad
1912–
1949; People’s Republic of China 1949–(Hucker, Appendix A, 434–35). 2. Every peasant family had to pay four taxes. A land tax paid at a very low level of one-thirtieth of the notional crop, a poll tax paid by men and
Chapter 4â•…Resource Raisingâ•… 67
women, a property tax (instituted in 142
bc)
levied at 1.2 per cent of all
property and all trading profits and a tax for exemption from military duty (Ponting, 2000: 234). All taxes had to be paid in cash. 3. In the north and north east, Manchuria came under occupation in 128 bc, in three years thereafter, most of the Korean Peninsula was conquered and the north, together with the eastern coast, was controlled for the next 400 years. To settle in these regions, the Han operated a system of state sponsored colonisation (Borthwick, 1992). 4. The Sui had already established, though on a limited scale, a system of state examination based on a curriculum consisting largely of Confucian learning. The Tang greatly expanded the system and began increasingly to use the examinations as a means of recruiting an elite within the bureaucracy. One of the major aims of this system of recruitment was to offset the dominance that aristocratic families exercised in the imperial court (Twitchett, 1973: 7). 5. From the beginning of the Tang dynasty there were cases of Turkish chieftains surrendering to the Tang and becoming generals in its armies. With the formal abolition in ad 737 of the practice of sending militiamen on tours of duty and the enlistment of permanent frontier armies in the Chinese defence forces, the frontier armies became very numerous. At first the overall command of these armies was kept in Chinese hands, but in ad
742 An Lu-shan was given an independent command in southern
Manchuria and in ad 747 the emperor was persuaded to adopt a deliberate policy of using non-Chinese as Military Governors on grounds that they were better soldiers and had no political ambitions or factional connections at court. It was this disastrous policy more than anything else that set the stage for rebellion by An Lu-shan. This was the beginning of chronic militarism in late Tang China (Pulleyblank et al. 1976: 33–60; Smith, 1976).
Chapter 5
An Intimidating Colossus: The Arab Miracle
I
â•… If the ancient world was dominated by the Greeks, Romans, Indians and the Chinese, the Middle Ages were dominated by the Arabs. They made a part of the world map—most of the Middle East and the whole of north Africa—indelibly their own. Most of the people living in this region today speak Arabic and call themselves Arab in one sense or another. At its peak in the second half of the first millennium, the Arab Empire stretched from Spain to China and was twice as large as the Roman Empire had been; through trade and cultural expansion, the Arabs carried their Muslim faith far beyond their borders, into the heart of Asia, down into the South Eastern tip of Malaysia and into the islands of Indonesia. If we look at the sweep of history covering the great civilisations of the world, the Arab Empire served as the bridge between classical antiquity and the European Renaissance. What made it all happen? How could a group of Arabs with no skills, experience or tradition of institutional governance succeed in creating an empire in just over a hundred years? Was it the messianic vision to spread the new religion beyond the homeland, or was it an odyssey to search for material opportunities beyond their desert? Whatever may have motivated them, they displayed a pragmatic grasp of ground realities as conquerors. 68
Chapter 5â•…An Intimidating Colossusâ•… 69
Beginnings At the time when the Arab Muslims were appearing on the scene, the Middle East was divided between the two great empires of Byzantium and Persia, which had been at odds with each other for three centuries. The series of wars in the first quarter of the 7th century ended in a Byzantine victory, with both parties exhausted and weakened: the Persians by feudal disintegration and the Byzantine Empire by strife between the Eastern churches. The Arabs, setting their sights on the countries of the Fertile Crescent—Mesopotamia, Syria and Egypt—embarked on their great campaign of conquest, a new stage in a series of migratory movements by Arab tribes.1 The leaders of the first group of invaders, the Qurayshites from Mecca, were not out to propagate the new religion. By profession, they were traders of the southern ports of Yemen and Oman as well as the masters of the caravan trade. Expansion of trade was their primary interest; the new religion came in handy as a great unifying and psychological force welding a group of temperamental tribes into a disciplined force. The new religion became the symbol of unity and victory, though the driving force of conquest was worldly rather than religious, the leaders of the troops were men with a perfunctory and utilitarian interest in religion. The armies of Islam started with the Arab element but, over a century from mid-7th to mid-8th, with contingents raised by them from subject peoples, they swept across central Asia, north Africa, Spain and Sicily. Running from the middle of the 7th to the middle of the 11th century was the Golden Age of the Muslim World. Over this span of 300 years (ad 642–969), two political regimes held sway successively over the vast empire. The political governance structure under both was a kind of loose federation
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of disparate regimes held together by religion and economic interests. The Arab Umayyad tribe quickly consolidated their territorial gains and established their legitimacy as the ruling class among alien peoples with diverse cultures. But, after about a century, the Umayyads succumbed to mis-governance (ad 661–750), and were displaced by another Arab tribe, the Abbasids, under whose governance Muslim civilisation reached its pinnacle.
Process of Consolidation Umayyad rule was a kind of military occupation by Arab tribal kings superimposed upon the Byzantine and the Persian administration. The Umayyads behaved ‘like the barbarian kings of the western Roman Empire, uneasy settlers in an alien world whose life continued beneath the protection of their power’ (Hourani, 1991: 27). The process of acquiring legitimacy and establishing itself in a completely alien territory, so different culturally, socially and economically, was a remarkable display of political foresight and administrative acumen. An invading force would normally leave behind a trail of destruction with disruptive consequences on civil, political and economic life of the occupied territories. The initial Arab invasion was somewhat of an exception. The conquest did not leave any trail of destruction nor were cities burned down or sacked as a measure of revenge.2 The Arab invaders came to be accepted as liberators for their message of peace and stability and the democratic, egalitarian and the cosmopolitan outlook of the new religion (Ashtor, 1976: 10). There was not much disruption in the lives of the subject peoples. The Armenians, Persians and Egyptians maintained their
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identities throughout the Arab invasion. Things were allowed to go on as they had before in every sphere and the peoples won over—the Christians, Jews or Persian converts—provided the administrative framework. The first Caliphs felt no need to define principles of governance and the nearest they came to this was indicated by Umar (ad 640): ‘the whole empire was put in trust for the Muslim community, with the Caliph as the trustee’ (Lewis, 1950: 57). In this phase of conquest, the Arabs created an empire and a state and not yet a civilisation. The cities and commercial networks were left unchanged, as were the two main currencies, the dirhem of Sassanid silver and the denarius of Byzantine gold, till the entire currency system was improved and reformed towards the end of the 7th century. The system of financial administration continued as before, run by people drawn from the same groups that had served the previous rulers. In the countryside, the new rulers maintained the systems of irrigation and cultivation which they found there.
The Fall of the Umayyads What brought about the downfall of the Umayyad Dynasty was not its failure to govern the vast territories, but its inability to grapple with the social tensions that sowed the seeds of revolt. The business of running an empire led to the emergence of a new class, the Mawali, who were non-Arab converts to Islam. From the Mawali came the workmen, shopkeepers, merchants and others required to serve the Arab rulers. The division between the dominant caste and the Mawali was more economic and social than racial (Lewis, 1950: 71). The Mawali settlements in the garrison towns very soon outnumbered the Arabs, and developed into a discontented population that understood its
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political and military significance. Their economic grievances found religious expression in a movement known as Shia’ism, defined as opposition to the established Order, the Sunni or orthodox Islamic doctrine. It was a social revolt against the Arab aristocracy and their state. The replacement of the Umayyads by the Abbasids in the leadership of the Islamic community was more than a mere change of dynasty, not the result of any palace conspiracy but the action of successful revolutionary propaganda and organisation. Fundamentally, it was a revolutionary turning point in the history of Islam. With the Abbasids, we enter a more structured form of governance, with legitimacy of the ruling class enunciated, and the hierarchy of power and authority clearly defined. Under the Umayyads the various countries run over by the Arabs had continued to be diverse cultural and economic regions; the Abbasids welded them into a great Muslim Empire. Their tool was a bureaucracy consisting of a hierarchy designed to connect each of the tiny communities of the Middle East to some provincial, regional and ultimately imperial centre. To create this organisation, the Caliphs drew upon the socially powerful and technically skilled families of the realm—the landowning families, the secretarial and administrative dynasties of both the Byzantian and Sassanian ancestor empires, Arab tribal chieftains and Muslim religious leaders (Lapidus, 1984). Abbasid polity and society were vertically organised. Its communities had no ties to each other, but were bound directly to some higher centre of co-ordination. Even when the power of the Caliphate was at its height, its effective role was confined mainly to the cities and the productive areas around them. Ultimately, the Caliphate administration was caught—as the later Chinese were—in the contradictions of centralised bureaucratic systems of government. To rule over his far-flung empires,
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the caliph had to give his governors the power to collect taxes and use part of the proceeds to maintain a local force. The local governments started building up their own power base, though they remained in principle loyal to the major interests of their suzerain.3 Economically, however, it was a strong and cohesive Muslim Empire, and, by the 9th century, a gigantic economic unit came into being, a unit never before equalled in the old world. The economic ascendancy of the Abbasid Empire over other regions of Asia and Africa, and even more over Western Europe, was overwhelming and it lasted about 200 years. The Abbasids nursed this economic empire, realising the great potential for trade in the conquered territories, the scope for expansion of this trade, the importance of giving merchants the freedom to operate and the benefits to the regime of allowing merchants from different nationalities to trade in its territories. A stark contrast to what was happening in China during the same period.
Orientation towards Trade: Four Positives Trade network and common market Given the fact that there was no significant break in continuity during the period of conquest, trade continued to flourish as before.4 It was a huge common market stretching from central Asia to the Indian Ocean, from the Sudan to the west and the Russian rivers. The centre of this world was in the isthmus bounded by the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, at the intersection of two major economic units: the Indian Ocean area and the Mediterranean area. These two territories, united in Hellenistic times but later split into two rival worlds, the Roman-Byzantine and the
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Parthico-Sassanian, were now reunited by the Muslim conquest into one economic unit. This large unit enjoyed an influx of gold, a plentiful supply of slaves and a network of major trade routes that stretched from China to Spain and from black Africa to central Asia and encouraged tremendous urban expansion. Baghdad and Samarra in the former Sassanid territories, Damascus and Fustat Cairo in the former Byzantine territories and Kairouan, Fez and Cordoba in north Africa and Spain—this vast network linking one town with another formed the material framework of the Muslim world as well as a circuit carrying the main currents of civilisation. This trend to urbanisation was far greater in scope and effect than during the Roman Empire; it ranks equally with the great period of urban development in the Hellenistic area or the growth of cities in western Europe in its early stage of development (Lombard, 1975: Chapter 6). The Islamic economy was not confined to an exchange of finished products through trade; it had developed all the characteristics of an integrated network of manufacturing processes. The Muslims improved methods of production in the industrial enterprises which they had inherited from the former rulers, the Persians and the Byzantines. They developed new branches of old industries and created new ones. The textile industry, as everywhere in the Middle Ages, was most important. Syria and Iraq had been renowned for silk manufactures, Aleppo for cotton garments, Tiberias for carpets and Galilee various kinds of textile fabrics.
Urban centres of consumption This extensive area came to be dotted with centres of urban consumption and bases of growing economic activities. Basra,
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starting as a collection of military camps after the conquest of Iraq, reached its zenith after the accession of Abbasids at the end of the 8th century. Among the towns founded in the first century of Abbasid rule, Baghdad, the new capital built in 762, was the foremost. Two years later the Caliph al-Mansur founded near ar-Rakka a town that became an important commercial and industrial centre. In 836, al-Mutasim founded Samarra on the Tigris, which replaced Baghdad as the residence of the caliphs for more than half a century. There were also many smaller towns such as Ramla in southern Palestine that became centres of lively trade. The towns in turn attracted people from distant countries. This demographic development that characterised the Muslim world was in sharp contrast to that seen in Europe during the early Middle Ages, when towns mostly disappeared. When the towns grew, the money economy spread into the countryside and this alone made life in the Muslim world very different from that of Medieval Europe.
Unification of the currency system5 The integrated economy of the vast region came to be supported by a unified currency system. In the early days, two coins were in circulation: Sassanid dirhems in the eastern provinces and Byzantine denarii in the western provinces. The Umayyads had continued with these earlier currencies, as, otherwise, the world of trade would have reacted with instinctive mistrust to any sudden innovation in the monetary field. In fact, an attempt at introduction of a Muslim dirhem at Basra in 660 failed, but it succeeded 40 years later. This success was partly due to the imaginative reform6 (carried out by the Caliphate of Umar during ad 634–644 of standardisation of the weight of three
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different systems of silver currencies in vogue and a significant change in the money situation reflecting an upsurge in economic activities. The Muslim area was rich not only in gold but in silver as well. Great quantities of gold, so far hoarded or used in jewellery, were confiscated from the palaces of the Persians kings and nobles and from the tombs of the Pharaohs. The rulers also compelled the Church to hand over their great hoards of gold in Syria and Egypt. To this was added the steady streams of gold arriving from mines in the empire. The major silver bearing areas of the Muslim world were the same as in the ancient world, primarily southern Spain, the ancient Tartesssos region, visited by Phoenicians, the Carthaginians and the Romans. The Muslims activated the mines left inactive after the fall of the Western Roman Empire. A more important group of mines existed in Armenia, northern Iran and central Asia. Also, in the west, there were two major silver bearing zones, the western tip of Spain and central Asia, together with the eastern point of northern Iran. The steady flow of gold and the abundant supplies of silver and to a lesser degree of copper and tin spawned an immense business of coining and minting. The minting of gold became decentralised and took place in all important towns. Quality went hand in hand with quantity, and the dinar, like every dominant currency was minted with extreme care. All this had tremendous consequences for economic life. With so many gold coins put into circulation, the propensity to hoard diminished. But it also led to a steep rise in prices,7 creating opportunities of ever-expanding profits for the merchants and also at a low rate of interest.8 The Muslims created a vigorous monetary economy based on expanding levels of circulation of a stable high-value coinage (the dinar) and the renewed
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integration of monetary areas that had been distinct and indifferent to each other.
Religious stance The merchants were the prime movers of the new integrated economy. According to an 11th century manual of commerce defining the activities of merchants, a typical merchant was one who strove, everywhere and all the time, and by any and every means, to get money (Rodinson, 1974: 31). The flourishing commercial life of the time was reflected in its thought and literature, where we find the upright merchant held up as an ideal ethical type. The leaders of Muslim expansion were traders even before their conversion, and they had conquered societies in which trade was very highly developed already before conquest. No wonder that the full-fledged religion of Islam came to be pervaded by the spirit and ideas of the rising merchant class. The merchant class attained a social position and self-esteem that it could secure in Europe only much later. Unlike in other civilisations, the merchant class in the Arab world derived great moral strength from Islam. There are religions whose sacred texts discourage economic activity in general, counselling their followers to rely on God to provide them with their daily bread, or more particularly, looking askance at any striving for profit. The Koran looks with favour upon commercial activity, confining itself to condemning fraudulent practices and requiring abstention from trade during certain religious festivals.9 The Koran emphasises that it is proper to combine the practice of religion and material life, carrying on trade even during pilgrimages, and goes so far as to mention commercial profit under the name of ‘God’s bounty’ (Ibid.: 24). Also, the Koran’s ideal did not challenge the right
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of ownership in any form, even though, as is true of all lawgiving, it is possible to deduce restrictions upon the use and abuse of property in certain cases. The right to property is not necessarily incompatible with justice; justice in economic matters means in Koran forbidding a type of gain that is particularly excessive (Rodinson, 1974: 21).10 The Islamic legal system was not codified like the Roman, but provided an element of commonality that was present throughout the Muslim world. The Koran itself contained a good deal of guidance on practical matters. More detailed jurisprudence, precedents, rules of family and property law, codes of social and religious behaviour were incorporated in hadith— records of tradition whose authority derived ultimately from sayings ascribed to the Prophet. Most theologians of this period belonged to the merchant class, as did most of the Muslim juri-consuls. Some of the prohibitions under Muslim law were prima-facie hindrances to development of a free market. For example, in the Koran, there is a specific prohibition of riba, which is interpreted as usury. The general perception is that this prohibition prevented any economic activity of the modern type from occurring among the Muslims. The historical records show that this prohibition had little practical effect as the legal scholars’ devised great practical ingenuity in getting round ence the theoretical prohibitions.11 There nre books of jurisp toaexpound what the Arabs call hiyal, meaning ruses or wiles. What these practices amount to is simply the authorising of loans at interest, provided that some additional legal formalities are observed. This is the conclusion that the scholars have drawn from the study of the law books and is borne out by the consistency between these rules and the merchants’ customs, as borne out by the letters found in the Cairo geniza12 (Goitien, 1968: 218–219).
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Merchants in Politics In the beginning, the relationship between business and polity was mutually supportive, but, within a century of the establishment of Abbasid regime, the rich mercantile class started to nurse political ambitions. Even earlier, under the Umayyad rule, the Persian gentry had situated itself in prominent positions in caliphal administration. This continued with the first Abbasid caliphs. Rich merchants began to play a conspicuous role in the civic administration, sometimes getting appointed even to the post of vizier. Acquisition of wealth through tax farming was the standard method for raising revenue that prevailed everywhere, in Iraq, Persia, Syria and Egypt. Land tax being the main source of revenue, the tax farming contract included very often the responsibility of managing royal estates. Most tax farmers were wealthy businessmen who had enriched themselves in other fields of economic activity and could afford to shoulder these responsibilities. The lure of profits through tax farming enticed the commanders of the army also to engage in this business. The administration of a province was usually conferred on the person who had farmed its taxes and the job became his stepping stone to a prosperous political life (Ashtor, 1976: 132–38). Tax farmers shared power with the ministers, the heads of administration, who belonged mostly to the class of rich landowners. They would cast their nets wider to engage in profitable commercial ventures. Indeed, this age of flourishing prosperity became an age of endemic corruption in administration.
Disintegration An internal revolt sprung up from the swamps of southern Iraq.13 The rebellion, which lasted till ad 883, had particularly
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disastrous economic consequences for the empire. It put an end to the highly profitable sea trade from India and South East Asia that came up the Persian Gulf to Basra, which had formed the basis for much of the legendary wealth of Bagdad. This maritime trade began to be diverted to the Red Sea and Egypt, where Ahmed ibn Tulun (ad 868–884), a young Turkish officer designated by the Caliph as the governor of Egypt, used the wealth to make Egypt effectively independent of the central government at Bagdad, to which it merely paid tribute. The Caliph, being fully preoccupied with a slave revolt, could do little to prevent Ahmed from consolidating his power in Egypt (Sicker, 2000: 35). Soon, taking advantage of the power vacuum along the Mediterranean littoral, Ahmed ibn Tulun established himself as an overlord, linking Syria, Palestine and Egypt, in a common constellation comparable to that which existed repeatedly in earlier times. Then, in ad 879, a Byzantine army, during the regime of a new and aggressive ruler, Basil I (ad 867–886) swept down from the mountains into the Jazira and laid waste the countryside, re-establishing a Graceo-Roman presence there for the first time in 200 years.
Lapse into Feudalism The loss of revenue from these developments further destabilised the Abbasid state itself, since it now had difficulty in paying the mercenary troops that were critical to its continued viability (Ibid.). From the early 10th century, the control of the Abbasids over the core of the empire in Mesopotamia was minimal. In ad 945, the region was conquered by the Iranian mercenaries, the Byyuids. The rule of this dynasty lasting 110 years marked the beginning of a process by which local landowners, the military and provincial rulers took power and set up their own smaller
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states opposed to central control from Baghdad. These feudal aristocrats created a new kind of social order in which estates were granted to the army together with the fiscal rights. The princes of this dynasty began to encroach upon the activities of the merchants, who suffered from the extortions of governors and the army. The military engaged in commercial activities and enjoyed the privilege of carrying their merchandise duty free along the roads. The regime instituted monopolies for manufactures such as silk, the manufacture and sale of which had previously been free to everyone (Ashtor, 1976: 177–83). The feudal system as established by the Byyuids came to form the core of Turkish feudalism, and led to the absolute supremacy of the army and the decline of the bourgeoisie14 (We follow it up in Chapter 9).
Business–politics Dynamics The Muslim world, as it evolved in from the 7th to the 11th century, drew its main sustenance from the far-flung trade network spreading from China to the western Mediterranean. Also it demonstrated considerable assimilative and absorptive power. Unlike the Roman world, which had made a sharp distinction between civilisation and barbarism, conversion to Islam was a simpler process than acquisition of Roman citizenship. Thus the new religion managed to bring the Berbers of the Maghreb into its fold, assimilated a large portion of Africa, and absorbed the barbarian Seljuk Turk and Mongol invaders from east Asia. Also, importantly, it had a strong domestic base, with its large urban and semi-urban centres for consumption and flourishing agriculture. The members of the merchant community were more than mere traders; they turned out to be manufacturers as well,
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developing centers of manufacture in several industries, in particular, textiles and glass that were already existing and creating a new industrial base in paper. This vast network of industry and trade, supported by a monetised economy, a stable currency and a sophisticated banking network became by far the predominant driving force of the economy of that period. However we characterise that economy, it was certainly not just some loose ensemble of feudal regimes. Trade was fundamental to its structure. The growth of cities and expanding urban markets, the spread of new crops, and sudden rise in cash crops indicated that the Muslim world, in a sense, had all the structural features of what Max Weber would characterise as a pre-capitalist economy, ahead of the Western world, by about three centuries. Thus, Islam made a powerful contribution to the growth of capitalism in the Mediterranean, in part because it preservedb ti expanded the monetary economy of late a quity and innovated business techniques that became the staple of Mediterranean commerce (in particular, partnerships and commenda agreements), and also because the seaports of the Muslim world became a rich source of the plundered money-capital which largely financed the growth of maritime capitalism in Europe. Indeed, Mandel stated this with unabashed bluntness when he wrote: ‘The accumulation of money capital by the Italian merchants who dominated European economic life from the 11th to the 15th centuries originated directly from the Crusades, an enormous plundering enterprise if ever there was one’ (Mandel, 1968: 103). The history of this empire, through the rise and fall of different dynasties, offers us rich insights into the dynamics of business-polity relationships. As the Umayyad Dynasty was expanding its territorial empire, it allowed business in the acquired territories to continue to operate as before, for it knew that it
Chapter 5â•…An Intimidating Colossusâ•… 83
was the creator of wealth. The successor dynasty, the Abbasids, also understood that the stability and continuity of a political regime cannot be ensured unless business enjoys freedom and autonomy in economic affairs, with some obln rolon, of coums , tos contribute a portion of their wealth for the affairs of the polity. But, as the empire reached its peak, the orientation of political power holders—civil administrators and the military—started changing: wealth became for them an object to be grabbed for personal benefit and not a source of strength to be nursed for the interests of the polity. This led to a complete metamorphosis in business–polity relationships, spelling doom for the empire: a kind of replay, if you like, of the decline and fall of the Western Roman Empire. Strangely, when Europe was emerging out of the shadows of feudalism and moving slowly towards a capitalist regime, the Arab Empire, already in a stage of pre capitalist maturity, went into a reverse direction. It lapsed into feudalism. If the Arab polity had been as sagacious as they were during the early period of their empire and had succeeded in maintaining a proper balance between the two vital interest groups of business and polity, the geo-politics of the region would possibly had taken a different complexion.
Notes 1. Arab tribes had founded principalities before Islam, of which the strongest was the kingdom of Palmyra in the lands of the Fertile Crescent. There was also al-Hira, a principality established with the help of Persian kings as a buffer to defend the Persian dominions against the Byzantines. A similar Arab buffer state was created by Byzantines against Persians, the principality of Ghassanids controlling Hauran, Phoenicia, northern Transjordan and Palestine. Egypt also had numerous Arab peoples long before the Muslim conquests.
