China's Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization (Series on Contemporary China)

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CHINA’S ELITE POLITICS Governance and Democratization

Series on Contemporary China

(ISSN: 1793-0847)

Series Editors: Joseph Fewsmith (Boston University) Zheng Yongnian (East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore) Published* Vol. 9

Economic Reform and Cross-Strait Relations: Taiwan and China in the WTO edited by Julian Chang & Steven M Goldstein

Vol. 10 Discontented Miracle: Growth, Conflict, and Institutional Adaptations in China edited by Dali L Yang Vol. 11 China’s Surging Economy: Adjusting for More Balanced Development edited by John Wong & Wei Liu Vol. 12 Tobacco Control Policy Analysis in China: Economics and Health edited by Teh-Wei Hu Vol. 13 China's Science and Technology Sector and the Forces of Globalisation edited by Elspeth Thomson & Jon Sigurdson Vol. 14 Migration and Social Protection in China edited by Ingrid Nielsen & Russell Smyth Vol. 15 China’s Reforms at 30: Challenges and Prospects edited by Dali L Yang & Litao Zhao Vol. 16 Political Booms: Local Money and Power in Taiwan, East China, Thailand and the Philippines by Lynn T White Vol. 17 Politics of China’s Environmental Protection: Problems and Progress by Chen Gang Vol. 18 Oil in China: From Self-Reliance to Internationalization by Lim Tai Wei Vol. 19 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization by Bo Zhiyue Vol. 20 China’s New Social Policy: Initiatives for a Harmonious Society edited by Zhao Litao & Lim Tin Seng Vol. 21 Oil and Gas in China: The New Energy Superpower’s Relations with Its Region by Lim Tai Wei

*To view the complete list of the published volumes in the series, please visit: http://www.worldscibooks.com/series/scc_series.shtml

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Series on Contemporary China – Vol. 19

CHINA’S ELITE POLITICS Governance and Democratization

Bo Zhiyue East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, Singapore

World Scientific NEW JERSEY

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LONDON

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SINGAPORE

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BEIJING

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SHANGHAI

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HONG KONG

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TA I P E I

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CHENNAI

Published by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. 5 Toh Tuck Link, Singapore 596224 USA office: 27 Warren Street, Suite 401-402, Hackensack, NJ 07601 UK office: 57 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London WC2H 9HE

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Series on Contemporary China — Vol. 19 CHINA’S ELITE POLITICS Governance and Democratization Copyright © 2010 by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. All rights reserved. This book, or parts thereof, may not be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage and retrieval system now known or to be invented, without written permission from the Publisher.

For photocopying of material in this volume, please pay a copying fee through the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. In this case permission to photocopy is not required from the publisher.

ISBN-13 978-981-283-672-4 ISBN-10 981-283-672-1

Typeset by Stallion Press Email: [email protected]

Printed in Singapore.

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Chapter

1 Preface Dr. Bo has long been a major contributor to the literature on China’s elites. This is the third of a trilogy. The first book, Chinese Provincial Leaders: Economic Performance and Political Mobility since 1949, came out in 2002. The second, China’s Elite Politics: Political Transition and Power Balancing, dealt with the subject as it stood at the Sixteenth Party Congress, held in 2002. And this volume, the third, analyzes the Chinese ruling elite as it emerged at the Seventeenth Party Congress, which met in 2007. In addition, Dr. Bo undertook a second, major task in this book, namely to assess the leadership’s capacity to govern. He did this by examining how it handled four major crises and challenges that arose in 2008: the paralyzing snow storm early in the year, the Tibetan riots in March, the devastating earthquake of May, and the August Olympics. This is an unusual and creative approach to the analysis of elite politics. The elite portion of the book can be read on two levels. First, the elite chapters constitute a very important work of reference for readers interested in the current Chinese rulers. Here, Dr. Bo has performed a major service to the profession. Prodigious research enabled him to produce a series of tables that contain an astonishing amount of information about the people who lead the most important political institutions of the country. If the reader wants to know how many Central Committee members hold PhD degrees, s/he can find the answer: 52, up from 12 on the Sixteenth Central Committee. vii

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Readers interested in the representation of non-Han minorities, of women, in age distributions, educational levels, or study abroad experiences, can find an appropriate table. The second, even more important level, is analytical. Dr. Bo brings to bear his own methodology to answer important political questions. A chapter is devoted to the shifting factional balance among the leaders, which, for instance, shows the numerical decline of the “Shanghai Gang” and the rise of the Youth League group around Party General Secretary and President Hu Jintao. Another chapter analyzes representation on the Central Committee of various Party and government institutions. Dr. Bo constructs a “representation index” for provinces, central institutions, and the military. He looks at the shifting balance of power between those Central Committee members who serve in provinces and those at the center. The fundamental finding is that Chinese political elite is becoming more and more institutionalized in terms of regularity of career patterns and of acceptance of key rules of the game. The four “crisis” chapters show China’s leaders in action. Dr. Bo’s meticulously gathered data enables him to shed light on regime performance. The chapter on Tibet is an impressive effort to defend the Chinese record. Dr. Bo marshals a great deal of historical and contemporary data to make his case. Undoubtedly, others in the international academic community may take issue with his findings. In the case of the great snowstorm, he shows how leaders were more effective than others in taking remedial action. In contrast, the mobilization of national and international resources and personnel that followed up on the May earthquake was truly impressive and very much in contrast to the leadership’s performance during the even deadlier Tangshan earthquake in 1976, a measure of the distance that the Chinese ruling elite has come. And of course, the Olympics demonstrated to the world that China has truly arrived on the world stage. These chapters augur well for the capacity of China’s leaders to handle the current global economic crisis. Thomas P. Bernstein Professor Emeritus Columbia University

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1 Acknowledgments A sequel to China’s Elite Politics: Political Transition and Power Balancing (World Scientific, 2007), this book has sprung out of my concerns for China’s future political development. Democracy, as Yu Keping puts it, is a good thing. But democratizing countries have yet to demonstrate their superior performance in governance. Popularly elected political leaders have increasingly suffered from a lame duck phenomenon. Once electoral euphoria subsides, these leaders’ approval ratings plummet. Instead of trusting these elected officials to do what is right for the country, citizens, often mobilized by opposition leaders, began to ask soon after the inauguration, “Who is next?” Should China follow suit anyway because democracy somehow is good for China in the long run? Or should China focus on governance instead of democratizing? Or should China conceive a new model of democracy that is appropriate for China’s social and economic conditions? The following pages will attempt to provide a tentative answer. I would like to thank Professor Wang Gungwu, Professor Yang Dali, and Professor John Wong of the East Asian Institute (EAI), the National University of Singapore, for having accepted me as a fulltime staff in this internationally-esteemed institution of China studies. Over the past four years, I have grown fond of the EAI and Singapore and would appreciate an opportunity for intellectual development in this stimulating scholarly environment. My thanks also go to ix

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Professor Zheng Yongnian and other colleagues (in particular Professors Thomas P. Bernstein and Dorothy J. Solinger) at EAI for their continuous support and Ms. Sandhya Venkatesh of World Scientific for her persistent assistance throughout the entire process of producing these two books. My parents, Bo Tingxiang and Zhang Shaoqing, have always been there for me in the past decades, and I am truly grateful to my wife, Yan Dong, for her love and support. I dedicate this book to our son, Lin Bo, for being so wonderful. I acknowledge with thankfulness the publishers for permitting me to reprint the following articles with revisions: Chapter 3, “Institutional Representation”, was originally published as “The CCP’s Seventeenth Central Committee: Institutional Representation” in Issues & Studies 41, no. 1 (September 2008): 1–41. Chapter 4, “Factional Balance”, was originally published as “Balance of Factional Power in China: The Seventeenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party” in East Asia 25, no. 4 (December 2008): 333–364.

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Chapter

1 Contents Preface Acknowledgments List of Tables List of Figures List of Maps

vii ix xiii xvii xix

Introduction: China’s Political Elites and Their Challenges Part I: Who Governs: China’s Political Elites 1. 2. 3. 4.

Top Leadership Central Committee Institutional Representation Factional Balance

1 17 19 53 91 131

Part II: How to Govern: Challenges

175

5. 6. 7. 8.

177 199 271 323

Snowstorms in the South The Tibet Issue Sichuan Earthquake Beijing Olympic Games

Conclusion: China’s Prospects for Democratization

383

Index

393 xi

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Chapter

1 List of Tables Table 1.1 Table 1.2 Table 1.3 Table 1.4 Table 1.5 Table 1.6 Table 1.7 Table 2.1 Table 2.2 Table 2.3 Table 2.4 Table 2.5

The Seventeenth Politburo Standing Committee (October 2007) Average Age of Politburo Standing Committee Members The Seventeenth Politburo (Excluding Standing Members) (October 2007) Average Age of Politburo Members (1982–2007) The Seventeenth Secretariat (October 2007) The Seventeenth Central Military Commission (October 2007) Average Age of China’s Top Leadership (October 2007) Educational Levels of the Seventeenth Central Committee (2007) PhD Holders of the Seventeenth Central Committee Members Overseas Studies Experience Among Central Committee Members Countries of Foreign Learning Experience Academicians in the Seventeenth Central Committee xiii

21 27 30 37 38 42 46 54 56 62 67 68

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Table 2.6 Table 2.7 Table 2.8 Table 2.9 Table 2.10 Table 2.11 Table 2.12 Table 3.1 Table 3.2 Table 3.3 Table 3.4 Table 3.5 Table 3.6 Table 3.7 Table 3.8 Table 4.1

Table 4.2 Table 4.3

Average Ages of Central Committee Members (1997–2007) Work Experience of Central Committee Members Party Standing of Central Committee Members Distribution of Home Provinces of Central Committee Members Females in the Central Committee Distribution of Nationalities among Central Committee Members Central Committee Members with Provincial Experience The Seventeenth Central Committee by Institution Elite Provincial Units in China (1969–2007) Provincial Central Committee Representation (1969–2007) Central Party-Institution Central Committee Representation (October 2007) Central Government Central Committee Representation (October 2007) Other Central Institution Central Committee Representation (October 2007) Military Central Committee Representation (October 2007) Corporate Central Committee Representation (October 2007) Members of the Shanghai Gang in the Seventeenth Central Committee (October 2007) Qinghua Graduates in the Seventeenth Central Committee (October 2007) Princelings in the Seventeenth Central Committee (October 2007)

68 71 73 75 78 80 81 92 93 95 101 104 109 113 122 135

138 140

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Table 4.4 Table 4.5 Table 4.6 Table 4.7 Table 6.1 Table 6.2 Table 6.3 Table 6.4 Table 6.5

Group Cohesion Matrix of the Princelings in the Seventeenth Central Committee (2007) CCYL Cadres in the Seventeenth Central Committee (October 2007) Provincial CCYL Cadres Other CCYL Cadres Tibetan Autonomous Units in the People’s Republic of China Tibet’s Governance in the History of China Names and Tenures of Tibet's Top Leaders Since 1950 Deaths Under the CCP's Rule (1949–1979) Funding for Tibet Projects from National Endowment for Democracy (2006)

xv

146 149 158 163 202 211 224 228 248

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1 List of Figures Figure 2.1 Figure 3.1 Figure 4.1 Figure 4.2 Figure 4.3 Figure 4.4 Figure 6.1 Figure 6.2 Figure 6.3

Population Pyramid of the Seventeenth Central Committee Balance of Institional Power in China (October 2007) Personal Ties of Former CCYL Secretariat Members Personal Ties of Former Full-Time Staff Members of the CCYL Factional Balance of the CCP Central Committees (2002, 2007) Group Cohesion Index of Factional Groups in China (2002, 2007) Ethnic Distributions of Tibetan and Han Populations in Tibet Han Population in Tibet (1964–2005) Central Subsidies to Tibet (1952–2006)

xvii

70 125 153 156 165 167 232 233 236

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1 List of Maps Map 6.1 Tibet Autonomous Region Map 6.2 The Dalai Lama’s Tibet

xix

200 201

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1 Introduction: China’s Political Elites and Their Challenges This book tackles the issue of governance in China. “The most important political distinction among countries”, Samuel P. Huntington observed in 1968, “concerns not their form of government but their degree of government”.1 “The differences between democracy and dictatorship”, he continued, “are less than the differences between those countries whose politics embodies consensus, community, legitimacy, organization, effectiveness, stability, and those countries whose politics is deficient in these qualities”.2 Interestingly, Huntington’s political theory of governance is astonishingly similar to Deng Xiaoping’s “cat theory” of economic development — it does not matter whether a cat is white or black; it is a good cat as long as it catches mice (in other words, it does not matter whether an economic policy is socialist or capitalist; it is a good policy as long as it promotes economic growth). To reformulate Huntington’s theory in Deng’s parlance, one may get that it does not matter whether a government is democratic or authoritarian; it is a good government as long as it governs. “LAME DUCK PHENOMENON” Unfortunately, many democracies, new democracies in particular, have been increasingly faced with the challenge of effective governance. 1

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Winners of democratic elections have increasingly suffered from a “lame duck phenomenon” in which newly inaugurated leaders are often challenged by opposition leaders and protested against by citizens for their inability to adequately address social and economic issues. President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (born February 19, 1953) of Argentina, the first female to be elected as president in the history of her country,3 was being labeled a lame duck president only half a year in office because of her defeat over a tax bill in the Senate.4 A popular presidential candidate who secured 45.3 percent of the vote on October 28, 2007, Cristina Kirchner got into conflict with Argentinean farmers in March 2008 when she raised taxes on agricultural exports. Within just over 100 days in office, she was faced with the largest protest in Argentina in six years.5 Her presumed loyalists defected, and her popularity tumbled. President Lee Myung-bak (born December 19, 1941) of the Republic of Korea (South Korea), once hailed as a potential savior of South Korea’s troubled economy, received calls for resignation amid the country’s largest anti-government protests in 20 years over a US beef deal, barely two months after his inauguration on February 25, 2008.6 The winner of a landslide victory with 48.7 percent of the vote, Lee’s approval ratings plummeted from 75.1 percent on February 23, 2008 to only 17.2 percent on June 2, 2008, at the end of his first 100 days in office.7 His entire cabinet resigned a few days thereafter. Unfortunately, these are not isolated examples of weak governments as a result of democratic elections. Massive protests and parliamentary meltdowns have occurred in the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, and other democracies.8 The Filipinos, having ousted President Jose Marcelo Ejercito (born April 19, 1937) through peaceful street demonstrations in January 2001, have been pressuring their current president, Ms. Maria Gloria Macaraeg MacapagalArroyo (born April 5, 1947), to step down since her inauguration on June 30, 2004. In Malaysia, after having led the ruling coalition Barisan Nasional (BN) to its worst election result in March 2008, Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (born November 26, 1939) was called to

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step down because of rising fuel and food prices. His designated successor, Deputy Prime Minister Najib Abdul Razak (born July 22, 1953), was accused of being involved in the 2006 killing of a Mongolian woman, Altantuya Shaariibuu, and the opposition leader, Anwar Ibrahim (born August 10, 1947), was charged with sodomy by a 23-year-old male aide. In Thailand, Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej (born June 23, 1935) faced opposition accusations of incompetence, mismanagement, and yielding national sovereignty, mass protests, and a noconfidence vote in the Parliament barely five months after he became the head of a newly reconstituted government. An opposition party, the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), occupied the grounds of the prime minister’s office on August 26, 2008, demanding him to move the business of government elsewhere. Samak Sundaravej was forced to step down as the prime minister on September 9, 2008 when a court ruled that he had violated the Constitution by accepting payments for his appearance in a television cooking show while in office. Somchai Wongsawat (born August 31, 1947), the brother-in-law of fugitive ex-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, became the Prime Minister on September 9, 2008, upon the Constitutional Court’s decision that the premiership of Samak Sundaravej had been terminated. He was elected Prime Minister on September 17, 2008 by the National Assembly, receiving 298 favorable votes against the 163 votes for Abhisit Vejjajiva (born August 4, 1964). But the PAD besieged the Parliament building on October 7, 2008 and then took control of Bangkok’s main airport on November 26, 2008. On December 2, 2008, the Thai Constitutional Court ruled that Prime Minister Somchai should be banned from politics for at least five years and that his party should be dissolved over election fraud.9 The airport closures left more than 300,000 tourists stranded in Thailand and cost the economy huge amounts in lost revenues and the country its reputation as a tourist destination. Moreover, as the 2008 24-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey reveals, majorities in major Western democracies are not satisfied with the way things are going in their own countries either. In Germany,

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63 percent of the people are dissatisfied with the country’s direction while only 34 percent are satisfied. In Britain, the split between the dissatisfied and the satisfied is 65 percent versus 30 percent. The Americans are much less optimistic about the way things are going in the United States: 70 percent are dissatisfied while only 23 percent are satisfied.10 The French are even a bit more pessimistic: 71 percent are not satisfied while 29 percent are. In Japan, 74 percent are dissatisfied with their country direction while 23 percent are satisfied.11 Clearly, people in these democracies are not happy about how their countries are being governed. Finally, a WorldPublicOpinion.org poll of 20 nations around the world in 2008 finds few democrats as inspiring world leaders.12 British Prime Minister Gordon Brown performed the best with an average score of 30 (without Great Britain). However, only six countries have confidence in him to do the right thing regarding world affairs while 11 nations do not have confidence in him as a world leader. The British are divided about him.13 French President Nicolas Sarkozy fares much worse. His average score (without France) is only 26. Among the 19 countries (excluding France) surveyed, four give him positive scores while 15 dismiss him as a world leader. In some Asian countries such as South Korea, China, and India, more favor him than not. And more Nigerians (47 percent) are positive about him than not (33 percent). In his home country, 54 percent of the people distrust him while 44 percent have confidence in him. American President George W. Bush is one of the least trusted leaders in the world, next only to Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. His average score is only 23 points (without the United States). Sixteen of the 19 nations surveyed do not have confidence in Bush, while only two countries (Nigeria and India) have confidence in Bush to do the right thing regarding world affairs. In Thailand, people are divided about Bush. In his own country, the United States, a majority (56 percent) do not trust him. Worse still, “Bush” has become a synonym for “lame duck leader”.14 A more worrying sign for democratic advocates is that this distrust is nothing personal. Few Americans, for instance, have faith in any of the three major institutions of their own democratic system.

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According to a Gallup poll taken on June 9–12, 2008 asking people how much confidence they had in a list of American institutions, none of the three branches of the federal government received high ratings. In the favorable categories of “great deal” and “quite lot”, the U.S. Supreme Court received a combined rate of 32 percent; the Presidency 26 percent; and Congress 12 percent.15 In contrast, Americans have much more confidence in the military and the police, institutions of force. The military received a favorable rating of 71 percent and the police 58 percent.16 AUTHORITARIAN RESURGENCE While democratic leaders suffer from the “lame duck phenomenon”, leaders of authoritarian regimes (or “dictators” in Western parlance) seem to elicit more confidence.17 According to the same WorldPublicOpinion.org poll of 20 nations conducted in 2008, Russian Leader Vladimir Putin, President of Russia before May 2008 and now Prime Minister of Russia, scores 32 points on average (excluding Russia). Five countries (China, 75 percent versus 11 percent; Ukraine, 59 percent versus 20 percent; South Korea, 54 percent versus 40 percent; Iran, 48 percent versus 27 percent; and India, 44 percent versus 18 percent) have confidence in him as a world leader, while 11 countries do not trust him. Thais and Nigerians are divided. Putin is very popular at home. Eighty percent of Russians trust him to do the right thing regarding world affairs. Similarly, Chinese President Hu Jintao also scores higher than both Bush and Sarkozy. His average score without China is 28 points. Five countries (Nigeria, 58 percent versus 25 percent; South Korea, 56 percent versus 41 percent; Iran, 52 percent versus 16 percent; Azerbaijan, 37 percent versus 30 percent; and Ukraine, 20 percent versus 13 percent) trust him as a world leader, while 13 countries do not have confidence in him. But Hu is hugely popular in China. Ninety-three percent of the Chinese have confidence in him as a world leader, the highest percentage among all the world leaders surveyed.

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Moreover, as the Pew Global Attitudes Survey shows, people under these authoritarian regimes are optimistic about the way things are going in their countries amidst global pessimism. In Russia, 54 percent of the people are satisfied with the way things are going in their country. The Chinese are the most optimistic of all: 86 percent of them are satisfied with their country’s direction. In the meantime, large majorities (82 percent) in China also believe their national economic situation is good while only 14 percent think otherwise;18 and still larger majorities (85 percent) say the future economic situation in China will improve.19 This positive sentiment shared by a majority in the rising dragon is consistent with China’s performance in economic development in the past decades. After rapid economic growth over the past three decades, China has emerged as one of the most important economic powerhouses in the world. By the end of 2007, China had registered a record of continuous growth at the annual rate of 9.7 percent for 30 years. With its GDP at US$3.7620 trillion in 2007,20 China overtook Germany as the World’s third largest economy, after the United States and Japan. In the meantime, China has also become the largest holder of foreign reserves in the world. China’s foreign reserves hit the US$1 trillion mark at the end of 200621 and surged to US$1.9 trillion in September 2008.22 CHINA’S FUTURE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT Nevertheless, China is also facing daunting problems, partly as a result of its past successes. Rapid industrialization has generated enormous side effects of energy shortage and environmental degradation. The coastal development strategy has substantially enlarged the gap between the eastern provinces and the interior regions. The influx of migrant workers into cities along with the fast pace of urbanization has increased social tensions between native residents and new migrants; and China’s increasing integration into the global system has resulted in the massive layoffs of employees of uncompetitive state enterprises. In addition, the urbanites have found themselves being increasingly buried under the “three new

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mountains”: medical care, university education, and housing. With more than 80,000 public protests a year as a result of land disputes and other social grievances, China indeed looks very much like a “fragile” power.23 To this mix, if one adds more explosive issues of Taiwan and Tibet, China seems to be in an imminent danger of collapsing.24 The collapse of China, in fact, could mean two different things. It could mean the collapse of China as a nation-state, as in the case of the Soviet Union in 1991. Or it could simply mean the demise of the political regime under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) while China remains intact as a well-integrated country. For Gordon Chang, the two outcomes are intertwined: the collapse of China is inevitable and China’s inevitable collapse is due to the mismanagement of the CCP. According to him, China’s “roads to ruin” include conflict across the Taiwan Strait, corruption, and accession to the World Trade Organization.25 But for others, collapsing is not necessarily the only possibility for a hopeless China in the near future. According to Minxin Pei, China is also likely to be trapped in transition because of “the selfdestructive logic of predatory authoritarianism”.26 “Deteriorating governance and economic performance”, as he puts it, “may be the necessary — but not sufficient — conditions for the emergence of a fatal crisis”.27 The CCP regime may survive for decades if it can use “the same mix of repression, cooptation, and adaptation to maintain an elite-based ruling coalition”.28 A third assessment of China’s future political development is much more optimistic than both the disintegration thesis and the stagnation thesis. The Chinese Communist leadership, as Dali L. Yang presents it, has engineered a series of successful institutional reforms, ultimately amounting to the fundamental transformation of the Chinese state “from a totalistic, unlimited government to a limited government, with its operations moving compulsory supervision to the provision of public services”.29 Although the CCP leadership has promoted governance reforms in order to keep its monopoly on political power, as he further explains, the institutional changes will nevertheless lead to good governance in China and lay the

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foundation for an effective democratic polity, “if and when China does become more democratic”.30 CHINA’S POLITICAL ELITES AND THEIR CHALLENGES A real assessment of China’s future political development, however, is not complete without an assessment of China’s political elites in the first place. This is where the current volume and its twin, China’s Elite Politics: Political Transition and Power Balancing, come in. Instead of a theoretical framework on political transition (the focus of the previous volume), this book will analyze characteristics of political elites and evaluate their ability to deal with crises through four case studies: Snowstorms in the South, the Tibet issue, the Sichuan Earthquake, and the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games. China’s political elites are defined in this study as those who wield political power in the most important political institution in China: the CCP. They are alternate and full members of the CCP’s Central Committee. Who these people are and what they do will most likely determine the future of China. Ultimately, it is not so much the fact that these political elites will face challenges of natural disasters and human affairs. It is rather how they deal with these challenges. CHAPTER OUTLINE The book is divided into two parts, attempting to answer two interrelated questions: Who governs? How to govern? Part I answers the “who” question. Chapter 1 introduces the newly reconstituted top leadership in the CCP: the Politburo Standing Committee, the Politburo, the Secretariat, and the Central Military Commission. As a result of political institutionalization, the leadership reshuffles strictly followed a relatively neutral criterion: age 68. Those in the Politburo Standing Committee who reached the retirement age of 68 in 2007 all retired, while those who were below 68 were either retained or promoted. In addition to Huang Ju who passed away in June 2007, Luo Gan, Wu Guanzheng, and Zeng

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Qinghong all stepped down from the Politburo Standing Committee due to their age. He Guoqiang and Zhou Yongkang were promoted from the Politburo to the Politburo Standing Committee, and Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang were uplifted to the Politburo Standing Committee from provinces. Similarly, Cao Gangchuan, Wu Yi, Zeng Peiyan, and Zhang Lichang also retired from the Politburo because of their age, and seven new members such as Wang Qishan, Liu Yandong, Li Yuanchao, Wang Yang, Zhang Gaoli, Xu Caihou, and Bo Xilai were introduced to the Seventeenth Politburo. The new Secretariat went through a major reshuffle. Five members exited, and four new members were added. The new members include Xi Jinping, Li Yuanchao, Ling Jihua, and Wang Huning. Compared to 2004, the Central Military Commission almost remained unchanged in 2007. The only new members were Wu Shangli (the PLA Navy commander), Xu Qiliang (the PLA Air Force commander), and Chang Wanquan (director of the General Armament Department). Chapter 2 provides a brief analysis of characteristics of the Seventeenth Central Committee members in terms of education credentials, age, work experience, Party standing, home province, gender, and nationality. In comparison to the previous central committees, the Seventeenth Central Committee is the best educated. The benchmark was raised from a three-year college education in the previous central committees to a four-year college education for the current central committee, and those who received at least a four-year college education are more than 92 percent of the total. Moreover, those who have obtained graduate educations are quite common among the Seventeenth Central Committee members. More than half of them have graduate education, and more than 50 have PhDs. There are 31 people with study abroad experience and nine academicians. The Seventeenth Central Committee members were a bit older in 2007 than the Sixteenth Central Committee members in 2002, possibly due to continuity. The Cultural Revolution generation became more dominant among the Seventeenth Central Committee members, and Shandong and Hebei became top producers of central committee members instead of Jiangsu. Females and minorities remain minorities, and more are likely to have accumulated provincial leadership experience.

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Chapter 3 evaluates the balance of power among formal institutions in the Seventeenth Central Committee. It creates a power index for each institution and depicts the power balance among the four formal institutions (provinces, central institutions, the military, and corporations) with these indices. Provincial units continue to be the most powerful institution in Chinese politics with the highest representation (or power) index. The central institutions rank the second, yet they are a combination of central Party institutions, central government institutions, and other central institutions. The military comes as the third. In addition to military officers on the Central Military Commission and general departments and services, military regions are all very well-represented. All political commissars and commanders of the seven military regions are full members of the Seventeenth Central Committee. Finally, corporate and academic leaders constitute an increasingly important yet still small part of the Seventeenth Central Committee. Chapter 4 assesses the balance of power among factional groups and the group cohesion of factional groups. Out of the four major factional groups in Chinese politics, the Shanghai Gang declined drastically, from 17 members in the Sixteenth Central Committee to only nine members in the Seventeenth Central Committee. With the removal of Chen Liangyu as the Party secretary of Shanghai and the dismissal of Han Zheng as acting Party secretary, the Shanghai Gang’s path to the Zhongnanhai has been cut off. The Qinghua Clique also declined, from 20 alumni in the Sixteenth Central Committee to 10 alumni in the Seventeenth Central Committee. But the Qinghua Clique’s decline was mostly due to retirement, as most of Qinghua graduates in the central committee were in their 60s in 2007. The Princelings increased, from 20 members in the Sixteenth Central Committee to 26 in the Seventeenth Central Committee. Noticeably, there are seven princelings in the Politburo and nine princeling generals in the Seventeenth Central Committee. The Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) Group, the largest factional group in the Sixteenth Central Committee with 57 members, further expanded to 82 in the Seventeenth Central Committee. In terms of the group cohesion index, the CCYL Group remained the

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strongest; followed by the Princelings, the Shanghai Gang, and the Qinghua Clique. Part II answers the “how” question. Chapter 5 analyzes a national crisis caused by the most serious snowstorms in the South in decades. The snowstorms were both misplaced and ill-timed. They were misplaced because they hit the southern provinces of China that are not used to frigid winters. Deep freezing in these provinces disrupted power generation and caused rail and highway paralyses. They were ill-timed because they occurred during the Spring Festival season when billions were traveling home. They were also ill-timed because the State Council was in transition. Out of 10 original senior members, only two would be retained. Fortunately, the Politburo had been reconstituted and was poised to deal with the challenge. Under the leadership of the Politburo Standing Committee, China survived its first crisis in 2008. Chapter 6 deals with the issue of Tibet in general and the March riots in particular. There are no controversies over the fact that Tibet is a part of China. But there are two different definitions of Tibet. For Beijing, Tibet refers to the Tibetan Autonomous Region (i.e., political Tibet). For the Dalai Lama, Tibet refers to regions of Tibetan residents (i.e., ethnic Tibet). There is also no consensus on when Tibet became a part of China. Beijing’s view is that Tibet has been a part of China since 1247. But Wang Lixiong’s view is that Tibet has been under Beijing’s direct rule since 1727 when the Qing court began to send resident ministers. Over the years since 1279 when the Mongols unified China, the central government of China has governed Tibet through different institutions and personalities. After the People’s Republic of China was founded in October 1949, successive leaders adopted different policies toward Tibet. Mao initially combined military campaigns with peaceful means to reinstall the central control over Tibet without much bloodshed. Under the 17-Article agreement between the Tibetan authorities under the Dalai Lama and the central government, Tibet was allowed to retain its religious, cultural, and social system. After the 1959 rebellion, however, the CCP conducted radical democratic reforms in Tibet, fundamentally transforming

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the traditional system of Tibet. After the Cultural Revolution, Hu Yaobang introduced liberal policies, encouraging religious activities. But these policies soon backfired. Lhasa was embroiled in a series of unrests in the late 1980s. In the late 1980s, Beijing began to change its policy, focusing on economic development. Due to the differences over the selection of the 11th Panchen Lama, Beijing lost patience with the Dalai Lama and conducted a patriotric campaign in Tibet in the late 1990s. Apparently, six rounds of talks between Beijing and the Dalai Lama’s personal representatives failed to produce any concrete results. Riots occurred in Lhasa and other Tibetan areas in March 2008. In the face of criticism from the Western media and some Western leaders, Beijing quickly restored the order in the troubled areas and made efforts to inform foreign leaders. In the meantime, the central government officials also conducted another round of talks with the Dalai Lama’s personal representatives in Shenzhen. Chapter 7 focuses on the Sichuan earthquake. Eight days after the Chinese government had a new talk with the Dalai Lama’s private representatives, China faced another crisis. An earthquake measured at 8.0 on the Richter scale occurred on May 12, 2008 in Wenchuan County, Sichuan Province, leaving tens of thousands dead and millions homeless. It was the strongest earthquake in China since 1950 and the deadliest since 1976. The Chinese leadership sprang to action immediately. President Hu Jintao issued an order for rescue within one hour and Premier Wen Jiabao arrived at the earthquake-stricken site in less than five hours. After a Politburo Standing Committee meeting on the same day, the top leaders took turns to visit Sichuan and other affected provinces. During the entire process of rescue and relief efforts, China was open, transparent, and effective. Instead of refusing assistance from other parts of the country as in the aftermath of the 1970 Tonghai earthquake or assistance from other countries as in the aftermath of the 1976 Tangshan earthquake, China in the aftermath of the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake welcomed domestic as well as foreign aid. Foreign donations came in from governments, businesses, and individuals. Foreign rescue teams from Japan, Russia, South Korea, and

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Singapore were permitted to go to Sichuan. Foreign medical teams from Russia, Japan, Italy, Germany, France, Cuba, Pakistan, and Indonesia were allowed to work in the quake affected areas, and foreign military assistance from 18 countries was welcomed. Chapter 8 studies the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games. For the Chinese, hosting an Olympic Games was a 100-year dream come true. For the Chinese leadership, that was China’s coming-out party. Under the slogan, “One World One Dream”, the Chinese leadership was initially determined to make the Beijing Olympics the best ever in the Olympic history. However, not everyone in this world shared Beijing’s dream. Human rights groups, Tibetan separatists, and others also wanted to use the limelight of the Beijing Olympic Games to advance their own courses. They disrupted the torch relays in several Western cities, in particular Paris, offending not only the Chinese government but also the Chinese people around the world. The Chinese leadership modified its goal for the Olympics and made a “safe Olympics” one of its top priorities. The Beijing 2008 Olympic Games, in the end, was indeed the best games ever in Olympic history. The opening ceremony was a grand display of Chinese civilization, filled with memorable moments. A dry evening at the site of the opening ceremony had been made possible by more than one thousand rain dispersal rockets; more than 110 world leaders were gathered in Beijing for the occasion; and 15,000 performers delivered a fantastic show. The Olympic venues are first-rate, high-tech, and environmentally friendly. More than 11,000 athletes from 204 countries and regions competed in 302 events in 34 sports. During the games, 38 world records and 85 Olympic records were set. The Chinese team collected 51 gold medals, No. 1 in the world, and 100 medals altogether. In addition to a “truly exceptional games”, China subsequently hosted “the greatest Paralympic Games ever”. As they had promised, these games were indeed “safe Olympics” as well as “green Olympics, high-tech Olympics, and people’s Olympics”. Finally, the conclusion explores China’s prospect for democratization. In a world of natural disasters and human upheavals, a government that actually governs is in demand. In spite of Francis

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Fukuyama’s proclamation 20 years ago that the Western liberal democracy represents the end of history as the best form of government, democracies increasingly suffer from a “lame duck phenomenon” where newly inaugurated democratic leaders are challenged by opposition leaders and protested by their voters for their inability to deliver. The Chinese government, in contrast, has proved to meet such a demand. In the face of natural disasters and human upheavals within one short year, the newly reconstituted leadership of the Chinese Communist Party overcame the challenges with high marks. What then is the future of China’s elite politics? Will China democratize? There are three possible trends for China’s elite politics in the foreseeable future: institutionalization, factionalization, and democratization. If China continues its current trend of institutionalization, Xi Jinping, the heir apparent to Hu Jintao, would be a beneficiary. Continued institutionalization would facilitate another smooth political transition from the fourth generation leadership with Hu Jintao at helm to the fifth generation leadership with Xi Jinping as the leader. China’s elite politics is also likely to become factionalized if and when factional groups are transformed into political factions. As both the Shanghai Gang and the Qinghua Clique have declined, real competition would occur between the Princelings and the CCYL Group. Finally, China is also likely to democratize. Although popular democracy is an eventual goal, intra-Party democratization is more likely in the near future. NOTES 1. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 1. 2. Ibid. 3. Isabel Martínez de Perón was the first female president of Argentina but she was not elected. She succeeded her husband, Juan Perón, as president of Argentina on July 1, 1974 after her husband’s death. 4. “Losing friends fast”, The Economist, July 18, 2008, http://www.economist. com/world/la/displayStory.cfm?story_id=11772229&source=features_box_ main.

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China's Political Elites and Their Challenges 15 5. “The Kirchners v. the farmers”, The Economist, March 27, 2008, http://www. economist.com/world/la/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10925670. 6. Choe Sang-Hun, “Protests in Seoul more about nationalism than beef ”, International Herald Tribune, June 11, 2008, http://www.iht.com/articles/ 2008/06/11/asia/seoul.php. 7. “Lee’s Approval Ratings Plunges to 17%”, KBS, June 4, 2008, http://english. kbs.co.kr/news/newsview_sub.php?menu=2&key=2008060407. 8. For a perceptive analysis of democratic excesses in Asian democracies, see Jonathan Tepperman, “One Mob, One Vote”, Newsweek, June 28, 2008, http://www.newsweek.com/id/143660. 9. “Top Thai court ousts PM Somchai”, BBC News, December 2, 2008, http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7759960.stm. 10. In a poll conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates International from October 8–9, 2008 on behalf of Newsweek, 86 percent of adult Americans are dissatisfied with the way things are going in the United States and 10 percent of American citizens are “satisfied” (for the full poll results, see http:// www.newsweek.com/id/163337?tid=relatedcl). Steve Tuttle, a journalist from Newsweek, found it incomprehensible that 10 percent of American citizens still continued to be “satisfied”. “Who are these people?” he asked. “One in 10 Americans can’t be repo men or Bush relatives. Satisfied? Now? Nobody’s that Republican. Do these 10 percenters live in caves without TV, magazines, newspapers and the Internet — yet somehow still have a phone so that pollsters can reach them? And if you lived in a cave without HBO, would you really be ‘satisfied’?” His anecdotal investigations among those “satisfied” yielded a drunkard, a really sweet couple (from Canada), and two America-lovers. For his article, see Steve Tuttle, “It’s Just a Flesh Wound”, Newsweek, October 11, 2008, http:// www.newsweek.com/id/163626. 11. For details, see “Some Positive Signs for U.S. Image: Global Economic Gloom — China and India Notable Exceptions”, The Pew Global Attitudes Project, June 12, 2008, http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/260.pdf. 12. For details, see http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/views_on_ countriesregions_bt/488.php?lb=brglm&pnt=488&nid=&id=. 13. Due to the defeat in a by-election in Glasgow East on July 24, 2008, Gordon Brown is considered a lame duck. For details, see “The Race to Succeed Gordon Brown”, The Economist, July 31, 2008, http://www.economist.com/world/ britain/displayStory.cfm?source=hptextfeature&story_id=11848334. 14. Jonathan Tepperman, “Time of the Tough Guys”, The Newsweek, June 16, 2008, http://www.newsweek.com/id/141764. 15. Jeffery M. Jones, “Confidence in Congress: Lowest Ever Any U.S. Institution”, Gallup, June 20, 2008, http://www.gallup.com/poll/108142/ConfidenceCongress-Lowest-Ever-Any-US-Institution.aspx.

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16. For a comparison with China, see William R. Hawkins, “Exclusive: Can Democracy Delivery the Goods?”, Family Security Matters, July 16, 2008, http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/publications/id.619/pub_detail.asp. 17. For an insightful analysis, see Jonathan Tepperman, “Time of the Tough Guys”, Newsweek, June 16, 2008, http://www.newsweek.com/id/141764. 18. The Pew Global Attitudes Project, June 12, 2008, p. 15. 19. Ibid., p. 16. 20. http://news.xinghuanet.com/english/2009-01/14/content_10658107.htm. 21. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6263325.stm. For more details, see http://www.safe.gov.cn/model_safe/tjsj/tjsj_detail.jsp?ID=11040000000000 0000,17&id=5. 22. http://www.safe.gov.cn/model_safe/tjsj/tjsj_detail.jsp?ID=1104000000000 00000,19&id=5. 23. For a detailed analysis of China’s problems, see Susan L. Shirk, China: a Fragile Superpower (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 24. For the literature on the thesis, see Edward Friedman, “China’s North-South Split and the Forces of Disintegration”, Current History 92 (1993): 270–274; Jack Goldstone, “The Coming Chinese Collapse”, Foreign Policy, no. 99 (Summer 1995): 35–52; Minxin Pei, “Will China Become Another Indonesia?” Foreign Policy, no. 116 (Fall 1999): 94–109; and Gordon Chang, The Coming Collapse of China (New York: Random House, 2001). 25. Chang, The Coming Collapse of China, pp. 256–282. 26. Minxin Pei, China’s Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), p. 215. 27. Ibid., p. 212. 28. Ibid. 29. Dali L. Yang, Remaking the Chinese Leviathan: Market Transition and the Politics of Governance in China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), p. 309. 30. Ibid., p. 314.

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Part I Who Governs: China’s Political Elites

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Chapter

1 Top Leadership As a result of the Seventeenth National Congress of the CCP, held on October 15–21, 2007, a new leadership of the Party has been generated. This chapter will look at the reshuffles among the top leadership, including the Politburo Standing Committee, the Politburo, the Secretariat, and the Central Military Commission. POLITBURO STANDING COMMITTEE Apparently, as a result of political institutionalization,1 the leadership reshuffle at the top level during the Seventeenth National Congress of the CCP strictly followed a relatively neutral criterion: age. For those who were in their late 60s in October 2007, the critical difference was between 67 and 68. Following Li Ruihuan’s precedent set at the Sixteenth Party Congress five years earlier, those who reached the age of 68 in 2007 had to step down. Four members of the Sixteenth Politburo Standing Committee exited. Luo Gan (born July 1935) stepped down in October 2007 at the age of 72. He was the oldest member of the Sixteenth Politburo Standing Committee. Wu Guanzheng (born August 1938) also retired at the Seventeenth National Congress of the CCP in October 2007, at the age of 69. Huang Ju (September 1938–June 2007), former executive vice premier and a member of the Shanghai Gang, passed 19

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away on June 2, 2007. He would have to exit anyway because he was already beyond 68 years old in that year. Finally, in spite of rampant rumors otherwise,2 Zeng Qinghong (born July 1939) was also retired. Zeng was just past his 68th birthday in July 2007. Five members of the Sixteenth Politburo Standing Committee were retained — General Secretary Hu Jintao (born 1942), National People’s Congress Standing Committee Chairman Wu Bangguo (born 1941), Premier Wen Jiabao (born 1942), Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Chairman Jia Qinglin (born 1940), and Li Changchun (born 1944), a Politburo Standing Committee member in charge of propaganda work. They were all younger than 68 at the time of the Party Congress. Born in March 1940, Jia Qinglin barely made the mark of 67 instead of 68. In contrast, having been born only eight months earlier, in July 1939, Zeng Qinghong had to leave. In addition to these five retained members, four people were promoted to the Seventeenth Politburo Standing Committee. He Guoqiang (born 1943) and Zhou Yongkang (born 1942) were both promoted from the Sixteenth Politburo, and Xi Jinping (born 1953) and Li Keqiang (born 1955) were uplifted from provincial party secretaries (Table 1.1). He Guoqiang, a native of Xiangxiang,3 Hunan, is considered one of Zeng Qinghong’s protégés.4 He was chosen to be Zeng’s successor as director of the Central Organization Department in October 2002 and subsequently became a Politburo member and a member of the Secretariat. Before that, he had been Party secretary of Chongqing, the fourth centrally administered municipality. A typical technocrat, he worked in Shandong for 24 years. Upon graduation from Beijing Institute of Chemical Engineering, he went to work in Lunan Chemical Fertilizer Plant in Shandong as an engineer in 1967. Twenty years later, he became Party secretary of Jinan and a standing member of the Shandong Provincial Party Committee. After a five-year stint as vice minister of Chemical Industry from February 1991 to October 1996, he was promoted to Fujian as acting governor. He was there to replace Governor Chen Mingyi, who was promoted to Party secretary of Fujian because Jia Qinglin, former Party secretary of Fujian, was

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Top Leadership Table 1.1

21

The Seventeenth Politburo Standing Committee (October 2007)

Name

Birth

Age

Home

Hu Jintao

1942

65

Anhui

Wu Bangguo

1941

66

Anhui

Wen Jiabao

1942

65

Tianjin

Jia Qinglin

1940

67

Hebei

Li Changchun

1944

63

Liaoning

Xi Jinping Li Keqiang He Guoqiang

1953 1955 1943

54 52 64

Shaanxi Anhui Hunan

Zhou Yongkang

1942

65

Jiangsu

Prior Party Position/Membership

Membership

Sixteenth Politburo Standing Member Sixteenth Politburo Standing Member Sixteenth Politburo Standing Member Sixteenth Politburo Standing Member Sixteenth Politburo Standing Member Shanghai Party Secretary Liaoning Party Secretary Sixteenth Politburo Member Sixteenth Politburo Member

Old Old Old Old Old New New New New

Source: http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-06/22/content_1540020.htm.

transferred to Beijing as acting mayor in October 1996. Three months after Zeng Qinghong became director of the Central Organization Department, He Guoqiang was promoted to Party secretary of Chongqing in June 1999. After having been elected a standing member of the Seventeenth Politburo in October 2007, he was made in charge of party disciplines. Apparently, Wu Guanzheng, outgoing secretary of the Central Disciplinary Inspection Commission (CDIC), disapproved of his appointment. Wu reportedly walked out the meeting when He Guoqiang was about to be inaugurated as his successor.5 Similarly, Zhou Yongkang, a native of Wuxi, Jiangsu, is also close to Zeng Qinghong reportedly for two reasons. First, both are princelings. Zeng’s father is Zeng Shan (1899–1972), former minister of Internal Affairs and a member of the Eighth and Ninth Central Committees of the CCP. Zhou’s father is Zhou Yiping (1915–1990), deputy political commissar of the Commission of Science, Technology,

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and Industry for National Defense (CSTIND) between 1982 and 1985.6 But Zhou Yongkang is not exactly a princeling, because his father was mostly a middle-ranking official for most of his political career. Zhou Yiping was a bureau chief of the No. 1 Ministry of Machinery in the 1950s, Party secretary of Taizhou Prefecture in Zhejiang in the 1960s, and a deputy secretary of the Western District of Beijing in the 1970s. He was never a member of the CCP’s Central Committee. Therefore, it is unlikely that his son, Zhou Yongkang, is identified with Zeng Qinghong in this regard. Secondly, Zhou and Zeng both worked in the petroleum industry. Another technocrat like He Guoqiang, Zhou worked in the petroleum industry for 31 years.7 Upon graduation from Beijing Petroleum Institute with a major in geophysical survey and exploration, Zhou worked as an intern in the geological survey team of No. 673 Factory in the Daqing Oilfield in 1967. Eighteen years later, he was promoted to vice minister of Petroleum Industry in December 1985. He was appointed deputy general manager when the Ministry of Petroleum Industry was converted to China National Petroleum and Natural Gas Corporation in April 1988 and succeeded Wang Tao as general manager in December 1996. In March 1998, Premier Zhu Rongji abolished China National Petroleum and Natural Gas Corporation and appointed Zhou Yongkang minister of Land and Resources. However, there is no evidence that Zeng and Zhou ever worked together closely in petroleum industry. Zeng’s work experience in petroleum industry is rather limited. He began to work in the area in 1981, when his father’s comrade-in-arms and fellow from the same hometown, General Yu Qiuli (1914–1999),8 appointed him deputy section head of the General Office of the State Energy Commission. When the State Energy Commission was abolished in May 1982, Zeng was introduced by Yu Qiuli to Tang Ke, minister of Petroleum Industry. Zeng worked in the Liaison Department of the Foreign Affairs Bureau in the Ministry briefly before he was made deputy manager of the Foreign Liaison Department of the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) in 1983. He was then promoted to deputy head of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Ministry and was appointed concurrently

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23

Party secretary of the South Yellow Sea Oil Company under the CNOOC. He was then promoted to deputy director of the Organization Department of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee in July 1984.9 In the same period, Zhou Yongkang was working in Liaohe Oil Exploration Bureau (LOEB) located in Panjing City, Liaoning Province. Nevertheless, Zhou and Zeng worked closely after Zhou was made a member of the Politburo and the Secretariat in November 2002. After having served as Party secretary of Sichuan (December 1999–December 2002), Zhou replaced Jia Chunwang as minister of Public Security in December 2002 and was elected a State Councilor in March 2003. At the First Plenum of the Seventeenth Central Committee, Zhou was promoted to the Politburo Standing Committee. He replaced Luo Gan as secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Commission, the highest organ on public security in China. Finally, Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang were promoted to the Seventeenth Politburo Standing Committee as candidates of the fifth generation leadership. According to Zong Hairen, both Xi and Li had been considered candidates for the Sixteenth Politburo Standing Committee prior to the opening of the Sixteenth Party Congress but their names were dropped because of Jiang Zemin’s objections.10 Xi Jinping, formerly acting governor and governor of Fujian between August 1999 and October 2002, was transferred to Zhejiang as acting governor on October 12, 2002, replacing Chai Songyue (born 1941) who would become chairman of the China Electricity Regulatory Commission. One month later, on November 21, 2002, Xi was promoted to Party secretary of Zhejiang while Zhang Dejiang (born 1946), former Party secretary of Zhejiang and a newly elected Politburo member, was transferred to Guangdong as Party secretary. In March 2007, Xi was transferred to Shanghai as Party secretary (and Han Zheng (born 1954) was dismissed as acting Party secretary of Shanghai and was allowed to stay on as Shanghai mayor). According to a report published in Nanfang Zhoumo (Southern Weekend), Xi was selected from among several candidates as a result of careful selection and deliberation. In January 2007, the Central Organization Department conducted a survey of about 400 people,

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randomly selected from more than 2,000 officials (including all bureau-level cadres, deputies to the Shanghai Municipal People’s Congress and district people’s congresses, and Shanghai deputies to the National People’s Congress as well as Shanghai deputies to the Chinese National People’s Political Consultative Conference). The survey not only covered such social issues as medical care, education, public security, and housing, but also collected public opinion on candidates for the top party position in Shanghai. It was probably the earliest straw poll on candidates for the position of provincial-level party secretaries.11 Obviously, Xi scored very high on the poll. He was appointed Shanghai Party secretary two months later. In March 2007, it appeared that Xi would certainly enter the Seventeenth Politburo as Shanghai’s party boss because of Shanghai’s elite provincial status. Beginning with Jiang Zemin in 1987, party secretaries of Shanghai have mostly been concurrently full members of the Politburo with Zhu Rongji as the only exception. Zhu served as Party secretary of Shanghai from August 1989 to April 1991, but he was only an alternate member of the Thirteenth Central Committee. Jiang Zemin, Wu Bangguo, Huang Ju, and Chen Liangyu were all full members of the Politburo. Jiang, Zhu, Wu, and Huang became standing members of the Politburo later after they were promoted to Beijing. However, Xi’s blessing could have very well been a curse. That is, because of his promotion to the position of Shanghai Party secretary in March 2007, only months away from the Party Congress, he would miss the chance to go even further into the Politburo Standing Committee. This is because no Shanghai party secretaries had ever been concurrent standing members of the Politburo. And it seemed unlikely that the Party Center would replace Xi as Party secretary of Shanghai before the Seventeenth Party Congress. Therefore, Xi might get stuck in Shanghai and lose the opportunity to enter the Seventeenth Politburo Standing Committee. Hence, it was surprising to see Xi’s name on the Seventeenth Politburo Standing Committee in October 2007. It was even more surprising to see his name placed ahead of Li Keqiang’s, suggesting that Xi, instead of Li, would be the heir apparent to Hu Jintao.

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25

The new pecking order seems to have been a result of an unprecedented straw poll on the top leadership. On June 25, 2007, according to a report by Xinhua News Agency, the central leadership conducted a survey on candidates for the Seventeenth Politburo.12 About 400 officials (including members and alternate members of the Sixteenth Central Committee) participated in the poll, and they made selections among 200 candidates who were younger than 63 years old and had a rank of a minister or a chief military region officer. Obviously, the pool of candidates was very large. The eventual size of the Seventeenth Politburo would be 25 members, while the pool was about 200. Yet the pool was not inclusive. Those who were 63 years old or older were not included in the pool. Not only were the retained members of the Sixteenth Politburo Standing Committee (Hu Jintao, Wu Bangguo, Wen Jiabao, Jia Qinglin, and Li Changchun) not included, but two new members of the Seventeenth Politburo Standing Committee (He Guoqiang and Zhou Yongkang) were also excluded. It is not clear why these people were not included on the list of candidates for the Seventeenth Politburo in the survey and on what basis they were elected as standing members of the new Politburo. Presumably, Xi was placed ahead of Li Keqiang because he had scored higher on the survey. Xi subsequently consolidated his position as the heir apparent in March 2008 when he was elected vice president of the People’s Republic of China.13 Two years younger than Xi, Li Keqiang had also been groomed for top leadership positions. A native of Dingyuan, Anhui, Li worked closely with Hu Jintao (whose ancestral hometown is Jixi, Anhui)14 in the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) in the 1980s. Upon graduation from Peking University in February 1982, Li was appointed secretary of the Peking University Communist Youth League Committee at the age of 27. He was subsequently elected a standing member of the Central Committee of the CCYL in December of the same year and became concurrently director of the School Department and secretary general of the China Student Federation in July 1983.15 One year later, Li was transferred to the Central Committee of the CCYL as an alternate member of the Secretariat. He was further promoted to a full member

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of the Secretariat in November 1985 and to the first secretary of the CCYL Central Committee in May 1993. Five years later, in June 1998, Li was transferred to Henan as deputy Party secretary.16 Nominally, Hu Jintao worked in the Central Committee of the CCYL from December 1982 to November 1985, but his actual experience in the CCYL Central Committee was two and a half years because he left for Guizhou in July 1985. Therefore, his overlap with Li Keqiang in the CCYL Central Committee was two and a half years. But when Li Keqiang became the first secretary of the CCYL Central Committee in May 1993, he was under Hu Jintao’s direct leadership. After five years as the first secretary of the CCYL Central Committee, Li was sent to Henan to gain local experience in 1998. He was acting governor and governor of Henan from July 1998 to January 2003. After Hu Jintao became general secretary of the CCP, Li was promoted to Party secretary of Henan in December 2002. Li was transferred to Liaoning as Party secretary in December 2004 and entered the Politburo Standing Committee in October 2007. He was appointed the executive vice premier of the State Council at the First Meeting of the Eleventh National People’s Congress in March 200817 and is poised to take over as China’s premier in five years. Since both Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang have doctoral degrees, the new Politburo Standing Committee is best educated ever, though no one on the Seventeenth Politburo Standing Committee has any experience studying abroad. The Seventeenth Politburo Standing Committee is not necessarily the youngest, in comparison to the previous ones in the past 25 years (Table 1.2). The Twelfth Politburo Standing Committee was the oldest, with an average age of 74 years. This is understandable because the majority of the Twelfth Politburo Standing Committee members were long marchers. Out of six standing members, only Zhao Ziyang did not participate in the long march. The other five (Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian, Chen Yun, and Hu Yaobang) all took part in the historical trek. In 1982, Ye Jianying was already 85 years old; Deng Xiaoping, 78; Chen Yun, 77; and Li Xiannian, 73. Only two people were under 70 — Hu Yaobang was 67, and Zhao Ziyang, 63.

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Top Leadership Table 1.2

27

Average Age of Politburo Standing Committee Members

Twelfth Politburo Standing Committee (1982) Thirteenth Politburo Standing Committee (1987) Fourteenth Politburo Standing Committee (1992) Fifteenth Politburo Standing Committee (1997) Sixteenth Politburo Standing Committee (2002) Seventeenth Politburo Standing Committee (2007)

Obs.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

6

73.83

7.96

63

85

5

63.60

5.32

58

70

7

63.71

8.12

50

76

7

65.43

5.35

55

71

9

62.11

2.71

58

67

9

62.30

5.43

52

67

Source: Updated from Bo Zhiyue, China’s Elite Politics: Political Transition and Power Balancing (Singapore: World Scientific, 2007), Table 1.3, p. 21.

The Thirteenth Politburo Standing Committee was 10 years younger than the previous one, signaling a genuine transition to a younger generation. The oldest member was Yao Yilin (born 1917), who was 70 years old in 1987; and the youngest was Hu Qili (born 1929), 58 years old. General Secretary Zhao Ziyang (1919–2005) was 68; Qiao Shi (born 1924), 63; and Li Peng (born 1928), 59. The average age of the Thirteenth Politburo standing members was 63.6, almost the same as the age of the youngest member of the Twelfth Politburo Standing Committee. The average age of the Fourteenth Politburo Standing Committee was a bit older than the Thirteenth Politburo Standing Committee because of its transitional nature. The number of the standing members was expanded from five on the Thirteenth Politburo to seven on the Fourteenth Politburo, and the age difference significantly increased. The age difference between the oldest and the youngest in the Thirteenth Politburo Standing Committee was 12 years (70 minus 58), and the age difference between the oldest and the youngest in the Fourteenth Politburo Standing Committee went up to 26 years (76 minus 50). Hu Jintao (born December 1942) was not yet 50 years old

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in October 1992 when the Fourteenth Party Congress was held, and Liu Huaqing (born October 1916) was already 76 years old in the same month. Liu Huaqing was invited back out of his retirement to assist the newly installed general secretary, Jiang Zemin (born 1926), to control the army. And Hu Jintao was groomed as the heir apparent. The Fifteenth Politburo Standing Committee was almost two years older than the Fourteenth Politburo Standing Committee because of its stability. Liu Huaqing and Qiao Shi were retired, and Wei Jianxing (born 1931) and Li Lanqing (born 1932) were newcomers. In the meantime, the age difference among members of the Fifteenth Politburo Standing Committee was reduced. The standard deviation of the ages dropped from 8.1 in the Fourteenth Politburo Standing Committee to 5.4 in the Fifteenth Politburo Standing Committee, and the age gap between the oldest and the youngest was narrowed from 26 to 16. The Sixteenth Politburo Standing Committee was three years younger than the Fifteenth Politburo Standing Committee because of substantial reshuffles. Out of seven members on the Fifteenth Politburo Standing Committee, six retired. Hu Jintao was the only one left. Yet the age difference among members of the Sixteenth Politburo Standing Committee reached the lowest point since 1982. The standard deviation of the ages was only 2.7, with the oldest at 67 (Luo Gan) and the youngest at 58 (Li Changchun). With the retirement (or death) of four oldest members of the Sixteenth Politburo Standing Committee (Luo Gan, Wu Guanzheng, Huang Ju, and Zeng Qinghong) and the recruitment of some younger members (Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang), the Seventeenth Politburo Standing Committee was a bit older than its predecessor. The oldest member is Jia Qinglin at 67, and the youngest member is Li Keqiang at 52. The age gap between the oldest and the youngest increased from nine years to 15 years. The age spread as measured by the standard deviation increased from 2.7 to 5.4. Similar to the Sixteenth Politburo Standing Committee, the large majority of the Seventeenth Politburo Standing Committee has had provincial management experiences. Out of nine members, eight have worked as provincial leaders before, taking 88.9 percent. Except for Premier Wen Jiabao, the rest have had extensive provincial experiences.

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Hu Jintao worked as Party secretary in Guizhou and Tibet; Wu Bangguo was a municipal Party leader in Shanghai for 11 years; Jia Qinglin worked in Fujian and Beijing; Li Changchun worked in Liaoning, Henan, and Guangdong; Xi Jinping served in Fujian, Zhejiang, and Shanghai; Li Keqiang was in Henan and Liaoning; He Guoqiang worked in Fujian and Chongqing; and Zhou Yongkang was Party secretary in Sichuan. As a transitional Politburo Standing Committee, the new decisionmaking organ seems to have a right mix. POLITBURO Similar to the Sixteenth Politburo Standing Committee, the Seventeenth Politburo was also reshuffled according to age. Full members (besides standing members) who reached the age of 68 in October 2007 all retired, including Cao Gangchuan (born 1935), vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, state councilor, and defense minister; Wu Yi (born 1938), the only female member of the Sixteenth Politburo and vice premier; Zeng Peiyan (born 1938), vice premier; and Zhang Lichang (born 1939), former Party secretary of Tianjin. Two full members of the Sixteenth Politburo (He Guoqiang and Zhou Yongkang) were promoted to the Politburo Standing Committee, and eight others remained in the Politburo. The only alternate member, Wang Gang, was promoted to a full membership. There are seven new full members on the Seventeenth Politburo (Table 1.3). They are Wang Qishan (born 1948), former mayor of Beijing; Liu Yandong (f.) (born 1945), former director of the United Front Department; Li Yuanchao (born 1950), former Party secretary of Jiangsu; Wang Yang (born 1955), former Party secretary of Chongqing; Zhang Gaoli (born 1946), Party secretary of Tianjin; Xu Caihou (born 1943), vice chairman of the Central Military Commission; and Bo Xilai (born 1949), former minister of Commerce. Noticeably, the majority of these new members are either princelings (children of former high-ranking officials) or cadres of the CCYL background or both.18 Wang Qishan, Liu Yandong,

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Table 1.3 The Seventeenth Politburo (Excluding Standing Members) (October 2007)

Name Wang Gang Wang Lequan Wang Zhaoguo Wang Qishan Hui Liangyu Liu Qi Liu Yunshan Liu Yandong (f.) Li Yuanchao Wang Yang Zhang Gaoli Zhang Dejiang Yu Zhengsheng Xu Caihou Guo Boxiong Bo Xilai

Birth Age

Home

Prior Party Position/Membership

Membership

1942 65 Jilin

Sixteenth Politburo Alternate Member 1944 63 Shandong Sixteenth Politburo Member 1941 66 Hebei Sixteenth Politburo Member

Old Old

1948 1944 1942 1947 1945

59 63 65 60 62

Shanxi Jilin Jiangsu Shanxi Jiangsu

New Old Old Old New

1950 1955 1946 1946 1945 1943 1942 1949

57 52 61 61 62 64 65 58

Jiangsu Anhui Fujian Liaoning Zhejiang Liaoning Shaanxi Shanxi

Beijing Mayor Sixteenth Politburo Member Sixteenth Politburo Member Sixteenth Politburo Member United Front Department Director Jiangsu Party Secretary Chongqing Party Secretary Tianjin Party Secretary Sixteenth Politburo Member Sixteenth Politburo Member Sixteenth Secretariat Member Sixteenth Politburo Member Minister of Commerce

Old

New New New Old Old New Old New

Source: http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-06/22/content_1540020.htm.

Li Yuanchao, and Bo Xilai are considered princelings; and Liu Yandong, Li Yuanchao, and Wang Yang used to be CCYL cadres. A native of Tianzhen, Shanxi, Wang Qishan was not born into a family of a high-ranking official. His father, a graduate of Qinghua University with a major in civil engineering, was an engineer under the Ministry of Construction in the 1950s.19 His father went to Qinghua University in 192920 and graduated in 1933,21 one year before Yao Yilin (Wang Qishan’s future father-in-law) entered the same elite university. Upon graduation, his father went to Qingdao, Shandong. But after the breakout of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937, his parents went to his mother’s hometown, Pingdu in Shandong (not far from Qingdao) and his father became a school teacher. For his anti-Japanese patriotism, the KMT officials at Pingdu awarded

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him a rank of “captain”. After the war with Japan was over, his parents went back to Qingdao. It was there Wang Qishan was born in July 1948. His family moved to Beijing in 1956, when his father was transferred to the Ministry of Construction as a senior engineer. Wang later graduated from No. 35 Middle School in Beijing (the “Red School”), which has produced many political and social elites such as Wang Guangmei (Liu Shaoqi’s wife), Wang Guangying (Wang Guangmei’s brother and former vice chairman of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee), Song Ping (former standing member of the Politburo), Li Ximing (former Politburo member and Party secretary of Beijing), and Deng Jiaxian (a scientist who made tremendous contributions to the development of nuclear bombs in China).22 Wang Qishan went to Fengzhuang Commune, Yan’an County, Shaanxi as an “educated youth” in 1969 at the age of 21. It was there he met with his future wife, Yao Mingshan, daughter of Yao Yilin.23 Because of this connection, Wang became a princeling and was transferred to the Research Office of Rural Policies under the Central Secretariat in 1982, officially beginning his political career. Nevertheless, Wang Qishan’s rise cannot be attributed to his connection to Yao Yilin alone. Wang in fact has accumulated wide-ranging experiences and outstanding performances. His administrative experiences range from financial affairs to local leadership and to central government offices. He is one of the few experts in financial matters among top leaders. He was general manager of China Rural Trust and Investment Corporation from 1988 to 1989, vice governor of the Construction Bank of China from 1989 to 1993, vice governor of the People’s Bank of China (the Central Bank) from 1993 to 1994, governor of the Construction Bank of China from 1994 to 1997. He also served as vice governor of Guangdong, Party secretary of Hainan, and mayor of Beijing. He assumed the latter position in April 2003 during the SARS crisis. In addition, Wang also worked as director of the Office for Economic Restructuring under the State Council from 2000 to 2002.24 Wang Qishan was an alternate member of the Fifteenth Central Committee and a full member of the Sixteenth Central Committee. After having entered the Politburo at the First Plenum of the

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Seventeenth Central Committee in October 2007, he subsequently resigned as Beijing mayor and became vice premier in March 2008, along with Li Keqiang, Hui Liangyu, and Zhang Dejiang. Liu Yandong and Li Yuanchao have many things in common. They are both from Jiangsu Province. Liu Yandong’s hometown is Nantong, Jiangsu, and Li Yuanchao’s hometown is Lianshui, Jiangsu. Interestingly, Li Yuanchao’s hometown is located in Subei but he was born in Sunan. He was born in Changzhou in November 1950, when his father, Li Gancheng, was Party secretary of the prefecture. Liu Yandong’s hometown is also located in Subei (Nantong), and she was born in Subei (Huai’an). For some reason, Liu Yandong’s birthday is recorded as “November 1945” in her official bio,25 but she was actually born in January 1946.26 Her father (Liu Ruilong) and mother (Jiang Tong) were married in 1942 in Anhui. They have four children: three daughters (Liu Yanhuai, Liu Yandong, and Liu Yanning) and one son (Liu Yanshen). Yanhuai was born in June 1944 in Dawangzhuang in Anhui (now located in Sihong of Jiangsu); Yandong was born in January 1946 in Huai’an, Jiangsu; Yanshen was born in October 1949; and Yanning in January 1953. Liu Yandong and Li Yuanchao are both children of former highranking officials who had some connection with Shanghai. Liu Yandong’s father, Liu Ruilong (1910–1988), was appointed secretary general of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee in June 1949. Liu Ruilong was then transferred to the East China Bureau as Party secretary of the Rural Work Committee, located in Shanghai. After three full years (from March 1950 to March 1953) in the post, he left Shanghai for Beijing as vice minister of Agriculture in 1953, although his tenure began in August 1952.27 Understandably, Liu Yandong spent part of her childhood in Shanghai. Li Yuanchao’s father, Li Gancheng (1909–1993), stayed in Shanghai much longer. Li Gancheng went to Shanghai in 1953 and stayed there for the rest of his life. He was in charge of the General Office of the Municipal Building Committee from February 1955 to May 195628 and vice mayor of Shanghai from July 1962 to February 1967. His son, Li Yuanchao, grew up in Shanghai.

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Finally, Liu Yandong and Li Yuanchao both served in the Secretariat of the CCYL for many years, working closely with Hu Jintao. Liu Yandong worked in the CCYL from 1982 to 1991. She was elected a member of the Secretariat of the CCYL Central Committee on December 31, 1982, along with Hu Jintao. Among six members of the Secretariat of the CCYL (in addition to the first secretary), Hu Jintao was ranked the first and Liu Yandong the second. Wang Zhaoguo was the first secretary; Hu Jintao was the executive secretary; and Liu Yandong was in charge of the International Liaison Department.29 After Hu Jintao was promoted to the first secretary of the CCYL Central Committee in December 1984, Liu Yandong became the executive secretary of the Secretariat. She stayed on that post until September 1991, when she was transferred to the United Front Department as deputy secretary general and deputy director. Li Yuanchao worked in the Secretariat of the CCYL Central Committee from 1983 to 1990. He was elected a member of the Secretariat of the CCYL in December 1983, along with Song Defu and Li Keqiang (as an alternate member).30 When Song Defu became the first secretary in November 1985, Li Yuanchao’s position in the secretariat moved forward to No. 3, behind Song Defu and Liu Yandong. He was transferred to the International Information Office of the Central Committee of the CCP as director of No. 1 Bureau in 1990. But Liu Yandong and Li Yuanchao entered the Politburo for slightly different reasons. Liu Yandong has been considered one of the most qualified women members of the Sixteenth Central Committee to succeed Wu Yi as a female representative on the Seventeenth Politburo.31 She replaced Chen Zhili as a state councilor in March 2008. Li Yuanchao has been one of the most visible provincial Party secretaries since 2003 for his political innovations and bold reform policies.32 Bo Xilai (born July 1949), son of Bo Yibo (February 6, 1908– January 15, 2007),33 entered the Seventeenth Politburo as minister of Commerce in October 2007. In addition to being a princeling, Bo Xilai also had extensive experiences in both local and central governments.34 Upon graduation from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

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with a master’s degree in international journalism, he worked in the Research Office of the Secretariat of the Central Committee and the General Office of the Central Committee for two years, from 1982 to 1984. He then worked in Liaoning for 20 years, including 16 years in Dalian. He was deputy secretary and secretary of Jin County in Dalian from 1984 to 1988; director of the Propaganda Department of the Dalian Municipal Party Committee, vice mayor, acting mayor, mayor, and Party secretary of Dalian from 1988 to 2000; and acting governor and governor of Liaoning from 2000 to 2004. He was transferred to Beijing in February 2004 as minister of Commerce. After having become a Politburo member, he was appointed Party secretary of Chongqing in November 2007. Wang Yang (born March 1955), another rising political star in China, also has extensive local and central experiences.35 A native of Suzhou, Anhui, he rose up initially from his home province. He worked as a CCYL cadre briefly from 1981 to 1984, assuming the titles of deputy secretary of the CCYL Suxian County Committee, propaganda director of the CCYL Anhui Provincial Committee, and deputy secretary of the CCYL Anhui Provincial Committee. Then he worked in Anhui Sports Commission as deputy director and director, from 1984 to 1988. His political career got a real boost when he was acting mayor and mayor of Tongling City in Anhui. It is where he experimented with a series of reform measures and gained a reputation as an audacious reformer.36 He was promoted to director of the Planning Commission of Anhui in 1992 and subsequently served as vice governor of Anhui for seven years. He was transferred to Beijing as vice chairman of the National Development and Planning Commission in 1999 and was promoted to the executive deputy secretary general with a ministerial rank in 2003. Two years later, he was sent to Chongqing as Party secretary. After having become a Politburo member, he was transferred to Guangdong as Party secretary in December 2007.37 Zhang Gaoli (born November 1946), Party secretary of Tianjin, is also a new member of the Politburo. A native of Jinjiang, Fujian, Zhang spent many years working in Guangdong. Upon graduation from Xiamen University in 1970, he went to Maoming Petroleum

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Company as a worker. He gradually rose up in the subsequent 14 years, becoming deputy secretary of Maoming Municipality and manager of the Maoming Petroleum Corporation in 1984. He was appointed chairman of Guangdong’s Economic Commission in 1985, vice governor of Guangdong in 1988, and Party secretary of Shenzhen in 1997. He was transferred to Shandong as acting governor in 200138 and was promoted to Party secretary of Shandong in 2002. Zhang was transferred to Tianjin as Party secretary in March 2007 and was subsequently installed in the Politburo in October 2007. Finally, General Xu Caihou (born June 1943) is also a new member of the Politburo.39 A native of Wafangdian, Liaoning, Xu joined the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in August 1963 when he was enrolled in the Harbin Military Engineering Institute. His political path is one of political officers. He worked as deputy political director (the same rank as deputy commander) of a Company in Shenyang Military Region for two years, from 1971 to 1972. Then he worked in Jilin Provincial Military District as a political officer for 12 years. His last position in Jilin was deputy director of the Political Department of the Provincial Military District. He was later appointed director of the Political Department of the Sixteenth Group Army in 1985 and promoted to its political commissar in 1990. He was promoted to assistant director of the PLA General Political Department40 in 1992, when Lieutenant General Yu Yongbo (born 1931), his hometown fellow, was director of the Department.41 Yu was appointed deputy director in December 1989 and director in November 1992. Xu was promoted to deputy director of the Department in September 1999 and replaced Yu as director in November 2002. When Hu Jintao was made the first vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the CCP in September 1999, Xu, along with Guo Boxiong, was also added to the CMC. At that time, Xu was the executive deputy director of the General Political Department and Guo was the executive deputy chief of the General Staff Department. Xu was a member of the Sixteenth Secretariat of the CCP and was promoted to vice chairman of the CMC in September 2004. He was retained as vice chairman of the CMC and

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entered the Seventeenth Politburo in October 2007.42 Yet somehow he did not replace General Cao Gangchuan as defense minister. There are two more PhDs among the Politburo members: Liu Yandong and Li Yuanchao. Liu obtained a doctoral degree in political science from Jilin University, and Li received a Doctor of Law in scientific socialism from the Central Party School. However, except for Zhang Dejiang who studied in North Korea in the late 1970s, no one else in the Seventeenth Politburo has overseas experience. Among full members of the Seventeenth Politburo (without standing members), one also finds a large majority with provincial experiences. With the exceptions of Wang Gang and Liu Yandong as well as two military leaders (Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou), all the other Politburo members have been provincial leaders. In other words, out of 14 civilian members, 12 have served as provincial leaders previously. Wang Lequan has worked in Shandong and Xinjiang; Wang Zhaoguo in Fujian; Wang Qishan in Guangdong, Hainan, and Beijing; Hui Liangyu in Jilin, Hubei, Anhui, and Jiangsu; Liu Qi in Beijing; Liu Yunshan in Inner Mongolia; Li Yuanchao in Jiangsu; Wang Yang in Anhui, Chongqing, and Guangdong; Zhang Gaoli in Guangdong, Shandong, and Tianjin; Zhang Dejiang in Jilin, Zhejiang, and Guangdong; Yu Zhengsheng in Shandong, Hubei, and Shanghai; and Bo Xilai in Liaoning and Chongqing.43 Similar to the Politburo Standing Committee, the turnover of the Politburo is also about 44 percent. As a result, the average age of full members on the Seventeenth Politburo (without standing members) increased by one and a half years (Table 1.4), a sign of a typical transitional Politburo. The political transition at the Politburo level appears to be following a cycle of 10 years. The average age of full members of the Politburo (without standing members) declined from 70.8 in 1982 to 64.8 in 1987 and further to 61.8 in 1992 when a major transition took place. The average age of full members increased slightly in 1997 to 62.2 but declined to 59.9 in 2002 when another major transition occurred. The average age of full members expanded somewhat again in 2007, but the figure is likely to decrease again in 2012 when another major transition takes place. The same pattern is also visible in terms of the average age of all Politburo members.

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37

Average Age of Politburo Members (1982–2007)

Politburo Members

1982

1987

1992

1997

2002

2007

Alternate Full* Standing

64.7 70.8 73.8

58.0 64.8 63.6

58.5 61.8 63.7

58.5 62.2 65.4

60.0 59.9 62.1

61.4 62.3

Total

70.8

64.1

62.1

62.9

60.7

61.8

Notes: *This is calculated without Standing Members. Source: Updated from Bo Zhiyue, China’s Elite Politics: Political Transition and Power Balancing (Singapore: World Scientific, 2007), Table 1.3, p. 21.

SECRETARIAT The Secretariat of the CCP Central Committee was almost completely reshuffled as a result of the Seventeenth Party Congress. Out of seven members on the Sixteenth Secretariat, five people exited, representing 71 percent of the total. Zeng Qinghong, former Politburo standing member, retired; Zhou Yongkang and He Guoqiang were both promoted to the Politburo Standing Committee; Xu Caihou, the only representative of the military on the Secretariat, was promoted to the Politburo; and so was Wang Gang, former director of the General Office. Liu Yunshan (born 1947) remained in both the Politburo and the Secretariat; and He Yong (born 1940), a potential candidate for Wu Guanzheng’s position as secretary of the CDIC, also stayed on. The new Secretariat has four new members: Xi Jinping, Li Yuanchao, Ling Jihua, and Wang Huning (Table 1.5). Xi is the only Politburo Standing Committee member on the Secretariat. As Zeng Qinghong before, he is supposed to be in charge of daily operations of the Secretariat. But his informal power over other members of the Seventeenth Secretariat is significantly less than that of Zeng Qinghong over other members of the Sixteenth Secretariat. He Guoqiang, a member of the Sixteenth Secretariat and director of the Central Organization Department, was Zeng’s protégé because it was Zeng who selected him for these positions. But the promotion of Li Yuanchao to the same set of positions (i.e., the membership of the Secretariat and the directorship of the Central Organization

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The Seventeenth Secretariat (October 2007)

Name

Birth

Age

Home

Xi Jinping Liu Yunshan Li Yuanchao He Yong

1953 1947 1950 1940

54 60 57 67

Shaanxi Shanxi Jiangsu Hebei

Ling Jihua Wang Huning

1956 1955

51 52

Shanxi Shandong

Prior Party Position/Membership

Membership

Shanghai Party Secretary Sixteenth Politburo Member Jiangsu Party Secretary Central Disciplinary Inspection Commission Deputy Head General Office Director Policy Research Director

New Old New Old

New New

Source: http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-06/22/content_1540020.htm.

Department) was more due to Hu Jintao than to Xi Jinping. Similarly, Wang Gang, another member of the Sixteenth Secretariat and director of the General Office of the Central Committee of the CCP, could also be considered Zeng’s protégé because Wang was Zeng’s successor as director of the General Office. A similar relationship is also absent between Xi Jinping and Ling Jihua, the new director of the General Office and a new member of the Secretariat. In fact, except for official relations as a result of the Seventeenth Party Congress, there is no evidence that Xi had any association with other members of the Seventeenth Secretariat previously. In addition to his close relationship with Hu Jintao, Li Yuanchao has been a rising political star in China in his own right. Li Yuanchao was transferred to Jiangsu as deputy secretary in September 2000 and became, concurrently, Party secretary of Nanjing in November 2001. In spite of his setback44 at the Sixteenth Party Congress because of a food poisoning incident in Nanjing on September 14, 2002 when more than 300 people were poisoned and 42 people died,45 Li was promoted to Party secretary of Jiangsu in December 2002. He was the only alternate member of the Sixteenth Central Committee among provincial party secretaries at the time. During his tenure as Party secretary of Jiangsu, Li Yuanchao promoted freedom of press,46 made

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efforts to create a “harmonious Jiangsu”,47 and initiated a series of measures on cadre recruitment. Ling Jihua (born October 1956), another former CCYL cadre, is also close to Hu Jintao but his early intimate association with Hu Jintao has been exaggerated. Ling was recruited to the CCYL Central Committee initially by Han Ying (born 1935), first secretary of the CCYL Central Committee from October 1978 to December 1982.48 Han, a native of Fuxin, Liaoning, is usually regarded as a man of Shanxi origin because of his long association with the province. He worked in Shanxi for 23 years, from 1955 to 1978.49 He was installed as the first secretary of the CCYL Central Committee in October 1978 by Hua Guofeng, chairman of the CCP from October 1976 to June 1981 and a Shanxi native. Instead of being recruited from Shanxi University in September 1982 as rumors have it,50 Ling had worked in Yuncheng Prefecture of Shanxi as a staff prior to his transfer to the CCYL Central Committee in 1979.51 He worked in the Department of Propaganda of the CCYL Central Committee as a staff member between 1979 and 1983. After he went to Beijing in September 1979, he was soon made the personal secretary of Gao Zhanxiang (born 1935), member of the Secretariat of the CCYL Central Committee from October 1978 to December 1982.52 When Gao was transferred to Hebei as a deputy Party secretary (it was called Party secretary then) in December 1982,53 Ling went along.54 Ling subsequently studied at the China Youth Political Institute between August 1983 and July 1985. When he returned to the CCYL Central Committee in July 1985, he was appointed deputy head of the Theory Section of the Department of Propaganda. At that time, Hu Jintao had already left for Guizhou. Clearly, Ling was never Hu Jintao’s personal secretary and he had barely any overlap with Hu Jintao in the CCYL before 1986.55 While Hu was in the CCYL from December 1982 to July 1985, Ling either was “on loan” (jiediao) to Hebei Provincial Party Committee (December 1982–August 1983) or studying at the China Youth Political Institute (August 1983–July 1985). Ling was deputy head of the Theory Section of the Department of Propaganda of the CCYL Central Committee. He was never being promoted by Hu

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Jintao to the position of deputy director of the General Office before 1986.56 Ling remained as deputy head of the Theory Section until 1988. He was then director of the General Office of the Secretariat from 1988 to 1990, deputy director of the General Office of the CCYL Central Committee from 1990 to 1994, and director of the Department of Propaganda from 1994 to 1995. Ling worked more closely with Song Defu (first secretary of the CCYL Central Committee from November 1985 to May 1993) and Li Keqiang (first secretary of the CCYL Central Committee from May 1993 to June 1998). Ling began to work closely with Hu in 1995. He was transferred to the General Office of the CCP Central Committee in December 1995 to be in charge of No. 3 Group in the Research Section. His job was to prepare reading materials for Hu Jintao. Ling was promoted to deputy director of the General Office in December 1999 (and possibly concurrent director of Hu Jintao’s office).57 He became the executive deputy director of the General Office with a rank of minister in 2003 and replaced Wang Gang as its director in September 2007.58 Compared to his predecessors such as Wang Zhaoguo, Wen Jiabao, Zeng Qinghong, and Wang Gang, Ling’s promotion after becoming director of the General Office was quite fast. Wen made it to the Secretariat of the CCP Central Committee as an alternate member in November 1987, one and a half years after his promotion to the directorship of the General Office; and Wang Zhaoguo became a full member of the Secretariat in September 1985, almost one and a half years after he became director of the General Office. Zeng became an alternate member of the Politburo and a member of the Secretariat in September 1997, four and a half years after his appointment as director of the General Office; and Wang Gang became an alternate member of the Politburo and a member of the Secretariat in November 2002, three years after his appointment as director of the General Office. In contrast, Ling was promoted to the Secretariat as a full member only one month after his appointment as director of the General Office but he failed to enter the Politburo as an alternate member.

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Finally, Wang Huning (born October 1955) can be roughly considered a member of the Shanghai Gang. A native of Laizhou, Shandong, Wang was born in Shanghai. With a master’s degree in international politics from Fudan University, Wang worked in his alma mater for 14 years, from 1981 to 1995. Wang was transferred to Beijing in April 1995 as the head of Political Group of the Policy Research Office under the Politburo Standing Committee. He was promoted to deputy director of the Policy Research Office in April 1998 and its director in October 2002.59 Wang is close to Jiang Zemin, Zeng Qinghong, and Wu Bangguo. He was recommended by Zeng and Wu to work in the Policy Research Office, and he is reportedly the real author of the “Three Represents”, a theory usually considered Jiang Zemin’s invention.60 Wang was promoted to the Secretariat in October 2007 possibly because of Zeng’s recommendation. The average age of the Seventeenth Secretariat was 56.8 years old in 2007, almost three years younger than the average age (59.7) of the Sixteenth Secretariat in 2002. The youngest was Ling Jihua, at 51; and the oldest was He Yong, at 67. CENTRAL MILITARY COMMISSION Compared to the Central Military Commission (CMC) elected in 2002, the new CMC was almost twice as large. In 2002, in addition to Chairman Jiang Zemin and Vice Chairmen Hu Jintao, Guo Boxiong, and Cao Gangchuan, there were four members (Xu Caihou, Liang Guanglie, Liao Xilong, and Li Jinai). In 2007, Chairman Hu Jintao was joined by two vice chairmen, Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou, as well as eight members: Liang Guanglie, Chen Bingde, Li Jinai, Liao Xilong, Chang Wanquan, Jing Zhiyuan, Wu Shengli, and Xu Qiliang (Table 1.6). A major expansion of the CMC, of course, had occurred three years earlier. At the Fourth Plenum of the Sixteenth Central Committee in September 2004, Jiang Zemin stepped down and Hu Jintao became chairman of the CMC. Xu Caihou, the then director of the General Political Department and a member of the Secretariat, was

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The Seventeenth Central Military Commission (October 2007)

Name

Birth

Age

Home

Title

Membership

Hu Jintao Guo Boxiong Xu Caihou Liang Guanglie

1942 1942 1943 1940

65 65 64 67

Anhui Shaanxi Liaoning Sichuan

Old Old Old Old

Chen Bingde Li Jinai

1941 1942

66 65

Jiangsu Shandong

Liao Xilong

1940

67

Guizhou

Chang Wanquan

1949

58

Henan

Jing Zhiyuan

1944

63

Shandong

Wu Shengli Xu Qiliang

1945 1950

62 57

Hebei Shandong

Chairman Vice Chairman Vice Chairman Defense MinisterDesignee Chief of Staff General Political Department Director General Logistics Department Director General Armament Department Director Second Artillery Force Commander Navy Commander Air Force Commander

Old Old

Old

New

Old

New New

Source: Yearbook of Who’s Who in China (2007). (Beijing: Zhongguo Renwu Nianjian, 2007), pp. 1, 12–13, 15–17.

promoted to vice chairman. In addition to directors of the four general departments (Li Jinai, director of the General Political Department; Liang Guanglie, chief of the General Staff Department; Liao Xilong, director of the General Logistics Department; and Chen Bingde, director of the General Armament Department), commanders of three major services (Qiao Qingchen, commander of the PLA Air Force; Zhang Dingfa, commander of the PLA Navy; and Jing Zhiyuan, commander of the PLA Second Artillery Corps) were also included in the CMC. In the new lineup of the CMC in 2007, Hu Jintao continued his position as chairman; and Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou as vice chairmen. Liang Guanglie (born 1940) had been replaced as chief of the

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General Staff Department but was retained as a member of the new CMC. He later replaced Cao Gangchuan as defense minister and state councilor in March 2008. Chen Bingde (born 1941) became new chief of the General Staff, and his position as director of the General Armament Department was taken over by Chang Wanquan (born 1949), former commander of Shenyang Military Region (from December 2004 to September 2007). Li Jinai (born 1942), Liao Xilong (born 1940), and Jing Zhiyuan (born 1944) were all retained, but Qiao Qingchen (born 1939) and Zhang Dingfa (1943–2006) were replaced. Qiao retired because of his age. He reached 69 in October 2007. He was replaced by Xu Qiliang (born 1950) as the PLA Air Force commander. Zhang Dingfa passed away in December 2006. He was replaced by Wu Shengli (born 1945) as the PLA Navy commander. It should be noted that Xi Jinping, the heir apparent to Hu Jintao as general secretary of the CCP, was not made the first vice chairman of the CMC. This is understandable because Xi needs some time before he can be involved in military affairs. If Hu Jintao’s experience is of any guide, Xi might enter the CMC at the Fourth Plenum of the Seventeenth Central Committee scheduled for 2009. In fact, Hu Jintao had gone through a probation period of seven years before his appointment in the CMC in 1999. Hu was made a standing member of the Politburo in October 1992 but he did not enter the CMC as the first vice chairman until September 1999 when the Fourth Plenum of the Fifteenth Central Committee was held. Since Hu is likely to retire at the Eighteenth Party Congress in 2012, Xi would likely enter the CMC sooner than in seven years. Moreover, out of three newcomers in the CMC, one is a princeling general.61 Wu Shengli (born August 1945),62 the PLA Navy commander, is son of Wu Xian (June 28, 1915–1997), former vice governor and deputy secretary of Zhejiang Province.63 A native of Wuqiao, Hebei Province, Wu Shengli joined the PLA in 1964. A graduate of the PLA Survey and Mapping Institute, he rose through the ranks in the PLA Navy. He was promoted to deputy commander of the Guangzhou Military Region and commander of the South China Sea Fleet in January 2002 and deputy chief of staff in

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June 2004. He replaced Zhang Dingfa as commander of the PLA Navy in August 2006 and entered the CMC in October 2007. He was awarded the rank of rear admiral in July 1994, the rank of vice admiral in July 2003, and the rank of admiral in June 2007.64 The average age of the CMC was 63.6 in 2007, a bit older than the CMC of 2002 because of its continuity. Xu Qiliang was the youngest, at 57; and Liang Guanglie and Liao Xilong the oldest, at 67. CONCLUDING REMARKS Apparently, the Chinese Communist Party was attempting to introduce new measures in selecting top leadership. It was the first time in the history of the People’s Republic that central committee members and other political elites were allowed to formally participate in selecting members of a new Politburo. However, this new measure still has a number of limitations. First, the potential pool was too big. For a Politburo of 25 members, the pool was about 200. Second, the pool, though big, was not inclusive. Fourteen people were excluded from the pool yet they were later elected to the Politburo: seven as standing members and seven as full members. Third, the results of the survey have not been published. It is not clear how many votes each candidate received and where the demarcation line lay. Nevertheless, this should be regarded as the first attempt to expand intra-Party democracy. As a result of the Seventeenth Party Congress, a new top leadership has been selected. As a transitional leadership, the key Party institutions at the top were all a bit older but with a right mix of old and new members. General Secretary and CMC Chairman Hu Jintao entered his second term as the Party leader and the commander-inchief. He was also reelected as president of the People’s Republic of China in March 2008. With his ideology — the “scientific outlook of development” — enshrined in the CCP Constitution as “an important principle for China’s economic and social development and a major strategic thought that must be upheld and applied in developing socialism with Chinese characteristics”,65 Hu would lead China

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for at least another five years. His partner, Premier Wen Jiabao, was also reelected as the head of the government. Wu Bangguo and Jia Qinglin have continued their positions as National People’s Congress (NPC) chairman and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) chairman, respectively. And Li Changchun is still in charge of propaganda. He Guoqiang and Zhou Yongkang are new members of the Seventeenth Politburo Standing Committee, but they are likely to serve for only one term. Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, new standing members of the Politburo, are frontrunners of the next generation leadership. Xi ranks No. 6 and Li, No. 7. As the heir apparent to Hu Jintao, Xi has taken a series of important positions: the only standing member of the Politburo in the Secretariat of the CCP Central Committee, president of the Central Party School, and vice president of the People’s Republic of China. As the heir apparent to Wen Jiabao, Li was made the executive vice premier of the State Council. The new pair is likely to take over in five years and lead China in the subsequent 10 years. Among their colleagues in the Politburo, Wang Qishan, Liu Yandong, Li Yuanchao, Wang Yang, and Bo Xilai are also noteworthy. Wang Qishan is vice premier; Liu Yandong is state councilor; Li Yuanchao is director of the Central Organization Department and a member of the Secretariat; Wang Yang is Party secretary of Guangdong; and Bo Xilai is Party secretary of Chongqing. What they do will not only affect a particular function or region but also determine whether they will continue to serve on the top leadership in the next 10 to 15 years. The two youngest members of the Secretariat, Ling Jihua and Wang Huning, will play an important role as assistants to the Politburo and its Standing Committee. They are also likely to move up further at the next Party Congress. Hu Jintao is likely to have an effective control over the 11-member Central Military Committee in the next five years. Sometime in the next few years, Xi will be gradually introduced to military affairs. He will likely be appointed as the first vice chairman of the CMC in 2009 and take over as the commander-in-chief a few years thereafter.

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Average Age of China’s Top Leadership (October 2007) Obs.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) Politburo (without PBSC) Secretariat Central Military Commission

9 16 6 11

62.30 61.44 56.83 63.55

5.43 3.65 5.98 3.36

52 52 51 57

67 66 67 67

Total

36

61.64

4.79

51

67

Source: Author’s database.

Among these top institutions, the Secretariat is the youngest and the CMC is the oldest (Table 1.7). The average age of Secretariat members was 57 years old in 2007, while the average age of CMC members was almost 64 years old. In the meantime, the age spread of the Secretariat is the largest and the age spread of the CMC the smallest. The standard deviation for the Secretariat is 6, and the standard deviation for the CMC is only 3.4. For this reason, the CMC is likely to witness the most drastic reshuffles at the Eighteenth Party Congress in 2012. The majority would have to step down then, and a new contingent has to be recruited. Overall, China is ruled by these 36 top leaders, whose average age is about 62 years old. The top leadership of China currently is at its best, with both experience and energy. It is poised to deal with challenges ahead. Now we turn to the Central Committee as a whole. NOTES 1. For a systematic treatment of political institutionalization, see Bo Zhiyue, China’s Elite Politics: Political Transition and Power Balancing (Singapore: World Scientific, 2007), Chapter 1. 2. Before the congress, Zeng had been rumored to take over from Hu Jintao as president of China, from Wu Bangguo as chairman of the National People’s Congress (NPC), or from Jia Qinglin as chairman of the CPPCC. For these rumors, see http://www.tycool.com/2007/01/10/00073.html; http://www. backchina.com/newspage/2007/01/16/113327.shtml; and http://www. tycool.com/2007/02/08/00033.html.

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3. It is also the hometown of Vice Admiral Ding Yiping (born 1951), deputy commander of the PLA Navy (http://baike.baidu.com/view/440157.htm). Ding Yiping’s father, Lieutenant General Ding Qiusheng (1913–1995), was born there. General Chen Geng (1903–1961) was also born there. 4. For He Guoqiang’s official biographical information, see http://news. xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2002-03/01/content_295880.htm. 5. “Bushuo Zaijian Meiyou Zhufu, Zhongjiwei Jiaojieban Wu Guanzheng Foxiu Erqu” (“No Goodbye No Blessing, Wu Guanzheng left abruptly at the transition meeting of the CDIC”), http://app2.dwnews.com/view-article.php?url=/ gb/MainNews/Forums/BackStage/2007_12_2_8_47_41_991.html. However, this article cannot be found in the print edition of Duowei Yuekan (Chinese News Monthly) 032 (November 1–December 1, 2007). 6. For Zhou Yiping’s biographical information, see http://baike.baidu.com/ view/307880.html. 7. For Zhou Yongkang’s official biographical information, see http://news. xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2002-03/04/content_298986.htm. 8. For a brief introduction to Yu Qiuli, see Bo, China’s Elite Politics, pp. 161–162. 9. For Zeng Qinghong’s official biographical information, see http://news. xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2002–01/16/content_240615.htm. 10. Zong Hairen, Disidai (The Fourth Generation) (Carle Place, NY: Mirror Books, 2002), pp. 24–33. 11. http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/64102/5537724.html. 12. http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-10/24/content_6931498.htm. 13. Renmin Ribao, March 16, 2008, p. 1. 14. Jixi, Anhui is Hu’s ancestral hometown. He was actually born in Shanghai and grew up in Taizhou, Jiangsu. See Wen Siyong and Ren Zhichu, Hu Jintao Zhuan (The Biography of Hu Jintao) (Carle Place, NY: Mirror Books, 2002), p. 25. 15. Zong Hairen, Disidai, p. 423. 16. For Li Keqiang’s official biographical information, see http://news.xinhuanet. com/ziliao/2002-02/25/content_289095.htm. 17. Renmin Ribao, March 18, 2008, p. 1. 18. For a detailed analysis of factional groups, see Chapter 4. 19. http://news.21cn.com/renwu/zjrw/2004/09/23/1778294.shtml. 20. http://www.cctv.com/news/china/20030504/100138.shtml. 21. http://gb.news.sina.com/c/2008-04-17/150215376583.shtml. 22. http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jiaoyu/1053/2097799.html. 23. http://www.wz-bgz.com/Article/27/28/2006-02/180.html. Yao Yilin and his wife, Hong Shouzi, have three children: Yao Mingshan (daughter), Yao Mingrui (daughter), and Yao Qing (son). See http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/ %E5%A7%9A%E4%BE%9D%E6%9E%97.

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24. For Wang Qishan’s biographical information, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/ ziliao/2002-03/05/content_300439.htm. 25. http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2002-12/30/content_674518.htm. 26. http://www.shxcb.gov.cn/dhxf/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=656. 27. http://www.hybsl.cn/xinwen/2008-01-21/7030.html. 28. http://www.shtong.gov.cn/node2/node2245/node72907/node72917/ node72962/node72967/userobject1ai86003.html. 29. Wen Siyong and Ren Zhichu, Hu Jintao Zhuan, p. 121. 30. http://www.ccyl.org.cn/history/leaders/. 31. There were five female full members in the Sixteenth Central Committee. They were Wu Yi, Chen Zhili, Uyunqimg, Huang Qingyi, and Liu Yandong. 32. For a series of four articles praising Li Yuanchao’s reform measures in Jiangsu, see Huang Guohua, “Jiangsu Cheng Zhongguo Gaige Xianfeng Xilie (1): Li Yuanchao wei Zhongguo Yulun Jiandu Qiangtan” (“Jiangsu as a pioneer in China’s reforms (1): Li Yuanchao took one step ahead in media supervision in China”) Yazhou Shibao (Asia Times), February 1, 2006; “Jiangsu Cheng Zhongguo Gaige Xianfeng Xilie (2): Li Yuanchao Shuaixian Linghui ‘Hexie Shehui’ Zhendi” (“Jiangsu as a pioneer in China’s reforms (2): Li Yuanchao was the first to make sense of the ‘harmonious society’”) Yazhou Shibao (Asia Times), February 1, 2006; “Jiangsu Cheng Zhongguo Gaige Xianfeng Xilie (3): Li Yuanchao Lipai Zhongyi Tiba Qiu He” (“Jiangsu as a pioneer in China’s reforms (3): Li Yuanchao promoted the controversial figure — Qiu He”) Yazhou Shibao (Asia Times), February 2, 2006; and “Jiangsu Cheng Zhongguo Gaige Xianfeng Xilie (4): Yangzhou Fazhan Guanjian Li Yuanchao Shitu” (“Jiangsu as a pioneer in China’s reforms (4): the development of Yangzhou is the key for Li Yuanchao’s future career”) Yazhou (Asia Times), February 4, 2006. http://www.atchinese.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=category& sectionid=5&id=185&Itemid=66. 33. For Bo Yibo’s biographical information, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/ politics/2007-01/21/content_5633332.htm. 34. For Bo Xilai’s biographical information, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/ 2002-02/21/content_285068.htm. 35. For Wang Yang’s biographical information, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/ ziliao/2005-12/26/content_3969021.htm. 36. For a report on Wang Yang’s reform in Tongling, see Qin Junyong and Hong Fen, “Wang Yang: Wudu Chongqing de Yangguang ‘Shaoshuai’” (“Wang Yang: A sunshine ‘young marshal’ in the foggy city, Chongqing”), News of the Communist Party of China, December 22, 2006, http://cpc.people.com.cn/ GB/64093/64387/5202896.html. 37. For Wang Yang’s work in Guangdong, see Bo Zhiyue, “Guangdong Under Wang Yang: ‘Mind Liberation’ and Development”, EAI Background Brief,

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38.

39. 40. 41. 42.

43.

44. 45.

46.

47.

49

No. 405 (September 12, 2008), East Asian Institute, the National University of Singapore, Singapore. Zhang was transferred to Shandong partially to make way for Huang Liman (f.), Jiang Zemin’s former colleague in the Ministry of Electronics Industry in the 1980s, to become Party secretary of Shenzhen. For Xu Caihou’s biographical information, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/ ziliao/2002-01/21/content_246269.htm. For a brief history of the PLA Political General Department, see http://news. xinhuanet.com/mil/2007-11/24/content_7138315.htm. For Yu Yongbo’s biographical information, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/ ziliao/2002-01/21/content_246222.htm. It is not clear how he got into the Seventeenth Politburo because one of the criteria for new members of the Politburo was a maximum age of 63. Xu was already 64 years old in June 2007 when the survey on future Politburo members was conducted. He was the only new member of the Seventeenth Politburo who was older than 63 in October 2007. For a detailed analysis of provincial leaders as candidates for the 17th Politburo, see Bo Zhiyue, “The Seventeenth Politburo Candidates: From Provinces to Beijing” (in Chinese), in Te-sheng Chen (ed.), Political Recruitment and Local Governance in the 17th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (Taipei: INK, 2008), pp. 133–185. He was elected as an alternate member instead of a full member of the Sixteenth Central Committee. For a detailed analysis of the incident, see “Xinxi Gongkai yu Zhengfu Gongxinli” (“Transparency and the government’s public credibility”), October 3, 2006, http://www.66wen.com/03fx/shehuixue/shehuigongzuo/20061003/ 43193.html. Jiangsu was the first provincial unit to issue a regulation to protect freedom of press. For details, see Huang Guohua, “Jiangsu Cheng Zhongguo Gaige Xianfeng Xilie (1): Li Yuanchao wei Zhongguo Yulun Jiandu Qiangtan” (“Jiangsu as a pioneer in China’s reforms (1): Li Yuanchao took one step ahead in media supervision in China”) Yazhou Shibao (Asia Times), February 1, 2006, Asia Times (Chinese), February 1, 2006, http://www.atchinese.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=13258&Itemid=66; “Jiangsu Sheng Yufang Zhiwu Fanzui Tiaoli” (“Regulations of Jiangsu Province on Duty Crime Prevention”), http://www.chinacourt.org/flwk/show1.php?file_id=110098. Huang Guohua, “Jiangsu Cheng Zhongguo Gaige Xianfeng Xilie (2): Li Yuanchao Shuaixian Linghui ‘Hexie Shehui’ Zhendi” (“Jiangsu as a pioneer in China’s reforms (2): Li Yuanchao was the first to make sense of the ‘harmonious society’”) Yazhou (Asia Times), February 1, 2006, http://www.atchinese. com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=13185&Itemid=28.

