Children’s Health and Children’s Rights
Children’s Health and Children’s Rights
edited by
Michael Freeman
MARTINUS NIJHOFF PUBLISHERS LEIDEN/BOSTON
A C.I.P. record for this book is available from the Library Congress.
Printed on acid-free paper.
ISBN-13: 978-90-04-14894-9 ISBN-10: 90-04-14894-9 © 2006 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill Academic Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. http://www.brill.nl All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Brill Academic Publishers provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. Cover photograph © ANP, The Netherlands. Printed and bound in The Netherlands.
Contents Preface ..................................................................................................
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Children’s Health and Children’s Rights: An Introduction .................. Michael Freeman
1
Listening and Responding? Children’s Participation in Health Care within England .................................................................................. Anita Franklin and Patricia Sloper
11
The Participation Rights of Premature Babies ...................................... Priscilla Anderson, Joanna Hawthorne and Margaret Killen
31
Children and Research: A Risk of Double Jeopardy? ............................ Lynn Hagger and Simon Woods
51
Of Newborns and Nubiles: Some Critical Challenges to Children’s Rights in Africa in the Era of HIV/Aids ............................................ Julia Sloth-Nielsen Rights of the Autistic Child .................................................................. Rosalind Ekman Ladd Caring for Children with Severe Disabilities: Boundaried and Relational Rights .............................................................................. Jo Bridgeman
73
87
99
Adolescent Gender Identity and the Courts .......................................... 121 Melinda Jones Anorexia Nervosa and its Moral Foundations ...................................... 149 Simona Giordano Short Changed? The Law and Ethics of Male Circumcision ................ 161 Marie Fox and Michael Thomson
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CONTENTS
Communication for Abandonment of Female Genital Cutting ............ 183 Neil Ford Rethinking Gillick ................................................................................ 201 Michael Freeman Frail Connections: Legal and Psychiatric Knowledge Practices in U.S. Adjudication over Organ Donations by Children and Incompetent Adults ................................................................................................ 219 Marie-Andrée Jacob Minors and Euthanasia .......................................................................... 255 Debbie Mannaerts and Freddy Mortier Our Inheritance, Our Future: Their Rights? .......................................... 279 Sheila A.M. McLean and J. Kenyon Mason Predictive Genetic Testing in Children and Respect for Autonomy ...... 297 Philippa Malpas Defining Parenthood ............................................................................ 311 Bonnie Steinbock
Index .................................................................................................... 335
Preface This book has grown out of a Special Issue of the International Journal of Children’s Rights, which was published as a double issue in the summer of 2005. The book omits a book review: for this readers are referred to the journal. But it includes an article on children and euthanasia – a live issue in Belgium and the Netherlands and surely elsewhere in the near future – which it was not possible to include in the Special Issue of the journal. The Introduction takes account of this as it does more fully of Neil Ford’s article on female genital cutting (this was inserted in the journal at the last moment after the Introduction to the journal issue had been set). The International Journal of Children’s Rights is now into its thirteenth year. It is the leading journal on the subject and has had a formative influence on the developments of thinking about children’s rights. It is right here to pay tribute to Philip Veerman whose inspiration it was. The journal has had Special Issues before; for example on child sexual abuse, on food and nutrition rights and on children in Africa. But this is the first to form a separate book. The next Special Issue planned will examine children’s rights in post-communist Eastern Europe: this is scheduled for early 2007. Children rights and their health has been a neglected subject. There are now three monographs (by Alderson, Ross and Miller – the latter two books have been reviewed in the journal), and the editor of the journal (and of this book) has compiled a collection of materials on ‘Children, Medicine and the Law’. This was published by Ashgate early in 2005. This book contains an extensive bibliography to which those interested in the subject may refer. From this it will be observed that there is a range of articles across disciplines on issues of health and medicine in relation to children and their rights. The subject is an evolving one and this is reflected in this volume with discussions of subjects like euthanasia and gender identity which would not have been found in the literature until relatively recently. This book contains a wide range of articles on a diverse set of subjects. The articles come from a range of disciplines and from several countries. The volume should stimulate debate on children’s issues and contribute to the development of policy. The Special Issue and this volume underwent a lengthy gestation period. There were articles which do not appear in this volume which were commissioned and promised – some of these may find their way into subsequent issues of the journal. I want to thank all those who assisted me in the production of this book. Lindy Melman at Brill encouraged me to produce the Special Issue and saw the
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opportunity to turn it into a book. Leonieke Aalders, also at Brill, was particularly helpful in bringing the project to fruition. And Priscilla Saporu, my secretary and personal assistant for much of 2005, was invaluable. Without her organisational skills, I doubt if this volume would have appeared. I must also thank the authors. All of them are donating their fee for contributing to this volume to UNICEF’s vaccination programme. Some children will thus benefit directly from the production of this book. But we hope children generally will gain from the discussion of the issues in this book. Michael Freeman
Children’s Health and Children’s Rights: An Introduction MICHAEL FREEMAN Faculty of Laws, University College London
Despite the more prominent focus on children’s rights today, reflected in and stimulated by the International Journal of Children’s Rights, relatively little attention has been given to children’s rights in the health care area. There are now three monographs,1 and there is increasing discussion in books on children’s rights.2 The questions that can, and have, been raised are many. They include – who decides whether a sick child should be treated (doctors, parents, the child, courts)?3 – when is a child competent to decide upon treatment (at a certain age or when capable of making the decision)?4 – if a child can agree to treatment, can s/he also refuse treatment (a blood transfusion, an abortion, a heart transplant)?5 – should grossly premature babies be saved?6 – should severely disabled new-born babies be kept alive or allowed to die?7 – can anorexic adolescents be force-fed?8 – can children donate organs to siblings?9 – should parents be allowed to use pre-implantation genetic diagnosis in order to have a child to save an existing sick child?10 – should parents be allowed to sanction non-therapeutic surgical procedures?11 – is the genetic screening of children legitimate?12 – can healthcare and education be separated (for example in the case of the autistic child)?13 – Whether a child should be permitted the right to have his/her life terminated by euthanasia14 Many of these issues, and several others, are discussed in this collection. The essays by Franklin and Sloper and by Alderson and her colleagues focus on participation rights. The U. N. Convention on the Rights of the Child is pivotal to this (Van Bueren, 1995; Kufeldt, 1993, Prout, 2000, Smith, 2002, Sinclair, 2004). The case for children’s participation has now been made. But, as Franklin and Sloper point out, children are given ‘little voice’ in medical consultations and are rarely consulted as partners in the evaluation and planning of health services15 whether a child should be permitted the right to have his/her life terminated by euthanasia. They use a model developed by Alderson and Montgomery (1996) which indicates four levels at which children can participate: being informed, expressing a view, influencing a decision; being the Michael Freeman (Ed.), Children’s Health and Children’s Rights, 1–10. © 2006. Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands.
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main decider. It is doubtful whether information needs are met. Equally doubtful is whether adequate mechanisms exist to allow children and young people to express their views. There are obvious barriers which obstruct participation, one of which is the way we view children.16 And children are not all alike. Leaving aside obvious differences of age, there are ethnicity and gender differences and, of course, disabled children raise a different set of issues (Cavet and Sloper, 2004). Franklin and Sloper discuss these questions within the context of England. Are things better elsewhere? The article by Alderson, Hawthorne and Killen expands our thinking about participation rights into new terrain, that of premature babies. Alderson (2000) had already explored young children’s and babies’ rights, quoting Trevarthen (1999). ‘It is clear from the beginning that children have a driving motivation to become part of a meaningful world. They want roles. They want to have tasks, they want to share interests, they want to have possessions, they like being able to share things with other people, they like to be able to share purposes and functions’.17 (see also Mayall, 1993)
In the article in this collection the rights of premature babies are explored using the U.N. Convention framework. They offer a valuable corrective to the new orthodoxy, represented by Harris (1985) and Singer (1995), that babies are nonpersons. Alderson and her colleagues note that although the right to life is often discussed as if it is something ‘adults allow or support’ and ‘babies receive’, ‘many premature babies put much energy and concentration into surviving as if, consciously or not, they value their life’.18 The article offers insights also into participation rights. The authors stress the ways that even premature babies can exercise their Article 12 rights. And ‘Countless observed and reported examples in the four NICU showed that many adults were convinced that they were not mechanically caring for the unconscious organisms that some philosophers allege babies to be. Instead, they were interacting within human relationships influenced by the babies’ views’.19
There has been much heart searching in the past on the issue of research with children. The Ramsey-McCormick debate was especially significant (Ramsay, 1976, 1977; McCormick, 1976). Ramsey argued that children should never participate as research subjects in ‘non-therapeutic research’. Participation, he argued, required informed consent which children could not give. Nor did he believe that parents as fiduciaries could authorise their child’s participation without being in breach of their duties. McCormick thought that parental consent was ‘morally valid insofar as it is a reasonable presumption of the child’s wishes’ (1974, p.11). To McCormick there are certain identifiable values that we ought to support because they are definitive of our flourishing and wellbeing, and children would choose (if they could) to participate. Ramsey’s
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response was that if McCormick were right ‘anyone – and not only children – may legitimately be entered into human experimentation without his will’ (Ramsey, 1976, p. 24). Ramsey also adduced that Kantian objection that using children as research subjects used them as ‘means’ and not as ends in themselves.20 The paper by Hagger and Woods takes up these issues and considers them further. They accept the vulnerability of children, but also the need for drugs to be tested upon them, and argue the case accordingly for safeguards, though they express concern that these should not prevent the recruitment of a sufficient number of children into a study. They consider that research regulation to be too paternalistic, and advocate a ‘more robust approach to allowing children to engage in non-therapeutic research’ and claim this is ‘ethically defensible’.21 The HIV/AIDS pandemic post-dates the U.N. Convention, as Sloth-Nielsen points out. But implications for children and their rights are profound, and a recent General Comment by the U. N. Committee on the Rights of Child has addressed these. It alerts us to four principles in the Convention (non-discrimination, best interests, the right to survival and development, and the right to have views respected). There are, however, deeper questions, such as the contradictions between rights to survival and development on one hand, and non-discrimination on the other hand, and it is these that Sloth-Nielsen addresses. There is little discussion today in Europe or the U.S. of mandatory testing for HIV infection (O’Brien, 1989 and Childress, 1991) but the issue remains a live one in Southern Africa. There are issues of consent to testing too, particularly in AIDS-ravaged countries where there may be no one to consent to a child being tested. The Nigel Redman case,22 which Sloth-Nielsen discusses, offers interesting insights into the dilemmas raised. The next two papers deal with two very different problems related to disability. Ladd examines the rights of the autistic child. Autism raises real problems. Is ‘assistance’ of the autistic child treatment or special education? Does an autistic child have the right to treatment or to be left alone? And what of the right (in Article 19 of the Convention) not to be subjected to physical punishment? Is this an absolute right (Newell, 1989; Miller 1987) or is it qualified when it is the only way of preventing self-injurious behaviour? These are important questions which existing literature has tended to gloss over or ignore. Bridgeman looks at the treatment of children with severe disabilities, concentrating in particular on the Glass case heard by English and European courts in the last couple of years.23 The Glass case illustrates the way the law can create conflict between professionals and parents when, as Bridgeman argues, ‘it should create a framework which supports and encourages them to work together’24 (which is exactly the ‘partnership’ ideal embodied in English
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child care law).25 Bridgeman appropriately questions what is meant by a ‘severe’ disability,26 pointing out that the earliest cases were about Down’s Syndrome babies (then designated mongols) which, only a generation ago, was regarded as so severe that some thought such babies should be allowed (even assisted) to die.27 One of the lessons to emerge from the Glass saga is that in a battle between family and medical personnel (and as you will see it became a battle literally), the rights of the child can be given less attention that they deserve. It is striking how little emphasis there is on the U. N. Convention in cases like Glass, or in the high-profile cases which have followed.28 Jones looks at yet another relatively new question: adolescent gender identity. She focuses on two recent Australian decisions, Re A and Re Alex29 which concern young people extremely distressed about their gender identity who wanted gender reassignment. The cases raise issues regarding the rights of the child to consent to gender reassignment, and also about the role of the courts in such applications. A was inter-sex; A was female but suffered from gender dysphoria. Both cases raise interesting rights issues, most significantly that relating to identity (and see Article 8 of the U. N. Convention). Neither child was found to be Gillick-competent, thus depriving us of discussion as to whether a Gillick-competent child could consent to gender reassignment. Even so Chief Justice Nicholson thought it right to distinguish using contraceptives from changing sex.30 Indeed, he was of the view that such a decision could not be taken ‘until the young person reaches maturity’ (by which I suspect he means ‘majority’). Other jurisdictions are bound to be confronted with these issues. Perhaps with the even more difficult one of a child who refuses gender reassignment when parents (or a court) thinks this is in his/her best interests.31 It is in connection with refusing treatment that the adolescent anorexic has troubled the courts. The next article in this collection examines anorexia nervosa from a rather different perspective. Giordano offers an understanding of anorexia in terms of the mind/body dualism. In the mind-body split, the body is insignificant. As she points out: ‘Within an ethic that demands the submission of the ‘physical’’, . . . . control over one of the most pressing physiological impulses, hunger, is praised’.32 Giordano argues that anorexia is not a response to the pressure to be thin operated by the media. This is, she argues, ‘a disgraceful minimisation of the complex psychological, social and cultural backgrounds that inform the sufferers’ behaviour. The fight against fat is a fight for control, a crusade for moral affirmation, for integrity and perfection’.33 With this understanding, a decision like that of the English Court of Appeal in Re W 34 becomes all the more unfathomable. The article by Fox and Michael Thomson offers a critique of routine neonatal male circumcision. Although defences of this are still found in contemporary literature (Freeman, 1999; Bridge, 2002; Benatar and Benatar, 2003) and English courts for one have accepted its lawfulness,35 this practice has been
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subjected to widespread condemnation. Some would even equate it with female genital mutilation.36 Fox and Thomson are concerned with the way that, despite the harms they identify which are associated with this practice, parental choice is privileged. Routine neonatal male circumcision has declined and may now be found to exist only amongst those committed to circumcision as a fundamental religious practice. Non-therapeutic and non-consensual circumcision, when not mandated by religion and not justified by the needs of cultural identity, cannot be defended. Whether it is child abuse, as some claim (Miller, 1990; Feldman, 1993, 158–160) is more dubious. Ritual male circumcision has to be looked at differently. Far from it constituting abuse, it is arguable that the failure by Jewish or Muslim parents to circumcise their sons is a form of abuse, with the child being likely to suffer ‘significant harm’.37 Fox and Thomson do not consider Article 8 of the U. N. Convention which requires respect for the child’s identity: nor do they note its Preamble which refers to ‘the importance of the traditions and cultural values of each people for the protection and harmonious development of the child’. Ford examines a new approach to female genital mutilation (or cutting). He points out that previous strategies, such as laws criminalising it, have had little effect. There have, of course, been well-publicised prosecutions, particularly in France. He, therefore, directs our attention to a new approach which adopts a non-directive social change process and places human rights communication within it. Rather than seeing laws as initiating social change, he urges that they should be used to ‘ratify success once a tipping point has been achieved’. He cites the precedent (from 100 years ago) of the Chinese practice of foot binding and the way this was ended. That took barely a decade after public discussion emerged within Chinese society, and augurs well in relation to female genital cutting. He does not discuss the issue in relation to ethnic minorities in first world countries (the United Kingdom or France, for example). Whether discussion and communication will work in such marginalized communities is debatable but should not be ruled out. The next article by Freeman rethinks Gillick. It examines the retreat from the 1985 decision in a succession of cases where children have refused treatment and calls for a new Gillick which puts goals and values in the forefront and places less emphasis on knowledge and understanding (and see Alderson and Goodwin, 1993). Jacob’s wide-ranging paper focuses on how legal texts are built. She examines the contribution of psychiatrists and others to the normalisation of organ transplants involving children and also incompetent adults. This is an investigation of how legal actors come to argue, determine and reform what is good, acceptable or illegitimate use of medical technologies. Although it is about organ donations by children, the thesis has implications across a wide range of medico-legal questions and not just those that affect children and incompetent
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adults. As she acknowledges, it may cast light for example on the ‘saviour sibling’ debate ‘on whether it is morally right to procreate a child in order to save the life of an existing one’ which is currently emerging (and see Freeman, 2006, forthcoming). Mannaerts and Mortier debate one of the most controversial issues relating to children and their health: should children be permitted to request that their lives be ended by active euthanasia? This is not – or not yet – an issue in most of the world where active euthanasia is not permitted. But it is a live issue in the Netherlands and in Belgium. Both of these countries permit active euthanasia for adults in carefully-regulated circumstances, and Netherlands allows this also for children of 12 and above (parental agreement being required for those under 16). Belgium does not. Mannaerts and Mortier argue the case for allowing euthanasia for minors. In England children – for these purposes those under 18 – cannot even refuse treatment. Of course, in any system in which they can – and Belgium is one – it is illogical to allow this, and in effect passive euthanasia, and not permit a child the opportunity to request a quic rather than long drawn out and undignified death. The next two articles by McLean and Mason and by Malpas focus on genetic testing. McLean and Mason examine a recent UK Government White Paper,38 in particular its proposals relating to the genetic testing of children. There are those who fear the detrimental potential of genetic information (on insurance, for example, or as regards discrimination). Others see instead the possible benefits of genetic knowledge to the family, including the child. McLean and Mason argue that the negative consequences of obtaining the information may ‘far outweigh any benefits achieved’.39 They have a concern with the possibility that proposals could be considered as ‘an encouragement to selective elimination of the disabled’.40 Their main concern though is with the rights of children. They have concern about the possible effects on children’s rights of intrusive, non-therapeutic interventions which, they warn, could become a reality if genetic profiling at birth is routinised. ‘Their rights [must] not be compromised by our technological capacities. . . .’41 Malpas, by contrast, sees compelling reasons to test. Her argument is that ‘the benefits for autonomy’s development in terms of enabling the child to begin to make plans and decisions about their own future. . . . trumps the child’s future decision not to know’.42 But what if the results are unfavourable, showing in effect a blighted future? That there is at least closure is hardly a healthy response. Wertz reported some ten years ago that US genetics professionals were receiving parental requests to test children for genes for Huntington’s chorea because they wanted to know whether or not they should set aside money for college tuition (see Wertz, 2002, 94). Malpas assumes that if children were competent to take the decision to be tested they would do so.
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But most adults, when offered testing for themselves, decide they do not want to know (e.g. Tyler, et al., 1992; Flinter et al., 1992). You have to know who you are to be able even to speculate about your future. Steinbock, in the final paper in this collection, raises questions about parenthood. The reproduction revolution has made us have to rethink concepts previously taken for granted. There have always been disputes as to with whom a child should live, but rarely at least as to maternity. Now that there may be competing ‘claims’ both as to who the mother is and who the father is – there could, Steinbock notes, be six contenders for the role of parent – questions have begun to be raised as to the basis of parenthood (see e.g. Shanley, 2001). But the problem is, as Steinbock acknowledges, ‘not framing the issue in terms of competing individual rights, but rather that the rights of children are too often given short shrift’.43 Of course, this only pushes the question into the further one of asking which rights children have in these complex areas. Do they have a right to the truth – to know their identity – or do they want a secure environment? But even this is not a complete answer, for some may want one and some the other, and some both. And even an emphasis on identity begs questions for it can be defined genetically, gestationally and socially. What is in a child’s interests? Could it be, as Steinbock suggests, to admit that s/he has a plurality of parents?
Notes 1 By Alderson (1993), Ross (1998) and Miller (2003). Freeman (2005(a)) contains a very full Bibliography. 2 For example, Fortin (2003), ch. 5. See also Alderson and Montgomery (1996). 3 See Freeman (2000(a), 2001). 4 The Gillick case [1986] AC 112 is seminal. And see Franklin and Sloper at pp. 7–25 and Alderson et al., at pp. 27–46. 5 An issue very much to the fore in England in the retreat from Gillick. See Freeman, pp. 178–195. 6 See Wyatt (1998) and Alderson et al., pp. 27–46. 7 An early discussion, still important, is Kuhse and Singer (1985). See Bridgeman at pp. 95–115. 8 See Draper (2000) and Giordano at pp. 145–156. 9 See Ross, L.F. (1998). 10 See Robertson (2002), Sheldon and Wilkinson (2004), Freeman (2006, forthcoming). 11 This has been raised in such different areas as sterilisation of the learning disabled (Freeman, 1988) and circumcision (Benatar and Benatar, 2003; Bridge, 2002). The latter is discussed by Fox and Thomson at pp. 157–177. 12 See Robertson and Savulescu (2001), Ross (2002), Hoffmann and Wulfsberg (1995). And see McLean and Mason, pp. 233–250. and Malpas, pp. 251–263. 13 See Ladd, pp. 83–94. The question might also be raised in relation to housing or social security and health care.
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See Mannaerts and Mortier, xxxx. See p.10. 16 See p.17. Some light is thrown on this by the events in the Bristol Royal Infirmary and the Alder Hey Hospital in Liverpool (and see Bridgeman, 2002). 17 See Alderson (2000, p. 26) quoting Trevarthen (1999), himself quoted in D. Purves and D. Selleck, Tuning into Children, BBC. 18 See p. 35. 19 See p. 41. 20 This argument is common in the current controversy over saviour siblings (see Freeman, 2006, forthcoming). 21 See p. 57. 22 Ex parte Nigel Redman NO (unreported 03/14083): see p. 78. 23 R v. Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust ex parte Glass [1999] 2 FLR 905; Glass v. United Kingdom [2004] 1 FLR 1019. 24 See p. 97. 25 See Children Act 1989. Partnership is more deeply embodied in some other systems (I discuss this at Freeman, 2000(b)). 26 See p. 97. See also Huxtable and Forbes (2004). 27 See R v. Arthur (1981) 12 BMLR1; Re B (Baby Alexandra) [1981] 1 WLR 1421. 28 The Charlotte Wyatt and Luke Winston-Jones cases, reported at [2005] 1 FLR 21 and [2005] 1 FLR 491 respectively. 29 (1993) 16 Fam LR 715; [2004] Fam CA 297. 30 [2004] Fam CA 297 at para. 173. 31 And see Freeman at pp. 179–195. 32 See p. 151. 33 See p. 154. See also Freeman at p. 186. 34 Re W is discussed at pp. 184–186. 35 See Re J [2000] 1 FLR 571; Re S [2005] 1 FLR. 36 Boyd (1998) and Gollaher (2000) argue it has common origins. See further Freeman, 1995. 37 English law defines abuse in terms of ‘significant harm’ (Children Act 1989 s.31(2)). 38 See also now Human Genetics Commission (2005). 39 See p. 247. 40 Ibid. 41 See p. 248. 42 See p. 261. See also Clayton, 2002. 43 See p. 278. 15
References Alderson, P. (1993) Children’s Consent To Surgery, Buckingham, Open University Press ——— (2000) Young Children’s Rights, London, Jessica Kingsley. Alderson, P. and Goodwin, M. (1993) ‘Contradictions Within Concepts of Children’s Competence’ International Journal of Children’s Rights, 1, 303–314. Alderson, P. and Montgomery, J. (1996) Health Care Choices: Making Decisions With Children, London, Institute for Public Policy Research. Benatar, M. and Benatar, D. (2003) ‘Between Prophylaxis and Child Abuse: The Ethics of Neonatal Male Circumcision’, American Journal of Bioethics, 3(2), 35–48.
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Boyd, B. R. (1998) Circumcision Exposed: Rethinking A Medical and Cultural Tradition, Freedom, California, The Crossing Press. Bridge, C. (2002) ‘Religion, Culture and the Body of the Child’ in (eds.) A. Bainham et al., Body Lore and Laws, Oxford, Hart. Bridgeman, J. (2002) ‘After Bristol: The Healthcare of Young Children and the Law’, Legal Studies, 23, 229–250. Cavet, J. and Sloper, P. (2004) ‘Participation of Disabled Children In Individual Decisions About Their Lives’, Children and Society, 18, 278–290. Childress, J. (1991) ‘Mandatory HIV Screening and Testing’ in (ed.) F. Reamer, AIDS and Ethics, New York, Columbia University Press, 50–76. Clayton, M. (2002) ‘Individual Autonomy and Genetic Choice’ in (eds) J. Burley and J. Harris, A Companion to Genethics, Oxford, Blackwell, 191–205. Draper, H. (2000) ‘Anorexia Nervosa and Respecting A Refusal of Life-Prolonging Therapy: A Limited Justification’, Bioethics, 14, 120–133. Feldman, D. (1993) Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Flinter F. A., et al. (1992) ‘Population Screening For Cystic Fibrosis’ Lancet 339, 1539– 1540. Fortin, J. (2003) Children’s Rights and the Developing Law, London, Butterworths (2nd ed). Freeman, M. (1988) ‘Sterilising the Mentally Handicapped’ in M.D.A. Freeman, Medicine, Ethics and Law, London, Stevens. ——— (1995) ‘The Morality of Cultural Pluralism’ International Journal of Children’s Rights, 3, 1–17. ——— (1999) ‘A Child’s Right To Circumcision’, British Journal of Urology International 83, Supplement 1 74–78. ——— (2000(a)) ‘Can We Leave the Best Interests of Very Sick Children To Their Parents?’ in (eds.) M. Freeman and A. Lewis, Law and Medicine, Oxford, Oxford University Press. ——— (2000(b)) ‘The End of the Century of the Child?’ Current Legal Problems 53, 509–558. ——— (2001) ‘Whose Life Is It Anyway?’ Medical Law Review 9, 259–280. ——— (2005 (a)) Children, Medicine and the Law, Aldershot, Ashgate. ——— (2005 (b)) ‘The Truth About Fathers’ in (ed.) J. Spencer, forthcoming. ——— (2006) ‘Saviour Siblings’ in (ed.) S. McLean, Essays in Honour of J. Kenyon Mason, Oxford, Hart, forthcoming. Gollaher, D. L. (2000) Circumcision: A History of the World’s Most Controversial Surgery, New York, Basic Books. Harris, J. (1985) The Value of Life, London, Routledge, Kegan Paul. Hoffmann, D. and Wahlsferg, E. (1995) ‘Testing Children for Genetic Predispositions: Is it in their Best Interest?’ Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 331–344. Human Genetics Commission (2005) Profiling the Newborn: A Prospective Gene Technology www.hgc.gov.uk (March 2005). Huxtable, R. and Forbes, K. (2004) ‘Glass v. U.K: Maternal Instinct v. Medical Opinion’, Child and Family Law Quarterly, 16, 339–344. Kuhse, H. and Singer, P. (1985) Should The Baby Live? The Problem of Handicapped Infants, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Kufeldt, K. (1993) ‘Listening to Children: An Essential For Justice’, International Journal of Children’s Rights, 1, 155–164. Mayall, B. (1993) ‘Keeping Children Healthy’, Social Science and Medicine, 36, 77–84.
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Miller, A. (1987) For Your Own Good: The Roots of Violence In Child-Rearing, London, Virago. Miller, R. (2003) Children, Ethics and Modern Medicine, Bloomington, Indiana University Press . Newell, P. (1989) Children Are People Too, London, Bedford Square Press. O’Brien, M. (1989) ‘Mandatory HIV Antibody Testing Policies: An Ethical Analysis’, Bioethics, 3, 273–300. Prout, A. (2000) ‘Children’s Participation: Control and Self-Realisation in British Late Modernity’, Children and Society, 14, 304–315. Ramsey, P. (1976) ‘The Enforcement of Morals: Non-Therapeutic on Children’, 6 Hastings Center Report 21. ——— (1977) ‘Children As Research Subjects: A Reply’, 7 Hastings Center Report 40. Robertson, J. and Savulescu, J. (2001) ‘Is There A Case in Favour of Predictive Genetic Testing in Young Children?’, Bioethics 15, 26–49. Robertson, J., and Kahn, J. and Wagner, J. (2002) ‘Conception To Obtain Haematopoietic Stem Cells’, Hastings Center Report 32(3), 34–40. Ross, L.F. (1998) Children, Families and Health Care, Oxford, Clarendon Press. Ross, L.F. (2002) ‘Predictive Genetic Testing for Conditions That Present in Childhood’, Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 12, 225. Shanley, M.L. (2001) Making Babies: Making Families, Boston, Beacon Press. Sheldon, S. and Wilkinson, S. (2004) ‘Should Selecting Saviour Siblings Be Banned?’, Journal of Medical Ethics, 30, 533. Sinclair, R. (2004) ‘Participation In Practice: Making it Meaningful, Effective and Sustainable’, Children and Society 18, 106–118. Singer, P. (1995) Rethinking Life and Death, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Smith, A.B., (2002) ‘Interpreting and Supporting Participation Rights: Contributions from Socio-cultural Theory’, International Journal of Children’s Rights 10, 73–88. Trevarthen, C. (1999) Quoted in L. Purves and D. Selleck, Tuning Into Children, London, BBC. Tyler, A. et al. (1992) ‘Presymptomatic Testing for Huntington’s Disease in Wales 1987–1990’, British Journal of Psychiatry 161, 481–488. Van Bueren, G. (1995) The International Law on the Rights of the Child, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff. Wertz, D. (2002) ‘Testing Young Children and Adolescents’ in (eds.) J. Burley and J. Harris, A Companion to Genethics, Oxford, Blackwall, 9–113. Wyatt, J. (1998) Matters of Life and Death, Leicester, Inter-Varsity Press.
Listening and Responding? Children’s Participation in Health Care within England ANITA FRANKLIN AND PATRICIA SLOPER Social Policy Research Unit, University of York
Introduction This article examines recent health policy developments in England in relation to children’s rights under Article 12 and 13 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). It draws on practice and research literature to explore evidence regarding: children’s participation both within decisions about their own care and concerning the development of health services, their access to mechanisms that allow them a voice, the provision of and need for accessible information, and factors which prevent or facilitate children’s participation. This paper does not explore in detail issues concerning children’s consent or competence to participate, for authoritative accounts on these subjects, see for example, Alderson and Montgomery, 1996; Alderson, 2000; British Medical Association, 2001; Department of Health, 2001a. Figure One: Article 12 and Article 13 of United Nations Convention on the Rights of The Child (1989) Article 12 1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child. 2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law. Article 13 1. The child shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of the child’s choice.
Michael Freeman (Ed.), Children’s Health and Children’s Rights, 11–29. © 2006. Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands.
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The term children is used to describe children and young people and does not specify an age range thus reflecting the variation and ambiguity of age range within much of the literature on children’s participation.
Policy on involving children and young people Children’s rights to expression and to receiving information are underpinned by Articles 12 and 13 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). The UK Government ratified the UNCRC in 1991, in the intervening years participatory initiatives and consultations have grown across social care, health and education (Willow, 1997, 2002; Department of Health, 1999, 2001b, 2003a; Sinclair and Franklin, 2000; Cavet and Sloper, 2004; Sinclair, 2004). Within England there is widespread acknowledgment that children should be involved in decisions which affect them. This is reflected in existing law, government guidance, regulations and policy. The Human Rights Act 1998 (Article 10) requires central and local government to uphold a right to freedom of expression and the Children Act 1989 requires local authorities to ascertain the wishes and feelings of children they look after or are about to look after, and to give these due consideration, subject to practicability, plus the child’s age and understanding. For disabled children, guidance and regulations (Department of Health, 1991) make it clear that, if a child has complex needs, communication difficulties or severe learning difficulties, arrangements must be made to establish their views, and that a disabled child cannot be assumed to be incapable of sharing in decision-making. Even the structures and culture of central government have to some extent embraced participation with the establishment of young people’s advisory fora, and the publication of a framework of core principles for children and young people’s involvement across all government departments. Alongside this is the requirement for all central government departments to produce associated Action Plans detailing how they are to involve children and young people in the decision-making of their department (Children and Young People’s Unit, 2001). The government want children and young people to have more opportunities to get involved in the design, provision and evaluation of policies and services that affect them or which they use (Children and Young People’s Unit, 2001, p. 2).
In addition, the government has started to address the need for accessible information for young people by making some of its websites and reports of consultation results available in child-friendly formats (See website: http://www. everychildmatters.gov.uk).
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Within health care, service users in general are being given more power in exercising choice and influencing the nature and quality of the services they receive: this also includes children and young people. For example, new national requirements for patient and public involvement place a duty on service providers to involve children and young people (Department of Health, 1999, 2001b, 2003a, 2003b). The Department of Health documents in its action plan an expectation that children and young people will be ‘routinely’ involved in service development at both central government and local level. Participation should go beyond consultation and ensure that children and young people initiate action and make decisions in partnership with adults, for example, making decisions about their care and treatment or in day to day decisions about their lives (Department of Health, 2002, p. 4).
Within England, the Children’s National Service Framework (NSF) sets standards aimed at raising the quality of the health and social care services that children receive. The Framework has a broad remit and it stresses the need to consult and involve children: the standard for hospital services states that “children, young people and their parents will participate in designing NHS [National Health Service] and social care services that are readily accessible, respectful, empowering, follow best practice in obtaining consent and provide effective response to their needs” (Department of Health, 2003b, p. 9). Since 2002, all English NHS and Primary Care Trusts, have been required to establish a Patient Advice and Liaison Service (PALS). This service seeks to enable patients and the public, including children and young people, to access information and raise issues of concern (Department of Health, 2000; 2001c). Professional organisations have also recognised the importance of involving children and young people. The British Medical Association (2001) states that health professionals should ensure the participation of children and young people in all aspects of decision-making about their healthcare and that health professionals should take all reasonable steps to enhance the ability of children to participate in decision-making. However, despite legislative requirement and a shift in philosophy, the Government’s commitment to children’s participation has been criticised by the UN Committee reviewing the UK Government’s implementation of the UNCRC. Whilst recognising the increased emphasis placed on participation by the Government, the Committee felt there was still more to do, especially in ensuring that participation leads to change. The Committee recommends that the State party, in accordance with Articles 12 and 17, take further steps to promote, facilitate and monitor systematic, meaningful and effective participation of all groups of children . . . The Committee further recommends that procedures be formed to acknowledge publicly the
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views expressed by children and the impact that they have on developing programmes and policies, and reflect how they are taken into consideration (Committee for the Rights of the Child, 2002, p. 7, quoted in Sinclair, 2004, p. 110).
The movement towards involving children in their healthcare is based on the growing body of evidence demonstrating children’s competence to be involved in decisions about their health and care, and about the relevance of experience to competence (for example, Alderson, 1993; Eiser, 1993; Rylance, 1996). Children with experience of severe illness or disability, especially, can contribute unique and essential knowledge during decision-making, which must be given serious consideration when helping children and parents decide about consent to treatment (Alderson, 1993; Alderson and Montgomery, 1996). Five years ago, Dixon-Woods et al. (1999) wrote that evidence suggests that partnership with children enjoys only limited success. Children are given little voice in medical consultations and are rarely consulted as partners in the evaluation and planning of health services. So what is the reality five years on? Does the evidence suggest movement towards more participatory practice and accessible information for children and young people within healthcare?
What is meant by participation? The term “participation” covers a broad continuum of involvement in decisions; it is a multi-layered concept, involving many different processes (see e.g. Kirby et al., 2003a; Sinclair, 2004). Boyden and Ennew (1997) state that there are two interpretations of the term ‘participation’. It can simply mean taking part, being present or consulted. Alternatively, it can denote a transfer of power so that participants’ views influence decisions. A number of writers have developed typologies to illustrate this. These generally make hierarchical distinctions between levels of participation according to the degree of power that is shared or transferred, usually depicted as steps on a ‘ladder of participation’. Arnstein (1969) first developed the ladder of participation in relation to citizen involvement in community development. Hart (1992, 1997) adapted this for children’s participation and a number of variations on this have followed, including Shier (2001) who attempts to create a “pathway to participation”. Shier adapts the ladder to help practitioners to explore the participation process, determine their current position and identify the necessary steps to be taken to increase their level of participation (see also for example, Thoburn et al., 1995; McNeish and Newman, 2002). These typologies have been criticised as they suggest a hierarchy with the objective being to reach the highest level, where children are the main decider (Treseader, 1997; Willow, 1997; Lardner, 2001). However, participation rights do not necessarily confer the right to be
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the main decider, nor do children want to exclude their parents and other adults from the process (Lansdown, 1995; Alderson and Montgomery, 1996; Morrow, 1998). Studies have also shown that children and young people recognise the limits of their autonomy and accept their need for adult guidance and support (Newman, 1996; Morrow, 1998). Recently, Kirby et al. (2003a) have developed a non-hierarchical model of participation, where no one level is assumed to be superior to another; instead the type of participation activity will be determined according to the circumstances and the participating children and young people. Models of participation help to distinguish between different levels of empowerment afforded to children and young people, highlight the need to understand the term participation and prompt examination of what kind of participation is appropriate. It is now generally accepted within England, that the level of children’s participation will vary depending on the decisions involved and the capability and choice of the child. However, meaningful participation must also be seen as a process not simply an isolated activity or event (Kirby et al., 2003a). Alderson and Montgomery (1996) define four levels at which children can participate; 1. 2. 3. 4.
Being informed Expressing a view Influencing a decision Being the main decider
Taking Alderson and Montogomery’s example, all levels are important methods of participation and the first three precede the fourth if the child is to make an informed choice. The first three levels are contained within the UNCRC and include any child who can first understand information, secondly, form a view and finally, is considered to be able to form a view which can usefully inform the decision-making process. This model provides a useful framework to examine the evidence of children’s participation within healthcare in England at this present time.
Provision and need for accessible information Genuine participation is based on informed consent and requires that children and young people are given full and accessible information about the decisions to be made and/or the participation activity. Children cannot participate in decisions if they are not fully informed of the options available to them and the implications of those options, it is the first and vital stage of the process. Children in hospital settings, for example, need to be informed about who is responsible for telling them what is happening, what the implications of
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treatment are, side effects, options that are available, implications of not having the treatment, whether it will hurt and how long it will take (Lansdown, 1995). While it is arguable that Article 12 is limited by reference to particular attributes of the child, namely their capacity, age and maturity, Article 13 grants children the right to express, seek and receive information in any medium they wish. This emphasis on provision of appropriate means of communication is of particular significance to younger children and disabled children, especially those with communication related impairments. The Department of Health states explicitly that a child who is learning disabled should not be assumed to lack competence: “many children will be competent if information is presented in an appropriate way and they are supported through the decision-making process” (Department of Health, 2001a, p. 4). Parents and health practitioners have a clear duty under Article 12 to ensure that the child has been given both the time and information they need to be helped to make an informed choice. However, evidence on children’s experiences of the process of information sharing is limited, for example, little is known as to whether their information needs are met when they have been involved in decision-making. Bradding and Horstman (1999) found that chronically ill children had information needs within four domains: diagnosis, treatment, prognosis and “supportive”, the need for honest, accurate information given within a supportive environment was evident. Beresford and Sloper’s (1999) research with 63 young people affected by six chronic conditions identified their views on medical and psychosocial information needs which must be met to promote physical and emotional well being. These included medical information on factors such as the condition, general human biology, treatments, tests and investigations, managing exacerbation, lifestyle factors, current research and health and other sources of statutory support. Psychosocial information needs included dealing with negative emotions, living with physical symptoms, living with unanswered questions, dealing with parents and peers, managing at school and in other social settings, living with restrictions on lifestyle, maintaining a positive attitude and planning for the future. The young people also highlighted the important role of their parents as information providers, indicating that parents’ information needs must also be addressed. Changing needs mean regular information is required, delivered in a variety of ways, appropriate to the needs of the young person. Dixon-Woods et al. (1999) state that there is a scarcity of evidence about how to design information materials for children. However, Alderson and Montgomery (1996) offer practical suggestions on the type of information which should be shared with children involved in decision-making in health care settings, such as information on their condition, purpose of treatment, hoped for benefits, timing and nature of treatment/investigation, risks involved and possible harm and incon-
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venience it will cause (pain, scarring, follow-up clinics etc.). They also suggest how practitioners might check young patients’ understanding of this information. For example, through the questions young patients might ask, their expression of hopes, fears and of what might be in their best interest. Brook (2000) has developed a framework for children to be involved in decisions about proposed liver transplant, although the framework is applicable to many situations. The framework highlights the uniqueness of each child and their family, the necessity of keyworkers to co-ordinate information sharing and the need for an open, friendly approach which shares information and does not give information. Privacy, sensitivity and an allowance of adequate time are deemed essential.
Access to mechanisms to allow children and young people to voice their views The second stage of Alderson and Montgomery’s model describes children expressing a view. However, genuine participation requires that this view is listened to. There is now widespread acknowledgement, particularly within the care-system, that children and young people’s safety relies on their being listened to and involved in decisions, both about their own lives and also in general policy and service development (Utting, 1997; Waterhouse, 2000). Moves have been made to create structures that allow children and young people to voice issues of concern or complain about services or treatment. Both the 1989 Children Act and the 1990 NHS and Community Care Act established a duty on the part of service providers to provide transparent complaints procedures. However, such procedures have been widely criticised for being adult orientated, inaccessible, lacking in confidentiality and difficult to negotiate without the support of an advocate (Utting, 1997; Aiers and Kettle, 1998). Patient Advice and Liaison Services have recently been established within all English NHS and Primary Care Trusts, to provide an easily accessible service for people with concerns about their care. However, research suggests that PALS have, so far, provided a generic service, and many have not provided a service that is accessible to children and young people (Heaton and Sloper, 2004). Nevertheless there are some attempts being made to make mechanisms for complaints accessible to children; for example, MENCAP (2003) has recently developed a resource pack to assist children with a learning disability to complain about the services they use. Some literature points to the necessity of not only formal mechanisms through which children can participate, but also the need for informal approaches – a listening culture, where children can voice their views and be listened to at any time (McNeish and Newman, 2002; Lightfoot and Sloper,
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2003; Kirby et al., 2003a, 2003b). Studies in the main concentrate on formal mechanisms, but Lightfoot and Sloper’s study found that young people urged an informal approach, in addition to formal structures and dedicated ‘participation workers’ (2002, 2003).
Focus of participation activity It is important when examining participation to distinguish the focus of children’s participation which can vary. The third level of Alderson and Montgomery’s model involves young people influencing decisions and children and young people can influence decisions in matters which affect them as individuals (personal or individual decisions), and those which relate to them as a group (public decision-making), for example within service planning and development, or influencing policymaking. Both are important, but the mechanisms to achieve involvement are likely to be different. Evidence of individual participation in health care Published literature within this area of participation has mainly focused on children’s competency to be involved in decisions about their health care and treatment. Most studies have concentrated on children with serious health problems or disabilities, where results have shown that when children acquire knowledge about their condition, treatment, likely pain and prognosis, they are more willing to co-operate with treatment, they understand better when and why to take drugs, they endure painful treatments more patiently and recover better (Alderson, 2000; Tates and Meeuwesen, 2001). Cavet and Sloper (2004) summarised the evidence on programmes or strategies designed to improve the knowledge of children and young people regarding their medical condition and concluded that they tended to show positive results (e.g. Bradbury et al. (1994) regarding hand surgery for children with missing fingers; Booth et al. (1995) about cochlear implants; Brook (2000) concerning children with liver disease; Barlow and Harrison (1996) regarding juvenile arthritis and volunteer contact; Lewis (1991) cited in a review by Lewin et al. (2002) about medical interviews with children and their parents; Bartholomew et al. (1997) regarding children with cystic fibrosis). Alderson (2000) quotes a number of examples of very young children with life-threatening illnesses being consulted and taking a very active role in their treatment. These include two-year old children with cancer understanding the names of their medication, the purpose of them and cooperating with their treatment (Kendrick et al., 1986) and a seven year old child weighing up the risks and benefits of having a heart and lung transplant (Alderson, 1993).