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2. The exception was the pillaging of Sassanid palaces for the looting of gold. There were many instances of confiscation of hoarded gold that was used for coinage and put into circulation. 3. The local dynasties that grew up were those of the Saffarids in eastern Iran (ad 867–1495), the Samanids in Khurasan (ad 819–1005), the Tulunids in Egypt (ad 868–905) and the Aghlabids in Tunisia (ad 800–909) (Hourani, 1991: 38). After the breakup of the empire, the centralised rule by the caliphs never revived. The new rulers were successful in giving their subjects security, gave them a stable government and improved their economic situation. 4. The territories that were involved in trade were the most important territories, in economic terms, because of their agricultural, industrial and mining output, their transport and caravan networks. These included countries with the most fertile soils, such as Mesopotamia and Egypt with their oases and long tradition of irrigation and the north African plains, which produced corn and oil. There were also the mining countries, the Caucasian-Armenian group, north Africa and Spain. There were also highly developed craft industries in Iran, Mesopotamia, Syria and Egyptian delta. Shipping was also well developed. 5. This section is mainly drawn from Lombard, Chapter 5 titled ‘Monetary Problems’. 6. The gold currency was based on a single system, the nomisma, but a truly Muslim currency was first created by the striking of a gold dinar at Damascus in 696. Two years later new Muslim silver coins dirhems were minted. From this time onwards these two coins were accepted as the legal Muslim currency, remaining unchanged in the Muslim world for many centuries. This gave the necessary impetus for the striking of silver dirhems on the Muslim pattern in
l the provinces. Thus the Musl
m
dinar and dirhem,
derived from the Byzantine nomisma and the Sassanid drachma, unified the two watertight monetary systems. 7. An Arabic source quotes the Caliph Harun ar-Rasid as saying that in his days the dinar had less value than a dirham in the days of al-Mansur (ad 754–75) (Ashtor, 1976: 86). 8. An interest of 20 per cent was customary at that time in wealthy European towns whereas in the Middle East the rate, till the time of Crusades, was 4–10 per cent on the average (Ibid.).
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╇ 9. Tradition attributed to the Prophet such statements as ‘In the day of judgment the honest truthful Muslim merchant will take rank with the martyrs of faith’ … ‘The truthful merchant will sit under the shadow of the throne of God on the day of judgment’ … ‘Merchants are the couriers of the world and the trusted servants of God upon earth’ (Lewis, 1950: 91). With commercial activities becoming widespread among all sections of the population after the Abbasid revolution of 750, merchants appeared as the bearer of a culture that considered money as the only real thing of value in the universe. 10. When Muhammad started preaching, there was undoubtedly much talk in Arabia about the communistic experiment that was carried out in the powerful neighbouring empire of Persia. Over two centuries before him, theoreticians had appeared in Iran who preached the abolition of private property through the collectivisation of all goods. To some extent this was accepted by the Persian ruler Kawadh I (ad 448–531), though the full right to property was again restored by Kawadh’s son and successor Anosharwan (ad 531–579). In his precepts Mohammad does not attack private property, though he condemns riches and the rich. 11. However it also seemed to have been the practice that where non-Muslim communities were present in considerable number, the Muslim merchants let them fulfill the function of money lenders operating without any camouflage, praising the trade in credit openly and publicly. In Morocco, Jews, though a small minority, were very willing to relieve the Muslims of the burden of their order. Thus usurious loans became the speciality of the Jews in Morocco and elsewhere, of the Greeks and other foreigners in Egypt, of Hindu merchants in India, just as in Medieval Europe, the Jews and Lombards fulfilled this role or as in China, the bankers of Shansi held from very ancient times a sort of monopoly in this field. Clearly, at the very moment when capitalist practices implying the need for interest were developing, the theologians and religious lawyers took the greatest trouble to theorise about the prohibition of interest, justifying it and also allowing for cases and exceptions. All these books apply the principle that necessity renders legitimate that which is, strictly, speaking, forbidden. This has been followed in all subsequent political regimes, including the Ottoman Empire. As is well known (we will be discussing this in a later chapter) this practice became so widespread that it was taken over, along with its
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Arabic name, by the western Europe and of the Middle Ages (Rodinson, 1974, Chapter 3). 12. Geniza (pronounced Gheneeeza) denotes the store room of a synagogue or any other place in which papers covered with Hebrew letters were discarded. For, according to Jewish belief, which has its parallels in Muslim and Coptic customs, no papers on which the name of God is found should – (old Cairo) be destroyed. So far, only the Genizas of a synagogue in Fustat and of the nearby cemetery of al-Basatin have been found. These two are called by a common designation ‘The Cairo Geniza’. 13. It was a region intersected by numerous canals and exposed to tidal fluctuations, where, in consequence, land gets covered in nitrates, making cultivation impossible. A project for reclamation of land was started by several enterprising businessmen of Basra; this involved removing nitrates from the soil. A large number of negro slaves (called in Arabic Zindj) from east Africa, deployed to work here under inhuman conditions, embraced Islam, developed a consciousness of their rights under the leadership of one al-Mahdi and organised revolt against their exploitation. Within 10 years of their rising, they established themselves in a new town, ‘alMukhtara’, occupied Abbadan, cut off Baghdad’s supplies from the south, captured Basra in 871 and became a state consisting of large parts of Iraq and Khuzistan. 14. European feudalism sprang up from personal dependence and subordination, the Oriental form of feudalism was a means of securing regular payment of the soldiery. The feudal regime in Western Europe was the concomitant of a contracting economy sunk to the lowest ebb of primitive self-sufficient economic units, the feudal regime in this region was established in a period of a highly developed pre-capitalist society.
Part II
The Medieval World: ad 1000–1500
By the beginning of the second millennium ad, maritime trade had started acquiring a long-distance global character, bringing previously isolated peoples into closer contact, from the Mediterranean and African civilisations to Asia. Trade evolved into regular movements of thousands of small vessels carrying everything from luxuries to daily necessities. But it was not trade between nations; merchants and their goods circulated through a generally frictionless ‘archipelago of towns’ in which not only did the units trade with each other and handle transit trade, but they even aligned their internal economies to suit this trade. At one end of the long trading network was China; at the other the Islamic regions of the Mediterranean. In the middle was south India. China, despite its aversion to business in general, had the potential to emerge as the undisputed hegemonic power of the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, but domestic concerns made it withdraw into a shell. At the other end, the Muslim Mediterranean had a strong business base but it failed to fill the vacuum created by China’s withdrawal because its polity became weak and inefficient. That left south India—but the political powers here were not interested in stepping out with military ventures to establish a hegemonic presence. They were content with peaceful trade. At the extreme ends were Japan and northwest Europe, developing into feudal economies. In Japan, the breakup of the monopoly of power held by the court-based aristocracy and central monasteries, and the appearance of new institutions of political authority and land control like the 88
samurai and the shogunates led to the rise of a military aristocracy. In Europe, barbarian kings evolved from tribal leaders into kings controlling the allegiance of magnates who were generally granted land in return for their allegiance; the power of the Church grew, and new arrangements described as feudal emerged. The business–polity partnership that started developing would become the core of what is known as a European hegemony. And this would later invade and occupy the vacuum in the Indian Ocean.
89
Chapter 6
Trade and Politics in the Indian Ocean
T
â•… The Indian Ocean connected a great variety of peoples, cultures and economies, being almost linked to the Mediterranean through the Red Sea, penetrating the central lands of West Asia via the Persian Gulf, washing both shores of the Indian subcontinent and linking up with the South China Sea, beyond which lay the Pacific. The sea routes were linked to over-land trade routes, creating a tight economic relationship. In the 10th and 11th centuries ad, economies throughout Asia expanded markedly and new powers emerged, such as the Cholas in southern India, the Khmers in Angkor, the Burmese at Pagan and the Song in China. These political consolidations stimulated Asia’s maritime commerce and the international traders who travelled the seas connecting eastern and western Asia.1 Before the arrival of the Europeans, the cultures and economies of the Indian Ocean were essentially self-sufficient within the geographical boundaries of the Indian Ocean and were only marginally determined by influences from outside the region (McPherson, 1993: 5).
India: A Strategic Location From the time of the Mauryan Dynasty to the 7th and 8th centuries ad, south India enjoyed remarkable political and 91
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economic stability. Although it had a multitude of contending kingdoms and would-be empires, it was generally free from the wide-ranging wars and invasions that characterised West Asia, north Africa, China and Europe (McPherson, 1993: 89–90). During the first three centuries of the 2nd millennium, south India was the bridge connecting the Mediterranean and West Asia with China.2 The Asian sea trade was sub-divided into three interlocking circuits—the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the South China Sea—each with its distinctive cultural characteristics. The middle circuit connected the south Indian coasts— Malabar on the west and Coromandel on the east—with Sumatra and Malaya on the Strait of Malacca, and with Java and the islands of Indonesia. The eastern-most circuit was Chinese space. Within the three circuits there were several sub systems shared by numerous groups. No single power ever exercised dominance over the entire system; the local hegemonic powers co-existed with each other (Chaudhuri, 1985: 15). On the western coast of India, Gujarati merchants traditionally maintained contacts with ports in the Persian Gulf and along the Arabian Coast. By the early days of Islam, the ports of Cambay and Saymur had already absorbed resident colonies of Arab merchants, some extremely wealthy, as well as sailors from Oman, Basra, Baghdad (Ibid.: 98). The merchants of the Malabar Coast, though of a slightly later vintage, were as wealthy, powerful, astute and foreign as those of Gujarat. In the second half of the 13th century, Samudri Raja (later distorted to Zamorin) came to prominence when Muslim merchants from the Red Sea flocked to his port because the political regime offered them attractive trading terms in return for their political and financial support. The Arabs made Calicut their home, assisted the Samudri Raja in his territorial expansion and drew his support for their commercial ambition. The Chinese watched
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their long-standing trade in the Arabian Sea shrink in the face of this Arab-Indian combination (Dasgupta, 2001: 5–6). On the eastern plains, the Pallavas, Cholas, Pandyas and eventually even Vijaynagar participated in the great revival of commerce that began in the 8th and 9th centuries. Indian merchants from the Coromandel Coast were journeying actively eastward in the 10th, 11th and 12th centuries. Trading towns had been established in each of the administrative districts of the Pallava kingdom, in which local and long distance trade could be conducted with relative freedom in return for certain taxes to the ruling power. The pattern continued into the Chola era (Hall, 1980: 93). The trading towns were allowed such autonomy because they fetched the royal treasury considerable tax revenues from their vast regional commercial network. By the late 12th century, international traders were calling regularly on the Coromandel ports, to pick up pearls, betel nuts, spices and cotton products from local merchants linked to the hinterland. Tamil civilisation was marked by its first major period of urban growth, and various dynasties lavishly endowed shrines and priests out of piety and for the pragmatic reason of reinforcing their legitimacy. Rulers viewed temples not only as symbols of royal legitimacy, but also as centres of commerce, for most were associated with fairs and marketplaces and were the key to the economic integration of southern India with both land and sea trade routes (McPherson, 1993: 83–84). The Chola rulers took a positive stand on trade because they derived considerable financial benefits from it. State support was not a condition for merchants venturing into foreign trade, but the state came to their assistance wherever it felt it could intervene effectively. Even in such cases, the state did not interfere to acquire centres of raw materials or markets but to remove the obstructions placed by another country on the trade
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(Thapar, 1966: 209). Overseas trade was the strength of the Chola merchants and towns such as Mahabalipuram and Kaveripattinam on the east coast and Quilon on the Malabar Coast controlled the south Indian trade. Trade with China reached an unprecedented volume during these centuries, which led to its becoming a state monopoly in China, the Chinese government not wishing to lose the income from it (Ibid.: 207). With Mongols controlling central Asia, Chinese merchandise destined for western Asia and Europe was carried almost exclusively by sea. The 11th century Tamil traders were organised into commercial corporations supported by the Chola state. The south Indian kingdoms were neither highly centralised nor despotic. Just as the government was not in full control of agricultural production, it was unable to fully exploit the foreign trade that tied its domains to the world market. Local merchant organisations helped administer the Chola ports and also ran the major trade emporia of the hinterlands (Hall, 1980: 165). They also controlled the activities of foreign merchants and their contacts with local commercial networks. During the first few centuries of the 2nd millennium, maritime trade was sufficiently important to prompt various south Asian states to intervene politically when required, but it was in the south and in Sri Lanka that maritime trade and politics intersected to the greatest effect (McPherson, 1993: 88). On the Coromandel and Malabar Coasts, many dynasties and kingdoms, while drawing most of their power from control of agricultural surplus, watched maritime trade closely, even forging state policy by warfare and diplomacy. Rulers otherwise dependent on resources raised through local land-holding intermediaries welcomed the revenues from trade, since such intermediaries were not always willing to give up their surpluses
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without concessions from the central authorities. Also, an increasing amount of land revenue was going to temples and Brahmins by way of grants, reducing royal revenues further. So the profits of trade helped the rulers chance to decrease their dependency upon subordinates who were to compensate them for their piety (McPherson, 1993: 89). For dynasties such as the Pandyas, Pallavas and Cholas, control of trade routes and ports was vital for political life. South Indian and Sri Lankan dynasties were, on many occasions, engaged, in the interests of trade, in naval campaigns for control of the pearl- and shell-rich Palk Strait, the Gulf of Munnar, at the junction of trade routes between the western and eastern Indian Ocean. Gradually, however, they lost power to the growing strength of the merchant class, who, as the Chola state decayed, became more assertive and formed the nucleus of new centers of political authority (Hall, 1980: 4). Economic power gave the merchant guild a position of political importance that translated into influence at the royal court. The guild leaders ensured that they had a say in taxation and related matters, and very soon their power counterbalanced that of the landowners and officials at the court (Thapar, 1966: 331). The Vijaynagar military-feudal state that succeeded the Cholas in about ad 1350 continued the Chola pattern, obtaining its income from agriculture and trade. The administrative structure had become more stratified and more closely connected with the economy. The pattern was broadly similar to that of northern India and was oriented more towards the extraction of agricultural surplus than to long-distance trade. The new Vijaynagar kingdom had conquered not only the small Muslim sultanates along the coast, but much of the former domain of the Cholas. Vijaynagar lay in the interior of the Deccan plateau and was oriented toward neither agrarian pursuits nor
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international trade. For the first time in south Indian history, the region came to be ruled by a centralised system of feudalism, and the pattern that evolved was broadly in alignment with that of northern India.
North India After the fall of the Gupta Empire in the 6th century ad, India remained politically fragmented. Islam had an impact from the first era of expansion when, in ad 711–713, Arab forces reached Sind. The main impact of Muslims on India did not come until the post-Abbasid military regimes emerged in eastern Iran and Afghanistan. In ad 1030, the Ghaznavids captured Lahore just as they were losing control of their core territory to the Seljuks, and continued to rule the northern part of the Indus Valley and Afghanistan. They were replaced in the 12th century by the Ghurids who began the conquest of north-west India by capturing Peshawar, Lahore and Delhi. In ad 1206 one of their generals, Qutb al-Din Aybek, declared himself independent and founded the Aybek Dynasty, the first of the Delhi Sultanates that were to rule much of India until ad 1526. The Afghan-Turkish elites were very much like the Arabs in early Islam—hostile to conversion and content to rule as military elite with their own special religion (see Chapter 5). The sultanate period was one of great prosperity; it was central to much of east-west Eurasian trade and agriculture, and was highly productive. India and China were then the richest areas of Eurasia (Chandra, 2009). The establishment of a strong centralised empire in north India, a sound currency system and security in communications led to the growth of over-land trade to West and Central Asia as well as overseas trade, mainly from Gujarat. Multan was an important trading centre, linked directly across the Bolan Pass
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to Kandahar, Herat and Bokhara, which was the junction of the Silk Route from China to Constantinople and Lebanon. Multan was also linked via the Indus to the western sea ports. The trading networks in the Indian Ocean world were complex but cosmopolitan. No one power dominated and none made any attempt to use force to gain trade advantages or control routes. Among the intermediate port-cities along the eastwest trade routes, the most important ports were those of India. The major Indian states were land-based and were usually quite content to let the coastal trading towns be independent and prosperous as long as they provided some revenue in return. Overall, India remained highly prosperous because of its strong agricultural base, the ability of its industries to meet nearly all domestic demand and the generally peaceful and flourishing external trade.
China: Missed Opportunity China was the most extensive and technologically advanced region of the medieval world and, in the 150 years following the foundation of the Song Dynasty (ad 960), China experienced a period of unprecedented economic growth. As in Europe, this prosperity was powered by a revolution in agriculture intensified by industry and long-distance trade. The spread of highyielding wet rice cultivation and guaranteed surpluses of food enabled farmers to cultivate and market a wider range of products. Mark Elvin claims that, by the 13th century, China had the ‘most sophisticated agriculture in the world, India being the only conceivable rival’ (Elvin, 1973: 128). Sustained by a large internal market,3 an effective transportation network through the Hwang Ho and Yangtze Rivers, and the benefits of technological advances in iron and steel, merchants took the sea routes to South East Asia, exporting silk,
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lacquer-ware and some iron and steel in return for spices and other tropical products. China’s prosperity grew on the back of the reactivated Silk Route across Central Asia and the Indian Ocean sea route. Chinese settlements throughout South East Asia boosted private sea trade, which soon overtook the official tributary trade with the region. With the state supporting private sea trade and many Chinese migrating to South East Asia under the Yuan Dynasty (ad 1127–1368), the Chinese trading networks across the southern seas and the Indian Ocean became as extensive as any contemporaneous European network (Arrighi, 2007: 322). China became a formidable power in a gradually integrating world system; the mature combination of agricultural productivity, commercialisation, urbanisation and industrialisation that emerged would flower much later in Europe. Under the southern Song Period (ad 1127–1276), the polity took a pragmatic view on trade: it needed the extra revenues to meet the heavy expenditure on the wars with the Mongols to the north and the weakening of profitable government monopolies in salt, iron and wine production (Borthwick, 1992). Particularly significant was the state’s support for navigation technology; shipbuilders pioneered the use of a compass in navigation and also designed a new ship that could cross turbulent seas at high speed. The Mongol Yuan Dynasty (ad 1277–1368), following the conquest of the southern Song by Kublai Khan, the grandson of Genghis Khan, had adopted and expanded the system of private trade and government finance that, in the late 13th and early 14th centuries, spurred industry and maritime trade. Most foreign trade was private, though under government control and restricted to a few ports. Chinese ships also began to sail into the Indian Ocean as early as Sriviyaya’s decline in the 12th century, but commercial voyages rarely went beyond India.
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Inward Turn
Why did [China] turn her back, withdraw her fleet and thus
♦
♦
Towards the end of the 14th century, the Ming navy consisted of 3,500 ocean-going ships, including over 1,700 warships, and 500 armed transports for grain. No naval force in the world at that time came close to the formidable armada. The Ming made a bid for maritime dominance for Asian waters; between ad 1405 and ad 1433, the Chinese court sent a series of seven major naval expeditions into the Indian Ocean, not for conquest and plunder but for commerce and trade. Several times, they reached as far as Aden and occasionally passed on to the east African Coast (Curtin, 1984: 135). Suddenly, there was a sharp shift in policy, and the Ming navy under Admiral Cheng Ho withdrew its fleet in ad 1405. In speculating on the consequences of withdrawal, Janet Abu-Lughod makes an interesting observation, one of the ‘Great Ifs’ of history:
leave an enormous vacuum of power that Muslim merchantmen, unbacked by state sea power, were totally unprepared to fill, but which their European counterparts would be more (Abu-Lughod, 1989)
♦
♦
than willing and able to — after a hiatus of some 70 years.
Unwittingly, China ceded to future foreign navies the control of the seas that would one day determine the fate of Asia. It did so perhaps in response to its own domestic priorities: the defence of the north, which meant the completion of the Great Wall. This dynasty’s survival was at stake, and there was no money to fund the maritime expansion (Darwin, 2007: 44). After this inward turn, the ports came to be seen as dens of foreigners and their crass commercial pursuits. China’s rulers
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concentrated on rebuilding the agrarian base and internal production and marketing. In deference to Confucian beliefs, the Ming emperors embraced an agrarian ideology in which land was the true wealth. This dependence on a narrow tax base and the refusal to allow government agencies to engage in trade precipitated a fiscal crisis. By the late 16th century, the model of defense based on an army that paid itself from its own agrarian estates had also broken down, and rural disorder, relatively low during much of the Ming era, had begun rising sharply (Darwin, 2007: 87–88). In the Chinese attitude to merchants, official ideology and popular psychology seemed to reinforce each other. Confucian scholars viewed merchants as parasites and it was virtually impossible for wealthy merchants to gain social status without giving up commercial activities. For the ruling regimes, giving merchants and manufacturers too much power or allowing them to accumulate too much capital was just as bad as allowing a military commander too many armed men. Wealth was contingent on its value to the Court. Confucian officials were always trying to balance one disturbing element (professionalised violence) against another equally disturbing element (professionalised pursuit of profit) (McNeill, 1983: 40). They would relent only when their activities served official ends. To increase revenue, they would sometimes promote overseas trade and even invest government funds in related ventures. ‘The profits from maritime commerce are very great. If properly managed they can be millions. Is it not better than taxing the people?’ (Ibid.: 41). Mercantile prosperity as a source of revenue was fully recognised later by the Yuan Dynasty, which did not share the Confucian disdain for merchants. Indeed, Marco Polo’s reception at Kublai’s court illustrates this fact.
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But, as has happened so often in the Chinese dynastic cycles, the Ming (ad 1368–1644) reversed this accommodating stance towards merchants and, in ad 1371, banned foreign trade by private persons. Chinese ships could sail to foreign lands under suitable regulation and with official permission. With the reinvigoration of the bureaucratic state under the Ming, there developed a social bifurcation in Chinese elite: a bureaucratic or Mandarin class that controlled the state apparatus, and a wealthy merchant class that had no access to state power. In Medieval Christendom in Europe, business had succeeded by the 15th century in carving out an autonomous path of its own, notwithstanding canonical prohibitions against business as a respectable calling. Also, equally important, it started demonstrating that, given the backing of state power, it could effectively hold its own in a competitive market situation. Unlike their European counterparts, business in China at this period could not use the state to advance their interests. The European states had come to regard control over trade as a critical resource in their pursuit of wealth and power; for China, because of geo-political compulsions, control over trade routes at that period was far less important than peaceful relations with neighbouring states and the integration of their populous domains into an agricultural economy. In a society in which merchants were not accorded as much honour as government functionaries and in which a centralised state set the terms for money and credit, conditions were not conducive for the development of an independent and powerful bourgeoisie. The state was far more penetrative than its Indian and Ottoman peers (Tracy, 1991: 68). By Song and Yuan times, virtually all institutions required to facilitate state and private capitalism were in place: a system to organise production and distribution, a system of
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money and credit and a system to regulate imports and exports (Abu-Lughod, 1989: 331–340). China could have chosen a path to a strong state capitalism or could have actively supported the mercantile community in their trade and settlements abroad. It did neither. It is this insularity of the polity, its failure to exploit trade and industry for the pursuit of power and plenty, as European powers had been striving to do during that period, that created a ‘trap’, as Mark Elvin has argued. Though preindustrial China had reached ‘high level equilibrium’, it did not show any incentive to climb higher.
