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ALSO PUBLISHED IN THE SERIES The Justification of Science and the Rationality of Religious Belief Mi,hael Banner Individualism in Social Science Forms and Limits of a Methodology Ril;eev Bhargava The Kantian Sublime From Morality to Art Paul Crowther Determinism, Blameworthiness, and Deprivation Martha Klein False Consciousness Denise Meyerson Truth and the End of Inquiry A Peircean Account of Truth C. ,. Misak The Good and the True M"hael Mo"is
Causality, Interpretation and the Mind WILLIAM CHILD
CLARENDON PRESS· OXFORD
Oxford University Press, Walton Street, Oxford OX2 Oxford New York Toronto Delhi Bombay Calcutta Madras Karachi Kuala Lumpur Singapore Hong Kong Tokyo Nairobi Dar es Salaam Cape Town Melbourne Auckland Madrid and associated companies in Berlin Ibadan
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All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press. Within the UK, exceptions are allowed in respect of any fair dealing for the purpose of research or private study, or criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, or in the case of reprographic reproduction in accordance with the terms of the licences issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside these terms and in other countries should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Child, William (T. William) Causality, interpretation, and the mind / William Child. (Oxford philosophical monographs) Includes bibliographical references. I. Philosophy of mind. 2. Causation. 3. Interpretation (Philosophy) 1. Title. II. Series. BD418·3·C455 1994 I28'.2-dc20 93-36597 ISBN 0-19-823978-5 I
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Typeset by Graphicraft Typesetters Ltd., Hong Kong Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by Bookcraft (Bath) Ltd. Midsomer Norton, Avon
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS people have helped me, in many ways, whilst I have been working on this book. It is a pleasure to acknowledge their help and to thank them. I am particularly grateful to the following people, who have read parts of the book and discussed them with me, sent me written comments, talked over my ideas, or helped in other ways: Bill Brewer, Justin Broackes, John Campbell, Quassim Cassam, Tim Crane, Adrian Cussins, Julia Drown, Jonathan Elven, Elizabeth Fricker, Mark Greenberg, Richard Holton, Lloyd Humberstone, Rae Langton, Mike Martin, Adrian Moore, David Owens, Sarah Richmond, Paul Robinson, Paul Snowdon, Helen Steward, Rowland Stout, Fred Stoutland, David Wiggins, and Tim Williamson. Many parts of the book started life in my B.Phil. and D.Phil. theses. That work was supervised, at various times, by David Charles, Jennifer Hornsby, Julie Jack, John McDowell, Christopher Peacocke, and David Pears. The influence of each remains, in many ways; I am very grateful to them all. Thanks also to a number of people who have typed parts of the book in its successive incarnations: Katy Cooper, Diane Hall, Maureen Jones, Judy Winchester, and, especially, Humaira Ahmed. I gratefully acknowledge the support of a number of institutions. I wrote the D .Phil. thesis which became the core of the book whilst a Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford, and completed the book during a Visiting Fellowship at the Australian National University: my thanks to the Warden and Fellows of All Souls, and to the ANU, for their generous support. I am also very grateful to the Master and Fellows of University College, Oxford, for supporting my research in many ways and for giving me leave of absence to complete the book, A slightly earlier version of Chapter 2 appeared as 'Anomalism, Uncodifiability, and Psychophysical Relations' in Philosophical Review, 102 (1993), 215-45 and a shorter version of Chapter 5 appeared as 'Vision and Experience: The Causal Theory and the Disjunctive Conception' in Philosophical Quarterly, 42 (1992), 297316. The discussion of Rorty in Chapter 4 §2 has been developed MANY
VI
Acknowledgements
from part of my 'Critical Notice-Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson (edited by E. LePore)', Mind, 96 (1987), 549-69. A number of paragraphs in Chapter 4 §2, and Chapter 5 §§2 and 5.4, appeared in 'On the Dualism of Scheme and Content', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 94 (1994), 53-71. I am grateful to the editors and publishers of those journals, and to the following copyright holders, for permission to re-use that material: Cornell University Press, publishers of Philosophical Review; the editors of the Philosophical Quarterly; Oxford University Press, publishers of Mind; and the Aristotelian Society. T.W.C. Oxford
February 1993
To my parents
CONTENTS
I.
2.
INTERPRET ATIONISM I. Interpretation and Interpretationism: Some Preliminaries 2. Language and Interpretation 3. Thought and Interpretability: Is Interpretability Necessary for Thought? 4. Thought and Interpretability: Is Interpretability Sufficient for Thought? 5. Constitutive and Non-Constitutive Interpretationism ANOMALISM, RATIONALITY, AND PSYCHOPHYSICAL RELATIONS I. The Argument for Anomalism 2. Psychological Indeterminacy and Psychophysical Determination 3. Anomalism and Supervenience 4. Anomalism, Psychophysical Correlations, and Functionalism 5. Uncodifiability and Token Correlations 6. Conclusions
3· CAUSAL THEORIES I. The Basic Argument for a Causal Conception 2. Causation and Causal Explanation 3. Mentalism and Physicalism 4· CAUSALISM AND INTERPRET ATIONISM: THE PROBLEM OF COMPATIBILITY I. Incompatibilist Arguments 2. Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, and Realism 5· VISION AND EXPERIENCE: THE CAUSAL THEORY AND THE DISJUNCTIVE CONCEPTION I.
The Causal Theory of Vision
7 8 13
23 40
47
56 56 68 74 78 80 89 90 91 100 110
119 120 129
140 140
x
Contents 2. The Disjunctive Conception of Experience 3. An Objection to the Causal Theory 4· Compatibilism 5. The Conceptual Claim 6. Conclusions
6. ACTION: CAUSAL THEORIES AND EXPLANATORY RELEVANCE I.
2.
3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
Causal Explanation without Correlations An Objection: Anomalism and Explanatory Relevance Causal Relevance Causal Explanatory Relevance Causal Explanation and Non-Mental Properties Causal Explanation and Mental Properties Conclusions Strict Laws and Anomalous Monism: A Concluding Note
143 154
155 164 176
178 179 183 188 19 0 192
204 216 217
References
222
Index
231
Introduction This book is an essay on two themes in the philosophy of mind, and on the relations between them. One theme is the idea that we can give an account of belief, desire, and the other propositional attitudes by giving an account of the ascription of attitudes to a subject on the basis of what she says and does. The other theme is the idea that the concepts of ordinary, common-sense psychology-the concepts of action, perception, memory, and so on-are essentially causal. The first theme informs an influential tradition in the philosophy of mind. According to that tradition, we can reach an understanding of the nature of the propositional attitudes by reflection on the procedure for interpreting a subject's attitudes and language: 'What a fully informed interpreter could learn about what a speaker means is all there is to learn; the same goes for what the speaker believes,l and desires. We can call this approach to the propositional attitudes, and to mental phenomena generally, interpretationism. 2 The second theme is a central assumption in mainstream philosophy of mind. It is not universal; but the thought that common-sense psychological explanation is not a form of causal explanation, or that the idea of perception does not involve the idea that a subject is causally affected by the things she perceives, is certainly a minority view. My questions are these: What is interpretationism, and what are its consequences? What is involved in seeing psychology in causal terms? And to what extent, if at all, are causal theories compatible with interpretationism? Davidson (1983) p. 315. The most consistent and sustained interpretationist accounts of the mental are to be found in the writings of Donald Davidson and Daniel Dennett (see e.g. Davidson (197¥), (1974C), and (1975); Dennett (1987a)). But the interpretationist perspective is by no means confined to them. And there is a strong Wittgensteinian strand to the view (a strand which is clearly visible in both Davidson and Dennett, though neither makes much direct reference to Wittgenstein's writings). 1
2
2
Introduction
In some writers (most famously, Donald Davidson) the two themes, interpretationism and causalism, come together. But there is at least a prima facie question whether the interpretationist approach to the propositional attitudes is compatible with causalism about the mental. For interpretationism has consequences for the ontological status of mental phenomena, and for the relation between the mental and the physical, which have seemed to many to threaten the possibility of a causal understanding of commonsense psychology. A simple way of expressing that incompatibilist intuition would be this. 'Causal theories commit us to a Cartesian view of the mind; but interpretationism is a fundamentally antiCartesian view; so it is impossible coherently to combine interpretationism and causalism.' We can expand that intuition as follows. Someone who proposes to understand action or perception, say, in causal terms, must explain how the notion of causality figures in our mental concepts. How, for example, are we to understand the claim that explaining an action by citing the agent's reasons is a form of causal explanation? One way of trying to make sense of the causal elements in psychology would be to invoke an ontology of mental states and entities, modelled on ordinary physical states and entities; the internal mental phenomena would be causally related to one another, and to external phenomena, in just the way that physical phenomena are causally related to one another. That would give us something like the following model. 'Beliefs, desires, experiences, and so on are internal states and entities. Perception consists in an object's appropriately causing an inner experience; action consists in the production of behaviour by inner states-beliefs and desires; and so on. And the causal behaviour of those mental entities is regular and law-governed, in just the way that the causal behaviour of physical things is governed by laws.' Now it is often assumed that this view of mental phenomena as internal, causally interacting entities is the only way of making sense of causalism about the mind. 3 And that is a thought common to opponents of causal theories and to some defenders of causal theories (the opponents and defenders disagree, of course, about the tenability of such a view of mental phenomena). 3 Some explicit statements: 'The causal analysis [of action] belongs in the tradition inaugurated by Descartes' (Stoutland (1985) p. 45); 'The psychology implicit in the causal theory [of perception] is thoroughly Cartesian .... And its epistemology is equally Cartesian' (Hyman (1992) p. 294).
Introduction
3
Now interpretationism is a radically anti-Cartesian view. Indeed, on some accounts, what motivates the interpretationist is the idea that the Cartesian conception of the mind is untenable. 4 In particular, it is thought, that conception gives rise to the traditional problems of other minds and of the external world. The traditional problems stem from the idea that beliefs, for example, are internal states, whose intrinsic mental character is independent of anything external, including the subject's behaviour. If we conceive of others' beliefs like that, how can we ever know that someone else is in a given mental state; and how can we so much as make sense of the thought that someone else is in a given mental state? Similarly, if the intrinsic character of belief is wholly independent of the external world, how can beliefs yield knowledge of the world lying beyond experience; and how can beliefs so much as have a content about the external world?5 According to the interpretationist, we need a change of focus. Rather than starting with the notion of a belief, conceived as an internal entity, we should start from the way in which the concept of belief actually figures in common-sense psychology. Now the concept of belief plays a role in our ordinary, everyday understanding of one another, and of ourselves, as rational agents-individuals with our own perspectives on the world, whose actions can be explained in terms of our reasons for performing them. And the basic way in which the notion of belief comes into common-sense psychology is the idea of a person believing that p; the concept of belief is the concept of a property of a person. The interpretationist thought is that we can give an account of the circumstances under which it is true that S believes that p by considering the circumstances under which S could be interpreted as believing that p, on the basis of what she says and does. That moves away from the Cartesian 4 Note that, in my use of the term 'Cartesian', a conception can count as Cartesian without accepting Descartes's own commitment to the idea that a human person is composed of two substances: an extended, unthinking body and an unextended, thinking soul. A materialist view will count as Cartesian if it treats mental phenomena as internal entities, whose intrinsic character is wholly independent of anything external. The label 'Cartesian' has become traditional for such a conception, though 'Humean' might, perhaps, be more accurate. (For reflections on the connections between Descartes's own views and modern materialist forms of Cartesianism, see McDowell (1985) §6 and Hornsby (1986) §10.) 5 I develop these connections between the Cartesian picture and the problem of other minds in Ch. I §3.3; and between that picture and the problem of the external world in Ch. 5 §2.
4
Introduction
position in two crucial respects. First, by focusing on the idea of belief as a property of a whole person, we do away with the conception of beliefs as internal states, states which are literally inside people's heads. (Of course, if S believes that p, then we can introduce talk of a sort of entity, S's belief that p. But such entities are derivative and secondary; they play no essential role in an account of thought and meaning; and they cannot be thought of as causally interacting items, like billiard balls or cogs.) Second, and relate diy, we reject the idea that the intrinsic character of thought is independent of the environment and of the subject's behaviour. The process of interpretation proceeds on the basis of publicly available facts about a subject's behaviour and contextual relations; so the idea of belief as it figures in common-sense psychology is, from the outset, the idea of a property which is not internal. Interpretationism, then, stands opposed to the view of propositional attitudes as internal states. So, if we accept the widespread assumption that causal theories depend on the idea that beliefs and desires are internal, causally interacting phenomena, there is a real problem about the tenability of the compatibilist view-the view that an interpretationist approach to psychology can be coherently combined with a causal understanding of the mental. A defence of compatibilism would need three elements: (i) the formulation of an acceptable version of interpretation ism, and an explanation of its commitments; (ii) the development of a version of causalism which is not committed to the Cartesian view; (iii) a demonstration, in detail, that the demands of interpretationism and of the causal theory are, in fact, compatible. That is what I shall aim to provide. In Chapter I I consider interpretationism. I distinguish a number of versions of the position, explore the options for interpretationists, and try to make clear what interpretationism really amounts to. An important part of the task here will be to explain and defend the central interpretationist presupposition, that reflection on the nature of interpretation can yield conclusions about the nature of thought. In Chapter 2 I examine the nature of the relations between the mental and the physical. Davidson's interpretationism is associated with the doctrine of the anomalism of the mental, the thesis that
Introduction
5
there is no system of strict laws on the basis of which mental phenomena could be precisely predicted and explained. Now the anomalism of the mental has often been taken to conflict with other claims about the relation between mental and physical; the claim that mental properties supervene on physical properties, for example, or that the mental is determined by the physical. Since we seem to need those claims if we are to explain how the mental can causally affect the physical, the doctrine of anomalism has seemed to many to make problems for the causa list approach. I start by explaining and defending the argument for anomalism, stressing its dependence on a thesis about the character of rationality. Turning to the implications of that argument, I argue that the doctrine of anomalism is perfectly compatible with the thought that the mental supervenes on the physical; but that, in ways which have not generally been appreciated, it rules out the possibility of various sorts of detailed correlation between mental and physical phenomena. All this has implications for the form of any causalism which could be compatible with interpretationism. Chapter 3 introduces and defends the arguments for a causal view of common-sense psychology. Those arguments come from two directions: there is the role of causality in understanding the form of psychological explanations; and there is the role of causality in understanding the content of mental phenomena. But it is one thing to say in general terms that action explanation, say, is a form of causal explanation; it is another to give a substantive causal theory which tells us, in detail, how causality figures in an understanding of action explanation. As a first step towards a substantive theory, I consider two questions: 'What makes an explanation a causal explanation; what is the form of a causal explanation?'; and, 'How are causal relations involving mental phenomena related to causal relations involving physical phenomena?' Chapter 4 discusses arguments for thinking that there is a tension between interpretationism in the philosophy of mind and causalism about the mental: it answers some of those worries; discussion of others is postponed to Chapter 6. I then consider a common incompatibilist suggestion: 'It is true that we need both causal stories about behaviour and the sort of rationality-involving psychological story offered by the interpretationist. But those are two different sorts of story, and should be kept apart; it is an error
6
Introduction
to try to combine them, by seeing psychological stories themselves as a type of causal story.' I argue that this sort of bifurcation between the causal and the rational is unacceptable; and I suggest that what it loses, which compatibilism supplies, is the possibility of a modest but appealing form of realism. Chapters 5 and 6 work towards a detailed causal account of the concepts of vision and action. Chapter 5 considers the case of vision. Here I start from a challenge to the causal theory. According to the challenge, the causal theory requires an essentially Cartesian view of experience, which we have reason to reject: that conception ought to be replaced by what has come to be known as a disjunctive view of experience; but this disjunctive view undermines the motivation for, and is actually inconsistent with, the causal theory. I argue against both those claims: the causalist can accept the disjunctive view of experience; and there remain good reasons for thinking that causality is an essential feature of the concept of VISIOn.
In Chapter 6 I consider the case of action. Here I focus on a problem which seems to arise when we combine a causal theory of action, a physicalist conception of causation, and the doctrine of the anomalism of the mental: can we combine those three views without sacrificing the common-sense idea that mental properties are causally, or causally explanatorily, relevant? I argue that we can; by combining an account of the relation between people's mental properties and their physical properties with an account of our primitive causal understanding of the mental, we can vindicate the common-sense idea in a way which is compatible with interpretationism, and with the associated doctrine of the anomalism of the mental.
I
I nterpretationism INTERPRETATION is the process of ascribing attitudes to an individual on the basis of what she says and does. When we interpret someone, we aim to make sense of her by attributing beliefs, desires, intentions, emotions, and other propositional attitudesattitudes in the light of which her behaviour is intelligible as, more or less, rational action. Interpretationists think that we can gain an understanding of the nature of the mental by reflecting on the nature of interpretation. The general interpretationist approach is familiar in the philosophy of mind. But exactly what does interpretationism amount to? What is the motivation for the interpretationist approach; and what justifies the claim that an investigation of the nature of interpretation can reveal the whole truth about the mental? What are interpretationists actually claiming about the link between thought and interpretability? And what, in detail, does interpretationism say about the mind? In this chapter I try to answer those questions, and to come to an understanding of the interpretationist position. In § I I sketch some of the key elements in the interpretationist's account of the mental, and make a number of preliminary points about the concepts of interpretation and interpretationism. In §2 I consider the relation between the ascription of attitudes and the interpretation of language. In § 3 I discuss what I shall call the interpretationist's 'necessity claim', the claim that '[t]houghts, desires, and other attitudes are in their nature states we are equipped to interpret';! I examine the content of the claim, and the justification for it. In §4 I consider whether interpretability is a sufficient condition for thought; and in § 5, whether interpretability is constitutive of thought. 1
Davidson (1990C) p. 14.
8
I. I.
Interpretationism
INTERPRETATION AND INTERPRETATIONISM: SOME PRELIMINARIES
I start by sketching in broad outline some principal features of an interpretationist conception of the mental. First, when we interpret someone we aim to make her behaviour intelligible in a certain way-by seeing why it made sense (or seemed to make sense) for her to act as she did. When we interpret someone, we explain her actions in terms of her reasons. So the idea of reason-giving explanation is central to the interpretationist conception of the mental. Internal to that form of explanation, and thus to the interpretationist conception, is the notion of rationality; the ideal of rationality has a constitutive role in propositional attitude psychology. To say that is to say (amongst other things) that if a subject has attitudes at all, the relations amongst her attitudes, perceptions, and actions must by and large be rational. No actual individual is perfectly rational; so all sorts of local irrationality in thought and action are intelligible. But what is not intelligible is that a subject might have a set of attitudes which were absolutely irrational, for none of which she had any reasons at all, and which it was impossible to relate intelligibly to her action; with an individual like that, the idea of explaining actions in terms of reasons could have no application. The general link between the propositional attitudes and the notion of intelligibility is one source of the interpretationist's principle of charity, or humanity: in ascribing beliefs, we should seek to optimize agreement between what S believes and what she ought rationally to believe, in the light of her situation, her other attitudes, and the available evidence. And the same goes for desire: subjects are, by and large, not just believers of the true but also 'lover[s] of the good,.2 It will turn out that the constitutive role of rationality has wide-ranging implications for the character of the mental. Second, on the interpretationist's view, propositional attitudes are not literally internal states. The concept of belief, say, is the concept of a property of a person: what is primary is the idea of a person believing that p; the idea of a kind of entity, S's belief that p, is derivative from, and dependent on, that. So if we think of a belief as a state at all, we must think of it as a state of a 2
Davidson (1970a) p. 222. See also Dennett (1981) p. 50.
§ I. Interpretation and Interpretationism
9
person. Interpretationists allow that there are connections between a person's having the beliefs and desires she does and her having the internal causal organization she does. (What attitudes a subject has is a matter of how she can be interpreted, which is answerable to what she says and does; and at some level, we think, her saying and doing what she does results from her being causally organized in the way ~he is.) But it would be wrong to think that claims about what a subject believes and desires are claims about her internal physical states; if it is possible to match up attitudes and internal states one-to-one, that will be something that needs to be shown, not something built into the very idea of a propositional attitude. Third, every actual subject is a physical individual. In that sense, interpretationism is a physicalist, or materialist, view; the existence of minds in the world does not involve the existence of any nonphysical matter. Some interpretationists also endorse the stronger claim that each mental event is a physical event. But the physicalism to which interpretationism is committed is a modest physicalism. Indeed, interpretation ism is often associated with the view that there are, or even that there could be, no systematic relations between the mental and the physical at all. (That is, again, a topic I explore in Chapter 2.) I have stated these central elements of the interpretationist position briefly, and dogmatically; the motivations for these interpretationist claims will emerge in this chapter and the next. 3 But I want to draw attention here to three features of interpretationism as I am characterizing it. First, the interpretationism I have described is (in the first instance, at any rate) a methodology in the philosophy of mind, rather than a set of doctrines. The basic interpretationist idea is that we can gain an understanding of the mental by reflection on interpretation; not that reflection on interpretation is the only way of reaching such an understanding. Of course, if that basic idea is right, then certain views about the mental are ruled out; and certain conclusions about the mental will follow. But the basic idea is quite compatible with the thought that the conclusions which interpretationism yields could be reached by some other route; it is even compatible with the idea that there could be a more direct 3
See also the writings of Davidson and Dennett cited in Introduction, n.
2.
10
I.
I nterpretationism
route to the same conclusions. Some interpretationists go beyond the basic idea, and see the concept of interpretation as an indispensable element in an understanding of thought. If we adopt that perspective, we do see interpretationism as more than simply one way of thinking about the mental. But, for the moment, I will be discussing the less ambitious claim. 4 Second, interpretationism offers us an understanding of the propositional attitudes: belief, desire, intention, hope, fear, pride, and so on. On one way of understanding 'the mental', a complete account of the propositional attitudes is a complete account of the mental; to hold that view is to accept 'the criterion of the mental in terms of the vocabulary of the propositional attitudes,.5 (One who accepts that criterion can accept the status as mental of experiences, in so far as experiences have contents subject to the same constraints of rationality and coherence as the propositional attitudes.) There are other ways of using 'mental' which would extend the subject-matter of philosophy of mind beyond what figures in propositional attitude psychology: on some views, for example, facts about sub-personal cognitive psychology, or even about the brain, can properly be considered facts about the mind. But there is no need to dispute about the words 'mental' or 'mind'. Interpretationism is an account of the propositional attitudes, and of other personal-level (as opposed to sub-personal) states with propositional content. I will talk of that as being an account of the mental; but someone who has a wider criterion of the mental can think of interpretationism as an account of a part of the mental. Third, I said that interpretation is the process of ascribing attitudes to someone on the basis of what she says and does. It is no part of that view that an interpreter must first identify what S says and does in non-mental terms, as mere vocalizations and physical movements, and then work out what mental properties S has. 6 Interpretationism can perfectly well accept that our most primitive identifications of behaviour already pick out what a I pursue the questions hinted at in this paragraph in §5 below. Davidson (197 oa) p. 216. 6 We can say something parallel about perception. We form beliefs about the external world on the basis of perception-on the basis of how things seem. It need be no part of that view that we must first identify the appearances in a neutral vocabulary, which prescinds from any claims about physical objects, and then work out how the external world is on the basis of that. 4
5
§ I. Interpretation and Interpretationism
11
subject says and does in mental terms-as cases of saying that p, asking whether q, picking something up, driving to London, and so on. But the fact that, in the normal case, we identify S's behaviour in mental terms, as this or that action, does not conflict with the idea that we ascribe attitudes on the basis of what subjects say and do. I may immediately identify what you are doing as pumping up a tyre; that does not stop me from explaining your action by ascribing various attitudes, attitudes I might not have suspected if you had not acted as you did. And that is all that the interpretationist's idea requires. I make this point in order to forestall the frequently expressed worry that interpretation ism must involve some sort of reductionism, or non-realism, about the mental. The worry is that interpretationism implies that all there really are are mere vocalizations and physical movements, and that talk of speech-acts and other actions, and of beliefs, desires, and the rest, is merely a convenient fiction. 7 But, as I have said, interpretationists need not accept such a view. It is true that some of Davidson's accounts of interpretation do suggest that, when we ascribe attitudes and meanings to a subject, we are constructing a theory on the basis of more primitive data. 8 Davidson is explicitly not attempting to reduce the intentional to something non-intentional; for what he regards as data-such facts as that S prefers one thing to another, or holds a given sentence true-are themselves intentional. But even allowing for that point, the theory may still seem too reductionist. Here are two common criticisms. (i) 'Davidson's account treats the data as facts about a subject's holding a sentence true, for instance. It is true that, if I already understand something of someone's language, and know a good deal about his attitudes, I "can know that [he] holds a sentence to be true without knowing what he means by it or what sentence it expresses for him."9 But it is wholly implausible that we could ever have access to a whole class of data about someone's holding sentences true in advance of any more detailed knowledge about his meanings and attitudes; and it is implausible that we could ever, even in theory, ascribe a whole set of more detailed intentional states on the basis of "more I discuss worries of this form in Ch. 4 § I and Ch. 6 § § 2. and 5. e.g.: 'Everyday linguistic and semantic concepts are part of an intuitive theory for organizing more primitive data .. .' ((1974C) p. 143 (emphasis added)). 9 Davidson (1975) p. 162.. 7 8
12
I.
Interpretationism
primitive data" of that sort. Rather, what seems plausible is that "[l]ight dawns gradually over the whole"tO-that, even in the case of radical interpretation, an interpreter works her way gradually to the ascription of a whole pattern of beliefs, desires, and meanings, a pattern in which no one part is any more basic than another.' (ii) 'The idea that all understanding is interpretation seems to obscure a fundamental difference between everyday cases in which we simply take another unthinkingly at face value, and cases in which we really do have to make an inference, from data that are not immediately intelligible, to a conclusion about what the speaker meant. The idea of interpretation is applicable to the second case; but it is not appropriate for the sort of everyday case where you hear someone speak, and know immediately, and unreflectively, that she has said that p. And this distinction is of great theoretical importance; for there are reasons for thinking that it could not be the case that all understanding involved an interpretation in that explicit sense.'ll I think these points are good reasons for rejecting some of what Davidson says about interpretation. For they cast doubt on the thought that the procedure of interpretation as he describes it could occupy the fundamental theoretical role he ascribes it. But suppose we accept the two points in the previous paragraph: first, that the process of coming to understand another is a process of gradually working one's way into a whole, rather than a process of constructing a theory from more primitive data; and second, that the possibility of meaning and communication depends on the existence of cases in which people take one another at face value without the need for explicit interpretation. Those thoughts do not disturb the main interpretationist theses about the nature of thought. They do not, for example, disturb the basic idea that what a fully informed interpreter could learn about S's thoughts, on the basis of what she says and does, is all there is to learn. And they leave intact the main elements of the view of thought which flows from the interpretationist approach: for example, the idea that the mental is constitutively governed by norms of consistency and rationality; the doctrine of the anomalism of the mental, and of certain sorts of indeterminacy of mental properties; and the anti-Cartesian metaphysics of thought. Wittgenstein (1969) §14I. See Wittgenstein (1958a), §§143-20I. Dumrnett quotes §201 in support of his objections to Davidson's use of 'interpretation' (Dummett (1986) p. 464). 10 11
§2. Language and Interpretation
13
A final note about terminology. As I use it, 'interpretation' involves the ascription of attitudes to a subject as well as the ascription of meaning to her words and sentences (if she has a language). We interpret a subject, or what she says and does. So my use of 'interpret' and 'interpretation' diverges from Davidson's. He distinguishes between interpretation theory (which involves the ascription of meanings to a subject's words) and decision theory (which involves the ascription of beliefs and desires to a subject); so, for Davidson, interpretation is only a part of the wider overall process of making sense of a subject by making sense of her actions and utterances. 12 But as long as we are clear about the terminology, the difference between Davidson's more restricted use of 'interpretation', and my broader use, is unimportant.
2.