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Evidence however, suggests that the involvement of children is patchy and requires further development. For example, research shows that the conversational contribution of the child in medical encounters is slight (Tates and Meeuwesen, 2001), and Obigwe (2004) quotes evidence from a database complied by The Commission for Health Improvement, which states that children and young people are unhappy with the lack of communication they get when they are treated in the NHS and that they are not sufficiently involved within the decision-making process. The database contains the results of 59 separate reports of feedback from children and young people about health care (see http://www.chi.nhs.uk//childrens_voices). There is limited evidence on which children are being involved in participation activity but the evidence available suggests that certain groups are less likely to be involved. Kirby and Bryson (2002), in their review of 27 research studies on participation, noted that older young people were more likely to be involved than younger ones and girls were more likely to be involved than boys. Concerns about the participation of young people from socially excluded groups have been raised by several authors (e.g. McNeish and Newman, 2002; Cutler and Frost, 2001) Younger children, children with communication difficulties and those with minimum involvement with local agencies have been identified as least likely participants (Sinclair, 2004). Cavet and Sloper (2004) summarise studies which suggest that some disabled children are not being afforded their full rights regarding participation, in particular ‘ventilator dependent’ young people (Noyes, 2000), those looked after by the local authority (Morris, 1998a, 1998b) and those with severe impairments (Lightfoot and Sloper, 2003). In addition, the lack of availability of communication aids to those children who rely on them has been reported as presenting obstacles and limiting the children’s involvement in decision-making (Stone, 2001; Morris, 1998a; Rabiee et al., 2001). Marchant and Jones (2003) note the linguistic and cultural barriers to involvement faced by disabled children from ethnic minority groups. The literature to date has in the main concentrated on children’s competency to participate, although there are increasing numbers of studies reporting successful participation of children within their own health care. However, there is no evidence yet to suggest that this is widespread practice, and clearly some children, such as those with disabilities, are generally not being involved. There has been little data collected on the approaches undertaken by practitioners, children’s experiences of involvement, and on the outcomes for children, parents, professionals and services.
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Evidence of participation in public decision-making regarding health care Children have a lot to tell us about their access to and experiences of health services and resources and this area has received more attention, with children increasingly being consulted about a range of issues concerning health services (for example, Elliot et al., 1996; Noyes, 2000; Jones et al., 2000; Gleeson et al., 2002; Liabo et al., 2002; Madge and Franklin, 2003). Young people have been involved in developing a children’s version of the Department of Health Drug Strategy (Department of Health, 2003a) and disabled children have expressed their views about what constitutes quality in services (Mitchell and Sloper 2001). Bradding and Horstman (1999) describe using the draw and write technique to allow young chronically ill children to express their views about hospitals, health professionals and health information needs. However, there is little evidence that collates the disparate reports published on what help and information children and young people want, where they go for help, and what gaps there are in formal and informal provision. Children and young people are ever more being asked for their opinions on services, yet there is a lack of data on how their views are feeding into the subsequent decision-making processes, which could led to disillusionment among young people who see little evidence that their views are being taken seriously (Sinclair, 2004). Cutler and Frost (2001) mapped young people’s involvement in public decision-making and concluded that within health promotion young people’s participation was in evidence. They highlighted government initiatives such as the National Healthy School Standard (NHSS), which aims to help schools become healthier places and places pupil participation high on the agenda. However, Cutler and Frost found little evidence of young people’s participation in health treatment services or indeed, information on good practice within this area. They highlighted one study by Lightfoot and Sloper (2002) which identified 27 examples of local health services which consulted children who were chronically ill or physically disabled, of which 11 involved young people in subsequent decisions about service development. Clearly, there is a need for more evidence of this kind to illuminate the approaches undertaken, document the experiences of those involved and to learn more about how or if children’s views are influencing the decisions being made.
Barriers to young people’s participation Although children and young people’s participation is part of international law and on the agenda of the government, there is evidence of a number of barriers that prevent effective participation (see for example, Alderson and
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Montgomery, 1996; Alderson, 2000; Willow, 2002). Lansdown (1995) notes that a commitment to respect the participation rights of children represents a significant shift away from traditional understandings of children’s status in society, and provokes concerns about its implications for adult/child relations. Participation raises questions about children’s status, lack of power and the need for widespread changes to how we view children. Some barriers identified pertain to the complexity and bureaucratic nature of organisations (Matthews, 2001; Kirby and Bryson, 2002, Kirby et al., 2003a, 2003b); to adult attitudes, particularly concerning the capabilities and competence of children, and the need to protect children (Matthews, 2001; Bell et al., 2002; Kirby and Bryson, 2002); to a lack of relevant training and support for adult facilitators and young people participating (Kirby and Bryson, 2002); a lack of research evidence to support participatory activities (DixonWoods et al., 1999; Hennessy, 1999); and practical barriers such as time, resources and dedicated funding (NcNeish and Newman, 2002). It should not be overlooked that young people themselves can form a barrier (McNeish and Newman, 2002). Young people may have fixed ideas about adults, or generally not have positive relationships with them. They may also lack self-esteem and confidence or their personal circumstances may not be conducive, for example if they are carers or lack transport. Of course, children and young people may not want to take part or have other competing priorities on their time.
Factors which facilitate young people’s participation Although a large number of guides and checklists on good practice in involving children in decision making exist (for examples, see Ward, 1997; Treseder, 1997; Beecher, 1998; Cohen and Emmanuel, 1998; Morris, 1998c, 2003; McNeish, 1999; Kirkbride, 1999; Shier, 2001; Clark and Herts, 2000; Sinclair and Franklin, 2000; Children and Young People’s Unit, 2001; Clark and Moss, 2001; Wade and Badham, 2001; Lightfoot and Sloper, 2002; Coombe, 2002; The Children’s Society, 2002; Marchant and Jones, 2003; Cutler, 2003; Kirby et al., 2003a, 2003b), it is not always clear where the evidence for this advice on good practice has come from. In most cases, evidence has been gathered from adult facilitators of participation activity; there is little evidence from children about their experiences of involvement, although some data are emerging (Matthews, 2001; Coombe, 2002; Lightfoot and Sloper, 2002, 2003; Kirby et al., 2003a). However, there are some common themes which can be derived from the literature and identified as being important to the success of participatory work with children and young people.
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– Clarity and shared understanding Clarity on the purpose, objectives, parameters and possible outcomes of participation is fundamental (Children’s Taskforce, Department of Health, 2001; Sinclair and Franklin, 2000; Kirby and Bryson, 2002). Sinclair (2004) states that only when the purpose of participation is clear can adults be honest with themselves and with children involved. Lack of clarity can also lead to tokenism and misunderstanding about the level of involvement children may have, and make it difficult to evidence change as a result of participation activity. When children are approached to participate they need clear, accessible information about what participation will entail and what participation will hopefully achieve, and arrangements regarding confidentiality, anonymity, and the option to opt out (Alderson, 1995; Sinclair and Franklin, 2000; Lightfoot and Sloper, 2002, 2003). – Staff training and development The need for staff training and skills development in order to promote participation in decision-making by children is highlighted in several studies (Hennessy, 1999; McNeish et al., 2000; Children’s Taskforce, Department of Health, 2001; Kirby and Bryson, 2002; McNeish and Newman, 2002; Lightfoot and Sloper, 2002, 2003; Kilgour, 2002). Attitudinal changes in health professionals are required about childhood and adolescence, particularly concerning consent and competence (Alderson and Montgomery, 1996); about communication (Beresford and Sloper, 1999); and about the idea of partnership between healthcare professionals and their patients (Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry, 2001). Beresford and Sloper (1999) highlight the need for skills development with regard to communication, with the suggestion that this will be more effective if young people’s communication skills are also developed. – Using flexible and appropriate methods There are a number of publications that highlight the advantages and disadvantages of numerous methods of involving children and young people and emphasise that flexibility and the use of a wide range of methods and approaches is important (for example, see Cohen and Emmanuel, 1998; Kirby and Bryson, 2002; Lightfoot and Sloper, 2002, 2003). The necessity of tailoring methods to be appropriate for children cannot be underestimated, taking into account factors such as their age, ethnicity, gender, individual circumstances and support needs. Cavet and Sloper (2004) summarize the evidence surrounding inclusive approaches to involving disabled children, though their conclusions may equally apply to other children and young people. They highlighted from the available evidence the following as important:
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– – – – –
using a multi-media approach or variety of methods; availability of resources such as communication aids or interpreters; use of advocates or mentors; multiple contacts in order to get to know the young person; flexibility about how children participate and recognising that children communicate in mediums other than speaking; – independent facilitators so that children can give their views about services they use in confidence; – and the need to make participation fun and rewarding. – Organisational culture, systems and structures It is recognized that the culture, structures and systems of organisations impact on participation activity (Kirby and Bryson, 2002; McNeish and Newman, 2002; Kirby et al., 2003a, 2003b; Cavet and Sloper 2004). A listening culture among staff is essential as well as genuine commitment, so that young people feel respected and confident to express their views, and have their views listened to and responded to (McNeish et al., 2000; Sinclair and Franklin, 2000; Children and Young People’s Unit, 2001; McNeish and Newman, 2002; Lightfoot and Sloper, 2003). Kirby et al. (2003a), highlight how genuine participation is a process and not an isolated event, and thus requires organisations to change in attitude, procedures and styles of working across all levels, create champions of participation to support change across the whole organisation, and develop a shared vision and understanding of participation. They state that the key to this is senior management support and a mainstreaming of practice. – Assessing and evidencing the impact of children’s participation Badham (2004) argues that it is often unclear how the process of participation is meant to link with better outcomes for the intended beneficiaries and what is actually changing for children and young people as a result of their involvement. Despite a growth in participation activity, there is a lack of evaluation in terms of process and outcomes, both internally and externally (Kirby and Bryson, 2002; Cavet and Sloper, 2004; Sinclair, 2004). For many, children’s participation is a value or rights based principle and not something that has to be justified by evidence. However, as Sinclair (2004) states, this should not diminish the need for monitoring or evaluation as part of a learning culture, so that more can be learnt about making the process meaningful and bringing about sustainable change. Some moves have been made in this direction with the Department of Health (2003a) prioritising this within their action plan and recent work funded by the Children and Young People’s Unit (Kirby et al., 2003a, 2003b). There is also increasing pressure to develop
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national minimum standards of participation and charter marks for organisations undertaking participatory activities (Cutler, 2003).
Concluding comments Within England, the value of involving children and young people is accepted by government and is continuing to be reflected in policy. However, it would appear that participation practice is limited and patchy and, particularly within service development, may only be occurring at relatively lower levels of decision-making (CR Team Article 12, 1999; Lightfoot and Sloper, 2003). There is little published evidence, as yet, to suggest that there is successful participation across all levels of Alderson and Montgomery’s model. Change and challenge lies ahead if participation is to become embedded and sustained. Equally of concern is the limited evidence of equality of participation across the whole population of children and young people (Kirby and Bryson, 2002; Sinclair, 2004; Cavet and Sloper, 2004). The exclusion of some groups of young people, particularly disabled children, younger children and those from marginalised groups, from the participation process has been raised by a number of authors (McNeish et al., 2000; NcNeish and Newman 2002; Sinclair and Franklin, 2000; Children and Young People’s Unit, 2001; Lightfoot and Sloper, 2003; Sinclair, 2004). Checklists and guides cannot achieve the long-term inclusion of children and young people in decision-making alone, although they can help to support initiatives and help to launch activity (Willow, 2002). However, sustained change can only come through breaking down the barriers to children’s participation. The challenges which lie ahead include the need to demonstrate the extent of young people’s involvement, the collation of evidence from children and young people about their own experiences of participation, and evidence on how participation can become embedded and sustained. Internal and external evaluations are needed on the process and outcome of participation. DixonWoods et al. (1999) argue that, “the aspirations of the children’s rights movement will have little chance of being realised until there is more research based evidence on outcomes of shared decision-making, how the competence of children can be assessed, how information can be shared with children and how shared decision-making should be managed in practice” (p. 778). Sinclair (2004) states that with participation “the first important step was to win the case for children’s participation and to see more and more young people being given the opportunity to influence decisions. The second was to make that involvement more meaningful for children. The next steps are to ensure that participation is more effective in the impact it has on decisions and on
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decision-making processes and ultimately on participation structures and cultures” (p. 114). This describes the current situation with regard to children being involved in their health care. Reports have documented the rights of children, and offered practical steps for participation and information provision. However, much is left to learn about who is being involved, how they are being involved and the outcomes of their involvement.
References Aires, A. and J. Kettle, When Things Go Wrong: Young People’s Experiences of Getting Access to the Complaints Procedure. (London: NISW, 1998). Alderson, P. Children’s Consent to Surgery. (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1993). ———. Children, Ethics and Social Research. (Barkingside: Barnardo’s, 1995). Alderson, P. and J. Montgomery. Health Care Choices: Making Decisions with Children. (London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 1996). Alderson, P. Young Children’s Rights: Exploring Beliefs, Principles and Practice. (London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2000). Arnstein, S. “Eight Rungs on the Ladder of Citizen Participation”, Journal of American Institute of Planners 1969, (35(4)), 216–224. Badham, B. “Participation – For a Change. Disabled Young People Lead the Way”, Children and Society 2004, (18(2)), 143–154. Barlow, J. and K. Harrison. “Focusing on Empowerment: Facilitating Self-Help in Young People with Arthritis Through a Disability Organisation”, Disability and Society 1996, (11), 539–551. Bartholomew, L., D. Czyzewski, G.S. Parcel, P.R. Swank, M.H. Sockride, M.J. Mariotto, D.V. Schidlow, R.J. Fink, and D.K. Seilheimer. “Self-management Of Cystic Fibrosis: Short-Term Outcomes Of The Cystic Fibrosis Family Education Programme”, Health Education and Behaviour 1997, (24), 652–666. Beecher, W. Having A Say! Disabled Children and Effective Partnership in Decisionmaking. Section II Practice Initiatives and Selected Annotated References. (London: Council for Disabled Children, 1998). Bell, P. and six young people from Investing in Children Projects. Changing the View: How young people’s ideas can revolutionise health services. (York: Youth Work Project, Conference Presentation. Involving Young Patients in the NHS, 20 September 2002). Beresford, B. and P. Sloper. The information needs of chronically ill or physically disabled children and adolescents. (York: Social Policy Research Unit, University of York, 1999). Booth, C.L., C. Sheridan, D. Cafarelli Dees, C. George, and N.P. Haacke. “Involving the older child in the cochlear implant decision-making process”. Annals of Otology, Rhinology and Laryngology 1995, (Supplement 166), 207–208. Boyden, J. and J. Ennew. Children in Focus: A Manual for Participatory Research with Children. (Stockholm: Radda Barnen, 1997). Bradbury, E.T., S.P.J. Kay, C. Tighe, J. Hewison. “Decision-making by parents and children in paediatric hand surgery”. British Journal of Plastic Surgery 1994, (47), 324–330. Bradding, A., and M. Hortsman “Using the write and draw technique with children.” European Journal of Oncology Nursing 1999, (3(3)), 170–175.
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Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry. Final Report. (Bristol: 2001). British Medical Association. Consent, Rights and Choices in Health Care for Children and Young People. (London: BMJ Books, 2001). Brook, G. “Children’s Competency to Consent: A Framework for Practice”. Paediatric Nursing 2000, (12(5)), 31–35. Cavet, J. and P. Sloper. “Participation of disabled children in individual decisions about their lives and in public decisions about service development”. Children and Society 2004, (18(4)), 278–290. Children and Young People’s Unit. Learning to Listen: Core Principles for the Involvement of Children and Young People. (London: Department for Education and Skills, 2001). Children’s Taskforce, Department of Health. Principles for Participation of Children, Young People and Families in the Children’s Taskforce. (London: Department of Health, 2001). Clark, P. and B. Herts. Make it Happen! (London: Department of Health, 2000). Clarke, A. and P. Moss. Listening to young children: The Mosaic Approach. (London: National Children’s Bureau, 2001). Cohen, J. and J. Emanuel. Positive Participation: Consulting and Involving Young People in Health-Related Work: A Planning and Training Resource. (London: Health Education Authority, 1998). Coombe, V. Up For It: Getting Young People Involved in Local Government. (London: The National Youth Agency, 2002). CR Team, Article 12. Respect! A Report Into How Well Article 12 of the United Nations Convention On The Rights Of The Child Is Put Into Practice Across The UK. (Nottingham: Article 12, Voluntary Action Centre, 1999). Cutler, D. and R. Frost. Taking the Initiative: promoting young people’s involvement in public decision making in the UK. (London: Carnegie Young People Initiative, 2001). Cutler, D. Standard! Organisational Standards and Young People’s Participation in Public Decision Making. (London: Carnegie Young People’s Initiative, 2003). Department of Health. The Children Act 1989 Guidance and Regulations: Volume 6 Children with Disabilities. (London: Department of Health, 1991). ———. Patient and Public Involvement in the new NHS. (London: Department of Health, 1999). ———. The NHS Plan: A Plan for Investment, A plan for Reform. (London: Department of Health, 2000). ———. Seeking Consent: Working with Children. (London: Department of Health, 2001a). ———. The Expert Patient: A New Approach to Chronic Disease Management for the 21st Century. (London: Department of Health, 2001b). ———. Involving Patients and the Public in Healthcare. (London: Department of Health, 2001c). ———. Listening, Hearing and Responding: Core Principles for the Involvement of Children and Young People. (London: Department of Health, 2002). ———. Listening, Hearing and Responding. Department of Health Action Plan 2003/04. (London: Department of Health, 2003a). ———. Getting The Right Start: The National Service Framework for Children – Standard for Hospital Services. (London: Department of Health, 2003b). Dixon-Woods, M., B. Young, and D. Heney. “Partnerships with Children”. British Medical Journal 1999, (319), 778–780. Eiser, C. Growing up with a Chronic Disease. (London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 1993).
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Elliot, E., A. Watson and S. Tanner. Time to Put Children First: Children’s and Young People’s Views of Health Care in Salford and Trafford. (Salford: Public Health Research and Resource Centre, University of Salford, 1996). Gleeson, C., M. Robinson and R. Neal. “A Review of Teenagers’ Perceived Needs and Access to Primary Health Care: Implications for Health Services”. Primary Health Care Research and Development 2002, (3), 193–203. Hart, R. Children’s Participation: From Tokenism to Citizenship. (Florence: UNICEF International Child Development Centre, 1992). ———. Children’s Participation: The Theory and Practice of Involving Young Citizens in Community Development and Environmental Care. (New York: UNICEF, 1997). Heaton, J. and P. Sloper. “National Survey of Patient Advice and Liaison Services (PALS) in England: Children, young people and parents’ access to and use of PALS”. Child: Care, Health and Development, 2004 (30(5)), 495–501. Hennessy, E. “Children as Service Evaluators”. Child Psychology and Psychiatry Review 1999 (4, (4)), 153–161. Jones, R., J. Coleman and C. Dennison. Community Health Initiatives for Young People: A Working Paper. (Brighton: Trust for the Study of Adolescence, 2000). Kendrick, C., J. Culling, T. Oakhill and M. Mott. “Children’s Understanding of Their Illness and Treatment Within a Paediatric Oncology Unit”. Association of Clinical Psychologists and Psychiatrists Newsletter 1986, (8), 16–20. Kilgour, K. Circus Skills: A Training, Support and Development Needs Survey of Participation Workers. (London: Carnegie Young People Initiative, 2002) Kirby, P. and S. Bryson. Measuring the Magic? Evaluating And Researching Young People’s Participation In Public Decision-Making. (London: Carnegie Young People Initiative, 2002). Kirby, P., C. Lanyon, K. Cronin and R. Sinclair. Building a Culture of Participation: Involving Children and Young People in Policy, Service Planning, Delivery and Evaluation-Research Report. (London, Department for Education and Skills, 2003a). ———. Building a Culture of Participation: Involving Children and Young People in Policy, Service Planning, Delivery and Evaluation-Handbook. (London: Department for Education and Skills, 2003b). Kirkbride, L. I’ll Go First: The Planning and Review Toolkit for Use With Disabled Children. (London: The Children’s Society, 1999). Lansdown, G. Taking Part: Children’s Participation in Decision Making. (London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 1995). Lardner, C. Exploring Good Practice in Youth Participation: A Critical Review. (Edinburgh: Clarity, 2001). Lewis, C.C., R.H. Pantell and L. Sharp. “Increasing patient knowledge, satisfaction and involvement: Randomized trial of a communication intervention”. Paediatrics, 1991 (88 (2)), 351–358, cited in Lewin S.A., Z.C. Skea, V. Entwhistle, M. Zwarenstein and J. Dick. “Interventions for providers to promote a patient-centred approach in clinical consultations. (Cochrane Review)”, The Cochrane Library 2002 (3: Oxford. (29 August 2002). Liabo, K., K. Curtis, N. Jenkins, H. Roberts, S. Jaguz and D. McNeish. Healthy Futures: A Consultation with Children and Young People in Camden and Islington About Their Health Services. (London: North Central London Strategic Health Authority, 2002). Lightfoot, J. and P. Sloper. Having a Say in Health: Guidelines for Involving Young Patients In Health Services Development. (York: Social Policy Research Unit, University of York, 2002).
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———. “Having a Say in Health: Involving Children and Young People with a Chronic or Physical Disability In Local Health Services Development”. Children and Society 2003, (17), 277–290. Madge, N. and A. Franklin. Change, Challenge and School Nursing. (London: National Children’s Bureau, 2003). Marchant, R. and M. Jones. Getting it Right: Involving Disabled Children in Assessment, Planning and Review Processes. (Hove: Triangle, 2003). Matthews, H. Citizenship, Youth Councils and Young People’s Participation. Journal of Youth Studies 2001, (4, (3)), 299–318. McNeish, D. Promoting Participation for Children and Young People: Some Key Questions for Health and Social Welfare Organisations. Journal of Social Work Practice 1999, (13(2)), 191–203. McNeish, D., A. Downie, T. Newman, A. Webster, and J. Brading. Report for Lambeth, Southwark and Lewisham Health Action Zone. The Participation of Children and Young People. (Barkingside: Barnardo’s, 2000). McNeish, D. and T. Newman. “Involving Children and Young People in Decision-Making”, in D. McNeish, T. Newman and H. Roberts (eds.), What works for Children? (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2002). MENCAP. Listen Up: Helping Children with a Learning Disability Complain about the Services They Use. (London: MENCAP, 2003). Mitchell, W. and P. Sloper. “Quality in services for disabled children and their families: what can theory, policy and research on children’s and parent’s views tell us?” Children and Society 2001, (15), 237–252. Morris, J. Still Missing? Volume 1, The Experiences of Disabled Children and Young People Living Away from their Families. (London: The Who Cares Trust, 1998a). ———. Still Missing? Volume 2, Disabled Children and the Children Act. (London: The Who Cares Trust, 1998b). ———. Don’t Leave Us Out: Involving disabled children and young people with communication impairments. (York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 1998c). ———. “Including All Children: Finding Out About the Experiences of Children with Communication and/or Cognitive Impairments”. Children and Society 2003, (17(5)), 337–348. Morrow, V. Understanding Families: Children’s Perspectives. (London: National Children’s Bureau/Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 1998). Newman, T. “Rites, Rights and Responsibilities”, in H. Roberts and D. Sachdev (eds.) Young People’s Social Attitudes. (Barkingside: Barnardos, 1996). Noyes, J. “Enabling Young ‘Ventilator-Dependent’ People to Express Their Views and Experiences of Their Care in Hospital”. Journal of Advanced Nursing 2000, (31(5)), 1206–1215. Obigwe, C. “Children Say They Are Not Involved Enough In Their Treatment”. British Medical Journal 2004, (March 13: 328 (7440)), 600. Rabiee, P., M. Priestley and J. Knowles. Whatever Next? Young Disabled People Leaving Care. (York: York Publishing Services, 2001). Rylance, G. “Making Decisions with Children”. British Medical Journal 1996, (312:) 794 (30 March). Shier, H. “Pathways to Participation: Openings, Opportunities and Obligations”. Children and Society 2001, (15), 107–117. Sinclair, R. and A. Franklin. Young People’s Participation: Quality Protects Research Briefing, No. 3. (London: Department of Health, 2000).
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Sinclair, R. “Participation in Practice: Making it Meaningful, Effective and Sustainable”. Children and Society 2004, (18(2)), 106–118. Stone, E. Consulting with Disabled Children and Young People. (York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2001). Tates, K. and L. Meeuwesen. “Doctor-Parent-Child Communication. A (Re) View of the Literature”. Social Science and Medicine 2001, (52(6)), 839–851. The Children’s Society. Young People’s Charter of Participation. (London: Children’s Society, 2002). Thoburn, J., A. Lewis and D. Shemmings. Paternalism or Partnership? Family Involvement in the Child Protection Process. (London: HMSO, 1995). Treseder, P. Empowering Children and Young People: Training Manual. (London, Children’s Rights Office/Save the Children, 1997). United Nations. Convention on the Rights of the Child. (Geneva: United Nations, 1989). Utting, W. People Like Us: The Report of the Review Safeguards for Children Living Away from Home. (London: HMSO/Department of Health/Welsh Office, 1997). Wade, H. and B. Badham. Hear by Right: Standards for the Active Involvement of Children and Young People. (Leicester: National Youth Agency and Local Government Association, 2001). Ward, L. Seen and Heard: Involving Disabled Children and Young People in Research and Development Projects. (York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 1997). Waterhouse, R. Lost in Care: Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry into the Abuse of Children in Care in the Former County Council Ares of Gwynedd and Clwyd since 1974. (London: HMSO, 2000). Willow, C. Hear! Hear! Promoting Children and Young People’s Democratic Participation in Local Government. (London: Local Government Information Unit, 1997). ———. Participation in Practice: Children and Young People as Partners in Change. (London, The Children Society, 2002).
The Participation Rights of Premature Babies PRISCILLA ALDERSON Professor of Childhood Studies, Social Science Reseach Unit, Institute of Education, University of London
JOANNA HAWTHORNE Senior Research Associate, Centre for Family Reseach, University of Cambridge
MARGARET KILLEN Research Officer, Social Science Research Unit, Institute of Education, University of London
Introduction Is it appropriate or useful to phrase premature babies’ needs, welfare, or best interests in the language of babies’ rights? Can babies be rights-holders? This paper reviews the relevance of the UN 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), and particularly the so-called participation rights, to premature babies and their care. The review is illustrated with examples drawn from a study of four neonatal intensive care units, NICU. The first part of this paper presents the background on human and children’s rights, on research about childhood, babies and participation, and on the neonatal research study. Examples from the study illustrate how participation rights relate to premature babies. The paper concludes that respect for babies’ participation rights is feasible, immediate, integral and indispensable to adequate neonatal care, and that babies’ rights justify and validate high standards of care. Rights Rights are justified on two main grounds. First, they may be seen as universal, inalienable to all members of the human family (the UNCRC is ratified by all governments except in the USA and Somalia) and legal entitlements that defend and respect every citizen. Citizenship from birth entitles the child to a legal identity, and the right to expect certain services, protections and amenities from the state. Babies can easily be included in these concepts of rights. Secondly and alternatively, citizenship with its civil rights may be justified as a status that is gradually learned or earned or developed towards, and is granted Michael Freeman (Ed.), Children’s Health and Children’s Rights, 31–50. © 2006. Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands.
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by age, sex, or merit. Traditionally, English law has restricted children’s rights and regarded children up to 21 and more recently 18 years as legal “infants”, literally “not speaking”. Current English policy on citizenship education (QCA, 1998) slips uncertainly between education for future adult citizenship or the education of children who are citizens now. Traditional links between a set age of majority linked with citizens’ participation or civil rights and the key right to a voice and to freedom of self-expression were replaced during the 1980s by competence or maturity. English case law now respects the decisions of children who have the understanding and discretion to make informed and wise decisions in their own best interests Gillick [1985]. The UNCRC accords to children who are able to form and express their own views, “the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child” (UNCRC, 1989:12).1 Neither article 12 nor Gillick states a minimum age, and these standards lean towards Holt’s view (1976) that children should be able to exercise their rights when they become able and willing to do so. Does the ability-competence criterion open all children’s rights from the above second concept of age-based rights towards the first universal concept that embraces all members of the human family? And are even premature babies able to form and express their own views? In Britain, the foetus is legally not “a person” (Montgomery, 1997:401) and has no rights throughout the 40 or more weeks of pregnancy, except for one right after 24 weeks:2 protection from termination of pregnancy. This right to life, however, is qualified in three ways. First, termination is allowed up to term if “serious handicap” is detected (1990 HFE Act). Secondly, in 2002 for example, although 2,753 abortions between the 20th and the 24th week were recorded, gestational ages may be under-estimated in records to allow abortions after 24 weeks (Times 8.9.03). Thirdly, practitioners are advised to respect women’s refusal of interventions during pregnancy and labour, including interventions intended to save the life of the foetus (RCOG, 1994). In marked contrast, from birth children are entitled to legal personhood, partly denoted by the complex and comprehensive UNCRC rights. The UNCRC preamble recognises the importance of special care within the family for the immature child in “an atmosphere of happiness and love and understanding” although these cannot be rights because they cannot be willed or enforced. UNCRC rights are qualified in that “the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration” (3), taking account of the rights and duties of parents or other responsible persons “to provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of the [UNCRC] rights” (5). Premature babies can easily be seen as benefiting from their UNCRC provision rights to services, to health care, education (of their parents and carers),
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welfare and amenities (Alderson, in press). Babies clearly benefit from their UNCRC rights to protection from abuse, neglect, violence and discrimination (Alderson, forthcoming). These rights can equally well be considered under the traditional rubric of the need, welfare or best interests of the child. The UNCRC participation rights are different, in being moderate versions of adults’ autonomy and civil rights, and some of these are often considered to begin to be relevant to young people aged from 10, 12 or 14 years. Participation rights include qualified freedoms of expression, information, thought, conscience and religion, association and peaceful assembly, set out in articles 13–15, which are subject to the “national law, public safety, order, health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. A further constraint is that although English law in Gillick respects the decisions of competent children, the UNCRC leaves the final decision making to adults and asks adults only to give “due weight” to the child’s views according to age and maturity (12). Some participation rights relate more obviously to babies: the right to life, to a name, an identity, a nationality, children’s rights to have contact with parents and family, to respect for their worth and inherent human dignity as valued members of society, and to respect for their cultural background. All the UNCRC rights can relate to young children (Alderson, 2000), and this paper will consider how the participation rights also relate to premature babies who survive birth from as early as 22 weeks gestation. The next section reviews insights from research about children’s and babies’ competencies and abilities to participate in their care and relationships. New understandings of childhood and babyhood Traditionally, children have been viewed as pre-social beings, who are developing and being socialised by adults towards the endpoint of mature adulthood (Mayall, 2002:4–5). The positive concept of development, of gradually becoming more informed, skilled, rational and reliable, has an inevitable negative converse side: deficit models of younger children as ignorant, incompetent, pre-rational and volatile. However, researchers have increasingly questioned this deficit model, and have examined how childhood is socially constructed, defined and practised in different societies. They have asked: how and why adults construct children as non-competent (as women used to be constructed); how young children’s essential vulnerable dependence may be increased by ascribed and taught incompetence and helplessness; how adults’ interests and authority are served by keeping children in an often imposed and prolonged dependence, which countless children around the world and in the past have shown is neither inevitable nor essential (John, 2003). Just as concepts of gender inequalities have been key to understanding womanhood and women’s social status, so “the concept of generation is key to understanding childhood”
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(Mayall, 2002:120; Alanen, 2001), to see how childhood is socially constructed through numerous changing beliefs, behaviours and adult-child relationships (James and Prout, 1997). Detailed observations show how young children can be highly competent – technically, cognitively, socially and morally (Dunn, 1987; Gardner, 1993; Hutchby and Moran Ellis, 1998; Alderson, 2000). More than being actors, young children can be agents: people who negotiate with others, and alter relationships or decisions or the working of social assumptions or constraints (Mayall, 2002:21). Researchers therefore have questioned the assumed gradual ascent from zero at birth up to adulthood. Since the 1960s, psychologists have recognised newborn babies as “agents creating their own environments in interactions with their caretakers” (Bell, 1968 cited in Wolke, 1995:117). Babies contribute to the parent-infant dyad and to their own development. They seek comforting stimuli, and avoid and shut out unwanted stimuli by habituation (getting used to and coming to ignore repeated stimuli) and by going to sleep. They have a range of self-soothing behaviours, and they “speak” in an expressive language of sounds, facial expressions and body movements that can be “read’. Babies vary greatly in how far they have a robust capacity to learn to handle multiple stimuli, to organise themselves, to interact with the complex environment, and to control their states so that they can avoid becoming overwhelmed and disorganised. Babies also vary in how cuddly they are by nestling or moulding themselves against the carer’s body, and in how readily they take part in social interactions, turning to sounds, tracking, gazing, smiling and becoming excited or irritable, as well as how soon they become exhausted, which they signal by becoming pale or mottled, with altered breathing, hiccoughs, yawns and regurgitating or gagging and crying (Brazelton, 1961; Brazelton and Nugent, 1995; Murray and Andrews, 2000). Researchers’ deeper awareness of newborn babies “marvellous” and “amazing” capacities has followed two key insights, which treat assessment as a means of participating in social interaction. First, observers must always take account of the baby’s state or level of awareness, from deeply or lightly asleep, to drowsy or alert, to becoming upset or crying intensely (Brazelton, 1961). Second, observers must be self-aware and receptive, moving beyond a distanced objective view that treats the baby as an object, towards experiencing a dynamic personal emotional interaction with the baby, sensitively following each baby’s cues to help them to give a “best performance”. “New born infants are social beings who quickly learn to judge the safeness of a situation from the examiner’s facial expression and voice, as well as from the way they are handled” (Brazelton and Nugent, 1995:2, 11). The NBAS – Neonatal Behavioural Assessment Scale – systematically documents term babies’ responses to aversive and non-aversive stimuli, and scores behaviours taking careful note of the baby’s states. Babies’ behaviour is recognised not as wholly biological, driven
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by instincts and genetically programmed development, but also as social, learned and responsive (Vygotsky, 1962; Bruner, 1990; Fifer and Moon, 1994; Siegal, 1997). “Nurture” shapes “nature”, when individual’s experiences alter the structure of the brain, before and after birth (Shatz, 1992; Greenfield, 2000). Research interest has grown in how babies “participate”, “take part” and are “partners” in their learning and social relationships. These participatory approaches have been applied to preterm babies “as socially competent and active partner[s]” with their caregivers, “seeking and eliciting” interactions “to assure self-actualization”, and actively shaping their own development; “self-actualization is participation with the world and interaction with another . . . with a maximum of joint validation” (Als, 1999:31,33, 35). NIDCAP – Newborn Individualized Developmental Care and Assessment Programme – involves naturalistic observations of even the smallest most fragile preterm babies from the first week after birth to record the baby’s strengths and sensitivities (not deficits) and to identify goals and recommendations for care (Als, 1981). Babies’ behaviour or language is understood in three subsystems: autonomic (breathing, heart rate, skin colour, hiccoughing, regurgitating); motor (body tone, posture, facial and body movements); and state (patterns of transferring between the states described earlier) (Als, 1981, 1999). NIDCAP sessions last at least 60–90 minutes and observe the environment and the baby’s behaviours and interactions with carers, in order to educate and support the caregivers and to plan care that will enhance the baby’s wellbeing and competence. As this brief review indicates, decades of evidence-based recommendations have been derived from forms of participative research that meticulously observe and listen to babies and try to perceive their views and learn their language. Whereas the foetus floats in warm fluid, gently bumping against the sides of the uterus, sensing muted sound and diurnal light, and not needing to feed, or digest, or breathe, or cope with gravity and temperature changes, premature babies have to learn to manage without all these protections before they are ready to do so. Premature babies also have to cope with high levels of light, noise, and painful procedures in some NICU, where lighting levels may sometimes be 40 times brighter than the recommended level for adults’ office lighting (Glass, 1988), and the noise may be 120 decibels, well above the maximum 50 decibels recommended for offices (Graven et al., 1992). Compared with babies at home, babies in NICU have much less cuddling, comforting, and care from a few adults who can give sensitive individualised responses to the baby’s cues described above. At times during the first forty weeks, the human brain grows by 250,000 neurones per minute (Purves, 1994), and there is particular concern for how the immensely rapidly growing premature baby’s brain can best be protected and nurtured, by adapting “neonatal caring routines to the autonomy of the infant” (Lagercrantz, 2003). There have been long
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debates on whether premature babies should be treated more like a foetus or like a term baby, and whether they are over-stimulated by direct sensations in the NICU that would be muted in utero, or else are under-stimulated by missing the gentle sounds, colours, lighting, tastes, touch-sensations and free movements that the foetus enjoys. Wolke (1989) concludes that babies are both over-stimulated when bombarded with adverse stimuli and also miss comforting contingent stimuli responsive to their own cues and needs. There are many practical recommended ways to increase premature babies’ participation in their health care, development and relationships. For example, from 24 weeks, babies tighten their lids and from 30 weeks they close their eyelids in response to bright lights. Subdued lighting helps babies from around 32 weeks to interact with carers when they fix, track and gaze. The baby’s gaze promotes parents’ affection, “launching both partners on their path of complex affective and cognitive interchange, fuelling mutual competence” (Als, 1999:31). Babies have fewer disruptions to their breathing and heart rate and fewer startle reactions when noise is managed with appropriate acoustic design and the staff work quietly (Mann et al., 1986; Philbin et al., 1999). If premature babies lie supine with their limbs outspread, it is harder for them to do their main tasks: to breathe, to conserve energy, to sleep, and therefore to be able to feed and grow. They struggle against gravity to gather themselves together into the foetal position, limbs together, hands near face so that they can settle themselves, bringing their hands to their face or sucking their fingers. Some neonatal staff take care to help babies to find and stay in their preferred position, by tucking them into soft fabric nests or rolls (Als, 1999; Boxwell, 2000:30–34). From 32–34 weeks, babies can coordinate their breathing, sucking and swallowing while learning to feed (Goldson, 1999). Care that is consistently responsive to the individual baby’s cues helps to prevent babies from becoming stressed, disorganised and unstable, while promoting rewarding interactions between babies and carers (Gottfried, 1985). Care needs to be synchronised with each baby’s signs of strength and sensitivity, seen in behaviours that are characteristically either approaching and exploring or avoiding and withdrawing (Als, 1999:33). Skin-to-skin holding (“kangaroo mother care”) benefits the baby and parent, stimulates breastfeeding, and promotes health and earlier discharge, its advantages have been demonstrated by research, and it has been predicted to “become the standard of care throughout the world within 10 years” (Anderson, 1999:152). NBAS and NIDCAP promote appropriate care for babies individually, and also generally when they are used to evaluate NICU standards, and to plan new structures and systems. Yet despite randomised research evidence of the advantages of what might be termed “baby-led” policies, many NICU still disregard this evidence or say that it is too weak. Whether neonatal staff spend time interacting with the babies appears to depend rather arbitrarily on how important the
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staff consider this to be, regardless of staffing levels, and also on how much individual babies initiate vocal and visual interactions (Linn et al., 1985). Goldson (1999:3–4) notes that although all members of the highly trained neonatal team are committed to each child’s survival and optimal development, “yet they function and perform their work in environments that may not be conducive to their own well being or to the well-being of the infants they are committed to caring for.” White (1992) asks why “noxious” NICU continue to be built. Goldson (1999:13–14) deplores the lack of research-based practice in many units, and speculates on whether this neglect is related to systems-based rather than individual-based models of care, that set the convenience and working needs of the staff before the needs of the family, besides cost and space constraints. The following sections review and illustrate specific participation rights, after explaining the research from which the examples are drawn. The neonatal research An ethnographic study, 2002–2004, observed four NICU in southern England (Alderson et al., 2004). Semi-structured tape-recorded interviews were held with 40 senior neonatal staff and, in the units and in their homes, with a purposive sample of the parents of 80 babies at risk of neuro-developmental problems. The research investigated: how relatively new neonatal treatments, techniques, knowledge and ethical guidance complicate or illuminate longstanding neonatal dilemmas; how clinicians select, evaluate and manage the many neurologically related issues, when making diagnoses, prognoses and treatment plans, and when discussing these with parents and colleagues; how parents and babies experience and respond to the NICU; the strengths and gaps in current knowledge and practice; and how multidisciplinary insights can inform care that is in babies’ present and future best interests. The transcripts and observation notes were analysed for replies to the research questions and for themes raised by participants (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). The data were analysed qualitatively, not in order to test a hypothesis or to measure incidence, but to analyse and try to explain current policies and practice. This paper analyses the data in the light of child rights perspectives.
