CISG Methodology
CISG Methodology
edited by
André Janssen Olaf Meyer
.
ISBN 978-3-86653-070-6 The Deutsche Natio...
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CISG Methodology
CISG Methodology
edited by
André Janssen Olaf Meyer
.
ISBN 978-3-86653-070-6 The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de © 2009 by sellier. european law publishers GmbH, Munich. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission of the publisher. Design: Sandra Sellier, Munich. Production: Karina Hack, Munich. Typeface: Goudy Old Style and Goudy Sans from Linotype. Printing and binding: Friedrich Pustet KG, Regensburg. Printed on acid-free, non-ageing paper. Printed in Germany.
Foreword of the Editors The 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) is now being applied both by international arbitral tribunals and the domestic courts of its more than 70 Member States. However, the success of the instrument is not to be simply judged by its application, but rather also by the uniform interpretation in all of the Member States. Although Art. 7 of the CISG underscores this “need to promote uniformity in its application”, the CISG itself gives very little guidance as to how to reach this goal. Without such guidance, however, each lawyer might be guided by the methodological rules that he is familiar with from his home jurisdiction. Therefore it is somewhat of a paradox of uniform law that whilst the number of Member States to the Convention is constantly increasing so too is the threat of variation in the application. The range of the methodological problems arising under the CISG can be seen by looking at the table of contents of this volume. Not all of them have been the subject of legal research so far. Thus, while some authors provide a thorough analysis of central topics of interpretation, others enter almost uncharted territories. We hope that it is this variation of the chosen methodological topics that makes this book worthwhile to read. This publication has been made possible with the generous financial support from Lovells (Düsseldorf) and Orth Kluth Rechtsanwälte (Berlin and Düsseldorf). Last but not least we are immensely grateful to those many persons who provided the help and support that allowed us to finish this book. We would particularly like to thank Edoardo Ferrante for his valuable advice, and Jonathon Watson for patiently proofreading all contributions. Bremen and Münster, January 2009
André Janssen Olaf Meyer
List of Contributors Camilla Baasch Andersen PhD, Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Leicester, UK Eric Bergsten Professor of Law Emeritus, Pace Law School, USA UNCITRAL Secretariat 1975-1985 UNCITRAL Secretary 1985-1991 Marta Cenini PhD, Department of Private Law and Legal History, Faculty of Law, University of Milan, Italy Larry A. DiMatteo PhD, Huber Hurst Professor of Contract Law & Legal Studies, Warrington College of Business Administration, University of Florida, USA Sieg Eiselen Professor of Law, Department of Private Law, University of South Africa, South Africa Hossam A. El Saghir Professor of Commercial Law, Helwan University, Egypt Director of the Middle East Center for International Commercial Law, Pace University, New York, USA Franco Ferrari Professor of International Law, Verona University School of Law, Italy Inge Rennert Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law at New York University School Law, USA Former Legal Officer, United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, International Trade Law Branch Urs Peter Gruber Professor of Law, University of Halle-Wittenberg, Germany Judge at the Court of Appeal Naumburg, Germany
List of Contributors
VIII
List of Contributors
André Janssen PhD, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for European Private Law at the University of Münster, Germany Sörren Claas Kiene Postgraduate judicial service trainee at the District Court Dortmund, Germany Former research assistant at the Centre for European Private Law, University of Münster, Germany Ole Lando Professor of Law Emeritus, Law Department, Copenhagen Business School, Denmark Wei Li Professor of Law, Faculty of International Law, China University of Political Science and Law in Beijing, China Ulrich Magnus Professor of Law, University of Hamburg, Germany Judge at the Hanseatic Court of Appeal, Germany Olaf Meyer PhD, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for European Law and Politics at the University of Bremen, Germany Loukas Mistelis Clive M. Schmitthoff Professor of Transnational Commercial Law and Arbitration, Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary University of London, UK Secretary of the CISG Advisory Council (2001-2007) Francesco Parisi Oppenheimer Wolff and Donnelly Professor of Law, School of Law, University of Minnesota, USA Professor of Public Finance, Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Italy Pilar Perales Viscasillas Professor of Commercial Law, University of La Rioja, Spain
List of Contributors
Bruno Zeller Associate Professor, Victoria University, Australia Associate Professor, The Institute for Logistics and Supply Chain Management, Victoria University, Australia Adjunct Professor, School of Law, Murdoch University in Perth, Australia
IX
Table of contents Table of contents Foreword of the Editors List of Contibutors
V VII
Preface Ole Lando
1
Methodological Problems in the Drafting of the CISG Eric Bergsten
5
Tracing Methodology in the CISG: Dogmatic Foundations Ulrich Magnus
33
Literal Interpretation: The Meaning of the Words Sieg Eiselen
61
Legislative Intention and the CISG Urs Peter Gruber
91
Case Law Precedent and Legal Writing Larry A. DiMatteo
113
The Observance of Good Faith in International Trade Bruno Zeller
133
An Economic Analysis of the CISG Marta Cenini and Francesco Parisi
151
Homeward Trend: What, Why and Why Not Franco Ferrari
171
Macro-Systematic Interpretation of Uniform Commercial Law: The Interrelation of the CISG and Other Uniform Sources Camilla Baasch Andersen
207
XII
Table of contents
The CISG and Its General Principles André Janssen and Sörren Claas Kiene
261
The Role of the UNIDROIT Principles and the PECL Pilar Perales Viscasillas
287
Constructive Interpretation – Applying the CISG in the 21st Century Olaf Meyer
319
The Interpretation of the CISG in China Wei Li
343
The Interpretation of the CISG in the Arab World Hossam A. El-Saghir
355
CISG and Arbitration Loukas Mistelis
375
Preface Ole Lando The CISG has established a World law of international sales1 and has influenced several national sales laws. It has launched initiatives to prepare a World law of international contracts and an EU law on contracts. It was the “godfather” of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (UPIC)2 and the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL),3 which again have influenced the interpretation of the CISG.4 Art. 7(1) CISG provides that in its interpretation, regard is to be had to its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith in international trade. Art. 7(2) CISG lays down that questions concerning matters governed by the CISG, which are not expressly settled in it, are to be settled in conformity with the general principles on which it is based or, in the absence of such principles, in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law. The questions to which art. 7 gives rise and other methodological questions need to be expounded, and that is what this book does. The wish expressed by most, if not all its contributors is to achieve uniformity in the application of the CISG. There have been divergences. Some judgments have shown a homeward trend. Courts have interpreted the CISG to mean the same as the corresponding provisions in their domestic law. It appears from the article by Wei Li that in the first years after 1988 the China International Economic Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) did not raise the issue on the applicable law to international sales contracts. Although the application of CISG is now the rule in the CIETAC it may still happen that the CISG is not applied when it should have been,5 and applied when it should not have been, or that it is applied wrongly.6 1 2
3
4 5 6
As of December 2008 the CISG had been adopted by 72 States. Published by the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), 2nd ed. Rome 2004. Lando/Beale (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Part I & II, The Hague 2000, and Lando/Clive/Prüm/Zimmermann (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Part III, The Hague 2003. See Perales Viscasillas in this book. See Li in this book. See Wu, CIETAC’s Practice on the CISG, Nordic Journal of Commercial Law 2005, 1 et seq.
2
Ole Lando
Divergences have also appeared in the interpretation of the CISG. Some, if not most, courts and arbitral tribunals pass lightly over the requirement in Art. 14 CISG that the price has to be included in the offer,7 a few take it seriously.8 Most courts and arbitral tribunals seem to apply the good faith principle to the parties’ behaviour and not as prescribed by Art. 7(1) CISG to the interpretation of CISG only,9 but there are still courts and arbitrators who restrict the principle to the interpretation of CISG.10 However, as pointed out by Ulrich Magnus,11 “the divergences are less than one could expect bearing in mind that no central CISG court exists.” Magnus states that “the dogmatic foundations of the method of interpretation of the CISG are relatively stable despite the fact that the CISG itself only sets out guidelines and aims for its interpretation but no precise method of interpretation.”12 It is also my impression that the divergences of interpretation are relatively few, and this in my view has another reason. On the whole, the laws of today have been framed by the Western European Tradition13 and this tradition has also developed a common sense of justice. When the CISG was negotiated we saw that the different legal backgrounds of the Members caused disagreement on some points, but there was not so much divergence about the substance of the rules as one could have expected. On most issues there was a common conception of what was just and expedient. When the PECL and the UPIC were negotiated the experience was the same. The Members of the two groups frequently tried to visualise how concrete cases would be solved in their country and found that 17 18
19 10
11 12
13
See cases reported in Unilex at Art. 14 CISG. See Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration at the Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce, 3 March 1995 [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950303 r1.html]. See cases reported in Unilex at Art. 7 CISG. See ICC Court of Arbitration Award Case no. 8611, 23 January 1997 [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/978611i1.html]. See also Zeller in this book (under C.). See Magnus in this book (under F.). In his very careful study of the interpretation of statutes in England and on the Continent Vogenauer (Die Auslegung von Gesetzen in England und auf dem Kontinent, Tübingen 2001) finds a trend towards uniformity. See also Markesinis, Comparative Law in the Courtroom and the Classroom, Oxford 2003, 50: “In the European world (which is also present physically and intellectually in the Australian, New Zealand, and Northern and Southern American worlds) one finds the most developed ideas likely to deserve careful study. Is it really suggested that this is not a fact? And if it were not, why would hugely important countries like China, Korea and the former Eastern block be studying these (Western European) systems and trying to import their notions and institutions as they build their own financial markets and the legal infrastructure that goes with them?”
Preface
3
the national contract laws generally differed more in the formulations and techniques than in the result. The Members often agreed on how the rules should be. I venture to assert that most of those general principles that André Janssen and Sörren Claas Kiene14 extract from the provisions of the CISG were shared by those who drafted the PECL and the UPIC. Some of them are in fact common to most of the existing legal systems. Very few countries do not support party autonomy, the principle of good faith and preservation of the contract. As pointed out by Bruno Zeller15 regarding the good faith principle they may do it differently, or to use Rodolfo Sacco’s expression their legal formants of the principles may differ but the basic ideas are the same. The lesson taken is that contract law is based more on ethical and economic considerations that are common to the lawyers of the Western European Tradition than on national cultural attitudes. But as said there are divergences and the question is how uniformity of the present and future understanding of CISG can be achieved.16 The languages are an impediment for the unification of the law.17 Since the working language of those who drafted CISG was English there is a tendency to give prevalence to the English version. That, however, will not help those judges or arbitrators who do not understand English. In addition, the CISG has been translated into the languages of the Contracting States, and it is likely that a court will rely on the translation rather than on one of the authentic versions, and the texts of the CISG’s six authentic languages do not all have exactly the same meaning. The working groups that prepared the UPIC, the PECL, and the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) have tried to unify the terminology. The European Union has struggled for a long time with the divergences of interpretation of EU law caused by the different languages. In the Action Plan for a More Coherent European Contract Law,18 the European Commission gave a high priority to a common terminology. For this purpose the
14 15 16
17 18
See Janssen/Kiene in this book. See Zeller in this book. There is as mentioned above no World Court to which national courts can refer questions of the application and interpretation of the CISG. The CISG Advisory Council is a committee whose primary purpose is to issue opinions relating to the interpretation and application of the Convention on request or on its own initiative. So far only seven opinions on the interpretation of the CISG were delivered. See on the Council http://www.cisgac.com/default.php?sid=128. See Bergsten in this book (under B.II.4). See the Action Plan on A More Coherent European Contract Law, COM(2003) 68 final (OJ 2003/C63/01).
4
Ole Lando
DCFR19 contains an annex with a list of definitions of terms such as contract, damage, goods, loss, writing etc. UNCITRAL might consider establishing a dictionary of terms used in the UNCITRAL texts. Another obstacle for uniformity of application is that what Franco Ferrari calls the “domestic background assumptions and conceptions.”20 Each country has its own legal atmosphere. The common lawyers breathe a legal air which is different from that of the civil lawyers; the legal mentality of the Chinese21 and the Japanese has its distinctive features and so on. A French sage has said that if you plan for the coming ten years you should plant a tree; if you plan for a one hundred years you should educate your people. According to Franco Ferrari the “CISG has to become part of the domestic background assumptions and conceptions in order for the disruptive effect of the natural resort to domestic background assumptions and conceptions to be overcome. For this result to be reached, law school curricula as well as text books will have to be changed to incorporate the study of the CISG.”22 I agree, and I would add that the students should learn to study and use the case law on the CISG. In my view the cases are as important as is the doctrine. But we have to be patient knowing the time it will take before the students become judges who can use their new background assumptions and conceptions. The CISG is in fact now taught in several law schools, and PECL and UPIC in some, but not in as many as is necessary in order to establish a truly international attitude. There is also a need to establish an influential international regime. Today there are some academic lawyers operating on the international scene. They hold conferences and they write books and articles which address an international readership. They know that they must establish common attitudes, that the ideas they wish to promote must be acceptable, and the language they write palatable to an international audience. Today the international regime is not very large. Compared to the number of academic lawyers its members are few and their influence not very great. At present the governing bodies of the law faculties of many countries have not fully realised the impact of the ongoing globalisation. If they would read the Writing on the Wall, they would do more to promote an internationalisation of the legal science and the law curriculum. This, however, will eventually become a necessity, and there is therefore reason to have trust in the future. But also here we must be patient. This book will give a push. It is a very useful contribution to the international doctrine. 19
20 21 22
See von Bar/Clive/Schulte-Nölke et al. (eds.), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Contract Law, Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), Interim Outline Edition, Munich 2008. Based in part on a revised version of the PECL. See Ferrari in this book (under F.). See for instance Li in this book. See Ferrari in this book (under F.).
Methodological Problems in the Drafting of the CISG Eric Bergsten It is well known that the CISG is a revision of the Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods (ULIS) and the Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (ULF).1 What is less known or appreciated is the significance of that history. The revision process raised a certain number of methodological problems, some of which are common to all international unification of law efforts. Some of those problems and their consequences were appreciated at the time, while others were not. This chapter will discuss a number of the methodological problems that were encountered during the revision process in UNCITRAL and will suggest some of the consequences that follow.
A. Introduction One reason for the unification of law is that it is a symbol of the existence of a newly unified state. That was a significant element in France following the Revolution and in Germany following unification in the end of the nineteenth century. In those cases unification was achieved through adoption of the unified law as national law. The equivalent in the European Union would be the adoption of a regulation rather than a directive calling for implementation by the Member States, though EU regulations seem to have lost much of their political symbolism. When the unification efforts anticipate world-wide or, at least, broad adoption, such as in regard to the CISG, there has to be a different motive. Whatever the motive, the international unification of law is always a difficult task. Unification of law implies that the subject matter is one that is already subject to a functioning set of legal rules in the different political entities concerned. As pointed out in the Schmitthoff Report that led to the creation of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL):
1
Available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/c-main.htm.
6
Eric Bergsten
“[W]hether harmonization is attempted on a world-wide scale or not, it is more easily achieved in technical branches of the law than in subjects closely connected with national traditions and basic principles of domestic law. Thus, harmonization has been most widely accepted in the law of industrial property, transportation by sea, air and land, international banking (bills of exchange and commercial credits) and arbitration.”2 The report concluded that there is no need to undertake unification unless “there is an economic need and (…) unifying measures would have a beneficial effect on the development of international trade.”3 Even where there is a demonstrated need, unification is not possible when the differences in policy, legal rules or legal concepts are too large. Unification takes place, therefore, in a middle ground of differences in the law that cause significant difficulties, but in which the differences are not excessive. It might be noted that there is also a middle way of judicial or administrative cooperation in some situations. One example is the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. However, that was never a relevant option for the CISG. There was no doubt that the law of contracts, and specifically contracts for the sale of goods, varied in often significant ways from one country to another and those differences often reflected “basic principles of domestic law”. The question faced in UNCITRAL and elsewhere was whether those differences could be overcome and which techniques were best suited to achieving that result.
B. Standard Contracts, Uniform Law or Convention? “There is more than one way to skin a cat.” Mark Twain, A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court A text intended to unify the legal rules in regard to a particular type of activity can take several different forms. None of them has ever achieved universality either as to the subject matter covered or participation. Each technique to unify the law has its strengths and its weaknesses. The choice of one technique or another may have to do with the extent to which the subject matter is ripe for unification. It also may have to do with the nature of the organisation within which the unification activity is undertaken. In regard to the international sale of goods, the unification efforts have taken the form of standard contracts, provisions to be inserted into contracts, uni-
2
3
Report of the Secretary-General, A/6396, para. 203. All United Nations documents cited are available on the UNCITRAL website, http://www.uncitral.org. Ibid, para. 204.
Methodological Problems in the Drafting of the CISG
7
form law and a stand-alone convention. UNCITRAL has considered all of them.
I.
Standard Contracts and Trade Terms
The oldest form and one that continues to have wide use is the standard contract, which in fact means the general conditions. Trade associations often prepare such general conditions or have rules binding on the members of the association in their dealings with one another. By their very nature the rules of a trade association or the general conditions prepared by them normally have little effect outside of the members of the association. Where the members of the trade association conduct a significant share of a given trade, its rules and general conditions may nevertheless be the effective legal rules governing the trade. It should also be noted that the general conditions prepared by a trade association that is closely linked with a given country will be drafted in the legal style and will use terminology of the legal system of that country. That is the reason so many of the general conditions emanating from trade associations based in London have a distinctly English character to them. That can be noticed in fields outside the international sale of goods. That is less true of general conditions or provisions to be inserted in form contracts prepared by international organisations. During the 1950s, in particular, there were two such efforts that influenced the discussions in UNCITRAL and thereby the subsequent development of the CISG. One was the General Conditions of Sale adopted by the CMEA countries of Eastern Europe.4 Although labeled General Conditions of Sale, they were effectively a uniform law, since they automatically applied to all contracts for sale within the trading block.5 Also during the 1950s and early 1960s the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe prepared a number of widely used general conditions for sale of different types of goods.6 In the light of later developments in UNCITRAL it is interesting to note that most of the ECE general conditions related to manufactured goods. The general conditions were especially intended for use in East-West trade in Europe. 4 5
6
Council of Mutual Economic Assistance. “[The] content presents a peculiar blend of provisions of the nature of general conditions and that of law. This may be explained by the circumstance that at their birth the GCDG were in fact a general condition, coming into play in the absence of a provision of the parties to the contrary.” Szász, A Uniform Law on International Sales of Goods: The CMEA General Conditions, Budapest 1976, 47. The ECE General Conditions of Sale are available at http://www.unece.org/ leginstr/Annex.pdf.
8
Eric Bergsten
Other unification efforts have produced texts to be incorporated into contracts. A notable example is Incoterms produced by the International Chamber of Commerce.7 Incoterms provide rules for interpretation of thirteen trade terms widely used in international contracts of sale. At one time there was an argument that Incoterms could have erga omnes effect as commercial custom. However, the ICC now recommends that “Incoterms 2000” be referred to specifically whenever the terms are used.8 Even the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules by means of its model arbitration clause fall into the category of texts that are intended to be incorporated by reference into the underlying contract, be it an international contract of sale of goods or otherwise. The importance of standard contract provisions was recognised by the General Assembly in its resolution creating UNCITRAL.9 It is no surprise, therefore, that at its first session UNCITRAL decided that reports should be submitted “examining the possibility of promoting the wider use of the existing general conditions of sale and standard contracts” and of Incoterms.10 The requested reports were submitted to the second session of UNCITRAL and the Commission decided to submit the ECE general conditions to the other UN regional economic commissions for their comments. This effort seems to have died a quiet death. On the other hand, UNCITRAL has endorsed the 1953, 1990 and 2000 versions of Incoterms.11 The endorsement may have contributed to the withdrawal of the American Foreign Trade Definitions by the sponsoring organisations and the currently all but universal use of Incoterms in international trade. Unfortunately, a number of the trade terms defined in Incoterms are also found in sections 2-319 to 2-322 of the Uniform Commercial Code in the United States with somewhat different definitions. Of more general interest was that the Commission decided at its second session that “at an appropriate time, consideration [should be given] to the feasi17 18 19
10
11
The current version adopted in 2000 is in ICC Publication no. 560. http://www.iccwbo.org/incoterms/id3040/index.html. Resolution 2205 (XXI). The General Assembly “Having noted with appreciation the efforts made by intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations towards the progressive harmonization and unification of the law of international trade by promoting the adoption of international conventions, uniform laws, standard contract provisions, general conditions of sale, standard trade terms and other measures,” established the Commission. Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the work of its first session (1968), A/7216, para. 48/19-20. (Commission Report, first session). Commission Report, second session, (1969), A/7618, para. 60(3); ibid, twentyfifth session (1992), A/47/17, 161; ibid, thirty-third session, (2000), A/55/17, para. 434.
Methodological Problems in the Drafting of the CISG
9
bility of developing general conditions embracing a wider scope of commodities than the existing specific formulations,”12 thereafter referred to as “general” general conditions. When the topic was first discussed at the fourth session there was wide-spread opposition to the idea, basically on the grounds that, because of the specific nature of each trade, it would be better to leave the subject of general conditions to the trade associations, which themselves had often found it necessary to prepare different general conditions for each trade or even sub-branches of different trades. Nevertheless, the Commission requested the Secretariat to continue its study of “general” general conditions. The requested report was finally submitted to the eighth session of the Commission in 1975.13 It suggested that the preparation of “general” general conditions should be closely linked to the work on revision of the ULIS. That was the only part of the report that gained approval. The conclusion drawn was that, absent a further study requested of the Secretariat, there would be little commercial interest in “general” general conditions applicable to a wide range of commodities.14 The requested study was never carried out and the subject of general conditions dropped from the agenda of UNCITRAL. The general conditions of sale discussed in UNCITRAL cover a sub-set of the factual situations for which a law governing international sales of goods must be drafted. The idea was to prepare them for commodity trades only. In spite of the positive experience with the ECE General Conditions of Sale, preparation of general conditions for manufactured goods was thought not to be feasible. The requirements of each trade were thought to be too specific to the trade for “general” general conditions to have a role. In regard to the sale of goods, UNCITRAL has endorsed only Incoterms, and has done it on three occasions. The explanation is undoubtedly that Incoterms provide solutions for a limited number of issues, and there is a variety of trade terms allowing flexibility in their use. However, once a specific Incoterm is chosen, there is no flexibility in the legal consequences that follow.
12 13
14
Commission Report, second session (1969), A/7618, para. 60(1)(g). Report of the Secretary-General: general conditions of sale and standard contracts, A/CN.9/98. Commission Report, eighth session (1975), A/10017, paras. 18-25. The present author had joined the UNCITRAL Secretariat three months prior to the eighth session and was the author of the report submitted to the Commission. The response of the Commission was a vivid lesson as to what an international organisation could be expected to accomplish.
10
II.
Eric Bergsten
Uniform Law or Convention
Even though the Commission decided in the end that it was not feasible to prepare “general” general conditions because of the wide diversity of factual situations that would have to be considered, there was never any doubt as to whether it would be desirable for there to be uniform law on the subject of the international sale of goods. The only question was how to bring this about. One technique that was not even considered was the preparation of a model law. In international usage, except for the special case of the European Union, there are three juridical forms in which uniform law can be drafted. These are a stand-alone convention, uniform law attached to a convention and model law. It is commonly thought that they are in descending order of their propensity to bring into force a uniform version of the text. It is for that reason that model laws intended to bring about uniform law have been rare in international usage, though that may change with the great success of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration.15 It has not only been widely used as the basis for national legislation, influencing even those laws that do not purport to be Model Law texts, but it has often been adopted with little or no change in the text of the Model Law, though there have usually been additions covering aspects of the law of arbitration that the Model Law does not cover. Of great importance is that a model law can be amended by the sponsoring organisation, as the Model Law was amended by UNCITRAL in 2006, without requiring the agreement of the States that have already adopted it. Nevertheless, it remains true that there is neither an explicit nor an implicit obligation for any State that adopts legislation on the bases of a model law to adopt it without alteration.
1.
Revision of ULIS
ULIS and ULF had been adopted as uniform laws attached to conventions at the diplomatic conference in The Hague in 1964, only two years before the General Assembly resolution calling for the creation of UNCITRAL had been adopted and four years prior to the first meeting of the Commis-
15
Another example is the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. Insolvency has been a notoriously difficult subject for unification efforts. The impressive success of the Model Law is undoubtedly due to its limited scope, but the results are nevertheless impressive. As of 30 September 2008 15 States have adopted legislation based upon it (see http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral _texts/insolvency/1997Model_status.html).
Methodological Problems in the Drafting of the CISG
11
sion. The two uniform laws had been elaborated by the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), beginning in 1931. It seems that even in 1964 at the diplomatic conference at which ULIS was adopted there was doubt as to whether it would be a success. In the Final Act of the Conference there was a recommendation that, if the Convention had not received the five ratifications necessary to bring it into force by 1 May 1968, UNIDROIT should appoint a committee of representatives of interested States to determine what further measures should be taken to unify the law of sales.16 When the first session of UNCITRAL took place in January 1968 the necessary five ratifications had not as yet been achieved. A decision was made to circulate a copy of ULIS to all States along with a copy of the commentary by Professor André Tunc17 with a questionnaire asking whether they intended to adhere to the Convention and the reasons for their position.18 The discussions at the second session showed that almost every conceivable view was represented. What was striking were the opinions that the needs of developing countries had not been taken into account and that few state trading countries had participated in the negotiations on ULIS. The Common Law countries had a number of more substantive objections to the text. There were a few voices heard that an entirely new convention should be prepared. The final decision, however, was to create a Working Group to “ascertain which modifications of the existing texts might render them capable of wider acceptance by countries of different legal, social and economic systems (…)”.19 In other words, in 1969 it seems to have been expected that the revision of ULIS and ULF would be undertaken by UNCITRAL rather than UNIDROIT as UNCITRAL’s way of promoting the widespread adoption of the UNIDROIT texts. By the time of the Working Group meeting in 1975 the recommended changes had been so extensive that it was clear that a new convention would be necessary and that it should be an UNCITRAL product. The Working Group also decided that the text should be in the form of a standalone, or “integrated” convention, following the precedent of the Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods (Limitation Convention), which had been adopted the year before.20 There is no record of any substantial discussion in the Working Group and there was certainly none when the Commission received the report of the Working 16
17
18 19 20
Recommendation II of the Final Act of the Hague Conference of 1964 on the Unification of Law Governing the International Sale of Goods. The Commentary in English and French was published by the Ministry of Justice of the Netherlands in a booklet of 108 pages. It is available at http://www.cisg. law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/tunc.html. Commission Report, first session (1968), A/7216, para. 48 et seq. Commission Report, second session (1969), A/7618, para. 38. Working Group Report, sixth session (1975), A/CN.9/100, para. 13.
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Eric Bergsten
Group about the change from a uniform law to a stand-alone convention.21 The decision had been made with seemingly little awareness as to its significance. The Working Group also decided that the new convention would continue not to include the rules on the formation of contracts.22 It was not until the Commission session in 1978 at which the final text of the draft Convention was adopted for submission to diplomatic conference that the provisions on the formation of the contract were integrated into the same text as the provisions on the substantive obligations of the buyer and seller. By 1978 it had been realised that a mistake may have been made in adopting the Limitation Convention as a separate convention. By themselves the rules on the limitation period in the international sale of goods are not sufficiently important to generate widespread support for ratification of the convention.23 The same was felt to be one of the reasons why ULIS and ULF had not gained wider support than they had. There were also technical reasons for merging the provisions on the formation of the contract with the provisions on the substance. ULIS and ULF contained a number of almost but not completely identical provisions. At the request of the Working Group a report was prepared by the Secretariat showing the technical means by which the two revised texts could be combined with no change in substance.24 In many cases the resulting provisions were very inelegant. However, the report showed that they could be combined, which was the important point, and the drafting of those provisions was simplified and improved at the Commission session. The wisdom of combining the revised ULIS and ULF into a single convention became apparent when the Limitation Convention was later amended by a Protocol at the diplomatic conference that adopted the CISG. The amending Protocol in large measure revised the same provisions that had been the subject mat21
22 23
24
Commission Report, eighth session (1975), A/10017, paras. 11-17. I was the secretary of the Working Group meeting and my memory after more than thirty years is that there was no consideration of the consequences that would follow from the rules being in the form of a uniform law or in the form of a stand-alone convention. Ibid, para. 16. The Convention has been ratified by 27 States of which 19 have ratified the Protocol. http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1974Convention_ status.html. The UNCITRAL CLOUT does not contain any abstract of cases concerning the Convention. The Convention may have been forgotten even where it is in force. Working Group report, ninth session (1978), A/CN.9/142, para. 303; and Report of the Secretary-General, Incorporation of the provisions of the draft Convention on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods into the draft Convention on the International Sale of Goods, A/CN9/145.
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ter of the Secretariat report. In the Final Act the Secretariat was requested to prepare a consolidated text of the Limitation Convention. When that task was undertaken, the resulting consolidated text was a mess.25 It would have been much improved if the re-drafting of the relevant provisions had taken place in the context of joining the provisions on the limitation period to the CISG as a separate Part, as the provisions on formation of the contract had been. The principal argument against integrating formation of the contract into the CISG was that there were States that intended to ratify the substantive sales law provisions that would not wish to ratify either the provisions on the formation of the contract or the provisions on the limitation period. The solution that was used for the provisions on contract formation is found in Art. 91 CISG. A State may declare that it will not be bound by Part II (formation) or Part III (substantive provisions). The same solution could have been used in regard to the limitation period, if the Limitation Convention had not already existed. Only the Scandinavian countries have made the declaration in regard to Part II of the CISG.
2.
Normative Nature of a Uniform Law
ULIS and ULF were not model laws but uniform laws attached to conventions. The CISG is a stand-alone convention. The stand-alone convention and the uniform law attached to a convention have equally strong pedigrees in international unification of law, but their consequences may be significantly different in the domestic legal order. A State that became party to the Conventions to which ULIS and ULF were attached undertook an obligation “to incorporate into its own legislation, in accordance with its constitutional procedure, not later than the date of the entry into force of the present Convention in respect of that State, the Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods (…) forming the Annex to the present Convention.”26 Consequently, ratification of the Convention by a State was necessarily accompanied by legislation enacting the Uniform Law in order for the State to fulfill its obligations. Enactment of the legislation would undoubtedly be accomplished at the same time as approval by the parliamentary body of ratification of the Convention in those countries in which parliamentary approval of ratification of the Convention was necessary. As shall be seen, not all States have such a requirement. It is 25 26
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/limit/limit-conv.pdf. Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, The Hague, 1 July 1964, Art. 1(1). A similar provision was to be found in the Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, The Hague, 1 July 1964, Art. 1(1).
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not unusual for the Convention to which a uniform law is attached to have a number of possible alternatives for certain of the provisions of the uniform law. A striking example is the 1931 Geneva Convention on bills of exchange and promissory notes.27 Annex II to the Convention consisted of 23 articles of authorised derogations from the Uniform Law and the consequences thereof. The Convention to which ULIS was attached specified only a few matters that could be the subject of a declaration by a ratifying State. The text of ULIS that was in force in any State was, therefore, the text of the Uniform Law as found in the Annex to the Convention. It was not the Convention. From a public international law perspective the national legislation was the implementation of the treaty obligation. From a domestic law point of view the national legislation was just that, i.e. domestic legislation. Of course, any State could enact ULIS without becoming party to the Convention. Since neither the Convention nor ULIS itself had a reciprocity requirement, the only reason for ratifying the Convention would be to publicise the fact that the law was in force and, perhaps, to bring the Convention into force. Once the requisite five States had ratified the Convention and it thereby came into force, even that reason was no longer applicable. There is no indication that any State contemplated adopting ULIS without ratifying the Convention, but it may have happened with the Geneva Convention on Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes. Whether the Uniform Law was adopted in implementation of the Convention or without ratification of the Convention, it was a national domestic text. To be sure, the provenance of the law could not be overlooked by lawyer or judge, since the Convention was referred to in Art. 1(4) and 4 of ULIS, but that did not change its normative character. The fact that it was a domestic statute had both a positive and a negative effect. The positive effect is that it was published and indexed in the same official publications as all other domestic laws. Nevertheless, being a law that applied only to international sales of goods, it was still a matter for each individual State, and perhaps even private publishers, to decide whether it would be included in compilations of laws in such a way that it was easy to find. That was not a problem in regard to the Geneva Uniform Law on Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes, since the Uniform Law applied to both domestic and international bills of exchange and promissory notes. However, a uniform law that applies to both domestic and international transactions is rare. The negative effect is that the interpretation by national courts of a uniform law that is in form a domestic statute can be expected to follow domestic rules of interpretation. There is nothing in either ULIS or the Convention that indicates that uniform interpretation of the Uniform Law would 27
Convention Providing a Uniform Law for Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes, Geneva, 7 June 1930.
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have been desirable. Even if such a provision had existed in ULIS or the Convention, it is difficult to see how it could have been implemented in anything but a restricted fashion. Then as now UNIDROIT published the Uniform Law Review, which often contains a certain number of court decisions on texts of uniform law. However, only a very restricted number of court decisions could have been published in it. Scholars might have published articles bringing the interpretations given to the Uniform Law in other countries to the attention of lawyers and courts, but that too could have been expected to have only a limited effect. The conclusion is easily reached that a uniform law might be only a little better than a model law at achieving uniformity of the law in practice.
3.
Normative Nature of a Stand-alone Convention
It could be thought that a stand-alone convention would eliminate the difficulties associated with a text of uniform law enacted as a domestic statute. Ratification of the Convention would mean that the Convention text itself would constitute the applicable norm. It would be the same norm in all of the ratifying States, not just a domestic norm with an identical wording to that in other ratifying countries, as in the case of a uniform law. Unfortunately, that is not the reality in fact. It is probably something close to reality on the continent of Europe. The large number of States with a somewhat limited geographical size has led to the existence of a large number of conventions regulating various crossborder situations. It is not only the European Union that contributes to this situation, though it has certainly led to a greatly expanded number of such legal rules. The Council of Europe lists 203 conventions on its treaty website. Not all relate to legal rules that affect individuals, but many do. The International Commission on Civil Status, composed of 16 Member States, lists 32 conventions on its website.28 When a party comes from a foreign country it may be natural to assume that there may be a convention governing the legal situation. Furthermore, on the European continent it seems to be a general rule that through one theory or another treaties have positive law effect in the domestic legal realm.29 That is not, however, the situation all over the world. 28
29
My marriage certificate, issued in Austria, is on a form provided for by the Convention on the Issue of Multilingual Extracts from Civil Status Records, signed 8 September 1976. No translation of the certificate is necessary in any country using one of the nine languages provided for on the form. Some conventions, however, require implementing legislation in whole or in part. One of them is the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, which appears in large part to be directly
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In the United Kingdom and all countries that have derived their law from it, with the exception of the United States, the government can enter into treaties without the approval of Parliament. However, no treaty can create legal rules in the domestic legal order without the Parliament’s approval. To be sure that any such convention will be implemented by appropriate parliamentary action, it is usual to have the law implementing the convention adopted prior to ratification of the convention. The practical effect is that it is largely irrelevant in those countries whether the uniform law is in the form of a law attached to a convention or is in the form of a stand-alone convention. The situation in New Zealand will illustrate the point. New Zealand ratified the CISG on 22 September 1994 and it came into force for New Zealand on 1 October 1995. The Sale of Goods (United Nations) Act of 1994 was adopted on 4 July 1994. The Act itself consists of only six sections and an annex that reproduces the text of the CISG. Section 4 of the Act provides that the Convention shall have the force of law in New Zealand.30 The result may be the optimal solution. The full text of the CISG is in force in New Zealand and is labeled as a convention but, being a schedule to an ordinary statute, it is printed and indexed in the places that a practicing lawyer would expect to look. Australia and Canada have a special problem. They are both federal States in which the complete authority for the law of sales of goods is in the constituent units (states in the case of Australia and provinces in the case of Canada). Naturally, those units do not have competence in regard to foreign affairs. Therefore, the federal government of both countries had the authority to ratify the CISG, but the implementing laws had to be passed by the states or provinces. Since there was no assurance that all of them would do so, or would do so by the time the federal government wished to ratify, the CISG contains a federal-state clause providing that the ratification could be accompanied by a declaration that it applied only to particular territorial units.31 When Canada ratified the CISG in 1986 British Colombia had not yet adopted the necessary legislation, but the declaration made under Art. 95 CISG was withdrawn in 1992 when British Colombia joined the rest of the country in adopting the CISG. It might be noted that earlier conventions did not contain a federal-state clause. Nevertheless, Canada has made
30
31
applicable. The far from uniform implementation of the New York Convention is vividly demonstrated in the document prepared by the UNCITRAL Secretariat for the forty-first session of the Commission, 16 June to 3 July 2008, Report on the survey relating to the legislative implementation of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York 1958), A/CN.9/656 and Add. 1. The full text of the Act can be found at http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/ 1994/0060/latest/whole.html#DLM332330. Art. 93 CISG.
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a declaration in regard to the New York Convention that the implementation of the Convention in Quebec differs from that of the rest of the country. These details cause no problems for the Australian or Canadian lawyer or court, but they may be confusing to the foreign lawyer. The United States poses yet a different problem. As in Australia and Canada, the law of sales generally is the law of the 50 states. In contrast to those two countries, the ratification of the CISG made it automatically the relevant law within its sphere of application. Normally in the United States conventions are published officially only in the publications devoted to treaties, which are not among the sources usually consulted by practicing lawyers. However, the unusual action was taken to publish the CISG in the Federal Register and as an appendix to Title 15 of the United States Code. The problem is that even those actions were not enough. Unless one knows to look for it, which only a minority of American lawyers whose clients engage in international sales do, it remains a hidden text. The assumption of most lawyers is that, absent a choice of law clause, the domestic sales law, i.e. Art. 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted in the relevant state, is the governing law even when the transaction involves a non-U.S. party as buyer or seller. Among those who know of the existence of the CISG, a significant number consider it “foreign law”.32 Similar to the Common Law countries discussed above, Norway “is traditionally a ‘dualistic’ country, transposing conventions like the [CISG] into domestic statutory law by way of separate ‘statutory’ legislation, not only translating, but adapting and adjusting by amendments etc. international texts according to national legislative tradition. (…) The ‘transformation’ method was also implemented in the particular case of CISG 1980.”33 Therefore, in Norway the governing law for an international sale is similar to, but different from, the CISG. The conclusion that one might draw is that the unification of law is not notably advanced by casting the text in the form of a stand-alone convention rather than as a uniform law annexed to a convention. Neither one guarantees identity of text in the countries that have adopted the unified text.
32
33
Fitzgerald, The International Contracting Practices Survey Project: An Empirical Study of the Value and Utility of the United Nation’s Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) and the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts to Practitioners, Jurists, and Legal Academics in the United States, to be published in 27 Journal of Law and Commerce 2008. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1127382. Krüger, Norsk kjøpsrett [Norwegian Sales Law], 4th ed., Bergen 1999, Chap. 26. Available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/kruger.html#26.1. See also, Hagstrøm, CISG: Implementation in Norway, an approach not advisable, Internationales Handelsrecht 2006, 246-248.
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Language
The cause of international unification of law also is impeded by the multiplicity of languages used throughout the world. ULIS was essentially drafted in French. An English translation was prepared prior to the diplomatic conference and the text was adopted in the two languages. The Convention provided that “Each Contracting State may incorporate the Uniform Law into its own legislation either in one of the authentic texts or in a translation into its own language or languages.”34 It was also required to notify the Government of the Netherlands as depository the text that it had incorporated into its legislation. The Convention, therefore, recognised the desirability or even necessity for the Uniform Law to be adopted in the language or languages normally used in the country in question. In a monolingual country there would be only one version of the Uniform Law in effect. There was no procedure to assure that any translation into a language other than English or French corresponded to the originals, except for the requirement of transmitting the text adopted to the Netherlands. As a Commission reporting to the General Assembly, UNCITRAL works in the languages of the General Assembly. Therefore, when UNCITRAL began its work determining the changes that would be necessary to make the text of ULIS generally acceptable, it worked in Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish. Arabic was added as a General Assembly language prior to the diplomatic conference in 1980. No special thought appears to have been given to the fact that this was expanding the number of official texts from two to six, though everyone was obviously aware of it. It is well known that it is difficult to translate legal texts accurately. Law is a discipline of concepts and the concepts used in one legal system, especially in one legal language, do not always correspond to the concepts in a different legal system or legal language. Much has been written about the problems of translation. Less has been written about drafting in one language with the expectation that the text will be translated. It is important that the original be well drafted grammatically and that ambiguities be eliminated. If a word or phrase can have two possible meanings, there is a high likelihood that one or more of the translations will have a meaning that is not what the author of the original intended. In regard to legal drafting it is also important that conceptual terms not be used, since they will have a particular meaning that cannot always be translated accurately. Of importance to the law of sale of goods, different legal systems have different rules as to when “delivery” takes place when, for example, the goods are sold in transit. The legal consequences of “delivery” on passage of the risk of loss or transfer of title are not the same. In place of 34
Art. I(2) ULIS.
Methodological Problems in the Drafting of the CISG
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delivery the CISG speaks of “handing over the goods” to mark the physical act, has its own rules on transfer of the risk of loss,35 and stipulates that the Convention “is not concerned with (…) the effect which the contract may have on the property in the goods sold.”36 The concordance of the six official language versions was a shared responsibility of the delegates, the UNCITRAL Secretariat and the Translation Service of the United Nations. Officially, the text of CISG was the responsibility of the delegates, both in UNCITRAL and later in the diplomatic conference. Some of the delegates were proficient in several of the official languages, as were some members of the UNCITRAL Secretariat. However, no one was knowledgeable about all six. In any case, translation is a special skill of its own. By necessity, there was great reliance on the United Nations Translation Service. The Translation Service is an excellent organisation that does a masterful job under sometimes extreme difficulties. During a meeting it often receives proposed new provisions or portions of the draft report in the evening after the meeting for the day is completed. It is expected to translate, print and distribute the resulting document in six languages to the delegates in the morning. In New York in particular the work for a meeting such as UNCITRAL may be interrupted because a meeting of the Security Council has been called. Because the UNCITRAL meetings alternated between New York and Europe (Geneva until the 1977 session of the Commission and Vienna since that date), different teams of translators often worked on the documents. Some of the translators are law trained, but most are not. It is a wonder that they are able to do the high-quality work that is typical of United Nations translations. Nevertheless, it was a problem. There was only one small discrepancy in the six language versions that was knowingly included. In the Drafting Committee at the diplomatic conference the Chinese translator asked whether the requirement in Art. 88(2) CISG that a party “bound to preserve the goods” for the other party37 must sell the goods when they are “subject to rapid deterioration” applied only to physical deterioration or included foreseeable price deterioration. Different characters would have to be used in Chinese to cover the two situations. The delegates relying on the English and French texts said that it included both and that it should. The delegate from the Soviet Union said that the Russian text covered only physical deterioration and that that was the correct solution. One wonders whether the same answer would be given today. After some debate it was decided that the matter could not be decided in the Drafting Committee, which had only a technical mandate and not a 35 36 37
Art. 66-70 CISG. Art. 4(b) CISG. For example, a buyer who has received the goods but intends to reject them (Art. 86(1) CISG).
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substantive mandate, and that it was not worth bringing to the attention of the full diplomatic conference.38 Having been given no answer from the delegates, the text in Chinese was decided by the translator. I do not know what it says. Over all, my experience has been that there is a high congruence of the texts of the CISG in French and English. Not only did the work in UNCITRAL commence with the text of ULIS and ULF in the two languages but many of the delegates were fluent in both languages. I would expect the Russian text also to be in line with the other language versions, in spite of the example just given, since the text was polished in Moscow by the delegation after the meetings of UNCITRAL and the delegation worked closely with the translators at the diplomatic conference. Some aspects of this were formally problematical, especially during the height of the Cold War, since no single delegation was supposed to have privileged access to the various language versions of United Nations documents. It was, however, very effective. I personally have somewhat less confidence in the quality of the Spanish text and considerably less in the Arabic and Chinese. The United Nations website indicates that the text of the CISG in Arabic has been rectified on two occasions and the Russian on one occasion. Rectifications of a Convention are governed by Art. 79 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Rectifications of conventions cause few problems when the persons concerned are government officials, whether in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or otherwise. Rectifications are less effective in regard to a convention such as the CISG that will be reprinted by numerous private publishers.39 Since the decision had been to adopt a stand-alone convention, there could be no provision as there was in the ULIS Convention that the sales law provisions could be enacted into positive law in the national legal order in one of the official texts or in a translation. Instead CISG has the standard provision in multilingual conventions that the convention was adopted “in a single original, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic.”40 It is clear that no single language version of a convention of a political nature can be relied upon by the dip38
39
40
The Chairman of the First Committee had previously stated that “it was not the Drafting Committee’s task to draw up any new text, which might give rise to discussions within the (First) Committee and delay its work.” Official Records, First Committee, fourth Meeting, para. 1. There was also a correction to the Russian text of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules after it had been adopted by the Commission. However, the error was noted at an early stage and the incorrect text was never distributed, though it did appear in the Report of the Commission to the General Assembly. A corrigendum to the report of the Commission in Russian was duly issued. Clause following Art. 101 CISG.
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lomats in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is not so clear as a matter of public international law whether the courts of a State that uses one of the official languages can rely on that language version alone. If they do, the result in regard to Art. 88(2) CISG would be that a Russian court, relying on the Russian text, would rule that there was a requirement to sell the goods for the account of the other party only if the goods are in danger of physical deterioration whereas a court in an English speaking country, relying on the English language text, would rule that there was a requirement to sell if there was foreseeable price deterioration as well. The problem is somewhat different in States where the legal language is not one of the six official languages. A translation into the legal language of the State will obviously be made. The document presented to the legislative body for approval will certainly include the translated text. Depending on the procedures common in the country in question, the six official language versions of the CISG may also be submitted, whether or not they are read by anyone. Once the CISG has been ratified, there is even more of a question as to whether any of the six official versions of the CISG will be considered when questions under it are raised by practitioners or courts. There is a special problem when there is more than one State sharing the same legal language into which the CISG will be translated. Unless the interested States prepare a joint translation, as the German speaking countries have done, the translations, and therefore the law applied by the courts in those States, will be different. The differences may be significant or they may be minor, but differences there will be.
C. Scope of Application Every law must indicate the transactions or situations to which it applies. The provisions on the scope of application of a text for the international unification of law may also mark the limits of what is deemed to be feasible to unify. That is very much the case with the CISG. The six articles in Chapter I on the scope of application fall into four categories: (1) internationality of the sale and status of the parties to the contract, (2) types of sale and types of goods covered, (3) aspects of the law relevant to a sale of goods not included and (4) right to exclude the application of the Convention. Only certain aspects of the first three categories will be discussed below.
I.