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48. For Han Ying’s tenure as the first secretary of the CCYL Central Committee, see http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/101380/7194604.html. 49. For Han Ying’s biographical information, see Shen Xueming and Zheng Jianying, (eds.), Zhonggong Diyijie zhi Dishiwujie Zhongyangweiyuan (The Central Committee Members of the Chinese Communist Party from the First through the Fifteenth Central Committee). (Beijing: Zhongyangwenxian Chubanshe, 2001), pp. 714–715. 50. http://info.51.ca/news/china/2007/09/19/136946.shtml. 51. For Ling’s official biographical information, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/ ziliao/2007-10/22/content_6924975.htm; http://www.xkb.com.cn/view. php?id=142802. 52. Gao was elected as a member of the CCYL Secretariat along with Hu Qili and others on October 27, 1978. See http://www.gqt.org.cn/search/zuzhi/documents/1978/781027.htm. 53. Gao’s official appointment began in January 1983. The first secretary of Hebei at that time was Gao Yang. See Zhongguo gongchandang juzhishi ziliao, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 410–411. 54. http://hi.baidu.com/jxys/blog/item/006eb2cc6202ab1300e928f5.html. 55. Hu Jintao’s personal secretary in the CCYL Central Committee was Ye Kedong (born 1960), deputy director of Taiwan Affairs Office of the CCP Central Committee. For details, see Chen Xiaoming, Yang Yun, and Xie Guanping, Zhonggong Shiqida Muqianxi (Power Plays: Before the Seventeenth Super-show of the Communist Party of China) (Carle Place, NY: Mirror Books, 2006), pp. 297–300. 56. For a widely circulated story about Ling Jihua and Hu Jintao, see http://www. cccrx.com/2005-4/200543233343.asp. 57. http://pic.singtaonet.com/feitures/17da/2/200710/t20071017_637592.html. 58. For Ling’s appointment, see Xinhua, September 19, 2007 http://cpc.people. com.cn/GB/64093/64096/6287953.html. 59. For Wang Huning’s official biographical information, see http://news.xinhuanet. com/ziliao/2007-10/22/content_6924961.htm; http://www.xblb.com/ Article/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=4813. 60. http://gb.chinareviewnews.com/doc/1004/7/6/7/100476794.html?coluid= 7&kindid=0&docid=100476794. 61. Princeling generals refer to military officers holding the rank of major general/rear admiral and above in the PLA who are children of first generation leaders. Xu Qiliang, the PLA Air Force Commander, was thought to be the son of Lietenant General Xu Lefu (1922–1997) but is actually not. For details, see Bo, China’s Elite Politics, pp. 397–423. 62. For a comparison of Wu Shengli with Ding Yiping, see Bo, China’s Elite Politics, pp. 414–416.

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63. For Wu Xian’s biographical information, see http://www.lifeall.com/mem/611/ person-detail.ahtml. 64. For Wu Shengli’s biographical information, see Yearbook of Who’s Who of China (2007). (Beijing: Zhongguo Renwu Nianjian, 2007), p. 17. 65. “The Constitution of the Communist Party of China (CPC)” (amended and adopted at the Seventeenth CPC National Congress on October 21, 2007), http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90785/6290980.html.

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Chapter

2 Central Committee The Seventeenth Central Committee of the CCP is a collection of the most powerful political elites in China. Among them, there are 204 full members and 167 alternate members, making a total of 371 people. This chapter is going to analyze the characteristics of these powerful political elites in terms of education credentials, age, work experience, Party standing, home province, gender, and nationality. EDUCATION CREDENTIALS Compared to the Sixteenth Central Committee, the Seventeenth Central Committee is even more educated. First of all, the benchmark was upgraded for the Seventeenth Central Committee. In a report on characteristics of the Sixteenth Central Committee members published in November 2002, a three-year college education (da zhuan) was used to measure the level of education of the Sixteenth Central Committee members in comparison to that of members of previous central committees.1 In a report on the Seventeenth Central Committee members published in October 2007, the yardstick was changed to a four-year college education (da xue). Among the Seventeenth Central Committee members, 92.2 percent reportedly obtained a college education or higher. Moreover, it is reported that 33.2 percent of the Seventeenth Central Committee members have 53

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titles of senior professional ranks, including nine academicians of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Chinese Academy of Engineering.2 Out of 371 members of the Seventeenth Central Committee, we have information on their educational background for 357 members (Table 2.1). Out of these 357 members, 330 have obtained at least a four-year college education, representing 92.4 percent. In contrast to the Sixteenth Central Committee where full members were slightly more educated than alternate members, full members of the Seventeenth Central Committee are less well educated than their alternate colleagues. Out of 199 full members with information on education, 178 have received at least a four-year college education, representing 89.5 percent. Out of 158 alternate members with information on education, 152 have obtained at least a four-year college education, representing 96.2 percent. Among those with at least a four-year college education, the majority has obtained graduate education. Out of 330 members with at least a four-year college education, 187 have graduate education credentials, taking 56.7 percent. Alternate members are more likely to have a graduate diploma than full members. Out of 152 alternate members with at least a four-year college education, 105 (69.1 percent) have obtained a graduate diploma; out of 178 full members with at least a four-year college education, 82 (46.1 percent) have received a graduate diploma. Table 2.1

Educational Levels of the Seventeenth Central Committee (2007) College College as % of as % of Valid College Non-college Unknown Total Valid Total Total Total

Alternate Members Full Members

152

6

9

167

158

91.0

96.2

178

21

5

204

199

87.3

89.5

Total

330

27

14

371

357

88.4

92.4

Source: Author’s database.

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A significant number of members with a graduate diploma however obtained a graduate-degree equivalent from Party schools.3 Jiao Huancheng (born October 1949), director of the Government Offices Administration of the State Council, 4 for instance, has obtained a graduate degree equivalent from the Central Party School on a part-time basis.5 Wu Jihai (born January 1953), Party secretary of Changde Municipality, Hunan Province, also obtained a graduate degree from the Central Party School. The difference between Jiao and Wu is that Jiao never attended a four-year college, while Wu graduated from Hunan Normal College with a major in Chinese Literature. The total number of the Seventeenth Central Committee members who obtained a Party school graduate diploma is 70 people — 28 full members and 42 alternates. In addition, 65 people received master’s degrees. Among them, 32 are full members and 33 alternates. Examples of full members with master’s degrees include Wang Chen and Cao Jianming. Wang Chen (born December 1950), minister of the State Council Information Office and deputy director of the Central Propaganda Department, obtained a master’s degree in journalism from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 1982. There is no evidence that he ever attended a college. He was admitted to the Graduate School of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in September 1979 and graduated in August 1982. Before his current appointment, he served as editor-inchief of the Guangming Daily, deputy director of the Central Propaganda Department, editor-in-chief of the People’s Daily, and director of the People’s Daily.6 In contrast, Cao Jianming (born September 1955), procurator-general of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, received his bachelor of law before obtaining his master of law from East China University of Politics and Law. He taught in his alma mater for 13 years, from 1986 to 1999, including serving as its president from 1997 to 1999. He was vice president of the Supreme People’s Court between 1999 and 2008. He was appointed procuratorgeneral of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate in March 2008.7 Examples of alternate members with master’s degrees include Pan Yunhe and Su Shulin. Pan Yunhe (born November 1946), executive vice president of the Chinese Academy of Engineering (CAE) and an

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academician of the CAE, received a master’s degree in computer application in 1981. Upon graduation, he began teaching at Zhejiang University. He was appointed vice president of Zhejiang University in 1994 and its president in 1995. He was elected an academician of the CAE in 1997 and was promoted to executive vice president of the CAE in 2006.8 Su Shulin (born March 1962),9 board chairman of the China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (Sinopec Group), obtained a master’s degree in management from Harbin Engineering University in 1999. He worked in Daqing Oilfield for 16 years, from 1983 to 1999. He was deputy general manager of China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) between November 1999 and September 2006. He was made a standing member of Liaoning Provincial Party Committee in September 2006 and became its organization department director in the following month. He was appointed board chairman of Sinopec Group in June 2007, replacing Chen Tonghai.10 Furthermore, there are 52 members of the Seventeenth Central Committee with PhD degrees (Table 2.2), up from 12 in the

Table 2.2

PhD Holders of the Seventeenth Central Committee Members

Name

Birth

Home

Xi Jinping Li Keqiang Liu Yandong (f.) Li Yuanchao Wang Jiarui

1953 1955 1945 1950 1949

Cai Wu Yu Youjun Li Bin (f.)

1949 Gansu 1953 Jiangsu 1954 Liaoning

Shaanxi Anhui Jiangsu Jiangsu Hebei

Zhou Xiaochuan 1948 Jiangsu Li Congjun 1949 Anhui Wang Min

1950 Anhui

Title Vice President Executive Vice Premier State Councilor Organization Director International Liaison Director Minister of Culture Vice Minister of Culture Minister of State Family Planning Governor of Central Bank Director of Xinhua News Agency Party Secretary of Jilin

Membership PBSC PBSC Politburo Politburo Full Full Full Full Full Full Full

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Central Committee 57 Table 2.2 Name Wang Zhengwei (Hui) Ashat Kerimbay (Kazakh) Sun Zhengcai Yuan Chunqing Xiao Jie

Birth

Home

(Continued ) Title

Membership

1957 Ningxia

Chairman of Ningxia

Full

1947 Xinjiang

Chairman of Xinjiang

Full

1963 Shandong 1952 Hunan 1957 Liaoning

Governor of Jilin Governor of Shaanxi Director of State Tax Administration Chairman of China Securities Regulatory Commission Mininister of Education Vice Director of Central Liaison Office in Hong Kong President of Chinese Academy of Sciences Head of Taiwan Affairs Office Auditor General President of the China Academy of Engineering Physics Party Secretary of Nanchang Party Secretary of China Weapons Corp. Organization Director of Chongqing Vice President of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Party Secretary of Hefei Vice Governor of Jilin

Full Full Full

Shang Fulin

1951 Shandong

Zhou Ji Peng Qinghua

1946 Shanghai 1957 Hubei

Lu Yongxiang

1942 Zhejiang

Wang Yi

1953 Beijing

Liu Jiayi Zhao Xiangeng

1955 Chongqing 1953 Shanxi

Yu Xinrong

1959 Fujian

Zhang Guoqing

1964 Henan

Chen Cungen

1952 Shaanxi

Wang Weiguang

1950 Shandong

Sun Jinlong Jin Zhenji (Korean) Wang Yupu

1962 Hubei 1959 Jilin 1956 Liaoning

Chairman of Daqing Oilfield Corp.

Full

Full Full

Full Full Full Alternate

Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate

Alternate Alternate Alternate (Continued )

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China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization Table 2.2 Name

He Lifeng Zhang Xiaogang Jin Zhuanglong

Bai Chunli (Manchu) Jiang Zelin Li Ke (Zhuang) Xie Heping Yang Huanning Xiang Junbo Wang Rong Li Jiheng Zhang Jie Xing Yuanmin Mei Kebao Zhai Huqu

Min Weifang Guo Shuqing Chen Deming Jiang Jianqing

Birth

Home

1955 Guangdong

(Continued ) Title

Party Secretary of Xiamen 1954 Party Secretary of Anshan Steel Corp. 1964 Zhejiang CEO of China Commercial Airplanes Corp. 1953 Liaoning Vice President of the Chinese Academy of Sciences 1959 Anhui Party Secretary of Sanya 1956 Guangxi Vice Governor of Henan 1956 Hunan President of Sichuan University 1957 Shandong Standing Member of Heilongjiang 1957 Chongqing Governor of China Agricuture Bank 1958 Jiangsu Party Secretary of Suzhou 1957 Guangxi Deputy Secretary of Yunnan 1958 Hebei President of Shanghai Jiaotong University 1949 Shandong Deputy Secretary of Tianjin 1957 Hunan Deputy Secretary of Hunan 1950 Jiangsu President of Chinese Academy of Agriculture 1950 Heilongjiang Party Secretary of Beijing University 1956 Inner Chairman of Chinese Mongolia Construction Bank 1949 Shanghai Minister of Commerce 1953 Shanghai Chairman of Chinese Industrial and Commercial Bank

Membership Alternate Alternate Alternate

Alternate

Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate

Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate

(Continued )

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Central Committee 59 Table 2.2 Name

Birth

Home

Xia Baolong

1952 Tianjin

Luo Huining

1954 Zhejiang

Zhao Yong

1963 Hunan

(Continued ) Title Deputy Secretary of Zhejiang Deputy Secretary of Qinghai Party Secretary of Tangshan

Membership Alternate Alternate Alternate

Note: Yu Youjun was dismissed at the Third Plenum of the Seventeenth Central Committee of the CCP, which was held from October 9 to 12, 2008. Source: Author’s database.

Sixteenth Central Committee and four in the Fifteenth Central Committee, respectively. In other words, more than 15 percent of those with information on their education have PhD degrees. Among these PhD holders, 22 are full members (including two Politburo members and two Politburo standing members) and 30 alternate members. As mentioned in Chapter 1, both Xi Jinping (vice president and No. 6 Politburo standing member) and Li Keqiang (executive vice premier and No. 7 Politburo standing member) have PhD degrees. Li Yuanchao, central organization department director and a Politburo member, and Liu Yandong, state councilor and a Politburo member, also have PhD degrees. Other examples of full members with PhD degrees include Wang Jiarui and Li Congjun. Wang Jiarui (born September 1949), director of the Central International Liaison Department, started off as a postman. He studied English for one and a half year in the 1970s and never had a chance to go to college on a full-time basis. But he obtained his bachelor, master’s, and PhD degrees on a part-time basis. While he was deputy director and director of the Newspaper Distribution Bureau, Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications between 1985 and 1992, he studied in the Department of Economic Management at Jilin University. He obtained his bachelor of management in July 1987, his master of management and PhD in December 1991. While he was vice mayor of Qingdao, Shandong Province from August 1995 to December 1997,

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he also pursued postdoctoral studies at Fudan University. As a postdoc is considered a higher degree than a PhD in China, Wang Jiarui is obviously one of the crème de la crème. Li Congjun (born October 1949), director of the Xinhua News Agency, in contrast, obtained his PhD on a full-time basis. He studied Chinese literature at the Liu’an Normal School, obtained his master’s degree in Chinese literature from Jilin University, and received his PhD in classical Chinese literature from Shandong University.11 His PhD thesis supervisor was Professor Xiao Difei (1907–1991), an eminent historian of Chinese literature.12 Before his current appointment, Li was deputy secretary of Ningbo in Zhejiang Province, Party secretary of Ningbo University, deputy director and director of the Propaganda Department of the Zhejiang Provincial Party Committee, deputy director of the Central Propaganda Department, and deputy director of the Xinhua News Agency. Examples of alternate members with PhD degrees include Wang Rong and Yu Xinrong. Wang and Yu obtained their PhD degrees in different fields through divergent paths. Wang Rong (born 1958), Party secretary of Suzhou Municipality in Jiangsu Province, obtained his PhD in agricultural economic management from Nanjing Agricultural University in 1988 on a full-time basis. Like Wang Min (Party secretary of Jilin and former Party secretary of Suzhou), Wang Rong is also an academician-cum-politician. He taught at his alma mater from 1988 to 1997, when he was appointed president of Jiangsu Academy of Agriculture. He became acting mayor of Wuxi Municipality in Jiangsu Province in June 2001, Party secretary of Wuxi in March 2003, and Party secretary of Suzhou in October 2004. Yu Xinrong (born June 1959), Party secretary of Nanchang Municipality in Jiangxi Province, presents a slightly different case. He graduated from Jiangxi University (now Nanchang University)13 in 1983 with a bachelor’s degree in philosophy.14 He later obtained a PhD degree in land resource management from Nanjing Agriculture University on a part-time basis in 2000, when he was director of the Agricultural Department of Jiangxi Province.15 His doctoral dissertation was “Developing Panyang Lake District”, and his

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supervisor was Qu Futian.16 He became Party secretary of Shangrao Municipality in Jiangxi Province in 2001, executive deputy secretary of Nanchang Municipality in January 2003, and Party secretary of Nanchang in April 2003. Compared to the Sixteenth Central Committee, the Seventeenth Central Committee witnessed more members with foreign study experiences (Table 2.3). There are altogether 31 people with foreign study experiences in the Seventeenth Central Committee — 11 full members and 20 alternates. The full members include Chen Zhili, Cao Jianming, Hua Jianmin, Wang Min,17 Wang Huning, Wang Yi, Yang Jiechi, Zhang Dejiang, Liu Mingkang, Lu Yongxiang, and Zhou Ji. The alternate members include Xu Lejiang, Yin Yicui, Yu Yuanhui, Zhang Guoqing, Jiang Jianqing, Pan Yunhe, Wang Rong, Guo Shuqing, Zhai Huqu, Wu Xianguo, Chen Cungen, Min Weifang, Bai Chunli, Wang Guangya, Zhan Wenlong, Lin Mingyue, Zhang Jie, Lu Xinshe, Zhao Xiangeng, and Xie Heping. Among them, the majority studied in one country, five studied in two countries, and one worked in four countries. Professor Xie Heping (born 1956), president of Sichuan University, has worked in four countries. He was a visiting professor at the University of Utah in the United States in 1991, visiting research fellow at the Royal Society and visiting professor at the University of Southampton in Britain in 1992–1993, visiting professor at Hannover University in Germany in 1994 and 1996, and visiting professor at Silesian Technical University in Poland in 1993, 1997, and 1999.18 The five Seventeenth Central Committee members who studied or worked in two countries are Bai Chunli, Lin Mingyue, Wang Guangya, Zhang Jie, and Zhan Wenlong. Bai is well-known for his experiences in studying abroad,19 but others need a brief introduction. Lin Mingyue (born 1947), vice president of the All China Taiwanese Association and president of the Shanghai Taiwanese Association, is one of a few females and the only person from Taiwan in the Seventeenth Central Committee. She and her husband, Fan Zengsheng, were both born in Taiwan. They went to Japan in 1971 and moved to the United States two years later. They went to Mainland China in August 1980 from the United States and joined

Fifteenth Central Committee

Number of Countries

Number of Countries

Number of Countries

Two 0 1 1 2 0 1 0 0

Four 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Total 1 1 6 13 1 3 6 0

One 0 1 2 8 3 0 3 1

Two 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0

Total 0 2 2 8 3 0 3 1

One 1 1 5 5 12 1 2 1

Two 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 0

Three 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Total 2 2 5 7 13 1 2 1

25

5

1

31

18

1

19

28

4

1

33

Source: Updated from Bo Zhiyue, China’s Elite Politics: Political Transition and Power Balancing (Singapore: World Scientific, 2007), Table 2.7, p. 84.

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Sixteenth Central Committee

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Seventeenth Central Committee

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Overseas Study Experience

Overseas Studies Experience Among Central Committee Members

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Table 2.3

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the Chinese Communist Party in 1985. Lin was elected as an alternate member of the Sixteenth Central Committee in 2002, and was reelected as an alternate member of the Seventeenth Central Committee in 2007.20 Wang Guangya (born 1950), former Chinese ambassador to the United Nations and currently vice minister and Party group secretary of Foreign Affairs, also studied in two countries. A native of Jiangsu, Wang was born in Shanghai. While he was a student at the Middle School of Shanghai Foreign Language Institute in the 1960s, one of his roommates was Yang Jiechi, who is currently the minister of Foreign Affairs. In 1972, he was sent to United Kingdom along with Yang Jiechi, Zhou Wenzhong (Chinese ambassador to the United States), and others. He studied at Atlantic College in Wales and the London School of Economics and Political Science in London from 1972 to 1975 where he met his future wife, Chen Shanshan (Congjun) (born 1950) [daughter of Marshal Chen Yi (1901–1972), former minister of Foreign Affairs]. From 1981 to 1982, Wang also studied at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University.21 Zhang Jie (born 1958), president of Shanghai Jiaotong University, gained foreign experience as a researcher. A native of Xingzhou, Hebei, Zhang Jie was born in Taiyuan, Shanxi. He was admitted as one of the first group of college students through a competitive national college entrance exam in 1977 and was enrolled in the Department of Physics at Inner Mongolia University. He received his bachelor’s and master’s degrees from Inner Mongolia University.22 He later obtained his PhD from the Institute of Physics, Chinese Academy of Sciences in 1988. He was a visiting scholar at the Max Planck Society in Germany and Rutherford Appleton Laboratory in the United Kingdom from 1988 to 1998. On November 27, 2006, he was appointed president of Shanghai Jiaotong University. He was subsequently elected as an alternate member of the Seventeenth Central Committee.23 Similarly, Zhan Wenlong (born 1955), vice president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, also went abroad as a researcher. A native of Xiamen, Fujian Province, he was admitted to the Department of Physics at Lanzhou University in 1977. He was a

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visiting scholar at GANIL (Grand Accelerateur National D’ions Lourds) in France from 1986 to 1988 and a visiting scientist at Columbia University as well as BNL (Brookhaven National Laboratory) and LBNL (Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory) in the United States from 1991 to 1993. He worked as director of Institute of Modern Physics, CAS from 1999 to 2008 and was appointed vice president of CAS in January 2008.24 In terms of learning experience, the dominant pattern in the Seventeenth Central Committee is similar to that of the Sixteenth Central Committee. The majority went abroad for short-term visits, while only a few pursued academic degrees. About two thirds of those studied abroad were either visiting scholars or trainees for a short duration. Only six people (about 20 percent) pursued doctoral degrees abroad. They are Lu Yongxiang, Min Weifang, Zhai Huqu, Zhou Ji, Chen Cungen, and Zhao Xiangeng. Lu Yongxiang (born 1942), vice chairman of the National People’s Congress and president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, received a doctoral degree in engineering from the Technical University of Aachen, West Germany in 1981. He has been on the Central Committee since 1982. He was an alternate member of the Twelfth and Thirteenth Central Committees and a full member of the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth Central Committees. Min Weifang (born 1950), Party secretary of Peking University, obtained his graduate degrees in the United States. A native of Qiqihar, Heilongjiang Province, Min was born in Shenyang, Liaoning Province.25 Upon graduation from Beijing Normal University in 1982, he went to Stanford University under the Chinese government’s sponsorship. He obtained a master’s degree in higher education in 1984, a master’s degree in sociology in 1985 and a PhD degree in economics of education in 1987. He conducted his postdoctoral research at the University of Texas at Austin from June 1987 to August 1988. He joined the faculty of Peking University in 1988 and became its Party secretary in April 2002. He was elected an alternate member of the Sixteenth Central Committee in 2002 and was reelected an alternate member of the Seventeenth Central Committee in 2007.26

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Zhai Huqu (born 1950), president of the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences, received his PhD in the United Kingdom. A native of Lianshui, Jiangsu Province, Zhai went to college in September 1973 after four years as a soldier in the People’s Liberation Army. He obtained his master’s degree from Nanjing Agricultural University in 1981 and his PhD from Birmingham University in the United Kingdom in 1987. He was appointed president of Nanjing Agricultural University in 1995 and president of the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences in 2001.27 He was elected an alternate member of the Sixteenth Central Committee in 2002 and was reelected an alternate member of the Seventeenth Central Committee in 2007. Zhou Ji (born 1946), minister of Education, also obtained his doctoral degree from the United States. A native of Shanghai, Zhou was born in Wuhan, Hubei Province. He graduated from Qinghua University in 1970 with a bachelor degree in precision instruments. He was enrolled in a graduate program at Huazhong University of Science and Technology in 1978 and went to the State University of New York at Buffalo in 1980. He acquired a master of science in 1981 and a PhD in 1984. He served as acting mayor and mayor of Wuhan, Hubei Province from December 2001 to April 2002 and was appointed minister of Education in March 2003. He entered the Seventeenth Central Committee in 2007 as a full member.28 Chen Cungen (born 1952), director of the Organization Department of Chongqing Municipality, obtained his doctoral degree from Austria. A native of Zhouzhi, Shaanxi Province, Chen studied at Northwest Forestry University between March 1972 and December 1974. He went back to his alma mater for graduate studies in September 1979 and acquired a master’s degree in August 1982. He went to Austria in May 1985 and obtained a PhD in October 1987 from the University of Agricultural Sciences in Vienna.29 He was appointed vice minister of Personnel Affairs in February 2006 and was transferred to Chongqing as its organization department director in April 2007. He was elected an alternate member of the Seventeenth Central Committee in October 2007.

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Finally, Zhao Xiangeng (born 1953), president of the China Academy of Engineering Physics, possibly obtained a PhD in physics from the University of Washington. A native of Xinzhou, Shanxi, Zhao was admitted to the Department of Physics, Shanxi University, in 1977.30 He later went on to the University of Washington and obtained a PhD in physics.31 With two exceptions, among the Seventeenth Central Committee members who studied abroad, almost all went to the Western countries, in particular, the United States of America and the United Kingdom (Table 2.4). More than half of them went to the United States, and another 23 percent went to the United Kingdom. Zhang Dejiang (born 1946), vice premier and a member of the Politburo, studied in North Korea. And Wu Xianguo (born 1956), former Party secretary of Shijiazhuang, Hebei Province,32 obtained his master’s degree from Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. There are nine academicians in the Seventeenth Central Committee (Table 2.5). They are Zhou Ji, Dorji, Xie Heping, Pan Yunhe, Chen Zuoning, Zhan Wenlong, Bai Chunli, Zhang Jie, and Lu Yongxiang. The first five are academicians of the Chinese Academy of Engineering, and Bai Chunli, Zhan Wenlong, and Zhang Jie are academicians of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Lu Yongxiang is an academician of both the Chinese Academy of Engineering and the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Chen Zuoning is the only female academician in the Seventeenth Central Committee. Zhou Ji and Lu Yongxiang are both full members, and the rest are alternate members. In sum, the Seventeenth Central Committee members are highly educated. In comparison to the Sixteenth Central Committee, the Seventeenth Central Committee has more members with graduate degrees including PhD degrees, more members with foreign learning experiences, and more academicians. AGE The Seventeenth Central Committee members in general, are slightly older than the Sixteenth Central Committee members (Table 2.6). Their average age was 56.2 years in 2007, while their counterparts in

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Central Committee 67 Table 2.4

Countries of Foreign Learning Experience Seventeenth Central Committee

Sixteenth Central Committee

Fifteenth Central Committee

Countries

Freq.

Percent

Freq.

Percent

Freq.

Percent

Western Countries USA Australia Sweden Western Germany Norway Japan United Kingdom Belgium Switzerland Canada Austria Netherlands

17 0 0 2 0 0 7 1 0 0 1 1

54.84 0.00 0.00 6.45 0.00 0.00 22.58 3.22 0.00 0.00 3.22 3.22

6 1 1 1 0 1 2 1 1 1 0 0

30.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 0.00 5.00 10.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 0.00 0.00

4 1 1 1 1 1 4 0 0 0 0 0

12.12 3.03 3.03 3.03 3.03 3.03 12.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

29

93.55

15

75.00

13

39.39

Eastern Countries Soviet Union Eastern Germany Czechoslovakia Yugoslavia North Korea Singapore

0 0 0 0 1 1

0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.22 3.22

2 1 0 1 1 0

10.00 5.00 0.00 5.00 5.00 0.00

16 1 1 1 1 0

48.48 3.03 3.03 3.03 3.03 0.00

Subtotal

2

6.44

5

25.00

20

60.60

31

99.99*

20

100.00

33

99.99*

Subtotal

Total

Note: *The total does not add up to 100 due to rounding. Source: Updated from Bo Zhiyue, China’s Elite Politics: Political Transition and Power Balancing (Singapore: World Scientific, 2007), Table 2.8, p. 85.

the Sixteenth Central Committee were 55.9 years on average in 2002. However, the full members got a bit older (59.2 versus 58.5) and the alternate members a bit younger (52.6 versus 52.7). The average age of the full members of the Seventeenth Central Committee in 2007 was a bit older than that of the full members of

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China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization Table 2.5

Academicians in the Seventeenth Central Committee

Name

Birth

Home

Membership

Year

Zhou Ji Dorji Xie Heping Pan Yunhe Chen Zuoning (f.) Bai Chunli Zhan Wenlong Zhang Jie Lu Yongxiang

1946 1953 1956 1946 1957

Shanghai Tibet Hunan Zhejiang Beijing

Chinese Academy of Engineering Chinese Academy of Engineering Chinese Academy of Engineering Chinese Academy of Engineering Chinese Academy of Engineering

1999 2001 2001 1997 2001

1953 1955 1958 1942

Liaoning Fujian Hebei Zhejiang

Chinese Academy of Sciences Chinese Academy of Sciences Chinese Academy of Sciences Chinese Academy of Sciences/ Chinese Academy of Engineering

1997 2005 2003 1991/1994

Source: Author’s database.

Table 2.6

Average Age of Central Committee Members (1997–2007) Obs.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

Seventeenth Central Committee Full Members Alternate Members Total

204 166 370

59.21 52.58 56.23

4.52 4.56 5.61

44 42 42

67 63 67

Sixteenth Central Committee Full Members Alternate Members Total

198 158 356

58.51 52.70 55.93

4.11 4.89 5.32

41 39 39

67 64 67

Fifteenth Central Committee Full Members Alternate Members Total

193 151 344

58.91 52.58 56.13

4.83 4.83 5.76

42 40 40

76 62 76

Notes: Ages are calculated according to the year of birth. Source: Updated from Bo Zhiyue, China’s Elite Politics: Political Transition and Power Balancing (Singapore: World Scientific, 2007), Table 2.9, p. 89.

the Sixteenth Central Committee in 2002 because of continuity. Out of 371 members of the Seventeenth Central Committee, more than half (187) had been in the Sixteenth Central Committee — 99 full members and 88 alternate members. With one exception, 98 full

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members of the Sixteenth Central Committee were reelected as full members of the Seventeenth Central Committee. Lieutenant General Li Andong (born 1946), deputy director of the General Armament Department, is the exception. A native of Xi’an, Shaanxi Province, Li was admitted to the Department of Aviation Engineering in the Harbin Institute of Military Engineering in August 1965. One of his classmates is General Chi Wanchun (born 1946), political commissar of the General Armament Department. Li was appointed deputy director of the General Armament Department in December 2000 and was awarded the rank of major general in 1995 and the rank of lieutenant general in 2002. He was a full member of the Sixteenth Central Committee but was made an alternate member of the Seventeenth Central Committee.33 Among the 88 alternate members of the Sixteenth Central Committee, 46 were promoted to full members in the new central committee and 42 were reelected as alternate members. Among 184 newcomers in the Seventeenth Central Committee, 124 (over two thirds) are alternate members and 60 (one third) full members. The average age of those retained as full members was 61.2 years in 2007, compared to 57.2 years for those who had been promoted from an alternate membership in the Sixteenth Central Committee to a full membership in the Seventeenth Central Committee and 57.6 years for those brand new full members in the Seventeenth Central Committee. In contrast, alternate members were all younger. Li Andong, the only full member of the Sixteenth Central Committee who was demoted to an alternate member in the Seventeenth Central Committee, was 61 years old in 2007. The alternate members of the Sixteenth Central Committee who were reelected as alternate members of the Seventeenth Central Committee were 54.2 years old on average in 2007. The new alternate members in the Seventeenth Central Committee were only 52 years old on average in 2007. In terms of age groups, the Seventeenth Central Committee members form a shape of half a diamond (Figure 2.1). At the bottom, there are only 25 people who were younger than 48 years old in 2007, taking 6.8 percent of the total.34 These are people who were born in the 1960s. At the top, there are also 25 people who were over

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% Female % Male

−8

−6

−4

−2

0

2

Percent

Fig. 2.1 Population Pyramid of the Seventeenth Central Committee

63 years old in 2007, taking 6.8 percent of the total. The proportions of the Seventeenth Central Committee members increase along with age until age 54. The majority lies between 54 and 63. Over one third (132 people) were between 54 and 59, and over one quarter (99 people) were between 60 and 63. Because of the age 68 rule, no one was older than 67 in 2007 in the Seventeenth Central Committee. Five people were 67 years old in October 2007 — Hua Jianmin, Jia Qinglin, Liao Xilong, He Yong, and Liang Guanglie. A native of Wuxi, Jiangsu Province, Hua was born in January 1940. He served as state councilor and secretary general of the State Council from 2003 to 2008. He was elected vice chairman of the National People’s Congress in March 2008. Yang Liwei, on the other hand, is the youngest member of the Seventeenth Central Committee. A native of Suizhong, Liaoning Province, Yang was born in June 1965. He is the first Chinese astronaut who circled the earth. He completed his mission in China’s first manned spacecraft (Shenzhou V) in October 2003. He was elected an alternate

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member of the Seventeenth Central Committee at the age of 42 in October 2007. WORK EXPERIENCE Among 340 people with known starting years of work in the Seventeenth Central Committee, the earliest is 1958, the year when Mao Zedong launched the Great Leap Forward, and the latest is 1989, the year of the Tiananmen Incident (Table 2.7). Those who began to work earlier than 1960 are all military men. General Guo Boxiong (born 1942), vice chairman of the CMC, General Liang Guanglie (born 1940), defense minister and state councilor, and General Chen Bingde (born 1941), general chief of staff, all joined the People’s Liberation Army in 1958. General Liao Xilong (born 1940), director of the General Logistics Department, joined the army in 1959. On the other hand, Jin Zhuanglong (born 1964) did not begin to work until 1989. Jin was admitted to Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics in 1982. Upon his graduation in 1986, he went for graduate studies in Shanghai and obtained a master of engineering from Shanghai Academy of Spaceflight Technology (SAST)

Table 2.7

Work Experience of Central Committee Members Freq.

Percent

Cum.

Seventeenth Central Committee Before the Cultural Revolution (1958–65) During the Cultural Revolution (1966–76) In the era of economic reforms (1977–89) Total

44 252 46 342

12.87 73.68 13.45 100.00

12.94 86.47 100.00

Sixteenth Central Committee Before the Cultural Revolution (1952–65) During the Cultural Revolution (1966–76) In the era of economic reforms (1977–82) Total

130 201 11 242

38.01 58.77 3.22 100.00

38.01 96.78 100.00

Source: Updated from Bo Zhiyue, China’s Elite Politics: Political Transition and Power Balancing (Singapore: World Scientific, 2007), Table 2.10, p. 92.

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in 1989. He joined the workforce in 1989 and was deputy director of a research institute in Shanghai between 1993 and 1995. Ten years later, he was appointed vice chairman and secretary general of the Commission of Science and Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND).35 After COSTIND was dissolved and merged with the Ministry of Information Industry and others to form a newly created Ministry of Industry and Information in March 2008, Jin was appointed general manager of a new company, the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China Ltd. (CACC), which would be responsible for research and development as well as manufacturing and marketing domestically made large passenger aircrafts.36 The range between the earliest and the latest entry into the workforce is 31 years, a full generation apart. In the late 1950s, when some of the Seventeenth Central Committee members joined the PLA, people such as Jin Zhuanglong were not born yet. Compared to the Sixteenth Central Committee, the pre-Cultural Revolution generation had less presence in the Seventeenth Central Committee. In the Sixteenth Central Committee, 43 percent began to work before 1966. In the Seventeenth Central Committee, those who joined the workforce during the Cultural Revolution dropped to 13 percent. The Cultural Revolution generation became the absolute majority in the Seventeenth Central Committee. About 74 percent of the members with information on their first year of work began to work during the Cultural Revolution, in comparison to 55 percent in the Sixteenth Central Committee. The post-Mao generation increased from only two percent in the Sixteenth Central Committee to 14 percent in the Seventeenth Central Committee. This pattern is more evident for full members than for alternate members in the Seventeenth Central Committee. The pre-Cultural Revolution generation makes up 20 percent of full members but only 3.4 percent of alternate members in the Seventeenth Central Committee. The Cultural Revolution generation makes up 77 percent of full members but 69 percent of alternate members. In contrast, post-Mao generation makes up 27 percent of alternate members but only three percent of full members.

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PARTY STANDING Similar to work experience, there is also a generation gap in terms of Party standing among the Seventeenth Central Committee members (Table 2.8). The most senior communist Party member in the Seventeenth Central Committee joined the Party in 1958 and had a Party standing of almost 50 years, while the most junior member became a Party member only in 1995, 12 years prior to the opening of the Seventeenth National Party Congress. The most senior communist Party member is He Yong, member of the Secretariat and deputy secretary of the Central Disciplinary Inspection Commission. A native of Qianxi, Hebei Province, he is also one of the oldest members in the Seventeenth Central Committee. He was born in October 1940 and turned 67 in October 2007 when the Seventeenth National Congress of the CCP was held. He joined the CCP in December 1958, at the age of 18. The most junior communist Party member is Dorji (Tibetan) (born 1954), chief of the Bureau of Geology and Mineral Resources Exploration and Development of the Tibetan Autonomous Region. A native Tibetan, Dorji was admitted to Chengdu Institute of Table 2.8

Party Standing of Central Committee Members Freq.

Percent

Cum.

Seveneenth Central Committee Before the Cultural Revolution (1958–65) During the Cultural Revolution (1966–76) In the era of economic reforms (1977–95) Total

37 180 103 320

11.56 56.25 32.19 100.00

35.77 83.08 100.00

Sixteenth Central Committee Before the Cultural Revolution (1953–65) During the Cultural Revolution (1966–76) In the era of economic reforms (1977–86) Total

92 123 44 260

35.77 47.31 16.92 100.00

35.77 83.08 100.00

Source: Updated from Bo Zhiyue, China’s Elite Politics: Political Transition and Power Balancing (Singapore: World Scientific, 2007), Table 2.11, p. 93.

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Geology in 1974 and went back home upon his graduation in 1978. He joined the CCP in December 1995 and was elected an academician of the Chinese Academy of Engineering in 2001. He was the only “outstanding communist Party member” from Tibet in 2006.37 In terms of historical periods, 12 percent joined the Party before the Cultural Revolution, 56 percent joined the Party during the Cultural Revolution, and 32 percent have joined the Party since 1977 (Table 2.8). Among alternate members, almost all joined the Party either during or after the Cultural Revolution with one exception, Lieutenant General Li Maifu (born 1946). A native of Qingshui, Shanxi Province, Li joined the PLA in September 1964 and the Party one year later. He was appointed deputy commander of the PLA Air Force in July 2003 and was promoted to deputy director of the General Logistics Department in December 2005. He was elected an alternate member of the Seventeenth Central Committee in October 2007. Among full members, the majority (61 percent) joined the Party during the Cultural Revolution while the rest were evenly spread between the pre-Cultural Revolution and post-Cultural Revolution periods, about 20 percent each. HOME PROVINCE38 Similar to the Sixteenth Central Committee, none of the Seventeenth Central Committee members were from Hong Kong or Macao (Table 2.9). Shandong replaced Jiangsu as the province with the largest number of members in the Seventeenth Central Committee, with 42 members (11.4 percent of the total39). Hebei is ranked the second, with 41 members (11.1 percent). They are followed by Jiangsu with 31 members (8.4 percent) and Zhejiang with 23 members (6.2 percent). Others among the top 10 include Henan (19 members), Liaoning (19 members), Hubei (18 members), Anhui (17 members), Shanxi (17 members), and Shaanxi (16 members). Among the least represented, one may find Qinghai (1), Taiwan (1), Hainan (1), Ningxia (2), Tibet (3), and Yunnan (3).

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Distribution of Home Provinces of Central Committee Members Seventeenth Central Committee

Sixteenth Central Committee

Fifteenth Central Committee

Freq.

Percent

Freq.

Percent

Freq.

Percent

North Beijing Tianjin Hebei Shanxi Inner Mongolia Subtotal

6 5 41 17 7 76

1.63 1.36 11.11 4.61 1.90 20.61

10 7 26 10 3 56

2.81 1.97 7.30 2.81 0.84 15.73

6 9 16 13 2 46

1.74 2.62 4.65 3.78 0.58 13.37

Northeast Liaoning Jilin Heilongjiang Subtotal

19 9 11 39

5.15 2.44 2.98 10.57

17 8 8 33

4.78 2.25 2.25 9.28

25 18 6 49

7.27 5.23 1.74 14.24

7 31 23 17 10 42 1 131

1.90 8.40 6.23 4.61 2.71 11.38 0.27 35.50

9 46 24 16 5 42 1 143

2.53 12.92 6.74 4.49 1.40 11.80 0.28 40.16

6 50 22 17 7 46 1 149

1.74 14.53 6.40 4.94 2.03 13.37 0.29 43.30

Central Jiangxi Henan Hubei Hunan Subtotal

8 19 18 13 58

2.17 5.15 4.88 3.52 15.72

9 16 16 18 59

2.53 4.49 4.49 5.06 16.57

10 12 8 18 48

2.91 3.49 2.33 5.23 13.96

South Guangdong Guangxi Hainan Hong Kong Macao Subtotal

5 7 1 0 0 13

1.36 1.90 0.27 0.00 0.00 3.53

8 4 1 0 0 13

2.25 1.12 0.28 0.00 0.00 3.65

8 3 1 0 0 12

2.33 0.87 0.29 0.00 0.00 3.49

East Shanghai Jiangsu Zhejiang Anhui Fujian Shandong Taiwan Subtotal

(Continued)

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(Continued ) Sixteenth Central Committee

Fifteenth Central Committee

Freq.

Percent

Freq.

Percent

Freq.

Percent

Southwest Sichuan Chongqing Guizhou Yunnan Tibet Subtotal

7 6 5 3 3 24

1.90 1.63 1.36 0.81 0.81 6.51

7 5 5 4 3 24

1.97 1.40 1.40 1.12 0.84 6.73

10 2 4 4 3 23

2.91 0.58 1.16 1.16 0.87 6.68

Northwest Shaanxi Gansu Qinghai Ningxia Xinjiang Subtotal

16 5 1 2 4 28

4.34 1.36 0.27 0.54 1.08 7.59

15 5 1 3 4 28

4.21 1.40 0.28 0.84 1.12 7.85

10 1 1 1 4 17

2.91 0.29 0.29 0.29 1.16 4.94

369

100.00

356

100.00

344

99.98*

Total

Note: *The total is not 100 due to rounding. Source: Updated from Bo Zhiyue, China’s Elite Politics: Political Transition and Power Balancing (Singapore: World Scientific, 2007), Table 2.12, pp. 94–95.

Despite the drastic economic expansion in the past three decades, some coastal provinces are still not prominent in producing central committee members. Guangdong, the No. 1 economy in China, has failed to send many natives to the Seventeenth Central Committee. Only five central committee members are from Guangdong Province, down from eight in both the Sixteenth Central Committee and the Fifteenth Central Committee. They are Huang Huahua (governor of Guangdong), Lin Shusen (governor of Guizhou), Liao Hui (vice president of the CPPCC), Vice Admiral Tong Shiping (political commissar of the National Defense University), and He Lifeng (Party secretary of Xiamen). However, not all of them were actually born in

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Guangdong. He Lifeng, for instance, was born in Fengcheng Town, Yongding County, Fujian Province,40 although his ancestral home is Xingning, Guangdong Province. He studied at Xiamen University and worked in Fujian until May 2009 when he was transfered to Tianjin. He is more of a Fujianese than a Cantonese. Liao Hui was born in Hong Kong and grew up in Beijing. He graduated from Beijing 101 Middle School and attended Harbin Institute of Military Engineering. Tong Shiping attended a middle school in Shanghai and was a military professional.41 Party secretary Wang Yang of Guangdong is a native of Anhui, Party secretary Zhu Xiaodan of Guangzhou is a native of Zhejiang, and Party secretary Liu Yupu of Shenzhen is a native of Shandong. Shanghai does not fare well either. Although seven people in the Seventeenth Central Committee list Shanghai as their hometown, none of them can be classified as members of the Shanghai Gang.42 These Shanghai natives are Ma Kai (state councilor and secretary general of the State Council), Yang Jiechi (minister of Foreign Affairs), Zhou Ji (Minister of Education), Zhang Yijiong (deputy secretary of Tibet), Ji Lin (vice mayor of Beijing), Chen Yuan (governor of National Development Bank), and Chen Deming (minister of Commerce). In fact, Ma Kai is more of a native of Beijing than Shanghai. He was born in Xingxian, Shanxi Province and grew up in Beijing. He had worked in Beijing since 1965 upon his graduation from Beijing No. 4 Middle School.43 Zhang Yijiong’s home town is Shanghai, but he practically grew up in Qinghai. He began to work in a factory in Qinghai at the age of 16 in February 1972. He worked in Qinghai for 34 years, from 1972 to 2006. He was promoted to deputy secretary of Tibet in December 2006. Shanghai Party Secretary Yu Zhengsheng and Mayor Han Zheng are both natives of Zhejiang. In terms of regional distribution, the East Region continues to be dominant with 131 members (35.5 percent). The North Region came in second with 75 members (20.6 percent). The South Region has the least representation with only 13 members (3.5 percent). Compared to previous central committees, the Seventeenth Central Committee members are more evenly distributed across regions. The

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East Region continued its downward trend, from 43.3 percent in the Fifteenth Central Committee to 40.2 percent in the Sixteenth Central Committee and 35.5 percent in the Seventeenth Central Committee. The North Region climbed up to No. 2, from 13.4 percent in the Fifteenth Central Committee to 15.7 percent in the Sixteenth Central Committee and 20.6 percent in the Seventeenth Central Committee. GENDER In comparison to the Sixteenth Central Committee, the Seventeenth Central Committee has more female representatives (Table 2.10). Female members increased from 7.6 percent in the Sixteenth Central Committee to 10 percent in the Seventeenth Central Committee. As in the Sixteenth Central Committee, there is no female standing member of the Politburo, and only one female (Liu Yandong) out of 25 Politburo members. Out of 37 female members, 13 (35.1 percent) are full members and 24 (64.9 percent) alternate members. Table 2.10

Females in the Central Committee Freq.

Percent

Seventeenth Central Committee Full Members Alternate Members Total

13 24 37

35.13 64.86 100.00

Sixteenth Central Committee Full Members Alternate Members Total

5 22 27

18.52 81.48 100.00

Fifteenth Central Committee Full Members Alternate Members Total

8 17 25

32.00 68.00 100.00

Source: Updated from Bo Zhiyue, China’s Elite Politics: Political Transition and Power Balancing (Singapore: World Scientific, 2007), Table 2.13, p. 96.

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Generally speaking, female members are younger than their male colleagues. On the average, female members were 53.4 years old in 2007 while male members were 56.6 years old. Moreover, from Figure 2.1, it is clear that female members can neither be too young nor too old. The youngest male member was 42 but the youngest female member was 45; and no female member was older than 65. The oldest female members are Chen Zhili and Uyunqimg (Mongolian). They were both 65 years old in 2007. Zhao Aiming and Ulagan (Mongolian) are the youngest. They were both born in the 1960s. Zhao was born in 1961, and Ulagan in 1962. Since she was born in November 1962, Ulagan was not yet 45 years old in October 2007. NATIONALITY Minority members increased to over 10 percent in the Seventeenth Central Committee. Out of 371 members, 40 are from minorities, representing 10.8 percent of the total (Table 2.11). Seventeen minorities are represented in the Seventeenth Central Committee. Hui continued its top position with eight members (2.2 percent), followed by five Zhuang (1.4 percent), four Tibetans (1.1 percent), four Mongolians (1.1 percent), and three Uyghur (0.8 percent). Two new minorities were added to the list of the Seventeenth Central Committee members — Bai and She. Bai is a nationality mainly located in Yunnan Province as well as Guizhou, Sichuan, and Hunan. Its population in 2000 was 1,858,063. Chen Yiqin (f.) (born 1959) is the only representative of Bai in the Seventeenth Central Committee. A native of Zhijin, Guizhou Province, she is an academician-cumpolitician. Upon graduation from Guizhou University, she began to teach in Guizhou Party School in 1982. She later became vice president of Guizhou Party School and deputy secretary of Qiannan Prefecture. She was appointed director of the Propaganda Department of Guizhou Provincial Party Committee in May 2007 and became an alternate member of the Seventeenth Central Committee in October 2007.44 The She nationality can be traced to the sixth century in Chaozhou, Guangdong Province. It was recognized as a nationality in China in December 1956 and had a population of 634,700 in 1990. The She

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Table 2.11

Distribution of Nationalities among Central Committee Members Seventeenth Central Committee

Sixteenth Central Committee

Nationality

Freq.

Percent

Cum.

Freq.

Percent

Cum.

Han Zhuang Tibetan Yi Uighur Tujia Miao Mongolian Manchu Hui Yao Kazakh Dai Buyi Bai Korean Li She

331 5 4 1 3 2 2 4 2 8 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1

89.22 1.35 1.08 0.27 0.81 0.54 0.54 1.08 0.54 2.16 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.54 0.27 0.27

89.22 90.57 91.64 91.91 92.72 93.26 93.80 94.88 95.42 97.57 97.84 98.11 98.38 98.65 98.92 99.46 99.73 100.00

322 2 5 1 3 2 2 2 3 7 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 0

90.45 0.56 1.40 0.28 0.84 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.84 1.97 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.00 0.56 0.28 0.00

90.45 91.01 92.42 92.70 93.54 94.10 94.66 95.22 96.07 98.03 98.31 98.60 98.88 99.16 99.16 99.72 100.00 100.00

Total

371

100.00

356

100.00

Source: Updated from Bo Zhiyue, China’s Elite Politics: Political Transition and Power Balancing (Singapore: World Scientific, 2007), Table 2.14, p. 97.

population in China is distributed mainly in Fujian, Zhejiang, Guangdong, Jiangxi, Anhui, Guizhou, and Hunan.45 Lei Chunmei (f.) (born 1959) is the only representative from the She nationality in the Seventeenth Central Committee. A native of Fu’an, Fujian Province, she was deputy secretary and secretary of the Chinese Communist Youth League Fujian Committee for almost a decade before her appointment as deputy Party secretary of Fuzhou Municipality in 2002. She then served as mayor of Longyan and was promoted to Party secretary of Nanping in May 2008. She was elected an alternate member of the Seventeenth Central Committee in October 2007.

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As in the case of female members, minority members were more likely to be alternate members than to be full members. Minority full members (16) make up 7.8 percent of all full members, and minority alternate members (24) make up 14.4 percent of all alternate members. PROVINCIAL MANAGEMENT EXPERIENCE Similar to the Sixteenth Central Committee, the Seventeenth Central Committee continues to witness the rise of political elites with local management experience, in particular provincial experience. China is a unitary state of vast provinces with varying conditions and different development levels. It is imperative that those who have local management experience constitute a major component of national political elites. In the Seventeenth Central Committee, the majorities have worked (or are currently working) in provinces as leaders (Table 2.12). Out of Table 2.12

Central Committee Members with Provincial Experience Total Obs.

Freq.

Valid Percent

Seventeenth Central Committee Full Members Alternate Members Total Politburo Standing Committee Politburo Secretariat

204 167 371 9 16 6

122 85 207 8 12 3

59.80 50.90 55.80 88.89 75.00 50.00

Sixteenth Central Committee Full Members Alternate Members Total Politburo Standing Committee Politburo Secretariat

198 158 356 9 15 7

106 88 194 8 11 3

53.54 55.70 54.49 88.89 73.33 42.86

Source: Updated from Bo Zhiyue, China’s Elite Politics: Political Transition and Power Balancing (Singapore: World Scientific, 2007), Table 2.19, p. 107.

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371 members, 207 or 55.8 percent have served (or are currently serving) as provincial leaders. This is 1.3 percent more than the proportion of the Sixteenth Central Committee members who served as provincial leaders. Among 167 alternate members in the Seventeenth Central Committee, 85 or 50.9 percent have provincial leadership experience. Among 204 full members, 122 or 59.8 percent have similar experience.46 The top leadership continues to be dominated by those with local leadership experience. With the exception of Premier Wen Jiabao, as mentioned in Chapter 1, all the other members of the Politburo Standing Committee have served as provincial leaders. Two thirds of the Politburo members (in addition to the Politburo Standing Committee members) have either worked or are currently working as provincial leaders. Among those who are currently working as provincial leaders, Wang Lequan is Party secretary of Xinjiang; Liu Qi, Party secretary of Beijing; Wang Yang, Party secretary of Guangdong; Zhang Gaoli, Party secretary of Tianjin; Yu Zhengsheng, Party secretary of Shanghai; and Bo Xilai, Party secretary of Chongqing. Among those who have had provincial leadership experiences, Wang Zhaoguo once served as governor of Fujian; Wang Qishan has worked in Guangdong, Hainan, and Beijing in various capacities; Hui Liangyu was a provincial leader in Jilin, Hubei, Anhui, and Jiangsu; Liu Yunshan worked as a provincial party leader in Inner Mongolia; Li Yuanchao was Party secretary of Jiangsu; and Zhang Dejiang worked in Jilin, Zhejiang, and Guangdong. Half of the Secretariat members have served as provincial leaders before, including Xi Jinping, Liu Yunshan, and Li Yuanchao. CONCLUDING REMARKS The intraparty democracy, it should be noted, was also expanded due to the selection of members of the Seventeenth Central Committee. The main indicator of the expansion is the difference between the number of candidates and the number of members elected in the Central Committee. In selecting members of the Sixteenth Central Committee in November 2002, there were 10 more candidates than the final full

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members, with a difference of 5.1 percent; and nine more candidates than the final alternate members, with a difference of 5.7 percent.47 In selecting members of the Seventeenth Central Committee in October 2007, the difference was expanded to 8.3 percent for the full members and 9.6 percent for the alternate members. The final full members were 204, with 221 candidates, 17 more; while the final alternate members were 167, with 183 candidates, 16 more.48 In comparison to the previous central committees, the Seventeenth Central Committee has its own characteristics. First, members of the Seventeenth Central Committee are the most highly educated. The bar was raised from a three-year college education in the previous central committee to a four-year college education as the benchmark for educational credentials. More than 90 percent of the Seventeenth Central Committee members have met this standard. Furthermore, more than half of those with a four-year college education have obtained graduate diplomas. Most interestingly, there are altogether 52 PhD holders in the Seventeenth Central Committee, up from 12 in the Sixteenth Central Committee and four in the Fifteenth Central Committee. Among those PhD holders, 22 are full members (including two Politburo standing members — Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang — and two Politburo members — Li Yuanchao and Liu Yandong) and 30 alternate members. The Seventeenth Central Committee is not particularly noteworthy in terms of studying abroad experiences, except for the fact that those who obtained their PhDs abroad double those in the Sixteenth Central Committee. The Seventeenth Central Committee also includes nine academicians. Secondly, the Seventeenth Central Committee in 2007 was slightly older than the Sixteenth Central Committee in 2002. The average age of the Seventeenth Central Committee was 56.2 in October 2007, compared to 55.9 of the Sixteenth Central Committee in November 2002. This is due to continuity. More than half of the members of the Seventeenth Central Committee had been members of the Sixteenth Central Committee. Because of the rule of age 68, no one was older than 67 in October 2007. The youngest

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was Yang Liwei, the first Chinese astronaut who circled the globe. He was 42 years old in 2007. Thirdly, the work experiences of the Seventeenth Central Committee members are widespread. There are those who joined the workforce as early as 1958, the year when Mao Zedong launched the Great Leap Forward. There are also those who began to work as late as 1989, the year of the Tiananmen Incident. The Cultural Revolution generation became dominant in the Seventeenth Central Committee, representing almost two thirds of the entire central committee. Those who joined the workforce before the Cultural Revolution became a minority, though not necessarily the least powerful. A similar pattern can be found about the Party standing of the Seventeenth Central Committee members. Fourthly, the Seventeenth Central Committee witnesses a new distribution of home provinces among its members. Shandong emerged as the No. 1 producer of central committee members (42), followed by Hebei (41), Jiangsu (31), and Zhejiang (23). The numbers of Shandong natives and Zhejiang natives remained more or less the same as the Sixteenth Central Committee. While Jiangsu’s natives dropped sharply from 46 in the Sixteenth Central Committee to 31 in the Seventeenth Central Committee, Hebei saw a drastic rise of its natives from 26 to 41. In contrast, Guangdong and Shanghai did not fare well in the Seventeenth Central Committee. There are only five Guangdong natives and seven Shanghai natives in the Seventeenth Central Committee, respectively. With 17 natives in the Seventeenth Central Committee, Anhui, Hu Jintao’s ancestral home province, is not particularly noteworthy. But one may find many political heavyweights from this province. In addition to Hu Jintao, one may find two more Politburo standing members (Wu Bangguo and Li Keqiang) and one Politburo member (Wang Yang). In terms of regional distribution, the East Region (131), the North Region (76), and the Central Region (58) are the top three, followed by the Northeast (39), the Northwest (28), the Southwest (24), and the South (13). Fifthly, there are now more female and minority members in the Seventeenth Central Committee. The proportion of female members

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increased from 7.6 percent in the Sixteenth Central Committee to 10 percent in the Seventeenth Central Committee. As in the Sixteenth Central Committee, there is one female Politburo member (Liu Yandong) but no female standing member of the Politburo. There are more female alternate members than female full members. The minority leaders also increased from 9.6 percent in the Sixteenth Central Committee to 10.8 percent in the Seventeenth Central Committee. Seventeen minorities are represented in the Seventeenth Central Committee. Two minorities, Bai and She, are also newly represented. The Hui nationality remains the No. 1 minority in the central committee, with eight members. It is followed by Zhuang (five), Tibetans (four), Mongolians (four), and Uyghur (three). Finally, similar to the Sixteenth Central Committee, the Seventeenth Central Committee continues to feature political elites with provincial leadership experience. Among nine members of the Politburo, eight have served as provincial leaders before, representing almost 90 percent. Among the other 16 members of the Politburo, 12 have worked or are currently working as provincial leaders. Among six members of the Secretariat, three have worked as provincial leaders. Altogether, there are 207 members of the Sixteenth Central Committee who have had provincial management experience, including 85 alternate members and 122 full members. Clearly, as described above, a typical member of the Seventeenth Central Committee is someone who is in the mid-fifties, a man, and a Han. His home province is more likely to be Shandong or Hebei than any other provinces. He is likely to be well-educated and joined the workforce during the Cultural Revolution. His party standing is about 33 years, and he is most likely to have some provincial management experience. NOTES 1. Wu Qingcai and Qi Bing, “Zhongxinshe: Xinshiji, Xinbaizi, Xintedian” (“The Xinhua News Agency: The New Century, the New Leadership, and the New Characteristics”), Renminwang, November 15, 2002, http://www.peopledaily. com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/8956/9419/20021115/867131.html.

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2. Liu Siyang, Liu Gang, and Sun Chengbin, “Jianfuqi Dang he Renmin de Zhongtuo: Xinyijie Zhonggong Zhongyang Weiyuanhui he Zhonggong Zhongyang Jilujiancha Weiyuanhui Danshengji” (“Shoulder the Responsibility of the Party and the People: The Birth of a New Central Committee and a New Central Disciplinary Inspection Commission of the Chinese Communist Party”), Zhongqingwang, October 21, 2007, http://vweb.youth.cn/cms/ 2006/2006news/jd17/dsj/200711/t20071108_610013.htm. 3. Whether a diploma from a party school should be treated as an equivalent of regular higher education institutions has been controversial since the 1980s. A document issued by the Central Committee of the CCP in 1983 proposed to treat graduates of party schools the same as graduates of regular education programs. But the State Education Commission insisted on treating them differently in a letter of July 1995. The Central Committee of the CCP issued another document in 2000 to reiterate its original stand. In the newly revised “Regulations on Party School Work” published on September 3, 2008, the reference to the equivalency of the party school education to a regular education has been deleted. For details, see Wang Heyan, “Dangxiao xueli buzai xiangshou tongdeng guomin jiaoyu daiyu” (“Party school education does not enjoy the same treatment as regular education any longer”) Caijing, October 7, 2008. http://www.caijing.com.cn/2008-10-07/110017944.html. Yet when this regulation was formally released on October 30, 2008, it clearly specified that graduate degrees such as masters and PhDs from Party schools should be treated as the same as those from regular academic programs under the Ministry of Education, see http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/8254041.html. 4. He is reported to be the personal secretary of Chen Yonggui, former vice premier from Shanxi Province. For a report in this regard, see http://www. gxcznews.com.cn/staticpages/20080403/newgx47f52b20-52474.html. 5. For Jiao Huancheng’s biographical information, see http://www.ggj.gov.cn/ vldxx/jhc/. 6. For Wang Chen’s biographical information, see http://www.scio.gov.cn/jbqk/ zygy/wangchen/jl/200804/t158316.htm. 7. For Cao Jianming’s biographical information, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/ ziliao/2002-02/28/content_295052.htm. 8. For Pan Yunhe’s biographical information, see http://baike.baidu.com/view/ 48872.htm. 9. For Su Shulin’s biographical information, see http://www.ce.cn/cysc/ny/ shiyou/200706/23/t20070623_11903232.shtml. 10. Chen Tonghai, a princeling [son of Chen Weida (1916–1990), former Party secretary of Tianjin], was dismissed because of his involvement in corruption cases. For Chen Tonghai’s biographical information, see http://club.qingdaonews.com/showAnnounce.php?topic_id=4145124&board_id=2.

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Central Committee 87 11. For Li Congjun’s official biographical information, see http://203.192.6.89/ xhs/2007-08/31/content_11020318.htm. 12. For an article about Xiao Difei, see http://www.online.sdu.edu.cn/subject/ rencai/article.php?aid=993. 13. For the historical evolution of Nanchang University, see http://www.ncu.edu. cn/web/html/menu22.htm. 14. In news about his election as an alternate member of the 17th Central Committee, Yu was identified as an alumnus who entered the University in 1979. See http://xyh.ncu.edu.cn/shownew.asp?id=1499. 15. For Yu Xinrong’s biographical information, see http://leaders.people.com.cn/ GB/58318/58457/81385/81386/5844834.html 16. For an abstract, see ttp://www.lw23.com/detail_102e368f-67d3-4165-8ed666247c474274.html. 17. Wang Min, Party secretary of Jilin, worked in the Hong Kong Polytechnic Institute as a visiting scholar for two years, from 1987 to 1989. 18. For Xie Heping’s biographical information, see http://www.scu.org.cn/ Aboutscu/aboutscu5.asp. 19. For details, see Bo, China’s Elite Politics, p. 83. 20. For Lin Mingyue’s biographical information, see http://baike.baidu.com/ view/1215389.html. 21. For Wang Guangya’s personal experience, see http://www.chinanews.com.cn/ gj/kong/news/2007/12-13/1104065.shtml. 22. His official resume published after his appointment as president of Shanghai Jiaotong University initially did not list his educational experiences at Inner Mongolia University. That omission caused some stir among netizens. His resume later was revised and includes his education at Inner Mongolia University. For details, see http://club.chinaren.com/12/122747539. 23. He missed only one point out of 100 in the Chinese writing test and was the second best examinee in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region in 1977. For details, see http://exam.21tx.com/2007/06/12/10901.html. 24. For Zhan Wenlong’s personal experience, see http://www.nsfc.gov.cn/nsfc/ desktop/jjyw.aspx@infoid=6113.htm. 25. His ancestral home is Huaiyuan, Anhui Province. For details, see http:// www.edu.cn/pkujzyg_5472/20070411/t20070411_227784.shtml. 26. For Min Weifang’s biographical information, see http://baike.baidu.com/ view/536653.htm. 27. For Zhai Huqu’s biographical information, see http://www.caas.net.cn/caas/ Leader/ZhaiHuqu.asp. 28. For Zhou Ji’s biographical information, see http://www.china.com.cn/ chinese/zhengyao/371539.htm.

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29. For Chen Cungen’s biographical information, see http://baike.baidu.com/ view/488585.htm. His doctoral degree needs further confirmation from English sources. 30. Zhao Xiangeng went back to his alma mater in May 2008 as a representative of the 1977 Class of Physics of the University. See http://news.sxu.edu.cn/xcb/ html/2008-5-27/2008527111206.htm. 31. According to a report, Zhao Xiangeng went to the same university as Niu Qian. Professor Niu Qian acquired his PhD in physics (in 1985) from the University of Washington. Therefore, Zhao Xiangeng must also have obtained his PhD there. For the report, see http://www.stdaily.com/other/dengxiaoping/ chunsongcontentzhang7.htm. For Professor Niu Qian’s information, see http://www.ph.utexas.edu/~niugroup/niu.html. 32. Wu Xianguo was dismissed in September 2008 because of the Sanlu milk scandal. For details, see http://news.163.com/08/0922/19/4MFG6UBT00 01124J.html. 33. For Li Andong’s biographical information, see http://gongxue.cn/gongchengzonglan/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=1689. 34. The total here is 370 instead of 371 because one case is missing. There is no information on the birthday of Lieutenant General Dong Wancai, director of the Political Department of the Beijing Military Region. 35. For Jin Zhuanglong’s biographical information, see http://baike.baidu.com/ view/488502.htm. 36. For the news about the inauguration of the company, see http://www.fdms. fudan.edu.cn/EN/aboutus/ShowNews.aspx?InfoGuid=c33fddfa-1f0a-4568ae73-e20a6bbe505f. 37. There were altogether 50 people who received such an honorary title in 2006. For the complete list, see http://news.qq.com/a/20060630/001884.htm. 38. Home province is “jiguan” in Chinese, usually the province where one’s father was born. It is different from birthplace (chushengdi), the province where one was born. For instance, Jia Qinglin’s home province is Hebei, but he was born in Shandong. In an official document, the home province is often reported. 39. The total here is 369 instead of 371 because there are no information on home province of Cao Qing, chief of the Central Guards, and Xu Yitian, political commissar of the National University of Defense Technology. 40. http://www.fjsq.gov.cn/ShowText.asp?ToBook=3092&index=1634&. 41. http://baike.baidu.com/view/917930.htm. 42. For the definition of the Shanghai Gang, see Bo, China’s Elite Politics, p. 141. 43. http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2006-11/12/content_5319085.htm. 44. For Chen Yiqin’s biographical information, see http://baike.baidu.com/view/ 768829.html. 45. For details, see http://www.e56.com.cn/system_file/minority/shezu/shezu/ shezu.htm.

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Central Committee 89 46. In fact, there are more central committee members who have local leadership experience — the experience of local management including provincial management. According to this new criterion, there would be altogether 229 (61.7 percent) in the Seventeenth Central Committee who have this kind of experience, including 101 alternate members (60.5 percent) and 128 full members (62.8 percent). 47. He Ping and Liu Siyang, “Xinhuashe: Jianfuqi Jiwangkailai de Zhangyao Shiming — Dang de Xinyijian Zhongyang Weiyuanhui Danshengji” (“Xinhua News Agency: Shoulder the Solemn Mission of Succession — The Story of the Birth of a New Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party”), Renmin Ribao, November 15, 2002, p. 3. 48. “Xinyijie Zhonggong Zhongyang Weiyuanhui he Zhonggong Zhongyang Jiwei Danshengji” (“The Birth of a new Central Committee and a new Central Disciplinary Inspection Commission”), Zhongqingwang, October 21, 2007. http://vweb.youth.cn/cms/2006/2006news/jd17/dsj/200711/t20071108_ 610013_4.htm.

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Chapter

3 Institutional Representation The National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which is held once every five years, is the occasion when power is distributed (or redistributed) among different political institutions. Institutional representation refers to the extent to which each institution is represented in the Central Committee of the CCP,1 and institutional balance refers to the proportion of the Central Committee representation allocated to major political institutions in China.2 Four major institutions — provincial units, central institutions, military institutions, and corporations — are all represented on the Seventeenth Central Committee. Compared to the Sixteenth Central Committee elected in 2002, provincial units continue to be prominent in the Seventeenth Central Committee, central institutions were still heterogeneous, the military remained more or less the same, and corporations expanded the presence. Provincial leaders constituted the largest group with 155 members, taking 41.8 percent of the total (Table 3.1). Central leaders were the second largest group with 124 members, taking 33.4 percent of the all. Military leaders came in a distant third with 64 members (17.3 percent), and corporate leaders were the smallest group with 28 members (7.6 percent). In terms of full membership, central leaders ranked the first with 95 members, followed by provincial leaders with 67 members. While there were 41 military full members, there 91

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The Seventeenth Central Committee by Institution Alternate

Full

Total

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

88 29 23 27

52.69 17.37 13.77 16.17

67 95 41 1

32.84 46.57 20.10 0.49

155 124 64 28

41.78 33.42 17.25 7.55

167

100.00

204

100.00

371

100.00

Provincial Leaders Central Leaders Military Leaders Corporate Leaders Total Source: Author’s database.

was only one corporate full member. There were 88 provincial leaders who were alternate members, taking 52.7 percent of the total number of alternate members. The remaining 79 alternate members were evenly distributed among central (29), military (23), and corporate (27) institutions. PROVINCIAL REPRESENTATION As on the Sixteenth Central Committee, provincial leaders continued to feature prominently in the Seventeenth Central Committee. Provincial leaders were the major source for new recruits for the new Politburo and its Standing Committee. Out of nine new members of the Seventeenth Politburo, six (66.7 percent) came from provinces. Out of four new members of the new Politburo Standing Committee, two were provincial leaders. Out of the total of 25 members of the Politburo, 10 (40 percent) were provincial leaders. Elite Provincial Units The number of provincial units that enjoyed the status of elite provinces3 remained the same as on the Sixteenth Central Committee (Table 3.2). All four centrally administered municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing) were represented on the Seventeenth Politburo. For the first time in 10 years, Chongqing’s

1969

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Table 3.2

Elite Provincial Units in China (1969–2007)

1973

1977

1987

1992

1997

2002

2007

ccvc

ccpa

ccpf

ccpf

ccpf

ccps

ccpf

ccpf

ccps

ccpf

ccps

Total

Beijing Tianjin Hebei Shanxi Liaoning Shanghai Jiangsu Zhejiang Anhui Shandong Henan Hubei Hunan Guangdong Guangxi Sichuan Tibet Shaanxi Xinjiang Chongqing

0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2 0 0 0 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

1 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1

2 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0

1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0

1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0

1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0

1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0

2 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1

0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

12 4 1 2 3 12 3 1 1 3 3 2 1 6 1 3 1 1 4 1

Total

3

8

3

7

1

2

6

4

5

1

5

8

2

8

2

65

93

Notes: ccpf = Full Members of the Politburo; ccpa = Alternate Members of the Politburo; ccps = Standing Members of the Politburo; ccvc = Vice Chairmen of the Central Committee. Source: Updated from Bo Zhiyue, China’s Elite Politics: Political Transition and Power Balancing (Singapore: World Scientific, 2007), Table 3.2, p. 113.

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Party secretary (Wang Yang) was also installed in the Politburo along with his colleagues from Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai. In Beijing, the Party boss (Liu Qi) and the mayor (Wang Qishan) both entered the Seventeenth Politburo. Guangdong, Hubei, and Xinjiang continued their presence in the Politburo, and Jiangsu and Liaoning became new elite provinces. Geographically, elite provincial units in the Seventeenth Central Committee were more evenly distributed than they were in the Sixteenth Central Committee. The new elite provincial units included two in the North (Beijing and Tianjin), two in the East (Shanghai and Jiangsu), two in the Central-South (Guangdong and Hubei), one in the Southwest (Chongqing), one in the Northwest (Xinjiang), and one in the Northeast. In terms of the three major economic areas, the Eastern Region was overrepresented by a large margin. Six out of 12 provincial units4 in the region had Politburo seats. In addition to the three centrally administered municipalities, three provinces were represented in the Politburo and two of them (Shanghai and Liaoning) were represented in the Standing Committee of the Politburo. The Central Region5 was least represented, with only one elite province (Hubei), the same as in 2002. The Western Region6 was better represented in the Politburo than the Central Region, with two elite provincial units (Chongqing and Xinjiang). However, many of these provincial leaders are unlikely to stay in their provinces for long. Li Yuanchao was transferred to Beijing as director of the Central Organization Department on October 26, 2007.7 Xi Jinping of Shanghai was transferred to Beijing and Yu Zhengsheng of Hubei was transferred to Shanghai on October 27, 2007.8 Li Keqiang of Liaoning was also transferred to Beijing two days later.9 Provincial Central Committee Representation All provincial units were represented in the Seventeenth Central Committee (Table 3.3). The 33 provincial units that had representation in the Sixteenth Central Committee were all represented in the Seventeenth Central Committee. On average, there were about two

1969

1973

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Table 3.3

Provincial Central Committee Representation (1969–2007)

1977

1982

1987

1992

1997

2002

2007

6 0 1 3 2 2 3 5 4 3 3 2 2 5 3 2 5 4 3 2

5 4 5 3 4 6 3 2 9 4 3 3 1 1 4 5 5 3 9 3

4 1 1 2 1 2 2 3 4 4 4 1 1 2 2 5 2 2 4 4

4 4 5 3 2 5 2 3 6 3 2 3 4 4 4 3 5 4 5 2

3 0 4 3 2 3 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 4 3 2 4 4 2

1 4 2 2 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 0 3 2 1 1 5 2 3 3

3 2 3 1 2 2 1 0 5 2 1 2 1 1 2 3 0 3 2 1

2 2 1 3 2 3 3 3 1 3 2 2 2 2 3 2 3 3 3 1

1 2 1 2 3 2 1 4 2 3 1 1 2 3 4 2 3 3 4 2

3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2

2 2 3 1 2 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 1 1 3 1 2 1 4 1

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

3 3 2 3 3 3 2 3 2 2 3 3 2 3 4 3 2 2 6 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

9 9 6 7 7 7 6 7 8 8 9 7 6 7 11 7 8 6 13 7

2 3 4 2 3 3 2 3 1 4 3 3 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 4

1 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2

2 1

1

1 1

1 1

10 9 8 6 7 11 6 7 9 11 7 7 8 7 7 7 10 8 10 8

95

(Continued )

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4 1 1 3 1 1 3 2 4 3 3 2 3 1 1 4 2 2 3 2

Institutional Representation

Beijing Tianjin Hebei Shanxi Inner Mongolia Liaoning Jilin Heilongjiang Shanghai Jiangsu Zhejiang Anhui Fujian Jiangxi Shandong Henan Hubei Hunan Guangdong Guangxi

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cca ccf cca ccf cca ccf cca ccf cca ccf cca ccf cca ccf cca ccf Index cca ccf ccp psbc Index

1973

1977

1982

1987

1992

1997

2002

2007

6 0 4 1 2 5 1 0 2

8 1 3 2 3 1 4 4 3

5 3 3 2 2 4 0 0 3

4 1 4 2 2 1 2 3 3

4 2 4 3 2 4 2 1 3

4 2 3 1 1 1 1 2 2

75 91 89 104 73 98 64

3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 3

2 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 3

3 3 2 3 3 1 1 2 2

4 1 2 2 3 3 2 1 3 2

69 53 66 69

2 2 2 3 2 2 1 2 3 2

1 1 3 3 1 0 1 2 3 2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

62 49

63

4 3 3 2 3 3 2 2 3 2 2 0 0

2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 4 2 3 1 1

10 7 7 8 7 7 6 6 13 6 8 2 2

86 68

244

2 3 3 1 2 3 2 2 3 2 3 0 0

2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 3 2 1 1 1

88 57

6 7 7 7 6 7 6 6 13 6 9 2 2

1 1

8

2

247

Notes: cca = Alternate Members of the Central Committee; ccf = Full Members of the Central Committee; ccp = Full Members of the Politburo; pbsc = Members of the Politburo Standing Committee. Shanghai and Jiangsu have one additional point because Xi Jinping and Li Yuanchao are both members of the Secretariat. Source: Updated from Bo Zhiyue, China’s Elite Politics: Political Transition and Power Balancing (Singapore: World Scientific, 2007), Table 3.3, p. 117.

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Total

6 3 2 2 3 2 4 3 4

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Sichuan Guizhou Yunnan Tibet Shaanxi Gansu Qinghai Ningxia Xinjiang Hainan Chongqing Hong Kong Macao

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cca ccf cca ccf cca ccf cca ccf cca ccf cca ccf cca ccf cca ccf Index cca ccf ccp psbc Index

China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization

1969

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(Continued )

Table 3.3

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97

full members from each of these provincial units, with four exceptions: Tibet had three full members; Xinjiang had four full members; and Hong Kong and Macao each had one full member. Without any exception, all provincial Party secretaries and governors were full members. In Tibet, in addition to the Party secretary (Zhang Qingli) and the chairman of the regional government (Qiangba Puncog), Legqog, chairman of the Standing Committee of the Tibetan Autonomous Regional People’s Congress, was also a full member. In Xinjiang, in addition to the Party secretary (Wang Lequan) and the chairman of the government (Ismail Tiliwaldi), there were two more full members. One was Nie Weiguo, deputy Party secretary and political commissar of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps. The other was Ashat Kerimbay, chairman of the Xinjiang People’s Political Consultative Conference. Both of them were elected as alternate members of the Sixteenth Central Committee in November 2002, but Ashat Kerimbay was promoted to a full member of the Sixteenth Central Committee in September 2004.10 Nie was elevated to a full membership on the Seventeenth Central Committee. As on the Sixteenth Central Committee, Hong Kong and Macao were both represented on the Seventeenth Central Committee. Gao Siren, director of the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) and a full member of the Sixteenth Central Committee, was a deputy to the Seventeenth Party Congress but was absent from the Seventeenth Central Committee. His deputy, Peng Qinghua, was made a full member of the Seventeenth Central Committee. Born in March 1944, Gao Siren was more than 63 years old in October 2007. Peng Qinghua, a native of Hubei, however, was only 50 years old in 2007.11 Peng, along with Li Guikang, was appointed deputy director of Hong Kong’s Liaison Office in January 2004.12 In Macao, Bai Zhijian, director of the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government in the Macao SAR, continued to be a full member of the Seventeenth Central Committee. The provincial alternate-member representation on the Seventeenth Central Committee was less diverse across provincial units than that of the Sixteenth Central Committee. No provincial

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units had more than four alternate members. Seven provinces had four alternate members. They were Hebei, Jiangsu, Fujian, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, and Guangxi. Fourteen provincial units had three alternate members. Eight provincial units had two alternate members. Two provincial units had one alternate member each. And, finally, Hong Kong and Macao did not have any alternate members. It is understandable that Tibet had only one alternate member because it had three full members. However, Shanghai is a bit puzzling. One of the elite provincial units with its Party secretary on the Seventeenth Politburo Standing Committee, Shanghai only had one alternate member. Yin Yicui, deputy secretary of Shanghai and an alternate member of the Sixteenth Central Committee, managed to enter the Seventeenth Central Committee as an alternate member. No one else from Shanghai was elected. Compared to five years earlier, Shanghai suffered major losses. In 2002, Huang Ju, former Party secretary of Shanghai, was transferred to Beijing before the Sixteenth Party Congress and entered the Sixteenth Politburo Standing Committee; and Chen Liangyu was promoted to Party secretary and was made into the Sixteenth Politburo. In addition, there was another full member (Han Zheng) and two alternate members (Yin Yicui and Liu Yungeng). Liu Yungeng, former deputy secretary and secretary of Shanghai’s Political and Legal Affairs Commission, was retired to Shanghai’s Municipal People’s Congress Standing Committee in February 2007.13 Born in July 1947, he was close to 60 years old. Neither Wu Zhiming (chief of the Public Security Bureau of Shanghai and secretary of Shanghai’s Political and Legal Affairs Commission) nor Shen Hongguang (director of Shanghai’s Organization Department) was elected an alternate member, although both were deputies to the Seventeenth Party Congress. With Yu Zhengsheng as the new Party boss of Shanghai, Shanghai is getting back to the pattern of personnel arrangement before Jiang Zemin’s era when outsiders were transferred to Shanghai as chief Party and government leaders. In terms of absolute numbers, provinces contributed 67 full members and 88 alternate members. Compared to five years earlier,

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provinces had one less full member and two more alternate members in 2007. Provincial Central Committee Index In order to make a comparison across provinces as well as among different institutional groups, we will produce a central committee index (or representation index) according to the following scheme.14 An alternate member of the Central Committee receives one point, a full member two, an alternate Politburo member one more, a full Politburo member two more, a standing Politburo member three more, and the general secretary five more.15 In addition, members of the Secretariat receive one more point each; and members of the Central Military Commission (CMC) receive two more points each and vice chairmen of the CMC three more points each. On average, the provincial central committee index was 7.5, with a range between 2 and 13 (the last column of Table 3.3). Hong Kong and Macao were the lowest with only two points each, and Xinjiang was the highest with 13. Jiangsu and Liaoning were noteworthy with 11 each. Jiangsu’s index was boosted because of its Party secretary, Li Yuanchao. He was a full member of the Politburo as well as a member of the Secretariat. Liaoning, on the other hand, emerged as a political star because of Li Keqiang, a standing member of the Politburo. Beijing is also noticeable because it contributed two Politburo members (Liu Qi and Wang Qishan). With an index of 9, Shanghai did not look terribly bad. This is because Xi Jinping was a standing member of the Politburo and a member of the Secretariat. However, these three provincial units were soon affected because of the departure of their Party bosses. Li Yuanchao was appointed director of the Central Organization Department on October 26, 2007. Governor Liang Baohua became concurrent Party secretary of Jiangsu.16 Xi Jinping was transferred to Beijing on October 27, 2007 and Yu Zhengsheng became the new Party secretary.17 The total scores from all provincial units were 247, representing 42 percent of the total scores (without core leaders) and thus making provinces the most powerful institution in Chinese politics.

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CENTRAL REPRESENTATION The representation of central organs is much more fragmented. On the surface, it seems that many central committee members were from the center. The total number of central officials, including the top leaders, stood at 124, with 95 full members and 29 alternate members. Central Party Institutions These members, however, came from a number of different sources. First, central Party institutions contributed many full and alternate members (Table 3.4). Among central Party leaders, six were Politburo members (including three standing members), three Secretariat members, 15 full members, and two alternate members. Hu Jintao (General Secretary), Li Changchun, and He Guoqiang (director of the Central Organization Department) were standing members; Liu Yunshan (director of the Central Propaganda Department), Liu Yandong (director of the Central United Front Department), and Wang Gang (secretary of the Work Committee of the Departments under the Central Committee and former director of the General Office) were Politburo members. Liu Yunshan was also a member of the Secretariat. Liu Yandong was the only female member of the Politburo. Just released as director of the General Office, Wang Gang was promoted from an alternate member to a full member of the Politburo without any particular portfolio. Ling Jihua (born 1956), director of the General Office, was made a member of the Secretariat but not a member of the Politburo. This was a bit unusual because two of his immediate predecessors managed to get into the Politburo as an alternate member. Zeng Qinghong, director of the General Office from 1993 to 1999, entered the Fifteenth Politburo as an alternate member without any prior Central Committee experience.18 His successor, Wang Gang, entered the Sixteenth Politburo as an alternate member. Wang had been an alternate member of the Fifteenth Central Committee.19 Ling Jihua was an alternate member of the Sixteenth Central

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Institutional Representation Table 3.4 2007)

Central Party-Institution Central Committee Representation (October

Central Party Institutions Politburo Central Disciplinary Inspection Commission Organization Department Propaganda Department United Front Department International Liaison Department General Office Central Guards Bureau Party School People’s Daily Party History Research Center Party Literature Compilation and Translation Bureau Work Committee of the Central Government Work Committee of the Departments Under the Central Committee Committee of Politics and Law under the Central Committee Committee for Comprehensive Management of Public Security Policy Research Office of the Central Committee Taiwan Office International Communications Office Central Foreign Affairs Office Committee of State Secrets Office of Central Party Institutions Total

101

cca

ccf

ccpf

ccps

sec

2

11 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1

7 7 6 2 3 1 3 2 2

1

2

1

1 1 1

1

1

1

6

1

2

1

1

1

3

Index

3

1

1 2

1

2

15

3

3

3

64

Notes: cca = Alternate Members of the Central Committee; ccf = Full Members of the Central Committee; ccpf = Full Members of the Politburo; ccps = Standing Members of the Politburo; sec = Members of the Secretariat. Source: Updated from Bo Zhiyue, China’s Elite Politics: Political Transition and Power Balancing (Singapore: World Scientific, 2007), Table 3.4, p. 122.

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Committee. Ling’s Central Committee experience before the Seventeenth Party Congress was better than Zeng Qinghong’s and the same as Wang Gang’s, but he failed to enter the Seventeenth Politburo as an alternate member. Wang Huning (born 1955), director of the Policy Research Office of the Central Committee, was also promoted to the Secretariat. A native of Shandong, Wang spent most of his adult life in Shanghai.20 After studying English in a training program at the Cadre School of Shanghai Normal University between 1972 and 1977, he worked for the Publication Administration for a couple of years. From 1978 to 1994, he first studied at Fudan University as a graduate student and then served as an instructor, associate professor, professor, chair of the Department of International Politics, and dean of the Law School at the university. He was called to Beijing by Jiang Zemin and Zeng Qinghong in 1995 to work in the Policy Research Office of the Central Committee. He entered the Sixteenth Central Committee as a full member and was promoted to the Secretariat in October 2007. He Yong (born 1940) was retained as a full member of the Seventeenth Central Committee as well as the first deputy secretary of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC). He was also retained as a member of the Secretariat. He Guoqiang (born 1943), a standing member and director of the Central Organization Department, was elected secretary of the CDIC. He Guoqiang exited from the Secretariat, and was replaced by Li Yuanchao as director of the Central Organization Department four days after the Seventeenth Party Congress. Finally, Cao Qing replaced You Xigui as the chief of the Central Guards Bureau before the Congress21 and was elected an alternate member of the Seventeenth Central Committee. Unlike You Xigui, who was the least popular alternate member of the Sixteenth Central Committee, Cao Qing is ranked No. 133 out of 167 alternate members on the Seventeenth Central Committee. Compared to the Sixteenth Central Committee, central Party institutions in the Seventeenth Central Committee had fewer alternate members. They had six alternate members in the Sixteenth Central

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Institutional Representation

103

Committee but only three alternate members in the Seventeenth Central Committee. In addition to Cao Qing, the other two were Wang Weiguang, vice president of the Central Party School,22 and Zheng Lizhong, the executive deputy director of the Taiwan Affairs Office. Apparently, no one from the Compilation and Translation Bureau made it into the Seventeenth Central Committee. Its deputy director, Yu Keping (born 1959), has made his name as a member of Hu Jintao’s think-tank. With an essay entitled “Democracy is a Good Thing”, he is well-known as a proponent of democracy in China. However, he was not even elected as a deputy to the Seventeenth Party Congress. Xia Yong, another advisor of Hu Jintao and director of the Committee of State Secrets, made it to the Seventeenth Party Congress as a deputy but was absent from the Seventeenth Central Committee. The total representation index of the central Party institutions was 64. Central Government Institutions Central government institutions were another major contributor. Under the State Council, there are altogether 76 institutions (Table 3.5). These include 28 ministries and commissions, one special organization directly under the State Council, 19 organizations directly under the State Council, four offices, 14 institutions, and 10 bureaus and administrations under the ministries and commissions. In addition, there are 28 other offices of coordination. These institutions contributed 56 full members and 15 alternate members. Among the full members, one (Vice Premier Hui Liangyu) was a Politburo member and two (Premier Wen Jiabao and State Councilor Zhou Yongkang) were standing members of the Politburo. Among 28 ministries and commissions, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is noteworthy. It had three full members and one alternate member, far more than any other ministry. Minister Yang Jiechi, Vice Minister Dai Bingguo, and Vice Minister Wang Yi were all elected full members. Wang Guangya, Chinese ambassador to the United Nations, was also elected an alternate member. It seems that the power in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been fragmented. Unlike

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Central Government Central Committee Representation (October

Central Government Institutions

cca

State Council State Council Leaders General Office Ministries and Commissions (28) Foreign Affairs National Defense National Development and Reform Commission Education Science and Technology Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense State Ethnic Affairs Commission Public Security State Security Supervision Civil Affairs Justice Finance Personnel Labor and Social Security Land and Resources Construction Railways Communications Information Industry Water Resources Agriculture Commerce Culture Health National Population and Family Planning Commission People’s Bank of China National Audit Office Special Organization directly under the State Council (1) State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission

ccf

ccpf

2 1

1

ccps Index

2

18 2

1

3

7

1

2 1 1 1

5 2 2 3

1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

2

1

(Continued)

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Institutional Representation Table 3.5

105

(Continued)

Central Government Institutions Organizations directly under the State Council (19) General Administration of Customs State Administration of Taxation General Administration for Industry and Commerce General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection, and Quarantine State Environmental Protection Administration General Administration of the Civil Aviation State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television General Administration of Press and Publication State General Administration of Sports State Administration of Work Safety National Bureau of Statistics State Forestry Administration State Food and Drug Administration State Intellectual Property Office National Tourism Administration State Administration of Religious Affairs Counselor’s Office of the State Council Government Offices Administration of the State Council National Bureau of Corruption Prevention

cca

1

ccpf

ccps Index

1 1 1 1

2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1

2 2 2 2 3 2

1

2

1

1

1

1

Administrative offices under the State Council (4) Overseas Chinese Affairs Office Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office Legislative Affairs Office Research Office Institutions directly under the State Council (14) Xinhua News Agency Chinese Academy of Sciences Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Chinese Academy of Engineering Development Research Center of the State Council National School of Administration China Seismological Bureau China Meteorological Administration

ccf

1

2

1

2

1

2 1 1 1 2 2

1 1 1 1 1

(Continued)

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(Continued)

Central Government Institutions China Banking Regulatory Commission China Securities Regulatory Commission China Insurance Regulatory Commission National Electricity Regulatory Commission National Council for Social Security Fund National Natural Science Foundation

cca

ccpf

ccps Index

1 1 1 1

2 2 1 1

1

1

1

1

Administrations and Bureaus under the Ministries and Commissions (10) State Bureau of Letters and Calls State Administration of Grain State Tobacco Monopoly Administration State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs State Oceanic Administration State Bureau of Surveying and Mapping State Post Bureau State Administration of Cultural Heritage State Administration of Traditional Chinese Medicine State Administration of Foreign Exchange

1

Other Offices South-to-North Water Diversion

1

Total

ccf

15

1 1 53

1

2

135

Notes: cca = Alternate Members of the Central Committee; ccf = Full Members of the Central Committee; ccpf = Full Members of the Politburo; ccps = Standing Members of the Politburo. Source: Updated from Bo Zhiyue, China’s Elite Politics: Political Transition and Power Balancing (Singapore: World Scientific, 2007) Table 3.5, pp. 125–126.

most other ministries and commissions where the minister is also secretary of the Party group of the ministry, the foreign minister is not the same as the secretary of the Party group of the ministry. When Li Zhaoxing was foreign minister, Dai Bingguo was the secretary of the Party group of the ministry. When Yang Jiechi was appointed minister of foreign affairs, Dai Bingguo remained the secretary. In September 2007, Wang Yi, Chinese ambassador to Japan, was transferred back to Beijing as vice minister and secretary of the Party group.23

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107

Originally, there was no one from the Ministry of National Defense on the Seventeenth Central Committee. Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan retired from the Central Committee. He also retired from the ministry in March 2008. He was replaced by General Liang Guanglie, former chief of general staff, who had been reelected to the Seventeenth Central Committee and the new Central Military Commission. With three more exceptions, all the other ministries and commissions had one full member. Some of these people were not yet ministers, but they were either the secretary of the Party group of the ministry (or commission) or the executive vice minister. Because both the minister of science and technology (Wan Gang) and the minister of health (Chen Zhu) are not CCP members, they are not eligible to be on the Seventeenth Central Committee. These two ministries were represented by their Party group secretaries, Li Xueyong for the Ministry of Science and Technology and Gao Qiang for the Health Ministry. The three exceptions were National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), Public Security, and Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (CSTIND). In NDRC, both the minister (Ma Kai) and the executive vice minister (Zhu Zhixin) were elected full members. Another vice minister, Chen Deming (former governor of Shaanxi), was elected an alternate member. The Ministry of Public Security actually produced three full members. Its minister, Zhou Yongkang, is now on the Politburo Standing Committee. Two of his deputies, Bai Jingfu and Liu Jing, were elected full members. In CSTIND,24 Minister Zhang Qingwei (born 1961) was reelected as a full member; and one of his deputies, Jin Zhuanglong (born 1964), was elected a new alternate member.25 Among the organizations directly under the State Council, two major ones were absent from the Seventeenth Central Committee. The head of the National Bureau of Statistics, Xie Fuzhan, was elected a deputy to the Seventeenth Party Congress but did not make it to the Seventeenth Central Committee. His predecessor, Qiu Xiaohua, was dismissed from office and expelled from the Party because of his involvement in corruption cases.26 The head of the

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State Food and Drug Administration, Shao Mingli, was also a deputy but not a member of the Seventeenth Central Committee. His predecessor, Zheng Xiaoyu, was executed in February 2007 because of his involvement in corruption cases.27 Among the institutions under the State Council, there were as many alternate members as full members. The Xinhua News Agency (Li Congjun), Development Research Center of the State Council (Zhang Yutai), the National School of Administration (Jiang Yikang), China Banking Regulatory Commission (Liu Mingkang), and China Securities Regulatory Commission (Shang Fulin) all had full members, while the Chinese Academy of Sciences (Bai Chunli), the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Leng Rong), the Chinese Academy of Engineering (Pan Yunhe), China Insurance Regulatory Commission (Wu Dingfu), and the National Electricity Regulatory Commission (You Quan) produced alternate members. Out of 10 bureaus under the ministries and commissions, only three managed to send alternate members. They were the State Letters and Complaints Bureau (Wang Xuejun), the State Bureau of Surveying and Mapping (Lu Xinshe), and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange [Hu Xiaolian (f.)]. Hu Xiaolian was also vice governor of the People’s Bank of China (the Central Bank). Finally, one of the other offices under the State Council also contributed an alternate member. The head of the South-to-North Water Diversion Office, Zhang Jiyao, was also elected as a new alternate member of the Seventeenth Central Committee. His deputy, Meng Xuenong, was appointed acting governor of Shanxi Province and was reelected as a full member. The total representation index of the central government institutions under the State Council was 135. Other Central Institutions There are other central institutions that do not belong to either the central Party institutions or the central government institutions under the State Council. These include the National People’s Congress (NPC), the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference

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109

(CPPCC), the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, various associations, and a number of national banking institutions (Table 3.6). These institutions contributed 28 members to the Seventeenth Central Committee — 17 full members and 11 alternate members. Among the full members, there were three Politburo members (including two standing members).

Table 3.6 2007)

Other Central Institution Central Committee Representation (October

Central Institutions National People’s Congress Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Courts Associations China’s Association for Science and Technology All China Federation of Trade Unions Chinese Communist Youth League All China Women’s Association China Disabled Persons’ Federation Chinese National Association of Industry and Commerce All China Federation of Taiwan Compatriots China’s Writers’ Association China’s Federation of Literary and Art Circles All China Federation of Supply and Marketing Cooperatives China Federation of Overseas Chinese Banks Bank of China Bank of Agriculture Bank of Construction Bank of Development Bank of Industry and Commerce Total

cca

ccf

ccpf

ccps

Index

1

1 1

1

3 6 1

15 17 3 13

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2

1

1 5

1 1 1 1 1 12

15

1

2

56

Notes: cca = Alternate Members of the Central Committee; ccf = Full Members of the Central Committee; ccpf = Full Members of the Politburo; ccps = Standing Members of the Politburo. Source: Author’s database.

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The NPC produced one standing member, one Politburo member, and three full members. Chairman Wu Bangguo was reelected as a standing member of the Seventeenth Politburo, and Vice Chairman Wang Zhaoguo (also chairman of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions) was reelected as a member of the Politburo. Vice Chairman Lu Yongxiang (also president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences) and Vice Chairwoman Uyunqimg (a Mongolian) were reelected as full members, and Deputy Secretary General Wang Wanbin was also elected as a full member. The CPPCC contributed one standing member and six full members. Chairman Jia Qinglin was retained in the Seventeenth Politburo Standing Committee. Vice Chairmen Abdul’ahat Abdulrixit (Uygur), Bai Lichen (Hui), Chen Kuiyuan (also president of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences), Li Zhaozhuo (Zhuang), and Liao Hui were all reelected as full members of the Seventeenth Central Committee. Deputy Secretary General Yang Chonghui was elected as a new full member of the Central Committee. In addition, Liu Yandong, director of the Central United Front, was also a vice chairwoman of the CPPCC. She was made a member of the Politburo. Both presidents of the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate were absent from the Seventeenth Central Committee. Xiao Yang (born August 1938), president of the Supreme People’s Court since 1998 and member of the fifteenth and sixteenth central committees, was already 69 years old in October 2007.28 Cao Jianming (born September 1955), the executive vice president of the Supreme People’s Court, was promoted from an alternate member of the Sixteenth Central Committee to a full member of the Seventeenth Central Committee. Similarly, Jia Chunwang (born May 1938), president of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate since March 2003 and a member of the twelfth through sixteenth central committees, was also 69 years old in October 2007.29 Zhang Geng (born September 1944), the executive vice president of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate,30 was elected a new alternate member of the Seventeenth Central Committee.31

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111

Eleven associations were also represented on the Central Committee. They include the All-China Federation of Trade Unions [Sun Chunlan (f.), full member], the All-China Women’s Federation [Huang Qingyi (f.), full member], the China’s Association for Science and Technology [Deng Nan (f.), full member], the Chinese Communist Youth League (Hu Chunhua, full member), the Chinese National Association of Industry and Commerce (Quan Zhezhu, Korean, alternate member), the China’s Writers’ Association [Tie Ning (f.), alternate member], the China Federation of Literary and Art Circles (Hu Zhenmin, alternate member), the China Disabled Persons’ Federation (Wang Xinxian, alternate member), the AllChina Federation of Taiwan Compatriots [Lin Mingyue (f.), alternate member], the All-China Federation of Supply and Marketing Cooperatives (Wang Jun,32 full member), and China Federation of Overseas Chinese (Lin Jun, alternate member). Clearly, there are almost as many women in this category as men. Finally, five major banks were also represented on the Seventeenth Central Committee. Each of them had an alternate member. They were Xiao Gang (board chairman of the Bank of China), Xiang Junbo (governor of the Bank of Agriculture), Guo Shuqing (board chairman of the Bank of Construction), Chen Yuan (governor of the Bank of Development), and Jiang Jianqing (board chairman of the Bank of Industry). There are additional bankers on the Seventeenth Central Committee such as Zhou Xiaochuan (governor of the Central Bank) and Hu Xiaolian (f.) (vice governor of the Central Bank and head of the Foreign Exchange Bureau). The total representation index of these central institutions amounted to 56. The total representation index of all three categories of central institutions is 256, slightly more than the total representation index of provincial units (247). This seems to be the reversal of the comparison five years earlier, when the provincial representation index exceeded the central representation index by a large margin. The fact is that we have included all core leaders such as Hu Jintao, Wu Bangguo, Jia Qinglin, and Li Changchun in the central institutions in the Seventeenth Central Committee but excluded the core leaders from the central institutions on the Sixteenth Central Committee.

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In other words, if we exclude core leaders from the central institutions on the Seventeenth Central Committee, the total representation index of the central institutions would be substantially reduced. The revised central representation index would be 200, 47 less than that of the provincial units, about the same as in 2002. MILITARY REPRESENTATION The military representation in the Seventeenth Central Committee remained more or less the same as in the Sixteenth Central Committee. No military leaders had a seat on the Standing Committee of the Politburo, and there were two Politburo members from the military. In addition, the military contributed 39 full members and 23 alternate members (Table 3.7). Compared to the Sixteenth Central Committee, the military has two less full members and one less alternate member on the Seventeenth Central Committee. Moreover, the military is no longer represented on the Secretariat of the Seventeenth Central Committee. Central Military Institutions Military institutions in China can be roughly divided into central and local institutions. The central military institutions include the Central Military Commission (CMC), four general departments, three services and armed police force, and three major military academies. These military institutions contributed 25 full members and 11 alternate members to the Seventeenth Central Committee. Among these full members, two were Politburo members and 10 were CMC members. General Guo Boxiong (born 1942) was retained as a Politburo member and as the first vice chairman of the CMC. General Xu Caihou (born 1943) exited from the Secretariat and entered the Seventeenth Politburo. He remained a vice chairman of the CMC but his ranking moved one notch up because of General Cao Gangchuan’s retirement. General Liang Guanglie (born 1940), former chief of general staff, was retained as a member of the CMC without any specific portfolio. He later replaced General Cao Gangchuan as China’s defense minister.

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Institutional Representation Table 3.7

113

Military Central Committee Representation (October 2007)

Military Institutions Central Military Institutions Central Military Commission General Staff Department General Political Department General Logistics Department General Armament Department Navy Air Force Second Artillery Corps Chinese People’s Armed Police Force National Defense University Academy of Military Sciences National University of Defence Technology Subtotal

cca

ccf

ccpf

cmc

Index

1 1 1 1 2 1

1 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

2

3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

17 9 9 7 8 7 6 7 6 4 4 1

11

23

2

10

85

2

6 4 7 7 6 6 5 41

1 2

1

Local Military Regions Beijing Military Region Shenyang Military Region Lanzhou Military Region Chengdu Military Region Jinan Military Region Nanjing Military Region Guangzhou Military Region

1 1 2 2 1

2 2 3 3 2 2 2

Subtotal

9

16

Other

3

Total

23

2 39

2

10

128

Notes: cca = Alternate Members of the Central Committee; ccf = Full Members of the Central Committee; ccpf = Full Members of the Politburo; ccps = Standing Members of the Politburo. Source: Updated from Bo Zhiyue, China’s Elite Politics: Political Transition and Power Balancing (Singapore: World Scientific, 2007), Table 3.6, p. 129.

Lieutenant General Jia Ting’an (born 1952), Jiang Zemin’s confidant and former director of the General Office of the CMC,33 was made an alternate member of the Seventeenth Central Committee. However, he ranked No. 167 out of 167 alternate members and thus was the least popular alternate member of the Seventeenth Central Committee.