Participation rights The right to life (6) The first participation right, from which all others follow, is that “every child has the inherent right to life [and] to the maximum extent possible survival and development” (6). The rights to life and to protection from torture (37) are
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commonly counted among the few absolute rights. Sadly, for premature babies neither right is absolute, partly because they can conflict. Several neonatal staff referred during their interviews to painful but life-sustaining treatment sometimes as “torture”. The right to life as survival can also potentially conflict with the quality-of-life rights: the right to the maximum extent possible of development (6), to the highest attainable standard of health (24), and to an adequate standard of living (27). Andrew was born at 22 weeks, and his parents were asked to decide if his treatment should continue. “We said we found the decision a very difficult one to make, because if he did survive we might be imposing a lifetime of suffering on him” (research number 1.20). So if a baby seemed to be very unlikely to survive, or to gain from painful treatment, or to have a future without severe suffering and serious impairment (in re B [1981] 1WLR 1421), the adults began to discuss whether treatment should legally be withheld or withdrawn, and the baby be allowed to die, as debated in an extensive literature (RCPCH, 1997; BMA, 2001; McHaffie, 2001). The usual policy at birth in Britain, if the baby appears to have some hope of survival, is to provide any necessary life-sustaining treatment in order to allow time to conduct tests and enable senior practitioners and parents to share in making informed decisions. NICU vary in the age of viability that they will accept; fewer units admit babies aged less than 24 or 23 weeks. Practitioners refer to a window of time while the baby depends on mechanical life support and it is still possible to decide to withdraw treatment. If the baby survives long enough to breathe independently, a decision to end life alters from “allowing the baby to die” by withdrawing mechanical ventilation into, more controversially, withdrawing fluids and nutrition. Medical ethics is influenced by high expectations of the threshold for a “reasonable” quality of life free from impairment and for an intellectual form of personhood, and low expectations of babies’ capacities and awareness. Harris (1985) asserts that no babies can value their own life and therefore their life has no value. Singer (1995) and others regard babies as non-persons (and therefore non-human-rights holders), lacking five “ethically relevant characteristics”: consciousness; the capacity to interact with others; having conscious preferences for continued life; having enjoyable experiences; and having relatives who will grieve at their death. In response, Wyatt (1998:167–8) describes the many parents he has known who relate to their premature baby as a unique, precious member of the human community, an individual, with a history, an identity and a name, not a thing but a person to be treated with gentleness and respect, irreplaceable, a beloved child. There are four criteria and kinds of evidence for considering whether babies are persons with human rights to life. Firstly legal, all babies from birth are recognised as persons with rights (HRA, 1998; UNCRC, 1989). Secondly societal, although society gains economically from treating impaired and unwanted
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babies as expendable, it is debated whether these cost-effective values increase human happiness and wellbeing, though that is a topic beyond this paper. Third is the value of premature and impaired babies to their parents and other carers, and our interviews and observations confirmed the overwhelming view in the empirical literature that these babies are very highly valued, loved, and grieved for; if withholding treatment is reluctantly considered, the primary concern is the best interests of the baby. Fourth are the rarely reported babies’ own experiences and responses, and adults’ perceptions of these, reviewed in this paper. The right to life is often discussed as if this is something that adults allow or support, and babies receive. However, many premature babies put much energy and concentration into surviving as if, consciously or not, they value their life. When William (all the babies’ names have been changed), born at 30 weeks, was aged 9 months, his mother was interviewed while she bottle-fed him. He still had a look of intense anxious concentration as he managed his breathing and struggled to suck and to cope, it seemed, with a bloated feeling after each short feed. Like some other babies, from soon after birth William gazed at his mother’s face, as if he depended on her loving support. The pleasure or reassurance that some babies evinced when held by their parents or by nurses they knew well showed that, to some degree, they had all five of Singer’s above “ethical” characteristics. Interviewer: And was there anything in him do you think that helped to get you all through [the time in NICU]? William’s mother: I think they’re amazing . . . babies, generally . . . a lot of the conversations between the [other] mothers come back to this, that they look very frail but they’re not – determined little – the will to live, I mean it’s obviously not as conscious as that in a baby, but the life thing is so strong, they’ll fight and fight and fight and you start respecting them for that, you know, he’s been much iller than I’ve ever been – never had me in intensive care, but they kind of keep going and you end up feeling really quite in awe of that (research number 3:15) [– means pause, . . . means words omitted].
Many parents and practitioners described similar admiration, and gave examples of babies continuing to survive against all expectations, or sometimes unexpectedly “giving up” as if, in some ways, the babies had the final say in whether they lived or died. The right of a child to a name and nationality (7) and to preserve his or her identity (8) The baby’s first name is a crucial way to enable everyone in the NICU to identify and relate to the baby as a unique person. The family name denotes the baby’s family membership, history and, often, ethnicity. Some first names are significant as the names of loved relatives, or they describe the baby. “Yemi’s” elder sister had lived for only one day, and he was born at 24 weeks with a
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20 per cent chance of survival, after a delayed journey in an ambulance that got lost. He stayed in the NICU for 6 months. His mother said: “His real name means ‘remembered by God’. I thought how appropriate because he could have been born on the steps of the flat, so I always think God was watching over him” (2.20). Babies participate by sustaining and rejuvenating and assuring the future of their society and nation. Having a name and a nationality enables the child to be registered, and therefore to be entitled to the UNCRC rights because these entail recognition by “state parties”. Babies are then entitled to state services such as free neonatal care in Britain. “Identity” refers to personal characteristics and agency. Adults frequently described babies’ distinctive responses and contrasted these with the characteristics of other babies or siblings. James was born at 31 weeks and was on cpap, a breathing aid. Some babies pulled on their tubes and the medical notes often recorded “self-extubated”. James’s mother described how he guided her caring: He doesn’t like cpap he pulls it out sometimes, he has pulled all his tubes out and then he is really happy when everything is out and he can be his own person. Yes I see him as a person, sitting and watching him for hours, learning about what he likes. He likes lying on his left side on his tummy, not on his right side. And he’s also like his father, he dislikes anyone playing with his feet, even if he’s sedated if you touch his foot he’ll squiggle but he likes his head and chin and forehead and his back being stroked. If he’s on his right side he gets grumpier. You can learn more and more about your own baby . . . Stroking him does sometimes help, and talking to him, that sometimes stops him crying, but I have to be careful not to get him too excited because then his respiration rate goes up . . . You’re projecting things from yourself and when he is awake and in a bad mood I see a lot of fighting spirit . . . If I talk to him such as while he is having blood taken, he calms down (3.4).
One doctor described seemingly lasting identity or characteristics when as children grew older they continued to be the “good” girl or the “extremely feisty” boy, and added: “There seem to be some very tenacious very strong characters . . . and they seem to be babies who do clinically very well” (1.24). Another aspect of “identity” is personhood, and we picked two qualities, memories and emotions, to see if parents and practitioners believed that babies were beginning to be “persons” of the kind that philosophers might recognise. Several practitioners denied this possibility, or said, “I hope not”, as if neonatal care would be less painful for babies without memories or emotions. Research by Brazelton, Als and others records specific emotional capacities. During our observations and interviews we saw, or heard adults describe, babies who appeared to express hurt, misery, calm, contentment, relief, pleasure and excitement. One counsellor’s views were shared by several neonatal colleagues:
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Yes I definitely think they have emotions and memories. I think they definitely know the difference between the touch of a parent and the touch of a nurse or a doctor, and . . . that if a parent touches them that’s going to be a loving touch and caring touch. The businesslike touch of a doctor is going to be very different. One can almost see the child cringe or tense . . . You see the difference in the reaction when the parent arrives there is an excitement it’s incredible but it may sound mad but I do think having been looking at the babies for so many years when their parent arrives the number of times I’ve said to the parents, “They know you are here, they are excited to see you they are pleased.” You can actually tell these things from a 23 weeker, which is amazing. And of course they have a memory, I think they understand whether they are going to have an [intervention]. I think the memory . . . is unthinkable but it’s knowable (1.25).
To recognise babies as sensitive persons with these kinds of memories and emotions raises vital questions about how neonatal care can respect babies’ rights to “preserve” their identity. The right to contact with family and parents (5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 18, 20, 22, 24, 27) A child shall not be separated from his or her parents against their will, except when [this] is necessary for the best interests of the child (9) The UNCRC, far from being a vision of selfish competing rights, repeatedly emphasises participation: solidarity, equality, communities of peace and justice, and rights that are respected through relationships, beginning with the family. The UNCRC respects “the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents” (5). Besides having “contact” with their family, babies actively contribute: they create and perpetuate families by enabling their parents to realise the right to “found a family” (HRA 1998). The attachment between children and parents, central to family life, appears to be especially nurtured by close physical contact between parents and the active social baby during the early weeks and months (Odent, 1999; Murray and Andrews, 2000; Matthiesen et al., 2001). Parents believed that their babies knew them early on. Joe’s mother: I really think Joe worked out who I was very early on . . . there’d be people around him doing things . . . and then I’d walk in the room and start talking and it was obvious that he looked towards my voice . . . and change and get a bit excited, get a bit jumpy . . . (1.12). Chima’s mother: Even when he is sleeping and I come in, he opens his eyes and looks around. I think he knows my smell or something (3.3).
For babies, “contact” means close emotional and physical ties. The staff varied in how soon and how enthusiastically they encouraged parents to touch and hold premature babies, and helped parents if they were afraid of harming their baby. Some nurses believed that skin-to-skin cuddling made babies too cold and stressed, in reverse of the research evidence. Although parents tended to accept their own unit’s policies, not knowing of possible alternatives, some
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were disappointed to have missed earlier opportunities, and others had to ask the staff to allow such contact. This could be hard when parents felt the staff might disapprove, or would criticise, or possibly blame parents if problems arose from their initiative. Adults might be more confident if they regarded this contact as the baby’s right. Although soft cotton clothes and covers “facilitate restfulness and comfort” (Als, 1999:55), in some NICU, the babies are nursed nude and stay in incubators to keep them warm. In other units, they wear clothes and hats, and are moved out of incubators as soon as possible, promoting closer contact between babies and caregivers. James’s mother described the link many parents made between contact as touch, relationship, and communication. It would be impossible for me to wait four weeks before touching him as some parents say they do. How could you build a relationship with your child? When you take him out and cuddle him, the mother or the father, you are fully involved, he calms right down (3.4).
Over time, baby-parent contact alters some parents’ views and experiences of the family. Henry’s mother described how she grieved and mentally had a “tough hard time” because he had Down’s syndrome, but how also they had a “wonderful” first year together: “he is a real blessing to me”. She would not wish to change Henry because “if he didn’t have Down’s syndrome he wouldn’t be the same person” (3.1). She spoke of her son’s practical and emotional agency. He had transformed her life, for example, she did not return to her career as she had planned. And when asked what was the best and most helpful part of the neonatal unit, Henry’s mother recalled the nurse who said to her, “These children they choose their parents, and this child has chosen you.” Rather like the counsellor’s view earlier, that babies’ memory is “unthinkable but knowable”, Henry’s mother believed that from the start “he probably felt loved, some very prime, primordial, what’s the word, deep way, they pick these things up, babies, they are very aware.” During the most private period, after birth, families have to cope with being in the noisy public NICU, and they need ways that help them to relax, to overcome separating barriers, and sustain intimate contact: curtained alcoves, reclining chairs, rooms for parents to stay and to eat, recognition of fathers’ responsibilities (UNCRC: 18; Killen et al., forthcoming) help with transport, cots for twins and triplets to share as soon as possible. NICUs’ provision of these facilities varied widely. The access and support can be seen as practical respect for babies’ rights to tactile family contact that promotes babies’ restful sleep and stable breathing, and parents’ calm fulfilment (Als, 1999:55).
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Freedom of association and peaceful assembly (15) Respect for the child’s cultural background, and inherent human dignity (30, 31, 37, 39) NICUs restrict general visitors’ access in order to preserve quiet and privacy, and some units limit parents’ access. After the babies go home many parents avoid groups and family gatherings for fear of infection. Parents often found it hard to talk to relatives who did not understand their intense anxiety, and they appreciated sharing support with other parents in the unit, although some units discouraged this when, for example, parents were told not to look at or ask or talk about other babies, no parent support group was arranged, and mothers spoke of meeting to talk only outside the unit. So while they would most appreciate support from their extended family and welcoming ceremonies to affirm the child’s cultural background and dignity as a valued new member of the family, parents could feel isolated, as Iwu’s Nigerian mother described. I go to see my baby and the nurses say, “Oh no you can’t see your baby, it is not allowed, you know.” Yes. If you ask anything about the next baby they say, “Don’t ask, we don’t have permission to talk about that, everything is confidential you know . . .” And you cannot go in to see the baby unless you are with the baby’s parents, and so I have to take the family visitors in and be there with them, not friends I don’t want them to come in to see her until she is well and everything is ok for her, they come to see me here [maternity ward]. Yes, I do need to see them. On Sunday a lot came, so even the staff had to ask them, “Oh you know this visiting time is over” [laughs] (3.5).
There are important reasons to limit and defer some of these participation rights but they are noted here as a reminder of some of the extra difficult differences that parents and babies experience after premature birth. The child’s right to express views freely in all matters affecting the child: the views of the child to be given due weight according to the age and ability of the child (12) The key participation right, to express views freely, involves being able to form views and having the means of expression, and this section begins with expression through the body and the voice. The baby’s cry could be highly significant to parents. Anna’s parents had one living daughter and their three other babies had died. Anna was born by caesarean section at 26 weeks weighing only 500 grams, and her mother heard Anna several hours before she could go to see her in the NICU. She cried when she was first born which we heard, which was pretty amazing, absolutely wonderful . . . her cry, which was something we thought we’d never hear, it was amazing. Absolutely amazing, it was lovely . . . they said she’s got 50–50 chance of survival (4.1).
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Although they find it distressing, parents are pleased when their baby grows strong enough to cry. “It’s nice you can tell when he really has got the hump” (2.1). It is not very easy when he cries but I also know that it is nice that he can cry. It was eerie . . . with all the babies on ventilators . . . at least they can cry when they are off the ventilator. It is a nice sound, human, not that I want him to be in pain . . . it is more that they cry when they don’t like something. They tell you (3.4).
Parents appreciate the nurses who comfort crying babies whose parents are away. Paediatricians are advised to read the babies’ appearance and behaviour, for example, in order to assess and relieve their pain (RCPCH, 1997a), which many practitioners take care to do, such as when a nurse talks gently and soothes the baby while a doctor inserts a line. Babies appear to distinguish between the gentle and painful simultaneous touching (Murdoch and Darlow, 1984) and noticeably cry less and quieten sooner when supported in this way. Not all staff are trained and supported to do this and some nurses hold a baby’s arm still, do not look at the crying baby and walk away when the doctor has finished, while the baby cries, sometimes for long periods. The units differ in how far they give “due weight” to babies’ basic expressions of distress or pleasure. Babies are most vocal in special care, the final room before they go home, which in some units resounds with frequent crying, whereas in other quieter units nursery nurses and parents spend hours cuddling and soothing the babies (Warren, 2001; Bond, 2002). The babies’ expressed views on feeding are central to their healthcare, reviewed in another paper (Alderson, forthcoming). When making the most serious decisions, adults might give, or have to give, “due weight” to the baby’s “views” (however loosely these might be “formed”). Anna’s mother described how twice Anna had rallied, contrary to the doctor’s warnings. And I feel so sorry for him [doctor] because it’s like she’s calling him a liar [laughs], which I am very pleased about. [Once, before the doctors could put her back on the ventilator, Anna’s breathing rate suddenly improved.] It’s like she’s playing games with us here! [And she’s saying] “I’m going to prove them wrong. I’m going to be okay” (4.1).
Anna’s parents decided that they could cope with a child with learning difficulties. “What we can’t cope with is no child at all.” But eventually they agreed that if Anna’s breathing failed the doctors would try re-ventilation, despite the extremely low chance of her survival, though they would not attempt resuscitation if her heart stopped. “Stubborn yes, and she fights hard for her – to sort of get better [but] if her heart was to stop beating that’s her way of saying, ‘I’ve had enough. I can’t cope any more’ ” (4.1). Anna died when she was 4 months old. It cannot be certain that babies “choose” to live or to die, still less express
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a choice by doing so, but neither can it be proved that they have no views on how long they continue the effort to survive when they are extremely weak and ill, or why some babies surmount far greater problems than others manage to. Some parents attributed outcomes partly to their child’s view and personality. Andrew’s mother: Yes, I think he definitely chose to live, because there were a couple of points where I would have exited. I have to say I would have left this life . . . He was incredibly ill . . . he was dying effectively, and the doctors were saying that, “You know it’s not good,” and I kind of got this feeling that he had decided, “No actually I am not ready to go. I want to live,” because then he would come back in from his sort of dying, and he would be fine. Well not quite but he would be different, and I feel that he chose to live . . . he’s just incredibly determined (1.20).
Some neonatologists similarly spoke in terms of babies’ agency. Int: Do you think there are qualities in babies that help them? 1.23: I think it is remarkable. I have enormous respect for these little babies, and sometimes the way they cling on to life is extraordinary. I don’t know . . . this will to live somehow . . . A – nearly died about three or four times. It was extraordinary how this little body, this little soul kept winning through. So yes, I think there are but I don’t know how to describe that quality but I think it is remarkable.
An important “view” that many babies expressed clearly was their preference to be cared for by their parents and by certain nurses, as if the emotional relationship of care mattered as much to them as the activities of care. There are certain nurses that know an awful lot about Sean, and are very fond of Sean, and Sean is very good when they are looking after him. And there are other nurses that [pause] I would say he picks up on their mood, and if they’re not as confident with him as some of the other nurses, he does pick up on that, and he gets a bit upset. And I have noticed that quite a lot with him . . . Most of the time you know when he doesn’t want you to touch him, especially when he cries, but there are there are certain nurses that he – it’s kind of, it’s hard to explain, you do feel like he’s taking a certain amount more from some than others . . . (2.1).
When he was two months old (born at 25 weeks), Sean’s mother described his communication. In some units, babies are bathed quickly, but in others the babies set the pace and are wrapped in a sheet at first, until they show when they are ready to enjoy the water (Warren, 2001). He’s a very fussy little boy . . . even when he was in an incubator and he had a tube down his throat . . . you would soon know if there was something that he didn’t like, so he’s a good communicator . . . one minute the hands are out there to say “stop”, and the next minute he’s crying cos he wants to be picked up, so he’s very finicky. [During his first bath] he was wrapped up for it but he pretty much decided to degown himself. He enjoyed it. He was amazing, so relaxed, and he cried when I took him out (2.1).
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Countless observed and reported examples in the four NICU showed that many adults were convinced that they were not mechanically caring for the unconscious organisms that some philosophers allege babies to be. Instead, they were interacting within human relationships influenced by the babies’ views. They confirmed Fischer and Rose (1994): “Because an infant is seen as continuously and actively self-constructing, the task of care becomes one of collaboration with the infant . . . by actively interpreting an infant’s behaviour, one can construct an appropriate care-giving environment [with] even the earliest, most fragile infants.” Als (1999:35–9) advises that repeated detailed observations and records “may then form the basis for care giving suggestions and modifications in environmental structuring”. The records see “the infant as an active structurer and participant in his or her own development,” with care guided by the infant’s needs and efforts, not purely the practitioner’s plans. Als gives the individual example of adjusting the ventilator settings when the baby is trying to breathe with rather than against the machine. General conclusions may also be drawn from the babies’ views, and from skilled observations, to inform NICU-wide policies to create baby-friendly units when practitioners respect and trust babies and parents (Als, 1999:58). The opportunity to be heard directly or through a representative during proceedings that affect the child, and periodic review (12, 25) Freedom of expression and information (12, 13, 23, 24) of thought, conscience and religion (14) Disabled children should enjoy a full and decent life in conditions which ensure dignity, promote self-reliance and facilitate the child’s active participation in the community with the fullest possible social inclusion (23) These articles endorse babies’ rights, through their parents and other caregivers, to the regular and free exchange of information, so that whenever possible reviews, assessments, plans and decisions may be made that take account of babies’ ascertained views and the values of the family. Article 23 partly resolves the potential conflict noted earlier between rights to survival and to an adequate standard of living, by advocating disabled children’s fullest possible participation, an aim to which neonatal treatment and preventive care are dedicated. Parents and practitioners are assisted in being informed advocates for premature babies when they have multidisciplinary training and support, libraries and other “access to information and material from a diversity of national and international sources, especially those aimed at the promotion of [babies’] social, spiritual and moral well-being and physical and mental health” (16).
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Conclusion This paper has aimed to illustrate the relevance of participation rights to all children, by showing their relevance to those most likely to be excluded, premature babies. Examples from the NICU illustrate how respect for premature babies’ participation rights is feasible in the experience of some adults who know and care for babies, and treat them as people who can to some extent form and express relevant views. Babies’ rights hold immediate and urgent messages in being the means to set and assess standards of care in neonatal units that promote the babies’ health and welfare, and the family relationships on which they so greatly depend. The protection, provision and participation UNCRC articles are integral and key concerns in NICU policy and practice, whether they are explicitly honoured or not, and because the rights are sometimes disregarded, attention to the UNCRC is an indispensable guide to high standards of neonatal care. The traditional language of children’s interests, needs and welfare tends to emphasise children’s passive helpless dependence on adults’ choices. The newer language of children’s rights, especially of participation, acknowledges that children too can be informed choosers, agents and contributors with views that can guide and inform individual baby’s care and wider neonatal policies and practices. Babies participate by sharing in the creation and growth of families and communities. More than actors, babies can be agents who alter relationships, decisions and the working of social assumptions or constraints (Mayall, 2002:21). The understanding of babies’ rights grows through the understanding of babies’ aware consciousness within human relationships; these two understandings can justify and validate one another. When babies are accepted to have a certain degree of consciousness, certain obligations by adults follow: to value the babies’ present life now, besides their potential and future; and to try to hear and respect babies’ views. In some ways, it is more important that adults respect what they understand to be babies’ views and rights, than that they try to prove that babies have an arbitrary level of consciousness high enough to count as a human-rights-holding personhood, because rights partly become real in being respected, just as babies learn to speak through being spoken to for months as if they can already speak. Conversely, the rights and autonomy of highly competent adults can be denied and ignored, in the example of prisoners of conscience, so that rights exist in perception and relationship besides in objective reality. Children’s rights also exist in an independent reality in the very carefully worded UNCRC, by far the most widely agreed international treaty. And by ratifying the Convention in 1991, the British government undertook to implement it. The UNCRC speaks of all members of the human family, a continuum of life without discrete stages, and the expressive views of premature babies illustrate how
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inclusive and diverse the UNCRC participation rights can be. Freeman (2002) reviews how normative rights become convincing neither through truth claims nor through subjective preferences, but through Kantian concepts of communal or universal “common sense” that imaginatively respects other people’s perspectives or standpoints and their common humanity. This paper has aimed to imagine premature babies’ human perspectives, and also to suggest integral, embodied, and commonly sensed bases for the rights of every member of the human family.
Acknowledgements We are grateful to all the families and staff in the neonatal units who helped with the research, “Foretelling Futures: dilemmas in neonatal neurology”, to Inga Warren, the Advisory Group, the four Local Research Ethics Committees that approved the project, and the Wellcome Trust Bioethics Programme for funding project no. 066458.
Notes 1 2
Numbers in brackets refer to UNCRC articles. “Weeks” indicate the length of gestation.
References Alanen, L., “Explorations in Generational Analysis”, in Alanen, L., Mayall, B. (eds.) Conceptualizing Child-Adult Relations (London: Routledge Falmer, 2001). Alderson, P., Young Children’s Rights (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2000). ——— “Are Premature Babies Citizens with Rights?” Journal of Social Science, (in press). Alderson, P., “Premature Babies’ Protection Rights”, (forthcoming). ——— “Nurses and Informed Consent”, (forthcoming a). ——— Hawthorne, J., Killen, M., Foretelling Futures: Dilemmas in Neonatal Neurology. End of project report (London: SSRU, Institute of Education, 2004). Als, H., Manual for the Naturalistic Observation of the Newborn (Preterm and Full Term) (Boston: Children’s Hospital, 1981). ——— “Reading the Premature Infant”, in E. Goldson (ed.) op. cit., (1999), pp. 18–85. Anderson, G., “Kangaroo Care of the Premature Infant”, in E. Goldson (ed.) op. cit., (1999), pp. 131–160. Bell, R., “A Reinterpretation of the Direction of Effects in Studies of Socialization”, Psychological Review, 1968 (75), 81–95. BMA. – British Medical Association, Withholding and Withdrawing Life Prolonging Medical Treatment (London: BMA, 2001).
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Bond, C., Positive Touch (London: St Mary’s Hospital, 2002). Boxwell, G. (ed.), Neonatal Intensive Care Nursing (London: Routledge, 2000). Brazelton, T., “Psychophysiologic Reactions in the Neonate. 1. The Value of Observation of the Neonate”, Journal of Pediatrics 1961 (58), 508–512. ——— “Introduction”, in T. Brazelton and J. Nugent (eds.) op. cit., (1995) pp. 1–6. ——— Nugent, J. Neonatal Behavioral Assessment Scale, 3rd edition. Clinics in Developmental Medicine no. 137, (London: MacKeith Press/CUP, 1995). Bruner, J., Acts of Meaning (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1990). Dunn, J., “The Beginnings of Moral Understanding”, in J. Kagan, S. Lamb (eds.) The Emergence of Morality in Young Children (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987). Fifer, W., Moon, C., “The Role of the Mother’s Voice in the Organization of Brain Function in the Newborn”, Acta Paediatrica, Suppl. 1994 (397), 86–93. Fischer, K., Rose, S., “Dynamic Development of Coordination of Components in Brain and Behaviour: a Framework for Theory and Research”, in G. Dawson, K. Fischer (eds.) Human Behaviour and the Developing Brain (New York: Guilford Press, 1994) pp. 3–66. Freeman, M., “Human Rights, Children’s Rights and Judgement”, International Journal of Children’s Rights 2002 (10), 345–354. Gardner, H., The Unschooled Mind: How children think and how schools should teach (London: Fontana, 1993). Glass, P., “Role of Light Toxicity in the Developing Retina Vasculature”, Birth Defects 1988 (24), 103–117. ——— 1993 “Development of Visual Function in Preterm Infants”, Infants and Young Children 1993 (6), 11–20. Goldson, E., (ed.) Nurturing the Premature Infant (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). Gottfried, A., “Environment of Newborn Infants in Special Care Units”, in A. Gottfried, J. Gaiter (eds.) Infant Stress Under Intensive Care (Baltimore: University Park Press, 1985) pp. 23–54. Graven, S., Bowen, F., Brooten, D., Eaton, A., et al., “The High-Risk Infant Environment”, Journal of Perinatology 1992 (12), 164–72. Greenfield, S., The Private Life of the Brain (London: Penguin, 2000). Harris, J., The Value of Life (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985). Holt, J., Escape From Childhood (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975). HRA – Human Rights Act (London: Stationery Office, 1998). Hutchby, I., Moran Ellis, J., (eds.) Children and Social Competence (London: Falmer, 1998). James, A., Prout, A., Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood (London: Routledge Falmer, 1997). John, M., Children’s Rights and Power (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2003). Killen, M., Alderson, P., Hawthorne, J., “Fathers in Neonatal Units”, (forthcoming). Lagercrantz, H., “Opening Address: the Development of Preterm Infants”, International Conference on Infant Development in Neonatal Intensive Care (London, 2003). Linn, P., Horowitz, F., Buddin, B., Leaker, J., Fox, H., “An Ecological Description of a Neonatal Intensive Care Unit”, in A. Gottfried, J. Gaiter (eds.) Infant Stress Under Intensive Care (Baltimore: University Park Press, 1985), pp. 83–111. Mann, N., Haddow, R., Stokes, L., Goodley, S., Rutter, N., “Effect of Night and Day on Preterm Infants in a Newborn Nursery: Randomized Trial”, British Medical Journal 1986 (293), 1265–7.
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Mattiesen, A., Ransjo-Arvidson, A., Nissen, E., Uvnas-Moberg, K., “Postpartum Maternal Oxytocin Release by Newborns: Effects of Infant Hand Massage and Sucking”, Birth 2001 (28,1), 13–9. Mayall, B., Towards a Sociology for Childhood (London: Routledge Falmer, 2002). McHaffie, H., Crucial Decisions at the Beginning of Life (London: Routledge 2001). Montgomery, J., Health Care Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). Murdoch, D., Darlow, B., “Handling During Neonatal Intensive Care”, Archives of Disease in Childhood 1984 (59), 957–61. Murray, L., Andrews, L., The Social Baby (Richmond: Children’s Project Publishing, 2000). Odent, M., The Scientification of Love (London: Free Association Books, 1999). Philbin, K., Robertson A., Hall J., “Recommended Permissible Noise Criteria for Occupied, Newly Constructed or Renovated Hospital Nurseries”, Journal of Perinatology 1999 (1), 559–563. Purves, D., Neural Activity and the Growth of the Brain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). QCA – Qualifications and Curriculum Authority, Education for Citizenship and the Teaching of Democracy in Schools (Crick Report) (London: DfEE/QCA, 1998). RCPCH – Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health, Withdrawing or Withholding Life Saving Treatment in Children (London: RCPCH, 1997). RCPCH, Prevention and Control of Pain in Children (London: RCPCH, 1997a). RCOG - Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, A Consideration of the Law and Ethics in Relation to Court Authorised Intervention (London: RCOG, 1994). Shatz, K., “Dividing up the Neocortex”, Science 1992 (258), 237–8. Siegal, M., Knowing Children (Hove: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997). Singer, P., Rethinking Life and Death (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1995). Strauss, A., and Corbin, J. Basics of Qualitative Research (London: Sage, 1998). Symington, A., Pinelli, J., “Developmental Care for Promoting Development and Preventing Morbidity in Preterm Infants” (Cochrane Database Systematic Review, 2000) (4): CD001814. UNCRC United Nations, Convention the Rights of the Child (Geneva: UN, 1989). Vygotsky, L., Thought and Language (Boston: MIT Press, 1962). Warren, I., (ed.) Guidelines for Infant Development in the Newborn Nursery. Third Edition (London: St Mary’s Hospital, 2001). White, R., “Design of Intensive Care Units”, Pediatrics 1992 (89), 1267. Wolke, D., “Parents’ Perceptions as Guides for Conducting NBAS Clinical Sessions”, in B. Brazelton, T. Nugent, (eds.) op. cit. (1995) pp. 117–125. ——— “Environmental Neonatology”, Archives of Disease in Childhood 1989 (62), 987–88. Wyatt, J., Matters of Life and Death (Leicester: Inter-varsity Press, 1998).
Children and Research: A Risk of Double Jeopardy? LYNN HAGGER Lecturer in Law, University of Sheffield and Chairperson, Sheffield Children’s NHS Trust
SIMON WOODS* Senior Lecturer in Bioethics, Policy Ethics and Life Sciences (PEALS) Research Institute, University of Newcastle.
On the one hand there has been significant publicity about the lack of research into drugs used to treat children but, on the other, widespread criticism about unethical research carried out in the past. In addition, some current professional guidelines in relation to research on children unable to consent have been censured for being too permissive. Now, recent legislation in relation to clinical research actually appears to be unduly restrictive. In this paper, we set out to defend the guidelines from an ethical and legal perspective and propose that an even more rigorous approach could be adopted to ensure children are engaged in research. This is not to advocate that the children should be subjected to undue risk nor that those close to them should not be involved in any decisionmaking process. We hope to demonstrate that a more balanced approach is necessary and timely, in the hope that those working in relevant areas gain sufficient confidence to justify their research proposals robustly rather than avoid them because of fear of castigation at the ethics approval stage. This would ensure children are accorded appropriate recognition of their autonomous interests and that they are afforded the same opportunities to benefit from research as adult subjects.
Introduction It should be said at the outset that we recognise the vulnerability of the research subject and, in particular, that where the child is involved. It is not difficult to see that the relationship between researcher and participant is unequal in power. It is the researcher who is likely to be seen as imbued with knowledge, status and will be the active partner rather than acquiescent recipient of intervention(s). These factors are exacerbated when considering the subject may well be ill, in unfamiliar surroundings and, if a child, already unequal in Michael Freeman (Ed.), Children’s Health and Children’s Rights, 51–72. © 2006. Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands.
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the power stakes outside of the research environment.1 The criticism of research carried out in the past on especially vulnerable children such as orphans, the learning disabled and looked-after children i.e. those subject to care proceedings, is entirely legitimate.2 These children were given unproven vaccines that were accepted as risky and not approved for general use without parental consent. Some children suffered significant pain and were left with brain damage. Fortunately, now, controls are such that no Research Ethics Committee would approve such a trial. Some researchers believe the pendulum has swung too far in the other direction so that it is well nigh impossible to carry out appropriate research on children. Recent secondary legislation provides that clinical research may only be carried out on children where there is a ‘direct benefit’ for the group of patients involved in the clinical trial. This apparently rules out non-therapeutic research, unless a very wide reading is taken of the term, so that it may include psychological and other benefits.3 This seems unlikely in the current, cautious climate. Some would take the view that this amounts to discrimination against children.4 There is some force to this argument in that the UK Government has recognised the paucity of research with children and that up to two thirds of children in hospital may be taking unlicensed drugs. Overall, other estimates suggest that forty per cent of drugs prescribed to children have never been tested on them and that the figure rises to sixty five per cent where newborn babies are concerned.5 As will be seen below, some believe even these figures are conservative. The UK Government is committed to provide additional funding to encourage research in this area. Its position will be bolstered by the European Commission’s intention to draft legislation within the next two years forcing drug companies to undertake appropriate research on children so that their therapeutic needs are more directly addressed. The proposals follow a period of consultation with relevant stakeholders and will be similar to legislation currently enacted within the United States,6 that will support and promote studies in children to ensure the safety of medicines, many of which are currently used off-label. As things stand, it is estimated that between fifty and ninety per cent of medicinal products used in the paediatric population have never been specifically evaluated for use in that group. Recent US paediatric studies, conducted in response to US legislation, the Paediatric Exclusivity and the Paediatric Research Equity Act 2002, led to sixty four labels containing new paediatric information for established medicines between July 1998 and February 2004. In forty one cases, the new labels included important new dosing/pharmacokinetic information, lack of efficacy or safety information which had an impact on the safe and effective use of the medicine in children. The Act also established a fund of two hundred million US dollars for the fiscal year of 2002 and such sums as were necessary for each of the succeeding five
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years for the study of the use in the paediatric population of medicinal products for which there was no patent protection or market exclusivity. The situation in Europe has, so far, not supported paediatric studies in this way. However, the issue has been recognised by the European Union and a Council Resolution was passed on 14 December 2000 which called on the Commission to make proposals in the form of incentives, regulatory or supporting measures in respect of clinical research and development to ensure that new medicinal products for children and medicinal products already on the market were fully adapted to the specific needs of children. The final study report from Member States was expected in March 2004 and the extended impact assessment of the Resolution is expected shortly. The draft EU legislation is likely to propose a requirement for new medicinal products and authorised medicines, covered by a patent or supplementary protection certificate, to present the results of studies in children according to an agreed paediatric investigation plan. This will be required at the time of marketing authorisation application or application for a new indication, new dosage form or new route of administration. It is also likely to propose linking the submission of such data regarding children and the updating of production information to the reward of a six month extension of the supplementary protection certificate. In addition, there may well be an incentive for new studies on the safety, quality and efficacy of the product in children linked to a new type of marketing authorisation, the Paediatric Use Marketing Authorisation, together with a study programme to fund or part-fund research into the paediatric use of off-patent medicines (Medicines Investigation for the Children of Europe: MICE). The existing pharmaceutical legislation is being reviewed and revised legislation will be applicable in the second half of 2005. These initiatives are to be welcomed but will be to no avail if the conservative approach indicated by the new UK Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004, hereinafter ‘Regulations 2004’, discussed below, are interpreted restrictively. Nor should criticisms that professional guidelines are out of step with the Declaration of Helsinki be persuasive in changing restricting further the ethical approach to research on children. One commentator has taken the view that those guidelines advocating that such intervention should be ‘not contrary to the [incompetent] child’s best interests’ flies in the face of the Declaration’s commitment to the individual’s interest taking precedence over those of wider society and not being used as a means to an end. For him, this is too permissive an approach and research must be in the child’s best interests.7 With this in mind, we wish to present arguments in this paper that bolster the position of children so that they may become optimally engaged in therapeutic and non-therapeutic research where this is of minimal risk. This may be achieved by ensuring that there are sufficiently sophisticated assessments
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of their competence, their empowerment and by a presumption that everyone, including children, wishes to participate in research that does not necessarily involve direct benefit to themselves. This higher level of engagement, supporting autonomous and wider interests, together with the likely benefits that will accrue as a result of research, should avoid the accusation that children suffer a double jeopardy as a result of their current limited involvement. We seek to support those ethical guidelines that facilitate research on children with a more relaxed approach and a broad reading of the recent Regulations 2004. A discussion of the current legal and ethical approach will provide the context for our proposals. Although there is now some statutory basis governing the protection of the participant in clinical trials in the form of the Regulations 2004, the section concerning children’s capacity is sufficiently vague in parts that reference to both statute and the common law will still be necessary to ensure legal compliance.8 In light of this and the fact that non-clinical research will continue to be predominantly governed by case law and ethical guidelines, we believe the following examination remains pertinent.
The current legal and ethical framework The Regulations 2004 stipulate that, as far as clinical research is concerned, a parent or legal representative of the child may consent to the child’s participation in research where full information has been given including the objectives, risks, inconveniences, conditions and the right to withdraw at any time. Informed consent is to be given on the basis of the child’s presumed will. This represents a useful shift from the focus on best interests with its inherent difficulties of imposing subjective values on the individual concerned. That is not to underestimate the problems of determining presumed will in some cases, but such an approach should help to ensure that the child’s perspective is more likely to be taken into account. There must be no financial inducements other than compensation for any subsequent injury or loss. Pain, discomfort, fear and any foreseeable risk must be minimised by the design of the trial with the age and relevant disease in mind, and with the risk thresholds and degree of distress specifically defined and monitored.9 The child may decide for itself if deemed to have capacity based on information received from a health care practitioner with experience of children. Who determines capacity and what constitutes relevant experience will need to be answered by reference to existing case law and/or other guidance. Most crucially, the provision that the trial must relate to a condition from which the child suffers and is such that it can only be carried out on minors seems broad. The fact that it must be of direct benefit to the group of patients involved in the
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research, however, is restrictive if read narrowly.10 This appears to preclude any non-therapeutic research, which is usually taken to mean that it confers no personal benefit to the research participant. This is to be regretted for the reasons discussed below. The overarching principle that the interests of the child must prevail over the interests of science and society, echoing the sentiments of other relevant instruments,11 emphasises this point.12 This is a principle to be borne in mind when considering involvement of the child in research at any point. In addition, the clinical trial must be necessary to validate other clinical trials where the participants were able to give informed consent or from other research methods.13 The approach advocated by the Regulations 2004 is in line with both international instruments and professional guidelines although the latter are more supportive of non-therapeutic research in some cases.14 Given non-clinical research, such as psychological studies for example, do not fall within the remit of the Regulations 2004 and that its provisions may be challenged at least on a theoretical basis, it is worth briefly surveying the position prior to its enactment.
The competent child and therapeutic research There are no cases directly in point as far as research is concerned but, by analogy, it should be possible to predict that the approach taken in relation to treatment would apply to therapeutic research. S. 8(1) Family Law Reform Act 1969 allows sixteen and seventeen-year-olds to consent to therapeutic and diagnostic interventions. For those children under sixteen, the decision in Gillick15 in relation to treatment suggests that those who are deemed to be of sufficient maturity and understanding, i.e. fully understand all the implications of what is proposed, would be able to consent to participation in therapeutic research where they stand to benefit directly from it. The assessment undertaken to determine Gillick competence should be applied to sixteen and seventeen year olds also given the specificity of the s. 8(1) provisions. It is selfevident that a sufficiently sophisticated assessment of competence is necessary. Given there is no direct precedent, one may assume that, in the event of conflict, the courts would refer to professional guidance to set the appropriate ethical standards in such a situation. These broadly advocate the rights of such children to consent to therapeutic treatment, but some guidelines specifically recommend that the assent of parents should also be obtained unless, in the case of sixteen and seventeen-year-olds, it would not be in the child’s best interests for the parents to be informed in this way.16 This is not the position of the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health (RCPCH) where the view is that a Gillick competent child should be able to consent to participation in research
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with no reference to parents.17 At the time of writing, the Central Office for Research Ethics Committees offers little guidance which is unfortunate given that the otherwise overarching document is likely to be the first point of reference for Research Ethics Committees (RECs).18
The competent child and non-therapeutic research We have seen that the law apparently does not allow non-therapeutic clinical research.19 As far as other types of non-therapeutic research is concerned, one might reasonably assume that the approach advocated by the RCPCH in relation to therapeutic research would be appropriate here in that a Gillick competent child should be able to consent to participation in research with no reference to parents. However, the decision in Re W,20 suggests that the courts are not minded to allow children to consent to non-therapeutic interventions. In view of this, it is probable that researchers will prefer to gain the consent of parents in such a case as recommended more generally by professional guidelines. Where parental consent is withheld but a Gillick competent child has consented, research should probably only be undertaken in exceptional circumstances where a very important study is jeopardised. Who determines this rather qualitative judgment is a moot point. Even where parental consent/assent is forthcoming, it is considered such research should only be undertaken where the risk is minimal.21 It is self-evident that the consent must be real in that it is given voluntarily, free from unacceptable inducements and in the light of full information.22 Earlier remarks about appropriate assessment of children’s competence are equally relevant here.
The incompetent child and therapeutic research Where the child is deemed incompetent by virtue of age or illness, parents will be able to consent to therapeutic research although professional guidelines suggest obtaining the child’s assent in addition would be good practice even where experimental treatment is concerned.23 In Simms v Simms,24 it was held that parents could consent to novel treatment for their sixteen-year-old daughter suffering from new variant CJD. Given there was no alternative therapy available, it was thought that it might halt the deterioration in her condition and would not increase her suffering, this was seen as an entirely reasonable approach. There is some doubt whether a parent could consent to their child participating in a randomised controlled trial given the child will not necessarily stand to gain directly from this.25 It should be noted that the Institute
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of Medical Ethics26 recommends consent of children over seven should be obtained for research and that the Royal College of Physicians27 suggested in addition that the child should be able to refuse even where parental consent is obtained; where they are too young to give consent, proceeding in accordance with parental consent should be undertaken with caution. It is certainly arguable that parental consent should only be seen as one factor to take into account. Parental consent may satisfy legal requirements but not be necessarily ethically justifiable where, for example, it is still distressing to an incompetent minor. Here, ethical practice would require the researcher to withdraw the child.
The incompetent child and non-therapeutic research Probably the area of greatest contention concerns the incompetent child and non-therapeutic research. In these cases it is strongly doubted whether parents can legally authorise their child’s participation. In the absence of clear legal guidance in the case of non-clinical research, it is thought such authorisation would not be deemed in the child’s best interests to be engaged in research where he/she does not stand to gain directly. Where the courts have been asked to assess whether proposed interventions are in a child’s best interests, they generally do not consider the wider interests of those caring for the child or of society.28 These other interests might be considered where this may have an indirect benefit to the child however.29 The focus on the individual is understandable but, arguably, short-sighted. Account must be taken of the fact that non-therapeutic research on children is necessary because, they respond differently to drugs and suffer from illnesses that do not affect adults. A case in point is Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy (DMD), a very rare single gene condition, affecting only boys and resulting in premature death. It is only relatively recently that boys with DMD survive to adulthood, but rarely with full mental capacity. The nature of this disease means that there is a need for research at all stages of the disease, but particularly on minor children and in circumstances where such research is unlikely to benefit participants. We have noted also the significant number of instances where unlicensed drugs are used in children.30 The RCPCH take the view that, provided it could not be carried out on adults and an appropriate risk/benefit assessment is undertaken, non-therapeutic research is legal and ethical.31 The first claim appears somewhat categorical. Although, as we shall see, there is an ethical argument that may be mounted to support the contention that it is permissible to conduct non-therapeutic research on children, this is only lawful if accepted
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by the courts. Parental consent cannot be seen as sufficient to render such research lawful nor would it be necessarily ethically justifiable. The law is still unclear, notwithstanding the Regulations 2004, that a court declaration as to the lawfulness or otherwise of any proposed non-therapeutic research where non-clinical research is concerned should be sought where there is concern that risks may be more than minimal. Of course, in the light of the apparent statutory prohibition on non-therapeutic clinical research, the courts may be influenced by this in relation to other types of research, so that approval is now less likely to be given.