Muslim Mediterranean The first three centuries of the 2nd millennium were very different from that of the early caliphates, the Umayyads and the Abbasids. That period set the main outlines of Islam and the societies it created. The subsequent period was one of increasing differentiation within the existing framework. With the decline of the Abbasid caliphate, Baghdad no longer dominated the Islamic world.4 Instead there was a multitude of centres—Samarkand, Bukhara, Nishapur, Isphahan, Cairo and Fez. Though the Muslim Mediterranean remained under constant threat of foreign invasions—the Crusades, Mongol invasion from Central Asia and a series of nomadic incursions from the Sahara—it continued to enjoy pronounced prosperity from about ad 970 to 1250. With the gradual disintegration of the Muslim world, a powerful political base emerged in Egypt under the Fatimid Dynasty. The Fatimids had begun as a Berber Dynasty ruling over Tunisia. In ad 969, they conquered Egypt and moved their capital to Cairo, taking away the major province of Baghdad from the Abbasids. In ad 1171, the Fatimids gave way
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to the Ayyubid Dynasty, and in ad 1250, they, in turn, gave way to Mamluks, the slave soldiers who had made up the major part of the Ayyubid army. The Mamluks ruled over declining Egypt until the Ottoman Turks conquered them in ad 1517. The Fatimid administration was friendly to the merchants and gave free rein to their capitalist tendencies. All sectors of the economic life were free—crafts, industry and trade. The government interfered in the trade in victuals only insofar it had to, for guaranteeing the supply of wheat to the big towns. In the relatively open trade of the Fatimid and Ayyubid periods, Jews and Muslims were part of a single trading community. The Fatimid Empire was organised by a Jewish businessman of outstanding capacity, Ibn Killis, who later adopted Islam and became the first vizier of the new state (Goitein, 1968: 239). Jews were competent in trade, but they were not only traders; they were free to practise any other profession on an equal basis with the Muslims, cutting across religious communities and encouraging practices that were very conducive to a kind of international business culture. For example, the office of wakil al-tujjar served as a legal representative for foreign merchants in much the same way as an English commission agent was to do in the 16th century and later (Curtin, 1984: 113). In Cairo, if a foreign merchant needed to collect a debt, he could apply to a wakil for help. Banking instruments were well developed so that money could be easily transferred without necessarily moving coins from one place to another. A 10th century writer pointed to the fact that a bill of exchange was accepted with greater readiness than an allocation of income from taxes, and then commented, ‘Merchants are more powerful than viziers’ (Goitein, 1968: 239). A rich class of industrialists succeeded, in spite of heavy taxation, in building up new enterprises and conquering new markets for their products. Although the regime maintained royal factories, it abstained from establishing industrial monopolies.
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The connection between commerce and government was particularly evident in the Mediterranean trade, increasingly threatened by European vessels. Arab boats plying in the Mediterranean needed military protection and the owners had to depend on government. On the India route, protection needs were less pressing and merchants ran their show (Abu-Lughod, 1989: 227). The conquest of Iraq by the Mongols had far reaching consequences on the entire Muslim Mediterranean region. One of them was the establishment of Mamluk rule in Egypt and in Syria. The regiments of military slaves who succeeded in expelling the Mongol invaders set up a government of their own, eliminating the civilians. Medieval feudalism received its final shape from the former slaves. The Mamluks, by establishing the economic and political superiority of the military, swept away the last remnants of self administration. The Karimi merchants, who had become very important in the last decades of the 13th and the first few decades of the 14th century, captured most of the spice trade in the Indian Ocean, displacing the small merchants. The Karimis accumulated great wealth as the Mamluks oppressed the small traders with taxes and monopolies. The merchant notables were a rich, powerful and socially honoured class, the wholesalers, brokers, international traders and dealers in luxury goods and intimately linked to the Mamluk state. The Mamluks also invested in commerce, either by employing merchants or forging partnerships with them. The emirs also invested in a wide range of routine commercial activities, possibly taking advantage of their status to avoid market taxes or cover illegal affairs. The merchants also acted as bankers to the regime. The Karimi spice merchants, who controlled the money lending business, could make large loans,
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not as individuals but as consortia represented by a few of their leading members. The state and sultan’s household gave direct employment to the merchants because of their extensive manufacturing and trading activities. Merchants were also employed in the slave trade. In the Mamluk Empire, while the merchants could not function without state protection and co-operation, the political regime could not dispense with the services of the merchant elites. Trade, apart from international trade and large-scale international wholesaling, remained private and independent, except for taxation. The state went to great lengths to support the merchants in their trading activities, from using diplomacy to providing armed escorts to ships with valuable cargos. The Karimi disappeared in the first decades of the 15th century, and this marked a turning point in the relations between the merchant class and the state. Out went the Karimi heritage of state protection, fiscal supervision, close banking and merchandising relations and a degree of official employment. The status of merchants as an independent class was lowered, and merchants were more fully assimilated into the state (Lapidus, 1984: 126). When incessant warfare began draining the resources of the Mamluk state, it sought to control, absorb and monopolise large chunks of the private economy. The government started to debase the currency in ad 1424. At the same time, it confiscated private sugar plantations and refineries and raised prices to increase the profit margin, but domestic consumption and exports fell. Venetian merchants began to develop competitive sugar production in Crete and Cyprus (Maddison, 2007: 199). In ad 1429, the government banned Egyptian traders from selling imported spices to foreigners until the sultan had completed his transactions. The Karimis moved a significant amount of capital elsewhere, and a state monopoly replaced them (Lapidus, 1984: 126). In the
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traditional Mediterranean form of trading and investment, the commenda, the merchants became regular officials of the state, handling spice trade on behalf of the sultan. This became the norm in the case of the other flourishing trades as well (Lapidus, 1984: 127). As the state’s participation in the economy intensified, the number of merchants serving as agents and regular employees of the sultan increased to keep pace with the proliferation of state offices and functionaries for trading. This rise of the mercantile community in the Muslim Mediterranean, from the 10th to the 11th century, gave the Middle Eastern bourgeoisie a social position and self-esteem that it secured far later in Europe. But it could never become an organised body and, as a class, never obtained political power, although many of its members occupied the first and second echelons of the state. Their status and power was undermined by two developments. One, the monetary and the mercantile economy gave way to one in which feudalistic trend became dominant and, two the bourgeois came to be overshadowed by castes of slave soldiers, mostly of Turkish extraction, which started dominated the history of that part of the world for the following 800 years.
Power Vacuum in the Indian Ocean During the early Song Period, Chinese ships preferred to meet Indian traders in the Strait of Malacca, but from time to time, China allowed Persian, Arab, Malaysian and Indian ships to enter a few selected harbours in which their transactions were closely supervised by state officials. By the late Song and Yuan Periods, not only did the Chinese open more ports to foreign ships but Chinese junks were foraying to Indian ports to meet Arab vessels there. During the early Ming times, the Chinese
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continued to maintain an impressive navy, a fact demonstrated in the opening decades of the 15th century by the wide-ranging fleet of Admiral Cheng Ho. But, by the mid-1430s, the Chinese withdrawal from the Indian Ocean had become permanent. The vacuum created left only the small Mamluk fleet with their Gujarat allies standing in the way of the Portuguese intruders. Viewed from the perspective of the Mediterranean, this vacuum was certainly unusual. In the Mediterranean, a perpetual state of naval warfare existed from the 9th century onwards, and commercial ships always moved in military convoys. But, in the Indian Ocean, commerce was not threatened by sea warfare and merchants did not depend, as did the Italians, on armed ships from the state to guard their passage. This system of laissez-faire and multi-ethnic shipping established over centuries of relative peace and tolerance was clearly unprepared for intrusion by the Portuguese following very different ‘rules of the game’. ‘The Arab merchants of Calicut were convinced that the Portuguese were not traders but pirates. Their apprehensions by and large came to be true. The Portuguese gradually elaborated a complex system of compulsion’ (Dasgupta, 2001: 8–9). On land, they forced a series of treaties that essentially gave them the right to buy products at below market prices and at sea they instituted a violently enforced pass system that required Asian vessels to purchase Portuguese permits. Through their military force, the Portuguese thus caused a radical restructuring of the ports of trade throughout the Indian Ocean that undermined Calicut. We would be discussing these developments in Part 4.
Notes 1. Major changes in maritime trade took place after 1200
ad.
By then the
carrying capacity and the trading capacity of the great maritime routes
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had enlarged from the norm in late antiquity. By the 13th century, bulk commodities to meet the most basic needs had entered these great arteries of trade. Contemporary descriptions list manufactured textiles, metals, utensils, weapons, semi-processed raw materials such as raw silk, raw cotton, and extracted forest or marine products. Also bulk food stuffs such as grains, sugar, butter, salt and dried foods (Abu-Lughod, 1989: 271). 2. As early as the 8th century, Arab-Persian ships were making the complete journeys from the Persian Gulf to Chinese ports on the South China Sea. By the 10th Century, the long journey was being broken at India and again at the Strait, stopping at places virtually dictated by the monsoon. In these locations colonies of the foreign merchants were gradually established, as traders were forced to have layovers of three to six months or longer (Curtin, 1984: 96–101). There are references to settlements of Muslim merchants at the Indus mouth, the Malabar Coast and on Ceylon. Resident factors, not used by the Italians until the 14th century, were thus an early feature of the Indian Ocean trade (Abu-Lughod, 1989: 266). 3. Adam Smith’s reference to Chinese market, see Arrighi 2007, Introduction. 4. The Muslim world displayed great intellectual vigour at a time when Europe was comatose and anaemic. The early Abbasid caliphs, particularly Harun-al Rashid and Mamun, played a pioneering role in sponsoring secular learning, founding libraries and observatories and inviting scholars from Syria, Mesopotamia, Persia, and Transoxiana. They financed translation of Greek and Indian works on philosophy, astronomy, mathematics and medicine. Scholarly activity in Baghdad faded in the course of the 12th century and disappeared with the Mongol invasion.
Chapter 7
Business on Leash: Japan
T
â•… The isolation of the Japanese islands gave the country an unusually unified and self-contained history. Protected from the play of competing civilisations or disruptions caused by foreign invasions, the Japanese people have lived a relatively undisturbed existence. Yet Japan went through some fundamental changes that transformed it from the primitive tribal society that it was before the 6th century ad into a nation of aristocratic bureaucrats from the 7th to 12th centuries, and then into a nation of contending feudal powers, and finally to the nation state of today.1 There is a slow organic quality that has distinguished Japan’s political and social evolution, partly as a result of long periods of isolation (Hall, 1971: 3–4). In the beginning, it was primarily a land-based economy with hardly any alternative sources of wealth. A heavy burden on the peasant population supported the upper strata of landowners, fighters, priests and officials. From the 5th century, Japan began to adapt creatively to the changing Asian political environment. The country’s political stability and independence was seriously threatened during the 400-odd years of almost constant civil wars that raged on the Chinese mainland between the fall of the Han and rise of the Tang Dynasties (from ad 220 to ad 618) as hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Chinese and Korean intellectuals fled to the islands and mingled with the Japanese ruling aristocracy (Perez, 1998: 15). 109
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By the 7th century, Japan began to adapt the key elements of governance from the Chinese model, particularly the system of a centralised state headed by an absolute sovereign. The early Japanese elite were warriors as well as rulers. A series of aristocrats ruled as sovereigns and their offices became hereditary. The power of the emperor was always limited but fell further into decline during the 9th century. Between ad 857 and ad 1160, the emperors came to be dominated by large landholding families. By the 11th century, semi-independent land holdings or shoen had become numerous and there was continual warfare among them. The encroachment of feudal practices—as identified with the rise of the bushi or the military aristocracy—into political and economic leadership, came slowly over the course of many centuries.2 By the late 13th century, Japan was like a coalition of semi-independent states under powerful military rulers, without any national system of taxes, justice or even common defence. By the 15th century, Japan h d become fragmented into small do mains and was mired in Civil War among powerful regional lords.
Merchant Prominence Paradoxically, the break-down of central authority freed local merchants and entrepreneurs to increase their economic activities during the Muromachi Period (ad 1338–1573) (Borthwick, 1992: 41). Agriculture was highly productive, backed by sophisticated irrigation systems and fertilisers. Peasants had gained significant levels of autonomy; major peasant revolts in ad 1428 and 1441 secured the abrogation of all debts. As trade and wealth spread, the peasants s iftrd rom being self-sufficiin and paying their taxes and dues in kind to much greater involvement in the money economy.
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From the 11th century Japan had been trading with Korea and China and, in ad 1404, trade was regulated with a formal treaty with China. Japan sold copper, sulphur, timber and specialist swords (37,000 a year by the 1480s) to China. Exports to China were now mass commodities, refined copper, sulphur, folding fans, screens, painted scrolls and above all, swords. In return, Japanese ships came back laden with strings of cash, raw silk, porcelain, paintings, medicines and books. Merchants became autonomous units within the major trading cities. In the West, ports trading with the mainland grew; inland fortress towns had large markets (Ponting, 2000: 460). Japanese merchants went down to South East Asia, and set up business in the Philippines, Siam and Taiwan, among other places. By the 16th century, Japanese ships were familiar in ports throughout the area (Perez, 1998: 42). Japan was no longer an under-developed member of the Chinese world order, and large quantities of Chinese currency entered the country. A money economy was created and merchants soon created credit mechanisms, money transfer systems and loans at interest through the bankers (doso). The daimyo or feudal overlords began to develop free markets around their castles to attract artisans and wholesale merchants. Often the daimyo would promise artisans and merchants a free hand in their own governance to attract them to his castle. Trade was immensely profitable to its patron and commercial income became the mainstay of both the civil and military aristocracy in Kyoto, the seat of the imperial administration. With the increase of trade, wealth was no longer tied to the land but could be accumulated in other ways and stored as precious metals or goods. The merchant class that grew around the administrative centers was able to cope with local power centers and formed za, roughly similar to the European guilds, to
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negotiate with rulers and gain exemption from local taxes. The za, which was a closed community of merchants or artisans who claimed monopoly rights to the sale or manufacture of particular commodities, proliferated during the 15th century. Patrons such as a great temple or a noble family guaranteed these rights. In an age when legal protection was of little real significance, this model helped commercial and artisan groups thrive, but their independence did not grow as it did in Europe. The merchant guilds continued to be dependent upon feudal support to such a degree that, in the 16th century, these could be easily brought under the firm control of the military authority (Hall, 1971: 124). The Shoguns—barbarian-subduing generalissimos, technically the emperor’s military deputy, leader of bakufu3—would always try to rein in the increasingly independent merchants and daimyo. They had also to contend with the rising power and wealth of the Buddhist temples, which controlled a great deal agricultural wealth and had become involved in money lending and pawn-broking. They also found it necessary to maintain their own armies to defend their land and wealth against rising lawlessness of the period (Perez, 1998: 40). The Shoguns were not slow in tapping sources of income from foreign trade or domestic monopoly.
A Turning Point Towards the end of the 15th century, the urban civilian administration lost power to the rising class of military men in the countryside and Japan stood at an epic turning point by the middle of the 16th ntury. The country dissolved into civil war, the imperial capital Kyoto was raided and burnt down several times, beginning in the 1460s. But no single military leader was
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able to consolidate power and the country remained at war for several decades. The change that broke this impasse came from abroad, triggered by Portuguese merchants. As they stumbled on to Japanese soil in 1543, the polity began to be transformed. Three successful military geniuses coming out of east-central Japan beat their fellow daimyo into submission and impose a rough unity. The ‘three unifiers’—Oda Nobunaga (1534–1582), Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536–1598) and Tokugawa Ieyasu (1542– 1616)—were cruel and brilliant military men. By the time of Ieyasu, the military hegemony was firmly established and legitimised in a new Shogunate authority that managed to keep the peace for over two-and-a-half centuries. The Tokugawa Shogunate, as it established itself in 1603 out of the Civil War, was a feudal version of the modern police state. It kept the central part of Japan and capital of Kyoto under immediate family. The political tranquility that historian George Sansom calls Pax Tokugawa was marred occasionally by peasant uprisings and political assassinations, but the period was generally characterised by peace under a benevolent samurai aristocracy (Sansom, 1943). The ideal economic world envisaged by the Tokugawa administrators derived from the experience of the 16th century daimyo and the new Confucian book learning of the 17th century. The Tokugawa Shoguns held that the society should be divided into broad classes: warrior bureaucrats parallel to China’s scholar bureaucrats, peasants, mostly farmers, artisans and merchants. The rationale for putting the merchants at the very bottom rung of the social ladder, in spite of their wealth and riches, was that peasants were economically secure and had a guaranteed source of income, their land. It postulated a fundamental agrarian economy with minimum development of trade—a society in which the samurai governed, the peasants produced and the merchants
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took care of distribution. The pursuit of this policy had its paradoxes and conflicts (Sheldon, 1958: 2). Over the 1st century or so of the Tokugawa administration, agriculture prospered with the expansion of the land-base and productivity improvements, and wealthy farming families began to emerge, powered by secondary economic activities. This created a paradox for the rulers; given the fact that the cultural ethic of the Tokugawa regime was averse to growth of affluence; it was looked down upon and was thought to reflect a decline in the moral fibre of both the samurai and the peasant classes. Merchants were denied free access to foreign trade and the government interfered extensively in the production and distribution of key commodities. The government’s attitude stemmed from the Confucian doctrine, which placed the merchant at the bottom of the four classes on the assumption that, as a ‘mover of goods’, he was by definition unproductive. Japan began to experience a profound struggle between the process of economic growth and the limitations imposed upon the economy by the political system, and the struggle was accentuated by the fact that the restraints were enforced just when the economy had acquired new capacities for growth and overseas expansion. On a pragmatic level, another kind of contradiction surfaced. The samurai scorned the merchant’s way of life, but also became deeply dependent upon the merchants’ services. Restricted to his castle towns, the samurai took special procurement merchants (goyo-shonin) into their service. Also, since a samurai was absolutely forbidden from engaging in any kind of commerce, he would give to the merchants, a special and exclusive right to manage commercial enterprises and also official sanction and some protection (Sheldon, 1958: 32). We have seen something akin to this in the classical Greek Period (see Chapter 1). The ruling class in Greece would not, because
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of cultural inhibitions, allow their own citizens to engage in non-agricultural business activities, but gave a free rein to noncitizens to pursue such vocations. The merchant communities started rising to prominence in the Tokugawa regime. Some of them, being especially patronised by the Shogun and daimyo, came to be known as the ‘house merchants’. This was the beginning of an alliance between the merchants and ruling authorities that has continued, in some form or other, since then. By the 18th century it was clear that Japan had entered a new phase of urban-centric commercial economy. Edo (later Tokyo) had become more populous than contemporary London or Paris. With the rapid development of a currency and exchange system, a great number of commercial houses had sprung up in Osaka and Edo to focus on money ending and exchange. By the 19th century, houses based on manufacturing and cottage industry had begun to make their appearance. By the middle of the Tokugawa Period most of the outstanding Chonin (non-samurai urban dwellers, merchants and artisans) houses which were to retain their status into the modern period had been established. The founder of the House of Mitsui had his start in the 1620s as a sake brewer. By the 1690s, the Mitsui became the financial agent for the Shogunate and the imperial house, in addition to serving several daimyo, managing also simultaneously a large network of wholesale provision stores. It diversified its business rapidly, establishing a rapid communication service between Edo and Osaka and also financing largescale reclamation. The House of Sumitomo began as drug and iron goods merchant, but soon expanded into trading of copper, operating copper refineries at Kyoto and Osaka, and developing the rich Besshi mines (Hall, 1971: 209). By the late Tokugawa Period, signs of a new style of economic development were visible at two levels. Urban growth and
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the expansion of the consumer market had injected a new spirit of enterprise into the countryside. Wholesale organisations and village entrepreneurs developed new techniques of mass production. The developments in rural areas had important consequences for the city-based licensed merchant, with whom they competed, and some of the daimyo. New practices that emphasised local production for export sale to Edo and Osaka on a monopoly basis began to lure the fiscal agents of the Han, a daimyo domain, still further into collaboration with the commercial class. But although the merchant prospered and was the master in his world, he did not challenge his place in the polity and acknowledged the fact that he was a servant in the samurai’s world. The feudal political power based on land was separate from the power based on the new commercial and money economy (Sheldon, 1958: 36). The cities in which the merchants lived were enveloped in the feudalistic government and social organisation and did not develop into self-governing cities as in Europe (Ibid.: 37). The financial power of the cities was carefully balanced against the political power, each depending heavily on the other for a continuation of the status quo. The rise of the merchant community to economic power was almost an underground movement, a contrast with the development of its counterpart in Europe. The Tokugawa Era transformed Japan economically, and was the foundation of Japan’s modern history. Tokyo (Edo) and Osaka became major urban centers. The Japanese economy and society had managed to move into a ‘virtuous circle’ of rising prosperity. The Tokugawa Era ended in January 1868, when their main forces surrendered to the combined royalist forces. Then began the truly, national government of the Meiji Era. For many, the end of the long period of divided regional political
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power symbolised the end of feudalism, the end of an oppressive political philosophy, the demise of artificial controls over personal choice and livelihood, the end of national seclusion and the end of economic stagnation. The Japanese evolution happened through a process that differed from the revolution in Europe of the late 18th and the 19th centuries. In Europe, the members of the newly powerful classes, especially the urban bourgeoisie, challenged and sometimes overturned the privileges of the long entrenched aristocrats. By contrast, in the Japan of the Meiji Era, it was the members of the elite of the old regime, the samurai, who spearheaded the attack on the old order. Their role has led many historians to describe Japan in the 19th century as undergoing ‘a revolution from above’ or an ‘aristocratic revolution’. One of the main driving forces behind the revolution was the need to build a strong and united Japan to counter the coercive foreign presence. Their first dramatic step was to abolish all the daimyo domains, thus dismantling a political order in place for 260 years. In three years, they jumped from the Middle Ages to the mid-19th century. Equally, if not, more remarkable was the second great change: less than a decade after the restoration coup, by 1876, the economic privileges of the samurai were wiped out entirely. The coup leaders expropriated an entire social class, the semi aristocratic elite from which they themselves came. The third was a system of universal conscription of all males for three yeas of active military service and four years of reserve status; by the mid-1890s, Japan’s military was strong enough to move from the task of keeping order at home to that of imposing its will overseas. Fourth, parallel to the programme for military reform, the new government instituted a system of education, declaring that four years of elementary education was to be compulsory for all children. Finally, one of the most
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portentous new departures of the new revolutionary era was the decision to put the emperor at the very centre of the political order, symbolised by the triumphal progress of the emperor from Kyoto to Edo in 1868. All these were self-propelled institutional changes that generated order, stability and support for business to expand.
Notes 1. Broad chronology: Yamato Period, Heian,
ad
794–1185; Fujiwara,
Muromachi,
ad
ad
ad
300–365; Nara,
858–1160; Kamakura,
1338–1573; Sokuho,
ad
ad
ad
710–784;
1185–1333;
1568–1700; Tokugawa,
ad
1600–
1868; Meiji Period, ad 1868–1912. 2. Historians have customarily divided the process into three: the Kamakura Period (1185–1333), when the military leadership and feudal practice existed in equal equilibrium with those of the Kyoto court; the Ashikga (or Muromachi) Period (1338–1573) during which the bushi took over the remains of the imperial system of government and eliminated most of the court proprietorships, and the Tokugawa Period (1603–1867) when the bushi class stood unchallenged as the country’s rulers but relied increasingly on the non-feudal means of government (Hall, 1971: 78). 3. Bakufu means ‘tent government’, a term applied loosely to feudal governments between 1192 and 1868 and headed by a Shogun.
Chapter 8
Emerging Out of the Shadows: Europe
I
â•… In the medieval power structure, the merchant community in Europe was confronted with two dominant powers: first, the local magnates such as the dukes and the counts who rule the mosaic of principalities that emerged as the Western Roman Empire collapsed; second, the Church. After the fall of the Roman power in the West, some imperial functions passed to the Latin Christian Church—some but not all, for the Church’s authority was essentially spiritual or ideological, not military, and its claims were embodied in law, not in armies (Hall, 1986: 120–121). How did the merchant community adapt to this power structure, with entrenched interests stretching back to centuries, and emerge as economic entrepreneurs, with an ethical and mercantile orientation completely foreign to the values of the feudal society? The strength of the merchant community came to be based on five pillars: economic upswing, monetisation, property concept, organised marketing and transaction efficiency.