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Among the four general departments, two had three full members and one alternate member; one had two full members and one alternate member; and one had two full members and two alternate members. The General Staff Department (GSD) had three full members and one alternate member. General Chen Bingde (born 1941), the new chief of general staff, was reelected a full member of the Seventeenth Central Committee and a member of the CMC. Two of his deputies, General Ge Zhenfeng (born 1944) and Lieutenant General Ma Xiaotian (born 1949), were also reelected as full members of the Seventeenth Central Committee, Lieutenant General Sun Jianguo, assistant chief of general staff, was elected as a new alternate member. Two other deputy chiefs of general staff, General Liu Zhenwu (born 1944) and General Zhang Li (born 1943), were absent from the Seventeenth Central Committee, although the former had been an alternate member of the Fifteenth Central Committee and a full member of the Sixteenth Central Committee, and the latter had been an alternate member of the Sixteenth Central Committee. General Liu Zhenwu was the first commander of the PLA troops in Hong Kong. He was commander of the Guangzhou Military Region between January 2002 and June 2007 and was transferred to Beijing in June 2007 as deputy chief of general staff. He was awarded the rank of major general in July 1990, the rank of lieutenant general in July 1997, and the rank of general in June 2004.34 General Zhang Li’s resume looks less impressive. He was initially a staff member responsible for showing movies and later served as a secretary in various offices. He was awarded the rank of major general in 1997, the rank of lieutenant general in 1999, and the rank of general in June 2004.35 Both Liu and Zhang are likely to retire soon. Similarly, the General Political Department (GPD) also had three full members and one alternate member. General Li Jinai (born 1942), director of the GPD, was reelected a full member of the Seventeenth Central Committee and continued to serve on the CMC. All of his three deputies made it into the Seventeenth Central Committee: General Liu Yongzhi (born 1944) and General Sun Zhongtong (born 1944) were reelected as full members and Lieutenant General Liu Zhenqi (Hui)36 was an alternate member.

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The General Logistics Department (GLD) produced two full members and one alternate member. General Liao Xilong (born 1940), director of the GLD, was reelected as a full member of the Seventeenth Central Committee and continued to serve on the CMC. General Sun Dafa (born 1945), political commissar of the GLD, was elected as a new full member. Lieutenant General Li Maifu (born 1946), a deputy director, was elected a new alternate member. Two other deputy directors, however, were not elected to the Seventeenth Central Committee. Lieutenant General Sun Zhiqiang (born 1944) was a full member of the Sixteenth Central Committee but was not elected a deputy to the Seventeenth Party Congress. Lieutenant General Wang Qian (born 1946), an alternate member of the Sixteenth Central Committee, was also absent from the list of military deputies to the Seventeenth Party Congress and the Seventeenth Central Committee. The General Armament Department (GAD) had two full members and two alternate members. Lieutenant General Chang Wanquan (born 1949), former commander of the Shenyang Military Region, was appointed director of the GAD in September 2007.37 He was reelected as a full member of the Seventeenth Central Committee and entered the CMC as a new member. General Chi Wanchun (born 1946), political commissar of the GAD, was also reelected full members of the Seventeenth Central Committee. Lieutenant General Li Andong (born 1946), deputy director of the GAD and a full member of the Sixteenth Central Committee, was elected as an alternate member of the Seventeenth Central Committee probably due to the “democratic” procedure of allowing more candidates than seats. Lieutenant General Zhu Fazhong (born 1948), another deputy director and an alternate member of the Sixteenth Central Committee, remained an alternate member of the Seventeenth Central Committee. The PLA Navy, the PLA Air Force, and the PLA Second Artillery Corps (missile troops) each contributed two full members. Admiral Wu Shengli (commander of the Navy), General Xu Qiliang (commander of the Air Force), and General Jing Zhiyuan (commander of the Second Artillery Corps) were all elected full members of the

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Seventeenth Central Committee and members of the CMC. Born in March 1950, General Xu Qiliang was the youngest member of the CMC at the age of 57. Admiral Hu Yanlin (December 1943), political commissar of the PLA Navy, was a deputy to the Seventeenth Party Congress but was not elected to the Seventeenth Central Committee. Vice Admiral Liu Xiaojiang (born 1949), deputy political commissar of the Navy and son-in-law of Hu Yaobang (former general secretary of the Party), was elected a new full member. Vice Admiral Liu later replaced Admiral Hu as political commissar of the Navy. Vice Admiral Ding Yiping (born 1951), deputy commander and chief of staff of the Navy, was reelected as an alternate member of the Seventeenth Central Committee. General Peng Xiaofeng (born 1945), political commissar of the Second Artillery Corps, was elected a new full member of the Seventeenth Central Committee, and Lieutenant General Wei Fenghe (born 1954), chief of staff of the Second Artillery Corps, was elected as a new alternate member.38 The Chinese People’s Armed Police Force contributed two full members and two alternate members. Its commander, General Wu Shuangzhan (born 1945) was reelected a full member of the Seventeenth Central Committee. Its former political commissar, General Sui Mingtai (September 1942), retired. General Yu Linxiang (born 1945), former political commissar of the Lanzhou Military Region, replaced him in September 200739 and was elected a new full member of the Seventeenth Central Committee. Lieutenant General Xi Zhongchao (born 1947), deputy commander, was reelected as an alternate member of the Seventeenth Central Committee, and Lieutenant General Wang Jianping (born 1953), chief of staff, was elected a new alternate member. Out of three major military academies, two contributed two full members and one an alternate member. Lieutenant General Wang Xibin (born 1948), president of the National Defense University (NDU), and Vice Admiral Tong Shiping (born 1947), political commissar of the NDU, were both elected new full members of the Seventeenth Central Committee. Both of them were appointed in their current positions shortly before the Party Congress.40 Lieutenant General Ma Xiaotian, former president of the NDU, was

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transferred to the General Staff Department as deputy chief of general staff in September 2007. Lieutenant General Wang Xibin, former chief of staff of the Beijing Military Region, was promoted to president of the NDU. General Zhao Keming (born October 1942), former political commissar of the NDU and a member of the Sixteenth Central Committee, retired because of his age. Vice Admiral Tong Shiping, former assistant director of the General Political Department, replaced General Zhao in September 2007. However, Lieutenant General Xu Zhigong (born 1945), an alternate member of the Sixteenth Central Committee and a vice president of the NDU, did not make it to the Seventeenth Central Committee. He was not even elected a deputy to the Congress. Similarly, the Academy of Military Sciences was represented by its president and political commissar on the Seventeenth Central Committee as full members. Lieutenant General Liu Chengjun (born 1949), former deputy commander of the PLA Air Force, replaced General Zheng Shenxia (born July 1942) as president of the Academy in September 2007. Lieutenant General Liu Yuan (born 1951), political commissar of the Academy and son of Liu Shaoqi (former president of China), was also elected a new full member of the Seventeenth Central Committee. However, the National University of Defense Technology only had one alternate member. Its political commissar, Vice Admiral Xu Yitian, managed to get into the Seventeenth Central Committee as a new alternate member, but its president, Lieutenant General Wen Xisen (born 1945) (an alternate member of the Sixteenth Central Committee), failed to enter the Seventeenth Central Committee, although both were deputies to the Party Congress. In sum, the central military institutions contributed 25 full members (including two Politburo members and 10 CMC members41) and 11 alternate members, with a representation index of 85. Local Military Regions There are seven military regions in China. They are Beijing, Shenyang, Lanzhou, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou, and Chengdu.

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These regions are all well represented on the Seventeenth Central Committee with two to three full members each and one to two alternate members from most of them. The Beijing Military Region generated two full members and two alternate members. Its new commander, Lieutenant General Fang Fenghui (born 1951), and its political commissar, General Fu Tinggui (born 1944), both entered the Seventeenth Central Committee as full members. Fang Fenghui was not a deputy to the Seventeenth Party Congress and was not on the Sixteenth Central Committee, while Fu Tinggui was not only a full member of the Sixteenth Central Committee and a deputy to the Seventeenth Party Congress, but also a member of the presidium of the Congress. Lieutenant General Dong Wancai, political director of the Beijing Military Region, and Lieutenant General Liu Zhenlai (born 1949), political commissar of the Beijing Military Region Air Force, were both elected new alternate members. The Shenyang Military Region had two full members. Its new commander, Lieutenant General Zhang Youxia (born 1950), and its political commissar, Lieutenant General Huang Xianzhong (born 1945), were both elected full members of the Seventeenth Central Committee, although Zhang was not a deputy to the Party Congress. Lieutenant General Zhang Youxia, son of General Zhang Zongxun (former director of the General Logistics Department), had been deputy commander of the Beijing Military Region. He was promoted to commander of the Shenyang Military Region in September 2007 when Lieutenant General Chang Wanquan was appointed director of the General Armament Department. The Lanzhou Military Region contributed three full members and one alternate member. In addition to its commander (Lieutenant General Wang Guosheng, born 1947) and its political commissar (Lieutenant General Li Changcai), the political commissar of the Xinjiang Military District (Lieutenant General Tian Xiusi, born 1950) was also elected a full member. Moreover, its chief of staff (Lieutenant General Liu Yuejun, born 1954) was reelected as an alternate member of the Seventeenth Central Committee, although he was not a deputy to the Party Congress.

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The Chengdu Military Region also had three full members and one alternate member. In addition to its commander and its political commissar, the commander of the Tibetan Military District was also elected a full member. Lieutenant General Li Shiming (born 1948) was transferred from the Shenyang Military Region to the Chengdu Military Region as a deputy commander in December 2005 and replaced General Wang Jianmin (born November 1942) as its commander in September 2007. Lieutenant General Zhang Haiyang (born 1949), son of General Zhang Zhen (former vice chairman of the CMC), became political commissar of the Chengdu Military Region in December 2005. Li Shiming was not a deputy to the Seventeenth Party Congress, while Zhang Haiyang was not only a deputy but also a member of the presidium. Lieutenant General Dong Guishan (born 1946), commander of the Tibetan Military District, made it to the Seventeenth Central Committee as a full member. His predecessor, Lieutenant General Meng Jinxi (born September 1944), was not even elected a deputy to the Congress and was subsequently absent from the Central Committee, though he had been a full member of the Sixteenth Central Committee. Major General Ai Husheng (born 1951), former commander of the 39th Army under the Shenyang Military Region and current chief of staff of the Chengdu Military Region and son of Ai Fulin, was elected a new alternate member of the Seventeenth Central Committee. The Jinan Military Region had two full members and two alternate members. Its commander (Lieutenant General Fan Changlong, born 1947) was promoted from an alternate member of the Sixteenth Central Committee to a full member of the Seventeenth Central Committee, and its political commissar (General Liu Dongdong, born 1945) was reelected as a full member of the Seventeenth Central Committee. Vice Admiral Su Shiliang (born 1950), a deputy commander of the Jinan Military Region and commander of the North China Sea Fleet, was elected a new alternate member. So was Major General Zhang Shibo, commander of the 20th Army. The Nanjing Military Region also contributed two full members and two alternate members. Its new commander (Lieutenant General Zhao Keshi, born 1947) and its new political commissar (Lieutenant

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General Chen Guoling) were both made full members. Zhao Keshi had been chief of staff of the Nanjing Military Region before he replaced General Zhu Wenquan (born October 1942) as the commander in September 2007. Chen Guoling, however, was promoted from deputy political commissar of the Guangzhou Military Region. He replaced General Lei Mingqiu (born June 1942) as the political commissar of the Nanjing Military Region in September 2007. Major General Cai Yingting (born 1952), former commander of the 31st Army and current chief of staff of the Nanjing Military Region, was elected a new alternate member. So was Major General Zhu Yimin (born 1953), former political commissar of the 47th Army under the Lanzhou Military Region and current political director of the Nanjing Military Region. Finally, the Guangzhou Military Region produced two full members and one alternate member. Its commander and its political commissar were both elected as new full members. Lieutenant General Zhang Qinsheng (born 1948) had been a deputy chief of general staff before he replaced General Liu Zhenwu as the commander of the Guangzhou Military Region in June 2007. He was not only a deputy to the Party Congress but also a member of the presidium, a spot usually occupied by political commissars of the military regions. Lieutenant General Zhang Yang (born 1951) had been political director of the Guangzhou Military Region and replaced General Yang Deqing (born 1942) as its political commissar in September 2007. He is the youngest military leader with the rank of chief military region. Major General Xu Fenlin (born 1953), former commander of the 21st Army under the Lanzhou Military Region and current chief of staff of the Guangzhou Military Region, was elected a new alternate member. Altogether, these seven military regions contributed 16 full members and nine alternate members with a total representation index of 41. Other Military Central Committee Members There are three other military central committee members that do not necessarily belong to either central military institutions or local

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military regions. Senior Colonel Yang Liwei (born 1965),42 a native of Liaoning Province, is the first Chinese astronaut circulating the earth in a manned spaceship (Shenzhou V). As a national hero, he was not only elected as a deputy to the Party Congress, but also made a member of the presidium. He entered the Seventeenth Central Committee as an alternate member. Major General Qin Yinhe (born 1950) is a doctor. He is president of the PLA’s General Hospital in Beijing. He was also elected an alternate member of the Seventeenth Central Committee. Chen Zuoning (f.) (born 1957) works in a research institute under the General Staff Department. A general engineer, she was elected a new alternate member of the Seventeenth Central Committee, though she was not a deputy to the Party Congress. The total representation index for the military as a whole was 128, less than either the provinces or the central institutions. CORPORATE REPRESENTATION The representation of corporate and academic leaders was further expanded in the Seventeenth Central Committee. Compared to 18 in the Sixteenth Central Committee, the Seventeenth Central Committee saw 28 corporate and academic leaders. However, with only one exception, all of them were alternate members. Corporations There are 18 corporations represented on the Seventeenth Central Committee (Table 3.8). Their representatives include Kang Rixin (born 1953), general manager of China National Nuclear Corporation; Zhu Yanfeng (born 1961), president of China FAW Group Corporation; Zhang Xiaogang (born 1955), general manager of Angang Steel Company; Zhang Ruimin (born 1949), CEO of Haier Group, China; Zhang Guoqing (born 1964), deputy general manager and Party group secretary of China Ordinance Industry Corporation (COIC); Xu Lejiang (born 1959), board chairman of Baosteel Group; Xiao Yaqing (born 1959), board chairman and

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Corporate Central Committee Representation (October 2007) Institutions

cca

Corporations China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) China FAW Group Corporation Angang Steel Company Limited Haier Group, China China Ordnance Industry Corporation (COIC) Baosteel Group Aluminum Corporation of China Ltd. (ACH) Daqing Oilfield Corporation China Telecom Corporation Sinopec Corporation China Railway Construction Corporation China Investment Corporation (CIC) State Grid Corporation of China Sanjiang Space Group China Aviation Industry Corporation I (CAICI) China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC) PetroChina Company Ltd. Taiyuan Steel Group

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Subtotal

17

ccf

Index

1

2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1

19

Academic Institutions Peking University Sichuan University Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences China Academy of Engineering Physics Lanzhou Institute of Modern Physics China Academy of Space Technology No. 1 Railway Survey and Design Institute Bureau of Geology and Mineral Resources Exploration and Development of Tibet

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Subtotal

8

8

Total

25

1

27

Notes: cca = Alternate Members of the Central Committee; ccf = Full Members of the Central Committee. Source: Author’s database.

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general manager of Aluminum Corporation of China (ACH); Wang Yupu, chairman and general manager of Daqing Oilfield Corporation; Wang Xiaochu (born 1958), president of China Telecom Corporation; Su Shulin (born 1962), general manager of Sinopec Corporation; Shi Dahua (born 1951), board chairman of China Railway Construction Corporation; Lou Jiwei (born 1950), board chairman of the newly established China Investment Corporation (CIC); Liu Zhenya (born 1952), president of State Grid Corporation of China; Liu Shiquan (born 1963), Party secretary of Sanjiang Space Group; Lin Zuoming (born 1957), general manager of China Aviation Industry Corporation I (CAICI); Li Changyin (born 1951), general manager of China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC); Jiang Jiemin (born 1954), president of PetroChina Company; and Chen Chuanping, Taiyuan Steel Group. Kang Rixin is the only full member among them. Four of them (Lin Zuoming, Liu Shiquan, Su Shulin, and Zhang Ruimin) had been alternate members of the Sixteenth Central Committee, and the rest were newly elected. Several corporations had been represented on the Sixteenth Central Committee, such as Angang Steel Company (Liu Jie, alternate member), Baosteel Group [Xie Qihua (f.), alternate member], Sinopec Corporation (Li Yizhong, full member) and Daqing Oilfield Corporation (Su Shulin, alternate member). On the Seventeenth Central Committee, Zhang Xiaogang replaced Liu Jie, Xu Lejiang replaced Xie Qihua, Su Shulin replaced Li Yizhong, and Wang Yupu replaced Su Shulin as representatives of their respective corporations. Since most of these corporations are state-owned, their leaders are in fact government officials. Lou Jiwei, for instance, had been vice governor of Guizhou and vice minister of finance. Su Shulin had served as director of the Organization Department of the Liaoning Provincial Party Committee before his appointment as general manager of Sinopec Corporation. Lin Jun had been general manager of China Grain Reserves Corporation before he was appointed Party group secretary of China Federation of Overseas Chinese. The total representation index of corporate leaders on the Seventeenth Central Committee was 19.

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Academic Institutions In addition to these corporate leaders, there were nine academic leaders on the Seventeenth Central Committee. Dr. Min Weifang (born 1950, Party secretary of Peking University) and Dr. Zhai Huqu (born 1950, president of the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences) were both reelected as alternate members of the Seventeenth Central Committee. They both studied and obtained their doctoral degrees abroad. Min Weifang got a doctoral degree in economics of education from Stanford University in the United States; and Zhai Huqu received a doctoral degree in plant genetics from Birmingham University in the United Kingdom.43 Dr. Xie Heping (born 1956), president of Sichuan University, was made a new alternate member. New alternate members include Dr. Zhao Xiangeng (born 1953), president of the China Academy of Engineering Physics; Dr. Zhang Jie (born 1958), president of Shanghai Jiaotong University; Zhan Wenlong (born 1955), director of the Lanzhou Institute of Modern Physics; Yuan Jiajun (born 1962), director of the China Academy of Space Technology; Li Jincheng (born 1963), deputy chief engineer of the No. 1 Railway Survey and Design Institute; and Dorji (Tibetan) (born 1953), head of the Bureau of Geology and Mineral Resources Exploration and Development of Tibet. The total representation index of academic leaders on the Seventeenth Central Committee was nine. The total representation index of both corporate and academic leaders was 27, the lowest among all institutions. CONCLUDING REMARKS At the conclusion of the CCP’s Seventeenth National Congress, provincial units remained the most powerful institution in Chinese politics (Figure 3.1). Their representation index was 247 (42 percent excluding the score of the political core). In Chinese politics, this means at least three things. First, the fact that provincial units are prominent is an indication that as a result of decentralization in the 1980s and 1990s provincial units (horizontal blocks), instead of

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Corporations 5%

Military 19%

Provinces 42%

Central institutions 34%

Fig. 3.1

Balance of Institional Power in China (October 2007)

central institutions (vertical blocks), are the most important institutions in China. They tend to have a larger share of Central Committee membership than central institutions. Moreover, China’s provinces have also become a training ground for top leadership. Two new Politburo Standing Committee members (Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang) and four out of the seven new members of the Seventeenth Politburo (Wang Qishan, Li Yuanchao, Wang Yang, and Zhang Gaoli) were directly recruited from provinces. Finally, the larger representation index might translate into superior power in case of contestation among institutions. The combined central Party, central government, and other institutions ranked the second with a total score of 200 (34 percent). On the individual-unit basis, central Party institutions are much more powerful than central government institutions. Heads of the Central Organization Department and Central Propaganda Department are

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both members of the Politburo and the Secretariat. Only one minister (Bo Xilai) managed to get into the Politburo, and none of current ministers are members of the Politburo and the Secretariat. The military came as a third with a representation index of 112 (19 percent). As an institution, the military is indispensable in Chinese politics. As before, the military contributed two members to the Seventeenth Politburo: General Guo Boxiong and General Xu Caihou. However, it no longer has any representation in the Secretariat. To signify the importance of military regions, all political commissars and commanders of the seven military regions are full members of the Seventeenth Central Committee, regardless of their previous Central Committee experiences. In fact, out of these 14 military leaders, all but three were new to the Central Committee. The corporate and academic leaders had the lowest representation index of 27 (5 percent). Over the past three decades, the Chinese economy has evolved from a centrally planned system to a marketoriented one and business entrepreneurs have played an increasingly important role in Chinese politics. The Chinese Communist Party has adapted to the new situation and attempted to incorporate this new political force to its ranks. However, business elites have mostly been absorbed into other institutions such as the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference rather than the CCP’s Central Committee. The institutional balance of the Seventeenth Central Committee was almost the same as that of its predecessor when it was elected on November 14, 2002. The only difference is that provinces declined from 43 percent in 2002 to 42 percent in 2007, and corporations increased from 4 percent in 2002 to 5 percent in 2007. The central institutions and the military institutions remained the same in percentage terms, though their scores were a bit higher in 2007 than in 2002 because of the expansion of the overall scores in 2007. It should be noted that the balance of institutional power has been anything but static due to constant inter-institutional transfers, especially those between central institutions and provinces. First, 12 people have been transferred from provinces to the center. They include Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, Li Yuanchao, Zhang Dejiang, Wang Qishan, Li Jianguo, Qian Yunlu, Ismail Tiliwaldi, Du Qinglin,

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Li Chengyu, Dai Xianglong, and Chen Baosheng. Xi Jinping, former Party secretary of Shanghai, was elected vice president of the People’s Republic of China in March 2008. Li Keqiang (former Party secretary of Liaoning), Zhang Dejiang (former Party secretary of Guangdong), and Wang Qishan (former mayor of Beijing) were appointed vice premiers of a new State Council under the leadership of Premier Wen Jiabao. Li Yuanchao (former Party secretary of Jiangsu) was made director of the Central Organization Department. Li Jianguo (former Party secretary of Shandong) was elected vice chairman and secretary general of the Eleventh National People’s Congress Standing Committee. Qian Yunlu (former Party secretary of Heilongjiang) was elected vice chairman and secretary general of the Eleventh National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. Ismail Tiliwaldi (former chairman of Xinjiang) was elected vice chairman of the Eleventh National People’s Congress Standing Committee. Du Qinglin (former Party secretary of Sichuan) was appointed director of the Central United Front Department and was subsequently elected vice chairman of the Eleventh National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. Li Chengyu (former governor of Henan) was transferred to Beijing as Party group secretary of the National Supply and Marketing Cooperative. Dai Xianglong (former mayor of Tianjin) was appointed chairman of the National Social Security Fund Council. And Chen Baosheng (former Party secretary of Lanzhou, Gansu) was appointed vice president of the Central Party School. Secondly, four central leaders have been transferred to provinces. They are Bo Xilai, Jiang Yikang, Ji Bingxuan, and Hu Chunhua. After having become a Politburo member, Bo Xilai (former minister of commerce) was transferred to Chongqing as Party secretary. Jiang Yikang (former Party secretary of the National School of Administration) was transferred to Shandong as Party secretary. Ji Bingxuan (former executive vice director of the Central Propaganda Department) was appointed Party secretary of Heilongjiang. And Hu Chunhua (former first secretary of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Youth League) was appointed governor of Hebei.

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As a result of these changes, provinces lost 37 points and the center lost 10 points. In other words, the center has a net gain of 27 points. However, among those who have been transferred to Beijing, at least nine — Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, Li Yuanchao, Zhang Dejiang, Wang Qishan, Li Jianguo, Qian Yunlu, Ismail Tiliwaldi, and Du Qinglin — have become members of the political core. They do not necessarily belong to ministerial-level institutions at the center. For this reason, the institutional balance between provinces and central institutions has not been significantly altered. NOTES 1. In Chinese politics, election to the Central Committee depends more on the post that a person holds in an institution than on personal characteristics. Chen Deming, currently minister of commerce, for instance, entered the Seventeenth Central Committee only as an alternate member because he was a low-profile vice minister of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). Had he been minister of commerce, he would have become a full member of the Seventeenth Central Committee. 2. Due to constant changes, it is critical to identify Central Committee members with their posts at the time of the Seventeenth Party Congress in October 2007. Once an initial distribution of institutional representation is depicted, it is then feasible to track changes. 3. For a definition and detailed discussion of elite provinces, see Zhiyue Bo, Chinese Provincial Leaders: Economic Performance and Political Mobility since 1949 (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), pp. 19–35. 4. They are Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan, and Liaoning. 5. It includes nine provincial units — Heilongjiang, Jilin, Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, and Anhui. 6. It includes 10 provincial units — Chongqing, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, Xinjiang, Tibet, Shaanxi, Yunnan, Guizhou, and Sichuan. For the division of the three areas, see http://www.anderson.ucla.edu:7777/research/globalwindow/ china/t8/sup1art.htm. 7. http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-10/26/content_6949147.htm. 8. http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2007-10/28/content_6957756.htm. 9. http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-10/29/content_6971127.htm. 10. http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/9667/9670/20021127/ 875816.html. 11. http://hm.people.com.cn/GB/85423/6411664.html.

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Institutional Representation 12. 13. 14. 15.

16. 17.

18. 19. 20. 21.

22.

23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30.

129

http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2004-12/21/content_2363144.htm. http://news.xinhuanet.com/local/2007-02/04/content_5691255.htm. This is adapted from Bo, Chinese Provincial Leaders, p. 27. This scheme standardizes Central Committee representation from all institutions and thus makes comparison across institutions possible. However, assigning six points to the General Secretary does not necessarily mean mechanically that the power of the General Secretary is the sum of six Central Committee alternate members. Depending on one’s needs, a reader may adjust the weights of the scheme accordingly. For instance, one may increase the gap between Central Committee full members and alternate members from one to five because the former are voting members while the latter are non-voting members. http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2007-10/26/content_6949444.htm. Governor Luo Qingquan became Party secretary of Hubei after the Seventeenth Party Congress in October 2007. http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/ 2007-10/27/content_6956596.htm. For Zeng Qinghong’s biographical information, see http://news.xinhuanet. com/ziliao/2002-01/16/content_240615.htm. For Wang Gang’s biographical information, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/ ziliao/2002-01/21/content_246343.htm. For Wang Huning’s biographical information, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/ ziliao/2007-10/22/content_6924961.htm. Somehow Cao Qing was elected a deputy to the Party Congress but was not on the list of PLA deputies. For the news about his appointment, see http://secretchina. com/news/gb/kanguanchang/dongxiang/2007/0907/210302.html. Wang Guangwei was later promoted to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences as vice president with a ministerial rank in January 2008. See http://news.sina. com.cn/c/2008-01-10/144914713199.shtml. http://www.northnews.cn/news/2007/200709/2007-09-26/105653.html. This institution was disbanded as a result of the administrative restructuring in March 2008. For Jin Zhuanglong’s biographical information, see http://baike.baidu.com/ view/488502.htm. For details, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2006-03/17/content_431 2521.htm. For details, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2002-03/05/content_300 408.htm. For Xiao Yang’s biographical information, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/ 2002-03/01/content_295423.htm. For Jia Chunwang’s biographical information, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/ ziliao/2002-03/01/content_295707.htm. For Zhang Geng’s biographical information, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/ video/2006-01/13/content_4047525.htm.

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130 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization 31. In March 2008, Cao Jianming was elected president of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate and Wang Shengjun president of the Supreme People’s Court. 32. Wang Jun replaced Li Yizhong as head of the State Administration of Work Safety in March 2008. Li Yizhong is now minister of Industry and Information Technology. See http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2008-03/21/content_ 7830038.htm. 33. Jia Ting’an was promoted to deputy director of the General Political Department in January 2008. See http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/ 20080129/09311970041.shtml. 34. For Liu Zhenwu’s biographical information, see http://www.diuba.com/ shequ/yule/832.htm. 35. For Zhang Li’s biographical information, see http://baike.baidu.com/view/ 304229.html. 36. Liu Zhenqi was promoted to the rank of general in July 2008. See http://mil. news.sina.com.cn/2008-07-15/1137510901.html. 37. http://secretchina.com/news/gb/kanguanchang/dongxiang/2007/1001/ 213436.html. 38. Noticeably, there are a number of princeling generals among the Seventeenth Central Committee members. For a detailed analysis of the rise of the princeling generals, see Bo Zhiyue, “Princeling Generals in China: Breaking the Two Career Barriers?” Issues & Studies 42, no. 1 (March 2006): 195–232; and Bo Zhiyue, “Balance of Factional Power in China: The Seventeenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party,” East Asia 25, no. 4 (December 2008): 333–364. 39. http://jiangxi.jxnews.com.cn/system/2007/09/21/002571797.shtml. 40. http://gb.chinareviewnews.com/doc/1004/4/7/2/100447213.html?coluid= 4&kindid=21&docid=100447213&mdate=0911163216. 41. Each CMC member receives two more points of representation index. 42. Yang Liwei was awarded the rank of major general in July 2008. See http:// www.xjdaily.com/news/china/256709.shtml. 43. For detailed introductions to Min Weifang and Zhai Huqu, see Bo, China’s Elite Politics, p. 135.

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Chapter

4 Factional Balance The new central committee elected at the Seventeenth Party Congress also reflects dramatic changes in factional balance.1 Compared to the Sixteenth Central Committee elected five years earlier, the Seventeenth Central Committee witnessed the decline of both the Shanghai Gang and the Qinghua Clique and the emergence of the Princelings and the further expansion of the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) Group.2 DECLINE OF THE SHANGHAI GANG The Shanghai Gang, a factional group closely linked to Former General Secretary Jiang Zemin, declined substantially between the Sixteenth Party Congress and the Seventeenth Party Congress. Shanghai Gang Members in the Sixteenth Central Committee In the Sixteenth Central Committee of the CCP elected in November 2002, 17 people were identified as Shanghai Gang members — 13 full members and four alternate members.3 One third of the Sixteenth Politburo Standing Members were Shanghai Gang members — Wu Bangguo, Zeng Qinghong, and Huang Ju. Besides these 131

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three standing members, one may also find Chen Liangyu as another member of the Sixteenth Politburo in 2002. In November 2002, the Shanghai Gang was a powerful factional group with a power index4 of 42 and a group cohesion index of 103.5 The Shanghai Gang began its decline in April 2003 when Zhang Wenkang (born 1940), the then minister of Health, was dismissed for his dereliction of duties in the SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) crisis. A native of Shanghai, Zhang served in various capacities at the PLA Second Military Medical University in Shanghai for nearly 30 years (1962–1990). He was transferred to Beijing in 1990 as deputy director of the Health Department of the PLA General Logistics Department and became vice minister of Health in 1993. Zhang entered the CCP Central Committee as a full member in 1997 and was appointed as minister of Health in March 1998. When China was hit by SARS epidemic in late 2002 and early 2003, Zhang Wenkang was in charge of health issues. The epidemic began in Guangdong Province and soon spread to Hong Kong and other provinces in China. Extremely contagious and life-threatening, the epidemic spread quickly and was killing people by the hundreds. Recently reappointed as minister of Health in March 2003, Zhang told a press conference of more than 200 Chinese and foreign reporters on April 3, 2003 that SARS had been brought under effective control in China and that travelling in China was very safe.6 Zhang’s description, however, was far from the truth. The reality was that SARS was rapidly spreading throughout China, threatening people in multiple provinces. He was subsequently replaced. The second major blow came in September 2004 when Jiang Zemin (born 1926) was forced to step down as chairman of the CMC at the Fourth Plenum of the Sixteenth Central Committee. A native of Yangzhou, Jiangsu Province, Jiang Zemin was an obscure figure in China’s elite politics until 1989 when he was plucked from Shanghai to be general secretary of the CCP.7 With few revolutionary credentials before 1949, Jiang climbed the ladder of success as a technocrat. He was minister of Electronic Industries between June 1983 and June 1985 and was appointed mayor of Shanghai in July 1985. He was promoted to Party secretary of Shanghai in November 1987

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and was made general secretary of the Party in June 1989. He was made chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) in November 1989 and was elected president of the People’s Republic of China in March 1993. He retired from the CCP central committee in November 2002 but refused to step down as chairman of the CMC. In September 2004, he retired from the CMC under pressure.8 The Shanghai Gang suffered another major blow in September 2006 when Chen Liangyu was removed from the Politburo for his involvement in corruption cases. A native of Ningbo, Zhejiang Province, Chen Liangyu (born 1946) spent his entire career in Shanghai.9 He began as a worker at the Pengpu Machinery Factory in 1970 and was promoted to Party secretary of Shanghai’s Electronic Appliances Bureau in 1984. He was appointed deputy director of the Old Cadres Bureau in January 1985 and was made head of the Huangpu District in Shanghai in February 1987. After a two-month stint as deputy secretary general of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee, Chen was promoted to deputy secretary of Shanghai in December 1992. He was appointed vice mayor of Shanghai in October 1996 and acting mayor in December 2001. After having been mayor of Shanghai for eight months, he was promoted to Party secretary of Shanghai in October 2002 and was made a member of the Politburo the following month. The Central Disciplinary Inspection Commission (CDIC), the Party’s watchdog, began to investigate a case of misusing social security funds in Shanghai on July 5, 2006. In the process, it discovered Chen Liangyu’s involvement in the case. The Politburo Standing Committee decided on August 24, 2006 to investigate Chen Liangyu.10 Based on preliminary investigations conducted by the CDIC, the Politburo decided on September 24, 2006 to remove Chen Liangyu as a member, a standing member, and the Party secretary of Shanghai Municipal Party Committee; suspend his membership in the Central Committee of the CCP and its Politburo; and conduct further investigations by the CDIC into Chen Liangyu’s corruption case. Based on these investigations, the Politburo made a decision on July 26, 2007 to expel Chen Liangyu from the CCP and to dismiss

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him from public offices.11 A couple of days earlier, Chen had already been removed (by Shanghai’s Huangpu District People’s Congress) as a deputy to the Shanghai Municipal People’s Congress and (by Shanghai Municipal People’s Congress Standing Committee) as a deputy to the National People’s Congress.12 According to a report in the People’s Daily, the mouthpiece of the CCP, Chen abused his power in the span of almost 20 years from 1987 to 2006 when he consecutively assumed positions of head of Huangpu District, deputy secretary general of Shanghai Municipal Party Committee, deputy secretary of Shanghai, vice mayor and mayor of Shanghai, Party secretary of Shanghai, and Politburo member.13 Chen Liangyu was charged in July 2007 for supporting illegal lending of Shanghai social security funds to individuals and companies and therefore jeopardizing the safety of the funds; providing assistance to illegal companies in their purchases of state-owned enterprises and thus causing huge losses to state assets; and abusing his power for sex. He was also charged with taking bribes for approving industrial projects, allocating financial resources, accepting foreign investment, land acquisition, and personnel promotions; abusing his power to assist his relatives in obtaining enormous returns for their economic activities; and protecting his associates who have violated Party disciplines and the law. The Politburo determined to transfer his case to the judicial system for criminal investigations. The removal of Chen Liangyu as Party secretary of Shanghai was more fatal to the Shanghai Gang than the retirement of Jiang Zemin as CMC chairman. This is because by removing Chen Liangyu, the central leadership under Hu Jintao has in effect put an end to the practice of promoting Shanghai cadres to the highest Party apparatus or the State Council in Beijing. In the meantime, the central leadership began a new practice of transferring leaders from other provincial units to be Party leaders of Shanghai. In March 2007, Xi Jinping, former Party secretary of Zhejiang, was appointed Party secretary of Shanghai and Han Zheng, mayor of Shanghai, was no longer acting Party secretary of Shanghai. After the departure of Xi Jinping, Yu Zhengsheng, Politburo member and former Party secretary of Hubei, was transferred to Shanghai in October 2007.

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135

The Shanghai Gang suffered another major loss on June 2, 2007 with the death of Huang Ju.14 Huang Ju was Jiang Zemin’s confidant and Chen Liangyu’s mentor. His death meant one less Shanghai Gang member in the Politburo Standing Committee. It is probably no coincidence that Chen was expelled from the CCP and removed from public office in July 2007, one month after Huang Ju’s death. The Shanghai Gang lost one more key member of the Politburo Standing Committee in October 2007 when Zeng Qinghong retired. Shanghai Gang Members in the Seventeenth Central Committee In contrast to the Sixteenth Central Committee, there are only nine Shanghai Gang members left in the Seventeenth Central Committee (Table 4.1). Wu Bangguo is the only standing member of the Politburo that is associated with the Shanghai Gang. Hua Jianmin and Chen Zhili were both state councilors at the time, and they were both retired to the National People’s Congress in March 2008. Xu Guangchun and Meng Jianzhu15 were provincial Party secretaries. Han Zheng was mayor of Shanghai. Yin Yicui was deputy secretary of Table 4.1 Members of the Shanghai Gang in the Seventeenth Central Committee (October 2007) Name

Birth

Home

Cao Jianming Chen Zhili (f.) Han Zheng Hua Jianmin Meng Jianzhu Wang Huning Wu Bangguo Xu Guangchun Yin Yicui (f.)

1955 1942 1954 1940 1947 1955 1941 1944 1955

Jiangsu Fujian Zhejiang Jiangsu Jiangsu Shandong Anhui Zhejiang Zhejiang

Total

CC Membership Rank Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Alternate

n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 164

Work Place

Index

Supreme Court State Council Shanghai State Council Jiangxi Policy Politburo Henan Shanghai

2 2 2 2 2 3 5 2 1 21

Source: Updated from Bo Zhiyue, China’s Elite Politics: Political Transition and Power Balancing (Singapore: World Scientific, 2007), Table 4.1, p. 142.

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Shanghai. Wang Huning was director of the Policy Research Office of the Central Committee and a member of the Secretariat. And Cao Jianmin was the executive vice president of the Supreme People’s Court.16 Noticeably, Shanghai Gang members were not particularly popular among Party deputies to the Congress. The only alternate member from Shanghai received the 164th place out of 167 people on the list. In comparison to the Sixteenth Central Committee, Shanghai Gang’s power index in the Seventeenth Central Committee was halved. Instead of 42 points previously, it was 21 points in 2007. Moreover, no one was the leader of the factional group. The most senior member of the group, Wu Bangguo, is not particularly faction-oriented. The Shanghai Gang’s group cohesion index17 was also reduced drastically. Among the Shanghai Gang members on the Seventeenth Central Committee, only five people had work experience in the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee. They are Wu Bangguo, Chen Zhili, Meng Jianzhu, Han Zheng, and Yin Yicui. Wu Bangguo worked as a standing member of the Shanghai Party Committee from 1983 to 1985, as a deputy secretary from 1985 to 1991, and as Party secretary from April 1991 to September 1994. Chen Zhili was a standing member between 1988 and 1989 and a deputy secretary from 1989 to August 1997.18 Meng Jianzhu was deputy secretary of Shanghai from November 1996 to April 2001. Han Zheng was a standing member between December 1997 and May 2002 and deputy secretary since May 2002. Yin Yicui was a standing member between November 2000 and May 2002 and has been a deputy secretary since May 2002. Wu Bangguo only worked with Chen Zhili for six years together. Chen Zhili also worked with Meng Jianzhu for one year. And Han Zheng has worked with Yin Yicui for seven years, and with Meng for three and a half years. The group cohesion index for these people was 18 in 2007, compared to 63.5 in 2002. The group cohesion index for Shanghai Gang members from the Shanghai Municipal Government was even lower. Only three people have worked as leaders of the municipal government in Shanghai. They are Meng Jianzhu, Hua Jianmin, and Han Zheng.

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Meng Jianzhu was vice mayor of Shanghai from February 1993 to October 1996.19 Hua Jianmin was vice mayor of Shanghai from 1994 to 1996. Han Zheng was vice mayor of Shanghai from February 1998 to February 2003 and has been mayor of Shanghai since February 2003. Meng Jianzhu worked with Hua Jianmin for two years, but neither of them worked with Han Zheng. Their group cohesion index was only two points in 2007, compared to 39.7 in 2002. These two group cohesion indexes are combined to give an estimate of the group cohesion of the Shanghai Gang as a whole. The result is 20 points, far less than 103 points in 2002. Clearly, the Shanghai Gang has been significantly weakened. QINGHUA CLIQUE The Qinghua Clique as a factional group is more of a corporate group than a faction. Due to retirement, the Qinghua Clique has also declined. In the Sixteenth Central Committee, there were 20 graduates of Qinghua University including four Politburo standing members with a power index of 54 and group cohesion of 142.20 In the Seventeenth Central Committee, there are only 10 Qinghua graduates (Table 4.2). Hu Jintao and Wu Bangguo were both retained as members of the Seventeenth Politburo Standing Committee. Xi Jinping, another Qinghua graduate, entered the Seventeenth Politburo Standing Committee as the No. 6 person. Liu Yandong, another Qinghua graduate, became the only female member of the Seventeenth Politburo. Other Qinghua graduates in the Seventeenth Central Committee include Hua Jianmin (former state councilor), Zhou Ji (minister of Education), Tian Chengping (former minister of Labor and Social Security), Chen Yuan (governor of the Development Bank), Zhou Xiaochuan (governor of the People’s Bank of China), and Lou Jiwei (chairman of the China Investment Corporation). The combined power index for these leaders is 34, 13 points higher than that of the Shanghai Gang. The group cohesion of the Qinghua Clique is based on the school ties of its graduates, which are calculated according to the following

Department

Entry

Party

Graduation

Index

Shanghai Anhui Jiangsu Jiangsu Beijing Hebei Anhui Shaanxi Shanghai Jiangsu

1945 1942 1940 1945 1950 1945 1941 1953 1946 1948

Automatic Control Hydropower Gas Turbine Chemical Engineering Computer Science Civil Architecture Electron Tube Chemical Engineering Machinery Manufacturing Economic System Engineering

Automatic Control Water Conservancy Power Chemical Engineering Computer Science Civil Architecture Radio Electronics Chemical Engineering Precision Instruments Economic Management

1964 1959 1957 1964 1978 1962 1960 1974 1964

1975 1964 1961 1964 1973 1964 1964 1974

1970 1965 1963 1970 1982 1968 1967 1979 1970 1985

1 9 2 4 1 2 5 6 2 2

1986

34

Source: Updated from Bo Zhiyue, China’s Elite Politics: Political Transition and Power Balancing (Singapore: World Scientific, 2007), Table 4.5, p. 176.

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Chen Yuan Hu Jintao Hua Jianmin Liu Yandong (f.) Lou Jiwei Tian Chengping Wu Bangguo Xi Jinping Zhou Ji Zhou Xiaochuan

Home

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Name

Qinghua Graduates in the Seventeenth Central Committee (October 2007)

138 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization

Table 4.2

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scheme. First, a pair of students gets a zero point if they studied at Qinghua University at different times. Second, a pair of students gets a quarter of a point, if they studied in different departments. Third, a pair of students gets half a point, if they studied in different classes of the same department. Finally, a pair of students gets one point, if they studied in the same class of the same department. Clearly, there are three cohorts of Qinghua graduates among the Seventeenth Central Committee members. The majority of them entered the Qinghua University before 1966, the start of the Cultural Revolution. Hua Jianmin was admitted to Qinghua in 1957. Hu Jintao was enrolled in the Department of Water Conservancy in 1959. Wu Bangguo entered the Qinghua University in 1960. Tian Chengping went to Qinghua in 1962. Chen Yuan, Liu Yandong, and Zhou Ji were admitted to the University in 1964. The second cohort consisted of only one person — Xi Jinping. He entered the Qinghua during the Cultural Revolution, in 1975. Finally, Lou Jiwei was a cohort by himself. He is the only person in this group that entered the Qinghua University after the Cultural Revolution. He studied computer science at Qinghua from 1978 to 1982. In addition, Zhou Xiaochuan is also a category by himself. He did not attend the Qinghua University as an undergraduate student but obtained a doctoral degree in economic system engineering at Qinghua in 1985. The group cohesion of the Qinghua Clique declined substantially. Instead of 142 points as in 2002, it was only 16 points in 2007. PRINCELINGS Princelings (taizidang) refer to children of former high-ranking officials of the CCP. The Seventeenth Party Congress witnessed drastic expansion of the princelings. In the Sixteenth Central Committee, there were 20 members identified as children of former high-ranking officials. In the Seventeenth Central Committee, 26 are princelings — 22 full members and four alternate members (Table 4.3). Noticeably, out of the 25 full members of the Politburo, seven are princelings. Xi Jinping (born 1953) is the only princeling who is a member of the Seventeenth Politburo Standing Committee, replacing

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140 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization Table 4.3

Princelings in the Seventeenth Central Committee (October 2007)

Name

Home

CC Birth Membership Rank

Relative

Index

Politburo Members Xi Jinping Li Yuanchao Wang Qishan Bo Xilai Liu Yandong (f.) Yu Zhengsheng Zhang Dejiang

Shaanxi Jiangsu Shanxi Shanxi Jiangsu Zhejiang Liaoning

1953 1950 1948 1949 1945 1945 1946

Full Full Full Full Full Full Full

n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a

Xi Zhongxun Li Gancheng Yao Yilin Bo Yibo Liu Ruilong Huang Jing Zhang Zhiyi

6 5 4 4 4 4 4

Central and Provincial Leaders Deng Nan (f.) Li Jianguo Liao Hui Liu Jing Zhou Xiaochuan Chen Yuan

Sichuan Shandong Guangdong Shanxi Jiangsu Shanghai

1945 1946 1942 1944 1948 1945

Full Full Full Full Full Alternate

n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 141

Deng Xiaoping Li Yunchuan Liao Chengzhi Han Jun Zhou Jiannan Chen Yun

2 2 2 2 2 1

Diplomats Dai Bingguo (Tujia) Wang Yi Wang Guangya

Guizhou Beijing Jiangsu

1941 1953 1950

Full Full Alternate

n/a Huang Zhen n/a Qian Jiadong 9 Chen Yi

2 2 1

Military Leaders Wu Shengli Peng Xiaofeng Ma Xiaotian Liu Xiaojiang Liu Yuan Zhang Haiyang Zhang Youxia Ding Yiping Ai Husheng

Hebei Henan Henan Jiangxi Hunan Hunan Shaanxi Hunan Henan

1945 1945 1949 1949 1951 1949 1950 1951 1951

Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Alternate Alternate

n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 137 45

3 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1

Total

Wu Xian Peng Xuefeng Ma Zaiyao Hu Yaobang Liu Shaoqi Zhang Zhen Zhang Zongxun Ding Qiusheng Ai Fulin

64

Source: Updated from Bo Zhiyue, China’s Elite Politics: Political Transition and Power Balancing (Singapore: World Scientific, 2007), Table 4.4, p. 152.

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Zeng Qinghong. Xi, also a member of the Secretariat, is son of Xi Zhongxun (1913–2002), vice premier of the State Council between April 1959 and October 1962 and one of the key allies of Deng Xiaoping in economic reforms and opening to the outside world in the 1980s. In addition to Xi Jinping, there are six other members of the Politburo who are also princelings. Zhang Dejiang was identified as a princeling in 2007. Zhang Dejiang was Party secretary of Guangdong Province and member of the Sixteenth Politburo and is a member of the Seventeenth Politburo. His father, Major General Zhang Zhiyi (1912–1997), was the only general from his hometown, Tai’an County of Liaoning Province and was former deputy commander of the Artillery Troops of the Guangzhou Military Region and deputy commander and acting commander of the Artillery Troops of the Jinan Military Region.21 Yu Zhengsheng, also a member of both the Sixteenth Politburo and the Seventeenth Politburo and Party secretary of Shanghai since October 2007, however, has been very well known for his “royal” background. His father is Huang Jing (1912–1958), former Party secretary and mayor of Tianjin and the founding minister of the First Ministry of Machine-Building Industry.22 His mother, Fan Jing (1919–2009), was vice mayor of Beijing from September 1964 to May 1966, vice chairwoman of Beijing’s People’s Political Consultative Conference from November 1977 to December 1979, and vice chairwoman of Beijing Municipal People’s Congress from December 1979 to January 1988.23 Moreover, Yu Zhengsheng’s father-in-law, Major General Zhang Zhenhuan (1915–1994), was also a highranking official. Zhang Zhenhuan, father of Zhang Zhikai, was awarded the rank of major general in 1961 and was director of the Committee of Technology under the Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (CSTIND) from July 1982 to March 1985.24 Bo Xilai, Liu Yandong, and Li Yuanchao, three new members of the Politburo, are also princelings. Bo Xilai, former minister of Commerce and currently Party secretary of Chongqing, is son of Bo Yibo (1908–2007), a veteran leader of the CCP who served as

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142 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization

vice premier of the State Council from 1956 to 1966 and again from 1979 to 1982.25 Liu Yandong, former vice chairwoman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and currently state councilor, is daughter of Liu Ruilong (1910–1988), former secretary general of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee and vice minister of Agriculture.26 Li Yuanchao (born 1950), former Party secretary of Jiangsu and currently director of the Central Organization Department, is son of Li Gancheng (1909–1993), former vice mayor of Shanghai. Wang Qishan, former mayor of Beijing and currently vice premier of the State Council, was not born into an elite family. During his years in the countryside of Shaanxi Province as an “educated youth” from Beijing, Wang reportedly met with his future wife, Yao Mingshan.27 Since Yao Mingshan is daughter of Yao Yilin (1917– 1994), vice premier of the State Council and standing member of the Politburo in the 1980s, Wang Qishan has also been classified as a princeling. Six central and provincial leaders are also princelings. Liao Hui, vice chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, is son of Liao Chengzhi (1908–1983), former head of the Committee of Overseas Chinese Affairs. Deng Nan (born 1945), the second princess in the group and Party group secretary of China’s Federation of Scientists, is daughter of Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997), the legendary leader of the CCP who fundamentally transformed China with economic reform and open-door policies.28 Liu Jing (born 1944), vice minister of Public Security, is son of Han Jun (1912–1949), former secretary-general of the Beiping Municipal Party Committee. Finally, Li Jianguo (born 1946), former Party secretary of Shandong and currently vice chairman and secretary general of the Chinese National People’s Congress (NPC), has also been identified as son of Li Yunchuan (born 1919), a diplomat and vice minister of Labor and Personnel.29 Two bankers are princelings. Zhou Xiaochuan (born 1948), governor of the People’s Bank of China (the Central Bank), is

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son of Zhou Jiannan (1917–1995), former vice minister of the First Ministry of Machine-Building.30 Chen Yuan (born 1945), governor of State Development Bank since March 1998,31 is son of Chen Yun (1905–1995), one of the top CCP leaders in the 1930s–1980s.32 Three out of four diplomats in the Seventeenth Central Committee are sons-in-law of former high-ranking officials. Dai Bingguo, former executive vice minister of Foreign Affairs and currently state councilor in charge of foreign affairs, is son-in-law of Huang Zhen (1909–1989), a veteran revolutionary and a career diplomat.33 Wang Yi (born 1953), former vice minister of Foreign Affairs and currently director of Taiwan Affairs Office, is son-in-law of Qian Jiadong (born 1924), another career diplomat. Wang Guangya (born 1950), former Chinese ambassador to the United Nations and currently vice minister of Foreign Affairs, is son-in-law of Marshal Chen Yi (1901–1972), a veteran communist and former minister of Foreign Affairs.34 Princeling generals, as expected, have overcome their career barriers and emerged as an important political force in Chinese politics.35 Nine princeling generals made it to the Seventeenth Central Committee — seven full members and two alternate members. One of them entered the Central Military Commission (CMC). Admiral Wu Shengli, commander of the PLA Navy, entered the CMC in 2007. His father, Wu Xian (June 28, 1915–1997), was mayor of Hangzhou (July 1951–September 1962) and Party secretary of Hangzhou (July 1953–January 1963),36 vice governor of Zhejiang (November 1958–January 1967), and a member of the Secretariat of Zhejiang Provincial Party Committee (January 1960–January 1967) as well as vice chairman of the Zhejiang Provincial People’s Political Consultative Conference (August 1950–December 1952 and December 1977–April 1983).37 General Peng Xiaofeng, political commissar of the Second Artillery Corps, is son of Peng Xuefeng (1907–1944), a revolutionary martyr.38 Lieutenant General Ma Xiaotian, deputy chief of general

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144 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization

staff, is son of Ma Zaiyao, former provost of the Political Institute of the PLA. Lieutenant General Liu Yuan, political commissar of the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences, is son of Liu Shaoqi (1898–1969), former president of the People’s Republic of China.39 Vice Admiral Liu Xiaojiang, currently political commissar of the PLA Navy, is reportedly son of Lieutenant General Liu Xiyuan (1917–2003), former deputy director of the General Political Department,40 and son-in-law of Hu Yaobang (1915–1989), former general secretary of the CCP.41 Vice Admiral Ding Yiping, chief of staff and deputy commander of the PLA Navy, is son of Lieutenant General Ding Qiusheng (1913–1995), the founding political commissar of the North China Sea Fleet.42 Two chief leaders of military regions, Lieutenant General Zhang Haiyang and Lieutenant General Zhang Youxia, are also princeling generals. Zhang Haiyang, political commissar of the Chengdu Military Region, is the third son of General Zhang Zhen (born 1914), former vice chairman of the Central Military Commission.43 Zhang Youxia, commander of the Shenyang Military Region, is son of General Zhang Zongxun (1908–1997), former director of the General Logistics Department.44 Finally, Major General Ai Husheng, chief of staff of the Chengdu Military Region, is son of Ai Fulin (1918–1994), former political commissar of the Artillery Troops in the Shenyang Military Region.45 The combined power index of these princelings is 64, much higher than that of the Shanghai Gang (21) and the Qinghua Clique (34). Princelings as a Political Faction However, there is hardly any evidence indicating that these princelings belong to a cohesive factional group. Very few of them ever worked together in the same organization. A few exceptions include those diplomats, bankers, and some military leaders. Dai Bingguo worked with Wang Guangya in the Ministry of Foreign

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145

Affairs for 24 years. But they have never worked closely in the same unit because Dai Bingguo worked mainly in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe Division and Wang Guangya worked in the International Division. Their personal tie therefore should be 12 points instead of 24, as working in the same ministry but different units gets half a point (Table 4.4). Dai Bingguo worked with Wang Yi in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for 14 years. But their time together in the same unit is much shorter because Dai Bingguo worked mainly in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe Division and Wang Yi worked in the Asia Division. They worked together closely for about one year and a half when they were both vice ministers of Foreign Affairs between May 2003 and September 2004. Their personal tie is 7.75 points.46 Similarly, Wang Guangya worked with Wang Yi in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for 25 years but their time together is much shorter because they worked in different divisions. They were both appointed assistant ministers of Foreign Affairs in 1998. Wang Guangya was promoted to vice minister of Foreign Affairs in 1999, and Wang Yi was promoted to vice minister of Foreign Affairs in 2001. They worked together for five years. Their personal tie is 15 points.47 Wang Qishan, Zhou Xiaochuan, and Chen Yuan have all worked in the banking sector but their overlap in the same organization is rather limited. Wang Qishan and Zhou Xiaochuan worked in a number of banks but not at the same time. Wang was vice governor of the People’s Bank of China between 1993 and 1994, and Zhou was vice governor of the People’s Bank of China between 1996 and 1997. Wang was governor of the China Construction Bank from 1994 to 1997, and Zhou was in the same post from 1998 to 2000. However, they both had some overlap with Chen Yuan, who was vice governor of the People’s Bank of China between 1988 and 1998. Chen worked with Wang for one year and with Zhou for one year. Finally, Wu Shengli, Liu Xiaojiang, and Ding Yiping are all navy officers but their direct work experiences together are very limited.

n/a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 0 9.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9.5 0 0 n/a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 n/a 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 n/a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 n/a

Total

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 9.5

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7.75

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12

n/a 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

15 n/a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

7.75 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

1

0

9.5

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

2

19.75 22.75 27

Notes: 1. Numbers in cells represent the personal ties of a pair. 2. The subtotals are the sum of the numbers above the diagnoal of n/a for each leader. 3. The total (53.25) is the sum of the numbers above the diagnoal of n/a. Source: Author’s database.

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 0 1 0 0 0 n/a 0 0 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 0 0 1 0 0 n/a 0 0 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 0 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2

0

3

6

0

0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 0 n/a 6

0

0 9.5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 19.75 15 0 2 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 53.25

Page 146

Xi Jinping Li Yuanchao Wang Qishan Bo Xilai Liu Yandong (f.) Yu Zhengsheng Zhang Dejiang Deng Nan (f.) Li Jianguo Liao Hui Liu Jing Zhou Xiaochuan Chen Yuan Dai Bingguo (Tujia) Wang Yi Wang Guangya Wu Shengli Peng Xiaofeng Ma Xiaotian Liu Xiaojiang Liu Yuan Zhang Haiyang Zhang Youxia Ding Yiping Ai Husheng

WY WGY Wu Peng Ma LXJ LY ZHY ZYX Ding Ai Subtotal

11:52 AM

Xi LYC WGS Bo LYD Yu ZDJ Deng LJG Liao LJ ZXC Chen Dai

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Group Cohesion Matrix of the Princelings in the Seventeenth Central Committee (2007)

146 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization

Table 4.4

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Wu Shengli spent most of his career in the Guangzhou Military Region. He was transferred to the General Staff Department as deputy chief of general staff in July 2004 and was appointed commander of the PLA Navy in August 2006. Liu Xiaojiang was appointed deputy director of the Political Department of the PLA Navy in 1998, was deputy political commissar of the PLA Navy between 2001 and 2008, and has been political commissar of the Navy since July 2008. Ding Yiping spent most of his career in the Jinan Military Region. He was demoted to deputy chief of staff of the PLA Navy in June 2003 in the aftermath of the submarine accident in that year48 and was appointed deputy commander of the PLA Navy in August 2006 and chief of staff of the PLA Navy in December 2006. The overlap between Wu Shengli and Liu Xiaojiang is one year; the overlap between Wu Shengli and Ding Yiping is one year; and the overlap between Liu Xiaojiang and Ding Yiping is four years. The Princelings are not yet a political faction. Although their overall group cohesion index is 53.25, significantly higher than that of the Shanghai Gang and the Qinghua Clique, princelings as a whole are not very cohesive. The index is inflated by three diplomats who worked together for decades and whose combined scores in the index are 34.75. Moreover, a strong personal tie of 9.5 between Li Yuanchao and Liu Yandong cannot be simply attributed to the fact that they are both princelings. They worked together in an organization that appears to be a competing factional group, the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) Group. Without these scores from the diplomats and the CCYL cadres, the group cohesion index for the Princelings would have been only 9. CHINESE COMMUNIST YOUTH LEAGUE GROUP The Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) Group continued its prominence in the Central Committee of the CCP following the

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148 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization

Seventeenth Party Congress. There are altogether 82 people with CCYL background in the Seventeenth Central Committee — 41 full members and 41 alternate members (Table 4.5). There are two former CCYL cadres in the Politburo Standing Committee — Hu Jintao and Li Keqiang. In addition, there are six other members of the Politburo that have CCYL backgrounds: Wang Zhaoguo, Liu Yunshan, Wang Lequan, Liu Yandong (f.), Li Yuanchao, and Wang Yang. In other words, out of the 25 Politburo members, almost one third have CCYL backgrounds. In particular, out of nine new Politburo members, four [Li Keqiang, Li Yuanchao, Liu Yandong (f.), and Wang Yang] were former CCYL cadres. Although these people are lumped together as a factional group, they actually constitute two separate subgroups: central and local cadres. Central Cadres A number of CCYL cadres have worked in the Central Committee of the CCYL on a full-time basis. They were central cadres of the CCYL. This group can be further divided into inner circle of the CCYL and full-time staff. Inner circle Members of the Secretariat of the CCYL Central Committee belong to the inner circle. They worked closely with each other, as they would in the Politburo Standing Committee of the Party. When Wang Zhaoguo was the first secretary of the CCYL Central Committee, the Secretariat included Hu Jintao, Liu Yandong (f.), Li Haifeng (f.),49 and Li Yuanchao as members, and Zhang Baoshun and Li Keqiang as alternate members. When Hu Jintao took over as the first secretary in December 1984, he worked with the same set of cadres in the Secretariat without Wang Zhaoguo. When Song Defu became the first secretary in November 1985, Zhang Baoshun and Li Keqiang became members of the Secretariat as well as Liu Qibao in addition to Liu Yandong (f.), Li Haifeng (f.), and Li Yuanchao.

Name

b784_Chapter-04.qxd

Table 4.5

CCYL Cadres in the Seventeenth Central Committee (October 2007) Index

Anhui Anhui Inner Mongolia Jiangsu Hebei Shandong Jiangsu Anhui

1942 1955 1947 1950 1941 1944 1945 1955

Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full

Politburo State Council Propaganda Central Organization National People’s Congress Xinjiang State Council Guangdong

General Secretary Vice Premier Director Director Vice Chair Party Secretary State Councilor Party Secretary

9 5 5 5 4 4 4 4

Central Party Institutions Du Qinglin Ling Jihua Shen Yueyue (f.)

Jilin Shanxi Zhejiang

1946 1957 1957

Full Full Full

United Front General Office Central Organization

Director Director Deputy Director

2 3 2

Central Government Institutions Cai Wu Liu Peng Wu Aiying (f.) Yang Chuantang Li Haifeng (f.) Li Xueju

Gansu Chongqing Shandong Shandong Hebei Beijing

1949 1951 1951 1954 1949 1945

Full Full Full Full Full Full

Ministry of Culture Sports Justice Ethnic Affairs Overseas Office Civil Affairs

Minister Director Minister Party Secretary Director Minister

2 2 2 2 2 2

(Continued )

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Title

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Work Unit

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Politburo Hu Jintao Li Keqiang Liu Yunshan Li Yuanchao Wang Zhaoguo Wang Lequan Liu Yandong (f.) Wang Yang

CC Membership

149

Birth

Factional Balance

Home

Work Unit

Title

Index

1948 1944 1952

Full Full Alternate

Media Quality Industry and Commerce

Director Director Party Secretary

2 2 1

Guizhou Hubei Liaoning

1950 1944 1953

Alternate Full Alternate

Religious Affairs CPPCC CAS

Director Vice Chairman Vice President

1 2 1

Sichuan Inner Mongolia

1945 1953

Full Full

CPPCC Ethnic Affairs

Dep. Sec. General Minister

2 2

Military Li Jinai

Shandong

1942

Full

Director

3

Liu Zhenlai (Hui)

Beijing

1949

Alternate

General Political Department Beijing Military Region

Air Pol Com.

1

Provincial Units Ji Bingxuan Liu Qibao Qiang Wei Zhang Baoshun Zhang Qingli Zhou Qiang Hu Chunhua Han Zheng

Henan Anhui Jiangsu Hebei Shandong Hubei Hubei Zhejiang

1952 1953 1953 1950 1951 1960 1963 1954

Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full

Heilongjiang Sichuan Qinghai Shanxi Tibet Hunan Hebei Shanghai

Party Secretary Party Secretary Party Secretary Party Secretary Party Secretary Governor Governor Mayor

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

(Continued )

Page 150

Shaanxi Heilongjiang Jilin

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CC Membership

12/14/2009

Birth

Liu Binjie Li Changjiang Quan Zhezhu (Korean) Ye Xiaowen Qian Yunlu Bai Chunli (Manchu) Yang Chonghui Yang Jing (Mongolian)

Home

150 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization

Name

(Continued )

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Table 4.5

Name

Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate

Shanxi Guangdong Henan Shandong Hainan Qinghai Fujian Shaanxi Yunnan Jilin Heilongjiang Xinjiang Liaoning Fujian Zhejiang Guangdong Chongqing Jilin Tianjin Xinjiang Tibet Shandong Liaoning Hunan

Title

Index

Governor Governor Governor Governor Governor Governor Governor Governor Governor Governor Chairman Governor Deputy Secretary Deputy Secretary Deputy Secretary Deputy Secretary Deputy Secretary Deputy Secretary Deputy Secretary Deputy Secretary Deputy Secretary Deputy Secretary Deputy Secretary

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

(Continued )

Page 151

1949 1946 1946 1953 1952 1955 1946 1952 1950 1954 1950 1961 1952 1952 1952 1949 1958 1953 1949 1953 1955 1958 1955 1957

Work Unit

11:52 AM

CC Membership

151

Hebei Xinjiang Liaoning Shandong Tianjin Shandong Hebei Henan Shandong Hebei Shanghai Shandong Liaoning Hunan

Birth

12/14/2009

Shandong Guangdong Shaanxi Shandong Tianjin Tianjin Fujian Hunan Hunan

(Continued )

Factional Balance

Meng Xuenong Huang Huahua Li Chengyu (Hui) Jiang Daming Luo Baoming Song Xiuyan (f.) Huang Xiaojing Yuan Chunqing Qin Guangrong Han Changfu Li Zhanshu Nur Bekri (Uygur) Chen Zhenggao Wang Sanyun Xia Baolong Liu Yupu Zhang Xuan (f.) Wang Rulin Xing Yuanmin Yang Gang Zhang Yijiong Liu Wei Luo Lin Mei Kebao

Home

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Table 4.5

CC Membership

Bayanqolu (Mongolian) Shi Lianxi (f.) Li Yumei (f.) Shen Weichen Sun Jinlong Tang Tao Ulagan (f. Mongolian) Wu Xianguo Zhao Yong Luo Zhijun Ma Biao (Zhuang) Zhu Xiaodan Song Airong (f.) Li Ke (Zhuang) Fu Zhifang Ji Lin Liu Hui (f. Hui) Ren Yaping Jin Zhenji (Korean) Shen Suli (f.) Yu Yuanhui (Yao) Wu Jihai (Miao) Lei Chunmei (f. She)

Inner Mongolia Hebei Shandong Shanxi Hubei Hubei Inner Mongolia Hebei Hunan Liaoning Guangxi Zhejiang Henan Guangxi Henan Shanghai Tianjin Inner Mongolia Jilin Jiangsu Guangxi Hunan Fujian

1955 1952 1956 1956 1962 1963 1962 1956 1963 1951 1954 1953 1959 1956 1956 1962 1959 1952 1959 1958 1964 1953 1959

Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate

Total

Work Unit Zhejiang Tianjin Shandong Shanxi Anhui Hubei Inner Mongolia Hebei Hebei Jiangsu Guangxi Guangdong Xinjiang Henan Hebei Beijing Ningxia Inner Mongolia Jilin Anhui Guangxi Hunan Fujian

Title

Index

Standing Member Standing Member Standing Member Standing Member Standing Member Standing Member Standing Member Standing Member Standing Member Standing Member Standing Member Standing Member Standing Member Vice Governor Vice Governor Vice Governor Vice Governor Vice Governor Vice Governor City Secretary City Secretary City Secretary City Mayor

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 149

Source: Updated from Bo Zhiyue, China’s Elite Politics: Political Transition and Power Balancing (Singapore: World Scientific, 2007), Table 4.7, pp. 184–186.

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152 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization

Table 4.5

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When Song Defu was reelected as the first secretary in May 1988, Liu Yandong (f.), Li Yuanchao, Zhang Baoshun, Li Keqiang, and Liu Qibao continued on the Secretariat. They were later joined by Yuan Chunqing in December 1992. Li Keqiang took over as the first secretary in May 1993, members of his Secretariat included Yuan Chunqing, Liu Peng, Ji Bingxuan, Bayanqolu (Mongolian), Jiang Daming, Sun Jinlong, Zhou Qiang, and Hu Chunhua. Finally, when Zhou Qiang succeeded as the first secretary in June 1998, his Secretariat members included Bayanqolu, Sun Jinlong, Hu Chunhua, and Zhao Yong. Apparently, these 17 people had close personal ties with one another (Figure 4.1). Li Keqiang worked with all of them in the Secretariat, except for Zhao Yong. His personal ties amount to 74.5 years. He is followed by Liu Yandong and Zhang Baoshun, both of whom have personal ties of 48 years. Li Yuanchao also worked very closely with many members of the Secretariat with a score of 44 years. So did Bayanqolu who has personal ties of 42.5 years. On the other hand, Wang Zhaoguo and Hu Jintao did not work very closely with this group. Their personal ties are 10 and 15 years, respectively. The group cohesion index of this group is 284.5, much higher than that of any of the factional groups mentioned earlier. In fact, this 80

74.5

70

48

48

50

44

42.5

40

36.5 33

30

27.5

30

30

27.5

34

30

19.5

19

20

15 10

10

ng Yo

nl Ji n Su

Personal Ties of Former CCYL Secretariat Members

Zh ao

on

g

ua

u

nh hu C

u H

ng

nq ol ya

Ba

g

Q ou Zh

Ji a

ng

D

am

ia

in

an

ng Pe u

ng xu Bi Ji

C an

Li

in

g

ao

nq

ib Q

hu

u Li Yu

n

an g

hu

qi Ke Li

)

o

Ba os ng

Zh a

Yu

an c

ha

(f.

(f. )

ng fe ai

Fig. 4.1

Li

Ya Li u

Li H

nd on

g

nt Ji u H

Zh

ao gu

o

ao

0

W an g

Number of Years

60

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154 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization

index, though very high, has vastly underestimated the extent to which these people actually worked with each other. This is because many members of the Secretariat had worked in the CCYL Central Committee for years before they entered the Secretariat. In order to have a full assessment of their group cohesion, we also need to take a look at full-time staff under the Central Committee of the CCYL. Full-time staff Some members of the Secretariat had worked in the CCYL Central Committee before their entry to the Secretariat. These include Zhang Baoshun, Yuan Chunqing, Jiang Daming, Zhao Yong, and Sun Jinlong. Zhang Baoshun entered the Tenth Central Committee of the CCYL in October 1978 as an alternate member.50 He began to work in the Department of Young Workers of the CCYL Central Committee in 1979. He was a staff member, deputy section head (fu chu), and deputy director of the Department before his entry to the Secretariat of the CCYL Central Committee as an alternate member in December 1982.51 He worked for the CCYL Central Committee altogether for 14 years. Yuan Chunqing began his work at the Central Committee of the CCYL in January 1980. He worked in the Department of Schools and Colleges for 13 years before he was promoted to the Secretariat in December 1992.52 He worked for the CCYL Central Committee for 18 years. Similarly, Jiang Daming started to work as a staff member of the Organization Department of the Central Committee of the CCYL in January 1982. He was promoted to deputy chief of the Organization Section in June 1984, section chief in January 1986, deputy director of the Department in April 1987, and director of the Department in June 1990. He did not enter the Secretariat until May 1993.53 He worked for the CCYL Central Committee for 16.5 years altogether. Zhao Yong had also worked for the CCYL Central Committee for a number of years before he entered the Secretariat. He was transferred to the Department of Young Workers of the CCYL Central Committee in October 1993 and then worked in the Department for almost five years until he was promoted to the Secretariat in June 1998.

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155

Sun Jinlong had also worked for the CCYL Central Committee for about a year before his entry into the Secretariat. He was appointed director of the Young Workers Department in January 1995 and was promoted to the Secretariat in October of the same year. Several other CCYL cadres managed to become standing members of the CCYL Central Committee but did not enter the Secretariat. These include Liu Yupu, Li Xueju, Liu Binjie, Luo Zhijun, Han Changfu, and Cai Wu. Liu Yupu became a standing member of the CCYL Central Committee in December 1982 and worked there for three years before he was transferred to the Central State Organs Work Committee in 1986.54 Li Xueju worked for the CCYL Central Committee for 10 years. He went to the CCYL Central Committee in 1978 and became a standing member of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCYL in December 1982. He was transferred to the Ministry of Civil Affairs in 1988.55 Liu Binjie worked for the CCYL Central Committee for 13 years. He worked there from August 1981 to July 1994.56 Luo Zhijun worked there even longer. He began there in December 1980 and was not transferred to Nanjing until September 1995. His work experience in the CCYL Central Committee was almost 15 years.57 It is not clear exactly how long Han Changfu was in the CCYL Central Committee but his tenure there was at least seven years. This is because he is reportedly to have worked as director of the Propaganda Department in 1986 and was identified as director of the Young Peasants Department in 1991 and as a standing member of the Thirteenth Central Committee of the CCYL in May 1993. Finally, Cai Wu was transferred to the CCYL Central Committee in July 1983 and worked there for almost 12 years. Lastly, there is a group of CCYL cadres who were regular staff members. These include Zhang Qingli,58 Ling Jihua,59 Li Changjiang,60 and Ye Xiaowen.61 Zhang Qingli, currently Party secretary of Tibet, was “borrowed” by the Central Committee of the CCYL in June 1978 when he was a deputy secretary of the Dongping County in Shandong Province. He was then officially transferred to the CCYL Central Committee in January 1979. He worked in the Department of Young Workers and Peasants for almost eight years,

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156 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization

from June 1978 to March 1986, when he was transferred to Dongying Municipality of Shandong as vice mayor. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Ling Jihua worked in the CCYL Central Committee roughly from October 1978 to December 1995, though not continuously. He worked mainly in the Department of Propaganda. Li Changjiang, former head of the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection, and Quarantine,62 worked in the CCYL Central Committee for almost six years, from November 1986 to August 1992, when he was appointed deputy chief of the State Land Management Bureau. Ye Xiaowen, the head of the State Administration of Religious Affairs, worked very briefly in the CCYL Central Committee. He was deputy director of the United Front Department of the CCYL Central Committee from June 1990 to July 1991, when he was transferred to the United Front Department of the CCP Central Committee. Clearly, these people (27) worked very closely with one another in the CCYL Central Committee (Figure 4.2). Yuan Chunqing has the highest score in terms of personal ties. He worked in the CCYL Central Committee for 18 years, and worked with everyone in

250

200

191

183

156

150

155

148

133

122.5 94.5

94.5

100

173.5

170.5

166

93

88.5 75.5

69

56.5

54.5 50

38.5 17.5

34

38

38.5 42

39 27.5

13

C

u

H

Ba

ya

nq

ol

u

(M

on

go lia hu n) n H hua u Ji Jint ao B Ji ing an xu an g D am Li in g H a Li ifen Ke g qi Li Yu an an g ch Li ao u Pe Li ng u Q Li ib u Ya ao Su ndo W n J ng an in lo g Yu Zh ng an ao g Zh Ch uo an un qi g Ba ng o Zh shu ao n Zh Yo ou ng Q ia Li ng u Yu Li pu Xu Li eju u B Lu inj ie o H an Zhij C un ha ng fu Li C a i C ha W u ng Li jian ng g Ye Jih Xi ua Zh ao an we n g Q in gl i

0

Fig. 4.2

Personal Ties of Former Full-Time Staff Members of the CCYL

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Factional Balance

157

the group except for Hu Chunhua. His personal ties with other members of the CCYL inner circle are 191 years. He is followed by Jiang Daming, with a score of 183 years. Ling Jihua followed next with a score of 173.5 years, and Luo Zhijun after him with a score of 170.5 years. Li Keqiang’s score is 166 years, and Zhang Baoshun’s score is 156 years. Others with a score of more than 100 include Liu Binjie (155 years), Cai Wu (148 years), Liu Yandong (133 years), and Li Yuanchao (122.5 years). The group cohesion index for this group is 1,256 points! Local Cadres Fifty-six members of the Seventeenth Central Committee with CCYL background worked mainly as local CCYL leaders. Among them, 41 worked as provincial cadres and 15 as CCYL cadres of lower levels or were affiliated with the CCYL in other capacities. Provincial cadres Among former provincial CCYL leaders, 25 were members of the CCYL Central Committee and 16 were not members of the CCYL Central Committee (Table 4.6). Two were standing members of the CCYL Central Committee — Yang Chonghui63 and Qiang Wei.64 Quan Zhezhu, Liu Yunshan, Li Chengyu, Wu Aiying (f.), Song Xiuyan (f.), Qian Yunlu, Huang Huahua, and Du Qinglin were all members of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCYL when they were provincial CCYL cadres.65 Quan Zhezhu was secretary of the Jilin CCYL Committee; Liu Yunshan was deputy secretary of the Inner Mongolia CCYL Committee; Li Chengyu was secretary of the Ningxia CCYL Committee; Wu Aiying was deputy secretary of the Shandong CCYL Committee; Song Xiuyan was deputy secretary of the Qinghai CCYL Committee; Qian Yunlu was secretary of the Hubei CCYL Committee; Huang Huahua was deputy secretary of the Guangdong CCYL Committee; and Du Qinglin was deputy secretary of the Jilin CCYL Committee.

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158 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization Table 4.6

Provincial CCYL Cadres

Name

Home

Yang Chonghui Qiang Wei Du Qinglin Han Zheng Huang Huahua Li Chengyu (Hui) Liu Yunshan Luo Baoming Meng Xuenong Qian Yunlu Shen Yueyue (f.) Song Xiuyan (f.) Wu Aiying (f.) Yang Chuantang Li Zhanshu Quan Zhezhu (Korean) Shi Lianxi (f.) Ji Lin Jin Zhenji (Korean) Lei Chunmei (f. She) Song Airong (f.) Luo Lin Tang Tao Ulagan (f. Mongolian) Yu Yuanhui (Yao) Wang Lequan Wang Yang Qin Guangrong Yang Jing (Mongolian) Liu Hui (f. Hui) Liu Wei Ma Biao (Zhuang) Mei Kebao Ren Yaping Shen Weichen Shi Lianxi (f.)

Sichuan Jiangsu Jilin Zhejiang Guangdong Shaanxi Inner Mongolia Tianjin Shandong Hubei Zhejiang Tianjin Shandong Shandong Hebei Jilin Hebei Shanghai Jilin Fujian Henan Liaoning Hubei Inner Mongolia Guangxi Shandong Anhui Hunan Inner Mongolia Tianjin Shandong Guangxi Hunan Inner Mongolia Shanxi Hebei

CC Birth Membership 1945 1953 1946 1954 1946 1946 1947 1952 1949 1944 1957 1955 1951 1954 1950 1952 1952 1962 1959 1959 1959 1955 1963 1962 1964 1944 1955 1950 1953 1959 1958 1954 1957 1952 1956 1952

Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Full Full Full Full Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate

CCYL CC Membership Standing Member Standing Member Member Member Member Member Member Member Member Member Member Member Member Member Member Member Member Member Member Member Member Member Member Member Member Non-Member Non-Member Non-Member Non-Member Non-Member Non-Member Non-Member Non-Member Non-Member Non-Member Non-Member (Continued )

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Factional Balance Table 4.6.

Name Wang Rulin Wang Sanyun Xing Yuanmin Yang Gang Zhang Yijiong

Home Henan Shandong Shandong Hebei Shanghai

159

(Continued ) CC Birth Membership 1953 1952 1949 1953 1955

Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate

CCYL CC Membership Non-Member Non-Member Non-Member Non-Member Non-Member

Source: Author’s database.

In the reshuffle of the Eleventh Central Committee in November 1985 when Song Defu replaced Hu Jintao as the first secretary, Shen Yueyue (f.), Meng Xuenong, Luo Baoming, Luo Lin, and Han Zheng also entered the CCYL Central Committee. Shen Yueyue was secretary of the Ningbo CCYL Committee in Zhejiang Province; Meng Xuenong was deputy secretary of the Beijing CCYL Committee; Luo Baoming was secretary of the Tianjin Municipal CCYL Committee; and Luo Lin was secretary of the Shenyang CCYL Committee in Liaoning Province. However, it is not clear what position Han Zheng held in the Shanghai CCYL Committee. He was neither secretary nor one of deputy secretaries. He was appointed a deputy secretary in charge of the Shanghai CCYL Central Committee in May 1990 and was made secretary one year later.66 In addition to Qiang Wei, Wu Aiying, Song Xiuyan, Shen Yueyue, and Luo Lin, one may find Yang Chuantang and Li Zhanshu among the members of the Twelfth Central Committee, of the CCYL. Yang Chuantang was secretary of the Shandong CCYL Committee, and Li Zhanshu was secretary of the Hebei CCYL Committee. Three provincial CCYL leaders were members of the Thirteenth Central Committee of the CCYL elected in May 1993. They were Luo Lin, Jin Zhenji, and Ulagan (f.). Luo Lin was secretary of the Liaoning CCYL Committee67; Jin Zhenji was probably secretary of the Jilin CCYL Committee; and Ulagan (f., Mongolian) was deputy secretary of the Inner Mongolia CCYL Committee.68

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160 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization

In addition to Ulagan who was reelected to the CCYL Central Committee in June 1998, four other provincial CCYL cadres also entered the Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCYL. They were Song Airong (f.), Ji Lin, Tang Tao, and Lei Chunmei (f., She). Song Airong was deputy secretary of the Xinjiang CCYL Committee69; Ji Lin was secretary of the Beijing CCYL Committee70; Tang Tao was secretary of the Hubei CCYL Committee71; and Lei Chunmei, a member of the She nationality,72 was deputy secretary of the Fujian CCYL Committee.73 Finally, in addition to Zhou Qiang and Zhao Yong, Yu Yuanhui (Yao) also entered the Fifteenth Central Committee of the CCYL in July 2003. As other politicians who take the CCYL route, Yu was retained as secretary of the CCYL General Branch of the Department of Agriculture in the Guangxi Institute of Agriculture upon his graduation in July 1986. He later served as deputy secretary and secretary of the CCYL Committee of the Guangxi Institute of Agriculture in the early 1990s. He was appointed secretary of the Guangxi Regional CCYL Committee in September 2001 and subsequently entered the Fifteenth Central Committee of the CCYL. He worked as the secretary until January 2006, for four and a half years.74 Compared to central CCYL cadres, these provincial CCYL cadres interacted less frequently with each other and with central CCYL cadres. But their connections to central CCYL cadres were stronger than those provincial CCYL cadres who were not members of the CCYL Central Committee. Two of the Politburo members with CCYL background, for instance, actually had brief experiences in CCYL work. Wang Lequan was deputy secretary of the Shandong CCYL Committee for four years, from 1982 to 1986; and Wang Yang was a CCYL cadre for three years, from 1981 to 1984. Wang Yang was deputy secretary of the Suxian Prefecture CCYL Committee of Anhui Province from 1981 to 1982, and propaganda department director and deputy secretary of the Anhui CCYL Committee from 1982 to 1984. But neither of them ever made it to the CCYL Central Committee. It is highly likely that they did not know each other in those years.

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Factional Balance

161

Similarly, Qin Guangrong and Yang Jing (Mongolian), two other full members of the Seventeenth Central Committee, also had brief experiences as CCYL cadres. Qin was deputy secretary of the Hunan CCYL Committee as well as president of the Hunan Youth Federation between December 1984 and February 1987, and Yang Jing was secretary of the CCYL Committee of the Yeke Juu League (now Ordos City) between October 1983 and November 1985, and secretary of the CCYL Committee of the Inner Mongolia between June 1993 and March 1996. Twelve alternate members with CCYL background served as provincial CCYL leaders with various lengths of tenure. They were Liu Hui (f. Hui), Liu Wei, Ma Biao (Zhuang), Mei Kebao, Ren Yaping, Shen Weichen, Shi Lianxi (f.), Wang Rulin, Wang Sanyun, Xing Yuanmin, Yang Gang, and Zhang Yijiong. Liu Hui was a CCYL cadre in Ningxia for 13 years, from 1985 to 1998.75 Liu Wei was a CCYL cadre for 13 years, from February 1980 to April 1995 (with a break from October 1985 to July 1987).76 Ma Biao did not work full time for the CCYL but served concurrently as a vice president of the Youth Federation of Guangxi from April 1989 to October 1994. Mei Kebao worked for five years as a provincial CCYL cadre in Hunan, from 1987 to 1992.77 Ren Yaping worked for almost 12 years as a CCYL cadre. He was secretary of the CCYL Committee of No. 2 Middle School in Huerhot of Inner Mongolia, and staff member and deputy secretary of the CCYL Committee of Inner Mongolia.78 Shen Weichen served as a CCYL cadre from 1983 to 1988. He was secretary of the Jindongnan Prefecture CCYL Committee from November 1983 to 1984, and deputy secretary of the Shanxi Provincial CCYL Committee from 1984 to 1988.79 Shi Lianxi also served as a CCYL cadre in Tianjin in the 1980s and the 1990s. Beginning in April 1982, she worked concurrently as secretary general and deputy secretary of the Tianjin Municipal CCYL Committee, as well as vice president of the Youth Federation of Tianjin.80 Wang Rulin was deputy secretary and secretary of the Jilin Provincial CCYL Committee in the 1980s. He was the secretary from August 1987 to April 1991.81 Wang Sanyun was secretary of the Guizhou Provincial CCYL Committee from July 1990 to

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162 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization

December 1992.82 Xing Yuanmin worked as deputy secretary of the Tianjin Municipal CCYL Committee in the 1980s.83 Yang Gang served as deputy secretary of the Xinjiang Regional CCYL Committee for less than two years, from December 1991 to October 1992, though he had gained experiences as a CCYL cadre for seven years previously.84 Finally, Zhang Yijiong was trained as a CCYL cadre. He attended the School of the CCYL Central Committee between October 1979 and February 1981 and was hired as a teacher in the Youth League School of Qinghai Province upon graduation. He was deputy director and director of the Department of Young Workers and Peasants of the Qinghai Provincial CCYL Committee from June 1983 to October 1986, and deputy secretary of the Qinghai Provincial CCYL Committee from October 1986 to May 1990.85 Other CCYL cadres Twelve CCYL cadres performed their services as CCYL cadres at lower levels (Table 4.7). They are Shen Suli (f.), Fu Zhifang, Nur Bekri (Uygur), Huang Xiaojing, Li Ke (Zhuang), Xia Baolong, Chen Zhenggao, Li Yumei (f.), Wu Jihai (Miao), Wu Xianguo, Zhu Xiaodan, and Zhang Xuan (f.). Shen Suli is the only person among this group of CCYL cadres who was a member of the CCYL Central Committee without being a provincial CCYL cadre. Her only experience in the CCYL was deputy secretary and secretary of the CCYL Committee of the Liu’an Prefecture of Anhui Province.86 She was elected a member of the Twelfth Central Committee of the CCYL in May 1988. Fu Zhifang worked in the Henan Provincial CCYL Committee for five years but was never its chief leader. He was a staff member and clerical secretary in the Organization Department of the Henan Provincial CCYL Committee from July 1982 to February 1985, and deputy director and director of the Organization Department from February 1985 to November 1987.87 Nur Bekri (Uygur), on the other hand, served as a CCYL cadre at Xinjiang University. He was secretary of the CCYL General Branch of the Department of Political

Name

Other CCYL Cadres

Fujian Liaoning Henan Guangxi Shandong Xinjiang Jiangsu Hunan Hebei Tianjin Hebei Zhejiang

1946 1952 1956 1956 1956 1961 1958 1953 1956 1952 1958 1953

Full Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate Alternate

CYL Affiliates Li Jinai

Shandong

1942

Full

Liu Zhenlai (Hui)

Beijing

1949

Alternate

Bai Chunli (Manchu)

Liaoning

1953

Alternate

Title

Index

Fujian Liaoning Hebei Henan Shandong Xinjiang Anhui Hunan Hebei Zhejiang Chongqing Guangdong

Governor Standing Member Vice Governor Vice Governor Standing Member Deputy Secretary City Secretary City Secretary Standing Member Deputy Secretary Deputy Secretary Standing Member

2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

General Political Department Beijing Military Region CAS

Director

3

Air Pol Com.

1

Vice President

1

Page 163

CCYL Cadres of Lower Levels Huang Xiaojing Chen Zhenggao Fu Zhifang Li Ke (Zhuang) Li Yumei (f.) Nur Bekri (Uygur) Shen Suli (f.) Wu Jihai (Miao) Wu Xianguo Xia Baolong Zhang Xuan (f.) Zhu Xiaodan

Work Unit

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CC Membership

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Birth

Factional Balance

Home

163

Source: Author’s database.

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Table 4.7

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164 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization

Education, and deputy secretary and secretary of the Xinjiang University CCYL Committee.88 Huang Xiaojing was the United Front Department director and secretary of the Fuzhou Municipal CCYL Committee89; Li Ke was secretary of the Nanning Prefecture CCYL Committee of Guangxi for a year, from 1982 to 198390; Xia Baolong was deputy secretary and secretary of the Hexi District CCYL Committee of Tianjin; Chen Zhenggao worked in the CCYL Committee of Dalian City of Liaoning Province in the early 1980s91; Li Yumei (f.) was secretary of the Lingyi Prefecture CCYL Committee for seven years, from January 1984 to March 199192; Wu Jihai (Miao) worked in the CCYL Committee of the Xiangxi Autonomous Prefecture of Hunan Province for three years, from February 1982 to June 198593; and Wu Xianguo was secretary of the CCYL Committee of No. 1 Middle School in Langfang City of Hebei, and secretary of the CCYL Committee of Langfang City of Hebei.94 Zhu Xiaodan worked in the Guangzhou Municipal CCYL Committee from 1977 to 1987 in various capacities. He became deputy secretary in 1982, and acting secretary and secretary after 1984.95 Zhang Xuan (f.) was organization department director and deputy secretary of the Chongqing Municipal CCYL Committee between July 1985 and November 1992.96 Since Chongqing was then a municipality under Sichuan Province, she was a CCYL cadre of the municipality level. The last group of the Seventeenth Central Committee members with CCYL background consists of those who were affiliated with the CCYL. They are Li Jinai, Liu Zhenlai, and Bai Chunli. General Li Jinai, currently director of the General Political Department of the PLA, was a member of the Tenth and the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCYL; Lieutenant General Liu Zhenlai, political commissar of the Beijing Military Region Air Force, was a member of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCYL; and Dr. Bai Chunli, vice president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, was a vice president of the Youth Federation of China. Li Jinai joined the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in December 1967. He was elected a member of the Tenth Central Committee of the CCYL in October 1978

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when he was chief of the Youth Section of the Organization Department under the Political Department in the Second Artillery Corps and was reelected a member of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCYL in December 1982 when he was Youth Section chief and deputy director of the Organization Department.97 Liu Zhenlai was probably working in the Organization Department of the PLA Air Force in December 1982 when he entered the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCYL. Bai Chunli was made a standing member of the Youth Federation of China in December 1993 and vice president of the Youth Federation of China in July 1995.98 Although Li Jinai and Liu Zhenlai might have opportunities to interact with other CCYL cadres, Bai Chunli is only a nominal cadre affiliated with the CCYL. CONCLUDING REMARKS In comparison to the Sixteenth Central Committee elected in 2002, the Seventeenth Central Committee witnessed dramatic changes to the factional balance of Chinese politics (Figure 4.3). The Shanghai 160 149

2002 2007 140

120

97

100

80 64 60

54 42

41

40

34 21

20

0 Shanghai Gang

Fig. 4.3

Qinghua Clique

Princelings

CCYL Group

Factional Balance of the CCP Central Committees (2002, 2007)

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166 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization

Gang, a factional group affiliated with former general secretary of the Party, Jiang Zemin, became significantly weaker. The number of the Shanghai Gang members declined from 17 in the Sixteenth Central Committee to nine in the Seventeenth Central Committee, and its power index dropped from 42 points in 2002 to a mere 21 points in 2007. More substantially, with Chen Liangyu’s removal as Party secretary and Han Zheng’s dismissal as acting Party secretary of Shanghai, the path to the Zhongnanhai (the compound of central Party and government offices) for Shanghai leaders was cut off. The Qinghua Clique also declined but for a different reason. The number of Qinghua graduates decreased from 20 in the Sixteenth Central Committee to only 10 in the Seventeenth Central Committee. Its power index declined from 54 points in 2002 to 34 points in 2007. Although the Shanghai Gang declined for political reasons, the decline of the Qinghua Clique was mostly due to retirement. As many Qinghua graduates in the Sixteenth Central Committee were in their 60s, they had to retire from their offices in 2007. The Seventeenth Central Committee saw the expansion of the Princelings. Princelings increased from 20 in the Sixteenth Central Committee to 26 in the Seventeenth Central Committee, and its power index increased from 41 points in 2002 to 64 points in 2007. The CCYL Group further expanded from 57 in the Sixteenth Central Committee to 82 in the Seventeenth Central Committee. Its power index increased from 97 points in 2002 to 149 points in 2007. Obviously, the CCYL Group remained the most powerful factional group by a large margin. The Princelings emerged as the second most powerful factional group while the Qinghua Clique declined from second to the third, and the Shanghai Gang became the weakest factional group of all. A similar pattern can be found in terms of group cohesion indexes (Figure 4.4). The Shanghai Gang dropped sharply, from 103.17 points in 2002 to only 20 points in 2007; the Qinghua Clique also declined substantially, from 142 points in 2002 to only 16 points in 2007; the Princelings increased significantly, from eight points in 2002 to 53.25 points in 2007; and the CCYL Group expanded greatly, from 405.5 points in 2002 to a staggering 1,256 points in 2007!99

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167

1400 2002

1256

2007 1200

1000

800

600

405.5

400

200

142

103.2 20

16

0 Shanghai Gang

Fig. 4.4

Qinghua Clique

8

53.3

Princelings

CCYL Group

Group Cohesion Index of Factional Groups in China (2002, 2007)

NOTES 1. For detailed analyses of previous central committees, see Franklin Houn, “The Eighth Central Committee of the CCP”, American Political Science Review 51, no. 2 (June 1957): 392–404; Donald W. Klein and Lois B. Hager, “The Ninth Central Committee”, The China Quarterly, no. 45 (January–March 1971): 37–56; Robert A. Scalapino, “The transition in Chinese Party leadership: A comparison of the Eighth and Ninth Central Committees”, in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., Elites in the People’s Republic of China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972), pp. 67–148; Gordon A. Bennett, China’s Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Congresses, Constitutions, and Central Committees: An Institutional overview and comparison. Occasional Paper, no. 1 (Austin: Center for Asian Studies, University of Texas, 1978); Hong Yung Lee, “China’s 12th Central Committee”, Asian Survey 23 (June 1983): 673–691; Li Cheng and Lynn White, “The Thirteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: From Mobilizers to Managers”, Asian Survey 28 (April 1988): 371–399; Xiaowei Zhang, “The Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCP: Technocracy or Political Technocracy”? Asian Survey 33 (August 1993): 787–803; David Shambaugh, “The CCP’s 15th Congress: Technocrats in Command”, Issues & Studies 34, no.1 (January 1998): 1–37; Zhiyue Bo, “The Sixteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Formal Institutions and Factional Groups”. Journal of Contemporary China 13, no. 39 (May 2004): 223–256;

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2.

3. 4.

5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

11.

12.

and Bo Zhiyue, China’s Elite Politics: Political Transition and Power Balancing (Singapore: World Scientific, 2007). These groups are factional groups instead of factions. Conceptually, factional groups are based on corporate ties and factions are based on clientelist ties. Among these factional groups, the Shanghai Gang is the closest to the definition of a faction; the CCYL Group is a typical factional group; the Qinghua Clique is a typical corporate group; and the Princelings is more of a categorical group than of a factional group. For a detailed discussion, see Bo, China’s Elite Politics, pp. 139–199. Bo, China’s Elite Politics, pp. 141–151. The power index is calculated according to the following scheme: one point for an alternate member of the Central Committee of the CCP; two points for a full member; three points for an alternate member of the Politburo; four points for a full member of the Politburo; and five points for a standing member of the Politburo; and six points for the General Secretary. In addition, members of the Secretariat receive one more point each; members of the Central Military Commission (CMC) receive one more point each; and vice chairmen of the CMC receive two more points each. The power index in this book is used interchangeably with central committee index and representation index. The latter two are very descriptive, and the former is deliberately used to project an image of power politics. For details, see Bo, China’s Elite Politics, p. 120. For the calculation of the Shanghai Gang’s group cohesion index, see Bo, China’s Elite Politics, p. 147. Renminwang, April 5, 2003, http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper464/ 8877/828486.html. For Jiang Zemin’s biographical information, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/ ziliao/2002-01/15/content_238452.htm. For a detailed discussion, see Zhiyue Bo, “China’s Central Military Commission under Hu Jintao”, Chinese Military Update 2, no. 5 (2005), pp. 7–10. For Chen Liangyu’s biographical information, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/ ziliao/2002-02/22/content_285938.htm. “Zhongyang Jiwei Fuzeren jiu Chachu Chen Liangyu Yanzhong Weiji Anjian Da Jizhe Wen” (“A Central Disciplinary Inspection Commission official answers questions about Chen Liangyu’s serious violations of party disciplines”), Renminwang, July 27, 2007, http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/ 6036629.html. “Zhongyang Kaichu Chen Liangyu Dangji Gongzhi” (“The Politburo expelled Chen Liangyu from the party and dismissed him from public office”), Renminwang, July 26, 2007, http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/ 6036368.html. “Chen Liangyu ying Weigui Weiji bei Mian Shanghai Shi ji Quanguo Renda Daibiao Zhiwu” (“Chen Liangyu has been removed as a deputy to the Shanghai

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13. 14.

15.

16. 17.

18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

23. 24.

25. 26.

27.

169

Municipal People’s Congress and a deputy to the National People’s Congress because of his violation of the disciplines and the law”), Renminwang, July 26, 2007, http://leaders.people.com.cn/GB/6033545.html. Renmin Ribao, July 27, 2007, p. 1. “Hung Ju Tongzhi Yinbing Yizhi Wuxiao Zaijing Shishi” (“Comrade Huang Ju died in Beijing”), Xinhuanet, 2 June 2007, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ politics/2007-06/02/content_6187227.htm. Meng Jianzhu was transferred to Beijing as minister of Public Security on October 28, 2007. http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2007-10/28/ content_6964757.htm. Cao Jianming was elected president of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate in March 2008. Group cohesion indexes refer to the extent members of a factional group worked with one another in the same organization. For detailed discussions on the calculation of each group cohesion index, see Bo, China’s Elite Politics, pp. 147, 173–174,175, 190. For Chen Zhili’s biographical information, see http://www.people.com.cn/ GB/shizheng/252/9667/9683/20021127/875867.html. For Meng Jianzhu’s biographical information, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/ politics/2007-10/28/content_6964757.htm. Bo, China’s Elite Politics, pp. 174–182. For Zhang Zhiyi’s biographical information, see http://www.soouo.com/ baike/5813.htm. Shen Xueming and Zheng Jianying, eds., Zhonggong Diyijie zhi Dishiwujie Zhongyangweiyuan (The Central Committee Members of the Chinese Communist Party from the First through the Fifteenth Central Committee). (Beijing: Zhongyangwenxian Chubanshe, 2001), p. 678. Dangdai Zhongguo de Beijing (Beijing in Contemporary China) Vol. 2 (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo Chubanshe, 1989), pp. 740–741, 745, and 753. For Zhang Zhenhuan’s biographical information, see http://baike.baidu.com/ view/134880.htm and http://lxy888.171.3book.cn/ns_detail.php?id=70459 &nowmenuid=274775&cpath=&catid=0. For Bo Yibo’s biographical information, see http://news.sohu.com/ 20070116/n247646108.shtml. For Liu Ruilong’s biographical information, see http://www.ntda.gov.cn/ main.asp?clsid=35&infoid=2079, http://njdj.longhoo.net/dj80/ca16303. htm, and http://xfj.nantong.gov.cn/xinfang/showinfo/showinfo.aspx?infoid= 101367&siteid=1&categoryNum=1804. For an interview with one of his daughters, Liu Yanning, see http://www.wybstv.com.cn/Article/new/BDXW/ QWYS/200710/20071018120427.html. http://secretchina.com/news/gb/kanguanchang/taizidang/2007/1101/ 217149.html.

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170 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization 28. For Deng Xiaoping’s biographical information, see http://news.xinhuanet. com/ziliao/2003-01/17/content_694863.htm. 29. For Li Yunchuan’s biographical information, see http://kp.china-embassy.org/ chn/dshd/lrds/lrdsjl/t288603.htm. 30. For Zhou Jiannan’s biographical information, see http://www.yixing.gov.cn/ yxmr/xdzmrw/zjn.htm. 31. For Chen Yuan’s biographical information, see http://finance.sina.com.cn/ roll/20050508/13441569105.shtml and http://www.chinanews.com.cn/ news/2006/2006-05-11/8/728427.shtml. 32. For Chen Yun’s biographical information, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/ ziliao/2003-01/17/content_693817.htm. 33. For his biographical information, see http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/ziliao/ wjrw/lrfbzjbzzl/t9071.htm. 34. For Chen Yi’s biographical information, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/ ziliao/2003-01/17/content_693800.htm. 35. For a pioneering study of this group of political elites, see Bo Zhiyue, “Princeling Generals in China: Breaking the Two Career Barriers?” Issues & Studies 42, no. 1 (March 2006): 195–232. 36. For details, see http://www.hangzhou.gov.cn/main/tszf/szzc/lrsz/, http:// www.hangzhou.gov.cn/main/zjhz/hzsz/citymark/494/T83486.shtml?catalogid=5488, and http://www.hangzhou.gov.cn/main/zjhz/hzsz/citymark/ 325/T82988.shtml?catalogid=5364. 37. For Wu Xian’s biographical information, see http://baike.baidu.com/view/ 317942.htm. 38. For Peng Xuefeng’s biographical information, see http://baike.baidu.com/ view/55294.htm#2. 39. For Liu Shaoqi’s biographical information, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/ ziliao/2003-01/17/content_694156.htm. For an official biography of Liu Shaoqi, see Liu Shaoqi Zhuan (The Biography of Liu Shaoqi) Vol. 1–2 (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 1998). 40. For Liu Xiyuan’s biographical information, see http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/ 64162/126778/130393/7586924.html. However, Liu Xiyuan probably has three children, two sons and one daughter. His sons are Liu Xiaodong and Liu Anbin, not Liu Xiaojiang. It is reported that Liu Xiaojiang’s father is another long marcher from Ji’an, Jiangxi, Liu Haibin (1908–1994). For Liu Haibin’s biographical information, see http://baike.baidu.com/view/312997.html? wtp=tt. 41. For Hu Yaobang’s biographical information, see http://news.sina.com.cn/c/ 2005-11-19/09387481944s.shtml. 42. For Ding Qiusheng’s biographical information, see http://baike.baidu.com/ view/44380.htm.