LANGUAGE AND INTERPRET AnON
Is the ascription of beliefs and desires inseparable from the interpretation of language? Or could a subject have thoughts without possessing a language? More precisely, does an explanation of what is required for thought make reference to a subject's possession of a language? Interpretationists divide on their answer to that question. And, as we will see, that division does not just affect what we say about thought and language; it influences the nature of interpretationism in other ways toO.13 On one view, which we might call linguistic interpretationism, the ascription of thought is inseparable from the interpretation of language: 'a creature cannot have a thought unless it has language.'14 That is not to say that the abilities of creatures which lack a language are utterly discontinuous from the abilities of language-users; to the extent that they approximate to languageuse, such creatures may approximate to the possession of beliefs. IS But these proto-beliefs of non-language-users have to be understood 12 For this distinction between interpretation theory and decision theory, see e.g. Davidson (1974C) pp. 144-8. 13 See the discussion of the interpretationist's necessity claim in § 3 below; and of the distinction between constitutive and non-constitutive interpretationism in §5. 14 Davidson (1982) p. 477. 15 Davidson suggests a view of this sort: 'small children and animals have beliefs and the rudiments of speech up to some system of transformations of ways of assigning propositions to their utterances or intentions. The fewer acceptable transformations, the more thought' ((1985) p. 252).
T.
I nterpretationism
in terms of their approximation to full-blown beliefs; there is no separately intelligible category of proto-belief, prior to the fullblown belief of the language-user. On the opposing view, nonlinguistic interpretationism, there are at least some beliefs whose possession does not require language. So what non-language-users have is not a mere approximation to something higher and language-dependent. 16 Of course, possession of a language vastly increases the range and precision of the attitudes available to a creature. So there are some cognitive states which are peculiar to language-users. But not all thought requires language. The main purpose of this section is to explore the arguments for linguistic interpretationism. I will suggest that there remains an important gap in Davidson's principle argument for that position; and that his recent efforts to fill it do not compel his conclusions. The fate of that argument will have important implications elsewhere (a point I pick up in §3 and §s below). But even if the argument for linguistic interpretationism fails, that would not mean the failure of the interpretationist view of the mental more generally. What could motivate the linguistic interpretationist's claim that we can ascribe beliefs to S only if we simultaneously interpret a language which S uses? Davidson writes: 'Belief ... depends ... on meaning, for the only access to the fine structure and individuation of beliefs is through the sentences speakers and interpreters of speakers use to express and describe beliefs.'17 Bracket the explicitly epistemic formulation here, and read it (as Davidson intends) as making a metaphysical claim too; the only way to make sense of someone's having a belief with 'fine structure' is to think of her as holding a sentence true. Now this seems to put the weight on the idea that a creature must have language if it is to have attitudes with relatively complex or fine-grained contents: attitudes like the belief that there is a largest prime number, that Napoleon had all the qualities of a great general, or that it is Friday.ls That in turn suggests that an attitude with a less complex or detailed content, like a desire for food or sex, might be explicable 16 For this view, see e.g. Dennett (1981) p. 65: 'the cognitive capacities of nonlanguage-using animals ... must ... be accounted for, and not just in terms of an analogy with us language users.' See also Evans (1982) p. 123. 17 Davidson (1983) pp. 314-15. See also (1973C) p. 127, (1974C) pp. 143-4, and (1975) p. 163. 18 Davidson offers these as examples of attitudes which a creature without a language could clearly not possess.
§ 2. Language and Interpretation
15
without reference to language. And something like that is Dennett's view: there are simple cognitive states which do not depend on their subject's possession of a language; and there are more complex beliefs which do-which 'can only be acquired ... via language' .19 On that view, there is a link between (some) thoughts and language; but it is not true that thought in general depends on language. However, Davidson has a different point in mind, which we could summarize as follows. 'One mark of the mental is intentionality, and the mark of intentionality is semantic intensionality; "attribution[s of attitudes] may be changed from true to false, or false to true, by substitutions in the contained sentences that would not alter the truth value of the sentence in isolation. ,,20 And that sort of failure of substitutivity makes sense only in the case of language-users.'21 The argument depends on two assumptions: that the creation of opaque, or intensional, contexts is an essential mark of the propositional attitudes; and that the only way to account for that opacity is by thinking of belief, say, as a disposition (amongst other things) to hold a sentence true. The first assumption is very plausible. The second has some intuitive appeal (though Davidson offers little argument in its favour). But it is certainly open to challenge. For example, Evans's pioneering discussion of what is involved in thinking of objects under specific modes of presentation shows how much can be said about what it is to think demonstratively of a perceptually presented object, or to think of something on the basis of a recognitional capacity, without appeal to any linguistic capacity of the subject. 22 And if we can make sense of a subject's having demonstrative and Dennett (1976) p. 274. Davidson (1975) p. 156. For similar claims, see Davidson (1970a) pp. 210I I and (1982) pp. 474-5, and Dennett (1983) pp. 240-1. But note that Davidson leaves room for the possibility that there could be thoughts which we could not attribute using a 'that'-clause followed by an ordinary sentence: 'there may be thoughts for which the speaker cannot find words, or for which there are no words' ((1975) p. 158). (He does not say what cases he has in mind. But one sort of example might involve cases where the subject is in the course of acquiring, or losing, a concept. See Ch. 2 §3.) 21 Davidson suggests an argument of this form ((1975) pp. 163-4, (1982) pp. 474-7, and (1985) p. 252). But he also recognizes its limitations (for which, see the previous note): from 'the dubious applicability of the intensionality test where dumb animals are concerned' we could conclude only that 'there probably can't be much thought without language' ((1982) p. 477). 22 See Evans (1982) Chs. 6-8. 19
20
16
I.
Interpretationism
recognition-based ways of thinking of things without appeal to its possession of a language, we can make sense of failures of substitutivity in belief-ascriptions without appeal to possession of a language. So the argument about substitutivity could certainly be contested. But that argument is not, in fact, the main motivation for Davidson's insistence that thought requires language. His motivation comes from a different, two-part, argument: the first part links possession of beliefs with possession of the concept of objective truth; the second links a subject's possession of the concept of objective truth with her being in communication with others. Why should possession of beliefs require possession of the concept of objective truth? The central thought is that there is a crucial difference between a subject with beliefs and a system which simply interacts in complex causal ways with its environment-a mere information processor. And the idea is that the key difference between a system which has beliefs and one which merely processes information is that something with beliefs can itself make sense of the distinction between how things seem to it and how they really are.23 A creature can interact with its environment in complex ways without having beliefs: 'It may discriminate among colours, tastes, sounds and shapes. It may "learn", that is, change its behaviour in ways that preserve its life or increase its food intake. It may "generalize", in the sense of reacting to new stimuli as it has come to react to similar stimuli.'24 But none of that requires the creature to be thinking of things as parts of an objective world, independent of itself; a creature which has this sort of ability will be responding to features which are in fact elements of an objective world; but it need not be thinking of them as features of an objective world. For a creature to have thoughts about the world, it is not enough that we be able to distinguish between how things seem to it and how they are; the contrast must be available to the creature itself. 25 In support of the idea that a creature can have beliefs only if it 23 Of course, when S's beliefs are true, how things seem to her will actually be how they are; but that does not undermine the distinction between things seeming to S to be some way and their actually being that way. 24 Davidson (1982) p. 4 80. 25 In Davidson's words, a creature which has beliefs must 'understand ... the possibility ... of being mistaken'; it must 'command ... the subjective-objective contrast' ((1975) p. 170, (1982.) p. 480).
§2. Language and Interpretation
17
can think of itself as having beliefs, consider a parallel. We can distinguish the idea of a reason for x to cl» from the merely causal idea of a reason why x cl»-d: there are reasons why apples fall, stars twinkle, and flowers turn to face the sun; but they are not reasons for the apples, stars, and flowers. And it is plausible that the idea of something's being a reason for x to cl» is intelligible only if x can think of it as a reason for cl»_ing. 26 Now some philosophers reject this first stage of the Davidsonian argument, and maintain that a creature can have beliefs without being capable of conceiving of itself as having beliefs. Dennett, for example, thinks that something can have what he calls first-order intentional states without having second-order intentional states (intentional states about other intentional states). So long as we are clear that a system which has only these first-order 'beliefs' does not think of things and events as objective things and events, there need be no conflict between Dennett's position and Davidson's; what Dennett calls a first-order intentional state does not even purport to be what Davidson calls a belief. For the sake of clarity, I propose to put things in Davidson's way: a state of a creature is a belief only if the creature is equipped to think of it as a belief. So much for the first part of the argument-which is really just a specification of what is meant by 'belief'. What about the second part; why should possession of the subjective-objective contrast require one to be in communication with others?27 Two questions arise. First, how exactly is a subject's being in 16 Some may be tempted to think that some reasons why flowers turn to face the sun are reasons for the flowers-those having to do with biological function, or evolutionary purpose. But there is a distinction between rationality, on the one hand, and biological or evolutionary purpose, on the other. If one says that flowers themselves have evolutionary reasons to turn to the sun, one is not saying that a flower is a locus of rationality. 17 In an early version of the argument, Davidson was unequivocal that communication is a necessary condition: 'We have the idea of belief [and thus of the subjective-objective contrast) only from the role of belief in the interpretation of language, for as a private attitude it is not intelligible except as an adjustment to the public norm provided by language. It follows that a creature must be a member of a speech community if it is to have the concept of belief' (( 1 97 5) p. 170, emphases added). More recently, he has been more guarded, offering only the partial argument that communication is a sufficient condition for grasp of the subjective-objective contrast: 'Clearly linguistic communication suffices' for grasp of the contrast, and Davidson has no idea 'how else one could arrive at the concept of an objective truth' ((1982) p. 480).
18
I.
Interpretationism
communication with others supposed to be relevant to her grasping the subjective-objective contrast? Second, is it true that only a creature's being in communication with others suffices for grasp of the subjective-objective contrast, or are there alternative possibilities? Davidson has two main lines of argument, which I will consider in turn. The first line of thought tries to show that it is only the fact of communication with others that gives each of us the resources to distinguish between how things seem to us and how, objectively, they are. The concept of objective truth 'can emerge only in the context of interpretation, which alone forces us to the idea of an objective, public truth' .28 G. E. Moore pointed out that I cannot intelligibly say, or think, 'I believe that p, but p is false'; the circumstances in which I am willing to assert that p and the circumstances in which I am willing to assert that I believe that p cannot come apart. Now someone who already has the general concept of objective truth can make sense of the possibility that how she believes things to be may not in fact be how they really are: she cannot intelligibly think, 'I believe that p but p is false'; but she can intelligibly think, 'I believe that p but it might turn out that p is false'. But suppose I did not already grasp the distinction between how things seem to me and how they really are. If I had the resources only of my own point of view, of how things seem to me, what could give me the idea of a contrast between what I believed and the truth? 'Nothing', is Davidson's response. In that situation, I could never be confronted with a contrast between how things seem to me and how they are. And if I could never be confronted by such a contrast, I could have no use for the distinction; indeed, I would not even have the resources to draw the distinction. It might happen that something I expected did not come to pass. But, with only my own point of view to go on, that would just be a case in which things seemed thus-and-so at one time, and seemed a different way at a later time. I would not have the resources to think of it as a case in which there was a distinction between how things seemed to me and how, objectively, they were. But now consider how things are if I am interacting with another creature, which has its own point of view on the world. 28
Davidson (1975) p. 17 0 •
§ 2. Language and Interpretation
19
There is now the possibility of divergence and disagreement. If S indicates that p is true when, in my opinion, p is false, I cannot make do with an undiscriminated conception of how things are, which makes no distinction between how things seem to me, how they seem to S, and how they really are. Initially, perhaps, I could make do with a single division: distinguishing between how things seem to S and how, in fact, they are-but still drawing no distinction between how things seem to me and how they are. But even if interaction does not compel one to distinguish between how things seem to oneself and how they really are, it provides one with the resources for doing so-resources absent when we consider things from the point of view of a single creature. And that, for the Davidsonian argument, is the important point. Now an obvious objection to this argument is the thought that there are in fact resources other than communication with others which would allow an individual to make sense of the distinction between how things seem to her and how they really are. For example, one might think that an individual could be confronted by a mismatch between a current series of perceptions and a generalization well established .on the basis of past experience; surely that could provide the resources for making a distinction between how things now seem and how they really are. Or again, one might claim that a subject's grasp of the contrast between how things seem and how they are is explicable in terms of her grasp of a simple theory of perception; to grasp such a theory (the idea would be) is to think of one's experiences as being causally explained by objects and events in the world one inhabits; and to do that just is to have grasped the distinction between how things seem to oneself and how they really are.29 Prima facie, at least, that is a reasonable objection; at the very least, it needs answering. And I do think that Davidson has not done enough to answer it. But he has said something, which emerges in a second line of thought. The second idea is that the reason why 'we cannot ... resolve the question of the contents of mental states from the point of view of a single creature' is that '[t]he identification of the objects of thought rests ... on a social basis'.30 Communication with 29
30
See Strawson (1979), Evans '(1980), and Campbell (1986). Davidson (199 1b ) p. 201.
20
I.
Interpretationism
others is part of what is necessary to fix the content of an individual's beliefs; and, since beliefs are, by definition, states with content, that means that communication is necessary for an individual to have beliefs at all. 31 Here is a statement of the problem which appeal to communication is supposed to solve: [TJhe cause of certain mental states is relevant to the content of those states. And ... one kind of case is especially important: an example is the way the fact that a certain mental state has been typically caused by seeing cows allows us to think 'There's a cow', even when no cow is present. But here a problem arises. What determines the content of such basic thoughts ... is what has typically caused similar thoughts. But what has caused them? There are many choices, for example events that occurred before all cows, or events spatially closer to the thinker than any COW.32
And here is a statement of Davidson's proposed solution, stressing the role of communication with others. [WJhat makes the particular aspect of the cause of [a] learner's responses the aspect that gives them the content they have is the fact that this aspect of the cause is shared by the teacher and the learner. Without such sharing, there would be no grounds for selecting one cause rather than another as the content-fixing cause. 33
Davidson likes to describe this procedure in terms of the metaphor of triangulation: 'Without one creature to observe another, the triangulation that locates the relevant objects in a public space could not take place. ,34 How is the metaphor of triangulation to be cashed out? The idea is this. In the simple cases we are considering, there is, for every belief which might be expressed by saying 'There's a cow', a causal chain leading back from a subject's perception to her immediate environment, and beyond. We face the question, 'Which stage of all these causal chains fixes the content of an utterance?' The naive response is, 'The stage where the cause of one utterance is similar to the cause of other utterances of similar responses.' But the problem with this naive idea is that it gives us no reason for 31 The argument is suggested in Davidson (1982), and developed more fully in (1989b), (1991a), and (1991b). 32 Davidson (1991b) p. 200. 33 Ibid. 201. 34 Ibid. See also (1982) p. 4 80.
§2. Language and Interpretation
21
saying that utterances of 'cow', and the beliefs thereby expressed, are about cows, rather than about patterns of retinal stimulation (at one extreme) or prehistoric ancestors of cows (at the other). There is a similarity between the animals which normally cause the beliefs we express with 'There's a cow'-they are all cows. But, equally, there are similarities of some sort between the patterns of retinal stimulation which normally cause such beliefs: 'all those arrays of light striking the retina have something in common; and so for other classes of causes'.35 What we must say, Davidson thinks, is that the stages of different causal chains which are the relevantly similar ones are the stages which we class together, naturally and unthinkingly, as being similar.36 The general thought is familiar as a theme in Wittgenstein's discussion of following a rule: what counts as going on in the same way is not dictated by the real nature of things, absolutely independent of us; how we find it natural to go on once trained plays some part in determining the categories we grasp and, therefore, in fixing what counts as going on in the same way.37 Now there is an obvious worry about this line of thought, a worry which is parallel to the objection we have already encountered: does the sort of triangulation needed to fix the contentdetermining stage of causal chains really require communication? On the face of it, the idea that what counts as similar to what is partially defined by similarity responses could be applied using only the similarity responses of an individual. But Davidson answers that worry by arguing that we cannot help ourselves to an Davidson (199Ib) p. 200. 'It is we who class cow appearances together, more or less naturally, or with minimal learning' (ibid. 200). 37 There are two points about which care is needed here. (i) We must be careful in describing the way in which the natural, blind, matter-of-course responses we give, once trained, help to fix what counts as similar to what; in particular, there is no prospect of a reduction of 'x is similar to y' to 'we find it natural to classify x as similar to y once trained'. (ii) The Wittgensteinian argument is an argument against what we might call 'rampant platonism' (the phrase is McDowell's); the idea that what counts as similar to what, or what counts as going on in the same way, is determined absolutely objectively, with no contribution by us. But the argument is consistent with the thought that there is a quite unobjectionable sense in which one cow is objectively similar to another, for example, or in which, if you are following the rule for adding 2, '1002' is objectively the right thing to put after '1000'. The upshot of Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations is not that anything goes, but just that what counts as (objectively) going on in the same way must be understood by reference to a practice. 3S
36
22
I.
Interpretationism
absolutely objective similarity relation when considering similarities amongst responses: The criterion on the basis of which a creature can be said to be treating stimuli as similar, as belonging to a class, is the similarity of the creature's responses to those stimuli; but what is the criterion of the similarity of the responses? This criterion cannot be derived from the creature's responses; it can come only from the responses of an observer to the responses of the creature.38
But does this really help? The same objection seems to recur; that the idea of understanding similarity in terms of what seems similar to subjects can in fact be applied in understanding the idea of similarity amongst the responses of a single individual; for there is nothing to stop a subject reflecting on her own responses and finding some of them similar to each other and others different from one another. I do not say that this objection is conclusive. But it would at least need to be addressed if the triangulation argument is really to show that thought requires communication. To sum up. The main support for the linguistic interpretationist's position, that possession of thoughts depends on possession of a language, comes from Davidson's two-part argument. According to that argument: (i) possession of thoughts requires grasp of the contrast between how things seem to oneself and how things really are; (ii) grasp of that contrast requires that one be in communication with others. I have discussed the reasons why one might think that being in communication with others is necessary for grasp of the subjective-objective contrast, and I have mentioned a lacuna in the arguments Davidson uses to justify that claim. We can certainly see that communication with others is one way of providing the resources which are necessary, first, for an individual to be able to make sense of the subjective-objective contrast, and, second, for a solution to the triangulation problem. But, despite Davidson's recent efforts, it is not clear that we have been given an adequate reason to think that only communication with others could provide those resources. I am not unsympathetic to Davidson's intuition about the essentially communal character of thought. But I do not think he has offered arguments which compel us to share that intuition. 38
Davidson (199Ia) p. 159.
§3. Thought and Interpretability: Necessity
23
I will not try to settle here the debate between the linguistic interpretationist and the objectors. But we can set out the strategic position. There is an argument for linguistic interpretationism, and there are a number of objections. Suppose it turns out that, as the objectors claim, we can show how it is intelligible for a subject to command the subjective-objective contrast without possessing a language, or without interacting with others at all. That would undermine the principle argument for a linguistic version of interpretationism. But it would not undermine interpretationism altogether. What is essential for interpretationism is the claim that thought is, in its nature, interpretable. And there are arguments for that claim which are independent of linguistic interpretationism.
3. THOUGHT AND INTERPRET ABILITY: IS INTERPRETABILITY NECESSARY FOR THOUGHT?
I said at the outset that interpretationism aims to draw conclusions about the nature of the propositional attitudes from reflection on the procedure for ascribing attitudes to a subject on the basis of what she says and does. But that gives rise to an obvious challenge. 'A study of interpretation can reveal the conditions under which an interpreter can know what someone's attitudes are; and it can reveal general features of thoughts which are accessible to interpretation. But how can that justify us in making claims about thought in general? On the face of it, in moving from claims about thoughts which we can ascribe to claims about thought in general, the interpretationist is making a straightforward and objectionable shift from epistemic to metaphysical considerations'.39 According to this challenge, the interpretationist is faced with a dilemma. One option is to observe a proper distinction between epistemic and metaphysical considerations, in which case our conclusions must be restricted; the best that interpretationism could 39 A slippage between epistemic and metaphysical considerations seems clear when Davidson addresses the (metaphysical) question, '[H)ow much like us must an artefact be, and in what ways, to qualify as having thoughts?', by making the (epistemic) point that 'the only way to tell if an artificial device ... has beliefs, intentions, desires, and the ability to perceive and interact with the world as a person does, is to attempt to interpret the behaviour of the device in the same way we do the behaviour of a person' ((I990C) pp. 15,26 (emphasis added)).
I.
Interpretationism
do would be to say what must be true of the attitudes of subjects we are able to interpret. 4o Alternatively, the interpretationist may press ahead and make claims about thought in general; but in doing so he will be relying on some sort of anti-realist assumption, which simply defines the truth about S's thoughts in terms of what an interpreter could come to know. To answer that challenge, the interpretationist needs to produce an argument to show why it follows, from the very nature of the mental, that 'what a fully informed interpreter could learn' about what a subject believes, desires, and means 'is all there is to learn,.41 He needs to show (not just to assume) that '[t]houghts, desires, and other attitudes are in their nature states we are equipped to interpret; [that] what we could not interpret is not thought,;42 and he needs to explain why that does not conflict with various common-sense realist thoughts we might have. What the interpretationist needs, then, is a necessity claim: the claim that interpretability is a necessary condition for thought. But what exactly does the claim come to; and can it be justified? My discussion will prol..eed by considering three questions: (I) What does interpretability amount to? (2) What sort of thesis is the interpretationist's necessity claim, and how strong is it intended to be? (3) What reasons are there for accepting it? 3.I. Interpretability
Interpretationism argues that there is an essential link between thought and interpretability. But what is interpretability? The basic idea is this: S is interpretable as at t, just in case the best scheme for interpreting S on the basis of what she says and does would ascribe S the property at t. (Instances of could include, for example, believing that p, or possessing the concept F.) But that idea can be filled out in different ways, depending on how we understand the idea of 'a scheme for interpreting S on the basis of what she says and does'. There are at least three parameters which can be varied, to produce different conceptions of interpretability. 40 This is McGinn's position: 'it is a condition of interpretability that the subject by and large believes what he perceives ... (This is not to say [that a person who systematically and globally refuses to let his beliefs be shaped by his experience I is impossible; it is just that he is not interpretable)' ((1986) p. 367). 41 See Davidson (1983) p. 315. 42 Davidson (1990C) p. 14.
§3. Thought and Interpretability: Necessity
25
First, there is a question about the sort of information available to the interpreter. Here, notice that, for the interpretationist, 'interpretability' means interpretability on the basis of what S says and does. One point of interpretationism is to explain how ordinary people can have knowledge of one another's beliefs and desires. So the information that provides the basis for interpretation can include only what is, or in ordinary circumstances could be, available to the ordinary observer; it cannot, for example, include information about goings-on in a subject's brain or nervous system. Second, there is a question about how much information of this sort we are to consider when we ask what properties a subject is interpretable as having. Here are some options. We might say that S is interpretable as believing that p if S could be interpreted as believing that p by an interpreter with knowledge of: (a) the words she utters in response to questions during a five-minute interview;43 (b) what she says and does in the course of a prolonged conversation; (c) what she says and does in a conversation, together with enough information to show that she has had a normal history; (d) the totality of what she actually says and does over a lifetime; (e) the totality of possible evidence. Clearly, someone interpretable as believing that p according to one of the criteria at the beginning of this list need not be so interpretable by the stricter standards lower down. So our choice of a standard of interpretability will affect our answer to such questions as, 'Could there be thoughts a subject was not interpretable as having?', or, 'Is being interpretable as cl> sufficient for being cI>?' A third question is who is to count as the judge of interpretability. Is S interpretable as being cl> only if we could interpret her as being cI>? Or would it be enough if there were a community of others like S, all of whom could interpret one another, though we could not interpret them at all? For Davidson, interpretability is interpretability by US. 44 But on the face of it, there might be room for an interesting form of interpretationism which did not understand 'interpretability' as 'interpretability by us': we might think that there are reasons for saying that any thinker must be interpretable by others with whom she interacts or shares a language, 43 44
ef. Turing (1950). For something on his reasons for saying this, see Davidson (1974d).
L.
Interpretationism
but that a creature could meet that condition without being interpretable by us. In what follows, I will work with the following understanding of interpretability. The information we consider in assessing whether or not S is interpretable as being can include only what is, or could be, available to ordinary observers: information about what S says and does, the circumstances in which she does so, and (we will see) certain information about S's history. Second, I will not assume that if S is interpretable as being she is interpretable by us; I want to leave room for the possibility of thoughts which are manifestable to others, but which could not be ascribed by us (perhaps because our intellectual capacities are too limited). Third, the amount of information to be considered in assessing questions of interpretability must include everything that someone could find relevant in interpreting a subject; so it must include more, for example, than the verbal responses to a short series of questions. That rules out some conceptions of interpretability, but it leaves open a number of different possibilities; I explore them further in §3.3 below. 3.2. The Strength of the Necessity Claim
Consider a formulation I quoted earlier: 'Thoughts, desires, and other attitudes are in their nature states we are equipped to interpret; what we could not interpret is not thought.'45 That slogan might be used to express various different sorts of thesis. But I want to focus on an epistemic claim, about the relation between what S thinks and what S can be known to think. How strong an epistemic claim is the interpretationist making? We can locate the possible views· on a spectrum between two extremes. At one extreme is what we might call the radically nonepistemic view of thought. 46 That view has two elements. First, that the mental is epistemically private; that knowledge of a subject's mental properties is available only to the subject herself. Second, that it is intelligible that beliefs about minds which Davidson (1990C) p. 14. The label 'radically non-epistemic' originates with Putnam; it (and the complementary 'radically epistemic') are used by Davidson ((199oa) §2). I intend this use of the labels to suggest a parallel between the interpretationist's view of the relation between thought and interpretability, and Davidson's view about the relation between truth and knowability in general. 45 46
§3. Thought and Interpretability: Necessity
27
are reached on the basis of interpretation might all be false. Summarizing: [A] Interpretation can yield no knowledge of others minds. [B] It is intelligible that all beliefs reached by interpretation might be false. Contrasting with that is a radically epistemic conception of thought. On that view, the conclusions an interpreter reaches cannot be wrong; it is not just that knowledge of others' minds is possible; if we follow the procedure for interpretation, error is actually ruled out. Now interpretationism clearly rejects the radically non-epistemic view of thought. But there are three questions about the interpretationist's positive position. How strong a rejection of the radically non-epistemic view is needed in order to vindicate an interpretationist approach? What is it, in fact, plausible to say about the relation between thought and interpretability? And what do interpretationists actually say? The interpretationist must reject [A]: the whole interpretationist approach depends on the idea that it is possible to know about others' minds on the basis of interpretation-'an observer can under favourable conditions tell what someone else is thinking,.47 And she cannot give only the most modest denial of [A], saying that interpretation can yield knowledge of some facts about minds, but allowing that there may be other aspects of the mental which are in principle beyond the reach of interpretation; for the claim is that what we could learn about the mental by interpretation, and by reflecting on interpretation, is all there is to learn, that it is the whole truth about the mental. For the interpretationist, there can be nothing about S's mind which could be known only by S herself; and there can be nothing which could be known only by appeal to resources (such as detailed information about what is going on in a subject's brain) which are unavailable to the interpreter. So a defence of interpretationism requires the strongest repudiation of [A]: there could be no thought, of any thinker, which it was impossible for an interpreter, in favourable circumstances, to discover. That is what will vindicate the claim that epistemic reflections (about interpretation) can yield metaphysical conclusions (about thought in general). 47
Davidson (1982) p. 476.
I.