Economic Opportunities The beginning of the 2nd millennium had ushered in a phase of European economic expansion that continued uninterrupted 119
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till the middle of the 14th century. After the instability brought about by barbarian invasions and the plague of the 6th and 7th centuries, north-west Europe and Italy experienced a period of economic and demographic growth from the 8th to the 10th centuries. With the security that feudalism provided in a chaotic world, land was cleared for cultivation and large estates set up. Agriculture, the base of the subsistence feudal economy, expanded following a series of technological innovations between the first half of the 6th century and the end of the 9th century: the water mill, heavy plough, the three-field system and new methods of harnessing draught animals. Economic historians are of the view that, between the first half of the 6th century and the end of the 9th century, northern Europe created or received a series of innovations that ushered in highly productive agriculture, laying the foundation for a secular increase in trade (Cipolla, 1976). With agricultural productivity increasing, the disposable surplus available to the feudal lords was larger than ever before. Then there was income from several kinds of non-agricultural activities such as animal husbandry and fabrication of leather, wool or cloth. Also many feudal lords could derive additional income through their control of mines, ports or crossroads that happened to be located within their domain. As demand surged, so did internal and cross-border trade. The portfolio of resources derived from agriculture and bulk utilitarian goods was extensive and these were exchanged across the continent, in local, regional and national markets. Sweden, for example, had no salt, which it vitally needed to preserve fish, meat and butter for the winter; on the other hand, it had a monopoly of European copper throughout the Middle Ages. Multiple exchanges of commodities was facilitated by low transport costs relative to those in the great continental land masses,
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given Europe’s long, indented coastline relative to its area and good navigable rivers. Trade came to be built upon such ‘great complementaries’ (Jones, 1964: 90). The large landowners also wanted luxury goods such as gold and silver plate or bronze and enamel from the Meuse Valley, the Rhineland and Limoges, pearls from the Persian Gulf and diamonds, rubies and other gems from India. High-class war horses from Lombardy or Hungary and arms and armour from Solingen, Toledo and Milan were greatly in demand too. A large trade in building materials also emerged. The Church had its own specialised demands, for craftsmanship in buildings, art, parchment and writing materials (Mann, 1993). The varied needs emanating from the ordinary people for food and from the wealthy aristocrats and courtiers for luxuries helped to create the critical mass. The trading networks established within the heart of the feudal economy were along two parallel diagonal lines, running from north-west to south-east. One line gathered the produce of Scandinavia and the north to the mouth of the Rhine, moved it up the Rhine to Switzerland and thence to north eastern Italy, and carried Mediterranean and eastern produce back. The other line began in Flanders, gathering North Sea produce, moving it mostly by land transport through northern and eastern France to the Loire and thence to the Mediterranean and north western Italy. This network also covered the manufacturing and commercial centres of northern Italy, the southern Netherlands and later southern Germany. Long distance trade also resumed with towns such as Venice, Amalfi and Bari renewing their links with Byzantium, thereby reversing the stagnation that had occurred in the 9th and 10th centuries in the western Mediterranean following the Arab conquests (Spufford, 2002: 14).
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Monetisation Rapid monetisation widened and deepened market development, the core of what has been described as a commercial revolution. The monetary economy started around the year 950, and gathered momentum in the first half of the 11th century, first in the Italian cities of the late 11th and 12th centuries, and subsequently, in England and France, approximately between 1180 and 1320 (Kaye, 1988: 16). Monetisation was facilitated by the great commercial development of the Ottoman Empire, with which England was closely linked, and an influx of silver from the Eastern Islamic Empire, combined with the discovery of veins of silver in Germany, near Goslar, in the Hartz Mountains (Spufford, 1988: 74–105). From the middle of the 12th century, there was a continuous sequence of large-scale producers of silver within Europe until the Villa di Chiesa mines went into a sharp decline in the second quarter of the 14th century and those of Kutna Hora a little later. The silver produced by this sequence of mines vastly surpassed that produced by the Hartz mines in the 10th century and rivalled that produced by the mines of central Europe at the beginning of the 16th century (Ibid.: 240). The money supply was at a high point, not again reached for several centuries. Substantial cash started penetrating the countryside as the habit of measuring and calculating in monetary terms began to be extended to all things. Peter Spufford has characterised this broad translation of older values in monetary terms as a ‘revolution in attitude towards money’. Where previously, for example, lords had valued their forest holdings primarily for their status and pleasure, in the 13th century they came to be seen as a resource to be rationally exploited for earning profits. In Champagne, in 1170, under Count Henry the Liberal, good
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timber came to be treated as cash and was to be cultivated and sold for building, while scrub was to be crushed and transformed into cultivable land. Reclamation of land for cultivation developed into a business venture. Philip of Alsace, Count of Flanders, invested in drainage schemes to reclaim land for cultivation and started founding new towns for profit; these included Calais and Dunkirk. The profit motive percolated all down the line. Landlords began to employ professional managers and accountants to get the most out of their resources (Spufford, 1988: 245–46). Cash started changing relations between landlords and tenants. Tenants were able to discharge their obligations in cash, and the landlords welcomed this practice since the money allowed them to buy a wider range of things and achieve a higher standard of living. On English manorial estates, for example, both labour services and rents in kind were increasingly paid for in money. By 1279, the number of rents paid in money had overtaken the number paid in produce or labour services (Wood, 2002: 79). More and more, the feudal landowners wanted money rather than influence over men in the form of loyalty. Landowners were also quick to go in for market-related production in their land. Trade linked the aristocratic domain estates and their products with the exporting cities dominated by merchant capitalists and brought the two interests together (Dewald, 1996: 83–84, 87).
Property Concept Feudal property rights are normally schematised by historians under three broad categories. First, the estate typically included a domain or land under the estate owner’s direct control that could be used as he wished. Second, on some groups of land, the
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estate-owner had only indirect control, because this land had been granted out for permanently fixed rents to peasant tenants. Peasants’ rights differed from place to place, but normally the peasant could sell the land, leave it to his heirs and in most ways treat it as full property, so long as he continued his payment to the lord. Third, the estate carried with it rights to exercise political power and run economic monopolies within its boundaries; typically these rights extended over all those who held permanent leases from the estate. The system of feudal property in land began to disintegrate under the combined impact of a growing market and monetisation. It was gradually becoming possible, for example, to possess and exploit land without holding clear title to it or having the right to sell it. In the medieval towns, proprietors of urban dwellings, which usually served as both residences and places of businesses, owned outright the land on which their buildings stood, and were free to dispose of it at will. While it was possible to possess and exploit land without holding a clear title to it or having the right to sell it, this was not the case with commodities or money where it made economic sense only when it could be traded or invested with incontestable ownership right. This was the beginning of the evolution of the institution of property in a commercial economy; by the 16th century, it became axiomatic in Western Europe that the king ruled, but that his subjects owned and that royal authority generally stopped where private property began. Property started becoming a thing, fully detached from person and family and from the explicit exercise of judicial and political power (Dewald, 1996: Chapter 2). In some societies divided by wide barriers of power and status, predatory behaviour by the lords was not uncommon. Anywhere east of the Elbe, in Prussia, Poland and Russia, the local lord enjoyed so much authority over the population that there
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was abusive treatment even of those residents who were normally free, let alone the serfs. The rise of commercial agriculture made conditions worse in these regions from the 16th to the 18th centuries. In the other regions of Europe, the erosion in property rights inherent in the concept of lordship, so fundamental to feudalism, formed one of the early modern period’s most important social changes. However, the erosion took place only gradually over the next few centuries till its last vestiges were virtually wiped out during the French Revolution.1
Market Forms During the Carolingian times, markets were held under the auspices of bishops and the transactions were based on local subsistence needs. As markets diversified and developed, merchants needed an organisational framework and supporting facilities. By the middle of the 13th century, sites for fairs had been institutionalised in four towns in the counties of Champagne and Brie in France. Merchants from different regions would assemble at particular sites during specified periods for transactions and business. All the regions of France sent their merchants there, as did northern and central Italy, Flanders, Hainault, Brabant, Spain, England, Germany, Switzerland and Savoy. These came to be recognised as the most important emporium for European trade by the mid-13th century. Merchants depended on the feudal lords to organise the fairs. The counts of Champagne and later the kings of France played a basic supporting role, without which it would have been virtually impossible to institutionalise the functioning of the fairs. This marks the beginning of an extraordinarily long and almost continuous process of adjustment of interests between the mercantile community and the ruling regimes. What were
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the main factors and circumstances underlying the development of markets and convergence of interests between the merchant community and feudal lords? First, for the feudal lords, it made rational economic sense to facilitate transactions in utilitarian goods and discourage the ‘plunder machine’ that was an irritating obstruction in those centuries (Jones, 1981). They started putting restraints on the waywardness of their subjects and also their own arbitrary behaviour. Second, security of the merchants was essential. The counts of Champagne, for example, gave the merchants very active protection, beginning from the day the merchants set out for the fair, and Thibaut II even got the kings of France to take under their protection all merchants passing through the royal territory on the roads to and from the Champagne fairs. Later, in 1209, Philip Augustus placed under his protection, all the Italian and other foreign merchants going to the fairs. Third, the lords had to assure justice to the merchants in respect of any disputes arising from transactions at the fairs. The chief officers attached to the fairs also doubled as wardens responsible for order and justice and controlled the fair seal, at least until 1318 when a chancellor or the keeper of the fair seal was appointed. The court of the fair wardens was a tribunal of capital importance. The counts of Champagne and Brie facilitated a local system of justice within the fairs themselves. The Guards of the fairs, who were officials appointed by the counts, policed the fair grounds. These officials who numbered 700 at times were under two notables who constituted a tribunal of justice, hearing cases, adjudicating conflicts and imposing penalties (Abu-Lughod, 1989). Fourth, the lords also had a financial interest that the fairs went off smoothly, as the fairs fetched considerable revenues from tolls on the goods in transit, rents on the halls, stables,
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and houses leased to the travelling merchants and licence fees for all sorts of economic enterprises. The lords collected fees for using their seals to ratify contracts and for a host of other purposes. Fifth, with the territorial enlargement of the market, there was an emerging recognition that the market was a mechanism with the capacity to define value, not only in the absence of, but also in spite of, governing agencies to regulate and control it. French chroniclers record an instance in 1304–1305 when the King completely failed to regulate the price of grain. Prices were soaring because of a scarcity of grains, and officers started checking hoarding. Maximum prices were set at one-third of the current price and farmers ordered to bring out their grain to the market. This proved disastrous. Grains promptly disappeared throughout Paris to the extent that bakers were forced to close their shops. A similar English attempt to regulate the market through maximum price on common food-stuffs during the famine of 1315 had to be promptly withdrawn. The concept of the market as a dynamic self-regulating system gradually took hold in the consciousness of people. A demonstration of the organisation of the market beyond the King’s control in this period was the evolution of a floating market price for money itself in response to constant monetary debasement (Kaye, 1998: 24–28).
Business Transactions Underlying the process of market development was the progressive sophistication of the technical procedures for settling transactions and for systematic book keeping. It spread over Europe from Italy as a centre.2 These were developed by the merchants themselves in response to their emerging business needs: the
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economies of scale associated with a growing volume of trade, and the need for effective mechanisms for enforcement of contracts at lower costs (North, 1981: 29). The most important of these innovations related to mobility of capital was the bill of exchange. Starting as a notarised instrument involving transactions between Genoa and the Champagne fairs, by the first half of the 14th century it had become the normal requirement for commercial payments between cities in Western Europe. Then there were innovations designed for transformation of uncertainty into risk, starting from sporadic individual contracts to more sophisticated forms in the later centuries. The third group of innovations relates to business risks, for spreading risks through portfolio diversification or by drawing in a large number of investors to share in risky ventures.3 These institutional innovations marked the beginnings of market-driven arrangements between merchants. The significance of these arrangements is that, both in devising and enforcing them, the merchant community had been functioning as developers and as regulators as well; they did not look for any special legislation from princes to look after the common interest. In fact, as some recent research has shown, they had on their own perfected contractual arrangements among merchants residing and operating in different political entities (Roover, 1974). In the first three centuries of the 2nd millennium, the conjuncture of these five critical factors provided the first momentum of growth for market and business in north-western Europe within the structure of feudalism. Many feudal ethic and obligations that were not in harmony with the emerging business ethics started getting diluted. Business was, as Wallerstein put it, both a solvent as well as a natural product of the medieval society and economy during the first three centuries (Wallerstein, 1979: 20).
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New men who lived, so to speak, on the margin of a society
♦
♦
In the beginning of the 2nd millennium, the merchant hovered at the periphery of the hierarchical feudal economy. A typical merchant, Godric of Finchale, a true Horatio Alger of the 11th century who rose from rags not merely to riches but even to sainthood, was depicted by Henri Pirenne, the great medieval historian, as the archetype of the emergent merchant class:
where land alone was the basis of existence … Speculation … largely contributed to the foundation of the first commercial fortunes. The speculation of a little peddler, a sailor, a boatonly he knew how to use it. (Pirenne, 1958)
♦
♦
man or a docker furnished him with quite enough capital, if
While recent research by economic historians counters the ‘mercantile settlement theory’, it could nevertheless be asserted that a typical merchant came from a variety of social origins. Some were former merchants for the abbeys and enjoyed fiscal privileges; many had been free merchants from the Carolingian times, while some would have been landowners taking to commerce. Many of them gradually faded out because of the substantial decline in long-distance trade and the absence of protective safeguards in those decades of political uncertainty (Fossier, 1997: 312). The feudal system was inherently antagonistic to the idea of giving merchants the autonomy they needed for their business enterprise to survive and flourish. Yet, the merchant community, learning to live with the mistrust of the peasants and the contemptuous haughtiness of the nobles, could, within just three centuries, successfully cross the treacherous waters of that age of political fragmentation and incessant warfare, and emerge as an independent and assertive business force. It would perhaps be no exaggeration to say that the kind of versatility, resilience
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and adaptability that we normally associate with modern business enterprises have their roots in the medieval past. While the energy, initiative and opportunism of the merchant community stand out, so do their unabashed materialism, insolence and egotism. A typical example in this regard is the Flemish draper, Jehan Boinebroke, described by his biographer as a person single-mindedly devoted to money, subordinating his every thought, word and action to this objective. Benedetto Zaccaria, known as the ‘merchant admiral’ of Genoa, chose a different route to prosperity, using his own fleet, intervening freely in politics and war, to launch enterprises that secured for him vast commercial fortunes. The fortunes of the merchants underwent an astonishing transformation. By the 11th century, the Pantaleone of Amalfi could present decorated bronze doors to their Cathedral, to San Paolo fuori de Mura and San Michele di Gangaono. Florentine money-lenders and businessmen like the Bardi or the Peruzza had a turnover of several hundred thousand florins per annum (Gies, 1972). Some of the richest merchants were close to the court, which needed their financial and political support. The banker Jacques Coeur, ‘the first financial magnate in Europe’ (1395–1456), invested his capital in all possible sorts of lucrative ventures and had interests throughout Europe. He became the treasurer and minister of the King of France, Charles VII, and had a hand in state reforms and in military and diplomatic policies (Kerr, 1971). A slightly older contemporary, Buonaccorso Pitti (1354– 1430), took an active part in public affairs in Florence. Considering himself equal to the highest aristocracy, he participated in wars and political intrigues and lived in the thick of factional struggles in the city (Le Goff, 1990: 262). The next two chapters take this story forward and look at how business, as an independent and potent force because of its
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wealth creating capabilities, started interacting, virtually at the same level, with the major power holders of the feudal society in Europe.
Notes 1. Later 18th century witnessed a series of efforts by the state to reduce the lordship’s burden on the peasants. This meant an attack on anything that restricted peasants’ economic freedom, an attack on what 18th century called serfdom. One after another 18th century kings legislated either the outright abolition of serfdom or severe restrictions on its exercise: the Habsburg Empire in central Europe in 1767, and in the 1780s, Denmark in 1702, the kingdom of Savoy, in northern Italy, in 1772 and the German state of Baden and Bavaria in 1783. When the French Revolution fully abolished what remained of feudalism in France, its efforts thus formed part of a broad movement of agrarian reform that was moving across Europe (Dewald, 1996: 76). 2. Sombart regarded that double-entry book-keeping ‘is born from the same spirit as the systems of Galileo and Newton, as the teaching of modern physics and chemistry’. It reduced the gain idea to an abstraction by putting the profit in a specific form, a definite sum of money in contrast to the natural aim of subsistence which was in the forefront of the medieval business man’s mental attitude. It was this abstraction of profit that first made the concept of capital possible (Nussabaum, 1993: 160). 3. These instruments, of Jewish, Byzantine and Muslim origins, through their evolution in the hands of the Italians to the regulated and joint stock companies are an evolutionary story of the institutionalisation of risk.
Chapter 9
In the Limelight: Knights of Commerce
I
What is your substance, whereof are you made? —Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream
In the preceding chapter, we have discussed how, in the first three centuries of the 2nd millennium, the merchant communities emerged as the moving spirit behind the development of markets in north western Europe. Associated with this was the growth of towns as the nucleus of commercial and urban expansion. Governance of the towns came to be dominated progressively by the patriciate class consisting of the nobility and large merchant groups. The mercantile culture and ethic wore down the feudal structure of stratified duties and obligations, and more remarkably, the strong ecclesiastical barriers to trade and wealth creation. This then is the theme of the present chapter.
Urban Expansion The development of markets spurred urban growth, particularly along the trading corridor. There was a provocative correlation, as Holton notes, between the upswing of the 132
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The merchants were obliged to overflow the boundaries of
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European economy from ad 1000 and ad 1300 in terms of population growth, increasing production and development of new markets and urban expansion (Holton, 1986). By about the second half of the 11th century, there grew up at many places in north western Europe urban settlements, the burgi, around the nucleus of the protective walls of the old Roman towns. During the early Middle Ages, these towns had shriveled up into a corner within the ancient walls, with their functions reduced almost exclusively to those of government and administration.
the old burg and to establish alongside it a new one … In this way were born, besides the ecclesiastical cities and feudal fortresses, a species of mercantile agglomeration in which the that led by the inhabitants of the inner city (Pirenne, 1958).
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inhabitants engaged in a way of life in complete contrast with
The revival of trade and the emergence of towns was achieved at the expense of powerful vested interests. The Christian Church was wedded to the prevailing economic structures. Its members comprised tiny literate elite and its ascetic ideals were suited to an agrarian culture, and it could be jolted from its introverted stupor only by a strong external force. Long-distance trade provided that force (Green, 1993: 20). The 10th century towns were primarily ecclesiastical and political, and were almost exclusively consumers of goods and services. In the 11th and 12th centuries, they became economic agglomerations that also produced exportable industrial goods and provided important services of re-consignment of basic necessities as well as of luxuries (Nicholas, 1997: 2). At the same time, the increases in rural productivity made it possible for the towns to become weighty corporate actors within the overall framework of feudalism.
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Towns become Trading Communities The medieval town that took shape became by nature a trading community. Commercial capital started working as the solvent of the ‘natural economy’. The feudal towns served, to borrow an expression from Charles Tilly, as ‘containers and distribution points for capital’ (Tilly, 1994). Self-sustaining rural communities that, with few exceptions, produced a narrow range of coarse goods for local consumption were transformed, expanded and refined by the unrelenting pressure of commercial forces. Over the decades, urban settlements provided the setting for the emergence of a business community based on ties between individuals rather than on kinship or personal dependence, as in the countryside (Holton, 1986: 30). By the middle of the 13th century, merchants and artisans were creating institutions aimed at preserving their autonomy in their spheres of interest. With these institutions, the towns became integrated units of economic activity. The units of market competition were not just individual merchants, but the towns themselves, which sought to enforce their monopolistic privileges against the countryside and against rival towns. In these ways, some of the urban centers became laboratories for the techniques and practices of economic production and exchange within a protected political framework. As such, they provided a history and an experience of a dynamic repertoire that was elaborated on a much larger scale, much as the national state was to become in the era of absolutism and mercantilism (Katznelson, 1993: 183–84). Merchants in the towns had the capacity to redirect production away from local markets to trade on a much wider scale. In turn, once the nodal points became intertwined in a larger market system that included overseas trade, the new world system became self-reinforcing, and capitalist production and exchange
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came to be elaborated on a much larger scale (Katznelson, 1993: 162–64). Given the obvious contrast between the functionally undifferentiated countryside and the economic specialisation of towns, historians have often argued that the towns could be regarded, as M.M. Postan characterised them, as ‘non-feudal islands in the feudal seas’ (Postan, 1972: 212). However, the status of the town was not that of a non-feudal island, its freedom and development was not ‘according to its own priorities’, as in Weber’s historicist formulation. The relationship between town and feudalism was mainly one of synergism and contrariety. The norm in the 11th century was for land-owning families to use their city residences and contacts to expand into commerce, but the reverse process occurred more often in the 12th and particularly 13th centuries, as persons who gained wealth through trade, bought land in the city and then increasingly in the rural environs as a means of gaining social status and political influence (Nicholas, 1997: 3). As the break-down of town life and the practical disappearance of the middle class in the West is the great watershed between the last phases of the Roman civilisation and the early Middle Ages, so the revival of town life and the growth in the wealth and power of the middle class marks the great transition from the early medieval into the later medieval and modern times (Vries, 1984).1
Guilds Expand their Role While, in a turbulent age, feudal society provided its members with a modicum of security, the towns, not being a part of that, had to look for guarantees of person and property from princes, nobles and clerics on whose land they came up. As traders came
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from a variety of social origins, they began to group themselves in guilds. Often known as charities or fraternities, these guilds had a purely social function to begin with, notably to encourage self-help and solidarity, but their focus started changing from social to mercantile. Guilds had initially admitted artisans but gradually excluded them and welcomed only great merchants (Verhulst, 1998: 107). They became closed associations, which tended to restrict trade in cloth and other important products by dominating and regulating artisans’ looms. In some towns, these merchant guilds merged with associations of merchants, known as ‘hanses’, which developed during the 12th century especially at Ghent and Saint-Omer but also in other towns. These guilds provided, protected and regulated economic environments for robust craft production and for the extension of networks of trade beyond the local regions. The guilds also procured privileges from the princes, nobles and clerics on whose lands they lived, allowing them to govern themselves and administer their own justice, very much as with the citizens of ancient Greek polis. They gained their freedoms sometimes by rebelling, sometimes by coming to terms with the local rulers. All male residents of urban communes enjoyed equal status and the right to participate in communal assemblies—an enormously important innovation, in that it established the principle of territorial rights in place of rights derived from social status (Pipes, 1999: 109). Self-administered justice was especially important because, as commercial people, they frequently entered into private contracts which neither royal nor feudal courts could enforce. In time, other rights were added. If the feudal court is the basis of modern constitutionalism, the charters gained by the medieval burghers from their lords may be said to provide
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foundation of modern civil rights. The greatest triumphs occurred in countries that did not then have constitutional monarchies: Italy, the Low Countries and Germany. In England, France and Spain, they were less successful (Pipes, 1999: 108–9). Thus ‘towns people’ emerged gradually as a ‘Third Estate’, alongside the clergy and nobility.