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43. For Zhang Zhen’s biographical information, see http://www.hnmrw.net/zjmr/ Html/475_6277.html, http://www.rwabc.com/diqurenwu/diqudanyirenwu. asp?people_id=3265&id=13046&p_name=%E5%BC%A0%E9%9C%87, and http:// www.51dh.net/magazine/html/135/135567.htm. 44. For Zhang Zongxun’s biographical information, see http://baike.baidu.com/ view/92707.htm. 45. For Ai Fulin’s biographical information, see http://www.ourzg.com/bbs/read. php?tid=14872&page=e. 46. They get 1.5 points for working closely for 1.5 years and 6.25 points (half of 12.5 years) for working in the same ministry but different units. 47. They get five points for working closely for five years and 10 points (half of 20 years) for working in the same ministry but different units. 48. For details of the accident, see Bo, China’s Elite Politics, pp. 233–238. 49. In fact, Li Haifeng (f.) had been a member of the Secretariat since October 1978. She was a member of the Secretariat of the Tenth Central Committee of the CCYL as well as a member of the Secretariat of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCYL. For a list of members of the Secretariat of the Tenth Central Committee of the CCYL, see http://www.gqt.org.cn/search/zuzhi/ documents/1978/781027.htm. 50. For a complete list, see http://www.gqt.org.cn/search/zuzhi/documents/ 1978/781026c.htm. 51. For Zhang Baoshun’s biographical information, see http://news.xinhuanet. com/ziliao/2004-01/12/content_1270509.htm. 52. For Yuan Chunqing’s biographical information, see http://politics.people. com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/9667/9684/4427138.html. 53. For Jiang Daming’s biographical information, see http://www.sd.xinhuanet. com/zfsw/2003-03/25/content_331287.htm. 54. For Liu Yupu’s biographical information, see http://www.neualumni.org.cn/ FriendMienShow.asp?InfoID=200510130007. 55. For Li Xueju’s biographical information, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/ ziliao/2003-03/17/content_782297.htm. 56. For Liu Binjie’s biographical information, see http://politics.people.com.cn/ GB/shizheng/252/9667/9683/5658110.html. 57. For Luo Zhijun’s biographical information, see http://unn.people.com.cn/ GB/22220/56692/3962006.html. 58. For Zhang Qingli’s biographical information, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/ ziliao/2005-11/28/content_3844338.htm. 59. For Ling Jihua’s biographical information, see http://politics.people.com.cn/ GB/1024/6416981.html. 60. For Li Changjiang’s biographical information, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/ ziliao/2002-03/05/content_300353.htm.

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172 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization 61. For Ye Xiaowen’s biographical information, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/ ziliao/2002-03/05/content_300419.htm and http://www.humanrights.cn/ china/newzt/yxw/index.html. 62. He resigned in September 2008 to take responsibility for a tainted milk scandal that sickened more than 50,000 infants and killed at least four. For details, see http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/09/22/asia/milk.php. 63. For Yang Chonghui’s biographical information, see http://www.people.com. cn/GB/shizheng/252/9667/9684/20021127/875652.html. 64. For Qiang Wei’s biographical information, see http://www.gov.cn/rsrm/200706/01/content_633559.htm. 65. Quan Zhezhu, Li Chengyu, Wu Aiying, and Qian Yunlu were also members of the Tenth Central Committee of the CCYL. For a complete list, see http://www.gqt.org.cn/search/zuzhi/documents/1978/781026c.htm. 66. For details, see http://shyouth.why.com.cn/wjzl/lici.html. 67. For Luo Lin’s biographical information, see http://baike.baidu.com/view/ 563401.html. 68. For Ulagan’s biographical information, see http://nmg.xinhuanet.com/ah/ zfzx/2006-12/04/content_8610612.htm. 69. For Song Airong’s biographical information, see http://www.xjts.cn/gov/ content/2006-08/08/content_1099226.htm. 70. For Ji Lin’s biographical information, see http://city.finance.sina.com.cn/city/ 2007-03-05/82833.html. 71. For Tang Tao’s biographical information, see http://politics.people.com.cn/ GB/41223/5874566.html. 72. For details, see http://www.china.com.cn/ch-shaoshu/index41.htm. 73. For Lei Chunmei’s biographical information, see http://www.fj.xinhuanet. com/dszx/2006-06/06/content_7185207.htm. 74. For Yu Yuanhui’s biographical information, see http://leaders.people.com.cn/ GB/58318/58453/86239/86245/5886951.html. 75. For Liu Hui’s biographical information, see http://www.nx.xinhuanet.com/ special/20060416/lh.htm. 76. For Liu Wei’s biographical information, see http://www.sd.xinhuanet.com/ zfsw/2005-10/26/content_10778031.htm. 77. For Mei Kebao’s biographical information, see http://www.hunan.gov.cn/ hnsw/ldjs/mkb/. 78. For Ren Yaping’s biographical information, see http://www.nmgnews.com.cn/ information/article/20050607/3161_1.html. 79. For Shen Weichen’s biographical information, see http://www.sxgov.cn/ bwzt%5Cddh/364186.shtml. 80. For Shi Lianxi’s biographical information, see http://news.enorth.com.cn/ system/2007/06/03/001693861.shtml.

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81. For Wang Rulin’s biographical information, see http://leaders.people.com.cn/ GB/58318/58433/80330/81463/5644489.html. 82. For Wang Sanyun’s biographical information, see http://news.enorth.com.cn/ system/2006/11/26/001472386.shtml. 83. For Xing Yuanmin’s biographical information, see http://news.enorth.com.cn/ system/2007/06/03/001693856.shtml. There is another Xing Yuanmin with identical Chinese characters but is a female. She is deputy secretary of Chongqing. 84. For Yang Gang’s biographical information, see http://politics.people.com.cn/ GB/41223/5778544.html. 85. For Zhang Yijiong’s biographical information, see http://www.chinatibetnews.com.cn/GB/channel4/32/200612/14/57298.html. 86. For Shen Suli’s biographical information, see http://leaders.people.com.cn/ BIG5/70158/81643/81814/5626797.html. 87. For Fu Zhifang’s biographical information, see http://www.he.xinhuanet. com/zhengwu/2006-11/01/content_8399465.htm. 88. For Nur Bekri’s biographical information, see http://www.xj.xinhuanet.com/ 2005-08/08/content_4831604.htm. 89. For Huang Xiaojing’s biographical information, see http://news.xinhuanet. com/ziliao/2004-12/16/content_2343097.htm. 90. For Li Ke’s biographical information, see http://baike.baidu.com/view/ 304760.htm. 91. For Chen Zhenggao’s biographical information, see http://unn.people.com. cn/GB/22220/56692/3961927.html. 92. For Li Yumei’s biographical information, see http://www.sd.xinhuanet.com/ zfsw/2003-03/25/content_10778098.htm. 93. For Wu Jihai’s biographical information, see http://hlj.rednet.com.cn/ Articles/2003/03/396412.htm. 94. For Wu Xianguo’s biographical information, see http://www.he.xinhuanet. com/zhengwu/2006-11/14/content_8516892.htm. 95. For Zhu Xiaodan’s biographical information, see http://www.gz.gov.cn/vfs/ leader/zxd.jsp?contentId=295042&catId=1971. 96. For Zhang Xuan’s biographical information, see http://cqtoday.cqnews.net/ system/2007/05/27/000806846.shtml. 97. For Li Jinai’s biographical information, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/ ziliao/2004-07/22/content_1626493.htm. 98. For Bai Chunli’s biographical information, see http://big5.xinhuanet.com/ gate/big5/www.ln.xinhuanet.com/2004-08/17/content_2698751.htm. 99. The decline of the Shanghai Gang and the strengthening of the CCYL Group will not have significant impact on the CCP’s policies, but they will affect how these policies are implemented.

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Part II How to Govern: Challenges

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Chapter

5 Snowstorms in the South The year 2008 was an eventful one for China. Natural disasters and human upheavals occurred one after another, challenging the newly reconstituted central leadership in Beijing. This chapter evaluates the Chinese leadership’s handling of the natural disaster as a result of snowstorms in South China. SNOWSTORMS IN THE SOUTH Winter 2008 in South China: Cold and Snowy China was hit by severe snowstorms in the South in early 2008. The storms were “misplaced”. Instead of northern China, the storms hit central and southern China. Beginning on January 10, 2008, southern provinces such as Hunan, Hubei, Anhui, and Guizhou weathered icy rains and snowstorms for about 10 days, causing serious disruptions to the traffic and electricity supply.1 Most airports and highways in these provinces were closed. South China is used to mild weather in winter but encountered one of the coldest winters in 2008 in recent decades. Hubei experienced the coldest winter in January 2008 in 16 years2 while its capital, Wuhan, witnessed the coldest winter in more than three decades.3 On January 19, 2008, Wuhan had a snowfall of 0.97 centimeters and the southeastern regions of the province witnessed a snowfall of 177

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10 centimeters. As a result of freeze, more than 40 places in Wuhan experienced water pipe bursts, causing more than 5,000 accidents of water supply disruptions. With a water supply network of more than 5,000 kilometers, Wuhan was vulnerable to the cold weather because 40 percent of the network (i.e., 2,000 kilometers) was aged and some of the pipe was made of ordinary cast iron or cement. Since most of the standpipe was outdoors, it was vulnerable to rupture due to the low temperature.4 Located south of Hubei, Hunan Province found itself in the same predicament. Hunan’s average temperature between December 2005 and February 2006 (winter season), for instance, was 6.5 degrees Celsius (43.7 degrees Fahrenheit), ranging from 5.1 degrees to 8.4 degrees Celsius (41.2 to 47.1 degrees Fahrenheit).5 However, most counties in Hunan faced the lowest temperatures in January 2008 since the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949. With the exceptions of Guidong, Jiangyong, and Rucheng, other 119 counties experienced the coldest days from January 12–23, 2008 in the past 50 years. Hunan had its first snow on January 12, 2008, and its average temperature from January 12–23 was ranging from –1.4 to 2.9 degrees Celsius (29.5 to 37.2 degrees Fahrenheit). Out of 122 counties, 87 experienced freezing cold.6 Yet this province of 68 million people with a land area of 2.1 million square kilometers had only three snow trucks.7 In a province where the first modern highway in China was built in 1913,8 workers had to resort to manual labor to maintain roads of 171,800 kilometers, including 7,789 kilometers at the second grade or above.9 Guizhou also faced the most severe snowstorms in five decades. One of the poorest provinces bordering Yunnan in the west, Guangxi in the south, Sichuan and Chongqing in the north, and Hunan in the east, Guizhou usually has a mild winter with temperatures in January ranging from 3 to 6 degrees Celsius (37.4 to 42.8 degrees Fahrenheit).10 Out of 88 counties (or county-level units), 77 experienced a large scale of icy snow in January 2008. The scope and duration of the snow was the severest in three decades. It was the worst in Zunyi Municipality in the north and Tongren Prefecture in the east, where the deep freeze was unprecedented in 50 years.11

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The snowstorms were also “ill-timed”. They occurred during the Chinese Spring Festival season when millions travel home. In recent years, the number of travelers during the Chinese Spring Festival season increased rapidly. The figure was 1.66 billion people/times12 in 2001, 1.74 billion people/times in 2002, 1.80 billion people/times in 2003, 1.90 billion people/times in 2004,13 and 2.04 billion in 2006.14 According to Ou Xinqian, vice minister of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the number of people travelling in China during the 2008 Chinese Lunar New Year season would reach a record of 2.37 billion people/times, 5.1 percent more than the previous year.15 Among those travelers, 179 million would travel by rail; 2,150 million by road16; 29.5 million by water; and 22 million by air. Because 2008 was the first year in which the “golden week” of the May Day Holiday was canceled,17 the demand for transportation was expected to increase drastically. Traditionally, the Chinese Lunar New Year travel season does not start until 15 days before the New Year’s Day. In 2008, that was January 23 (December 16 of the Chinese Lunar Year). But the Ministry of Railways decided to begin the season six days earlier in 2008 because of the unexpected heavy traffic. On January 16, 2008, 3.96 million people traveled by train. The next day, the number of travelers by train went up to 4.09 million. The Ministry inaugurated the traveling season for the Chinese Lunar Year on January 18, 2008, 21 days before the Chinese New Year (February 7, 2008).18 The season would last until 25 days after the holiday (March 2, 2008). Disasters Caused by Snowstorms The snowstorms caused serious disruptions to the electricity supply and traffic in a number of provinces. The power shortage for the entire country was 70 million kilovolts, and 13 provinces experienced power blackouts in the month of January 2008. Hubei and Guizhou, in particular, suffered the worst power blackouts amid the snowstorms due to the collapse of electricity pylons and poles for overhead transmissions.19 Because of eight consecutive days of snow, four pylons within the Anhui segment of the 500 kilovolts line from Yichang (in Hubei) to

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Huaxin (in Shanghai), i.e., Yi-Xin line, collapsed on January 17, 2008, causing disruptions to the electricity supply from the Three Gorges Dam to East China. The wire had been designed for ice of 1–2 centimeters thick, but it was covered with ice of 4–5 centimeters or even 6 centimeters in some places. 20 The cold weather also caused electricity shortage in Hubei. The province’s coal stock decreased from 2.74 million tons in early October 2007 to only 1.2 million tons in January 2008. In the midJanuary 2008, Hubei bought between one and four tons of coal each day, enough only for one tenth of the demand from power plants in the province. Hubei, therefore, had to limit the electricity use, by reducing its supply by 12 million kilovolts hours a week.21 A net exporter of electricity, Guizhou witnessed the unprecedented damage to its power grid because of the snowstorms. As a result of freezing weather since January 12, 2008, 2,803 power lines were damaged.22 Altogether 12 electricity pylons in Guizhou collapsed between January 18, 2008 and January 21, 2008, causing the most serious damage to the power grid in the province in history. Six pylons along the 500 kilovolts line from Yaxi Township (in Zunyi County, Zunyi City) to Xifeng County (in Guiyang), i.e., Ya-Feng line, collapsed on January 18. The next day, Pylon No. 128 along the 500 kilovolts line from Guiyang City to Fuquan City (in Buyi-Miao Autonomous Prefecture of South Guizhou) collapsed; and severe icing was found between Pylons No. 53 and No. 54 and between Pylons No. 57 and No. 58 along the 500 kilovolts line from Fuquan City to Qingyan Town (in Huaxi District, Guiyang City). In many places, the wire was broken due to the weight of ice. The maximum thickness of ice around the wire along the 500 kilovolts Ya-Feng line was 4.8 centimeters, weighing about 4.1 kilogram per meter (1.4 times more than the designed sustainable weight).23 As the icy snow continued, the power grid in Guizhou was cut into four isolated grids — the Northeastern region, the Central region, the Western region, and Bijie Prefecture (also in the West).24 Worse still, many power plants in Guizhou ran out of coal, significantly undermining its capacity to supply electricity. To help Guizhou survive the disaster, neighboring provinces exported electricity to the province in late

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January 2008 — eight million kilovolts from Guangdong, one million kilovolts from Guangxi, and 1.9 million kilovolts from Yunnan.25 The snowstorms also affected the traffic significantly. Several days before the official inauguration of the Spring Festival Travel Season, several provinces had already began to experience serious traffic jams. On January 17, 2008, 17 highways in the country were closed due to snowstorms. Airlines were delayed and highways were closed in Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, and Guizhou.26 The snowstorms in the South subsequently put undue stress on the railway transportation as more and more highways were closed. On January 18, 2008, the first day of the traveling season for the railways, 4,314,000 people/times traveled by train, 31.7 percent more than that of the same day of 2007.27 The next day, the number of travelers by train went further to 4,496,000 people/times, 44.5 percent more than that of the same period of 2007.28 In addition to passengers, the Ministry of Railways also had to transport coal for power generation. On January 22, 2008, 32,611 train cars were loaded with coal, 5,000 cars per day more than in the same period of the previous year.29 On the first day of the Spring Festival Travel Season, January 23, 2008, highways in Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Anhui, Hubei, Hunan, and Guizhou were closed because of the snow the previous night.30 Many passengers switched from buses to trains, putting further stress on already overstretched railway system. As many flights were either delayed or canceled, traveling by train became the only option. Railway stations and trains were overly crowded. There were at least one million more passengers each day taking the train in the 2008 Spring Festival Travel Season than the previous season.31 On January 25, 2008, 200 trains along the Jing-Guang railway [a major artery railway in China connecting Beijing (the national capital) in the North to Guangzhou (the provincial capital of Guangdong Province) in the South] and 60 trains along the Hu-Kun Railway (another major artery railway in China connecting Shanghai in the East to Kunming in the West) were delayed because of frigid rains in Hunan.32 More than 40,000 travelers were stranded along the Jing-Guang railway, and more than 100,000 passengers were stranded in Guangzhou Railway Station.33

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By January 28, 2008, the snowstorms had affected about 78 million people in 14 provinces (autonomous regions and centrally administrated municipalities) and left 24 people dead. Those provinces include Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hunan, Hubei, Guangxi, Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, and Xinjiang. Moreover, the snowstorms also affected 4.2 million hectares of crops, collapsed 107,000 houses, and damaged 399,000 houses, with a direct economic cost at 22 billion yuan. 34

GOVERNMENT RESPONSES Provincial Responses Initially, provincial leaders struggled to handle the problems within their own jurisdictions. For Zhang Chunxian (born May 1953), Party secretary of Hunan and chairman of the Hunan Provincial People’s Congress, one of the major problems was the traffic jam in Hunan along the Jing-Zhu Expressway, which connects the capital of China (Beijing) and Zhuhai, bordering the Macao Special Administrative Region. Completed in October 2004, the Jing-Zhu Expressway was the first north-south express route, extending 2,310 kilometers. As a result of more than 10 days of consecutive snowfalls beginning on January 13, 2008, the Hunan section of the Jing-Zhu Expressway was clogged with stranded vehicles. In order to mobilize all forces against the natural disaster, Zhang Chunxian curtailed the meetings of the Hunan Provincial People’s Congress and Hunan Provincial People’s Political Consultative Conference35 and ordered the province to cancel all meetings and activities that were not related to dealing with the snowstorm crisis.36 As the former minister of Transport from October 2002 to December 2005 and the winner of the IRF (International Road Federation) Man of the Year in 2006 (the IRF’s most prestigious award that recognizes an individual’s contribution to road development), Zhang proved to be effective in handling the humanitarian crisis as a result of massive traffic jams in Hunan.37 On January 27, 2008, 27,000 vehicles were stranded in Hunan along the Jing-Zhu

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Expressway, extending more than 190 kilometers and involving more than 80,000 drivers and passengers.38 In view of the blockage in the north of Guangdong due to icy roads there, Zhang proposed to reroute these vehicles to Guangdong through Guangxi or Jiangxi.39 The diversion through Guangxi began on January 29, 2008, and the detour via Jiangxi proceeded on February 1, 2008. By February 3, 2008, more than 30,000 vehicles used the two new routes and the traffic jam along the Jing-Zhu Express was substantially released. In Guizhou, Party Secretary Shi Zongyuan (born July 1946) and Governor Lin Shusen (born December 1946) also worked hard to deal with the natural disaster as a result of snowstorms. By January 18, 2008, 76 out of 87 counties/municipalities experienced deep freeze, the most serious in the past five decades, causing damages to 2,803 power lines.40 Two days later, Guizhou activated its emergency plan. The provincial government would try to secure the safety of power grid, limit the electricity usage to 30 to 50 million kilovolts hours per day, stop providing electricity to seven categories of high power consumption industries, and guarantee power supply for local residents. As power plants in Guizhou were unable to produce electricity due to the shortage of coal, the total provision of electricity in the province was halved, from 180 million kilovolts hours to 90 million kilovolts hours a day. The provincial government decided on January 24, 2008 to expropriate coal stored at all railway stations in the province to satisfy the demand of power plants.41 Guangdong was initially not affected by the snowstorm. The top priority on January 23, 2008, the beginning of the Spring Festival Travel Season, seemed to be sending peasant workers (nong min gong) back home.42 Two days later, on January 25, however, about 100,000 passengers descended at the Guangzhou Railway Station at night. In the morning of the next day, Guangzhou Party Secretary Zhu Xiaodan (born 1953) instructed that in view of the bad weather, emergency measures should be activated immediately in order to deal with the problems of food and drinking water supply as well as keeping stranded passengers warm at railway and bus stations, that temporary settlements should be set up in the surrounding areas, and that temporary medical stations should be sent to these stations. At night,

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Mayor Zhang Guangning (born 1953) went to the Guangzhou Railway Station to investigate the situation and provide leadership on site. In the afternoon of January 27, the number of stranded passengers at the Guangzhou Railway Station swelled to 150,000. The Guangzhou Government mobilized 200 buses to transfer passengers to other locations in Guangzhou. More than 50,000 passengers were lodged at Guangzhou Trade Fair Center.43 Guangdong Party Secretary Wang Yang (born 1955) visited the Guangzhou Railway Station in the afternoon of January 27. He told passengers that the government was trying all measures to help them and remarked that most of the passengers were peasant workers who made great contributions to Guangdong’s development and that the local government has the responsibility to solve their problems.44 Yet passengers kept pouring in at the Guangzhou Railway Station, and the number of stranded passengers reached more than 200,000 in the early morning of January 28, 2008. During his visit to the Guangzhou Railway Station in the morning of January 28, Governor Huang Huahua (born 1946) proposed to persuade the peasant workers to stay in Guangdong for the holiday. He urged municipalities in the Pearl River Delta region to ask all enterprises, especially foreign funded enterprises (san zi qi ye) to mobilize migrant workers to spend the holiday in Guangdong and suggested that these workers be paid overtime and be entertained during the holiday season.45 Considering the circumstances, Huang’s suggestion was quite thoughtful, farsighted, and original. At a seminar held at the Guangzhou Railway Station, he made the suggestion in the context of implementing the spirit of the State Council’s teleconference on the supply of coal, electricity, and petroleum and the safe transportation of passengers during the Spring Festival Travel Season. But the exact wording of the State Council’s meeting was to “allow the masses to go home safely for the New Year”.46 Asking migrant workers to stay in Guangdong was a decision made by the Guangdong government. The decision had been made at a meeting held in the afternoon of January 27, subsequent to the State Council’s meeting.47

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Ministry Responses The Ministry of Railways under the leadership of Liu Zhijun (born 1953) took some effective measures to ease traffic jams over railways. In its “Spring Festival Travel Season Plan” released on January 2, 2008, the Ministry of Railways anticipated a busy season of 40 days from January 23 to March 2. The estimated passengers would reach 178.6 million during this period, 8.3 percent more than that of the previous season. Passengers were estimated to concentrate in Beijing, Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Hangzhou during the first 15 days before the Chinese Lunar New Year (February 7, 2008 Thursday) and in Chengdu, Chongqing, Wuhan, Nanchang, Hefei, and Fuyang during 25 days after the New Year. The pressures were likely to be put on main arteries such as Jing-Guang (Beijing to Guangzhou), Jing-Jiu (Beijing to Jiujiang), Jing-Hu (Beijing to Shanghai), Jing-Ha (Beijing to Harbin), Longhai (Lianyungang in Jiangsu to Lanzhou in Gansu), Lan-Xin (Lanzhou in Gansu to Xinjiang), Hu-Kun (Shanghai to Kunming), Jiao-Liu (Jiaozuo in Henan to Liuzhou in Guangxi), Xiang-Yu (Xiangfan in Hubei to Chongqing), Bao-Cheng (Baoji in Shaanxi to Chengdu), Xiang-Qian (Hunan to Guizhou), Qian-Gui (Guizhou to Guangxi), and Chuan-Qian (Sichuan to Guizhou). In view of a larger number of passengers by train in 2008, the Ministry prepared three sets of plans to deal with normal, peak, and emergency situations.48 In retrospect, the Ministry of Railways’ decision to start the season six days earlier (i.e., moving the first day of the Spring Festival Travel Season from January 23, 2008 to January 18, 2008) was a prudent one. This is because the snowstorms in the South subsequently put undue stress on the railway transportation as more and more highways were closed and flights were either delayed or canceled. The Ministry of Railways made the decision on January 17, 2008. Minister Liu Zhiyun urged railway workers to confront imminent difficulties and challenges ahead at a teleconference held at 11 pm on January 17.49 On January 18, 2008, the first day of the traveling season for railways, 4,314,000 people/times traveled by train, 31.7 percent more than those of the same day of 2007.50

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The next day, the number of travelers by train went further to 4,496,000 people/times, 44.5 percent higher than that of the same period of 2007.51 In response to the forecast of snowstorms from January 19 to 21, 2008 in at least eight provinces (Ningxia, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Jiangsu, and Anhui), the Ministry of Railways issued an urgent call to its subordinate bureaus to be alert to weather conditions in their areas and to be ready to activate emergency measures if necessary.52 Yet cold weather persisted in the South, affecting the railway transportation. On January 25, 2008, the southern segment of the Jing-Guang Railway was paralyzed because the electricitypowered trains were disconnected from power sources due to the snowstorms. Liu Zhijun had to mobilize diesel-powered trains to the Jing-Guang Railway and reroute trains through other railways.53 By January 27, 63 trains had been rerouted through Jing-Jiu (Beijing to Jiujiang in Jiangxi) Railway, San-Mao (Sanshui in Foshan to Maoming in Guangdong) Railway, Jiao-Liu Railway, and Hu-Kun Railway.54 Furthermore, 35 passenger trains and 78 diesel-powered trains were transported to Guangzhou.55 In the meantime, the Guangzhou Railway Group decided to refund train tickets between January 27 and February 6. In contrast, the Ministry of Communications under the leadership of Li Shenglin (born November 1946) was less prepared for the crisis. In terms of hardware, China has accomplished a great deal in road construction. A network of highways connecting major parts of China had been completed by the end of 2007. With a total of 35,000 kilometers, the national network consists of five major roads linking north and south (including Tongjiang in Heilongjiang to Sanya in Hainan, Beijing to Fuzhou in Fujian, Beijing to Zhuhai in Guangdong, Erenhot in Inner Mongolia to Hekou in Yunnan, and Chongqing to Zhanjiang in Guangdong), and seven major roads joining east and west (including Suifenhe to Manzhouli in Inner Mongolia, Dandong in Liaoning to Lhasa in Tibet, Qingdao in Shandong to Yinchuan in Ningxia, Lianyungang in Jiangsu to Horgas in Xinjiang, Shanghai to Chengdu in Sichuan, Shanghai to Ruili in Yunnan, and Hengyang in Hunan to Kunming in Yunnan).56

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But the Ministry of Communications was slow in policy response. As with the Ministry of Railways, the Ministry of Communications was also anticipating a record number of passengers for the Spring Festival Travel Season in 2008. The number of travelers/times by road was about 1.97 billion in 2007,57 but the number would increase to 2.15 billion in 2008.58 However, while the Ministry of Railways published its plan for the Spring Festival Travel Season on January 2, 2008, the Ministry of Communications chose to boast its great accomplishments of the previous five years on January 5, 2008. At a national work conference on transportation held on that day, Minister Li Shenglin indicated that China had completed 28,000 kilometers of highways in the past five years, more than the sum of highways built in the preceding 15 years, and that the newly built roads in rural areas was 1.3 million kilometers, more than all the roads built in the preceding 53 years.59 Yet there was no word about how to cope with the record high traffic in the coming weeks of the Spring Festival Travel Season. On January 17, 2008 when the Ministry of Railways decided to move the beginning of the Spring Festival Travel Season six days earlier in view of the increasing traffic by rail, the Ministry of Communications took no measures, even though 12 highways, three provincial-level roads, and two national-level roads had already been closed because of the snowstorms.60 The Ministry of Communications was also one day later than the Ministry of Railways in issuing an urgent call to its subordinate bureaus on activating emergency measures to deal with the effects of icy snows on road transportation. The Ministry of Railways sent its urgent call on January 18 in response to the forecast of snowstorms from January 19 to 21, 2008 in at least eight provinces, while the Ministry of Communications issued its call on January 19 when the snowstorms had already hit these provinces.61 The former was proactive, while the latter was reactive. On January 23, 2008, the first day of the Spring Festival Travel Season, Minister Li Shenglin asked his subordinate units to ensure that major highways, national and provincial roads stay open but several provinces such as Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Anhui, Hubei, Hunan, and Guizhou had closed parts of their highways due to the icy snow the previous night.62 While traffic jams were

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most serious in Hunan Province, Li was instead inspecting Henan Province on the first day of the Spring Festival Travel Season.63 To some extent, different responses to the snowstorm crisis from the Ministry of Railways and the Ministry of Communications were due to the different backgrounds of their leaders. Liu Zhijun is far more experienced as Minister of Railways than Li Shenglin as Minister of Communications. Liu has worked in the railway system for 36 years. He was Party secretary of Wuhan Railway Sub-Bureau, deputy director of the Political Department of Guangzhou Railway Bureau, deputy chief of Zhengzhou Railway Bureau, Chief of Shenyang Railway Bureau, general manager of scheduling in the Ministry of Railways, and vice minister of Railways. He was appointed minister of Railways in March 2003.64 Li Shenglin, on the other hand, was relatively new on his job. He was appointed Minister of Communications in December 2005 and had no experiences in transportation previously.65 National Transition Gap The natural disaster as a result of snowstorms in the South and elsewhere was not a problem for only a few individual provinces. It became a national problem. Fourteen provinces (Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hunan, Hubei, Guangxi, Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, and Xinjiang) were affected, causing disruption for 78 million people.66 However, the State Council was slow in its response, partly because of a political transition gap. In China, the convening of a national Party Congress when the Party leadership is formed usually precedes that of a National People’s Congress when the national government is formed. The transition gap is thus defined by the duration from the time of the national Party Congress to the time of the national People’s Congress. During the transitional period from October 2007 when the Seventeenth Party Congress elected a new Party leadership to March 2008 when a new state council was formed, there was a gap of leadership in the national government. Those who were scheduled to leave the State Council stopped working in the national government, while candidates for a new State Council had yet to be

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nominated. Out of four vice premiers of the State Council formed in March 2003, only one (Hui Liangyu) was to be retained. Among the other three, Huang Ju (September 1938–June 2007) passed away in June 2007 while Wu Yi (born November 1938) and Zeng Peiyan (born December 1938) were scheduled to retire in March 2008. All five original state councilors were scheduled to be replaced in March 2008. Zhou Yongkang (born December 1942) was promoted to the Politburo Standing Committee; Cao Gangchuan (born December 1935) and Tang Jiaxuan (born January 1938) were both up for retirement because of their advanced ages; and Hua Jianmin (born January 1940) and Chen Zhili (born November 1942) would leave the State Council for the National People’s Congress as a form of retirement. In other words, out of 10 original senior members of the State Council, only two (Premier Wen Jiabao and Vice Premier Hui Liangyu) would stay on. Therefore, it is not surprising initially to see Premier Wen Jiabao everywhere at the forefront but no one else. On January 25, 2008, Wen went to the service station of the Jing-Shi (from Beijing to Shijiazhuang) Expressway in Zhuozhou, Hebei and Beijing’s western railway station to investigate the transportation of goods and passengers during the Spring Festival Travel Season.67 Two days later, Wen gave a speech at a teleconference of the State Council on coal production and transportation, transportation of goods and passengers, electricity provision, and production and transportation of gas and petroleum.68 On January 28, 2008, Wen flew to Hunan but was forced to land in Hubei because Changsha Airport was closed due to snow. As soon as he arrived in Changsha, the capital of Hunan Province, he called for a meeting on the situation in Hunan.69 On the night of January 29, 2008, Wen went to Guangzhou because of the large numbers of stranded passengers at the Guangzhou Railway Station.70 Yet no other senior members of the State Council went to the provinces affected by snowstorms. For instance, while Wen was checking the traffic situation at the Guangzhou Railway Station in Guangdong in the morning of January 30, 2008, Hua Jianmin, the then state councilor and secretary general of the State Council,

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attended a meeting on the work of retired cadres in Beijing at the same time.71 After Premier Wen Jiabao chaired a meeting of the executive members of the State Council on February 1, 2008, inaugurating an emergency management center on coal, electricity, petroleum and transportation to coordinate activities in these regards and send work groups to various localities,72 Vice Premier Hui Liangyu and State Councilor Hua Jianmin were seen in a seminar organized for religious leaders in Beijing the very next day, February 2, 2008.73 Role of the Politburo Standing Committee Interestingly, the dual system of the Party and the state is often regarded as a defect of the Chinese political system. This is because the Party tends to meddle with state affairs. Yet this time, the Party apparatus came in handy as a “spare engine” for the national crisis. Newly reconstituted, the Politburo sprang to action. On January 29, 2008, General Secretary Hu Jintao chaired a Politburo meeting on the problems caused by the recent snowstorms in China.74 It was determined that China faced a national disaster and that dealing with the disaster was the most urgent task for the Chinese leadership at all levels. The first priority was to increase production of coal. Coal should be supplied to power plants first. In the meantime, the Politburo urged political leaders at various levels to take all measures to eliminate transportation stoppages. After the meeting, major political figures were sent to different localities. With the exception of Wu Bangguo, eight standing members of the Politburo went to different provinces to direct the relief efforts. On January 30, 2008, six airplanes carrying six members of the Politburo Standing Committee left Beijing for different provinces.75 Hu Jintao went to Shanxi and Hebei on January 31, 2008 to facilitate coal production and transportation.76 He visited a coalmine in Datong, Shanxi. Located in the north of Shanxi, Datong Coalmine Group Corp is one of the major producers of coal with an annual production of more than 100 million tons. Hu entered a coalmine

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more than 400 meters underground to meet miners who had worked overtime to increase supply. He encouraged them to produce more coal safely and sent them festive greetings. He then went to Qinhuangdao Port in Hebei Province to facilitate the transportation of coal from North China to the South. The Qinhuangdao Port, connected with Datong, Shanxi by Da-Qin Railway, is the hub for transporting coal from North China to the South. With transportation of about one million tons of coal a day, the port was vital for the urgent supply for power plants in the South. Premier Wen Jiabao returned to Hunan after a 44-hour stay in Beijing.77 After his visit to Guangzhou on January 30, 2008, Wen chaired an executive meeting of the State Council on February 1 on disaster relief measures. The meeting came up with five measures and established an emergence command center.78 Soon after the meeting, Wen went back to Hunan on the same day. He began to work as soon as he arrived in Changsha at 4:16 p.m.79 Jia Qinglin, a Politburo Standing member and CPPCC chairman, went to Anhui on behalf of Hu Jintao on January 30. Accompanied by Party Secretary Wang Jinshan and Governor Wang Sanyun, Jia visited Hefei and Liu’an in Anhui during his stay from January 30, 2008 to February 1, 2008.80 On the same day, Politburo Standing Committee Member Li Changchun went to Hubei on behalf of Hu Jintao. Accompanied by Party Secretary Luo Qingquan and Governor Li Hongzhong, Li visited the Hankou Railway Station, Wuchang Fujiapo Long-distance Bus Station, the Wuhan Railway Bureau scheduling office, Hanchuan Power Plant, and Jing-Zhu Highway.81 Xi Jinping went to Guizhou on behalf of Hu Jintao from January 30 to February 1.82 Li Keqiang went to Sichuan on behalf of Hu Jintao on January 30, 2008.83 He Guoqiang went to Jiangxi on behalf of Hu Jintao on January 30.84 And Zhou Yongkang went to Henan on behalf of Hu Jintao on January 30.85 Hu Jintao chaired a Politburo Standing Committee meeting on the disaster relief efforts on February 3, 2008. Based on information gathered from various provinces, the meeting decided that the top priorities were transportation, electricity supply, and people’s livelihood. The Chinese leadership would try all means to restore the

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normal function of road, railway, and air transportation, to recover electricity production, and to assist those affected by the disaster.86 Several Politburo standing members were dispatched to different provinces around the Chinese Lunar New Year. Hu Jintao spent four days (February 5–8) in Guangxi. He helped with the delivery of relief goods at the airport in Guilin upon his arrival and visited various places in the disaster-hit autonomous region.87 Wu Bangguo went to the National Power Grid, the Ministry of Railways, and Western Beijing Station in Beijing on February 3.88 Wen Jiabao visited Guizhou on February 589 and spent the eve of Chinese New Year and the New Year in Jiangxi on February 6 and 7.90 In the absence of a fully functional State Council, the Politburo Standing Committee under the leadership of Hu Jintao shouldered the responsibilities. The problems were substantially eased around the Spring Festival holiday. All airports in China were reopened by February 4, 200891; highways were mostly open on February 5, 200892; the traffic along railway became normal on February 8 with about three million passengers on their way home93; and power supply was basically restored on February 9 providing electricity to 21 million households (92 percent of the total).94 Most significantly, by February 5, China had been able to send some 3.5 million passengers that had been stranded in Guangzhou since January 26 on their way home by train, a miracle in the history of railway transportation.95 By the end of the Spring Festival travel season, March 2, 2008, 196 million passengers traveled by train — a record in history and a 10-percent increase over the previous travel season — and 2,017 million people traveled by road.96 The first major crisis was over. CONCLUDING REMARKS China’s leadership encountered its first major challenge in the first two months of 2008. “Once-in-fifty-years” snowstorms hit many provinces in China, especially those in the south. The snowstorms were “misplaced” and “ill-timed”. They were misplaced because they

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hit southern provinces that were used to warm weathers in winter. None of heavily affected provinces such as Hubei, Hunan, and Guizhou were prepared for icy snows in the months of January and February. The snowstorms were also ill-timed because they hit China right around the busiest travel season in a year — the Spring Festival travel season, when millions headed home for the most popular holiday season. Initially, individual provinces and ministries responded to the challenge in their own ways. Hunan curtailed its provincial people’s congress meeting and attempted to solve the problem of traffic jams along the Jing-Zhu Expressway by rerouting buses. Guizhou tried to salvage power shortages as a result of collapsing pylons and poles connecting power stations. Guangdong struggled to handle the expanding number of stranded passengers at the Guangzhou Railway Station. Ministries of Railway and Communications were overwhelmed by transportation paralyses and the increased demand for transportation of goods and people. Provincial leaders such as Hunan Party Secretary Zhang Chunxian and Guangdong Governor Huang Huahua proved to be very effective. Zhang made a decision to cut short the provincial people’s congress meeting to deal with the crisis and conceived plans for diverting traffic through other routes. Huang came up with the idea to keep stranded passengers in Guangdong for the holiday instead of promising an early resumption of railway traffic. Minister Liu Zhijun’s performance during this crisis was truly outstanding. The Ministry of Railways released a travel plan on January 2, 2008 for the Spring Festival travel season, made a decision on January 17 to start the travel season six days earlier than usual, and worked around the clock to solve the problem of 3.5 million stranded passengers in Guangzhou. In contrast, Minister Li Shenglin of Communications was much more reactive in the face of the crisis. Unfortunately, the snowstorms also came when the national government leadership was in transition. Out of the original 10 members of the State Council leadership, one passed away and seven others were scheduled to retire. Only Premier Wen Jiabao and Vice Premier Hui Liangyu would continue in a new State Council. Thus, there was

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a leadership transition gap in the State Council. Fortunately, the Politburo had been reconstituted and was fully functional. Under the leadership of General Secretary Hu Jintao, the Politburo Standing Committee stepped up to the plate. After a meeting on the disasters on January 29, 2008, members of the Politburo Standing Committee were dispatched to different provinces on behalf of Hu Jintao. By February 5, two days before the Chinese New Year, the traffic along railways and roads was basically restored. More than 3.5 million stranded passengers in Guangzhou finally were on their way home. By February 9, power supply was basically restored. And by March 2, the end of the travel season, things were back to normal. The Chinese leadership had survived its first major challenge in 2008. NOTES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

13. 14. 15. 16.

17.

Renmin Ribao, January 18, 2008, p. 5. Renmin Ribao, January 22, 2008, p. 2. Renmin Ribao, January 24, 2008, p. 9. Renmin Ribao, January 21, 2008, p. 5. Hunan Nianjian (2007) [Hunan Yearbook (2007)] (Changsha: Hunan Nianjian She, 2007), p. 29. http://unn.people.com.cn/GB/14778/6824805.html. Renmin Ribao, January 24, 2008, p. 5. http://original.britannica.com/eb/article-71010/China. Hunan Nianjian (2007) [Hunan Yearbook (2007)] (Changsha: Hunan Nianjian She, 2007), p. 200. Guizhou Nianjian (2007) [Guizhou Yearbook (2007)] (Guiyang: Guizhou Nianjian She, 2007), p. 41. Renmin Ribao, January 22, 2008, p. 2. People/times refers to the product of the times each person uses transportation and the number of people who use transportation. It is counted as four people/ times if one person takes four trains/buses. http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shehui/1063/2324592.html. http://info.china.alibaba.com/news/detail/v5000060-d5625113.html. Renmin Ribao, January 16, 2008, p. 9. The original number is 215,000. It probably should be 2,150,000,000. This is because the number for 2007 was 1,970,000,000. See Renmin Ribao, February 4, 2007, p. 1. According to an ordinance issued by Premier Zhu Rongji on September 18, 1999, the Chinese citizens have four national holidays — one day for the

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18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35.

36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41.

New Year’s Day; three days for the Spring Festival (the first three days of the Chinese Lunar New Year); three days for the Labor Day (May 1–3); and three days for the National Day (October 1–3). Connecting holidays with weekends makes the Labor Day and the National Day holidays the “gold week”. Yet the number of days for the Labor Day Holiday was reduced from three days to one (May 1) according to a newly revised ordinance issued by Premier Wen Jiabao on December 14, 2007. Renmin Ribao, January 19, 2008, p. 2. Renmin Ribao, January 24, 2008, p. 9. Renmin Ribao, January 22, 2008, p. 5. Renmin Ribao, January 21, 2008, p. 5. Renmin Ribao, January 28, 2008, p. 5. http://news.sohu.com/20080122/n254812546.shtml. http://www1.csg.cn/dqpy/200803/t20080304_39270.htm. Renmin Ribao, January 28, 2008, p. 5. Renmin Ribao, January 18, 2008, p. 5. Renmin Ribao, January 20, 2008, p. 2. Renmin Ribao, January 21, 2008, p. 2. Renmin Ribao, January 24, 2008, p. 9. Ibid., p. 4. Jiangnan Shibao, January 25, 2008, p. 5. Renmin Ribao, January 27, 2008, p. 1. http://news.qq.com/a/20080127/000151.htm. Renmin Ribao (overseas edition), January 29, 2008, p. 3. The Tenth Hunan Provincial People’s Political Consultative Conference was held from January 18–23, 2008. See http://live.rednet.cn/2008zx/wzzb.htm; http://hn.rednet.cn/c/2008/01/23/1427022.htm. The Eleventh Hunan Provincial People’s Congress was scheduled for the period of January 20–27, 2008. See http://hn.rednet.cn/c/2008/01/20/1423818.htm; http://hn. rednet.cn/c/2008/01/27/1429358.htm. It is not clear how many days the meetings were cut short by. But it is likely that the former was not affected at all and the latter was cut short by at most three days. The Hunan Provincial People’s Congress was scheduled to conclude on January 27 but probably closed on January 25. Renmin Ribao, January 29, 2008, pp. 1, 5. Renmin Ribao, January 31, 2008, pp. 1, 5; Renmin Ribao, February 5, 2008, p. 5. Renmin Ribao, February 5, 2008, p. 5. Ibid. Renmin Ribao, January 28, 2008, p. 5. The Eleventh Guizhou Provincial People’s Congress was held from January 18–26, 2008, as scheduled. There is no evidence that the meeting was curtailed

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42. 43. 44. 45.

46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75.

because of snowstorms. http://www.chinanews.com.cn/gn/news/2008/ 01-15/1134436.shtml. Renmin Ribao, January 24, 2008, p. 4. Renmin Ribao, February 1, 2008, p. 6. http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/64094/6828358.html. For details, see http://www.gdemo.gov.cn/zt/kjdz/xctp/200801/t20080128_ 40680.htm; Renmin Ribao, January 30, 2008, p. 5 (the date in this report in Renmin Ribao was January 27, 2008, which is an error). Renmin Ribao, January 28, 2008, p. 1. For the full text of Wen Jiabao’s speech, see Renmin Ribao, February 2, 2008, p. 2. http://www.gdemo.gov.cn/gzyw/200801/t20080128_40482.htm. Renmin Ribao, January 3, 2008, p. 2. Renmin Ribao, January 29, 2008, p. 9. Renmin Ribao, January 20, 2008, p. 2. Renmin Ribao, January 21, 2008, p. 2. Ibid. Renmin Ribao, January 29, 2008, p. 9. Renmin Ribao, January 28, 2008, p. 1. Renmin Ribao, January 29, 2008, p. 9. Renmin Ribao, December 19, 2007, p. 2. Renmin Ribao, February 4, 2007, p. 1. Renmin Ribao, January 16, 2008, p. 9. Note the error in the original report. “Yi” (100 million) was misspelled as “wan” (10,000). Renmin Ribao, January 6, 2008, p. 1. Renmin Ribao, January 18, 2008, p. 5. Renmin Ribao, January 20, 2008, p. 2. Renmin Ribao, January 24, 2008, p. 4. http://www.zgjtb.com/101179/101182/101212/26307.html. For Liu Zhijun’s biographical information, see http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/ %E5%88%98%E5%BF%97%E5%86%9B. For Li Shenglin’s biographical information, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/ ziliao/2002-02/21/content_284411.htm. Renmin Ribao, January 29, 2008, p. 9. Renmin Ribao, January 27, 2008, pp. 1, 2. Renmin Ribao, January 28, 2008, pp. 1, 2. Renmin Ribao, January 30, 2008, pp. 1, 2. Renmin Ribao, January 31, 2008, pp. 1, 2. Ibid., pp. 1, 4. Renmin Ribao, February 2, 2008, pp. 1, 4. Renmin Ribao, February 3, 2008, pp. 1, 4. Renmin Ribao, January 30, 2008, p. 1. Renmin Ribao, February 4, 2008, p. 6.

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Snowstorms in the South 197 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95.

Renmin Ribao, January 31, 2008, p. 1. Renmin Ribao, February 2, 2008, p. 1. Ibid. Ibid. Renmin Ribao, February 2, 2008, pp. 1, 4. Renmin Ribao, February 3, 2008, pp. 1, 4. Renmin Ribao, February 2, 2008, pp. 1, 4. Renmin Ribao, February 3, 2008, pp. 1, 4. Ibid. Renmin Ribao, February 2, 2008, pp. 1, 4. Renmin Ribao, February 4, 2008, p. 1. Renmin Ribao, February 7, 2008, p. 1; February 9, 2008, p. 1. Renmin Ribao, February 4, 2008, pp. 1, 4. Renmin Ribao, February 7, 2008, pp. 1–2. Renmin Ribao, February 8, 2008, pp. 1, 3. Renmin Ribao, February 5, 2008, p. 2. Renmin Ribao, February 6, 2008, p. 2. Renmin Ribao, February 10, 2008, p. 1. Ibid. Renmin Ribao, February 13, 2008, pp. 1, 4. For an interview with Liu Zhijun, see Renmin Ribao, February 18, 2008, p. 2. 96. Renmin Ribao, March 3, 2008, p. 2.

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Chapter

6 The Tibet Issue On March 14, less than two weeks after the end of the 2008 Spring Festival Travel Season, the Chinese leadership found itself in another major crisis. Tibetans in Lhasa, Tibet and the Gannan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Gansu Province attacked police officers and civilians and set fire to government offices and businesses. The Western media almost unanimously accused the Chinese government of brutal suppression. Overseas Tibetans and their sympathizers subsequently disrupted the torch relays of the Beijing Olympic Games in a number of Western cities. The Chinese leaders quickly brought order to the troubled areas, resumed talks with personal representatives of the Dalai Lama, and made efforts to inform foreign leaders about the nature of the Tibet issue.1 TIBET IN THE HISTORY OF CHINA Tibet is a Part of China It is indisputable that Tibet is a part of China. Yet this statement is where the consensus stops and controversies begin. First, there is no consensus on what “Tibet” really means. According to the Chinese government, Tibet is a provincial-level autonomous region. The Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) lies in the southwest of China and in the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, covering an area of 199

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200 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization International border State border Prefecture border County border Disputed border

Ga

nsu

Xinjiang Qinghai

Tibetan Autonomous Region

India

Sichuan

Ne

pal

Bhutan

Burma

Yunnan

Map 6.1 Tibet Autonomous Region Source: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Tibet%26neighbors.svg.

1,222,000 square kilometers (one sixth of the total territory of the People’s Republic of China). The TAR is bounded to the north by Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and Qinghai Province, to the east by Sichuan Province, to the southeast by Yunnan Province, and to the south and west by four countries: Myanmar (Burma), India, Bhutan, and Nepal (Map 6.1). According to Tenzin Gyatso (born July 6, 1935), the 14th Dalai Lama, however, Tibet is not limited to the area of the TAR. It also includes many areas under the administration of other provinces such as Qinghai, Sichuan, Yunnan, and Gansu (Map 6.2). In the Dalai Lama’s autobiography,2 the map of the Tibet covers four areas: the Changtang in the northwest; U-Tsang in the south; Kham in the east; and Amdo in the north.3 But the map produced by the Government of Tibet in Exile only includes three areas: Amdo, Kham, and U-Tsang (which probably covers both Changtang and U-Tsang).4 The Dalai Lama’s Tibet covers an area of 2.5 million square kilometers, more than twice as large as the TAR. In addition to the territory of the TAR (except for the part of Lhoka Prefecture that is

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Map 6.2 The Dalai Lama’s Tibet Source: http://www.savetibet.org/tibet/history/glance.php.

roughly U-Tsang, which is shown as a part of India), the Dalai Lama’s Tibet includes the entire Qinghai Province, a half of Sichuan Province, a half of Gansu Province, a quarter of Yunnan Province, and a part of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. This Tibet includes people of 24 other nationalities such as Han, Hui, Mongolian, Tu, Lisu, Naxi, Derung, Nu, Yi, Bai, Lhoba, Monba, Zhuang, Manchu, Bouyi, Uyghur, Miao, Xiaerba, Deng, Kazakh, Qiang, Salar, Dongxiang, and Bonan as well as Tibetans. “Tibet” as an English word has been transliterated from a Chinese term “tubote”.5 Tibet as an independent country was called “bo” (“bod” in Tibetan) during the Tang Dynasty (618–907). In their communications with the Tang Empire, Tibetans addressed themselves as the people of “tubo” (“Tubo” in Tibetan with “tu” meaning “great”) to show their equal status with the people of “Great Tang” (“datang”). The Mongols of the 13th century called Tibet “tubote” with “te” being a sign of plurals because of Tibet’s fragmentation at the time. Thus the English term, “Tibet”.6 The Chinese term for Tibet, Xizang, was coined by Emperor Kangxi in 1721.

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After having successfully expelled the Dzungars from Tibet, the emperor composed an essay for a tablet, in which the word Xizang was used to refer to the area of U-Tsang centered in Lhasa.7 The Dalai Lama’s Tibet currently does not exist as a single administrative unit. The Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) has existed as a provincial-level administrative unit of the People’s Republic of China since September 8, 1965.8 In addition to the TAR, there are also ten Tibetan autonomous prefectures and two Tibetan autonomous counties (Table 6.1). In the

Table 6.1

Province Tibet Sichuan (Liangshan Prefecture) Qinghai

Gansu (Wuwei City) Yunnan Total

Tibetan Autonomous Units in the People's Republic of China Tibetan Autonomous Units

Population (2007)

Area (sq. km)

Tibet Region Aba Prefecture* Ganzi Prefecture Muli County

2,735,867 873,800 954,600 131,000

1,202,072 84,242 152,629 13,252

Haibei Prefecture Hainan Prefecture Huangnan Prefecture** Guoluo Prefecture Yushu Prefecture Haixi Prefecture*** Gannan Prefecture Tianzhu County Diqing Prefecture

276,466 414,986 231,706 155,306 310,818 374,434 680,100 213,600 375,000 7,727,683

34,077.4 44,546 109,432.5 76,564.9 210,346.1 237,753.8 45,000 7,147 23,870 2,240,932.7

Notes: *Aba is a Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture. **Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture also includes a Mongolian autonomous county, Henan Mogolian Autonomous County. ***Haixi is a Mongolian and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture. Sources: 1. Tibet Statistical Yearbook (2008), p. 33. 2. Sichuan Statistical Yearbook (2008), pp. 5, 87, 279. 3. Qinghai Statistical Yearbook (2008), pp. 47, 78–81, 495–522. 4. Gansu Yearbook (2008), pp. 210, 298, 371–373. 5. Yunnan Statistical Yearbook (2008), pp. 15, 62, 541. 6. China Statistical Yearbook (2005), p. 415.

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Sichuan Province, there are two Tibetan autonomous prefectures (Ganzi and Aba) and one Tibetan autonomous county (Muli). These areas were major components of Xikang (Kham), a province established in 1939 under the leadership of Liu Wenhui (1894–1976). At the time when the people’s government of Xikang province was formed on April 26, 1950, its jurisdiction included one city (Ya’an City), one autonomous district (Tibetan Autonomous District), and two special districts (Ya’an Special District and Xichang Special District).9 In April 1952, Liangshan was separated from Xichang Special District and formed a Yi Autonomous District. In 1953, the province had a population of 3.4 million and Tibetans made up 14.2 percent.10 Xikang province was abolished in October 1955 and was merged into Sichuan province. At the same time, Xikang Tibetan Autonomous District was renamed Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture. The prefecture is headquartered in Kangding County and manages 18 counties. The total population is 954,600 (2007), and Tibetans make up 77.8 percent. Muli (or Mili) Tibetan Autonomous County has also been a part of Xikang province. It was Muli Tibetan Autonomous District under the jurisdiction of Xichang Special District. It was renamed Muli Tibetan Autonomous County on February 19, 1953, still under the jurisdiction of Xichang Special District. Xichang became a prefecture in October 1955 when it was incorporated to Sichuan province. In October 1978, Xichang Prefecture was abolished, and Muli was merged into Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture. Muli has a population of 131,000 (2007), and Tibetans make up 32.4 percent. Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture has a different story. Its predecessor, Maoxian Special District was a part of Chuanxi between January 1950 and August 1952. When Sichuan province was reestablished by merging Chuandong, Chuannan, Chuanxi, and Chuanbei in August 1952, Maoxian Special District became a part of Sichuan provinice. In 1953, Maoxian Special District was abolished and formed Sichuan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture. The prefecture was renamed Aba Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in 1955 and renamed again Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture in 1987. The prefecture includes 13 counties with a total population

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of 873,800 (2007). Tibetans are the largest ethnic group in the prefecture, making up 54.5 percent of the population. They are followed by Han (23.6 percent) and Qiang (18.4 percent). Qinghai province, the home province of the 14th Dalai Lama, has the second largest Tibetan population in China. The population of Tibetans in Qinghai is 1,211,313 (2007), making up 22.0 percent of the total population in Qinghai (5.5 million).11 Originally a pastoral land for Qiang people, Han people began to control the area in the period of Western Han (202 BCE–9 CE). The place was later occupied by the Tuyuhun people, an ethic group originally from Liaoning province, for more than 300 years from the third to seventh century. Tibetans attacked the Kingdom of the Tuyuhun in 660, starting a long war in the territory of Qinghai. During the Anshi Turmoil in Tang Dynasty (755–763), Tibetans occupied Xining in 757 and Kuocheng (eastern Qinghai) in 760. But their control over Qinghai ended in 842, 82 years later, when the Kingdom of Tubo collapsed.12 Long before the Dalai Lama’s birth, Qinghai had been dominated by the Ma family, a Hui (Chinese Muslim) family originally from Gansu Province. Ma Haiyan (1826–1900) became a dominant force as a part of the Qing army in 1871 when he reached an agreement with General Zuo Zongtang. His son, Ma Qi (1869–1931), built an army, Ninghai Army (i.e., Ma Family Army), in 1915. The central government of the Republic of China decided in 1928 to establish Qinghai Province with Sun Lianzhong (1893–1990) as the founding governor.13 But Ma Qi became acting governor in 1929 when the province was officially established and then became governor in 1930. Although his brother, Ma Lin, succeeded him as governor of Qinghai in 1931 when he passed away, his two sons, Ma Bufang (1903–1975) and Ma Buqing (1901–1977), were in control. In fact, it was Ma Bufang, the then-governor of Qinghai, who reported on June 28, 1938 to the central government in Nanjing about the discovery of Lhamo Thondup (i.e., later Tenzin Gyatso) as a candidate for the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama in Qinghai.14 Obviously, the province where Lhamo Thondup (later the 14th Dalai Lama) was born in 1935 was not Amdo but Qinghai.

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There are six Tibetan autonomous prefectures in Qinghai. However, Tibetans are not necessarily the majorities in these prefectures. The Yushu Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture has a Tibetan majority, making up 95.3 percent of the population. So does the Guoluo Tibetan Prefecture, where Tibetans make up 87.1 percent of the population. The Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture also has a Tibetan majority (52 percent). Although the Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture also has a Tibetan majority (65.9 percent), this prefecture also has quite a few Mongolians. It has a Henan Mongolian Autonomous County among its four counties (Tongren, Jianzha, Zeku, and Henan), and the Mongolians make up 13.5 percent of the population. But Han is the largest ethnic group in the Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, making up 42.2 percent of the population. The Hui is the second largest ethnic group in the prefecture, making up 28.2 percent. In fact, one of the four counties (Menyuan, Qilian, Haiyan, and Gangcha), Menyuan, is a Hui autonomous county. Tibetans are the third largest ethnic group in the prefecture, making up 21.3 percent. It is not clear why it was established as a Tibetan autonomous prefecture in the first place. It could very well have been established as a regular prefecture or a Hui autonomous prefecture. The story of Haixi, which somehow is separated into two areas by Yushu Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, is more complicated. When the area was established as an autonomous district on January 25, 1954, it was called “Haixi Mongolian, Tibetan, and Kazakh Autonomous District” under the jurisdiction of Qinghai Province. It was renamed “Haixi Mongolian, Tibetan, and Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture” in 1955. At a meeting of leaders from Qinghai and Xinjiang in May 1984, it was decided that the Kazakhs living in the Haixi Mongolian, Tibetan, and Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture would be relocated to Xinjiang. With the approval of the State Council, the prefecture was renamed Haixi Mongolian and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture.15 The majority of the residents in the prefecture are Han, making up more than 75 percent. Tibetans are the second largest ethnic group, making up 11.4 percent. The Mongolians rank the third, making up 7.5 percent.

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In a word, Qinghai is a province of diverse population. Han is the largest ethnic group in the province, making up 53.7 percent of the population. Tibetans constitute the second largest ethnic group, making up 22 percent; and Hui is the third largest ethnic group, making up 15.9 percent. In addition, there are more than 20 other ethnic groups living in the province. Even in these Tibetan autonomous prefectures, Tibetans do not always constitute the majority. They are the largest ethnic group in the Yushu Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, the Guoluo Tibetan Prefecture, the Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, and the Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, but not in the Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture and Haixi Mongolian and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture. Gansu Province also has one Tibetan autonomous prefecture and one Tibetan autonomous county. Gannan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture is located in the southwest of Gansu, bordering with Qinghai’s Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture and Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture and Sichuan’s Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture. With a total population of 680,100 (2007), the prefecture includes one county-level city (Hezuo), seven counties (Lintan County, Zhuoni County, Zhouqu County, Diebu County, Maqu County, Luqu County, and Xiahe County) and 95 towns/townships. Tibetans are the majority, making up 54 percent of the population, and there are 23 other ethnic groups such as Han, Hui, Mongolian, Tu, Salar, and Bonan. Tibetans are the majority in Maqu (87.5 percent), Xiahe (78.6 percent), and Zhuoni (68 percent), but not in Zhouqu (34.6 percent).16 Tianzhu Tibetan Autonomous County in Wuwei City, Gansu Province, is the first minority autonomous county in the history of the People’s Republic of China. Taking its name from the first characters of two monasteries (Tiantang Monastery and Zhugong Monastery), it became Tianzhu Autonomous District (county-level) on May 6, 1950. It was later renamed Tianzhu Tibetan Autonomous District in 1953 and Tianzhu Tibetan Autonomous County in 1955. It has been a part of Wuwei since 1961. The county has a population of 213,600 and manages 19 towns/townships, 172 villages, and 778 neighborhoods.17

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Finally, Yunnan Province has one Tibetan autonomous prefecture. Located in the northwest of the province, Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture was established on September 13, 1957.18 The population of the prefecture is 375,000 (2007), and its majority are minorities, making up 83.6 percent of the population. Out of 27 ethnic groups, Tibetans are the largest, making up 33.8 percent; the Lishu are the second largest, making up 29 percent. Out of the three counties (Shangri-La, Deqin, and Weixi), one, Weixi, is a Lishu autonomous county.19 The capital of Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture was formerly called Zhongdian County. The county was renamed Shangri-La County in 2001 after the fictional land of Shangri-La in James Hilton’s novel Lost Horizon. Published in 1933, the novel depicted a paradise in a Tibetan area — Shangri-La — where people were peaceful, loving, and happy. In the novel, the inhabitants of Shangri-La are almost immortal, living years beyond the normal lifespan and only very slowly aging in appearance. Yunnan (Zhongdian), Sichuan (Muli), and Tibet in China as well as Pakistan (Hungza Valley) and Bhutan are all claimed to have been the original inspiration of the concept, mostly to attract tourism.20 After a oneyear investigation, the Yunnan Provincial Government declared in 1997 to have found Shangri-La in Zhongdian County and the State Council approved its name change in 2001.21 Second, there is no consensus on what “China” means. China is “Zhongguo” in Chinese. But “Zhongguo” (Central Kingdom) has never been used as the country’s official name. The original concept for the territories under the governance of Chinese emperors was “Tianxia” (literally, all under Heaven). Since the Chinese emperor was the son of the heaven (Tianzi), he was considered being in charge of “all under Heaven”. Each dynasty had its own name in order to differentiate it from the preceding dynasty, but the reign name of the incumbent emperor was usually used as the basis for calculating years. After the 1911 revolution, the country was renamed “Republic of China” (Zhonghua Minguo). Yet “Zhongguo” was not its official name but simply its abbreviation. After the Chinese communists controlled the territories of the mainland China, they renamed the country “People’s Republic of China” (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo).

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Again, “Zhongguo” is used as its abbreviation with a combination of the first and the last characters of the official name. According to the government of the People’s Republic of China, “Zhongguo” has a long and continuous history of more than four thousand years beginning with the Xia Dynasty (2070–1600 BCE). However, Victoria Tin-bor Hui suggests that Chinese history actually counts “only 936 years of unification from the beginning of history to 2000” if we take the Weberian standard and a minimalist territorial definition.22 The standard Weberian conception of state power holds that an effective state is one that monopolizes the means of coercion within its territory, and the minimalist definition of the Chinese territory is roughly bounded by the Yellow River in the northwest, the Yin Shan mountains and the lower Liao River in the northeast, the Sichuan basin in the west, the eastern part of the Yungui plateau in the southwest, Guangdong in the south, and the coastline in the east.23 Interestingly, she counts the majority of the years of the Yuan, Ming, and Qing dynasties as years of unification as well as those of the People’s Republic of China but discounted the Republic of China era completely.24 Wang Lixiong, on the other hand, believes that the Yuan is not China. The fact that the Yuan dominated Tibet is not the same as China dominating Tibet. It is rather that the Mongols and Tibetans joined hands and ruled China.25 The Mongol Empire was established in 1206 when Genghis Khan (1162–1227) was made ruler of all Mongols. At that time, the Mongol Empire was a competitor to the Chinese Song Dynasty (960–1279). Tibet was officially incorporated into the Mongol Empire in 1247, when Sakya Pandita Kunga Gyeltsen (1182–1251),26 a leader of the Sakya Sect of Tibetan Buddhism, met with the Mongol Prince Koden27 (?-1251), a grandson of Genghis Khan and second son of Ögedei Khan (1186–1241) (the second Great Khan of the Mongol Empire) in Liangzhou (present-day Wuwei of Gansu Province) and decided on the terms for Tibetan submission to the Mongols.28 As the captain of the Mongolian Western Road Army with the title of Prince of Xiliang, Koden was in charge of Western Xia, Gansu, and Qinghai. After his senior general, Dorta Nagpo, charged into Tibet in

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1240 as far as the Razheng Monastery,29 240 kilometers north of Lhasa, Koden invited a leader of the Sakya Sect of Tibetan Buddhism to Liangzhou to negotiate the arrangements for Tibet’s submission. Sakya Pandita first sent off his nephews Drogön Chögyal Phagpa (1235–1280),30 aged 10, and Chana Dorje (1239–1267),31 aged six, in August 1244 and then traveled from Lhasa himself. They arrived at Liangzhou two years later and met with Koden in 1247 at the White Dagoba Monastery in Liangzhou. As a result of the meeting, Koden and Sakya Pandita reached an agreement on the terms of Tibet’s submission. First, the Mongols would assign the Sakya Sect and its envoys to exercise joint management over Tibet. Those who pledge allegiance could remain in their former positions; otherwise, they would be targets for attacks from the Mongol troops. Second, local officials of Tibet should prepare in triplicate a list of officials, the household registration of the local population, and tax payments: they would keep one copy of the information and submit two copies to Prince Koden and the Sakya Sect leaders. Third, the Mongols would send officials to Tibet and determine, in conjunction with the Sakya officials, types of tax payments.32 Sakya Pandita subsequently wrote a number of letters to all religious leaders in Tibet, convincing them of the necessity of submitting to the Mongols.33 The Mongol Empire was renamed Da Yuan (Great Yuan) in 1271 and unified China in 1279. China, i.e., Zhongguo, has evolved over the past four thousand years as a political entity. In the process, China has been dominated by people of different ethnic backgrounds. The Mongols are not Han, but Yuan is China and Yuan Dynasty is an important part of Chinese history. Similarly, the Manchurians are not Han but Qing is also China and Qing Dynasty an important part of Chinese history. China has experienced periods of divisions and unifications, but China is China whether it is divided or unified. The country may have a short history of unification for less than 1,000 years but that does not make Chinese history any shorter. Third, there is no consensus on how long Tibet has been a part of China. According to a white paper on Tibet released by the Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of

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China on March 2, 2009, “Tibet has been an inseparable part of China since ancient times”. 34 More specifically, an earlier white paper of 1992 located the year of Tibet becoming a part of China to be the mid–13th century.35 In other words, it considers 1247 as the year when Tibet was officially incorporated into the territory of China’s Yuan Dynasty. According to Wang Lixiong, however, China did not exercise sovereignty over Tibet until 1727 when the Qing court began to send resident ministers (Zhuzang Dachen) to Tibet.36 For him, the fact that Tibetans surrendered to the Mongols in 1247 is not evidence that China exercised sovereignty over Tibet because Yuan is not China. Moreover, the Zongzhi Yuan — the Yuan Empire’s institution for controlling Tibetan affairs — was headed by Tibetans. It is therefore Tibetans instead of the Mongols who were ruling Tibetans. Finally, the Mongols accepted Tibetan Buddhism and took Tibetan monks as their imperial tutors.37 Evidently, China had not exercised sovereignty over Tibet since “ancient times”. At least, Tibet was an independent and unified country from 629 to 842. The fact that Tibetans became subdued to the Mongols in 1247 may not be construed as the beginning of China’s sovereignty over Tibet. At that time, the Mongol Empire was separate from the Chinese dynasty, Southern Song (1127–1279). But when the Yuan replaced Southern Song in 1279 as a Chinese dynasty, Tibet became a part of China. In that sense, Tibet has been a part of China for 730 years by 2009. How Tibet was Governed Tibet was governed by different institutions during different dynasties in the history of China. After securing their dominance over Tibetans, the Mongol Empire established Zongzhi Yuan (General Council) in 1264 to handle national religious affairs as well as Tibet’s local affairs and appointed Phagpa as the head of the office (Table 6.2). The office was renamed Xuanzheng Yuan (Political Council) in 1288.38 Below the head, there were Yuanshi who were in charge of daily operations, and they were in turn assisted by officials

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Tibet’s Governance in the History of China

Period

1247 1264 1288 1374

Mongol Empire Mongol Empire Yuan Ming

1375 1578

Ming Ming

1588

Ming

1653

Qing

1653

Qing

1709

Qing

1713

Qing

1721

Qing

1727

Qing

1793

Qing

1912

Republic of China

Governance Tibet was incorporated into the Mongol Empire Zongzhi Yuan was established Zongzhi Yuan was renamed Xuanzheng Yuan Dbus-Gtsang Itinerant High Commandery and Mdo-khams Itinerant High Commandery were established E-Li-Si Army-Civilian Marshal Office Sonam Gyatso was granted the title of Dalai Lama by the Mongolian ruler Altan Khan as a Ming local official Sonam Gyatso was granted a title of Dorjichang (or Vajradhara) by the Ming Court Lozang Gyatso, the fifth Dalai Lama, was granted a title of Dalai Lama, Overseer of the Buddhist Faith on Earth Under the Great Benevolent Self-subsisting Buddha of the Western Paradise, along with a golden seal of authority Güshi Khan, the political and military leader of Tibet, was granted a title of Righteous and Wise Gushri Khan, along with a golden seal of authority, by Emperor Shunzhi Shilang (i.e., Vice Minister) Hao Shou was dispatched to help manage Tibet on behalf of the Central Government Lozong-Yiehsi, the fifth Panchen Lama of Tibet, was granted a title of Panchen Erdeni, along with a golden seal of authority, by Emperor Kangxi The Qing Court established the system of Kalon to manage Tibetan affairs High commissioners from Beijing were stationed in Tibet The Qing Court issued “Imperially Authorized Regulations on Governance of Tibet” Bureau of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs was established (Continued)

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(Continued)

Year

Period

Governance

1928

Republic of China

1951

People’s Republic of China

1965

People’s Republic of China

Commission for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs was established “17-Article Agreement” was signed in Beijing between the Central Government of China and the local government of Tibet Tibet Autonomous Region was established

Sources: Chen Qingying, Xizang Lishi (The History of Tibet) (Beijing: Wuzhou Chuanbo Chubanshe, 2002); Dangdai Zhongguo de Xizang (two volumes) (Tibet of Contemporary China) (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo Chubanshe, 1991); and Gyaincain Norbu, Huihuang de Ershishiji Xinzhongguo Dajilu: Xizang Juan (The Glorious Records of New China in the 20th Century: Tibet) (Beijing: Hongqi Chubanshe, 1999).

such as Tongzhi, Fushi, and Jianyuan. The number of Yuanshi varied from one to 10. They had to be monks nominated by the head of the office and appointed by the emperor. Other officials could be either monks or lay men and either Tibetans or Mongols.39 The key figure in the Zongzhi Yuan from 1264 to 1280, of course, was Phagpa, a Tibetan spiritual and political leader. He had been a close friend of Kublai (or Khubilai) Khan (September 23, 1215–February 18, 1295), the founder of the Yuan Dynasty. Upon his enthronement in March 1260, Kublai Khan appointed Phagpa as Guoshi (state tutor) in charge of Buddhism and granted him a jade seal of authority with a text reading “Great Yuan State Tutor in Charge of Buddhism”.40 Kublai Khan further appointed him the head of the Zongzhi Yuan in 1264 when that office was established and promoted him to be Dishi (imperial tutor) in 1270. Under Zongzhi Yuan (Xuanzheng Yuan), there were three military commands responsible for three areas of Tibet. One (Tubo Deng Chu Xuanwei Shisi Du Yuanshuai Fu or Mdosmad Xuanweisi) was headquartered in Hezhoumen (now Linxia City of Gansu Province) and was in charge of Mdosmad (Amdo) (including the areas of currently Hainan, Huangnan, and Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures of Qinghai Province, Gannan Tibetan Autonomous

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Prefecture of Gansu Province, and the northern part of Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture of Sichuan Province).41 One (Tubo Deng Lu Xuanwei Shisi Du Yuanshuai Fu or Mdokhams Xuanweisi) is in charge of Mdokhams (or Khams) (including the areas of currently Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture of Sichuan Province, Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture of Yunnan, Yushu Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture of Qinghai, and parts of Chamdo District and Nakchu District of Tibetan Autonomous Region).42 And the third (Wusizang Xuanweisi) was in charge of Dbus-gtsang (or U-Tsang, which includes the majority of the current TAR except for Chamdo).43 Through Zongzhi Yuan and Phagpa, the Yuan also instituted a new system of administration in Tibet. The Yuan divided Tibet into thirteen myriarchies (khri-`khor = 10,000 households) and appointed myriarches to administer them. Some of them such as Zhigong, Phagdru, and Caiba had been established earlier, in 1251.44 Others such as Qumi were established later, in 1265. These administrative units were all under the jurisdiction of the Sakya authority, which reported to Phagpa. The Sakya sect was very powerful in Tibet for about 100 years from 1264 to 1358. It monopolized the position of imperial tutor and thus controlled Zongzhi Yuan (later Xuanzheng Yuan). All imperial tutors, who were concurrently heads of Zongzhi Yuan (and later Xuanzheng Yuan) were from this sect, in particular the Kun clan. When the imperial tutor was away from Tibet, the abbot of Sakya Monastry45 managed Tibetan local affairs instead. As the imperial tutor and the abbot were both monks, a layman position of the Ponchen (dpon-chen) was created to administer daily affairs. The Sakya authority also created a position of tripon to manage about 10,000 households under its direct control.46 The Sakya authority was replaced by Phagdru Kagyu of the White Sect of Tibetan Buddhism in 1358 as the dominant force in Tibet.47 After the founding of the Ming Dynasty in 1368, Emperor Zhu Yuanzhang issued edicts to Tibetans to submit to the Ming. The central government of Ming China (1368–1644) subsequently established Dbus-Gtsang Itinerant High Commandery and Mdokhams Itinerant High Commandery in 1374 and E-Li-Si Army–Civilian

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Marshal Office in 1375 to manage local affairs of Tibet. The central government appointed local officials and officers, accepted tributes from Tibet, and developed trade relations (known as tea-horse trade fairs) between Tibet and inland areas.48 Qing emperors (1644–1912) strengthened China’s control over Tibetan affairs. Emperor Shunzhi made Ngawang Lozang Gyatso (1617–1682), the fifth Dalai Lama, a Tibetan, a religious leader of Tibet and Güshi (or Gushri) Khan (1582–1655),49 a Mongol, a political and military leader of Tibet, in 1653. Dalai Lama is not the name of a person. It is a title given to an individual who is the spiritual leader of the Gelugpa sect of Tibetan Buddhism. This person is believed to be the latest incarnation of a long line of Buddhist masters. The title “Dalai Lama” was given to Sonam Gyatso (1543–1588) in 1578 by the Mongol Altan Khan (1507–1582). But Sonam Gyatso was recognized as the third Dalai Lama and his previous incarnations, Gendun Drup and Gendun Gyatso, were conferred as the first and second Dalai Lamas posthumously. The full Mongolian title, “the wonderful Vajradhara, good splendid meritorious ocean”, is primarily a translation of the Tibetan words, Sonam Gyatso (sonam means “merit” and gyatso “ocean”).50 In other words, “Dalai” is synonym with “Gyatso”. “Dalai” is a Mongolian term for “ocean of wisdom”, and “Gyatso” a Tibetan term for “ocean of wisdom”.51 “Lama” is a Tibetan term corresponding to the Indian word “guru”, meaning teacher.52 At the time of the Fifth Dalai Lama, the Gelugpa school of Tibetan Buddhism, with the military assistance of Güshi Khan, replaced the Kagyu school as the dominant force in Tibet. Güshi Khan conquered Kham in 1640 and Shigatse in 1642 and recognized the authority of the Fifth Dalai Lama over Tibet. Losang Gyatso visited Beijing in 1653, and Emperor Shunzhi granted him the honorific title, “Dalai Lama, Overseer of the Buddhist Faith on Earth Under the Great Benevolent Self-subsisting Buddha of the Western Paradise”.53 For the Qing court, it was a means to extend its control over Tibet. At the time, religious power was separated from political and military power and the Mongols were in charge of political and military affairs in Tibet.

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Emperor Kangxi, who reigned in China from 1661 to 1722, further tightened Beijing’s control over Tibet. He sent a Shilang (equivalent of a vice minister in today’s bureaucratic system in China), Hou Shou, to help manage Tibet on behalf of the central government in 1709; officially recognized the Panchen Lama as another major religious leader in 1713, along with the Dalai Lama; and set up a system of Kalon to manage local officials of Tibet in 1721. During the years of Emperor Kangxi, the Dalai Lama’s power expanded. The Fifth Dalai Lama began a new tradition of appointing his regent in 1669, a prerogative previously preserved for the Mongols. His regent, Sangye Gyatso (1653–1705), became very powerful. He hid the death of the Fifth Dalai Lama for 14 years and sent memorials to the Qing court in the name of the Fifth Dalai Lama. After Emperor Kangxi discovered the truth in 1696, he demanded Sangye Gyatso to give an account and adopted additional measures to govern Tibet more effectively. Another important religious leader in the Gelugpa sect of Tibetan Buddhism, the Panchen Lama has had a special relationship with the Dalai Lama. Lobsang Chökyi Gyaltsen (1570–1662), the fourth Panchen Lama, was the first to be accorded this title during his lifetime.54 He was the master (teacher) of both the fourth and fifth Dalai Lamas.55 He supervised the pre-novice ordination ceremony for the Fourth Dalai Lama (1589–1616)56 and gave him the dharma name, Yonten Gyatso, in 1603. After the Fourth Dalai Lama passed away in 1616, he helped to locate the Fifth Dalai Lama and chaired his ordination ceremony in 1625. He was the real leader in the emergence of the Gelugpa sect over the Kagyu sect in Tibet.57 Because of his tremendous contributions, Güshi Khan confirmed upon him the honorific title of “Panchen Pokto”. This is a combination of terms in three languages. “Pan” is short for a Sanskrit term, pandita, meaning “scholar”; “Chen” is short for a Tibetan term, chenpo, meaning “great”; and “Pokto” is a Mongolian word meaning “wise and brave man”.58 Emperor Kangxi elevated the status of the Panchen Lama in 1713 not to balance the power of the Dalai Lama but to provide an alternative to the Dalai Lama. Because of controversies over who was the real Sixth Dalai Lama, the Mongol leaders and the Tibetan leaders

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came into conflict. Tibetans’ Sixth Dalai Lama, Tsangyang Gyatso (March 1683–1707), had passed away in 1707, and the Mongols’ Sixth Dalai Lama, Ngawang Yeshe Gyatso, was not accepted by Tibetans. Emperor Kangxi thus granted the honorific title to the Fifth Panchen Lama, Lobsang Yeshe (1663–1737) to provide an alternative.59 Emperor Yongzheng (December 13, 1678–October 8, 1735) began to station ambans (a Manchu term for resident ministers) in Tibet in 1727 to exercise direct control over Tibetan affairs. For 185 years between 1727 and 1911, the Qing court made 173 appointments, including 102 ambans and 71 assistant ambans. Among the ambans, one individual (Mala) served three terms; 14 people served two terms; 18 assistant ambans were promoted to ambans; six people did not assume duties; and 64 people assumed their duties. Among assistant ambans, five served two terms; 15 did not assume duties; and 51 actually assumed duties.60 Most ambans and their deputies were Manchus and Mongols but there were a few Han. Jing Wen was the first Han amban in Tibet, and he served there from August 1861 to March 1869. Qing Shan was the second Han amban in Tibet but he failed to assume his duty in 1900 due to illness. Zhao Erkang (1845–1911) was the last Han amban in Tibet. He served in that capacity from March 1908 to April 1911.61 Yet the most famous Han official was Zhang Yintang (1866–1937).62 A career diplomat who assisted in dealing with the British over Tibet, he introduced a series of reform measures in his capacity as a high commissioner from Beijing63 from December 1906 to March 1908.64 Beijing’s management of Tibet became more institutionalized under Emperor Qianlong, who reigned from 1735 to 1796. He issued an edict in 1751, authorizing the Seventh Dalai Lama to be in charge of both religious and political affairs. This was the beginning of theocracy in Tibet.65 In the same year, with the approval of Emperor Qianlong, the amban issued a new regulation of 13 articles on Tibetan affairs, specifying the authority of the Dalai Lama and ambans.66 To further strengthen its control over Tibetan affairs, the Qing court issued in 1793 a regulation on Tibetan affairs, “Imperially

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Authorized Regulations on Governance of Tibet”.67 The regulation consists of 29 articles, specifying central authorities over religious, political, military, and economic issues in Tibet. In particular, the regulation specified the procedures (i.e., gold urn system) to determine the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama as well as other high lamas. The Qing court displayed its authority over Tibet by twice removing Thubten Gyatso (February 12, 1876–December 17, 1933), the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, of his official title of the Dalai Lama because of his derelictions of duty, in August 1904 and February 1910, respectively.68 The central government of the Republic of China continued its control over Tibet. In April 1912, the Ministry of Internal Affairs set up a Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Section, which was renamed Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Bureau three months later. The office was further upgraded to Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Council in 1914 and was made Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission in 1929.69 President Yuan Shikai issued an order to restore Thubten Gyatso’s title of the Dalai Lama in October 1912.70 After the death of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, the Nanjing government sent Huang Musong (1883–1937) to Tibet in April 1934. Huang became chairman of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission in March 1935.71 Wu Zhongxin (1884–1958), Huang’s successor as chairman of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, went to Lhasa in January 1940 and inspected Lhamo Thondup, a four-year old boy from Qinghai Province, as the only candidate for the Fourteenth Dalai Lama. After his report to Nanjing, the central government issued a No. 898 government order to approve the appointment. Wu then supervised the enthronement ceremony of Lhamo Thondup as the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, who was given the name “Jetsun Jamphel Ngawang Lobsang yeshe Tenzin Gyatso” (“Tenzin Gyatso” for short), on February 22, 1940.72 Wu then set up an office in Tibet — the Tibetan affairs office of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission — with Kong Qingzong as its founding head. The Nanjing government also approved the selection of Gonpo Tseten (February 19, 1938–January 28, 1989) as the tenth incarnation of

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the Panchen Lama, who was enthroned on June 11, 1949 in Qinghai under the auspice of Chinese officials and was given the name of Lobsang Trinley Lhündrub Chökyi Gyaltsen or Choekyi Gyaltsen.73 It is clear that different dynasties governed Tibet through different institutions, mechanisms, and personalities. The Yuan governed Tibet through Tibetans. It created institutions such as the Zongzhi Yuan/Xuanzheng Yuan, three commands, and myriarchies. The Ming’s control over Tibet was mainly through granting honorific titles. The Qing initially used the Mongols and Tibetans to rule Tibet and later sent its resident ministers (ambans) to directly manage Tibetan affairs. The Republic of China continued to exercise its authority over Tibet by conferring the titles of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama to their reincarnations.

MANAGING TIBETAN AFFAIRS IN THE ERAS OF MAO-DENG-JIANG Mao Zedong’s Tibet Policies The People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under the leadership of Mao Zedong in Beijing on October 1, 1949. As many new dynasties in Chinese history, this new government was born out of military contestation. Inevitably, the extension of its power throughout the country would have to take the form of military conquest in most cases. This extension of military troops to a province was called “liberation” in CCP terms. In Tibet, Mao Zedong pursued a dual strategy of peaceful negotiations and military campaigns. On the one hand, the CCP organized delegations to negotiate with the Tibetan government for peaceful liberation; on the other hand, Mao also sent the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops (the Eighteenth Army under the leadership of Zhang Guohua and Tan Guansan) to Tibet. Initial attempts at peaceful talks failed. A representative of the Central Government for peace talks, Geda Trulku Lama, was assassinated on August 21, 1950.74 The head of the first delegation on

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peace mission, Thupten Jigme Norbu (August 16, 1922–September 5, 2008)75 (the abbot of Kumbum Monastery in Qinghai Province, the then current incarnation of the Taktser Rinpoche, and the eldest brother of Tenzin Gyatso, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama of Tibet),76 defected as soon as he arrived in Lhasa in October 1950.77 After a brief military campaign of 18 days (from October 6–24, 1950), the PLA troops under the leadership of Zhang Guohua (October 1914– February 21, 1972)78 successfully occupied Chamdo in October 1950. Under the political and military pressure of the CCP, the majority of Tibetan troops in Chamdo under the leadership of Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme (born 1910) surrendered without a fight. Tenzin Gyatso (born July 6, 1935), the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, assumed power on November 17, 195079 and sent a delegation to Beijing in March 1951.80 The Dalai Lama’s delegation and Beijing’s representatives went through six rounds of talks from April 29 to May 21, 1951. On May 23, 1951, the two sides reached an agreement entitled “Agreement of the Central People’s Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet” (i.e., the 17-Article Agreement),81 reaffirming Beijing’s authority over political, military, economic, and foreign affairs in Tibet. After the 17-Article Agreement was signed, the Dalai Lama and his entourage returned to Lhasa in August 1951 from his refuge in Yatung (or Dromo) in the south of Tibet. The Dalai Lama, along with the Panchen Lama, was invited to Beijing in 1954 and was subsequently elected vice chairman of the First National People’s Congress Standing Committee on September 27, 1954.82 Upon his return from Beijing to Lhasa in April 1955, the Dalai Lama wrote a long poem, praising Chairman Mao as the “rising Sun”.83 In the early 1950s, the Central Government of the PRC preserved Tibet’s political, religious, and economic system in accordance with the 17-Article Agreement. After the Preparatory Committee of Tibet Autonomous Region was established in April 1956 with the Dalai Lama as its chairman, Mao indicated to the Dalai Lama that Tibet was not ready for “democratic reforms”.84 The Central Committee of the CCP decided in 1956 that Tibet’s reforms could wait for another six years.85

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However, an open clash erupted in Lhasa in March 1959. The causes of the clash were complicated and are subject to different interpretations. According to the CCP’s account, the reactionary elements of the ruling elite in Tibet had instigated armed uprisings in the Tibetan areas of Sichuan Province (or the Kham) in 1955–56 in reaction to democratic reforms there and organized rebellions in Lhasa in 1959.86 According to late Dawa Norbu, former editor of the Tibetan Review, the clash was due to China’s different policies toward the Tibetan areas. China’s policy towards “political Tibet (TAR)” “was undoubtedly realistic and imaginative”, but its policy towards “ethnic Tibet (Kham and Amdo)” was “rigid and lacked realism”.87 For him, the Tibetan Revolt of 1959, fundamentally, was caused by the inevitable clash of two diametrically opposed value systems. Given the nature of theocracy and the fusion of society and religion in Tibetan value system, “there could be no social change without touching or undermining the religious foundation”. And the “democratic reforms”, which aimed at changing the property relations, would inevitably affect the value system of Tibetans.88 In addition to the domestic forces, the United States government was also indirectly involved in the revolt. As a part of the containment strategy, the US Tibet policy was aimed at “isolating and overthrowing the Chinese Communist government”.89 As early as March 1951, the US government was determined to intervene in Tibetan affairs, even at the risk of sacrificing its cordial relations with India and the KMT government in Taiwan. “In other words”, as Dawa Norbu stated it, “the counter-Communist strategy was the American global strategy to which regional factors such as India and KMT Taiwan were subordinated, and sacrificed, if and when necessary”.90 The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) established contact with the Dalai Lama’s second elder brother Gyalo Thondup (born 1928) in 1951, upon his arrival in the United States.91 With the assistance of Gyalo Thondup and others, the CIA selected and trained Tibetan fighters in Camp Hale (Colorado) and Saipan and airdropped them in Tibet in the 1950s.92 CIA agents even infiltrated the staff of the Dalai Lama. “Almost everyone but myself was heavily armed”, 93 the Dalai Lama recalled his escape in March 1959 in his memoir. His

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personal cook was one of the young men trained by the CIA; another CIA operative was a radio operator “who was apparently in touch with his headquarters throughout the journey”.94 Tibetan government-in-exile under the Dalai Lama worked closely with the CIA on military operations between 1959 and 1969.95 Gyalo Thondup and Gompo Tashi (the head of resistance forces) worked with the CIA to set up a new guerrilla base in Mustang in northern Nepal in 1960.96 The Dalai Lama was also reportedly on the CIA’s payroll from the late 1950s until 1974, receiving US$15,000 a month (US$180,000 a year).97 As the US government under Richard Nixon sought better relations with China, the CIA decided to terminate its support for the Tibetan resistance forces in 1969. Five years later, in 1974, the guerrilla forces in Mustang surrendered to the Nepalese government under the urge of the Dalai Lama to avoid a military clash.98 After the March 1959 rebellion, the CCP changed its policy and conducted a revolution against the old serfdom in the subsequent two years. The abolition of Tibet’s serfdom was long overdue. Serfdom is a modified slave system in which serfs were bound to the land. This system was completely abolished in Europe in 1861.99 China did not abolish this system in Tibet until one hundred years later, in 1961. Mao Zedong’s accomplishment in this regard, therefore, may be hailed as a great progress for mankind as much as (if not more than) Abraham Lincoln’s achievement in the emancipation of slaves in the United States. Before the reforms, the nobility, the clergy, and the Lhasa government owned all the arable land in Tibet. Out of 3.3 million ke (about 22 million acres),100 the nobility took 24.3 percent; the clergy 36.8 percent; and the Lhasa government 38.9 percent. The ruling class constituted only five percent of the total population, and more than 90 percent of Tibetans were serfs and slaves. After the reforms, these serfs and slaves were liberated in a real sense. They became human beings with fundamental rights for the first time. As a result of the reforms, Tibet’s agricultural production greatly increased. The total agricultural product was 184.5 million yuan in 1959, but was increased to 277.3 million yuan in 1963 and further to

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357.4 million yuan in 1966. At the constant price (with 1959 as 100), these latter numbers represent a net increase of 50.3 percent in 1963 and 93.7 percent in 1966.101 The Chinese government believed that the Dalai Lama was abducted and had him re-elected in absentia as vice chairman of the Second National People’s Congress Standing Committee in April 1959. Chairman Mao Zedong expressed his hope that the Dalai Lama would eventually return. “If he does not return in 59 years, he might return in the 60th year”, Mao said.102 The Great Leap Forward (GLF) skipped Tibet because of its later development. While the rest of the country established people’s communes in 1958, Tibet did not begin to establish people’s communes until 1965 and did not complete the process until 1975 when 1,964 communes were formed.103 Nonetheless, under the influence of radicalism prevalent during the GLF, CCP cadres and other activists became excessive in arresting “counter-revolutionary rebels” and destroying Buddhist statues, monasteries, and texts.104 In Chamdo, for instance, as Zhang Jingwu (Party secretary of Tibet CCP Work Committee) admitted in 1960, five percent of the arrests were mistakes.105 Compared to other regions of China, the impact of the Cultural Revolution on Tibet is also relatively minor. Soon after the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, “revolutionary rebels” in Lhasa rose against “capitalist roaders” in power and red guards from other places such as Beijing and Shaanxi along with local red guards began to destroy the “four olds” — old customs, old culture, old habits, and old ideas. A number of leading cadres in Tibet were criticized, and the majority of 529 monasteries were damaged. Yet the Central and local government made efforts to limit the damage by stipulating that counties and districts in the border areas would not carry out the Cultural Revolution and by restricting Han red guards from travelling to Tibet.106 Hu Yaobang’s Liberal Policies After the Cultural Revolution, Beijing introduced liberal policies in Tibet. During his visit to Tibet in May 1980, General Secretary Hu

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Yaobang (November 20, 1915–April 15, 1989) announced a sixpoint policy toward Tibet. First, Tibet should fully exercise its rights as an autonomous region under the unified leadership of the central government. Second, Tibet should recuperate from its current difficulties, reducing people’s economic burdens. Third, Tibet should implement a special and flexible policy to promote economic growth. Fourth, Tibet should use the substantial subsidies from the central government to develop agriculture and animal husbandry and meet the urgent needs of the people. Fifth, Tibetan culture should be developed. Sixth, the unity of Han and Tibetan cadres should be strengthened.107 Hu Yaobang encouraged Tibetan leaders to protect their “special interests” with specific laws and regulations; waived taxes for Tibetans; promised to increase central subsidies to Tibet with an annual growth rate of 10 percent; pledged to promote Tibetan culture and education; and announced the transfer of 85 percent of Han cadres back to the inland areas.108 Han cadres reportedly had mixed feelings about Hu’s speech. Those who had worked in Tibet for many years were furious about Hu’s remarks because Hu completely discredited their sacrifices and accomplishments in Tibet; and newcomers were glad that their sufferings in this remote region would end soon.109 Under these liberal policies, the central government revived religious activities in Tibet, rebuilt Buddhist monasteries, and recruited monks. Tibetan Buddhism Institute was established in 1983; and China Tibetan Language Advanced Institute of Buddhism was founded in 1987.110 Yin Fatang (born 1922), acting Party secretary of Tibet since March 1980, however, was concerned that Hu’s policies, especially his religious policies, would likely lead to religious fanaticism, potentially causing riots down the road. In his view, Hu’s drastic reversals of Beijing’s policy toward monasteries, religious activities, and the ancient nobility would help the Dalai Lama and be tantamount to capitulation to the serf owners. He resisted Hu’s policies in the name of an anti-spiritual pollution campaign.111 In order to implement his policies, Hu Yaobang called for a conference on Tibetan affairs. At the Second Work Conference on Tibetan Affairs held in February–March 1984, Hu argued strongly

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Names and Tenures of Tibet’s Top Leaders Since 1950

Party Secretary Zhang Guohua Fan Ming Zhang Jingwu Zhang Guohua Zeng Yongya Ren Rong Yin Fatang Wu Jinghua Hu Jintao Chen Kuiyuan Guo Jinlong Yang Chuantang Zhang Qingli

Chairman (1/1950–3/1952) (6/1951–12/1952) (3/1952–8/1965) (9/1965–2/1967) (9/1969–4/1971) (4/1971–3/1980) (3/1980–6/1985) (6/1985–12/1988) (12/1988–10/1992) (12/1992–9/2000) (9/2000–12/2004) (12/2004–11/2005) (11/2005–)

Npapoi Ngawang Jigme Zeng Yongya Ren Rong Sanggyai Yexe, aka Tian Bao Npapoi Ngawang Jigme Doje Cedain Doje Cering Gyaincain Norbu Legqog Qiangba Puncog

(9/1965–1/1967) (9/1968–11/1970) (11/1970–8/1979) (8/1979–4/1981) (4/1981–2/1983) (2/1983–11/1985) (11/1985–5/1990) (5/1990–5/1998) (5/1998–3/2003) (3/2003–)

Source: Zhongguo Gongchandang Zuzhishi Ziliao (Materials on the Organization History of the Chinese Communist Party) (Beijing: Zhonggong Dangshi Chubanshe, 2000), Volumes 5–7 and Appendix Volume 1; and Yearbook of Who’s Who of China (various years).

against concerns about the possible riots as a result of increasing influence of religion in Tibet and subsequently replaced Yin Fatang with Wu Jinghua (February 17, 1931–October 19, 2007) as Party secretary of Tibet, in June 1985 (Table 6.3). As the first (and the only) non-Han Party secretary of Tibet, Wu Jinghua, a Yi nationality from Sichuan, became a religious enthusiast. He actively promoted religious activities during his tenure in Tibet. He donned Tibetan’s gowns and took the lead in participating in all sorts of religious activities, earning a nickname “Lama Secretary”. His subordinates in Tibet, Han and Tibetans alike, followed suit, creating religious fanaticism in Tibet.112 In the meantime, the Tibetans’ worship of Chairman Mao was first replaced by the worship of Chairman Mao’s “reincarnation”, Chairman Hua Guofeng (February 16, 1921– August 20, 2008), and then replaced by the worship of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama. The worship of the Dalai Lama in particular was greatly facilitated by the return of the Dalai Lama’s relatives and exiled Tibetans in the early 1980s because of Hu Yaobang’s policies.113 As a result of Hu Yaobang’s promotion of

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“religious freedom” in Tibet, the Dalai Lama went back in spirit and the Dalai Lama’s exile government reestablished itself as a competing institution with the CCP in this lamaist region. In 1979, the Tibet Autonomous Region Government set up an office — “Receiving Returned Tibetans Committee” — to receive returned Tibetans from overseas. By 1999, this office had received 27,700 people (58,000 people times) and helped to resettle 2,200 returned Tibetans.114 As Hu Yaobang was promoting liberal policies in Tibet in the late 1970s and the 1980s, the US Tibet policy also went through a major shift. Instead of covert operations under the CIA, the USA decided to provide overt funding for programs to promote democratic values and human rights.115 The US Congress passed legislation (H.R. 2915)116 in 1983 to set up a nonprofit organization, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), to promote democracy abroad. According to the legislation, the NED would serve six purposes: “encouraging democratic institutions through private sector initiatives; facilitating exchanges between private sector groups and democratic groups abroad; promoting nongovernmental participation in democratic training programs; strengthening democratic electoral processes abroad in cooperation with indigenous democratic forces; fostering cooperation between American private sector groups and those abroad ‘dedicated to the cultural values, institutions, and organizations of democratic pluralism;’ and encouraging democratic development consistent with the interests of both the US and the groups receiving assistance”.117 The funding for the NED was appropriations from the US government, initially set at US$31.3 million a year. In addition, US Congress also provides special appropriations to the NED to carry out specific democratic initiatives in “countries of special interest” including China and Tibet.118 Congress members became very active on the Tibet issue in the 1980s. On July 24, 1985, in a signed letter, 91 members of Congress urged Beijing to have direct talks with the Dalai Lama.119 On June 16, 1987, the US House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight, a standing subcommittee within the House Foreign Affairs Committee,

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passed a resolution on the Tibet issue. In September of the same year, the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight invited the Dalai Lama to give a speech at the US Congressional Human Rights Caucus. In his address to the US Congressional Human Rights Caucus on September 21, 1987, the Dalai Lama proposed a five-point peace plan: (1) transformation of the whole of Tibet into a zone of peace; (2) abandonment of China’s population transfer policy which threatens the very existence of Tibetans as a people; (3) respect for the Tibetan people’s fundamental human rights and democratic freedoms; (4) restoration and protection of Tibet’s natural environment and the abandonment of China’s use of Tibet for the production of nuclear weapons and dumping of nuclear waste; and (5) commencement of earnest negotiations on the future status of Tibet and of relations between the Tibetan and Chinese people.120 In his explanations of these points, the Dalai Lama used strong languages and drew astonishing historical parallels. He likened the experience of Tibetans in the hands of the CCP regime to the Holocaust and accused the Chinese government of murdering and torturing Tibetans in millions. He said, To improve relations between the Tibetan People and the Chinese, the first requirement is the creation of trust. After the holocaust of the last decades in which over one million Tibetans - one sixth of the population - lost their lives and at least as many lingered in prison camps because of their religious beliefs and love of freedom, only a withdrawal of Chinese troops could start a genuine process of reconciliation.

“The Holocaust also known as Shoah”, according to Wikipedia, “is the term generally used to describe the genocide of approximately six million European Jews during World War II, a program of systematic state-sponsored extermination by Nazi Germany, under Adolf Hitler, and its collaborators”. According to one estimate, the Nazi Germany murdered 5,933,900 Jews in the Holocaust, representing 67 percent of the total Jews (8,861,800). In Poland, Baltic countries, and Germany & Austria, the killing rates were as high as 90 percent. The estimated pre-War Jewish population in Poland, for instance, was

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3,300,000 and the estimated Jewish population annihilated was 3,000,000, representing 90 percent.121 By using the term, “the holocaust”, the Dalai Lama made two points: one, China was guilty of genocide in Tibet;122 two, the genocide that China was guilty of was comparable to the most outrageous form of the genocide in human history. Later, the Dalai Lama placed the number of Tibetans being persecuted more precisely at 1.2 million.123 To dramatize his claims, the Dalai Lama used strong language to describe the “vile atrocities” of the Chinese against Tibetans. “The methods that the Chinese used to intimidate the population”, as the Dalai Lama claimed, include “crucifixion, vivisection, disemboweling and dismemberment of victims” as well as “beheading, burning, beating to death and burying alive, not to mention dragging people behind galloping horses until they died or handing them upside down or throwing them bound hand and foot into icy water”. 124 “Dragging people behind galloping horses until they died” refers to a Chinese colloquial “wu ma fen shi ”, a method of execution in ancient China, where a criminal is torn apart by five horses pulling in different directions. But it is unclear whether this cruel form of execution has ever actually been used in Chinese history.125 Moreover, it is well known that crucifixion is an ancient method of execution, where the condemned is tied or nailed to a large wooden cross and left to hang until death. This form of execution was used by the Romans until AD 337. This form of execution is completely foreign to the Chinese. To substantiate the Dalai Lama’s claim, the Tibetan governmentin-exile provided a detailed breakdown of the 1.2 million victims. According to a table in Chapter 5 of a document (“Yi Shishi Zhengming Xizang Zhenxiang” (“To Use Facts to Prove Truths about Tibet”)) released by the Tibetan government in exile, 1,207,387 Tibetans died because of China’s cruel rule between 1949 and 1979.126 Among them, 173,221 died in prison; 156,758 were executed; 432,705 died in the battle; 342,970 died of starvation; 9,002 were forced to commit suicide; and 92,731 were tortured to death. In terms of regional distributions, there are 427,478 deaths in U-Tsang; 480,261 in Kham, and 299,648 in Amdo (Table 6.4).

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228 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization Table 6.4

Deaths Under the CCP’s Rule (1949–1979)

Form of Death

U-Tsang

Kham

Amdo

Total

Died in Prison Executed Died in Battle Died of Starvation Suicide Tortured to Death

93,560 8,267 143,253 31,072 3,375 27,951

64,877 32,266 240,410 89,916 3,952 8,840

4,784 96,225 9,042 121,980 1,675 15,940

173,221 156,758 432,705 342,970 9,002 92,731

Total

427,478

480,261

299,648

1,207,387

Source: The Government of Tibet in Exile, “Yi Shishi Zhengming Xizang Zhenxiang” (“To Use Facts to Prove Truths about Tibet”), Chapter 5, http://gangjanba.googlepages.com/ tibettruth1.