International instruments Edwards has commented that key professional guidelines and certain international instruments are out of step with the Declaration of Helsinki, the cornerstone of approaches to be taken to ensure the protection of research subjects.32 The Declaration of Helsinki states that: In medical research on human subjects, considerations related to the well-being of the human subject should take precedence over the interests of science and society.33
Quite clearly, utilitarian arguments are unlikely to have much force on this basis whereas a deontological perspective, with a focus on the individual from a rights or duty-based approach, can more easily provide the ethical underpinnings of such a statement. Most guidelines concur with this approach, as do the Regulations 2004. Yet the most relevant guidelines in relation to children support the idea that non-therapeutic research on children is legitimate, where it is not against their best interests. A narrow reading of the best interests approach cannot possibly run where there is no direct benefit to the child. A change in emphasis, so that the wider interests of society are taken into account with those of the individual, could be seen as being out of step with the Declaration. However, perhaps the Declaration should be perceived in a similar manner to the European Convention on Human Rights in that it is a ‘living instrument’ developing in line with a rapidly changing society with changing mores as a result of informed debate? While the individual’s interest must continue to be at the forefront of any debate, this must surely be in the context of that individual’s place in society?
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Children and consent – the nature of the problem As we have seen, obtaining consent is seen as pivotal in ensuring legitimate research. In considering the problem of children’s participation in research we view consent as both part of the problem and part of the solution. Part of the problem because consent is problematic for adults as well as children, being generally relied upon to do too much of the ethical work in the context of research. Consent is part of the solution, because a much more inclusive attitude towards children and consent will be of benefit to children. The general thrust of our argument is that research regulation, and legislation, where this exists, is still too paternalistic. This is not a contradiction in terms even when discussing children. We have seen that there are certain conditions that affect only children, and there are treatments used for children that have not been properly researched for use in children. Children are disadvantaged by this position but placed in double jeopardy by the reluctance to allow children to participate in research. We are arguing for a much broader and inclusive approach towards children, and a greater recognition of the diversity that exists amongst children with respect to their capacities. Addressing the issue of consent is, however, only part of the solution. In taking a broad and coherent approach to the problem of children’s participation in research it is necessary to consider the question beyond the issue of consent. In bringing pressure to bear on the prevailing ethico-legal model of children’s consent to research we find an initial ally in the general approach adopted by liberal bioethics. Generally speaking, the liberal position can be characterised as one that regards the autonomy of the individual as a powerful trump over concerns for their welfare. Welfare concerns only gain in moral priority when autonomy is diminished. Although this may give good reason to prioritise the welfare of children in the context of research, it is not clear that this is a generalisation that withstands scrutiny. It is not a presumption of liberal bioethics that being a child per se equates to diminished autonomy and therefore, in principle at least, we have the makings of an argument. One of the crucial questions with regard to children’s consent to research is to what extent we should regard children as intrinsically vulnerable, thus giving greater priority to their welfare interests over and above their burgeoning self-determination? The perception of the child as a vulnerable individual has been the metric for regulation and legislation, and is precisely the paternalistic presumption we wish to call into question. We regard this approach as leading to regulatory approaches that are blunt instruments. Although the general liberal approach we have outlined seems to be a good starting point it must be noted that some liberal commentators have qualms about extending full rights to self-determination to children. Joel Feinberg34 offers an argument, the thrust of which could be seen to justify setting the tone
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of regulation at a more paternalistic level than liberals might otherwise be comfortable with, but, if sound, may give good reason to presume that children are rightly regarded as vulnerable. Since this is a threat to our own position we consider this here. Although Feinberg is not addressing the issue of children’s consent to research, his argument is a justification of the right to intervene in the lives of children for the sake of the child’s future autonomy, their ‘right to an open future.’ Our interpretation of this claim takes interventions to include restrictive legislation limiting the child’s, and his or her parent’s, right to consent to participate in research. In other words, the very values liberals are at pains to defend forms the grounds on which the conservative approach to children is based. Where a child’s decision or behaviour is such that it threatens his or her own future autonomy it represents sufficient grounds for intervention. Feinberg emphasises that such measures should be regarded as means to hold the child’s right in trust until such a time as the child reaches maturity and has the competence to exercise such a right. In fairness to Feinberg, his concerns are with decisions that threaten the child’s future autonomy in substantive ways, for example, by threatening future health, mental ability, reproductive choice and so on. In the light of these concerns then such measures seem proportionate. However, this kind of argument with regard to children is in principle problematic for liberals. This approach inevitably relies upon stipulating an arbitrary demarcation between adult and child, since there is no fixed correlation between age and capacity for autonomy (particularly if one also takes context into account, for example, the child who is an experienced patient), but rather a loose contingent relationship. There is, therefore, an inevitable Sorites35 problem, which must be addressed. This is not merely a philosophical puzzle but an issue that strikes at the heart of the consent and children in research debate. The problem raises questions, not only concerning the moral justification of policies for intervening in the lives of children, but also the widely regarded right of the adult to enjoy non-interference in his or her life. The question of how to respond to the mature minor for example is mirrored on the other side of the stipulated legal (or whatever the divide liberals would consider reasonable) age divide by the problems presented, not only by the immature adult, but any person who has an interest in an open future and can be seen to be forestalling this by the decisions they are now about to make. This of course is a very illiberal conclusion and one that Feinberg would no doubt wish to reject. However, this conclusion can only be avoided by showing why the child, and uniquely the child, should be managed in this way when adults, who all surely share the same interest as children in an open future, should not.
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An alternative legal approach? A more robust approach to allowing children, whether competent or not, to engage in non-therapeutic research we believe is ethically defensible and we have begun to set out the grounds for challenging the traditional approach on the lines set out above. What of the legal position? It is worth bearing in mind that although the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 (UNCRC) underpins the legal framework, it is arguable that some of the key Articles of the UNCRC are not fully reflected in practice. In particular, Article 12: . . . the child who is capable of forming his or her own views has the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child: the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with age and maturity of the child.
Article 13: . . . the child shall have the right to freedom of expression, (including) freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of the child’s choice.
We have said that the legal position appears to be clear in that clinical research must relate to a condition from which the child suffers, is such that there is no alternative but to use minors and must be of direct benefit to the group of patients involved in the research.36 We suggest that, although this seems very restrictive, there could be some interesting challenges around the notion of ‘direct benefit’. For example, ‘direct benefit’ could include the psychological benefit of knowing that your research participation has made a contribution to the ‘greater good’. The Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) could present an opportunity to argue more vociferously than has thus far been the case to support claims for allowing for a greater recognition of the autonomous interests of children. This could include the right to engage in non-therapeutic research. Notwithstanding Lord Donaldson’s negative remarks in Re W 37 when contemplating non-therapeutic interventions, closer examination of the text does reveal a commitment to giving due consideration to the preferences of the minor.38 The notion of evolving autonomy makes far more sense than imposing arbitrary age limits with respect to capacity.39 The approach adopted in Re T ,40 where there is a presumption of capacity allowing for the right to self-determination is suggested as equally relevant for the maturing minor. Such a presumption would, of course, be rebuttable. If the fundamental factor in autonomous decision-making, the ability to make a choice, is taken into account in determining competence, this would extend the notion of Gillick competence. This should be more than the ability
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to understand which relies, to a lesser or greater extent, on whether others approve of the outcome. This approach has been endorsed by the English Law Commission41 and currently enshrined in the Mental Capacity Bill. An appropriate evaluation of adolescent autonomy might need a recognition that the idea of fully autonomous choice is an aspiration and, in reality, only maximally autonomous choice is possible.42 Defects in control, reasoning, information and stability will undermine respect for particular choices. In the case of research, it is axiomatic that the individual must be in possession of sufficient information to make a proper choice and, in the case of a minor, account must be taken of their experience as well as adequate communication with health professionals involved and their parents/carers. Given the conspicuous lack of a successful challenge in the UK to the test for competence as determined by the courts, perhaps this indicates this is set at too high a level. A failure properly to assess children’s competence could, theoretically, breach Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the right, inter alia, not to be subject to inhuman and degrading treatment, under the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). However, Strasbourg case law suggests that only the more extreme examples of inhuman and degrading treatment will breach Article 3.43 Currently, a failure to accurately assess competence is unlikely to constitute a breach of Article 3 unless this is then followed by very significant medical intervention, such as research, particularly where inadequate levels of information have been provided. Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which requires respect for private and family life, would be at the centre of any claim now made by the mature minor who believes that their competence has not received sufficient recognition by health professionals and their parents under the Human Rights Act 1998. This may help strengthen the mature minor’s claim for a greater recognition of their autonomy rights and a more sophisticated assessment of competence may assist in acknowledging these. The European Court of Human Rights has given explicit recognition that although no previous case had established a right to self-determination as being contained in Article 8, the notion of personal autonomy was an important principle underlying the interpretation of its guarantees.44 Article 14 may also be engaged. This provides the right not to be discriminated against in the enjoyment of other Convention rights and carries no express public interest exceptions and imposes a positive obligation on states as to the way in which the enjoyment of these rights is secured.45 In formulating a claim about the lack of recognition of competency in the mature minor, age discrimination would seem to be the inevitable focus of any Article 14 discussions. Where it does receive scrutiny, the approach will be to establish whether there is differential treatment or outcome, an acceptable ground for this and whether the resulting difference is justifiable.46
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The competency issues for researchers The legal position is a clear indication that today’s society recognises the need to consult children and respond to their views. Clearly, researchers need to be aware of the broad legal framework within which they must operate. Some of the detail of relevant cases help because these highlight the need for, inter alia, involving the child and giving credence to their views. The process itself can empower children and their carers as they are helped to make decisions, adding to their confidence and competence, as well as provide a thorough means of assessing the child’s capacity. This should include taking account of the child’s experience and how this might have had an impact on their maturity and understanding. The exploration of competency must be undertaken to ensure legitimate decision-making. The best decisions will be achieved if wide-ranging views are taken into account, including those of the child and its significant others, together with those of relevant experts where necessary. The use of protocols for assessing capacity is advisable. Using age and traditional measures of general intelligence alone is a poor measure of a child’s capacity to have sufficient understanding.47 There must be a recognition of contextual factors emphasising the importance of the social component of cognitive development. It is obvious that children develop at different rates and contemporary research indicates that they can process and interpret the demands of their world, in particular their social world, at a very early age.48 The age of the child is not so important as the ability of the child’s mind to accommodate to its circumstances and needs. Intelligence as a concept is also undergoing radical re-appraisal resulting in psychometric measuring tools that measure intelligence as a multifactorial construct. This infers an acknowledgement that people are now aware that they cannot accurately predict particular competencies from measures of general cognition.49 In sum: Competence is more than a skill, it is a way of relating and can be understood more clearly when each child’s inner qualities are seen within a network of relationships and cultural influences.50
While bolstering the claims of children to have a greater recognition of their autonomous interests is essential, we believe that additional arguments are also necessary to ensure their appropriate engagement in research.
Children and consent: further complexities We wish to establish that when we talk of children we are not talking of a single homogeneous group. We recognise the legal concept of the child that includes individuals from birth to eighteen years, with only a somewhat
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begrudging recognition of the older child’s right to self-determination by a limited recognition of certain capacities to consent.51 Nor are we talking, in the context of research about a homogeneous activity. There are very marked contrasts between the “straightforward” clinical trial for a new drug and complex, longitudinal, genetic research or epidemiological research project. Here, we will draw on some examples to demonstrate the complexity and range of issues inherent in some research. From these brief analyses, we hope to show that consent is also problematic for adults and children and that too much emphasis is given to consent. As a result there is a need to find a more useful approach. We are persuaded that the common good argument that follows provides such a model where there is an expectation that everyone should participate in research albeit within proper governance arrangements to safeguard all participants’ interests.52
Case examples The Avon Longitudinal Study of Parents and Children (ALSPAC)53 and the North Cumbria Community Genetics Project (NCCGP)54 are two of the longest standing genetics databases in the UK and involved the collection of biological samples from women and their newborn children (maternal blood, infant cord blood and placental tissue) in conjunction with lifestyle information which also extends to information regarding partner’s lifestyle. These data are held in the project’s databases and may be made available to other research studies. Haimes and Whong-Barr,55,56 amongst others,57 have expressed their concerns about the range of issues projects of this kind inevitably raise. These concerns include questions about who has a voice and who remains, or is forced to remain, silent in the debates about genetic databases, their creation, governance and future existence. With reference to the NCCGP, they express particular concerns for what they call the “silent participants”, the infants even though they have been ‘properly consented’ in that their parents have consented on their behalf. Not only this, but the fact that the child participants in this project are likely to become unwitting participants in further research during a time period in which they will develop an actual voice. Unwitting because it was agreed that further decisions to use these data in anonymised form would be made by the Local Research Ethics Committee. Recommendations may, but equally may not, include a requirement to seek further consent. With the development of the power of speech, there is also the voice, evidence of the burgeoning capacity to form an opinion, to have a viewpoint, and, in legal parlance, to have the competence to decide for themselves. The custodians of the NCCGP database are clear that the child participants
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will be able to withdraw their samples once they reach the age of sixteen. Setting aside the question of how complete such a withdrawal might be, they are, until that age, essentially silent donors to medical research during a period in which they could feasibly give or withhold their consent at a much earlier point. Whether this is an injustice or not must be a judgement balanced against the merits of the project as a whole and the actual risks posed to the individual by continued participation. Whether a child was or was not included in the ALSPAC or NCCGP studies relied on decisions made by its mother. Continuing involvement in ALSPAC still relies heavily upon parental consent. Evaluative research on this project has revealed, albeit hypothetically, the curious finding that some dissenting children may be coerced into continuing to participate. Either because parents impose their will on the child or children do not feel empowered to speak out. Although elsewhere adult and child participants also acknowledge the importance of the child’s right to veto continued participation.58 The fact that initial and continuing involvement in these studies relies upon the mother’s consent illustrates some of the complexity that surrounds the issue of presumed competent adults to consent for themselves and their children. Haimes and Whong-Barr59 describe a number of concerns in their evaluation study of the NCCGP project. For example, some mothers regarded the cord blood and placental tissue as waste and therefore not significantly attached either to themselves or their child. This raises doubts as to whether they understood that agreeing to donate such tissue was in fact agreeing to their, and their child’s participation in the study. Some respondents reported that they would have asked more questions if the sample had been of a different type, such as venous blood or a cheek swab. Some respondents also reported being uncertain as to whether they donated tissue or not. Of course, if a more invasive sample had been requested, this does not necessarily mean that women’s understanding of the gene bank would have been greater. Haimes and Whong-Barr point to what they see as an important complicating factor, namely, the context in which this study took place. Context includes the fact that these were pregnant women also receiving antenatal care when they were approached to participate in the study. Haimes and Whong-Barr are concerned that if the participants are uncertain about what they donated, how clear can they be about the rationale of the research to which they contributed, or about the nature of the uses to which their information and samples might be put? Clearly these concerns pose serious doubts as to the validity of the consent of these participants, and in turn the validity of the consent for their children. However, despite these concerns, Haimes and Whong-Barr also report that many respondents remained enthusiastic about their participation, reporting motives, which included altruism and the wish to contribute something back to society.
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The NCCGP example is illustrative of two of the issues we are concerned with in our argument. One is the unequal burden placed upon the role of consent to do most of the moral work in the context of research; the second is the need to develop a richer notion of inclusive citizenship. These examples of research demonstrate not just the range of issues, but the moral ambiguity that muddies the water. The complexity of a research project, its context and the uncertainty surrounding the aims of the research sometimes make the ideal of informed consent as the ultimate ethical safeguard an improbable, if not impossible, aspiration, not only for children but for competent adult proxies. We regard this as a complexity that we should both recognise and accept. We do not argue for abandoning consent but rather that we should both recognise and be realistic about its limitations. One implication perhaps is that we should be more willing to allow children an active role in consenting to research recognising that children are sometimes no more vulnerable than their adult proxies. Of course, consent cannot legitimise an ethically flawed or unethically executed research project. Therefore whilst widening the community of those deemed able to consent, we should redouble our efforts to ensure that research is properly governed and regulated. It is with this final point in mind that we now turn to consider where society’s expectations of its citizens’ participation in research should lie.
The common good proposal If anything can claim the status of a common good then it is health and the practice of medicine and health care, which aims to preserve and restore it. It is a reasonable expectation within any developed society to receive the best medical treatment and care. The raison d’être of the UK’s National Health Service is to provide this. Whilst it is in everyone’s interests that health care delivery is of the highest possible standard it is not often noted that high standards can only be achieved with the co-operation of those who stand to benefit. The best treatment and care cannot be achieved without proper research. For research to be of most benefit it requires the co-operation of a significant number to render the research both valid and generalisable. Willingness to participate is an expectation that can reasonably be had of everyone. The traditional stance in medical ethics, however, is to emphasise the moral responsibility that health professionals have to each individual patient and to ignore the responsibility each person qua patient may have. Health care ethics gains its legitimacy from the fact that it is grounded in common morality, respect for persons, which entails respect for a person’s autonomy. In turn respect for autonomy requires not only respect for an individual’s decision-making capacity but for that patient’s privacy and right to be
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truthfully informed. Respect for persons also requires that we refrain from doing harm to others and that we aim to do positive good to others. One would expect that the rationale for regulation and legislation of research to reflect these basics of common morality. The moral duties of health professionals have their foundation in common morality. We wish also to emphasise that every person shares these duties equally. We therefore conclude that an individual’s rights must be balanced against the potential demands made upon them in the interests of the common good. Everyone stands to gain important benefits from health care and expects that his or her care will be of the highest standard. So how should a society that values these benefits characterise the expectations it has of its citizens if they are to enjoy these benefits? One could talk of a moral duty based on an equal expectation of reciprocity from the beneficiaries. We would prefer to put this in terms of a moral expectation that each person, the young, the old, the infirm and the healthy, will contribute to medical research. We put the claim in this way because, although there may be a justified expectation, we would not go so far to say to say that others may convert this expectation into an obligation and unilaterally enforce it. The moral expectation that all citizens will contribute to medical research rests upon a number of considerations. The first is that it is part of the general morality that each person should refrain from harming others. The second is that we all have positive duty to do good. The third is that research is in everyone’s interests and it therefore seems only fair to expect everyone to contribute to a service from which each expects to benefit.60 It could be observed that these claims are too demanding given that people who turn to the health care services do so out of need and are inherently vulnerable as patients. It should be emphasised that this claim does not diminish the moral importance of each individual patient, including the right to have his or her personal interests taken into account. Nor does it give licence to health professionals to pursue their research interests without due consideration of their moral and legal responsibilities. However, does being a child weaken one’s moral status or alter one’s moral obligations? We think not, having such an expectation, even of children, should be construed as part of the initiation into good citizenship. Children should grow up socialised into a world in which the society in which they thrive has legitimate expectations in return. This is emphatically not to say that a citizen may not grow up to criticise and ultimately reject the values of their own culture. This is of course an unpopular and admittedly difficult argument to make in the light of Bristol and Alder Hey scandals and the subsequent collapse in the trust of health professionals that has ensued.61 A society can only begin to insist upon such expectations where it has gained and is proved worthy of the trust of its citizens.62 Existing legislation and ethical guidance is designed to afford protection to
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individuals who participate in research. However, the existence of specific legislation does not alter the fact that, first and foremost, all people, patients and health professionals alike have a moral duty of care and a duty not to harm others. So it is a general moral principle that forms the basis of the duty of care each person has to prevent harm coming to others through his or her acts or omissions, and hence the duty to participate in research. This is particularly apposite with regard to children where there has been the historical reluctance to research on children, even where children will be the direct and sometimes the only beneficiaries. As we have argued, the expectation that all children ought to participate in research is well-founded. To expect participation in research is to presume willingness to do what any reasonable, moral person should be prepared to do, at least where the risks of serious harm are small or non-existent. This argument stands independently of the issues associated with consent. Failure to obtain consent, either of the child or their parent, may present a circumstance in which one feels that the expectation of participation remains legitimate, but for pragmatic reasons it would be politic not to insist. The sight of a child dragged kicking and screaming from its parent’s arms is not an image that could conceivably contribute to an argument about good citizenship! Of course, the parent and child may never be approached in certain forms of public health monitoring and epidemiological research. What of the law? Does it uphold the ethical principle by offering a balance between the moral expectation as we describe and the duty to act in the best interests of the child currently receiving care, and the wider obligation to future patients who stand to gain from the research? It must be said that this approach is neither fully reflected in current legislation nor in case law. There is some evidence that the courts may be sympathetic to the idea that parents may consent to procedures more beneficial to the community where these are not against the interests of the child, i.e. where risks are minimal.63 This should be encouraged, as should a more robust assessment of children’s capacity to consent to non-therapeutic research on their own behalf. This should be determined on a case-by-case basis taking into account such issues as the level of information given to parents and their children in the decision-making process about any risks involved. Thus, each case must be examined on its merits within a general framework of principles not specific, restrictive regulations. The approach adopted in the US may be instructive. Here, research on children is allowed where: it poses no greater than minimal risk; where it involves greater than minimal risk but offers direct benefit to the individual research subject; where it involves greater than minimal risk but offers no prospect of direct benefit to the subject but may yield information about their condition and where understanding may be advanced about a serious health problem in children. This last category of research requires specific approval at federal level
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following advice from a panel of experts.64 Although there will always be disagreement about such notions as ‘minimal risk’, independent scrutiny of proposals from experts in a relatively relaxed framework might be one adopted by RECs in the UK provided clearer guidance is established here. Brazier has also argued that judges should not be the final arbiters of acceptable practice.65 She suggests the establishment of a code of practice underpinned with statutory force when consent can be given and by whom, overseen by independent expert scrutiny.66 The Regulations 2004 go some way in this regard in that rigorous scrutiny will continue to be provided over research proposals but relevant experts should be co-opted when appropriate. Where children are concerned, it is arguable that it should be mandatory that a paediatrician and/or other relevant professionals should be called upon to advise RECs.
Conclusion The fact that there are some conditions that only affect children and that a significant proportion of drugs prescribed for them are untested on the paediatric population, means that research should be increased urgently. This must be carried out within strictly circumscribed limits to ensure children are not exposed to undue risk. However, safeguards to ensure ethical research should not be so rigorous that they make it impossible to recruit sufficient numbers of children for a study to be feasible, otherwise they will remain in the bind of double jeopardy. We believe the proposals contained in this paper strike an acceptable balance between the appropriate protection and empowerment of children together with the needs of the research community by assuming everyone wishes to make a contribution to the overall welfare of the wider community.
Notes * Our grateful thanks go to D. Longley, Reader in Law, University of Sheffield for comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 1 Edwards, S., 2005. 2 The Times, August 30, 2004, p. 9. 3 Schedule 1, Part 4, para. 10, Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004. 4 E. Webb (2004). 5 The Times, 21 August 2004. 6 Personal communication on the US and EU position in this section from Professor N. Bishop, Consultant Paediatrician, Sheffield Children’s NHS Trust. 7 Op. cit., at n. 1, where the professional guidelines at n. 14, infra, are discussed.
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Schedule 1, Part 4, paras. 1–8 and Principles 13–15. Ibid. 10 Schedule 1, Part 4, paras. 9–10, Regulations 2004. 11 E.g. World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki (2000). 12 Schedule 1, Part 4, Principle 16, Regulations 2004. 13 Ibid., para. 11. 14 Declaration of Helsinki, supra at n. 11, British Medical Association (2004), Royal College of Paediatric and Child Health (2000) and the Council for International Organisations of Medical Sciences (2002). 15 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] A C 112. 16 Department of Health HSG (91) 5, para. 4. 17 RCPCH, op. cit. at n. 14. 18 Standard Operating Procedures for Research Ethics Committees in the United Kingdom, 2004. 19 Op. cit. at n. 10. 20 Re W (A Minor) (Wardship: Consent to Medical Treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 627, CA. 21 Institute of Medical Ethics ‘Medical Research with Children: Ethics, Law and Practice’ (1986) Bull. No. 14, p. 8 usefully defines the acceptable risk levels in relation to death, major and minor complications. 22 The European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, Strasbourg 1997 broadly follows this approach: ; Treaty 164. 23 E.g. BMA (2004). 24 [2003] 1 All ER 669. 25 I. Kennedy and A. Grubb, Medical Law, (London: Butterworth, 2000, 1718). 26 Supra at n. 21. 27 Op. cit., at n. 14. 28 Re D [1976] 1 All Er 326 and Re B [1987] 2 All ER 506 but note the decision in Re T(a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1997] 1 All ER 906, where the court did defer, unusually, to the mother’s wishes over those of the medical team who considered a liver transplant to be in the child’s best interests. 29 Re Y (Mental Incapacity: Bone Marrow Transplant) [1997] Fam. 110 although concerning an incapacitated adult, a very broad reading was given of best interests so that the benefit of saving her sister’s life, meant that her mother would maintain more positive contact with her. 30 Op. cit. at nn. 4–6. 31 RCPCH, op. cit., at n. 14. 32 Edwards, S., (2005) 1; he compares the Declaration of Helsinki with the professional guidelines set out at n. 14. 33 Declaration of Helsinki, (2000). 34 Feinberg, J. (1992). 35 Sorites or the ‘heap’ problem: the classical philosophical problem of judging when one thing has achieved the transition into another when the transition involves small incremental changes. So at what point does the developing child reach the point at which she deserves the respect due to the adult with full capacity? 36 Op. cit. at n. 10. 37 Ibid., pp. 637–639. 38 Op. cit. at n. 37, pp. 637– 639. 39 Lord Scarman in Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] A C 112 at 186 and M. Brazier and C. Bridge (1996). 40 Re T [1992] 4 All ER 649. 8 9
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Law Com Report No. 231 Mental Incapacity (London: HMSO, 1995) Part III (1). J. Harris, (1985). 43 Z v. UK [2001] 2 FLR 612. 44 Pretty v. United Kingdom [2002] 2 FCR 97. 45 Belgian Linguistic case, Series B, No. 3 (1967), 24 June 1965, 305–6. 46 D. Feldman, (2002, 144–6). 47 See L. Hagger, (2003) for a more detailed exposition of these points. 48 J.M. Mandler, (1990). 49 C. Elliott, P. Smith and K. McCulloch, (1996). 50 P. Alderson, (1992, 123). 51 Given the retraction from the recognition of children’s autonomous interests in Gillick supra at n. 15 in the subsequent cases of, for example, Re R (A Minor) (Wardship: Consent to Medical Treatment) [1991] 4 All ER 177, CA and Re W (A Minor) (Wardship: Consent to Medical Treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 627, CA. 52 Chadwick R., and Berg, K. (2001). 53 ALSPAC (2002). 54 Chase, D. et al. (1998). 55 Haimes, E., & Whong-Barr, M., (2004a). 56 Haimes, E., & Whong-Barr, M., (2004b). 57 Laurie, G., (2002). 58 Williamson, E. et al. (2004, 147). 59 Op. cit. at n. 56. 60 Harris, J. and Woods, S. (2000). 61 The Report of the Royal Liverpool Children’s Inquiry, Jan 2001 () The report of the public inquiry in to children’s heart surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984–1995 (Cm 5207(1)). 62 O’Neill, O. (2002). 63 S v S [1972] AC 24 and A. Bissett-Johnson and P. Ferguson, (1996). 64 Code of Federal Regulations paras. 46–50. 65 Brazier, M., (2003). 66 Ibid. at p. 408. 41 42
References Alderson, P. (1992) ‘In the genes or in the stars’ Journal of Medical Ethics, pp. 119–124. ALSPAC (2002) . Brazier, M. (2003) Medicine, Patients and the Law, London, Penguin. Brazier, M. and Bridge, C. (1996), ‘Coercion or Caring: Analysing Adolescent Autonomy’, Legal Studies, 16, 107. British Medical Association (2004) Medical Ethics Today. The BMA’s handbook of ethics and law, London, BMA. Chadwick, R. and Berg, K. (2001) ‘Solidarity and equity: new ethical framework for genetic databases’, Nature Review Genetics 2, pp. 318–321. Chase, D., Tawn, E., Paker, L., Jonas, P. and Burn, J. (1998) ‘The North Cumbria Community Genetics Project’, Journal of Medical Genetics 35, pp. 413–416. Council for International Organisations of Medical Sciences (2002) International ethical guidelines for biomedical research involving human subjects, Geneva, CIOMS databases: a case study of the North Cumbria Genetics Project’ in R. Tutton & O. Corrigan,
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eds. Genetic Databases: socio-ethical issues in the collection and use of DNA, London: Routledge. Department of Health HSG (91)5. Edwards, S. and McNamee, M.J. (2005) ‘The ethical concerns regarding guidelines for the conduct of clinical research on children’ JME. Elliott, C., Smith, P. & McCulloch, K. (1996) British Ability Scales Second Edition (BAS II). NFER-Nelson: Windsor, U.K. European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (1997) Strasbourg . Feinberg, J. (1992) ‘The Child’s Right to an Open Future’ in Freedom and Fulfillment, Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp. 76–98. Feldman, D. (2002) Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales, Oxford University Press. Hagger, L. (2003) ‘A new perspective on cognitive development in infancy’ American Scientist 78, pp. 236–243. ——— (2003) ‘Some implications of the Human Rights Act 1998 for the medical treatment of children’ Medical Law International 6, pp. 25–5. Haimes, E., & Whong-Barr, M., (2004a) ‘Levels and styles of participation in genetic databases: A case study of the North Cumbria Genetics Project’ in R. Tutton & O. Corrigan, eds. Donating, collecting and exploiting human tissue: Social and ethical dimensions of genetic research, London: Routledge. ——— (2004b) ‘Key issues in genetic epidemiology: lessons from a UK based empirical study.’ TRAMES 8, 105–163. Harris, J. (1985) The Value of Life, Routledge. Harris, J. and Woods, S. (2000) ‘What are the responsibilities of the individual when participating in medical research? in: Doyal, L. and Tobias, J. (eds.) Informed Consent in Medical Research. BMJ Books pp. 286–292. Institute of Medical Ethics (1986) ‘Medical Research with Children: Ethics, Law and Practice’. Kennedy, I. And Grubb, A. (2000) Medical Law, Butterworths, London. Laurie, G. (2002) Genetic Privacy: a challenge to medic-legal norms. Cambridge University Press. Law Commission Report No. 231 (1995) Mental Incapacity London, HMSO. Mandler, J.M. (1990) ‘A new perspective on cognitive development in infancy’ American Scientist 78, pp. 236–243. O’Neill, O. (2002) Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Royal College of Paediatric and Child Health (2000) ‘Guidelines for the ethical conduct of medical research involving children’, Archives of Disease in Childhood, 82 pp. 178–82. Standard Operating Procedures for Research Ethics Committees in the United Kingdon (2004). Webb, E. (2004) ‘Discrimination against children’, Archives of Disease in Childhood 89 pp. 804–808. Williamson, E., Goodenough, T., Kent, J. and Ashcroft, R. (2004) ‘Children’s participation in genetic epidemiology: consent and control’ in R. Tutton and O. Corrigan, eds.Genetic Databases: socio-ethical issues in the collection and use of DNA, London, Routledge. World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki (2000), Ethical principles for medical research involving human subjects, Edinburgh, WMA.
Of Newborns and Nubiles: Some Critical Challenges to Children’s Rights in Africa in the Era of HIV/Aids JULIA SLOTH-NIELSEN Faculty of Law, University of the Western Cape, South Africa
1. The international legal framework within which HIV/Aids issues should be addressed Both the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) and the regional charter for the protection and promotion of children’s rights, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990), are silent on the issue of HIV/Aids directly. Nor is this particularly surprising – both were formulated before the impact of the epidemic began to be felt in the developing world, and before the implications of the disease for children could be fully understood. The most substantive elaboration of principle concerning the issues relevant to HIV/Aids and the rights of the child is contained in the Committee on the Rights of the Child’s General Comment No. 3 (2003) entitled ‘HIV/Aids and the rights of the child’ (CRC/GC/2003/1). The Comment commences with the assertion that initially, children were thought to be only marginally affected by the Aids pandemic, but that it is now apparent that children are at the heart of the problem. The majority of new infections are to be found in adolescents and young people, on the one hand, and, on the other, transmission of the disease to newborns during the birth process means that babies and infants constitute another vulnerable group. More generally, all children can be rendered vulnerable to the effects of HIV/Aids through the loss of parental care-givers. Further, HIV/Aids cannot merely be viewed as a health related issue, as numerous other rights (civil, political and socio-economic) can become compromised due to the impact of HIV/Aids. The General Comment affirms the centrality of the four general principles which inform the interpretation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, namely, the right to non-discrimination (article 2), the right of the child to have his or her best interests taking account of as a primary consideration (article 3), the right to survival and development (article 6) and the right to have his or her views respected (article 12). This seemingly obvious recantation of the four principal rights in the Convention architecture belies, however, some very much deeper questions. Michael Freeman (Ed.), Children’s Health and Children’s Rights, 73–85. © 2006. Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands.
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What is in the best interest of children in the HIV/Aids environment? Can (and should) some rights be accorded a margin of deference (or assigned primacy) over others in relation to some of the practical dilemmas that arise? Is there not an internal contradiction in asserting on the one hand, the rights to survival and development, and, at the same time, the right to non-discrimination, for example? These and other questions are raised with reference to more substantive examples in the following sections of this article, taking as a starting point the framework further elaborated by General Comment no. 3. The General Comment highlights that although the four Pillars of the Convention are central, a range of other Convention rights may be affected, including the right to special protection and assistance by the state (article 20), the right to health (article 24) and the right to preventive health care, sex education and family planning education and services (article 24(f )). With regard to the application of the right to non-discrimination, the point is made that a particular concern is the existence of gender-based discrimination combined with taboos or negative or judgemental attitudes to sexual activity of girls, as this can limit their access to preventive measures and other services (para 6). That girls are disproportionately affected by the spread of the HIV/Aids epidemic is stressed, and States are encouraged to ‘give careful attention’ to sexuality and life styles of teenagers, and to take steps to prevent early or forced marriage which exacerbate vulnerability to HIV/Aids (para 9). A State’s response to HIV/Aids should, according to the General Comment, be centred on the mutually reinforcing elements of prevention, care, treatment and support in order to maximize effectiveness. Part of the prevention leg involves ensuring children’s access to appropriate sex education and information about sexuality to equip them to protect themselves and others against infection, even in settings where this is not the cultural norm (paras 13 and 14). The educational imperative is stressed further at para 27, where it is stated that ‘reducing HIV/Aids related vulnerability requires first and foremost that children, their families and communities be empowered to make informed choices about decisions, practices or policies affecting them in relation to HIV/Aids’. The Committee on the Rights of the Child expresses the view that health services are generally not responsive to the needs of persons aged below 18 years, and in particular, adolescents (para 17). The requirements for enhanced health service delivery suggested include services that are accessible, affordable, confidential, non-judgemental, do not require parental consent, and do not discriminate (para 17). Services should incorporate voluntary counselling and testing, confidential sexual and reproductive health services, free or low cost contraception, condoms and services, as well as HIV-related care and treatment if and when needed, including treatment for the prevention of health problems related to HIV/Aids, such as tuberculosis and other opportunistic infections.
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However, the General Comment requires State Parties to refrain from imposing mandatory HIV/Aids testing in all circumstances and to ensure protection against such testing. Where testing is undertaken on a voluntary basis, the evolving capacity of the child will determine whether the necessary consent is required from the child directly, or from a parent or guardian. Sufficient information must be conveyed prior to testing to ensure that the required consent is adequately informed (para 20). Test results must be kept confidential, in accordance with the child’s right to privacy (enshrined in article 16 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child). The confidential status of HIV/Aids results is explicitly extended to health and social welfare settings, and it is further provided that information on the HIV status of children may not be disclosed to third parties – including parents – without consent (para 21). The General Comment identifies mother-to-child transmission (MTCT) during pregnancy, labour and through breastfeeding as the primary cause of infection in infants and young children. The provision of essential antiretroviral drugs, appropriate antenatal, delivery and post partum care, access to HIV counselling and testing services for pregnant women and their partners, are amongst the recommended steps to be implemented by State Parties. In addition, the provision of counselling on infant feeding options and guidance in selecting the option most suitable to the specific situation are dealt with. The Committee emphasizes that breastfeeding remains the preferred feeding choice for uninfected women and women who do not know their health status, but recognizes that breastfeeding can increase the risk of HIV transmission significantly. However, given that an absence of breastfeeding can expose children to other ills such as malnutrition or infectious disease, the policy position is that replacement feeding in the case of HIV positive mothers should only be advocated where it is affordable, feasible, sustainable and safe (para 24). Perhaps the most crucial characteristic of the General Comment is the formal recognition it accords to the phenomenon of child-headed households within the international law framework (see para 28). The Comment underlines that legal, social and economic protection is required for children living in child-headed households and orphans to ensure that other rights are protected and fulfilled. Specifically, inheritance and property rights need to be affirmed legally and in practice. Continued access to education is regarded as vital, and birth registration constitutes a critical mechanism for ensuring proof of identity to ensure the safeguarding of other rights. The overall philosophy of the approach of the Committee on the Rights of the Child is that ‘orphans are best protected and cared for when efforts are made to enable siblings to remain together, and in the care of relatives or other family members’. Institutional care should play only an interim role, and then only when family based care within the community is not available. All forms of
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institutional care should be considered to be a last resort, and limits should be placed on the length of time that children spend in an institution (para 32). Programmes must support the eventual reintegration of orphaned children – whether they are themselves infected or not – into community life. A subsequent General Comment on Adolescent Health and Development in the context of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (General Comment no. 4 CRC/GC/2003/4), reaffirms many of the principles covered in General Comment no. 3. These include obligation to safeguard by law the adolescent’s right to medical treatment without parental consent, the need to respect the adolescent’s rights to privacy and confidentiality of medical information, the obligation to take steps to raise the minimum age of marriage, and the need to provide access to adequate information essential for adolescent health and development. Specifically mentioned in this regard is access to sexual and reproductive information including family planning and contraception, regardless of parental consent (para 21). States are encouraged to develop measures to change cultural views about adolescent’s need for contraception and the prevention of sexually transmitted diseases, and to address cultural and other taboos surrounding adolescent sexuality (para 23). It is submitted that the norms and principles outlined above raise a number of challenges for both children’s rights practitioners and theorists. In addition, the insistence on recognising and requiring services to address children’s evolving sexuality, whilst no doubt realistic, poses enormous threats to prevailing cultural and religious values in many traditional African settings. The ensuing section will endeavour to begin to explore some of these issues with reference to some specific issues that arise in the context of HIV/Aids.
2. Recognizing the legitimacy of child-headed households as social units The first theoretical dilemma raised here concerns the recognition and protection (including through legal reform) that the General Comment requires to be afforded to child-headed households. Child-headed households are generally regarded as being households with younger children where the main care-giver him or herself is aged below 18 years (Sloth-Nielsen 2004). The main objective of legal recognition is to ensure the provision of social services, adult guidance, and access to social grants (in South Africa, at least) to children being raised in households headed by persons who themselves are aged below 18 years. Protection of property rights and some recognition of the quasi-adult legal status of the (child) care-giver are further goals. In South Africa, for instance, there is already the beginnings of a process of law reform statutorily to define and recognize child-headed households as fam-
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ily units. The Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004 provides that a grant may now be received by a person of 16 years or older, a shift downwards from the previous minimum age of 18 years. The Act also refers to child-headed households in the definitions section, although this is currently without real meaning as the actual content and scope of this definition can only be ascertained by a cross reference to the (as yet incomplete) Children’s Bill 70 of 2003, which is destined to contain a more substantive elaboration. The Children’s Bill, currently before Parliament, is likely to contain further clauses aimed at securing legal protection for children in child-headed households,1 although the nature and scope of the further provisions has been the subject of heated debate. Similar law reform endeavours are underway in Swaziland, Mozambique and Lesotho, although none has reached the stage at which legislation has been tabled in Parliament. However, inasmuch as a children’s rights approach supports treating children as subjects rather than as objects, and advocates a dynamic engagement with concepts such as children’s evolving capacity, agency and ability to influence and participate in processes associated with their development, it could be contended that this is a far cry from a formal jurisprudential position that endorses the premature award of adult status and responsibility to children and adolescents who themselves are entitled to the benefits of the status of childhood. In the African context, the special vulnerability of children heading households has been described eloquently: Children, especially girls, face more general household duties, care of the sick and of younger children. These tasks and the lack of resources in the household often cause children to drop out of school. Under these circumstances, children may be forced onto the street, into criminal activities or even exploitative forms of child labour . . . in situations of extreme poverty, child headed households are unsustainable. Children find their way onto the streets where they become involved in commercial sex work, beg, steal and do menial tasks. (Children in 2001: 88)
In South Africa, available data indicates that because four times more women than men are infected by HIV/Aids, the risk of children losing mothers who generally fulfill the primary care-giver role is especially significant. In 2002, 150,000 children lost a mother due to HIV/Aids, and this figure is expected to rise significantly over the next half decade as people with existing HIV/Aids infections acquire full blown Aids. (Children’s Institute 2003: 36). Estimates by Unicef in Lesotho indicate that there are 73,000 orphans aged 0–14 years, ie 8.3% of the children in that age group. The HIV/Aids prevalence rate amongst pregnant women aged 15–19 years is 25%, based on 1999 statistics. Today’s 15 year old will have, at present infection rates, a 74% chance of contracting HIV/Aids before the age of 50.2 Similar data prevails elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa.