Internationality of the Sale and Status of the Parties
In contrast to the 1931 Geneva Uniform Laws on negotiable instruments, which apply to both domestic and international use of the instruments,
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there was never any question from the inception of the preparation of ULIS at UNIDROIT in 1931 that it would apply only to international sales. ULIS combined a subjective element and an objective element to determine internationality. The subjective element was that the parties had their places of business in different States. The objective element was that the goods were in carriage or were to be shipped from one State to another, that the offer and acceptance had been effected in different States or the delivery of the goods was to take place in another State even though the offer and acceptance of the contract had been in one State.41 When UNCITRAL undertook the revision of ULIS the objective elements were not considered to be necessary. Therefore, the CISG “applies to contracts of sale of goods between parties whose places of business are in different States.”42 It is only the places of business that are to be considered, not the nationality of the parties.43 The CISG applies even if the goods are to remain where they were prior to the sale. The most obvious example is that the goods were in a warehouse and are expected to remain there. The controversy in regard to the criterion of internationality in ULIS was that it applied to all international contracts of sale, even though neither the goods nor the parties had any relationship with a Contracting State. Professor Tunc in his Commentary noted that the example had been given in the diplomatic conference of a sale between two companies, one having its place of business in the United States and the other in Canada, assuming that neither had ratified ULIS. Even if the litigation comes “before the court of a European State which has signed the Uniform Law, it seemed paradoxical that this court should apply the Law to the parties.”44 Professor Tunc gave three reasons why it was justified that the sale need not have any contact with a Contracting State. First of all, Art. 3 ULIS allowed the parties to exclude the application of the law, as does Art. 6 CISG. It is difficult to see, however, that the U.S. and Canadian parties in the hypothetical case would have contracted out of ULIS as such, though they might have included a choice of law provision in the contract, which would have had the effect of contracting out of ULIS. The second reason was that “a tribunal will not normally declare that it is competent to decide on a contract unless the contract has some substantial connection with the country where the tribunal sits.” The third reason would seem to have been the crucial one: “Now, in all these cases, the Uniform Law seems undoubtedly superior to municipal laws, if not in itself, at least as regards international contracts; it is
41 42 43 44
Art. 1(1) ULIS. Art. 1(1) CISG. Art. 1(3) CISG. Tunc, Commentary (op. cit. fn. 17), 16.
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stressed, in short, that all municipal law contains peculiar rules the application of which can result in injustice to a contracting party who is not forewarned. (…) The Uniform Law has appeared not only acceptable, but positively good, to experts belonging to very different legal and political systems. That is to say it seems to protect any contract, whatever its type, from the eccentricities and injustices inherent in any municipal system.”45 Professor Tunc was certainly correct that courts in Contracting States would have few occasions to adjudicate contract disputes between parties from two non-Contracting States, but it could happen. The issue was of more importance in regard to the image it projected than it ever would have been in practice. Nevertheless, the fact that ULIS could be applied to sales of goods between parties from non-Contracting States was a major reason why there was so much resistance to ULIS in certain States. It did not help the image problem that the Convention provided that a State could make ULIS applicable only to sales of goods between parties from Contracting States and that six of the nine States that eventually ratified the ULIS Convention did so.46 In the revision of ULIS leading to the CISG there was little doubt that the Convention would apply to contracts between parties from Contracting States. An issue arose that did not need to be considered in ULIS. If the contract was not between parties from two Contracting States but the rules of private international law would lead to the application of the law of a Contracting State, it was felt that the CISG should apply, and Art. 1(1)(b) CISG so provides. A Contracting State has two (at least) laws of sale of goods of which the CISG is one. Just as expressed by Professor Tunc in regard to ULIS, the CISG was thought to be more appropriate than the law of sales of goods otherwise applicable in the State.47 The CISG had been drafted for international sales and, therefore, does not have any elements in it appropriate for a domestic sale but that would be a surprise to a foreign party in an international sale. It was only the day prior to the close of the diplomatic conference that Art. 95 CISG, permitting a State to declare that it will not be bound by Art. 1(1)(b) CISG was introduced. The delegate of Czechoslovakia pointed 45 46
47
Ibid. Art. III ULIS. The six States that made the Art. III reservation were Gambia, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, San Marino and United Kingdom. Only Belgium, Israel and Italy did not make the reservation. The list of Contracting States indicating the reservations is available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/ implement/i-64ulis.pdf. It is desirable not to contrast the CISG with “domestic law”. In any State that has ratified the CISG it too is domestic law.
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out that both Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic had legislation specifically for international trade. He continued that similar legislation was under preparation in Poland and Romania. “For countries with such a system, the rule in paragraph 1(b) [of Art. 1 CISG] would mean the exclusion of whole areas of the special legislation enacted to govern international trade transactions.”48 He went on to say that the net result of Art. 1(1)(b) CISG would be that countries like Czechoslovakia would be unable to ratify the Convention. The conference accepted the argument and Art. 95 CISG was adopted.49 Although the historical reason for allowing the declaration may have passed, China, Singapore and the United States of America have made the declaration in addition to the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Germany declared that it would not apply Art. 1(1)(b) CISG in respect of any State that had made a declaration that that state would not apply Art. 1(1)(b) CISG. It is not clear the significance of the German declaration. In any case, the increasing number of States that have ratified the CISG means that Art. 1(1)(b) CISG is losing its significance, as is Art. 95 CISG.50
II.
Definition of Goods
Although the CISG applies to sales of goods, there is no definition of what constitutes goods. It is possible to draw the conclusion that stocks, shares, investment securities, negotiable instruments, money and electricity were all thought to be goods, since their sale is expressly excluded from the scope of application of the CISG, as it was from ULIS.51 This suggests that the item need not be in tangible form to be “goods”.52 Any law of sales will have a number of borderline situations where it is not clear whether the sale is of goods or of some other category of asset. A common one not discussed in the CISG is the point at which ore, timber, crops and the like cease being part of the land and become “goods”. However, the CISG does provide the criteria for determining when goods that are 48 49 50 51 52
Official Records, eleventh Plenary Meeting, para. 80. Ibid, para. 93. As of 30 September 2008, 71 States have ratified the Convention. Art. 2 CISG; Art. 5 ULIS. The Secretariat Commentary on the draft Convention states that in some legal systems none of these items would be considered to be “goods”, which might thereby cause discrepancies in the application of the Convention, that in many legal systems the financial instruments are subject to mandatory rules and that the sale of electricity presents special problems. Official Records, Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, prepared by the Secretariat, Art. 2, paras. 7 and 10.
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to be manufactured for the buyer fall within its scope of application. There has been some controversy as to how those criteria are to be applied.53
III. Types of Sales Excluded from the CISG The exclusion of sale of goods by auction and on execution or otherwise by authority of law in Art. 2 CISG were also carried over from ULIS. Neither type of sale was thought to be of commercial significance in international trade and both were governed by special regulatory regimes. The exclusion of sales by auction may no longer seem as obvious as it did when ULIS and the CISG were drafted. Auctions of goods over the internet have become common and some of those sales are both international and from one commercial party to another. Although the CISG specifies that the civil or commercial character of the parties is not to be taken into consideration, as did ULIS, the CISG does not apply to sales of goods bought for personal, family or household use, unless the seller neither knew nor ought to have known that they were bought for any such use. There was no such restriction in ULIS. The reason for providing that the civil or commercial character of the parties is not to be taken into consideration is that the criteria for determining whether a party has a commercial character vary from one country to another, and there is no such categorisation in other countries. The exclusion of sales for personal, family or household use serves as the means of excluding consumer sales from the CISG. The reason for excluding such sales is that many countries have special rules governing consumer sales and it was thought best not to risk conflict between the CISG and those rules.
IV. Validity ULIS excluded from its coverage any question of the validity of the contract or of any of its provisions or of any usage.54 ULF was silent on the matter. In 1973 UNIDROIT sent a letter transmitting the text of a “draft of a law for the unification of certain rules relating to the validity of contracts of international sale of goods” with an accompanying explanatory report.55 It was explained that the purpose of the draft was to fill a gap left in ULIS by the exclusion of matters of validity from it. The matter was referred to the following session 53
54 55
CISG-AC Opinion no. 4, Contracts for the Sale of Goods to Be Manufactured or Produced and Mixed Contracts (Art. 3 CISG), 24 October 2004. Rapporteur: Perales Viscasillas. Available at http://www.cisgac.org. Art. 8 ULIS. Commission Report, sixth session (1973) A/CN.9/9017, paras. 144-148.
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of the Commission at which time the Commission requested the Working Group on the International Sale of Goods “to consider the establishment of uniform rules governing the validity of contact for the international sale of goods, on the basis of the above UNIDROIT draft, in connection with its work on uniform rules governing the formation of contracts for the international sale of goods.”56 The UNIDROIT draft along with a Secretariat report was submitted to the Working Group when it took up the revision of ULF.57 The report suggested that the draft convention to be prepared incorporating the revised ULF should not include any provisions in respect of validity of contracts based on the UNIDROIT draft.58 Four principal arguments were presented in support of this conclusion. First, the problems raised by questions of invalidity were relatively rare events in respect of contracts for the international sale of goods. The likely reason was said to be that such contracts are concluded between merchants who are, at least compared to the average person, relatively sophisticated in matters of contracting. Secondly, “when such events do occur, they can usually be handled as well under non-uniform national law as under any proposed text of uniform law.” The common examples of mistake, fraud or duress that would justify a party to avoid the contract under the UNIDROIT draft would justify that party to avoid the contract under any applicable legal system. Therefore, adoption of a uniform law would not increase the uniformity of result for the parties. Thirdly, it did not appear that any text of uniform law on the subject could increase the unification of result in practice. That is because, as shown by the UNIDROIT draft, the crucial questions must be characterised by the adjudicator. For example, in Art. 11 of the UNIDROIT draft, a party who has been led to conclude a contract by a threat could avoid the contract if the threat had been “unjustifiable, imminent and serious”. Fourthly, some aspects of the law governing the validity of contracts are an important vehicle by which the political, social and economic philosophy of the particular society is made effective in respect of contracts. There was a fifth argument presented that may have been the most important one. Due to the absence of a general consensus on the policies that some aspects of the law of validity of contracts embody, the subject “would appear to be so complex that it would not be feasible for the Working Group to complete its work on the formation of contracts for the international sale of goods ‘in the shortest possible time’ as requested by the Commission (…)”. The Com56 57
58
Commission Report, seventh session, A/CN.9/9617, para. 93. Report of the Secretary-General: formation and validity of contracts for the international sale of goods, A/CN.9/128, annex II. The text of the UNIDROIT draft with Secretariat comments on each article is in Appendix II of the report. Ibid, para. 27.
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mission was under pressure to complete the revision of ULIS and ULF as quickly as possible. It had to demonstrate that it could function as a “legislative” body and not just as a glorified seminar on the law of sales. At the last meeting of the Working Group prior to submitting the revised ULF to the Commission there was a substantial discussion on the question of validity.59 In the end, no provision of the UNIDROIT draft was submitted to the Commission. The Working Group did adopt a provision on good faith: “In the course of the formation of the contract the parties must observe the principles of fair dealing and act in good faith.”60 This text was changed in the Commission to a text that was almost identical to what eventually was adopted as Art. 7(1) CISG. It provides that: “In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith in international trade.”61 The UNIDROIT draft covered the main issues of validity, mistake, fraud and threat. The difficulty is that there are sources of invalidity of a contract, such as bribery, in various legal systems. There are certainly others in various legal systems. Since the CISG leaves issues of validity to non-uniform national law and a finding of invalidity trumps anything in the CISG, a potential source of inconsistency in application of the CISG exists.
D. Interpretation of the CISG ULIS was drafted basically by representatives from Civil Law countries and the text reflected that background. To a significant degree the revision process involved changes in the text to accommodate Common Law conceptions. A major difference between the Civil Law and the Common Law is in the standards of interpretation of the law. Art. 17 ULIS provided: “Questions concerning matters governed by the present Law which are not expressly settled therein shall be settled in conformity with the general principles on which the present Law is based.”
59 60 61
Working Group Report, ninth session, (1977) A/CN.9/142, paras. 48-87. Ibid, annex, Art. 5. Commission Report, eleventh session, (1978) A/33/17, paras. 42-60.
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That is standard methodology for a Civil Law code. The code covers the matters to which it applies in totality. There are no gaps within the scope of application. So too with ULIS. Within its somewhat limited scope of application there were no gaps. All questions could be answered by application of the general principles on which the Law was based. That legal technique is in sharp contrast to the one followed in Common Law countries. The underlying law is the judge-made Common Law. The standard dictum is that statutes in derogation of the Common Law are to be interpreted narrowly. While this dictum has lost much of its force with the large amount of legislation governing many areas of modern life, the basic principle remains. Perhaps the best illustration is found in the section 1-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code in the United States: “Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, and other validating or invalidating cause supplement its provisions.”62 It is not really accurate to say that there are gaps in the Uniform Commercial Code, or similar statutes in Common Law countries generally, though gaps certainly exist in many statutes. It is more accurate to say that the general principles of law that affect the interpretation and application of all statutes are found outside of the statutory law itself. The Working Group at its second session recommended that the text of Art. 17 ULIS should be deleted. It had been criticised in the Working Group as “vague and illusory, since the Law did not specify or indicate the general principles on which it was based; such a reference would lead to uncertainty and possibly to a Court’s use of its own national rules on the assumption that these were the general principles underlying the Uniform Law.”63 In its place it was recommended that what is largely the text of Art. 7(1) CISG should be substituted for it. There was also a suggestion that the revised ULIS should include a provision that “Private international law shall apply to questions not settled by the Uniform Law.”64 However, the Working Group thought that questions of principle had been raised that should be decided by the Commission. When the Commission received the report of the Working Group it discussed the matter at length, but then concluded that it was not practicable 62
63 64
There was a realignment of provisions in the 2001 official version of Art. 1. The quoted language is now found in section 1-103(b). The revised text has been adopted in four of the fifty states. Working Group Report, second session, (1970) A/CN.9/52, para. 129. Ibid, para. 133.
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to reach a decision at the intermediate stage of the revision of ULIS. It could consider the matter more readily when a text proposed by the Working Group was reviewed as a whole.65 The question of the interpretation of the revised ULIS never was discussed in UNCITRAL. When the Working Group was ready to submit a complete revision of ULIS (by now called a Convention) to the Commission in 1975, any provision on interpretation of the Convention had been left out.66 Its status as a pending question was noted in a report by the Secretariat.67 Nothing more was heard about the issue until the diplomatic conference. There were several proposals for a new provision on interpretation. The proposal that was adopted and what is now Art. 7(2) CISG was made orally by the German Democratic Republic and adopted in the First Committee by the narrow margin of 17 votes in favour, 14 against with 11 abstentions.68 In the Plenary the two paragraphs of Art. 7 CISG were adopted without dissent. The Italian delegate stated that the Article was particularly important for the Convention as a whole because uniform interpretation of the Convention was to be sought by all those called on to apply it. He hoped that above all the first portion of para. (2) would help such an interpretation in practice.69 It can be hoped that the Italian delegate is correct. However, the difficulty remains that jurists in some legal systems are trained to find general principles in a legislative text while jurists in other legal systems are not so trained and the latter group can rely on the second portion of Art. 7(2) CISG to justify the absence of a general principle governing the issue in question.
E. In Conclusion, Is Uniform Interpretation Possible? With all of the difficulties that have been presented in this paper, and the many others that have not been mentioned, is a uniform interpretation of the CISG a reasonable goal? If by uniformity one means a single interpretation of every provision, even the most passionate supporters of the CISG would have to admit that it would be unrealisable. It is difficult enough to secure uniform interpretation of the law in national legal systems. It is un65 66
67
68 69
Commission Report, fourth session (1971) A/CN.9/8417, paras. 81-91. Revised text of the Convention on the International Sale of Goods as approved or deferred for further consideration by the Working Group on the International Sale of Goods at its first six sessions, A/CN.9/100, annex I. Report of the Secretary-General; pending questions with respect to the revised text of a uniform law on the international sale of goods, A/CN.9/100, annex III. Official Records, Report of the First Committee, Art. 6, para. 5. Official Records, Summary Records, sixth Plenary Meeting, para. 44.
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thinkable in a world where the text exists in multiple languages, where it has not always been transposed into the domestic legal systems with faithful adherence to the official texts, where the practitioners have sometimes radically different education in the law and approach legal questions with different preconceptions and, most importantly, where there is no court of final appeal that can give a uniform interpretation to all parties. If uniformity of interpretation can be understood as being something less complete, extraordinary strides have been made. The drafters of the CISG helped by including Art. 7(1) CISG in the text. When a State ratifies the Convention the political authorities have given an instruction to its courts as well as to practitioners and academics that in the interpretation of the Convention regard is to be had among other things to the need to promote uniformity in its application. I emphasise the word “need”. By itself this provision will not bring about uniform interpretation, but it is a strong statement and it will have some impact. Since there is no court that can give a uniform interpretation to controversial provisions, other methods to increase the likelihood of uniform interpretation have been developed. UNCITRAL has led the way. As early as 1983 UNCITRAL expressed its desire that some method be devised whereby court and arbitral decisions interpreting the texts prepared by the Commission could be widely disseminated.70 That finally resulted in the CLOUT (Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts) system being instituted. In the CLOUT system abstracts of court and arbitral decisions are published in all six languages of the Commission. The availability of CLOUT abstracts has been considerably enhanced in recent years by their publication on the Internet as well as United Nations printed documents. On the basis of the CLOUT abstracts a Digest of opinions has been prepared under the auspices of the UNCITRAL Secretariat. It too is available on the UNCITRAL website.71 Although some concern has been expressed that the Digest reports interpretations of the CISG that would hopefully not be followed by other courts, the availability of CLOUT and the Digest in six languages and from anywhere in the world reduces the argument that the decisions of courts in other countries are not available. Important non-official efforts to bring about uniform interpretation of the CISG would include the CISG-Advisory Council, an organisation of CISG scholars who have undertaken to prepare interpretations of provisions in the CISG that are subject to different interpretations or that reflect new developments in commerce or communications.72 A resource of immense importance is the data base on the CISG maintained at the Pace University 70 71 72
Commission Report, sixteenth session, (1983) A/38/17, para. 137. http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/case_law/digests/cisg.html. The official website is http://www.cisgac.org. The opinions issued to date can be found on a number of data bases.
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Institute of International Commercial Law.73 The website includes links to the members of the Autonomous Network of CISG Websites where material on the CISG is maintained in the languages of the country concerned. The resources cited above provide the raw materials for uniform interpretation of the CISG. However, those raw materials must often be interpreted themselves to make them understood by the courts and practitioners. That is largely the task of the scholarly community. The Pace data base contains a bibliography of over 8,000 books and articles that have been written about the CISG and contains over 1,100 full texts. Most are in English, but many are in other languages. It is somewhat symbolic that the first full text item listed is a doctoral thesis at Cairo University written in Arabic.74 The CISG will not receive 100 percent uniform interpretation. That is not to be expected. Moreover, it is not a perfect text. Few, if any, legal texts reach that standard. It will be revised at some date, probably in the relatively distant future, although it is difficult to revise a convention that has received a large number of ratifications. Nevertheless, the CISG has been an outstanding success, which is shown by the large number of ratifications, the extent of scholarly interest, and the surprisingly high degree of consistent (I dare not say “uniform”) interpretation. 73 74
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu. El Hamid, The Avoidance of the Contract for International Sale of Goods according to the Vienna Convention 1980, doctoral thesis Cairo University, 2nd ed., Cairo 2001. Available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/bib2.html.
Tracing Methodology in the CISG: Dogmatic Foundations Ulrich Magnus
A. Introduction I understand the subject as meaning the method how the CISG is, and should be, interpreted and applied. Every judge, arbitrator, writer or practitioner dealing with a CISG issue has – directly or indirectly – to take a stance on how to understand the CISG provision relevant for the issue at hand. For this purpose of interpretation he or she will – sometimes consciously, sometimes subconsciously – follow a certain method. Being aware of national differences in the method of interpretation of legal texts the drafters of the CISG tried to provide for a specific method of interpretation of the CISG. The various aspects of this method are examined in detail in the contributions assembled in this book. The present paper intends to give a general outline of this method and its dogmatic background and also of the interplay of the different aspects. Tracing methodology in the CISG can be exclusively understood to mean the method of interpreting and applying the CISG in judicial practice and international doctrine. Tracing methodology in the CISG could, however, also be understood in an entirely different sense since there are many other methodological aspects of the CISG that could be traced as well: for instance, the method as to how the CISG as one if not the leading international convention on private law was developed and how the comparative method was used for its preparation; the method as to how the CISG is, and should be, used for legislative purposes; whether and how the CISG could and should be used for the interpretation of national law that was modelled after the CISG etc. So interesting as they are these methodological aspects will be left aside. The paper begins with some general remarks on the function and purpose of the interpretation of international unifying conventions; it then tries to answer some delicate and less frequently raised questions of the interpretation and application of the CISG and finally discusses foundations of the method of interpretation of the CISG.
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B. Function and Purpose of Interpretation of International Conventions Lawyers rely and depend on words: they are their instruments. Words and phrases can be, and often are, ambivalent: their meaning must be fixed by interpretation. According to a common understanding interpretation is “the process of ascertaining the meaning of a written document.”1 It serves the aim to reveal the sense of words and phrases. This function of interpretation, familiar in national law, applies also to the text of the CISG without any restriction. An additional aim of interpretation is often to adapt the meaning of a legal text to changed circumstances, the more so the longer the time period between the creation of the text and the need to apply the text. This latter aim has particular weight for international conventions that in general can be less easily amended than national law (though the CISG with its predecessor ULIS/ULF2 is a counter-example).3 It should, however, be noted that these general aims of interpretation do not necessarily entail a certain – for instance more subjective or more objective – method of interpretation. Interpretation with respect to international conventions, in particular to those that, like the CISG, try to unify substantive law pursues a further central aim: the uniform application of these instruments. Their interpretation has to support the unification purpose that is the core issue of unifying conventions. As has been often observed uniform law texts alone do not necessarily produce uniform law.4 The danger of divergent interpretations influenced by the respective national background of the seized court is only too real.5 To achieve the ideal of virtual unification as closely as possible – to
1 2 3
4
5
Earl Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law, vol. I, 2nd ed., London 1977, 430. The Hague Uniform Sales Conventions of 1964. It lasted only sixteen years to amend the Hague Uniform Sales Law and convert it into the Vienna Sales Convention. Witz, L’interprétation de la CVIM: Divergences dans l’interprétation de la Convention de Vienne, in: Ferrari (ed.), The 1980 Uniform Sales Law. Old Issues Revisited in the Light of Recent Experiences, Munich 2003, 279 et seq. For examples of divergences in the interpretation of the CISG see Witz (op. cit. fn. 4), 285 et seq.; further Andersen, The Uniformity of the CISG and Its Jurisconsultorium: An Analysis of the Terms and a Closer Look at Examination and Notification, The Hague 2006, particularly 179 et seq.; de Lukowicz, Divergenzen in der Rechtsprechung zum CISG. Auf dem Weg zu einer einheitlichen Auslegung und Anwendung?, Bern 2001, 54 et seq.; Graffi, Divergences in the Interpretation of the CISG: The Concept of “Fundamental Breach“, in: Ferrari (ed.), The 1980 Uniform Sales Law. Old Issues Revisited in the Light of Recent Experiences, Munich 2003, 305 et seq.
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request complete uniformity is anyway “to cry for the moon”6 – also requires the uniform application and thus the uniform interpretation of the uniform text. In turn, a uniform method of interpretation of international uniform law conventions is needed. However, also methodological considerations on interpretation of uniform law conventions have to bear in mind that unification of law and uniformity of its application is no purpose in itself. Unification in particular of sales law serves the aim to facilitate trade relations between parties from different states, to reduce the costs of those transactions and finally even to contribute to peace between nations (“if goods do not cross borders soldiers will”).7 The interpretation of the CISG has also to strive for these aims. A uniform method of interpretation that recognises these aims is therefore essential for uniform application of the CISG. However, even if such a method would be applied certain impediments could nonetheless frustrate all efforts to achieve maximum uniformity in the application of the CISG. This would be a “political” interpretation of the CISG and a strikingly different quality of judgments rendered in different countries. These two questions shall be discussed next.
C. Political Interpretation of the CISG? A rather delicate and rarely addressed aspect of the interpretation of uniform laws is the “political” interpretation of the respective instrument. By political interpretation I mean that state courts in their judgments on international relations systematically favour their own citizens. This can be achieved by unfair procedural means in court proceedings, which is however a matter outside the scope of this paper. But such discrimination can also be achieved by the interpretation and application of the international law instrument itself. Is there anything of this kind in relation to the CISG? In international sales cases it would be rather easy to prefer the home industry by court decisions. The courts of a country could easily reject claims by foreign claimants against home defendants and grant claims by home claimants against foreign defendants in a systematic way. It is not necessary that this is done openly. It is entirely sufficient and possible to do it in a hidden way via the interpretation of the vague and flexible terms of the respective law. Sales law – and in particular the CISG – contains so many vague and flexible terms that their systematic interpretation in favour of the 6
7
Lord Wilberforce in Photo Production Ltd. v. Securicor, Transport, Ltd. [1980] 1 All E.R. 556 (562) (H.L.) (“To plead for complete uniformity may be to cry for the moon.”). Ascribed to Bastiat (a 19th century economist). The Preamble to the CISG expresses in other words the same idea.
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home industry would pose no real difficulty. If, for instance, the foreign party is the seller who claims payment for delivered goods the standard defence is the non-conformity of the goods because they were not fit for their normal purpose. The “normal purpose” leaves a rather broad discretion for interpretation that could be systematically exercised against foreign sellers and in favour of home sellers. Another example: if the foreign party is the buyer who complains of the non-conformity of the delivered goods it is also easy to deny the buyer’s claim for termination or price reduction if there is a requirement – such as in Art. 39 CISG – to give notice within a reasonable period of time. This notice requirement and its exceptions in Art. 40 and Art. 44 CISG could again be easily used to systematically reject claims of foreign buyers as delayed either by applying different time standards or by preferring home parties with respect to the exceptions. Or, a final example: damages are only recoverable if the test of foreseeability is met (Art. 74 CISG). Courts could rather easily apply this test always and systematically in favour of the home party since the result of this test depends on the circumstances of the case. In a globalised world where, despite all efforts to establish a global system of free trade, countries compete strongly with each other for economic wealth, there is an essential interest and temptation for states to protect their own industry. It would be by no means surprising if the judiciary also behaved in the same way and discriminated against foreigners. On the other hand, such behaviour would clearly offend most fundamental objectives of justice like equal treatment of equal cases and neutrality of decision. Whether courts of CISG countries discriminate in the way outlined above has not yet been the subject of systematic research. However, having collected, reviewed and commented on international CISG cases for almost two decades it is my impression that no such tendency is systematically pursued in any of the CISG Member States. A little more objective, though by no means representative test of the “political” attitude of courts concerning the CISG confirms this personal impression. If one takes the last twenty CLOUT8 cases relating to the CISG9 in theory at least ten foreign parties and ten home parties should have won their case had the courts decided in a neutral, impartial manner. In fact, the outcome of this little test showed an almost equal number of foreign and home parties who won their case.10 18
19 10
CLOUT = Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts (case collection run by UNCITRAL). CLOUT has established a network of National Correspondents who constantly prepare English abstracts of CISG decisions of their country for the collection which is freely accessible under: www.uncitral.org. See CLOUT cases no. 729-734, 746-753, 770-777. These cases comprise decisions from Austria, China, Germany, Mexico, Spain and the United States. Even in theory a full balance between winners and losers is unlikely. In international cases there might be a tendency that claimants institute proceedings only if
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Thus, the trust in a generally neutral interpretation of the CISG by whatever court appears not to be ill-founded even though a homeward trend can sometimes be observed to fall back on national law or national legal thinking when unsettled questions of the CISG have to be decided.11 In fact, the trust in court decisions that apply the CISG free from political implications is an indispensable ingredient for an effective unification of sales law on a global level because the unification of the legal text of the CISG alone cannot guarantee its fair, let alone, uniform application. If courts behaved systematically in an unfair way this necessary basis would be destroyed.
D. Quality of the Decisions on the CISG Another delicate subject is the quality of the judgments on the CISG. Quality in this context means nothing more nor less than the correct application of the provisions of the applicable law to the facts at hand, at least of those provisions whose application do not require a great deal of interpretation. Again, a survey on the general quality of judgments in such a large number of countries like the 71 CISG Member States is entirely outside the scope of this paper. But if one concentrates on the application of the CISG and the question of whether its text has been generally correctly understood and applied insofar as the text leaves no great room for interpretation again, an impression based on experience can be formulated from which a tendency can be inferred. This impression and experience relies on the UNCITRAL Digest,12 which collects and reports the respective case law of almost all CISG States for every CISG provision. The tendency that can be inferred from the Di-
11 12
the prospects to win are rather high due to the difficulties that the involvement of a foreign party entail, from jurisdiction and service problems over language and evidence problems to problems with the recognition and enforcement of the judgment in a foreign country. See thereto Ferrari in this book. The Digest is accessible on the internet under: www.uncitral.org/english/clout/ digest_cisg_e.htm. A Draft of the Digest has been published in: Ferrari/ Flechtner/Brand (eds.), The Draft UNCITRAL Digest and Beyond: Cases, Analysis and Unresolved Issues in the U.N. Sales Convention, Munich 2004, 501 et seq. As to the Digest see Bazinas, Uniformity in the Interpretation and the Application of the CISG: The Role of CLOUT and the Digest, in: UNCITRAL/SIAC (eds.), Celebrating Success; 25 Years United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 25 Journal of Law and Commerce (2005/06), 18 et seq., 23 et seq.
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gest shows that misunderstandings and incorrect applications of clear and unambiguous CISG provisions are a rare exception.13 Moreover, the Digest reveals that with respect to disputed questions of interpretation there is almost always a prevailing view followed generally by a clear, often the vast majority of courts.14 Though it cannot be denied that there are also divergences in interpretation of the CISG15 taken together they are rather few, in particular if it is sufficiently taken into account that no central CISG court exists. Despite this lack of a central court competent for CISG matters it is therefore surprising – as well as satisfying – that under an overall perspective a rather far-reaching, self-induced uniformity of application of the CISG of reasonable quality has been achieved. This result has been supported by a number of helpful factors: the rather clear wording and structure of the CISG itself; the UNCITRAL Digest; the CLOUT collection (in English) and national collections of CISG cases, in particular the CISG databank of the Pace University;16 the opinions of the CISG Advisory Council;17 the many national publications on the CISG in each CISG Member State18 and a global network among CISG researchers19 – all these factors add to the result of a relatively high quality of CISG judgments as far as the correct application of the CISG provisions is concerned. Some of the mentioned fac13
14
15 16 17
18
19
But see on some examples of misapplication of CISG provisions Garro, Some Misunderstandings about the U.N. Sales Convention in Latin America, in: Ferrari (ed.), Quo Vadis CISG? Celebrating the 25th Anniversary of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Munich 2005, 113 et seq. The most prominent example is the gap that Art. 78 CISG leaves, namely the rate of interest. The overwhelming majority of courts fill the gap by redress to the applicable national law that must be determined according to the rules of private international law. Nonetheless, there are deviating decisions that follow various different paths. However, these are few or even single decisions; see Draft Digest (op. cit. fn. 12), 810 et seq. See for references supra fn. 5. Use www.cisg3.law.pace.edu/cases.html. The Advisory Council is a (private) group of CISG experts of different countries. The Advisory Council publishes opinions on important and disputed CISG provisions; thus far seven Opinions have been published in Internationales Handelsrecht (IHR) 2003, 244 (Opinion no. 1); IHR 2004, 163 (Opinion no. 2); IHR 2005, 81 (Opinion no. 3); IHR 2005, 124 (Opinion no. 4); IHR 2006, 35 (Opinion no. 5); IHR 2007, 250 (Opinion no. 6); IHR 2008, 122 (Opinion no. 7). Again UNCITRAL provides a comprehensive bibliography on scholarly writings on the CISG. Established not only but mainly by UNCITRAL’s net of national correspondents who report CISG cases to CLOUT.
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tors – the Digest, CLOUT, the network, the Advisory Council – are unique for international private law conventions. On the one hand, they evidence the weight that a globally correct, convincing and uniform application of the CISG is given. On the other hand, they demonstrate the great efforts that are necessary to achieve this result when a central court is lacking. However, in order to avoid any false impression there is still room, and sometimes ample room, for qualitative improvements. They concern in particular a much more advanced use of foreign case law and foreign legal doctrine.
E. Foundations of the Method of Interpretation I.
Sources
When concerned with a problem of interpretation of an international convention such as the CISG, one has to look first for specific interpretationprovisions within the Convention itself. If they – like Art. 7 CISG – do not offer too much help one has to seek help elsewhere. It is questionable whether further international instruments such as the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 can be taken into account. As a further and final step an independent method of interpretation must be developed as to how the CISG and similar conventions have to be interpreted.
II.
CISG’s Interpretation Provision
1.
Aims Instead of a Method of Interpretation
Art. 7(1) CISG requires that in the interpretation of the Convention “regard is to be had to its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith in international trade.” While para. 1 addresses the interpretation issue para. 2 of the provision provides for a mechanism to fill gaps in the Convention. The latter contains the famous reference to general principles, namely that “questions concerning matters governed by this Convention that are not expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general principles on which it is based.” Only where no such principles exist do the traditional conflict rules determine the applicable national law. However, the border between para. 1 and 2 of Art. 7 cannot always precisely be drawn. It may fluctuate so that both paragraphs can influence each other.
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Taken seriously Art. 7(1) CISG formulates aims rather than a precise method of interpretation.20 The precise method as to how these aims are to be achieved remains mainly open or has been presupposed by the drafters of the CISG. Therefore, the details of a uniform method of interpretation need to be developed under the CISG. This method will be discussed at a later stage. First, these aims that serve as guidelines for the interpretation of the CISG shall be examined.
2.
The CISG’s International Character
To take account of the CISG’s international character requires the decider to disregard his or her own national perspective when interpreting the Convention. Legal terms or constructions known to, and familiar in, national law must be generally left aside. Nor can CISG decisions be based on purely internal case law. The CISG constitutes its own legal cosmos that must be generally understood in itself without redress to a specific national law. This is often addressed as the autonomous interpretation of uniform law instruments.21 Only where the CISG itself expressly refers to national law as, for example, in Art. 1(1)(b) CISG is it self-explanatory that national law has to be applied. Similar considerations apply where a legal term or institute of the CISG has been evidently borrowed from a certain national law – as for instance the “Nachfrist” concept of Art. 49(1)(b) and Art. 64(1)(b) CISG from German law,22 the concept of foreseeability in Art. 74 CISG from English law23 or the period of grace in Art. 45(3) and Art. 61(3) CISG from
20
21
22
23
Ferrari, in: Schlechtriem/Schwenzer (eds.), Kommentar zum Einheitlichen UNKaufrecht – CISG –, 4th ed., Munich 2004, Art. 7 no. 8; Huber/Mullis, The CISG. A new textbook for students and practitioners, Munich 2007, 9 (“guidelines”); Magnus, in: Staudinger Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch mit Einführungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen. Wiener UN-Kaufrecht (CISG), Berlin 2005, Art. 7 no. 30. Ferrari (op. cit. fn. 12), 140 et seq.; Ferrari (op. cit. fn. 20), Art. 7 no. 9 et seq.; Komarov, Internationality, Uniformity and Observance of Good Faith as Criteria in Interpretation of CISG: Some Remarks on Article 7(1), 25 J. L. & Com. (2005/06), 75, 78; Magnus (op. cit. fn. 20), Art. 7 no. 12 et seq.; Westermann, in: Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, vol. 3, 4th ed., Munich 2004, Art. 7 no. 1. § 326(1) former German Civil Code (BGB); since the reform of 2002 now § 323(1) BGB. Art. 74 CISG was greatly influenced by the English leading case Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 54 Ex. 341.
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French law.24 That national law may then help to understand the meaning and function of the CISG term or provision.
3.
The Duty to Promote Uniformity
The need to promote uniformity obliges that notice be taken of the interpretation rendered by courts and legal doctrine from other Contracting States. By ratifying a unifying convention such as the CISG, the state accepts and undertakes the – legal – duty that its courts will take into account decisions of courts of other countries in order to reach a uniform application of the Convention. It would be a violation of this duty if the courts systematically neglected CISG decisions from other countries.25 It is no argument that decisions from other countries are not always easily accessible and are often not understood because of the language. The freely accessible CLOUT system or other CISG databanks enable each court to take notice – at least by means of an abstract in English – of the relevant CISG decisions in other countries.26 It is also no argument against heeding foreign decisions that the courts are bound by the rule of law and must apply national law and statute and are only allowed to follow national precedents and may be formally bound by them as in Common Law jurisdictions. The CISG itself is binding national law and orders that uniformity of its application be reached. That can only be achieved when the application of the CISG in other countries is observed, considered and followed where no good reasons request the contrary. Thus, national law of CISG Member States does not only not forbid heeding foreign decisions; on the contrary, it obliges the national courts to do so. Moreover, national law is entirely free to oblige the national courts to take foreign decisions into account. This is nothing unusual. The rules of private international law very often oblige courts to apply strictly, without any discretion, rules that follow from foreign court decisions (in particular when the law of Common Law jurisdictions must be applied as governing law).
24 25
26
See Art. 1184(3) and Art. 1244-1 code civil. Yet, this is still the rule rather than the exception: Flechtner, The CISG in U.S. Courts: The Evolution (and Devolution) of the Methodology of Interpretation, in: Ferrari (ed.), Quo Vadis CISG? Celebrating the 25th Anniversary of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Munich 2005, 91 et seq. (with respect to US decisions); Müller/Togo, Die Berücksichtigung der Überzeugungskraft ausländischer Präzedenzfälle bei der Auslegung des CISG, IHR 2005, 102 et seq. (however, with positive Italian, US-American and German exceptions). See thereto Ferrari (op. cit. fn. 12), 144 et seq. with references to databanks etc.
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The duty to promote uniformity does, however, not override any existing national hierarchy of court decisions. The duty obliges for notice to be taken of foreign decisions; that means that judges have to examine whether relevant foreign case law exists, and if so, have to consider it. By no means are they formally obliged to follow it.27 Foreign decisions are not strictly binding precedents – although this has been already suggested.28 But as yet no clear system exists, and none is in sight, that decides which foreign decisions should be regarded as binding (even of lower courts? Even of Non-CISG Member States? Coordination with the internal hierarchy of courts?).29 Foreign decisions can therefore only be granted persuasive authority.30 But such authority they do have. They should be followed where reasoning and result are convincing. But where there are good reasons to decide otherwise then each court is entirely free to so decide.
4.
The Good Faith Principle
The observance of good faith in international trade establishes a rather general commandment to apply the Convention in a fair and reasonable way.31 The good faith principle is particularly vague and therefore open to differing 27 28
29
30
31
Also Westermann (op. cit. fn. 25), Art. 7 no. 1. See for instance Bonell, in: Bianca/Bonell (eds.), Commentary on the International Sales Law. The 1980 Vienna Sales Convention, Milan 1987, Art. 7 no. 3.1.3 (“a sort of binding precedent”); DiMatteo, An International Contract Law Formula: The Informality of International Business Transactions Plus the Internationalization of Contract Law Equals Unexpected Contractual Liability, 23 Syracuse J, Int. L. & Com. (1997), 61, 79 (“supranational stare decisis”). To these problems Ferrari (op. cit. fn. 12), 148 et seq.; De Ly, Uniform Interpretation: What is Being Done? Official Efforts, in: Ferrari (ed.), The 1980 Uniform Sales Law. Old Issues Revisited in the Light of Recent Experiences. Verona Conference 2003, Munich 2003, 335, 338 et seq. See Bell, Uniformity through Persuasive International Authorities – Does Stare Decisis really Hinder the Uniform Interpretation of the CISG?, in: Andersen/Schroeter (eds.), Festschrift Kritzer, London 2008, 35 et seq.; Ferrari (op. cit. fn. 12), 150; Müller/Togo (op. cit. fn. 25), IHR 2005, 102 et seq.; Schlechtriem, Internationales UN-Kaufrecht, 4th ed., Tübingen 2007, no. 43. It can be left aside here whether the good faith principle also applies to the contract and conduct of the parties to an international sales transaction. The good faith interpretation of the CISG has at least indirect repercussions on the parties’ contract and conduct and thus also influences the latter; compare further Farnsworth, Duties of Good Faith and Fair Dealing under the UNIDROIT Principles, Relevant International Conventions, and National Laws, 3 Tul. J. Int. and Comp. L. (1995), 56 et seq.
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interpretations and applications, all the more so as Common Law jurisdictions and Civil Law jurisdictions understand and use the principle in rather different ways in their internal law.32 The introduction of the principle into the CISG was therefore controversially discussed.33 It appears to be common ground under the CISG that the good faith principle of Art. 7(1) CISG does not operate as a general corrective tool that allows each decision reached by the ordinary application of the CISG provisions to be overturned.34 Its role is much more limited. It is the commandment to interpret the provisions of the CISG in a way that their application leads to reasonable and fair solutions. The standard of fairness is not a domestic one but that used in international trade. Moreover, it must be the standard applicable to the specific profession involved in the dispute, for instance in the international car, steel or computer trade. Finally, the principle needs specification through case law and legal doctrine. Insofar the general principles addressed in Art. 7(2) CISG – most of which follow from provisions of the CISG – can fill the good faith principle with more precise content.35 A case example evidences best how the good faith principle is, and should be, applied in practice: the case36 concerned the incorporation of standard contract terms into a German-Spanish sales contract. The German seller sold a rolling-milling machine under his own general contract terms but did not transmit those terms to the buyer. Afterwards he wanted to invoke the terms. The German Federal Court decided that the incorporation of standard terms into a contract is regulated by Art. 8 CISG. The good faith principle of Art. 7 CISG requires an interpretation of that article that the user of standard terms who wants to incorporate them into a contract must regularly37 transmit their text to the other party. It would offend the 32
33
34 35
36
37
Compare in particular Whittaker/Zimmermann (eds.), Good Faith in European Contract Law, Cambridge 2000. The legislative history of the good faith principle is extensively set out by Bonell (op. cit. fn. 28), Art. 7 no. 1.5 et seq. See Huber, Some introductory remarks on the CISG, IHR 2006, 228 et seq., 229. In this sense for instance Lookofsky, Understanding the CISG, 3rd ed., The Hague 2008, 37; Magnus, Comparative editorial remarks on the provisions regarding good faith in CISG Article 7(1) and the UNIDROIT Principles Article 1.7, in: Felemegas (ed.), An International Approach to the Interpretation of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1980) as Uniform Sales Law, Cambridge 2007, 45 et seq.; Schlechtriem (op. cit. fn. 30), no. 44. Bundesgerichtshof (BGH), 31 October 2001, IHR 2002, 14, 16 or under http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/011031g1.html. The decision does not exclude certain exceptions where the transmission might be unnecessary, for instance if in a certain branch the contents of the regularly
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good faith principle in international trade if the other party would be obliged to inquire the contents of terms not transmitted.38 The Court used the good faith principle for the interpretation of a CISG provision whose text did not provide an answer to the problem raised. The solution that the party who benefits from the use of standard contract terms must not only refer to them but must in principle send them to the other party appears not to be unreasonable in international trade.39
5.
The CISG’s Gap-filling Mechanism
A wide understanding of interpretation also comprises the question of how gaps in a legal text have to be filled. Generally, the analogous application of existing provisions is the tool used to fill unintended gaps in a codifying regulation. Art. 7(2) CISG goes a step further and refers in that respect to the underlying general principles of the CISG. The provision prescribes, however, a refined gap-filling approach. First, an “internal gap” of the Convention must be discerned. The CISG must govern the issue but unintentionally not settle it, for instance the question in which currency the price has to be paid if neither the parties have agreed thereon nor usages or the circumstances allow it to be fixed, or whether electronic communication constitutes “writing” in the sense of Art. 13 CISG etc. Second, if such an internal gap exists then CISG’s underlying general principles shall provide the answer. For this purpose these principles have to be discovered. In all other cases – of an “external gap” or of lack of a general principle – the rules of private international law step in and determine the applicable national law.
38
39
used terms are well known to all those trading in that branch or if the recipient already knows the contents of the terms. See thereto recently Magnus, Incorporation of Standard Contract Terms under the CISG, in: Andersen/Schroeter (eds.), Festschrift Kritzer, London 2008, 303 et seq. The Court based its decision in addition also on the parties’ duty to cooperate and inform the other side. This duty also obliges to transmit terms upon which a party wants to rely. For rather harsh criticism of the decision see Berger, Die Einbeziehung von AGB in internationale Kaufverträge, in: Berger et al. (eds.), Festschrift Horn, Berlin 2006, 3 et seq.; Kindler, Ob Walzfräsmaschine oder Schreibtischsessel: Keine Obliegenheit zur AGB-Übersendung beim Vertragsschluss nach CISG!, in: Adolff et al. (eds.), Festschrift Heldrich, Munich 2005, 225 et seq.; Schmidt-Kessel, Einbeziehung von Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen unter UN-Kaufrecht, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 2002, 3444 et seq. The main criticism is the impracticability for the user if s/he is obliged to transmit the text of the standard terms to the other party.
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The outlined mechanism might appear as too difficult and might also lead to unnecessary uncertainty since many of CISG’s underlying general principles are the object of some controversy.40 Yet, the approach of Art. 7(2) CISG has the advantage to strengthen the unifying effect of the Convention. First, the micro cosmos of the CISG has to be fully exploited before private international law leads back to separated national law. Again, as in the case of the good faith principle, Art. 7(2) CISG grants no permission to freely invent discretionary general principles. Only existing general principles that lie on the ground of the CISG like pebbles on the ground of a clear brook can be resorted to. As yet CISG case law has recognised and consolidated a number of general principles such as party autonomy.41 A hotly debated question is whether Art. 7(2) CISG or the CISG at all allows also resort to be made to general principles outside the Convention, in particular to sets of principles such as the UNIDROIT Principles or the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL or Lando Principles). The prevailing view allows such resort to be made although it is open whether as general principles within Art. 7(2) CISG42 or as an interpretation aid under Art. 7(1) CISG.43 In my view the Principles can be used both as an aid to 40
41
42
43
For a collection of general principles thus far recognised by case law see Draft Digest (op. cit. fn. 12), 538 et seq.; Ferrari (op. cit. fn. 20), 160 et seq.; Magnus, Die allgemeinen Grundsätze im UN-Kaufrecht, 59 Rabels Zeitschrift (RabelsZ) (1995), 469 et seq. See e.g., Tribunale di Rimini, 26 November 2002, Giur. It. 2003, 896 with note Ferrari or under http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/021126i3.html; Hof Beroep Ghent, 15 May 2002, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020515b1.html; Landgericht Stendal, 12 October 2000, IHR 2001, 32 or under http://cisgw3.law.pace. edu/cases/001012g1.html. For further general principles see the references in the preceding footnote. Against that possibility: Saenger, in: Bamberger/Roth (eds.), Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, vol. 1, 2nd ed., Munich 2007, Art. 7 no. 7; Westermann (op. cit. fn. 21), Art. 7 no. 10. Boele-Woelki, Terms of Co-existence: The CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles, in: Šarčevič/Volken (eds.), The International Sale of Goods, The Hague 2001, 203 et seq.; Bonell, The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and the Vienna Sales Convention – Alternatives or Complementary Instruments?, 1 Uniform Law Review (ULR) (1996), 34 et seq.; Burkart, Interpretatives Zusammenwirken von CISG und UNIDROIT Principles, Baden-Baden 2000, 249; Ferrari (op. cit. fn. 20), Art. 7 no. 59 et seq.; Garro, The Gap-Filling Role of the UNIDROIT Principles in International Sales Law, 69 Tulane L. Rev. (1995), 1149 et seq.; Magnus, Die UNIDROIT Principles und die Wiener Kaufrechtskonvention, in: Cashin Ritaine/Lein (eds.), The UNIDROIT Principles 2004. Their Impact on Contractual Practice, Jurisprudence and Codification, Zurich 2007, 57, 63; Magnus (op. cit. fn. 20), Einl zum CISG no. 50 et seq. and Art.