According to the Tibetan local government, the population of Tibetans in 1950 was less than three million. In its letter to the United Nations dated December 3, 1950, the Tibetan government described Tibetans as “a weak and peace loving people, hardly exceeding 3 million”.127 In other words, these who had been persecuted in hands of the Chinese government from 1949 to 1979 would be more than 40 percent of Tibetans in 1950. If these were true, then these Tibetans would have perished in “a program of systemic state-sponsored extermination” on a similar scale to that of the Nazi holocaust. However, according to Xu Mingxu, these figures are unlikely to be true. For him, it is incredible that the population of Tibetans more than doubled in the period of 37 years under the CCP’s rule from less than three million in 1950 to six million in 1987, while the total population of the People’s Republic of China increased only by 96 percent in the same period from 540 million in 1949 to 1,060 million in 1987. It is nothing but a miracle that Tibetans could have more than doubled having lost more than 40 percent of their population of the initial year. Either the CCP treated Tibetans extremely well after having eliminated 1.2 million Tibetans so that their population could multiply at a faster pace than the Chinese as a whole; or the CCP did not persecute 1.2 million Tibetans. Xu believed the latter, and his estimate is under 200,000.128

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These figures of the Tibetan government-in-exile are indeed incredible. First, according to an estimate of the Chinese government, the total population of Tibetans in 1950 was two million instead of three milion.129 If the Dalai Lama’s figure of six million Tibetans in 1987 were true, then the population of Tibetans would have increased three times within 37 years under the CCP’s rule. In the meantime, the total population in China increased only by 98.7 percent from 550 million in 1949 to 1,093 million in 1987.130 Second, these figures simply do not add up. In the category of those who died in prison, there are 93,560 in U-Tsang, 64,877 in Kham, and 4,784 in Amdo. These numbers should add up to 163,221, but the total in the table is reported to be 173,221, 10,000 more. In the category of those who were executed, there are 8,267 in U-Tsang, 32,266 in Kham, and 96,225 in Amdo. These numbers should add up to 136,758, but the total in the table is reported to be 156,758, 20,000 more. In the category of those who died in the battle, there are 143,253 in U-Tsang, 240,410 in Kham, and 9,042 in Amdo. These numbers should add up to 392,705, but the total in the table is reported to be 432,705, 40,000 more. In the category of those who died of starvation, there are 31,072 in U-Tsang, 89,916 in Kham, and 121,980 in Amdo. These numbers should add up to 242,968, but the total in the table is reported to be 342,970, 100,002 more. In the category of those who were tortured to death, there are 27,951 in U-Tsang, 8,840 in Kham, and 15,940 in Amdo. These numbers should add up to 52,731, but the total in the table is reported to be 92,731, 40,000 more. The only category that has no figure inflation is those who were forced to commit suicide. In this category, there are 3,375 in U-Tsang, 3,952 in Kham, and 1,675 in Amdo, adding up to 9,002, the actual sum. What is more interesting is that the totals by region do not add up either. In the region of U-Tsang, there are 93,560 deaths in prison; 8,267 were executed; 143,253 died in the battle; 31,072 died of starvation; 3,375 were forced to commit suicide; and 27,951 were tortured to death. The total should be 307,478 but is reported to be 427,478, 120,000 more. In the region of Kham, there are 64,877 deaths in prison; 32,266 were executed; 240,410 died in the battle;

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89,916 died of starvation; 3,952 were forced to commit suicide; and 8,840 were tortured to death. The total should be 440,261 but is reported to be 480,261, 40,000 more. In the region of Amdo, there are 4,784 deaths in prison; 96,225 were executed; 9,042 died in the battle; 121,980 died of starvation; 1,675 were forced to commit suicide; and 15,940 were tortured to death. The total should be 249,646 but is reported to be 299,648, 50,002 more. What is most amazing is that not only these inflated numbers in rows add up to 1,207,387 but these inflated numbers in columns also add up to 1,207,387. The inflated total is 210,002 more than the actual total, with an inflation rate of 21.1 percent. Third, these figures do not tally with the facts. In spite of the myth of Shangri-La where people lived a long life, Tibetans had a short life span and perished easily for a number of reasons. The life expectancy of Tibetans in 1959 was only 35.5 years.131 Before 1949, Tibetans had died for several reasons: (1) widespread venereal disease; (2) the practice of polyandry; (3) the climate and topography; and (4) a large, mostly celibate clergy.132 According to the Tibetan government-in-exile, 427,478 Tibetans in U-Tsang (i.e., TAR) died between 1949 and 1979 because of the CCP policies. This is incredible because the figure is more than the total number of estimated actual deaths in the TAR during the period. According to Xizang Tongji Nianjian (Tibet Statistical Yearbook) (1993), there were altogether 153,000 deaths in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (U-Tsang in the Dalai Lama’s terms) for a period of 10 years (1970 to 1979) with an average annual death rate of 9.3 per thousand.133 Except for the year of 1965, there is no information available on either the number of deaths or the death rate in TAR. It is likely that the death rate in the years from 1959 to 1969 is lower than that of the years of 1970 to 1979 because the death rate in 1965 is only 5.1 per thousand. Even if the average annual death rate from 1959 to 1969 (except for 1965) were the same as that of the 1970s, the total number of deaths in TAR the period of 1959 to 1969 would be 132,291. Let us further assume that the total numbers of deaths from 1949 to 1958 were 106,559, based on the same death rate and the same population figure of 1,150,000

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(1952 figure) for every single year. The total numbers of deaths for the period of 1949 to 1979 would only amount to 391,850. Clearly, this figure is an overestimate of the actual number of deaths in the period in TAR. But even this exaggerated figure is less than the alleged number of deaths due to the CCP’s harsh rule.134 Moreover, the PLA troops did not enter Tibet until October 1950 and there are no known massacres in Tibet from 1950 to 1958. In the Chamdo battle of October 6 to 24, 1950, the only battle in the period of 1949 to 1958, there were few casualties. Therefore, the death tolls of this period can be excluded. The total number of actual deaths thus can be estimated to be no more than 285,291 for the period of 1959 to 1979. Suppose there was a computational error in Table 6.4 and the actual figure is indeed 307,478. This latter number is still larger than the estimated number of actual death tolls for the period. In his address to the US Congressional Human Rights Caucus on September 21, 1987, the Dalai Lama also alleged that due to the population transfer of Han Chinese into Tibet, the Tibetan population was reduced to “an insignificant and disenfranchised minority in Tibet itself”.135 He said, Today, in the whole of Tibet 7.5 million Chinese settlers have already been sent, outnumbering the Tibetan population of six million. In central and western Tibet, referred to by the Chinese as the “Tibetan Autonomous Region”, Chinese sources admit the 1.9 million Tibetans already constitute a minority of the region’s population. These numbers do not take the estimated 300,000–500,000 troops in Tibet into account – 250,000 of them in the so-called Tibetan Autonomous Region.136

It is true that according to the Chinese sources, there were 1.9 million Tibetans in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) in 1986. According to the Tibet Statistical Yearbook (2008), the population of Tibetans in 1986 in the TAR was 1,937,379.137 But Tibetans cannot possibly be a minority in the TAR, because the total population of the TAR in 1986 was 2,024,938.138 In other words, Tibetans constituted 95.7 percent of the total population in the TAR, hardly a minority (Figure 6.1).

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232 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization 3,000,000

2,500,000

2,000,000

Han

1,500,000

Tibetan

1,000,000

500,000

0

Fig. 6.1

Ethnic Distributions of Tibetan and Han Populations in Tibet

In fact, Tibetans have never been a minority in the TAR. They have always taken more than 90 percent of the total population in the locality. In contrast, the total number of Han Chinese in the TAR has never exceeded 130,000 any year and they take no more than seven percent of the total population there (Figure 6.2). Contrary to the Dalai Lama’s claim, Han population witnessed a downward trend both in absolute numbers and in percentages since 1980 when Hu Yaobang, former general secretary of the CCP, introduced a new policy of reducing Han population in Tibet.139 The population of Tibetans increased by 12.8 percent, from 1,718,238 in 1980 to 1,937,379 in 1986. Han population in Tibet decreased 40.9 percent from 122,356 in 1980 to only 72,340 in 1986. In 1986, Tibetans took 95.7 percent of the total population in the TAR and Han took only 3.6 percent.140 Anyway, subsequent to the Dalai Lama’s address at the US Congress, Lhasa witnessed three upheavals in a row: one on September 27, 1987; one on October 1, 1987; and one on March 5, 1988.141 At least for the first two, the Dalai Lama’s presence in the United States and the US Congress’s support were partially

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140,000 6.46

6.60 6.00

120,000 5.37

5.00

4.85

4.12

80,000

4 07 4.07

Total

3.88

3.793.76 3.563.57

60,000

3.47

3.33 3.09

2.93

2.942.94

2.842.832.882.872.85

3.01

2.832.87

3.04

4 00 4.00 3.91

3.54 3.00

40,000

2.00

20,000

1.00

0

0.00

Fig. 6.2

Percent

100,000

Han Population in Tibet (1964–2005)

responsible. “These events in Tibet”, as A. Tom Grunfeld observed, “were triggered by deepening hostilities in the Tibetan-Han relationship, anger at the executions, agitation by visitors (both Western and Tibetan), and the knowledge that the Dalai Lama was at that moment in Washington, D.C”.142 Copies of the Congress June resolution and the Dalai Lama’s pictures were widely circulated in Lhasa.143 Deng Xiaoping’s Development Strategy With Hu Yaobang’s policy failure, the “Lama Secretary”, Wu Jinghua, seemed to be losing control over the situation. The Central Committee of the CCP decided in October 1988 to transfer Hu Jintao (born December 1942), Party secretary of Guizhou since July 1985, to Tibet. Yan Mingfu (born 1931),144 member of the Secretariat of the CCP Central Committee and director of the Central United Front Department at the time, cabled Hu on October 30, 1988, asking him to come to Beijing. Yan then went to Tibet with Hu.145 Officially appointed as Party secretary of Tibet

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in December 1988, Hu went to Lhasa in the same month.146 Unexpectedly, the Tenth Panchen Lama passed away on January 28, 1989 and Tibet was again embroiled in another riot in March 1989. Officially recognized by the KMT government in June 1949 as the 10th incarnation of the Panchen Lama at the age of 11, Lobsang Trinley Lhündrub Chökyi Gyaltsen (February 19, 1938–January 28, 1989) sent a telegraph to Beijing on October 1, 1949, supporting the new government.147 He was invited to visit Beijing from Qinghai in April 1951 to work with the delegation of Tibet from Lhasa on an agreement with the Central Government. In December 1954, he was elected vice chairman of the Second Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. In April 1956, he was made the first vice chairman of the Tibetan Autonomous Region Preparation Commission, along with Tenzin Gyatso as the chairman. After the flight of Tenzin Gyatso in 1959, Chökyi Gyaltsen decided to stay on and was subsequently elected vice chairman of the Second National People’s Congress Standing Committee in April 1959.148 In June 1962, he wrote a long letter to Premier Zhou Enlai about the situation in Tibet and other Tibetan-inhabited areas. Although the letter was received favorably initially, it soon became a liability for Chökyi Gyaltsen in August 1962 when Mao called for class struggles.149 The Panchen Lama’s supporters, Xi Zhongxun (Xi Jinping’s father) and Li Weihan (Li Tieying’s father), were soon dismissed, and Chökyi Gyaltsen was criticized. In December 1964, Chökyi Gyaltsen was dismissed as vice chairman and acting chairman of the Tibetan Autonomous Region Preparation Commission. In January 1965, he failed to be re-elected as vice chairman of the Third NPC Standing Committee. During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), he was first tortured by the red guards and then was imprisoned in 1968 in Beijing (Qincheng Prison).150 Having spent nine years and eight months in prison, Chökyi Gyaltsen was finally released in October 1977, after the arrest of the Gang of Four. Against the tradition of celibacy for Buddhist lamas, the Tenth Panchen Lama married in June 1978 to Li Jie (born 1958), granddaughter of Dong Qiwu (November 27, 1899–March 3, 1989), a general of Jiang Jieshi who defected to the

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CCP in 1949. In 1983, the couple gave birth to a baby girl, Yabshi Pan Rinzinwangmo (who later goes by “Renji”).151 Chökyi Gyaltsen was rehabilitated in July 1979 as vice chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. In the aftermath of a series of riots in Tibet in 1987–88, the Panchen Lama was invited back to Lhasa as the counterbalance to the influence of the Dalai Lama. Yet he unexpectedly passed away in January 1989. Chökyi Gyaltsen had suffered in the hands of the CCP in his life but died a glorious man. In 1984, the central government allocated 7.8 million yuan, 108.5 kilograms of gold, 2,000 kilograms of silver, 665 kilograms of mercury, 563.75 kilograms of copper, 1,099 cubic meters of timber, 116.8 tons of steel, and lots of jewelry to build a combined stupa-tomb for the Fifth through Ninth Panchen Lamas at Tashilhunpo Monastery in Shigatse.152 After the Tenth Panchen Lama died in January 1989, Beijing built a grander stupa-tomb for him with a total investment of 6.6 million yuan. Covered by 614 kilograms (1,354 pounds) gold, 868 precious stones, and 246,794 jewels, the stupa-tomb (Songshinajie) is the most splendid and expensive mausoleum in China since the 1950s.153 Beijing finally made a fundamental shift in its policy toward Tibet. The new policy in Tibet, as Hu Jintao explained in his speech on December 18, 1989, consisted of two components: The CCP would stage an anti-separatist struggle on the one hand and promote economic development on the other.154 Under this new policy, Beijing was no longer tolerant of the Dalai Lama’s influence. Instead of a religious leader who would be welcomed back on favorable terms, the Dalai Lama was portrayed as the head of a separatist clique — the Dalai Clique; instead of a benign influence, the Dalai Lama’s image was regarded as a symbol of Tibet separatist forces. Under the mantra of “development is the fundamental truth”, Beijing poured enormous resources into the economic and social development of Tibet. In addition to 43 major projects (with a total investment of 480 million yuan) that Hu Yaobang promised in 1984, the central government decided in 1994 to support another 62 major projects (with a total projected investment of 2,380 million yuan and the actual investment of 3,670 million yuan by the end of 1997)

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in Tibet.155 By 1997, the central government had invested more than 300 million yuan and rebuilt 1,787 monasteries in Tibet. 156 Moreover, the central government has provided substantial subsidies to the government of Tibet Autonomous Region over the years. In 1952, the total expenditure of Tibet was 9.7 million yuan and the central subsidies were 10.5 million yuan, 7.8 percent more than the expenditure. In 1959, the central subsidies (111.1 million yuan) exceeded the local expenditure (70.1 million yuan) by 58.5 percent. The central subsidies expanded from 118.1 million yuan in 1965 (when the Tibet Autonomous Region was established) to 601 million yuan in 1980 and skyrocketed to 20,078.6 million yuan in 2006 (Figure 6.3).157 The central subsidies in the past three decades were more than 58 percent of the local gross product on average, ranging between 44 percent (in 1992) and 81 percent (in 2002). The central subsidies in 2006 exceed the local gross product of 2003 by 1,569,600 yuan. 158 In the meantime, Beijing also built a railway linking Tibet with the rest of China. The first section of the Qing–Zang (Qinghai to Tibet) Railway, which connected Xining and Golmud (815 km), was 2,500,000

2,007,860 2,000,000

1,915,340

10,000 yuan

1,500,000

1,000,000

635,957 500,000 313,440

1,047

11,112

11,805

18,345

29,179

60,104

1952

1959

1965

1970

1975

1980

105,772

123,715

1985

1989

0

Fig. 6.3

1995

2000

Central Subsidies to Tibet (1952–2006)

2005

2006

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completed in 1984, and the second section of the railway between Golmud and Lhasa (1,142 km) was completed in October 2005 at the cost of 3.68 billion yuan. The train service was inaugurated by President Hu Jintao on July 1, 2006.159 Jiang Zemin’s Patriotic Education Campaign In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, Beijing did not completely give up on the Fourteenth Dalai Lama. Beijing sent an invitation to the Dalai Lama for the funeral of the Tenth Panchen Lama and held discussions with his personal representatives. Yet by 1995, Beijing lost patience with him over the search for the Eleventh Panchen Lama and began a patriotic education campaign in the TAR. After the Tenth Panchen Lama passed away on January 28, 1989, the Buddhist Association of China sent a letter of invitation to the Dalai Lama, inviting him to attend the funeral of the Tenth Panchen Lama. President Zhao Puchu (1907–2000) of the Association delivered the letter to the Dalai Lama’s personal representative.160 But the Dalai Lama refused the invitation.161 He missed a major opportunity for direct contact. Less than three months later, on March 5, 1989, Lhasa was embroiled in another major upheaval.162 Following the Tiananmen Incident in June 1989, the Dalai Lama was unexpectedly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in October 1989 “first and foremost for his consistent resistance to the use of violence in his people’s struggle to regain their liberty”.163 Contrary to the testimony of CIA agents who were personally involved in the “secret war” in Tibet and the Dalai Lama’s own description in his autobiography, Egil Aarvik, chairman of the Norwegian Nobel Committee, described the community of Tibetans in exile as “assuredly the first and only one that has not set up any militant liberation movement” and compared the Dalai Lama favorably with Mahatma Gandhi, one of this century’s greatest protagonists of peace.164 There seems to have been a mismatch between the Nobel Peace Prize and the Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lama received the prize not because of the Tibet issue but because of the Tiananmen Incident.

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“People close to the Nobel Peace Prize selection process say”, according to a New York Times article published on October 13, 1989, that the Dalai Lama, the exiled Tibetan leader, gained the advantage over other candidates, including President Mikhail S. Gorbachev of the Soviet Union, largely because of the brutal suppression of the democracy movement in China and the international outrage that followed.165

Obviously, the Dalai Lama had nothing to do with student demonstrations in Beijing and it is strange that he was awarded the prize on behalf of student demonstrators. A student demonstrator commented that the victims of the June fourth would have never dreamed that in return for their blood was a Nobel Peace Prize to the Dalai Lama and that had they been alive, they would have opposed Tibet independence.166 The Central Government of the People’s Republic of China met with the Dalai Lama’s personal representatives twice, in 1992 and 1993. The Dalai Lama’s brother, Gyalo Thondup, visited Beijing in April 1992, and his personal representative (Tashi Wangdi) continued talks with the Chinese Ambassador in New Delhi in September of the same year.167 During these meetings, Beijing agreed to allow his personal representatives to return to China. Yet the Dalai Lama unilaterally terminated the contact because of the “rigid attitude” of the Chinese government.168 It is on the issue of the search for the Eleventh Panchen Lama that Beijing lost patience with the Dalai Lama. On August 19, 1989, Beijing announced a plan to search for the new Panchen Lama by traditional procedures.169 Most significantly, the procedures include the use of the lottery system whereby the finalist is to be selected out of three semi-finalists whose names are inserted into a golden urn — a practice introduced by Emperor Qianlong in 1793. Clearly, Beijing intended to use the practice to assert its authority on this important religious/political appointment.170 On March 21, 1991, the Dalai Lama informed Beijing through the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi of his intention to get involved in the search. He wished to send a delegation of high lamas to assist in

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the search. But Beijing declined his offer in June 1991. In July 1993, Chadrel Rinpoche, the head of the search team171 and the abbot of the Tashilhunpo Monastery, sent through Gyalo Thondup the Dalai Lama a letter describing the progress of the search. The Dalai Lama invited Chatral Rinpoche to visit India to discuss the search in his reply in August 1993 but received no response in the next two years.172 Yet on May 14, 1995, probably based on information provided by Chadrel Rinpoche, the Dalai Lama unilaterally declared the discovery of the reincarnation of the Eleventh Panchen Lama, a sixyear-old boy, Gedhun Choekyi Nyima (born April 25, 1989).173 Beijing denounced the Dalai Lama’s action and had Chadrel Rinpoche arrested on the charge of treason. Beijing proceeded with the drawing of lots from a golden urn and announced the choice of Gyancain Norbu (born February 13, 1990) as the Eleventh Panchen Lama in November 1995.174 “The Dalai Lama”, as Li Ruihuan (born September 1934), chairman of the Chinese National People’s Political Consultative Conference (CNPPCC) from 1993 to 2003, remarked in November 1995, “is the chief of the Tibet separatist clique, a loyal tool of international anti-China forces, the ultimate source of social disorder in Tibet, and the most serious obstacle to establishing a normal order of Tibetan Buddhism”.175 Beijing began in June 1996 to stage a “patriotism education campaign” to clean up Tibetan monasteries over a period of four years.176 For Beijing, the Dalai Lama had been using monasteries to instigate separatist activities through four measures: (1) through the approval of reincarnations of lamas; (2) through teachings to visiting lamas in India; (3) through organizing pro-independence groups; and (4) through radios and separatist propaganda materials.177 Under the leadership of Party Secretary Chen Kuiyuan (born January 1941) of the TAR, a leading group on patriotic education was formed. The group was led by Deputy Secretary Tenzin and Deputy Secretary Legqog (born October 1944) and composed of eight provincial-level cadres and 58 prefectural-level officials. Its goal was to clean up 150 monasteries within four years.178 The group decided to start with three major monasteries of Gelugpa Buddhism in Lhasa — the Sera, Gandan, and Drepung

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monasteries — because they had been the origins of the riots since 1987. The Drepung Monastery is the largest of the three. Located in the western suburb of Lhasa, the monastery used to be the seat of the Dalai Lama. The monks from the Drepung Monastery were the ones who started the riot on September 27, 1987. The Sera and Gandan monasteries also played similar roles in the upheavals in Lhasa. The leading group on patriotic education sent work teams to the monasteries to: (1) terminate the influence of the Dalai Clique and eliminate illegitimate monks; (2) strengthen the management of the monasteries by appointing those monks who are patriotic and enjoy good reputation; (3) establish regulations and institutions to protect normal religious activities; and (4) help monks to see through the tricks of the separatist clique and to take the patriotic stand.179 In the meantime, the Tibetan Autonomous Region Party Committee decided to conduct a patriotic education campaign in the whole region. According to Chen Kuiyuan, the main battleground with the Dalai Clique lies in the spiritual domain. The Dalai Clique had been overthrown politically, and its economic privileges had also been deprived. Yet its influence in the spiritual domain still lingered on. “If we retreat from the spiritual domain”, he said, “that is equivalent to the retreat from the main battleground in our fight with the Dalai Clique; if we allow the Dalai any room in the spiritual domain, we will inevitably lose ground in politics”.180 In the fight with the Dalai Lama, he continued, one has to take off his religious cover and expose his true color. There were four main goals in the campaign. First, Party members and government officials should not only draw a line with the Dalai Lama but also refrain from participating in any religious activities. Party officials should not hang the picture of the Dalai Lama at home. Retired officials should not go to India for the Dalai Lama’s teachings; nor should they send their children to study at the Dalai Lama’s schools. Second, in the education campaign, the Dalai Lama should be named as “the chief of the Tibet separatist clique, a loyal tool of international anti-China forces, the ultimate source of social disorder in Tibet, and the most serious obstacle to establishing a normal order of Tibetan Buddhism”. Third, in schools, students should

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receive atheist education. They should learn to love the country before their love for the religion. Since Tibet is part of China, loving Tibet is consistent with the loving of the motherland. Fourth, efforts should be made to step up the external propaganda work so as to let the world fully know the history and current reality of Tibet.181 BEIJING’S TIBET POLICY UNDER HU JINTAO For Beijing, there is no such a thing as the “Tibet issue”. No country in the world has ever questioned the sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China over Tibet in the past five decades, and the Chinese government is guilty of neither “genocide” nor “cultural genocide”. Yet the Western media sided with the Dalai Lama, and some Western leaders threatened to boycott the Beijing Olympics if Beijing would not talk to the Tibetan leader. It has been a great challenge for the Chinese leadership. Hu Jintao and Tibet As mentioned earlier, President and General Secretary Hu Jintao was Party secretary of Tibet from 1988 to 1992. He was directly involved in managing Tibetan affairs. In the aftermath of a series of upheavals in Tibet, the Panchen Lama was invited back to Lhasa as the counterbalance to the influence of the Dalai Lama. His sudden death was illtimed, and another upheaval soon broke out on March 5, 1989. Two days later, Premier Li Peng issued the marshal law for Lhasa, effective on March 8, 1989.182 Hu Jintao reportedly appeared on the street of Lhasa with a helmet on his head along with the armed forces to demonstrate his determination to deal with Tibet separatist forces.183 In October 1989, the reconstituted Politburo Standing Committee held a special meeting on Tibet affairs (where Hu Jintao made a report), producing a document “Meeting Minutes of the Politburo Standing Committee on Tibet Affairs”. 184 This document marked a departure from the policies of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang.185 Tibet’s central task, according to the document, is to control the situation and develop the economy. The top priority for Tibet

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is to maintain social stability. The riots in Lhasa, it argues, should not be simply regarded as a consequence of the “left” policies. There are both internal and external causes for the riots. Imperialist and separatist forces joined hands to split China, attempting to overthrow the rule of the Chinese Communist Party and Chinese socialist system. The foundation of social stability, however, is economic development. Hu Jintao subsequently relayed the message at the Eighth Plenum of the Third Communist Committee of the Tibetan Autonomous Region in December 1989. Hu Jintao later fell ill in January 1991 and went to Beijing for treatment.186 In January 1992, Chen Kuiyuan, vice chairman of Inner Mongolia, was transferred to Tibet to be deputy secretary in charge of the Party affairs on behalf of Hu Jintao. Hu officially left Tibet in October 1992.187 On October 19, 1992, Hu Jintao appeared as a new member of the Politburo Standing Committee, along with Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, Qiao Shi, Li Ruihuan, Zhu Rongji, and Liu Huaqing. According to Gao Xin, Hu Jintao had been a candidate for the position of Central Organization Department director. But Deng Xiaoping wanted to have a younger member in the Politburo Standing Committee, and under the recommendation of Song Ping, Hu was installed as the youngest member of the Politburo Standing Committee at the age of 49.188 One story speaks directly to the connection between Hu’s Tibet experience and Deng’s endorsement. According to Gyalo Thondup, the Dalai Lama’s second-eldest brother, he met with Hu Jintao sometime in the late 1980s. He asked a lot of very specific questions, and Hu gave him all the answers. To his amazement, Hu could even tell him the number of wild dogs running on the streets of Lhasa. To his complaint about the lack of sufficient public toilets, Hu explained that the government in fact had built many public toilets in Lhasa, but Tibetans did not want to use them. Hu also told him that he helped issue 1,500 special permits on carrier tricycles to Tibetans but Tibetans either sold them out or rent them to Han. After a two-hour talk, Gyalo Thondup was impressed. “He is very good, very modest, and very practical”, Gyalo Thondup remarked. When Deng Xiaoping

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asked him about his impression of Hu, Gyalo Thondup said, “China would have fewer problems if you had a few more Hu Jintaos”.189 Six Rounds of Talks Between September 2002 and July 2007, Beijing conducted six rounds of talks with the Dalai Lama’s representatives. This was another significant shift. The central leadership went through a major reshuffle during this period. Hu Jintao replaced Jiang Zemin as general secretary of the Party in October 2002, as president of China in March 2003, and as chairman of the Central Military Commission in September 2004. Jia Qinglin became chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) in March 2003 instead of Li Ruihuan. Liu Yandong became director of the Central United Front Department in October 2002 instead of Wang Zhaoguo. Since Jia was not familiar with Tibet affairs, it is unlikely that he played any significant role in these talks. Hu was probably in charge of the whole process, with specific talks delegated to Liu Yandong and Zhu Weiqun. In September 2002, three representatives of the Central Government (NPC Standing Committee Vice Chairman Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme, Central United Front Department Director Wang Zhaoguo, and Deputy Director Li Dezhu) and four envoys of the Dalai Lama (Lodi Gyaltsen Gyari, Kelsang Gyaltsen, Sonam Norbu Dagpo,190 and Bhuchung K. Tsering191) toured Beijing, Lhasa, Nyingchi, Shigatse, Chengdu, and Shanghai. The two groups met again in May–June 2003. On the Central Government side, the representatives were Central United Front Department Director Liu Yandong and Deputy Director Zhu Weiqun; on the Dalai side, these were the same people. The two groups visited Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Yunnan. The first two meetings were considered exploratory. In September 2004, the two groups of the same composition met again in Guangdong, Hubei, and Sichuan. Both sides began to discuss some issues. The fourth meeting took place at the Chinese

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embassy in Switzerland from June 30 to July 1, 2005.192 The representatives of the Central Government were Deputy Director Zhu Weiqun, No. 7 Bureau Chief Sitar, and four other staff of the Central United Front Department. In addition to the four envoys (Lodi Gyaltsen Gyari, Kelsang Gyaltsen, Sonam Norbu Dagpo, and Bhuchung K. Tsering), the Dalai Lama also sent his representative to Taipei, Tsegyam Ngaba.193 The fifth meeting took place in Guangxi between Deputy Director Zhu Weiqun and the four usual envoys of the Dalai Lama. It is reported that they discussed substantial issues for one day, during the period of February 15 to 23, 2006. The sixth meeting was held in Shanghai and Nanjing between Deputy Director Zhu Weiqun and the four usual envoys of the Dalai Lama from June 29 to July 5, 2007. According to Lodi Gyaltsen Gyari, the talk came to a critical stage but the two sides remained divided over a number of issues.194 March 14 Riots in Lhasa and Gannan On March 14, 2008, a group of Tibetans started a riot in Lhasa, the capital of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). According to Xinhua News Agency, rioters burned down schools, hospitals, banks, restaurants, office buildings, and residential houses; set fire on police cars and civilian vehicles; and attacked ordinary people and officers and men of the armed police and security forces.195 In the riot, 18 innocent people were killed and 382 wounded; one policeman was murdered and 23 others were seriously wounded; more than 30 office buildings and more than 100 houses were destroyed; more than 420 businesses were burned down; and more than 80 police cars and civilian vehicles were destroyed.196 On the same day, rioters in the Gannan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture of Gansu Province also attacked police officers and ordinary people and destroyed government offices and stores.197 Ninety-four people including 64 police officers and 27 armed police officers were wounded; 105 offices of municipal and county governments, units under 113 townships and towns, 22 village committees, 14 village entertainment centers, and 464 state-owned and private

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enterprises were affected, with the total damage worth 227.3 million yuan (US$32.5 million).198 The mastermind of these riots, according to Qiangba Puncog, chairman of the Tibetan Autonomous Region, is the Dalai Clique.199 According to a Tibetan eyewitness, the turbulence had started a few days earlier, on March 10, 2008, the 49th anniversary of the 1959 Revolt. At 4:00pm, about 300 monks from the Drepung Monastery began demonstrating, shouting slogans of religious freedom and halting the population transfer of Han people to Tibet. They marched to the Customs at Lhasa and were blocked by the armed police. They were beaten and forced to go back to the Monastery at 2:00am next morning. At 6:00pm on March 11, dozens of monks from the Sera Monastery started demonstration, shouting slogans and waving the snow lion flag (the flag of Tibet). They were all arrested and sent away. After their request for releasing the Sera Monastery monks was refused, the monks from the Jokhang Temple (the first Buddhist temple in Tibet) began a hunger strike. In the next three days, major monasteries in Lhasa were surrounded by the armed police. The riot began at noon on March 14 when monks from the Ramoche Temple (the most important temple in Lhasa after the Jokhang Temple) overthrew a police car outside of the temple, resulting in a clash with the armed police in plainclothes. Tibetans then attacked stores owned by Han people. There were no massive clashes between Tibetans and the armed police during the day.200 According to foreign tourists from many countries such as Switzerland, Canada, New Zealand, and Germany in Lhasa at the time, Tibetan rioters were indeed brutal. They attacked Han with fists, rocks, and metal bars. They witnessed the murder of at least one Han male by Tibetans. The man was dragged off his motorcycle and beaten to death. They also saw that the Tibetan rioters came with boxes of rocks.201 The March 2008 riots in Tibet presented a dilemma for Beijing. If the local authorities did not intervene, rioters would destroy more schools, hospitals, banks, restaurants, office buildings, and residential houses and further attack civilians and security forces. If the local authorities were authorized to crack down on these rioters, human

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rights groups, Tibet separatist forces, and international media would criticize the Chinese government for “appalling” human rights violations. Indeed, Beijing has been caught in a series of dilemmas over Tibet at least since the 1950s. In 1959, as A. Tom Grunfeld recorded, China’s charges about external aid to the Tibetan rebels were “rebuffed out of hand”. The Economist, among others, rejected China’s charges by stating that “Nobody, either in committed or uncommitted countries, would be taken in by the communist allegations that...the rebellion was supported by ‘imperialists, the Chiang Kai-shek bands and foreign reactionaries’”.202 Yet the international press swiftly supported the Dalai Lama’s claims that the Tibetans in exile never received any external help and used the Dalai’s version of the story as evidence against the “red terror” in Tibet. “The worldwide rejection of these charges”, Grunfeld observed, “did a disservice to the cause of the Tibetan refugees by making the eventual acknowledgement of aid all the more difficult and embarrassing”.203 In 2008, very much like in 1959, the international media did not hesitate to criticize Beijing for its “brutality” against Tibetans in Tibet. Quite a few Western news agencies used erroneous pictures as evidence against Beijing. Some used a picture of Nepalese police against Tibetan demonstrators in Nepal as the evidence of Chinese police’s brutality against Tibetan demonstrators in Tibet; a photo of an ambulance as the evidence of “heavy military presence in Lhasa”; a picture of a Han Chinese being rescued by police as the evidence of an “insurrectionist taken away by police”; and even edited out rioters attacking a military vehicle from a picture to show the military vehicle alone.204 Yet few seriously investigated Beijing’s charges that these riots were instigated by the “Dalai Clique”, in particular the Tibet Youth Congress (TYC) and other Tibet separatist organizations that were financed by US and other Western sponsors.205 The Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Youth Congress Part of the reasons that the Dalai Lama appeared to be double-faced in the eyes of the Chinese government is his affinity to the TYC,

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“a worldwide Organization of Tibetans united in our common struggle for the restoration of complete independence for the whole of Tibet”.206 According to the website of the TYC, the Dalai Lama supported this organization from the very beginning. He delivered the inaugural address on October 7, 1970 when the TYC was founded; and a member of the TYC would “dedicate oneself to the task of serving one’s country and people under the guidance of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, the Spiritual and Temporal Ruler of Tibet”.207 While the Dalai Lama appears to be pursuing a peaceful middle path for Tibet’s autonomy, the TYC is determined to “struggle for the total independence of Tibet even at the cost of one’s life”.208 Headquartered in Dharamsala, India, the TYC has 81 regional branches in India, Nepal, Bhutan, Norway, Canada, France, Japan, Taiwan, Australia, and the United States of America. It claims to have more than 30,000 members worldwide.209 The TYC has been responsible for a series of violent riots and destructions since 1985.210 For TYC members, there is no contradiction between the Dalai Lama’s peaceful approach and their violent approach. They are simply two sides of the same coin. According to Tendzin Choegyal (born 1946),211 the Dalai Lama’s younger brother, “the Dalai Lama is playing a red face by taking the pacifist’s path...but the only way we could put on pressure is to use violence and the Dalai Lama should be kept out of violence”.212 TYC members should use terrorist activities, he further indicated, because “Terrorist activities could attain the biggest effect at the lowest cost”.213 It seems that the Dalai Lama has played his part very well. On the one hand, he publicly maintained his distance from the TYC and its activities. He openly declared in the aftermath of riots in the Tibet Autonomous Region and Gansu that he would “completely resign” if violence committed by Tibetans in his homeland spirals out of control. On the other hand, he later on publicly denied his own statement. On March 18, 2008, four days after the riots broke out in Tibet and Gannan, the Dalai Lama threatened to step down as leader of Tibet’s government-in-exile if violence in Tibet worsens. “If things become out of control”, he said in Dharamsala, India, his “only

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option is to completely resign”. 214 On April 14, 2008, the Dalai Lama reiterated his threat to resign in Seattle, Washington, the United States of America.215 But only ten days later, on April 24, 2008, the Dalai Lama openly denied that he ever made a statement about his resignation. To answer a question about his relationship with the TYC and his statement of resignation if the TYC continues to resort to violence, the Dalai Lama said at a press conference in New York, “First of all, I have never said anything about resignation”.216 According to the website of National Endowment for Democracy (NED) — the successor organization to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States of America in “the battle of ideas at international forums”, the NED funded 11 organizations of Tibet separatist forces with a total of US$293,000 in 2006 alone.217 Interestingly, the TYC is not one of them (Table 6.5). Informing Foreign Leaders Apparently, foreign leaders were not all well-informed about the real nature of Tibet riots. On March 26, 2008, President Hu Jintao talked Table 6.5 Funding for Tibet Projects from National Endowment for Democracy (2006) China (Tibet) Gu-Chu-Sum Movement of Tibet International Campaign for Tibet Khawa Karpo Tibet Cultural Centre Charitable Trust Longsho Youth Movement of Tibet Tibet Museum Tibetan Literacy Society Tibetan Parliamentary and Policy Research Centre Tibetan Review Tibetan Women’s Association Tibetan Writers Abroad PEN Center Voice of Tibet Total

US$ 40,000 53,000 20,000 15,000 15,500 28,500 20,000 26,000 30,000 10,000 35,000 293,000

Source: http://www.ned.org/grants/06programs/grants-asia06.html#chinaTibet.

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to President George W. Bush of the United States over the phone on a number of issues including Tibet. On the riots in Lhasa, Hu told Bush that the incidents were by no means “peaceful demonstrations” or “non-violent” actions as claimed by the Dalai Clique but sheer criminal offenses. No responsible government would sit idle for such crimes that gravely encroached human rights, severely disrupted social order, and seriously jeopardized the life and property of the masses. The Chinese government’s policy toward the Dalai Lama, according to Hu, is clear and consistent. “We have kept in touch with his side all along with great patience”, he said. “We are willing to continue contact and consultation with the Dalai Lama, as long as he truly abandons advocating ‘Tibet independence’, stops activities aimed at splitting the motherland (in particular activities to instigate and mastermind violent crimes in Tibet as well as in some other regions and to sabotage the upcoming Beijing Olympic Games), and accepts that Tibet and Taiwan are inalienable parts of China”.218 One day after the torch relay disruption in Paris,219 Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd delivered a blunt message to China in a speech in Beijing on April 9, 2008. “Australia, like most other countries, recognizes China’s sovereignty over Tibet”, he told students at Peking University on the first day of his visit to China, “but we also believe it is necessary to recognize there are significant human rights problems in Tibet”.220 He suggested that both sides find a solution through dialogue. During his meeting with Kevin Rudd in Sanya, Hainan Province on April 12, 2008, Hu told Rudd that incidents in Lhasa, Tibet and some other places were not “peaceful demonstrations” or “nonviolent” actions but sheer violent crimes. No responsible government would sit idle for such crimes that have gravely encroached human rights, severely disrupted social order, and seriously jeopardized the life and property of the masses. He pointed out that affairs in Tibet are entirely internal affairs of China. “Our conflict with the Dalai clique”, he said, “is not an ethnic problem, a religious problem, or a human rights problem. It is a problem either to safeguard national unification or to split the motherland”. Hu stressed that the door for dialogue between the central government and the Dalai Lama is

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open. “The barrier to contacts and talks does not lie on our side”, he indicated, “but on the side of the Dalai Lama”. If the Dalai Lama has sincerity, he should put it into action. “As long as the Dalai side stops activities splitting the motherland, stops activities scheming and instigating violence, and stops activities sabotaging the Beijing Olympic Games”, he said, “we are ready to continue contacts and talks with him at any time”.221 According to the report published in the People’s Daily, Kevin Rudd stressed that Australia fully recognizes China’s sovereignty over Tibet and Taiwan; that the one-China policy adopted by Australia remains unchanged. Australia hopes to become a sincere friend of China; and it is a long-term strategy of Australia to develop longterm, friendly, and cooperative ties with China. He also wished the Beijing Olympics a success.222 New Talks Soon, Beijing delivered its promises. Less than two weeks after Hu Jintao’s meeting with Kevin Rudd, Xinhua News Agency sent out a news release on April 25, 2008 on the forthcoming talks with the Dalai’s private representatives. Considering that the Dalai side had repeatedly requested the resumption of talks, the news reported, relevant agencies of the central government were preparing contacts and talks with private representatives of the Dalai Lama in a few days. The central government’s policy toward the Dalai Lama has been consistent, and the door for dialogue has been open. The government hopes that through contacts and consultations, the Dalai side will take actions to stop activities splitting the motherland, stop activities scheming and instigating violence, and stop activities sabotaging the Beijing Olympic Games, so as to create a favorable environment for future talks.223 On May 4, 2008, the two sides met in Shenzhen, Guangdong for the first time since the March riots. The central government was represented by Zhu Weiqun and Sitar, and the Dalai Lama was represented by Lodi Gyaltsen Gyari and Kelsang Gyaltsen. A native of Jianhu, Jiangsu, Zhu Weiqun (born 1947) actually grew up in

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Beijing. He studied at Jingshan School from 1960 to 1965 and enrolled at the Renmin University of China from 1965 to 1970. He was a reporter in the 1980s and began to work for the Central United Front Department in the 1990s. He was made deputy director in February 1999 and the executive deputy director (with a ministerial rank) in January 2006.224 He was a member of the Sixteenth Central Disciplinary Inspection Commission and is a member of the Seventeenth Central Committee of the CCP. This was his sixth time to meet with the Dalai Lama’s envoys. He has been the key figure in the talks on behalf of the central government since 2005. Sitar (born 1953) was born in Dege County, Xikang Province.225 His ancestors had been serfs for generations. Upon graduation from Kangding Normal School in 1968, Sitar worked as an elementary school teacher. He later served as deputy Party secretary of a commune. Through a national entrance exam, he was enrolled in the Department of Political Science in the Central Nationalities University in 1978. He was president of the Student Union of the Political Science Department and was retained as a teacher upon graduation in 1982. He began to work in the Central United Front Department of the CCP in July 1984 and was later sent to the Chinese Embassy in India. In 1988, he was transferred to the Chinese Consulate in Zurich, Switzerland. His job then was to work with overseas Tibetans. Sitar went back to the Central United Front Department in 1997. He first worked as deputy head of the No. 2 Bureau (in charge of ethnic and religious affairs) and then was appointed head of the No. 7 Bureau (in charge of Tibetan affairs),226 when the new bureau was established sometime before June 2005. Sitar was promoted to deputy director of the Central United Front Department in August 2006.227 Lodi Gyaltsen Gyari (or Lodi G. Gyari) was born in 1949 in Nyarong, also Xikang Province228 (presently Xilong County, Garze Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan Province) where he received a traditional monastic education.229 According to his biography posted on the website of “International Campaign for Tibet”, he and his family fled from Tibet to India in 1959. At the age of 10, it was unlikely that he made the decision of flight alone. It is not clear

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whether his family fled to Tibet from Xikang Province first and then from Tibet to India or from Xikang to India directly. He was later an editor for the Tibetan Freedom Press and founder of the Tibetan Review, the first English language journal published by Tibetans in exile. He was one of the founding members of the Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC) and served as its president in 1975. He was a member of the Assembly of Tibetan People’s Deputies, the Tibetan Parliament in exile, and later became its chairman. He was Deputy Cabinet Minister with responsibilities for the Council for Religious Affairs and the Department of Health. He became Senior Cabinet Minister for the Department of Information and International Relations in 1988. He is the Dalai Lama’s special envoy and the executive chairman of the Board of the International Campaign for Tibet, an independent human rights group based in Washington, D.C. He is married to Dawa Chokyi, and the couple has six children. They live in McLean, Virginia, the United States of America. Interestingly, Kelsang Gyaltsen (born March 7, 1951) was also born in Xikang Province. His hometown is Rasi, Batang, on the border with Tibetan Autonomous Region. His parents are Kelsang Lekden and Tselha. The family arrived in India in March/April 1959, when Kelsang Gyaltsen was eight years old. After basic schooling in India, he was sent to Switzerland in May 1963. Between 1963 and 1973, he went through primary school in Unterwasser, Toggenburg, secondary school and boarding school in Walterswil, Baar, and commercial and administrative apprenticeship in Feller AG, Horgen. He received one-year training in English language at Cambridge from 1974 to 1975 and served as a member of Junior Cadre of UBS Zurich, Switzerland from 1975 to 1983. After a brief service in Dharamsala, India, he was appointed the Dalai Lama’s representative at the Office of Tibet in Switzerland for Middle and South Europe in 1985. He was promoted to political secretary of the Dalai Lama in 1992 and was made his envoy to the European Union in 1999. He was appointed the Dalai Lama’s envoy for Europe in March 2008.230 He participated in all meetings with the representatives of the central government of the People’s Republic of China between 2002 and 2007.

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During the meeting, Zhu Weiqun and Sitar condemned the rioters and justified the local government’s actions against them. They also reiterated the central government’s policy toward the Dalai Lama and urged the Dalai side to take credible moves to stop activities aimed at splitting China, stop plotting and inciting violence, and stop disrupting and sabotaging the Beijing Olympic Games.231 Lodi Gyaltsen Gyari and Kelsang Gyaltsen expressed their views on relevant matters and said they would report the meeting faithfully to the Dalai Lama. Zhu and Sitar “patiently” answer their questions and exchanged views with them regarding future contacts and consultations. The two sides agreed to meet again at an appropriate time in the future. Lodi and Kelsang seemed to be happy about the meeting. “(Zhu and Sitar) are people that Kelsang and I have (known) for many years”, Lodi told reporters, “so we have a good rapport, that was always very helpful”.232 In a statement released after briefing the Dalai Lama, Special Envoy Lodi Gyari expressed their appreciation to the hosts for “accepting our suggestion to hold this informal meeting in Shenzhen as well as agreeing to a meeting of principals without aides”.233 The two sides, according to Lodi, held open and frank discussions in a friendly and respectful atmosphere, despite the prevailing tense and grave situation in Tibet. CONCLUDING REMARKS On the heels of a natural disaster as a result of unprecedented snowstorms in South China in the history of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese leadership faced a human disaster as a result of the largest riots in Tibet and other Tibetan areas since 1959. There is a consensus between Beijing and the 14th Dalai Lama that Tibet is a part of China. But the two sides differ on the meaning of Tibet. For Beijing, Tibet is the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR). For the Dalai Lama, in addition to the TAR, Tibet also includes other Tibetan areas in Qinghai, Sichuan, Gansu, and Yunnan. Currently, Tibetans reside mostly in one provincial-level autonomous region, 10 autonomous prefectures, and two autonomous counties.

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The TAR, i.e., “the political Tibet”, is an administrative unit; and Tibetan areas, i.e., “the ethnic Tibet”, currently do not constitute a single administrative unit. Historically, Tibet has been part of China since 1279 when the Yuan Empire became a Chinese dynasty. In the period of 670 years, the political regimes of different dynasties ruled Tibet through different institutions and personalities. During the Yuan Dynasty, the Mongols managed Tibetan affairs through Tibetans. They established Zongzhi Yuan (General Council) in 1264 and appointed a Tibetan state tutor as the head of the office. Under the office, there were three military commands responsible for three areas of Tibet. The Mongols also divided Tibet into 13 administrative areas known as “myriarchies” (10,000 households) and appointed Tibetans to manage them. During the Ming Dynasty, the central government established three commanderies to manage Tibetan affairs. It appointed local officials and officers, accepted tributes from Tibet, and developed trade relations (known as tea–horse trade fairs) between Tibet and inland areas. The Qing emperors strengthened China’s control over Tibet through a series of new measures. Emperor Shunzhi used both Tibetans and Mongols to manage Tibetan affairs. He elevated the Dalai Lama, a religious leader of the Gelugpa sect of Tibetan Buddhism, to be a religious leader of Tibet, and Güshi Khan, a Mongol, a political and military leader of Tibet. Emperor Kangxi began the practice of sending Qing officials to Tibet, officially recognized the Panchen Lama as another major religious leader of Tibet, and set up a system of Kalon to manage local officials of Tibet. It was Emperor Kangxi who first used the term, “Xizang”. Emperor Yongzheng started to send resident ministers (ambans and assistant ambans) on a regular basis. The practice continued for 185 years. Emperor Qianlong began the practice of theocracy in Tibet and further strengthened China’s rule over Tibet through new regulations on the authorities of resident ministers and the central approval of the reincarnations of lamas especially the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama. The central government of the Republic of China continued its rule over Tibet by setting up relevant institutions and managing the

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search and approval for the reincarnations of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama. In the eras of Mao Zedong through Jiang Zemin in the history of the People’s Republic of China, different leaders managed Tibetan affairs differently. With a dual strategy of peaceful negotiations and military campaigns, Mao succeeded in a peaceful liberation of Tibet with few casualties. By turning a potentially ethnic issue into an issue of class struggle, Mao further liberated a million serfs at the expenses of their masters, winning the hearts and minds of Tibetans as their savior. Hu Yaobang ended the policy of class struggle in Tibet and introduced liberal policies of religious freedom to Tibet. He transferred Han cadres out of Tibet, incidentally creating frictions between Han and Tibetans. He promoted religious freedom in Tibet by appointing a lama Party secretary. Under these policies, class struggles were replaced by ethnic tensions; and the worship of Chairman Mao and Chairman Hua gave way to the worship of the Dalai Lama. Three riots ensued in 1987 and 1988. With Hu Yaobang’s policy failure, the Chinese government adopted a dual strategy of engaging in an anti-separatist struggle and promoting economic development. Beijing could no longer tolerate the Dalai Lama’s influence, and the central government poured enormous resources into the economic and social development of Tibet. With the death of the Tenth Panchen Lama in January 1989, Lhasa witnessed another major riot in March 1989. Initially, Beijing tried to work with the Dalai Lama. Beijing sent an invitation letter to him for the funeral of the Tenth Panchen Lama and conducted talks with his personal representative. Yet the Dalai Lama unilaterally named the new Panchen Lama without consultation with Beijing in 1995. The Tibetan Autonomous Region Party Committee subsequently organized patriotic campaigns to clean up the influence of the Dalai Lama in monasteries in Tibet in particular and in the region in general. Around the time when Hu Jintao became the top leader in China, Beijing began conciliatory policies. The central government of the People’s Republic of China resumed talks with the Dalai Lama, and the two sides conducted a series of six talks between September 2002 and July 2007.

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On March 14, 2008, the most serious riot in five decades broke out in Lhasa and the Gannan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture of Gansu Province. At least 19 people were killed in Lhasa and more than 400 people were wounded in both Lhasa and Gannan. The riots started by monks from the Ramoche Temple, and Tibetans attacked Han people and burned down Han people’s stores and government offices. Instead of condemning the rioters, however, the Western media criticized Beijing for its “brutality” against Tibetans in Tibet. Quite a few western news agencies used erroneous pictures as evidence against Beijing. The challenge for Beijing in the aftermath of March riots in Tibet and elsewhere in China was two-fold. On the one hand, it was an issue of law and order. The Chinese government had to bring these rioters to justice. On the other hand, it was also an issue of public relations. The Chinese leadership responded to the challenge by adopting a three-pronged strategy. First, the Chinese officers videotaped the riots before bringing the rioters to justice. The recordings were evidence of the violence committed by Tibetan rioters, and they were shown to the world. Second, the Chinese leaders took various opportunities to inform foreign leaders and the international media of the truth about the “Tibet issue”. Third, the Chinese leadership also resumed dialogue with the Dalai Lama’s private representatives. In terms of the law and order, the Chinese government proved to be quite effective. In terms of public relations, the Chinese leadership made some progress. Yet only eight days after the first round of talks between the two sides, another drastic event occurred. The Chinese leadership would face another unexpected challenge. NOTES 1. The literature on Tibet and its related issues is rather extensive. Here is a list of examples in English and Chinese. In English, the examples include Luciano Petech, China and Tibet in the Early 18th Century: History of the Establishment of Chinese Protectorate in Tibet (Leiden: E.J. Brill. Monographies du T’oung Pao Vol. 1, 1950); Melvyn C. Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, 1913–1951 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); and A History of Modern Tibet,

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2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

7. 8. 9. 10.

Volume 2, The Calm Before the Storm: 1951–1955 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007); Tenzin Gyatso, the 14th Dalai Lama, Freedom in Exile: Autobiography of His Holiness the Dalai Lama of Tibet (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1990); A. Tom Grunfeld, The Making of Modern Tibet (revised edition) (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1996); Tsering Shakya, The Dragon in the Land of Snows (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999); Dawa Norbu, China’s Tibet Policy (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2001); Jane Ardley, The Tibetan Independence Movement: Political, Religious and Gandhian Perspectives (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002); John Powers, History as Propaganda: Tibetan Exiles versus the People’s Republic of China (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); Barry Sautman and June Teufel Dreyer, eds., Contemporary Tibet: Politics, Development, and Society in a Disputed Region (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2006); and Warren W. Smith, China’s Tibet? Autonomy or Assimilation (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield , 2008). In Chinese, the examples include Wang Lixiong, Tianzang: Xizang de Mingyun (Sky Burial: The Fate of Tibet) (New York: Mirror Books, 1998); Xu Mingxu, Yinmou yu Qiancheng: Xizang Saoluan de Lailongqumai (Intrigues and Devoutness: The Origin and Development of the Tibet Riots) (New York: Mirror Books, 1999); Chen Qingying, Xizang Lishi (The History of Tibet) (Beijing: Wuzhou Chuanbo Chubanshe, 2002); Zhao Ziqi, Tuobing zhi Lu: Huiwu Dalai Lama ji Jidai qi Fanghua Daibiaotuan Shimuo (The Ice-break Trip: the Meeting with the Dalai Lama and the reception of his delegation to Taiwan) (Taipei: Shjie Ziyou Minzhu Tongmeng Zhonghua Minguo Zonghui, 1993); Dangdai Zhongguo de Xizang (two volumes) (Tibet of Contemporary China) (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo Chubanshe, 1991); and Gyaincain Norbu, Huihuang de Ershishiji Xinzhongguo Dajilu: Xizang Juan (The Glorious Records of New China in the 20th Century: Tibet) (Beijing: Hongqi Chubanshe, 1999). Tenzin Gyatso, the 14th Dalai Lama, Freedom in Exile: Autobiography of His Holiness the Dalai Lama of Tibet (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1990). Tenzin Gyatso, Freedom in Exile, pp. 3–6. http://www.tibet.com/glance.html. In fact, it is a combination of the Tibetan and the Mongolian. “Tubo” For details, see Meng Hong, “Pingxin Jingqi Kan Xinjiang Xizang Shijian” (“Look at the issues of Xinjiang and Tibet calmly”), Zhongguo Bianzheng, 174 (June 2008), pp. 15–16. http://ask.koubei.com/question/1306062304329.html. Dangdai Zhongguo de Xizang (Tibet of Contemporary China) (Volume 2) (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo Chubanshe, 1991), p. 588. Zhongguo Gongchandang Juzhishi Ziliao Appendix 1 (1) (Beijing: Zhonggong Dangshi Chubanshe, 2000), p. 429. Ibid.

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258 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization 11. Qinghai Statistical Yearbook (2008) (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2008), pp. 76, 82. 12. Xu Mingxu, Yinmou yu Qiancheng (Intrigues and Devoutness), pp. 399–402. 13. In other words, the province where Lhamo Thondup (later the 14th Dalai Lama) was born in 1935 was not Amdo but Qinghai. 14. For his letter to the Nanjing government dated June 28, 1938, see Zhao Ziqi, Tuobing zhi Lu (The Ice-Break Trip), pp. 69–74. For a detailed description of the entire search process, see Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, 1913–1951, pp. 314–330. 15. Qinghai Statistical Yearbook (2008) (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2008), p. 47; and http://baike.baidu.com/view/135311.htm. 16. Gansu Yearbook (2008) (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2008), pp. 298–309. 17. Gansu Yearbook (2008) (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2008), pp. 210–212. 18. Yunnan Statistical Yearbook (2008) (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2008), p. 544. 19. Yunnan Statistical Yearbook (2008) (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2008), pp. 3, 62; and http://baike.baidu.com/view/1099770.htm#3. 20. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shangri-La. 21. http://baike.baidu.com/view/22180.htm. 22. Victoria Tin–bor Hui, “How China was Ruled”, The American Interest, Spring (March/April) 2008: pp. 53–65. 23. Ibid., pp. 58–59. 24. Ibid., Table 2, p. 60. 25. Wang Lixiong, Tianzang: Xizang de Mingyun (Sky Burial: The Fate of Tibet) (New York: Mirror Books, 1998), pp. 17–19. 26. For his biographical information, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sakya_ Pandita. 27. Other translations are Gotan or Kodan. 28. See Dawa Norbu, China’s Tibet Policy, in particularly Chapter 4; and China’s White Paper, Tibet: Its Ownership and Human Rights Situation, September 1992, http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/tibet/index.htm. For a detailed study of Tibet under Yuan China, see Jiun Yih Chang, A Study of the Relationship Between the Mongol Yuan Dynasty and the Tibetan Sa-Skya Sect (PhD diss., Indiana University, 1984). The first member of the dissertation committee was Professor Thupten Jigme Norbu, the eldest brother of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama. 29. For a brief description of the Razheng Monastery, see http://baike.baidu. com/view/478840.htm. 30. For Pagba’s biographical information, see http://baike.baidu.com/view/ 58201.htm. 31. For his biographical information, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Drog%C3% B6n_Ch%C3%B6gyal_Phagpa; and http://www.tibetology.ac.cn/lidaimingren/ ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=2517.

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The Tibet Issue 259 32. Dangdai Zhongguo de Xizang (Tibet of Contemporary China) Vol. 1 (Beijing: Dongdai Zhongguo Chubanshe, 1991), pp. 40–41. 33. Chen Qingying, Xizang Lishi (The History of Tibet), pp. 30–31. 34. The Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “Fifty Years of Democratic Reform in Tibet”, March 2, 2009, http://www. china.org.cn/government/news/2009-03/02/content_17359029_6.htm. 35. The Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “Tibet — Its Ownership and Human Rights Situation”, September 21, 1992, http://www.seac.gov.cn/gjmw/zt/2009-02-24/123541560247-1395.htm (its English translation, http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/tibet/ index.htm). 36. Wang Lixiong, Tianzang (Sky Burial), pp. 31–54. 37. Wang Lixiong, Tianzang (Sky Burial), pp. 17–19. 38. The office was renamed after the Xuanzheng Palace of the Tang Dynasty because that was the place where the Tang emperor had met with visitors from the Kingdom of Tubo. http://wenda.tianya.cn/wenda/thread?tid= 4a04baef20cc65a5&clk=wttpcts. 39. Chen Qingying, Xizang Lishi (The History of Tibet), pp. 34–35. 40. For the image of the seal, see http://zt.tibet.cn/english/zt/forum/..%5 Cforum/200402004518130052.htm. 41. http://ask.koubei.com/question/1306112414941.html. 42. http://ask.koubei.com/question/1306062304329.html. 43. http://ask.koubei.com/question/1306062304329.html. 44. Chen Qingying, Xizang Lishi (The History of Tibet), p. 31. 45. For details on the Monastry, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sakya_ Monastery. 46. Chen Qingying, Xizang Lishi (The History of Tibet), pp. 34–35. 47. For details on the rise of Phagdru Kagyu, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Kagyu#Phagdru_Kagyu. 48. Chen Qingying, Xizang Lishi (The History of Tibet), pp. 43–58. 49. For Güshi Khan’s biographical information, see http://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/G%C3%BCshi_Khan. One source says that he died in 1654 instead of 1655. See Chen Qingying, Xizang Lishi (The History of Tibet), p. 61. 50. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dalai_Lama#cite_ref-2. 51. Meng Hong, “Pingxin Jingqi Kan Xinjiang Xizang Shijian” (“Look at the issues of Xinjiang and Tibet calmly”), Zhongguo Bianzheng, 174 (June 2008), pp. 18–19. 52. Tenzin Gyatso, Freedom in Exile, p. 1. 53. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/5th_Dalai_Lama#cite_ref-14. 54. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lobsang_Ch%C3%B6kyi_Gyalsten. 55. http://www.hudong.com/wiki/%E7%BD%97%E6%A1%91%E5%8D%B4% E5%90%89%E5%9D%9A%E8%B5%9E.

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260 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization 56. He is the only Mongolian Dalai Lama. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 4th_Dalai_Lama. 57. http://www.hudong.com/wiki/%E7%BD%97%E6%A1%91%E5%8D%B4% E5%90%89%E5%9D%9A%E8%B5%9E. 58. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panchen_Lama. 59. Ma Lianlong, Libei Dalai Lama Yu Zhangyang Zhengfu Guanxi (Relations of Successive Dalai Lamas to the Central Government of China) (Xining: Qinghai Renmin Chubanshe, 2008), pp. 128–137. 60. Ma Lianlong, Libei Dalai Lama Yu Zhangyang Zhengfu Guanxi (Relations of Successive Dalai Lamas to the Central Government of China) (Xining: Qinghai Renmin Chubanshe, 2008), p. 14. For the complete list, see Xiao Jinsong, Qingdai Zhuzang Dachen (Ambans and Assistant Ambans in Tibet) (Taipei: Mengzang Wuyuanhui, 1996), pp. 252–297; Wu Fengpei and Zeng Guoqing, Qingchao Zhuzang Dachen Zhidu de Jianli yu Yange (Chronicles of the System of Ambans and Assistant Ambans in Tibet) (Beijing: Zhongguo Zangxue Chubanshe, 1989), pp. 111–171; Wang Yao and Chen Qingying, Xizang Lishi Wenhua Cidian (Encyclopedia of Tibetan History and Culture) (Hangzhou: Xizang Renmin Chubanshe and Zhejiang Renmin Chubanshe, 1998), available at http://gongjushu.cnki.net/kns50/NaviCRFD/Show Detail.aspx?Table=CRFDOTHERINFO&ShowField=Content&TitleField=TitleShowTitle&Field=OTHERID&Value=R20060628600A000050; and http:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Qing_Imperial_Residents_in_Tibet. 61. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zhao_Erfeng. 62. http://baike.baidu.com/view/1089101.html. 63. Zhang went to Tibet in November 1906 as a Qing official to “investigate and rectify Tibetan affairs”. He purged amban Youtai but refused to take an appointment as an assistant amban in December 1906. Although Lianyu was officially amban, Zhang was actually in charge of Tibetan affairs in Tibet during his stay. See Dahpon David Ho, “The Men Who Would Not Be Amban and the One Who Would: Four Frontline Officials and Qing Tibet Policy, 1905–1911”, Modern China 34, No. 2 (April 2008), pp. 215–216. 64. For a detailed comparative study of Zhang Yintang and Zhao Erfeng, see Dahpon David Ho, “The Men Who Would Not Be Amban and the One Who Would: Four Frontline Officials and Qing Tibet Policy, 1905–1911”, Modern China 34, No. 2 (April 2008): 210–246. For Zhang Yintang’s reform measures, see Wang Lixiong, Tianzang (Sky Burial), Appendix 2, pp. 550–551. 65. Ma Lianlong, Libei Dalai Lama Yu Zhangyang Zhengfu Guanxi (Relations of Successive Dalai Lamas to the Central Government of China) (Xining: Qinghai Renmin Chubanshe, 2008), p. 15. 66. Ma Lianlong, Libei Dalai Lama Yu Zhangyang Zhengfu Guanxi (Relations of Successive Dalai Lamas to the Central Government of China) (Xining: Qinghai Renmin Chubanshe, 2008), pp. 163–164.

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The Tibet Issue 261 67. For the text in Chinese, see Wang Lixiong, Tianzang (Sky Burial), Appendix 1, pp. 543–549. 68. Chen Qingying, Xizang Lishi (The History of Tibet), pp. 91–98. 69. For details, see http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E8%92%99%E8%97%8F%E5% A7%94%E5%93%A1%E6%9C%83. 70. Chen Qingying, Xizang Lishi (The History of Tibet), p. 99. 71. http://baike.baidu.com/view/592818.htm. 72. Ma Lianlong, Libei Dalai Lama Yu Zhangyang Zhengfu Guanxi (Relations of Successive Dalai Lamas to the Central Government of China) (Xining: Qinghai Renmin Chubanshe, 2008), pp. 325–333; Chen Qingying, Dalai Lama Zhuanshi Ji Lishi Dingzhi (The Dalai Lama’s Reincarnations and the Historical Precedents) (Beijing: Wuzhou Chuanbo Chubanshe, 2004), pp. 128–138. 73. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Choekyi_Gyaltsen. 74. For details, see Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, 1913–1951, pp. 685–686. 75. For his biographical information, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thubten_ Jigme_Norbu. 76. Tenzin Gyatso (1935–) has four brothers and two sisters. In the order of age, the siblings are Tsering Dolma (sister) (1919–1964), Thupten Jigme Norbu (1922–2008), Gyalo Thondup (1928–), Lobsang Samten (1932–1985), Tenzin Gyatso (1935–), Jetsun Pema (sister) (July 7, 1940–), and Tendzin Choegyal (he used to be Ngari Rimpoche) (1946–). See http://internal. northeast.cn/system/2008/04/27/051233717.shtml. 77. Gyaincain Norbu, Huihuang de Ershishiji Xinzhongguo Dajilu: Xizang Juan (The Glorious Records of New China in the 20th Century: Tibet), p. 70. For Thupten Jigme Norbu’s version, see his autobiography, Tibet is My Country: the Autobiography of Thubten Jigme Norbu, brother of the Dalai Lama, as told to Heinrich Harrer, translated from the German by Edward Fitzgerald (New York: Dutton, 1961). See also Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, 1913–1951, pp. 737–739. 78. For Zhang Guohua’s biographical information, see http://baike.baidu.com/ view/45993.htm. 79. Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, 1913–1951, pp. 704–707. 80. Ibid., pp. 758–759. 81. For the text in Chinese, see Gyaincain Norbu, Huihuang de Ershishiji Xinzhongguo Dajilu: Xizang Juan (The Glorious Records of New China in the 20th Century: Tibet), pp. 677–678. 82. In his speech at the conference, the Dalai Lama highly praised the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, expressed his strong support on behalf of Tibetans for the central government’s policies toward Tibet, and acknowledged the conspiracies of foreign imperialists to seek to drive a wedge between Tibet and the Motherland. For the text of his speech, see Meng Hong, “Pingxin Jingqi Kan Xinjiang Xizang Shijian” (“Look at the issues

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83.

84.

85. 86.

87. 88. 89. 90. 91.

92.

93. 94. 95. 96. 97.

98. 99. 100.

of Xinjiang and Tibet calmly”), Zhongguo Bianzheng, 174 (June 2008), pp. 25–28. Tenzin Gyatso, the 14th Dalai Lama of Tibet, “Mao Zhuxi Song” (“Praising Chairman Mao”) http://www.crt.com.cn/news2007/News/shmw/2008/ 412/08412144342EE35GD2CEAG098F4J6BE.html. “Democratic reforms” referred mainly to social and economic reforms in Tibet, in particular land reform. Gyaincain Norbu, Huihuang de Ershishiji Xinzhongguo Dajilu: Xizang Juan (The Glorious Records of New China in the 20th Century: Tibet), p. 97. Ibid. Gyaincain Norbu, Huihuang de Ershishiji Xinzhongguo Dajilu: Xizang Juan (The Glorious Records of New China in the 20th Century: Tibet), pp. 96–105. Dawa Norbu, China’s Tibet Policy (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2001), p. 215. Ibid., p. 216. Ibid., p. 264. Ibid., p. 267. Gyalo Thondup studied written Chinese with a native Chinese teacher named Ma in the years 1943–44 and then was sent to Nanjiang in April 1946 along his brother-in-law, Phuntso Tashi, to study at Chiang Kai-shek’s Political Academy. He was married to Zhu Dan, the daughter of Chu Shikuei (a Guomindang general), in 1948. He went to India via Hong Kong in 1949 and then stayed in Taiwan until 1951. He went to the United States in September 1951. He became involved in a secret anti-Chinese organization in 1952. For details, see Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, Volume 2, The Calm before the Storm, pp. 234–243, 370–377. For details, see Dawa Norbu, China’s Tibet Policy (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2001), Table 15.1, pp. 269–271. For a recent video program revealing the CIA’s involvement in Tibet, see The Shadow Circus: The CIA in Tibet, http://www.asianamericanmedia.org/shadowcircus/ . Tenzin Gyatso, Freedom in Exile, p. 154. Ibid., p. 154. For specific operations, see http://www.asianamericanmedia.org/shadowcircus/time.html. http://www.asianamericanmedia.org/shadowcircus/time.html. Michael Backman, “Behind Dalai Lama’s holy cloak”, The Age, May 23, 2007, http://www.theage.com.au/news/business/behind-dalai-lamas-holy-cloak/ 2007/05/22/1179601410290.html. http://www.asianamericanmedia.org/shadowcircus/time.html. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Serfdom. One ke is one mu, which is 6.6666 acre.

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The Tibet Issue 263 101. Xizang Shehui Jingji Tongji Nianjian (1989) (Tibet Social and Economic Statistics (1989)) (Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe, 1989), pp. 84–85. 102. “Mao Zedong’s Speech at the Sixteenth Meeting of the State Council” (April 15, 1959), in Gyaincain Norbu, Huihuang de Ershishiji Xinzhongguo Dajilu: Xizang Juan (The Glorious Records of New China in the 20th Century: Tibet), p. 690. 103. Zhongguo Gongchandang Juzhishi Ziliao Vol. 5 (Beijing: Zhonggong Dangshi Chubanshe, 2000), p. 743; Zhongguo Gongchandang Juzhishi Ziliao Vol. 6 (Beijing: Zhonggong Dangshi Chubanshe, 2000), p. 379. 104. For an analysis based on the Tenth Panchen Lama’s letter to the Chinese central government written in May 1962, see Xu Mingxu, Yinmou yu Qiancheng (Intrigues and Devoutness), pp. 174–181. 105. Ibid. 106. Gyaincain Norbu, Huihuang de Ershishiji Xinzhongguo Dajilu: Xizang Juan (The Glorious Records of New China in the 20th Century: Tibet), pp. 124–125; Wang Lixiong, Tianzang (Sky Burial), pp. 314–323; Xu Mingxu, Yinmou yu Qiancheng (Intrigues and Devoutness), p. 192. 107. For a complete text in Chinese, see Wang Lixiong, Tianzang (Sky Burial), pp. 314–323; Xu Mingxu, Yinmou yu Qiancheng (Intrigues and Devoutness), pp. 555–565. 108. Xu Mingxu, Yinmou yu Qiancheng (Intrigues and Devoutness), pp. 555–565. 109. Ibid., p. 208. 110. Ibid., pp. 223–227. 111. Ibid., pp. 208–210. 112. Ibid., pp. 211–212. 113. Wang Lixiong, Tianzang (Sky Burial), pp. 309–314, 326–337; Xu Mingxu, Yinmou yu Qiancheng (Intrigues and Devoutness), pp. 255–263. 114. Tibet Yearbook (2000) (Lhasa: Xizang Renmin Chubanshe, 2000), photo 1 (after p. 178). 115. For a brief summary of the US policy shift, see Dawa Norbu, China’s Tibet Policy (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2001), pp. 278–282. 116. For details, see http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d098:HR02915: @@@T. 117. http://www.ned.org/about/nedhistory.html. 118. http://www.ned.org/about/nedhistory.html. 119. Dawa Norbu, China’s Tibet Policy (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2001), p. 274. 120. “Dalai Lama statements — US: Address by the Dalai Lama to the United States Congress on 21 September 1987”, Free Tibet, http://www.freetibet. org/about/dalai1. 121. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Holocaust. 122. He later made such a statement in Tenzin Gyatso, Freedom in Exile, p. 181.

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264 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization 123. “Address of His Holiness the Dalai Lama of Tibet in Yale University, October 9, 1991”, Congressional Ceremony to Welcome His Holiness The Dalai Lama of Tibet (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1992). 124. Tenzin Gyatso, Freedom in Exile, p. 136. 125. For a reference, see http://www.guxiang.com/lishi/mi/chunqiu/200011/ 200011280010.htm. 126. http://gangjanba2.googlepages.com/ProvewithTruth.doc. 127. FO371/84455, copy of U.N. file A/1658, original English version of Tibetan appeal, dated 11 December 1950. Quoted in Melvyn C. Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, 1913–1951 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), pp. 746–748. 128. Xu Mingxu, Yinmou yu Qiancheng (Intrigues and Devoutness), pp. 181–186. 129. A. Tom Grunfeld, The Making of Modern Tibet (revised edition) (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), p. 251. 130. http://www.stats.gov.cn/ndsj/information/zh1/c011a. 131. http://www.humanrights.cn/en/Messages/Focus/focus017/4/t200903 17_429008.htm. 132. A. Tom Grunfeld, The Making of Modern Tibet (revised edition) (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), p. 249. 133. Xizang Tongji Nianjian (Tibet Statistical Yearbook) (1993) (Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe, 1993), p. 66. 134. One may want to conduct similar exercises for other regions. 135. He made a similar statement in his autobiography. See Tenzin Gyatso, Freedom in Exile, pp. 276–277. 136. http://www.freetibet.org/about/dalai1. 137. Xizang Tongji Nianjian (Tibet Statistical Yearbook) (2008) (Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe, 2008), p. 33. 138. Xizang Tongji Nianjian (Tibet Statistical Yearbook) (2008) (Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe, 2008), p. 33. 139. For a text of Hu Yaobang’s talk on May 29, 1980 in Chinese, see Wang Lixiong, Tianzang (Sky Burial), pp. 555–565. For a brief summery in English, see Dawa Norbu, China’s Tibet Policy, pp. 316–317. 140. Xizang Tongji Nianjian (Tibet Statistical Yearbook) (2008) (Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe, 2008), p. 33. Of course, one should also consider the impact of the floating population, those who are not registered as local residents in Tibet. But they cannot possibly be more than 95 percent of the registered residents. 141. For details, see Xu Mingxu, Yinmou yu Qiancheng (Intrigues and Devoutness), pp. 311–331. 142. A. Tom Grunfeld, The Making of Modern Tibet (revised edition) (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), p. 232.

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The Tibet Issue 265 143. A. Tom Grunfeld, The Making of Modern Tibet (revised edition) (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), p. 232; and Xu Mingxu, Yinmou yu Qiancheng (Intrigues and Devoutness), p. 314. 144. Yan Mingfu is son of Yan Baohang (April 6, 1895–May 22, 1968), a legendary figure who worked closely with Zhang Xueliang as an under cover communist Party member and who sent the earliest warnings to the Soviet Union about Germany’s imminent invasion and informed the Soviet troops of the military deploment of the Japanese troops in Manchuria. For details, see http:// english.peopledaily.com.cn/200505/05/eng20050505_183723.html. 145. Wen Siyong and Ren Zhichu, Hu Jintao Zhuan (The Biography of Hu Jintao) (Carle Place, NY: Mirror Books, 2002), p. 224. 146. http://tibet.cn/news/tjyd/200806/t20080619_407555.htm. 147. Dangdai Zhongguo de Xizang (Tibet of Contemporary China) Vol. 1 (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo Chubanshe, 1991), p. 557. 148. Tenzin Gyatso was reelected as vice chairman of the Second National People’s Congress Standing Committee in absentia. 149. For details, see http://culture.china.com/zh_cn/history/files/11022841/ 20080318/14731950_3.html. 150. For the origin of this famous prison, see http://prison.com.cn/Picture/200410-8/91677557-C287-46D6-ADF2-60CA0A084609.Html. 151. Renji went to the United States at the age of 13. She later studied political science at American University and studied finance for her doctoral degree at Qinghua University. For details, see Isabel Hilton, “The Buddha’s Daughter (Yabshi Pan Rinzinwangmo) (interview), The New Yorker, March 29, 2004; http://sh.focus.cn/msgview/10331/131303472.html. 152. See Gyaincain Norbu, Huihuang de Ershishiji Xinzhongguo Dajilu: Xizang Juan (The Glorious Records of New China in the 20th Century: Tibet), p. 556 and http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2008-04/09/content_ 7947642.htm. 153. http://www.tibettravel.info/shigatse/tashilunpo-monastery/atractions.html. 154. Wen Siyong and Ren Zhichu, Hu Jintao Zhuan (Biography of Hu Jintao) (New York: Mirror Books, 2002), p. 240. 155. Xu Mingxu, Yinmou yu Qiancheng (Intrigues and Devoutness), pp. 239–244. 156. Ibid., pp. 223–227. 157. Tibet Statistical Yearbook (2007) (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2007), p. 87. 158. Ibid., p. 87. 159. For a map of the railway, see http://www.qh.xinhuanet.com/qztlw/czjs.htm. 160. Hua Zi, “Fuping Dalai Lama yu Zhongyang Zhengfu de Tanpan Wenti” (“Another Look at the Talks between the Dalai Lama and the Central Government”), Zhongguo Xizang (China Tibet) No. 1, 2002: 2–4. 161. Tenzin Gyatso, Freedom in Exile, p. 287.

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266 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization 162. For details, see Xu Mingxu, Yinmou yu Qiancheng (Intrigues and Devoutness), pp. 335–350. 163. Egil Aarvik (chairman of the Norwegian Nobel Committee), “Presentation Speech”, http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1989/ presentation-speech.html. 164. Ibid. 165. Sheila Rule, “How, And Why, the Dalai Lama Won the Peace Prize”, The New York Times, October 13, 1989, p. A14. See also Nicholas D. Kristof, “How Tiananmen Square Helped Support for Tibet”, The New York Times, August 18, 1991, Section 4, p. 4; and Grunfeld, The Making of Modern Tibet, pp. 236–237. 166. Wang Lixiong, Tianzang: Xizang de Mingyun (Sky Burial: The Fate of Tibet) (New York: Mirror Books, 1998), p. 517. 167. Grunfeld, The Making of Modern Tibet, p. 240. 168. Hua Zi, “Fuping Dalai Lama yu Zhongyang Zhengfu de Tanpan Wenti” (“Another Look at the Talks between the Dalai Lama and the Central Government”), Zhongguo Xizang (China Tibet) No. 1, 2002: 2–4. 169. For Beijing’s announcement, see http://www.zytzb.cn/zytzbwz/theory/ lishi/lishi111.htm. 170. Grunfeld, The Making of Modern Tibet, pp. 243–245. 171. For the complete list of search team members, see http://news.xinhuanet. com/newmedia/2008-04/01/content_7898861.htm. 172. “Contact with the Chinese authorities regarding the search for the reincarnation of the Panchen Lama”, The Government of Tibet in Exile, http://www. tibet.com/PL/may14b.html. 173. Grunfeld, The Making of Modern Tibet, p. 243. 174. http://www.zytzb.cn/zytzbwz/theory/lishi/lishi111.htm. 175. For Li Ruihuan’s speech in Chinese, see http://ru.china-embassy.org/chn/ ztbd/xzzt/bczs/t66919.htm. 176. Gyaincain Norbu, Huihuang de Ershishiji Xinzhongguo Dajilu: Xizang Juan (The Glorious Records of New China in the 20th Century: Tibet), p. 172. 177. Gyaincain Norbu, Huihuang de Ershishiji Xinzhongguo Dajilu: Xizang Juan (The Glorious Records of New China in the 20th Century: Tibet), p. 172. 178. Gyaincain Norbu, Huihuang de Ershishiji Xinzhongguo Dajilu: Xizang Juan (The Glorious Records of New China in the 20th Century: Tibet), p. 172. 179. Gyaincain Norbu, Huihuang de Ershishiji Xinzhongguo Dajilu: Xizang Juan (The Glorious Records of New China in the 20th Century: Tibet), p. 173. 180. Gyaincain Norbu, Huihuang de Ershishiji Xinzhongguo Dajilu: Xizang Juan (The Glorious Records of New China in the 20th Century: Tibet), p. 173. 181. Gyaincain Norbu, Huihuang de Ershishiji Xinzhongguo Dajilu: Xizang Juan (The Glorious Records of New China in the 20th Century: Tibet), p. 174.

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The Tibet Issue 267 182. For a copy of the administrative order, see Gyaincain Norbu, Huihuang de Ershishiji Xinzhongguo Dajilu: Xizang Juan (The Glorious Records of New China in the 20th Century: Tibet), p. 736. 183. Wen Siyong and Ren Zhichu, Hu Jintao Zhuan (The Biography of Hu Jintao), pp. 231–232. But this photo has yet to be found. 184. http://www.chinatibetnews.com/fazhi/2008-06/30/content_116277.htm 185. The real change came in June 1988 when Qiao Shi, a Politburo Standing Committee member in charge of the Central Disciplinary Inspection Commission, visited Tibet. See Gyaincain Norbu, Huihuang de Ershishiji Xinzhongguo Dajilu: Xizang Juan (The Glorious Records of New China in the 20th Century: Tibet) (Beijing: Hongqi Chubanshe, 1999), p. 1125. 186. Wen Siyong and Ren Zhichu, Hu Jintao Zhuan (The Biography of Hu Jintao), pp. 249–250; Yang Zhongmei, Hu Jintao: Zhonggong Kuashiji Jiebanren (Hu Jintao: A cross-century successor) (Taipei: Shibao Wenhua, 1999), pp. 158–159. 187. Zhongguo Gongchandang Zuzhishi Ziliao (Materials on the Organization History of the Chinese Communist Party) No. 2, Vol. 7 (Beijing: Zhonggong Dangshi Chubanshe, 2000), p. 1061. 188. Gao Xin, Lindao Zhongguo de Xinrenwu (China’s Top Leaders: Bios of China’s Politburo Members) Vol. 1 (Carle Place, NY: Mirror Books, 2003) , pp. 30–37. 189. Ji Suoming, “Deng Xiaoping Xizang Zhengce Jiemi” (“Secret stories of Deng Xiaoping’s policy toward Tibet”), Yazhou Zhoukan 21, No. 9 (March 11, 2007), p. 28. 190. For his biographical information, see http://www.tibetanyouthcongress.org/ centrex/1980_1983.html. 191. For his biographical information, see http://www.savetibet.org/us/staff/ index.php?id=2. 192. http://www.mtac.gov.tw/pages/53/940702-940708.pdf. 193. For Lodi’s account of this round and a group photo, see http://www.savetibet. org/news/newsitem.php?id=773. For some discussions on the possibility of the Dalai Lama’s return to Tibet, see http://www.linkingbooks.com.tw/ activity/activity178128m-003.asp. 194. http://trans.wenweipo.com/gb/paper.wenweipo.com/2008/05/05/ CH0805050004.htm. 195. For photos, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/photo/2008-03/22/content_ 7836487.htm. 196. http://news.xinhuanet.com/photo/2008-03/22/content_7836487.htm. For photos and videos, see http://bbs.aooci.com/viewthread.php?tid=41375 &extra=page%3D1. 197. http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-03/23/content_7843422.htm.

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268 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization 198. Ibid. 199. http://unn.people.com.cn/GB/7076711.html. For more details about the uprising of Tibetans in exile, see http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2008-04-01/ 233615271291.shtml. 200. Wu Jingyi and Zhang Yanqiu, Xizang Zhi Luan (The Turbulence at Tibet) (Carle Place, NY: Mirror Books, 2008), pp. 13–25. 201. Wu Jingyi and Zhang Yanqiu, Xizang Zhi Luan (The Turbulence at Tibet) (Carle Place, NY: Mirror Books, 2008), pp. 64–76. 202. Grunfeld, The Making of Modern Tibet, p. 152. 203. Ibid. 204. For photos, see http://world.huanqiu.com/roll/2008-03/77876.html. 205. For a detailed presentation of these charges, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/ newscenter/2008-03/30/content_7884185.htm. Evidently, these charges are not baseless. According to the website of National Endowment for Democracy (NED) — the successor organization to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States of America in “the battle of ideas at international forums”, the NED funded 11 organizations of Tibet separatist forces with a total of US$293,000 in 2006 alone. See http://www.ned.org/grants/06programs/ grants-asia06.html#chinaTibet. 206. http://www.tibetanyouthcongress.org/aboutus.html. 207. http://www.tibetanyouthcongress.org/aboutus.html#aims_and_objectives. 208. http://www.tibetanyouthcongress.org/aboutus.html#aims_and_objectives. 209. http://www.tibetanyouthcongress.org/aboutus.html#aims_and_objectives. 210. For details, see http://news.ifeng.com/photo/news/200804/0411_1397_ 486414.shtml. 211. For a brief introduction to him, see http://www.psg.com/~ted/vaninst/ VbChoegyal.html; http://news.cnwest.com/content/2008-06/14/content_ 1272424_3.htm. 212. http://news.ifeng.com/photo/news/200804/0411_1397_486414_1.shtml. 213. http://www.ireport.com/docs/DOC-12872;jsessionid=6F680CB0DBCC4 B1470E44EADEC9A9B53. 214. Gavin Rabinowitz, “Dalai Lama to resign if violence worsens”, http:// apnews.myway.com/article/20080318/D8VFQ2000.html. 215. “Dalai Lama reiterates resignation threat over Tibet” (April 14, 2008) http:// www.buddhistchannel.tv/index.php?id=70,6227,0,0,1,0. For video records of the Dalai Lama’s statement, see http://youtube.com/watch?v=XPvNLiQs7aI& feature=related; and http://youtube.com/watch?v=4tA3MS-DVV0&feature= related. 216. Lü Xianxiu, “Dalai Lama: wo mei shuoguo guanyu cizhi de hua” (“The Dalai Lama: I did not say anything about resignation” (April 24, 2008), Duowei Yuekan (Chinese News Monthly) 38 (May 1, 2008 – June 1, 2008), pp. 45–47. 217. http://www.ned.org/grants/06programs/grants-asia06.html#chinaTibet.

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The Tibet Issue 269 218. Renmin Ribao, March 27, 2008, p. 1. According to the White House, Bush raised his concerns about the situation in Tibet and encouraged the Chinese government to engage in substantive dialogue with the Dalai Lama’s representatives and to allow access for journalists and diplomats (http://www.whitehouse. gov/news/releases/2008/03/20080326-2.html). 219. For details, see Chapter 8. 220. “Rudd voices concerns on Tibet”, The South Morning Herald, April 9, 2008, http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/we-wont-be-silent-rudd/2008/04/ 09/1207420450075.html. 221. Renmin Ribao, April 13, 2008, p. 3. 222. Ibid. 223. http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-04/25/content_8049758. htm; and Renmin Ribao, April 26, 2008, p. 4. 224. http://news1.ruc.edu.cn/102380/57746.html 225. Xikang Province was later merged into Sichuan Province in July 1955. 226. This bureau is now called the Bureau of Tibetan Affairs. Its new head is Bi Hua (August 28, 1955–). She used to be vice director of China Tibetology Research Center (CTRC) (http://www.tibetculture.net/zjxh/xhjs/200712/ t20071213_301001.htm). 227. http://www.xfc.gov.cn/html/qgyxgcdyfcl/qgyxgcdyfcl/2007-2/8/14_37_ 29_181.html. 228. In Lodi’s biographical information, his home province was “Kham”, a term refers to one of the three traditional provinces claimed by the Tibetan government in exile. But historically, the place belonged to Xikang Province, which was established as an official province by the government of the Republic of China in 1939 and was abolished by the government of the People’s Republic of China in July 1955. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kham. 229. http://www.savetibet.org/us/board/lodigyari.php. 230. For a copy of his curriculum vitae, see http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/droi_2627052008_cvkgyaltsen/droi_262 7052008_CVKGyaltsenEN.pdf. 231. Renmin Ribao, May 5, 2008, p. 4. 232. “Tibet envoys leave H.K. after meeting with Beijing officials”, Asian Political News, May 12, 2008, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0WDQ/is_/ ai_n25439647. 233. http://newsblaze.com/stor y/20080509164945nnnn.nb/newsblaze/ TIBET001/Tibet.html.

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Chapter

7 Sichuan Earthquake At 2:28 p.m. China Standard Time (CST) on May 12, 2008, an earthquake measuring 8.0 on the Richter scale1 occurred in Wenchuan County, Sichuan Province. The Chinese leadership sprang to action immediately, the world community’s support poured in, the Chinese people were fully mobilized in mutual assistance, and the media provided timely reports on rescue efforts. China was in an unprecedented calamity, the Chinese people were unprecedentedly united in spirit, and the Chinese government put up its best effort ever in the rescue work as a responsible government. EARTHQUAKES IN CHINA Strong Earthquakes in the History of China Located in one of the most active seismic regions of the world, China has been plagued by numerous destructive earthquakes during its long history. In the span of 2,788 years from 780 B.C. to 2008, China has recorded 83 major earthquakes with a magnitude of 7.0 or higher on the Richter scale.2 Among them, 20 had a magnitude of 8.0 or higher, of which three were 8.5 or higher.3 The first recorded earthquake with a magnitude of 8.0 occurred on September 17, 1303 in Hongtong (36°3′N, 111°7′E), Shanxi Province.4 With the epicenter in Zhaocheng and an estimated intensity 271

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of XI on the Modified Mercalli scale,5 the Hongtong Earthquake recorded a death toll of more than 200,000.6 All the buildings within the epicenter of 44 kilometers (north to south) by 18 kilometers (east to west) collapsed. The deadliest of all earthquakes in the history of China occurred on January 23, 1556 in Huaxian, Shaanxi Province. Also known as the “Jiajing Great Earthquake” after the reign of Emperor Jiajing of the Ming Dynasty and later as the “Shaanxi Earthquake”, the quake had an estimated magnitude ranging from 8.0 to 8.3 on the Richter scale (it was later assigned Moment Magnitude of 8.25)7 and an estimated intensity of XI. Its epicenter, near Mount Hua in Shaanxi (close to present day Weinan City), covered an area of 2,700 square kilometers, affecting five provinces of 280,000 square kilometers. The earthquake was responsible for the devastation of 101 counties in five provinces (Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Shanxi, and Hebei) in Central China, leaving more than 830,000 people dead (the deadliest earthquake in world history).8 The first recorded earthquake with a magnitude of 8.5 and the intensity of XII was Yancheng Earthquake, which occurred on July 25, 1668 in Yancheng (34°8’N, 118°5’E), Shandong Province.9 More than 410 counties in 10 provinces in China as well as some places in Korea recorded the earthquake in their annuals, including 154 records in Shandong, 89 records in Jiangsu, 77 records in Henan, 57 records in Hebei, 58 records in Anhui, and 44 records in Zhejiang.10 The earthquake was responsible for the death of 47,615 people.11 The Haiyuan Earthquake was another strong earthquake with a magnitude of 8.5 and intensity of XII. It occurred at local time 8:06:53 p.m. on December 16, 1920, with its epicenter in Haiyuan County (36°7′N, 104°9′E), Ningxia. A total of 234,117 people died in the earthquake, including 73,027 in Haiyuan County, 39,068 in Guyuan County, 18,208 in Tongwei County, and 15,213 in Jingning County. The earthquake caused the largest landslide in the history of China, burying the entire village of Sujiahe in Xili County. The destruction extended to seven provinces, and damage (intensity VI–X) occurred in the major cities of Lanzhou, Taiyuan, Xi’an, Xining, and Yinchuan.12 The earthquake was felt in 17 provinces,

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covering a total area of 2,510,000 square kilometers (about one quarter of the total territory of China). Seiches from this earthquake were observed in two lakes and three fjords in western Norway.13 Finally, the Zayu Earthquake (in Tibet) of August 15, 1950 was another earthquake of 8.5 with the intensity of XII. Recorded variably from 8.5 to 8.7 in different sources, this earthquake was also known as “Assam-Tibet earthquake” of 195014 or “Assam earthquake”15 because severe damage (intensity X) also occurred in the Sibsagar-Sadiya area of Assam, India. The epicenter was in Zayu, Tibet, and the earthquake affected many regions in China and India, killing about 4,800 people (including 3,300 Chinese and 1,500 Indians). Sandblasts, ground cracks, and large landslides occurred in the Nyingchi-Qamdo-Zhamo (Rima, Zayu) area of eastern Tibet. In the Medog area, the village of Yedong slid into the Yarlung Zangbo (Brahmaputra) River and was washed away. A flood caused by the quake inundated several villages in India, and the quake (intensity VI) was felt as far away as Calcutta.16 From Xingtai Earthquake to Tangshan Earthquake Xingtai earthquake Although the Zayu earthquake occurred after the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the CCP government did not yet control Tibet when the earthquake occurred on August 15, 1950. Mao Zedong instructed to put military pressure on the peaceful liberation of Tibet on August 23, 1950, the Southwest Military Region issued an order to prepare a military campaign at Chamdo three days later, and the 18th Army under the leadership of Zhang Guohua and Tan Guansan did not arrive in Chamdo until October 6, 1950.17 The first major earthquake that occurred under the administration of the CCP government therefore was the 1966 Xingtai earthquake. In fact, it was a series of earthquakes, occurring in a sequence. The first major one measuring 6.8 on the Richter scale occurred at 5:29:14 a.m. local time on March 8, 1966 in Longyao County, Xingtai Prefecture, Hebei Province, followed by five quakes above magnitude 6.0. Two weeks later, on March 22, 1966, a 7.2-magnitude earthquake occurred at 4:19:27 p.m. local time in Ningjin County in

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the north of the epicenter. These quakes affected 80 counties in Hebei, leaving 8,064 people dead and 38,451 injured. More than five million houses collapsed, and 77 bridges were damaged.18 In 1966, the PLA’s Sixty-Third Army was stationed in Hebei Province. The army headquarters was in Shijiazhuang, the capital of Hebei,19 and the 187th Division was located in the Xingtai Prefecture.20 According to Xu Xin (born 1921), the then-deputy commander21 of the Sixty-Third Army, he and Political Commissar Cai Changyuan (1917–199522) arrived in Xingtai from Shijiazhuang within an hour of the quake by a jeep and a truck in the early morning of March 8, 1966 and quickly located the epicenter at Longyao County, about 45 kilometers north of Xingtai City.23 They informed the Beijing Military Region [whose commander was Yang Yong (1912–1983) and political commissar was Li Xuefeng (1907–2003)] and the State Council. As soon as he received the report, Premier Zhou Enlai (March 5, 1898–January 8, 1976) asked the Beijing Military Region and the Sixty-Third Army to send rescue teams to the site and asked his military secretary Zhou Jiading (born 1922) to prepare two helicopters for his visit to the site.24 He chaired an emergency meeting in Beijing at the night of the same day to discuss rescue measures and went to the site the very next day. Zhou flew to Shijiazhuang in the afternoon of March 9, 1966 and went to Longyao in the evening. On March 10, he went to Baijiazhai Village, one of the most seriously affected areas. Always considerate of others, Zhou asked the audience of more than 2,000 at a mass meeting at Baijiazhai to turn their back toward the wind while he was speaking facing the wind. He encouraged the people there to overcome difficulties and restore production as soon as possible. After the second major quake of March 22, 1966, Zhou went to the epicenter in Ningjin County on March 31, 1966. He visited five villages on April 1. Zhou subsequently met with two groups of seismologists in Beijing and urged them to learn to make accurate earthquake predictions.25 On April 27, 1966, Zhou met with Li Siguang (1889–1971), minister of Geology (from August 1952 to May 1966), and Wong Wenbo (1912–1994), vice president of the Chinese

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Academy of Petroleum Science and entrusted them with the task of earthquake predictions. Zhou said, “I hope you will study earthquake predictions — this is my task to you”.26 Of Mongolian origin, Li Siguang was born in Huanggang, Hubei on October 26, 1889. Originally named Li Shikui, he changed his name into Li Siguang by accident. He studied in both Japan and Britain and returned to China in 1918.27 Li Siguang became the founding minister of Geology in September 1952. He was also the founding chairman of the Seismological Studies Commission of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) (from November 1953 to 1955) as concurrent vice president of the CAS.28 In 1954, he made a proposal to compile historical materials on China’s earthquakes. Two years later, a two-volume series on the chronology of earthquakes in China under the leadership of Fan Wenlan (1893–1969) was published by the Science Press in Beijing.29 Li Siguang attended the emergency meeting chaired by Premier Zhou Enlai on March 8, 1966. After the meeting, he dispatched a 32-person seismic geological expedition from the Chinese Academy of Sciences to the site and established a seismic geology office in the Ministry of Geology to monitor the information from the site.30 At a meeting on the Xingtai earthquake in March 1966, Premier Zhou asked the participants whether it was possible to forecast earthquakes. Many participants argued that if countries like the Soviet Union, the United States, and especially Japan (where there are frequent earthquakes) that were advanced in science and technology could not solve this problem, then China by no means could. Li Siguang, however, told Zhou, “I think earthquakes are predictable, but we need to do a lot of careful work in order to find out the causes of earthquakes”.31 In his reply to the letter from Zhou on the causes of the Xingtai earthquake in early April, Li made two points. First, it is not appropriate to overestimate the significance of abnormal animal behavior as an indicator of the earthquake. Second, the Xingtai earthquake must have occurred because of the geological structure of the region.32 On November 24, 1967, Li drafted an outline on seismic geology. In the first part, he discussed four aspects on the investigations of the

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movement of tectonic zones. First, locate important regions to investigate tectonic activities through macro observation methods on geological structure. Second, use tools to measure terrain changes and the relative motion of seafloor and land. Third, collect historical data on earthquakes to ascertain the relationship between the epicenter distribution and the tectonic zone or tectonic system. Fourth, use seismograph to locate the source of the earthquake in order to verify or supplement the knowledge on the relationship between the epicenter and the tectonic zone of past earthquakes. In the second part, he proposed five methods of earthquake predictions to measure crustal stress changes: inductance method, underground water level observation method, ultrasound method, deformation resistance method, and steel string method.33 Tonghai earthquake However, a bigger and more devastating earthquake occurred less than four years later. At 1:00:34 p.m. local time on January 5, 1970, an earthquake measured at 7.7 on the Richter scale and the intensity of X occurred in Tonghai County, Yunnan Province.34 The epicenter with a depth of 12 kilometers was located in Wuxing Village (24°12′N, 102°41′E) in Tonghai. The earthquake affected seven counties (Tonghai, Eshan, Jianshui, Yuxi, Huaning, Jiangchuan, and Shiping) in Yunnan, leaving 15,621 people dead and 26,783 injured.35 This time, Premier Zhou Enlai did not visit the site. One month later, on February 6, 1970, Zhou asked Li Dejun of the Kunming Military Region to send his apologies to Tan Puren (1910–December 17, 1970),36 chairman of the Yunnan Provincial Revolutionary Committee and political commissar of the Kunming Military Region at the time. “I went to Hebei twice after the Xingtai earthquake, but have not been to Yunnan once after this Tonghai earthquake. I thought about going to Tonghai, Yunnan to take a look, but I have been too busy to go”. Zhou later added that he actually had thought of going twice.37 Li Siguang almost predicted this earthquake. On December 28, 1968, 379 days before the earthquake, he told the seismic geological

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survey team to pay attention to the tectonic zones in Northwest and Southwest regions. He specifically mentioned the tectonic zone in Yuxi, Yunnan. A few days later, he urged the No. 7 survey team in a letter to pay particular attention to the possibility of an earthquake in the Tonghai area. In December 1969, he sent four groups to areas around Tonghai to set up an experiment observation station. The earthquake occurred while one of the groups was working in the vicinity of the epicenter in Tonghai.38 Moreover, the Central Earthquake Leading Small Group just approved a proposal to hold a national conference on earthquake at 11:00 p.m. on January 4, 1970, two hours before the Tonghai earthquake.39 What is peculiar about this earthquake is that the local leaders of the disaster area refused to take any donations. Yunnan Province put forth a principle of “three don’ts and three dos”. They did not want relief grains, did not want cash donations, and did not want relief materials. They relied on the ever-victorious Mao Zedong Thought, relied on the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance and hard work, and relied on collective strength to restore production and rebuild their homes. Based on this principle, the earthquake-affected areas decided to return cash and material donations, keeping only Chairman Mao’s red books, Chairman Mao’s badges, and letters of condolences.40 Haicheng earthquake The glorious moment for the China Seismological Bureau came in 1975. Because of its accurate forecasts, China avoided heavy human casualties in a major earthquake. At the First National Conference on Earthquakes held from January 17 to February 9, 1970, it was decided that Shenyang-Yingkou area in Liaoning Province was one of the key monitory zones for potential strong earthquakes.41 The Earthquake Office of the Liaoning Province further specified six potential earthquake zones — Dalian, Yingkou, Dandong, Jingxi, Tieling, and Shenyang; and established observation stations.42 At a conference on potential earthquakes in North China and Bohai Region in June 1974, the China Seismological Bureau raised the possibility of an earthquake of 5–6 on the Richter Scale occurring

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within one or two years. The State Council issued earthquake warnings in the form of No. 69 Document along with the report from the China Seismological Bureau to seven provincial units (Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Shandong, and Liaoning). Liaoning held a number of meetings internally, as well as in conjunction with Tianjin and Shandong, on earthquake forecasts and corresponding measures from June to October 1974.43 The seismologists in Liaoning had observed underground water changes and abnormal animal behavior in November 1974, before an earthquake of 4.8 on the Richter scale occurred in Qingwo Reservoir of Liaoning on December 22, 1974. At a national conference on earthquakes in January 1975, the Liaoning Seismological Bureau raised the possibility of a 6.0 earthquake occurring in Liaodong Peninsular and its adjacent seafloor in January–February 1975 or the first half of 1975. Between February 1 and 3, 1975, there were about 100 small quakes in the area of Yingkou and Haicheng. At 0:30 a.m. on February 4, 1975, the Earthquake Office of the Liaoning Province issued a warning of an imminent major earthquake to the whole province and made a report to the Provincial Government at 6:00 a.m. At 10:30 a.m. on the same day, the Provincial Government of Liaoning sent a phone message to local governments about the forthcoming earthquake, indicating the possibility of a major earthquake in the area of Haicheng County and Yingkou County.44 The Haicheng earthquake measured 7.3 on the Richter scale with an intensity of IX occurred hours after the warnings, at 7:36:06 p.m. on February 4, 1975. The epicenter (40°39′N, 122°48′E) was located between Haicheng County and Yingkou County in Liaoning, one of the most populous and developed areas in China. Within the perimeter of intensity VII, there were three major cities of Anshan, Yingkou, and Liaoyang as well as 11 counties in Haicheng, Yingkou, and Panshan with a total population of 8.35 million. Because of early warnings and preparations, major human casualties were avoided. Only 328 people died and 17,980 people injured in the earthquake, taking 0.004 percent and 0.2 percent of the total population of the area, respectively.45

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Tangshan earthquake Contrary to the popular belief, Geng Qingguo (born 1941),46 a veteran seismologist, did not play any significant role in the forecast of the Haicheng Earthquake because his theory was about the relationship between droughts and earthquakes, and he was more concerned with North China than Liaoning. But he could have played a very important role in forecasting the next and much more devastating earthquake in Tangshan, Hebei. A native of Beijing, Geng graduated from the Department of Geophysics in the University of Science and Technology of China in Beijing in August 1965. He went to Xingtai in 1966 as a member of the Institute of Geophysical Exploration under the Ministry of Geology.47 He was appointed director of the Earthquake Precursor Observation Station in Guanzhuang, Beijing under the Institute of Geophysical Exploration in January 1968.48 He was responsible in January 1970 for drafting a proposal on the national conference on earthquakes and was among the first to arrive in Tonghai, Yunnan on January 5, 1970 after the earthquake had been confirmed. He reported personally to Premier Zhou on the Tonghai earthquake on February 6, 1970.49 While he was in Tonghai, a farmer told him of the droughts in the year before the earthquake. When another farmer in Shanxi mentioned the serious droughts in north China in 1972, he began to do research on the relationship between droughts and earthquakes. Based on the meteorological data of the past 100 years, he concluded that drought regions would become epicenters of 6.0 or higher between one and three-and-a-half years later; that the larger the draught area the more severe the earthquake; and that the earthquake that occurs in the third year is half a degree higher than the earthquake that occurs within the first year.50 Geng delivered a presentation on his research results at a conference in Linfen, Shanxi in November 1972. After two earthquakes of 1973 and 1974 had confirmed his theory, Geng made a report in May 1974 to Bai Jiefu (born 1921), director of the Beijing Bureau of Science and Technology, who then reported to

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Hu Keshi (May 30, 1921–June 27, 2004),51 Party leader of the China Seismological Bureau. Yet Geng was not directly involved in issuing earthquake forecasts about the 1975 Haicheng Earthquake, as he was closely monitoring Hebei and Beijing. After making another oral report on the potential earthquakes in Hebei and Beijing to Bai Jiefu and Huang Zuozhen (born 1914),52 Party secretary of Beijing (the first Party secretary of Beijing then was Wu De) and political commissar of the Beijing Garrison Command, in February 1975, Geng was interviewed by a Xinhua news reporter, who later wrote an internal report on his views. Geng’s views were noted by Hua Guofeng (February 16, 1921–August 20, 2008), the then-vice premier of the State Council, in his speech to the participants of the Third National Conference on Earthquakes on May 9, 1975.53 Geng and the Beijing Seismic Team had collected enough information to make an accurate forecast. Out of five indicators of the imminent major earthquake, Geng and his assistant (Niu Hongding) found corroborating information on four (daily precipitation, daily average temperature, daily highest temperature, and daily lowest temperature) between June 29 and July 5, 1976 and on the fifth (daily average air pressure) on July 23, 1976.54 Based on her research on seismic activity, Hua Xiangwen (f.) of the Beijing Seismic Team predicted on July 14, 1976 that there would be a major earthquake, possibly in the region of Tangshan and Luanxian. On July 14, 1976, Zhang Guomin of the Beijing Seismic Team called Wang Chengmin (born December 1935), the head of the Jing-Jin Group of the Analysis and Forecasting Office of the China Seismological Bureau for a meeting, but Wang wanted a week of investigation before the meeting. On July 21, Zhang Guomin called Mei Shirong (f.), vice director of the Analysis and Forecasting Office of the China Seismological Bureau and Wang Chengmin’s boss, asking for an emergency meeting but she refused. She wanted to wait until Wang Chengmin came back from an investigation in Tangshan.