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Further, the ideal of alternative kinship care in community settings is rapidly fading, as the capacity of communities to continue to absorb orphaned children decreases. In addition to the risk factors relating to acute marginalisation and involvement in some of the worst forms of child labour outlined above, research has indicated a range of other needs that arise in the context of HIV/Aids and childheaded households. Children frequently need relief from the arduous duties associated with caring for terminally ill parents. They may require bereavement support and psycho-social care. They may have suffered severe discrimination on account of the HIV/Aids status of their primary care-giver, to the point where child and adult are expelled from the extended family circle when the care-giver’s HIV status becomes public. Moral guidance and mentoring from adult quarters after the death of a primary care-giver may be entirely absent. All the children living in the household may experience heightened difficulties in accessing available services, such as the acquisition of birth certificates, and their capacity to negotiate hurdles posed by officialdom (e.g. in the education system) is exacerbated by their youth and vulnerability. These less obvious threats to sound growth and development are brought to the fore by an approach which recognizes child-headed households as autonomous family forms, because such an approach proceeds from an assumption that the household can indeed function as such. Second, there may be an inherent conceptual dilemma created by recognizing child-headed households as independent units in society, in that this step can significantly undermine the overarching message that the protection of a child rights approach should extend to all children aged below 18, a message successfully encapsulated in the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (in article 2).3 The view that childhood should be a golden age, symbolized by innocence, freedom, play and recreation, and characterised by the absence of adult-type responsibility is undoubtedly an idyllic image and one which is obviously mitigated by the reality of poverty, exploitation, hunger, war, and so forth (Human 2000:154). However, this vision surely remains an ideal that lies at the core of efforts progressively to improve access to the protections enshrined in the Convention on the Rights of the Child and related documents.4 The risk exists that dilution of the minimum age for entry into adulthood in one sphere could jeopardise the achievement of uniform norms and principles in others – the minimum age for protections regarding commercial sex work, for example.5 Another danger is that whilst purporting to empower children living in child-headed households, and whilst maintaining that this will increase their access to protective services, formal recognition of their capacity to regulate their own family life may in fact disguise further neglect and degradation. Indeed, inasmuch as the approach of the General Comment is generally that
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families and communities, rather than government actors, lie at the forefront of the fight against HIV/Aids, the point has been made that this approach could provide a ready excuse for States to abdicate responsibility for orphaned children who are subsisting, after a fashion, in a form of family type care in a community setting (Sloth-Nielsen: 2004). Similarly, theoretical (or even legal) acknowledgement of the autonomy of the child-headed household as a functioning societal unit raises the spectre of a State retreat, along the lines of the approach which characterized the ‘hands off’’ relationship between States and the private lives of (conventional) families for much of the previous century. And, in African contexts, where resource constraints prevail and are often adduced by governments attempting to defend inaction and non-delivery, this risk is real. Yet, it cannot be denied that African countries faced with large scale orphanhood, coupled with the prospect of a steadily diminishing community capacity to take on parental functions towards all vulnerable children, are possibly not at liberty to ignore the realities that confronts them in an era characterized by the emergence of child-headed households. This view might encompass, too, that a utopian, purist approach which reserves the title of ‘family units’ only for kinship groups headed by adults is simply a Western construct, especially given the prevalence of such phenomena as early marriage and teenage pregnancy on the continent. It could therefore be contended that recognition (legal and otherwise) of the issue, rather than denying its existence, enables concrete measures to be developed. A good example of this might be in the terrain of inheritance laws, where countries in sub-Saharan Africa are exploring ways of protecting children against dispossession of the family property after the death from HIV/Aids of care-givers, even though, as children, they are not liable to inherit directly under customary law.6 On balance, no view is expressed at to which route (recognition of childheaded households or not) is preferred, and it can be concluded at this point that the issue is worthy of far more extensive debate within child rights circles. Due regard should be had to the inherent tension that exists between the right to autonomy (children are best off growing up in community settings where siblings can be kept together) and the right to protection.
3. Child and adolescent sexual health in the HIV/Aids context A second theoretical conundrum arises in the context of adolescent sexuality, parental consent, and access to concrete reproductive services and technologies. The principled position advocated in the General Comments of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, as explained above, relies on the premise that access to information and services for prevention (such as contraception)
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and to reproductive technologies should be freely available to children and adolescents, without regard to a particular age, and independent of parental consent. Again, this must, from a variety of perspectives, be regarded as controversial. For one, it calls into question the parallel status of protective legislative regulations fixing a minimum age at which children may legally consent to sexual intercourse – generally to be found in sub-Saharan Africa, as elsewhere (Shaffner 2002:214). If pre-teens can freely access contraception and other services in the reproductive health field, what does that imply for the intended beneficial protective mantle of minimum age laws? Two, it appears to negate totally the parental role in providing guidance and advice (as elements of the furnishing of consent)7 in children’s evolving sexual lives, as access to contraception should be guaranteed in the absence of parental knowledge. As stated, no specific age is provided for in this regard,8 nor are the blanket access to contraceptive and other reproductive health services provisions contained in the General Comment apparently linked to the well-known concept of children’s evolving age and maturity, a test which has conventionally been supported by children’s rights authors to determine the threshold for seeking children’s (rather than parents’) consent.9 [However, it is mentioned that HIV counselling and testing services should be provided in a way which pays attention to the evolving capacities of children (para 19), and that it is the child’s evolving capacity that will determine whether children’s or parent’s consent to HIV/Aids testing is required. Access to HIV/Aids testing, I would argue, does not necessarily involve the same considerations as access to contraception might do, for example.] In view of bold position in recognising the full autonomy of children (not only teenagers) in determining their own access to preventive and other reproductive health services, it is submitted that the General Comment could be regarded as breaking new ground at the international level.10 Third, the General Comment extends the above thinking even further in para 21, which provides that State parties must protect the confidentiality of HIV test results consistent with the obligation to protect the right to privacy of children (article 16),11 including within health and social welfare settings, and information on the HIV status of children may not be disclosed to third parties including parents without consent. (emphasis added)
It is self-evident that the underlying reasoning rests on the prevalence of discrimination against persons known to have HIV/Aids and the risk that once so identified, a child or adolescent may be marginalized or even excluded from his or her family or community setting. Yet the notion that the acquisition of a transmissible and potentially incurable disease by a child may not be revealed to his or her care-givers without the child’s consent (in the context of consid-
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erations such as the proven benefits for delaying the onset of full blown HIV/Aids of improved nutrition and timely responses to opportunistic infections) must be contentious. It not only heralds an approach which may compromise the ability of parents to provide the nurture and support they are required to do; potentially (at a theoretical level) does it not risk demeaning the familial tie between parent and child in the quest to acknowledge the child’s right to self-determination? 12 However, it must also be stated that the countervailing considerations which have inspired the approach taken in the General Comment are well articulated and are undoubtedly valid: ‘. . . children are more likely to use services that are friendly and supportive, provide a range of services and information, are geared to their needs, ensure their opportunity to participate in decisions affecting their health and are accessible, affordable, confidential, non-judgemental, do not require parental consent and do not discriminate.’ (para 17). Nevertheless, seen together with the recognition of child-headed households as independent family units, it appears that recent trends in the HIV/Aids context support a nascent construction of children as autonomous mini-adults, in fundamental contrast to dominant Western conceptions of children as ‘prepeople’, (Mayall 246), that is, incompetent, uninformed, and inadequate. Also, the approach of the General Comment masks the anomalies that may arise where children’s rights are concerned in the HIV/Aids context. Giving full effect to children’s right to privacy could pave the way to compromising children’s rights to adequate parental care. Granting unfettered autonomy rights in the area of reproductive health may undermine a range of protections designed to prevent exploitation and unwise decision-making.
4. HIV/Aids testing and alternative care for infants More practical concerns are raised by the some of the issues related to HIV/Aids testing and access to alternative care for babies and infants. While is it entirely consistent with a general human rights agenda that mandatory testing of all children should be absolutely proscribed, the question that arises is how realistic this is in certain settings. Access to adoption (including intercountry adoption) and foster care services frequently depend on the receiving substitute parents having been furnished with adequate knowledge of a child’s HIV/Aids status, and HIV/Aids testing of available infants is reportedly quite routine in these situations in practice. As a general proposition, practitioners assert that testing thus furthers access to appropriate care and placement (for both HIV positive and HIV negative babies), which is in children’s best interests, as institutional placement may be rendered unnecessary. Would a
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children’s rights approach be completely compromised by relaxing the prohibition on mandatory testing in relation to adoption and foster care procedures? The need for mandatory testing is frequently at issue in social welfare settings, too, since there may be a need in practice to protect uninfected infants (and indeed the care-giving adults themselves) from acquiring HIV/Aids from those who are infected, particularly in the institutional care system. Toddlers and small children play, fall and injure themselves, and engage in normal robust physical contact which can ultimately lead to contact with bodily fluids. The absence of certainty about a child’s HIV/Aids status poses significant challenges, and can place uninfected children at serious risk. Yet the General Comment proscribes testing in social welfare institutions.13 Another practical difficulty related to consent to testing in the case of infants arose for determination in a South African court in 2003, in the case of Ex Parte Nigel Redman NO (unreported case 03/14083).14 Existing provisions of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983 provide that a child aged over 14 years may grant consent to medical treatment (which has been interpreted to include HIV testing) without parental consent, but for children aged below 14 years, either parental or Ministerial consent must be obtained, unless the matter is urgent, whereupon the medical superintendent of the hospital where the child is being treated may substitute his or her consent for that of the parent or guardian. In this instance, treatment would be narrowly defined to include treatment necessary to preserve the life of the child or to prevent serious injury or disability – i.e., a need urgent enough to warrant dispensing with the parent’s consent. The facts of this case did not reach the level of urgency required to allow the medical superintendent to furnish consent. This case involved a clinical research trial at a public paediatric hospital, in association with an academic institution, which trial involved the provision of anti-retroviral therapy to HIV positive children and their families. The ethics committee of the academic institution approved the study, with the proviso that informed consent be obtained from the legal guardians of all child participants. However, three were maternal orphans, and in one instance, both parents were deceased. Legally, the acquisition of consent was impossible, yet to exclude those children from the ambit of the study would have had the effect of denying from them the benefit of potentially life saving medical treatment. An urgent court order had to be sought in order for the treating doctor to be authorized to proceed with the research and treatment. When further funds were obtained to allow a greater number of children to be included in the study, the same problem arose a second time, necessitating another approach to a court. Commenting on the case, the public interest attorney concerned argued that a fundamentally different approach is required to issues of consent in the context of a catastrophic Aids epidemic and growing orphan population
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(Gerntholtz, L., 2003:13), since legal processes involving such continued applications to courts are financially out of reach for most in the context of a developing country. Consent, in the context of newborns and babies in a world of HIV/Aids, can be a barrier to desirable and advantageous services, she implies, rather than serving the protective function originally intended. A final example is drawn from emerging practice in the Southern African region.15 This relates to endeavours underway to develop separate registers listing orphans, children living with HIV/Aids, and children rendered vulnerable due to the fact that their parents or care-givers are ill with HIV/Aids (evidently known as vital registration). Clearly inspired by the entirely laudable motive of ensuring that children do not fall through the cracks, as the colloquial term goes, and that those most at risk are identified so that service provision can be expedited, it cannot be ignored that the future existence of a register of this nature (not to mention the various uses to which it might be put) is arguably in direct conflict with the non-discrimination principle which enjoys such a primary status in international children’s rights law. The very act of creating a separate listing of the affected group could be regarded as a discriminatory step, the best interests of the group concerned nothwithstanding.
5. Conclusions Some of the issues I have raised in the substantive parts of this article might suggest a conservative agenda – deny young children access to sexual reproductive services if they do not have parental consent; parents have the right to know the HIV/Aids status of their children. (I do not intend to propose either in quite such stark terms!). Then, again, it might be argued that an alternative extreme represents a rabidly liberal stance – let children form their own families, sanctioned by law if needs be, and allow them near complete autonomy and choice, chronological age notwithstanding. I have tried to show that this approach, too, may not ultimately serve the children’s rights agenda. What this article has attempted, however, is to encourage a process of deeper discussion to assess the (changing?) construction of childhood, as well as emerging tensions between rights, occasioned by the HIV/Aids epidemic in this region. This surely lies at the heart of debates as to the manner in which State’s laws, policies and programmes should respond to the phenomenon, so as to further the best interests of children – qua children.16
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Notes This is based on the suggestion of such provisions in the South African Law Reform Commission’s Report on the Review of the Child Care Act (2002), which contains a draft Bill on which the Children’s Bill that was tabled in Parliament is largely based. 2 Taken from “HIV/Aids in Lesotho” UNICEF September 2003. 3 The applicable provision of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child is a less rigid benchmark, as it appears to permit treating those who in national law have attained majority whilst aged below 18 differently. See Gose, M., 2002. 4 Such as the two optional protocols to the CRC. 5 Some feminists would assert the right of autonomy of occupation over a ‘straight’ minimum age below which commercial sex work is proscribed. 6 Mozambique and Lesotho provide two examples where such revision of the laws of inheritance are underway. In South Africa, in the recent case of Bhe v The Magistrate, Khayalitsha (CCT 49/03), the Constitutional Court of South Africa struck down the rule of male primogeniture in the customary law of inheritance, holding that it constituted discrimination against girls. At the time of writing the full judgment was not available. 7 Consent is often viewed from the starting point that it is going to be withheld, whereas this statement proceeds from a perspective that sees informed consent as being linked to guided decision-making, assessment of alternatives, and post-decision support. 8 See note 10 below. 9 In the renowned case of Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112 the House of Lords said that parental rights yield to the child’s right to make his own decisions when he reaches a sufficient understanding and intelligence to be capable of making up his own mind on the matter requiring a decision. See further Freeman, M., Removing rights from adolescents in The Moral Status of Children, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Netherlands, 1997. 10 Domestically, South Africa’s Choice on Termination in Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996 permits a minor child to seek and undergo a termination of her pregnancy without the knowledge or consent of her parents or guardian. 11 Referring to the relevant article of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. 12 The South African Children’s Bill of 2003 will, if adopted in present form, provide for a child of 12 years or older to be competent to consent to an HIV/Aids test without parental assistance, and to have access to reproductive health services. 13 Based on material gathered and interviews undertaken by the author during the course of an unpublished study conducted in residential institutions in the Western Cape in 2004, commissioned by the Provincial Government of the Western Cape. 14 Discussed in Gerntholtz, L. 15 The country concerned in best left unidentified. 16 There is an extensive legal revisioning process occurring in the sub-region, with Lesotho, Swaziland and South Africa all concurrently undertaking child law drafting processes. Mozambique has also completed a legal review of child law with the view to drafting comprehensive children’s law. 1
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References Children’s Institute, University of Cape Town, 2003, The situation of children in South Africa. Gerntholtz, L., HIV Testing and treatment, informed consent and AIDS orphans, vol. 4 (3) Economic and Social Rights Review in South Africa 11. Gose, M., 2002, The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Community Law Centre, University of the Western Cape. Human, S., 2000, The Theory of Children’s Rights in C.J. Davel (ed.) Introduction to Child Law in South Africa Juta and Co Cape Town. Mayall, B., The sociology of childhood and children’s rights, vol. 8 (3) International Journal of Children’s Rights 243. Office of the Rights of the Child – The Presidency (South Africa), Children in 2001. Sloth-Nielsen, J., Realising the rights of children growing up in child-headed households: A guide to laws, policies and social advocacy (Cape Town: Community Law Centre, University of the Western Cape, 2004). Shaffner, L., An age of reason: paradoxes in the U.S. legal construction of adulthood, vol. 10 (3) International Journal of Children’s Rights 201 at 214. South African Law Reform Commission, Report on the Review of the Child Care Act (2002). UNICEF “HIV/Aids in Lesotho” September 2003.
Rights of the Autistic Child ROSALIND EKMAN LADD Professor of Philosophy Emerita, Wheaton College Visiting Professor of Bioethics, Brown University
Introduction Autism and the related pervasive developmental disorders present ethical issues quite unlike most other typical physical or mental childhood conditions. How can parents give informed consent for treatment when the cause of the disorder is not known, prognosis is extremely difficult and uncertain, the diagnosis covers a wide spectrum of abilities and disabilities, and there is primarily only anecdotal evidence of efficacy of treatment? How can physicians, psychiatrists, and other professionals make recommendations to parents when they lack evidence-based data to support one treatment over another and when there are inherent difficulties in designing the research that might provide answers? In addition, there are funding issues complicated by controversy over some of the most commonly used methods: is it medical treatment or special education? To put the issues in terms of children’s rights, we may ask: Does an autistic child have the right to treatment? If so, what kind? Does the autistic child have a right to be left alone and not forced into society’s criteria of what is normal, as some people claim? Does the child have a right not to be subjected to physical punishment, even if it is the only thing that seems to achieve control of selfinjurious behaviour? And finally, does he or she have a right not to be an experimental subject or, rather, a right to be included in experiments, on the hope that one of them will produce important new knowledge? This paper will address these issues, in an effort to bring attention to the rights of children whose illness or disorder or treatment does not fit into typical patterns. The rights of autistic children has been a neglected topic: a search in the archives of the Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, for example, shows only one article on autism and ethics (Gerhardt et al., 1991). It is time, then, to turn a philosophical spotlight on the topic.
Michael Freeman (Ed.), Children’s Health and Children’s Rights, 87–98. © 2006. Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands.
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Description of Autism According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric Association (DSM IV), autism is a subtype of a wide group of disorders known as Pervasive Developmental Disorders. The diagnosis of autism is made when a child displays at least 8 of 16 listed symptoms. Common characteristics or symptoms include: marked impairment or total lack of verbal and nonverbal communication, often occurring as a regression from earlier use of language; impaired social interaction, with the child seeming to live in a world of his own and unresponsive to other people; self-stimulating behaviour such as rocking or spinning. Children may be severely affected or high functioning, may be mentally retarded or not. Diagnosis is generally made between ages two and three and the disorder occurs three to four times more often in boys. The incidence of autism and PDD diagnosis is estimated to be from 1 in 166 to 1 in 500. Furthermore, the incidence is increasing at an alarming rate: California reports an increase of 634% between 1987 and 2002 and Denmark reports a 500% increase. Denmark’s count includes only full syndrome autism, so the increase cannot be attributed to the use of an increasingly wider definition.
Treatment Options and Informed Consent Medical treatment for children requires parental informed consent. Informed consent requires good information, but there are many unknowns about the treatment of autism. Without good outcome data, however, how can parents be said to be informed and give valid consent? Parental consent is compromised in a more important practical sense, as well. The options for treatment for a particular child can be very limited, since the special schools or programmes are labour-intensive, requiring trained staff often on a one-to-one ratio with the children. Needless to say, the programmes are expensive and even with state funding, which often has to be argued for in each case, waiting lists can be long. Programmes in high demand may accept new children only at age 2 or 3, which further limits parents’ choices. Where options do exist, choice among treatments can be a stab in the dark. There are many theories and many programmes that claim to have success at reversing or eliminating the symptoms of autism, but there are no good controlled studies to show that a given treatment works or works over the wide spectrum of children who are said to be autistic. There are no established standards of practice. Parents are at the mercy of whatever programmes may be available in their geographic area or whatever their school district or medical
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insurance will pay for, and may have to rely on word of mouth from other parents, often long distance through the internet. Nor can parents always have confidence in the studies that have been published in the scientific literature, for they sometimes have turned out to be unreliable. For example, one of the first explanations of the cause of autism was published in 1943, attributing it to failure in mother-love or “refrigerator parents.” Later studies, based on a large number of cases, showed no difference in parental warmth and responsiveness between parents of autistic children and parents of non-autistic children in a control group (Kotsopoulis, 2000). More recently there was another example of claim and counter-claim which excited a great deal of interest. In 1998 an article in The Lancet reported a link between immunizations and the onset of autistic symptoms (Wakefield, 1998), but that result was invalidated in another study in 2002, based on a much larger number of cases (Madsen et al., 2002). Given the absence of good scientific data, it is tempting to draw conclusions and generalize from one’s own case. A number of parents have claimed to find correlations between certain foods and autistic behaviour; a strict diet eliminating these foods, especially gluten and dairy products, is said to lessen or eliminate disruptive behaviours (Seroussi, 2000). While it may be that many autistic children also have food allergies, to draw conclusions from single cases or even a large number of personal testimonies is either an instance of the fallacy of improper generalization or post hoc, propter hoc. The need for scientific study of causes and correlations remains. The most widely acclaimed method of treating autistic children is the Applied Behavior Analysis (ABA) method developed by Dr. Ivor Lovaas in 1970. It is an intensive programme of discrete trial training and behaviour modification, which involves breaking down skills into small steps and then rewarding the child as he develops the skills. Each step is repeated and reinforced many times. ABA involves one-to-one interaction with specially trained teacher-therapists and occupies most of a school day with additional at-home sessions each day with tutors or parents. The best programmes operate on a year-round schedule and include out-of-classroom instruction, as well (Egel in Powers, 2000). Lovaas claims that 47% of the children in his programme achieved “normal” status and in a follow-up study at age 11 1/2, 44% were indistinguishable from the average child (Lovaas 7, 1987; McEachim, Smith, Lovaas, 1993). On the basis of this data, the New York Department of Health recommends ABA as an important element in the treatment of autistic children. However, the Lovaas studies and results are not without their critics. Other professionals object on the grounds that they involved a very small number of children (19) and that the admission criteria Lovaas used selected for
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high-functioning autistic children and rejected those with severe retardation. More importantly, the study did not use a randomized control group, the gold standard of research design. There was a control group in the study, but subjects were assigned to groups depending on parents’ choices and availability of therapists. This may have skewed the results. Currently there are studies underway at 14 locations in the U.S. and Europe, funded by the U.S. National Institute of Mental Health, comparing 150 children being treated with ABA and the same number of children with similar symptoms being treated with some other kinds of treatment (McIntosh, 1999). When these results are in, some of the questions about choice of treatment should be easier to answer. The ABA method has been challenged on other grounds as well. In 2000 in what has come to be known as the Auton case four families who had been denied medical coverage for ABA treatment of their autistic children sued the government of British Columbia on the basis of having been denied necessary medical care. In the initial hearings, the government claimed that the ABA programmes are education, not medical treatment, and further that their effectiveness is undocumented. The parents won their case, the court finding that Early Intensive Behavioural Intervention (Lovaas’ version of ABA) is a medically necessary service, defining “medically necessary” as whatever cures or ameliorates illness” and that it should be funded for children up to age 6 (Freeman, 2003). The case was then appealed to the British Columbia Court of Appeals in October 2002, which agreed with the lower courrt and extended the time of paid treatment until the physician affirms that it is of no further benefit to the child. The case is not over yet, for in June 2004, the case was appealed once again, this time to the Supreme Court of Canada. At this writing, no decision has been handed down. The case is a critical one in terms of financial costs. ABA school and homebased programmes range about $45,000 to $60,000 per year per child for an undetermined number of years, depending on the child’s progress. If indeed some form of ABA becomes standard treatment based on scientifcally valid outcomes research, and if ABA is effective only with intensive, specialized one-on-one early intervention, virtually no individual family will be able to provide treatment for their children. If the financial burden falls on society, it will be a great burden. Yet, a strong argument can be made that individuals with disabilities have a right to treatment if treatment exists and that justice in society requires providing greater resources to those who need them to lift them to a level closer to those who are not born with disabilities. Parents of autistic children are often fierce advocates for their children. Yet, they are at a disadvantage in not knowing what to choose for their children until
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there is better and more complete information available about effective treatment methods.
Ethical and Unethical Modes of Treatment Behaviour Modification While it would seem to almost everyone that interventions designed to conform an autistic child’s behaviour closer to the norm for all children are a benefit to the child, even this assumption has been challenged. In the testimony in the Auton case, one woman, Michelle Dawson, herself with a childhood diagnosis of autism, argued against requiring funding for ABA. She claimed that some autistics may contribute to society without adopting “normal” behaviour and faulted the courts for not assuming that society should accommodate to autistics (Simmeron, 2004). This is in line with a familiar argument in the disability literature, that it is that society ought to change to accept individuals with differences rather than requiring those individuals to conform to society’s expectations or norms. This argument has merit in many cases, but there are three factors that count against it in relation to autism. First: individuals with autism have difficulty in relating to other people and their expectations, and thus they are not as likely to feel social pressure to conform as individuals with other disabilities. The second important factor is that many children with autism do not seem generally happy. The child who loses himself for hours in watching a coin spin may seem quite content, but just as often autistic children demonstrate what we can only interpret as deep frustration or anger or inner turmoil, engaging in serious tantrums many times a day every day, persistent whining or moaning, and for some, extremely serious self-inflicted hitting, biting, gauging, to the point of being life-threatening. It may seem acceptable to advise leaving well enough alone for a child with disabilities who finds happiness in some activities or relationships, as many Down’s Syndrome children do, but leaving the apparently miserable or self-injurious child alone does not seem justified. Thirdly, given that society is set up for the person of typical ability, it does seem to be in the child’s best interest to teach as many communication skills and other skills in daily living as he or she can manage. The greater the degree that children can understand and relate to the social world, the more opportunities that open up to them which may bring satisfaction and pleasure, for example, travel, games, sports. An argument that many people find persuasive is that parents should make choices for children that will leave them an “open future,” that is, that will not unnecessarily close off future choices and opportunities. (Feinberg)
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If further justification is needed, we should note that only with some behaviour modification can an out-of-control child become controlled enough to make it possible for the family to live with and care for him or her. If a child has a right to family life, or if not a right but at least if it is a benefit or in the child’s best interest, and if some sort of behaviour modification is a necessary step to achieving this, then it does seem perfectly justified. Even if the argument from the child’s own best interest could not be made, say if he is so lacking in social awareness that he would be just as happy in another setting as he is being cared for by his family, there might be good reasons for using behaviour modification on the basis of the family’s best interest. However difficult a child’s behaviour may be, families often have very strong committment to keeping him or her at home (Greenfeld, 1978). There is increasing sentiment among theorists that ethical decisions may be made in the best interest of the family unit, even when it may not be the best interest of the individual child. “Exclusive focus on the child does not give enough weight to the child’s family with whom his interests are inextricably bound” (Ross, 1998, p. 43). One father expresses it very poignantly this way: “When do I say ‘I’ve done enough for Esther, now it’s Anna’s turn?’ ” (Gottlieb, 2002). This reasoning seems particularly appropriate for parents and siblings of autistic children, who are called on to make extraordinary efforts to maintain a good family life. Thus we may conclude that however imperfect the available treatments may be, Ms. Dawson’s testimony notwithstanding, the autistic child should not be left alone to let nature take its course. We may go so far as to say that if a family refuses all treatment for their child, that should be grounds for intervention by others. Aversive Techniques Some professionals and some parents, especially those who have children with the most severe symptoms, including seriously self-injurious behaviour, claim that only physical punishment or aversive techniques succeed in protecting the child and others (Israel; Gerhardt, et al., 1991). This gives rise to ethical questions about treatment vs. abuse and the right of autistic children to be as free of physical punishment as average children are. Aversive techniques are generally defined as behaviour modification techniques that provide negative, that is, unpleasant, stimuli to the child and may include mild spanks, finger pinches, ammonia smells, food deprivation, and even weak electrical skin shocks. Common child-rearing advice nowadays generally supports the view that positive reinforcement works better than negative and that negative reinforcement either does not work at all or if it works, it teaches the child to resolve conflicts with violent behaviour. Some children’s
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rights advocates argue against all physical punishment on the grounds that it is a form of abuse and wrong in itself (Turner, 2002). Many treatment regimes for autistic children do use only positive reinforcers such as enthusiastic praise or small treats such as potato chips or candy. If these reinforcers do not work and aversives do work, does a utilitarian argument justify the use of what otherwise might be considered inhumane, abusive, and unethical treatment? States that licence educational and treatment centres for children with serious behaviour disorders do pay attention to children’s rights. Some states in the U.S. prohibit the use of aversives. In those states where they are not prohibited, they require strict accounting of the incidence of physical or chemical restraints, physical isolation, and other physical controls or punishments. Schools and treatment centres have Human Rights Committees whose job it is to oversee the use of restraints and aversives. Generally such techniques are to be used only as a last resort and only to prevent harm to self or others. Typically, children have a natural desire to please parents and teachers, are able to model behaviour on peers and adults, respond to positive rewards by conforming behaviour, show empathy toward animals and other children, and at some point can understand the rationale behind behaviour requirements. By contrast, for autistic children who lack these abilities, it seems reasonable that one might need to devise alternative methods in the most severe cases. A separate question is whether or not parents, who do not come under state regulations, should be held to the same standard, i.e. should parents of out-ofcontrol children be allowed a wider range of physical punishments before being accused of child abuse? Parents, especially those not trained in special parenting skills, readily acknowledge a sense of frustration and even anger towards their children, even while intellectually acknowledging that it is not the children’s fault that they act as they do. If physical punishment results from this frustration and anger, it may make the parent feel better for the moment, but probably has no instructive value for the child. This, then, is not the use of aversive techniques in the educational sense, and the utilitarian justification does not apply. We may conclude, then, that the use of aversive techniques at the hands of professionals and within a structured and carefully monitored treatment program may be justified, but parents’ treatment of autistic children should be limited in the same way child abuse would be limited in any other family. However, given the extreme challenges of living with a seriously out-ofcontrol child, holding parents accountable should be accompanied by policies making available not only treatment services for the child, but parent training and support and respite services for the family as well.
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Medication The controversy over the use of medication such as Ritalin to calm the behaviour of ADHD-diagnosed children is well-known. The issue is complicated in the case of autistic children because the behaviour problems are often accompanied by other problems, such as allergies, gastrointestinal disorders, and insomnia. Each of these conditions may call for medications until the child is overwhelmed by a whole barrage of drugs. Also, because until recently most new drugs were not tested on children, physicians and psychiatrists rely on “off-label” use, again introducing a kind of trial and error element about selection and dosage into what should be evidence-based medicine. While the use of medication in itself is not unethical, it is appropriate to call for caution about overprescribing and note that there is a real need for controlled studies to establish appropriate guidelines.
Medical Treatment vs. Education Apart from medication, the most common treatment for autistic children involves training in life skills: responding to others, learning to brush their hair, feed themselves, learning language or communication skills, etc. The line between medical treatment, that is, treatment for a medical condition, and education, albeit very special education, blurs. The paradigm of medical treatment is surgery to repair a defect or medication to cure an illness or to alleviate symptoms, in each case returning the patient to a normal or near-normal state. The so-called medical model attributes all illness and symptoms to physiological origins and looks to biological interventions for treatment. Even for mental illness, the role of medication is increasingly more important and talk therapy less often used. This change has been fuelled as much by insurers preferring the lower cost of drug treatment as by recent advances in medicine. For autistic children, appropriate medication is easily classified as medically necessary and insurers will pay. But beyond that, the training that has become the lifeline for many autistic children can be classified as education and thus not medically necessary. Educational services are paid for out of a different pocket, and insofar as government agencies are responsible, they tend to be less generous and more reluctant to spend for the specialized education that parents want for their children. The practical issue may boil down to this: can it be shown that the state will save money in the long run by providing the specialized treatment, considered either as medical or educational, that currently seems most promising? Few parents can afford the whole cost of specialized services, nor provide for the
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welfare of their child as he or she becomes an adult. One can speculate that the child who does not receive services as a child is more likely to require more extensive and expensive care as an adult. Adults who have learned life skills as children may thrive in group homes, even if they never progress to total selfsufficiency, whereas children who have not received treatment will need either intensive personal care or may be relegated to an institutional setting that may, indeed, violate their right to humane care. We need good data to make the case for the cost-savings of providing services to children at an early age, whether the services are classified as medical or educational.
Problems About Research Many of the issues about the rights of autistic children can be resolved only when the various treatment options have been tested according to the standards of evidence-based medicine. Developing a research programme to answer the unanswered questions, however, poses a whole array of ethical issues. Any medical or psychological research with child subjects presents challenges to the ethical researcher because children are presumed incapable of giving informed consent. For participation in research trials that hold promise of being of benefit to the child, i.e. therapeutic research, parents may give proxy consent. The case is different with non-therapeutic research where, according to U.S. guidelines, parental consent is not sufficient. One can imagine examples of non-therapeutic research: researchers whose goals are to discover genetic links to autism or, say, markers in the blood that might predict onset or severity of autistic behaviour and may help in discovering effective treatments, may well need to draw blood samples to compare those of autistic children with non-autistic control groups or may require brain scans to look for special characteristics. These research projects may be well-designed and hold promise of eventually unlocking some of the mysteries about causes and treatment, but no one expects them to be of immediate benefit to the children whose blood is being sampled. Thus, much of the very important research on autism involves clearly non-therapeutic procedures. Some theorists argue that no children should ever be subjects in non-therapeutic research. They cannot give consent (Ramsey, 1970) and they cannot be said to have an obligation to participate where adults do not, so children should not be subject to involuntary altruism (Archard, 2003). Despite these objections, most government policies do allow such research with certain protections in place. One of the protections of children’s rights written into U.S. guidelines requires, in the case of non-therapeutic research, that assent be obtained
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from all minor subjects over the age of 7. This requirement, in turn, requires informing and explaining the research protocol to the child in age-appropriate language and then waiting for his or her voluntary, uncoerced agreement to participate. A second protection of child subjects allows the child to withdraw from the experiment at any time for any reason. In other words, child subjects have complete veto power over their own participation, parental permission notwithstanding, as long as the research is for future or generalizable knowledge and holds out no realistic hope of having therapeutic value for them. How do these protections apply to the autistic child? Can autistic children give valid assent? Can they understand research explanations, including the prospect of being altruistic and doing something that may benefit future children? The answer has to be that some high-functioning autistic children can, but the majority, who have difficulty understanding abstract concepts and difficulty empathizing with others, will not be able to do so. Some useful research may be so non-invasive and non-threatening that researchers and Internal Review Boards (IRBs) may be willing to overlook the assent requirement. If a researcher wants to observe a child at play or take a video to document typical behaviour or collate data from interventions designed for therapeutic purposes, this would not raise an ethical red flag. However, subjecting the child to additional blood drawing, while not a major intervention, well might be something the child would object to, if he could. Research concerning educational methods does not fall under these regulations. Thus, if parents or teachers try some new methods for training and educating their autistic children, there is no problem. Similarly, if they use a trial and error method to find the right combination or dosage of medications, there is no ethical problem since the intent is to find something that will benefit that particular child. Regarding the second protection for child subjects, can an autistic child withdraw from an experiment when he or she wants to? It is problematic. For a child exhibiting oppositional behaviour or general withdrawal from social contact, how can a researcher know when she is behaving in her own usual manner and when she is trying to withdraw from the particular research protocol? The protection of allowing child subjects to withdraw appears to be inapplicable in many cases and thus the autistic child loses a right or protection that other children have. Considerations about informed consent and valid assent, then, seem to lead to the conclusion that autistic children should not be used as non-therapeutic research subjects. Without this kind of research, though, the hope for improved treatment comes to a dead end. Is there a way out? Perhaps there is. U.S. guidelines permit two exceptions to the assent requirement. One is for children who cannot give assent. Parents may consent for infants, for example,
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as long as the research poses only minimal risk or no more than minor increase over minimal risk. The second exception is for research that holds promise of yielding knowledge of “vital importance.” The question of whether or not research on causes and treatment of autism is of vital importance is easier to answer. The effect of autism on the children themselves and their families can be devastating and the increase in the population is very significant. As this discussion has illustrated, there are many unanswered questions that need to be answered before families and professionals can be confident that autistic children are getting the most effective treatment. Thus, it does not seem to be an exaggeration to consider even nontherapeutic research to be of vital importance. In that case, parental consent is sufficient for the child’s participation.
Conclusion The lack of good research stands in the way of fulfilling the right of autistic children to safe, effective, humane medical treatment and effective methods of education and training designed to maximize the individual child’s potential. It challenges the ethical ideal of parental informed consent and raises questions about the ethics of various treatment modalities currently in use. Beyond that, the lack of good research has implications for the limits that society, in the form of governmental or private insurers, or goverment-funded educational systems, feels justified in imposing on services for autistic children. The research question, it seems, holds the key to determining how to fulfill the rights of the children. There are ethical challenges concerning research design and the use of child subjects, especially in non-therapeutic protocols. But these challenges must be overcome if society is to fufill its obligation to this increasing, vulnerable segment of the population.
References American Psychiatric Association (1994). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th ed., Washington, S.C.: American Psychiatric Association. Archard, David William (2003). Children, Families, and the State. Aldershot, Ashgate. Egel, Andrew (2000). “Finding the Right Early Intervention and Educational Programs.” In M. Powers, Children with Autism: A Parents’ Guide. Bethesda, MD: Woodbine House. Feinberg, Joel (1980). “The Child’s Right to an Open Future,” in W. Aiken and H. LaFollette (eds.) Whose Child? Parental Rights, Parental Authority and State Power, Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 124–53.
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Freeman, Sabrina (2003). Science for Sale in the Autism Wars. Langeley, B.C.: SKF Books. Gerhardt, P., D.L. Holmes, M. Allessandri, M. Goodman (1991). “Social Policy on the Use of Aversive Interventions: Empirical, Ethical, and Legal Considerations.” Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, Sept. 21 (3), pp. 265–77. Gottlieb, Roger (2002). “The Task of Embodied Love: Moral Problems in Caring for Children with Disabilities,” Hypatia, 17:30, 2002, pp. 225–236. Greenfeld, Josh (1978). A Place for Noah. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Israel, Matthew. “Follow-up Study of 31 Former Students at Judge Rotenberg Center,” unpublished: . Kotsopoulis, Sotiris (2000). “Uncertainties in aetiology and treatment of infantile autism – Assumptions and evidence,” in Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy Vol. 3, Issue 2, p. 175ff. Lovaass, I (1987). “Behavioral Treatment and Intellectual Functioning in Young Autistic Children,” Journal of Clinical and Consulting Psychology, 55, pp. 3–9. McEachim, J., Smith, T., and Lovass, O. (1993). “Long-term Outcomes for Children with Autism Who Received Early Intensive Behavioral Treatment.” American Journal of Mental Retardation: 97, pp. 359–372. McIntosh, Hugh (1999). www.apa.org/monitor/9/99. Madsen, K.M. et al. (2002). “A population-based study of Measles, Mumps, and Rubella Vaccination and Autism,” in New England Journal of Medicine, 347:1477–82, Nov. 7, 2002. Ramsey, P. (1970). The Patient as Person. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Ross, Lainie Friedman (1998). Children, Families, and Health Care Decision-Making, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Seroussi, Karyn (2000). Unraveling the Mystery of Autism and Pervasive Developmental Disorder: A Mother’s Story of Research and Recovery, New York: Simon and Shuster. Simmeron, Lisa (2004). “Summary of Auton Case” www.autismsocietycanada.ca. Turner, Susan (2002). Something to Cry About: An Argument Against Corporal Punishment of Children in Canada. Toronto: Wifrid Laurier University Press. Wakefield, Andrew (1998). “Ileal-lymphoid-nodular hyperplasia, Non-specific Colitis, and Pervasive Developmental Disorder in Children.” The Lancet, Feb. 28, 1998.
Caring for Children with Severe Disabilities: Boundaried and Relational Rights JO BRIDGEMAN Sussex Law School, University of Sussex
I have known David all his life. I know when he is happy, when he is sad or when he is in pain. I thought it was disgusting that these doctors did not take that into account. . . . Yes, David does have a different quality of life, but so does everyone. I don’t have the same quality of life as a film star jetting round the world. David has never walked, so he doesn’t know what it’s like. Being handicapped and being in pain are different things. . . . Yes, I was angry. I was angry for David because I knew him best and I needed to stick up for him. I needed to give him a voice. (Carol Glass quoted in Day, 2004) We need to take decisions away from the side of the hospital bed. Life and death decisions are a human rights issue not just a medical issue. A fuller and more comprehensive picture will be gained in the context of the individual’s life within the family or wider community. . . . The generally accepted view that the quality of life that a disabled person leads has limited value, needs to be challenged. (Richard Parnell, Research Manager, Scope quoted on David Glass website ) Parents see 24-hour reality of a severely disabled child who has good times and bad times. Hospital staff see the child at a point in time – commonly a low point – and are less aware of the person behind the disability than the parents are. Parenting is about a relationship and the voice of those who have that relationship must be heard. (Brian McGinnis, Special Advisor, Mencap, BBC News Online, Thursday April 22nd 1999)
Introduction The problem of how to treat the terminally ill is as old as life itself. Doctors and nurses have to confront it frequently, but it is never easy. Parents and relatives have to confront it less often and that makes it all the more difficult for them. Judges are occasionally faced with it when terminally ill children are wards of court. It is an awesome responsibility and only made easier for them than for parents to the extent that judges are able to approach it with greater detachment and less emotional involvement. (Re C (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1989] 3 WLR 240, per Lord Donaldson MR, p. 242)
As Lord Donaldson acknowledged in Re C, decisions about the treatment of children with severe disabilities, some but not all of whom are terminally ill, Michael Freeman (Ed.), Children’s Health and Children’s Rights, 99–119. © 2006. Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands.
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are extremely difficult for all concerned – parents, relatives, doctors, nurses and judges – however emotionally involved. In the immediate period following the birth of a child with severe disabilities or confronted with a diagnosis of severe disability following an accident, parents will be dependant upon professionals from a range of disciplines for information, advice, guidance and support whilst they come to terms with the situation and its meaning for the future of their child and family: whilst their responsibility for making decisions about the treatment of their child commences immediately. Inevitably, some parents will find their situation impossible to cope with and be unable to take an active part in caring for their child.1 Other parents become experts in their child’s medical condition, their caring needs and experience of life. Where the child’s condition permits them to be cared for at home parents have ongoing contact with community health services and, in times of crisis, with hospital services. The general principles of law and the principles developed in the cases concerning decisions about the treatment of children with severe disabilities set the parameters within which professionals work and the advice they give to parents who are confronted with the responsibility for a child with very special medical, nursing and caring needs. The focus of this article is the recent ECHR judgment in the case of Glass v UK (Glass v United Kingdom [2004] 1 FLR 1019) – a landmark decision for the impact of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms on healthcare law demonstrating the importance of rights in the protection of this particularly vulnerable group of children. The judgment of the Court is to be welcomed for the clarity it brings to the role of parents, professionals and the court in relation to the medical treatment of dependent children – that decisions are made by parents, not healthcare professionals, and in the event of a disagreement, by the court. The judgment further clarifies that children have the same rights in relation to healthcare decision-making as those enjoyed by adults; that is, the right to privacy giving protection from non-consensual interference with the body, exercised during childhood on their behalf by their parents. However, this conception of rights, centred upon respect for the autonomy and self-determination of the individual, is a narrow conception which fails to engage with other rights, such as those arising from relationships (Kiss, 1997, p. 5). That is, a conception of rights based upon individualism, separation and non-interference rather than one which ‘creates, fosters and protects valued relationships’ (Minow and Lyndon Shanley, 1997, p. 95). What remains left out of the account is an appreciation of the child as an individual situated within a relationship with a mother who cared and her view of her child’s best interests, his quality of life, gained as she provided 24 hour care through ‘good times and bad times’. The ECHR judgment in Glass v UK prompts consideration of the parameters, set by English law, within which professionals work and the role of parents with the responsibility for a child
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with severe disabilities. As occurred in the case of David Glass, the law has the potential to create conflict between professionals and parents when it should create a framework which supports and encourages them to work together, each showing due respect for the expertise of the other, in the joint enterprise of caring for the child. This is particularly important given that the vast majority of decisions about children with severe disabilities are made in the wards, not in the courtroom. Professional understanding of what the law expects and permits of them is thus central to the future care of children with severe disabilities.