Interpretationism
What about [B]? The interpretationist has no direct commitment to rejecting [B]; what is required is rather the rejection of [A], in full generality. But perhaps there is an indirect route from a thesis about the possibility of gaining knowledge by interpretation to a thesis about the impossibility of interpretation's leading to global error. It is arguable that someone who accepts [B] must accept [A]. The thought would be this: for it to be intelligible that all our beliefs about others' minds could be false, we must think of those beliefs as being based on a source of evidence (about people's behaviour, physically conceived) which could be as it is, even if what lay behind it (others' mental states themselves) were wholly different. And once we think of the relation between the 'inner' and the 'outer' in that way, it becomes impossible to see how beliefs about others' mental states could be justified at all: in fact, it becomes impossible to see how one could so much as form the idea of someone else being in such an 'inner' state. 48 So [B] implies [A]. Hence, .,[A] implies .,[B]. So if we reject [A], and say that interpretation can yield knowledge, we are committed to rejecting [B]. The thought is that we could not so much as have the concept of others as possessors of thoughts unless we had some true beliefs about others: there must be some simple and basic cases, of the sort in connection with which we acquire the concepts of others as possessors of thoughts, in which the possibility of error does not arise. 49 But even if we accept that reasoning, it only gets us to the most modest rejection of [B]; it is a long way from that to any stronger claim-such as the claim that our beliefs about others' minds must, by and large, be true. And the interpretationist does not seem to be committed to that stronger claim. Independently of interpretationism, what is it plausible to say about the relation between thought and interpretability? For an explanation of this last point, see §3.3 below. Cf. Wittgenstein (1968) p. 293: 'The language games with expressions of feelings are based on games with expressions of which we don't say that they may lie.' See also p. 295: 'I distinguish "moaning with toothache" and "moaning without toothache" and now we can't go on to say that of course in the child we make the same distinction. In fact we don't'; and Wittgenstein (1958a) §249: 'Are we perhaps overhasty in our assumption that the smile of an unweaned infant is not a pretence?', to which part of the answer is obviously supposed to be, 'No' (the other part being the observation that there is something inappropriate about calling this an assumption). 48
49
§3. Thought and Interpretability: Necessity
29
Intuitively, we do often know what others think; the claim that interpretation cannot yield knowledge of others' minds is not plausible. And (though this is less obvious) it is not clear that intuition involves the idea that there are features of others' minds which could not be detected on the basis of interpretation. But intuition also recoils from the radically epistemic view that an interpreter's conclusions are guaranteed to be right. For an actual interpreter, making ascriptions on the basis of a finite amount of ordinary evidence, it seems perfectly intelligible that some of her conclusions should be wrong. We know, for example, that a subject may resolutely conceal an opinion or desire, even from her closest friends and best interpreters. Similarly, there are actual cases of people born with profound physical disabilities, assumed to have severe mental disabilities too, and only discovered years later to have been, all along, perfectly intelligent. Such people had rich and complex attitudes; but they were taken by actual interpreters to lack attitudes altogether. In the cases we know about, the mistake was discovered. But there could surely be cases which went undetected; in fact, it seems likely that there actually have been. Intuitively, then, we cannot say that everything a careful and conscientious interpreter comes to believe about her subjects will be true-that there is no more to what a subject thinks than what an actual interpreter would interpret her as thinking. But accepting that is compatible with saying that there is no more to what a subject thinks than what an interpreter could find out, in favourable circumstances, on the basis of ordinary ways of telling. Where an interpreter reaches a mistaken conclusion about a subject's beliefs, the problem is not that, in order to have reached the correct conclusion, she would have needed a special sort of evidence unavailable to an ordinary interpreter; it is simply that the circumstances in which she was interpreting her subject were unfavourable. So we make sense of the possibility of an unknown truth about another mind not in terms of the presence of a state of a sort which could not be discovered by an interpreter, but rather in terms of S's being in a state which an interpreter would have known about in normal circumstances, but where the normally available basis for an interpreter's conclusion was, for special reasons, unavailable. A sober and intuitively appealing view, then, would reject the radically non-epistemic view of thought, and affirm that
I.
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Interpretationism
interpretation could, in favourable circumstances, reveal the whole truth about a mind; but it would also reject the radically epistemic view, that the conclusions we reach as interpreters could not be wrong. If that is a position which is intuitively plausible, is it what interpretationists have actually claimed? Interpretationists are often taken to be advocates of a radically epistemic view of thought; it is assumed that, on their view, what an interpreter concludes is, by definition, the whole truth about a mind. But, as I have stressed, interpretationists need not make such a strong claim. And Davidson, at least, clearly does not. The position he adopts has the following elements. (i) It is possible to gain knowledge of others, minds by interpretation: 'an observer can under favourable conditions tell what someone else is thinking',so and '[a]ttributions of belief [are] publicly verifiable'.51 (ii) There is no element of the mind which could not be known, in favourable circumstances, on the basis of interpretation: 'What a fully informed interpreter could learn about what a speaker [believes] is all there is to learn',52 and 'what we could not interpret is not thought,.53 (iii) There is no guarantee that the beliefs we actually form as interpreters will all be true. That is explicit in the claim that 'any way of telling [that a creature thinks] will be fallible';54 and it is implicit in the two claims just quoted in (ii): the claim is that what an interpreter could learn is all there is to learn, not that what an interpreter would in fact conclude is the whole truth. It seems, then, that there is a moderate view of the relation between thought and interpretability, which would be enough to vindicate the claim that reflection on interpretation can yield conclusions about thought in general, which is supported by intuition, and which is actually advocated by interpretationists: there is no element of the mental which could not, in favourable circumstances, be known on the basis of interpretation; but there is no guarantee that the conclusions we actually reach by interpretation will all be right, or even that they must, by and large, be true. Before considering arguments which attempt to vindicate that claim, I want briefly to consider an objection which is likely to have been nagging for some time. 'You say that the inter50 52 54
Davidson (1982) p. 47 6. Davidson (1983) p. 315. Davidson (I990b) p. 5.
51 53
Davidson (I974C) p. 153. Davidson (I990C) p. 14.
§ 3. Thought and Interpretability: Necessity
3I
pretationist's fundamental intuition is that what a fully informed interpreter could learn about S's beliefs and desires, in favourable circumstances, is all there is to learn. But that is hardly a distinctive view of the mind; it could surely be accepted on any view of the mind. Indeed, we can make an analogous claim about any subject-matter at all. What would be wrong, for example, with saying that what a fully informed investigator could learn about rocks or stones or trees, or about cabbages or kings, is all there is to learn?' I would say three things in response. First, a fully informed interpreter, in favourable circumstances, is limited to knowledge of what a subject would do and say in various situations (and to certain sorts of knowledge about the subject's history).55 In particular, she does not have any knowledge about the subject's brain, or about sub-personal information-processing. So even the minimal claim that I have formulated puts the interpretationist in conflict, for example, with those who think that questions about an agent's mind which are unanswerable at the level of interpretation might in principle be settled by looking to the detail of sub-personal information-processing. 56 Second, interpretationism as formulated also conflicts with a classically Cartesian approach. The Cartesian may claim to be able to endorse the idea that an interpreter can learn the whole truth about others' minds: arguing that, provided an interpreter is in the favourable circumstance in which others do in fact have attitudes and sensations like her own, she can learn the whole truth about others' minds by using an argument from analogy with her own case. But it is arguable that that is not a coherent position-that if we start from the Cartesian's startingpoint, we cannot really make sense of ascriptions of conscious mental phenomena to others at all. 57 If that is right then, contra the critic, the Cartesian is not entitled to endorse the interpretationist's claim. Third, it is true that many who could legitimately endorse the claim would not regard themselves as interpretationists; certain sorts of functionalists might be an example. But that is as it should be. I have introduced interpretation ism, in the first instance, as a methodology for investigating the For the importance of knowledge of a subject's history, see §4 below. I think this is compatible with saying that there are some constraints on the kind of causal mechanism which may be allowed to produce genuinely intelligent 57 See §3.3 below. behaviour. On that topic, see further §4 below. 55 56
32
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Interpretationism
mental; it is not necessarily a distinctive view of the mental, which conflicts with all other views. There was also the charge that interpretationism as I have formulated it does not involve any contrast between the mental and other subject-matters. In one sense, I agree, there is a parallel. The slogan, 'What a fully informed investigator could learn about cabbages is all there is to learn', captures the idea that to learn all there is to learn about cabbages, you would need to employ only straightforward empirical methods. There is nothing transcendental about the reality of cabbages; nothing which resists discovery through being noumenal. We could make the same claim about thought. But there is this difference between the two cases. To learn all there is to learn about cabbages, you would need more than is available to the ordinary layperson; you cannot learn all there is to learn just by gross observation. One way of putting that is to say that, when you start investigating the cellular structure of cabbages, you are still learning about cabbages. By contrast, the parallel claim about interpretation builds in a restriction on the sort of information that is relevant to learning all there is to learn about belief; if we start to investigate the brains of believers, for example, we are changing the subject; information of that sort could not be required in an investigation of what an agent believed. So the claim that what a fully informed interpreter could learn about a subject's attitudes is all there is to learn really does say something distinctive. But why should we accept it? Why not accept the opposing intuition, that there could perfectly well be thoughts and thinkers which were wholly resistant even to an interpreter in the most favourable circumstances?
3.3. Arguments for the Necessity Claim We can identify at least four lines of thought which might be used to support the interpretationist's necessity claim. (i) Some arguments for the claim are specific to the linguistic interpretationist. And these include one of Davidson's few explicit arguments. The core of Davidson's argument is this thought: meaning is essentially public; belief is inextricably linked to meaning; so belief is essentially public also. As he puts it: 'A speaker who wishes his
§3. Thought and Interpretability: Necessity
33
words to be understood cannot systematically deceive his wouldbe interpreters about when he assents to sentences-that is, holds them true. As a matter of principle, then, meaning, and by its connection with meaning, belief also, are open to public determination.'58 Now it is certainly true that meaning is by its nature open to public determination. The meaning of a word is a matter of its use in communication, so there can be no element of its meaning which is not knowable by an interpreter on the basis of the use that speakers make of it; any such element would be irrelevant to its role in communication. 59 But what exactly this establishes about belief depends on what 'connection with meaning' we take belief to have. To motivate the view that belief is in general interpretable, we would need a general connection between belief and meaning. Now, as we have seen, Davidson does indeed offer a general argument-the argument that a creature can have beliefs only if it has a language. But that argument does not license a move from the fact that meaning is open to public determination to the claim that belief is also, in its nature, open to public determination. For, as Davidson insists, the general argument does not show 'that each thought depends for its existence on the existence of a sentence that expresses that thought'; it does not even give us 'any reason to maintain that what we can't say we can't think'-'there may be thoughts for which ... there are no words'.60 If that is right, then an argument for the claim that there is no thought which an interpreter could not learn about cannot go via the publicity of meaning. If every thinker must be a language-user, then the essential publicity of meaning assures us that some thoughts of every thinker will be interpretable. But there is no route from the publicity of meaning to the interpretability of thought in general. (ii) A different argument for the necessity of interpretability falls out of a popular account of the metaphysics of propositional attitudes. According to the popular account, the notion of belief is a construct, implicitly defined by its place in a simple theory for Davidson (1983) p. 315. See Dummett (1973) p. 216. Cf. Wittgenstein's comments on the relation between meaning and use, and Davidson's commendation of Quine for 'revolutioniz[ing] our understanding of verbal communication by taking seriously the fact ... that there can be no more to meaning than an adequately equipped person can learn and observe' (Davidson (1989b) p. 78). 60 Davidson (1982) p. 477; (1975) p. 158. 58
59
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Interpretationism
explaining and predicting behaviour (including linguistic behaviour); the same goes for the notions of desire, intention, and the rest. Now, if belief is exhausted by its role in understanding people, and explaining their behaviour, it follows that there can be no element of a person's beliefs which is not available to the interpreter on the basis of what that person says and does; for, if there were such an element, it could play no role in an interpreter's understanding of the person. This line of thought is explicit in both Dennett and Davidson. Here is Davidson: 'talk apparently of thoughts and sayings ... belong[s] to a familiar mode of explanation of human behaviour and must be considered an organized department of common sense which may as well be called a theory. One way of examining [the nature of thought and language] is by inspecting the theory implicit in this sort of explanation: 61 Similarly, Dennett's starting-point for reflection on the propositional attitudes is 'the concept of a system whose behaviour can be-at least sometimes-explained and predicted by relying on ascriptions to the system of beliefs and desires .. :62 'Intentional system theory' is the theory employed in this sort of explanation and prediction; and belief and desire are simply defined by their place within the theory. One obvious objection to this line of thought is the idea that our concepts of the propositional attitudes are not exhausted by their role in the interpretation of others: there is also the role of the mental in first-person awareness, and in one's own theoretical and practical reasoning. According to the objection, that shows two things. First, that the idea that the propositional attitudes are exhausted by their role in a simple theory for understanding others' behaviour is false; such a theory can at best characterize part of our concept of thought. Second, that there is an alternative explanation of our concept of thought, on which it will be perfectly intelligible that there could be uninterpretable thoughts and thinkers. On the alternative understanding, the contents of our concepts of belief, thought, and so on are determined not by a theory which involves the application of those concepts to others, but by our own first-person awareness of what it is to believe that p or to be a thinker. When I judge that x has thoughts I am applying 61 62
Davidson (1975) p. 158. For a similar statement, see (1974a) p. 234. Dennett (1971) p. 3.
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35
to x the concept of thought whose content is determined by my awareness of my own thoughts; I am judging that x has states of the sort I have when I judge that I am thinking. Since the concept of thought is determined by its first-person character, and not by any links to behaviour, there is no guarantee that all thought is even potentially manifestable. Concerning the first point, it is obviously true that an understanding of the mental would be inadequate if it gave no place to the role of consciousness, or of first-person awareness. And I think it is true that some versions of the idea that belief and desire are defined by their role in explaining behaviour do ignore the distinctive role of self-consciousness: they think of beliefs and desires from a purely third-person perspective; they conceive of propositional attitudes as constructs in a theory for explaining people's behaviour in exactly the same way as we treat centres of gravity or masses, say, as constructs in a theory for explaining the behaviour of inanimate bodies. An explanation involving centres of gravity obviously does not involve the idea that a centre of gravity is (potentially) an object of reflexive awareness to the thing whose centre of gravity it is; if we think of belief and desire as exact analogues of centres of gravity, the same thing would hold for explanations in terms of propositional attitudes. But there is no reason why someone who holds that belief and desire are implicitly defined by their role in understanding people must ignore the role of self-consciousness. She can insist that subjects have a distinctive mode of awareness of their own thoughts, that a creature only has thoughts if it can think of itself as having thoughts, and that propositional attitude explanation is literally applicable only to creatures which can think of the reasons we cite as reasons for doing what they did. So it is not true that this sort of understanding of the propositional attitudes must take an exclusively thirdperson View. The second point went further and suggested, in effect, that our concepts of thought might be exclusively first personal. This line of objection has some intuitive appeal, and has been historically influential. But, for familiar reasons, it is not tenable. To see why, we can consider a third motivation for the necessity claim. (iii) The third argument (or set of arguments) involves a line of thought which lies behind Wittgenstein's idea that an '''inner
36
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Interpretationism
process" stands in need of outward criteria'63 and also behind Strawson's idea that 'one ascribes P-predicates [predicates which are properly ascribed to persons but not to other material bodies] to others on the strength of observation of their behaviour; and that the behaviour-criteria one goes on are not just signs of the presence of what is meant by the P-predicate, but are criteria of a logically adequate kind for the ascription of the P-predicate,.64 I do not suggest that Wittgenstein's and Strawson's arguments are identical, or that there is just one line of thought in each. But there is at least a common core. We can apply the concept of thought univocally to ourselves and to others. 65 Now suppose that there were types of mental state for which there were no outer criteriano way of knowing that someone was in those states on the basis of what they said and did; a subject's being in such a state would be a fact which would resist discovery by the best-informed interpreter in the most favourable circumstances. How could we make sense of the thought that someone else was in such a state? The model would presumably be this: each person understands what it is to possess such a state by actually having it herself; we make sense of the idea of another's possessing it by analogy with our own case. But the model is beset with familiar problems. In the first place, it is arguable that, if I simply consider my own case introspectively, and without reference to the behavioural manifestations of mental properties, I do not have the resources to set up a psychological language at all; I cannot make sense of the identification and re-identification even of my own sensations. 66 Nor do I have the resources to distinguish between myself and states I ascribe to myself; so I cannot make sense of ascribing mental properties to myself. 67 But suppose, per impossibile, that I could get the concept of a type of mental state in this way. Then my only way of making sense of there being a mental state of this kind Wittgenstein (195 8a) §5 80. 64 Strawson (1959) p. 106. According to many interpretations, Wittgenstein held that present-tense mental self-ascriptions are not descriptions, do not express knowledge, and are not statements about a person (see e.g. (1958a) §246, (1958b) pp. 55,67, and (1981) §472). 1 think that that interpretation is, at best, an exaggeration and over-generalization of claims Wittgenstein made about particular cases. But, even if we accept the interpretation, we need not deny that, in '1 believe that p' and 'You believe that p', 'believe that p' has the same meaning. 66 See Wittgenstein (1958a) §§243 H. and (1968) pp. 288, 290-1. 67 See Strawson (1959) Ch. 3. 63 65
§3. Thought and Interpretability: Necessity
37
would be by imagining being in a state of that kind; and, in that case, I could not make sense of a state of that kind other than as one possessed by me: 'If one has to imagine someone else's pain on the model of one's own, this is none too easy a thing to do: for I have to imagine pain which I do not feel on the model of the pain which I do feel.'68 But suppose, again per impossibile, that, having gained the concept of pain from my own case, with no reference to any behavioural manifestation, I could make sense of another's being in pain by analogy with my own case. I could not then explain why it is intelligible to ascribe pain to other people and to animals, say, but not to stones and plants. 69 For, having altogether severed satisfaction of the concept of pain from the fulfilment of any behavioural conditions, there would be no conceptual grounds at all for limiting its application to individuals which behave in particular ways. In short, we can only make sense of others (and thus also of ourselves) as possessors of mental states, and we can only understand the limits of intelligibility of our psychological concepts, if we think of ourselves and others as possessors of non-mental as well as mental properties, and if our psychological concepts have some constitutive link with behavioural criteria. 70 (iv) I have been discussing the question, 'What reason is there for thinking that belief is in its nature interpretable; what justification is there for rejecting the idea that there could be uninterpretable thinkers and thoughts?' I have described a number of answers. But a different response would be to reject the questions altogether. On that view, it is out of place to ask for a justification of the idea that thought is essentially interpretable; it is just a datum that we do generally know what others believe and desire, and that we have ways of telling what attitudes someone has. That does not mean that there is nothing for the philosopher to say about the link between thought and interpretability. We do not need to justify the assumption that we can know what others Wittgenstein (1958a) §302. Cf. Williams (1978) pp. 100-1. See ibid., §28 3. 70 I would emphasize that this view need not involve the idea that the 'behavioural criteria' can be stated in non-intentional terms, or the idea that there must be necessary and sufficient behavioural conditions for someone's being in an inner state, or the supposedly Wittgensteinian idea that knowledge that someone else is in an inner state is based on awareness of defeasible behavioural criteria. (On Wittgenstein's use of the notion of a criterion, see McDowell (1982).) 68
69
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Interpretationism
believe and desire; that is the datum. But we do need a philosophical understanding of how that can be so; how must we think of belief if we are to make intelligible the familiar fact that a wellinformed interpreter can, in favourable circumstances, tell what someone believes, desires, and intends? The interpretationist account of thought will then be an answer to that question. On this approach, we take the epistemological facts as the starting-point and then discuss how the metaphysics must be to make the epistemology intelligible. And there are precedents for such an approach; it can be found, for example, in some recent work about knowledge of the non-mental world. In this case, the idea is to start from the datum that we do, by and large, have knowledge of the world around us. The question for philosophy is then, 'How must we think of our position vis-a-vis the rest of the world, and in particular, how must we think of perception, if we are to make it intelligible that we have knowledge of an objective world?'71 The parallel way of justifying an interpretationist approach to the mental is not, as far as I know, explicitly articulated by interpretationists. But it is certainly a possible line to take; and it does seem to be a strand in some interpretationist thinking. I suggest that we put aside the first view we considered (which argued from the publicity of meaning to the publicity of belief); as I said, even if we accept the Davidsonian argument for linguistic interpretation ism, that does not give us the general link between thought and interpretability which interpretationism requires. But I propose to accept the other three lines of thought: (ii) the 'theory' view of thought; (iii) the argument that 'inner' states must have 'outer' criteria; and (iv) the idea that it is simply a datum that we can know facts about other minds. How strong a link between thought and interpretability do those arguments sustain? First, if we accept the arguments, we can reject the idea that knowledge of others' minds is impossible; and to do so is to reject one strand of the radically non-epistemic conception of thought. The possibility of knowledge of others' minds is directly asserted if we accept that it is a datum that we can, in favourable 71 For this approach to the problem of the external world, and for discussions of the relation between the source of that traditional problem and the source of the traditional problem of other minds, see McDowell (1982) and Davidson (1989a), (199Ia). The approach has a thoroughly Wittgensteinian flavour-which is explicit in McDowell, and obvious, though less explicit, in Davidson.
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circumstances, know what someone is thinking: and it directly follows from the other two arguments. But none of the three lines of thought vindicates the radically epistemic claim, that the beliefs an interpreter forms about others' thoughts are guaranteed to be true. If we accept the 'theory' view of thought, we must accept that the theory of S's behaviour which we formulate, necessarily on the basis of finite evidence, may not be the best theory: it is always a possibility, for example, that our theory will be undermined by future behaviour; or that an attitude (or a creature) we cannot now interpret might come to be interpretable. Similarly, the fact that there are logically adequate behavioural criteria for S's being in some 'inner state' is no guarantee that, where it seems to us that the criteria are satisfied, S is on that occasion in that state. But the key question for the interpretationist is whether the arguments vindicate the central claim, that thought is essentially interpretable-that there could not be thoughts, or thinkers, which an interpreter, in favourable circumstances, could not interpret. Here, the 'datum' argument by itself is not enough. It may be a datum, where we can interpret a thinker, that it really has the beliefs we interpret it as having. But it is difficult to see how it could be a datum that nothing unreachable by interpretation could be thought. For that conclusion, we need the support of an account of what it is to think of something as a thinker. That is what we get from the 'theory' view and from the argument for 'outer' criteria. The negative part of the argument for criteria shows that we cannot make sense of the idea of uninterpretable thoughts or aspects of thought. The positive account of our mentalistic concepts suggested by that argument, and augmented by the 'theory' view, is an account from which it follows that all thought is in principle interpretable. The worry we started from was that, without an argument to show that thought was necessarily interpretable, interpretationism would be faced with the dilemma of choosing between an outright anti-realism about the mental, and the admission that it does not yield conclusions about thought in general, but only about those thoughts which are interpretable. I think the arguments I have been reviewing do supply what the interpretationist needs-a vindication of the claim that thought is in its nature interpretable, which avoids the radically epistemic (and obviously unacceptable) conception of thought.
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Interpretationism
4. THOUGHT AND INTERPRETABILITY: IS INTERPRET ABILITY SUFFICIENT FOR THOUGHT?
Is being interpretable as being sufficient for being ? Or is interpretability only a necessary condition for thought, a condition which needs to be supplemented by other conditions? Pure interpretationism holds that being interpretable as being is sufficient for being <1>; supplemented interpretationism maintains that interpretability is not enough by itself, but needs to be supplemented by further conditions. (I said in §3.1 above that our answer to the question, whether being interpretable as being is sufficient for being <1>, is affected by how much we build into the notion of interpretability. So at least part of what I am presenting as an issue between pure and supplemented interpretationism could alternatively be presented as an issue between a relatively liberal and a relatively demanding standard of interpretability.) Here are some cases where the issue between pure and supplemented versions of interpretationism will arise. (i) It can seem that heat-seeking missiles and chess-playing computers are interpretable as having beliefs and desires about their respective 'targets' and 'goals'; do they really have those attitudes, or are there further conditions for genuine belief and desire which they fail to fulfil? (ii) Similarly, chimpanzees, dogs, and birds can seem interpretable as having ranges of attitudes more or less like our own; should they really be credited with such attitudes? (iii) Consider someone who is shifted, unbeknownst to her, from the normal environment where she has grown up and acquired her conceptual repertoire, to a different but, to her, indiscriminable environment; someone transported from Earth to Twin Earth, for example.72 An interpreter meeting her soon after the journey to Twin Earth, and knowing nothing of her background, would ascribe her beliefs and desires about the things and kinds on Twin Earth. But does she really have beliefs and desires with those contents? (iv) We seem to be able to imagine systems which would behave just like a normal human being, and which would therefore be interpretable as having thoughts, but whose behaviour would be produced in ways strikingly different from our own-so different, that there IS an intuition that these would not be intelligent systems at 72
For the original discussion of Twin Earth cases, see Putnam (I97Sa).
§4. Thought and Interpretability: Sufficiency
41
all. 73 ('Intelligent' in this context simply means 'possessing propositional attitudes'.) There are finitely many sensory stimuli which an ordinary human being can register. And there are finitely many physical movements a human being can make. So we can imagine sufficiently diligent and determined scientists, or Martians, adopting the following procedure. Working with sufficiently small time intervals, they take some ordinary human being and work out how she would respond to each of the n possible sensory inputs at t. They record all that information in the form of a table with n entries: if S received input i l at t, she would respond with r l ; if she received i2 at t, she would respond with r2; and so on. Then, for each possible input and response at t, they consider how S would respond to each possible sensory input at t+1: suppose that, at t, S had received input i l and issued response rI-how would she then respond to each of the n possible sensory inputs she could receive at t+I?; suppose that, at t, S had received input i2 and issued response r2-how would she respond to each of the n possible inputs at t+I?; and so on. The process is continued until the scientists, or Martians, have produced a vast branching set of input-output correlations covering every possible series of sensory inputs which S could receive in the course of an ordinary human life span. Then they programme a system with this vast look-up table: if the system receives sensory input i l at th it 'consults' the table and 'reads off' the appropriate response, rh which it then gives; and so on, for each successive time. Such a system would behave just like the normal human being on whose dispositions it was modelled. But there is a strong intuition that it is completely unintelligent, a mere machine: 'All the intelligence it exhibits is that of its programmers.'74 Must the interpretationist deny that intuition? I think there is a clear case for interpretationists to supplement the most minimal condition of interpretability with further considerations of various sorts (or, equivalently, to employ a relatively demanding standard of interpretability). And the case is not simply an ad hoc response to counterexamples. One kind of supplementing condition concerns a system's history. Interpretation is answerable, not just to what an agent says and does at a moment, but to the wider context of her behaviour: 73
For the sort of example used in this paragraph, see Block (1981) pp. 19-25, 74 Block (1981) p. 21.
41, and Peacocke (1983) p. 205.
I.
I nterpretationism
what else she says and does (in the future as well as the past), what abilities and capacities she has, the nature of her natural and social environment, and so on. So what would in one context be a case of $-ing would not be so in another;75 and in order for S to be $, more is necessary than that she should, on an occasion, do and say things characteristic of being $. The surrounding context, and her history, must also be right. For example, suppose we accept that, at least in certain basic cases, the content of a belief is partially determined by the normal cause of beliefs of that type. Now the normal cause of beliefs of a given type at t may differ from their typical actual cause at t. Think of the person unknowingly transported from Earth to Twin Earth, and consider that person at some time shortly after the journey. At that time, the typical cause of the beliefs she expresses by saying 'There's some water' will be the presence of XYZ, not the presence of water. But the 'normal', content-determining cause of beliefs of that type will be water: it is her interaction with water which has given content to the beliefs she expresses by using the word 'water'; and it is water (not XYZ) which these beliefs are about. 76 So in order to know how to interpret someone, we need enough information about her history and past environments to tell what the content-determining causes of her beliefs are. In the normal run of things, a little acquaintance with S tells us all we need to know about her history. But the problem cases-the Twin Earth traveller, and so on-remind us of the importance of a creature's history in determining the contents of its attitudes. In order to be $, a creature must not just be interpretable as being $ at a moment, it must also have the right sort of history. (Alternatively, we might say that having the right sort of history is a condition for really being interpretable as being $. That is the way Davidson tends to put it in his recent treatment of this theme. 77 ) A second sort of supplementing condition involves the application of constraints of economy-versions of Occam's Razor. The general principle is that we should not ascribe attitudes any more 75 Cf. Wittgenstein: 'What, in a complicated surrounding, we call "following a rule" we should certainly not call that if it stood in isolation' ((1978) VI. 33). 76 As time passes, the normal cause of the beliefs she expresses by saying, 'There's some water', will be XYZ and not water; the content of the relevant beliefs will change likewise. (For an account of the parallel process of gradual change in the reference of a name, see Evans (1982) pp. 388-91.) 77 See Davidson (1990b) pp. 9-10 and (1990c) pp. 14-15.