Emergence of Self-governing Communes The emergence of communes was an act of political and social assertion by leading local men pushed to it because of the instability of authority and by decades of conflicting violent claims. The urban communes were the work of men privileged and well-born, enlisted mainly from among the large class of resident urban knights. They also included a scattering of rich merchants and money-lenders, a few local men trained in the law, and a handful of small landed proprietors of some antiquity. Their authority soon spread out through the expanding property interests and commercial ties of its citizens, moving into the countryside and overcoming any resistance from rural communes or magnates. There were differences in the way communes originated and established themselves across Europe, but they all grew into strong municipal structures, the focal points of all classes and interests, not only of mercantile and artisan classes, but also of feudal, agrarian and military ones.2 Though the communes held the bulk of local authority de facto, whatever the claims of ceremony and legal authority, they were never strong enough to seize the full range of public powers. In the first century of their existence communes coexisted with the older authority but over the next century, dual or inter-locking authority came to be terminated.
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The one common characteristic of their evolution was that, to begin with, the aristocracy was the mainspring of the movement; it was the aristocracy which triggered the movement. Even their counterparts in the country—the associations of knights, small landed proprietors and freeholders, and men of substance—were bound together by oaths to defend existing rights or to seize new ones. Its objectives were those of propertied or privileged men, responding to its local needs or perils and taking collective action in order to be more effective. This common characteristic in the evolution of communes has long been ignored by historians in the name of ‘urban democracy’ (Fossier, 1997: 368).
Dominance of Merchants in Communes Towards the end of the 12th century, the stranglehold of the nobility on the communes started loosening. The quarrels among the nobility made for the greatest danger to their authority in the city. In all the great Italian communes such as Milan, Florence, Genoa, Pisa and Bologna, the nobility was hopelessly divided. By the middle of the 12th century, pressure groups of merchants emerged within the communes. Most of the larger inland cities had one or two merchant guilds, and their elected heads now began to turn up as governmental advisors and diplomatic agents, representing the city’s big commercial interests. They aimed to influence commercial policy in large-scale trade and sought to fix the norms that governed commercial practices (Martines, 2002). By the 13th century, the highest echelon of merchants formed the cities’ governing class and held all the power even though numerically this patriciate was an insignificant proportion of the
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urban population. Masses of wage workers, serfs, small-scale artisans and shopkeepers were dependent upon them. According to one Italian chronicler, the ‘people’ were that part of the population that ‘lives on buying and selling’; he did not consider anyone who ‘lived with the labour of his hands’. One German chronicler, relating the revolt of Mainz, called the plebeian population a ‘pestiferous mass’ and a ‘dangerous mob’ (Gurevich, 1990: 259). The interests of large merchants and of craftsmen within the communes did not always match, and serious ruptures erupted in many cities between them by the middle of the 13th century, particularly in Italy. Just as in the period after ad 1100, municipal noblemen working through their commune had pushed forward to take power away from bishops or empire, so also in the decades after ad 1200, the popolo confronted the aristocratic commune, grasped piece-meal at its authority, or took it over altogether by throwing armed men into the fray. The rich businessmen and their part of nobility did not give in. The old set of big merchants and bankers were grouped together with a large array of knights in an organisation known as the Motta and they hit back. The popular political movements of the 13th century ended in dictatorship or oligarchy (Nicholas, 1997, Chapter 8). The popolo were defeated by organised resources: by feudal magnates in upper Italy, by merchant bankers and entrepreneurs in north-central Italy, west of the Apennines, and by alliances everywhere between big money and feudal landed interests. As long as the power of the consular nobility remained intact, rich merchants, shippers and bankers were ready to accept the support of the emerging popolo, so seeming to endorse it. But after about ad 1250 or ad 1260, having fully achieved their aims and now menaced by the political ambitions of the middle-classes, they broke with the popolo, dividing and undermining the popular movement (Martines, 2002).
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The different kinds of associations had a political as well as social role to play since they were instruments for acquiring and exercising power. During the 11th and 12th centuries, they contributed to the formation of urban laws that were distinct from the customary laws of the surrounding countryside and were better suited to a dynamic society based on money transactions. The communes were largely responsible for the fact that the towns acquired their own statutes and distinctive institutions. The bench of aldermen, sometimes in isolation and sometimes together with representatives of the legal community, became the political expression of the dominant class in Europe. We discuss in the next chapter how this power came to be exercised in three clusters of towns in Europe, in regions dominated by Hanses, in Flanders and northern Italy.
Mercantile Ethic and Culture The growth of the consciousness of money’s place and function in society paralleled the rise of the merchant from a lowly position to one of great social and political power over the course of the 13th century. The merchant’s social success presented a newly rationalised model of behaviour and perception, leading individuals far removed from commerce to imitate their modes of thought and activity (Roover, 1948). Money became the blood of the city and the place of an individual in the hierarchy came to be determined by his revenue. Even when city functions multiplied, the money mentality won over and modelled sensitivities and behaviours of the practitioners of other professions: the jurist would sell his knowledge of law, the professor his learning, the day worker his physical strength and the minstrel his talent (Rossiaud, 1990).
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You should seek to conceal your total income from the
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The principal values of the merchants of the late 14th and early 15th centuries come out clearly from the memoirs of Giovanni di Pagolo Morelli (ad 1371–1444). His memoirs abound in advice:
communal government in order to avoid paying taxes and should use every possible means to show only half of what you really own. You must be friends with whoever is in power and belong to the strongest party. You should trust no one, not servants, nor kin nor friends, because men are full of vice and imbued with deceit and betrayal when money or any other possession is in question, there is no friend or acquaintance who can take better care of your interests than you can yourself. If you are rich, be happy to other means.
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buy friends with money if you cannot gain your friendship with
It was said of Morelli that he could not remember how many children his daughter-in-law had, but the sums paid for dowries he remembered with precision (Gurevich, 1990: 269). Second, the mercantile culture started shaping the outlook and behaviour of the town dwellers. The town dweller was more often than not a recent immigrant, yesterday’s peasant. The market place was the heart of the town and the town dweller learned dependence upon the market. Above all he learned about diversity and change, about the wide range of opportunities open to him. He could profit from urban refinement that, after ad 1350, came to be called ‘urbanity’ or civility, for, there existed an ‘art of living proper to the urban world’. The towns offered new careers in business, in the professions of medicine, law and teaching and in government administration.
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They developed as great centers for the growth of new ideas and attitude. Also associated with this was a strong feeling of local patriotism. The great merchants themselves, at least in the 13th century, were prepared to pay for this with their money and their lives.
‘In the Name of God and Profit’ 3 Since Augustine (ad 354–430), the Church had conceived of a singe universal society with Christ as its head. Gregory VII undertook in the 11th century to give society a unified control under the Pope. Politically, the Church rebuked kings for the mismanagement of states and of their private lives; economically, the Church sought to regulate industry and commerce by preaching the idea of the just price, by prohibiting usury, by teaching that property is a trust from God held for general benefit, and by its inculcation of charity; intellectually it developed a single culture in the schools and universities and, when everything failed to achieve conformity, it invoked the inquisition. During the period when the merchant community was developing its own power network, it had to reckon with the infrastructure of papal power over an enormous terrain. By the late 11th century, this ideological power network was firmly established throughout Europe in two parallel authoritative hierarchies of bishoprics and monastic communities, each responsible to the Pope. Its economic subsistence was provided by tithes (contribution) from the faithful and by revenues from its own extensive estates. Ideologically, the church was sustained by a monarchical conception of religious authority, asserted to be superior in an ultimate sense to secular authority. Understandably, there was a continuous, fluctuating power struggle between secular rulers and the church.
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Inevitably, the merchant community had to work its way through the jurisdiction of the two dominant power holders in the feudal society. The merchants had to protect their own person and property and to ensure for themselves the freedom to move across territories to transact their business. The way the Champagne fairs came to be organised was a tribute to the business-like behaviour of the participants and the protection offered by the lords. While the lords were busy with their own power struggles in the feudal world, they had the pragmatic sense to allow the business to carry on in their independent ways so long as they did not encroach on their power and authority within their territorial jurisdiction. In a sense, it was this hands-off relationship that contributed to the enormous growth of business over these three centuries. However, it was not easy for the merchant community to get past the authority of the church in their business transactions: the mercantile culture itself was not in harmony with the ecclesiastical tradition of the Church. Preachers thundered tirelessly against the avaricious and the wealthy. The profits of usurers, preachers insisted, continued without interruption, denying the normal rhythm of work and rest and destroying the connection between the person and his labour because interest continued to accumulate while he ate, slept or even listened to a sermon. The accusations of the preachers were striking a sympathetic chord in the minds of the city dwellers. One chronicler of the early 13th century, Matthew Paris, wrote of the Lombards (as Italian bankers and money lenders were called in countries north of the Alps): ‘The Lombards, great rogues ... are traitors and imposters … They devour not only men and domestic animals, but also mills, castles, farmlands, heath and woods.’ The persecution and slaughter of Italian usurers, particularly in France, during the late 13th and 14th centuries, were
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phenomena as frequent and widespread as pogroms against the Jews (Gurevich, 1990: 250). The tri-functional scheme of ‘prayers-warriors-plowmen’ of the 11th century was in obvious contradiction with the emerging social reality. There was a gradual transformation in attitudes even among papal views. In ad 1078, a council at Rome had condemned merchants by stating that it was impossible for either merchants or soldiers to pursue their trades without sinning and denied them the hope of eternal salvation unless they could find other work. Yet, in ad 1179, Pope Innocent III canonised the merchant Homobonus of Cremona within two years of his death (Wood, 2002: 116). Even in the teachings of Berthold there was a qualitative change in the attitude towards the merchant community. He came to take the view that merchants were necessary to the functioning of society and that vocations have been distributed according to the will of God and that no one can abandon his ‘service’ to pass from one social order to another. According to him, what was reprehensible was not the occupation of the merchant but practices such as hoarding, monopolistic trade, deceit and theft. The south German cities of Rosenburg and Augsburg, where Berthold preached, were large commercial centers with a wealthy merchant class. The values of Augustine, the theologian and moralist opposed to property and riches, started losing their universal acceptability. Though Thomas Aquinas (ad 1225–1274), regarded trade as ‘something sordid and shameful’, he came to fully recognise its necessity for society. Over time, wealth ceased to be spoken of exclusively in negative terms. People started to see their professional vocation, their property and their time, as gifts of God. The theologians and friars of the mendicant orders made a notable contribution to the ethical and religious justification of commerce and the merchants.4 The exaltation of the
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merchant developed in parallel with economic nationalism. In the 14th century, the Italian civilian Bartolus, a friend of Dante and Petrarch, and his pupil Baldus, praised trade and commerce as the foundation of political power, and also encouraged the development of a large and prosperous merchant class in the cities (Wood, 2002: 118).5 The emergence of a self-confident merchant community within the framework of European feudalism changed the power equation fundamentally. The business elites that emerged out of the cauldron of feudal Europe form an interesting contrast to their counterparts in Muslim cities. The merchant cities of the Middle Ages, as Braudel put it, ‘all strained to make profit and were shaped by the strain’ (Braudel, 1984: 91). The Syrian and Egyptian cities lacked a class organisation in the Western sense. The rulers were a group apart, followed by religious leaders and intellectuals, who in some texts were put roughly on the same plane as other leaders including rich merchants. Longdistance merchants were urban notables in ways somewhat similar to their western counterparts, but they were more linked to the state than in Europe. As we have discussed in an earlier chapter, the repression of the market mechanism by the Emir deprived this group of any chance to exert political influence; social respectability came even more from involvement with the government and religion than in Europe (Lapidus, 1984; Hourani, 1991). Business entrepreneurs in Medieval Europe worked and flourished in autonomous city-states, where the influence of landed wealth was necessarily limited. The special juridical status of urban communes made it possible for their inhabitants to develop and sustain their own political interest, while it isolated them culturally and socially from the agrarian world round them. In this way:
…cities were not only foci of economic activity but schools
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of political and economic association—incubators of the bourgeoisie as a self-conscious, assertive, interest group. They were also crucibles for the refinement of values that, although rooted in European culture, were still deviant and feudal order. (Landes, 1958: 20–21)
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limited to a minority—values ultimately subversive of the
We discuss in the next chapter how the Hanse League and the merchant republics of the major city-states shaped the characteristics of the bourgeoisie.
Notes 1. The role of urban location in the demise of feudalism and in the rise of capitalism has provoked interesting debate among economic historians over the usual town-centric portraits of epochal transformation. Urban locations did have a role both in the demise of feudalism and in the rise of capital, but the role was arguably quite different from that of the linear developmental trajectory ascribed to by Paul Sweezy. As Sweezy has argued, feudal cities were the ‘prime mover’ both for the decomposition of feudalism and for the rise of capitalism precisely because they constituted an external proto capitalist agent of dissolution within the ambit of the feudal mode of production. The relationship between the merchant capitalism of feudal towns, the post-feudal mercantilism headquartered in the political capitals of absolutist regimes and industrial capitalism of factory cities was emphatically not one of a movement along a straight line. The feudal town was not the lineal ancestor of the early modern city, nor was the early modern city the linear ancestor of the industrial capitalist city. Any such thought has been decisively rebuffed by Ian de Vries’ reconstruction of European urbanisation in early modern Europe. De Vries demonstrates that there was no gradual or benign process of urbanisation hand in hand with a steady development of capitalism culminating in the great towns ‘studied by Engels’ that were created de novo in the late 18th and early 19th centuries (Vries, 1984).
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2. The patterns of evolution in the north and south of the Alps were different. North of the Alps was a land of strongly established villages, without a strong urban tradition, with princes closer at hand and with craft activities firmly anchored to local production. The aristocracy played a key part here. Merchants were outsiders, relatively weak. The land from the Siene to the Rhine was the cradle of the communes, where all that the merchants desired were guarantees of protection and economic liberties. It was a different kind of world for the merchants in the region south of the Alps in Italy. Overcoming political turbulence and confused authority, at the beginning of the 2nd millennium, several settlements in Italy, with roots in Roman municipal and Bishops’ seats, struggled hard to regain their autonomy. Because of the instability of authority and decades of conflicting violent claims, leading local men resolved to have self-government: the conscious formation of the urban communes was the work of men privileged and well born, enlisted mainly from among the large class of resident urban knights (Fossier, 1997: 371–73). 3. The motto on the ledger of Francisco Datini, the merchant of Prato (14th century), a deeply troubled man whose agonies were caused more by the fear of losses than by the fear of God (Origo, 1957). 4. In Roover (1974), we may read an absorbing account of the scholastic attitude to trade and entrepreneurship from the 11th to the 14th centuries which is designed to counter Max Weber’s thesis that religious influences stifled the development of capitalism in the Middle Ages. 5. One of the high points of economic humanism was Poggio Bracciolini’s dialogue on avarice. Without the cupidity which motivated the economic life, all liberality would cease, ‘all the magnificence of the cities would be removed, all culture and ornament would be destroyed, no temples would be built, no colonnades, no palaces, all arts would cease, and then confusion of our lives and of the republic would follow’ (Wood, 2002: 118).
Chapter 10
Playing with Power: Merchant Republics
B
â•… By the 14th century, several groups of merchant communities had established themselves as financial powers with substantive control over the administration of many cities along the trade routes in Europe. The political system that came to be formed was based on the city-state: autonomous, relatively large and internally compact, each bordering the next without serious discontinuity. It was the political creation of a commercial metropolis which, through war, diplomacy or purchase, succeeded in enlarging the territorial framework of the original urban commune and in dominating its hinterland of small and middling towns and villages (Hocquet, 1999). In many significant ways, we see in the behaviour of these merchant groups the beginnings of what we have come to know as the ‘bourgeois’ character. Though feudal princes had formal jurisdictional sovereignty over the urban growth centers, the bourgeoisie in many urban centres succeeded in holding their own. History was in their favour, for the princes were involved in feudal and dynastic wars and left the bourgeoisie relatively untouched. We discuss in this chapter the behavioural pattern of three such groups: the Hanse, a powerful and domineering group of merchants operating out of Lubeck who ran far-flung trade networks emanating from north and Baltic Seas; the merchants 148
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based in southern Netherlands, the hub of a flourishing textile industry, who had to keep themselves perennially engaged in fights to preserve their economic independence from feudal encroachments; and the Italian city republics of Milan, Venice, Florence and Genoa, with their rich concentrations of trade, industry and wealth.
Hanse Merchants The Hanse merchants were the true inheritors of the Norsemen, using the broad spaces and coastlines of Europe as their playground. The central axis ran from London and Bruges to Riga and Revel, the gateways to either Novgorod or to Vitebsk and Smolensk. The merchants from the north of Germany strove to establish trade monopoly in this region: they extended gradually their geographical reach, from Zuyder Zee to Finland and from Sweden to Norway. The Hansards were individual traders who travelled with the goods they had to sell, dominating the commerce of northern Europe in the 14th century. During the earlier centuries of medieval expansion, they had established themselves as the main commercial intermediaries between east and west. It was they who traded and reaped the profits rather than the Flemings, English and Poles who produced or consumed many of their goods. The Hanseatic League began as an association of merchants and ships from north German coastal towns like Bremen, Wismar and Danzig seeking to protect their common trade interests. The towns were concerned not only with German trade, but also with long distance trade between Western Europe and the Baltic: the movement of cloth, salt and wine from the west, grain and forest products from the east and fish from the North Sea and Scandinavia. The north of Europe, the trading waters
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of the Baltic, the North Sea, the English Channel and even the Irish Sea, became the scene of the sea-borne commercial triumph of the Hansa. Established formally in Lubeck in 1356, the League reached the peak of its medieval commercial prosperity in the 14th century as ‘one of the oldest, most complete and complex merchant organisations of the Middle Ages’ (Mauro, 1990). Not a state, not even a firmly constituted organisation, the merchant alliance was a remarkable success story because of its solidarity and shared pride. In the Mediterranean, with its comparative abundance of wealth, the different cities could operate independently and compete with each other in fierce rivalry, but in the Baltic and North Sea, with low profit from the bulky goods that were the staple trade of the region, the traders had to control both supply and demand, and a strong self-regulating organisation was the plank on which their success was built (Braudel, 1984: 103). Aggression was the key in their business dealings. In the early days, the League worked to secure the legal rights of anchorage, storage and residence and local immunity, which its members required to conduct their business. Over time, it started resorting to any means to protect its turf, cajoling, decreeing, threatening, boycotting and, when needed, using force. The contemporary political structure was the framework of an Empire within which—as in the rest of Europe at the time—noble and royal families played out their competitive struggles for power. No wonder, therefore, that the League could not count on help from the emperor in their early skirmishes and subsequent war with the King of Denmark. When the skirmishes with Danish kings became irritants to their trade, the League decided to challenge them. The League raised naval forces, first to suppress pirates and then to contest the policies of Denmark. Their hands were strengthened
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when the Danes sacked Wisby in 1361, provoking the League to work out an alliance with Norway and Sweden. Subsequently, the troops of the League captured Heisingborg, destroyed Copenhagen and occupied the Sound. It imposed upon the King of Denmark the Treaty of Stralsund by which they acquired wide freedom and control of castles in his country (Holmes, 1975: 124). The German Emperor was not pleased with all this; he was, on paper at least, with the King of Denmark against his own subjects. War and trade thus developed as complementary ways of gaining control of what belonged to others. Hansa’s war against the King of Denmark was a significant milestone; it signaled that a new power has arisen in the north of Germany, which came to be accepted as a reality by Flanders, France and England. The League developed into a mighty trading empire, linking at one time as many as 90 towns: each proud and jealous of its prerogatives, but never losing sight of their common objective— domination of trade in their domain. Each town of the League was like a miniature republic, but in matters of trade affecting common interests, it would submit to persuasion, arbitration and sanctions by the League. The Hanseatic League possessed no formal constitution and no central government, but had very great commercial power. Apart from defending privileges of members in such out-posts as Bergen, Bruges and London, the League enforced a ‘guest law’, which forbade direct trade between noncitizens in their towns; thus locals prospered as middle-men. It could pronounce the exclusion of a city or a merchant that did not follow its customary rules and the ban could be potent. Self-regulation by the League was crafted carefully; it secured a balance between the collective business interests of its members and the independence of the towns. The solidity displayed by the League carried it through for nearly four centuries.
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In the cities, political posts were generally the rewards for those who had successful careers in trading and banking; in German cities the town hall usually housed the merchants’ exchange as well as the government. Political posts went to the heads of rich families when it was time for them to retire from their commercial travels. With trading and money as their strength, towns like Lubeck could even confront the imperial power. These towns also chose symbols that were an assertion of their power and authority. Hamburg had a painting of the Day of Judgment which showed knights, princes and even Popes being pitch-forked into Hell, while hard-working grocers and drapers were being raised in bourgeoisie triumph to the Right Hand of God. The slow decline of the Hanseatic League was the result of both economic and political factors. It was the mysterious wanderings of the herring that triggered the decline of the League’s North Sea trade monopoly. The Hansa owed a large part of its riches to the herring trade, and when in the 15th century, the fish began to spawn in the North Sea, the centre of northern Europe’s commercial success shifted to the Netherlands. The Hansa also found it increasingly difficulty to handle aggressive modern states such as England, Prussia and Muscovy. What is the legacy that Hansa has left behind? Over the centuries, Hansa had created a way of life whose solid virtues were cemented into every stone of its bursting and elegant cities. Many European historians have hailed it as a beacon for all who seek a future based on sturdy local autonomy, international cooperation and mutual prosperity. Never before, as Braudel said, was there a true international economy (Braudel, 1984: 102). To be Hanseatic was to belong to an inimitable, international civilisation based on shared values and priorities.
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Southern Netherlands In the late Middle Ages, a number of independent counties, politically fragmented and located in the northwest corner of continental Europe, spread over parts of what today are France, Luxemburg, Belgium and the Netherlands, collectively referred to as the Low Countries because of their nearness to sea level. The more prominent among these were the counties of Flanders and Hainault, the duchy of Brabant and the bishopric of Liege. Flanders (now western Belgium) was within the feudal fold and to some extent within the political orbit of the king of France of which the count was a vassal; the other counties, theoretically, were within the territorial ambit of the less effective German King. By the 13th century there were a large number of towns dotting this region, which derived their wealth from a highlydeveloped woollen cloth industry. In the 13th century Flanders reached its peak; so great was the production of Flemish cloths that, in some sense, one could characterise it as a kind of industrial revolution (Abu-Lughod, 1989: 84). By the 12th century, the towns could secure privileges from the kings and counts for ensuring freedom and safety of trade. They strove hard to maintain the integrity of their liberties on which their commercial success was based. Unlike the towns of the Hanseatic League or the cities of northern Italy, the towns in the Netherlands could never isolate themselves from the seigniorial or princely politics. The towns framed economic policies of their own, negotiating and making decisions on trade relations, both long distance and local and setting up their own commercial jurisdiction with authority over native and foreign merchants. The general revolt in Flanders (1322–1328), leading temporarily to the deposition of the count, was sparked by the count’s action in granting rights of justice along the river Zwin
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to a relation of his. This was unacceptable to the business community, for the Zwin, Brughes’ line of communication with the sea, was considered far too critical for the cloth industry of the towns to be open to arbitrary decisions. During the 13th and 14th centuries, merchants dominated not only local but also national and international politics. The rich burghers had very high stakes in the textile industry and had to remain constantly vigilant about the moves of the counts and the King of France. Each of these counties had a different constitutional arrangement with the dukes who had come to power by inheritance, purchase, or conquest. At the peak of their prosperity, the governments of the three great commercial towns of Bruges, Ghent and Ypres, in Flanders, were in the hands of aldermen elected from the wealthier burgesses, though, formally, they had to share their powers with bailiffs representing the Count or Duke. In Ghent, an oligarchy of 39 persons rotated the 13 aldermanic posts among themselves every three years (Holmes, 1975). This situation had always been extremely frustrating to the dukes nursing ambitions of acquiring substantive control over Flanders, since it was the most valuable part of their dominion in terms of revenues. Flanders and Brabant also included some of the most important old and established industrial and commercial towns of Europe and were more difficult to manage than large agrarian states. Things could get very confusing for rival political governments when the Flemish towns got involved in their disputes, as in the Hundred Years’ War between France and England (1337–1453). The towns flourished on wool imported from England, so they had to take sides. Edward III (1327–1377) tried to secure the alliance of the Flemish towns against the King of France. Given their natural hostility to the French crown, the towns allowed themselves to be used as a lever by Edward III.