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interpretation and even as general principles although they did not exist at the time when the CISG was drafted. In a strict sense they therefore could not underlie the CISG. Indeed, it was in turn the UNIDROIT Principles and the PECL that were mainly modelled after the CISG. The CISG underlies them. However, a dynamic understanding of the CISG’s underlying general principles should be adopted. As far as general principles underwent a development and as far as this is expressed and evidenced by the UNIDROIT and the PECL, this development should also be taken account of for the interpretation of the CISG. Otherwise the CISG would be frozen in the state of its conclusion and would partly lose its ability to be adapted to changing times and needs.
III. The Vienna Treaties Convention 1.
The General Relationship between the Vienna Treaties Convention and Uniform Law Conventions
In general, the interpretation of international treaties is regulated by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969. This Convention is binding at least for those states that have ratified it.44 It provides in its Art. 31-33 expressly for certain rules on the interpretation of international treaties. It has, however, been questioned whether these rules can be applied to the interpretation of conventions such as the CISG. The reason for doubts is the fact that the Treaties Convention is directed towards states. It regulates how states have to conclude, interpret and apply international treaties concerning international relations between them; the Treaties Convention thus primarily concerns so-called contract treaties by which states conclude treaties between themselves.45 The CISG – as a law-making treaty – is, on the contrary, designed for the application between civil persons; the substantive CISG provisions are directed towards the parties of interna-
44
45
7 no. 14; Perales Viscasillas, UNIDROIT Principles for International Commercial Contracts: Sphere of Application and General Provisions, 13 Arizona J. of Int. and Comp. Law (1996), 383, 440 et seq.; Schlechtriem (op. cit. fn. 30), no. 44 (but very reluctant at no. 52 fn. 140); reluctant or contra for instance Herber, “Lex mercatoria” und “Principles” – gefährliche Irrlichter im internationalen Kaufrecht, IHR 2003, 1 et seq.; Michaels, Privatautonomie und Privatkodifikation. Zu Anwendbarkeit und Geltung allgemeiner Vertragsrechtsprinzipien, 62 RabelsZ (1998), 606. Generally on this Convention, see Sinclair (MacTaggart), The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 2nd ed., Manchester 1984. See in particular the Preamble to the Treaties Convention.
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tional (sales) transactions. It has therefore been advocated that Art. 31-33 Vienna Treaty Convention can only, if at all,46 be applied to Art. 89-101 CISG (the diplomatic final provisions of the CISG that are in fact directed towards the Member States of the CISG).47 However, according to the prevailing and preferable view, the interpretation rules of the Treaties Convention can nonetheless be resorted to for the interpretation of conventions such as the CISG.48 In addition, it does not matter whether they are directly applicable or applicable by analogy. Art. 31-33 Treaties Convention state rather general rules of interpretation that fit for all kinds of international treaties.49 This is particularly clear with respect to Art. 33 Treaties Convention. This provision deals with interpretation problems of treaties when they are authenticated in more than one language. Its rule that the text is equally authoritative in each language unless otherwise agreed on is applicable to international treaties irrespective of whether they are directed towards states or towards private parties. Moreover, Art. 31-33 Treaties Convention codify anyway largely international customary law that already existed prior to the conclusion of the Treaties Convention.50 Although the Treaties Convention has been ratified 46
47
48
49
50
Against the application of the Vienna Treaties Convention to the CISG see e.g. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales Under the 1980 United Nations Convention, 3rd ed., The Hague 1999, no. 103. Similarly also Burkart (op. cit. fn. 43), 134 et seq., who suggests that interpretation rules should not be taken from the Vienna Treaties Convention but from the respective substantive convention such as the CISG itself. His main argument is that the Vienna Treaties Convention is binding only for its Member States. See Enderlein/Maskow/Strohbach, Internationales Kaufrecht, Berlin 1991, Art. 7 no. 2.2; Karollus, UN-Kaufrecht. Eine systematische Darstellung für Studium und Praxis, Vienna 1991, 13. For a general discussion of Art. 31-33 Treaties Convention and their meaning for private law conventions Happ/Roth, Interpretation of uniform law instruments according to Principles of International Law, 2 ULR (1997), 702 et seq.; see also Villiger, Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights, in: Bröhmer et al. (eds.), Festschrift Ress, Cologne 2005, 317 et seq. Basedow, Das Konventionsprivatrecht und das Völkerrecht der Staatsverträge, in: Leible/Ruffert (eds.), Völkerrecht und IPR, Munich 2006, 153, 168 et seq.; Ferrari (op. cit. fn. 20), Art. 7 no. 33; Magnus (op. cit. fn. 20), Art. 7 no. 16. In this sense already Kropholler, Internationales Einheitsrecht, Tübingen 1975, 267. See International Court of Justice (ICJ), 12 November 1991, I.C.J.Rep. 1991, 53, 71 (Case concerning the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989, Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal); European Court for Human Rights, 21 February 1975, Series A, vol. 18, 14; Bundesverfassungsgericht, BVerfGE 40, 141, 167; see also Goode/Kronke/McKendrick/Wool, Transnational Commercial Law, Oxford 2004, 1.
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by less than half of all states on the globe and not by all CISG States, most of the general interpretation rules of the Treaties Convention are widely accepted and constitute international customary law. These general rules – as far as suitable for law-making treaties – were applicable even if the Treaties Convention did not exist. They have to be observed in any event.
2.
The Interpretation Provisions of the Treaties Convention
a)
The Central Elements of Interpretation: Wording, Context, Purpose
According to its heading Art. 31 Treaties Convention is the “general rule of interpretation”. Its most important clause is Art. 31(1) Treaties Convention. It orders that a “treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” The provision lists three central elements upon which any interpretation of a legal text must draw: the wording, the context and the purpose of a legal term or provision. It can be regarded as customary international law that these core elements have to be taken into account whenever interpretation becomes necessary. Paras. (2) and (3) of Art. 31 Treaties Convention specify further what is meant by the notion of “context”. It is not only the whole text and systematic order of the respective treaty including its preamble and eventual annexes that may shed light on the understanding of the norm requiring interpretation. The context also comprises surrounding agreements, practices between the parties (to the international treaty) and “relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties”. What is meant by this latter reference to relevant rules of international law is somewhat obscure. Partly, it has been suggested that the reference allows even resort to be made to international sets of rules such as the UNIDROIT Principles.51 Generally, it has been argued that the reference means that all relevant rules of international law that are applicable between the involved (states-) parties have to be observed when a specific treaty requires interpretation.52 51
52
Basedow, Die UNIDROIT-Prinzipien der internationalen Handelsverträge und die Übereinkommen des einheitlichen Privatrechts. Eine praktische Studie zur praktischen Anwendung des internationalen Transportrechts, besonders der CMR, in: Basedow/Hopt/Kötz (eds.), Festschrift Drobnig, Tübingen 1998, 19, 25 et seq. The argument is that Art. 31(3)(c) Treaties Convention refers to the general law of nations to which, according to Art. 38(1)(c) Statute of the ICJ, also the general principles recognised by civilised nations belong. The UNIDROIT Principles formulate such recognised principles which are common to the Member States of the Treaties Convention. Sinclair (op. cit. fn. 44), 139.
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That means that already existing international law (codified or customary) must be respected. Rules that are still on their way to become universally accepted53 do not yet belong to the category of existing international law. Indeed, it is too bold to acknowledge the UNIDROIT Principles as already presently applicable international law. The preferable way is to use the UNIDROIT Principles as an aid to interpretation via the interpretation provision of the CISG instead via Art. 31(3)(c) Treaties Convention (see thereto below). Art. 31(1) Treaties Convention does not appear to establish a ranking list between the mentioned factors but seems to treat them more or less as of equal weight even if a slight prevalence for the wording could, though not necessarily, be read into the text of Art. 31(1) Treaties Convention.
b)
Travaux Préparatoires
While the general importance of the three listed elements for any interpretation of a legal text is almost undisputed (though not their relative weight) the rather restrictive use of the travaux préparatoires as a means of interpretation as is provided for by Art. 32 Treaties Convention is less universally accepted.54 The provision allows recourse to “supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion”, however only in order to confirm a result reached under the general rule of interpretation or if this result remains unclear or “manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”55 The preparatory work is admissible only as a “supplementary” means of interpretation. It therefore ranks secondary and does not appear to have the same weight as the primary factors of interpretation listed in Art. 31(1) Treaties Convention.56 Though the Convention does not define the term “preparatory work” the latter certainly includes the usual conference materials such as drafts (even of prior stages) and records of the conference at which the respective treaty 53
54
55 56
As to the extent to which the UNIDROIT Principles have already been accepted Bonell, The UNIDROIT Principles a Decade After Their First Appearance: What Have They Achieved and What Are Their Prospects for the Future?, in: Cashin Ritaine/Lein (eds.), The UNIDROIT Principles 2004. Their Impact on Contractual Practice, Jurisprudence and Codification, Zurich 2007, 259 et seq. For instance, under German law, the so-called historical interpretation, which takes account of the legislative history of a provision, is part of the traditional interpretation method. See e.g. Bundesgerichtshof, BGHZ 46, 74, 80; Bundesgerichtshof, BGHZ 62, 340, 350; Bundesgerichtshof, NJW 2003, 290. Art. 32(a) and (b) Treaties Convention. In this sense also Goode/Kronke/McKendrick/Wool (op. cit. fn. 50), 3; Stein/von Buttlar, Völkerrecht, 11th ed., Cologne 2005, no. 86.
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was concluded.57 By restricting the weight of the legislative history, Art. 32 Treaties Convention indicates that the Convention gives the objective approach of interpretation greater preference than the subjective approach that puts much weight on the intentions of the legislator.
c)
Autonomy of the Treaty Parties
As a further rule of interpretation para. 4 of Art. 31 also contains the wellknown and widely accepted maxim that “a special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended”, a modern and enlarged expression of the maxim falsa demonstratio non nocet. The Treaties Convention thus recognises the freedom of the (states-) parties to agree on a particular meaning of a term or a provision or even on a specific interpretation and that this understanding then prevails.
d)
Specific Problems of Multilingual Treaties
Multilateral international treaties are usually also multilingual. Special interpretation problems can arise from their authentication in two or more languages. For these cases Art. 33 Treaties Convention provides rules that are particularly relevant for conventions such as the CISG, which is authenticated in the six official UN languages: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish. Art. 33(1) Treaties Convention declares: “the text is equally authoritative in each language, unless the treaty provides or the parties agree that, in case of divergence, a particular text shall prevail.” The terms of the treaty are then presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text.58 If, after a comparison of the authentic texts, different meanings nevertheless remain then that meaning shall be adopted “which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty”.59 These rules are partly echoed in the CISG itself – the final Authentic Text and Witness Clause of the CISG prescribes as well that the texts in the six official UN languages are equally authentic. The equal authenticity clause is regularly contained in modern international treaties.60 The respec-
57 58 59 60
Compare Goode/Kronke/McKendrick/Wool (op. cit. fn. 50), 3 fn. 10. Art. 33(3) Treaties Convention. Art. 33(4) Treaties Convention. See for instance Art. 46 United Nations Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods; the final Witness Clause of the UNIDROIT Convention on International Factoring; the final Witness Clause of the UNIDROIT Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment; the fi-
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tive provision in Art. 33(1) Treaties Convention must therefore be regarded as customary international law. But so must Art. 33(4) Treaties Convention also be regarded. For, if the authentic texts differ, a mechanism to solve the differences is needed and evidently presupposed by all international treaties that contain the aforementioned Authenticity Clause. The most reasonable solution upon which the usual equal authenticity clause also seems implicitly to be based is that of Art. 33(4) Treaties Convention namely, to adopt the meaning that best serves the objects and purposes of the respective provision or treaty unless the (states-) parties have agreed otherwise.
3.
The Specific Relationship between Art. 7 CISG and the Interpretation Rules of the Treaties Convention
As mentioned, the Treaties Convention regulates the interpretation of international treaties in general – at least for the Member States of the Treaty Convention, and as far as the Convention codifies customary international law, even for all states. But the CISG also contains its own interpretation provision (Art. 7 CISG). The question must be answered as to in which relationship this provision stands to the interpretation rules of the Treaties Convention. Since the method of interpretation is only rather vaguely addressed in Art. 7 CISG and needed, and may even yet need, further development the question arises as to how far such further development was and is already bound by, and must follow, the rules of the Treaties Convention. From Art. 31-33 Treaties Convention certain conclusions can be drawn also with respect to the relationship between the interpretation provision of the CISG (or like provisions in comparable conventions) and the interpretation rules of the Treaties Convention. From Art. 31(4) Treaties Convention it can be inferred that, where an international treaty contains an interpretation rule, this provision, as far as it reaches, prevails over the general interpretation rules of the Treaties Convention. Art. 31(4) Treaties Convention acknowledges that the parties to a treaty may give a term – and certainly likewise a provision or a method of interpretation – a “special meaning.” Furthermore, Art. 33(1) and (2) Treaties Convention recognise the freedom of the parties to the treaty to agree on specific rules that then prevail over the interpretation rules of the Treaties Convention. The parties to an international treaty may therefore freely adopt a specific method of interpretation for a specific treaty. In this sense, the Treaty Convention recognises a kind of (states-) party autonomy. Therefore, in principle Art. 7 CISG takes preference over the Treaties Convention. Where, as in the case of Art. 7 CISG, the precise method of interpretation is only vaguely indicated and nal Witness Clause of the Convention on the International Carriage of Goods by Road.
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still needs to be fully developed, this process of development should take account of the interpretation rules of the Treaties Convention; it should avoid any contradiction with the Treaties Convention as far as possible. But nonetheless, indications of a specific understanding or method of interpretation in the special treaty again prevail over the general interpretation rules of the Treaties Convention. Art. 7 CISG and Art. 31-33 Treaties Convention are therefore interrelated and mutually influential. The Treaties Convention, in particular its provisions that equally qualify as customary international law, sets a frame for the development of individual methods of interpretation for single uniform law conventions. On the other hand, the drafters of such conventions are free to provide for such individual method as they agree on; thereby they influence in turn the customary international law. Therefore, as far as Art. 7 CISG and the whole Sales Convention itself give indications for the method of interpretation these indications prevail over the interpretation rules of the Treaties Convention.
IV. A “CISG Specific Interpretation”? From the foregoing considerations it follows that any interpretation of a CISG provision or a CISG term has to start from the commandments enshrined in the Convention itself. Though the CISG’s central interpretation provision is Art. 7 CISG, the Preamble and the final Authentic Text and Witness Clause61 of the Convention also have to be taken into account. As already mentioned, Art. 7 CISG describes the method of interpretation only vaguely and formulates aims of interpretation62 rather than a precise method of interpretation. Nonetheless, the CISG gives some hints to the method that must be followed. But that still falls short of establishing a special CISG-specific method of interpretation. The interpretation of the CISG follows the general method of interpreting international treaties. The outer frame of this method is specified by Art. 31-33 Vienna Treaties Convention. The central abstract elements for any interpretation listed there – wording, context, purpose, and also legislative history – play their role for the CISG as well. Yet, the peculiarities of the Sales Convention influence the outcome of the application of these elements decisively: the context must be CISG specific; the purpose of a CISG term or provision can only be inferred from the CISG and not from a general method of interpretation. While the main aims of the CISG’s interpretation have been discussed supra the following part gives a short review over the method of interpretation applicable to the CISG. For the details further contributions to this book can be referred to. 61 62
It provides inter alia that the texts in the six languages are equally authentic. As to these aims see already supra at E.II.
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The Wording
The wording of a term or provision sets always the inevitable starting point, and is at the same time the object, of any interpretation. Traditionally, Common Law jurisdictions used to place greater weight on the wording of legal texts than Civil Law jurisdictions. The latter tended and still tends to prefer the purposive interpretation among the different interpretation factors. With respect to international treaties, whose wording is regularly the outcome of extended discussion and often a well-balanced compromise where each single word counts, the text indeed deserves specific attention and particular weight. Under the CISG it is also universally accepted that any interpretation has to start with the wording of the disputed term or provision.63 The first problem that one encounters is, however, which wording has to be taken. The person deciding will generally start with the text in his or her language. But unless this is one of the official UN languages s/he must be aware that the wording is not authentic but only a translation and that in case of doubt it is necessary to actually refer back to all authentic texts. Normally, a true comparison between all six UN language versions will be unrealistic, if not impossible, without intensive international cooperation. In cases of doubt it is, however, widely accepted that despite the equal authenticity clause of the CISG, the English version can claim particular weight since English was the working language at all stages of preparation of the CISG.64 The wording has generally to be given its “ordinary meaning”:65 the meaning as generally used and understood in the CISG Community. If there is such an ordinary meaning that is often the end of interpretation (for instance that “writing” includes electronic “writing” by e-mail). “If the statutory text provides for a certain regulation in clear formulation then it needs important 63
64
65
See for instance Ferrari, in: Münchener Kommentar zum Handelsgesetzbuch vol. 6, 2nd ed., Munich 2007, Art. 7 no. 28; Herber/Czerwenka, Internationales Kaufrecht, Munich 1991, Art. 7 no. 7; Saenger (op. cit. fn. 42), Art. 7 no. 2; Saenger, in: Ferrari/Kieninger/Mankowski/Otte/Saenger/Staudinger (eds.), Internationales Vertragsrecht, Munich 2007, Art. 7 no. 2; Witz/Salger/Lorenz, Internationales Einheitliches Kaufrecht, Heidelberg 2000, Art. 7 no. 20. In this sense for instance Schweizer Bundesgericht (BG), 13 November 2003, IHR 2004, 215 (217); Achilles, in: Ensthaler (ed.), Gemeinschaftskommentar zum Handelsgesetzbuch mit UN-Kaufrecht, 7th ed., Neuwied 2007, Unterzeichnungklausel no. 1; Brunner, UN-Kaufrecht – CISG. Kommentar zum Übereinkommen der Vereinten Nationen über Verträge über den internationalen Warenkauf von 1980. Unter Berücksichtigung der Schnittstellen zum internen Schweizer Recht, Bern 2004, Art. 7 no. 5; Ferrari (op. cit. fn. 20), Unterzeichnungklausel no. 2; Magnus (op. cit. fn. 20), Art. 7 no. 17. See also Art. 31(1) Treaties Convention.
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reasons required by justice to justify an interpretation which deviates from the wording of the text.”66
2.
The Contextual Interpretation
While the verbal interpretation of the wording of a provision is indispensable for its interpretation the context of the provision can, but need not, necessarily serve as an important aid to interpretation. The contextual or systematic interpretation draws conclusions from the systematic position of a provision in the CISG for the meaning of that provision. For instance, the position of Art. 78 CISG – in a separate section of its own – shows that the exemption provision of Art. 79 CISG, which is part of another section, does not apply to Art. 78 CISG. But not always does the systematic order provide hints for the interpretation of a norm; e.g. the position of Art. 74 CISG in the Damages Section does not shed light on the question of whether or not the loss addressed in that provision covers counsel’s fees. That question can only be answered with a view to the scope of application of the CISG that does not cover rules of procedure on the allocation of costs.67 As already mentioned, according to Art. 31(2) and (3) Treaties Convention the context does not only extend to the system of the relevant treaty itself but also to further related agreements, to practices among states and to relevant rules of international law. For the CISG this context definition should include also other uniform law conventions on contract law such as the Limitation Convention, the Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road (CMR), the Montreal Convention, the Ottawa Conventions on International Financial Leasing and International Factoring and many others that are designed for global use and form a steadily growing international body of uniform civil (contract) law and also share many common terms and underlying general principles. The meaning of ba66
67
Bundesgerichtshof, Wertpapiermitteilungen (WM) 1991, 2108: “Sieht das Gesetz in klarer Formulierung eine bestimmte Regelung vor, so müssten schwerwiegende, am Gerechtigkeitsdenken orientierte Gründe vorliegen, um eine vom Wortlaut abweichende Gesetzesauslegung zu rechtfertigen.” (though with respect to the interpretation of the Hague Sales Law). See thereon Zapata Hermanos Succesores, S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Co., Inc. (7th Cir. 2002) http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/021119ul.html; Lookofsky/Flechtner, Viva Zapata! American Procedure and CISG Substance in a U.S. Circuit Court of Appeal, 7 Vindobona J. Int. Com.L. and Arb. (2003), 93 et seq.; Lookofsky/Flechtner, Zapata Retold: Attorney’s Fees Are (Still) Not Governed by the CISG, 26 J. L. & Com. (2006/7), 1 et seq.; Schlechtriem, Anwaltskosten als Teil des ersatzfähigen Schadens, Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax) 2002, 226 et seq.
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sic terms, for instance “place of business”, “contract”, “consumer contract”, “obligation”, “breach of contract”, “damage/loss” or “damages” etc. should be understood in an identical sense for all these instruments unless reasons of substance require their different meaning. Their settled meaning under one convention could therefore support their interpretation for other conventions. This “interconventional” interpretation68 is particularly apt for, and required by, uniform law conventions on private law. Art. 31 Treaties Convention does not appear to exclude it. In a certain sense the interconventional interpretation modifies or even supersedes the autonomous interpretation. No longer is the single convention a stand-alone that forms the entire cosmos relevant for interpretation purposes. The cosmos is now the much broader body formed of conventions on similar matters. The contextual interpretation should equally allow redress to international sets of rules such as the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and the PECL. These sets of rules also presently form part of the international body of uniform private law, albeit as “soft law” only. They can support a certain interpretation of an ambiguous CISG term or provision or even help filling internal gaps in the CISG, in particular where both sets of rules suggest identical solutions.69 On the other hand they cannot fill those gaps that the CISG drafters have deliberately left (e.g. the interest rate in Art. 78 CISG).70 These gaps must be filled by the applicable national law in the way Art. 7(2) CISG prescribes. Even in another respect, the context definition of Art. 31(2) and (3) Treaties Convention, if taken literally, is too narrow. The CISG Digest prepared by UNCITRAL must certainly belong to the permitted context materials because it has been prepared by the sponsoring organisation of the CISG as a kind of quasi-official commentary on the Convention. Although the Digest only records the international case law on the CISG, the prevailing view that it also always presents will be highly influential in the entire CISG Community and is a first-rate interpretative aid.
68
69 70
See thereto Ferrari, I rapporti tra le convenzioni di diritto materiale uniforme in materia contrattuale e la necessitá di un’interpretazione interconvenzionale, Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale (Riv. dir. int. priv. proc.) 2000, 669 et seq.; Ferrari (op. cit. fn. 20), Art. 7 no. 38; Magnus, Konventionsübergreifende Interpretation internationaler Staatsverträge privatrechtlichen Inhalts, in: Basedow et al. (eds.), Aufbruch nach Europa: 75 Jahre Max-PlanckInstitut, Tübingen 2001, 571 et seq. See already supra E.II.1. and E.III.2.a. See the many court decisions cited in the Draft Digest (op. cit. fn. 10), 815 et seq. But contra for example Goode/Kronke/McKendrick/Wool (op. cit. fn. 50), 212 who advocate the applicability of the respective article of the UNIDROIT principles (Art. 7.4.9).
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The Legislative History
The historical interpretation draws conclusions from the legislative history of the CISG provision requiring interpretation. The legislative history of a provision – in any case only a secondary and supplementary means of interpretation under the Treaties Convention – can be, but need not be meaningful. The prior Drafts of the CISG, even the CISG’s predecessor, Hague Uniform Sales Law, also the interventions and votes at the Vienna Conference of 1980 sometimes reveal, albeit not always clearly, the intentions of the CISG’s drafters and thereby add to the interpretation. For instance, the interpretation of Art. 28 CISG, according to which courts of – in particular Common Law – countries need not grant specific performance unless they would do so under their own law can benefit if one knows the intention behind the norm (namely, to allow Common Law and Civil Law countries to maintain their own solution on performance after a breach of contract).71 The legislative history should therefore be used without the formalistic restrictions provided for by Art. 32 Treaties Convention, namely that the travaux préparatoires can only confirm an already established interpretation or can only be adduced if the meaning remains otherwise unclear or leads to absurd results.72 However, the core idea of Art. 32 Treaties Convention must be borne in mind that the legislative history is not always helpful and has regularly less weight for the interpretation than the wording and purpose of a provision.
b)
The Purposive Interpretation
Next to its wording is the object and purpose of a provision important for its interpretation;73 an element of interpretation regarded by some as even the most important.74 To discover the purpose of a provision requires itself cautious interpretation. It does not allow the person deciding to infuse his or her own view or that of his own legal system of the purpose into the interpretation. Again, the wording, context and legislative history and the general aims of the Convention indicate the purpose of a norm, in particular 71
72 73
74
See the reasons for this provision already given by Rabel, Der Entwurf eines einheitlichen Kaufgesetzes, 9 RabelsZ (1935), 1 et seq., 69 for the very first Draft of a Uniform Sales Act. See Art. 32(a) and (b) Treaties Convention. Brunner (op. cit. fn. 64), Art. 7 no. 5; Magnus (op. cit. fn. 20), Art. 7 no. 36; Melis, in: Honsell (ed.), Kommentar zum UN-Kaufrecht. Übereinkommen der Vereinten Nationen über Verträge über den internationalen Warenkauf (CISG), Berlin 1997, Art. 7 no. 11. For instance Kropholler (op. cit. fn. 49), 276.
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which problem the provision should solve or sometimes which “mischief” should be remedied. For instance, Art. 49 and Art. 64 CISG, which require a declaration of avoidance of contract, should remedy the “mischief” of the automatic ipso facto avoidance allowed under the Hague Uniform Sales Law.75 Moreover, the normal result to which the application of a certain meaning would lead must be taken into account. A purposive interpretation has to see that an interpretation is chosen that generally leads to reasonable and effective solutions and realises as far as possible the general aims of the Convention as well as the aims listed in Art. 7(1) CISG.
c)
Comparative Method of Interpretation
Comparison with solutions in national legal systems may also help in finding the appropriate meaning of a provision in a uniform law convention. It has, however, been suggested to apply the comparative method of interpretation to the CISG only, if at all, in a cautious and limited way.76 The reason for this reluctance is the practical difficulty to compare all relevant legal systems in a systematic and competent way. In daily practice this is impossible. In any case the CISG is already based on intensive and careful comparison of laws that set standards.77 If at all, scholarly writing can add comparative law arguments that may be helpful for the interpretation of the CISG.
d)
CISG and EU-law: Regionalised Interpretation?
In the European Union, 23 of the 27 Member States have ratified the CISG (only Ireland, Malta, Portugal and the United Kingdom abstain thus far). Many central CISG terms also appear in EU enactments; some of these enactments, in particular the Consumer Sales Directive78 and the Package Travel Directive,79 have more or less extensively borrowed from the CISG. There is a danger and temptation for courts in EU countries to interpret the CISG and the respective EU law in an identical way although the EU, 75
76
77
78
79
See Secretary General, Report, UNCITRAL Yearbook III (1972), 41 et seq.; further thereon Hellner, Ipso facto avoidance, in: Ehmann et al. (eds.), Festschrift Weitnauer, Munich 1980, 85 et seq. Brunner (op. cit. fn. 64), Art. 7 no. 5; Ferrari (op. cit. fn. 63), Art. 7 no. 38; Magnus (op. cit. fn. 20), Art. 7 no. 37; Melis (op. cit. fn. 73), Art. 7 no. 11. See in particular Rabel, Recht des Warenkaufs, vol. 1, Berlin 1936, vol. 2, Berlin 1957/8. Directive 1999/44/EC on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees. Directive 90/314/EEC on package travel, package holidays and package tours.
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mainly the European Court of Justice (ECJ), has developed an EU specific method of interpretation that stresses the purposive interpretation (the socalled effet utile)80 and requires an interpretation “in the light of the provisions of Community law as a whole”.81 Definitions of common terms (for instance “place of business”)82 which the ECJ has already given, may easily creep into the interpretation of the CISG when courts in EU countries have to apply the same term with respect to the CISG. This could lead to a partially regionalised interpretation of the CISG since similar integration movements are on the way on all continents.83 Such regionalised interpretation could be welcomed because a single and certain method of interpretation would be applied within the EU. On the other hand, a regionalised interpretation would give up the aim of a globally uniform interpretation and application of the CISG. The main advantage of the sales law unification, a worldwide identical sales law, would fade away. Any regionalisation of the interpretation of the CISG must therefore be strictly rejected.84
e)
Relative Weight of the Single Elements
The elements relevant for the interpretation of the CISG constitute a kind of flexible system. Except that the wording is always the fundament and starting point of interpretation neither a strict order nor a clear ranking list exists among the other elements context, legislative history and purpose. As mentioned, the object and purpose of a provision should be given more weight than its context and legislative history. But this is no hard and fast rule. The courts seem to prefer a flexible application of those elements that promise the most aid to interpretation in the respective case. This flexibility is probably inevitable. The uncertainty that is its necessary corollary can only be reduced if courts will become much more willing to consult, truly consider, and where reasonable, follow foreign CISG case law and even doctrine in their decisions.
80
81
82 83
84
See for instance European Court of Justice (ECJ), (Joined Cases C-6 and 9/90, Francovich and others v. Italian Republic) [1991] ECR I-5357 (para. 33). ECJ (Case 283/81, CILFIT Srl and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v. Ministry of Health) [1982] ECR 3415 (para. 20); see further Reich, Understanding EU Law. Objectives, Principles and Methods of Community Law, 2nd ed., Antwerp 2005, 24 et seq. See ECJ (Somafer v. Saar-Ferngas) [1978] ECR 2183 (2193). See thereto Schroeter, UN-Kaufrecht und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht. Verhältnis und Wechselwirkungen, Munich 2005, 684 et seq. In the same sense Schroeter (op. cit. fn. 83), 686 et seq.
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F. Concluding Remarks Tracing the methodology of interpretation of the CISG and exploring its dogmatic foundations – can a result be formulated? A first conclusion must stress that a uniform method of interpretation is indispensable in order to achieve and further the unification purpose of the Convention. A second – a little overstated – conclusion can be drawn that in principle the uniform interpretation of the CISG functions satisfactorily already. Under an overall perspective the divergences in interpretation are no quantité negligible. But the divergences are less than one could expect bearing in mind that no central CISG court exists. I do not hesitate to state that the dogmatic foundations of the method of interpretation of the CISG are relatively stable despite the fact that the CISG itself only sets out guidelines and aims for its interpretation but no precise method of interpretation. However, Art. 31-33 Vienna Treaties Convention provide a general framework of elements for interpretation – text, context, legislative history and purpose – which most CISG courts in fact use. Except by always starting with the text and giving the text and then the purpose particular weight, courts habitually use these elements in a rather flexible way when interpreting the Convention. It must be doubted whether a stricter method could be, and even should be, achieved. Interpretation requires a reasonable degree of flexibility. Yet, even though the present form of interpretation of the CISG appears to be not unsatisfactory, improvements of the method of interpretation are nonetheless necessary and feasible in order both to avoid the creation of new divergences and to reduce the existing ones in the understanding and application of the CISG. The most urgent improvement concerns the improved use of foreign case law and foreign legal doctrine by courts. Courts should be aware that insofar a true global CISG Community has developed and really exists. Courts should therefore take account of relevant decisions rendered abroad and of relevant legal doctrine formulated there. Courts can rather easily take notice of these developments via the internet and the many helpful tools developed for the CISG. It is, however, also the task of scholars to communicate the relevant foreign material to the home market.
Literal Interpretation: The Meaning of the Words Sieg Eiselen
A. Introduction One of the leading commentaries on the CISG recognises that Art. 7 CISG establishes the foundation for the approach to the interpretation of the Convention, but that it does not lay down any methods for the interpretation of the Convention.1 There is however a wide ranging consensus that the first step in the interpretation of the CISG should be a literal interpretation by having regard to the wording and if the wording is clear the court or tribunal need to go no further.2 This seems to reflect a narrow literalist or textual approach to the interpretation of the CISG. In many domestic legal systems a strict literalist approach to interpretation has come increasingly under fire during the second half of the 20th century as being too restrictive and often misleading. The CISG was drafted in an effort to harmonise the law applicable to international sales transactions in order to facilitate international trade by avoiding the application of widely diverging domestic sales to these transactions. Its success in doing so is recognised very widely.3 In its drafting care 1
2
3
Schlechtriem, in: Schlechtriem/Schwenzer, Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods, 2nd ed., Oxford 2005, Art. 7 no. 19. See also Magnus, in: Staudingers Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch mit Einführungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen, Wiener UN-Kaufrecht (CISG), Berlin 2005, Art. 7 no. 30; Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales Under the 1980 United Nations Convention, 3rd ed., The Hague 1999, 88-89; Kritzer/Eiselen, International Contract Manual, vol. 4, London 2008, § 85:11. Magnus (op. cit. fn. 1), Art. 7 no. 32; Schlechtriem, in: Schlechtriem/Schwenzer (op. cit. fn. 1), Art. 7 no. 21. Andersen, Uniform Application of the International Sales Law: Understanding Uniformity, the Global Jurisconsultorium and Examination and Notification Provisions of the CISG, Alphen aan den Rijn 2007, 30; DiMatteo et al., The Interpretive Turn in International Sales Law: An Analysis of Fifteen Years of CISG Jurisprudence, (2004) 34 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business (NW J of Intl L & Bus), 299-440; Kritzer/Eiselen (op. cit. fn. 1), § 80:1; Schlechtriem, in: Schlechtriem/Schwenzer (op. cit. fn. 1), 6-7; Van Alstine, Dynamic Trea-
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was taken to avoid legal concepts or terms that were too closely linked to any particular legal system or culture. It is of prime importance for any harmonising convention that such convention should be interpreted and applied in a uniform manner throughout the world otherwise it will not achieve the desired harmonisation.4 The CISG strives to ensure a uniform interpretation and application through the prescriptions in Art. 7 CISG.5 However, Art. 7 CISG only contains fairly generalised rules about the interpretation of the CISG referring to its international character, the need for uniformity and the observance of good faith. Any gaps in the Convention are to be filled with reference to its underlying principles. It is only where such principles do not exist or cannot be discerned, that a court should turn to domestic law. The broad terms of reference found in Art. 7 CISG is in contrast to the fairly detailed rules and presumptions of construction that can be found in many legal systems. The specific prescriptions of Art. 7 CISG may also be read with the provisions of Section 3 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969. Art. 31(1) of that Convention stipulates that a treaty must be “interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”. The literal approach to the words of any treaty is stated as the starting point, but immediately qualified by reference to the context, object and purpose of the treaty. The Convention also specifically allows the use of preparatory material to confirm the literal interpretation arrived at or to deal with ambiguities, uncertainties and results which are manifestly absurd or unreasonable. Although not all CISG Contracting States have adopted the
4
5
ty Interpretation, (1998) 146 University of Pennsylvania Law Review (U of Penn LR), 687-793. DiMatteo et al., (op. cit. fn. 3), 309-310; Honnold (op. cit. fn. 1), 88-89; Mann, Uniform Statutes in English Law, (1983) 99 Law Quarterly Review (LQR), 377378; Pearce/Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia, 5th ed., Sydney 2001, 10-11; Fothergill v Monarch Airlines [1980] 2 All ER 696 (HL) 621-622. Andersen (op. cit. fn. 3), 30-31; Kritzer/Eiselen (op. cit. fn. 1), § 85:5; Magnus (op. cit. fn. 1), Art. 7 no. 32; Schlechtriem, in: Schlechtriem/Schwenzer (op. cit. fn. 1), Art. 7 no. 21. See also the Secretariat Commentary to Art. 6 (the draft counterpart of Art. 7(1) [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/secomm/secomm-07.html] which states: “National rules on the law of sales of goods are subject to sharp divergencies in approach and concept. Thus, it is especially important to avoid differing constructions of the provisions of this Convention by national courts, each dependent upon the concepts used in the legal system of the country of the forum. To this end, article 6 [draft counterpart of CISG article 7(1)] emphasizes the importance, in the interpretation and application of the provisions of the Convention, of having due regard for the international character of the Convention and for the need to promote uniformity.”
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Treaty Convention, it is widely regarded as embodying general principles of international law which should be used even by non-contracting states.6 The process of interpretation of domestic legislation is viewed and tackled differently in Common Law and Civil Law systems. In Civil Law systems courts will resort much more readily to the historical background and preparatory materials (travaux préparatoires) in the interpretation of statutes than Common Law countries where much greater reliance is placed on the plain meaning of the text.7 The result is that there might be an unintentional divergence in the approach of judges or arbitrators from different jurisdictions when approaching the text of the CISG. Common Law judges and arbitrators may be more inclined to adhere to the literal interpretation of the CISG where the ordinary meaning of the words used seems clear or unambiguous. This chapter will largely be restricted to a critical examination and discussion of the literalist approach and the interpretation of the CISG, as intentionalism and purposivism as well as comparative interpretation is dealt with elsewhere in this book.8
B. The Literalist Tradition I.
Introduction
The literal approach to the interpretation of statutes may be found in many jurisdictions and is a quite natural first reaction to text relying on the reader’s education, experience and language skills. The understanding of the text is said to be based on the meaning that a competent, knowledgeable, purposeful and informed user of ordinary language would give to ordinary words used in a statute.9 It is based on the premise that language, especially statu-
6
7
8 9
Per Lords Wilberforce and Diplock in Fothergill v Monarch Airlines [1980] 2 All ER 696 (HL) 695, 702; Dugard, International Law – A South African Perspective, 2nd ed., Capetown 2000, 338-339. Honnold (op. cit. fn. 1), 89-90. The United States is an important exception to this general rule. See also DiMatteo, The CISG and the Presumption of Enforceability: Unintended Contractual Liability in International Business Dealings, (1997) 22 Yale Journal of International Law (Yale J of Intl L), 133 et seq. See e.g. the contributions by DiMatteo and Gruber in this book. Bell/Engle, Cross Statutory Interpretation, 3rd ed., London 1995, 1; Sullivan, Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 4th ed., Toronto 2002, 5-7; Summers, Essays in Legal Theory, Dordrecht 2000, 221.
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tory language is clear, unambiguous and capable of a true meaning within the context used.10 According to the literal approach the true meaning of the statute is to be found only in the precise words of the text itself. A nineteenth century South African judge remarked:11 “I confess that I regard it as a very unsafe mode of construction to attach more weight to the presumed object of the Legislature than to the language actually employed. The safer course is, as was said in De Villiers v Cape Divisional Council (Buch. Rep. 1875, p. 65), to observe the literal and grammatical sense of the words employed, and leave it to the Legislature − which is always at hand for the purpose − to amend the law in case such construction should not carry out its real intention.” Although a strict literal approach to the interpretation of statutes is probably not followed in any jurisdiction any longer, some form of literalism is still firmly entrenched in many jurisdictions, albeit in some other modified guise such as intentionalism.12 Reference is made to the intention of the legislature, but the intention is sought almost exclusively in the language of the text itself.13 There has, however, also been recognition that the strict formalism of the literal approach is no longer tenable in most jurisdictions.14 In Principal Immigration Officer v Hawabu15 the court refers to the “elasticity which is inherent in language” which necessitates courts to have resort to the text as a whole and even extraneous material such as the legislative history of the
10
11
12
13 14
15
Du Plessis, The Interpretation of Statutes, Durban 1986; Kellaway, Principles of Legal Interpretation, Durban 1995, 5. See for instance Principal Immigration Officer v Hawabu 1936 AD 26, at 31. De Villiers CJ in De Kock v The Resident Magistrate of Caledon (1896) 13 SC 386, at 387. See for instance Cowen, The Interpretation of Statutes and the Concept of the Intention of the Legislature, (1980) 43 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse RomeinsHollandse Reg (THRHR), 378-392; Du Plessis, Statute Law and Interpretation, in: Joubert (ed.), The Law of South Africa, vol. 25 part 1, 1st Reissue, Durban 2001, 283; Public Carriers Association v Toll Road Concessionaries (Pty) Ltd 1990 (1) SA 925 (A). Bell/Engle (op. cit. fn. 9), 18 refer to the continued importance of this rule in most cases. Du Plessis (op. cit. fn. 10), 31-32; Sullivan (op. cit. fn. 9). Bell/Engle (op. cit. fn. 9), 17-18; Pearce/Geddes (op. cit. fn. 4), 23-24; Sullivan (op. cit. fn. 9), 7-8. 1936 AD 26 at 31.
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text. This is also evident from the following statement by Lord Griffiths in Pepper v Hart:16 “The days have long passed when the courts adopted a strict constructionist view of interpretation which required them to adopt the literal meaning of the language. The courts now adopt a purposive approach which seeks to give effect to the true purpose of legislation and are prepared to look at much extraneous material that bears on the background against which the legislation was enacted.” In order to properly understand the continued importance and proper place of the literalist approach to interpretation, its historic development and the criticisms levelled at it must be briefly traced, before considering its implications for the interpretation of the CISG.
II.
Historical Origin and Development
The modern approaches to the interpretation of statutes in the Common Law world are based on the developments through four distinct periods.17
1.
Equitable Construction
During the first period equitable construction was the dominant approach. This approach developed into the so-called mischief rule. The rule was formulated as follows in the Heydon case:18 “(…) that for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law), four things are to be discerned and considered: (1) What was the common law before the making of the Act. (2) What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide. (3) What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth. And (4) The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro
16 17 18
[1993] 1 All ER 42 at 50. Sullivan (op. cit. fn. 9). As quoted in Pugh v Pugh [1951] 2 All ER 680. See also Re Greycaine Ltd [1946] 2 All ER 30; Escoigne Properties Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1958] 1 All ER 406; Bell/Engle (op. cit. fn. 9), 11-12; Sullivan (op. cit. fn. 9), 4.
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privato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico.” This approach has remained relevant and is still referred to in English courts today.19 However, the approach is often qualified. For instance in the Spath Holme case Lord Nicholls states:20 “Use of non-statutory materials as an aid to interpretation is not a new development. As long ago as 1584 the Barons of the Exchequer enunciated the socalled mischief rule. In interpreting statutes courts should take into account, among other matters, ‘the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide’ (see Heydon’s Case (1584) 3 Co Rep 7a at 7b, 76 ER 637 at 638). Nowadays the courts look at external aids for more than merely identifying the mischief the statute is intended to cure. In adopting a purposive approach to the interpretation of statutory language, courts seek to identify and give effect to the purpose of the legislation. To the extent that extraneous material assists in identifying the purpose of the legislation, it is a useful tool.” In this approach the courts viewed the legislative texts as less important than the actual intentions of legislature. Sullivan indicates that this approach was appropriate for that time as judges were active participants in the law-making process. Furthermore, texts were unreliable and inaccessible because they were still recorded and copied by hand.21
2.
Strict Construction
The firm establishment of the sovereignty of Parliament by the 18th century introduced a new era in England where there was less need or opportunity for equitable construction. The public and judicial mood during this period was also strongly influenced by the liberal philosophy of Locke and the revolution of 1688.22 Under these influences there was a strong emphasis on the freedom of individuals and the preservation of their life, liberty and property from state interference. Judges were constrained to apply parliamentary statutes, but any changes to the status quo by statutes had to be formulated in 19
20
21 22
See for instance Re Mayfair Property Co, Bartlett v Mayfair Property Co [1898] 2 Ch 28, Hickman and Others v Peacey and others [1945] 2 All ER 215; R (on the application of Bushell and others) v Newcastle upon Tyne Licensing Justices and another [2006] 2 All ER 161; Orton v Collins and others [2007] 3 All ER 863. R v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions and another, ex parte Spath Holme Ltd [2001] 1 All ER 195. Sullivan (op. cit. fn. 9), 4. Bell/Engle (op. cit. fn. 9), 12; Sullivan (op. cit. fn. 9), 4.
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clear terms. The fundamental resistance to the interference of Parliament during this period gave rise to the presumption in favour of a strict construction of statutes.23 Courts also refused to fill apparent gaps in statutes, despite a clearly discernible intention, limiting the application of the statute to those situations covered by the actual wording. Accordingly acts were also strictly interpreted where a gap or a casus omissus existed.24 The strict approach to interpretation had an unfortunate by-product. The statutory draftsman, in an attempt to avoid the consequences of a strict interpretation, drafted statutory texts that aimed at covering every possible eventuality.25 This has caused English style legislation ever since to be much more detailed and complicated than is the case with Civil Law statutes. The detailed nature of statutes has often made them even more difficult to interpret and understand.
3.
Literalism
During the 19th and 20th centuries the English Parliament turned out more and more legislation that dealt with matters that were not known to the Common Law. Liberalism in judicial thinking was replaced by the doctrines of parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law. The approaches of the former eras seemed less relevant under these circumstances. These developments provided fertile ground for the growth of literalism or the primacy of plain meaning.26 The rule was formulated as follows in the oft quoted passage of Chief Justice Tindal CJ:27 “My Lords, the only rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is, that they should be construed according to the intent of the Parliament which passed the Act. If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do, in such case, best declare the intention of the lawgiver. But if any doubt arises from the terms employed by the legislature, it has always been held a safe means of collecting the intention, to call in aid the ground and cause of making the statute, and to have recourse to the pre-
23 24
25 26 27
Bell/Engle (op. cit. fn. 9), 12-13; Sullivan (op. cit. fn. 9), 4-5. Bell/Engle (op. cit. fn. 9), 12-13. For a more recent illustration of this thinking see Magor and St. Mellons Rural District Council v Newport Corporation [1951] 2 All ER 839. Bell/Engle (op. cit. fn. 9), 11-12. Sullivan (op. cit. fn. 9), 5-6, 14-15. Sussex Peerage case (1844), 11 Cl. & Fin., 8 E.R. 1034.
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amble, which, according to DYER, C.J.28, is − ‘a key to open the minds of the makers of the Act, and the mischiefs which they intended to redress’.” Sullivan adds that the rule of law provides a further argument for the literal approach.29 It satisfies the need for legal certainty and predictability. According to this argument the literal interpretation affords citizens and their advisors to rely on the apparent meaning of the text.30 A strict literalist approach can sometimes lead to harsh results. Courts committed to this approach accept these consequences provided that the words used are clear and unambiguous. The following statement by Birkett LJ is representative of this approach:31 “It is agreed that the cardinal rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is that they should be construed according to the intention of the Parliament that passed them. The language of the enacting words is clear, and the learned judge found it to be so by his use of the words “unqualified and plain in their meaning.” In these circumstances I should have thought that, according to the rules for the construction of statutes, the preamble ought to be disregarded. But it was the consequence of giving the words their plain meaning which made the learned judge turn to the preamble, because he said that the legislature must have intended to put some limit on their operation. With great respect, I cannot think that this was applying the recognised rules of construction, for if the meaning of the words is plain, the consequences are to be disregarded.” The commitment and reliance on pure literalism as stated above often breaks down when judges are faced with the consequences of such an interpretation.32 This gave rise to the development of a fourth approach often labelled as the ‘golden rule’.