Children with Severe Disabilities My concern in this article is the care of children with severe disabilities. That the approach which the courts take in making decisions about children with severe disabilities was first addressed in a case concerning a baby with Down’s Syndrome serves to demonstrate how our understandings of ’severe disability’ are historically specific (and, it should also be noted, culturally and socially specific) (Asch, 1998). In 1989, the Court of Appeal gave consent to surgery to remove a blockage in her intestine in the absence of evidence that baby Alexandra’s life was ‘demonstrably going to be so awful that in effect the child must be condemned to die’, rather that ‘the life of this child is still so imponderable that it would be wrong for her to be condemned to die.’2 Today, Down’s Syndrome is recognised as a chromosomal disorder causing some physical abnormalities and learning difficulties the extent of which cannot be determined at birth and, as with the development of any child, at least in part dependant upon the support and opportunities provided (Down’s Syndrome Association, ). Current medical and social understanding would demand the conclusion that life with Down’s Syndrome is not ’so intolerable’ that consent should be withheld for ordinary treatment (Campbell, 1989). Neither would good medical practice support the provision of ‘nursing care only’ and administration of sedatives to a baby born with Down’s Syndrome as in R v Arthur.3 Although there is evidence in the intervening period of, if not discriminatory, ‘less favoured’, treatment of children with Down’s Syndrome whose parents were denied details of all the treatment options for their heart conditions (Kmietowicz, 2001). The children whose treatment and lives are under consideration include those born with congenital disabilities or with disabilities resulting from prematurity,4 oxygen deprivation at birth or resulting from an accident. Advances in medical science and technology make possible the survival of babies for much longer with much more serious problems than before, raising legal and ethical issues about the provision of medical treatment and care and social issues about the
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responsibilities of society to vulnerable, dependant children and those who take care of them. Whilst parents of children with severe disabilities may become very skilled themselves in meeting the medical and nursing needs of their child, the complex needs of their child leaves parents dependant upon professionals to provide expert help – although they may not always agree with the judgement of the professional upon whom they rely (Feder, 2002). Caring for children is demanding work. Parents caring for a child with disabilities do so with either the knowledge of their shortened life expectancy and extended dependency or the additional concern about who will care if their dependant child outlives them (Davison, 1995). Securing what their child needs may involve careful negotiation with service providers (Read, 2000). Although services may be unavailable, inadequate or unaffordable placing enormous demands – practical, emotional and financial – upon the family (Centre for Policy Studies, 2004). Research by Mencap of parents of children with profound and multiple learning disabilities found there to be a chasm between the services which were needed and those which were available. Of the 76 families interviewed, 48% received no support from outside the family and 78% either no support or less than 2 hours support a day although 60% were providing basic care or educational/ therapeutic care for in excess of 18 hours a day, leaving them with six hours of, frequently disturbed, sleep (Mencap, 2001). The story of David Glass is a story of a loving mother, a supportive family and the battles which they had to fight on behalf of a child with severe disabilities. David was born in 1986, a fourth child to his mother, Carol Glass. David has severe physical and mental disabilities (including cerebral palsy, hydrocephalus, epilepsy, curvature of the spine and a dislocated hip, visual impairment and limited cognitive function) and is cared for at home by his mother with the help of his sisters and aunts. At the age of 12, David suffered complications following a tonsillectomy causing scepticaemia and recurrent respiratory tract infections. After a number of admissions to hospital, his condition had deteriorated to the point where doctors treating him at St Mary’s Hospital in Portsmouth believed he was dying, that it was not appropriate to provide intensive care and that morphine should be administered to alleviate pain and suffering. His mother, Carol Glass, disagreed with the assessment that he was dying and her solicitor wrote a letter to the hospital expressing her view that morphine should not be administered to David. David was re-admitted the following month to the care of a different consultant. Diamorphine was administered despite his mother’s refusal of consent and a Do Not Resuscitate Order (DNR) put on his notes without her knowledge. In the opinion of the doctors, David became more restful; in his mother’s, the diamorphine depressed his breathing. The doctors agreed to reduce the diamorphine on condition that
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there were no attempts at resuscitation. Family members, however, proceeded to resuscitate him through singing, talking and blowing raspberries. As doctors intervened in an attempt to stop them, a fight broke out between family members and the doctors whilst his mother resuscitated him. David’s condition improved and he was discharged later that night. The Director of the Trust wrote to his mother informing her that the hospital would only be able to provide palliative care for David in the future and if she wished for more active care David should be taken to hospital in Southampton. His mother believed that the medical assessment/treatment was a judgement about the quality of David’s life – that the doctors thought he had a low quality of life and consequently was not worth continued treatment. An assessment she unreservedly rejected.5 These events led to an array of proceedings brought by both David’s mother and the hospital. Carol Glass sought judicial review of the decision of the hospital (R v Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust, ex parte Glass, 22 April 1999, Scott Baker J, ). Scott Baker J held that the decision was not susceptible to review as it related to past events which would not arise again, it would be difficult to frame a declaration which did not limit doctors in providing appropriate treatment for any future situation and if there was a disagreement between doctors and his mother in the future it would be determined according to the best interests of the child. Permission to appeal was refused, Lord Woolf MR emphasising that where agreement between doctors and parents is not possible the court should decide in the best interests of the child (R v Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust, ex parte Glass [1999] 2 FLR 905). The actions of the doctors were subject to investigation by the General Medical Council which concluded that they amounted to neither serious professional misconduct nor seriously deficient performance. Carol Glass complained to the police but the Crown Prosecution Service concluded that there was insufficient evidence to bring criminal proceedings against the doctors and that it was inadvisable to prosecute the doctors for attempted murder, conspiracy to murder or offences contrary to the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. Whilst the actions of the doctors thus appeared to have been vindicated, the family members – two aunts and an uncle – who had been involved in the fight were prosecuted and convicted of offences against the person. Having failed to secure consideration of the merits of her complaints in English Law, Carol Glass took her case to the European Court of Human Rights which found there to have been a breach of David’s Article 8 rights. One of the extremely worrying aspects of the facts surrounding this case was the certainty of the treating doctors that their conduct had behind it the full force of the law permitting them to decide about David’s medical treatment overriding the wishes (refusal of consent) of his mother who had experience and knowledge of her son’s condition gained through her attentiveness to him
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as she cared for him. The ECHR judgment details extracts from David’s medical notes which testify to the confidence of the doctors in their ability to treat according to their assessment of his best interests. Dr Walker recorded, I have told [Carol Glass] that we can give morphine to alleviate distress even vs. their wishes (and we can – I am assured by the Official Solicitor that no judge has ever overturned a doctors’ decision to withdraw treatment/alleviate symptoms) but we wouldn’t without telling them. (Glass v United Kingdom [2004] 1 FLR 1019, para. 14)
Dr Hallett wrote in David’s notes: ‘In the event of total disagreement we should be obliged to go to the Courts to provide support for decision [to use morphine]. Mother says she does not understand this’ (Glass v United Kingdom [2004] 1 FLR 1019, para. 16, emphasis added.) In other words, that court approval to act against his mother’s wishes was necessary but would be forthcoming. The meeting between family members and the Chief Executive at which the family were told that diamorphine would be administered was conducted in the presence of police. When Carol Glass then asserted that if the hospital was correct and David was dying, she wished to take him home: A police officer in attendance advised her that if she attempted to remove him, she would be arrested. The hospital also indicated that unless the family members present allowed the doctors to commence diamorphine the police would remove them also. (Glass v United Kingdom [2004] 1 FLR 1019, para. 24).
The European Court of Human Rights commented, with implicit criticism, upon the use of the police to provide the doctors with ‘back up’ in putting their decision about treatment into effect: [T]he doctors and officials used the limited time available to them in order to try to impose their views on [Carol Glass]. It [the European Court of Human Rights] observes in this connection that the Trust was able to secure the presence of a police officer to oversee the negotiations with the second applicant but, surprisingly, did not give consideration to making a High Court application even though “the best interests procedure can be involved at short notice” (see the decision of Mr Justice Scott Baker in the High Court proceedings). (Glass v United Kingdom [2004] 1 FLR 1019, para. 81)
There is no question that the doctors were acting in what they genuinely believed were David’s best interests. However, in their judgements about his care and medical treatment they failed to respect his mother’s knowledge of her son’s condition, quality of life and ability to withstand treatment gained in twelve years of taking care of him. Night and Day. Good days and bad. Despite having taken responsibility for caring for her son, in her words ‘knowing him best’ as a child beyond his disability, Carol Glass’s views were ignored and steps taken to treat him as a dying patient. The doctors’ confidence that the law
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permitted them to treat David according to their judgement ignoring his mother’s opinion led to conflict between them, situated on opposing sides in the judgment of his best interests. This interpretation of the law created a situation where those caring for David became adversaries in their caring, losing sight of their shared endeavour. Before addressing the response of the ECHR, it is necessary to explore the question whether the doctors were properly advised as to their legal position.
The Principles of Law The best interests principle is employed for determination of treatment decisions across a range of situations including the medical treatment of incompetent adults (F v West Berkshire Health Authority [1990] 2 AC 1), sterilisation of adults with learning difficulties (Re SL (adult patient: medical treatment) [2000] 2 FLR 452) and decisions at the end of life (Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789). Assessment of the best interests of the child remains a central determining principle in decisions about the treatment, non-treatment and withdrawal of treatment from children with severe disabilities. In Re J Lord Donaldson MR referring back to the case of baby Alexandra, Re B (above), declined to treat ‘Templeman LJ’s use of the words “demonstrably so awful” or Dunn LJ’s use of the word “intolerable” as providing a quasi-statutory yardstick’ whilst accepting that the court was required to perform a balancing exercise (Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1991] 2 WLR 140, per Lord Donaldson MR, p. 149). From Lord Donaldson MR’s judgment we can derive the following principles: 1. ‘the starting point is not what might have been, but what is’; 2. there is a presumption in favour of a course of action which will prolong life; 3. it is necessary to consider the pain and suffering and quality of life if life is prolonged and the pain and suffering caused by the treatment; 4. from the point of view of patient.6 In the same case, Taylor LJ repeated Dunn LJ’s use of ‘intolerability’ as a guiding principle. Life, from the perspective of the child, must be intolerable before treatment is withheld: I consider that the correct approach is for the court to judge the quality of life the child would have to endure if given the treatment and decide whether in all the circumstances such a life would be so afflicted as to be intolerable to that child. I say ‘to that child’ because the test should not be whether the life would be intolerable to the decider. The test must be whether the child in question, if capable of exercising sound judgment, would consider the life intolerable. . . . It takes
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account of the strong instinct to preserve one’s life even in circumstances which an outsider, not himself at risk of death, might consider unacceptable. The circumstances to be considered would, in appropriate cases, include the degree of existing disability and any additional suffering or aggravation of the disability which the treatment itself would superimpose. In an accident case, as opposed to one involving disablement from birth, the child’s pre-accident quality of life and its perception of what has been lost may also be factors relevant to whether the residual life would be intolerable to that child. (Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1991] 2 WLR 140, per Taylor LJ, p. 158)
Thus, a decision about the treatment, non-treatment or withholding of treatment from a child with severe disabilities requires assessment of the quality of life of the child, or in Taylor LJ’s judgment ‘whether life would be intolerable’, from the perspective of the child. However, the age or disabilities of the child, or both, will mean that the child is unable to provide an account of the quality or tolerability of his or her life as experienced. Consequently, the child is dependent upon those caring for him or her to make judgements on their behalf. This demands consideration of whether it is ethically acceptable for one to judge the quality of life of another; to decide whether from the other’s perspective life is intolerable.
Quality of Life In the conjoined twins case, Re A (Re A (children) (conjoined twins: surgical separation) [2001] 2 WLR 480), Ward LJ considered the question whether it was ethically and legally appropriate to assess the quality of life of another. Looking back to previous cases, Ward LJ considered that the court in Re J (above) and himself in Re C (Re C (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1989] 3 WLR 240) had been engaged in a process of assessing the worthwhileness of treatment because respect for the sanctity of life permits treatment to be withdrawn or withheld only where it, the treatment, is not worthwhile. In reaching this conclusion about the previous cases and the approach to be adopted in the case before him, Ward LJ adopted John Keown’s analysis of vitalism, sanctity of life and quality of life in his article which responded to the case of Tony Bland (Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789), ‘Restoring Intellectual Shape to the Law After Bland’ (Keown, 1997). In this article, John Keown argued that respect for the sanctity of life prohibits the intentional ending of life by either act or omission whilst permitting both the administration of treatment to relieve pain which has the effect of shortening life (double effect) and withholding treatment because it is not worthwhile ‘either because it offers no reasonable hope of benefit or because, even though it does, the expected benefit would be outweighed by burdens which the treatment would impose’ (Keown, 1997, p. 485). He argued that it is ethically and legally
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acceptable to give consideration to the patient’s condition in order to assess the worthwhileness of treatment. But that the courts should not, in his view, make quality of life judgements which involve assessment of the ‘worthwhileness of the patient’s life’ (Keown, 1997, pp. 486–7). Applying this in Re A, Ward LJ had ‘regard to the actual condition of each twin and hence the actual balance sheet of advantage and disadvantage which flows from the performance or the non-performance of the proposed treatment. Here it is legitimate, as John Keown demonstrates, and as the cases show, to bear in mind the actual quality of life each child enjoys and may be able to enjoy.’ (Re A (children) (conjoined twins: surgical separation) [2001] 2 WLR 480, para. 10). Whereas, quoting Keown, ‘[f]rom the standpoint of the sanctity doctrine, a central objection to the Quality of life philosophy is that it denies the ineliminable value of each patient and engages in discriminatory judgements, posited on fundamentally arbitrary criteria such as physical or mental disability, about whose lives are “worthwhile” and whose are not. The arbitrariness is highlighted when it is asked which disabilities, and to which degree, are supposed to make life not worth living?’ (Re A (children) (conjoined twins: surgical separation) [2001] 2 WLR 480, para 7.4 quoting Keown, 1997, p. 487). John Keown’s analysis of vitalism, sanctity and quality of life rightly highlights the importance of not making arbitrary or discriminatory judgements in making decisions about treatment, non-treatment or withholding of treatment. However, as recognised in the quotation from Ward LJ’s judgment above, the sanctity of life doctrine does involve assessment of quality of life as an inherent part of assessment of the worthwhileness of treatment. As John Harris argued, in his response to the conjoined twins case, this is a ‘distinction without a difference’. Medical treatment is not an end in itself and decisions about treatment are dependant upon the contribution it will make to the quality of life (Harris, 2001). But, with a focus upon the benefits and burdens of medical treatment, primacy is given, as the decisions in the cases show, to medical opinion. Decisions about treatment, non-treatment or withdrawal of treatment are not just decisions about treatment, they are decisions about life. Judgements about the quality of life of the child cannot be avoided but, as Keown rightly points out, these must be neither prejudiced nor capricious. They must be arrived at with careful consideration of the quality or tolerability of life of the individual child from the perspective of the child. Our lives have meaning to us through interaction, our relationships, our experiences as well as the ‘ineliminable value’ of each individual self. Decisions should not be based solely upon an objective assessment of the benefits and burdens of the medical treatment by detached professionals who may only have intermittent responsibility for the child dependant upon their care in episodes of crisis but must be informed by accounts of those with knowledge of the individual child dependant upon them for their daily care (Newson, 1978). As Hedley J recognised
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in his judgment about the future treatment and care of Charlotte Wyatt, ‘[t]hose who have cared for a disabled child often have different perceptions of “quality of life” and “intolerability” to those who have not’ (Portsmouth NHS Trust v Wyatt & Others [2004] EWHC 2247, para. 30). The particular input from those who have taken the responsibility of caring is to see the child not as a medical problem, as a disability which cannot be remedied, but to appreciate the child as a person beyond the disability providing a very different understanding of their condition and the quality of their life to that of the medical professionals who treat them in times of crisis. The response of Carol Glass to the treatment of her son shows the love she has for him, the appreciation she has for him as a person and her understanding of the value of his life to him gained through her experiences of taking care of him.
Tolerable Lives and Professional Judgement This understanding, that parents who have experience of caring for a child with severe disabilities may have a very different perspective of the child’s quality or tolerability of life from others, including as Adrienne Asch identifies healthcare professionals, highlights the importance of parents and professionals working together to decide what is best for the child (Asch, 1998). In Re J, Lord Donaldson MR characterised the relationship between parents and professionals as a ‘partnership’ (Re J (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1991] 2 WLR 140, per Lord Donaldson MR, p. 143). However, Lord Donaldson MR appeared to consider the doctors to be the dominant partners in the relationship who must decide in consultation with the parents and, if possible, agree with them on the appropriate course of action taking time to explain to the parents the treatment options available. Two years later in Re J, Lord Donaldson MR was unable to imagine any situation in which the court would require a doctor to treat contrary to their clinical opinion (Re J (A Minor) (Child in Care: Medical Treatment) [1992] 3 WLR 507, per Lord Donaldson MR, p. 516). This view was re-iterated in a case in 1996 in which the doctors and parents were agreed that the best interests of C were that artificial ventilation be withdrawn, sedation administered and loving care provided for what remained of her life. In this case, Sir Stephen Brown P went as far as to say that decisions about treatment were taken by doctors and the purpose of reference to court was to ‘share responsibility’: The courts do not instruct doctors how they should perform their clinical and professional duties. However, the courts are ready to assist with the taking of responsibility in cases of grave anxiety such as this case. (In re C (a Baby) [1996] 2 FLR 43)
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In many of the few reported cases which preceded the treatment of David Glass, this was the function of recourse to the court: sharing responsibility by seeking an independent adjudication upon the course of action considered to be in the best interests of the child by those involved in his or her care. The position noted by Dr Walker in 1998, that ‘no judge had ever overturned a doctor’s decision to withdraw treatment/alleviate symptoms’ was consistent with the views expressed in those cases but it was a partial account of the law which failed to address the differences between those cases and David Glass’s situation. It could have been noted that there were no reported cases in which a parent who had been the primary care provider of the child was so adamant that the judgement of the doctors about their child’s condition and quality of life was wrong. Acting upon the advice they had been given, the doctors failed to undertake a thorough assessment of the quality or tolerability of life from the perspective of the child and to share with his mother responsibility for the decision about David’s treatment. However, a case soon followed which supported the interpretation of the law upon which Dr Walker relied. This was despite the caveats which by this time had been added by Lord Woolf when refusing permission to appeal in David’s judicial review case. In his judgment, Lord Woolf accepted the principle of non-interference by the courts in areas of clinical judgment in the treatment of patients where this can be avoided; and the refusal of the courts to dictate appropriate treatment to a medical practitioner subject to the power of the court to decide in the child’s best interests taking fully into account the attitude of medical practitioners (R v Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust, ex parte Glass [1999] 2 FLR 905). In July 2000, the court was asked to decide about the treatment of ID whose parents had a very different understanding of his quality of life from that of the doctors (A National Health Service Trust v D [2000] 2 FLR 677). At the time of the application to the court, ID was 19 months old. He had been born prematurely, had neurological handicaps and severe developmental delay, problems with a number of organs in addition to severe, chronic, irreversible and worsening lung disease. From the age of 8 months, ID had been cared for at home by his parents with the support of community services and hospital visits to deal with particular problems. His parents had worked closely with the health professionals identifying when changes in his condition meant that professional help was required. A fever had led to acute chronic respiratory and cardiac failure and the consultant paediatrician thought that ID was dying and therefore should not be admitted to paediatric intensive care. Attempts were made to transfer ID to paediatric intensive care (the hospital he was in did not have a unit) but consultants in the three hospitals contacted agreed that he was not suitable for intensive care. Yet, on that occasion intensive care proved not to be necessary, ID was treated successfully with drugs and he returned home. The application was for a declaration that in the event
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of a future respiratory or cardiac failure or arrest it would be lawful to withhold resuscitation and to provide palliative care only. ID was terminally ill and the issue was whether he had reached the point where further intervention to save his life in the event of an arrest was no longer in his best interests. The paediatricians provided the court with their clinical assessment of ID’s worsening lung disease but told the court that they had not seen the improvements in his development noted by his parents. In his report Dr P, consultant in paediatric intensive care, ‘stated that the family’s description of I’s development appears at odds with what has been documented by the medical staff, saying that he could find no record of I having head control, visual fixation and following, sitting, speaking words or reaching for an object’ (A National Health Service Trust v D [2000] 2 FLR 677, p. 683). Dr P wrote his report with the benefit of the hospital records and clinical notes and a clinical examination of ID conducted four days after he was admitted to hospital with a fever. In contrast the evidence of the paediatric therapist, occupational therapist, home visitor, lead nurse in neo-natal home care and speech and language therapist supported his parents’ view that he had made progress. The speech and language therapist ‘spoke of I becoming more alert and responsive to the environment around him and that he greeted familiar people with recognition. He follows with his eyes people and toys which interest him. He is beginning to show signs of some vocabulary with a hand and arm movement to indicate “bye bye”. He has a delightful smile and can indicate pleasure and displeasure.’ (A National Health Service Trust v D [2000] 2 FLR 677, p. 684). His parents considered the application premature pointing to his current health and the developmental progress which they considered he had made. They also emphasised that ID was able to recognise them, he demonstrated his pleasure at being with them and there was a bond between them. They considered that the doctors were not, as Re J required, assessing ID’s quality of life as he experienced it but from a medical perspective drawing on their own non-disabled, adult experience. His parents accepted that in the event of readmission (at the time of the application he had recovered from the crisis and they were caring for him at home) they would consider all the circumstances including the doctors’ opinions about the advisability of ventilation. Likewise, the paediatrician had told the court that she would assess ID’s condition in the event of admission to determine whether ventilation was appropriate. His parents had taken responsibility for the care of their son. Despite their understanding of his quality of life gained through their experiences of caring for him and supported by the evidence of other professionals, the decision about his future treatment and his life were handed over to the clinicians who would care for him when the next crisis arose. The declaration handed decisions about ID’s future treatment to the paediatrician permitting treatment to be withheld according to her clinical judgement and contrary to his parents’ caring judgement.
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Where parents provide long-term care to their child with the assistance of professionals at moments of crisis, their experiences of their child as an individual gained through the care they give uniquely places them to provide insights into the tolerability of life as experienced by their child. Their daily care provides them with an understanding of their child’s quality of life which contrasts with the perception of the professionals who focus upon the disability of the child whom they treat in times of crisis.7 As Carol Glass said: What the doctor couldn’t understand was that David is not a handicapped child. He is a child with handicaps. It got to the stage where it was out of my hands and the doctors seemed to think his life was not worth saving. But I knew David, and I knew he wasn’t dying. (Carol Glass quoted in Day, 2004)
This knowledge, experience and attentiveness may lead parents to conclude that their child’s life is intolerable to them as did the parents of Thomas Creedon. Born with brain damage, Thomas was blind, deaf, had cerebral palsy and epilepsy. His mother, Fiona, described her ‘immense despair’ as a parent caring for her son and consequently having to watch him suffer as he lived ‘the most awful existence imaginable’ (Fiona Creedon quoted in Toolis, 1996). Failure on the part of professionals or judges to take proper account of their views is to ignore the enormous contribution to the life of their child through the care they give and the knowledge they have gained of their child as an individual. Central to the case of Glass v UK was the question where responsibility lies for decisions about the treatment of young children.
Rights of Children with Severe Disabilities The Human Rights Act 1998 has had a limited impact upon the law regulating the provision of treatment for physical illness in England and Wales. That the first challenge to English healthcare law after the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force in October 2000 was in relation to death – and the specific question as to whether the law relating to the withdrawal of treatment from patients in a persistent vegetative state was compatible with the Human Rights Act – was no surprise (NHS Trust A v M; NHS Trust B v H [2001] 2 WLR 942). Further consideration has followed in matters of death in the well-known case of Dianne Pretty (R (on the application of Pretty) v DPP [2001] 3 WLR 1598; Pretty v United Kingdom [2002] FLR 45) and issues surrounding the creation of life (Leeds Teaching Hospital NHS Trust v A and others [2003] 1 FLR 1091).8 All with very little disruption to existing principles of law. David and Carol Glass alleged that the actions of the hospital amounted to a breach of Articles 2 (right to life), 6 (right of access to court), 8 (private and family life), 13 (right to effective remedy), and 14 (not to be discriminated against in the
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enjoyment of Convention rights) of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The complaint that the actions of the hospital amounted to a breach of their Article 8 rights was held admissible, with the remainder rejected as manifestly unfounded (ECHR, Decision as to the Admissibility of Application no. 61827/00 by David and Carol Glass against the United Kingdom, 18 March 2003). In Pretty the ECHR had stated that ‘private life’ is a ‘broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition’ including self-determination as ‘the notion of personal autonomy is an important principle underlying the interpretation of its guarantees’ (Pretty v United Kingdom [2002] FLR 45, para. 61). In Glass v UK, the European Court of Human Rights held that the administration of diamorphine to David against the continued opposition of his mother (as his proxy) amounted to an interference with his right to respect for his private life9 and specifically his right to physical integrity (Glass v United Kingdom [2004] 1 FLR 1019, para. 70).10 Administering diamorphine against his mother’s wishes without seeking consent from the court was not necessary in a democratic society and amounted to a breach of David’s Article 8 right. The ECHR noted that the doctors had recorded in their notes previously that his mother was opposed to the administration of morphine and that recourse to the courts might be necessary. Their failure to do so contributed to their perception that they were, in October, faced with an emergency. Even so, an application to court could have been made when consent to administration of diamorphine was refused. Instead, the doctors proceeded to treat according to their judgement overriding that of his mother (Glass v United Kingdom [2004] 1 FLR 1019, paras. 80–83). In their failure to respect the refusal of consent of David’s mother as his legal proxy (or seek consent from the court), the actions of the hospital staff amounted to a breach of his Article 8 rights. Consequently, the view of the ECHR was that English law which places with parents the responsibility for making decisions about the healthcare of their child, with involvement of the court in cases of disagreement, is compatible with the Convention. To the extent that the doctors felt that, upon the advice they had been given, they were able to proceed in the face of his mother’s refusal, without any reference to the court, any misunderstanding about English Law has been clarified. However, in reaching this conclusion the ECHR adopted an atomistic concept of rights affording the bodily boundaries of the separate, autonomous individual protection from non-consensual interference. As a child, David’s personal integrity was protected through his mother in whom parental responsibility was vested. This conclusion is clearly important for extending to children – to vulnerable, dependant children – the same protection from harm and abuse in the form of non-consensual treatment as is enjoyed by adults (Kiss, 1997, p. 7). But this is a narrow conception of rights which fails to reflect the
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complex reality of the inevitable dependencies involved: the dependency of a child with severe disabilities upon his or her parents, parental dependency upon healthcare professionals and the dependency of the state upon the care provided by parents to their child. Whilst it does amount to a recognition of a dependant child as a rights bearing individual with interests worthy of protection and the responsibility of parent for child, it leaves out of consideration his mother’s love, care and connection and the knowledge of his quality of life gained as she cared for him. Martha Minow and Mary Lyndon Shanley argue that a relational concept of rights would embrace the individual as both separate and as situated within a web of relationships of care, attachments and interdependency and understand the family as a unit determined both by the individuals of which it is comprised and by the existing social, political and historical context (Minow and Shanley, 1997, pp. 100–101). This conceptualisation of rights enables us to understand children as both individuals with rights to be protected and as dependant upon the love and care of others. Furthermore, a relational concept of rights would embrace the realities of caring for children with severe disabilities and a wider range of factors relevant to their best interests. Children, including those with severe disabilities such as David Glass, are entrusted to the care of their parents with the greatest responsibility often falling, as with Carol Glass, upon their mothers with support from their families and (some, often minimal) support from the state. That responsibility and the knowledge, experience and appreciation of the individual which goes with it needs to be recognised if the rights of the child cared for are to be given proper respect. A relational concept of rights would focus upon providing support for and fostering relationships amongst those involved in caring for children. Further, a relational concept of rights would confront the way in which attitudes, the social environment and public policy impact upon the lived reality of life with disability exposing their hitherto hidden impact (Asch, 1998, p. 78). Whilst a boundaried conception of rights protecting from non-interference led to the conclusion that David’s Article 8 rights had been interfered with and hence it was not necessary to address whether this mother’s rights had likewise, a relational concept of rights demands consideration of the rights of family members caring for and taking care of the child. A failure to address whether Carol Glass’s right to family life was interfered with by the actions of the hospital which dismissed her views and excluded her from decisions about the care of her child is a further and compounding failure to recognise her responsibility of caring. The consequence is that the ECHR requires English Courts to respect the negative right of protecting the boundaries of children’s bodies from interference and not the positive right arising from relationships of love, care and responsibility integral to the quality of their lives.
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Responsible and Caring Decision-Making In a short, separate opinion Judge Casadevall noted that time appeared to have vindicated Carol Glass’s objection to the medical assessment: ‘Beyond any speculation as to what would have been the outcome of an application to the High Court for authorisation to pursue the treatment proposed by the doctors . . ., the facts have shown – nearly six years later and to date – that, in the particular circumstances of the present case, maternal instinct has had more weight than medical opinion.’ (Glass v United Kingdom [2004] 1 FLR 1019, separate opinion, Judge Casadevall, para. 2). David’s mother had a clear view, from her experience of caring for him 24 hours a day since birth that he had a quality of life which justified treatment. Likewise, baby ID’s mother had a very different understanding of the quality of his life as he experienced it than did the doctors who provided medical care in moments of crisis. Whilst Carol Glass and the parents of ID were of the opinion that their child’s experience of life was of value to them, parents who take care of their child will not always press for treatment to continue. As noted above, the parents of Thomas Creedon thought that their son’s life was intolerable to him. Parents have reached the decision, because they care, that their child should receive no further treatment. Other parents will not be so certain about the best interests of their child: the mother in Re C could not cope ‘with the present dilemma’;11 Baby J’s parents were described by Lord Donaldson MR as being in an ‘agonising dilemma’;12 in the next case, Baby J’s mother supported the view of the local authority that ventilation should be provided whereas his father did not know what was best for their son.13 If weight is placed upon the experience of those who care, what does this mean for the child whose parents are unable to cope with being actively involved in caring for their child or the child whose condition is so severe that the parents are unable to do much for him or her?14 Inevitably dependant all young children, and more so when they have severe disabilities, have someone caring for them and someone with responsibility for making decisions about their care. Careful decision-making about whether the child’s quality of life is tolerable to them will proceed with recognition of the child as a individual, attentiveness to them and responsiveness to their needs. As Hedley J stated in his judgment about the future treatment and care of Charlotte Wyatt he had ’seen not just a physical being but a body, mind and spirit expressed in a human personality of unique worth.’ (Portsmouth NHS Trust v Wyatt & Others [2004] EWHC 2247, para. 39). The paediatrician who reported to the court in Re C (Re C (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1989] 3 WLR 240) and whose report was given effect to by the order of the court appreciated that judgements about the best interests of the child and assessment of the quality of her life had to involve the insights of those who cared for her. C, a baby girl, at time of the application 16 weeks old had been born prematurely
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with congenital hydrocephalus and poorly formed brain structure. She had already undergone an operation to insert a shunt to prevent the build up of fluid and the court had to decide upon future treatment. The paediatrician’s report noted that despite ‘receiving outstandingly devoted care’, C appeared unhappy and unless administered with a sedative cried in what appeared to be pain. C lay quietly until handled when she responded with an irritated cry which could sometimes be quietened by stroking her face. In his assessment, C was blind and probably deaf and, because she had made no progress despite the high standard of care, her prognosis appeared ‘hopeless’. However, in making any decisions about her future medical treatment and care ‘the opinions of the local nurses and carers should be taken into account for they know her well, show great love for her, and have a feeling for her needs that an outsider cannot have.’ (Re C (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1989] 3 WLR 240, p. 245). This paediatrician recognised that the decision whether the life of a child with severe disabilities is tolerable cannot be based upon medical assessment alone but must involve the knowledge of those who take care of and care for the child attentive to his or her needs, coping abilities and happiness. An atomistic approach to rights gives protection to the child’s body from non-consensual interference but in entrusting decisions to the child’s ‘legal proxy’ makes no enquiries into the quality of the caring relationship. A relational concept of rights would involve a more complex process seeking not only to protect the individual but also examining the caring relationships and the caring arrangements. This would involve recognition of the varied circumstances in which children with disabilities are cared for and confront the impact of the care provided upon their quality of life. There would also have to be acknowledgment of the impact of attitudes, public policy and social provision upon the quality of the child’s life in responding to the question whether society is meeting its responsibilities to children with severe disabilities.
Individuals in Caring Relationships The ECHR judgment in Glass v UK provides an important acknowledgement that children with severe disabilities are individuals with rights which must be respected although it approached the rights of the child who lacked the competence to make decisions about medical treatment through an atomistic model of rights protective of the body of the separate autonomous individual from non-consensual interference. Affording the same rights to children as extended to adults, something which English Law can stand accused of having failed to do on an issue earlier addressed by the ECHR, the smacking of children.15 In her response to the ECHR judgment, Barbara Hewson questioned whether a court asked to consent to administration of diamorphine or give an order to
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continue life saving treatment, would favour a mother’s view over the doctors’ (Hewson, 2004). Decisions of English courts since have continued to demonstrate a tendency to be convinced by the medical evidence in preference to parental opinion (Portsmouth NHS Trust v Wyatt & Others [2004] EWHC 2247; Luke Winston-Jones, October 2004 (unreported)). A linear model of parental responsibility for the child replaced with judicial responsibility for the child in the event of a disagreement fails to acknowledge the web of relationships in which the child is situated and the importance of healthcare professionals and parents working together in caring for and making decisions about the care of the child. A relational concept of rights provides a richer conceptualisation of rights addressing not only the minimum protections extended to children but further how we – parents, professionals and society – best meet our caring responsibilities to children. It requires understanding of the child as both an individual and as situated within a web of relationships such that the insights, knowledge and experiences of both parent and professional are valued in reaching decisions about care. Furthermore, it underscores the value of the contribution of both parties in the partnership informing a judgment about the best interests and quality of life of the child from the child’s point of view: the detached, objective medical expertise of the professionals and the emotionally attached, partial, personal experience of parents. An appreciation that doctors and parents are not on opposing sides rather they have different perspectives on the best interests of the child both of which are necessary for a proper determination requires them to work together to achieve a better understanding of their respective positions. It appreciates the importance of the family, or those caring for the child, to the child’s quality of life, lived in relations with others and not in isolation. And demands consideration of the context of caring to the quality of life of the child, recognising the contribution of those who take the responsibility of caring and the responsibility of the state to vulnerable, dependant children.
Notes Templeman LJ referred to the ‘shock’ of the ‘caring’ parents in Re B upon discovering that their child had Down’s Syndrome such that with ‘great sorrow’ they had refused their consent to the intestinal surgery in the ‘genuine belie[f ]’ that it was in her best interests, In Re B (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1981] 1 WLR 1421. B was made a ward of court upon the refusal of her parents to consent to the surgery. Although she was later returned to their care, see Freeman, 1997, p. 171. 2 In Re B (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1981] 1 WLR 1421, per Templeman LJ, p. 1424. Giving her the life expectancy of a person with Down’s Syndrome. Without the surgery she would have died within a matter of days. Dunn LJ pointed out that the court could not determine that her life would be intolerable because it was not possible to determine her prognosis until she reached the age of about two. 1
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3 R v Arthur, 5 November 1981 (). Dr Arthur was prosecuted for attempted murder as it was not possible to establish that the baby died as a consequence of the acts/omission of the doctor. The jury found him not guilty. 4 7% of births in the UK are before 37 weeks gestation. The problems which may beset premature infants include respiratory difficulties which may require oxygen support or artificial ventilation, result in rupture of the lung or chronic lung disease. Premature babies are also at risk of brain damage due to bleeding, heart problems, feeding difficulties, inflammation and perforation of the bowel and at risk of serious infection, (Morley, 1991, p. 6). A study reported on BBC Panorama of 1,200 babies born alive at less than 26 weeks gestation found that 40% had moderate to severe cognitive development impairment at the age of 6, Miracle Baby Grows Up, 22 September 2004. 5 For personal accounts from Carol Glass see Day, 2004; Hardy, 2004; English, 2004 and David Glass’s website . 6 Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1991] 2 WLR 140, per Lord Donaldson MR, pp. 147–149. Ward LJ in Re A (children) (conjoined twins: surgical separation) [2001] 2 WLR 480, para. 7.4, doubted that this remains good law following the rejection of substituted judgement in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 but did not examine the issue. Furthermore, what is required here is not determination of what the patient would have wanted (substituted judgement) but assessment of quality of life from the perspective of the child living with the disability. 7 Adrienne Asch argues that clinicians need to confront their own ambivalences about people with disabilities and be informed about living with disabilities by people who have the experience and, I would argue, their families, (Asch, 1998). 8 Although this case falls into the area where healthcare law and family law overlap. Mr and Mrs A underwent infertility treatment involving ICSI (intracytoplasmic sperm injection) in which Mrs A’s eggs were to be fertilised with Mr A’s sperm and any embryos used for their treatment (not the treatment of others or research). There was an error on the part of the clinic so that Mr B’s sperm was used to fertilise Mrs A’s eggs. Mr A sought a declaration that he was the legal father of the twins. This was refused since he was not the legal father under s 28 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. Although Mr and Mrs A’s rights to respect for family life were infringed this was justified under Article 8(2) as the infringement was proportionate to protect the welfare and interests of the twins given the domestic family law remedies available. Likewise with the twins. 9 A conclusion predicted by A.R. Maclean, ‘The Human Rights Act 1998 and the Individual’s Right to Treatment’ (2000) 4 Medical Law International 245. 10 As would be the administration of medical treatment contrary to the refusal of a mentally competent adult patient, Pretty v United Kingdom [2002] FLR 45, para. 63. The court did not consider it necessary to address the issue of whether his mother’s Article 8 rights were interfered with. Nor did the majority find it necessary to determine whether putting a DNR on his notes without his mother’s knowledge was an interference with David’s Article 8 rights. 11 Re C (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1989] 3 WLR 240 and at the time of the hearing could not be contacted. C’s father accepted the medical advice. 12 Demonstrating less understanding of the difficult position they were in Balcombe L.J. said of them: ‘I should mention the position of J’s parents. J’s mother has many problems and cannot cope on her own. J’s father has a better comprehension of what is here at stake. The parents have at times been prepared to accept the doctors’ recommendations, as indorsed by the judge, but at other times have followed the line taken by the Official Solicitor. Before us the parents’ counsel said (on the instructions of the father who was present in court) that the father wants J to have any chances there may be. This is a wholly
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understandable attitude, but not one which is of direct assistance to this court in the decision we now have to make.’ Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1991] 2 WLR 140, pp. 152–153. 13 Re J (A Minor) (Child in Care: Medical Treatment) [1992] 3 WLR 507. The judgment does not consider the views of the foster parents caring for J. 14 As in re C (a Baby) [1996] 2 FLR 43. Although C’s parents had ‘faced the position bravely’ agreeing with the medical opinion. 15 In A v UK [1998] 2 FLR 959. Despite much debate and support for a complete ban on the smacking of children and following from a consultation paper (DoH, 2000) s 58 of the Children Act 2004 only goes so far as to limit the justification of reasonable punishment of children, in both criminal and civil law, to batteries which do not cause actual bodily harm.
References Asch, A. (1998) ‘Distracted by Disability’, Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 7 pp. 77–87. Campbell, A.G.M. (1989) ‘Some ethical issues in neonatal care’ in Dunstan, G.R. and Shinebourne, E.A. (eds.) Doctors’ Decisions: Ethical Conflicts in Medical Practice, Oxford, OUP. Centre for Policy Studies (2004) People, Not Budgets: Valuing Disabled Children. Day, E. (14 March 2004) ‘Do Not Resuscitate – and don’t bother consulting the family’, The Sunday Telegraph. Davison, J. (6 August 1995) ‘Live or let die?’, The Sunday Times. DoH, (2000) Protecting Children, Supporting Parents: A Consultation Document on the Physical Punishment of Children. English, R. (10 March 2004) ‘A Mother’s Right to Decide’, The Daily Mail. Feder, E.K. (2002) ‘Doctor’s Orders: Parents and Intersexed Children’ in Kittay, E.F. and Feder, E.K. (eds.), The Subject of Care: Feminist Perspectives on Dependency, Lanham, Boulder, NY and Oxford, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc. Freeman, M. (1997) ‘Do Children Have the Right Not to Be Born?’ in The Moral Status of Children: Essays on the Rights of the Child, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Hardy, R. (13 March 2004) ‘A Most Extraordinary Mother’, The Daily Mail. Harris, J. (2001) ‘Human Beings, Persons and Conjoined Twins: An Ethical Analysis of the Judgment in Re A’, Medical Law Review, 9(3) pp. 221–236. Hewson, B. (2004) ‘When maternal instinct outweighs medical opinion’ 154 NLJ522–523. Keown, J. (1997) ‘Restoring Intellectual Shape to the Law After Bland’, 113 LQR 481–503. Kiss, E. (1997) ‘Alchemy or Fool’s Gold? Assessing Feminist Doubts About Rights’ in Lyndon Shanley, M. and Narayan, U. (eds.) Reconstructing Political Theory: Feminist Perspectives, Cambridge, Polity Press. Kmietowicz, Z. (2001) ‘Down’s children received “less favourable” hospital treatment’ 322 BMJ 815. Maclean, A.R. (2000) ‘The Human Rights Act 1998 and the Individual’s Right to Treatment’ 4 Medical Law International. Mencap (2001) No ordinary life: The support needs of families caring for children and adults with profound and multiple disabilities. Minow, M. and Lyndon Shanley, M. (1997) ‘Revisioning the Family: Relational Rights and
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Responsibilities’ in Lyndon Shanley, M. and Narayan, U. (eds.) Reconstructing Political Theory: Feminist Perspectives, Cambridge, Polity Press. Morley, C. (1991) ‘Without Their Consent? Working with Very Premature Babies’ in Brazier, M. and Lobjoit, M. (eds.) Protecting the Vulnerable: autonomy and consent in health care, London, Routledge: London. Newson, E. (1978) ‘Unreasonable Care: The Establishment of Selfhood’, in Vesey, G. (ed.) Human Values, England, Harvester Press. Read, J. (2000) Disability, the Family and Society: Listening to Mothers, Buckingham, Open University Press. Toolis, K. (3 February 1996) ‘A Death for Thomas’, The Guardian.
Adolescent Gender Identity and the Courts MELINDA JONES Independent human rights scholar & consultant, former Director of the Australian Human Rights Centre, based in Melbourne, Australia [email protected].