§4. Thought and Interpretability: Sufficiency
43
complex than are required to explain the range of x's behaviour. As Lloyd Morgan puts it: 'In no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of the exercise of a higher psychical faculty, if it can be interpreted as the outcome of the exercise of one which stands lower in the psychological scale.'78 Constraints of this sort may be applied at at least two levels. Applying a constraint of economy at the general level, we get the condition that we should not ascribe attitudes to a system at all unless it exhibits 'the rich range of behaviour that a thinking creature must have'. So, for example, we should not ascribe beliefs to heat-seeking missiles or chess-playing computers: if we do so, we generate expectations about their other behaviour which could not be fulfilled; there is not enough there for the missile or computer to count as having thoughts. 79 Dennett's version of this idea is that we should not attribute propositional attitudes where the pattern of behaviour detected by the putative intentional explanation could be detected equally well by a non-intentional explanation; there are 'patterns in human behaviour that are describable from the intentional stance, and only from that stance'. 80 By contrast, the patterns in the behaviour of, say, thermostats, can be captured naturally in non-intentional terms. So the ascription of attitudes to thermostats, or simple creatures, is surplus to explanatory requirements in a way that their ascription to human beings is not. And constraints of economy apply also at a detailed level, when it comes to considering the contents of the attitudes we ascribe: we should not ascribe contents to a creature which allow discriminations to be made between situations which it is unable to discriminate between. Consider a child who can count to three, and can tell whether collections of more than three things are equinumerous, but who lacks the concepts of the cardinal numbers in general. Her behaviour could be explained by ascribing attitudes about numbers greater than three; but such ascriptions would implicitly credit her with further abilities which she does not have. 81 Third, how might an interpretationist respond to the worry that L10yd Morgan (1894) p. 53. See Davidson (1982) p. 477 (from where the phrase in the previous sentence of text is taken) and (1990C) pp. 15-6. 80 Dennett (1979) p. 25 (second emphasis added). 81 For this example, and other applications, see Peacocke (1983) pp. 78-86. For related points, see Evans (1975). 78
79
44
I.
Interpretationism
there are certain sorts of causal organization a system might have which would produce interpretable behaviour, over as wide a range of circumstances and times as one could demand, but which seem incompatible with the possession of thoughts? As far as I can see, there are the following options. (i) 'There is no real intuition that the sort of system I described earlier-call it Blockhead-does not really have thoughts; as long as an individual is causally organised in such a way that its behaviour is reliably interpretable, it has the attitudes it is interpretable as having. Any temptation to think that Blockhead does not have thoughts results from a sleight of hand with the notion of a lookup table. Suppose a normal human being seems to be able to play chess well; but that she produces her "chess-playing behaviour" by literally looking up responses in a table of moves, understanding nothing of what she is doing (suppose she does not even know that this movement of pieces on a board is a game). That fact about her really would undermine the attribution of the detailed attitudes about chess which her "chess-playing behaviour" would seem to manifest. But the "look-up table" in the Blockhead example is quite different; it is not something literally consulted at all. The fact that Blockhead's sub-personal organization is structurally isomorphic with a look-up table is irrelevant to the question whether, at the personal level, Blockhead has propositional attitudes.' (ii) 'The sort of system described is not a genuine possibility; the computational resources needed to calculate and operate a lookup table which would take us from all possible stimuli to appropriate responses, for each moment in a hundred-year lifetime, would be so fantastically huge that no physically possible system could embody such a table.' (iii) 'The criterion of interpretability needs to be supplemented by constraints on causal organization. In order to have propositional attitudes, a system must be in physically realized states which play the same causal roles in relation to inputs, outputs, and other internal states as are played by the corresponding propositional attitudes in a psychological story about that system. Blockhead's causal organization is not like that. And that explains the intuition that Blockhead does not really have thoughts.'82 That reply works 82 This is Peacocke's answer to his version of the Blockhead problem. A system like Blockhead does not have thoughts because '[t]here are no states of [the system] related as folk psychology takes belief, experience, memory, intention, and so forth to be related to one another' ((1983) p. 2.06).
§4. Thought and Interpretability: Sufficiency
45
only if we can accept the idea that an individual's psychology must be mirrored in detail at the level of internal physically realized states. But 1 think there are serious reasons for doubt about that idea. 83 (iv) 'We need to supplement the condition of interpretability with constraints on causal organization. But the only constraints we can offer have a purely negative form: there are certain sorts of causal organization which are enough to establish that a system organized in those ways does not have thoughts; but we are not (yet) in a position to give any positive characterization of the type of causal organization that a system must have if it is to count as a subject of thought.'84 (v) 'The criterion of interpretability must be supplemented by positive constraints on causal organization. But the constraints do not amount to the requirement of a full-blown isomorphism between an individual's physical make-up and its psychological makeup.' 1 agree that we can make some claims of a general nature about the causal organization of a rational agent, without commitment to full-blown isomorphism. (I suggest a claim of this sort about memory in Chapter 6 § 1.) But it is not at all clear to me that one could develop these general claims, in a way which would rule out Blockhead, without recourse to the sort of functionalism implicit in (iii) above. (vi) 'We have already seen one way in which a system's causal history is relevant to the question, whether it really has the thoughts it seems to have: since the contents of a system's beliefs are partially determined by the normal causes of beliefs of those types, the contents of its beliefs are inseparable from its causal history. Now that thought applies to Blockhead too: since his dispositions do not result from any pattern of causal interactions between him and the things and kinds he seems to be thinking about, he cannot correctly be interpreted as thinking about them. And there is another feature of Blockhead's causal history which also counts against the attribution of thoughts. The system which mediates Blockhead's "perceptual inputs" and "behavioural outputs" relies on information about which inputs would produce which outputs in some normal human being; so the way in which Blockhead's behaviour IS produced from his perceptual inputs is entirely parasitic on 83 84
See Ch. 2 §4. This is the position that Block recommends (see (1981) p. 43).
I.
Interpretationism
there being interpretable behaviour which results from perceptual inputs in some other way. For that reason, it could not be the case that all intentional behaviour was produced in the same way as Blockhead's; there must be (or have been) a subject whose perceptions and behaviour are mediated by something other than information about the normal correlations of perceptions and behaviour in other agents. And there is an intuition that a creature or machine whose information-processing system is necessarily parasitic in this way, and could not be present in the general case, could not count as having intentional properties.' I have described a number of responses to cases of the Blockhead type, and indicated some questions or difficulties about some of them. I do not at present have a fixed view about which of these responses is the best. But, in the absence of a firm decision between the options, I should say something about their implications for interpretationism. On one view, to supplement the interpretability criterion with any sort of constraint on causal organization would be to give up the essentials of interpretationism. For to do so would be to admit that there is more to being a subject of thought than simply having the capacity to do and say appropriate things in appropriate circumstances. I have the following comments. First, the inclusion of constraints on causal organization would indeed involve the repudiation of the purest form of interpretationism. But, as I am characterizing interpretationism, that is only one interpretationist position; and to move away from it is not to repudiate interpretationism altogether. We would only do that if we showed that there was thought which in its nature resisted interpretation; and the sorts of consideration we have been discussing do not suggest that. Second, and relate diy, even if we impose constraints on causal organization, the notion of interpretability is still playing a central role in our understanding of the conditions under which something is a subject of thought. For all we can say about what is in common to systems which have thoughts, but whose internal causal organization is different, is that they are all interpretable; interpretability remains a necessary condition for thought. And (as Block insists) it may be that the only positive thing we can say about the kind of causal organization a thinker must have is that it is a kind of organization which reliably produces behaviour on the basis of which a system is interpretable as having thoughts.
§ 5. Constitutive and N on-Constitutive
47
Third, suppose we accept that the question, whether S is a subject of thought, is answerable to general constraints on the form of S's causal organization; we do not thereby accept the idea that facts about S's thoughts are facts about her internal informationprocessing (a claim which really would have an anti-interpretationist flavour). I conclude that the sorts of supplement considered here are not at odds with either the letter or the spirit of interpretationism. A final point. Interpretationism aims to make it intelligible that an ordinary interpreter can, in favourable circumstances, tell what someone believes and desires. Is that aim fulfilled if we add supplements to the simple test of interpretability (or, alternatively, if we adopt a relatively demanding criterion of interpretability)? It would not be fulfilled if the supplementing conditions were such that an ordinary interpreter could have no way of knowing that a subject satisfied them. But the conditions I have been mentioning are not of that sort. For example, an ordinary observer can know enough about someone's history and background to know what the content-determining causes of her attitudes are: my way of telling is fallible, but I know enough about your past history to know that you have had the same sort of causal interactions as I have, and thus to know what you mean by such terms as 'cat', 'water', 'Lady Thatcher', and 'London'. Or again, if I am playing a game of chess by post, I may be fooled into thinking that my opponent is a person, when in fact it is simply a computer. But when I take my opponent to be a person, I do so on the assumption that it would behave in a range of other ways in other circumstances; and that assumption is one which it would be easy enough for me to test, given ordinary information of the sort that I do, ordinarily, have about other people. So to know that something has thoughts, and what its thoughts are, we need to know more about it than how it actually responds to various questions, or stimuli, on an occasion. But the additional information we need is information which is, or could be, available to the ordinary interpreter of others. 5. CONSTITUTIVE AND NON-CONSTITUTIVE INTERPRET ATIONISM
Does the notion of interpretability figure in a constitutive account of believing that p? Or is the relation between thought and
I.
Interpretationism
interpretability non-constitutive; so that, though believing that p and being interpretable as believing that p always go together, and are a priori related, the idea of interpretability is inessential to an appreciation of what belief is? (For the sake of simplicity I will assume, in this section, that interpretability is sufficient for thought. But the constitutive-non-constitutive contrast I develop works equally well if we are considering a more supplemented form of interpretationism.) Socrates discusses a partially parallel question in the Euthyphro. What is holy is what is loved by the gods. So we can say the following: (x)(x is loved by the gods if and only if x is holy). But there are two possibilities about the relation between x's being holy and its being loved by the gods: (i) x is holy because it is loved by the gods; (ii) the gods love x because it is holy. According to (i), being loved by the gods is constitutive of being holy. It is in virtue of satisfying the condition of being loved by the gods that a thing counts as being holy. So any account of the conditions for being holy must make reference to the fact that holy actions and people are loved by the gods. According to (ii), a thing's being holy is not constituted by its being loved by the gods. So we can give an account of the conditions something must satisfy to count as being holy without invoking the property of being loved by the gods; that is so, even if the 'account' says simply that holiness is a basic, unanalysable property.8S The debate between constitutive and non-constitutive forms of interpretationism is analogous. Constitutive interpretationism says that a statement of what it is for S to believe that p makes essential reference to the idea of S's being interpretable as believing that p. Non-constitutive interpretationism holds that an adequate account of what it is to believe that p will have the consequence that, whenever someone believes that p, they will be interpretable as believing that p. But a statement of what it is to believe that p makes no reference to the property of interpretability. For example, suppose we defined belief thus: for x to believe that p is for x to be disposed to behave as if p were true. 86 On that 85 Socrates' discussion is only partially parallel to the distinction I want to draw between constitutive and non-constitutive interpretationism. (i) above holds that being loved by the gods is prior to, and independent of, being holy. But what I am calling constitutive interpretationism need not think that being interpretable as believing that p has the same sort of priority over, and independence with respect to, believing that p. 86 See Braithwaite (1932-3).
§5. Constitutive and Non-Constitutive
49
account, what is constitutive of an agent's believing that p is her having a certain sort of behavioural disposition; interpretability as such is no part of the condition for belief. But since behavioural dispositions are open to public observation, the account has the consequence that anyone who believes that p will be interpretable as believing that p. The distinction between constitutive and non-constitutive interpretationism affects not just our understanding of what it is to have a particular belief, but also our understanding of the very general claims which interpretationists make about the character of belief. For example, both constitutive and non-constitutive versions will accept the following two claims: (I) Belief is in its nature veridical and rational. (11) An interpreter must so interpret as to find a subject's beliefs to be, by and large, true and rational. 87 But they disagree about the relation of these claims. The nonconstitutive interpretationist thinks that (I) is prior to (11): 'We can explain why beliefs are generally true and rational without reference to interpretation. The veridicality of belief might be explained, for example, by reference to the role of normal causes in determining the content of beliefs of a given type; the fact that belief is answerable to constraints of rationality might be explained by the fact that belief aims at truth and that the canons of rationality are the canons of truth-preservation. Given (I), an interpreter wishing to make accurate attributions must respect (11), and interpret so as to maximize her subjects' truth and rationality.' The constitutive interpretationist, by contrast, thinks that (11) is prior to (I): 'General truths about belief must be understood by reference to facts about interpretation. In this spirit we might say, for example, that belief is veridical because it is only by assuming veridicality that we can find a way into the circle of belief and meaning, as we must if we are to interpret others' beliefs. 88 Given 87
Some interpretationists would prefer different claims, for example:
(I') Belief is in its nature rational and intelligible in the circumstances.
(H') An interpreter must so interpret as to maximize rationality and minimize unintelligible falsehood. But the point I am making will apply whatever versions of these claims one prefers. 88 'From a formal point of view, the principle of charity helps solve the problem of the interaction of meaning and belief by restraining the degrees of freedom allowed belief while determining how to interpret words' (Davidson (1983) p. 3 16).
50
I.
Interpretationism
(11), and the constitutive status of interpretability, (I) simply follows; belief is in its nature true and rational.' This distinction, between what 1 am calling the constitutive and non-constitutive versions, raises an important issue about the character of interpretationism. But it is not an issue which interpretationists have addressed head on, and the positions of actual interpretationists often involve a mix of both constitutive and non-constitutive elements. Many formulations of interpretationism are neutral as between the two versions. So, for example, suppose we hold that (x)(x believes that p iff x can be predictively attributed the belief that p).89 That is equally acceptable to the constitutive interpretationist (who reads the right-hand side as the condition which must be satisfied if the left-hand side is to be true) and to the nonconstitutive interpretationist (who reads the left-hand side as explaining the truth of the right-hand side). Similarly, the slogan, 'what we could not interpret is not thought', is acceptable by either sort of interpretationist. With some of Dennett's formulations, however, we seem to have a view which is firmly in the constitutive camp. For example, he writes: 'What it is to be a true believer is to be an intentional system, a system whose behaviour is reliably and voluminously predictable via the intentional strategy.'90 The 'what it is' in that claim suggests that he is offering a constitutive account of belief. But Dennett offers other statements of his position which make no reference at all to the idea of interpretability or predictability. For example: 'I am claiming ... that folk psychology can best be viewed as a sort of logical behaviourism: what it means to say that someone believes that p, is that that person is disposed to behave in certain ways under certain conditions. What ways under what conditions? The ways it would be rational to behave, given the person's other beliefs and desires.'91 That specification of what it is to believe that p makes no reference to interpretability, or to explicability via the intentional strategy. What are we to make of the apparent conflict? One possibility would be that there is a tension in Dennett between constitutive and non-constitutive elements. But 1 am fairly sure that even what 89 90
For this formulation, see Dennett (1981) p. 67. Dennett (1979) p. IS. 91 Dennett (1981) p. So.
§5. Constitutive and Non-Constitutive
51
look like his statements of constitutive interpretationism, when fleshed out, are actually expressions of a non-constitutive position. Dennett insists that 'all there is' to being an intentional system is being a system whose behaviour is reliably predictable via the intentional strategy. As I said, that sounds like a constitutive formulation. But he goes on to provide the resources to understand this idea in terms which make no reference at all to interpretability. The behaviour of a system will be predictable via the intentional strategy if it can be predicted by the method of attributing beliefs, desires, and rational acumen according to the following rough and ready principles: [its] beliefs are those it ought to have, given its perceptual capacities, its epistemic needs, and its biography .... [its] desires are those it ought to have, given its biological needs and the most practicable means of satisfying them .... [and its behaviour] consist[s] of those acts that it would be rational for an agent with those beliefs and desires to perform. 92
With that explanation of what is required for a system's behaviour to be predictable via the intentional strategy, we can give the following account of what it is to be a subject of propositional attitudes: 'What it is to be a true believer is to be an intentional system, a system which behaves in a way that would be rational for an agent which had the beliefs and desires that system ought to have in the light of its circumstances and needs.' And that account makes no reference to the idea of predictability or interpretability. (Of course, we can only spell out what behaviour would be rational for a given agent if we use the notions of reason and rationality. So to say that Dennett's account of what it is to be an intentional system does not ultimately rely on the idea of intentional stance predictability is not to say that he offers a reduction of the notion of a rational agent to something non-intentionaP3) Ibid. 49. Dennert in fact goes on to offer an explanation of the notion of behaving rationally in evolutionary terms: the beliefs and desires a creature ought to have are those it 'would have if it were ideally ensconced in its environmental niche' ((1981) p. 49). (This explanation, incidentally, seems quite implausible: there is no reason to think that what is rational and what promotes survival need coincide; and even if they did, that would be a coincidence between two different sorts of consideration.) That confirms my point, that the concept of interpretability, or intentional stance predictability, is dispensable from the overall picture. But the point stands even without this further element in Dennert's theory. 92
93
I.
Interpretationism
To motivate a constitutive position we would need to show that an account of what it is to possess beliefs must mention the role of belief in interpretation. One proposal, therefore, would be that a version of interpretationism will be constitutive if it sees belief as a construct in a theory for predicting and explaining behaviour. But in fact that idea is still not enough to give us constitutive interpretationism. And Dennett's case shows why. He proposes that the concepts of belief and desire are constructs in a theory for predicting and explaining behaviour, a theory of interpretation. But, as we have seen, it turns out that, in saying what conditions S must satisfy to count as having particular beliefs, we need not mention interpretability at all. And consider functionalism more generally. According to the functionalist, when we talk of propositional attitudes, we are operating with a primitive theory for predicting and explaining behaviour. We can in principle give an explicit statement of that simple theory; and from the statement of the theory, we can derive definitions of the concepts of belief, desire, and the rest. The theory concerns relations amongst perceptions, attitudes, and behaviour; that something satisfies the definitions derived from the theory, and therefore has given beliefs and desires, is simply a matter of its perceptions and behaviour being arranged in particular ways, of their exhibiting particular patterns. The fact that the theory which implicitly defines the notions of belief and desire is a theory for predicting and explaining behaviour, a theory we use in interpreting others, does not mean that the ideas of interpretability, predictability, or explicability play any role in saying what it is for a system to have a belief or desire. (Similarly, we could regard the concept of mass as being implicitly defined by its place in a theory for predicting and explaining the behaviour of physical things. But that does not mean that an account of what it is for something to have a given mass must mention the concept of predictability or explicability.) What, then, would be a genuinely constitutive form of interpretationism? We have already seen an argument which insists that belief must be understood in the context of communication and mutual interpretation-Davidson's argument that possession of beliefs requires mastery of the subjective-objective contrast, that that could arise only in the context of interpreting others, and therefore that a creature has beliefs only if it is in communication with others. If that argument succeeds, we cannot explain what it
§5. Constitutive and Non-Constitutive
53
is to believe that p without invoking the idea of interpretation. So the position motivated by the Davidsonian argument really would be a constitutive interpretationism: it is an account of thought which essentially involves the concept of interpretation. As we have seen, there are difficulties with the argument: at the very least, it needs to be supplemented by further arguments to answer the critic who thinks that grasp of the subjective-objective distinction would be available to a sufficiently sophisticated individual which reflected on its past and future, or conceived of the course of its experience as being jointly causally explained by its position in the world and objective states of affairs. But something like this argument will be needed if the idea of interpretability is to figure in a genuinely constitutive account of thought. I conclude this section by considering three related charges of circularity, or self-defeatingness, which might be brought against the constitutive interpretationist. (i) 'According to constitutive interpretationism, we have the mental properties we do in virtue of being interpretable as having them. S believes that p, for example, in virtue of being interpretable as believing that p. Now there is a general requirement that, if B obtains in virtue of A, A must be prior to, and in some sense more basic than, B. That condition is satisfied when we say that x is holy in virtue of being loved by the gods; there is no special difficulty in holding that the property of being loved by the gods is prior to the property of being holy. But the parallel priority thesis for interpretationism is not straightforward: "Being interpretable as believing that p" mentions the property of believing that p; and, more generally, interpretability is not explicable without reference to the properties people are interpretable as having. So how could interpretability be prior to belief, and the rest, as it would have to be for the "in virtue of" claims to go through?' (ii) 'Interpretationism analyses thought in terms of interpretability. Now to interpret S as being is itself to have a propositional attitude about S. So interpretationism is explaining what it is for S to have an attitude in terms of an interpreter's having an attitude about S. But now we can ask what it is for the interpreter to have that attitude. And clearly there will be a vicious regress.' (iii) 'According to interpretationism, a rational agent is a creature whose behaviour is reliably predictable from the intentional stance. To understand what that condition comes to, we need to understand the notion of intentional stance
54
I.
Interpretationism
prediction. And as we have seen, an explanation of intentional stance prediction will make claims such as the following: to operate the intentional stance, "treat the object whose behaviour is to be predicted as a rational agent" .94 But that explanation of intentional stance predictability itself employs the concept of a rational agent; it says that a creature is intentional stance predictable if it behaves like a rational agent. So the idea of a rational agent explains, rather than being explanatorily dependent on, the idea of intentional stance predictability; which means that the attempt to explain the concept of rational agency in terms of intentional stance predictability is self-defeating.' One response to these objections would be to concede the points, and accept that interpretationism cannot provide a constitutive account of thought. That would not involve the rejection of interpretationism altogether; but it would mean accepting a less ambitious form. A second response would be to distinguish between different notions of priority, and thereby remove the threat of circularity. One might, for example, say that the concept of being interpretable as believing that p is definitionally prior to the concept of believing that p (i.e. the concept of believing that p can be illuminatingly defined in terms of the concept of being interpretable as believing that p), but that the concept of believing that p is cognitively prior to the concept of being interpretable as believing that p (i.e. no one could possess the second concept without possessing the first).95 But I think that the constitutive interpretationist should give a third response-a no-priority view. When the constitutive interpretationist says that a constitutive account of thought must involve the idea of interpretation, she is not intending to give analyses of mental concepts in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions about interpretability, conditions which are intelligible independently of the mental concepts being 'analysed'. The constitutive interpretationist's point is just that an account of what it is to believe that p must involve the idea of interpretation and interpretability.96 The concept of being Dennett (1979) p. 17. For these notions of definitional and cognitive priority, see Peacocke (1983) pp. 30 ,42.. 96 That is why it is misleading to think of constitutive interpretationism as the view that S believes that p in virtue of being interpretable as believing that p (see n. 85 above). 94 95
§ 5. Constitutive and Non-Constitutive
55 interpretable as being is not intelligible in advance of the concept of being <1>; but (if the argument for constitutive interpretationism is right) the concept of being is not intelligible without reference to the concept of being interpretable as being <1>, either. With that in mind consider, for example, the idea that an interpretationist account of what it is to be a rational agent will be self-defeating, since it depends on a prior (and non-interpretationist) account of rational agency. If the constitutive interpretationist is right, there simply is no conception of rational agenthood which is explanatorily prior to the interpretationist's account of an agent as a creature which interprets and is interpreted by others; the idea of a rational agent and the idea of rational intelligibility arise together, and arise essentially in the context of communication and interpretation. My own feeling is that there is something appealing about the constitutive interpretationist's position, but that none of the arguments we have seen does enough to establish it; we have yet to see an argument which shows that the concept of belief could not be understood except by reference to the concepts of interpretation and interpretability. So there remains an issue, and an important one, between the constitutive and non-constitutive positions. For present purposes, though, what matters is the necessity claim, the claim that thought is in its nature interpretable. As long as that is true-and I have argued that it is-we can approach questions about the nature of thought by considering interpretation. If constitutive interpretationism is true, then we can approach those questions only by considering interpretation. But we can adopt the interpretationist perspective without having to take a stand on that question.
2
Anomalism, Rationality, and Psychophysical Relations I F our account of the propositional attitudes is shaped by interpretationism, what follows about the general character of (that part of) the mental, and about the relations between the mental and the physical? Interpretationism has been associated with the thesis of the anomalism of the mental, with the denial of psychophysical laws, and with various claims about the indeterminacy of mental properties. And it has often been thought that those features of the interpretationist view would constitute at least a prima-facie obstacle to a causal understanding of the mind. So we need to see how interpretationism gives rise to ideas about anomalism and the rest, and what those ideas actually amount to. I am particularly interested in three questions. First, what is the argument for the anomalism of the mental, for the non-existence of any system of 'strict laws ... on the basis of which we can predict and explain mental phenomena,?l Second, what are the implications of the doctrine of the anomalism of the mental for the thesis that mental properties are determined by, or supervene on, physical properties? And third, what are the implications of anomalism for the possibility of effecting detailed correlations between particular mental and physical phenomena?
I.
THE ARGUMENT FOR ANOMALISM
Davidson, famously, offers an ambitious argument against the possibility of psychophysical laws. The broad structure of that argument is this. Rationality is 'constitutive of the range of applications of such concepts as those of belief, desire, intention and action'. But '[p ]hysical concepts have different constitutive elements'. 1
Davidson (I97oa) p.
224.
§ I. The Argument far Anamalism
57
So, '[s]tanding ready, as we must, to adjust psychological terms to one set of standards and physical terms to another, we know that we cannot insist on a sharp and law-like connection between them'.2 Spelling out that structure a little gives us the following. The possession of propositional attitudes is governed by normative constraints of 'coherence, rationality, and consistency,;3 in determining what attitudes an agent has, we must consider such matters as what it would be rational for her to believe, what she has good reasons to want and to do, and what beliefs she can coherently combine. But these constraints of rationality and the rest cannot 'be stated in a purely physical vocabulary',4 they 'have no echo in physical theory'.5 So no purely physical characterization of S, no matter how complicated or comprehensive, can yield a characterization of what it would be rational for her to believe, desire, or do in those circumstances; and thus, given the constitutive role of rationality, no purely physical characterization can yield a characterization of the mental properties she has in those circumstances. And that is enough to show that there cannot be laws relating the mental and the physical. That makes the argument clearer. But there are still a number of questions. What does it mean to say that the norms of rationality have no echo in physical theory, and what is the basis for the claim? What sorts of psychophysical relations does that fact about rationality rule out? And what is the status of the argument; is it, for example, a proof of the impossibility of psychophysical laws? As a preliminary, it is important to appreciate how much is built into the notion of rationality which the argument deploys. When we interpret a subject, we strive to make sense of her; in doing so, we are considering the question, 'What, rationally, should someone think and do in these circumstances?' Absolutely everything that goes into answering that question is included in the idea of rationality. So, rationality includes everything relevant to saying 'what constitutes a good argument, a valid inference, a rational plan, or a good reason for acting', 6 and everything relevant to the application of those notions to the particular case; it includes 2 Davidson (I974a) p. 239. The quotations in the two previous sentences are 3 Ibid. 231. from the same article (pp. 237, 239). 4 Davidson (I973 a ) p. 259. 5 Davidson (I97¥) p. 231. 6 Davidson (I974b) p. 241.
2.