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On July 24, based on his geomagnetic K index, Zhang Minhou predicted that two days around July 26 (July 24 through July 28, 1976), there would be an earthquake of at least 4.0 in the area of Beijing, Tianjin, Huailai, Tangshan, Bohai, and Zhangjiakou. Geng Qingguo, the then-head of a small group on earthquake predictions in the Beijing Seismic Team, told Zhang that he would make an urgent report if Zhang could raise the magnitude of the earthquake to 5.0.55 Finally, a meeting between staff of the Beijing Seismic Team and those of the Analysis and Forecasting Office of the China Seismological Bureau took place on July 26, 1976, two days before the earthquake. At the end of the whole-day meeting with the Beijing Seismic Team, Wang Chengmin relayed Mei Shirong’s message of not issuing warnings. He said, “According to Comrade Mei Shirong, northern Sichuan has been a mess because of earthquake predictions, can you imagine kind of chaos in Jing-Jin-Tang area? Beijing is the capital. We should be very careful about issuing earthquake warnings!”56 In fact, Wang Chengmin was as much worried about the imminent earthquake as Geng Qingguo and his colleagues, and Wang had been trying to issue warnings about the Tangshan earthquake against the will of his superiors. Among officials of the China Seismological Bureau, there were two opposite views in 1975–1976. One view, represented by Mei Shirong, was that major earthquakes would occur in the western China; another view, represented by Wang Chengmin, was that major earthquakes would occur in eastern China. Since Mei was Wang’s boss, Mei’s view became dominant. Ironically, 14 days before the Tangshan earthquake, on July 14, 1976, a national conference on the experiences of predictions of and preparations for earthquakes was convened in Tangshan. Wang Chengmin offered to make a report on earthquakes at the conference but Vice Director Cha Zhiyuan of the China Seismological Bureau declined his offer and asked him to present his views at seminars in the evening but not on behalf of the Bureau. Wang warned participants on July 17–18, 1976 that there could be an earthquake of at least 5.0 in Tangshan and Luanxian between July 22 and August 5, 1976.57

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To draw attention to the imminent earthquake, Wang Chengmin went out of his way and posted a big character poster — his only big character poster in his career — on July 22, 1976 in front of the Bureau chief ’s office.58 Nominally, Hu Keshi was the head of the Party core group of the Bureau from February 1974 to October 1976, but he did not have any real power in July 1976. In the midst of the “anti-rightist tendency” campaign targeting Deng Xiaoping and his associates including Hu Yaobang (the then-deputy head of the Party core group of the CAS) and Li Chang (born 1914) (the then-deputy head of the Party core group of the CAS), Hu Keshi, a former associate of Hu Yaobang, was also deprived of his power.59 The bureau chief was Liu Yingyong (May 19, 1915–January 8, 1990), a veteran revolutionary. A native of Shaanxi, Liu joined the CCP in 1933.60 With very little formal education, he was made a key figure of geology. When he was offered the position of the head of Minerals Department of the Ministry of Geology in October 1952, he was quite reluctant to accept the position. “I did not even understand the term ‘geology’”, he said, “The only things I could recognize among minerals were coal and iron”.61 Liu was appointed director of the Earthquake Office in September 1969 and, most significantly, was appointed the founding chief of the China Seismological Bureau in August 1971.62 In 1976, Liu was concerned more about his own political future than earthquakes. “I was weighing, on the daily basis, which sentence I should say and which sentence I should not; which document I have to deliver and which document I could delegate to others…”63 In the morning of July 26, Wang Chengmin and 14 others from the China Seismological Bureau were scheduled to meet with their colleagues of the Beijing Seismic Team. Before they left, Wang visited Mei Shirong at her home, requesting her presence. Mei refused to go, claiming she was busy with other things. Wang asked her for instructions to bring to the meeting. She said, “Sichuan is already a mess, how could we handle it if Beijing and Tianjin become chaotic? Beijing is the capital. You should be careful with your words”.64 After the meeting with the Beijing Seismic Team, Wang spent the night writing a letter on the situation. He went to the Bureau leaders

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at 7:30 a.m. on July 27, 1976, requesting an emergency meeting. Liu Yingyong agreed to have a meeting with him but he himself would have to be excused because of his medical appointment for his rhinitis. At 10:00 a.m., Wang had a meeting with Bureau leaders. Deputy chiefs Cha Zhiyuan and Zhang Guansan (1915–April 6, 2008)65 were present; and Mei Shirong, Wang Chengmin, Zhang Chengzhen, Liu Defu, and others made reports. Because of the seriousness of the situation, Wang read his letter, elaborating evidence for an imminent major earthquake. Mei Shirong did not say a word then. At the end of the meeting, Cha Zhiyuan said, “We are currently very busy. We will discuss it again next week. You should go to Langfang to take a look”.66 July 27, 1976 was a Tuesday. The Monday of the following week would be August 2, 1976. Fifteen hours later, at 3:42:56 a.m. on July 28, 1976, however, an earthquake of magnitude 7.8 hit Tangshan. As it was dawn, the whole city was asleep. The epicenter (39°38′N, 118°11′E) was near Tangshan, Hebei, a city of one million inhabitants. The official death toll was 242,769 but much higher figures have been reported.67 More than 708,000 people were injured, including 164,851 severely injured. The responsibility of failing to issue an early warning lay with Cha Zhiyuan and Mei Shirong. A native of Wujin, Jiangsu, Cha (born 1940) was a graduate of the Department of Geophysics, the University of Science and Technology of China in Beijing. He began to work for the China Seismological Bureau in December 1973. Since Liu Yingyong and Zhang Guansan were non-specialist leaders, Cha was the de facto leader on earthquake predictions in China. According to his memoir published in 2006, he was responsible for a series of documents on potential earthquakes in the area of Beijing, Tianjin, Tangshan, and Bohai Sea. He chaired a conference on earthquakes in North China and Bohai Sea in June 1974, which resulted in a report on the possibility of an earthquake of at least 5.0 in the area of Beijing and Tianjin. He drafted a document in January 1975, specifying an earthquake of 6.0–6.5 in the area of Beijing, Tianjin, and Tangshan, and drafted another similar document in January 1976.68

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Instead of taking full responsibility, Cha put blame on other people, and implicitly on Mei Shirong.69 According to him, it was the Analysis and Forecasting Office of the China Seismological Bureau that reached a conclusion in May 1976 that no major earthquakes would occur in the areas of Beijing, Tianjin, Tangshan, and Zhangjiakou.70 A native of Guang’an, Sichuan (Deng Xiaoping’s hometown), Mei Shirong (born April 27, 1928)71 graduated from the Department of Physics at Chongqing University in 1952. She studied seismology in the Soviet Union as a post-graduate student between 1956 and 1960. She began to work in the China Seismological Bureau in 1974 and was deputy director of the Analysis and Forecasting Office in 1976.72 She was the one who organized the meeting in May 197673 that concluded that no major earthquakes would occur in the areas of Beijing, Tianjin, Tangshan, and Zhangjiakou. She refused to meet with the Beijing Seismic Team twice at the critical moments: once on July 21, 1976 and once on July 26, 1976. She was silent at the meeting of July 27, 1976. Mei indeed was responsible for failing to issue warnings ahead of the earthquake. But her responsibility lay in technical areas. Cha had the political responsibility. Cha also blamed Wang Chengmin in his memoir explicitly. When he asked Wang Chengmin at the meeting of July 27, 1976 whether there would be a major earthquake in the following days, he recalled, “He (Wang Chengmin) firmly replied, ‘there will be no major earthquakes these days’ ”.74 This statement is unlikely to be true given Wang’s dramatic actions of having posted a big-character-poster in front of the Bureau chief’s office and having repeatedly requested for a meeting with Bureau leaders. There might not be enough evidence at the time to make a very accurate prediction about the locality and magnitude of a major earthquake as Cha claimed, but it was entirely possible to send some early warnings based on the incomplete information. In fact, based on the predictions made by Wang Chengming at the July 14, 1976 meeting, cadres of Qinglong County (located 115 kilometers away from Tangshan) took preventive measures and saved many lives.75 In a county of 470,000 people where 7,300 houses collapsed and

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another 180,000 houses damaged, only one person died in the quake.76 The year 1976 was a turning point in the history of the People’s Republic of China. Premier Zhou Enlai, the premier since the founding of the People’s Republic, passed away on January 8. Marshal Zhu De, the most respected “general commander” of the People’s Liberation Army, passed away on July 6. At the time of the earthquake on July 28, Mao Zedong was in his last days. Hua Guofeng (February 16, 1921–August 20, 2008), the premier since April 7, 1976, made a report to Mao about the effect of the quake in Beijing and called for a meeting with China Seismological Bureau staff including Liu Yingyong, Mei Shirong, and Huang Xiangning on the same day. Hua went to Tangshan on August 4, 197677 and reportedly remarked, “Foreigners want to come to China and assist us. We, the great People’s Republic of China, do not need foreign intervention and do not need foreign aid!”78 WENCHUAN EARTHQUAKE The Sichuan earthquake, also known as Wenchuan earthquake after its epicenter (31°02′N, 103°37′E) in Wenchuan County, Sichuan, was the strongest earthquake since the 1950 Zayu earthquake. Measured at 8.0 on the Richter scale, the earthquake affected 16 provinces (such as Shaanxi, Gansu, and Chongqing) in China.79 The Wenchuan earthquake was also the deadliest since the 1976 Tangshan earthquake. A county of 106,119 people covering an area of 4,084 square kilometers, Wenchuan is located in southeast part of the Aba Tibetan-Qiang Autonomous Prefecture and the seat of the Wenchuan County government, Weizhou Township, is 159 kilometers to the northwest of Chengdu, the provincial capital of Sichuan.80 The official death toll as of July 21, 2008 is 69,197, including 68,636 in Sichuan Province. The earthquake also left 374,176 injured, 18,222 missing, and 4.8 million homeless. The question is whether there was enough evidence to predict the earthquakes.81 Chen Xuezhong (born August 1963), a scientist at the Institute of Geophysics, the China Seismological Bureau (CSB),

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made a prediction in 2002 that there would be a major earthquake of M ≥ 7.0 in Sichuan Province within next year or two. He made that prediction in an essay, “Seismic Risk Analysis of Earthquakes of M ≥ 7.0 in Sichuan Province, China”, published in the twelfth (2002) issue of Recent Developments in World Seismology, a Chinese journal.82 He warned, “Beginning with 2003 we should pay more attention to the possibility of an earthquake of M ≥ 7.0 occurring in Sichuan Province!” But his prediction did not materialize in either 2003 or 2004. In another article published in the first issue of the journal in 2005, “The December 26, 2004 Indonesia earthquake with M8.7 and its effect on the seismic tendency of the mainland China”, Chen warned again about the possibility of earthquakes of M ≥ 7.0 in Sichuan Province.83 During an interview on May 16, 2008, Chen confirmed his predictions. According to him, his predictions were based on the frequency of major earthquakes in Sichuan. The average number of years between major earthquakes since 1800 was 16 years, with a maximum of 34 years and a minimum of three years and 83 percent of major earthquakes occurred within 23 years. The average number of years between major earthquakes since 1900 was 11 years, with a maximum of 19 years and a minimum of three years and seven M ≥ 7.0 earthquakes that occurred in Sichuan since 1900 occurred within 1–3 years after the occurrences of M ≥ 7.7 earthquakes in other areas of the Mainland China. But it had been 26 years (since 1976) as of 2002 since the last major earthquake in Sichuan. After a M8.1 earthquake occurred on November 14, 2001 in Mount Kunlun between Qinghai and Xinjiang, Chen made the prediction that Sichuan would have a major earthquake within a year or two. The fact that the prediction did not come true in 2003 or 2004 did not rule out its possibility. He therefore issued another warning in 2005.84 Although these were reasonable predictions, they were not precise enough to be meaningful in coming up with preventive measures. In the meantime, Geng Qingguo also claimed that he had made predictions since 2006 based on his theory of the relationship between droughts and earthquakes that the Aba region (the prefecture where Wenchuan County is located) and other regions in Sichuan

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might have the risk of having a M7.0 earthquake in a few years. On April 26–27, 2008, the Professional Committee of Forecasting National Disasters of the Chinese Geophysical Society85 (of which Geng Qingguo is executive vice chairman) determined that “within a year from May 2008 to April 2009, attention should be paid to the area from south of Lanzhou to the border of Sichuan, Gansu, and Qinghai where an earthquake of M6–7 might occur”, explicitly specifying that “within a range of 10 days around May 8, 2008 (i.e., from April 28 to May 18, 2008) there would be a risk of having a M ≥ 7.0 earthquake in the region of Aba”. The report was reportedly sent to the China Seismological Bureau on April 30, 2008.86 But Deputy Director Che Shi of the Monitoring and Forecasting Department of the China Seismological Bureau said on May 20, 2008 that his bureau did not receive any short-term forecasts from any work units, any individuals, or any groups regarding this earthquake before May 12, 2008. According to him, the China Seismological Network Center (formerly the Analysis and Forecasting Center) had received more than 700 short-term forecast reports since 2000 and only seven of them were basically accurate. The center received 26 forecast reports in 2008 but none of them were accurate.87 Moreover, according to Gao Jiaguo, research fellow of the Geology Research Institute of the China Seismological Bureau, China still has a long way to go in forecasting, particularly regarding major disasters. China’s forecast accuracy is 70–80 percent for regular weather conditions, but only 20–40 percent for heavy rains within 24 hours. For huge storms, the United States’ accuracy is 20 percent and China’s is only 15 percent. China’s forecast accuracy between 1960 and 2007 was 16 percent for earthquakes but only 13 percent for earthquakes of M > 7.0.88 In other words, contrary to Geng Qingguo’s claim that stronger earthquakes are easier to forecast, higher magnitude earthquakes are more difficult to forecast accurately. The point here, however, is not whether some predictions came true but whether there was enough evidence to forecast ahead of the earthquake. Moreover, according to the procedure of the China Seismological Network Center, those who want to send a warning about an earthquake have to make a formal report by filling out a

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forecast form with the time, location, and magnitude of the earthquake. Sun Shihong was one of the staff at the Center responsible for processing these forms. Before the Wenchuan earthquake, he did not receive any formal warning written in a completed forecast form.89 One thing that China certainly significantly improved in 2008 was its technology on information gathering. Back in 1976, when the Tangshan earthquake occurred, it took the China Seismological Bureau (CSB) hours to locate the epicenter. The earthquake occurred at 3:42 a.m. on July 28, 1976. But seismographs at the Seismic Observation Station near Beijing’s Miyun Reservoir and elsewhere in the capital were all shaken out of order. No one knew where the epicenter was and what the measure and intensity of the earthquake were. More than one hour later, at 5:00 a.m., the China Seismological Bureau sent out four groups to search for the epicenter in four directions (north, south, east, and west) in a range of 200 kilometers around Beijing. At the same time, four people (Li Yulin, Cao Guocheng, Cui Zhiliang, and Yuan Qingwu) from Tangshan Kailuan Coalmine were coming in an ambulance to Beijing to report the earthquake. The group from Tangshan met with a group from the China Seismological Bureau at Jixian County in Tianjin, 88 kilometers away from Beijing. After a brief exchange, Yuan Qingwu went back to Tangshan along with the seismological staff; and the other three continued their trip to Beijing along with a staff from the CSB. When they finally arrived at Zhongnanhai, Li Yulin burst out, “Tangshan has been wiped out!” It was then already past 8:00 a.m., five hours later.90 In contrast, in less than 10 minutes after the Wenchuan earthquake occurred, the CSB was able to locate the epicenter and sent a report to the State Council. The earthquake occurred at 2:28 p.m., the China Seismological Network Center (located in Sanlihe Street in Beijing, some 1,500 kilometers away from Wenchuan) identified the earthquake with Wenchuan as the epicenter, measuring 7.8 on the Richter scale (it was later revised to 8.0) at 2:36 p.m.91 Instead of five hours, it took the CSB only eight minutes in 2008 to produce an accurate report. Sun Shihong, the chief forecaster of the China Seismological Network Center, happened to be in Kunming at the time. He received a SMS about the earthquake at 2:38 p.m.92

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Leadership Response The Chinese leadership’s response was swift. Within hours, President Hu Jintao issued an order to help those affected by the earthquake, Premier Wen Jiaobao was on his way to direct the rescue work, and the Chengdu Military Region dispatched troops to help with disaster relief work in the earthquake-stricken area. Having just returned from a very successful five-day state visit to Japan in the evening of May 10, 2008, Hu Jintao issued the order at about 3:28 p.m. on May 12, 2008, one hour after the earthquake93 and chaired a Politburo Standing Committee meeting in the evening of the same day.94 At the meeting, it was announced that an Earthquake Relief Command had been established with Premier Wen as the commander-in-chief and Vice Premiers Li Keqiang and Hui Liangyu as deputy commander-in-chiefs. Under the command, there are eight small groups responsible for rescue work, earthquake monitoring, medical care, infrastructure, production restoration, security, and publicity. These small groups are composed of leaders from various ministries, the PLA, People’s Armed Police, and local governments. Two days later, on May 14, 2008, Hu chaired another Politburo Standing Committee meeting on the earthquake relief work, rallying the entire nation behind the relief efforts and sending more troops, armed police, firemen, special policemen, and medical workers to the quake-affected areas to save lives.95 On May 16, 2008, Hu Jintao went to Sichuan himself. Upon his arrival at Mianyang Airport in Sichuan, he held a meeting with Wen Jiabao on the relief work. He then visited Leiguzhen Township, the most severely affected area in Beichuan County on the same day96 and went to Wenchuan County and Pengzhou City on May 17.97 On May 18, he visited Shifang City.98 At the time of the earthquake, Wen Jiabao had just returned to Beijing from a visit to Henan.99 When the earthquake occurred, as Wen recalled, he was working in his office in Beijing. His office shook because of such a strong earthquake (7.8 on the Richter scale with an intensity of XI) in a densely populated area of 300 people per square kilometer. He immediately decided to go to the earthquake-hit areas. Out of his love for the Chinese people, he said, he needed to

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get to the site as soon as possible to save lives because of the vital importance of the first 72 hours.100 He boarded the plane at 4:40 p.m., two hours and 12 minutes after the quake and arrived at Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan at 7:10 p.m.101 After chairing a meeting of the Earthquake Relief Command in Chengdu, Wen went to Dujiangyan, a city northwest of Chengdu less than 100 kilometers from the quake’s epicenter at Wenchuan County. At the site of Xinjiang Primary School where pupils were buried under the rubbles on May 13, 2008, he told two trapped children, “This is Grandpa Wen Jiabao. Hold on, children. You will be saved”.102 It was there where Wen reportedly stumbled and fell in his haste but he refused to let a medical worker bandage his bleeding arm. “Trying to coordinate another rescue attempt”, a blogger at the Newsweek reported, “Wen falls. Minutes later his arm is visibly bleeding. A medical worker tries to put a dressing on the cut, but Wen pushes him or her away”.103 Then he went to Deyang, a city about 97 kilometers east of the epicenter, and Mianyang, a city about 140 kilometers northeast of Wenchuan.104 He went to Beichuan Qiang Autonomous County, about 160 kilometers northeast of Wenchuan and Yingxiu Township of Wenchuan, the epicenter of the earthquake, on May 14.105 Wen went back to Beijing on May 16106 and chaired at least three meetings of the Earthquake Relief Work Command from May 17 through May 19.107 On May 22, 2008, Wen went back to Sichuan again to coordinate the relief work.108 Wu Bangguo, chairman of the NPC Standing Committee and the No. 2 ranking Politburo Standing member, chaired a meeting of the chairmen of the NPC Standing Committee on May 22, 2008 and pledged his support for the relief work. After hearing a briefing made by Vice Premier Li Keqiang, Wu remarked that: (1) the NPC Standing Committee would put the report of the State Council on the earthquake relief work in the agenda of the next NPC Standing Committee meeting in June; (2) the NPC would carry out the decision of the Party Center and support the State Council’s financial requests for relief work, making adjustments to the budgetary expenditure so as to make available whatever was needed for the

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relief work;109 and (3) the NPC would review the crisis management law as well as the earthquake prevention and disaster reduction law, and make appropriate revisions.110 Wu went to Sichuan on May 26. He visited patients at the General Hospital of the Chengdu Military Region and a distribution center of relief materials at the Chengdu Railway Station in Chengdu on the same day111 and moved on to Yingxiu Township in Wenchuan and Dujiangyan City the next day.112 On May 28, he went to Hanwang Township in Mianzhu City and Pingtong Township in Pingwu County.113 Jia Qinglin, chairman of the CPPCC and Politburo Standing Committee member, was visiting Slovenia on May 12 at the time of the earthquake. He had been on a tour of four nations in Europe: Romania, Hungary, Slovenia, and Croatia since May 4, 2008.114 He went to Croatia on May 13115 but decided to curtail his visit to Croatia on May 14.116 He chaired a meeting of the CPPCC on the earthquake relief work on May 23117 and visited Sichuan from May 29 to 31.118 Li Changchun, Politburo Standing Committee member in charge of propaganda work, chaired a meeting about media reports on the earthquake in the evening of May 12. He urged media reporters to enhance their sense of political awareness, their perspective of overall situation and their sense of social responsibility; firmly grasp the correct direction of public opinion in the spirit of being highly responsible for the Party and the people; make positive reports so as to create a social atmosphere of the whole nation united to overcome the difficulties and to provide strong spiritual power, media support, and ideological guarantee for the relief work. He indicated that reporters from Renmin Ribao, Xinhua News Agency, China National Radio (CNR), and China Central Television (CCTV) would be sent to the earthquake-hit areas right away and that the media should provide timely, accurate, open, and transparent reports on the earthquake. A leading small group on relief work report had been established under the Department of Propaganda.119 On behalf of General Secretary Hu Jintao, Li also visited the earthquake-affected areas in Sichuan from June 1 to 2, 2008.120 Xi Jinping, the heir apparent to Hu Jintao and No. 6 Politburo Standing Committee ranking member, did not visit Sichuan in the

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first one and a half months of the earthquake. On behalf of General Secretary Hu Jintao, he went to Shaanxi Province,121 a neighboring province in the north of Sichuan on May 19, 2008. Shaanxi was seriously affected by the earthquake. Eighty-nine counties in 10 cities such as Hanzhong and Baoji in the province were affected. By 9:00 p.m. local time on May 18, 2008, the earthquake had left 113 people dead, 1,920 injured, and 1,129,000 homeless; 102,000 houses collapsed and 575,000 houses were damaged.122 He visited Hanzhong on May 19,123 Lüeyang County on May 20124 and Baoji on May 21.125 From June 27 to 29, 2008, in accordance with instructions of General Secretary Hu Jintao, Xi, along with Li Yuanchao, Politburo member and director of the Central Organization Department, visited Sichuan.126 Li Keqiang, the executive vice premier and the heir apparent to Wen Jiabao, as well as No. 7 Politburo Standing Committee ranking member, played an important role in the earthquake relief operations. Appointed deputy commander-in-chief of the Earthquake Relief Command within hours of the earthquake on May 12, 2008, Li was responsible for coordinating earthquake relief operations among the different ministries. After the first Politburo Standing Committee meeting on the earthquake relief work on May 12, Li chaired a meeting of leaders from 43 organizations on the earthquake relief operations. Under his leadership, the General Office of the State Council established an emergency mechanism. The General Department of Staff of the PLA, the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the China Seismological Bureau, the Ministry of Health, the Central Propaganda Department, the Ministry of Industry and Information, the National Development and Reform Commission, and the Ministry of Public Security all activated the grade I emergency response mechanism.127 After Wen Jiabao returned to Beijing, Li Keqiang went to Sichuan to coordinate the relief operations on behalf of Wen. He visited Mianyang on May 18;128 Shifang, Beichuan, and Anxian on May 19;129 Wenchuan and Dujiangyan on May 20;130 and Mianzhu on May 21.131 He Guoqiang, Politburo Standing Committee member and secretary of the Central Disciplinary Inspection Commission (CDIC) as well as former party secretary of Chongqing, visited Chongqing on behalf of General Secretary Hu Jintao from May 19132 to 21.133

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Finally, Zhou Yongkang, Politburo Standing Committee member in charge of security issues and former party secretary of Sichuan, went to Gansu on May 15, 2008 on behalf of General Secretary Hu Jintao to coordinate efforts to repair the collapsed Tunnel No. 109 of the Baoji-Chengdu Railway. The Baoji-Chengdu (Bao-Cheng) Railway, linking Baoji in Shaanxi in the north with Chengdu in Sichuan in the south over a distance of 669 kilometers, passes through 304 tunnels. Affected by the massive earthquake in Wenchuan, Sichuan, Tunnel No. 109 (which is located in Huixian County, Gansu) collapsed. A 41carriage cargo train passing through this section was struck by huge rocks from the landslide and was derailed. The 500 tons of aircraft gasoline carried on the train leaked and caught fire.134 Zhou then went to Lunan City, one of the most seriously affected areas in Gansu (which is another neighboring province in north of Sichuan) on May 16.135 Zhou also visited Sichuan in accordance with General Secretary Hu Jintao’s instructions from June 5 to 9.136 Possibly adopting a proposal from Hu Xingdou, a professor of economics at the Beijing Institute of Technology,137 the Chinese leadership declared a three-day mourning period from May 19 to 21 for the tens of thousands of people killed in the quake. The State Council issued a public notice, asking that all national flags fly at halfmast at home and Chinese diplomatic missions abroad;138 that public recreational activities be halted; that Chinese citizens nationwide stand in silence for three minutes to mourn for the victims at 2:28 p.m. on May 19 (Monday); and that air raid sirens and horns of automobiles, trains, and ships wail in grief.139 During the mourning period, condolence books were opened in China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Chinese embassies and consulates around the world; and the Beijing Olympic torch relay was also suspended.140 At 2:28 p.m. on May 19, 2008, Hu Jintao, Wu Bangguo, Wen Jiabao, Jia Qinglin, Xi Jinping, He Guoqiang, and Zhou Yongkang along with other Politburo members stood in front of the Zhongnanhai, the residence of the central government, in silence for three minutes.141 The four general departments of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) were immediately mobilized after the quake. In accordance with Chairman Hu’s instructions, the General Staff Department

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under the leadership of General Chen Bingde (born July 1941) issued orders to the Chengdu Military Region, the Lanzhou Military Region, the PLA Air Force,142 and the People’s Armed police to dispatch troops immediately to areas affected by the earthquake.143 The General Political Department under the leadership of General Li Jinai (born 1942) sent political instructions, urging the PLA troops to carry out Chairman Hu’s instructions. The General Department of Logistics under the leadership of General Liao Xilong (born 1940) and the General Department of Armament under the leadership of Chang Wanquan (born January 1949) were all prepared for the relief work. The Chengdu Military Region (covering Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, and Tibet) under the leadership of Commander Lieutenant General Li Shiming (born January 1948) and Political Commissar Lieutenant General Zhang Haiyang (born July 1949) sent 6,100 troops and four helicopters to the affected areas within hours.144 By May 18, 2008, China had deployed a total of 113,080 PLA troops and armed police to help with rescue operations in earthquakehit areas in Sichuan. According to National Defense Ministry spokesman Senior Colonel Hu Changming, these troops were from the Chengdu Military Region, the Jinan Military Region, the Lanzhou Military Region, the Beijing Military Region, the Guangzhou Military Region, the PLA Navy, the PLA Air Force, the Second Artillery Corps, and the Armed Police. Military transport aircrafts and helicopters had made 1,069 flights, 92 military trains and 110,000 military vehicles, cranes, rubber boats, portable communication devices, and power generators were used in the operations. The armed forces had pulled out 21,566 people (dead or alive) from the debris, treated 34,051 injured people, and transferred 205,370 people to safety. They also airdropped 307 tons of relief supplies and repaired 557 kilometers of damaged roads.145 By June 9, 2008, troops, volunteers, and residents in the earthquake-hit areas had rescued 83,988 people in Sichuan alone.146 Social Mutual Assistance In the face of national crisis, the Chinese united in spirit and in action. First, businesses, government organizations, and ordinary

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people all made donations. By 4:00 p.m. on May 14, 2008, charity organisations in China received donations of 877 million yuan, including 311 million yuan to China Red Cross and 120 million yuan to China Charity Federation.147 On the same day, donations from people in Hong Kong reached HK$600 million.148 By June 11, 2008, China had received donations of 44.57 billion yuan from home and abroad, including 36 billion yuan in cash donations.149 Businesses in mainland China, Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan all made donations. Those who made donations of more than 100 million yuan150 include the family of Li Siu-Kei (born 1926) and Henderson Land Development Company Limited (Hong Kong) (577 million yuan),151 State Grid Corporation of China (210 million yuan),152 Li Ka Shing (Hong Kong) (130 million yuan),153 Formosa Plastics Group (Taiwan) (100 million yuan), Rizhao Steel Group (Shandong) (100 million yuan),154 Tianjin Rockcheck Steel Group Co., Ltd. (Tianjin) (100 million yuan),155 Run Run Shaw (Hong Kong) (born October 4, 1907) (100 million yuan),156 and Wang Laoji (Guangdong Jiaduobao Drink & Food Co., Ltd.) (Guangdong) (100 million yuan).157 Even though Vanke, a real estate company in Shenzhen, eventually made a total donation of 105 million yuan for the earthquake relief and post-earthquake reconstruction by late May 2008,158 the company had been a target of public criticism because of remarks made by its board chairman. After announcing a donation of 2.2 million yuan on May 12, Wang Shi (born January 1951), Chairman of Vanke, wrote a blog on May 15 entitled “After all, life is the most important (in reply to netizen 56)”, saying that the 2.2 million donation from Vanke was an appropriate amount and that Vanke’s employees should donate no more than 10 yuan each. China is a country with frequent natural disasters, he explained, business charity activities should be sustainable and they should not become burdens for businesses. His remarks were widely criticized on the internet. Netizens pointed out Vanke was the No. 1 real estate company in Mainland China in 2007 with the total sales of 52.3 billion yuan and a net profit of 4.8 billion yuan. The 2.2 million donations from Vanke are merely 0.0458% of its net profit. Vanke’s employees were also disappointed at

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Wang Shi’s remarks. Many made donations exceeding the prescribed 10-yuan limit. Investors punished Vanke by selling off its stocks. Following Wang Shi’s remarks, Vanke’s stock price dropped by 12 percent in five days. Vanke was embroiled in a public relations crisis. Vanke subsequently tried to repair its image by announcing a 100million yuan donation for post-earthquake reconstruction in Sichuan on May 20, 2008.159 Private companies played an important role in the relief efforts. By June 5, 2008, private companies had made a total donation of 6.24 billion yuan, including cash donations of 5.15 billion yuan. Among the 8,000 companies that made donations, 98 donated more than 10 million yuan each and six gave more than 100 million yuan each.160 Donors also included movie stars such as Jackie Chen, Jet Li, Zhang Ziyi, Fan Bingbing, and Andy Lau, and sports stars such as Yao Ming, Liu Xiang, and Yang Ling, as well as numerous ordinary people. Communist party members contributed a special party membership fee as a form of donation for the earthquake relief efforts. By June 17, 2008, the total special party membership fee contributed had reached 8.43 billion yuan. When a ninety-plus–year-old Party member lined up to contribute the special party membership fee one day, he was told to skip the line and make the contribution right away. “There is only special party membership fee, but there is no special party member”, he said, “Everyone is lining up, so must I”.161 Wang Deqing, a widow who lost her husband to the earthquake, contributed 50-yuan special party membership fee on behalf of her late husband. She explained that her husband was a party member and would have made this contribution himself had he been alive.162 Ninety-two year old Zhuo Lin (Deng Xiaoping’s wife) (born 1916), another veteran Party member, made a donation of 100,000 yuan, consisting of all her savings and some donations from the family.163 Many served as volunteers in the earthquake relief efforts. The day after the earthquake, May 13, 2008, more than 3,000 residents of Chengdu, the provincial capital, lined up for blood donations.164 By May 19, 2008, 7,700 medical workers and 53,600 volunteers had arrived in the earthquake-hit areas.165 By May 23, 76,000 volunteers

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had participated in the rescue work 365,000 times.166 The first medical team from Macao comprising 10 doctors and 10 nurses went to Sichuan on May 23.167 By June 3, almost 6 million volunteers had participated in the earthquake relief work.168 As a result of the important role volunteers played in the earthquake relief work, volunteerism has been well-received by the Chinese government. The Central Steering Commission on Social Construction of Ideological Infrastructure (Zhongyang Jingshen Wenming Zhidao Weiyuanhui),169 the decision-making organ of the Central Committee of the CCP on social ethics education established in 1997,170 issued a document on October 6, 2008, making a 16-point proposal to local governments on promoting volunteerism among the Chinese. According to the document, voluntary service as a “newborn thing” should be encouraged because it is a reflection of social responsibility of citizens — a lively practice of consciously serving others and the society, and building a better life together; an important mark of modern social civil development; and an effective channel for promoting spiritual construction in the new era. Volunteer services can broadly mobilize social resources, effectively supplementing deficiencies of government services and market services.171 In the meantime, non-government organizations (NGOs) in China172 also made tremendous contributions in the relief efforts. In China, these are not called NGOs ( fei zhengfu zuzhi) but civil organizations (min jian zuzhi). The civil organizations include two major categories: charity organizations (cishan jigou) and non-profit social organizations ( fei yingli shehui tuanti). In 2008, there were more than 300,000 civil organizations in China,173 including more than 1,000 foundations.174 On the second day of the earthquake (May 12), three charity organizations (China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation (CFPA), China Youth Development Foundation (CYDF), and Nandu Charity Foundation) called for all civil organizations in China to work together in the earthquake relief efforts. To the call, 163 civil organizations responded. These organizations worked in the areas of materials distribution, environmental protection, medical assistance, psychological counseling, and education.175

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Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan all made timely contributions to Sichuan’s relief work. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region government decided on May 14 to appropriate HK$350 million (about US$45 million) for the relief efforts,176 and sent three rescue and medical teams over the next two days,177 in addition to a medical team that had arrived in Beichuan County on May 13.178 According to a survey, 95 percent of Hong Kong residents donated for the relief efforts.179 The total donations from both the government and Hong Kong residents were more than HK$2.2 billion (about US$282 million) as of June 16, 2008.180 Meanwhile, the Macao Special Administrative Region government also decided to provide 100 million yuan (about US$14.6 million) for the relief efforts on May 13,181 and sent a medical team of 20 people (including 10 doctors and 10 nurses) on May 23182 and another medical team of 21 people (including 11 doctors and 10 nurses) on June 10.183 The Macao Foundation also provided 10 million yuan (about US$1.46 million) on May 13.184 Macao residents also donated 205 million Macao patacas (about US$25.6 million) through the Central Liaison Office, in addition to 80 million Macao patacas (about US$10 million) through the Macao Red Cross.185 Taiwan residents also provided donations and assistance. Presidentelect Ma Ying-jeou donated NT$200,000 (US$6,545) in the afternoon of May 13,186 and he and his wife, Chou Mei-ching, also joined more than 100 other celebrities answering phone calls and accepting donations for the Sichuan earthquake victims in a television fundraising campaign held on May 18.187 The event collected NT$227 million (US$7.4 million).188 Taiwan’s rescue team of 22 people arrived in Chengdu in the afternoon of May 16189 and joined the rescue teams from Hong Kong and Russia in Mianzhu City.190 A Taiwan Red Cross medical team of 37 people left Taipei for Chengdu on May 20.191 By May 30, 2008, Taiwanese had donated a total of 780 million yuan (US$112.4 million) in cash and 33 million yuan (US$4.76 million) worth of relief goods.192 International Assistance In contrast to 1976 when the Chinese government refused to accept any foreign aid in the aftermath of the Tangshan earthquake, China

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opened its door in 2008 to international assistance in the relief work following the Wenchuan earthquake. Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda sent a message to Chinese President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao through the Japanese embassy in Beijing later on May 12, the day of the earthquake, offering to help with the rescue work if necessary.193 American President George W. Bush expressed his condolences to the victims of the quake and his willingness to provide assistance to China in an announcement on the same day194 and conveyed the message in a phone conversation with President Hu Jintao on May 13.195 Russian President Dmitry Medvedev sent a message of condolences to Chinese President Hu Jintao over the disastrous earthquake and expressed his willingness to offer humanitarian aid sometime before Tuesday (May 13) night and Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin also sent a similar message to Premier Wen Jiabao at the same time.196 Leaders from other countries such as Britain, Romania, Chile, Mexico, Portugal, Israel, Afghanistan, Cyprus, Spain, Germany, Laos, South Korea, Brazil, Jordan, Pakistan, Italy, Singapore, Australia, North Korea, Vietnam, Mongolia, Thailand, Bangladesh, India, France, as well as the European Union, also expressed their sympathy and support.197 The Chinese government responded to their sympathy and support with great appreciation and indicated its willingness to accept foreign aid. At a press conference at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on May 13, 2008, Spokesman Qin Gang indicated China’s willingness to accept international assistance.198 At a press conference on the same day, Wang Zhenyao, director of the disaster relief bureau under the Ministry of Civil Affairs, also expressed China’s appreciation for international assistance. He said that the Chinese government would accept donations from the international community and forward them to earthquake-stricken areas in a timely fashion. But after taking traffic congestion into consideration, he believed it was difficult to arrange for international rescue teams to visit the earthquake-affected areas then. “When circumstances permit”, Wang said, “we will ask the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to liaison with relevant organizations such as the Ministry of Civil Affairs and the China Seismological Bureau to make an arrangement (for international rescue teams)”.199

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International aid poured in China from many countries and international organizations. By June 4, 2008, a total of 166 countries and 16 international organizations had provided cash donations of 3,555 million yuan (US$512 million) and relief materials worth 1,154 million yuan (US$166 million).200 In terms of government donations, Saudi Arabia was the top donor of all countries. Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah Bin-Abd-al-Aziz Al Saud (born August 1, 1924) decided to donate US$50 million in cash and US$10 million worth of relief materials right away.201 The first batch of relief goods donated by Saudi Arabia arrived in Chengdu in the afternoon of May 20, 2008. The relief goods included 14,000 tents and blankets, instant food, milk powder for children, and rescue tools. In addition to the US$60 million donations, Saudi Arabia decided on May 20 to donate 85,000 tents, 400,000 awnings, and 500,000 blankets.202 In addition, Saudi Arabia also contributed US$1.5 million to the United Nations’ efforts to raise money for the post-earthquake construction in Sichuan, the first ever donation from Saudi Arabia to the United Nations in this area.203 Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Joseph Harper (born April 30, 1959) was not the first Canadian leader to send a note of condolences to the victims of the Sichuan earthquake204 but the Canadian government offered the second-largest donation of all countries with more than CA$17 million (about US$17 million). The first note came on May 12 from the then Foreign Minister Maxime Bernier (born January 18, 1963) and International Cooperation Minister Beverley Joan “Bev” Oda (born July 27, 1944).205 The pair announced an aid of CA$1 million (about US$1 million) to China’s relief work, and Minister Oda also indicated that the Canadian government would also set up a Sichuan Earthquake Relief Fund to match individual donations to humanitarian organizations.206 In the meantime, the provincial government of Ontario also donated CA$1 million.207 On May 18, the Canadian government and the provincial government of British Columbia announced additional aid of CA$8 million (CA$2 million from the province of British Columbia and CA$6 million from the Canadian federal government).208 In addition, Canada also contributed CA$7 million to the United Nations’ efforts to raise money for post-earthquake construction in Sichuan.209

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The Japanese government was the third highest donor among all the countries. The then-Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda (born July 16, 1936) was the first foreign leader to offer assistance to China’s relief efforts. Only three hours after the earthquake, he sent a message to President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao through the Japanese embassy in Beijing, offering Japan’s assistance to China.210 The Japanese government decided to provide an urgent aid of US$5 million in cash on May 13, and the prefecture of Niigata, Japan, donated 1 million yen (about 67,000 yuan) through the Japanese embassy in Beijing on the same day.211 On May 30, the Japanese government announced another donation of 500 million yen (about US$4.8 million) of relief goods.212 The German government was the fourth largest donor to China’s relief efforts. German Chancellor Angela Dorothea Merkel (born July 17, 1954) was among the first foreign leaders to express sympathy for the victims of the earthquake. In an official statement issued on May 12, Merkel said the German government was ready to provide speedy assistance to China.213 The Germany government announced on May 13 that it would provide its initial aid of e500,000 (US$770,000) in cash for earthquake victims in Sichuan.214 The Germany government announced on May 16 that it would provide another e1 million (US$1.55 million) in aid to China.215 A few days later, the Germany government pledged another e2.5 million (US$3.88 million) of Chinese-German development aid to China’s earthquake relief efforts, on top of its previous aid of e1.5 million (US$2.3 million).216 In addition, the Defense Ministry of Germany provided China with e3 million (US$4.65 million) worth of aid materials.217 The Norwegian government also provided a large amount of assistance to the victims of the Sichuan earthquake. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway made an announcement on May 13 that the Norwegian government would provide an aid of 20 million kroners (about US$4 million) to China.218 The Norwegian government later also provided relief goods worth of e110,000219 and medical supplies worth US$1.07 million.220 In addition, Norway also contributed US$1.5 million to the United Nations’ efforts to raise money for post-earthquake construction in Sichuan.221

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The South Korean government assisted China in its need. Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA)222 indicated to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce on May 14 that the South Korean government would provide an emergency aid of US$1 million.223 A few days later, the South Korean government added relief materials worth US$4 million, raising the total to US$5 million.224 In addition, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak (born December 19, 1941) visited the earthquake-hit area during his state visit to China. He visited Dujiangyan on May 30 before his departure for Seoul.225 In addition to Japan and South Korea, many other neighboring countries also offered their assistance. Bangladesh sent a cargo plane carrying 10 tons of relief materials to China;226 Turkmenistan offered 40 tons of relief materials;227 Uzbekistan offered 50 tons of relief materials;228 Mongolia donated US$50,000;229 North Korea offered US$100,000;230 the Philippines provided US$100,000;231 Cambodia government offered US$100,000;232 Tajikistan assisted with US$100,000 and relief materials such as tents;233 Vietnam assisted with US$200,000, 150 tents and 10,000 cans of milk powder;234 Singapore government offered US$200,000235 (S$272,300) as well as humanitarian aid worth S$108,920 (US$80,000);236 Indonesia provided 36 tons of relief goods worth US$489,000;237 Thailand pledged US$500,000;238 Laos offered lumber worth US$500,000239 and US$100,000 in cash;240 Kazakhstan provided relief materials worth US$3.6 million;241 and India pledged to provide relief materials worth US$5 million.242 The most touching story is the assistance from Pakistan. Upon hearing China’s call for tents on May 19, 2008,243 the Pakistani government decided to provide 10,000 tents for China’s relief work on the same day.244 It subsequently added another more than 10,000 tents from its strategic reserves, reaching a total of 22,260 tents on May 23, 2008.245 At an estimated price of more than US$200 per tent, these tents are worth more than US$4 million.246 But the Pakistanis would not let the Chinese pay for them. “When Chinese brothers were helping us, did they ever ask us for money?” the Pakistanis reasoned.247

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In contrast, the US government’s cash donation of US$500,000248 was only one percent of Saudi’s initial cash donation.249 The United States government dispatched two airplanes to deliver relief goods worth about US$700,000.250 A few days later, the US government provided additional relief materials worth of US$1 million.251 In terms of donations, the US government did not seem to give more than many much smaller and poorer countries. Those who made donations of more than half a million US dollars include Gabon (US$500,000),252 Senegal (US$500,000), Lesotho [5 million loti (about 4.51 million yuan or US$650,000)],253 Denmark (US$650,000),254 Romania (US$860,000), Algeria (US$1 million), Venezuela (US$1 million), Oman (US$1 million),255 Equatorial Guinea (US$1 million), Slovakia [29 million Slovak Koruna (about US$1.425 million)], Malaysia (US$1.5 million), France [about e1 million (about US$1.55 million)],256 Spain [e1 million (US$1.55 million)], seven tons of relief goods, and 82 tents;257 Netherlands [e1 million (US$1.55 million)];258 Ireland [e1.11 million (about US$1.72 million)],259 Belgium [e1.18 million (about US$1.82 million)],260 Australia [AU$2 million (about US$1.9 million)],261 Nigeria (US$2 million);262 Turkey (US$2 million); Sweden [12.9 million Swedish Krona (about 14.45 million yuan or US$2.08 million)];263 Finland [e1.9 million (about US$2.93 million)],264 Britain [£2 million (US$3.95 million)],265 and Italy [at least e3.365 million (about US$5.22 million)] and 410 tents.266 Many small countries also made their contributions. Mali initially pledged 25 million CFA francs267 but President Amadou Toumani Touré (born November 4, 1948) doubled the amount, making it to 50 million CFA Franc (840,000 yuan) at the donation ceremony.268 “Mali is still a poor country”, he said, “but the Mali people want to show Chinese brothers that we are together in success and glory as well as in hardship and difficulties”. Albania offered US$40,000;269 Samoa gave US$100,000;270 and Slovenia provided e100,000 (US$155,000).271 In addition to donation from governments, businesses and individuals of the international community also made large amounts of donations. By May 20, 2008, the US Red Cross and American

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companies had made a total of at least US$32 million donations in both cash and relief goods.272 By May 19, 2008, the Overseas Chinese office of the State Council had received donations of 264 million yuan (US$38 million).273 By June 8, 2008, the Chinese embassy in Singapore had received cash donations of S$17.1 million (US$13 million).274 At the same time, Overseas Chinese in Britain sent their donations of £1.23 million (US$2.43 million) to the Chinese embassy in London.275 The Chinese embassy in Spain also received e1.65 million (US$2.56 million).276 The total donations from overseas Chinese are estimated to be more than 1.3 billion yuan (US$187 million).277 Some prominent business donors include Tiong Hiew King (Zhang Xiaoqing) of Rimbunan Hiyau Group (RH Group) of Malaysia (70 million yuan);278 Dhanin Chearavanont (Xie Guomin) of Charon Pokphand Group (CP) (13 million yuan);279 Djuhar Sutanto (Liem Oen Kian) of Rong Qiao Group (12 million yuan);280 Sukanto Tanoto (Tan Kuang Ho) of Raja Garuda Mas International (RGMI) (11 million yuan);281 Chen King Ki See (Shi Gongqi) of Liwayway (China) Co., Ltd. (11 million yuan);282 and Huang Rulun of Centurial Jinyuan (10 million yuan).283 Many international organizations were very generous in their assistance as well. The United Nations headquarters provided US$8 million;284 the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) in China provided relief materials of US$430,000, including 1,000 tents and 15,000 blankets;285 UNICEF in Hong Kong offered the first assistance of HK$2 million;286 the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) provided US$60,000 and 11,000 tents;287 the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) gave US$100,000;288 the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) offered US$50,000;289 the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) provided US$500,000;290 and Louis Michel, European Union Commissioner responsible for Development and Humanitarian Aid pledged an aid of e2 million (US$3.1 million).291 Moreover, UN General Secretary Ban Ki-moon (born June 13, 1944) visited the earthquake-affected areas in Sichuan on May 24, 2008, only 12 days after the quake. He joined Premier Wen Jiabao in Yingxiu Town, Wenchuan County to survey the site and visit victims.292

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It is probably at the second Politburo Standing Committee meeting on the relief efforts held on May 14, 2008 when the Chinese leadership decided to accept foreign rescue teams. In the morning of May 15, the Chinese government announced that it would accept the Japanese assistance for rescue efforts.293 It later announced the acceptance of rescue teams from Russia, South Korea, and Singapore. As soon as China accepted Japan’s rescue assistance, the Japanese government immediately dispatched a rescue team of 31 people [including nine from the National Police Agency, seven from Japan Coast Guard, 11 from Fire and Disaster Management Agency (FDMA), three from Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), and one from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs]294 on May 15. “This was the quickest in the 20-year history of Japan’s foreign rescue assistance”, Japanese rescue team leader Takashi Koizumi recalled. After the Japanese government made a decision to send a rescue team at noon on May 15, 2008, the first Japanese rescue team left Japan at 6:10 p.m. on the same day295 and arrived at 9:45 a.m. on May 16, 2008 in Qingchuan, 400 kilometers from Chengdu.296 Another Japanese rescue team of 29 people arrived at Chengdu at about 7:00 p.m. on the same day and went to Qingchuan from there.297 The first rescue team of 50 people from Russia arrived at Chengdu at 5:30 p.m. on May 16 and went to Mianzhu from there. The rescue team of 47 from South Korea arrived at Chengdu’s Shuangliu International Airport at 6:40 p.m. on the same day (20 minutes before the second rescue team from Japan).298 The Singaporean rescue team of 55 people also arrived at Chengdu in the evening of May 16,299 followed by the second rescue team of 47 from Russia in the morning of May 17.300 The Japanese rescue team recovered the bodies of Song Xuemei and her 75-day-old daughter from the rubble in Qingchuan County at 7:25 p.m. on May 17.301 The first Russian rescue team saved the life of a 61-year-old woman in Dujiangyan (a county-level city under the administration of Chengdu) at 9:00 p.m. on May 17, after she had been buried for 127 hours.302 It took the rescue workers 40 minutes to complete the rescue work. The Russian teams also recovered the bodies of seven victims.303 The South Korean rescue team recovered the bodies of 16 victims in Yinghua Township of Shifang City

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(a county-level city under the administration of Deyang),304 and the Singaporean rescue team recovered the bodies of five victims in Hongbaizhen Township of Shifang. 305 Altogether, a total of 214 members of the four rescue teams from Japan, Russia, South Korea, and Singapore worked for more than 120 hours in more than 40 places. They rescued one survivor and recovered 75 bodies.306 China also accepted foreign medical teams. On May 19, 2008, Foreign Ministry Spokesman Qin Gang announced that China Red Cross307 had been authorized to accept some foreign medical teams to assist in the medical relief work in China.308 On the next day, the first foreign medical team arrived in Sichuan. At 10:35 a.m. on May 20, 2008, the Russian medical team arrived at the Shuangliu International Airport in Chengdu in an Il-76 transport aircraft carrying a mobile hospital, transportation vehicles, and other relief materials.309 The 67-member Russian medical team consisted of 47 medical workers and 20 supporting staff. They brought with them a B-ultrasonic wave machine, an X-ray machine, and other medical equipments. By June 2, 2008 when it returned to Russia, the medical team had treated more than 1,500 patients/times.310 Other medical teams followed. The Japanese medical team of 23 people arrived at Chengdu in the evening of May 20, 2008. By June 2, 2008 when it returned to Japan, the medical team had treated 1,355 patients/times.311 The Italian medical team of 20 people arrived in Chengdu in the afternoon of May 22, 2008.312 The Italian team came with a field hospital equipped for complicated surgical procedures. It set up in Xiaode Town, Mianzhu City and provided medical services to earthquake survivors and training to local medical workers313 and worked until June 5, 2008.314 Germany’s Red Cross donated a field hospital. With 20 tents and 120 beds, the e1.2-million hospital is capable of serving a community of 250,000 people.315 Germany sent two medical workers to Chengdu on May 21 to prepare for the field hospital’s setup, followed by a team of 10 at 10:30 a.m. on May 23.316 The German team set up in Dujiangyan City. In the evening of May 23, the Cuban medical team of 35 members (including 18 doctors and 17 nurses) arrived in Chengdu and began to work immediately.317 The Cuban medical team had treated 1,092 patients, including 31 surgeries by June 4, 2008, when it left

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Chengdu.318 The British medical team of seven members reached Chengdu in the afternoon of May 24 and then went on to Mianyang City, Sichuan.319 The team worked for nine days in the Mianyang Municipal Hospital until May 31.320 The French medical team of 13 people arrived in Chengdu at 11:50 a.m. on May 25 and moved on to Guangyuan City, Sichuan in the same evening.321 The team worked for nine days in the Central Hospital of Guangyuan until June 4.322 The Pakistani medical team of 28 members left Islamabad, the Pakistani capital, for China in two C-130 transport airplanes of the Pakistani air force on May 27, 2008, along with medical equipments, medicines, and foods.323 On the same day, the airplane carrying the Indonesian medical team of 20 members left the Soekarno-Hatta International Airport in Jakarta, Indonesia for Gansu.324 The Pakistani medical team and the Indonesian medical team worked in Wudu County and Wenxian County, Gansu, respectively.325 Most interestingly, the Chinese government also decided to open its air space for military assistance from foreign countries. Eighteen countries provided humanitarian assistance through military channels. These include Russia, the United States, Belgium, Israel, Singapore, Pakistan, Bangladesh, South Korea, Germany, Romania, Belarus, Ukraine, Poland, Serbia, Finland, Montenegro, Vietnam, and Mongolia.326 The Chinese government decided to accept Russia’s donations and allow Russian planes to deliver relief materials right away before May 14, 2008. A Russian aircraft carrying the first batch of 30 tons of humanitarian aid (mostly tents and blankets valued at over US$300,000) from the Russian Ministry of the Emergency Situations (EMERCOM)327 arrived at Chengdu at 2:55 p.m. on May 14, 2008,328 the first from other countries. Another Il-76 transport aircraft carrying the second batch of humanitarian aid took off in Moscow in the same evening.329 Two US air force airplanes carrying supplies worth US$700,000 arrived in Chengdu on May 18, 2008.330 For the first time, the German Federal Defense Force delivered relief materials to China, by a special plane on June 4, 2008.331 Both Pakistan and Bangladesh used their C-130 transport airplanes of the military to send relief materials to Sichuan.332 As of June 23, 2008, the rescue workers had rescued 83,988 people and relocated 1,466,054 people. The medical workers had treated

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2,040,174 people times and hospitalized 96,140 people. The relief goods sent to the earthquake-hit areas include 1,579,700 tents; 4,866,900 beds; 14,101,300 cloths; 1,341,000 tons of fuel; and 2,866,000 tons of coal. The relief fund from various local governments in China was 54.31 billion yuan while the central relief fund was 49.6 billion yuan. The donations from domestic and external sources were 52.48 billion yuan.333 CONCLUDING REMARKS What was so impressive about China in the aftermath of the Wenchuan earthquake in 2008 is the sharp contrast to its own past. Compared to China of 1976, the China of 2008 was much more efficient, much more responsive, much more transparent, and much more open. Instead of more than five hours in 1976, seismologists located the epicenter in eight minutes in 2008. President Hu Jintao issued an order to rescue victims only one hour after the earthquake, and Premier Wen Jiabao arrived in Sichuan in less than five hours. Instead of refusing international assistance as it did in 1976, China not only accepted donations from other countries and international organizations, but also allowed foreign rescue teams from Japan, Russia, South Korea, and Singapore to help with the rescue work. Moreover, China also granted permission to foreign medical teams and foreign assistance through the military. Medical teams from Russia, Japan, Italy, Germany, Cuba, Britain, France, Pakistan, and Indonesia went to Sichuan and Gansu for medical assistance. Military aircrafts carrying relief goods came from 18 countries including Russia, the United States, Belgium, Israel, Singapore, Pakistan, Bangladesh, South Korea, Germany, Romania, Belarus, Ukraine, Poland, Serbia, Finland, Montenegro, Vietnam, and Mongolia. Moreover, China’s swift response to the earthquake and openness to foreign aid also formed a sharp contrast to one of its neighbors, Myanmar. Hit by Cyclone Nargis, a strong tropical cyclone with strong winds of up to 215 kilometers per hour (135 miles per hour), in the densely populated, rice-farming delta of the Irrawaddy Division (the southwestern corner of the country) less than 10 days earlier on

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May 3, 2008, Myanmar’s military junta had been resisting foreign aid, especially from the United States.334 In the aftermath of the Wenchuan earthquake, however, China almost immediately opened to foreign donations, foreign rescue workers, and even foreign military assistance. China was open to foreign media covering its relief efforts. Except for Falungong followers335 and Sharon Stone, a good friend of the Dalai Lama,336 who cursed China for the quake, the international community had nothing but sympathy for the Chinese people, and the international media had nothing but praise for the Chinese government’s relief efforts. NOTES 1. It was initially measured at 7.8 but later revised to 8.0. For the revision, see Renmin Ribao, May 19, 2008, p. 1. 2. For a list of these earthquakes, see http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/ 80291/7261351.html; http://www.forestry.gov.cn/dizhen/Default2.aspx? id=165. However, four more earthquakes are missing from the list. These include the 1902 Artux, Xinjiang earthquake (August 22, 1902); the 1920 Dagangkou, Taiwan earthquake (June 5, 1920); the 1931 Fuyun, Xinjiang earthquake (August 11, 1931); and the 1972 Huoshou Island, Taiwan earthquake (January 25, 1972). See Zhongguo Zaiqing Baogao, 1949–1995 (Report on the Damage Caused by Disasters in China, 1949–1995) (Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe, 1995), p. 169. 3. For a complete list, see Zhongguo Zaiqing Baogao, 1949–1995 (Report on the Damage Caused by Disasters in China, 1949–1995), p. 169. 4. For a few articles on technical aspects of the earthquake, see http://www.cnki.com.cn/Journal/A-A5-DZXB-2004-04.htm. 5. For a definition, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mercalli_intensity_scale. 6. Zhongguo Zaiqing Baogao, 1949–1995 (Report on the Damage Caused by Disasters in China, 1949–1995), p. 176. According to one historical record, 475,800 people died in one prefecture (Pingyang Lu) alone (http:// politics.people.com.cn/GB/80291/7261351.html). But another historical record shows that the population in this prefecture was 270,121 and the population in another seriously affected prefecture (Taiyuan Lu) was 155,321. The total population in these two prefectures were therefore 425,441 (http:// www.sxkp.com/kpw/kjbnews/News_View.asp?NewsID=5484). Since the death toll was about 50 percent of the total population, it should be 212,720. Of course, this may be the minimum number because there must be other regions where people were killed in the earthquake.

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310 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization 7. http://news.xinhuanet.com/society/2006-10/26/content_5252780.htm. 8. Zhongguo Zaiqing Baogao, 1949–1995 (Report on the Damage Caused by Disaster in China, 1949–1995) (Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe, 1995), p. 176. 9. http://www.eqsd.gov.cn/zj/diao1.htm. 10. http://www.eqsd.gov.cn/zj/diao1.htm. 11. Zhongguo Zaiqing Baogao, 1949–1995 (Report on the Damage Caused by Disaster in China, 1949–1995) (Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe, 1995), p. 176. 12. http://baike.baidu.com/view/135524.htm. 13. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haiyuan_earthquake#cite_note-usgs-0. 14. Mario Paz, ed., International Handbook of Earthquake Engineering: Codes, Programs, and Examples (New York: Springer, 1994), p. 256. 15. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1950_Assam_earthquake. 16. http://earthquake.usgs.gov/regional/world/events/1950_08_15.php. 17. Gyaincain Norbu, Huihuang de Ershishiji Xinzhongguo Dajilu: Xizang Juan (The Glorious Records of New China in the 20th Century: Tibet) (Beijing: Hongqi Chubanshe, 1999), p. 1092. 18. Zhongguo Zaiqing Baogao, 1949–1995 (Report of the Damage Caused by Disasters in China, 1949–1995), pp. 202–203. 19. http://military.club.china.com/data/thread/1011/135/04/09/4_1.html. 20. http://dshyj.cctv.com/program/jzql/topic/history/C15671/20060512/ 101429.shtml. 21. Xu Xin remembered himself as the commander and chief of staff of the 63rd Army, but the commander of the 63rd Army from 1964 to 1969 was Zhang Yinghui (1913–). Xu Xin did not become commander of the 63rd Army until 1969. For Zhang Yinghui’s biographical information, see http://heroes.jxwmw.cn/system/ 2007/10/25/010008781.shtml. 22. For his biographical information, see http://shafeng090.blog.enorth.com.cn/ article/218583.shtml. 23. http://cache.qihoo.com/wenda.php?do=snap&act=fetchHtmlsnap&m= 67518926c3f6e967056b0616cece4685&surl=http%3A%2F%2Fdzh.mop.com %2Fdwdzh%2Ftopic%2FreadSub_41_8839793_0_0.html&kw=%D0%CF% CC%A8%B5%D8%D5%F0. 24. http://cq.qq.com/a/20080530/000542.htm. 25. http://cq.qq.com/a/20080530/000542_1.htm. 26. http://cache.qihoo.com/wenda.php?do=snap&act=fetchHtmlsnap&m= 67518926c3f6e967056b0616cece4685&surl=http%3A%2F%2Fdzh.mop.com %2Fdwdzh%2Ftopic%2FreadSub_41_8839793_0_0.html&kw=%D0%CF% CC%A8%B5%D8%D5%F0. 27. For Li Siguang’s biographical information, see http://baike.baidu.com/ view/2128.htm. 28. http://www.cas.cn/html/cas50/ldr/lisiguang.html.

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Sichuan Earthquake 311 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

35.

36.

37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42.

43. 44. 45.

46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52.

http://www.cas.ac.cn/html/Dir/2008/06/12/15/93/01.htm. http://www.cigem.gov.cn/ReadNews.asp?NewsID=15623. http://www.cags.net.cn/2008/20080711.htm. Ibid. http://www.cigem.gov.cn/ReadNews.asp?NewsID=15623. For a detailed report on the Tonghai earthquake, see Yang Jiarong, “Dajienan de huimuo: Tonghai 7.8 ji dadizhen sanshi zhounian ji” (Look back at the great tragedy: In memory of the 30th anniversary of the Tonghai 7.8 great earthquake), Bianjiang Wenxue, no. 1 (2000): 19–38. Zhongguo Zaiqing Baogao, 1949–1995 (Report on the Damage Caused by Disaster in China, 1949–1995) (Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe, 1995), pp. 203–205. Tan Puren was reportedly assassinated because he had failed to assassinate Zhou Enlai in accordance with a secret order from Mao Zedong and Lin Biao. See http://www.secretchina.com/news/260309.html. Yang Jiarong, “Dajienan de huimuo: Tonghai 7.8 ji dadizhen sanshi zhounian ji”, p. 31. Ibid., p. 27. http://flac.yuxi.cn/xxxs.aspx?id=2006021614504883. Yang Jiarong, “Dajienan de huimuo: Tonghai 7.8 ji dadizhen sanshi zhounian ji”, p. 35. http://baike.baidu.com/view/33629.htm. “Haicheng Dizhen shi Zenyang Yubao de?” (“How was the Haicheng Earthquake forecasted?”) http://www.3i3i.cn/Technology/Weather/200701/ 155850.html. Ibid. Ibid. Zhongguo Zaiqing Baogao, 1949–1995 (Report on the Damage Caused by Disaster in China, 1949–1995) (Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe, 1995), pp. 205–207. For his biographical information, see http://baike.baidu.com/view/1592425. htm. http://bbs1.people.com.cn/postDetail.do?view=2&pageNo=1&treeView= 1&id=86285700&boardId=2. http://www.cyzone.cn/Forum/32997.aspx. http://flac.yuxi.cn/xxxs.aspx?id=2006021614504883. http://bbs1.people.com.cn/postDetail.do?view=2&pageNo=1&treeView= 1&id=86285700&boardId=2. For his biographical information, http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper464/ 12480/1122416.html. For his biographical information, see http://www.1921.org.cn/CN/my/profile.jsp?u=huangzuozhen.

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312 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization 53. http://bbs1.people.com.cn/postDetail.do?view=2&pageNo=1&treeView= 1&id=86285700&boardId=2. 54. Ibid. 55. http://bbs1.people.com.cn/postDetail.do?view=2&pageNo=1&treeView= 1&id=86285700&boardId=2. 56. Ibid. 57. http://q.sohu.com/forum/20/topic/2293067. 58. http://q.sohu.com/forum/14/topic/2332481. 59. http://enews.xwhb.net/html/2008-06/24/content_5121.htm. 60. For Liu Yingyong’s biographical information, see http://www.1921.org.cn/ CN/my/profile.jsp?u=liuyingyong. 61. http://enews.xwhb.net/html/2008-06/24/content_5121.htm. 62. For a list of leaders of seismological offices, see http://xabbs.soufun.com/ qgjb~-1~355/7918591_7918591.htm. 63. http://enews.xwhb.net/html/2008-06/24/content_5121.htm. 64. http://news.zijin.net/news/1/2008-7-23/n0872329A2KC17AG9E7 J06K_4.shtml. 65. For his biographical information, see http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_521 ba5930100aiad.html. 66. http://news.zijin.net/news/1/2008-7-23/n0872329A2KC17AG9E7 J06K_4.shtml. 67. According to BBC, the earthquake was measured at 8.3 on the Richter scale, killing 750,000 people. http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/ july/28/newsid_4132000/4132109.stm. 68. Cha Zhiyuan, “Women weishenmo weineng yubao Tangshan dizhen?” (Why didn’t we predict the Tangshan earthquake?), Ming Pao Monthly, no. 8 (2006), pp. 41–42, 46–47. 69. Interestingly, no one mentioned Ding Guoyu (1931–), the head of the Analysis and Forecasting Office. 70. Cha Zhiyuan, “Women weishenmo weineng yubao Tangshan dizhen?” (“Why didn’t we predict the Tangshan earthquake?”), Ming Pao Monthly, no. 8 (2006), p. 42. 71. Her husband, Lin Tinghuang (1925–2007), served as deputy director of the China Seismological Bureau from 1982 to 1986. For his biographical information, see http://www.cea.gov.cn/manage/html/8a8587881632fa5c01166 74a018300cf/_history/08_06/30/1214800088046.html. 72. http://www.xiaoshuo.com/readbook/0011025769_10821.html. 73. http://www.xiaoshuo.com/readbook/0011025769_10819.html. 74. Cha Zhiyuan, “Women weishenmo weineng yubao Tangshan dizhen?” (Why didn’t we predict the Tangshan earthquake?), Ming Pao Monthly, no. 8 (2006), p. 42.

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Sichuan Earthquake 313 75. Qian Gang, the author of Tangshan Dadizhen (Tangshan Great Earthquake) (Hong Kong: Luzhou Chubanshe, 1986), made this argument. See Qian Gang, “Zhengshi Lishi shi Zuihao de Jinian” (The best memorial of history is to face it), Ming Pao Monthly, no. 8 (2006), p. 51. 76. For details, see http://www.xiaoshuo.com/readbook/0011025769_10783. html; http://www.tzw.gov.cn/shownews.asp?id=50677. 77. Renmin Ribao, September 1, 2008, p. 4. 78. Yu Zeyuan, “Zhongguo Gaoguige Jinian Tangshan Dizhen Sanshi Zhounian: Cengjing Haojie Difu Tianfan, Rujin Bianhua Fatian Difu” (China will have a high profile commemoration of the 30th anniversary of the Tangshan Earthquake: It was a catastrophe making the earth and the heaven upside down; now it is the great change shaking the heaven and the earth), Lianhe Zaobao, July 28, 2006. http://www.zaobao.com/special/ newspapers/2006/07/zaobao060728.html. 79. Renmin Ribao, June 12, 2008, pp. 1, 7. 80. Renmin Ribao, May 13, 2008, p. 5. 81. There is an important distinction between predictions and forecasts. Predictions are intermediate-term based on some probabilities, and forecasts are short-term based on geophysical evidence or other indicators. For an article in this regard, see http://economy.guoxue.com/article.php/16578. 82. For his article, see http://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTotal-GJZT20021 2001.htm. 83. See http://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTotal-GJZT200501005.htm. 84. “Chen Xuezhong: Wunianqian Ceng Tuice Sichuan Jiang Fasheng Dadizhen” (Chen Xuezhong: He predicted five years earlier that Sichuan would have a major earthquake), http://news.hexun.com/2008-05-16/106026714.html. 85. For a brief introduction, see http://www.fudu.org/company.asp?cid=5. 86. Jiang Xun, “Yueshi dadizhen yuerongyi yuce” (The stronger the earthquake, the easier the forecast), Yanzhou Zhoukan 22, no. 21 (June 1, 2008): 14–15. 87. http://scitech.people.com.cn/GB/7267691.html. Fang Zhouzi lent his support to this official view. For his argument, see http://www.cyol.net/zqb/ content/2008-05/28/content_2200491.htm. 88. http://blog.voc.com.cn/sp1/yangguangjing/102540472259.shtml. 89. Wang Jing, “Qianghua Jiance Jiamihuishang: Wenchuan Zhenzai hou de Zhongguo Dizhentai Wang Zhongxin Jianwen” (Enhance monitoring and have more frequent meetings: observations at the China Seismological Network Center in the aftermath of the Wenchuan earthquake), Kexue Shibao, May 14, 2008, http://www.sciencenet.cn/htmlnews/20085149156437206585.html. 90. Jiefangjun Bao, June 11, 2008, http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/ 64387/7368749.html. According to Cha Zhiyuan, the State Council dispatched helicopters to locate the epicenter. The survey team under the

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91. 92. 93.

94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103.

104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119.

leadership of Zou Qijia located the site in Tangshan at about 7:00 a.m., more than three hours after the earthquake [See Cha Zhiyuan, “Women weishenmo weineng yubao Tangshan dizhen?” (Why didn’t we predict the Tangshan earthquake?), Ming Pao Monthly, no. 8 (2006), p. 47]. Jiefangjun Bao, June 11, 2008, http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/ 64387/7368749.html. http://www.tianshui.net.cn/class/guonei/200805142391141.htm. “Qizhuang shanhe de shengming dayingjiu” (Unforgettable life-saving rescue work), Renmin Ribao, May 19, 2008, p. 12. The report about Hu Jintao’s order was posted on the Xinhuanet at 3:55 p.m. on May 12, 2008. His order must have been issued earlier than the posting. http://news.xinhuanet.com/ newscenter/2008-05/12/content_8151980.htm. Renmin Ribao, May 13, 2008, p. 1. Renmin Ribao, May 15, 2008, p. 1. Renmin Ribao, May 17, 2008, p. 1. Renmin Ribao, May 18, 2008, p. 1. Renmin Ribao, May 19, 2008, p. 1. Renmin Ribao, May 13, 2008, p. 2. http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2008-10/18/content_10214778.htm. Renmin Ribao, May 13, 2008, p. 1. Renmin Ribao, May 14, 2008, p. 1. Jonathan Ansfield, “Wen Jiabao: Man of the Moment”, The Newsweek, May 17, 2008, http://www.blog.newsweek.com/blogs/beijing/archive/2008/05/17/ wen-jiabao-man-of-the-moment.aspx. Renmin Ribao, May 14, 2008, pp. 1, 4. Renmin Ribao, May 15, 2008, p. 1. Renmin Ribao, May 17, 2008, p. 1. Renmin Ribao, May 18, 2008, p. 4, May 19, 2008, p. 1. and May 20, 2008, p. 1. Renmin Ribao, May 23, 2008, pp. 1, 2. It is interesting to note that Wu had already made these promises of budgetary outlays even before the meeting of the NPC Standing Committee. Renmin Ribao, May 23, 2008, pp. 1, 4. Renmin Ribao, May 27, 2008, pp. 1, 4. Renmin Ribao, May 28, 2008, pp. 1, 2. Renmin Ribao, May 29, 2008, pp. 1, 4. Renmin Ribao, May 5, 2008, p. 1. Renmin Ribao, May 14, 2008, p. 1. Renmin Ribao, May 15, 2008, p. 1. Renmin Ribao, May 24, 2008, pp. 1, 4. Renmin Ribao, May 30, 2008, pp. 1, 4; May 31, 2008, pp. 1, 4; and June 1, 2008, pp. 1, 4. Renmin Ribao, May 14, 2008, pp. 1, 4.

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Sichuan Earthquake 315 120. Renmin Ribao, June 2, 2008, pp. 1, 4; June 3, 2008, pp. 1, 2. 121. Shaanxi is Xi’s home province. It is also a province where he worked as an “educated youth” from 1969 to 1975. 122. Renmin Ribao, May 20, 2008, pp. 1, 4. 123. Ibid. 124. Renmin Ribao, May 21, 2008, pp. 1, 2. 125. Renmin Ribao, May 22, 2008, pp. 1, 2. 126. Renmin Ribao, June 30, 2008, pp. 1, 2. 127. Renmin Ribao, May 15, 2008, p. 4. 128. Renmin Ribao, May 19, 2008, pp. 1, 2. 129. Renmin Ribao, May 20, 2008, pp. 1, 2. 130. Renmin Ribao, May 21, 2008, pp. 1, 2. 131. Renmin Ribao, May 22, 2008, pp. 1, 2. 132. Renmin Ribao, May 20, 2008, pp. 1, 4. 133. Renmin Ribao, May 21, 2008, pp. 1, 4; May 22, 2008, pp. 1, 2 134. Renmin Ribao, May 16, 2008, pp. 1, 4. The tunnel was repaired and the railway was reopened on May 24, 2008 (For details, see Renmin Ribao, May 25, 2008, p. 5). 135. Renmin Ribao, May 17, 2008, p. 2. 136. Renmin Ribao, June 10, 2008, pp. 1, 4. 137. For his proposal, see http://www.huxingdou.com.cn/earthquake.htm. 138. On May 12, 1999, the Chinese national flags flew at half-mast at Tiananmen Square, Xinhua Gate, the Great Hall of the People, the site of Foreign Affairs Ministry, the location of the government of provinces, autonomous regions, centrally administered municipalities, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and Xinhua News Agency in Macao in memory of three victims (Shao Yunhuan, Xu Xinhu, and Zhu Ying) of the US attack on the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade (Renmin Ribao, May 13, 1999, p. 1). That was the first time this was done for ordinary Chinese citizens. According to Zong Hairen, however, the decision to fly the national flag at half-mast in memory of the victims was made only after China had learned in the evening of May 11, 1999 that the embassies of the United States and other NATO countries were planning to fly their national flags in memory of the Chinese victims on May 12, 1999 (Zong Hairen, Zhong Rongji zai 1999 (Zhu Rongji in 1999) (Carle Place, New York: Mirror Books, 2001), p. 97). 139. Renmin Ribao, May 19, 2008, p. 1. 140. Ibid. 141. Renmin Ribao, May 20, 2008, p. 1. Former General Secretary Jiang Zemin’s name also appeared in the newspaper as No. 2 person in the pecking order of the current Politburo Standing members but he was absent in person. Vice Premier Li Keqiang was not present in Beijing, as he was directing relief efforts in Sichuan at the time. 142. As the commander of the PLA Air Force and director of the General Staff Department both sit at the Central Military Commission, the former does not

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143.

144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150.

151. 152. 153. 154.

155.

156. 157.

158. 159.

necessarily answer the latter. But in practice, director of the General Staff Department is half a grade higher than the commander of the PLA Air Force, and is in the position to command the PLA Air Force as the head of the PLA Crisis Management Office. I would like to thank Dr. You Ji for clarifying this point. According to Chen Bingde, he issued the first order as the general chief of staff at 3:40 p.m. on May 12, 2008. The order was issued to a rescue team in an army. For details, see “Zongcanmuzhang: Hu Jintao Diaoqian Dajun Kangzhen Jiuzai Neimu” (The General Chief of Staff: the inside story of Hu Jintao’s mobilization of troops for the earthquake relief works), http://www.taihainet. com/news/military/jslwt/2008-12-29/357846.shtml. Renmin Ribao, May 13, 2008, p. 5. Renmin Ribao, May 19, 2008, p. 2. Renmin Ribao, June 12, 2008, pp. 1, 7. Renmin Ribao, May 15, 2008, p. 9. Renmin Ribao, May 15, 2008, p. 10. Renmin Ribao, June 12, 2008, p. 2. For lists of businesses making donations, see Renmin Ribao, May 15, 2008, p. 9; May 17, 2008, p. 6. It was announced on May 17, 2008 that donations from businesses and individuals would be published in the special section on the earthquake relief work of Renmin Ribao in the order of sizes of their donations, but no such publications can be found in the newspaper of later dates. This is probably because of criticism from the public. In an article published on May 27, 2008 in Renmin Ribao, He Zhenhua argued that it was not a good idea to publish such a list because love cannot be measured by the amount of cash donations. People express their love in different ways. Those who do not have money are willing to donate their blood while some beggars also made donations. For the article, see Renmin Ribao, May 27, 2008, p. 4. http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/8215/122548/122724/7304320.html. http://business.sohu.com/20080516/n256907764.shtml. http://news.xinhuanet.com/house/2008-05/20/content_8212166.htm. This was one donation made on May 18, 2008. The total donations from the company had been 153 million yuan by May 26, 2008. See http://rizhao.sdn-tax.gov.cn/art/2008/5/26/art_34227_143618.html. Its Board chairman is Zhang Xiangqing, a 38-year old survivor of the Tangshan earthquake. For his story, see http://unn.people.com.cn/GB/ 14748/7264759.html. http://yule.sohu.com/20080515/n256883267.shtml. http://business.sohu.com/20080519/n256948658.shtml. There are in fact two companies behind this brand of soft drink, Wang Laoji. For details, see http://www.ce.cn/xwzx/gnsz/gdxw/200806/25/t20080625_15954741.shtml. Renmin Ribao, May 28, 2008, p. 15. http://news.xinhuanet.com/employment/2008-05/21/content_8219701.htm.

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Sichuan Earthquake 317 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170.

171. 172.

173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194.

Renmin Ribao, June 19, 2008, p. 15. Renmin Ribao, June 20, 2008, p. 4. Renmin Ribao, June 17, 2008, p. 13. Renmin Ribao, May 17, 2008, p. 2. Renmin Ribao, May 14, 2008, p. 5. Renmin Ribao, May 20, 2008, p. 2. Renmin Ribao, May 24, 2008, p. 2. Renmin Ribao, May 27, 2008, p. 4. Renmin Ribao, June 8, 2008, p. 4. For details about this commission, see http://www.godpp.gov.cn/gywm/ index.htm. For a list of initial members of the Commission, see http://www.godpp.gov.cn/ zlzx/2007-10/31/content_11542846.htm. As of 2008, Li Changchun is its chairman. See http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/66081/6900562.html. Renmin Ribao, October 10, 2008, p. 6. For systematic analyses of these organizations, see Yiyi Lu, Non-Governmental Organisations in China (London: Routeledge, 2008); and Jonathan Unger, Associations and the Chinese State: Contested Spaces (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2008). Renmin Ribao, July 11, 2008, p. 9. http://www.chinanpo.gov.cn/web/showBulltetin.do?id=29249&dictionid=1940. Renmin Ribao, July 11, 2008, p. 9. Renmin Ribao, May 15, 2008, p. 10. Renmin Ribao, May 17, 2008, p. 4; June 19, 2008, p. 5. Renmin Ribao, June 12, 2008, p. 10. Renmin Ribao, June 12, 2008, p. 10. Renmin Ribao, June 18, 2008, p. 5. Renmin Ribao, May 16, 2008, p. 16. Renmin Ribao, May 24, 2008, p. 2. Renmin Ribao, June 19, 2008, p. 5. Renmin Ribao, May 16, 2008, p. 16. Renmin Ribao, June 18, 2008, p. 5. Renmin Ribao (overseas edition), May 14, 2008, p. 3. Renmin Ribao (overseas edition), May 19, 2008, p. 3. Renmin Ribao (overseas edition), May 29, 2008, p. 5. Renmin Ribao, May 17, 2008, p. 4. Renmin Ribao, May 18, 2008, p. 4. Renmin Ribao (overseas edition), May 28, 2008, p. 3. Renmin Ribao, May 31, 2008, p. 4. Renmin Ribao, May 13, 2008, p. 3. Ibid.

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Renmin Ribao, May 14, 2008, p. 1. Renmin Ribao, May 14, 2008, p. 3. Ibid. Ibid. Renmin Ribao (overseas edition), May 14, 2008, p. 4. Renmin Ribao, June 5, 2008, p. 2. Renmin Ribao, May 16, 2008, p. 3. http://www.chinaembassy.bg/eng/dtxw/t456553.htm. http://www.512gov.cn/GB/126482/7711524.html. He later sent two messages in this regard. See Renmin Ribao, July 10, 2008, p. 3. http://news.gc.ca/web/view/en/index.jsp?articleid=398149. h t t p : / / w w w. a c d i - c i d a . g c . c a / C I D AW E B / a c d i c i d a . n s f / E n / F R A 516145415-Q6Z. Renmin Ribao, May 19, 2008, p. 3. Renmin Ribao, June 19, 2008, p. 11, and http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/ blog_5348b75e01009owr.html?tj=1. http://www.512gov.cn/GB/126482/7711524.html. Renmin Ribao, May 13, 2008, p. 3; May 16, 2008, p. 11. Renmin Ribao, May 14, 2008, p. 3. Renmin Ribao, May 31, 2008, p. 3. http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6409294.html. Renmin Ribao, May 15, 2008, p. 6. http://en.chinagate.com.cn/features/earthquake/2008-05/17/content_15 284008.htm. Renmin Ribao, May 21, 2008, p. 3, and http://in.china-embassy.org/eng/ zgbd/t456884.htm. Renmin Ribao, June 5, 2008, p. 10. Renmin Ribao, May 15, 2008, p. 6. Renmin Ribao, May 20, 2008, p. 3. Renmin Ribao, May 31, 2008, p. 3. http://www.512gov.cn/GB/126482/7711524.html. For a brief introduction to this agency and its assistance to China, see http://www.ccyl.org.cn/bulletin/gjb_gjqn/200707/t20070704_34197.htm. Renmin Ribao, May 15, 2008, p. 6. Renmin Ribao, May 21, 2008, p. 3. Renmin Ribao, May 31, 2008, p. 5. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-05/28/content_8272110.htm Renmin Ribao, May 22, 2008, p. 3. Ibid. Renmin Ribao, May 15, 2008, p. 6. Renmin Ribao, May 19, 2008, p. 3. Renmin Ribao, May 30, 2008, p. 3.

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249. 250.

251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256.

Renmin Ribao, May 17, 2008, p. 3. Renmin Ribao, May 22, 2008, p. 3. Renmin Ribao, May 30, 2008, p. 3. Renmin Ribao, May 20, 2008, p. 11. http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/view/ 351238/1/.html. Renmin Ribao, May 24, 2008, p. 3; May 28, 2008, p. 11. Renmin Ribao, May 14, 2008, p. 3. Renmin Ribao, May 17, 2008, p. 3. Renmin Ribao, June 3, 2008, p. 3. Renmin Ribao, May 25, 2008, p. 3. Renmin Ribao, May 17, 2008, p. 3. http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-05/19/content_820 5994.htm. Renmin Ribao, May 20, 2008, p. 3. Renmin Ribao, May 24, 2008, p. 3. Renmin Ribao, June 2, 2008, p. 3. Dadi (Earth Biweekly) nos. 11–12 (2008), http://paper.people.com.cn/dd/ html/2008-06/16/content_47870.htm. The funds would come from the US Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). See http://www. america.gov/st/peacesec-english/2008/May/20080513151431idybeekcm0. 4892237.html. Renmin Ribao, May 15, 2008, p. 6. Renmin Ribao, May 18, 2008, p. 3. There is some harsh criticism of the US government for being stingy on some Chinese blogs. For a small sample, see http://www.truthfromfacts.com/2008/05/20/chinese-bloggers-say-america-stingy-with-sichuan-donation/. It is interesting to note that some of expressions do not appear to be very harsh when they are translated from Chinese into English. Examples include “Americans are little people” and “America is so disgusting, the American enterprises in China are especially stingy…KFC, Coca-Cola, Microsoft are all iron roosters (stingy)”. But the Chinese government attempted to cover up for the American government by lumping together the donations from the US government and American businesses and individuals in its reports. See relevant reports in Renmin Ribao, May 18, 2008, p. 3 and May 21, 2008, p. 3. Renmin Ribao, May 20, 2008, p. 3. Renmin Ribao, May 30, 2008, p. 3. Renmin Ribao, May 24, 2008, p. 3. Renmin Ribao, May 17, 2008, p. 3; May 20, 2008, p. 3. Renmin Ribao, May 24, 2008, p. 3. Renmin Ribao, May 25, 2008, p. 3.

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267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294.

Renmin Ribao, May 18, 2008, p. 3; June 17, 2008, p. 12. Renmin Ribao, May 24, 2008, p. 3. Renmin Ribao, May 20, 2008, pp. 3, 11. http://www.512gov.cn/GB/126482/7711524.html. Renmin Ribao, May 21, 2008, p. 3. Renmin Ribao, May 24, 2008, p. 3. Renmin Ribao, May 27, 2008, p. 3. Renmin Ribao, May 18, 2008, p. 3; July 7, p. 11. Renmin Ribao, May 21, 2008, p. 3. Renmin Ribao, May 25, 2008, p. 3. See also Zong He, “Guoji Shehui Yuanzhu Zhongguo Qingkuang” (International Aid to China), Dongbei Zhichuang, 2008: 32–33. Reactions to the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, http://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/Reactions_to_the_2008_Sichuan_earthquake#cite_note-8; http:// www.chinatoday.com.cn/English/e2008/e200807/p24.htm. Renmin Ribao, May 24, 2008, p. 3. Renmin Ribao, May 30, 2008, p. 3. Renmin Ribao, May 19, 2008, p. 3. Ibid. Ibid. Renmin Ribao, May 18, 2008, p. 3; May 21, 2008, p. 3. Renmin Ribao (overseas edition), May 23, 2008, p. 6. Renmin Ribao, June 9, 2008, p. 3. Ibid. Renmin Ribao, June 17, 2008, p. 12. Renmin Ribao (overseas edition), July 11, 2008, p. 6. Ibid. Renmin Ribao (overseas edition), May 23, 2008, p. 6. Ibid. Renmin Ribao (overseas edition), May 30, 2008, p. 6. Renmin Ribao (overseas edition), May 17, 2008, p. 2; May 23, 2008, p. 6. Renmin Ribao (overseas edition), May 23, 2008, p. 6. Renmin Ribao, May 22, 2008, p. 3. Ibid. Renmin Ribao, May 15, 2008, p. 6. Renmin Ribao, May 22, 2008, p. 3; May 24, 2008, p. 3. Renmin Ribao, May 22, 2008, p. 3. Ibid. Renmin Ribao, May 20, 2008, p. 3. Ibid. Renmin Ribao, May 25, 2008, p. 3. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/xwfw/fyrth/t435231.htm. http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2008-05/16/content_977838.htm.

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307.

308. 309.

310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317. 318. 319. 320. 321. 322. 323. 324.

Renmin Ribao, May 31, 2008, p. 3. Renmin Ribao, May 17, 2008, p. 4. http://health.cdqss.com/news/2008/5/08516215783023.shtml. Renmin Ribao (overseas edition), May 17, 2008, p. 4. http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-05/18/content_820 2072.htm Renmin Ribao (overseas edition), May 17, 2008, p. 4. Renmin Ribao (overseas edition), May 19, 2008, p. 2. Renmin Ribao, May 18, 2008, p. 5. Renmin Ribao, May 20, 2008, p. 3. Renmin Ribao (overseas edition), May 19, 2008, p. 2. Renmin Ribao, June 5, 2008, p. 3. Wei He and Hu Mou, “Renjian Youai Kuanyue Guojie: Ji Dazai zhong de Guoji Jiuyuan Renyuan” (Human love knows no borders: a report on international rescue workers of the Sichuan earthquake) Renminwang, June 26, 2008, http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/67481/94156/122667/123126/ 7428036.html. For a study of the origin of China Red Cross, see Yang Zhifang and Zhou Qiuguang, “Lun Zhongguo Hongshizihui de Qiyuan” (Origin of Red Cross Society of China), Hunan Shifan Daxue Shehui Kexue Xuebao (Journal of Social Science of Hunan Normal University) 35, no. 4 (July 2006): 115–121. http://world.people.com.cn/GB/119475/7262261.html. Chen Yiming, “Aixin Kuanyue Jiangjie: Ji Guojishehui dui Wenchuan Dizhen Zaiqu de Weiwen Zhiyuan” (Love knows no borders: a report on assistance of the international community to the relief work of the Wenchuan earthquake affected areas), Renminwang, June 24, 2008, http://cpc.people.com.cn/ GB/67481/94156/122667/123126/7416972.html. Renmin Ribao, June 3, 2008, p. 3. Ibid. http://world.people.com.cn/GB/1029/7290542.html. http://www.chinatoday.com.cn/English/e2008/e200807/p24.htm. Renmin Ribao, June 7, 2008, p. 3. http://pic.people.com.cn/GB/42590/7289219.html. http://world.people.com.cn/GB/1029/7290542.html. Renmin Ribao (overseas edition), May 26, 2008, p. 4. Renmin Ribao, June 6, 2008, p. 3. Renmin Ribao, May 25, 2008, p. 3. Renmin Ribao, June 3, 2008, p. 3. Renmin Ribao, May 26, 2008, p. 3. Renmin Ribao, June 5, 2008, p. 10. Renmin Ribao, May 28, 2008, p. 11. Ibid.

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322 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization 325. Renmin Ribao, June 3, 2008, p. 3. For some reason, the medical team of 102 people from Ukraine offered by the Ukraine government never came to China. See Renmin Ribao, May 15, 2008, p. 6. 326. Renmin Ribao, May 29, 2008, p. 10; June 2, 2008, p. 3; June 12, 2008, p. 4; July 11, 2008, p. 2. 327. For a brief introduction to the ministry, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ EMERCOM. 328. Renmin Ribao, May 15, 2008, p. 4. 329. http://dzrb.dzwww.com/dzzb/dzzb-gjxw/200805/t20080515_3547433.htm. 330. http://www.chinatoday.com.cn/English/e2008/e200807/p24.htm. 331. Renmin Ribao, June 4, 2008, p. 10. 332. Renmin Ribao, May 29, 2008, p. 10; June 2, 2008, p. 3. 333. Renmin Ribao, June 24, 2008, p. 5. 334. For details, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyclone_Nargis#International_ relief. 335. Falungong followers disrupted the charity activities in New York city on May 17, 2008 and celebrated the earthquake as a sign that the heaven was punishing the Chinese Communist Party. For details, see “Falungong Zunao Haiwaihuaren Dizhen Zhenzai Re Zhongnu” (The Falungong disrupted the overseas Chinese’s donations for victims of the earthquake and offended many), http://www.heluochina.net/wz/html/2008-05/3034.htm. 336. During the Cannes Film festival on May 22, 208, actress Sharon Stone remarked, “All these earthquakes and stuff happened and I thought, ‘Is that karma?’ When you are not nice, bad things happen to you”. For details, see http:// lifeinmotion.wordpress.com/2008/05/27/sharon-stone-calls-chinese-earth quake-karma/. For a recording, see http://entertainme.excite.co.uk/news/ 2284/Sharon-Stone-China-earthquake-was-bad-karma.

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8 Beijing Olympic Games For the CCP, the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games is China’s comingout party. Determined to make the Olympic Games the best ever in history, Beijing mobilized the most populous country in the world. However, Tibet separatist forces under the leadership of the Dalai Lama took advantage of the international limelight of Beijing’s forthcoming Olympic Games and staged a series of riots in Tibet and other Tibetan areas in China and subsequently sabotaged the torch relays. The CCP leadership handled these disruptions and moved on to make the Beijing Olympic Games “truly exceptional” and the subsequent Paralympics “the greatest Games ever”. “ONE-HUNDRED-YEAR DREAM” Hosting the Olympic Games: A Chinese Dream from an American? Hosting an Olympic Games, according to the Chinese media, has been a Chinese dream for one hundred years. In 1908, as this version of the story goes, an article published in Tianjin Youth1 asked three questions: When will China send an athlete to the Olympic Games? When will China send a team to the Olympic Games? When will China host an Olympic Games? China answered the first question by sending its first athlete, Liu Changchun, to the Los Angeles 323

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Olympic Games in 1932; the second question by sending its first team to the Berlin Olympic Games in 1936; and finally the third question by hosting an Olympic Games in Beijing in 2008.2 Upon further investigation, however, these three questions are found to have actually been raised by an American. In a report to the International Committee of the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) in New York on September 30, 1908, C. H. Robertson, director of the Tianjin (Tientsin) YMCA, wrote: One feature of the year has been the inauguration of a campaign with the slogan — “When will China win a place at the Olympic Games?” This is followed with — “When will China be able to send a winning team?” and then “When will China be able to invite the Alternating Olympic Games to come to China?”3

Clearly, the campaign for participating in the Olympic Games started in 1908 (instead of 19074) because this campaign was “inaugurated” in that year and these questions were raised by an American in China in English. It seems that Robertson was the driving force behind this campaign because he hoped to “prepare a memorial to the high Provincial and Imperial officials this year with these questions”.5 He also gave a series of public lectures on the Olympic Games with slides from the London 1908 Olympic Games. Robertson gave an address with slides from the London 1908 Olympic Games on his new “projectoscope” at the awards presentation ceremony for the winners in the Sixth Annual Athletic Contest on October 22, 1908.6 Due to the popular demand, he repeated the presentation on October 31, 1908.7 Yet a third version of the story suggests that Zhang Boling (Chang Po-ling) (April 5, 1876–February 23, 1951), the founder of Nankai University in Tianjin, was the first Chinese to introduce the concept of the Olympic sports to China.8 A contemporary of Pierre de Frédy, Baron de Coubertin (January 1, 1863–September 2, 1937), the founder of the International Olympic Committee, Zhang Boling gave a speech on the “Olympic Games at Athens”9 at the closing ceremony of the Fifth Annual Athletic Contest on October 24, 1907.10 In his speech, Zhang, director of the First Private Middle School,

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introduced the concept of Olympic Games and expressed his hope that the Chinese athletes would participate in the Olympic Games in the near future.11 According to Liang Jisheng, a historian of the history of Nankai University, Zhang Boling embodied seven firsts: the first to propose for China to join the Olympic family; the first to propose and organize the Far East Olympic movement; the first to create China National Sports Association; the first to observe the Olympic Games on behalf of the Chinese government; the first to introduce Olympic education to classroom; the first to facilitate the participation of the Olympic Games by Chinese athletes; and the first to propose China as a host for Olympic Games.12 Moreover, Robertson’s report reflects some Chinese influence since he used a phase that was more common in Chinese than in English — “win a place” — in his original first question, “when will China win a place at the Olympic Games?” This might be a direct translation of the Chinese phrase, “ying de yixi zhi di”. The fact that Zhang’s speech came before Robertson’s report may support the third version of the story. His speech on October 24, 1907 was detailed in an article published in Tientsin Young Men two days later. 13 Moreover, another article on the Olympic Games, “Athletic Events”, was published in Tientsin Young Men on May 23, 1908.14 In this article, an anonymous author gave a detailed account of the historical evolution of the modern Olympic Games. After a brief introduction to the most recent Olympics at Athens (1896), Paris (1900), St. Louis (1904), and Athens (1906), the author discussed China’s role in the upcoming Olympic Games: So far as we are informed, China will have no representative in the Contest this year at London. How soon she may produce athletes of such skill and strength to be able to win a place in this very significant international gathering is hard to estimate, but we are sure that it will come and we are confident that it will be sooner than many people may guess. In the meantime, we shall continue to train athletes and to urge upon those who are in a position to forward this enterprise the privilege and the need not speak of the duty that China owes to herself and to others to develop physical training to the point where she can not only send athletes to Athens, but of that time when she can invite one of the biennial games that are held out of Athens to come to China.15

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Clearly, these three questions had been embedded in this article. “How soon she may produce athletes of such skill and strength to be able to win a place in this very significant international gathering” can be easily rephrased into “when will China win a place at the Olympic Games?” And “to the point where she can not only send athletes to Athens, but of that time when she can invite one of the biennial games that are held out of Athens to come to China” is the prototype of “when will China be able to send a winning team?” and “when will China be able to invite the Alternating Olympic Games to come to China?” Although the author was anonymous, those behind the writing might include Zhang Boling and C. H. Robertson. As Robertson indicated in his September 30, 1908 report, these three questions had been “presented in various public meetings” and had been “raised many times with officials and educators and are now beginning to spread to other points in the province”.16 The same set of questions was reiterated in another report from Robertson on promoting the YMCA’s missionary activities in China. In a report entitled “A Plan for Promoting Missionary Activity Among Association Boys”, Robertson wrote: The Young Men’s Christian Associations of China and Korea have been for some years pushing an athletic campaign, which has had as its slogan these three questions: 1. When will China be able to send a winning athlete to the Olympic contests? 2. When will China be able to send a winning team to the Olympic contests? 3. When will China be able to invite all the world to come to Peking for an International Olympic contest, alternating with those at Athens?17

Evidently, this report was written later than 1908 because the athletic campaign featuring these questions had been pushed “for some years”. These three questions are essentially the same, but their expressions were more in line with the English usage than the Chinese language. But as the campaign gripped “in a remarkable way the heart and imagination of Chinese officials, educators, and students”,18 these questions must have been raised in Chinese as well.19

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However, in a larger historical context, foreign missionaries in general and the YMCA in particular were the major sources of the contribution to the modernization of Chinese sport. British missionaries built a ball field on the grounds of a church in the Lahu tribal village of Nuofu, near the border of Yunnan Province and Myanmar, in 1895. Canadian missionaries at St. John’s University in Shanghai, and British (Anglican and Presbyterian) and American (Methodist) missionaries in Fujian Province also shared track and field as well as team sports with their pupils in the late 1890s.20 The YMCA was the organization that introduced many Western sports and Western-style sports competitions in China, and can also take credit for the early organization of the Olympic movement in China. Established in 1895 by David Willard Lyon (1863–March 16, 1943)21 — the first American YMCA secretary sent by the International Committee of the YMCA in North America to China, the Tianjin YMCA was the pioneer in promoting the Olympic movement in China.22 The General Committee of China, Korea, and Hong Kong was founded in 1901, and Fletcher Sims Brockman became the first national secretary in 1901, and Max Joseph Exner (March 31, 1871–October 10, 1943)23 was made the first national physical director in 1908.24 Zhang Boling may be the first in China to give a public speech in Chinese on the Olympic Games but he was working closely with a number of YMCA leaders such as C. H. Robertson and Max J. Exner in promoting the Olympic movement in China.25 Hosting an Olympic Games has indeed been a Chinese dream but this Chinese dream was not entirely indigenous. YMCA directors, C. H. Robertson and Max J. Exner in particular, also played very important roles in promoting the Olympic movement in China in the early stage. Inspiration for China: the 1906 Athens Olympic Games Although some Americans such as C. H. Robertson and Max J. Exner helped launch the Olympic movement in China, the 1906 Athens Olympic Games was the original source of inspiration for the Chinese.