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When the French and the English fought for control of Flanders, the workers sided with the English invaders. The English forces, with help of worker militias, defeated the French in the famous battle of Courtrai. This victory not only altered the internal governance of the Flemish cities but the outcome of international politics (Holmes, 1975: Chapter 1). That the designs of the English failed is another story, but, in the confused political situation that emerged, the three big towns of Bruges, Ghent and Ypres consolidated their republicanism. But the towns started losing their bargaining strength with the decline of the cloth industry in Flanders, which happened when England and Holland showed they could produce simple clothes more cheaply. Internal cohesiveness between the patriciate and the textile workers became fragile. The workers took to the streets in 1280 in virtually every textile town in Flanders to protest their conditions. These open conflicts of interest sapped the political strength of the towns when it came to taking on the counts or the King of France. Between the towns also, conflicts of business interests developed, as, for example, between Antwerp, the growing centre of international trade, and Bruges, the declining centre of the Flemish cloth industry.
Genesis of Global Financial Centres Flanders occupies a unique place in the evolution of trade and its finance. For several centuries the region was the economic centre of gravity for the whole of Europe. Bruges contained within itself a point of maximum commercial intensity, as it united the two major poles of maritime circulation—that of the Mediterranean with that of the Baltic and North Seas. In its markets products were found, exchanged and transported from the near east and Africa by the Genoese and the Venetians and the goods were
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bought from Russia and Scandinavia through the Baltic by the ships of the Hanse. Bruges became the chief commercial city of northern Europe (Holmes, 1975: 18). Bruges retained its primacy until well into the 15th century when the silting of the Zwin estuary made it difficult for ocean-going vessels to reach the harbour. Bruges was overtaken by Antwerp, and for more than 50 years, Antwerp wielded supremacy greater than that of Bruges in its heyday. Some scores of men, princes, diplomats, artists, poets, travellers and merchants, have left on record their astonishing admiration at the queen of commercial capitals. Two characteristics marked it apart. First, its cosmopolitan character; Antwerp attracted trading nations because of its better and more enlightened treatment, and fewer restraints and greater tolerance, in contrast to Bruges. Second, the network of trade among the different ‘nations’ at widely scattered points and in particular, the techniques of their financing, building in the risk factors, can be said to be the beginning of a ‘circuit of finance’ that would in later decades would be one of the main foundations of oceanic trade (Neal, 1990). Considering the close relationship between trade and finance, it is easy to understand why merchant bankers left Bruges and set up shop in Antwerp. Foreigners—Italians, Frenchmen, Englishmen, Germans, Portuguese, Spaniards, or ‘nations’, as such groups were called—came to do business at Antwerp. The singlemost important event that marked the beginning of Antwerp’s rise was the decision of the Portuguese to choose the city for marketing spices. From 1460, the Portuguese had begun marketing the produce of their oceanic enterprises at Bruges. But when the Portuguese royal factor established himself at Antwerp, the spice trade leapt into prominence. Vasco da Gama’s success in getting to the source of east Indian spices ensured that for half a century
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to come, Antwerp was to be the main channel of Portuguese spices into Europe. The English also chose Antwerp as the ‘mart town’ for English cloth. The south Germans, based at Nuremberg, Augsburg and Frankfurt and linked with such places as Berlin, Breslau and Leipzig traded in metals from the central European mines and in the fustians woven south Germany. Big German firms such as the Fugger, Hochstatter, Welser and Tucher had all begun with a combined metal and cloth trade and later specialised in metals, in particular copper and silver. Many Lombard traders settled in the city and became involved in the creation and financing of inter-European enterprises. Antwerp’s political, religious and fiscal autonomy were secured after paying a political price. The city had extended support to Maximilian during his 10-year struggle with the Flemish towns which was to last unimpaired until the advent of Philip II 70 years later. The alliance was formalised by Maximilian’s charter calling upon nation’s residents at Bruges to transfer themselves to Antwerp. The creation of Charles V’s empire gave the city natural advantages inside his extensive political system and made it the obvious place for feeding the precious metals of the Americas into the European trade stream (Elton, 1963: 42). But this had a price: the town had to be willing to ‘support the prince in his necessities’. Second, it had to accept the policy the prince pursued with the resources thus provided. For the first 50 years of the century, which were coterminous with the reign of Charles V, these conditions were substantially fulfilled. The town was invariably ready with the money required to confirm an old privilege or require a new one or to redeem a toll or farm a tax, while its wealthiest strangers made the loans which an imperial monarchy happened to be in constant need. The town used its privileges to protect its business community, but this was never to the liking of the monarch.
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City States in Italy Around the year 1200, north and central Italy had 200 to 300 city republics, although only a handful of them contained more than 20,000 inhabitants. In the course of the 14th and 15th centuries, the number fell sharply but the survivors included cities of great commercial importance, notably Genoa, Milan, Venice and Florence. Merchants from all over northern Italy ventured forth to take advantage of the opportunities for trade in the expanding European economy. The basis of that trade was the relation between an undeveloped area and a developed one, between northern Europe, where markets for luxury goods opened up once the political situation began to stabilise, and the older markets in the Levant, where many of the goods were to be found. Italy was located half way between these market areas and lay in the midst of the sea that facilitated transport, so that Italians were destined to be middlemen—the traders and shippers. Everywhere in northern Italy, in small towns and large ones, entrepreneurs collected what capital they could and went out to exploit market opportunities. Over the next two centuries, they built up a network of commercial relations that spanned all of Europe, from England to Egypt. All this became the life-line of the developing European economy (Goldthwaite, 1991: 31). The big four Italian cities occupied themselves with fairly distinct market niches. Florence and Milan engaged in manufacturing and in overland trade with northwestern Europe, with Florence specialising in textile trades and Milan specialising in metal trades. Venice and Genoa both specialised in maritime trade with the east: Venice in deals with the southern Asian circuit based on spice trade and Genoa in deals with the central Asian circuit based on the silk trade (Arrighi, 1994: 88).
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Florence had no port and therefore no fleet of galleys but the very elaborate worldwide of firms like the Alberti were a Florentine speciality. The big four created a vast international network. Florentine gold florins, for example, first issued in 1252, became a standard international currency for all of Europe. By early 14th century, Florence had outstripped all of its neighbours and indeed most other European towns, in size and wealth as an industrial centre.1 As a nominal part of the Byzantine Empire, Venice had been serving as the transfer station for goods dispatched to northern Italy by traders within the Byzantine system. During the 12th century, Venetian traders expanded their scope to the whole eastern Mediterranean, profitably mixing trade, piracy, conquest. Participation in Crusades was fully exploited by them to pursue their commercial interests (Atiya, 1962). In material terms, Venice was the greatest commercial success story of the Middle Ages—a city without much industry which came to bestride the Mediterranean world and to control an empire through mere trading enterprise. The 15th century saw the culmination of Venetian prosperity. In the period just before 1423, Venice was said to have 3,000 vessels, of less that 100 tons burden, manned by some 17,000 sailors; 300 large ships with crews totaling 8,000; and 45 galleys employing in all 11,000 men. These figures may be a trifle exaggerated but they give some idea of the swarming activity of the Venetian seaways (Clough et al., 1952: 61).
Entrepreneurial Ethos and Culture In these city-states, the merchant community acquired a culture and ethos strikingly similar to what one finds in the capitalist countries of today. One distinct feature common among
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the city-states was the entrepreneurial attitude of the merchant class. They were imbued with a pro-enterprise culture which flourished in the autonomous ambience of the cities. Cities of the 16th and 17th centuries saw the dominance of ‘a group of talented and ruthless entrepreneurs’, classic examples of what Pareto called the ‘speculator type’, whose pursuit of profit at once encourages and is encouraged by economic development. In his classic study on the Renaissance, Jacob Burkhardt stressed their ‘individualism’. The pro-enterprise culture was suffused with aggression. Venice was driven to acquire, for the sake of her trade interest in eastern Mediterranean, the islands of Negroponte, Crete and many lesser places on the route between Venice and the Black Sea. If Venice had sugar plantations in Cyprus, Genoa controlled the alum mines of Phocaca, alum being a vital raw material for the textile industries of Europe. The rivalry of Venice and Genoa in the eastern Mediterranean—almost a foretaste of the rivalries of imperialist powers in the early 20th century—produced bitter wars in the later 14th century. Within this conglomerate, one can discern different patterns of intermixing of business and politics. The Venetian political structure was that of an oligarchy. The city’s leading families were merchants and bankers and the city’s governing council represented the leading families. The ruling Doge came from the patriciate and the ruler was in substance its chief executive sub-serving the domestic and foreign interests of the merchant capitalists. The Venetian state’s policies were geared to promote commercial monopolies, protect its merchants and channel trade through Venice rather than to create a territorial empire. Their rulers gained a reputation for their ability to wage canny and successful sea battles for the benefit to the city’s merchants, bankers and manufacturers.
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The great advantage that the Venetian state enjoyed, as compared with the larger states in Europe, was that it could finance wars carried out in the interests of the merchants by borrowing from the merchants and taxing the cash flows such as customs and excise passing through the extremely commercialised economy. The strength of the Venetian state was in its fiscal rectitude and in ability to borrow and tax, with support from business, without creating a bulky bureaucratic governance and fiscal structure. At the start of the 17th century, while other European states were acquiring war debts and struggling to set up workable fiscal machinery, Venice could manage to liquidate its entire debt (Lane, 1996: 326). Second, finance started emerging as a major tool for the expansion of business; the Florentine traders had developed the expertise to use finance as an effective leverage. By ad 1250, Florence had 80 important trading and banking firms like the Spini, Spigliati, Bardi, Pulci and Alfani. Other towns such as Sienna, Lucca and Pistoia boasted dozens of wealthy firms but Florence became the financial capital of Europe in the 14th century. The importance of the bankers of Florence was enhanced by the break-up of the order of the Templars2 in the early part of the century. Florentine networks of business were embedded in an extensive and dense web of financial support. Scattered all across the Western world, and yet linked with the technical facilities for dealing with one another, the Florentines had what was in effect Europe’s only international banking system. The great bankers of the time were at the same time members of the wool guilds so that international banking and commerce in cloth developed co-extensively (Ibid.). Well before the end of the 14th century, Florentine capital and business knew how to assert its strength to the point where it could penetrate and outbid its
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most vigorous competitors even in their home areas. In 1382, Venice reversed its protectionism to allow the Florentines to set up an establishment in Venice and allow them to invest in the Venetian maritime trade. Florentine capital contributed significantly to the growth of textile industry in Ragusa in the 15th century. In Barcelona, the king, recognising the superiority of the financial services provided by Florentines, allowed them to move in, despite vigorous protests by local merchants (Goldthwaite, 1991). Florentine finance owed its respectability to its involvement with the politics of the day; Florentine bankers would assiduously cultivate political personages and leverage these connections to their enormous business advantage. Papal connections inspired awe and Florentines used it to good effect through management of papal finance. The papacy collected taxes, dues, fees from almost every land in Europe, and this money had to be collected and sent to Rome or held till they were needed. The popes needed a highly organised system to carry out these functions; the Florentines provided it. Ironically, it was the Church then that, despite its condemnation of many banking practices, stimulated the growth of crossborder financial transactions, the basis of what we would call an international bank. The pan-European activities of the Popes were inextricably bound up with the commercial expansion of Italian business: they had virtually grown together (Holmes, 1975: 67). By plugging into the Papal financial network, the banking firms were able to build up an extensive branch operation, ensuring that ‘the largest floating capital in the world’, as the Florentine chronicler Geovanni Vilani described it, passed through their hands (Roover, 1974). The strongest of these families/firms at the end of the 14th century,
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the Alberti, established its position in the Papal network so securely that it was able to survive the break in diplomatic relations between the Papacy and Florence occasioned by the War of Eight Saints (1375–1378). Trade in religion on Rome’s account was so inextricably combined with trade in wool on Florence’s own account that the firm’s business did not suffer much even though the family was exiled for over a century, from 1401 to 1428, because of the city’s internal fractional strife (Goldthwaite, 1991: 35). What Alberti began was developed more vigorously during the Medici Period.
High Finance: Genesis From involvement in Papal finances it was but a small step for the Italian bankers and financiers to get involved in the finances of the princes and kings. This association between business and politics is the genesis of what we call ‘high finance’ today. This shift to high finance increased as the returns from the wool trade shrank because of a change in consumer preferences and entry of new players. Florentine expertise in finance gave its merchants tremendous business resilience, changing their business models and enabling them to exploit new opportunities. During the Hundred Years’ War (1337–1453), the constant need for financial assistance imposed on the two sides by the commercialisation of warfare created unprecedented opportunities for commercial and financial intermediation and the Florentine merchant bankers were well placed to take advantage of this (Arrighi, 1994: 107). The Florentine chronicler Giovanni Villani wrote about the activities of Florentine merchants in England during Edward III’s war with France in ad 1338 and after:
During this war between the kings of France and England the
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merchants of the King of England were those of the Bardi and Peruzzi companies of Florence. Through their hands went all his revenues and wools and other things and they (Holmes, 1975: 68)
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supplied from them all his expenses, wages and other needs.
The influence of Italian bankers permeated many regimes in Europe. Two such bankers, Biccio and Musciatto, dominated the finances of France in the reign of Philip the Fair (1285–1314). The Bardis, who had extensive business interests in northern Europe, owed their prosperity to their association with the King of Naples, also the Count of Provence in southern France; they lent him money to finance his wars and in return got the exclusive right to control the exports of grain, fruit and diary products from Apulia in southern Italy and grain from Provence, trading extensively in French textiles and scarlet cloth from Ypres. But high finance had its heavy price. Joanna of Naples repudiated half of the debt owed to the Bardi by her kingdom. English mobs rioted against the foreign usurers. Finally in 1345–1346, Edward III was unable to pay the huge sums he had borrowed from the Bardis. This catastrophe threw the Bardis into bankruptcy and they paid their creditors only 48 per cent. It was probably little comfort to them that the Peruzzi were involved in the same crisis and likewise went bankrupt (Clough et al., 1952: 86). When the financial leadership in Florence in the 15th century went to the Medicis, the family used its bank as a lever to gain effective control over the Florentine state. ‘It is hard for the rich to live in Florence, unless they rule the state’—this is how one of the Medicis rationalised their attitude towards the state, implying that if you do not control the state, the state will ruin
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you (Parks, 2005: 87). Business and politics came to be inseparably intermixed. Cosimo, the dominant Medici figure in the 15th century, reached out across Europe—planning, calculating and spinning his web across the continent’s financial centres (Hale, 1977: 127–43). The diplomatic function of the foreign branch managers of the House of Medici was always considerable. The branch in Milan, for example, was a kind of ministry of finance, housed in a palazzo made available to the bank by the Duke, Francesco Sforza, and greatly enlarged at Cosimo’s expense (Hibbert, 1979: 87). The Medicis became so deeply involved in the business of politics that they rose to prominence in the ranks of the European aristocracy even though their commercial and financial activities withered away. They gave the Church a number of cardinals and two Popes, Leo X (1513–21) and Clement VII (1523–34), and France two queens, Catherine and Marie. Branches of the family were princes and dukes down to the 18th century. In Genoa as well, state policy was primarily directed at ensuring the superiority of Genoese commerce in their traditional trade routes. Genoese enterprises managed to establish and maintain, through their naval power, a quasi-monopolistic control over the Black Sea terminal of their Central Asian trade. As long as the Mongol Empire could ensure the security of this central Asian route, and Genoa retained its military superiority in the Black Sea, Genoese trade prospered and grew in scale, scope and volume. Then, the Ottoman power rose and destroyed Genoese supremacy in the Black Sea region. The setback to Genoese long-distance trade prompted the landed aristocrat-turned-merchant class to rethink its strategy. With the military commercial empire beginning to disintegrate, the Genoese landed aristocracy withdrew from commerce to re-feudalise itself. Meanwhile, the bourgeoisie element of the
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merchant classes found itself in a crisis: on the one hand, it had huge reserves of money, information, business know-how and connections, but on the other, it no longer had the ability to protect itself and its traffic. Then, opportunity presented itself on the Iberian Peninsula when Barcelona’s leading private banks collapsed in the crash of the early 1380s. The Genoese filled the gap to become the most important financiers in the Iberian region, very much as the Medici had taken advantage of the collapse of Bardi and Peruzzi in the crash of the 1340s. The Genoese merchants took over Castilian trade. Once they had obtained this foothold, the Genoese was well placed to entrench themselves in the Castilian economy, and later participate in the lucrative trade between Seville and Castile’s colonial empire. It was with the help of the Genoese merchants that the King
of Spain was able to convert the intermittent flow of silver from America to Seville into a steady stream. After 1567, the Spanish troops fighting in the Netherlands demanded regular monthly payments in gold coins. Genoese merchants provided this. Thus Genoese predominantly influenced the course of 16th century Spanish development. If the Catalans rather than Genoese had won the struggle for entry into the would have taken a profoundly different turn. (Elliott, 2006)
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Castilian commercial system, the history of a united Spain
In Venice, as in Florence, the end of the Eurasian trade dictated that the surplus capital be transferred from trade to war and state-making activities, from the business of trade to the business of politics. In Florence, it materialised in the highly concentrated form of the irresistible rise of the Medici to the monarch
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of the city; in Venice it materialised in the more diffused if less spectacular form of ‘rentarisation’ of the entire upper stratum of the city’s merchant class. These elements played a passive role in the subsequent expansion of the capitalist world economy. Thus, when at the end of the 15th century, the European world economy entered a new phase of expansion under the impact of the so-called great discoveries, the opening-up of a direct link between Europe and the east Indies, and of the conquest and the plunder of the Americas, the capitalist classes of Venice, Florence and Milan played no active role in the promotion and organisation of the expansion. By then, their surplus capital had been fully absorbed in state-making and had lost much of its previous flexibility. It was Genoese capital that showed the way.
Business and Politics: A Matchless Mixture Even before the expression ‘colonial empire’ existed, the city republics of the end of the Middle Ages, before the rise of the Great Powers and before the Age of Discovery, did in a real sense, possess one. With regard to Genoa and Venice, Fernand Braudel has spoken of ‘European expansion’ taking place as early as 12th century. These aggressive little entities were oriented towards external trade and no longer lived in an exclusive relationship with the countryside around them. Venice and Genoa had its borders marked by Lisbon, Fez, Damascus, Azov in addition to Bruges and the Hanseatic League. They possessed trading outposts and possessions abroad, from the Barbary Coast to Caffa on the Black Sea. It was like a Portuguese Empire before its time, but confined to the interior of the Mediterranean (Ferro, 1997). During the crusades, Venice came close to occupying the Byzantine Empire but Genoa restored the Paleologue Dynasty.
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Divided among themselves, they came up against a wall: Islam strongly entrenched in the Levant, which the Vivaldis from Genoa had attempted to bypass by means of expeditions, round Africa, as early as 1282. Their enterprises failed because these were too large for small states. But the idea lived on. The big city-states of Italy had become major European powers instead of being appendages to feudal lords. The entry of businessmen into political decision-making drew them into the economic functioning of the state. In all their diversities, they were able to adapt their ways of thinking to the realities of the economic world and assert their own scale of values. Looking back, after the city-states were gone, from the turmoil of the 16th century, it would seem that the personages like Cosimo, Lorenzo de Medici or Jacques Coeur had belonged to a more self-assured, in some ways even innocent age. They all came before the sacking of Rome (1527), before the sieges of Naples (1527–1528) and Florence (1529–1530). But the city state format was proving inadequate for giving continuous support to expanding business activities. By the end of the 15th century, the relatively autonomous Italian city states found themselves pawns of great power politics. In 1492, the dual monarchy of Castile and Aragon—the linked but not merged inheritances of Ferdinand and Isabella— completed the conquest of Granada, eliminating from Iberia the last substantial vestige of once great Muslim empires. Responding in part to the threat of a united Spain, France made a bid for Italian hegemony, initiating the era of wars on a European scale. These wars in their turn shaped the European state system, constructed the platform for European conquests outside of Europe, and helped form the centralised, autonomous, bureaucratic states that eventually came to predominate Europe and then in the world as a whole. Prosecution and conduct of
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wars required men, material and finance; the way the different political regimes could raise these resources became critical. The natural rhythm of the body politic was broken and a new one in the form of fiscal military state started evolving.
Notes 1. Florence had an annual income greater than that of the king of England and the revenue of Venice and its Terra Firma at the middle of the 15th century was 50 per cent higher than that of France, more than the double of England and Spain (Bobbitt, 2002: 83). 2. The Knight Templars were among the most famous of the Western Christian military orders. Templar knights were among the most skilled fighting units of the Crusades. Non-combatant members of the Order managed a large economic infrastructure throughout Christendom, innovating financial techniques that were an early form of banking, and holding many fortifications across Europe and the Holy Land. The Templars’ existence was tied closely to Crusades, and when the Holy Land was lost, support for the Order failed. King Philip IV of France, deeply in debt to the Order, burned the members at the stakes and confiscated their wealth. Under pressure from King Philip, Pope Clement V disbanded the Order in 1312. The organisation existed for nearly two centuries in the Middle Ages.
Part III
The Great Transition: Warfare Technology— The Catalytic
In the beginning of the 15th century, Europe was a region of fragmented sovereignty and porous borders. Muslim dominions had come up in most of the Roman Empire’s former space. A loosely linked Byzantine Empire extended from eastern Italy to the Black Sea. To the north, an even more indefinite Russian state stretched to the Baltic. A Danish kingdom wielded power from the western Baltic to the British Isles. South of the Baltic lay a host of shifting Polish, Bohemian and Hungarian principalities. To the west was a Saxon Empire that claimed the heritage of Charlemagne, and still further, the Kingdom of France. Within the ring formed by three sprawling ephemeral states, rivals commonly used armed force to further their own interests without paying much attention to their nominal sovereigns. Nearly all European political units were composite states built around ruling families and dynasties. Nothing like a centralised national state existed anywhere in Europe. There has been a tendency to take a rather mystical view of the rise of these states, the argument being that these states had features—some representative or semidemocratic government, controlled state power, the rule of law, individual and local liberties and privileges—that were behind the rise of Europe and thus crucial for the development of industrialisation and capitalism. So, the argument goes these states were models for other societies wishing to become ‘modern’. Actually, the processes that powered the emergence of the European fiscal-military state had little to do with these factors and more to do with the revolutionary changes in 172
the strategy and tactics of warfare that made it impossible for princes and monarchs to conduct war within the feudal setup. The princes and monarchs were compelled to bring military activities under the umbrella of the state, thus institutionalising the relationships between the merchant capitalists and the monarchs. These fiscal-military states were strengthened further as they adopted mercantilist policies and practices. The progressive deepening of collaboration between business and polity through fiscal– military–mercantilist states was at the roots of European hegemony in the later centuries.
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Chapter 11
Sword and Purse: Beginnings of Collaboration
T
â•… The 16th century was one of transition from the era of small city-states mostly ruled by patriciates with business interests or supported by business communities to one of nation-states ruled by monarchs. Geo-political developments started changing the face of Europe. The complex of principalities and territories known as Germany was at the height of prosperity and population. The decline of France in the wars of the previous two centuries and of Italy in the Franco-Spanish wars of the previous 30 years had put Germany at the centre of the European stage (Elton, 1963: 23). The rising power of the Habsburg Empire emerged as the central political sensation of the times.1 As Germany came to occupy the centre of the European stage, the authority of Charles V was open to challenge on all fronts. France felt encircled and frustrated in her search for military glory and was spoiling for opportunities to settle a web of claims in Burgundy and Italy. In the eastern border, the formidable power of the Turks was a constant worry. Internally, the 85-odd imperial cities’ jealously guarded their independence and maintained their defences while the aristocratic nobles regarded the 16th century monarch as not more than primus inter pares. Charles found himself challenged simultaneously by intense 175
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religious dissidence. It was but inevitable that Europe came to be involved in incessant warfare.