4.
The Golden Rule – Qualified Literalism
The golden rule makes provision for a departure from the literal interpretation of the text where the application of the words in their ordinary sense
28 29 30
31
32
In Stowell v Lord Zouch (1569), 1 Plowd 353. Sullivan (op. cit. fn. 9), 5. Bell/Engle (op. cit. fn. 9), 15, 32-33; Sullivan (op. cit. fn. 9), 5; Summers (op. cit. fn. 9), 234-236. For a discussion of similar reasoning to the literalist approach in the United States see Van Alstine (op. cit. fn. 3), 710-713. H R H Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover v Attorney General [1955] 3 All ER 647. See also R v McIntosh [1995] 1 SCR 686 at 704. Sullivan (op. cit. fn. 9), 5-6.
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would be intolerable or where it would lead to an absurdity.33 The rule helps the interpreter from overcoming some of the difficulties in inherent linguistic formalism by allowing the court discretion to modify or augment the words of the statute.34 The rule was first formulated by Parker CB in Becke v Smith35 but it is his statement in Grey v Pearson36 which is most often quoted and followed:37 “I have been long and deeply impressed with the wisdom of the rule, now, I believe, universally adopted, at least in the courts of law in Westminster Hall, that in construing wills, and indeed statutes, and all written instruments, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no further.” The golden rule provides a life buoy to literalism. It qualifies the rule in order to save it from the unacceptable results to which it may sometimes lead when applied in its simplest form.38 However, the rule is to be employed only in the most extreme or unusual cases.39 The rule therefore provides an escape from the consequences of literalism in relatively few instances. Du Plessis also raises a fundamental logical problem at the heart of the golden rule: if the intention of the legislature is to be obtained from the language used by the legislature, how can a contrary intention be gleaned from the very same language?40 It is obvious that the intention must be obtained from some other source extraneous to the text itself such as the legislative history or context of the text.41 The unfortunate result of stark literalism in some instances which gave rise to the adoption of the golden rule, also provided the impetus for the de33 34 35 36 37
38 39
40 41
Bell/Engle (op. cit. fn. 9), 15-16; Sullivan (op. cit. fn. 9), 6. Du Plessis (op. cit. fn. 12), 282, 290. (1836) 2 M & W 191, at 195. (1857) 6 HL Cas 61, at 106. Bell/Engle (op. cit. fn. 9), 16-17; Du Plessis (op. cit. fn. 12), 290-291; Sullivan (op. cit. fn. 9), 6; Venter v Rex 1907 TS 910, at 919; Re Guinness’s Settlement Guinness and another v S G Warburg (Executor and Trustee) and others [1966] 2 All ER 497; Pakala Narayana Swami v King-Emperor [1939] 1 All ER 396, at 396. Du Plessis (op. cit. fn. 12), 282-283, 290-291. Bell/Engle (op. cit. fn. 9), 17; Cowen (op. cit. fn. 12), 380; Du Plessis (op. cit. fn. 12), 291; Thompson v Good [1910] AC 409, at 420; Vickers, Sons and Maxim Ltd v Evans [1910] AC 444, at 445; Principal Immigration Officer v Hawabu 1936 AD 26, at 31. Du Plessis (op. cit. fn. 12), 291. Du Plessis (op. cit. fn. 12), 291.
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velopment of new approaches and theories to the interpretation of statutes. Some of these theories, such as limited contextualism, were refinements of the literalist approach, but still used literalism as its underlying paradigm.42 Although it seems that American courts may have escaped the constraints of literalism at a much earlier stage than English law, this appearance may be deceptive. For instance in Caminetti v. United States43 the court still took a strictly literal approach to interpretation stating: “Where the language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning the duty of interpretation does not arise and the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion.” Contrast that remark with the following remark in U.S. v. American Trucking Associations44 a few years later where the court states: “There is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes. Often these words are sufficient in and of themselves to determine the purpose of the legislation. In such cases we have followed their plain meaning. When that meaning has led to absurd or futile results, however, this Court has looked beyond the words to the purpose of the act. Frequently, however, even when the plain meaning did not produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable one ‘plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole’ this Court has followed that purpose rather than the literal words. When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no ‘rule of law’ which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on ‘superficial examination’.” However, in more recent cases there still seems to be an adherence to the strict literalist approach. Van Alstine, referring to the decision in Chan v. Korean Airlines45 calls this a “new strain of restrictive formalism” which prevents courts from applying any “invasive interpretive techniques, regardless of the effects on the long-term health of a statutory body of law.”46 In U.S. v. Whitley,47 for instance the court remarks:
42
43 44 45 46 47
Cowen, Prolegomenon to a restatement of the principles of statutory interpretation, (1976) 1 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (TSAR), 151-152; Du Plessis (op. cit. fn. 12), 283. Caminetti v. U.S. 242 U.S. 470, 37 S.Ct. 192 U.S. 1917. U.S. v. American Trucking Associations 310 U.S. 534, 60 S.Ct. 1059, U.S. 1940. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 135 (1989). Van Alstine (op. cit. fn. 3), 687-688. 2008 WL 2405707, C.A.2 (N.Y.), 2008.
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“Although we hesitate to precipitate a circuit split, we conclude that there are substantial grounds for doing so with respect to the interpretation of the “except” clause. First, we have repeatedly been instructed to give statutes a literal reading and apply the plain meaning of the words Congress has used. (…) Indeed, the Supreme Court has reversed a court of appeals for not giving a literal reading to another provision of section 924(c). See United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 8, 117 S.Ct. 1032, 137 L.Ed.2d 132 (1997) (observing, with respect to what is now subsection 924(c)(1)(D)(ii), that “where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction. The case must be a strong one indeed, which would justify a court in departing from the plain meaning of words (…).”) (quoting United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95-96, 5 L.Ed. 37 (1820) (Banks Law Publishing Co.) (1904) (Marshall, C.J.).” It is clear that the literal approach or “new textualism”48 to the interpretation or construction of statutes is still a dominant force in Common Law jurisdictions, even if it is sometimes masquerading as literalist-cum-intentionalist approach.49
III. Critique of the Literalist Approach The literalist approach to interpretation is based on the premise that words and language will have, in most instances, a clear and unambiguous meaning. Courts therefore only need to adhere to the plain or ordinary meaning of the words used to give effect to the intention of the legislature. Justice Frankfurter, writing at a time when literalism was still the dominant paradigm in English, remarked:50 “These current English rules of construction are simple. They are too simple. If the purpose of construction is the ascertainment of meaning, nothing that is logically relevant should be excluded. The rigidity of English courts in interpreting language merely by reading it disregards the fact that enactments are, as it were, organisms which exist in their environment. One wonders whether English judges are confined psychologically as they purport to be legally. The judges deem themselves limited to reading the words of a statute. But can they really escape placing the words in the context of their minds, which after all are not automata applying legal logic but repositories of all sorts of assumptions and impressions?” 48 49 50
Van Alstine (op. cit. fn. 3), 687-688. Du Plessis (op. cit. fn. 12), 107. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, (1947) 2 The Record of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 231-2.
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Kelsen further argues that the interpretative process is driven by political choices:51 “The view that it is the function of interpretation to find the ‘true’ meaning of the law is based on an erroneous concept of interpretation (…). The decision of a judicial authority renders binding (…) one of several meanings of a legal norm, all equally possible from a logical point of view. The choice of interpretation as a law-making act is determined by political motives.” The resort to a life buoy such as the golden rule to rescue the literal approach or the necessity to turn to the mischief rule or intuitionalism are all indicative of the fact that the narrow literalist approach is not tenable and needs to be augmented or even replaced. However, intentionalism and even a purposive approach have failed to provide a single satisfactory approach to the interpretation of statutes.52 The English and Scottish Law Commission in their report on interpretation refers to the inadequacies of language and draftsmanship as a serious drawback in the interpretation of statutes:53 “To place undue emphasis on the literal meaning of the words of a provision is to assume an unattainable perfection in draftsmanship; it presupposes that the draftsmen can always choose words to describe the situations intended to be covered by the provision which will leave no room for a difference of opinion as to their meaning. Such an approach ignores the limitations of language, which is not infrequently demonstrated even at the level of the House of Lords when Law Lords differ as to the so-called ‘plain meaning’ of words.” One of the main arguments for the literalist approach is that it promotes legal certainty.54 Legal certainty, however, is often more apparent than real.55 In Savage v CIR56 Schreiner, a South African appeal judge, remarks that “what seems a clear meaning to one man may not seem clear to another”. He goes on to say that the literal meaning is not something that is revealed to judges by a sort of authentic dictionary, but simply what individual judges think is the literal meaning. This observation recognises the fact that language is 51
52 53
54 55
56
Kelsen, Law of the United Nations, New York 1964, Preface XV. See also Van Alstine (op. cit. fn. 3), 713-715. See Van Alstine (op. cit. fn. 3), 713-715. The English and Scottish Law Commission, Law Commission Report no. 21, 1969, para. 30. See for instance Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd [1980] 2 All ER 696, at 705. Cowen (op. cit. fn. 42), 152; Du Plessis (op. cit. fn. 12), 282; Venter v R 1907 TS 910, at 913. 1951 4 SA 400 (A) 410.
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often imprecise, that one word may have several meanings depending on the context in which it is used and that statutory language is often couched in very wide terms allowing a large measure of discretion in the manner in which such a provision can be applied in practice.57 The reference to the intention of the legislature as a modification to the literalist approach is often no more than a pretence to rely only on the actual words of the text itself. In many cases where reference is made to the intention of the legislature, the intention is based simply on the words used in the statute itself.58 Any reference to the history of the act and its enactment or other extra textual contexts, is expressly rejected.59 These shortcomings were clearly recognised by the English and Scottish Law Commission. They stated that many courts in Great Britain tended to over-emphasise the narrow version of the literalist approach and that they refuse to go beyond the meaning of a statutory provision in the light of its immediate and obvious context.60 The Commission proposed that courts should follow a purposive approach to interpretation, namely an approach in which the general underlying purpose of a statute would be promoted by the interpretation to an interpretation which would not. This approach was subsequently embraced by English courts, but did not signify as radical a move away from literalism (as expressed in Grey v Pearson)61 as one may have expected.62
IV. Conclusion Clear and unambiguous language is mostly still regarded as a statute’s first and primary source of meaning.63 As late as 1969 the Law Commission in England concluded that there was a tendency amongst many judges to rely too heavily on a narrow version of the literal rule and a refusal to go beyond the immediate language and obvious context.64 The Commission proposed
57 58
59 60
61 62 63 64
Cowen (op. cit. fn. 42), 152; Van Alstine (op. cit. fn. 3), 713-714. See for instance Shenker v The Master 1936 AD 136 at 142; Bhayat v Commissioner for Immigration 1932 AD 1125, at 129; HRH Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover v Attorney General [1955] 3 All ER 647. See also R v McIntosh [1995] 1 SCR 686, at 704. Cowen (op. cit. fn. 12), 383-384. The English and Scottish Law Commission, Law Commission Report no. 21, 1969, para. 80; Bell/Engle (op. cit. fn. 9), 17; Cowen (op. cit. fn. 42), 152. (1857) 6 HL Cas 61, at 106. See Bell/Engle (op. cit. fn. 9), 18. Cowen (op. cit. fn. 12), 378; Du Plessis (op. cit. fn. 10), 29. The English and Scottish Law Commission, Law Commission Report no. 21, 1969, para. 80; Bell/Engle (op. cit. fn. 9), 17.
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that judges should adopt a purposive approach to statutory interpretation.65 The purposive approach is akin to the old mischief rule, but it goes wider in that it also embraces the positive purposes underlying any legislation. Although judges in many jurisdictions have adopted the purposive approach, there is still a tendency to rely simply on a literalist approach unless there is some ambiguity in a statute or where the original interpretation leads to absurd or unacceptable results.66 Judges are still reluctant to abandon the traditional literalist approach to interpretation and adopt a more nuanced and integrated approach where the literal interpretation is but the starting point.67
C. Literalism and the CISG I.
Introduction
The CISG contains an important provision on the interpretation of the Convention in Art. 7 CISG. Art. 7 CISG firstly establishes the principle of autonomous interpretation, namely that the Convention must be interpreted free from any preconceptions based on domestic law.68 Rather the interpretation is to be based on the international character of the Convention and the need to promote uniformity in its application.69 The provisions of Art. 7 CISG deal with the central goals and principles, but do not give express guidance about the method of interpretation.70 These goals and principles are important when a contextual and purposive approach to interpretation is followed.
65
66
67
68
69
70
The English and Scottish Law Commission, Law Commission Report no. 21, 1969, para. 80. See for instance U.S. v. Gonzales 520 U.S. 1, 117 S.Ct. 1032; Rhodes v Allied Dunbar Pension Services Ltd and others Re Offshore Ventilation Ltd [1988] 1 All ER 524. Steyn, Democracy through Law – Selected Speeches and Judgments, Aldershot 2004, 42-44; Sullivan (op. cit. fn. 9), 7; Randburg Town Council v Kerksay Investments (Pty) Ltd 1998 1 SA 98 (SCA). DiMatteo et al. (op. cit. fn. 3), 311 et seq.; Kritzer/Eiselen (op. cit. fn. 1), § 85:11 (a); Magnus (op. cit. fn. 1), Art. 7 no. 12; Schlechtriem, in: Schlechtriem/ Schwenzer (op. cit. fn. 1), Art. 7 no. 5, 19. Kritzer/Eiselen (op. cit. fn. 1), § 85:8; Magnus (op. cit. fn. 1), Art. 7 no. 20; Schlechtriem, in: Schlechtriem/Schwenzer (op. cit. fn. 1), Art. 7 no. 14. Magnus (op. cit. fn. 1), Art. 7 no. 30; Schlechtriem, in: Schlechtriem/Schwenzer (op. cit. fn. 1), Art. 7 no. 19.
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Approach Advocated by Commentators
Magnus is of the opinion that although a definite interpretative approach has as yet not been established in the case law internationally, there have been signs that the gap between the different approaches found in the Common Law and Civil Law countries, is closing.71 The leading commentaries on the CISG seem to advocate a literalist approach to the interpretation of the CISG.72 In his discussion on the methods of interpretation, Schlechtriem states: “The first step is the literal interpretation by having regard to the wording. Only if that does not produce an answer, should recourse be had to the purpose of the provision; when so doing, the travaux préparatoires must be used as a guide.” Magnus supports this approach stating that in the interests of uniformity it is important that the ordinary meaning of the words used should not be abandoned too easily by reverting to a teleological or purposive interpretation whereby different national courts establish their own interpretations of specific words or provisions or solutions.73 This approach has also been echoed in the case law. In the MCC-Marble Ceramic case74 the court states: “One of the primary factors motivating the negotiation and adoption of the CISG was to provide parties to international contracts for the sale of goods with some degree of certainty as to the principles of law that would govern potential disputes and remove the previous doubt regarding which party’s legal system might otherwise apply. (…) Courts applying the CISG cannot, therefore, upset the parties’ reliance on the Convention by substituting familiar principles of domestic law when the Convention requires a different result. We may only achieve the directives of good faith and uniformity in contracts under the CISG by interpreting and applying the plain language of article 8(3) as written and obeying its directive to consider this type of parol evidence.” One of the difficulties of interpreting the CISG is that many of its provisions contain formulations that are broadly stated in the style of Civil Law codes.75 The following non-exhaustive list of examples can be mentioned: 71 72
73 74
75
Magnus (op. cit. fn. 1), Art. 7 no. 30. Magnus (op. cit. fn. 1), Art. 7 no. 32; Schlechtriem, in: Schlechtriem/Schwenzer (op. cit. fn. 1), Art. 7 no. 21. See also Mann (op. cit. fn. 4), 377-378. Magnus (op. cit. fn. 1), Art. 7 no. 32. United States, 29 June 1998, Federal Appellate Court, 11th Circuit, MCCMarble Ceramic Center v. Ceramica Nuova D’Agostino, available at http:// cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980629u1.html, 1388-1389. Andersen (op. cit. fn. 3), 31; DiMatteo et al. (op. cit. fn. 3), 317-318, 319-320.
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•
Art. 3(1) CISG: (…) to supply a substantial part of the materials (…); Art. 3(2) CISG: (…) in which the preponderant part of the obligations (…); Art. 8(2) CISG: (…) according to the understanding that a reasonable person of the same kind as the party would have had (…); Art. 25 CISG: (…) as substantially deprive him of what he is entitled to expect (…); Art. 35 CISG: (…) fit for the purpose for which goods of the same kind would ordinarily be used (…);76 Art. 39: (…) specifying the nature of the lack of conformity within a reasonable time after he has discovered (…) [Author’s emphasis].
• • • • •
In applying these broadly stated rules, courts are faced with a difficult task in fostering a uniform interpretation or application of the CISG if regard is had only to the wording of the specific provision.77 These examples show that in many instances courts should consider not only the wording in a literalist approach, but should use other interpretative aids such as the travaux préparatoires and comparative international material when interpreting and applying the provisions of the CISG. As discussed above, the literalist approach is often deceptive and misleading in its simplicity. The words used in the CISG may also be deceptively familiar to judges who may impose their understanding of domestic concepts on those words, rather than a more universal approach taking into account the context and different understandings of those words. The differences in interpretation of Art. 35(2)(a) CISG about the quality of goods provides a good example and is discussed below. The literalist approach contains further dangers when applied to the CISG. The Convention exists in six official languages which are, in theory in any case, of equal interpretative importance. Where there is a discrepancy between the various language versions, commentators agree that courts should aim towards a uniform interpretation, even if it means discarding or neglecting one of the versions.78 There also seems to be a consensus that in some cases the English (or sometimes the French) text may express the intention of the drafters better than the other languages as English was the 76
77
78
See for instance Netherlands, 15 October 2002, Netherlands Arbitration Institute, Case no. 2319 (Condensate crude oil mix case), available at http://cisgw3. law.pace.edu/cases/021015n1.html, which dealt with the different meanings that could be given to this provision. The court referred extensively to the travaux préparatoires as well as foreign case law and academic commentary in determining the interpretation of this Article. Zeller, The UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, (2000) 12 Pace International Law Review (Pace Intl LR), 79-106, at no. 39-40. Magnus (op. cit. fn. 1), Art. 7 no. 33; Schlechtriem, in: Schlechtriem/Schwenzer (op. cit. fn. 1), Art. 7 no. 21.
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dominant language during the discussions and was also the language used by the drafting committee.79
III. General Approaches to the Interpretation of Conventions English courts have recognised from an early stage that the interpretation of treaties needs to be treated differently from domestic legislation even in those cases where the treaty is incorporated into the domestic law by reenacting the treaty as a whole.80 In James Buchanan & Co Ltd v Babco Forwarding and Shipping (UK) Ltd81 the court states: “I think that the correct approach is to interpret the English text which after all is likely to be used by many others than British businessmen, in a normal manner, appropriate for the interpretation of an international convention, unconstrained by technical rules of English law, or by English legal precedent but on broad principles of general acceptation (Stag Line Ltd v Foscolo, Mango & Co Ltd ([1932] AC 328 at 350, [1931] All ER Rep 666 and 677), per Lord Macmillan). Moreover, it is perfectly legitimate in my opinion to look for assistance, if assistance is needed, to the French text. This is often put in the form that resort may be had to the foreign text if (and only if) the English text is ambiguous, but I think this states the rule too technically. As Lord Diplock recently said in this House, the inherent flexibility of the English (and, one may add, any) language may make it necessary for the interpreter to have recourse to a variety of aids (Carter v Bradbeer ([1975] 3 All ER 158 at 161, [1975] 1 WLR 1204 at 1206)). There is no need to impose a preliminary test of ambiguity.” In Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd82 Lord Diplock confirmed this approach stating that the language of a convention is not chosen by an English parliamentary draftsman and is not couched in the conventional English legislative idiom.83 Furthermore, it is aimed at a much wider and more varied judicial audience than is the case with purely domestic legislation. This should be kept in mind when a convention is interpreted. For these reasons English courts should take cognisance of the travaux préparatoires when interpreting conventions like their counterparts in other parts of the world. 79
80 81 82
83
Kritzer/Eiselen (op. cit. fn. 1), § 85:11 (a); Magnus (op. cit. fn. 1), Art. 7 no. 33; Schlechtriem, in: Schlechtriem/Schwenzer (op. cit. fn. 1), Art. 7 no. 22. Bell/Engle (op. cit. fn. 9), 161-162. [1977] 3 All ER 1048, at 1052. [1980] 2 All ER 696. For a discussion of the case in CISG context see Zeller (op. cit. fn. 77), 79-106, at fn. 11 et seq. At 706.
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Lord Scarman in the same decision argues for an even wider range of interpretational aids to be taken into account:84 “We know that in the great majority of the contracting states the legislative history, (‘les travaux préparatoires’), the international case law (‘la jurisprudence’) and the writings of jurists (‘la doctrine’), would be admissible as aids to the interpretation of the convention. We know also that such sources would be used in the practice of public international law. They should, therefore, also be admissible in our courts; but they are to be used as aids only.” The interpretation of conventions in many countries is now determined by the provisions of section 3 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969. In the Fothergill case the House of Lords indicated that these provisions are in any event merely a codification of customary international law. The following provisions may be relevant:85 “Art. 31 General rule of interpretation 1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. (…) Art. 32 Supplementary means of interpretation Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: 84
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At 715. For the exposition of a similar approach in Australia see Pearce/Geddes (op. cit. fn. 4), 32-33. As to the applicability of the Convention see Andersen (op. cit. fn. 3), 32-33; Felemegas, The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Article 7 and Uniform Interpretation, (2000-2001) Pace Review of the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), 115-265 [http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/felemegas.html]. Honnold, however argues that the Convention is not applicable as it only applies to the interpretation of conventions that are designed to control sovereign states – see Honnold, Uniform Laws for International Trade: Early “Care and Feeding” for Uniform Growth, (1995) 1 International Trade and Business Law Journal, 1-10 at fn. 5. See also DiMatteo (op. cit. fn. 7), 140; Van Alstine (op. cit. fn. 3), 687-793; Zeller, Four-Corners – The Methodology for Interpretation and Application of the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 2003 [http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/4corners.html].
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(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable” [author’s emphasis].” Art. 31 presents an approach to interpretation which is in accordance with the more modern approaches to legislative interpretation, moving away from pure literalism and taking into account the context and purpose of the Convention. It is augmented by the provisions of Art. 32 that allows for certain supplementary materials to be used in interpreting treaties. It is ironic that Art. 32, which deals with the supplementary means of interpretation, should itself be ambiguous. It is not clear whether recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation in all instances in order to confirm the meaning arrived at by applying the literal-cum-purposive approach of Art. 31, or whether it can only be used in the qualifying circumstances in which the interpretation leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure or leads to a manifestly absurd or unreasonable result. The former interpretation would be in line with the more recent realist approaches to interpretation which recognise that texts which, superficially considered, reveal a clear and unambiguous meaning, may nevertheless be unclear if regard is had to the purpose of the legislation and supplementary materials.86 The latter interpretation would be more in line with the stricter approach to interpretation, only allowing supplementary materials in exceptional circumstances.87 It would seem however that generally courts are much more readily inclined to revert to supplementary materials when interpreting treaties. The approach of the English courts in the Buchanan case88 and the Fothergill case89 provides a good example.90 Surprisingly, in very few of the CISG case law consulted, has there been any reference to the Treaty Convention as an aid to interpretation.91 86
87 88
89 90
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Sullivan (op. cit. fn. 9), 433 seems to ascribe to this approach. She contrasts the position in regard to travaux préparatoires under this Convention where it is generally admissible, with the traditional Common Law approach, where it is not. She also states that the supplementary materials may be used to illuminate meaning as well as purpose. See also Pearce/Geddes (op. cit. fn. 4), 32 et seq. This is for instance the approach adopted by Mann (op. cit. fn. 4), 379 et seq. James Buchanan & Co Ltd v Babco Forwarding and Shipping (UK) Ltd [1977] 3 All ER 1048. Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd [1977] 3 All ER 616. See also Bell/Engle (op. cit. fn. 9), 161 et seq.; Kellaway (op. cit. fn. 10), 184 et seq.; Pearce/Geddes (op. cit. fn. 4), 32 et seq.; Sullivan (op. cit. fn. 9), 431 et seq. See for instance Netherlands, 15 October 2002, Netherlands Arbitration Institute, Case no. 2319 (Condensate crude oil mix case), available at http://cisgw3. law.pace.edu/cases/021015n1.html.
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IV. Trends in the Case Law An analysis of the case law shows that there are a variety of interpretational approaches that have been followed by courts when dealing with the CISG.92 The approaches range from a strict literalist approach where only the words of the text itself are considered, to an integrated purposive approach where not only the words, but also the broader context, purpose of the Convention and drafting history and comparative materials are taken into account. Unfortunately the latter approach is encountered all too rarely, with a strict literal or textual approach still holding sway.
1.
Strict Literal Approach
In view of the fact that the leading commentaries advocate a literal approach to interpretation and the prevalence of this approach in domestic legal systems, it is not surprising that a strict literalist approach to the interpretation and application of the CISG is the most prevalent approach found in the case law. In many of these cases the courts and arbitral tribunals simply quote the relevant articles and apply them to the facts before them without reference to any authority or other relevant materials.93 92
93
For an excellent analysis of the practical interpretation of the CISG under various jurisdictions and the emerging jurisprudence see DiMatteo et al. (op. cit. fn. 3), 299-240. See also the UNCITRAL Digest, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/ case_law/digests.html. See for instance United States, 7 December 1999, Federal District Court Illinois, Magellan International v. Salzgitter Handel, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace. edu/cases/991207u1.html; ICC Arbitration Case no. 11849 of 2003 (Fashion products case), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/031849i1.html; Russia, 18 October 2005, Arbitration proceeding 21/2005 (Varnish and paint machine case), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/051018r1.html; Russia, 2 June 2005, Arbitration proceeding 131/2004, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050602r1.html; United States, 5 May 2003, Federal Appellate Court, 9th Circuit, Chateau des Charmes Wines Ltd. v. Sabaté USA, Sabaté S.A., http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/030505 u1.html; Australia, 28 April 1995, Federal Dist. Ct., Adelaide Roder v. Rosedown, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950428a2.html; United States, 6 December 1995, Federal Appellate Court, 2nd Circuit, Delchi Carrier v. Rotorex, http:// cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/951206u1.html; Bulgaria, 12 March 2001, Arbitration Case 33/98, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/010312bu.html; United States, 4 April 2006, Federal District Court New Jersey, Valero Marketing v. Greeni Oy, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/060404u1.html; China, 13 January 1999, CIETAC Arbitration proceeding (Latex gloves case), http://cisgw3.law.pace. edu/cases/990113c1.html; China, 7 December 2005, CIETAC Arbitration pro-
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2. Seemingly Strict Literal Approach, but with Reference to Authority In some cases the application of the plain meaning of the words is coupled with a reference to commentary or other case law, but without any reference to context or purpose or drafting history.94 In most of the cases where there is a reference to case law or authority the courts referred only to case law or authority emanating from that particular jurisdiction.95 Ameri-
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ceeding (Heaters case), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/051207c1.html; China, 8 November 2002, CIETAC Arbitration proceeding (Canned asparagus case), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/021108c1.html; Australia, 17 January 2003, Supreme Court of Western Australia, Ginza Pte Ltd v Vista Corporation Pty Ltd), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/030117a2.html; Finland, 26 October 2000, Helsinki Court of Appeals (Plastic carpets case), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/ 001026f5.html. See for instance Switzerland, 28 October 1998, Supreme Court (Meat case), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/981028s1.html; Switzerland, 7 July 2004, Supreme Court (Cable drums case), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040707s1.html; Austria, 12 February 1998, Supreme Court (Umbrella case), http://cisgw3.law. pace.edu/cases/980212a3.html; Austria, 13 April 2000, Supreme Court (Machines case), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000413a3.html; Germany, 2 March 2005, Federal Supreme Court (Frozen pork case), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/ 050302g1.html; Germany, 3 August 2005, District Court Neubrandenburg (Pitted sour cherries case), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050803g1.html; United States, 28 May 2003, Federal District Court, Chicago Prime Packers, Inc. v. Northam Food Trading Co., et al., http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/030528u1.html; Belgium, 15 May 2002, Appellate Court Gent (Design of radio phone case), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020515b1.html. See for instance Germany, 2 March 2005, Federal Supreme Court (Frozen pork case), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050302g1.html; Germany, 9 January 2002, Supreme Court (Powdered milk case), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020109g1. html; Germany, 15 September 2004, Appellate Court München (Furniture leather case), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040915g2.html; Germany, 3 August 2005, District Court Neubrandenburg (Pitted sour cherries case), http://cisgw3. law.pace.edu/cases/050803g1.html; Germany, 15 September 2004, Appellate Court München (Furniture leather case), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/ 040915g2.html; Germany, 31 October 2001, Supreme Court (Machinery case), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/011031g1.html; Australia, 17 November 2000, Supreme Court of Queensland (Downs Investments v. Perwaja Steel), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/001117a2.html; United States, 28 September 2007, Federal District Court Kansas, Guang Dong Light Headgear Factory Co. Ltd. v. ACI International, Inc., http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/070928u2.html; United States, 28 May 2003, Federal District Court, Chicago Prime Packers, Inc. v. Northam Food Trading Co., et al., http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/030528u1.
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can courts have tended to repeat the statement that there is not much relevant case law therefore entitling them to turn to similar domestic legislation (namely the Uniform Commercial Code),96 despite the fact that there has been quite a dramatic increase in the number of reported cases which is easily available from a number of sources, most notably the Pace Institute of In-
96
html; United States, 28 March 2002, Federal District Court Illinois, Usinor Industeel v. Leeco Steel Products, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020328u1.html; United States, 28 August 2001, Federal District Court Illinois, Zapata Hermanos v. Hearthside Baking http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/010828u1.html; United States, 22 November 2002, Federal District Court Florida, Impuls v. PsionTeklogix, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/021122u1.html; United States, 6 December 1995, Federal Appellate Court, 2nd Circuit, Delchi Carrier v. Rotorex, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/951206u1.html; Austria, 6 February 1996, Supreme Court (Propane case), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960206a3.html; Austria, 9 March 2000, Supreme Court (Roofing material case), http://cisgw3. law.pace.edu/cases/000309a3.html; Belgium, 15 May 2002, Appellate Court Gent (Design of radio phone case), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020515b1.html; Austria, 12 February 1998, Supreme Court (Umbrella case), http://cisgw3. law.pace.edu/cases/980212a3.html; Spain, 7 June 2003, Appellate Court Valencia, Cherubino Valsangiacomo, S.A. v. American Juice Import, Inc., http:// cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/030607s4.html; Switzerland, 28 October 1998, Supreme Court (Meat case), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/981028s1.html; Switzerland, 7 July 2004, Supreme Court (Cable drums case), http://cisgw3.law. pace.edu/cases/040707s1.html. See for instance United States, 6 December 1995, Federal Appellate Court, 2nd Circuit, Delchi Carrier v. Rotorex, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/951206u1. html; United States, 29 June 1998, Federal Appellate Court, 11th Circuit, MCCMarble Ceramic Center v. Ceramica Nuova D’Agostino, http://cisgw3.law.pace. edu/cases/980629u1.html; United States, 6 July 2004, Federal District Court, Raw Materials Inc. v. Manfred Forberich GmbH & Co., KG, http://cisgw3.law.pace. edu/cases/040706u1.html; United States, 23 May 2005, Federal Appellate Court, 7th Circuit, Chicago Prime Packers, Inc. v. Northam Food Trading Co., http:// cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050523u1.html; United States, 28 May 2003, Federal District Court, Chicago Prime Packers, Inc. v. Northam Food Trading Co., et al., http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/030528u1.html; United States, 6 April 1998, Federal District Court New York, Calzaturificio Claudia v. Olivieri Footwear, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980406u1.html; United States, 19 March 2005, Federal District Court New York, Genpharm Inc. v. Pliva-Lachema A.S., http:// cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050319u1.html. For a similar approach in Australia see Australia, 12 October 2001, Supreme Court of Queensland, Court of Appeal, Downs Investments v Perwaja Steel, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/011012a2. html; Australia, 17 January 2003, Supreme Court of Western Australia, Ginza Pte Ltd v Vista Corporation Pty Ltd, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/030117a2.html.
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ternational Commercial Law website.97 For instance in the recent Genpharm case the court states:98 “The Second Circuit has recognized that “[c]aselaw interpreting analogous provisions of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”), may also inform a court where the language of the relevant CISG provisions tracks that of the UCC. However, UCC caselaw ‘is not per se applicable.’” Delchi Carrier, 71 F.3d at 1028 (quoting Orbisphere Corp. v. United States, 726 F.Supp. 1344, 1355 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1989). Here, the Court finds that caselaw interpreting contract formation under Article 2 of the UCC is helpful.” This approach must be rejected. The reference to domestic provisions that may be similar runs contrary to the clear instruction in Art. 7 CISG to heed the principle of uniformity in the interpretation of the CISG.99 Augmenting the interpretation by reference to domestic law introduces domestic concepts and understandings which might be very different from those in other jurisdictions. There is a growing body of law within which courts are starting to refer not only to other domestic decisions and authority, but also to decisions and doctrine from foreign jurisdictions.100 This development is in keeping with 197
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At http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/. There are currently more than 2,000 reported cases, a substantial number of which have been translated into English. See also the UNCITRAL CLOUT website at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/case_ law.html; the CISG website of the Law Faculty of the University of Basel at http://www.cisg-online.ch/; and the UNILEX database at http://www.unilex.info/. United States, 19 March 2005, Federal District Court New York, Genpharm Inc. v. Pliva-Lachema A.S., http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050319u1.html. See also United States, 6 July 2004, Federal District Court, Raw Materials Inc. v. Manfred Forberich GmbH & Co., KG, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040706u1.html; United States, 28 May 2003, Federal District Court, Chicago Prime Packers, Inc. v. Northam Food Trading Co., et al., http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/030528u1. html; United States, 6 December 1995, Federal Appellate Court, 2nd Circuit, Delchi Carrier v. Rotorex, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/951206u1.html; United States, 29 March 2004, U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Oregon, In re: Siskiyou Evergreen, Inc., Debtor, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040329u2. html; United States, 21 June 2002, Federal Appellate Court, 4th Circuit, (Schmitz-Werke v. Rockland), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020621u1.html. See Secretariat Commentary to Art. 6 (the draft counterpart of Art. 7(1); Kritzer/ Eiselen (op. cit. fn. 1), § 85:5; Magnus (op. cit. fn. 1), Art. 7 no. 32; Schlechtriem, in: Schlechtriem/Schwenzer (op. cit. fn. 1), Art. 7 no. 21. See for instance Netherlands, 15 October 2002, Netherlands Arbitration Institute, Case no. 2319 (Condensate crude oil mix case), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/ cases/021015n1.html; Spain, 7 June 2003, Appellate Court Valencia, Cherubino
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the requirement of Art. 7 CISG that there should be uniformity of interpretation and application.101 The most celebrated of these cases is the Italian decision in the Rheinland Versicherung case102 in which the court made refer-
101
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Valsangiacomo, S.A. v. American Juice Import, Inc., http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/ cases/030607s4.html; Spain Audiencia Provincial, Appellate Court Valencia, 7 June 2003, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/030607s4.html; Italy, 10 January 2006, District Court Padova (Merry-go-rounds case), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/ cases/060110i3.html; Italy, 25 February 2004, District Court Padova (Agricultural products case), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040225i3.html; Italy, 12 July 2000, District Court Vigevano (Rheinland Versicherungen v. Atlarex), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000712i3.html; Germany, 31 March 2008, Appellate Court Stuttgart (Automobile case), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/ 080331g1.html; Austria, 15 October 1998, Supreme Court (Timber case), http:// cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/981015a3.html; United States, 29 March 2004, Federal District Court Pennsylvania, Amco Ukrservice et al. v. American Meter Company, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040329u1.html; United States, 28 March 2002, Federal District Court Illinois, Usinor Industeel v. Leeco Steel Products, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020328u1.html; United States, 26 March 2002, Federal District Court New York, St. Paul Guardian Insurance Company et al. v. Neuromed Medical Systems & Support et al., http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/ 020326u1.html; United States, 1 June 2006, Federal District Court New York, Multi-Juice, S.A. v. Snapple Beverage Corp., http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/ 060601u1.html; Germany, 24 March 1999, Supreme Court (Vine wax case), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990324g1.html. See Secretariat Commentary to Art. 6 (the draft counterpart of Art. 7(1); Kritzer/Eiselen (op. cit. fn. 1), § 85:5; Magnus (op. cit. fn. 1), Art. 7 no. 32; Schlechtriem, in: Schlechtriem/Schwenzer (op. cit. fn. 1), Art. 7 no. 21. Italy 12 July 2000 District Court Vigevano (Rheinland Versicherungen v. Atlarex) http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000712i3.html. For a discussion of this case see DiMatteo et al. (op. cit. fn. 3), 299-440, 408, 567, 582, 589, 788, 866; Ferrari, Tribunale di Vigevano: Specific Aspects of the CISG Uniformly Dealt With, (2001) 20 Journal of Law and Commerce 225-239; Mazzotta, The International Character of the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: An Italian Case Example (June 2003), at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/ cisg/biblio/mazzotta.html. Saint ‘Elia, Editorial Comment, http://cisgw3.law.pace. edu/cases/000712i3.html, remarks: “In a remarkable opinion of the Tribunale di Vigevano, Judge Alessandro Rizzieri, not only sought to apply the provisions of the CISG faithfully to the letter and spirit of the uniform law, but in so doing he also exhibited a willingness to employ the very means which so many jurists and scholars have exhorted courts and arbitral panels to use. Judge Rizzieri cited American, Austrian, Dutch, French, German, Italian, and Swiss court cases contained in national reporters, ICC arbitral awards, as well as two CISG websites and UNILEX. Conspicuously absent are references to civilian commentaries and
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ence to an impressive array of foreign decisions. It is, however, not always easy to discern whether courts who refer to other case law and doctrine get beyond a literal interpretation of the specific provisions or not. Maybe one should conclude that in referring to these other sources, in keeping with the requirements of Art. 7 CISG to heed the international character of the CISG and aim at uniformity of decision, is in line with a contextual and purposive approach to the interpretation of the Convention. The difficulty, though, is that the courts in many instances do not use language or a clearly discernible approach which could be classified as purposive.
3.
Integrated Purposive Approach – Reference to International Character, Underlying Principles and Travaux Préparatoires
Art. 7 CISG and the Preamble to the CISG provide some of the context and objects that must be used in the interpretation of the Convention. There is a growing number of cases in which the courts have relied on these provisions to aid them in the interpretation of the Convention. The American Medical Marketing case103 provides a good example of a court taking the international character of the Convention into account in interpreting Art. 35 CISG. There are also quite a few cases where courts have made reference to the underlying principles of the CISG.104 Although there is some debate about
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treatises. For the most part, the judge firmly followed the majority and prevalent views announced by the above-mentioned tribunals.” United States, 17 May 1999, Federal District Court Louisiana, Medical Marketing v. Internazionale Medico Scientifica, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990517u1. html. For a discussion of this case see DiMatteo et al. (op. cit. fn. 3), 299-440 at fn. 590. See also Germany, 20 April 1994, Appellate Court Frankfurt (New Zealand mussels case), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/940420g1.html; United States, 6 April 1998, Federal District Court New York, Calzaturificio Claudia v. Olivieri Footwear, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980406u1.html; Germany, 25 June 1997, Appellate Court Karlsruhe (Surface protective film case), http:// cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970625g1.html; Switzerland, 7 May 1993, District Court Laufen, Canton Berne (Automatic storage system case), http://cisgw3.law. pace.edu/cases/930507s1.html. Netherlands, 10 February 2005, Netherlands Arbitration Institute (interim award), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050210n1.html; Netherlands, 28 January 2005, Supreme Court, B.V.B.A. Vergo Kwekerijen v. Defendant, http://cisgw3. law.pace.edu/cases/050128n1.html; United States, 19 November 2002, Federal Appellate Court, 7th Circuit, Zapata Hermanos v. Hearthside Baking, http:// cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/021119u1.html; China, 8 November 2002, CIETAC Arbitration proceeding (Canned asparagus case), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/
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the nature and identification of the underlying principles, there is at least consensus about a number of these underlying principles such as party autonomy, full compensation, freedom of contract, good faith, estoppel and reasonable reliance.105 In one case a Dutch arbitral panel regarded the provisions of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts as representative of such principles.106 Van Alstine states that the new generation of commercial conventions calls for a dynamic role and approach by the judiciary in the development of the law within their scope by employing appropriate interpretational techniques. The case that probably best illustrates the dynamic and integrated approach that is necessary in the interpretation of the CISG is the Dutch Condensate crude oil mix case.107 In this case the arbitral panel had to interpret Art. 35(2)(a) CISG which deals with a presumption that goods are non-conforming unless they are “fit for the purposes for which goods of the same description would ordinarily be used”. The tribunal refers to the fact that in the case law and doctrine up to that date there had been three distinct approaches that had been used or supported. It states: “[68] The Arbitral Tribunal, thus, finds that the dispute between the parties is to be analysed under Article 35(2)(a) CISG which requires that the goods are fit for the purposes for which goods of the same description would ordinarily be
105
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cases/021108c1.html; Germany, 31 October 2001, Supreme Court (Machinery case), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/011031g1.html; Finland, 26 October 2000, Helsinki Court of Appeals (Plastic carpets case), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/ 001026f5.html; Austria, 7 September 2000, Supreme Court (Tombstones case), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000907a3.html; Colombia, 10 May 2000, Constitutional Court, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000510c7.html; China, 13 January 1999, CIETAC Arbitration proceeding (Latex gloves case), http://cisgw3.law. pace.edu/cases/990113c1.html; Switzerland, 28 October 1998, Supreme Court (Meat case), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/981028s1.html; Switzerland, 5 November 1998, District Court Sissach (Summer cloth collection case), http:// cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/981105s1.html; ICC Arbitration Case no. 9117 of March 1998, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/989117i1.html; France, 23 October 1996, Appellate Court Grenoble, Gaec des Beauches v. Teso Ten Elsen, http:// cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/961023f1.html. DiMatteo (op. cit. fn. 7), 144 et seq.; Kritzer/Eiselen (op. cit. fn. 1), § 85:13; Magnus (op. cit. fn. 1), Art. 7 no. 40-57; Schlechtriem, in: Schlechtriem/Schwenzer (op. cit. fn. 1), Art. 7 no. 30; Zeller (op. cit. fn. 77), 79-106. Netherlands, 10 February 2005, Netherlands Arbitration Institute (interim award), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050210n1.html. Netherlands, 15 October 2002, Netherlands Arbitration Institute, Case no. 2319 (Condensate crude oil mix case), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/021015n1. html.
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used. In this respect, three interpretations exist. According to a first line of thought, Article 35(2)(a) requires that the seller delivers goods which are of a merchantable quality. This interpretation goes back to the drafting history of CISG. During the negotiations of CISG, the question arose how the provision of the draft on conformity of goods, absent contract specification or particular purpose, should be interpreted. At that time, it became clear that the English common law countries favoured merchantable quality whereas the civil law continental European rule was to the effect that average quality is required. In order to clarify the draft, the Canadian delegation proposed to endorse the civil law rule by also including an average quality rule. However, during the negotiations, the Canadian amendment was withdrawn. This background has been mentioned in the German New Zealand Mussels case but was considered not to be relevant there because the mussels were both merchantable and of average quality (Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt, April 20, 1994, Unilex database [see also http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/940420g1.html], referring to RIW 1994, 593, confirmed by Bundesgerichtshof, March 8, 1995, Unilex database [see also English translation available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/ 950308g3.html]). No case law could be found which inferred from the travaux préparatoires that the continental rule was not to be adopted and that merchantable quality is sufficient. [69] The second view is that the average quality rule is to be adopted in relation to CISG cases (for one such instance, see without further references, Landgericht Berlin, September 15, 1994, Unilex database [see also English translation available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/940915g1.html]). [70] Scholarly writings have mentioned the problem (see …) but later publications, even among civil law scholars, are divided between merchantable and average quality (see…) with a majority of Germanic writers endorsing the average quality rule based upon similar rules in the German, Austrian and Swiss civil codes. Some other authors have taken positions similar to the majority view but with some qualifications based on the concrete circumstances of the case such as a buyer ordering goods from a specialized manufacturer (entitled to above-average quality) or a buyer who under specific circumstances could not expect average quality (entitled to below-average but still satisfactory quality) (see…). Finally, some French authors have specifically stated that the average quality rule of the French Civil Code is not applicable to CISG cases (Heuzé, V., o.c., 219, Audit, B., La vente internationale de marchandises, Paris, LGDJ, 1990, 96). [71] Finally, a third theory rejects both opinions mentioned above and states that neither merchantability nor average quality fit within the CISG system. This theory rather suggests a reasonable quality (see…). One case has endorsed this theory in holding that the buyer’s reasonable expectations are to be taken into account (Arbitral Award, June 5, 1998, Arbitration Institute, Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Unilex database [see also English text available at http:// cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980605s5.html], unpublished in hard copy).”
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The tribunal then goes on to find that the provisions of Art. 7(2) CISG require an autonomous solution, based neither on the Common Law test of merchantable quality or Civil Law test of average quality.108 It therefore opts for the third option which it regards as a neutral solution which is in conformance with the travaux préparatoires of the Convention.109 This case is surprisingly also one of the few cases to have made actual use of the travaux préparatoires of the CISG.110
D. Conclusion There is an appealing simplicity to the call by literalists that the interpreter should consider only the actual words of a statute or the CISG unless there is an ambiguity or gap or where that interpretation would lead to an absurdity. But it is too simple. Words are never free from the contexts within which they are used and the interpreters are likely to be influenced by their own preconceptions about the meaning of certain familiar terms. When judges or arbitrators are faced with a text which is international and aimed at international harmony of trade law, such as the CISG, they should take extra care in ensuring that they conform to the prescripts of Art. 7 CISG which calls for interpretation that takes cognisance of its internationality, the need for uniformity and the observance of good faith, the underlying principles of the Convention and the need to refrain from using domestic law. The interpreters can only do so if they approach the text of the CISG with as many interpretational aids as possible to ensure that they
108 109 110
Para. [107] to [117]. Para. [118]. See also Italy, 26 November 2002, District Court Rimini, Al Palazzo S.r.l. v. Bernardaud di Limoges S.A., http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/021126i3.html; Germany, 20 April 1994, Appellate Court Frankfurt (New Zealand mussels case), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/940420g1.html; Spain, 7 June 2003, Appellate Court Valencia, Cherubino Valsangiacomo, S.A. v. American Juice Import, Inc., http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/030607s4.html; United States, 28 March 2002, Federal District Court Illinois, Usinor Industeel v. Leeco Steel Products, http:// cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020328u1.html; United States, 27 July 2001, Federal District Court California, Asante Technologies v. PMC-Sierra, http://cisgw3.law. pace.edu/cases/010727u1.html; United States, 22 November 2002, Federal District Court Florida, Impuls v. Psion-Teklogix, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/ 021122u1.html; United States, 19 November 2002, Federal Appellate Court, 7th Circuit, Zapata Hermanos v. Hearthside Baking, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/ 021119u1.html, does not state authority or sources; Van Alstine (op. cit. fn. 3), 743-745.