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The Olympic Games, an international multi-sport event, was originally held at Olympia, Greece. Initially recorded in 776 BC, the Games were held in the subsequent 1,169 years until A.D. 393.26 The Olympic Games were revived in the 19th century, and the first modern international Olympic Games under the leadership of the International Olympic Committee were held at Athens in 1896. A popular view in China is that the International Olympic Committee sent an invitation to the Qing Government before the Athens Games, but the Qing Court did not respond to the invitation out of its ignorance. A version of this story was published in Chongqing Evening News (Chongqing Wanbao) on August 25, 2008, one day after the closing of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games.27 However, there is no evidence that the International Olympic Committee under the leadership of its first president, Demetrius Vikelas (February 15, 1835–July 20, 1908),28 had ever sent an invitation to the Qing Court.29 In fact, the inaugural Games had been initially set in 1894 to be held in Paris in 1900. It was only on the second thought that an earlier date, 1896, was chosen in order not to reduce public interest during the six-year waiting period and Athens (instead of London) was then selected as the host city for the inaugural Games.30 In other words, the Athens 1896 Olympic Games, which lasted from April 6–15, 1896, did not have any impact on China. The 1900 Olympic Games at Paris also failed to have any impact on China. A sideshow for the Paris 1900 Universal Exposition (Paris Exposition Universelle of 1900), the Olympic Games was catered to the needs of the Paris Expo. There was no opening or closing ceremony, and competitions were dragged on for more than five months, from May 14–October 28, 1900.31 Rarely called “Olympic Games”, the sports events were held in 16 areas of industrial classifications of the Expo. Fencing events, for instance, were held in the area of the Expo’s exhibition for knives and swords; and rowing events in the area of the Expo’s exhibition for life-saving equipments.32 The most contentious of all the events was the marathon. The course was poorly marked out, and runners, who had to contend with distractions from cars, bicycles, pedestrians, and animals, often got lost. Arthur Newton of the United States took the lead without being

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passed by anyone else but finished fifth, while another American, Richard Grant, was run down by a cyclist. Michel Theato, the winner of the event, was originally thought to be French but turned out to be a Luxembourgian.33 In the end, no medals were given to the winners.34 The Qing Court participated in the World’s Fair in Paris but not in the Olympic Games there. With an investment of 15,000 taels, the Qing government built a national hall at the Expo and leased space at other display halls for a relatively large collection of products from China (such as Shanghai’s silk goods, antiques, ceramics from Guangdong, and stone goods from Zhejiang).35 The dragon flag, the national flag of the Qing Dynasty in China, was seen at the closing ceremony of the Paris Expo, and that was mistaken for China’s participation in the 1900 Paris Olympic Games.36 Similarly, the Qing Court also sent a delegation to the World’s Fair (the “Louisiana Purchase” Exposition) at St. Louis in Missouri, the United States, in 1904,37 but paid scant attention to the “Games of the III Olympiad”, concurrently held there. The St. Louis 1904 Olympic Games, overshadowed by the Louisiana Purchase Expo, turned out to be another major disappointment. Essentially an American affair, 83 percent of participating athletes were from the United States. Out of 630 athletes from 12 nations,38 523 were Americans. The second largest team was from Canada, with 52 athletes, and the third largest team from Germany (17). Greece sent 14 athletes, and Switzerland only one. France, the preceding host, sent none, although Albert J. Coray, a runner in the marathon race, and a member of the second-placed Chicago Athletic Association team in the four-mile team race, was discovered to be French. Neither Baron de Coubertin, founder of the International Olympic Committee and its president from 1896 to 1925, nor American President Theodore Roosevelt bothered to show up at the Games. The Games lasted for 146 days, from July 1 to November 23, 1904. The marathon race at this Olympics was more scandalous than contentious. Frederick Lorz (1883–February 4, 1914), an American long distance runner, was applauded as the triumphant winner when he returned to the stadium allegedly to retrieve his clothes, after

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having dropped out the race only nine miles into the race and having ridden a pace car for 11 miles.39 Thomas J. Hicks (January 7, 1875–December 2, 1963), a Briton running for the United States, was the first to cross the finish-line “legally”, after having received several doses of strychnine sulfate mixed with brandy from his trainers. That was the first recorded case of doping in the history of the Olympic Games, as strychnine is now forbidden for athletes. Worse, the 1904 Olympics also featured the Anthropology Days.40 Held on August 12 and 13, 1904, the Anthropology Days was a “scientific experiment” where a variety of “savages” from indigenous populations, including Pygmies, Filipinos, Patagonians, and various American Indian tribes, competed in various events so that anthropologists could see how they compared to the white man. The “savages”, who had been brought to St. Louis as part of the exhibits at the World’s Fair, competed in such undignified events as mud fighting and greased-pole climbing as well as regular Olympic events such as running races, javelin, archery, and weight tossing. Due to random selection and lack of athletic training, these natives performed poorly in these events. The official report of the 1904 Olympic Games thus expressed dismay in these men’s running (“very poor”), javelin (“another disappointment”), archery (“another disappointment”), and weight-tossing abilities (“the savages did not take kindly at all to the 56-lb weight”) and concluded that “lecturers and authors will in the future please omit all reference to the natural athletic ability of the savage, unless they can substantiate their alleged feats”.41 Upon hearing about the Anthropology Days, Coubertin prophetically noted that such a charade “will of course lose its appeal when black men, red men, and yellow men learn to run, jump, and throw, and leave the white men behind them”.42 The most problematic and frustrating for the Chinese, however, was their participation in the 1904 World’s Fair. A grand event celebrating Thomas Jefferson’s 1803 purchase of the Louisiana territories from Napoleon (which increased the size of the United States by 140 percent) and the largest international exposition ever, the St. Louis “Louisiana Purchase” Exposition of 1904 was opened on April 30, 1904 by President Theodore Roosevelt from the

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East Room of the White House in Washington, DC, via a new device, the telegraph.43 Eager to present a positive image of China in the aftermath of the 1900 Boxer Rebellion, the Qing Court sent the largest delegation with the highest rank to the World’s Fair at St. Louis.44 In addition to the usual Customs Service expo managers, the Qing sent a number of Manchu and Chinese officials. Prince Pu Lun was appointed Imperial High Commissioner to the fair, and Vice-Commissioner Huang Kaijia (a graduate of Yale’s class of 1883) had arrived in St. Louis one year earlier, in the summer of 1903, along with more than 30 workers and artisans from China to prepare for the exhibition.45 Although the Qing delegation enhanced China’s visibility in the world and won some salutary praises, the Chinese encountered some humiliating treatment both en route and at the fair. In the tradition of restricting Chinese immigration to the United States as manifested in the Exclusion Act of 1882 and the Geary Act of 1892, U.S. Congress also established a set of procedures regarding the entry into the United States of “Chinese” participants for the St. Louis Exposition. According to the Acts, Chinese mechanics, artisans, agents or employees under contract had to furnish photographs of themselves (in triplicate) to the American Customs officer at the port of entry, to proceed directly from that port of entry to the fair without visiting any other place or engaging in any other business, to deposit a bond for 500 dollars in United States currency, to report to an Inspector for a permit (which would require that the bearer return within 12 hours) if they wanted to leave the exposition grounds temporarily, and to leave the United States within 30 days of the exposition’s close.46 Trouble began in February 1904 when the Chinese exhibitors and workmen were detained at San Francisco upon their arrival because the immigration authorities were dissatisfied with their paperwork (which bore the mark of visas from the American consul in Shanghai in accordance with the Acts). In addition to the issue of entry into and travel within the United States, the Qing representatives also found the display of Chinese objects objectionable. Among stamps from China at the exhibit in the United States Government Hall, for instance, one could find those

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showing various opium smoking tools. Moreover, opium pipes and women’s tiny bound-foot shoes, products considered shameful for China, were on display at the Chinese exhibition.47 It is inconceivable that the Chinese officials found inspiration in the St. Louis Exposition, let alone the 1904 Olympic Games. The Olympic Games that saved the modern Olympic movement was the Athens Olympic Games in 1906. Although no longer recognized by the International Olympic Committee as one of the Olympic Games, the 1906 Athens Olympics was a watershed in the history of the Olympic movement. Originally designed as a quadrennial intermediate Olympic Games with a permanent home in Athens alternating with the internationally organized games, the 1906 Athens Games was the first to have all athlete registration go through the National Olympic Committees (NOCs); the first to have the Opening of the Games as a separate event, an event at which the athletes marched into the stadium in national teams, each following its national flag; the first to have the closing ceremony; and the first to raise national flags for the victors. In contrast to the 1900 Paris Games and the 1904 St. Louis Games that were overshadowed by the World’s Expos and were stretched out over months, the 1906 Athens Games were stand-alone games and lasted for only 11 days, from April 22 to May 2, 1906. Most importantly, the Athens Games served as a source of inspiration for the Olympic movement in China. As mentioned above, Zhang Boling made an explicit reference to the 1906 Athens Games in his remarks on the Olympic movement in China on October 24, 1907. Of course, the 1908 London Games also had a direct impact on China’s Olympic movement. Officially opened on April 27, 1908 by King Edward VII, the London Games were probably subsequently mentioned in the article on the Olympic Games published in the Tientsin Young Men of May 23, 1908. The slides of the London Games were shown a number of times at several public gatherings in Tianjin in the same year. As a result, these three critical questions were raised for China: When will China be able to send a winning athlete to the Olympic Games? When will China be able to send a

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winning team to the Olympic Games? When will China be able to host an Olympic Games in Beijing? Answering the First Two Questions Strictly speaking, the sending of Liu Changchun (1909–February 21, 1983) to the 1932 Los Angeles Games is not exactly the answer to the first question “when will China be able to send a winning athlete to the Olympic Games?” Liu was the first athlete to represent China at the Olympic Games, but he was not the first winning Chinese athlete at the Olympic Games. Although he registered for the men’s 100 meters, 200 meters, and 400 meters, he decided not to attend the men’s 400 meters due to exhaustion from a 23-day journey to the United States and his failure to qualify for the finals of the 100 meters and 200 meters. In retrospect, Liu was too tired to compete after a long journey. His record in China in 1929 was 10.8 seconds, the same as the 100 meters record of the 1928 Amsterdam Olympic Games. But his time on July 31, 1932 at the 100 meters preliminary was only 11.1 seconds48 and the winner of his group was 10.9 seconds.49 In light of the results of the 100 meters at the 1932 Olympic Games, it is unlikely that Liu would have won a medal in that event. The winner of the gold medal in the 100 meters, Eddie Tolen, set an Olympic record of 10.3 seconds at the Games. The silver medalist, Ralph Harold Metcalfe, was closely behind Eddie Tolen, with a result of 10.38 seconds.50 The bronze winner, German athlete Arthur Jonath, ran the 100 meters in 10.4 seconds.51 Liu’s career best was 10.7 seconds. Similarly, Eddie Tolen also set a record of 21.2 seconds in the men’s 200 meters at the Games, and he was followed by George Simpson with a result of 21.4 seconds and Ralph Metcalfe at 21.5. Liu’s career best was 22 seconds.52 The real answer came in 1960, when Yang Chuan-kwang (or C. K. Yang) (July 10, 1933–January 27, 2007) won a silver medal in the decathlon53 at the 1960 Rome Olympic Games for the Republic of China.54 Known as the “Iron Man of Asia”, Yang was the gold medalist in the decathlon at the 1954 Asian Games as well as the 1958 Asian Games. Although he finished in eighth place in the

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decathlon at the 1956 Summer Olympics in Melbourne, Australia, he won the silver four years later in Rome, Italy. Eight years later, Chi Cheng (born March 15, 1944) became the first Chinese woman medalist in the Olympic Games in history. A native of Taiwan, Chi participated in the 1968 Summer Olympic Games in Mexico City, Mexico, on behalf of the Republic of China. She won a bronze medal in the 80-meter low hurdles.55 By the same token, China (Republic of China) sent its first team to the Olympics in 1932 and subsequently to the Olympics in 1936 and 1948, and the People’s Republic of China sent its first team in 1952. But these were not the answers to the second question “when will China be able to send a winning team to the Olympic contests?” The Chinese delegation to the 1932 Olympics in Los Angeles, the United States included only one athlete, Liu Changchun, who failed to win any medals. The Chinese delegation to the 1936 Olympics in Berlin, Germany, included 49 athletes56 but did not win any medals; nor did the Chinese delegation to the 1948 London Olympics. The PRC delegation to the 1952 Helsinki Olympics raised the flag of the PRC but did not win any medals. An unequivocal answer came in 1984. That was one answer for two questions. To the Los Angeles Games in 1984, China sent a winning team of athletes, winning 15 gold, 8 silver, and 9 bronze medals.57 Xu Haifeng (born August 1, 1957) was the first Chinese athlete to win a gold medal at the Olympic Games.58 He won the gold medal in the 50-meter pistol event in the 1984 Los Angeles Summer Olympics, the first gold medal at the Games. China subsequently collected 14 more gold medals and ranked fourth in the gold medal count at the Games, after the United States (83), Romania (20), and West Germany (17). Becoming a Host to the Olympic Games Historically, China had been a host to a number of major sports events in Asia, yet China did not seriously consider hosting an Olympic Games until 1990. As mentioned earlier, under the leadership of the YMCA directors and Zhang Boling, China hosted the

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Second Far Eastern Championship Games (the successor of the “Far Eastern Olympic Games” and the precursor to the Asian Games) in Shanghai in 1915.59 But only three countries sent delegations to the Games: the Republic of China, Japan, and the Philippines. After the Asian Games Federation was formed in 1949 that held its inaugural Games in New Delhi, India in 1951, China hosted the 11th Games in Beijing from September 22 to October 7, 1990.60 With 6,122 athletes from 37 countries competing in 27 sports, the Beijing Asian Games was a great success. China won a total of 341 medals including 183 golds (more than 58 percent of all gold medals of the Games), 107 silvers, and 51 bronzes, further consolidating China’s No. 1 position in Asia. On a visit to the newly built National Olympic Center on September 3, 1990, Deng Xiaoping asked Wu Shaozu, the then-head of the State Sports Commission, “Have you made up your mind to bid for an Olympic Games?”61 Beijing began preparing its bid for the 2000 Summer Olympic Games in February 1991 and submitted its application in December of the same year.62 As the decision was to be made at the 101st International Olympic Committee (IOC) Session in Monte Carlo, Monaco, in September 1993, Li Lanqing (born May 1932), vice premier of the State Council and a Politburo member, flew to this tiny principality in Europe on September 16, 1993. Li was honorary chairman of the delegation of the Beijing 2000 Olympic Games Bid Committee (BOBICO), and the other members of the delegation included Chen Xitong (born 1930) (Party secretary of Beijing and a Politburo member) as president of the BOBICO, and Wu Shaozu (born 1939) (chairman of the State Sports Commission), Li Qiyan (born 1938) (mayor of Beijing), He Zhenliang (born 1929) (vice president of the International Olympic Committee and president of the China Olympic Committee),63 and Zhang Baifa (born 1934) (vice mayor of Beijing) as vice presidents.64 Five cities made presentations to the IOC Session from September 20 to 23, 1993.65 The other candidate cities were Manchester (Britain), Berlin (Germany), Istanbul (Turkey), and Sydney (Australia). In the first three rounds of voting, Beijing was ranked first. Out of 89 votes in the first round, Beijing received 32; Sydney 30; Manchester 11;

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Berlin 9; and Istanbul 7. After Istanbul was eliminated in the second round, Beijing’s favorable votes went up to 37, followed by Sydney’s 30, Manchester’s 13, and Berlin’s 9. Beijing continued to lead in the third round with 40 favorable votes (out of 88 votes now), ahead of Sydney by three votes and Manchester by 29 votes. However, the vote tally was dramatically altered in the last round, when Sydney received 45 votes while Beijing only 43.66 Since it was a secret ballot, it is not clear who voted against Beijing in the final round. However, Wu Ching-kuo (born October 18, 1946), Taiwan’s representative to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) since 1988,67 revealed in June 2000 that he cast his vote for Beijing in September 1993, putting an end to the speculation that he supported Sydney and contributed to the Australian city’s narrow win over Beijing.68 In the meantime, it was quite obvious that the United States opposed Beijing’s 2000 Olympics bid because of strong opposition from its Congress.69 Although China’s initial reaction to the failure of the 2000 Olympic bid was to try for the 2004 Summer Olympic Games, the Chinese leadership soon decided to focus on the 2008 Games instead. The Beijing Municipal Government submitted an application to the National Olympic Committee (NOC) of the People’s Republic of China on November 25, 1998, starting the bidding process for the 2008 Summer Olympic Games (officially, the Games of the XXIX Olympiad in 2008). With the approval of China’s NOC, Beijing sent an official application to the IOC on April 7, 1999. The Beijing 2008 BOBICO was formed on September 6, 1999, which approved its logo and motto at its second plenum on February 1, 2000.70 The logo, an artistic presentation of the Chinese character Jing (the national capital) on a Chinese seal, depicts a “dancing Beijing”, symbolizing a milestone for China’s Olympic movement and China’s pledge to respect and carry on the Olympic spirit.71 The motto, “New Beijing, Great Olympics”, represents the modern image of Beijing, a city with a 3,000-year history and a dynamic present.72 On August 28, 2000, the IOC announced its acceptance of candidate cities for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad in 2008: Beijing

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(China), Istanbul (Turkey), Osaka (Japan), Toronto (Canada), and Paris (France). After visiting candidate cities from February 21 to March 29, 2001,73 the IOC Evaluation Commission produced the “Report of the IOC Evaluation Commission for the Games of XXIX Olympiad in 2008” at its final meeting held between March 31 and April 3, 2001 in Lausanne, Switzerland.74 At its 112th meeting in Moscow in July 2001, the IOC voted to decide which city would host the 2008 Games. Beijing received 44 favorable votes (out of 102 votes) in the first round and 56 (out of 105 votes) in the second round. On July 13, 2001, IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch announced Beijing the winner of the election as the host city for the Games of XXIX Olympiad in 2008. Clearly, the government’s support was one of the critical factors for Beijing’s successful bid. First, the local leadership of Beijing made its bid for the 2008 Games its top priority. After Beijing lost its bid for the 2000 Olympic Games, the local leadership went through a major reshuffle. Chen Xitong, Party secretary of Beijing and a Politburo member, was dismissed in April 1995 when Vice Mayor Wang Baosen was found to have committed suicide amid allegations of Wang’s involvement in corruption. Wei Jianxing (born 1931), another Politburo member and also a member of the Secretariat, took over as Party secretary of Beijing in April 1995, and Jia Qinglin (born 1940), Party secretary of Fujian between December 1993 and November 1996, was transferred to Beijing as acting mayor in October 1996, replacing Li Qiyan. By September 1999 when the Beijing 2008 BOBICO was formed, Jia Qinglin had become Party secretary of Beijing and a Politburo member, and Liu Qi had become mayor of Beijing. A native of Wujin, Jiangsu, Liu Qi (born November 1942) is a typical technocrat. Having graduated from the Metallurgical Department of Beijing Institute of Iron and Steel Engineering with a postgraduate education, Liu worked in the field of metallurgy for 30 years. He was minister of the Metallurgical Industry from 1993 to 1998, when the ministry was abolished in a major administrative restructuring. He was transferred to Beijing as deputy secretary in

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March 1998 and was appointed vice mayor of Beijing in the following month. In February 1999, Liu succeeded Jia Qinglin as mayor of Beijing while Jia had been promoted to Party secretary of Beijing in August 1997. On September 6, 1999 when the BOBICO was established, Liu became its president. The executive president was Wu Shaozu (born 1939), head of the State Sports Administration. Yuan Weimin (deputy head of the State Sports Administration) and Liu Jingmin (vice mayor of Beijing) were executive vice presidents; He Zhenliang (vice president of the International Olympic Committee and president of the China Olympic Committee) was advisor; Zhang Faqiang (deputy head of the State Sports Administration),75 Yu Zaiqing (deputy head of the State Sports Administration),76 Li Zhijian (deputy secretary of Beijing),77 Li Wenyi (vice mayor of Beijing),78 Wang Guangtao (vice mayor of Beijing),79 and Zhang Mao (vice mayor of Beijing) were vice presidents, Tu Mingde (secretary general of the China Olympic Committee) and Wang Wei (deputy secretary general of the Beijing Municipal Government)80 were secretary generals. The BOBICO had 76 members altogether.81 Party Secretary Jia Qinglin was not an official member of the BOBICO, but he assumed the leadership role for the Olympic bid because he was the boss of Beijing. He attended the inauguration of the BOBICO on September 6, 199982 as well as a number of meetings subsequently.83 Beijing’s efforts received strong central support. Premier Zhu Rongji and President Jiang Zemin both indicated their full support. Zhu expressed his support on behalf of the Party Center and the State Council during a meeting with foreign guests in May 2000,84 and both Zhu and Jiang wrote letters to IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch in November 2000.85 A more interesting case is Li Lanqing. Honorary chairman of the delegation of the Beijing 2000 BOBICO and a Politburo standing member in charge of sports, Li seldom appeared at the meetings of the Beijing 2008 BOBICO between September 1999 and July 2001. He met with Michael Knight, chairman of the Sydney Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games (SOCOG) on July 28, 2000 on

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behalf of President Jiang Zemin;86 and also met with China’s sports delegation to the Sydney Olympics before and after the Games.87 But there is no report that he ever attended a meeting on Beijing’s bid for 2008 Olympic Games. It was announced on July 3, 2001, however, that Li Lanqing, executive vice premier and Politburo standing member, was going to attend the IOC’s 112th meeting in Moscow between July 10 and 14, 2001 on behalf of the Chinese government.88 As Li Lanqing later recalled, he drafted a statement in English himself and sent it to Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji, both of whom were good at English. Jiang quickly approved the draft, and Zhu also approved the English draft but asked Li to prepare a Chinese version. Li then translated the presentation from English to Chinese himself.89 In a three-minute presentation, Li made two points. First, China had supported sports activities in other developing countries. Second, if Beijing were to make profits from hosting the Olympic Games, China would use them to establish a foundation to support Olympic movement in developing countries; if Beijing were to suffer losses, the Chinese central government would make up the difference. The central message, according to Li, was to show the Chinese central government’s full support for Beijing’s bid. Under Li’s leadership, Beijing won the bid as the host city for the Games of XXIX Olympiad in 2008. China’s 100-year dream was coming true.

PREPARING FOR THE OLYMPIC GAMES Beijing’s Pledges Under the motto, “New Beijing, Great Olympics”, Beijing’s leaders promised the 2008 Olympic Games to be the best ever in the history of Olympic Games.90 In the bid application report, Beijing introduced three themes for the 2008 Olympic Games: green Olympics, high-tech Olympics, and people’s Olympics. Under a “Green Olympics Program” (GOP), Beijing planned to complete by 2007 20 major projects costing US$12.2 billion to improve the city’s environment. Moreover, it would carry out

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a Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) and an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) for the whole course of the Games including its preparatory phases; formulate a detailed Environmental Management Plan (EMP); establish an Education Center for Sustainable Development in the Olympic Green; adopt procurement policies to encourage designers, builders, suppliers, sponsors, and licensees to address environmental priorities; and hold public events to involve local residents in the process of promoting environmental protection.91 In different areas of environmental protection, Beijing made specific pledges. In solid waste disposal, Beijing promised to treat all solid wastes, making sure that 50 percent of the solid wastes be separately collected and 30 percent recycled by 2008. In sewage treatment, Beijing would increase its daily capacity from 1.08 million tons in 1999 to 2.8 million tons in 2008, treating 90 percent of the sewage generated and reusing 50 percent of the treated water. Beijing would continue to protect drinking water sources and use water-saving facilities and non-flush toilets in the Olympic Village. In air pollution reduction, Beijing swore to maintain high air quality not only for the period of the Games in 2008 but also for the whole year by imposing a strict standard for vehicle exhausts.92 To make the 2008 Games a “High-tech Olympics”, Beijing pledged to substantially upgrade its technological infrastructure. By 2008, more than 80 percent of Beijing’s subscriber loops for fixed line telephone network would be digitized, and intelligence network (IN) and Internet protocol (IP) based customer services, such as interactive video conferencing, prepaid cards, 1-800 services, virtual private networks, and collect call services, would be available.93 Beijing’s optical fiber networks would connect all Olympic venues and transmission system operating at terabits per second would be used to dramatically increase the capacity of the network.94 Beijing would also upgrade its mobile telephony infrastructure from 2G technology to 3G technology, providing General Packet Radio Services (GPRS) and catering for 15 million users.95 In addition to four satellite operators with 32 main earth stations and three operators with six submarine optical cables and two submarine cables due for

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completion in 2002 and 2004 respectively, Beijing would build more submarine cables, use DWDM technology over international cables to provide terabits per second capacity, and launch another five satellites for communications and TV broadcasting.96 More specifically, Beijing pledged to: •

•

•

•

•

• •

Expand its fiber network to cover all Olympic sites, providing a secure broadband network to deliver the Games to the world; Establish an integrated telecom office for the Olympic precinct and remote switches in each venue, providing 40,000 lines and managing all voice, data, and internet transmissions as well as broadband services; Build a mobile communications network capable of managing all 2G and 3G requirements as well as other technologies introduced before 2008, providing a capacity of 500,000 calls in the Olympic precinct; Build a digital Olympic trunk radio network operating on 800MHz and independent of the public system, providing a capacity of 15,000 handsets in up to 1,000 talk groups; Establish a digital cable TV network capable of HDTV transmission for all Olympic Family venues with enough bandwidth for international transmission, providing overseas broadcasting; Build a national digital broadcasting system, providing comprehensive Olympic coverage for people throughout China; and Provide wireless and IP services to reduce cabling at venues.97

To produce a “People’s Olympics”, Beijing made pledges to introduce a number of communications and education programs to imbue the athletes and people of China with the spirit of Olympism; hold a series of cultural events related to Olympics; and organize a youth camp for the 2008 Olympic Games.98 The central guiding principle is to promote sustainable social and economic development and to imbue the 1.25 billion Chinese people with Olympism, leaving the social, economic, athletic, and technological legacies of the Olympic Games to future generations of China.

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More specifically, Beijing pledged to: •

• •

•

•

• • • •

•

•

Create an Olympic Education Network based in the Olympic Research Center of Beijing University of Physical Education, linking Olympic sport and social science specialists in China and building connections with the International Olympic Academy at Olympia and other international institutions on Olympics around the world; Publish an Olympic book series and produce TV documentaries on Olympic themes; Offer Olympic lecture courses based on the Olympic Education Textbook compiled by the IOC Commission of Culture and Olympic Education to 400 million students at primary and secondary schools, as well as colleges and universities between 2005 and 2008; Invite representatives from IOC and UNESCO, world-renowned experts on Olympism, and athletes to give a series of public lectures on values, evolution, and future development of the Olympic Movement; Hold a series of exhibitions such as “Treasures from the International Olympic Museum”, “International Olympic postage stamps”, “Olympic memorabilia”, etc.; Organize an “Olympic World Tour” to facilitate visits by Chinese people to previous host cities of the Olympic Games; Organize an International Sports Film Festival and International Festivals of Music and Drama; Construct an “Olympic Monument” in a prominent place on the Olympic Green; Establish an organizing committee for the International Youth Camp to manage the Youth Camp for the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games with 800 young people aged between 16 and 20 from around the world; Conduct the Olympic Torch Relay across the land of China with the participation of millions, representing all 56 ethnic groups in China; and Hold the Opening and Closing Ceremonies in a new National Stadium.99

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Moreover, Beijing also planned to construct venues for the Olympic Games as well as infrastructure for the municipality, substantially upgrade the transportation system, build more roads and railways, expand the capacity of Beijing International Airport, and build an “Olympic Village”.100 The total BOCOG expenditure for the Olympic Games was estimated to be US$1,609 million, including US$190 million of capital investments.101 In addition, the total nonBOCOG expenditure of capital investments was estimated to be US$ 14,256 million.102 Finally, Beijing also planned to build a Media Village in the Olympic Green to accommodate about 20,000 accredited media personnel, a Main Press Center (MPC) of 58,400 square meters in the Olympic Green and several Media-Sub-Centers at the competition venues. It is also planning to provide work areas, offices, equipment, facilities, and services needed by the media. As noted in the Evaluation Commission’s report, Beijing also confirmed that “there will be no restrictions on media reporting and movement of journalists up to and including the Olympic Games”.103 Beijing’s Measures Five months after Beijing won the bid, the Beijing Organizing Committee for the Games of XXIX Olympiad (BOCOG) was established on December 13, 2001. Liu Qi, a Politburo member and Party secretary of Beijing, served as its president. The BOCOG adopted “Chinese seal, dancing Beijing” as its emblem, “high-level Olympics with distinguishing features” as its goals, “Green Olympics, Hightech Olympics, and People’s Olympics” as its concepts, and “One World One Dream” as its theme. After a two-month public consultation (from March 28 to May 28, 2002) and subsequent internal deliberations and revisions, the BOCOG released the “Beijing Olympic Action Plan” on July 13, 2002, the first anniversary of the awarding of the Games to Beijing. To make the Games a Green one, Beijing adopted a series of measures. First, it relocated its polluting industries elsewhere. The Beijing Government identified more than 200 steel, chemical,

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automobile, electronics, and other companies as serious polluters and made plans to move them to somewhere else. The two most notorious polluters were Capital Steel Corporation (Shougang), which was just 10 miles west of Tiananmen Square and the producer of onetenth of air particles in the capital, and the Beijing Coking-Chemical Plant. Both of them were relocated to Tangshan, Hebei, 93 miles east of Beijing.104 Second, Beijing substantially upgraded the public transportation system in the capital. Its subway system of a basic two-line operation of 54 kilometers in 2001 was expanded to an eight-line operation of more than 200 kilometers in 2008. In addition to Lines 1 and 2, Line 13 (40.9 kilometers) was opened in 2002; Batong Line (18.9 kilometers) in 2003; Line 5 (27.6 kilometers) in 2007; Line 8 (Olympic Branch) (4.5 kilometers), Line 10 (24.7 kilometers), and Airport Express (28.5 kilometers) were opened in 2008.105 The Beijing subway daily ridership, which was 1.3 million in 2001, increased to 3.4 million in 2008, with a record of 4.92 million on August 22, 2008.106 In addition, at least another five lines are under construction (Lines 4, 6, 9 and commuter lines to Daxing and Yizhuang), with work on at least three more (Lines 7, 14, and the Fangshan Line) set to begin by the end of 2008. By 2015, Beijing’s rapid transit rail network is expected to reach 561 kilometers in length.107 Third, the Olympic facilities were constructed based on the principle of energy efficiency and environmental friendliness. With more than 120 energy conservation measures, the Olympic competition venues were expected to save 50 percent of energy and living facilities including the Olympic Village; and the Media Village were expected to save 65 percent of energy.108 Moreover, some 500 buses using diverse new energies were put into operation during the Olympic Games. A hydrogen gas station was established at the new energy demonstration park in the Yongfeng High Tech Center in Zhongguancun.109 Zhengzhou Yutong Bus Company, China’s largest bus manufacturer, and Alcoa, the world’s leading aluminum producer, joined hands to come up with an environmentally-friendly bus, “Green Bus” (ZK6126HGE), for the Beijing Olympic Games.110 The bodies of the two test buses are made primarily of aluminum and

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are 46 percent lighter than traditional buses. Overall, the new buses weigh about one and a half tonnes less than buses now on the road, requiring less fuel and emitting fewer greenhouse gases. Fourth, Beijing continued tree-planting campaigns. Under the slogan “Hosting a Green Olympics and Building an Ecological City”, national leaders, BOCOG officials, and volunteers from all walks of life attended an annual tree planting activity in Beijing. Fifth, the Central Government established an “Olympic Games Air Quality Guarantee Work Coordinate Group” to facilitate coordination among Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, and Shandong to ensure air quality in Beijing and Olympic venues in other provinces.111 The group met at least five times to monitor the progress, discuss issues, and propose further actions. At the fifth meeting of the group on May 15, 2008, Minister Zhou Shengxian of Environmental Protection reported that the desulfurization project in power plants in the six provincial units had been completed, taking 81 percent of the total capacity of power generation; 85 percent of key polluting factories had been forced to reduce their production or were closed down; and 61 percent of industrial cleanup had been accomplished.112 Sixth, Beijing introduced a temporary traffic control measure in June 2008 to reduce the number of cars on the roads during the Olympic Games. According to the measure, between July 20 and September 20, 2008, the city’s 3.5 million vehicles would be allowed on the roads on alternate days depending on whether their license plates are odd or even numbers.113 Finally, Beijing suspended all the construction in the city before and during the Olympics. As a result, Beijing’s environment drastically improved. The forest coverage in Beijing increased from 41.9 percent in 2001 to 50 percent in 2008; the number of good days with grade II air quality or better rose from 50 percent in 2001 to 70 percent in 2008.114 The air quality in August 2008 in Beijing was the best in a decade. For the first 18 days in August 2008, Beijing reported grade I air quality for nine days and grade II air quality for the other nine days.115 Moreover, the Beijing Olympic Village received a Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) gold award presented by

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the US Green Building Council. This “gold medal” was awarded to the Beijing Olympic Village for its environmentally-friendly design, as its use of solar cells and geothermal heat pumps.116 As an example of greener power generation, Huadian Beijing Co-generation Co., a key thermal power plant for Beijing that provides heat for the buildings along Chang’an Avenue, including the Great Hall of the People, Diaoyutai State Guesthouse, and a cluster of State administrative facilities, is greener, more powerful, and more energy-efficient than its predecessor. The old thermal power plant featured a tall factory chimney that emitted heavy industrial smoke and soot, with a 200,000 kilowatts capacity that supplied heat for 500,000 people and 12 million square meters of construction areas in Beijing. The new factory has a heat supply capacity of 540 million kilocalories per hour and a power generation capacity of 1.9 billion kilowatts a year. Fueled by natural gas, the new factory saves emissions of 500 tonnes of sulfur dioxide, 400 tonnes of dust, and 1,300 tonnes of Nitrogen Oxide (NOX) every year.117 To make the Olympic Games a high-tech one, the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) and the Beijing Municipal Government have also made great efforts. Under the leadership of Minister Xu Guanhua (born 1941), nine government organizations [Ministry of Science and Technology, Beijing Municipal Government, Ministry of Education, Commission for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND), State General Administration of Sports, Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), Chinese Academy of Engineering, China Association for Science and Technology, and National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC)] joined forces and released an “Olympics Science and Technology (2008) Action Plan” on July 27, 2001, pledging to assemble science and technology talent to provide the Olympic Games with technological support.118 After the Beijing Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXXIX Olympiad (BOCOG) was established on December 13, 2001, the BOCOG also formed the XXXIX Olympiad Science and Technology Committee on June 7, 2002 to be its advisory council on Olympic related high-tech issues.119

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These organizations have adopted four major measures to implement the Action Plan. First, they organized 10 major Olympic related technological projects such as “Beijing Intelligence Transport System (ITS)”120 and “Electric Vehicles”,121 including 167 projects and 249 subjects. Second, they activated a special category of Olympic technology, with 85 key projects emphasizing five areas of technological services for Olympic competitions, Olympic construction, sports technology, and Olympic Green construction. Third, they decided to assemble technological talents of the nation to provide technological support and services for the Olympic construction. Fourth, they promoted high-tech Olympic Games through international cooperation and established partnership with the European Union, the United States, Australia, and the IOC regarding technological development related to Olympics.122 Over a period of seven years, 35,000 researchers and scientists from 200 companies, 170 research institutions, and 50 institutions of higher education completed more than 1,000 projects related to the Olympic Games.123 The Beijing Olympic Science and Technology Committee supported 1,180 projects with a total investment of 3.17 billion yuan (including 927 million yuan financial investment from the municipal government).124 To make the Olympic Games a “People’s Games”, Beijing also made efforts to create a welcoming social environment for athletes and spectators from China and other countries. The Beijing Bureau of Personnel began to train 100,000 civil servants to speak English in late July 2001, soon after Beijing’s successful bid for hosting the Olympic Games;125 the BOCOG initiated a “2008 Olympic Games Image and Scenery Project” on April 7, 2002, planning to create unique images and visual effects for the Beijing Olympic Games in three stages;126 the Renmin University of China launched a website on “People’s Olympics” with a theme on “People’s Olympics and Psychological Environment” on June 15, 2002;127 the Beijing Municipal Government announced on August 1, 2002 to invest 600 million yuan in the next five years to implement a “People’s Olympics” heritage conservation program, refurbishing historical sites in the city of Beijing and its adjacent areas;128 and Beijing

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residents were educated to foster good manners conforming to a set of social ethics outlined in the “Implementation Outline for the Building of Civic Ethics”.129 Beginning on January 1, 2005, Beijing launched a campaign of “Etiquette Beijing, People’s Olympics”. In this campaign, the Beijing Municipal Government tried to raise the level of social ethics among its residents through a series of bi-monthly activities on: (1) daily etiquette, such as respecting the elderly and caring for the young and creating a harmonious neighborhood; (2) social etiquette, such as obeying traffic regulations and observing the public order; (3) stadium etiquette, such as not leaving trash behind after the games and rising for the national anthem; (4) professional etiquette, particularly the professional image of taxi drivers; (5) campus etiquette to instill civic-mindedness and good habits among students; and (6) etiquette toward foreign visitors.130 Beijing officials distributed 4.3 million copies of an etiquette book outlining rules on good manners and foreign customs, including what not to wear. Among the no-no’s: more than three color shades in an outfit, white socks with black shoes, and pajamas and slippers in public.131 The book also advised older women not to choose shoes with heels that are too high and warned against spitting or staring at others in public. The guidelines offered a list of eight things not to ask foreigners, including their age, marital status, income or religious and political beliefs. The campaign went in a high gear in 2006 when six municipal governments (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Qingdao, Shenyang, and Qinhuangdao) made a joint public appeal to raise the level of social etiquette for a successful Olympics in Beijing.132 With central support, the campaign went nationwide and would last for three years.133 Beijing also built facilities for the Olympic Games. Out of 28 sports for the Games, 26 were to be held in Beijing, requiring 31 venues. Among them, 12 had to be built new, 11 to be upgraded, and eight were temporary venues. The National Stadium (“Bird’s Nest”) was the iconic building of the Beijing Olympics. Originally budgeted for US$246.71 million,134 the Bird’s Nest would be the main stadium for both the Olympics and the

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Paralympics. With a seating capacity of 91,000 including 11,000 temporary seats occupying an area of 258,000 square meters, the Bird’s Nest stands 68.5 meters tall, 332.3 meters long and 296.4 meters wide. Designed by a consortium of Herzog & de Meuron (Switzerland), Ove Arup (United Kingdom), and China Architecture Design & Research Group, ground was broken on December 24, 2003; construction started in March 2004; and the Stadium was officially opened on June 28, 2008.135 Another iconic building of the Beijing Olympic Games is the National Aquatics Center, also known as the “Water Cube”. Also located in the Olympic Green, the Water Cube would be the venue for swimming, diving, and synchronized swimming in the Olympics. Originally budgeted for US$107.51 million,136 the Aquatics Center was built in accordance with a water-saving concept. Covered by ETFE (ethylene tetrafluoroethylene) air cushions, the Water Cube’s membrane structure is the world’s largest and most complex ETFE project. Designed and built by a consortium made up of PTW Architects (an Australian architecture firm), Arup International Engineering Group, China State Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCEC), and China Construction Design International of Shanghai (CCDI), the venue set a new standard in environmental sports design, not only in China but also in the world.137 The outer surface and roof façade of the Water Cube can collect 10,000 tons of rain water, 70,000 tons of clean water, and 60,000 tons of swimming pool water annually, saving 140,000 tons of recycled water a year.138 Ground was broken on December 24, 2003, and the construction was completed on January 28, 2008. The venue occupies an area of 65,000 square meters, with a seating capacity of 17,000 (including 11,000 temporary seats). Beijing not only built a Media Village but also promised to treat accredited reporters in accordance with international conventions and experiences of the past Olympics.139 Located outside the north fifth ring road of Beijing and to the northeast of the Olympic Green and the Olympic Forest Park covering 630,000 square meters, the Media Village could provide up to 6,000 rooms to accredited media during the Olympic and Paralympic Games.140

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On December 1, 2006, Premier Wen Jiabao signed a decree issuing a set of regulations on reporting activities in China by foreign journalists during the Beijing Olympic Games and its preparatory period.141 Foreign journalists would be allowed to legally report in the People’s Republic of China during the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games in order to spread the Olympic spirit. They could conduct interviews as long as they obtained consent from the interviewees. The regulation would be effective from January 1, 2007 to October 17, 2008.142 Finally, Beijing designated three areas for public protests during the Olympic Games. At a press conference on the security of the Olympics, Liu Shaowu, director of the BOCOG security department, announced that peaceful demonstrations would be allowed during the Games in three parks: World Park; Purple Bamboo Park; and Ritan Park. But those who plan to hold a protest in these designated zones have to obtain permission from Beijing’s public security bureau in advance.143 About half an hour ride to Tiananmen Square, World Park (a 47-hectare park) is located in Fengtai District (the southwest of Beijing). Purple Bamboo Park (a 46-hectare park) in Haidian District (the northwest of Beijing) is about 100 meters from the Capital Indoor Stadium, where the volleyball competition was held; and Ritan Park (Temple of Sun, a 20-hectare park) in Chaoyang District (the east of Beijing) is 10 kilometers from the Tiananmen Square. However, no demonstration of “political, religious or racial propaganda”, according to Liu, would be permitted in Olympic sites or areas.144

MANAGING THE OLYMPIC GAMES “Best Games Ever in the Olympic History” For China, hosting an Olympic Games was a one-hundred-year dream come true. China’s leadership was exuberant about the opportunity and determined to make it the best games ever in history. At the press conference in Moscow after signing the contract on behalf of the host city on July 13, 2001, Liu Qi, president of the BOBICO

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and mayor of Beijing, promised to fulfill the pledges in the bid report and to present the world with the most outstanding Olympic Games in history.145 At the welcoming ceremony for receiving the BOBICO delegation from Moscow on July 14, 2001, Vice President Hu Jintao reaffirmed the central support for making the Beijing Olympics the most exciting and most outstanding event in the history of Olympic Games.146 At the first executive meeting of the Beijing Municipal Government three days later, Mayor Liu Qi asked planners to make adjustments to the 10th Five-Year Plan for high-tech industry development and the three-year development plan for city public transportation in accordance with the goal of “hosting the most outstanding Olympic Games in the Olympic history”.147 At the meeting with the BOBICO staff on July 18, 2001, Li Lanqing urged them to make the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games the most outstanding Games in the Olympic history in accordance with General Secretary Jiang Zemin’s requests.148 China’s policy in this regard did not change as a result of power transition from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao at the Sixteenth Party Congress of November 2002. At a meeting with IOC President Jacques Rogge on June 2, 2003 in Lausanne, Switzerland, President Hu Jintao expressed the Chinese government’s full support for making the Beijing 2008 Olympics the “most outstanding Olympic Games”.149 To make the Games the best ever, an auspicious day had to be chosen for the opening ceremony. Originally, the BOBICO had recommended hosting the Games in September 2008 because of Beijing’s favorable weather conditions then.150 September is one of the best months in Beijing. It is cooler and drier than July and August. IOC, however, proposed to host the Games between July 25 and August 10, 2008. Beijing considered these days acceptable in its bid report, as Beijing’s daily average air temperature ranges from 24.5°C to 26.1°C, average humidity level at 67 percent, and short rain showers during this period.151 Yet as Wang Qishan (born July 1948), mayor of Beijing and executive president of the BOCOG, revealed at a forum on “Chinese Sciences and Culture” on November 4, 2004, Beijing subsequently

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tried to renegotiate the days to avoid hot and humid July and August and to move the opening ceremony to late August. But it was decided that the opening ceremony would be held in early August because of summer holidays in Europe and the United States and the fixed schedules of the US Open 2008 (August 25-September 7, 2008) and the US Major League Baseball (MLB) 2008. The auspicious time on the auspicious day for the opening ceremony, as Wang disclosed, would be 8pm on August 8, 2008.152 The exact time for the opening is said to have been 8 minutes and 8 seconds past 8pm on 8/8/2008.153 The number “eight” sounds like “fa” (prosperity) in Cantonese, and a string of eights is supposed to bring good fortune to the Beijing Olympics. Beijing also assembled the best team for the opening and closing ceremonies. On April 16, 2006, the BOCOG announced its creative team for the opening and closing ceremonies of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games. Zhang Yimou (born November 14, 1951), an internationally-acclaimed Chinese filmmaker well known for films such as Red Sorghum (1987), To Live (1994), and Not One Less (1999), was made chief director. Zhang Jigang (born December 25, 1958),154 an internationally-acclaimed Chinese choreographer and a Major General of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as well as director of the Song and Dance Ensemble of the PLA, and Chen Weiya, another internationally-acclaimed choreographer and director as well as the deputy director of the China National Song and Dance Ensemble, were deputy chief directors. Yu Jianping, president of Beijing Special Engineering Design Institute, was technical director. The team’s production executive was Lu Jiankang, general manager of the Bei’ao Culture and Sports Co., who participated in the planning and organization of the 21st Universiade opening ceremony in Beijing and in the NGO forums at the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing. The team’s cultural and artistic advisors included Ji Xianlin and Tang Yijie, eminent professors at the prestigious Peking University; Jin Shangyi, chairman of the China Artists’ Association and ex-president of the Central Academy of Fine Arts; Xu Xiaozhong,

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honorary president of the Central Academy of Drama; and movie director Chen Kaige. The BOCOG also invited three overseas advisors to join the work team. They were Steven Spielberg (born December 18, 1946),155 a world-renowned American movie director; Yves Pepin, president of French company ECA2 who staged the 2004 Olympics closing ceremony in Athens; and Richard Peter Birch, the Australian chief director of four successive Olympic events since 1988.156 Beijing also produced the most ambitious torch relay program. According to a finalized plan officially released on April 26, 2007, the Beijing 2008 Olympic Torch Relay would “traverse the longest distance, cover the greatest area, and include the largest number of people”.157 The theme is a “journey of harmony” with a slogan, “Light the Passion, Share the Dream”. The Olympic Flame, according to tradition, would be lit in Olympia, Greece, on March 25, 2008. From March 25–30, the Torch Relay would travel across Greece, ending at the Panathinaiko Stadium, the site of the first modern Olympic Games in 1896. After the handover ceremony in the stadium, the Olympic Flame would arrive in Beijing on March 31, 2008. After a welcoming ceremony in the capital of China for the arrival of the flame, Beijing 2008 Olympic torch relay would commence. In the subsequent 130 days, the torch would travel 137,000 kilometers through 135 cities158 (including 20 cities in other countries).159 Impressed by the grandeur of the route, IOC President Jacques Rogge remarked, By traveling along the “Silk Road”, a symbol of ancient trade links between China and the rest of the world, crossing the five continents and going to new places, the Beijing 2008 Torch Relay will, as its theme says, be a “journey of harmony”, bringing friendship and respect to people of different nationalities, races, and creeds.160

“I have no doubt”, he continued, “the Beijing Olympic Torch Relay will leave many extraordinary memories and create new dreams for people around the world”.161

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Disturbances and Disruptions Instead of “one world, one dream”, unfortunately, not everyone in this world shared Beijing’s dream. Human rights groups, Tibetan separatists, and others also wanted to use the limelight of the Beijing Olympic Games to advance their separate courses. Things began to unravel in February 2008 when Steven Spielberg pulled out of his role as advisor to the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games because the Chinese government, in his view, did not do enough to alleviate the situation in Darfur, Sudan. In a statement, Spielberg said that he decided to formally announce the end of his involvement as one of the overseas artistic advisors to the opening and closing ceremonies of the Beijing Olympic Games as he found that his conscience would not allow him to continue business as usual. Instead of working on Olympic ceremonies, he would rather spend his time and energy on helping “bring an end to the unspeakable crimes against humanity that continue to be committed in Darfur”. “Sudan’s government bears the bulk of the responsibility for these on-going crimes”, he continued, “but the international community, and particularly China, should be doing more to end the continuing human suffering there”.162 That was the first sign that the Beijing Olympic Games was being politicized. Even worse, the Beijing Olympic Torch Relay was severely disrupted in several Western cities in the aftermath of the riots in Tibet and elsewhere in China. On March 24, 2008, when Liu Qi, president of the Beijing Olympic Organizing Committee, spoke ahead of the torch lighting in Olympia of Athens, Greece, three men from the France-based media rights group Reporters Sans Frontieres (Reporters Without Borders, or RSF) broke into the ceremony venue. One man ran up behind Liu Qi attempting to display a black flag depicting the Olympic rings made from handcuffs.163 Although the Olympic torch went smoothly through three cities outside China — Almaty in Kazakhstan, Istanbul in Turkey, and St. Petersburg in Russia, the torch relay turned chaotic in London, Britain. The host of the 1908 and 1948 Olympic Games, London had also been selected on July 6, 2005 to host the 2012 Olympic

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Games as the only city in the world to host three Olympic Games. However, the capital of the United Kingdom was not a particularly good host to the Olympic torch.164 After the torch relay in London began at 10:30 a.m. (local time) from Wembley Stadium on April 6, 2008, one Tibet independence supporter tried to grab the torch from a torchbearer, former Blue Peter host Konnie Hug (born July 17, 1975);165 another two attempted to extinguish the flame with an extinguisher; and more blocked and held up the relay.166 In the afternoon, when the torch was surrounded by a large group of protesters, the police decided to take the torch by bus along Fleet Street to St Paul’s Cathedral instead of carrying it by a runner. Prime Minister Gordon Brown greeted the torch outside Number 10 Downing Street but did not hold it because of the political pressure. Police made 37 arrests during the day.167 The torch relay suffered the most serious disruptions in Paris. The procession through Paris on April 7, 2008 degenerated into a melee. Protestors from Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland arrived at the French capital by train, bus, or flight and sabotaged the torch relay.168 When Jin Jing (born 1981),169 a handicapped Chinese female torchbearer, was carrying the torch for the third leg of a new course along the Seine River in Paris, she was attacked by a pro-Tibet independence activist. The man reached for her wheelchair and tried to wrestle the torch from her. Jin, a slender woman of 27 years with only one leg, struggled to protect the torch, earning the kudos from the Chinese as the “smiling Olympic angel in a wheelchair”.170 Some French politicians were implicated in the chaos. Bertrand Delanoë (born May 30, 1950), mayor of Paris, said he was planning to unfurl a giant banner over city hall saying, “Paris defends human rights everywhere in the world”.171 He allowed a Tibetan flag and a black banner depicting the Olympic rings as handcuffs to hand over the Hotel de Ville (city hall) and canceled a ceremony to welcome the torch relay.172 He subsequently endorsed Paris city council’s decision to award the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan spiritual leader and the head of Tibet separatist movement (in the eyes of the Chinese), the title of an honorary citizen of Paris.173 French President Nicolas Sarkozy was also contemplating

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the possibility of boycotting the Olympic Games opening ceremony in Beijing on August 8, 2008. Similar clashes between pro-Tibet independence demonstrators and Olympic supporters and the police, though on much smaller scales, occurred in a number of other cities such as San Francisco (United States), Buenos Aires (Argentina), Canberra (Australia), Nagano (Japan), and Seoul (South Korea). Overall, the torch relay, which originally had meant to showcase China’s goodwill toward the world, turned out to be a public relations nightmare for Beijing. Moreover, there were signs in China that Beijing could very well be a target of terrorist attacks. In April 2008, a senior police officer from the Ministry of Public Security revealed attempts by two terrorist groups in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region to kidnap foreigners and carry out suicide attacks on the run-up to and during the Beijing Olympic Games.174 The groups were plotting attacks on hotels, government buildings, and military installations in Beijing and Shanghai. In the first case, a 10-member terrorist group led by Aji Muhammat was arrested between January 4 and 11, 2008. The group was sent by East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), listed as a terror group by both the United Nations and the United States in 2002, to carry out terrorist attacks. The group had been recruiting members and raising money to buy explosives. After conducting 13 explosive and poisonous device experiments in remote areas of the country, the members had planned to attack hotels, government buildings, and military facilities in Beijing and Shanghai, starting in May 2008. The second terrorist group, based in Urumqi, capital of Xinjiang, was uncovered between March 26 and April 6, 2008. This group had planned to launch human bombs in Urumqi and other major cities, and kidnap foreign athletes and reporters during the Games. In fact, these were only part of the story. By July 2008, police in Kashgar, Xinjiang had dismantled altogether 12 terrorist groups, destroyed 41 Islamic militant training bases, and detained 82 people suspected of plotting to sabotage the Olympic Games.175 Chinese leaders realized the importance of safety for the Olympics and decided to make a “Safe Olympics” another goal in

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addition to the goals of “Green Olympics, High-Tech Olympics, and People’s Olympics”. Initially, a “Safe Olympics” was a goal for the Beijing Public Security Bureau because of its responsibility for the security of the Olympics. On November 25, 2005, Ma Zhenchuan, chief of the Beijing Public Security Bureau, revealed a plan to ensure a “Safe Olympics”.176 The goal was later upgraded to a goal for the public security system in China. On February 13, 2006, Zhou Yongkang, Politburo member, member of the Secretariat of the CCP Central Committee, State Councilor, and minister of Public Security, urged security officers in Beijing to further improve their organization system to establish a centralized, unified, and efficient command system; collect accurate and reliable intelligence for decision-making; strengthen security work on Olympic venues; learn from their counterparts in other countries and from previous Olympic Games; enhance security personnel training; expand crisis management capacity with anti-terror as a focus; and increase public awareness of security issues.177 The goal, of course, was to ensure a “Safe Olympics”. Since Meng Jianzhu (born July 1947), former Party secretary of Jiangxi, took over as minister of Public Security on October 28, 2007, he continued this policy of a “Safe Olympics”. At a meeting of public security chiefs in January 2008, Meng asked public security officers to work together in order to realize the goal.178 Finally, the goal was upgraded to one for the entire nation. A Politburo meeting on June 27, 2008 chaired by General Secretary Hu Jintao focused on preparations for the Olympics and the Paralympics. There was no mention of the goal for the “best ever” Olympics at the meeting. Instead, the focus was to fulfill the pledges Beijing had made to the international community and to make the Beijing Olympics a high level Olympics with Chinese features. The meeting also made a “Safe Olympics” a goal for the Beijing Olympics.179 A few days later, on July 9, 2008, 30 days before the opening of the Olympics, Xi Jinping, vice president of the People’s Republic of China and No. 6 Politburo standing member in charge of the Beijing Olympics, emphasized the importance of a “Safe Olympics” in a keynote speech at a gathering to review preparations for the Beijing

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Olympic Games and the Paralympic Games. “A safe Olympics”, he remarked, “is the most important indicator of a successful Beijing Olympics and is also important for our country to showcase its image”.180 Moreover, Chinese leaders were also adjusting their attitudes toward criticisms. They were learning to adapt to embrace the diversity of opinions and value systems in the world. During his visit to Qatar (the fourth stop of his first trip abroad as vice president of the People’s Republic of China) on June 24, 2008, Xi remarked to Hong Kong reporters that China should not be disturbed by internal riots and external problems. “We don’t care whether (someone) likes that Beijing is hosting the Olympics. There are all kinds of people in this vast world — that is what makes the world very lively”, he reportedly commented.181 According to him, the Chinese people should remain calm and concentrate on doing their own job well. As a major gathering of athletes, coaches, and tourists from different cultural backgrounds, the Olympics is bound to have frictions. Not everybody in the world necessarily cherishes what the Chinese people take great pride in, and the Chinese people will have to learn to be more tolerant and understanding. “Truly Exceptional Games” Largest gathering of world leaders The day finally came. It was August 8, 2008, the day of the opening ceremony for the Beijing Olympic Games. In spite of calls for boycotting the Beijing Olympic Games, more than 110 foreign dignitaries showed up at China’s capital, 30 more than those preregistered prior to the opening of the Games, making the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympic Games one of the largest gatherings of world leaders.182 American President George W. Bush had been a consistent supporter of the Beijing Olympic Games. Bush accepted Hu’s invitation to attend Beijing’s opening ceremony in September 2007, when the two met in Sydney, Australia for the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic

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Cooperation) summit.183 After Steven Spielberg dropped out from the creativity team for the opening and closing ceremonies of the Olympics, Bush reaffirmed his commitment to coming to Beijing in an interview with BBC on February 14, 2008. When questioned about Spielberg’s pullout, Bush answered, “That’s up to him. I’m going to the Olympics. I view the Olympics as a sporting event”.184 In the aftermath of the Tibet riots, the United States government reaffirmed Bush’s decision to come to the opening ceremony at least four times. Subsequent to the London torch relay, the White House spokesman, Tony Fratto, reaffirmed Bush’s decision on April 7, 2008.185 During his meeting with Chinese Vice Premier Wang Qishan at the White House on June 18, 2008, Bush indicated his desire to attend the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics again.186 The White House spokeswoman, Dana Perino, confirmed Bush’s trip to Beijing at another press conference on July 3, 2008.187 At his meeting with President Hu Jintao on the sidelines of the G8 Summit in Sapporo, Japan on July 9, 2008, Bush again said he was looking forward to attending the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympic Games.188 And most importantly, he showed up on August 8, 2008. In contrast, French President Nicolas Sarkozy (born January 28, 1955) was not consistent on this issue. Before he became president of France, Sarkozy had visited China three times.189 During the Presidential campaign, while his opponent, Socialist Marie-Ségolène Royal (born September 22, 1953), raised the possibility of boycotting the Beijing Olympics because of China’s stance on the bloody turmoil in the Sudan region of Darfur, Sarkozy clearly ruled out a boycott of the Games over China’s position on Sudan.190 During his first trip to China as French President in November 2007, Sarkozy expressed his desire to come back for the Beijing Olympics. He told the Chinese hosts in front of the Bird’s Nest inside the Olympic Green on November 27, 2007 that he would attend the opening ceremony and asked them to “keep a good seat” for him.191 He went back to France with business deals worth e20 billion (about US$30 billion).192 However, on March 25, 2008, Sarkozy changed his position of unconditional support for the Beijing Olympics. Instead, he would

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make a decision whether to go to Beijing depending on whether Beijing would have a dialogue with the Dalai Lama. “Our Chinese friends must understand the worldwide concern that there is about the question of Tibet”, he said.193 “I don’t close the door to any option, but I think it’s more prudent to reserve my responses to concrete developments in the situation. I want dialogue to begin and I will graduate my response according to the response given by Chinese authorities”. At a joint press conference on March 27, 2008, however, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown had a different response. To a question on whether the leaders of major democracies such as Britain and France should boycott the opening ceremony in Beijing as a result of what was going on in Tibet, Sarkozy appeared indecisive while Brown clearly ruled out the possibility of boycotting the Olympic Games.194 Following the Paris torch relay fiasco, China and France sought to repair the damage to Sino-French relations. Hu Jintao sent Zhao Jinjun (born December 1945),195 former Chinese ambassador to France, as his special envoy to France on April 18. Zhao met with Sarkozy and delivered Hu’s letter to him. He also met with French Senate President Christian Poncelet and former French Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin.196 Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman announced on April 22, 2008 that Poncelet would be visiting China between April 21 and 27, 2008 at the invitation of China’s top legislator Wu Bangguo, and that Raffarin would be visiting China between April 24 and 27, 2008 at the invitation of the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs.197 Sarkozy asked Poncelet to make a special trip to meet with Chinese torchbearer Jin Jing upon his arrival in Shanghai on April 21, 2008. In a sympathy note to the wheelchair-bound fencer who was attacked during the Olympics torch relay in Paris on April 7, 2008, Sarkozy praised Jin Jing for her courage, condemned the attack, and invited Jin Jing to visit France in the near future.198 Finally, after a long delay, Sarkozy received Chinese new ambassador to France, Kong Quan (born November 1955),199 on April 22, 2008.200 Sarkozy also sent Raffarin as his special envoy to China with a letter to President Hu.201

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Another senior French official, Jean-David Levitte (born June 14, 1946),202 a diplomatic adviser of Sarkozy, also visited China from April 26 to 27, 2008 to hold an unofficial consultation about the Sino-French strategic dialogue with Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo, which resulted in a five-point understanding. First, the Sino-French comprehensive strategic partnership is very precious and both sides should doubly cherish and maintain this relationship. The two sides should handle the bilateral relations from a strategic and long-term perspective. At present, relations between the two countries are at a crucial stage. The two sides should make efforts to remove barriers, enhance mutual trust, and promote the healthy and smooth development of Sino-French relations. Second, the French adheres to the One China policy and has reiterated that Tibet and Taiwan are inalienable parts of China, issues of Tibet and Taiwan are China’s internal affairs, and France supports China’s great cause of peaceful reunification. Third, the Olympic Games is an event of sports and friendship for peoples of the world and the event has nothing to do with politics. The French support the Beijing Olympic Games and wishes it a complete success. Fourth, France has a positive view of China’s increasingly important role in solving regional hot issues and global issues. A comprehensive Sino-French strategic partnership will play a greater role in the maintenance of world peace and stability. Fifth, in the second half of this year, China will host the AsiaEurope summit and France will assume the EU presidency and host the 11th China-EU Summit in that capacity. The two sides are ready to work together to further promote Sino-EU ties.203 On the eve of France taking on the presidency of the European Union (June 30, 2008), Sarkozy began to back-paddle on his boycott threat. In an interview with French television (France 3), Sarkozy said that he could attend the opening of the Beijing Olympics if talks between China and the Dalai Lama would make more progress.204 The Chinese, however, were not happy about his attempt to link his attendance to the Beijing Olympic opening ceremony to the dialogue. Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Liu Jianchao registered

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China’s opposition to any foreign leaders linking the issue of Tibet to their attendance to the Beijing Olympics205 and 88 percent of Chinese respondents to an online survey of 100,000 people conducted by Sina.com viewed Sarkozy’s remarks as “extremely unfriendly” and did not welcome his presence at the opening ceremony.206 Finally, Sarkozy dropped all pre-conditions in July 2008. During a half-hour meeting on the sidelines of the Group of Eight (G8) industrialized nations summit in northern Japan on July 9, 2008, Sarkozy told Chinese President Hu Jintao he would go to Beijing for the opening ceremony.207 “The president confirmed to the Chinese President that he intends to go to Beijing on August 8 to take part in the opening ceremony of the 29th Olympiad”, a statement subsequently issued by Sarkozy’s office said.208 Hu’s reply was that Sarkozy made the right decision.209 Sarkozy arrived in Beijing on August 7, 2008, as both President of France and President of the European Union, among nearly 50 foreign leaders who arrived at China’s national capital that day.210 Several world leaders were absent from the opening ceremony for various reasons: German Chancellor Angela Merkel was on her “vacation”, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper never planned to come;211 Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi said Beijing was too hot and humid;212 and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, Czech Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek, and Lithuanian Prime Minister Gediminas Kirkilas boycotted the opening ceremony.213 The opening ceremony went ahead without them. Grand opening ceremony In order to stage a great opening ceremony, Beijing engineered a dry evening at the Bird’s Nest, the site of the opening ceremony, by blowing away rain clouds. A total of 1,104 rain dispersal rockets from 21 sites were fired between 4:08 p.m. and 11:30 p.m. on August 8, 2008, dispersing the clouds over Beijing.214 This was the largest rain dispersal operation in China, and the first time in history that such

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technology was used to ensure the weather condition for an Olympic opening ceremony.215 The operation was successful, and there was no rain at the Bird’s Nest that night. The opening ceremony, directed by Zhang Yimou and his team, was a grand display of Chinese culture and history of 5,000 years. In “the most spectacular opening ceremony ever”, 216 featuring 15,000 performers, a giant scroll unfolded, depicting the story of a great civilization through drums, fireworks, dancing, and singing. In retrospect, however, the opening ceremony was less than perfect. The 29 giant footprints outlined in fireworks starting from Tiananmen Square to the Bird’s Nest Stadium, representing the historical culmination of the modern Olympic movement to the glorious moment of the opening of the Beijing Olympic Games were real217 but their representation on the television screen turned out to be visual effects. With the exception of the very last footprint, all the others had been visual effects created by the visual effects team for the ceremony.218 Lin Miaoke, the nine-year-old girl who charmed a worldwide audience with a rendition of “Ode to the Motherland”, was actually lip-synching. The real singer, seven-year-old Yang Peiyi, was considered not pretty enough.219 Even worse, the decision to use Lin Miaoke on stage instead of Yang Peiyi seems to have been made by “a Politburo member”. One interpretation of the decision is that Yang Peiyi was not allowed to be on the stage because she was not pretty enough. Another interpretation, relayed by Chen Qigang, the ceremony’s music director, is that Lin Miaoke had been chosen first for her appearance but her voice was not good enough. At the last moment, the decision was made to replace Lin Miaoke’s recording with Yang Peiyi’s recording, not to replace Yang Peiyi by Lin Miaoke as the performer.220 According to Chen, the first requirement for the performer is that she has to look pretty. Based on this criterion, the music team then tried to decide whose voice was the best. The first girl the team agreed on was a 10-year old. Her voice was used throughout the earlier rehearsals. But she was not selected because she was not young enough and looked more like a teen.

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The team then narrowed the candidates down to around seven, including Lin Miaoke and Yang Peiyi. But Lin Miaoke’s voice was not considered good enough, while Yang Peiyi’s voice was flawless. Finally, a decision had to be made. Here are Chen Qigang’s own words: It can be said that we had to make the choice at the last minute, for we had gone through a number of reviews that were all very strict. We listened to Lin Miaoke’s recording on the site when we were doing the rehearsal. Then those from various sections, especially Central Committee Politburo leaders, while listening, made suggestions to us, saying that a change must be made. That was that.221

Clearly, the decision made at the last minute in which the Politburo leaders were involved, was not about who should appear on stage but whether Lin Miaoke’s recording should be used. The decision was not to use Lin Miaoke’s recording but Yang Peiyi’s. In other words, the Politburo leaders did not say that Yang Peiyi was not pretty enough for the stage and asked to replace her with a better looking Lin Miaoke. Instead, they suggested replacing Lin Miaoke’s recording with that of Yang Peiyi because Lin Miaoke’s voice was not good enough. According to Chen Qigang, But as far as Lin Miaoke was concerned, we had two recordings, which did not have much difference. Therefore, the voice Lin Miaoke later heard was Yang Peiyi’s voice, but of which she herself was not necessarily fully aware.222

In spite of these small glitches, the Beijing Olympic opening ceremony was indeed unparalleled in the history of the modern Olympics. Largest gathering of athletes in Olympic history The Beijing Olympic Games was the largest gathering of athletes in Olympic history, with 11,526 athletes (including 11,108 confirmed) from 204 countries and regions.223 In a span of 16 days, these athletes competed in 302 events in 34 sports. With a total of

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100 medals, the Chinese team collected the most gold medals, 51. The United States was a distant second with 36 gold medals, though its total medals were 110. This was the first time that China won the most gold medals in the Olympics, and it was also China’s best in history. Since China’s participation in the Olympics for the first time in 1984, its team had made great progress. China ranked fourth with 15 gold medals in 1984; 11th with five gold medals in 1988; fourth with 16 gold medals in both 1992 and 1996; third with 28 gold medals in 2000; and second with 32 gold medals in 2004. Although China’s top track and field star, Liu Xiang (born July 13, 1983), an Olympic gold medalist and world champion in men’s 110 m hurdles, pulled out of the competition at the last minute, China collected almost 20 more gold medals in 2008 than four years earlier. Moreover, athletes from a record 87 countries won medals; and 55 of them won at least one gold medal, also a record. Athletes from Afghanistan, Bahrain, Mauritius, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Togo won their first Olympic medals. Athletes from Bahrain, Mongolia, and Panama won their first gold medals. Singapore also won its first medal since its independence in 1965, though it won its very first medal in 1960 when Singapore was a self-governing state within the British Empire. At the Beijing Olympics in 2008, the Singapore women’s table tennis team, Li Jiawei, Feng Tianwei, and Wang Yuegu, received a silver medal. During the Games, 38 world records and 85 Olympic records were set. Usain Bolt (born August 21, 1986), a Jamaican sprinter, set world records in three events at the Beijing Olympic Games — 9.69 seconds for the men’s 100 meters, 19.30 seconds for the men’s 200 meters, and 37.10 seconds for the men’s 4 × 100 meters relay, along with his teammates. He was the first man to win all three events at a single Olympics since Carl Lewis in 1984 and the first man in history to set world records in all three at a single Olympics. Michael Fred Phelps (born June 30, 1985), an American swimmer, collected eight gold medals at the Beijing Olympics, becoming the most successful athlete at a single Olympics.224

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When the Beijing Summer Olympic Games finally came to close on August 24, 2008, IOC President Jacques Rogge exclaimed in his speech at the closing ceremony, “These were truly exceptional games!”225 “The Greatest Paralympic Games Ever” The Olympics was not the end of the story. In fact, a better part of the story had yet to unfold. On September 6, 2008, without much fanfare, the Beijing 2008 Paralympics opened. In contrast to the Olympic Games with a modern history of 102 years, the Paralympic Games did not officially begin until 1960. A quadrennial multi-sport event for athletes with physical, mental, and sensorial disabilities, the Paralympics is tied to the Olympic Games and has usually been held in the same host city following the conclusion of the Olympics since 1988.226 Directed by Zhang Jigang, deputy director of the Olympic opening and closing ceremonies and the executive director of the opening ceremony of the Paralympics, the performances for the opening ceremony of the Thirteenth Paralympics were filled with unforgettable moments. Yang Haitao (born October 27, 1982), a 26-year-old blind singer, enchanted the audience of more than 90,000 with his magnetic voice and his wish to have light for three days. His song soared at the Bird’s Nest Stadium: “Gently, you stroke my face. Quietly, you make me warm. Though I cannot see you, I know you are here with me…”. And his words touched every heart: “I am blind. My home is China. If I could see the light for three days, the people I want to see most are Dad, Mom, and you…”.227 Li Yue, a 12-year-old amputee girl, saw her dream of being a ballet dancer come true. A student of ballet for two years, Li had to have her left leg amputated after having been buried under rubble for more than 70 hours during the Sichuan earthquake in May 2008. In a performance of “Never-Ending Dance”, Li was featured along with Lü Meng, “the First Ballet Boy of China” and the winner of the Special Award at the Twentieth Varna International Ballet Competition, Bulgaria in 2002.228 Dancing in a wheelchair, the ballerina was surrounded by

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a circle of 100 deaf performers. Dancing with shoes in their hands, the performers simulated legs for her. After a performance of the theme song “Flying with the Dream” by Han Hong and Andy Lau, the Paralympic flag was raised and the Paralympic anthem played. With the torch on his wheelchair, Hou Bin, the 33-year-old high jump gold medalist with one leg, pulled himself up along a hanging rope to the rim of the steel-latticed Bird’s Nest and lit the cauldron for the Games. An equally powerful display of athletic vigor and vitality, the Beijing Paralympics was another huge success. More than 4,000 athletes from 147 countries and regions participated in 20 sports in 11 days. With 547 people including 332 athletes, the Chinese delegation was the largest at the Beijing Paralympics. China ranked first in both the number of gold medals and total medals. The Chinese athletes won 89 gold medals, 70 silvers, and 52 bronzes, amounting to 211 medals altogether. Chinese gold medals and total medals were both more than twice as many as second-placed Great Britain, which had 42 gold medals and 102 total medals.229 This was also China’s best in history. In 1984, when China first competed in the Paralympics in Stoke Mandeville, United Kingdom (for wheelchair athletes) and New York, the United States (for cerebral palsy, visually impaired, amputees, and others), it won only two gold medals, ranking 28th. Four years later, in Seoul, South Korea, China’s Paralympic team did far better, winning 17 gold medals (ranked 14th), 17 silvers, and nine bronzes. That year, China’s Paralympic athletes fared better than their Olympic colleagues, who got only five gold medals and 28 medals in all. In 1992, the Chinese Paralympic team moved up by one place to 13th on the gold tally with 11 gold medals. China subsequently jumped to ninth in 1996 with 16 gold medals, to sixth in 2000 with 34 gold medals, and to first in 2004 with 63 gold medals.230 Athletes from 76 countries and regions won medals at the Beijing Paralympics, and 52 of them won at least one gold medal. Athletes from Laos, Lebanon, Mongolia, Namibia, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and Syria won their first ever Paralympic medals. Athletes from Croatia, Mongolia, Saudi Arabia,

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Singapore, and Venezuela won their first ever gold medals. Two female athletes from Singapore took home four medals, including one gold, one silver, and two bronzes. At the speed of 57.43 seconds, Yip Pin Xiu, the 16-year old with muscular dystrophy, took a silver medal — the country’s first at the Paralympics — in women’s 50 m freestyle on September 13, 2008.231 Two days later, she took a gold medal — again the country’s first at the Paralympics — in women’s 50 m backstroke.232 Her colleague, Laurentia Tan, a 29-year old with cerebral palsy from birth, collected two bronzes in equestrian: one in the individual Championship Test Grade 1A and one in the individual Freestyle Test Grade 1A.233 After another spectacular performance on “a letter to the future” in the closing ceremony, International Paralympic Committee (IPC) President Philip Craven (born July 4, 1950) declared the Games “the greatest Paralympic Games ever”.234 It was not just a compliment. He had every reason to be exuberant about the Beijing Paralympics. He remarked: An ethereal Opening Ceremony, Staggering athletic performances in perfect stadia, the best-ever Paralympic Villages, Amazing high definition television coverage, A never ending and self generating supply of passion and emotion, Superb organization, Wonderful volunteers, Millions of new Paralympic sports aficionados both here in China and around the world.235

“The Paralympic spirit that is ever bright in our movement”, he continued, “found here in China, a kindred spirit”. The slogan for the Beijing Paralympics as well as for the Beijing Olympics, “One World, One Dream”, and “One People”, according to Craven, had become a reality. CONCLUDING REMARKS Hosting an Olympic Games was a 100-year-old Chinese dream, but the initial set of three critical questions (When will China be able to

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send a winning athlete to the Olympic contests? When will China be able to send a winning team to the Olympic contests? When will China be able to host an Olympic Games?) was probably articulated by an American in English. The real inspiration for China’s Olympic movement came from neither the inaugural 1896 Athens Games nor the 1900 Paris Games and the 1904 St. Louis Games, as the latter two were more of a sideshow for a world exposition than a genuine international sports event of any significance. Instead, the Chinese (in particular Zhang Boling) were inspired by the 1906 Athens Olympic Games, though this is no longer officially recognized in the sequence of modern Olympic Games. The Chinese provided an answer to the first question in 1960 when Yang Chuan-kwang (C. K. Yang) won a silver medal in the decathlon at the Rome Olympic Games on behalf of the Republic of China; the second question in 1984 when the Chinese team won 15 gold medals at the Los Angeles Olympic Games; and after the first attempt in the early 1990s, gave an unequivocal answer to the last question on July 3, 2001 when the International Olympic Committee selected Beijing as the host city for the Games of XXIX Olympiad in 2008. In the subsequent “biblical seven years”,236 Beijing made tremendous efforts to upgrade its hardware and software to make the 2008 Olympic Games “green Olympics, high-tech Olympics, and people’s Olympics”. In terms of “hardware”, Beijing relocated polluting industries elsewhere, substantially upgraded the public transportation system, built modern and environmentally friendly Olympic venues (such as Bird’s Nest and Water Cube), and supported thousands of technologically innovative projects. As a result, Beijing was fundamentally transformed into a modern metropolitan city. In terms of “software”, Beijing trained civil servants to speak English, refurbished historical sites in Beijing and its adjacent areas, and launched a campaign for “Etiquette Beijing, People’s Olympics” by a series of activities on daily etiquette, social etiquette, stadium etiquette, professional etiquette, campus etiquette, and etiquette toward foreign visitors. To accommodate foreign journalists and governments, the Chinese leadership decided to open up the

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country to foreign reporters during the Games and designated three zones for potential public protestors. Out of its exuberance for realizing the 100-year dream, the Chinese leadership initially swore to make the Beijing Olympics the best games ever in history with a slogan “One World One Dream”. However, not everyone in the world shared China’s dream. Human rights groups in general and Tibetan separatists and their sympathizers in particular took advantage of the limelight of the Beijing Olympic Games and attempted to advance their courses. First, Steven Spielberg stepped down in February 2008 as an advisor to the Beijing Olympic Games because the Chinese government, in his view, did not do enough to alleviate the situation in Darfur, Sudan. Then the Beijing Olympic torch relay was seriously disrupted in multiple Western cities such as Athens (March 24), London (April 6), Paris (April 7), and San Francisco (April 9). In Paris in particular, a female handicapped torchbearer was attacked by a Tibet independence supporter. As a result of these incidences as well as real terrorist threats, the Chinese leadership revised its priorities and made “safe Olympics” its top goal. In the end, Beijing indeed hosted the best ever Olympics in the history of modern Olympic movement. The opening and closing ceremonies of the Beijing Olympics and Paralympics were spectacular, Beijing’s Olympic venues were first-rate, the Chinese audiences were well-mannered, and sports men and women set new records in multiple events. China ranked first in the final gold medal tally for the first time in history, winning a total of 51 gold medals. Most importantly, many world leaders came to Beijing for the opening ceremony, millions all over the world enjoyed the Olympics either on site or through televisions, and the whole event went smoothly with very few glitches. The air was good, the traffic was manageable, and the people were friendly. One of the major winners of the Beijing Olympic Games is Xi Jinping, the heir apparent who was in charge of the event. With the success of the Olympics and Paralympics, Xi is one step closer to the crown of this emerging power.237

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NOTES 1. This is a direct translation of the Chinese name. The original journal was published in English; its title was Tientsin Young Men. 2. h t t p : / / w w w. c h i n a n e w s . c o m . c n / o l y m p i c / n e w s / 2 0 0 8 / 0 8 - 0 4 / 1335273.shtml. 3. C. H. Robertson, September 30, 1908. I would like to thank Susan Brownell for providing this source. 4. According to Andrew Morris, the campaign started in 1907. See his article, “‘To Make the Four Hundred Million Move’: Late Qing Dynasty Origins of Modern Chinese Sport and Physical Culture”, Comparative Studies in Society and History 42, no. 4 (October 2000), p. 892. 5. C. H. Robertson, September 30, 1908. I would like to thank Susan Brownell for providing this source. 6. Tientsin Young Men VII, 28 (October 24, 1908). This source is from Chih-Kang Wu, The Influence of the YMCA on the Development of Physical Education in China (Ph.D. dissertration, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1956), p. 107. See also Andrew Morris, “‘To Make the Four Hundred Million Move’: Late Qing Dynasty Origins of Modern Chinese Sport and Physical Culture”, Comparative Studies in Society and History 42, no. 4 (October 2000): 876–906; and Cultivating the National Body: A History of Physical Culture in Republican China (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, San Diego, 1998) as well as http://www.gmw.cn/CONTENT/2008-08/09/content_ 819484.htm. 7. Tientsin Young Men VII, 29 (October 31, 1908). This source is from Chih-Kang Wu, The Influence of the YMCA on the Development of Physical Education in China (Ph.D. dissertration, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1956), p. 108. 8. http://www.gmw.cn/CONTENT/2008-08/09/content_819484.htm. 9. Zhang was not talking about the Athens 1896 Games. He was talking about the Athens 1906 Olympic Games. This will be explained in detail later. 10. Chih-Kang Wu, The Influence of the YMCA on the Development of Physical Education in China (Ph.D. dissertration, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1956), pp. 103–104. 11. http://www.gmw.cn/CONTENT/2008-08/09/content_819484.htm. 12. Ibid. 13. Tientsin Young Men VI, 19 (October 26, 1907). This source is from Chih-Kang Wu, The Influence of the YMCA on the Development of Physical Education in China (Ph.D. dissertation, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1956), pp. 103–104. 14. Tientsin Young Men VII, 12 (May 23, 1908). This source is from Chih-Kang Wu, The Influence of the YMCA on the Development of Physical

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15.

16. 17.

18. 19.

20. 21.

22. 23. 24.

25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

Education in China (Ph.D. dissertation, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1956), pp. 106–107. Tientsin Young Men VII, 12 (May 23, 1908). This source is from Chih-Kang Wu, The Influence of the YMCA on the Development of Physical Education in China (Ph.D. dissertation, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1956), pp. 106–107. C. H. Robertson, September 30, 1908. I would like to thank Susan Brownell for providing this source. C. H. Robertson, “A Plan for Promoting Missionary Activity Among Association Boys”, Annual Reports of the Foreign Secretaries of the International Committee, October 1, 1909 to September 30, 1910 (New York: International Committee, YMCA, 1910), p. 192. I would like to thank Susan Brownell for providing this source. See also http://hnn.us/roundup/ entries/50087.html. The University of Minnesota’s exhibit, “Reaching for the Gold”, shows China’s path to the Olympic Games with its archives on the YMCA in China. See http://www.mndaily.com/articles/2008/08/13/ 72167656. Morris, “‘To Make the Four Hundred Million Move’”, p. 892. Another version states that Zhang Boling raised these questions in a discussion with friends in October 1908. See http://fy.jcrb.com/shownews.aspx? newsid=1209. Morris, “‘To Make the Four Hundred Million Move’”, pp. 876–906. For his biographical information, see http://hoopedia.nba.com/index.php/ Willard_Lyon; and http://www.bdcconline.net/bdcc_stories/china/tianjin/ lyon_dw.html. http://special.lib.umn.edu/findaid/html/ymca/yusa0009x2x4.phtml. For his family trees, see http://www.jedh.com/src/genealogy/Full07a-p/ p216.htm. For Max J. Exner’s biographical information, see Janice A. Beran, “Max J. Exner: Naismith’s Roommate — Later Coach, Teacher and Public Health Physician”, http://www.la84foundation.org/SportsLibrary/NASSH_Proceedings/ NP1991/NP1991h.pdf. http://special.lib.umn.edu/findaid/html/ymca/yusa0009x2x4.phtml. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Olympic_Games#cite_ref-Encarta-Ancient_1-0. http://cqwb.cqnews.net/webnews/htm/2008/8/25/299026.shtml. For his biographical information, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demetrius_ Vikelas. http://www.china.com.cn/international/txt/2008-05/21/content_ 15373774.htm; http://www.thefirst.cn/900tian/90006_2_27_3.htm. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1896_Summer_Olympics. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1900_Summer_Olympics. http://xk.cn.yahoo.com/articles/071012/1/4eya.html.

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33. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1900_Summer_Olympics. 34. At the inaugural Olympic Games at Athens in 1896, the winners of the first and second places were awarded silver and bronze medals and no gold medals were given. At the 1900 Paris Olympic Games, no official winner medals were given. At the 1904 St. Louis Olympic Games, the winners of the first, second, and third places were given gold, silver, and bronze medals. For more details about these medals, see http://olympic-museum.de/w_medals/wmed1896. htm. 35. Susan R. Fernsebner, Material Modernities: China’s Participation in World’s Fairs and Expositions, 1876–1955 (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, San Diego, 2002), p. 31. 36. http://2008.cnki.com.cn/aoyun/gushi_17.html. 37. Fernsebner, Material Modernities, pp. 31–54. 38. Bill Mallon, The 1904 Olympic Games: Results for All Competitors in All Events, With Commentary (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 1999), p. 1. 39. http://www.historyhouse.com/in_history/olympics/. 40. Susan Brownell, ed., The 1904 Anthropology Days and Olympic Games: Sport, Race, and American Imperialism (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2008). 41. Bill Mallon, The 1904 Olympic Games: Results for All Competitors in All Events, With Commentary (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 1999), p. 205. 42. Ibid., p. 12. 43. Fernsebner, Material Modernities, p. 31. 44. Ibid., p. 35. 45. For some photos of the Chinese village and Chinese participants at the fair, see http://exhibits.slpl.org/lpe/data/LPE240023046.asp?thread=240029535. 46. Fernsebner, Material Modernities, p. 43. 47. Ibid., pp. 51–54. 48. http://www.nnnews.net/News/NNNEWSQ23739T20088252231NWCDPIOQ9.html. 49. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liu_Changchun. 50. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ralph_Metcalfe. 51. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arthur_Jonath. 52. http://www.buildcc.com/html/31/72631-339625.html. 53. Decathlon is a 10-event athletic contest, consisting of the 100 m, 400 m, and 1500 m runs, the 110 m high hurdles, the javelin and discus throws, shot put, pole vault, high jump, and long jump. 54. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yang_Chuan-kwang. 55. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chi_Cheng. 56. For a detailed list, see http://association.cadsm.org.tw/Quotation/ TPENOCv2/changes/changes_03.asp?struct_id=26&struct_ide=2024&cu_ no=3&file=/LTD/sample/spo_sample/Sample_03.asp.

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374 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69.

70.

71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77.

78.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China_at_the_1984_Summer_Olympics. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xu_Haifeng. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Far_Eastern_Championship_Games. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1990_Asian_Games. Xu Jiangshan and Sun Xiaosheng, “Xiaoping de Yuanwang Shixian le” (“Deng Xiaoping’s dream came true”), Renmin Ribao, July 14, 2001, p. 4. Yan Xiaoming, Wang Jianxin, and Lai Renqiong, “Weile Zhuangyan de Chengnuo” (“For Our Solemn Pledges”), Renmin Ribao, July 13, 2008, p. 1. http://baike.baidu.com/view/136417.htm. http://2008.sohu.com/20080708/n258017016.shtml. For a detailed description of the session, see http://www.la84foundation.org/ OlympicInformationCenter/OlympicReview/1993/ore312/ORE312j.pdf. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2000_Summer_Olympics_bids. http://www.olympic.org/uk/organisation/ioc/members/bio_uk.asp?id=41. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0WDQ/is_2000_June_26/ai_ 63024361. Patrick E. Tyler, “Olympics; There’s No Joy in Beijing as Sydney Gets Olympics”, New York Times, September 24, 1993, http://query.nytimes. com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F0CE3DC1139F937A1575AC0A965958260& sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all. See also David M. Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing US-China Relations, 1989–2000 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001), p. 42. For a chronology of Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Summer Olympic Games, see “Shen Ao Dashi Ji” (“Chronology of Bidding for the 2008 Summer Olympic Games”), Renmin Ribao, July 13, 2001, p. 10. http://www.beijing2008.cn/spirit/beijing2008/graphic/n214068869. shtml. John E. Findling and Kimberly D. Pelle, eds., Encyclopedia of the Modern Olympic Movement (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2004), p. 264. For an IOC procedures, see http://multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/en_report_ 296.pdf. Findling and Pelle, Encyclopedia of the Modern Olympic Movement, p. 265. For Zhang Faqiang’s biographical information, see http://news.sohu.com/ 20060223/n241989971.shtml. For Yu Zaiqing’s biographical information, see http://2008.163.com/08/ 0807/11/4IO6H3ER00742437.html. In April 2000, Li Zhijian and Yuan Weiming split Wu Shaozu’s positions. Li became party group secretary and deputy head of the State Sports Administration, and Yuan became the head of the State Sports Administration. See http://sports.sina.com.cn/others/200004/1936603.shtml. For Lin Wenyi’s biographical information, see http://politics.people.com.cn/ GB/shizheng/252/9667/9685/3953021.html.

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79. For Wang Guangtao’s biographical information, see http://news.xinhuanet. com/ziliao/2002-03/01/content_295722.htm. 80. For Wang Wei’s biographical information, see http://www.beijing2008.cn/ bocog/executive/n214047705.shtml. 81. Renmin Ribao, September 7, 1999, p. 1. 82. Ibid. 83. One meeting was held on May 18, 2000 (see Renmin Ribao, May 19, 2000, p. 5). One meeting was held on October 20, 2000 (see Renmin Ribao, October 21, 2000, p. 3). 84. Renmin Ribao, May 9, 2000, p. 1. 85. For a copy of Jiang’s letter dated November 21, 2000, and a copy of Zhu’s letter dated November 30, 2000, see http://www.beijing2008.cn/spirit/ beijing2008/candidacy/files/. 86. Renmin Ribao, July 29, 2000, p. 1. 87. Renmin Ribao, September 9, 2000, p. 1; Renmin Ribao, October 3, 2000, p. 1. 88. Renmin Ribao, July 4, 2001, p. 4. 89. “Li Lanqing Jiangshu Beijing Shen’ao Xianwei Renzhi de Gushi” (“Li Lanqing told some stories about the Beijing’s Olympic bid that few knew”) http://gb.cri.cn/17844/2008/08/08/2945s2185303.htm. 90. Renmin Ribao, July 14, 2001, p. 3. 91. Beijing’s Bid Report, http://en.beijing2008.cn/spirit/beijing2008/candidacy/ files/, Theme 4, pp. 54–55. 92. Ibid., Theme 4, pp. 54–57. 93. Ibid., Theme 15, pp. 80–81. 94. Ibid., Theme 15, pp. 82–83. 95. Ibid., Theme 15, pp. 85–86. 96. Ibid., Theme 15, pp. 85–86. 97. Ibid., Theme 15, pp. 92–93. 98. Ibid., Theme 17, pp. 116–123. 99. Ibid., Theme 17, pp. 116–123. 100. Ibid., Theme 5, pp. 72–73. 101. Ibid. 102. Ibid. 103. “Report of the IOC Evaluation Commission for the Games of XXIX Olympiad in 2008”, http://multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/en_report_299. pdf, p. 73. 104. Ariana Eunjung Cha, “Relocation of Beijing factories only moved the problem”, The Washington Post, August 8, 2008, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/ html/nationworld/2008099200_chinafactories08.html. 105. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beijing_Subway. 106. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beijing_Subway. 107. http://news.xinhuanet.com/sports/2008-07/17/content_8563354.htm.

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376 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization 108. http://finance.cctv.com/special/special/C20404/20080703/102532. shtml. 109. http://www.most.gov.cn/eng/newsletters/2008/200809/t20080902_ 63732.htm. 110. Renmin Ribao, July 29, 2008, p. 1. For a video clip on “‘Green Bus’ Debuts at Olympics”, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tIfaEDT0pgQ. 111. http://news.xinhuanet.com/environment/2008-08/04/content_ 8944186.htm. 112. http://www.sepa.gov.cn/hjyw08/200805/t20080516_122532.htm. 113. http://www.moc.gov.cn/zhuzhan/jiaotongxinwen/difangxinwen/200806/ t20080623_500644.html; http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/07/ 080723094845.htm. 114. Renmin Ribao, July 29, 2008, p. 1. 115. In the Chinese air quality monitoring system, grade I is excellent with the air pollution index (API) from 1 to 50. Grade II is fairly good, with an API reading from 51 to 100. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/olympics/2008-08/ 19/content_6950973.htm. 116. Renmin Ribao, August 14, 2008, p. 3. 117. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2008-05/19/content_ 6695626.htm. 118. For the complete plan in Chinese, see http://www.ahinfo.gov.cn/xinwen/ wr/ahkjxw/2001stxw/kjxw1011.htm. 119. http://2008.qq.com/a/20080710/000594.htm. 120. For a detailed discussion of this topic, see http://tech.sina.com.cn/e2/200302-25/1136167788.shtml. 121. For a detailed discussion of this topic, see http://dzrb.dzwww.com/dzzb/ xinnengyuan/200807/t20080703_3763615.htm. 122. http://2008.people.com.cn/GB/6196391.html. 123. Renmin Ribao, August 22, 2008, p. 16. 124. Ibid. 125. Renmin Ribao, August 1, 2001, p. 6. 126. Renmin Ribao, April 8, 2002, p. 2. 127. Renmin Ribao, July 5, 2002, p. 8. 128. Renmin Ribao, August 2, 2002, p. 2. 129. Renmin Ribao, September 22, 2003, p. 9. 130. Renmin Ribao, December 18, 2004, p. 4. 131. Loretta Chao, “For Beijing, Etiquette Isn’t a Game”, Wall Street Journal, August 1, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/public/article_print/SB12175275 2638401551.html. 132. Renmin Ribao, March 26, 2006, p. 4. 133. Ibid., p. 1.

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134. Beijing’s Bid Report, http://en.beijing2008.cn/spirit/beijing2008/candidacy/ files/, Theme 5, p. 76. However, the budget has been revised several times later with the final construction cost of US$290 million and the total cost of US$423 million (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beijing_National_Stadium). 135. For details, see http://www.beijing2008.cn/96/44/column212044496. shtml; http://en.beijing2008.cn/cptvenues/venues/nst/headlines/n21442 3642.shtml. The actual spending on the Bird’s Nest was US$423 million, instead of US$246.71 million. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beijing_ National_Stadium#CITEREFPasternack2008. 136. Beijing’s Bid Report, http://en.beijing2008.cn/spirit/beijing2008/candidacy/files/, Theme 5, p. 76. 137. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Water_Cube. 138. http://en.beijing2008.cn/cptvenues/venues/nac/headlines/n214241555. shtml. 139. Renmin Ribao, December 20, 2005, p. 13. 140. http://www.paralympic.org/release/Main_Sections_Menu/News/ Current_Affairs/2005_11_29_a.html. 141. Renmin Ribao, December 2, 2006, p. 4. 142. When this regulation expired on October 17, 2008, Premier Wen Jiabao issued another regulation, “Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Waiguo Changzhu Xinwen Jigou he Waiguo Jizhe Caifang Tianli” (“Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on News Covering Activities of the Permanent Offices of Foreign News Agencies and Foreign Journalists”). For the full text in Chinese, see http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2008-10/17/content_1124261. htm. Under the new regulation, foreign journalists continue to be allowed to conduct interviews as long as they can get consent from the interviewees. 143. China Daily, July 26, 2008, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/olympics/200807/26/content_6879244.htm. 144. Ibid. However, there were no protests in these areas during the Olympics. For an insightful analysis in this regard, see James Fallows, “Their Own Worst Enemy”, The Atlantic, November 2008, http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/ 200811/chinese-progress. 145. Renmin Ribao, July 15, 2001, p. 6. 146. Ibid., p. 1. 147. Renmin Ribao, July 19, 2001, p. 2. 148. Ibid., p. 1. 149. Renmin Ribao, June 3, 2003, p. 3. 150. http://multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/en_report_299.pdf, p. 62. 151. Beijing’s Bid Report, http://en.beijing2008.cn/spirit/beijing2008/candidacy/ files/, Theme 4, pp. 62–63. 152. http://news.xinhuanet.com/sports/2004-11/05/content_2179376.htm.

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378 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization 153. Richard Williams, “Patriot games: China makes its point with greatest show”, The Guardian, August 9, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/sport/2008/ aug/09/olympics2008.openingceremony. 154. For Zhang Jigang’s biographical information, see http://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Zhang_Jigang. 155. For Steven Spielberg’s biographical information, see http://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Steven_Spielberg. 156. Renmin Ribao, April 17, 2006, p. 4. 157. Renmin Ribao, April 27, 2007, p. 1. 158. However, Taipei later dropped out. 159. China Daily, April 26, 2007, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/2008/2007-04/ 26/content_861178.htm. 160. Renmin Ribao, April 27, 2007, p. 1. 161. Ibid. 162. “Statement from Steven Spielberg, Regarding Beijing 2008 Olympic Games”, http://www.asiaing.com/statement-from-steven-spielberg-regarding-beijing2008-olympic-games.html. 163. “Olympic torch lit despite protest” BBC News, March 24, 2008, http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7310654.stm. 164. For the torch relay route and a list of torch bearers in London, see http:// www.bbc.co.uk/london/content/articles/2008/03/04/olympic_torch_ feature.shtml. 165. “Clashes along Olympic torch route”, BBC News, April 6, 2008, http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7332942.stm. For Konnie Hug’s biographical information, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Konnie_Huq. 166. Renmin Ribao, April 7, 2008, p. 4. Interestingly, on a separate report on p. 12, there was no mention of the relay disruptions. 167. “Clashes along Olympic torch route”, BBC News, April 6, 2008, http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7332942.stm; Sam Greenhill, Benedict Brogan, Lucy Ballinger, Olinka Koster, and Vanessa Allen, “London’s shame as protests plunge Olympic torch relay into chaos”, Mail Online, April 7, 2008, http:// www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-557566/Londons-shame-protests-plungeOlympic-torch-relay-chaos.html. 168. Katrin Bennhold and Elisabeth Rosenthal, “Olympic torch relay through Paris turns into melee”, International Herald Tribune, 7 April 2008, http://www. iht.com/articles/2008/04/07/europe/torch.php. 169. For Jin Jing’s biographical information, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Jin_Jing. 170. http://torchrelay.beijing2008.cn/en/journey/paris/news/n214297268. shtml. For a video recording, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I28U cqobzPA.

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171. “Paris braced for torch protests”, BBC News, April 7, 2008, http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7333875.stm. 172. “Protests curt short Olympic relay”, BBC News, April 7, 2008, http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7334545.stm#upagain. 173. “French capital honours Dalai Lama”, BBC News, April 21, 2008, http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7358695.stm. 174. Renmin Ribao, April 11, 2008, p. 10. 175. China Daily, July 16, 2008, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/200807/16/content_6851114.htm. 176. Renmin Ribao, November 26, 2005, p. 7. 177. Renmin Ribao, February 14, 2006, p. 4. 178. Ibid. 179. Renmin Ribao, June 28, 2008, p. 1. 180. Renmin Ribao, July 10, 2008, p. 5. 181. http://news.163.com/08/0625/13/4F9OCU600001124J.html. 182. By July 31, 2008, more than 80 foreign dignitaries had indicated their willingness to come to the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympic Games on August 8, 2008 (Renmin Ribao, August 1, 2008, p. 1.). But on the day, more than 110 showed up in Beijing (Renmin Ribao, August 9, 2008, p. 2.). 183. http://2008.qq.com/a/20070906/000212.htm. However, it was not mentioned in the press briefing of the White House for the meeting, http:// www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/09/20070906-2.html. 184. “In full: George W Bush’s BBC interview”, BBC, February 14, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7245670.stm. 185. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/04/20080407-3.html. 186. Renmin Ribao, June 20, 2008, p. 3. 187. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/07/20080703-8.html. 188. Renmin Ribao, July 10, 2008, p. 1. 189. Renmin Ribao, May 17, 2007, p. 3. 190. “Olympics-China says boycott calls against ‘goodwill’”, Reuters, April 26, 2007, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/PEK159135.htm; Renmin Ribao, May 17, 2007, p. 3. 191. Renmin Ribao, November 28, 2007, p. 4. 192. “Sarkozy wins China 20bn euro deal”, BBC News, November 26, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7112500.stm. 193. “Sarkozy threatens boycott of Beijing Olympic Games opening ceremony”, The Times, March 26, 2008, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/ world/europe/article3620417.ece. 194. “Press Conference with Nicolas Sarkozy”, March 27, 2008, http://www. number10.gov.uk/Page15166.

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380 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization 195. For Zhao Jinjun’s biographical information, see http://www.mfa.gov.cn/ chn/ziliao/wjrw/lrfbzjbzzl/t9127.htm; http://baike.baidu.com/view/ 864363.htm. 196. Renmin Ribao, April 23, 2008, p. 3. 197. Ibid. 198. Renmin Ribao, April 22, 2008, p. 3. 199. For Kong Quan’s biographical information, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/ ziliao/2003-01/31/content_714371.htm. 200. Kong Quan was appointed as Chinese ambassador to France on March 12, 2008, replacing Zhao Jinjun (Renmin Ribao, March 13, 2008, p. 4). But Sarkozy did not receive him until April 22, 2008 (Renmin Ribao, April 23, 2008, p. 3). Kong had been in Paris at least since April 7, 2008. He was among those who greeted the arrival of the Olympic flame to Paris (China Daily, April 7, 2008, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/olympics/torch/200804/07/content_6595260.htm). 201. Raffarin also brought a letter written by Former French President Jacques Chirac. China Daily, April 24, 2008, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/ 2008-04/24/content_6639620.htm. 202. For Jean-David Levitte’s biographical information, see http://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/Jean-David_Levitte. 203. Renmin Ribao, April 28, 2008, p. 2. 204. John Leicester, “Sarkozy Backs Off Olympic Boycott Threat”, The Hoffington Post, June 30, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/06/30/sarkozybacks-off-olympic_n_110096.html?view=screen. 205. Renmin Ribao, July 2, 2008, p. 3. 206. Li Xiang, “Sarkozy not wanted at Olympics, survey says”, China Daily, July 3, 2008, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2008-07/03/content_68144 77.htm. 207. “Sarkozy to attend Olympics opening ceremony: statement”, http://www. abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/07/09/2298956.htm. 208. Ibid. 209. Renmin Ribao, July 10, 2008, p. 1. 210. Renmin Ribao, August 8, 2008, p. 4. 211. http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90777/90852/6481818.html. 212. http://euobserver.com/9/26588. 213. Ibid. 214. Renmin Ribao, August 10, 2008, p. 14. 215. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/olympics/2008-08/09/content_691 9493.htm. 216. http://www.thrfeed.com/2008/07/olympics-openin.html. 217. For details of the original design and later modifications, see “Yanhua Zongshejishi Jiemi Kaimushi 29 ge Juda ‘Jiaoyin’” (“The Chief Designer for

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219.

220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226.

227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236.