Warfare Technology By the early 14th century, new techniques and technology started revolutionising warfare.2 For a thousand years or so, following the fall of the Roman Empire, the cavalry had been the dominant branch of armies throughout Europe. The mounted warriors were nobles while the foot soldiers accompanying them were the serfs and commoners. The introduction of the rapid-firing longbow was the first blow at the primacy of the cavalry; the introduction of guns in the 14th century, first as artillery and then as firearms, reduced the cavalry to an auxiliary force and the infantry now moved to the fore. Archers, and then infantry armed with muskets, ended the dominance of feudal knights and the massed squares of pikesmen. The armies themselves grew dramatically in size, giving their commanders scope for decisive action in the field and ending the era of the static, inconclusive siege tactic that was a favourite till about the end of the 15th century. It is generally admitted that, at Ravenna in 1512 and at Marignano in 1515, field battles were won by artillery for the first time in history (Cipolla, 1993: 28). Princes and monarchs keen to expand their realms using the opportunities opened up by the new technologies of war became desperate to overcome the military constraints inherent in the feudal military structure. Feudal armies were organised and equipped on the basis of a network of relationships—military specialisation, land tenure and personal obligation. In medieval Europe, war had been an honourable profession for wealthy specialists, eulogised in the European literature as selfless knights,
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who trained for it from early youth, in return for economic security through grants of land, and pledged service and allegiance to the lord. A land-holding warrior class developed free of all duties save that of rendering mounted service to the lord for a number of days in a year. The rulers could no longer count on the feudal ethic and obligations as the main instruments for the mobilisation of men, materials and weapons. However, none of the then ruling princes and emperors in Europe were equipped to organise, on his own strength the men, material and finance required for the switch to the new warfare strategy. In feudal warfare, the cost of war was levied through the social system; in the emerging landscape only a statecontrolled fiscal system could meet the cost of war. But creating such a system takes time, and rulers were driven to look for quick ways to mobilise resources, given the frequency of wars.3 The strategy for resource-raising became the prime mover in the transformation of relations between the rulers and social elites, in particular the community of merchant capitalists—the beginning of a long process that extended from the early 16th century to around 1700.
Resource Raising Raising resources for warfare became the axis round which business–polity relations started moving. The character of the economy, the extent of urbanisation and the spread of merchant communities, location of financial centres—all these influenced the ways in which the ruling classes and business entrepreneurs started relating to each other. If one were to draw a line from Copenhagen to Venice, all the thriving commercial towns were situated west of that, with
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relatively uncommercialised agrarian economies to the east. Merchant capitalists were dominant in the urban civilisation of 15th century Western Europe. Despite the collapse of the 13th century agrarian boom and the population crisis produced by the plague after about 1350, the wealth of the trading towns had increased—in the north, where the Hanseatic League dominated the Baltic and the North Sea, and in the south, where the Danube and the Rhine towns controlled the profitable trade routes over the Alps into Italy and from France and Burgundy in the west to flourishing industries and markets in the east. On the other hand, eastern Europe’s primarily agrarian economies were dominated by the feudal ethic and had little commercial orientation. There were also differences in the relative availability of commercial capital and surplus from agricultural activities. These two factor endowments influenced the pattern of state formation as well as the relationships between political actors and business entrepreneurs. Two types of social interaction influenced these developments: the logic of coercion in which administration and violence control human activities in a territorial setting, especially the extraction of resources from peasants; and the logic of capital which controls human activities in the market, especially trade, finance and transport. We follow Tilly in discussing the outcome of the interplay between the two logics, as the different regimes got involved in resource-raising efforts.
Agricultural Economies In Europe’s zones of herding and subsistence agriculture, with capital remaining slight and dispersed, as in Russia, the ruler had little option but to enlist the support of landlords to conscript peasants for the army and to create massive bureaucracies for
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collecting taxes for necessary resources. The mode of mobilising resources was primarily, as Tilly characterised it, coercionintensive (Tilly, 1994). Since there was little urbanisation and so also concentration of capital, rulers squeezed the means of war from their own populations and others they conquered by building their own massive structures of extraction. The Mongol hegemony respected this power structure and, during the 16th century, as the Mongol states collapsed, Russian conquests to the south and east brought into being a system of forced labour by peasants with restrictions on their rights to move. Landlords generally enjoyed, as in Russia, the freedom to exercise economic and political control of the peasants in their jurisdictions. When the Muscovite tsars, Ivan the Great (1462–1505) and Ivan the Terrible (1533–1584) set about to establish direct control, bypassing the independent power magnates, they had to create an army and bureaucracy attached to the crown. As this was a capital scarce region, they could not draw upon any financial resources to procure men and ensure their allegiance; they had to resort to extensive land grants. The logic of territorial expansion through war left the Russian state with no option but to buy the allegiance of office-holders in the bureaucratic set up with expropriated land. The system gathered momentum with the formal codification in 1649 of the practices of serfdom that had gained currency over two centuries. As the Russian state began seriously to engage in war with its heavily-armed western neighbours, it had no option but to expand the bureaucracy. The growing population of 16th century Europe put a premium on food production and land acquired a greater value since the collapse of the agrarian boom of the 13th century. Everywhere it was the aristocracy, not the urban middle class, who made the most of the changed circumstances. The great granary of Europe—the area east of the Elbe—was exploited by
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landowners who often succeeded in adding territorial rulership to commercial success. The nobility and bureaucracy were so strong that where they sensed profit in trade transactions, they would shut out the merchants. When, in the 16th century, large volumes of eastern European trade began to flow westward, they used state power to contain merchants and coerce peasant producers for supplies for their shipments (Tilly, 1992: 142). In Prussia as well, the mobilisation of the army was through a forcible quota; every canton was required to provide a quota of men, a system that was deployed to man the Swedish army that had occupied Prussia during the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648). The land-owning class used its quasi-feudal powers as a lever to impose the burden of military obligation on the peasantry. The Prussian state saw it could ensure a steady flow of men, material and finance for war by reinforcing and strengthening the powers of the land-owning class and by creating more state-guaranteed privileges. The officer corps in Prussia was mostly drawn from the nobility. All major tasks of the government, including taxation, management of the economy and the administration of the royal domain were subordinated to the imperious command of a military regime. The impact on the character of the state was the dominance of large privileged nobilities and substantial state bureaucracies.4 A social hierarchy, defined, supported and dominated by the state, became the inevitable outcome in states located in regions with scarcity of capital (Brewer, 1994: 62). In some regional economies, the expanding trading cities had a decided edge in relation to the feudal powers. The Iberian Peninsula hosted a conglomerate of dynastically linked monarchies. Portuguese kings had the great advantage of deriving much of their income and credit from the commerce of a single city. With heavy involvement in world-spanning international trade, Lisbon maintained tenuous relations with an agricultural
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hinterland, with the monarchy drawing a large share of all its income from profits on overseas trade (see Chapter 14). Ready revenue gave its rulers wide autonomy vis-à-vis the population they ruled, but it made them dependent on the continued flow of that revenue and on the people who produced it. Naturally the Portuguese crown remained vulnerable to a decline in Lisbon’s commercial vigour, and it was but natural that Lisbon’s commercial oligarchy retained power in royal affairs. Madrid in Castile remained the headquarters of the landowning nobility that, like the crown, profited immensely from the capture of Muslim lands, but as the revenue from these sources became uncertain, the crown had to borrow extensively from the merchants. Such cities managed to extend their prerogatives in the interplay between vigorous nobility, an expanding monarchy and the merchant community in urban clusters involved in overseas trade. So, from the middle of the 13th century, Barcelona and other cities obtained self-government, especially in trade affairs, monetary and fiscal authority and even the right to equip a war fleet. These privileges were granted in return for gold, which the kings used for dynastic purposes. During the 13th and 14th centuries, bargaining between the three major forces enabled them to realise their main goals (Tilly, 1994: 228).
Urbanised Economies In contrast to primarily agricultural economies in which the state had abundant land at its command, maritime states such as Venice collaborated with merchants and financiers and developed its sea power on the strength of resources from excise and custom. In states such as the United Provinces, convergence of the interests of the ruling class and the capitalists smoothened
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the internalisation process. In the earlier centuries as well, princes and merchant capitalists often worked towards a common interest when it came to defence or aggressive warfare. During the Hundred Years’ War, a commercial war party evolved in Europe that made alliance with aggressive sections of the nobility and succeeded in delaying the efforts of Richard II (1379– 1399) to make peace when the war was going badly. Their main interest was to become contractors to the army and, more importantly, to bring Flanders within the orbit of the English wool trade (Mann, 1986: 432). But this relationship between ruling regimes and merchants—the conquest of markets as well as land—became more entangled in the 16th century, when the polities had to rely on the services of external sources to adapt to the revolutionary technological changes in warfare. First, they had to seek services from a class of contractors, condottieri, whose job it was to conduct war on a purely commercial basis.5 They would serve any political regime so long as their contract of service specified the size of force to be provided, the length of time it was to serve, and the scale on which it was to be paid. By the late 15th century, commercialised warfare became classless and international. The mercenary served any master: Protestant Germans happily fought under Spanish or French colours; Italian specialists served the Queen of England or the Dutch. They had a bond of loyalty to the employer, but only so long as the employer paid them. If they were not paid, they would ransack the countryside. The Spanish Fury of 1574, when unpaid Spanish troops ransacked Antwerp, was one gruesome and spectacular example of the fate that befell countless towns and villages in north and central Europe in the late 16th and 17th centuries (Howard, 1978: 29). The wars of the knights of the early Middle Ages now became wars of the mercenaries (Howard, 1978). The economic scale
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of mercenarism reached unprecedented proportions during the late 16th and 17th centuries. It was business on a massive scale, this business of organising through a network of contractors the food, arms, uniforms, shelter and means of transport needed for war. The organisers of war, the military entrepreneurs of that age, became in effect organisers of big business. Princes and monarchs, handicapped as they were by the lack of mobile resources, had to outsource the business of war to a very large extent to these entrepreneurs, who developed tremendous financial muscle with their own power bases. During the first half of the 16th century, they organised armies under contract, extended credit to equip and pay them, led them on campaign and commanded them in battle. The alliance between banking and war-making fostered the rise of the German military enterprises that edged out the Swiss as kings of Europe’s battle-fields. The Emperor’s lack of regular taxes or a standing army made the Holy Roman Empire a welcome pasture for both the south German bankers and the military enterprisers. Wallerstein, a petty nobleman of Bohemia, bestrode the Germans like a colossus, with the biggest and best organised private army. Though nominally a contractor serving the emperor, he behaved like a sovereign by virtue of the size of the military force he commanded, numbering over 50,000 men at its peak. Whenever required, he lived off the country he operated in, with no scruples in doing so. It was to such mercenaries that Maximilian ended up owing much of his debt of six million florins, an amount 18 times his annual income (Brady, 1991 in Tracy, 1990: 146). What Charles V started, continued thereafter during the time of Philip II, the bulk of whose troops consisted of foreign mercenaries (Elliott, 1970: 24). Second, the revolution in military technology had also been opening-up trading opportunities in raw copper and bronze
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ordnance.6 The most conspicuous example is that of Fugger, who, among many business lines, was also a great merchant of copper and owned a gun foundry. King John II of Portugal, King James IV of Scotland and Maximilian developed real technical expertise in gunnery by patronising gunners and gun founders and devoting a good deal of resources to arsenals and artillery trains (Cipolla, 1965: 25–26). Wallerstein had also organised arms production in some of the estates owned by him in Bohemia in partnership with a Flemish businessman and speculator named Hans De-Witte (McNeill, 1983: 121). The Habsburg emperors also used this merger of private commercial and military enterprise for their military ventures. Another remarkable power structure was created by the Swedish king, Gustav Adolf (1611–1632), who used his public authority to conscript manpower and supplies for his campaign in Germany. Also, and equally importantly, he could produce armaments from Swedish iron production, developed by Louis de Greer, a native of Leige and a resident of Holland. Third, if princes and monarchs were to avail themselves of the services of these outsourced outfits, they had no option but to seek financial assistance from the wealthy merchant banking families. For Charles V, the Fuggers of Augsburg were the most prominent of the financial families of south Germany on whom he could count. The Fuggers had a meteoric rise during the 16th century, using the intimate relationships that they had been cultivating for several past decades with the Habsburg monarchs. It was not a kind of relationship that usually subsists between lenders and borrowers; it could more appropriately be described as some kind of beneficial strategic partnership. The ruler could indulge his dreams of territorial aggrandisement and dynastic consolidation, while the merchant house got new opportunities
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in different types of business. Such links laid the foundations for internationalisation of business and financal dealings.7 In the late 14th century, the Fugger family was a successful textile trader, but what turned the fortune of the firm is their lending to princes in times of their need. Jakob, the grandson of the founder, loaned Sigismund, the Archduke of Tyrol, 20,000 ducats, taking as security the most productive of the Schwarz silver mines and the revenues of the entire province of Tyrol. Another loan to Sigismund in 1488 gave the Fuggers the management of silver production in its entirety. When Maximilian followed his cousin as the Archduke of Tyrol, he could not simply do without them. In 1519, Fugger engineered a spectacular manipulation to secure the election of Charles V as the Holy Roman Emperor. The historian Ehrenburg has called this raising of funds to bribe the electors as the biggest business deal of the century. The election was a great trial of strength for Europe’s money powers. The French Valois drew upon the Italian gold and the Habsburg contenders were backed by a consortium of the Welser, Fugger and others (Ehrenberg, 1963: Chapter I). The Fuggers’ extensive international network also allowed them to provide a critical service to the Habsburgs, whose empire was fragmented throughout the continent. They would transfer money paid by the vassal states in different European currencies, to Augsburg by means of bills of exchange, through the money market in Antwerp. The Fuggers also met the personal expenses of the royals. Thus, at the Vienna congress, when the marriages of Maximillian’s grandchildren to the Hungarian King Ladislaw were being arranged, Fugger was putting up the dowries. He also lent to Maximilian and his entire court sufficient jewels with which to shine before their guests (Ibid.; also Beard, 1963).
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Fourth, while seeking credit from merchants was not a new development for ruling princes, in the 16th century it was a different game: the polities needed the back-up of an institutionalised financial market. It became the normal practice in the 16th century for princes to approach the merchant capitalists for loans to finance their warfare. South German merchants such as the Fuggers joined the Italian colleagues in lending to kings. The Fuggers borrowed in Antwerp, for instance, to finance Spanish wars with future deliveries of American silver as collateral (for development of Antwerp as a financial centre, see Chapter 8). Long range borrowing obligated the ruling princes to foreigners they could not easily control. Of these the Fugger and Welser families of Augsburg in Germany were the most prominent. In the initial years of his reign, Charles V had easy access to the world of finance through Antwerp, the economic centre of his empire and then, at the peak of its prosperity, it had a highly-developed machinery for liquidating resources and raising loans for the conduct of policy and especially of war. Thanks to Gasper Ducci, the Italian financial expert based at Antwerp, finance capital was mobilised by means of bonds that the receivers-general of the Netherlands issued in their own name. These were ‘bearer bonds’, redeemable by whoever came into possession, and were thus negotiable and legally recognised under an ordinance of 1536. These bonds came to be regularly issued: government could raise capital from wide sources and the rates could be linked closely to commercial borrowing. At Lyons the same object was to be achieved by the ‘King’s Letters’ issued by the French government. Successful conduct of war depended on a stable business– polity relationship. But, while the rulers knew they had to make contractual payments to the private military enterprises, none of the major powers had fiscal machineries that could
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ensure the discharge of their liabilities. There was always a tension and tussle between the crown and the financing business house. The Fuggers, for example, could not refuse the incessant demands for funds from the Habsburgs, their biggest borrower and one of the most powerful forces in European politics. The fortunes of big mercantile houses and the financial fortunes of Europe’s royal families were inextricably intertwined, and the Antwerp world of high finance faced a catastrophe in the third quarter of the century when Spain declared itself bankrupt in 1557 and Portugal followed three years later. The bankers saw their issues compulsorily converted into 5 per cent annuities. The state bankruptcies were followed by those of public authorities in the Netherlands, among the receiver-general and a number of towns. The bankruptcies exposed the hollowness of crown finances under the pressure of war; the existing taxes seemed inadequate even to meet the most pressing needs. The failure of Philip II to pay the troops he had deployed in the Netherlands to curb the unrest over high taxation cost him dear. His troops ransacked Antwerp, provoking a general revolt all over the Netherlands. The country joined together to form the Union of Utrecht and declared its independence in 1981. Although south Netherlands soon fell to Spanish troops, the seven northern provinces, protected from invasion by the river barriers, held out against the Spanish, creating an independent polity run by the bourgeoisie (see the separate Chapter 16 on the Dutch Republic). For the ruling princes, exclusive dependence on military entrepreneurs was fraught with grave risks, as mercenaries could be faithless. There was always a lurking fear that, some day, a powerful military entrepreneur might behave like Sforza, who, in 1450, successfully usurped the state of Milan and ruled over it for almost 50 years. There was also another daring instance,
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somewhat earlier, in Italy; the 6,500-strong Great Catalan Company took service with the Duke of Athens only to turn on him in 1311 and establish its own ‘duchy of mercenaries’ which survived for 63 years (Thomson, 1994: 28). The aggressive European rulers, those living close to the market for mercenaries, had developed one-to-one contractual relationships with large financiers and merchant houses, but they were increasingly realising that it was not a permanent solution to their recurring financial crisis. They needed to replace the mercenaries with loyal standing armies, and at the same time ensure a steady stream of resources to pay for their up-keep, training and their arms. The solution lay in internalising the organisation and administration of men, material and finances, by creating within the framework of government, a resource raising fiscal machinery with bureaucratic underpinnings. This internalisation was a key element in the formation of fiscal-military states. By the beginning of the 16th century, they had begun to take an embryonic form, with taxes and customs sufficient only to support the nucleus of permanent armed forces (Glete, 2002: 21). The process of maturity was a long one, and merchants and financiers provided critical support in the development of complex fiscal and bureaucratic organisations and the apparatus that smoothened the process to maturity. We discuss these in the next two chapters of this part.
Notes 1. The empire covered much of western and central Europe. Through inheritance from his father in 1506, Charles V became Duke of Burgundy— Franche Comte’, Luxemburg, the Netherlands—and, in 1516, through his grandfather, Ferdinand of Aragon, inherited the crown of Aragon, with Sicily and Naples, and a little later, Castile, with its American conquests,
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subsequently united through the personal union of Ferdinand and Isabella; then in January 1519, his grandfather, the Emperor Maximillian died, leaving Charles heir to the Austrian lands (Austria, Tyrol, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola) and the original family Habsburg family lands round the upper Rhine, between Switzerland and Burgundy (Elton, 1963: 23). 2. This was first emphasised by Michael Roberts in his now-famous inaugural lecture at the Queen’s University of Belfast in January 1955. He identified four profound changes in warfare during the period 1560–1600: First, a revolution in tactics, as archers and then infantry armed with muskets ended the dominance of feudal knights and massed squares of pikesmen; second, a dramatic increase in the size of armies; third, strategies changed as the possibility of decisive action in the field replaced the static and inconclusive siege tactics of the previous century; fourth, war became more of a depredation on the civilian society (Bobbitt, 2002: 69). 3. There were fewer years of peace in the 17th century than ever before: Poland only knew 32, France 47, England 59 and Spain hardly knew peace at all. In the first half of the century there was not one calendar year of peace (Parker, 1979: 73). 4. At the end of the 18th century, the military nobility represented 68 per cent of aristocratic families in the Prussian electoral provinces and 60 per cent of those in eastern Prussia. 5. Military contractors of this type had been flourishing in the Italian peninsula, in the later Middle Ages, a couple of centuries before they took root in the north of Alps. The Swiss had established their reputation in this area, having demonstrated their military mettle by defeating Burgundy’s Charles the Bold during the 1470s. Soon, thereafter, every power needed its own Swiss soldiers and it became a profitable business for the Swiss cantons to supply soldiers for pay. The deployment of Swiss mercenaries became so widespread that, in 1515, two Swiss armies, one in the service of the French king, and the other in the service of an Italian baron, found themselves on opposing sides in a battle in northern Italy and almost annihilated each other. Following the footsteps of the Swiss, a few small principalities started specialising in the production and sale of mercenaries. Large scale mercenarism in the form of the free companies flourished in Europe between 1300 and 1450. When Britain needed extra troops for her war against rebellious Americans, she turned to Hesse-Cassel, a small 18th
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century state: this gave rise in American folk history to the word ‘Hessian’ signifying crassness and unpatriotism (Tilly, 1992: 82). 6. Nuremberg was the main centre of German metallurgy; Lyons was the centre through which France bought her provisions. Bolanzo, on the way from Tyrol to northern Italy, and Antwerp where the flow of commodities from west Africa and later the Spice Islands met the flow of metallurgical products from Germany and Flanders. 7. The really big firms such as Augsburg’s Fuggers grew much too big for the protection the city-states could supply. Sometimes they conducted separate foreign policies against their own governments or against their natural allies. The war between Charles V and German Protestants in 1546–1547 and its aftermath supply some telling examples. At Augsburg the Fugger stayed loyal to the emperor but their government supported the Protestant League; at Nuremburg the big families, all Lutherans, kept the entire city loyal, and at Strasbourg, the threat of outlawry, if Charles won the war, drove the Protestant merchants to face exile rather than resistance and ruin. The lesson is clear: the great south German firms, having out-grown their home-towns, gravitated towards the monarch for protection and favour.