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take sufficient notice of the international context of the Convention and the underlying purposes. There are a number of valuable aids that are available to interpreters of the CISG, namely the rich and well documented drafting history (travaux préparatoires), a wealth of excellent commentaries and academic comment and an ever-growing body of case law which is readily accessible. The rules of interpretation in most jurisdictions now recognise that these aids are admissible in interpreting conventions and there is strong evidence that they are used in many instances. The reasoned use of the widest array of interpretational aids is the best guarantee for an understanding and application of the CISG that is uniform.111 A too strict adherence to the words only bears with it the risk that the ideal of uniformity will be undermined. 111
For a similar conclusion see Van Alstine (op. cit. fn. 3), 690-691.
Legislative Intention and the CISG Urs Peter Gruber
A. Legislative Intention and Interpretation I.
Legislative Intention as Goal of Interpretation
It is widely accepted that an important goal of interpretation is to give effect to the intention of the legislator. This goal has not only been recognised in Civil Law systems but has also been confirmed by judges and scholars of Common Law states.1 In English law, it is a traditional rule that a “statute is the will of the legislature; and the fundamental rule of interpretation, to which all others are subordinate, is that a statute is to be expounded according to the intent of them that made it”.2 It should be noted however that in many legal systems interpretation can at times go beyond the original will of the legislator. This has sometimes been described as an “updating construction”3 or “dynamic interpretation”.4 Still, it seems that an updating or dynamic interpretation does not necessarily depart from the concept of legislative intention. In many cases, the goal of a dynamic interpretation lies in ascertaining a presumed will of the legislator in situations which, especially due to changing economic, political or cultural circumstances, have not really been thought of by the legislator.5 So at least in these cases, dynamic interpretation is probably not in opposition to the concept of legislative intention. It should rather be seen as a complementary concept.
1
2 3
4
5
For further references see Gruber, Methoden des internationalen Einheitsrechts, Tübingen 2004, 88 et seq. Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (by Wyatt Paine), 6th ed., London 1920, 1. Bennion, Statutory Interpretation, 3rd ed., London 1997, Section 158 (359) und Section 288 (686 et seq.). Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 University of Pennsylvania Law Review (1998), 687 et seq. For a detailed discussion on whether or not the CISG can be developed and modernised by means of interpretation see the contribution by Meyer (in this book).
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So all in all, it can be said that discerning the intention of the legislator as a goal of interpretation – although not completely undisputed6 – is widely supported in most legal systems. The concept of legislative intention therefore can supposedly also be used for the interpretation of the CISG. This is additionally supported by the fact that the CISG is an international convention and that, in the field of international conventions, discerning the will of the Contracting States constitutes an accepted goal of interpretation.7
II.
Discerning Legislative Intention in National Law
Whereas the goal of interpretation is not really in doubt, there is more controversy as to the means by which this goal can be reached. It seems rather obvious that any interpretation has to begin with the inquiry of the words of the law.8 It is for the courts to construe these words, hereby taking account of the structure of the provisions concerned, and – by doing so – to give effect to the will of the legislator.9 But apart from that, it is quite doubtful whether or not there are other means by which the intention of the legislator can be ascertained. In Civil Law countries there is wide consent that the legislative history in general and the drafting records (travaux préparatoires) in particular can be used for the interpretation of national law.10 Moreover, it is widely accepted that one has to take into consideration the purpose of the law which, 16
17
18
19
10
In national debate it has been asserted that a “will” in a strict sense can a priori only be formed by a natural person, not by legislatures. It has been asserted that “intent is elusive for a natural person, fictive for a collective body” (see Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y (1994), 61, 68). This criticism does not seem convincing as a decision of a collective body is based on the will of the natural persons belonging to that collective body. It has to be noted however that the CISG imposes no obligations on the Contracting States in their conduct as sovereign entities, but merely regulates the relations between buyer und seller in a private contract. As it is thus a “legislative treaty”, discerning the will of the Contracting States might not be as important as in treaties which impose obligations on the Contracting States as such. See Van Alstine (op. cit. fn. 4), 687, 705 et seq. Eskridge Jr./Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term – Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 Harvard Law Review (1994), 26, 57; Bennion (op. cit. fn. 3), Section 151 (344). See Lord Griffith in the leading case Pepper v Hart (3 W.L.R. 1032, 1040 C, (H.L. 1992)): “The object of the court in interpreting legislation is to give effect so far as the language permits to the intention of the legislature.” For further references see Gruber (op. cit. fn. 1), 163 et seq.
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inter alia, can be ascertained by the travaux préparatoires.11 In some cases the purposive approach can modify the result that has been reached by a purely textual interpretation.12 This can even be the case if the text of the law appears to be clear and unambiguous at first sight.13 The picture is less clear in Common Law countries. In England, the use of travaux préparatoires has for a long time been rejected by the courts. The same has been basically true – apart from some traditionally accepted exceptions14 – for arguments based on the purpose of the law. So at least at first sight, there seems to have been a fundamental difference between the methods of interpretation used on the continent and in England.15 It was only in 1994 – in the leading case Pepper v Hart16 – that the House of Lords accepted the use of travaux préparatoires under certain circumstances.17 It can be also said that reasoning based on the purpose of a statute has lately gained more and more acceptance.18 Therefore, the previously assumed gap between the Civil Law methods of interpretation and the methods used in
11 12
13
14
15
16 17
18
Gruber (op. cit. fn. 1), 183 et seq. See – claiming that the purposive interpretation has paramount importance – Hassold, Strukturen der Gesetzesauslegung, in: Canaris et al. (eds.), Festschrift für Karl Larenz zum 80. Geburtstag, Munich 1983, 211, 236 et seq. See for instance Kramer, Juristische Methodenlehre, 3rd ed., Munich 2005, 73 et seq; Looschelders/Roth, Juristische Methodik im Prozess der Rechtsanwendung, Berlin 1996, 24 et seq. At least from a Civil Law perspective, the traditionally accepted mischief rule could be characterised as a form of purposive interpretation (see Vogenauer, Die Auslegung von Gesetzen in England und auf dem Kontinent, Tübingen 2001, 676 et seq.). For an underlying reason for this see Wendehorst, Relations: The State as a Foundation of Private Law Reasoning, 56 American Journal of Comparative Law (Am. J. Comp. L.) (2008), 567, 582 (“(…) textualism has often been used by the judiciary as a means to hold statutory law in check and to preserve in the traditional common law a realm of freedom from the state.”). Pepper v Hart (3 W.L.R. 1032, 1040 C, (H.L. 1992)). For a detailed discussion of the case see Bates, The Contempory Use of Legislative History in the United Kingdom, 54 Cambridge Law Journal (1995), 127 et seq.; Eskridge Jr., The Circumstances of Politics and the Application of Statutes, 100 Columbia Law Review (2000), 558, 569 et seq.; Miers, Taxing Perks and Interpreting Statutes, 56 Modern Law Review (1993), 695 et seq.; Vogenauer (op. cit. fn. 14), 969 et seq. For an in-depth analysis of the purposive approach in the English court practice see Vogenauer (op. cit. fn. 14), 963 et seq.
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England seems to have somewhat decreased or even, as some say, almost diminished.19 In the United States there is an opposite development. The use of travaux préparatoires and the purposive interpretation have for a long time been allowed in the courts.20 But the late 1980s witnessed the rise of a new formalistic method of interpretation. This method – commonly referred to as “new textualism” – merely focuses on the text of the law and rejects the use of travaux préparatoires and any notions of legislative purpose.21 As the new textualism has been fervently advocated by several Justices of the Supreme Court – such as Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas22 – it cannot be said that it is merely a passing phenomenon. On the contrary, it seems that the new textualism has gained considerable practical importance. It influences the day-to-day practice of the courts.23 In summary it can thus be said that within the various legal systems there are divergent attitudes as to the use or disuse of legislative history and the 19
20
21
22
23
See Vogenauer (op. cit. fn. 14), 963 et seq. and 1254 et seq.; Zimmermann, Roman Law, Contemporary Law, European Law. The Civilian Tradition Today, Oxford 2001, 184 et seq. See for instance Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 Columbia Law Review (1997), 673, 674 (“For more than a century, the Supreme Court has relied on the legislative history accompanying a statute to determine legislative “intent” in cases of statutory ambiguity.”). For details see Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law, Princeton 1997. Scalia (op. cit. fn. 21). See also Mank, Is a Textualist Approach to Statutory Interpretation Pro-Environmentalist?: Why Pragmatic Agency Decisionmaking Is Better than Judicial Literalism, 53 Washington and Lee Law Review (1996), 1231, 1237 and Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 Wash. University Law Quarterly (1994), 351, 351 (both authors suggest that Justice Thomas approves of Justice Scalia’s textualist approach). See Frickey, Revisiting the Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation: A Lecture in Honor of Irving Younger, 84 Minnesota Law Review (1999), 199, 205 (“Justice Scalia’s arguments have had some effect upon the Supreme Court. The Court is less likely to cite legislative history today, and when it does, the citations seem less important to the outcome. The Court pays careful attention to statutory text and is much more likely than in earlier eras to use dictionaries to assist in constructing textual meaning.”); Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 Michigan Law Review (1994), 1, 46 (“The Court in recent years has placed greater reliance on dictionary definitions and the canons of construction and somewhat less reliance on legislative history.”); Sunstein, Interpreting the Statues in the Regulatory State, 103 Harvard Law Review (1989), 407, 415 (“Textualism appears to be enjoying a renaissance in a number of recent cases.”).
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use or disuse of the “purposive approach”. Additionally, it seems that the methods of interpretation can fall under the influence of trends.24 These trends can be based on constitutional concerns as for instance the separation of powers. Apart from that they can apparently also be influenced, as seems to be the case in the United States, by the political attitudes of the acting judges and scholars.25
III. Discerning Legislative Intention in the CISG 1.
“Autonomous” Methods of Interpretation in the CISG
As Art. 7(1) CISG calls for a uniform application of the CISG, it is generally accepted that there have to be autonomous methods of interpretation.26 When applying the CISG, one has to leave behind domestic preconceptions of interpretation. However controversial the discussion on the national level might be, the viewpoint adopted there cannot merely be transferred to the interpretation of the CISG.27 As for now, the controversies at the national level do not seem to have a decisive impact on the main-stream discussion on the CISG.28 With respect
24 25
26
27
28
Van Alstine (op. cit. fn. 4), 687, 716. Many authors have observed that actually textualists tend to be politically conservative (see Amar, Intratextualism, 112 Harv. L. Rev. (1999), 747, 801 no. 204; Eskridge Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. (1990), 621, 668; Killebrew, Where are all the left-wing textualists?, 82 New York University Law Review (N.Y.U.L. Rev.) (2007), 1895 et seq.). See Bonell, in: Bianca/Bonell, Commentary on the International Sales Convention, Milan 1987, Art. 7, at 72 stating that interpreting the CISG means “first of all to avoid relying on the rules traditionally followed in interpreting ordinary domestic legislation”. For further references see Ferrari, Interpretation of the Convention and gap-filling, in: Ferrari/Flechtner/Brand (eds.), The Draft UNCITRAL Digest and Beyond, Munich 2003, 138, 140. See also the famous English case of Fothergill v Monarch Airlines [1980] 2 All E.R. 696 (H.L.). In this case – which was not governed by the CISG – four of five judges of the House of Lords made reference to the legislative history in order to interpret a provision of an international convention. It seems, however, that the US Supreme Court has applied a predominantly textual approach not only for the interpretation of domestic law, but also for the interpretation of international treaties (see Van Alstine (op. cit. fn. 4), 687, 722 et seq.).
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to the interpretation of the CISG, there is a broad consensus that both legislative history and the purposive approach can and should be used.29 Indeed, the use of travaux préparatoires and purposive arguments is not explicitly prescribed, but suggested by the CISG. Art. 7(1) CISG stipulates that in the interpretation of the Convention, regard is to be had to its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application. As most Member States of the CISG use travaux préparatoires and purposive arguments in their national law, it would impede uniformity if an interpreter, when applying the CISG, confined himself a priori to a purely textual interpretation.30 Furthermore, a purely textual approach would not be in line with Art. 7(2) CISG. The provision deals with matters governed by the Convention that are not expressly settled therein. Art. 7(2) CISG gives the judge the right to take recourse to the general principles upon which the Convention is based. Although the provision deals with gap-filling – not with interpretation – it is also relevant for the methods of interpretation as it clearly puts a stop to any formalistic approach. In the light of Art. 7(2) CISG it would appear contradictory if the judge, who in the field of gap-filling is given considerable leeway, was restricted to a formalistic textual approach in the field of interpretation. Apart from the arguments derived from Art. 7 CISG, a purely textual approach – leaving aside the question whether it is convincing on a national level31 – simply would not work in the field of international conventions such as the CISG. The arguments brought forward in favour of a purely textual approach are not transferable to the interpretation of the CISG. This is certainly true for the utilitarian assertion that a purely textual approach 29
30 31
See for instance Ferrari, in: Schlechtriem/Schwenzer (eds.), Kommentar zum Einheitlichen UN-Kaufrecht, 4th ed., Munich 2004, Art. 7 no. 36; Van Alstine (op. cit. fn. 4), 687 et seq. Van Alstine (op. cit. fn. 4), 687, 743 et seq. The new texualism has been widely criticised in scholarly debate, see for instance Bussel, Textualism’s Failures: A Study of Overruled Bankruptcy Decisions, 53 Vanderbilt Law Review (2000), 887 et seq.; Eskridge Jr., Textualism and Original Understanding – Should the Supreme Court Read the Federalist but Not Statutory Legislative History?, 66 George Washington Law Review (1998), 1301 et seq.; Eskridge Jr., Textualism, The Unknown Ideal?, 96 Michigan Law Review (1998), 1509 et seq.; Frickey (op. cit. fn. 23), 199 et seq.; Pierce, The Supreme Court’s New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 Columbia Law Review (1995), 749 et seq.; Popkin, An “Internal” Critique of Justice Scalia’s Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76 Minnesota Law Review (1992), 1133 et seq.; Sunstein, Formalism and Statutory Interpretation – Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 University of Chicago Law Review (1999), 636 et seq.
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could help to discipline the legislator. Textualists have sometimes argued that if the legislator was aware of the purely textual interpretation of the courts, he would be more careful and diligent when drafting the legal texts.32 In the field of international conventions, such an assertion does not seem realistic. International conventions will only be concluded if the contracting parties have the will to compromise. This is especially true for conventions that, such as the CISG, operate almost on a world-wide level. The CISG had to reconcile the Civil Law and Common Law traditions and also the interests of industrial powers and developing countries. Under these circumstances it would have been illusory to call for a legal text that was totally clear, precise and detailed. Either one accepts the compromise character of international conventions or one has to do without them.33 Textualists have essentially asserted that a restriction to a purely textual interpretation could help to prevent the interpreter from sneaking in personal attitudes or political preferences. This argument, which has been widely discussed and criticised on a domestic level,34 is obviously not convincing in the field of international conventions such as the CISG. First it has to be noted that the CISG has been drawn up in several equally authentic language versions. Therefore on a textual level, all the language versions have to be taken into consideration. This makes textual interpretation quite difficult and causes special problems in case the language versions, judged only by the text, do not have the same meaning.35 Even more importantly, the CISG – as it is built on compromise solutions – contains rather broadly framed terms. These terms inevitably leave considerable room for interpretation. Merely relying on the text simply would not lead to clear results. A restriction to a textual approach would therefore not prevent the interpreter from taking recourse to personal attitudes but rather tempt him into doing exactly that or at least into using domestic concepts and definitions. Finally, constitutional concerns – especially with regard to the separation of powers – do not hinder the use of the travaux préparatoires and purposive arguments in the case of the CISG. It has to be noted that the CISG was negotiated by representatives of the Executive Branch and that the national parliaments were fully aware of this negotiation process. Furthermore, par32 33 34
35
For further references see Van Alstine (op. cit. fn. 4), 687, 721 fn. 139. Van Alstine (op. cit. fn. 4), 687, 745 et seq. See Eskridge Jr. (op. cit. fn. 31), 96 Michigan Law Review (1998), 1509, 1548; Manning (op. cit. fn. 20), 673, 695 (talking of a “textualist paradox”). There is quite some controversy as to how divergent language versions have to be interpreted. See Gruber (op. cit. fn. 1), 134 et seq. See also (proposing that only one “official version” should be enacted) Sheaffer, The Failure of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and a Proposal for a New Uniform Global Code in International Sales Law, 15 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. (2007), 461 et seq.
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liaments, when deciding on the CISG, had access to the travaux préparatoires. Under these circumstances and in the light of Art. 7 CISG – which was also approved by the parliaments – it was clear that the content of the CISG could not be discerned by a purely textual interpretation alone. Therefore, the assumption of an uncontrolled and unconstitutional “selfdelegation” by the national parliaments seems to be unfounded.36 Consequently, the core question is not of whether legislative history and purposive interpretation can or should be used at all. The real question is of how much they can contribute to a full understanding of the CISG. This again should not be decided in the light of ongoing discussions in the national legal systems. An autonomous standard can again only be reached by an unprejudiced look at the CISG itself.
2.
Legislative History of the CISG
a)
Travaux Préparatoires
aa) Inherent Difficulties of Using the Travaux Préparatoires
The acts and proceedings of the Vienna Conference constitute the most important tool for the interpretation of the CISG. Additionally, the previous deliberations within UNCITRAL have to be taken into consideration.37 It has to be acknowledged that working with these travaux préparatoires is not an easy task. Much of the legislative history of the CISG can be found in the UNCITRAL Yearbooks. The Yearbooks are quite difficult to grasp. This is especially due to the fact that during the deliberations the article numbering system has been changed several times. Therefore it has been pointed out that looking for the relevant parts of the travaux préparatoires can end in a search for a needle in a haystack.38 The legislative history can be accessed more easily thanks to the documentary history prepared by Professor Honnold. He collected the studies, deliberations, and decisions which led to the CISG.39 This documentary history – also containing pages taken from the Yearbook – gives very helpful cross-references and therefore facilitates the work with the abundant mate-
36 37
38
39
See Van Alstine (op. cit. fn. 4), 687, 744 et seq. Hackney, Is the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods Achieving Uniformity?, 61 Louisiana Law Review (2001) 473, 477. Honnold, Documentary History of the Uniform Law for International Sales. The Studies, Deliberations and Decisions that led to the 1980 United Nations Convention with Introductions and Explanations, Deventer 1989, at vii. See the preceding footnote.
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rial. Still, using the travaux préparatoires requires a considerable amount of patience and meticulousness. Apart from these practical difficulties there are material limits to the analysis of the travaux préparatoires.40 The CISG was adopted in a diplomatic conference by delegates of several participating States. Adopting a uniform text is not equivalent with the consent to all the underlying arguments and statements that had been brought forward in favour of the adopted text. The representatives of the participating states primarily approved the text of the CISG as such. They did not – albeit keeping in mind the debate and the compromises that were reached during the conference – decide on individual contributions to the conference. Therefore individual contributions on a specific matter during the Vienna Conference or previous deliberations have to be judged with some restraint and scepticism. A related problem with the travaux préparatoires in the case of the CISG lies in the apparent diversity of opinion of the delegates. A German scholar observed that most delegates intended to add some individual note to their argument, thereby trying to distance themselves from previous statements of other delegates.41 So in many cases – despite the agreement on a uniform text – existing diversities in opinion were never dissolved completely or unequivocally. The delegates rather preferred compromise solutions which, especially due to the use of open textured terms, still leave room for interpretation and controversy. In this case it is not possible for an interpreter to just pick the statements of one delegate and simply allege that his opinion has been accepted by the majority that voted on the text of the CISG.42 Otherwise such an interpretation could be, as textualists have pointed out with regard to the travaux préparatoires in national law-making, compared to “looking over a crowd and picking out your friends”.43
bb) The Benefits of Analysing the Travaux Préparatoires
At first glance it seems that the benefits of the travaux préparatoires are somewhat limited. Indeed if one expects a clear and definite answer to a 40
41
42
43
See Ferrari, Uniform Application and Interest Rates Under the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention, 24 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law (1994), 183, 205 (“it must be noted, however, that recourse to such materials must not be overestimated in interpreting the Vienna Sales Convention.”). Neumeyer, Offene Fragen zur Anwendung des Abkommens der Vereinten Nationen über den internationalen Warenkauf, Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft (RIW) 1994, 99, 100. Neumeyer (op. cit. fn. 41), 99, 100; see also Eskridge Jr. (op. cit. fn. 31), 96 Michigan Law Review (1998), 1509, 1531 (talking of “cherry-picking options”). See Scalia (op. cit. fn. 21), 36.
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specific question, one cannot rely solely on the travaux préparatoires. This also seems to be confirmed by court practice in the interpretation of the CISG. If courts directly refer to the travaux préparatoires of the CISG, most of the time they only try to reinforce their argumentation primarily based on a textual analysis, case law or scholarly writing.44 On the other hand this does not necessarily mean that an analysis of the travaux préparatoires is a fruitless effort. They can provide additional and sometimes decisive arguments for interpretation. Arguments derived from the legislative history can be used as an affirmation of a result that might be suggested, but not yet sufficiently supported by the text of the CISG alone. In some cases legislative history can help to construe a multi-faceted or ambiguous text. It is the interplay of the text and the underlying materials that can lead to a convincing result. It seems that a thorough analysis of the travaux préparatoires can best be achieved by specialised scholars. Courts that are absorbed by their day-today case-load will very often not have the time to really make full use of the travaux préparatoires. But as most courts refer to scholarly writing, the travaux préparatoires might influence the outcome of the case even if they are not explicitly cited by the courts. Therefore the fact that most courts do not directly base their argumentation on the travaux préparatoires should not lead to the conclusion that legislative history has only limited importance for the interpretation of the CISG. Even if the travaux préparatoires do not support a specific result as such they can still be of practical use. This is especially the case when they show that a question was taken into consideration by the delegates but apparently – especially when there are several contradicting statements – not really brought to a consensus.45 In this case the interpreter can come to the conclusion that the drafters of the CISG left the definite answer to the decisionmaking of the courts and further scholarly debate. Indeed, there are quite a number of questions that have not really been solved completely during the Vienna Conference. This is, for example, true for a disputed question concerning the definition of “fundamental breach” in Art. 25 CISG. The provision stipulates that a breach of contract committed by one of the parties is fundamental if it results in such detriment to the other party as substantially to deprive him of what he is entitled to expect 44
45
See for instance Landgericht Aachen, 20.7.1995, CISG-online no. 169 (referring to the travaux préparatoires underlying Art. 78 CISG); Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt a. M., 20.04.1994, RIW 1994, 593 (referring to Art. 43 of the preceding Convention relating to a Uniform law on the International Sale of Goods (The Hague 1964) for an interpretation of Art. 49 CISG). See – for instance – Landgericht Aachen, 20.7.1995, CISG-online no. 169 (pointing out that the delegates only agreed on a general rule on interest, but did not reach an agreement on a specific interest rate).
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under the contract. A breach of contract is not fundamental if the party in breach did not foresee such a result and a reasonable person of the same kind in the same circumstances would have also not foreseen such a result. The text does not specify at what time the party in breach should have foreseen the consequences of the breach, whether at the time the contract was concluded or at the time of the breach. The underlying materials confirm that the drafters of the CISG discussed the questions intensively, but did not reach a solution.46 They clarify that in this case, the CISG does not give any answer to the question. The interpreter therefore has some leeway in finding the solution but should put special emphasis on ascertaining the scholarly debate and the practice of the courts.47
b)
Secretariat Commentary
Specific mention should be made of the Secretariat Commentary. It has a special status among the travaux préparatoires and can probably be considered the most important part of CISG’s legislative history. The Secretariat Commentary does not constitute an Official Commentary of the CISG. It is therefore not a real equivalent of the Official Commentary to the UCC. Nonetheless, it has been argued that the Secretary Commentary, a work by an international team, comes very close to an official commentary.48 When using the Secretariat Commentary, one has to keep in mind that it is on the 1978 Draft of the CISG. As in the final text of the CISG most articles of the 1978 Draft have been re-numbered, the interpreter has to match up the 1978 Draft with the Official text of the CISG. But this is a feasible task, and it quickly becomes apparent that in most cases, the text of the Draft 1978 was – apart from the numbering – only subjected to minor 46 47
48
See Secretariat Commentary, Art. 23 no. 5. For further information see (asserting that the time of conclusion of the contract is relevant) Ferrari, Wesentliche Vertragsverletzung nach UN-Kaufrecht, Internationales Handelsrecht (IHR) 2005, 1, 5 et seq.; Magnus, in: Staudinger, Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch mit Einführungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen: Wiener UN-Kaufrecht (CISG), Berlin 2005, Art. 25 no. 19; Schlechtriem, in: Schlechtriem/Schwenzer (op. cit. fn. 29), Art. 25 no. 15; dissenting (also the time after the conclusion could be relevant) Lüderitz/Fenge/Budzikiewicz, in: Soergel/ Lüderitz (eds.), vol. 13: Einführungsgesetz, 13th ed., Berlin 2000, Art. 25 no. 4. Kritzer, The Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Scope, Interpretation and Resources, 9 International Law Quarterly (1997), 203, 226; Lookofsky, Fault and No-Fault in Danish, American and International Sales Law. The Reception of the 1980 United Nations Sales Convention, 27 Scandinavian Studies in Law (1983), 109, 132 fn. 185.
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changes or in most cases to no changes at all. Therefore the Secretariat Commentary on the Draft 1978 is without any doubt, although written over 30 years ago, of great importance for the interpretation of the CISG. Indeed, the Secretariat Commentary is still referred to by courts and scholars. Moreover, there are hardly any solutions offered by the Secretariat Commentary that have not been adopted by courts and scholars. As the Secretariat Commentary nowadays is freely accessible on the internet49 – albeit only in English language – one can predict that the Secretariat Commentary will remain of considerable practical importance also in the future.
3.
Legislative History and Purposive Approach
The study of the above-mentioned travaux préparatoires can be of even greater importance if it is used as a starting point for a purposive argumentation. Both the contributions to the Vienna Conference and the Secretariat Commentary give indications as to the aims of a particular article. Very often, the CISG tries to find a compromise between the conflicting interests of the parties to the contract. The travaux préparatoires can give some indication as to the compromise solution that the delegates had in mind. In this case, the study of the travaux préparatoires can lead to a more precise result than the text of the CISG that – using rather indefinite terms or some interplay between a general rule and vaguely framed exceptions – only provides a framework. Moreover, it has to be pointed out that the CISG also contains compromise solutions in so far as it tries to reconcile different legal traditions. The CISG normally avoids the use of legal concepts typical of a given legal tradition. Whenever the national laws contain divergent concepts the CISG aims at a compromise or an independent solution.50 This is, inter alia, true for the provisions on open-price contracts (Art. 14(1) and 55 CISG), the revocability and irrevocability of the offer (Art. 16 CISG); the obligations of the buyer to examine the goods and to give notice of existing defects (Art. 38, 39, 44 CISG) or the question whether or not the seller can be held liable even if he acted without fault (Art. 79 CISG). Even if the CISG contains terms that are also used in the national laws – such as “reasonable”, “good 49
50
It can be obtained under http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/materials-commentary. html or under http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/conference.html. See for instance (referring to the disputed problem of open price contracts) Amato, U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods − The Open Price Term and Uniform Application: An Early Interpretation by the Hungarian Courts, 13 Journal of Law and Commerce (1993), 1, 29 (“As was evidenced by the negotiations that led to the conclusion of CISG, compromise was the order of the day.”).
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faith”, or “avoidance” – those terms are not identical with the corresponding terms of the national laws.51 In all these cases, the CISG has to be interpreted autonomously.52 The study of the travaux préparatoires can help to fully understand the compromise solutions that the CISG tries to reach. They operate as a background that gives a clearer shape to the neutrally framed and at times somewhat vague expressions used in the CISG. Furthermore, the study of the legislative history and the travaux préparatoires can operate as a starting point and a guideline for further comparative research and interpretation.
4.
Balancing of Arguments Derived from Text, History and Purpose
a)
Flexible Balancing in the Individual Case at Hand
In national law, there has been quite a lot of scholarly debate on how the various interpretative factors – text, legislative history and purposive arguments – should be weighed if they do not point to the same result. Many scholars argue that there is no hierarchy of interpretative factors. It all depends on a flexible balancing of arguments.53 Therefore textual arguments and arguments based on legislative history or purpose have to be evaluated in the individual case at hand.54 A predominance of a textual interpretation cannot be justified by the weaknesses and problems associated with an assessment of legislative history and the travaux préparatoires. Textualists have quite correctly drawn attention to the fact that legislative history – like arguments based on the purpose of the law – can be ambiguous or even misleading.55 These interpretative factors can at times even be misused to sneak in personal preferences and
51 52
53 54
55
Ferrari (op. cit. fn. 26), 138, 141. See for instance Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales Under the 1980 United Nations Convention, 3rd ed., Deventer 1999, at 89 stating that the CISG should not be interpreted “in the light of the concepts of our domestic legal system”. For further references see Gruber (op. cit. fn. 1), 205 et seq. It has to be noted that there is an abundance of divergent opinions in the scholarly debate, see for instance Canaris, Das Rangverhältnis der „klassischen“ Auslegungskriterien, demonstriert an Standardproblemen aus dem Zivilrecht, in: Beuthien/Fuchs/Roth/Schiemann/Wacke (eds.), Festschrift für Medicus, Cologne 1999, 25, 33 et seq., 60 (claiming that there are some rules of priority for certain kinds of arguments); Hassold (op. cit. fn. 12), 211, 236 et seq. Scalia (op. cit. fn. 21), 31 et seq. suggesting that an analysis of legislative intent “is much more likely to produce a false or contrived legislative intent than a genuine one”.
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conceptions of the interpreter.56 Whereas these apparent weaknesses of the historical and purposive approach have to be taken seriously, they are far from justifying a predominance of a merely textual interpretation. This is simply due to the fact that the text of the CISG, as already stated above, can be equally ambiguous.57 Travaux préparatoires can therefore, if handled with care, provide valuable additional and sometimes decisive information and add some objectivity to the interpretative process. The same is true for purposive arguments derived from a thorough analysis of the travaux préparatoires. They can especially prevent the judge from simply taking recourse to his own preconceptions or the solutions adopted by his own national law under the disguise of a purely textual interpretation.
b)
The CISG and the Acte Clair-Doctrine
Whereas many authors do not advocate a general predominance of the textual argument, they claim that textual arguments shall prevail if the text is unambiguous and clear. As to the interpretation of international treaties, this concept has been called the acte clair-doctrine.58 If one takes a closer look, the acte clair-doctrine – leaving aside the question whether it is convincing as such – does not really have a relevant field of application within the CISG. This is again due to the fact that the CISG, which has been drawn up in several equally authentic language versions, contains numerous compromise solutions and rather broadly framed terms. In most cases, the language of the CISG simply does not really amount to something that could be called an acte clair. This is true – just to give an example – for the discussions on the fundamental breach (Art. 25 CISG), a key concept of the CISG.59 A fundamental 56
57
58 59
See Scalia (op. cit. fn. 21), 17 et seq. (suggesting that there is a “practical threat […] that, under the guise or even the self-delusion of pursuing unexpressed legislative intents, common law judges will in fact pursue their own objectives and desires, extending their lawmaking proclivities from the common law to the statutory field”). The same can very often be said of domestic laws. See for instance Eskridge Jr. (op. cit. fn. 31), 96 Michigan Law Review (1998), 1509, 1533 et seq.; also Frickey (op. cit. fn. 23), 199, 207 (“(...) it is open to question whether the new attention to formalism has increased predictability and certainty.”); Sunstein (op. cit. fn. 23), 407, 418 (“The most familiar problem with textualism is that statutory language is sometimes ambiguous or vague. To say that courts should rely on the words or on their ordinary meaning − the plain meaning approach − is unhelpful when words have more than one dictionary definition, or when the context produces interpretative doubt.”). For further references see Gruber (op. cit. fn. 1), 213 et seq. See Graffi, The interpretation of the CISG: The concept of “fundamental breach”, in: Ferrari/Flechtner/Brand (op. cit. fn. 26), 305, 310 (calling it a “mile-
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breach is, inter alia, a precondition for the avoidance of the contract (Art. 49, 64 CISG).60 As already pointed out above, Art. 25 CISG basically stipulates that a breach of contract committed by one of the parties is fundamental if it results in such detriment to the other party as substantially to deprive him of what he is entitled to.61 It is quite obvious that a purely textual interpretation of the abstract definition contained in Art. 25 CISG does not lead to a definite result. The text of Art. 25 CISG has been deemed to be “vague and ambiguous” by one of the leading commentators.62 Another author has rightly pointed out that even the term “detriment” used in Art. 25 CISG has not even been subjected to any definition within the CISG.63 It should be added however that is hardly possible to draft a definition that covers all the possible situations of breach of contract and that at the same time leads – just on the basis of a textual interpretation – to clear results. Courts and scholars therefore agree that when Art. 25 CISG is applied, the decision does not so much depend on an abstract assessment of the text, but on an evaluation of the interests at hand.64 Numerous factors may be relevant.65 When looking at the individual case, the interpreter has to take into account the underlying purpose of Art. 25 CISG that, as has been pointed out in the travaux préparatoires, primarily lies in restraining the avoidance of contracts.66 It is this purpose of the provision that, through a
60 61
62
63
64
65 66
stone concept”); Gruber, in: Münchener Kommentar zum BGB, Schuldrecht Besonderer Teil 1, 5th ed., Munich 2008, Art. 25 no. 1. Gruber (op. cit. fn. 59), Art. 25 no. 1 et seq. There is no “fundamental” breach if the party in breach did not foresee and a reasonable person of the same kind in the same circumstances would not have foreseen such a result. Bonell, The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and the Vienna Sales Convention (CISG) – Alternatives or Complementary Instruments?, 28 Uniform Law Review (1996), 26, 28 et seq. Babiak, Defining “Fundamental breach” Under the United Nations Conventions on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 6 Temple International and Comparative Law Journal (1992), 113, 119. Bundesgerichtshof, 3.4.1996, BGHZ 132, 290, 299 = NJW 1996, 2364 = CISGonline no. 135; Schweizerisches Bundesgericht, 28.10.1998, CISG-online no. 413 = UNILEX, E.1998–18.1 = SZIER 1999, 179. For further references see Gruber (op. cit. fn. 59), Art. 25 no. 6 et seq. Bundesgerichtshof, 3.4.1996, BGHZ 132, 290, 299 = NJW 1996, 2364 = CISGonline no. 135; Schweizerisches Bundesgericht, 28.10.1998, CISG-online no. 413 = UNILEX, E.1998–18.1 = SZIER 1999, 179.
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case by case development, has led to a rather narrow interpretation of the conditions set forth in Art. 25 CISG.67 A similar observation can be made with regard to the interpretation of Art. 38 and 39 CISG. These provisions deal with the time period in which the buyer has to examine the goods and give notice of existing defects. Art. 38(1) CISG stipulates that the buyer must examine the goods within as short a period as is practicable in the circumstances. Art. 39(1) CISG stipulates that the buyer loses the right to rely on a lack of conformity of the goods if he does not give notice to the seller specifying the nature of the lack of conformity within a reasonable time after he has discovered it or ought to have discovered it. Numerous legal systems – especially the Germanic legal systems68 but also the US-American law69 and some legal systems influenced by French law70 – contain similar provisions. Nonetheless, courts and scholars again agree that both Art. 38 and Art. 39 CISG have to be interpreted autonomously.71 Domestic preconceptions of what is “practicable” or “reasonable” in the circumstances must not be used.72 It is obvious that the terms used in Art. 38 and Art. 39 CISG leave much room for interpretation – especially with respect to the time periods. A purely textual approach would again not suffice and maybe even involve the risk of recourse to domestic preconceptions. The textual interpretation therefore only operates as a starting point. Legislative history combined with a comparative view on the different legal systems gives more precise information and suggests that the provisions should not be interpreted too strictly. 73 67
68
69 70
71 72
73
For an evaluation of case law see Ferrari (op. cit. fn. 47), 1; Freiburg, Das Recht auf Vertragsaufhebung im UN-Kaufrecht, Berlin 2001; Lubbe, Fundamental breach under the CISG: A source of fundamentally divergent results, 68 RabelsZ (2004), 444 et seq. § 377 German Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB – Commercial Code), § 377 UGB Austrian Unternehmensgesetzbuch (UGB); Art. 201 Swiss Obligationenrecht (OR – Code of Obligations). § 2-607(3)(a) UCC. As for instance in Italy or Portugal. In France, there is no obligation to examine the goods; the buyer is only required to bring an action for lack of conformity within a short period of time (bref délai). See Gruber (op. cit. fn. 59), Art. 39 no. 33 et seq. See Schwenzer, The Noble Month (Articles 38, 39 CISG) – The Story Behind the Scenery, Eu.J.L.Ref. 2006, 353, 358 (“The task was to convince the German courts to abandon their rigid time limits and slowly move towards the other legal systems that had not previously stipulated any notice requirements.”). For an evaluation of the travaux préparatoires see Schwenzer (op. cit. fn. 72), 353, 355 et seq. For a comparative analysis see Janssen, Die Untersuchungs- und Rügepflichten im deutschen, niederländischen und internationalen Kaufrecht − Eine rechtsvergleichende Darstellung der Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede, Baden-
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German courts – guided by a decision of the Bundesgerichtshof74 – therefore quite convincingly interpret Art. 38, 39 CISG in a more buyer-friendly way than the corresponding provision of the German Handelsgesetzbuch.75 They clearly make a difference between the strict obligation that is imposed on the buyer by domestic German law and the much more lenient provisions of the CISG.76 If the German courts had only relied on the text, they probably would not have found a significant difference between Art 38, 39 CISG and the corresponding provision of their national law. Furthermore, there are even examples in which courts and scholars favour solutions that seemingly deviate from a result achieved by a purely textual interpretation. One controversial issue of considerable practical importance concerns the frequent practice of sending offers and acceptances containing general conditions. In most cases, the general conditions used by the contracting parties differ. Still, the parties normally will go ahead with the contract without explicitly agreeing on one of the standard forms. In this case, it is widely accepted that the contract – irrespective of the discrepancies between offer and acceptance – is valid.77 But there is much dispute as to the terms of the contract (so-called battle of forms). On the basis of a purely textual interpretation of Art. 19 CISG, one would easily conclude that the contracting party who is last to send his form controls the terms of the contract.78 If one looks at the text of Art. 19(3) CISG, the use of one’s own form – if it contains additions, limitations or other modifications from the offer – constitutes a counter-offer. This counter-offer seems to be accepted by the other party who, without objecting to the counter-offer, starts performing the contract or accepts the performance of the other party.79 As
74
75
76
77
78 79
Baden 2001; also Tribunale di Vigevano, 12.7.2000, IHR 2001, 72, 74 et seq. = CISG-online no. 493. Bundesgerichtshof, 3.11.1999, ZIP 2000, 234, 236 = NJW-RR 2000, 1361 = CISG-online no. 475. See DiMatteo/Dhooge/Greene/Maurer/Pagnattaro, The Interpretive Turn in International Sales Law: An Analysis of Fifteen Years of CISG Jurisprudence, 24 Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business (2004), 299, 315, 359 et seq. For a detailed evaluation of German, Austrian und Swiss case law see Ferrari, Die Rügeobliegenheit bei Vertragswidrigkeit nach Art. 39 CISG, Zeitschrift für Schweizerisches Recht (ZSR) 2006, 533; Schwenzer (op. cit. fn. 72), 360 et seq. See also Lehmkuhl, Das Nacherfüllungsrecht des Verkäufers im UN-Kaufrecht, Frankfurt a.M. 2002. See Bundesgerichtshof, 9.1.2002, NJW 2002, 1651, 1652 = ZIP 2002, 672 = CISG-online no. 651. See Gruber (op. cit. fn. 59), Art. 19 no. 25. See Ferrari, in: Münchener Kommentar zum Handelsgesetzbuch, vol. 6, 2nd ed., Munich 2007, Art. 19 no. 15 with further references.
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such the text of the CISG seemingly adheres to a solution which in scholarly debate is called the last-shot doctrine.80 Nonetheless, many scholars argue that – despite the wording of Art. 19 CISG – the last shot-doctrine should not be applied. They point out that the last-shot-doctrine leads to an undeserved advantage of one party and that it is not in line with what the parties really expected.81 These authors therefore suggest that, while the contract as such stays valid, conflicting standard forms are to be considered invalid. The solution of the question not regulated by the contract should then be found in the provisions of the CISG. This so-called knock-out rule is not so much based on a textual interpretation but rather on an evaluation of the interests and will of the parties and – moreover – on the principles of good faith and fair dealing that can be derived from Art. 7 CISG.82 The knock-out rule seems to be favored by the German Bundesgerichtshof although the court in the specific case at hand did not see a necessity to give a definite opinion on the matter.83 While there are many arguments that could be brought forward for the last-shot doctrine and the knock-out rule, it becomes clear that the textual argument alone is never sufficient and should always be viewed in a broader context. Sometimes – as shown in the case of conflicting standard forms – even a seemingly clear text might be outweighed by purposive arguments supported by legislative history.
B. Legislative Intention and Gap-filling It should be added that the concept of legislative intent is not only relevant for interpretation, but also for gap-filling. Art. 7(2) CISG clearly shows that 80
81
82 83
For a comparative analysis see Sukurs, Harmonizing the Battle of the Forms: A Comparison of the United States, Canada, and the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 34 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. (2001), 1481 et seq. See Lüderitz/Fenge (op. cit. fn. 47), Art. 19 no. 5; Gruber (op. cit. fn. 59), Art. 19 no. 18 et seq.; Kühl/Hingst, Das UN-Kaufrecht und das Recht der AGB, in: Thume (ed.), Festgabe für Rolf Herber, Neuwied 1999, 50, 56; Magnus (op. cit. fn. 47), Art. 25 no. 23 et seq.; Schlechtriem (op. cit. fn. 47), Art. 19 no. 20; Ventsch/Kluth, Die Einbeziehung von Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen im Rahmen des UN-Kaufrechts, Internationales Handelsrecht (IHR) 2003, 61, 63 et seq. Schlechtriem (op. cit. fn. 47), Art. 19 no. 20. Bundesgerichtshof, 9.1.2002, NJW 2002, 1651, 1653 = ZIP 2002, 672 = CISGonline no. 651; Ventsch/Kluth (op. cit. fn. 81), 61, 64. The decision is interpreted differently by Schlechtriem (op. cit. fn. 47), Art. 19 no. 20 fn. 63a (claiming that the Bundesgerichtshof directly adopted the knock-out-rule).
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an interpreter, if there is a question that falls within the scope of application of the CISG, primarily has to look for a solution within the CISG itself. The provision aims at preventing the resort to domestic law to the largest extent possible. Art. 7(2) CISG also gives an indication as to the methods that should be used for gap-filling. It stipulates that questions concerning matters governed by the CISG that are not expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general principles on which it is based. In the absence of such principles, these questions should be settled in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law. The provision therefore seems to combine the application of general principles with, if inevitable, a recourse to the rules of private international law. Apart from the wording of Art. 7(2) CISG, one has again to keep in mind that gap-filling should aim at ascertaining the will of the legislator. The interpreter should establish the rule the drafters of the CISG would probably have preferred if they had provided an explicit solution for the question at hand. It can therefore be characterised as the search for a will of the legislator that has not really been expressed in the text of the Convention itself. Whereas interpretation looks for the actual will of the legislator, gap-filling deals with something that could be qualified as the search for the presumed or hypothetical will of the legislator. On this basis, it is obvious that gap-filling should not be limited to the methods expressly mentioned in Art. 7(2) CISG. There is consent that an interpreter, if there is a gap within the CISG, should attempt to find a solution by means of an analogical application or an argumentum e contrario.84 It is also basically undisputed that the analogical application or an argumentum e contrario are, if compared with the recourse to the general principles mentioned in Art. 7(2) CISG, the preferred means of gap-filling.85 This can easily be explained by the fact that they are closer to the existing text than the application of general principles. Therefore they are more likely to be in conformity with the presumed will of the legislator.86 If one wonders whether there should be an analogical application of a certain provision, an analysis of the travaux préparatoires can be helpful. This is especially the case if such an analogical application or an extension of the provision was explicitly discussed in the course of a preceding confer-
84
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DiMatteo/Dhooge/Greene/Maurer/Pagnattaro (op. cit. fn. 75), 299, 315 (“The notion of analogical reasoning is not expressly mentioned in the general provisions. However, such a methodology is implied in any comprehensive code.”). Ferrari (op. cit. fn. 26), 138, 160; Ferrari (op. cit. fn. 29), Art. 7 no. 47. Bonell (op. cit. fn. 26), Art. 7 no. 2.3.2.1; Gruber (op. cit. fn. 1), 288; Schmid, Das Zusammenspiel von Einheitlichem UN-Kaufrecht und nationalem Recht: Lückenfüllung und Normenkonkurrenz, Berlin 1996.
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ence. So just as in interpretation there is interplay between these interpretative factors. Furthermore, both the analogical application and the argumentum e contrario heavily depend on the purpose of the specific provisions. It is therefore again the purpose of a provision that can be decisive, and it is again legislative history that might help to ascertain the purpose. Both the analogical application and the argumentum e contrario therefore require an evaluation of the text, the purpose and the legislative history. It becomes apparent that in interpretation and gap-filling the same factors are used. Only if there is no possibility of a gap-filling with the help of an analogical application or an argumentum e contrario does the interpreter have to resort to the general principles on which the CISG is based. Having recourse to the general principles is different from an analogical application as these principles can be applied on a much wider scale.87 Again, general principles cannot only be detected on the basis of a purely textual analysis. Legislative history and travaux préparatoires can help to find out which provisions of the CISG contain general principles. This is especially true for the Secretariat Commentary that in many instances, while discussing the provisions of the 1978 draft, quite often gives indications as to the general principles on which the provisions are based on.
C. Conclusions In the discussion about the interpretation of the CISG, one should make a clear distinction between the goal of interpretation and the means by which this goal can be reached. First, there should be a consensus on the goal of interpretation. On the basis of this consensus, there can be a discussion on the methods used for reaching this goal. In this article it is argued that the main goal of interpretation – notwithstanding concepts of an updating or dynamic interpretation88 – primarily lies in discerning the will of the legislator. It seems that this goal is not only used on the national level, but is equally accepted by the interpreters of the CISG. If one accepts this goal it becomes quite obvious that a purely textual approach is not sufficient. The picture does not only consist of the text, but also comprises the legal history and the (subjective) purpose. Similar observations can be made with regard to gap-filling mentioned in Art. 7(2) CISG. The presumed or hypothetical will of the legislator has to be established with the help of the existing text, but also the underlying materials and the purpose of the law. 87 88
Ferrari (op. cit. fn. 26), 138, 160. See Meyer (in this book).