Adolescence is a time of dramatic change, where children are growing rapidly and are searching for their identities. ‘Becoming’ rather than ‘being’ is an apt description of this period of life. Emotions run high; change is ongoing. Experimentation and risk-taking are common occurrences. Adolescents have a heightened awareness of their body image and a preoccupation with the physical changes to their bodies. They have an increased interest in sexuality and an important element of adolescent development is gender identity. While this has relatively rarely been seen as aspects of the right to health, issues of sexual health and well-being have played a significant role in defining the rights of the child. The entitlement of a child to decision-making power has been clarified in the context of medical treatment. The standard approach to establishing where the parents’ responsibility ends, and where the child’s right to control over his/her own bodies begins, is to establish whether the child is ‘Gillick competent’. (Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112). When the child is aware of the nature and the consequences of a course of action, it is the child’s decision which counts. This landmark ruling was made by the English House of Lords, which found that a 15 year old had the capacity to seek contraceptive advice, and to decide to take the contraceptive pill, without the need for parental consent. The test is functional rather than statusbased. It is not determined by the specific age or stage of a child, but by the competency of the particular individual at the time of asserting the right. As such, the Gillick test fits with the dynamic developmental model of children’s rights (Jones & Marks, 1994), and with those who consider that rights emerge with the child (Campbell, 1992; Freeman, 1983; Eekelaar, 1986). The Australian case of Marion (Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services v JWB and SMB (1992) 175 CLR 218 – known as Marion’s Case) could be seen as diluting ‘parental rights’ or as assuring that appropriate decision-making takes place where the child is not Gillick competent. The case involved a 13 year old girl with a significant intellectual disability. The parents sought court authorization to sterilize their daughter. The High Court found that Marion was not Gillick competent, and suggested that Michael Freeman (Ed.), Children’s Health and Children’s Rights, 121–148 . © 2006. Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands.
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where what was at stake was a non-therapeutic invasive procedure, no child would be likely to meet the standard. However, these are not matters which the parents can simply decide on behalf of the child. The High Court made it clear that in decisions of this nature, a court must grant permission to carry out any medical treatment. Because of Marion’s subjective position, it was unnecessary to consider how to ensure that, consistent with Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child; the view of the child was appropriately taken into account. This article focuses on two recent Australian decisions where a court was called upon to authorize invasive medical procedures (Re A (1993) 16 Fam LR 715; Re Alex [2004] FamCA 297). Both cases concern young people who were extremely distressed about their gender identity, and had applied for permission to undergo sexual reassignment. These cases provide contrasting pictures in terms of the decision-making process and therefore with the extent to which the outcomes are well-grounded. Both cases raise issues regarding the rights of the child, the child’s right to consent and the role of the courts in medical treatment applications. Because there are no binding rules or guidelines for the courts to apply in special medical treatment decisions, there is a great difference in the way the respective courts make their judgments. The cases demonstrate that a firmer basis in values and process is required. The wide discretion available to judges needs to be reined in, and specific criteria for decisionmaking needs to be established. The risk to the denial of the child’s right to health is too great to be subjected to the whims and predisposition of unguided judges.
1. The Gender Re-Assignment Cases a) Re A (1993) 16 Fam LR 715 ‘A’ was born with ambiguous genitalia and an inter-sexed condition known as congenital adrenal hyperplasia. This disorder is the result of the over-production of androgens (male sex hormones) in the adrenal glands of the foetus, which in a female foetus causes masculinization of the genitalia. In A’s case, although the child was born with normal female fertility, the degree of masculinization at birth meant that she had a clitoris exactly like a male penis, and the labia were fused together in such a way that they gave the external appearance of an empty scrotum.1 As a result there was some initial confusion as to the child’s gender. The birth certificate recorded the birth of a boy, with a male name, but the child was, until the time of the hearing, known by a female name. A sufficient number of children are inter-sexed for American texts to list this as a common childhood ailment (Ford, 2000). In cases such as A’s, where chil-
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dren are diagnosed with congenital adrenal hyperplasia, it is standard practice to raise the child as a female. Medical treatment consists of surgical genital reconstruction and cortisone hormone treatment to replace the absent hormones and to prevent any further masculinity. As this treatment is highly invasive and the surgery primarily cosmetic, there is a question as to whether the decision to consent to the treatment lies with the parents or it is a matter which should be adjudicated by a court. A number of commentators consider the surgery of inter-sexed infants sufficiently contentious to be a Western form of female genital mutilation – a practice outlawed in its traditional manifestation. (Ford, 2000; Cole, 2003; Briffa, 2003) Instead of seeing gender on a continuum from male to female, with a wide variety of alternative valid experiences, gender is seen as being forced into binary categories of the sort which dominate Western intellectual thought. Further, there is research indicating that there is a high incidence of making the wrong choice at birth (Briffa, 2003, 15), which results in traumatic decisions to redo what was undone. A’s case would certainly have been different had the parents allowed the child to determine his or her own gender at an appropriate age. As A’s parents were aware, the treatment of congenital adrenal hyperplasia by hormones is a life-long process, for without this intervention the adrenal glands would continue to produce male androgens. While A’s parents accepted the medical advice, and hormone treatment commenced within a week of A’s birth, they did not ensure that A was given the required hormone treatment. Instead, they attended the Endocrine Clinic relatively infrequently and only complied with the treatment programme approximately a third of the necessary times. The result was that A became progressively more masculine in appearance, and her clitoris had regrown to a considerable degree. She also experienced what she described as painful erections. Further, she found herself sexually attracted to women. These factors had a profound effect on A’s mental development, such that by the age of 13 she wished to be a boy. She sought medical advice and became determined to undergo gender-reassignment surgery. In order to transform A from female to male, a number of operations were envisioned. The first involved sterilisation – the total removal of healthy female internal genitalia including the ovaries, tubes and uterus. A further 2 or 3 operations would be required to reconstruct the external genitalia, to give the physical appearance of a man. This was a complex multi-stage process, and no guarantee could be given that A would be able to void while standing or that the appearance would result in normal male genitalia. On top of this, A desired to undergo bilateral mastectomies. The process would take place over two years during much of which A would be recovering from the surgery. Because gender-reassignment surgery is highly invasive, irreversible, major surgery and not a medical necessity, the doctors involved requested court
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approval before they would proceed. A and her mother applied to the Family Court of Australia for consent to undertake the medical treatment. This was ultimately approved by the Court. b) Re Alex [2004] FamCA 297 Like A, Alex approached the court with respect to gender re-assignment. However, his situation was quite different from A’s. Although both his chromosomes and his external genitalia were unequivocally female, Alex suffers from a condition known as gender dysphoria or gender identity disorder, previously referred to as transsexualism (Vitale, 2001, 124).2 This condition arises when the brain sex of the person conflicts with the other means of gender identification (Gooren, 2000; Zhou J.-N. et al., 1997). This was accepted in the Australian Full Court of the Family Court, which held that . . . the weight of medical opinion generally agrees that in the instance of a transsexual person, that individual is born with a brain that recognises him or herself as a member of the sex opposite to that whose physiological indicia he or she bears. The expert evidence before his Honour, which he accepted, was that this was probably of biological origin within the brain. (In Re Kevin (Validity of marriage of transsexual) (No 2) (2003) FLC ¶93–127 para 56)
In these rare cases, a person feels entirely disembodied. They have a distinct, profound and longstanding belief that their bodies do not belong to them, and they experience deep trauma and pain at the reality of their gender classification. Gender dysphoria usually involves extreme emotional and behavioural difficulties: “In the course of psychosexual development, the young person ‘experiences their phenotypic sex as incongruous with his or her own sense of gender identity’, and adolescents with this condition often experience intense distress.” (Spriggs, 2004, 319) As a young child, Alex had assumed himself to be a boy, and had expected to grow a penis in the fullness of time.3 He was distressed when he first saw his mother naked and realised that her adult appearance corresponded to his own. Alex had been brought up by his father, to whom he was very close. When the father died, Alex was sent from where he had lived in Greece, to his mother in Australia. The mother quickly rejected Alex, and at the time of the application he was living with his aunt. Alex experienced a severe case of gender identity disorder – his desire to live as a male and become male in appearance was longstanding, and he went to great lengths to conceal his female body. For example, at school he was so determined to avoid using the girls’ toilets that he wore nappies to school and avoided drinking liquid to reduce his need to urinate. Similarly, he refused to attend a camp where he would be expected to sleep in the girls’ quarters, until it was arranged that he could sleep in one of the single rooms available for children with disabilities. Prior to the application to the
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Court, Alex had experienced major depression, had suicidal ideation, and displayed a range of behaviour problems (including self-harming behaviours) which diminished as he gained recognition of the male status so desired. The proposed course of gender re-assignment treatment Alex requested was not as dramatic as that requested for A, although it is nonetheless controversial (Spriggs, 2004). It does not involve surgery, although this option would remain open to Alex, should he still desire it once he reached the age of majority. What was sought was authorization for a staged process, involving both reversible and irreversible treatment. The first stage involved the continuous administration of the contraceptive pill. This would delay the development of female secondary sexual characteristics, avoiding menses and breast growth. Both these aspects of development were repulsive to Alex and would be dangerous to his mental health were they not prevented. The treatment involved is entirely reversible, so that there was little risk of a wrong decision being made. The second stage of the gender re-assignment treatment sought involved hormone therapy which would result in the masculinisation of his voice, muscle growth, increase in facial and body hair, and the growth of the clitoris. The hormonal treatment would also have masculine behavioural effects and its impact would be primarily irreversible. The final stage of the process would be gender re-assignment surgery, but that was not a matter contemplated by the application. Although the treatment proposed involved significant medical intervention in Alex’s life, while he remained a child he would remain a sexually normal female and retain normal female fertility. As such, the Court’s decision was to allow the staged approach. The decision was seen as a package: the first stage could commence immediately; the second stage could commence when Alex reached his sixteenth birthday, if at this time he maintained his desire to become a boy. Throughout both stages Alex was to receive psychiatric counselling to support him through the process. It was felt that the consequences of not approving the application far exceeded any risk involved in making an affirmative decision, and that allowing the procedure was consistent with the best interests of the child.
2. Issues Arising from the Cases Given the seriousness of the issues relating to gender identity and the degree of bodily intrusion involved in gender reassignment, it is important that the optimal outcome is achieved in cases such as these. The degree of difficulty of undergoing the procedures, and the real likelihood that gender re-assignment will result in discrimination, ensures that decisions to proceed with treatment will never be taken lightly (Gooren L., 2000; Cole J., 2003; Briffa, 2003).
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However, from a physical perspective, the medical treatment sought in these cases is not dictated by medical necessity. If there is no urgency in acting, a fundamental question is whether the decision to undertake gender re-assignment could wait until the adolescents reached adulthood, when these procedures would be legally unproblematic. I now turn to the three primary issues arising from the cases. The first issue is the relationship between the proposed treatment and the rights of mature children. The second issue is the question of who may consent to medical treatment when the patient is a minor. The third issue is the question of the appropriateness of the courts being involved in medical decision-making. These issues lead us to inquire about the basis of decision-making – not the question of who should decide, but the process of decision-making and the factors to be taken into account. a) The rights of the child Asserting that children have rights involves the claim that children are entitled to be treated with equal concern and equal respect and without discrimination, at the same time as recognizing their vulnerability and their place within the family. While rights have often been described as trump cards (Dworkin, 1977), where there is a winning hand, the development of children’s rights has given rise to a relational view of rights (Jones M. & Marks L.A.B., 2001; Minow M., 1990; Olsen F., 1992). On this account, children, by virtue of being rights-bearers, are included in the conversation involving the exercise of power, and are entitled to participate in decisions affecting them. Recognising children as rights-bearers involves according them respect proportional to their age, maturity and understanding (Jones M. & Marks L.A.B., 1994; Jones M. & Marks L.A.B., 2001). Parents have responsibility for the well-being of their children, and this means that they must nurture their independence and decision-making capacity such that they are appropriately prepared for adulthood. The Convention on the Rights of the Child has given legal effect to the rights of the child.4 Children are defined as those of under the age of 18, and the rights applicable to children are both substantive and procedural. Three articles of the Convention are potentially of relevance to the issues involved in the cases discussed. These are Article 3, dealing with the best interests of the child; Article 12, relating to the child’s wishes; and Article 8, concerning the right to identity. 1. The best interests of the child Article 3(1) provides that “the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration” in all matters concerning children (Alston P., 1994). Article 3 requires that whenever children are players or participants, whether this be in
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the family, in the education system, at recreation, or within the criminal justice system, decisions which affect the child can only be taken after a consideration of the child’s position. It is necessary to establish which outcome will be in the best interests of the child, and to take that matter into serious consideration in the decision making process. The application of the best interest principle is discussed below. 2. The wishes of the child and the Role of a Child Representative Another provision of the Convention on the Rights of the Child of significance in these cases is Article 12, which provides that children have the right to be heard, both socially and in judicial and administrative proceedings. However, while children who are capable of forming views of their own have the right to express those views freely in all matters concerning them, the weight given to their wishes is dependant on the age and maturity of the individual. In both cases under consideration, the children were given scope to present their perspective on the treatment sought, and in each case they were anxious to be allowed to proceed with gender re-assignment. Each child was heard respectfully by the judge. In Alex, Chief Justice Nicholson met with Alex in private in order to appreciate fully the child’s perspective on the application, and respected his wish that the conversation be confidential (para 43). It is unclear how A’s voice was heard during the hearing, although Mushin J reports that A requesting “Just make me back into a boy, just like I was when I was born”. In accord with each child’s wishes, each Court referred to the young applicant as ‘he’. This was indicative of the respect accorded the child in these cases, but may have unduly influenced the outcome of the cases. It would have been quite undermining had the Court accepted the chosen gender identity and then refused to allow them treatment to confirm that gender. To have done this prior to the outcome of the hearings raises a serious issue for the Courts. Article 12 envisages the possibility that a child’s right to be heard may be discharged through the appointment of a representative or another appropriate body. In cases such as those under consideration, it may be an advantage for the child to be separately represented in the proceedings. (A separate representative does not, in common law, take instructions from the child or simply reflect the stated wishes of the child: Family Law Council, 1989; Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission, 1989; Australian Law Reform Commission, 2004). Although part of the task of a separate representative is to ensure that the opinion of the child is sought, the separate representative has the task of helping with the collection of evidence to present to the court an independent view of what is in the child’s best interest. In A’s case there was no separate representative involved, although were this legally required it would have solved a significant problem that the court confronted. This
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problem is that in many medical treatment cases there is no natural contradictor, and so the application in A’s case was effectively an ex parte application. Justice Mushin commented about the difficulty this posed: A difficulty which I have faced in this matter has been that I have not had the benefit of anybody to put the contrary view to the court. It is clear that A has very strong wishes in this regard and the application is supported [by] the Public Advocate. While it is reasonable to infer that the apparent non-existence of a person to argue against the granting of the relief sought by the mother leads to the conclusion that the case for the relief is strong, I must comment that it would have been most helpful to hear a contrary argument put (16 Fam LR 715 at 721).
In an adversary judicial system such as Australia’s, the courts depend on the material presented by the opposing parties. Where there is no opposing party, the only means of obtaining information additional to that presented, is to adopt a more inquisitorial style of decision-making. Chief Justice Nicholson solved the problem in Alex by allowing the Court to operate less formally than usual, and by playing an investigative role in the proceedings (para 43).5 The effect was that the hearing . . . often took the form of an orderly discussion between witnesses and legal representatives (including, sometimes, instructing solicitors) and myself . . . [the benefit of which included] hearing witnesses engage in a dialogue in respect of each other’s evidence. (para 43)
Further, in Alex, Chief Justice Nicholson appointed a Child Representative at the first occasion that the matter was before him, and the Child Representative subpoenaed evidence and arranged for the preparation of a Family Report. The Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission was also given leave to intervene in the case. The hearing process was modified in a manner which “enhanced the depth and richness of the evidence, and thereby better served the aim of an outcome which will be in Alex’s best interests”. (para 41) While the hearing process adopted by the Court in Alex is clearly within the power of the Family Court, it is not mandated or even formally recommended that hearings be conducted in this manner. Despite the obvious benefits, in particular with respect to the evidence presented and the potential quality of the outcome, the choice as to how to manage the case is almost arbitrary. If the best interests of the child are to be properly understood, it would seem essential that an independent representative is appointed to ascertain the child’s views and to ensure that there is a full range of evidence relating to the child’s position. 3. The right to identity The third right of potential relevance to these cases is the right to an identity, provided for by Article 8 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 8 obliges states parties to the Convention to “undertake to respect the
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right of the child to preserve his or her identity, including nationality, name and family relations”. The right to identity includes nationality, name and family relations, which suggests that other aspects of identity may also be protected by the Convention. It is at least arguable that the gender identity of the child is included within the terms of Article 8 and that that aspect of the child’s identity must be respected. Having said this, however, it does not necessarily follow that respect for gender identity requires the authorization of any particular medical treatment proposed, even if that treatment is consistent with the child’s sense of personhood. This matter was raised in Re Alex, by the Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission which intervened in the case. Chief Justice Nicholson agreed with the submission as a matter of general principle, and considered that the issue of the right to identity weighed in favour of authorization of the procedure (paras 220–224). b) Consent to medical treatment Doctors and medical professionals are protected from charges of assault and battery by the doctrine of informed consent. In common law, the position of a competent adult is rarely problematic. As long as the consent is voluntarily given on the basis of information about the risks of the procedure, medical practitioners are protected from suit even if the outcome of the procedure is less than ideal.6 The doctrine of consent recognises the adult’s right to self-determination and autonomy, ensuring that adults have the right to be free of unwanted bodily contact and to decide whether such contact should occur. The position of children, and of adults deemed to be incompetent, is far more complex. 1. The ability of the child to consent to medical treatment Medical treatment decision-making is one context in which the idea of children having rights has become meaningful. This was made clear in the highly approved decision of the English House of Lords, Gillick (Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112) in which it was held that once a child has a “sufficient understanding and intelligence to enable . . . her to understand fully what is proposed” (Marion’s case (1992) 175 CLR 218, 237) the decision is hers to make. Decision-making capacity does not depend on the age of the child, but on subjective features of the child in respect to the particular treatment proposed. Independent of age, ability or disability, a child may be Gillick competent for some purposes, and be able to consent to specific medical treatment, but not be Gillick competent with respect to other medical procedures. Medical practitioners are required to make an assessment of the child’s competency, and to respect the child’s rights to confidentiality and privacy once
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they have given their consent. This is important because there are many situations in which the child will not want to involve his or her parents, and will only seek advice if they can be assured of confidentiality (Davis & Mykitiuk, 2001). For example, it is crucial that children can approach medical practitioners for matters involving contraceptive advice and other issues related to sexuality and reproductive rights. Many children would only seek help in these areas if they were confident that their inquiries would remain confidential. Ignorance with respect to these matters can put an adolescent at risk – early pregnancy and the contracting of sexually transmitted diseases pose a great threat to adolescent health (Davis & Mykitiuk, 2001; United Nations, 2003). Gilllick has been criticised for requiring a higher standard of insight on the part of children than the law imposes on adults (Enright, 2003). It has also been undermined in fact, in cases involving the right to refuse medical treatment (NSW Law Reform Commission, 2004; Bunney, 1997; Mendelson, 1996; Freeman, this volume).7 However, it remains the basis on which we can best understand the concept of children’s rights, and it nonetheless remains the legal authority on medical treatment. The Gillick standard accords with international law, reflects experience and psychology and is respectful of the emerging rights of the child (Marion’s case). The role of the court in the situation where a child is found to be Gillick competent was not at issue in either Re A or Re Alex. In both cases, the children were acknowledged to be troubled mature minors, and both were held to lack Gillick competence. In A’s case, Mushin J. commented: A understands the problem and, in general terms, the way in which it is proposed that such problem be resolved and further, the child has expressed a desire that such resolution take place. However, I am not satisfied that A has sufficient capacity and maturity to fully appreciate all aspects of the matter and to assess objectively the various options available to him. (16 Fam LR 715, 720)
In Re Alex, Chief Justice Nicholson commented: In my view, the evidence does not establish that Alex has the capacity to decide for himself whether to consent to the proposed treatment. It is one thing for a child or young person to have a general understanding of what is proposed and its effect but it is quite another to conclude that he/she has sufficient maturity to fully understand the grave nature and effects of the proposed treatment (para 168) . . . It seems to me that there is a considerable difference between a child or young person deciding to use contraceptives as in Gillick and a child or young person determining upon a course that will “change” his/her sex. It is highly questionable whether a 13 year old could ever be regarded as having the capacity for the latter, and this situation may well continue until the young person reaches maturity. ([2004] FamCA 297, para 173)
Once it is found that the child him or herself is unable to consent to the medical treatment at present, the question of whether the particular child will ever
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have the capacity to consent, raised in Gillick & Marion, needs to be considered. The implication of this question is that if there is the possibility that the child could decide to undertake the proposed treatment at a later date, the matter should be left until the child was able personally to consent. The idea that the possibility of future consent should result in a finding against a current application has been reiterated in a number of cases, but I can find no case in which the decision has turned on this point.8 It may be, therefore, what is colloquially known as ‘a furphy’ – a distraction from the real issues. Nonetheless, when dealing with major invasive surgery in the absence of the child’s consent, leaving the matter until either the child reaches majority or until they become Gillick competent, may be the most respectful decision. Mushin J. commented in A’s case that I had nevertheless considered the possibility of rejecting the application on the basis that it is only another three and a half years until A attains 18 years and at that stage it would be open to him to make his own decision. (16 Fam LR 715, 722)
An applicant must present a strong case explaining why the medical treatment should proceed rather than wait. My own research into the position of people with inter-sex conditions suggested that there may be good reasons to authorise immediately the dramatic surgery proposed.9 However there is no evidence that Mushin J. had access to any information about inter-sexed people. He provided no reasons in his judgment as to why the matter couldn’t wait, beyond an untested psychologist’s views.10 The judgment presents no discussion about whether a less invasive option could be considered.11 Given that it was too late to prevent the onset of secondary female characteristics, it may be that the danger of waiting until majority would be slight. A appears to be quite naïve, and he seems to think that once the process is authorised it will be smooth sailing.12 Bearing in mind that what was being sought was a number of major operations over an extended period of time, it is worrying that the judge did not consider other courses of action. For example, in the context of transgender people, there is a good deal of evidence that their anxiety, suicidal ideation and depression are alleviated simply by a programme of action being put into place (Vitale, 2001, pp. 127–8). Further, transgender people are expected to pass the ‘real life’ test, living as their chosen gender for at least a year, before proceeding to surgery. It could be argued that a staged programme, which acknowledged A’s preferred gender but left gender re-assignment surgery until adulthood, could have been adopted. As noted above, such a staged process was authorised in Re Alex. Although Alex would become competent to consent to surgery at some time in the future, there were good reasons why the process should begin while Alex was a child. Unlike the decision-making process in Re A, Nicholson CJ carefully considered alternative ways of dealing with Alex’s gender identity issues. He
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found that “[t]he prognosis for behavioural intervention to change Alex’s selfimage and behaviour is poor” (para 206) and that . . . if treatment is not permitted there is consistent concern that Alex will revert to unhappiness, behavioural difficulties at home and self-harming behaviour. Socially, he will be significantly ill at ease with body and self-image during his period of adolescent development until he is competent to make his own treatment decision. Transition into a male public identity will be more difficult than if it occurs at the commencement of secondary school. (para 209)
Intervention to prevent the development of secondary female characteristics in this case was both reversible and timely. The irreversible second stage of treatment authorized is far less invasive than the intense medical intervention authorized in Re A. Yet in Re Alex the Court only allowed the treatment on the basis that the hormone treatment is accompanied by ongoing psychological and psychiatric support. The importance of such support was noted in Re A, but it was not ordered even though there was a real chance that A would not accept the support (16 Fam LR 715, 723). 2. When the child cannot consent There are some matters about which it would seem that children can never be found Gillick competent.13 These include cases involving life and death decisions, and a class of procedures which are major and irreversible, and which have significant consequences. Because of the risk of the wrong decision being made, or because there is potential for conflict of interest between the parents and the child, the courts have held that not only is the child unable to consent, but neither do the parents have authority to consent (Marion’s Case at 250; P v P (1994) 181 CLR 583). In such cases, the common law now considers that applications must be made to courts or other competent authorities before any medical treatment commences. Gender re-assignment involves major irreversible processes, where the stakes in the decision are high. The courts in each of the cases under consideration considered that medical procedures leading to gender re-assignment to fall into this exceptional category and that the court alone had jurisdiction to consent. To come to this conclusion courts need to establish, first the basis of their power to make decisions of this nature, and secondly, that the procedure was appropriately classified as a special medical procedure. On the first point, the common law courts rely on the inherent power of superior courts to look after the well-being of the weak and those in need of protection. Known as parens patriae, the welfare power was originally developed to protect property rights, but has more recently been used as the source of power to decide medical cases. Although it is not a superior court, the parens patriae jurisdiction is vested in the Family Court of Australia through provisions of the Family Law Act (Cth).14
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The second jurisdictional issue involves a determination of whether the major irreversible medical treatment requires court authorisation. The law in this area was developed in the context of the sterilisation of intellectually disabled young women. It was acknowledged that not every sterilisation would require an application to the court. If the medical procedure was carried out in response to a medical need such as to repair damage or deal with disease, the decision would be an ordinary medical one and come within the power of parents (Marion’s Case, 229–236; 253). The difficulty is drawing the line between the two classes of procedures. The test developed attempts to distinguish therapeutic from non-therapeutic procedures.15 Although sterilising women with intellectual disabilities had been ‘medicalised’ (Marion’s Case, 250–252), it often had more to do with social, cultural or political perspectives on the rights and entitlements of people with disabilities. The Australian High Court in Marion’s case commented: We hesitate to use the expression ‘therapeutic’ and ‘non-therapeutic’, because of their uncertainty. But it is necessary to make the distinction, however unclear the dividing line may be. (Marion’s Case, 250)
One means of drawing the line between therapeutic and non-therapeutic treatment is to apply the ‘but for’ test.16 In sterilisation cases this test works well – if the procedure would not be undertaken ‘but for’ the intellectual disability, it is automatically suspect. Decisions to sterilise intellectually disabled people could easily be motivated by eugenic considerations, to protect the person from the consequences of sexual abuse, for contraceptive purposes and for the purposes of menstrual management (Family Law Council, 1994). The interests of the carer could conflict with the interest of the person to be sterilised. As a result, the risk of a wrong decision was high and the consequences of a wrong decision would be serious. While the ‘but for’ test could alert both medical practitioners and courts to the dangers of the sterilisation, and it is a valuable indicator of discrimination against people with disabilities, it is unhelpful in the cases under consideration. This is because without the particular disabilities or conditions leading to the application for gender re-assignment, there would be no imaginable reason for undergoing the treatment. It seems to me that not only is the but for test unhelpful, but the therapeutic/non-therapeutic distinction doesn’t hold at all. Other than the sterilization cases, where the applications are based on perceived social rather than medical need, the only cases where the distinction makes sense are those involving organ or tissue transplant. In the circumstances where the donor is a child, the procedure to facilitate the transplant is clearly not therapeutic for the child.17 However in Michael’s case, the application was regarding the performance of cardiac surgery on an 11-year-old boy where parental consent was refused. The procedure was clearly therapeutic in the context of congenital
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heart disease (Re Michael (1994) FLC ¶92–471 and Re Michael (No 2) (1994) FLC ¶92–486). Similarly it is unclear that the procedures in Re A and in Re Alex are non-therapeutic. Although both A and Alex had medically recognized conditions, and the applications were with respect to the treatment of their conditions, the judges claimed that the decisions before them concerned non-therapeutic procedures. In A’s case, Mushin J discusses the distinction, then comments: With respect to the present case, it might be argued that the sterilisation is a “byproduct of surgery appropriately carried out to treat some malfunction or disease”. . . . The proposed medical treatment will require invasive, irreversible and major surgery. In addition . . . it is abundantly clear that court authorisation is required in the present case “first, because of the significant risk of making the wrong decision, either as to a child’s present or future capacity to consent or about what are the best interests of a child who cannot consent, and secondly, because the consequences of a wrong decision are particularly grave”. There will not only be biological, but also social and psychological consequences of the proposed intervention. (6 Fam LR 715, 720)
As such, Mushin J is relying on the general category of cases which need to be divided into classes of therapeutic and non-therapeutic, while implying rather than arguing that A’s case falls into the latter class. However, the complex, invasive medical treatment is only proposed as a means of treating A’s inter-sexed condition. In Alex’s case, Nicholson CJ devoted a number of pages to his argument that the proposed procedure is non-therapeutic. Although the judgment is based on a treatment plan to rectify Alex’s gender dysphoria, Nicholson claims: The current state of knowledge would not, in my view, enable a finding that the treatment would clearly be for a “malfunction” or “disease” and thereby not within the jurisdiction of this Court as explained by the majority in Marion’s case. To my mind, their Honours were seeking in that case to distinguish medical treatment which seeks to address disease in or malfunctioning of organs. In the context of sterilisation for example, they would seem to have had in mind a malignant cancer of the reproductive system which required an intervention that was medically indicated for directly referable health reasons. The present case does not lend itself to such a comparison (para 195).
There is a fundamental contradiction in these cases. At the threshold, the case must involve non-therapeutic medical treatment if the court is to have jurisdiction to make the decision. If a therapeutic treatment is sought, it is within the parent’s decision-making power if the child is not Gillick competent. However, for the sort of treatment applied for in Re A or in Re Alex to be authorized, it must be proportionate to the child’s interests. It is difficult to imagine that major, invasive irreversible surgery such as gender re-assignment surgery could ever be considered appropriate unless it was found to be a reasonable
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response to the problem it was intended to solve. Therefore, in order to authorize the medical treatment, the courts would have to find that the procedure was therapeutic (that is, is a medical response to a medical problem). I do not want to suggest that these are not the types of cases requiring independent decision-making. On the contrary, experimental or unusual situations involving major irreversible medical processes performed on children require the sort of careful and measured judgment provided by external bodies such as courts. This allows for heightened accountability, and protects both the parents and the medical practitioners. Most importantly, it protects the child from abuse in the name of medicine. However, a new way of articulating the class of cases which fall into the category of procedures requiring court authorisation must be found. c) The process of decision-making Once is it confirmed that the court is the appropriate decision-maker, the question arises as to the grounds on which the decision should be made. 1. The best interests of the child In all cases involving parens patriae jurisdiction, the governing principle of decision-making is the best interests of the child. However the concept of ‘best interests’ is too vague a standard to provide guidance to decision-makers (Wolfson, 1992; Parker, 1994). Virtually any outcome could be defended as consistent with the best interests of the child. Deciding what is best for a child poses a question no less ultimate than the purposes and values of life itself. Should the judge primarily be concerned with the child’s happiness or with the child’s spiritual and religious training? Should the judge be concerned with the economic productivity of the child when he grows up? . . . [I]f the judge looks to society at large, he finds neither a clear consensus as to the best child rearing strategies nor an appropriate hierarchy of ultimate values. (Mnookin, 1975, 260)
There have been many calls for guidelines, particularly given the serious nature of the decisions under consideration (Brady et al., 2000; Fellowes, 2000). Brennan CJ commented in P v P that: the diversity of values and circumstances which would affect decisions to make sterilisation orders precludes any realistic expectation that decisions would not be made according to the idiosyncratic opinion of individual judges. ((1994) 120 ALR 545, 569)
This would be equally true of judges hearing gender re-assignment cases. Guidelines have been developed by the courts specifically in the context of medical decision-making, beyond those specific to sterilisation cases18
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(Nicholson et al., 2001; Family Law Council of Australia, 1994). In Re Jane (1998) 12 Fam LR 662, Marion (No 2) (1992) 17 Fam LR 336 and again in Re Alex (para 201ff ), Nicholson CJ articulated a set of factors relevant to determining the best interests of the child. The factors include: (i) The particular condition of the child or young person which requires the procedure or treatment (ii) The nature of the procedure or treatment proposed (iii) The reasons for which it is proposed that the procedure or treatment be carried out (iv) The alternative courses of treatment that are available in relation to that condition (v) The desirability of and effect of authorising the procedure for treatment proposed rather than available alternatives (vi) The physical effects on the child or young person and the psychological and social implications for the child or young person of authorising the proposed procedure or treatment or not authorising the proposed procedure or treatment (vii) The nature and degree of any risk to the child or young person of authorising the proposed procedure or treatment or not authorising the proposed procedure or treatment (viii) The views (if any) expressed by the guardian(s) of the child or young person, a person who is entitled to the custody of the child or young person, a person who is responsible for the daily care and control of the child or young person, and the child or young person himself, to the proposed procedure or treatment and to any alternative procedure or treatment. A further principle, which may be a matter of best interests or be a limitation of the best interests principle, is that all invasive procedures that have the effect of threatening the bodily integrity of the individual and may undermine their human rights should only ever be authorized as a last resort (the majority in Marion, 259–260; Nicholson CJ in Marion (No 2) (1992) 17 Fam LR 336, 350). This means that not only must alternative processes have been investigated, but they must also have been implemented and found to fail to resolve the problem. 2. Decision-making in the Courts The different decision-making processes in Re A and Re Alex, and the unsatisfactory nature of the decision in Re A, become apparent when the best interests of the child are assessed in the light of the factors developed by Nicholson CJ.
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(i) The particular condition of the child or young person which requires the procedure or treatment Re A: A has an inter-sex condition. Of the three means of identifying gender, it would seem that the chromosomes are female, the brain sex male, and the genitalia ambiguous. As an infant A was subjected to genital surgery, and as a child she partially complied with the process of hormone treatment to deal with the masculinisation. The current position is that A desperately wants to be a boy and assumes that highly invasive medical procedures are required. Because this was insufficiently discussed, we do not know if there is an alternative explanation for A’s current situation. Other than physical complaints, which are the direct result of the failure to comply with the medical process begun in childhood, it was noted that A was sexually attracted to girls. The possibility that A is a lesbian was not raised. Millbank has argued that this is consistent with the picture of A presented and would suggest that surgical intervention is totally inappropriate (Millbank, 1995). Re Alex: Alex’s situation is more straightforward. Alex’s genitalia and chromosomes are female. His brain sex is male. He has gender dysphoria, and has had a long-standing gender identity crisis. No other description of the problem fits the facts. Over a period of time, Alex’s sense of his body had led to serious behaviour problems. It was confirmed in the judgment that Alex’s problems relate to gender not sexuality (para 205). (ii) The nature of the procedure or treatment proposed Re A: It is essential that the exact nature of what is requested is understood. In A’s case, the proposed treatment involved a number of major operations requiring anaesthetic. The procedures would be conducted over much of A’s remaining childhood, and could be expected to take A out of school on numerous occasions. The medical characterization of the treatment plan is (a) bilateral mastectomies; (b) hysterectomy and oophorectomy; (c) unfolding of the clitoris to increase its length and to relieve pain caused by erections; (d) closure of the labia to create the appearance of a scrotum; (e) the insertion of prosthetic testes; and (f) such further or other necessary and consequential procedures to give effect to the treatment of the child. Re Alex: Much less is being proposed in Alex’s case. There is no request for surgical intervention. Rather, it is proposed that Alex be prescribed the contraceptive pill to suppress the development of secondary female characteristics, and hormonal treatment when he reaches 16 to develop male characteristics. The first process is reversible should the decision transpire to be wrong. The second part of the process is irreversible. The hormone treatment is to be accompanied by on-going psychological and psychiatric support.
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(iii) The reasons for which it is proposed that the procedure or treatment be carried out Re A: The reason why the procedure is proposed for A is that it is expected to resolve gender ambiguity and the psychiatric effects of this being unresolved. No evidence was presented about how the desire to become male had affected A, beyond recent expression of suicidal thoughts. We do not know how deepseated the desire to become male was. We do not know if, independent of the proposed treatment, A had attempted to live as a boy. We do not know if A had refused to attend school wearing the girl’s uniform or if A had become distressed whenever the assumption of female gender was made. Behaviour of this sort was part of Alex’s story. The proposed procedure for A is so invasive that one would have expected that evidence about the need for treatment would present an extreme situation. Re Alex: The reason why the procedure is proposed for Alex is because it is the recommended response to profound gender dysphoria, which will be more easily managed if Alex does not have to deal with menstruation and the development of breasts. Alex’s problems were evident in a range of behaviours which indicated that Alex found the state of his body intolerable. The timing of the application also recommended that the procedure should be allowed. An immediate decision would make the transition from female to male considerably simpler if the process were to commence before Alex entered high school. (iv) The alternative courses of treatment that are available in relation to that condition Re A: Although Mushin J comments that “alternative and less invasive procedures have failed and there is now . . . no other procedure or treatment which will provide the desired outcome” (16 Fam LR 715, 721–2), there is no discussion in the judgment of what alternatives there may be, what happened when they were pursued, and why they failed. Before authorising such dramatic measures as allowed in Re A, one would hope that consideration was given to this point. Re Alex: In Alex’s case, the only alternative suggested was behavioural intervention, the prognosis for which was considered to be poor. Alex was already receiving counselling, and the professional’s all agreed that the stage treatment was the only alternative solution. Attempts to ‘cure’ people of gender dysphoria through counselling have proved highly unsatisfactory (Downs & Whittle, 2000). (v) The desirability of and effect of authorising the procedure for treatment proposed rather than available alternatives Re A: Mushin J simply asserts that this is the most desirable outcome for A, given that this is what A wants and expects. He does cite the psychologists treating A in support of the decision, but these views are not tested against those
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of other experts or the consideration of any other course of action. Although A was said to be suicidal about the current state of play, this may be a result of depression or other mental illness, albeit related to the inter-sexed condition which no-one, especially an adolescent with all the typical confusion about emerging sexuality, would cope with easily. If this were the case, it is possible that antidepressant or other drugs may have a positive role in treating A. Re Alex: Nicholson C.J. works through the expert opinions and the opinions of those involved in treating Alex. He is persuaded by the weight of evidence that authorising the procedure will help Alex’s socialization into his chosen gender identity and that it will counter-act Alex’s self-harming and suicidal behaviour. The fact that this is consistent with Alex’s wishes is also significant. (vi) The physical effects on the child or young person and the psychological and social implications for the child or young person of authorising the proposed procedure or treatment or not authorising the proposed procedure or treatment Re A: One alternative is always to refuse to authorize the procedure. Mushin J, however, was very concerned not to upset A, who believed that the Court would allow the process. Strikingly absent from the decision is any discussion of the psychological and social implications of allowing the procedure. There is no mention of the impact of frequent hospitalization, of the pain and risk of surgery, of the time A will not spend at school, or of the effect the procedure will have on A’s social life over the years it will take for the process to be completed. The medical opinion that there is no guarantee that the operations will result in normal-looking male genitals or in the ability to urinate standing, did not even elicit comment from the judge. The psychological risks of not proceeding are referred to, but these are not balanced against the risks which always accompany surgery. There is no evidence that A even considered the problems incumbent in the treatment, or that s/he was aware that there may be unintended side-effects or consequences. The effect of not authorising the proposed treatment played a greater part in the decision. Mushin J was “satisfied that A’s sense of social and biological identity and self esteem depend to a very large extent upon the performance of the procedure the subject of this application” (16 Fam LR 715, 721). A would be “devastated” if the treatment was not authorised. Exactly the effect of this is unclear. It may be that with appropriate counselling A could come to terms with the need to wait till s/he was old enough to make a decision with requiring the court’s consent. The risk of waiting was not a risk that Mushin J was prepared to take. Re Alex: Nicholson C.J., on the other hand, was confident that Alex understood the risks and side effects of the proposed treatment and that care was taken with respect to the social consequences of Alex becoming male. Given
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what was involved in the application, hormonal treatment rather than surgery, the risks of the procedure were relatively low. However, the Court accepted that the consequences of not authorising the treatment were serious behavioural issues at home and school, distress with body and poor self-image and selfharming behaviour. The extreme behavioural problems Alex had experienced in the past were only alleviated by the sense of relief that something was happening to resolve the problem. Further, studies have shown that the earlier gender-reassignment is commenced, the greater the chance of a favourable outcome (Downs & Whittle, 2000, 199). Downs & Whittle even believe that failure to treat could give rise to an action for negligence (Downs & Whittle, 2000, 202). (vii) The nature and degree of any risk to the child or young person of authorising the proposed procedure or treatment or not authorising the proposed procedure or treatment Re A: The risks attendant to the complex invasive programme of treatment sought to be authorized in A’s case must be considerable, yet they are not discussed or considered in the judgment. There was no consideration of the fact that A may change her mind about her gender re-assignment, and how A would cope in that case. Given the non-compliance with the original medical regime, which is attributable to A’s parents rather than A, it is nonetheless a real possibility that the surgical process would become too much for a child to cope with, and that A would seek to withdraw. In particular, the evidence presented suggests that on-going counselling will be essential to the success of the treatment. Yet there was no consideration of whether this should have been made a condition of approval of the treatment plan. In fact, I would go further and suggest that significant psychological and social counselling should have been ordered before any surgery could take place. Further, both the child and the family will need on-going support, and the risk of this not being mandated is a risk to the possibility of the success of the treatment. Re Alex: Apart from the physical risks attendant on the procedure, it was clear on the facts that there would be negative consequences for Alex’s education, residential arrangements and social developmental if authorisation of the proposed treatment were refused. Further, Alex was aware that the staged approach to treatment would mean that should he change his mind about the gender re-assignment, the risks were minimal prior to commencing the second stage at age 16. After that time Alex would have to live with the irreversible effects of the treatment, even if he decided not to proceed with surgery or changed his mind about his gender.