Anomalism and Rationality
practical rationality, not just theoretical rationality; it involves inductive as well as deductive rationality; and considerations about rationality are relevant, too, in assessing how a belief and desire must cause an action that they explain. 7 Turning to the first question I raised above; what does it mean to say that the norms of rationality have no echo in physical theory? The idea is that the constraints imposed on a set of propositional attitudes by the criteria of rationality could not be exactly mirrored by the constraints imposed on a system of physical states by physical laws and principles. What supports that idea is a thesis about the character of rationality-the thesis that rationality is uncodifiable. We can explain the thesis, in the first instance, for practical rationality. The virtuous person is someone who knows what one ought tu do, what practical rationality requires (or, perhaps more plausibly, someone who knows what one may do, what practical rationality permits). Now, as John McDowell says, it is natural to think that 'the virtuous person's views about how, in general, one should behave are susceptible of codification, in principles', 8 from which, given a description of any set of particular circumstances, we can deductively derive a specification of what to do in that situation. But though the picture may be natural, McDowell insists, it is wrong: to an unprejudiced eye it should seem quite implausible that any reasonably adult moral outlook admits of any such codification. As Aristotle consistently says, the best generalizations about how one should behave hold only for the most part. If one attempted to reduce one's conception of what virtue requires to a set of rules, then, however subtle and thoughtful one was in drawing up the code, cases would inevitably turn up in which a mechanical application of the rules would strike one as wrong-and not necessarily because one had changed one's mind; rather, one's mind on the matter was not susceptible of capture in any universal formula. 9
The point McDowell makes about practical rationality extends (as he stresses) to rationality in general: there is no fixed_setof 7 For this last point, about the role of rationality in distinguishing deviant from non-deviant causal chains, see Davidson (1974a) p. 233 and (1973b) p. 79. 8 McDowell (1979) p. 33 6. 9 Ibid. See also Wiggins (1975-6) passim. For a splendid statement of the same theme, see the last paragraph of Book 7 Chapter 2 ('St Ogg's Passes Judgement') of George Eliot's The Mill on the Floss. (Dancy draws attention to the same passage ((1993) pp. 70-1).)
§ I. The Argument far Anamalism
59
rules ar principles from which, together with a statement of the circumstances of any particular case, we could deductively derive a complete, detailed specification of what one ought to do or think in that case. Since the norms of rationality are the principles governing the interpretation of a subject's words and attitudes, we could express the same point about the uncodifiability of rationality as a point about interpretation: there is no definite set of rules or principles for arriving at the best interpretation of an agent. When we interpret others, we strive to make sense of them: in doing so we draw on our own conception of rationality to form judgements in each particular case; and we can draw on those resources without limit. So, in describing and applying our conception of rationality, there is no stage at which we can say that the canons of rationality have been exhaustively enumerated, that there is nothing more to add. IQ To say that rationality is uncodifiable is not necessarily to say that there can be absolutely no true, exceptionless principles of rationality. But if there are any such principles, they will not be such as to deliver a detailed answer to every question (or, more ambitiously, to any question) of the form, 'What should I do, or believe, in these circumstances?' Consider two suggestions about what might qualify as a universal principle of theoretical rationality: (a) 'If you believe that (p ~ q) and that p, then you should believe that q'; and (b) 'Always believe what you have best reason to believe.' These are true and exceptionless. But they do not threaten the thesis of uncodifiability for they fall far short of supplying a complete, detailed specification of what one ought to believe on an occasion. (a) does not tell us in detail what we should believe; for, when faced with that principle in an actual situation in which one believes that p and that (p ~ q), different responses are possible: one might come to believe that q; but equally, if one 10 Some evidence of the thesis of uncodifiability in Davidson. About rationality in general: '[rlationality is ... a normative notion which by its nature resists regimentation in accord with a single public standard' ((1985) p. 245). And about the principles governing interpretation: 'there are no rules for arriving at [the best theory of S's language at tl, no rules in any strict sense, as opposed to rough maxims and methodological generalities' ((1986) p. 446). In a longer treatment of this topic, I would develop the obvious parallels with Wittgenstein. For the present, I refer the reader to just one passage-Wittgenstein (1958a) p. 227 para. h-for a nice statement of the uncodifiability of a certain sort of knowledge in commonsense psychology.
60
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had independent reasons for thinking that q was not true, one might drop one's prior belief that p, or that (p ~ q). A principle like (a), by itself, does not determine what one ought to believe, all things considered. And (b) gains its exceptionlessness at the price of emptiness. A codification of rationality would have to spell out, in detail, exactly what there is best reason to believe in a particular situation; (b) is silent on that question. If we accept that rationality is uncodifiable, and thus that the norms of rationality have no echo in physical theory, what follows? First, that there is no set of general principles from which, together with a specification of any agent's physical properties, we can derive a complete and detailed specification of her mental properties. If rationality is uncodifiable, there is no system of principles from which we could derive, given a specification of an agent's physical properties, a statement of what it would be rational for her to believe, desire, and do. If there are no such principles for deriving a statement of what would be rational for S, there are no such principles for deriving a statement of which attributions of mental properties make best sense of S; and if there are no principles for deriving that, there are no principles for deductively deriving a specification of S's mental properties. Second, it follows from the uncodifiability of rationality that there can be no system of strict laws on the basis of which actions and other mental phenomena could be exactly predicted and explained. We could not give detailed predictions and explanations of every mental phenomenon by appeal to purely psychological laws, laws mentioning only mental states and events: for one thing, there are mental states and events which have non-mental causes; and those states and events could not be predicted or explained by appeal to purely psychological laws. ll So if there were a system of strict laws for predicting and explaining mental phenomena, they would have to relate the mental to the physical; they would have to be (or include) psychophysical laws. But given what has been said already, there could be no such system. There could be (and, we suppose, there is) a system of physical principles by reference to which it could be determined what sort of movement would result from any given physical impact on a particular human 11 Cf. Davidson (1974b) p. 241: 'psychological events and states often have causes that have no natural psychological descriptions.'
§ I. The Argument for Anomalism
6I
being. But there could not be a system of principles by reference to which it could be determined what action, if any, each such movement would be; that is a matter which requires the direct application of the uncodifiable norms of rationality to each particular case. It is important to be clear about what the argument from uncodifiability is supposed to rule out. The conclusion of the argument is that there is no system of 'strict laws ... on the basis of which we can predict and explain mental phenomena,/2 that it is impossible, even in principle, 'to explain and predict human behaviour with the kind of precision that is possible in principle for physical phenomena'Y The point, then, is that there is a kind of systematic and precise explanation which is characteristic of the physical sciences, but which is in principle impossible for propositional attitude psychology. In the physical case, there is a vocabulary, and a system of general, quantitative laws, such that the occurrence (or the chance) of any event at all could in principle be precisely predicted or explained by describing things in that vocabulary and applying those laws. (The parenthesis provides for the possibility of an irreducibly probabilistic element in physical theory.) Or, if you prefer: the occurrence (or the chance) of any event is precisely determined by the physical character of its antecedents, in accordance with laws which make up a general, quantitative system. And it is a crucial part of this picture that there is a system of laws. There are not separate, one-off laws for each situation, determining the occurrence (or the chance) of each event from its antecedent conditions. Rather, there is a finite set of laws; and the occurrence (or the chance) of any event is determined given the values of all variables mentioned in the laws. 14 Davidson (197oa ) p. 2.2.4. \3 Davidson (197411) p. 2.30. The picture given in this paragraph is summed up in the following claim of Davidson's: 'Physical theory promises to provide a comprehensive closed system guaranteed to yield a standardized, unique description of every physical event couched in a vocabulary amenable to law' ((197oa) pp. 2.2.3-4)' (Note also his claims about the character of physical laws: they are' "closed" in the sense of requiring no ceteris paribus clauses'; they 'may have provisos limiting [their] application [but they must allow] ... us to determine in advance whether or not the conditions of application are satisfied'. And they 'come as close to allowing the unconditional prediction of the event in question as the perhaps irreducibly probabilistic character of physics allows.' (The first and third quotations are from his (1987a) p. 44; the second from (197411) p. 2.33.)) 12 14
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The conclusion of Davidson's argument is that propositional attitude psychology 'cannot be, or be incorporated in, a closed science,15 of the form I have just described. In other words, there is no system of general, quantitative laws by reference to which any mentally characterized event at all could be precisely predicted or explained, given its antecedents. Notice, therefore, that the argument does not rule out absolutely everything that someone might call a psychophysical law. For example, someone might say it is a law that if x has beliefs, then x has a brain with physical properties of a certain sort: that is a true, universal generalization (she might say), which is supported by its instances and supports counterfactuals. But the existence of the law 'If x has beliefs, x has a brain with such-and-such physical properties' is quite compatible with the conclusion of the argument. For a crude law of that sort is not part of a system of laws which would permit the precise prediction and explanation of particular mental phenomena. It is sometimes thought that, if this is what the anomalism of the mental amounts to, then it is a less interesting thesis than we had been led to believe. One reason for thinking this is the idea that what has been said about propositional attitude psychology could equally be said of any area at all, with the exception of fundamental physics. For in any 'special science' the laws make essential use of ceteris paribus clauses; they apply only in 'normal conditions' (where which conditions are normal cannot be nonquestion-beggingly specified in the vocabulary of the science itself). But this is not a point against the argument. The argument does not simply observe that the generalizations of psychology involve ceteris paribus clauses, and give that as a reason for saying that there could not be, in psychology, strict laws of the sort to which physics aspires. It also says that there is a principled reason for thinking that that feature of psychology could not be eliminated without changing the subject-'deciding not to accept the criterion of the mental in terms of the vocabulary of the propositional attitudes':16 namely, the constitutive role of rationality and the uncodifiability of rationality. Now there may be arguments to show that the absence of a system of strict laws is, equally, an ineliminable feature of other special sciencesY But if there is, the Davidson (1974b) p. 241. 16 Davidson (1970a) p. 216. This, incidentally, is something which Davidson has always allowed (see (1974b) pp. 240-1 and, for a more recent statement, (1987a) p. 45). 15
17
§ I. The Argument for Anomalism argument needs to be given. Without such an argument, there remains a disanalogy between, on the one hand, psychology (and the social sciences which make essential use of propositional attitude concepts) and, on the other, the non-psychological special sciences. And even if there are parallel arguments for the nonpsychological cases, they must be very different arguments; for in geology or biology, for example, there is no question of finding the objects of our descriptions to be rational. A different reason for thinking that anomalism, as defined above, is not a distinctive feature of the mental is that even in physics there is no system of strict laws of the sort I described: it is not just that the laws of physics are irreducibly probabilistic (which the argument allows) but that the very idea of a finite system of general, quantitative laws which would in principle allow the exact prediction and explanation of every event (or its chance) gives a false picture of physics; it may capture the Newtonian ideal, but it is not an accurate picture of post-Newtonian physics. We can make a number of points in response to that argument. First, even if the laws of physics fall short of the ideal I have described, they come so much closer to it than any set of psychophysical or psychological principles could that the claim that there is a qualitative distinction between the two survives intact. IS Second, even if physics cannot in fact provide a system of strict laws, it makes sense to make the search for such a system a regulative ideal in the physical sciences; but, given the argument about rationality, that makes no sense in psychology. Third, and relatedly, whatever the actual character of physics, there are sciences of matter which aim at explanations in terms of strict law; and the point of the argument about rationality is that explanations in psychology could not be like that. So, when we talk about the sorts of relation we can expect between the mental and 'the physical', we can be happy to allow that' "the physical" [does] no more than point to the subject matter of those sciences which aim at explanations of [a certain sort)'; namely, 'explanation[s] in which one makes things intelligible by representing their coming into being as a particular instance of how things generally tend to happen'.19 Finally, whatever lack of system there is in moving 18 19
Davidson makes this claim ((I987a) p. 45). McDowell (1985) pp. 390, 389.
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Anomalism and Rationality
from a characterization of x's physical properties at t to a characterization of its physical properties at t', it must be less than the lack of system involved in moving from x's physical properties at t to its mental properties at t'. For in the mental case the transition will involve all the lack of system characteristic of physical theory (in moving from physical properties at t to physical properties at t') and more besides (in moving from physical properties at t' to mental properties at t,).20 Everything that I have said thus far depends on the key claim that the norms of rationality are uncodifiable. But what can be said against the possibility of producing such a codification? As far as I know, everyone who makes the claim agrees that the uncodifiability of rationality is not susceptible of proof. 21 There are two (complementary) ways of proceeding from there. The more modest route is to make an entirely negative case: rather than giving reasons for thinking that rationality is not codifiable, we simply challenge our opponent to give reasons for thinking that it is. We place the onus on the reductionist to say why we should think that a codification is possible; and we stand ready to show, case by case, why each purported regimentation of rationality falls short of what is required. This approach is strengthened if we can explain why philosophers might think that such a codification had to exist, and show that those motivations are not compelling. For example, one motivation for thinking that rationality had to be codifiable would be removed if we could show that considerations which are not codifiable need be no less objective than considerations which are. Another motivation would be removed if we could show how a grasp of rationality can constitute knowledge even if rationality is uncodifiable. Those two points would help to disarm a third worry, by helping to show that something can count as an exercise of reason without 20 Cf. Davidson: 'Let us agree that psychophysical laws incorporate the indeterminism of quantum physics. If I am right, there will be a further indeterminism over and above the ubiquitous physical indeterminism, an indeterminism due to the nature of the propositional attitudes' ((1985) p. 248). 21 See e.g. Davidson: 'nothing I can say about the irreducibility of rationality deserves to be called a proof' ((1970a) p. 215). McDowell (1985) observes that, for some areas of rationality, it is plausible that the Davidsonian claim is susceptible of proof (p. 388); but insists that, for rationality in general, 'proof is [not] in question' (p. 391).
§ I. The Argument for Anomalism
involving the application of a set of codifiable considerations. 22 And a fourth motivation would be removed if we could show how rational explanation can be a variety of causal explanation even though the principles of rationality do not form a system of causal laws.23 The more ambitious route would be to give positive reasons for thinking that there could be no codification of rationality. There are positive reasons of two sorts. First, there are considerations which make it reasonable to believe that rationality is uncodifiable without explaining why it is. For example, one might argue induotively in the following way: human beings have sought codifications of rationality for centuries, as they have sought codifications in the physical sciences; but whereas there has been some measure of success in the physical sciences, no effort at the codification of rationality even begins to look successful; so it is reasonable to believe that there is no codification to be found. That argument has some force. But it would be more satisfying to identify the features of rationality which rule out any codification, and thereby explain what makes rationality uncodifiable. And I think we can say something of this sort. The characteristic question we face in practical rationality is, 'What should I do in this particular set of circumstances?'; the characteristic question of theoretical rationality is, 'Is p (probably) true?' The structure of the reasoning involved is parallel: 24 in the practical case, we must decide what to do in the light of numerous judgements about the desirability of an action relative to certain features (e.g. -ing is desirable in so far as it would be kind and undesirable in so far as it would be dishonest); in the theoretical case, we make an overall probability judgement in the light of various judgements of probability relative to given evidence (e.g. it is likely to rain tomorrow in so far as the barometer is falling, and unlikely to rain in so far as there is a red sky tonight). In neither case is there a fixed weighting or ordering of the competing considerations, or any definite rule for comparing them; our 22 For these points, see McDowell (1979) especially §4. For analogous points about aesthetics, see Mothersill (1983), especially pp. 100 and 117; and about the philosophy of science, see Newton-Smith (1981), pp. 115-16 and Ch. IX §9. 2J See McDowell (1985) and Davidson (1976). 24 See Davidson (1970b) pp. 37-8.
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conclusions may be guided by principles and rules of thumb, but they are not dictated by them. There is, in sum, no question of reaching a practical decision, or an overall probability judgement, deductively. Now someone might say that the fact that we do not reach our conclusions deductively does not show that they could not be reached deductively. But that point can be addressed in both practical and theoretical cases. In the case of practical rationality, it counts against the possibility of codification that, in a situation of choice, '[t]here is nothing a person is under antecedent sentence to maximize,;25 practical reasoning is not a matter of reasoning about the means to a set of predetermined ends, for it is not fixed in advance what the governing aim of a decision must be. Furthermore, we cannot 'treat the concerns an agent brings to any situation as forming a closed, complete, consistent system. For it is of the essence of these concerns to make competing, inconsistent claims. ,26 Practical reasoning often involves the weighing of different and conflicting values or concerns. It is very plausible that these really are different values, so that there is no question of resolving such conflicts by simple measurement of quantities of a single commodity; and it is also plausible that there is no fixed ordering of the conflicting values or concerns. In the case of both theoretical and practical rationality we can learn from discussions in the philosophy of science. Kuhn and Feyerabend have argued that there are no codifiable rules for judging between different scientific paradigms, or assessing different theories: 'paradigm change cannot be justified by proof.>27 And many of the considerations which they and others apply to choices between paradigms or scientific theories can be applied also to choices between beliefs or courses of action. 2s One key idea involves the application to this case of an idea I have just mentioned in the case of practical rationality-the idea that decisions about what is rational are governed by a number of Wiggins (1975- 6) p. 231. 26 Ibid. 27 Kuhn (1970) p. 15 2. We can apply those considerations without needing to accept either the idea that different scientific theories are incommensurable (which is one of Kuhn's and Feyerabend's more extreme reasons for denying the existence of a codifiable scientific method) or the idea that the non-existence of a codifiable method for assessing competing theories leaves only relativism and irrationalism. 2S
28
§r. The Argument for Anomalism different and potentially conflicting values. Thus, Kuhn argues that the comparison of different theories involves such 'scientific values' as accuracy, consistency, broadness of scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness-which together constitute 'the shared basis for theory choice'.29 But the assessment of the relative merits of two theories cannot be a matter of the mechanical application of these values; for judgement is essentially involved in determining, for example, what counts as a simpler or more fruitful theory; and judgement is involved in assessing what weight to give the different criteria when they conflict. 30 Or again, 'since no paradigm ever solves all the problems it defines and since no two paradigms leave all the same problems unsolved, paradigm debates always involve the question: Which problems is it more significant to have solved?'3! And that question, too, essentially involves a judgement which cannot be determined by any rule or method. 32 Philosophers more realistic than Kuhn or Feyerabend must still accept much of. what they say about the comparison and assessment of different theories. For realists, for example, a choice between theories will often involve an inference to the best explanation; in assessing what counts as the best explanation, we cannot avoid considerations of simplicity, elegance, fruitfulness, and so on; and those are precisely the sort of consideration whose uncodifiability Kuhn and Feyerabend have done much to convince us of.33 (Someone might think that, if the argument for the anomalism of the mental succeeds, then there must be a parallel argument from the uncodifiability of scientific method to the impossibility of strict laws in the physical sciences; and that would mean that we would lose the sense of a disanalogy between the mental and the physical. But the thought would be mistaken. The fact that the standards for choosing between theories are not codifiable does not mean that, within any particular theory, there cannot be strict exceptionless laws by reference to which physical events can be precisely predicted and explained. It is the analogue of this latter claim which is being made in the mental case.) In considering the case for the uncodifiability of rationality, we Kuhn (1977) p. 322. 30 See ibid. 324-5. 31 Kuhn (1970) p. IIO. For similar themes in Feyerabend, see e.g. his (1978) pp. 178-80. 33 For a discussion of inference to the best explanation, see Lipton (1991); and for a realist and rationalist insistence on the importance of uncodifiable judgement in theory-choice, see Newton-Smith (1981) Ch. IX §9. 29
32
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can also learn from the case for saying that the aesthetic is uncodifiable-that verdicts about beauty, elegance, aptness, and so on are not reachable as deductive consequences of a set of aesthetic principles. 34 For some of the considerations we apply to choices between theories and explanations (elegance, simplicity, and so on) are themselves aesthetic; and, of course, practical reason may directly involve aesthetic considerations. One feature in particular of the aesthetic case is worth bringing out. In determining whether or not an aesthetic work is good (beautiful, elegant, etc.), absolutely every feature of it is relevant; we cannot rest a judgement of beauty on some subset of its characteristics; such a judgement could always be defeated by its other characteristics. The result of that is that the only way of getting a true general principle of taste is to build in all the details of a particular case. But principles of that form simply sum up the results of aesthetic judgement in a particular case; they do not form a system which we could use to derive a verdict about each new case; so they do not provide the resources for a codification of the aesthetic. The same point applies directly to rationality. The only way to make 'If <1>, then you should believe that p' unconditionally true, with no ceteris paribus clauses, is to build into '' absolutely every feature of a particular case in which it is, all things considered, rational to believe that p; if is anything less, the principle will not hold with complete generality. But principles like that are not the materials for a codification of rationality; they are the results of applying the uncodifiable norms of rationality to the details of a particular case. These considerations may not convince the sceptic. But perhaps they will be enough to persuade the neutral observer to agree to put the onus on the person who thinks there must be a codification of rationality. 2.
PSYCHOLOGICAL INDETERMINACY AND PSYCHOPHYSICAL DETERMINA nON
If there are no strict psychophysical laws, it is natural to think that there must be some sense in which the mental facts are not 34 See Mothersill (1983) for an extended defence of the view that 'there are no principles of taste' (p. 85), and a fortiori no 'recipe that would guarantee [aesthetic) success' (p. 123). (Mothersill herself notes (p. 108) the analogy between her claim that there are no laws of taste and Davidson's claim ((197¥) p. 233) that there are no 'serious laws connecting reasons and actions').
§z. Indeterminacy and Determination determined by the physical; at any rate, it follows directly that they are not determined by the physical in accordance with a system of laws. But does this anomalism mean that the mental facts are not determined by the physical facts at all? And how do these issues about the determination of mental by physical relate to issues about the determinacy (or indeterminacy) of the mental? We can distinguish three grades or varieties of indeterminacy. The first is -manifested in the fact that we cannot always accurately characterize a person's mental properties by ascribing full-blown propositional attitudes, or by the outright attribution of conceptual abilities; there are borderline cases, indefiniteness, and vagueness. One reason for this is the context-dependence of mental descriptions. An interpretation of a piece of behaviour is answerable not just to what the agent says and does at that moment, but to the wider context in which it occurs: what else she says and does, what abilities and capacities she has, the nature of her natural and social environment, and so on; so what would in one context be a case of cD-ing would not be so in another. 35 Now there will be indefiniteness, and borderline cases, when we consider the question, whether or not the context is sufficient to justify a particular mental characterization. For example, take the question, 'Does S understand the word w?' There will be some cases where there are determinate answers; but there will also be vague and indefinite cases. Consider, for instance, someone who is learning a new concept; for example, a child who is learning to use the word 'sister', and who has reached a stage where she knows that 'sister' applies to her own sisters, but does not realize that someone can be a sister without being a sister of hers. Suppose she says, 'Katy is my sister.' We cannot simply report her attitudes by saying, for example, 'Jo believes that Katy is her sister', or 'Jo has no idea about whether or not Katy is her sister'. What we should do is to describe the case in detail, as I have just done, in a way which makes it clear what is going on, without insisting on a choice between two precise descriptions. 36 In this case, the vagueness arises in the acquisition of a new concept or ability. There will be a parallel vagueness in descriptions of someone who is gradually 35
This context-dependence is a major theme of Wittgenstein's (see (1958a)
passim). See also the anti-individualist writings of Evans (especially (1982)), Putnam
(e.g. (1975a)) and Burge (e.g. (1979) and (1986a)). 36 A similar idea is developed by Dan Sperber ( (1985) pp. 49-53).
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losing concepts or abilities. 37 And similar issues arise when we consider the contents of thought; consider the vagueness implicit in talk about the 'normal' cause of thoughts of a given type. In these cases, the physical facts do not determine a set of definite, full-blown ascriptions of propositional attitudes. But it would be wrong to say that such cases alone show that there need be no fact of the matter about S's attitudes, or that there can be several equally good mental descriptions compatible with all the non-mental facts. It is not that there is no fact of the matter about which of a number of competing ascriptions is correct. Rather, there is a fact of the matter about S's attitudes; it is just that the facts are not reportable by a simple ascription of the form'S believes that p'. Because of the possibility of vagueness of this form, a full physical characterization of a subject need not determine a precise mental characterization. But for all that has been shown so far, the imprecise mental facts may be completely determined by the physical facts. A different grade of indeterminacy in mental descriptions stems from the indeterminacy of interpretation. There are different sources, or forms, of indeterminacy. I want to focus on the form associated with what Davidson calls a 'commonplace fact about interpretation', the fact that an agent's choices are jointly determined by her beliefs and desires. 38 It follows from that commonplace fact that there will be any number of different ascriptions of belief and desire which account equally well for a given choice. A vote for the Conservatives in an election, for example, could be accounted for by a belief that the Conservatives will cut taxes and a desire that taxes should be cut; alternatively, it might be accounted for by a belief that the Conservatives will raise taxes and a desire that taxes should be increased. It is clear that the scope for indeterminacy diminishes when we require, first, that an interpretation should account not just for a single datum but for a whole pattern of data, and second, that the interpretation should meet various standards of plausibility, rationality, and consistency, 37 See Stich's (1982) discussion of the attitudes of a subject who is becoming senile. 38 Davidson (1973a) p. 257. Strictly, taking account of the role of meaning in the overall project of interpretation, the commonplace fact is that an agent's preferring the truth of one sentence rather than another is jointly determined by what her words mean, what she believes, and what she desires. For present purposes, it is harmless to ignore the complication.
§ 2. Indeterminacy and Determination and should fit with our general empirical knowledge of 'how persistent various preferences and beliefs are apt to be, and what causes them to g(OW, alter and decay'.39 But, Davidson thinks, indeterminacy remains even when we take account of those factors. What though, is the character of this remaining indeterminacy? One idea is that interpretation is indeterminate because different methods of interpretation may be empirically equivalent; even 'when all the evidence is in', when we are faced with 'all possible evidence',4o two different schemes of interpretation may give equally acceptable explanations of every datum. The measurement of temperature is often used as an analogy for this sort of indeterminacy:41 there is a sense in which the measurement of temperature is indeterminate, for there are numerous different 'schemes' for measuring temperature (Fahrenheit, Centigrade, and so on); each scheme is equally acceptable, since each is equally good at capturing the relations amongst different temperatures. Now if the mental is indeterminate in this sort of way, what follows for the idea that mental properties are determined by physical? Consider the case of temperature. In a very weak sense, a complete physical characterization of a thing does not determine a description of its temperature; for x's being in a given physical state is compatible with a description of its temperature as having, for example, either the value 0' or the value 32'. But in a different sense, temperature-descriptions are quite determinately settled by physical characterizations; for once we have made an arbitrary choice of a scheme for measuring temperature, and have decided to describe x's temperature as having the value 32', temperaturedescriptions for all other things, and for x at all other times, are fixed systematically by their physical properties without further indeterminacy. Adapting a claim from the Tractatus, we could say that, 'although there is something arbitrary in our temperaturedescriptions, this much is not arbitrary-that when we have determined one thing arbitrarily, everything else follows automatically,.42 Davidson (1976) p. 274. For 'when all the evidence is in', see Davidson (1973C) p. 139 and (1974c) p. 154; for 'all possible evidence', see Davidson (1973a) p. 257. 41 For one of Davidson's many uses of the analogy, see his (1973a) p. 257. 42 See Wittgenstein (1961) 3.342. Strictly speaking, in the case of temperature, we ought to say that everything else follows automatically once we have fixed two things: for we need to fix both an origin and a unit of measurement. 39 40
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Let us accept that the mental exhibits at least the relatively superficial indeterminacy of the Centigrade-Fahrenheit case. That cannot be the whole story; for, as the case of temperature shows, that form of indeterminacy is compatible with the existence of a set of laws which, given an arbitrary choice of one of the equally eligible schemes, systematically relate descriptions in one vocabulary to descriptions in another. 43 And that is just what is ruled out, in the mental case, by the argument for anomalism. 44 What character must the indeterminacy of the mental have, then, if it is to incorporate the anomalism of the mental? Here we reach a third grade of indeterminacy. We get a helpful model by considering the relation of aesthetic and physical characterizations. According to one plausible view, the aesthetic does not simply float free of the physical; if one judges that x is beautiful, and y is an exact physical replica of x, then one must also judge that y is beautiful-the aesthetic supervenes on the physical. But, consistent with that, we can say that there are features of the relation between the aesthetic and the physical which have no parallel in the Centigrade-Fahrenheit case. When we evaluate x, we do not make a single arbitrary choice of an 'aesthetic scheme', relative to which the aesthetic properties of all other things are automatically determined by their physical properties-as we do make a single arbitrary choice of a unit and origin for measuring temperature. Rather, we make a new aesthetic judgement in each particular case we consider. To say this is not to say that we simply make it up as we go along, unconstrained by our previous judgements: it is to make the point that an aesthetic outlook need not be codifiable. Now, just as aesthetic judgement does not involve a single arbitrary choice of an aesthetic scheme, relative to which the aesthetic properties of all things are fixed by their physical properties, so interpretation does not involve a single arbitrary choice of a scheme of interpretation, relative to which a person's mental properties at any time are systematically fixed by her physical 43 A point Davidson notes: the nomological irreducibility of the mental is not 'due simply to the possibility of many equally eligible schemes, for this is compatible with an arbitrary choice of one scheme relative to which assignments of mental traits are made' ((197oa) p. 222). See also (1974C) p. 154 and (1985) p. 245. 44 Of course, we might still use the analogy of the indeterminacy of physical measurement to capture the empirical insignificance of indeterminacy in the mental case, without suggesting that the indeterminacy of measurement captures the form of the indeterminacy of interpretation.