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It does not seem possible to establish an abstract hierarchy of the interpretative factors. A convincing result can only be achieved if the interpreter enters the hermeneutical circle in which “[a] part can only be understood in the context of the whole, and the whole cannot be understood without analyzing its various parts.”89 From this point of view, textual, historical and purposive arguments cannot be weighed individually, but are parts of one consistent interpretative process. This does not mean that interpretation necessarily leads to only one correct result. In interpretative matters, there can be several possible answers. Nonetheless, a broad use of the above-mentioned interpretative factors can lead to an objective assessment and thereby help to reduce the risk of diverging interpretations. 89
Eskridge Jr./Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 Stan. L. Rev. (1990), 321, 351.
Case Law Precedent and Legal Writing Larry A. DiMatteo It is one thing “to sing from the same hymn sheet”;1 it is another to sing in harmony!
A. Introduction Many legal scholars hoped that the adoption and ratification of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) would be the basis for a uniform international law of sales. At the level of acceptance, the CISG has been enormously successful as evidenced by its adoption by seventy-one countries and, with the exception of Brazil and the United Kingdom, virtually all of the world’s major trading nations. The uniformity this acceptance was expected to bring remains dependent on the level of uniformity in its interpretation and application. In order to encourage such uniformity, CISG interpretive methodology calls for autonomous interpretations. The alternative methodology reflects the use of purely domestic legal sources to aid in the interpretation of CISG provisions. This type of interpretation is a product of a “homeward trend” bias. This chapter will assess the existence of what has been named the jurisconsultorium. Mazzacano defines the term as “the consideration of legal doctrine, jurisprudence, case law, and scholarly writings from all jurisdictions, including foreign or international jurisdictions, or comity.”2 Andersen explains that the term jurisconsultorium refers to the “shared interpretational sphere” created when jurists consult with one another.3 This consultation can be carried out directly by citing foreign case law or indirectly by entering the debates found
1
2
3
Goode, Insularity or Leadership? The Role of the UK in the Harmonization of Commercial Law, (2001) 50 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (ICLQ), 751 (argues CISG is better in certain areas than English law). Mazzacano, Brown & Root Services v. Aerotech Herman Nelson: The Continuing Plight of the U.N. Sales Convention in Canada, (2004-05) Pace Review of the CISG (PR), 169 et seq. Andersen, Uniform Application of the International Sales Law: Understanding Uniformity, the Global Jurisconsultorium and Examination and Notification Provisions of the CISG, Alphen aan den Rijn 2006, 5.
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in scholarly writings. This chapter assesses the degree in which such a shared interpretive sphere has been formed. Whittington observes that the open-textured rules of the CISG present two problems for uniformity of application: (1) “reluctance of courts to review foreign case law” and (2) “inability of decision-makers to distance themselves from domestic preconceptions of interpretation.”4 He also notes that with “the recent growth of online CISG databases we are beginning to see progress” in courts reviewing foreign cases.5 One of the objectives of the current study is to see if this is so. Does a review of CISG decisions show a trend toward increased use of foreign sources of law?
B. Foreign Case Law as Persuasive Authority Andersen noted that the ultimate assessment of a uniform law is whether that law produces uniform results. Further, she emphasises that uniform interpretations should not be the measuring standard. Instead, she argues that the measure should be whether the results of even different interpretations result in “a similar governing of legal phenomena.”6 The similarity of result standard and not identical autonomous interpretations of the CISG is a more feasible standard for measuring uniformity of application. However, the question remains of the means by which similarity of results or effects are reasonably attainable. The means recommended here, and elsewhere, is the use of foreign CISG cases as persuasive authority. This is intimated by Andersen who opined that such uniformity of results is the product of “the application of deliberate efforts to create specific shared rules.” A Spanish Court noted in referring to the CISG that: “The spirit of the Convention is to achieve uniform law not only in regard to its text; courts should also apply it in a uniform manner (…). The only way to assure the uniformity of the Convention is to take into account decisions from tribunals of other countries when applying the Convention and to consult expert opinions of scholars in the subject, in order to achieve uniformity.”7 In the end, foreign cases should be reviewed and considered in the application of the CISG by different courts confronting similar issues. 4
5 6 7
Whittington, Comment on Professor Schwenzer’s Paper, (2005) 36 University Wellington Law Review (VUWLR), 809 et seq. Whittington (op. cit. fn. 4), 809 et seq. Andersen (op. cit. fn. 3), 13. Cherubino Valsangiacomo, S.A. v. American Juice Import, Inc (Spain, 7 June 2003, Appellate Court Valencia), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/ 030607s4.html.
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Andersen argues what we call this judicial deference or comity has been mostly a debate in semantics. She suggests that what is needed is an autonomous definition of precedent.8 Andersen provides a normative construct to place the use of foreign case and arbitral decisions within a nonhierarchal, unstructured, non-mandatory framework of CISG precedents: “CISG precedents [should be viewed as] inspirational contributions to the creation of autonomous [interpretations].”9 I agree. However, the analysis provided here is intended to be mostly descriptive. The first part of this chapter will examine the normative questions of what should be the standard for measuring uniformity of application and the appropriate role of foreign case law or scholarly works in that application. This chapter will not focus on the proper standard to measure the uniformity of application. But, I have noted elsewhere that a relative standard and not an absolute is the most rational and practical way to measure uniformity of application. An example would be whether the application of the CISG resulted in a manageable level of uniformity to the extent that impediments to international trade have been reduced. This standard is similar to the one suggested by Andersen that uniformity is to be measured by the degree in which there are deliberate efforts to produce similarity of results. The main question analysed here is whether courts and arbitral panels use foreign case law or scholarly writings in their application of the CISG. In order to assess such use, the normative claim is made that foreign case law should be used as persuasive authority. The degree of persuasiveness of a foreign case will depend on whether it is well-reasoned, including its use of foreign case law and scholarly commentary. A court confronted with conflicting foreign law precedents has the opportunity to redress the conflict by providing a reasoned choice of the two or by providing an autonomous alternative. The mere recognition of the foreign case law conflict provides an important service or inspiration to future jurists confronted with a similar substantive issue or a decisional conflict.
I.
The Role of Foreign Cases in CISG Interpretation and Application
A recent survey found that an alarmingly low percentage of international business lawyers and judges in the United States were even modestly familiar
8
9
For a brief review of the doctrine of precedent or stare decisis in American law see, Sellers, The Doctrine of Precedent in the United States of America, (2006) 54 The American Journal of Comparative Law (AJCL), 67 et seq. Andersen (op. cit. fn. 3), 62.
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with the CISG.10 Only 30% of practitioners surveyed were thoroughly or moderately familiar with the CISG. An astonishing 82% of the judges surveyed declared that they were “not at all familiar” with the CISG. On a more positive note, 73% of American law professors were thoroughly or moderately familiar with the CISG. These types of statistics provide one explanation of why some courts have ignored the CISG’s interpretive methodology. The next section will review that methodology, and the problem of homeward trend analysis. The final part of this section will review the scholarly debate over how best to assess and encourage uniformity of application. The notion of foreign case law as persuasive authority will be explored, along with American unilateralism, and French case reporting style.
II.
CISG Interpretive Methodology
One question often posed in the CISG literature is the function and value of foreign case law and scholarly legal writings in the interpretation of the CISG. Two perspectives can be used in analysing this issue − the internal and the external views. The first looks to the interpretive methodology internally directed by CISG articles. The second, barring any prohibition within that internal interpretive methodology, the external view looks outside the CISG to further assess the role of foreign case law and legal scholarship in the application of the CISG. The CISG does not expressly mandate the use of foreign cases or legal commentary. However, the importance of those sources, especially foreign case law, can be implied through its general principles as enunciated in its Preamble and Art. 7(1) CISG. The Preamble asserts that “the adoption of uniform rules (…) would contribute to the removal of legal barriers in international trade.” Art. 7(1) CISG sets out three general rationales or principles that comprise the CISG’s interpretive methodology. The interpretation of its rules should be based on its “international character,” the “need to promote uniformity in its application,” and the importance of observing “good faith in international trade.” The CISG fails to provide a clear mandate as to the role of foreign case law in its application. The choices of the functional role of foreign case law are as binding precedent, as persuasive authority, or as irrelevant given the fact that the CISG is adopted as “domestic” law. Given the general principles, and reasonable implication thereof, the use of foreign case law as persuasive author10
Fitzgerald, An Empirical Study of the Value and Utility of the United Nation’s Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) and the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts to Practitioners, Jurists, and Legal Academics in the United States, (2008) 27 Journal of Law & Commerce (JLC), forthcoming.
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ity is the most compelling standard for achieving the purpose of the CISG − the unification of international sales law. Therefore, the rest of the analysis provided here is based on the following answers to the normative versions of the descriptive questions posed by Andersen.11 Should the general principles be limited to a gap-filling role? No. Should the general principles be used as interpretational guidelines throughout the CISG? Yes. The difference between construction (filling in gaps) and interpretation is ambiguous at best. For particular applications, the jurist is not gap-filling per se, but is determining the scope of a given CISG rule. This is the position taken in CISG Advisory Council Opinion no. 3 regarding the application of the Common Law’s parol evidence rule. It states that there is “no question of a gap in the CISG, and no grounds for recourse to non-uniform domestic law.”12 The Advisory Opinion reaffirms the interpretive methodology of the CISG as reasoning from the text, purposes, and general principles. Interestingly, the Advisory Opinion references other uniform instruments, namely, the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (UNIDROIT Principles) and the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL). It notes that the PECL requires merger clauses to be individually negotiated to be enforceable.13 The Advisory Opinion concludes that the best practice to ensure the enforceability of a merger clause and the admission of extrinsic evidence would be to expressly and explicitly derogate from Art. 8 CISG.
III. Homeward Trend Analysis In this section a brief discussion of the homeward trend analysis will follow; for a fuller discussion of the problem of homeward trend see Ferrari’s contribution in this volume. The danger of the use of nation-specific sources of law and legal traditions in the application of the CISG is the likely increased chances of divergent applications. This is not to say that reasonable alternative interpretations are unlikely. But, the degree of divergence and likelihood of reconciliation is enhanced when alternative readings of the CISG are the product of autonomous interpetations not formulated through the lens of domestic law. A review of the cases shows some countries, such
11 12
13
Andersen (op. cit. fn. 3), 127. CISG Advisory Council Opinion no. 3: Parol Evidence Rule, Plain Meaning Rule, Contractual Merger Clause and the CISG, available at http://cisgw3.law. pace.edu/cisg/CISG-AC-op3.html. See generally, Perales Viscasillas, The Formation of Contracts and the Principles of European Contract Law, (2001) 13 Pace International Law Review (PILR), 374 et seq.
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as Italy, Germany, and Austria, have done admirable work in fending off the temptation of homeward trend analysis. In contrast, the record of countries such as the United States and Canada is mixed with a considerable amount of their courts ignoring foreign case law and CISG scholarly commentary. One commentator notes that “Canadian courts have tended to treat the CISG in a cursory manner, and ultimately make decisions on the basis of domestic law.”14 The use by jurists of the CISG’s general principles is vital to the creation of autonomous interpretations. At times, this is done directly from the general principles. At other times it is done indirectly though the construction of implied general or specific principles.15 These sub-principles developed through the process of deduction from the general principles and induction from novel fact patterns can be used in narrower categories of cases. The induction of trade usage which the parties know or ought to have known, as provided for in Art. 9(2) CISG, can also be used in crafting implied general principle. Given the few general principles enunciated in Art. 7(1) CISG, it is not surprising to see jurists recognising implied general principles derived from the principles of uniformity, international character, and good faith, and made necessary by the pressures to do justice in particular types of cases. This process would come within Art. 7(2) CISG’s mandate that if “matters governed by [the CISG] are not expressly settled in it [they] are to be settled in conformity with the general principles.” An example of the process of deduction-induction to imply a general principle is found in a Helsinki Court of Appeals decision from the year 2000. The court implied a duty of continuation of contract or principle of loyalty.16 It held that a seller has a duty not to abruptly end a longstanding relationship without extended notice. The general principle of good faith, and the importance of notice throughout the CISG, can be used in the deduction process. The facts in the induction process may include the recognition that numerous discrete transactions between parties create strong relational norms and possibly a trade usage that the seller or buyer should not end the relationship abruptly.
C. The Scholarly Debate The focus of the analysis is on three topical areas: (1) application in practice and trends in application of the CISG, (2) explanations for divergences in 14 15
16
Mazzacano (op. cit. fn. 2), 169 et seq. See DiMatteo/Dhooge/Greene/Maurer/Pagnattaro, International Sales Law: A Critical Analysis of CISG Jurisprudence, Cambridge 2005, 23 et seq. HO Helsinki S 00/82, 26 October 2000, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/ cisg/wais/db/cases2/001026f5.html.
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application and methodology among CISG signatory countries, and (3) some normative conclusions on how best to improve the uniformity of applications. The first area will provide a relatively subjective analysis of the degree that courts have used scholarly writings and foreign case law in applying the CISG. Although actual cases will be used and some statistical analysis offered, this will be a largely anecdotal, cursory sampling of the more than 3,000 CISG cases and arbitral decisions. The second area will generally focus on the systemic reasons between the Civil Law and Common Law’s application of different interpretive methodologies. A few observations of national idiosyncrasies will be offered, such as American exceptionalism, French decision-writing and reporting style, Italian courts’ style of citing foreign CISG case law, and German courts’ tendency to heavily cite scholarly writings.
I.
The Notion of Persuasive Authority
Glenn notes the three potential benefits of the law’s recognition of foreign cases as persuasive authority.17 First, it justifies the use of foreign cases and sources of law. This benefit is premised on the belief that how other legal systems have dealt with a given issue is likely to provide insight to the case before the court. Second, and this is especially true with an international sales law, the realisation of the benefits of legal harmonisation is dependent on the degree of uniform application or uniformity of results. The normative claim that an international sales law is welfare-benefitting can only be measured by actual results. Finally, the engaging of foreign perspectives and reasoning allows a country to take a leadership role in the interpretation of international law. The reputation of a country’s law as rational and fair is largely due to the willingness of its courts to take “the risk of leading.”18 As noted earlier, a Spanish Appellate Court asserted that the spirit of the CISG is best served by uniform application of its text.19 Another Spanish court noted that: “On the basis of the principle of solidarity and interdependence within international relationships, a new conception of the notion of sovereignty has been recognised and formed based upon the integration and observance of supranational principles and rules.”20
17 18 19 20
Glenn, Persuasive Authority, (1987) 32 McGill Law Review (MLR), 261 et seq. Glenn (op. cit. fn. 17), 298. Cherubino Valsangiacomo, S.A. v. American Juice Import, Inc (op. cit. fn. 7). BSC Footwear Supplies v. Brumby St, Spain, 16 November 2000, Appellate Court Alicante, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/001116s4.html.
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An Italian court went so far as to say that Art. 7(1) CISG mandates the use of foreign case law as persuasive authority.21 The inconsistency of the reasoning is apparent. Art. 7(1) CISG does not expressly mandate the use of foreign case law as persuasive authority. However, the sentiment is correct that to be true to the CISG’s mandate to “promote uniformity in its application” the review of foreign case law is an intellectual necessity in order to write a well-reasoned decision.
II.
American Unilateralism
Soon after the CISG went into effect, an American academic cautioned that “Americans should remain involved in the ongoing dialogue on the Convention.”22 The best way to influence the development of the CISG is by writing persuasive opinions. This is done by applying CISG interpretive methodology as expressed in its Articles and through its legislative history. The crafting of persuasive opinions necessarily dictates the use of scholarly materials and foreign law cases, as well as arbitral decisions. The notion of persuasive authority is premised on two underlying themes in the context of CISG methodology. First, the use of scholarly writings, foreign case law, and arbitral decisions is not specifically required by the CISG. However, the use of such sources as persuasive authority is implied by the uniformity and good faith principles found in Art. 7 CISG. Gruber will review the importance of “Legislative Intention” in his contribution to this book. The legislative history of CISG negotiations and drafting show that the importance of uniformity of application was a major concern. Zeller will address the principle of good faith in international trade, while Janssen and Kiene discuss the general principles found in the CISG. The main obstacle to the interpretive methodology of the CISG is that it is applied in the context of national legal traditions. An example of such a tradition is the notion of American exceptionalism or unilateralism. Other obstacles may be more stylistic than substantive. An example is the tradition in France of short, non-descriptive court decisions. The reasoning of the French courts and citation to sources used in rendering a decision are rarely enunciated in the reported cases. These two examples will be discussed later in this chapter. One point to note here is that the overarching effect of na21
22
Italy, 29 December 1999, District Court Pavia (Tessile v. Ixela), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/991229i3.html. See also, Switzerland, Pretore della giurisdizione Locarno-Campagna, 16 December 1991, available at http:// cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/911216s1.html. Zwart, The New International Law of Sales: A Marriage Between Socialist, Third World, Common and Civil Law Principles, (1988) 13 North Carolina Journal of International and Commercial Regulation (NCJICR), 109, 128.
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tional legal traditions may be as much a subconscious framing of the CISG as it is an intentional avoidance of its methodology. The second underlying theme implied in the concept of persuasive authority is that a foreign case or a scholarly writing should only be cited if it is well-reasoned. If persuasive authority is properly applied, then a race to the top would be the result. The better, more reasoned decisions (based on a review of foreign cases) would reach the level of persuasive authority while the parochial, poorly reasoned ones would be delegated to the misinterpretation side of CISG jurisprudence. However, even if scholarly analyses assist in distinguishing good from bad cases the problem remains that bad decisions may be applied within a given national legal realm. The role of foreign law in American courts has been the grounds for debate in the area of constitutional interpretation. Calabresi has argued in favour of American unilateralism in the area of social and constitutional issues. He asserts that: “When the Court decides highly contested social issues in consultation with foreign law, it risks ignoring or diluting what Americans perceive to be its exceptional place in the world, and adopts an untenable role as social change agent.”23 Speaking more broadly, another commentator argues that the use of foreign law sources can be manipulated in support of a position not supportable under United States jurisprudence.24 On the other side of the debate, a commentator characterises these arguments as based upon the “myth of insularity.”25 He notes that, in fact, the use of foreign law by American judges is an old practice. Seipp notes that the use of sources as persuasive authority is as old as stare decisis: “When English courts arrived at a notion of binding precedent, they developed a corresponding idea of ‘persuasive precedent,’ [or] ‘persuasive authority,’ re-
23
24
25
Nilsen, Symposium: The Role of Judges in the Twenty-First Century, (2006) 86 Boston University Law Review (BULR), 1037, 1046 commenting on Calabresi, A Shining City on a Hill: American Exceptionalism and the Supreme Court’s Practice of Relying on Foreign Law, (2006) 86 BULR, 1335 et seq. Kochan, Sovereignty and the American Courts at the Cocktail Party of International Law: The Dangers of Domestic Judicial Invocations of Foreign and International Law, (2006) 29 Fordham J. Int’l L., 507 (focuses mostly on the use of foreign and international sources in constitutional and human rights law). Seipp, Our Law, Their Law, History and the Citation to Foreign Law, (2006) 18 BULR, 1435 et seq.
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ferring to those sources that a judge might cite and might find persuasive, but would not be bound to follow.”26 In the end, the debate over the use of foreign legal sources in constitutional interpretation and the fear that foreign sources will be manipulated to support untenable positions are weak arguments in the context of the application and interpretation of an international sales law. Seipp suggests that “[o]pponents to citation of foreign law fundamentally misconstrue the distinction between binding and persuasive authority.”27 He quotes Caleb Cushing who in 1820 noted the use of European common, civil, and customary law as persuasive authority in United States courts: “[O]ur courts study them all, and adopt from them whatever is most applicable to our situation, and whatever is on the whole just and expedient, without considering either obligatory. The authority of a decision or opinion, emanating from either of these sources, is rested on exactly the same foundation, viz. its intrinsic excellence.”28 The problem is not that United States courts are unfamiliar with the notion of persuasive precedent.29 The problem is there are no standards or principles for applying foreign cases as persuasive authority. Even though the current constitutional debate over citing foreign law is different than the application of an international private law convention, the modern judicial disregard of foreign case law has plagued cases applying the CISG. Waldron has argued that what is needed is a theory that would “provide guidance in such use as persuasive or conclusive authority; the areas in which it is more appropriate, such as private law, and where it may be less appropriate, such as constitutional interpretation.”30 A past obstacle to using foreign cases as persuasive authority was the lack of accessibility to those cases. This is no longer true in the area of the CISG with the development of readily accessible databases and translations of foreign cases.
26 27 28
29
30
Seipp (op. cit. fn. 25), 1438. Nilsen (op. cit. fn. 23), 1046. Cushing, On the Study of the Civil Law, (1820) 11 North American Review (NAR), 412. For example, courts from many states in the United States cite Delaware state court decisions as persuasive authority in the area of corporate governance. Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, (2005) 119 Harvard Law Review (HLR), 129.
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Even in the few “enlightened” American cases, such as Chicago Prime v. Northam Food,31 American courts continue to exhibit a lack of understanding of CISG interpretive methodology. In that case the trial court cited six foreign CISG cases and cited scholarly literature on the CISG on nine occasions. This represents the largest number of such citations by an American court. The District Court in Chicago Prime, states that “the Convention directs that its interpretation be informed by its ‘international character and (…) the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith in international trade.’”32 But, it then immediately qualifies that approach by stating that “case law interpreting analogous provisions of Art. 2 of the U.S. Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) may also inform the court where the language of the relevant CISG provisions tracks that of the UCC.”33 The judge points out that “federal case law interpreting and applying the CISG is scant.”34 This begs the question as to why he readily resorted to American case law.
III. Application with Reasons Unknown: France A number of obstacles to uniformity of application have appeared in French CISG jurisprudence. The general obstacle is that French courts rarely provide the rationales for their decisions. This does not mean that French courts do not read or are unaware of foreign case law or scholarly writings relating to the CISG. The reason that such transparency may play a diminished role in French jurisprudence is that case law generally plays less of a role in the Civil Law system. However, at least in the area of CISG jurisprudence, this has not been the case in Germany and Italy. One thing is certain, that whether applying the civil code or the CISG, the cursory style of reporting decisions or la methode devinatoire is an embedded feature of French legal tradition. Unfortunately, this is a hindrance to autonomous interpretations and the evolution of persuasive authority needed for the uniform application of the CISG. A second troubling development is represented by the Cour de Cassation decision in Schreiber v. Thermo Dynamique.35 The court delegated to the 31
32
33 34
35
Chicago Prime Packers, Inc. v. Northam Food Trading Co, 320 F. Supp. 2d 702 (E.D. Ill. 2004), affirmed on appeal, 408 F. 3d 894 (7th Cir. 2005). Ibid at 709, quoting, Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp, 71 F. 3d 1024, 1027-28 (2nd Cir. 1995). Ibid. Ibid, quoting, Usinor Industeel v. Leeco Steel Products, 209 F. Supp. 2d 880, 884 (N.D. Ill. 2002). France, 26 May 1999, Supreme Court Schreiber v. Thermo Dynamique available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990526f1.html. See Whittington (op. cit. fn. 4), 812.
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lower or trial courts the determination of “reasonableness” under Art. 39 of the CISG (notice of lack of conformity). The Cour de Cassation failed to provide any guidance and simply affirmed the lower court’s use of “its sovereign discretion.” It is disturbing that the highest court in a country would not provide guidance in order to prevent divergent interpretations within its own national legal system. In Mr. Flippe Christian v. SARL Douet Sport Collections, the Commercial Court of Besançon summarily stated that the final notice of non-conformity given six and eleven months after delivery was reasonable because it was within the outer limit of the two years provided in Art. 39(2) CISG.36 This approach was again taken by another Appellate Court in a 2003 decision.37 The court ignored the reasonableness requirement of Art. 39(1) CISG. In fact, it extended the two year limit in Art. 39(2) CISG by stating that the two year period was to be taken from the time that the seller knew of the defect. The court reasoned that since the machines provided under the contract were still being used by the buyer, the buyer’s earlier complaints acted to extend the commencement of the two-year period. The court “observed that the buyer could, under Art. 47 CISG, fix an additional period of time of reasonable length to allow the seller to perform its obligations.” It failed to provide any rationale as to whether it was reasonable notice as required in Art. 39(1) CISG. In 2004, another Appellate Court held that notice given eleven months after final invoices had been issued was unreasonable.38 The court failed to recognise the earlier decision in Mr. Flippe Christian v. SARL Douet Sport Collections that held that an eleven month period was a reasonable time to give notice. The Appellate Court in Pelliculest v. Morton International held that two months was a reasonable period for notice under Art. 39 CISG.39 In this case, the buyer never directly notified the seller of the non-conformity. Instead, the buyer’s insurance company notified the seller’s insurance company some two months after the non-conformity had been brought to the attention of the buyer. The court avoided a ruling on the reasonableness of the notice by noting that the insurance company’s agreement to hire an expert to evaluate the non-conformity was dispositive on the issue: “It is thus not contestable that the notice of the defect had been made within a reasonable period of time as envisioned by Art. 39 of the CISG.” 36
37
38
39
France, 19 January 1998, District Court Besançon, available at http://cisgw3.law. pace.edu/cases/980119f1.html. France, 18 December 2003, Appellate Court Lyon, available at http://cisgw3.law. pace.edu/cases/031218f1.html. France, 26 October 2004, Appellate Court Poitiers, available at http://cisgw3.law. pace.edu/cases/041026f1.html. France, 24 October 2000, Appellate Court Colmar, available at http://cisgw3.law. pace.edu/cases/001024f1.html.
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CISG Advisory Council Opinion no. 240 notes that the Supreme Courts of Austria and Switzerland, in contrast to France’s Cour de Cassation, attempted to provide such guidance. The former holding that notice within fourteen days and the latter within thirty days after discovering of the nonconformity, whether actual or implied, was presumptively reasonable. Although not discussed in the previous discussion of persuasive authority, the higher the court in a national court hierarchy the greater the hope for rendering a well-reasoned decision. A decision of a country’s supreme court cannot only unify CISG application within a country, but if well-reasoned it has the potential of impacting the application of the CISG worldwide. The Austrian and Swiss Supreme Courts’ willingness to provide guidance to their lower courts has been noted by courts in other countries.
D. Scholarly Writings and CISG Interpretation This section will examine the use of scholarly writings and commentary in the application of the CISG. The first part argues for the need for compromise and convergence in the use of such sources and in national reporting of CISG cases. The second part presents findings of a brief “empirical” analysis of the sources used in CISG cases and arbitral decisions. It reinforces the need to use foreign case law as persuasive authority in order to reach a manageable level of uniformity.
I.
The Use of Scholarly Writings and Commentary
The value and function of legal writings in the interpretation of the CISG has varied in national legal systems. As a matter of general jurisprudence, there are considerable differences between jurisdictions. Whereas in some systems it is still improper for judges to quote legal writings, other countries have a long tradition of academic exchange between judges and scholars. The obligation to have regard to the international character of the CISG (Art. 7(1) CISG) indicates courts are under some form of obligation to consider writings by legal scholars. That is because these writings are probably the best source for learning about other countries’ approaches to CISGrelated issues.
40
CISG Advisory Council Opinion no. 2: Examination of the Goods and Notice of Non-Conformity Art. 38 and 39, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/ CISG-AC-op2.html.
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In Ajax Tool Works, Inc. v. Can-Eng Manufacturing,41 the court rejected the party’s claim that a contract’s express limited warranty acted as a disclaimer of implied warranties. It acknowledges that under Ontario Sale of Goods Act [as well as the US Uniform Commercial Code] such disclaimers may be interpreted as such, but that under CISG more is needed. The “question [under the CISG] is whether the disclaimer is a part of the agreement between the parties, arguably a tougher, yet ultimately fairer standard.”42 As important for the current discussion the court directly quotes a scholarly source for this proposition. Some twenty years since its adoption CISG jurisprudence has produced a mix of properly reasoned cases, and arbitral decisions, and many characterised by homeward trend analysis. A large body of easily accessible cases and scholarly literature has been complied to assist in understanding the CISG and its application. Unfortunately, as will be discussed later in this chapter, this global database of CISG materials has not seen the full realisation of uniformity of application or the creation of a global jurisconsultorium. The development of online databases has not resulted in a greater recognition of foreign cases or scholarly literature in some countries. At a higher level, the CISG’s lack of uniform application has diminished the potential benefits of creating a fuller appreciation of comparative legal cultures.43 Another technique in developing a uniformity of CISG application is the use of other uniform or soft laws as an aid to interpretation. The uniform law that is most applicable is the UNIDROIT Principles. Mistelis claims that the UNIDROIT Principles have been increasingly used in legal practice and dispute resolution.44 The UNIDROIT Principles are a worthy template in the drafting of international business contracts. However, some have questioned the appropriateness of using them in interpreting the CISG. In the area of filling in gaps in the CISG, Andersen argues that the UNIDROIT Principles or PECL are “not natural extensions of the general principles of the CISG and the notion of automatically referring to these [soft laws] as standard solutions to problems which were left open by the drafters is contrary to 41
42
43
44
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1306; CCH Product Liability Reporter P16, 516 (N.D. Ill. 2003). Ibid at 18, quoting, Cook, CISG: From the Perspective of the Practitioner, (1998) 17 JLC, 347. See, Rossett, Unification, Harmonization, Restatement, Codification and Reform in International Commercial Law, (1992) 40 AJCL, 683 et seq. (emphasises the need to encourage the growth of a common legal culture); Markesinis, Comparative Law − A Subject in Search of an Audience, (1990) 53 Modern Law Review (MLR), 1 et seq. (looking at foreign law can bring a deeper understanding of problems). Mistelis, The UNIDROIT Principles Applied as the ‘Most Appropriate Rules of Law’ in a Swedish Arbitral Award, (2003) 8 Uniform Law Review (ULR), 633.
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the CISG [interpretive methodology].”45 In practice, Mistelis’ proposition that the UNIDROIT Principles have been used in dispute resolution involving the CISG is correct in the area of arbitration. A significant number of International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration decisions have referenced the UNIDROIT Principles in applying the CISG. The contrary is true for court cases − rarely have the courts used the UNIDROIT Principles to aid their applications of the CISG. Cuniberti argues that if the reason for the CISG is to increase international trade by reducing transaction costs and reducing the uncertainty of the applicable contract law rules, then it is difficult to justify.46 He asserts that the issue of applicable law is not something that prevents parties from entering into an international business transaction. However, despite the fact that parties do not expressly or consciously opt in or opt out of the CISG, Cuniberti argues that there are likely some transaction cost savings for both sophisticated and unsophisticated merchants. For the unsophisticated party, transaction costs during the post-formation stage are reduced since the CISG provides a readily accessible default law. For the sophisticated party, transaction cost savings are possible by avoiding costs of negotiating over the applicable law and the costs of learning foreign contract rules. The ultimate solution to the lack of uniformity in CISG applications is the use of well-reasoned foreign case law and arbitral decisions as persuasive precedent. This was aptly stated by an Italian Court in Al Palazzo S.r.l. v. Bernardaud di Limoges S.A.: “The goal of uniformity can be advanced even if the court decisions and arbitral awards of other countries, which should be taken in consideration by judges, have only persuasive and not binding value.”47 True transaction cost savings, whether in the formation of a contract or in dispute resolution, are best captured by a uniform application of the CISG.
II.
A Prequel to an Empirical Study
Andersen and I have begun an empirical analysis of all reported CISG decisions − judicial and arbitral. The project will code all decisions to determine the frequency of citations to foreign decisions and scholarly legal writings. The study will determine variations in citation between Common and Civil Law countries, between national legal systems, and between law cases and arbitral decisions. It will also provide longitudinal findings to determine any 45 46
47
Andersen (op. cit. fn. 3), 130 et seq. Cuniberti, Is the CISG Benefiting Anybody?, (2006) 39 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law (VJTL), 1511. Italy, 26 November 2002, District Court Rimini, available at http://cisgw3.law. pace.edu/cases/021126i3.html.
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discernable trends in CISG jurisprudence over the past twenty years. For the present undertaking, some preliminary findings will be provided with the caveat that the analysis does not possess the statistical power needed to confirm statistically relevant conclusions. The purpose of the current presentation is thus intended to be purely conceptual − outlining some of the issues and variations that the larger empirical study is intended to clarify. A second caveat is that the preliminary study likely displays the biases of a Common Law scholar pertaining to the differences between the Civil and Common Law legal systems. Reimann48 correctly notes that the old dichotomies of Civil versus Common Law, legislative versus case law, and civil codes versus Common Law statutes are more of a hindrance than a help, and deter decision-makers from other important sources of law. This seems especially true for an international sales law. Nonetheless, these dichotomies were used in the construction of hypotheses for the current study. Some of these hypotheses reflect the misconceptions of the current author. But the misconceptions also represent the importance of not overstating the harmonising power of an uniform sales law. Rossett notes that it is always important to see such uniform laws in the context of the national, political and social systems in which they will be implemented: “If one focuses too hard on the unity of the text, one is quite likely to lose sight of the disparity of result that is produced when that text is applied in different systems.”49 This analysis consisted of a random selection of 217 judicial and 45 arbitral decisions applying the CISG. The selection resulted in a review of 97 Civil Law and 91 Common Law cases. An additional 15 French court cases were reviewed. Most of the arbitral decisions were taken from International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) cases. One hypothesis posed that Civil Law courts are more likely than Common Law courts to cite scholarly writings. Black and Richter’s study of the decisions of the Canadian Supreme Court showed that citations to secondary literature increased dramatically in Civil Code cases versus non-Civil Code cases.50 The preliminary finding of CISG cases indicates that Civil and Common Law courts, as well arbitral panels, exhibited a high level use of secondary or scholarly sources. About 68% of the arbitral decisions cited scholarly work as compared to 62% for Civil Law courts and almost 50% for Common Law courts. It seems that citation rate to scholarly writings be48
49 50
Reimann, Stepping Out of the European Shadow: Why Comparative Law in the United States Must Develop Its Own Agenda, (1998) 46 AJCL, 637. Rossett (op. cit. fn. 43), 687. Black/Richter, Did She Mention My Name?: Citation of Academic Authority by the Supreme Court of Canada, 1985-1990, (1993) 16 Dalhousie Law Journal (DLJ), 377. The authors found that 87.5% or 21 of 24 of the Civil Code cases cited scholarly writings, while only 46.5% or 277 of 596 of the non-Civil Code cases contained such citations.
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tween Civil and Common Law countries is not overly significant. However, the disparity in citation rate is significant when the analysis is narrowed to only CISG-related scholarly writings. Sixty-three percent of the Civil Law courts cited CISG commentaries while only 18% of the Common Law courts cited specifically the CISG literature. The use of foreign law cases in CISG-related court decisions is significantly different between Civil and Common Law decisions by a two to one margin. Civil Law courts cited foreign case law in about 15% of its CISG cases, while Common Law courts only 8%. Arbitration panels used foreign CISG cases about 40% of the time. When looked at from a nation-specific perspective, Zimmermann’s observation holds true that “the diversity existing among civilian systems may be as great, and sometimes greater, than the differences between French and English, or German and English law.”51 My cursory analysis shows vast differences in citation rates among Civil Law countries. In the area of citation to CISG literature a dichotomy appears. At one pole, the countries of Austria, Germany, and Switzerland have a very high rate of citation to CISG literature. On average, the sample indicated a combination citation rate of over 90%. In contrast, CISG cases in Denmark, France, Italy, and Spain rarely cited the CISG literature. In the case of France, as noted earlier, this is not a surprise given the cryptic nature of their judicial opinions in general. Belgium placed in the middle of the two above groupings. Belgian courts cited CISG literature in about 45% of their cases. Finally, the rate of citation has remained fairly consistent over the years between the above two groupings. Again, the citation to foreign CISG cases varied dramatically between the Civil and Common Law cases reviewed. Italian courts and German courts showed the greatest frequency of cites to foreign case law with the Italian cases having a citation rate of 60% and the German cases a rate of 27%. When combined, that is cases citing either foreign case law or CISG literature, the citation rate increased to 100% for German and Swiss cases, 93% for Austrian cases, 60% for Italian cases, 49% for Dutch cases, 11% for Spanish cases, and 0% for French cases. In contrast, the Common Law cases reviewed cited foreign case law only about 8% of the time. However, when aggregated the citation rate variance between all Civil and Common Law cases reviewed was 14% to 8%. Despite the high citation rates for some countries, the overall citation rates to foreign CISG cases are woefully low. Arbitral panels showed a greater willingness to use external sources in their application of the CISG. About 43% of arbitral decisions referenced CISG-related scholarly writings. Arbitration panels cited CISG legal cases at a rate of 22%. In addition, one in three of the arbitral decisions reviewed 51
Zimmermann, Comparative Law and the Europeanization of Private Law, in: Reimann/Zimmermann (eds.), The Oxford Handbook to Comparative Law, Oxford 2006, 559.
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made use of the UNIDROIT Principles in the application of the CISG as compared to a citation rate of about 1% for all Civil and Common Law cases combined. The interplay between the CISG and other uniform law sources will be more fully analysed by Andersen in her contribution to this book. Unfortunately, when analysed longitudinally, there does not seem to be any noticeable increases in citation rates. For example, United States courts’ citation to foreign case law has remained relatively fixed at about 10% when comparing pre-2000 cases with post-1999 cases. During this same timeframe citations to CISG scholarly literature actually declined from 21% to 17%. The most “positive” intellectual reason for the low citation rates is that although American courts are astute at using legal precedent they are uncomfortable in using foreign cases as persuasive authority. A less positive reason, as indicated in the Fitzgerald survey,52 is the relative ignorance of the CISG and its application by US judges and practitioners. The stagnation in citation rates in the United States and elsewhere is especially disappointing given the development of readily accessible databases of foreign CISG case law and arbitral decisions. Regarding the development of databases of foreign legal cases and scholarly literature, an Italian court stated that in “furtherance of the objectives of Art. 7(1) of the CISG, these publications aim at assuring uniform application and interpretation through reference to the case law of different countries.”53 Unfortunately, the relationship between increased access to foreign case law and increased use of that law has not been shown, especially in the United States. The “continuing process of convergence”54 by which a uniform text can be made to be a uniform law in practice has yet to be verified.
E. The Future Application of the CISG In the years ahead, my hope is that well-reasoned, autonomous interpretations of the CISG will increasingly win out over homeward trend-reasoned decisions. In order to fully obtain the benefits of a uniform sales law, it is important for jurists to follow the CISG interpretive methodology and not to prematurely resort to domestic law in its application. Such an approach is true to the intent of the drafters when they incorporated legal systemneutral terminology into the CISG. Ferrari has argued that not all CISG terms can be interpreted autonomously. He gives as an example the fact that the CISG fails to provide a set of private international rules. Therefore, courts must resort to domestic pri52 53 54
Fitzgerald (op. cit. fn. 10), forthcoming. Al Palazzo S.r.l. v. Bernardaud di Limoges S.A. (op. cit. fn. 42). Bridge, Uniformity and Diversity in the Law of International Sales, (1996) 15 PILR, 55-89.
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vate international law (conflicts of law) rules. This is true, but it is dangerous to extrapolate from that particular issue to a general statement. The general statement that best describes CISG interpretive methodology is that but for a very few exceptions, “all expressions must be interpreted autonomously.” Such a general statement is essential to the goal of uniform application. The problem of divergent autonomous or original interpretations remains. As was stated previously, “priori meanings taken from national legal systems will have to be abandoned in favor of independent meanings consistent with the CISG’s objective” of advancing a uniform international sales law.55 The fact that there may be divergent, autonomous interpretations of a CISG rule is a positive advancement over homeward trend decisions since, divergent, autonomous decisions indicate that CISG interpretive methodology was used, and hopefully, included a review of foreign case law. The fact that a review of foreign case law failed to prevent a divergent interpretation is not a bad result per se. A subsequent interpretation may have been a result of a misunderstanding of prior cases. More positively, the subsequent interpretation may have been needed to correct poorly reasoned prior cases. The above notion of divergent, autonomous interpretations highlights the second role of using foreign case law as persuasive authority. The first role, as discussed above, is the creation of autonomous interpretations. The second role of using foreign case law is the reconciliation of autonomous, divergent interpretations. Before addressing the reconciliation issue, a clarification of the word “divergent” is necessary. Divergent implies a different result. Different results or rule interpretations are indeed an affront to uniform application. But, the case of divergent reasoning with similar results is not a clear case of non-uniformity at least not for the “conflicting” cases. However, divergent reasoning projected into future cases is likely to produce non-uniformity of results. There are then three components for a truly uniform law: uniformity of text, uniformity of reasoning, and uniformity of result. Reconciliation of divergent interpretations by subsequent courts or arbitral panels is possible through reasoned determination of which foreign cases are more “persuasive.” A well-reasoned decision would assess the divergent interpretations and provide an alternative or combined interpretation. Amato envisioned such a function by subsequent courts when he stated: “[A firm] foundation can only be built if courts interpreting the CISG provide detailed and convincing analyses. Such detailed and convincing analyses (…) will consider the pertinent provisions of the [CISG] (…) the interplay between 55
DiMatteo, The CISG and the Presumption of Enforceability: Unintended Contractual Liability in International Business Dealings, (1997) 22 Yale Journal of International Law (YJIL), 136.
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them (…) and include reference to (…) [its] legislative history (…) and to scholarly articles (…). In so doing, the decisions will have a logic and rationale which will be persuasive of their own accord.”56 This prevalence of reasoned decisions in the application of an international sales law will ultimately determine the degree of success that law achieves as a unifying agent. This is why the use of foreign case law, and to a lesser extent scholarly writings, as persuasive authority is vital. This is why it is important for courts to differentiate between foreign contract law and the CISG. Jurists need to set aside the idiosyncrasies of their national legal systems for the common good. France and other countries need to provide reasoned decisions to explain their applications of the CISG. Countries, such as the United States and Canada, will need to recognise the importance of understanding foreign cases when applying the CISG to common issues. Finally, my Christmas list would include the continued expansion of member countries to include countries like Brazil, India and the United Kingdom. The work of legal scholars remains vital to the unification process. By teaching the CISG in law schools, the next generation of judges and international business law practitioners are likely to be more sophisticated in their approach to international sales law. In addition, the role of legal scholars in critiquing CISG decisions remains a valuable service. Such critiques will hopefully encourage future courts to make use of the better reasoned domestic and foreign cases. The result will be a more functional uniform international sales law. A choir made up of more than seventy different legal systems may never sing in harmony but at least it will be singing together, albeit a little off key. That is in itself quite an accomplishment! 56
Amato, U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods − The Open Price Term and Uniform Application: An Early Interpretation by Hungarian Courts, (1993) 13 JLC, 28 et seq.
The Observance of Good Faith in International Trade Bruno Zeller
A. Introduction The principle of good faith in contractual dealings has a varied degree of acceptability. In Civil Law countries, notably in the German and French legal system, good faith is well established. In Australia, good faith has a tentative foothold whereas, England appears to be “the last bastion” clinging to a “rigorous interpretation of contractual obligations.”1 The United States is the only Common Law country that has included good faith into its statutory sales law regime. The new Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China2 has also taken note of the principles of good faith and included the principle into several articles. Art. 6 of the new Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China, the most important one, states: “The parties shall abide by the principle of honesty and good faith in exercising their rights and performing their obligations.”3 The CISG also refers to good faith in Art. 7(1) CISG and notes that good faith must be observed in international trade. One would be forgiven to think that such a term is uniformly understood as it has a long history of developments – especially in Germany, France and the United States. However, the contrary is the case and even between the French bonne foi4 and the German Treu und Glauben,5 which have the same origin, variations of interpretation and application are evident. Sonnenberger commented that a levelling-out of differences can be extremely difficult.6 This is not surprising as good faith is a metaphysical concept and the understanding thereof depends on the “structure and content of the specific legal sys-
1
2
3 4 5 6
Williams, An Introduction to General Principles and Formation of Contracts in the New Chinese Contract Law, (2001) 17 Journal of Contract Law, 13, 17. Promulgated in the Second Session of the Ninth National People’s Congress on 15 March 1999. Ibid, New Chinese Contract Law. Art. 1134(3) Code Civil (CC). § 242 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB). Sonnenberger, Treu und Glauben – ein supranationaler Grundsatz?, in: Böttcher/ Hueck/Jähnke (eds.), Festschrift für Walter Odersky, Berlin 1996, 703 et seq.
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tem in which they are implemented, and on the concrete and specific contract in question.”7 There is, however, a general universal point where there is no disagreement, namely that a business does not continue to prosper if it behaves disreputably and in an unfair manner. It is also understood that a business must make profits in order to survive and hence must act in its own interest. The problem therefore is where these two modes of behaviour intersect and whether good faith is the principle by which this intersection is found. This chapter will attempt to elicit the intent and application of good faith in the CISG. This topic is not without controversy and needs to be tackled on two fronts. Firstly, some authors suggest that good faith only addresses the interpretation of the Convention whereas others find the principle also to be additionally applicable to the behaviour of parties in their contractual dealings. As a second point the problem as to what good faith actually means within the ambit of the CISG will also be discussed. To facilitate an understanding of what good faith actually means the German and French system will be briefly addressed in order to gain some insight into the meaning and substance of good faith as applicable in the two legal systems. Such an understanding can serve as a first attempt at understanding the meaning of good faith. Philosophically this is of value as even a short comparative analysis highlights not only the similarities but also brings out differences. However, care needs to be taken not to simply import this understanding into the CISG. The CISG is after all an international document and must be understood independently from domestic laws. This mandate is laid down in Art. 7(1) CISG which prohibits recourse to domestic law where the CISG is governing the particular issues at hand. In general terms this view has been recognised in England in 1962 when it was observed that: “It would be deplorable if the nations should, after protracted negations, reach agreement (…) and that their several courts should then disagree as to the meaning of what they appeared to agree upon.”8 The problem in the search for the concrete meaning of good faith can be very simply stated. The CISG makes it mandatory to apply good faith in Art. 7(1) CISG without however giving a definition as to what good faith
7
8
Schlechtriem, Good Faith in German Law and in International Uniform Laws, Saggi, conferenze e seminari, Rome 1997, available at http://w3.uniroma1.it/idc/ centro/publications/24schlechtriem.pdf. Scruttons Ltd. v Midlands Silicones Ltd., [1962] A.C. 446, 471, on the application of the Hague Rules.
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actually means.9 Therefore there are two issues to be considered in analysing good faith under the CISG. First what is understood under the term of good faith and secondly – as pointed out above – does this term cover the interpretation of the Convention only or does it also govern the relationship between the contractual parties?