Chapter 12
Fiscal Revolution: Grip of Financiers
T
â•… The alliance between political and business entrepreneurs, though mutually beneficial, was inherently unstable. First, the mercenaries were unreliable; second, there was no administrative and fiscal set-up to manage and service the growing debt. On both fronts, the European polities took up reform measures that were, in more senses than one, revolutionary in their implications. Over the 17th and 18th centuries, an astonishing increase took place in the size of national armies and navies, as well as the supporting bureaucratic and fiscal apparatuses. The two reforms were to be the solid foundations for viable nation-states. By the 16th and 17th centuries, the major powers had standing armies, professionally-equipped and trained and kept in perpetual readiness for war. Apart from external aggressors, the challenges to the authority of the crown from religious and aristocratic dissenters were becoming a normal feature in 16th century Europe. In the course of these two centuries, national armies increased tenfold. By the last quarter of the 17th century, the Spanish army consisted of 70,000 troops, the Dutch 110,000, the French 120,000, the Swedish 63,000 and the Russian 130,000. In contrast, during this period, the British army had only 15,000 troops, smaller than it had been in 1475, mainly because she did not get involved in any major international conflict in 191
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Europe between the mid-15th and 17th centuries (Brewer, 1989: 8). When, however, she came to be involved after the Glorious Revolution (1688) with several wars in the European continent, the War of English Succession (1688–1697), the War of Spanish Succession (1702–1713), the War of Austrian Succession (1739– 1748), the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763) and the American War of Independence (1775–1783), Britain’s land and naval forces were nearing nearly 200,000. All this weighed heavily on state budgets.1 Inflation resulting from the inflow of Spanish–American silver had raised the overall costs of government and with the increasing burden of war, raising resources became crucial. Three main ways of acquiring revenue were at hand. First, direct taxes of various types, such as taxation of the individual and his wealth, hearth taxes, taxes on landed and urban property, taxes on specific types of wealth and taxes on livestock. Second, excise on foodstuffs, wine, beer and salt. The third possibility was to borrow money. This became increasingly necessary, because, as the 16th century advanced, the fiscal systems of most states were unable to guarantee large sums, just when urgently needed for a campaign or for other purposes. By the 16th century, the countries in Europe usually had an overall annual budget that dedicated different sources of revenue to different heads of expenditure. As a general rule, the costs of peace-time government were laid upon the income of a prince from his domain, from customs and from Regalian rights. In times of warfare, it was grossly inadequate. The monarchy in England, for example, preferred to sell crown property in the late 16th century, but this could not be stretched beyond a point. In Sweden too, as revenues were seldom sufficient, the income of the crown was sold or pawned to raise lump sums
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in cash. In Denmark, despite the fact that revenue from the domain did at first increase in absolute terms, by 1662, the proportion from this category was reduced to 10 per cent, whereas, it had oscillated between 37 and 62 per cent in the first decades of the 17th century. The central purpose of the fiscal reform was to seek out the most profitable forms of taxation that could guarantee the largest sums of money quickly and safely to the treasury. But in pushing through such a reform, European polities had to contend with several internal power holders, be these municipalities, nobles or the Catholic Church. In the 14th century, European kings had to deal with these elites not as powerful individuals, but as members of corporate assemblies or estates (Brady, 1991: 134). Such corporate institutions formed and flourished during the 250 years after ad 1250, beginning as tools of government through which kings and princes sought consent from the politically active, propertied classes (Strayer, 1970). Different estates had their own legal entitlements to be defended by their corporate powers. Before the 16th century, no crown west of the Elbe River in Germany could tax on its own authority; all levies had to be accepted by assemblies of elites known as Parliament (England), Parlements (France) or Cortes (Spain). In many countries, clergy and nobles were able to defend their tax exemptions or at least sustain preferential treatment. As the rulers sought to expand their fiscal and war making capacities, they had to recognise claims made by various elites (Poggi, 1978: 72). The tax base of the different countries was broadly similar. It was mainly a combination of direct taxes, usually levied upon landed wealth together with indirect taxes on international trade and domestic commodity production, though, understandably, the proportion between direct and indirect taxes varied from
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state to state. England depended on land tax, custom and excise, France had a chief direct tax, the taille, along with a series of indirect taxes—the gabelles, tabacs, aides and traites—usually administered by tax farmers. In Prussia, kontribution extracted from land matched the akzise levied on the towns. The United Provinces combined a levy on real property with customs duty and a general excise on a wide variety of commodities. These standard taxes were grossly inadequate for financing the continuous warfare in which the countries had been involved. But resources could not be raised speedily from internal sources because of several constraints. The nobles and the clergy normally enjoyed fiscal immunity. As late as 1659, in the territory of Ravenna in Italy, clergy, nobility and foreigners were exempt from paying taxes, though they held 35, 42 and 15 per cent of the land, respectively (Cipolla, 1993: 40). Over most of Europe, fiscal privileges created delays, reduced receipts and complicated the tax raising process (Ibid.). Because of this inelasticity, the political regimes had to turn to indirect taxes, which fell heavily on consumption of necessities. The burden hit the poor the hardest and they could not be coerced beyond a point. The fiscal managers had to strike a delicate balance between the resource needs of the political regimes and the willingness and capacity of the conventional sources: ordinary citizens, landed aristocrats and merchants. Given the urgency and desperation, the fiscal managers were driven to extraordinary and unorthodox ways of collecting standard revenues and also to explore new avenues such as borrowing. In the 16th and 17th centuries, the major concentration of wealth being with the bourgeoisie (Kamen, 1971), every polity in the capital-intensive regions wanted the resources of the bourgeoisie on tap. Polities could pursue their military adventures only with the support of
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the bourgeoisie, which in turn would seek to extract its price. The way the different polities came to manage their relationships with the bourgeoisie and strike a balance became a critical factor in the power equilibrium within Europe. In France, the ordinary receipts2 were too small to pay for the needs of the Bourbon monarchs even in peace-time. In war, these receipts became totally inadequate.3 Financial managers came to depend on other sources of income, the Affaires Extraordinaires. Things were called extraordinary until they had become so generally accepted by law and custom as to become ordinary. These were the rentes, a loan to the crown, giving an annual interest on loans, and the treaties, a contract between the king and a financier, known as a traitant, assuring the king a certain amount of resources. In the initial stages, fiscal administration was carried out with the minimum of bureaucratisation. Collection of taxes was generally farmed out to private business interests. The government sold its right to collect a particular tax or part of it in return for a substantial down payment in cash. Tax farming was an efficient method since government servants were limited in number. Financiers would extend loans to the crown because the right to collect taxes over a number of years provided them with collateral. For financially beleaguered monarchs, this had some distinct advantages: plenty of cash in hand and a regular predictable income because the tax-farmers paid a fixed annual rent for the tax regardless of the yield. The cost of collection being the responsibility of tax-farmers, the monarch could scrimp on the fiscal administration and collection machinery. In France, the farms for the indirect taxes provided 80 per cent of royal income in the first half of the 17th century, and a significant but fluctuating proportion of total revenue until the end of the ancien régime (Bonney, 1991: 292).
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Then there were some ways of raising extraordinary revenue. France introduced the sale of offices during the wars in Italy in the late 15th century and made it a widespread practice during the wars of the 17th century. In Spain, sale of offices was done during the war against the Moors and was most frequent during many of the wars against France. Francis I bureaucratised the system of sale of public offices by establishing the Bureau des parties casuelles as the official vendor of royal posts. High officials were also allowed to sell subordinate offices and even incumbents could sell their positions. Subsequent monarchs not only created new offices, but divided existing ones, conferring a single post on as many as three persons. By the mid-16th century, this had created a big problem. In 1546, the Venetian ambassador reported that ‘there are an infinite number of offices, and they increase every day’. In the second half of the 16th century, about 50,000 new offices had been created, a figure which does not seem improbable when one looks at some of the figures for the growth of the bureaucracy (Kamen, 1971: 179). The profession best represented in this spectacular growth was the law, this ‘amazing flood of lawyers’, who thronged the administrative bodies of the state at virtually every level—but only on paper. In practice, the great majority of the new officials were absentees, men who had acquired the office for the social position it conferred and for the salary that went with it. The threat to the state, then, was not overbureaucratisation, but absentee officials, officials who had been appointed not because they were qualified but because they had paid for the post. So great was the demand for office that a considerable inflation in prices occurred. A judgeship in the Parlement of Paris, for instance, was officially valued in ad 1605 at 18,000 livres; under Louis XIII the price reached 70,000, and by 1660, the post was valued at 140,000 (Ibid.).
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In the early 17th century, prices went up when offices were made inheritable. From 1604, the monarch started charging an annual fee to officers who wanted the right to bequeath their offices to their heirs and successors. Throughout the first half of the 17th century, the sale of offices constituted an important source of French revenues, never falling below a quarter of the total. In a fiscal crunch, the monarch would raise large sums with great rapidity, by creating and selling more offices and increasing the charges levied on the existing office holders. These officers enjoyed fiscal exemption and were not obliged to pay the taille. All this created a fountain of corruption in which the French office-holders loved to thrive. The upper classes protested about the sale of office, which they regarded as their domain. Every estate’s general in this period, up to the last one in 1614, protested at the ‘frightful number of superfluous offices’. But so long as the state needed to sell offices, there was no alternative to venality. Sully, Richelieu, Mazarin and Colbert in France and Philip II and Olivares in Spain, all had their reforming phases and though all were conscious of the acute financial problems that venality caused, they were prisoners of their own system; they all accepted venality as the direct and inevitable response to the financial pressures created by war. Colbert’s valiant efforts merit a mention. He devised ‘maxims of order’ to replace what he termed ‘maxims of confusion’ (Barzun: 292). He set up the Chambre de Justice to punish the financiers and created a new Consiel Royal des Finances to direct the financial machine, together with a new accounting system to ensure that proper standards were maintained. But his efforts were a failure. The new institutions were able to supply the needs of the monarchy only so long as the king did not involve France in war. Once war broke out, even Colbert was forced to resort to
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extraordinary measures. The state’s fiscal apparatus became a front for financiers, men who owed loyalty neither to the institutions nor to the state. So while the government sought to build new administrative structures that were supposed to be immune to corruption, it was formalising and systematising methods of financing that increased corruption. The personal links between the men who ran the two systems and the interchangeability of the personnel of the two systems point indicate that the financial habits of the French monarchy were not an avoidable aberration of the absolutist government but an integral part of it. Second, another extraordinary measure, common both in England and France was the sale of honours. In England, the periods of greatest venality were also years of war. Henry VIII’s conflicts with France in 1540s, the heroic Elizabethan struggle against Spain in the 1580s and 1590s and of King James’s peace in the 1620s, when England was at war with both France and Spain, were periods remarkable for their political corruption. In the 17th century, James and Charles, and more often than not, their favourite, the Duke of Buckingham, sold knighthoods, baronetcies (newly created in 1610) and peerages. The first two Stuarts raised at least £620,000 through the sale of honours between 1603 and 1629. The years of greatest sales were years of greatest financial crises. The prevalence of competing private interests within the state was most obvious with the sale of offices and titles. The purchase of an office or a title constituted a quick road to social respectability for the wealthy and upwardly mobile mercantile families. The sale of office was practised to a lesser extent in almost all states, though France was notorious in this respect. Revenues from the sale of offices for the French monarchy reached 55 per cent of the ordinary revenues during 1630–1634 (Bonney, 1991: 292). The capital value held in offices was estimated at
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419 million livres in the 1660s (Bonney, 1991: 292). A second great wave of sale of offices occurred during the period of Louis XIV’s later wars, while reliance on semi-private contractors continued to the French Revolution and beyond. Third, the sale of trade privileges and monopolies prompted by fiscal needs was an important device that the bourgeois exploited to the fullest extent. Take the situation in England. Begun by Elizabeth and rapidly expanded during the Spanish War in the 1580s and the 1590s, the practice reached a peak in the 1630s when the monopolies on starch, coal, salt and soap raised £80,000 a year and between £200,000 and £300,000 for the monopolists. In early 17th century England, merchant involvement in joint stock companies influenced the role they played in national politics (Brenner, 1993: 199). The English crown granted economic privileges to particular groups of merchants, mainly through incorporation as a joint stock or regulated company; Brenner terms these privileges ‘politically constituted forms of private property’ (Ibid.: 652). The Levant and East India traders came to exercise, in particular, overwhelming dominance in state finances. As custom farmers, they came to play an increasingly crucial role in providing credit for a crisis-ridden government in the 1620s and 1630s. Between 1620 and 1640, some 28 different men headed syndicates in control of the farms for currants, wines and sweet wines. Of these, 10 were East India Company (EIC) directors, and 11 were leading Levant Company merchants. At least eight of the others were not merchants at all, but financiers and financial administrators. Among all these custom farmers, there were only two merchant adventurers who had been dominant in the cloth trade with Antwerp (Brenner, 1993: 82). By the Turkey Company patent of 1581, the Crown granted the whole of the lucrative west Asian market to a single joint
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stock company of just 12 merchants. Of the 12, no fewer than eight were London aldermen or became aldermen some time during 1580s. Three were at sometime Members of Parliament (MPs). Also, three of them were the most important mediators between the Crown and the city merchant community. The patentees gave £5,000 as a loan to the Queen and the charter was issued. Such royal backing of commercial initiatives in return for financial support became the norm and was a powerful influence on the development of the Levant–East India trade. In the 16th century, few states contracted long-term debts, but, by the end of the 17th century, almost all states were permanently in debt. In the ‘domain state’, loans would be contracted to bridge short-term financial difficulties; often, parts of the domain would be pledged and the obligations paid back as soon as possible. In the ‘tax state’, loans were established as a part of the state’s budget and guaranteed by regular taxation. The charges upon the debt were funded by permanent tax resources. Servicing of the debt, which included both the payment of interest and the repayment by installments of the money borrowed, constituted usually the most significant item of expenditure (Bonney, 1991: Chapter 12). The permanency of public debt paved the way for the bourgeoisie to increase its influence, as cities and their financial elites extended the loan capital to the state (Bonney, 1991: 286). From the Middle Ages itself, merchant bankers held a wide range of positions in the financial administration of city-states as well as those of princes and kings. They were mint masters, managers of silver mines, receivers of taxes and holders of state monopolies (Bonney, 1991: 5w6, Chapter 14). Princely finances attracted them and in return for their services, they obtained economic advantages. If they were members of the prince’s inner circle, they were well informed about the prospects of war and peace
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and could spread their risk. This world of high finance exercised growing political influence and from the late 14th century, central Europe came to be dominated by the high finance of Nuremberg and Augsburg. In the 16th century, with the growing burden of military expenditure, there was a public debt in practically every kingdom, duchy and republic, not confined only to the empire under Charles V of France and of Spain under Philip II. An almost universal growth in the demand for capital (Bonney, 1991: 515) from external sources came to be matched by its supply. The supply of capital was diverse and of extraordinary geographical scope, reflecting the spurt in trade and economic growth that was visible in several sectors and branches that were highly profitable. In the 16th century, the highest profits were made in Mediterranean and Atlantic maritime trade and were concentrated in a number of port cities; in the production and commercialisation of goods finished on the continent, especially in southern Germany and the Rhineland (Bonney, 1991: 516). Financial centres dotted Europe, exercising functions similar to those of towns with fairs in the early Medieval Period. These financial markets were all located in regions known for their intense economic activity, from which surplus capital could be siphoned off for investment. There were many municipal, regional or international centres offering public credit, either through their merchant bankers or a range of borrowers or at times both (Ibid.: 519). There were institutional and political limits on the functioning of such markets. Thus, in Venice, the Signoria monopolised the sources of wealth for its own public credit operation, and the capital market serviced those needs to such an extent that no other power even dreamed of floating a loan on the closed financial market of the Rialto. On the other hand, Genoese capital
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circulated freely in other markets and supplied public credit demands in Naples, Lyon, Antwerp, Madrid and Valladolid. In several markets, Genoese bankers dominated as state creditors— for the kings of France at Lyon, and for the kings of Spain at Antwerp, the Bisenzone, Milan and Naples.
Financiers and Public Debt There were two distinct ways in which financiers came to acquire significant influences on management of public credit. First, through the public banks, as seen in Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and south Germany during the 14th and 15th centuries, these banks were primarily engaged in exchanging currencies in circulation, but, as urban authorities increasingly resorted to the sale of life annuities, the most common form of long-term credit, the public banks became involved in the management of public credit. This was the practice in a large number of independent and sovereign cities. In contrast, public credit elsewhere remained largely in the grip of a class of powerful financiers (Bonney, 1991: 528). While allowing for specific national differences, broadly similar types of financiers were to be found in France, in the lands of the Spanish monarchy, in the Austrian Empire, the United Provinces and to a lesser extent, England (Ibid.). Thus, in 17th century England, moneyed men and goldsmiths such as Philip Burlamachi and Sir Paul Pinder had advanced large sums to the first two Stuarts, and combined this with tax farming, the operation of monopolies granted by royal fiat and the tenure of offices in the fiscal apparatus. During the interregnum and under Charles II, financially powerful figures such as Alderman Edward Blackwell and Sir Thomas Vyner had performed a variety of financial services for the Council of State and the restored king, acting as loan agents, bullion merchants and
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remitters to creditors abroad. By the 1670s, goldsmith bankers like Blackwell and Vyner—who together were owed £645,000 by Charles II—were assigning the interest on the royal debt on their creditors, thereby involving their depositors in what we might call the precursor of the national debt. Large financiers had a vicious grip on the finances of the polity. The root of the evil was the tax farming system. In 1671, custom farming was cancelled; the excise farm ended in 1683 and the hearth tax farm in the following year. The English Treasury thus came to control both revenue and expenditure (Brewer, 1994: 93). The abolition of the tax farming system did not signify that the fiscal needs of the state could be met without the help of rich private financiers. As there was a basic disjunct between the flow of revenue into the system and the prolonged and often indecisive campaigns in which the rulers got embroiled, the dependence on those who could organise resources remained. In order to meet temporary financial needs, the government appointed ‘monied’ men as ‘cashiers’. These men had access to substantial funds in the private money market and were prepared to lend large sums to the monarch in return for access to constant flow of revenue remitted to their office. This system of undertaking received a boost immediately after 1688, when William III became desperate for cash to carry on his campaigns against James and Louis XIV and appointed a number of financiers on the Revenue Board. It is only when the state created a new way of raising money by setting up the Bank of England in 1694 did individual financiers lose their grip over the tax-collecting machine. Personal royal debt was not transformed into a parliament-controlled public or national debt suddenly, but in a series of complex steps. The government was looking for long-term borrowing instead of the short-term financing that the Tudors and Stuarts
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had been forced to adopt. In fact, during the second half of the 17th century, more than a hundred schemes for the setting up of a public bank were put forward in Britain (Davies, 1994: 254). Born out of a marriage of convenience between the business community of the city and the government of the day, the bank was the first confident step taken towards the institutionalisation of the public credit system in England. The needs of the government, involved in a long war against Louis XIV, were growing at a much faster pace than the lending resources of the goldsmiths and at the same time the business interests were getting critical of the monopolistic power of goldsmiths. The bank came into being by the Ways and Means Act of June 1694, its real purpose being to raise money for the War of the League of Augsburg by taxation and by the novel device of a permanent loan. This Act was known variously as the ‘Tonnage’ or ‘Tunnage Act’, because the taxes were to be raised from both ships and wines. The establishment of the Bank of England did not break the connection between the state and private financiers. They continued as underwriters of government issues and as negotiators of contracts to pay for the provisioning of British troops overseas. The two functions were intimately connected, with many government contractors also subscribing to the loans. The greatest wealth in that age was to be made in government finance (Brewer, 1989: 209). Arguably, financiers were in a sense the by-products of the rapid expansion of the 18th century fiscal military state. A consortium of bankers, ‘monied men’ investors, speculators and stock jobbers were living off the states’ need to borrow money to fund their wars. In England, the financiers were commonly viewed as part of a Whig plot to tie the public to the new regime of 1688 and as the true power behind the ministry and the monarch, and were also accused of making private fortunes at the
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nation’s expense, by lending the state their own and other people’s money, and by the overt espousal of a belligerent and therefore expensive foreign policy (Brewer, 1989: 206–07). However, as the rise of funded wealth and the domination of flows of money and goods by contracts and licenses issued in London placed a heavy burden on the Bank of England’s resources, the government was forced to turn to the private banks and merchants who began to be known as ‘merchant bankers’. The funding of a national debt by the mercantile and property owning classes revealed the perfect trust which subsisted between the elite and government; the Bank of England came to be regarded as the institutionalised expression of the trust. The national debt became something like a national icon (Bayly, 2002: 62). While the medieval state remained small, it could attain a large measure of autonomy, existing off its own financial resources plus extortion from dependent groups. After warfare technology changed, no state could survive on the battle-field unless it found ways of collaborating with better-organised civil groups to raise funds. Building on medieval traditions, some European elites, including those in England and France, made claims to a political voice.4 In many situations, like the English, issues of taxation were enmeshed with issues of political representation. In France, a contest over judicial and legal authority between the Parlements and the Crown was repeatedly acted out, culminating in the mid-17th century Fronde, in which the Crown’s authority to raise new taxes came under challenge. In Prussia, with the move towards absolutism, the ruler acquired direct control over an urban excise on consumption goods, allowing him to fund his army without depending on the estates. The English, French and Prussian rulers succeeded in making the elites subordinate to them; the failure of a European sovereign
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to achieve a measure of autonomy in exchange for recognition of certain claims could spell disaster. Constructing state power on the foundation of an effective fiscal system meant working out a boundary between what the state could do and what lay beyond its powers. States able to expand their capacities to extract resources and to field armies developed a measure of autonomy from the elites and the common people they governed. States diverged along absolutist and constitutional lines, but were collaborated closely with their dominant classes. This collaboration was gradually turning into an organic unity between state and dominant classes (Mann, 1986: 501–15). Fiscal revolution, combined with military revolution, provided one dimension of this growing organic unity, the other dimension came from economic nationalism. This is the theme of the next chapter.
Notes 1. For France, the increase was dramatic in the 1630s, following its entry in the Thirty Years’ War. Expressed in real terms, there was a five to eightfold increase from the early 17th century to the 1690s (Bonney, 1991: 282). Spain, which had already experienced an enormous increase in its military burden in the 16th century—probably unequaled by any other state—was confronted with a new peak in the 1650s (Ibid.). Between the 1590s and 1670s, the English budget increased 16 times in money terms, and more than this if we take into account the last decades of the 17th century. In Denmark, from 1602 and 1700, state expenses rose 12-fold, with a significant rise after the standing army was created in 1637. And in the Dutch Republic, military costs as a result of the Eighty Years’ War against Spain reached a peak during the 1630s and 1640s; there were equally high levels of expenditure during the Anglo-Dutch Wars and again during the Nine Years’ War in the 1690s. 2. There were three main sources of ordinary income: the taille, corresponding to modern taxes on land, on the individual (income tax) and on movable
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effects. The other elements of ordinary taxes were indirect—the most important of which were aides, gabelles and traites. Aides was a kind of excise levy on merchandise and goods sold within the country, gabelles was a tax on salt and traites was customs duties levied on goods entering or leaving the realm. 3. In theory, the overall amount of taxation deriving from royal farms increased by over 60 per cent in the period 1630–1661. At the time of the fall of Fouquet, it stood at 36.9 million livres. Yet the maximum that the state could hope to receive from farms in 1661 was a mere 11 million livres. The charges on the farms resulting from the alienation of sums for the payment of wages of venal officers, Rents sur L’Hotel de Ville and pensions for important personages consumed the balance of 25 million livres (Dent, 1973: 39). 4. In England, in particular, during the first half of the 17th century, when Parliament was engaged in a confrontation with the Crown, there were sharp conflicts within the merchant communities. Each group had different interests to defend. The aristocratic oppositionist group that thrived on profiteering on Spanish islands was in favour of an aggressive Spanish policy and was not against the increasing levies that were being levied on trade for meeting the costs of warfare. The Levant merchants, on the other hand, who had been thriving on trade and did not want that their trade routes to be disrupted in any manner, were opposed to the levies. As Parliament was opposed to levies imposed, the two merchant groups, with opposing business interests, engaged themselves openly in the political battle between the Crown and the Parliament.
Chapter 13
Economic Nationalism: Fusion of the Sword and Purse
W
The king also, having care to make his realm potent, as well by sea as by land, for the better maintenance of the Navy, ordained, That Wines and Woads from the parts of Gascoigny 208
♦
♦
We discussed in the two previous chapters how, as the fiscalmilitary states were taking shape, the major political powers and the bourgeoisie came to be increasingly dependent on each other. Dependence showed up in various forms, but, given the territorial ambition of the ruling classes, and the over-riding need for resources, the power and the reach of the bourgeoisie were always visible. A war cannot be fought and won without the backing of a strong and supportive economy; military strength alone does not help. Princes and monarchs soon came to realise that they needed wider and deeper relationships with the bourgeoisie to get an edge in their power games. Contemporary powers were experimenting with different policies and practices in the search for national wealth and prosperity. Francis Bacon, the English statesman and philosopher who lived in those times, described how trade policy was being framed by the Crown in terms of a political objective. In his History of the Reign of King Henry the Seventh (1622), Bacon said:
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and Languedoc, should not be brought but in English bottoms; plenty to consideration of power. (Whittaker, 1960: 32)
♦
♦
bowing the ancient policy of this estate, from consideration of
Two broad orientations may be discerned. One is the focus on state power—not to re-acquire