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properties. And the reasons are the same. Since there is no codifying the considerations we use in interpretation, we cannot represent the interpreter's task as the arbitrary one-off choice of a scheme of interpretation, which she then simply applies; rather, the interpreter must assess what rationality requires in particular situations by considering each situation as it arises. What are the implications of this third grade of indeterminacy for the thesis that mental properties are determined by physical? There is, as I have stressed, an important disanalogy between the mental case and the Centigrade-Fahrenheit case. But on the question of the determination by physical properties of other descriptions, the two cases are on all fours. There is an obvious sense in which the physical facts do not determine a mental description; for, given a physical characterization, there are different mental characterizations which are equally good at accounting for all choices. But in a different sense, the mental facts on an occasion do seem to be completely fixed by the physical facts. We could say that the different equally eligible mental descriptions are simply different ways of describing the same facts; the facts about the mental, on that view, are what is invariant between different acceptable descriptions. 45 Now the physical facts do not fix the correctness of one of the equally acceptable mental descriptions rather than another. But they do, presumably, fix what is invariant between the different descriptions; a subject's causal powers and dispositions. And to fix that just is to fix the mental facts. What the anomalism of the mental rules out is the sort of systematic determination of mental properties by physical which could be codified in a set of strict psychophysical laws; but it has nothing to say against the kind of case-by-case determination which I have just described. That point has important implications for the compatibility of psychophysical anomalism and psychophysical supervenience. 45 See Davidson (1974C) p. 154 and (1977) p. 225. In a recent paper, Davidson has put the point quite explicitly: 'Because there are many different but equally acceptable ways of interpreting an agent, we may say, if we please, that interpretation or translation is indeterminate, or that there is no fact of the matter as to what someone means by his or her words. In the same vein, we could speak of the indeterminacy of weight or temperature. But we normally accentuate the positive by being clear about what is invariant from one assignment of numbers to the next, for it is what is invariant that is empirically significant. The invariant is the fact of the matter. We can afford to look at translation and the content of mental states in the same light' ((1991a) p. 161).
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3. ANOMALlSM AND SUPERVENIENCE
The doctrine that the mental is supervenient on the physical has been taken to capture (at least a part of) an acceptably modest form of physicalism, a form which embodies the idea that mental properties are determined by physical whilst respecting the anomalism of the menta1. 46 But are the doctrine of supervenience and the principle of the anomalism of the mental really consistent? Many have thought not. Intuitively, the sort of claim we need in order to capture the idea that mental properties are determined by physical is what has come to be know as strong supervenience. Loosely, we can take the general form of a psychophysical supervenience claim to be this: there cannot be two subjects who are alike in every physical respect without being alike in every mental respect. Weak supervenience claims only that this is true within any possible world. Strong supervenience makes the claim across worlds: a subject in any possible world who was physically exactly the way x actually is would be mentally exactly the way x actually is. Slightly more precisely: Necessarily, for every mental property M, if x has M there is some physical property P such that x has P and Necessarily, for all y, if y has P, it has M.47 We need strong supervenience to reflect the intuitive idea that the mental facts are determined by the physical facts, because the intuitive idea supports cross-world claims; we do think that, if y had been physically exactly the way x actually is, then y would have been mentally exactly the way x actually is. One objection to the idea that psychophysical supervenience is compatible with the anomalism of the mental is the idea that that sort of supervenience claim directly yields psychophysical laws: 'qui dit survenance, dit loi.'48 As Jaegwon Kim puts it, 'if you want psychophysical dependence, you had better be prepared for psychophysicallaws,.49 Another objection is that the source of the mental's anomalism (its answerability to norms of rationality) rules 46 See Davidson (1970a) p. 214. I add the proviso 'at least a part of' because there are good reasons for thinking that supervenience alone is not enough to capture the intuitive notion of psychophysical dependence. See, amongst others, Charles (1992) and Snowdon (1989). 47 For this formulation, and for discussion of the distinction between strong and weak supervenience more generally, see Kim (1984). 48 Thanks to Jerry Cohen for this formulation. 49 Kim (1984) p. 171.
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out psychophysical supervenience: for (it has been thought) if the doctrine of supervenience were true, that would mean that considerations of overall rationality could be trumped by non-rational considerations; and that conflicts with the claim that rationality plays a constitutive role in the realm of the mental. For example: Imagine two people alike in all relevant physical respects, one of whom has the mental property M. If we now consider whether the other person also has M, why should we let his physical similarity to the first person be a consideration at all? It might well be the case that the principles of rationality which Davidson takes to govern the attribution of mental content, taken in conjunction with the other mental states already attributed to him, require us to deny that the second person has M.50
The first thing to show in response to these objections is that we can motivate the doctrine of supervenience without relinquishing the supremacy of considerations of overall rationality. The motivation would go as follows. The ascription of attitudes is answerable to two things: a subject's behaviour, physically described; and the context in which she acts-which includes the subject's past history, the nature of the physical environment, of the social environment, and so on. So where there is a difference between A's and B's mental properties, there must be a difference either in actual or counterfactual behaviour, or in contextual facts. But (a) it is a plausible causal hypothesis that where there is a difference in subjects' actual or counterfactual physical behaviour, there must be a difference in their underlying physical properties. And (b) it is an obvious feature of even the mildest physical ism that where there is a difference in context there must be a physical difference: the differences in context which affect a mental characterization are such facts as that a subject is in Oxford rather than Orissa (consider the significance of a shake of the head), or that she has been in causal contact with one of a pair of duplicates rather than the other; and contextual differences like that are, or are dependent on, physical differences. Taken together, (a) and (b) give us the following motivation for accepting the doctrine of supervenience. If there is to be a mental difference, there must be a difference in physical behaviour, and/or a difference in context. And a difference in either behaviour or context requires a physical difference; for causal reasons in the one case, and for general physicalist 50 Evnine (1991) p. 69.
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reasons in the other. Equivalently: to say that A and B are alike in all physical respects is to say that they are (i) alike in their dispositions to physical behaviour, and (ii) alike with respect to every feature of context. If that is so, there could be no basis for interpreting A differently from B; given (i) and (ii), there can be no mental difference between them. In the light of that account of the motivation for the doctrine of supervenience, consider again the second of the objections I described. The objection was this: 'if we accept the anomalism of the mental, we must accept that A and B could be alike in all relevant physical respects yet differ mentally, because considerations of overall rationality could require that B be interpreted differently from A; and to say that is flatly to contradict the thesis of supervenience.' But the objection is misguided. Interpretation, and rationality, have to get a grip on something. And what they get a grip on are facts about behaviour and about context. If there really are reasons of overall rationality for interpreting A and B differently, that can only be because of differences in context, or in physical dispositions. But then A and B are not, after all, alike in every physical respect. Suppose, on the other hand, we find that A and B really are alike in every physical respect; the doctrine of supervenience requires us to ascribe to B the same mental properties that we have ascribed to A, on the basis of their physical likeness and our existing interpretation of A. 51 Does that mean that rationality has been displaced from its constitutive role? Surely not. Our characterization of A is driven by the norms of rationality. That A and B are alike in every physical respect guarantees that the considerations of rationality have nothing different to go on in B's case than in A's. So, in confidently applying our interpretation of A to B also, our interpretation of B remains properly answerable to considerations of overall rationality. The other worry was that, by making the sort of cross-world claims it does, strong supervenience delivers psychophysical laws. It is true that strong supervenience delivers sufficient conditions for a subject to have a given mental property: Necessarily, if x has maximal physical property P*, then x has mental property M. And if we are happy with conditions which contain infinite disjunctions 51 I take it that similarity in every physical respect, including every respect of context, could arise only for counterparts in different possible worlds. So talk of our finding that A and B are physically exactly alike is metaphorical.
§3. Anomalism and Supervenience
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of properties, then strong supervenience gives us necessary and sufficient conditions for a mental property: Necessarily, x has M iff x has P*l v P*2 v ... P*n. However, strong supervenience will only threaten anomalism if the modalized, universally quantified conditionals (or biconditionals) which it yields count as psychophysical laws in the sense that the advocate of anomalism was concerned to deny. One strategy has been to argue that the biconditionals, at any rate, are not proper laws, on the grounds that the disjunctive properties they exploit are not proper properties. 52 But I want to stress a different point. What laws, exactly, would supervenience yield? The laws would be principles saying that, as a matter of necessity, in a completely specified set of physical circumstances, with every aspect of context fixed, a subject will have a given set of mental properties: Necessarily, (x)(P*x ~ Mx). That principle links a set of mental characteristics with a single, completely specified set of physical characteristics. But it is not part of a system of exact, quantitative laws in accordance with which mental characteristics are determined by physical-or by reference to which one could derive mental characterizations from physical; it does not, for example, tell us what mental change in S would be brought about by a given physical change. Even if we knew all the supervenience conditionals derivable by considering every subject in the history of the world, we would not have the resources, in a new case, to derive a subject's mental properties directly from a specification of all the physical circumstances of the case (for any two actual subjects must differ in some physical respect); rather, we must make a new judgement about the application of the norms of rationality in each new case. 53 There is, therefore, no genuine tension between the doctrine of supervenience and the anomalism of the mental. The conditionals (or biconditionals) which supervenience gives us may be allowed, in one sense, to be lawlike; they support counterfactuals, for example. But they do not form a system of laws which would permit the precise prediction and explanation of See e.g. Teller (1984) and Charles (1992) p. 272 n. 9. This is a point which Davidson makes in explaining why complete knowledge of the physical make-up of an artificially created 'human being' would not give us psychophysical laws. If we had such knowledge, 'we could only say, in psychological terms, what the machine would do under completely specified circumstances; no general laws about its behaviour would be forthcoming' ((1973a) p. 258). 52 53
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particular mental phenomena; and it was the possibility of such a system which the argument for the anomalism of the mental was an argument against. 4. ANOMALISM, PSYCHOPHYSICAL CORRELATIONS, AND FUNCTIONALISM
It is sometimes thought that, in order to make intelligible the causal explanatory role of the mental, or to vindicate the factuality of mental ascriptions, we need to show that mental phenomena are related in a systematic way to physical phenomena. And it is that thought which often drives the search for a systematization or regimentation of propositional attitude psychology: there must be some way of correlating mental and physical phenomena, of marrying up the mental and the physical (the thought proceeds), and any such correlation requires a systematization of propositional attitude psychology. Now we can distinguish between two general levels at which such a systematization might be sought. First, and most ambitious, is the aim of codifying propositional attitude psychology in general. Second, there is the less ambitious aim of providing a regimentation of, or a systematic scheme of interpretation for, the attitudes of a particular individual. And this aim might itself be pursued at two levels. The stronger idea is that we could provide a diachronic systematization of S's attitudes. The weaker aim would be simply to provide a synchronic systematization of S's attitudes; though there is nocodifiable scheme of interpretation for an individual agent over time, S's attitudes at any given time do constitute a definite structure of interrelated states.54 Whatever the scope of the regimentation, the marrying-up of mental and physical is to be achieved (on the view we are considering) via an isomorphism between the mental scheme or structure and the physical scheme or structure; given such an isomorphism, we will be able to correlate parts of the mental structure with corresponding parts of the physical structure. 54 This weaker aim might be encouraged by an analogy with some of Davidson's views about interpreting language. According to Davidson, there can be no systematic scheme for interpreting the meanings of S's words over time; but a theory of meaning for S's language at a time can be perfectly systematic-it can take the form of a Tarski-style truth theory. (See Davidson (1986).)
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Now this project, of course, is characteristic of functionalism. Functionalists usually aim for the most ambitious form of codification: a general account of propositional attitude psychology. And the most plausible view of this type is 'common-sense functionalism'. On that view, our common-sense psychological descriptions and explanations embody a set of principles about the relations between attitudes, perceptual inputs, behavioural outputs, and other attitudes; these constitute a common-sense theory of the propositional attitudes, implicit in our ordinary practice. We can make the theory explicit by exhaustively articulating the platitudes of common-sense psychology. From that, we can derive an explicit definition of each mental concept (in the manner of Ramsey and Lewisss ). Then S believes that p, for example, just in case S is in some physical state whose functional role, in relation to S's physically characterized inputs, outputs, and other states, is the same as the functional role played by believing that p in the common-sense psychological theory. How does functionalism of that form fare in the light of the argument against psychophysical laws? According to the argument, rationality is not codifiable; there is no way to systematize the requirements of rationality, only general principles and rules of thumb which guide judgements about what would be rational in particular cases. But the principles about how attitudes and actions must be related to one another, and to objective circumstances, if they are to be rational are, in another guise, the commonsense platitudes which the functionalist treats as implicitly defining our concepts of mental states. So if the principles of rationality cannot be codified, then the platitudes of common-sense psychology cannot be codified either. And that seems to undermine the functionalist's programme for defining the propositional attitudes. If the common-sense platitudes about desiring that q, say, cannot in principle be systematically specified, then there is no definite functional role which we can associate with desiring that q. We can specify, in mental terms, roughly and indefinitely, a causal role characteristically played by a type of desire. But the specification of any such causal role must make essential play with considerations about what would be rational. (To have a desire to make a parachute jump, for example, is (at least) to have a ss See Ramsey (192.9) and Lewis (1972.).
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disposition to make a parachute jump, given appropriate beliefs and other attitudes. Which beliefs are 'appropriate'? Clearly, beliefs in the light of which it would be rational for someone with that desire to act on it.} And given the irreducibility of rationality to any set of physically stateable rules or principles, that sort of mentally specified causal role is not something which could be captured in physical terms; nor could that role be played by something identifiable in non-rational terms. The sort of general isomorphism required by the common-sense functionalist's project, between psychological causal roles and physically specifiable causal roles, is incompatible with the uncodifiability of rationality. 56 This conclusion is perfectly compatible with the view, endorsed by the interpretationist, that part of what it is for a creature to have a given attitude is for it to have a certain rationally specified disposition. That view is much weaker than the common-sense functionalism we are considering; for the functionalism requires, not just that the creature as a whole be organized in such a way that it has the relevant dispositional property, but that the psychologically specified causal roles be played by internal states or properties naturally identifiable in non-psychological terms.
5. UNCODIFIABILITY AND TOKEN CORRELA nONS
The argument about rationality rules out functionalism as a general theory of propositional attitude psychology. But it may seem that the argument does not rule out the idea of precise psychophysical correlations altogether. For there are two related, and far less ambitious, ideas which may seem unthreatened: the idea that we can think of an individual's psychology at a time as a definite structure of interrelated mental states and events, isomorphic with a structure of interrelated physical states and events; and the idea that we can correlate each token mental state or event with some token physical state or event. It is easy to see why these less ambitious ideas seem unthreatened by the argument which ruled out functionalism as a general theory. The thought is this. 56 The same claim is made by Hornsby: 'the causal-explanatory powers of mental states cannot be specified in such a way that a scientist could be led to recognize states that are the subjects of his studies as having those powers' (( 1986) p. 112). And see, more generally, McDowell (1985).
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'Rationality in general is not codifiable. But when we characterize S's attitudes at t, we do not have to characterize rationality as a whole, but only a particular set of attitudes, rationally related in specific ways.' Or again. 'Maybe there is no way of capturing in physical terms the type of causal role that the belief that p plays in common-sense psychology in general. But in characterizing S's belief that p we need not do that; S's belief that p is a particular state, with definite causes and effects; and there is no reason why that specific and definite set of causal relations should not be isomorphic with the causal relations of some specific physical state of S's.' 1 shall argue, however, that there is a problem even for the possibility of token correlations between particular mental states and events and particular physical states and events; and that at least part of that problem stems from what 1 have said about the character of rationality. 1 will suggest separate arguments (i) against the possibility of detailed correlations between mental and physical states, and (ii) against the possibility of identities between mental and physical events (though the arguments are related in various ways). 5.1. States The argument will have two parts. (I start by concentrating on token identities; 1 suggest later how the argument might generalize to other forms of token correlation.) First, if a single mental state is to be a physical state, even on an occasion, then something stronger must be true-that there is a general isomorphism between a person's mental states and her physical states: the train of reasoning which explains an action, say, must form a definite structure, each element of which can be correlated with an element in an isomorphic story about causally related physical states. Second, given the uncodifiability of rationality, there cannot in general be that kind of isomorphism between a structure of mental states and a structure of physical states; given uncodifiability, we cannot regard S's attitudes at t as having a definite structure of the required sort. 1 will state the argument in a way which accepts that states as well as events can be the relata in causal relations: so that beliefs,
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desires, hopes, and so on, as well as events like a person's seeing or hearing something, or the onslaught of an attitude, can be causes and effects. That this is what many philosophers think seems clear. (I think in fact that we do better to understand the causal significance of propositional attitudes not by thinking of an attitude as a causally relevant item but by focusing on the explanatory relevance of a person's having an attitude. 57 But for the moment 1 will talk in the terms usually involved when people are trying to match up mental and physical phenomena.) If we think that a given mental state can be matched up with some particular physical state, how is the matching of these two phenomena to be effected: how are the items for matching up to be selected from amongst the totality of S's mental and physical make-up? The general suggestion is that we should exploit causal role. The mental state, m, is identifiable as the occupant of some definite token causal role-sandwiched, as it were, between a set of mental causes and mental effects. To identify m with a physical state p, we must find some physical item which is the occupant of the same causal role: each mental cause of m must correspond to some physical cause of p, and each mental effect of m to some physical effect of p.58 Already we can see that, if just one mental state is to be a physical state, there must be a substantial isomorphism between a structure of causally related mental phenomena and a structure of causally related physical phenomena. But the causal isomorphism cannot stop at the immediate causes and effects of m and p. For the whole story can be repeated for each of those causes and effects. 1 claim, therefore, that in order for m and p to be identical, there must be a definite structure of causal relations between m and other mental states, which is mirrored by a structure of causal relations amongst physical states. But that view of a person's attitudes-as a complex of mental phenomena whose interactions could be mirrored by the causal interactions of a set of physical items-seems threatened by the thesis of uncodifiability. The threat can be brought out, in the first instance, by looking at the case of action. See Ch. 3 §2, Ch. 4 §I, and Ch. 6 §6. There may also, of course, be physical causes and effects of m which are not mental; but there will be no mental causes of p which are not physical. 57
58
§5. Token Correlations
To understand an action fully we need to be able to recapitulate the practical reasoning which explains its appeal to the agent. S9 (There need be no commitment to the idea that the agent consciously went through that reasoning.) Consider an example. I learn that my mother is terminally ill in Edinburgh; having various concerns about her welfare, and about my duties as a child, I travel there to be with her. Now that points to a simple explanation of my action: I believed that my mother was dying, was concerned for her welfare, and so on, and therefore went to see her. And that simple explanation looks like the sort of causal story which could be mirrored by some physical causal story, in just the way required for interesting token identities. But of course, we do not fully understand my action if we know only a particular belief and desire in the light of which acting in that way seemed attractive. For I went to see my mother even though that meant failing to do other things. The practical reasoning which went into this action involves more than the recognition of a single reason; there is the recognition of other reasons to do competing things, and the assessment of the strength of those competing reasons. In a full understanding of an action, we must see the particular concern on which I acted in the light of the other concerns which competed with it, and understand why I acted on just that concern rather than any other; we must understand my assessment of competing reasons. And in order to understand that, one must appreciate my conception of practical rationality, of how to live. Now if my conception of how to live were codifiable, then the recapitulation of my practical reasoning, the account of my assessment of competing reasons, could take a deductive form, supplying a proof that going to be with my mother in Edinburgh was the thing I should do; and that would be a train of reasoning which we might reasonably think could be mirrored in a series of mechanical steps. But in fact my conception of how to live is not codifiable, and it cannot be broken down into any fixed set of components. So, it seems, the reasoning which led to my selection of just this concern as the one to act on cannot be represented as a definite series of 59 In what follows, I am indebted to McDowell's account of the form that action explanation takes when we recognize the uncodifiability of rationality, an account which itself draws on Wiggins's discussion of practical reasoning. See McDowell (1979) S5 and Wiggins (1975-6).
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causal transactions amongst a fixed set of considerations. 60 That means that an explanation of my action, which recapitulates that reasoning, cannot represent it as the upshot of a definite series of causal transactions amongst a fixed set of rational considerations. But then the explanation does not have the sort of definite causal form necessary in order to effect detailed correlations between parts of the explanation and parts of a causal story about the physical antecedents of my behaviour. The argument moves from the claim that a conception of practical rationality is uncodifiable to the claim that a person's practical reasoning on an occasion cannot be represented in terms of the interaction of a fixed set of components. Someone might resist that move, on the following grounds. 'S's conception of how to live cannot be represented in a set of principles deductively applied in particular cases to yield verdicts about what to do. But, for all that, her conception of how to live may consist in a set of general principles (containing references to what one should do "on the whole", or "for the most part"), which she applies non-deductively to particular cases. Uncodifiability is no bar to representing the deliverances of such a conception as the causal consequences of a fixed set of principles. So we can, after all, break down the application of S's conception of how to live into a definite set of elements. And those mental elements can be matched with the elements of a physical set.' But it seems to me that a person's conception of how to live is not adequately represented as a simple collection of principles. An integral part of that conception is how those principles are applied, and how they are weighed against one another. If we know, for example, that S thinks that, by and large, it is important to be kind, and important to be fair, then we know something of S's conception of how to live. But to understand that conception fully we need also to know the answers to such questions as, 'What sort of thing does S count as an instance of kindness?', and 'How will S go about adjudicating conflicts between fairness and kindness?' Those are questions which we can (sometimes) answer; for we can come to understand someone else's 60 I think, incidentally, that this is a claim which Davidson himself is inclined to accept. Talking of what would be involved in 'giving an account of how a decision is reached in the light of conflicting evidence and conflicting desires', he says that he 'doubt[s) whether it is possible to provide such an account at all' ((197441) p. 23 2 ).
§5. Token Correlations conception of how to live and, having understood it, we can reliably anticipate the judgements she makes about new cases. But that is something we do by learning to see things as S does, not by referring to a fixed catalogue of principles or considerations. I have concentrated on the case of practical rationality-arguing from the uncodifiability of a conception of practical rationality to the impossibility of representing practical reasoning on an occasion as a structure isomorphic with a structure of causally related physical states. But the same considerations will apply, mutatis mutandis, in the case of theoretical rationality: the considerations which explain my forming (or retaining) the belief that p, by showing why it is rational for me to believe it, cannot in general be mapped on to a pattern of causal relations amongst physical states. I have presented my argument as an attack on the possibility of identities between token mental states and token physical states. But I think that the same considerations show that there could not be relations of constitution between particular mental and physical states either. To effect any correlations at all between mental states and physical states (whether identity or something weaker, like constitution), we need to be able to regard the train of reasoning which explains an actio~ or belief as having a definite structure. My argument has been that, given the uncodifiability of rationality, we cannot regard reasoning in that way. That rules out identifying individual elements of a train of reasoning with individual elements of a physical causal story. But it equally rules out relations of constitution between mental particulars and sets of physical particulars. What we might still say is that, overall, S's reasoning at t is constituted or realized by some set of physical transactions or processes. But what we cannot do is to break down the reasoning into a definite set of parts, or a collection of individual attitudes; and if we cannot do that, there cannot be relations of constitution between specific parts of the process of reasoning and specific physical states or events. I will mention two objections to the argument I have been developing. The first objection concedes the point of the argument but questions the generality of the conclusion it establishes. 'Let us agree that the reasoning which explains an action or a belief need have no definite structure, and that where it does not, it cannot be broken down into a fixed set of mental components, each with a
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definite causal role, which can be mirrored by a set of physical states and events. That may cover a great many cases: all nondeductive reasoning, we might allow. But it does not cover every case. Some beliefs are reached as the result of a precise and finite deductive argument; and some instrumental practical reasoning is deductive. Those chains of reasoning do have a definite structure which could be mirrored in the mechanical interactions of a set of physical states. So they avoid the force of the argument: tokenidentities do seem possible for the elements of reasoning of that sort. Or again, attitudes may be causally produced in entirely nonrational ways: by drugs, or electrodes, or bumps on the head. In those cases, there is no problem about matching a rationalizing account of the causal history with a physical account; so again, the argument does not apply; where a mental state or event has a definite, clearly defined set of causes and effects, there is no bar to a correlation with a particular physical state or event.' A concessive response would allow the objection but insist on two points: first, that the argument from uncodifiability shows that we cannot accept a token-identity theory as a general thesis about mental states; and second, that the argument still applies to the vast bulk of mental states, since non-deductive reasoning is so pervasive. I think in fact that it might be plausible to defend a stronger response: that no mental state figures only in chains of deductive reasoning or in non-rational causal relations; so that the argument from uncodifiability does have a fully general application. But even if one rejects the stronger view, the argument is still strong enough to count against the sort of token-identity theory that many people have actually held. The second objection says that the argument, if successful, would be much too strong. 'The claim that the reasoning which explains a particular action cannot be mirrored in the causal relations amongst a set of physical states amounts to the claim that rational behaviour cannot be produced by a mechanism at all. And that is absurd. Since rational behaviour does in fact occur, it must be causally produced somehow; and in fact we know that it is produced by a mechanism-the brain.' If the argument did purport to show that rational behaviour could not be produced by the operations of a mechanism, that would be a devastating objection. But in fact it does not. What it shows is that we cannot, even on an occasion, identify individual physical parts, or properties, or
§5. Token Correlations states of a mechanism as the individual attitudes we mention in describing, in mental terms, the aetiology of the rational behaviour it produces. It is consistent with that to think that we could effect correlations at a coarser level. We might, for example, show that a particular sort of mental function was associated with a particular region of the brain. We might identify a mechanism in the brain which was causally responsible for, say, S's linguistic behaviour; and we might regard such a mechanism as actually being S's linguistic ability. If S engaged in some reasoning for a specified period of time, we might say that S's thinking was, or was constituted by, the neural goings-on in the appropriate region of S's brain during that time. But in none of those cases are we correlating particular propositional attitudes with particular physical states or phenomena. What blocks psychophysical correlations at that level is the character of the constraints of rationality which apply to them. Where we are dealing with coarser mental phenomena, those constraints do not directly apply; which is why there is no parallel problem about correlating mental and physical phenomena at the coarser level. 5.2. Events
The argument of § 5. I depended on the claim that the reasoning which rationally explains an action or an attitude cannot be regarded as being a definite structure of causally interrelated mental phenomena. 61 But, one might think, that argument does not count against the view that mental events are physical events. For a story about the causal relations between mental events really can be broken down into a definite series of components; it can be regarded as having a definite causal structure. A causal story about events will not capture the complexity of the practical reasoning which explains an action, say; indeed, it may have only two elements, a perceptual cause and the action which is its effect. 62 But, for just that reason, such a story does have a specific set of components, 61 That is not to say that we should reject the view that the attitudes involved in such an explanation causally explain actions; only that we should reject a particular model of the way in which reason explanations are causal explanations. (For more on this, see Ch. 3 §2, Ch. 4 §I, and Ch. 6.) 62 For a discussion of the relation between action explanations and causal relations between events, see Ch. 3 §2 and Ch. 4 §I.