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fireworks revealed the story about the 29 giant ‘footprints’ at the opening ceremony”), CCVT.com, August 9, 2008, http://news.cctv.com/china/ 20080809/105443.shtml. Richard Spencer, “Beijing Olympic 2008 opening ceremony giant firework footprints ‘faked’”, Telegraph, August 10, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co. uk/sport/othersports/olympics/2534499/Beijing-Olympic-2008-openingceremony-giant-firework-footprints-faked.html. For the original report in Jinghua Ribao, see http://www.cnetnews.com.cn/2008/0809/1050032. shtml. “Yang Peiyi, Lin Miaoke”, Chicago Tribune, August 12, 2008, http://www. chicagotribune.com/sports/olympics/chi-yang-peiyi-lin-miaoke-080812-ht, 0,857904.story. For the interview with Chen Qigang on this issue, see http://www. youtube.com/watch?v=FdXzbLA1Bpk. Ibid. Ibid. Renmin Ribao, August 2, 2008, p. 1. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_records_at_the_2008_Summer_ Olympics. http://en.beijing2008.cn/ceremonies/headlines/n214584113.shtml. The first two Paralympics (1960, 1964) were also held in the same host cities. For details, compare http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Olympic_Games with http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paralympic_Games. Renmin Ribao, September 7, 2008, p. 6. Renmin Ribao, September 7, 2008, p. 6. For Lü Meng’s biographical information, see http://www.sino-china.com/page8.html. http://results.beijing2008.cn/WRMP/ENG/INF/GL/95A/GL0000000. shtml. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paralympic_Games. http://sg.news.yahoo.com/cna/20080914/tap-683-swimmer-yip-pin-xiuclinches-sin-231650b.html. http://theonlinecitizen.com/2008/09/yip-pin-xiu-an-awesome-achievement/. http://sg.news.yahoo.com/cna/20080911/tap-273-singapores-laurentiatan-wins-se-231650b.html. For the full text of his speech, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/200809/17/content_10067030.htm. For the full text of his speech, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/200809/17/content_10067030.htm. For insightful comments on China and the United States in the years of 2001–2008, see Thomas L. Friedman, “A Biblical Seven Years”, The New York Times, August 26, 2008 (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/27/opinion/

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382 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization 27friedman.html). In the op-ed, he said, “When you see how much modern infrastructure has been built in China since 2001, under the banner of the Olympics, and you see how much infrastructure has been postponed in America since 2001, under the banner of the war on terrorism, it’s clear that the next seven years need to be devoted to nation-building in America”. 237. Bo Zhiyue, “The Heir Apparent Clears the First Hurdle”, EAI Bulletin 10, no. 2 (September 2008), pp. 1, 12.

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Conclusion China’s Prospects for Democratization The times have changed. Merely 20 years ago, Francis Fukuyama declared the triumph of the Western liberal democracy as the end of history. Now we are witnessing democratic decay everywhere. Democratically elected leaders are increasingly suffering a “lame duck phenomenon” where newly inaugurated leaders are challenged by opposition leaders and protested by citizens for their inability to deliver the goods. As the world is embroiled in the most serious global economic crisis since the Great Depression as a result of the American subprime loan fiasco, a government that actually governs is in demand. The Chinese government, for what is worth, meets such a demand. GOVERNING CAPACITY OF THE CCP REGIME As a result of the Seventeenth National Congress of the CCP, a group of new political elites have emerged. They are a bit older (possibly a bit wiser), much better educated, and more likely to have some provincial management experience. Most importantly, they were

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poised to take challenges. In an eventful 2008, their governing capacity was seriously tested and, apparently, they have succeeded in confronting these challenges with high marks. First, China’s system of duality with the Party’s dominance, which is often considered awkward if not obsolete, turned out to be an advantage in times of crises. During the snowstorms in the south when the State Council was dysfunctional because of the scheduled retirement of the majority of its senior members, the Politburo Standing Committee stepped up to the plate and played the leadership role in dealing with the crisis. The redundancy became a double guarantee system. In the face of international criticisms over riots in Tibet and Gansu, the Chinese leadership remained calm. They patiently reiterated their stand time and again, and informed foreign leaders of the same. They held talks with the Dalai Lama’s personal representatives but did not give in on basic principles. It was Sichuan earthquake that made Chinese leaders respectable and admirable. “Grandpa” Wen Jiabao went to the quake-stricken area within hours. He refused medical assistance to himself after he fell and hurt his arm in the rubbles. President Hu Jintao issued orders for relief work within one hour and called for a Politburo Standing Committee meeting on the same day. Politburo standing members took turns to visit Sichuan and other affected provinces. Unlike China of 1976, China of 2008 was open, transparent, and effective. The Chinese government accepted foreign aid with open arms. Foreign donations of cash and relief materials poured in; foreign rescue teams were accepted; foreign medical teams were allowed to work with Chinese medical workers; and foreign military assistance was welcomed. Last but not the least, the Chinese government delivered a successful Olympic Games. In fact, these were the best Olympic Games and the best Paralympic Games ever. In spite of boycott threats from some international leaders, the Beijing Olympic Games was one of the largest gatherings of world leaders in recent years; in spite of worldwide concerns over Beijing’s natural environment, the capital city had the best air quality during the Olympics in decades; and in spite of different interpretations of some parts of the program, the

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opening and closing ceremonies of the Beijing Olympics were spectacular. To top it off, China was first in terms of gold medals. It was a safe Olympics. It was also a green Olympics, a high-tech Olympics, and a people’s Olympics. Overall, it was the best Olympics ever. What then is the future of China’s elite politics? China’s elite politics, in my view, is likely to evolve along one of three trends in the future: institutionalization, factionalization, or democratization. INSTITUTIONALIZATION The successful transition from the third generation leadership to the fourth generation leadership in 2002 was largely due to political institutionalization in China. As a result of institutionalization, Hu Jintao was able to quickly establish himself in the aftermath of the Sixteenth Party Congress as the most powerful man in the Chinese political system because of his top position in the system. Hu’s position was further solidified as a result of the Fourth Plenum of the Sixteenth Central Committee in September 2004 when Jiang Zemin relinguished his office of the CMC chairmanship. Continued institutionalization is likely to facilitate another smooth transition from the fourth generation leadership to the fifth generation leadership. The official heir apparent, Xi Jinping, therefore, is likely to be a major beneficiary of this particular trend. His power is likely to increase when he collects more powerful positions. Political elites in the Party and government institutions would likely subordinate their personal loyalty to their institutional loyalty, whose focus would be on Xi. This is because he is likely to take over from Hu Jintao as the most powerful person in China. In this scenario, those who will be over 67 years old at the Eighteenth Party Congress in 2012 will likely retire, and some of the Politburo members who will be 67 or younger then would probably move up into the Politburo Standing Committee. In other words, seven out of the nine Politburo Standing members (Jia Qinglin, Wu Bangguo, Wen Jiabao, Zhou Yongkang, Hu Jintao, He Guoqiang, and Li Changchun) would retire. Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang would stay on, and Xi would become general secretary of the Party.

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Similarly, seven more Politburo members will also reach the age of 68 and would retire. They include Wang Zhaoguo, Wang Gang, Guo Boxiong, Liu Qi, Xu Caihou, Hui Liangyu, and Wang Lequan. Among the rest of the Politburo members, Liu Yunshan, Zhang Dejiang, and Yu Zhengsheng will have the most seniority in the Politburo and thus are the most promising candidates for the Politburo Standing Committee in 2012. Among them, Liu Yunshan is the most likely to enter the next Politburo Standing Committee to replace Li Changchun. Yu Zhengsheng would be a strong candidate to replace Wu Bangguo as NPC chairman. However, there would be competition among Zhang Dejiang, Wang Qishan, and Wang Yang for the seat in the Politburo Standing Committee reserved for the next executive vice premier, after Li Keqiang succeeds Wen Jiabao as premier. If Liu Yandong is selected as Jia Qinglin’s replacement as chairperson of the CPPCC in 2013, she would be the first female member of the Politburo Standing Committee in the history of the CCP. Li Yuanchao would be a good candidate to replace He Guoqiang as CDIC secretary in charge of party disciplines. The new lineup in the Politburo Standing Committee in 2012 would be Xi Jinping (general secretary of the Party and president of the PRC), Li Keqiang (premier), Yu Zhengsheng (chairman of the NPC), Liu Yandong (chairwoman of the CPPCC), Liu Yunshan (in charge of propaganda), Wang Qishan (or Zhang Dejiang or Wang Yang) (executive vice premier), and Li Yuanchao (secretary of the CDIC). In this new lineup, there would be seven Politburo Standing members instead of nine. FACTIONALIZATION The second possible trend is factionalization when factional groups evolve into political factions. Once a paramount leader based on a universal concensus steps down, a group of contenders tend to reorient themselves around smaller groups within the political elites. Their competion is likely to harden the political network of factional groups, transforming these corporate factional groups into political factions based on clientalist ties.

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Consequently, competing and mutually exclusive political factions with separate leaders might emerge. In the new power configuration, the Shanghai Gang is unlikely to play any significant role because of its drastic decline. The Qinghua Clique is also likely to fade from the scene of China’s elite politics due to the retirement of its members. The real competition would occur between the CCYL Group and the Princelings. With 82 people (41 full members and 41 alternate members) in the Seventeenth Central Committee, the CCYL Group would become the most powerful political faction. Li Keqiang would be the leader of this faction because of his previous CCYL experience and his high position in the Party apparatus. As the CCYL Group is the most cohesive factional group in the Seventeenth Central Committee with a group cohesion index of 1,256 points for central cadres of the CCYL alone, there would be strong bandwagon effect among other members of the Central Committee. The Princelings would form a strong contending faction under the leadership of Xi Jinping. The strength of the princelings lies in three areas. First, there are 26 princelings (22 full members and four alternate members) in the Seventeenth Central Committee. Second, these princelings are dominant in the military. There are nine princeling generals in the Seventeenth Central Committee and one of them is a member of the CMC. In addition, a number of princeling generals are in charge of military corps and provincial military districts. Third, in addition to the core of the princelings in the CCP Central Committee, there are various networks of princelings in business communities, the military, and the community of retirees. Factionalization would result in the elimination of fence sitters. Because of the exclusiveness of political factions, those who have double or triple identities would have to decide which faction he/she would like to join. It is easy for those (such as Han Zheng) who are considered members of both the Shanghai Gang and the CCYL Group to determine their political identity because of the decline of the Shanghai Gang and the rise of the CCYL Group. Those who are considered members of both the CCYL and the Princelings (such as

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Liu Yandong and Li Yuanchao) would have to weigh their choices very carefully. Factionalization of China’s elite politics is likely to bring back old guards. As positions have to be reinforced by informal networks, those who have more extensive political networks tend to be more dominant in politics. In this sense, the nominal leaders of these factions could be replaced by old guards as more dominant players in elite politics. However, without formal mechanisms, it is hard to translate factional strength into real political power. It is not easy to speculate the potential official lineup as a result of factionalization. DEMOCRATIZATION China is also likely to democratize along certain trajectories. Following its model of successful economic transformation, China’s democratization would also likely to be gradual. With a popular democracy as an eventual goal, China would most likely start with the CCP’s intraparty democracy. In terms of electing the top leader of the Party, there are three options. The first option is for all members of the CCP to elect the top leader. This has been done in Taiwan where KMT (Guomindang) and DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) leaders have been democratically elected by all members of the respective parties. Considering the size of the CCP (more than 75 million members), however, this option is not practical for the moment. The second option is for deputies to the Party Congress to elect the top leader. Again, this would require amendaments to the CCP Constitution. Yet this change would be more consistent with the spirit of the CCP Constitution. The Party Congress, after all, is supposedly the decision-making body of the CCP. It is harder to mobilize political support among Party Congress deputies, especially when factionalization is explicitly prohibited. The third option is to elect the general secretary through a secret ballot by the CCP Central Committee. There are two variants to this option. One is for full members of the Central Committee to elect the top leader, in accordance with the CCP Constitution. The other is to

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extend the electoral rights to alternate members as well. In the latter case, either the CCP Constitution has to be amended to allow alternate members to have rights to vote; or alternate members are promoted en mass to full members, eliminating the category of alternate members. Either way, this form of democratization would produce paradoxical consequences for the dynamics of China’s elite politics. On the one hand, this option would reinforce the trend of institutionalization. The power of Central Committee members would be strengthened, and their power would be institutionalized. Central Committee members would constitute the selectorate for the top Party leader. On the other hand, it would also help facilitate the trend of factionalization. As competition for the top post in the Party intensifies, contenders would have to seek support from their classmates, former colleagues, and friends. They would activate their political networks, turning the existing factional groups into political factions. In this scenario, contestation among factions would emerge and the outcome of the contestation would depend on the relative strengths of respective factions. It is conceivable that Li Keqiang would be more likely to replace Hu Jintao as general secretary of the Party instead of Xi Jinping in this scenerio. CCYL cadres would naturally coalesce around him as a very cohesive group in the Central Committee. They would vote for one of their own instead of a princeling. In contrast, it is hard for the Princelings to compete with the CCYL Group. There are fewer princelings in the Central Committee than CCYL cadres, and Xi Jinping is not a natural leader of the Princelings in the Central Committee. Xi’s father, Xi Zhongxun, belongs to a minority among the veteran leaders. Instead of long marchers from Southern provinces such as Hunan and Jiangxi, Xi Zhongxun and his comrades were from Shaanxi, a province in the North. Moreover, because of their close association with Gao Gang, another veteran leader from Shaanxi, who committed suicide because of his factional activities in the 1950s, cadres from Shaanxi endured political misfortunes categorically different from those from the South. Because of this background, Xi Jinping has not been very close to other princelings. Yu Zhengsheng might have closer ties with other princelings than Xi Jinping.

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PARADOX OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN CHINA Moreover, democratization in China would also pose paradoxes for the Chinese authorities and the Western governments. Chinese leaders have in recent years adjusted their attitude toward democratization in China.1 Democracy, in their view, is a universal value of mankind. There is no reason to avoid using the term in their political discourse. After all, the Chinese political system in essence is also a democratic system by their definition. The Chinese leaders also recognize the value of direct elections as one of major components of democractic governance. However, in a country where political divisions coincide with ethnic divisions in some regions, a bottom-up approach to democratization might result in the collapse of China as a nation-state. In China, “talk of democracy”, as Joseph Khan acutely observed before the opening of the Seventeenth Party Congress, was simply talk.2 In the political report to the Seventeenth Party Congress, the “talk” covers an entire section, Section 6 “Unswervingly Developing Socialist Democracy”.3 With 2,828 Chinese characters in the section, “democracy” was mentioned 36 times. Yet there was no hint at Western-style democratization in China. There is no reason to expect the CCP leader to introduce Western-style democracy, lest one of its consequences were to undermine the CCP’s rule and to lead to China’s collapse as a nation-state. Democratization in China would also pose a paradox for Western countries. The Westerners would applaud China’s efforts to democratize but have to contend with the rise of Chinese nationalism. Yet a democratized China would certainly be much more nationalistic.4 NOTES 1.

For a systematic analysis of the evolution of CCP leaders’ views on democracy, see Bo Zhiyue, “Political Reform in China: What’s Next?” a paper delivered to an international conference on “China’s Three Decades of Reform and Development in Global Perspective”, organized by East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, Singapore, November 7–8, 2008.

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3. 4.

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Joseph Khan, “In China, Talk of Democracy is Simply That”, The New York Times, April 20, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/20/world/asia/ 20china.html?_r=1&oref=slogin. For the full text of the report in Chinese, see http://news.sina.com.cn/c/ 2007-10-24/205814157282.shtml. During my visit to Taiwan in March 2008, I raised the possibility of a democratized yet nationalistic mainland China and argued that such a regime would more likely resort to force to solve the Taiwan issue than the current CCP regime. To my amazement, some of my Taiwanese colleagues responded by expressing their strong preference for an authoritarian regime instead of a democratic one.

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Index Abdullah Ahmad Badawi 2 Abdullah Bin-Abd-al-Aziz Al Saud 300 Abhisit Vejjajiva 3 Abraham Lincoln 221 academicians 9, 54, 66, 68, 83 Academy of Military Sciences 113, 117, 144 Adolf Hitler 226 Afghanistan 299, 365 age 8, 9, 19, 21, 25–31, 36–38, 41–44, 46, 49, 53, 66, 67, 69–71, 73, 77, 83, 116, 117, 234, 242, 251, 348 age difference 27, 28 age groups 69 age 68 rule 70 average age 26, 27, 36, 37, 41, 44, 46, 66–69, 83 Ai Fulin 119, 140, 144 Ai Husheng 119, 140, 144, 146 Aji Muhammat 356 Albania 303 Albert J. Coray 329 Alcoa 344 Algeria 303

16-point proposal 297 1793 regulation on Tibetan affairs 216 17-Article Agreement 11, 212, 219 1896 Athens Olympic Games 328 1900 Boxer Rebellion 331 1900 Paris Olympic Games 329 1904 St. Louis Olympic Games 373 1906 Athens Olympic Games 327, 369 1908 London Olympic Games 324, 332 1932 Los Angeles Olympic Games 333 1948 London Olympics 334 1952 Helsinki Olympics 334 1956 Summer Olympics in Melbourne 334 1968 Summer Olympic Games in Mexico City 334 1984 Los Angeles Summer Olympics 334, 365 A. Tom Grunfeld 233, 246, 257 Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture 203, 206, 213 Abdul’ahat Abdulrixit (Uygur) 110 393

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394 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization All China Federation of Supply and Marketing Cooperatives 111 All China Federation of Taiwan Compatriots 109, 111 All China Federation of Trade Unions 109–111 All China Taiwanese Association 61 All China Women’s Association 109 Altan Khan 211, 214 Altantuya Shaariibuu 3 alternate members 25, 53–55, 59, 60, 61, 66–69, 72, 74, 78, 81–83, 85, 89, 92, 93, 96–103, 106, 108, 109, 112–124, 131, 139, 143, 148, 161 Aluminum Corporation of China Ltd. (ACH) 122, 123 Amadou Toumani Touré 303 ambans 216, 218, 254 assistant ambans 216, 254 Amdo 200, 204, 212, 220, 227–230 American subprime loan fiasco 383 Analysis and Forecasting Office 280, 281, 284 Andy Lau 296, 367 Angang Steel Company Limited 122 Angela Dorothea Merkel 301 Anhui 21, 25, 30, 32, 34, 36, 42, 56, 58, 74, 75, 77, 80, 82, 84, 93, 95, 135, 138, 149, 150, 152, 158, 160, 162, 163, 177, 179, 181, 182, 186–188, 191, 272 Anshi Turmoil 204 Anthropology Days 330 anti-separatist struggle 235, 255 anti-spiritual pollution campaign 223 Anwar Ibrahim 3 APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) 358 approval ratings 2 Argentina 2, 356 Arthur Jonath 333 Arthur Newton 328

Ashat Kerimbay (Kazakh) 57, 97 Asian Games Federation 335 Atlantic College 63 Auspicious Day 351, 352 Australia 67, 247, 249, 250, 299, 303, 334, 335, 347, 356, 358 Austria 65, 67, 226 authoritarian regimes 5, 6 authoritarian resurgence 5 Azerbaijan 5 Bahrain 365 Bai Chunli (Manchu) 58, 61, 66, 68, 108, 150, 163–165 Bai Jiefu 279, 280 Bai Jingfu 107 Bai Lichen (Hui) 110 Bai nationality 79 Bai Zhijian 97 Balance 10, 91, 125, 126, 128, 131, 165, 215, 235, 241 of factional power 130, 165–167 of institutional power 124–128 Ban Ki-moon 304 Bangladesh 299, 302, 307, 308 Bank of Agriculture 109, 111 Bank of China 31, 104, 108, 109, 111, 137, 142, 145 Bank of Construction 109, 111 Bank of Development 109, 111 Bank of Industry and Commerce 109 Baoji-Chengdu (Baocheng) Railway 293 Baosteel Group 121–123 Barisan Nasional (BN) 2 Bayanqolu (Mongolian) 152, 153, 156 Bei’ao Culture and Sports Co. 352 Beijing 8, 20, 57, 92, 132, 177, 199, 274, 323 Beijing 101 Middle School 77

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Index 395 Beijing 2000 Olympic Games Bid Committee (BOBICO) 335–338, 350, 351 Beijing 2008 Olympic Games 3, 8, 13, 241, 250, 323, 328, 342, 348, 350, 351, 352, 354, 357–359, 361, 362, 365, 368, 370 boycott of 356, 358–362, 384 opening ceremony 13, 351, 352, 356, 358, 359–364, 366, 368, 370 torch relay 13, 199, 249, 293, 323, 342, 353–356, 359, 360, 370 Beijing 2008 Paralympics 366 Beijing Coking-Chemical Plant 344 Beijing Institute of Iron and Steel Engineering 337 Beijing Institute of Technology 293 Beijing International Airport 343 Beijing Military Region 113, 117, 118, 150, 164, 274, 294 Beijing No. 4 Middle School 77 Beijing Petroleum Institute 22 Beijing Seismic Team 280–282, 284 Beijing Special Engineering Design Institute 352 Belarus 307, 308 Belgium 67, 303, 307, 308, 355 Berlin Olympic Games in 1936 324 Bertrand Delanoë 355 Beverley Joan “Bev” Oda 300 Bhuchung K. Tsering 243, 244 Bhutan 200, 207, 247 Bird’s Nest 348, 349, 359, 362, 363, 366, 367, 369 Birmingham University 65, 124 BNL (Brookhaven National Laboratory) 64 Bo Xilai 9, 29, 30, 33, 36, 45, 82, 126, 127, 140, 141, 146 Bo Yibo 33, 140, 141

Bonan 201, 206 bottom-up approach 390 Bouyi 201 boycott 241, 356, 358–362 Britain 4, 61, 275, 299, 303, 304, 308, 335, 354, 355, 356, 360, 367 British Columbia 300 Buddhist Association of China 237 Buenos Aires 356 Bulgaria 366 Bureau of Geology and Mineral Resources Exploration and Development of Tibet 124 Buyi 80, 180 C. H. Robertson 324, 326, 327 C. K. Yang 333, 369 Cai Changyuan 274 Cai Wu 56, 149, 155–157 Cai Yingting 120 Cai Zhenhua 141 Cambodia 302 Camp Hale (Colorado) 220 Canada 67, 245, 247, 300, 329, 337 Canberra 356 Cao Gangchuan 9, 29, 36, 41, 43, 107, 112, 189 Cao Guocheng 288 Cao Jianming 55, 61, 110, 135 Cao Qing 102 Capital Steel Corporation (Shougang) 344 capitalist roaders 222 Carl Lewis 365 cat theory 1 Central Academy of Drama 353 Central Academy of Fine Arts 352 Central Committee Index See also Representation Index 99, 103, 108, 111, 112, 117, 120, 121, 123–126

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396 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization Central Disciplinary Inspection Commission 21, 73, 133, 251, 292 Central Earthquake Leading Small Group 277 Central Foreign Affairs Office 101 Central Government Institutions 10, 103–106, 108, 125, 149 Central Guards Bureau 101, 102 central institutions 10, 91, 108, 109, 111, 112, 121, 125, 126, 128 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 220, 221, 225, 237, 248 Central International Liaison Department 59 central leaders 25, 91, 92, 127, 134, 177, 243 Central Military Commission (CMC) 8, 46 central military institutions 112, 113, 117, 120 Central Nationalities University 251 Central Organization Department 20, 21, 23, 37, 45, 59, 94, 99, 100, 102, 125, 127, 142, 242, 292 central Party institutions 10, 100–103, 108, 125, 149 Central Party School 36, 45, 55, 103, 127 Central Propaganda Department 55, 60, 100, 125, 127, 292 Central Region 84, 94, 180 central representation 100, 111, 112 Central Steering Commission on Social Construction of Ideological Infrastructure 297 central subsidies 223, 236 Central United Front Department 100, 127, 233, 243, 244, 251 Centurial Jinyuan 304 Cha Zhiyuan 281, 283 Chadrel Rinpoche 239

Chai Songyue 23 Chairman Mao’s badges 277 Chamdo 213, 219, 222, 231, 273 Chana Dorje 209 Chang Wanquan 9, 41–43, 115, 118, 294 Changde, Hunan 55 Changtang 200 charity organizations (cishan jigou) 297 Charoen Pokphand Group (CP) 304 Che Shi 287 Chen Baosheng 127 Chen Bingde 41–43, 71, 114, 294 Chen Chuanping 123 Chen Cungen 57, 61, 64, 65 Chen Deming 58, 77, 107, 128 Chen Guoling 120 Chen Kaige 353 Chen King Ki See (Shi Gongqi) 304 Chen Kuiyuan 110, 224, 239, 240, 242 Chen Liangyu 10, 24, 98, 132, 133–135, 166 Chen Mingyi 20 Chen Qigang 363, 364 Chen Shanshan (Congjun) 63 Chen Weiya 352 Chen Xitong 335, 337 Chen Xuezhong 285 Chen Yi 63, 140, 143 Chen Yiqin (f. Bai) 79 Chen Yuan 77, 111, 137–140, 142, 145, 146 Chen Yun 26, 140, 143 Chen Zhenggao 151, 162–164 Chen Zhili (f.) 33, 61, 79, 135, 136, 189 Chen Zhu 107 Chen Zuoning (f.) 121 Chengdu Institute of Geology 73

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Index 397 Chengdu Military Region 113, 119, 144, 289, 291, 294 Chi Cheng 334 Chi Wanchun 69, 115 Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi) 234, 246 Chicago Athletic Association 329 Chile 299 China 1, 22, 53, 91, 132, 177, 199, 271, 323 and the Qing Dynasty 209 and the Yuan Dynasty 209, 210, 212, 254 as “Tianxia” (all under Heaven) 207 as “Zhongguo” (Central Kingdom) 207 as the People’s Republic of China 11, 25, 45, 127, 133, 144, 167, 200, 202, 206–208, 218, 228, 238, 241, 252, 253, 255, 257, 273, 285, 334, 336, 350, 357, 358 as the Republic of China 204, 208, 217, 218, 254, 333–335, 369 China Academy of Engineering Physics 66, 122, 124 China Academy of Space Technology 122, 124 China Aviation Industry Corporation I (CAICI) 122, 123 China Banking Regulatory Commission 106, 108 China Central Television 291 China Charity Federation 295 China Disabled Persons’ Federation 109, 111 China Electricity Regulatory Commission 23

China FAW Group Corporation 121, 122 China Federation of Overseas Chinese 109, 111, 123 China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation (CFPA) 297 China Insurance Regulatory Commission 106, 108 China Investment Corporation (CIC) 122, 123, 137 China Meteorological Administration 105 China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) 121, 122 China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) 22 China National Petroleum and Natural Gas Corporation 22 China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) 56 China National Radio 291 China National Song and Dance Ensemble 352 China Ordnance Industry Corporation (COIC) 121, 122 China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (Sinopec Group) 56 China Railway Construction Corporation 122, 123 China Red Cross 295, 306 China Rural Trust and Investment Corporation 31 China Securities Regulatory Commission 106, 108 China Seismological Bureau 105, 277, 278, 280–285, 287, 288, 292, 299 China Seismological Network Center 287, 288 China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC) 122, 123 China Telecom Corporation 122, 123

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398 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization China Tibetan Language Advanced Institute of Buddhism 223 China Youth Development Foundation (CYDF) 297 China’s future political development 6–8, 385–391 China’s political elites 1, 8, 17 definition of 208 China-EU Summit 361 China’s Association for Science and Technology 109, 111 China’s Federation of Literary and Art Circles 109 China’s Writers’ Association 109, 111 Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences 65, 122, 124 Chinese Academy of Engineering (CAE) 54, 55, 66, 68, 74, 105, 108, 346 Chinese Academy of Sciences 54, 58, 63, 64, 66, 68, 105, 108, 110, 164, 275, 346 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 33, 55, 105, 108, 110 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 7, 14, 44, 63, 91, 126, 218, 224, 242 Chinese Communist Party Constitution 45 Chinese Communist Youth League 10, 25, 80, 109, 111, 127, 131, 147 central cadres 148–157 Central Committee 148, 153–162 local cadres 148, 157–162 Secretariat 148, 153–155 Chinese Communist Youth League Group (CCYL Group) 10, 14, 131, 147, 162, 166 Chinese Geophysical Society 287 Chinese Lunar New Year travel season 179

Spring Festival travel season 181, 183–185, 187–189, 192, 193, 199 Chinese National Association of Industry and Commerce 111 Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 20, 42, 108, 109, 126, 127, 142, 234, 235, 243 Chinese People’s Armed Police Force 113, 116 Chinese political system 190 Chinese Spring Festival season 179, 181, 183, 185, 187, 188, 192 Chinese territory 208 Choekyi Gyaltsen 218 See also Tenth Panchen Lama Chongqing 20, 21, 29, 30, 34, 36, 46, 57, 58, 65, 76, 82, 92–94, 96, 127, 141, 149, 151, 163, 164, 178, 182, 185, 186, 188, 284, 285, 292, 294, 328 Chongqing Evening News 328 Chongqing University 284 Chou Mei-ching 298 Christian Poncelet 360 civil organizations (min jian zuzhi) 297 clergy 221, 230 clientelist ties 168, 386 closing ceremony 324, 328, 329, 332, 353, 366, 368 coastal development strategy 6 cohorts 139 collapse of China 7, 390 collapse of electricity pylons and poles 179 coming-out party 13 Commander-in-Chief 46, 289, 292 Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China Ltd 72 Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense 107, 141

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Index 399 Committee for Comprehensive Management of Public Security 101 Committee for Receiving Returned Tibetans 225 Committee of Politics and Law under the Central Committee 101 Committee of State Secrets 101, 103 Compilation and Translation Bureau 101, 103 Construction Bank of China 31 containment strategy 220 contestation 125, 218 corporate group 137 corporate leaders 91, 92, 121–124 corporations 10, 91, 121–123, 125, 126 corruption 7, 105, 107, 108, 133, 337 Counselor’s Office of the State Council 105 counterrevolutionary rebels 222 country’s direction 4 Cristina Fernández de Kirchner 2 Croatia 291, 367 crucifixion 227 Cui Zhiliang 288 cultural genocide 241 Cultural Revolution 9, 12, 71–74, 84, 85, 139, 222, 234 Cyclone Nargis 308 Czechoslovakia 67 Da Yuan (Great Yuan) 209 Dai Bingguo (Tujia) 140 Dai nationality 80 Dai Xianglong 127 Dalai Clique 235, 240, 245, 246, 249 Dalai Lama 11, 12, 199, 200–202, 204, 211, 214–227, 229–233, 235, 237–244, 246–256, 309, 323, 355, 360, 361 First 214 Second 214

Third 214 Fourth 215 Fifth 211, 214, 215 Sixth 215, 216 Seventh 216 Thirteenth, 217 Fourteenth 217, 219, 237 meaning of 253 Dali L. Yang 7 Dana Perino 359 Da-Qin Railway 191 Daqing Oilfield 22, 56, 122, 123 Daqing Oilfield Corp 122, 123 Darfur, Sudan 354, 370 Datong Coalmine Group Corp. 190 David Willard Lyon 327 Dawa Norbu 220, 257 Dbus-Gtsang See U-Tsang Dbus-Gtsang Itinerant High Commandery 211, 213 Dege County, Xikang 251 Demetrius Vikelas 328 democracy 1, 3, 14, 45, 82, 103, 225, 238, 248 democracy is a good thing ix, 103 democratic 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 11, 14, 115, 219, 220, 225, 226 decay 383 elections 2 reforms 11, 219, 220 democratization 14, 383, 388–390 Deng Jiaxian 31 Deng Nan (f.) 111, 140, 146 Deng Xiaoping 1, 26, 140–142, 233, 242, 282, 284, 296, 335 Denmark 303 Derung 201 Development Research Center of the State Council 105, 108 Dhanin Chearavanont (Xie Guomin) 304 Dharamsala, India 247

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400 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization Diaoyutai State Guesthouse 346 dictators 5 dictatorship 1 Ding Qiusheng 140, 144 Ding Yiping 116, 140, 144–147 Dingyuan, Anhui 25 Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture 207, 213 Director of the General Office 37, 38, 40, 100, 113 Dishi (imperial tutor) 212 disintegration thesis 7 Djuhar Sutanto (Liem Oen Kian) 304 Dmitry Medvedev 299 Donald Tusk 362 Dong Guishan 119 Dong Qiwu 234 Dong Wancai 118 Dongxiang 201 Dorji (Tibetan) 73, 124 Dorta Nagpo 208 DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) 388 dragon flag 329 Drepung Monastery 240, 245 Drogön Chögyal Phagpa See Phagpa Dromo (Yatung) 219 Du Qinglin 126–128, 149, 157, 158 dual strategy 218, 255 dual system 190 Dujiangyan 290–292, 302, 305, 306 Dzungars 202 Earthquake Relief Command 289, 290, 292 East China Bureau 32 East Region 77, 78, 84 East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) 356 Eastern Germany 67 economic development 1, 6, 12, 235, 242, 255, 341

Eddie Tolen 333 educated youth 31, 142 education credentials 9, 53, 54, 83 four-year college education (daxue) 9, 53, 54, 83 graduate diploma 54, 55, 83 Master’s degree 34, 41, 55, 56, 60, 63–66 Ph.D. degrees 56, 59, 60, 66 postdoctoral studies 60 three-year college education (dazhuan) 9, 53, 83 Edward VII 332 effective governance 1 Egil Aarvik 237 Eighteenth Army 218 electricity shortage 179, 180, 193 Eleventh Central Committee of the CCYL 155, 157, 164, 165 E-Li-Si Army-Civilian Marshal Office 211 elite provincial status 24 Elite Provincial Units 92–94, 98 Central Region 84, 94, 180 Central-South 94 East 94 North 94 Northeast 94 Northwest 94 Southwest 94 Western region 94 end of history 14, 383 energy shortage 6 environmental degradation 6 epicenter 271–274, 276–279, 283, 285, 288, 290, 308 Equatorial Guinea 303 ethnic divisions 390 ethnic groups 206, 207, 342 See also nationality ethnic Tibet 11, 220, 254

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Index 401 Etiquette Beijing, People’s Olympics 348, 369 EU presidency 361 European Union 252, 299, 304, 347, 361, 362 Exclusion Act of 1882 331 faction 14, 137, 144, 147 factional 10, 14, 153, 167 balance 131, 165, groups 10, 14, 153, 167 power 130 factionalization 14, 386–388 Falungong 309 Fan Bingbing 296 Fan Changlong 119 Fan Jing 141 Fan Wenlan 275 Fan Zengsheng 61 Fang Fenghui 118 Far Eastern Olympic Games 335 female members 78, 79, 81, 84 fence sitters 360 Feng Tianwei 365 Fifteenth Central Committee 31, 43, 44, 59, 68, 76, 78, 83, 100, 114, 160 Fifteenth Central Committee of the CCYL 160 Fifteenth Politburo Standing Committee 28 fifth generation leadership 14, 23 Fifth Panchen Lama (Lobsang Yeshe) 211, 216, 217 Filipinos 2, 330 Finland 303, 307, 308 Fire and Disaster Management Agency (FDMA) 305 First Ballet Boy of China 366 First National Conference on Earthquakes 277 First National People’s Congress 219 five-point peace plan 26

five-point understanding 361 Fletcher Sims Brockman 327 food poison incident in Nanjing 38 foreign aid 13, 285, 298, 229, 308, 309 foreign funded enterprises (san zi qi ye) 184 foreign media 309 foreign medical teams 13, 306, 308 British 308 Cuban 13, 308 French 13, 308 German 13, 308 Indonesian 13, 308 Italian 13, 308 Japanese 13, 308 Pakistani 13, 308 Russian 13, 308 foreign rescue teams 13, 305, 308 Japanese 13, 308 Russian 13, 308 Singaporean 13, 308 South Korean 13, 308 foreign reserves 6 foreign study experiences 36, 61–67 Formosa Plastics Group 295 Four Olds 222 Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCYL 160 Fourteenth Politburo Standing Committee 27, 28 Fourth Generation Leadership 14 Fourth Panchen Lama (Lobsang Chökyi Gyaltsen) 215 Fourth Plenum 41, 43, 132 of the Fifteenth Central Committee 43 of the Seventeenth Central Committee 43 fragile power 7 France 4, 13, 64, 247, 299, 303, 308, 329, 337, 354, 359–362

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402 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization Francis Fukuyama 14, 383 Frederick Lorz 329 freedom of press 38 Fu Tinggui 118 Fu Zhifang 152, 162, 163 Fudan University 41, 60, 102 Fujian 20, 23, 29, 30, 34, 36, 57, 63, 68, 75, 77, 80, 82, 95, 98, 135, 151, 152, 158, 160, 163, 186, 327, 337 full members 8, 10, 24, 29, 36, 44, 53–55, 59, 61, 66–69, 72, 74, 78, 81–83, 85, 89, 91, 93, 96–98, 100, 101, 103, 106–110, 112–120, 122, 126, 131, 139, 143, 148, 161 full-time staff 148, 154, 156 funeral of the Tenth Panchen Lama 237, 255 Gabon 303 Gallup Poll 5 Gandan Monastery 20 GANIL (Grand Accélérateur National d’Ions Lourds) 64 Gannan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture 199, 206, 244, 256 Gansu 56, 76, 96, 127, 149, 182, 185, 188, 199–202, 204, 206, 208, 212, 213, 244, 247, 253, 256, 272, 285, 287, 293, 307, 308 Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture 203, 213 Gao Gang 389 Gao Jianguo 287 Gao Qiang 107 Gao Siren 97 Gao Xin 242 Gao Zhanxiang 39 Ge Zhenfeng 114 Geary Act of 1892 331 Geda Trulku Lama 218

Gedhun Choekyi Nyima (Eleventh Panchen Lama) 239 Gediminas Kirkilas 362 Gelugpa sect 214, 215, 254 gender 9, 53, 78 Gendun Drup 214 Gendun Gyatso 214 General Administration for Industry and Commerce 105 General Administration of Customs 105 General Administration of Press and Publication 105 General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection, and Quarantine 156 General Administration of the Civil Aviation 105 General Armament Department 9, 42, 43, 69, 113, 115, 118 General Logistics Department 42, 71, 74, 113, 115, 118, 132, 144 General Office of the CCP Central Committee 40 General Political Department 35, 41, 42, 113, 114, 117, 144, 164, 294 General Staff Department 35, 42, 43, 113, 114, 117, 121, 145, 293 generation gap 73 Geng Qingguo 279, 281, 286, 287 Genghis Khan 208 genocide 226, 227, 241 Geology Research Institute 287 George W. Bush 4, 249, 299, 358 Germany 3, 6, 13, 61, 63, 64, 67, 226, 245, 299, 301, 306–308, 329, 334, 335 global economic crisis 383 gold urn system 217 Golden Week 179 Golmud 236, 237 Gompo Tashi 221

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Index 403 Gonpo Tseten (Choekyi Gyaltsen) 217, 218 good government 1 Gordon Brown 4, 355, 360 Gordon Chang 7 governance 1, 7, 207, 211, 212, 217 Government Offices Administration of the State Council 55 graduate-degree equivalent from Party schools 55 Great Depression 383 Great Hall of the People 346 Great Leap Forward 222 Green Bus 344 green Olympics 14, 339, 343, 345, 357, 369 Green Olympics Program (GOP) 339 group cohesion 10, 132, 136, 137, 139, 146, 147, 153, 154, 157, 166, 167 group cohesion index 10, 132, 136, 137, 147, 153, 157, 166, 167 of the CCYL Group 10 of the Princelings 131, 139, 146, 166 of the Qinghua Clique 137, 139, 166 of the Shanghai Gang 137 Guangdong 23, 29, 31, 34–36, 46, 58, 75–77, 79, 80, 82, 84, 93–95, 98, 127, 132, 140, 141, 149, 151, 152, 157, 158, 163, 181, 183, 184, 186, 189, 193, 280, 243, 250, 295, 329 Guangming Daily 55 Guangxi 58, 75, 93, 95, 98, 152, 158, 162, 161, 163, 164, 178, 181, 182, 185, 188, 192, 244 Guangzhou Military Region 43, 113, 114, 120, 141, 145, 294 Guangzhou Railway Station 181, 183, 184, 189, 193

Guangzhou Trade Fair Center 184 Gu-Chu-Sum Movement of Tibet 248 Guizhou 26, 29, 39, 42, 76, 79, 80, 96, 123, 128, 140, 150, 161, 177–183, 185, 187, 188, 191–195, 233, 294 Guo Boxiong 30, 35, 36, 41, 42, 71, 112, 126 Guo Jinlong 224 Guo Shuqing 58, 61, 111 Guoluo Tibetan Prefecture 205, 206 Guoshi (state tutor) 212 guru 214 Güshi (or Gushri) Khan 214 Gyancain Norbu (Eleventh Panchen Lama) 239 Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture 205, 206 Haicheng Earthquake 277–280 Haier Group, China 121, 122 Hainan 31, 36, 74, 75, 82, 96, 151, 186, 202, 205, 206, 212, 249 Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture 205, 206 Haixi Mongolian and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture 205, 206 Haixi Mongolian, Tibetan, and Kazakh Autonomous District 205 Haixi Mongolian, Tibetan, and Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture 205 Haiyuan Earthquake 272 Han amban 216 Han Changfu 151, 155, 156 Han Hong 367 Han Jun 140, 142 Han nationality 80 Han Ying 39, 278 Han Zheng 10, 23, 77, 98, 134–137, 150, 158, 159, 166 Hanchuan Power Plant 191

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404 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization Hankou Railway Station 191 Hannover University 61 Harbin Engineering University 56 Harbin Institute of Military Engineering 35, 69, 77 He Guoqiang 9, 20–22, 25, 29, 37, 45, 47, 100, 102, 191, 292, 293 He Lifeng 58, 76, 77 He Yong 37, 38, 41, 70, 73, 102, 344 He Zhenliang 335, 338 Hebei 9, 21, 30, 38, 39, 42, 43, 56, 58, 63, 66, 68, 73–75, 84, 85, 93, 95, 98, 127, 138, 140, 149–152, 158, 159, 163, 164, 189–191, 272–274, 276, 278–280, 283, 344, 345 Heilongjiang 58, 64, 75, 95, 127, 150, 151, 186 heir apparent 14, 24, 25, 28, 43, 45, 291, 292, 370 Henan 26, 29, 42, 57, 58, 74, 75, 93, 95, 127, 135, 140, 150, 151, 152, 158, 159, 162, 163, 182, 185, 186, 188, 191, 202, 205, 272, 289 Henan Mongolian Autonomous County 205 Henderson Land Development Company Limited 295 high-tech Olympics 14, 339, 340, 357, 369 historical periods 74 Holocaust 226, 227 home province 9, 34, 53, 74, 75, 84, 85, 204 Central Region 84, 94, 180 East 75 North 75 Northeast 75

Northwest 76 of the Fifteenth Central Committee 31, 43, 100, 114 of the Seventeenth Central Committee 9, 10, 23, 43, 44, 53–56, 59, 63–65, 67–72, 74, 79, 80, 82–85, 97, 102, 108, 110, 112–119, 121, 124, 126, 128, 143, 157, 161, 164, 251 of the Sixteenth Central Committee 25, 31, 33, 38, 41, 44, 53, 63–65, 69, 82, 83, 85, 97, 98, 102, 110, 114, 115, 117–119, 123, 132, 143 South 75 Southwest 76 Hong Kong 57, 74, 75, 77, 96–99, 105, 114, 132, 295, 298, 304, 327, 358 Hongdong Earthquake 272 horizontal blocks 124 Hôtel de Ville (city hall) 355 Hou Bin 367 Hou Shou 215 Hu Chunhua 111, 127, 150, 153, 156, 157 Hu Jintao 5, 12, 14, 20, 21, 24–29, 33, 35, 38–43, 45, 46, 84, 100, 103, 111, 134, 137–139, 148, 149, 153, 156, 159, 190–192, 194, 224, 233, 235, 237, 241–243, 248, 255, 289, 291–293, 299, 301, 308, 351, 357, 359, 360, 362 Hu Keshi 280, 282 Hu Qili 27 Hu Xiaolian (f.) 108, 111 Hu Xingdou 293

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Index 405 Hu Yanlin 116 Hu Yaobang 12, 26, 116, 140, 144, 222–225, 232, 233, 235, 241, 255, 282 six-point policy toward Tibet 223 Hu Zhenmin 111 Hua Guofeng 39, 224, 280, 285 Hua Jianmin 61, 70, 135–139, 189, 190 Hua Xiangwen 280 Huadian Beijing Co-generation Co. 346 Huang Huahua 76, 151, 157, 158, 184, 193 Huang Jing 140, 141 Huang Ju 8, 19, 24, 28, 98, 131, 135, 189 Huang Kaijia 331 Huang Musong 217 Huang Qingyi (f.) 111 Huang Rulun 304 Huang Xiangning 285 Huang Xianzhong 118 Huang Xiaojing 151, 162, 163, 164 Huang Zhen 140, 143 Huang Zuozhen 280 Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture 202, 205, 206 Huangpu District, Shanghai 133 Huazhong University of Science and Technology 65 Hubei 36, 57, 65, 74, 75, 82, 93–95, 98, 134, 150, 152, 157, 158, 160, 177–182, 185–189, 191, 193, 243, 275 Hui Liangyu (Hui) 30, 32, 36, 82, 103, 189, 190, 193, 289 Hui nationality 85 Hunan 20, 21, 55, 57–59, 68, 75, 79, 80, 93, 95, 98, 140, 150–152,

158, 161, 163, 164, 177, 178, 181, 182, 185–189, 191, 193 Hunan Normal College 55 Hungza Valley 207 incompetence 3 India 4, 5, 200, 220, 239, 240, 247, 251, 252, 273, 299, 302, 335 Indonesia earthquake 286 industrialization 6 inner circle 148, 157 Inner Mongolia 36, 63, 75, 82, 95, 149, 150, 152, 157–159, 161, 181, 186, 187, 242, 278, 345 Inner Mongolia University 63 Institute of Geophysical Exploration 279 institutional balance 91, 126, 128 between provinces and central institutions 128 definition of 208 of the Seventeenth Central Committee 9, 10, 23, 43, 44, 53–56, 59, 63–65, 67–72, 74, 79, 80, 82–85, 97, 102, 108, 110, 112–119, 121, 124, 126, 128, 143, 157, 161, 164, 251 See also factional balance; institutional representation institutional reforms 7 institutional representation 91 of central institutions 111 of provincial units 92, 111 of the corporations 91 of the military 37, 120, 307 institutionalization 8, 14, 19, 385, 386 inter-institutional transfers 126 international assistance 298–300, 308

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406 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization International Campaign for Tibet 248, 251, 252 International Communications Office 101 International Community 299, 303, 309, 354, 357 International Olympic Committee 324–329, 335, 336, 338, 369 International Paralympic Committee (IPC) 368 intra-party democracy 45, 82 intra-party democratization 14, 388, 389 Iran 5 IRF (International Road Federation) 182 Iron Man of Asia 333 Isabel Martínez de Perón 14 Ismail Tiliwaldi (Uygur) 97, 126–128 Israel 299, 307, 308 Italy 13, 299, 303, 308, 334 Jacques Rogge 351, 353, 366 James Hilton 207 Japan 4, 6, 12, 13, 31, 61, 67, 106, 247, 275, 289, 301, 302, 305, 306, 308, 335, 337, 356, 359, 362 Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) 305 Jean-David Levitte 361 Jean-Pierre Raffarin 360 Jet Li 296 Jews 226 Ji Bingxuan 127, 150, 153, 156 Ji Lin 77, 152, 158, 160 Ji Xianlin 352 Jia Chunwang 23, 110 Jia Qinglin 20, 21, 25, 28, 29, 45, 70, 110, 111, 191, 243, 291, 293, 337, 338 Jia Ting’an 113 Jiajing Great Earthquake 272

Jiang Daming 151, 153, 154, 156, 157 Jiang Jianqing 58, 61, 111 Jiang Jiemin 123 Jiang Tong 32 Jiang Yikang 108, 127 Jiang Zelin 58 Jiang Zemin 23, 24, 28, 41, 98, 102, 113, 131, 132, 134, 135, 166, 237, 242, 243, 255, 338, 339, 351 Jiangsu 9, 21, 29, 30, 32, 36, 38, 39, 42, 56, 58, 60, 63, 65, 70, 74, 75, 82, 84, 93–96, 98, 99, 127, 132, 135, 138, 140, 142, 149, 150, 152, 158, 163, 185, 186, 186, 243, 250, 272, 283, 337 Jiangxi 60, 61, 75, 80, 95, 135, 140, 181–183, 186, 188, 191, 192, 357 Jiangxi University (now Nanchang University) 60 Jiao Huancheng 55 Jilin 30, 35, 36, 56, 57, 59, 60, 75, 82, 95, 149–151, 157–159, 161 Jilin Provincial Military District 35 Jilin University 36, 59, 60 Jin County, Dalian 34 Jin Jing 355, 360 Jin Shangyi 352 Jin Zhenji (Korean) 152, 158 Jin Zhuanglong 58, 71, 72, 107 Jinan 20, 113, 117, 119, 141, 147, 294 Jinan Military Region 113, 119, 141, 147, 294 Jing Wen 216 Jing Zhiyuan 41–43, 115 Jing-Guang railway 181, 186 Jingshan School 251 Jing-Zhu Expressway 182, 193 Jinjiang, Fujian 34 Jixi, Anhui 25 Johns Hopkins University 63

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Index 407 Jokhang Temple 245 Jose Marcelo Ejercito 2 Joseph Khan 390 Journey of Harmony 353 Juan Antonio Samaranch 337, 338 Juan Perón 14 Kalon 211, 215, 254 Kang Rixin 121, 123 Kangding Normal School 251 Kangxi 201, 211, 215, 216, 254 Kashgar, Xinjiang 356 Kazakh 57, 80, 201, 205 Kazakhstan 302, 354 Kelsang Gyaltsen 243, 244, 250, 252, 253 Kelsang Lekden 252 Kevin Rudd 249, 250 Kham 200, 203, 214, 220, 227–229 Khawa Karpo Tibet Cultural Centre Charitable Trust 248 Kingdom of the Tuyuhun 204 Kingdom of Tubo 204 KMT (Guomindang) 388 Koden 208, 209 Kong Qingzong 217 Konnie Hug 355 Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) 302 Kublai (or Khubilai) Khan 212 Kumbum Monastery 219 Kun clan 213 Laizhou, Shandong 41 Lama Secretary 224, 233 lame duck 1, 2, 4, 5, 14 leader 4 phenomenon 1, 2, 5, 14, 383 president 2 Lanzhou Institute of Modern Physics 122, 124

Lanzhou Military Region 113, 116, 118, 120, 294 Lanzhou University 63 Laos 299, 302, 367 Laurentia Tan 368 LBNL (Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory) 64 Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) 345 leadership reshuffle 8, 19 Lee Myung-bak 2, 302 Legislative Affairs Office 105 legitimacy 1 Legqog (Tibetan) 97, 224, 239 Lei Chunmei (f. She) 152, 158 Lei Mingqiu 120 Leng Rong 108 Lesotho 303 Lhamo Thondup (Tenzin Gyatso) 200, 204, 217, 291, 234 Lhasa government 221 Lhoka Prefecture 200 Li Andong 69, 115 Li Bin (f.) 56 Li Chang 282 Li Changcai 118 Li Changchun 20, 21, 25, 28, 29, 45, 100, 111, 191, 291 Li Changjiang 150, 155, 156 Li Changyin 123 Li Chengyu (Hui) 151, 158 Li Congjun 56, 59, 60, 108 Li Dejun 276 Li Dezhu 243 Li Gancheng 32, 140, 142 Li Haifeng (f.) 149, 153 Li Hongzhong 191 Li Jianguo 126–128, 140, 142, 146 Li Jiawei 365 Li Jie 234 Li Jiheng 58

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408 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization Li Ji’nai 41–43, 114, 150, 163–165, 294 Li Jincheng 124 Li Ka Shing 295 Li Ke (Zhuang) 58, 152, 162, 163 Li Keqiang 9, 20, 21, 23–26, 28, 29, 32, 33, 40, 45, 56, 59, 83, 84, 94, 99, 125–128, 148, 149, 153, 156, 157, 191, 289, 290, 292 and the CCYL Group 14, 166 personal ties 146, 153, 156, 157 relations with Hu Jintao 360 Li Lanqing 28, 335, 338, 339, 351 Li Maifu 74, 115 Li nationality 80 Li Peng 27, 241, 242 Li Qiyan 335, 337 Li Ruihuan 19, 239, 242, 243 Li Shenglin 186, 187, 188, 193 Li Shikui 275 Li Siguang 274–276 Li Shiming 119, 294 Li Siu-Kei 295 Li Weihan 234 Li Wenyi 338 Li Xiannian 26 Li Ximing 31 Li Xuefeng 274 Li Xueju 149, 155, 156 Li Xueyong 107 Li Yizhong 123 Li Yuanchao 9, 29, 30, 32, 33, 36–38, 45, 56, 59, 82, 83, 94, 96, 99, 102, 125–128, 140–142, 146–149, 153, 156, 157, 292 Li Yue 366 Li Yulin 288 Li Yumei (f.) 152, 162–164 Li Yunchuan 140, 142 Li Zhanshu 151, 158, 159 Li Zhaozhuo (Zhuang) 110

Li Zhijian 338 Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) 97 Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government in the Macao SAR 97 Liang Baohua 99 Liang Guanglie 41, 42, 44, 70, 71, 107, 112 Lianshui, Jiangsu 32, 65 Liao Chengzhi 140, 142 Liao Hui 76, 77, 110, 140, 142, 146 Liao Xilong 41–44, 70, 71, 115, 294 Liaohe Oil Exploration Bureau (LOEB) 23 Liaoning 21, 23, 26, 29, 30, 34–36, 39, 42, 56–58, 64, 68, 70, 74, 75, 93–95, 99, 121, 123, 127, 140, 141, 150–152, 158, 159, 163, 164, 186, 204, 277, 278, 279 Liaoning Seismological Bureau 278 liberation 35, 65, 71, 164, 218, 219, 237, 255, 273, 285, 293, 352 Light the Passion, Share the Dream 353 Lin Jun 111, 123 Lin Miaoke 363, 364 Lin Mingyue 61, 111 Lin Shusen 76, 183 Lin Zuoming 123 Ling Jihua 9, 37, 38, 39, 41, 46, 100, 149, 155–157 relations with Gao Zhanxiang relations with Han Ying relations with Hu Jintao lip-synching 363 Lisu 201 Liu Binjie 150, 155–157 Liu Changchun 323, 333, 334 Liu Chengjun 117 Liu Defu 283

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Index 409 Liu Dongdong 119 Liu Huaqing 28, 242 Liu Hui (f. Hui) 152, 158, 161 Liu Jianchao 361 Liu Jiayi 57 Liu Jie 123 Liu Jing 107, 140, 142, 146, 338 Liu Jingmin 338 Liu Mingkang 61, 108 Liu Peng 149, 153, 156 Liu Qi 30, 36, 82, 94, 99, 337, 343, 350, 351, 354 Liu Qibao 148, 150, 153, 156 Liu Ruilong 32, 140, 142 Liu Shaoqi 31, 117, 140, 144 Liu Shaowu 350 Liu Shiquan 123 Liu Wei 151, 158, 161 Liu Wenhui 203 Liu Xiang 296, 365 Liu Xiaojiang 116, 140, 144–147 Liu Yandong (f.) 29, 56, 138, 140, 146, 148, 149, 153 Liu Yanhuai 32 Liu Yanning 32 Liu Yanshen 32 Liu Yingyong 282, 283, 285 Liu Yongzhi 114 Liu Yuan 117, 140, 144, 146 Liu Yuejun 118 Liu Yunshan 30, 36, 37, 38, 82, 100, 148, 149, 157, 158 Liu Yupu 77, 151, 155, 156 Liu Zhenlai (Hui) 150, 163 Liu Zhenqi 114 Liu Zhenwu 114, 120 Liu Zhenya 123 Liu Zhijun 185, 186, 188, 193 Liu’an Normal School 60 Liwayway (China) Co., Ltd. 304 Lodi Gyaltsen Gyari 243, 244, 250, 251, 253

London School of Economics and Political Science 63 London torch relay 359 Longsho Youth Movement of Tibet 248 Lost Horizon 207 Lou Jiwei 123, 137–139 Louis Michel 304 Louisiana Purchase Exposition 329, 330 lower Liao River 208 Lu Hao 211 Lu Jiankang 352 Lü Meng 366 Lu Xinshe 61, 108 Lu Yongxiang 57, 61, 64, 66, 68, 110 Luo Baoming 151, 158, 159 Luo Gan 8, 19, 23, 28 Luo Huining 59 Luo Lin 151, 158, 159 Luo Qingquan 191 Luo Zhijun 152, 155–157 Ma Biao (Zhuang) 152, 158, 161 Ma Buqing 204 Ma family 204 Ma Haiyan 204 Ma Kai 77, 107 Ma Lin 204 Ma Qi 204 Ma Xiaotian 114, 116, 140, 143, 146, 147 Ma Ying-Jeou 298 Ma Zaiyao 140, 144 Ma Zhenchuan 357 Macao 75, 295, 297, 298 Macao Foundation 298 Macao Red Cross 298 Mahatma Gandhi 237 Mala 216 Malaysia 2, 303, 304

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410 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization Mali 303 Manchu 58, 80, 150, 163, 201, 216, 331 Mao Zedong 71, 84, 218, 222, 255, 273, 277, 285 Mao Zedong Thought 277 Maoming Petroleum Company 34 March 14 Riots 244 March 1959 Rebellion 221 Maria Gloria Macaraeg Macapagal-Arroyo 2 Marie-Ségolène Royal 359 Mauritius 365 Max Joseph Exner 327 Max Planck Society 63 Maxime Bernier 300 May Day Holiday 179 Mdokhams Itinerant High Commandery 211 Mdokhams (Khams) 211, 213 Media Village 343, 344, 349 medical team 13, 297, 298, 306–308 British 4, 216, 300, 307, 327, 360, 365 Cuban 306 French 4, 307, 329, 353, 355, 359–361 German 301, 306, 307, 333, 362 Indonesian 307 Italian 306, 362 Japanese 30, 299, 301, 305, 306 Pakistani 4, 302, 307 Russian 5, 299, 305–307 Taiwanese 7, 57, 61, 74, 75, 101, 103, 109, 111, 143, 220, 247, 249, 250, 295, 298, 334, 361 Mei Kebao 58, 151, 158, 161 Mei Shirong 280–285 Meng Jianzhu 135–137, 357

Meng Jinxi 119 Meng Xuenong 108, 151, 158, 159 Menyuan Hui Autonomous County 205 Mexico 299, 334 Miao 80, 152, 162–164, 180, 201 Michael Fred Phelps 365 Michael Knight 338 Michel Théato 329 migrant workers 6, 184 military 5, 8–11, 13, 19, 25, 29, 35–37, 41–44, 46, 69, 71, 77, 91, 92, 99, 107, 112–121, 125, 126, 132, 133, 140, 141, 143–145, 147, 150, 163, 164, 211, 212, 214, 217–219, 221, 243, 246, 254, 255, 273, 274, 276, 289, 291, 294, 307–309, 356 military assistance 13, 214, 307, 309 military campaigns 11, 218, 255 military contestation 218 military institutions 91, 112, 113, 117, 120, 126 military junta 309 military leaders 36, 91, 92, 112, 126, 140, 144 Military Region 10, 25, 35, 43, 44, 113–121, 126, 141, 144, 145, 147, 150, 164, 273, 274, 276, 289, 291, 294 Beijing 113, 117, 118, 150, 164, 274, 294 Chengdu 113, 119, 144, 289, 291, 294 Guangzhou 43, 113, 114, 120, 141, 145, 294 Jinan 113, 119, 141, 147, 294 Lanzhou 113, 116, 118, 120, 294 Nanjing 113, 119, 120 Shenyang 35, 43, 44, 113, 115, 118, 119, 144

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Index 411 military representation 112–121 Min Weifang 58, 61, 64, 124 Ming Dynasty 213, 254, 272 Ministry of Agriculture 32, 142 Ministry of Civil Affairs 155, 292, 299 Ministry of Commerce 302 Ministry of Communications 186–188 Ministry of Construction 30, 31 Ministry of Culture 149 Ministry of Education 346 Ministry of Finance 123 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 103, 144, 145, 293, 299, 301, 305 Ministry of Health 292 Ministry of Industry and Information 72, 292 Ministry of Information Industry 72 Ministry of Justice 104 Ministry of Labor and Social Security 137 Ministry of Land and Resources 22 Ministry of National Defense 107 Ministry of Personnel 65 Ministry of Petroleum Industry 22 Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications 59 Ministry of Public Security 23, 107, 142, 292, 356, 357 Ministry of Railways 179, 181, 185–188, 192, 193 Ministry of Science and Technology 107, 346 Ministry of State Security 104 Ministry of Supervision 104 Ministry of Water Resources 104 minority members 79, 81, 84 Minxin Pei 7 Mirek Topolanek 362 mismanagement 3, 7 Miyun Reservoir 288

Monba 201 Mongol Empire 208–211 Mongolia 3, 299, 302, 307, 308, 365, 367 Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission 217 Monitoring and Forecasting Department 287 Monte Carlo, Monaco 335 Montenegro 307, 308 Mount Hua 272 Muli (or Mili) Tibetan Autonomous County 203 Mustang 221 mutual assistance 271, 294 Myanmar 200, 308, 309, 327 military junta 309 Nagano 356 Najib Abdul Razak 3 Namibia 367 Nandu Charity Foundation 297 Nanfang Zhoumo (Southern Weekend) 23 Nanjing 38, 60, 65, 113, 117, 119, 120, 155, 204, 217, 244 Nanjing Agricultural University 60, 65 Nanjing Military Region 113, 119, 120 Nankai University 324, 325 Nantong, Jiangsu 32 Nanyang Technological University 66 Napoleon 330 National Audit Office 104 National Aquatics Center 349 “Water Cube” 349 National Bureau of Corruption Prevention 105 National Bureau of Statistics 105, 107 National Council for Social Security Fund 106

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412 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization national crisis 11, 190, 294 National Defense University 76, 113, 116 National Development and Planning Commission 34 National Development and Reform Commission 104, 107, 179, 292 National Electricity Regulatory Commission 106, 108 National Endowment for Democracy (NED) 225, 248 National Natural Science Foundation 106, 346 National Olympic Committees (NOCs) 332 National People’s Congress (NPC) 20, 24, 26, 31, 45, 64, 70, 108, 109, 127, 134, 135, 142, 149, 188, 189, 219, 222, 234 National Population and Family Planning Commission 104 National Power Grid 192 National School of Administration 105, 108, 127 National Stadium See Bird’s Nest National Tourism Administration 105 national transition gap 188 See also political transition gap National University of Defence Technology 113 nationality 9, 53, 79, 80, 85, 160, 224 Bai 58, 61, 66, 68, 79, 80, 85, 97, 107, 108, 110, 150, 163–165, 201, 279, 280 Buyi 80, 180 Dai 80, 103, 106, 127, 140, 143–146, 361 Han 10, 23, 39, 77, 80, 85, 98, 134–137, 140, 142, 150, 151, 155, 156, 158, 159, 166, 201, 204–206, 209,

216, 222–224, 231–233, 242, 245, 246, 255, 256, 367 Hui 30, 32, 36, 57, 76, 77, 79, 80, 82, 85, 103, 110, 114, 140, 142, 146, 150–152, 158, 161, 163, 189, 190, 193, 201, 204–206, 208, 289 Kazakh 57, 80, 201, 205 Korean 57, 80, 111, 150, 152, 158, 302, 305 Li 9, 19, 56, 94, 140, 186, 211, 274, 335 Manchu 58, 80, 150, 163, 201, 216, 331 Miao 80, 152, 162–164, 180, 201 Mongolian 3, 79, 80, 110, 150, 152, 153, 156, 158, 159, 161, 201, 202, 205, 206, 208, 211, 212, 214, 215, 217, 275 Naxi 201 She 79, 80, 85, 110, 152, 158, 160 Tibetan 11, 73, 97, 199, 285, 323 Tujia 80, 140, 146 Uighur 80 Yao 27, 30, 31, 80, 140, 142, 152, 158, 160, 296 Yi 9, 29, 33, 57, 61, 63, 80, 103, 106, 140, 143, 145, 146, 180, 189, 201, 203, 224, 227, 228 Zhuang 58, 79, 80, 85, 110, 152, 158, 161–163, 201 See also ethnic groups Naxi 201 Nazi Germany 226 Nepal 200, 221, 246, 247 Netherlands 67, 303, 355 Never-Ending Dance 366 New Beijing, Great Olympics 336, 339

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Index 413 New Delhi 238, 335 New Zealand 245 Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme 219, 243 Ngawang Lozang Gyatso 214 Ngawang Yeshe Gyatso 216 NGOs 297 Nicolas Sarkozy 4, 355, 359 Nie Weiguo 97 Nigeria 4, 5, 303 Niigata, Japan 301 Ningbo University 60 Ningbo, Zhejiang 133 Ninghai Army (i.e., Ma Family Army) 204 Ningxia 57, 74, 76, 96, 152, 157, 161, 186, 272 Niu Hongding 280 No. 1 Ministry of Machinery 22 No. 1 Railway Survey and Design Institute 122, 124 No. 35 Middle School in Beijing 31 No. 7 Bureau 244, 251 Nobel Peace Prize 237, 238 nobility 221, 223 non-profit social organizations (fei yingli shehui truanti) 297 North China Sea Fleet 119, 144 North Korea 36, 66, 67, 299, 302 North Region 77, 78, 84 Northeast 75, 84, 94, 208, 290, 349 Northwest 65, 76, 84, 94, 200, 207, 208, 277, 285, 290, 350 Northwest Forestry University 65 Norway 67, 247, 273, 301 Norwegian Nobel Committee 237 Nu 201 Nur Bekri (Uygur) 151, 162, 163 Ode to the Motherland 363 Office for Economic Restructuring 31 Office of Central Party Institutions 101 Ögedei Khan 208

Olympia, Greece 328, 353 Olympic Games 8, 13, 199, 249, 250, 253, 323–339, 341–361, 363–370 Olympic Green 340, 342, 343, 347, 349, 359 Olympic opening ceremony 361, 363, 364 Olympic Village 340, 343–346 Olympics 13, 241, 250, 325, 329, 330, 332, 334, 336, 339–343, 345–353, 356–361, 364–366, 368–370 Oman 303 on loan (jiediao) 39 One World One Dream 13, 343, 354, 368, 370 One-China policy 250, 361 One-Hundred-Year Dream 13, 323, 339, 350, 370 Ontario 300 Ou Xinqian 179 Outstanding Communist Party Member 74 Overseas Chinese Affairs Office 105 Pakistan 13, 207, 299, 302, 307, 308, 367 Pan Yunhe 55, 61, 66, 68, 108 Panama 365 Panchen Lama 12, 211, 215–219, 224, 234, 235, 237–239, 241, 254, 255 Panchen Pokto 215 Panjing 23 Papua New Guinea 367 Paris 1900 Universal Exposition (Paris Exposition Universelle of 1900) 328 Paris torch relay fiasco 360 Party History Research Center 101 Party literature 101 Party standing 9, 53, 73, 84, 85 Patagonians 330

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414 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization Patriotic Education Campaign 237, 240 peaceful negotiations 218, 255 peasant workers (nong min gong) 183 migrant workers 6, 184 pecking order 25 Peking University 25, 64, 122, 124, 249, 352 Peng Qinghua 57, 97 Peng Xiaofeng 116, 140, 143, 146 Peng Xuefeng 140, 143 People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) 3 People’s Bank of China 31, 104, 108, 137, 142, 145 People’s Daily 55, 101, 134, 250 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 9, 35, 42–44, 65, 71, 72, 74, 114–117, 132, 143–145, 147, 164, 165, 218, 219, 231, 285, 289, 292–294, 352 PLA Air Force 9, 42–44, 74, 115, 117, 143, 147, 165, 294 General Hospital 121, 291 Navy 9, 42–44, 115, 116, 143–145, 147, 294 Second Artillery Corps 42, 115 Second Military Medical University 132 Survey and Mapping Institute 43 People’s Olympics 14, 339, 341, 343, 347, 348, 357, 369 People’s Republic of China 11, 25, 45, 127, 133, 144, 167, 200, 202, 206–208, 218, 228, 238, 241, 252, 253, 255, 273, 285, 334, 336, 350, 357, 358 personal ties 146, 153, 156, 157 Pervez Musharraf 4 PetroChina Company Ltd 122

Pew Global Attitudes Survey 3, 6 Ph.D. holders 56, 59, 83 Phagdru Kagyu 213 Philip Craven 368 Philippines 2, 302, 335 Pierre de Frédy, Baron de Coubertin 324 PLA Air Force 9, 42–44, 74, 115, 117, 143, 147, 165, 294 PLA Navy 9, 42–44, 115, 116, 143–144, 147, 294 PLA Second Artillery Corps 42, 115 Poland 61, 226, 307, 308 Policy Research Office 41, 101, 102, 136 Policy Research Office of the Central Committee 102, 136 policy response 187 Politburo 8–12, 19–21, 23–31, 33–38, 40, 41, 43–46, 56, 59, 66, 78, 81–85, 92–94, 96, 98–103, 106, 107, 109, 110, 112, 113, 117, 125–127, 131–135, 137, 139–142, 148, 149, 160, 189, 190–192, 241, 242, 289–293, 305, 335, 337–339, 343, 357, 363, 364 Politburo Standing Committee 8, 9, 11, 12, 19–21, 23–29, 36, 37, 41, 45, 46, 81, 82, 92, 96, 98, 107, 110, 125, 133, 135, 137, 139, 148, 189–192, 194, 241, 242, 289, 291–293, 305 Political and Legal Affairs Commission 23, 98 political divisions 209 political faction 14, 144, 147 political institutionalization 8, 19 political institutions 91 political mobility 128 political regime 7, 254

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Index 415 political theory of governance 1 political Tibet 11, 220, 254 political transition 8, 14, 27, 36, 37, 62, 67, 68, 71, 73, 76, 78, 80, 81, 93, 96, 101, 106, 113, 135, 138, 140, 152, 188 gap 188 Ponchen (dpon-chen) 213 popular democracy 14 Portugal 299 post-Cultural Revolution 71 Power Balancing 8, 27, 37, 62, 67, 68, 71, 73, 76, 78, 80, 81, 93, 96, 101, 106, 113, 135, 138, 140, 152 power blackouts 179 power generation 11, 181, 345, 346 power grid 180, 183, 192 power index 10, 132, 136, 137, 144, 166 of the CCYL Group 173 of the Princelings 131, 139, 146, 166 of the Qinghua Clique 137, 139, 166 of the Shanghai Gang 19, 41, 77, 131, 135, 137, 144, 147, 166 See also representation index power shortage 179, 193 pre-Cultural Revolution 72, 74 predatory authoritarianism 7 Preparatory Committee of Tibet Autonomous Region 219 presidency 5, 361 Princeling Generals 10, 43, 143, 144 Princelings 10, 11, 14, 21, 29, 30, 131, 139–142, 144, 146, 147, 165, 166, 167 probation period 43 projectoscope 324

property relations 220 provinces 6, 9, 10–12, 75, 76, 81, 84, 85, 92, 94, 98, 99, 121, 125–128, 132, 177, 178–, 182, 186–194, 200, 272, 285, 345 provincial 9, 10, 20, 24, 28, 33–36, 38, 39, 56, 60, 79, 81, 82, 85, 91–95, 97–99, 111, 112, 123, 124, 134, 135, 140, 142, 143, 150, 157–162, 181–183, 187, 193, 199, 202, 207, 239, 253, 276, 278, 285, 296, 300, 324, 345 cadres 157 cadres of the CCYL 29, 148 central committee index 95, 96, 99 experience 28, 36, 81 leaders 28, 36, 82, 85, 91, 92, 94, 140, 142, 182, 193 representation 92, 111 responses 182, 184 units 10, 91–94, 97–99, 111, 112, 124, 134, 150, 278, 345 Pu Lun 331 public protests 7, 350 Purple Bamboo Park 350 pygmies 330 Qatar 358 Qian Jiadong 140, 143 Qian Yunlu 126–128, 150, 157, 158 Qiang Wei 150, 157–159 Qiangba Puncog (Tibetan) 245 Qianlong 216, 238, 254 Qiao Qingchen 42–44 Qiao Shi 27, 28, 242 Qin Gang 299, 306 Qin Guangrong 151, 158, 161 Qin Yinhe 121 Qincheng Prison 234 Qing Dynasty 209, 329

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416 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization Qing Shan 216 Qingdao, Shandong 30, 59 Qinghai 59, 74, 76, 77, 96, 150, 151, 157, 162, 182, 188, 199–206, 208, 212, 213, 217–219, 234, 236, 253, 286, 287 Qinghai-Tibet Plateau 199 Qinghua Clique 10, 11, 14, 131, 137, 139, 144, 147, 165, 166, 167 school ties 137 Qinghua University 30, 65, 137, 139 Qinglong County 284 Qingshui, Shanxi 74 Qing-Zang (Qinghai to Tibet) Railway 236 Qinhuangdao Port 191 Qiqihar, Heilongjiang 64 Qiu Xiaohua 107 Qu Futian 61 Quan Zhezhu (Korean) 158 railway transportation 181, 185, 186, 192 rain dispersal operation 362 Raja Garuda Mas International (RGMI) 304 Ralph Harold Metcalfe 333 Ramoche Temple 245, 256 Razheng Monastery 209 red books 277 Red Guards 222, 234 Red School 31 Red Terror 246 Regional Distribution, Central Committee 77, 84, 227 East Region 77, 78, 84 North Region 77, 78, 84 South Region 77 reincarnation 204, 217, 218, 224, 239, 254, 255 religious freedom 225, 245, 255

Ren Yaping 152, 158, 161 Renmin University of China 251, 347 Reporters Sans Frontieres (Reporters Without Borders or RSF) 354 representation index 103, 108, 111, 112, 117, 120, 121, 123–126 of academic leaders 124 of central institutions 111 of provincial units 111 of the corporations 121 of the military 37 See also power index Republic of China 11, 25, 45, 127, 133, 144, 167, 200, 202, 204, 206–208, 211, 212, 217, 218, 228, 238, 241, 252–255, 273, 285, 333–336, 350, 357, 358, 369 Republic of Korea (South Korea) 2 rescue team 12, 274, 298, 299, 305, 306, 308 Hong Kong 57, 74, 75, 77, 96–99, 105, 114, 132, 295, 298, 304, 327, 358 Japanese 30, 299, 301, 305, 306 Russian 5, 299, 305–307 Singaporean 305, 306 South Korean 302, 305 Taiwan 7, 57, 61, 74, 75, 101, 103, 109, 111, 143, 220, 247, 249, 250, 295, 298, 334, 361 resident ministers (zhuzang dachen) 210 responsible government 249, 271 revolutionary rebels 222 Richard Grant 329 Richard Nixon 221 Richard Peter Birch 353 Richter scale 12, 271–273, 276–278, 285, 288, 289

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Index 417 Rimbunan Hiyau Group (RH Group) 304 Ritan Park 350 Rizhao Steel Group 295 Romania 291, 299, 303, 307, 308, 334, 367 Rong Qiao Group 304 Royal Society 61 Run Run Shaw 295 Russian Ministry of the Emergency Situations (EMERCOM) 307 Rutherford Appleton Laboratory 63 Safe Olympics 13, 14, 356–358, 370 Saipan 220 Sakya Monastry 213 Sakya Pandita Kunga Gyeltsen 208 Sakya Sect 208, 209, 213 Salar 201, 206 Samak Sundaravej 3 Samoa 303 Samuel P. Huntington 1 San Francisco 331, 356, 370 Sangye Gyatso 215 Sanjiang Space Group 122, 123 Sanya, Hainan 249 Sapporo, Japan 359 SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) 31, 132 Saudi Arabia 300, 367 school ties 137 scientific outlook of development 45 Second Far Eastern Championship Games 335 Second National People’s Congress 222, 234 Second Work Conference on Tibetan Affairs 223 Secretariat 8, 9, 19, 20, 23, 25, 26, 30, 31, 33–35, 37–41, 45, 46, 50, 73, 81, 82, 85, 96, 99–102, 112,

126, 136, 141, 143, 148, 153–155, 233, 337, 357 of the CCP Central Committee 37, 40, 45, 233, 357 of the CCYL Central Committee 33, 39, 148, 154 seismic geology 275 Senegal 303 Seoul 302, 356, 367 Sera Monastery 245 Serbia 307, 308 serfdom 221 Seventeenth National Congress 19, 73, 124 Seventeenth Politburo Standing Committee 20, 21, 23–26, 28, 45, 98, 110, 137, 139 Shaanxi 21, 30, 31, 38, 42, 56, 57, 65, 69, 74, 76, 93, 96, 107, 138, 140, 142, 150, 151, 158, 182, 185, 186, 188, 222, 272, 282, 285, 292, 293 Shaanxi Earthquake 272 Shandong University 60 Shang Fulin 57, 108 Shanghai 10, 11, 14, 19, 21, 23, 24, 29, 32, 36, 38, 41, 57, 58, 61, 63, 65, 68, 71, 72, 75, 77, 82, 84, 92–96, 98, 99, 102, 124, 127, 131–138, 140–142, 144, 147, 150–152, 158, 159, 165–167, 180, 181, 185, 186, 243, 244, 327, 331, 335, 348, 349, 349, 356, 360 Shanghai Academy of Spaceflight Technology (SAST) 71 Shanghai Foreign Language Institute 63 Shanghai Gang 10, 11, 14, 19, 41, 77, 131–137, 144, 147, 165–167 Shanghai Jiaotong University 63 Shanghai Municipal Party Committee 23, 32, 133, 134, 136, 142

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418 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization Shanghai Taiwanese Association 61 Shangrao, Jiangxi 61 Shangri-La 207, 230 Shangri-La County 207 Shanxi 30, 38, 39, 57, 63, 66, 74, 75, 77, 93, 95, 108, 140, 149–151, 152, 158, 161, 181, 186, 187, 190, 191, 271, 272, 278, 279, 345 Shanxi University 39, 66 Shao Mingli 108 Sharon Stone 309 She nationality 79, 80, 160 Shen Hongguang 98 Shen Suli (f.) 152, 162, 163 Shen Weichen 152, 158, 161 Shen Yueyue (f.) 149, 158, 159 Shenyang Military Region 35, 43, 44, 113, 115, 118, 119, 144 Shenyang, Liaoning 64 Shenzhen 12, 35, 77, 250, 253, 295 Shenzhou V 70, 121 Shi Dahua 123 Shi Lianxi (f.) 152, 158, 161 Shi Zongyuan (Hui) 183 Shigatse 214, 235, 243 Shijiazhuang, Hebei 66 Shunzhi 211, 214, 254 Sichuan 8, 12, 13, 23, 29, 42, 58, 61, 76, 79, 93, 96, 122, 124, 127, 140, 150, 158, 164, 178, 182, 185, 186, 188, 191, 200–203, 207, 208, 213, 220, 224, 243, 251, 253, 271, 281–287, 289–294, 296–298, 300, 301, 304, 306–308, 366 Sichuan basin 208 Sichuan earthquake 8, 12, 271, 285, 298, 300, 301, 366. See also Wenchuan earthquake Sichuan Earthquake Relief Fund 300 Sichuan University 61, 122, 124 side effects 6

Silesian Technical University 61 Silvio Berlusconi 362 Singapore 13, 27, 37, 62, 66, 67, 68, 71, 73, 76, 78, 80, 81, 93, 96, 101, 106, 113, 135, 138, 140, 152, 299, 302, 304–308, 365, 367, 368 Sino-French comprehensive strategic partnership 361 Sino-French relations 360, 361 Sinopec Corporation 122, 123 Sitar 244, 250, 251, 253 six-point policy toward Tibet 223 Sixteenth Central Committee 25, 31, 33, 38, 41, 44, 53, 63–65, 69, 82, 83, 85, 97, 98, 102, 110, 114, 115, 117–119, 123, 132, 143 Sixteenth Group Army 35 Sixteenth Party Congress 19, 23, 38, 98, 131, 351 Sixteenth Politburo Standing Committee 19, 20, 23, 25, 28, 29, 98 Sixty-Third Army 274 Slovenia 291, 303 smiling Olympic angel in wheelchair 355 snow lion flag 245 snowstorms 8, 11, 177–183, 185–193, 253 social tensions 6 sodomy 3 Somchai Wongsawat 3 Sonam Gyatso (Third Dalai Lama) 211, 214 Sonam Norbu Dagpo 243, 244 Song Airong (f.) 152, 158, 160 Song and Dance Ensemble of the PLA 352 Song Defu 33, 40, 148, 153, 159 Song Dynasty 208 Song Ping 31, 242

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Index 419 Song Xiuyan (f.) 151, 157, 158 Songshinajie 235 South China Sea Fleet 43 South Region 77 South Yellow Sea Oil Company 23 South-to-North Water Diversion 106, 108 Southwest 76, 84, 94, 199, 206, 208, 273, 277, 308, 350 Soviet Union 7, 67, 144, 145, 238, 275, 284 Spain 299, 303, 304 spare engine 190 Special Party membership fee 296 Spring Festival season 11, 179 St. John’s University 327 St. Louis 1904 Olympic Games 329 stagnation thesis 7 standard deviation 28, 46 Stanford University 64, 124 State Administration of Cultural Heritage 106 State Administration of Foreign Exchange 106, 108 State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs 106 State Administration of Grain 106 State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television 105 State Administration of Religious Affairs 105, 156 State Administration of Taxation 105 State Administration of Traditional Chinese Medicine 106 State Administration of Work Safety 105 State Bureau of Letters and Calls 106 State Bureau of Surveying and Mapping 106, 108 State Council 11, 26, 31, 45, 55, 70, 77, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 127, 134, 135, 141, 142, 149, 188–194,

205, 207, 209, 274, 278, 280, 288, 290, 292, 293, 304, 313, 335, 338 State Energy Commission 22 State Environmental Protection Administration 105 State Ethnic Affairs Commission 104 State Food and Drug Administration 105, 108 State Forestry Administration 105 State General Administration of Sports 105, 346 State Grid Corporation of China 122, 123, 295 State Intellectual Property Office 105 State Oceanic Administration 106 state power 208 State Tobacco Monopoly Administration 106 State University of New York at Buffalo 65 State Post Bureau 106 State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 104 Stephen Joseph Harper 300 Steven Spielberg 353, 354, 359, 370 straw poll 24, 25 street demonstrations 2 study-abroad experience 9 stupa-tomb 235 strychnine sulfate 330 Su Shiliang 119 Su Shulin 55, 56, 123 successor 3, 20, 21, 38, 100, 217, 248, 335 Sui Mingtai 116 Sukanto Tanoto (Tan Kuang Ho) 304 Sun Chunlan (f.) 111 Sun Dafa 115 Sun Jianguo 114 Sun Jinlong 57, 152, 153–156 Sun Lianzhong 204

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420 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization Sun Shihong 288 Sun Zhengcai 57 Sun Zhongtong 114 Supreme People’s Court 55, 109, 110, 136 Supreme People’s Procuratorate 55, 109, 110 Susan L. Shirk 16 Suzhou, Anhui 34 Sweden 67, 303 Switzerland 67, 244, 245, 251, 252, 329, 337, 349, 351, 355 Sydney Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games (SOCOG) 338 Syria 367 Taipei 244, 298 Taiwan 7, 57, 61, 74, 75, 101, 103, 109, 111, 143, 220, 247, 249, 250, 295, 298, 334, 361 Taiwan Red Cross 298 Taiwan Strait 7 Taiyuan Steel Group 122, 123 Taiyuan, Shanxi 63 Tajikistan 302, 365 Takashi Koizumi 305 Taktser Rinpoche 219 talks with the Dalai Lama’s representatives 243, 244, 250–253 Tan Guansan 218, 273 Tan Puren 276 Tang Dynasty 201, 204 Tang Jiaxuan 189 Tang Ke 22 Tang Tao 152, 158, 160 Tang Yijie 352 Tangshan Earthquake 13, 273, 279, 281, 285, 288, 298 Tangshan Kailuan Coalmine 288 Tashi Wangdi 238

Tashilhunpo Monastery 235, 239 tea-horse trade fairs 214, 254 Technical University of Aachen 64 technocrat 20, 22, 132, 337 tectonic zones 276, 277 Tendzin Choegyal 247 Tenth Panchen Lama 234, 235, 237, 255 Choekyi Gyaltsen 218 Tenzin 200, 204, 217, 219, 234, 239 Tenzin Gyatso 200, 204, 217, 219, 234 Fourteenth Dalai Lama 200, 204, 219, 253 Lhamo Thondup 204, 217 terrorist attacks 356 Thai Constitutional Court 3 Thailand 2, 3, 4, 299, 302 Thaksin Shinawatra 3 the Philippines 2, 302, 335 the Political Institute of the PLA 144 theocracy 216, 220, 254 Theodore Roosevelt 329, 330 Third Generation Leadership 14, 23 Thirteenth Central Committee of the CCYL 155, 159 Thirteenth Politburo Standing Committee 27 Thomas J. Hicks 330 Thomas Jefferson 330 Three Gorges Dam 180 three new mountains 6 Three Represents 41 three-day mourning period 293 three-pronged strategy 256 Thubten Gyatso 217 Thupten Jigme Norbu (Taktser Rinpoche) 219 Tian Chengping 137–139 Tian Xiusi 118 Tiananmen Incident 71, 84, 237

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Index 421 Tiananmen Square 344, 350, 363 Tianjin 21, 29, 30, 34–36, 58, 59, 75, 77, 82, 92–95, 127, 141, 151, 152, 158, 159, 161–164, 278, 281–284, 288, 295, 323, 324, 327, 332, 345, 348 Tianjin Rockcheck Steel Group Co., Ltd. 295 Tiantang Monastery 206 Tianxia (all under Heaven) 207 Tianzhen, Shanxi 30 Tianzhu Tibetan Autonomous County 206 Tianzi (son of the heaven) 207 Tibet 7, 29, 68, 97, 150, 199, 273 meaning of 253 Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) 199, 244 Tibet Museum 248 Tibet policy 220, 225, 241 Deng Xiaoping’s 1, 233, 284, 296 during the Ming Dynasty 254 during the Qing Dynasty 329 during the Republic of China 218, 254 during the Yuan Dynasty 254 Hu Jintao’s 26, 39, 40, 43, 84, 103, 250, 293 Hu Yaobang’s 222, 224, 233, 255 Jiang Zemin’s 23, 41, 98, 113, 135, 237, 351 Mao Zedong’s 218, 221 Tibet separatist forces 235, 241, 246, 248, 323 Tibet Youth Congress (TYC) 246–248, 252 Tibetan 11–13, 73, 80, 97, 119, 124, 199, 201–221, 223, 226–234, 238–242, 244–246,

248, 251–256, 285, 323, 354, 355, 370 Tibetan Buddhism 208–210, 213, 214, 215, 239, 240, 254 Tibetan Buddhism Institute 223 Tibetan fighters 220 Tibetan Freedom Press 252 Tibetan Literacy Society 248 Tibetan Parliamentary and Policy Research Centre 248 Tibetan Review 220, 248, 252 Tibetan riots 12, 323 Tibetan Women’s Association 248 Tibetan Writers Abroad PEN Center 248 Tie Ning (f.) 111 Tientsin Young Men 325, 332 Tiong Hiew King (Zhang Xiaoqing) 304 Togo 365 Tong Shiping 76, 77, 116, 117 Tonghai Earthquake 276, 277, 279 Tongling City, Anhui 34 Tongren Prefecture, Guizhou 178 Tony Fratto 359 torch relays 13, 199, 323 traffic jams 181, 182, 185, 187 tripon 213 Tsangyang Gyatso 216 Sixth Dalai Lama 215, 216 Tselha 252 Tu Mingde 338 Tubote See Tibet Tujia 80, 140, 146 Turkey 303, 335, 337, 354 Turkmenistan 302 turnover 36 Tuyuhun people 204 Twelfth Central Committee of the CCYL 159, 162 Twelfth Politburo Standing Committee 26, 27

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422 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization U.S. beef deal 2 U.S. Congress 331 U.S. Congressional Human Rights Caucus 226, 231 U.S. Green Building Council 346 U.S. House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight 225 U.S. Red Cross 303 U.S. Supreme Court 5 Uighur 80 Ukraine 5, 307, 308 Ulagan (f. Mongolian) 152, 158 UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) 304 United Kingdom 63, 65–67, 124, 349, 355, 367 United Nations 63, 103, 143, 228, 300, 301, 304, 356 United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 304 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 34 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 304 United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) 304 United States 4, 6, 61, 63–66, 124, 220, 221, 232, 247, 248, 249, 252, 275, 287, 303, 307–309, 328–331, 333, 334, 336, 347, 352, 356, 359, 365, 367 University of Agricultural Sciences in Vienna 65 University of Science and Technology of China 279, 283 University of Southampton 61 University of Texas at Austin 64 University of Utah 61 University of Washington 66, 167

urbanization 6 US Tibet policy 220, 225 Usain Bolt 365 U-Tsang 200, 202, 213, 227–230 Dbus-Gtsang 211, 213 Uyunqimg (f. Mongolian) 79, 110 Uzbekistan 302 Vanke 295, 296 Venezuela 303, 368 vertical blocks 125 Victoria Tin-bor Hui 208 Vietnam 299, 302, 307, 308 village of Yedong 273 Vladimir Putin 5, 299 Voice of Tibet 248 Wafangdian, Liaoning 35 Wan Gang 107 Wang Baosen 337 Wang Chen 55 Wang Chengmin 280–284 Wang Deqing 296 Wang Gang 29, 30, 36, 37, 38, 40, 100, 102 Wang Guangmei 31 Wang Guangtao 338 Wang Guangya 61, 63, 103, 140, 143–146 Wang Guangying 31 Wang Guosheng (Jiangsu) 118 Wang Guosheng (PLA) 118 Wang Huning 9, 37, 41, 46, 61, 102, 135, 136 Wang Jianmin 119 Wang Jianping 116 Wang Jiarui 56, 59, 60 Wang Jinshan 191 Wang Jun 111 Wang Laoji 295 Wang Lequan 30, 36, 82, 97, 148, 149, 158, 160

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Index 423 Wang Lixiong 11, 208, 210 Wang Min 56, 60, 61 Wang Qishan 9, 29–31, 36, 45, 82, 94, 99, 125–128, 140, 142, 145, 146, 351, 359 Wang Rong 58, 60, 61 Wang Rulin 151, 159, 161 Wang Sanyun 151, 159, 161, 191 Wang Shengjun 130 Wang Shi 295, 296 Wang Tao 22 Wang Wanbin 110 Wang Wei 338 Wang Weiguang 57, 103 Wang Xiaochu 123 Wang Xibin 116, 117 Wang Xinxian 111 Wang Xuejun 108 Wang Yang 9, 29, 30, 34, 36, 45, 46, 77, 82, 84, 94, 125, 148, 149, 158, 160, 184 Wang Yi 57, 61, 103, 106, 140, 143, 145, 146 Wang Yuegu 365 Wang Yupu 57, 123 Wang Zhaoguo 33, 36, 40, 82, 110, 148, 149, 153, 156, 243 Wang Zhengwei (Hui) 57 Wang Zhenyao 299 Water Cube 349, 369 weak government 2 Wei Fenghe 116 Wei Jianxing 28, 337 Wen Jiabao 12, 20, 21, 25, 28, 40, 45, 82, 103, 127, 189–193, 289, 290, 292, 293, 299, 301, 304, 308, 350 and Sichuan earthquake 8, 12, 271, 285, 298, 300, 301, 366 “Grandpa” Wen Jiabao 290 Wen Xisen 117

Wenchuan Earthquake 13, 285, 288, 299, 308, 309 Western democracies 3 Western Germany 67 Western Han 204 Western-style 14, 327 White Dagoba Monastery 209 White House 331, 359 White Sect 213 Wong Wenbo 274 Work Committee of the Central Government 101 Work Committee of the Departments Under the Central Committee 100 work experience 9, 22, 53, 71, 73, 84, 136, 145, 155 World Park 350 World Trade Organization 7 WorldPublicOpinion.org poll 4, 5 World’s Fair (the Louisiana Purchase Exposition) 329, 330 Wu Aiying (f.) 149, 157, 158 Wu Bangguo 20, 21, 24, 25, 29, 41, 45, 84, 110, 111, 131, 135–139, 190, 192, 290, 293, 360 Wu Ching-kuo 336 Wu De 280 Wu Dingfu 108 Wu Guanzheng 8, 19, 21, 28 Wu Jihai (Miao) 152, 163, 164 Wu Jinghua 224, 233 wu ma fen shi 227 Wu Shaozu 335, 338 Wu Shengli 41–44, 115, 140, 143, 145–147 Wu Shuangzhan 116 Wu Xian 43, 140, 143 Wu Xianguo 61, 66, 152, 162–164 Wu Yi 9, 29, 33, 189 Wu Zhiming 98 Wu Zhongxin 217

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424 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization Wuqiao, Hebei 43 Wuxi 21, 60, 70, 276 Xi Jinping 9, 14, 20, 21, 23, 26, 28, 29, 37, 38, 43, 45, 56, 59, 82, 83, 94, 96, 99, 125–128, 134, 137–141, 146, 191, 291, 293, 357, 370 and institutionalization 14, 385, 386 and the Beijing Olympic Games 370 as heir apparent 14, 43, 291, 370 compared to Zeng Qinghong 21 informal power in the Secretariat 37 relations with Li Yuanchao 37 relations with Ling Jihua 37 relations with other princelings 139, 389 Xi Zhongchao 116 Xi Zhongxun 140, 141, 234 Xia Baolong 59, 151, 162–164 Xia Dynasty 208 Xia Yong 103 Xiamen University 77 Xiamen, Fujian 63 Xiang Junbo 58, 111 Xiao Difei 60 Xiao Gang 111 Xiao Jie 57 Xiao Yang 110 Xiao Yaqing 121 Xiaerba 201 Xie Fuzhan 107 Xie Heping 58, 61, 66, 68, 124 Xie Qihua 123 Xikang 203, 251, 252 Xikang Tibetan Autonomous District 203 Xing Yuanmin 58, 151, 159, 161, 162

Xingtai Earthquake 273, 275, 276 Xingzhou, Hebei 63 Xinhua News Agency 25, 60, 85, 105, 108, 244, 250, 291 Xining 204, 236, 272 Xinjiang 36, 57, 76, 82, 93, 94, 96, 97, 99, 118, 127, 149, 151, 152, 160–164, 182, 185, 186, 188, 200, 201, 205, 286, 290, 356 Xinjiang Primary School 290 Xinzhou, Shanxi 66 Xizang Tongji Nianjian 230 Xizang 201, 202, 212, 227, 228, 230, 254 Xu Caihou 9, 29, 30, 35–37, 41, 42, 112, 126 Xu Fenlin 120 Xu Guangchun 135 Xu Guanhua 346 Xu Haifeng 334 Xu Lefu 44, 140, 143 Xu Lejiang 61, 121, 123 Xu Mingxu 228 Xu Qiliang 9, 41–43, 115, 116 Xu Xiaozhong 352 Xu Xin 274 Xu Yitian 117 Xuanzheng Yuan (Political Council) 210 Yabshi Pan Rinzinwangmo 235 Yan Mingfu 233 Yan’an County, Shaanxi 31 Yancheng Earthquake 272 Yang Chonghui 110, 150, 157, 158 Yang Chuan-kwang See C. K. Yang Yang Chuantang 149, 158, 159, 224 Yang Deqing 120 Yang Gang 151, 159, 161, 162 Yang Haitao 366 Yang Huanning 58

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Index 425 Yang Jiechi 61, 63, 77, 103, 106 Yang Jing (Mongolian) 150, 158, 161 Yang Ling 296 Yang Liwei 70, 84, 121 Yang Peiyi 363, 364 Yang Yong 274 Yao Ming 296 Yao Mingshan 31, 142 Yao nationality 80 Yao Yilin 27, 30, 31, 140, 142 Yarlung Zangbo (Brahmaputra) River 273 Yasuo Fukuda 299, 301 Ye Jianying 26 Ye Xiaowen 150, 155, 156 Yellow River 208 Yi nationality 224 Yin Fatang 223, 224 Yin Shan mountains 208 Yin Yicui (f.) 135 Yip Pin Xiu 368 Yi-Xin line 180 Yongzheng 216, 254 Yonten Gyatso 215 Fourth Dalai Lama 215 You Quan 108 You Xigui 102 Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) 324, 326, 327, 334 Yu Jianping 352 Yu Keping 103 Yu Linxiang 116 Yu Qiuli 22 Yu Xinrong 57, 60 Yu Yongbo 35 Yu Youjun 56, 59 Yu Yuanhui (Yao) 152, 158, 160 Yu Zhengsheng 30, 36, 77, 82, 94, 98, 99, 134, 140, 141, 146 Yuan Chunqing 57, 151, 153, 154, 156

Yuan Dynasty 209, 210, 212, 254 Yuan Jiajun 124 Yuan Qingwu 288 Yuan Shikai 217 Yuan Weimin 338 Yugoslavia 67 Yuncheng Prefecture, Shanxi 39 Yungui Plateau 208 Yunnan 58, 74, 76, 79, 96, 151, 178, 181, 182, 186, 188, 200–202, 207, 213, 243, 253, 276, 277, 279, 294, 327 Yushu Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture 205, 206, 213 Yves Pepin 353 Zayu Earthquake 273, 285 Zeng Peiyan 9, 29, 189 Zeng Qinghong 20–22, 28, 37, 40, 41, 100, 102, 131, 135, 141 relations with He Guoqiang 21, 37 relations with Zhou Yongkang 21, 22 Zeng Shan 21 Zhai Huqu 58, 61, 64, 65, 124 Zhan Wenlong 61, 63, 66, 68, 124 Zhang Baifa 335 Zhang Baoshun 148, 150, 153, 154, 156, 157 Zhang Boling 324–327, 332, 334, 369 Zhang Chengzhen 283 Zhang Chunxian 182, 193 Zhang Dejiang 23, 30, 32, 36, 61, 66, 82, 126–128, 140, 141, 146 Zhang Dingfa 42–44 Zhang Faqiang 338 Zhang Gaoli 9, 29, 30, 34, 36, 82, 125 Zhang Geng 110 Zhang Guangning 184

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426 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization Zhang Guohua 218, 219, 224, 273 Zhang Guomin 280 Zhang Guoqing 57, 61, 121 Zhang Haiyang 119, 140, 144, 146, 294 Zhang Jie 58, 61, 63, 66, 68, 124 Zhang Jigang 352, 366 Zhang Jingwu 222, 224 Zhang Jiyao 108 Zhang Li 114 Zhang Lichang 9, 29 Zhang Mao 338 Zhang Minhou 281 Zhang Qingli 97, 150, 155, 156, 224 Zhang Qingwei 107 Zhang Qinsheng 120 Zhang Ruimin 121, 123 Zhang Shibo 119 Zhang Wenkang 132 Zhang Xiaogang 58, 121, 123 Zhang Xuan (f.) 151, 162–164 Zhang Yang 120 Zhang Yijiong 77, 151, 159, 161, 162 Zhang Yimou 352, 363 Zhang Yintang 216 Zhang Youxia 118, 140, 144, 146 Zhang Yutai 108 Zhang Zhen 119, 140, 144 Zhang Zhenhuan 141 Zhang Zhikai 141 Zhang Zhiyi 140, 141 Zhang Ziyi 296 Zhang Zongxun 118, 140, 144 Zhao Aiming (f.) 79 Zhao Erkang 216 Zhao Jinjun 360 Zhao Keming 117 Zhao Keshi 119, 120 Zhao Puchu 237 Zhao Xiangeng 57, 61, 64, 66, 124 Zhao Yong 59, 152–154, 156, 160 Zhao Ziyang 26, 27, 241

Zhejiang 22, 23, 29, 30, 36, 43, 56–60, 68, 74, 75, 77, 80, 82, 84, 93, 95, 133–135, 140, 143, 149–152, 158, 159, 163, 243, 272, 329 Zheng Lizhong 103 Zheng Shenxia 117 Zheng Xiaoyu 108 Zhengzhou Yutong Bus Company 344 Zhongdian County 207 Shangri-La County 207 Zhongguancun 344 Zhongguo (Central Kingdom) See China Zhonghua Minguo See Republic of China Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo See People’s Republic of China Zhongnanhai 10, 166, 293 Zhou Enlai 234, 274, 275, 276, 285 Zhou Ji 57, 61, 64–66, 68, 77, 137–139 Zhou Jiading 274 Zhou Jiannan 140, 142 Zhou Qiang 150, 153, 156, 160 Zhou Shengxian 345 Zhou Xiaochuan 56, 111, 137–140, 142, 145, 146 Zhou Yiping 21, 22 Zhou Yongkang 9, 20–23, 25, 29, 37, 45, 103, 107, 189, 191, 293, 357 son of Zhou Yiping 21 Zhouzhi, Shaanxi 65 Zhu De 285 Zhu Fazhong 115 Zhu Rongji 22, 24, 242, 338, 339 Zhu Weiqun 243, 244, 250, 253 Zhu Xiaodan 77, 152, 162–164, 183 Zhu Yanfeng 121

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Index 427 Zhu Yimin 120 Zhu Yuanzhang 213 Zhu Zhixin 107 Zhuang nationality 80 Zhugong Monastery 206

Zhuo Lin 296 Zongzhi Yuan (General Council) 210, 254 Zunyi, Guizhou 178, 180 Zuo Zongtang 204