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(viii) The views (if any) expressed by the guardian(s) of the child or young person, a person who is entitled to the custody of the child or young person, a person who is responsible for the daily care and control of the child or young person, and the child or young person himself, to the proposed procedure or treatment and to any alternative procedure or treatment. Re A: All the parties expressed the view that the proposed treatment should be authorized. Because there was no contradictor of these views, about which Mushin J. expressed regret, he gave considerable weight to the opinions of A and her mother. Although A’s father was not involved in the application, Mushin J. was satisfied that he agreed with the proposal for medical treatment. The Public Advocate of Victoria, whose role in the proceedings is unclear, also supported the application. Re Alex: In Alex’s case, all parties including Alex supported the proposed treatment. Alex’s mother was estranged from her child and was not involved in the application. Even if she had opposed court authorization, her opinion would carry little weight given her lack of involvement in Alex’s life. Alex’s wishes were realistic and based on a level of understanding about the nature of the treatment proposed. Beyond the factors listed above, there are a number of other factors which I consider to be important in order to protect the right to health of the child or young person. These are: (i) Is the treatment proposed the treatment of last resort Re A: Although there was no serious consideration of any other alternatives, Mushin J. concluded that the six invasive medical processes proposed to be undertaken were treatment of last resort. Re Alex: This is not specified in Alex’s case, but it is clear on the evidence that the procedure under consideration constituted a treatment of last resort. (ii) The nature of the evidence & the trial Re A: A significant problem is A’s case was the scant evidence on which the findings were made. The only hint of the best interests being applied as a basis for decision-making, comes at the end of the judgment, when Mushin J comments that A would be extremely disappointed if the procedure was not authorized and that if the procedure was delayed until A reached majority there is “a high probability that vast irrevocable damage will have already been done” (16 Fam LR 715, 721). No independent experts were called in support of this finding and no information about similar cases was presented. The case was presented in an adversarial manner, which limited the judge’s capacity to play a broader role in the proceedings. I am troubled by A’s case, primarily because I do not believe that the evidence presented was sufficient to allow such major invasive treatment
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to be undertaken. In civil cases the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities, and so the combined force of the medical evidence, which was more hesitant than Mushin J saw it to be, and the views of the parties, were together considered sufficient to tip the balance in favour of authorizing the procedure. Judges of the Family Court have the power to appoint a Children’s Representative and to commission the representative to investigate the strength of the child’s wishes and to provide objective evidence relating to the matter under consideration. Unfortunately this did not occur. Re Alex: The decision in Re Alex stands in stark contrast to the decision in Re A. Although what was being sought was controversial, the treatment proposed in Alex’s case is far less invasive than that proposed in Re A. Yet Nicholson CJ gave the matter careful consideration. First, Nicholson CJ held himself to a high standard of evidence: I must be firmly satisfied upon clear and convincing evidence that the proposed treatment is in Alex’s best interests . . . [by] applying the standard established by Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336. (para 4)
The principle established by Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 was stated by Dixon J. (as he was at the time): Except upon criminal cases to be proved by the prosecution, it is enough that the affirmative of an allegation is made out to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. But reasonable satisfaction is not a state of mind that is attained or established independently of the nature and consequence of the fact or facts to be proved. The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. In such matters “reasonable satisfaction” should not be produced by inexact proofs, indefinite testimony, or indirect inferences. . . . It is often said that such an issue as fraud must be proved ‘clearly’, ‘unequivocally’, ‘strictly’ or ‘with certainty’ . . . This . . . means that the nature of the issue necessarily affects the process by which reasonable satisfaction is obtained. Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 361
The seriousness of the consequences of the applications for both A and Alex is such that it will affect the fundamental human rights of the child. The evidence in Re Alex was of this standard; the evidence in Re A was not. I believe that Re Alex has precedental value to the effect that the evidence presented in medical treatment decisions must meet the Briginshaw standard. In order to discharge the required standard of proof, Nicholson J allowed the Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission to intervene in the proceedings, appointed a Children’s Representative to prepare a report both about Alex and about the procedure contemplated by the application, and had a psychologist on the staff of the Family Court prepare a report. There was an array of
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independent expert medical witnesses with senior professional qualifications including a consultant psychiatrist who is a specialist in child and adolescent psychiatry, a consultant child and adolescent psychiatrist who also an academic, the Head of the Department of Paediatric and Adolescent Gynaecology and the principal of Alex’s primary school. Further, the court procedure was non-adversarial, which allowed for ‘depth and richness’ in the examination of the evidence. This provided the reader with confidence that the issues for Alex were taken extremely seriously and that no medical treatment which offended Alex’s human rights would be allowed. Beyond the proposed medical treatment being authorized, Nicholson C.J. made a number of ancillary orders to protect the best interests of the child. These orders included the right for Alex’s public identity documentation to record his gender as male, the liberty for any party to re-list the matter and the continuing appointment of the Child Representative as a contact point for Alex as the treatment progresses. In other words, Nicholson C.J. took a broad perspective on the impact of authorizing the treatment, and acted to protect the full range of Alex’s human rights affected by the gender-reassignment process. (iii) Financial Issues Although questions of distributive justice rarely are raised in the context of individual rights, it is not meaningful to accord a right to a child unless one is prepared to facilitate that right, at least on equal terms with adults. In the context of the rights of the child to consent to medical treatment in Australia, discussion must include the ability of children to access the national health scheme, Medicare. (NSW Law Reform Commission, 2004) The costs of the procedures proposed in Re A and that requested Re Alex are high, and one factor that should be taken into account is whether this has been considered and whether it is realistic to authorize the procedures. In Re A no account was taken of the costs of the surgery proposed and whether the state should bear that cost. In Re Alex, Nicholson C.J. considered it significant that the financial costs of the treatment had been thought through, and that money was available to complete the transition by surgery should Alex decide on this course as an adult (para 221). If there is any doubt at all about whether the Court should allow a child to proceed with expensive medical treatment, the financial implications of the decision may be a good reason to delay the decision until the time the child is able to consent, whether this be as a minor or when the age of majority is attained.
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3. Conclusion These cases deal with extremely difficult issues. In all situations the road to establishing the best interests of the child is bumpy. Adolescent health issues are fraught with danger, as the young person is going through a tumultuous time of life and may feel passionate about one course of action which can almost arbitrarily be replaced with an alternative passion. Ensuring the medical treatment decisions are consistent with the right to health, as well as respectful of the other rights of the child, requires measured analysis of the facts presented. Having a court involved in decision-making should add value to the decision to be made. While courts do not have medical expertise, they are experienced at assessing information in a way that parents are not trained to do. Where highly invasive major irreversible medical procedures are concerned, there are great advantages in involving an external disinterested, independent decision-maker. Removed from the emotion of the application, a judge can weigh up evidence and bring to light issues of which the parties were not aware. The decision-making can be measured, and the full implications for the child examined. In medical treatment cases where courts are called upon, the risk of serious abuse of a child’s fundamental human right to bodily integrity is high. As such, a heightened accountability is required.
Notes As per the Director of the Department of Endocrinology provided for the Court and reproduced in the judgment of at 716. 2 Psychologist Anne Vitale comments that the condition would be better referred to as ‘Gender Expression Deprivation Anxiety Disorder’ because: In the DSM III-R (1987) people suffering from gender dysphoria were referred to as “Transsexuals.” When the DSM was updated in 1994, the term “Transsexual” was replaced with “Gender Identity Disorder.” This is not an improvement. The term Gender Identity Disorder implies that one’s physiological sex is correct and that one’s inner sense of gender is disordered or wrong. It is clear that this is not how gender dysphoric individuals perceive their condition. This is evident both in psychologists’ inability to change a person’s sense of gender with therapy and the ready preference of many of these individuals to undergo physical sex reassignment. 3 All information about Alex is derived from the judgment of Chief Justice Nicholson of the Family Court of Australia. 4 The extent to which the Convention is legally enforceable depends on whether a state has a monist concept of law, in which ratifying conventions has the immediate effect of incorporating them into the law of the land, or the dualist incorporation approach, in which international law must be incorporated into law by a further act of the state. In Australia, for example, international law must be incorporated into legislation for it to have domestic effect. It has been held that the Family Law Reform Act had that effect for parts 1
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of Convention on the Rights of the Child: B & B v Minister for Immigration and Multiculturalism and Ethnic Affairs (2003) 173 FLR 360. 5 Moderations to the normal hearing process included: the judge indicating the sort of evidence required; having the hearing in a private conference room around a table, rather than in a court; allowing the presentation of evidence to vary from written to oral; allowing a discussion rather than a sequential process of examination and cross-examination; having more than one hearing date to allow for the search for additional evidence; and the making of transcripts available during the course of the trial. 6 In Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479 the High Court of Australia held that the standard of care is based on disclosure of the risks which a reasonable person, in the patient’s position, would attach significance to it, or if the medical practitioner is, or should reasonably be, aware that the particular patient would be likely to attach significance to it. 7 See Re W (A Minor) [1993] Fam 64; Re S (A Minor) (Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1995] 1 FCR 604; Re C (Detention: Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 180; Re B (A Minor) (Treatment and Secure Accommodation) [1997] 1 FCR 618; and Re M (Child: refusal of medical treatment) [1999] 2 FCR 577. 8 In the context of sterilizing women with intellectual disabilities the Australian High Court held that there was no reason in principle why a person with an intellectual disability would not be able to consent to procedures like sterilisation. Further, the possibility of protection from being sterilised on the basis of potential future capacity would have the effect of averting the cases where women discover that they have been sterilised only when they want to begin a family. See Marion’s Case at 232 & 329. 9 Nothing I have come across deals directly with the problem of an inter-sexed adolescent desiring to undergo gender re-assignment surgery. However, it would seem to me that the evidence of errors in determining the gender of inter-sexed people, and the clear identity crisis A is experiencing, place A in a position similar to a transgender individual. 10 Mushin J comments: “I am very conscious of the evidence that if I require A to wait until he turns 18 there is a very high probability that vast irrevocable damage will have already been done, thereby causing the delay to work against his best interests”: 16 Fam LR 715 at 721. 11 Although Mushin J asserts that “alternative and less invasive procedures have failed” he cites no evidence in support of the claim: 16 Fam LR 715 at 721–2. 12 Mushin J comments: “To his credit the psychologist expressed the view that A’s expectations that everything will be, effectively, rosy if I accede to this application are probably idealistic and that there are still very considerable problems ahead. The psychiatrist wrote in her report that were I to accede to this application A will need very significant emotional and psychological support before, during and after any medical procedures. It is not simply a matter of having the operations.” 16 Fam LR 715 at 722. 13 Chief Justice Nicholson left open t he question of whether there remained a role for the Court if the child was found to be Gillick competent: Re Alex at para 173. He did not accept the submission made by the Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission that in this situation, the jurisdiction of the court is ousted: Australia, Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission Intervention in Re Alex at 1.3(a) & 2.8 available at: . 14 This was confirmed by the High Court in Marion at 255–6 and in P v P (1994) 181 CLR 583. See also the discussion of the Full Family Court in B and B and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (2003) FLC ¶93–141 pars 210–247 and in Re GWW and CMW (1997) FLC ¶92–748 at 84, 106– 9, per Hannon J.
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15 This distinction was used as a test in the Canadian case of Re Eve [1986] 2 SCR 388. In Re Jane, Nicholson C.J. adopted this distinction, arguing that therapeutic aims and procedures involve the treatment of some malfunction or disease while non-therapeutic procedures “performed as a matter of routine for religious or social purposes” Fam LR 690 at FLC 760. 16 The application of the ‘but for’ test was proposed by both the Family Law Council & the Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission. However the courts have tended to dismiss this test as too blunt an instrument: see P v P (1995) 19 Fam LR 1 at 23. 17 It could well be argued that the distinction is unnecessary because the procedure is in the interest of a third party rather than the child, so establishing that donation could possibly be in the child’s best interest would be difficult. See for example Re GWW and CMW. (1997) FLC ¶92–748. 18 The Family Law Council recommended that if the sterilization is wanted for four reasons, then sterilisation could never be authorized. These reasons are when sterilization is desired for eugenic reasons, for purely contraceptive purposes, in order to conceal or avoid the consequences of sexual abuse, and if menstruation is yet to commence. Sterilization can only be authorized for a person under the age of 18 if the procedure is necessary to save life or to prevent serious damage to the person’s physical or psychological health. The factors to consider in determining whether there is serious damage to a person’s physical or psychological health include the feasibility of less permanent means of contraception, an evaluation of the person’s response to training in menstrual management if this is the problem and the best interests of the child. Sterilisation is only to be authorized as a last resort.
References Alston, P. (1994) The Best Interests of the Child (1994) Oxford, Clarendon Press. Australian Law Reform Commission (2004) Submission to the Attorney-General’s Department Issues Paper on Non-Therapeutic Sterilisation of Minors with a DecisionMaking Disability. Briffa, A. (2003) Discrimination against People affected by Intersex Conditions Report on behalf of Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome Support Group Australia (AISSGA). Submission to the Chief Minister and the Department of Justice & Community Safety of the Australian Capital Territory . Bunney, L. (1997) “The capacity of competent minors to consent to and refuse medical treatment” Journal of Law and Medicine 5, pp. 52–64. Campbell, T.D. (1992) “The Rights of the Minor: as Person, as Child, as Juvenile, as Future Adult” in Alston, P., Parker, S. & Seymour, J. Children’s Rights and the Law Oxford, Clarendon Press. Cole, J. (2003) “Legal Issues on the Treatment of Children with Intersex Conditions” AIGSA Website . Davis, V.J. & Mykitiuk, R. (2001) “The Rights of the Adolescent: The Mature Minor” Journal of the Society of Obstetricians and Gynecologists of Canada 23, pp. 343–345. Downs, C. & Whittle, S. (2000) “Seeking a Gendered Adolescence: Legal and Ethical Problems of Puberty Suppression among Adolescents with Gender Dysphoria” in Heinze, E. (ed.) Children’s Rights: Of Innocence and Autonomy, Massachusetts, Dartmouth. Dworkin, R. (1977) Taking Rights Seriously, London, Duckworth.
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Eekelaar, J. (1986) “The Emergence of Children’s Rights”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 6, 161–182. Enright, M. (2003) “Mature” Minors & the Medical Law; Safety First? Cork Online Law Review VII [2003] 1 . Family Law Council (2004) Canberra Practice Direction 2004/9, <www.familycourt. gov.au/>. Family Law Council of Australia (1994) Sterilisation and Other Medical Procedures on Children. Fellowes, M. (2000) “Australia’s Recommendations for the Sterilisation of the Mentally Incapacitated Minor – A More Rigorous Approach?” Web Journal of Current Legal Issues [2000] 2 . Ford, K.K. (2000) “ ‘First Do No Harm’ – The Fiction of Parental Consent to GenderNormalising Surgery on Intersexed Infants” Yale Law & Policy Review 19, pp. 469–488. Freeman, M.D.A. (1983) The Rights and Wrongs of Children London, Frances Pinter. Gooren, L. (2000) “Interview on Gender Dysphoria” ABC Radio National, The Health Report . Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission (1989) Submission intervening in P v P at the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia No SY 4034. Jones, M. & Marks, L.A.B. (1994) “The Dynamic Developmental Model of Emerging Rights in Children” International Journal of Children’s Rights 2, pp. 265–291. ——— (2001) “Mediating Rights: Parents, Children & the State” in Jones, M. & Marks, L.A.B. (eds.) Children on the Agenda: The Rights of Australia’s Children, Sydney, Prospect Press. Mendelson, D. (1996) “Historical evolution and modern implications of concepts of consent to, and refusal of, medical treatment in the law of trespass” Journal of Legal Medicine 17, pp. 1–71. Millbank, J. (1995) “When is a Girl a Boy? Re A (a child)” Australian Journal of Family Law 9, pp. 173–181. Minow, M. (1990) Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion and American Law, New York, Cornell University Press. Mnookin, R.H. (1975) ‘Child custody adjudication: Judicial functions in the face of indeterminacy’. Law and Contemporary Problems 39, pp. 226–293. Nicholson, A., Harrison, M., & Sandor, D. (2001) “The Role of the Family Court in Medical Procedure Cases” in Jones, M. & Marks, L.A.B. Children on the Agenda, Sydney, Prospect. NSW Law Reform Commission (2004) Issues Paper 24 Minors’ Consent to Medical Treatment. Olsen, F. (1992) “Children’s Rights: Some Feminist Approaches to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.” in Alston, P., Parker, S. & Seymour, J. Children’s Rights and the Law, Oxford, Clarendon Press. Parker, S. (1994) “The Best Interests of the Child – Principles and Problems” in P. Alston (ed.) The Best Interests of the Child, Oxford, Clarendon Press. Spriggs, M.P. (2004) “Ethics and the Proposed Treatment for a 13-year-old with Atypical Gender Identity” Medical Journal of Australia, 181 (6), pp. 319–321. United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, (2003) General Comment 4 “Adolescent Health & Development in the context of the Convention on the Rights of the Child” CRC/GC/2003/4. Vitale, A. (2001) “Notes on Gender Role Transition: The Gender Variant Phenomenon – A
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Developmental Review” Gender and Psychoanalysis, An Interdisciplinary Journal, 6 (2), pp. 121–141. Wolfson, S. (1992) “Children’s Rights: The Theoretical Underpinning of the ‘Best Interests of the Child’ ” in Freeman, M. & Veerman, P. The Ideologies of Children’s Rights, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff. Zhou, J.-N., Hofman, M.A., Gooren, L.J., Swaab, D.F. (1997) “A Sex Difference in the Human Brain and its Relation to Transsexuality” International Journal of Transgenderism 1, pp. 1–5. .
Anorexia Nervosa and its Moral Foundations1 SIMONA GIORDANO Lecturer in Bioethics at the Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, University of Manchester
Anorexia: case history Ninety pounds. Finishing the muffin I had for lunch, I sit in the corner of the couch with a blanket covering my body. My dad walks past to the kitchen without noticing me. This happens frequently; he just doesn’t see me. A cool wind blows past stuck with it a scent of emotion. My body cannot get comfortable on the seat, with my bones so cold and poking my skin. I’m lost, hidden in my own off-world. Everything is okay in my off-world; it is warm and comforting. Dinner time. Again? I’m not hungry. I lay in bed, trying to sleep. Tossing and turning, curling up into a fetal ball, I cannot get warm. My legs and arms fall asleep therefore I stretch myself out on my back. I lay there with my hands resting in the slope between my hips and stomach, my arms tight to my side. Each breath, and heartbeat, is slow and mucky. I quickly get up to run to the resort for the third time. Breakfast. I can’t eat now, too nervous. I step on the scale, naked and shivering. Eighty-nine pounds. Not too bad, still have that stomach though! Walking the long path to the building I pant and feel exhausted, wanting to sleep right there on the sidewalk, if only it were warm. I glance in the three-way mirror. I can see my back, my ribs and spine all looking back at me. My butt sagging. I look close to the mirror, my skin translucent. There are purple circles around my eyes. I’ve lost more than half my hair. What’s happened? I can’t eat without staring at the food. I pick it apart, and push it around my plate. I can’t keep up with all the rules I have for myself. I constantly break them anyway. I’m horrid even to myself. I did this, I deserve the punishment. It’s all my fault. How [the hell] will I tell my parents? I sit on the cold hard metal medical bed with a sheet of paper covering it, rehearsing over and over what I’ll say to the doctor. A woman comes in to Michael Freeman (Ed.), Children’s Health and Children’s Rights, 149–160. © 2006. Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands.
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weigh me and take my blood pressure. One hundred pounds. “When was your last period?” She asked. “Eight months ago.” She proceeded to ask if I had been pregnant or sick. “God, you’re not throwing up are you?” Of course not, that never worked. I sit and wait more for the doctor, rehearsing again what I’d tell her, feeling quite defeated by the comments of the previous woman. Finally she comes and tells me, yes, it’s Anorexia Nervosa.
Introduction This is one of the innumerable stories published every day in the web and in the media. Eating disorders, a rarity about 30 years ago, have now become an epidemic (Gordon, 1991, p. 39), and everyone in our society has or has had a relative, or a school mate, or a friend, or a daughter, with anorexia or bulimia.2 In common discourse, eating disorders are often seen as the result of the pressure to be thin, operated by the media. Magazines and the media would propose/impose an unnatural model of beauty and young women would fall in the trap of eating disorders in the effort to emulate their favourite top models. In this paper I will argue that eating disorders are not the products of fashion, but of some moral values that are strongly embodied in the western culture. In other words, it is not fashion that shapes our bodies, but morality.
Eating disorders: an epidemic that affects many children About 1% of young women are diagnosed as having anorexia, and about 17% of college-aged women are diagnosed as having bulimia. Of these, between 30 and 80% have had a history of anorexia. (DSM-IV TR, 2000, 307.1; 370.51). The statistics obviously only refer to people who seek help and who meet the diagnostic criteria. However, there are a number of “silent sufferers”, who will never seek professional help and who will consequently not appear in clinical estimates, and there are people who have eating disorders or a difficult relationship with their body and with eating, but who do not meet the diagnostic criteria. If these are taken into consideration, the numbers rise enormously. According to the Eating Disorders Association, 1.15 million people currently suffer from eating disorders in the UK . Childline Support (see ), active in the UK helps up to 1,300 children with eating disorders every year. Eating disorders might affect anyone, including women up to the menopause. However, according to the International Classification of Diseases, the
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disorder “occurs most commonly in adolescent girls and young women, but adolescent boys and young men may also be affected, as may children approaching puberty . . .” (ICD-10, 1992, F 50). Other authoritative studies confirm that eating disorders mainly occur during adolescence (Bruch, 1974, pp. 262, 264) (Ward and Gowers, 2003, pp. 103–20, 115). Sufferers are mainly women between 16 and 19 years old (Selvini Palazzoli et al., 1998, p. 20). The disorder is often found in secondary schools, colleges and campuses (Faccio, 1999, p. 30). Some of the most relevant and controversial legal cases in the UK concern minors (Re W [1993] Fam 64; Re C [1997] 2 FLR 180, thought by no means all do). Anorexia is by far the most lethal among psychiatric disorders. Mortality associated with the disorder is up to 20% (Griffiths and Russel, 1998, p. 127). Most deaths result from suicide. This gives an idea of the unbearable suffering that people with eating disorders experience. Eating disorders are a complex syndrome and their causes are not fully understood. This makes it extremely difficult to help someone in the grip of an eating disorder.
One common explanation: the role of the media In common discourse, anorexia and bulimia are often regarded as the effect of the pressure operated by the media to be thin. The media would suggest that there is an equation between thinness and beauty, and that in order to be beautiful, especially as a woman, you need to be thin (or very thin). People, in particular young women, would start dieting, and being reinforced by the positive remarks of their peers, would continue to diet up to the point where they become unable to control themselves and they would become anorexic. A similar argument has been proposed in medical settings. The British Medical Association, in a report entitled Eating Disorders, body image and the media (British Medical Association, 2000), suggested that [t]he media play a significant role in the causation of eating disorders, where they can ‘trigger’ the illness in vulnerable individuals, by suggesting that being ‘thin’ means being successful.
The British Medical Association feared that some forms of advertising may be contributing to an increase in the incidence and prevalence of anorexia nervosa .
Indeed, magazines are replete with very thin and super-thin models, and it is sometimes difficult to differentiate between a model and an anorexic, as the images below testify.
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Picture of a model
Picture of an anorexic Although the fashion might have an impact on people’s perception of themselves, the relationship between fashion and media on the one hand, and eating disorders on the other, is not a causal one: “the media are responsible for eating disorders”; “anorexia is a product of contemporary fashion”. Instead both fashion and people with eating disorders express a common phenomenon: the preference for thinness. In other words, fashion and the media are not a cause but an effect. The real causes for eating disorders, as we shall see, are found in morality. After the British Medical Association published its report on anorexia, the director of a magazine complained that the blame for their use of super-thin models should not lie with them. He pointed out that the reason why they use skinny models is that they are what the general public want to see. People generally buy more the magazines where skeleton-like bodies are pictured. The supply satisfies the demand! (The Guardian, May 31, 2000, <www.guardian. co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4023818,00.html>. If it is true that both magazines and anorexia are an expression of the widespread taste for thinness or extreme thinness, we should ask: why do people in our society like these women? What is attractive in thinness? Before we answer this question, we need to discredit a common (but partly false) belief.
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The ancient myth of thinness Many people mistakenly believe that the mania of thinness is a recent phenomenon. The mania of thinness has instead obsessed western women for a long time. Medical books of the 1800s indicate that women of that time dreaded fat. Beauty manuals and magazines of the time present fat as an element that spoils the beauty of forms and female grace. Fat around the waist was considered as the most abhorrent. Hence the use of tight lacing and corsets, which control and castigate female fat and which allow the woman to display a “wasp-waist”. Although it was known that tight laces and corsets might be detrimental to health, a slender waist was imperative and the practice of tightening females’ stomachs was commonplace. There is also evidence that girls and women used methods to control their body weight, such as drinking vinegar and lemon juice, which were thought to help to lose weight (Krugovoy Silver, 2003, p. 53). An interesting parallel should be drawn here between these practices and those employed by people with eating disorders, who typically use laxatives and diuretics as an aid to diet, in order to lose weight or maintain underweight. In both cases the woman has to castigate herself in order to conform to the ideal of female grace and beauty. An overview of Victorian literature also shows the link between female beauty and thinness/lightness. [T]he prototypical heroine of nineteenth-century fiction . . . almost inevitably displays a tiny appetite: Dickens’s Little Dorrit, Eliot’s Dorothea Brook, and Brontë’s Jane Eyre are only three of the most well-known heroines defined in part by their light, pale bodies. In Ruth, Elizabeth Gaskell establishes her fallen heroine’s fundamental innocence and passionlessness with repeated allusions to her slimness, her ‘little figure’, and ‘beautiful lithe figure’ (Krugovoy Silver, 2003, p. 10).
The preference for a thin female body persists through the 20th Century. Studies of “Miss America” and of the magazine Playboy since the 1960s have registered decreased weight and decreased curves through the 60s and 70s. During the 70s the “tubular” androgynous body was imperative (Gordon, 1991, p. 78). Why has Western society for a long time attached high aesthetic value to thin, super-thin or otherwise “castigated” women?3 The answer to this question is to be found in a particular conception of the human person and in a morality that is closely related to that conception. The conception of the human person I am referring to is the idea that persons are a composite of body and mind (or reason or spirit) as two ontologically separated entities. This metaphysics may be regarded as one of the essential foundations of eating disorders.
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Dualistic conception of the human person: origins Most people seem to assume that human beings have a body and a mind (otherwise called reason, soul, spirit, intellect). The dichotomy of mind and body probably originated in ancient Greece, with Orphism (Reale and Antiseri, 1984, vol. I). Orpheus was a Greek (probably legendary) poet. According to Orphism, the soul is a demon (da¤mvu), a divine principle that fell into the body because of an original sin. The soul is immortal and reincarnates in different bodies, until the rituals and practices of the “Orphic life” put an end to the cycle of reincarnations (metempsychosis) and the soul is set free. Orphism, in contrast with original Greek naturalism, for the first time presented physical life as something that needs to be transcended. This had a major impact on the whole Greek culture, including philosophy and science. This stream of thought is found in the School of Pythagoras, in Empedocles, in Plato (Reale and Antiseri, 1984, p. 112) and in Aristotle (Aristotle, 1986, iii 4, 429a9–10; cf. iii 3, 428a5; iii 9, 432b26; iii 12, 434b3) (Reale and Antiseri, 1984, pp. 17–20; p. 406). The metaphysical distinction was clearly accepted in Christianity, in the various interpretation of Christian theology (such as the Patristic doctrines and the Scholastic philosophy) and in the whole medieval western philosophy and theology. Many modern philosophers (remarkable in this sense are the speculations by Descartes and Kant) adopted this view. And also in literature we find examples of this dualistic conception of the human person. Emily Dickinson, for example, wrote: I do not care for the body, I love the timid soul, the blushing, shrinking soul; it hides, for it is afraid, and the bold obtrusive body . . . (Letter No 39) (Johnson, 1958, p. 103). [W]ho cares for a body whose tenant is ill at ease? Give me the aching body, and the spirit glad and serene, for if the gem shines on, forget the mouldering casket (Letter No 54) (Johnson, 1958, p. 140) (Giordano, 2002).
This dichotomous conception of the human being is still widely accepted. Philosophers like Peter Singer (Singer, 1995), John Harris (Harris, 1992), Derek Parfit (Parfit, 1976, pp. 143–63), H. Tristram Engelhardt (Engelhardt, 1996), argue that the human being in its “complete” or “higher” form, must possess “mental” capacities – self-awareness, and so on, and that beings that do not possess the “mental” capacities are not “persons”. Having a body is not enough: it is the mind (or reason, or rationality) that gives us our special status. The definition of death which is currently accepted in US and in Europe, “brain death” (= cortex + brain stem), (Department of Health, 1998; Re A
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[2002] 3 Med LR 303) reflect the same concept: what we consider as a “person” must have “mental” capacities. That we have “a reason” or “a mind” seems so self-evident to many that often little justification is offered (Ryle, 1978, pp. 13–14). I will not discuss here whether or not this philosophical argument is valid. The important aspect, the one that has major impact on eating disorders, is that this metaphysics is not merely descriptive, but normative. The next section will show how this metaphysics contributes to the articulation of a certain moral framework which is determinant to eating disorders. The “baseness” of the body and eating disorders In the mind-body split, the body is generally regarded as either “insignificant” or “inferior” or both. This ideology is one of the determinants of eating disorders. Within an ethic that demands the submission of the “physical”, it is obvious that control over one of the most pressing physiological impulses, hunger, is praised. Fasting has been associated (and is still associated) with ideas of control over the chaotic passions of the body, and the person who is able to exert control over hunger has often been presented as an example of moral integrity (Bruch, 1974, p. 25) (Weber, 1976, p. 166) (MacSween, 1995, p. 211). Moreover, fasting has been associated (and is still associated) with the idea of purity. Fasting is “detox”; this of course means that eating is a form of pollution. Fasting “cleanses up” the organism. Being empty of food is being clean. By simply navigating on the web, one finds countless advertisements that offer fasting as a form of purification, both physical and spiritual. The advertisements invariably suggest a connection between emptiness (freedom from food), cleanness, freedom from diseases and purity (where purity is both physical and spiritual). In the following advertisement, for example, fasting is presented as a panacea for every cell. Detoxification is a normal body process of eliminating or neutralizing toxins through the colon, liver, kidneys, lungs, lymph and skin. Fasting is the world’s most ancient and natural healing mechanism. Fasting triggers a truly wondrous cleansing process that reaches right down to each and every cell and tissue in the body
Another website, advertising another wellness centre, contains a number of case studies on the benefits of fasting. Tim allegedly underwent 49 days fasting, (31 days on pure water; 18 on restricted coconut water and pure water). The following is an extract from his testimonial:
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I won’t relate exactly what happened to me. Nothing that I expected to happen, happened; the things I least expected to happen, did. If you hear my stories, you might expect the same things to happen to you. I can tell you of my tongue’s coat changing and parting like the red sea, moles falling off, grey hairs vanishing, warts disappearing, knees and entire leg bones straightening, eyesight going wild then improving, a little toenail appearing for the first time in my life, . . . And who knows what miracles occurred in my kidneys, my spleen, my prostate, etc., etc.? . . . Generally though, I am amazed at the overall rejuvenation that has occurred. My hair and eyes are shining. My brain feels like it is being fed properly (for the first time) – in essence, I am substantially cleverer. I am calmer. I am happier. I am wiser. My skin is as taught as rubber. I sat next to a super-handsome 19 year old Olympic triathelete in the plane home and the stewardess asked if we were brothers as “we looked so alike”. (I just had to tell you that.) Tim
These advertisements reveal a mixture of different elements, some of which may help understanding of eating disorders. Through fasting the person achieves “purity” (physical, spiritual or both). “Purification” from food is good at all levels: is good for the body (cure of diseases; purity from the pollution of food) and good for the spirit (“My brain feels like it is being fed properly (for the first time) – in essence, I am substantially cleverer. I am calmer. I am happier. I am wiser”). Control of the body is “will power”, physical spiritual catharsis, demonstration of virtue and moral character. We may look at eating disorders in the light of this. Control of food intake is central to eating disorders, together with compensatory practices, such as self-induced vomiting, abuse of laxatives and diuretics. Interestingly, these are also called “cathartic” practices. These are practices through which the person purifies herself from food. The eating disordered person has accepted the idea that being empty from food is being “clean”, an idea which is not spread by fashion, but which has its origins in metaphysics and morality. Control of body impulses and needs is a way in which the person affirms her moral purity: she purifies herself and also affirms her moral character – she is able to control her body with her will.4, 5 Saying that the eating disordered person wants to be thin and to emulate top models is a disgraceful minimisation of the motives and background of anorexic behaviour. At the basis of the admiration for a thin body, or an empty body there are moral values: self-control, perfectionism, purity, intellectual achievement, will power and hard work, a cluster of values with a long history (Duker and Slade, 2003, pp. 108–110; pp. 121–22; p. 130) (Vandereycken and Van Deth, 1994, chapters 2 and 11) (Lawrence, 1984, pp. 32–35) (Bruch, 1974 p. 25). This is why the more people with eating disorders become emaciated, frail and vulnerable, the more they go on fasting, the more powerful, cleansed, pure they feel.
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As Duker and Slade report: There are three underlying characteristics that are particularly marked in any sufferer. These are an intense morality, an extreme sensitivity, particularly to the needs and feelings of others, and a profound sense of worthlessness . . . they are completely rule-bound . . . They apply their moral rules to food, to eating, to exercising as to everything else in their life . . . sufferers typically adhere very strongly to a cluster of values that centre on hard work, self control, personal responsibility, high standards of achievement, deferred gratification, not receiving rewards that have not been earned, not receiving where this is not deserved . . . these values and aspirations can be applied to food and body regulation as effectively as they can be applied to work, educational achievements, career success, personal relationships and of course sports, where encouragement for these values to be extended to body regulation is explicit . . . Anorexics, bulimics, all those striving to get their body ‘into shape’ . . . are people who place very high value on control . . . it is the continuity between the sufferers’ moral attitude and that of their social group or culture that again explains why the condition can be lethal (my emphases) (Duker and Slade, 2003, pp. 108–110).
The values that “shape” eating disorders reflect widely accepted views of the human person and moral virtue. Many people, including anorexics, believe that there is something moral in the capacity to control this chaotic and dangerous accessory that is our body, and something immoral in the incapacity to control it. In a context that denigrates the body, fatness as abundance of body – as “corpulence” (from the Latin corpus = body + ulentus = abounding in) cannot be considered “beautiful” – because it is not acceptable. Fatness is not simply ugly (likewise, it is not simply “unhealthy” or “bad for you”): fat it is depreciable as the synonymous of corporeal vices, indolence, weakness, moral collapse (MacSween, 1995, pp. 249–50). Why women? It may be asked why this morality affects women, rather than men, at least in this particular way. If the morality is one and for all, why do mostly women develop eating disorders? The idea that eating disorders are a “female” problem is partly misleading. The population of male sufferers is increasing (Andersen, 2002, pp. 188–92) (Fichter and Krenn, 2003, pp. 369–83), and dynamics akin to anorexia inform male behaviour in a number of other areas, ranging from sports (a classic example is the body-builder) to work activities. People who believe that achieving is proof of adequacy (Duker and Slade, 2003, p. 132) will adopt behaviours that resemble the fight for control operated by the anorexic. This fight may be operated at work (fight for intellectual-social achievements), in the gym (fight for bigger muscles) or at the dinner table (control of food intake), but with similar dynamics. There may be a number of social factors that might explain why women
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become anorexic, in response to certain moral values, whereas men become, for example, obsessive body builders or obsessive workers. These social factors are related to gender stereotypes, which for example link the value of men with strength and the value of women to frailty and a-corporeality. In order to understand the different response in females and males we should analyse gender stereotypes that have crystallised in this particular society. Although such analysis goes beyond the scope of this paper, the metaphysics outlined above, with its normative functions, can in part explain anorexia, and provides a better explanation than the one that refers to the media.
Conclusions In common discourse, anorexia is often viewed as a response to the pressure to be thin operated by the media. I have argued that the (omni) presence of ultra-thin models does not explain the disorder. It rather shows that in our society (western society) we are attracted to thinness. This raises the question as to why we are attracted to thinness. Many people believe that this attraction to thinness is a contemporary phenomenon. I have shown that dread of fat was common in previous eras and that the strait jacket of diet has for a long time been considered as an imperative for women. The attraction to thinness is not a phenomenon merely linked to “fashion”. Thinness becomes valuable in a determined socio-cultural context, for what it symbolises. In the socio-cultural context of the Western world, it symbolises the submission of the body to the mind. Within a context that praises the submission of the body, with its impulses and needs, it is clear that the control of one of the most pressing physical needs, the need to eat, is considered as one of the highest expression of moral rectitude. Being thin is thus not merely beautiful: it is valuable. Thinness indicates the transcendence of the body. It is the emblem of the person’s self-control and discipline. Concomitant denigration of fat reflects the low conception of the body, which is invariably found in all eras in western culture. The claim that anorexia nervosa is an effect of the negative influence operated by the media is thus a disgraceful minimisation of the complex psychological, social and cultural backgrounds that inform the sufferers’ behaviour. The fight against fat is a fight for control, a crusade for moral affirmation, for integrity and perfection. The media are a scapegoat, I believe, which we are rather inclined to blame because, otherwise, we are bound to question ordinary ideas of what type of beings we are, and to accept that there is something poten-
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tially very dangerous and even lethal in ordinary concepts of personhood and related moral values.
Notes An earlier version of this paper was presented at the FAB/IAB World Congress of Bioethics, Sydney, November 2004. 2 Binge eating and obesity may also be regarded as eating disorders. I will for the sake of convenience refer to anorexia and bulimia, but what is said is valid for the preoccupation with thinness, whether or not the person becomes emaciated as a result of that preoccupation. 3 One could argue that thinness is preferable to fatness because it shows the forms of the female body, which fat would instead cover. However, the extreme thinness that characterises anorexia and contemporary models does not reveal, but instead obscures, female forms. To the same extent as very fat bodies are similar to one another (so that individual forms are masked by fat), extremely thin bodies are similar to one another (the forms are eliminated). 4 I am not claiming that this process is fully conscious, and that anorexics fast because they think, at a conscious level, that this will make them morally virtuous. What I am arguing is that the preference for a thin or super-thin body (and hence anorexia) makes sense if one considers this particular moral background and the metaphysics of the human person which underlies and supports it. The level of awareness that anorexics may have of the importance of this philosophical and moral background in the articulation of their behaviour is a different issue, and something that may be better established in clinical settings. 5 One may also object that anorexics’ thinking is impaired by food deprivation and therefore they cannot be acting out of reasons. Whereas it is true that food deprivation may impair mental functioning, the issue still arises as to why people start fasting in the first instance and get to a stage of food deprivation that compromises thinking and reasoning, and the arguments of this paper offer some elements for reflection as to the reasons why people adopt harmful and apparently unintelligible eating behaviours. 1
References Andersen, E.A. (2002) ‘Eating Disorders in Males’ in Fairburn, G.C. and Brownell, K.D. (eds.) Eating Disorders and Obesity, London, The Guilford Press. Aristotle (1986) De Anima (On the Soul), Harmondsworth, Penguin. ——— (1998) Metaphysics, London, Penguin. British Medical Association (2000) Eating Disorders, Body Image & The Media, London, BMJ. Bruch, H. (1974) Eating Disorders: Obesity Anorexia Nervosa and the Person Within, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul. Department of Health. A Code of Practice for the Diagnosis of Brain Stem Death. London: Department of Health, 1998. DSM-IV-TR (2000) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. Text Revision. Washington DC, American Psychiatric Association.
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Duker, M. and Slade, R. (2003) Anorexia Nervosa and Bulimia: how to help, BuckinghamPhiladelphia, Open University Press. Engelhardt, H.T. (1996) The Foundation of Bioethics, New York-Oxford, Oxford University Press. Faccio, E. (1999) Il Disturbo Alimentare, Modelli Ricerche e Terapie, Roma, Carocci. Fichter, M. and Krenn, H. (2003) ‘Eating disorders in males’ in Treasure, J. Schmidt, U. and Van Furth, E. (eds.) Handbook of Eating Disorders, Chichester, Wiley. Giordano, S. (2002) ‘Qu’un souffle de vent . . .’, Medical Humanities, 28(1) pp. 3–8. Gordon, R. (1991) Anoressia e Bulimia, Anatomia di un’Epidemia Sociale, Milano, Raffaello Cortina. Original English version (1990) Anorexia and Bulimia, Anatomy of a Social Epidemic, Oxford, Blackwell. Griffiths, R. and Russel, J. (1998) ‘Compulsory treatment for anorexia nervosa patients’ in Beumont, P.J.V. and Vandereycken, W. (eds.) Treating Eating Disorders: ethical, legal and personal issues, New York, New York University Press. Harris, J. (1992) The Value of Life, London, Routledge. ICD-10 (1992) International Classification of Diseases ICD-10, Geneva, World Health Organisation. Johnson, T.H. (1958) The Letters of Emily Dickinson, Cambridge, Harvard University Press. Krugovoy Silver, A. (2003) Victorian Literature and the Anorexic Body, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Lawrence, M. (1984) The Anorexic Experience, London, The Women’s Press. MacSween, M. (1995) Anorexic Bodies: a Feminist and Social Perspective, London, Routledge. Selvini Palazzoli, M., Cirillo, S. Selvini, M., Sorrentino, A.M. (1998) Ragazze Anoressiche e Bulimiche, la Terapia Familiare, Milano, Raffaello Cortina Editore. Parfit, D. (1976) ‘Personal Identity’ in Glover, J. (ed.) The Philosophy of Mind, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Reale, G. and Antiseri, D. (1984) Il Pensiero Occidentale dale Origini a Oggi, RomaMilano, La Scuola. Ryle, G. (1978) The Concept of Mind, London, Penguin, first published in 1949. Singer, P. (1995) Rethinking Life and Death, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Vandereycken, W. and Van Deth, R. (1994) From Fasting Saints to Anorexic Girls, the History of Self-Starvation, London, Athlone Press. Ward, A. and Gowers, S. (2003) ‘Attachment and Childhood Development’ in Treasure, J. Schmidt, U. and Van Furth, E. (eds.) Handbook of Eating Disorders, Chichester, Wiley. Weber, M. (1976) The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, London, George Allen & Unwin.
Short Changed? The Law and Ethics of Male Circumcision MARIE FOX AND MICHAEL THOMSON Law School, Keele University
Introduction Routine neonatal male circumcision has generally failed to excite medico-legal attention. Notwithstanding recent debates in the ethical literature, notably in special issues or symposia in the Journal of Medical Ethics (2004, 30) and American Journal of Bioethics (2003, 3), the law has yet to engage seriously with this issue. In a forthcoming contribution to an emerging medico-legal debate we have suggested that neglect of this issue is partly attributable to the way in which routine infant male circumcision (and its attendant effects and risks) is typically characterised in opposition to female circumcision for rhetorical and political reasons (Fox and Thomson, 2005). The result is that, while female circumcision is constructed as morally and legally unacceptable within a civilised society, male circumcision is characterised as a standard and benign medical practice. In this article our focus turns to the related failure to engage in a full cost/benefit analysis of the practice and the harm it causes to boy children. This article starts by outlining, briefly, how routine male circumcision has come to be debated in contemporary ethical, professional and (the limited) legal literature. Particular attention is devoted to the privileging of parental choice, notwithstanding documented medical risks and the absence of conclusive evidence of medical benefit. We suggest that the medico-legal failure to take seriously the risks involved is understandable if we recognise that the concept of harm is inherently fluid and that pain (particularly where it is experienced by infants) is often incapable of articulation. This insight means that it is crucial to address the ways in which specific harms are contextualised. We explore this process of constructing harm through a consideration of the law’s response to circumcision in the leading case of Brown and in the Law Commission’s recommendations on circumcision in its report Consent in the Criminal Law. By problematising the legal reasoning in these English legal texts we seek to contest legal orthodoxy which construes the decision to circumcise a male infant as a legitimate parental decision. We also suggest that this prevailing legal consensus is largely a product of the way in which the practice has historically emerged. Thus we trace a brief Michael Freeman (Ed.), Children’s Health and Children’s Rights, 161–181. © 2006. Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands.
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history of neonatal male circumcision, focusing on the early justifications for the procedure and interrogating the types of harm that were constructed or imagined in these justifications. In these medical histories, the emphasis is placed on harms risked by not circumcising rather than the risks inherent in the procedure. Importantly, such justifications are based on matters of hygiene coupled