B. Good Faith in Germany and France – a Comparative View This brief analysis between the German and French understanding of good faith is instructive as Sonnenberger makes the point that – despite the fact that the French and German law on good faith has the same parentage – similarities are difficult to find.10 Indeed it is impossible to find in German law a definition of what exactly good faith means despite the fact that the observance of “Treu und Glauben mit Rücksicht auf die Verkehrssitte” as noted in §§ 242 and 157 BGB has been enacted since 1900. What is certain is the fact that in German law – contrary to French law – the term good faith has a double meaning, namely “Gutgläubigkeit” and also “Gutwilligkeit.”11 This can be loosely translated as meaning good faith and good will or prepared to exhibit good will. “Bonne foi” on the other hand best equates to the German “Gutwilligkeit”. This difference in the understanding of the term has far reaching consequences as an application is tied to particular events. The German law will often find a breach of good faith if the very reason of the failure of the contractual obligations goes to the very root of the contract. In French law the very opposite is the case. Pacta sunt servanda is still the leading principle and is applied before bonne foi is contemplated even if conditions have substantially changed since the contract was formed.12 The conclusion is that the parties’ contractual obligations cannot be modified or varied by applying good faith. In other words the French treatment of contractual obligations is closer to the Common Law approach in England than the German one. The German approach is that good faith is a regulative principle which will and can be used to control or even correct the parties’ contractual obligations.13 In recent times the French legal system has modified its stand and bonne foi is now applied to the contractual relationship between parties. However, it must be understood that, despite a certain vagueness, a structural model is discernable. To put it simply the principle of bonne foi has been interpreted 19 10 11 12 13
Zeller, Good Faith – The Scarlet Pimpernel of the CISG, Pace essay 2000, available at http:cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/zeller2.html. Sonnenberger (op. cit. fn. 6), 703. Sonnenberger (op. cit. fn. 6), 707. Sonnenberger (op. cit. fn. 6), 704. Sonnenberger (op. cit. fn. 6), 706.
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as guaranteeing a mode of behaviour which is not contrary to what a reasonable person would expect from a contractual relationship. In the end though it is not what the parties expected bonne foi to mean, but what the judge considers how the parties ought to have behaved within their contractual relationship.14 Bonne foi has been used even when a contractual relationship had to be redefined. In a 1992 decision the French Supreme Court15 forced an oil company to renegotiate the price of oil to a petrol station which pursuant to the contract could not continue to operate profitably. The French Supreme Court has on several occasions forced – without hesitation – contractual parties to embrace new obligations which were judged to be necessary obligations under the umbrella of bonne foi.16 The question can be asked whether it is indeed possible to define the term of good faith or whether it is necessary to define such a term. The inevitable question of course would be if the term cannot be defined then why include it in the first place? The answer must be that good faith is a term which may not be definable but is nevertheless understood. It will take on substance within a given set of facts. This is not unusual because many legal systems contain terms which defy a clear definition such as terms of unconscionable conduct. After all, the law is expressed not only by words but also through “expectation” ideas such as good faith. The inevitable conclusion is that good faith is an elusive term and the famous passage in the “The Scarlet Pimpernel”17 is very apt to describe the search for good faith. “They seek him here they seek him there [they seek him] everywhere. Is he in heaven, is he in hell, that (…) elusive Pimpernel?” The question needs to be posed of whether in the search for the elusive meaning of good faith one looks too hard in the wrong places or one looks without seeing the obvious.18
C. Good Faith and the CISG – What Does It Cover? A reading of Art. 7 CISG could suggest that – as the observance of good faith is tied to the first sentence, namely the interpretation of this Convention – it does not govern the relationship between the parties. However, many authors and courts suggest that good faith covers both the interpreta14 15 16 17 18
Sonnenberger (op. cit. fn. 6), 710. Cf. case note Mestre, Revue trimestrielle de droit civil 1993, 124 et seq. Sonnenberger (op. cit. fn. 6), 712. Baroness Orczy, The Scarlet Pimpernel, adapted by Cross, London 1988. Zeller (op. cit. fn. 9).
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tion of the Convention and the relationship between the parties. The starting point in this debate is the logical observation that Art. 7 CISG as an interpretative article covers the interpretation of the Convention but not of itself. Therefore the first step is to interpret Art. 7 CISG. In order to interpret Art. 7 CISG recourse to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention) must be sought. Honnold supports this argument and he states: “Article 7 of the Sales Convention embodies mutual obligations of the Contracting States as to how their tribunals will construe the Convention. Hence the Vienna Convention would be pertinent to a question concerning the construction of article 7, but the Vienna Convention would not govern the interpretation of the articles dealing with the obligations of the parties to the sales contract, for these articles are to be construed according to the principles of article 7.”19 Art. 31(1) of the Vienna Convention is of significant interest as it states: “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” The question is if the Vienna Convention mandates that a treaty must be interpreted in good faith then why does Art. 7 CISG include the principle of good faith? It appears to be obvious that there would be no need for such an inclusion. Art. 31 of the Vienna Convention makes it clear that all Conventions need to be interpreted in good faith. To extend the argument the Vienna Convention also mandates that the terms of the treaty must be interpreted “in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” The object and purpose of the CISG can be gleaned from its preamble. Terms such as “on the basis of equality and mutual benefit” are used and that the adoptions of the uniform rules “govern contracts for the international sale of goods.”20 It can be argued that due to the object and purpose of the CISG (specifically that it governs contracts for the sale of goods) the good faith principle must be extended to the relationships between the contracting parties. Arguably the CISG and the relations between parties can therefore be interpreted in good faith without the incorporation of Art. 7 CISG through the Vienna Convention. However, the fact is that Art. 7 CISG is part of the CISG and therefore cannot be ignored. Honnold’s view is persuasive enough to indicate that the Vienna Convention is merely restricted to the interpretation of Art. 7 CISG. The inter19 20
Honnold, Uniform Sales for International Sales, 3rd ed., Deventer 1999, 112. Preamble CISG.
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pretation of the remainder of the Convention is regulated by Art. 7 CISG. However if, as suggested above, good faith is merely assisting in the interpretation of the Convention, by what means is “good faith” interpreted? As good faith is part of Art. 7 CISG and this article in turn must be interpreted by the Vienna Convention, the conclusion would be that good faith cannot be interpreted by the CISG but by the Vienna Convention. In other words a gap exists in the CISG which must be filled by relevant laws – in this case the Vienna Convention. The argument that one needs to look at the intentions of the drafters to shed some light on the problem does not advance the argument very much considering the tortuous and difficult birth of the principle of good faith. The Commission in 1978 found itself divided on this question and after considerable debate referred the matter to a small working group to draft a compromise which eventually became Art. 7(1) CISG. It should be noted that more government representatives abstained from voting than those that took part in it.21 It is for these reasons that whatever the drafters suggested does carry little weight. Two points support this view. First the travaux préparatoire are only a collection of thought at a given point in time; they are frozen in time. The CISG, on the other hand, is a living instrument taking its cues from current thought and practices. This argument is supported by the fact that the outcome reached by the working group was a compromise and has been labelled as not being satisfactory anyway.22 Secondly, and following in the same line of arguments, in the end the legal instrument must be read and applied as it stands today as the instrument alone is the collective thought of the drafters and not the travaux préparatoire. To illustrate this point: contrary to the opinion of the working group that feared that due to the vagueness of Art. 7 CISG the principle of good faith would be influenced by municipal thinking,23 this has not happened. Courts have recognised the second mandate in Art. 7 CISG and have interpreted the Convention free from domestic principles and influences includ-
21
22
23
See generally Report of the Secretary-General: Analytical Compilation of Comments by Governments and International Organisations on the Draft Convention on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods as Adopted by the Working Group on the International Sale of Goods, paras 64-79 and also para 58. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/146 and addenda 1-4 (1978), reprinted in (1978) 9 Y.B.U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, 127, 132-33. Zaccaria, The Dilemma of Good Faith in International Commercial Law, (2004) 5 Macquarie Journal of Business Law, 101, 105. Bonell, Article 7: Interpretation of the Convention, in: Bianca/Bonell (eds.) Commentary on the International Sales Law – The 1980 Vienna Sales Convention, Milan 1987, 69.
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ing the principle of good faith. Put simply, the working group was wrong in their assessment of Art. 7 CISG. In relation to the question whether good faith also covers the relations between parties Honnold makes a pertinent point. He suggests that the “articles dealing with the obligations of the parties (…) are to be construed according to the principles of article 7.”24 This suggests that good faith in Art. 7 CISG goes beyond the interpretation of the Convention alone. As good faith is regarded as being a general principle of the CISG the next step would be to look at the CISG contextually. It follows therefore that the phrase “regard is to be had to (…) the observance of good faith in international trade” arguably needs to be interpreted within the four corners of the CISG. However, it does not mean that the CISG “is opened up to every single equitable consideration.”25 This suggests that, at first reading, the principle of good faith permeates the CISG as a whole. It follows that the principle of good faith is applicable to the interpretation of the Convention as well as the behaviour of the parties as prescribed within the four corners of the CISG. When the Convention is interpreted every article within the Convention is interpreted in good faith. It follows therefore that if Art. 8 CISG is interpreted, the relationship between the parties which is regulated within Art. 8 CISG is also interpreted in good faith. The question simply is can the phrase in Art. 8(1) CISG, namely that statements and conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to his intent, be interpreted without the assistance of good faith? To put it differently, when the application of the interpretation of the CISG affects the parties’ standings can the good faith component be disregarded? It is argued that once an interpretative component is attached to an interpretation of regulatory behaviour of the parties it flows naturally into the regulated relationship. In a recent decision the French Supreme Court noted: “In interpreting the elements of the evidence that were put before the court with respect to the principles set out in Article 8 CISG, and namely the principle which states that the contracts must be interpreted in good faith, the Court of Appeal was able to deduce that the agreement contained reciprocal obligations to deliver and purchase determined goods, at an agreed price such that it constituted a sale, which was subject to the Vienna Convention of 11 April 1980.”26
24 25
26
See Honnold (op. cit. fn. 19), 159. See Appellate Court Munich, 15 September 2004, available at http://cisgw3.law. pace.edu/cases/040915g2.html. See French Supreme Court (Société Romay AG v SARL Behr France), 30 June 2004, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040630f1.html.
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Good faith is tied up with the performance of the contract. Arguably therefore, if a party substantially deprives the other one of what they are entitled to under the contract they act in bad faith. Bad faith is the opposite of and therefore linked with the notion of good faith which again brings Art. 7(1) CISG into play. As pointed out above, it is agreed that some literature supports the belief that the principle of good faith should be interpreted narrowly.27 Farnsworth noted that: “This provision (article 7) does no more than instruct a court interpreting the Convention’s provisions to consider the importance of the listed factors.”28 This approach has also been found in decisions such as the ICC Award no. 8611. The arbitrators noted: “Since the provision of Article 7(1) of the CISG concerns only the interpretation of the Convention, no collateral obligation may be derived from the promotion of good faith.”29 The problem with these views is that they engage in the practice of “cherry picking.” The question is whether the “listed factors” in Art. 7 CISG can be separated, that is some only apply to the interpretation of the Conventions whereas others regulate the behaviour of the parties. It is argued that such a separation is impossible as the interpretation of the CISG is intimately woven into the regulation of the contractual relationships. In the end any sales laws aim to regulate and order the contractual relationship between parties. It could be argued that using international court decisions merely assists in interpreting the provisions of the Convention. However, the argument that court decisions also affect the parties is also defendable as they are in support of particular points of debate. Articles such as Art. 8 CISG are directed to determine the relationship between parties. A court can only reach a decision and hence use the rules of the CISG once the relationship between the parties has been determined, that is the facts of the case have
27
28 29
See for example Farnsworth, Duties of Good Faith and Fair Dealing under the UNIDROIT Principles, Relevant International Conventions and National Laws, (1995) 3 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law, 47 et seq.; Felemegas, The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Article 7 and Uniform Interpretation, Rev. CISG 2000-2001, The Hague 2002, 115 et seq.; Whinship, Commentary on Professor Kastely’s Rhetorical Analysis, (1988) 8 Northwestern Journal of Law & Business, 623 et seq. Farnsworth (op. cit. fn. 27), 55. ICC Award no. 8611, 23 January 1997, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace. edu/cases/978611i1.html.
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been elicited. In other words the interrelationship between the actors has been examined. Due to Art. 7 CISG, uniformity is achieved by disallowing a homeward trend. In the application of this article commentators who criticise courts which follow the homeward trend hence do not take note of the need to promote uniformity in the application of the Convention. However, if good faith is only addressed at the interpretation of the countries where good faith is not known or not considered to be a principle of law would by definition reach a different conclusion. The result is that on the one hand Art. 7 CISG demands uniformity in decision making and on the other hand it is not achieved because part of Art. 7 CISG – namely good faith – is not a mandatory principle. It is simply trite to argue that part of an interpretative article is to be excised from investigating the actions of the parties to a contract unless a clear mandate to that effect exists. The drafters of the CISG have not done so. Schlechtriem correctly points out that: “(…) similar to the irresistible force of fundamental laws of nature such as the law of gravity, the principle that not only the interpretation of the Convention, but also the evaluation of the relations, rights and remedies of the parties, should be subject to the principle of good faith.”30 The overarching principle of the CISG is to achieve uniformity of application and that can only be achieved by a tripartite approach to the interpretation and application of the Convention. That is the courts and tribunals, the parties and the CISG is understood and applied by all in the same manner. Two important principles stand out in Art. 7 CISG: “uniformity” and “good faith.” This combination suggests that recourse to domestic definitions of good faith or – no recourse at all as the case may be – is contrary to the autonomous interpretation of the CISG. This was confirmed in Dulces Luisi, S.A. de C.V. v Seoul International Co. Ltd y Seolia Confectionery Co. (Dulces Luisi)31 in which the court stated that the principle of good faith must be interpreted internationally without “resorting to its meaning under Mexican law.”32 It is interesting to note that the problem of whether good faith applies to the interpretation of the Convention only or extends to the contractual parties is not new. In 1988 Winship, after firmly believing that good faith only extended to the interpretation of the Convention, noted that he was con-
30 31
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Schlechtriem (op. cit. fn. 7). Comisión para la Protección del Comercio Exterior de Mexico, arbitral award, 30 November 1998, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/981130m1.html. Ibid.
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vinced by the “conviction of the critics that over time a general obligation on contracting parties to act in good faith will be accepted.”33 The argument can be extended if Art. 7(1) CISG is considered as providing a tool as to the interpretation of the CISG. As such a tool Art. 7(1) CISG could be considered to be a general principle hence applicable to the whole Convention which includes obligations on contracting parties. It is perhaps by good fortune that the promoters of the CISG were not able to write the CISG “tightly,” that is more like a code. Yet the presence of general principles allows some “fluidity” within the CISG. There is room left to adjust the interpretation of the CISG to change circumstances as long as the mandate of Art. 7 CISG is closely followed.34
D. Good Faith and the CISG – What Does It Mean? The first step as to the application of good faith has been discussed above and the next question is as to the meaning of good faith and how it is applied by courts and tribunals. At the outset it must be pointed out that the duty to act in good faith does not equate to a duty based on morality. Such a concept would never lead to a uniform application as morality is a social duty based on cultural norms.35 Furthermore, this fact has been clearly clarified in the drafting process.36 A further matter has also been clarified in a Dutch case,37 namely how the principle of good faith is situated within a contract. The facts are simple: the seller signed a contract which contained a penalty clause which proved to be disproportionate to the damages suffered by the buyer. The seller argued that based on the principle of good faith the penalty ought to be reduced to a more appropriate level. The court correctly ruled that the terms of good faith do not extend to terms which were willingly entered into. There are many attempts at defining good faith but not a single definition has found universal approval. Powers, as an example, suggested that:
33 34
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Winship (op. cit. fn. 28), 629. Zeller, Four-Corners – The Methodology for Interpretation and Application of the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 2003, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/4corners.html. Zeller, Good Faith – is it a Contractual Obligation?, (2003) 15 Bond Law Review, 204 et seq., 210. See generally Honnold, Documentary History of the Uniform Law for International Sale, Deventer 1989, 369. Appelate Court Arnhem (Diepeveen-Dirkson BV v Niewenhoven Veehandel GmbH), 22 August 1995, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950822n1. html.
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“The duty of good faith can be defined as an expectation and obligation to act honestly and fairly in the performance of one’s contractual duties. A certain amount of reasonableness is expected from the contracting parties.”38 This definition may be true but it still leaves the judiciary with a “functional problem”39 – a feature of many attempts in defining good faith. It is therefore more appropriate and useful to look at approaches and applications of good faith rather than at attempts of defining good faith. In the end nobody can deny the fact that good faith has been applied in varying degrees by many countries including Common Law countries such as Australia. It follows that the general maxim still stands that “the law of contract has not so far prescribed in a comprehensive way, standards of conduct to be observed in contract negotiations and contract performance.”40 However, it is also an established maxim that courts are “required to ensure that the parties have genuinely adhered to the bargain which they entered into.”41 The tool to be used to establish the adherence to the bargain under the CISG is the principle of good faith which must be applied within the circumstances prescribed in Art. 7 CISG. As good faith is contained in Art. 7 CISG the vehicle by which this principle is imported into contracts has been determined. Good faith – unlike in other legal systems such as in Australia – does not depend on its incorporation into a contract via contractual terms. Hence a court does not need to concern itself with the question of whether good faith has been included either through express or implied terms, it applies to all contracts by force of law. However, parties may – via Art. 6 CISG – attempt to expressly exclude good faith to apply to their contract. Upon first reading of Art. 6 CISG such an exemption appears to be possible. The first point is that an argument can be mounted that Art. 7 CISG is mandatory hence cannot be deviated from. More importantly it is argued that as soon as an interpretative element in the CISG is excluded the Vienna Convention will fill the gap. As pointed out above Art. 31 of the Vienna Convention applies which contains good faith as a mandatory element. Therefore there are strong arguments to suggest that good faith cannot be excluded. The conclusion can be drawn that the principle of good faith is alive and well and arguably takes on life within given circumstances. It is an undisputed fact that defining good faith is either extremely difficult if not imposs38
39 40
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Powers, Defining the Undefinable: Good Faith and the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, (1999) 18 Journal of Law and Commerce, 333 et seq., 335. Zeller (op. cit. fn. 35), 209. Mason, Contract, Good Faith and Equitable Standards in Fair Dealing, (2000) 116 Law Quarterly Review, 66 et seq., 77. Peden, Incorporating Terms of Good Faith in Contract Law in Australia, (2001) 23 Sydney Law Review, 222 et seq., 238.
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ible. A possible starting point is to make a distinction between the function of good faith and the values and attitudes which vary between different systems. It needs to be kept in mind that Art. 7(1) CISG prohibits recourse to domestic law. Hence, values and attitudes to good faith of different legal systems are only useful in a comparative sense, despite the fact that on occasions the same general principles may be observed. To transplant general principles of law from one legal system into another one is fraught with danger as law is logically an expression of a culture of a society. As such it is not possible to even isolate abstract terms developed in other legal systems and transplant the understanding into the CISG because “they might have been produced and formulated in order to fill a need which does not exist under the CISG.”42 At best a thumbnail definition is possible by using the reverse test namely “you’ll know it when you don’t see it”43 or good faith is the opposite of bad faith. Just because a party must act in good faith does not mean that it cannot have regard to commercial self-interest. The line in the sand is where self-interest translates into behaviour which can be termed as acting in bad faith. In addition it must also be understood that good faith does not equate to reasonable endeavours. Mason pointed out that: “Ordinarily an agreement to negotiate in good faith would simply exclude bad faith conduct whereas a reasonable endeavours undertaking raises questions about what is to be agreed as well as the relevance of the considerations which might influence a party in refusing to agree.”44 Art. 7(1) CISG is of help here as the CISG left no doubt that only good faith and not reasonable endeavours are to be tested and applied. There are several possible approaches to try to understand the meaning of good faith. The easiest and least complicated approach would be to argue that good faith is a general principle of the CISG and hence it is applicable throughout the Convention. It is indeed recognised that many provisions within the four corners of the CISG “would be meaningless without recognising a general duty to act in good faith.”45 Once the articles are discovered which rely for their meaning on good faith an understanding what good faith means within the confines of the CISG is achieved. To put it differently: “In these circumstances a breach of these articles requires the court to invoke the principle of good faith but the court is not required to embark on a great 42 43
44 45
Schlechtriem (op. cit. fn. 7). Klein, Good Faith in International Transactions, (1993) 15 Liverpool Law Review, 115 et seq. Mason (op. cit. fn. 40), 80. Zaccaria (op. cit. fn. 22), 105.
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‘philosophical dissertation’ to discover the meaning of good faith. Good faith is linked directly to prescribed situations and hence is explained.”46 This approach can be justified, as the starting point is not Art. 7 CISG but rather the article in question. Furthermore, it can go hand in hand if a third possible interpretation of Art. 7 CISG is adopted namely to draw from both of the definitions discussed above. Art. 7 CISG applies not to the interpretation of the contract itself but rather imposes an obligation to interpret the Convention in good faith as it relates to the contract.”47 The conclusion is that a definition of good faith is not a matter to be resolved by the parties but rather by Art. 7 CISG. Good faith is embedded within Art. 7 CISG, hence it is regarded as being a general principle. Arguably therefore Art. 7 CISG refers to the state of mind of those who interpret the CISG. Due to Art. 7(1) CISG the natural or normal state of mind is with good faith. Thus, Art. 7(1) CISG is applied to every case at hand in the normal course of interpreting the CISG. The question is nevertheless how a principle is to be discovered when one does not exactly know what he is looking for? The starting point is the preamble where it is stated that international trade must be developed “on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.”48 Klein has argued that: “(…) an ongoing goal of systematic regulatory approach to contractual relationships is to head off disputes before they arise, and failing that, to minimize the problems which inevitably result form complex human interactions.”49 The first step in an endeavour to achieve such a goal is to introduce a general principle which permeates the whole Convention in attempting to achieve the desired outcome. Arguably the general principle of good faith covers the attempt to develop laws “on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.” This can be the reason why a court can argue that “Art. 18 merely specifies the principle of good faith which is also one of the general principles of the CISG.”50 The court would have argued that the sentence “A statement made by or other conduct of the offeree indicating assent to an offer is an acceptance”51 cannot be implemented unless the general principle of good faith is applied which is explained within that article. In other words there was no need to 46 47 48 49 50
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Zeller (op. cit. fn. 35), 213. Klein (op. cit. fn. 43), 121. Preamble CISG, second paragraph. Klein (op. cit. fn. 43), 141. District Court Sissach, 5 November 1998, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace. edu/cases/981105s1.html. Art. 18(1) CISG.
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define what good faith means, in particular as conduct and statements by the parties need to be given meaning within the practice of fair dealing and good faith within the circumstances of an acceptance. Good faith simply is the mandated step for parties to carry “out the interlocking steps of an international sales transaction.”52 It could therefore be argued that good faith is implicitly included in many of the provisions of the CISG and can be grouped into three categories: “(1) to promote full and frank exchange of relevant information, (2) to prevent parties from benefiting from conduct undertaken to frustrate their own contracts and (3) to salvage agreements wherever possible and minimize damages resulting from failed contracts.”53 The above categories are useful indications of how an attempt can be made to understand the application of the general principle of good faith. For the purpose of this chapter only the first of the three listed categories will be discussed as arguably the content of the debate would not change.
E. Exchange of Relevant Information It is settled law that not all information exchanged between the parties has contractual consequences. It is argued that a contract is not the sum total of a relationship but rather the narrative of economic experiences and relationships.54 In addition, not all contractual consequences are expressed in an exchange of information. Art. 8 and 9 CISG supply the tools by which the information has to be judged. These articles recognise that a contract is a narrative of experiences. In short Art. 8 CISG urges the courts to look at statements and conduct of parties and interpret these matters “according to the intent where the other party knew or could not have been unaware what that intent was.”55 It is not only the objective intent but also the subjective intent of the parties which form part of the exchange of information. Furthermore, not only the contract but all surrounding circumstances of the pre-contractual negotiations and post-contractual conduct are taken into
52
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Kritzer, Guide to Practical Application of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Deventer 1989, 115 et seq. Klein (op. cit. fn. 43), 125 et seq. Zeller (op. cit. fn. 35), 217. Art. 8(1) CISG.
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consideration. Put simply, parties need to negotiate and conduct themselves in a way which is responsible. As a practical consequence of the exchange of information which is frequently litigated is the problem of the battle of the forms. Of specific interest to this chapter is not which terms are finally applicable to a contract. It is the step before, namely what is the relevant information which needs to be exchanged in order for the terms to be considered to form part of the contract. Three recent German decisions are of interest. The German Supreme Court noted that: “For the user of the clauses, however, it is easily possible to attach to his offer the general terms and conditions, which generally favour him. It would, therefore, contradict the principle of good faith in international trade (Art. 7(1) CISG) as well as the general obligations of cooperation and information of the parties to impose on the other party an obligation to inquire concerning the clauses that have not been transmitted and to burden him with the risks and disadvantages of the unknown general terms and conditions of the other party.”56 The Appellate Court in Cologne built on the decision of the German Supreme Court and started with the premise that it is sufficient if a party knew or ought to have known that the other party will only deal on their own terms and these terms are commonly known in the particular trade. “Then, and only in such cases, do the terms and conditions not have to be present at the acceptance.”57 The court went on to explain that: “(…) a trade usage cannot be constituted through the contents of terms and conditions which were not effectively included in the contract. It contradicts the principle of good faith in international trade (Art. 7(1) CISG) as well as the general duty to cooperate and the duty to communicate with business parties, to impose an obligation to inquire in regard to a clause that is not disclosed to the contractual partner, and to saddle him with the risks and disadvantages of unknown adverse terms and conditions. That which contradicts the principle of good faith can never be considered to be a usage in trade.”58 The court translated the obligations contained in Art. 8 and 9 CISG to be features of good faith and specifically noted that communication and coop56
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German Supreme Court, 31 October 2001, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace. edu/cases/011031g1.html. Appellate Court Cologne, 21 December 2005, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace. edu/cases/051221g1.html. Ibid.
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eration between business partners is the overarching theme by which business must be conducted which includes the application of the CISG. The District Court Neubrandenburg came in essence to the same conclusion and pointed out that the principle of good faith prohibits to burden the other party to familiarise itself with clauses which were either not sent to them or are not of customary status.59 Furthermore, the Netherlands Arbitration Institute also looked at the applicability of terms and conditions. The buyer followed the established practice of sending a signed copy of the faxed confirmation back to the seller without expressing its disagreement with the General Conditions. The tribunal held that: “By failing to express its disagreement with the General Conditions or to deviate from its practice of returning a signed copy of the faxed confirmation, the buyer impliedly accepted them and the seller was allowed under the principle of good faith to rely on the buyer’s acceptance.”60 These cases have demonstrated that good faith was applied to contractual relations of the parties and is applied widely. Good faith is an essential tool to bind individual provisions into a cohesive framework which regulates the international sale of goods not only on a regulatory basis but also the rights and duties of the parties.
F. Conclusion Case law and academic writing make it clear that good faith is not only applied to the interpretation of the Convention only but also governs the rights and duties of the parties. It may have been a compromise position to construct Art. 7 CISG but subsequent development of the CISG resolved the uncertainty which existed in the drafting stage. Good faith therefore is arguably the connecting factor which gives meaning to provisions and the Convention as a whole where there is no explicit ruling. It is the “glue” that joins general principles to particular rules. It can be argued that the drafters of the CISG – by design or good luck – have avoided the need for courts to “adopt a doctrine of good faith (…) to improve contract enforcement”61 by linking good faith to specific situations described in various provisions.
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District Court Neubrandenburg, 3 August 2005, available at http://cisgw3.law. pace.edu/cases/050803g1.html. Netherlands Arbitration Institute, 10 February 2005, available at http://cisgw3. law.pace.edu/cases/050210n1.html. Stack, The Two Standards of Good Faith in Canadian Contract Law, (1999) 62 Saskatchewan Law Review, 210 et seq., 223.
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It is also obvious that the CISG has not defined what exactly is meant under the term of good faith. This is not unique as even Germany, with arguably the longest history of a codified rule invoking good faith, has not succeeded in codifying this term. Arguably a definition of good faith is therefore not needed in order to understand and apply such a concept if one reflects that: “[a] study not of contract law, but rather of contract practice is the key to understanding the economic properties of contracting that are necessary to work out sensible uniform laws for commercial purposes.”62 The simple fact is that good faith allows a court or tribunal to give greater certainty to contractual relationships. The critics who claim that good faith generates uncertainty and ambiguity and should therefore not be applied is in reality “an objection to the application by courts of generalised concepts and standards instead of rigid rules.”63 It is interesting to note – and not surprising – that attempts at understanding good faith tends to bring out similar arguments. In Australia, Peden argued that: “If it is accepted that good faith has a broad impact across many contract law principles, then it will be quite rare for courts to need to incorporate a separate and autonomous obligation. In fact, most of the cases to date where such an obligation has been implied could be seen as examples of cases of basic construction of contracts, which is informed by good faith.”64 The major difference between Australian domestic law and the CISG is that in the latter good faith is expressly recognised as an obligation and is applicable to all contracts and is not an “obligation which has been implied.” The CISG in Art. 7(1) CISG has recognised the fact that contractual parties can never foresee all circumstances. The purpose of good faith simply is “to act as a ‘leveller’ which brings events into line, which was either subjectively or objectively agreed upon in the contract.”65 62
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Amissah, The Autonomous Contract: Reflecting the borderless electronic-commercial environment in contracting, presentation at seminar on legal information, Bergen September 1997, available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/ biblio/amissah2.html. Mason (op. cit. fn. 40), 94. Peden, Contractual Good Faith: Can Australia Benefit form the American Experience?, (2003) 15 Bond Law Review, 175 et seq., 202. Zeller (op. cit. fn. 35), 227.
An Economic Analysis of the CISG Marta Cenini and Francesco Parisi
A. Introduction The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) is an important landmark in international trade.1 This Convention, which has been ratified by 71 countries (as of July 2008), contains many vital steps in standardising business agreements throughout the world. The effect the CISG has had on reducing transaction costs and the volume of international trade has been recently analysed.2 Considering the objectives of the Convention, it has been praised for providing a valuable set of default rules for international contracts of sale. This article analyses some of the substantive provisions of the CISG through the lens of law and economics.
B. Formation of the Contract: The Problem of Efficient Reliance In most cases involving the international sales of goods, the parties are not physically proximate, meaning that offer and acceptance are not simultaneous. Part II of the CISG governs contract formation stating that an acceptance is considered binding, and a contract is formed, only when the acceptance reaches the offeror, provided that the latter has not made another contract with someone else during the time that the acceptance takes to reach the offeror and has revoked the offer (Art. 16 CISG). This rule is the so-called receipt rule.3 1
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United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Vienna, 11 April 1980, Treaty Document Number 98-9 (1984), UN Document Number A/CONF 97/19, 1489 UNTS 3. Lehn, The CISG: Perspectives from an Economist, in: Flechtner/Brand/Walter (eds.), Drafting Contracts under the CISG, Oxford 2008, 264 et seq. On the one hand, Art. 15 CISG states that “an offer becomes effective when it reaches the offeree”, on the other hand, Art. 18 CISG says that “an acceptance of an offer becomes effective at the moment the indication of assent reaches the offeror”.
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An alternative rule that could have been chosen by lawmakers is the socalled mailbox rule which, on the contrary, states that an acceptance is effective at the moment the offeree posts it, regardless of when the offeror actually receives it. The rationale underlying such a rule is that the contract is considered formed when there is (even an abstract) meeting of minds, which is exactly when the offeree decides to send the offeror a message of acceptance. The first and obvious advantage of the mailbox rule is that the offeree has a longer period to accept the offer: given, for example, that the offeree should answer the offeror by the 30th of July, the offeree will be able to put the acceptance message in the mailbox on the 30th, while under the receipt rule the acceptance message should arrive by the 30th. Furthermore, under the mailbox rule the offeror has to remain ready to perform for a longer period of time that is the fixed deadline plus the number of days necessary either to receive the offeree’s acceptance or to know whether the offeree has sent his acceptance. The second, and more important, consequence of applying the mailbox rule is that the offeree has incentives to rely on the contract very early on, to be more exact, when he sends the message of acceptance and so before the offeror’s knowledge of his acceptance. On the other hand, the receipt rule gives the offeror more time to look for other contracting parties (and as such to revoke his offer) and encourages the offeror to make alternative contracts. Literature of law and economics4 underlines that whichever of the two rules is superior and preferable depends on which rule is better able to incentivise early reliance by the offeree or to give freedom to the offeror to make alternative contracts. Having chosen the receipt rule, the Convention consequently provides an incentive for the offeror to continue bargaining with other parties. Furthermore, in the context of a contract between parties who are in different countries, as is the case when contracts are governed by the CISG, the receipt rule appears to be preferable, as it states more precisely when the contract is made for both parties. Actually, this is only the tip of the iceberg of a more complex problem involving the question of what in fact should be considered an offer and an acceptance: a communication that exposes the offeror to the risk that an acceptance occurs and a binding contract is formed. It is very rare that contracting parties precisely define how they intend each communication to be exchanged and if they mean to be legally committed to the other party or not. When bargains fail, one party may try to claim that there was no commitment and that both of them were free to exit the negotiations. The other 4
Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law, Cambridge/Massachusetts 2004, 329 et seq.
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party may claim to have relied on the first party’s conduct and statements and that a legal commitment was already reached. The CISG, like many other similar conventions and laws,5 uses very few words about such a complex problem, saying just that “a proposal for concluding a contract addressed to one or more specific persons constitutes an offer if it is sufficiently definite and indicates the intention of the offeror to be bound in case of acceptance” and that “a proposal is sufficiently definite if it indicates the goods and expressly or implicitly fixes or makes provision for determining the quantity and the price” (Art. 14(1) CISG); and that “a statement made by or other conduct of the offeree indicating assent to an offer is an acceptance” (Art. 18(1) CISG). These kinds of definitions leave a very wide range of cases unsolved. Law and Economics literature6 has deeply analysed these concerns. The traditional point of view7 underlines that courts called on to decide cases focusing on contract formation should try to reconstruct the parties’ most likely intentions. Recently, other authors,8 accepting the validity of this assumption, have focused the attention on the efficient incentives to reliance. These authors start from the principle that, at times, a legally enforceable commitment is the only way to induce the other party to rely efficiently and to choose an efficient level of reliance.9 Reliance, as well known in economic literature, is a form of “relationship-specific investment”: any action taken by a party relying on the fact that a contract will be concluded, increases his benefits if the contract is then concluded and performance takes place; but leaves the relying party worse off than if he had not relied, if the other party does not accept the proposed transaction and the bargaining fails. When parties are still negotiating, a way to give incentive to efficient reliance is to consider in determinate cases the non-relying party, who is now trying to withdraw from the 5
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See for example, Restatement of Contracts (Second), section 24 (1979), which states that a communication can be interpreted as an offer if it is “so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to that bargain (…) will conclude it”. Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations, 26 Yale Law Journal (Yale L. J.) (1917), 169 et seq.; Llewellyn, On our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance (pts. 1 & 2), 48 Yale L. J. (1938), 1 et seq.; Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 Stanford Law Review (Stan. L. Rev.) (1996), 481 et seq.; Katz, The strategic structure of offer and acceptance: game theory and the law of contract formation, 89 Michigan Law Review (Mich. L. Rev.) (1990), 215 et seq. Corbin (op. cit. fn. 6); Llewellyn (op. cit. fn. 6). Craswell (op. cit. fn. 6), 490. Goetz/Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 Yale L. J. (1980), 1261.
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negotiations, as legally committed. That is, in those cases where that party is trying to exploit the fact that the other party has relied on a successful negotiation (because a better offer has come along or simply to extort the other party for a higher price), but if he had been asked to commit at the time the other party had to rely, he would have wanted to be committed.10 In other words, if the relying party cannot induce the other party to commit, he would bear all of the costs of unsuccessful reliance, but on the other hand would not capture all of the benefits of his reliance, leaving the process economically inefficient. If it becomes unprofitable for the nonrelying party to make the contract, he will withdraw from the negotiations without having to pay any damages. Meanwhile, the relying party would not capture all of the benefits of his reliance as the non-relying party can gain a higher price by threatening the relying party not to make the contract. It is important to note that in these cases, notwithstanding the fact that the non-relying party is trying to withdraw from negotiations, it is in his interest to be legally committed to such an agreement. If an efficient level of reliance is chosen, the expected value of the total transaction increases and both the benefits of the relying party and the gains of the other party may increase as well. Any general rule on contract formation that intentionally leaves a wide range of cases to be decided by the courts on a case by case basis, clearly has the disadvantage that it gives the courts a very arduous task: deciding whether the level of reliance was efficient and increasing the expected value of the transaction at the time the relying party in fact relied. On the other hand, especially with regards to contracts involving international trade, it could be very difficult for lawmakers to choose default rules on contract formation: under the CISG, the notion of “goods” covers all objects that form the subject-matter of commercial sale contracts, from a simple machine to computer programs, and Art. 3 CISG expressly states that contracts for the supply of goods to be manufactured or produced shall be considered sales.11
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11
Craswell (op. cit. fn. 6), 492 et seq. As will be analysed more in-depth later in this contribution, when a contract is already made, and the promisee awaits the performance of the promisor, a way to give incentive to the relying party to choose an efficient level of reliance is to fix the amount of damages due by the breaching party to a sum equal to the expectation damages parametered to a reasonable level of reliance. That is unless the party who orders the goods undertakes to supply a substantial part of the materials necessary for such manufacture or production, and unless the preponderant part of the obligations of the party who furnishes the goods consists in the supply of labor or other services (Schlechtriem, in: Schlechtriem/Schwenzer (eds.), Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG), Oxford 2005, Art. 3 no. 1 et seq.).
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It would be very difficult to choose a default rule and so any chosen rule would be necessarily inefficient in a wide range of cases and would induce parties to negotiate to change them, which clearly increases private transaction costs. However, there are some aspects that are advantageously solved by a default rule. One of them is the question of how to interpret silence or ambiguous conduct of the offeree after the other party’s offer. On this matter the CISG is very clear and states that: “Silence or inactivity does not in itself amount to acceptance” (Art. 18(1) CISG). A default rule that, on the contrary, had stated that in cases of silence, a commitment should have been implied, would have represented a far greater imposition on the silent party; probably a default rule like that would have been agreed by parties only after they had discussed it explicitly.12
C. Fundamental Breach and the Principle of Maintenance of the Contract Part III of the Convention begins with Art. 25 CISG, which defines when a breach of contract may be considered fundamental. This is when the breach “results in such detriment to the other party as substantially to deprive him of what he is entitled to expect under the contract” (Art. 25 CISG). Art. 49(1) and Art. 64(1) CISG, on the other hand, state that if, and only if, the breach of contract committed by one of the parties is fundamental, is it possible for the other party to declare the contract avoided13 and to be released from the contract. In the preparatory work on the CISG and at the final Conference in Vienna, draftsmen decided that the seriousness of the breach should not be defined as referring to the amount of damages caused by non-performance, but rather referring to the interests of the promisee as they arise from the contract.14 Conversely, as a general remedy the CISG establishes the priority of the right to require performance to the party who has failed to perform: on one hand, if it is the seller who fails to perform, the buyer has a right to require performance under Art. 46 CISG (in particular the obligation to deliver 12 13
14
Craswell (op. cit. fn. 6), 485, 524-525. Note that Art. 26 CISG states that the declaration of avoidance may be unilateral and is effective only if made by notice to the other party. Therefore, this right can be exercised directly by the parties without the immediate intervention of the judge. Unlike hypothetical remedies of damages, which require the intervention of third party decision-makers for the quantification of the damages, all the remedies contemplated by the CISG are at the parties’ immediate disposal. Such a choice and design of remedies is wise given their immediate effect towards the minimisation of adjudication costs. Schlechtriem (op. cit. fn. 11), Art. 25 no. 1 et seq.
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goods in conformity with the contract); on the other hand, if it is the buyer who fails to perform, the seller has a right to require payment, to take delivery and performance of any other obligation of the buyer (Art. 62 CISG). In adopting that system of remedies, the Convention follows an approach and tradition underlying in particular the legal system of Germany, and in general of the continental European system. On the other hand, the Common Law tradition has a different approach in this matter and courts, in cases regarding sale of goods, have granted specific relief in very few circumstances. This remedy was sometimes given by separate courts of equity but generally only when the remedy of damages was deemed inadequate. At a legislative level, under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), the buyer can require performance only if goods are “unique” for him and, at the discretion of the court, “in other proper circumstances” (section 2-716 UCC). “Uniqueness”, in this context, means that the good has no substitute or equivalent with regards to its attributes or properties.15 This contrast between the Civil and Common Law legal tradition led the draftsmen of the Convention to the introduction of a compromise provision, namely Art. 28 CISG, which states that a court is not bound to enter judgment for specific performance unless it would do so under its own law in respect of similar contracts of sale not governed by the Convention.16 The extension of the remedy of specific performance to a wider range of cases is a question that has interested many authors of the law and economics literature.17 Generally speaking, it can be said that the law and economics literature concludes that specific performance is an efficient remedy in many cases and, in Common Law, should be applied more frequently. One main reason that parties might have a preference for the remedy of specific performance, rather than damages, is that it is usually very difficult for courts to quantify exactly the amount of damages and consequently there is a high risk that they either exceed or fall short of the actual loss.18 With 15
16
17
18
From an economic perspective, the substitutability of a particular good is determined by observing consumer behaviour; elasticity of demand shows the degree of substitutability of a good. Farnsworth, The Convention on the International Sale of Goods from the Perspective of the Common Law Countries, in: La Vendita internazionale, Milan 1981, 14-15. Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 University of Chicago Law Review (U. Chi. L. Rev.) (1978), 351; Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 Yale L. J. (1979), 271; Shavell, Specific performance versus damages for breach of contract, (the paper can be downloaded from http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_ center and from http://papers.ssrn.com) 2005, 1. Kronman (op. cit. fn. 19), 360; Schwartz (op. cit. fn. 17), 274. The author in particular underlines that “[t]he magnitude of this risk is inversely related to the completeness and reliability of the information on which the court bases its award. At one ex-
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regard to the CISG, that problem could often arise because international trades may regard many collateral contracts, with several parties involved in different aspects: production of the goods, assembly thereof, sale and delivery to a party who is in a different country and may have already agreed with another party to resell the goods. Transaction costs to reach an agreement with international parties are often very high and involve complex negotiations. If one party does not perform, and his breach does not result in a detriment to the main interests of the dealing, it is surely more costly to abandon the whole plan and pay damages, than to save what has already been done and request specific performance. Specific performance appears to be the most accurate method of compensation for the loss suffered by the promisee because it gives him the precise performance he purchased.19 Bound to this aspect, contracts governed by the CISG often create a surplus not only for the buyer but also for the seller who, for example, could take advantage of the favourable exchange of currency paid by the counterpart or could think to reinvest the money in other profitable activities. While the value of monetary price is usually deemed equal for the two parties, and therefore there is no surplus from the transfer of money from one party to the other, in the case of an international contract there could be room for such a seller’s surplus. As will be analysed more in-depth in the following sections of this contribution, when bilateral contracts are at stake, the remedy of specific performance could be deemed preferable since it avoids allowing the breached-upon party, who has undertaken investments in reliance of the other party’s counter-performance, to lose the surplus that he could have gained from the counterpart’s performance.20 The traditional moral objection that requiring performance interferes with the promisor’s liability more than requiring the payment of money, is not consistent. First of all, within international trades, the promisor sells roughly fungible goods or is in the business of selling unique goods. As Schwartz21 underlines, goods are, in either circumstance, assets to the promi-
19 20
21
treme, where there is a well-developed market generating evidence of substitutability, this risk is minimal. At the other extreme, where there is no market or at most a few isolated transactions, this risk is substantial. There is a point between these two extremes at which the risk becomes unacceptably large (…). This point separating those contracts that are specifically enforceable from those that are not – the point to which the uniqueness test obliquely refers”. Schwartz (op. cit. fn. 17), 274. Fon/Parisi, Plaintiff in Default: An Economic Analysis of Contracts with Mutual Obligations, (the paper can be downloaded from http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract= 1020669) 2007, 1; Parisi/Cenini, Interesse positivo, interesse negativo e incentivi nella responsabilità contrattuale: un’analisi economica e comparata, Rivista di diritto civile (Riv. dir. civ.) suppl. 2008, 231. Schwartz (op. cit. fn. 17), 296-297.
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sor much like cash; requiring their delivery is not relevantly different from requiring the delivery of cash. Shavell22 adds that parties will prefer the remedy of specific performance when the breach regards contracts to convey existing goods, as in the case of the CISG. In this case, as the goods already exist, there are no problems with the production costs.23
D. The Principle of Conformity of the Goods and Functions of Conventional and Legal Warranties Art. 35 CISG reads that: “The seller must deliver goods which are of the quantity, quality and description required by the contract and which are contained or packaged in the manner required by the contract”. The article thereafter states that the seller is liable for any lack of conformity which “exists at the time when the risk passes to the buyer”, even though the lack of conformity becomes apparent only after that time.24 Finally, Art. 39 CISG states that the buyer loses the right to rely on a lack of conformity of the goods if he does not give notice to the seller specifying the nature of the lack of conformity “within a reasonable time after he has discovered it or ought to have discovered it” and that in any event, the notice to the seller must be given at the latest “within a period of two years from the date on which the goods were actually handed over to the buyer”.25 It follows that under the Convention the seller bears specific responsibilities in case the quality or the performance of the purchased good does not conform to the buyer’s specifications and contractual expectations. Art. 35 CISG limits the scope of warranties prescribed by the Convention to failures of the so-called “search properties” of a sold item. As is well known, this kind of quality can be observed by both parties at the time of the purchase and are the object of an information search by the buyer. Conversely, other characteristics of a sold good, such as durability or functionality, that cannot be directly observed at the time of purchase and are only revealed through the use of the item over time (thus they are described as
22 23
24
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Shavell (op. cit. fn. 17), 13 et seq. Conversely, Shavell (op. cit. fn. 17), 13 et seq., underlines that when contracts are to produce new goods or provide services and the promisor fails to perform, parties would tend to prefer the remedy of damages, essentially because of the problems that would be created under specific performance if production costs were high. As one will see in the following paragraph, the time at which the risk passes is governed by the parties’ agreements, commercial usages – particularly Incoterms – or practices, or alternatively by Art. 67-69 CISG. Note that at the Diplomatic Conference the question of the two year limitation period was one of the most contentious issues.
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“experience properties”) are not covered by the legal warranty. Nonetheless, these non-verifiable characteristics can be the object of a special form of guarantee (the guarantee of durability). Finally, those characteristics that cannot be verified either through search or experience are classified as “credence properties”.26 Risk adverse parties may seek to protect themselves through warranties. From an economic perspective, conventional and legal warranties have three main functions: a) insurance; b) signaling; and c) incentive functions. The pursuit of these functions is not always possible with the choice of a single warranty instrument. As shown in Table 1 below, only for a small subset of situations does the same level of warranty yield the optimal balance of risk allocation and incentives between the parties.27
Insurance Signaling
Incentives
Does not Matter Both Risk Neutral Symmetric Information
Full Warranties Buyer Risk Averse Seller has Private Information Exogenous Risk Seller Controls Risk
Partial Warranty Both Risk Averse Both have Private Information Bilateral Precaution
No Warranty Seller Risk Averse Buyer has Private Information Buyer Controls Risk
Table 1: Parameters for Choice of Optimal Warranties
It is important to consider the choice of the equilibrium level of warranties that the parties would contractually agree upon under different conditions. As summarised in Table 1, from an economic point of view the equilibrium choice of level and duration of a contractual warranty depends on a) the risk propensities of the parties; b) the informational asymmetries between the parties; and c) the determinants of the probability of a product’s lack of conformity or breakdown. From an economic incentive viewpoint, different op26
27
Parisi, The Harmonization of Legal Warranties in European Law: An Economic Analysis, 52 American Journal of Comparative Law (Am. J. of Comp. L.) (2004), 403 et seq. (the paper can also be downloaded from http://papers.ssrn.com/ abstract_id=276993); Wehrt, Warranties, in: Bouckaert/Boudewijn/de Geest (eds.), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, vol. III, Aldershot 2000; Darby/Karny, Free Competition and Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 Journal of Law and Economy (J. of Law and Econ.) (1973), 67. For the sake of graphical simplicity, Table 1 considers only three discrete values of warranties (i.e., full, partial, or no warranty). In real life, levels of warranty are continuous and the optimal level of a conventional warranty will be chosen by lawmakers and by the contracting parties according to the relative weight attached to each of the three parameters of optimisation (i.e., optimal level of insurance, information disclosure and performance incentives).