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whose causal relations are quite clear. So, even if we accept the argument of § 5. I about correlating mental and physical states, there is no parallel barrier to correlating mental and physical events. However, there is a different argument, which is due to Hornsby, against identifying mental and physical events-an argument which I think we should accept. 63 The argument is this. Suppose we know which mental event caused some bodily movement involved in S's -ing; call that event m. And suppose we also know in full detail about the neural events involved in causing that bodily movement. Hornsby's question is, 'Which element of the neurophysiological causal story is identical with the mental event m?' There is no particular neurophysiological event which can plausibly be identified with m; for neurophysiology individuates things much more finely than psychology, both spatially and temporally. And there is no metaphysically respectable way of constructing larger neurophysiological events from smaller ones so as to yield a neurophysiological event of the right spatio-temporal dimensions to be identified with m. If we set ourselves to produce a collection of neural events which jointly occupy just the spatial and temporal dimensions that m occupies, we might be able to do so. But there is no natural way to pick out such a collection in non-mental terms; and that is a reason for not regarding such a collection as a neurophysiological entity. The argument can be seen as a variant of a familiar argument against psychophysical type identities. 64 If there is a reason to expect the predicates of mental and physical vocabularies not to pick out the same types-because they are answerable to different standards and designed for different descriptive and explanatory purposes-then there is, equally, reason to expect their singular terms not to pick out the same individuals and events. 65 See Hornsby (1980-1). 64 For a classic statement, see Putnam (19 6 7). For a similar conclusion, see Stoutland: 'the individuals of psychology are as irreducible to the individuals of physics, as the kinds of psychology are to the kinds of physics' ((19 85) p. 59). Someone might say that this argument has no force against Davidson. For his criterion for something's being a physical event (or a mental event) is just that it has a physical description (or a mental description) (( 197oa) p. 211). And the gerrymandered collection of neural events which occupies the same location as m does have a physical description, even if it is not one which would occur to, or be of any use to, neurophysiologists. But in fact Davidson's own position seems to require a more restricted conception of what it is to be a physical (or mental) event. (The possibility of a more restricted conception is not something he has denied (see 63 65
§6. Conclusions That argument does not directly draw on the feature of rationality which I have identified as being crucial to the argument for anomalism-its uncodifiability. But it is still in the spirit of that argument. For it depends essentially on the idea that mental and physical vocabularies are answerable to different constraints, and to different descriptive and explanatory purposes.
6. CONCLUSIONS
I finish with a brief review of the conclusions of the chapter. I argued in § I that the Davidsonian argument for the anomalism of the mental depends on a thesis about the character of rationalitythe thesis that the norms of rationality are uncodifiable; and I said why that is a plausible thesis. In §2 I distinguished between various ways in which the mental might be said to be indeterminate, and discussed the relation of indeterminacy to the thesis that mental properties are determined by physical properties. In § 3 I showed, first, that we can motivate the claim that mental properties strongly supervene on physical properties without giving up anything essential to the argument for anomalism, and, second, that strong supervenience does not yield laws of a sort which the advocate of anomalism denied. Turning to the possibility of effecting psychophysical correlations, I argued in §4 that the uncodifiability of rationality rules out functionalism as a general theory of the propositional attitudes, and in § 5. I that it rules out the possibility of detailed correlations between propositional attitudes and physical phenomena. I concluded in § 5.2 by sketching an argument against the view that mental events are physical events. We must now see whether the view of the relation between the mental and the physical which has emerged from the discussion is compatible with a causal view of the mind; and, if it is, what sort of causal view that will be. (19700) p. 212).) His reason for holding that the mental is not a closed system is that there are mental events which do not have mental causes. But that is only true if our criterion of what it is for an event to be mental (or not) goes beyond the liberal criterion stated above. The point, as Davidson says, is that 'psychological events and states often have causes that have no natural psychological descriptions' ((1974b) p. 241 (emphasis added)).
3 Causal Theories I T is a commonplace of contemporary philosophy of mind that our ordinary, common-sense understanding of psychology is a form of causal understanding; and that many of our common-sense psychological concepts have an essentially causal element. So, for example, causality figures in the concepts of perception and memory: if S sees x, then x causally explains S's perception; the same goes, mutatis mutandis, for memory. It figures in determining the contents of propositional attitudes; for, at least in certain central cases, the content of a belief is partially determined by the normal cause of beliefs of that type. And causation figures twice over in the understanding of action: in describing an action as a -ing, we make reference to its effects-if S killed his father, he did something which caused his father's death; and in describing an action as an intentional -ing, we make reference to its causal history-if S intentionally killed his father, then a desire for his father's death must be part of what causally explains the action. We can distinguish two different roles which causation is playing. First, there is the idea that various explanations in psychology are causal explanations; when we explain an action by citing the agent's reasons for doing what she did, for example, we have causally explained the action. Second, there is the idea that causation plays an essential role in determining the intentional content, or the correct mental characterization, of a phenomenon: what makes it the case that it is x not y that I am seeing is that it is x not y which is causally responsible for my experience; what makes it the case that the thoughts I express by saying 'cats are <1>' are thoughts about cats are the complex causal relations between me and cats. And the two roles causation plays are intertwined; for the causal facts which determine the content of mental phenomena (causation's second role) are facts about what causally explains those phenomena (its first role). For example, what makes it the case that my current beliefs count as memories of some
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earlier event is (partially) that those beliefs are causally explained by my participation in the original event. I shall start by examining the first idea about causation-the idea that explanations in psychology are causal explanations; and I focus on a particular class of explanations, reason-giving explanations of intentional actions.
I.
THE BASIC ARGUMENT FOR A CAUSAL CONCEPTION
Davidson's classic argument for a causal conception of action explanation goes as follows.! Reasons explain actions. But we have not yet explained an action if we have said only that S acted some way and had a reason to perform that action: 'for a person can have a reason for an action, and perform the action, yet this reason not be the reason why he did it. Central to the relation between a reason and an action it explains is the idea that the agent performed the action because he had the reason.'2 But what is the force of the 'because' which captures the link between a reason and an action it explains? We have two options. Either we say that the link between reason and action is sui generis, a basic relation; in which case there is no further understanding to be had and the relation remains a mystery. Or we give some kind of analysis of the relation; and what could that be but a causal analysis? As Davidson says: 'One way we can explain an event is by placing it in the context of its cause; cause and effect form the sort of pattern that explains the effect, in a sense of "explain" that we understand as well as any. If reason and action illustrate a different pattern of explanation, that pattern must be identified.'3 And, Davidson thinks, there is no plausible candidate for the pattern of reason explanation other than the causal pattern: 'the best argument for a [causal] scheme ... is that it alone promises to give an account of the "mysterious connection" between reasons and actions.,4 The argument is appealing. But what explains its appeal? There are, after all, many explanatory uses of 'because' which are not causal. For example, we can say that I broke the law because I parked on the yellow lines; or that the delivery was a no-ball 1
See Davidson (19 63).
2
Ibid. 9.
3
Ibid.
10.
4
Ibid.
11.
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because the bowler overstepped the crease; or that Xanthippe became a widow because she was married to Socrates and Socrates died; or that it is more likely than not that a random selection of twenty-three people will contain two with the same birthday because the probability of their all having different birthdays is ((365 x 364 x ... x 343) + 36523), which is less than half. None of these uses of 'because' points to a causal explanation; so why should the 'because' in action explanation be causal? The intuition behind Davidson's argument is that an explanation of an action is an explanation of why something happened, or why an event occurred. A non-causal explanation may explain something about a particular event; this particular parking was illegal, for example, because it was a case of parking on the yellow lines. That is an explanation of why a particular event had a certain property; it explains why, given that there was a parking at this place and time, that parking was illegal. But it does not explain, and no non-causal explanation could explain, why the event occurred in the first place. So the appeal of Davidson's argument rests on this thought: (i) an action explanation is an explanation of why something happened; but (ii) no non-causal explanation can explain why something happened; so (iii) action explanations must be causal. One could resist this argument by denying either of the premisses: so, either by denying that an action explanation is an explanation of why something happened, or by claiming that there can be non-causal explanations of happenings or occurrences. I will consider these responses in reverse order. The idea that any explanation of the occurrence of an event must be causal is plausible case by case. For any putatively noncausal explanation of an event, we can always make the Davidsonian point: knowing this story allows us to fit the event into a pattern which potentially makes sense of it; but we are still left wanting to know why the event actually occurred, what made it happen when it did. And for that, we need to be told something causal. What supports the intuition is this. Every event either has a cause or it does not. If it has a cause, then explaining why the event occurred must make reference to that cause. If it does not have a cause, then there is simply no explanation of why this particular event occurred when it did. 5 5 For further discussion, and endorsement, of the idea that all explanation of events is causal explanation, and for ways of dealing with some supposed counterexamoles. see Lewis (rq86a) ~~.
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In practice, philosophers who think of action explanation in non-causal terms typically accept that explanations of the occurrence of events are causal explanations. They reject the causal theory because they deny that an explanation of an action is an explanation of the occurrence of an event. The central idea of this sort of non-causal account of action explanation is this: to give the reason for an action is to explain, not why it happened, but why it counts as the sort of action it is, to explain its meaning or significance. (Compare an explanation of why this delivery was a no-ball; what we explain is not why the delivery occurred, or why the ball was bowled, but .why, given that it was, it counted as a no-ball.) On this view, the concept of intentional action plays a basic role in our observation and description of the world. We see someone catching a ball, crossing the road, eating an apple, flipping a switch, boiling a kettle. Such descriptions embody the 'meaning', or the intentional significance, of an action. And citing the agent's reasons explains that significance or meaning in two ways. It allows us to see why the action counts as an action of that sort. And it may give us a more detailed characterization of the action, thereby revealing a level of significance which was not immediately apparent: when we learn S's reason, we learn that he was not only flipping the switch but also, intentionally, signalling to someone watching outside. On this picture, reason explanations are to be distinguished from causal explanations. As Stoutland writes: [The non-causal theory) gives no explanation of why the agent's behaviour occurs or comes about ... An explanation of action, on [the) noncausal theory, gives the attitudinal conditions in terms of which to derive the understanding of the agent's behaviour as the act that he performedand that is sufficient to explain why the agent acted as he did. 6
Since human behaviour has causes and effects, there is, of course, a causal explanation of behaviour to be given. But giving it is a matter for neurophysiology. There is no reason to think that 'the factors which account for the intentionality of behaviour and in terms of which action is explained should also account for, i.e., cause, the behaviour in the act,.7 It may be helpful to compare this non-causal conception of action explanation with non-causal conceptions of explanation in other areas. Suppose we want to understand a text: perhaps we 6
Stoutland (1976) p. 302.
7
Ibid. 303.
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are debating whether Henry V illustrates the glory of war, the virtues of single-minded leadership, and the importance of nationalism; or whether it is a graphic warning of the brutality and horror of war, the dangers of absolute power, and the importance of internationalism. Now (it is said) we can approach the question without reference to the causal history of the text (and without reference to the author's intentions). What we do is to see which interpretation makes best overall sense of the pattern of speeches and events in the play; we argue for one interpretation rather than another by showing that it accommodates all the different incidents more convincingly or coherently; there is no question of any causal claim in this process of interpretation. s Or again, suppose we want to explain the meaning of a painting; perhaps we are looking at a cubist canvass titled Young Girl with Guitar, and we want to explain the painting to someone who does not even begin to see how this might be a picture of a young girl with guitar. What is required (it is said) is not a story about the causal history of the painting; rather, we need to point to features of the painting itself ('Follow this line and you can see how it traces the profile of a face') and of its context (we might say both 'Think of the different views you get of a guitar from different angles' and 'Think of the way that artists had already been breaking away from ideals of realistic depiction'). Similarly, it is suggested, when we explain an action we are showing how to make sense of it by fitting it in a particular way into a pattern of the agent's words and deeds. Suppose there are two competing explanations for a given action: S killed her terminally ill father by administering poison; she needed money and knew that if she killed him she would inherit a large sum; she also saw that he was in pain and wanted to end his suffering. We show that one explanation is better than the other by showing that it makes better overall sense of this action in the light of her other actions: true, she needed the money, but nothing about her is consistent with her having killed her father for his money, and she was always given to acts of compassion; the pattern associated with something done from compassion fits this case, the pattern associated with something done for personal benefit, or from greed, 8 For a comparison of action explanation to the explanation of a text, see Ricoeur (1971).
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does not. Just as in the case of explaining a play, when we explain the meaning of the action-what sort of action it was-we must look to features of the behaviour itself and of its context (the circumstances in which S acted, the pattern of her actions in general), not to features of its aetiology. In the broadest outline, then, there are two proposals about how we should understand action explanation. One proposal is that an action explanation explains why something happened, or why an event occurred; on that view, the explanation must be causaP The alternative is that an action explanation tells us not why an event occurred but why it has a given significance; why it counts as the sort of action it is. What could show that one proposal rather than the other was right? It is sometimes said, in defence of the causal view, that there is no conflict between the idea that to explain an action is to give its causes, and the idea that to explain an action is to explain its significance. '''[E]vents are often redescribed in terms of their causes. (Suppose someone was injured. We could redescribe this event 'in terms of a cause' by saying he was burned.)"IO That shows that a description which illuminates something's meaning or significance may do so by reference to its causes. So the idea that action explanations are significance-yielding explanations is no bar to the causal view of action.' But this point cannot be decisive. The non-causa list will agree that there are some significance-yielding descriptions (like the description of an injury as a burn) which work by displaying a thing in the light of its causes, but say that there are others which do not mention causes. And, of course, she will claim that action explanations are significance-yielding explanations of the non-causal kind. From the other side, the argument for a causal view is sometimes attacked in the following way. 'The argument depends on the assumption that there are cases in which an agent has two equally good reasons for an action, but where just one of them is the 9 The event whose occurrence is explained when we explain an action is someone's doing something, not a mere motion of someone's body. (If we say that the events which action explanations explain are bodily movements, we should, as Jennifer Hornsby has pointed out, notice an ambiguity in the phrase 'bodily movement'. Action explanations are concerned with bodily movements in the sense of movings by agents of their bodies, rather than with bodily movements in the sense of mere motions of bodies. (See Hornsby (1980) Ch. 1.)) 10 Davidson (19 63) p. 10.
3. Causal Theories reason why she acted; in such a case, the argument claims, only a causal link could make the difference between, on the one hand, having a reason and acting, and, on the other, acting because of a reason. But there is something wrong with the idea that there could be an agent with two equally good reasons for an action which she performs for only one of them. Suppose an agent performs an action for which she had two reasons. There are two possibilities. (i) When we look at the pattern of the agent's reasons as a whole, we see that there are in fact grounds for saying that one of the reasons was better, or more compelling, than the other, and thus for concluding that the action was done for that reason and not the other; or (ii) even when we look at the totality of the agent's reasons, there are no grounds at all for distinguishing between the two reasons. In a case of the first sort, our ordinary criteria for assessing the strength of an agent's reasons suffice to determine that she acted for that reason and not the other, without any appeal to causation. In a case of the second sort, the two reasons are equally good; but then to invoke causation in an effort to show that one reason rather than the other was the reason why she acted would be to impose a bogus determinacy on the mental; what we ought to say in that case is just that the agent acted for more than one reason. In neither case, therefore, is there any basis for the appeal to causation: either we can say what makes it the case that S acted for one reason rather than the other without appeal to causation; or else it is not true that S did act for one reason rather than the other.' That line of thought, however, is mistaken. In the first place, it is wrong to think that the Davidsonian argument depends on the idea that there are cases in which an agent acts for just one of two equally strong reasons. The point of the argument is that we need to understand the 'because' in 'She <J)-d because she believed that p'. Suppose there is never a case in which S has two equally good reasons for an action she performs for only one of them. It is still true that the mere fact that S's attitudes made it rational to <J) does not by itself explain her actually <J)-ing. The point of the argument for a causal view is not that we must appeal to causation in order to tell whether S <J)-d for one reason rather than another; it is, rather, that we must appeal to causation in order to understand the metaphysics of the relation between reason and action. Second, and relatedly, the fact that we can effect a distinction by
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using a set of criteria which are not explicitly causal is clearly compatible with the distinction's being a distinction between things with a causal history of one sort and those with a causal history of another. For example, I can tell the difference between the song of a garden warbler and the song of a blackcap by applying a test which is not explicitly causal; how sustained is the song, and what is its pitch? But the distinction thus effected is a distinction between songs with different aetiologies; the one is produced by garden warblers, the other by blackcaps. Similarly, even if it were true that I could distinguish between a compassionate killing and a killing motivated by greed without the use of explicitly causal considerations, that would not show that a philosophical understanding of the distinction should not appeal to the characteristically different aetiologies of the two sorts of action. (Furthermore, of course, the causalist will not agree that the considerations which I use are not explicitly causal. So the argument begs the question against the causal view in any case.) I have stressed that the essential move in the argument for a causal conception of reason explanation is the thought that the causal view is needed if reason explanation is to be made intelligible. But what sort of intelligibility is this; in what sense does the causal view allow us to understand explanations of action? A detailed answer will depend partly on the detail of the substantive theory we produce. But there are· two general points to make at this stage. First, the idea is not that we have to learn that reason explanation is causal explanation in order to be able to understand an explanation of someone's action in terms of her reasons. Nor is it that we can first have the general concept of causal explanation and only later come to see reason explanation as an instance of that general form. On the contrary, it is a datum that reasons explain actions; and it is plausible that our grasp of the general concept of causal explanation is derivative from (or, at least, interdependent with) our grasp of specific modes of explanation, of which reason explanation is one. Rather, the understanding we get from seeing that reason explanation is a form of causal explanation is a reflective understanding of the metaphysics of this form of explanation; we understand what sort of explanation it is, and how reasons explain actions. And that paves the way for an understanding of the way in which facts about action fit in with facts
3. Causal Theories about the rest of the natural world, and of the way in which psychological explanations relate to the facts of physical causation. Second, the understanding which a causal theory yields will not be reductive. For one thing, behaviour counts as action only if it is causally explained by a reason in the right of sort of way,ll and it is very plausible that there is no way to specify that 'right sort of way' which does not itself presuppose the concept of action. For another, our 'analysis' says that actions are causally explained by reasons-by beliefs, desires, intentions, and so on. But the concepts of those attitudes are inseparable from the concept of action, not prior to it, as they would have to be if reductive explanation were in question. So far, then, we have explored the general form of the causal and the non-causal views. What can we say to judge the issue between them? The first point at issue, I have stressed, is what we regard an action explanation as explaining; the causa list insists, and the non-causalist denies, that we are explaining why something happened. So it would help the causalist's case if we could defend that claim. Now it may be that the best that the causalist can do by way of defence is to point out the intuitive plausibility of the view, and offer to explain why various objections from the non-causalist do not threaten it. But perhaps we can add strength to the intuition by showing how naturally we exploit the idea of causality in thinking of the relation between an agent's attitudes and her actions. For example, one way of producing a result is to produce in someone else a motive for bringing it about; by inducing attitudes in you, I can affect your actions and, through them, the world beyond you. It is hard not to think causally of the whole transaction, and equally hard not to think causally of each of its stages. The first stage is clearly causal; when I induce some motive in you, I am evidently affecting you causally. And it is equally natural to think causally of the relation between your attitudes and your actions. And that, perhaps, may go some way to vindicating the causalist's conception of the explanandum in action explanation. A different way of supporting the causal view is to see how such a view of action fits into a wider understanding of the mental. For example, it is arguable that a causal view gives us a better overall 11
See e.g. Davidson (197'1'7) p. 2.32..
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understanding of the structure of the concept of action than any non-causal view; for it is plausible that a causal theory will give us an understanding of why the concept of action has various features (for example, a particular set of enabling and defeating conditions), which a non-causal theory would have to regard as being inexplicable features of our practice. 12 Or again, a causal view of action is part of a more general causal understanding of the mental, an understanding which has things to say about the status of mental phenomena, about thought, content, and objectivity. I will argue, in fact, that the adoption of a worthwhile and plausible form of realism requires a general causal understanding of the mental, of which a causal view of action explanation is a part. Of course, a non-causal view of action is also part of a wider overall conception of the mental and of its relations to the nonmental. So the issue between the two views of action can be discussed at two levels. At the particular level, we can ask which view accords better with our natural understanding of the concept of action, and which view gives a better account of the various features of that concept. At the more general level, we can compare the overall conceptions of the mental of which the different views of action are parts. I have already said something about why I think a causal understanding of action is superior at the particular level; and the detailed discussion of the form of a causal theory which follows is intended to support that. In Chapter 4 §2 I address the more general question, what makes the causal conception of the mental as a whole preferable to a non-causal conception. Before proceeding, a brief note on the label, 'causal theory of action'. As I am using the phrase, a causal theory of action is simply a theory which says that explaining actions by giving the agents' reasons for doing them is a mode of causal explanation. Some causal theories of action have included other claims. In particular, some writers associate the causal theory of action with the view that S's -ing was an action if and only if it was caused (in the right sort of way) by an intention, or by a belief and desire (of an appropriate sort). Against such accounts it is sometimes objected that there are many intentional actions which are not done for reasons at all. For example: 'When I cross my legs while 12
I say something about the parallel claim for the case of vision in Ch. 5 §5.I.
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listening to a lecture, that action (usually) has no explanation in terms of reasons for doing it that I had antecedently. I just spontaneously do it.'!3 But someone who claims that reason explanation is a form of causal explanation can remain neutral on that point: if there can be actions which the agent does for no reason at all, these will be actions for which there are no reasongiving explanations; and actions like that fall outside the scope of the sort of causal theory I am considering. 2.
CAUSA nON AND CAUSAL EX PLANA nON
The conclusion of the Davidsonian argument of § I is that reason explanation is a form of causal explanation. But what does this conclusion come to; what is involved in the claim that reason explanations are causal explanations; and how are we to think of reason explanation in causal terms? There are at least two questions which any causalist must answer. (i) What is the relation between causal explanation and causation? (ii) What is the relation between, on the one hand, causation and causal explanation involving mental phenomena and, on the other, physical causes and effects? In this section, I shall consider the first of those questions. Suppose we ask, what makes an explanation a causal explanation? On one view, what causal explanations have in common is this: wherever there is a true causal explanation there is, behind it, an instance of causation, a 'natural relation which holds in the natural world between particular events or circumstances, just as the relation of temporal succession does or that of spatial proximity,.14 On another view, causal explanations are united not by their dependence on a natural relation of causality, but rather by the fact that they are all explanations of the occurrence or persistence of particular events or circumstances, or of general types of event or circumstance; 'cause' is 'the name of a general categorial notion which we invoke in connection with the explanation of particular circumstances and the discovery of general mechanisms of production of general types of effect' .15 I start by examining the first view. 13 Ginet (199 0 ) p. 13 0 . Ginet's point is not just that intentional actions need not be preceded by intentions or desires; he thinks there need be no causally operative intention or desire at all, whether antecedent or concurrent (see ibid. 9). 14 Strawson (19 8 5) p. 115. 15 Ibid. 135.
§z. Causation and Causal Explanation
IOI
The simplest and most familiar version of that view goes like this. We can distinguish between a relation of causal explanation and a relation of causation.!6 Causal explanation is a non-natural, intensional relation between facts or sentences, reportable in such idioms as 'The fact that p explains the fact that q', 'The reason why q was that p', and 'If you know that p you can see why q'. For example, 'The fact that the building was made of inferior materials explains the fact that it collapsed', 'The reason why the train came off the rails was that the axle broke', and 'If you know that the city has been shelled you can see why there are lots of ruined buildings.' Causation, by contrast, is a natural, extensional relation between particular events, reportable in such idioms as 'x caused y', or 'y was due to x'. For example, 'The blaze in Pudding Lane caused the Fire of London', and 'His death was due to his fall.'!7 A number of questions about the relation between causal explanation and causation naturally arise. First, the metaphysics of the relation. The basic picture is this. Causal reality is a network of causally interrelated events. We can pick out causes and effects using singular terms; and however we pick out two events, the purely causal claim that one event caused another is true if the relation of causality holds between the two events picked out. When we give a causal explanation, we are giving information about causally related events; and the truth of a causal explanation (unlike that of a purely causal statement) depends on our picking out causes and effects in particular ways. Suppose the collision with an iceberg mentioned on page three of the Guardian caused the sinking of the Titanic mentioned on page five of The Times. Then, 'The event mentioned on page five of The Times was caused by the event mentioned on page three of the Guardian' is a true but unexplanatory causal statement. 'The fact that the Titanic sank is explained by the fact that it collided with an iceberg' expresses the same basic causal truth; but it picks out cause and effect in such a way that to see the effect in the light of the cause is to make the effect intelligible; in doing that, it gives us an explanation. The 16 This contrast is drawn and discussed by Davidson (1967) and Strawson (1985). Many features of the account I give draw, in particular, on Strawson. 17 As Strawson remarks, ordinary language does not always mark the distinction as carefully, or in the same terms, as might be suggested by the selection of these different idioms to represent the different relations.
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general idea, then, is that the truth (or acceptability) of a causal explanation rests on the presence of appropriate relations of causation. And a natural thought would be to put the point in the following way: a causal explanation is one whose explanatory power depends on the assumption that there are events mentioned, or pointed to, in the explanans and explanandum sentences, between which the natural relation of causation obtains; and whose truth (or acceptability) requires that that relation does indeed obtain. For example, I might offer this explanation; Spencer Percival died because he was shot. If the explanation is true, then the relation of causal explanation obtains between two facts: the fact that Spencer Percival was shot and the fact that he died. And it is a necessary condition for the explanatory relation to hold between these facts that there is an event introduced by 'the fact that Spencer Percival was shot' (namely, the shooting of Spencer Percival) and an event introduced by 'the fact that Spencer Percival died' (namely, Spencer Percival's death), such that the natural relation of causation holds between the two events. Reference to causally related events is rarely quite so near to the surface of a causal explanation as it is in the case just considered. In some cases the explanandum is the fact that an event occurred, but there is no simple way of identifying, from what is given as the explanans, an event which was the cause; for example, 'The train crashed because the driver was drunk.' In other cases, the explanandum is not the occurrence of an event but something's having a certain feature; for example, 'The train arrived late because there were leaves on the line.' But the fact that, in some (or even most) cases, reference to causally related events is concealed is compatible with the idea that the truth of an explanation depends on the presence of appropriate relations of causality between particular events. Suppose, for instance, that it is true that the train crashed because the driver was drunk. Though it is not explicitly mentioned in the explanation, there was an event which caused the crash-the train's crossing the points. Since trains often cross points without crashing, an explanation should tell us what was special about this crossing, why it caused a crash when most crossings do not. It was a crossing at 70 m.p.h., on a Tuesday, at 10.00 a.m., of a train containing 120 passengers, driven by a drunken driver. Why did it cause a crash? The first and last of those features of the cause are the relevant ones, the
§2. Causation and Causal Explanation
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features which are connected in some regular way with derailings of trains or with recklessness. And in saying that the crash happened because the driver was drunk, we select one particularly salient feature of the cause. In some cases we may offer such a feature-citing explanation without even knowing what the cause was; knowing that the driver was drunk, we are sure that, whatever the exact cause, its involving a drunken driver will be a relevant feature. But, even in this case, the truth of the explanation depends ultimately on the obtaining of a causal relation between events. So much for the metaphysical question. What of the epistemic question? Typically, causal explanation is epistemically prior to causation; that is to say, knowledge that x caused y is generally based on knowledge of an explanation-the fact that x occurred explains the fact that y occurred. I myself may know (by testimony) only that the event mentioned on page three of the Guardian caused the event mentioned on page five of The Times, and thus know that a certain causal relation obtains without knowing any explanatory relation. But my doing so depends on someone's having the causal information in an explanatory form. In some cases we may know of a causal relation without anyone having an explanation: by observing a regularity involving events of certain kinds we may learn enough to see that there must be a causal relation between x and y without yet being able to offer an explanation of y in terms of the occurrence of x: 'it must be that which is producing the effect, but I don't see how.' But such cases seem the exception; they presuppose a framework of causal relations which are understood, and knowledge of which we have in an explanatory form. There are, finally, two points to make about the concepts of causation and of causal explanation. First, it is plausible that the concept of a relation of causality holding between particular events is derivative from concepts of causal explanation; that, as Anscombe suggests, the very possibility of having the general concept of causation as a relation between events is dependent on having simple causally explanatory concepts-concepts of causal action such as 'scrape, push, wet, carry, eat, burn, knock over, keep off, squash, make (e.g. noises, paper boats), hurt,.18 Second, the model I have 18
Anscornbe (1971) p. 137.