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timal levels of warranty should be chosen in all such cases in order to create the optimal balance of risk allocation and incentives. In the following sections the results anticipated in Table 1 are considered. An examination will be carried out on the level of conventional warranties that parties would have chosen if they had negotiated it; these results will then be compared with the warranty imposed on sellers by the Convention.
I.
Exogenous Risk: Warranties as Insurance
When the probability of non-conformities, defects, or failures of the sold goods is merely exogenous28 and the information available to the contracting parties at the time of sale is symmetric,29 the allocation of the risk of product defects to one party or the other has no signaling or incentive effects: the optimal allocation of the risk is exclusively determined by the relative risk aversion of the parties. When the seller is risk neutral and the buyer is risk averse, which often occurs when a consumer30 purchases goods from a professional seller,31 the contracting parties would naturally bargain for a full warranty in case of product defects. In this case, the risk of exogenous defects is entirely borne by the seller. An opposite result would be obtained in the converse case of a riskaverse seller and a risk-neutral buyer. Here, the buyer would be the best riskbearer and thus – if all other conditions apply – the parties would naturally 28
29
30
31
The risk is exogenous when neither the seller’s level of care in production nor the buyer’s level of precaution in the use of the item can influence the probability of defects. Buyers and sellers have symmetric information, for example, when the percentage that a produced item becomes defective within a short period of time is known ex ante by both parties. In this case the parties have similar expectations concerning the failure rate of the sold items. It is important to note that by virtue of Art. 2(a) CISG, the Convention does not apply to the sales of goods bought for personal, family or household use. Schlechtriem (op. cit. fn. 11), Art. 1 no. 59 et seq., underlines that although the CISG does not apply solely to commercial sales contracts (Art. 1(3) CISG), the exclusion of goods bought for personal use limits its sphere of application de facto to commercial purchases, thus excluding the consumer purchase. The application of the Convention is therefore conditional upon the goods being acquired for business purposes. Professional sellers are generally assumed to be risk-neutral because they are in a position to self-insure, distributing the risk of non-conformity over a large number of transactions.
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bargain for a sale with no warranty. The buyer serves as the seller’s insurer for the exogenous risk of product failure. In case of both parties with some positive level of risk aversion, the optimal allocation of risk is mixed. Since risk aversion induces increasing marginal costs (in utility terms) with an increase in the value of the risk, parties would naturally bargain to split the risk of product defect or failure, with a resulting choice of partial warranty. The last case to be considered is when both parties are risk-neutral, which occurs when both seller and buyer are professionally involved in the business of trade. In this case, alternative allocations of the risk will yield identical levels of aggregate utility; thus the parties will not have any incentive to reallocate such risk.
II.
Asymmetric Information: Warranties as Signals
At this point one is to consider the different group of cases in which the risk is still exogenous but is known with different degrees of accuracy by the contracting parties. Assuming that both parties are risk-neutral, so that alternative levels of warranty are equally desirable from the risk allocation point of view, the only relevant criterion for choosing amongst different levels of warranties is the effect that alternative warranty protection may have on the parties’ incentives and ability to reveal information. In the law and economics literature, this function of conventional warranties is known as signaling: the choice of warranty reveals truthful and credible information to the other party. When the seller has private information, a warranty can be viewed as signal of quality. Imagine a scenario where different producers are faced with a varying probability of defective products. In this case, producers cannot distinguish between defective and non-defective items at the moment of sale, but they do have better information than the buyers concerning the percentage of produced goods that will likely become defective within a short period of time.32 In this scenario, the buyer will have an expectation of the failure rate of the sold goods equal to the market average, while the seller will have an expectation equal to his specific production sample.33 The 32
33
The seller knows the actual probability of defects of his products and can compute the resulting warranty costs. Low-quality sellers will face a higher probability of product defects and thus will also face higher warranty costs. Such asymmetric information creates a problem that is similar in nature to the lemons problem first considered by Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Quarterly Journal of Economy (Quarterly J. of Econ.) (1970), 488.
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seller’s willingness to offer a warranty (and to add the price of the warranty to the sale price) is a credible signal of the information available to the seller.34 Warranties can be seen as valuable “tools of information transfer”.35 On the other hand, when it is the buyer who has private information, warranties can be seen as signals of risk. A buyer may have private information concerning the future use of the goods and the potential harm that he would suffer in case of failure or defect of the purchased item. If the seller cannot differentiate a high-loss buyer from a low-loss buyer, a single level of warranty will be offered to all buyers and the buyer’s willingness to forego warranty coverage can signal the actual level of risk that he faces. In case of bilateral asymmetry, sellers will offer a broad variety of warranty coverage in order to signal their private information concerning quality, while buyers will demand varying levels of warranty coverage to signal their individual risk level. In equilibrium, high defect rate sellers will serve customers with small individual losses, whereas low defect rate sellers will sell to more sensitive buyer.
III. Endogenous Risk: Warranties as Incentive In real life, the probability of defective goods is not merely exogenous because it can be influenced by the behaviour of the parties. In case of endogenous risk, warranties operate as incentives for the parties to invest in the production and preservation of quality. Disregarding insurance and signaling concerns in the choice of warranty instruments, the main hypothesis regards the case in which only the seller can influence the probability of a product’s defect or non-conformity. Here the only relevant variable is the effort of such a party to reduce the defect rate of the sold goods and seller’s efforts shall be undertaken at an optimal level. Since the seller is in the best position to minimise the risk of a product’s defect, efficiency requires that whoever can reduce the harm at the lowest cost should do so, in turn leads to shift on such a party the primary liability for the case of product’s failure. When both buyer and seller can affect the probability of a defect or product’s failure, there are two different solutions for the warranty problem. If it is possible to ascertain ex post whether a certain defect is attributable to one or the other party, the two incentive problems can be separated and the optimal warranty would provide full coverage for those risks that are under the control of the seller and no warranty for those risks that are under the 34
35
Through the mechanism of contractual warranties, sellers facing different exogenous probability of product defects will be able to offer easily observable and credible information to potential buyers. Wehrt (op. cit. fn. 26), 182-187.
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control of the buyer.36 However, in all such cases where the causal contribution to the defect, lack of conformity or failure of the product cannot be ascertained ex post, no first-best outcome can be created by a single warranty instrument. A second-best outcome can be pursued through partial warranties that leave the incentives of both parties partially aligned.37
IV. Warranties under the CISG The economic model of optimal warranties analysed above provides valuable guidance in the design of default legal warranties and in the study of the solution proposed in the Convention. It is important to note that since the CISG promulgates a default warranty protection scheme, the parties’ freedom of contract is not hindered and contractual autonomy can be exercised in order to set an efficient level of warranty that is consistent with the results of the economic model. Parties are free to accommodate their idiosyncratic needs with the choice of an unconventional warranty instrument. First of all, the limitation imposed by Art. 35 CISG, providing a warranty concerning failures of search properties, is consistent with the economic model. Credence properties are not ascertainable by a third party decisionmaker. Equally sensible is the exclusion from the standard legal warranty on the goods’ search attributes that can be inspected by the buyer, at the time of purchase, free of cost.38 Such exclusion is explicable as a method to create incentives for the ex ante information and reduction of ex post litigation. Conversely, features that are not easily observable or searchable by the buyer fall within the scope of the warranty protection, thus creating disclosure incentives for the seller if he possesses private information that is not readily observable by the buyer. The CISG introduces a subjective test of awareness where there would have otherwise been a merely objective test of conformity. Secondly, the economic model evidences that the imposition of a full legal warranty over the typical lifetime of a product would only be justified in a very restrictive set of circumstances, in particular where the probability of product failure is exclusively controlled by the seller. In all other situations of bilateral precaution and whenever other considerations (e.g. relative risk aversion of the parties and informational asymmetries) call for truncated forms of buyer protection, unlimited lifetime warranties would be inefficient. 36 37 38
Wehrt (op. cit. fn. 26), 187 et seq. Parisi (op. cit. fn. 26), 17-18. See Art. 35(3) CISG (stating that the seller is not liable for any lack of conformity of the goods if “at the time of the conclusion of the contract [note: not at the time of delivery] the buyer knew or could not have been unaware of such lack of conformity”).
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In this respect, the Convention sets an efficient level of partial warranty where the risk of non-conformity, defects, or failure of the sold goods is borne by seller only for a limited period of time and only with regards to particular characteristics of the good. In corroboration of this analysis, empirical studies that have examined conventional warranties adopted in the market in the absence of legal constraints are consistent with the prediction of the economic model. Even in the absence of some minimum legal protection, parties bargain or expect some minimum level of protection. Likewise, full lifetime warranties are rarely observed in the marketplace.39 The dominance of partial warranties is easily explained by the economic model as well. The three main goals of warranty instruments (insurance, signaling and incentives) often require the adoption of different levels of warranty. Under such circumstances, the global optimisation over all such maximands requires the balancing of the marginal benefits of the level of warranty in each of the three dimensions. An increase in warranty level may often be beneficial for the buyer’s insurance function but might reduce the incentives for the buyer to signal his subjective level of risk or to adopt precautions to avoid subsequent product failure. At the same time, a decrease in warranty level may create improved incentives for the buyer to take precaution in the use of the product, but may frustrate the goal of providing adequate insurance for the seller’s signaling of the quality of the good or incentives for improving the quality of the sold products. Under all such circumstances where there are conflicting aims of the warranty system, and where it is not possible to determine ex post whether a product failure is causally attributable to one or the other party, the best achievable choice of warranty will represent a second-best optimum, where the sum of marginal benefits of the warranty in all three dimensions is equal to the sum of the marginal costs.
E. Passing of Risk: The Delivery of the Goods and the Cheaper Cost Avoider The Convention does not govern the transfer of title from the seller to the buyer (Art. 4(b) CISG), but provides rules that determine the transfer of risk for damage to the goods. The fundamental rule is stated in Art. 66 CISG which reads: “Loss of or damage to the goods after the risk has passed
39
Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 Yale L. J. (1981), 1297. Reprinted in: Goldberg (ed.), Readings in the Economics of Contract Law, Cambridge 1989, 174; Wehrt (op. cit. fn. 26).
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to the buyer does not discharge him from his obligation to pay the price, unless the loss or damage is due to an act or omission of the seller”. The risk that goods may be accidentally lost or damaged between the conclusion of the contract and its performance involves the problem of allocating that risk to one of the contracting parties. Regarding contracts of sale, the “cheapest cost avoider” criterion leads to allocate that risk on the seller as long as he possesses the goods. Therefore, until he delivers the goods to the buyer or hands them over to the first carrier for transmission, the seller should bear the risk of accidental losses or damages as he is in the best position to minimise this risk. On the other hand, placing the transport risk on the buyer after the goods have been handed over to the first carrier is justified by the consideration that after the arrival of the goods the buyer is in a better position than the seller to ascertain any damage to the goods which has occurred during the transport. Honnold40 suggests that in case of “hightech” goods, which only the seller can repair, the buyer may wish to consider negotiating over the clause, in order to take over responsibility for the goods only after arrival at their destination. In any case, the practical significance of Art. 67 CISG is in fact limited. In international trade, parties usually agree to specific terms (CIF, FOB, “ex ship” clause, etc.), which take priority over the CISG rules by virtue of Art. 6 and Art. 9 CISG.
F. Damages: Efficiency of Awarding Expectation Interest and the Problem of Overreliance Art. 74-77 CISG govern the amount of damages due in case of a breach of contract. It is stated that the sum must be equal to the loss, including the loss of profits, suffered by the non-breaching party as a consequence of the breach. This definition corresponds to the notion of expectation interest, which includes lost profits or expectations of the non-breaching party and aims at putting the latter in the same position in which he would have been if the contract had been performed effectively. The law and economics literature has very often underlined that the measure of expectation damages is best suited to incentive optimal performance and reliance investments on the promisor and the promisee. The promisor owes performance to the promisee and invests in performance efforts; the promisee awaits the promisor’s performance and undertakes reliance investment.
40
Honnold, Risk of Loss, in: Galston/Smith (eds.), International Sales, New York 1984, § 368.2.
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Damages can be viewed as the “price” paid by promisor for breaching his contractual obligations and an increase in the price of the breach (that is, a higher amount of damages to be paid in case of breach) will induce the promisor to undertake greater efforts towards performance, which is necessarily costly but also diminishes (but not eliminates) the probability of nonperformance.41 The promisee, who awaits performance, also may undertake investments relying on the promisor’s performance. As has already been seen, reliance is a form of “contract-specific investment”: any action taken by a party relying on the fact that the contractual counterpart will perform, increases his benefits if the promisor, in fact, performs but makes the relying party worse off than if he had not relied, if the other party breaches the contract. Efficiency requires that the promisee takes into account not only the expected increase in the value of performance but also the potential increase in loss in the event of non-performance.42 Damage remedies should aim at both encouraging an optimal level of performance investments and an optimal level of reliance. Efficiency requires that the level of performance efforts and reliance investments are to be chosen in order to maximise the expected benefit from the contract minus the performance costs borne by the promisor.43 Economic analysis has shown that to encourage optimal performance efforts, the promisor should be threatened by expectation damages in case he breaches his contract. Expectation damages efficiently incentive the promisor because it makes him internalise the entire costs of his breach, which includes the foregone profit that the promisee would have obtained from the fulfilled contract. However, expectation damages have a disadvantage: they induce the promisee to undertake excessive reliance investments. Any action taken by 41
42
43
Note that even an optimal level of efforts by the promisor does not guarantee successful performance and a possibility is left that a breach of the contract occurs: in other words, performance is not bound to the promisor’s efforts in a deterministic way but only probabilistic. Furthermore, it is considered that performance efforts affect only the probability of performance, while performance quality is fixed. Mathematically, one can say that the probability of performance, p (x), increases with the promisor’s efforts, p’ > 0 at decreasing rate p’’ < 0. Note that the gain πA(y) obtained by promisee when performance is carried out – and consequently, the expectation damages due by the promisor to the promisee when a breach occurs – increase with reliance, though at a decreasing rate: G’2 > 0 and G’’< 0. Max H = p(x) πA(y) + [1 – p(x)] πI(y) – y – x. x, y Efficeny requires choosing a level of debtor’s effort (x) and promisee’s reliance (y) to maximise promisee’s expected benefit from the contract (p(x) πA(y)+[1-p(x)] πI(y)-y) minus the performance costs borne by debtor (x).
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the relying party, as seen, increases his benefits if the promisor, in fact, performs but makes the relying party worse off if the other party breaches the contract. The amount of expectation damages, in fact, varies in accordance with the variation in reliance. Here reliance investments increase the benefit that the promisee can obtain from the contract and expectation damages are equal to the entire foregone benefit of the contract. It follows that the promisee has an incentive to rely indefinitively: if the promisor performs, he would gain the entire benefit that comes from the contract and its investments in reliance; if the promisor does not fulfil his obligations, expectation damages, increasing as reliance investments increase, will include his reliance investments as well. This advantage taken by the promisee creates inefficiency because it makes the breach of the contract more costly for the promisor and puts on the breaching party the cost of reliance even when the reliance investments of the promisee are socially inefficient. A way to avoid this obstacle is to parameter the amount of damages due by the breaching party not to the actual investments undertaken by the promisee but to an abstract level of reasonable reliance that is socially optimal. In other words, it is necessary to impose a constraint on marginal damages, as to avoid increasing of damages as reliance investments themselves increase. In this way, the amount of damages paid by the promisor would be the same both in case of overreliance (that is when the promisee invests too much) and of underreliance (that is when the promisee invests in reliance less than the optimal level). The entire risk of overreliance would be borne by the promisee. The rule that could be invoked to introduce the parameter of reasonable reliance into the computing of expectation damages is the so-called mitigation rule. Art. 77 CISG, like many other laws on contractual damages, states that if a party breaches the contract, the other party must take such measures as are reasonable in the circumstances in order to mitigate the losses resulting from the breach. If the non-breaching party fails to take such measures, the amount of damages due by the other party may be reduced. Such a rule could be interpreted as a duty to mitigate not only the damages that come from the breach, but also the damages that over-reliant conduct can create before the breach has occurred. In this way, a constraint on marginal damages would be imposed and expectation damages would be limited to a parameter of abstract and reasonable reliance.44 The promisee, however, has always the possibility to subjectivise what is to be considered reasonable reliance, for example informing the other party about his intention of undertaking special investments while he is awaiting the promisor’s performance. Note that since the two parties have already entered into negotiations, transaction costs in this case will be very low. In this way, what is subjectively reasonable for the promisee becomes foreseeable for the promisor at the time of the conclusion of the contract (Art. 74 CISG). 44
Parisi/Cenini (op. cit. fn. 20), 234 et seq.
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G. Forseeability of Loss as a Limit on Liability: The Contemplation Rule as a Penalty Default The last aspect, considered at the end of the previous paragraph, introduces the problem of the so-called information-forcing default rules. From an opposite point of view to what was considered above, the contemplation rule (Art. 74 CISG) can be seen as a way to force the promisee to reveal information in his possession in order to obtain, when the promisor fails to perform, a fully compensatory amount of damages. In a famous article, Ayres and Gertner45 introduced the concept of “penalty default” as the default rules that – contrary to the traditional function of default rules to provide the rule the parties would have chosen if they had bargained it – are instead set at what the parties would not want, in order to give at least one party an incentive to contract around the default rule and to reveal information to the other party or to third party (especially courts).46 Penalty defaults are appropriate when it is cheaper for the parties to negotiate a term ex ante than for the courts to estimate ex post what the parties would have wanted. When the rationale is to inform the relatively uninformed contracting party, the penalty default will be against the relatively well-informed party. Regarding damages to be paid by the breaching party, the informed party is the promisee, who is the only person who exactly knows how much a breach of contract could affect his interests and can foresee the predictable amount of damages. In this context, the contemplation rule operates as a penalty default. The promisee has to tell the other party of all the potential consequential damages, otherwise he runs the risk of being awarded an amount of damages insufficient, with regards to the amount of damages foreseeable for the promisor. Under Art. 74 CISG, like under other similar rules in Civil and Common Law traditions, the liability to pay damages is limited to the loss that the party in breach foresaw or ought to have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract, in light of the circumstances of which he then knew or ought to have known.
45
46
Ayres/Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L. J. (1989), 87. Contracts are necessarily incomplete and the basic reason for this being the costs of contracting. If transaction costs are greater than the benefits of contracting, parties will prefer not to bargain. Lawmakers can minimise the cost of contracting by choosing the default rule most parties would have wanted. Ayres and Gertner (op. cit. fn. 46), 91, instead, show that sometimes it may be efficient to choose a rule that a majority of people actually disfavour in order to induce parties to contract around the default rule.
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As Ayres and Gertner47 underline, the contemplation rule may not be consistent with what fully-informed parties would have wanted, and in particular cases the promisor may even be the more-efficient bearer of the risk. The function of the contemplation rule is instead to induce the promisee as the more-informed party to reveal the information regarding his potential loss to the promisor. Informing the latter creates value because it makes him able to prevent the loss more efficiently. The contractual price will be sensitive to the information exchanged, increasing as the amount of damage foreseen increases, but the promisee with high consequential damages will usually prefer to reveal his private information and pay more for the performance than face the risk of being undercompensated.
H. Defence of Non-performance Chapter V of the Convention governs the disturbances of the contract that may occur prior to performance. Art. 71 CISG provides the so-called defence of non-performance, stating that a party may suspend the performance of his obligation if, after the conclusion of the contract, it becomes apparent that the other party will not perform a substantial part of his obligations. Art. 72 CISG instead governs the so-called anticipatory breach of contract and provides a remedy that is available even before the obligation becomes due, offering protection against a future breach of contract. Art. 71 CISG provides a temporary remedy of suspension of performance; Art. 72 CISG gives the promisee the right to declare the contract void. The defence of non-performance has recently been studied from an economic perspective.48 In particular, its efficiency has been analysed with regard to contracts with mutual obligations i.e. contracts in which each party is – at the same time – the promisor of his performance and the promisee of the other party’s counter-performance and each performance is able to create a surplus for the other party. Both parties undertake efforts to fulfil their performance and invest in reliance of the other party’s counter-performance. A contract of sale is usually considered an agreement that creates surplus only for the buyer who receives the good and can, for example, resell it, since the obligation of buyer (payment of the price) is considered not able to create surplus for the seller: the value of monetary price is usually deemed equal for both parties. However, as one is speaking of an international contract that can involve a considerable amount of money, one can consider a scenario where the seller actually expects to gain a benefit from the other contractual party’s obligation, for example taking advantage of the favourable exchange of cur47 48
Ayres/Gertner (op. cit. fn. 46), 101-102. Fon/Parisi (op. cit. fn. 20), 1 et seq.
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rency paid by the buyer or thinking of reinvesting the money in other profitable activities (or for both motives). In these cases, one can consider even a traditional contract of sale as a contract able to create surplus for both parties, which, as is about to be analysed, can affect the efficiency of some remedies. Fon and Parisi in their recent study49 have shown that when contracts are characterised by mutual obligations, the defence of non-performance creates a distortion of the parties’ incentive, leading to an increase in performance efforts and a decrease in reliance investments. This is because the defence of non-performance creates a double threat: the breaching party not only faces full liability for having failed to perform (that is, he will have to pay expectation damages to the non-breaching party) but also risks losing the benefit of his counter-performance. This further risk increases the cost of breach. Consequently, as has already been seen in the previous paragraph, the increase of the cost of breach will lead the promisor to undertake too many investments to deal with his performance. Since the contract is bilateral, both parties will face the risk of having to pay expectation damages plus the risk of losing the surplus, and the incentives of both parties will be distorted, leading to an excessive level of performance effort. The magnitude of these distortions depends on the parties’ expectations regarding their contractual counterpart’s use of the defence of non-performance and in particular on factors such as the presence of contract-specific investments, uncertainty in contract litigation, and opportunity to redeploy withheld performances.50 When bilateral contracts are at stake, the breaching party should be allowed not only to collect damages if his counterpart was also in breach, but also to force the performance of his non-breaching counterpart, who should be prevented from raising the defence of non-performance. This remedy could be deemed preferable as it avoids the breaching party, who has undertaken investments in reliance of the other party’s counter-performance, losing the surplus that he could have gained from the party’s performance.51
I.
Conclusion
The CISG has created a valuable system of risk and incentive allocation for international trade that in many ways reflects the predicaments of an economic analysis of law. Considering the CISG’s policies of contract formation, legal warranties, and expectation damages, the CISG generally balances incentives and optimal risk allocation, to maximise the value of transactions to prospective traders. 49 50
51
Fon/Parisi (op. cit. fn. 20), 11 et seq. Reliance incentives also are distorted by threats of the application of the defence of non-performance, albeit less severely. See also Parisi/Cenini (op. cit. fn. 20), 231.
Homeward Trend: What, Why and Why Not Franco Ferrari
A. Autonomous Interpretation v. Homeward Trend? It is common knowledge, and has been for some time,1 that “drafting uniform words is one thing; ensuring their uniformity is another”,2 since “even when outward uniformity is achieved (…), uniform application of the agreed rules is by no means guaranteed, as in practice different countries almost inevitably come to put different interpretations upon the same enacted words.”3 In order to reduce the 1
2
3
See Riese, Einheitliche Gerichtsbarkeit für vereinheitlichtes Recht, Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht (RabelsZ) 1961, 604, 607 et seq.; Zweigert, Die Rechtsvergleichung im Dienste der europäischen Rechtsvereinheitlichung, RabelsZ 1951, 387, 395. Andersen, The Uniform International Sales Law and the Global Jurisconsultorium, (2005) 24 Journal of Law and Commerce (J. L. & Com.), 159, 162; see also Martiny, Autonome und einheitliche Auslegung im Europäischen Zivilprozeßrecht, RabelsZ 1981, 427; McMahon, Differentiating between Internal and External Gaps in the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: A Proposed Method for Determining “Governed by” in the Context of Article 7(2), (2006) 44 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (Colum. J Transnat’l L.), 992, 999; Rudolf, Einheitsrecht für internationale Forderungsabtretungen, Tübingen 2006, 11; Ryan, The Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Divergent Interpretations, (1995) 4 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law (Tul. J. Int’l & Comp. L.), 99, 101; Sturley, International Uniform Law in National Courts: The Influence of Domestic Law in Conflicts of Interpretation, (1989) 27 Virginia Journal of International Law (Va. J. Int’l L.), 729, 731. Munday, The Uniform Interpretation of International Conventions, (1978) 27 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (ICLQ), 450. For similar statements, see more recently, Andersen, Furthering the Uniform Application of the CISG Sources of Law on the Internet, (1998) 10 Pace International Law Review (Pace Int’l L. Rev.), 403, 404 (stating that “uniformity does not follow automatically from a proclamation of uniform rules. Uniformity is a difficult goal to achieve, as uniform words do not always ensure uniform results, especially where a Convention is in effect throughout countries with completely differing social, economic, and cultural back-
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risk of diverging interpretations of one and the same text,4 that text must also be interpreted in a uniform way, since, as stated, for instance, by Viscount Simonds on behalf of the House of Lords in Scruttons Ltd. v. Midland Silicones Ltd.,5 “it would be deplorable if the nations should, after protracted negotiations, reach agreement (…) and that their several courts should then disagree as to the meaning of what they appeared to agree upon”.6 The drafters of the 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,7 hereinafter: CISG,8 were aware of this problem, which is why they introduced a provision designed to help to reach the uniformity aimed at, by imposing that in interpreting the CISG “regard is to be had to its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith in international trade.”9 The same is also true for the drafters of other uniform law conventions, such as the 1980 Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations10 and the 1988 UNIDROIT Conventions on International Factoring and International Financial Leasing.11
14
15 16 17 18
19 10
11
grounds, and perhaps most significantly, different legal systems”); Duncan, Nachfrist was Ist? Thinking Globally and Acting Locally: Considering Time Extension Principles of the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods in Revising the Uniform Commercial Code, (2000) Brigham Young Law Review (B.Y. L. Rev.), 1363, 1368 (stating the same). It has often been stated that it is only possible to reduce the danger of diverging interpretations; it is not possible to eliminate it as such; see e.g. Lookofsky, Consequential Damages in Comparative Context, Copenhagen 1989, 294. Scruttons Ltd. v. Midland Silicones Ltd., [1962] A.C. 446, 471. For similar statements see Ferrari, La vendita internazionale. Applicabilità ed applicazioni della Convenzione di Vienna del 1980, 2nd ed., Padua 2006, 10 et seq. See the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, reprinted in (1980) 19 International Legal Materials (ILM), 668 et seq. Many abbreviations have been used for the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods; for a court decision listing several ones, see Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt, 20.4.1994, available in English at: http://www. cisg-online.ch/cisg/urteile/125.htm. For an overview in legal writing of the various abbreviations, see Flessner/Kadner, CISG? Zur Suche nach einer Abkürzung für das Wiener Übereinkommen über Verträge über den internationalen Warenkauf, Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht (ZEuP) 2005, 347 et seq. Art. 7(1) CISG. See Art. 18 of the EEC Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, reprinted in (1980) 19 ILM, 1492, 1496. See Art. 4 of the UNIDROIT Convention on International Factoring, reprinted in (1988) 27 ILM, 943, 945; Art. 6 of the UNIDROIT Convention on International Financial Leasing, reprinted in (1988) 27 ILM, 931, 933.
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Many courts12 and commentators13 construe the reference to the obligation to have regard to the CISG’s “international character” in its interpretation to mean that the CISG is to be interpreted “autonomously”,14 not “na12
13
14
See e.g. Tribunale di Modena, 9.12.2005, available at: http://www.cisg-online.ch/ cisg/urteile/1398.pdf; Oberster Gerichtshof, 23.5.2005, available in English at: http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050523a3.html; Bundesgerichtshof, 2.3.2005, available in English at: http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050302g1.html; Tribunale di Padova, 11.1.2005, available at: http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1& do=case&id=1005&step=FullText; Tribunale di Padova, 25.2.2004, available in English at: http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040225i3.html; Audiencia Provincial de Valencia, 7.6.2003, available in English at: http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/ 030607s4.html; Handelsgericht Aargau, 26.9.1997, available in English at: http:// cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970926s1.html; Gerichtspräsident Laufen, 7.5.1993, available in English at: http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/930507s1.html. See e.g. Audit, La vente internationale de marchandises, Paris, 1990, 47; Bonell, La nouvelle Convention des Nations-Unies sur les contrats de vente internationale de merchandises, Droit et pratique du commerce international (Dr. pr. comm. int.) 1981, 7, 14; Diedrich, Maintaining Uniformity in International Uniform Law via Autonomous Interpretation: Software Contracts under the CISG, (1996) 8 Pace International Law Review (Pace Int’l L. Rev.), 303; Ferrari, Interprétation uniforme de la Convention de Vienne de 1980 sur la vente internationale, Revue internationale de droit comparé (Rev. int. dr. comp.) 1996, 813, 827; Hager, Zur Auslegung des UN-Kaufrechts – Grundsätze und Methoden, in: Baums/Wertenbruch (eds.), Festschrift für Ulrich Huber zum siebzigsten Geburtstag, Tübingen 2006, 319, 320; Karollus, UN-Kaufrecht. Eine systematische Darstellung für Studium und Praxis, Vienna/New York 1991, 11; Magnus, in: Staudinger, Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch mit Einführungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen – Wiener UN-Kaufrecht (CISG), revised ed., Berlin 2005, 171; Najork, Treu und Glauben im CISG, Bonn 2000, 53; Schmitt, “Intangible Goods“ in Online-Kaufverträgen und der Anwendungsberich des CISG, Computer und Recht (CuR) 2001, 145, 147. See, among others, Achilles, Kommentar zum UN-Kaufrechtsübereinkommen (CISG), Neuwied 2000, 28; Bonell, Commento all’art. 7 della Convenzione di Vienna, Nuove Leggi civili commentate (Nuove Leggi civ. comm.), Padua 1989, 21; Felemegas, The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Article 7 and Uniform Interpretation, Review of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) (Rev. CISG) 2000/2001, 115, 235; Hackney, Is the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods Achieving Uniformity?, (2001) 61 Lousiana Law Review (La. L. Rev.), 473, 475; Jametti Greiner, Der Vertragsabschluss, in: Hoyer/Posch (eds.), Das Einheitliche Wiener Kaufrecht, Vienna 1992, 43, 57; Liguori, La convenzione di Vienna sulla vendita internazionale di beni mobili nella pratica: un’analisi critica delle prime cento decisioni, Foro italiano (Foro it.)
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tionalistically”, i.e. not in the light of domestic law,15 as difficult as this may be.16 Consequently, one should not have recourse to any domestic concept in order to solve interpretive problems arising from the CISG,17 as also
15
16
17
1996, 145, 148; Saenger, in: Ferrari et al. (eds.), Internationales Vertragsrecht, Munich 2007, Art. 7 CISG no. 2; Torsello, Common Features of Uniform Commercial Law Conventions. A Comparative Study Beyond the 1980 Uniform Sales Law, Munich 2004, 18; Vazquez Lepinette, The Interpretation of the 1980 Vienna Convention on International Sales, Diritto del commercio internazionale (Dir. comm. internaz.) 1995, 377, 387. See Honnold, The Sales Convention in Action – Uniform International Words: Uniform Applications?, (1988) 8 J. L. & Com., 207, 208, where the author states that “one threat to international uniformity in interpretation is a natural tendency to read the international text through the lenses of domestic law”. See also Babiak, Defining “Fundamental Breach” under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, (1992) 6 Temple International Law Journal (Temple Int’l & Comp. L. J.), 113, 117; Kolosky, Beyond Partisan Policy: The Eleventh Circuit Lays Aside the Parol Evidence Rule in Pursuit of International Uniformity in Commercial Regulation, (1998) 24 North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation (N. C. J. Int. L. & Com. Reg.), 199, 200; Komarov, Internationality, Uniformity and Observance of Good Faith as Criteria in Interpretation of CISG: Some Remarks on Article 7(1), (2006) 25 J. L. & Com., 75, 77; Schlechtriem, Internationales UN-Kaufrecht, 4th ed., Tübingen 2007, 45. In this respect see Murray, The Neglect of CISG: A Workable Solution, (1998) 17 J. L. & Com., 365, 367, stating that for a court it certainly is difficult to “transcend its domestic perspective and become a different court that is no longer influenced by the law of its own nation state”; more recently see DiMatteo et al., The Interpretive Turn in International Sales Law: An Analysis of Fifteen Years of CISG Jurisprudence, (2004) 24 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business (Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus.), 299, 303. See also Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales under the United Nations Convention, 3rd ed., Deventer 1999, 89, stating that “the reading of a legal text in the light of the concepts of our domestic legal system [is] an approach that would violate the requirement that the Convention be interpreted with regard to its international character.” For similar statements, albeit without particular reference to the CISG, Bernstein, International Contracts in European Courts: Jurisdiction under Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention, (1996) 11 Tulane European and Civil Law Forum (Tul. Eur. & Civ. L. Forum), 31, 36. For a similar statement in case law, see, albeit without specific reference to the CISG, Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines, [1980] 2 All E. R. 696; Corte di Cassazione, 24.6.1968, Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale (Riv. dir. int. priv. e proc.) 1969, 914.
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stated in a recent Swiss court decision,18 since this “nationalistic approach”19 would not only lead to divergences, but, ultimately, to the promotion of forum shopping,20 which, however, the CISG wants to reduce.21 Many commentators have argued that what has just been said is true even where the expressions employed by the CISG (or by other uniform law conventions, for that matter)22 are textually the same as expressions which relate to concepts that have a specific meaning within a particular domestic legal system – such as “avoidance”, “reasonable”, “good faith”, etc.23 In ef18
19 20
21
22
23
See the decision by the Gerichtspräsident Laufen, 7.5.1993, available in English at: http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/930507s1.html. For this expression see Bonell (op. cit. fn. 13), 14. The danger of forum shopping as a result of diverging interpretations by courts from different countries has also been referred to by Honnold (op. cit. fn. 17), 95, where the author states that “[t]he settlement of disputes would be complicated and litigants would be encouraged to engage in forum shopping if the courts of different countries persist in divergent interpretations of the Convention.” For a reference to the CISG’s goal of reducing forum shopping, see e.g. Burkart, Interpretatives Zusammenwirken von CISG und UNIDROIT Principles, BadenBaden 2000, 8; De Ly, Opting out: some Observations on the Occasion of the CISG’s 25th anniversary, in: Ferrari (ed.), Quo Vadis CISG? Celebrating the 25th anniversary of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Munich 2005, 25, 37; Dore, Choice of Law under the International Sales Convention: A U.S. Perspective, (1983) 77 American Journal of International Law (Am. J. Int’l L.), 521, 532; Erauw, Wanneer is het Weens Koopverdrag van toepassing?, in: van Houtte et al. (eds.), Het Weens Koopverdrag, Antwerp/Groningen 1997, 21, 23; Klepper, The Convention for the International Sale of Goods: A Practical Guide for the State of Maryland and Its Trade Community, (1991) 15 Maryland Journal of International Law and Trade (Md. J. Int’l L. & Trade), 235, 237; Sambugaro, Exclusion of the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention: Does Recent US Case Law Open the Door to Forum Shopping?, Internationales Handelsrecht (IHR) 2007, 231, 236. For a discussion of the interpretation of uniform law conventions in general (as opposed to a discussion of the interpretation of the CISG), see Bariatti, L’interpetazione delle convenzioni internazionali di diritto uniforme, Padua 1986; Trompenaars, Pluriforme unificatie en uniforme interpretatie − in het bijzonder de bijdrage van UNCITRAL aan de internationale unificatie van het privaatrecht, Deventer 1989. Note, however, that according to Salama, Pragmatic Responses to Interpretive Impediments: Article 7 of the CISG, An Inter-American Application, (2006) 28 University of Miami Inter-American Law Review (U. Mia. Int-Am. L. Rev.), 225, 232, “a methodological approach that discounts the use of analogies to domestic legal concepts seems impractical if not impossible. In particular, a judge looking to interpret a provision needs some frame of reference to assist in understanding that provision.”
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fect, those expressions refer to concepts that are independent24 and different25 from national concepts,26 since the expressions employed in uniform law conventions such as the CISG are intended to be neutral.27 This appears to be a basic principle of international uniform law28 resulting, among others, from the assumption that international uniform law “does not want to
24
25
26
27
28
For this conclusion, see also Herber/Czerwenka, Internationales Kaufrecht. Kommentar zu dem Übereinkommen der Vereinten Nationen vom 11. April 1980 über Verträge über den internationalen Warenkauf, Munich 1991, 47. For somewhat different conclusions, see however, van der Velden, Indications of the Interpretation by Dutch Courts of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, in: Hondius et al. (eds.), Netherlands Reports to the Twelfth International Congress of Comparative Law: Sydney-Melbourne 1986, Deventer 1987, 21, 33-34 (stating that where the source of uniform law is to be found in a specific national law, recourse to a domestic interpretation is a logical aid to the interpretation of the uniform law); Mann, Uniform Statutes in English Law, (1983) 99 Law Quarterly Review (LQR), 376, 383 (stating that “[i]t is simply common sense that if the Convention adopts a phrase which appears to have been taken from one legal system [...] where it is used in a specific sense, the international legislators are likely to have had that sense in mind and to intend its introduction into the Convention”). See Ferrari, The Relationship Between the UCC and the CISG and the Construction of Uniform Law, (1996) 29 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review (Loy. LA L. Rev.), 1021, 1026. For this statement, see also Lanciotti, Norme uniformi di conflitto e materiali nella disciplina convenzionale della compravendita, Naples 1992, 287. The presumed neutrality of the language employed by the drafters of the CISG has been referred to, e.g. Bonell, Art. 7, in: Bianca/Bonell (eds.), Commentary on the International Sales Law, Milan 1987, 65, 74 (“[w]hen drafting the single provisions these experts had to find sufficiently neutral language on which they could reach a common understanding”); for similar statements, see, more recently, Bridge, A Law of International Sale of Goods, (2007) 37 Hong Kong Law Journal (Hong Kong L. J.), 17, 40; Butler, Celebrating Anniversaries, (2005) 37 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review (Vict. U. Wellington L. Rev.), 775, 777; Spaic, Approaching Uniformity in International Sales Law Through Autonomous Interpretation, (2007) 11 V. J. Int’l Com. L. & Arb., 237, 242 et seq.; Zeller, International Trade Law – Problems of Language and Concepts?, (2003) 23 J. L. & Com., 39, 39; see also the statement by UNCITRAL itself to be found in U.N. document A/CN.9/562, at page 1: “The drafters of the Convention took special care in avoiding the use of legal concepts typical of a given legal tradition”. See e.g. Kropholler, Internationales Einheitsrecht. Allgemeine Lehren, Tübingen 1975, 265.
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identify itself with any legal system, because it wants to conjugate with all”.29 Indeed, any choice of one expression rather than another is the result of a compromise30 and does generally not correspond to the reception of a concept peculiar to a specific domestic law:31 the interpreter must therefore be aware of so-called faux-amis.32 Where, however, it is apparent from the legislative history that the drafters wanted a given concept to be interpreted in the light of a specific domestic law, one is allowed to have recourse to the “domestic” understanding of that concept.33 Unfortunately, however, courts do not seem to always comply with the aforementioned mandate to interpret the CISG autonomously, nor do they seem to resort to “nationalistic” interpretations only where they are justified by the legislative history to do so. In effect, a closer look at some decisions allows one to state that a “homeward trend” is discernible, at least by some courts. This trend is deplorable, however, as it promotes parochialism34 and
29
30
31
32 33
34
Benedetti, Commento all’art. 4 della Convenzione di Vienna sui contratti di vendita internazionale di beni mobili, Nuove Leggi civili commentate (Nuove Leggi civ. comm.) 1989, 9. Diedrich (op. cit. fn. 13), 310, even states that “the text of the CISG consists of unique, supranational collective terms formed out of compromises between state delegates based on several systems of laws.” For further statements stressing that the CISG constitutes a compromise, see Diederichsen, Commentary to Journal of Law & Commerce Case I, Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt, (1995) 14 J. L. & Com., 177; Ferrari, Uniform Interpretation of the 1980 Uniform Sales Law, (1994) 24 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law (Ga. J. Int’l & Com. L.), 183, 201; Koneru, The International Interpretation of the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: An Approach Based on General Principles, (1997) 6 Minnesota Journal of Global Trade (Mn. J. Global Trade), 105; Salama (op. cit. fn. 23), 232; Selden, Lex Mercatoria in European and U.S. Trade Practice: Time to Take a Closer Look, (1995) 2 Annual Survey of International and Comparative Law (Ann. Surv. Int’l & Comp. L.), 111, 121. See also Enderlein et al. (eds.), Internationales Kaufrecht: Kaufrechtskonvention. Verjährungskonvention. Vertretungskonvention. Rechtsanwendungskonvention, Berlin 1991, 61; Herber, Art. 7, in: Schlechtriem (ed.), Kommentar zum Einheitlichen UN-Kaufrecht, 2nd ed., Munich 1995, 91, 94. See Honnold (op. cit. fn. 17), 89. For this conclusion, see Achilles (op. cit. fn. 14), 29; Ferrari, Art. 7, in: Schlechtriem/Schwenzer (eds.), Kommentar zum Einheitlichen UN-Kaufrecht – CISG, 4th ed., Munich 2004, 138, 142; Magnus (op. cit. fn. 13), 171. See Rockwell, Choice of Law in International Products Liability: Internationalizing the Choice, (1992-1993) 16 Suffolk Transnational Law Review (Suffolk Transnat’l L. Rev.), 69, 74.
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thus defeats the very purpose behind the drafting of the CISG,35 namely the creation of a uniform sales law,36 aimed at the creation of legal certainty, and at “the removal of legal barriers in international trade”.37 In effect, the homeward trend “deprives the collective signatories of the predictability and reliability of law which the CISG was meant to create. In order for the CISG to truly live up to the purpose for which it was created, interpreting courts must stay within the strict boundaries of Art. 7.”38 This is why it is rather surprising that one commentator suggests not only that the “categorical condemnation of the homeward trend is unwarranted”,39 but also that “[t]he homeward trend may (…) enhance the legitimacy and acceptability of the CISG over the long term.”40 In this author’s opinion, this view is not tenable. As regards the suggestion that the homeward trend enhances the CISG’s legitimacy, it seems to overlook that the CISG’s legitimacy is derived from the wide acceptance it enjoys41 due to the goal it pursues, namely the creation of a uniform sales law able to break down the obstacles to international import/export constituted by the plethora of existing legal regimes,42 a goal that can only be achieved by applying the CISG in one and the same manner in the various Contracting States.43 35
36
37 38
39
40 41
42
See Diedrich (op. cit. fn. 13), 304 (stating that the homeward trend “puts a uniform application of International Uniform Law at risk”); Tuggey, The 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Will a Homeward Trend Emerge, (1985-1986) 21 Texas International Law Journal (Tex. Intl L. J.), 540, 554 (stating that “[i]f such a [homeward] trend emerges and remains uncorrected it would defeat the purposes of the CISG in a manner equal to a simple failure on the part of many nations to ratify the Convention”). In this respect see e.g. Malloy, The Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International Contracts: Another Piece of the Puzzle of the Law Applicable to International Contracts, (1995) 19 Fordham International Law Journal (Fordham Int’l L. J.), 662, 667 note 17. Preamble CISG. Larson, Applying Uniform Sales Law to International Software Transactions: The Use of the CISG, its Shortcomings, and a Comparative Look at How the Proposed U.C.C. Article 2B Would Remedy Them, (1996) 5 Tul. J. Int’l & Comp. L., 445, 459. Halverson Cross, Parole Evidence Under the CISG: The “Homeward Trend” Reconsidered, (2007) 68 Ohio State Law Journal (Ohio St. L. J.), 133, 138. Halverson Cross (op. cit. fn. 39), 138. See Bridge, A Comment on “Towards a Universal Doctrine of Breach” – The Impact of the CISG by Jürgen Basedow, (2005) 25 International Review of Law and Economics (Int’l Rev. L. & Econ.), 501. Legitimising the CISG on different grounds, see Gillette/Scott, The Political Economy of International Sales, (2005) 25 International Review of Law and Economics (Int’l Rev. L. & Econ.), 446, 447 et seq.
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As for the suggestion that the homeward trend enhances the CISG’s applicability by preventing the parties from the countries43in the courts of which the homeward trend is discernible from opting-out,44 it does not take due account, among others, of the fact that those parties’ reliance upon the homeward trend is justified only where the dispute is to be decided by the courts of the countries in which they are located.45 This, however, would (generally) require the opposing parties to agree with the former parties’ choice of forum which, however, they are not necessarily willing to do, for different reasons: either, because they want their own courts’ domestic interpretation of the CISG to apply, where it exists (thus leading to a battle of homeward trends), or simply because they do not want the opposing party to be able to rely on its “domestic” interpretation, since this would give that party a competitive advantage. As a consequence, a conflict may arise that may ultimately be solved solely by excluding the CISG altogether46 (which certainly does nothing to enhance the CISG’s applicability). For sure, however, this conflict creates unpredictability;47 this cannot be advocated. The aforementioned suggestion does not take into account either that the homeward trend prevents the CISG from functioning as a neutral law to which to resort when the parties want to avoid the applicability of the domestic law of the opposing party,48 thus limiting, rather than promoting, the CISG’s applicability. 43
44
45
46
47
48
See also Povrzenic, Interpretation and Gap-Filling under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, available at: http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/gap-fill.html. See Halverson Cross (op. cit. fn. 39), 138, stating that “the propensity of U.S. courts to interpret the Convention in light of domestic legal traditions may ameliorate the tendency of U.S. parties to opt-out of the CISG.” For a recent analysis of the relationship between the CISG and choice of forum, see Ferrari, Choice of Forum and CISG; Remarks on the Latter’s Impact on the Former, in: Brand et al. (eds.), Drafting Contracts Under the CISG, Oxford 2007, 103 et seq. See also Gillette/Scott (op. cit. fn. 41), 454 stating that “[i]f the problem solving objective of a uniform [International Sales Law] is not met, therefore, the product will be linguistically uniform upon enactment, but the parties subsequently will either abandon the law entirely or opt-out of disfavored provisions thus undermining even the i