10 4
3. Causal Theories
been describing is intended to be quite general. Wherever there is a relation of causal explanation, there is a relation of causation between events. And causation is a single type of natural relation; there is no question of action explanation (for example) involving a different type of causation from other modes of causal explanation. But that is compatible with there being something primitive and sui generis about our various causal concepts and forms of causal explanation. We can say, for example, that action explanation is a sui generis mode of causal explanation. And we can allow that action explanation plays a primitive role in our grasp of causal concepts. Before proceeding, I want to comment on the relation between the broadly Davidsonian picture of causal explanation I have been describing and the account offered by David Lewis. 19 On Lewis's view, 'to explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history,.2o The information mayor may not be given in a form which makes it easily assimilable, which allows the recipient to fit it into her overall stock of information about this event, or such events in general, or which shows (if it is true) 'that the causal processes at work are of familiar kinds; or that they are analogous to familiar processes; or that they are governed by simple and powerful laws; or that they are not too miscellaneous'.21 We have a preference for being given information in a form which is easily assimilable (and so on); but we have still been given an explanation, even if we are given the information about y's causal history in some less useful form. 22 So, for example, 'The Titanic sank because of an event mentioned on page three of the Guardian' is no less of an explanation than 'The Titanic sank because it hit an iceberg'. How important is the issue between the Davidsonian conception and Lewis's? If we adopt Davidson's conception, then one use for the distinction between causation and causal explanation is this: there is a question how cause and effect must be described if the information that x caused y is to give us an explanation of the fact that See Lewis (19 86a ). 20 Ibid. 21 7. 21 Ibid. 228. Lewis himself thinks it is fruitless to debate the question, whether an unsatisfactory chunk of explanatory information is still an explanation, or whether, rather, it does not count as an explanation at all; 'we will gladly say either' ((1986a) p. 218). Strictly speaking, therefore, what I am describing is a position slightly more committed than Lewis's own. 19
22
§2. Causation and Causal Explanation
r05
y occurred; and, in particular, there is an issue about whether
mental properties satisfy plausible criteria of explanatory relevance.
If we accepted Lewis's framework, we would not put the issues in that way; the information that x caused y is an explanation of y's occurrence, in whatever form it is given. But the same questions could be recast: there are some ways of giving the information that x caused y which make it easily assimilable and allow the recipient to make use of it; so there is a question about which ways of giving causal explanatory information are useful, and why; and there is an issue about whether mentioning mental properties when we give information about causes is one way of making that information useful. As far as I can see, any suggestion we might make, in the Davidsonian framework, about how the information that x caused y must be given if it is to yield an explanation could be recast, in Lewis's framework, as a suggestion about how the information should be given if it is to meet various pragmatic desiderata; and any argument which showed, in the first framework, that mental properties can be explanatorily relevant could be recast as an argument to show, in the second framework, that giving explanatory information by using mental descriptions can be a way of giving information which meets the desiderata. So though there is an overarching issue about whether we should accept Lewis's framework or Davidson's, for many purposes we can safely abstract from that question. The broadly Davidsonian model I have described is simple and elegant. But critics say that it is inadequate; for, they say, it is not true that all our causal talk can be understood as either (a) reporting relations of causality between events, or (b) giving causal explanations, whose status as causal depends on the fact that there are suitable causally related events underlying explanans and explanandum. Some of the supposed counterexamples are not unduly troubling. One sort of counterexample is supposed to show that causal explanations may depend on causal relations between states, or between states and events, and not just on causal relations between events. So, for instance, it is said that underlying the explanation, 'My leg is broken because I fell off my bike',is a causal relation between an event (my falling off my bike) and a state (my leg's being broken, or my leg's broken state); or that the truth of the explanation, 'The bridge collapsed because the bolt was weak',
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is sustained by a causal relation between a state (the weakness of the bolt) and an event (the collapse of the bridge). But such cases can be accommodated comfortably within the Davidsonian model. For instance, when we talk loosely of a state as a cause of an event, there is a causal relation between events; the state was part of the circumstance in which the cause occurred; and mentioning that state can help to explain why that cause had the effect it did. For example, the bridge collapsed because the bolt was weak. What caused the collapse of the bridge was an event-the train's crossing the bridge. But the train's crossing would not have caused the bridge's collapse if the bolt had not been weak; so mentioning the weakness of the bolt helps to explain why the bridge collapsed by explaining why the cause had the effect it did. A different sort of counterexample concerns negative causal explanations: 'Don did not die because his rope did not break.' In that explanation there are no events mentioned, or indicated, in the explanans and explanandum sentences. So again, it is suggested, it is wrong to say that a causal explanation is true, if it is true, in virtue of the presence of an underlying causal relation between such events. 23 But we can accommodate these cases if we allow that the relation between a causal explanation and causal relations between events may be less direct than I suggested earlier. So, we can say simply that to give a causal explanation is to 'tell, or suggest, a causal story', or 'to provide some information about [a] causal history,.24 And a negative causal explanation does seem to fulfil that criterion; for a causal story can be a story saying that an event of type F (which might have been expected to cause an event of type C) did not do so; and information about causes can include the information that there was no event of type C because no event of type F happened to cause it. For example, Don did not die because his rope did not break. What happened was that Don fell. But the fall did not cause a death, because his rope did not break. That is a causal story: a story about an event (Don's fall), about its having a certain feature (being a fall with an unbroken rope), and about its not causing an effect of a certain sort. We explain the fact that there was no everit of a certain sort by citing features of an event which did occur. Or, on another 23 For this last example, and discussion of the relation between causal explana· tion and causation, see Mellor (1987). 24 Davidson (1967) p. 161; Lewis (1986a) p. 217.
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occasion, we might explain why Don did not die by pointing out that he did not fall at all. In that case, there is no causal relation between events mentioned in explanans and explanandum sentences. But to say that there was no event of a certain kind is to tell a story about causes; and it is a story which makes it intelligible why no event which was a death of Don came about. But there are two sorts of case which are not so easily accommodated. First, simple causal explanations often cite the causal action of an individual substance in bringing about an effect. Our ordinary causal vocabulary reflects that when we talk of one thing crushing another, or of breaking, bending, closing, denting, scratching, knocking over, and so on. 25 And second, many causal explanations cite the continuous operation of causal processes. The snow is melting because the sun is shining; the durian fruit filled the room with an unpleasant smell; his smoking gave him cancer; the boxer is being kept alive by a life-support machine. Where, in these cases, are there events which we can plausibly think of as cause and effect? The natural thought in the case of causal action is that 'whenever any of these simple verbs is applicable, some causing is going on or has gone on,;26 and we might say something similar about causal processes. We might, in other words, regard the operation of a causal process, or a case of causal action, as involving a series of causal relations amongst events. But what will those events be? We should not expect processes to be constituted by events at the same level as the processes themselves-events naturally identifiable in the same sort of vocabulary that we use to pick out the original processes. When I push a pram, I make it move over a period of time; it is not plausible to think that there is a series of pushings and movings, where each pushing and each moving is a distinct event, such that my pushing at t caused the pram's movement at t (or, perhaps, at t'), my pushing at t' causing its movement at t' (or t"), and so on. A natural thought would be that we can find causally related events implicit in the operation of causal processes if we appeal to the way in which processes identified in everyday causal vocabulary are constituted by lower-level physical events. That may be a defensible position. But notice two things about it. 25
For discussion of such causal verbs, see Strawson (1985) p. 124, Anscombe 26 Mackie (1974) p. 132.
(1971) p. 137, and Mackie (1974) pp. 132-4.
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First, processes fall readily into kinds; rotting, growing, dissolving, melting, and so on. We can naturally and easily pick out processes which are instances of these kinds, and we can make generalizations about them. But there is no reason to think that there will be any natural way, using the vocabulary in which we pick out the constituting events, to pick out just the set of events which constitute a particular instance of a process. Nor is there any reason to think that, using that vocabulary, we will be able to formulate the generalizations about processes.27 So there is a way in which talk of causal action and causal processes is just as basic in our causal thinking as is talk of causally related events. And that gives us a reason to question the primacy given in the Davidsonian model to causal relations between events, and to explanations which depend on such relations. Second, the suggestion is now this: instances of causation which may not, on the surface, appear to involve causally related events (such as the operation of causal processes) do in fact involve them, since they are constituted by causally related physical events. But that involves a shift from the position we started with. That was a position about the form of statements concerning causality: the idea was that causal statements relate events; and causal explanations tell stories about causally related events. And the causally related events with which causal explanations are concerned were events describable and identifiable in the sort of vocabulary used in the explanations. But the defence I am envisaging changes that model: according to that defence, we can, in the case of some causal explanations, find causally related events which sustain the explanations only by investigating the underlying nature of causation, and only by employing the vocabulary of the sciences of matter. So the idea that there is a general relation between causal explanation and relations of causation between events requires, not just an analysis of the logical form of causal statements and of causal explanation, but also an analysis of the metaphysics of causation. To the extent that the original model suggested that causal explanations would always be backed by causally related events at the same level as the phenomena mentioned in a causal explanation, that model does seem threatened by some of the problem cases. 27 See Stout (199 I) for extended discussion of, and opposition to, the idea that causal processes can be reduced to series of causally related events.
§ 2. Causation and Causal Explanation
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Where does this leave us? It seems that it is not, in general, true that wherever there is an instance of causality there are, at the same level, and identifiable in the same vocabulary, causally related events. In the face of that, we could defend a revised (though still broadly Davidsonian) model of the relation of causality and causal explanation by incorporating in the model claims about the relation between different levels of description; where there is a causal explanation, there must, underlying the explanation, be low-level, causally related physical events. Alternatively, we could give up the idea that what makes an explanation a causal explanation is its dependence on the presence of causal relations between events, and accept the alternative suggestion, that 'cause' is the name of a general categorial notion having to do with the explanation of particular circumstances. I incline in this latter direction: for it is not clear that we should build into a general account of what it is for an explanation to be a causal explanation the details of the actual physical nature of causation. Notice also that what persuaded us, in § I above, that action explanation is a form of causal explanation was simply the conviction that an action explanation is an explanation of something's happening; we did not need to exploit any claim about the dependence of action explanations on the obtaining of causal relations between events. However, whilst this approach would involve a move away from the broadly Davidsonian picture, one should not overemphasize the difference. First, on anyone's view, there are very many causal explanations whose truth does depend on the obtaining of a causal relation between events mentioned, or introduced, in the explanans and explanandum sentences. In those cases, we can accept all that the Davidsonian model says about the relation between causality and causal explanation. And it may well be that all of the psychological cases which will concern us in Chapters 5 and 6 are of this sort. So, for many cases, we might agree with Strawson's further point, that it 'doles] not ... matter ... very much' whether we regard 'cause' as the name of a natural relation or rather as a general categorial notion of the sort I have described. Second, there are (as we shall see in §3) reasons for thinking that where there are causal phenomena (including causal processes and instances of causal action) there must be causally related physical events; so, even if we cannot regard it as part of the concept of causation, the suggestion of a general relation between causal explanation and
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physical causality (which I called a 'revised (but still broadly Davidsonian) model') seems to be right.
3 . MENTALISM AND PHYSICALISM
I turn now to the second question I raised at the beginning of §2: how are mental causation and causal explanation related to the physical? There is a distinction between, on the one hand, what we could call a purely mentalistic account of psychological causation and, on the other, accounts which accept some degree of physicalism. 28 The pure mentalist accepts that we can tell causal stories about mental phenomena. But she thinks that the causal stories can be fully understood in mental terms, without making any claims or assumptions about physical causes, effects, or causal processes. All the claims we need to make in order to vindicate the idea that a particular type of mental phenomenon, or explanation, is causal can be made in wholly mental terms: causes and effects need only be characterized in mental terms, for instance; the counterfactuals we associate with causal claims can be understood without appeal to anything non-mental; and so on. There is no philosophical need to mention any non-mental properties in making causal claims about a subject's thoughts and actions intelligible. The physicalist denies this; a full understanding of causal relations involving mental phenomena, and of psychological explanations, must relate them to physical phenomena and to physical causality. Very crudely expressed, the physicalist's leading thought is this. All causal efficacy is the result, ultimately, of the efficacy of microlevel physical causes and causal processes. If we are given all micro level physical causal relations and processes in the world, we do not need to add anything else in order to have all the causal relations and processes (including the mental ones) in the world, or to generate all the causal occurrences (including the mental occurrences). That is to say that, in some sense, the facts of mental 28 A terminological point. I use 'mentalism' to contrast with 'physicalism'-in a way which this section should make clear. So my use of the term is different from the use of some philosophers of psychology-where the contrast is between mentalism and behaviourism. (For an example of that usage, see e.g. Fodor (1975) pp. 2-9·)
§3. Mentalism and Physicalism
III
causality are wholly determined by, or are constituted by, or obtain in virtue of, or are supervenient on, the facts of physical causality. The basic physicalist thought, then, is that if the facts of mental causation are to be intelligible, they must be related in some way to facts about physical causation. But there are different ways in which this thought may be developed, which differ about the strength of the relation between mental and physical. Suppose S switched on the kettle to make some coffee. That explanation expands in a familiar way: she switched on the kettle because she wanted to make some coffee and believed that switching on the kettle was a way to do so; she q,-d because she desired that q and believed that p. If that causal explanation is true, what must be true at the physical level? Or, in other words, what are the physical implications of a psychological explanation? There is a spectrum of possible views. The strongest view would be the familiar type-type identity theory. For each type of propositional attitude (believing that p, desiring that q, hoping that r, and so on), there is some physical property which is lawfully co-extensive with possession of that attitude. On that view, if our simple explanation of S's turning on the kettle is true, then the following must be true: S has some physical property Ph of a type which is lawfully co-extensive with believing that p; S has a physical property P2 , of a type which is similarly correlated with desiring that q; and Pt and P 2 combined causally in bringing about the physical movements by which S turned on the kettle. A slightly less demanding view, which still requires a very strong pattern of correlations between a subject's mental and non-mental properties, is the representational theory of mind, or the language of thought hypothesis. 29 On that view, there are no general type correlations between propositional attitudes and physical properties. But there are token correlations: to have a belief, say, is to be in some specific relation to an internal representation, where internal representations are real, physically realized entities. And there are strong constraints on the physical (or, more generally, syntactic) properties of those internal representations. Propositional attitudes have causal roles. And, by and large, the causal role actually played by a token belief, say, mirrors its rational role; on the whole, a 29
See e.g. Fodor (1975) or, for a brief statement, (1987) Ch.
I
and appendix.
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belief causes only attitudes and behaviour which are rational in the light of its content. Now the properties of a belief are explained by the properties of its associated representation. The only properties of a representation which could influence its causal behaviour are its physical or syntactic properties. So in order to understand the (otherwise miraculous) match between the semantic content of a belief, say, and its causal role, we must suppose that a representation's syntactic properties mirror its semantic properties. Given that theory, what are the physical implications of our simple action explanation? If 5 believes that p and desires that q, then 5 stands in the Belief relation to an internal representation Rh and stands in the Desire relation to an internal representation R2 ; RI has syntactic properties which mirror the content p, and R2 has syntactic properties which mirror the content q; and RI and R2 causally combine to bring about 5's physical movements. Davidson's anomalous monism proposes a considerably weaker relation between the mental and the physical. 30 '5 -d because she believed that p and desired that q' is a causal explanation. (i) Where there are causal explanations, there are causally related events. So there must have been a causal relation between mental events m l and m2: m2 (the effect) was 5's -ing; m l might have been the onset of the desire for coffee, perhaps, or 5's noticing that it was coffeetime. (ii) Where there are causally related events, there are strict causal laws which those events instantiate. And the only strict laws are physical laws. So there must be physical descriptions PI and P2, such that m l is a PI event and m2 is a P2 event, and there is a law linking events which are PI and events which are P2 : Necessarily, whenever there is a P! event there is a P2 event. (iii) If events are identical, they have all the same causes and effects. So the whole pattern of causal relations amongst the mental events which led up to the action must be mirrored in the pattern of physical events which caused it. 3 ! The most relaxed view about psychophysical correlations is that where there is a true causal story about mental phenomena, there 30 For the canonical statement of anomalous monism, see Davidson (19700), (1973a), and (1974a). 31 See Davidson (1973a) pp. 254-5. This last requirement, obvious enough in
itself, is often forgotten. That can make the sort of psychophysical correlations required by anomalous monism seem weaker than, in fact, they are.
§3. Mentalism and Physicalism
113
must be some causal story or other about the physical production of physical correlates of the mental effect, but that nothing very specific follows about the elements or the form of that physical causal story. We should not, for example, expect the physical causal story to be isomorphic with the corresponding mental story, with a one-one correlation between each element in the mental story and some corresponding element in the physical story. Rather, we should expect that the physical story will have its own shape and its own sort of complexity, and that there will be no systematic correlation at all between elements in the two causal stories; we should not even expect to find identities between token mental and physical events or states. If S -d because she believed that p and desired that q, what we can say is this. The claim has what we might call 'causal import'. This means that we are entitled to assume that there is a [physical, or neurophysiological] causal explanation of the fact that S did and that this explanation relates this action to other (actual and possible) actions by S in a causal, counterfactual supporting way .... It means that we are entitled to assume that there is a causally organized network through which actions that go with the same belief are related. But none of this entitles us to the simple idea that in marking S's reason as believing that p and desiring that q, we are limning the units that a future neuroscience will use in identifying the [physical] causes of behaviour.32
Similar views are expressed, for example, by Dennett and by Hornsby.33 And if the arguments of Chapter 2 are right, then nothing stronger than this view is sustainable. Most of us are drawn to some version of the physicalist view, rather than to the purely mentalist account of mental causation. But it is worth trying to understand what we find appealing about the physicalist view, and unappealing about the mentalist. The mentalist's thought is likely to be this: take a given area in which mental causation is at work; philosophy is interested in the concept of that phenomenon; and nothing in the concept of a causal 32 W. Robinson (1990) p. 51. (Rather than saying that there is a physical explanation of the fact that S did CP, I would say that there is a physical explanation of the bodily movements involved in S's doing CP.) 33 For Dennett's view, see e.g. his (1981): a reason explanation, he says, commits itself only 'to there being some causal explanation or other falling within a very broad area (i.e., the intentional interpretation is held to be supervenient on [the agent's) bodily condition)' (p. 57). For Hornsby's, see her (1993), especially pp. 167-8, 18 4-5.
3. Causal Theories relation between mental phenomena requires that the mental causation should be underpinned in some way by the physical-it is perfectly coherent to think of the mental causation operating without any physical underpinning at all. Consider the case of memory. There is a common-sense distinction between cases in which prompting jogs a memory, and cases in which it merely imparts information afresh. How can we make sense of that distinction? It is natural to do so in causal terms: when I really remember, my witnessing the event is causally responsible for my current beliefs and impressions; when I do not really remember, my current beliefs and impressions are causally explained by something else (typically by what others have told me about the event).34 And, on the mentalist view, that is all we need to say about the causation of memory. The connection between a memory and the remembered event is, in Anscombe's words, 'an original phenomenon of causality: one of its types ... No general theory about what causality is has to be introduced to justify acceptance of it. Nor does it have to be accommodated to any general theory, before it is accepted. It is just one of the things we mean by causality.'35 So to make intelligible the distinction between prompting which jogs a memory and prompting which imparts the information afresh, all we need say is this: 'When prompting jogs a memory, the prompting brings it about that I have beliefs and images which are causally derived from my witnessing of the original event; when prompting imparts the information afresh, there is no such causal link. That is a full and fully intelligible account. If someone challenges us to explain the causal relation, we should say that no further explanation is required; the causal claim is true, and that is all we need to say. In particular, the concept of memory does not require that there should be any linking mechanism intermediate between cause and effect. 36 Since it is not a priori that the causation of memory is physically mediated, and nothing about physical causes or causal processes comes into the concept of memory, there is simply no philosophical (as opposed to scientific) need to say anything about the relations between the causation of memory and the physical.' One response to this line of argument would be to question the 34 36
See Martin and Deutscher (1966). Cf. Wittgenstein (1981) §610.
35
Anscornbe (1976) p. 127.
§3. Mentalism and Physicalism rigid distinction which it requires between features which are part of the concept of memory and those which are not. 3? If it is actually true that memory is mediated by neurophysiological changes in the brain, and if that is widely believed by those who possess the concept of memory (or by experts to whose use of the concept ordinary usage is in some way deferential), there may be a good case for saying that the idea of physical mediation is part of the concept; or there may be no saying whether it is part of the concept or not. There is much to be said for that response. But suppose, for the sake of argument, that we concede that the idea of physical mediation is not part of the concept of memory. It may still be an intellectual imperative to say something about the relation between a mentalistic story about memory and various facts of physical causality. Philosophy has a legitimate interest not just in understanding the concept of memory but also in understanding the relations between different sorts of concepts which apply to subjects, and between different levels of description; and in that way it has an interest in understanding the phenomenon of memory itself. From that perspective, the purely mentalist story of memory causation is inadequate and intellectually unsatisfying. There are a number of reasons why. First there is the general physicalist point that I have already mentioned: that all causal relations and processes are determined by minute physical causal relations and processes. One way of putting the point is this. Con~ider the case of action. When someone acts, something physical happens. (We can say this without being committed to the idea that an action is a physical event.) But, at a basic level, any physical occurrence, any movement or change in matter, can in principle be completely causally accounted for in terms of minute physical causes and causal processes. 38 In giving this detailed microphysical account we give as complete an account as possible of what brought about the physical movements-of what 'did the actual causing'. Now there is also a mentalistic causal story; S -d because she noticed that p (and believed that q . .. etc.). The mental causation of the action must either operate independently of the physical processes which caused the movements S made, in which case the movements were causally For the classic statement of this sort of response, see Quine (1953). Sometimes S can act by not moving; but in those cases, too, there is a complete physical explanation of the absence of physical movement. 37 38
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overdetermined; or it must in some way be realized or constituted by the physical causal processes. But the physical movements by which S -d, or which constitute S's -ing, were not overdetermined; it is not true that, had the physical processes not occurred, those movements would still have happened, brought about directly by the mental cause. So the mental causation must be realized or constituted by the physical processes. 39 And exactly the same considerations apply to memory. This reasoning clearly depends on a general physicalist premiss: that any physical change or movement can be completely accounted for by physical causal processes. 40 That is not something we know a priori; epistemically, it could have turned out that some physical changes were accounted for by non-physical causes and mechanisms; or that they happened causelessly. But even if the physicalist premiss is not knowable a priori, it is, we suppose, true. Given its truth, we cannot be content to say that memory, for example, involves a sui generis sort of causation, whose operation is simply a basic, autonomous feature of the world; if we make the bare causal claim about memory and leave it at that, we do not fully understand the idea that present memories are caused by past events; we need to say something about how the effect is brought about by the cause. A second sort of reason for thinking that an account of memoryor of any mental phenomenon-must relate the mental causation to underlying physical processes is the idea that there are constraints on causation, or causal explanation, which can be satisfied in the mental case only if we appeal to the physical. There are various arguments of this sort. (i) It has been said that causal relations must be backed by strict causal laws. Given that premiss, it is argued, and the fact that there are no strict laws stateable in terms involving mental vocabulary, we must identify mental events with physical events if we are to understand the metaphysics of 39 Peacocke offers arguments of this form to show that mental events are identical with physical events ((1979) pp. 134-43), and that 'possession of a mental property (on a particular occasion) consists (at least on that occasion) in possession of a physical property' ((1989) pp. 73-4 (emphasis added)). One can accept the main thrust of the argument-that mental causation is realized or constituted by physical causation-without having to accept Peacocke's identity claims. For another statement of essentially the same line of thought, see Papineau (1990). 40 In cases of indeterminism, what is accounted for by physical causal processes is the chance of the change that occurs.
§3. Mentalism and Physicalism
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mental causation. 41 (ii) It has been argued that psychological explanations will satisfy conditions about the independence of explanans and explanandum only if the explanatory psychological properties are realized by physical properties. 42 (iii) Again, we might argue that we must appeal to physical characterizations of mental causes and effects to show how cause and effect satisfy the condition that causes and effects must be independent existences. If (i)-(iii) are genuine conditions on causation and causal explanation, they are a priori conditions; and it is a priori that they cannot be met by a purely mentalistic account of mental causation. So (if they are genuine constraints) it is a priori that pure mentalism is inadequate. (What we cannot tell a priori is whether there is some level of non-mental description other than the physical at which those constraints can be met. So these considerations would not provide an a priori route to physicalism.) I will not make use of either (i) or (ii); but (iii) will be a consideration, in Chapter 5 §4, in favour of a physicalist rather than a purely mentalist understanding of the causal element in vision. Third, there are general reasons for saying that a subject cannot be a possessor only of mental properties. (We have seen these reasons in the arguments for interpretationism (in Chapter I §3.3).) So there seems to be no prospect for an account of what it is to be a thinker, or to remember, or to act, which simply makes no reference to the fact that a subject is a physical individual with physical properties. Nor is there any clear motivation for wanting such an account; if our very concept of a thinker is the concept of a thing with a physical nature, it is not clear why we should want to understand mental phenomena and mental causation in a purely mentalistic way, nor why we should think it possible to do so. In making out the general case for preferring some sort of physicalist understanding of mental causation, I have concentrated mostly on the case of memory. But the considerations I have described apply across the board-to action, perception, and thought as much as to memory. I stressed that there is a whole spectrum of views which share the basic physicalist perspective. The strongest of these views are certainly ruled out by the arguments for the anomalism of the mental. If I am right, then there is a problem even about anomalous monism too; which would leave only the 41
See Davidson (197 oa ).
42
See Peacocke (1979) Ch. 3 §4.
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weakest form of physicalism. But issues about the precise form of an acceptable physicalism, and the exact way in which appeal to the physical must enter our understanding of mental causation, can only be decided by a detailed examination of the various phenomena; I shall approach these issues of detail in Chapter 5, where I discuss vision, and Chapter 6, where I discuss action.
4
Causalism and I nterpretationism: The Problem of Compatibility I N the previous chapter I started to develop the case for thinking of the mental in causal terms. But is causalism about the mental really compatible with the interpretationist approach? Many have thought not. Some of those in this incompatibilist tradition are causalists about the mental, who think (because of their incompatibilism) that interpretationism is unacceptable. They tend to express the incompatibilist intuition thus: 'causal theories see mental phenomena as internal states and events, mediating causally between perceptual inputs and behavioural outputs; but interpretationism is a form of instrumental ism, which rejects that view; so interpretationism is incompatible with causal ism.' Other incompatibilists have a broadly interpretationist understanding of the mental, and see that as a reason to reject causal theories. They might express the intuition in these terms: 'causal theories commit us to a Cartesian view of the mind; but the prime motivation for interpretationism is opposition to the Cartesian view; so it is impossible to accept both interpretationism and causal theories.' But, despite the differences, the central incompatibilist intuition is the same in each case. In this chapter I start, in § I, by ~xploring the main reasons for thinking that there is a tension between causalism and interpretationism. I defend the possibility of a compatibilist view against some of these objections; but a full defence will depend on the more detailed discussions of Chapters 5 and 6. In §2 I examine the suggestion that we can accommodate the important features of the interpretationist view and the causal view without accepting the compatibilist idea that interpretative stories about mental phenomena are themselves causal stories. In countering that suggestion I will argue that the compatibilist view is essential to a modest and